

Profile

53

Friday, Sept. 6, 1968
6:25 p. m.

SECRET

MR. PRESIDENT:

The following item from Agence France Presse as of this afternoon is, perhaps, the most hopeful thing I have seen about Czechoslovakia. Kuznetsov is the professional Soviet peacemaker, rather than a party hatchet man. For example, they sent him to New York to mop up the mess after the Cuba missile crisis.

We could, of course, be wrong.

Here is the item:

"Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Reported in Prague: AFP reports that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov arrived this afternoon in Prague. At the time of the report he was said to be conferring with President Svejeda. AFP had reported earlier today that Moscow would send an emissary to Prague 'with full powers to negotiate with the Czechoslovak leaders.' It is not clear what Kuznetsov's functions could, in fact, be. His position suggests that he may become Soviet proconsul although presumably the military aspects of the occupation are under the control of General Pavlovsky, the commander of the occupation forces."

W. W. Rostow

(quote from Dept of State Czech Task Force sitrep 1500 hrs EDT Sept 6 1968)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Declassification, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 12-11-92

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 716990-163
By rg/lip, NARA, Date 12-11-92

SECRET

INFORMATION

54

Friday, September 6, 1968
6:15 p.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith Keith Holyoake's
acceptance of 9-10 October for his
visit with you.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



54a
NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

6 September 1968

My dear Mr President,

I have been asked by my Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Keith Holyoake, to pass to you the following message:

Dear Mr President,

It was kind of you to accept the amended dates for my visit to Washington. 9 and 10 October, which I understand are convenient for you, will fit very well with the rest of my programme.

I am looking forward to the opportunity of meeting you again and of exchanging views on a number of important questions.

Mrs Holyoake, who I am glad to say will be with me on the visit, joins me in sending warm regards to Mrs Johnson and you.

Yours sincerely, (Signed) KEITH HOLYOAKE

Yours sincerely,

Ambassador

The President,

The White House.

Pres. file
55

~~SECRET~~

Friday, Sept. 6, 1968
2:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will be interested in this report by Davis
of a meeting with Manescu in Bucharest:

- his comments on your statement;
- his judgment that "danger was not entirely
over."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Bucharest 2478)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By rg/dck, NARA, Date 12-14-92

DAVIS
55a

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PAGE 01 BUCAR 02478 061733Z

44

ACTION SS 30

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/030 W

O P 061620Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2831
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY SONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL MUNICH
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK.
USMISSION BERLIN UNN
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE UNN
AMEMBASSY WARSAW UNN

~~SECRET~~ BUCHAREST 2478

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FONMIN MANESCU

1. MANESCU RECEIVED ME FOR FIFTY MINUTES AT 1530 SEPT 6 AND IN RESPONSE MY INITIAL QUERY FOR HIS VIEWS CURRENT SITUATION NOW THAT HE HAD BEEN BACK IN ROMANIA FOR FEW DAYS MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. MANESCU HAD JUST SEEN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU AND PRIMER MAURER AND THEY AGAIN ASKED MANESCU TRANSMIT THROUGH ME, AS MANESCU HAD DONE THROUGH BALL ON SEPT APPRECIATION OF ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT AND OF THEMSELVES PERSONALLY FOR PRESIDENT'S AUG 30 STATEMENT WHICH THEY CONSIDERED WISE AND EFFICACIOUS. MANESCU SAID STATEMENT HAD HAD "COOLING" EFFECT ON A DANGEROUS CURVE WHICH MIGHT HAVE LED TO THE WORST.

B. DANGER WAS NOT COMPLETELY OVER AND IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THIS STATEMENT, WHICH PRESIDENT SAID WAS NOT ON BEHALF OF ANY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BUCAR 02478 061733Z

PARTICULAR ADMINISTRATION BUT THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES, SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DIE, TO BE DISCARDED OR PIGEONHOLED. MANESCU DID NOT PRESUME TO ADVISE ON HOW THIS COULD BE DONE BUT ROMANIAN LEADERS THOUGHT STATEMENT STILL SERVED USEFUL PURPOSE.

C. THOUGH MANESCU'S FIRST MEETING WITH BALL HAD BEEN NOTED IN ROMANIAN PRESS, LAST ONE HAD NOT NOR HAD PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT - ALL FOR "OBVIOUS REASONS." NEVERTHELESS HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT ALL ROMANIANS NOT JUST GOVERNMENT WERE AWARE OF THIS STATEMENT AND THE SOVIET REACTION THERETO IN WASHINGTON AND ELSEWHERE AND THEY APPRECIATED WHAT PRESIDENT HAD DONE.

D. MANESCU PAID TRIBUTE TO SECRETARY FOR MAKING POINT TO DOBRYNIN THAT US INFORMATION AND ACTIONS NOT BASED ON ANYTHING ROMANIANS HAD SAID.

E. ROMANIA REMAINED FAITHFUL TO ITS COMMITMENTS BUT OTHERWISE WAS DETERMINED TO MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS IN ITS OWN INTERESTS AS IT SAW THEM WITHOUT ANY DICTATION FROM OUTSIDE. IT DESIRED TO HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES. WHETHER ROMANIA HAD RELATIONS WITH THIS OR THAT STATE WAS A QUESTION ONLY FOR ROMANIA.

G. EXPRESSED HIS OWN DEEP APPRECIATION FOR UNDERSTANDING AND TREATMENT HE HAD EXPERIENCED IN NEW YORK ESPECIALLY FOR PART PLAYED BY SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR BALL AND BUFFUM.

2. I GAVE MANESCU GIST OF YUGOSLAV AND ROMANIAN REPORTS OF SOVIET TROOP DEPLOYMENTS IN HUNGARY AND BULGARIA AS WELL AS OUR EVALUATION OF THESE REPORTS CONTAINED STATE 232256. NEVERTHELESS I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE HIS VIEWS. MANESCU REPLIED THAT AS HE HAD SAID BEFORE "DANGER WAS NOT OVER." ROMANIA REMAINED WATCHFUL. HOWEVER, MANESCU NEITHER CONFIRMED NOR DENIED THESE REPORT. BUT HE ASSERTED FIRMLY THAT ROMANIA WAS DETERMINED TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST INVASION.

3. REFERRING TO REPORT (BUCHAREST 2477) COMING TO EMBASSY'S ATTENTION ONLY THIS MORNING THAT SOVIETS HAD DELIVERED "ULTIMATUM" TWO DAYS AGO DEMANDING CESSATION OF PROVOCATIVE STATEMENTS BY ROMANIANS AND PERMISSION FOR SOVIET TROOPS TO TRANSIT ROMANIA TO BULGARIA, MANESCU REPLIED SAYING FIRST ALLEGED SOVIET REQUEST FOR JOINT MANEUVERS ON ROMANIAN SOIL HAD BEEN SUBJECT DISCUSSION WITH BALL ON SEPT 2. HE SAID IT TRUE THAT ONE OR TWO YEARS AGO SMALL

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PAGE 03 BUCAR 02478 061733Z

LIMITED JOINT MANEUVER HAD BEEN HELD IN ROMANIA. HE COULD NOW SAY ON AUTHORITY OF CEAUSESCU THAT NO REPEAT NO SUCH REQUEST HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM USSR RECENTLY. AS FOR THIS MORNING'S REPORT REACHING EMBASSY ROMANIA WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR TO DO SO WOULD BE TO INVITE SIMILIAR ACTION AGAINST ITSELF. HE DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF REPORTED REQUEST FOR TRANSIT OF SOVIET TROOPS TO BULGARIA BUT SAID HE WOULD NEVERTHELESS CONVEY THIS REPORT TO CEAUSESCU AND MAURER. MANESCU COMMENTED THAT NATURAL IN DANGEROUS SITUATION PEOPLE SHOULD BECOME SOMEWHAT ALARMED AND HE SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO ESPECIALLY LARGE PURCHASES OF SUGAR AND FLOUR BY POPULATION.

4. COMMENT: I HAVE LITTLE DOUBT THAT MANESCU CAME FROM SEEING CEAUSESCU AND MAURER AS HE WAS FIVE MINUTES LATE FOR OUR APPOINTMENT AND HAD SENT HIS SECRETARY-INTERPRETER CELAC TO WAITING ROOM WHO EXPLAINED MANESCU HAD BEEN DELAYED AT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. MANESCU, WHILE OUTWARDLY CALM AND MEASURED IN EXPRESSING HIS VIEWS, APPEARED CLEARLY WORRIED THAT, AS HE PUT IT, "DANGER WAS NOT ENTIRELY OVER." DAVIS

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

Pearl

56

Friday, Sept. 6, 1968
1:30 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a Czech Military Attache explains why (para. 8) he believes we have not seen the end of trouble in Czechoslovakia.

There is a ring of authenticity in this report and assessment.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-162
By is, NARA Date 9-8-97

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : IOP - Mr. Ryan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: August 30, 1968

FROM : IOP/C - Robert A. Bauer RB

SUBJECT: Czech Military and Air Attache on the Situation in his Country

Three weeks ago, my wife (born in Prague and Czech speaking) and I met at a social function the then newly arrived Czech Military and Air Attache, Col. Miroslav Dvorak and his wife. Mrs. Dvorak does not speak English well and asked my wife whether she could help her register her daughter at the Americanization School, Prospect Place, in the District.

This was done this morning and afterwards Mrs. Dvorak invited my wife for coffee at her apartment where she was joined by the Colonel. He then proceeded to volunteer the following information to my wife:

1. The Russians had a government set up to step in and take over upon the entrance of the occupation troops. In view of the Czech resistance this government never dared to take over. Half of the collaborators stayed in Moscow, the other half are under heavy Russian guard in the country home of former President Novotny.
2. The Soviets now know clearly that they were misled in their estimate of the internal situation. The prime instigator of the aggression was Ulbricht, who is frightened by the spread of the liberal tendencies in the East European countries.
3. One of the greatest provocations to the Prague population was the opening of the headquarters of the East German occupation authorities in the former Petschek Bank, which gained infamy as the Gestapo headquarters during the Nazi occupation.
4. The Russian soldiers were visibly stunned by the resistance they met. Polish units have been spread all over the country into secluded areas to avoid fraternization with the local population.
5. Dubeck shows an injury on his forehead. The official explanation, greatly doubted, is that he bumped against a door. The editor-in-chief of RUDE PRAVO suffered a nervous breakdown and is in a Prague hospital.
6. All Czech diplomats and foreign correspondents have been advised by their government that they can indefinitely postpone their home leave or other planned visits home. All borders are closed to all foreigners.



5010-108

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJ/RAC 02-55
By SJ NARA, Date 9-30-02

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

7. He doubts that the Russians will invade Romania or Yugoslavia in view of the Czech experience. At the same time he is convinced that the liberalization movement simply cannot be stopped and will also in the long run make headway in the USSR.

8. He is exceedingly pessimistic about the immediate future. The Czech leaders proclaim continuously, "they must take measures" of a "temporary nature". This means that liberalization will resume one day and the Russians cannot tolerate this. Also, violent student acts can be expected any moment. Many newspaper editors have already chosen jobs in factories rather than to publish censored newspapers. This will leave Prague with a maximum of two newspapers. He is afraid that an explosion is inevitable and will lead to the harshest reprisals. Typical for the defiant attitude of the Prague government is its request to the occupying powers for immediate negotiations on the exact dates of troop withdrawals and reparation payment for damages suffered by Czech citizens.

The Colonel and his wife expressed the wish to have us alone for dinner in two weeks.

IAS - Mr. Littell

IOS - Mr. McNichol

IOP/C:RABauer:sgx3813

CONFIDENTIAL

Pres. file
57Friday, September 6, 1968
1:20 p. m.~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MR. PRESIDENT:


Herewith a tentative judgment which, of course, could be overturned by new facts tomorrow.

1. The enemy may have opted for the second of Abrams' four alternatives; that is, a stretch-out of military operations at relatively low casualty rates.

2. The enemy may have decided to shift his weight away from the cities to provincial areas and the countryside.

3. Since the enemy's military operations always have a political purpose, his political situation may be this:

- He failed in his attempt to soften the Democratic convention on Vietnam.
- He is most actively engaged in trying to build up his political organization in the countryside for bargaining purposes and, possibly, for a cease-fire situation. Rural and provincial military operations could help in this effort.
- He may be planning to conserve military assets for a program of steady, limited pressure, rather than dramatic major action, as a background to serious negotiations; but we will require some days -- or a few weeks -- to make this judgment.
- Or he may be planning a program of limited pressure and conservation of assets so he has bargaining strength in the early months of 1969, as a new President takes stock.



3.3(b)(1)


SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / RAC 02-59
By Sj, NARA, Date 1-22-07

~~SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

-2-

3.3(b)(1)



W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

AC. 10N

58

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, September 6, 1968 - 1:15pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Czechoslovak Refugees

1. sup
2. Pres file

Since the NSC meeting, Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Thompson have reviewed the public statement on Czechoslovak refugees. They are satisfied with the statement at Tab A and the Department is resubmitting it for your approval.

Alternatively, the Department could issue the statement at Tab B. This would serve the purpose, and the real question is whether you would prefer a Presidential or a Departmental announcement.

The State Department has also resubmitted its draft memorandum in which you would authorize use of the parole authority and direct the State Department to ask for an additional \$20 million in the Refugee Assistance Appropriation request. This request for funds would be made public in due course when the State Department requests the increase. Your memorandum authorizing these actions is at Tab C and should be signed if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

As stated.

(Tab A)
Presidential statement approved _____

(Tab B)
State Department should issue statement _____

If approved, SIGN MEMO AT TAB C

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-162
By iso, NARA Date 9-8-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

58a

76

STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE ADMISSION
OF CZECHOSLOVAK REFUGEES TO THE UNITED STATES

The people of Czechoslovakia have suffered a grievous
blow to their hopes for greater freedom and their aspirations
for a better life.

Many have decided they must seek a new life in another
country.

To those many hundreds of Czechoslovak refugees who
have applied for admission to the United States, I declare
that our doors are open as they always are to those who seek
freedom.

To this end, I have directed the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General to arrange for the orderly entry, in
accordance with our immigration laws of those Czechoslovak
refugees who desire to come to the United States.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-162

By ms, NARA Date 9-8-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

584 7679

STATEMENT ON THE ADMISSION OF CZECHOSLOVAK REFUGEES
TO THE UNITED STATES

As a result of recent events in Czechoslovakia,
substantial numbers of citizens of that country have become
refugees. Many hundreds have applied for admission into the
United States. In response to this growing appeal, the
President has directed the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General to arrange for the orderly entry, in
accordance with our immigration laws, of those Czechoslovak
refugees who desire to come to the United States.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-162
By iss, NARA Date 9-8-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL**

Authorization for Assistance to Czechoslovak Refugees

To provide assistance to refugees from Czechoslovakia, you are hereby directed to make the necessary arrangements for the orderly entry into the United States of a fair share of the Czechoslovak refugees who seek political asylum, in accordance with the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including the parole of refugees by the Attorney General for emergent reasons and in the public interest under Section 212(d)(5) of the Act.

To cover the costs of initial reception, interim care and maintenance, resettlement processing, transportation, integration in the United States, and other necessary expenses, the Department of State is directed to seek an increase of \$20,000,000 in the FY 1969 Migration and Refugee Assistance Appropriation request still pending before the Congress.

Friday, September 6, 1968, 1:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Anthony Eden's Personal Note

Free file

Anthony Eden (Lord Aven) sent to you a personal note enclosing a column which he wrote about relations between East and West and Vietnam. The column was written before the Czech invasion.

I recommend that you sign the attached draft reply as evidence of your appreciation for his friendly note.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

BKS:amc

54.2

September 6, 1968

Dear Lord Aven:

Thank you for your expression of confidence that I will not let go by any opportunity to advance toward an honorable peace in Southeast Asia.

I fear that some of the hopes that you expressed in your newspaper article have been wrecked by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Now we must turn from what might have been to assuring a common defense of Western Europe without abandoning hope that improved relations between East and West is a feasible objective.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable
The Earl of Aven, K. G., P. C., M. C.
Manor House, Alvediston
Salisbury, Wiltshire
England

LBJ:WWR:BKS:amc

MANOR HOUSE,
ALVEDISTON,
SALISBURY. *Wiltshire*
BROAD CHALKE 289.

Personal

15th August, 1968.

Dear Mr. President,

I would suppose that the President of the United States, who bears the chief responsibility for us all in the Free World, has more reading to do than any man living. I, therefore, hesitated to send you the enclosed, but I thought that you might be interested in this commentary from one who is today a spectator of events.

In particular, I hope you will agree with my comments on Vietnam, for I have not forgotten the impression made upon me by our talk. No man in history has inherited a more unenviable problem, which was not of his own making, than you did in Vietnam.

With cordial regards and every good wish,

*Yours very sincerely,
Anthony Brown*

The Honourable Lyndon B. Johnson,
The President of the United States of America.



Lord Avon

AS I SEE THE WORLD TODAY...

DESPITE the fighting and the threats we could be entering a period when negotiations will have a chance in world affairs again. This applies particularly to South-East Asia and to Europe.

Hanoi's actions are capable of several interpretations. Though North Vietnam would be prudent to negotiate before mounting disorder in China aggravates its problems, there is no certain indication that it intends to do so.

Against this, the mortaring of Saigon is stilled and no new offensive has been launched.

It is possible that out of all this manoeuvring an opening will occur for a

by

THE EARL

OF AVON, K.G.

measurable advance in the Paris talks. If so, the only certainty is that President Johnson will not let it go by.

Meanwhile the Western nations are preoccupied or in disarray, French leadership being apparently refreshed in its determination to be out of step, if not at cross purposes, with every former ally.

Nor are the Warsaw Powers in any better shape. The stresses within that alliance need no emphasis. They have led, curiously enough, to the re-grouping of the former three Powers of the Little Entente, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, so prominent in the 'thirties.

This time their purpose is not to contain a threat from without but to retain the right to practice less rigid Communism within.

Soviet Russia's anxieties are not limited to Europe, disturbing as these are. Moscow's Middle Eastern ventures are proving costly, nor is there any certainty that a single one of them will work out as planned.

Out-reaching all else is the threat from a China rent with internal feuding, but determined to oppose all

agreement on the total of forces and armaments to be stationed on each side in Germany and in some neighbouring countries.

To give confidence in such an arrangement it should be internationally supervised. This would give a first opportunity for the two groups of nations to practise this among themselves.

If successful it would be invaluable in increasing confidence between them. It would also be useful to examine the possibility of a demilitarised zone between East and West as a further reassurance.

It may be argued that the chances of success are too slender to make this effort worthwhile, since it has failed before. The answer is that nations can change their outlook.

For instance, the Russians, who were not prepared in private or in public to endorse the proposals I had made to this effect at the Summit conference in 1955, modified their stance 18 months later. In April 1957, to the extent of declaring publicly their willingness "to resume discussion of the proposals made some time ago in a general form by Sir Anthony Eden on the setting up of demilitarised zones in Europe and of areas with restrictions of armaments."

Message

Some Western countries have also modified their attitudes on these matters from time to time.

I do not want to exaggerate this experience, yet it surely has a message. Having got so far so many years ago, I cannot see that there is any fresh ingredient in the situation today which makes

Soviet plans and purposes. Nato and the Warsaw Powers being thus each in trouble, there is everything to be gained by talking now about the one topic, Europe, which holds fair prospect of some advantage.

Effort

Both groups must benefit greatly from any arrangements which can be made to reduce the burden of armaments, relax political tension, promote the flow of trade.

Attempts to bring about just such a result have been made many times in the last 20 years, but they have failed.

A reversal of Moscow's recent policy of limited latitude to Prague to evolve within the Warsaw Pact would wreck our hopes again.

That danger apart, I believe that this is the moment when another effort should be made from either side of the Iron Curtain and that the climate is right for it.

The Warsaw and the Nato Powers should try first for important but limited objectives. They should seek

it impossible for either the West or the Soviet Union to be interested in the ideas at the present time

There is here a basis upon which the Nato Powers and the Warsaw Powers could get to work. The objectives can be differently phrased and others added to them.

However, the fact that agreement on how to negotiate was so nearly reached in the 'fifties is to me convincing evidence that worthwhile results can be achieved in the existing atmosphere, when there is a more general understanding of how much it can be to the advantage of each and all.

Progress

If nations of essentially different outlook know that they stand to gain by the progress of their discussions on these or kindred topics, then they will do useful work if once they can make up their minds to get started.

Negotiations have their own momentum.

Pres file

60

~~SECRET~~

Friday, Sept. 6, 1968
12:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This report suggests Ky is in a sensible,
constructive mood.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

25X1A

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-019-039-002/11

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable• ROUTINE *60a*
IN 85889

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
EXO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

051818Z

CITE

DIST 5 SEPTEMBER 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 3 SEPTEMBER 1968

25X1

SUBJECT 1. VICE PRESIDENT KY'S COMMENTS ON HIS
POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN PARIS PEACE TALKS
2. KY'S FAVORABLE REACTION TO PASSAGE OF
25X1A BILL FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL*Rostow*

ACQ

SOURCE

25X1

1. VIC PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1968 SAID THAT HE STILL REGARDS FAVORABLY PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S MAY 1968 SUGGESTION THAT HE ATTEND THE PARIS PEACE TALKS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, KY SAID THAT HE IS INCLINED TO ACCEPT THIEU'S OFFER TO HEAD A LATER NEGOTIATING DELEGATION WHICH WOULD BE A FITTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT. KY

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 019.039.002/12By JC, NARA, Date 12-14-01**SECRET**

25X1IN 85889

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM /NO DISSEM ABROAD

(classification)

(dissem controls)

REPEATED AN EARLIER STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD NOT ACTUALLY CHAIR THE DELEGATION AND SIT AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE, BUT HE WOULD STAY IN THE BACKGROUND WHERE HE COULD MAKE IMMEDIATE DECISIONS ON THE DAILY PROBLEMS OF NEGOTIATING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

KY COMMENTED THAT HE IS AWARE OF THE REASON WHY THIEU MADE THIS SUGGESTION. IF CONCESSIONS ARE NECESSARY, KY WOULD BE THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND WOULD BE ON RECORD AS THE PERSON MAKING THE CONCESSIONS. THIS WOULD LEAVE THIEU IN A PREFERRED POSITION, ACCORDING TO KY. KY ADDED THAT HE BELIEVES SOME CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES WILL BE NECESSARY, AND THE PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THE MILITARY, WILL BE INCLINED TO ACCEPT CONCESSIONS IF HE MAKES THEM BECAUSE HIS ANTI-COMMUNIST POSITION IS NOT QUESTIONED BY THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT HIS PRESENCE IN PARIS MIGHT HAVE A PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION AND PERSUADE IT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM IS SERIOUS AND WILL MAINTAIN A HARD BUT NOT INFLEXIBLE POSITION DURING THE TALKS.

2. KY FAVORABLY NOTED THE PASSAGE BY THE LOWER HOUSE OF THE BILL FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL WHICH THE CONSTITUTION PLACES UNDER THE
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

25X1 IN 85889

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

(classification)

(dissem controls)

SUPERVISION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT. HE SAID THAT HE INTENDS TO ORGANIZE A SECRETARIAT TO HELP HIM PLAN PROGRAMS WHICH HE WILL SUGGEST TO THE COUNCIL AS POLICY.

25X1A 3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: KY, WHO FOR THE PAST FOUR MONTHS HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT, NOW SEEMS TO BE REASSESSING HIS POSITION. DURING THIS CONVERSATION HE GAVE SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT HE HAS DECIDED TO BECOME MORE ACTIVE IN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE INTENDS TO KEEP WITHIN HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AS VICE PRESIDENT. HE STRESSED THAT HE WOULD DO HIS UTMOST TO DEVELOP UNITY WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT.)

25X1A 4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, MAJOR GENERAL DAVIDSON) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED] 25X1
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, September 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Luke Battle to Egypt

*Long
2. Pres file*

The UAR Ministry of Culture invited Secretary Rusk to attend ceremonies winding up the project to keep Abu Simbel and other monuments from being covered by the lake building up behind the Aswan Dam. The Secretary has designated Luke Battle to represent him.

This project has long been regarded as a worldwide effort in collaboration with UNESCO to save these ancient monuments. Luke was first involved when he was Assistant Secretary for Cultural Affairs and he had a continuing role in marshalling US contributions when he was Ambassador in Cairo. He will be one member of an American cultural delegation. We would stand publicly on the position that this is a cultural trip.

Luke would, of course, talk with senior officials in the Government and would probably see Nasser. Most of us feel this would be a good idea since one of our blank spots is a clear picture of what the Egyptians are really willing to do for a peace settlement. Luke is in a position to ask the hard questions and give us the best possible picture just as we are getting ready for possible crucial Arab-Israeli talks in New York during the General Assembly.

Everybody is in favor of his going, but he wants to be sure you have no objection.

W. W. Rostow

No objection _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-14-01*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. Luke Battle to Visit Egypt - The UAR Ministry of Culture has invited Secretary Rusk to attend the ceremonies September 21-22 marking the completion of the transfer of the Nubian monuments in Egypt to higher ground to keep them from being covered by the lake forming behind the Aswan High Dam. The Abu Simbel project has been regarded as a multilateral effort independent of the status of bilateral relations. The invitation, despite the absence of diplomatic relations, is UAR recognition of the U.S. role as the major public and private contributor to the project. Secretary Rusk has designated Luke Battle to represent him at these ceremonies since Ambassador Battle was one of those directly responsible for our decision to contribute. The UAR has expressed its pleasure at Mr. Battle's proposed trip, and President Nasser has indicated that he will see him. The Foreign Minister also expects to see him. This is the first opportunity for a senior Government official to visit Cairo at their invitation since the war.

We understand that the Egyptian press has carried a report of Mr. Battle's trip, linking it to talks on the resumption of relations. In our guidance on the trip we are emphasizing Mr. Battle's connection with the project since its earliest stages and playing down the political import of his visit. Mr. Battle does not plan to visit other capitals in the area.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

September 6, 1968

Chron

Dear Mr. Schroeder:

Confirming Mr. Most's telephone invitation, we greatly appreciate your willingness to attend a small meeting of executives of the chain stores to be held on Thursday, September 12, at 2:00 p.m. at the Center for Inter-American Affairs at 690 Park Avenue (68th Street), New York City.

During President Johnson's recent visit to Central America, I discussed the possibility of expanding exports from these countries. Among the non-traditional products, I believe that some consumer store goods items represent a good potential for rapid expansion.

We need the advice and guidance of the experts in the field. Next Thursday's meeting will consider what steps can be taken to develop this Central American market. I enclose a list of others who have agreed to participate.

If you desire any other information, please telephone Mr. Amicus Most, 702-383-4869.

Sincerely yours,

W. W. Rostow

Enclosure

Mr. Robert Schroeder
Vice President
R. H. Macy Company
34th Street and 7th Avenue
New York, New York

SAME LETTER ALSO SENT TO ATTACHED LIST OF ADDRESSEES

Mr. Robert Boulogne
Vice President, Foreign Purchasing
J. C. Penny Purchasing Company

Mr. J. W. Herbst
General Manager
Metasco, Incorporated

Mr. Bruce Hyatt
Vice President
J. C. Penny Purchasing Company

Mr. Steven L. Osterweir
President
Associated Merchandizing Corporation

Mr. R. W. Rosevear
Vice President, Merchandizing
W. T. Grant Company

Mr. Harold Schapps
General Manager
Gimbels International Buying Corporation

Mr. Theodore Schlesinger
President
Allied Stores Corporation

Mr. Robert Schroeder
Vice President
R. H. Macy Company

Mr. Rostow

INFORMATION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, September 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Earthquake Relief for Iran

1. sup
2. Pres file

We are acting on your desire to help Iran in the wake of last weekend's earthquakes.

The Iranians are doing a good job on their own, and Armin Meyer's mission has already been helping with money and helicopters. In addition, a plane carrying 1,000 tents and about 5,000 blankets should be in Iran by next Tuesday or Wednesday. The total cost of that operation--including the airlift--will be a little over \$200,000.

A second plane load is under consideration, but Armin has suggested that it stand by until he can coordinate further with the Iranians to avoid duplicating help the British and Germans will send. The unexpectedly outstanding job the Iranians are doing has already reduced the need for foreign help below his preliminary estimates.

The Shah appreciates our help, and has sent a warm reply to your offer to help (attached).

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-14-01*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TEXT OF MESSAGE

TEHRAN, IRAN
SEPTEMBER 2, 1968

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I AM DEEPLY TOUCHED BY THE VERY KIND MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY WHICH YOU HAVE SENT ME CONVEYING YOUR PERSONAL CONDOLENCES AND THOSE OF MRS. JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THE OCCASION OF THE DEVASTATING EARTHQUAKES IN KHORASSAN.

ON BEHALF OF MY PEOPLE AND MYSELF I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS TO YOU MR. PRESIDENT AND MRS. JOHNSON AS WELL AS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OUR SINCERE AND HEARTFELT GRATITUDE FOR THIS TOKEN OF FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY.

I HIGHLY APPRECIATE YOUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE IN THIS HOUR OF TRIAL AND TRAGEDY.

SINCERELY,

MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI.

THE HONOURABLE
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, September 6, 1968
8:45 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Davis warns us
Rumanian crisis may not be at an
end.

W. W. Rostow

Bucharest 2477

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng/dck, NARA, Date 12/14/92

WWRostow:rln

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ACTION EUR 20

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USIE 00, CCO 00, USUE 00, NEA 13, SR 01, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, SAL 01, SAH 02, SA 01, RSR 01, O 02,
OPR 02, OC 06, E 15, /152 W

O P 061105Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2830
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL MUNICH
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUCHAREST 2477

1. LATEST EVIDENCE POINTS TO CONCLUSION THAT ROMANIANS ARE HIGHLY APPREHENSIVE ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS.
2. STRIKING FACT ABOUT CEAUSESCU'S BRIEF SPEECHES (THERE WERE FOUR OF THEM) DURING TOUR OF BUCHAREST FACTORIES SEPTEMBER 5 IS THEIR CONCILIATORY TONE. NOT ONCE DID HE REASSERT ROMANIAN LINE ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA (INSISTENCE ON CZECH SOVEREIGNTY AND WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS), WHICH WAS NOT EVEN DIRECTLY MENTIONED. INSTEAD, AFTER PRAISING WORKERS FOR SUCCESSFULLY CARRYING OUT ECONOMIC PLAN, CEAUSESCU REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED ROMANIA'S DESIRE TO OVERCOME "DIFFICULT SITUATION" IN RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND STRENGTHEN COOPERATION WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND UNITY OF SOCIALIST BLOC.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BUCAR 02477 061139Z

3. IT IS ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT FOR PAST SEVERAL DAYS ROMANIAN PRESS HAS CONFINED ITSELF TO VERY BRIEF COVERAGE OF ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND PARTY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IMPRESSION CONVEYED IS THAT "NORMAL ACTIVITY" HAS RESUMED.

4. ALTHOUGH OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES IN BUCHAREST HAVE SURFACE "BUSINESS AS USUAL" AIR ABOUT THEM, A LOT SEEMS TO BE GOING ON WHICH IS NOT MENTIONED IN MEDIA. THUS, USUALLY RELIABLE ROMANIAN SOURCE INFORMS US THAT HE HAS IT FROM "HIGHLY RELIABLE SOURCE" THAT SOVS DELIVERED SOMETHING IN NATURE OF ULTIMATUM TO ROMANIANS AFTERNOON SEPTEMBER 4 MAKING TWO DEMANDS: THAT ROMANIANS STOP MAKING OFFENSIVE STATEMENTS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THAT THEY AGREE TO PASSAGE OF SOVIET TROOPS (PLUS TANKS) ACROSS ROMANIAN TERRITORY IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE IN WARSAW PACT MANEUVERS IN BULGARIA. ROMANIAN LEADERSHIP REPORTEDLY AGREED TO FIRST DEMAND BUT, AS REGARDS SECOND, TOLD SOVS THAT TROOPS COULD ONLY PASS NON-STOP ON "SEALED TRAINS." SOVS REPORTEDLY REJECTED THIS SUGGESTION BECAUSE THEY WANTED THEIR ARMORED UNITS TO MOVE BY ROAD. AS RESULT OF SITUATION CREATED BY SOV REQUEST, CEAUSESCU, AS CHIEF OF STATE, DECREED ON SEP 4 "STATE OF ALERT NO. 1" (INVOLVING HIGH STATE OF READINESS).

5. EMBASSY TRYING TO CHECK OUT THIS REPORT AND PARTICULARLY ALLEGED STATE OF ALERT. BEFORE RECEIPT THIS REPORT I HAD ASKED MFA FOR APPOINTMENT WITH FOMIN MANESCU SEPT 6 OR 7 FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION. DAVIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

65

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, September 5, 1968
7:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

These articulate views of
Denis Healey on Czechoslovakia and
Eastern Europe may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

London 12398, 2 sections

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988
By rg, NARA, Date 11-10-92

WWRostow:rlh

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ACTION SS 30

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/030 W

R 051810Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5888
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION NATO

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 LONDON 12398

EXDIS

SUBJ: HEALEY VIEWS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. MINISTER AND POL COUNSELOR LUNCED TODAY WITH DEFENSE MINISTER HEALEY. FOLLOWING REPRESENT HIGHLIGHTS VIEWS EXPRESSED BY HEALEY DURING LONG AND RAMBLING CONVERSATION WHICH RELATED PRINCIPALLY TO RECENT EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS:

A) WHILE HE DID NOT CLAIM TO HAVE ANTICIPATED SOVIET INTERVENTION, HEALEY SAID IT CAME AS NO SURPRISE TO HIM. CZECHOSLOVAKIA "IS AN ARROW POINTING AT SOVIET HEART" AND DUBCEK, WHO HEALEY CONSIDERED AS AN ESSENTIALLY WEAK MAN WHO HAD BEEN THROWN INTO A POSITION BEYOND HIS ABILITY TO COPE WITH, HAD LET MATTERS GET BEYOND HIS CONTROL. SOVIETS WERE PROBABLY OBJECTIVELY CORRECT IN ASSESSING CZECH DEVELOPMENTS AS A FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE TO DOMINANT ROLE OF COMMUNIST PARTY AND THUS IN SOVIET EYES TO SECURITY OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP, AND, ULTIMATELY, RUSSIAN STATE. THIS DISTINGUISHED SITUATION FROM THAT IN ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA.

B) EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA DID NOT CHANGE IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC BALANCE IN EUROPE. IT WAS REVERSION TO THE STATUS QUO RATHER THAN A CHANGE IN IT. HE DID NOT FORESEE NEED FOR ANY MAJOR CHANGES IN NATO STRATEGY OR REQUIREMENT FOR SIGNIFICANT FORCE BUILD-UP. WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 12398 01 OF 02 052020Z

AT DECEMBER MEETING, HE THOUGHT, ON ACHIEVING SOLID AGREEMENT ON A GOOD SET OF FORCE GOALS MORE OR LESS ALONG LINES WE WERE AIMING FOR, AND THIS OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE EASIER TO ACHIEVE AS A RESULT OF CZECH ACTIONS.

C) SOVIET ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA DID NOT PRESAGE ANY SHIFT IN SOVIET POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. IT COULD NOT BE READ AS AN INTENTION TO "CROSS THE LINES" IN EUROPE, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT SOME DANGER FOR BERLIN COULD ARISE INDIRECTLY FROM CZECH SITUATION. MAJOR DANGER, HE THOUGHT, WOULD COME FROM SOVIETS MOVE AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA, SINCE THIS WOULD REPEAT WOULD UPSET STATUS QUO (WHICH WOULD NOT BE THE CASE IF SOVIETS MOVED ON ROMANIA). IN THIS CASE, WEST COULD BECOME INVOLVED SINCE HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR WEST TO SUPPORT YUGOSLAV'S MORALLY AND, IF REQUESTED, WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHORT OF ACTUAL TROOPS. THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT YUGOSLAVIA WOULD RESIST RUSSIANS MORE THAN PASSIVELY. HE THOUGHT THIS VIEW (DISTINGUISHING YUGOSLAVIA FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA) SHOULD BE SIGNALLED TO SOVIETS, SINCE HE DID NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN ROMANIA AND ALTHOUGH LESS LIKELY, YUGOSLAVIA, DESPITE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SITUATION IN THOSE COUNTRIES AND IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

D) IN LONG RUN, HEALEY THOUGHT WESTERN "DETENTE" POLICY AS LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVE WAS VALID AND SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED AS A RESULT CZECH EVENTS, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS CLEARLY A SETBACK TO ANY EARLY CONCRETE DEVELOPMENTS IN FAVORABLE DIRECTION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. HE ALSO STRESSED THAT WESTERN DETENTE POLICY SHOULD BE BASED ON REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION IN MOSCOW RATHER THAN ON WISHFUL THINKING. PROPER POSTURE FOR WEST WAS A VERY COOL AND ALOOF ATTITUDE TOWARDS SOVIETS AND ITS ALLIES WHO HAD INVADED CZECHOSLOVAKIA. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS SHOULD GO ON IN DUE COURSE ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DELAY THEIR START; OBJECTIVE OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS CONTINUED VALID, AS DID THAT OF MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS. HE THOUGHT SOVIET INTERVENTION HAD PROBABLY KILLED NPT, ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT HEALEY HAS ALWAYS BEEN PERSONALLY QUITE COOL TOWARDS THIS PROJECT. FOR A PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD, HOWEVER, WEST SHOULD DO EVERYTHING IT COULD TO IMPRESS UPON SOVIETS THAT ITS ACTION IN CZECHO-

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PAGE 03 LONDON 12398 01 OF 02 052020Z

SLOVAKIA HAD A PRICE TAG IN TERMS OF SETBACK TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THAT IT COULD NOT EXPECT BUSINESS AS USUAL TO CONTINUE.

E) SOVIET ACTION HAD IN MANY RESPECTS BEEN A WINDFALL FOR NATO, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT HAD PUT A STOP TO UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS ON PART OF US, BELGIANS AND CANADIANS, AT LEAST FOR A PERIOD OF TIME. (HERETOFORE HEALEY HAD ACCEPTED FURTHER US FORCE PULL-OUTS AS MORE OR LESS INEVITABLE.) ALTHOUGH FRENCH WERE DISSENTERS, REST FELT IT "BEST TO KEEP AHOLD OF NURSE FOR FEAR OF HAVING SOMETHING WORSE". FROM HIS REMARKS, WHICH HE STRESSED WERE ENTIRELY PERSONAL, IT WAS CLEAR HE OPPOSED SPECIAL NATO MEETING BEFORE REGULAR DECEMBER SESSION AND FAVORED GOING AHEAD WITH NPG MEETING IN BONN IN OCTOBER AS SCHEDULED, AS FRG DESIRED. HEALEY THOUGHT NAC HAD PERFORMED WELL DURING CRISIS, AS HAD SACEUR. SACLANT, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD DONE "DAMN ALL" (I.E. NOTHING).

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PAGE 01 LONDON 12398 02 OF 02 052027Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/030 W

R 051810Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5892
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION NATO

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 LONDON 12398

EXDIS

F. HEALEY WAS LESS CLEAR AS TO HIS PROGNOSIS RE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE THOUGHT SOVIETS WOULD PAY WHATEVER PRICE WAS REQUIRED TO RE-ESTABLISH SITUATION AS IT WAS BEFORE IT GOT OUT OF HAND THIS SPRING ALTHOUGH THEY WERE NOT SEEKING RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF SITUATION AS IT WAS UNDER NOVOTNY. THIS MAY OR MAY NOT REQUIRE LONG-TERM PRESENCE OF SOVIET TROOPS, BUT HE THOUGHT THAT AS SOON AS THEY COULD DO SO WITH RELATIVE IMPUNITY SOVIETS WOULD FIND A WAY TO DUMP DUBCEK AND CO. THIS COULD NOT BE DONE UNTIL DEEPER WEDGE HAD BEEN DRIVEN BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION AND LEADERSHIP. ON LONG TERM, HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THAT NET TREND TOWARDS GRADUAL LIBERALIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND ULTIMATELY IN SOVIET UNION ITSELF, WOULD IN DUE COURSE BE RE-ESTABLISHED. SOVIETS LIKELY TO PERMIT A PROCESS OF CAREFULLY CONTAINED LIBERALIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. TROUBLE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD STEMMED FROM FACT THIS PROCESS HAD GAINED MORE ACCELERATION THAN IT WAS REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT SOVIETS COULD PUT UP WITH. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THERE WAS MUCH CHANCE OF PURE STALINISM BEING REIMPOSED EITHER IN USSR OR ANY PLACE IN EASTERN EUROPE.

2. COMMENT: HEALEY HAS JUST RETURNED FROM VACATION AND WAS AT PAINS TO STRESS THAT HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED CZECHOSLOVAKIA AT LENGTH YET WITH HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 12398 02 OF 02 052027Z

WHILE HIS VACATION HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED BY RETURN TO LONDON FOR PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE, HE WENT BACK, ALONG WITH MUCH OF REST OF CABINET, TO HIS HOLIDAYS AFTER DEBATE COMPLETED. HOWEVER, AS DEPT KNOWS, HEALEY IS ONE OF MOST INTELLIGENT AND ARTICULATE MEMBERS OF CABINET AND IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT ALTHOUGH HIS THOUGHTS ON SITUATION MAY NOT BE FULLY SHARED BY HIS COLLEAGUES, HIS VIEWS WILL GO A LONG WAY TOWARD INFLUENCING CABINET ATTITUDES.
BRUCE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66
Thursday, September 5, 1968

7:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador-designate Linder
Friday, September 6, 11:30 a.m.

Harold Linder was President of the Export-Import Bank from 1961 to 1968. He leaves September 10 for his new assignment as your Ambassador to Canada.

Our relations with Canada are generally good but the Trudeau government is still a question mark.

What we want from Canada in general is:

- Cooperation in continental defense.
- Fair treatment of U.S. investment (almost one-third of our total foreign investment).
- Good trade relations (about 20% of our total trade).
- Greater Canadian sharing of defense and aid responsibilities.

The recent elections gave Trudeau a majority government -- the first Canada has had in six years. You might wish to tell Linder that you will be interested in receiving his early appraisal of:

- The new government's prospects.
- How it will try to resolve its French-Canadian problem.
- What it proposes to do about NATO.
- Its general attitude toward the United States.

ERF
ERF:mm

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-26
By *ig*, NARA Date *12-4-96*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Thursday, September 5, 1968
7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the transcript of the
question and answer session following
Clark Clifford's speech today at the
National Press Club.

W. W. Rostow

rlh

ACTION

68
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Thursday, September 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press guidance on Eugene Black trip to Cambodia

Pres. file

After George Christian tomorrow announces the Black trip the press will be scurrying around about the purpose of his Cambodia stop. Attached is guidance for use on background with the press which we plan to distribute to the 10 or 15 people here and in the State Department to whom the reporters will turn. It acknowledges that Mr. Black will be discussing problems arising from Communist violations of Cambodian territory but does so in a way calculated to discourage the kind of newspaper reports which Sihanouk would find offensive.

I recommend you approve the guidance.

W. W. Rostow

Att

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

cc: George Christian

STATE:MWright:wpt

EUGENE BLACK TRIP

Press Guidance for Visit to Cambodia

The announcement that Mr. Black will visit Cambodia during his trip will stimulate press interest in whether he will be discussing broader issues affecting US-Cambodia relations, as well as the Mekong development plan mentioned in the announcement. In responding to this press interest, we should strike a balance between acknowledging that these broader matters will be discussed and emphasizing the point in such a way that might adversely affect Sihanouk's attitude towards the visit.

For knowledgeable and responsible journalists, the following points can be made ON BACKGROUND in response to queries about the Cambodia visit.

1. The stated purpose of the visit -- to discuss Mekong development -- is valid; it is not merely a cover for other discussions.
2. However, Mr. Black is the President's personal representative on this trip, and he is authorized to discuss with the Cambodians broader matters affecting US -Cambodia relations. Most of these matters are related, of course, to the problems arising from continued Viet Cong/North Vietnamese violation of Cambodian neutrality and territory in connection with their military actions in South Vietnam. (It is preferable that we not go into too much detail on our current estimates on VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory, as press reports attributing such detailed comments to U.S. official sources might prejudice the visit itself.)
3. As appropriate, on an off-the-record basis, we can explain that the reason the official announcement does not refer specifically to these broader discussions is obvious: while the Cambodians have agreed to the visit, their sensibilities are well known and the government is subjected to various internal and external pressures which might make it feel that it must publicly show that it is not changing its basic stance. If they felt compelled to do this, the prospects for useful talks would be lessened.
4. Mr. Black is not visiting Cambodia to conduct specific negotiations; rather, his visit is a continuation of our efforts to find

2.

some solution to the problems which have been irritants in our relations and have adversely affected our effort in Vietnam. Obviously the problem of the LCU and its crew will come up in the discussions if the problem has not been solved by the time he arrives, but he is not going there for the express purpose of negotiating this matter. He has broad terms of reference for this visit, not detailed negotiating positions. We of course hope that the visit will pave the way to a solution of some of the major problems, even if no concrete agreements are reached at the time.

Presfile
61

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~ Thursday, Sept. 5, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will wish to read, I believe, Sect. Rusk's draft instructions to Harriman and Vance for Saturday.

I have discussed para. 3 with Sect. Rusk. He feels confident that previous discussions with the North Vietnamese have been sufficiently precise about "military activity in the DMZ area" so that the language here is safe.

This draft is approved by Sect. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler.

~~SECRET/HARVAN/PLUS~~
attachment

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 16781
By is, NARA, Date 11-20-97

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE IO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

Index

TODEL _____

STATE

NODIS / HARVAN / PLUS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 16781

By us, NARA, Date 11-20-97

1. For your Saturday meeting we believe that the emphasis should be on probing Tho and Thuy on the "points of agreement and disagreement" that they have with our Phase 2 package. We leave the details of how this is done to you, and offer the following suggestions to be used as you see fit.
2. The most important point for the DRV to understand is that the GVN must participate in any discussions, in any forum, which deal with the political settlement in the South. The USG does not intend to dictate to the South Vietnamese the future of their country--nor will it allow the DRV to so dictate. For this reason the USG has proposed the "our side/your side" formula. Such an arrangement would not preclude a continuation of private conversations such as these on matters of concern to the US and the DRV, ~~XX~~
3. The other point of greatest importance to us, it should be emphasized, is that military activity in the DMZ area, and massing north of the DMZ, must cease. We should let the North Vietnamese know that it is the absence of military activity in the DMZ area ~~XX~~ which is important, and that details, such as inspection arrangements, can be discussed after the cessation of

Drafted by:

U - Richard Holbrooke

Vol. 121.

6005

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances

EA - Mr. Bundy 6/7/5

WH -

U - Mr. Katzenbach

S/S - Mr. Read

DOD - Secretary Clifford

Abstract

Classification

~~SECRET~~
Classification

bombing if we believe that the principle is understood and will be observed.

You may convey the impression that we could stop the bombing in return for less than the full Phase 2 package, but it would be difficult/in the absence of some understanding. ~~XXXXXX~~ ^{to take action}

4. You may wish to review the military situation, pointing out that the NVA/VC have launched a series of attacks which are not bringing peace any closer. While we look for restraint on the enemy's part, we find only forces massing for attacks, and then launching them. While these attacks will be repulsed, with heavy losses to enemy forces, they are scarcely the kind of acts which encourage the cessation of bombing.

5. We hope that this will be the first of several meetings at this level with Tho.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

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Thursday, September 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Eugene Black, 5:30 p. m. Today

Pres. file

Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk which constitutes both summary instructions for Black's Cambodia mission and talking points for your meeting with Black this afternoon.

I have one serious reservation to the instructions, which state (page 3) "your visit should not involve a discussion of the captured LCU and its crew." If the Cambodians are still holding the crew at the time of the visit, I think it will be impossible for Black to ignore that issue completely. To do so would give a false signal to Sihanouk that the issue is of no real interest to you. It would also be extremely difficult to defend publicly a complete failure to use this opportunity to obtain the release of the prisoners. Finally, there is a good chance that Sihanouk will choose to release the prisoners to Black.

I suggest, therefore, that the instructions be revised to call for Black to express your concern at the continued detention of the LCU crew and your hope that Prince Sihanouk will be able quickly to remove this prickly issue by releasing the crew. The instructions should also authorize Black to accept the prisoners from the Cambodian Government should the offer be made.

Otherwise, the instructions are probably adequate. (Black will have detailed background papers which put flesh on these rather minimal instructions.) In your conversation with Mr. Black I suggest you make the following points:

- we know that Sihanouk cannot entirely stop Communist use of his territory.
- we hope, however, that he can be persuaded to increase Cambodia's harassment of Communist misuse of Cambodian territory.
- we hope that Sihanouk can actively press for a more effective International Control Commission role in identifying violations of Cambodian neutrality.
- neither you nor the American people have the slightest hostility toward Cambodia and will continue to act with the greatest possible restraint.
- However, the increasing Communist use of Cambodian territory

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NIJ 02-67
By *cbm*, NARA, Date 3-10-03

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constitutes a serious problem which cannot be ignored and which endangers both the Cambodian and U.S. Governments desire that Cambodia be insulated from the Vietnam fighting.

-- That is the reason why you attach great importance to the hope that Prince Sihanouk will be able to take effective steps to inhibit significant Communist military activities on Cambodian soil.

One special problem which you might wish to mention to Black is our Daniel Boone operation in Cambodia. In a diplomatic note this week Sihanouk equated Communist military activities in Cambodia with the occasional "special forces type" incursions by U.S. forces. He will probably make the same point to Black and I do not think you would want Black to hear of these operations first from Sihanouk. I suggest you mention them briefly and point out that their ~~sole~~ purpose and reason are to develop intelligence on Communist military activities in Cambodia. As to the rest of the trip, I concur in Secretary Rusk's suggestion that you discuss with Black an oral personal message to the Japanese on the need for them to do more in Asia. You might also mention to Black that both the Thai and the Vietnamese will be rather prickly about his Cambodian conversations but that we will provide guidance for him on this matter after we have the report of his conversations in Cambodia.

I recommend that you approve the attachment to Secretary Rusk's memorandum as Mr. Black's instructions, with a revision to provide for Black's raising the problem of the LCU prisoners and accepting their release if Sihanouk makes the offer.

Att

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

STATE:MWright:wpt

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S/S 12103

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mr. Eugene Black's Mission to Cambodia

For your meeting with Mr. Black this afternoon at 5:30, I attach summary instructions on which I recommend your approval, and your use as a talking paper with Mr. Black. (TAB A).

These instructions cover only the Cambodian portion of Mr. Black's trip. As you know, he will also be making a major speech in Japan, and will be calling in Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam, and in Manila to touch base with the Asian Development Bank people. You may wish to discuss with him a personal message to the Japanese on the need for them to do more in Asia -- a theme he will be hitting hard in his speech in any event -- and you may also wish to discuss with him just how he should handle our continuing intentions toward regional assistance in Southeast Asia, together with the unfortunate failure of the Senate to act on the authorization of special funds for the ADB.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Encl:

1 - Instructions (TAB A)

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-14-01*

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Principal Instructions for Mr. Eugene Black's
Visit to Cambodia -- September 11-14, 1968

The major reason for including Cambodia in your itinerary is to bring home to Prince Sihanouk our grave concern over VC/NVA use of his territory, including the question of a more effective International Commission for Supervision and Control. It would be unrealistic to expect a significant reorientation of Cambodian policy as a result of your visit. We should keep our expectations within the limits of Cambodian capabilities rather than anticipate any sweeping or decisive Cambodian action against the VC/NVA. Our interest will be served to the extent we can persuade Sihanouk to increase Cambodia's own efforts to harass the VC/NVA and to press for a more effective ICC operation.

In stressing our deep concern over the abuse of Cambodian neutrality, you should make emphatically clear that neither the President nor the American people entertain the slightest hostility toward Cambodia, or wish for Cambodia anything but the preservation of its independence and neutrality. You should be prepared to stress that the President has exercised every restraint possible, and that the United States continues

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

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-2-

to act in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Bowles Communique in January. Stressing that the United States has no desire to see the Viet-Nam war extended into Cambodia, you should nevertheless underline the fact that as long as the war continues there will be a danger of border incidents despite our best efforts to prevent them.

It is almost certain that the Cambodians will raise the question of an American statement expressing respect and recognition for Cambodia's sovereignty within its present frontiers. Having made clear our concern with the problem of VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory, you may inform Sihanouk that the United States Government would consider making such a statement whenever this move could significantly enhance the prospects for a lasting improvement in U.S./Cambodian relations. You should explore whether in fact Sihanouk is prepared for resumption of diplomatic relations on a serious and responsible basis. And you should make clear that our willingness to make such a declaration and to resume relations would of course be greatly influenced by the Cambodian attitude on border problems and VC/NVA activities.

On the question of a declaration, you may pursue the

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-3-

discussion to the point of making clear the precise form of declaration we would be prepared to make, but you should avoid a final commitment unless further instructed.

Your visit should not involve a discussion of the captured LCU and its crew, an issue which it is hoped will be disposed of before your arrival in Phnom Penh.

Your own special background as the President's Special Representative for Southeast Asian Economic Matters will signal to the Cambodians your interest in discussing the future development of the Mekong basin. You may affirm United States support for regional programs such as that of the Mekong Committee.

~~SECRET~~

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/OHIO

Thursday, September 5, 1968
5:10 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

As background to the Oslo channel, I have had all the exchanges leading up to it, through the Norwegians, combed out so you can see the line of chatter that preceded it.

You will note (para. 3) that the North Vietnamese in February 1968 foreshadowed a possible cease-fire proposal.

W. W. Rostow

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By us, NARA Date 9-29-98

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-409
By iss, NARA Date 9-29-98

71a
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Thursday, September 5, 1968

NORTH VIETNAMESE CONVERSATIONS WITH NORWEGIANS

Beginning June 1, 1967, the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Peking, Ngo Minh Loan, has held numerous secret conversations with Norway's diplomatic representatives to Communist China -- Ambassador Algard and Charge Tangeras.

This channel is still open. The next Norwegian-North Vietnamese exchange is expected to take place about September 20 when the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Moscow, Nguyen Tho Chan, is scheduled to visit Oslo to talk secretly with Norwegian government officials.

There follows a summary of points made by Ambassador Loan to the Norwegians which have not been made by North Vietnamese representatives elsewhere:

1. Ambassador Algard said Ambassador Loan told him on June 1, 1967, in Peking that:

a. Hanoi was ready for "very far-reaching concessions".

b. The North Vietnamese would do their utmost to avoid requesting direct Chinese intervention in North Vietnam; that even an American invasion of North Vietnam would not necessitate foreign help. (From Oslo 4531, June 14, 1967)

2. Ambassador Algard, reporting on three conversations with Ambassador Loan in August, 1967, in Peking, said the North Vietnamese representative, speaking personally, told him that:

a. Hanoi is willing to accept a non-Communist Government in South Vietnam; that is, a neutral government having relations with both East and West and receiving aid from both sides. (It should be noted that Ambassador Loan considers the National Liberation Front as non-Communist.)

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b. The South Vietnamese Government is "a political factor". (From Oslo 1063, September 8, 1967)

3. In February, 1968, Ambassador Algard reported that Ambassador Loan had said that Hanoi presupposed (assumed) that military operations be stopped while negotiations are being conducted. The North Vietnamese representative referred to the fact that all fighting had been stopped during the Geneva negotiations. (From Oslo 1406, February 10, 1968)

4. Ambassador Algard reported from Peking in July of 1968 that Ambassador Loan had told him that:

a. Hanoi was ready to indicate military "restraint" in return for a bombing halt.

b. South Vietnam would remain a separate state based on a capitalist economy for the foreseeable future.

c. Hanoi was willing to accept collaborating with some members of the present regime in Saigon but not all.

d. A political solution in Vietnam must be based on the Geneva agreement. (From Oslo 5486, July 3, 1968)

5. The Norwegian Charge, Tangerang, reported on July 20, 1968, from Peking that Ambassador Loan had told him:

a. Hanoi is dissatisfied with the Paris negotiations.

b. Hanoi is interested in a "new deal" through other channels. (From Oslo 5700, July 20, 1968)

INFORMATION

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, Sept. 5, 1968
5:00 p. m.

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MR. PRESIDENT:

Kiesinger is sending Kurt Birrenbach as a
Special Representative to the United States. (Tab A)

Birrenbach is an excellent man of strong
character -- pro U. S. and NATO. He is an old
friend, and one with whom we can bluntly raise
such questions as the German military budget,
how much pressure we can expect Bonn to exert
on Paris, etc.

Also attached is an account of Lodge's talk
with Kiesinger which gives the background to his
view about a Summit, etc. (Tab B)

W. Rostow

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NJ 94-197
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

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Tab A

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-196
By JD, NARA, Date 7-28-94

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EXDIS

1. DR. KURT BIRRENBACH, WHO HAS JUST BEEN NAMED AS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF CHANCELLOR KIESINGER TO THE UNITED STATES, AND WHO IS LEAVING FOR NEW YORK ON SATURDAY, CALLED AT MY OFFICE AND SAID THE FOLLOWING:
2. THE VOICE OF THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT BEEN HEARD IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA NOR HAD IT BEEN HEARD FOR A LONG TIME BEFORE THAT. THE LEADER OF AN ALLIANCE COULD NOT REMAIN SO SILENT. THERE IS RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT TITO REGARDS SOVIET INVASION AS AN ACUTE AND PRESENT DANGER. IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO ASSUME THAT THE SOVIETS, HAVING SUPPRESSED INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN EAST GERMANY, POLAND, HUNGARY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WOULD NOT HESITATE AS REGARDS ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA. UNLESS NATO IS ENERGIZED -- BY WHICH HE MEANS, I BELIEVE, UNLESS THE ALLIANCE IS NOURISHED -- THE WHOLE OF EUROPE WILL BE LIKE A MAN SUFFERING FROM ANEMIA; THE NOSE AND THE CHIN AND THE SHAPE OF THE FACE DO NOT CHANGE, BUT AFTER A FEW YEARS THERE IS NOTHING LEFT. BIRRENBACH WAS NOT THINKING IN TERMS OF MILITARY ACTION BUT HE WAS INSISTING THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR A NEW LOOK AT EUROPE AND FOR A MEETING AT WHICH PERSONS POSSESSING THE POWER WOULD PUT THEIR MINDS ON THE SUBJECT AND KEEP THEIR MINDS ON IT UNTIL NEW AGREEMENTS COULD BE AGREED ON AND NEW POLICIES COULD BE FORMULATED.
3. HE HOPED TO CALL ON THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT AND ASKED WHETHER I WOULD MAKE THE APPOINTMENTS FROM HERE. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT A BETTER PROCEDURE WOULD BE FOR HIM TO TELL THE SECRETARY OF HIS PLANS AND THE APPOINTMENTS COULD THEN BE MADE EITHER BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OR BY THE GERMAN EMBASSY. LODGE

Roston

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By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
USMISSION NATO

Rostow

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BONN 16455

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TALK WITH CHANCELLOR ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Federal Republic of Germany

1. SUMMARY: THE CHANCELLOR MADE THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL POINTS: THE SOVIET DECISION TO INVADE CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS NOT AN ISOLATED MATTER BUT REPRESENTS A BASIC CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD ALL OF EASTERN EUROPE. QUOTE WISE AND FIRM UNQUOTE US LEADERSHIP IS ESSENTIAL IN THE NEW SITUATION. THE US CAN STOP SOVIET ACTION AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA, AND HOPEFULLY, ROMANIA. THE HEIGHTENED SOVIET EMPHASIS ON ALL EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES BEING THEIR PRIVATE PRESERVE PUTS THE FRG IN A SPECIAL AND VULNERABLE POSITION BECAUSE QTE HALF OUR COUNTRY IS ONE OF THE STATES IN THE SOVIET PRESERVE UNQTE. HENCE FRG EFFORTS TOWARD GERMAN UNITY WILL BE SHARPLY ATTACKED. A NATO SUMMIT WOULD BE THE BEST MEANS OF DEMONSTRATING THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE WEST, AND THERE ARE SIGNS THAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE COMING TO THIS VIEW. A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KOSYGIN IS, OF COURSE, THE PRESIDENT'S OWN DECISION, BUT IF SUCH A MEETING TAKES PLACE IT MUST TAKE ON A NEW AND DIFFERENT CAST, WITH THE PRESIDENT MAKING CLEAR TO KOSYGIN THE GRAVITY AND

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CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW SITUATION CREATED BY CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE CHANCELLOR IS NOT OPTIMISTIC OVER HIS CHANCES OF PERSUADING DE GAULLE OF THE NEED TO STAND WITH THE WEST ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE CHANCELLOR IS SENDING BIRRENBACH TO THE US ON SEPTEMBER 7 AS HIS QTE SPECIAL ENVOY UNQTE TO REPRESENT GERMAN VIEWS AND TO LEARN US VIEW ON THE RESPONSE TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. END SUMMARY.

2. THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE IN A RELAXED ATMOSPHERE DURING THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 4 AT THE CHANCELLOR'S BUNGALOW. PRESENT WERE THE CHANCELLOR, CARSTENS, GUTENBERG AND OSTERHELD, AS WELL AS THE AMBASSADOR AND THE DM. THE CHANCELLOR BEGAN BY SAYING HE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THE CONVERSATION WITH THE AMERICAN AMB ON THE EVE OF HIS TRIP TO THE NEAR EAST. HE HAD DEBATED SOME AS TO WHETHER HE SHOULD GO IN VIEW OF THE CZECH SITUATION BUT DECIDED THAT HE SHOULD DO SO. COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE CHANCELLOR ATTACHED PUBLIC POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS TALK BEFORE GOING ON HIS TRIP. HE ALSO CLEARLY FELT HE OUGHT TO SPEAK TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AFTER HIS INTERVIEW WITH TSARAPKIN.

3. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT THERE ARE SIGNS THAT SOVIET POLICY HAS UNDERGONE A BASIC CHANGE. THE THREAT TO ROMANIA REMAINS VERY REAL AND YUGOSLAVIA IS ALSO MENACED. TITO IS DEEPLY WORRIED AND FEELS QTE ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE UNQTE FROM THE SOVIETS NOW. TITO ALSO IS DISAPPOINTED IN THE WESTERN REACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING THE US REACTION AND, ON A QUITE DIFFERENT SCALE, THE DE GAULLE REACTION. THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE HAD ALWAYS BEEN DEEPLY IMPRESSED BY A REMARK WHICH SECRETARY ONCE MADE TO HIM TO THE EFFECT THAT EUROPEAN COMMUNISM, BECAUSE IT DOES NOT MEET THE REALITIES OF THE WORLD TODAY, SIMPLY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO HOLD OUT UNDER "CO-EXISTENCE" AND THAT ONLY IN CHINA IS COMMUNISM LIKELY TO SURVIVE IN THE LONGER TERM. WHAT SURPRISED THE CHANCELLOR WAS THAT THE SOVIETS STRUCK OUT SO SOON AND SO SHARPLY IN AN EFFORT TO STOP THIS INEVITABLE INTERNAL EROSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNISM. IT WAS IN REALITY AN ACT OF DESPERATION AND WEAKNESS. THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE HAD DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO AVOID ANY PROVOCATION FOR SOVIET ACTION IN THE CZECH CASE, INCLUDING EFFORTS TO KEEP IMPORTANT OFFICIAL GERMANS FROM EVEN GOING TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

4. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, THE CHANCELLOR KEPT RETURNING TO THE THEME THAT WISE AND FIRM US LEADERSHIP IS ESSENTIAL IN MEETING THE SITUATION. THE US AS THE LEADING POWER IN THE WEST MUST ASSUME THE LEAD. THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE RECOGNIZED OUR

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DIFFICULTIES ON THE EVE OF AN ELECTION, BUT THERE WAS REALLY NO ALTERNATIVE. HE FELT THAT BY TAKING A FIRM LINE AND RALLYING WESTERN UNITY, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO DETER THE SOVIET UNION PERHAPS FROM MOVING AGAINST ROMANIA AND ESPECIALLY AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA. A SOVIET MOVE AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA WOULD BE A MOST GRAVE EVENT FOR ALL OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.

5. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT NECESSARILY A NEW POLICY, THE CATEGORICAL EMPHASIS WHICH THE SOVIETS NOW PUT ON ALL OF THE "SOCIALIST" STATES BEING THEIR PRIVATE PRESERVE POSES A VERY SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR GERMANY BECAUSE ONE PART OF GERMANY, THE GDR, IS REGARDED BY THE SOVIETS AS A PART OF THE SOVIET BLOC. THIS WOULD SEEM TO MEAN THAT ALL EFFORTS BY THE FRG TO BRING THE GERMAN REUNIFICATION OR EVEN CONTACTS WITH THE GDR WILL BE REGARDED BY THE SOVIET UNION AS A HOSTILE ACT. WITH THEIR NEW EMPHASIS ON US ARTICLES 53 AND 107, THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO USE THIS AS A PRETEXT FOR INTERVENING MORE DIRECTLY AGAINST THE FRG. NOT ONLY IN THE PROPAGANDA SENSE BUT ALSO POLITICALLY, THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO BE AGGRESSIVE AGAINST THE FRG.

6. THIS MAY WELL, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TAKE THE FORM OF MOVES AGAINST BERLIN. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT THE FRG WAS DETERMINED TO MEET THIS EXPECTED, NEW AGGRESSIVENESS FROM THE SOVIETS WITH CALMNESS BUT ALSO WITH FIRMNESS. HE EXPECTED ALSO GREATLY HEIGHTENED PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AGAINST THE FRG (WE TOOK THIS OCCASION TO TELL THE CHANCELLOR OF THE HELPFUL INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING US WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST IN COUNTERING SOVIET PROPAGANDA ATTACKS AGAINST THE FRG AROUND THE WORLD.)
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LIMDIS

7. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE STUCK BY HIS PROPOSAL ON THE VALUE OF A NATO SUMMIT MEETING AS AN EFFECTIVE MEANS FOR DEMONSTRATING THE UNITY OF THE WEST. HE MENTIONED THAT HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY SIGNS THAT SOME COUNTRIES, LIKE THE NETHERLANDS AND LUXEMBOURG, WERE SHOWING SIGNS OF BEING FAVORABLE TO THE IDEA. HE MENTIONED ALSO NEW YORK TIMES SPONSORSHIP. HE SAID THAT THERE IS NOW A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR NATO AND THE WEST.

8. THE CHANCELLOR REFERRED TO RUMORS OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KOSYGIN. THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE WOULD NOT OF COURSE PRESUME TO ADVISE FOR OR AGAINST SUCH A MEETING; IT WAS UP TO THE PRESIDENT TO DECIDE IF SUCH A MEETING IS HELD. ITS MAIN PURPOSE HOWEVER, MUST BE TO BRING HOME TO THE SOVIETS FULLY THE GRAVITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND TO DETER THEM FROM SIMILAR ACTION AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES. THE CHANCELLOR

SAID HE REALIZED THIS WOULD CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF A PRESIDENT-KOSYGIN MEETING BUT HE FELT OBLIGATED TO SAY THAT THE CZECH

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INVASION CREATED AN ENTIRELY NEW SITUATION.

9. ON DE GAULLE, THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE WILL BE MEETING HIM AT THE END OF THE MONTH AND WILL OF COURSE ENCOURAGE HIM TO STAND MORE CLOSELY WITH THE WEST IN REACTING TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW DE GAULLE WOULD RESPOND, ALTHOUGH HE FEARED HE WOULD PROBABLY STILL HOPE TO PLAY AN INDEPENDENT ARBITER ROLE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

10. THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE FELT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAVE CLOSE CONTACT NOW WITH THE US BECAUSE AMBASSADOR KNAPPSTEIN IS UNFORTUNATELY ILL AND MINISTER LILIENFELD HAS RECENTLY LEFT. HE IS SENDING BIRRENBACH AS ONE WHOM HE FULLY TRUSTS AS HIS PERSONAL ENVOY TO TALK WITH KEY PEOPLE IN THE US. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD IMPORTANT DECISIONS WERE BEING MADE IN WASHINGTON AT THIS MOMENT AND THAT HE WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED ON THEM.

11. IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, THE AMBASSADOR MADE NUMBER OF POINTS. HE SAID THAT HE FULLY AGREED ON THE GREAT GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION AND KNEW THAT IT WEIGHED VERY HEAVILY ON THE PRESIDENT'S MIND. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE FELT IT WAS AN HOUR OF REAL OPPORTUNITY FOR NATO WHICH HAD NOT EXISTED BEFORE. THE AMB ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ARE PAYING DEARLY FOR THEIR ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THEIR EFFORTS FORCIBLY TO PUT DOWN THE SPIRIT OF FREEDOM AND THE DESIRE TO SHARE IN THE BENEFITS OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY MIGHT ERODE THE FOUNDATION OF COMMUNISM IN THE LONG RUN. BUT MILITARY SUCCESS HAD A CERTAIN DEVASTATING EFFECTIVENESS ALL ITS OWN. THE AMBASSADOR PROMISED TO KEEP IN CLOSEST CONTACT WITH THE CHANCELLOR ON THE LATEST US THINKING REGARDING STEPS TO BE TAKEN.
LODGE

~~SECRET~~

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, September 5, 1968
5:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The marked passage indicates
pacification has about regained Tet-
offensive losses and that there is
significant forward momentum.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rln

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

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732

UNITED STATES EMBASSY
Saigon, Viet-Nam

August 22, 1968

MISSION COUNCIL ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 66

TO : All Members of the Mission Council

FROM : G. D. Jacobson, Mission Coordinator *G. D. Jacobson*

SUBJECT: Actions Emerging from Mission Council Meeting on
Monday, August 19, 1968

1. Ambassador Bunker opened the Mission Council meeting at 10:00 A. M. He reviewed the highlights of the past week, including the Paris talks, and expressed particular gratification regarding Ambassador Harriman's opening statement of August 14.

2. Major General Seignious, who attended the Mission Council meeting, gave a brief but very interesting resume of the Paris talks as viewed by the negotiators, and then answered questions posed by Council members.

3. Ambassador Komer gave a short briefing on "Hamlet Evaluation System Trends as of End-July 1968," which clearly brought out the modest step-up in gradual but relatively steady revival of security in the countryside. Relatively secure population increased to 64.9 percent--a gain of 1.6 percent or 340,000 people, which exceeds any other month in 1968. Contested population declined to 18.2 percent and VC-controlled population dropped to 16.9 percent. Rural security trends (excluding towns) followed the same pattern, as they have consistently. July gains raised relatively secure rural population to 49.4 percent, or 1.3 percent gain from end-June. Most significant, according to Ambassador Komer, was the rate of post-Tet improvement--a gain of 5.5 percent in relatively secure rural population during the five months since Tet--which was substantially greater than the pre-Tet rate of gain. Of course, it was partly due to heavy enemy losses, depleting of guerrilla forces to fill up his battalions, and current lull as he girded for another major push. Also, another modest setback might recur if the enemy succeeded in launching a new countrywide offensive.

As of Tet: * 16.3%
 ** 16.4%

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *ja*, NARA, Date *12-14-01*

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Review

2

4. Mr. Cooper discussed the current rice problem, stating that large amounts of paddy are in storage in provincial mills with equally large amounts unsold on farms, rice stocks in Saigon remain disturbingly high, storage facilities in Saigon will soon be strained to the utmost, stocks of U. S. long grain rice in Saigon have yellowed and become infested to a point where the rice will probably have to be re-milled, rice and paddy prices are too low, no viable scheme exists for sale or barter of surplus red rice abroad, and no implementation decrees concerning GVN war risk insurance have yet been issued. Mr. Cooper said that these problems have been presented to Minister Ho, but with no results. Ambassador Bunker directed that a talking paper be prepared on the subject for his use in discussions with the Prime Minister and the President.

ACTION: ECON.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, Sept. 5, 1968
4:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith some briefing notes for your talk with Pete Lisagor this afternoon; although I doubt that you require anything on the subjects he has indicated to Dave Hackler he wishes to raise.

1. Paris Negotiations and Vietnam

After the conventions, Hanoi faces a fundamental decision:

- to negotiate with this Administration; or
- to deal with the next Administration.

We shall probably have the answer to that question in the days and weeks ahead. We cannot forecast it now. The two Conventions were as helpful as anything could be in suggesting that they have no substantial reason to wait. Moreover, we have hopes that six months from now the Saigon government, the ARVN, and the military position on the ground will be even better than it is now. Nevertheless, we do not fully understand the minds of the men in Hanoi. We can only:

- do everything imaginable to achieve an honorable settlement at the earliest possible date;
- but if that is not possible, to leave to the next President the best possible situation politically in Saigon and militarily on the ground.

2. Middle East

Only a naive man could be confident that we will be able to achieve an early peace in the Middle East. Nevertheless, we are working as hard on this problem as we are on Southeast Asia. A good deal of quiet diplomacy is proceeding. The critical period will be the meeting of the General Assembly later this month in New York when the Foreign Ministers will all be present. We shall make a maximum effort at that time to see if the corner can be turned in the Middle East.

3. Eastern Europe

Despite Dobrynin's assurance to Sect. Rusk, we are by no means easy about Rumania (see attached message from Moscow indicating that Soviet/Rumanian border area is closed to travel). The men in Moscow showed that they were capable of a desperate military action against a background of fears which must objectively appear exaggerated to us. We do not even know whether the Moscow arrangements for Czechoslovakia will remain stable. Therefore, this is a time for alertness and prudence. We must not pretend that something big and bad has not happened. It has happened. Work is going forward in NATO to take stock of its implications for the West. We shall not rush into extreme actions or adopt inflammatory postures; but we are taking stock in the face of the Soviet action and the increased presence of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

Confidential
Attachment

Walt Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 05379 051400Z

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ACTION EUR 20

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SS 25,USIA 12,NSA 02,SSO 00,NSCE 00,NIC 01,ACDA 16,IO 13,SA 01,
SAH 02,SAL 01,RSR 01,OPR 02,/129 W

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AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMCONSUL MUNICH
USMISSION BERLIN

Reston

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MOSCOW 5379

SUBJ: ROMANIAN BORDER AREA CLOSED TO TRAVEL

1. MFA TODAY REFUSED TO REGISTER TRAVEL TO ROMANIAN BORDER AREA BY TWO SECOND SECRETARIES. TRIP HAD BEEN SUBMITTED BY EMBASSY AS MOSCOW TO KISHINEV BY AIR, KISHINEV/IZMAIL/ODESSA BY CAR, ODESSA BACK TO MOSCOW BY AIR, ON DATES SEPT 6 THROUGH 10.
2. OVS HAS ALSO REFUSED TO REGISTER AUTOMOBILE TRIP THROUGH UKRAINE AND MOLDAVIA REQUESTED BY DAO FOR DATES SEPT 5 THROUGH 9. OVS INDICATED WOULD APPROVE TRAVEL ONLY AS FAR AS KHAROKOV AND EVEN THAT LEG TO BE CARRIED OUT BY AIR.
3. IN BOTH CASES REFUSAL WAS "FOR REASONS OF TEMPORARY NATURE." WE HAVE NO MEANS DETERMINING WHETHER REFUSAL RELATED TO REPORTED BUILD-UP OF SOVIET TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IN UKRAINE AND ALONG ROMANIAN BORDER. SWANK

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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BRIEFING MEMO

Thursday, September 5, 1968
10:25 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Briefing for Ambassador Thompson's 12:30 Appointment

Ambassador Thompson hopes to get guidance on how to respond when -- as he expects -- Soviet leaders ask him whether we are prepared to go forward on pending initiatives.

-- What is our posture toward proceeding with strategic arms talks?

-- What is our attitude on other pending initiatives?

What Ambassador Thompson wants more than any specific instruction is your general view and guidance as to his posture and attitude.

Although Ambassador Thompson doubts that you will want to go deeply into Vietnam questions without the Secretary and your other advisers, he is ready, of course, to talk about Soviet attitudes toward various possibilities in Vietnam.

Ambassador Thompson expects to return to Moscow next Monday or Tuesday -- but would like your guidance on the timing of his return.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~SECRET~~

71

INFORMATION

Thursday, September 5, 1968

9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

**You may wish to see this copy of
the speech Clark Clifford will deliver
today at 12:30 p.m. at the National Press
Club.**

W. W. Rostow

wwrostow:rla

76a
HOLD FOR RELEASE
UNTIL DELIVERY OF ADDRESS
EXPECTED AT 1 P.M. (EDT)
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1968

NO. 824-68
OXford 5-0192 (Info.)
OXford 7-3189 (Copies)

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE CLARK M. CLIFFORD
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
WASHINGTON, D. C.
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1968 - 1 P.M. (EDT)

President Cromley, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Last Sunday marked the end of my first six months as Secretary of Defense. Accordingly, this is an appropriate occasion on which to review briefly with you some of my principal impressions about this position and some of the major events of my half year in office.

It seems even clearer to me now than it did at my confirmation hearing last January that my primary responsibility as Secretary of Defense is to seek to assure the survival of this Nation no matter what the strength of any of its enemies. Others within and without the Government are free to work unqualifiedly for the best of all possible worlds. The Secretary of Defense must make certain that we are prepared for the worst.

I find this responsibility neither uncongenial nor unrewarding. Because, as I see it, an America that is strong militarily is neither a provocateur nor a potential aggressor. Our military security provides instead the best available deterrent to military adventures by those who might otherwise see how far they could go.

That belief underlies the views I expressed in my confirmation hearing on the issue of our position relative to the Soviet Union in the field of strategic nuclear weapons. I indicated my intention to seek diligently to preserve our margin of advantage. The same motivation governed the position of the Defense Department on the efforts of some in Congress to defer or even eliminate the deployment of our Sentinel Anti-ballistic Missile System. Recently we were also faced with a somewhat comparable decision in connection with the testing of our newest developments in the nuclear missile field. This series of tests involves the principle of multiple independent re-entry vehicles or MIRVs. We were extremely gratified by the

MORE

results of the initial tests of our Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles.

In both these instances, we have proceeded with these new, and admittedly very expensive, weapons developments not with the idea that war is inevitable. Instead we have done so on the basis that a position of substantial strength is essential and is the best position from which we can negotiate agreements that may make the threat of nuclear war increasingly remote.

There have, of course, been those who have disagreed with this approach. For example, in the course of the controversy over Sentinel, there were those in our Congress who insisted -- and I am sure that they did so in all sincerity -- that our proceeding with this ballistic missile defense would lead to "very dangerous countermeasures by the Soviet Union," that it would ignite a missile defense race and that it would "be positively harmful in its effect upon the growing possibility of discussions between the United States and Russia in regard to the limitations of armaments."

I did not share these fears. We had made it clear that the Sentinel ABM defense was designed primarily against the Chinese threat and could not cope with a massive Soviet attack. Moreover, I felt and continue to feel that, with the Soviet Union having for some time been engaged in the actual deployment of a ballistic missile defense, our decision to go ahead with our own system would both improve the chances of talks and the negotiating climate should such talks take place. Whatever the thinking of the Soviet leaders may have been, the Senate's rejection of the attempt to cut off construction funds for the Sentinel certainly did not delay the Soviet decision to start talks on strategic weapons. Just four days after the Senate action, we received for the first time acceptance of our long-standing offer to talk with the Soviet Union about curbs on nuclear weapons.

We can continue to hope that, at an appropriate time, these talks can take place. In the meantime, I am confident that our decision to proceed with the very important tests of our MIRV principle does not prejudice the prospect that such talks would be fruitful.

I am also proceeding with another decision. I have today directed that the Sentinel ABM system be exempt from the expenditure reduction program required by Congress for FY 1969. From a financial standpoint, the option to reduce Sentinel expenditures could have been useful. I have determined, however, that in the light of all current developments our prudent course is to press forward as planned with the Sentinel system.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience." One's views are probably at least as much the product of experience as they are of logic. And my own deeply-held belief in the importance of dealing from strength has not resulted from the past half year alone,

(MORE)

but stems also from my experience with the administration of President Truman in the period following World War II.

Those were the years in which our hopes that the Soviet Union would cooperate out of good will and common aims in a world of free nations turned out rapidly to be pure illusion. We found that the dismantling of our military machine was matched by no comparable action on the part of the Soviets. Instead, they exhibited their intention to move in whenever and wherever situations of weakness could be found. We rapidly learned that we could meet this challenge only through such creative actions as the Truman Doctrine, under which we helped provide Greece and Turkey with the means to resist the pressures of Communist expansionism. Then there was the Marshall Plan, which enabled the war-drained countries of Western Europe to rebuild their shattered economies. Perhaps most important of all, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization presented the Soviets with an array of free nations firm in their determination to present a collective defense to any further Soviet probes.

My personal participation in the years when NATO was formed unquestionably has influenced my reaction during the past six months to suggestions that the number of American troops in Europe should be drastically reduced. Admittedly, the more than 300,000 American servicemen who are now in Western Europe, more than 23 years after the end of World War II, represent a substantial expense for the American people. But the cost is dwarfed when one compares it to the enormous cost of American lives and treasure expended in a general war or to the consequences if America were to be isolated in a hostile world.

We should not, in my view, be led by NATO's success into the delusion that a strong United States military contribution to NATO is no longer necessary. Some had thought, and there had been some signs that justified such thinking, that today's Soviet Union was a far better neighbor than the Soviet Union of the late 1940's.

The events of the past couple of weeks, I submit, have clearly demonstrated that a significant American military presence in Western Europe is still needed. At the same time, our NATO allies surely must review these events from the standpoint of the effect upon our common security.

The developments of these last few days confirm the fact that, when and if we negotiate, safety and success demand that we negotiate from strength.

We would hope at an appropriate time to begin to discuss with the USSR a limitation on both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons systems. Such discussions could lead to an understanding which, at a minimum, would enable us to check the spiralling cost of nuclear arms with no diminution in our national security. The non-nuclear powers, of course, would welcome any evidence of mutual restraint. Such an agreement would also significantly encourage adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty which both we and the Soviet Union regard as an important safeguard against the nuclear outbreaks that could jeopardize the civilized existence of mankind.

(MORE)

The events that have occurred, and the decisions that I have faced during my half year in office, thus reinforce my fundamental belief that our long-range hopes for peace, and for peaceful co-existence, rest in the continued military strength of the United States.

These months have also seen developments that provide a basis for hope that we can find a solution to our most vexing short-range problem -- peace in Vietnam. Contrasting where we were on March 1st with where we are today, there are three important elements in this more hopeful prospect. First and most important was President Johnson's statesmanlike initiative in his March 31st speech, in which he courageously took the first step toward peace by limiting the bombing of North Vietnam to the infiltration routes in the Panhandle. This action led to the Paris peace talks. The talks thus far have produced no settlement but they are continuing. As Hanoi faces up to the futility of further attempts to take over the South by force, we may see some movement that will bring peace closer.

The second element in the new look since March was the decision that U. S. troop strength in Vietnam could be limited to 549,500. We have been assured by General Abrams, and our Commanders in the field told me personally during my July trip to Vietnam, that this strength, together with the forces of the South Vietnamese and our allies, is sufficient to withstand and defeat any offensive that the enemy can mount. Our effort in South Vietnam can now be seen not to be an unlimited drain on our resources. The so-called "bottomless pit" has been capped.

The third and final element in the changed complexion in South Vietnam is the progressive development of our policy to prepare the armed forces of Vietnam to take over a greater share of the burden of the continuing battle if peaceful settlement continues to prove elusive. During the past six months, we have steadily improved the fire power of the Regular Forces of South Vietnam and today every combat battalion of these Regular Forces and many of the Regional and Popular Forces as well are armed with the M-16 rifle. Our ability to equip all the South Vietnamese combat and combat support troops with this latest and best in shoulder arms is facilitated by the fact that M-16 rifle production is now two and one-half weeks ahead of an already accelerated schedule. Initial deliveries from our two new sources are now expected to arrive more than a month ahead of the scheduled date of February 1969. The armed forces of South Vietnam will continue to receive priority allocation of these weapons. As you know, M-16s are already in the hands of all our American combat troops who are performing so magnificently in Vietnam.

Together, these three developments have put us in a far stronger position to bring our Vietnamese involvement to a satisfactory conclusion.

Finally, I would like to dwell briefly on the special problem of discharging our fundamental responsibility of ensuring the national security at a time when the military means of doing so have become increasingly expensive and when the competing demands

(MORE)

on the budgetary dollar have multiplied. As a result of the Congressional mandate that the 10% surtax be accompanied by a \$6 billion reduction in Federal expenditures, we must cut \$3 billion out of our Defense expenditures for this Fiscal Year. Several of the steps in this program, which we refer to as Project 693, have already been announced. Obviously the programs, facilities and units eliminated as a result of the restrictions imposed by Congress have represented some reduction in our military posture. They must not, however, despite the obvious difficulties, involve any dangerous impairment of our over-all security, or seriously diminish our ability to meet the international treaty commitments which constitute a vital part of that security.

But the financial stringencies under which we must now operate make it more important than ever that we get the maximum value for every Defense dollar that we spend. In this effort, we will be aided greatly by a major new expense accounting system which we have now adopted in the Defense Department. We call this new system Project PRIME. With PRIME, the commanding officer and every department head at a base will know the cost of military as well as civilian personnel; and the costs of all kinds of services and supplies that are used on a current basis. With this kind of information available quickly and reliably, the commander will be better able to make wise choices in the use of his limited budget funds. PRIME also includes a uniform set of accounts for classifying costs, so that managers at all levels in the department can make useful comparisons. This uniform set of accounts will also help me and others who make choices between major programs, because we can be more confident about the relevant cost of competing programs. PRIME is a significant step in applying businesslike methods to the operation of the Defense Department.

We live in an imperfect world. From the standpoint of our national security, we know not what lies ahead of us next week, next month or next year. I say to you that our hopes for the future, as well as the lessons of the past, suggest that the rock of power must be the foundation for the house of peace.

- E N D -

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INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, September 4, 1968
8:20 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a self-explanatory
message from Sec. Rusk on the Soviet
INTERSPUTNIK proposal.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRestow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By rg, NARA, Date 1-7-93



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 3, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet INTERSPUTNIK Proposal

Just before the Czech invasion, the Soviets, along with seven other Communist countries, floated a proposal for the establishment of an international communications system, which they dubbed INTERSPUTNIK. A message from Premier Kosygin announcing the proposal was read at the opening session of the Vienna UN Space Conference, August 14. He said that " . . . in order to satisfy the needs of the developed and underdeveloped countries, the USSR is proposing the creation of an international communications system through artificial earth satellites based on democratic principles with total equality of all its participants".

The draft agreement is structurally similar in content to the present INTELSAT agreement. A major difference is the provision for decision making on a one-country/one-vote basis rather than weighted voting based on investment as in the INTELSAT system.

At present we can only speculate as to the Soviet motives in putting forth this proposal at this time. We doubt that they seriously expect to establish a truly world-wide system to supplant INTELSAT. It could be that they envision a more limited one which would handle some of the traffic among the Soviet Union and its allies. A number of countries, principally for political reasons, may want to participate in such a system as well as in INTELSAT. Alternatively, the Soviets' real aim may be to force a restructuring of INTELSAT in the forthcoming negotiations on INTELSAT permanent arrangements, so that they can participate on a basis

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

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of equality with the United States. Lastly, they may simply be interested in making these negotiations more difficult for the United States. They have not exhibited any interest in INTELSAT to date. You may recall that since the spring of 1964 we have at various times encouraged the Soviets to join INTELSAT, the last time being your speech in June commemorating the Glassboro talks.

It is worth noting that both Yugoslavia and Romania are showing interest in joining INTELSAT, and, in fact, the Communications Satellite Corporation just recently concluded a consulting engineering contract with the Government of Yugoslavia to design and prepare earth station specifications for that Government.

Jim Webb has reported from Vienna that the Soviets did not gain the propaganda splash they must have intended, and that the United States presentations have been most impressive. While the Soviets have not succeeded in disrupting the agreed agenda of the Conference, they may have set the stage for continuing agitation on this issue.

I agree with Mr. Webb that we must continue energetically our preparations for the INTELSAT negotiations next February. We should be prepared to make such changes in the structure as are necessary and acceptable to continue the very broad support this organization has built in the last four years. The problem is to ascertain whether the Soviets are interested in discussing this subject with us in a serious manner. In light of the current Czech situation, we will not be able to do that now, but we shall attempt to sound the Soviets out as soon as such contacts are feasible.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Wednesday, September 4, 1968 -- 8:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Just so that you might see what the problem looks like, I have drafted this statement which might accompany an agreement to begin discussions on the strategic arms race with the Soviet Union, in ways that would protect your political flank here and in Western Europe.

If we were to go beyond -- to a summit meeting -- the same kind of statement would be relevant; but I believe that we would have to have some beginning of troop withdrawals from Czechoslovakia -- at least -- and more security than I, at least, feel about Rumania.

I am giving this piece of paper no other circulation.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 89-151

By rg/isp, NARA, Date 12-14-92

WWRostow:rla

78a

(9/4/68)

The U. S. and the Soviet Union have agreed that discussions designed to limit the strategic arms race shall begin on _____ in _____.

I wish to speak frankly on the relation of our decision to proceed with these discussions and recent events in Eastern Europe.

As I have said before, it is a tragic fact that the Soviet Union -- the second industrial power in the world and one of the two nuclear super-powers -- should have felt its security threatened by the very modest degree of national independence and human freedom which emerged in Czechoslovakia.

These trends arose from the authentic wish and aspirations of the people of Czechoslovakia. No external power was involved. No external power sought -- or seeks -- to exploit these trends to reduce the security of the Soviet Union. These trends may be temporarily deflected but they will surely not be halted by military power or the threat of its use. All over the world new generations are coming to

maturity, which will define in their time the direction their nations shall take. In an environment of increased educational opportunity and intense international communications, it is clear that the peoples of the world will increasingly assert their rights of national independence and of freedom to choose and design freely the ideas which shall govern the life of their nations.

We must all learn to live with the certain fact of diversity.

Above all, no military pact or political alliance can revoke a nation's rights under the United Nations Charter.

We of the West have had to take stock soberly and prudently of the implications for our own security of a Soviet willingness to unleash military force under such circumstances and of the presence of increased Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

These considerations do not, however, diminish -- in fact, they increase -- the urgency of seeking to build a more rational and peaceful structure of arrangements in the world and of moving towards peace.

It would not help the hard-pressed citizens of Czechoslovakia if we were to give up our efforts to see if the strategic arms race can be limited. If the Soviet Union and the United States can succeed in this difficult enterprise, all humanity will benefit.

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INFORMATION

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
~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, September 4, 1968
8:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This intercepted conversation
indicates an important fact; namely,



3.4(b)(1), (3), (6)
6.1(c)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-58
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

Wednesday, September 4, 1968
5:00 PM

John J. Jones
Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Secretary Rusk asks you to see the Foreign Minister and Minister of Economic Development of Guinea. Both Ministers are close advisors to Sekou Toure; they are in town through Tuesday, September 10, for talks at the World Bank.

Toure is probably the best grass roots politician in Africa, though his erratic behavior has often been annoying to the rest of us. Lately there are signs that Guinea may be getting down to business on the development front. Joe Palmer came back from his recent African swing very excited about what Toure was doing in agriculture and self-help projects. (Toure also showed an encouraging change of heart toward the U.S. by personally squiring Joe around the country.)

I think a brief meeting with the Ministers would be moderately useful as a sign to Toure (and others in Africa) that we always applaud serious nation-building, whatever the frictions of the past. But this is clearly not a must.

W. W. Rostow

O. K. ; set up meeting between now and Sept. 10 _____

No _____

Call me _____

RPM/vmr

5/5 11602

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 26, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for Guinean
Foreign Minister Lansana Beavogui
and Minister of Economic Development
Ismael Toure

Recommendation:

That you receive Guinean Foreign Minister Lansana Beavogui and Minister of Economic Development Ismael Toure during their current stay in Washington, which will last until about September 10.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Ministers Beavogui and Toure are here at the head of a special delegation to conclude negotiations for an IBRD loan. The proceeds of the loan will be used to build the infrastructure to support a large bauxite mining operation being exploited by a group led by Harvey Aluminum, ALCOA and ALCAN. Ministers Beavogui and Toure are the principal confidants and advisers of Guinean President Toure and influential members of the powerful Political Bureau of Toure's political party. They have supported President Toure in his efforts to promote economic development by first concentrating on social development, particularly the development of a sense of nationhood and self-reliance among the Guinean masses. At its present stage this unique Guinean approach to development is putting its emphasis on agriculture and encouraging young people to look to the development of Guinea's agriculture as a base for further economic development. When Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Joseph Palmer visited Guinea recently, President Toure and Foreign Minister Beavogui personally escorted him to various parts of the country, acted as his guides and arranged for him to address large masses of the Guinean population, something hitherto unheard-of in our relations with Guinea.

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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I believe it would be extremely helpful for you to talk with Ministers Beavogui and Toure, and that they can help further your understanding of the development program they are pursuing in Guinea, a program which I believe will sooner or later be copied by other African countries. By receiving them, you would not only encourage them and be taking a big step forward in improving our relations with Guinea, but you would also be demonstrating the value of American friendship.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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Res file
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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, Sept. 4, 1968
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an interesting CIA report on
activist youth around the world.

I will have an analytic summary prepared
for you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~-attachment (Helms covering memo 4 Sept 68 w Cy No. 1
of No# 0613/68-Restless Youth)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 1-7-93

82
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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Wednesday, September 4, 1968
4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the 3:00 p.m. Czech situation summary. You will note (paragraphs 5-6 and 8) that anxiety about Rumania is by no means at an end.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By p, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~TOP SECRET~~

SC #11710/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
4 September 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Czechoslovakia and Rumania
(As of 1500 EDT)

1. Pravda warned again today that Soviet troops had to remain in Czechoslovakia, citing unspecified "counterrevolutionary" activity as justification. The troops have left the national radio and news agency buildings, however, and are reportedly about to withdraw from the TV station as well. There are press reports that some of those services will resume tomorrow. The Soviets reportedly continue to occupy the offices and printing plants of most of the newspapers in Prague.

2. Rude Pravo, the party daily, reported today that the National Assembly will meet next week to pass legislation sanctioning press censorship and restricting the right of assembly. The paper also published an announcement by the Finance Ministry which warned that stringent economic measures may be necessary to compensate for the set-back suffered since the intervention. Premier Cornik reportedly

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 99-211

By il, NARA, Date 11-14-05

3.3(b)(1)

E.O. 12958

~~TOP SECRET~~

convened another cabinet session today to discuss economic matters and may address the nation tonight.


3. The US Embassy in Prague reported today that Premier Cernik informed a group of intellectuals on 2 September that the over-all situation is still uncertain, and that it is unclear how much the Soviets will restrict the Czechoslovak government's freedom of action. Cernik stated further that the government knew of only five persons--high-ranking security officials--who have been arrested by the Soviets. Cernik apparently believes that there are close to 800 KGB personnel in Czechoslovakia. Minister of Culture Galuska reports that the Soviets are already attempting to introduce their "advisors" into "cultural areas."

4. Pravda today denied charges that Moscow forewarned the US of its actions in Czechoslovakia. Yuri Zhukov, a prominent Soviet commentator, especially cited Chinese efforts to create distrust between the USSR and North Vietnam with charges of US-USSR collusion. This denial may indicate the Soviets anticipate an adverse Chinese propaganda campaign relating to Ambassador Dobrynin's assurances to the US regarding Rumania.

5. The Rumanians have told the Yugoslav government that three Soviet divisions are in Bulgaria and six additional Soviet divisions have moved into Hungary from the

USSR, according to information given to the US Ambassador in Belgrade by a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official late yesterday. There continues to be no evidence suggesting the presence of any Soviet troops in Bulgaria. The US Embassy in Budapest comments that continuous systematic coverage of Hungary by western attaches since the beginning of August has failed to confirm the presence of even one additional Soviet division in that country. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav armed forces continue on alert and have prepared ground force defensive positions facing Hungary and Bulgaria.

6. The Soviets have refused permission for a US attache trip that was to be taken tomorrow to several locations in the southwestern USSR including Kishinev and Odessa. Both cities are in the military district bordering Rumania.





[REDACTED]

exchange intelligence on Soviet troop deployments. This is a good indication of the extent of Yugoslav nervousness and distrust of Soviet intentions in regard to Rumania and Yugoslavia, but it is not without precedent. Following Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 a program for the exchange of military intelligence information was instituted between the US and the Yugoslav Defense Ministry. The agreement was cancelled in August 1955 when Belgrade normalized its relations with Moscow.



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September 4, 1968

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~~SECRET~~
FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL ABRAMS, EYES ONLY

Pres file
CAP 82372

I wish to re-inforce Bus Wheeler's message to you urging heightened security precautions in view of the report that the enemy intends to assassinate you and your staff.

Aside from my personal concern, I wish you to know the respect and gratitude I feel for the vigorous and imaginative way you are conducting operations. Your frustration of the enemy is a major contribution to the honorable peace we all seek.

You have my complete confidence and support, as well as my deep appreciation for your unparalleled record of service to our country.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ.019-039.002/13

By Jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

WWRostow:rlh

Approved For Release 2001/08/24 : NLJ-019-039-2-13-6

ACTION

Wednesday, September 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gene Black's visit to Cambodia

1. *sup*
2. *Free file*

Attached is the text of the public announcement of Black's visit to Asia. The State Department proposes that the announcement be made by George Christian Friday morning.

Time does not permit coordinating an approved text with the Cambodian Government. The proposed announcement is therefore very bland about Black's visit to Cambodia. It merely mentions Cambodia among the countries to be visited, for the purpose of Mekong Valley development and "other matters of mutual interest."

We would like to have your approval of this announcement so that we can get it into Australian hands for delivery to the Cambodians before they read about it on the tickers.

I recommend you approve the announcement. George Christian concurs.

Att

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

cc: George Christian

8-1a

EUGENE R. BLACK VISIT TO ASIA

September 6 - 25, 1968

The President's Special Adviser on Asian Economic and Social Development, Eugene R. Black, departed today for visits to the Philippines, Cambodia, Japan, Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam.

In Japan, Mr. Black will consult with Prime Minister Sato and other Japanese leaders regarding post-war reconstruction in Southeast Asia and support for the growing number of proposals for regional development programs in that part of the world. Mr. Black will address the Japan Research Institute on September 17 in Tokyo. His topic will be 'Towards a New Diplomacy in East Asia'.

A particular concern of Mr. Black's in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam will be the plans for development of the resources of the Mekong Basin for peaceful purposes. This trip marks Mr. Black's fourth mission to Asia for President Johnson over the past several years to consult with Asian leaders on development matters. The President has also asked him to discuss with the leaders of these countries other matters of mutual interest. The President has directed Mr. Black to review United States participation in programs sponsored by the Mekong Committee to confirm that timely support is provided for preparation of plans which can be implemented as peace is restored. These plans are being carried forward even while the war continues in Viet-Nam.

In Laos, Mr. Black will attend the dedication of the first component of the multilaterally financed Nam Ngum Dam. This first component is an

access bridge across which builders of the dam are expected to move within a few weeks. He will participate in discussions of plans for the major mainstream dam at Pa Mong for which a first stage proposal is now nearing completion by the United States Bureau of Reclamation. Among those accompanying Mr. Black will be the U. S. Commissioner of Reclamation, Floyd Dominy.

In Bangkok, Mr. Black's schedule will include talks with U Nyun, the Executive Secretary of the U. N. Commission on Asia and the Far East and representatives of other regional activities.

In Manila, he will meet with officials of the Asian Development Bank.

ACTION

Wednesday, September 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Eugene Black's visit to Cambodia

Pres file

The Cambodians have now informed us, through the Australians, that Prince Sihanouk said Black "would be welcome" in Cambodia between the 10th and the 14th of September. According to the Cambodian message, Black will be received as a guest of the government, will be met by the Prime Minister, and will be honored by a dinner hosted by the Acting Foreign Minister. Although the Cambodian message does not mention a meeting with Prince Sihanouk that, I believe, can be assumed.

Black will be leaving Washington at noon on Friday, September 6. He will be in Cambodia September 11 through 13.

Black will bring home to the Cambodians our grave concern over Communist military use of Cambodian territory. His instructions are now being drafted by the State Department. Marshall Wright will participate in this process and the instructions will, of course, be cleared with you prior to Black's departure.

One specific point: in the scenario approved earlier by you for the Black visit, it was planned that Black would not repeat not raise the question of the 11 American prisoners held by the Cambodians. As it now stands, there is a good chance that the Cambodians will release the prisoners prior to Black's arrival. However, if that does not happen, I suspect it is impractical and undesirable to have Black ignore the prisoner issue. First, the Cambodians will expect him to raise it, and could easily misinterpret his silence on the subject as an indication of high-level disinterest.

Second, should Black totally ignore this issue and that fact became public knowledge I really cannot conceive of a good public relations defense against the bitter criticism which would ensue. Finally, it would be quite like Sihanouk to plan now to release the prisoners to Black as a gesture of princely generosity. We would certainly not wish to queer any such plans by our disinterest. I do not think the prisoner issue need take much of Black's time, but I do question the wisdom of his ignoring it altogether.

When Black raises the question of Communist use of Cambodian territory, Sihanouk is almost certain to counter with a request for an American guarantee of Cambodia's borders. State has worked out a statement for Mr. Black's

contingency use with Sihanouk. The statement has the approval of our legal authorities and the Department of Defense, and should not cause much trouble with our Vietnamese and Thai allies. Black would indicate to Sihanouk our willingness to issue this statement in connection with a general improvement of US-Cambodian relations.

I think it is important that Black have with him a political advisor with broad knowledge of our Asian policies and problems. You might wish at the luncheon today to raise this point with Secretary Rusk and satisfy yourself with the adequacy of the staff being provided Black.

There will, of course, be great press interest in the Black trip. The public announcement of the visit to Cambodia will stress Mr. Black's development of the Mekong Valley. However, the primary purpose of his visit will become known and it would probably be wise to background with some candor on that aspect of Black's mission. We have under preparation both on-the-record and background guidance for use with the press and will submit these to you for approval before their use.

Finally, Black will be in town Friday morning prior to his departure. Now that his visit to Cambodia is a reality, I recommend you see Black again for a last-minute exchange of views and to arm his mission with a public demonstration of your personal interest.

W. W. Rostow

1. I will see Black on Friday morning.

Approve _____ Time _____

Disapprove _____

Have Secretary Rusk brief him.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. Black should request the release of the American prisoners.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

MWright:wpt

2

Wednesday, September 4, 1968, 1:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Czechoslovak Crisis

Leonard Marks telephoned to say that he would be prepared to discuss Western European press and radio reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia at this afternoon's NSC meeting. I recommend that you ask him for a brief report following Director Helms' comments on fears aroused in Germany by the Russian movement into Czechoslovakia.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

~~SECRET~~

10/10/68
P file
87

Leuch with the President
Wednesday, Sept. 4, 1968, 1:00 p. m.

Agenda

1. Vietnam (Sect. Rusk, Sect. Clifford, and Gen. Wheeler)

- report on Wednesday Paris meeting;
- next steps in negotiation;
- military situation and prospects;
- threat of assassinations in Saigon.

2. Cambodia (Sect. Rusk)

- Sitrep on possible contacts and initiatives with Sihanouk.

3. Eastern Europe (Sect. Rusk)

- Poland and Most Favored Nation treatment;
- asylum for Czech refugees as suggested by Mr. Cherno;
- handling of second inaugural Soviet flight to the U. S.

4. Sugar Conference (Sect. Rusk)

- UNCTAD World Sugar Conference scheduled for Sept. 23.
Likely sugar agreement that would emerge would double Castro's income from sugar exports. We may be able to achieve postponement. Congress unlikely to ratify.

5. PUEBLO (Sect. Rusk)

- Sitrep.

6. Should Ambassador Shriver call on de Gaulle? (Sect. Rusk)

7. Other.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 768 85-03

By kip/19, NARA, Date 11-10-92

W. W. Rostow

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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~--LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Pres. file

Wednesday, September 4, 1968 -- 10:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

At the tea break this morning an arrangement was made for a private meeting at 10:00 a.m. Saturday, Sept. 7, including (for the first time) Tho as well as Thuy, Averell as well as Cy.

The fact that it's a morning session, with a whole day to work, may (or may not) be significant.

In talking with John Walsh on the classified phone, Cy asked that: "We not rock the boat until after Saturday" -- meaning no new initiatives. John Walsh said we had nothing in mind right now except that Abrams to go on shooting up the enemy. Cy said: "Fine."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, September 4, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Messages of Support to the Germans

At Tab A is Secretary Rusk's memo recommending you send messages to Kissinger, Brandt and Schuets thanking them for their birthday greetings to you and using the occasion to say the U.S. is determined to meet its responsibilities to NATO and to Berlin. Draft messages to each are attached at Tab B for your approval.

The Germans are nervous. These messages would be an effective public gesture of support.

I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-197
By CL, NARA, Date 1-5-95

Approve messages _____

No _____

Call me _____

inf
ERF:mmm:st~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2650

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 2, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Messages of Support for the Leaders
of the FRG and Berlin

Recommendation:

That you authorize telegraphic transmission of the enclosed messages thanking Kiesinger, Brandt and Schuetz for their birthday greetings and affirming the determination of the United States to support the Federal Republic and Berlin.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Embassy Bonn and the United States Mission in Berlin, as well as a number of prominent German visitors here, have all reported with considerable emphasis that the morale of the German population, and particularly in Berlin, has been seriously shaken by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The willingness of the Soviets to run the risks involved in any invasion, the fact that Soviet troops have occupied the border between Bavaria and Czechoslovakia, and the exposed position of Berlin, have all caused a feeling of deep insecurity in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Berlin. The people in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Berlin need assurances that the United States will stand by them.

Ambassador Lodge has concurred in a strong recommendation from United States Mission Berlin that you

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GROUP 4

Downgraded at three-year intervals.

Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652, SEC 5(A)(10)

By ag/dcl, NARA, Date 1/13/53

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

convey, through a public statement, the determination of the United States to stand by its Berlin obligations and its German Allies.

Chancellor Kiesinger, Foreign Minister Brandt (on behalf of the SPD Executive), and President of the Bundesrat (also Governing Mayor of Berlin) Schuetz have all sent you birthday greetings. Responses to their birthday greetings would provide a natural opportunity to convey the American determination to stand by the Germans. Such messages would receive very wide circulation throughout the Federal Republic and Berlin, would be an extremely welcome gesture, and would do much to restore German confidence.

Subject to your concurrence, we propose to send the enclosed messages to Embassy Bonn, for delivery to Kiesinger, Brandt and Schuetz.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Proposed messages to Kiesinger, Brandt and Schuetz
2. Texts of messages from Kiesinger, Brandt and Schuetz
3. Berlin 2170

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Proposed Message to Chancellor Kiesinger

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-197
By ab, NARA, Date 1-5-95

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I was heartened by your thoughtful message on my sixtieth birthday. It was very good of you and Mrs. Kiesinger to think of me on that occasion.

I agree with you entirely on the importance of a strong North Atlantic Alliance. We have just witnessed an example of unprovoked aggression against a small nation very close to your country. The existence of NATO can provide the people in the Alliance with security from the same fate. The events in Czechoslovakia have brought home to all of us that NATO is the keystone to security and peace in Europe. It was reassuring to receive your own renewed expression of faith in the Alliance.

I want you and the German people to know we Americans are firmly determined to fulfill our responsibilities in the Alliance. And there should be no doubt that we will meet our obligations in Berlin. Our resolve to defend Berlin is unshakeable.

While we renew our obligations for the mutual security of all the Allies in NATO, we are also resolved not to lose

the hope and the faith that the future of mankind lies in the solution of problems through understanding, mutual respect, and observance of the rights of all. We cannot allow ourselves to be deterred from the pursuit of this goal. The friendship of our two nations is a firm foundation from which to continue.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending you and Mrs. Kiesinger our warm friendly regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Proposed Message to Foreign Minister Brandt

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:

I deeply appreciate the generous birthday wishes you sent on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Social Democratic Party. In troubled times such as these, when the hopes of a people for freedom have been dashed by an act of unprovoked armed aggression, I am especially pleased to have your reassuring words on our mutual endeavors for peace. I want to assure you that the recent events have reinforced my own country's resolve to meet its responsibilities towards its allies. And I want you to know that Berlin is very much on my mind; we will not falter in our determination to defend that city.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

9-1 x
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Proposed Message to Bundesrat President (and Governing Mayor) Schuetz

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your kind message of congratulations on my birthday. In these trying times when we have just witnessed a people's quest for freedom cut off by an unprovoked armed intervention, I especially appreciate assurances such as yours which reaffirm the close ties between our two countries. The tragic recent events in Czechoslovakia have only strengthened the continuing resolve of my country to protect the freedom of Berlin, and to work with our NATO Allies to protect the peace, freedom, and security of all its members.

I very much appreciate your thoughtfulness and extend to you my warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM CHANCELLOR KIESINGER

Mrs. Kiesinger and I send you our sincere congratulations upon your sixtieth birthday. We wish you good health and happiness for the future. The events of the past few days have again made it clear to us of what decisive importance a strong North Atlantic Alliance is for the security of all of its members and for a successful peace policy. I am happy that our two governments serve these goals through close and understanding cooperation. On the occasion of your birthday, I recall with appreciation the part you, Mr. President, play in strengthening German-American friendship.

With kind regards and with our best wishes to Mrs. Johnson, I remain,

Yours,

K. G. Kiesinger

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-197
By CB, NARA, Date 1-5-95

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM FOREIGN MINISTER BRANDT

On behalf of the Executive Committee of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany we take the liberty to extend to you our sincere congratulations on your birthday today. We wish you all the best for your personal well-being and join you in hoping for the success of your endeavors for peace.

Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner, Helmut Schmidt, Alfred Nau, Hans-Juergen Wischnewski

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM BERLIN GOVERNING MAYOR SCHUETZ

On the occasion of your sixtieth birthday I would like to convey to you my sincere congratulations and those of the German people.

On this day I give grateful thought to the friendly ties that link our two peoples, in which you occupy a significant part. May you be granted continued health and personal well-being in the years to come.

For the President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Klaus Schuetz,
President of the Bundesrat



Department of state

TELEGRAM

89h

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 788

ACTION COPY

PAGE 01 BERLIN 02170 301113Z

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ACTION EUR 20

AJ

INFO SA 01, SAH 02, SAL 01, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,
L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, IO 13, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /114 W

R 301040Z AUG 68
FM USMISSION BERLIN
TO AMEMBASSY BONN
SECSTATE WASHDC 3044

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L BERLIN 2170

JOINT MISSION/USIS MESSAGE

SUBJ: RECOMMENDED STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON BERLIN

REF: BERLIN 2138, 2137

BUREAU
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER
172 AUG 30 11 11

1. WE HAVE REPORTED ON THE DETERIORATING MORALE AMONG THE BERLIN POPULATION COUPLED, AT LEAST IN PART, WITH THE WIDE-SPREAD IMPRESSION THAT US COMMITMENTS TO BERLIN ARE NO LONGER AS FIRM AS THEY USED TO BE. THIS DETERIORATION OVER THE LAST THREE OR FOUR MONTHS HAS BEEN ACCENTUATED AS A RESULT OF THE CZECH EVENTS.
2. TO COUNTERACT THIS FEELING, WE RECOMMEND THAT AT A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY (PRESS CONFERENCE OR SPEECH) IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD REITERATE OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF WEST BERLIN IN STRONG TERMS. IF, FOR INSTANCE, HE WERE ASKED WHETHER OR HOW THE US WOULD REACT IF SOVIET OR EAST GERMAN TROOPS COMMITTED AGGRESSION IN BERLIN AS THEY DID IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HIS REPLY COULD INCLUDE A STATEMENT THAT WE HAVE A DEFINITE COMMITMENT TO PROTECT-- IF NEED BE BY FORCE--THE SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF BERLIN, A COMMITMENT WHICH WAS DEMONSTRATED IN 1948, WHICH HAS BEEN REITERATED BY PRESIDENTS EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY AND WHICH IS AS FIRM AND EXPLICIT TODAY AS IT WAS WHEN IT WAS MADE. THIS SHOULD BE KNOWN IN BERLIN AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
3. SUCH A HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENT WOULD DO MUCH, WE BELIEVE,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-199

By 10-31-94, NARA, Date

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM
32.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BERLIN 02170 301113Z

TO REVITALIZE THE BERLINERS' MORALE. THE LATTER, IN OUR JUDGMENT, HAS BECOME A NECESSITY.

4. THE AMBASSADOR (WHO IS PRESENTLY IN BERLIN) CONCURS IN THIS RECOMMENDATION. GP-3. MORRIS

DECLASS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZ CZ CEEA5 03
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3679

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82370

~~SECRET~~

1968 SEP 4 01 53 PM '68

TUESDAY

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES REPORT

Free file

1. SHAH'S VISIT TO THE USSR - AMBASSADOR BOHLEN WAS TOLD BY IRANIAN AMBASSADOR ANSARY TODAY THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BEFORE THE EARTHQUAKES THE SHAH HAD DEFINITELY DECIDED TO VISIT MOSCOW SEPTEMBER 24.

IN THE WAKE OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE IRANIANS HAD BEEN IN A QUANDARY ABOUT WHETHER THE VISIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE.

CHIP BOHLEN MENTIONED THAT A NUMBER OF NATO COUNTRIES WERE CANCELLING PROJECTED VISITS TO AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT PARTICIPATING IN THE INVASION.

AMBASSADOR ANSARY APPEARED TO HOPE THAT THESE CANCELLATIONS BY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS CONSIDERATIONS ARISING FROM IRAN'S NATURAL CALAMITY, MIGHT INFLUENCE THE SHAH'S FINAL DECISION REGARDING HIS VISIT.

2. VIETNAMESE SENATE DELEGATION - A SIX-MAN DELEGATION OF VIETNAMESE SENATORS WILL BE MAKING AN OFFICIAL GOODWILL VISIT TO THE U.S. AND CANADA BEGINNING THURSDAY. THE DELEGATION IS HEADED BY SENATOR HUYNH VAN CAO, CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. THE DELEGATION WILL BE IN WASHINGTON SEPTEMBER 5-11 TO MEET VARIOUS OFFICIALS, SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN, AND JOURNALISTS, AND WILL HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON FRIDAY.

SENATOR CAO HAS TOLD OUR EMBASSY THAT THE REAL PURPOSE OF THE VISIT IS TWOFOLD: TO OBSERVE THE PRE-ELECTION POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE U.S., AND TO EXPOUND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POSITION ON THE VIET-NAM SITUATION;

3. CUBA - INTERNATIONAL SUGAR CONFERENCE - AN INTERNATIONAL SUGAR CONFERENCE IS SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 23. AS IT NOW STANDS, HOWEVER, CUBA WOULD GET A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD GET DOUBLE THE PRICE FOR CUBAN SUGAR THAT IT RE-SELLS; OTHER MAJOR EXPORTERS, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY AUSTRALIA, ARE ANXIOUS FOR ALMOST ANY KIND OF AGREEMENT BECAUSE SUGAR PRICES ARE SO LOW.

WE FELT IT HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO AVOID ALLOWING THE CUBAN ASPECTS OF THIS ARRANGEMENT FROM BECOMING AN ELECTION ISSUE. WE THEREFORE REQUESTED POSTPONEMENT OF THE CONFERENCE AND TOLD PREBISCH, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF UNCTAD, THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE UNABLE TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE, WERE IT TO RESUME. OUR REQUEST FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE CONFERENCE PRODUCED AN IMMEDIATE STRONG OBJECTION FROM AUSTRALIA, WHICH HAS ASKED THAT WE RECONSIDER OUR DECISION;

DTG 032313Z SEP 68

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

2X FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

SENT SENT
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OJ WTE10
DE WTE 3677

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82368

S E R E T / HARVAN / PLUS
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

AS BACKGROUND TO LUNCHEON DISCUSSION TOMORROW, THIS
VANCE-ZORIN TALK MAY INTEREST YOU.

1. WE SAW ZORIN AT SOVIET EMBASSY MORNING SEPTEMBER 3 FOR
MEETING OF SLIGHTLY OVER AN HOUR. (BOGOMOLOV BEING ON LEAVE,
OBEREMKO AND PERRY INTERPRETED AND SOVIET PRESS ATTACHE
BASKAKOV TOOK NOTES ON SOVIET SIDE.)

2. IT WAS NOTICEABLE THAT ZORIN'S ATTITUDE WAS MORE
FORTHCOMING AND UNARGUMENTATIVE THAN IN ANY OF OUR PREVIOUS
TALKS. HE SEEMED AT PAINS TO STRESS POSITIVE ASPECTS OF
SITUATION REGARDING VIETNAM TALKS, AND TO PASS UP
OPPORTUNITIES TO START USUAL POLEMICS ABOUT US POSITION.
ZORIN COMMENTED AT OUTSET THAT HE HAD BEEN OCCUPIED
ELSEWHERE THAN WITH VIETNAM, AND HARRIMAN REPLIED THAT CALL
ON HIM WAS MADE IN HOPES OF GETTING HIS ATTENTION BACK TO
THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM. OTHERWISE EAST EUROPEAN SITUATION
DID NOT COME UP EXCEPT THAT HARRIMAN MENTIONED THAT THESE
EVENTS WOULD HARDEN US OPINION.

3. WE LED OFF BY SAYING THAT OUR VISIT WAS TO TAKE STOCK
OF THE SITUATION, AND POINTED OUT FAILURE OF TALKS WITH DRV
ON HIS PHASE ONE - PHASE TWO PROPOSAL. WE POINTED TO THE
INCREASED ATTACKS IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS AND TO THE RESUMPTION
OF THE USE OF SOVIET-MADE ROCKETS IN INDISCRIMINATE SHELLING
OF SAIGON AND DANANG. WE GAVE HIM THE DETAILS OF THE HEAVY
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM THE INDISCRIMINATE
ATTACKS. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THE HEAVY AND SENSELESS LOSSES
BEING INCURRED BY NVA IN LAST TWO WEEKS.

4. WE THEN REFERRED TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S MESSAGE TO
HO CHI MINH WHICH IN SPITE OF THE MILITANT LANGUAGE OF THE
MESSAGE INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS STILL INTERESTED
IN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT. WE STATED
THAT HANOI'S CONTINUAL REFUSAL TO GIVE ANY INDICATION OF
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER THE BOMBING STOPPED WAS AN
UNREASONABLE POSITION, AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS TIME
FOR THE SOVIET GOVT TO USE ITS INFLUENCE OR ITS INGENUITY
TO FIND A WAY TO PERMIT A HALT IN THE BOMBING AND THUS THE
COMMENCEMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS. WE ASKED THAT THIS
BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF HIS GOVERNMENT. WE POINTED OUT
THAT THE PRESIDENT AS LATE AS AUGUST 19 HAD INDICATED THAT WE
COULD NOT TAKE THE NEXT STEP UNTIL WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE
THAT HANOI WAS PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO MOVE WITH US IN
DEESCALATING THE WAR AND IN SEEKING PEACE.

68 SEP 4 PM 8:58

TUESDAY

Free file

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By PC, NARA, Date 12-14-01

APPROX FROM QUOTE COPY

5. AFTER PROMISING TO REPORT THIS TO MOSCOW, ZORIN GAVE HIS IMPRESSION OF RECENT TALKS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE IN PARIS, SAYING THEIR POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT MOVE UNTIL US STOPPED BOMBING. ZORIN RECOUNTED HIS CONVERSATION WITH LE DUC THO AT YESTERDAY'S NORTH VIETNAMESE RECEPTION, IN WHICH THO POINTED OUT TO ZORIN PHAM VAN DONG'S ANNIVERSARY STATEMENT, WHICH ZORIN TOLD US CONTAINED A SENTENCE IN THE SAME VEIN AS MOSCOW'S MESSAGE WHICH WE HAD REFERRED TO, NAMELY, DONG HAD STATED THAT STOPPING THE BOMBING WOULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN REACHING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THAT LE DUC THO HAD STRESSED THAT THIS STATEMENT BY PHAM VAN DONG "CORRECTLY SET FORTH" HANOI'S POSITION. ZORIN SAID WHEN HE TOLD LE DUC THO HE WAS SEEING THE AMERICANS NEXT DAY, LE DUC THO REFERRED TO PHAM VAN DONG'S STATEMENT AND ADDED THAT "THIS WAS THE MESSAGE" HE WOULD LIKE DELIVERED TO THE AMERICANS. WHEN WE ASKED ZORIN IF HE BELIEVED A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WAS REALLY POSSIBLE, ZORIN SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE YES OR NO ANSWER, BUT THOUGHT "THE POSSIBILITY EXISTED FOR MOVING AHEAD." ZORIN ADDED THAT HANOI REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS DID NOT FEEL THEMSELVES ABLE TO MAKE ANY STEP TOWARDS US THAT WOULD BE TAKEN AS CONCESSION, GIVEN PRESENT MOOD IN HANOI. WE ASKED IF HE MEANT MOOD WITHIN POLITBURO, AND ZORIN SAID LE DUC THO TOLD HIM POLITBURO WAS UNANIMOUS ON THIS POINT.

6. ZORIN ADDED THAT HIS BELIEF NOW WAS THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE NO LONGER CONSIDERED THEY COULD ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES BY MILITARY MEANS, AND THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO MOVE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT BY POLITICAL MEANS. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS NOT THEIR ORIGINAL POSITION, AND GAVE IMPRESSION THAT USSR HAD INFLUENCED HANOI IN THIS DIRECTION. HE SAID HIS CURRENT IMPRESSION WAS THAT HANOI WAS READY TO TALK SERIOUSLY ABOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THAT "THEY HAD THEIR POSITIONS READY."

7. WE BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF NECESSITY FOR GVN INCLUSION AT SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. WE EXPLAINED THAT HANOI HAD SAID IT WAS READY TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS TALKS AFTER BOMBING HALTED, BUT AT SAME TIME SAID IT WOULD NOT AGREE TO INCLUDE GVN. WE QUESTIONED HOW SERIOUS HANOI WAS SINCE THERE COULD NOT BE SERIOUS TALKS WITHOUT INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES. WE INDICATED THAT THERE WAS NO OBSTACLE TO NLF OR ALLIANCE BEING REPRESENTED, BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT GVN BE REPRESENTED ON OUR SIDE. RETURNING TO THIS QUESTION LATER, ZORIN ASKED IF WE BELIEVED HANOI WOULD SIT AT SAME TABLE WITH GVN REPRESENTATIVES. WE REPLIED THIS WAS ESSENTIAL. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, ZORIN STATED THAT WHILE THE REPRESENTATION QUESTION POSED DIFFICULTIES, HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT CONSTITUTED AN UNSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE. HE ADDED THAT IF US FOLLOWED WISE POLICY, HE THOUGHT THIS OBSTACLE COULD BE OVERCOME.

8. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION ZORIN BROUGHT UP DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION AND SAID HE THOUGHT IF DEMOCRATS HOPED TO WIN THEY WOULD HAVE TO CHANGE POSITION ON STOPPING BOMBING. WE ATTEMPTED TO CORRECT SOME OF ZORIN'S MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT US OPINION, ENDING UP BY EMPHASIZING THAT IN OUR VIEW BEST TIME TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WAS RIGHT NOW. WE SAID THAT US HAD SEIZED ON ZORIN'S PHASE ONE - PHASE TWO PROPOSAL, HOPING THIS WOULD BE A POSSIBLE BRIDGE; BUT THIS HAD NOT BEEN WORKING OUT, AND WE URGED USSR TO USE ITS INFLUENCE PROMPTLY TO FIND ANOTHER BRIDGE.
HARRIMAN.

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

DTG 032225Z AUG 68

EXTRACT FROM QUICK COPY

92
1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

EEA500
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3676

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82367

SEP 3 23 01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

SWAZILAND-- TINY BRITISH PROTECTORATE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA--
BECOMES INDEPENDENT SEPTEMBER 6. FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR APPROVAL,
IS PROPOSED MESSAGE TO SWAZI KING SOBUZA. I RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE.

BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY:

ALL AMERICANS JOIN ME IN SENDING YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF
SWAZILAND OUR WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THE INDEPENDENCE
OF YOUR NATION.

YOU CELEBRATE TODAY BOTH A PROUD ACHIEVEMENT AND A
PRECIOUS HOPE. FOR SWAZILAND HAS MADE THE DIFFICULT PASSAGE TO
STATEHOOD WITH A COURAGE AND FORESIGHT WHICH WILL LONG BE
AN EXAMPLE OF PEACEFUL PROGRESS. AND YOU GAIN YOUR FREEDOM
WITH YOUR MAJESTY'S WISE LEADERSHIP AND A FIRM COMMITMENT TO
BUILDING A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL YOUR PEOPLE.

THE UNITED STATES IS ESPECIALLY PROUD TO WELCOME SWAZILAND
TO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS. WE SHARE YOUR FIRM BELIEF IN THE DIGNITY
AND EQUALITY OF ALL MEN. WE SHARE YOUR HOPE FOR THE PEACE AND
PROSPERITY NOT ONLY OF SWAZILAND, BUT OF ALL THE NEW AFRICA.

I KNOW, YOUR MAJESTY, THAT OUR TWO NATIONS WILL CONTINUE
TO DEVELOP CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS IN THE YEARS AHEAD.
WITH BEST PERSONAL REGARDS.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 032208Z

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 11-17-92

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WHCA

1968 SEP 3 22 39

~~SECRET~~

93

EEA499
00 WTE10
DE WTE 3675

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82366

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: CIA'S INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM ON THE SITUATION
IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR 4:00 PM EDT SEPT. 3, 1968

1. MOSCOW TASS TODAY REPORTED ON THE ACTIVITY OF BREZHNEV FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE CZECHOSLOVAK NEGOTIATIONS A WEEK AGO. THE SOVIET PARTY LEADER WAS SAID TO HAVE RECEIVED MONGOLIAN PARTY SECRETARY TSEDENBAL, NOW ON A VISIT TO MOSCOW, FOR TALKS WHICH REVEALED A "COMPLETE IDENTITY OF VIEWS."

2. THERE STILL IS NO CONFIRMATION OF RUMORS THAT A MEETING OF THE SOVIET PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE WAS HELD 2 SEPTEMBER. ALTHOUGH COMMUNIST NEWSMEN ARE REPORTING THE PRESENCE IN THE SOVIET CAPITOL OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS FROM THE PROVINCES, THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW REPORTED THAT ACTIVITY IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HEAD-QUARTERS APPEARED NORMAL TODAY.

3. THE TONE AND CONTENT OF SOVIET PRESS TREATMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION IS LESS VICIOUS THAN IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. THE SOVIET PARTY NEWSPAPER PRAVDA HAS REPORTED WITHOUT COMMENT THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW CZECHOSLOVAK PRESIDUM. MOSCOW EVIDENTLY WISHES TO EASE TENSIONS WHILE ALLOWING DUBCEK TIME TO MOVE ON SOVIET-RECOMMENDED "REFORMS." THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER IZVESTIA, HOWEVER, IMPLICITLY URGED THE DISMISSAL OF TWO LEADING CZECHOSLOVAK OFFICIALS -- BOTH ARE ABROAD -- BY CASTIGATING THEM IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED TODAY. SOVIET RUSSIA, A NEWSPAPER OF THE SOVIET PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CALLED TODAY FOR VIGILANCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED ACTIVITY OF "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY SCUM" THERE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 02-59

By *sj* NARA Date 1-22-07

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4. WESTERN PRESS SERVICES REPORT THAT THE SITUATION IN PRAGUE AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IS BEGINNING TO RETURN TO NORMAL. SOVIET FORCES REPORTEDLY HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE PRAGUE HEADQUARTERS OF THE NEWS AGENCY CTK, THE RADIO STATION IN BRATISLAVA, THE PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE IN HRADCANY CASTLE, AND MOST MINISTRIES. TROOPS REMAINED, HOWEVER, AT THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND INTERIOR AND IN WENCESLAS SQUARE. THEY ALSO OCCUPY 10 OF THE 14 CZECHOSLOVAK CIVIL AIRPORTS, BUT RADIO BRATISLAVA REPORTED THIS AFTERNOON THAT CIVIL FLIGHTS BETWEEN THE SLOVAK CAPITAL AND PRAGUE MAY RESUME SOON. AP CITED CZECHOSLOVAK SOURCES AS STATING THAT INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS WILL PROBABLY RESUME BEFORE THE BRNO TRADE FAIR BEGINS IN MID-SEPTEMBER. RUDE PRAVO REPORTED THAT INTERNATIONAL TRAIN SERVICE HAS RESUMED TO ALL COUNTRIES BUT HUNGARY.

5. ACCORDING TO A REUTERS REPORT TODAY THE CZECHOSLOVAK PRESS IS PREPARED TO CENSOR ITSELF. THE NEW CENSORSHIP BUREAU HAS ISSUED BROAD GUIDELINES THAT NO "NEGATIVE INFORMATION AND COMMENT" CONCERNING MOSCOW AND ITS ALLIES, OR CRITICAL COMMENT OF THE PARTY, POLICE, WORKER'S MILITIA, OR ARMY WILL BE TOLERATED.

6. RADIO BRATISLAVA REPORTEDLY BROADCAST TODAY THAT HUNGARIAN TROOPS WERE BEGINNING TO LEAVE CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND REUTERS REPORTED THAT POLISH AND BULGARIAN OCCUPATION TROOPS WERE ALSO WITHDRAWING. AS YET, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO FIRM EVIDENCE THAT ANY OCCUPYING GROUND FORCES HAVE LEFT THE COUNTRY.

7. SEVERAL MILITARY ATTACHES IN HUNGARY HAVE MADE TRIPS TO AREAS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY NEAR THE RUMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV BORDERS FROM 30 AUGUST TO 2 SEPTEMBER AND REPORT NO SOVIET OR HUNGARIAN MILITARY ACTIVITY INDICATIVE OF A BUILDUP IN THESE AREAS.

8. THIRTY-TWO OF THE APPROXIMATELY 100 BULGARIAN AIRCRAFT WHICH DEPLOYED TO AIRFIELDS IN NORTHEASTERN BULGARIA ON 28 AUGUST FLEW TO BASES IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY THIS MORNING.

SECRET

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INFORMATION

24

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 3, 1968
7:10 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I think the attached memorandum, summarizing some 30 reports on divisions in the Soviet leadership over Czechoslovakia, will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 29, NARA, Date 1-7-93

WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

94a

SECRET

September 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Divisions in the Soviet Leadership

CIA has pulled together some thirty reports from their own sources, diplomats, and journalists on the stand of various Soviet leaders on the Czech crisis (Tab A). The following analysis is highly speculative, but --I hope-- interesting.

Conclusions: A crude numerical "tally" of reports would have six in favor of intervention (Brezhnev, Podgorny, Shelest, Kirilenko, Pelshe and Polyansky), and five against (Kosygin, Suslov, Shelepin, Voronov and Mazurov). Probably some of those against intervention swung over to the majority. Several reports have it that the final vote was 8-3, with Kosygin, Suslov and Shelepin against.

If these thirty reports are to be believed, it was an unstable lineup -- and an excruciating decision.

Kosygin - Of seventeen reports which touch on his position, sixteen have him in opposition to the intervention or expressing strong reservations. The seventeenth simply says he took a "hard line" in the Cierna negotiations but does not comment on his position on the invasion question. If there is truth to any of this reporting, Kosygin opposed the move.

Brezhnev - Nine reports have him favoring intervention and two opposed. Interestingly, eight other reports variously describe him as having vacillated, hesitated or expressed reservations, and then swung over or acquiesced in the invasion scheme. Such a shift would not be altogether out of character, judging from reports of his actions in other crises.

Podgorny - Two reports have him favoring intervention. Perhaps the small number of references to him reflect his having played a small role.

Shelest - The six reports which mention him by name describe him as an ardent interventionist -- perhaps the strongest of them. His inclusion, with the top three, in the delegation for the earlier negotiations of the Warsaw Five might have reflected his leadership of a hard-line opinion in the Politburo (at a time when Brezhnev was still on the fence and Kosygin sympathetic to the Czechs). As a Ukrainian, Shelest may have been particularly apprehensive about the spill-over effects of Czech freedom among his own restive people -- particularly the intellectuals.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-56
By SL NARA, Date 10-3-02

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2

Suslov - Five reports have him favoring intervention while nine reports have him opposing it or expressing strong reservations. While Suslov has been described for years as the intransigent ideologist and hard-liner of the Politburo, he is, nevertheless, the man responsible for the forthcoming World Party Congress. The Czech intervention may have wrecked years of Suslov's labor -- and he must have been the Politburo member closest to World Communist reaction.

Shelepin - Two reports have Shelepin for the intervention and three have him against. As a former challenger for top leadership whose wings were clipped, Shelepin may be casting about discreetly for allies against Brezhnev. This is what Malenkov did in somewhat similar circumstances after he lost the Premiership in 1955. Shelepin has been described as something of an opportunist in past crises.

Other Politburo Members - Kirilenko and Pelshe are each described by one report as favoring intervention. Voronov and Mazurov are each described by the report as against it. No report gives Polyansky's position explicitly, but several indicate a majority which must have included him favoring intervention.

The Military - Seven reports describe "the military" as pressing for intervention while one has them against. Only three reports mention Grechko's personal position. Of those three, two report him as opposed to intervention. It is worth remembering that earlier in the summer Red Star, the Army newspaper, printed some articles friendly to the Czechs and implicitly bearish on intervention.


Nathaniel Davis

Attachment
As stated.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

946

Reports on Divisions in Soviet Leadership Regarding Czechoslovak Crisis:

New York Times 8/29/68 (Vincent Buist) cites a Communist source in Prague: Brezhnev, Kosygin & Suslov had strong reservations about occupation; Shelest & Shelepin, supported by Grechko, pushed military intervention.

[REDACTED] Podgorny, Suslov and possibly Kirilenko may be removed in aftermath of crisis; Party Secretary Katushev & KGB Chairman Andropov intimately involved in affair, careers would depend on future events concerning Czechoslovakia; said Mazurov is a possible comer.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Suslov one of most vocal opponents against intervention; Brezhnev, previously having avoided hard-line on Czechoslovakia, threw in his lot with interventionists and negated Suslov's arguments.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Leaders like Shelepin, Kosygin, Suslov, Voronov and Grechko opposed intervention; hardliners, especially the military, advocated intervention; Brezhnev accepted the counsel of the latter group [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] decision to intervene represented a yielding by some civilian leaders to their military colleagues.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] says he found it difficult to believe that Kosygin would have approved the Soviet action.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] many rumors present, most plausible of which, but nonetheless unconfirmed, placed decision on military intervention within Politburo as 8 to 3, with Kosygin, Suslov & Shelepin against.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Brezhnev primarily responsible for decision to intervene; says [REDACTED] have firm information that Suslov had opposed it.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] decision to intervene was pushed by Suslov; Kosygin fought it; Brezhnev initially vacillated, then joined those advocating intervention.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Kosygin, Shelepin & Suslov opposed intervention.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 02-56

By ebm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] Kosygin & Suslov have most consistently been reported as against intervention; Brezhnev is frequently reported as vacillating; Podgorny & Shelest reportedly pushed for intervention; no firm evidence on attitude of the military.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Kosygin, supported by two other members of the Politburo opposed intervention; remainder of Politburo & Chief of Staff of Warsaw Pact nations were in favor; Brezhnev depicted as leading the "Hawk" faction, not only on Czechoslovakia but also on question of taking over West Berlin.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] cites an unidentified member of Ukrainian government--Kosygin, supported by two other members of Politburo opposed intervention; remainder of Politburo & Warsaw Pact military officials favored it; Brezhnev said to favor seizure of West Berlin as well as occupation of Czechoslovakia.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

State 223567 8/19/68 Dutch Counselor at Embassy DC: at Cierna Shelest was the hard-liner, Brezhnev tended seek compromise; Kosygin sought to soft-pedal the crisis.

[REDACTED] UAR Ambassador is convinced Kosygin opposed intervention; heard rumor that Kosygin & Grechko resigned but withdrew resignations when majority decided to go ahead with intervention; knows that Mazurov supported Kosygin.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Suslov provided lead in support for Czechs at Cierna; Brezhnev, Kosygin & Shelest took a very hard-line.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] relaxation of tension at Cierna-Bratislava reflected efforts of Kosygin; thought Suslov & Brezhnev led opposition to Kosygin re crisis.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] at Cierna Shelest, on the third day of talks, made a crude & groundless attack on whole Czech policy & its individual representatives.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Cierna meeting was an exercise set up by Moscow's "doves" who include both Brezhnev and Kosygin, to convert "hawks" who include Suslov, to view that intervention is not necessary.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] 1.5(cc)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] He blames Brezhnev for mis-handling Czech crisis. Allegedly Brezhnev reneged on tough line decided upon at Warsaw meeting July 14-15, arranging Cierna meeting so he could master crisis on a 'party' basis and thereby gain personal popularity and acclaim.

[REDACTED] 1.5(cc)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] Dubcek and Brezhnev met to establish guidelines for talks when breakdown was near; participation at Cierna after that point was limited to Brezhnev, Kosygin and Suslov on the Soviet side.

[REDACTED] 1.5(cc)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] particularly sharp statements were made at Cierna by Brezhnev and Suslov, Brezhnev even made personal attack on Dubcek.

[REDACTED] 1.5(cc)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] At Cierna there were slight differences, even on first day of talks, discernible between views of Kosygin and Brezhnev.

[REDACTED] 1.5(cc)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] CP Czechoslovakia believes Soviet leadership is divided into a hard line group made up of Podgorny, Suslov and the Soviet military leadership; and a more conciliatory group, composed of Kosygin and the moderates around him. Brezhnev is said to have taken a position between the two groups, both of which are attempting to bring him over to their side.

[REDACTED] 1.5(cc)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] that USSR will "never" tolerate the collapse of socialism in Czechoslovakia. [REDACTED] during ensuing talks with Tito, is said to have told Tito that he sensed a "nuance" of difference among the Soviet leaders when he spoke to them, sometimes separately. He felt that the toughest was definitely Brezhnev and the less emphatic was Kosygin.

Christian Science Monitor 8/22/68 (Paul Wohl) "Criticism of Mr. Brezhnev and several of his close colleagues came especially from the military and from

Ukrainian party boss Shelest, an important member of the Politburo who, according to Czech sources, took the toughest stand at the Cierna conference. Other Politburo members who are known to have taken a tough stand in Cierna and apparently disapproved of Bratislava are trade-union chief Shelepin and the head of the party control commission, veteran Bolshevik Arvid Pelshe." Also says that the military appear to have insisted on military intervention.

Washington Post 8/11/68 (Anatole Shub report from Prague) Says that Suslov is said to have played a conciliatory role at Cierna meeting and at Bratislava, was being singled out for praise by "ambitious young Czechoslovak communist officials." Says Czechs believe that Brezhnev has been holding to the middle ground. Also says that Kirilenko is reported to have been a "hawk" in the later stages of the Czech crisis.

Washington Post 8/4/68 (Kenneth Ames from Prague) "It was quickly learned in Prague that Soviet party chief Brezhnev himself had advocated immediate military intervention. Credit for staying his hand at that critical time should probably be shared by the Hungarians (Kadar), the divided Soviet Politburo and the Soviet military command." (Thus he describes the pre-Cierna period, saying that Soviet-sponsored coup, planned for July 15-17, was called off at last moment.

New York Times 8/25/68 (David Binder) Cites "highly reliable" Eastern European sources travelling to Berlin: hard-line politicians and generals rammed through the intervention scheme over objections of Brezhnev, Kosygin and Kadar.

Wood
25

Tuesday, September 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Condolence Message from President Somoza

At Tab A is a message of condolence from President Somoza over the death of Ambassador Mein.

At Tab B for your approval is a suggested response.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

State recommends that the language of this response be used to reply to condolence messages which may be received from other Chiefs of State.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

2652
95a
—
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 4484
Spanish

TELEGRAM

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

29 AUGUST 1968

10:43

HIS EXCELLENCY

LYNDON B JOHNSON

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA, PROFOUNDLY DISTURBED
BY THE DEATH OF YOUR AMBASSADOR IN GUATEMALA, GORDON MEIN,
WISH TO EXPRESS THEIR SORROW TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES. THE DESPICABLE ASSASSINATION PERPETRATED
BY THE ENEMIES OF DEMOCRACY WILL SERVE TO INCREASE OUR
GRATITUDE AND ADMIRATION FOR THE VALOROUS MEMBERS OF THE UNITED
STATES DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN OUR COUNTRIES AS THEY JOIN IN
OUR DESIRE FOR PEACE, FREEDOM AND PROGRESS.

A. SOMOZA

DRAFT MESSAGE

956
—

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate your message of condolence on the death of Ambassador John Gordon Mein. Ambassador Mein was a distinguished representative of the United States. Like a soldier, he gave his life in the line of duty. We are greatly saddened by his tragic passing, but also inspired by his example. Your message of sympathy is a tribute to his memory.

Sincerely,

96
ACTION

Tuesday, September 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file
SUBJECT: Presidential message renaming the Navy Communication Station
in Australia in honor of Harold Holt

On September 20 the U.S. Naval Communication Station at Northwest Cape in Australia is to be renamed in honor of Harold Holt. Prime Minister Horton will be present as will Zara Holt. The United States will be represented by Bill Crook and Assistant Secretary of Navy Randolph Driver.

There follows for your approval a Presidential message which would be read on the occasion and would formally rename the Station in honor of Harold Holt:

"One year ago I had the privilege of playing a part in the commissioning of the United States Naval Communication Station at Northwest Cape. At that time I sent a message to Prime Minister Harold E. Holt, who had taken a great interest in the establishment of the Station and honored its commissioning by his presence. I said that the Station was a symbol both of Australia's welcome to United States forces and of the United States' firm intention to play a continuing role in the pursuit of peace in Asia.

"Today Harold Holt is no longer with us. With his passing Australia lost a valiant leader, a statesman of vision and courage. The United States lost a great and gallant friend. And I lost a trusted comrade whose counsel and support I deeply valued.

"The Naval Communication Station at Northwest Cape already symbolizes the bonds of friendship and the common goals which unite us. The American people desire that it should serve, also, as a memorial to Harold Holt and the great personal contribution which he made to the deepening of that friendship and to progress towards those goals. We would like it to serve as a lasting reminder of the affection and warm admiration we had for him.

"In that spirit, with the concurrence of the Australian Government and with deep personal satisfaction I hereby rename this Station the United States Naval Communication Station, Harold E. Holt. Lyndon B. Johnson."

I recommend you approve the message.

Approve _____

W. W. Rostow

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

STATE:MWright:wpt

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

SENT
WHCA

97

EEA497
CO WTE10
DE WTE 3673

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82364

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: DIGEST OF STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS

NIGERIA AGREES TO EMERGENCY FLIGHTS

NIGERIA HAS AGREED TO RED CROSS EMERGENCY RELIEF FLIGHTS
TO AN AIRSTRIP IN BIAFRA FOR 10 DAYS BEGINNING THURSDAY.

MODIFIED "NO FORCE REDUCTION" PLEDGE

MISSION NATO REPORTS THAT BELGIAN DEFENSE MINISTER
SEGERS IS DRAFTING A STATEMENT WHICH WILL INDICATE
BELGIUM IS POSTPONING TROOP WITHDRAWALS, AND WILL,
IN FACT, DEPLOY ADDITIONAL BELGIAN ELEMENTS TO WEST
GERMANY. THE STATEMENT WILL BE PRESENTED IN TOMORROW'S
MEETING OF THE NATO DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE.

EASTERN ARAB DEFENSE COMMAND

JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL KHAMMASH TOLD OUR
DEFENSE ATTACHE THAT THE EASTERN ARAB DEFENSE COMMAND
COMPOSED OF SYRIA, IRAQ, AND JORDAN - WILL BE FORMED
OCTOBER 1. ITS COMMANDER WILL BE AN IRAQI, WITH
HEADQUARTERS IN SYRIA. THE UAR WILL NOT PARTICIPATE
WITH FORCES, BUT ONLY IN A LIAISON AND COORDINATION
FUNCTION.

CYPRUS

EMBASSY NICOSIA REPORTS THAT TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADER
DENKTASH HAS CALLED, IN AN INTERVIEW, FOR AN INTER-
COMMUNAL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BETTER SAFEGUARD THE
TURKISH COMMUNITY'S RIGHTS AND PROPERTY THAN DOES THE
1963 CONSTITUTION. THE EMBASSY REPORTS THIS IS THE
FIRST PUBLIC CRACK IN THE RIGID TURKISH CYPRIOT POSITION
ON THE INVIOABILITY OF THE 1963 CONSTITUTION. THE EMBASSY
BELIEVES HE IS TRYING TO EDUCATE THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS
TO THE NEED FOR GIVE AND TAKE IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.

SEP 5 21 11

68 SEP 5 11 PM 5:29

TUESDAY

Pres file

TG: 032041Z SEP 68
FROM QUOTE COPY

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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WHCA

1967 SEP 3 20 13

VZCZCEEA496
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3672

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82363

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

YOU MAY WISH TO KNOW THAT SEC. RUSK, SEC. CLIFFORD
AND I MET FOR A LONG LUNCH TODAY IN SEC. CLIFFORD'S OFFICE.

WE DISCUSSED THE WISDOM AND POSSIBLE CONTENT OF A NEW
INITIATIVE WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS.

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A NEW INITIATIVE AT THIS TIME
ARE THE FOLLOWING:

-- AFTER THE CHICAGO CONVENTION AND THE MANY PROPOSITIONS
PUT TO HANOI VIA PARIS, IT IS "THEIR MOVE." (NICK KATZENBACH,
AMONG OTHERS, STRONGLY HOLDS THIS VIEW.)

-- HANOI HAS CRANKED UP THE OSLO CHANNEL WHICH GOES TO
WORK SEPTEMBER 29, AND IT MAY BE WISE TO SEE WHAT THEY HAD
IN MIND BEFORE WE MOVE OFF THE POSITION WE HAVE SO AMPLY
COMMUNICATED TO THEM WITHOUT ANY RESPONSE FROM THEIR SIDE.
THE POINT WAS, PERHAPS, MOST GENERALLY PUT BY SEC. RUSK
WHEN HE EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT WE MIGHT MOVE AND PROJECT
SOME WEAKNESS OR ANXIETY TO HANOI JUST BEFORE THEY WERE
PREPARED TO MAKE SOME MOVEMENT IN OUR DIRECTION; AND
OUR MOVE MIGHT ENCOURAGE THEM TO SIT BACK FOR SOME FURTHER
PERIOD OF TIME.

-- WE OUGHT TO KNOW BETTER WHERE THEY INTEND TO GO WITH
THEIR THIRD WAVE OFFENSIVE, ON WHICH I HAVE JUST SENT YOU A
RATHER FULL AND REASSURING ANALYSIS BY GEN. ABRAMS.

-- IF WE PLAN TO APPROACH KOSYGIN, IT MIGHT BE WORTH WAITING
A FEW DAYS TO SEE HOW THINGS EVOLVE IN PRAGUE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS THOMPSON AND BOHLEN'S VIEW THAT
THIS IS A RATHER GOOD TIME TO APPROACH THE LEADERS IN MOSCOW
WHO APPEAR ANXIOUS TO REHABILITATE THEMSELVES A BIT AFTER THE
WORLDWIDE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTION AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

IN ADDITION, OF COURSE, WE ALL UNDERSTOOD FULLY THE REASONS
WHICH LED THE PRESIDENT TO SUGGEST THAT WE SEARCH FOR ANY
IMAGINATIVE INITIATIVE OF WHICH WE CAN CONCEIVE THAT MIGHT MOVE
THE NEGOTIATIONS OFF DEAD CENTER;

THEREFORE, WE ARE PREPARING A POSSIBLE COMMUNICATION TO
KOSYGIN. IF IT WERE JUDGED THAT A DIRECT APPROACH TO KOSYGIN
WAS NOT WISE AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE COULD PUT THE PROPOSITION
TO ZORIN IN PARIS OR DIRECTLY TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AT THE NEXT
PRIVATE SESSION;

INDEED, THE FIRST THING WE HAVE TO FIND OUT IS WHETHER,
AT THE TEA BREAK TOMORROW, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE PREPARED
TO PROCEED WITH A PRIVATE SESSION.

DTG 031937Z SEP 68

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~
EZA495
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DE WTE 3671

SENT
WHCA

1967 SEP 3 20 00

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82362

~~SECRET~~

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

HEREWITH CLARK CLIFFORD'S LETTER TO ME COMMENTING ON GENERAL TAYLOR'S SUGGESTION THAT WE REESTABLISH SOMETHING LIKE THE FORMER NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE NSC. AS YOU SEE, SEC. CLIFFORD AND GEN. WHEELER BELIEVE THAT PRESENT STAFF WORK WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FULLY COVERS THE WORK FORMERLY DONE BY THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE AND, THEREFORE, THEY DO NOT BELIEVE A NEW STUDY IS REQUIRED.

I WILL MAKE SEC. CLIFFORD'S LETTER AVAILABLE TO GEN. TAYLOR.

QUOTE

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST THAT WE LOOK INTO MAX TAYLOR'S SUGGESTION FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE SORT OF STUDY LAST CONDUCTED BY THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE NSC IN 1963, I HAVE HAD MY STAFF REVIEW EXISTING STUDIES TO DETERMINE WHETHER A NEW NES-TYPE EFFORT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE.

NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE NES STUDIES WERE INITIATED IN THE 1950'S AT A TIME WHEN OUR STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES WERE FAR LESS THAN THEY ARE TODAY AND MORE SIGNIFICANTLY FOR PURPOSES OF A NEW STUDY, WE LACKED THE ANALYTICAL CAPABILITY TO ASSESS RELATIVE U.S. AND SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN VARIOUS SCENARIOS. GENERAL WHEELER AND I FIND THAT EXISTING CURRENT MATERIAL FULLY COVERS THE GROUND OF THE NET EVALUATION STUDIES.

OUR INTELLIGENCE IN REGARD TO SOVIET CAPABILITIES HAS VASTLY IMPROVED, AS REFLECTED IN PERIODICAL NIES ON SOVIET STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, UPDATED VERSIONS OF BOTH OF WHICH WILL BE FORTHCOMING SHORTLY (NIES 11-8 AND 11-3).

THE DOD STRATEGIC FORCE AND EFFECTIVENESS TABLES, LAST REVISED ON AUGUST 7, 1968, CONSIDER RELATIVE STRENGTHS IN A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT STRATEGIC SITUATIONS, AND WE HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF READILY PREPARING ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR ANY PARTICULAR SCENARIO NOT COVERED. THE FORTHCOMING DPM ON U.S. STRATEGIC AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS ALSO COVERS MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THIS MATERIAL GENERAL WHEELER AND I ARE CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE TO PROCEED WITH A NEW NET EVALUATION STUDY. END QUOTE

DTG: 031911Z SEP 68

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-68
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

XEROX FROM QUICHE COPY

99
The file
60 SEP
PM 4:21
TUESDAY

100
SENT
WHCA

1967 SEP 3 19 58

EEA494
OO WTE13
DE WTE 3670

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82361

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-58
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

YOU WILL WISH TO READ ABRAMS' LUCID SUMMARY OF THE MILITARY SITUATION.

A. IT IS BECOMING CLEAR THAT THE ENEMY HAS ATTEMPTED TO LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE EFFORT, POSSIBLY HIS GREATEST THUS FAR. YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE SURGE IN INFILTRATION PRECEDING THE AUGUST EFFORT. IT IS NOTEWORTHY TO ME THAT THE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES IN NORTH VIETNAM AND SOUTH VIETNAM CAUSED BY TACAIR AND B-52 WERE AS FOLLOWS: 5 APRIL-4 MAY TOTAL 1730 AND 19 JULY-17 AUGUST TOTAL 4772. COMPARING THE PERIOD OF 18-29 AUG 68 TO 5-16 MAY 68 WE FIND THAT THE ENEMY KIA FOR THE AUGUST PERIOD TOTAL ABOUT 8500, WHILE THE ENEMY KIA FOR THE MAY PERIOD RUN TO ABOUT 12,000. ENEMY INITIATED GROUND ASSAULTS AND ATTACKS BY FIRE TOTAL ALMOST 300 FOR EACH PERIOD. WE SAW MORE GROUND ASSAULTS IN THE MAY PERIOD AND A FEW MORE ATTACKS BY FIRE IN AUGUST. IN MAR THE ENEMY FIRED AN AVERAGE OF 21 ROUNDS PER ATTACK BY FIRE (ABF); IN AUGUST HE EXPENDED 34 ROUNDS PER ABF.

B. EXCEPT FOR DANANG, HIS OPERATIONS THUS FAR, HAVE BEEN PREPARATORY AND DIVERSIONARY IN NATURE. HE HAS TRIED TO ATTRACT US FROM HIS PRIMARY OBJECTIVES. HE SEEKS TO ATTRIT OUR FORCES ON GROUND OF HIS CHOOSING. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE HAS MADE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO GET INTO DANANG. HE FOUGHT HARD AT DANANG AND HAD AROUND 1200 KILLED IN ACTION THERE.

C. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DISLOCATE HIS PLANS. HE HAD A MAJOR ATTACK PLANNED FOR THE DMZ AND THE TRI-THIEN AREA ON 26-27 AUGUST. HE COULD NOT GET IT OFF. HIS DANANG FAILURE HAS FORCED HIM TO SHIFT THE 21ST REGIMENT OF THE 2D NVA DIVISION NORTH TO REINFORCE HIS FRONT 4 UNITS. ON THE WAY NORTH THIS REGIMENT GOT ENTANGLED IN THE FIGHTING WEST OF TAM KY AND TOOK AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CASUALTIES. WE KNOW THAT THE ENEMY HAS HAD TO POSTPONE PLANNED ATTACKS IN THE DELTA AT CAI LAI AND CAN THO. HE HAS LOST OVER 600 KIA AT DUC LAP WITHOUT ATTRACTING A SINGLE FRIENDLY UNIT FROM THE DEFENSE OF BAN ME THOUT. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE

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TUESDAY

Pres file

ORCHESTRATION OF HIS EFFORTS AROUND SAIGON HAVE BEEN THROWN OFF IN TIMING AND RESULTS REQUIRING HIM TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT ADJUSTMENTS TO HIS PLANS. WE HAVE A REPORT FROM A VERY RELIABLE PENETRANT AGENT THAT HIGH RANKING CADRE FROM HIS SUB-REGION HEADQUARTERS LEFT ON 18 AUGUST TO ATTEND A MEETING AT COSVN. THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO RECEIVE ORDERS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. THIS SAME AGENT STATED THAT THE ATTACK ON SAIGON HAD BEEN POSTPONED AND THAT THE CADRE WHO HAD GONE TO COSVN HAD NOT RETURNED BY 29 AUGUST.

D. GENERALLY, THE RVNAF HAVE PERFORMED COMPETENTLY, AND IN SOME CASES, WITH DISTINCTION. THE FRIENDLY OPERATION AT DUC LAP, TO GIVE JUST ONE EXAMPLE, WAS FIRST RATE. RVNAF MORALE IS GOOD, AND ITS CONFIDENCE IS HIGH. ARVN OPERATIONS SINCE JUNE IN THE DELTA HAVE BEEN MOST SUCCESSFUL. THEY HAVE KEPT THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY THERE ON A DECLINING CURVE.

OUR PREEMPTIONS ARE PERHAPS FORCING THE ENEMY TO RECONSIDER HIS CONCEPT FOR THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. IF SO, IT SEEMS TO US HE HAS THREE BASIC COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO HIM. FIRST, HE CAN CARRY FORWARD HIS THIRD OFFENSIVE, LAUNCHING MAJOR ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY EITHER SIMULTANEOUSLY OR IN IMMEDIATE TANDEM. SECOND, HE CAN DELAY THE INITIATION OF MAJOR ATTACKS, CREATING ANOTHER "LULL PERIOD", CONCENTRATING HIS EFFORTS AGAINST SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS AND DISTRICT AND PROVINCE CAPITALS, AND STRETCHING-OUT HIS OFFENSIVE. THIRD, HE CAN CANCEL THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. I BELIEVE HE WOULD PREFER TO ADOPT THE FIRST COURSE OF ACTION. OUR PREEMPTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE GIVING HIM MAJOR PROBLEMS, AND MAY DRIVE HIM INTO THE SECOND COURSE OF ACTION - THE STRETCH OUT. AS OUR FRIENDLY OPERATIONS CONTINUE, WE AIM TO SO DISLOCATE HIS PLANS THAT HE WILL CALL OFF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE JUST AS HE CANCELLED THE SECOND OFFENSIVE ON 14 JUNE 68.

THERE IS TO MY MIND ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WHICH WE SHOULD CONTEMPLATE. AT SOME POINT IN THIS THIRD OFFENSIVE THE ENEMY MAY ACCEPT THE FUTILITY OF HIS BLOODY ATTACKS AND THE STERILITY OF THE OFFENSIVE MAIN FORCE WAR STRATEGY HE HAD ADOPTED FOR 68. AT THAT POINT, WHILE HE STILL HAS SIZEABLE FORCES AS BARGAINING POINTS, HE MAY ASK FOR A CEASEFIRE OR SOME SIMILAR PLOY. IF THIS SHOULD OCCUR, I THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE REALIZE THAT THE ENEMY IS DEALING FROM A POSITION OF MILITARY WEAKNESS, WHILE WE ARE IN A POSITION OF MILITARY STRENGTH AND GROWING.

REGARDLESS OF WHAT COURSE OF ACTION THE ENEMY ADOPTS, WE WILL BE READY FOR HIM. HOPEFULLY, WE WILL BE AHEAD OF HIM. WE HAVE ALREADY COST THE ENEMY 8500 KIA IN THIS CAMPAIGN, AND HE CAN SHOW NOTHING OF VALUE FOR THEM. WITH OUR COMBINED STRENGTH AND THE ATTITUDE OF QUIET DETERMINATION, TEAMWORK, AND SOLID CONFIDENCE I FIND AMONG COMMANDERS WHEREVER I VISIT, I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO DEFEAT HIM.

DTG 031900Z SEPTEMBER 1968

Xerox from Quick Copy

ACTION

101

Tuesday, September 3, 1968

5:30pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a message to King Baudouin of Belgium, thanking him for his birthday greetings to you and congratulating him in turn on his birthday. He will be thirty-eight on September 7.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

WWR

ERF:mm

101a

Your Majesty:

**Thank you for your kind message of
birthday greetings. Please accept in turn my
warm congratulations and sincere best wishes
on the occasion of your birthday. May every
happiness and success come to you and your
countrymen in the years ahead.**

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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T-116/R-XX
French

WN 4 43 VIA RCA

BRUSSELS 1650 AUGUST 26, 1968

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR BIRTHDAY IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME
TO EXTEND MY SINCERE WISHES FOR YOUR PERSONAL HAPPINESS AND FOR
THE HAPPINESS OF THOSE DEAR TO YOU.

BAUDOUIN

SENT
WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

102

1967 SEP 3 16 53

68-SEP

PM 12:58

TUESDAY

EEA498
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3664

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO JAMES JONES
CITE CAP82356

free file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

I WOULD APPRECIATE ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
FOR PLANNING PURPOSES.

1. FOR WHAT TIME IS THE NSC MEETING SCHEDULED TOMORROW?
2. DOES THE PRESIDENT ENVISAGE A TUESDAY LUNCH THIS WEEK?
IF SO, WHEN?
3. SHOULD TOMMY THOMPSON AND HARLAN CLEVELAND BE AT THE
NSC MEETING? I RECOMMEND THAT THEY BE PRESENT SINCE BOTH SOVIET
POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF NATO WILL BE UNDER EXAMINATION.
4. TOMMY THOMPSON MAY BE LEAVING FOR MOSCOW AS EARLY AS
FRIDAY. WOULD THE PRESIDENT LIKE TO SEE HIM BEFORE HE RETURNS
TO MOSCOW? I SUSPECT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA AND THAT SEC. RUSK
SHOULD ALSO BE PRESENT, SINCE THOMPSON NEEDS THE PRESIDENT'S
GUIDANCE AS TO HOW TO PLAY OUR RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW IN THE
DAYS AHEAD.
5. SECRETARY FOWLER WILL NOT BE ATTENDING THE COUNCIL
MEETING. JOE BARR IS ACTING SECRETARY. SHOULD BARR BE
INVITED?

DTG: 031624Z SEP 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-17-92

SENT
WHCA

1967 SEP 3 16 47

68 SEP 3 PM 12:58

TUESDAY 103

~~SECRET~~

EEA489
OO WTE 18
DE WTE 3665

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82357

free file

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS PARIS REPORT OF COMMUNIST ASSASSINATION INTENTIONS IN VIETNAM. THE "ME" IN THE TEXT IS GENERAL WALTERS, AN EXPERIENCED HAND. SAIGON HAS BEEN INFORMED.

QUOTE.

SAME INFORMANT WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY GIVEN ME INFORMATION ON VIET-NAM WHICH HARRIMAN DELEGATION HAS FOUND USEFUL HAS INFORMED ME THAT IN CONTACTS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE IN PARIS HE HAS ASCERTAINED THAT THE ORDERS GIVEN TO THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR URBAN TERRORISM IN SAIGON ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. ASSASSINATE GENERAL ABRAMS WHATEVER THE COSTS, WITH HIS PRINCIPAL ASSISTANTS, DURING MONTH OF SEPTEMBER.
2. MULTIPLY TERRORIST ATTACKS IN CITIES.
3. DO NOT HESITATE TO ATTACK CIVILIAN DIPLOMATS AT U.S. EMBASSY.
4. DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO DISRUPT ECONOMY OF SOUTH VIET-NAM.

SAME SOURCE SAID THAT IN CONVERSATION HA VAN LAU, ONE OF PRINCIPAL DELEGATES TO PARIS TALKS, LATTER TOLD HIM, "ABRAMS IS REALLY HURTING US. HE SEEMS TO KNOW WHAT WE ARE PLANNING TO DO AND PREMPTS MOVE, BUT WE WILL NOT GIVE IN."

COMMENT: THIS SOURCE IS FRENCHMAN, BORN IN VIET-NAM, EDUCATED THERE, SERVED NINE YEARS IN FRENCH ARMY THERE AND HAS VERY WIDE CONTACTS WITH VIETNAMESE OF ALL CONVICTIONS IN PARIS. WHILE I CANNOT VERIFY ABOVE, HE HAS GIVEN ME ACCURATE INFORMATION IN PAST.

END QUOTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-68
By ctm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

~~SECRET~~

DTG 031625Z SEPT 68

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1967 AUG 29 19 32

EEA487
00 WTE10
DE WTE 3663

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82354

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

~~SECRET~~

SEPTEMBER 3, 1968

THIS BALL-MANESCU CONVERSATION MAY INTEREST YOU,
INCLUDING EVALUATION OF YOUR SAN ANTONIO STATEMENT.

USUN 6363

QUOTE

BALL, ACCOMPANIED BY BUFFUM, CALLED ON MANESCU SEPT 2 PRIOR
TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR LONDON AND BUCHAREST. MANESCU MADE
FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. PRES. CEAUSESCU WISHED CONVEY PERSONAL APPRECIATION
FOR PRES. JOHNSON'S AUG 30 STATEMENT, WHICH RUMANIAN GOVT.
REGARDED AS WISE, IMPORTANT AND HELPFUL.
2. US INTERVENTION WITH USSR IN RUSK-DOBRYNIN CONVERSATION
ON THREAT TO RUMANIA ALSO APPRECIATED AND HELPFUL.
3. MANESCU CONCERNED BY NY TIMES STORY SEPT 2 ALLEGING
US DENIED DOBRYNIN GAVE ASSURANCE RUMANIA WOULD NOT BE
INVADED. HE THOUGHT THIS DETRACTED FROM EFFECT OF PRES.
JOHNSON'S SPEECH. BASED ON BUFFUM-WALSH TELCON, BALL
INFORMED MANESCU TIMES STORY MISLEADING, THAT DEPT HAD BEEN
SAYING "NO COMMENT", (WHICH WAS NOT INTENDED BE DENIAL),
AND THAT IMPRESSION CREATED BY NY TIMES WOULD BE CORRECTED.
(WE INFORMED MANESCU OF REPORTS ON SIMILAR ASSURANCES
GIVEN BY ZORIN TO FRENCH, WHICH HE HAD NOT HEARD.)
4. IN CONTRAST TO HIS PREVIOUS RELUCTANCE TO INDICATE
CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARD RUMANIA, MANESCU
CONFESSED HE IS TROUBLED BY REPORTS WHICH STILL BEING
BROUGHT BACK BY RUMANIAN TRAVELLERS OF TROOP MOVEMENTS
ALONG BORDERS. HE SAID RUMANIA "HAD BEEN ASKED" TO DENY
SUCH REPORTS, WHICH HE SAID IT COULD NOT DO. HE THOUGHT
SUCH DENIALS SHOULD COME MORE APPROPRIATELY FROM
COUNTRIES CONCERNED.
5. BALL ASKED WHETHER THERE ANY TRUTH TO REPORTS WARSAW
PACT MANEUVERS SCHEDULED IN RUMANIA LATER THIS YEAR OR NEXT
YEAR. MANESCU SAID HE KNEW OF NO SUCH PLANS AND, INDEED,
WOULD LOOK ON ANY PROPOSAL FOR SUCH MANEUVERS WITH GRAVE
RESERVATIONS.
6. WHILE STRESSING RUMANIA DESIRES AVOID CONFLICT WITH USSR,
HAS NO INTEREST IN US-SOVIET CONFLICT, OR EVEN IN DISRUPTING
IMPROVEMENT IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS, MANESCU SAID HE WOULD
LIKE TO BE ABLE TO REASSURE HIS GOVT US WILL CONTINUE MAKE
CLEAR SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE WOULD VIEW ATTACK ON RUMANIA.
BALL SAID HE WAS SURE WE WOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN SAME
POSITION SO RECENTLY DEMONSTRATED IN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH
AND SECRETARY'S DEMARCHE WITH DOBRYNIN.
7. BALL SAID HE HAD BEEN CRITICIZED IN SOME EDITORIALS
DURING CZECH CRISIS FOR NOT HAVING CONDEMNED COMMUNISM AS A
SYSTEM. SECURITY COUNCIL MADE CLEAR WHAT WE OPPOSE IS EFFORT
BY ONE COUNTRY TO IMPOSE ITS WILL IN ANOTHER; WE ARE NOT
INTERESTED IN ATTACKING REGIMES IN EASTERN EUROPE BECAUSE
OF THEIR IDEOLOGY AS LONG AS THEY SEEK RESOLVE DIFFERENCES
PEACEFULLY AND NOT BY FORCE. END QUOTE

WORLD QUICK COPY

68 SEP 10:45
TUESDAY

1968 SEP 2 16 48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 SEP

PM 1:23

105
MONDAY

EEA279
CO WTE10
DE WTE 3650

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82346

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEREWITH GOWON, MUCH HARRASSED, EXPLAINS HIS POSITION
TO YOU ON FOOD SUPPLIES TO BIAFRA.

MY DEAR PRESIDENT:

"I AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE WHICH CAME TO ME BY
HAND OF YOUR AMBASSADOR, MR. ELBERT G. MATHEWS, ON 15TH
AUGUST. I HAD DELIBERATELY DELAYED REPLYING THE HOPE OF
BEING ABLE TO INFORM YOU THAT, BY AGREEMENT WITH THE REBELS
ON LAND AND AIR CORRIDORS, THE LONG-OUTSTANDING PROBLEM OF
RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR REBEL-HELD AREAS WAS ON THE WAY TO BE-
ING SOLVED. UNFORTUNATELY, WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN ADDIS
ABABA HAVE ELICITED FROM THE REBEL DELEGATION NOTHING MORE
THAN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LAND
AND AIR CORRIDORS.
AS YOU KNOW, THE TRAGEDY ON BOTH SIDES OF THE FIGHTING
LINES HAS CAUSED ME NO END OF ANGUISH. I HAVE HAD TO WATCH
HELPLESSLY WHILE THE REBEL LEADERS HAVE CALLOUSLY USED THE
LIVES OF THE CIVILIANS IN THEIR TERRITORY TO VILIFY MY
GOVERNMENT AND THUS OBTAIN SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT ABROAD. I
HAVE WATCHED, WITH NO LITTLE FRUSTRATION, WORLD OPINION BE-
ING TAKEN FOR A RIDE BY THE REBELS WHO HAVE BRAZENLY REFUSED
TO ALLOW RELIEF SUPPLIES TO GET TO THE THOUSANDS OF SUFFER-
ING CIVILIANS. I SPEAK WITH GREAT FEELING ON THIS SUBJECT,
MR. PRESIDENT, BECAUSE FOR EVERY DAY THE REBELS ARE ENABLED
BY "WORLD OPINION" TO CONTINUE THEIR INTRANSIGENCE SOME TENS,
POSSIBLY HUNDREDS, OF MY FELLOW COUNTRY-MEN ARE UNNECESSARILY
LOSING THEIR LIVES, IF ONLY THIS OPINION BROUGHT PRESSURE TO
BEAR ON THE REBELS TO HAVE COMPASSION AND GIVE UP THEIR FUTILE
ATTEMPT AT SECESSION, THE SUFFERINGS WOULD END IMMEDIATELY.

for file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 12-14-01

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

"MY DELEGATION WENT TO ADDIS ABABA WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO NEGOTIATE A PACKAGE DEAL INVOLVING AN AIR CORRIDOR (WHICH THE REBELS INSIST UPON) AND A LAND CORRIDOR (WHICH I OFFERED IN MAY). MY INSISTENCE ON A LAND CORRIDOR IS NOT BASED ON POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. ALL THE RELIEF EXPERTS WHO HAVE STUDIED THE PROBLEMS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE FIGHTING LINES ARE UNANIMOUS IN THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ONLY PRACTICAL WAY FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES OF THE MAGNITUDE REQUIRED TO REACH THE POPULATION IN REBEL-HELD AREA IS FOR SUPPLIES TO BE SENT BY LAND.

"AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE THINGS MOST NEEDED ARE LOCAL FOODSTUFFS LIKE YAM, GARI, BEANS AND RICE WHICH ARE BULKY ITEMS AND WHICH ARE BETTER TRANSPORTED BY LAND. IT IS VERY SAD TO NOTE ALSO THAT THE REBELS HAVE REJECTED THE OFFER OF MY DELEGATION AT ADDIS ABABA TO CONTRIBUTE LARGE QUANTITIES OF THESE LOCAL FOODSTUFFS TO THE ICRC FOR DISTRIBUTION IN THE REBEL HELD AREAS.

"I AM CONVINCED, THEREFORE, THAT THE REASON FOR THEIR ATTITUDE IS THAT ONCE RELIEF SUPPLIES CAN PASS THROUGH FEDERAL TERRITORY AND BE SEEN TO BE SAFE AND UNCONTAMINATED, THE STING WILL BE TAKEN OUT OF MR. OJUKWU'S PROPAGANDA. THE RESULT WILL BE THAT MANY MORE WOULD DESERT MR. OJUKWU AND HIS REBELLION MIGHT THEREFORE COLLAPSE WITHOUT THE NEED FOR FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH DISAPPOINTED, THEREFORE, I AM NOT SURPRISED THAT MR. OJUKWU IS USING EVERY POSSIBLE RUSE TO AVOID AGREEMENT ON A LAND CORRIDOR WHILE INSISTING ON AIR CORRIDOR AS A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE TO WIN INTERNATIONAL SYMPATHY AND RECOGNITION.

"THE AIR CORRIDOR DEMANDED BY THE REBEL LEADERSHIP IS DESIGNED ALSO TO PROVIDE THEIR SIDE WITH MAXIMUM MILITARY ADVANTAGE AS IT WOULD LIE IN THE PATH OF THE IMMEDIATE ADVANCE OF MY TROOPS AND IS NEARER ON THEIR DIRECT MUNITIONS SUPPLY ROUTE FROM LIBERVILLE IN GABON. IF THE SECESSIONISTS ARE REALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SUFFERINGS OF THE IBOS THEY SHOULD HAND OVER THEIR MAIN AIRFIELD IN THE ULI/INILA AREA TO THE ICRC FOR HANDLING RELIEF SUPPLIES. I AM PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERN FOR THE SUFFERING OF THESE INNOCENT PEOPLE. I AM HOPEFUL THAT PRESSURES FROM THE WORLD LEADERS LIKE YOUR EXCELLENCY MAY PERSUADE OJUKWU TO CHANGE HIS MIND.

"AS REGARDS THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ICRC IT IS UNFORTUNATE THAT IN THEIR ANXIETY TO SHOW THE WORLD THAT THEY ARE DOING SOMETHING TO RELIEVE DISTRESS IN THE REBEL TERRITORY, THE ICRC HAVE INFRINGED THEIR OWN CHARTER, BROKEN OUR LAWS AND EMBARRASSED MY GOVERNMENT. THUS, WHEN THE REBELS WERE DEMANDING A CEASEFIRE AND THE LIFTING OF THE BLOCKADE AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR COMMENCING THE PEACE TALK IN KAMPALA, THE ICRC WAS CONVAISSING AMONG SOME GOVERNMENTS THE NEED FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO LIFT ITS BLOCKADE. THEY ALSO SENT A DELEGATE TO KAMPALA FOR THIS PURPOSE.

"YOUR EMBASSY HERE WAS KIND ENOUGH TO GIVE US ADVANCE INFORMATION ON THIS "HUMANITARIAN" MANOEUVRE. RECENTLY, THE ICRC AGAIN EMBARRASSED MY GOVERNMENT BY SUDDENLY ANNOUNCING THAT THEY HAD OBTAINED "THE NEUTRALISATION OF AN AIR-STRIP IN A SIGNED AGREEMENT WITH THE "BIAFRAN" AUTHORITIES" WITHOUT OBTAINING OUR AGREEMENT.

"MR. PRESIDENT, YOU WILL AGREE THAT NOBODY CAN BE MORE CONCERNED THAN WE NIGERIANS ABOUT THE SUFFERING OF OUR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN IN ANY PART OF THIS COUNTRY. WE RECOGNIZE THE GOOD WORK OF GENUINE HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS. OUR EXPERIENCE HERE HAS SHOWN, HOWEVER, THAT THE HUMANITARIAN ARDOUR SEEMS TO BE RATHER SLECTIVE AND TO BE, MORE AROUSED WHEN THERE ARE PROSPECTS OF PUBLICITY. FOR SOME REASON, THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ICRC IN THE LIBERATED AREAS WHERE THEY CAN OPERATE FREELY DO NOT MATCH THEIR MUCH PUBLICISED CONCERN FOR THE SUFFERINGS OF THE PEOPLE BEHIND THE REBEL LINES.

"MAY I, MR. PRESIDENT, EXPRESS MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR THE THE COOPERATION MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS RECEIVED FROM YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT.

"PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM.

YOURS MOST SINCERELY,
GOWON (SIGNED)

(MAJOR-GENERAL YAKUBU GOWON)
HEAD OF THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES,
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA."

MATHEWS

DTG021548Z SEPT 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

106

1968 SEP 2 15 35

EEA477
OO WTE19
DE WTE 3647

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82344

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-197
By CL, NARA, Date 1-5-95

~~SECRET~~

SEPTEMBER 2, 1968

SEP 2 AM 11:47
MONDAY

I BELIEVE YOU WILL WISH TO READ THIS THOUGHTFUL
ANALYSIS OF LODGE FROM BONN AS BACKGROUND TO NSC
MEETING ON WEDNESDAY.

BONN 16317

SUBJ: WESTERN ACTION ON SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. AS SEEN FROM BONN, THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS NOT ONLY STARTLED BUT ALSO GENUINELY FRIGHTENED MANY GERMANS. THE APPEARANCE OF SOVIET FORCES ON THE BAVARIAN BORDER IS DISTURBING. ALTHOUGH NEARLY ALL GERMAN LEADERS HAVE COMPLETELY REJECTED THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOVIET INVASION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, THE NIGHTLY SIGHT OF SOVIET TANKS IN PRAGUE ON GERMAN TELEVISION SCREENS AT THE HEIGHT OF THE CRISIS AND THE CONVERSION OF THE "SOFT" CZECH-FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BORDER INTO A "MILITARY CURTAIN" HAS ACTIVATED OLD FEARS.

2. HELMUT SCHMIDT HAS TOLD EMBASSY OFFICERS HIS FIRST CONCERN IN FORMULATING THE SOCIALIST DEMOCRATIC PARTY REACTION TO THE INVASION WAS TO FIND MEASURES WHICH WOULD HEAD OFF DEEP POPULAR UNREST. IN HIS BRIEFING TO THE BUNDESTAG FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AUGUST 26, KIESINGER SPOKE OF THE INVASION AS HAVING CAUSED A CHANGE IN THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE. HE ALSO SPOKE OF ALARMING INDICATIONS OF A HITHERTO DISCOUNTED ELEMENT OF IRRATIONALITY IN SOVIET DECISION MAKING. RUETE AND SAHM, BOTH EXCEPTIONALLY CALM PROFESSIONALS, HAVE RAISED THESE ASPECTS IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH US.

3. IN THIS SITUATION, KIESINGER'S SUDDEN GRASP FOR A NATO SUMMIT MEETING WAS VIRTUALLY A REFLEX REACTION. BY "NATO", HE OF COURSE MEANT THE U.S. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE PLEASED THAT THIS IS SO AND THAT WE SHOULD BE GLAD THAT THE GERMANS AUTOMATICALLY CRY OUT TO US FOR HELP WHEN THEY ARE IN DIFFICULTIES. IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE MIGHT INDEED BE DIFFERENT.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

4. OBVIOUSLY, THERE MUST BE A REACTION FROM US. THE GERMANS MUST NOT HAVE REASON TO THINK THAT WE FAIL THEM IN MOMENTS OF HIGHEST STRESS. EMOTIONAL OR EXAGGERATED AS THE GERMAN REACTION TO THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN INVASION MAY APPEAR TO US, IT EXISTS AND IT IS REAL. IF IT IS NOT DEALT WITH, SEVERE DISILLUSIONMENT WILL SET IN, TOGETHER WITH A TREND TOWARD GRADUAL EXTINCTION OF THE REFLEX REACTION OF TURNING TO THE ALLIANCE.

5. INTELLECTUALLY, THE GERMANS REALIZE WE HAVE MANY PREOCCUPATIONS -- ELECTIONS, INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND VIETNAM. BUT EMOTIONALLY, THEY CANNOT GRASP WHY WE DO NOT DO MORE TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP IN THE CZECH SITUATION. SAHM'S PLAINTIVE REMARK TO EMBOFF THAT THE GERMANS HAVE TRIED A NATO SUMMIT, THEY HAVE TRIED WEU AND THEY HAVE TRIED EEC, ALL IN VAIN, AND WHERE IS THE WEST, INDICATES DEPTH OF FEELING IN A NORMALLY PHLEGMATIC INDIVIDUAL. SEEN FROM HERE, DE GAULLE HAS FAILED THE GERMANS AT A TIME OF NEED AND THIS MAY BE A VALUABLE LESSON FOR THEM.

6. GERMAN POLITICAL LEADERS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY WORK THEIR WAY THROUGH THIS INITIAL PHASE OF EXCITEMENT. THROUGH A PECULIAR COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY ARE FOR THE FIRST TIME PRETTY MUCH ON THEIR OWN IN A SITUATION OF FIRST IMPORTANCE CONCERNING THE SOVIET UNION AND THEIR SECURITY. THE ENSUING SITUATION COULD BE A CHALLENGE TO THEM TO EXERT LEADERSHIP IN EUROPE AND TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE TOWARD COMMON EUROPEAN ACTION ON DEFENSE AND POLITICAL COORDINATION.

7. BUT THIS IS A ROLE GERMAN LEADERS ARE MOST RELUCTANT TO ASSUME. THE FACT THAT KIESINGER IS A CONCILIATOR RATHER THAN A STRONG LEADER, KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR OWN PAST AND OF THE CRITICISM THEY WILL INCUR FROM THEIR ALLIES IF THEY TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND REMAIN ISOLATED, ALL RESULT IN POWERFUL INHIBITIONS WHICH MAKE IT UNCERTAIN THAT THEY WILL FACE UP TO THE CHALLENGE. WE SHOULD HELP THEM TO MOVE TOWARDS THE BEGINNING OF A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN EUROPE WHICH NO NATION HAS SHOWN IN RECENT YEARS; WE SHOULD ALSO HELP THEM, BECAUSE IF THEY FAIL TO MEET THE CHALLENGE, THEY WILL WITH HUMAN PREDICTABILITY TAKE OUT THEIR DISAPPOINTMENT ON US.

8. AT PRESENT THE THOUGHTFUL GERMAN SADLY RECOGNIZES THAT AS OSTERHELD SAID THERE HAS BEEN "NO COMMON ACTION, NOT EVEN A COMMON STATEMENT... ONLY PETTY BICKERING WITHIN THE WEST" AND HE BELIEVES GERMANY SHARES THE SHAME. BUT LESS THOUGHTFUL GERMANS ARE ALREADY SAYING THAT WE CARE MORE FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS THAN WE DO OUR RELATIONS WITH FRG FORGETTING FOR THE MOMENT THAT A WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS WOULD BE A DISASTER NOT ONLY FOR THE IMMEDIATE PARTICIPANTS BUT FOR GERMANY TOO.

9. THE CONSIDERATIONS LISTED IN PARAS 1 TO 8 PERSUADE ME OF THE NEED TO LOOK FOR STEPS WHICH WE COULD TAKE WHICH WOULD RESPOND TO THE ABOVE FEELING AND NOURISH OUR ALLIANCE. OUR COMMITMENTS TO GERMANY ARE, I BELIEVE, CLEARLY SPELLED OUT. WE NEED TO REINFORCE THE FEELING HERE THAT THESE COMMITMENTS BIND US NOT ONLY LEGALLY OR TEXTUALLY, BUT IN OUR MINDS AND IN OUR DEEPER FEELINGS.

10. OF THE VARIOUS STEPS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO MEET THE PRESENT SITUATION, THE BEST FOR THE LONGER RUN IS PROBABLY A WESTERN SUMMIT MEETING UNDER NATO OR OTHER GUISE.

11. OTHER STEPS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN ARE:

A. TO CALL ME BACK TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR CONSULTATIONS. THIS IS A CONVENTIONAL BUT USEFUL WAY OF UNDERLINING CONCERN AND INTEREST.

B. TO INVITE KIESINGER, AS THE LEADER OF NATO COUNTRY MOST AFFECTED BY SOVIET MOVES, TO WASHINGTON IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE COULD STOP IN LONDON ON THE WAY BACK, BUT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO STOP IN PARIS BECAUSE DE GAULLE PLANS A VISIT HERE SEPT 27-28; KIESINGER HAS PLANNED A TRIP TO TURKEY, IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN SEPT 5-15; AT PRESENT, HE APPEARS TO INTEND TO PRECEED WITH IT.

C. TO CONVENE A NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE THIS SHOULD BE IN SEPTEMBER.

D. TO PRECEDE THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING PLANNED FOR OCTOBER WITH A MEETING OF ALL NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS, AND THEN FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY WITH THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP.

12. THIS SEQUENCE MIGHT CULMINATE IN SUMMIT THROUGH MAKING THE DECEMBER NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING A MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

13. OTHER POSSIBILITIES ARE:

A. IF CURRENT STATE OF OPINION MAKES IT FEASIBLE, A U.S. SENATE RESOLUTION AFFIRMING THE NEED FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE ALLIANCE FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE AND AFFIRMING THE U.S. INTENTION TO MAINTAIN PRESENT TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE. THIS MIGHT BE TIED TO THE PRESENCE OF SOVIET FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. ALTERNATELY, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IF SENATORS, IN ADDITION TO SENATOR MANSFIELD, WHO HAVE HITHERTO BEEN KNOWN AS ADVOCATES OF U.S. TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE, WOULD MAKE STRONG STATEMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENT OF THIS CONTINENT.

B. VISITS TO EUROPE AND GERMANY BY AS MANY HIGH-LEVEL U.S. POLITICAL FIGURES AS POSSIBLE. A VISIT TO BERLIN BY THE FUTURE PRESIDENT-ELECT WOULD HAVE GREAT MERIT.

C. IT WILL OF COURSE NOW BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER FOR THE TRAINING EXERCISE SCHEDULED TO BRING BACK TROOPS WITHDRAWN UNDER ROTATION PROGRAM TAKE PLACE AS SCHEDULED IN JANUARY 1968 AND NOT BE DELAYED.

D. A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON BERLIN, AS SUGGESTED EARLIER.

E. U.S. LEADERSHIP IN NATO ON THE VARIOUS PROJECTS ALREADY UNDER WAY DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE, AS REPORTED BY USNATO.

14. IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT ALL OF THE MEETINGS PROPOSED ABOVE HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND CONCRETE OUTCOME. THEIR IMMEDIATE PURPOSE SHOULD BE AS POLITICAL ACTS OF SOLIDARITY WITH REASSURING PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT. THE SUBSTANTIVE AIM SHOULD BE TO WORK TOWARD HOLDING THE NATO TROOP FIGURE WHERE IT IS; ACHIEVING LIMITED INCREASES WHERE POSSIBLE IN DEFENSE BUDGETS; AND WHERE POSSIBLE, INCREASED PRACTICAL COOPERATION WITH THE FRENCH MILITARY. SUCH ACTIONS CAN AND SHOULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT REVERSION TO THE HARSH VOCABULARY OF THE COLD WAR. WE SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE NOW REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES TO GIVE DEFENSE AT LEAST AS MUCH PRIORITY AS RELAXATION OF TENSIONS.

15. OUR MAIN OBJECTIVES IN DEALING WITH THE GERMANS SHOULD BE TO BRING THEM TO TAKE RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP AMONG THE EUROPEANS BOTH AS REGARDS DEFENSE AND PROGRESS TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. ON THE FIRST, WE MIGHT EXPECT THEM TO MAKE SOME INCREASE IN THEIR DEFENSE BUDGET. ON THE SECOND, FOR THEM TO ATTEMPT, WITH THE HELP OF COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES OTHER THAN FRANCE TO DEVELOP CLOSER COLLABORATION WITH BRITAIN IN THE DEFENSE FIELD AND MOVE TOWARD MARKET MEMBERSHIP FOR BRITAIN. I BELIEVE THAT SOVIET ACTIONS MAY HAVE CREATED A NEW OPENING FOR MOVEMENT IN EUROPE WHICH SHOULD BE USED SOON. LODGE.

DTG 021413Z SEPT 68

~~SECRET~~

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OO WTE 10 WTE 15
DE WTE 3651

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-54
By is NARA, Date 9-11-07

1968 SEP 2 10 11

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP82347

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

TODAY IS "RELATIVE OPTIMISM" DAY WITH RESPECT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THERE ARE ALL SORTS OF RUMORS THAT THEY MAY EVEN BEGIN TO WITHDRAW SOME SOVIET FORCES FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

WE EVEN HAVE A PRESS STORY WHERE IZVESTIA PRINTED AN ARTICLE TODAY PRAISING BOTH PRESIDENT SVOBODA AS A "BRAVE SELF-CONTROLLED OFFICER" AND PARTY LEADER DUBCEK AS "A FIGHTING SOLDIER". WE'LL SEE HOW IT LOOKS TOMORROW, MEANWHILE HERE IS THE 11:30 AM SITUATION REPORT.

1. AN AP REPORT FROM MOSCOW QUOTES COMMUNIST SOURCES AS SAYING THAT AN IMPORTANT MEETING OF THE SOVIET PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS EXPECTED, AND MAY ALREADY HAVE STARTED. LARGE NUMBERS OF GOVERNMENT LIMOUSINES WERE SEEN PARKED OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE BUILDING. NO OFFICIAL INFORMATION FROM SOVIET SOURCES COULD BE OBTAINED. ACCORDING TO COMMUNIST SOURCES, THE MEETING WAS CALLED TO SEEK WAYS OF MITIGATING HOSTILE WORLD REACTION TO THE OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, PARTICULARLY THE CRITICISM VOICED BY THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. THESE SOURCES SAID THAT THE KREMLIN WAS CONSIDERING SOME CONCILIATORY GESTURE SUCH AS PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. THOUGH UNCONFIRMED, THESE FIRST REPORTS FROM MOSCOW IMPLY CONTINUED PERTURBATION WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP OVER THE CZECHOSLOVAK PROBLEM.

2. THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAD SEEN EVIDENCE IN THE SOVIET PRESS OF 1 AND 2 SEPTEMBER OF AN EFFORT TO TAKE SOME STEAM OUT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION, BOTH INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY. LIFE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS PORTRAYED AS RETURNING TO NORMAL AT A FAIRLY SATISFACTORY PACE, DESPITE THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES." IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET SOLDIERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKS ARE STRESSED. PRAVDA ON 2 SEPTEMBER SPECIFICALLY DENIED THE "FABRICATED" STORY OF THE "SERIOUS ILLNESS" OF AN UNSPECIFIED CZECHOSLOVAK LEADER -- PRESUMABLY DUBCEK -- AND DENIED RUMORS OF ARRESTS AMONG CZECHOSLOVAK INTELLECTUALS. THE PRESS HAS SUSPENDED DENUNCIATION OF YUGOSLAVIA, RUMANIA AND AUSTRIA. ALTHOUGH "IMPERIALISTS" REMAIN UNDER ATTACK, SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO THE U.S. ARE RARE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, TODAY'S PRAVDA WARNS THE CZECHS AGAINST RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES FOR HARD-CURRENCY LOANS. ALTHOUGH CLAIMING THAT THE USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE "SOVEREIGN AND EQUAL" TRADE PARTNERS, PRAVDA

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Pres file
107
1968 SEP 2 MONDAY
PM 3:25

SAID THAT "ONLY POLITICAL INFANTS COULD THINK ABOUT... FLIRTING WITH IMPERIALIST MONOPOLIES WHO SEDUCE SIMPLETONS... WITH HEAVY CREDITS." THE \$550 - MILLION HARD CURRENCY CREDIT REQUESTED BY THE CZECHS FROM THE USSR SEVERAL MONTHS AGO HAS NOT BEEN GRANTED. SINCE LAST SPRING THE CZECHS ALSO HAVE MADE INQUIRIES OF SEVERAL WEST EUROPEAN SOURCES ON THE AVAILABILITY OF CREDITS. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE CZECHS WILL BE PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING THE LARGE WESTERN LOANS AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO DEVELOP EFFICIENT CZECH EXPORT INDUSTRIES.

4. THE US EMBASSY IN PRAGUE REPORTED ON 1 SEPTEMBER THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT SEEM TO BE PROCEEDING WITH HASTE IN CLAMPING DOWN ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA. DESPITE CONTINUING RUMORS OF AN IMPENDING WAVE OF ARRESTS, THE EMBASSY HAD NOT HEARD OF ANY ARRESTS OF SPECIFIC INTELLECTUALS OR OTHERS. THE MEXICAN AMBASSADOR IN PRAGUE, HOWEVER, STATED THAT HIS CZECHOSLOVAK SOURCES HAVE DESCRIBED THE CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS AS "MACHIAVELLIAN," AND SUSPECT THE SOVIETS HOPE TO LURE BACK CZECHOSLOVAKS NOW ABROAD SO THAT THEY WILL NOT PROPAGATE CZECH RESENTMENT. THE CZECHOSLOVAKS ARE ALSO SUSPICIOUS OF THE RELATIVELY LENIENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRESS, BELIEVING THE SOVIETS HOPE TO BEGUILE WRITERS WITH PROGRESSIVE TENDENCIES AND THEN "PICK THEM OFF."

5. THE CZECHOSLOVAK JOURNALISTS UNION REPORTEDLY ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT IT WILL ACCEPT CENSORSHIP FOR THREE MONTHS ONLY. IT ALSO STATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE INSISTED THAT THREE OF THE MORE OUTSPOKEN AND LIBERAL JOURNALS, REPORTER, STUDENT, AND LITERARNI LISTY, BE FORCED TO CEASE PUBLICATION. TWO OTHER PAPERS, THE TRADE UNION DAILY PRACE AND THE SOCIALIST DAILY SVOBODNE SLOVO, ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT THEY INTEND TO TEST THE LIMITS OF PERMISSIBLE PUBLICATION UNDER THE NEW CONDITIONS. THE EMBASSY REPORTED THAT MOST PAPERS WERE STILL OPERATING, BUT FROM OUTSIDE THEIR PREMISES.

6. RUETERS REPORTED TODAY THAT SOME 500 CZECHOSLOVAKS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN VIENNA LAST NIGHT WERE NOT ABOARD THE PRAGUE-VIENNA EXPRESS TRAIN. AUSTRIAN OFFICIALS SUSPECT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE TIGHTENED BORDER CONTROLS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE US EMBASSY IN PRAGUE LEARNED FROM SEVERAL CZECHOSLOVAKS YESTERDAY THAT AS OF 1 SEPTEMBER NO EXIT PERMITS WILL BE ISSUED FOR A PERIOD OF AT LEAST SEVERAL DAYS.

7. MILITARY ACTIVITY IN BULGARIA PICKED UP THIS MORNING WITH THE BEGINNING OF A GROUND FORCES FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE INVOLVING AT LEAST THE BULGARIAN ARMY FORMATION IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. AN AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE WAS UNDER WAY YESTERDAY IN NORTHEASTERN BULGARIA AND PROBABLY WAS A PRELUDE TO THE GROUND ACTIVITY. BULGARIAN AIRCRAFT REMAIN DEPLOYED AT AIRFIELDS IN THE NORTHEASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY.

8. RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRAVEL OF ALLIED LIAISON MISSIONS IN SOUTHEASTERN EAST GERMANY HAVE BEEN EXTENDED ONCE AGAIN BY THE SOVIET COMMANDER IN EAST GERMANY. THE NEW TERMINAL DATE OF THE TRAVEL BAN IS 15 SEPTEMBER.

9. THE RUMANIAN PRESS HAS NOT PUBLISHED OR COMMENTED ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH, AND, ACCORDING TO A RUMAINIAN NEWS-AGENCY OFFICIAL, WOULD NOT DO SO IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS "PROVOCATIVE." THE US EMBASSY IN BUCHAREST NOTES THAT THE RUMAINIAN PRESS OF 1 AND 2 SEPTEMBER HAD VIRTUALLY NO COVERAGE OF THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

DTG: 021747Z SEP 68

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

108
EYES ONLY

VZCZCEEA490
OO WTE12
DE WTE 3652

1968 SEP 2

MONDAY
11 PM 3:14

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82348

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

SEPTEMBER 2, 1968

RESPONDING TO YOUR INSTRUCTIONS OF THIS MORNING, SECRETARY RUSK PROPOSES THAT YOU SEEK TO NEGOTIATE WITH NIXON AND HUMPHREY THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE DELIVERED BY HARRIMAN TO THE CHIEF OF THE HANOI DELEGATION IN PARIS:

Pres file

"WE URGE THE DELEGATION OF THE DRV TO WORK URGENTLY AND SERIOUSLY WITH AMBASSADORS HARRIMAN AND VANCE TO BRING ABOUT A LASTING PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE PRESENT ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT AFFECT THE INTERESTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN AN EARLY PEACE, BUT A PEACE THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE RIGHTS AND WISHES OF ALL THE GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA."

DTG 021846Z SEPTEMBER 1968

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-248

By CB, NARA, Date 5-25-95

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

109

1968 SEP 1 16 37

VZCZCEEA469
CO WTE10
DE WTE 3637

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO JIM JONES
CITE CAP32336

Pres file
68 SEP 1 1:07
SUNDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO THE SHAH:

"YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY,

"I WAS GRIEVED TO LEARN OF THE SEVERE EARTHQUAKES THAT HAVE STRUCK IRAN IN THE PROVINCE OF KHORASAN. ON BEHALF OF ALL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, MRS. JOHNSON AND I SEND OUR DEEP SYMPATHY AND SINCERE CONDOLENCES FOR THE TRAGIC SUFFERING AND LOSS OF LIFE THAT HAVE BEFALLEN THE IRANIAN PEOPLE.

"IF I CAN BE OF ASSISTANCE TO YOU IN THIS TRAGIC DISASTER, PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO LET ME KNOW.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON"

DTG 011640Z SEPT 1968

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-17-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 1, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

110
Presfile
sent Rusk via wire
CAP 82335

Sec. Rusk and I discussed whether a redrafted message to Kosygin should now be contemplated, in the wake of Dobrynin's assurances about Berlin and Romania. It could focus on Dobrynin's assurances to you about a quick withdrawal of Warsaw Pact forces.

He is inclined to wait a few days to see what transpires in Prague and in Moscow-Bucharest contacts.

I concur.

We shall have some thoughts on this and other matters upon your return.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-146
By ing, NARA, Date 9-6-94

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~