

64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCEEAJ322  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 3463

FROM WALT ROSTOV  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82185

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 27, 1968

IF, AS HARRY MCPHERSON RECOMMENDS, YOU DROP THE PASSAGE ON BOMBING AND CONFINE YOURSELF TO MORE GENERAL STATEMENTS, YOU COULD DROP THE THREE PARAGRAPHS AFTER THE WORDS "WE WOULD FIGHT" AND THEN ADD AFTER THE PHRASE "MY VOICE CAN BE HEARD" THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTARY PASSAGE:

"THERE CAN BE NO STABLE PEACE UNLESS AGGRESSION IS RESISTED; BUT RESISTING AGGRESSION IS NOT ENOUGH. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE WORKED WITH OTHERS:

- "-- TO ASSIST THE DEVELOPING NATIONS;
- "-- TO BUILD STURDY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA, AND ASIA;
- "-- TO MAINTAIN RATIONAL WORLD POLICIES IN THE FIELDS OF TRADE AND MONEY;
- "-- AND TO TAME AND CONTROL THE NUCLEAR DANGER THAT STILL THREATENS HUMANITY."

SEC. RUSK AND I FELT THERE WAS SOME MERIT IN A BRIEF, CONSTRUCTIVE STATEMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY TO BALANCE WHAT YOU HAD TO SAY ABOUT AGGRESSION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 271853Z AUG 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

TO BE AN ADMINIST  
FILED PER E.O. 1  
AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO  
16, 1983  
BY sg ON 11-10-92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

65

1968 AUG 27 17 05

68 AUG 27 PM 1:09

TUESDAY  
*Free file*

EEA317  
OO WTE18  
DE WTE 3458

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82181

~~CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY~~

SECRETARY RUSK AND I HAVE CONFERRED ON THE LATEST DRAFT SPEECH AND HAVE THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS.

AFTER "CRUSH A PEOPLES' FIRST STEPS TOWARD FREEDOM" ADD --  
"STEPS WHICH THREATENED THE SECURITY OF NO OTHER NATION."

FOR SENTENCE BEGINNING "OUR FIDELITY IS WRITTEN" SUBSTITUTE --  
"OUR FIDELITY IS RECORDED IN MANY A CRISIS AND IN THE SACRIFICES  
OUR SONS HAVE MADE ON THE BATTLEFIELDS IN KOREA AND VIETNAM."

FOR PARAGRAPH BEGINNING "THOSE WHO CARRY THE BURDEN"  
SUBSTITUTE -- "IT IS MY JUDGMENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF -- ON THE  
BASIS OF ALL THE EVIDENCE -- INCLUDING THE ASSESSMENT OF THOSE  
WHO CARRY THE BURDEN ON THE BATTLEFIELD -- THAT A UNILATERAL  
BOMBING HALT AT THIS TIME WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE  
ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES; INCREASE OUR CASUALTIES AND THOSE OF OUR  
ALLIES; AND ENDANGER OUR POSITIONS, PARTICULARLY IN STRATEGIC  
AREAS OF I CORPS."

REASON FOR ABOVE: THE PRESIDENT MAKES HIS ASSESSMENT NOT  
MERELY ON THE BASIS OF THE JUDGMENT OF FIELD COMMANDERS, BUT  
ON THE BASIS OF ALL OTHER INFORMATION AND ADVICE; ALSO,  
WE ARE STAFFING OUT ABRAMS' LAST MESSAGE IN RESPONSE TO OUR  
QUESTIONS, AND THERE IS SOME DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE AGREED  
THAT THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES AT THE DMZ WOULD INCREASE "SEVERAL  
FOLD."

FINALLY, INSERT AT "1930'S": "IN THE 1940'S."

DIG: 271636Z AUG 68

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MESSAGE. CANCELLED. RET. BY  
GSC 13 AND ARCHIVIST'S  
MAR 16, 1983.

BY 18 ON 11-10-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

ARX FROM QUOTE COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

66  
Aug. 27, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk and I have conferred on the latest draft speech and have the following suggestions.

After "crush a peoples' first steps toward freedom" ADD --  
"steps which threatened the security of no other nation. "

For sentence beginning "Our fidelity is written" SUBSTITUTE --  
"Our fidelity is recorded in many a crisis and in the sacrifices our sons have made on the battlefields in Korea and Vietnam. "

For paragraph beginning "Those who carry the burden" SUBSTITUTE --  
"It is my judgment as Commander in Chief -- on the basis of all the evidence -- including the assessment of those who carry the burden on the battlefield -- that a unilateral bombing halt at this time would substantially increase the enemy's capabilities; increase our casualties and those of our allies; and endanger our positions, particularly in strategic areas of I Corps. "

Reason for above: The President makes his assessment not merely on the basis of the judgment of field commanders, but on the basis of all other information and advice; also, we are staffing out Abrams' last message in response to our questions, and there is some doubt that it would be agreed that the enemy's capabilities at the DMZ would increase "several fold. "

Finally, insert after "1930's": "in the 1940's. "

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY 18 ON 11-10-92

Tuesday, August 27, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Harold Linder will be leaving on September 9 to take up his new post as our Ambassador to Canada. State recommends an appointment with you before he leaves.

*Pres file*

I believe a meeting with you would be very helpful.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange meeting  
with Linder \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*WR*  
ERF:mm



1968 AUG 27 15

68

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-162  
By iso, NARA Date 9-8-97

VZCZCEEA315  
OO WTE18  
DE WTE 3453

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE CAP82177

~~SECRET~~

free file  
TUESDAY  
68 AUG 27 AM 11:39

AUGUST 27, 1968 10:00 A.M.

SUBJECT: CZECH-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE AND GENERAL SITUATION

THE CZECH-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE HAS JUST BEEN PUBLISHED IN MOSCOW. IT CALLS FOR THE GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPYING TROOPS -- AS THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY IS NORMALIZED. SOVIET TROOPS ARE NOT TO INTERFERE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS (AND APPARENTLY ARE WITHDRAWING FROM THE CENTER OF PRAGUE). THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO SAID CZECH LEADERS HAD "EXPLAINED" HOW THEY WERE STRENGTHENING THE LEADING ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND SOCIALIST INSTITUTIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. WHILE THIS IS NOT EXPLICIT, WHAT IS PROBABLY REFERRED TO IS A CZECH ASSURANCE THAT NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO MOVE OUT ON TO THE POLITICAL SCENE. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE CZECHS HAVE AGREED TO IMPOSE SOME SORT OF CENSORSHIP TO PROTECT THE WARSAW PACT ALLIES FROM ATTACK AND THE PUBLICATION OF UNPALATABLE TRUTHS. CZECHOSLOVAKIA REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE WARSAW PACT, THE EAST-BLOC ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND THE GENERAL LINES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY--PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS BONN.

PRESERVATION COPY

IN RETURN, THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED THE CONTINUANCE IN OFFICE OF DUBCEK, CERNIK, SMRKOVSKY AND APPARENTLY EVEN CISAR. TO ACCEPT THESE MEN, BRANDED ONLY DAYS AGO AS TRAITORS TO COMMUNISM, REPRESENTS A PAINFUL BACK-DOWN. CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S PROGRESSIVE ACTION PROGRAM IS TO GO FORWARD AND IN MOST AREAS HER CITIZENS' NEWLY WON FREEDOMS CONTINUE.

A CONTINUING INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUGGLE IS LIKELY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PARTY NEWSPAPER, RUDE PRAVO, HAS APPEARED UNDER THE APPARENT EDITORIAL DIRECTION OF ITS CONSERVATIVE-LEANING EDITOR --WHO DISMISSED TWO OF HIS MAIN LIBERAL COLLEAGUES JUST BEFORE THE INVASION. RUDE PRAVO ASSERTS THAT THE EXTRAORDINARY PARTY CONGRESS HELD IN PAST DAYS IN A PRAGUE FACTORY IS INVALID. THERE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE A DRIVE BY THE CONSERVATIVES --AND THEY WILL BE HOPING AND RELYING ON SOVIET SUPPORT--TO RESTORE THE DELICATE BALANCE OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE FORCES THAT PREVAILED IN THE OLD PRESIDUM AND OLD CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THEY WILL BE TRYING TO BUCK ALMOST UNIVERSAL POPULAR SENTIMENT.

IT IS NOT CLEAR--NOT WITHSTANDING THE COMMUNIQUE--WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE REALLY AGREED TO WITHDRAW ALL THEIR TROOPS. THE MOSCOW TALKS OBVIOUSLY HIT A SNAG YESTERDAY, HOLDING UP FINAL AGREEMENT AND THE COMMUNIQUE FOR MANY HOURS DURING THE NIGHT. IT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING IF THIS TROOP ISSUE CAUSED THE DELAY --WITH THE SOVIETS INSISTING ON A CONTINUING PRESENCE AND THE CZECHS PRESENTING MOUNTING EVIDENCE FROM BACK HOME THAT THEIR PARTY, PEOPLE, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT WERE DETERMINED TO DEMAND THAT THE RUSSIANS MUST GO. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT FURTHER TALKS BETWEEN THE RUSSIANS AND CZECHS WILL BE NECESSARY.

THE AGREEMENT REACHED IS UNEASY AND UNSTABLE. IT HAS ELEMENTS VERY DIFFICULT TO SWALLOW ON BOTH SIDES. THE REMARKABLE THING IS THAT CZECH DETERMINATION, COURAGE AND INGENUITY HAVE PRODUCED A REAL COMPROMISE.

~~SECRET~~

DTG 271446Z AUG 68

PRESERVATION COPY



~~SECRET~~

69

EEA314  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE3450

1968 AUG 27 14 57

68 AUG 27 AM 11:00  
TUESDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82176

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

AUGUST 27, 1968

THIS ROMANIAN INITIATIVE IS OMINOUS. WE SHOULD THINK  
HARD ABOUT IT.

USUN 6298

1. CONFIRMING BALL-RUSK TELECON, ROMANIAN CHARGE DUMA TOLD MISSION OFFICIAL AUGUST 26, THAT MANESCU HAD COME TO NEW YORK NOT AS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT BUT RATHER AS ROMANIAN FORMIN; DUMA IMMEDIATELY ADDED, "YOU KNOW SOVIETS ARE MASSING TROOPS ON ROMANIA'S BORDERS." HE SAID MANESCU WILL SEE SECRETARY GENERAL AUG 27 AND MAY GO WASHINGTON TO SEE SECRETARY RUSK.
2. DUMA SAID HE WAS SURE US GOV COULD PREVENT INVASION OF ROMANIA IF IT TOLD SOVIETS THAT THEY HAD GONE FAR ENOUGH. WHEN MISSION OFFICIAL POINTED OUT TO DUMA THAT US COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO THREATEN USSR, DUMA SAID, US SHOULD INTERRUPT ITS POLICY OF DETENTE IN ORDER CONVINCE THE SOVIETS US NOT ACQUIESCING IN PRESENT SOVIET POLICY. DUMA SAID IF ROMANIA GOES, YUGOSLAVIA WOULD BE NEXT ON SOVIET LIST. HE EMPHASIZED THAT ROMANIAN GOV DETERMINED TO FIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST ANY INVASION AND WILL NOT RESTRICT ITSELF TO PASSIVE RESISTANCE.
3. BALL, ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, SEEING MANESCU 12:30 PM AUG 27.

DTG: 271418Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 11-1-01



114-100000-170  
Pres file  
Tuesday, August 27, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a request from the late Chancellor Adenauer's grandson for copies of pictures taken during your condolence call at the Adenauer home in Rhoendorf, Germany.

State recommends you send the pictures. I concur. A draft reply is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

ERF:mm

70a

August 28, 1968

Dear Mr. Adenauer:

I am pleased to send you copies of the photographs you requested in your letter of August 8, 1968.

Please give my cordial regards to all members of the Adenauer family.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:

Photographs

Mr. Konrad Adenauer  
Am Platschhof 3  
Köln - Lindenthal  
Germany

LBJ:ERF:mm

706  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 4026  
R-12/R-16  
German

11378

Konrad Adenauer

Am Platzhof 3  
Köln - Lindenthal, Germany

August 8, 1968

April 25, 1967

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson  
President of the United States of America  
White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Last year you sent to the whole Adenauer family a magnificent album of photographs of your visit in Rhöndorf on the occasion of the funeral of my grandfather, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The album has been placed in the family archives. I should be very happy, and it would be a great honor for me, if you could send some additional photographs, namely those showing you, Mr. President, shaking hands with us grandchildren in front of the house in Rhöndorf, since I appear on one of these pictures with you. A picture with you would be a wonderful memento.

Trusting that you will be able to grant my wish, I remain, with the highest esteem and my best wishes to you and your family.

Faithfully yours,

[signed:] Konrad Adenauer

RECEIVED  
AUG 14 1968  
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE



EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

68 AUG 26 PM 7:46

MONDAY

299  
EEA399  
OO WTE18  
DE WTE3433

1968 AUG 26 23 35

FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP82163

~~SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY

AUGUST 26, 1968

HEREWITH ADDITIONAL POINTS COVERED IN SECRETARY'S CON-  
VERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, AUGUST 23, 1968

*Pres file*

THE SECRETARY REFERRED TO THE STATEMENT AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN HAD MADE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON WHEN INFORMING HIM OF SOVIET ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO THE EFFECT THAT NOTHING WAS CONTEMPLATED WHICH WOULD EFFECT THE VITAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAD NOTED THIS STATEMENT VERY CAREFULLY AND ASSUMED THAT IT WAS MEANT TO BE TAKEN QUITE SERIOUSLY. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS INDEED THE CASE.

AMBASSADOR THOMPSON ASKED DOBRYNIN HOW LONG HE THOUGHT THE JAMMING OF OUR BROADCASTS WOULD GO ON. DOBRYNIN SAID HE THOUGHT THE JAMMING QUITE PROBABLY WAS RELATED TO THE DEBATES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND MENTIONED THAT AMBASSADOR BALL HAD USED SOME VERY STRONG LANGUAGE.

IN DISCUSSING THE SOVIET ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN SAID THE SOVIET TROOPS HAD OBVIOUSLY HAD STRICT ORDERS NOT TO RESPOND TO PROVOCATIONS UNTIL ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. HE MENTIONED ONE INCIDENT IN WHICH SOME CZECHS HAD DELIBERATELY CRASHED AN AUTOMOBLE INTO A SOVIET TANK AND THEN TAKEN PICTURES OF IT.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 26/2304Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

Xerox from Quick Copy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, August 26, 1968

*Pres. file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Claims Against France

Attached is Secretary Rusk's memo requesting approval to initiate talks with the French on compensation for losses we incurred when we had to move our military installations out of France. Secretaries Fowler and Clifford join in this recommendation.

These claims cover:

- the estimated value of the remaining useful life of the facilities we left in France; plus
- certain moving costs involved in the relocation.

State estimates the total at \$230-\$250 million.

Our NATO allies may be willing to share certain of these relocation costs with us (up to a maximum of \$96 million). They expect repayment in proportion to any compensation we might ultimately receive from France. They expect us to bring our bilateral claim to France before they begin negotiations with us to share in our costs.

In addition to our bilateral claims, we share in the combined NATO financial claims against France for similar costs on NATO-financed facilities. The Fourteen invited the French to begin discussions on this issue in February but so far received only a stalling response.

Asking the French to begin discussions on our bilateral claim may look like provoking a U.S. - French confrontation. The French response will probably amount to a stall or a brush-off. But we do have a legitimate claim and we will be subject to Congressional criticism if we delay presenting it. To take both factors into account, Secretary Rusk is recommending a low-key approach (along the lines of the attached draft note), with no public statement.

John Leddy will seek Ambassador Shriver's advice on a suitable time to make this approach.

I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve approach to the French \_\_\_\_\_

*GR*  
No \_\_\_\_\_  
ERF:mst

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

72a  
August 21, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S. Claims Against France

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to initiate discussions with the French Government, through the means of a note verbale along the lines of the enclosed draft, on financial compensation to the United States for losses suffered as a result of the French decisions of 1966 evicting foreign military personnel from installations in France.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

On December 8, 1967 you approved the Department's proposal, supported by the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury, to seek agreement among the Fourteen Allies of France to present a NATO claim against France. Our proposal also took note of the necessity for the United States to prepare and eventually present its own claim to France covering the loss of permanent facilities the capital investment in which amounted to about \$490 million, before the removal or sale of certain movable property. It was considered preferable, however, to go forward initially with the NATO claim, primarily to minimize the inevitable U.S.-French confrontation aspect of the claims problem, and to decide on a time to present our own claim after we had an idea of how the NATO claim was proceeding.

It now appears there would be little to gain by delaying presentation of the U.S. claim any further. The French have not yet responded to an invitation by

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

the Fourteen extended on February 14, 1968 to initiate discussions, but have indicated informally that they would prefer to put the whole matter off for some time. While we have taken several steps to spur forward the NATO claim--by obtaining agreement on the legal and financial details of the Fourteen case and on the appointment of an attorney to assist the Fourteen's negotiator--it seems likely that early substantive discussions with the French are not in prospect. As a result it will be some time before we have any experience from the NATO claim which could guide us in the conduct of our own claim. Our allies in the Group of Fourteen have meanwhile indicated a willingness to share a portion of our costs of relocating forces and facilities from France (up to a total of \$96 million) provided we share any proceeds of our claim against France with them according to an appropriate formula.

An early presentation of the U.S. claim would undeniably create the impression of a U.S.-French confrontation. This factor must, of course, be balanced against Congressional interest in how the Government plans to recoup the financial loss engendered by the French actions. In order to take both of these concerns into account we would plan to initiate the bilateral claim in low-key. We do not intend initially to publish the attached draft Note Verbale and would confine our responses to Congressional inquiries to the statement that we had proposed discussions with the French Government. Eventually, of course, it will become necessary to make available to Congress the basic U.S.-French exchanges on this subject; these would include a subsequent U.S. statement containing an overall figure for the claim, which we expect will be in the area of \$230-250 million. The calculation of the amount of the claim will be based on the value of the estimated remaining useful life of the facilities plus certain movement costs associated with our relocation from France. This formula is the same as that adopted by the Group of Fourteen for the multilateral NATO claim.

The Secretaries of Treasury and Defense join me in this recommendation.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Draft Note Verbale.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DRAFT NOTE VERBALE ON CLAIMS

The Embassy of the United States presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's Aide-Memoire of April 12, 1966, the exchange of views between the French Ambassador and the Acting Secretary of State on June 6, 1966, and the remarks by the American Ambassador to the French Foreign Minister on August 2, 1966, in connection with the question of financial responsibility for the consequences of the decisions taken by the French Government pursuant to its Aide-Memoires of March 10 and 29, 1966.

As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is aware, the Chairman of the Group of Fourteen Allies of France reported to the North Atlantic Council on February 14, 1968, that the Group of Fourteen have requested the French Government to commence discussions on the financial consequences of the decisions taken by the French Government to terminate use by her NATO Allies of jointly financed NATO Infrastructure and International Military Headquarters facilities constructed in France.

These decisions also terminated United States use of facilities developed or constructed in France by the United

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

States at its own expense pursuant to the Chateauroux Depot Agreement of February 27, 1951, the Air Bases Agreement of October 4, 1952, the United States Military Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953 and the System of Communications Agreement of December 8, 1958.

The United States Government took note in the Embassy's Aide-Memoire of April 12, 1966, of the desire of the French Government to terminate these Agreements and that the United States Government could only consent to their termination if the French Government agreed to apply the two-year consultation and termination provision contained in the System of Communications Agreement of December 8, 1958 to all of the Agreements. The French Government thereafter did not accept this proposal on the occasion of the French Ambassador's interview with the Acting Secretary of State on June 6, 1966. The United States Government proceeded to withdraw its forces from the facilities in France at the same time making clear that it could not accept France's unilateral attempt to terminate the Agreements. It remains the view of the United States Government that the French decisions were not in accord with the terms of the aforementioned Agreements, the duration of each of which is

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

co-extensive with the period of validity of the North Atlantic Treaty, unless earlier terminated by mutual consent; in the case of the 1958 Agreement, termination also results if a two-year period has passed following a request made by either party to revise the Agreement.

Consequently, it is the view of the United States Government that it is entitled to financial compensation by the French Government with respect to facilities developed or constructed pursuant to the Agreements cited above, and, also with respect to certain improvements made by the United States at its own expense to facilities constructed in France under the NATO Infrastructure program, plus the costs incurred by the United States in moving out of the aforementioned facilities.

Recalling that the French Government in its Aide-Memoire of March 29, 1966, expressed a willingness to discuss the problems which would remain to be settled as a result of the French decisions, the United States Government proposes that representatives of our two Governments commence discussions of the financial matters described above.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

The United States Government proposes that discussions take place at an early date in Paris, and looks forward to learning the views of the French Government in this regard.

The Embassy takes this occasion, etc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

73

1968 AUG 26 23 57

68 AUG 26 PM 8:08

*Free file*  
MONDAY

EEA301  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 3434

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82164

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES REPORT FOR  
AUGUST 26, 1968

1. PRESIDENT CHIANG REQUESTS F4C SQUADRON

CHINESE AMBASSADOR CHOW SHU-KAI TODAY CONVEYED TO THE SECRETARY AN URGENT PERSONAL REQUEST FROM PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK THAT WE PROVIDE ONE F4C SQUADRON TO THE GRC UNDER GRANT MAP; UNTIL THIS CAN BE DONE, CHIANG URGED THAT A USAF F4C SQUADRON BE STATIONED ON TAIWAN. CHIANG REITERATED HIS CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTACK AGAINST THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS WHICH HE HAS EXPRESSED TO US ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS. RECENTLY, CHIANG STATED TO OUR AMBASSADOR AND CINCPAC THAT HE THOUGHT MAO'S PROBABLE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA INCREASED THE POSSIBILITY THAT COMMUNIST CHINA MIGHT PRECIPITATE A TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS. NEITHER THE GRC NOR WE, HOWEVER, HAVE ANY RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ARE PLANNING OR PREPARING FOR SUCH ACTION.

THE SECRETARY INFORMED AMBASSADOR CHOW THAT IN VIEW OF THE REDUCTION IN THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND OTHER PRESSING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, THERE IS NO PROSPECT THAT WE CAN AT ANY TIME SOON PROVIDE THE GRC WITH THE AIRCRAFT CHIANG HAS REQUESTED. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERMITTENT DEPLOYMENT OF USAF PLANES TO TAIWAN WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *JC*, NARA, Date 11-1-01

XEROX FROM QUEUE COPY



## 2. POSSIBLE SC MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST

THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAS INFORMED US OF A JORDANIAN LETTER TO HIM CONCERNING "MASSIVE ISRAELI ATTACKS" ON VILLAGES IN THE JORDAN VALLEY AND STATING THAT THE COUNCIL "IS EXPECTED TO MEET" URGENTLY TO CONSIDER WHAT "FURTHER AND MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES AS ENVISAGED IN THE CHARTER" SHOULD BE TAKEN TO STOP THIS ISRAELI AGGRESSION. THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONSIDER THE LETTER A REQUEST FOR A COUNCIL MEETING BUT BELIEVES SOME SC MEMBER (PERHAPS ALGERIA) MAY REQUEST A MEETING WHEN THE LETTER IS CIRCULATED AS AN SC DOCUMENT TOMORROW.

## 3. CASTRO SUPPORTS SOVIETS -- REJECTS IMPROVED U.S. RELATIONS

CASTRO HAS GIVEN HIS SUPPORT TO SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. ADMITTING, IN A SPEECH, THAT LEGALLY AND IN TERMS OF SOVEREIGNTY THE INVASION COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED, HE SAID THAT POLITICALLY THE MOVE WAS ESSENTIAL TO PREVENT CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM GOING OVER TO THE IMPERIALISTS. CASTRO TOOK SWIPES AT THE CZECH LEADERSHIP SAYING IT WAS NOT A MODEL OF TRUE REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP. CASTRO ALSO DECLARED IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS THAT CUBA HAD NO INTEREST WHATEVER IN IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THAT IF CUBA HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN MAKING CONCESSIONS TO THE YANKEES TO SURVIVE OR "SINKING WITH THE REVOLUTION", IT WOULD PREFER THE LATTER.

## 4. VFW CHIEF BRIEFED

DICK HOMAN, NEWLY ELECTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS, WAS BRIEFED TODAY BY DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY BOHLEN ON THE CZECH SITUATION. MR. BOHLEN'S BRIEFING EMPHASIZED THAT NEITHER EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY WAS THERE ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ANY OTHER FOREIGN POWER ON SPHERES OF INFLUENCE.

DTG: 262309Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

74

Sent  
RECEIVED  
WHCA

MONDAY

1968 AUG 26 21 07

'68 AUG 26 PM 5:14

EEA294  
00 WTE10  
DE WTE 3422

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82153

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

*Pres file*

AUGUST 26, 1968

HEREWITH ABRAMS SUMMARIZES THE BATTLE SCENE. AS HIS SUMMARY --  
AT THE END -- INDICATES, HE IS DOING QUITE A JOB OF PREVENTING THE  
ENEMY FROM GETTING SET FOR MAJOR ATTACKS AT THE DMZ AND ON  
THE CITIES WHILE INFLECTING HEAVY CASUALTIES.

MODERATE ENEMY ACTIVITY CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ON  
25-26 AUG 68, WITH THE HEAVIEST ENGAGEMENT OCCURRING NEAR TAM KY  
IN I CORPS.

IN THE I CORPS, ENEMY ACTION INCREASED SOMEWHAT FROM THE PREVIOUS  
DAY. THERE WERE THREE LIGHT CONTACTS WITH ENEMY FORCES EAST OF CON  
THIEN IN THE DMZ AREA. IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE IN THE CENTRAL DMZ, 5  
ARC LIGHT STRIKES ARE SCHEDULED AGAINST POSSIBLE REGIMENTAL SIZE  
UNITS OF THE 320TH NVA DIVISION AND BASE AREA LOCATED IN THAT  
VICINITY. A MARINE REGIMENT (MINUS) IS PREPARING TO COMBAT ASSAULT  
INTO THE HILL MASS NINE KILOMETERS WEST OF THE ROCKPILE ON 27  
AUGUST 68 TO FOLLOW UP THE ARC LIGHT STRIKES.

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT TWO NVA REGIMENTS ARE  
ENGAGED IN RECONNAISSANCE BETWEEN HUE AND CAMP EVANS. THIS ACTIVITY  
TOGETHER WITH THE LOCATION OF A SUBORDINATE OF THE FORWARD ECHELON,  
HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE WEST OF HUE ON 25 AUGUST  
68, INDICATES INCREASED ENEMY ACTIVITY MAY BE FORTHCOMING IN THIS  
AREA. A USUALLY RELIABLE ARVN AGENT REPORTS THAT ELEMENTS OF THE 29TH  
REGIMENT, 325C NVA DIVISION, ARE DEPLOYED 30 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST  
OF DANANG WITH THE MISSION OF INFILTRATING ALLIED MILITARY BASES  
NORTH OF DANANG SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER. ANALYSIS OF STATEMENTS BY  
PRISONERS CAPTURED IN THE DANANG AREA INDICATES THAT ONLY LOCAL  
FORCE COMPANIES AND 2 BATTALIONS OF THE 38TH REGIMENT HAVE BEEN  
COMMITTED IN THE ACTION AROUND DANANG. IT APPEARS THAT THE ENEMY  
IS FOLLOWING THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED PLAN OF EMPLOYING VC UNITS  
TO DISRUPT DEFENSES IN THE AREA.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-22  
By com NARA, Date 3-17-03

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FOUR BATTALIONS OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION ARE PROGRAMMED FOR SECURITY MISSIONS TO BEGIN ON 26 AUGUST 68 FOR VITAL AREAS OF DANANG AND NATIONAL ROUTE 1 BETWEEN DANANG AND HUE/PHU BAI. AS ENEMY UNITS ARE LOCATED, OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY REMAINING 1ST MARINE DIVISION BATTALIONS TO PREVENT HIS ENTRY INTO THE DANANG VITAL AREA OR WITHDRAWAL AFTER CONTACT.

ON 25 AUGUST 68, 8 KILOMETERS WEST OF TAM KY, FRIENDLY FORCES CONTACTED AN UNKNOWN-SIZED ENEMY FORCE, RESULTING IN 213 ENEMY KILLED. ON 25 AUGUST 68, 223 ENEMY WERE KILLED IN THE SAME AREA. THE ENEMY UNIT IN BOTH ACTIONS WAS PROBABLY THE 1ST VC REGIMENT, 2ND NVA DIVISION.

SUPPORTED BY B-52 STRIKES, FRIENDLY FORCES CONTINUE TO INFLICT HEAVY LOSSES ON THE ENEMY UNITS THREATENING THE CHU LAI BASE COMPLEX. ONE BATTALION OF THE AMERICAN DIVISION IS BEING SHIFTED TO REINFORCE CHU LAI AND TO ACT AS A REACTION FORCE.

ON 24 AUGUST 68 THE 18TH REGIMENT, 3RD NVA DIVISION WAS LOCATED 32 KILOMETERS WEST OF QUANG NGAI CITY. THE ENTIRE 3RD NVA DIVISION IS NOW LOCATED IN QUANG NGAI PROV. ON 25 AUGUST 68, THE HA THANH SPECIAL FORCES CAMP 25 KILOMETERS WEST OF QUANG NGAI CITY, RECEIVED HEAVY MORTAR, ROCKET AND GROUND ATTACKS. A LARGE ENEMY FORCE, WHICH PROBABLY INCLUDES ELEMENTS OF THE 18TH AND 22ND REGIMENTS, 3RD NVA DIVISION, IS REPORTED 3 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF THE CAMP. CONTACT IS CONTINUING. A SPECIAL FORCES COMPANY HAS BEEN AIRLIFTED FROM NHA TRANG TO CHU LAI FOR REINFORCING THE HA THANH CAMP.

IN II CORPS, THE ENGAGEMENT AT DUC LAP IN QUANG DUC PROVINCE CONTINUED WHILE ELSEWHERE IN THE CORPS AREA, THERE WERE SCATTERED GROUND ACTIONS AND ATTACKS BY FIRE. BY THE EVENING OF 25 AUGUST 68, THE DUC LAP SPECIAL FORCES CAMP WAS CLEARED TO THE OUTER TRENCH LINE; HOWEVER, THE CAMP CONTINUED TO RECEIVE SPORADIC FIRE THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. THE ENEMY FORCE IN THIS ACTION HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THE 95C NVA REGIMENT LAST LOCATED IN CAMBODIA NEAR THE TRI-BORDER AREA ON 7 JUNE 68. LAST NIGHT, THE DUC LAP SUB-SECTOR HEADQUARTERS RECEIVED 122MM ROCKET FIRE AND THEN EARLY THIS MORNING RECEIVED HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO GROUND ATTACK. ON 25 AUGUST 68, AN ENEMY FORCE DESTROYED A BRIDGE ON HIGHWAY 14 BETWEEN BAN ME THUOT AND DUC LAP, THUS CUTTING THE ONLY LAND LINE BETWEEN THE TWO POINTS. SEVEN SPECIAL FORCES COMPANIES ARE WITHIN THE PERIMETER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES CAMP, AND RESUPPLY BY AIR WAS COMPLETED DURING THE NIGHT. SWEEP OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED IN THE AREA TO LOCATE AND DESTROY REMAINING ENEMY UNITS.

SCATTERED CONTACT IN THE OUTLYING PROVINCES OF III CORPS CONTINUED ON 25 AUG 68. IN TAY NINH PROVINCE, THE ENEMY LAUNCHED ATTACKS BY FIRE ON THE TRANG SUPPORT BASE CAMP AND ON THE TAY NINH BASE CAMP. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE LIGHT; ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN.

THE AMBUSH OF A 25TH US INFANTRY DIVISION CONVOY ON ROUTE 22, NORTHWEST OF GO DAU HA IN SOUTHEAST TAY NINH PROVINCE ON 25 AUGUST 68, INDICATES CONTINUING ENEMY INTEREST IN THE CORRIDOR BETWEEN THE VAM CO DONG AND SAIGON RIVERS IN SOUTHEAST TAY NINH AND NORTHEAST HAU NGHIA PROVINCES.



A PRISONER FROM A COMMO LIAISON SECTION OF LAI THIEU DISTRICT, CAPTURED IN SOUTHERN BINH DUONG PROVINCE ON 22 AUG 68 PROVIDES FURTHER INFORMATION THAT ELEMENTS OF THE DONG NAI REGIMENT ARE MOVING INTO STAGING AREAS IN SOUTHERN BINH DUONG PROVINCE. THE PRISONER ALSO STATES THAT HE WAS TOLD THAT HIS SECTION WAS TO SERVE AS GUIDE FOR THE 141ST NVA REGIMENT. THIS IS THE FIRST INDICATION THAT THE 141ST REGIMENT, LAST LOCATED IN NORTHERN BINH LONG PROVINCE, WAS MOVING TO THE SOUTHERN BINH DUONG AREA. B-52 STRIKES CONTINUE TO BE A FACTOR IN DESTROYING THE ENEMY AND IN AIDING THE MANEUVER OF FRIENDLY FORCES.

ON GOING OPERATIONS IN III CORPS WILL BE SUPPORTED WITH FIVE ARC LIGHT STRIKES TODAY. THE STRIKES WILL BE FLOWN AGAINST MAJOR INFILTRATION ROUTES IN BINH DUONG PROVINCE LEADING TO SAIGON. AS THE THREAT TO THE OUTER FRINGE CITIES LESSENED, THE UNITS DEPLOYED FROM THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT ARE BEING RETURNED TO THE SAIGON AREA FOR DEFENSE OF THAT CITY. US AND ARVN UNITS ARE STILL POSITIONED ASTRIDE THE MAIN INVASION ROUTES TO SAIGON WHERE THEY ARE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS. THIRD BRIGADE, 101ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION HAS BEEN ALERTED FOR REINFORCING 25TH US DIVISION SWEEP OPERATIONS IN THE AREA SOUTHWEST OF TAY NINH CITY.

IN IV CORPS, THERE WAS A MARKED DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS DURING THE NIGHT OF 25-26 AUG 68. ON 25 AUG 68, BINH THUY AIRFIELD RECEIVED OVER 50 ROUNDS OF 75MM PACK HOWITZER IN THREE DIFFERENT ATTACKS RESULTING IN NEGLIGIBLE CASUALTIES AND SLIGHT DAMAGE TO THE INSTALLATION. IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE, A PRISONER REPORTS THAT BETWEEN 25 AND 26 AUG 68, THE ENEMY IS PLANNING TO ATTACK OUTPOSTS ON HIGHWAY 4 BETWEEN CAN THO AND PHONG HIEP IN CONJUNCTION WITH FURTHER ATTEMPTS TO INTERDICT THE HIGHWAY. THE ENGAGEMENT INITIATED YESTERDAY AS A FOLLOW-UP OF A B-52 STRIKE AGAINST THE POSSIBLE 3 ENEMY BATTALIONS 19 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF CAI LAY IS CONTINUING. ENEMY LOSSES TO DATE ARE 83 KILLED. ELEMENTS OF THE 7TH ARVN DIVISION SUPPORTED BY TWO US BATTALIONS OF THE 9TH DIVISION CONTINUE THE OPERATION TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES CONTACTED IN THAT AREA. TO COUNTER AN INCREASE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE, AIR CAVALRY WITH A REACTION FORCE IS DEPLOYED IN THE VICINITY OF CAN THO. AN ARC LIGHT STRIKE IS SCHEDULED FOR THE MORNING OF 27 AUG 68 IN VINH BINH WITH A PLANNED GROUND EXPLOITATION BY AIR CAVALRY AND ARVN INFANTRY UNITS.

IN ANALYZING THE ENEMY ACTIVITIES SINCE 18 AUG 68 THE FOLLOWING PATTERNS EMERGE:

1. THE ATTACKS IN IV CORPS, OUTER III CORPS, AND IN II CORPS WERE PROBABLY DIVERSIONARY IN NATURE. THEY WERE MADE GENERALLY IN AREAS WHERE ENEMY GROUND FORCES ARE RELATIVELY WEAK. LOCAL FORCE UNITS COMPRISED A LARGE PART OF THE ATTACKING FORCES.

2. EXCEPT FOR DANANG, THE ENEMY HAS NOT STRUCK THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES AGAINST WHICH HE HAS LONG BEEN CONCENTRATING HIS STRENGTH - THE DMZ, BAN ME THUOT, AND PARTICULARLY SAIGON.

3. THE DANANG ATTACK WAS PROBABLY NOT DIVERSIONARY. IT WAS PROBABLY PREPARATORY TO A FUTURE MAJOR EFFORT THERE.

4. THE ENEMY'S ATTACK IS BEING DELAYED EVEN IN AREAS WHERE HE HAS COMPLETED PREPARATIONS. HE IS FORCED TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS TO OUR PREEMPTIONS AND INITIATIVES. HERE ARE SOME OF THESE ADJUSTMENTS.

A. IN THE DMZ WE CONTINUE TO INTERCEPT MESSAGES INDICATING ENEMY DIFFICULTY IN POSITIONING FORCES FOR ATTACK. THE 138TH AND 270TH REGIMENTS HAVE BEEN HIT HARD SINCE 15 AUG 68 AND ARC LIGHT STRIKES AS WELL AS FRIENDLY PROBES ARE DISRUPTING DEPLOYMENT OF 320TH DIVISION ELEMENTS.

B. IT HAS LONG BEEN EVIDENT THAT ENEMY FORCES IN MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONSOLIDATE FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY. FRIENDLY OPERATIONS DEEP IN HIS BASE AREAS HAVE DRIVEN THE 9TH REGIMENT BACK TO THE ASHAU, THE 6TH REGIMENT REMAINS THERE, AND HEADQUARTERS TRI-THIEN-HUE ITSELF HAS WITHDRAWN TO LAOS. ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY IS SHOWING A RENEWED INTEREST IN HUE, HIS FORCES IN MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE REMAIN WEAK, COMPLAINING OF LACK OF REPLACEMENTS, SUPPLIES, AND FOOD.

C. IN THE DANANG AREA WE HAVE SEEN SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ADJUSTMENTS. THE 2ND NVA DIVISION WAS TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE DANANG ATTACKS AND THE 3RD NVA DIVISION MAY HAVE BEEN MOVING TOWARD DANANG AS WELL. HOWEVER, FRIENDLY OPERATIONS SOUTHWEST OF DANANG APPARENTLY PREVENTED THE 2ND NVA DIVISION FROM JOINING WITH FRONT 4 FORCES AND IT WAS INSTEAD DIVERTED TO ATTACKS ON TAM KY AND CHU LAI. EVEN THESE ATTACKS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR HIM. HE HAS LOST BETTER THAN A BATTALION FROM KILLED ALONE NEAR TAM KY AND HAS GOTTEN NO CLOSER THAN 7 KILOMETERS TO THE CITY. AFTER BEING LONG STALLED IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, THE 3RD NVA DIVISION WILL APPARENTLY NOW ATTACK QUANG NGAI CITY RATHER THAN PROCEED NORTH. THE ATTACK ON DANANG ITSELF APPEARS TO BE ON A REDUCED SCALE WITH ELEMENTS OF ONLY ONE REGIMENT SO FAR PARTICIPATING. WE HAVE TENUOUS INDICATIONS THAT THE 29TH REGIMENT FROM MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE MAY NOW JOIN IN THE DANANG FIGHTING ATTACKING, FROM THE NORTHWEST. IF SO, THIS REPRESENTS ANOTHER ENEMY ADJUSTMENT TO HIS PLANS FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CITY.

D. WHILE THE ENEMY HAS BEEN STRIPPING HIS FORCES FROM THE NORTHERN B-3 FRONT, WE HAVE HAD NUMEROUS INDICATIONS OF AMBITIOUS PLANS FOR PLEIKU PROVINCE WITH EMPHASIS ON THANH AN DISTRICT. HEAVY CONTACT WITH ENEMY FORCES 22 KILOMETERS NORTH OF THE CITY ON 18 AUG 68 LEFT NEARLY 100 ENEMY KILLED, AND MONTAGNARD TRIBESMEN REPORT BETWEEN 200 TO 300 ENEMY RECENTLY KILLED BY B-52 STRIKES IN THE AREA.

E. SINCE MID-JULY, WE SAW THE ENEMY DEPLOY AN ENTIRE DIVISION FROM KONTUM PROVINCE SOUTH TO BAN ME THUOT IN WHAT HE HOPED WOULD BE A QUICK AND HEAVY STRIKE AT A LIGHTLY DEFENDED TARGET. IT NOW APPEARS THAT EVEN A FOURTH REGIMENT, THE 95C, HAS JOINED THE CONCENTRATION. HOWEVER, WE REINFORCED BAN ME THUOT BEFORE HE COULD SET HIS PLANS IN MOTION. HE HAS THUS, APPARENTLY, LAUNCHED A REGIMENTAL ATTACK ON DUC LAP SPECIAL FORCES CAMP IN THE HOPES OF DRAWING FRIENDLY FORCES FROM BAN ME THUOT. THIS DIVERSION HAS FAILED AND DUC LAP HAS BEEN REINFORCED FROM ELSEWHERE. NOW THE QUESTION ARISES - WILL HE STILL ATTACK BAN ME THUOT WITH LESS CHANCE OF SUCCESS?

F. IN III CORPS THE ENEMY IS ATTEMPTING TO CARRY OUT HIS OBVIOUS PLAN OF DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS IN THE OUTLYING PROVINCES AS AN EFFORT TO WEAKEN ALLIED DEFENSES OF SAIGON. HOWEVER, HIS PREPARATIONS FOR THE MAIN BLOW AGAINST THE CAPITAL CONTINUE TO SUFFER FROM FRIENDLY ACTION. IN SUBREGION 3, ENEMY DOCUMENTS AND PRISONERS ATTEST TO DIFFICULTIES. THE 520TH BATTALION FRESH FROM IV CORPS WAS ALMOST DESTROYED, THE 294TH BATTALION WAS DISSOLVED TO PROVIDE REPLACEMENTS FOR OTHERS, AND AT LEAST FOUR OTHER BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN MERGED INTO TWO. ENEMY DOCUMENTS SPEAK OF "LARGE SCALE ATTACKS" TO BE CONDUCTED IN SR-3 FROM 18 AUG 68 PRIOR TO THE SAIGON OFFENSIVE. THESE HAVE FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. TO THE NORTH, ELEMENTS OF THE 5TH VC DIVISION WERE HEAVILY ENGAGED WEST OF DAU TIENG ON 22 AUG 68. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS UNIT WAS INTERCEPTED ENROUTE SOUTHWARD TO SAIGON. THE UNIT WITHDREW NORTHWARD, POSSIBLY TO TRY ANOTHER ROUTE EAST OF THE MICHELIN PLANTATION.

G. IN THE DELTA WE HAVE HAD NUMEROUS HARD INDICATORS OF A PENDING MULTI-BATTALION ATTACK ON THE CAI LAY-CAI BE AREAS. BASED ON THESE INDICATIONS, ARVN FORCES SWEEPED THE AREA TO THE NORTHWEST AND ON 20 AUG 68 A SENIOR CAPTAIN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE DT-1 REGIMENT, WAS CAPTURED. HE CONFIRMED THE PLAN FOR ATTACK ON CAI LAY, BUT ADDED ALLIED OPERATIONS WHICH RESULTED IN THE COMPROMISE OF THE BATTLE PLAN CAUSED ABANDONMENT OF THE OPERATION.

5. IN SUMMARY, THE ENEMY'S CURRENT ACTIVITIES ARE GOVERNED BY TWO PREDOMINANT FACTORS - HIS PLANS AND OUR OPERATIONS. HE MUST CONSTANTLY READJUST HIS CONCEPTS, TIMING, AND DISPOSITIONS AS OUR OPERATIONS PREEMPT HIS INITIATIVES OR DISLOCATE HIS PLANS. SO FAR, NEITHER HIS ATTEMPTED DIVERSIONS, HIS CHANGES OF DIRECTION, NOR HIS ASSAULTS HAVE GAINED SUCCESS. HE WILL KEEP SHIFTING HIS FORCES AND CHANGING HIS PLANS AS WE CONTINUE TO HURT HIM AND DISRUPT HIS PREPARATIONS. AS HE ADJUSTS, WE SHIFT OUR COMBAT POWER AND HIT HIM AGAIN. IN THIS WAY WE SPOIL HIS ATTACKS, INFLICT HEAVY CASUALTIES, AND EXERCISE THE INITIATIVE.

DTG: 261653Z AUG 68

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1968 AUG 26 18 42

1968 AUG 26 PM 2:56  
MONDAY

*for file*

EEA293  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 3426

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE CAP82156

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SENSITIVE

FOLLOWING IS A MEMORANDUM FROM HENRY OWEN

QUOTE

IF GENERAL EISENHOWER DIES, THERE WILL, IT IS SAID,  
BE SEVERAL DAYS OF CEREMONY AND MOURNING.

IF SO, THE TONE OF THESE CEREMONIES SHOULD BE VERY  
DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH MARKED THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT  
KENNEDY: THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY TRAGIC ABOUT THE  
PEACEFUL DEATH OF SOMEONE WHOSE 77 YEARS HAVE BEEN AS  
LARGE IN ACCOMPLISHMENT AND SATISFACTION AS THOSE OF  
GENERAL EISENHOWER, AND IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO  
PORTRAY OR MARK IT OTHERWISE.

THESE EVENTS ATTENDANT ON HIS DEATH SHOULD BE SEEN AS  
AN OCCASION FOR PRIDE AND COMMEMORATION IN RE THE GREAT  
ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH WE ASSOCIATE WITH GENERAL EISENHOWER -  
MOST NOTABLY, WITH THE VICTORIES AND SACRIFICES OF WORLD  
WAR II.

THIS MAY NOT BE A BAD TIME TO REMIND THE COUNTRY,  
PARTICULARLY YOUNGER AMERICANS, OF THESE GREAT EVENTS.

END QUOTE

DTG 261823Z AUG 68

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR 16 1983.

*by [signature]* *on 9992*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1968 AUG 26 176 46 PM 1:54  
MONDAY

EEA291  
LOOO WTE13  
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FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAPS2154

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

HEREWITH THIEU ON ENEMY STRATEGY

QUOTE: PRESIDENT THIEU MENTIONED DURING THE COURSE OF OUR (BUNKER-THIEU) AUGUST 24 JOINT CONSULTATION MEETING THAT HE FELT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE TWO BASIC MILITARY PROBLEMS: THEY CANNOT ATTACK WITH WHOLE UNITS AT THE TIME AND PLACE THAT THEY WISH, BECAUSE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR DISLOCATING AND SPOILING ACTIONS; AND THEY CANNOT SUSTAIN AN ATTACK OR MAINTAIN POWER OVER A CAPTURED AREA. THEIR STRATEGY THEREFORE WILL BE TO ATTACK IN WAVES - AN OFFENSIVE OF 3-5 DAYS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY WITHDRAWAL AND A 2-3 MONTH PERIOD OF PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT WAVE. THIEU THUS EXPECTS THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE TO LAST UP TO A WEEK, TO BE FOLLOWED BY A PERIOD OF PREPARATION AND THEN ANOTHER OFFENSIVE AROUND U.S. ELECTION TIME. THIS DIFFERS FROM HIS ESTIMATE OF SIX WEEKS OR TWO MONTHS AGO WHEN HE FELT THAT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN AN OFFENSIVE FOR A PERIOD OF FOUR OR FIVE WEEKS. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THE COMMUNISTS SEE ANY PARTICULAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE VARIOUS U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, CONSIDERING THEM ALL IMPERIALISTS AND COLONIALISTS. WHAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE SEEKING IS TO INFLUENCE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DIRECTLY, TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THE WAR WILL BE "TOO LONG", AND THAT AMERICA CANNOT WIN IT. END QUOTE

~~SECRET~~

DTG 261718Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

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*Free file*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, August 26, 1968 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor proposes that the old Net Evaluation group, which assessed relative U. S. -Soviet nuclear capabilities, be revived in a somewhat new form.

I have made sure that Sec. Clifford is aware of the recommendation. He will be working with the JCS on their response to this recommendation.

I recommend that you budget, at some time convenient to you, for a discussion of the issue which Gen. Taylor has raised.

In general, I am sympathetic to Gen. Taylor's line of thought, given:

- the relative evening up of U. S. -Soviet nuclear capabilities;
- the possibility that we may enter strategic nuclear weapons talks.

The critical issue will be the best form of organization, I suspect.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 02-33  
By jol, NARA, Date 12-15-06

WWRostow:rln



~~TOP SECRET~~ 77a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

August 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In the course of the Board's continuing appraisal of the adequacy of our Government's intelligence coverage of Soviet plans and actions affecting U. S. national security, we have had discussions of the desirability of reinstituting a periodic examination of the relative strategic strength of the United States and the USSR. We have noted that the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council which had been charged with this work was inactivated in 1963 and that no other agency in the government has been given the responsibility for continuing an interdepartmental analysis of this matter. Meanwhile, from the intelligence point of view, we see the increasing need for reliable information on the status of Soviet advanced strategic military capabilities, and on related Soviet research and development efforts.

Based on discussions with former members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, our conclusion is that the former evaluation procedure would hardly be adequate to cope with the current problem which is now far more complex than the one which confronted us in the past. These complexities arise from the growing sophistication of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems, the many unknown factors with regard to the performance of these new weapons and the sensitivity of the kind of study which we have in mind.

The kind of analysis we envision would call for an evaluation of the composition, reliability, effectiveness and vulnerability of the strategic offensive and defensive forces of both sides, to include their command and control systems. It would also call for a close study of the urban-industrial structure of both nations in order to assess the probable effects of strategic attacks on urban-industrial targets. These analyses should be based upon the best available information and foreign intelligence. A by-product of the kind of new study we are discussing would be to focus attention on the gaps in the intelligence data and to accelerate measures to collect the missing pieces.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 02-33  
By id, NARA, Date 12-15-06

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~


After the development of the best possible understanding of the likely performance of the opposing strategic forces, it should then be possible to construct one or more scenarios for war game purposes in order to measure the interactions of these forces in nuclear war. The results would then permit our best military and scientific minds to draw pertinent conclusions as to the relative strength of our forces and the considerations which should influence future decisions and actions in the strategic field.

The agencies interested in such a study and with a contribution to make to it include the White House, State, Defense, JCS, CIA, Justice and AEC. Since the study would draw heavily upon the scientific community, the President's Science Advisory Committee should be included as a participant.

Taking into account this breadth of governmental interest, the question arises as to the best way of organizing it. The old Net Evaluation Group did not have adequate scientific support to carry on a study of the scope which we are proposing. Furthermore, it reported through a committee chaired by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Security Council. Under present conditions, the Board believes that the proposed study could best be done under the Secretary of Defense acting as executive agent for the President.

#### Recommendation

It is the recommendation of your Board that the Secretary of Defense be directed to prepare proposed terms of reference whereby he would undertake the net evaluation studies in collaboration with the appropriate other government agencies, along the lines suggested above.



Maxwell D. Taylor  
Chairman

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DE WTE 3419

1968 AUG 26 15 40

78  
MONDAY  
68 AUG 26 AM 11:57

FROM WALT ROSTON  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH82131

UNCLAS

AUGUST 26, 1968

*Pres file*

HEREWITH TWO SUGGESTED PASSAGES FOR THE DRAFT SPEECH  
WHICH JOE CALIFANO MADE AVAILABLE TO ME LAST NIGHT.

THE FIRST, SECRETARY RUSK URGED ME TO SEND DOWN.  
HE SAID IT WAS NOT COVERED IN HIS SUGGESTIONS. THE  
PROPOSED PASSAGES FOLLOWS:

"THERE CAN BE NO STABLE PEACE UNLESS AGGRESSION IS  
RESISTED; BUT RESISTING AGGRESSION IS NOT ENOUGH.  
THAT IS WHY WE HAVE WORKED WITH OTHERS:

- TO ASSIST THE DEVELOPING NATIONS;
- TO BUILD STURDY REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE,  
LATIN AMERICAN, AFRICA, AND ASIA;
- TO MAINTAIN RATIONAL WORLD POLICIES IN THE FIELDS  
OF TRADE AND MONEY;
- AND TO TAME AND CONTROL THE NUCLEAR DANGER THAT  
STILL THREATENS HUMANITY."

THE SECOND IS A CONTINGENCY PASSAGE IF, IN THE NEXT  
24 HOURS, THE CZECH SITUATION TAKES A TURN FOR THE BETTER:

"WE SAW SOMETHING ELSE IN THE PAST WEEK, ASIDE FROM  
A BRUTAL DISPLAY OF FORCE. WE SAW THE POWER OF MEN AND  
WOMEN WHO STAND PROUDLY ON THEIR FEET IN THE FACE OF  
GUN BARRELS. WE SAW THE POWER OF WORLD OPINION NO  
LONGER WILLING TO ACCEPT PASSIVELY THE VIOLATION OF  
A NATION'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

"THIS IS NO LONGER THE WORLD OF STALIN.

"AND I PRAY THOSE RESPONSIBLE IN MOSCOW WILL DRAW  
THE CORRECT CONCLUSION; FOR WE CANNOT GO BACK -- WE CAN  
ONLY GO FORWARD TO BUILD AN ORDERLY WORLD OF INDEPENDENT  
NATIONS AND INCREASINGLY FREE MEN."

DTG 261522Z AUG 1968

PRESERVATION COPY



1968 AUG 26 14 34

68 AUG 26 AM 10:45  
MONDAYVZCZCEEA286  
OO WTE18 WTE15  
DE WTE 3414FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE CAPS2148DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-162  
By ies, NARA Date 9-8-97

Free file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN ADDITION TO WHAT FOLLOWS WE HAVE REPORTS FROM PRAGUE THAT OUR EMBASSY IS SURROUNDED BY SOVIET OCCUPATION TROOPS. SECRETARY RUSK PLANS TO HAVE DOBRYNIN IN TO PROTEST.

1. WE ARE HAVING TROUBLE WITH SOVIET OCCUPATION FORCES AND MAY HAVE MORE.
2. YESTERDAY THREE OF OUR VEHICLES WITH DIPLOMATIC TAGS WERE STOPPED AND SEARCHED AND A BURST OF BULLETS WAS FIRED OVER THE CAR IN WHICH OUR ARMY ATTACHE WAS TRAVELLING. HANDERSCHIED'S APARTMENT WAS BROKEN INTO LAST NIGHT BY SOVIET TROOPS AND A SPORTING SHOTGUN REMOVED. JUST NOW A COUPLE OF SOVIET SOLDIERS WITH RIFLES WERE SIGHTED IN THE UPPER GARDEN AROUND THE GLORIETA. WE ARE NOW FLYING OUR FLAG FROM THERE.
3. AM PROTESTING THESE INCIDENTS TO SOVIET EMB BUT DOUBT THIS WILL DO MUCH GOOD. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR DEPT TO TAKE STEPS IN MOSCOW AND ALSO WITH SOVIET AMB WASHINGTON MAKING PROTEST IN APPROPRIATE FORM WITH WARNING OF SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AND REQUESTING PROTECTION OF OUR PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY.

DTG:261416Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY



1968 AUG 26 14 44

80  
168 AUG 26 AM 10:49  
MONDAY

EEA287  
OO WTE18  
DE WTE 3413

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE CAP82147

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH BACKGROUND ON CHANCELLOR'S COMMENTS ON NATO  
AND SUMMIT

1. OSTERHELD, THE CHANCELLOR'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR, TOLD THE DCM THAT HE WAS ABLE TO REACH THE CHANCELLOR IN BADEN-WURTEMBERG LATE SUNDAY. OSTERHELD SAID THE CHANCELLOR MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON HIS REPORTED PRESS INTERVIEW:

THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE HAD NOT INTENDED HIS COMMENT ABOUT A POSSIBLE SUMMIT OF LEADING NATO NATIONS AS A FORMAL PROPOSAL FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION IT HAD BEEN INTENDED ONLY AS A SUGGESTION OF ONE MEASURE AMONG OTHERS WHICH MIGHT PERHAPS BE TAKEN. FURTHERMORE, HE HAD NOT MEANT TO SUGGEST AN URGENT SUMMIT MEETING TO DEAL WITH THE CZECH CRISIS AS SUCH. HE HAD MEANT RATHER THAT SUCH A MEETING MIGHT BE CALLED FOR A LONGER TERM PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING AND RE-VITALIZING NATO, THE NEED FOR WHICH WAS EVIDENT BECAUSE OF THE CZECH CRISIS. AS FOR THE GENESIS OF THE IDEA, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT BRZEZINSKI HAD PUBLICLY SUGGESTED SUCH A SUMMIT MEETING RECENTLY. THE RADIO COMMENTATOR DR. RUMMEL, WHO HAD MADE THE RECORDED INTERVIEW WITH THE CHANCELLOR, HAD MENTIONED BRZEZINSKI'S SUGGESTION TO THE CHANCELLOR JUST BEFORE THE INTERVIEW AND IT WAS THIS WHICH HAD BEEN THE IMMEDIATE IMPULSE FOR THE SUGGESTION.

2. OSTERHELD ADDED THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF HIS OWN:

AS FOR THE ALLEGED DEROGATORY REMARKS OF THE CHANCELLOR ABOUT THE STATE OF NATO, OSTERHELD POINTED OUT THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S COMMENTS HAD BEEN IN RESPONSE TO A LOADED QUESTION BY DR. RUMMEL, WHO HAD ASKED ABOUT THE "EROSION" OF NATO. THE CHANCELLOR, ALTHOUGH NOT DENYING THAT NATO HAD FALLEN INTO A KIND OF "DAILY ROUTINE" STATE, HAD GONE ON TO SAY THAT THE REAL TEST OF AN ALLIANCE IS THE MANNER IN WHICH IT RESPONDS TO AN EMERGENCY. THE CHANCELLOR HAD EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT NATO WOULD SUCCESSFULLY MEET THIS TEST.

3. OSTERHELD SAID THAT IN ANY SUBSEQUENT PRESS COMMENT, THE FRG WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE ABOVE POINTS. HE FULLY AGREED ON THE DESIRABILITY OF PLAYING DOWN AND MINIMIZING THE WHOLE MATTER AT THIS TIME. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S COMMENTS WERE MADE ONLY IN PASSING AS A PART OF A VERY LONG AND COMPREHENSIVE "THINKING OUT LOUD" RADIO INTERVIEW.

4. OSTERHELD ALSO CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE CHANCELLOR, THROUGHOUT THE LONG INTERVIEW, THIS TIME MADE NO REFERENCE TO ALLEGED US-SOVIET COLLUSION ON DIVIDING UP EUROPE. FULL TEXT OF INTERVIEW BEING SENT WASHINGTON.

DTG: 261416Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

FROM QUEEN COPY



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-199  
By CG, NARA, Date 5-5-95

81

~~SECRET~~

August 26, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

*sent Hand via wire  
Pres file  
CAP 82146*

Herewith summary of an analysis by Al Jenkins of the swing to the right in China.

For the past six weeks or so, and most clearly in the past ten days, there has been the most country-wide shift toward the conservatives yet seen in the past two years. Matters have, in fact, gone so far in the provinces in the direction of the old-liners and under military auspices that one must wonder what is happening to the position of Lin Biao himself. Current policy is certainly different from what he has espoused since 1964.

Revolutionary committees have been set up in the last few days in both Yunnan and Fukien Provinces. Both are completely dominated by the military and each of the chairmen have in the past been under Red Guard criticism.

The Red Guards, on the other hand, have fallen on lean days indeed.

These moves have been accompanied by the strongest measures taken to date by the Army to stop factional fighting. Summary executions have been resorted to in a number of instances. A back-to-work movement appears to have met with limited but perhaps slowly growing success.

Increased Army patrol activity has been noted in Peking in recent days, and an important Army unit long stationed on the Korean border has been moved into Peking.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2-

There is nothing new on the harvest, except that Peking has entered into urgent negotiations with Australia for wheat deliveries after December. Peking is expected also to negotiate with Canada for further purchases.

There has been speculation that the heavy rains and the natural peak (from melted snows far to the west) might cause devastating floods.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Monday, August 26, 1968 - 8:15 am

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I don't quite understand the references in this letter to you; but, after all, it's addressed to you -- not me!

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rawalpindi  
August 13, 1968

82a

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

My Dear Mr. President:

With me: janitor -- no, but waiter on tables;  
sweeper -- no, but bellhop; painter of barns  
-- no, but ditch digger; seller of "real silk  
hose" -- no, but seller of Fuller brushes.

I don't know about you real silk hose salesmen,  
but us Fuller Brush fellers had our own song.  
I can recall the tune, although I can't render  
it; but the only words I remember are, "I am  
the Fuller Brush man. For the others I don't  
give a damn."

With all the best, I am

Sincerely,

Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr.  
Ambassador



~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

83

1968 AUG 25 15 26

*Free file*

EEA269  
OO WTE13  
DE WTE 3391

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82131

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

AUGUST 25, 1968

68 AUG 25 AM 11:46

SUNDAY

HEREWITH BUNKER ESTABLISHES EXACTLY HOW THIEU HAS MOVED TO FULFILL HIS HONOLULU COMMITMENT TO YOU ON PEACE INITIATIVES.

QUOTE: WHEN I SAW THIEU AUGUST 24, I RECALLED HIS TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT AT HONOLULU IN WHICH THEY HAD AGREED THAT THE OPTIMUM TIME TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT MAY BE BETWEEN NOW AND JANUARY 23. I ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT STEPS HE MIGHT HAVE TAKEN TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE OTHER SIDE.

THIEU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE AND THE PRESIDENT HAD AGREED ON THIS POINT. HE ADDED THAT AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG LAM, WHO HAD LEFT FOR PARIS THAT SAME DAY, HAD BEEN GIVEN A CLEAR DIRECTIVE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN TRYING TO OPEN CONTACT IN WHATEVER WAY HE CAN WITH BOTH DRV AND NLF REPRESENTATIVES. THIEU SAID PARIS SEEMED TO BE THE BEST LOCATION FOR THIS EFFORT SINCE IN SAIGON THERE WAS PRACTICALLY NO OPPORTUNITY FOR CONTACT AND IT WOULD IN ANY CASE LEAK AND LEAD TO SPECULATION. THIEU CONFIRMED THAT AMBASSADOR LAM WAS PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH MAI VAN BO, ADDING THAT SENATOR TRAN VAN LAM ALSO KNEW HIM. THIEU CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IT WAS NOT AN EASY UNDERTAKING AND MUST BE DONE WITH GREAT CARE AND CIRCUMSPECTION. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE IN THE DIRECTION THAT BOTH HE AND THE PRESIDENT HOPED TO PROCEED. END QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

DTG: 251503Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 11-1-01

Xerox from Quick Copy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 25, 1968

84  
sent back via wire  
CAP 82/30  
Pres file

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

INFORMATION GEO RGE CHRISTIAN

Sec. Rusk has been trying to reach you on the following matter.

It appears that Kiesinger, in a speech that will be released at 2:30 p.m. our time, proposes a NATO summit meeting.

Sec. Rusk feels that this is an inappropriate suggestion to make in public until it had been staffed out privately. He is asking Lodge to urge Kiesinger to indicate that this is a suggestion about which Germany will be consulting with its allies;

-- He suggests our public posture should be that we are prepared to consider the idea in consultation with our NATO colleagues, but not to commit ourselves either in substance or in tone to the proposition.

-- In fact, Sec. Rusk (and I) <sup>are</sup> ~~xxx~~ <sup>live</sup> ~~are~~ wary of a NATO summit meeting unless we ~~had~~ worked out in advance certain constructive measures within the West to strengthen NATO and the West; for example, an increase in other than U.S. NATO contributions or military budgets, or -- a very long shot -- a de Gaulle agreement to let Britain into the Common Market. A NATO agreement focused on the East would be both inflammatory and dramatize the impotence of the West with respect to the Czech situation.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-29  
By us, NARA, Date 4-27-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

New subject: We have just received the following [redacted]

[redacted] indicating a very tough agreement between  
the Czechs and the Russians:

QUOTE Radio Free Prague gives details of a compromise reached  
between the Czechoslovak delegation and the Soviet leaders in Moscow  
which it says it learned on Sunday. It reports that it was decided in  
Moscow, among other things, that all acts against occupation troops are  
to be discontinued on the Czechoslovak side. The country is to stay in  
the Warsaw Pact. Freedom of the press and radio is to be curtailed.  
All arrested persons are to be released. Besides, it has been agreed  
that all occupation troops will stay in the country until further notice. END  
QUOTE

We do not know, in fact, whether the report is accurate.

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 25, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
FOR THE PRESIDENT  
INFORMATION GEO RGE CHRISTIAN

84  
sent Rusk via wire  
CAP 82/30  
free file

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-- He suggests our public posture should be that we are prepared to consider the idea in consultation with our NATO colleagues, but not to commit ourselves either in substance or in tone to the proposition.

-- In fact, Sec. Rusk (and I) <sup>are</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>have</sup> ~~are~~ wary of a NATO summit meeting unless we ~~are~~ worked out in advance certain constructive measures within the West to strengthen NATO and the West; for example, an increase in other than U.S. NATO contributions or military budgets, or -- a very long shot -- a de Gaulle agreement to let Britain into the Common Market. A NATO agreement focused on the East would be both inflammatory and dramatize the impotence of the West with respect to the Czech situation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / RAC 12-104

By Uld NARA, Date 12-27-2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

New subject: We have just received the following intercepted broadcast from Hamburg indicating a very tough agreement between the Czechs and the Russians:

QUOTE Radio Free Prague gives details of a compromise reached between the Czechoslovak delegation and the Soviet leaders in Moscow which it says it learned on Sunday. It reports that it was decided in Moscow, among other things, that all acts against occupation troops are to be discontinued on the Czechoslovak side. The country is to stay in the Warsaw Pact. Freedom of the press and radio is to be curtailed. All arrested persons are to be released. Besides, it has been agreed that all occupation troops will stay in the country until further notice. END QUOTE

We do not know, in fact, whether the report is accurate.

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

60 AUG 24 PM 4:40

86  
SATURDAY

EEA261  
00 NTE13  
DE WTR 3376

1968 AUG 24 20 33

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82121

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-305  
By ing NARA Date 8-26-96

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO DIS~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

AUGUST 24, 1968

HEREWITH A CONVERSATION YESTERDAY OF AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN  
WITH SECRETARY RUSK AND AMBASSADOR THOMPSON.

"THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO COME  
IN FOR A VERY INFORMAL CHAT ABOUT CURRENT PROBLEMS. HE BEGAN  
BY REFERRING TO HIS TALK WITH THE AMBASSADOR EARLY IN THE WEEK  
ON DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE  
CAME FROM GEORGIA AND WAS SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS SOFT SPOKEN  
IN MANNER. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE AMBASSADOR HAD IN ANY  
WAY BEEN MISLEAD BY THE MANNER IN WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED THE  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA PROBLEM, AND WHETHER THE AMBASSADOR HAD FULLY  
UNDERSTOOD THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT THE SECRETARY HAD TOLD  
HIM ABOUT REACTION IN THIS COUNTRY AND THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEVELOPMENTS ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE SECRETARY'S  
REMARKS. HE SAID THAT THE DECISION WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT HAD  
MADE WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT AN EASY ONE. THE REACTION IN THE UNITED  
STATES AND FOR THAT MATTER IN CERTAIN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAD  
BEEN CLEARLY PREDICTABLE. HE HAD PERSONALLY THOUGHT THAT A  
SOLUTION TO THE CZECH PROBLEM HAD BEEN FOUND, BUT SOMETHING  
MUST HAVE HAPPENED TO CHANGE THE SITUATION. IN SPECULATING  
ON WHAT THIS MIGHT BE THE SECRETARY REFERRED TO HERR ULBRICHT'S  
VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT SOVIET POLICY WAS  
NOT DETERMINED BY HERR ULBRICHT OR ANYONE ELSE. EAST GERMANY  
WAS OF COURSE AN IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT, BUT THE  
SOVIETS KNEW HOW TO SAY NO TO HERR ULBRICHT. LATER IN THE  
CONVERSATION AMBASSADOR THOMPSON SPECULATED ON THE ROLE OF THE  
CZECHOSLOVAKIA PRESS IN EFFECTING THE SOVIET REACTION, AND  
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS WAS CERTAINLY A  
FACTOR. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN SAID THAT HIS COUNSELOR HAD  
RETURNED FROM MOSCOW LAST WEEKEND, AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT MOST  
OF THE SOVIET LEADERS WERE ON VACATION. DOBRYNIN HAD BEEN  
ON THE VERGE OF ASKING PERMISSION TO ACCOMPANY HIS WIFE AND  
DAUGHTER WHEN THEY RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION NEXT TUESDAY.  
HE INDICATED HE HAD RECEIVED WORD OF THE CHANGE IN SOVIET  
POLICY ONLY A SHORT TIME BEFORE HE HAD INFORMED THE PRESIDENT  
ABOUT IT.

PRESERVATION COPY



WHEN THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE SOVIET ACTION, DOBRYNIN ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY IT LARGELY ON THE BASIS OF INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN NO INDICATIONS THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA INTENDED TO LEAVE THE WARSAW PACT OR CONDUCT ITSELF IN ANY WAY OTHER THAN AS A MEMBER OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW IT HAD BECOME CLEAR THAT DUBCEK WAS A WEAK LEADER WHO WAS ALLOWING THINGS TO DRIFT, AND THAT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE RIGHT WAS STEADILY GAINING INFLUENCE, AND THE SOVIETS THOUGHT THAT DUBCEK WAS LOSING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. THESE DEVELOPMENTS WERE LEADING IN THE DIRECTION OF A SITUATION IN WHICH CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD NO LONGER BE A MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT. DOBRYNIN EMPHASIZED THAT THE CZECH ECONOMIC REFORMS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE CASE AS THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR THEM ALONE TO DECIDE.

WHEN THE SECRETARY AGAIN REFERRED TO THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, DOBRYNIN SAID THAT HE COULD TELL THE SECRETARY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SAY, IN CASE THE SUBJECT WERE RAISED, THAT THE SOVIET UNION DESIRED TO CONTINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS UPON THE BILATERAL QUESTIONS WITH WHICH THEY HAD BEEN DEALING BEFORE THE RECENT CZECH EVENTS. HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND THE STRATEGIC MISSILE PROBLEM. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO PROCEED IMMEDIATELY IN THESE MATTERS WHILE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION WAS STILL SO UNCLEAR. WITHOUT WISHING TO PRESS THE SECRETARY HE WONDERED WHETHER AS A MATTER OF POLICY, UNRELATED TO TIMING, THE UNITED STATES WOULD ALSO WISH TO PROCEED TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS.

THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HIS REPLY WOULD HAVE TO CONSIST OF TWO STATEMENTS. THE FIRST WAS THAT FROM THE BEGINNING OF HIS ADMINISTRATION THE PRESIDENT WAS PROFOUNDLY AND PASSIONATELY INTERESTED IN ADVANCING THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND IN PROMOTING BETTER RELATIONS AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. WE OF COURSE HAD DIFFERENCES, AND SOME OF THESE WOULD REMAIN BUT IN THIS ATOMIC AGE THE PRESIDENT CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL TO DO EVERYTHING HE COULD TO DIMINISH DANGERS OF CONFLICT. THE SECRETARY MENTIONED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD TODAY MET WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP. MANY OF THESE MEN HAD BEEN SCATTERED ABOUT THE COUNTRY, AND THEIR REACTIONS REFLECTED THE SERIOUS IMPRESSION WHICH THE CZECH DEVELOPMENTS HAD HAD ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. IT APPEARED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO STRONG CRITICISM FOR HIS EFFORTS IN BUILDING BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. NEVERTHELESS, HE COULD ASSURE THE AMBASSADOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S DEEP COMMITMENT TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

THE SECOND PART OF HIS ANSWER WAS THAT AT THE PRESENT STAGE HE SIMPLY COULD NOT SAY WHAT THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE UPON THE PROBLEMS UNDER DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT PRESIDENT SVOBODA'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT SVOBODA WOULD STAY ON UNTIL THE NEXT DAY WHEN HE WOULD RETURN TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE SECRETARY RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE SAFETY OF THE CZECH LEADERS, AND DOBRYNIN SAID THAT WHILE OF COURSE HE HAD NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT NO HARM WOULD COME TO DUBCEK OR THE OTHER CZECH PERSONALITIES. IN THIS CONNECTION THE SECRETARY REFERRED TO THE CZECH RADIO BROADCAST COMMENTING ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE CZECH DELEGATION THAT HAD GONE TO MOSCOW.

THE SECRETARY MENTIONED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD GONE TO THE RANCH. HE HAD RECEIVED IN THE LAST FEW HOURS A NUMBER OF ALARMING RUMORS ABOUT A POSSIBLE SOVIET INVASION OF ROMANIA. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT THESE RUMORS HAD NOT COME TO US FROM THE ROMANIANS. THE AMBASSADOR WOULD SURELY BE AWARE OF WHAT THE EFFECT SUCH ACTION WOULD HAVE UPON THE UNITED STATES OPINION COMING ON TOP OF THE RECENT SOVIET ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE SECRETARY EXPECTED THE PRESIDENT TO TELEPHONE HIM AS SOON AS HE ARRIVED AT THE RANCH AND RECEIVED THESE REPORTS, AND THE SECRETARY DID NOT KNOW WHAT HE SHOULD REPLY. HE ASKED WHETHER DOBRYNIN HAD ANY INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT. DOBRYNIN SAID HE HAD NEITHER SEEN NOR HEARD ANY INDICATION WHATEVER OF ANY CONTEMPLATED SOVIET ACTION AGAINST ROMANIA, AND DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANYTHING TO THESE RUMORS. ON THE CONTRARY, HE REFERRED TO THE WARM GREETINGS WHICH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD SENT TO THE ROMANIAN LEADERS ON THE OCCASION OF THEIR NATIONAL HOLIDAY.

THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION BY STATING THAT HE DID NOT CONTEMPLATE INFORMING THE PRESS OF AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN'S VISIT."

DTG: 241849Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

~~NOBIS~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

87

EEA259  
00 WTE10 WTE15  
DE WTE 3375

1968 AUG 24 19 10

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE CAPE2120

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SATURDAY, AUGUST 24, 1968

SUBJECT: LATIN AMERICAN ROUNDUP

HERewith A REPORT ON HOW SOME IMPORTANT SITUATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA HAVE DEVELOPED THIS PAST WEEK:

1. REACTION TO THE PELLY AMENDMENT AND PROSPECTS FOR A FISHERIES CONFERENCE

--THIS WEEK ECUADOR AND PERU PROTESTED OFFICIALLY TO THE PELLY AMENDMENT TO THE FISHERMEN'S PROTECTIVE ACT.

--CHILE, WHICH FAVORS A FISHERIES CONFERENCE, WILL TRY TO CONVINCE ECUADOR AND PERU OF THE DESIRABILITY OF TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

--WE ARE WORKING TOWARD A CONFERENCE BY OCTOBER 7, OUR ANNOUNCED TARGET DATE. BUT THE ACTUAL CONFERENCE MAY BEGIN LATER.

2. BOLIVIA

--THE AUGUST 20 COUP ATTEMPT BY GENERAL VASQUEZ FAILED BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES STILL SUPPORT BARRIENTOS.

--THE UPCOMING TRIAL OF ARGUEDAS (WHO LEAKED THE GUEVARA DIARY) WILL STRAIN THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND BARRIENTOS.

3. CHILE

--THE 1969 GNP MAY DROP BY 8 PERCENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT MAY DOUBLE BECAUSE OF INFLATION, BUDGET SQUEEZE AND THE WORST DROUGHT ON RECORD.

XEROX FROM QUEPAC COPY

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12355,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY rg ON 12-14-9

*Pres file*  
68 AUG 24 PM 3:27  
SATURDAY



--ALSO FREI AND HIS PARTY MAY LOSE POPULAR SUPPORT IN 1969 AND 1970 ELECTIONS.

--AID IS WORKING ON EMERGENCY FOOD AND POWER-GENERATING PROGRAMS.

#### 4. MEXICO

--STUDENTS CONTINUE WITH LARGE, PEACEFUL RALLIES AND SO FAR HAVE NOT ACCEPTED PARTICIPATION IN A GOVERNMENT-PROPOSED COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE STUDENT GRIEVANCES.

--AS THE OLYMPICS APPROACH, PUBLIC OPINION IS HARDENING AGAINST THE STUDENTS.

--THE GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE EVERY STEP TO SEE THAT STUDENT UNREST DOES NOT DISRUPT THE GAMES SCHEDULED TO START OCTOBER 12.

#### 5. URUGUAY

--THE GOVERNMENT HAS ORDERED THE ARREST OF STUDENT AND POLITICAL GROUPS' LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS OF AUGUST 15.

--WE ARE EXPEDITING DELIVERY OF RIOT CONTROL EQUIPMENT.

--THE PACHECO ADMINISTRATION IS NOT NOW SERIOUSLY THREATENED BUT THE MOOD IS TENSE.

#### 6. POPE PAUL WELCOMED IN COLOMBIA

--CROWDS OF ABOUT A MILLION GAVE A TUMULTUOUS WELCOME TO THE FIRST POPE TO VISIT LATIN AMERICA.

--THE PONTIFF'S REMARKS HAVE STRESSED SOCIAL JUSTICE, AGRARIAN AND TAX REFORM, AND HIS STAND ON BIRTH CONTROL.

#### 7. LATIN AMERICAN REACTION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

--EXCEPT FOR CUBA, GOVERNMENTS AND PRESS HAVE CONDEMNED SOVIET INTERVENTION.

--LAST NIGHT IN A SPEECH, CASTRO EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE SOVIETS.

--CUBAN MILITARY FORCES ARE ON ALERT, PRESUMABLY OUT OF FEAR OF UNITED STATES MOVES AGAINST THEM.

DTG: 241840 AUG 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SATURDAY

SENT  
RECEIVED  
WHCA

'68 AUG 24 PM 3:02

1968 AUG 24 18 54

EEA256  
OO WTE18  
DE WTE 3366

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH82116

UNCLAS

HERewith A ROSTOW BROTHERS' DRAFT, AS REQUESTED. GENE WAS PRINCIPLE WORDSMITH. I HAVE BRACKETTED MORE THAN ONE-THIRD, TO REDUCE LENGTH. SOME FURTHER EDITING POSSIBLE. BUT WISHED YOU TO HAVE FULL TEXT.

MY FELLOW DEMOCRATS:

WE HAVE COME TOGETHER AGAIN, AS WE DO EVERY FOUR YEARS, TO TAKE STOCK OF OURSELVES, AND TO DRAW NEW STRENGTH FROM OUR COMMUNION.

THOMAS JEFFERSON SAID MEN WERE DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTIES: "THOSE WHO FEAR AND DISTRUST THE PEOPLE," AND "THOSE WHO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES WITH THE PEOPLE."

FROM HIS TIME TO OURS,

FROM THE DAYS OF ANDREW JACKSON TO THOSE OF WOODROW WILSON, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, HARRY TRUMAN AND JOHN F. KENNEDY,

OUR PARTY HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH THE HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE.

(WE ARE OF THE PEOPLE.

AND OUR HIGHEST POLITICAL AMBITION HAS BEEN TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF THE PEOPLE.)

WE ARE THE PARTY OF THE MANY, NOT THE FEW.

(WE ARE THE PARTY OF ALL AMERICA,

--NOT OF BUSINESS ALONE, OR OF LABOR ALONE;

--NOT A PARTY OF FARMERS, OR OF CITY DWELLERS;

--NOT A PARTY OF ONE RACE, OR OF ONE RELIGION;

BUT A PARTY EQUALLY STRONG IN EVERY PART AND REGION OF THE NATION.

WE ARE THE PARTY OF PROGRESS, AND OF SOCIAL ACTION.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

88

*Free file*

WE HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD FOR EVERY IMPROVEMENT AND REFORM IN MODERN AMERICA, FROM THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND THE WAGNER ACT TO SOCIAL SECURITY, CIVIL RIGHTS, MEDICARE, AND THE GREAT NEW CRUSADE AGAINST MAN'S OLDEST CURSE, POVERTY ITSELF.)

(ABOVE ALL), WE ARE THE PARTY OF FAITH, NOT FEAR--

THE PARTY OF FAITH IN DEMOCRACY;

THE PARTY OF FAITH IN THE WISDOM OF THE PEOPLE; AND

THE PARTY OF FAITH IN AMERICA, IN ITS GENIUS AND IN ITS DESTINY.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY WE KNOW AND LOVE IS A TURBULENT PARTY, NOT ALWAYS A POLITE ONE. OUR PEOPLE HAVE VIGOR, AND AMBITION.

(WE EMBRACE MANY STRANDS OF AMERICAN LIFE.)

NATURALLY, WHEN WE COME TOGETHER, WE ARGUE, AND WE ARGUE HARD.

(WE CARE, AND WE CARE PASSIONATELY, ABOUT IDEAS AND PRINCIPLES.

WE KNOW THAT DEMOCRATIC POLITICS REQUIRES FAIR COMPROMISES. AND WE KNOW TOO THAT IN A DEMOCRACY THOSE COMPROMISES SHOULD BE OPENLY DEBATED, AND OPENLY ARRIVED AT. WE DON'T BELIEVE IN BACK-ROOM POLITICS, IN THE POLITICS OF THE WINK AND THE DEAL.)

WE BELIEVE THAT OUR VITAL AND ROBUST DEBATES ARE WHAT OUR PEOPLE WANT AND RESPECT.

OUR PEOPLE KNOW THAT THE NATION FACES HARD CHOICES.

OUR PEOPLE WANT THE WHOLE TRUTH ABOUT THOSE HARD CHOICES, NOT SLICK WORDS, AND TWO-FACED FORMULAE.

OUR PEOPLE KNOW THAT TRUE DEMOCRACY REQUIRES THE STERN AND SINEWY DEBATES WHICH HAVE ALWAYS CHARACTERIZED OUR PARTY. THEY BELIEVE--AND WE ALL BELIEVE--THAT A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CAMPAIGN IS AN EDUCATIONAL PROCESS, IN WHICH EVERY ISSUE SHOULD BE FAIRLY FACED.

AMERICAN CITIZENS STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET. THEY MAKE UP THEIR OWN MINDS. THEY WANT TO REACH RESPONSIBLE JUDGMENTS NEXT NOVEMBER, RESPONSIBLE JUDGMENTS ABOUT MEN AND ISSUES. THEY EXPECT EVERY CANDIDATE TO COMMIT HIMSELF, FRANKLY AND OPENLY. THEY WANT TO KNOW, THEY INSIST ON KNOWING, WHAT EACH CANDIDATE AND EACH PARTY STANDS FOR.)

THEY WANT TO HEAR AND EXAMINE THE COMPETING VIEWS WITHIN EACH PARTY, AND BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

THEN THEY WILL DECIDE WHAT MAKES SENSE AND WHO SHALL LEAD.

OUR PEOPLE KNOW THAT LIKE EVERY OTHER NATION WE HAVE TROUBLES WHICH COME FROM DIVIDED VIEWS;



--THEY KNOW THAT SOME OF OUR PEOPLE ARE TROUBLED ABOUT THE SECURITY BURDENS WHICH THE TWENTIETH CENTURY HAS THRUST UPON US;

--THEY KNOW THAT SOME ARE TROUBLED BECAUSE THE PACE OF SOCIAL PROGRESS IS TOO SLOW, AND OTHERS STILL BECAUSE THEY THINK IT IS TOO RAPID.

I BELIEVE THAT OUR PARTY WILL GO TO THE PEOPLE WITH THE ANCIENT MESSAGE, "THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE US FREE."

OUR TROUBLES ARE FROTH ON THE SURFACE OF PROGRESS.

WE MUST FACE THEM, AND SOLVE THEM, NOT BY REPRESSION, BUT BY MORE PROGRESS;

NOT BY REACTIONARY POLICIES, BUT THROUGH REASON AND AGREEMENT;

NOT BY FORCE ALONE, BUT THROUGH THE VINDICATION OF JUSTICE;

NOT BY ATTACKING THE INDEPENDENCE OF OUR COURTS, BUT BY OBEYING THEIR JUDGMENTS, AND LIVING BY THE LAW;

NOT BY CREATING A POLICE STATE, BUT BY PROVIDING FOR STRONG, EFFICIENT, AND FAIR POLICE FORCES;

NOT BY ABANDONING THE SAFETY OF THE NATION TO THE FORCES OF CHAOS AND EVIL ABROAD, BUT BY STICKING TO OUR PROMISES, AND CONTINUING WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO BUILD A SOLID SYSTEM OF WORLD PEACE.

NOW LET ME EXAMINE WITH YOU THE MAIN PROBLEMS WE FACE TODAY, AS I SEE THEM.

## II

FIRST, LET US CONSIDER WHAT WE STAND FOR AT HOME.

THE GOAL OF OUR PARTY TODAY IS WHAT IT WAS IN THE TIME OF THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ANDREW JACKSON.

THEIR DREAM IS THE COMPASS OF OUR EFFORTS.

WE SEEK TO FULFILL THEIR IDEAL OF AN AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH OF FREE MEN AND WOMEN,

--EQUAL IN DIGNITY

--EQUAL IN OPPORTUNITY

--EQUALLY PROTECTED BY LAW AND CUSTOM IN ALL THEIR UNALIENABLE HUMAN RIGHTS.

(THE DAILY LIFE OF OUR SOCIETY IS CARRIED ON BY PRIVATE BUSINESS, BY ORGANIZED LABOR, AND BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS. THEY FUNCTION WITHIN A BROAD FRAMEWORK OF LAW ESTABLISHED BY OUR NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SEVERAL STATES.

THOUSANDS, MILLIONS OF FREE PRIVATE DECISIONS DETERMINE HOW AND WHERE OUR PEOPLE WORK AND LIVE, WHAT THEY EARN, AND HOW THEY SPEND THEIR INCOMES. SUCH DECISIONS ARE MADE BY BUSINESSMEN AND BY TRADE UNIONS, BY CONSUMERS AND BY CITIZENS, BY HOSPITALS AND UNIVERSITIES AND WELFARE AGENCIES.

THEIR FREEDOM IS ONE OF THE BASIC CONDITIONS OF HUMAN FREEDOM EVERYWHERE. THERE CAN BE NO REAL FREEDOM IN A SOCIETY WHERE EVERY MAN WORKS FOR THE SAME EMPLOYER.

THE FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN A FREE SOCIETY IS TO ESTABLISH FAIR RULES, AND TO PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT WHICH FAVORS FULL EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. IT SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE THOSE SERVICES AND OPPORTUNITIES WHICH PRIVATE ENTERPRISE CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO OFFER.)

IF WE LOOK BACK AT THE RECORD OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN ECONOMIC POLICY, WE HAVE REASON FOR SOLID PRIDE.

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1946, WE HAVE HAD NO DEPRESSIONS, AND ONLY A FEW SHORT PERIODS OF RECESSION, DURING THREE DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIONS. BY THE SOUND MANAGEMENT OF BANKING POLICY AND TAX POLICY, WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A CLIMATE WITHIN WHICH BUSINESS AND LABOR HAVE FLOURISHED IN FREEDOM MORE SUCCESSFULLY THAN EVER BEFORE IN OUR HISTORY. FOR THE LAST EIGHT YEARS, WE HAVE HAD THE LONGEST AND MOST PRODUCTIVE BOOM IN OUR HISTORY, A BOOM ALMOST WITHOUT PRICE INFLATION (CHECK). IN THIS PERIOD, EMPLOYMENT ROSE FROM (HOW MANY) TO (HOW MANY), AND INCOME PER CAPITA FROM (HOW MUCH) TO (HOW MUCH).

OUR GOVERNMENT HAS NOT DIRECTED THE ECONOMY, NOR UNDERTAKEN TO MAKE PRIVATE BUSINESS DECISIONS.

BUT IT HAS DONE EVERYTHING WITHIN ITS POWER TO PROVIDE A FAVORING FIELD FOR THE ENERGY AND IMAGINATION OF BUSINESSMEN AND PRIVATE GROUPS.

THE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP IS ONE OF THE IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN MODERN TIMES. THE NATION HAS LEARNED THAT BUSINESS, LABOR AND GOVERNMENT CAN AND DO WORK TOGETHER. THEY ARE NOT ENEMIES, BUT TRUSTED FRIENDS, INDISPENSABLE TO EACH OTHER, AND TO THE CONTINUED PROGRESS OF OUR SOCIETY IN FREEDOM. AS A RESULT, MANY OLD BATTLE CRIES HAVE VANISHED FROM OUR POLITICS. THEY WILL NOT BE MISSED.

AMERICAN PROGRESS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS AND OF ECONOMIC POLICY IS RECOGNIZED EVERYWHERE AS THE CHALLENGE AND THE MODEL WHICH THE ECONOMIES OF OTHER NATIONS MUST FOLLOW IN ORDER TO SPEED THEIR OWN PROGRESS.

OUR TECHNOLOGY, OUR LABOR RELATIONS, AND THE VITALITY OF OUR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE ARE GENERALLY ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE THE BEST IN THE WORLD.

(MUCH NEEDS TO BE DONE, MUCH ALWAYS NEEDS TO BE DONE, TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF OUR ECONOMY.)

IF WE LOOK BACK TO THE DARK DAYS OF 1932, I THINK EVERY AMERICAN WOULD AGREE THAT OUR NATION HAS ACCOMPLISHED NEARLY MIRACULOUS SOCIAL PROGRESS IN THE SHORT SPACE OF A GENERATION.

THE POSITION OF LABOR HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED.

WE HAVE BEGUN TO MAKE GOOD, AT LONG LAST, AND MUCH TOO LATE, OUR PROMISE OF EQUALITY TO THE NEGRO.

THE SPECTER OF DEPRESSION HAS BEEN BANISHED, AND THE ASSURANCE OF A FAIR SHARE HAS BEEN GIVEN TO THE FARMER.

WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A SYSTEM OF SOCIAL SECURITY, AND STARTED ON THE GREAT TASK OF HEALTH.

OUR EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM HAS (QUADRUPLLED?) IN SIZE AND IN THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS.

WE HAVE DEVELOPED POWERFUL AND EFFECTIVE METHODS FOR IMPROVING THE HOUSING OF OUR PEOPLE.

(OUR PARTY HAS NOT HAD A MONOPOLY OF VISION AND IDEALISM IN ACCOMPLISHING THESE GREAT SOCIAL ADVANCES. BUT WE CAN FAIRLY CLAIM THAT OUR FOUR PRESIDENTS, OUR LEADING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, OUR GOVERNORS AND OUR PARTY MEMBERS THROUGHOUT THE NATION HAVE BEEN THE MAINSTAY OF THE EFFORT.)

THE WHOLE NATION CAN TAKE SATISFACTION IN THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE. BUT THE WORK IS INCOMPLETE. OUR PEOPLE RIGHTLY DEMAND THAT ITS PROMISE BE FULFILLED. AND THEY KNOW FROM THE SUCCESSFUL EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST FEW YEARS THAT FURTHER PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE.

( I SUGGEST TODAY, IN THE LIGHT OF THIS SUCCESS, THAT THERE ARE FIVE GREAT AREAS OF OUR DOMESTIC LIFE WHERE THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROGRESS IS ON GOVERNMENT, NOT ON PRIVATE BUSINESS OR PRIVATE GROUPS. IN COMPLETING SOME OF THESE TASKS, GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ABLE TO DRAW ON ITS STRONG PARTNERSHIP WITH BUSINESS AND LABOR, WITH PROFESSIONAL GROUPS, AND WITH HOSPITALS AND UNIVERSITIES.

BUT IN THESE AREAS, THE INITIAL IMPULSE MUST CONTINUE TO COME FROM GOVERNMENT.)

I SHOULD IDENTIFY FIVE BASIC CIVIC RIGHTS AS THE GOAL OF OUR SOCIAL POLICY IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

(1) THE RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION--THE EQUAL RIGHT OF EVERY CHILD TO THE BEST EDUCATION CONSONANT WITH HIS CAPACITIES; (ADD PARA. OF DETAIL)

(2) THE RIGHT TO HEALTH--THE EQUAL RIGHT OF EVERY HUMAN BEING TO THE BEST MEDICAL ATTENTION OUR SOCIETY CAN PROVIDE; (ADD PARA. OF DETAIL)

(3) THE RIGHT TO WORK--THE EQUAL RIGHT OF EVERY PERSON TO THE DIGNITY OF WORK, AND TO THE TRAINING HE NEEDS TO EQUIP HIM FOR AN HONORABLE AND PRODUCTIVE PART IN THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE NATION; (ADD PARA. OF DETAIL)



(4) THE RIGHT TO A HOME--THE RIGHT OF EVERY PERSON TO DECENT, SANITARY HOUSING, AND TO THE ASSISTANCE OF THE COMMUNITY IN OBTAINING SUCH HOUSING WHEN IT IS BEYOND HIS EARNING POWER TO DO SO; (ADD PARA. OF DETAIL) AND

(5) THE RIGHT TO JUSTICE--THE RIGHT OF EVERY HUMAN BEING TO THE FULL AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, AT EVERY LEVEL OF OUR SOCIETY, IN EVERY NEIGHBORHOOD, IN EVERY COURT AND EVERY POLICE STATION. (ADD PARA. OF DETAIL)

(WE SHOULD GALVANIZE THE WHOLE AMERICAN COMMUNITY TO JOIN IN A GREAT AND SOLEMN RESOLVE TO SEE THAT THESE FIVE RIGHTS ARE VINDICATED.

NOTHING LESS THAN A RENEWED NATIONAL RESOLVE CAN ASSURE SUCCESS IN THE EFFORT.) CONGRESS CAN PASS LAWS, AND THE PRESIDENT CAN SIGN THEM. BUT DEEP CHANGES IN OUR POLICY AND IN OUR HABITS REQUIRE GREAT AND DEDICATED EFFORTS BY THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE.

IF SUCH EFFORTS ARE MADE, AND MADE PROMPTLY, THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS MARRED OUR SOCIAL LIFE DURING THESE LAST FEW YEARS WILL ABATE. THE DESPAIR AND FRUSTRATION WHICH FEEDS VIOLENCE WILL GIVE WAY TO HOPE. MEN AND WOMEN WHO NOW FEEL EXCLUDED WILL KNOW THEY ARE WELCOME IN EVERY SENSE TO THE FELLOWSHIP OF OUR COMMON LIFE.

### III

THERE HAS OF COURSE BEEN A GREAT DEBATE IN THE NATION ABOUT THE RIGHTNESS OF OUR COURSE IN VIET-NAM. THE DEBATE GOES FAR BEYOND VIET-NAM. IT CHALLENGES THE PREMISES OF THE FOREIGN POLICY WHICH FOUR PRESIDENTS, AND A BIPARTISAN MAJORITY OF OUR PEOPLE, HAVE STAUNCHLY SUPPORTED SINCE 1945.

(WHEN THE SECOND WORLD WAR ENDED, THE UNITED STATES FACED A PROBLEM NEW TO OUR EXPERIENCE. WE HAD LIVED SAFELY FOR MORE THAN A CENTURY WITHIN A SYSTEM OF WORLD ORDER MAINTAINED BY THE NATIONS OF EUROPE. IN 1945, THAT SYSTEM WAS IN RUINS.

FOR THE SIMPLEST OF REASONS, WE HAD TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THE DEVELOPING A NEW SYSTEM OF PEACE. WE HAVE A DEEP NATIONAL INTEREST IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A REASONABLY ORDERED WORLD -- A WORLD OF WIDE HORIZONS -- IN WHICH WE COULD HOPE TO BE SECURE NOT AS AN ISOLATED GARRISON, LIVING UNDER SIEGE CONDITIONS, BUT AS A FREE NATION, A PART OF A FREE WORLD COMMUNITY. THERE WAS NO ONE ELSE STRONG ENOUGH TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP IN THIS EFFORT, IF WE HAD FAILED TO UNDERTAKE IT.)

THE WORLD THEN WAS IN PRECARIOUS CONDITION. THE SOVIET UNION WAS BEGINNING TO PUSH OUT FROM ITS BORDERS. IT HAD BREACHED THE AGREEMENT IT MADE WITH US AT YALTA AND POTSDAM, CALLING FOR FREE ELECTIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY. IT HAD THREATENED THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF TURKEY, IRAN AND GREECE. IN GREECE, AS IN VIET-NAM, ITS TECHNIQUE

OF SUBVERSION WAS TO SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY FORCES OPERATING WITHIN THE COUNTRY.

MEANWHILE, THE NATIONS OF EUROPE WERE WITHDRAWING FROM THEIR POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSITIONS IN ASIA, AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY LEFT BEHIND A LARGE NUMBER OF VULNERABLE NEW NATIONS, WHOSE WEAKNESS TEMPTED AGGRESSION.

THE COMBINATION OF COMMUNIST AMBITION AND WEAKNESS AMONG THE DEVELOPING NATIONS PROVED TO BE A TINDER BOX. IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT SO MUCH OF THE TROUBLE DURING THE LAST TWENTY YEARS HAS TAKEN PLACE IN SUCH PLACES AS KOREA, VIET-NAM, CUBA, CONGO, AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

WITH THE HELP OF OUR ALLIES, WE HAVE SOUGHT TO RESTORE STABILITY, AND TO HELP THE DEVELOPING NATIONS HELP THEMSELVES. BEHIND THE SHIELD OF THE AMERICAN GUARANTY, WE HAVE WORKED FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADVANCE, AND THE SECURITY OF INTERNAL STRENGTH.

FOR TWENTY YEARS, WE HAVE STEADILY PURSUED THE COURSE OF ENCOURAGING THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD TO BUILD REGIONAL COALITIONS FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREAS MOST CRUCIAL TO OUR SECURITY.

IN EUROPE, BEHIND THE SHIELD OF NATO, THE MARSHALL PLAN SUPPORTED RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY, AND THE EVOLUTION OF OUR ACTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIP WITH THE NATIONS OF EUROPE IN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY AFFAIRS, IN AID, AND IN MANY OTHER AREAS OF POLICY.

THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS RECENTLY AGREED ON A PROGRAM OF NEW AND CONCERTED POLITICAL INITIATIVES IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE, AND OF RESPONSIBLE CONCERN FOR SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. IT HAS PROPOSED TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE A PROGRAM OF BALANCED AND MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, AND OF ARMS LIMITATION UNDERSTANDINGS.

THAT OFFER REMAINS OPEN. (IT SHOULD PROVIDE ALL COUNTRIES THE ASSURANCE OF AGREED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE RIGHT TO PURSUE THEIR OWN POLICIES OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN PEACE.

OURS IS A PLAN FOR THE STEADY REDUCTION OF TENSION AND OF SUSPICIONS IN EUROPE, AND ELSEWHERE.

SUCH AN APPROACH THREATENS NO LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF ANY STATE. IT RESTS ON RESPECT FOR THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF ALL STATES TO THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE.

IN THE DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED FOR THE REDUCTION OF TENSION IN EUROPE, NO TOPIC WOULD BE BARRED.)

OUR PROPOSALS OFFER THE SOVIET UNION FAR GREATER ASSURANCE OF SECURITY THAN ITS TRAGIC AND BRUTAL ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS FREEDOM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY FORCE.



-(THAT ACT IS A BARE FACED AGGRESSION, IN OPEN CONTEMPT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD HAS BEEN SHOCKED BY THIS OUTRAGE. THE BRAVE PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAVE CLEARLY SHOWN THEIR INTENSE DESIRE TO REMAIN IN CHARGE OF THEIR OWN DESTINY. AND WORLD OPINION HAS SUPPORTED THEIR STUBBORN AND PERSISTENT WILL TO REMAIN FREE.)

TONIGHT I APPEAL TO THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION TO UNDO THEIR ACTION BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE. (NO IRREVOCABLE STEPS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AS YET. BUT IF THE SOVIETS BEGIN TO USE FORCE ON A LARGE SCALE, NO MAN CAN BE SURE WHAT THE OUTCOME WILL BE.

WE AND OUR NATO ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED A FAIR AND PEACEFUL WAY TO UNRAVEL THE SECURITY PROBLEM IN EUROPE.)

IT IS NEVER TOO LATE TO CHOOSE THE PATH OF REASON, AND OF PEACE.

(OUR PROBLEM IN VIET-NAM, LIKE OUR PROBLEMS IN IRAN, TURKEY, GREECE, BERLIN, AND KOREA, IS PART OF OUR EFFORT TO CONTAIN COMMUNIST EXPANSION, AND TO PERSUADE THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA TO ACCEPT THE RULES OF TRULY PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.)

WE ARE IN VIET-NAM, AS I SAID IN BALTIMORE, THREE YEARS AGO, FOR THE SAME REASON THAT WE HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY IN EUROPE - BECAUSE GREAT INTERESTS IN WORLD ORDER ARE IN BALANCE AND THEREFORE OUR OWN SECURITY IS AT STAKE. THE "DEEPENING SHADOW OF COMMUNIST CHINA" IS THE REALITY BEHIND THE CONTEST IN VIET-NAM, WHICH "IS PART OF A WIDER PATTERN OF AGGRESSIVE INTENTION." WE ARE THERE, AS I SAID THEN, AND MANY, MANY TIMES SINCE, BECAUSE "WE HAVE A PROMISE TO KEEP", AND IT WOULD SHAKE CONFIDENCE "FROM BERLIN TO THAILAND" IF AN AMERICAN COMMITMENT WERE PROVED WORTHLESS.

"OUR OBJECTIVE IS THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM, AND ITS FREEDOM FROM ATTACK. WE WANT NOTHING FOR OURSELVES -- ONLY THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM BE ALLOWED TO GUIDE THEIR OWN COUNTRY IN THEIR OWN WAY. "WE WILL DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO REACH THAT OBJECTIVE. AND WE WILL DO ONLY WHAT IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY."

(WHETHER ONE CONSIDERS THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM TO BE A CIVIL WAR, AIDED FROM ABROAD, OR AN INFILTRATION AND INVASION BY NORTH VIET-NAM, THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEM IS THE SAME. UNDER EITHER HYPOTHESIS, NORTH VIET-NAM IS WAGING WAR AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM. SOUTH VIET-NAM HAS A PERFECT RIGHT UNDER THE CHARTER TO DEFEND ITSELF. AND ITS ALLIES HAVE AN EQUALLY CLEAR RIGHT TO ASSIST IT.

THERE IS NO USE AT THIS POINT IN GOING OVER THE HISTORY OF THE AFFAIR, AND REVIEWING THE PLACES WHERE MISTAKES MAY WELL HAVE BEEN MADE.



THE PLAIN FACT IS THAT PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND THE SENATE OF THE (WHICH) CONGRESS RATIFIED THE SEATO TREATY, WHICH DEALS EXPRESSLY WITH WHAT HAPPENED. A LATER CONGRESS PASSED THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION, WHICH EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED THE ACTIONS WE HAVE TAKEN. WHEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT ACT TOGETHER TO UPHOLD A TREATY OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATION SPEAKS WITH A SINGLE VOICE.)

THE QUESTION -- AND THE ONLY QUESTION -- BEFORE US IS WHAT KIND OF PEOPLE WE ARE. ARE WE PEOPLE OF OUR WORD, OR AREN'T WE? WHAT HAPPENS TO SECURITY ALL OVER THE WORLD IF AMERICAN TREATIES AND OTHER COMMITMENTS LOSE THEIR POWER TO DETER? ARE WE THE KIND OF PEOPLE WHO QUIT WHEN THE GOING GETS ROUGH?

I KNOW THE CANDIDATES HAVE GONE AROUND THE COUNTRY, AND APPEARED BEFORE OUR PLATFORM COMMITTEE, WITH ONE FORMULA AFTER ANOTHER FOR HELPING AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN AND AMBASSADOR VANCE IN PARIS.

(MOST OF THEIR PROPOSALS HAVE ALREADY BEEN TRIED. OTHERS I HAVE CONSIDERED, AND REJECTED.)

THERE IS NO USE TRYING TO WRITE INSTRUCTIONS TO NEGOTIATORS IN A PARTY PLATFORM. THAT CAN'T HELP MAKE THEIR JOB EASIER.

BUT I'LL TELL YOU ONE WAY WE CAN HELP OUR NEGOTIATORS HERE IN CHICAGO.

HANOI IS WATCHING THIS CONVENTION, I ASSURE YOU. THEY ARE HOPING WE WILL ADOPT A WEAK PLATFORM, AND NOMINATE A WEAK MAN TO SUCCEED ME.

I KNOW, AND YOU KNOW, THAT ANY AMERICAN WHO BECOMES PRESIDENT IN 1969 WILL BE JUST AS SOLICITOUS AS I HAVE TRIED TO BE IN PROTECTING OUR INTERESTS, AND IN REMAINING FAITHFUL TO THE PROMISES PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY MADE.

BUT HANOI DOESN'T KNOW THAT.

WE MAY BE ABLE TO MOVE THEM TOWARDS REAL NEGOTIATIONS BY LETTING THE MESSAGE GO FORTH FROM THIS PLACE, LOUD AND CLEAR, THAT AMERICA'S WORD IS AMERICA'S BOND, AND THAT IT DOESN'T PAY TO TRIFLE WITH AN AMERICAN TREATY.

(LET US MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT OUR DEBATE OVER VIET-NAM. MUCH MORE THAN VIET-NAM IS IN ISSUE.

MANY OF THOSE WHO WOULD HAVE US CUT AND RUN IN VIET-NAM WOULD RECOMMEND WITHDRAWAL EVERYWHERE. THEY WANT US TO PULL BACK TO THE UNITED STATES, AND ABANDON THE PATIENT, STEADY EFFORTS OF FOUR PRESIDENTS OVER TWENTY YEARS TO CONSTRUCT A STABLE AND PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM OF PEACE. HERE WE WOULD SIT, COWERING IN OUR FORTRESS, WHILE GREAT AREAS OF THE FREE WORLD ENDURED THE AGONY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THERE IS NO SAFETY FOR THE NATION IN SUCH A COURSE. WE CANNOT REPEAL THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, AND CRAWL BACK INTO THE WOMB OF OUR ISOLATIONIST PAST. WE MUST NOT, WE CANNOT REPEAT THE MISTAKE WE MADE IN 1920, WHEN WE REPUDIATED PRESIDENT WILSON, AND ACCEPTED THE EMPTY PROMISES OF PRESIDENT HARDING.)

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS NEVER BEEN THE PARTY OF ILLUSION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WE HAVE ALWAYS KNOWN THAT THERE WAS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE NATION ABROAD AND ITS PROGRESS AT HOME. OUR PARTY FOUGHT FOR AMERICAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WHICH COULD HAVE PREVENTED WORLD WAR II. WE LED THE WAY IN FAVORING LIBERAL TARIFF AND TRADE POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH THE YEARS.

ALL THREE GREAT DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS OF THIS CENTURY HAVE UPHELD BOTH SAFETY ABROAD AND PROGRESS AT HOME.

WILSON, ROOSEVELT, TRUMAN AND KENNEDY -- IT IS AN HONORABLE LIST, AND ONE WE CAN BE PROUD OF.

LET US NOT BETRAY THEIR HERITAGE IN OUR CONVENTION THIS WEEK.

#### CONCLUSION

WE ARE MEETING TONIGHT AS A PARTY, AND WE SHALL GO INTO THE ELECTIONS AS MEN AND WOMEN BATTLING FOR OUR PARTY.

BUT LET US NEVER FORGET THAT WE ARE AMERICANS FIRST, AND DEMOCRATS SECOND.

WE ARE A COMMUNITY, A NATION, BOUND TOGETHER BY SHARED MEMORIES AND SHARED VALUES, BY HOPES AND DREAMS WHICH HAVE INSPIRED EVERY GENERATION OF OUR HISTORY.

BEYOND OUR DIVISIONS AND OUR DEBATES, WE ARE ONE PEOPLE. EVEN THE MOST ANGRY OF OUR YOUNG MEN HEAR WHAT PRESIDENT LINCOLN CALLED THE "MISTIC CHORDS OF MEMORY" WHICH STRETCH, HE SAID, "FROM EVERY BATTLEFIELD AND PATRIOT GRAVE TO EVERY LIVING HEART AND HEARTHSTONE" OF THIS LAND.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN PRONOUNCED THESE WORDS DURING THE GRAVEST CRISIS IN OUR EXPERIENCE AS A NATION. HE SOUGHT, AND SOUGHT IN VAIN, TO PREVENT THE WORST TRAGEDY IN OUR HISTORY, THE WAR AMONG BROTHERS.

THE LESSON OF THAT TRAGEDY IS BURNED DEEP IN EVERY AMERICAN MIND. WE SHALL NEVER AGAIN ALLOW DIFFERENCES OF POLICY, OR CIVIL STRIFE, TO DRAW US BEYOND THE LIMITS OF OUR UNION, AND THE LIMITS OF OUR LAW. WE SHALL NEVER AGAIN FAIL TO HEED WHAT PRESIDENT LINCOLN, AT THAT SOLEMN MOMENT, CALLED "THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE."

IN A SOCIETY OF FREE MEN, JEFFERSON WROTE, GOVERNMENTS DERIVE "THEIR JUST POWERS FROM THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED."

WHEN THE SHOUTING AND TUMULT OF THE ELECTIONS ARE STILLED, WE SHALL COME TOGETHER AGAIN, SILENTLY AND BY INSTINCT, AS A SINGLE UNITED PEOPLE. AT THAT POINT, WE KNOW, OUR DEEPEST MORAL OBLIGATION WILL BE TO ACCEPT THE DECISION OF THE PEOPLE, TO RALLY TO OUR LAW, AND TO OBEY IT.

THE FINEST GIFT ENGLAND MADE TO US IS THE DOCTRINE THAT NO MAN, NOT EVEN THE KING, IS ABOVE THE LAW. IN THIS TIME OF TESTING, LET NO ONE LOSE SIGHT OF THIS GREAT PRINCIPLE. IT IS THE FIRST ARTICLE OF OUR FAITH AS A SOCIETY OF CONSENT. WITHOUT IT, WE COULD CEASE TO BE AMERICA.

DTG 241551Z AUG 68



VIA POUCH

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Saturday, August 24, 1968  
2:00 p. m.

Presfile  
89

MR. PRESIDENT:

This authentic report of a Soviet pitch to Indian Foreign Secretary Dayal is fascinating as an exercise in U. S. -Soviet parallelism.

The Russian, in justifying the supply of some Soviet arms to Pakistan, urges on India many of the same things we would urge on them:

- normalization of relations with Pakistan;
- sign the NPT;
- don't worry too much about a few tanks for Ayub; etc.

Behind this is a fear of increased Chinese influence in Pakistan and a desire -- at the present time, at least -- for peace on the sub-continent.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE attachment

(Log 2592)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NY 001-132-2-12 (#49)  
By JP NARA, Date 1/23/12

Pres file

90  
/

~~SECRET~~  
FROM WALT ROSTOW  
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 24, 1968

Herewith a conversation yesterday of Ambassador Dobrynin  
with Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Thompson.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 84, 1988  
By ag, NARA, Date 11-10-92

Amb. Thompson  
(Drafting Office and Officers)

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 23, 1968

SUBJECT: Situation in Czechoslovakia

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Dobrynin  
The Secretary Rusk +  
Ambassador Thompson

COPIES TO:

For the President  
From Walter Rostow  
Herewith a  
conversation yesterday  
of

" The Secretary said he had asked the Ambassador to come in for a very informal chat about current problems. He began by referring to his talk with the Ambassador early in the week on developments in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary said that he came from Georgia and was sometimes referred to as soft spoken in manner. He wondered whether the Ambassador had in any way been misled by the manner in which he had discussed the Czechoslovakia problem, and whether the Ambassador had fully understood the significance of what the Secretary had told him about reaction in this country and the possible effect of Czechoslovakia developments on Soviet-American relations.

The Ambassador said he had fully understood the Secretary's remarks. He said that the decision which his Government had made was obviously not an easy one. The reaction in the United States and for that matter in certain Communist parties had been clearly predictable. He had personally thought that a solution to the Czech problem had been found, but something must have happened to change the situation. In speculating on what this might be the Secretary referred to Herr Ulbricht's visit to Czechoslovakia. Dobrynin said that Soviet policy was not determined by Herr Ulbricht or anyone else. East Germany was of course an important member of the Warsaw Pact, but the Soviets knew how to say no to Herr Ulbricht. Later in the

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Authority NLS 95-305

By g/lis NARA, Date 11-1-01



~~SECRET~~/NODIS

-2-

conversation Ambassador Thompson speculated on the role of the Czechoslovakia press in effecting the Soviet reaction, and Ambassador Dobrynin acknowledged that this was certainly a factor. Ambassador Dobrynin said that his counselor had returned from Moscow last weekend, and had told him that most of the Soviet leaders were on vacation. Dobrynin had been on the verge of asking permission to accompany his wife and daughter when they return to the Soviet Union next Tuesday. He indicated he had received word of the change in Soviet policy only a short time before he had informed the President about it.

When the Secretary indicated that he had been surprised by the Soviet action, Dobrynin attempted to justify it largely on the basis of internal developments in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary said that we had seen no indications that Czechoslovakia intended to leave the Warsaw Pact or conduct itself in any way other than as a member of the socialist camp. Dobrynin said that in his view it had become clear that Dubcek was a weak leader who was allowing things to drift, and that in these circumstances the right was steadily gaining influence, and the Soviets thought that Dubcek was losing control of the situation. These developments were leading in the direction of a situation in which Czechoslovakia would no longer be a member of the Warsaw Pact. Dobrynin emphasized that the Czech economic reforms had nothing to do with the case as the Soviets considered that this was a matter for them alone to decide.

When the Secretary again referred to the possible effects of recent developments on Soviet-American relations, Dobrynin said that he could tell the Secretary that he had received instructions to say, in case the subject were raised, that the Soviet Union desired to continue to make progress upon the bilateral questions with which they had been dealing before the recent Czech events. He referred specifically to the peaceful uses of atomic energy and the strategic missile problem. He understood that it would probably be impossible for the United States to proceed immediately in these matters while the international situation was still so unclear. Without wishing to press the Secretary he wondered whether as a matter of policy, unrelated to timing, the United States would also wish to proceed to deal with these problems.

The Secretary said that his reply would have to consist of two statements. The first was that from the beginning of his administration the President was profoundly and passionately interested in advancing the cause of peace and in promoting better relations and better understanding between our two countries. We of course had differences, and some of these

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

-3-

would remain but in this atomic age the President considered it essential to do everything he could to diminish dangers of conflict. The Secretary mentioned that the President had today met with the Congressional leadership. Many of these men had been scattered about the country, and their reactions reflected the serious impression which the Czech developments had had on the American people. It appeared that the President would be subject to strong criticism for his efforts in building better relations with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he could assure the Ambassador of the President's deep commitment to the cause of peace.

The second part of his answer was that at the present stage he simply could not say what the policy of the United States would be upon the problems under discussion with the Soviet Union.

The Secretary expressed the hope that President Svoboda's visit to Moscow would be successful. Dobrynin said that Svoboda would stay on until the next day when he would return to Czechoslovakia. The Secretary raised the question of the safety of the Czech leaders, and Dobrynin said that while of course he had no specific information, he was convinced that no harm would come to Dubcek or the other Czech personalities. In this connection the Secretary referred to the Czech radio broadcast commenting on the composition of the Czech delegation that had gone to Moscow.

The Secretary mentioned that the President had gone to the Ranch. We had received in the last few hours a number of alarming rumors about a possible Soviet invasion of Romania. The Secretary emphasized that these rumors had not come to us from the Romanians. The Ambassador would surely be aware of what the effect such action would have upon the United States opinion coming on top of the recent Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. The Secretary expected the President to telephone him as soon as he arrived at the Ranch and received these reports, and the Secretary did not know what he should reply. He asked whether Dobrynin had any information on this subject. Dobrynin said he had neither seen nor heard any indication whatever of any contemplated Soviet action against Romania, and did not believe that there was anything to these rumors. On the contrary, he referred to the warm greetings which the Soviet leadership had sent to the Romanian leaders on the occasion of their National holiday.

The Secretary concluded the conversation by stating that he did not contemplate informing the press of Ambassador Dobrynin's visit. "

~~SECRET~~/NODIS



91

EEA254  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 3364

FROM YALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82114

3

AUGUST 24, 1968

CLEVELAND FROM NATO REFLECTS IN THE FOLLOWING THE SAME ANXIETY AS SARAGAT ABOUT TOO FORTHCOMING A U.S.-SOVIET POSTURE IN PRESENT ENVIORNMENT.

"1. UNTIL THIS WEEK ASSUMPTION OF EUROPEAN ALLIES HAS BEEN THAT SOME MAJOR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND SOVIET UNION ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, OR EVEN VIETNAM, WERE MAJOR AIM OF THIS ADMINISTRATION IN HIS REMAINING MONTHS IN OFFICE. PRESS STORIES FROM WASHINGTON THIS MORNING HAVE HELPED FAN RUMORS, ALREADY CIRCULATING IN NATO HEADQUARTERS, THAT THE UNITED STATES STILL HOPES THIS MAY BE POSSIBLE, DESPITE CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

2. SOVIET ACTION HAS OF COURSE PRODUCED A SHOCK WAVE AMONG EUROPEAN ALLIES WHICH FOR TIME BEING FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERS THE POLITICAL CLIMATE. EVEN DOVISH ALLIES ARE CANCELLING EAST-WEST VISITS AND CONSTRAINING OTHER CONTACTS; GERMANS AND ITALIANS HAVE HASTENED TO RELATE THEIR NPT SIGNATURES TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR FLAGGING, BUT DO NOT NEED TO BELABOR, THE NEED FOR PRIOR CONSULTATION IN NAC ON ANY US-SOVIET MOVES, EVEN PROCEDURAL ONES, AT THIS MOMENT IN EUROPEAN HISTORY. THE GHOST OF US-SOVIET CONDOMINIUM IS ALWAYS READY TO WALK AGAIN.

3. WE HAVE OF COURSE "CONSULTED" ABOUT THE IMMINENCE OF TALKS ON OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AND ALLIES WITHOUT EXCEPTION WERE ENCOURAGING US TO GET ON WITH IT. BUT THESE PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS ADEQUATE NOTICE OF ANY MOVE ON THIS TOPIC IN THE CHANGED CLIMATE.

4. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE YOU CAN LET ME HAVE ON WHETHER THE PRESS REPORTS ARE FALSE ALARMS OR TIME BOMBS."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

### State Dept. Guidelines

By re NARA, Date 11-1-01

**विज्ञापन**

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1988



EEA253  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 3365

1968 AUG 24 15 39

92

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP 82115

~~SECRET~~

*Free file*

AUGUST 24, 1968

1968 AUG 24 PM 12:04  
SATURDAY

IS THIS DRAFT CABLE FROM STATE THE RIGHT TONE TO TAKE WITH THIEU ABOUT A VISIT TO U.S. BEFORE JANUARY?

1. IN VIEW OF PREVIOUS TELEGRAM AND LATER PRESS REPORT THAT THIEU STILL HAS IN MIND POSSIBILITY OF VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES SOME TIME BEFORE JANUARY, WE HAVE BEEN GIVING ENTIRE MATTER CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT. THERE IS NO DOUBT, OF COURSE, THAT INVITATION TO THIEU TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR A STATE VISIT IS STILL OUTSTANDING. HONOLULU WAS NOT UNDERSTOOD BY GVN OR BY OURSELVES TO BE A SUBSTITUTE. NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE OBVIOUS DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE A VISIT BETWEEN NOW AND THE INAUGURATION. THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, IN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN VIET NAM AND ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, TO SAY NOTHING OF DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATIONS WITH THE ELECTIONS, WILL BE EXTREMELY FULL. THE PERIOD AFTER OUR ELECTIONS IS AN EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TIME FRAME TO PEER IN TO FROM THIS POINT IN TIME, BUT IF ONE DOES, ONE IS FORCED TO CONCLUDE THAT NEITHER NOVEMBER, DECEMBER NOR EARLY JANUARY APPEARS LIKELY TO OFFER AN OPPORTUNE TIME FOR A STATE VISIT BY THIEU.

2. DESPITE THE FOREGOING WE DO NOT, OF COURSE, WISH TO FORECLOSE FINALLY THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BETWEEN NOW AND JANUARY 20. IT MIGHT INDEED BE THAT A PROPITIOUS MOMENT WILL PRESENT ITSELF ON SHORT NOTICE WHICH WOULD MAKE ONE FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE. BUT ON BALANCE WE MUST TAKE A PESSIMISTIC OUTLOOK IN VIEW OF ALL THE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED AND FOR THIS REASON, WE WOULD HOPE THAT, SHOULD THIEU RAISE THE SUBJECT WITH YOU, YOU ARE ABLE TO CONVEY TO HIM AN IDEA OF THE FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTING TO PLAN A VISIT WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, WITHOUT TELLING HIM FLATLY THAT IT IS JUST NOT IN THE CARDS. THIEU HAS SHOWN HIMSELF IN THE PAST TO BE A PERCEPTIVE INDIVIDUAL, CAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING FAIRLY SUBTLE NUANCES, AND WE WOULD EXPECT THAT HE WILL UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED AND NOT PRESS THAT THE STANDING INVITATION BE HONORED.

3. AS STATED ABOVE, THERE IS THE CHANCE THAT A VISIT WILL PROVE ADVANTAGEOUS ON VERY SHORT NOTICE AND WE WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE THIS POSSIBILITY OPEN TO US.

APPROVE-----

DISAPPROVE-----

CALL ME-----

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 11-1-01

DTG: 241523 AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

P file  
93

August 24, 1968

~~SECRET~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Cleveland from NATO reflects in the following the same anxiety as Saragat about too forthcoming a U. S. -Soviet posture in present environment.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHCR  
DE RUPHNA 4357 2362130  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 232052Z AUG 68  
FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3022  
STATE GRNC  
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~~SECRET~~ USNATO 4357  
NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CLEVELAND

7588Q

AUG 24 1227AM 1968

*For the President  
From Walt Rostow  
Cleveland from NATO  
reflects in the following  
the same anxiety as  
Saragat about*

1. UNTIL THIS WEEK ASSUMPTION OF EUROPEAN ALLIES HAS BEEN THAT SOME MAJOR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND SOVIET UNION ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION, OR EVEN VIETNAM, WERE MAJOR AIM OF THIS ADMINISTRATION IN HIS REMAINING MONTHS IN OFFICE. PRESS STORIES FROM WASHINGTON THIS MORNING HAVE HELPED FAN RUMORS, ALREADY CIRCULATING IN NATO HEADQUARTERS, THAT THE UNITED STATES STILL HOPES THIS MAY BE POSSIBLE, DESPITE CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

2. SOVIET ACTION HAS OF COURSE PRODUCED A SHOCK WAVE AMONG EUROPEAN ALLIES WHICH FOR TIME BEING FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERS THE POLITICAL CLIMATE. EVEN DOVISH ALLIES ARE CANCELLING EAST-WEST VISITS AND CONSTRAINING OTHER CONTACTS; GERMANS AND ITALIANS HAVE HASTENED TO RELATE THEIR NPT SIGNATURES TO THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR FLAGGING, BUT DO NOT NEED TO BELABOR, THE NEED FOR PRIOR CONSULTATION IN NAC ON ANY US-SOVIET MOVES, EVEN PROCEDURAL ONES, AT THIS MOMENT IN EUROPEAN HISTORY. THE GHOST OF US-SOVIET CONDOMINIUM IS ALWAYS READY TO WALK AGAIN.

3. WE HAVE OF COURSE "CONSULTED" ABOUT THE IMMINENCE OF TALKS ON OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AND ALLIES WITHOUT EXCEPTION WERE ENCOURAGING US TO GET ON WITH IT. BUT THESE PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS ADEQUATE NOTICE OF ANY MOVE ON THIS TOPIC IN THE CHANGED CLIMATE.

4. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE YOU CAN LET ME HAVE ON WHETHER THE PRESS REPORTS ARE FALSE ALARMS OR TIME BOMBS. #

GP - CLEVELAND  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *11-1-01*



EEA242  
00 WTE10  
DE WTE 3340

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82098

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: CIA REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS  
OF 4 PM EDT

THERE IS LITTLE NEWS THUS FAR ON THE SVOBODA MISSION  
TO MOSCOW. ACCORDING TO AN ACCOUNT REPORTEDLY CARRIED ON  
MOSCOW TELEVISION, THE TALKS TOOK PLACE TODAY IN A "FRANK"  
ATMOSPHERE AND WILL BE CONTINUED TOMORROW.

THE SITUATION IN PRAGUE, WHERE MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED  
TONIGHT, AND, GENERALLY, THROUGHOUT CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS QUIET.

THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS  
RELATED TO THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA DURING THE PAST  
EIGHT HOURS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY THREATENING  
MOVES TOWARD RUMANIA BY SOVIET, HUNGARIAN OR BULGARIAN ARMED  
FORCES.

DUBCEK'S WIFE AND TWO SONS RETURNED TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
TODAY, ACCORDING TO A REPORT BROADCAST BY ONE OF THE CLANDESTINE  
RADIOS. THE SAME REPORT ALSO INDICATED  
THAT DUBCEK'S MOTHER PLEADED WITH THE SOVIET COMMANDER IN  
BRATISLAVA TO RELEASE HER SON. SHE WAS TOLD THAT DUBCEK WAS  
NOT INTERNED, BUT "WE ARE NEGOTIATING WITH HIM." THE  
COMMANDER ADDED THAT DUBCEK HAD BROKEN PROMISES HE HAD MADE  
TO THE SOVIETS AND THE OTHER WARSAW PACT INTERVENTIONISTS  
AT THE BRATISLAVA CONFERENCE.

MEANWHILE AT THE RUMANIAN EMBASSY IN PEKING, CHINESE  
PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI WARMLY SALUTED THE RUMANIANS, THEIR  
ANNIVERSARY, AND THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE "WARSAW FIVE'S"  
INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. CHOU ALSO PROMISED CHINESE  
SUPPORT FOR THE "PEOPLE" OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AGAINST THE "FASCIST  
POWER POLITICS" OF THE USSR, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ATTACKING  
THE CZECH LEADERS AS REVISIONISTS WHO HAD TRIED TO SELL OUT  
TO THE U.S.. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIETS INTERVENED TO PREVENT  
SIMILAR "UNCONTROLLABLE CHAIN REACTIONS" IN EASTERN EUROPE.  
CHOU ASSERTED THAT U.S. ACQUIESCENCE TO THE SOVIET OCCUPATION  
OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS PART OF A DEAL INVOLVING SOVIET  
ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. "OCCUPATION" OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT HAS OFFICIALLY PROTESTED  
THE OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES  
IN BELGRADE OF THE USSR, POLAND, THE GDR, HUNGARY AND BULGARIA  
WERE HANDED A NOTE ON 22 AUGUST EXPRESSING YUGOSLAVIA'S  
"EXTREME CONCERN" OVER THEIR UNLAWFUL ENTRY INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

ITALIAN COMMUNIST LEADER LUIGI LONGO CENSURED THE  
SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TODAY IN A SPEECH TO HIS  
PARTY DIRECTORATE. EXPRESSING GRAVE DISSENT WITH THE KREMLIN'S  
POLICY, HE EMPHASIZED THAT "IT BELONGS TO THE COMMUNISTS AND  
GOVERNMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO GUARANTEE THE DEFENSE OF THEIR  
COUNTRY."

THE EXODUS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
BY TRAIN AND PRIVATE CAR CONTINUES. A SPECIAL EVACUEE TRAIN  
FROM PRAGUE ARRIVED IN VIENNA TODAY CARRYING 245 AMERICANS  
AMONG IT 426 PASSENGERS. THE U.S. EMBASSY IN PRAGUE REPORTS  
THAT ANOTHER 294 AMERICANS LEFT THERE BY SPECIAL TRAIN FOR  
FRANKFURT AND PARIS THIS MORNING. THE EMBASSY ALSO  
HAS DISPATCHED SEVERAL CAR CARAVANS OF U.S. CITIZENS.

DTG 232213Z AUG 1968

INFO FROM CHECK COPY

1968 AUG 23 23 30

~~SECRET~~

68 AUG 23 PM 7:43

FRIDAY

94

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-17  
By us, NARA, Date 3-8-03

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-21  
By isl, NARA, Date 1-31-07

95

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OO WTE10  
DE WTE 3342

1968 AUG 23 23 15

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

68 AUG 23 PM 7:32

FRIDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUGUST 23, 1968

HEREWITH A CIA ASSESSMENT OF THE POSSIBLE SOVIET MILITARY  
THREAT TO RUMANIA. MOST OF IT IS FAMILAR TO YOU.

QUOTE 1. BUCHAREST IS CLEARLY CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBILITY  
OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN RUMANIA. AS ONE RUMANIAN DIPLOMAT  
IN BONN REPORTEDLY PUT IT "ONCE THE SOVIETS ARE THIS PREGNANT,  
THEY MIGHT DECIDE TO HAVE TWINS." RUMANIAN DIPLOMATS ARE KNOWN  
TO HAVE FLOATED RUMORS CONCERNING POSSIBLE SOVIET INTERVENTION  
AT DIPLOMATIC POSTS IN WASHINGTON, BONN, VIENNA, PARIS, AND  
ATHENS, IN PART NO DOUBT AS A DEVICE TO HEAD OFF ANY SUCH  
ACTIONS. IF THE RUMANIAN LEADERS BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS A  
THREAT OF IMMINENT MILITARY ACTION BY THE USSR, IT IS UNLIKELY  
THAT RUMANIAN LEADER CEAUSESCU WOULD BE GOING AHEAD WITH HIS  
PLANS TO VISIT YUGOSLAVIA ON 24 AUGUST.

2. THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE OF ANY SOVIET MILITARY  
ACTIVITY DIRECTED TOWARD RUMANIA. NEITHER THE US EMBASSIES  
IN BUCHAREST, SOFIA OR BUDAPEST NOR THE US MILITARY ATTACHES  
IN THOSE CAPITALS HAVE REPORTED ANY EVIDENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY  
BUILD-UPS ALONG THE RUMANIAN-USSR BORDER OR THE RUMANIAN-  
HUNGARIAN BORDER. NOR HAVE WE NOTED ANY FIRM INDICATIONS IN  
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE OF SOVIET PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY  
MOVES AGAINST RUMANIA. WE HAVE BEEN IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH  
NSA SPECIALISTS ON THIS SUBJECT FOR THE PAST 24 HOURS.

3. ASIDE FROM THE STORIES PUT OUT BY THE RUMANIANS,  
WE HAVE TWO PIECES OF INFORMATION THAT MAY BE INDICATIVE.

THE SOVIET  
AMBASSADOR IN LONDON TODAY ADVISED AN OFFICIAL OF THE SOVIET  
BANK THERE NOT TO GO AHEAD WITH HIS SCHEDULED VISIT TO RUMANIA  
BECAUSE "BIG THINGS WOULD BE HAPPENING THERE SOON."

A SOVIET DIVISION NEAR THE  
RUMANIAN BORDER IN THE ODESSA MILITARY DISTRICT IS ABSENT FROM  
ITS GARRISON. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHERE THIS DIVISION IS PRESENTLY  
LOCATED.

4. WE ARE INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THE STORIES BEING PUT OUT  
BY THE RUMANIANS AS BEHAVIOR TYPICAL OF BUCHAREST WHEN THEY ARE  
UNDER PRESSURE. HOWEVER, WE ARE  
NOT INCLINED TO WRITE OFF THE PROSPECT OF SOVIET INVASION. IT  
IS CLEARLY A SITUATION THAT WARRANTS THE CLOSEST SCRUTINY OVER  
THE NEXT FEW DAYS. END QUOTE

DTG: 232221Z AUG 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

E.O. 12958

3.3(b)(1); 4.2(c)

XXXXXX FROM QUICK COPY



94  
INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Friday, August 23, 1968 - 5:05 pm

Mr. President:

I am inclined to agree with the attached: the Soviet decision was probably made on August 17, taken to the Central Committee August 19.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-22  
By ebm, NARA, Date 3-17-03



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


96a

~~TOP SECRET TRINE (GAMMA)~~

August 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Decision to Intervene



3.4(b)(1),(3)  
6.1(c)

The withdrawal of Soviet military aircraft and their return to forward positions on Monday would neatly fit this scenario of decision.

*ND*  
Nathaniel Davis

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-22  
By *cbm*, NARA, Date 3-17-03

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~  
~~(GAMMA)~~

*Presfile*

97

Friday, August 23, 1968  
4:25 p. m.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

Herewith a letter to me from Ed Hamilton announcing that he intends to resign, effective September 16.

He was asked by Lester Pearson and Bob McNamara to be the Staff Director of their enterprise. He has profound convictions and feelings about development and foreign aid. In the end, he judged that he could not say no to them; although I know he is speaking the literal truth when he says that he finds it extremely difficult to leave your staff at this time.

I spent a lot of time with Ed talking about this decision. It was my candid advice to him that he could do more for foreign aid and its future by working in the government on the papers that we would leave behind us than he could on this group. But his decision was otherwise; and I believe we can only accept and respect it.

We need not worry about the shop:

- Ed Fried will pick up foreign aid;
- Hal Saunders will pick up India/Pakistan, which he used to carry and would like to carry again;
- I shall probably leave Roger Morris on Africa, on which he has worked with Ed Hamilton.

I may wish to strengthen the shop with an extra junior man or so, but we can manage.

**W. W. Rostow**

**Attachment**

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAY 16, 1983.

BY RG ON 9-9-82

97a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 23, 1968

Dear Walt:

As you know, events have conspired to place before me a difficult personal decision. I have now given it a great deal of thought, and I want to convey and explain my conclusions.

It is hard to exaggerate my debt to you, to Mac Bundy, to Francis Bator, and, above all, to the President. Your unfailing help and your willingness to take a chance on a very green hand have produced the three most absorbing and profitable years of my life. I suppose it is always a special honor to serve a President. But the honor multiplies when the President has the wisdom, the courage, and the vision of President Johnson. I have found it a singular privilege to work for him. Indeed, it has been my firm intent, tested and reaffirmed several times now, to remain on this staff through the end of his Administration.

However, I find that life has its own timetable and that it poses me a hard choice. You know I believe the most serious threats to our security will arise in the developing world where the first prerequisite for peace is economic progress. Though needs and dangers in these areas are growing, there is less and less support for the transfer of resources from rich countries to poor countries necessary to make rapid progress possible. In my judgment, the most important element in reversing this trend is a careful, very high-level review of where we have been in the development business, where we should go, and how we should get there. This kind of assessment and prescription is the necessary, if not the sufficient, condition for the new surge of enthusiasm and creativity so sorely needed.

Fortunately, such a project is about to get underway. Mr. Lester Pearson has agreed to chair a small, distinguished commission to carry out this task under the auspices of the World Bank. This seems to me just the combination of sponsorship, seniority, and political sensitivity most likely to succeed. I think you and I share a deep hope that it will succeed, and, for my own part, I would maintain that its success is at least as important to the long-term national interest of the United States as anything we are doing or may do during the next year in the overseas development field within our own government.



Messrs. Pearson and McNamara have asked me to accept appointment as Staff Director of this enterprise. I have searched my conscience and I find that this is the one task and the one opportunity which cannot be postponed, and which I feel I must be involved in if my services are wanted. Therefore, after the most painstaking consideration, I have decided to ask you to accept my resignation as a Senior Member of the National Security Council Staff, effective September 16.

Again, I want you to know how profoundly I have appreciated the opportunity to serve President Johnson. His greatness and the greatness of these years will stand long after the transient clamor has subsided. His achievements are indelibly inscribed not only in the statute books but in the lives of the millions at home and abroad who will benefit from his foresight and his compassion. History often denies its giants the luxury of immediate and undivided acclaim. But when the final tale is told, it will be clear that the Johnson years brought more good to more people than any similar period in history. And those of us who were privileged to work with him will know why.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Edward K. Hamilton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Edward" being the most prominent.

Edward K. Hamilton

Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House

Friday, Aug. 23, 1968  
11:30 a. m.

Pres J  
98  
/

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have attached to the notes for the  
1:00 p. m. meeting a summary of Gen.  
Abrams' response to your questions.

Herewith the full text of the outgoing  
and incoming.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

*Pres file*

Friday, August 23, 1968 -- 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed opening statement by the President for the Leadership meeting at 1:00 p.m. today, and a proposed agenda to follow.

1. Statement by the President.

I have asked you to meet with us today because I believe our political leaders should know what the world looks like. We are conducting our political campaign and these matters must be discussed; but they should be discussed against a background of knowledge.

The Czech crisis in all its ramifications and situations in South-East Asia and the Middle East add up to one of the major moments of international crisis since 1945. *calling for alertness and calm, confidence and national unity.*

-- There is the unresolved crisis in Czechoslovakia itself with consequences that none of us can fully now predict;

-- There are the implications in the crisis for the posture of NATO;

-- There is great anxiety in Rumania and partial mobilization;

-- *The* Cubans and *the* North Koreans *never* have gone on a military alert posture, ~~probably out of anxiety that, with the Soviet Union distracted, we might move against them;~~

-- Military activity in South Vietnam is building up with every indication from intelligence that we shall have very heavy fighting in the weeks ahead;

-- The Middle East situation remains unresolved, with Arab terrorists and Israeli counter blows continuing to make that part of the world potentially explosive;

-- There is an interruption -- for how long none of us can now predict -- of constructive movement between East and West in Europe and between the United States and the Soviet Union, at a time when we *were* about to come to grips with the great issue of the strategic arms race and possibilities of containing it.



I have no new policies to lay before you today. These are fast-moving events which we shall be weighing carefully and assessing before we make any new decisions about our own policy and action. But I did think it important and right that we should share with you our information on the international scene. After the briefing is completed, we shall answer your questions as best we can; and receive any suggestions or observations you may care to make.

I think it best if we proceed by major areas of the world. We might begin with Europe and then go to Southeast Asia and, finally, have a few words on the Middle East.

## **2. Europe. (The President)**

With respect to Europe: First, Director Helms will tell us what we knew and did not know about Soviet intentions before they moved into Czechoslovakia. Then Mr. Marks will give us a brief picture of the world reaction to the Soviet move. Secretary Rusk will analyze the events in Czechoslovakia and we shall also have Ambassador Thompson's evaluation of Soviet motives and objectives there. Ambassador Ball will tell us what has been going on in New York and what the prospects are at the United Nations for further debate and action. Finally, I want Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler to explain to us the military implications of the crisis, including its implications for our posture in NATO, as they see it.

Secretary Rusk  
Director Helms  
Director Marks  
Ambassador Thompson  
Ambassador Ball  
Secretary Clifford  
General Wheeler

## **3. Southeast Asia. (The President)**

As you know, military activity has increased in recent days in Vietnam and all our intelligence indicators suggest that we face heavy fighting in the weeks ahead. I should first like General Westmoreland to give us his evaluation of the latest reports coming from General Abrams in Saigon. Then I shall call on Secretary Rusk briefly to describe the political evolution of the new government there and the state of the Paris talks. Finally, Secretary Clifford will tell us about the South Vietnamese mobilization of the armed forces, our modernization program, and the performance in the field of the ARVN in recent days.

General Westmoreland  
Secretary Rusk  
Secretary Clifford

It may interest you that I put to General Abrams yesterday a series of searching questions about the military effects of the bombing we are doing against North Vietnam. He replied this morning at great length. Here are the questions I put and a summary of his answers in his own words. (Summary attached for the President to read.)

It is against the background of this and other military evaluations that we have had to insist on some reciprocity for a total bombing cessation and have attached such importance to the de-militarization of the DMZ in our contacts in Paris. You can also see, from General Abrams' assessment, some strictly military reasons Hanoi would wish to press us hard for a total bombing cessation.

4. Middle East. (The President)

As you know, I have always regarded the potential danger in the Middle East as at least as great -- if not greater -- than in Southeast Asia, because of the potentiality of a U. S. - Soviet direct confrontation. We had a good, strong smell of that confrontation in the war of last June. Therefore, I shall ask Secretary Rusk to give us his evaluation of where the Middle East now stands and what the prospects are -- if any -- for forward movement towards peace in the weeks ahead, including especially the meeting of the General Assembly in September when the Foreign Ministers will all be present in New York City, as well as Ambassador Jarring.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Summary of Gen. Abrams' Views

99a

What is the effect of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam?

First, we believe we are now destroying or damaging approximately 15% of the trucks believed to be moving into South Vietnam. This amounts to an average of 90 trucks per week.

Second, it is our conviction that the air interdiction program in the North Vietnam panhandle has been the primary agent which has reduced trucks detected from a level of 1000 a day in mid-July to between 150 and 200 a day at the present.

A third effect is to prevent the enemy from massing artillery and air defense means in the area to the north of the DMZ from which they can attack our forces. Further, we interfere with his ability to concentrate forces and supplies for sudden attacks through the DMZ against our units.

What would be the military effect of a cessation of that bombing?

First, military materiel would be able to reach the DMZ or the borders of Laos unimpeded. We believe the current attrition from truck destruction alone, not to mention truck park storage areas, is running several hundred tons per day on the average in the NVN panhandle. The truck flow could be expected to return to a level of 1,000 a day or even higher within as little as a week. If we take average truck loading at 3-1/2 tons, we are talking about an increase, repeat increase, in southward movement which could amount to 1,500 tons per day or more. Next, the enemy would be able to mass artillery, air defense means, and ground units freely north of the DMZ for use against our forces. Finally, freed from interdiction north of 17 degrees, the enemy could move reinforcements to the DMZ by truck or rail, thus drastically shortening transit time.

Is there any possibility of your providing even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam?

We would have to expect a several-fold increase in U. S. and allied casualties in the First Corps. With the bombing authority now in effect, I am able with forces available to limit the enemy's capability in South Vietnam by interdicting his roads and destroying substantial amounts of his munitions and supplies before they reach South Vietnam. In addition, I am able to suppress his artillery and air defense north of the Ben Hai so that our positions just south of the DMZ are secure. If the bombing in North Vietnam now authorized were



to be suspended, the enemy, in 10 days to two weeks, could develop a capability in the DMZ area in terms of scale, intensity and duration of combat on the order of five times what he now has. If he should develop this, it would, in my judgment, make our positions in northern Quang Tri (to include Dong Ha and the Cua Viet) untenable. I cannot agree to place our forces at the risk which the enemy's capability would then pose.

**INFORMATION**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

100

**Friday, August 23, 1968**  
11:25 a.m.

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith Ssragat urges you not  
to go to Moscow.**

**W. W. R.**

*Pres file*



Department of State

100a  
TELEGRAM  
10

OO RUEHC  
DE RUHHRO 7859 2361005  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 230950Z AUG 68  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7952  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ ROME 7859

7191Q

Aug 23, 1968  
6:44 A.M.

NODIS

1. AMBASSADOR Malfatti, Diplomatic Adviser to President Saragat, conveyed to me urgently this morning, August 23, a personal and private message from Saragat to President Johnson.
2. Saragat has seen a press flash indicating the possibility that President Johnson might consider going to Moscow in the near future. Saragat hopes in the most friendly and personal way that there is no truth to this report and that the President is not rpt not planning to go to Moscow.
3. Saragat believes that the Soviets are now in the worst position in which they have ever been. The whole Communist world is under accusation. Communist parties in Western countries, including Italy, are shaken, confused and on the defensive. President De Gaulle is isolated. For President Johnson to go now to Moscow would save the Communists and would put America's allies, including Italy, in a most difficult situation. The effect in Europe would be very negative.
4. Saragat hopes that his personal expression of concern will be understood as being inspired by his deep friendship for the President and for the United States.

GP-2.

MELDY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 96-296

By jc/cb NARA Date 11-1-01



INFORMATION

101

Friday, August 23, 1968  
11:00 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Intelligence on Czech Crisis

*Pres file*

There are attached two press stories which are the result of Dick Helms' effort to counter earlier reports of a U. S. intelligence failure in anticipating the Czech crisis:

1. An AP report of this morning which is a complete turn-around of its earlier story; \*
2. A Washington Post article which came out of the conversation between Mr. Helms and Russ Wiggins of the Post.

Also attached is a page 1 story in today's Wall Street Journal which says that U. S. intelligence on the Czech situation was excellent -- except for the timing. Mr. Helms does not know the source of this story.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments (3)

\* This is the result of my call of last night to AP - Davey Cornell.

## U.S. INTELLIGENCE-CZP-4

WASHINGTON (AP)--PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND OTHER TOP U.S. OFFICIALS WERE ALERTED TO THE PROBABILITY OF A SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ABOUT THREE WEEKS BEFORE RUSSIAN TROOPS CROSSED CZECH FRONTIERS, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID TODAY. 101a

A SECRET PAPER WAS GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT AND CIRCULATED AMONG SOME 30 HIGH OFFICIALS EARLY IN AUGUST SAYING SUCH A SOVIET-LED MOVE WAS PROBABLE, THE ADMINISTRATION SOURCES SAID.

THEY ALSO DECLARED THAT AS LATE AS TUESDAY, THE DAY OF THE INVASION, JOHNSON AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS WERE NOTIFIED AT THEIR WEEKLY STRATEGY LUNCHEON BY INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS THAT SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION WAS PROBABLE.

THIS WAS BASED ON THE EXPERTS' KNOWLEDGE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ITSELF ALSO WAS MEETING TUESDAY ON THE CZECH SITUATION.

THE CLAIMS OF FOREWARNING CLASHED WITH A PREVIOUS STATEMENT BY A HIGH STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL THAT "WE WERE SURPRISED" BY THE INVASION.

THEY ALSO RAN COUNTER TO INFORMATION FROM PENTAGON SOURCES THAT, WHILE AN INVASION WAS FORESEEN AS A POSSIBILITY, THERE WAS NO INTELLIGENCE FORECAST THAT IT WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN.

THE PENTAGON SOURCES ALSO SAID THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS SURPRISED.

OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID THAT CHARLES BOHLEN, A LEADING EXPERT ON RUSSIA, AND OTHER ADVISERS TOLD JOHNSON IT SHOULD BE ASSUMED THERE WOULD BE SOME SORT OF MILITARY MOVE AGAINST THE CZECHS.

JA948AED AUG. 23

## WASHINGTON -- ADD U.S. INTELLIGENCE-CZECH (24)

THESE SOURCES SAID THAT AT THE TUESDAY LUNCH, ONLY HOURS BEFORE THE INVASION, THERE WAS A VIGOROUS DISCUSSION AMONG JOHNSON, SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CLARK M. CLIFFORD AND OTHERS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A RUSSIAN MOVE.

"THEY DISCUSSED NOT ONLY THE POSSIBILITY BUT EVEN THE PROBABILITY, THERE MIGHT BE AN INVASION," AN OFFICIAL SAID. "THE CONSENSUS WAS THERE MIGHT BE A MOVE AGAINST THE CZECHS."

IT WAS FELT, THE OFFICIALS SAID, BY THOSE AT THE WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON THAT RUSSIA PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO THROTTLE THE LIBERAL CZECH REGIME.

THERE IS NO DISAGREEMENT THAT THE FIRST WORD THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RECEIVED ABOUT THE INVASION CAME FROM RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ANATOLY DOBRYNIN IN A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING WITH JOHNSON TUESDAY NIGHT ABOUT THREE HOURS AFTER THE INCURSIONS STARTED.

THERE ALSO IS NO DISPUTE THAT THE FIRST INFORMATION RECEIVED THROUGH OFFICIAL U.S. INFORMATION GATHERING CHANNELS CAME ABOUT AN HOUR AFTER THE START OF THE JOHNSON-DOBRYNIN MEETING WHEN MONITORING STATIONS INTERCEPTED A RADIO PRAGUE BROADCAST.

ACCORDING TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, OBVIOUSLY ANXIOUS TO SHIELD U.S. INTELLIGENCE FROM CHARGES OF FAILURE, THE INTELLIGENCE MEN WERE "PRETTY SHARP IN CALLING THE SHOTS."

JA953AED AUG. 23

Close Surveillance Maintained

# U.S. Kept Track of Invaders

Troops of the Soviet Union and its communist satellites were under the closest surveillance by the American intelligence community prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and reports on the invasion reached the President within the hour of Soviet Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin's visit, it was learned yesterday.

Following the Cierna meeting, deployment of the troops on Czechoslovakia's border were continuously noted. The shifting of command posts and units were

under constant study and battle information was continuously in hand.

These observations continued during the critical period that Alexander Dubcek, Communist Party chairman, met with Czechoslovakia's editors.

During this time, anxiety mounted.

At the regular Tuesday White House luncheon, where the President surveys the world situation with his top foreign policy advisers, the outlook was reported to him in detail. The facts of the troop deployments on the border, which they could be crossed at almost a moment's notice, were summarized.

CIA Director Richard Helms, and Walt W. Rostow, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, both regarded with foreboding the meeting of the Soviet high-ranking officials in Moscow, to which many of them had been summoned from vacations.

Both officials felt the meeting had to do with the Czech crisis. They did not make any prediction that orders for intervention would be given, but they told the President that the outlook was extremely ominous.

The luncheon meeting lasted from 1 until 3 p.m., and broke up with a clear understanding that very

serious events might be in the offing.

During the evening, the CIA began to gather reports of what looked like alarming though isolated troop movements.

They had a report from reliable sources of troops entering Prague within the hour of Dobrynin's White House visit shortly after 6 p.m.

The lapse between the time of the actual movements and reports to authorities here were attributed to the ordinary delays of transmission and collation.

The first reports were given high credibility because of the nature of the weather, which was cloudy with intermittent mist—a condition in which movements of aircraft and personnel probably would not have occurred if maneuvers only were involved.

In retrospect this was also viewed by Washington intelligence sources as an indication that the operation had been decided upon only a short time before the invasion took place.



## Washington Wire

A Special Weekly Report From  
The Wall Street Journal's  
Capital Bureau

U.S. INTELLIGENCE on Czech crunch was excellent—except for the timing.

Well in advance, LBJ had CIA's flat prediction that Moscow would succeed in crushing Czech liberalism, and wouldn't shy from military occupation. Top diplomats also forecast a tough squeeze on Dubcek, though they thought he might ride it out. But most expected no Russian move before autumn.

Officials here still insist the Russian Politburo really didn't intend to invade so soon, suggesting a sudden change of mind or an as-yet undisclosed shift in the Kremlin power structure. One reason the Moscow men were willing to look like butchers: They figured they would soon have this image anyway, because the Czech free press was digging into past purges and would have implicated Brezhnev in murder.

*The dramatic White House huddles this week entertained no thought of strong U.S. action. The decision against that had come at least a month before.*

102

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, August 23, 1968  
8:30 a.m.

*Per file*

Mr. President:

This is a fuller report of the  
enemy mortar and rocket attacks in  
I Corps and II Corps.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo for Record, "Enemy Attacks in 1st and 2d Corps"  
23 August 1968 0645 EDT

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989  
By rg, NARA, Date 9-9-92

CONFIDENTIAL



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 August 1968  
0645 EDT

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Enemy Attacks in 1st and 2d Corps

1. During the period 221230-221530 EDT August, there were 36 enemy mortar and rocket attacks in the 1st Corps. The attacks were centered in the central and southern coastal areas. Only three were followed by ground assaults. The most significant of these occurred at the MACSOG compound located at Marble Mountain 4 miles south of Da Nang. Enemy sappers penetrated the perimeter but were ejected after a 4-hour fight. Friendly losses were 16 killed, 125 wounded, 3 bunkers destroyed, and 2 bunkers damaged. The enemy suffered 32 killed. Preliminary cumulative results are: friendly, 28 killed and 179 wounded; enemy, 40 killed. Three persons have been detained.

2. The 2d Corps sustained more than 30 enemy mortar, rocket, and ground attacks during the period 212040-221525 EDT August. Preliminary results are: friendly, 16 killed (2 US, 11 ARVN, 1 PF, 2 SVN civ), 57 wounded (36 US, 3 ARVN, 6 CIDG, 8 RF/PF, 2 US civ, 2 SVN civ), and 1 UH-1H, 2 O-1Es, 2 EC-47s, and 3 buildings damaged. The enemy suffered 24 killed.

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NSA REP

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STATE REP

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DDO

ADDO

CCOC

PAC DESK

*Howard S. Moore*  
HOWARD S. MOORE

Rear Admiral, USN

Deputy Director for

Operations, NMCC

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12333, U.S. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 6, 1978

By *ry* NARA Date *9-9-92*

CONFIDENTIAL



103

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, August 23, 1968  
8:27 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

The attached FBI report indicates how, in fact, a good many Soviet officials feel about the Czech invasion. This one is a TASS KGB man in New York City.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-18  
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

1032

RECEIVED  
WHCA

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9:50PM 3-22-63 MSE

PRIORITY

TO: THE PRESIDENT 011

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE 022

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA 017

TO: DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 015  
AND NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER

TO: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 010

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS




3.4(b)  
(1), (6)

END PAGE ONE

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI/RAC 02-19  
By dlm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



3.4(b)(1),(6)

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



3.4(b)(1),(6)

GP-1

END

APPROVED BY SA CG SUL



INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, August 23, 1968  
8:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Ellsworth Bunker's  
reply to the back channel message  
you directed me to send.

My message is also attached.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

*for file*

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 12, NARA, Date 9-9-82

104a

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WHCA

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FM SAIGON  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 231124Z AUG 68

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 297

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

REF: CAP 82084

I EXPECT TO SEE THIEU TOMORROW AND WILL TAKE UP SUBJECT OF YOUR MESSAGE WITH HIM. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED SUBJECT WITH HIM TWICE SINCE HONOLULU. I KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN GIVING MUCH THOUGHT TO HOW BEST TO ESTABLISH CONTACTS WITH OTHER SIDE, AND I SHALL PURSUE THIS SUBJECT WITH HIM TOMORROW. REGARDS.

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

GP-1  
110

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~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ.019.039.001/8

By jc, NARA, Date 11-6-01

August 22, 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER FROM WALT ROSTOW

The President suggests you recall to Thieu his observation at Honolulu that the optimum time for Thieu to negotiate a settlement may be between now and January 20, with this Administration behind him -- an observation with which Thieu indicated apparent understanding and, even, agreement. You might indicate the President's interest in what steps he has taken to establish contacts with the other side and, in general, how Thieu proposes to proceed at his initiative.

CA P82084

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-29  
By us NARA, Date 4-29-03

PRESERVATION COPY



105

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-30  
By io, NARA, Date 2-28-03

~~SECRET~~

Friday, August 23, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ~~The Question of Eugene Black's Going to Cambodia~~

*following*  
The attached memorandum from Secretary Rusk (~~Tab A~~) requests:

1. that you authorize a message to Sihanouk, through the Australians, requesting that Sihanouk receive Mr. Black to discuss Mekong River developments and "the problem in American-Cambodia relations discussed by Ambassador Bowles last January," and
2. that you reconsider the question of Marshall Wright going with Black.

Since Mr. Black's schedule will have to be rearranged if he goes to Cambodia, State is hopeful of obtaining your decision on the first of these recommendations today. As for the second, I see no need for you to reconsider.

Secretary Rusk and Mr. Black believe strongly that Sihanouk would not agree to receive Mr. Black if the discussion were to be confined to Mekong matters alone. Indeed, the major purpose of the visit should be to bring home to Sihanouk our grave concern over North Vietnam Army/Viet Cong use of his territory, including the question of a more effective International Control Commission.

This could lead to the question of a declaration by us concerning Cambodian borders, and we would need to furnish Mr. Black with a formula and authority which could be used if the atmosphere warrants.

A suggested message to be conveyed through the Australians is at Tab B. It is designed to:

- put maximum pressure on Sihanouk to receive Mr. Black;
- give Sihanouk the least possible handle for adverse publicity or for any claim that Mr. Black was coming either to make concessions or to threaten him.

The following considerations should be borne in mind:

- success in this gambit is far from certain;

*sent Rusk via  
wire  
CA P8 2097*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

-- Sihanouk will be greatly tempted to exploit our approach to support his version of his borders, thereby offending Thailand and perhaps Vietnam;

-- if Sihanouk is, in fact, unable or unwilling to do anything about Communist use of his territory, his vanity may be inflamed by our flushing out his impotence or unwillingness -- resulting in characteristic tantrums.

In sum, if our approach fails, we must be prepared for an uncomfortable, public, self-serving exploitation of our efforts by Sihanouk, and an attempt to embarrass us with our allies, his neighbors.

The decision rests on how much we want to gamble in hopes of attaining at least partial solution to the problem of Communist use of Cambodian territory. Despite the very real risks outlined above, I am inclined to believe that we should make the suggested approach, relying upon Mr. Black's good judgment to back away from full use of his authorization if at the time he should believe the dangers appear to outweigh the likelihood of gains.

Recommendation:

That you authorize the message to Sihanouk at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

AJenkins:mmm-

~~SECRET~~

August 22, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mr. Eugene Black's Trip to Asia, and Specifically  
the Question of His Going to Cambodia

Recommendation

1. That you authorize a message to Sihanouk, through the Australians, requesting that Sihanouk receive Mr. Black for the purpose of discussing Mekong River developments and "the problems in American/Cambodian relations discussed by Ambassador Bowles last January." (This covers the use of Cambodian territory by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, and the possibility of our making a border declaration. At the same time, we believe specific topics should not be stated for the reasons given below).

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See Me \_\_\_\_\_

2. That, in order to give Mr. Black's visit to Cambodia additional prestige as well as needed staff support, you reconsider the question of Marshall Wright, of Walt Rostow's staff, going with him, and authorize such participation.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See Me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By pc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

### Discussion

As you know, Mr. Black is making a major speech in Japan on September 17, and then going on to dedicate a newly-constructed bridge that is part of the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos. He is also planning to visit Bangkok and Saigon (for Mekong discussions) and believes it would be highly useful to stop in Manila in order to emphasize our interest in the Asian Development Bank. (I might note that the last has assumed additional importance because of the failure of the Congress, before July 31, to appropriate our third annual \$20 million hard-money commitment to the regular capital of the ADB; we anticipate early action on this in September, but the due date for such commitments is August 22, and we will have had to explain the temporary delay. This of course is wholly different from the question of an authorization for the soft-money "special funds" for the ADB.)

I understand, and agree with, your desire that we make every effort to have Mr. Black visit Cambodia. It is his strong feeling, which I share, that Sihanouk would not agree if the discussion were to be confined to Mekong matters. Moreover, the major purpose of the trip should indeed be to bring home to Sihanouk our grave concern over NVA/VC use of his territory, including the question of a more effective ICC. This could lead on to the question of a declaration by us on the Cambodian borders, and we should arm Mr. Black with a formula and authority that could be used if the atmosphere warrants. We would not have in mind Mr. Black becoming involved in any way in the current question of our captured LCU and its crew; this may or may not be out of the way by early September, but in any event he should not be put in the position of haggling over this issue.

We have weighed the question whether the request for Mr. Black to see the Prince should come in the form of a personal message from you. On the one hand, this would make

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~- 2 -~~

it more likely that Sihanouk would receive him. On the other hand, we see substantial danger that Sihanouk would publicize any message from you in a negative and harmful manner, as he has too often done for our communications in the past and might be particularly tempted to do if the message came from you personally.

Accordingly, weighing all factors, I believe that a message in the sense of the attached draft at TAB A would be our best move (a) to put maximum pressure on Sihanouk to receive Mr. Black; (b) to make clear the subjects we would want to discuss; but (c) to give Sihanouk the least possible handle for adverse publicity or for any claim that Mr. Black was coming either to make concessions or to threaten him.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~DRAFT~~~~TAB A~~Message To Be Conveyed Through Australian Channels

The American Government wishes Prince Sihanouk to know that Mr. Eugene Black, the Personal Representative of President Johnson for Southeast Asian Economic Matters, is traveling to Asia during September to visit Japan, Laos, the Philippines, and nations directly concerned with the development of the Mekong Basin.

The American Government requests that the Royal Cambodian Government receive Mr. Black during the course of this visit. In addition to matters affecting the future development of the Mekong Basin Mr. Black would be prepared to discuss the major problems of American/Cambodian relations that were considered during the visit by Ambassador Chester Bowles in January, which visit was of course deeply appreciated on the American side. Mr. Black is closely familiar with the views of President Johnson and the American Government on these basic problems.

(The Australians should then be instructed to make clear quietly that Mr. Black would not expect to take up



specific pending issues, referring indirectly but clearly to the question of the LCU).

As to dates, the period between September 10 and September 14 would be most convenient for Mr. Black, and would fit with his visit to Manila and with his commitments in Japan on September 15 - 17 and in Laos on September 20 - 21.

~~SECRET~~

August 23, 1963

*Pres file*  
*106*

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

This may be hokum, but you should be aware that the UPI has a report from its correspondent in Bucharest, allegedly from Rumanian diplomats:

Russia has told the Rumanians that Ceausescu must resign or they will invade.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

107  
INFORMATION

Friday, August 23, 1968

Mr. President:

Subject: Infiltration into South Vietnam

Herewith the latest perspective on infiltration since last November.

	<u>1</u> Groups Observed	<u>2</u> Observed* Strength	<u>3</u> Possible** Strength (estimated)
Nov.	20	4,986	7,681
Dec.	16	9,216	11,346
Jan.	32	12,372	15,872
Feb.	14	4,194	7,344
Mar.	48	13,428	25,776
Apr.	53	23,292	34,291
May	61	20,582	29,158
June	41	9,982	15,703
July	33	12,438	17,820
Aug. 1 - 22	<u>7</u>	<u>3,154</u>	<u>3,675</u>
Totals	325	113,644	168,666

The above figures are impressive; but, in addition, two divisions moved across the DMZ in December-January, against Khe Sanh.

W. W. Rostow

\* grouped<sup>s</sup> where intelligence gave us numbers in the group.

\*\* includes column 2 plus numbers allocated to groups where intelligence indicated a group existed, but did not provide numbers.

DECLASSIFIED

WWR:ksb

Authority NLS-CBS 24

By ics, NARS, Date 7-2-84

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~



~~SECRET~~

Friday, August 23, 1968

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

The day before yesterday the city of Saigon received about 20 rocket rounds. Of these, some 15 impacted in the east central portion of the city. The Government Assembly Building was hit by two rounds. Five rounds struck in the Cholon section. Initial reports indicate 17 persons were killed and 69 wounded.

Beginning at noon, Washington time, yesterday the Danang Airbase and Marble Mountain facilities came under ground and artillery attack. Unsuccessful attempts were made to "liberate" a prisoner of war compound. US casualties were 16 killed and 125 wounded. Enemy casualties were 32 killed.

A company size enemy unit has continued the battle three kilometers south of Danang at the Cam Le Bridge. The action continued through the daylight hours and heavy casualties are expected.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Office, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *rg*, NARA, Date 9-9-92

DECLASSIFIED  
EO 12958, Dec 23  
DATE 2-2-83 BY SP-6  
By *rg*, NARA, Date 9-9-92

~~SECRET~~

109

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

August 23, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Subject: Artillery Activity in Czechoslovakia

The Czech artillery communications groups passing fire commands, as reported in the CIA Summary, has declared "the end of the exercise."

This clarifies an area of great concern.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-21  
By il, NARA, Date 1-31-07

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

August 22, 11:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Memorandum for the President

Subject: Unconfirmed reports of Dubcek's Death

The wire services are carrying reports from two ham radio operators - one in Holland and the other in New York state - that Dubcek was killed one or two hours earlier. Repeatedly two different Czech hams made the two broadcasts. They asked that the information be relayed but gave no more information.

We have no confirmation from any other source.

For Walt W. Rostow

Nathaniel Davis



111

Thursday, August 22, 1968  
9:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres. file*

As I reported to Tom Johnson, I could not get Cormier but did get Doug Cornell, of AP. I gave him a very full briefing and he said he would try to get a story in which would not be tied in to the White House.

W. W. Rostow  
(dictated over phone)

WWRostow:rla

112

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

112

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Thursday, August 22, 1968  
8:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

25X10

These [redacted] indicate that the Russians have probably gotten into the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that the voice of Czechoslovakia in New York may have been throttled, although it could be tactics by nationalists in Prague who wish to avoid excessive exposure in capitalist New York.

W. W. Rostow

Walt

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-019-039.001/9

By jc, NARA, Date 11-2-01

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DAVIS

112a

726 PM 8-22-83 EFH

PRIORITY

TO: THE PRESIDENT 07

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE 13

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA 13

TO: DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
AND NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER

TO: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 05

TO: DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 05

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

RECEIVED  
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*free file*

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

CZECH CRISIS




3.4(b)(1), (6)

END PAGE ONE

PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



3.4(b)(1), (6)

GP-1  
EN

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 02-19

By cbm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

PRESERVATION COPY



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WHCA

600 PM -8-22-68 EFH

PRIORITY

TO THE PRESIDENT 06

TO SECRETARY OF STATE 14

TO DIRECTOR CIA 09

TO DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 07

AND NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

1968 AUG 22 22 10

~~SECRET~~ -NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

CZECH CRISIS

3.4(b)  
(1),(6)

PAGE TWO (~~SECRET~~ -NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

3.4(b)  
(1),(6)

PRESERVATION OF

PAGE THREE ~~(SECRET)~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)



3.4(b)(1), (6)

END.  
GP-1

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

PRESERVATION

INFORMATION

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, August 22, 1968  
8:35 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This is another obscure suggestion  
that the Czech military forces may  
take some kind of action.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-29  
By us NARA, Date 4-29-03

WWRostow:rlh



113a

~~SECRET SAVIN~~  
~~SECRET SAVIN~~

1968 AUG 23 00 17

Flash

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USM 42J  
USM 42K  
ZEN

1.4(d)(1)  
1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1), (6)  
6.1(c)

~~SECRET SAVIN FOLLOW-UP NR 2 TO VRITIC 03-68~~

[REDACTED]

1.4(d)(1)  
1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1), (6)  
6.1(c)

NNNNVV

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-23  
By cbm, NARA, Date 4-24-03

114

INFORMATION

Thursday, August 22, 1968  
7:25 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a situation report on  
New York.

You might call George and tell  
him he's doing fine -- if you think he is.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

114a

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Progress of UN Debate

George Ball reports that a vote in the Security Council is not now expected until after midnight tonight.

As of now, there are ten certain votes for the resolution. The Pakistan representative possibly will vote for, making an expected total of eleven.

Two representatives are expected to vote no -- Algeria and India. The Indians say they have no instructions but if they get them in time, they will most likely be negative.

Ball urges we do not try to delay the vote as was suggested earlier today in order to await the arrival of the Czech Foreign Minister who is not now expected in New York until 1:00 p. m. tomorrow.

Ball inquired whether there was any Washington inquiry of his handling of the debate so far.

*Brom*  
Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-162  
By is, NARA Date 9-8-97



115  
INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, August 22, 1968 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob Ginsburgh's analysis of the current data on Vietnam, including the materials from which Sec. Clifford talked at today's Cabinet meeting.

You should also know the following:

"The enemy appears to be attempting to move toward his objectives of Danang, Hoi An, Chu Lai, Quang Ngai, Banmethuot, and Saigon, and the area between the DMZ and Route 9, but in a manner which would avoid contact with our forces to the extent possible. On the other hand, our forces are on the move and we are coming into contact with the enemy. The situation could thus be described as presently being in a state of flux. The most propitious time for the enemy to move would be within the next few nights, which will be the dark of the moon. The evidence of the past week seems to indicate that the enemy is nearing the completion of his preparation for the future military action and intends to pursue a talk-fight policy."

Also attached is an account of some 37 attacks conducted by the enemy between 12:30 and 3:30 p.m. our time. (Tab B)

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 21  
By ica, NARS, Date 6-26-84

WWRostow:rla

115a

~~SECRET~~

22 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Third Offensive

It is clear that the military lull in Vietnam has ended.

I believe that the third offensive has, in fact, started, for the following reasons:

- Key indicators of military activity are running substantially above the 1967 rate; during the lull, they were as much as 30% below the 1967 rate.

- There have been a number of indications that the third offensive would be different from the TET and May offensives. There seems to be more emphasis on prolonged fighting as opposed to high intensity fighting. In view of the extraordinarily high losses the enemy usually seems to suffer during periods of highest intensity fighting, he would have good military reasons for prolonging the fighting rather than intensifying it. The main disadvantage is that his TV image suffers.

- Current intensity is generally comparable to the period 2-9 May -- except for the day of most intense fighting, 5 May.

- Continued references to N-day could refer to different N-days in different locations. Thus, we may well be faced with a series of rolling attacks rather than one all-out country-wide coordinated attack.

- Even if the enemy hopes to conduct a massive offensive, our spoiling attacks may limit his capability and disrupt his timing.

The point of this is not to predict that there will be no major coordinated country-wide attack. The enemy has the capability if he wishes to use it in this fashion at any time.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 21

By ICS, NARS, Date 9-25-84

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The significant points are that:

- we may never see fighting approaching the highest intensities of the TET and May offensives, but
- we should not conclude, therefore, that the third offensive has been abandoned, because
- current intensity is sufficient to make a good case for the evaluation that the third offensive is already under way;
- we would be well-advised to start preparing the Press for this possibility.

2

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


REPORTING PERIOD ENDS AT 2400 H (SAIGON)

TET OFFENSIVE - 29 JAN 68 - 13 FEB 68  
MAY OFFENSIVE - 4 MAY 68 - 9 JUNE 68


1967 DAILY AVERAGE

115b


# US/RVNAF KIA



# VC/NVA KIA



# SABOTAGE/TERRORIST ATTACKS



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NL2/CBS 7  
By iss, NARS, Date 7-25-83

PRESERVATION COPY


REPORTING PERIOD ENDS AT 2400 H (SAIGON)

TET OFFENSIVE - 29 JAN 68 - 13 FEB 68  
MAY OFFENSIVE - 4 MAY 68 - 9 JUNE 68

1967 DAILY AVERAGE


1152

# \* ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS




INCLUDES ALL ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS BY FIRE; FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE ROSE ATTACKS WHICH WERE THE RESULT OF ALLIED OPERATIONS.


## TOWNS ATTACKED



# BN LEVEL ATTACKS



## DIST/PROV CAPITALS ATTACKED



DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30

By jc NARA, Date 11-1-01

PRESERVATION COPY

115 d

Between 12:30 and 3:30 this afternoon there were 27 enemy attacks by ground fire or fire in I Corps. There were 10 attacks in the II Corps. Except for the attacks on the Special Forces Compound and the POW Camp on Marble Mountain and Di Linh City in the II Corps all attacks have seized.

Places that were attacked in the I Corps:

Quang Tri City - five rocket and 40 mortars  
Combat Base Dandergrip - unknown size  
Hue - five to six rounds of rockets  
Phu Bai - unknown number of rounds of mortar  
Three Maf Hqs - mortar and small arms fire  
Danang Airfield - 26 rockets  
Danang City - small arms fire  
Marble Mountain  
Special Forces Compound - mortar and small arms  
fire  
POW Camp - underground attack  
Dien City - mortar and small arms fire  
Hoi An - unknown number of mortar  
Vietnam Navy Coastal Group 14 - mortar and ground attack  
Landing Zone Corba - mortar  
Thang Binh Sector Hqs - mortar rocket and ground attack  
Landing Zone O'Connor - mortar attack  
Landing Zone West - mortar and ground attack  
Tamky City - mortar attack  
Landing Zone Bowman - mortar and ground attack  
Landing Zone Young - mortar attack  
Tien Phuoc City - mortar and small arms fire  
Landing Zone Buff - mortar  
Landing Zone Dotty - mortar and ground attack  
Quang Ngai City - mortar and ground attack  
MACV Compound at Duc Pho City - mortar

There is no other information available at present. This was received from NMCC who received it from MACV by telephone.



114

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, August 22, 1968  
6:55 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith somewhat more detailed  
account of the rocket attack on the  
Danang air base.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 9-9-92

WWRostow:rlh

116a

~~SECRET~~

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1966 AUG 22 22 42

FM 366TFA DNG AB RVN  
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RUHEAA/PACAF CC  
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RUHKB/CINCPACFLT  
RUXSAW/COMUSMACV  
RUMOTLA/COMUSMACVTHAI  
RUMTBK/AMEMB BANGKOK  
RUMSAW/DOD SEPC REP MACV  
RUAOBLA/JIONT SOBE PROCESSING CENTER  
RUHGUL/COMSEVENTH FLT  
RUHKM/CGFMSPAC  
RUMFUE/CTF 77  
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON  
RUEBABA/TAC CP  
RUWTEJA/AFSCC

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12336, Sec 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998  
By 18 NARA Date 9-9-97

PAGE 2 RUMSAGP 1812 ~~SECRET~~  
RUMSAH/12TFW CRB AB RVN  
RUMSARA/37TFW PHN CAT RVN  
RUMBDFB/8TFW UDORN RTAFB THAI  
RUMBDF/DEP CYDR 7 13AF THAI  
RUMBDFE/355TFW TAKLI RTAFB THAI  
RUMBDFD/332TFW KORAT RTAFB THAI  
BT

~~SECRET~~/JPCCO/JOPREP JIFFY 1812/366TFW/DCOI/OPREP-3/  
PINNACLE SERIAL NBR 002.

A. REFERENCE: PINNACLE SERIAL NBR 001.  
A1. SUBJECT: ROCKET ATTAANHDANANG AIR BASE.  
A2. 23 AUG 68

H. INCIDENT NARRATIVE: RECEIVED 21 ROUNDS OF 122MM ENEMY ROCKET  
FIRE. 1 ROUND HIT NEAR BASE OPERATIONS CAUSING FRAGMENTATION  
AND CONCUSSION DAMAGE. ON HIT 6XTRUCK IN FRONT OF 15TH  
AERIAL PORT PASSENGER TERMINAL. FIVE HITS BETWEEN TAXIWAYS E2 4  
-S 3-4 ON DIPT AREA BETWEEN RUNWAY 17L AND TAXIWAY. ON HIT  
INTERSECTIN OF COURIER STATION. TEN HITS IN THE VICINITY OF  
THE AIRCRAFT DUMP ON NORTH END. ON HIT VNAF SOCCER FIELD. ON  
HIT VNAF POL BUILDING. ONE USAF KIA, 4 USAF WIA, 2 USAF BUNKER

PAGE 3 RUMSAG 1812 ~~SECRET~~  
INJURIES. RUNWAY 17R OPERATIONAL, RUNWAY 17L AVAILABLE FOR  
EMERGENCY USE, WILL BE OPERATIONAL WHEN PATCHES DRY.  
FIRE FIGHT IN PROGRESS 1 KILOMETER OFF SOUTH END. NEGATIVE  
OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE REQUIRED.

GP-4  
BT

P file  
117

Thursday, August 22, 1968  
4:00 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith two reports of which you should be aware; although the first is unconfirmed and the second is obbure:

-- the first states that the Austrians have unconfirmed reports that there is some movement of military forces from the Budapest area toward the Romanian frontier;

-- the second indicates that the Czech military are intensively jamming Soviet transmitters and that "special battle material" will "move out" on the passage of a codeword. This could carry an implication that the Czech army may go into business.

We are, of course, following these matters closely.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL & SECRET~~ attachments

~~DECLASSIFIED~~  
~~E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6~~  
NLJ 97-192  
By js, NARA Date 3-6-98

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-192 + NCS/KK 02-22  
By obm, NARA, Date 3-17-03



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 06125 221748Z

1968 AUG 22 18 00

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ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, IO 13,  
GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, SA 01,  
SAL 01, SAH 02, SR 01, NIC 01, ACDA 16, E 15, RSR 01, 129 W

O P 221700Z AUG 68

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4961  
INFO AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIENNA 5125

1. FONOFF SEGEN PLATZER TELLS ME HUNGARIANS HAVE STOPPED RIVER TRAFFIC ON PART OF DANUBE RUNNING BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY AND NUMBER OF AUSTRIAN AND OTHER BOATS ARE STUCK THERE. AUSTRIANS HAVE CALLED IN HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR TO PROTEST AND ASK FOR REOPENING OF RIVER TRAFFIC. PLATZER SPECULATES THAT STOPPAGE OF RIVER TRAFFIC MAY PRESAGE SOME MOVEMENT ACROSS DANUBE BY COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES.

2. PLATZER SAID AUSTRIANS ALSO HAVE UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THERE IS SOME MOVEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES FROM THE BUDAPEST AREA SOUTHWEST TOWARD THE ROMANIAN FRONTIER AND THAT ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES HAD BEEN ALERTED.

MACARTHUR

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-193

By is, NARA Date 5-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TO DIRECTOR

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~~SECRET~~ CRITIC NR 23-6 PASEP ROMEO FIVE/BRAVO PLUS  
42J AND USA 42J

FORM 42J AND USM 42J

1.5(c)  
1.6(d)(1)  
3.4(b)(1), (6)  
4.1(c)

#211

DSA 344

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, August 22, 1968  
4:00 p. m.

*Profile*  
118  
—

MR. PRESIDENT:

I asked Bob Ginsburgh to look at the three recent Democratic proposals for Vietnam and see what a statement would look like which emphasized what was agreed rather than what was disagreed.

I am by no means clear that McCarthy will wish at any point to have what is agreed underlined. I have no idea what Ted Kennedy's political <sup>game</sup> ~~gain~~ is, or George McGovern's. Nevertheless, what Bob Ginsburgh produced is worth reading if you -- or the Vice President -- should at any time try to pull together the Vietnam positions in a positive way.

W. W. Reston

Attachment



## Proposals for a Vietnam Policy

In an election campaign it is entirely proper that each candidate should seek to distinguish his position from those of his opponents.

These distinctions, however, should not obscure the important areas of agreement which do exist. It is especially important that our enemies do not place exaggerated importance on marginal differences while underestimating the substantial consensus which exists.

Within the last week three significant approaches to ending the war in Vietnam have been placed before the Democratic Party -- and the American people:

- Senator McCarthy's seven points,
- Senator Kennedy's four points, and
- the six points of the proposed Dutton/Gilligan platform.

An objective analysis shows that there is little significant difference among any of these proposals or of the current policy of the United States Government.

All four are in agreement on the following substantive points:

- The U. S. seeks an honorable peace by peaceful means.
- The future of Vietnam is a matter for the Vietnamese to decide for themselves. The U. S. should be prepared to consider assistance to the Vietnamese in building a viable political and economic post-war structure -- if they wish us to.
- Within South Vietnam there should be free, honest elections in which all South Vietnamese should be allowed to compete peacefully.
- All foreign troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible.
- As rapidly as possible the ARVN should take over from U. S. troops and U. S. troops should be reduced.
- In the meantime, we should not widen the war; to the contrary, we should de-escalate as rapidly as possible.

- The most meaningful immediate step which the U.S. could take toward peaceful resolution of the conflict is the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

Thus, the issues which exist are not those of fundamental policy. Essentially, they are questions of the best tactics and the proper timing to achieve these fundamental policies.

The tactical issues themselves are largely the result of:

- problems in semantics,
- differences in the style of the candidates,
- our intense search for some way of persuading the North Vietnamese that there ought to be a way of finding a mutually acceptable settlement, and
- a sense of frustration resulting from the fact that the North Vietnamese are not yet ready to stop the war on any terms but their own.

There should be no doubt that even these tactical differences would be largely indistinguishable from each other after any one of the candidates assumed the responsibilities of power. The real difference would turn out to be not a matter of platform, policy, nor of program but the personal, political style of the President.

119  
*Pres file*

INFORMATION

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, August 22, 1968  
3:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

I asked for this appraisal from Dick Helms of a rather suspicious message. Here are the facts and his relatively reassuring judgment.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-29  
By is, NARA, Date 4-29-03

WWRostow:rlh



119a

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

22 August 1968

1.5(c)  
1.6(d)(1)  
3.4(b)(1)(D)  
6.1(c)

Castro may fear that the US might use the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia as a justification for intervention in Cuba.

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~SECRET~~  
Authority: NLJ/RAC 02-23  
By: cbm, NARA, Date: 4-25-03

*Pres file*  
*120*  
*—*

Thurs., Aug. 22, 1968  
10:10 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I asked Bill Bundy to prepare this analysis of Ted Kennedy's speech, which may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

W. P. Bundy  
August 21, 1968

1200

POINTS CONCERNING SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY'S SPEECH

I. Stopping the Bombing

The speech urges that we "end unconditionally all bombing," i.e., without any indication of what Hanoi would do and presumably even if they are in the middle of an offensive. It argues that:

- the bombing has never reduced infiltration, as allegedly confirmed by Secretary Clifford "just last week";
- "an end to the killing in Vietnam can never be negotiated so long as the bombing of North Vietnam continues,"
- halting the bombing would thus save more American lives than it would endanger;
- Hanoi would be "~~much~~" less likely" to initiate new assaults;
- this action would test Hanoi's willingness to begin serious negotiations.

COMMENT

1. What Secretary Clifford said last week was that the present bombing was doing about as well as we could do from the standpoint of "attrition." As the word attrition clearly indicates, this means that the bombing is ~~reducing the present flow by~~ destroying a significant percentage of trucks and supplies.



Moreover, (a point not mentioned by the Senator) the bombing clearly affects North Vietnam's ability to mass forces north of the DMZ and threaten our forces south of the DMZ. This is precisely what Secretary Clifford stressed in the same press conference: "If (the President) gives up the bombing of even this limited part of North Vietnam, he does not want to do it at the expense of the lives of the men we have in northern I Corps."

~~The only point in Secretary Clifford's remarks about whether the bombing was or was not reducing infiltration had to do with whether bombing north of the 20th parallel had this effect. What Secretary Clifford said was that it did not. But this is entirely different from the "attrition" imposed by present bombing restricted to key supply routes and the crucial area north of the DMZ.~~

the

2. It is true that North Vietnamese have refused to consider a cease-fire until the bombing stops. But it does not follow that such a cease-fire, or any major progress in the negotiations, would occur if the bombing stopped. In fact, if we stop the bombing for nothing, as the President pointed out on Monday, such a unilateral step could well stiffen Hanoi and lead it to believe that continued stubbornness would get us to yield on successive points.

3. There is no basis ~~whatsoever~~ for any such confident judgment as the Senator makes that a "blind" cessation -- such as he proposes -- would make new Hanoi attacks "less likely." Hanoi has shown little indication of being influenced by world opinion in its decisions. Under a "blind" cessation, there would be no obligation, not even the indication that the Administration has sought, that new attacks would not take place. The chances must be assessed as substantial that Hanoi would not be deterred -- and the resulting situation could easily become one in which progress was impossible and in which we might even be compelled to resume bombing, which would set back the whole cause of peace substantially.

## II. Negotiating a Mutual Withdrawal from South Vietnam.

The speech urges that, following the bombing cessation, we negotiate mutual withdrawal of all foreign forces with Hanoi.

The speech goes on:

"If we continue instead to insist that our withdrawal be conditioned upon the cessation of all violence in the South, or based upon the readiness of South Vietnamese troops to take over, or tied to elaborate plans for international peace forces, I am very much afraid that we will remain there indefinitely. My objective is much simpler: as Hanoi withdraws her troops, we withdraw ours."

COMMENT

1. We have consistently stated our readiness to negotiate mutual withdrawal with Hanoi, and view it as a first item for substantive discussions. There is no difference of view here.

2. However, the quoted passage is a factually inaccurate statement of the Administration's position, which (by the use of the word "continue") is clearly implied to include the quoted elements. In fact, the Manila formula -- reiterated over and over again by Harriman in Paris, by the President, and by all others -- says that we are prepared to withdraw our forces "as" the forces from the North are withdrawn, and "the level of violence thus subsides." In other words, we have been scrupulously careful not to condition our withdrawal proposal on the cessation of "all violence" in the South, but have tied it solely to the violence caused by forces ~~from~~ the North.

Moreover, the Manila formula for agreed withdrawal has never been contingent on the readiness of South Vietnamese troops, nor on any plan for international peace forces. All that we have said in this area is that any "unilateral" withdrawal can take place only when the South Vietnamese become capable of dealing with the situation.



In short, Senator Kennedy's position that "as Hanoi withdraws her troops, we withdraw ours," is the Administration position. He is unfortunately guilty of misrepresentation in the quoted passage suggesting that the Administration has any different view.

3. The speech contains a curious sentence, in this section, that: "We can in the course of our disengagement take steps to assure the safety of those whom we encouraged to stand up against a Communist military takeover." If this means our withdrawing as Hanoi withdraws, then we do believe this to be the case, and again there is no disagreement. But if Senator Kennedy means that we can do anything "to assure the safety" of non-Communist South Vietnamese in a unilateral and non-compensated US withdrawal, he is flying in the face of all military and civilian judgment on the ground.

### III. Helping the South Vietnamese Build a Viable Structure.

This is Senator Kennedy's third point. As stated in the summary, there can be no argument with it.

Senator Kennedy further says that our intention to withdraw would be the most important spur we could provide to the Saigon Government "to persuade it to broaden its base, increase its appeal, and negotiate an accommodation with the National

Liberation Front." (As already stated, we have made that intention clear.)

Senator Kennedy's next point appears to be that Saigon should not have a veto on our stopping the bombing or mutual withdrawal, and should be put on notice "that their chief prop will be taken away" as soon as we can agree on these matters.

COMMENT

1. There is no disagreement with the objective that the Saigon Government broaden its base and increase its appeal. Moreover, Thieu has made clear<sup>\*</sup> his willingness to deal with elements of the NLF, refusing only to recognize the Front as an independent entity. If the NLF really means business, this distinction should make no difference. Moreover, the South Vietnamese view that the NLF is not in fact independent is abundantly supported by the evidence of its domination, as an organization, from Hanoi.

2. The underlying premise of Senator Kennedy's whole point in this area appears to be that Hanoi will agree to a mutual withdrawal of troops without agreement, or a clear picture, on the political structure in the South. In other words, the Senator appears to think that we can simply negotiate mutual withdrawal and let it go at that. However desirable this

objective -- and one could wholly concur in it -- Hanoi's position on peace treats the so-called "Four Points" as a unit, and thus lumps together withdrawal and a political settlement in the South under the program of the NLF (coalition and takeover). Hence it is most doubtful, if not entirely wishful, to talk as though mutual withdrawal could be negotiated as a separate issue, or <sup>at least</sup> that Hanoi would agree to it on this basis.

IV. "Significantly Decreasing This Year the Level of Our Military Activity and Military Personnel in the South."

This is of course nothing more nor less than a partial unilateral withdrawal. Senator Kennedy argues that it would "hopefully" spur Hanoi to agree to mutual withdrawal with us, and "hopefully" spur Saigon's talking to the NLF.

COMMENT

1. On the best military and civilian judgment on the ground, the unilateral "significant" US withdrawal would weaken the military situation and <sup>surely</sup> ~~further~~ increase Hanoi's temptation to launch further attacks. This has a direct bearing not only on the lives of our men, but on the kind of atmosphere that would exist for serious talks, assuming -- as the Senator proposes -- that we had also stopped the bombing.



2. Apart from the military impact, it flies in the face of all experience with Communist nations, and with Hanoi, to suppose that a unilateral withdrawal would make Hanoi more willing to talk seriously about an agreed mutual withdrawal. Surely they would be much more inclined to argue to themselves that they should hold out and expect us to take another unilateral step.

V. General

While containing some useful elements (stress on withdrawal and strengthening the South Vietnamese), the speech urges a "blind" cessation of the bombing, with all the dangers this would involve not only to lives but to real progress toward peace, and urges significant unilateral withdrawal within the next few months. Far from being the road to an honorable peace, the speech really adds up to the beginning of a process of withdrawal that would hardly, despite the Senator's initial claim for it, "enable us to end our participation in this war with honor, having fulfilled our commitments to prevent a North Vietnamese takeover of the South and having left the future of South Vietnam to the determination of the South Vietnamese people."

In sum, the speech is a slippery and plausible-sounding argument founded on extremely dubious judgments and premises. Indeed, like so many pat solutions, it could be accused of a very deep and basic lack of candor as to its real objectives.

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Thursday, August 22, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a summary of reports on the situation in Bolivia:

*Pres file*

1. This past month Bolivia has faced its longest sustained crisis since the junta takeover in November 1964. The atmosphere in Bolivia is still supercharged. The August 21 coup attempt fizzled, but its key leader, General Vasquez, is still at large (Tab A).

2. The IRG meeting yesterday afternoon tentatively concluded that we should continue to live with the present Government and should learn from President Barrientos what his current motives are (Tab B).

3. The month-long crisis stems from former Minister Arguedas' public admission in Chile on July 18 that he had leaked Che Guevara's prized diary to Castro in June. That incident undermined the support the Bolivian military had been furnishing Barrientos these past four years.

-- Arguedas' charged, in a press conference on his return to La Paz last Saturday, that the CIA had interfered in Bolivian affairs (Tab C).

-- At first, it appeared Arguedas and Barrientos were in league to make the CIA a scapegoat and deflect from themselves some of the criticism over the Guevara diary episode. But in an August 20 press conference, Barrientos defended Bolivia's relations with the US and condemned Cuba as the real threat (Tab D).

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[redacted] much of Arguedas' press conference comment about the CIA is groundless (Tab E).

4. Ambassador Raul Castro will arrive in La Paz this Saturday in an unpublicized manner.

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NLJ 02-29  
By W. W. Rostow NARA, Date 4-29-03

W. W. Rostow

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11622

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Bolivia - Former Army Chief of Staff  
Announces Intention to Overthrow  
Barrientos Regime

Former Army Chief of Staff General Marcos Vasquez at 9:30 p.m. on August 20 announced over a La Paz radio station that he had broken with Barrientos and Ovando with the intention to "raise standard of rebellion."

On August 12, General Vasquez had been maneuvered out of his position as Army Chief of Staff by Barrientos and Ovando because he was considered a threat to the Barrientos Government. Since that time Barrientos has been trying to get General Vasquez out of Bolivia gracefully before he could rally support to his cause and give Barrientos trouble. He was scheduled to arrive in the United States on August 17 to represent Bolivia on the Inter-American Defense Board. His departure from Bolivia would have coincided roughly with the arrival of ex-Minister Antonio Arguedas from Lima.

Vasquez probably sensed that the Arguedas revelations would cause sufficient turmoil in the already charged Bolivian political climate so that he might be

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able to maneuver himself into a position to topple the Barrientos Government. It is reported that he has been actively seeking the support of dissident political parties and groups. He has also been trying to make contact with our Chargé.


Vasquez enjoys some support from some junior and non-commissioned officers and has been trying to expand this support to include entire units. He has been aiming at getting one or two regiments to support him to capture key facilities in La Paz. At the same time, he would try to gain popular support by capitalizing on the recent Arguedas revelations and the strong Bolivian sentiment of nationalism and denouncing the Barrientos Government for corruption and subservience to the United States. Although it is difficult to say from the limited information available on Vasquez' present strength, it would appear from his decision to make a radio announcement without simultaneously having troops move in to take over key installations that he still does not have sufficient Army unit support to move in this manner and therefore is trying to appeal to the public in the hope of rallying Army support if he receives favorable public reaction.

General Ovando made an announcement following Vasquez' announcement calling Vasquez a traitor and stating that the Armed Forces had not taken an active role in the present political crisis but that they would not permit anarchy. President Barrientos is traveling in southern Bolivia and therefore has not yet been heard from on the most recent developments. It is to be assumed, however, that Ovando is acting at this point to preserve constitutional government, and therefore there is agreement between Barrientos and Ovando with regard to how to deal with Vasquez' actions.

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We have been informed by the Bolivian Ambassador here, who was in contact with General Ovando, that General Vasquez has been summarily dismissed from the Armed Forces and has gone into hiding.

At this point in time, it would seem that the Vasquez initiative has aborted, that the Armed Forces are unified behind Barrientos and Ovando, and that Vasquez has not been able to rally sufficient support within the Armed Forces to make a concerted move for power. Nevertheless, the political climate in Bolivia is hypercharged and has been this way for a month now. This is the longest sustained crisis which the Bolivian Government has undergone since the military junta took over from the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in November 1964. Although Barrientos and Ovando working together have been able to maintain control throughout, the stresses and strains of increasing pressure from so many diverse sources in the Bolivian political picture (students, teachers, members of Congress, elements of the Armed Forces and a growing adverse public opinion) are bound to take their toll.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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11634

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 21, 1968

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Bolivia - Situation Report

The coup attempt by deposed Army Chief of Staff General Marcos Vasquez seems to have failed. Armed Vasquez supporters assaulted and temporarily captured the La Paz arsenal in the early morning hours of August 21, but were dislodged and arrested by Army and national police units.

President Barrientos returned to La Paz from Cochabamba in the morning and at a mid-day press conference gave the clear impression that the danger had passed and that Vasquez, now in hiding, would be arrested shortly.

The above estimate of the situation was concurred in by the IRG, which reviewed the latest available information in a meeting this afternoon. The IRG further concluded a) that the basic United States position at this time should be that it supports the continuation of constitutional government, and b) that this was the position we should convey discreetly as appropriate. It was noted that an assessment of

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Barrientos' motives is needed and has been requested (State 224459). The IRG concluded that no further immediate action is feasible. The Country Director was asked to keep the short-range contingency plans under review.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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August 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Bolivia - Former Minister of  
Government Returns, Makes Accusations  
Against CIA

Former Bolivian Minister of Government Arguedas returned to La Paz on August 17. At press conferences held upon his arrival and again later in the day, Arguedas ascribed his action of providing the Guevara diary to Castro to his desire to rid Bolivia of "imperialism," as exemplified by the activities of the CIA. Arguedas claimed that he had been recruited by the CIA in 1965, and provided considerable information on names of CIA personnel and their alleged activities in recent years in Bolivia.

Embassy La Paz believes that Arguedas' anti-CIA line may have been ordered by President Barrientos to place the onus of the diary scandal on the United States, thereby diverting attention from the GOB's shortcomings.

Possible ramifications of this development are several:

- 1) Greatly increased press attention here to CIA "activities."

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- 2) Possible public demonstrations against our Mission in Bolivia.
- 3) Possible intensification by radical student and labor groups of agitation against the GCB (a minor demonstration occurred in La Paz on August 16, but was easily broken up).
- 4) This raises the question of U.S.-Barrientos relationships if the Embassy's belief is correct.

Regarding (1) above we are planning, at least for the time being, to adhere to our usual policy of declining comment on accusations about the CIA, no matter how absurd such accusations are.

Regarding point (2) above, our most recent information is that La Paz is calm, although there are rumors of a possible student demonstration at the American Embassy. The Embassy has taken security precautions.

Regarding point (3), we continue to believe that the GOB can weather local threats as long as support from the military is forthcoming. The Barrientos-military relationship, while uneasy since the onset of the diary scandal, is not yet at a point where military support seems likely to be withdrawn.

On point (4), it is too early to predict the effects of this incident on our relationship with Barrientos. We will be evaluating this question over the next few days.


ACTION TAKEN: Ambassador Castro will delay his arrival in Bolivia. He will return to Washington for further consultations. This action is in accordance

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with the recommendation of Embassy La Paz which believes demonstrations against Ambassador Castro are likely if he arrives at the height of the present crisis.

  
for Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 20, 1968

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Bolivia - Arguedas Case

Bolivian ex-Minister of Government Antonio Arguedas has not had any additional access to the press since August 17. Reports from La Paz indicate that the general political climate except for continuing student demonstrations is calm and that President Barrientos appears to be in control of the Government.

Ex-Army Chief of Staff General Vasquez has not yet departed La Paz for "golden exile" at the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington. There are indications that he has delayed his departure to take advantage of the atmosphere created by Arguedas' charges to organize his own supporters. The Government's chances of maintaining control of the present situation would improve considerably with an early departure of Vasquez.

It is still unknown how far Barrientos is willing to go to refute the specific charges against the CIA in Bolivia. However, at a morning press conference he praised individual U.S. programs in Bolivia such as AID and the Peace Corps. He defended the GOB's relationships with the United States and condemned Cuba as the source of subversion in the hemisphere. He also stated that Arguedas would be tried for treason by a military tribunal.

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


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There are, however, continuing anti-United States reactions to the Arguedas statements. The Embassy expects that they will have lingering negative effects on our relations.

Ambassador Castro has returned from El Salvador to Washington awaiting developments before departing for La Paz. If it is determined by the Embassy that there is a possibility for the Ambassador to arrive with limited public notice we will propose that he arrive in La Paz on Saturday, August 24.

  
for Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

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~~SECRET~~ 121e  
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt Rostow

Cord Meyer tells me he promised you this  
background information

*Rich*  
Richard Helms

Attachment - 1

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20 August 1965  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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NLJ 02-32  
By us, NARA, Date 3-24-03

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 22, 1968

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Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Amb. Bunker's 63rd weekly report:

A. General

-- Lull came to an end on August 17-18; initial enemy attacks were heavily defeated. On August 21-22, tempo was up in all Corps areas.

-- Enemy appears to be avoiding contact in moving against objectives (6 cities and areas south of DMZ), but our forces are engaging him.

-- Enemy appears near completion of preparations for further military action.

-- Vietnamese are giving more thought to a political settlement with a general realization that military victory is not possible for either side and concessions will be necessary.

-- At our suggestion, GVN is working on peace initiative which will hopefully underscore Hanoi's intransigence and help dispel impression that GVN is rigid on peace.

-- Foreign Minister Thanh's August 20 speech stressed flexibility of GVN in future relations with Hanoi and third countries.

-- Keen interest being evinced in US political situation, particularly Democratic Convention; your VFW speech ended speculation on bombing halt.

-- The sum of GVN efforts to improve administration, fight corruption, set up democratic institutions, and improve image abroad, while not spectacular taken day by day, is encouraging.

-- Saigon's Mayor is attacking many problems with vigor and is getting results in areas including civil defense and refugee resettlement.

B. Political

-- Huong government's realization of negative impact abroad of GVN's recent anti-dissident actions may lead to easing of Dzu's sentence from five years' hard labor to house arrest. In two cases this week special military court gave acquittals and suspended sentences.

-- A "Plan for Eliminating Corruption" was announced by GVN, anti-corruption committees were established in each ministry and province and administrative anti-corruption safeguards were to be implemented.

-- Assembly completed work on both Supreme Court and Inspectorate bills. Six months after taking office, Inspectorate will begin audit of property of all top officials.

-- Negotiations continue in Saigon with rebel Montagnard leader.

-- GVN report on Cam Ranh Bay incident to be issued soon.

-- Hanoi reduced stress on Communist Alliance.

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C. Military

- As indicated in General section, lull in enemy activity seems to have ended.
- Particularly effective engagements were fought by regiments of ARVN 1st Division in DMZ and Hue areas.

D. Pacification

- Enemy third-wave offensive preparations have not yet caused significant defensive shifts detracting from pacification effort.
- Thieu will initiate pacification seminar program in IV Corps this week.
- Chieu Hoi ralliers reached 1968 high of 477 last week. They are often instrumental in leading allies to arms caches.
- Initial allocation of 55,000 weapons has been distributed to civilian Self-Defense groups, principally in urban areas likely to be third-wave targets. Self-Defense units reportedly fought well in defending Tay Ninh city.
- RD cadre field strength rose almost 2,000 to 37,500 during July.
- The elite, US-advised, Provincial Reconnaissance Units during first half of 1968 increased strength by 24% and showed 23 to 1 kill ratio against enemy forces. About two-thirds of operations are directed against VC infrastructure.

E. Economic

- Price index rose slightly and is now 30% over January 1 level.
- Money supply is up 45% and still increasing rapidly. Mission fears resumption of inflationary pressure, although safety valve of import licensing is up over previous quarter.
- Black market currency prices continue to rise amid rumors of third-wave attacks and false rumors of impending devaluation.
- Rice deliveries from Mekong Delta are up again, but GVN is still undecided on a rice purchase policy.

W. W. R.



Thursday, August 22, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (saigon 36074)

Herewith my sixty-third weekly message:

A. General

The pattern of enemy military activity changed abruptly during the past week. The lull which had existed for some weeks past came to an end on the night of August 17-18 with a series of coordinated attacks on Tay Ninh Province and city; on Loc Ninh which had been the scene of heavy fighting last October; and Dak Seang in Kontum Province. These attacks were mounted in considerable force. At Tay Ninh, the enemy employed three battalions; in Loc Ninh and Dak Seang, the attacks were in battalion size-plus strength. In each instance the enemy was heavily defeated. He succeeded in gaining a temporary foothold in the southwest perimeter of Tay Ninh city, but was driven out by the morning of August 19. On the night of August 20-21, there was a series of fire and ground attacks on district and province towns in the delta. The province capital of Ben Tre was attacked by two enemy companies and both My Tho and Can Tho were mortared. All told, there were fifteen such attacks during the night. In the early hours of this morning, August 22, Saigon received twenty rounds of 122MM rocket fire, one round going through the roof of the National Assembly building, another falling within a block of our 17th field hospital. Preliminary reports indicated fourteen civilians killed and fifteen wounded. During the last twenty-four hours the tempo of activity has increased in all corps areas.

The enemy appears to be attempting to move toward his objectives of Danang, Hoi An, Chu Lai, Quang Ngai, Ban Me Thuot, and Saigon, and the area between the DMZ and Route 9, but in a manner which would avoid contact with our forces to the extent possible. On the other hand, our forces are on the move and we are coming into contact with the enemy. The situation could thus be described as presently being in a state of flux. The most propitious time for the enemy to move would be within the next few nights, which will be the dark of the moon. The evidence of the past week seems to indicate that the enemy is nearing the completion of his preparation for further military action and intends to pursue a talk-fight policy.

Along with the military situation, discussion of possible terms of a political settlement continues much to the fore in the thoughts of the Vietnamese. Our provincial reporters now say that it is generally accepted in the provinces as well as in the urban areas that there will not be a military victory for either side and that the struggle will eventually become political. It is also becoming more generally understood that concessions will be necessary, and many if not most political leaders are trying to frame in their own minds the terms of a settlement which they can accept.

In this connection, I have discussed with Thieu, Ky, and Thanh the usefulness of some kind of Government of Vietnam peace initiative at this time. It seems to me that this would be an appropriate moment for such a move on several counts. If the enemy should be able to mount an attack, as he gives every indication of at least attempting to do, a prior peace move by the Government of Vietnam would underline Hanoi's aggressiveness and intransigence. It would also help to dispel a view which I take it is held in a good many quarters that this government is rigid and actually hostile toward a political settlement; whereas as a matter of fact, I believe its view has become increasingly flexible. In addition, there is a certain fluidity in Vietnamese domestic opinion on these questions, and the Government of Vietnam could probably do something to prepare public opinion along the right lines if it moved now. Thieu has responded favorably to this suggestion and at his direction a paper is being prepared under Thanh's leadership on government policy toward negotiations and peace. He wants to present this as a forthcoming and positive document that will make clear the determination of his government to find a basis for a just and honorable peace. Thieu has agreed that this will be coordinated with us and I have urged him to proceed on it as rapidly as possible. In my talk with him yesterday, he asked me whether I thought it would be useful if he made a speech which would pull together various things which had been said at one time or another about the government's attitude toward peace; he felt there was considerable confusion here and abroad on where South Vietnam stands. A more realistic view is now taken of peace terms, and it was possible to say things which could not be mentioned publicly in the past. I said that I thought this would be highly useful and should serve to contrast a forthcoming and reasonable attitude on the side of the government with the rigidity which Hanoi had so far displayed at Paris.

Thieu has recently set up an advisory council to help him formulate the government policy and strategy in the expected future negotiations. He has said he expects the DRV to propose a cease-fire in the near future and he wants to be prepared to deal with that contingency. He has, therefore, asked the council to study four main questions: 1. composition of the peace delegation; 2. the conditions under which the government would accept a cease-fire; 3. international controls and guarantees; and 4. future relations between North and South Vietnam.

Of some interest in this connection was a speech August 20 by the Foreign Minister in which he stressed the flexibility of the government with regard to the question of legitimacy (he mentioned the possibility of opening diplomatic relations with such "third world" nations as Indonesia, France, and Cambodia). As one of his conclusions, Thanh said, "the Republic of South Vietnam is prepared to discuss with North Vietnam arrangements for a cease-fire and conditions for reunification by peaceful and democratic process, under international supervision." He spelled out somewhat his ideas on the gradual development of practical bilateral relations after the settlement with North Vietnam -- humanitarian, economic, and cultural -- along the lines he indicated at the Honolulu meeting.

Vietnamese interest in our domestic political situation continues at a high level. There was speculation in the local press on the possibility of a complete halt to the bombing before the Democratic Convention. Your speech at the VFW should put

an end to it. The press also seized on Senator McGovern's candidacy as an important development. Several papers noted editorially Hanoi has been encouraged by his candidacy, and they conclude that no concessions can be expected from Hanoi until the Democratic candidate is selected. Interest both in the Democratic platform and in the candidates will undoubtedly remain intense until the word is out from Chicago.

While attention here is concentrated on the military situation, the question of a future political settlement, and our domestic politics, the government also continues its efforts to improve administration, fight corruption, set up democratic institutions, and improve their image abroad. Taken day by day, progress is not spectacular. However, I think the sum of these efforts is encouraging and I will summarize in the political section some of the things that have been done on these problems during the past week. I should like to mention here, however, a concrete example which I observed this week.

On Tuesday I was invited by the Mayor of Saigon, Colonel Nhieu, to meet with him in his office and subsequently to tour with him those parts of Saigon that were hardest hit during the February and May attacks.

We discussed for about an hour the various problems he faces and the programs he has underway to meet them. This ranged from the usual problems such as traffic, public transportation, police, public works, health and education to the special war-time problems of civil defense, refugee and reconstruction, and the fight against the Communist infrastructure now getting underway in an organized fashion. I was very well impressed with the way the mayor is attacking his many problems. He is well organized, hard working, and has a reputation for honesty.

At present, 150,000 persons including 27,000 females, are on the civil defense rolls -- this figure may ultimately go as high as 500,000-600,000. Of these, 14,316 (including 356, 29.3) have had their 33 hours training. So far, 2,260 weapons have been issued, and the Ministry of Interior has agreed to provide a total of 10,000. A total of over 22,000 weapons will ultimately be issued. These groups are not to be thought of as an army -- their function will be patrolling and guard duty in their own wards and precincts. Only those actually on patrol or guard duty at any given time will be armed. The plan is to provide 30 carbines and one pistol to each of the 711 ward teams. There will also be arms for 56 precinct teams of fifteen men each, and nine district teams of the same size.

Most heartening of all was the progress I saw in reconstruction and resettlement of the Tet and post-Tet evacuees since my last visit to the war-torn parts of the city some two months ago; permanent housing for 1,400 family units, in the form of well planned and attractive four-story, reinforced concrete apartments is expected to be available at the end of October. Nine hundred more such family units are to become available in November. Each apartment building will house from 140 to 150 families. Occupants will pay about 2,000 piasters a month, which over twenty years will make them the owner of their unit. Two thousand more of the same type are planned by the government, and the AID supported Ming Mang project on which



construction has not yet begun, will provide another 2,000. Eventually, between 30,000 and 35,000 people will be provided with housing far better than the shacks in which they had been living. This is all additional to the semi-permanent prefabricated housing such as Petrus Ky (with some 12,000 occupants) and housing constructed by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and U. S. engineer units in districts 6 and 8.

## B. Political

Government of Vietnam Image. The Huong government is aware that some of its recent actions against dissident elements have hurt its image in the United States and other countries. Apparently one result is that some consideration is being given to easing Dzu's sentence. One suggestion we have heard being house arrest in Dalat. We intend to follow up on this possibility.

The special military court this week took action in two cases which, if they do not improve the Government of Vietnam image abroad, certainly will not hurt it. August 16 the court tried the owner of a small print shop and his assistant, a Buddhist monk, for printing subversive literature. Judging by the evidence presented, the two were probably guilty as charged, but they drew only a suspended sentence.

The following day General Lam Van Phat and four other officers were acquitted of charges arising from the attempted February 1965 coup against General Nguyen Khanh. The Phat case was played up in the local press, with accounts of Phat's hard life while posing as a simple peasant farmer in an area often troubled by the Viet Cong. Phat was quoted as saying he had never believed he could set foot in Saigon and become a free citizen again, and he "almost fainted for joy" when told he had been acquitted.

Anti-Corruption Campaign. A further move against corruption was the announcement this week of the establishment of anti-corruption committees in each ministry and province. Announcement of the committees was coupled with the publication of a "plan for eliminating corruption". This effort is intended to concentrate on preventing rather than discovering and punishing corruption. Various administrative procedures and safeguards are to be implemented which will make corruption more difficult and less attractive.

The assembly completed work on both the Inspectorate and Supreme Court bills this week, thus clearing the way for establishment of the two remaining branches of the new constitutional government. Under the law establishing the independent Inspectorate an audit of the property of all top officials, including the President and Vice President, is to be completed within six months after the Inspectorate takes office. There will be 18 chief inspectors, six chosen by the Assembly, six by the Supreme Court, and six by the President. The personnel and facilities of the present Inspectorate under Mai Tho Truyen will apparently be absorbed by the new body; there is speculation that Truyen will himself be named to the Inspectorate and serve as its Chairman.



Fulro. Current negotiations with the rebel Fulro Montagnard leader, Y Bham, are still in progress in Saigon. While no agreement has been reached as yet, both Y Bham and Minister Huynh Van Dao have told us that they are optimistic about the outcome. Y Bham has been entertained informally by Dao, his opposite number in the negotiations, and seems to have confidence in the Huong government. His mere presence in Saigon plus the cordial atmosphere of the negotiations are in sharp contrast to Y Bham's suspicious and somewhat aloof attitude during his negotiations with government officials in Ban Me Thuot last year. This is another area in which the Huong government is following an enlightened policy which promises more support internally and a better image abroad.

The Alliance. Although the alliance has figured in the news recently, largely as a result of some imaginative Japanese correspondents, we have the impression that Hanoi may, at least for the moment, be less interested in its possibilities than formerly. The list of slogans for the commemoration of the August revolution and the DRV National Day omitted any reference to the alliance. Moreover, the latest alliance communique, supposedly issued following a July 3 meeting near Saigon, associates the alliance very closely with the NLF and makes little effort to suggest that its policies differ in any way from that of the NLF or Hanoi. Perhaps the long trial of the alliance leaders and the failure of the alliance to attract any meaningful support in South Vietnam have caused the DRV to conclude that the alliance is not likely to serve as an effective intermediary between Communists and certain nationalist circles.

Cam Ranh Bay Report. The report of the joint investigation was signed by the Defense Minister on August 21 and forwarded to President Thieu. The investigators found that most of the allegations made immediately after the search were untrue. However, they also found that in a few instances, the Americans involved did go beyond the agreements relating to such searches, i.e., they entered and searched in some areas when not accompanied by government authorities. The U. S. side is investigating these incidents further. We are pressing for quick release of the report to dampen down further rumors and speculation.

### C. Military

As I noted in the general section, the lull in enemy activity seems to have ended. Whether this in fact signals the opening of the third wave remains to be seen.

I have outlined the overall military situation in the general section, but I would like to add a few details on some recent Army of the Republic of Vietnam performance; evidences of improvement continue to appear. This week, the second regiment of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 1st Division carried out a brilliant operation in the southern part of the DMZ near the coast. It caught the 1st battalion of the 139th North Vietnamese Army Regiment by surprise, killed 165 of the enemy, captured all the weapons of the heavy weapons company, and a document stating that

the 1st battalion had orders to attack south from the DMZ on August 22. In a brief engagement with the same enemy battalion a few days before, the second Army of the Republic of Vietnam killed 107 enemy. This battalion is believed to be almost wiped out. On August 16, General Abrams visited the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 1st Division and decorated some of the men for their part in this action. He came back more than ever impressed with their professionalism and esprit.

In another action southwest of Hue, the newly organized 4th Regiment of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 1st Division killed 96 enemy, took 40 prisoners, and captured 45 weapons, while suffering six dead and four wounded. This was not only a green regiment, but it was on its first operation.

#### D. Pacification

Preparations against the so-called third wave offensive have not yet detracted from pacification, as there has been little shifting of forces to defensive positions. Nor has increased enemy activity in the Third Corps and now in the delta yet had any apparent impact on pacification. The Government of Vietnam is keeping its cool, with Thieu still planning the first of his pacification visits in the Fourth Corps on Friday. Komer has exerted considerable influence over its preparations and will give us a readout.

Despite usual increased VC/NVA security precautions as attack plans mature, the Chieu Hoi rate hit a 1968 high last week -- 477 returnees. Many brought information on enemy plans. Increasingly returnees are leading friendly forces to caches, which complicates enemy attack preparations. In the lower delta, a VC artillery chief of a district and the chief of a weapons "factory" rallied and promptly led friendly forces to a large cache containing a 75MM pack Howitzer, a 105MM mortar, eight crew-served weapons, innumerable small arms, and large quantities of ammunition. Rewards exceeding one million piasters were paid by the Chieu Hoi Ministry.

We have reports that local self-defense groups fought well against enemy who infiltrated Tay Ninh city during Sunday morning's attack. In fact, the self-defense program has moved ahead rapidly during "self-defense month", which opened on August 11 and is gaining momentum. The first allocation of 55,000 weapons has been distributed, principally to Saigon and other large cities most likely to be targets of any "third-wave". Although statistics are probably quite unreliable because of rapid growth of the program, the interior ministry lists almost 270,000 people as being involved -- security groups, first-aid teams, lookouts, etc. More than 130,000 are already armed. Ceremonies to present weapons to people's self-defense groups are being held around the country as the President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Interior all give personal support to the program.

Big improvements were noted in Revolutionary Development cadre during July. Field strength jumped almost 2000 to nearly 37,500. For the fifth month in a row cadre losses declined -- mainly as a result of fewer desertions.

But by far the most productive pacification elements are the elite provincial reconnaissance units over which U. S. advisors exert considerably more control than any other pacification asset. Their strength increased 24 percent during the first half of 1968. Over the six-month period, the enemy/provincial reconnaissance unit kill ratio was 23 to 1 -- last month it was 25 to 1. About two-thirds of all provincial reconnaissance unit operations are directed against the VC infrastructure, making the provincial reconnaissance units our most potent exploitation force.

#### E. Economic

In another relatively quiet week, retail prices in Saigon rose slightly. The food index rose 2 percent and non-food items rose 1 percent. The rise in food prices was chiefly due to a firming of rice prices, which rose 2 to 5 percent, probably due to rumors of an impending price support program. Goods moving up Route 4 from the delta are in good supply, but rains and security conditions continue to impede traffic on Route 20 from Dalat.

The retail price increase since January 1 now stands at 30 percent. During the same period, the money supply has increased by about 45 percent, and it is still increasing rapidly. Therefore, despite the fact that price increases have been moderate during the last few weeks, we still fear that inflationary pressures will resume over the coming months. However, the largest safety valve for inflationary pressure, imports, show signs that it is functioning: licensing of government foreign exchange totaled \$24 million in July and \$11 million in the first 11 days of August, compared, for instance, to \$56 million for the whole April-June quarter.

One disturbing note is that black market currency prices continued to rise last week, with the dollar rate reaching 210-215 piasters by week's end. Some generalized fear of inflation is no doubt a work, but rumors of an impending "third wave" attack on Saigon, and of developments from the Paris conference, are now at a height, and these may be responsible for the fairly sharp rises in currency rates of the last two or three weeks. Time Magazine's totally false report that there would be another devaluation may also have contributed to the pressure on the piaster.

Rice deliveries from the delta were strong during the first half of August -- 20,000 tons compared to 30,000 for the whole month of July, and July itself was a good month. Rumor of government action on a price support program is believed to be one of the factors. Unfortunately, there is so far no truth to this particular rumor, as the government continues undecided on the key questions of how much rice will be purchased, when and at what price.

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INFORMATION

August 22, 1968

Mr. President,

*Pres file*

Congressional comments on the first day of the Czech occupation included the following comments from Press accounts. All except Senator McCarthy treated the events as a very serious and highly deplorable matter.

DEMOCRATS

Senator Eugene McCarthy

- "I do not see this as a major world crisis."
- "There is little the U.S. could have done."
- Calling an NSC meeting was "out of proportion" to events.
- "If you want to play games at the U.N., go ahead."
- Vietnam, Dominican Republic and Bay of Pigs make it "harder for us to raise serious moral and diplomatic protests. We certainly could not use force in view of President Johnson's recent statement on the bombing of North Vietnam."

Senator George McGovern

- "I view this as a serious matter."
- "The United States is certainly not going to get involved in this matter."
- "The United Nations ought to be the forum where these things are settled."
- Because of Vietnam "our capacity to protest the Soviet intervention is weakened."
- The occupation reflects "fundamental division in the Red Bloc," but the "force of nationalism" will in long run prevail.

Senator Edward Kennedy

- "The entry of Russian troops in Czechoslovakia is a retrogression into an age we had all hoped was passed. I will not comment in detail, but these events are an affront to decency and especially to the brave people who have demonstrated that they seek to be independent of the Soviet Union."



Senator Thomas Dodd

- "The Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia is an act of infamy which will go down in history with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. I hope that the tragedy in Czechoslovakia will be a lesson to those who have urged appeasement or conciliation on Communism in Europe, in Vietnam, in Latin America and throughout the world, or who have engaged in pipedreams about a softening in Soviet policies."
- U.S. should invoke an emergency session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Senator William Fulbright

- "A very tragic development" which in the long run "will prove to be a great mistake on the part of the Russians." Shows "that communism as such -- the Russian variety at least -- does not appeal to the Czechs."
- Fulbright has offered no advice on U.S. course of action. "It's too new."

Senator Mike Mansfield

- "There is nothing that the U.S. can do. Our over-involvement in Vietnam would prevent us from doing anything even if there was anything we could do -- which we cannot at this time."
- "All the United Nations can do is to debate and deplore the situation..."

Senator Wayne Morse

- "...demonstrated again that a totalitarian state fears freedom of expression more than it fears anything else... The Communist parties of Russia, Finland, East Germany and Bulgaria knew that their own doctrinaire way of life could not withstand freedom of expression, should it prove contagious."

Senator William Proxmire

- "The invasion means higher taxes for Americans. Now the defense budget could be higher than ever."
- "Any prospect for reducing American troops in Western Europe is now gone for the indefinite future. The prospect of an additional, expensive U.S. buildup in Europe seems very real."

Senator Ralph Yarborough

- "We are weak over the rest of the world because we have all of our forces pinned down in Southeast Asia."
- "The Czech events raised 'a very definite possibility' that President Johnson might re-enter the Presidential contest."

8/22/68

## REPUBLICANS

### Senator George Aiken

- "Some of the Eastern European nations have been trying to get out from under Russian domination for a long time. Unfortunately, the U.S. has not given them any encouragement, but apparently will go along with whatever Russia wants to do there. It's disgusting."
- The Russian invasion was not fully unexpected.

### Senator Frank Carlson

- The situation is "extremely grave with far-reaching implications. The intrusion of foreign troops into that country proves once again the foundation upon which we had hoped to build better East West relations is merely a Communist facade. What they really mean is peaceful coexistence on their terms only."
- "The reversion to the strong-arm police-state tactics similar to the Hungarian revolt is a brutal shock to the hopes and desires of citizens throughout Europe."

### Representative Paul Findley

- The NATO Council should be convened immediately and U.S. ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty should be suspended indefinitely.
- U.N. Security Council should be called quickly.

### Representative Gerald Ford

- The sympathies of all Americans "are with the freedom-loving Czechs so crudely suppressed by Soviet military might, but the U.S. should not become involved in this Communist family fight."
- Soviet invasion is "a clear violation of Czech sovereignty," but U.S. should "move with extreme caution in this situation."
- Soviet Union should be required to explain its actions before the United Nations.

### Senator Thomas Kuchel

- "Brutal Soviet aggression against a liberal neighbor" poses "a grave warning to the Atlantic Alliance nations" -- "the flames could easily spread."
- "A terrible blow to our prayers for a durable peace. The entire world has a vital stake in this tragedy. Therefore there is an urgent need to convene the U.N. Security Council at once."

Senator Jack Miller

- The Senate should seriously consider postponing ratification with Russia of the pending non-proliferation treaty.
- "This resort to the same type of naked military power as was used in Hungary clearly demonstrates that the leaders of the Soviet Union have not changed their philosophy or strategy."

Representative William Minshall

- "...greatly disturbed by the apparent failure of our intelligence services to provide our government with any advance notice of the invasion."
- Called for an immediate emergency meeting of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee with Pentagon and State Department officials to consider what can be done "to shape up and sharpen up our intelligence agencies both in the military and the CIA?"

Senator Strom Thurmond

- "Demonstrates once again, as did the murder of Hungarian citizens in the 1950's, that Soviet Communism is the same under Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev as it was under the tyrannical dictatorship of Khrushchev and Stalin. -- There is once again blood on the Iron Curtain and another nation's death piled on the debris of history which cries for strong foreign policy leadership from America." The goals of world communism remain "totalitarian, monolithic, expansionistic and dependent upon military power and brute force to exercise its will."

Representative Bob Wilson

- The Russians "have reverted to their true colors."

8/22/68

**BOMBINGS SINCE MARCH 31**


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For President's use at  
Cabinet Meeting 8/22/68

On March 31, I restricted the bombing of North Vietnam to a limited area below the 20th parallel excluding the area containing about 90% of the population and 80% of the land area.

Here is how I look at the cost to us of this move and the advantages.

The costs are these:

Pres. file

- 
- Supplies move normally into Haiphong Harbor to Hanoi and south -- without obstruction. Hanoi is repairing plants we have damaged and bridges and other transport facilities.
  - Although they have not disbanded or sent south the large forces allocated to anti-aircraft defense and repair work, the lack of bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area has undoubtedly eased Hanoi's task of running their country.

On the other hand, since April 1, we have been destroying or damaging each week an average of 200 of the 700 trucks that we observe. These trucks are all engaged in supplying the forces in South Vietnam. By this concentrated bombing, we are reducing the flow of men and ammunition below the level it would otherwise reach. This has been particularly important since every indicator of intelligence available to us tells us that they have been building up our men and supplies in the South for a third major attack which could come at any time -- although they have not yet apparently made the final decision to go.

The cessation of the bombing of the northern part of Vietnam has reduced the pressure on us around the world. Secretary Rusk tells me that none of the western European governments -- or indeed other non-communist governments -- is pressing us to stop the rest of the bombing without some understanding from the other side on what they would do if we would stop.

- Although now a considerable campaign is being mounted in the United States to stop the rest of the bombing unilaterally, the people as a whole understand, as a recent poll indicates, that we have to protect our men with this tactical bombing in the panhandle until we can get some reciprocity.



On balance, our military men are reasonably satisfied that the decision we took on March 31 has not significantly weakened our position, especially at a time when they expect further intensive battles in the south, and we continue to bomb in the relevant tactical area north of the DMZ.

Restow/mf  
8-22-68  
12:45p

~~SECRET~~

August 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakia -- Talking Points for Today's Cabinet Meeting

You may wish to open today's Cabinet Meeting with the following points:

1. The [REDACTED] Cierna meeting indicated we should not assume there would be no military intervention by the Soviets.

3.3  
(b)(1)

-- Our [REDACTED] continued to show Soviet forces massed for imminent invasion.

-- For several days prior to August 20 there were reports of increased tension and some indications of preparation for action.

-- We were provided with excellent reporting from Prague and Moscow, including ~~our~~ Ambassador Thompson's overall evaluation that "the Soviets will go to great lengths to push the Czechs back to something close to the pre-January situation, and the following interesting prediction by a Soviet intellectual on August 1: "No matter what our leaders have said at Cierna, or will say at Bratislava, sooner or later they will have to crush this thing."

-- The Tuesday lunch agenda carried the following item: "Soviet strategy in U. S. -Soviet relations at this stage, including the relationship to possible moves against Czechoslovakia." At the Tuesday lunch we discussed reports of a Soviet Central Committee meeting and Richard Helms reported that this might indicate a definite Soviet decision to move.

2. The Soviets probably decided to move for both foreign and domestic reasons.

-- Czechoslovakia protects the flank of Soviet forces in Germany and the viability of the Soviet position in the heart of Europe hinges on it. Without Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Pact might well ~~crumble~~ tremble.

-- The play-back effect of Czechoslovakia's experiment in democracy and freedom threatens Communist stability throughout the Bloc and in the Soviet Union itself.

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

3. The events of Tuesday evening:

-- At 7:05 p.m. Walt Rostow relayed Dobrynin's request for a meeting. Secretary Rusk was immediately informed.

-- Dobrynin came to the White House, and read the Soviet statement advising us that troops were moving in alleged response to external and internal threats to the Czech Communist regime.

-- After his session with the platform committee -- during which ticker reports of the invasion started coming in -- Secretary Rusk returned to the White House.

-- The NSC meeting followed.

4. We believe there is no basic disagreement within the United States Government on policy.

-- We have no commitment to intervene militarily in Czech defense.

-- We do not believe an American military intervention is in our national interest.

(We also do not believe such an intervention could be in the Czech interest. Interestingly, the Czechs were sufficiently prepared for what happened to have issued explicit orders to their military forces not to resist an invasion.)

5. We must treat the present situation -- in all its tragedy -- in the broad context of world politics. The Cold War is not over, but we should also understand that we cannot simply return to it. As I said in my 1967 State of the Union Message, "Our relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are ... in transition" -- a transition that is complicated and dangerous. The ideological basis for Soviet power is fragmenting, and the Russians are moving toward a more pragmatic and normal society -- but they are still a great and jealous nation state. The work we have done in recent years has contributed to this process. In the long run, it will be vitally important to continue this work -- although no one can say with any certainty when it will be possible to resume our efforts in practical ways.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~