

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a cable	Saigon 37046 <del>S</del> 8 p <i>open 11/9/02</i> [Duplicate of #33a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8 B(3)[B] Bunker Weekly Report to President"] [Sanitized NLJ CBS 10]	9/4/68	<del>A</del>
#3 memo	Rostow to President, 2:00 p.m. <del>S</del> 2 p <i>open 11/9/02</i>	9/7/68	<del>A</del>
#5a memo	Wheeler to Rostow <del>S</del> 7 p <i>open 3-9-03 NLJ/RAC 02-53</i>	9/11/68	<del>A</del>
#7 memo	Rostow to President, 4:15 p.m. <del>C</del> 1 p <i>open 11/9/02</i>	9/11/68	<del>A</del>
#9 memo	Rostow to President, 3:30 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 11/9/02</i>	9/11/68	<del>A</del>
#9a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 11/9/02</i>	9/10/68	<del>A</del>
#9b table	"Attack sorties" <del>PCI</del> 1 p <i>open 11/9/02</i>	undated	<del>A</del>
#10 memo	Rostow to President, 2:20 p.m. <i>Open 11.27.97</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	9/11/68	<del>A</del>
#10a cable	Paris 20662 <del>S</del> 4 p <i>Open 4.21.97 RAC</i> [Dup. #45a, NSF CF VN, "HARUAN XTB" BX 119] [Dup. #28, NSF, LE VAI, "HARUAN XTB Y.21"]	9/11/68	<del>A</del>
#13 memo	Rostow to President, 9:45 a.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 11/9/02</i>	9/11/68	<del>A</del>
#16 memo	Rostow to President, re: Japan <i>Open 4-21-97 NLJ 96-91</i> <del>C</del> 1 p	9/11/68	<del>A</del>
#16a ltr	President to PM Sato <i>Open 4-21-97 NLJ 96-91</i> <del>PCI</del> 1 p	9/13/68	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 93, September 1-11, 1968**

**Box 39**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16a ltr	<del>PM Sato to President</del> <del>PCI 3 p</del> <i>open 4-21-93 NSF 96-71</i>	<del>8/16/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#17 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>C 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#18a memo	<del>Holbrooke to Secretary</del> <del>TS 3 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#18d ltr	<del>Averell to Dean</del> <del>TS 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#18e note	<del>From Cyrus Vance</del> <del>TS 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#18f rpt	<del>From Governor Harriman</del> <del>TS 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#18g rpt	<del>"Harriman's Views on a Meeting with Kosygin"</del> <del>TS 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#20 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 8:10 p.m.</del> <del>C 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#20a memo	<del>Fowler to President</del> <del>C 2 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#21 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 8:05 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p open 1-10-93 NLJ 94-197</del>	<del>9/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#21a memo	<del>Rusk to President</del> <del>S 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#22 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>S 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#24 memo	<del>Rostow to President, re: Barbados</del> <del>C 1 p open 1/9/02</del> [Duplicate of #28, NSF, Country File, Barbados, Prime Minister's Visit]	<del>9/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 93, September 1-11, 1968

Box 39

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#24a memo	<del>Rusk to President</del> <del>C</del> <del>2 p</del> <del>open 1/9/02</del> [Duplicate of #1d and 28a, NSF, Country File, Barbados, Prime Minister's Visit]	<del>8/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#24b rpt	<del>Talking Points re: Barbados</del> <del>C</del> <del>2 p</del> <del>open 1/9/02</del> [Duplicate of #1e and 28b, NSF, Country File, Barbados, Prime Minister's Visit]	<del>9/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#27 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 4:00 p.m.</del> <del>open 4/12/03 NSF 02-67</del> <del>PCI</del> <del>1 p</del>	<del>9/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#27a memo	<del>Davis to Rostow</del> <del>open 4/12/03 NSF 02-67</del> <del>PCI</del> <del>2 p</del>	<del>9/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#28a cable	<del>Vienna 6459</del> <del>S</del> <del>2 p</del> <i>open 5.21.98 NLJ 97-193</i> [Duplicate of #8a, NSF, Country File, Austria, Vol. I]	<del>9/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#30 memo	<del>Rostow to President, re: Libya</del> <del>C</del> <del>1 p</del> <del>open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#32 memo	<del>Rostow to President, re: India</del> <del>C</del> <del>1 p</del> <del>open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#32a memo	<del>Rusk to President, re: India</del> <del>C</del> <del>2 p</del> <del>open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#32b draft	<del>President to PM Gandhi</del> <del>PCI</del> <del>1 p</del> <del>open 1/9/02</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#32c memo	<del>Read to Rostow</del> <del>C</del> <del>1 p</del> <del>open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#32d draft	<del>President to PM Gandhi</del> <del>PCI</del> <del>1 p</del> <del>open 1/9/02</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#33 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>C</del> <del>1 p</del> <del>open 1/9/02</del> [Duplicate of #64j, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 94]	<del>9/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 93, September 1-11, 1968

Box 39

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#34 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>S 1 p open 1/9/02</del> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 9/9/68]	9/9/68	<del>A</del>
#34a memo	<del>Rusk to President, re: Israel</del> <del>S 2 p open 1/9/02</del> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 9/9/68]	9/9/68	<del>A</del>
#34b rpt	<del>Talking Points re: Israel</del> <del>S 2 p open 1/9/02</del> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 9/9/68]	9/9/68	<del>A</del>
#36a cable	<del>Intelligence Cable</del> open 1/9/02 <del>C 2 p</del>	9/8/68	<del>A</del>
#37a cable	<del>Bonn 16587</del> <del>C 2 p</del> open 7-28-94 NLS 94-198	9/7/68	<del>A</del>
#38a cable	<del>Paris 20523</del> <del>S 14 p open 1/9/02</del> [Dup. #58a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN XVI, "Bx 119"] [Dup. #58 NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN Chron v. 21"]	9/7/68	<del>A</del>
#39 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 10:16 a.m.</del> <del>PCI 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	9/8/68	<del>A</del>
#39a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p sanitized per RPL 1/9/02	9/7/68	A
#40a cable	<del>Prague 3444</del> open 4/14/03 NLS 02-78 <del>S 2 p</del>	9/8/68	<del>A</del>
#41 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 3:30 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p open 1/9/02</del> [Duplicate of #62, NSF, CF, VN, "General Military Activity, 2C(15)a, 9/1-10/68"]	9/7/68	<del>A</del>
#41a memo	<del>Coberly to Smith</del> <del>S 2 p open 1/9/02</del> [Duplicate of #62a, NSF, CF, VN, "General Military Activity, 2C(15)a, 9/1-10/68"]	9/7/68	A

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 93, September 1-11, 1968**

**Box 39**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#42 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 3:15 p.m. open 4/1/03 NSJ/RAC 77-214</del> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>9/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#42a rpt	Intelligence Report S- 1 p	undated	A
#44 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 2:10 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p open 3/13/03 NSJ/RAC 02-54</del>	<del>9/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#45a cable	<del>Paris 20522</del> <del>S 2 p open 1/9/02</del> [Dup #59a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD II, "BX 119"] [Dup #59, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD Chron V. 21"]	<del>9/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#46 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m.</del> <del>C 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#46a cable	<del>Moscow 5413</del> <del>C 2 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#47 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 10:35 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 8:35 a.m. sanitized per RAC 1/9/02 S 1 p	9/7/68	A
#48a cable	Intelligence cable sanitized per RAC 1/9/02 S 1 p	9/7/68	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, 8:20 a.m. sanitized per RAC 1/9/02 S 1 p	9/7/68	A
#49a cable	Intelligence Information Cable sanitized per RAC 1/9/02 S 2 p	9/6/68	A
#49b cable	Intelligence Information Cable exempt per RAC 8/24/01 S 5 p	9/6/68	A
#49c cable	Intelligence Information Cable exempt per RAC 8/24/01 S 3 p	9/6/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 93, September 1-11, 1968

Box 39

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#51 memo	Rostow to President, re: Germany. TS 1 p open 1/9/02	9/7/68	A
#51a letter	President to Kiesinger TS 2 p open 1/9/02	9/9/68	A
#55a cable	Bucharest 2478 S 3 p open 1/9/02 [Duplicate of #32c, NSF, Country File, Rumania, Vol. 3] [Exempt NLJ 88-147]	9/6/68	A
#56 memo	Rostow to President, 1:30 p.m. open 9-25-97 NLJ 97-162 C 1 p	9/6/68	A
#56a memo	Bauer to Ryan open 11/3/02 NLJ 02-55 C 2 p	8/30/68	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President, 1:15 p.m. open 9-25-97 NLJ 97-162 C 1 p	9/6/68	A
#58a rpt	"Statement of the Pres. on Admission of Czech. Refugees..." C 1 p	undated	A
#58b rpt	"Statement on Admission of Czech. Refugees..." C 1 p	undated	A
#60 memo	Rostow to President, 12:30 p.m. submitted per SEC 9/9/02 S 1 p	9/6/68	A
#60a cable	Intelligence Information Cable submitted per SEC 1/9/02 S 3 p	9/5/68	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President, re: Egypt C 1 p open 1/9/02	9/6/68	A
#61a rp	"Luke Battle to Visit Egypt" PCI 1 p open 1/9/02	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 93, September 1-11, 1968**

**Box 39**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#63 memo	Rostow to President, re: Iran <del>C</del> 1 p open 1/9/01	9/5/68	A
#64a cable	Bucharest 2477 <del>C</del> 2 p open 1/9/02 [Duplicate of #32e, NSF, Country File, Rumania, Vol. 3]	9/6/68	A
#65a cable	London 12398 <del>S</del> 5 p open 1/9/02 [dup #64a & 64b, NSF, CF, UK "Vol. 14" Bx 212]	9/5/68	A
#66 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 p.m. <del>C</del> 1 p open 1-17-97 NLJ 96-26 [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 9/9/68]	9/5/68	A
#69 memo	Rostow to President <del>S</del> 1 p [open Dup #266, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN III, Bx 119"] [Poss. Dup #266, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN Chron V.21"]	9/5/68	A
#69a cable	Deptel to Paris " " " <del>S</del> 2 p [dup. #266, NSF, CF, VN, HARVAN Paris V 12, "Bx 119"] [dup. #68, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN Chron V.21"]	undatd	A
#70 memo	Rostow to President open 4/3/03 NLS 02-67 <del>S</del> 2 p [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 9/5/68]	9/5/68	A
#70a memo	Rusk to President <del>S</del> 1 p open 1/9/02	9/5/68	A
#70b rpt	"Principal Instructions for Mr. Eugene Black's..." <del>S</del> 3 p open 1/9/02	9/68	A
#71 memo	Rostow to President, 5:10 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p Open NLJ 97-409 9.29.98	9/5/68	A
#71a rpt	"North Vietnamese Conversations with Norwegians" <del>S</del> 2 p " " "	9/5/68	A
#72 memo	Rostow to President, 5 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p open 1-10-95 NLJ 94-339	9/5/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 93, September 1-11, 1968

Box 39

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#72a cable	<del>Bonn 16454</del> <i>open 7-28-94 NLJ 94-198</i> <del>S 5 p</del>	<del>9/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#73 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 5 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#73a memo	<del>Mission Council Action Memo #66</del> <del>S 2 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>8/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#75 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 10:25 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p open 1/9/02</del> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 9/5/68]	<del>9/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#77a memo	<del>Rusk to President</del> <del>C 2 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#82 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 4:30 p.m.</del> <del>TS 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#83 cable	<del>President to Abrams (CAP 82372)</del> <i>sanitized as per 1/9/02</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>9/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#88 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 10:05 a.m.</del> <del>TS 1 p open 1/9/02</del>	<del>9/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#89 memo	<del>Rostow to President, re: Germany</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 1-10-95 NLJ 94-197</i> [Duplicate of #44, Meeting Notes File, "[Briefing Papers for] September 4, 1968 National Security Council Meeting"] [Sanitized NLJ 82-206]	<del>9/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#89b draft	<del>President to Kissinger</del> <del>PCI 2 p</del> <i>open 1-10-95 NLJ 94-197</i> [Duplicate of #44d, Meeting Notes File, "[Briefing Papers for] September 4, 1968 National Security Council Meeting"]	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#89c ltr	<del>Kissinger to President</del> <del>PCI 1 p</del> <i>open 1-10-95 NLJ 94-197</i> [Duplicate of #44g, Meeting Notes File, "[Briefing Papers for] September 4, 1968 National Security Council Meeting"]	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 93, September 1-11, 1968**

**Box 39**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#89h cable</del>	Berlin 2170 <del>C</del> 2 p <i>open 11-14-94 NLS 94-199</i> [Duplicate of #44j, Meeting Notes File, "[Briefing Papers for] September 4, 1968 National Security Council Meeting"]	<del>8/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#90 cable</del>	Rostow to President (CAP 82370) <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 1/9/02</i>	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#91 cable</del>	Rostow to President (CAP 82368) <del>S</del> 2 p <i>open 1/9/02</i> [Dup. #74, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN XII," B4119]	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#94a memo</del>	Davis to Rostow <i>open 11/13/02 per NSJ/RAL 02-56</i> <del>S</del> 2 p	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#94b rpt	"Reports on Divisions..." S 4 p <i>sanitized 4/2/03 NSJ/RAL 02-56</i>	undated	A
<del>#97 cable</del>	Rostow to President (CAP 82364) <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 1/9/02</i>	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#98 cable</del>	Rostow to President (CAP 82363) <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 1/9/02</i>	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#99 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82362) S 1 p <i>sanitized 4/2/03 NSJ 02-6B</i>	9/3/68	A
#100 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82361) S 2 p	9/3/68	A
<del>#103 cable</del>	Rostow to President (CAP 82357) <i>open 4/2/03 NSJ 02-6B</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#104 cable</del>	Rostow to President (CAP 82354) <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 1/9/02</i>	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#105 cable</del>	Rostow to President (CAP 82346) <del>C</del> 3 p <i>open 1/9/02</i>	<del>9/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#106 cable</del>	Rostow to President (CAP 82344) <del>S</del> 4 p <i>open 1-10-95 NLS 94-197</i>	<del>9/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 93, September 1-11, 1968

Box 39

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#108 cable</del>	<del>Rostow to President (CAP 82348)</del> <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 6-8-95 NLS 93-248</i>	<del>9/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#110 cable</del>	<del>Rostow to President (CAP 82335)</del> <del>TS</del> 1 p <i>open 9-7-94 NLS 94-146</i> [Duplicate of #84, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Kosygin," and #6, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Czechoslovakia-1968"]	<del>9/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 93, September 1-11, 1968

Box 39

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
42a rpt	Intelligence report 1 p S - sanitized 4/2/03 NLJ/RAC 02-57	[9/68]	A
50 note	Rostow to the President, 8:30 p.m. 1p TS - sanitized 4/2/03 NLJ/RAC 02-58	9/7/68	A
50a cable	Intelligence report 1p ts - Exempt 4/2/03 NLJ/RAC 02-57	9/6/68	A
57 memo	Rostow to the President, 1:20 p.m. <i>sanitized 9-14-07</i> 2 pp s - NLJ/RAC 02-59	9/6/68	A
79 note	Rostow to the President, 8:00 p.m. 1p ts - sanitized 4/2/03 NLJ/RAC 02-58	9/4/68	A
79a cable	Intelligence Report 1p TS- Exempt 4/2/03 NLJ/RAC 02-57	n.d.	A
82A memo	Intelligence Memorandum 4 pp TS - <del>sanitized 4/2/03 NLJ/RAC 02-60</del> <i>more info released 9-17-07 NLJ/RAC 99-211</i>	9/4/68	A
<del>93 cable</del>	<del>CAP 82366</del> <i>open 9-14-07 NLJ/RAC 02-59</i> <del>2pp S</del>	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>100 cable</del>	<del>CAP 82361</del> <i>open 4/2/03 NLJ/RAC 02-58</i> <del>2pp S</del> <del>Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 9, 12/16/83</del>	<del>9/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>107 cable</del>	<del>CAP 82347</del> <i>open 9-18-07 NLJ/RAC 02-59</i> <del>52pp S</del> <i>sanitized 2-20-01 NLJ/RAC 00-104</i> <i>[dup #1, NSF, CF, "Ceech, Czech Crisis CAP cables, 8/68" Bx 181]</i>	<del>9/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>79a cable</del>	<del>Sanitized</del> <del>Exempt</del> <i>open 1/9/02</i>	<del>9/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 93, 9/1-11/68, Box 39

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Wednesday, September 4, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Ambassador Bunker's 65th weekly report:

*Pres file*A. General

- Evidence from intelligence, interrogations, captured weapons and heavy enemy losses (8,500 KIA in first ten days) indicates enemy's "third-wave" offensive effort has been frustrated.
- General Abrams reports Vietnamese have performed well in all corps areas, carrying a greater share of the fighting than before and inflicting twice as many KIA on the enemy as have our own forces.
- Enemy has resorted to sharply increased use of terror against population centers including rocket attacks on Da nang. US Mission is publicizing the attacks.
- Enemy likely to delay major attacks while keeping pressure of a "rolling offensive" on provincial capitals and other secondary targets.
- Possibility exists that militarily frustrated enemy will at some time recognize futility of his efforts and call for a cease fire.
- We should not recognize any enemy acquisition of territory as a condition for cease-fire; this would be tantamount to a de facto partition.
- It would be important to safeguard GVN ability to maintain its administrative apparatus at all levels. We have to be very careful in agreeing to terms for a cease-fire in a future political contest and we must stay in close step with GVN.
- Failure of the enemy offensive, results of the Democratic convention and growing strength of Thieu/Huong government have improved VN morale.
- Thieu is moving through Lien Minh to develop political organization and unified leadership. Focus on new social action programs and on increasing participation of formerly neglected groups.
- In Chau Doc province on Cambodian border new province chief and agricultural improvements demonstrate possibilities of progress. But US province team reports seeing whole convoys of trucks moving across border with arms of vital importance to enemy's effort in Delta and in III Corps.

B. Political

- Huong has enthusiastic and sometimes free-swinging support from National Assembly and press in his anti-corruption drive.
- Three newspapers were suspended for citing AP report that Huong was preparing to make "a public scandal" if Thieu was unwilling to move rapidly against a list of high-ranking offenders.
- Severe GVN reaction may reflect Thieu-Huong disagreement on this issue but should not obscure advances being made against corruption.
- Eight Assembly delegations travelling abroad show increased efforts to tell South Vietnam story to the world.
- Cabinet favors land reform as part of political action program for urban and rural areas.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLQ-CBS 10  
By ag/ics, NARA, Date 12-15-92



C. Military

-- Abrams says II Corps ARVN Commander exercised consummate skill in Duc attack response. Thieu honors defenders.

-- ARVN demonstrates increasingly effective performance in I, II and IV Corps battles.

D. Pacification

-- Enemy prepares political battlefield for possible future grab of countryside control; pushes organization of liberation committees at all levels.

-- Countering this threat is complicated by need for improved GVN management in hamlets and villages plus increased enemy assassination and abduction efforts. In a Quang Tri district 17 out of 40 trained officials were eliminated.

-- Self-defense continues to receive top priority; Thieu and Huong hold ceremonies for self-defense month.

-- Mission seeking to break log-jam on self-defense weapons distribution at local level; only 39,000 of 421,000 members are armed.

-- RF/PF show marked improvements by all yardsticks in July.

-- New enemy attacks failed to disrupt pacification but Chieu Hoi rate declined sharply.

-- Thieu has carried out pacification seminars and planning amid enemy efforts to launch new offensive.

E. Economic

-- Retail prices decline one percent.

-- Black market rate for dollars slacked off markedly; a response perhaps to Vice President Humphrey's nomination and failure of VC to attack Saigon.

-- Little action despite continuing discussion on rice supply, war. risk insurance and taxation questions.

W. W. R.



Wednesday, September 4, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 37046)

Herewith my sixty-fifth weekly message:

A. General

While it is probably too early to make a definitive assessment of the enemy's current military effort, it seems to me that the picture which has emerged is encouraging. Certainly all the evidence, intelligence, interrogations, statements from Hanoi indicated the enemy's intention of launching a major offensive. The weapons and munitions uncovered prior to his August attacks were more than twice the amount picked up before the May offensive. But the enemy's effort to get his offensive off the ground has been almost totally frustrated. He has had no victories, either military or psychological.

In the effort to mount an offensive, the enemy has suffered heavy losses, about 8,500 killed in action in the first ten days of the ground fighting. Intelligence indicates that planned attacks on Saigon, Can Tho, Cai Lai, the DMZ area, and the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area have all been thwarted or postponed as a result of our operations. A serious enemy effort to enter Danang was balked, the enemy losing 1,200 men and gaining nothing of consequence. In the First Corps, the enemy is known to be unable to care for his wounded; General Abrams reported one pitiful case where a woman was forced to donate whole blood for wounded enemy troops to the point of complete debilitation.

During these recent enemy attacks, the performance of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces has been particularly encouraging, a demonstration that its improvement continues. The enemy badly needs a victory with some psychological impact, but it was the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces which succeeded in that kind of victory at Duc Lap. In all the corps areas, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces have done well. General Abrams reports that the Vietnamese have carried a greater share of the fighting than in any previous enemy offensive and pointed out that they have inflicted twice as many killed in action on the enemy as have our own forces.

Perhaps partly as a result of our successful response to the enemy effort, he has resorted to sharply increased use of terror. In the First Corps, undefended hamlets have been attacked, civilians killed and wounded and houses burned. While Saigon has not been rocketed since the night of August 27-28, other population centers have continued to receive indiscriminate shelling. Danang was hit with thirty-one rockets on the night of September 1. Twenty-six civilians were

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

By SC, NARA, Date 12-14-01

PRESERVATION COPY



killed and 45 wounded in that attack. We are making an effort to publicize this kind of attack. The shelling of Saigon evoked a prompt response all over the world and I believe that response impressed Hanoi. Now, however, the enemy continues to shell other South Vietnam cities, and little attention seems to be paid to it outside of Vietnam but the rockets that fall on Danang are just as deadly as those that fall on Saigon, the people are just as dead, and the civilian population just as much the victim of pure terror.

In my talk with him on August 30, Thieu expressed the view that the enemy will try to sustain his military efforts over as long a period as possible with the objective of influencing opinion in the United States hoping thereby to force important concessions in negotiations. He believes that the enemy now no longer has the capacity for an all-out-overall offensive and will, therefore, resort to a "rolling" offensive, as he put it, "battle by battle" in an effort to conserve his forces and at the same time hoping for some individual spectacular result which will impress U. S. opinion.

It seems to me that Thieu's view may well turn out to be correct. Basically, the enemy would appear to have three options: cancel his third offensive; pressing the current effort forward with all the strength at his disposal; or delaying major attacks while keeping up pressure on secondary targets such as province capitals, thus stretching out his effort while minimizing losses. For the immediate future, I believe the enemy is most likely to adopt the third course--not because he wants to but because we have forced him to. As I mentioned in last week's report, I believe that the improved coordination of the Vietnamese and allied forces and their more effective utilization, the improved performance of the South Vietnamese Army and our effective and skillful spoiling tactics have been responsible for this.

There is also the possibility that at some time the enemy will recognize the futility of his efforts and call for a cease-fire at a time of his choosing. Thieu thinks that this will happen sooner or later and he is trying to prepare for it in a variety of ways. One indication of enemy plans for such a move may be the intensified effort to set up "liberation committees" at various levels around the country, in many cases trying to parallel Government of Vietnam administrative structures. In a cease-fire situation, the enemy might claim such committees were in effective control of many areas.

On balance, I am inclined to believe the enemy will persist with a "rolling offensive" for some months, quite possibly until after our Presidential election. Our success in frustrating the enemy militarily could, however, result in an abrupt change in his attitude and we should be prepared for such a move. We have, of course, been discussing this possibility in our consultations with the Government of Vietnam. If the enemy should call for a cease-fire, it would be important to safeguard Government of Vietnam ability to support and if necessary to continue to maintain its administrative apparatus at all levels. We should not "recognize" any enemy acquisition of territory as a condition of a cease-fire: this would be tantamount to a de facto partition.



The failure of the enemy offensive, the results of the Democratic convention, and the growing strength of the Thieu/Huong government have caused a perceptible improvement in morale here. Not only the Government of Vietnam but people in general seem to gain more and more confidence in the future. There is less questioning of our determination, more willingness to accept the Paris talks, and greater acceptance of the idea of a political settlement. There is noticeably less fear of a future political contest with the Communists.

In this connection, I was encouraged by a report from First Corps. It stressed the fact that there was increased awareness there that nationalist political groups must unite to face the Communists. First Corps political factions have been famous in the past for their multiple divisions; now they are apparently trying to sink their differences and joined together in Thieu's Lien Minh.

I think it important that Thieu has again expressed to me his awareness that the Lien Minh must have his personal leadership. He also said that he is trying to sharpen up the focus of the Lien Minh social welfare effort, which is about to get underway in Saigon. The effort has a long way to go, but it seems to be moving; cadres are being trained and should go into action very soon.

In my opinion, the Vietnamese Nationalists have some reason for confidence, but it is true that as of now they lack political organization and united political leadership. But Thieu and the Lien Minh are moving to solve that problem in several ways. Thieu is paying particular attention to the problem of winning over formerly neglected groups, such as women and youth. At the same time, both he and Huong are not losing sight of the fact that increasingly effective government is in the long run the most effective means of gaining the people's support. Also important in the long run is the simple fact that the great majority of the Vietnamese people do not want a Communist government. If the Nationalists can at the crucial point succeed in putting the issue in terms of a Communist versus a Nationalist candidate, I think there would be little doubt of the outcome.

Also favoring the Nationalists in a political confrontation should be the important backing of the Nationalist military and civil administration. To the degree that these can be used as Nationalist Cadre they could counteract the several hundred thousand Communist Cadre that Thieu estimates are now in place in South Vietnam.

There is also the fact that the Communists have never waged a peaceful political struggle here. To the degree that the peace settlement deprives them of the use of force and terror, they will be obliged to abandon their favorite tactic, which is to combine political blandishment with a large measure of military persuasion.

We have need to be very careful in agreeing to terms for a cease-fire in a future political contest and we must stay in close step with the Government of Vietnam. But given a reasonable chance, I think the Nationalists can and will prevail in South Vietnam.

On September 3 I traveled to Chau Doc Province on the border with Cambodia. I saw a number of encouraging developments which you may find of some interest,

because they illustrate the kind of things that are happening elsewhere in South Vietnam.

The new Province Chief (Lt. Col. Hue) who took over last month is a fine example of the new men the government is putting in as replacements for those found corrupt or incompetent--his predecessor was one of the worst. He has already infused new life into key programs such as the fight against the Viet Cong infrastructure, and our Province advisory team feels certain that across-the-board improvements are in the offing. There is also a newly-appointed police chief on the scene, again reported to be an enormous improvement over his weak and corrupt predecessor.

I got out into the countryside and talked to a farmer who was full of enthusiasm about the new IR-8 rice--his second crop this year--in which he claimed to have a handsome profit; visited a village school built as a self-help project, of which the villagers were visably and understandably proud; and went through a quite primitive but "vertically integrated" silk textile operation--an industry which with some encouragement and help could become important to the province, I am told.

The Viet Cong are a threat in this area only because of the Cambodian sanctuary. Infiltration of weapons, ammunition and supplies from Cambodia through Chau Doc is heavy. Many large caches have been taken en route. Our Province team reports seeing whole convoys of trucks moving up to the border from the Cambodian side at night. They are convinced that this traffic is of vital importance to the enemy's effort in the Delta and in Third Corps.

#### B. Political

The anti-corrupt drive. Prime Minister Huong is pressing his drive against corruption. In this effort he has the enthusiastic and sometimes free-swinging support of a number of assembly deputies and the local press. Unfortunately, it now appears that the effort may have generated some tensions within the government, and as an indirect result three newspapers have been suspended as of today.



We had a report some time ago from Information Minister Thien to the effect that Huong was prepared to make "a public scandal" if Thieu proved unwilling to move against 62 high ranking offenders. We are still not certain how much credence to put in this report; however, the government's response to a similar story by AP was remarkably strong. The Government of Vietnam not only issued a categorical denial of the AP story as "totally without foundation", but suspended publication of three dailies which carried the AP account.

According to the official statement on the suspension of the papers, at least two of them were warned against using the story but printed it regardless. White spaces in several other papers indicate that they decided against printing the story after a similar warning. This, of course, amounts to de facto censorship. It is likely to provoke considerable opposition here and will certainly do nothing to improve the government's image abroad.

The evident government sensitivity to the AP story may mean that Huong and Thieu have some important differences on how fast and how far the anti-corruption drive can go. It could also mean that Thieu and Huong are in agreement but are determined to control the pace and direction of the anti-corruption program and will not be pushed by the press. We will be watching these developments closely and will be considering whether some urging from us is needed to assure lifting of the suspension.

This event should not be allowed to obscure the progress that Huong has made in his efforts against corruption. I reported recently on the establishment of corruption committees in every province and every ministry. They are intended to find and implement measures to prevent corruption. There is also a steady effort to replace corrupt province and district chiefs, and the results are becoming apparent in improved government. Huong's office this week put out an order requiring all civil servants to submit an accounting of their property. Also announced was the punishment of a number of officials whose records have been investigated recently. These included a deputy province chief and a provincial police chief.

Probably in part because of Huong's efforts, a number of Assembly deputies have made public charges of corruption against various officials. Probably not all of the charges can be substantiated, but many are likely to prove true. These public charges and the press accounts of them should tend to reduce corruption. Unfortunately, they may also have contributed to fears in some government circles that the anti-corruption drive was getting out of hand.

On the plus side this week, I should also mention the increased efforts of the Information Ministry and the Assembly to get the South Vietnam story to the world. Something like eight Assembly delegations are fanning out to every continent during the month of September when the Assembly will be in recess for several weeks. Their chief objective will be to win support and understanding for the Government of Vietnam. The Information Minister is also putting heavy stress on improved information work abroad. In this connection, our new joint US-Government of Vietnam

daily press briefings are proving effective in putting the Government of Vietnam and especially improved Army of the Republic of Vietnam performance in better perspective.

We also have a report that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet favor increased emphasis on land reform. According to this report, the Cabinet is agreed that land reform should be part of the government's political action program and should include urban as well as rural areas.

### C. Military

I reported last week on the action at Duc Lap Special Forces Camp and sub-sector compound. On August 28, President Thieu visited the Special Forces Camp, but couldn't land at the district compound because the fight was still going on there. However, he promoted the sub-sector commander, who had done an outstanding job, from captain to major and gave two other battlefield promotions from his helicopter to officers who had distinguished themselves and were still engaged in the fighting.

General Abrams tells me that the Second Corps Commander, General Lu Lan, handled the Duc Lap action "with consummate skill", reinforcing from coastal areas rather than drawing his troops from Ban Me Thuot as the enemy no doubt hoped he would do. Thus the enemy lost at least 644 killed and 154 individual and 58 crew-served weapons without having the slightest impact on the defense of Ban Me Thuot.

Also in the Second Corps, elements of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 22nd Division, in coordination with our 173rd Airborne, inflicted 122 killed in action on the enemy in Binh Dinh Province over the period August 22-28, at a cost of 1 US and 2 Army of the Republic of Vietnam killed.

In the First Corps, the 21st and 31st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger Battalions and the 51st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment continued to maul the enemy in the Danang-Hoi An area, thus contributing singly to the defense of Danang, a key enemy target at present. Preliminary reports received last week showed that these units killed 275 of the enemy in this area from August 29-31 and (on the basis of incomplete reports) captured 50 weapons (5 crew-served), losing 28 killed in action themselves.

In the delta, General Abrams reports that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and Regional and Popular Forces are continuing to do a fine job of keeping the pressure on the enemy. Examples during the past week were operations in the Cao Lanh area (Kien Phong Province) by units under the command of the 44th Special Tactical Zone, in which 171 enemy were killed and 21 weapons and considerable ammunition and fuel captured, with friendly killed in action only 8; an operation south of Vinh Long by the 9th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division which killed 23 enemy,



captured 8 weapons and 47 grenades with 1 friendly killed in action; and a 32nd Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment (21st Division) operation northeast of Ca Mau which killed 25 enemy and destroyed an arms factory at a cost of one Army of the Republic of Vietnam soldier wounded.

#### D. Pacification

As I mentioned earlier, evidence continues to pile up that the enemy is pushing hard to establish "liberation committees" in the countryside. Despite his seeming lack of success in eliciting popular response, almost every province reports that some village "liberation committees" in one form or another have been set up -- frequently by drawing candidates from the local Communist Party who have to serve if directed. The date of September 2 was set as the deadline for also organizing district and province level committees. And just recently, we learned that Danang became the third city -- Hue and Saigon being the others -- with a chapter of his "so-called alliance". All this betokens preparation for some kind of a political initiative by Hanoi. Under the right conditions, he could surface his "committees" and lay claim to considerable portions of the countryside and a certain degree of legitimacy. This preparation of the "political battlefield" by the enemy could cause the Government of Vietnam and ourselves serious problems in the future.

Therefore, we are drawing up a program to suggest to the Government of Vietnam ways to neutralize this Viet Cong political structure through the Phoenix program and at the same time develop stronger Government of Vietnam local institutions as a counter. Although strengthening local government has long been part of pacification, government execution has not been very effective. Again, this has been a management problem of trying to improve administration in some 8,000 hamlets and 1,500 villages over which the Government of Vietnam exercises the dominant influence. Also complicating have been the considerable enemy efforts to thwart government plans. For example, in one district in Quang Tri, 17 out of 40 local officials who received training during the latter part of 1967 have been killed or abducted since Tet.

Self-defense, which is tied in closely with improving local administration, is still getting top-level attention. Thieu has stressed its importance at his two pacification seminars, Huong and his ministers are presiding over province ceremonies marking self-defense month, and much is finally being undertaken at local levels. An impressive 421,000 members have been signed up for self-defense groups, though only 39,000 have been armed as yet. Less than one-third of the self-defense members trained so far to use weapons have been armed. We are seeking to break the logjam.

The Regional and Popular Forces -- which are the security key to more effective, lasting pacification -- showed marked improvement in July according to reports just analyzed. Regional Force strength assigned to tactical units increased 8,200 (7 percent); Popular Force strength rose 2,900 (2 percent). Improvements were

measured by each of the gauges used to keep track of the 6,000 Regional and Popular Force units -- strength, training, fire power, supply support and most important -- operations. Officer and NCO strength is rising also.

Pacification has not yet been set back to any great extent by recent stepped-up enemy combat activities. While the Tet offensive, and to a lesser extent, the post-Tet attacks caused many units to draw back to defend the cities, there has not been a similar redeployment of friendly forces in recent weeks. By and large, enemy attacks have failed to disrupt on-going pacification activities, nor has the enemy targeted rural areas except through increased terrorism and harassment of Regional and Popular Force units and Revolutionary Development teams. But we have noted the sharp decline in the Chieu Hoi rate which normally accompanies an enemy offensive. It is also significant, I think, that Thieu went through with his pacification seminars in the midst of enemy attempts to get an offensive geared up.

#### E. Economic

Retail prices declined about one percent in Saigon this week. The decline spread across most of the food products which reach Saigon via Route 4, and can be attributed to repair of the two bridges damaged by the Viet Cong last week. Rice prices, however, firmed slightly.

The black market rate for dollars ~~slashed~~ ~~markedly~~ this week, a response perhaps to the fact of Vice President Humphrey's nomination and the failure of the Viet Cong to attack Saigon again.

Despite a continuing discussion with the government on economic policy measures -- rice supply, war risk insurance, and taxation -- little action has occurred. Minister Ho claims that prices paid to the farmer for paddy rice have risen in the delta, but his principal preoccupation seems to be with threats to punish violators of the price-control laws, a wholly useless exercise in our view.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~**PRESERVATION COPY**



*Pres. file*

2

Monday, Sept. 9, 1968  
11:15 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Abrams' latest assessment of the military situation in the field. He believes:

-- the enemy's third offensive has "foundered from the outset;"

-- the enemy is in the midst of "a period of reassessment, which he may have not yet completed;"

-- on balance, he expects a stretched out military operation with the primary focus on Saigon, if the enemy can get his forces in close.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ-CBS 21  
By isa, NARS, Date 6-26-84

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED-  
WHCA

2a  
EYES ONLY

ZCZCQAA084

1967 SEP 9 13 55

OO HEXADS  
DE YSNKQA 13 2531236  
O 091209Z ZYH ZFF-5  
FM GEN EARL WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
INFO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE  
MR RUSK STATE  
MR HELMS CIA  
O 080323Z ZYH ZFF-3  
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS  
INFO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
AMB BUNKER AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
MG SEIGNIOUS CAS PARIS (LT D.W. JEFF, USN)  
ZEM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 7  
By is, NARS, Date 7-25-83

~~SECRET~~ MAC 12129 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
THIS IS MY ASSESSMENT OF THE ENEMY'S POSTURE SINCE HE  
INCREASED THE TEMPO OF HIS OPERATIONS ON 18 AUG.  
EVIDENCE OF HIS PLANS VARIES FROM REGION TO REGION. IN THE DMZ  
HIS FORCES HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH A SUBSIDIARY ROLE--TO INFLICT  
MAXIMUM CASUALTIES ON ALLIED FORCES AND HOLD THEM IN THE  
DMZ, ATTACK OUR LOC AND REAR SERVICE FACILITIES, AND ASSIST IN  
ESTABLISHING THE ENEMY'S SHADOW GOVERNMENT.  
IN MR-TRI-THIEN-HUE, WE KNOW OF THE ENEMY'S DESIRE TO CONDUCT  
OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY, BUT HE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DO SO. IN NORTHERN  
MR-5 WE HAVE SEEN A LONG TERM ENEMY BUILD-UP WITH DANANG THE  
MAJOR PRIZE. CAPURED DOCUMENTS DESCRIBE THE FRAMEWORK OF  
HIS PLANS. SEVERAL REFER TO PHASES, AND SPECIFY PERIOD FROM  
MID-AUGUST THROUGH SEPTEMBER. ONE REFERS TO A FOUR-MONTH  
PHASE. IN GENERAL, HIS PLANS FOR NORTHERN MR-5 WERE TO  
ATTACK DISTRICT CAPITALS, MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND U.S. FORCES  
IN REPETITIVE WAVES, TO SPREAD OUR FORCES, CONFUSE US AS TO HIS  
OBJECT, AND BREAK DOWN OUR DANANG DEFENSES. THEN HE WOULD  
ATTACK THAT CITY IN FORCE.  
IN THE B-3 FRONT, THE ENEMY SAW A CHANCE FOR A CHEAP  
VICTORY. HE WOULD QUIETLY MOVE THE 1ST NVA DIVISION TO  
DARLAC PROVINCE FOR A STRIKE AT LIGHTLY DEFENDED BAN ME THOUT,  
WHICH AAS TO FALL AS THE OPENING ROUND OF THIS THIRD OFFENSIVE.  
IN THE DELTA, WE KNOW THE ENMY PLANNED ATTACKS FOR THE FIRST  
TEN DAYS OF HIS THIRD GENERAL OFFENSIVE. THESE PLANS INCLUDED  
MULTI-BATTALION ASSAULTS ON CAI LAY CITY AND CAN THO.  
IN III CTZ WE HAVE DIRECT EVIDENCE OF ENEMY INTENTIONS FROM ALL  
LEVELS AND THIS PROBABLY REFLECTS HIS BROAD INTENTIONS FOR THE COUNTRY-  
WIDE EFFORT. THE ENEMY INTENDED TO CONDUCT JULY ATTACKS IN TAY NINH  
PROVINCE WITH A LESSER EFFORT AGAINST SAIGON, PROBABLY TO PRECEDE THE  
MAIN THRUST OF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. MANY DOCUMENTS DATED IN JULY CONTAIN



SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE "THIRD GENERAL OFFENSIVE," INDICATING MID-AUGUST AS THE TIME. BRO ENEMY INTENTIONS ARE REVEALED BY A 10 JUN 68 COSVN DIRECTIVE OUTLINING 3 BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTINUAL SUMMER OFFENSIVE AND UPRISING. HIS CADRE WERE TO PREPARE FOR A "GREATER OFFENSIVE," AND "IN THE SAIGON AREA .... CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT IS TO MAKE PREPARATIONS, AND BRING THE WAR AND UPRISING INTO THE VERY CENTER OF THE CITY." IN OUTLYING AREAS, STATED ENEMY MISSIONS HAVE BEEN TO CUT LOC LEADING TO CITIES, ATTACK ALLIED SWEEP AND COUNTERATTACK FORCES, EXPAND THE "SPRINGBOARD" TO SAIGON, AND POLITICALLY CONSOLIDATE THE RURAL AREAS.

A LATER DOCUMENT SPECIFIED THE USE OF THIS 10 JUNE COSVN DIRECTIVE AS WELL AS THE EARLIER 6TH COSVN RESOLUTION IN JULY REORIENTATION COURSES. THUS THE ENEMY'S BROAD STRATEGY HAD NOT CHANGED. HE STILL HOPED TO INDUCE A POPULAR UPRISING, AND STILL BELIEVED SAIGON TO BE OF KEY IMPORTANCE. HOWEVER, THE 10 JUNE DOCUMENT SHOWS NEW STRESS ON THE OUTLYING AREAS.

A 5 AUG 68 HQ, SVNLA DOCUMENT STATES THAT THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN FORCED TO CHANGE THEIR STRATEGY BY RESORTING TO A "STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE" COUPLED WITH VIOLENT COUNTERATTACKS TO AVERT A FORTHCOMING VC/NVA OFFENSIVE. HAVING ASSESSED OUR STRATEGY AS A DEFENSIVE ONE ORIENTED ON SAIGON, THE ENEMY PROBABLY BELIEVES WE ARE VULNERABLE IN THE OUTLYING AREAS. OTHER DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING SEVERAL DATED IN EARLY AUGUST, SHOW MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE OUTLYING REGIONS. THE 9TH VC DIVISION IS TO "LIBERATE THE RURAL AREA." SAIGON OUTSKIRTS ARE DESCRIBED AS CRITICAL; HERE UNITS ARE TO CARRY OUT "CONSTANT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES, ... INCITE THE POPULATION TO STAGE MASS UPRISINGS." ADDITIONALLY, SUB-REGIONS SURROUNDING SAIGON ARE TO LAUNCH PROBES AGAINST THE CAPITAL WITH SOME OF THEIR UNITS.

THE EVIDENCE IN ITS ENTIRETY INDICATES THAT THE ENEMY PROBABLY DID NOT INTEND A MAJOR DRIVE AGAINST SAIGON TO FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY ON THE HEELS OF HIS PRELIMINARY ATTACKS IN THE OUTLYING PROVINCES. HE HAS SEEN OPPORTUNITIES FOR SIGNIFICANT GAINS IN THE OUTLYING REGIONS. HE WILL ATTEMPT TO SECURE A SOLID FOOTHOLD IN THE SAIGON OUTSKIRTS AND ADJACENT AREAS BEFORE COMMITTING MAJOR FORCES TO ATTEMPT PENETRATION OF THE CITY.

CONSIDERING THE ENEMY'S PLANS COUNTRYWIDE, HIS OFFENSIVE WAS TO HAVE THESE CHARACTERISTICS: FIRST, HE ENVISIONED AN OFFENSIVE OF LONGER DURATION THAN HIS TET AND MAY ATTACKS. HE PLANNED TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE AND EXPLOIT IT THROUGH FOLLOW-UP OPERATIONS, CAPITALIZING ON WEAKNESSES OFFERED BY ALLIED REACTIONS. SECOND, HE WAS TO OPEN WITH DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS IN AREAS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE. THIRD, HE THOUGHT HE COULD QUICKLY SUCCEED AT DANANG, AND WAS READY TO PROMPTLY EXPLOIT HIS OPENING, HAD THE ATTACK BEEN SUCCESSFUL. FOURTH, HE WOULD RETAIN FLEXIBILITY, PRESERVING THE CAPABILITIES OF HIS MAJOR FORCES IN KEY OBJECTIVE AREAS FOR COMMITMENT AT THE DECISIVE TIME AND PLACE. HE WOULD THREATEN IMPORTANT OUTLYING AREAS SUCH AS TAY NINH, HOPING THAT OUR REDEPLOYMENTS WOULD EXPOSE MORE VITAL OBJECTIVES. IF SO, HE WOULD MOVE TO EXPLOIT THE GAPS. IF NOT, HE WOULD EXPLOIT HIS RELATIVE STRENGTH IN THE OUTLYING REGIONS-- TO GAIN MILITARY VICTORIES, EXPAND HIS CONTROL OF POPULATION, AND LAY THE GROUND-WORK FOR SUBSEQUENT THRUSTS AGAINST KEY URBAN AREAS IN A LATER PHASE OF HIS OFFENSIVE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
900

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

~~SECRET~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

ZCZCQAA085

1967 SEP 9 14 12

OO YEKADS  
DE YSNKQA 18 2531236  
O 091209Z ZYH ZFF-5  
FM GEN EARLE WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
INFO RM ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE  
MR RUSK STATE  
MR HELMS CIA  
O 080323Z ZYH ZFF-3  
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS  
INFO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
AMB BUNKER AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
MG SEIGNIOUS CAS PARIS (LT D.W. JEFF, USN)  
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 12129 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE HAS NOT UNFOLDED AS HE INTENDED. THE GRADUAL ACCELERATION OF MOMENTUM HE HOPED FOR WAS CHECKED AT THE OUTSET. IN THE DMZ, HE HAS BEEN PRE-EMPTED AND HIS PLANNED ATTACKS HAVE NOT YET MATERIALIZED. IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS HIS ORIGINAL PLANS WERE THWARTED WHEN WE REINFORCED BAN ME THUOT. A DIVERSIONARY EFFORT AT DUC LAP FAILED WITH HEAVY CASUALTIES, AND FOR THE PRESENT HIS FORCES IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS ARE INCAPABLE OF FURTHER MAJOR ACTION. IN THE DELTA HIS PLANNED ASSAULTS ON CAI LAY CITY AND CAN THO WERE CANCELLED AS A RESULT OF ARVN PRE-EMPTIVE OPERATIONS, STRONG DEFENSES, AND CAPTURE OF ENEMY PLANS. HIS LONG-TERM BUILD-UP IN NORTHERN MR-5 HAS BEEN DEALT A CRIPPLING BLOW, WITH HIS PRELIMINARY ATTACKS RESULTING IN OVER 1200 KIA IN THE DANANG AREA ALONE. ENEMY UNITS THAT ARE STILL INTACT IN NORTHRN MR-5 ARE VULNERABLE TO OUR OPERATIONS. HIS INITIAL DIVERSIONARY EFFORTS IN III CTZ HAVE FAILED TO ACHIEVE THEIR HOPED FOR RESULTS, AND SAIGON IS NOT YET WITHIN HIS GRASP.

THE DIMENSIONS OF HIS PROBLEM ARE EVIDENT FROM HIS LOSSES. AFTER NEARLY THREE WEEKS OF RENEWED FIGHTING, HE HAS SUSTAINED OVER 12,000 KIA BY BODY COUNT ALONE. THIS EQUATES TO 76 PER CENT OF HIS KIA OVER A SIMILAR PERIOD DURING THE 5 MAY OFFENSIVE. HE HAS NO GAIN TO SHOW FOR THIS RAPID DEPLETION OF A VITAL RESOURCE, AND THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CASUALITIES CAUSED BY OUR B-52 STRIKES. THUS WE SEE HIS CONCERN TO HOLD DOWN CASUALTIES. HE IS DIRECTING HIS COMMANDERS TO CONSERVE THEIR FORCES, TO AVOID DISCLOSING POSITIONS, AND TO AVOID LARGE ENGAGEMENTS OTHER THAN THOSE SPECIFICALLY ORDERED. THIS IS EVIDENCE OF HIS NEED TO PRESERVE HIS STRENGTH IN ORDER TO RETAIN A CAPABILITY FOR WHAT HE HOPES WILL BE A FORTHCOMING SUCCESSFUL EFFORT.



LOOKING AHEAD, THE ENEMY HAS THREE OPTIONS. HE CAN INCREASE THE TEMPO, ATTEMPTING MAJOR ATTACKS SOON IN AREAS WHERE HE STILL HAS THE CAPABILITY, PRIMARILY III CTZ, NORTHERN MR-5, AND THE DMZ. HE IS NOW VULNERABLE TO FRIENDLY OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY IN MR-5, AND THIS MAY PROMPT HIM TO ATTACK WHILE HE STILL HAS THE WHEREWITHAL, AND A MEASURE OF INITIATIVE. ALTERNATIVELY, HE CAN CURTAIL HIS OFFENSIVE; PULL BACK TO REDUCE HIS EXPOSURE, AND CONSERVE HIS FORCES FOR SOME LATER EFFORT. FINALLY, HE CAN STRETCH OUT HIS OFFENSIVE, LAUNCHING NEW SEQUENTIAL ATTACKS, SEEKING TO KNOCK US OFF BALANCE AND CREATE OPPORTUNITIES WHICH HE CAN EXPLOIT.

WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THE ENEMY IS NOW IN A PERIOD OF REASSESSMENT, WHICH HE MAY HAVE NOT YET COMPLETED. THE ENEMY'S ACTIONS, HOWEVER, DO NOT YET SHOW ANY SIGNIFICANT DEVIATIONS FROM WHAT HE PLANNED, EXCEPT THOSE FORCED BY OUR OWN OPERATIONS. HE HAS NOT RECENTLY CHANGED HIS DEPLOYMENTS, AND IS CONSERVING HIS STRENGTH.

OUR EVIDENCE OF RECENT ENEMY DECISIONS IS STILL INCOMPLETE, BUT WHAT WE HAVE SUGGESTS A STRETCHED-OUT AND PHASED OFFENSIVE. TWO RECENT REPORTS FROM RELIABLE PENETRANT AGENTS IN III CTZ POINT TOWARD AN UPCOMING "INTERMEDIARY" PHASE WITH CONTINUED ATTACKS IN OUTLYING AREAS -- A PRELIMINARY INDICATION OF HIS COURSE OF ACTION.

IN SUMMARY, WE SEE THAT THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE HAS FOUNDERED FROM THE OUTSET. HIS INITIAL DIVERSIONARY EFFORTS FAILED, AND IN THE DELTA AND WESTERN HIGHLANDS HE EXPENDED MUCH OF HIS CAPABILITY IN THESE INITIAL, COSTLY EFFORTS. IN NORTHERN MR-5 HIS HEAVY LOSSES REDUCED HIS CAPABILITIES. HIS SUPPORTING EFFORT IN THE DMZ AREA HAS BEEN CONTINUALLY THWARTED. IN III CORPS HE HAS BEEN HURT, BUT LESS SO THAN IN OTHER AREAS, AND HERE HE RETAINS MOST OF HIS CAPABILITY FOR NEW ATTACKS. HE PROBABLY VIEWS III CTZ AS HIS BEST REMAINING OPPORTUNITY FOR A SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS.

SAIGON REMAINS HIS PRIMARY ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. HE KNOWS HE CANNOT AT THIS TIME COMMIT MAJOR FORCES DIRECTLY AGAINST THE CAPITAL, YET HE SEEMS DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE SOME TANGIBLE SUCCESS FOR HIS EXPENDITURES. HE WILL PROBABLY PROCEED WITH CAUTION, DIRECTING HIS NEXT MAJOR ATTACKS AGAINST LESSER BUT MORE ATTAINABLE OBJECTIVES IN OUTLYING AREAS. SMALL SCALE CYCLIC PROBES AGAINST THE CAPITAL BY SUB-REGION FORCES ARE PROBABLE DURING THIS PERIOD. HE WILL ATTEMPT TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A FUTURE THRUST AGAINST SAIGON.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
900

~~SECRET~~  
~~EXCLUDED FROM GAMP~~

**SECRET -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY**

Saturday, September 7, 1968 -- 2:00 p.m.

**Mr. President:**

I reported to Sec. Rusk the idea of the First Lady joining Luke Battle on the trip to Egypt.

Sec. Rusk suggested, after discussing the matter with Luke Battle, that Luke join me here. We have just completed a long analysis of the problem, at lunch.

1. So far as the Israelis and the Jewish community are concerned, the event would be somewhat startling. Its political significance would be subject to complicated interpretation. But, in one way or another, a rationale for the trip might be made which would quiet anxieties.

2. So far as the Egyptians are concerned, Luke is confident they will try to project it to their own people and to the Middle East as the U.S. pursuing with Cairo the objective of re-establishing normal diplomatic relations. It is impossible for the Middle Eastern mind to accept the idea that the First Lady's journey to Egypt could be based simply on her authentic interest in cultural matters.

3. Perhaps most important, so far as diplomacy and politics are concerned, Luke Battle believes the Moroccans, Tunisians, ~~Egyptians~~, the Saudis, and the Shah of Iran -- all of whom are in different ways locked in what they regard mortal combat with Nasser -- would be deeply disturbed and even frightened. They would draw the conclusion that the U.S. had finally decided to pivot its Middle East policy on revival of relations with Nasser. We could make heroic efforts to give them a different interpretation; but it is Luke's personal judgment that no amount of explanation could be effective at this particular juncture when not only the Israeli-Arab problem is unhinged but the whole future balance between the Arab and Muslim world is being worked out on a basis which, hopefully, de-rates Nasser's role.

4. Finally -- and above all -- Luke is deeply concerned about Nasser's or anyone else's ability to guarantee the safety of the First Lady in Egypt. (Sec. Rusk underlined this factor to me on the phone.)

The problem is not that Nasser would not try to protect the First Lady. The problem is that the people of Egypt have been fed so much wild propaganda about the U.S. that there are bound to be certain number of distorted minds which might be sufficiently affected to raise a significant security risk.



**SECRET**

-2-

There is a minor matter; namely, that the facilities for staying overnight at Abu Simbel are fairly primitive, although the Egyptians will probably make efforts to improve them because we believe the Belgian lady Minister of Culture will be there.

I have asked Luke who else is on the delegation. He said invitations were issued by the Egyptian government. They include Americans who have made a substantial contribution to the Abu Simbel enterprise; for example, Max McCullough and Rudolph de Seif, both Executive Secretaries of the private committee. Undoubtedly others, such as Huntington Hartford and Mrs. deWitt Wallace (Reader's Digest) will be included since both have been very active. Luke will, however, try to track down for us the list of those that Cairo has invited. He will also look into the possibility of generating an invitation for Mrs. Vincent Astor, if she is not already on the list.

My personal comment is this:

-- I can see ways of coping with the Israelis and the Jewish community in the U. S. ; although the non-Egyptian Muslims might understand better than we may now appraise a visit on a cultural occasion of this kind, in the end I am sure Sec. Rusk and Luke are correct in assessing that the appearance of the First Lady in Egypt would lead to endless misleading speculation and alarmed superficial reactions.

-- I think we must take Luke Battle's judgment seriously about the security problem which, in my view, is overriding. He and his family know precisely what this is about. They lived three years in Cairo in the shadow of a series of rather well-documented assassination plots.

Luke and I concluded very sadly, because, basically, he honestly believe, it is a great idea if it could be pulled off without these risks and probable diplomatic misunderstandings.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

**SECRET**

4

ACTION

Wednesday, Sept. 11, 1968

5:30pm

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a warm birthday message to President Saragat of Italy. He will be 70 on Thursday, September 19.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message ✓

No       

Call me       

  
ERF:rust



4a

**PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SARAGAT  
OF ITALY**

**I take great pleasure in sending you my sincere good wishes and those of the American people on the occasion of your seventieth birthday. It is with particular satisfaction that I recall our meetings of last September when my wife and I had the good fortune of celebrating your birthday with you at the White House.**

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~-- EYES ONLY

Wednesday, September 11, 1968  
5:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this report from Bus Wheeler of Gen. Abrams' view of a possible cease-fire proposal and his reply to certain key questions posed to him by Gen. Wheeler.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Office, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 9-9-92



~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

5a



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-53  
By ins, NARA, Date 2-28-03

CM-3646-68  
11 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW, SPECIAL ASSISTANT  
TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Unilateral Enemy Cease-Fire

Recently I posed a series of questions to General Abrams relating to a possible enemy cease-fire initiative. You may be interested in his response, which was concurred in by the American Embassy, Saigon, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific:

Part I - Synopsis of Current Situation

The enemy's plans for what he considered to be his third offensive have foundered from the outset (17-18 August). He envisaged this offensive as the longest and the most intensive of 1968, gaining for him the initiative and allowing him through follow-up operation to capitalize on any Allied weakness. In the DMZ he has had difficulties positioning his force and we continue to disrupt his plans. In northern MR-5, his plans for a heavy thrust at Danang have been blunted and his reserve units are in a precarious situation. His try for a quick strike at Ban Me Thuot was frustrated, and the diversion attempt at Duc Lap has cost him at least a regimental equivalent. In III CTZ, his diversionary attacks in the outer provinces were blunted without accomplishing the planned weakening of the Saigon defenses. In IV CTZ, multi-battalion attacks on Cai Lay and Can Tho cities were pre-empted and his units grow weaker. Already the enemy's losses stand at 76 per cent of those he sustained for a similar period during the May offensive. The enemy is now in a period of reassessment, and it appears that he may try a stretched out and phased offensive. Determined to maintain a plausible image of military strength, he will probably proceed with caution, directing his next major attacks against lesser but more attainable objectives in outlying areas while attempting to lay the ground work for a future thrust against Saigon.

copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

However, I believe we must consider his military campaign in the context of his broader objectives. If the enemy decides that the military campaign cannot achieve his ends, he has what could be a practical alternative through which he could avoid chancing the stigma of a major military setback by exploiting the initiative of a cease-fire. Specifically, in those rural areas which he controls the enemy has set up a network of "Liberation Committees" which, if merged with the "Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces," could provide an ostensible governmental structure ready to parallel the GVN at all levels. In addition since July 1967 the enemy has greatly expanded his VC force structure, partially on a skeleton basis which, in connection with or preceding a cease-fire, could be quickly fleshed out with NVA fillers. Thus, upon declaration of a cease-fire the enemy could surface an ostensible governmental apparatus, which he could manipulate, and which would be backed by an expanded VC military structure. This would establish a favorable situation in a coalition government as a ruse of politics which would serve as an intermediate step to his ends.

Of course, a key question which we must all address is: assuming Hanoi envisages a negotiated withdrawal from SVN of US/FW forces and NVA Main Force (not NVA cadre personnel absorbed in VC force structure) after cease-fire, and recognizing that the RVNAF modernization and pacification programs will continue to bolster the opposition, how will the enemy assess the resulting relative power position at any given time? This, together with his evaluation of the promise of his current military campaign, would be of prime importance to his timing of any cease-fire initiative.

We cannot be sure whether the enemy, in proposing a cease-fire in the near future, would feel he was doing so out of choice or out of necessity. Our analysis suggests, however, that in either case, such action offers to him possibilities for advantage (and for disrupting the whole US/SVN effort) that he cannot achieve on the battlefield. I am impressed with the necessity of insisting that any cease-fire must be accompanied by removal of the major NVA forces to North Vietnam - as well as the bulk of the NVA troops now in nominally VC units - if security in SVN is to be maintained. Other aspects of this matter are brought out in the answers and rationale, relating to your specific questions, which follow.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY

Part II - Answers to Specific Questions Posed in Referenced Message, Together With Rationale (There is no assurance of acceptance by GVN):

Q1. What disposition of enemy main force units could the US/GVN accept during a cease-fire which might remain in force over an extended period without any political agreement?

A. US/GVN should not agree to any disposition of enemy main force units over an extended period of time without a political agreement. However, US/GVN could accept main force units disposed in clearly defined base areas, away from major population centers, for a period of about 30 days.

Rationale: Any disposition of enemy main force units in SVN over an extended period would give the VC/NVA de facto control of the areas in which they are disposed. The preclusion of friendly sweeps through those areas would permit the enemy to install his own viable government and sovereignty there. Such enemy consolidation would support NLF claims at later peace talks. Limiting the enemy to base areas in lightly populated regions for a relatively short period, however, would not provide him that advantage. Militarily, an enemy disposition of his own choosing would permit him to resume hostilities in a posture at least as good as that held at the time the cease-fire became effective, reinforced by the added advantage of surprise. Moreover, at least a part of the enemy forces in SVN are currently somewhat disorganized and weakened as the result of our air attacks and ground spoiling operations. Over an extended time period, the enemy would be afforded the opportunities to recuperate, reorganize, reinforce, and resupply clandestinely his main force units to a level not achievable under present circumstances.

Q2. Could the US/GVN accept a cease-fire in which enemy regional and guerrilla forces remained armed and in their provincial, district, and village settings?

A. US/GVN should not accept a cease-fire in which enemy regional and guerrilla forces remain armed and so disposed. However, provided main force units have moved to base areas, US/GVN could accept enemy regional and guerrilla forces remaining in province, district,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~NOFORN~~

EYES ONLY



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

and village settings provided they disarm. (The latter would be very difficult, in fact, practically impossible to assure in terms of effective enforcement.)

Rationale: Allowing the enemy and guerrilla forces to remain in their present status would provide those forces an opportunity to reinforce the existing VC infrastructure to the extent that GVN presence in those areas would be seriously threatened if not impossible to maintain. Depending on the progress of pacification in the various areas occupied, the steadily improving GVN pacification program could be seriously hampered. There would be a concomitant loss of confidence in GVN/FW capability to provide protection against the VC. The possibility of losing a large segment of the population to VC control under these conditions poses an unacceptable risk.

Q3. If the enemy unilaterally declared a cease-fire while their main force units were deployed in or immediately around major population centers, how long would it take to eject them or inflict a decisive defeat upon them while the modalities of an agreed cease-fire were negotiated?

A. In the event the enemy should succeed in deploying significant strength in major population centers, the process of ejecting him or inflicting decisive defeat on him, without causing unacceptable destruction to urban areas as in the past TET and May operations, would be time-consuming, and would possibly require well in excess of 30 days. If enemy forces were deployed in areas immediately outside the major population centers where the full weight of US/GVN fire power could be brought to bear they could be ejected or, if they chose to stand and fight, defeated in a much shorter period of time, possibly a week to 10 days.

Rationale: The problems associated with ejection or decisive defeat of the enemy differ depending on whether he is located in or immediately outside of the population centers. Our experiences with TET and the May offensive illustrate the difficulty of either ejecting or defeating a determined enemy quickly

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

without causing unacceptable casualties and damage to friendly civilian personnel and property. Our full military capability can be more readily used if the enemy elects to mass near but outside the population centers. Under these conditions he could be ejected or decisively defeated more quickly. The amount of diplomatic "foot dragging" which might be to our advantage in the event of a unilateral enemy cease-fire declaration under the conditions posed is difficult to specify. Generally speaking, any delay which could be achieved would be to our advantage.

Q4. Would it be desirable to seek a meeting for this purpose between the US/GVN high command and the so-called commander of the Liberation Army?

A. It would not be desirable for the US/GVN High Command to seek a meeting with the so-called commander of the Liberation Army (VC/NVA) until the cease-fire has been agreed to at the governmental level and the broad modalities have been established. This could possibly be done within the framework of the official conversations in Paris providing the GVN were associated with these. After a cease-fire and associated modalities have been agreed to at the governmental level, it would be desirable for the respective high commands to meet for the purpose of negotiating the remaining, on-the-scene, details of implementing the cease-fire.

Rationale: Agreement at the governmental level to a cease-fire and to its broad terms would be more binding on all parties to abide by the modalities reached. The discussions preceding such an agreement could result in the introduction of GVN negotiators at the table - an important aspect of any agreement. It could affect South Vietnamese sovereignty. Within guidelines thus established, the details for implementing the cease-fire would be of direct concern to the commanders of opposing military forces, and could be worked out on the scene by the respective high commands.

Q5. How could we explain in a convincing manner to the US public the necessity for negotiation and agreement on modalities prior to a cease-fire?

~~TOP SECRET~~

NO. 1

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

A. The explanation should point out the dangers to the security of US forces and to the future viability of SVN unless there is agreement on modalities prior to US agreement to a cease-fire. An aggressive public information program will have greater impact if it is mounted prior to the enemy's announcement of a cease-fire, if this is feasible during pre-election period; mounted after the announcement, the program would appear to be negative and would not be as effective.

Rationale: Many Americans appear to want to end the war regardless of the conditions. Therefore a portion of the public would probably be willing to accept a cease-fire without adequate safeguards. It is necessary to convince the public that a cease-fire without agreed modalities is not in the best interests of the nation and places US forces deployed in SVN in an untenable position. The following are a few of the many points which could be stressed.

A. The enemy has not honored past cease-fires even during brief holiday periods.

B. Lack of an agreement on modalities increases the enemy's opportunity to improve his military position by such actions as infiltrating additional men and material.

C. The difficulties inherent in geographic intermingling of friendly and enemy forces are great and fraught with significant danger to our forces.

Q6. Is it conceivable that a cease-fire would hold up in the absence of agreed arrangements?

A. It is not conceivable that a cease-fire would, in any practical sense, hold up in the absence of agreed arrangements.

Rationale: In the past the enemy has demonstrated consistent bad faith in violating cease-fire. In the absence of prior agreements the door would be open for violations without our being in a strong position to remonstrate or to exercise reciprocity. It must be expected that the enemy will seize upon any opportunity in a cease-fire situation to better his position. Moreover, without the restraints of specific agreements, the GVN would also be sorely tempted to seize upon any reasonable opportunity to gain an advantage.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

Concerning our comment on the desirability of preparing public opinion in the United States, South Vietnam and the world at large, I agree that it would be most desirable provided we satisfy ourselves that the net result would not be greater pressure for an expectation of a cease-fire. The preparation of United States public opinion is addressed in the response to question 5 above.

My staff has undertaken an evaluation of various cease-fire scenarios and the effect they might have on our operations here. One of the preliminary conclusions we have reached is that, before any agreement on cease-fire, the definition of the term and the specific conditions should be carefully articulated and negotiated at governmental level.

The definition of cease-fire found in Appendix G of the JCS study, short title: SEA CABIN (U) has been assumed as the working definition used in the above responses. That definition states: "A standdown of military operations in South Vietnam in which offensive ground combat operations and associated close air and naval gunfire support would not be initiated. All military forces, including irregulars, would assume a defensive posture, firing only if attacked or clearly endangered. Patrolling, reconnaissance, and surveillance essential to security of forces could be conducted." I believe, however, that this definition should be carefully examined, in consideration of specific provisions which would be acceptable or unacceptable to the US/GVN, before it serves as a basis for negotiation of the terms of a cease-fire in Vietnam,



EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

ACTION

Wednesday, September 11, 1968

4:35 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Holyoake wishes to see Presidential candidates

*Pres file*

New Zealand Ambassador Corner has informed Ambassador Duke that Prime Minister Holyoake would like to meet with Vice President Humphrey and Richard Nixon during his upcoming visit to the United States. Ambassador Duke plans as a matter of routine to seek the appointments on the Prime Minister's behalf, unless you see some objection to this procedure.

Holyoake's desire to meet the Presidential nominees is understandable and a similar wish will doubtless be expressed by other state visitors. I can see advantages to such meetings being arranged through State Department Protocol rather than on a hit-and-miss basis. I recommend you approve Ambassador Duke's attempting to arrange the appointments.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove       

Call me       

MWright:wpt

Page  
1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, Sept. 11, 1968  
4:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Keith Waller called to tell me that Robert Menzies has suffered three light strokes in England. He has been forced to cancel his lectures at the University of Texas. Keith told me, confidentially, that an initial paralysis in one side and loss of the power of speech have now passed. He is recovering; but, at his age (73) it is a serious matter.

If you wish to send him a message, he should be addressed care of Australia House, London.

W. W. Rostow

Proposed  
Prepare message okay ✓

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dep. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01



**Proposed Message to Sir Robert Menzies**

I was greatly distressed to learn from Keith Waller of your illness. Get well soon, old friend, because Austin -- and many other places -- needs to hear your wisdom and I need the comfort of your company.

8

Wednesday, Sept. 11, 1963  
4:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

VIA: John Macy

*Pres. file*

Sect. Rusk tells me that it is Luke Battle's judgment that it would be wise to announce his attached resignation, of which you know, as early as possible -- before his trip to Cairo. He is scheduled to leave Monday, September 16.

Luke's reason is that, knowing Nasser, he feels that Nasser would take it as bad faith if his resignation were announced just after his trip.

Attachment

W. W. Rostow

*Announce resignation before Sept. 16 —*

*to —*

*Call me —*

*Pres J*  
9

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, Sept. 11, 1968  
3:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

As you know, the monsoon will soon begin to shift and it will become dry in Laos, wet in the North Vietnamese panhandle.

The cost of a bombing cessation in the panhandle will decrease in the period October to February-March.

I asked Bob Ginsburgh to look at the data to give us a feel for how much the cost would be reduced.

This is the result.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01



9a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

10 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

The attached graph shows the distribution of attack sorties by month in Laos and in Route Packages 1, 2, and 3 of NVN (RPs 4, 5, and 6 are excluded).

On this historical basis, the best time for a cessation of bombing in NVN would be from about October to February or March. Even during this period, however, there would probably be significant costs involved.

You will note that the level of bombing in NVN has never been reduced to the lowest levels of activity in Laos.

- At the very lowest point (Feb 68) bombing in Route Packages 1, 2, and 3 equalled 28% of the total effort in these route packages, plus Laos.

- For Dec 66 through Feb 67, the corresponding percentage was 44%.

- For Nov 67 through Mar 68, the percentage was 36%.

- Furthermore, sorties over NVN were lower than "normal" because of bombing pauses:

Dec 66	--	2-1/2 days
Jan 67	--	1-1/2 days
Feb 67	--	6 days
Dec 67	--	1-1/2 days
Jan 68	--	2-1/2 days

All out-of-country sorties were lower than normal on Feb 68 because of diversion to in-country uses to meet the TET offensive.


DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/75, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

2  
ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

# ATTACK SORTIES - NVN RB 1+2+3, LAOS.



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 175095, State Dept. Guidelines  
By JC NARA Date 12/17/01

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~

Wednesday, September 11, 1968  
2:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

If you wish to get a feel for today's  
empty give-and-take in Paris, here is  
a summary.

They were just waiting for  
tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

DELTO 715 (Paris 20662)

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By is, NARA, Date 11-21-97



Department of State

10a  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

O 111410Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5918

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 4760

By no NARA, Date 4-21-97

3 1 6 9 Q

Sept 11, 1968

11:13AM

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 20662

N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 715

SUBJECT: IMMEDIATE SUMMARY 21ST SESSION, SEPTEMBER 11, 1968.

1. LE DUC THO WAS ABSENT. BOTH THUY AND HA VAN LAU WERE PRESENT. THE MEETING CONVENED ON SCHEDULE.

2. THUY'S PREPARED STATEMENT TOOK 25 MINUTES. HE OPENED BY REFERRING TO THE US STATEMENT OF LAST WEEK IN WHICH THE US ALLEGED THAT THE NORTH WAS AGGRESSING AGAINST THE SOUTH, AND IN WHICH THE US ASKED REPEATEDLY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER BOMBARDMENT OF THE NORTH HAS BEEN STOPPED. THUY STATED THAT THE US WAY OF STATING THE PROBLEM AMOUNTED TO RECIPROCITY WHICH THEY HAVE REJECTED. THE QUESTION IS NOT THAT THE US DOESN'T KNOW WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF THE BOMBING IS STOPPED, BUT RATHER THAT THE US SIDE REFUSED TO RESPOND TO THE LEGITIMATE DEMANDS OF THE DRV AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE; HAVING LAUNCHED THE AGGRESSION IN VIET-NAM, THE US MUST END IT. THE KEY TO PEACE IS IN HANDS OF THE US.

3. THUY CONTINUED: AS LONG AS THE US REFUSED TO LOOK TOWARDS PEACE AND INTENSIFIES THE WAR, THEN THE VIETNAMESE MUST CONTINUE TO FIGHT. HE QUOTED GREATLY EXAGGERATED AUGUST 68 STATISTICS FROM THE 9TH MLF COMMUNIQUE TO PROVE THEIR MILITARY VICTORIES. PARALLEL TO MILITARY VICTORY POLITICAL FORCES HAVE DEVELOPED RAPIDLY -- EVEN WITHIN THE POLITICAL LINES OF DEFENSE OF THE ENEMY. THE PROGRAM OF THE "ALLIANCE" HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO GATHER TOGETHER THE FORCES OF NATIONALISM. THE US IS FORCED MORE AND MORE INTO A PASSIVE DEFENSE. MUTINIES BY GI'S HAVE BEEN SUPRESSED. IN THE FIGHTING, MANY AMERICAN SOLDIERS HAVE REFUSED TO OBEY ORDERS. MANY, LIKE JOHN PETER JOHNSON IN DA NANG, HAVE RALLIED TO THE SIDE OF THE FORCES OF LIBERATION.

4. THUY CONTINUED: YESTERDAY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AGAIN SAID THAT THE US WILL NOT TOTALLY CEASE THE BOMBING WITHOUT RECIPROCITY. THY REPEATED THAT THERE CAN BE NO RECIPROCITY WHATSOEVER.

5. THE US SIDE TRIES TO MAKE THE PUBLIC BELIEVE THAT THE DRV HAS COUNTED ON A CHANGE IN THE US PRESIDENCY, AND THAT THE DRV HAD LOST HOPE. THE ALLEGATION IS RIDICULOUS. VIET-NAM COUNTS

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

ON ITS OWN FORCES AND JUST CAUSE. THE DRV HAS WON VICTORY AFTER VICTORY AND IS GAINING SUPPORT FROM MANY COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND FROM PROGRESSIVE ELEMENTS IN THE US. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF THE US ARE THE BUSINESS OF THE US. HOWEVER ANY PRESIDENT WHO DOESN'T HAVE THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL NATIONALISTIC RIGHTS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IS DOOMED TO FAILURE.

6. THE US MUST ABANDON AGGRESSION, NEO-COLONIALISM, AND THE POLICY OF SEEKING PERMANENT DIVISION OF VIET-NAM. THE US MUST RECOGNIZE THE NLF AND DISCUSS WITH IT QUESTIONS OF INTEREST IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

FIRST THE US MUST IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY CEASE ALL BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR SO THAT OTHER QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO BOTH PARTIES CAN BE DISCUSSED. OTHERWISE THE PARIS TALKS WILL REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE.

7. HARRIMAN COMMENTED ON THUY'S STATEMENT. HE REGRETTED THAT THUY CONTINUED TO CONFUSE THE REAL CAUSE OF THE WAR IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR LIES IN THE FACT THAT NORTH VIET-NAM DELIBERATELY EMBARKED ON THE USE OF FORCE AND TERROR TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE SOUTH. THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM RESISTED, AND THEY ASKED US HELP WHICH THE US GAVE. THE DRV HAS BEEN FRUSTRATED IN ITS OBJECTIVES, AND HAS LOST HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF MEN.

8. HARRIMAN THEN READ SOME AUGUST STATISTICS TO CORRECT AND COUNTER THOSE QUOTED BY THUY FROM THE NLF 9TH COMMUNIQUE. HARRIMAN GAVE THE US/RVNAF/FWMAF KIA/WIA FIGURES, FRIENDLY-ENEMY WEAPONS LOST, AND FRIENDLY-ENEMY WEAPONS LOSS RATIO. HE STATED THAT THE FALSE FIGURES OF THE DRV DO NOT IMPRESS THE US OR PUBLIC OPINION, OR CHANGE THE REAL SITUATION. THE DRV TALKS OF VICTORY, AND CONTINUES TO PURSUE THE BELIEF THAT IT CAN WIN MILITARILY. HARRIMAN ASKED HOW MANY MORE THOUSANDS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE YOUTH IS THE DRV PREPARED TO LOSE BEFORE IT UNDERSTANDS THAT IT CANNOT WIN MILITARILY.

9. HARRIMAN THEN READ HIS PREPARED TEXT. LAST WEEK HE HAD ASKED THUY TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. BUT NORTH VIET-NAM HAS GIVEN NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE READY -- AS THE US IS -- TO REMOVE THEIR FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM. IN FACT, THE DRV HAS INTENSIFIED THE VIOLENCE DURING THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, AGAIN WITH HEAVY INVOLVEMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. ATTACKS WERE DIRECTED AT VARIED TARGETS -- BORDER OUTPOST, PRINCIPAL CITIES, AND SMALL FARMING COMMUNITIES. ALL ATTACKS REFLECTED A CONSCIOUS DECISION BY HANOI TO PRESS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF POLITICAL OBJECTIVES BY MILITARY MEANS.

10. HARRIMAN OUTLINED THE FUTILITY OF THEIR ACTIONS, GIVING THE CASUALTIES ABSORBED BY THE DRV. DESPITE DRV STRIDENT CLAIMS OF GREAT VICTORIES, ALL OF THE MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PURPOSES OF THEIR VIOLENCE HAVE FAILED. LIKEWISE, DRV/VC ACTS OF TERRORISM CANNOT BE DEFENDED. ROCKET ATTACKS ON SAIGON ON AUGUST 22 AND SEPTEMBER 6 WERE USED AS EXAMPLES OF INEXCUSABLE ATTACKS ON INNOCENT CIVILIANS. EXAMPLES OF INCREASED ASSASSINATIONS AND BOMBINGS THROUGH

HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

O 111410Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5919

~~SECRET~~ SEC 2 OF 2 PARIS 20662

N O D I S H A R V A N

DELTO 715

3 1 6 2 Q

Sept. 11, 1968

11AM

SUBJECT: IMMEDIATE SUMMARY, 21ST SESSION, SEPTEMBER 11, 1968

THE COUNTRY WERE GIVEN TO ILLUSTRATE THE NLF'S INTENSIFIED CAMPAIGN OF FEAR. IN SHORT, NEITHER VIOLENCE BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY, NOR TERRORISM BY THE NLF WILL BRING THE DRV SUCCESS. HARRIMAN ONCE AGAIN APPEALED TO THE DRV TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, DISCUSS MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, AND ALLOW SOUTH VIETNAM TO DECIDE ITS OWN FUTURE. QUOTING FROM THE PRESIDENT, HE SAID US AWAITS REASON TO BELIEVE DRV READY TO JOIN IN DE-ESCALATING AND MOVING SERIOUSLY TOWARDS PEACE.

11. HARRIMAN COMPLETED HIS STATEMENT AT 11:46 AND SUGGESTED A TEA BREAK. THUY AGREED.

12. THE 35 MINUTE TEA BREAK DID NOT INCLUDE ANY DISCUSSION OF MATTERS DIRECTLY RELATED TO NEGOTIATIONS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CONTINUED TO DISPLAY A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCENE WHICH THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY FOLLOWING CLOSELY. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH YESTERDAY, AND ASKS IF IT REFLECTED A HARDENING OF POSITION. WE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE US POSITION.

13. THE MEETING RECONVENED AT 12:21. THUY MADE A FEW REMARKS, THE FIRST PERTAINING TO THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR: THE US SIDE SLANDERS THE NORTH--ACCUSING IT FALSELY OF INVADING SOUTH VIETNAM--TO COVER ITS OWN AGGRESSION,--TO JUSTIFY THE INSTALLATION OF A PUPPET REGIME, AND TO SERVE ITS NEO-COLONIALIST SCHEMES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 Paris 20662 Sept. 11, 1968 Section 2 of 2

QRM SECONDLY, SAID THUY, THE US SIDE SAYS IT IS WINNING, AND THAT VIET-NAM IS LOSING, AND THE US QUOTES FIGURES TO PROVE IT. THE DRV SIDE KNOWS AHEAD OF TIME THAT THE FIGURES ARE WRONG, BUT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD NOT ARGUE OVER NUMBERS. HOWEVER, IT REMAINS THAT THE US MILITARY FORCES HAD TO ABANDON KHE SAHN. THE US STILL BOASTS THAT SAIGON IS IMPREGNABLE BUT WHY DOES THE US WORRY WHEN POPULAR FORCES ATTACK SAIGON? WHY WERE TAYLOR, LODGE, MCNAMARA AND WESTMORELAND FIRED? THESE FACTS SHOW WHO'S WINNING.

15. THIRDLY, THE US ACCUSES THE POPULAR FORCES OF TERRORISM AGAINST CIVILIANS. THE US INDISCRIMINATELY USES B-52'S, NAPALM, BEEHIVE BOMBS, TOXIC CHEMICALS, AND SWEEP OPERATIONS IN POPULATED AREAS-- THESE ARE ACTS OF TERRORISM. THE US AUTHORITIES HAVE HAD TO ADMIT THAT THEY ERRONEOUSLY HIT THEIR OWN UNITS AS WELL AS CIVILIANS. THUY THEN PROVIDES SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF "CRIMES COMMITTED BY US EXPEDITIONARY FORCES IN VIET-NAM;" E.G., ACTS BY CORPORAL R. ALLEN, 27TH MARINE REGIMENT; SWEEP OPERATIONS IN CAN THO AND RACH GIA; SEVERAL BOMBINGS IN NORTH VIET-NAM; ARRESTS OF FISHERMAN BY US BOATS; ETC.

15. THUY'S FOURTH POINT WAS THE LEGALITY OF THE GVN; AN IMMENSE MAJORITY OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT THE NLF. THE PUPPET SAIGON IS HATED. WITHOUT US TROOPS AND ARMS, THE GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS SET UP BY THE US COULD NOT REMAIN. TO SUM UP THUY REPEATED THE SUBSTANCE OF PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE.

16. HARRIMAN REPLIED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ANSWERED THE UNJUSTIFIED CHARGES OF THE DRV. HE DID, HOWEVER, SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON LODGE, TAYLOR, MCNAMARA AND WESTMORELAND, SAYING THAT, INSTEAD OF BEING FIRED, THEY HAD LEFT THEIR POSITIONS WITH HONOR AND PRESENTED EXPRESSIONS OF GRATITUDE, AND POINTED TO THE RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS THEY NOW OCCUPY.

17. THUY REPLIED THAT TO CLARIFY WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT THESE MEN, HE DID NOT SAY THEY WERE FIRED--THAT WAS A MISTAKE OF INTERPRETATION. IT WAS THEIR VIETNAMESE POLICY THAT HAD FAILED--WHICH FORCED THEM TO RESIGN.

18. THE MEETING ADJOURNED AT 1300 HOURS. HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

*11*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, Sept. 11, 1968  
12:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Averell takes on De Gaulle on  
Yalta in relation to Czechoslovakia -- rather well.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

(Paris 20642)

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 11-10-92



Galsburg  
Wright  
11a

RECEIVED  
INCA

1968 SEP 11 09 28

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HCE417

PAGE 01 PARIS 00001 110850Z

15-S  
ACTION P 04

INFO EA 10,SS 25,SAH 02,IO 13,NSC 10,INR 07,CIAE 03,DODE 03,NSAE 00,  
NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,CCO 00,FILE 02,L 03,H 02,RSC 01,RSR 01,  
EUR 15,/295 W

0 110745Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5900

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SET 1 OF 2 PARIS 20642

DELTO 709

FROM JORDEN FOR DONNELLEY

1. HERewith TEXT OF GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S INTERVIEW WITH RADIO  
LUXEMBOURG ON SEPTEMBER 10. NOT TO BE RELEASED BEFORE 1PM,  
PARIS TIME, SEPTEMBER 11.

TRANSCRIPT OF TAPED RADIO INTERVIEW OF AMBASSADOR  
W. AVERELL HARRIMAN BY MR. BONJEAN, RADIO  
LUXEMBOURG

TAPED AT AMERICAN EMBASSY PARIS, FRANCE TUE/DA, Y,  
SEPTEMBER 10, 1968.

Q. WHAT DO THINK OF THIS ANALYSIS OF EUROPE AS DIVIDED INTO  
TWO CAMPS, EACH OF WHICH IS DOMINATED BY TWO POWERS,  
THE TWO POWERS BEING RIVALS?

A. WELL, I THINK THAT PRESIDENT DE GAULLE HAS SOMEWHAT  
OVERSIMPLIFIED HISTORY WHEN HE COMPARED THE WARSAW  
PACT AND THE DOMINATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN EASTERN EUROPE WITH  
THE FREE ASSOCIATION OF NATIONS THROUGH NATO. IT IS  
QUITE A DIFFERENT SITUATION.

YOU WILL REMEMBER, HERE IN FRANCE EVEN, THERE WERE ALLIED FORCES IN-

PRESERVATION COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 PARIS 00001 112850Z

CLUNG AMERICANS; STATIONED IN FRANCE AT THE REQUEST OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT--AND WHEN PRESIDENT DE GAULLE AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ASKED THE AMERICAN TROOPS TO LEAVE, THE ONLY QUESTION ASKED WAS "WHEN DO YOU WANT THEM TO GO?" AND THEY LEFT EVEN BEFORE THE DATE THAT WAS PRESCRIBED.

SO THAT TO SPEAK OF THE DOMINATION OF EASTERN EUROPE BY THE SOVIET COMMUNIST CAMP, AS IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE TO THE FREE ASSOCIATION OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, WHICH INCLUDES CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, IS A DISTORTION.

AY I ADD THIS WORD, TOO: THAT THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY, NATO, WAS DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THE AGGRESSION FROM THE EAST. YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE THING THAT SHOCKED THE WEST SO MUCH WAS THE COUP IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. I THINK IT WAS IN MARCH 1948, AND THEN THE BLOCKADE OF WEST BERLIN WHICH LED TO THE AIRLIFT. NATO WAS A RESULT OF THE THREAT WHICH CAME FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SATELLITE TROOPS AT THAT TIME.

Q IT IS QUITE CLEAR, SIR, THAT THE WORD "BLOC" IS EASIER TO USE IN RESPECT TO THE EASTERN BLOC. NEVERTHELESS, GENERAL DE GAULLE SAYS THAT THE ORIGIN OR THE CREATION OF THOSE BLOCS WAS THE CONFERENCE AT YALTA, AND THAT, THEREFORE, THE UNITED STATES BEARS A PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE EXISTENCE OF THOSE BLOCS, OR RATHER OF THOSE "SPHERES OF INFLUENCE" WHICH IS THE EXPRESSION USED BY GENERAL DE GAULLE.

A. THERE IS ONE THING WHICH GENERAL DE GAULLE SAYS WHICH IS TRUE: THAT HE WAS NOT AT YALTA; AND THEREFORE HIS IMPRESSIONS HAVE BEEN GAINED NOT FROM A KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT WENT ON, BUT A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE.

THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF HIS COMING TO YALTA. THERE WAS MUCH UNFINISHED BUSINESS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION, THE BRITISH, AND THE UNITED STATES HAD, WHICH HAD TO BE COMPLETED, AND IT WAS NOT THOUGHT IT AS APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO COME. THERE WAS SOME TALK OF HIS COMING LATER, BUT AS I UNDERSTAND IT HE WASN'T VERY KEEN TO DO THAT. IN ANY EVENT, HE WASN'T ASKED. AND THEN HE REFUSED TO MEET PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AFTER YALTA.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PRESERVATION COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 PARIS 00001 110850Z

NOW THE FACT OF YALTA, VERY SIMPLY, WAS THAT PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL TRIED TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR PEACE. WE DISCUSSED, OF COURSE, THE DIVISION OF GERMANY AND THE FUTURE OF GERMANY, AND IN THAT CONNECTION WE INSISTED--THE BRITISH AND OURSELVES, THE AMERICANS--INSISTED THAT FRANCE HAVE AN OCCUPATION ZONE IN GERMANY--WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ARRANGED.

STALIN RELUCTANTLY AGREED, BUT, OF COURSE, SAID THAT THE AREAS OF THAT ZONE WOULD HAVE TO COME OUT OF THE AMERICAN AND THE BRITISH ZONES.

NOW, OF THE MATTERS DISCUSSED AT YALTA WHICH GENERAL DE GAULLE SPEAKS OF, THERE WAS DISCUSSION ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS, THE CONFERENCE THAT WAS TO BE HELD IN SAN FRANCISCO IN THE END OF APRIL OF THAT YEAR; OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL THERE WAS THE PROBLEM OF THE COUNTRIES THAT WERE GOING TO BE LIBERATED, OR WERE BEING LIBERATED, BY THE RED ARMY AS THEY DROVE THE NAZI FORCES BACK INTO GERMANY.

BOTH PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL WANTED TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT THAT THESE COUNTRIES, INCLUDING POLAND, WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, THE RIGHT TO PICK THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS, AND NOT TO COME UNDER THE DOMINATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. I REMEMBER THERE WAS EVEN FEAR AT THAT TIME THAT THE CONSTITUTION--OF COURSE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION, HAD BEEN CHANGED. STALIN WAS PLANNING TO MAKE, THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE, STATES WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION FEDERATION. SO THAT ONE OF THE IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS WAS THAT WHICH RELATED TO LIBERATED EUROPE, WHICH INCLUDES, OF COURSE CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

NOW THE DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE PROVIDED-- AND STALIN AGREED TO IT--THE RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND SELF-GOVERNMENT TO THOSE PEOPLE WHO HAD FORCIBLY BEEN DEPRIVED OF THEM BY THE NAZI AGGRESSION; AND SPECIFICALLY IT WAS STATED THAT WE WOULD WORK TOGETHER TO ASSURE RELIEF MEASURES AND CONDITIONS OF INTERNAL PEACE.

AND THEN--AND THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT-- THE FORMATION OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IS AUTHORIZED. I SHOULD

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PRESERVATION COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 PARIS 00001 110850Z

SAY "INTERIM" GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, BROADLY REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS OF THE POPULATION AND PLEDGED TO THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS OF GOVERNMENTS RESPONSIVE TO THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.

AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE THREE COUNTRIES WOULD WORK TOGETHER TO FACILITATE THESE CONDITIONS.

NOW POLAND WAS A SPECIAL CASE BECAUSE, AS YOU WILL REMEMBER, THE ATTACK ON POLAND BY HITLER BROUGHT THE BRITISH INTO THE WAR, AND THE UNITED STATES, OF COURSE, WITH SO MANY POLES IN AMERICA, HAD A SPECIAL INTEREST IN POLAND. I SUPPOSE I TALKED TO STALIN MORE ABOUT POLAND WHILE I WAS AMBASSADOR, THAN ABOUT ANY OTHER SUBJECT. AND THERE WAS A FINAL AGREEMENT AT YALTA, WHICH UNFORTUNATELY WAS BROKEN: THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED THAT THE TEMPORARY LUBLIN GOVERNMENT, WHICH WE HAD NOT RECOGNIZED, AND WHICH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PRESERVATION COPY



RECEIVED  
WHCA

1968 SEP 11 08 56

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HCE414

PAGE 01 PARIS 20642 02 OF 02 110818Z

12  
ACTION P 04

INFO EA 10, SS 25, SAH 02, IO 13, NSC 10, INR 07, CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00,  
NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, FILE 02, L 03, H 02, RSC 01, RSR 01,  
/080 W

0 110740Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5901

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 20642

DELTO 709

FROM JORDAN FOR DONNELLY

ACCURATELY STATES THAT HE DIDN'T RECOGNIZE WHEN HE WAS  
IN MOSCOW, IN DECEMBER OF 1944, SEVERAL MONTHS AHEAD OF  
YALTA SHOULD BE ENLARGED. BUT HE DID DO ONE THING WHICH WE  
HADN'T DONE, HE SENT A LIAISON OFFICER TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE  
LUBLIN GOVERNMENT.

NOW, WE HADN'T RECOGNIZED THAT GOVERNMENT AND WE INSISTED,  
THE BRITISH AND THE UNITED STATES, THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT  
SHOULD INCLUDE DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS FROM POLAND. OR I SHOULD SAY  
"DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS FROM POLAND, ITSELF," AND FROM THE "POLES  
ABROAD." THAT MEANT, OF COURSE, THE LONDON GOVERNMENT.

NOW THIS NEW GOVERNMENT, THE NEW POLISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT  
OF NATIONAL UNITY, WAS TO BE PLEDGED TO HOLD FREE AND UNFETTERED  
ELECTIONS, AND WE WENT INTO A GOOD DEAL OF DETAIL: "AS SOON  
AS POSSIBLE," "ON THE BASIS OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND SECRET  
BALLOT." AND IN THESE ELECTIONS, "ALL DEMOCRATIC AND ANTI-NAZI  
PARTIES SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE PART AND PUT FORWARD  
CANDIDATES."

YOU CAN SEE THAT WE WENT INTO THIS DETAIL BECAUSE WE WERE  
VERY SUSPICIOUS OF STALIN'S INTENTIONS, AS A RESULT OF THE MANY

PRESERVATION COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 PARIS 20642 02 OF 02 110818Z

TALKS THAT I HAD HAD WITH HIM.

AND OF COURSE, THE INTERESTING THING--AN INTERESTING ASPECT OF THE YALTA AGREEMENTS -- I ASK OFTEN OF THOSE PEOPLE WHO SAY THEY WERE FAVORABLE TO IT, TO THE SOVIET UNION: "WHY DID STALIN GO TO SUCH EXTREME LENGTHS IN BREAKING THESE AGREEMENTS IF THEY WERE FAVORABLE TO HIM?"

YOU REMEMBER THAT IT WAS NOT UNTIL MARCH OF 1948 THAT THE COUP IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OCCURRED AND THE COMMUNISTS DOMINATED THAT COUNTRY. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THIS CASE -- I HAPPEN TO KNOW IT BECAUSE I TALKED WITH MR. BENES WHEN HE MADE HIS ARRANGEMENTS WITH STALIN TO RETURN IN 1944, I THINK IT WAS TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. (HE DIDN'T LIKE THE ARRANGEMENT. HE WAS UNHAPPY ABOUT IT.) REQUIRED THE INCLUSION OF CERTAIN COMMUNISTS IN THE GOVERNMENT. BUT BENES FELT THAT HE COULD DOMINATE THE SITUATION, BECAUSE HE KNEW THE CZECH PEOPLE WOULD BE SO OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM. BUT SINCE THAT DIDN'T WORK BENES WAS PUSHED ASIDE. YOU REMEMBER THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER, JAN MASARYK, EITHER COMMITTED SUICIDE OR, AS IT SEEMS TODAY, WAS KILLED, AND THE IRON FIST OF COMMUNISM TOOK OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA -- NOT THROUGH YALTA BUT THROUGH BREAKING THE YALTA AGREEMENT.

THIS TAKE-OVER BY THE COMMUNISTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS MADE POSSIBLE ONLY BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE RED ARMY THEN, AS IS NOW THE CASE, IN THE REOCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE HAD DIFFERENT FATES AT DIFFERENT TIMES. I REMEMBER I WAS SENT TO ROMANIA WITH MR. VISHINSKY AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, AND WE ESTABLISHED A COALITION GOVERNMENT AT THAT TIME. UNFORTUNATELY, IT DIDN'T LAST, AS YOU WILL RECALL, AND SEVERAL YEARS LATER THE NON-COMMUNISTS WERE PUT IN JAIL AND KING MICHAEL FLED THE COUNTRY.

IN HUNGARY, THERE WERE FREE ELECTIONS, IN 1945. THE COMMUNISTS ONLY GOT 18 OR 19 PERCENT OF THE VOTES. THE PEASANT PARTY WON THE ELECTION, BUT THAT GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS A FREE GOVERNMENT, WAS CLOSED IN ON BY THE COMMUNISTS AND THE NON-COMMUNISTS WERE FORCED OUT, AND, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, WITH THE HELP OF THE RED ARMY THE COMMUNISTS TOOK OVER. THAT IS THE FATE OF EASTERN EUROPE, CASE BY CASE, OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS, AND THE THREAT TO ALL THE FREE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WAS SO DRAMATIC THAT IT MADE THE UNITED STATES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PRESERVATION COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 PARIS 20642 02 OF 02 110318Z

AND THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE REALIZE THEIR DANGERS, AND THAT IS WHY NATO WAS ORGANIZED. IT WAS NOT A UNITED STATES IDEA, IT WAS A COMMON IDEA OF FREE NATIONS, AND SELF-PROTECTION FOR THEIR OWN FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE.

I WANT TO -- IN CLOSING THIS EPISODE -- SAY THAT, OF COURSE, I, AND MY COLLEAGUES, HAVE THE MOST ENORMOUS RESPECT FOR GENERAL DE GAULLE IN HIS COURAGE IN STANDING OFF THE NAZI AGGRESSION, AND IN RALLYING THE FORCES OF THE FREE FRENCH. THE FRENCH DIVISIONS FOUGHT GALLANTLY IN ITALY, AND GALLANTLY IN FRANCE, IN DRIVING THE NAZIS OUT, AND IN CONQUERING OF THEIR FORCES. AND I HAVE NOTHING BUT RESPECT FOR GENERAL DE GAULLE AND THE PART THAT HE PLAYED AT THAT TIME, AND THE PART THAT THE FRENCH PEOPLE PLAYED IN THE LIBERATION OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY.

BUT DON'T LET US FORGET THAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH PLAYED A VERY GREAT ROLE IN THE LIBERATION OF FRANCE, AND IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME APPRECIATION OF THAT ROLE; AND I AM SURE THERE IS, IN THE HEARTS OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE. AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES, TO ME, IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT IN OUR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND NOTHING I BELIEVE, WILL EVER DIVIDE OUR TWO PEOPLE FROM A COMMON FRIENDSHIP OVER THE YEARS.

Q- GOVERNOR, YOU ARE HERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE VIET-NAM, AND I COULD NOT END THIS INTERVIEW WITHOUT ASKING YOU AT LEAST ONE QUESTION ABOUT IT. IF THERE IS ANYTHING YOU COULD TELL US ABOUT THIS NEGOTIATION ON VIET-NAM?

A- WELL, NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, BUT I THINK THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CAME HERE VERY ARROGANT. THEY NOT ONLY DID NOT SHOW ANY RESTRAINT, AS PRESIDENT JOHNSON ASKED, BUT THEY ACTUALLY ESCALATED THE FIGHTING. REMEMBER, THEY ATTACKED SAIGON, SHELLED SAIGON. THE WHOLE WORLD OBJECTED TO THAT. AND THEN THEY HAVE, SINCE THEN, REDUCED SOME OF THEIR ACTIVITY.

NOW WE HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS, BUT I THINK THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REALIZE BETTER THAN THEY DID BEFORE THE SIMPLE OBJECTIVE OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON -- THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM MUST BE ALLOWED TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE,

IN FACT, THE SAME PRINCIPLE THAT WE TALKED ABOUT IN YALTA SHOULD APPLY TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PRESERVATION COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 PARIS 23642 02 OF 02 110813Z

AND, IN ENDING, I WANT TO EXPRESS MY GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT FOR THEIR HOSPITALITY; TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE, AND HIS COLLEAGUES. THEY HAVE DONE EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO FACILITATE THESE DISCUSSIONS. AND, UNDER THAT ATMOSPHERE, I STILL AM HOPEFUL THAT SOME AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED.

HARRIMAN

PRESERVATION COPY



**THE WHITE HOUSE**  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, September 11, 1968  
10:00

Mr. President:

Mr. Rostow requested that I send you the attached message from General Abrams informing us of a planned operation into the eastern DMZ.

White House Situation Room

*Raymond A. Wotring*  
Briefing Officer

*Pres. file*

*1.2*



~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

RECEIVED  
WHCA

120  
1968 SEP 12 02 14

ZCZ CKAB 855ZZ CNKB 484 QAB 678

OO YE KADS

DE YSNKQA 67 2552 145

O 112140Z ZYH ZFF-5

FM GEN WHEELER

INFO CIA MR HELMS

WHITE HOUSE MR ROSTOV

O 111129Z ZYH ZFF3

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS

ADT MCCA IN CINCPAC

INFO CAS PARIS FOR MG SEIGNIOUS, (LT D.S. JEFF, USN)

AMB BUNKER AMEMB SAIGON

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 12302 EYES ONLY

1. (TS) ON 13 SEPTEMBER ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST BRIGADE OF THE 5TH MECHANIZED DIVISION, COMBINED WITH ARVN UNITS, WILL EXECUTE A ONE DAY OPERATION NORTH OF GIO LINH IN ORDER TO COUNTER INCREASED ENEMY GROUND AND MORTAR ACTIVITY AND TO EXPLOIT B-52 STRIKES. THE AREA OF OPERATION IS BOUNDED BY A LINE CONNECTING YD 1370, YD 1377, YD 2479 AND YD 2370.

2. (TS) CONCEPT:

A. ON 12 SEPTEMBER, TWO B-52 STRIKES WILL BE MADE ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE TARGET DURING THE AFTERNOON. ON 13 SEPTEMBER, TWO COMPREHENSIVE STRIKES WILL BE FLOWN EARLY IN THE MORNING ON THE CENTER OF THE TARGET PRIOR TO THE PENETRATION INTO THE DMZ.

B. ONE BRIGADE (-) (REIN) WILL CONDUCT AN ARMOR ATTACK IN TWO PHASES INTO THE EASTERN DMZ SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER. THE FIRST PHASE WILL CONSIST OF AN ATTACK TO THE NORTHEAST FROM CON THIEN TO OBJECTIVE ONE (VIC YD 163770). THE SECOND PHASE WILL CONSIST OF A TURNING MOVEMENT TO THE SOUTHEAST AND A SCREENED WITHDRAWAL SOUTH ALONG HIGHWAY ONE. 2D ARVN REGIMENT WILL CONDUCT A SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK (VIC YD 2479) DURING FIRST PHASE. GP-3

280

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.3

AF Guide, SRA Records, 4/1/00

By 25 NARA, Date 1-13-93

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12856, Sec. 3.3

DA 3-10, 1-13-93

By ng NARA, Date 1-13-93

XEROX FROM QUOTE COPY

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

13

Wednesday, September 11, 1968  
9:45 a.m.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: No Progress at Today's Paris Meeting**

The meeting with the North Vietnamese in Paris today produced nothing that hadn't been said before.

The 35-minute tea break consisted of desultory conversation about the weather. However, the North Vietnamese reaffirmed the time and place for private meeting tomorrow.

The total length of the meeting was 2-1/2 hours -- the shortest on record. North Vietnamese Adviser Tho was not present.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:ksb

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 2-14-01



**ACTION**

*Free file*

**Wednesday, September 11, 1968 -- 9:30 a.m.**

**Mr. President:**

On Sunday we sent to you the attached proposed message to Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal. As you know, he recently underwent an operation. Amb. Bennett believes it would be appropriate and much appreciated. We have been unable to locate the memorandum which was sent to you on Sunday. If you will indicate your wishes, we will proceed accordingly.

**W. W. Rostow**

**Message approved** \_\_\_\_\_

**No** \_\_\_\_\_

**Call me** \_\_\_\_\_

**rlh**



17a  
—

Proposed message to Prime Minister Salazar

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

My best wishes for an early recovery.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

15

ACTION

Wednesday, September 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Birthday message to Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore

Lee Kuan Yew will be 45 on September 16. State recommends the following message be sent to him through our Embassy in Singapore:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I extend my warmest good wishes to you on your 45th birthday. May the year ahead bring only good health and good fortune to you and the people of Singapore. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson."

I recommend you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

STATE:MWright:wpt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14  
Wednesday, September 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to You from Prime Minister Sato of Japan

At Tab B is a message to you from Sato, delivered to Secretary Rusk by Liberal Democratic Party Vice President Kawashima. Kawashima is here to discuss matters of "mutual interest" with leaders in Government and Congress.

Sato's message

-- expresses respect for "your great decision to open the way for the settlement of the war in Vietnam;"

-- speaks of the respect and trust of the free countries of Asia in the steadfast efforts of the U.S. for freedom and peace;

-- refers to the Japanese people's rejoicing in the return of the Bonins and their appreciation of your understanding of "the national desire for the early return of the administrative rights of Okinawa;" and

-- points out his belief that the resounding victory of his Party proves beyond dispute the support of the people for his policies of U.S. - Japanese cooperation and adherence to the Security Treaty.

A suggested response is at Tab A. The reference to the Ryukyus is non-committal and is designed to defuse Sato's reference to "early return." We do not know whether this use was intended to move beyond the wording of the November communique. It is used in the context of the Japanese "national desire," and therefore should not give any particular trouble if Sato's message is made public. In that event, release of your response should keep things straight.

Recommendation:

That you sign the suggested reply.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-91  
By isp, NARA Date 12-12-96

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

AJenkins:mm

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*September 13, 1968*

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of August 17, 1968, which I recently received through the kind offices of Mr. Shojiro Kawashima, Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party.

I share your conviction that through perseverance we will achieve a peace based on justice in Vietnam. I believe that the unstable conditions in Asia require steadfast efforts on the part of all free nations to achieve freedom and peace. In this regard I am gratified by your interpretation of recent elections in Japan as indicative of firm support for the Mutual Security Treaty.

Among the favorable results of our meeting last November, the return of the Bonin Islands to Japan and the frank exchange of views on the Ryukyus have undoubtedly strengthened the relationship of confidence and trust between our two countries.

I trust that Mr. Kawashima's meetings with Government and Congressional leaders here will provide a useful forum for a further exchange of ideas leading to deeper mutual understanding.

Please accept my best wishes for your continued success and for the welfare of the citizens of Japan.

Sincerely,

*15/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

His Excellency  
Eisaku Sato  
Prime Minister of Japan  
Tokyo

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-91  
By sig, NARA Date 12-12-96

LBJ:State:AJenkins:mm:9/11/68



16a

August 16, 1968

Dear Mr. President :

It is my great pleasure to send greetings to you through Mr. Shojiro Kawashima, Vice-President of the Liberal Democratic Party, who is visiting your country in a private capacity.

It is almost one year since I conferred with you in Washington last autumn. Since that time, you have earned my heartfelt respect by your great decision to open the way for the settlement of the war in Viet-Nam. I regret that the negotiations in Paris have as yet made but slow progress; however, I am sure that the United States will persevere, and it is my sincere hope that a peace based on justice will be brought to Viet-Nam as soon as is humanly possible.

I would also like to point out that in the face of unstable circumstances in Asia and the Far East, involving not only Viet-Nam but also the recent situation in the Korean Peninsula, the free countries of the area hold great respect and trust in the steadfast efforts of the United States for freedom and peace.

The

The President,

The White House,  
Washington, D. C.,  
U. S. A.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-91  
By sig, NARA Date 12-12-96

The Japanese people to a man rejoiced in the return of the Bonin Islands to Japan from under the United States administration, brought about this June as a result of our talks last year. The Japanese people, furthermore, appreciate fully that you, Mr. President, understand the national desire for the early return of the administrative rights over Okinawa.

I fought the House of Councillors election last July on the basis of cooperation between Japan and the United States and firm adherence to the Security Treaty between our two countries at a time when the attention of the nation was brought to several aspects of our relations, including the problem of military bases. As you know very well, my Liberal Democratic Party won a resounding victory surpassing expectations, thus proving beyond dispute the support of the people to the policies of my Cabinet.

At such a time, I have asked Mr. Kawashima to meet with a number of leaders in your Government and in Congress to discuss frankly matters of mutual interest to both our two nations, explaining the people's feelings as well as the general situation in Japan today, while learning about the recent situation in the United States.

I am confident that Mr. Kawashima, who plays a very important role in our political world through his dual capacity

as

as Vice-President and Chairman of the Foreign Policy  
Research Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party, will  
deepen our countries' mutual understanding and trust through  
his visit to Washington.

May I extend my best wishes for your health and for  
the prosperity of the citizens of the United States.

Sincerely,

  
Prime Minister of Japan.

*HOWE*

17

Wednesday, September 11, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

President Diaz Ordaz agrees to drop the Amistad Dam dedication ceremony.

No announcement of this decision needs to be made since the meeting was never announced.

In response to possible press inquiries, the Mexicans would like us to follow this line:

"Such a meeting was considered on a preliminary basis, but the programs of both Presidents have become so congested that it has not been possible to synchronize their schedules without great inconvenience to them. Accordingly, the meeting will not be held."

W. W. Rostow

cc: Jim Jones  
George Christian

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



## INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~  
HARVAN PLUS

Tuesday, September 10, 1968 -- 2:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Richard Holbrooke, the author of the attached memorandum to Sec. Rusk, is a Foreign Service Officer attached to Amb. Harriman's staff. He was in the U. S. on leave when the latest talk took place. Sec. Rusk sent him on a personal mission to Paris to get "the flavor" of the recent private session with Tho, as well as the views of Harriman, Vance, and Habib.

Sec. Rusk thought you might wish to read Holbrooke's memorandum. In addition, the brief appendices may interest you, notably Gov. Harriman in D and E.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989  
By 19, NARA, Date 1-7-93

WWRostow:rlm

~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

18a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

September 10, 1968

PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Views of Ambassadors Harriman and Vance,  
and Phil Habib; September 7 - 9, 1968.

The Delegation feels that "we have entered a new and important phase." In Vance's words, "we hope to be able to move if talks work out well before the end of the month." The Delegation was struck by Tho's delay of the next private session until Thursday, but encouraged by Tho's willingness to speed up the talks thereafter--his agreement in principle to "meet many hours a day and many days a week." To Vance, the schedule of private talks--to be decided Thursday--will be an important clue to the seriousness of the DRV. If Tho agrees to frequent talks (and the Delegation will press for two or three times weekly), then we can conclude that the DRV is in the opening phases of a plan for serious discussions. The Delegation is unanimous in believing that the DRV is now beginning serious discussions. These discussions will not, of course, be concluded before January 20, but the groundwork for settlement might be laid by then--this is the Delegation's hope. Vance was also favorably struck by the North Vietnamese emphasis on the secrecy of these talks.

Habib and Negroponte were both struck by the differences between the last meeting and all previous ones. This one was held at the same Vitry house in which Vance met with Lau. But the meeting was upstairs in a room prepared for formal talks, with a conference table and the exact number of chairs. The mood of the North Vietnamese was also quite different from that in earlier meetings, which were held in an informal setting downstairs.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

-2-

To Habib, Hanoi's behavior suggested strongly that they had delayed Harriman-Tho meetings until after Pham Van Dong's September 2nd speech and after the conventions. Habib believes that they were not satisfied with the results of the Democratic Convention.

The Delegation believes that Tho is leading up to something new. "Every time Hanoi is ready to make a statement or a change in their position they precede it with preparation and propaganda."

While Vance believes that they have not ruled out some parts of the Phase 2 package, the Delegation does not think that Hanoi will really talk in detail about Phase 2 matters until after the bombing stops. However, they expect Tho to drop new hints on Hanoi's position what he calls "concrete matters" in the next sessions.

The Delegation said that it is very grateful for the telegram of instructions it received on Thursday, September 5. It does not need additional instructions for the next meeting, although it would welcome advice. It intends to let Tho finish his presentation, and it will not rebut his specific distortions of fact. Harriman intends, however, to make a general statement explaining to Tho that Hanoi confuses nationalism and Communist subversion.

The Delegation believes that, in pointing in "every way possible" to the Pham Van Dong speech as important, the North Vietnamese were using for the first time in Paris, a technique that ~~we~~ had urged them to use."

Vance said that he thought we should work towards tying down the GVN representation issue and the DMZ. ~~We probably won't be able to get a clear statement from Tho,~~ but Vance hopes that we can get a more oblique sort of statement, such

-3-

as "we will know what to do," which, in the proper context, the Delegation would feel is a significant concession on Hanoi's part.

The Delegation believes that we will not get agreement on "our side/your side" soon. If we want to stop the bombing in the near future, we will have to find an alternative approach to the crucial question of GVN representation.

The Delegation is worried about the attitude of the GVN. Harriman is afraid that they "have not faced up to the realities of President Johnson's stated position." By this he means the "one man, one vote" principle, our call for the participation of all Vietnamese in free elections, etc. While the Delegation feels, from its "close and careful" reading of all the information from Saigon, that we are better off today than two months ago in Viet-Nam, "there is no chance of Hanoi throwing in the sponge."

Harriman also wished to call the Secretary's attention to the South Vietnamese presidential election law and voting rights under the election law. In Harriman's view they are disturbingly restrictive, and are the kind of thing which need to be changed in Viet-Nam.

These two documents are attached as Tab A. Tab B is a copy of Governor Harriman's hand-written note to the Secretary. Tab C is a copy of Ambassador Vance's hand-written note. Tab D is a copy of Governor Harriman's "supplemental note." Tab E is a special separate item.

Richard C. Holbrooke



*Hold*

186

SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW

Article II. The following categories of persons will not be allowed to be candidates:

. . . . .

(9) Those who have directly or indirectly worked for communism or pro-communist neutralism or worked in the interest of communism.

identical  
(Virtually/~~identical~~ provisions appear in the Upper and Lower House election laws.

Held 18c

Voting Rights under the SVN Presidential Election Law

Article 4 of the election law says that all persons over 18 years of age, who are inscribed on the electors list and holders of electors' cards have the right to vote except those deprived of the rights of citizenship.

Comment: Any person over 18 with an ID card is automatically inscribed on the electors' list in his locality, and he is issued his voter's card upon request. Since the GVN has always been interested in high voter turn-outs, it has usually mounted information campaigns to make sure voters pick up their cards or even distribute them several days before election day.

The law also provides for a process whereby persons not inscribed on the electors' list have the right to file a complaint in order to rectify the error, if any.

There are no political restrictions on the right to vote. Such restrictions are confined to the right to file candidacy.

JDNegroponte:8/20/68

~~TOP SECRET~~  
NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

18d

B

Paris, September 9

Dean.

Many thanks for sending Dick to talk with us. Cy and I have each given him a note of things particularly on our minds. I fully agree with his notes -- mine are supplementary. Dick has talked to me at length and all other members of the delegation separately and can answer, I hope, any question you have in mind.

With my best,

Averell

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By pc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~TOP SECRET~~  
NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

~~TOP SECRET~~  
NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

18e

C

Cyrus Vance - Handwritten Note - September 7, 1968

1. We feel we have entered new and important phase.
2. We hope to be able to move if talks work out well  
before end of month.
3. More thought should be given to our/side your/side  
and variant.
4. We were struck by delay until Thursday--but willingness  
to speed up talks thereafter.
5. Grateful for telegram.
6. Grateful for Dean sending Dick over here.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~TOP SECRET~~  
NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS



18-F  
D

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

~~TOP SECRET~~

GOVERNOR HARRIMAN - SEPTEMBER 9, 1968

1. We may be approaching a new opening --  
We will make every effort to develop it.
2. We don't need any new instructions at the moment, but  
I won't hesitate to ask if we do. We want all the advice  
you have.
3. I'm still worried that Saigon government is not in a mood to  
negotiate seriously. I don't feel they have faced up to realities of  
President Johnson's stated position. Facts of life are even  
tougher.
4. ~~I hope we will not miss an opportunity because of military~~  
optimism. We are better off today, I feel, than two months ago, but  
there is no chance of Hanoi throwing in the sponge. (We follow  
information very closely)
5. ~~President Johnson's minimum objectives can be obtained with~~  
~~some gamble, but not Bunker's. (I feel Thiaux is even more realistic)~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~TOP SECRET~~  
HARVAN/PLUS/NODIS

~~TOP SECRET~~  
NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

HARRIMAN'S VIEWS ON A MEETING WITH KOSYGIN

The President should not go to Russia unless the bombing has stopped. Obviously the Russians would give their eye-teeth for a visit, but we could not make progress on Viet-Nam unless the bombing is stopped. If the bombing is stopped Harriman is very much in favor of a trip, during which the President should make major demands on the Russians for a settlement on Viet-Nam.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~TOP SECRET~~  
NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

INFORMATION

Tuesday, September 10, 1968  
8:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith marked passages are  
Thieu's statement about U. S. troop  
withdrawals.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

## HANOI, AT PARLEY, SAYS U.S. SPREADS RUMORS OF GAINS

Harriman Disputes Thuy—  
American Offer of Postwar  
Help Is Brushed Aside

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, July 10 — North Vietnam accused the United States Government today of "spreading rumors" of forward movement in the Vietnam talks here "to appease American public opinion."

In the 12th session of the official conversations since May 13, Xuan Thuy, Hanoi's chief representative, brushed aside American offers, which were renewed today, of economic aid to Southeast Asia after the war. He charged that the offers were an American device for avoiding the issue of the North Vietnamese demand for a halt in United States bombing as the first step toward a settlement.

Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, the chief American negotiator, recalled United States aid to the war-shattered economies of Europe after World War II and reminded the North Vietnamese delegates of President Johnson's April, 1965, pledge of \$1-billion in aid to Southeast Asia.

Offer Called 'Little Carrot'

A North Vietnamese spokesman said this "little carrot will not hide the black barrel of the cannon" used by American forces in Vietnam.

Mr. Thuy, both in his formal presentation and again in an informal sidewalk chat with reporters, insisted that there had been no progress in the two months of talks. There can be none, he asserted, until the bombing of the North has been halted unconditionally "without further delay." The bombing has been limited to the southern area of North Vietnam since the end of March.

The thrust of North Vietnam's position, allied diplomats suggested later, appeared to reflect a conclusion that the very process of the Paris talks

had reduced popular pressure on the Johnson Administration to stop the bombing.

'Straws in the Wind'

Mr. Harriman contradicted Mr. Thuy's assessment. Although the two sides have differed in the past on this matter, today's disagreement was more open.

"I can't say any immediate results have been achieved," Mr. Harriman commented, "but I still maintain there are straws in the wind, regardless of what he says."

American negotiators have avoided stating that the talks have made progress, but they have been slightly encouraged by the fact that, despite the deadlock over the bombing question, Hanoi shows no signs of wanting to break off the talks.

Among other encouraging signs, they have said, are its willingness to permit a whole range of political and military issues to be raised and its negotiators' acceptance of informal conversations during recess. These provide a chance for discussion of substantive issues — fruitless so far — and potentially serious secret bargaining.

Some Western observers suggested that widely published reports mentioning American statements that "straws in the wind" pointed toward progress in the talks might have embarrassed Hanoi with the Chinese Communists, which have disapproved of the talks, and possibly some militant elements of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Vietcong in South Vietnam.

The 70-minute prepared statement by Mr. Thuy was explicit in seeking to counter any mild optimism emanating from Washington.

Creation of Obstacles Alleged

"In order to serve their political designs," he said, "the American authorities have on the one hand willfully created obstacles to these conversations by refusing the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and, on the other hand, they spread rumors on the existence of 'similar points in the positions of both sides,' 'some signs of progress,' of 'new movements,' of 'new ideas on the American side' in the official conversations."

"These statements are only designed to appease American public opinion, which is demanding a revision of American policy in Vietnam from the Johnson Administration."

These remarks were under-

## Hanoi's Moves

By Peter Braestrup

Washington Post Foreign Service

ABOARD USS CONSTELLATION IN TONKIN GULF, July 10—President Thieu today told newsmen aboard this attack carrier that serious peace talks hinge on the outcome of an expected Communist summer offensive throughout South Vietnam.

"It may be the last battle, the last all-out effort by the Communists. They will try to (gain) a bargaining position at the negotiating table, and I'd like to see them try," the 44-year-old President said.

Arriving aboard the Constellation by air from Saigon, Thieu presided over the award of Vietnamese medals to 41 U.S. Navy men. After lunch, relaxed and smiling, accompanied by Premier Iran Van Huong, he held a wardroom press conference.

Discussing his coming Honolulu meeting with President Johnson, Thieu said it would be a "joint review" of the Paris talks and Vietnam. He added that he might ask Mr. Johnson for faster deliveries of modern equipment to the expanding 700,000-man South Vietnamese forces so the lat-

ter can take on a greater share of the war more quickly.

But Thieu backed away from his April prediction that some U.S. troops might be phased out of South Vietnam by year's end.

"The end of 1968 is too soon to phase out many units," he said. "But I think from 1969 on, we could have a timetable for phasing out major American units. But I repeat I hope that all American forces never withdraw at one time . . . You know well that South Vietnam's army needs time . . ."

Thieu promised neither his people nor his allies quick peace. He again rejected the notion of formal talks or coalition with the National Liberation Front, calling it "simply a tool of Hanoi." If Hanoi chose to include Vietcong representatives in its peace delegation, that was immaterial, Thieu said, since "we consider them all as 'the other side.'"

Expressing his confidence in the continued U.S. commitment to South Vietnam's defense, Thieu said that the Honolulu meeting should help quiet the oft-voiced fears of Saigon's more hawkish legislators that America is "selling out" Saigon at the Paris talks. He lauded Ambassador W. Averell Harriman's efforts at the talks, and urged patience.

But Thieu made little secret of his own fears that the faction-ridden non-Communist South Vietnamese would be unable to compete politically with the well organized Vietcong minority once the shooting stopped.

"We should be prepared for peace" he said. He cited his own recent efforts to encourage a solid two-party system. "I believe that the political arm is more necessary from now on to deal in peacetime with the Communists."

Asked why Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky had not, as originally planned, accompanied him to the Constellation, Thieu smiled and said that reports of Thieu-Ky feuds were "entirely imaginary."

Ky, the President went on, had joined him in a meeting yesterday with U.S. Ambassador Elsworth Bunker, but a sprained ankle incurred while waterskiing kept Ky away today.

For Thieu and his entourage, the Navy put on a proper show: admirals and captains in dress whites, a 50-man Marine honor guard in blue and khaki

scored by Mr. Thuy in talking with reporters and by Nguyen Thanh Le, the North Vietnamese spokesman, in a formal press briefing. Mr. Le also brushed aside a proposal yesterday by Bui Diem, the South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States, who is here as an observer, for direct talks between Saigon and Hanoi.

In his formal presentation, Ambassador Harriman rejected Mr. Thuy's charge that the United States was skirting the bombing question. "The United States is prepared to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, but what will then happen?" he said, alluding to demands for some matching military restraint from Hanoi.

"To stop the bombing would be only one step," he said. "We are prepared to take other steps. You also are called upon to take steps in the direction of peace."

His offers of postwar aid drew ridicule.

"The representative of the United States Government speaks about seeds for rice with increased yield which the United States will send to Vietnam," Mr. Thuy said, "but even at this moment American troops and American planes are attacking our harvest, are now destroying the economic infrastructure of South Vietnam."



the total will exceed 800,000 men by the end of 1968.... It is also anticipated that an additional 200,000 men will be made available at the end of 1968 in auxiliary and paramilitary forces, such as the police and self-defense forces. Pres. Johnson ... [noted that] M-16 automatic rifles have already been provided to all regular Vietnamese infantry, airborne, marine and ranger battalions.... Increased production of the M-16 should make it possible to get the weapon into the hands of all South Vietnamese forces during 1969....

"The 2 Presidents deplored the use of the [Paris] discussions for propaganda purposes on the North Vietnamese side.... They agreed that the basic objective in the Paris talks is to open the way to a stable and honorable peace. In the face of continued high infiltration and other military actions directed from Hanoi, however, they saw no alternative but to continue to press for realistic discussions on the appropriate actions by both sides.

"The 2 Presidents again affirmed that the Republic of Vietnam should be a full participant playing a leading role in discussions concerning the substance of a final settlement and that their 2 governments would act in full consultation with each other and with their allies, both in the present phase and throughout....

"Pres. Thieu reaffirmed the policy of his government to resolve the internal problems of all the South Vietnamese people in an amicable, just and peaceful way in accordance with the principle of one man, one vote.... He offered full participation in political activities to all individuals and members of groups who agree to renounce force and to abide by the Constitution of Vietnam.

"Pres. Thieu further stated that, when peace was restored, it would be the policy of his government to explore all the avenues which may lead to the reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means, through the free and democratic choice of all Vietnamese in the North and in the South. To that end he would consider favorably the gradual development of relations beneficial to both South Vietnam and North Vietnam, subject only to essential safeguards against renewed subversion....

"Pres. Johnson... [affirmed that] U.S. forces are fighting to repel external aggression. The United States has no other ambitions in Vietnam. It desires no bases, no continued military presence and no political role in Vietnamese affairs. As North Vietnam takes its men home and ends its aggression against South Vietnam, U.S. forces will be withdrawn, in accordance with the Manila Communiqué....

"The United States will not support the imposition of a 'coalition government,' or any other form of government, on the people of South Vietnam. The people of South Vietnam—and only the people of South Vietnam—have the right to choose the form of their government....

"The 2 Presidents stated that a complete cessation of hostilities must be part of a final peaceful settlement.... They concluded that such a cessation would be possible whenever the government of North Vietnam is prepared earnestly to examine the arrangements required. Effective controls and guarantees would be necessary. The 2 Presidents thus solemnly called on the authorities of North Vietnam to forsake the path of violence and to take the road toward peace now open to them through the Paris talks, which should lead to negotiations involving directly North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Until these hopes are realized, the 2 Presidents confirmed their determination to halt aggression and to defend the Republic of Vietnam....

On his return to Saigon July 22, Thieu told the South Vietnamese that the Honolulu conference had produced no significant changes in relations between Washington and Saigon. The "rumors" that the U.S. wanted to halt the bombing of North Vietnam, withdraw part of its forces and impose a coalition government on South Vietnam were purely "imaginary," Thieu said. In an allusion to the 1968 presidential race in the U.S., Thieu asserted: "Any President of the United States should not consider only his personal position on Vietnam" but "should consider what the Americans are doing here in Vietnam and the responsibility of the United States in the world." "You are in Vietnam to fight for yourself and to fight for the freedom of all humanity," Thieu told Americans.

The North Vietnamese Communist Party newspaper *Nhan Dan* asserted July 22 that the Honolulu conference had "failed to produce any novelty." "The aim of the Honolulu conference was to patch up the ruined cardboard castle of the U.S. puppets," the paper declared. "But the wand did not work, and the U.S. puppets have only revealed their bellicosity and obduracy."

Nguyen Thanh Le, North Vietnamese spokesman at the Paris talks, told reporters July 22: "The Honolulu meeting revealed that the position of the United States remains infinitely obstinate. It is more clear that the United States still refuses to stop its bombing against the Democratic Republic of [North] Vietnam and that it refuses to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam." The U.S. was still determined to support "the puppet government" of South Vietnam "as an instrument of a neo-colonial policy in South Vietnam."

Clifford Visits Saigon. U.S. Defense Secy. Clark Clifford had visited South Vietnam July 14-18 to confer with American and South Vietnamese officials. This was Clifford's first visit to South Vietnam as Defense Secretary.

Prior to his departure from Washington, Clifford had said at a news conference July 11 that intelligence information indicated "a great deal of enemy activity" despite a current lull in the ground fighting. Citing the Communist build-up in the I Corps area below the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and in the III Corps area around Saigon, Clifford said he had to "face the realities" of the "possibility of a new [enemy] offensive this month or possibly in August." According to intelligence data, he said, 8 or more enemy divisions were concentrated in the 5 provinces comprising the I Corps area. Asked when U.S. forces could begin withdrawing from South Vietnam, Clifford said he "would be unwilling to predict withdrawal of any American troops in 1969" unless there were favorable developments in the Paris peace talks. "I believe we must proceed on the assumption that if the enemy chooses to fight, that we must remain there," Clifford said. (In an interview July 10, South Vietnamese Pres. Nguyen Van Thieu had asserted that the U.S. could "perhaps begin to withdraw major American units in 1969" because the South Vietnamese had "done very well" in improving their armed forces.)

Among those accompanying Clifford were Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; William P. Bundy, Assistant State Secretary for Far Eastern affairs; Paul C. Warnke, Assistant Defense Secretary for international security affairs; and Phil Goulding, Assistant Defense Secretary for public affairs. Clifford and his aides arrived in Saigon July 14. Clifford conferred with U. S. officials July 15, met with South Vietnamese government leaders July 16 and visited the U. S. bases at Danang and Phubai in the I Corps area July 17. The officials flew to Honolulu July 18 for the conference between Pres. Johnson and

South Vietnamese Pres. Thieu; they returned to Washington July 20.

On his arrival at Tansonnhut Air Base July 14, Clifford affirmed that the U.S. was "interested in doing all we can" to develop the fighting capacity of the South Vietnamese army. He noted in particular that American factories would be producing the M-16 automatic rifle at a "substantially more rapid rate" toward the end of the year and that the U.S. intended to distribute the .223-caliber M-16s to all South Vietnamese units, "even at the expense of our forces." (Asked to comment on Clifford's statement on distributing M-16s, Brig. Gen. Winant Sidle, chief information officer for the U.S. command, said July 14 that South Vietnamese fighting units would be given preference over American logistical troops. Currently all U.S. combat troops were equipped with the M-16.) Clifford said he was "unable to speculate" about whether the bombing of North Vietnam would be increased or reduced. He reiterated that he could not give a timetable for the start of U.S. troop withdrawal, as this depended on certain "imponderables," such as the rate of development of the South Vietnamese army, the intentions of the Communist forces and the progress of the Paris peace talks.

Clifford told reporters at Danang July 17 that he expected the enemy to launch a major new assault throughout South Vietnam within 2 months. He described the current fall-off in ground fighting as the "lull before the storm" and added: "We proceed on the assumption that enemy combat plans at this time are coupled with the desire to make an impression on the conferees in Paris, that if they might be able to bring off some spectacular accomplishment that this could affect the negotiations"; U.S. field commanders intended "to see that no such spectacular result is obtained by the enemy." Clifford said some North Vietnamese troops had pulled back from the northern provinces of South Vietnam into the DMZ "where they apparently are being refitted and refurbished."

Paris Talks Deadlocked. U.S. and North Vietnamese representatives held their 11th, 12th and 13th negotiating sessions in Paris July 3, 10 and 17. Both sides reported no progress in resolving the issues under discussion. [See p. 258D3]

The July 3 session was marked by a North Vietnamese confirmation that Hanoi intended to release 3 captured American pilots. Radio Hanoi had made the announcement earlier July 3, and Xuan Thuy, chief North Vietnamese representative at the Paris talks, confirmed the report during a break in the session.

Thuy said Hanoi was releasing the pilots because of the "humanitarian and lenient policy" of his government. W. Averell Harriman, chief U.S. negotiator, thanked Hanoi and said he hoped the gesture "indicated a willingness to move toward a peaceful settlement" of the war.

INFORMATION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, September 10, 1968 - 8:10 pm

Pres file

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

## SUBJECT: Sterling Credit Package

Attached is Secretary Fowler's memo describing the final agreement reached at Basel this weekend on the \$2 billion "safety net" for sterling.

The Central Bankers acted after:

- the UK reported it succeeded in negotiating satisfactory agreements with present holders of sterling balances;
- agreeing on how to make up the \$200 million French share and shortfalls in what a few other countries could manage. We took up our proportion -- increasing our share from \$550 million to \$650 million, or just under one-third of the total.

The agreement is now in force. The market reaction was good.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

*Caw*  
ERF:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON

202

September 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

AGREEMENT ON STERLING CREDIT PACKAGE

At the BIS meeting in Basle on September 8, 1968, agreement was reached on the \$2 billion credit package "safety net" for sterling balances. It was announced by the BIS on September 9 that the new arrangements will be brought into force immediately.

The Governor of the Bank of England reported on the results of the U.K.'s consultations with the sterling area countries. In these consultations, each of the 40-odd sterling countries was offered a dollar value guaranty on all but 10 percent of its official sterling reserves in exchange for an undertaking to hold substantially the same proportion of sterling in its total reserves as it does now. Each such agreement is legally binding for three years, with specific provision for two-year extension by mutual consent.

The U.K. has completed negotiations on this basis with some thirty countries holding about 80 percent of official sterling balances. Final agreements with the remaining ones are expected very soon.

There was considerable discussion about the question of making up the \$200 million French share, since the French Government in the light of present circumstances was unwilling to agree to participate. (France has lost almost \$3 billion in reserves since the May riots.) Also, Belgium, Switzerland and Japan found it necessary to reduce their shares below the amounts envisioned last July. To offset these short falls and to increase the total, Germany, Italy, the three Scandinavian countries and the United States increased their shares and the BIS took a share. The U.S. share is just under one-third of the total.

Continued/p.2

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
Treasury Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

The shares are as follows:

	(Amount in millions of dollars)	
	Original Proposal	Final
Austria	\$ 50	\$ 50
Belgium	100	70
Canada	100	100
Denmark)		
Norway )	65	125
Sweden )		
France	200	-
Germany	350	400
Italy	200	225
Japan	100	80
Netherlands	100	100
Switzerland	125	100
United States	550	650
BIS	-	80
Total	\$ 1,940	\$ 1,980

Note: Belgium and Japan will seek further governmental authorization to increase their shares by \$10 million each to make the package an even \$2 billion.

Under the agreement, the Bank of England will be entitled to draw some \$600 million right away and probably will do so and use the proceeds to repay short-term credits provided in November 1967 and March of this year.

*Henry H. Fowler*  
Henry H. Fowler

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 10, 1968 - 8:05pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

*for file*

Attached is Secretary Rusk's memo recommending you see Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, influential member of the German Parliament. Birrenbach is here at the personal request of Kiesinger to discuss the situation in NATO and Europe following the Czech crisis.

Birrenbach will be seeing Secretaries Rusk, Clifford and Fowler, and others of your senior advisors. He will also see people on the Hill.

I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation. I believe it would be useful to get back to Kiesinger, through him, your views on the need for an effective European response to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange appointment \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-197  
By CG, NARA, Date 1-5-95

*WWR*  
ERF:mst

~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

212

~~SECRET~~

September 10, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Dr. Kurt Birrenbach's Visit to  
Washington

Recommendation:

That you meet with Dr. Kurt Birrenbach.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, a prominent Christian Democratic member of the German Parliament, is in Washington at the personal request of Chancellor Kiesinger, to give us German views of the European situation following the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and to ask for our thinking.

Dr. Birrenbach, who is a long-time friend of the United States, has met with me and will be meeting with a number of other high-level officials during the week. I believe that a talk with you would be useful in conveying forcefully to him and through him to the Chancellor, the vital importance of the Germans and other Europeans accepting their share of NATO responsibilities in meeting the new situation in Europe.



Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 10, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Netherlands Shipbuilding for North Korea and the PUEBLO Case

The Verolme United Shipyards in the Netherlands are constructing four fish factory ships for North Korea, with completion date in 1969. Two are under construction in the Netherlands and two in the Verolme Shipyards in Cork, Ireland.

Our Naval Attache's office in The Hague reports that the first of the ships is due to be launched October 12, 1968, and delivered to a North Korean crew in February 1969. A second vessel should be completed about July 1969. The ships have accommodations for a crew of 201.

Except for boilers which are of United Kingdom origin, we do not as yet have any information concerning third country subcontractors or suppliers. State and Defense have sent to the field a list of desired information. Our Defense Attache's office at The Hague has received an invitation to tour Verolme's Rosenberg Yards on September 20, at which time we may receive additional information.

It is unlikely that the North Koreans would want to be holding the PUEBLO crew at a time when a North Korean crew of this size is on the high seas. State and Defense are actively considering in what manner the prospective delivery of these ships to North Korea might be exploited to our advantage in the PUEBLO case. The consensus at the working level seems to be that we should at least make inquiry of the Netherlands government concerning these ships in the belief that the Verolme United Shipyards would learn of the inquiry from its government, and that the North Koreans would, in turn, learn of our inquiry from the Shipyards.

The above factor in the PUEBLO equation could mean that time is on our side.

W. W. Rostow

AJenkins:mm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-14-01*

~~SECRET~~

*Mr. Rostow*

*Pres file*

Tuesday, September 10, 1968

Mr. President:

Ambassador Sevilla-Secassa celebrates his 60th birthday tomorrow, Wednesday, September 11th.

You may wish to send him greetings along the lines of the attached draft.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:WGB:pas:9 10 68

September 11, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Lady Bird and I send you warmest congratulations as you celebrate your sixtieth birthday. This has indeed been a special year for you with so many happy occasions to commemorate. May the coming ones bring you added joy and continuing success.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Dr. Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa  
Ambassador of Nicaragua

LEJ:WGB:pas:9/10/68

Tuesday, September 10, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Barbados Prime Minister Barrow,  
Wednesday, September 11

Prime Minister Barrow is the head of the newest (November 1966) and smallest (166 square miles and 250,000 population) independent country in the Western Hemisphere. This is his first official visit to the United States.

From your standpoint the visit is a purely courtesy affair. Your involvement is limited to:

- 11:30 a.m. -- the customary welcome ceremony on the South Lawn;
- 12:00 noon -- a not more than 30 minute office call; and
- 8:00 p.m. -- a state dinner.

What substantive talks are held will be at State.

With a country of this size, it is hard to find much of substance around which to build a visit. But there are two themes we have worked into the welcoming statement and the toast which fit your foreign policy projections:

1. The future of small states lies in economic and physical integration with its neighbors. Barbados is doing this with other former British colonies in the Caribbean area.

2. No matter how small a state is, it has something to contribute to man's quest for peace and knowledge. Barbados is helping us with ocean and weather research by providing facilities.

I recommend you stress these points in your conversations with the Prime Minister.

I enclose at Tab A Secretary Rusk's briefing memorandum and briefing book. The welcoming statement and toast will be reaching you through Harry McPherson.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

WWR:WGB:pas

CONFIDENTIAL





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 31, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Errol W.  
Barrow of Barbados, Wednesday, September 11,  
at 12:00 noon

You have never met Mr. Barrow who is making his first visit to the United States in an official capacity, as Prime Minister of the newest independent nation in the Western Hemisphere (November 30, 1966). A leading lawyer-economist in Barbados, Barrow studied law and economics in London twenty years ago after his distinguished war-time service with the RAF. He has visited the United States on several occasions and is married to an American-born Negro who has retained her U.S. citizenship. In addition to Mr. Barrow, the official party includes the Permanent Secretary of External Affairs (Barrow himself is the Foreign Minister), his Ambassador to the United States, and the OAS Representative. After completing their two-day visit to Washington, they will fly on to San Francisco and then to Seattle where they will visit the Boeing plant.

What Barbados Wants

The principal Barbadian objective will be a successful visit that increases the international prestige of Barbados and enhances the image of the Barrow Administration at home. The Barbadians may also wish to stress broad policy questions, such as U.S. trade policy toward the underdeveloped nations, and air routes into the United States for a Barbadian airline. They hope that the trip will increase U.S. public awareness of Barbados and the Commonwealth Caribbean for the purposes of trade and tourism.

What the United States Wants

Barbados generally supports our foreign policy although some government officials hold private reservations about Vietnam. Our objective for this visit is to extend a warm welcome to a sound and valuable Caribbean friend, now independent, known throughout the Caribbean for its democratic traditions, its stable government, and its rational and

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By 8, NARA, Date 12-17-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

progressive leadership. Our trade and tourism relationships with Barbados are steadily increasing.

Prime Minister Barrow will probably not bring up specific bilateral matters, although he may mention the Inter-American system, aviation routes and the Inter-American Development Bank; he and the other members of his party plan to raise bilateral questions at the appropriate level. Suggested talking points are enclosed.

The Prime Minister's native language is English.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Suggested Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING PAPER FOR YOUR MEETING WITH  
PRIME MINISTER BARROW OF BARBADOS  
September 11, 1968

TALKING POINTS

Presidential Opener

- I am very happy that you could accept my invitation to Washington. Your visit will help in strengthening the ties between our two English-speaking democracies.
- Barbados' economic progress in recent years has been notable. I understand that tourism is now your nation's second largest industry, and growing at 15% per year.
- I am pleased to note that your wife is an American, which adds to our pleasure at receiving you in this nation's capital.

Caribbean Economic Cooperation

- I hope that Barbados will continue to play a progressive and constructive role in promoting Caribbean economic cooperation, to which the United States attaches great importance.

Topics the Prime Minister May Raise

Inter-American Development Bank

- (The Prime Minister may mention his concern that Barbados cannot afford to pay the normal subscription level for entry into the Inter-American Development Bank. Barbados is extremely interested in obtaining soft loans from the Bank which would be one of the few sources of concessional loans available to it.)

You May Want to Say

- I understand that discussions between the Bank and Barbados are underway. The United States is, of course, interested in smaller nations having access to concessional loans. The level of subscription for entry into the Bank is a problem which can best be resolved by the Board of

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

Aviation

- (The Prime Minister may mention that Barbados is supporting a flag airline called Air Caribbean which, although not yet operational, will be owned and operated by a Swedish company. In this context, he may express his desire to exchange further air rights with the U.S.)

You May Want to Say

- In our view the interests of Barbados, the United States and the Caribbean region would all be better served if Barbados joined in a regional airline effort.

Guyana-Venezuela Border Dispute

- (The Prime Minister is seriously concerned over Venezuela's position on the Guyanese border. He supports Prime Minister Burnham and may ask you to spell out our views on this subject.)

You May Want to Say

- We have encouraged the two governments to settle their disagreements in bilateral talks. We do not accept the legality of Venezuela's claim to portions of the high seas off Guyana and we have told the Venezuelans so. We think it important that friends of Guyana and Venezuela counsel moderation and restraint, particularly in a time of election campaigns in both countries.

ACTION

Tuesday, September 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday message to President Marcos

*Pres file*

September 11 is Philippine President Marcos' 51st birthday. State recommends that you send the following message through our Embassy in Manila:

"His Excellency  
Ferdinand E. Marcos  
President of the Republic  
of the Philippines  
Manila

Lady Bird and I send our most cordial good wishes for your health and happiness on your birthday and in the years ahead. Our warm regards also to Imelda.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

I recommend that you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

*9/10/68 - 7:18pm*

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

STATE:MWright:wpt



*Pres file*

26

Monday, Sept. 9, 1968  
4:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith estimated infiltration arrivals  
for September, October, and November.

Still quite high -- but not as high as  
July and August (29,000 and 30,000 respectively).

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

26a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

The following is our latest estimate of infiltration arrivals during the next few months.

Sept.	19,600
Oct.	12,318
Nov.	11,638

This takes into account all of the infiltration groups noted to date. It does not consider an attrition factor.

*Art*  
Art McCafferty

P, 2  
27

Monday, Sept. 9, 1968  
4:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an alleged Soviet feeler (a KGB man working for U Thant) suggesting that Gromyko might talk with the President about Vietnam when he comes to the United States before the General Assembly.

It is unclear from Melman's account how much is Melman and how much is Lesslevsky.

In any case, the proper route for discussion is not back to Melman, but Sect. Rusk to Dobrynin.

I am making a copy of this report available to Sect. Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-67  
By clm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

September 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Reported Soviet Feeler on Vietnam

Professor Seymour Melman called me this morning. He said he had spent some time socially with Viktor Lessiovsky this weekend, and Lessiovsky had made a feeler to him about Vietnam.

According to Melman, Lessiovsky was U Thant's personal assistant until about a year and a half ago and came back again this summer to the same job. He has Minister rank in the Soviet Foreign Service. (The foregoing appears accurate. Lessiovsky appears in The Ugly American -- with no effort even to change the name -- as the only Russian in Rangoon who spoke Burmese. He is thought to be an old KGB-type.)

Lessiovsky expressed considerable discouragement about the possibility of Nixon being elected President. Melman countered by asking why the North Vietnamese were waiting until January, when they could be dealing with the present Administration. Melman suggested that the Soviets should, perhaps, send an emissary of high rank who could deal with President Johnson.

Lessiovsky answered that Gromyko was coming to the General Assembly very shortly, and might be the right person. He gave Melman the impression -- although I cannot vouch for Melman's enthusiasm not outrunning his accuracy -- that the idea of Gromyko talking with the President about Vietnam had been in Lessiovsky's mind from the start. Lessiovsky asked Melman if there was any basis for optimism that the U. S. would be interested in talking seriously if Gromyko were to call on the President. Melman asked me what the story was on this. I pointed out that Secretary Rusk would, in all probability, be in New York for the General Assembly in any case and Gromyko could talk with him or raise the possibility of a Presidential appointment if he were interested. I said that the American government was of course interested in talking about peace if there were a real chance to do so constructively.

Melman said he raised the possibility with Lessiovsky of Gromyko coming right away to New York if he had something to say. Lessiovsky seemed to think that a few days before the opening of the GA would be time enough. Lessiovsky mentioned the difficulty of an emissary coming before the normal start of the GA, and stirring up all sorts of press speculation about the reason for his trip.

Melman asked me if there was any response he could give Lessiovsky, as he expects to see him again in two or three days. I said I would check on it.

\* General Assembly opens on Sept 24; Foreign Ministers now expected about 28th.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-67

By: [initials], NARA, Date 3-20-03

Melman expects to call me again tomorrow morning.

(A year or so ago Melman came to Washington to talk about a similar "feeler" which he described in detail to officers in EA at the State Department after an initial conversation with me. Apparently one of the Russians at the UN (not Lessiovsky) was suggesting a stand-down cease-fire, followed by a supervised truce, internationally supervised elections, and a new government. Lessiovsky apparently indicated a familiarity with this earlier conversation when he talked with Melman a day or two ago. From this, Melman surmizes that the present Russian feeler may be something along these lines.) :



Nathaniel Davis



INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, September 9, 1968  
2:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith evidence of continuing  
grave uneasiness in Central Europe --  
this time, from Austria.

*Free file*

W. W. Rostow

Vienna 6459

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House: 1-5-93  
By *rg*, Date *1-5-93*

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

HCD452

Davis 28a

PAGE 01 VIENNA 06459 091549Z

RECEIVED  
WHCA

51

ACTION SS 70

1967 SEP 9 16 03

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,USUE 00,CCO 00,

/070 W

P 091452Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5150

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-193  
By is, NARA Date 5-21-98

~~SECRET~~ VIENNA 6459

LINDIS

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVES AGAINST AUSTRIA.

REF : VIENNA 6390 AND STATE 234682.

1. SAW CHANCELLOR KLAUS TODAY AND INFORMALLY CONVEYED COMMENTS. IN STATE 234682 (AS ON SEPT. 4 ONLY KLESTIL PRESENT). HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID CONTINUING INFORMAL AND CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGES OF VIEWS WITH GOA RE DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CENTRAL EUROPE NOT ONLY USEFUL BUT NECESSARY BECAUSE THERE MAY BE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES.

2. IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE HE THEN SAID GOA DEEPLY CONCERNED THIS PAST WEEKEND BECAUSE AUSTRIAN MOBILE RADAR UNITS HAD ON SEPT. 7 BEEN JAMMED FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS THEY WERE DURING CZECH INVASION. THIS COUPLED WITH RUMORS GOA HAD RECEIVED THAT THERE MIGHT BE FURTHER GRAVE DEVELOPMENTS DURING WEEKEND SEPT. 7-9 HAD LED GOA ON SEPT. 7, AS AN EMERGENCY PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, TO DEPLOY CERTAIN ARMED UNITS TO COVER AIRFIELDS AND OTHER STRATEGIC POINTS WHICH SOVIETS MIGHT TRY TO SEIZE, AS THEY SEIZED PRAGUE AIRPORT, IF THEY DECIDED TO MOVE ON AUSTRIA. THESE DEPLOYMENTS WERE OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED AS GTE ALERT-TRAINING EXERCISES UNQTE TO TEST MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT PLANS, ETC.

3. KLAUS SAID GOA HOPES HAVE WORD SOON FROM ITS EMBASSY IN PRAGUE AND OTHER SOURCES AS TO PURPOSES AND PROSPECTS OF SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETZOV'S VISIT THERE. HE SAID UNCONFIRMED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 VIENNA 06459 091549Z

REPORTS INDICATE SVOBODA AND DUBCEK ARE TO BE PUT UNDER FURTHER HEAVY PRESSURE TO CLAMP DOWN ON CZECH POPULATION, MEDIA, ADMINISTRATION, ETC. AND THAT A BREAK BETWEEN SVOBODA AND DUBCEK ON ONE HAND AND SOVIETS ON OTHER IS A POSSIBILITY. GOA ALSO HAS REPORT THAT IF SOVIETS DO NOT RECEIVE SATISFACTION BY SEPT.

14-15 FURTHER SOVIET MOVES AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA MAY TAKE PLACE. FINALLY, KLAUS SAID GOA HAS CONTINUING INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF MAJOR SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENTS IN UKRAINE WHICH COULD PRESSAGE MOVE AGAINST ROMANIA ALTHOUGH IT HAS NO RPT NO INTELLIGENCE INDICATOR THAT SOVIETS HAVE MADE ANY SUCH DECISION. KLAUS CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING HOPE THAT WE COULD MEET INFORMALLY ON RATHER FREQUENT OCCASIONS DURING THIS CRITICAL TIME. I AGREED SAYING I WOULD ALSO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH FONMIN WALDHEIM AND ALSO GIVE HIM COMMENTS I HAD GIVEN KLAUS.

4. I NOTE FROM PARA 3 STATE 234682 THAT DEPT. PLANS TO CONVEY INFO CONTAINED IN PARA 2 TO LEMBERGER. I SEE NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO THIS BUT SUGGEST LEMBERGER NOT RPT NOT BE INFORMED OF MY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH KLAUS BECAUSE FROM WHAT HE SAID I DO NOT BELIEVE HE WOULD WANT THIS. PEG ON WHICH DEPT. COULD HANG ITS COMMENTS TO LEMBERGER COULD BE QTE PRESS AND OTHER REPORTS THAT AUSTRIA IS INTERESTED IN U.S. REACTION TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES AGAINST EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES. UNQTE

5. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS APPROPRIATE.  
MACARTHUR

ACTION

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 9, 1968 -- 1:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Clark Clifford has twice this morning expressed a desire for guidance from you as to issues you wish him to discuss at the Leadership meeting at 5:30 p.m. today.

I told him that I thought you would probably wish him to be prepared on

- the military situation in Vietnam;
- the military implications for NATO of the increase in Soviet forces in Central Europe.

Clark feels that he does better when he is well prepared.

Are these two subjects the issues you want discussed?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ no \_\_\_\_\_

Do you have other guidance for Sec. Clifford? Is there any particular guidance you would wish me to forward to Sec. Rusk?

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, 1  
By sg, NARA, D. 7-992

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Mr. Rostow~~

30

INFORMATION

~~1. Rostow~~  
2. Rostow file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Indefinite Postponement of the Libyan Prime Minister's Visit

Prime Minister Bakkush of Libya was scheduled for an official visit on September 25-26, but he resigned last week after the King refused to let him make changes in the cabinet.

The new Prime Minister would like to come to Washington sometime but feels he can't leave Libya in the foreseeable future. He has made it clear that his desire to postpone the visit is purely for domestic reasons and has nothing to do with Libya's relations with the United States.

As it stands now, the Libyans assume they still have an invitation, but they doubt they will be able to accept until 1969.

Walt W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Monday, September 9, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

President Mendez Montenegro has sent you a message expressing deepest regret over the assassination of Ambassador Mein (Tab A).

State recommends a reply along the lines of draft at Tab B to be delivered through our Embassy. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Atts

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:WGB:pas:9/9/68

11953

31.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 4435  
R-XX/R-XXXII  
Spanish

WN3 053 VIA RCA

GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA 2046 AUGUST 28, 1968

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

DEEPLY SHOCKED BY THE TRAGIC DEATH OF HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR  
JOHN GORDON MEIN, I EXPRESS TO YOU THE CONDOLENCES OF THE PEOPLE  
AND GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA. WE ARE INDIGNANT OVER THIS SHAMEFUL  
CRIME. THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT REST UNTIL THOSE RESPONSIBLE HAVE  
BEEN APPREHENDED AND THE PROPER PENALTIES IMPOSED. I RENEW TO  
YOU THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGH CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM.

JULIO CESAR MENDEZ MONTENEGRO  
PRESIDENT OF GUATEMALA

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your expression of condolence on the death of Ambassador John Gordon Mein. Ambassador Mein was a distinguished representative of the United States who worked tirelessly during his years in Guatemala to strengthen the friendly relations between our two nations.

I appreciate the efforts you are taking to apprehend and bring to justice those responsible for this tragic crime. I have every confidence in the determination and energy with which you are conducting your investigation and hope that your efforts will be successful.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro  
President of the Republic of Guatemala  
Guatemala

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

Mr. Rostow

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 9, 1968

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk recommends (Tab A) that you see (1) Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, and (2) her Deputy Prime Minister, Morarji Desai.

You'll recall that you considered the Gandhi appointment earlier and instructed us to come back to you closer to the date. Plans are now set for her trip to Latin America later this month. On her way home she plans to stop in New York to address the General Assembly October 15. To avoid embarrassment the Indians have been publicly denying news stories of a meeting between you and the Prime Minister, but we think she would like to come here for an informal call October 14 if you could see her. You might wish to consider a small working lunch, but we'll be back on that if she can come.

Secretary Rusk, Nick Katzenbach and Chet Bowles think this would be a good meeting with Mrs. Gandhi. Since you last saw her, the Indians have started--with our help and advice--an economic recovery that could be the long-awaited turning point in their development battle. And a session with you would carry through the useful and straight-talking U.S.-Indian dialogue that Nick ignited this summer in New Delhi. If you are willing to see her, the invitation at Tab B is for your approval.

The same reasoning also recommends a meeting with Morarji Desai who is Finance Minister as well as Madame Gandhi's Deputy. In addition, Morarji is (a) probably the best friend we have at the controls of Indian policy, (b) a strong politician and likely successor to Mrs. Gandhi, and (c) a very bright, interesting man with deep knowledge of India and Asia. Morarji will be in town September 30 - October 5 for the annual meetings of the World Bank.

Two Indian appointments within two weeks shouldn't wrinkle any brows--if you don't mind--since both leaders are here for other events. You have seen both before and it would be natural to take stock with them.

I recommend you approve both appointments and the proposed invitation to Mrs. Gandhi (Tab B).

W. W. Rostow

Invite Madame Gandhi October 14;

message approved \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Schedule Desai Sept. 30-Oct. 5 \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

32a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointments for Indian Prime Minister  
Gandhi and Deputy Prime Minister Desai

RECOMMENDATION:

I suggest that you receive Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, and Mr. Morarji Desai, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, during their separate visits to the United States this fall. Mr. Desai will be here at the end of September, Mrs. Gandhi in mid-October.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

DISCUSSION:

Prime Minister Gandhi, who visited the United States last in April 1966 shortly after assuming office, will be stopping over in New York in mid-October while returning to India from an official visit to South America. She wishes to come to Washington for a few hours at your convenience for an informal meeting with you. She has been asked to address the UN General Assembly on October 15 and has suggested that October 14 would be the best time for her.

I believe a meeting with the Prime Minister would provide a valuable opportunity for you to review Indo-U.S. relations and to take stock of the accomplishments which India has made, many of them at our urging, over the 2½ years since you last saw Mrs. Gandhi. Such a meeting would provide further momentum to the dialogue

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2

with India recently advanced by the talks Nick Katzenbach held in New Delhi.

You should know that the Indian Government has denied any knowledge of a news report that Mrs. Gandhi would have talks with you in Washington next month. The news report apparently had a Washington origin.

I would also recommend that you meet, two weeks earlier, with Deputy Prime Minister Desai, when he is in Washington to attend the annual IBRD/IMF meetings September 30 - October 5. (You will recall having seen Mr. Desai last year when he was in Washington en route to the annual meetings in Rio.) He is a man of wide influence, and has emerged as the strongest figure in the present Indian Cabinet aside from Prime Minister Gandhi herself. He is favorably disposed towards the United States, and we regard him as one of the best friends of the United States in the Indian Government.

He has been active in Indian public life for 35 years. He is able to speak authoritatively and cogently on almost any aspect of the Indian Government's activities and policies. He has an incisive mind and, though 72, is still considered by many a likely bet to succeed Mrs. Gandhi as Prime Minister.

While I would not ordinarily recommend that you see two leaders from the same country within such a short time frame, I believe that Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Desai are of such stature that meetings should be arranged with both. I am confident that each session would be a constructive one.



Dean Rusk

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Proposed Presidential Message to Madame Gandhi

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

I understand you will be stopping over briefly in the United States next month, and I hope it might be possible for you to come to Washington and visit with me.

I recall with great pleasure our last meeting here some two and a half years ago, and very much welcome the opportunity which your forthcoming journey offers to see you again. I am sure that another meeting, like our first visit together, would be most helpful in improving our understanding of each other's hopes and problems.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending best wishes. We both hope you will have a pleasant and rewarding visit to Latin America.

Sincerely,

Her Excellency  
Indira Gandhi  
Prime Minister of India  
New Delhi

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01



12216

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 7, 1968

2880  
1-Scumblers  
2-Ret.  
32cMEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Invitation to Prime Minister  
Indira Gandhi of India from the  
President to Meet in October

The Secretary has sent the President a memorandum recommending that he invite Prime Minister Gandhi to visit him in Washington during her stopover in the United States next month. Mrs. Gandhi will be returning to India at that time following an official visit to Latin America.

A suggested letter from the President to Mrs. Gandhi is enclosed.

*John P. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested letter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 SEP 9 AM 8 49

32d

*Proposed Message to Madame Gandhi*  
SUGGESTED LETTER

Her Excellency  
Indira Gandhi,  
Prime Minister of India,  
New Delhi.

Dear Madam Prime Minister:

*understand you will be stopping over briefly in the United States next month and*  
I hope it ~~will~~ be possible for you to come to

Washington and visit with me ~~next month~~ during your  
brief stopover in the United States. I recall with  
great pleasure our last meeting here some two and a  
half years ago, and very much welcome the opportunity  
which your forthcoming journey offers to see you again.

I am ~~confident~~ <sup>sure</sup> that another meeting, like our first  
visit together, would be most helpful in ~~acquainting~~  
~~one another with our views and in strengthening mutual~~

*improving our*  
~~understanding of each other's hopes and problems.~~

I would appreciate your letting me know what  
time would be convenient to you for an informal get-  
together.

~~With best regards, in which~~ Mrs. Johnson joins me in  
*sending best wishes. We both hope that you will have a*  
*pleasant and rewarding*  
*visit to Latin America.*  
Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 9, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

The Latins have a saying that runs: "There is no worse initiative than the one which is not taken." So I ask your indulgence in bringing the OAS dinner invitation to your attention again.

Last month on Secretary Rusk's recommendation, you agreed to a dinner in your honor, provided Mrs. Johnson's schedule permitted and it would not establish a precedent. The initiative for the dinner came from OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza who wanted to arrange a Latin American tribute for what you have done for the hemisphere.

After checking out Mrs. Johnson's schedule and the precedent aspects, I had State confidentially inform the OAS Council Chairman that you accepted in principle with the date to be worked out. The OAS Chairman subsequently let UPI know of the plans, indicating September 19 as the probable date. After State complained to the Chairman about the leak, he arranged for the OAS to say that an invitation had been extended "but no acceptance has been received from the White House."

My understanding was that after the OAS leak, you wanted your response to the invitation to stand as the OAS had put it out to the press, i.e. no acceptance yet. But Jim Jones now tells us that your intention was to say no to the invitation.

Before going back to the OAS with your response, I wanted to make sure of your decision and to point out that a negative would have these limited adverse effects:

1. OAS Secretary General Plaza who originated the tribute idea would be quite taken back by the turn down of his first initiative with you.
2. The Latin Ambassadors who know about the dinner invitation, would take it as a slight and you would lose some of the goodwill you have built up with them.

W. W. Rostow

I meant what I said:

NO to the invitation \_\_\_\_\_

I want the invitation

held for a later date \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:WGB:pas

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow

34

INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

Monday, September 9, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon--  
5:00 p.m., Monday, September 9

Our last big chance in your Administration for progress toward Mid-East peace will come while Eban and the Arab foreign ministers are at the UN in October. If those sessions are to produce anything, Eshkol's government will have to bite the bullet and decide what it will settle for. Otherwise, it can only stall. Allon will be a key to that decision. He should have no doubt about your position.

We recommend you press him as hard as you feel you can with this theme: You are as deeply concerned for Israel's future as a man could be. You believe Israel's survival depends on making peace with its neighbors. You know it takes two to negotiate and don't kid yourself about Nasser's intentions. At the same time, you can't honestly feel Israel has done all it could to get negotiations started.

He'll raise the Phantoms. I'd suggest turning that aside by saying you're not going to let the balance tip against Israel but you don't think hardware is the main guarantee of Israel's future. You wish to talk about peacemaking. You'd like to see Israel do the following now:

1. Show the Arabs Israel is ready to negotiate in good faith. Whatever Israel has done, the fact is that the Israeli government has not decided on its terms for withdrawal. The Arabs know it and doubt Israel can bring itself to withdraw. [You might talk about your March 31st decisions and say Israel has to find its own equivalent for breaking its impasse.]
2. Give Jordan Israel's opening position on terms for a settlement--now. You know it will be hard for Israel's Cabinet to argue this out, but you don't see any other way to make progress. [We can't mention the secret talks, but it's plain even to Jarring that Israel has to get down to specifics now or stall.]
3. Come up with a realistic position on Jerusalem. You understand how Israelis feel. You admit the world let the Jews down after 1948. But unless Israel can find some way to give Jordan a political role in Jerusalem, there won't be peace.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

W. W. Rostow

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01~~SECRET~~

2885  
342

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

September 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister  
Yigal Allon of Israel, September 9  
at 5:30 p.m.

Yigal Allon

Yigal Allon, recently-named Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Immigrant Absorption, is visiting the United States on a speaking and fund-raising tour and has asked for an appointment with you.

What Allon Wants

Allon will stress the high priority which the Israeli Government attaches to our agreement now to sell Israel 50 F-4 Phantoms. He may cite the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia as an additional reason for our help to the Israel Defense Forces against possible Soviet-inspired Arab military action.

What We Want

We want to reassure Allon that we are keeping Israel's defense capability under active and sympathetic examination. At the same time, we do not wish to endanger any favorable political developments through an escalation of the arms race. We want Israel to understand our view that its security cannot rest on arms alone. Our position on a settlement continues to rest on the five principles you outlined on June 19, 1967. It takes two to make peace

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

-2-

and for its part Israel must convince its Arab neighbors that it has no expansionist designs, that the boundaries it is prepared to negotiate are not based on conquest alone, that it remains flexible over Jerusalem, and that it is prepared to actively assist in solving the refugee problem. As a means towards implementing your five principles, we strongly urge Israel to continue to support the Jarring mission as offering the best opportunity for the political solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. We want Israel to show restraint in the arms field and we oppose Israel's acquisition of a Surface-to-Surface Missile. We want Israel to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Talking Points
2. Biographic Information

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH ISRAELI  
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER YIGAL ALLON,  
SEPTEMBER 9, 5:30 P.M.

WAR AND PEACE

In answer to Mr. Allon's presentation about the F-4s you might wish to point out that as stated in the January 8, 1968 Joint Statement with Prime Minister Eshkol you "agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area." At the same time, we are convinced that war is the worst possible way to solve disputes and the security of Israel cannot rest on arms alone. Long-term security must include an accommodation with the Arabs. Our position continues to rest on the five principles of peace you outlined on June 19, 1967. It takes two to make peace and Israel's contribution to implementing these principles includes:

1. making clear to its Arab neighbors that it has no expansionist designs on their territory;
2. seeking honest negotiations over boundaries and not relying on sheer conquest alone;
3. remaining flexible regarding Jerusalem which is a central issue in the dispute and which must become part of the overall settlement; and
4. participating directly in the solution of the refugee problem.

JARRING MISSION

Regardless of whether or not Mr. Allon raises the subject, you might wish to emphasize that we continue in our conviction that the Jarring Mission offers the best opportunity for the political solution of the Arab-Israel dispute and the implementation of our five principles. We therefore urge Israel to continue to offer Jarring its fullest cooperation. We hope that the presence of Foreign Minister Eban and his Arab counterparts at the forthcoming UNGA will make possible a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01



serious substantive dialogue through Ambassador Jarring and perhaps joint meetings. This is why we have urged Israel to do all it can to lay the groundwork for such developments in its indirect exchanges with Jordan and the UAR.

#### ARMS

We do not want further arms escalation in the Middle East and we cannot disassociate the question of sales of conventional arms from the broader question of Israel's intentions concerning sophisticated weapons. In this connection we are going to raise in more detail with Prime Minister Eshkol our awareness of recent developments in Israel's Surface-to-Surface Missile capacity (the MD-620) and to state our strong opposition to the introduction of a new weapons system into the region. No Arab state is even close to a Surface-to-Surface capability. In order to calm fears and prevent a significant escalation in the arms race we would like Israel's private and public reassurances that it will not be the first country to introduce new weapons into the area. We also strongly urge Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Yigal ALLON

Yigal Allon was born October 10, 1918 at Kfar Tabor, Palestine, the son of Polish immigrants, and grew up as a member of the Kibbutz Ginossar on Lake Tiberias, the kibbutz which he still considers home. In the 1930's he joined the Haganah (the Jewish local defense force) and from 1945 to 1948 he distinguished himself as leader of the Palmach (commando forces of the Haganah). Allon left the Army in 1948 with the rank of Brigadier General.

During the 1950's Allon pursued higher educational studies while at the same time actively participating in Israeli politics. He was elected a Member of the Knesset representing left-wing Mapam in 1950. When Mapam split in 1954, Allon became a leader of the leftist and nationalist splinter party, which called itself Ahdut Avoda. He became Secretary General of Ahdut Avoda in 1958. During the period 1950-51 he studied at London University and in the summer of 1953 he took courses at Harvard. He continued his studies at Oxford during 1960-61.

On November 2, 1961 Allon was appointed Minister of Labor by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. He strongly supported Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's efforts to unite Mapai and Ahdut Avoda. During the critical period just before the June, 1967 Israel-Arab War Eshkol proposed to surrender his Defense Portfolio to Allon only to be over-ridden by the Mapai Secretariat which nominated Moshe Dayan. On July 1, 1968 Eshkol named Allon Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Immigrant Absorption.

Allon is married and has three children. In addition to Hebrew, he speaks English, Polish, and Arabic.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Sunday, September 8, 1968  
1:40 PM

*Pres file*

35

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed message from you to  
Prime Minister Salazar in light of  
the Ambassador's attached recommendation.

*W. W. Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

1967 SEP 8 15 19

CONFIDENTIAL

35a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HOD401

PAGE 0: LISBON 01907 081452Z

44

ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, R 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, CPR 02, RSR 01, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /093 W

P 081430Z SEP 68

FM AMEMBASSY LISBON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2442

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LISBON 1907

REF: LISBON 1903 AND 1906

SUBJECT: OPERATION ON SALAZAR

I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR PRESIDENT TO SEND BRIEF MESSAGE EXPRESSING BEST WISHES FOR EARLY RECOVERY TO AILING PRIME MINISTER. WHILE BACKGROUND FACTS AND EXTENT OF INJURY STILL UNCLEAR, MEDICAL COMMUNIQUE REPORT INTRACRANIAL OPERATION AND PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED HERE.

BENNETT

CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

35b

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Ambassy LISBON. IMMEDIATE

STATE

REF: Lisbon's 1907

1. Please deliver following message to Prime Minister Salazar from President:
2. QTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister: ~~Please accept~~ My best wishes for an early recovery. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQTE
3. White House does not plan release but has no objection if GOP wishes to do so.

END

EUR/SPP:GWLandaunt 9/8/68 4065

EUR/SPP - George W. Landau

EUR - Mr. Laddy

White House -

3/8

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Sunday, September 8, 1968  
1:35 PM

Mr. President:

Mr. Rostow suggested that I send you the attached cable, from the US Defense Attache in Tel Aviv, reporting on today's artillery duel along the Suez Canal between UAR and Israeli forces.

White House Situation Room

*[Signature]*  
Briefing Officer

*Pres. file*

RECEIVED  
WHCA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PLJ. 019.039.002/2

1987 SEP 8 17 02

By jc. NARA. Date 12-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KOD406

PAGE 01 081653Z

41  
ACTION NEA 06

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, NSAE 00, GPM 04, NSC 04, SP 01, SS 25,  
RSC 01, INR 07, P 03, FILE 01, IO 03, EUR 08, CCO 00, /063 W

-----  
O P 081628Z SEP 68  
FM USDAO/TEL AVIV  
TO DIA  
DEPT STATE  
USUN  
USDAO AMMAN  
INFO CINCSRIKE  
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM  
USCINCEUR/USEUCOM  
CINCUSNAVEUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1599 SEP 68.

1. THE FOLLOWING ARMY SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS FURNISHED USDAO BY IDF/FLO AT 08/1500Z SEP: QUOTE TODAY AT 1100Z AN ANTI-VEHICLE MINE WAS DISCOVERED ON A TRACK TEN KILOMETERS NORTH OF PORT TAWFIQ (AT RJ APPROX 3001N-3233E) ON SUEZ CANAL. AT 1300Z THE MINE WAS DETONATED. DURING THE OPERATION EGYPTIAN SMALL ARMS FIRE WAS OPENED AND FIRE WAS RETURNED. THE EXCHANGE LASTED TEN MINUTES. LATER EGYPTIANS OPENED WITH ARTILLERY ON A LARGE FRONT FROM EL KANTARA TO PORT TAWFIQ. FIRE WAS BEING RETURNED AS OF 1420Z. UN OBSERVERS

PAGE 2 RUHVL 1599 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUGGESTED CEASE FIRE FOR 1450Z. IDF ACCEPTED. UNQUOTE

2. BRIG GEN DAVID CARMON, ISRAEL MIL ATTACHE TO U.S., MEETING WITH DATT AND ARMA TODAY, INDICATED IAF NOT REPEAT NOT INVOLVED. HE ADDED UN HAD ASKED FOR CEASE FIRE AT 1410Z AND UAR HAD REFUSED.

3. CARMON INDICATED ONE IDF SOLDIER KILLED AND SOME WOUNDED IN EL KANTARA. HE THOUGHT UAR TAKING THIS INITIATIVE TO HELP RAISE UAR ARMY MORALE. HE ADDED UAR HAS OVER 600 PIECES ARTY ON WEST BANK OF CANAL.

4. CARMON THINKS UAR INITIATIVE RELATED TO CURRENT UN DISCUSSIONS.  
5. AT LUNCH TODAY, MAJ GEN A. YARIV, IDF DIRECTOR OF MIL INTELL,

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 081653Z

INDICATED TO DATT THAT IDF HAD AN EXERCISES PLANNED NEAR THE CANAL SHORTLY.

6. COMMENTS:

A. RECON NOT REPEAT NOT POSSIBLE TO AREA INVOLVED.

B. IDF LEADERSHIP IN CONTACT WITH DATT TODAY HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT SHOWN UNDUE APPREHENSION AND DID NOT REPEAT NOT THINK AIR FORCE WOULD BE NEEDED.

7. EMBASSY INFORMED. GP3.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sunday, September 8, 1968  
11:49 AM

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

The attached from Bonn suggests that we may face soon a decision on Czech refugees as a practical working matter.

See marked passages.

*W. R.*  
W. W. Rostow



Department of State

3702  
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 611

PAGE 01 BONN 16587 071813Z

47  
ACTION ORM 03

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-198  
By         , NARA, Date 7-28-94

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SR 01, SCÄ 02, SCS 04, ACÖÄ 16, NIC 01, SA 01, SÄL 01,  
SAH 02, F 15, RSR 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03,  
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USTÄ 12, NSA 02, VO 02, T4B W

R 071250Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9909  
INFO AMCONSUL BREMEN  
AMCONSUL DUESSELDORF  
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT  
AMCONSUL HAMBURG  
AMCONSUL MUNICH  
AMCONSUL STUTTGART  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 16587

SUBJ: CZECH REFUGEES

REF: GENEVA 4715

1. DR. GERHARD WOLFRUM, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CZECH REFUGEES IN THE FRG REFUGEE MINISTRY TOLD US YESTERDAY THAT THE NUMBER OF CZECH REFUGEES COMING TO GERMANY COULD REACH SERIOUS PROPORTIONS VERY SOON IF CIRCUMSTANCES PROVED UNFAVORABLE. HE SAID THE PRESENT RATION OF CZECHS LEAVING THE CSSR TO THOSE RETURNING WAS 6 TO 5, BUT THERE WERE SIGNS THAT A RADICAL INCREASE OF THOSE LEAVING MIGHT BEGIN. APPARENTLY WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SOVIETS, THE CSSR AUTHORITIES WERE GRANTING EXIT VISAS TO VIRTUALLY ALL CZECH CITIZENS WHO FELT THEMSELVES IN DANGER. IN TURN THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN PRAGUE, REPRESENTING FRG INTERESTS, HAS BEEN GRANTING WITHOUT QUESTION ENTRY VISAS FOR GERMANY TO ALL APPLICANTS POSSESSING EXIT VISAS. WOLFRUM POINTED OUT THAT WHILE THE DAILY NUMBER OF VISA APPLICANTS AT THE FRENCH EMBASSY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BONN 16587 071813Z

WAS MINIMAL LAST WEEK, IT ROSE TO SEVERAL HUNDRED EARLY IN SEPTEMBER AND ON SEPTEMBER 5 THERE WERE LITERALLY "THOUSANDS." THE REPORTS THAT THE CZECH-FRG BORDER HAD BEEN CLOSED FOR CZECH DEPARTURES, HE THOUGHT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A MOOD OF PANIC.

3. WOLFRUM CITED THE THOUSANDS OF CSSR TOURISTS NOW IN THE WEST AS A FURTHER SOURCE OF DIFFICULTY. THERE WERE NOW 50,000 IN YUGOSLAVIA, AND SINCE THERE ARE FEW JOBS TO BE HAD THERE, HE EXPECTED THAT THE FRG WOULD BE CALLED UPON TO HELP ACCOMMODATE THOSE WHO CHOSE NOT TO RETURN. AUSTRIA, TOO, WOULD HAVE MORE THAN IT COULD HANDLE. WHILE RELATIVELY FEW TOURISTS HAVE THUS FAR REQUESTED ASYLUM IN THE FRG, THEIR SITUATION GROWS MORE PRECARIOUS WITH EACH SUCCEEDING DAY. SOME HAVE RUN OUT OF MONEY AND THE OTHERS WHO HAVE NOT NOW FIND BANKS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT CZECH CROWNS.

9. WOLFRUM SAID THAT WHILE THE FRG HAD PREPARED SINCE LAST SPRING FOR THE EVENTUALITY OF A LARGE NUMBER OF CZECH REFUGEES, CAMP ZIRNDORF (THE CAMP RESERVED FOR NON-GERMAN REFUGEES) IS ALREADY FULL. THE FRG HAS THEREFORE SET ASIDE THREE FURTHER CAMPS FOR THE CZECHS THAT HAD FORMERLY BEEN USED FOR GERMAN REFUGEES: ONE IN NUERNBERG, ONE IN NEUBURG ON THE DANUBE, AND ONE NEAR UNNA, WESTFALIA.

4. WOLFRUM POINTED OUT THAT GERMAN EMIGRANTS AND ETHNIC GERMAN (VOLKSDEUTSCH) REFUGEES COULD BE HANDLED UNDER EXISTING REGULATIONS. FOR CZECHS THE FRG HAS PROVISIONALLY SET A FIGURE OF 5,000 AS THE MAXIMUM IT COULD ACCORD ASYLUM AND ABSORB INTO THE ECONOMY. THIS FIGURE WAS BASED IN PART ON THE FRG'S CURRENT NEED FOR LABOR. IF THIS WERE TO CHANGE SERIOUSLY, FEWER CZECHS COULD BE ACCEPTED. WOLFRUM URGED THAT THE US, CANADA AND AUSTRALIA PREPARE NOW FOR A POSSIBLE WAVE OF CZECH REFUGEES IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS.

5. COMMENT: THIS POSSIBILITY HAS EVIDENTLY BEEN ANTICIPATED BY OTHERS AS WELL. ON SEPTEMBER 5 DR. STUCKENBERG OF THE FRG INTERIOR MINISTRY INQUIRED WITH THE CONSUL REGARDING AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY RELATING TO THE CZECH SITUATION. IN ADDITION, DR. CATSICAS, ICEM HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR GERMANY, HAS REQUESTED AN APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR LODGE. WE WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE THE VIEWS OF THE DEPT AND OF MR. MARSHALL, INS. REP. IN FRANKFURT, REGARDING THE PROSPECTS FOR GRANTING VISAS UNDER PREFERENCE 7 FOR CZECHS REQUESTING AMERICAN ASYLUM. LODGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Lois*

38

*Pres file*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sunday, September 8, 1968  
11:30 AM

Mr. President:

Herewith, the full account of the Saturday meeting  
with Tho and company.

Key passages marked.

Nothing new except the full text of Tho's diatribe.

*W. W. Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow



Department of State

10  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

384

ZCZCFJL294

00 RUEHC

DE RUFNCR 20523/1 2512000

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 071910Z SEP 68

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5806

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SET 1 OF 7 PARIS 20523

NODIS HARVAN PLUS

DELTO 700

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LE DUC THO SEPTEMBER 7.

1. WE MET WITH LE DUCH THO AND XUN THUY FOR THREE HOURS THIS MORNING AT THE SITE OF PREVIOUS MEETINGS BETWEEN VANCE AND LAU IN VITRY. THE MEETING STARTED AT 10 A.M. ALSO ATTENDING ON DRV SIDE WERE HA VAN LAU, AN INTERPRETER, AND TWO NOTE-TAKERS. HABIB AND NEGROPONTE WERE PRESENT ON OUR SIDE.

2. THUY ASKED US IF WE HAD ANY OPENING REMARKS SINCE WE HAD SUGGESTED THE MEETING. WE OPENED BY EMPHASIZING OUR FEELING THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATORS TO FIND A WAY AROUND DIFFICULTIES. NEGOTIATORS ARE OF COURSE BOUND BY INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS BUT PERHAPS IF WE EXPLORE OUR DIFFERENCES AND SEEK TO FIND AREAS OF AGREEMENT WE MIGHT FIND THAT WE ARE LESS FAR APART THAN IT SEEMS. WE FEEL THAT SOME OF OUR DIFFERENCES MAY BE MATTERS OF FORM RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE.

3. THERE IS FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT ON A CESSATION OF BOMBING NVN SO THAT WE CAN PROCEED TO SERIOUS TALKS TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE DIFFER ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR A CESSATION OF BOMBING, AND ON THE MEANING OF THE WORD "SERIOUS". WE HAVE HAD THE BENEFIT OF EXCHANGING VIEWS BOTH IN OPEN SESSIONS AND IN THE VANCE/LAU TALKS. WE KNOW THAT OPENLY THE DRV DOES NOT WANT TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT OF WHAT YOU CALL RECIPROCITY. BUT WE ALSO THINK THAT DRV KNOWS THAT THERE IS NO SENSE TO STOP THE BOMBING UNLESS THE CONDITIONS ARE RIGHT, OTHERWISE THE BOMBING WILL START AGAIN WITH VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT NOW THAT WE HAVE STARTED TALKING, BOTH SIDES WOULD LIKE TO SEE THESE TALKS MOVE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority PAC 16774

By JACCO. NARA. Date 12-14-01

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- PARIS 20523 SECTION 1 SEP 7

4. THIS, WE SAID, WAS A GENERAL STATEMENT OF OUR POSITION, AND WE ASKED IF THEY HAD ANY REMARKS OR DID THEY PREFER US TO GO DIRECTLY INTO THE DETAILS. THUY ASKED IF WE HAD ANYTHING TO ADD TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE VANCE/LAU TALKS.

5. WE SAID WE COULD CITE ONE DETAIL AS AN EXAMPLE: IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THE PRESIDENT'S GREATEST CONCERN IS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE DMZ AREA WERE THE BOMBING TO STOP AGAINST DRV TROOP CONCENTRATIONS NORTH OF THE 17TH PARALLEL. WE WOULD NOT WANT THE FIGHTING TO BE INTENSIFIED WERE SUCH A CESSATION TO TAKE PLACE. WE HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED TO BELIEVE THAT WE WERE NOT TOO FAR APART ON THIS POINT AND IF WE REMEMBERED CORRECTLY LAU HAD INDICATED TO VANCE THAT IF THE US STOP ITS OPERATIONS IN THE DMZ, THE DRV WOULD "KNOW WHAT TO DO." BUT THE DRV IS CONCERNED BY THE QUESTION OF ICC PRESENCE AND OTHER TECHNICAL CONDITIONS BECAUSE IT MIGHT FREEZE THE POLITICAL DIVISION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH. THIS FEAR IS NOT WELL-FOUNDED. WHAT IS WELL-FOUNDED IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REDUCTION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE DMZ AREA, IF THE BOMBING STOPS. THAT IS ONE EXAMPLE OF A SUBJECT WHICH WE MIGHT DISCUSS WITH AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY WHAT OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE IN MIND.

6. ANOTHER EXPLE IS THAT WE WERE MUCH INTRIGUED BY LE DUC THO'S STATEMENT OF SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THAT POLITICAL TALKS MUST TAKE PLACE BEFORE A CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES.

7. YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS THE QUESTION OF "SERIOUS TALKS". WE HAVE CALLED DRV'S ATTENTION TO OUR POSITION ON THIS SUBJECT A NUMBER OF TIMES. WE HAVE SAID PUBLICLY FOR MONTHS THAT WE WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF THE GVN. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HAVE INCLUDED ON THE DRV SIDE, THE NLF OR ANYONE ELSE THEY MIGHT WISH. WE DO NOT WANT TO SEE A GOVERNMENT IMPOSED ON SOUTH VIET-NAM BY EITHER HANOI OR WASHINGTON. THUS THE GVN MUST BE PRESENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE DRV ON MATTERS OF BILATERAL INTEREST OF ANY KIND, SUCH AS FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. WE HAVE NOTED THAT DRV HAS SAID IT WISHES TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER AND WE WOULD BE WILLING.

8. WE THEN SAID WE HAD PUT ENOUGH IDEAS ON THE TABLE AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING THEIR COMMENTS.

9. THUY REPLIED THAT WHEN DRV DELEGATION HAD COME TO PARIS, IT HAD DONE SO WITH THE SERIOUS INTENTION OF DETERMINING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THEN PROCEEDING TO OTHER MATTERS OF INTEREST BY BOTH PARTIES. HARRIMAN  
BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



10  
Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC  
DE RUFNCR 20523/2 2512000  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 071910Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5807  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
S ~~SECRET~~ SET 2 OF 7 PARIS 20523

CONTROL: 2150Q

RECD: SEP 7, 1968  
4:43 PM

NODIS HARVAN PLUS

DELTO 700

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LE DUC THO SEPTEMBER 7.

10. THUY THEN ASKED IF WE WANTED TO EXPLAIN, ELABORATE OR CLARIFY ANY MATTERS WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN VANCE AND LAU AT THEIR PRIVATE MEETINGS. AT THE MAJESTIC WE HAVE DISCUSSED GENERALITIES. AT THE VANCE/LAU MEETINGS WE HAVE DISCUSSED CONCRETE MATTERS. DO WE FEEL THAT THERE ARE ANY CONCRETE PROPOSALS WHICH MAY NOT HAVE BEEN UNDERSTOOD CLEARLY BY DRV, SIDE OR DO WE HAVE ANYTHING NEW TO ADD.

11. WE SAID THAT WE HAD THE IDEA THAT DRV HAS REJECTED OUR PHASE I - PHASE 2 PROPOSAL. IS DRV PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER? WE ADDED THAT ONE OF THE IDEAS IN THE PHASE I - PHASE 2 WAS THE QUESTION OF THE DMZ AND WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING THEIR COMMENTS ON THIS. THUY REPLIED THAT AMBASSADOR LAU HAD ALREADY COMMENTED ON OUR PROPOSAL AND IF WE HAVE NOTHING NEW TO ADD WE WOULD OPEN THE FLOOR TO REMARKS BY LE DUC THO. WE HAVE REFERRED TO SOMETHING THO HAD SAID A FEW WEEKS AGO AND HE SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO SPEAK FOR HIMSELF. WE SAID, THAT AS TO THE QUESTION WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING, HE THOUGHT WE MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING NEW.

12. WE INTERJECTED THAT THERE WERE INDEED TWO THINGS WHICH WERE NEW. ONE WAS THE PRESIDENT'S AUGUST 19TH SPEECH IN WHICH HE SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR A REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HANOI WAS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN DEESCALATING THE CONFLICT AND MOVING SERIOUSLY TOWARDS PEACE. THE OTHER NEW ELEMENT IS PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN DONG'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 2 TO WHICH DRV APPEARS TO ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE. THAT STATEMENT REFERS TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AS A MEASURE "WHICH WILL HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE SEEKING STEP BY STEP OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOR THE VIETNAM PROBLEM."

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



13. THUY SAID HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE THE PRIVATE NATURE OF THE CONVERSATIONS HERE AS WELL AS THOSE WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN VANCE AND LAU, HABIB AND HIEN, ETC. DRV DOES NOT WANT EITHER THEIR CONTENTS OR THE FACT THEY ARE TAKING PLACE TO BE MADE PUBLIC. WE SAID WE WERE VERY WELL AWARE OF THE NEED FOR THIS AND HAVE TAKEN GREAT PRECAUTIONS TO ASSURE THAT THESE PRIVATE ARE KEPT SECRET. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE PREPARED FOR THE CONTINGENCY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH MEETINGS MIGHT ACCIDENTALLY BECOME KNOWN, AND PERHAPS WE COULD AGREE ON A MUTUAL LINE TO TAKE WITH THE PRESS IN THIS EVENTUALITY. IT WAS AGREED TO DO SO LATER IN THE MEETING.

14. THO THEN SPOKE, FIRST, HE WANTED TO CORRECT OUR MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT HE HAD TOLD US IN JUNE. WE HAD ASKED HIM WHY THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT REDUCE THE LEVEL OF HOSTILITIES. HE HAD REPLIED THAT AS LONG AS THE VIETNAMESE QUESTION IS NOT SOLVED NOR EVEN THE QUESTION OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, IT WAS NATURAL THAT THE HOSTILITIES WOULD CONTINUE.

15. WE HAD INTERPRETED THIS TO MEAN THAT POLITICAL TALKS MUST PRECEDE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. WE HAD MISUNDERSTOOD AND THEREFORE THO WANTED TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT.

16. WE SAID OUR RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THO HAD REMARKED THAT HISTORY HAS TAUGHT US THAT THERE HAD TO BE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BEFORE A TOTAL CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES. WE SAID WE DID NOT WANT TO ARGUE ABOUT WHAT THO SAID AND IF HIS REMARKS HAD NO POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE THEN THERE IS NO POINT IN PURSUING THIS FURTHER HERE.

17. THO THEN MADE A LENGTHY STATEMENT ON THE VIET-NAM SITUATION. HE READ FROM HANDWRITTEN NOTES.

18. THO BEGAN BY SAYING THAT WE HAVE HEARD DRV VIEWS MANY TIMES, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. VIEWS EXPRESSED DURING OUR PRIVATE MEETING HAVE REFLECTED THE GENERAL POSITION OF THE DRV AND ITS POSITIVE ATTITUDE. DRV REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ACCEPTED US PROPOSAL FOR A PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN HEADS OF DELEGATIONS AND THIS IS NEW EVIDENCE OF DRV POSITIVE ATTITUDE, SERIOUS INTEREST, AND GOOD WILL. BUT ON US SIDE NOTHING NEW HAS BEEN PUT FORTH WHICH COULD LEAD TO A GOOD SETTLEMENT. THUS HE WONDERS WHETHER US SIDE HAS SERIOUS INTENT IN THESE PRIVATE TALKS.

19. DRV'S FIRST DEMAND, THO CONTINUED, IS THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THIS IS A LEGITIMATE DEMAND AND IF THE US REALLY HAS GOOD WILL THEN THE VIETNAMEE 049733. :-, 73 35533S PEACEDULLY.

20. THO SAID THAT WE HAD RAISED SOME CONCRETE MATTERS UPON WHICH HE DID NOTILAN TO COMMENT THIS MORNING. HE PLANNED FIRST TO GIVE HIS VIEWS ON THE GENERAL SITUATION IN VIET-NAM AND AFTER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



Department of State

10  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NNNN ZCZCFJL296

OO RUEHC

DE RUFNCR 20523/3 2512000

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 071910Z SEP 68

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5808

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 20523 SET 3 OF 7

NODIS HARVAN PLUS

DELTO 700

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LE DUC THO SEPTEMBER 7.

THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR OUR VIEWS REGARDING A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. AFTER THAT WE CAN GO INTO A DISCUSSION OR SETTLEMENT OF CONCRETE PROBLEMS. THO SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PROPERLY UNDERSTAND AND EVALUATE THE SITUATION BEFORE BEING ABLE TO SOLVE A PROBLEM. IF WE DON'T HAVE A CORRECT ASSESSMENT THEN THE PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED. SO THO SAID HE WOULD GIVE US HIS VIEWS AND HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD THEN DO THE SAME. FIRST, REGARDING THE REAL SITUATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD IN VIET-NAM, IT IS THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS LAUNCHED A WAR OF AGGRESSION WHICH IS THE COSTLIEST AND LONGEST WAR IN US HISTORY. THE UNITED STATES IS A GREAT COUNTRY WHICH HAS OVER 200 MILLION PEOPLE. IT IS THE RICHEST AND MOST POWERFUL NATION BOTH MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY IN THE IMPERIALIST CAMP. IT IS A GREAT NUCLEAR POWER. BUT IT HAS WAGED A WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM WHICH HAS A POPULATION OF ONLY 14 MILLION PEOPLE. IT HAS AN AREA OF 170 THOUSAND SQUARE KILOMETERS AND ITS TERRITORY WAS DEVASTATED BY NINE YEARS OF RESISTANCE AGAINST THE FRENCH COLONIALISTS. THE UNITED STATES HAS CARRIED OUT A TOTAL WAR AGAINST VIET-NAM, MOBILIZING MORE THAN 500,000 OF ITS OWN MEN IN ADDITION TO PUPPET AND SATELLITE FORCES. COMBINED THESE FORCES REPRESENT MORE THAN A MILLION MEN, NOT COUNTING US FORCES STATIONED ON THE SEVENTH FLEET AND IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SUCH AS THAILAND.

21. THE UNITED STATES DROPPED TWO MILLION TONS OF BOMBS ON SOUTH VIET-NAM IN THE YEARS 1965, 1966 AND 1967. THIS QUANTITY EQUALS THE COMBINES TOTAL USED IN EUROPE AND IN THE PACIFIC DURING WORLD WAR II. THE NUMBER OF ARTILLERY SHELLS EXCEEDS THE QUANTITY USED BY THE UNITED STATES DURING WORLD WAR II. FROM JANUARY TO APRIL,

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

1966, THE US DROPPED 105,000 TONS OF BOMBS ON XHE SANK ALONE, AN AMOUNT EXCEEDING THE QUANTITY OF BOMBS DROPPED ON JAPAN DURING ALL FO WORLD WAR II.

22. THE UNITED STATES DEFENSE BUDGET FOR 1967/68 AMOUNTS TO OVER 70 BILLION DOLLARS, THE GREATEST WAR BUDGET EVER KNOWN. THIS YEAR WE HAVE SPENT 35 BILLION DOLLARS IN VIET-NAM WHICH COMPARES WITH ONLY 20 BILLION SPENT DURING THE KOREAN WAR. THE WAR IS ALSO COSTLY IN HUMAN TERMS. THE US HAS LOST HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF KILLED AND WOUNDED IN ACTION. THE US OFFICIALLY ADMITS TO 200,000 CASUALTIES, BUT THIS OFFICIAL FIGURE IS BELOW THE TRUTH. HE HAD JUST READ AN ARTICLE BY JODATE: ALSO, THE US MILITARY COMMENTATOR, WHO SAID THAT EVERY 10,000 MEN LOST BY VIET-NAM WOULD BE THE EQUIVALENT OF 100,000 LOST BY THE U.S.

23. THE FOREGOING DATA, SAID THO, ARE FROM THE UNITES STATES PRESS. IF ONE CONSIDERS THE AREA AND POPULATION OF SOUTH VIET-NAM IN RELATION TO THE TREMENDOUS MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES, AND IF ONE COMPARES THE VIETNAMESE WAR TO ANY OTHER WAR IN US HISTORY, IT IS CLEAR THAT IT IS THE COSTLIEST AND LARGEST WAR EVER WAGED BY THE U.S. IT IS ALSO THE LONGEST WAR SINCE THE UNITED STATES FOUGHT FOR ITS INDEPENDENCE. THO ADDED THAT HE WAS ONLY COUNTIV THE SIX YEARS SINCE GENERAL HARKINS ESTABLISHED HIS COMMAND IN SAIGON.

24. WHAT HAVE BEEN THE RESULTS OF THESE GREAT EXPENDITURES BY THE UNITED STATES? IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE US HAS SUFFERED ITS GREATEST DEFEAT SINCE ITS INDEPENDENCE. HOW HAS THIS DEFEAT BEEN MANIFESTED ON THE VIETNAMESE BATTLEFIELD?

25. FIRST, AS REGARDS THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM THE UNITES STATES REPLACED THE FRENCH AFTER THE LATTER WERE DEFEATED AND SET UP THE PUPPET REGIME OF NGO DINH DIEM. THE US SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY TO SET UP AND MANAGE THAT REGIME WHICH PURSUED A POLICY OF SAVAGERY AND CRUELTY AGAINST THE POPULATION. UNDER THE THREAT OF BAYONET DIEM WANTED TO HERD ENTIRE POPULATION INTO STRATEGIC HAMLETS WHICH WERE NOTHING OTHER THAN CAMOFLAGED CONCENTRATION CAMPS. IN THE HISTORY OF COLONIALISM THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A PARALLEL SITUATION WHERE A GOVERNMENT WANTED TO PLACE ITS ENTIRE POPULATION IN A CONCENTRATION CAMP. THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SUFFERED FOR A HUNDRED YEARS UNDER THE FRENCH AND JAPANESE. THEY TOO WERE SAVAGE AND CRUEL BUT NO COMPARISON IS POSSIBLE WITH DIEM. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE KNOWN OPPRESSION, THEY HAVE KNOWN MANY PRISONS BUT NO PRISON WAS AS GREAT AS DIEM'S REGIME. THO REFERRED US TO A BOOK BY NGUYEN DUC THUAN, A COMRADE IN ARMS WHO HAD ONCE BEEN IN PRISON WPH THO, WAS LATER IMPRISONED BY DIEM AND SUBSEQUENTLY WROTE HIS RECOLLECTION OF DIEM'S ATROCITIES.

BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

10

CO RUEHC  
DE RUEFNCR 20523/4 2512000  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 071910Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5809  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 2155Q

RECD: SEPT 7, 1968  
5:47 PM

~~SECRET~~ SET 4 OF 7 PARIS 20523

NODIS HARVAN PLUS

DELTO 700

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LE DUC TWO SEPTEMBER 7.

THE BOOK WAS CALLED BAT KHUAT (INDOMINATABLE).

25. THE UNITED STATES THOUGHT IT COULD SUBJUGATE THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THROUGH THE DICTATORSHIP AND FASCISM OF DIEM BUT IT MIS-CALCULATED. THE SITUATION IN VIET-NAM AT THAT TIME WAS DIFFERENT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAD BEEN UNDER FOREIGN DOMINATION. THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAD DECLARED THEIR INDEPENDENCE IN 1945, THEY FOUGHT THE FRENCH FOR NINE YEARS, AND THEY UNDERSTOOD THE MEANING OF FREEDOM, INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO OWN LAND REDISTRIBUTED TO THE TILLERS. THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAD A HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL CONSCIENCIOUSNESS AND GAINED CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN THE WAR AGAINST THE FRENCH. IT WAS FOOLISH TO THINK ONE COULD PLACE SUCH A PEOPLE IN STRATEGIC HAMLETS. AT THE TIME THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM WERE EMPTY-HANDED BECAUSE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENEVA ACCORDS, CADRES, SOLDIERS, AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN REGROUPED TO THE NORTH. NEVERTHELESS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE STOOD UP AGAINST OPPRESSION AND SIMULTANEOUSLY UNITED TO DESTROY THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS. IN THE FACE OF THIS RESISTANCE THE UNITED STATES STEPPED UP ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PUPPET ARMY AND ADMINISTRATION. IT WAGED A SPECIAL WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM BUT IT FAILED. FROM THE BATTLE OF AP BAC IN 1963 TO THE BATTLE OF BINH GIA IT WAS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE GUERRILLA FORCES COULD NOT BE BEATEN. AT THAT TIME, THE MAIN FORCES OF THE PUPPETS WERE ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE AND BOTH THE PRESS AND UNITED STATES MILITARY OFFICERS ADMITTED THIS. THUS, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NLF, THE SPECIAL WAR WAS DEFEATED BY THE GUERRILLAS AND LODGE, TAYLOR AND HARKINS WERE RECALLED TO THE US. EVEN TAYLOR HAS SAID THAT THE BATTLEFIELD AND THE OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN ILL CHOSEN BY THE UNITED STATES.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- PARIS 20523 SECTION 4 OF 7 SEP 7

27. IN 1965, THO CONTINUED, THE US SHIFTED FROM A SPECIAL WAR TO A LOCAL WAR. IN 1965/66, THE US BROUGHT 400,000 TROOPS INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM. IT DROPPED GIGANTIC QUANTITIES OF BOMBS AND SHELLS OVER THE HEADS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THE US THOUGHT IT WOULD SMASH THE RESISTANCE IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. ONCE AGAIN IT FAILED. BY INTRODUCING ITS TROOPS, THE US HAD AROUSED THE INDIGNATION OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WHOSE TRADITION OF RESISTANCE AGAINST AGGRESSION IS GREAT. THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH WILL ACCEPT ANY SACRIFICE AND WILL NOT ACCEPT LOSS OF THEIR COUNTRY. THE UNITED STATES FORCES ARRIVED WHEN FORCES OF LIBERATION ROSE UP IN ARMED STRUGGLE AND WERE WINNING VICTORY. LIBERATION FORCES WERE EVERYWHERE. US FORCES WERE SURROUNDED AND UNDER ATTACK. IN 1965/66, AND AGAIN IN 1966/67, THE UNITED STATES MOBILIZED ITS FORCES FOR DRY-SEASON OFFENSIVES WHICH ARE CALLED "SEARCH AND DESTROY" OPERATIONS, BUT THESE FAILED. A GREAT DEFEAT WAS "OPERATION JUNCTION CITY" IN 1966/67. DURING THIS OPERATION 40,000 TROOPS WERE MOBILIZED BY THE US SIDE, AND YET THE NLF MAIN FORCES COULD NOT BE DESTROYED. THE COMMANDER OF THE OPERATION WAS RELIEVED.

28. THUS THE STRATEGY OF "SEARCH AND DESTROY" FAILED AND SO DID THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THIS HAS EVEN BEEN ADMITTED BY THE AUTHOR OF THE LATTER PROGRAM, GENERAL LANSDALE. AFTER THE 1966/67 SEASON, THE UNITED STATES WAS UNABLE TO LAUNCH ANY GREAT OFFENSIVE AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES OF LIBERATION LAUNCHED MANY OFFENSIVES OF THEIR OWN WHICH WERE ACCOMPANIED BY A SIMULTANEOUS GENERAL UPRISING. THE EVENTS OF FEBRUARY, 1968, WERE THE GREATEST DEFEAT OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ENTIRE WAR OF AGGRESSION. THIS DEFEAT SHOOK OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD. EVEN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS OFFICER IN VIET-NAM, GENERAL CHAISSON, SAID "...I MUST ADMIT THAT THE VC SURPRISED ME BY THEIR ATTACKS." THO FURTHER QUOTED CHAISSON TO THE EFFECT THAT HE ADMIRERD THE VC FOR THEIR ORGANIZATION AND WELL-COORDINATED BATTLE PLANS. AS A RESULT OF TET, THO SAID, EVEN THOSE MOST SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT WERE FORCED TO RECOGNIZE THE TRUTH AND THE TET DEFEAT WAS RELATED TO THE REPLEACEMENT OF DEFENSE SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY





Department of State

10  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC  
DI RUFNCR 20523/5 2512000  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 071910Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5810  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 2159Q

RECD: SEP 7, 1968  
6:14 PM

~~SECRET~~ SET 5 OF 7 PARIS 20523

NODIS HARVAN PLUS

DELTO 700

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LE DUC THO SEPTEMBER 7.

29. HAVING FAILED IN "SEARCH AND DESTROY" THE UNITED STATES SWITCHED TO A STRATEGY OF "CLEAR AND HOLD", SHIFTING FROM MOBILE OFFENSIVES TO PASSIVE DEFENSE. THE US NO LONGER CAN LAUNCH LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS SINCE IT HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO CALL BACK ITS TROOPS IN DEFENSE OF CITIES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THE US WANTS TO CHANGE THE BALANCE BY INTENSIVE USE OF AVIATION, PARTICULARLY B-52'S, BUT THE AIR FORCE CANNOT BE DECISIVE. THE DECISIVE FACTOR IS THE INFANTRY. YOUR INFANTRY IS ON PASSIVE DEFENSE AND "MUST FIGHT THE WAY WE WANT AND NOT THE WAY THEY LIKE." THIS POSTURE OF PASSIVE DEFENSE HAS CAUSED A DECLINE IN THE MORALE OF US AND PUPPET TROOPS, AS EVIDENCED BY RECENT MUTINIES IN PRISONS IN DANANG AND LONG THANH. THE LOSS OF MORALE AND THE LOSS OF THE INITIATIVE HAVE COST US GREATLY.

30. ON THEIR SIDE, THO CONTINUED, THE LIBERATION FORCES HAVE THE INITIATIVE. THEIR TACTICS ARE CREATIVE AND CLEVER. THE MORALE OF THE PEOPLE AND FORCES OF LIBERATION IS HIGH. SIXTH TO SEVENTY PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE IN LIBERATION UNITS COME FROM FAMILIES OF WHOM ONE OR MORE MEMBERS HAVE BEEN KILLED BY US AND PUPPET TROOPS. THUS THEIR PATRIOTISM AND HATRED CANNOT BE CHECKED BY ANY FORCE. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT SOMETIMES A SQUAD OF LIBERATION TROOPS CAN DEFEAT A COMPANY OF US TROOPS. THUS US KEEPS ITS FORCES IN DEFENSE OF IMPORTANT CITIES SUCH AS SAIGON AND DANANG; BUT IT CANNOT PREVENT ATTACKS AGAINST EITHER OF THESE CITIES OR ITS MILITARY BASES.

31. TAKE FOR EXAMPLE KHE SANH. THE US HAD SAID THAT IT WAS WELL DEFENDED AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON EVEN MADE HIS GENERALS SIGN A PLEDGE THAT IT COULD BE DEFENDED, BUT FINALLY, THE US HAD TO WITHDRAW. THIS WAS A GREAT DEFEAT FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS GENERALS HAVE HAD TO ADMIT THIS. THEY ADMIT THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT ATTACKS BY THE LIBERATION FORCES.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- PARIS 20523 SECTION 5 OF 7 SEP 7

32. THO THEN TURNED TO THE POLITICAL SITUATIONS WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS OUR MOST SIGNIFICANT AND FUNDAMENTAL DEFEAT. THE UNITED STATES, HE SAID, DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE SPIRIT OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST AGGRESSION. VIET-NAM IS A SMALL COUNTRY AND EVEN WHEN SITUATED NEXT TO FEUDAL CHINA, A MUCH LARGER COUNTRY, IT COULD NOT BE DEFEATED. THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE NEVER ACCEPTED THE LOSS OF THEIR FATHERLAND AND THEY HAVE STOOD UP AGAINST AGGRESSION MANY TIMES. THE FRENCH CAME AND ULTIMATELY WERE DRIVEN OUT. THE VIETNAMESE ARE AN OPPRESSED PEOPLE WHO ENDURED INDESCRIBABLE HARDSHIP IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST THE FRENCH. THUS WHEN THE COUNTRY WAS SUBJECTED TO AGGRESSION ONCE AGAIN, THE PATRIOTISM AND SENTIMENTS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE GREATLY WOUNDED. IF THE US WERE IN THE POSITION OF THE VIETNAMESE, IT WOULD UNDERSTAND. VIETNAM IS ONE BUT IT IS DIVIDED AND COUNTLESS FAMILIES ARE SEPARATED. THUS THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE GREATLY ATTACHED TO THE UNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY. THEY WILL STRUGGLE HARD AND WILL NOT GIVE IN, WHATEVER THE SACRIFICE. THE COUNTRY MAY BE TEMPORARILY DIVIDED BUT THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE WILL NOT BE. THE PEOPLE IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH HAVE STOOD UP AS ONE MAN. THE NLF HAS BUILT GREAT COHESION AMONGST THE PEOPLE INCLUDING WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE. THESE EXAMPLES OF PATRIOTISM ARE OBSERVED AND ADMIRER BY THE WORLD PRESS. OUR CHILDREN, THO SAID, HAVE TAKEN UP ARMS. IN MANY FAMILIES, AS MANY AS THREE GENERATIONS HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFLICT OF NEARLY TEN YEARS. THE US HAS MADE EVERY EFFORT TO CONSOLIDATE THE PUPPET ADMINISTRATION AND WIN THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE. IT HAS FAILED, NO COUNTRY HAS CHANGED SO MANY PUPPETS. THERE WERE TWELVE CHANGES IN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, BUT THE UNITED STATES CANNOT CHANGE THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE SOUTH. THIS IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND BECAUSE THE PUPPETS ARE INSTRUMENTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY. THE PUPPETS ARE BUT CORRUPT MILITARISTS WHO DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE HEART OF THE PEOPLE. THERE ARE PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES WHO UNDERSTAND US AND XUAN THUY HAS SPOKEN ABOUT THIS MANY TIMES.

33. THO SAID HE HAD JUST ONE REMARK ABOUT PRESIDENT THIEU. SOME SAIGON PAPERS HAVE ALLEGED THAT THIEU'S FAMILY ENGAGED IN SMUGGLING AND WHEN THEY PUBLISHED THESE REPORTS THEY WERE CLOSED. IF US TRIES TO KEEP THIEU IN POWER, HOW CAN IT EXPECT TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM? IF WE PERIST IN SUPPORTING THIS ADMINISTRATION, WE WILL FAIL.

34. THO THEN SUGGESTED THAT WE TAKE A BRIEF BREAK FOR TEA, WHICH LASTED 25 MINUTES, WITH NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION.

35. WHEN THE MEETING RESUMED, THO MADE THE FINAL PORTION OF HIS BT.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



Department of State

10  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

DD RUEHC  
DE RUEFNR 20523/6 2512000  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 071910Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5811  
STATE GRNC

CONTROL: 2160Q

RECD: SEP 7, 1968  
6:26 PM

BT  
~~SECRET~~ SET 6 OF 7 PARIS 20523

NODIS HARVAN PLUS

DELTO 700

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LE DUC TWO SEPTEMBER 7.

STATEMENT WHICH DEALT WITH THE "WAR OF DESTRUCTION"  
AGAINST

THE NORTH. VIET-NAM IS ONE AND ITS PEOPLE ARE ONE. WHEN THE SOUTH IS A VICTIM OF AGGRESSION THE NORTH IS OBLIGED TO HELP THE SOUTH. RESPONDING TO THE APPEAL OF THE NLF, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN REGROUPED TO THE NORTH AFTER 1954 WENT BACK SOUTH TO LIBERATE THEIR FAMILIES AND THEIR NATIVE VILLAGES. THE UNITED STATES LAUNCHED ITS WAR OF DESTRUCTION AGAINST THE DRV FOR TWO PURPOSES. FIRST, TO PREVENT THE FLOW OF ASSISTANCE FROM THE PEOPLE OF NVN TO THE PEOPLE OF SVN, AND SECOND, TO DESTROY THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POTENTIAL OF THE DRV, AND TO FORCE DRV INTO SUBMISSION THROUGH FAMINE, DISRUPTION AND POVERTY. THESE OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT BEEN ACHIEVED.

36. THE QUANTITIES OF BOMBS DROPPED OVER THE DRV AMOUNT TO 65 KILOGRAMS PER HEAD AND 25 TONS PER ACRE; BUT THROUGH BRAVERY AND HATRED THE PEOPLE OF NORTH VIET-NAM HAVE OVERCOME ALL DIFFICULTIES IN ORDER TO BRING ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH. AS FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF CITIES, FACTORIES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION, THE DRV HAS SUFFERED BUT THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POTENTIAL, AS WELL AS THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE DRV, HAVE NOT BEEN SERIOUSLY AFFECTED, SINCE THE COUNTRY IS PREDOMINANTLY AGRICULTURE. THE DRV DOES NOT DEPEND ON INDUSTRY AND MOST PRODUCTION IS BY HAND. THUS, WHEN THE US BOMBS CITIES OR FACTORIES, THERE IS NO EFFECT ON DRV PRODUCTION.

37. WHEN THE UNITED STATES LAUNCHED ITS ATTACKS, THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CEASELESSLY STOOD UP AGAINST US AVIATION WHICH SUFFERED GREAT LOSSES, RESULTS WERE NOT ACHIEVED AND MCNAMARA HAS SAID AS MUCH, AND ADMITTED THAT THE BOMBING CANNOT FORCE THE DRV TO SUBMIT. WHO ADDED THAT A NUMBER OF US JOURNALISTS AND PERSONALITIES HAD

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- PARIS 20523 SECTION 6 OF 7 SEP 7

VISITED THE DRV AND SEEN THE FACTS FOR THEMSELVES. THIS HE SAID IS THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION IN BOTH VIET-NAM.

38. THO SAID THAT THE WAR HAD NOT ONLY FAILED IN VIET-NAM BUT ALSO IN THE US. IT HAS PUT THE US IN THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY IT HAS EVER KNOWN. THERE IS A LARGE BUDGET DEFICIT. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT AMOUNTS TO AN BILLION DOLLARS. THE DRAIN OF GOLD IS SUCH THAT US RESERVES AMOUNT TO ONLY 10.4 BILLION DOLLARS. THE DOLLAR HAS DEPRECIATED, THERE IS INFLATION. ALL THESE FACTS ARE FROM THE US PRESS. FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIRMAN MARTIN HIMSELF HAS SAID THAT THE US IS FACING A BUDGET AND PAYMENTS CRISIS WHICH IS INTOLERABLE. THESE FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES ARE CAUSED BY THE VIET-NAM WAR AND THEY HAVE CREATED DIFFICULTIES FOR THE GREAT SOCIETY PROGRAM WHICH AS A RESULT CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE BURDENED BY DEBT AND INCREASED TAXES AND THEIR YOUTH ARE DRAFTED TO GO ON TO A USELESS DEATH. POPULAR OPPOSITION TO THE WAR CONSTANTLY INCREASES. OPPOSITION IS FOUND AMONGST VARIETY OF LEADERS, POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS AND SO FORTH. DOZENS OF PERSONS HAVE BURNED THEMSELVES TO DEATH IN OPPOSITION TO THE WAR.

39. HE THEN CONTINUED SAYING THAT US SOLDIERS WERE FED UP WITH THE WAR, THERE WAS AN INCREASING NUMBER OF DESERTIONS AND DURING OF DRAFT CARDS, THE MOVEMENT OF NEGROES IN ITS OPPOSITION OF WAR, DISCRIMINATION AND IN SUPPORT OF DEMANDS FOR A BETTER LIVING, IS SPREADING. THE UNITED STATES HAS PARTIALLY REPPRESSED THE PEOPLE WHO OPPOSE THE WAR. THE INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS OF US SOCIETY ARE INTENSIFYING THE EVIDENCE OF THIS IS THE DEATH OF SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY AND REVEREND MARTIN LUTHER KING. ALL THIS SHOWS THAT BECAUSE OF THE WAR OF AGGRESSION IN VIET-NAM THE US HAS LOST THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. NO WAR IN US HISTORY HAS BEEN SO OPPOSED BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND IF IT CONTINUES IT WILL FURTHER LOSE THE HEART OF THE PEOPLE AND AGGRAVATE SOCIAL CONTRADICTION.

40. THE VIET-NAM WAR CONFRONTS US WITH FAILURE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE. THE STRUGGLE BY THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AGAINST AGGRESSION IS SUPPORTED BY THE SOCIALIST AND PEACE-LOVING COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. NO NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT HAS EVER GAINED AS MUCH SUPPORT AS THE STRUGGLE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. EVEN THE VIETNAMESE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FRENCH DID NOT HAVE TO MUCH SUPPORT. BECAUSE OF THE VIETNAM WAR, THE US HAS LOST PRESTIGE, HAS LOST THE HEART OF THE US PEOPLE, AND IS MORE ISOLATED THAN AT ANY TIME IN ITS HISTORY. EVEN IN THE UNITED NATIONS, WHERE THE UNITED STATES

BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

00. RIJHC  
DE RIJFNCR: 20523/7 2512000  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 071910Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5812  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 2161Q

RECD: SEP 7, 1968  
6:45 PM

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SEC OF 7 PARIS 20523

MODIS HARVAN PLUS

DELTO 700

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LE DUC THO SEPTEMBER 7.

EXERTS GREAT INFLUENCE AND CONTROL, US PRESTIGE IS DECLINING.

A NUMBER OF US ALLIES HAVE EVEN VOICED DISAPPROVAL OF US POLICY. THE DRV CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT BECAUSE OF THE VIET-NAM WAR, THE US HAS FAILED IN VIET-NAM, IN THE UNITED STATES, AND IN THE WORLD.

41. WHEN HE WAS ALIVE, JOHN F. KENNEDY RECOGNIZED THAT THE VIET-NAM SITUATION WAS A TUNNEL WITHOUT AN EXIT. HE SAID THIS IN 1963. THE PROGRAM OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY HAS HAD TO ADMIT THAT THE VIETNAMESE WAR WAS A FAILURE BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY. LORD MONTGOMERY, A FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE WAR, HAS SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE US FOR ITS VIET-NAM POLICIES, AND A NUMBER OF FRENCH GENERALS WHO FOUGHT IN INDO-CHINA, HAVE ALSO SPOKEN ALONG THE SAME LINE. THIS, SAID THO, IS REALITY, AND THE INESCAPABLE CONCLUSION IS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS FAILED.

42. THO CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT DOAY HE HAD SPOKEN OF THE GENERAL SITUATION. ON ANOTHER DAY HE WOULD ADDRESS HIMSELF TO THE CONCRETE DETAILS OF A SOLUTION. WE ASKED THO IF HE DID NOT PREFER TO COMPLETE HIS PRESENTATION TODAY. THO SAID THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO SPEAK ON ANOTHER DAY BUT HE WAS PREPARED TO LISTEN TO OUR COMMENTS ON WHAT HE HAD JUST SAID. WE POINTED OUT THAT MANY PEOPLE ARE DYING ON THE BATTLEFIELD, BOTH ALLIES AND ORTH VIETNAMESE, AND WE PROPOSED HOLDING ANOTHER MEETING TOMORROW.

43. THO THEN SUGGESTED NEXT FRIDAY. WE SAID THAT SEEMED TO US TO BE A LONG TIME AND SAID WE DID NOT SEE HOW WE COULD MAKE PROGRESS IF WE WORKED AT THIS PACE. THUY SAID THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF PREPARING FOR NEXT WEDNESDAY'S FORMAL MEETING. WE SAID WE WERE PREPARED TO MAKE OUR WEDNESDAY STATEMENT AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. THO THEN SAID HE WAS WILLING TO MEET AGAIN NEXT THURSDAY AT 3:00 P.M.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



PAGE 2- PARIS 20523 FINAL SECTION OF 7 SEP 7

44. WE SAID THAT IN THE MEANWHILE WE PREFERRED NOT TO COMMENT PIECE-MEAL ON WHAT HE HAD JUST SAID. WE SAID THAT WE APPRECIATED THO'S EXPRESSING ALL THAT IS ON HIS MIND AND WE PLANNED TO SPEAK TO HIM WITH THE SAME FRANKNESS. OBVIOUSLY, WE SEE THE SITUATION IN MOST CASES QUITE DIFFERENTLY. WE SAID WE DID NOT WANT THE DRV TO GET THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ACCEPT THEIR DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION. OUR PRINCIPAL REGRET IS THAT THO IS NOT WILLING TO MEET US SOONER. PEOPLE ARE DYING IN THE FIELD AND WE HOPE THAT DRV SIDE WILL RECONSIDER AND BE PREPARED TO MEET ON TUESDAY.

45. THUY SAID THAT WE CAN CONSIDER THE THURSDAY APPOINTMENT FIRM BUT DRV SIDE WILL RECONSIDER AND LET US KNOW IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO MEET AT AN EARLIER DATE. WE THEN DISCUSSED WHAT WE SHOULD SAY TO THE PRESS IN THE EVENT THEY SHOULD GET WIND OF THESE PRIVATE MEETINGS. ALI SHOWED US THE PROPOSED TEXT OF THE STATEMENT TO BE USED BY BOTH SIDES, IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. THE LANGUAGE OF LAU'S DRAFT WAS, HOWEVER NOT PARTICULARLY SATISFACTORY AND WE AGREED TO SAY "WE NEVER COMMENT ON ANY ALLEGATIONS OR RUMORS ABOUT PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS."

46. WE THEN REMARKED THAT IF WE WERE TO MAKE PROGRESS HERE WE SHOULD MEET SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK. WE LIKE THE IDEA OF THOROUGH AND COMPLETE PRESENTATIONS, SUCH AS THE ONE MADE BY LE DUC THO, BUT THESE THINGS TAKE TIME. WE DON'T EXPECT THAT OUR STATEMENT WILL BE QUITE AS LONG. PERHAPS, HOWEVER, OUT OF THESE TALKS WE CAN FIND SOME AREAS OF AGREEMENT, SOME AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT WHICH WE WILL DISREGARD AND SOME AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT WHERE WE CAN REACH SOME SORT OF MIDDLE GROUND. THAT WILL TAKE TIME, BUT WE ARE WILLING TO SPEND IT. OUR OBLIGATION IS TO THE PEOPLE FIGHTING IN VIET-NAM.

47. THO SAID HE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO MEETING MANY HOURS A DAY AND MANY DAYS A WEEK. WE COULD WORK UP A CALENDAR FOR THIS AT OUR NEXT MEETING.

48. WE THANKED THO FOR HIS HOSPITALITY AND EXPRESSED REGRET THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO ACCEPT OUR INVITATION TO MEET AT HARRIMAN'S RESIDENCE. WE DO, HOWEVER, FIND DRV'S MEETING SITE VERY SUITABLE FOR THESE PURPOSES AND THEREFORE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MEETING THERE THE NEXT TIME. WE HOPE SOME DAY THE DRV REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE ABLE TO COME TO HARRIMAN'S. THUY RESPONDED THAT PERHAPS WE COULD COME BACK TO THAT LATER. THE MEETING ADJOURNED.

HARRIMAN

BT

*for*

39

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file*

Sunday, September 8, 1968  
10:16 AM

Mr. President:

You should be aware of this report that the  
Soviet Central Committee has voted:

- to "normalize" the situation in Czechoslovakia,  
on grounds of damage to world Communist movement;
- to replace Brezhnev. Could be wishful gossip  
or true.

*W. W. Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS.019.039.002/3  
By jc NARA, Date 12-14-01

390

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

IN 87417

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DD/I	DIA	NMCC/MC EXO	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC OER	NIC FBIS	NSA DCS	SOO IRS	ONE AID	CRS USIA
-------------------	-----	----------------	---------	-----	------	------	------	-----------------	-------------	------------	------------	------------	-------------

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

072258

25X1A

DIST 7 SEPTEMBER 1968

COUNTRY: USSR/CZECHOSLOVAKIA/YUGOSLAVIA

DOI : [REDACTED] 25X1C 0

SUBJECT: SOVIET PRESIDUM RECOMMENDATION TO REPLACE BREZNHEV;  
SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "NORMAL-  
IZATION" IN CSR.

ACQ : [REDACTED]

25X1A

SOURCE : [REDACTED]

25X1X

1. SINCE THE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA (CSR),  
THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT HAS RECEIVED LITTLE IF ANY REPORTING

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-019-039-002/4

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

IN 87417

25X1A

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

OF VALUE FROM THE CZECHOSLOVAK EMBASSIES IN THE CAPITOLS OF THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE INTERVENTION. TO FILL THE RESULTANT VOID, THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN PROVIDING THE DUBCEK GOVERNMENT WITH REPORTS ON DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THESE WARSAW PACT CAPITOLS OF INTEREST TO THE CSR. THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN CHanneled TO THE CSR GOVERNMENT VIA THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN PRAGUE.

2. ONE OF THE ITEMS PASSED TO THE DUBCEK GOVERNMENT BY THE YUGOSLAVS CONCERNED THE MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CC) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (CPSU) WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 1968. AT THIS MEETING, A RESOLUTION WAS PASSED WHICH RECOMMENDED THAT IN VIEW OF THE "INCREASE IN INTERNAL TENSION" EVIDENT AFTER THE RECENT EVENTS IN THE CSR, AND IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER REPRESSIVE ACTIONS TAKEN WITHIN THE CSR, AND THAT EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF "NORMALIZATION" THERE. THE RESOLUTION STATED THAT THESE STEPS WERE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE MEETING OF FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER IN MOSCOW TO TAKE PLACE. THIS CC RESOLUTION WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

IN 87417

25X1A

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

3. ANOTHER ITEM PASSED BY THE YUGOSLAVS TO THE DUBCEK GOVERNMENT, WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE REPORT WAS UNCONFIRMED, STATED THAT IN A MEETING DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN SEPTEMBER 1968, THE CPSU PRESIDUM DECIDED TO CONVENE ANOTHER SESSION OF THE CC FOR THE WEEKEND OF 7/8 SEPTEMBER. AT THIS MEETING OF THE CC, A "PROPOSAL" IS TO BE READ BY MIKHAIL SUSLOV ON BEHALF OF A MAJORITY GROUP WITHIN THE PRESIDUM RECOMMENDING THAT LEONID BREZNHEV BE REMOVED AS FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CPSU. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE YUGOSLAV 25X1A OFFICIAL SAID THAT HE HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT WHO WAS TO BE BREZNHEV'S SUCCESSOR, BUT THAT SINCE SUSLOV WAS TO READ THE PROPOSAL, IT WAS UNLIKELY TO BE HE. THE YUGOSLAV ADDED THAT WHILE THE PRESIDIUM PROPOSAL THAT BREZNHEV BE REMOVED <sup>WAS</sup> UNCONFIRMED, IT WAS CERTAIN THE BREZNHEV'S POSITION WAS VERY PRECARIOUS. IN THE EVENT THAT BREZNHEV WAS REMOVED BY THE CC, IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE MADE PUBLIC AT ONCE, AND HE MIGHT REMAIN IN THE POSITION FOR A BRIEF PERIOD IN ORDER TO SOFTEN THE BLOW FOR INTERNATIONAL CONSUMPTION.)

4. ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1968 THE OFFICIAL CSR NEWS AGENCY CTX RECEIVED A MESSAGE AT ITS PRAGUE HEADQUARTERS [REDACTED] 25X1X [REDACTED] REPORTING THAT THE CPSU

25X1X

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~



IN 87417

25X1A

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

PRESIDIUM WILL PROPOSE TO THE CC THAT BREZNHEV BE REMOVED AS  
FIRST SECRETARY. THE MESSAGE STATED THAT CTK SHOULD NOT  
DISSEMINATE THIS INFORMATION, BUT SHOULD INSTEAD WAIT FOR THE  
ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS.

25X1A 5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE. [REDACTED] 25X1A

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

BT

ADVANCE COPIES SENT ELECTRICALLY TO WHITE HOUSE SIT ROOM, USIA AND USIB MEMBERS

NO FOREIGN DISEM

~~SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres. file*

Sunday, September 8, 1968  
10:15 AM

Mr. President:

Tad Szulc may (or may not) report in tomorrow's  
TIMES presence in Czechoslovakia of SCUD missiles  
(a surface-to-surface tactical weapon; range, 160  
miles; 2,000 pound conventional warhead).

  
W. W. Rostow

DAVIS  
402

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1967 SEP 8 12 53

~~SECRET~~

HCD395

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 03444 081239Z

44  
ACTION EUR 20

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,  
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, SAH 02, SA 01, SAL 01,  
ACDA 16, IO 13, RSR 01, /112 W

P R 081100Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4926  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
USMISSION NATO

~~SECRET~~ PRAGUE 3444

REF: USDAO PRAGUE 0531

SUBJECT: NY TIMES REVELATION OF SOV DUAL PURPOSE MISSILES

NY TIMES CORRESPONDENT SZULC, TRAVELLING OUT PRAGUE SEPT 6 WITH AUREL COSTESCU (FORMER MEMBER RUMANIAN UN MISSION WHO TEMPORARILY IN PRAGUE) OBSERVED SIGNS OF SCUD MISSILE EQUIPMENT AND PROMPTLY INFORMED ARMA WHO CONFIRMED PRESENCE AS REPORTED REFTEL. SZULC NOW WEIGHING SENDING STORY TO TIMES AND HINTED TO TIMES OVER PHONE SEPT 7 THAT HE HAD SOMETHING IN THIS LINE WHICH HE MIGHT SEND IN SEPT 9.

SZULC FEELS MISSILE PRESENCE WILL SOON COME TO LIGHT AND IS TEMPTED TO HAVE FIRST STORY. ON OTHER HAND, HE AWARE OF RISK TO HIS CONTINUED PRESENCE OF REPORTING SENSITIVE MILITARY INFORMATION AND OF INTERNATIONAL IMPACT THAT STORY COULD HAVE ESPECIALLY IN FRG.

WE HAVE TOLD SZULC THAT PRESENCE OF ADDITIONAL SCUD EQUIPMENT DOES NOT OF ITSELF GREATLY CHANGE MILITARY PICTURE BUT THAT REPORTING OF STORY COULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT AND WOULD CERTAINLY LEND SUPPORT TO THOSE IN FRG AND ELSEWHERE WHO ARGUING THAT SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN EUROPEAN MILITARY BALANCE HAS OCCURRED. WE OFFERED ASK DEPT. TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH TIMES SO THEY WOULD KNOW OF SZULC INITIATIVE AND

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-78  
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-27-0

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 03444 081239Z

HELPFULNESS TO US AND COULD REACH JOINT DECISION ON HANDLING  
STORY THERE. SZULC PREFERS, HOWEVER, MAKE OWN DECISION ON  
FILING STORY BUT WOULD WELCOME ADVICE FROM DEPARTMENT BEFORE  
MAKING DECISION. MENTIONED DEPUTY UNDERSECY BOHLEN AS PERSON  
WHOSE VIEWS HE PARTICULARLY RESPECTS. WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF  
THESE COULD BE CONVEYED TO SZULC SOONEST.  
BEAM

41

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Saturday, September 7, 1968  
3:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith replies to your three questions of this morning on:

- Thai troops (going fine);
- The Korean logistic support force (no movement);
- South Vietnamese mobilization as percent of population; and equivalent U. S. figure (5.7% of total South Vietnamese population: U. S. equivalent, about 12 million).

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01





THE JOINT STAFF

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

41a

7 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH, WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Information

Following information is provided in response to telephone inquiry from Mr. Bromley Smith to Colonel F. L. Smith, Chairman's Staff Group at 1210 hours on 7 September 1968.

Question 1: What is the status of the Thai troops which were scheduled to go to South Vietnam, to include their numbers, shipping dates and prospective date of closure if incomplete?

Answer: The deployment to South Vietnam of the first half (approximately 5,000) of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, a light division designated the Black Panthers, was completed in early August 1968. The second half is not scheduled to deploy until 27 January 1969.

The advance party (209 men) of the Black Panthers deployed to South Vietnam in early July 1968, the main body of the force deployed in three increments on 19 and 26 July and 2 August. Vehicles and equipment were sent during the period 17 July - 2 August.

Question 2: In regard to the provision of additional ROK troops to South Vietnam and the civilianization of the ROK logistic support force there, what is the present status?

Answer: The matter of additional ROK forces to South Vietnam, and the civilianization of the ROK logistic support force, is not being pursued at present. ROK payment requirements for the civilianization program were much too high. Equipment for the light infantry division (the additional ROK force under original consideration) has been diverted to the ARVN modernization program.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30  
By jc NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~SECRET~~

Question 3: What will be the ARVN troop strength on 1 January 1969? Is this program progressing as planned, at the end of this year, what will be the ratio of RVN forces to the SVN population?

Answer: The Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) troop strength as of 1 January 1969 will be 801,215. Included in this total is an ARVN strength of 356,766 as well as a combined RF/PF strength of 392,067. The total strength including paramilitary/security forces is approximately 993,000. This program is progressing as planned, in fact it has, at times, been ahead of schedule. RVNAF strength, including all armed services and regional and popular forces will represent 4.6% of the total population of SVN estimated at 17.5 million, or 7.1% of that portion of SVN population under government control. RVNAF strength plus paramilitary/security forces (CIDG, National Police, RD personnel, Armed Propaganda Teams (APT), Personnel Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and Kit Carson Scouts) represent 5.7% of the total population of SVN or 8.8% of that portion of SVN population under government control.

*100 Soberly*

U.S. equivalent - about 12 million

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

42

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, September 7, 1968  
3:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This is a somewhat ominous -- but  
not necessarily authoritative -- German  
Communist report on the situation in  
Czechoslovakia.

W. W. Rostow


~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln


DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 99-214  
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

42a

~~SECRET~~



3.4(b)(1),(3),  
(b)  
6.1(c)

From Sigint Readiness  Summary Report #470  
3.4(b)(1),(3),(b)  
6.1(c)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-57  
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, Sept. 7, 1968  
2:40 p. m.

has file  
4

MR. PRESIDENT:

You approved sending a delegation headed by  
Sect. Wilbur Cohen to the dedication of the Berlin  
Medical Center on October 9.

Attached is a draft White House press release  
to be issued Tuesday, Sept. 10.

If you approve, we will coordinate a simultaneous  
release in Germany.

Attachment

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

P. S. Sen. Hill was asked but couldn't make it.



**DRAFT WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE**

**'President Johnson has designated the U. S. Delegation to attend dedication ceremonies at the Berlin Medical Center (Klinikum) on October 9. The Medical Center is an example of the long standing U. S. interest in Berlin and of our close cooperation with the Federal Republic in maintaining the city's viability. In recognition of this, the President has designated Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Wilbur J. Cohen as his personal representative. The other members of the delegation are Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge; Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa; Senator John J. Sparkman of Alabama; Deputy Under Secretary of State Idar Rimestad; the Surgeon General of the United States, Dr. William H. Stewart; Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alfred Puhon; and two prominent American citizens who have long been connected with the Medical Center project, Mr. Leon Chatelain, Jr., Chairman of the Benjamin Franklin Foundation, and Mrs. Eleanor Lansing Dulles.**

**"The Medical Center, which was constructed by the Benjamin Franklin Foundation (a non-profit German-American organization), will be the largest and most modern medical center in Germany and one of the largest in the world. It will contain some 1,500 beds, include extensive treatment facilities, and accommodate all of the teaching and research facilities of the Medical Faculty of the Free University of Berlin."**

*Pres file*

Saturday, Sept. 7, 1968  
2:10 p. m.

*44*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Background Facts on Aircraft for Israel -- for briefing Mr. Nixon

1. Two different aircraft are involved in our military supply discussions with Israel -- the A-4 Skyhawk and the F-4 Phantom.

-- The Skyhawk is a subsonic attack bomber, the perfect plane for the kind of attacks on airfields and planes that Israel made in winning air superiority on June 5, 1967. Its speed does not lessen its suitability for this job; even a supersonic plane would have to fly subsonically on the kind of low-level, pin-point attack the Israelis relied on. It carries almost four times the bomb load carried by the Mirage III-C (which the Israelis used so effectively in 1967) and more than the best Soviet light bombers in the area. Its main shortcoming is that it is mainly an attack plane and has limited capability to fight its way out of air-to-air combat. The Israelis have used the Skyhawk in the Jordan Valley and are pleased with it. It costs about \$880,000.

-- The Phantom is one of the most advanced fighter-bombers in the world. Its supersonic speed (Mach 2 at high altitude, Mach 1.1 at low) is comparable to the speeds of the most advanced Soviet fighter-bombers in the area (SU-7), but its bomb load is more than 3 times as great and its range 2 times greater. Its advantages over the Skyhawk are that it can carry almost twice the bomb load over a greater range and still prove the equal of the best supersonic interceptor that might counter-attack. It costs \$2.2 million. It holds 15 world records for performance.

2. We are already providing Skyhawks under two separate agreements:

-- In 1966, we sold 48, with delivery to begin in December, 1968. Delivery is on schedule at the rate of 3-4 planes per month.

-- In January, 1968, you promised Prime Minister Eshkol to add another 40 Skyhawks to the end of that earlier delivery schedule. Production arrangements have been made. We have not publicized this.

-- These 88 Skyhawks will raise Israel's aircraft inventory above what it was on June 5, 1967 (roughly 200 to 240).

3. We have Israel's request for Phantoms under consideration. We keep daily tabs on the military balance between Israel and the Arabs. We see no immediate threat to Israel now. We have ample lead time for delivering these planes within the period when any shift in this balance might take place.

HSaunders:mz

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RACO 2-54  
By us, NARA, Date 2-28-03

W. W. Rostow

cc: HSaunders

INFORMATION

**SECRET--HARVAN PLUS**

Saturday, September 7, 1968  
1:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the flash account of  
the Paris meeting this morning.

Key passages are marked.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

DELTO 699 (Paris 20522)

**SECRET--HARVAN PLUS**

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 9-9-92



Department of State

45.  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

VV CRA013  
.....ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUFNCR 20522-2511609  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z 071555Z SP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5805  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 20522

NODIS HARVAN PLUS

DELTO 699

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. WE MET FOR THREE HOURS THIS MORNING SEPTEMBER 7 WITH LE DUC THO, XUAN THUY AND HA VAN LAU, WITH THEIR INTERPRETER AND NOTE TAKER. HABIB AND NEGROPONTE ACCOMPANIED US. AT THEIR REQUEST, MEETING TOOK PLACE IN SAME NORTH VIETNAMESE HOUSE AS VANCE/LAU TALKS.

2. MOST OF THE TIME WAS TAKEN UP BY AN ENDLESS HARANGUE BY LE DUC THO, EXPLAINING IN GREAT INACCURATE DETAIL THAT WE HAD LOST THE WAR AND FAILED IN POLITICAL FIELD. THO CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD NOT YET FINISHED HIS STATEMENT, THE BALANCE OF WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AT OUR NEXT MEETING. HE WAS NOT PREPARED, HE SAID, TO SAY ANYTHING FURTHER TODAY. HE SAID ALTHOUGH HE WOULD LISTEN TO OUR COMMENTS TODAY, HE WOULD PREFER TO COMPLETE HIS FULL STATEMENT BEFORE WE DID. WE DECIDED IT WAS BETTER TO HEAR HIM OUT BEFORE RESPONDING.

3. OUR NEXT MEETING IS SET FOR THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 12 AT THREE O'CLOCK, WITH AN OUTSIDE POSSIBILITY OF MEETING TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 10. THEY AGREED TO ESTABLISH AT OUR NEXT MEETING A CLENDAR OF LONGER AND FREQUENT PRIVATE MEETINGS. WE ALSO AGREED AT THEIR INITIATIVE TO KEEP EVERYTHING SAID AT THESE PRIVATE MEETINGS SECRET. IF WE WERE QUERIED ABOUT THEM, WE WOULD SIMPLY STATE "WE NEVER COMMENT ON ANY ALLEGATIONS OR RUMORS ABOUT PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS."

4. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, WE STATED IT SEEMED TO US THAT IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NEGOTIATORS IN PARIS TO FIND A WAY TO REMOVE THE ROADBLOCKS THAT WERE PREVENTING PROGRESS. PERHAPS THIS COULD BE DONE BY SEEKING AREAS OF AGREEMENT. WE STATED THERE WERE TWO PRINCIPAL POINTS WE WANTED TO MAKE. BOTH SIDES AGREED ON THE OBJECTIVE OF STOPPING THE BOMBING, AND PROCEEDING TO SERIOUS TALKS TO REACH A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER WE DIFFERED ON THE QUESTION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE BOMBING COULD

~~SECRET~~

1968 SEP 7 PM 12 28 01

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 16775

By jcl/ics. NARA, Date 72-14-01

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 20522, September 071555Z )(NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

BE STOPPED, AND WHAT WE MEAN BY MOVING TO SERIOUS TALKS. ON THE FIRST POINT, THEY WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE PRESIDENT'S EMPHASIS ON HIS CONCERN IN WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN THE AREA OF THE DMZ. THIS MATTER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN AMBASSADORS VANCE AND LAU, AND WE THOUGHT THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE SO FAR APART SINCE LAU HAD INDICATED THAT IF WE ON OUR SIDE ENDED MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE DMZ, THEY WOULD KNOW WHAT TO DO." ON THE SECOND POINT, WE STATED THAT WE HAD CONTINUALLY MADE IT DEFINITE THAT WE COULD NOT HAVE SERIOUS TALKS ABOUT THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN. THIS IS A MUST. WE WERE PREPARED TO HAVE THEM INCLUDE THE NLF OR OTHERS ON THEIR SIDE. HOWEVER, WE COULD HAVE BILATERAL TALKS ON BILATERAL SUBJECTS SUCH AS FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY RAISED.

5. WE ALSO MENTIONED THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 19, "THIS ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT INTEND TO MOVE FURTHER UNTIL IT HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER SIDE INTENDS SERIOUSLY TO JOIN WITH US IN DE-ESCALATING THE WAR AND MOVING SERIOUSLY TOWARDS PEACE," AND PHAM VAN DONG'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 2, "MOREOVER, IN PARIS WE ARE RAISING A VERY JUST AND WELL-FOUNDED DEMAND WHICH WILL HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE SEEKING STEP BY STEP OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOR THE VIETNAM PROBLEM." WE SUGGESTED DISCUSSING THEIR SIGNIFICANCE.

6. LE DUCH THO'S MONOLOGUE THEN FOLLOWED. DETAILED ACCOUNT REPORTED SEPTTEL, BUT WE THINK THAT INR COULD PROBABLY WRITE IT WITHOUT OUR REPORT.

7. COMMENT: LE DUC THO AT THE CLOSE OF MEETING STATED THAT HE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO MEET PRIVATELY "MANY HOURS A DAY AND MANY DAYS A WEEK." WE WILL KNOW MORE ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STATEMENT WHEN WE SEE THE CALENDAR AT NEXT THURSDAY'S MEETING. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THO IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE SURE THAT WE UNDERSTAND HANOI'S CONTENTIONS AND TO AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION THEY ARE NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS. THO'S OFFER TO HOLD FREQUENT PRIVATE MEETINGS, COUPLED WITH HIS UNDERSCORING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SECRECY OF THESE MEETINGS MAY INDICATE THEY ARE PREPARING FOR MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS. HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~



4:  
/

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, September 7, 1968  
11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

This report from Prague on the Kuznetsov mission and the continuing uncertainty as to how Moscow will play Czechoslovakia may interest you.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 5413

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

DAVIS  
46a

1967 SEP 7 14 53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCD354

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 05413 071436Z

46  
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CCO 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, SAH 02,  
SAL 01, SA 01, NIC 01, NEA 13, IO 13, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10,  
P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, RSR 01, SR 01, /123 W  
-----

O P 071345Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9672  
INFO AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USNATO  
USMISSION USUN  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 5413

SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. AT BRAZILIAN RECEPTION TODAY SEVERAL DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES QUESTIONED CZECH AMBASSADOR VLADIMIR KOUCKY AS TO SIGNIFICANCE VISIT OF DEPT FROM MIN V. V. KUZNETSOV TO PRAGUE.

2. KOUCKY TOLD YUGOSLAV AND DANISH AMBASSADORS, AMONG OTHERS, THAT KUZNETSOV VISIT CONNECTED WITH EARLIER CZECH-SOVIET AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMISSION TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION OF BRATISLAVA AND MOSCOW ACCORDS. HE DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER KUZNETSOV WILL BE PERMANENTLY SITUATED IN PRAGUE OR WHETHER IS SIMPLY NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES AND MODUS OPERANDI OF COMMISSION.

3. KUZNETSOV MISSION IS WIDELY REGARDED AMONG OUR COLLEAGUES

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 05413 071436Z

AS INTERESTING AND SIGNIFICANT SOVIET MOVE. SOME ARE INCLINED TO SEE IT AS CONCILIATORY GESTURE, BASING THIS JUDGMENT ON REPUTATION WHICH KUZNETSOV JUSTLY MERITS AS ONE OF MOST INTELLIGENT, RESTRAINED, AND ACCOMPLISHED OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS. VIRTUALLY ALL NOTE AS WELL CURIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS VISIT IN SOVIET PRESS, WHICH CAREFULLY IDENTIFIED HIM NOT ONLY AS FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUT ALSO AS MEMBER OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, MEMBER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE CPSU, AND DEPUTY OF SUPREME SOVIET. THERE IS CONSEQUENTLY NO DOUBT THAT HE REPRESENTS ALL ELEMENTS OF POWER-STRUCTURE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT IMPORTANCE IS ATTACHED TO HIS MISSION. SINCE DESPITE THESE CREDENTIALS HE IS NOT MEMBER OR CANDIDATE MEMBER OF POLITBURO, THERE IS ALSO RECOGNITION THAT WHATEVER KUZNETSOV NEGOTIATES WILL BE AD REFERENDUM AND THAT HIS SELECTION FOR MISSION DELIBERATELY KEEPS ALL OPTIONS OPEN TO LEADERSHIP.

4. GIVEN AMBIGUITIES OF SOVIET PRESS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECH-OSLOVAKIA, WHICH HAVE RANGED OVER PAST WEEK FROM OPTIMISTIC ACCOUNTS OF A RETURN TO NORMALCY TO RENEWED STRICTURES AGAINST PERSISTENCE OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY (THESE FREQUENTLY BEING EXPRESSED IN SAME ARTICLE), WE CAN PROBABLY ASSUME THAT SITUATION IS ONE IN WHICH IMPROVISATION IS ORDER OF THE DAY. KUZNETSOV MAY THEREFORE HAVE MISSION OF BRINGING SOVIET POLITICAL AUTHORITY MORE DIRECTLY IN PLAY. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER HIS TOUCH IS LIGHT OR HEAVY; AND IT IS PROBABLY PREMATURE TO SPECULATE WHETHER HE WILL TIGHTEN OR LOOSEN THE SCREWS.

5. WE HAVE NOTED WITH SOME INTEREST THAT SOVIET PRESS HAS REPEATEDLY REACTED DEFENSIVELY TO CHARGES (A) THAT SOVIET DELIVERIES OF PRODUCTS ESSENTIAL TO CZECH ECONOMY ARE BEING CURTAILED AND (B) THAT WIDESPREAD ARRESTS OF INTELLECTUALS ARE OCCURRING. PRESS HAS VIGOROUSLY DENIED BOTH THESE CHARGES, SUGGESTING THAT SOVIETS HAVE THUS FAR PURSUED A POLICY OF WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED (HOWEVER EUPHEMISTICALLY) LIMITED INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. BUT OMINOUS NOTES HAVE BEEN SOUNDED WITH EQUAL FREQUENCY IN SOVIET PRESS, LEAVING ONE WITH IMPRESSION DEVELOPMENTS ARE REGARDED AS FAR FROM SATISFACTORY. PERHAPS OUTSTANDING IN THIS RESPECT HAS BEEN DEVOTION OF UNUSUALLY GENEROUS SPACE TO SPEECHES AND ACTIVITIES OF GUSTAV HUSAK (FIRST SECRETARY, SLOVAKIA) LEADING HERE TO WIDESPREAD SPECULATION THAT HE IS CONSIDERED BY SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS LIKELY REPLACEMENT FOR DUBCEK SHOULD LATTER STUMBLE. SWANX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Pres Lee  
47

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Saturday, Sept. 7, 1968  
10:35 a. m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a quick telephonic report of the private meeting this morning.

1. It went 3 hours plus. Harriman, Vance, and Habib were present, with three men on the other side also.
2. Harriman opened making the two points we made in our instructions plus probing for a response on Phase 1 - Phase 2 (the two points were the importance of GVN participation and the DMZ).
3. The then took the situation in hand. He said what Harriman was talking about were "specific, concrete matters." The Hanoi side was "not ready to talk about them today, on this occasion." He said that first he wanted to make a general statement.
4. He then made a very rough general statement of the kind that they might publish in Hanoi: why we were losing the war; the legitimacy of the Hanoi position; etc. etc. At the end of the general statement he said that at the next private meeting he would complete the general statement and then they could get on with the "specific, concrete matters." He suggested that they meet next Friday, September 13.
5. Harriman then said men are getting killed every day -- let's speed up these discussions and get on with the business. The replied that he agreed with Harriman. He proposed, therefore, that they meet on Thursday, September 12, at 3:00 p. m. At that time he (The) would present to Harriman a calendar of dates for future private meetings. He envisaged that these private meetings would take place "several times a week." They would deal with "specific, concrete matters."
6. The added that he attached the greatest importance to keeping these private meetings secret.
7. Cy and Averell believe that, at long last, Hanoi has decided to move into exchanges of views on serious matters and to get on with the job. They are quite cheered up by this morning's session.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, September 7, 1968  
8:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the terrorist incidents  
in Saigon.

They are using up their infiltrated  
terrorist assets we expected them to  
use in the context of an attack on the  
ground.

25X1A

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ.019.039.002/6

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01



RECEIVED  
WHCA

48a

1967 SEP 7 05 28

DLA022

2510503

ZKZX OO ZSL DE 25X1A

O 970454Z ZYM

FM CIA

TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SSO ACSI DA

SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION

AFSSO USAF

CNO

DIA/ISIC

JCS

NIC

USIA

DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER

STATE (RCI)

CIA-OCI

25X1A

ZEM

S E T NOFORN

(ADVANCE)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 6 SEPTEMBER 1968

SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0100 HOURS LOCAL TIME

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (7 SEPTEMBER) N

25X1A

SOURCE THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED  
AT 0100 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 7 SEPTEMBER.1. BETWEEN 0600 AND 1945 HOURS 6 SEPTEMBER THERE WERE SIX  
TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN SAIGON. DETAILS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- (A) AT 0600 AN EXPLOSION OCCURRED IN THE 2D PRECINCT ACROSS  
THE STREET FROM THE OFFICE OF A WARD CHIEF. THE HOUSE  
WAS PARTIALLY DAMAGED. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.

25X1X

- (B) AT 1415 A GRENADE WAS THROWN INTO A PRIVATE HOME IN THE  
6TH PRECINCT. TWO CHILDREN WERE KIA.

25X1X

- (C) AT 1430 A GRENADE WAS THROWN INTO A POWER PLANT IN THE  
6TH PRECINCT CAUSING NO DAMAGE OR CASUALTIES. SUSPECTS  
ARE BEING HELD.

25X1X

- (D) AT 1445 A PACKAGE OF TNT WAS THROWN FROM A MOTORCYCLE  
INTO THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF A WARD CHIEF IN THE  
3D PRECINCT. THE TNT DID NOT EXPLODE. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE.

25X1X

- (E) AT 1840 AN ESTIMATED 22 POUNDS OF TNT WAS DETONATED NEXT  
TO THE OFFICE OF THE VIETNAMESE INFORMATION SERVICE IN  
THE 5TH PRECINCT RESULTING IN COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF THE  
OFFICE AND DAMAGE TO THREE HOUSES NEAR THE OFFICE  
CASUALTIES ARE 7 KIA, 22 SERIOUSLY WOUNDED AND 33  
SLIGHTLY WOUNDED.

25X1X

- (F) AT 1945 HOURS THERE WAS AN ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF  
A 4TH PRECINCT WARD CHIEF AT HIS RESIDENCE. THE VICTIM  
IS UNDERGOING EMERGENCY TREATMENT.

25X1X

25X1A

2.

DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT

ARPAC PACAF

GP-1

A

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-039-2-7-3

PRESERVATION COPY

49

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, September 7, 1968

8:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

These three intelligence reports of this morning may interest you.

*Pres file*


1. Further evidence on the Rumanian leaders' reaction to your San Antonio statement.

2. Wilfred Burchett suggesting rather considerable Hanoi anxiety about the U. S. reaction to the Soviet moves in Czechoslovakia and about those moves themselves. (They are a very bad precedent for long-run relations between China and North Vietnam.)

3. Observations on the state of the Paris talks, which carry forward the familiar thesis about the so-called "lull." (This may be significant because it is possible that we shall see emerge another "lull.")

25X1C

W. W. Rostow



~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

SANITIZED, st/wt guidelines

Authority NLJ.019.039.002/8

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## Intelligence Information Cable

IN

49a

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SDO	ONE	CRS
				EXC	DDZ								

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/  
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE

25X1 DIST 6 SEPTEMBER 1967

06 20 50z SEP 68

COUNTRY RUMANIA

DOI

25X1C

SUBJECT REACTION OF RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S  
WARNING TO THE SOVIET UNION

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ.019.039.002/9

By JC, NARA, Date 12-14-01

25X1A

ACQ

25X1C

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1. THE STAND TAKEN BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN A STATEMENT ON 30 AUGUST 1968 TOWARD THE DANGER WHICH COULD BE CREATED BY A MILITARY INTERVENTION BY THE USSR SIMILAR TO THAT MADE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WAS VERY WELL RECEIVED BY THE LEADERS OF THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. THE ASSESSMENT WAS MADE THAT THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TEMPERED THE STATE OF HYSTERIA OF THE SOVIET LEADERS.
2. RUMANIAN OFFICIALS RECEIVED WITH VERY GREAT SATISFACTION AND EXCITEMENT THE STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON. IT IS THE OPINION OF [REDACTED] THAT "EVEN IF MAURER AND

25X1C

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/  
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

(Dissem controls)

25X1 IN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/  
BACKGROUND USE ONLY  
(dissem controls)

CEAUSESCU NEVER ACKNOWLEDGE PUBLICLY THEIR SATISFACTION WITH  
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT, THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT IT  
WAS VERY MUCH APPRECIATED BY THEM."

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: NONE

25X1A

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/  
BACKGROUND USE ONLY  
(dissem controls)

5  
4  
3  
2  
1


INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Saturday, September 7, 1968  
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith extremely sensitive  
information indicating that



3.4(b)(1), (3), (6)  
6.1(c)

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-58  
By chm, NARA, Date 3-20-03



~~TOP SECRET~~  
SENSITIVE

September 7, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Nick Katzenbach and Paul Nitze recommend (Tab A) that you sign the attached letter to Chancellor Kiesinger undertaking to consult prior to the selective use of nuclear weapons in Germany.

You previously approved this action (Tab B), and Sec. Clifford has informed Defense Minister Schroeder that we agreed to an exchange of letters between yourself and Chancellor Kiesinger on this subject.

This letter will be delivered to the Chancellor on about Sept. 18 by Amb. Lodge who will receive the Chancellor's reply at the same meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Atts. - 2

SMKeeny:jb:9-6-68/9pm  
bcc: SMK file and chron  
    >WWR (2)  
    SMK comeback copy

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

51a

Sept 9, 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SENSITIVE

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

This letter is to confirm our understanding concerning consultation between our two governments on the use of nuclear weapons.

With respect to the general release of nuclear weapons, the United States believes that in the interest of maintaining the full effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent, no special arrangements going beyond the provisions of the Athens Guidelines on consultation are desirable.

With respect to the selective release of nuclear weapons by the US for use in Germany or by forces of the Federal Republic, I can confirm to you the following undertakings:

1. In order to enable the Government of the FRG to make its views known to the US Government before selective release of nuclear weapons for use from or on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany, the President of the United States and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany will consult directly with each other prior to such release.
2. The President of the United States will not make selective release of nuclear weapons for use by German armed forces if the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany objects to such release.

The United States Government regards the above undertakings as being in amplification and support of the Athens Guidelines on consultation.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Authority FRUS, 64-68, vol. 15 #286  
By jc NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

2

It is my understanding that to avoid any possible impairment of the nuclear deterrent, knowledge of these undertakings will be limited to our two governments and that they will not be made public. Should any public statements regarding the subject matter of this letter be necessary, such statements will be the subject of prior agreement between our governments.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency Kurt Georg Kiesinger  
Federal Chancellor of the  
Federal Republic of Germany  
Bonn

LBJ:SMKeeny:jb:9-6-68

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Saturday, September 7, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

*Pres file*

Harold Linder wanted you to know:

- He called Senator Aiken in Vermont and discussed with him his new assignment; and
- called on Senator Muskie and had a good talk with him about Canada.

W. W. Rostow

*Cir*

ERF:mst