

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3 memo	Rostow to President, 7:10 p.m. <i>open 1/9/02</i> TS — 1 p	9/18/68	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President, 7:05 p.m. <i>open 1/9/02</i> S — 1 p [Duplicate of #3, NSF, CF, Portugal, Vol. 2]	9/18/68	A
#4a cable	Lisbon 1976 <i>open 1/9/02</i> S — 1 p [Duplicate of #3a, NSF, CF, Portugal, Vol. 2]	9/18/68	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 2:25 p.m. S — 1 p <i>Open NLT 97-407 9.29.98</i>	9/18/68	A
#5a cable	Oslo 6605 ( <i>dup #54, NSF, MTP, Vol. 94, Box 39</i> ) S — 2 p <i>Open NLT 97-407 9.21.98</i>	9/18/68	A
#6 memo	Rostow to President, 2:20 p.m. <i>open 1/9/02</i> S — 1 p ( <i>dup #75, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD Chron V.22"</i> )	9/18/68	A
#6a cable	Saigon 38087 <i>open 1/9/02</i> S — 1 p ( <i>dup #152, Tm, + 22, "NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD Chron V.22"</i> )	9/17/68	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President, 10:10 a.m. <i>open 1/9/02</i> S — 1 p	9/18/68	A
#20 memo	Rostow to President, 11:10 a.m. <i>open 9-25-97 NLT 94-162</i> S — 1 p	9/17/68	A
#20a cable	Prague 3582 <i>Open NLT 97-158 11-17-98</i> S — 3 p	9/16/68	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President, 10:15 a.m. C — 1 p <i>Open 4-17-95 NLT 94-468</i> [Duplicate in Diary Backup]	9/17/68	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President, 10:05 a.m. <i>open 1/9/02</i> C — 2 p	9/17/68	A
#24 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. <i>open 5-24-98 RAC</i> TS — 1 p	9/18/68	A

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 94, September 12-18, 1968**

**Box 39**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
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#25 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1/9/02</i> S <del>1 p</del> [Duplicate of #89, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 14] [Exempt NLJ 85-242]	9/18/68	<del>A</del>
#25a cable	Paris 20891 <i>open 1/9/02</i> S <del>7 p</del>	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#26 memo	Rostow to President, 8:25 p.m. S <del>1 p</del> <i>open 2-13-98 RAC</i>	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#26a cable	Tokyo 12064 " S <del>3 p</del> [Duplicate of #7a, NSF, CF, VN, "5E (2)b Cambodia, 1/68-10/68"]	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#27a cable	Lisbon 1952 <i>open 1/9/02</i> C <del>1 p</del> [Duplicate of #4a, NSF, CF, Portugal, Vol. 2]	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#27b cable	Duplicate of #27a <i>open 1/9/02</i>		
#27c cable	Lisbon 1953 <i>open 1/9/02</i> C <del>2 p</del> [Duplicate of #4b, NSF, CF, Portugal, Vol. 2]	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. <i>open 1/9/02</i> C <del>1 p</del>	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#34 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1/9/03 NLJ 02-69</i> S <del>1 p</del>	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#35 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1/9/02</i> C <del>2 p</del>	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#36 memo	Rostow to President, 3 p.m. <i>open 12-15-95 NLJ 95-188</i> C <del>1 p</del> [Duplicate of #75, NSF, CF, Mexico, Vol. 4]	9/16/68	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#36a cable	Mexico 7016 C 1 p <i>open 12-5-45 NLJ 95-120</i> [Duplicate of #75a, NSF, CF, Mexico, Vol. 4]	9/13/68	<del>A</del>
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 12:30 p.m. <i>open 5/1/02 NLJ 01-260</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #3, NSF, CF, Australia, Vol. 3]	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#38a cable	Canberra 8064 <i>open 5/1/02 NLJ 01-259</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #3a, NSF, CF, Australia, Vol. 3] [dup. #89, NSF, CF, VN, "HARUAN chun v. 22"]	9/16/68	<del>A</del>
#44 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. S 1 p [Duplicate of #190, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 10] [Exempt NLJ 84-170] - <i>sanitized 9-11-00</i>	9/16/68	A
#44a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Exempt 9-17-03 NLJ 03-76</i> S 2 p <i>EXEMPT 4/3/03 NLJ 02-70</i> [Duplicate of #190a, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 10] [Exempt NLJ 84-187]	9/13/68	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President (CAP 82396) <i>open 1/9/02</i> S 1 p	9/15/68	<del>A</del>
#52a cable	Paris 20861 <i>open 1/9/02</i> S 1 p <i>NSF</i> [Dup. #15ba, NSF, CF, VN, "HARUAN <del>III</del> ", "Bx119"] [dup. #110a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARUAN chun v. 22"]	9/14/68	<del>A</del>
#53 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 4/13/03 NLJ 02-71</i> [Duplicate of #36, NSF, CF, VN, "General Military Activity, 2C (15)a, 9/1-9/10/68"] - <i>sanitized 1998</i>	9/14/68	A
#53a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 8 p [Duplicate of #36a, NSF, CF, VN, "General Military Activity, 2C (15)a, 9/1-9/10/68"] - <i>exempt 1998</i>	9/13/68	A
#54a cable	Moscow 5511 <i>open 4/2/03 NLJ 02-73</i> C 3 p	9/13/68	<del>A</del>

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NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 94, September 12-18, 1968

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#54b memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. (dup #42 NSF, CF, VN <del>Paris</del> / Paris Lally, Assoc TDCS Box 134) S 1 p sanitized per RAC 1/9/02	9/14/68	A
#54c cable	Intelligence Information Cable dup #42a above S 2 p sanitized per RAC 1/9/02	9/13/68	A
#55 memo	Rostow to President, 8:25 a.m. S 1 p sanitized 5-2-95 NIS 94-200 sanitized per RAC 1/9/02	9/14/68	A
#55a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 5 p exempt per RAC 8/24/01	9/13/68	A
#55b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 6 p sanitized 4/2/03 NIS/RAC 02-61	9/13/68	A
#56 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 6:45 p.m. open 4/2/03 NIS 02-72</del> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>9/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#56a cable	<del>Paris 20831 open 4/2/03 NIS 02-73</del> <del>S 1 p</del> [dup #36a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARUAN III," Box 119] [dup #4, NSF, CF, VN, "HARUAN Chron. Vol. 2"]	<del>9/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#57 memo	Rostow to President, 6:45 p.m. open 1/9/02 S 1 p [Duplicate of #3, NSF, Agency File, NATO General, Vol. VI]	9/13/68	A
#57a cable	Deptel to Bonn open 1/9/02 S 3 p [Duplicate of #3a, NSF, Agency File, NATO General, Vol. VI]	9/12/68	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President, 2 p.m. open 1/9/02 PCI 1 p	9/13/68	A
#62 memo	Rostow to President, 1:40 p.m. S 1 p [Duplicate of #25, NSF, Country File, Rumania, Vol. 3] - exempt 7/25/01	9/13/68	A
#62a cable	Intelligence Cable S 1 p [Duplicate of #25a, NSF, Country File, Rumania, Vol. 3] - exempt 7/25/01	9/13/68	A

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#63a cable	Paris 20779 <i>Open 11.21.97 RAC</i> S <u>6 p</u> [Dup #39a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD XII," Box 19]	9/12/68	A
#64e memo	Rostow to President (CAP 82305) <i>open 1/9/02</i> C <u>2 p</u> [Duplicate of #8, Vol. 92]	8/30/68	A
#64f cable	Duplicate of #64e <i>open 1/9/02</i>		
#64g memo	Rostow to President (CAP 82268) <i>open 1/9/02</i> C <u>2 p</u> [Duplicate of #27, Vol. 92]	8/29/68	A
#64i cable	Duplicate of #64g <i>open 1/9/02</i>		
#64j memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1/9/02</i> C <u>1 p</u> [Duplicate of #33, Vol. 93]	9/9/68	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1/9/02</i> C <u>1 p</u>	9/13/68	A
#67a rpt	"Proposed Reply" <i>open 1/9/02</i> PCI <u>1 p</u>	undated	A
#69a memo	Read to Rostow <i>open 1/9/02</i> C <u>2 p</u> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 9/6/68]	9/6/68	A
#72 memo	Rostow to President, 5:35 p.m. <i>open 5-23-01 NLJ 00-21</i> S <u>1 p</u>	9/12/68	A
#72a cable	[Dup #4, NSF, Agency File, "NATO General, Vol. 6, Box 3"] NATO 4686 <i>Exempt 2/26/02 NLJ/RAC 00-292</i> S <u>4 p</u> [Duplicate of #4a, NSF, Agency File, NATO General, Vol. VI]	9/12/68	A
#75 memo	Rostow to President S <u>2 p</u> <i>open 1-10-95 NLJ 94-197</i> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 9/13/68] [Duplicate in NSF, CF, Germany, "Vol. 16, Bx 189"]	9/12/68	A

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#78 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 4/2/03 NLS 02-72</i> <del>C</del> 1 p	9/12/68	<del>A</del>
#79 memo	Rostow to President, 10:45 a.m. <i>open 1/9/02</i> <del>S</del> 3 p [Duplicate of #7, NSF, Country File, Spain]	9/12/68	<del>A</del>
#79a memo	Katzenbach to President S 8 p <i>sanitized 8-9-04 NLS 01-279</i> [Duplicate of #7a, NSF, Country File, Spain]	9/10/68	A
#79b rpt	"Annex--Joint Declaration" PCI 2 p <i>sanitized 8-9-04 NLS 01-279</i> [Duplicate of #7a, NSF, Country File, Spain]	undated	A
#81a cable	Deptel to NATO <i>Dupe in File of WWR, Box 2, MTGS, July-DEC 68</i> <del>TS</del> 3 p <i>open 1/9/02</i>	<i>000# 36f and 37e</i> <del>9/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#83a airgram	Ottawa A-1620 <i>open 1-7-09</i> <del>C</del> 18 p [Duplicate of #9a, NSF, Country File, Canada, Vol. V]	<del>9/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
7a rpt	Intelligence Report 2pp TS - <i>open 4/13/03 NIS/RAL 02-62</i>	9/18/68	<del>A</del>
24a rpt	Intelligence Report 2 pp TS - <i>sanitized 4/2/03 NIS/RAL 02-63</i>	9/16/68	A
65a rpt	Extract from Intelligence Memorandum 1 p TS - <i>open 4/2/03 NIS/RAL 02-63</i>	9/12/68	<del>A</del>
77a cable <i>sanitized 5-13-03 NIS/RAL 02-64</i>	Intelligence Report 2 pp S -	9/12/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 94, 9/12 - 18/68, Box 39

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INFORMATION

*Pres file*

Wednesday, September 18, 1968 -- 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Clark Clifford called to report the result of his findings on the possibility of awarding a fourth star to General Lewis Walt.

In brief, both his own legal advice and the legal judgment of the Navy Counsel is that there is no way to do it without getting a special bill passed in the Congress. Although he personally has the highest respect for Gen. Walt, he does not believe it would be appropriate to recommend to you the passage of special legislation.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla



2

*Pres file*

INFORMATION

Wednesday, September 18, 1968  
7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark Clifford's press interview today following his appearance before the Subcommittee on Defense appropriations.

W. W. Rostow

rlh



Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford  
Interviewed by Press  
Following appearance before  
Subcommittee on Defense of  
Senate Appropriations Committee  
September 18 1968. 1:10 p.m. EDT

Question: Mr. Secretary, the United States and Britain and France have sent a note to the Soviet Union about their claim they have the right to unilaterally act in Western Germany to stop the rise of Nazism and that sort of thing. How does this fit into this whole picture that seems to be developing vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia?

Secretary Clifford: I would be unable to comment on this particular matter. I think you would have to consult Secretary Rusk on that one. It would be inadvisable for me to make any comment at all.

Question: Mr. Secretary, could you elaborate a little bit on the order which involves the U.S. Forces in Europe--when this will start, what it is going to be like with regard to the troops?

Secretary Clifford: No decision has been made in that regard. It has been suggested by some of the NATO countries that it might be advisable to hold exercises of a military nature in NATO sometime after the first of the year. We are considering it. If we were to participate at that time, as I stated yesterday we would send some 10 or 12,000 troops over there to take part in the exercises. That would give us a total of some 30 to 40,000 troops taking part in these military exercises. There is no present intention of increasing our military forces in NATO.

Question: Mr. Secretary, has there been any commitment made on new military hardware for NATO?

Secretary Clifford: None whatsoever.

Question: Mr. Secretary, there are reports that since the Czechoslovak invasion that there now are 15 additional Soviet divisions on alert and in Czechoslovakia and East Germany on a border confrontation with the NATO countries. Is this correct?

Secretary Clifford: I would be unable to state the exact number of the Soviet divisions that have moved. There are obviously Soviet divisions and divisions from other Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia, which of course have moved those divisions near the line of NATO defense.

Question: The Europeans, our allies, seem much more concerned about this than we do, and they have been putting pressure on us to do something. What are we going to do?

MORE

Secretary Clifford: I do not know that they seem more concerned than we. President Johnson made what I considered to be an exceedingly frank and forthright statement. I believe that there will be some time in the period of the next few weeks a meeting of NATO Ministers so that this entire matter will be discussed. I do not know who would be present at such a meeting or what the date would be held, but there is already contact going on now between the NATO countries and the United States in which this new threat is being carefully considered.

Question: Mr. Secretary, would you give us your appraisal of the situation in Vietnam at this moment? Is the threat of a new Communist major attack ended?

Secretary Clifford: Such a threat is clearly not ended. As I have stated before, we do not know specifically whether the enemy has been attempting to mount its third offensive. There are many indications which indicate that it has tried to mount a third offensive, but General Abrams' tactics and strategy have been exceedingly effective. His spoiling operations have prevented a number of those attacks from taking place, so that it is possible that they may have been trying to get the third offensive started <sup>but</sup> have been prevented from doing so by the action of friendly forces. Let me state, however, the enemy still has the ability, both from the standpoint of manpower and equipment, to mount other attacks if it chooses so to do. The major question is whether they are willing to sustain the very substantial losses that accompany these attacks that they have been making.

Question: Mr. Secretary, is there any plane under consideration besides the F-4 for sale to Israel?

Secretary Clifford: As you know, the F-4 was involved in a conversation held between President Johnson and Premier Eshkol last January, at which time President Johnson stated he would continue to give sympathetic consideration to the military needs of the Israelis. That matter is still under consideration, and President Johnson has not reached a final conclusion. We are supplying Israel with other military equipment. I am not permitted to go into detail in that regard.

Question: Is there a serious imbalance there now that could lead to new outbreak of fighting in the Middle East?

Secretary Clifford: I am not conscious of that. I know that the Arab nations have had restored to them, to a certain extent, the military power that they had before. I believe, also, that Israel has increased its military power since the war last year. I am not conscious of any imbalance that exists there in that area. Two more questions.

MORE



Question: Mr. Secretary, when you refer to a meeting of NATO Ministers, is that Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers?

Secretary Clifford: That decision <sup>has</sup> ~~is~~ not yet been made. It could be Foreign Ministers. ~~It~~ might be both Foreign and Defense Ministers or, as sometimes happens, there will be meetings of Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, and Finance Ministers. One more question.

Question: Mr. Secretary, is there any noticeable effect of our Presidential race now in terms of the military operations in Vietnam?

Secretary Clifford: I am unable to ascertain any effect in that regard. I believe that we were wondering whether there might be some effort made prior to the conventions, so that military efforts on the part of the enemy might have affected in some manner the decision reached at the convention. I cannot be sure that is so, but some advance that thesis. We do not now see any relationship at all between the military engagement or enemy strategy in Vietnam and the coming election in this country in November. Thank you, gentlemen.

Press: Thank you very much.

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Wednesday, September 18, 1968  
7:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA on the Soviet  
leadership.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

SC No. 12372/68, 18 Sept 1968  
Cy 1, Intelligence Memo  
"Policies and Personalities  
in the Soviet Politburo"

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PLJ.019.039.003/1  
By jc NARA, Date 12-17-01



INFORMATION

4

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, September 18, 1968  
7:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Contrary to press reports,  
Dr. Merritt rates Salazar's chance  
for survival is virtually zero.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Lisbon 1976

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-17-01

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

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82  
ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, CCO 00, /070 W

0 182055Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2502

~~SECRET~~ LISBON 1976

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By je, NARA, Date 12-17-01

*Mr. Pastore  
Contrary to  
press reports*

SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH DR. HOUSTON MERRITT ON PROSPECTS FOR  
DR. SALAZAR

1. DR. HOUSTON MERRITT, ACCOMPANIED BY PROF ALMEIDA LIMA  
(ONE OF OUR LOCAL PHYSICIANS ATTENDING DR. SALAZAR), CAME

TO MY HOUSE EARLY THIS EVENING. DR. MERRITT HAS EXAMINED  
PRIME MINISTER TWICE TODAY IN COMPANY OF HIS PORTUGUESE COLLEAGUES  
AND WITH SOME OF THEM VISITED PRES. THOMAZ AT PRESIDENTIAL  
PALACE IN BELEM THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS SALAZAR'S CONDITION  
AND PROGNOSIS OF CASE. DRS. MERRITT AND ALMEIDA LIMA REPORTED  
THOMAZ HAD MADE IT CLEAR HE WANTED UNVARNISHED TRUTH AS TO  
PM'S CONDITION. MEDICAL TEAM HAS ALSO PREPARED REPORT ON TODAY'S  
CONSULTATIONS WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE MADE PUBLIC SHORTLY.

2. DR. MERRITT, ALONG WITH PORTUGUESE DOCTORS, CONSIDERS  
SALAZAR'S CONDITION WITHOUT HOPE AND DOES NOT EXPECT HIM TO  
REGAIN CONSCIOUSNESS. HE CAUTIONED,  
HOWEVER, THAT HE HAS KNOWN CASES WHICH DESPITE ALL INDICATIONS  
SUDDENLY TOOK TURN FOR BETTER. IN SALAZAR CASE, EARLIER  
HEMATOMA CAUSED BY FALL WAS A LARGE ONE, AMOUNTING TO 100CC.  
SUBSEQUENT SEPT 16 ATTACK HAD NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH EARLIER  
PROBLEMS, ALTHOUGH PROF. ALMEIDA LIMA VOLUNTEERED THAT AFTER  
EFFECTS OF SHOCK FROM EARLIER OPERATION UNDER LOCAL ANAESTHETIC -  
TWO HOLES DRILLED INTO SKULL - COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO  
ONSET OF "VASCULAR ACCIDENT". MERRITT EXPLAINED LATEST ATTACK  
WAS ACTUALLY BRAIN HEMORRHAGE RATHER THAN THROMBOSIS AND THUS  
MORE SERIOUS AS TO POSSIBILITIES OF RECOVERY.

3. DR. MERRITT ESTIMATED SALAZAR SURVIVAL PERIOD AS PERHAPS  
10 DAYS. PROF. ALMEIDA LIMA EXPRESSED VIEW IT MIGHT BE AS LITTLE  
AS FOUR DAYS, POINTING OUT THAT VARIATIONS IN PULSE ALREADY  
BEGINNING TO APPEAR, ACCOMPANIED BY SOME REAPPEARANCE OF FEVER.  
DR. MERRITT AMENDED HIS PROGNOSIS TO NOT LONGER THAN 10 DAYS.

4. BOTH DOCTORS SAID FORTHCOMING REPORT WOULD NOT CONCEAL  
GRAVITY OF SITUATION BUT WOULD AT SAME TIME INCLUDE SOME  
HOPEFUL EXPRESSIONS WITH VIEW TO EASING IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION.

BENNETT

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS



INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/OHIO

Wednesday, September 18, 1968  
2:25 p.m.

*Free file*

Mr. President:

This telegram (see page 2) suggests  
Hanoi change in serious purpose of  
OSLO channel -- conversion to Nordic  
propaganda.

They may believe Paris is enough  
or have some scheme in mind we can't  
detect.

W. W. Rostow

Oslo 6367

~~SECRET~~/OHIO

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-409  
By us, NARA Date 9-29-98

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

W# 5a  
TELEGRAM

(5)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-407

By us, NARA Date 9-21-98

~~SECRET~~

CN: 5678Q

RECD: 18SEP68  
619A

00 RUEHC  
DE RUDKSO 6605 2620905  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 180900Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1972  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ OSLO 6605

NODIS OHIO

REF: OSLO 6367

1. FONOFF HAS LAID DOWN FOLLOWING SCENARIO FOR VIETNAM TALKS:

(A) DAVIDSON BRIEFING SEPT 19 AT 11 AM WITH SEC GEN BOYE, AMB ALGARD, POLITICAL DIRECTOR ANSTEENSEN, ASIAN AFFAIRS OIC VRAALSEN AND AMB TIBBETTS.

(B) AFTERNOON SEPT 20 ARRIVAL NORTH VIETNAMESE OSLO FROM MOSCOW VIA BERLIN. PARTY NOW CONSISTS AMB NGUYEN THO CHAN FROM MOSCOW, DRVN FONOFF WEST EUROPEAN DIRECTOR VO VAN SUNG, AND ATTACHE-INTERPRETER LE KY GIAI INSTEAD OF PHAN DO AN NAM (OSLO 6367).

(C) SATURDAY SEPT 21 NORWEGIANS PLAN BEGIN TALKS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE AT FONOFF AND RESUME ON MONDAY SEPT 23 WITH UNKNOWN SCHEDULE THEREAFTER.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2  
5678Q OSLO 6645

2. FONOFF AND ESPECIALLY FONMIN HAVE BEEN THROWN INTO SLIGHT SWIVET BY TELEGRAM RECEIVED SEPT 18 FROM NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR MOSCOW WHO HAS NOT BEEN INFORMED RE THIS VISIT AND WHO RECEIVED QUOTE COURTESY VISIT UNQUOTE SIXTEENTH FROM THREE PERSONNAGES PARA 1(B) WHO STATED THEY PROCEEDING VIA BERLIN TO OSLO FOR FRIENDLY VISIT TO DISCUSS COMMERCIAL MATTERS AND NORDIC POST WAR ECONOMIC AID AND GIVE QUOTE EXPOSE OF SITUATION IN VIETNAM UNQUOTE. ALL NOW DESIRE PASSPORT VISAS RATHER THAN SEPARATE VISAS (OSLO 6367) WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO SET AT NAUGHT ALL ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO AVOID QUESTIONS FROM CHINESE. THIS BOOBOO TOGETHER WITH STRONG AND RIGID PROPAGANDIST REPLY FROM CHAN TO NORWEGIAN AMBS INQUIRY RE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS HAS RAISED SOME DOUBT IN NORWEGIAN FONOFF AS TO SERIOUSNESS OF VISIT IN OSLO. ALGARD WILL MEET VIETNAMESE ON ARRIVAL AND ENJOIN STRICT SILENCE AND SATURDAY TALUS PLUS WEEKEND CONTACTS SHOULD GIVE CLEARER PICTURE BUT FONMIN IS ALREADY CONTEMPLATING SITUATION IN WHICH VIETNAMESE VISITORS PRESENCE DETECTED AND HIS FELLOW CONSERVATIVE PARTY MEMBERS WILL WANT TO KNOW WHY NORWAY IS CONFABULATING ON SLY WITH ENEMIES OF US WHO HAVE SUPPORTED OUTRAGE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THUS FAR FONOFF IS PLANNING IF VISIT LEAKS TO STICK WITH COVER THAT VIETNAMESE ARE RETURNING ALGARD VISIT HANOI AND RETURN VISIT COULD NOT DECENTLY BE CANCELED, BUT FONOFF WILL BEND EVERY EFFORT KEEP VISIT SECRET.

3. CONFIRMING BOVEY-DAVIDSON TELECON, BOVEY OR INFORMED EMBOFF WILL MEET DAVIDSONS EVENING SEPT 18.

4. DEPT PLEASE PASS USDEL PARIS.

GP-1. TIBBETTS

BT

~~SECRET~~



6

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~ HARVAN/PLUS

*Profile*

Wednesday, September 18, 1968 - 2:20 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker indicates anxiety about GVN role, in wake of Sept. 15 private session.

It is clear this is gut issue. We can either:

- hold up bombing cessation until it is settled;
- make its prompt resolution a condition for keeping a bombing cessation.

I suspect the para. 3 formula is the one with which we shall first be confronted.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 38087

~~SECRET~~ HARVAN/PLUS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-17-01



Department of State

WH 6a  
TELEGRAM  
5

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC  
DE RUMJIR 38087 2620240  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P R 180230Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 891  
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2182  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 38087

5617Q

1968 SEP 17 PM 11 29

PARIS FOR VIET NAM MISSION

*Pastor*

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

REF: PARIS 20873 (DELTO 733)

1. SEPTEMBER-15 MEETING APPEARS SIGNIFICANT FROM HERE AND I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE DEPARTMENT AND PARIS COULD CUT US INTO YOUR EXCHANGES ON INTERPRETATIONS AND POSSIBLE CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN.

2. OF OBVIOUS CONCERN IS THE INTERPRETATION TO BE PLACED ON THO'S STATEMENT THAT PARTICIPATION OF GVN COULD BE DISCUSSED "JUST LIKE OTHER QUESTIONS" AFTER CESSATION (PARA-38). THIS AND THE PRECISE WORDING THAT TWO SIDES CAN THEN GO ON TO DISCUSS THE AGENDA ITEMS AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY WILL BE TAKEN UP FORESHADOWS TROUBLE ON THE QUESTION OF GVN PARTICIPATION.

3. THERE IS LITTLE COMFORT TO BE DERIVED FROM UPI STORY THAT PARIS DRVN SPOKESMAN OF SEPT. 16 ENVISAGED TWO INITIAL SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS, ONE BETWEEN DRVN AND US ON ALL ISSUES OF INTEREST (PRESUMABLY PRIMARILY MILITARY MATTERS) AND ONE BETWEEN NLF AND US ON ALL MATTERS AFFECTING "THE SOUTHERN PART OF VIET-NAM". WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT THIS MAY BE INACCURATE VERSION OF RESPONSE AT PRESS CONFERENCE AS RECORDED DELTO 735, IN WHICH UNFORTUNATELY HIS ANSWER WAS INAUDIBLE ON THE TAPE.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE ESPECIALLY YOUR LATEST THINKING ON QUESTION OF GVN PARTICIPATION IN RELATION TO DIRECTION IN WHICH TALKS APPEAR TO BE HEADING. BUNKER  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~

By *jc* NARA, Date 12-17-01

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, September 18, 1968  
2:20 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Pentagon response to  
the three military points made in  
Jack Anderson's column of Sept. 17.

As you know, we can find not  
a word of truth in what he said about  
diplomacy.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 11-17-92



7a  
~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 Sep 1968

COMMENTARY ON ISSUES RAISED BY  
JACK ANDERSON COLUMN, 17 SEPTEMBER 1968

Jack Anderson's column published in "The Washington Post" on 17 September alleges several deficiencies in "American military intelligence" incident to the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. For ease of commenting on them, they are identified as follows:

- 1) "The invasion . . . caught American military intelligence completely by surprise," "an estimated 330,000 troops . . . managed to slip into Czechoslovakia without immediate detection by the massive electronic monitoring equipment."
- 2) "The first word of the invasion came from an informant inside the Czech government and reached the White House scarcely two hours before the official Soviet notice."
- 3) "The Pentagon was also shocked over the use of satellite troops in the invasion."

With respect to the first allegation, it should be noted that ~~the entire intelligence community had been monitoring and reporting the movement of Warsaw Pact forces for an extended period prior to 20 August.~~ This was true both during the 20-30 June Warsaw Pact exercise in Czechoslovakia and following the delayed withdrawal of those forces across the Czechoslovak border by 3 August. On 2 August, the DIA Intelligence Summary noted that major elements of from 15 to 19 Soviet divisions were believed to be located near the Czechoslovak borders, deployed in southeastern East Germany, southern Poland, northwestern Hungary and near Uzhgorod, USSR. The USIB Watch Committee, having noted the continued presence of these forces on 7 August, concluded in its report ~~on 14 August: "We believe the Soviet Union will continue to exert pressure on Czechoslovakia and will keep military forces readily available for direct intervention should Moscow consider it necessary."~~

It was abundantly clear, and reported, as exemplified above, that the Soviet Union was capable of a virtually immediate military intrusion into Czechoslovakia. This picture of continued military preparedness, in the aftermath of a withdrawal of forces from Czechoslovakia, had, perforce, to be viewed in the light of the then ongoing political and diplomatic activities in East Europe and between Moscow and the West. While no judgment was rendered that the Soviets actually would invade, ~~the possibility of their doing so was clearly stated.~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-62  
By cbm NARA, Date 3-10-03

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~It is true that the actual intervention was launched and underway~~  
~~for sometime, perhaps several hours, prior to our receipt of notification.~~  
~~It is not true that 330,000 troops "managed to slip into Czechoslovakia"~~  
~~without immediate detection. This figure exceeds the high side of the~~  
~~estimated ultimate total occupation force. The initial force penetrating~~  
~~prior to our knowledge was a fraction of this total, and their undetected~~  
~~progress was aided not only by maintenance of radio silence, but by~~  
~~the unexpected and yet unexplained lack of any outcry by Czechoslovak~~  
~~border forces or by the citizenry. An intensive study is in progress~~  
~~with a view to examining incidents surrounding the intervention in an~~  
~~effort to provide an after-the-fact reanalysis of our intelligence~~  
~~reporting procedures and of our preliminary evaluations of raw intel-~~  
~~ligence.~~

~~We have no information relative to "an informant inside the Czech~~  
~~government," or his possible reporting, as noted in the second allega-~~  
~~tion above.~~

~~As to the statement that the "Pentagon was shocked" by the use~~  
~~of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact troops, the intelligence community has,~~  
~~for some time expressed the judgment that the USSR contemplated an~~  
~~active role for these forces in the event of war in Europe. This~~  
~~judgment was especially applicable to the so-called Northern Tier of~~  
~~East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The implication that the~~  
~~intelligence community believed, or disseminated, information to the~~  
~~effect that these East Europeans would be restricted to the role of~~  
~~"logistical support" is unwarranted.~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, September 18, 1968, 10:10 A.M.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Paris Meeting--More of the Same

*Pres file*

By secure phone our Paris delegation reports that today's meeting with the North Vietnamese was a strictly routine restatement of old arguments. Nothing new developed in the three hour and 20 minute session.

During tea break there was a further exchange of statements based on well-known positions.

The private meeting scheduled for Friday will be held in the afternoon rather than in the morning at the request of the North Vietnamese.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *12-17-01*

~~SECRET~~



INFORMATION

Wednesday, September 18, 1968 -- 8:25 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You may wish to know that in our first regular weekly staff meeting on the key foreign policy decisions of the Johnson Administration, we dropped one item (the negative MLF decision) but added:

- Tonkin Gulf
- The OAU speech
- C-130's for the Congo
- The McCloy exercise
- The January 1, 1968 balance of payments program

We plan to concentrate, against the background of materials collected from State (on the evolution of the problem and the broad results) in the President's key moments of decision.

I can see a rather exciting book shaping up with Oke's pictures covering key meetings, etc.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Wednesday, September 18, 1968  
8:20 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud cries for help, as the proposed AID Appropriations Bill cuts well into the bone.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON

10a

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

September 17, 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT:** House Appropriations Subcommittee Mark-up of the  
A.I.D. Appropriations Bill


A detailed breakdown of the Passman Subcommittee action on the foreign aid appropriations bill is shown on the annexed table. The entire cut was in economic assistance.

The cutting process has now reached the point that it calls into question the sincerity of the United States commitment to cooperation with the poor countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia. It also undermines whatever position of leadership remained to us among the donor nations. This scale of effort on the part of the richest country in the world will be viewed throughout the world as a declaration of indifference and a retreat towards isolationism.

I understand that Passman supported a somewhat higher appropriation level but was outvoted by a coalition consisting of the Republicans plus some Democrats. I also understand that Chairman Mahon did not actively participate in the discussion.

The Subcommittee is scheduled to report to the full Appropriations Committee Thursday morning at 10:00. Later on Thursday, the Committee plans to apply for a rule waiving points of order on the bill with the intention of taking the bill to the floor early next week.

Unless I hear from you or Charlie Zwick to the contrary (I am sending him a copy of this memorandum), I propose to make a strong appeal to the Senate Appropriations Committee to restore the appropriation to the authorization level. It will take all the force we can muster - and maybe then some - to get very far.

  
William S. Gaud

Attachment

**LIMITED OFFICIAL USE**



**FOREIGN AID LEGISLATIVE ACTION**  
(in \$ Millions)

	<b>FY 1968</b>	<b>FY 1969</b>	<b>FY 1969</b>	<b>FY 1969</b>
	<b><u>Appropriation</u></b>	<b><u>Authorization</u></b>	<b><u>Authorization</u></b>	<b><u>HAC</u></b>
		<b><u>Request</u></b>	<b><u>Bill</u></b>	<b><u>Recommendation</u></b>
Development Loans	\$435	\$765	\$350	\$265
Technical Assistance	180	235	200	150
Alliance for Progress	469	625	420	270
Loans	(389)	(515)	(330)	(200)
Technical Assistance	( 80)	(110)	( 90)	( 70)
Supporting Assistance	600	595	410	335
Contingency Fund	10	100	10	5
Contributions to International Organizations	130	143	135	120
Other	<u>78</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>69</u>
Total A.I. D.	\$1, 902	\$2, 545	\$1, 599	\$1, 244
Military Assistance	<u>400<sup>1/</sup></u>	<u>420</u>	<u>375</u>	<u>375</u>
Total	\$2, 302	\$2, 965	\$1, 974	\$1, 619

<sup>1/</sup> Excludes \$100 million supplemental appropriation for military assistance to Korea.

INFORMATION

11  
*Press file*

Wednesday, September 18, 1968  
8:20 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith text of Clark Clifford's  
press interview outside the Committee  
room yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

11a

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford  
Interviewed by the Press  
Following appearance before  
Subcommittee on Defense of the  
Senate Appropriations Committee  
September 17, 1968, 1:10 p.m. EDT

Question: Mr. Secretary, Naval air reserve units that were called up at the time of the start of the Pueblo crisis are going to be released and returned to civilian life. Can we read anything into this--are we perhaps not considering a military response to the Pueblo?

Secretary Clifford: No, the reason for releasing the Naval reservists was the obligation that we have under the Congressional Act that we must cut a very substantial amount from our 1969 expenditures. By releasing these reservists we are able to save quite a substantial amount of money which will go to the credit of the total of \$3 billion that we have to cut from our Fiscal 1969 expenditures. It does not indicate any change in attitude, nor does it affect any other reservists that were called.

Question: Mr. Secretary, is it your impression that the North Vietnamese are watching our political scene and waiting, and for that reason there is no....

Secretary Clifford: It is difficult to say. It would be pure speculation. I would have the feeling they were watching it more carefully before the conventions because there was some possibility that the candidates might have a sharp difference of opinion over the war in Vietnam. Now, however, that the conventions are over and both candidates have enunciated similar policies with reference to Vietnam, I doubt that that constitutes any real hindrance to progress in Paris. I believe that historically they are slow, they are difficult to reason with, and I think we must not become discouraged about the Paris talks, but must keep them going.

Question: We haven't seen Mr. Nixon say anything like predicting bringing the troops home late this year--some of the troops home late this year or early next year--as Mr. Humprey said. Do you think that might have some effect on the negotiations?

Secretary Clifford: I believe not. I think that there is general agreement that the American troops will stay there as long as they are needed and I think that the North Vietnamese understand that. The only specific prediction I have heard made was one made by President Thieu of South Vietnam when he said in a speech some weeks ago that he anticipated that increments of American troops could be brought back some time in Calendar 1969.

MORE



Question: Are there any plans to beef up our military strength in Europe in light of Czechoslovakia?

Secretary Clifford: There are no plans to increase our military forces in Europe at the present time. It is possible that a decision will be made to advance some military exercises that were planned for the year 1969. Those might be moved forward and might take place sometime after the first of the year, but that would result in only a temporary addition of military personnel for the purpose of conducting exercises within NATO countries.

Question: Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that you helped President Johnson write his 1966 State of the Union address. Do you have any comments on that report, sir?

Secretary Clifford: Only a general observation, that I was called on from time to time during the last five years of the Johnson Administration to help on matters of that kind and similar kinds. I do not recall if I helped on that one specifically. I may have.

Question: Mr. Secretary, was Justice Fortas in on those deliberations?

Secretary Clifford: I wrote a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee and made a statement with reference to the participation of Justice Fortas, and I have nothing to add to that letter that I wrote.

Question: .... writing that letter?

Secretary Clifford: I was not. I wrote the letter and they accepted it apparently as my position on the matter and I have not heard from the Committee since writing that letter to them.

Question: About a month ago, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a North Vietnamese third offensive. Now, in light of what has happened the last couple of days in a sharp increase of North Vietnamese activities, is there any doubt in your mind the offensive is on?

Secretary Clifford: Yes, it is difficult to analyze what is taking place. We received substantial intelligence information over the past month that the North Vietnamese were planning a third offensive. It is difficult to know what effect General Abrams' spoiling operations have had, for there has been substantial combat. His efforts have been exceedingly effective, and it may be that they have been trying to start the third offensive but have been unsuccessful. We'll know more about that in the coming weeks. They still have the ability to mount other attacks and they may choose to do so. One more question.

MORE

Question: How many extra troops will be going to Europe for these temporary--this temporary increase?

Secretary Clifford: That has not been determined, but it would be something in the neighborhood I would say from a minimum of 20- to a maximum of 40,000 troops that would take part in military exercises. Thank you.

Press: Thank you.

*Pres file*

Wednesday, September 18, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is Secretary Rusk's memo recommending you meet with French Foreign Minister Debre. He will be in the U.S. for the General Assembly session and will be in Washington October 10-12.

You will be seeing British Foreign Minister Stewart at 5:30 p.m., Friday, October 11. I believe it would be helpful if you could also see Debre.

W. W. Rostow

Arrangement appointment\_\_\_\_\_

No\_\_\_\_\_

Call me\_\_\_\_\_

ERF:mst



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

12a

September 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Call on You by  
French Foreign Minister

Recommendation:

That you meet for a half hour with the French Foreign Minister, Michel Debre, between noon October 10 and noon October 12 at a time convenient to you.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

The French Foreign Minister, Michel Debre, will attend the General Assembly session at New York, and will visit Washington during October 10-12. I plan to give a lunch here for him on October 12.

The French Ambassador in a formal note has submitted a request for Debre to pay a courtesy call on you. Ambassador Shriver has warmly endorsed this request, as a contribution to the improved atmosphere of relations with France. In addition, this would be an important gesture of reciprocity, since General de Gaulle has always granted requests to receive United States officials.

I hope you can find the time to meet with Mr. Debre.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

13

ACTION

Wednesday -- September 18, 1968 - 6:55pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Holyoake visit

*Pres file*

Holyoake can be an articulate spokesman for the importance not only of our current Vietnam policy, but of a continued American role in Southeast Asia. However, both the National Press Club and the national TV shows are reluctant to schedule him for fear that some development in the campaign would force them to cancel with all the embarrassment that would entail.

I suggest, therefore, that we make sure that he has a platform by giving him ours -- that is, that you take him out to meet the White House press corps after his meeting with you on the second day of his visit.

This also would serve the purpose of giving Holyoake a little of the special treatment which Gorton received. The New Zealanders are sensitive about "being taken for granted," or being considered merely a tail on the Australian dog.

If you find this idea has merit, I suggest we reserve 12 noon on October 10 for your second meeting with Holyoake. Doing so, of course, does not commit you to the joint press conference which you would, in any event, want to discuss with Holyoake. I recommend that you approve the second office meeting with Holyoake at 12 noon on October 10.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Lou Schwartz

*work*  
*Pres file 114*

Wednesday, September 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Prince Makhosini Dlamini (Mah-Keh-SEE-nee Dlah-MEE-nee), Prime Minister of Swaziland -- 10:40 A. M. today

This is an informal courtesy call. A biography is attached. Swaziland is newly independent (September 6; Cliff Alexander and Ralph Becker were your representatives at the ceremony). The Prime Minister is in town briefly before going up to speak for Swaziland's entry into the UN. He lunches with Secretary Rusk tomorrow.

Swaziland -- like the other enclave states of Lesotho and Botswana -- is a geographic hostage of South Africa. They will not be able to satisfy their brethren by talking loudly on the race issue. But the Prime Minister inherited a fairly stable country from the British and should run a moderate and progressive regime.

There are <sup>no</sup> ~~only two~~ pressing U. S. -Swazi bilateral issues. AID self-help funds will give Swaziland \$50,000 in FY 1969, including support for an agricultural training center as one of our independence gifts. 24 Peace Corps volunteers start work there in January. The Swazis have a small U. S. sugar quota (6,000 tons) and the Prime Minister may ask to have it increased. If he raises the sugar question, you might wish to say:

-- Our sugar quota is a thorny economic and political problem. The Swaziland case will certainly be considered when the existing U. S. Sugar Act is discussed and revised in 1970. There is not much hope for action any sooner than that.

In addition, you might say to the Prime Minister:

1. We welcome Swaziland into the family of nations and look forward to warm and constructive cooperation with her.
2. The Prime Minister should know -- as you have told the leaders of Lesotho and Botswana -- that the United States firmly supports their independence. We share their commitment to the dignity of man.
3. Though our resources are limited by what Congress gives us, we will try to help whenever we are asked and wherever we can in the building of a new Africa.



## BIOGRAPHY

Prince Makhosini Jameson Dlamini

(Pronounced: Mah koh SEE ree Dlah-MEE-nee)

Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Swaziland

Born in 1914 in Swaziland, the Prime Minister attended primary and high school there, completing his formal education by attending Umphumulo Teacher Training Institute in the adjacent Province of Natal, South Africa, from 1938 to 1940. He is married and has 10 children.

He was a teacher and high school principal for seven years and first entered local politics as chairman of the Swaziland Teachers Association. He left teaching for full-time farming in 1947, when he also became active in the Swazi National Council, the traditional tribal body which advises the Monarch.

The Prime Minister entered the modern arm of government in 1949 as a rural development official. He held various administrative positions and served as a member or leader of Swazi delegations sent to Great Britain to discuss constitutional and minerals problems, and to nearby Botswana and Lesotho upon their independence.

He became leader of the King's political party, the Imbokocho National Movement, in 1964, when the party won ten of the 12 seats on the old Legislative Council. In 1966 he was appointed to the old Executive Council.

With the granting of self-government on April 25, 1967, the Imbokocho won all 24 elective seats in the 30-member House of Assembly, which replaced the Legislative Council. Prince Makhosini Dlamini became Prime Minister and continued in that office following full independence on September 6, 1968.

Sept. 1968

**SECRET**

**Lunch Meeting With the President**  
**Tuesday, September 16, 1968 - 1:30 pm**

**AGENDA**

1. **Paris Talks.** (Sec. Rusk; Amb. Harriman)

- Hanoi intentions
- Where we now stand
- Next steps

At Tab A is Vance's report of Sunday morning's private session.

2. **Military Situation, Prospects, and Appropriate U.S. Strategy.**  
(Sec. Clifford; Gen Wheeler)

See Tab B for Thieu's appreciation.

3. **Gene Black in Cambodia.** (Sec. Rusk)

Report: Cambodians totally negative. See Tab C.

4. **Pueblo.** (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report.

5. **Spanish Base Negotiations.** (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report.

6. **Czechoslovak Situation.** (Sec. Rusk; Mr. Helms)

Situation report.

7. **Block in Senate Foreign Relations Committee.** (Sec. Rusk)

A quorum hard to come by. What, if anything, should we urge Sen. Sparkman to do in the face of the hold up of NPT, IDA, and military sales legislation, in view of Gore's position.

8. **Other.**

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 11-17-92

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

**-SECRET-**

ACTION

Tuesday - September 17, 1968

*+ snap*  
*2 Pres file*  
*W*

Mr. President:

You appointed Mr. Herbert M. Singer of New York City to the U. S. Delegation to the inauguration of Ecuadorean President Velasco Ibarra.

On his return Mr. Singer sent you the letter at Tab B expressing appreciation for the mission.

You may wish to acknowledge his letter with the suggested reply at Tab A.

W. W. Reston

**Attachments**

Tab A - Suggested letter for Presidential signature to Mr. Herbert M. Singer.

Tab B - Letter of September 11 to President from Herbert Singer.



16a

September 17, 1968

Dear Mr. Singer:

I was especially pleased to receive your letter of September 11 giving your views on the Ecuadorean political scene and the performance of our diplomatic representatives.

I am grateful to you for accepting the assignment. Persons outside government service have much to contribute to our diplomatic efforts abroad, and I think you will agree with me that undertaking a mission such as you did contributes to a better understanding at home of what we are trying to do in other countries.

I am glad that you and Mrs. Singer found the trip a rewarding experience.

Sincerely,

*15/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

Mr. Herbert M. Singer  
10 East 56th Street  
New York, N. Y. 10022

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

11

166

HERBERT M. SINGER  
10 EAST 56<sup>TH</sup> STREET  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022

September 11, 1968

H

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I returned last week from Quito, Ecuador, where, in accordance with your appointment, I attended the inauguration of President Velasco as your personal representative. I am deeply grateful to you for affording me this unusual opportunity for public service.

Because I feel certain that the head of our delegation, Assistant Secretary Covey Oliver, has reported on our trip more fully, more effectively and, I am certain, with greater understanding than I could possibly provide, I shall not attempt to give you an interpretation of our various discussions with President Velasco, members of his cabinet, representatives of agriculture, industry and labor, members of our top personnel in Ecuador and members of the very large community of diplomats from foreign lands who attended the inauguration.

However, I would like to make a few observations which may be of particular interest to you:

1. With so many harsh and disagreeable events that mar peace and freedom in the world, I am particularly pleased that we bring to you happier tidings concerning Ecuador. This nation which has had a long and stormy history of government instability, recently adopted a new constitution; and, in a thoroughly democratic manner, elected its new president. The transfer of power from the old to the new administration was effected amicably, with the participation of all branches of government and with the unifying presence of leaders of the opposition.

September 11, 1968

Page 2

The President

2. I personally delivered your gift to President Velasco with your warm good wishes for his success in advancing the interests of his country. President Velasco graciously responded. Despite the past friction between the prior Ecuadorian administration and our government, President Velasco expressed, during our discussions, his warm good will for the United States; and in this, I believe, from all evidence available to us, that he expressed the attitude of the Ecuadorian people.
3. The democratic process and President Velasco's populist philosophy will undoubtedly be under strain due largely to economic problems. American aid can play a profound, perhaps a critical, role in Ecuador's economy, in the continuation of its democratic institutions and in the stability and warmth of its relationship with the U.S.
4. I feel I must express my great admiration for those who represent our government in Ecuador. The quality of these public servants, their dedication to the interests of our country, their deep knowledge in the area of their responsibility, their balanced judgment and their sensitive deportment have impressed me deeply. I particularly wish to make mention of our Charge d'Affaires, Mr. John Crowley, who, upon the withdrawal of our ambassador, successfully assumed the responsibility of the Embassy during a most delicate period.
5. Lastly, I would like to pay special tribute to the head of our delegation, Assistant Secretary Covey Oliver, for his able handling of this mission, and particularly for his talents, skills

September 11, 1968


Page 3

The President

and personality as a diplomat which have earned for him not only the warm regard of the Ecuadorian official family, but the deep respect of the diplomatic community assembled in Quito.

Again, Mr. President, please accept my warm appreciation and my thanks for this opportunity to be of service in the nation's interest.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John W. Singer". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the left.

HMSinger:cal



ACTION

17

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Tuesday, September 17, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Message from You to President Park

State recommends that you send a message of congratulation to President Park Chung Hee on the occasion of his fifty-first birthday on September 30.

As you know, President Park regards you as a firm and understanding friend of the Republic of Korea, and considers that he has established an especially close relationship with you.

A suggested text for a telegraphic message of congratulation is attached.

Recommendation:

That you approve the suggested message.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

AJenkins:mm

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

17a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Message

Dear Mr. President:

I extend my heartiest congratulations to you on the occasion of your fifty-first birthday. I hope that in the year to come great good fortune will attend you as you lead the Korean people in their search for peace and prosperity.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Chung Hee Park

President of the Republic of Korea

Seoul

*Pres file*

Tuesday, September 17, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Dr. Salazar is extremely ill and is not expected to live. Attached for your approval is a condolence message from you to the President of Portugal to be sent in the event of Salazar's death.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*JK*  
JKNewman:mst

18a  
—

**MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT THOMAZ OF PORTUGAL**

**I wish to extend my sincere condolences and those of  
the American people to you, the Portuguese Government  
and the people of Portugal on the death of the President of the  
Council of Ministers, Professor Dr. Antonio de Oliveira  
Salazar.**



Tuesday, Sept, 17, 1968  
11:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Sect. Rusk reports as follows on UPI 12:

1. Aiken's statement was made yesterday. Foster has since seen him and reassured him.
2. The cause of Aiken's anxiety was some very loose testimony by Commissioner Tape of the AEC who implied that the Non-Proliferation Treaty involved a "big giveaway."
3. Aiken has assured Foster that he will vote for the Treaty.
4. Foster reports to Sect. Rusk that all the Democrats are present today, plus four Republicans. A quorum exists. Foster believes they will vote the NPT out of committee.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Geo. Christian

has file

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Tuesday, Sept. 17, 1968  
11:10 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This report is interesting in a number of respects, most notably because it confirms other reports that a Czech delegation is going to Moscow shortly to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet troops. (para. 3)

The comments by Brezhnev & Company are rather interesting.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-attachment (Prague 3582)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-162  
By us, NARA Date 9-8-97





# Department of State TELEGRAM

21

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02. PRAGUE 03582 161157Z

WERE ABLE CONVINCE ~~"TRUE COMMUNISTS WILL GET RID OF THEIR LEADER SHIPS OR GOVERNMENTS"~~

6. CERNIK INDICATED HE WOULD TERMINATE CONVERSATION, REMARKING THAT ~~KGB NOW IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEMONSTRATING NO SUCH CAPABILITIES.~~

7. BREZHNEV SOFTENED HIS LINE SAYING HE NOT REFERRING TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHERE SOVS WILL "ALWAYS HONESTLY FULFILL AGREEMENTS" AND THAT ~~AS LONG AS CZECHOSLOVAKS DO THEIR PART, THERE WAS NOTHING TO FEAR.~~

8. GRECHKO, WHO PRESENT, ADDED THAT HE WARNING ALL THAT SOVS HAVE MORE CONVENTIONAL ARMS THAN ALL EUROPE TOGETHER DISPARAGED DE GAULLE'S "FORCE DE FRAPPE" AND SAID HE KNEW HOW "CONVINCE AMERICA" WHERE "ONE NUCLEAR BOMB WOULD PACIFY THEM".

9. CERNIK ASKED IF HE WERE SUPPOSED TO CONVEY ALL THIS TO THE APPROPRIATE PLACES.

10. CERNIK AND HAMOUZ THOUGHT BREZHNEV BEHAVED AS IF HE HAD LOST CONTROL OF HIS NERVES, IN CONTRAST TO KOSYGIN WHO EMPHASIZED SOV CZECHOSLOVAK FRIENDSHIP.

SAME SOURCE, IN COMMENTING ON ~~KUZNETSOV'S ROLE IN PRAGUE,~~ CLAIMED:

1. ~~KUZNETSOV BEING TROUBLE WITH MILITARY (PRESUMABLY SOV MILITARY).~~

2. HOWEVER, HE HAS URGENTLY DEMANDED PLACEMENT TWO SOV AIR DIVISIONS IN PILSEN AND BUDEJOVICE, WITH CZECH DIVISIONS PREVIOUSLY THERE BEING SENT TO PROSTEJOV (MORAVIA) AND PRESOV (SLOVAKIA). (BRIDGES IN THIS DIRECTION ARE BEING REINFORCED SO THEY CAN CARRY 3000 TONS. ROCKET BASES ARE SUPPOSED TO BE BUILT IN PILSEN-KLATOVY AREA.)

3. DELEGATION INCLUDING MILITARY SUPPOSED TO GO TO MOSCOW NEXT WEEK TO NEGOTIATE WITHDRAWAL.

GP-1

~~SECRET~~





*Department of State* **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03: PRAGUE 03582: 161157Z

BEAM:

NOTE: HANDLED LIMDIS PERIS/S-0.

~~SECRET~~

*Puiple*

21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, Sept. 17, 1968  
11:00 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Although the views of this North Vietnamese prisoner (a Lt. Colonel) are out-of-date (he was captured in April), I thought you should know of them.

I doubt the Communists have the capability to do what he suggested in the face of a bombing halt; and we have made it clear we would resume.

Nevertheless. . .

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-attachment

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *rg*, NARA, Date 11-17-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (extracted from DOD Intelligence Information Report 30 Aug 68)

~~VC/NVA Policy Regarding PARIS Peace Talks. The current VC/NVA policy is and has been for many years that, in the event of a complete halt to the bombing of NVN, to immediately launch an all-out offensive against the RVN using all available troops in the RVN and in NVN. There would be no regard to VC/NVA personnel losses. The ultimate objective would be to gain and control as much territory as possible to support a very strong position at the bargaining table. The reasons behind a full scale offensive would be to show the strength of VC/NVA forces, and to produce a feeling among the American population that the continued utilization of US forces in Vietnam is not only futile but wasteful. Another full scale offensive would also provoke demonstrations against US participation in the Vietnamese struggle. In addition, the effect of the coming US presidential elections would be affected; in that the possibility of a Dove candidate being elected would be enhanced if the VC/NVA elements prove strong enough to cause large numbers of US/Allied casualties. If a candidate who advocates a complete halt to the bombing of NVN and VC/NVA military targets is elected, the chances of a complete halt to the bombing is enhanced, which, again, would result in an all out attack against the RVN by all available troops, both in the RVN and in NVN. Discussions in reference to peace talks have taken place among high ranking VC/NVA cadre since the end of the Binh Da battle in 1964. If peace talks were begun, the ultimate aim would be another offensive to provide a strong bargaining position for the Communists. Since the deescalation of the bombing of NVN, the one aim of the Communists has been to gain a complete halt to the bombing. This would allow them the opportunity to wage an all-out offensive against the RVN and drive the US/Allied forces from the country.~~

The Communists were not ready on 31 March 68 to attend the Paris peace talks, but were forced to accept the invitation or "lose face" in the eyes of their own people, since it would no longer be possible to accuse the US of not desiring to end the war. The Communists have no fear of US/Allied normal infantry tactics as applied in RVN, but are greatly disturbed by both the bombing and artillery bombardments by US/ARVN/Allied forces. This show of military strength, if ever stopped, would cause the RVN/US to "lose face" in the eyes of the VC/NVA. Deescalating the US/Allied military might would further entice the VC/NVA to continue their attacks and resistance against RVN/Allied countermeasures. By maintaining a show of strength, RVN/Allied Forces retain the respect of VC/NVA elements. But a show of weakness, such as would be caused by a halt to the bombing, would cause a loss of face in the opinion of the oriental mind (sic). The VC/NVA desire is to gain complete control of the RVN through the medium of the National Liberation Front. Even if an agreement was reached whereby both NVN and the US agreed to pull out of the RVN, there would be no assurance that NVN would keep its end of the bargain. It is easy to insure that US troops would depart because they are foreigners. But the NVN and the VC would merely relocate themselves in areas in the RVN to accomplish either of two objectives: (1) to begin the attacks anew upon departure of all US/Free World Forces from RVN with the ultimate objective of a Communist type govern-

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12333, Dec 33

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1998

By 19 NARA Date 11-17-92



ment throughout the country, or (2), to conduct elections throughout both the RVN and NVN whereby, because of the numerical superiority of the population in NVN including VC sympathizers in the RVN, the National Liberation Front would still achieve control of the government for the Communists. In this manner, control would be achieved legally, as happened between 1943 and 1948 in Czechoslovakia. Further propaganda fuel is provided the Communists (NVN/VC) by current disagreements among dissident factions (dove/hawk) in the US. It is hoped that this continued disagreement will cause such friction and such a dislike for the current conflict in RVN that, in the coming presidential election, the people will show their disfavor of the US involvement by electing a president who has shown a desire to end the bombing and, eventually, the war. Source reiterated a number of times that, in the event of a halt to the bombing, all VC/NVN Forces both in the RVN and in NVN, would immediately begin an all-out attack against the RVN, regardless of losses suffered. There is no compassion among the Communist leaders where life or property are concerned as long as they achieve their objective, that of complete control of the RVN. In addition, source made the following suggestions as possible solutions to prevent the achievement of Communist aims:

(a) ~~A continuance of the bombing to include a renewal of the bombing of NVN, that is, Hanoi, Haiphong, etc.~~

(b) ~~A continuance of the struggle in the RVN against VC/NVA Forces with no thought of a withdrawal of US/Allied Forces.~~

(c) ~~Under no condition give in to form a coalition government, because this would be simply the beginning of a Communist takeover in RVN.~~

(d) ~~Assume a belligerent attitude toward the VC/NVN government. This would show a strength, politically as well as militarily.~~

(e) ~~Under no circumstances should the ARVN/Allied Forces invade NVN. This would only cause a unification of dissident elements which presently exist in NVN and cause them to fight a common enemy, that is, a foreign enemy. The Vietnamese people, both North and South, have a great love of their country and resent any foreigner controlling either its government or its people. The North Vietnamese have been under Communist domination for 10 years or more and are already tired of the lack of living essentials and the frugality under which they live. Source suggested that the RVN/Allied Forces continue to defend only against attack on RVN and to permit the people to eventually overthrow the Communists on their own.~~



22

Tuesday, Sept. 17, 1968  
10:15 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, as requested, some issues for your conversation with Averell Harriman at 12:30 p. m. today; although I doubt any guidance from me is required.

1. What, in general, is Harriman's judgment of the prospects for the Paris talks in the weeks ahead?
2. What is his guess, as an old hand, as to the meaning of the channel in Oslo which they apparently plan to open on September 20?
3. What does he read into Hanoi's apparent interest in the precise meaning of the Manila formula?
4. What is his guess as to how Hanoi plans to handle the year-side, our-side issue and the role of the GVN?
5. If we should find a formula for stopping the bombing and beginning serious substantive talks in Paris, does he believe Hanoi will:
  - seek rapid movement towards a peaceful settlement? or
  - find an issue like the bombing cessation on which they can keep the talks going with no progress for many months while they are totally free of bombing?

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-468  
By Clr, NARA, Date 4-4-95

ACTION

23

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, September 17, 1968 - 10:05 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposal for an Allied Declaration on Berlin

*(perhaps for lunch discussion)*

Attached for your approval is a draft Allied Declaration on Berlin. Its purpose is to affirm the legitimacy of Federal Republic activities in West Berlin. It makes the following points:

- The Three Powers welcome FRG activities in West Berlin.
- These activities are indispensable to the viability of West Berlin and harm no one.
- The viability of West Berlin is important not only to the Three Powers but to the peace of the world.
- The Three Powers, having full responsibility for order in the city, will not accept outside interference with these legitimate activities -- or with trade or the peaceful passage of Germans between Berlin and the Federal Republic.

Secretary Rusk has approved the Declaration.

The background is this:

- After the Soviets applied pressure on Berlin in June through the visa issue, Brandt proposed to Secretary Rusk in the NATO meeting that the allied powers work out a declaration of support for the FRG role in Berlin.
- During meetings in Bonn the FRG proposed a draft declaration of what the Allies would consider to be the legitimate activities of the Federal Republic in Berlin. (The attached statement is a revision of this German draft.)
- Recently, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin formally complained to Ambassador Lodge about the provocative nature of certain FRG meetings in Berlin. Ambassador Dobrynin made the same point orally to Secretary Rusk on September 1. In effect, the Russians charged that the Federal Republic was trying to build tension and cause trouble in Berlin.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

An Allied Declaration could be used as an answer to the Soviet charges. Most important it can serve as preventive medicine against further attempts by the Russians and East Germans to chip away at Berlin. It would build up the confidence of the people of Berlin.

If you approve this draft, we will send it to Bonn to negotiate the language with the UK and France.


I concur in the recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

  
ERF:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TEXT OF DRAFT ALLIED DECLARATION ON BERLIN  
(FRG TEXT AS AMENDED IN DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
SEPTEMBER 10, 1968)

Questions concerning the role of the Federal Republic of Germany in helping maintain the viability of Berlin having been raised recently, the Governments of France, the U.K., and the U.S. find it useful to make their own views clear. The Three Powers therefore issue the following declaration:

As a result of agreements reached among the Four Powers. in connection with the termination of hostilities in 1945, Greater Berlin, as a part of Germany, is subject to the joint administration of the Four Powers pending a peace settlement. Until the establishment of a final governmental organization on German soil, territories on German soil--including in particular Berlin--remain a part of Germany and their status cannot be changed without the consent of all of the Powers concerned.

The Three Powers have over the years welcomed the development of close contacts between the three Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany as an important contribution to the viability of Berlin and to the Three Powers in meeting their responsibilities in the city. These contacts are also in accord with the will of the people of West Berlin.

Maintaining the viability of Berlin is of great significance not only to the U.S., U.K. and France but to the entire world. Its absence could lead to tensions threatening peace not only in Berlin or in Germany, but throughout the world.



The Federal Republic has conducted certain activities in Berlin which contribute to the viability of Berlin. These activities threaten no one. The Three Powers will accept no outside interference with these legitimate activities or with peaceful passage of Germans and commerce between Berlin and the Federal Republic. At the same time, the Three Powers will continue to exercise fully their control and authority in Berlin as provided for by valid international treaty and practice. The Three Powers expect the Soviet Union to respect all decisions taken pursuant to the Three Powers' authority in Berlin.

The Three Western Allies pursue their obligations in Berlin in the spirit of furthering international peace, order, and well-being. The Fed Rep's contribution to Berlin's viability is consistent with this spirit. The three Western Allies hope that the same dedication to these international goals will guide the Soviet authorities in formulating their policies with respect to Berlin.

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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

*Wed* *18*  
~~Tuesday~~, September 17, 1968  
10:30 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This evaluation of the enemy's difficulties and lack of punch in Northern I Corps is of interest and relevance.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 11892  
By iso NARA, Date 11-21-97

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rlh

Problems Continue to Plague Enemy Units in Northern I Corps

24a

5. Communist forces deployed in the northern coastal region of I Corps continue to be frustrated by their inability to mount a sustained military effort against allied targets from Hue to Quang Tri city.

6. Allied spoiling operations have probably been the principal problem for the enemy in this sector. A document captured on 19 August near the district capital of Phu Loc in Thua Thien Province, for example, reveals that the morale and effectiveness of the North Vietnamese 5th Regiment has deteriorated sharply because of combat losses, allied airstrikes, and sickness. Significantly, the document was written prior to an allied operation of 26 August which overran the regimental headquarters and inflicted further heavy losses on its subordinate battalions.

7. Critical food shortages, due in part to allied rice denial operations, also continue to plague enemy forces in the northern provinces. A recent

based west of Hue has stated that his unit had been forced to redeploy to base areas in the A Shau Valley in order to get rice because none was available in the usually plentiful eastern coastal lowlands. Recently captured documents indicate that the North Vietnamese 812th Regiment and other front line combat units of the Communists B-7 Front are encountering similar food problems in the Quang Tri city area.

8. The damaging effect of "Typhoon Bess" has further complicated the enemy's already critical rice problem, not only in the northern coastal region but also along the eastern DMZ.

9. Because of such difficulties, Communist main force units appear to pose little immediate threat to allied positions and population centers in the Hue - Quang Tri city sector.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-63  
By ebm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

16 September 1968

I-2

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Hue in the Laotian infiltration corridor. This marks the westernmost position the headquarters has even been known to occupy and further reduces the likelihood of major enemy attacks in the coastal lowlands in the near future.

16 September 1968

I-3

~~TOP SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68.W1.20.255

~~SECRET~~/EXDISBy *jc* NARA. Date 12/7/01

INFORMATION

Mr. President:

Wednesday, September 18, 1968

Herewith George Ball's account of his meeting with Jarring in Paris Monday. Paragraph 5 on page 3 describes what many of your advisors feel is the nub of the current Arab-Israeli impasse.

In Jarring's view--which many of your advisors share--the main roadblock is Israel's inability to state its view of where boundaries should be. Israel cannot do this until the Cabinet makes a decision. Eshkol has delayed forcing that decision until the Arabs enter direct negotiations. The Arabs will not surrender that trump card--symbolizing recognition of Israel--until they believe the Israeli government has committed itself to withdrawal.

Many of your advisors feel that we can't hope for progress on any front until we tackle Israel on this issue. For instance, they feel that any response to the Soviet initiative--desirable as a response may be--will be academic until we can bring Israel along behind a counterproposal. This is why we recommended as the centerpiece of your B'nai B'rith speech: "...put their views on the table--begin talking the substance of peace."

The Israelis would argue vigorously that they are ready to put their views on the table only when they are convinced Nasser is ready to talk real peace. And they don't think he is. While no one has any illusions about Nasser, Jarring believes the UAR is ready to end belligerency. We're not sure, but we think there's enough in the UAR position to be worth probing.

Where we disagree with Israel is that they're holding out for a complete Arab cave-in right from the start--open borders, full recognition, reconciliation. We see the road to that goal made up of a series of stepping stones, and we see a settlement not as "instant peace" but as a framework within which attitudes can change. We think Israel is holding out for too much and losing sight of substantial gains within its grasp--permanent boundaries and passage through the Canal.

Therefore, many of your advisors--while agreeing we must treat the Soviet proposal seriously--would hate to see us pin too much hope on it by itself. They believe we must concentrate primarily on moving the Israelis to make their commitment to withdraw clear by stating their position on boundaries. If you were to go ahead with Phantoms, they would consider this a fair return.

Att: Paris 20891, 9/16/68

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS







*Department of State*

# TELEGRAM

**SECRET**

PAGE 02 PARIS 20891 161650Z

FORWARD SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS OF HIS OWN, JARRING "PREFERRED TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION IN NY." HOWEVER, WE ARE CONVINCED HE IS PREPARED TO PUT FORWARD SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS ON HIS OWN AT APPROPRIATE TIME, THOUGH HE SAID HE HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT THIS SINCE NEITHER SIDE ACCEPTED HIM AS A MEDIATOR. HE FEELS FREE TO PUT "IDEAS" TO THE PARTIES. HIS ASSESSMENT REGARDING POSSIBLE SC ACTION IN EVENT OF FAILURE ON HIS PART IS SAME AS OURS--THAT UAR PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE ATTRACTION AT UN AND ISRAELIS WOULD BE ON DEFENSIVE AND "IN DIFFICULTY." HE HAS TOLD GOI THIS. HE HAS ALSO MADE CLEAR TO BOTH SIDES "HE CANNOT GO ON FOREVER IN ABSENCE OF PROGRESS." HE FEARS THAT ALTERNATIVE TO PROGRESS IS NOT ONLY SC, BUT ALSO STEPPED UP USE OF FORCE, SINCE "UAR NOT ABLE TO MAKE WAR BUT NOW ABLE TO STRIKE BACK EFFECTIVELY MILITARILY." HE EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN OVER SITUATION ALONG SUEZ, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT FACT "MISSILES COULD BE USED WHICH PERMIT MILITARY EXCHANGES WITHOUT ANY MOVEMENT OF FORCES." JARRING THOUGHT UAR WOULD BE WILLING TO BITE AT A SETTLEMENT THAT SATISFIES ITS TERRITORIAL DEMANDS BUT DOES NOT ENTIRELY SATISFY JORDANIAN TERRITORIAL DEMANDS. END

2. AMBASSADOR BALL OPENED CONVERSATION BY EXPRESSING DEEP APPRECIATION THAT JARRING COULD SEE HIM; HE WAS IN EUROPE TO BRIEF NATO ON UN MATTERS AND HAVE TALK HERE WITH OUR PARIS NEGOTIATORS. HE WAS PLEASED FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH JARRING WHERE MATTERS STOOD. US PREPARED TO HELP JARRING IN HIS EFFORT TO PROMOTE A SOLUTION AND BRING PEACE TO MIDDLE EAST. WE LOOK FORWARD TO UP-COMING PERIOD OF GENREAL ASSEMBLY, AT WHICH FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE PRESENT, AS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY WHICH MUST NOT BE LOST.

3. AMBASSADOR JARRING AGREED FULLY THAT MAJOR EFFORT MUST BE MADE AT GA. SITUATION IN SOME RESPECTS WORSE SINCE NOT ONLY HAD HE NOT BEEN ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS BUT CONDITIONS ALONG SUEZ HAD DETERIORATED. HE EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN, NOTING THAT NOT ONLY DOES UAR HAVE CAPACITY TO STRIKE BACK, BUT THAT HE FOUND ISRAELI MILITARY "TESTY" AND WITH A CERTAIN DESIRE TO STRIKE.

4. HE REVIEWED HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH GOI AND UAR. HE SAID HE TOLD EBAN LATEST ISRAELI WRITTEN REPLY TO UAR QUESTIONS NOT HELPFUL. AT SAME TIME, HE BALANCED THIS STATEMENT WITH CLEAR-CUT JUDGMENT ATTACKING ISRAELIS. HE DID NOT DEMUR FROM EBAN'S CHARACTERIZATION OF IT AS A VERBAL TIRADE.

**SECRET**



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PARIS 20891 161650Z

5. HE FOCUSED PRINCIPALLY ON QUESTION OF A GOI-UAR SETTLEMENT. HE DOES NOT SHARE ISRAELI VIEW THAT PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN, SINCE HE DOES NOT BELIEVE HAUSSAIN IS STRONG ENOUGH TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT, BEFORE THE UAR. HE BELIEVES SETTLEMENT WITH UAR HAS LESS INHERENT DIFFICULTIES THAN ONE WITH JORDAN. HE RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO NEED FOR ISRAELIS TO TELL HIM SPECIFICALLY WHAT THEY MEAN BY SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES. HE IS FULLY AWARE THAT EBAN HAS SAID ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT THERE ARE NO MAJOR TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN GOI AND UAR, BUT HE SAID ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO PROVIDE HIM WITH KIND OF STATEMENT REGARDING BOUNDARIES AND WITHDRAWAL WHICH HE COULD USE TO MAKE PROGRESS. HE WOULD FIND EXTREMELY USEFUL A GOI STATEMENT WHICH RELATED WITHDRAWAL TO SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES AS WELL AS TO OTHER PARTS OF THE RESOLUTION. DIFFICULTY AS HE SEES IT, WHICH NOT NEW TO US, IS THAT ISRAELIS HAVE NOT MADE ANY DECISIONS REGARDING BOUNDARIES AND THAT STATEMENTS SUCH AS TEKOAH MAY 1 SC STATEMENT ARE CON- DITIONAL ON DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. JARRING EXPRESSED JUDGMENT THAT IF GOI WAS WILLING TO DEFINE MORE PRECISELY IN A STATEMENT ITS ATTITUDE ON BORDERS AND TERRITORY LIMITED TO UAR, THEN UAR WOULD BE TEMPTED. HE FEELS UAR WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INSIST THAT ISRAELI STATEMENT ACCEPTING PRINCIPLE OF WITH DRAWAL-BE BROADLY APPLICABLE TO ENTIRE SETTLEMENT--THAT IS, BE ALLEMBRACING SO THAT IT WOULD BE LIKEWISE APPLICABLE TO WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL JORDANIAN TERRITORY, INCLUDING JERUSALEM. HERE JARRING SAID HE WAS PLAYING AROUND WITH WORDS IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH PARTIES, SINCE SC RESOLUTION OFFERED SOME FLEXIBILITY IN SENSE THAT IT CALLED FOR "WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES" NOT "THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES." (SEE PARA 1 OF SC NOV RESOLUTION.)

6. IN SHORT, JARRING SAID HE NEEDED A STATEMENT FROM ISRAEL THAT IT IS WILLING TO GET OUT OF UAR TERRITORY. HE THOUGHT ISRAEL COULD DO THIS SINCE EBAN HAD SAID SEVERAL TIMES THERE WERE NO MAJOR TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN GOI AND UAR. HE SINGLED OUT GAZA FOR SEPARATE TREATMENT BELIEVING IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE UN TAKE OVER ITS ADMINISTRATION FOR 5 OR 10 YEARS AFTER WHICH PEOPLE COULD BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE THEIR PERMANENT FUTURE AND STATUS. HE THOUGHT GAZA MIGHT SOME DAY GO TO JORDAN AND THAT IF THE PEOPLE WERE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO CHOOSE AT SOME LATER STAGE, THEY WOULD PROBABLY OPT FOR JORDAN RATHER THAN ISRAEL.

~~SECRET~~

DISSEMINATION





*Department of State*

# TELEGRAM

**Sección**

PAGE: 04 PARIS 20891 161650Z

GP-1 SHRIVER

NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T.

**SEVEN**

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



*Department of State*

# TELEGRAM

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N' S E X D I S E X D I S E X D I S

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PAGE 01 PARIS 20891 161600Z

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**ACTION SS 30**

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INFO /030 W

P 161507Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6081

~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF TWO PARIS 20891

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, USNATO, MOSCOW,  
TELAVIV, AND USUN

SUBJECT: BALL/SISCO TALK WITH JARRING RE CURRENT STATUS HIS MISSION

7. BALL EXPLORED POSSIBLE PROCEDURE FOR TALKS, PERHAPS AT WALDORF, INCLUDING SEPARATE OFFICE FOR JARRING WITH PARTIES IN ADJOINING ROOMS. WE ALSO EXPLORED WITH JARRING POSSIBILITY OF LINKING SOME STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAELIS WITH SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR DISCUSSION WHICH GOI COULD JUSTIFY AS DIRECT AND UAR INDIRECT. WE MADE POINT THAT THIS KIND OF A LINKAGE MIGHT GIVE US SOME LEVERAGE WITH ISRAELIS, THOUGH OUR INFLUENCE WITH GOI IS NOT AS GREAT AS MANY SAY IT IS. WHILE JARRING DID NOT BY ANY MATTER OF MEANS DISMISS OUR SUGGESTED PROCEDURE, HE DID EXPRESS STRONG DOUBT THAT SUCH A PROCEDURE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO UAR. HE INDICATED HIS CLEAR INTENTION TO CONTINUE INDIRECT PROCESS IN FIRST INSTANCE. AT THE OUTSET AT LEAST HE INTENDS TO OPERATE FROM DRAKE HOTEL AND TO CALL ON THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THEIR RESPECTIVE HOTELS, BUT ON A STEPPED-UP SCALE. HE DOES NOT FEEL HE CAN GET UAR AND ISRAELIS IN SAME HOTEL. MOREOVER, HE DID NOT FEEL THAT ANY LEVEL OTHER THAN AT FOREIGN MINISTERS' WOULD BE USEFUL; IN OTHER WORDS, TRYING TO START AT THE RAPHAEL-MOHAMMED RIAD LEVEL DID NOT ATTRACT HIM. HE RECALLED HOW USELESS HIS DISCUSSIONS WERE AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL IN NY WITH EL KONY AND AL FARRAH. HE ALSO EXPRESSED VIEW THAT GOI ATTEMPTS TO GET IN TOUCH WITH UAR SECRETLY WERE IMPOSSIBLE.

8. HE SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO ANSWER IN NY BALL'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER HE WOULD PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS OF HIS OWN TO PARTIES. AS

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 20891 161600Z

NOTED IN ABOVE SUMMARY, WE GOT CLEAR IMPRESSION HE WILL PUT SOME OF HIS OWN PROPOSALS IN FORM OF "IDEAS" TO PARTIES AT APPROPRIATE STAGE.

9. JARRING ALSO GAVE US AN INDICATION OF HIS THINKING ON SUBSTANCE. HE CHARACTERIZED ALLON PLAN AS UNACCEPTABLE. WHILE NOTING THAT HE WAS FREE TO PUT FORWARD "IDEAS" RATHER THAN "PROPOSALS" (HE RECOGNIZED THERE WAS ONLY A FINE LINE BETWEEN THESE CONCEPTS), HE SAID ISRAELIS KNOW THAT IF HE PUTS FORWARD A PROPOSAL JUST WHAT IT WOULD BE. BY THIS HE MEANT THAT HIS IDEAS ARE ALONG LINES OF FAMILIAR PLAN CALLING FOR PARTIAL GOI WITHDRAWAL FROM SUEZ IN HOPES THAT ON A STEP BY STEP BASIS THIS WOULD LEAD TO IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER PARTS OF RESOLUTION. HE SAID HE HAS NOT PUT THIS FORWARD

FORMALLY, SINCE HE KNOWS IT IS UNACCEPTABLE TO ISRAELIS. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IF HE FAILS, SUCH IDEAS WILL HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF ATTRACTION IN SC AND THAT ISRAELIS ARE LIKELY TO FIND THEMSELVES IN DIFFICULTY. HE DID NOT SAY WHETHER SUCH IDEAS WOULD BE INCLUDED IN ANY REPORT HE EVENTUALLY MAKES.

10. HE ALSO HAD A FEW THINGS TO SAY ABOUT REFUGEE QUESTION. ONLY BEGINNINGS OF A SOLUTION WOULD BE REQUIRED IN HIS JUDGMENT RATHER THAN COMPLETE AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION AS PART OF ENTIRE SC PACKAGE. HE FELT THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOVEMENT IN ATTITUDE OF PARTIES ON REFUGEE QUESTION, AND THAT BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THAT A TOTAL SOLUTION WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME. HE THEREFORE FELT THERE WAS SOME GIVE ON THIS ASPECT OF SC RESOLUTION, AND THAT NEITHER SIDE EXPECTED A FULL SOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATION BEFORE OTHER THINGS COULD HAPPEN IN CARRYING OUT SC RESOLUTION.

11. HIS JUDGMENT IS THAT SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF CZECH SITUATION, WANT TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THEIR DIFFICULTIES IN MIDDLE EAST AND WANT A POLITICAL SOLUTION. BALL NOTED WE WOULD BE TALKING WITH SOVIETS IN NY AS WELL AS NUMBER OF OTHERS. JARRING BELIEVES THAT UAR WOULD NO MORE WELCOME BEING FINGERED BY USSR THAN ISRAELIS BY US.

12. IN COMING BACK SEVERAL TIMES TO TENSE AND PRECARIOUS SITUATION IN SUEZ AREA, JARRING EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT A RENEWAL OF SERIOUS FIGHTING COULD HAVE EFFECT OF NEGATING SMALL AMOUNT OF PROGRESS MADE. HE IS CONCERNED THAT IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI FAILURE TO RESPOND SATISFACTORILY ON TERRITORIAL QUESTION, AND RENEWED FIGHTING IN

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PARIS 20891 161600Z

SUEZ AREA, UAR MIGHT DECIDE AT SOME POINT TO NULLIFY ITS ACCEPTANCE OF SC RESOLUTION AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO IMPLEMENT IT. JARRING SAID THAT TO THIS POINT UAR HAS BEEN STEADFAST IN ACCEPTING THOSE ELEMENTS IN SC RES ENDING BELLIGERENCY AND CALLING FOR RESPECT AND RECOGNITION OF SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF STATES IN AREA.

GP-1 SHRIVER

NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T.

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS  
EXDIS



*File*  
26

Monday, Sept. 16, 1968  
8:25 p. m.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 17961  
By is NARA, Date 2-13-98

~~SECRET~~  
MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Black's own account of his  
frustrating mission to Cambodia.

Clearly, they will not do the job with the  
North Vietnamese-Viet Cong bases.

It's up to us.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Tokyo 12064)



Department of State

26a  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 896

2

PAGE 01 TOKYO 12064 161310Z

47

ACTION SS: 30

INFO /030 W

R 161220Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2446

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 12064

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 17962

By is NARA, Date 2-13-98

EXDIS:

SUBJECT: EUGENE BLACK VISIT TO CAMBODIA

FROM BLACK

1. A SEPARATE TELEGRAM FROM TAIPEI TRANSMITS THE BASIC REPORT OF CONVERSATIONS HELD DURING MY VISIT TO CAMBODIA. THIS MESSAGE SETS FORTH MY PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE CURRENT ATTITUDE OF THE RKG ON THE BROAD QUESTION OF IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

2. BOTH SIDES SPOKE FULLY ON THE MAJOR POINTS OF U.S./CAMBODIAN PROBLEMS AND IT EMERGED PRETTY CLEARLY TO ME THAT THE CAMBODIANS WANT A U.S. DECLARATION ON THEIR BORDER MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE. THEY ARE FOCUSSTING ON THIS DETAIL AND NOT DEVOTING TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF HOW TO GO ABOUT REDUCING OUR OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS SO THAT WE MIGHT IMPROVE AND NORMALIZE RELATIONS. THEY KNOW AS WELL AS WE DO THAT THE VC/NVA ARE USING CAMBODIAN TERRITORY AND THEY'RE WORRIED ABOUT IT. BUT THEY DON'T SEEM READY TO DO MUCH MORE THAN ARE ALREADY DOING, AND THEY ARE PROBABLY NOT WILLING TO FORCE ANY ISSUE WITH THE VC/NVA ON THIS SCORE, EVEN THOUGH THEY MADE STRONG ASSERTION THEY MAKING INVESTIGATIONS AND TAKING ACTION WHERE ILLEGAL USE THEIR TERRITORY FOUND. PENDING CONFIRMATION THEIR CLAIM WHICH I DOUBT THEY WILL OR CAN PROVIDE, I CONCLUDE THEY PREFER TO APPLY WHATEVER PRESSURE THEY DECIDE TO EXERT AGAINST HANDI AND THE FRONT BY PSYCHOLOGICAL AND DIPLOMATIC MEANS AND THEY'RE PROBABLY NOT GOING TO GO VERY FAR EVEN WITH THESE MEASURES.

3. DESPITE OUR REPEATED EXPLANATIONS, THE CAMBODIANS STILL SEEM TO THINK THAT THE BURDEN OF REDUCING BORDER INCIDENTS RESTS ALMOST

~~SECRET~~

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PRESERVATION COPY





# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TOKYO 12064 161310Z

~~EXCLUSIVELY WITH BETTER AMERICAN CONTROL OF U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THEY THINK THAT OUR ISSUANCE OF A BORDER DECLARATION WILL BY DEFINITION ESTABLISH MORE STRINGENT CONTROLS ON U.S. AND GVN OPERATIONS AND HENCE WILL REDUCE INCIDENTS. THEY ALSO SUGGEST THAT A U.S. EMBASSY FUNCTIONING IN PHNOM PENH COULD HELP HEAD OFF RKG/U.S. PROBLEMS. FAILING TO OBTAIN A U.S. DECLARATION, THE RKG WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THEIR BEST TACTIC AGAINST THE U.S. AND GVN LIES IN PROPAGANDA AND DIPLOMATIC FIELDS. THEY GAVE LITTLE EVIDENCE THEY BELIEVE ANY GREAT ATTENTION NEED BE DIRECTED TOWARDS INHIBITING VC/NVA OPERATIONS IN AREA.~~

4. THE CAMBODIANS CLEARLY STATED THAT THEY ATTEMPTED TO CONTROL VC/NVA ACTIVITIES THROUGH PRESSURE AGAINST THE DRV AND FRONT MISSIONS, BOTH OF WHICH ARE ON THE RECORD AS RESPECTING CAMBODIAN FRONTIERS. ~~IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY HAVE IN MIND THE SAME KIND OF PRESSURE ON ANY REESTABLISHED AMERICAN MISSION. LENDING SUPPORT TO THIS SUPPOSITION WAS THE RATIONALE GIVEN FOR SIHANOUK'S DECISION NOT TO GRANT ME AN AUDIENCE. THIS INDICATES THAT A FUTURE CHIEF OF MISSION MIGHT BE DENIED OR GRANTED ACCESS TO THE CHIEF OF STATE ON BASIS OF HIS COUNTRY'S PERFORMANCE FROM CAMBODIAN POINT OF VIEW. ON OTHER HAND, I MADE SEVERAL POINTED INQUIRIES WHETHER A FUTURE U.S. AMBASSADOR WOULD BE GIVEN NORMAL COUNTESSIES AND TREATMENT AND WAS ASSURED THIS WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM.~~

5. IT ALSO SEEMS CLEAR FROM OUR DISCUSSION THAT AT LEAST UP TO NOW THE RKG HAS BEEN THINKING OF THE LCU 1577 AND THE 11 AMERICAN SOLDIERS AS ~~BARGAINING COUNTERS TO PUSH US TOWARDS THE ISSUANCE OF A BORDER DECLARATION. WE MADE IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN A SWAP OF THIS SORT BUT THAT PROSPECTS FOR BOTH THE BORDER DECLARATION AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WOULD BE IMPROVED IF THEY LET THESE MEN GO.~~

6. AS FOR THE ICC, I ~~HAVE THE IMPRESSION THE CAMBODIANS HAVE NO INTENTION OF MAKING ANY REAL EFFORT TO GALVANIZE IT INTO GREATER ACTION AND THAT THEY SEE IMPROVEMENT OF ICC MATTER FOR OTHER PARTIES TO PUSH.~~

7. I THINK THE MAIN THINGS WE ACCOMPLISHED ON THIS VISIT WERE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ~~WE ARE NOT THREATENING THEM AND THAT THERE ARE PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING U.S./RKG RELATIONS IF THAT IS WHAT THEY REALLY WANT.~~ AT THE SAME TIME, I THINK WE INDICATED CLEARLY

~~SECRET~~

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*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 TOKYO 12064 161310Z

~~OUR SERIOUS CONCERN OVER THE PROBLEM OF VC/NVA USE OF CAMBODIA,~~  
~~WHICH CONTINUES TO HINDER ANY NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS.~~  
JOHNSON  
BT

NNN:

~~SECRET~~

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EX-105



*Per file*

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 16, 1968  
8:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

As the attached telegrams indicate, Prime Minister Salazar, an old economics professor that made good, appears to have had a dangerous relapse.

W. W. Rostow

Lisbon 1952  
Lisbon 1953

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By sg/du, NARA, Date 12-14-92

WWRostow:rlh

27a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECEIVED  
WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCE303

PAGE 01 LISBON 01952 162035Z

1968 SEP 16 20 45

88  
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,GPM 04,H 02,  
INR 07,L 03,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,RSR 01,/079 W

0 162035Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2483

*Reston*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LISBON 1952

SUBJECT: SALAZAR'S CONDITION

AS OF 9 PM LOCAL TIME, HAVE REPORT FROM DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUE  
BASED ON SOURCE HE CONSIDERS ABSOLUTELY RELIABLE THAT THERE IS  
NO HOPE FOR PRIME MINISTER'S SURVIVAL AND WHOLE GOVERNMENT  
AND COUNCIL OF STATE HAVE BEEN ASSEMBLED. MEDICAL BULLETIN  
EXPECTED BEFORE MIDNIGHT.

SENNETT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc* NARA, Date *12-17-01*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECEIVED  
WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCE803

PAGE 01 LISBON 01952 162035Z

1968 SEP 16 20 45

38  
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,GPM 04,H 02,

INR 07,L 03,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,RSR 01,/079 W

O 152035Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2483

*Rostow*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LISBON 1952

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BENNETT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc* NARA, Date 12-17-01



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1968 SEP 16 23 16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCE814

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-17-01

PAGE 01 LISBON 01953 162300Z

92  
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, GPM 04, H 02,  
INR 07, L 23, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, RSR 01, /079 W

0 162250Z SEP 68

FM AMEMBASSY LISBON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2484

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LISBON 1953

SUBJ: SALAZAR SUCCESSION

REF: LISBON 1952

1. OTHER SOURCES CONFIRM INFO REFTL THAT AS OF 10:30 LOCAL TIME COUNCIL OF STATE AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS GATHERING AT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO CHOOSE SUCCESSOR TO PRIME MIN SALAZAR. DECISION EXPECTED THIS EVENING. SALAZAR'S CONDITION REPORTEDLY CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE.

2. ALL SECURITY FORCES ON LOW LEVEL ALERT. TOO EARLY FOR PUBLIC REACTION AS YET TO NEWS OF SALAZAR'S RELAPSE, WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED IN LOW KEY ON RADIO AND TELEVISION. NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT YET THAT SUCCESSION UNDER CONSIDERATION.

3. PORTUGUESE PRESS SOURCE REPORTS THAT FRONT RUNNERS FOR SUCCESSION BEFORE MEETING STARTS ARE LONG-TIME HEIR APPARENT MARCELO CAETANO, FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER AND ARMY STRONGMAN SANTOS COSTA AND CURRENT DEFENSE MINISTER GOMES DE ARAUJO. THESE THREE NAMES REPRESENT EFFORT BY GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENT TO GUARANTEE ORDERLY TRANSITION, WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY PRIMARY CONCERN GOVERNMENT AT THIS TIME, BUT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED EXCLUSIVE LISTING.

4. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM WALK THROUGH POPULAR QUARTER OF ALFAMA AND OTHER MEMBERS OF STAFF AND I HAVE DRIVEN AROUND VARIOUS QUARTERS OF TOWN. TRAFFIC AND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION OPERATING AS USUAL, SIDEWALK CAFES WELL PATRONIZED AND EVENING STROLLERS OUT IN FORCE. ATMOSPHERE AS OF NOW IS ONE OF NORMALCY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LISBON 01953 162300Z

IN STREETS.

BENNETT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 16, 1968

5:30pm

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mid-East Reactions to Your B'nai B'rith Speech

L. Rostow  
2. Per file

The Mid-East part of your speech has been well received.

The Egyptian Minister here felt it was a positive step. He particularly "saluted" your call for the parties to put their views on the table. He regretted that we had not explicitly urged Israeli withdrawal and wished we had spoken out last spring, but on balance his reaction was quite favorable.

The Jordanian Ambassador called on his own to congratulate us on a "balanced" speech. He too felt it would have been better had we done this last spring, but he was generally pleased at the degree to which we took Arab concerns into consideration.

Arab press reaction has run the full course of predictable views. The Syrians have twisted the speech into an affirmation of strong support for Zionist expansionism. The Lebanese moderates--the Arabs most likely to judge the speech by its content--felt it was constructive. There has been very little reaction so far from Cairo.

Ambassador Rabin said, "We are very satisfied," and indicated this is Jerusalem's reaction too. The Israeli press expressed reserved satisfaction, although there was some comment on the differences between the US and Israel revealed in the speech. But Eban said at a press conference in Israel Friday: "There has been constancy and fidelity to what was said on June 19, 1967. ... I find nothing new or disconcerting. ... The area of agreement between us is overwhelmingly more important than the differences."

Rabin is already quoting the speech back to us, and Allon quoted it at the Press Club Thursday. Of course, they quote only what supports their position. They pointedly ignore your call for putting views on the table through any procedure that makes sense. But privately they understand. On the Phantoms, Eban quoted your statement about not allowing the balance of forces to become an incentive for war and felt you would draw the right conclusions. No comment on your main point--arms limitation.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 12-17-01~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 16, 1968 -- 5:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Profile*

Herewith 4 specific questions for Sec. Rusk.

1. In the long sweep of the future, what role do you envisage for Latin America: in relation to the U. S. ; Western Europe; Africa; and Asia?
2. What should our relations with the Soviet Union look like 10 years from now?
3. What would you hope our relations with mainland China be like in 1980?
4. In your judgment, should Western Europe continue to work towards political and economic integration over the next 10 years, or has that objective faded away?
5. What are your hopes for the evolution of Africa in the years ahead?

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Monday, September 16, 1968 -- 5:10 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I suggest the following 4 questions for your session with Sec. Rusk at 5:30 p.m. this afternoon.

1. What do you regard as the major achievements of the Department of State -- and of U.S. foreign policy in general -- over the past 5 years?
2. What would you like to see us accomplish in the next 4 months?
3. What do you regard as the major tasks which will inevitably face the next administration in, say, its first year?
4. What are your dreams for American foreign policy -- your vision of the future towards which we should strive; and, in the light of that vision, what do you think the great tasks of American foreign policy are over the next 10 years?

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm



ACTION

*Pres file*

Monday, September 16, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a  
draft birthday message to Pope Paul.  
He will be 71 on Thursday, September 26.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*ERF*

ERF:mst

MESSAGE TO HIS HOLINESS, POPE PAUL VI

Your Holiness:

In my own name, and on behalf of the American people, I should like to extend to you my sincere best wishes on the occasion of your seventy-first birthday. Your prayers continue to give inspiration to all of us and it is my fervent hope that in the year to come, we may move closer to our mutual goal of a world of peace with justice and opportunity for all men.

*has file*

Monday, September 16, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a brief message to the annual Steuben Day Parade in New York on Saturday, September 21. This is the major event of the year for the German-American community in the New York area.

You have designated Ambassador McGhee to represent you in the parade. He would read your message at the ceremonies.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

ERF:mst

MESSAGE FOR DELIVERY AT STEUBEN DAY PARADE  
IN NEW YORK

I am pleased to send my warm best wishes, through Ambassador McGhee, to Americans of German descent who today honor the memory of General von Steuben.

General von Steuben arrived on these shores in 1777. More than eight million Germans followed in his footsteps. They made an immeasurable contribution to the defense of liberty and democracy and to the cultural and scientific enrichment of the United States.

The annual tribute the Steuben Society pays to this great German who became a great American is a tribute as well to all Americans of German descent who have done so much to build the American heritage.



Monday, September 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Public Opinion Poll on PUEBLO Tactics

*Pres file*

You have received a letter (attached) from the McNaught Syndicate giving the results of its nationally syndicated public opinion poll SOUND OFF in answer to the question:

"What would you like our government to do about freeing the PUEBLO and her crew?"

We have asked State for an appraisal of the poll's findings. Prior to receiving that, however, you may wish to note the poll's results in connection with the discussion of the PUEBLO at your Tuesday luncheon.

The results of the 3,217 ballots received are as follows:

	AGE GROUPS			
	16-25	26-49	50-UP	ALL AGES
1. Admit we were entirely in the wrong and apologize as N. Korea insists before they will release the crew.	23.7	9.1	12.7	12.3
2. Continue present conferences. Our leaders know best.	2.2	1.8	2.8	2.3
3. Keep conferences going but, meanwhile, seize N. Korean ships and citizens for better bargaining.	4.0	5.7	8.3	6.7
4. Set limit on conferences. Then, if still unsettled, use whatever force necessary to free ship and crew.	70.1	83.5	76.2	78.6

While some of the phraseology used in the four possible answers appears slanted so as to skew the results, it is nevertheless disturbing that nearly four-fifths chose the fourth answer. We may need to address ourselves in public media more fully to the question of why we have so far rejected the use of force.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

AJenkins:mm

33a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 12, 1968

FOR: Walt Rostow

FROM: Whitney Shoemaker

You may want to bring this  
to the President's attention.  
Perhaps State should  
acknowledge.

To Al Jenkins for  
memo to President  
Send copy to S/S for direct  
acknowledgment BISS


MR. SHOEMAKER:

Letter I showed you together with list of  
newspapers in which ballot clipping appeared.  
Have included extra copy of letter which you  
may retain if you wish.

Reta

Clippings from:

Seattle Times	63
St. Louis Globe Democrat	105
Cleveland Plain Dealer	383
Arizona Republic (Phoenix)	1155
Vallejo Times Herald	121
Knoxville News-Sentinel	70
World Herald (Omaha)	120
Chicago American	215
Indianapolis Star	557
	<hr/> 2789
Letters	28
	<hr/> 2817



Code

3710

Question No.

28

AGE GROUP (circle one)

16-25

(26-49)

50 or over

THE GLOBE-DEMOCRAT ASKS YOU TODAY:

*What would you like our government to do about freeing the Pueblo and her crew?*

Circle Your Choice (circle only one)

1. Admit we were entirely in the wrong and apologize as North Korea insists before they will release the crew.
2. Continue present conferences. Our leaders know best.
3. Keep conferences going but, meanwhile, seize North Korean ships and citizens for better bargaining.
4. Set limit on conferences. Then, if still unsettled, use whatever force necessary to free ship and crew.

Clip or tear out this coupon after circling your age and the answer of your choice, and mail within 24 hours to:

**SOUND OFF (No. 28) ST. LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT,  
12th and DELMAR, ST. LOUIS, MO. 63101**



33<sup>rd</sup>

## THE McNAUGHT SYNDICATE, INC.

*Features for Newspapers*

60 E. 42nd ST. NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

September 9, 1968

Mr. President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

In August, a Communist broadcast stated the USS Pueblo crew members "appealed to the people of the United States to urge our government to take appropriate action" to get them home.

WS SOUND OFF, our nationally syndicated weekly public opinion poll, is a logical method of determining the pulse of the people in the United States on such a subject. Our newspapers queried their readers, the week of August 24/25, asking them to circle their choice in answer to the following question:

"What would you like our government to do about freeing the Pueblo and her crew?"

Herewith, we enclose the 3,217 ballots we received. The results were tallied in three age groups by a 360 IBM Computer and are given in their percentages as follows:

	AGE GROUPS			
	16-25	26-49	50-UP	ALL AGES
1. Admit we were entirely in the wrong and apologize as N. Korea insists before they will release the crew.	23.7	9.1	12.7	12.3
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3. Keep conferences going but, meanwhile, seize N. Korean ships and citizens for better bargaining.	4.0	5.7	8.3	6.7
4. Set limit on conferences. Then, if still unsettled, use whatever force necessary to free ship and crew.	70.1	83.5	76.2	78.6

September 9, 1968

Mr. President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

contd ..

We are sending copies of this letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee and the House of Representatives, along with others in Washington.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Chas. V. McAdam".

Chas. V. McAdam

CVM:ds  
Enc.

33 e

**THE MCNAUGHT SYNDICATE, INC.**

*Features for Newspapers*

60 E. 42nd ST. NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

9/9/68

UNDER SEPARATE COVER, BALLOTS HAVE  
BEEN FORWARDED VIA REGISTERED MAIL.

THE MCNAUGHT SYNDICATE, INC.

34

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

September 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Exercise GOLDEN ROD

*Pres file*

A large-scale NATO-wide command post exercise (CPX) named GOLDEN ROD is scheduled to be conducted during October 16-25, 1968. This will coincide with a US worldwide CPX called Exercise HIGH HEELS. Secretary Rusk has cleared the political aspect of the NATO exercise.

In neither case will combat units be directly involved, although some subordinate units may coordinate individual routine training exercises with the play of the GOLDEN ROD CPX.

Because of the periodic (annual) nature of the two CPXs and the routine character of the unit training exercises, it is not anticipated that any serious attempt will be made to link these activities to the recent Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-69  
By com, NARA, Date 3-24-03

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

Monday, Sept. 16, 1968

*Pres. J. Lee*

*35*

MR. PRESIDENT:

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By J, NARA, Date 12-17-01

There is an excellent man who works in this government: Jim Grant. He is in charge in Washington of work on the Vietnamese economy.

He has just come back from a trip to Vietnam, having been there in June. His report was extremely interesting in a good many respects. You might even wish to get the feel from him directly since he is concrete, precise, and vivid as a reporter. I have reason to trust his judgment, since I have known him for more than ten years. In particular, he made these points:

- Mobilization is going extremely well, with the sons of the rich as well as the poor getting into uniform.
- From Hue to the delta there is the sound of hammer on nail as the Tet damage is repaired. If you fly over Hue, the town glistens from the aluminum roofing.
- Huong has made a real impact on the country, especially the cities. He is a truly major asset to Thieu in bringing the people and the government closer together, with some beginnings of an identification of the people with their government.
- The new rice seeds are really beginning to take hold in the delta and spreading fast: this is associated by the people with the government.
- The anti-corruption campaign is gradually taking hold, but there are still problems with some of the bigger fish. But even if it is politically too difficult to get rid of all the big fish, they are becoming cautious about corruption, with some interesting side effects.
- Industrial reconstruction after Tet is going forward in the smaller factories, but some of the bigger damaged factories have not yet been repaired.
- In the villages the big job now is to hang both security and economic responsibilities onto the village governments, including the administration of land reform measures and the collection of the land tax. The latter is beginning to happen, but only slowly. Where it has happened, the villages have taken on real vitality.
- The Vietnamese, working with Lilienthal, are coming up with an outline plan that will need a lot of details filled in, but is practical and hopeful: its objective is self-sustained growth without any foreign aid whatsoever ten years from the end of the war. This would be vastly quicker than

Greece, Turkey, and South Korea, for example. Both Jim and I think that, with any political stability, it is wholly feasible, given potentialities for earning foreign exchange through rice exports, fish, etc.

- Jim has found the key to the land reform dilemma. He believes Saigon has been correct in saying that there is not a burning pressure for land reform. What Saigon has missed is that it would be a tremendous positive lift to the government and the people if land was made available to tenant farmers who are now paying their rent to absentee landlords in Saigon and the provincial towns. He will be coming up with a concrete land reform scheme before the end of this month which, I hope, we can persuade Bunker and Thieu to back. (The economic team in Saigon will be here to consider this with Grant in the days ahead.)

W. W. Rostow

*Pres. file*  
36

Monday, Sept. 16, 1968  
3:00 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Mexicans may have caught two of the  
men who killed Amb. Mein.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Mexico 7016)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-188  
By 129, NARA, Date 12-5-95



Department of State

362  
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 362

PAGE 01 MEXICO 07016 140134Z

88

ACTION ARA 16

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, *WB*

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, AID 28, RSR 01, /115 W

P 132342Z SEP 68

FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7571

INFO AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEXICO 7016

1. MEXICAN CITY PRESS REPORTED ARREST OF TWO GUATEMALANS WHO HAD BEEN CAPTURED IN PUEBLA AFTER HOLDING UP NINA AVILA CAMACHO, NIECE OF FORMER PRESIDENT, AND STEALING HER 1968 MUSTANG. OTHERS IN GROUP REPORTEDLY ESCAPED.

2. ACCORDING TO LEGAL ATTACHE SOURCES, TWO ARRESTED WERE VICTOR MANUEL SANCHEZ VALENCIA AND CARLOS PEREZ MESTE. MEMBERS OF GROUP ESCAPED WERE IDENTIFIED AS RUDY FION, AND CARLOS LOPEZ. FIRST TWO WHO WERE WOUNDED CLAIMED TO BE MEMBERS OF 13-NOVEMBER GUERRILLA GROUP AND REPORTEDLY CONFESSED TO PARTICIPATION IN ASSASSINATION OF AMBASSADOR MEIN. LATER TWO ESCAPED. GUATEMALANS REPORTEDLY HAD APPOINTMENT AT BORDER SEPTEMBER 12 WHICH WAS REASON THEY STOLE CAR. DEARBORN

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-120

By *ing*, NARA, Date *12-1-95*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



INFORMATION

Monday, September 16, 1968 -- 2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

When Neil Sheehan came in this morning I bluntly told him he'd made a major error in saying the President had "made a decision."

He told me The New York Times had been approached in New York by an Israeli representative. The Israeli said the President had decided to give the Phantoms. The New York office told him to check. His check indicated we did not plan to give the Israelis the Phantoms now.

So he wrote his story.

I told him it was bad reporting and asked if he was informed that the President had made a definite negative decision. He said: no. Perhaps, he added, he should not have left out the now. He didn't tell me with whom he checked.

He said the Times did not wish to be used for purposes of Israeli pressure on the U.S. Government. I told him his story -- as written -- was a provocation for such pressure.

He agreed it might be so -- and apologized.

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

wwrostow:rla

has file 38

Monday, September 16, 1968  
12:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Australians signal Crook that they want to be informed in advance of any bombing policy shift and not caught short, as with March 31.

It's probably an election year for Gorton.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(Canberra 8064)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-260  
By Sj, NARA, Date 4-26-02



# Department of State

~~SECRET~~

384 WH  
TELEGRAM

PP RUEIC  
DE RUEI/BAC 8064 2600320  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 160235Z SEP 68  
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2900  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ CANBERRA 8064

CONTROL : 47990  
RECEIVED : Sept. 16  
1:45A.M.

NODIS/PLUS

REF: STATE 238761

1. IN ABSENCE PM, I CONVEYED SUBSTANCE PARA 2 REFTEL TO HEWITT WHO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION QUICK RESPONSE HIS INQUIRY (CANBERRA 8054). SAID HE WOULD PASS IT ON TO PM AS SOON AS HE RETURNED TO CANBERRA. RE PARA 5 REFTEL, HEWITT SAID UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACH HAD BRIEFED WALLER IN JULY ALONG LINES STATE 204338 AND THAT ANDERSON WAS ALSO INFORMED, ALTHOUGH HEWITT DID NOT EXPLAIN HOW THIS HAD BEEN DONE.

2. HEWITT DISPLAYED CONSIDERABLE NERVOUSNESS ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF ANY SUDDEN AND DRAMATIC MOVE ON OUR PART WHICH MIGHT CATCH GORTON AND GOA OFF GUARD. HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER BOMBING HALT BEING DISCUSSED OR CONTEMPLATED OR ANY CHANGE IN CURRENT BOMBING POLICY UNDER CONSIDERATION. HE SAID, IF SO, THEY WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT IT. ON THIS I SIMPLY REFERRED TO OUR STATEMENTS ON BOMBING CONTAINED IN RECORDS OF PARIS TALKS AND TO RECENT STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY REAFFIRMING OUR POLICY. HE ALSO ASKED IF A SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WAS BEING PLANNED AND, IF SO, THEY WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT THAT ALSO. ~~I TOLD HIM I HAD NO INFORMATION ON THAT~~

3. HEWITT, BY HIS QUESTIONS AND GENERAL ATTITUDE, CONVEYED IMPRESSION AUSTRALIANS FEEL THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF OUR THINKING AND THAT WE WERE BEING LESS THAN CANDID WITH THEM. HE STRESSED, WITH GOOD POSSIBILITY OF AUSTRALIAN ELECTION THIS YEAR (WHICH NOW SEEMS ALMOST CERTAIN), THAT WE MUST KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON MATTERS RELATED TO VIETNAM SO THAT GORTON AND GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE EMBARRASSED BY ANY DISCLOSURE OF POLICY SHIFT OR MAJOR DEVELOPMENT WHICH HAD NOT BEEN KNOWN TO THEM WELL IN ADVANCE. DEPT WILL RECALL GORTON'S UNHAPPINESS OVER SHORTNESS OF NOTIFICATION OF PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31 SPEECH ON BOMBING LIMITATION.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-259  
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-26-02



~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, CANBERRA 8064, September 16, 1968 1:45A.M. NODIS/PLUS

4. HEWITT SHOWED ME A SHEAF OF MESSAGES FROM WALLER REPORTING ON HIS CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON ON VIETNAM. THEY APPEARED QUITE EXTENSIVE AND FROM MY BRIEF PERUSAL OF SOME OF THEM I FELT THAT GOA WAS BETTER INFORMED ON WASHINGTON THINKING THAN I AM. MEETING ENDED WITH SUGGESTION FROM HEWITT THAT PRIME MINISTER AND I MIGHT GET TOGETHER SOON FOR GENERAL REVIEW OF SITUATION. I RETURN FROM OFFICIAL TRIP TO WEST AUSTRALIA SEPTEMBER 27 AND SUCH MEETING, IF DEPT AGREEABLE, COULD TAKE PLACE ANYTIME THEREAFTER. IN LIGHT OF FACT GORTON SEEMS TO FEEL HE IS NOT BEING KEPT FULLY INFORMED, SUCH A MEETING COULD BE USEFUL IN ALLAYING THESE FEARS. DEPT MAY WISH TO COMMENT ON THIS AND, IF AGREEABLE TO IT, PROVIDE GENERAL BACKGROUND TELEGRAM ON OR ABOUT OCTOBER. 1 WHICH COULD BE USED AS BASIS DISCUSSION.

5. WE HOPE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE WILL BE DONE, PARTICULARLY IN THIS PRE-ELECTION PERIOD, TO KEEP GOA FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED OF ALL IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND PLANS.

6. ONE INTERESTING SIDELIGHT TO ABOVE IS OBVIOUS EFFORT ON HEWITT'S PART TO BECOME PRINCIPAL GOA CONTACT WITH THIS EMBASSY. HE TWICE ALLUDED TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GORTON AND HASLUCK SAYING TO EFFECT, WE SHOULD DEAL WITH PLIMSOLL, WITH WHOM HEWITT HAD GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP BUT NOT WITH HASLUCK.

CROOK  
BT

~~SECRET~~



INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, September 16, 1968  
11:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Abrams tells us of  
another probe into the DMZ. The  
last was a considerable success.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

MAC 12470

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Collection, Box 1003  
By rg, NARA, Date 1-7-93

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1968 SEP 16 14 29

*Rostow*

39a

ZCZCQAA244 .....  
OO YEKADS  
DEEEEEEEEE YSNKQA 23 2601355  
O 161351Z ZYH ZFF-5  
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
INFO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE  
MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC  
MR HELMS CIA WASH DC  
O 151047Z ZYH ZFF-3  
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS  
ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
INFO CAS PARIS FOR MG SEIGNIOUS (LT D.W. JEFF USN)  
AMB BUNKER, SAIGON  
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 12470 EYES ONLY

1. (TS) ON 16/17 SEP ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD MARDIV WILL EXECUTE A 4 - 5 DAY OPERATION NORTH OF MUTTER'S RIDGE (RIDGELINE THAT RUNS SOUTHEAST/NORTHWEST THROUGH XD 9260), SOUTH OF BEN HAI RIVER, N/S GRID LINE XD88 ON WEST AND N/S GRIDLINE XD98 ON THE EAST, TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND STAGING AREAS IN DMZ SOUTH OF BEN HAI RIVER AND TO EXPLOIT B-52 STRIKES.

2. (TS) CONCEPT:

A. ON 16 SEP THREE B-52 STRIKES AND ON 17 SEP TWO B-52 STRIKES WILL BE MADE IN THE DMZ WITHIN THE ABOVE AREA OF OPERATIONS.

B. 3RD MARDIV CONDUCTS A MULTI-REGIMENTAL OPERATION WITH ONE REGIMENT ATTACKING NORTH FROM THE VICINITY OF MUTTER'S RIDGE TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY AND FORCE HIM BACK INTO THE DMZ. B-52 STRIKES ARE TO BE DIRECTED ON KNOWN STAGING AREAS AND ARE TO BE EXPLOITED BY A HELICOPTER-BORNE ATTACK BY ONE REGIMENT INTO LANDING ZONES SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER AND THENCE ATTACKING SOUTH TO DESTROY THE ENEMY BEING DRIVEN NORTH.  
GP-3

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.  
200

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12350, DATE 8-3  
04 MONTH, JAN 8, 1993  
By *rg* NARA, DMS 1-293

*See file**40*

Monday, Sept. 16, 1968  
10:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Sect. Rusk has looked into the Neil Sheehan story. Sheehan, just back from a trip to Asia, normally covers the Pentagon. He sometimes telephones someone at State; but there is no record of his having gotten in touch with anyone at State on this issue. (Incidentally, Sheehan is coming in to see me at 11:30 -- filling in for Max Frankel while he is on the road with the campaign.)

As for substance, he says the key phrase is "President Johnson has decided." This, of course, is untrue. The rest of the story is generalized background which Sheehan could have written from information around town. Sect. Rusk himself says that he gave a backgrounder about a month ago to a group of columnists which touched on this matter. He indicated that no decision had been made; and that some of the factors which bore on the decision were what the other side did in building up Arab arms; how the Jarring mission went; etc. In short, he cannot establish that anyone at State told Sheehan that "President Johnson has decided..."

If we wish to turn off the story, we can refer people to the President's speech at B'nai B'rith and say: "No decision has been made." If further softening is required, we can go back to the language of the Ranch communique when Eshkol was here.

W. W. Rostow

cc: *Geo. Christian*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, Sept. 16, 1968  
10:10 a. m.

Handwritten: *Handwritten*  
ACTION

41

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know, as the attached indicates, that I am working on the assembly of crisis materials.

State is, evidently, prepared to cooperate.

The members of my staff in each field will get the State material, combine with White House materials, and organize coherent folders on each with three elements:

- a short summary (5-10 pages);
- an analytic table of contents for the key documents, as done for your correspondence with Moscow on arms control;
- the documents themselves.

I have asked for first drafts by November 1, and expect to turn over the folders to you before Christmas. I shall be meeting with my staff on this once a week.

Bowdler has the message loud and clear.

Does this attached list meet with your approval?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

W. W. Rostow

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED FOR E.O. 12812  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S RULES OF  
MAY 16, 1983.

BY 19 ON 1-13-93





12518

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

2954  
41a

September 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Special Papers on Foreign Policy Decision-Making

I informed our History Project coordinator, Mr. Tims, that you had mentioned the following events as subjects of special papers on foreign policy decision-making to be produced for the President:

- The Non-Proliferation Treaty
- The decision to drop the MLF scheme
- The Indian Food Mission of early 1967
- The Dominican Republic intervention of 1965
- The revision of the Panama Canal Treaty
- The Kennedy Round crisis
- The gold crisis
- The two Cyprus crises
- The India-Pakistan war and its aftermath
- The Pueblo affair
- The decision to send large forces to Viet Nam
- The President's March 31 announcement and the Paris talks
- The Honolulu Conference of 1966
- The President's Far Eastern trip of 1966
- The Middle East War

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY RG ON 1-7-93

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

I would appreciate your confirming the accuracy  
and completeness of the above list for Mr. Tims' use.

*I am, my dear bro, your faithful & obed<sup>t</sup> servant*



Eugene V. Rostow  
Under Secretary for  
Political Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

See file

42

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, Sept. 16, 1968  
10:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know that Averell Harriman will be arriving late this afternoon in Washington (perhaps 6 p.m. -- State is not certain). He will be here through Wednesday.

Would you wish to see him? If so, what time would be convenient?

W. W. Rostow

Will see Harriman \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Time \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 18, NARA, Date 11-7-74

Monday, September 16, 1968 -- 8:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Lester Velle, Reader's Digest, today at 1:00 p.m.

Velle is gathering material for a book on US policy in the Near East. The Reader's Digest recently published his somewhat inaccurate and overwritten but generally favorable account of your hot line dealings with the USSR during the Arab-Israeli war (attached).

You will have your own comments on policy. It would be useful for him to take away an impression along these lines:

- Peace is your overriding concern.
- We can work constructively only if there is peace.
- Israel's only long run guarantee is peace.
- Full economic growth depends on peace.
- You are supporting peace efforts, but a lasting peace can be made only by the Near Easterners themselves. One of the big lessons of 1967 was that settlements made by outsiders don't last.
- Your June 19, 1967, and September 10, 1968, speeches spelled this out.

He may wish to explore our commitment to Israel.

- We have no formal treaty, but four presidents have supported Israel's territorial integrity (and that of other Near Eastern states).
- You strongly urged Israel in May 1967 to exhaust all peaceful ways of opening the Straits of Tiran. We were heavily engaged in an international effort when war broke out. You didn't think going it alone would solve Israel's long-term problem.
- As you told Eshkol last January, you are keeping Israel's defense needs under close review. We are selling Skyhawk jet fighters, bombers and Hawk air defense missiles.

He might ask your views on Soviet activities in the area.

- We want a Near East run by the Near Easterners.
- To limit Soviet influence, we have to support moderate Arabs as well as Israel, and encourage radical Arabs towards moderation.
- Tension in the Near East is the best opening for Moscow.

As a general observation, you might add that you never expected Mid-East problems to be solved easily. The Jarring mission is still the best bet for peace.

If Velle wants to get into details, you might tell him to see Hal Saunders of my staff.



I gather from Loyd Hackler that Velle would also wish to talk with the President about his general quest for peace over the past 5 years and solicit the President's views on how the efforts at detente now stand in the light of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

-- From the time of taking office the President felt that, despite all obstacles, the peace of humanity depended in part on efforts to put U. S. -Soviet relations on the best basis possible in the light of realities. The President had no illusions about the depth of the Soviet commitment to expansion or about the difficult and dangerous problems that lie before us. On the other hand, Soviet nuclear and industrial power -- and its capacity for destruction -- were such that the effort had to be undertaken on behalf of the American people and all humanity.

-- The President's first initiative was on January 18, 1964, when he responded to a December 31, 1963, letter from Khrushchev. The President proposed that the two countries get to work on a list of practical matters, including the following:

- to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
- to end the production of fissionable material for weapons;
- to transfer large amounts of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes;
- to ban all nuclear weapons tests;
- to place limitations on nuclear weapons systems;
- to reduce the risk of war by accident or design;
- to move toward general disarmament.

-- It has been hard, up-hill, stubborn, difficult work to move as far forward as we have with the Consular Convention, the air agreement, cultural agreements, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the agreement in principle to talk about damping the nuclear arms race. Aside from these concrete achievements, the intimate exchanges with Moscow may have prevented a much bigger war in the Middle East in 1967 and certainly assisted in bringing the India-Pak war to an end.

-- The Soviet decision to move into Czechoslovakia was certainly a major setback. It shook throughout the world the slow growth of confidence that the Soviet Union was beginning to behave like a well poised, mature and increasingly peace-minded power. It is very disturbing, as the President has said in public, that they should have taken the very modest degrees of Czechoslovak moves toward independence and liberalism as a matter of overriding national security for the Soviet Union. And we simply do not know enough about what is happening and will happen in Czechoslovakia -- and in political circles in Moscow -- to know when the path of negotiations on serious matters with the Soviet Union can be resumed.

-- Nevertheless, there is only one way for history to move if there is to be a chance of stable peace on this small planet; that is, towards increasing U. S. -Soviet cooperation.

-- But this does not mean that our efforts to make progress with the Soviet Union are a substitute for maintaining our own strength or the strength of our alliances. Quite the contrary. We got the atmospheric test ban treaty after the Cuba missile crisis -- as a result of demonstration of U. S. strength, not as a substitute for it. If we are weak or our alliances disintegrate, the President has little doubt that the old ambitions, deep in communism, will rise again in Soviet policy.

W. W. Rostow

HSaunders/WWRostow:rin

43a

47TH YEAR

# *The* Reader's Digest

AUGUST 1968

*An article a day of enduring significance, in condensed permanent booklet form*



## The Week the Hot Line Burned

On two chilling days during the Arab-Israeli conflict, a year ago, Moscow and Washington were embroiled in a terrifying test of will. At stake: the fate of the world. Here, for the first time, is the inside story

*Condensed from a forthcoming book, "Countdown in the Holy Land"*

LESTER VELIE

**F**OR Lyndon B. Johnson, June 6, 1967, was "the most awesomely difficult day of my life." It was the second day of the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War; and while the world was engrossed in that drama, a more momentous struggle unfolded in secret between the United States and the Soviet Union. For the first time the Russians used the "hot line" between Moscow and Washington in anger. In this confrontation—and again four days later—Premier Aleksei Kosygin and President Johnson waged a war of nerves and wills. As one Presidential adviser put it, "we moved very close to the precipice."

The "most difficult day," a Tuesday, began at 5:50 a.m. when the

"COUNTDOWN IN THE HOLY LAND," COPYRIGHT © 1968 BY LESTER VELIE, WILL BE PUBLISHED IN 1969

white telephone at the President's bedside jangled him awake. It was Walt Rostow, special assistant for national security. The previous day, Rostow had awakened the President at 4:30 a.m. to inform him that Israel and Egypt were at war. Now the news was equally foreboding. The Kremlin had signaled that Premier Kosygin would be sending a message within 20 minutes. The President dressed hurriedly, gulped some coffee and headed for the Situation Room in the White House basement. This consists of a conference area and an adjoining small communications center crowded with news teleprinters and "security telephones" that link the White House with Washington's intelligence community and with the Pentagon.

The hot line is a by-product of the Cuban missile confrontation. After that brush with nuclear disaster, President John F. Kennedy and Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev had agreed that ordinary channels of communications were too cumbersome to deal with crises in an age of nuclear ICBMs. A direct wire was set up, with teleprinters in Moscow and in the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon. The Russians transmit in Russian,

SINCE 1953, The Reader's Digest has published more than 100 articles by Roving Editor Lester Velie, on such important subjects as labor, education and crime. For the past year, he has devoted himself to a study of the long chain of events that led up to the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, and the aftermath of that conflict.

the Americans in English. At the Pentagon a translator stands ready to relay any Kremlin message to the White House Situation Room.

**Coolheaded Men.** For three years and nine months the line had remained blessedly quiet, carrying only test messages and New Year's Day greetings. Then, Monday morning, June 5, came the electrifying news that Moscow had activated it seriously for the first time. But the message was a reassuring one: The Soviet Union would keep hands off the Middle East War, provided the United States did the same. In a cautiously worded reply, Johnson agreed.

Now, on Tuesday, as President Johnson entered to receive the new hot-line message, the Situation Room was crowded with men whose combined appearance at 6:40 a.m. spelled "crisis." Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara were there. The President had also called in additional intellectual muscle—coolheaded men, tested in other crises: Dean Acheson, President Truman's Secretary of State; Clark Clifford, Truman's legal adviser; McGeorge Bundy, who had coordinated security information for President Kennedy as well as for Johnson; Llewellyn Thompson, ex-ambassador to the U.S.S.R.

Eyes heavy-lidded from two sleepless nights, Walt Rostow handed the President a rough translation of the new message. Its contents were omi-

nous. Kosygin had dropped his "let's keep hands off" line. Now he insisted that the United States persuade the Israelis to halt their advance in the Sinai and withdraw to their borders. With this demand came a thinly veiled threat: in effect, get them out of there or *we* will!

The President and his advisers were dealing with shocked and angry men. The Russians had made a vast miscalculation. They had overestimated their protégé, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and underestimated the Israelis. For three weeks, while Nasser moved 80,000 troops to Israel's southern borders and boasted that "our basic aim is the destruction of Israel," the Russians had blocked every move in the United Nations to defuse the crisis. When war came, the Russians, confident that Nasser would win, stalled U.N. efforts to achieve a swift cease-fire. For the same reason, Kosygin had suggested that both powers stand aside. Johnson had agreed. He believed the Israelis would win. The CIA, the Pentagon and the State Department, in separate appraisals, had told him so.

It took just 24 hours for the Russians to learn the full measure of their miscalculation. They were, a participant later said, "in shock." Nasser's vaunted air force of Russian MIGs was a charred ruin; his Russian-equipped armies were a fleeing rabble. The Russians had invested two billion dollars' worth of arms in the dream that Nasser would one day head a pro-Soviet

Arab empire. Now the arms were going up in fire and smoke.

**Two Searching Hours.** At the mahogany conference table, the President read Kosygin's message to the somber men around him. They plunged into discussion of possible courses of action, and consequences.

If Johnson did pressure the Israelis to withdraw, he would be doing what another U.S. President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, had done in roughly similar circumstances in 1957. Then, too, Nasser had massed troops and armor on Israel's southern borders, and the Israelis chased them from the Sinai in 100 hours. Then Nikita Khrushchev rattled his nuclear rockets and demanded that the Israelis withdraw, or else. The United States joined with the Soviet Union to insist in the U.N. (and privately) that the Israelis pull out—despite Israel's arguments that a withdrawal, without a prior lasting settlement with Egypt, would only set the stage for another Arab attempt to destroy Israel. On the eve of the 1967 war, Eisenhower privately confessed a doubt that the U.S. action against Israel in 1957 had been correct.

President Johnson was determined not to repeat the pressure against Israel to pull back. Negotiations and settlement must come first.

But if Johnson said "no" to Kosygin, and the U.S.S.R. then intervened, could the U.S. stand aside while the Soviets helped the Arabs annihilate two million Jewish vic-



tims? Morally, it was inconceivable. Practically, too, it was inconceivable. Israel is one of the few democracies in all Asia and the Middle East. Since the world regards the U.S. as Israel's protector, whether the U.S. wishes to be or not, Israel's destruction, with Soviet help, while the U.S. stood idly by would send tremors of fear throughout the non-communist world. Further, if Israel went down, no other pro-Western nation in the Middle East would be safe from Nasser and the Russians. Thus, Soviet intervention would almost certainly bring U.S. intervention, and could mean war between the two superpowers.

Two hours sped by in searching discussion. With Rusk, McNamara and Rostow, the President framed a reply to Kosygin. The import: The United States would not act unilaterally. The place to seek an end to the Arab-Israeli War was at the United Nations; the method, a U.N. cease-fire resolution. (In New York, the President had already ordered U.N. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg to stand firm against any Russian pressure inside the Security Council for a forced Israeli withdrawal.)

This reply, coupled with the firm U.S. stand at the U.N., crowded Kosygin and company into an uncomfortable corner. Would the Russians come out of their corner fighting? Even while the hot-line message was going out, two Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean were ordered to move toward the theater

of war. On Monday, these two carriers had ostentatiously abandoned jet-fighter exercises to reassure the watchful Russians that the United States was sitting out the war. Now, just as ostentatiously, the USS *America*, the USS *Saratoga* and their destroyer escorts steamed east from Crete at 20 knots under a state of alert. A Soviet destroyer which had been shadowing the *America* for days would undoubtedly inform Moscow at once.

**Kosygin Calling.** The President plodded through his day, keeping as many of his regular appointments as possible in order to maintain secrecy. As the hours dragged, tension built. What would the Russian reaction be? Would they send bombers to the Sinai? Would their Mediterranean rocketships bombard Israel's coastal cities? Preparing for such a contingency, the Israeli defense ministry preempted hospitals in Tel Aviv, and consecrated land in public parks to accommodate some 20,000 graves.

Toward evening, in Washington, the hot line signaled the second message of the day from Kosygin. At 6:20 p.m. the President hurried once more to the Situation Room.

Kosygin, by now having learned that he faced certain defeat in the U.N., repeated his demand that Johnson force the Israelis to halt and pull back. Otherwise the Soviets would have to make perilous decisions. The Kremlin was assessing steps with dire consequences. It was clear, said a participant in the con-

frontation, the Russians were coming as close as they could to saying that they were prepared to risk nuclear war.

As the President studied Kosygin's ominous message, news came that the U.N. had adopted the expected cease-fire resolution asking the belligerents to hold their fire but making no demands on Israel to quit the Sinai. It was a humiliating defeat for the Russians. Johnson went before TV cameras waiting in the White House theater. "The vote of the Security Council," he said in an optimistic, 107-word Presidential statement to the nation, "opens a very hopeful path away from danger in the Middle East."

None of the millions listening could suspect from his words that the United States and the Soviet Union were at that moment on a collision course that could lead to war.

Back in the Situation Room at 8:30 p.m., the President found a cluster of haggard men. His advisers, in and out of the room during the long 14 hours since morning, were all bone-weary. But now Johnson bent to the task of framing a second reply to Kosygin. It yielded no more ground than did the first.

It was now 9 p.m. in Washington, 4 a.m. in Moscow. Kosygin and his colleagues, as weary as their American counterparts, probably would want to sleep on their next move.

The President returned to his living quarters, slumped heavily before a television set to watch Israel's

foreign minister, Abba Eban, state Israel's case before the U.N. After ten it suddenly occurred to him that he had had no dinner. Ravenous, he ate a Texas-style dinner of pot roast, black-eyed peas and greens. At 1:30 a.m., he went to bed.

Thus ended a day of which an aide later said: "Had we waffled on Tuesday, there is no doubt the Russians would have moved—and we could have been at war."

**On to Syria.** As the President dozed off, it was 7:30 a.m. Wednesday in Tel Aviv. The war was roaring into its third day. Among top Israeli policy-makers, a crucial debate was raging whose outcome would set the U.S. on a new collision course with the U.S.S.R. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had formed a special four-man "advisory cabinet": the new defense minister, Gen. Moshe Dayan; the ex-chief of staff, Prof. Yigael Yadin; labor minister and 1948 war hero, Yigal Allon; and Abba Eban. As the third day's fighting revealed that the war against Egypt was already won, these men turned their thoughts to Israel's most implacable Arab foe, Syria.

For years, from their Golan Heights, the Syrians had rained artillery fire and terror on Jewish settlements in the Huleh Valley below. It was Syria that provided the spark that set off the war: the fabrication, supported by the Russians, that the Israelis were massing troops on Syria's borders. And now, as Syrian tanks attacked border settle-

ments, Radio Damascus clamored for blood: "This is a campaign of annihilation. Strike at the nests of aggression! Crush the Zionist gang!"

All but one of Eshkol's advisers supported a full-dress assault on Syria. But the dissenting voice was a formidable one—that of General Dayan. Syria was the Soviet Union's most cherished protégé, he argued. Israel had already achieved its war aims: the defeat of Nasser, destruction of the Egyptian army and the reopening of the Tiran Straits. Why bait the Russian Bear beyond endurance? Dayan convinced his colleagues. The decision on Syria was put aside.

Yet as the war entered its fourth day, the pressure to do something about the shelling from the Syrian Heights—and about the Syrians—became overwhelming. By Thursday, Dayan had bowed to that pressure. The Syrian Heights would be attacked as soon as troops arrived from the Sinai and Jordanian fronts. Thus the stage was set for the second hot-line cliff-hanger of the week, with nuclear war again at stake.

**Up the Impossible Grade.** Let's follow the Israeli assault on the Syrian Heights as it builds into a global crisis. At 11:30 a.m. Friday (5:30 a.m. Washington time), Israeli tanks and infantry crossed the border into Syria. The 27-hour conquest that followed was one of the most bizarre military operations in the annals of warfare.

Looking down from their redoubts—a sheer 1500 feet above the valley—the Syrians saw 35-ton bulldozers inching their way up the steep slopes to clean mammoth boulders from the path of closely following tanks. In some places the grade was so precipitous that tanks had to be winched up. The Israelis had chosen to scale the heights along a route so difficult that the Syrians had built relatively light defenses on the ridges above it. Once the tanks reached and overran these positions, they could assault the more heavily fortified areas from the rear.

Speed was essential. At any moment the U.N. might intervene with a cease-fire order. Or the Russians might intervene with missiles or MIGs.

By 9 p.m. (3 p.m. Washington time), the Israelis had done it. They had scrambled up the Golan Heights, and punched a hole through one sector of the 40-mile-long line of bunkers and trenches. But time was running short. The U.N. Security Council had been meeting for more than two hours, and a cease-fire was coming. In a change of plan, the Israeli forces fanned out north and south behind the Syrian positions.

In the White House, State Department and Pentagon, concern mounted steadily. What would the Russians do? Assurances came from the Israeli embassy that Israel did not intend to take Damascus. But the situation was growing critical.

At the U.N., the Syrians had charged, falsely, that the Israelis were bombing Damascus in preparation for seizing it—as earlier in the week Nasser had charged that U.S. planes were bombing Cairo. Their purpose: to draw the Russians into the war.

**"War Paint On."** Throughout early Saturday, as the Security Council met in predawn emergency session, the Syrians kept up their accusations. Then, at 8 a.m., a signal flashed in the Pentagon: a new Kremlin message was on its way over the hot line. In this message Kosygin demanded that the United States halt the Israelis forthwith. His tone was even tougher than it had been on Tuesday. It was immediately clear that this crisis was much more serious than the earlier one.

Discussion boiled in the Situation Room. The Russians, having stood by as the Israelis crushed Nasser's armies, could not remain idle while the Israelis toppled the Damascus regime. They were in an embarrassing spot with the Arabs and might take desperate measures to get off it. Those in the Situation Room who had gone through the Cuban missile crisis knew that the present confrontation held more danger. Kennedy had dealt only with Khrushchev: what Fidel Castro did or said was irrelevant. But in the Six-Day War, Johnson and Kosygin were not the masters of events. The Israelis had assured Washington that they would not attack Damascus. But they had

not accepted a cease-fire, either, and even now their forces were plunging eastward into Syria.

Over the hot line, the President pointed out that the United States could no more control the Israelis than Kosygin could control the Egyptians or Syrians. He also noted that if the Russians had cooperated with the U.S. in mid-May, there would have been no war in June.

Two more messages whipped in from Kosygin, each tougher than its predecessor. Some in the Situation Room began to fear that the Soviets might intervene not only to halt the Israelis in Syria, but to recoup all the Arabs' shattered fortunes in the war.

At this point the President made a fateful decision: on his orders, three task groups of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean headed toward the Syrian coast, 600 miles away. Two consisted of the carriers *Saratoga* and *America* with their destroyer escorts, and 100 fighter-bombers each. The other was an amphibious ready force carrying a battalion of Marines. "They had war paint on their cheeks, packs on their backs and were ready to go," a Navy man said.

**The Bell Rings.** As the President served this notice on the Russians to keep hands off, he also took steps to end the fighting in Syria. Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, acting on the President's orders, called Israel's Ambassador Avraham Harman to the State Department, where he asked him "in

the strongest possible terms" to accept a cease-fire. He pointed to the grave possibility that the Soviets might intervene to dislodge Israel from all Arab territory.

In fact, the end was near. The Israeli tanks and troops had reached their goal: the town of Quneitra, 40 miles short of Damascus. Dayan at that very moment was working out a cease-fire with the Syrians through Lt. Gen. Odd Bull, chief of staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization forces in Jerusalem.

So, as the United States and the Soviet Union stood toe-to-toe, trading "thought for thought" over the hot line, both were saved by the bell. At 12:30 p.m., Saturday, June 10, a U.N. cease-fire, accepted by Israel

and Syria, went into effect. In the Situation Room, the President and his advisers knew that the worst was over. No fourth hot-line message from Kosygin was expected; none came.

The Arab-Israeli conflict was a crucial battle in the cold war. It was hard proof that communist expansion aims are being pushed as vigorously today as they were under Khrushchev and Stalin. More depended on this war than the fate of one small nation; it also held the fate of a strategic area stretching from the Atlantic on the west to the Persian Gulf on the east—and north into Europe itself. Thus, for a brief moment the fate of the world hung on a thin hot line.

#### Back Talk

A NEWLY married friend of mine had a guest room that was rarely used, and the only time she bothered to dust it was when overnight visitors were expected. One day her husband went into the room looking for something, saw the dresser covered with dust and, thinking to call it tactfully to Mary's attention, wrote in the dust, "I LOVE YOU."

About a week later he had occasion to go into the room again. He found in the dust below his message the words: "I LOVE YOU TOO."

—Contributed by Sarah E. Luxton

MY HUSBAND, who is highly organized and efficient in all that he does, put up a blackboard in the garage to make notes to himself of things to do—have the dog vaccinated, buy material for repair jobs, change the air-conditioning filter, etc. I am neither organized nor efficient, and one evening when he returned home from work he reminded me of some of the things I had not done. Annoyed, I went straight to his blackboard and wrote: 1. Repair grill; 2. Transplant gardenia plant; 3. Repair fence; 4. Buy sand for sandbox—and so on, until I had a list of 12 things for him to do.

The next morning when I was getting into my car to go shopping, I glanced up at the chalkboard and found that my list had been erased. In its place was written in big letters: 1. TAKE DOWN CHALKBOARD.

—Contributed by Mrs. Bob G. Furton

Woman's new  
ated an indust  
worth of glam

## Beauty the Bu

Condensed from NEW

"IF SHE wants to b  
has to work at it  
ters of loveliness  
magazines. And wo  
does, knowing tha  
through the rites, st  
ions, sacrifices and  
time and money, s  
manage to improve c  
bestowed. Facials, h  
ups; massages, ma  
cures; paraffin, steam  
mud baths; silicone i  
lifts, injections—all  
serious, funny, sad  
charming pursuit of l  
As buyer Sheila Ki  
in New York says, "I  
one of moonbeams."  
\$7 billion, the estima

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, September 16, 1968  
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some intelligence on  
Israeli plans for French missiles  
with a potential nuclear capability.

*W. Rostow*  
Rostow

25X1A



SECRET

Authority NLJ-001-142-002/20

By JC, NARA, Date 5-23-01



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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, September 16, 1968 -- 8:15 pm

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this thoughtful assessment by Thieu of the enemy's current strategy.

*Pres file*

He has decided that the enemy does not have the capacity for a major attack on Saigon and the other cities; but will revert to the older strategy of trying to expand his hold in the countryside.

He does not believe that this is a long-term strategy but designed to lead up to a position where the enemy will have some bargaining power when the enemy proposes a cease-fire in place.

Therefore, he believes that, while protecting the cities, we should throw more of our resources into extending security and control in the countryside and try to raise our present level of control from the present level of perhaps 66% of the total population to 75-80% secure.

Interestingly enough, we discussed this possible shift in U.S. and GVN priorities at the last meeting of Nick Katzenbach's Vietnam group with Bus Wheeler. Bus said that Abrams' present strategy would automatically move in this direction as the third wave gave way to protracted harassing operations.

*You may wish to discuss this with Clark and Bus.*

~~SECRET~~ W. Rostow

Saigon 37824

WWRostow:rlm

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Authority 71C 82-206

By rs/vs, NARA, Date 1-13-93





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 37824 141240Z

~~HE NOW HAS. IT IS ALL THAT IS WITHIN HIS CAPABILITIES FOR THE NEXT 5-6 MONTHS. THE ENEMY IS LIKE A CARD PLAYER DECIDING HOW BEST TO USE HIS REMAINING MONEY. HE WILL CONTINUE TO BLUFF IN PARIS, MAINTAINING THAT HE IS WINNING THE WAR, WHILE TRYING TO EXERT SOME MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE GROUND IN VIETNAM.~~

C. THE ENEMY HOPES TO MAINTAIN A CERTAIN MILITARY PRESSURE DURING THE FOUR MONTHS REMAINING UNTIL THE INAUGURATION OF A NEW AMERICAN PRESIDENT AND TO EXTEND HIS CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRYSIDE DURING THIS PERIOD. THIS, HANOI BELIEVES, WILL ENABLE THEM TO MAKE THE WORLD THINK THAT THEY ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO KEEP UP THE MILITARY STRUGGLE. ~~IT WILL PUT THEM THROUGH THEIR OCCUPATION OF MORE AND MORE VILLAGES IN A POSITION TO PROPOSE A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE, AND PERHAPS THEN TO ASK FOR ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE BELIEF THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE COMMUNISTS WOULD VOTE FOR THEM.~~

2. THIEU SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THE CABINET, IN THE COURSE OF ITS REVIEW OF PACIFICATION ON SEPTEMBER 12, THAT THE GVN OBJECTIVE FOR THE NEXT YEAR MUST BE TO CONSOLIDATE ITS CONTROL OF THE SECURE AREAS IN AN EFFORT TO GIVE THE POPULATION OF THESE AREAS, SOME 75-80 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM, MORE SECURITY AND A GOOD ADMINISTRATION. THIS WOULD INVOLVE MORE EMPHASIS ON PACIFICATION THAN ON DEVELOPMENT AND MORE EMPHASIS ON THE SECURE THAN ON THE CONTESTED AREAS. IT WOULD MEAN THAT SOME 75-80 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE SECURITY AND AN EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION.

3. I COMMENTED THAT THIS SEEMED TO ME A SOUND APPROACH AND PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN TO SET UP AN ADMINISTRATIVE NETWORK IN MANY AREAS PARALLEL TO THAT OF THE GVN. BUNKER.

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DISSEMINATION



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BRIEFING MEMO

Monday, September 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with G. Edward Clark, newly-appointed U. S. Ambassador to Mali -- 12:30 PM today

*Pres file*

This is a brief farewell session for photographs. Ed Clark is a career officer who has been working on South Africa. His new job will be just as tough. Mali is a poor, left-leaning country in West Africa; our relations with her have been generally cool. The Malians get their economic help mainly from the French and the communists. They seemed to be softening their anti-U.S. line on Viet-Nam recently, but they now support the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia and are making sweet noises again toward Hanoi.

Clark's mission boils down to a holding operation to remind the Malians that they have serious business to mind at home. We would hope that Mali would follow Sekou Toure's example in Guinea and evolve a all the more responsible and even-handed view of the world.

If there is time for more than pleasantries, you might wish to tell Clark:

1. You appreciate the difficulty of his mission to a country which makes money by kicking the U. S.
2. But the time of the radicals and the demagogues in Africa is rapidly passing. The Malians should be able to see the future belongs to the Houphouets and the Ankrahs, the serious nation-builders who have cast off dogma.
3. Clark's job will be to get them to understand that lesson before the rest of Africa passes them by completely.

W. W. Rostow

HSS/RPM/vmr



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## BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

### G. Edward Clark

Mr. Clark was born in Thompson Ridge in the Hudson River Valley of New York in 1917. He attended Syracuse University from which he received a Bachelors Degree in 1938 and a Masters Degree in 1940. In 1946 he was a member of the Syracuse faculty.

Mr. Clark served in the U.S. Army from 1941 - 1946 and rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He spent the major part of the war in the Headquarters Staff of the China-Burma-India Theater. While there he often attended briefings given by Secretary (then Colonel) Rusk.

In 1946 Mr. Clark was appointed a Foreign Service Reserve Officer and assigned as Information Officer to Bombay, India. He later was made Consul and Attache in Bombay. From 1951 to 1953 Mr. Clark served in Washington; first as a member of the Promotion Review Panel for the Staff Corps in South East Asia, then as Acting Director of the Public Affairs Field Program Staff of Near East, South Asia, and Africa. In 1952 he was appointed a Foreign Service Officer.

In 1953 Mr. Clark was assigned to Tangier, Morocco as Second Secretary and Consul. While there he became First Secretary.

Following his Tangier assignment Mr. Clark returned to Washington where he was detailed to the Office of Deputy Director of the Budget. Later he served as Executive Assistant for the Assistant Secretary for Administration.

In 1958-59 he attended the National War College, after which he served two years in Amsterdam as Consul General. In 1961 he was named Deputy Chief of Mission in Pretoria, South Africa.

Mr. Clark returned to Washington in 1965 to become Director of the Office of West African Affairs where he

became familiar with Mali. In 1966 he assumed the position of Country Director for Southern African Affairs in which he was serving at the time of his appointment as Ambassador to Mali.

Mr. Clark is married to the former Lyla ("Lee") Sween. He has three children: Daughter Bonnie Lee ("Lee Junior"), 24; and sons Ted, 22, and George, 19.

Monday, September 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Walt Butterworth,  
Monday, September 16, 1968, 12:30

Ambassador Butterworth retired on Friday after 40 years in the Foreign Service. He was the senior career Ambassador and the senior officer in the Service.

He served in the Far East, Western Europe, and Canada. He has been an Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Ambassador to Sweden, the EEC, and Canada.

If you have the time, you may wish to ask his views on:

- the Trudeau Government's prospects;
- what it will do about NATO;
- its general attitudes toward the United States;
- how it will deal with its French Canadian problem.

W. W. Rostow

ERF:mst

*P.S. you may wish to compliment him on his farewell despatch. It would mean a great deal for him to know it was appreciated by the President.*

*W*

~~SECRET~~

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Authority 7285-07  
By ag/ics, NARA, Date 1-13-93

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FROM M WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP32393

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

SEPTEMBER 15, 1963

*Hawaii Plus*

HEREWITH VANCE'S REPORT OF THIS MORNING'S PARIS MEETING.

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. WE HAD OUR THIRD MEETING WITH LE DUC THO AND XUAN THUY MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 15. THE SAME PEOPLE WERE PRESENT ON BOTH SIDES. THE MEETING LASTED 2 HOURS AND 40 MINUTES, INCLUDING A 20 MINUTE TEA BREAK.
2. AFTER EXPRESSIONS OF CONDOLENCE ON THEIR PART FOR REASONS FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S RETURN TO US, HE SAID THAT HE WAS GOING BACK TO THE US TODAY TO ATTEND THE FUNERAL AND EXPECTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF VISIT BY GOING TO WASHINGTON TO CONSULT. WE SAID THAT WE HAD STUDIED WITH INTEREST LE DUC THO'S REMARKS OF SEPTEMBER 12 AND WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME REMARKS AND COMMENTS ON THEM. WE SAID AT THE OUTSET WE WISHED TO UNDERLINE THE FACT THAT, AS WE HAD POINTED OUT IN THE LAST MEETING, WE WERE NOT LOOKING FOR A RED CARPET OR A CAMOUFLAGED SURRENDER. WE ARE LOOKING FOR SUBSTANCE--A JUST AND HONORABLE SETTLEMENT. WE STATED WE WISHED TO DEVOTE THE BALANCE OF OUR COMMENTS TODAY TO SOME CONSTRUCTIVE ASPECTS OF THO'S REMARKS AND WOULD MAKE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS ON OUR SIDE.
3. WE SAID WE WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THO'S STATEMENT THAT THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THOSE PEOPLE THEMSELVES WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND THAT PENDING REUNIFICATION THE MILITARY PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954 SHOULD BE STRICTLY RESPECTED.
4. WE SAID THAT THESE STATEMENTS WERE CONSISTENT WITH OUR VIEWS AND UNDERLINE THE NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM. WE COMMENTED THAT THO HAD SAID THAT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US FORCES WAS A CRUCIAL ISSUE. ON OUR PART, WE BELIEVE THAT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES IS THE CRUCIAL ISSUE AND SO INDICATED AT OUR LAST MEETING. THUS, THERE APPEARS TO BE COMMON GROUND ON WHICH WE MAY BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT.
5. IN THIS CONNECTION WE HAD INDICATED AT OUR LAST MEETING WE WOULD HAVE FURTHER COMMENT ON THE QUESTION OF



WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. WE SAID WE WISHED TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF POLICY ON THIS MATTER WHICH WAS IMPORTANT AND NEW.

6. WE SAID: US AND FREE WORLD FORCES WILL BE WITHDRAWN AS NORTH VIET-NAM WITHDRAWS ITS FORCES, INCLUDING ALL PERSONNEL INFILTRATING FROM THE NORTH. WITHDRAWALS WILL BEGIN SIMULTANEOUSLY AND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ANY US FORCES REMAINING AFTER COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WILL LEAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT NOT LATER THAN 6 MONTHS THEREAFTER. WHEN WITHDRAWAL WAS COMPLETED, NO FURTHER TROOPS FROM EITHER SIDE WOULD BE INTRODUCED. THE PHRASE "WHEN THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE THUS SUBSIDES" IS DESCRIPTIVE OF THE CONDITION WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES AND DOES NOT REFER TO VIOLENCE THAT MAY OCCUR AMONG SOUTH VIETNAMESE AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. MODALITIES AND TIMING OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AND AGREED BETWEEN US.

7. THO AND THUY WERE VERY INTERESTED IN THIS STATEMENT OF POLICY AND INTERRUPTED SEVERAL TIMES FOR THE PURPOSE OF CLARIFICATION. THEY QUESTIONED WHY WE PROPOSED THAT ALL EXTERNAL TROOPS MUST BE WITHDRAWN SIMULTANEOUSLY BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, PROVIDED THAT SOME US TROOPS COULD REMAIN UNTIL 6 MONTHS AFTER ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. WE REPLIED WE HAD MANY MORE TROOPS THAN THEY, HAD A LONG WAY TO GO, AND MANY INSTALLATIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE EVACUATED. THO SAID, WITH A SMILE, THAT WE HAVE MANY MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION AND WE COULD LEAVE MORE QUICKLY THAN THEY COULD. WE REPLIED IN LIKE VEIN THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE THEM WITH MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO TAKE THEIR FORCES HOME QUICKLY. WE THEN POINTED OUT THAT THESE WERE MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED BUT THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL TO START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE SAID THIS STATEMENT IS A NEW STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF PEACE AND SHOULD RESOLVE ANY QUESTION THEY MIGHT HAVE REGARDING THE GOODWILL OF THE US AND OUR SERIOUS INTENTIONS.

8. WE SAID THAT BOTH OF US HAD SPOKEN OF CESSATION OF BOMBING AS A FURTHER STEP TOWARDS PEACE. WE HAD SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD DISCUSS THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO STOP ALL BOMBARDMENT. AT THE VANCE/LAU TALKS THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSION OF FACTORS THAT WOULD BE RELEVANT TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. ONE WHICH WE CONSIDER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS RECENTLY EMPHASIZED AGAIN IS THE QUESTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE DMZ AREA.

9. WE SAID THE US HAS PROPOSED RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DMZ, THAT IS, MILITARY ACTIVITY IN, THROUGH, OR ACROSS THE DMZ, AND THE MASSING OF TROOPS NORTH OF THE DMZ, SHOULD CEASE. WE HAD PROPOSED THAT WE REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON DETAILED PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTION AND SUPERVISION OF THE RESTORATION OF THE DMZ. WE SAID WE ARE WILLING TO DEFER UNTIL AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING DISCUSSION OF SUCH DETAILED PROCEDURES IF THE PRINCIPLE OF CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE DMZ IS UNDERSTOOD AND WILL BE OBSERVED.

10. WE COMMENTED THAT WHEN VANCE AND LAU DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT, LAU HAD SAID THAT IF WE WOULD ACT, THE DRV WOULD "KNOW WHAT TO DO". HE FURTHER SAID THAT IF THE US WOULD STOP BOMBING AND STOP ITS ACTIONS IN THE DMZ, WE WOULD THEN "SEE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN." WE SAID WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY FURTHER COMMENT THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE ON THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION AND THE APPARENTLY SIGNIFICANT STATEMENTS MADE BY LAU. THO SAID HE WISHED TO RESERVE HIS COMMENTS UNTIL WE HAD FINISHED EVERYTHING WE HAD TO SAY.

11. WE SAID THAT WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR AT OUR LAST MEETING THAT THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SVN IS FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO DECIDE, AND THAT NEITHER HANOI NOR WASHINGTON SHOULD DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY DISCUSSIONS WHICH DEAL WITH THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE SOUTH. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE PROPOSED INCLUSION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SVN ON OUR SIDE, AND HAVE INDICATED WE WOULD BE READY TO HAVE THE DRV INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NLF, OR THE ALLIANCE, OR ANY OTHER GROUP, ON ITS SIDE. WE ADDED THAT -- AS WE HAD INDICATED -- SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD NOT PRECLUDE A CONTINUATION OF PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS SUCH AS THESE ON MATTERS OF CONCERN ON THE MATTERS WE HAD RAISED TODAY.

12. THO SAID THAT ON MANY POINTS WE HAD DIFFERENT VIEWS BECAUSE US IS THE AGGRESSOR AND THE DRV IS THE VICTIM, AND BECAUSE THE US IS IMPERIALIST AND THE DRV IS COMMUNIST. HE SAID THERE WAS NOTHING STRANGE IN THESE DIFFERENCES, BUT THEY WERE POINTS OF REALITY WHICH NO PERSON OF CONSCIENCE COULD DENY AND THAT HE WOULD ADDRESS HIS REMARKS TO THESE DIFFERENCES. THE FIRST QUESTION IS WHO IS THE AGGRESSOR IN VIET-NAM. THIS IS A BASIC QUESTION, THE ESSENCE OF WHICH MUST BE REALIZED BEFORE WE CAN REACH A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. HE THEN GAVE THE USUAL HISTORICAL EXPOSITION TO SHOW THAT THE US WAS THE AGGRESSOR AND NVN THE VICTIM. HE SAID THE US WAS CONFUSED ABOUT NATIONALISM IN VN AND THAT THE PEOPLE WE WERE SUPPORTING WERE TRAITORS WHO HAD SOLD THEIR COUNTRY AND WERE NOT TRUE NATIONALISTS. HE DENIED THAT THE LIBERATION FORCES WERE SUFFERING DEFEAT, SAYING THEY HAD STOOD UP AGAINST US AND GAINED THE ADMIRATION AND SUPPORT OF THE WORLD. HE DENIED THAT THEY HAD ABANDONED THEIR OPERATIONS IN RURAL AREAS TO ATTACK THE CITIES. HE SAID THAT IN THE PAST THEY HAD NOT ATTACKED THE CITIES BECAUSE THE SITUATION WAS NOT RIGHT. NOW THEY WERE STRONG ENOUGH TO FIGHT NOT ONLY IN THE RURAL AREAS BUT IN THE CITIES AS WELL. THE FACT THAT THEY HAD NOT OCCUPIED ANY CITIES WAS NOT A DEFEAT BECAUSE THE WAR CAN BE WON WITHOUT DESTROYING THE ENEMY OR CAPTURING CITIES. THIS WAS TRUE WHEN THEY DEFEATED THE FRENCH COLONIALISTS.

13. THUY SPOKE TO THO WHO THEN APPEARED TO ABANDON THE LAST SEVERAL PAGES OF HIS PREPARED REMARKS, AND SAID HE WOULD ADDRESS HIMSELF NOW TO THE VIEWS WE HAD EXPRESSED TODAY. THEY HAD EXAMINED THE VIEWS WE

HAD EXPRESSED WITH GREAT INTEREST. WE HAD RAISED MANY QUESTIONS BUT THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED AFTER WE HAVE STOPPED THE BOMBING SO THAT TOGETHER WE COULD FIND A CORRECT SOLUTION. HE SAID THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE SPOKEN ABOUT RESPECT FOR THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS WHICH CONTAIN MANY CONCRETE PROVISIONS. HE SAID THERE ARE DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THESE PROVISIONS WHICH CAN BE DISCUSSED AFTER A CESSATION OF BOMBING, AND THAT BOTH SIDES CAN RAISE THESE PROBLEMS FOR DISCUSSION.

14. AS TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL TROOPS, THEY HAVE PUT FORWARD THE POSITION THAT SINCE THE US WAGED AGGRESSION, THE US AND SATELLITE TROOPS MUST WITHDRAW FROM SVN. WE, HOWEVER, PUT THE PROBLEM IN ANOTHER WAY. THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE QUESTION OF BOMBING. HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL SIX MONTHS LATER, BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IT LATER.

15. AS TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, THO SAID THAT THE DRV DEMANDS THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR WITHOUT RECIPROCITY AND WE HAD ACCEPTED (SIC) THIS. AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WE COULD SHIFT TO PHASE 2. AT THAT POINT WE COULD RAISE THE ITEMS WHICH INTEREST US. THESE ITEMS COULD BE THE ONES WE RAISED THE OTHER DAY OR TODAY. FOR THEIR PART, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD RAISE ITEMS ALSO. THE TWO SIDES WOULD THEN DISCUSS AND ELABORATE AN AGENDA. THOSE QUESTION WHICH CAN BE DISCUSSED FIRST COULD BE TAKEN UP IMMEDIATELY AND THE REMAINING ITEMS COULD BE DISCUSSED IN ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGENDA AGREED UPON. WE SHALL THEN DISCUSS AND FIND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOR THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM IN PHASE 2 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGENDA WHICH WE SHALL HAVE DISCUSSED AND AGREED UPON.

16. THO SAID THAT WHAT LAU HAD SAID TO VANCE ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER CESSATION OF BOMBING IS PRECISELY THAT. IT THEREFORE MEANS THAT THE POSITIVE PROPOSALS THAT THE DRV HAD MADE ARE EVIDENCE OF THE POSITIVE ATTITUDE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE IN FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. WE SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT AT ALL OF THE DRV'S GOOD WILL AND SERIOUS INTENT. HE SAID, THEY MEAN WHAT THEY SAY.

17. AS TO THE LAST ITEM WE HAD RAISED ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM IN THE CONFERENCE, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS BETWEEN US. AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WE SHOULD DISCUSS THIS QUESTION ALSO, JUST LIKE OTHER QUESTIONS.

18. HE THEN SUMMED UP BY SAYING THE US MUST UNCONDITIONALLY CEASE THE BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST NVN. THE US COULD THEN RAISE ALL ITS ITEMS. FROM THEIR SIDE THE DRV WILL RAISE ALL ITS ITEMS. THERE WILL THEN BE A DISCUSSION OF AN AGENDA. WE WOULD THEN DETERMINE THE ITEMS TO DISCUSS FIRST, AND THOSE WOULD



BE DISCUSSED IMMEDIATELY. OTHER ITEMS WOULD FOLLOW IN TURN BECAUSE THERE ARE MANY OF THEM. THIS IS A POSITIVE PROPOSITION BECAUSE THE DRV WOULD POSITIVELY DISCUSS THEM IF WE WOULD STOP THE BOMBING. IF WE WANTED TO MEET THE NEXT DAY FOLLOWING A CESSATION OF BOMBING AND DISCUSS THE ITEMS, THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS THEM WITH SERIOUS INTENT AND GOOD WILL. HE REPEATED AND EMPHASIZED "SERIOUS INTENT AND GOOD WILL" A NUMBER OF TIMES.

19. AT THIS POINT WE TOOK TEA BREAK.

20. AFTER THE TEA BREAK, WE BEGAN BY SAYING WE WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY ONE POINT. THO HAD SAID WE BOTH AGREED TO A STOPPING OF BOMBING. THAT OF COURSE WAS NOT CORRECT. WE ACCEPTED THAT A CESSATION OF BOMBING COULD FURTHER THE OBJECTIVE OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, BUT THAT WE NEEDED TO DETERMINE THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY OUR STOPPING THE BOMBARDMENT.

21. IN PREVIOUS TALKS BETWEEN VANCE AND LAU AND TODAY, WE HAD POINTED OUT MATTERS WHICH WERE MOST IMPORTANT IN MOVING TOWARDS PEACE. WE HAD MENTIONED TWO TODAY, BUT THERE WERE OTHER MATTERS WHICH VANCE HAD MENTIONED WHICH WOULD COME ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS IN PHASE 2.

22. WE THEN SAID WE WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE OUR IMPRESSIONS. BASED ON WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BETWEEN MEMBERS OF OUR RESPECTIVE DELEGATION, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IF THE BOMBARDMENT WERE STOPPED THE DRV WOULD KNOW WHAT TO DO IN AND AROUND THE DMZ. IN OTHER WORDS, SINCE THE DRV WISHED TO MOVE TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AS THEY HAVE SAID, THEIR ACTIONS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH MOVING TOWARD PEACE. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD SAID REALITY WOULD SPEAK FOR ITSELF AND THAT REALITY WOULD CREATE CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. MORE SPECIFICALLY, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IF THE BOMBARDMENT WERE STOPPED AND WE RESPECTED THE DMZ, THEY WOULD RESPECT THE DMZ.

23. THO REPLIED THAT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THESE CONVERSATIONS IN BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE MEETINGS, THEY HAVE REPEATED THAT THEY HAD COME WITH SERIOUS INTENT AND GOODWILL IN ORDER TO REACH A POLITICAL AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM. THEY ASKED THE SAME OF US. THE CESSATION OF BOMBING IS THE CRUCIAL POINT WHICH WILL OPEN THE WAY TO GO FURTHER AND FIND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THEIR DEMAND WAS LEGITIMATE. HE THEN REPEATED THAT AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WE COULD GO ON TO RAISE ANY ITEMS ON EITHER SIDE AND AGREE UPON AN AGENDA AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THE ITEMS WOULD BE DISCUSSED.

24. AT THIS POINT, THUY ADDED HIS COMMENTS. HE SAID THE VIEWS THEY EXPRESSED TODAY HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT OUR VIEWS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DRV HAD ADDED SOMETHING NEW IN ORDER TO SPEED UP PROGRESS. WE HAD RAISED PHASE 1-PHASE 2, AND THEIR VIEWS EXPRESSED TODAY WERE EVIDENCE



THAT THEY HAD TAKEN THIS PROPOSAL INTO ACCOUNT. WHAT IS NEW IN THEIR PROPOSAL TODAY IS THAT AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING THERE WOULD BE DISCUSSIONS TO AGREE UPON AN AGENDA AND ON THAT AGENDA COULD BE ALL THE PROBLEMS WE RAISED AND ALL THE PROBLEMS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD RAISE. WE WOULD THEN CHOOSE THE ITEMS TO BE DISCUSSED FIRST AND THE ITEMS TO FOLLOW. THUY SAID THAT THEY WERE PROPOSING A MORE POSITIVE STEP AND IT WAS UP TO THE US TO DECIDE THE PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THE BEGINNING OF DISCUSSIONS. THE DRV IS PREPARED TO BEGIN DISCUSSION THE DAY AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THIS IS EVIDENCE OF THEIR SERIOUS INTENT AND GOODWILL AND A POSITIVE STEP TOWARD A SETTLEMENT.

25. WE SAID THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING ON WHAT WE HAD SAID ABOUT THE DMZ AND WE WANTED TO CORRECT IT. ONE OF THE IMPORTANT MATTERS WHICH WE HAD RAISED THIS MORNING WAS THE QUESTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE DMZ AREA. WE THEN REPEATED OUR POSITION ON THE DMZ AS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 9 ABOVE.

26. THUY THEN SAID, "DOES THIS MEAN THAT MILITARY ACTIONS WOULD STOP BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING?" WE REPLIED, "NO. THE MILITARY ACTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY AND DISCUSSION OF INSPECTION AND SUPERVISION COULD FOLLOW." WE THEN REPEATED THE STATEMENT WHICH LAU HAD MADE TO VANCE IN THIS REGARD. THUY SAID THAT THERE WAS ONE PRINCIPLE TO COME BACK TO AND THAT WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO RECIPROCITY. IF THERE IS ANYTHING RELATED TO RECIPROCITY, THEN THEY REJECT IT. THO SAID THAT THERE MAY SOMETIMES BE A MISUNDERSTANDING, AS THERE WAS ABOUT A STATEMENT THAT HE HAD MADE IN JUNE. ALTHOUGH WE HAD QUOTED LAU'S WORDS CORRECTLY, LAU DID NOT SAY WHAT THEY WOULD DO AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. AS THO HAD SAID THIS MORNING, THEY HAD GOODWILL AND SERIOUS INTENT TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM. THEY DEMANDED A CESSATION OF BOMBING AFTER WHICH WE COULD RAISE ANY MATTER WE WISHED AND THEY COULD RAISE ANY MATTER THEY WISHED, THUS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF SERIOUS TALK TO FIND A SETTLEMENT. THO SAID IF THE US PROPOSES A CESSATION OF BOMBING TO BE CONDITIONAL TO A DISCUSSION OF ANY PARTICULAR ITEM, OR IF WE WOULD STOP THE BOMBING AND THEY WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PARTICULAR ACTIONS, THAT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO RECIPROCITY, WHEREAS, WHAT HE HAD PROPOSED THIS MORNING WAS THAT ONCE WE HAVE STOPPED THE BOMBING WE WOULD SIT TOGETHER AND WE WOULD THEN SEE WHAT A SERIOUS ATTITUDE AND GOOD WILL THEY HAD.

27. WE SAID THAT WE WERE GAINING THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE TALKS CAN'T BE SERIOUS UNLESS CERTAIN THINGS HAPPENED. THO REPLIED THAT IF WE WOULD STOP THE BOMBING, SERIOUS TALKS CAN BEGIN. WE ANSWERED THAT WHAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN OF CONCERN TO US IS THAT IF WE DID STOP THE BOMBING AND THEN THEIR TROOPS WOULD DRIVE THOROUGH THE DMZ, THAT THIS WOULD BE THE END OF SERIOUS TALKS. AS A RESULT OF THE SERIES OF PRIVATE TALKS, WE BOTH UNDERSTOOD BETTER WHAT SERIOUS

TALKS MEAN TO EACH OTHER AND WE WERE SURE THEY UNDERSTOOD THE KIND OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT POSSIBLE. IF SERIOUS TALKS STARTED AND BROKE OFF, IT WOULD BE A SET BACK WHICH WE ASSUME NEITHER OF US WANTED. WE HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION--ALMOST THE CONCLUSION--THAT IF SERIOUS TALKS START THEY WANT THEM TO BE PRODUCTIVE WITH GIVE-AND-TAKE ON BOTH SIDES. BUT CERTAIN THINGS ARE QUITE OBVIOUSLY ESSENTIAL FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, AND WE WANT TO MAKE SURE THEY UNDERSTOOD THEM

28. THO TOOK NO EXCEPTION TO WHAT WE HAD SAID AND STATED THAT HE HAD A FEW WORDS HE WANTED TO ADD. HE SAID THAT FOUR MONTHS OF OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE TALKS, INCLUDING THE VANCE/LAU MEETINGS AND THESE HERE, HAVE BROUGHT A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S VIEWS FOR FINDING A SETTLEMENT. OUR VIEWS HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY EXAMINED BY THEM AND THEY HOPED WE WOULD CAREFULLY EXAMINE THEIRS. GRADUALLY BY TALKING WE WOULD UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S GOODWILL. THO SAID HE IS CONVINCED THAT BY OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE TALKS WE WILL FIND A SETTLEMENT FOR THE FUTURE, AND THIS IS WHAT THEY WISHED.

29. WE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN NEXT FRIDAY AT 9:30 A.M. AND ADJOURNED.

30. COMMENT: WE NOTE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS MADE TODAY BY THO WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN MADE BEFORE IN THE SAME WAY.

A. THO AND THUY STATED THEIR READINESS TO BEGIN SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS THE DAY AFTER CESSATION OF BOMBING (SEE PARAS 10 AND 24).

B. NUMEROUS REFERENCES BY THO TO SERIOUS INTENT AND GOOD WILL FOR FINDING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. IN PARA 24 ABOVE AND AGAIN IN PARA 23, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATED THIS SERIOUS INTENT AND GOODWILL TO PROPOSALS WE HAVE MADE. IN PARA 26, THO SAID THAT AFTER A CESSATION OF BOMBING, WE WOULD THEN SEE WHAT A SERIOUS ATTITUDE AND GOODWILL THEY HAD.

C. IN PARA 27 ABOVE, WE STATED OUR VIEWS OF WHAT WAS NECESSARY FOR SERIOUS TALKS TO CONTINUE AND THE DANGER OF THEIR BREAKING OFF. IN PARA 28 ABOVE, THO TOOK NO EXCEPTION TO WHAT WE HAD TO SAY. HE STATED THAT OUR OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE TALKS HAVE BROUGHT A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S VIEWS. HE CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS AT THIS POINT BY SAYING THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT BY OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE TALKS WE WILL FIND A SETTLEMENT AND THAT THIS WAS WHAT THEY WISHED.

D. IN PARA 7 ABOVE, THEY ASKED IN DETAIL ABOUT THE SIX-MONTH PROVISION AND FOR THE FIRST TIME APPEARED TO IMPLICITLY ACCEPT DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 151859Z SEP 68



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SEP 15 000344

FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP82392

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SENSITIVE

*Pres file*

SEPTEMBER 14, 1968

AT THE SUGGESTION OF MY COLLEAGUES, I HAVE SET DOWN MY EQUIVALENT FOR 1968 OF "LET'S GET THIS COUNTRY MOVING AGAIN" IN 1960. A SAMPLE TEXT FOLLOWS.

IN SIMPLE LANGUAGE, IT WOULD BE: "WE'RE NOT GOING TO LET A HANDFUL OF WHITE AND BLACK PUNKS TURN THIS COUNTRY OVER TO WALLACE, STROM THURMOND, AND THOSE WHO BASE THEIR CAMPAIGN ON THEIR SUPPORT."

IT SHOULD BE, IN MY JUDGEMENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT'S THEME -- EVERYDAY. HE COULD END UP WITH GREAT LIBERAL REPUBLICAN SUPPORT AND PUSH NIXON BACK TOWARDS GOLDWATER'S CONSTITUENCY.

THIS -- PLUS SOME VIETNAM PROGRESS -- AND BUILDING THE CASE THAT NIXON'S FINGER SHOULD NOT BE ON THE NUCLEAR TRIGGER, COULD DO THE JOB -- IF ANYTHING CAN DO IT.

"I HAVE DECIDED IT IS MY DUTY TO SPEAK OUT FRANKLY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THE DEBATE CONCERNING LAW AND ORDER WHICH APPEARS TO BE PLAYING SO LARGE A PART IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN. I DO SO BECAUSE I BELIEVE THERE IS A DANGER THAT UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN MAY GIVE WAY TO BLIND FEAR; AND BLIND FEAR MAY DRIVE THIS GREAT NATION OF OURS ON TO DANGEROUS POLITICAL PATHS.

IN A DEMOCRACY THE ONLY BASIS FOR INTELLIGENT AND WISE ACTION IS A BOLD FACING OF THE FACTS. THE FIRST FACT IS THAT A VERY SMALL MINORITY OF OUR NEGRO CITIZENS -- AT MOST, 5 PERCENT -- ARE USING IN PUBLIC AS WELL AS IN PRIVATE THE LANGUAGE OF VIOLENCE AND IN SOME CASES THEY MAY HAVE ENGAGED IN VIOLENCE AND INTEND TO DO SO FURTHER.

SEP 14 PM 8:42

RECEIVED FROM QUINCY COPY

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
RECEIVED PER E.O. 12356,  
ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF

ON 11-17-92

SECOND, A VERY SMALL PROPORTION OF OUR STUDENTS AND YOUNG PEOPLE -- PERHAPS LESS THAN 3 PERCENT OF OUR TOTAL STUDENT POPULATION OF 6 MILLION -- HAVE BEEN DRAWN INTO THE DOCTRINE OF SO-CALLED CONFRONTATION. THEY ACCEPT THE LEADERSHIP OF MEN WHO CHOOSE AN ISSUE OF PROTEST; AND THEN PROVOKE A DEMONSTRATION DESIGNED TO LEAD TO CONFLICT WITH THE POLICE. THEY HOPE THAT CONFLICT WILL BE VIOLENT. ON THE BASIS OF THIS VIOLENCE, THEY COUNT ON ENLARGING THE NUMBER OF THOSE PREPARED TO PROTEST WITH THEM. 95 PERCENT OF OUR NEGRO CITIZENS REJECT THE DOCTRINES OF VIOLENCE. THEY MAY WELL HAVE GRIEVANCES. THEY MAY WELL INSIST THAT CERTAIN INEQUITIES IN OUR SOCIETY BE CORRECTED. BUT THEY ARE PREPARED TO WORK WHOLLY WITHIN OUR SYSTEM OF LAW AND POLITICS. 98 PERCENT OF OUR STUDENTS -- WHATEVER THEIR VIEWS OR GRIEVANCES -- ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITHIN OUR SYSTEM OF LAW AND POLITICS.

NOW WHAT ABOUT THOSE WHO ARE PLAYING THESE DANGEROUS GAMES WITH DOCTRINES OF VIOLENCE AND CONFRONTATION?

THE ANSWER IS THEY MUST BE DEALT WITH BY OUR INSTRUMENTS OF LAW AND ORDER, JUST AS ANY OTHERS WHO CHOOSE TO VIOLATE THE LAW. THEY ARE A PROBLEM. BUT THEY ARE A MANAGEABLE PROBLEM IF WE KEEP THAT PROBLEM IN PROPORTION; FIRMLY BACK OUR POLICE FORCES; AND INSIST THAT WE ARE A PEOPLE WHO DEMAND GOVERNMENT BY LAW.

WITHIN THESE SMALL GROUPS WHO ADVOCATE VIOLENCE AND CONFRONTATION THERE ARE A FEW MEN, A VERY FEW, WHO HAVE A PLAN. THIS PLAN IS NOT UNDERSTOOD BY MOST OF THOSE WHOM THEY LEAD. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT A SOCIETY CHALLENGED BY VIOLENCE WILL SET ABOUT MAKING LAW AND ORDER THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS. THEY AIM -- THEY CONSCIOUSLY AIM -- TO PROVOKE A RIGHT-WING REACTION IN THIS COUNTRY, BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THEIR RADICAL IDEAS WILL FLOURISH BETTER IF THIS NATION TURNS TO REACTIONARY POLITICS THAN IF ITS POLITICS CONTINUES TO BE DOMINATED BY THE GREAT MODERATE CENTER GROUPS IN BOTH PARTIES WHO HAVE MADE THIS NATION WHAT IS IS.

LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THEIR DOCTRINE IS ONE OF THE OLDEST OF COMMUNIST TACTICS. IN MANY COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA, FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMUNISTS ARE WORKING EVERY DAY TO UNDERMINE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PROVOKE MILITARY TAKEOVERS. THEY DO THIS BECAUSE THEY FEEL THEIR POSITION WILL GROW MORE IMPORTANT IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIP THAN



IT CAN BE UNDER CIVIL CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. THE QUESTION BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THIS ELECTION IS SIMPLY THIS: ARE WE GOING TO PLAY THEIR GAME? ARE WE GOING TO LET A TINY MINORITY OF WHITE AND BLACK PEOPLE, INFECTED BY ANARCHIST DOCTRINES, TURN POLITICAL POWER OVER TO MEN WHO HAVE OPPOSED EVERY CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORT AT HOME AND ABROAD THAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED TOGETHER-- THROUGH POLITICAL PARTIES -- IN THE POSTWAR YEARS. LET ME BE CLEAR: THERE IS A GREAT DEAL WE HAVE DONE AND THERE IS A GREAT DEAL MORE THAT WE MUST DO TO MAKE OUR STREETS SAFER AND TO INSURE THAT THESE SMALL MINORITIES ARE FIRMLY HELD WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW OF THIS LAND. BUT WE CAN DO THESE THINGS IF WE CAREFULLY ANALYZE THE PROBLEMS, STRENGTHEN AND IMPROVE OUR POLICE FORCES AND WORK TOGETHER ON THIS PROBLEM AS WE HAVE ON SO MANY OTHERS. IT IS TIME FOR EVERY WORKER, EVERY BUSINESSMAN, EVERY STUDENT, EVERY TEACHER - IN FACT, EVERY CITIZEN -- TO ASK HIMSELF THIS QUESTION: AM I REALLY PREPARED TO TURN THE POLITICAL POWER OF THIS COUNTRY OVER TO REACTIONARIES BECAUSE I AM REVOLTED BY THE WORDS AND ACTIONS OF A TINY MINORITY? I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE READY TO DO THIS. I BELIEVE WE HAVE ENOUGH CONFIDENCE IN OURSELVES -- IN WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED AND IN WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE -- TO STAY STEADY ON COURSE; TO KEEP OUR COOL; AND CONTINUE TO BE THE GREAT NATION OF MODERATES WHO HAVE RAISED THE STANDARD OF LIFE IN OUR COUNTRY TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL KNOWN IN HUMAN HISTORY AND WHO HAVE BEEN A STEADY FRIEND OF FREEDOM AND DECENCY AND PROGRESS ABROAD."

DTG: 142256Z SEP 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE  
LITERALLY EYES ONLY

September 15, 1968

50  
*sent to Camp David  
via wire  
CAP 82396  
Pres file*

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

The telephonic flash report of the Paris private meeting this morning is obscure. They found it hard to summarize on the phone. Their written report should arrive about noon and will be forwarded.

- Meeting took 2 hours and 40 minutes;
- Harriman presented the points he indicated to us he would make, and there was discussion.
- The other side used some "nuanced language" which "interested" our delegation.
- They remain "not discouraged, not encouraged; but interested."
- Firm agreement to meet again on Friday -- with probably not much to be expected from Wednesday tea break.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 12-17-01

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE