

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|--|---------|--------------|
| #1 memo | Rostow to President C 1 p open 3/13/03 NLS 02-7 | 9/25/68 | A |
| #1a memo | President to SecDef and AEC Chairman PCI C 1 p open 3/13/03 NLS 02-7 | 9/26/68 | A |
| #1g memo | President to Pastore C 2 p open 10/18/01 | 5/17/68 | A |
| #1h rpt | "The supply of enriched uranium fuel..." C 4 p open 10/18/01 | undated | A |
| #4 memo | Rostow to President, 7:10 p.m. C 1 p open 10/18/01 | 9/25/68 | A |
| #4a memo | Rusk to President C 2 p open 10/18/01 | 9/19/68 | A |
| #7a memo | Wheeler to President S 1 p open 10/18/01 | 9/25/68 | A |
| #8 memo | Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. S 1 p open 10/18/01 [Dup. #28, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN Chron V. 22"] | 9/25/68 | A |
| #8a cable | Paris 21378 S 2 p open 10/18/01 [Dup. #126, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN 811, 'Box 119"] [Dup. #280, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN Chron V. 22"] | 9/25/68 | A |
| #11 memo | Rostow to President, 3:45 p.m. TS 1 p open 10/18/01 | 9/25/68 | A |
| #11a memo | TS Rostow to President S 1 p open 10/18/01 | 9/25/68 | A |
| #11b memo | Rostow to President, 4:45 p.m. TS 1 p open 10/28/95 NLS 94-457 | 9/24/68 | A |
| #13a cable | Saigon 38741 S 1 p open 10/18/01 [Dup. #270, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN Chron V. 22"] | 9/25/68 | A |

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 95, September 19-25, 1968

Box 39

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| #14a memo | Rostow to President, 10:05 a.m. <i>open 10/18/01</i> C 2 p [Duplicate in Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, "9/25/68-2:04 p.m."] <i>Dupe in File of WWR, BOX 2, MTGS JULY-DEC '68, DOC #32b, 33a</i> | 9/17/68 | A |
| #15 memo | Rostow to President, 11:50 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/25/68 | A |
| #15a cable | Oslo 6752 (<i>dup # 4a, NSF CF Vietnam, "Oslo" Box 139</i>) S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-407 9.21.98</i> | 9/25/68 | A |
| #16 memo | Rostow to President, 11:15 a.m. C 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/25/68 | A |
| #16a memo | Rusk to President, re: Argentina C 2 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/20/68 | A |
| #17 memo | Rostow to President, 10 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/25/68 | A |
| #19a memo | Wheeler to Rostow S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | undated | A |
| #19b rpt | "Extract of Testimony before Mahan Subcommittee..." S 6 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/10/68 | A |
| #20 memo | Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/25/68 | A |
| #20a cable | Moscow 5648 S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/24/68 | A |
| #21 memo | Rostow to President, 9:10 a.m. C 1 p <i>open 9-15-95 NLJ 93-248</i> | 9/25/68 | A |
| #24e rpt | "Net changes in force posture..." <i>open 5/13/02 NLJ 02-11</i> TS 1 p | undated | A |
| #24d map | "Central Region Allied Command Europe" S 1 p <i>open 1/9/2020 per NLJ 02-11</i> | undated | A |

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|------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|
| #24e table | "NATO Active divisions in Central Europe" S 2 p | undated | A |
| #24f map | "Central Region Allied Command Europe" S 1 p | undated | A |
| #24g table | "Air Order of Battles" S 2 p | undated | A |
| #25 memo | Rostow to President, 5:25 p.m. C 2 p - open 10/18/01 | 9/24/68 | A |
| #27 memo | Rostow to President, 4:45 p.m. TS 1 p - open 10/18/01 | 9/24/68 | A |
| #28a note | Intelligence Note 744 extract S 1 p - open 7-14-94 NLS 94-25 | 9/20/68 | A |
| #30 memo | Rostow to President, 2:00 p.m. (dup # 20, NSF, CF, VN Hauer/Crocodile Indian Proposal... Box 134) S 1 p - open 10/18/01 | 9/24/68 | A |
| #30a memo | Taylor to President (dup # 20 b es above) S 2 p - open 10/18/01 | 9/24/68 | A |
| #32 memo | Rostow to President, 12:55 p.m. (dup # 5, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "Ohio" Box 13) S 1 p - open 10/18/01 | 9/24/68 | A |
| #32a cable | Oslo 6737 (dup # 34, NSF MTP Vol 95, Box 39 CF, Vietnam, "Ohio" Box 135 S 1 p - open NLT 17-407 9.2.98 | 9/24/68 | A |
| #33 memo | Rostow to President, 12:30 p.m. - open 10/18/01 S 1 p - [dup # 35, NSF, CF, Hauer Chron. v. 22"] | 9/24/68 | A |
| #33a cable | Saigon 38599 - open 10/18/01 S 4 p - [dup # 32, es above] | 9/24/68 | A |
| #34 memo | Rostow to President, 12:15 p.m. S 1 p - open 10/18/01 | 9/24/68 | A |

open 1/9/2020
per NLS 02-11

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|-----------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|
| #34a cable | Bangkok 20707- S 2 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/24/68 | A |
| #36 memo | Rostow to President, 10 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/24/68 | A |
| #36a cable | Moscow 5633 S 2 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/23/68 | A |
| #37 memo | Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m. TS 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/24/68 | A |
| #37a memo | Keeny to Rostow TS 2 p <i>sanitized 3/15/03 NSJ/RAL 02-3</i> | 9/23/68 | A |
| #37b rpt | "Comparison of American and Soviet Space Programs" TS 3 p <i>Open NLJ 019-0394-5(102) open 8-12-09 NLJ/RAC 02-4</i> | undated | A |
| #41 memo | Rostow to President S 2 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/24/68 | A |
| #43 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82480)- S 3 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> [Duplicate of #134, NSF, Country File, France, Vol. 14] [Sanitized NLJ 85-242] | 9/23/68 | A |
| #44 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82479)- S 3 p <i>Open NLJ 97-407 9.21.98</i> | 9/23/68 | A |
| #45 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82474) S 2 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/23/68 | A |
| #46 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82478) S 2 p <i>open 7/15/02 NLJ 02-10</i> | 9/23/68 | A |
| #47 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82476) <i>Open NLJ 97-158 11-10-98</i> C 2 p | 9/23/68 | A |

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|------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|
| #49 memo | Rostow to President, 6 p.m. C 1 p open 10/18/01 [Duplicate of #14, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11] | 9/23/68 | A |
| #49a memo | Rostow to President C 2 p open 10/18/01 [Duplicate of #14b, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11] | 9/23/68 | A |
| #49b memo | Zwick to President C 2 p open 10/18/01 [Duplicate of #14c, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11] | 9/12/68 | A |
| #49d memo | Hamilton to President C 2 p open 10/18/01 [Duplicate of #13, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11] | 8/5/68 | A |
| #49e memo | Zwick to President C 2 p open 10/18/01 [Duplicate of #13b, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11] | 8/3/68 | A |
| #49f memo | Gaud and Freeman to President C 4 p open 10/18/01 [Duplicate of #13d, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11] | 7/26/68 | A |
| #50 memo | Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m. C 1 p open 10/18/01 | 9/23/68 | A |
| #50a memo | W. Bundy for the Files S 3 p open 7/15/02 NJ 02-10 | 9/20/68 | A |
| #50b cable | From Canberra TS 5 p open 7/15/02 NW 02-10 | 9/19/68 | a |
| #52 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82464) <i>open MJ 97-407</i> S 2 p <i>9.21.98</i> | 9/22/68 | A |
| #53a cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82462) S 14 p open 10/18/01 <i>[dup #49, NSF, C.F., Vol. "HAWAII" Chron. 2-22]</i> | 9/22/68 | A |

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|-----------------------|--|--------------------|--------------|
| #54 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82456) <i>Open NLJ 97-407</i> S 7 p <i>9.21.98</i> | 9/22/68 | A |
| #55 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82460) S 3 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/22/68 | A |
| #58 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82451) S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/21/68 | A |
| #59 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82445) <i>open 9-25-98 NLJ 97-162</i> C 5 p | 9/21/68 | A |
| #60 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82446) <i>Open NLJ 97-409</i> TS 5 p <i>9.29.98</i> | 9/21/68 | A |
| #65 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82444) S 2 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> <i>[Camp #SSb, NSF, CF, VII, "HARUANCHON v. 22"]</i> | 9/21/68 | A |
| #66 cable | Duplicate of #60 <i>Open NLJ 97-409 9.29.98</i> | | |
| #66b cable | Duplicate of #60 " " " | | |
| #66c cable | Duplicate of #60 " " " | | |
| #66d cable | Duplicate of #60 " " " | | |
| #66e cable | Duplicate of #60 " " " | | |
| #70 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82424) S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/20/68 | A |
| #71 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82431) TS 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/20/68 | A |
| #72 cable | Duplicate of #71 <i>open 10/18/01</i> | | |
| #75 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82430) S 1 p <i>open 5-15-02 RAC NLJ 99-180-1</i> <i>[duplicate #11a, Czechoslovakia, vol. 4, Box 39]</i> | 9/20/68 | A |

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NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 95, September 19-25, 1968

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|-----------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|
| #76 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82421) S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/20/68 | A |
| #78 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82411) S 12 p [Duplicate of #37, NSF, CF, VN, "8B(3)[B] Bunker Weekly Report"] [Sanitized NLJ CBS 10] <i>open 7/15/02 NLJ 02-10</i> | 9/19/68 | A |
| #80 memo | Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/19/68 | A |
| #82 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82409) C 1 p <i>open 11-5-97 NLJ 95-188</i> | 9/19/68 | A |
| #83 cable | Rostow to President (CAP 82407) S 1 p | 9/19/68 | A |
| #85 cable | Duplicate of #83 <i>sanitized 3/13/03 NLJ 02-9</i> | | |
| #86 memo | Rostow to President, 2:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/19/68 | A |
| #87a cable | Bonn 17052 S 6 p <i>open 7-28-94 NLJ 94-196</i> | 9/18/68 | A |
| #88a cable | Bucharest 2613 C 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> [Duplicate of #20a, NSF, CF, Rumania, Vol. 3] | 9/19/68 | A |
| #89 memo | Rostow to President, 11:25 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> | 9/19/68 | A |
| #90 memo | Rostow to President, 11:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 10/18/01</i> [dup of #3, NSF, CF, VN, "HAWAII Chron v.22"] | 9/19/68 | A |
| #90a cable | USUN 6558 S 1 p <i>Open RAL 6-15-98</i> [dup of #3, NSF, CF, VN, "HAWAII Chron v.22"] | 9/18/68 | A |

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| 1e ltr | Seaborg and Nitze to President 1 p C - | 9/18/68 | A |
| 1f rpt | Amendment to Technical Annex... 3 pp C - | n.d. | A |
| 3 note | Rostow to the President, 7:15 p.m. <i>sanitized 8-22-97 NLJ 94-76</i> 1 p TS- <i>same designation 3/31/03 NLS/RAC 02-05</i> | 9/25/68 | A |
| 3a memo | Intelligence Memorandum <i>sanitized 10-21-97 NLJ 94-75</i> 3 PP ts- <i>same sanitized 3/13/03 NLS/RAC 02-06</i> | 9/24/68 | a |
| 3b map | Map 1 pp TS <i>same sanitized 3/13/03 NLS/RAC 02-06</i> | 9/68 | A |
| 12 note | Rostow to the President, 3:45 p.m. <i>sanitized 8-22-97 NLJ 94-76</i> 1 p TS- <i>open 4/1/03 NLS/RAC 02-7</i> | 9/25/68 | A |
| 12a rpt | Intelligence Report 1p TS - | 9/25/68 | A |
| <i>Sanitized 5-13-05 NLJ/RAC 02-8</i> 24 memo | Rostow to the President, 6:25 p.m. <i>sanitized 8-22-97 NLJ 94-76</i> 1 p TS- <i>open 4/1/03 NLS/RAC 02-7</i> | 9/24/68 | A |
| 24a memo | William Lemnitzer to Rostow <i>sanitized 8-22-97 NLJ 94-76</i> 2 pp TS- <i>open 4/1/03 NLS/RAC 02-7 + NLS 94-96</i> | 9/24/68 | A |
| <i>24b cable</i> <i>more info released 8-9-04 NLJ/RAC 02-8</i> | Intelligence Report 4 pp TS - <i>sanitized 94-89 10-4-04</i> | 9/23/68 | A |
| 38 cable | CAP 82482 <i>open 4/1/03 NLS/RAC 02-7</i> 2pp S <i>Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 8, 12/16/83</i> <i>Sanitized 5-19-96 NLJ 94-91 more released</i> | 9/24/68 | A |
| 61 cable | CAP 82449 <i>dup #41 NSE, LG, VA, Sam, Salko, Misc</i> 2 pp S- <i>sanitized 4/1/03 TDCS Box 134</i> <i>NLS/RAC 02-7</i> | 9/21/68 | A |
| 62 cable | CAP 82448 <i>dup #80 as above</i> 2pp S- <i>sanitized 4/1/03 NLS/RAC 02-7</i> | 9/21/68 | A |

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|------------------|--|---------|--------------|
| 69 cable | CAP 82428 open 3/13/03 N502-9 1p S- | 9/19/68 | A |
| 73 memo | Rostow to the President open 3/13/03 N502-9 1p S- | 9/20/68 | A |

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WWR

1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 25, 1968

1
2 *Pres file*

Mr. President:

In the attached letters, Glenn Seaborg and Paul Nitze, with the concurrence of Sec. Rusk, submit for your approval an Amendment to the 1958 US-UK atomic energy Agreement which will make possible the transfer of special nuclear material for use in the UK submarine program. The classified letter covers an Amendment to the classified Technical Annex to the Agreement which sets forth the maximum amounts of materials to be transferred.

You originally approved the negotiation of this Amendment in your letter to Senator Pastore (attached) dated May 17, 1968. The Amendment was initialed by US and UK representatives on September 6, 1968.

Subject to your approval, the Amendment will be formally signed by the US and the UK. It will then be submitted by you to Congress and will automatically become effective after it lies before Congress for sixty days unless objections are raised.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:

- 1. Two ltrs dtd 9/18 fm Seaborg/Nitze
- 2. Two ltrs to Seaborg and Clifford for signature
- 3. Cy ltr to Senator Pastore dtd 5/17

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

SMKeeny:jb:9-25-68/2:30pm
bcc: SMK file and chron
CEJ
WWR (2)
SMK comeback cy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-7
By *is* NARA, Date *2-3-03*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1a

September 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CHAIRMAN, U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

In your joint letters to me of September 18, 1968, you recommended that I approve a proposed Amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.

I note from your joint recommendations, the United Kingdom is participating with the United States in international arrangements pursuant to which it is making substantial and material contributions to our mutual defense and security. The proposed Amendment will permit cooperation which will further improve our mutual defense posture.

Having considered your joint recommendations and the cooperation provided for in the Amendment, I hereby:

- a. Approve the program for the transfer of materials, in the types and quantities and under the terms and conditions provided in the joint letters of September 18, 1968, to me from the Chairman, USAEC, and the Secretary of Defense and the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- b. Approve the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- c. Determine that the performance of the proposed Amendment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security; and
- d. Authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment for the Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of State.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-7
By iw, NARA, Date 2-3-03

Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ:AEC&DOD:SMKeamy:jb:9/20/68



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

2973
16
SEP 18 1968

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

There is hereby submitted for your consideration and approval a proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.

The proposed Amendment will extend, under the authority of Section 91c. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the provisions of the 1958 Agreement, as amended, which provide for the transfer of special nuclear material for research on, development of, production of, or use in utilization facilities for military applications. The proposed Amendment also provides that the transfer of specific other materials will be authorized for such applications. The maximum quantities of these specific materials to be transferred, or authorized for transfer, by the United States during the effective period of this Amendment (i.e., prior to December 31, 1979), are covered in a supplementary classified letter. These quantities can be made available for transfer during this period without adverse effect on our defense programs.

As is required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the United Kingdom is participating with the United States in an international arrangement pursuant to which the United Kingdom is making substantial and material contribution to the mutual defense and security.

This Amendment does not provide for an extension of the exchange of naval nuclear propulsion technology or equipment or for any transfer of materials and equipment for nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it does not affect any of the provisions of the Agreement which are not being amended and, accordingly, does not affect our ability to continue to cooperate in the weapons or intelligence areas under the existing provisions.

Mr. President

- 2 -

The cooperation authorized by the provisions of the Amendment would cover the period January 1, 1970 to December 30, 1979, inclusive.


It is recommended that you:

- a. Approve the program for the transfer of material as set forth herein and in the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- b. Approve the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- c. Determine that the proposed Amendment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security; and
- d. Authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment for the Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State concurs in the foregoing recommendation.

Respectfully yours,


Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
SEP 6 1968


Secretary of Defense

Enclosure:
Proposed Amendment to U. K.
Mutual Defense Agreement

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO U. K. MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on its own behalf and on behalf of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority;

Desiring to amend in certain respects the Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes signed at Washington on the third day of July, 1958, as amended;

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Subparagraph A.3 of Article III bis of the Agreement for Cooperation shall be deleted and subparagraph A.4 of Article III bis shall be renumbered as subparagraph 3 thereof.

Article 2

Paragraphs B and C of Article III bis of the Agreement for Cooperation shall be renumbered as Articles C and D thereof, respectively, and a new paragraph B shall be inserted to read as follows:

"B. The Government of the United States shall transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom special nuclear material, and authorize the transfer of other material, for research on, development of, production of, or use in utilization facilities for military applications, in such quantities, at such times prior to December 31, 1979, and on such terms and conditions as may be agreed."

Article 3

Article IX of the Agreement for Cooperation shall be amended as follows: The words "paragraph A or paragraph B of Article III bis" shall be deleted from subparagraph 1 of paragraph B and the words "paragraph A, paragraph B, or paragraph C of Article III bis" shall be substituted therefor.

Article 4

This Amendment, which shall be regarded as an integral part of the Agreement for Cooperation, shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of this Amendment.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Amendment.

1.d

PROPOSED MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AND CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
FROM THE PRESIDENT

In your joint letters to me of _____, you recommended that I approve a proposed Amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.

I note from your joint recommendations, the United Kingdom is participating with the United States in international arrangements pursuant to which it is making substantial and material contributions to our mutual defense and security. The proposed Amendment will permit cooperation which will further improve our mutual defense posture.

Having considered your joint recommendations and the cooperation provided for in the Amendment, I hereby:

- a. Approve the program for the transfer of materials in the types and quantities and under the terms and conditions provided in the joint letters of _____, to me from the Chairman, USAEC, and the Secretary of Defense and the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- b. Approve the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- c. Determine that the performance of the proposed Amendment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security; and

d. Authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment for the Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of State.

19
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 17, 1968

Dear John:

I am most pleased that you are able to resume your duties in the Senate. We have missed you.

I would like now to respond to your thoughtful letter on the UK fuel request for their nuclear submarine program. I have had my people take a careful look at the issues you raised. Their memorandum on the subject is enclosed.

Their conclusions seem to me to make a lot of sense. The British have been staunch and firm friends through many difficult moments; their support for our Vietnam policies has been a great source of strength to all of us. In light of this steadfast friendship, we should think long and hard before taking steps that could only injure this close relationship.

I have decided, therefore, to inform the British that we are prepared to work out appropriate arrangements for the supply of the requested fuel. Knowing your concerns on this matter, I deeply appreciate your willingness to support me in this decision.

In reaching this decision, I have taken into account the UK's withdrawal from many world-wide defense undertakings. While the UK defense cutback decisions are disappointing to us, I believe we should continue to cooperate with them in defense programs that are in our interests as well as theirs.

As you noted in your letter, we have not cooperated with the Italians or the Dutch in naval nuclear propulsion programs for which they requested our help. I believe, however, that they and our other Allies will understand that our providing fuel for UK submarines is a continuation of existing cooperation with the UK and does not involve new "favoritism." We would, of course, expect to review fully with the Joint Committee any change which we might contemplate in our posture towards cooperative programs in the field of naval nuclear propulsion.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 97-333(4506)

By jc/ics NARA, Date 10-17-01


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

I am aware of the recent British offer to supply-- under EURATOM safeguards -- a relatively small amount of low-enriched uranium to Italy for use in land-based experiments related to a nuclear propelled surface ship project. I understand the Italians will probably not accept this offer because the British informed them that they would not be able to supply fuel for the shipboard reactor as well as the experimental work. I believe that the British offer was not contrary to our interests and should not affect our willingness to provide fuel for the UK submarine fleet.

Perhaps you would like to talk with Dean Rusk or Nick Katzenbach about this further to get a more detailed picture of the considerations that led to my decision. I know that either of them would be happy to do so.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

The Honorable John O. Pastore
The United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Supply of Enriched Uranium Fuel
For the UK Submarine Program

Concern has been expressed about the proposed supply of enriched uranium to the British for their nuclear submarine program in the post-1970 period on the following grounds:

1. Such an arrangement might complicate our relationships with other countries which have requested, but have not received, US assistance for naval nuclear propulsion programs;

2. Purchase of submarine fuel from the US may enable the UK to compete more effectively with the US in the international nuclear power market;

3. Such an arrangement is unwarranted in view of UK trade with Red China, North Vietnam and Cuba.

These considerations are discussed in order.

1. Effect on US Relations with Other Countries

The United States has had a major influence on both the hunter-killer and Polaris submarine programs of the UK. We have provided both a complete reactor for the first UK nuclear hunter-killer submarine and continuing substantial technical assistance under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement. The 1962 Nassau Agreement resulted in the UK undertaking its Polaris submarine program. Under this Agreement, all of the UK Polaris submarines are to be committed to NATO. The UK is also assigning all of its nuclear hunter-killer submarines to NATO missions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PLJ 97-332 (*50c)

By JCLCB NARA, Date 10-17-01

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Up to now, the UK has provided fuel for all its nuclear submarines except the first one, using material produced at the Capenhurst gaseous diffusion plant. However, the top stages of that plant were shut down in 1964 at the time the US and USSR were also announcing cutbacks in the production of weapons materials. Additional highly enriched uranium suitable for submarine fuel could be produced at Capenhurst only after considerable expenditures by the UK. On the other hand, the US can supply the submarine reactor fuel needed by the UK without difficulty.

In light of this background, an unfavorable response to the UK would have the disadvantage of introducing an unnecessary abrasiveness into US/UK relations. Indeed, forcing the UK to resume production of highly enriched uranium at Capenhurst could be regarded as a distinctly unfriendly act in light of the UK's recent financial difficulties. In addition, renewed production by the UK of highly enriched unsafeguarded weapons-grade material might serve to emphasize the gap between the nuclear "haves" and the "have not" nations at a time when the US and UK are making a serious effort to achieve a Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Agreement by the US to sell nuclear submarine fuel to the UK would be unlikely to cause new feelings of discrimination on the part of other nations to which the US has not provided assistance in the field of naval nuclear propulsion. The long standing cooperation between the US and the UK in the nuclear field is well known to our other allies, and they would probably view the sale to the UK of nuclear submarine fuel as a natural extension of existing arrangements. All requests by other nations for assistance in naval nuclear propulsion would involve the initiation of new programs rather than continuation of an existing program as in the case of the UK.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. US/UK Competition in Sale of Power Reactors

Provision by the US of the amounts of submarine fuel the British have requested would allow them to release for their nuclear power program only about one-tenth of the amount of low-enriched fuel required for the initial loading of one medium-sized power reactor. This would not be of significance in the international market for nuclear power reactors.

In 1966 the US entered into agreements with the United Kingdom for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy under which up to 10,000 kilograms of U-235 will be supplied to the UK. Much of this material will be used in the British nuclear power program. These agreements could, of course, have the effect of releasing British enriched uranium for potential competition with the United States. This concern was raised during the hearings on the agreements held by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. However, the conclusion was reached that the sale of uranium to friendly nations at prices which fully cover the cost of production should not be withheld because of their ability to compete with the US in the international reactor field. In view of the US agreement to provide the United Kingdom with nuclear material for civil purposes, it would be difficult to justify, on the basis of possible competitive advantage, withholding material for use in an important UK defense program which contributes materially to the common defense and security.

3. UK Trade with Red China, North Vietnam and Cuba

The UK does not permit the export of strategic goods on the COCOM list to North Vietnam, Communist China or Cuba. Its exports to North Vietnam in 1966 amounted to only \$104,000 or less than one percent of the total

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

free world exports of \$12.5 million to that country. UK exports to Communist China and Cuba in 1966 were \$93.6 million and \$22.7 million respectively and accounted for 7 and 9 percent of these countries' imports from the free world. UK exports to these three countries during 1967 were: Communist China \$108.1 million; North Vietnam \$185,000; Cuba \$24.1 million. Although the US has discouraged British trade with North Vietnam, Cuba and Communist China, the UK government is not in a position to prevent private companies from engaging in non-strategic trade with these three countries.

A related matter of concern to the US is the use of British-flag cargo ships to carry goods to North Vietnam. During 1967, a total of 78 free world ships entered North Vietnamese ports. Of these, only one was a vessel registered in the United Kingdom itself. However, 66 Hong Kong-registered ships, which fly the British flag, entered North Vietnamese ports during 1967. These ships are engaged primarily in coastal shipments from Communist China to North Vietnam. They are manned almost entirely by Hong Kong Chinese crews, operate under time charters to Communist China or North Vietnam, and are believed to be under control of Communist Chinese interests.

The US has periodically discussed with the UK Government the possibility of dealing with the problem of Hong Kong registered ships trading with North Vietnam. The UK has great difficulty in taking effective action in view of the implications such action might have for Hong Kong.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 25, 1968

Dear George:

I accept your resignation of September 25 with a reluctance which will be understood by all who know the quality of your work in the Government.

I must, however, accept your judgment on an issue which you feel to be one of conscience.

I thank you again for your dedicated and distinguished contribution to the public service. I shall always recall warmly, George, the time you served with me.

Sincerely,

LBJ/Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable George W. Ball
The Representative of the United States
to the United Nations

LBJ:WWRostow:rla



2a
THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

September 25, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

For the compelling reasons that I have explained to you, I am today submitting my resignation as United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

In doing so, let me repeat what I am sure you already know: that over the years I have found deep gratification in serving twice under your wise leadership and that I hold, and will always hold, for you the highest respect and affection.

Most sincerely,


George W. Ball

The President

The White House

I have today submitted to President Johnson my resignation as United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

I have taken this step so that I may devote all my time and energy between now and November 5 to help assure the election of Hubert Humphrey and the defeat of Richard Nixon.

My decision has not been taken lightly. It stems from a solemn assessment of my obligations to my country, my family, and my own convictions. It reflects my firm belief that during the years immediately ahead our nation will face unparalleled dangers and opportunities in the larger world arena. To surmount those dangers and utilize those opportunities will require leadership with the most exacting qualities of mind and spirit. It is essential that the President of the United States be a man with settled principles and clear vision. It is not enough to have had some exposure to foreign affairs. Far more important, he must possess the perception and compassion that will enable him to feel and understand the epic forces now at work in a fast-changing world.

These are the qualities needed to guide our country toward a stable and lasting peace. It is because I am convinced that Hubert Humphrey has those qualities and Richard Nixon

lamentably lacks them that I am compelled by conscience to adopt my present course of action. I hope that other anxious men and women - realistically facing the full implications of the choice now confronting them - will also decide to work actively for Vice President Humphrey.

To avoid any misunderstanding of my motives and purposes, I wish to state flatly that after the November election I shall return promptly to private life. I have asked the Vice President not to consider me for any post in his Administration.

My decision takes full account of my present public duties. I could not give up my responsibilities at the United Nations if I thought that my resignation would in any way impair the effective representation of the United States in the Security Council or the General Assembly. There are, however, immediately available highly experienced individuals any one of whom could serve in this capacity with distinction for himself and honor for our country.

I have told President Johnson of my decision and the soul-searching logic that led me to make it. I have expressed to him my immense gratitude for his friendship, his confidence, and for the high privilege of serving twice under his wise leadership.

See file
3
/

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, Sept. 25, 1968
7:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the CIA assessment of Soviet military capabilities in Germany against both Bavaria and Berlin.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] attachment

3.4(b)(1)

(cy 1 of SC-07107/68 TS [redacted] "Current Disposition and Capabilities of Soviet Forces for Localized Offensive Actions Against Berlin or West Germany)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-05
By *ms*, NARA, Date **3-3-03**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
24 September 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Current Disposition and Capabilities of Soviet
Forces for Localized Offensive Actions
Against Berlin or West Germany

1. The redistribution of Soviet and East German forces which took place during the invasion of Czechoslovakia has resulted in an improved capability for localized offensive action against Bavaria. At the same time, however, the Soviet forces in East Germany have been reduced, and their current posture is probably poorer for offensive action against NATO than before the invasion. Although present Soviet and East German troop dispositions around Berlin are sizable, they are also considerably reduced from the levels present before the Czech invasion (see attached map).

Soviet Forces Adjacent to Bavaria

2. The invasion of Czechoslovakia resulted in the deployment of two additional Soviet armies near the Bavarian border, and the probable deployment of a third Soviet army in the East German-Czechoslovak border area. Including the army permanently deployed opposite Bavaria in East Germany, there are now at least three, and probably four, Soviet armies within 100 miles of Bavaria.

3. Considering that NATO has two corps in this area, with each corps roughly equivalent to a Soviet army, the Soviets probably would believe their superiority in the area adequate to ensure a localized victory. The current dispositions leave the Soviets weak in the 100-mile sector between the Helmstedt and Eisenach autobahns from which they withdrew forces to invade Czechoslovakia.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 02-6

By iw, NARA, Date 3-3-03

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)
SC-07107/68

4. Below is a list of the Soviet armies involved:

Permanently deployed on East German-Bavarian border

8th Guards Army

2 motorized rifle divisions
1 tank division

2 East German motorized rifle divisions

Relocated to Czechoslovakia from East Germany

1st Guards Tank Army

3 to 4 tank divisions
2 motorized rifle divisions

20th Guards Army

3 motorized rifle divisions

Moved to southern East Germany or north-western Czechoslovakia from western USSR

11th Guards Army

4 to 5 motorized rifle divisions

Soviet Forces in the Area of Berlin

5. The Soviets would consider the defense of the East German border area an essential aspect of any move against Berlin. The movement of the two armies from East Germany to Czechoslovakia has reduced Soviet forces facing West Germany. In addition, it has reduced the number of divisions around Berlin from seven to four--three Soviet and one East German.

6. In all, there are currently six Soviet and East German divisions located around Berlin and between Berlin and the West German border. Five of these are in the 3rd Shock Army which has three

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SC-07107/68

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

divisions in the vicinity of Berlin and two near the West German border. One East German division is in the western suburbs of Berlin.

7. It is likely that as the Czechoslovakian situation stabilizes the Soviets will restore forces in East Germany to their former strength. At the same time they probably will maintain a new force on the order of six divisions along the Czechoslovak-Bavarian border.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

316

Soviet And East German Ground Forces Deployment Against West Germany And Berlin

3.4(b)(1)

1 May 1968



Mid-September 1968



Possible Future Soviet Deployment



2124 Y-88 CIA

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

21

ACTION

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, September 25, 1968

7:10 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Secretary Rusk recommends that we recognize Equatorial Guinea -- a tiny Spanish territory on the west coast of Africa -- as soon as it becomes independent October 12th. Rusk also advises giving double credentials to our envoy in nearby Togo, Albert W. Sherer, as your Ambassador to the new country.

This is a routine recognition. Equatorial Guinea is poor and fairly quiet. It will be a ward of the Spanish in its economic and security needs for sometime to come. Accrediting our man in Togo (where he would remain resident) also to Equatorial Guinea is workable and saves money. We would plan to put a small junior staff in the country sometime next year to handle the little business we'll have. Joe Palmer assures me this arrangement will not be taken as a snub by the new country. We operate double coverage in two other similar situations in Africa.

I second Rusk's recommendations.

W. W. Rostow

Approve recognition _____

Approve double accreditation _____

Disapprove _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Call me _____

WWR:HS:RM:lw

Att: #2997

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *pc* NARA, Date 9-24-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 19, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recognition of Equatorial Guinea, Establishment
of Embassy and Accreditation of Ambassador

Recommendation:

I recommend that the United States recognize Equatorial Guinea upon its independence, establish an Embassy in Santa Isabel, and accredit also to Equatorial Guinea Ambassador Albert W. Sherer who is resident at Lome, Republic of Togo.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Spanish territory of Equatorial Guinea is to become independent on October 12, 1968. The new country's government will be elected in September and the Spanish Government will transfer power to it before independence.

Our primary objective will be to encourage the new country's close cooperation with Spain, whose assistance will continue to be required for the foreseeable future, in order to avoid political turmoil which could affect the entire region.

Although the new nation will probably have importance beyond its small size, I believe that US interests can adequately be served without a resident Ambassador. Day-to-day relations with the new country can be handled by a small resident staff to be established at the capital of Santa Isabel sometime next year. This arrangement will save residence construction and other expenses that the assignment of a resident Ambassador would entail and will correspond to our representation in

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 9-24-01

Mauritius and the Gambia, where we have resident Charges with Ambassadors, resident in the Malagasy Republic and Senegal respectively, who are dually accredited to these countries.

Our Ambassador to Togo has been suggested rather than an Ambassador to one of Equatorial Guinea's immediate neighbors since the latter have potential competing territorial claims on the new country.

Assuming that Ambassador Sherer is named to the US delegation to the independence day celebrations, we would like to seek agreement as soon as possible after the new Government is chosen so that he can present his credentials while at Santa Isabel at that time.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

ACTION 5

Wednesday, September 25, 1968

7:04 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Timing of your second meeting with Holyoake

Pres file

In order to firm up Holyoake's schedule we need to fix a firm time for your meeting with him on October 10, the second day of his visit to Washington.

I think 12:00 noon is the best time. It will permit State to go ahead with arrangements for a luncheon that day. It would leave time for Holyoake to appear before the White House press corps, should you wish to have him do so.

I recommend you approve 12:00 noon on October 10 for your second office meeting with Prime Minister Holyoake.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWright:wpt

4
ACTION

Pres file

Wednesday, September 25, 1968 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk has asked Joe Palmer to go out soon to Nigeria to take a fresh look at the rapidly-moving situation in the civil war, and to make sure the international relief effort is geared for what may be a long haul.

Once his Nigerian survey is done, Joe plans to take the chance to visit briefly the African countries he missed when the Nigerian crisis broke up his tour in June. His goal -- which you and the Secretary have urged -- is to have stumped at least once everywhere we have relations on the Continent.

For Joe's earlier trip you sent along Presidential mementos -- cuff links and autographed copies of No Retreat -- for each of the leaders he met. These gifts were warmly received and Palmer asks if you might approve the same for the leaders he'll see this time (list attached). He leaves this weekend.

This is not essential -- merely a matter of gesture.

W. W. Rostow

OK again, cuff links and No Retreat _____

No _____

Call me _____

HS:RM:WWRostow:tlm

6a
—

LIST OF COUNTRIES MR. PALMER WILL VISIT

| <u>NATION</u> | <u>LEADER</u> | <u>TITLE</u> |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Dahomey | Dr. Enile -Derlin Zinsou | President |
| Togo | Lt. Colonel Etienne Eyadema | President |
| Ghana | Joseph Arthur Ankrah | Chairman, National Liberation Council |
| Zambia | Kenneth Kaunda | President |
| Malawi | Hastings Banda | President |
| Swaziland | H. M. King Sobhusa II | |
| Botswana | Sir Seretse M. Khama | President |
| Lesotho | H. M. King Moshoeshoe II | |
| Lesotho | Leabua Jonathan | Prime Minister |

Presfile

7

Wednesday, Sept. 25, 1968
6:55 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Wheeler reports
General Abrams' clarification along much the
same lines as Ambassador Bunker's.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-17-92



~~SECRET~~

7a

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

25 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Bombing Cessation

1. As you requested in your telephone conversation with me this morning, I talked to General Abrams on the secure telephone regarding paragraph 10 of Ambassador Bunker's message, Saigon to State 38599. General Abrams stated, as I think the message reads, that his views were based upon the hypothesis that decision to suspend bombing might be taken on the basis of "assumptions." If such were the case, he believes that as between restraints in enemy operations in the DMZ and having the GVN take part in the negotiations from the outset, the latter is more important. He did not intend to convey a recommendation that we proceed on the basis of "assumptions" or that we abandon any one of the three basic elements essential to us for a bombing cessation.

2. I note that in Embassy Saigon to State 38741 Ambassador Bunker makes precisely the same points.

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30
By jc, NARA, Date 9-24-01

~~SECRET~~

8
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

Wednesday, September 25, 1968
5:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Cy Vance puts it hard
to the Russians on the GVN.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Paris 21378 (DELTO 770)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *9-24-01*



Department of State

Cy Taylor/Dinsburgh

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

80 7

OO RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 21378 2691815
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251750Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6215
STATE GRNC
BT

1968 SEP 25 PM 2:26 08268

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 21378

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 770

FROM VANCE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH OBEREMKO, SEPT. 25

REF: A. PARIS 21192 (DELTO 754)
B. PARIS 21344 (DELTO 767)

1. AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 25 VANCE MET AT SOVIET EMBASSY WITH MINISTER-COUNSELOR OBEREMKO, WHO IS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN ZORIN'S ABSENCE. NEGROPONTE WAS ALSO PRESENT, AND BOGOMOLOV ATTENDED ON THEIR SIDE.

2. VANCE TOLD OBEREMKO THAT SINCE THEIR LAST MEETING WE HAD SPOKEN AGAIN WITH THO AND THUY AT TODAY'S TEA BREAK. THE MEETING HAD BEEN TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY. WE HAD TOLD THE NRTH VIETNAMESE THAT THE SUBJECT OF WHICH PARTIES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD FOLLOW THE CESSATION OF BOMBING HAD BECOME A MAJOR ROADBLOCK TO PROGRESS. WE HAD TOLD THE DRV SIDE TODAY THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING. WE EMPHASIZED THE WORD "WOULD" RATHER THAN "COULD" SINCE, AT OUR LAST MEETING, THE DRV SIDE HAD COMMENTED ON OUR USE OF THE WORD "COULD" AS INDICATING UNCERTAINTY. WE TOLD DRV WE HAD TAKEN THEIR COMMENTS INTO ACCOUNT AND HAD CONSULTED WITH WASHINGTON AND COULD STATE THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE SUBJECT WOULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING. WE HAD SAID TO THE DRV THAT WE TRUSTED THAT WHAT WE HAD SAID TODAY WOULD CLEAR THE ROADBLOCK.

3. VANCE SAID THAT OUR DISCUSSION WITH THO AND THUY AT TODAY'S TEA BREAK HAD LASTED MORE THAN AN HOUR AND THAT THEY HAD BEEN TOTALLY INTRANSIGENT. WE HAD GOTTEN ABSOLUTELY NOWHERE. WE HAVE TRIED, FROM THE BEGINNING

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority RAC 10373

By *jc/ics* NARA, Date 9-24-01

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 21378, 251750Z SEP, (NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND WE HAD HOPED THAT WHAT WE SAID TODAY WOULD CLEAR THE ROADBLOCK, BUT THE DRV SIDE HAS NOT BUDGED ONE INCH. VAGUENESS OF LANGUAGE IS NOT A PROBLEM IN VIEW OF THE CHANGE THAT WE HAD MADE TODAY. WE WONDERED WHAT OBEREMKO COULD TELL US TODAY. VANCE ASKED WHETHER OBEREMKO HAD HEARD FROM HIS GOVERNMENT, AND HOW THEY VIEWED THE PROBLEM.

4. OBEREMKO SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED VANCE'S REMARKS OF SEPTEMBER 21 TO MOSCOW AND HAD NOT YET RECEIVED A REPLY. HE SAID HE PRESUMED THAT THE MATTER WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION AND EXPECTED TO HEAR SOME WORD IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS. VANCE SUGGESTED THAT OBEREMKO MIGHT ALSO WISH TO TRANSMIT OUR CHANGE FROM "COULD" TO "WOULD." OBEREMKO REPLIED, "YES, THIS IS A CLARIFICATION," AND THAT HE WOULD TRANSMIT IT WITHOUT DELAY. OBEREMKO SAID HE WOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY FURTHER COMMENT SINCE HE KNEW WHAT WE WANTED WAS AN ANSWER FROM MOSCOW. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE DRV REMAINS UNCHANGED, AND WE HAVE KNOWN IT FOR A LONG TIME, THAT IS, THAT THE US MUST UNCONDITIONALLY CEASE THE BOMBING AND ALL ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV, AND THEN THE DRV WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY QUESTION EITHER MIGHT WISH TO RAISE.

5. VANCE SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF GVN INCLUSION IS NOT ONE OF RECIPROCITY, BUT IS A QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION OF SERIOUS TALKS. THERE CANNOT BE SERIOUS TALKS IF GVN REPRESENTATIVES ARE NOT INCLUDED IN TALKS REGARDING THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE WILLING TO HAVE SEATED ON THE DRV SIDE THE NLF, THE ALLIANCE, OR ANY OTHER GROUP THEY MAY WISH. THE DRV'S UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT GVN REPRESENTATION RAISES GRAVE QUESTIONS AS TO THEIR SERIOUSNESS AND WHETHER THEY MERELY WANT TO STRING US ALONG. IT DOES NO GOOD FOR THEM TO CALL OUR PROPOSAL A DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY.

6. OBEREMKO REPLIED THAT IS WAS STILL A CONDITION. VANCE SAID THAT IT WAS A QUESTION OF DEFINING WHAT SERIOUS TALKS ARE. WE THINK THE WORLD WOULD BE SHOCKED IF THEY KNEW THAT THE DRV IS REFUSING TO INCLUDE THE GVN IN TALKS REGARDING THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. THIS MUST MEAN THAT HANOI WANTS TO DICTATE THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. VANCE SAID THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO WEIGH IN ON THIS SUBJECT.

7. OBEREMKO REPLIED THAT HE WOULD COMMUNICATE THE CLARIFICATION FROM "COULD" TO "WOULD" WHICH HE SAID WAS CLEAR TO HIM AND TO BOGOMOLOV. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE USELESS FOR HIM TO PREDICT WHAT THE REPLY FROM MOSCOW WOULD BE, BUT HE WOULD LET US KNOW WHEN HE GETS A REPLY.

HARRIMAN
BT

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

9

Wednesday, Sept. 25, 1968
4:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This extract from a captured notebook of a North Vietnamese soldier is, I believe, the first reference which might suggest that Hanoi is, in the end, willing to accept a central role with the GVN.

The source and form of the information is, of course, no more than suggestive.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

9a
—

September 25, 1968

SUBJECT: Third Offensive

Notebook, entries made between October 28 to November 20, 1967, and March 29 to September 9, 1968, by D2T (possibly Co 10) Nguyen Xuan Chan of an unspecified Div (possibly 2nd NVA Division), indicates that the US did not really want peace because they continued to attack NVN, particularly intensive attacks on Quang Binh Province. In conjunction with the Paris Peace talks, notes taken during a reorientation course on July 4, 1968, indicate that it is necessary to return to the Geneva Agreement and have the Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces, shake hands with the Puppet (Saigon) Government to drive the US troops out of the country. An entry, dated September 9, 1968, reveals that HI Regiment failed to accomplish its mission in the western area (NFI) and accomplished its mission in the southern area unsatisfactorily. His unit suffered heavy casualties. The document further discloses the following shortcomings which prevailed among the unit members: fear of fighting in mountainous areas and attacks on strongholds, dependence on firepower, lack of determination due to the Peace Talks, and fear of hardships and difficulties.

CDEC #09-2080-68, Bulletin 16,649 (military cable)

Wednesday, Sept. 25, 1968
3:50 p. m.

Pres file

10

MR. PRESIDENT:

Gene Black returns on Thursday,
September 26, arriving at Andrews
at 0210 in the morning. *that is, tomorrow.*

W. W. Rostow

11

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

Wednesday, September 25, 1968
3:45 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor sets down 4 alternatives worth considering in the first of the stalemate on the question of GVN participation.

You will note that his option d is similar to ploy B in the attached which I sent up to you yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 9-24-01

11a

September 25, 1968

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Status of the Paris Negotiations.

Reference: Paris Telegram 21344.

This latest tea break cable reads to me as if we have encountered an obstacle which is not likely to go away of itself and which calls for a new appraisal of our options. Among these worth considering are the following:

a. Continue to argue the point of GVN participation intermittently while accepting the fact that substantive negotiations are deadlocked more or less indefinitely.

b. Drop the GVN question and proceed to other Package II items such as the suspension of indiscriminate attacks on urban centers, the control of infiltration and the modalities of troop withdrawals, hoping to return to the GVN issue after some progress has been made on these other points.

c. Return the bombing in North Viet-Nam at least to the 20th parallel with or without prior warning to the other side.

d. Take a new diplomatic initiative hoping to shake up the stalemate in Paris. This might be a proposal to open a military conference in the DMZ for the purpose of developing a plan for a cease-fire or the announcement of a meeting of our troop contributing allies to discuss the stalemate with them.

Now would seem to be the time to review the pros and cons of options such as these and to decide what reorientation, if any, is necessary for our negotiation efforts. A capital question is whether a continued stalemate in Paris favors us or them.

M. D. T.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc NARA, Date 9-24-01

~~SECRET~~

people
12

Wednesday, Sept. 25, 1968
3:45 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

MR. PRESIDENT:

This Cambodian order chasing the VC out
is interesting if they have the capacity to make
it stick.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRBNE~~ attachment

(Dipsum 25 Sept 68)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-7
By cbmt, NARA, Date 3-17-03

12a

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

1. CAMBODIA-VIETNAM: Phnom Penh orders all Viet Cong chased from Cambodia

In a 24 September message, Cambodian Surface Defense Headquarters in Phnom Penh ordered province police commanders to take "all measures to chase the Viet Cong from our territory" and to report execution of the order. The message was also sent to all autonomous city police commanders and to all provincial governors. (2 [] R31-68) 3.4(b)(3), 6.1(c)

INR Comment: The above circular appears to reaffirm the Cambodian Government's standing instructions to police and army units to disarm all Viet Cong elements and to force them to leave Cambodian territory within 24 hours. In the past, compliance with these instructions has been uneven. From time to time some Cambodian units have skirmished with small Viet Cong elements, while other units aware of their weakness, appear either to have adopted a laissez faire attitude or to have colluded with Viet Cong commanders for profit. In recent months, however, there have been increasing indications of Viet Cong involvement in the Khmer Rouge activities along the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border and of Cambodian Army clashes with apparently joint Viet Cong-Khmer Rouge elements. The above instruction may therefore be part of the government's effort not only to cull the Viet Cong but to isolate them from the Khmer Rouge.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-8
By Sj NARA, Date 5-5-03

DIPSUM 25 Sept 68

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

13

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, September 25, 1968
3:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Ellsworth responds both to my back channel and to Sec. Rusk's telephone conversation.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 38741

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-17-92



Department of State

W J 13a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

2

00 RUEHC
DE RUNJIR 38741 2691640
ZNY SSSSS ZZK
O 251625Z SEP 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1394
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 38741

8 2 4 0 Q
Sept. 25, 1968
12:50PM

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

FOR SECRETARY AND ROSTOW

1. REGRET ANY MISUNDERSTANDING PURPORT OF MY MESSAGE.
2. IN TRYING TO ASSESS DIRECTION AND PURPORT OF PARIS TALKS AS WELL AS GEN. WHEELER'S INQUIRY SEPTEMBER 21 TO GENERAL ABRAMS OF EFFECT OF BOMBING CESSATION SHOULD DECISION BE TAKEN WITHIN TEN DAYS TO TWO WEEKS TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION I WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IF WE DECIDED TO MOVE ON BASIS OF "ASSUMPTIONS" THAT IN MY VIEW THE MOST BASIC AND ESSENTIAL ASSUMPTIONS WERE GVN PARTICIPATION AND OBSERVANCE OF THE DMZ AND OF THESE TWO I CONSIDER GVN PARTICIPATION FIRST. GEN. ABRAMS SHARES THIS VIEW.
3. I ALSO INTENDED TO MAKE PLAIN, IF I DID NOT, THAT WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE DRV THAT ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND INCREASED INFILTRATION WOULD ALSO ENDANGER THESE DISCUSSIONS. WHAT I INTENDED TO EMPHASIZE WAS THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE I PLACED ON THESE THREE POINTS. ALL IN MY VIEW ARE IMPORTANT.
4. CONTENTS OF MESSAGE BASED ON HYPOTHESIS THAT DECISION MIGHT BE TAKEN TO PROCEED ON BASIS OF "ASSUMPTIONS" AND IMPLIED DRV AGREEMENT; CERTAINLY NOT A RECOMMENDATION THAT WE DO SO. I AM GLAD TO KNOW FROM TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY THAT ALL THREE POINTS ARE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT.
BUNKER
BT

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority RAC 10372

By jc/ies NARA. Date 10-16-01

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Meeting With the President
Wednesday, September 25, 1968 - 1:00 pm

AGENDA

Pres file

1. United Nations. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford)

2. Paris Negotiations. (Sec. Rusk)

Where we stand.
Next steps.

3. Eastern Europe and Berlin. (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report. Sec. Rusk wishes to discuss tripartite Berlin statement, earlier raised with you. (Tab A)

4. Abrams' Backgrounder. (Sec. Clifford)

Bus and Clark believe reporting from Saigon is now so good -- and Gen. Abrams' standoffish posture so successful -- they recommend against a backgrounder.

5. Nuclear Release Authority. (Sec. Clifford)

Sec. Rusk, Sec. Clifford, and Gen. Wheeler have completed a review of this matter, designed to clear up ambiguities. I believe Sec. Clifford will wish to leave papers for your consideration.

6. Other.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-17-92

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, September 17, 1968 -- 10:05 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ~~Proposal for an Allied Declaration on Berlin~~ (*proposal for discussion*),

Attached for your approval is a draft Allied Declaration on Berlin. Its purpose is to affirm the legitimacy of Federal Republic activities in West Berlin. It makes the following points:

- ~~The Three Powers welcome FRG activities in West Berlin.~~
- ~~These activities are indispensable to the viability of West Berlin and harm no one.~~
- ~~The viability of West Berlin is important not only to the Three Powers but to the peace of the world.~~
- ~~The Three Powers, having full responsibility for order in the city, will not accept outside interference with these legitimate activities -- or with trade or the peaceful passage of Germans between Berlin and the Federal Republic.~~

Secretary Rusk has approved the Declaration.

The background is this:

- After the Soviets applied pressure on Berlin in June through the visa issue, Brandt proposed to Secretary Rusk in the NATO meeting that the allied powers work out a declaration of support for the FRG role in Berlin.
- During meetings in Bonn the FRG proposed a draft declaration of what the Allies would consider to be the legitimate activities of the Federal Republic in Berlin. (The attached statement is a revision of this German draft.)
- Recently, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin formally complained to Ambassador Lodge about the provocative nature of certain FRG meetings in Berlin. Ambassador Dobrynin made the same point orally to Secretary Rusk on September 1. In effect, the Russians charged that the Federal Republic was trying to build tension and cause trouble in Berlin.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo. 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *10-16-01*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Tab A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

An Allied Declaration could be used as an answer to the Soviet charges. Most important it can serve as preventive medicine against further attempts by the Russians and East Germans to chip away at Berlin. It would build up the confidence of the people of Berlin.

If you approve this draft, we will send it to Bonn to negotiate the language with the UK and France.

I concur in the recommendation.

W. A. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

TEXT OF DRAFT ALLIED DECLARATION ON BERLIN
(FRG TEXT AS AMENDED IN DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEPTEMBER 10, 1968)

Questions concerning the role of the Federal Republic of Germany in helping maintain the viability of Berlin having been raised recently, the Governments of France, the U.K., and the U.S. find it useful to make their own views clear. The Three Powers therefore issue the following declaration:

As a result of agreements reached among the Four Powers in connection with the termination of hostilities in 1945, Greater Berlin, as a part of Germany, is subject to the joint administration of the Four Powers pending a peace settlement. Until the establishment of a final governmental organization on German soil, territories on German soil--including in particular Berlin--remain a part of Germany and their status cannot be changed without the consent of all of the Powers concerned.

The Three Powers have over the years welcomed the development of close contacts between the three Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany as an important contribution to the viability of Berlin and to the Three Powers in meeting their responsibilities in the city. These contacts are also in accord with the will of the people of West Berlin.

Maintaining the viability of Berlin is of great significance not only to the U.S., U.K. and France but to the entire world. Its absence could lead to tensions threatening peace not only in Berlin or in Germany, but throughout the world.

The Federal Republic has conducted certain activities in Berlin which contribute to the viability of Berlin. These activities threaten no one. The Three Powers will accept no outside interference with these legitimate activities or with peaceful passage of Germans and commerce between Berlin and the Federal Republic. At the same time, the Three Powers will continue to exercise fully their control and authority in Berlin as provided for by valid international treaty and practice. The Three Powers expect the Soviet Union to respect all decisions taken pursuant to the Three Powers' authority in Berlin.

The Three Western Allies pursue their obligations in Berlin in the spirit of furthering international peace, order, and well-being. The Fed Rep's contribution to Berlin's viability is consistent with this spirit. The three Western Allies hope that the same dedication to these international goals will guide the Soviet authorities in formulating their policies with respect to Berlin.

Pres. file
15

~~SECRET~~/OHIO/PLUS

Wednesday, Sept. 25, 1968
11:50 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the end of the line in Oslo.

W W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/OHIO/PLUS attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 9-24-01

Sept. 25, 1968

15a

Copy of OSLO 6752

1. This morning (Wednesday, Sept. 25) Ridgway and I were given account by Algard and Vraalsen of their dinner conversation with North Vietnamese last night (Sept. 24).

2. Algard told us that he had made a "final effort" over brandy to pin the North Vietnamese down by summing up his understanding of the substance of their visit. Algard told the North Vietnamese that the Norwegians had listened to their presentations with great interest and that he was convinced that the North Vietnamese had a serious approach to the question of peace negotiations if bombing stopped and that if the bombing were stopped, the North Vietnamese would take no military advantage particularly in the area in and around the DMZ.

3. In reply, the North Vietnamese said that their approach was indeed serious. They also observed that North Vietnamese do not use the words "take advantage" in this context. Algard told us that he thinks the North Vietnamese were trying to convey the impression that they do not think in terms of taking advantage. Algard indicated to us that he considered it useless to pursue the matter since it appeared to him that the North Vietnamese were under instructions to go no further.

4. Summing up his conclusion on the North Vietnamese visit, Algard told us he regarded as most important the facts that North Vietnam had sent a delegation, including a man who came all the way from Hanoi to Oslo, under specific conditions as to secrecy and the role of the Government of Norway and that "they played the game." The North Vietnamese did not attempt to propagandize the public or to control the local Vietnam solidarity committee. Algard believes that while the North Vietnamese "didn't offer much directly in the way of assurances" the serious manner in which they conducted themselves was, in an "oriental way" intended to demonstrate that they could play an honest game and that they would be willing to play an honest game if the bombing were stopped. I said that I was very disappointed that the North Vietnamese delegation had been either unwilling or unable to give any substantive assurances, and Algard admitted that he had hoped for more from them.

5. We now have and are translating the Government of Norway notes of their Friday and Saturday meetings with the North Vietnamese.

TIBBETTS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-407
By ics, NARA Date 9-21-98

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16

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - September 25, 1968
10:15 a.m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Herewith a recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you receive the Argentine Ambassador for a farewell call.

I regard your seeing him as a purely marginal matter. There is no strong substantive reason for you to do this. Since he and his brother, recently dismissed as Argentine Army Chief, are at logger-heads with President Ongania, there is some risk of even a courtesy farewell call being misinterpreted in Argentina.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Memo to President from Secretary Rusk, September 20.

Approve —
Disapprove —
Call me —

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 9-24-01

cc - Jim Jones



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 20, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment by the
Ambassador of the Argentine Republic,
Alvaro C. Alsogaray

Recommendation:

That you receive Ambassador Alsogaray for a brief
farewell call.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The resignation of Ambassador Alvaro C. Alsogaray of
Argentina has been accepted by his government and he plans
to leave for Buenos Aires on September 30. He has requested
an appointment with you at any time through September 28 in
order to say goodbye.

Subsequent to the acceptance of Ambassador Alsogaray's
resignation, President Ongania dismissed his brother, Julio
Alsogaray, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. He also dis-
missed the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy and the Air
Force at the same time. Despite this circumstance, we do
not believe that your receiving Ambassador Alsogaray would
be taken amiss by the President or Foreign Minister of
Argentina.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 9-24-01

3006
16a
→

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Ambassador Alsogaray is one of the leading advocates in Latin America of sound monetary policies and of the free enterprise system. He also advocates a return of Argentina to democratic government, though not necessarily in the immediate future. It is likely that Alsogaray will continue to exercise influence in Argentine affairs, and it would therefore be appropriate for you to receive him for a brief farewell visit.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, Sept. 25, 1968
10:00 p.m.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a quick flash report over the classified telephone from Habib on today's meeting:

- elapsed time two hours and fifty minutes;
- public session "absolute nonsense -- nothing whatsoever of interest;"
- tea break, one hour and six minutes -- Habib was not in on the substantive discussion at the tea break, but Vance told him to report that the other side was "quite rigid;" there was "no progress;" there was "no agreement on a Friday meeting," but they indicated that if they got instructions, there might be a Friday meeting.

Habib also reported to John Walsh that Murray Marder is back in Washington, stating that he "knows the views of each member of the delegation." Neither Habib nor Vance saw Marder, but other members of the delegation did. Marder is sore because the State Department blew up his story that the lull was political. He may give us trouble.

Habib also reports that the Vietnamese in Paris are getting very jumpy suspecting private meetings (only Thieu is informed). Walsh observed that it's a miracle that we've held the private meetings secret thus far.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 9-24-01

INFORMATION

Wednesday, September 25, 1968
9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark Clifford's testimony,
Sept. 10, sent to you by Congressman
Mahon.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

rln

19

INFORMATION

SECRET

Wednesday, September 25, 1968
9:20 a. m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Here, from Gen. Wheeler, is the relevant extract on troops from his questioning by Congressman Lipscomb.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 11-17-92

~~SECRET~~

LDX

FROM: General Wheeler
TO : Mr Walt W. Rostow

Following extract of testimony before Mahan Subcommittee on 10 September 1968 is provided in response to your request.

The testimony is unclassified except for the comment on the HAWK battalions on page 76.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30
By jc, NARA, Date 10-16-01

PRESERVATION COPY

Mr. Mahon. That suits me if it suits the committee.

Mr. Lipscomb?

Mr. Lipscomb. Mr. Secretary, can you fill us in on the publicity being given to the Marine Division that is being brought home from Vietnam and how this affects our stature and so forth?

Secretary Clifford. At the time of the Tet emergency -- I think it was the 27th -- a Marine regimental landing team was sent to Vietnam. It was over some ^{5,000} [4,000] men. Out of that ^{5,000} [4,000], I think somewhere in the neighborhood of around 1200 have already come back. They have been rotated back; their time ran out and they were ill and wounded and killed and so forth.

Two thousand of them are to remain in Vietnam and there are approximately 800 that are returning at this time and they will be coming in on the West Coast maybe today, tomorrow or sometime.

Now, those are the facts. Have I answered your question?

Mr. Lipscomb. Is our force in South Vietnam remaining at the same level?

Secretary Clifford. Yes. This does not reduce our force in any way. This is part of the rotation process. They are being taken out -- brought back as others have been brought back. They are being replaced by other troops.

Mr. Lipscomb. What gives this particular movement so much publicity? I mean why?

Secretary Clifford. I had not been aware that it had gotten so much publicity. We have treated it on a rather routine basis.

General Wheeler. I think the answer would be that this is the first unit that has been withdrawn from Southeast Asia as a unit. ^{of} A flag coming back, even though it has been replaced by a brigade of the Fifth Mechanized Division.

Heretofore all of the people who have come back, Mr. Lipscomb, have returned as individuals and the units to which they belong have remained in-country.

Mr. Lipscomb. Are there any more planned major units being returned to the United States between now and the end of the year?

General Wheeler. No.

Mr. Lipscomb. Is this the only planned unit movement as such that might occur?

General Wheeler. Yes, that is correct except for *two HAWK battalions, one Army and one Marine that are expected to be deployed from South Vietnam in October of this year.* Secretary Clifford. I would say as of now. There could

be changes.

Mr. Lipscomb. How long had this particular movement been planned?

General Wheeler. I think it was *MARCH 1968* ~~May 31st~~ we made the decision to replace the Marine RLT with a brigade of the Fifth Mechanized Division.

Mr. Lipscomb. Upon what basis are the reports and announcements that there will be a substantial decrease in troops between either late this year or early next year? On what basis is this being made?

Secretary Clifford. Do you mean that we could then cut the number of American troops?

Mr. Lipscomb. Return men home, yes.

Secretary Clifford. I have never said that. It has never come out authoritatively from the Pentagon. We have no plan to reduce the number of troops in Vietnam at all. We had an authorized figure of 549,500. We will maintain that figure until there is some development that causes us to decide that we can bring some home.

I know of no statement that has come out of the Pentagon that says that we are prepared to bring any of those home.

I was asked the question some time ago. Will you predict that in 1969, Mr. Clifford, you will bring some groups of some troops home? I said "No, I cannot. I am unwilling to say there is any special or specific time we will bring any troops back."

Mr. Lipscomb. Such reports are not coming out of background briefings to the press or anything like this?

Secretary Clifford. They are certainly not coming out of the Pentagon.

Mr. Lipscomb. Pure speculation?

Secretary Clifford. Pure speculation. Except for one statement that I notice that President Thieu of Vietnam said when he made a speech and said that he could confidently predict that American troops, some of them, could come back in the year 1969. I remember, I was asked a question right after he said that. The question was: "Do you agree with President Thieu?" And I said, "No, I cannot predict the return of any troops in '69. I don't know. I would hope we can have them all back, but I can't predict it under present conditions."

Mr. Rhodes. What caused the decision to bring this particular flag back?

Secretary Clifford. The 27th RLT, Marines, and a brigade of the 82nd Airborne were sent out on an emergency basis during the Tet offensive at the request of General Westmoreland to augment his forces.

Now, the Marines have ^{''} problem. Their entire remaining base -- once the 27th RLT deployed from the West Coast -- was not sufficient to sustain the level of forces that they had in Vietnam. We knew that at that time. So we were looking forward to the time when this Marine element could come back to the United States, be replaced by an Army unit; in this case, a brigade of the Fifth Mechanized Division, so the Marines then would be able to train and rotate their people in accordance with plan.

Mr. Lipscomb. Mr. Secretary, you have expressed yourself very well on the anti-ballistic missile. Have we had any failures that have either been publicized or not publicized in the program that we can be confronted with when we go into debate on this? Is there anything new?

Secretary Clifford. On our ABM Sentinel?

Mr. Lipscomb. Yes.

Secretary Clifford. Not that I know of.

Mr. Lipscomb. Research and Development and Planned Procurement -- I mean the thing is ^{going} ~~flowing~~ all right?

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, September 25, 1968
9:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read Tommy Thompson's assessment of the Soviet dilemma over Czechoslovakia and his judgment on the use of force against Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Austria.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 5648

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 9-24-01



Department of State

5 20a
TELEGRAM

MOS438
RR RUEHC
DE RUEHCR 5648FD 2681640
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R 241530Z SEP 68
FM ANEMBASSY MOSCOW
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~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 5648

079230

1968 SEP 24 PM 5 03

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

REF: STATE 243112

1. I HAD ARRANGED TAKE AIR FORCE PLANE FROM WIESBADEN ON MY WAY BACK FROM GA OCTOBER 16 IN ORDER TO BRING IN 8,000 POUNDS SENSITIVE MILITARY EQUIPMENT. I PROPOSE LET PLANE COME IN AS SCHEDULED AND WILL FLY TO WIESBADEN OCTOBER 18 OSTENSIBLY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT RETURNING IN LESS THAN A WEEK COMMERCIALY. I WILL IN FACT HAVE DEFERRED PHYSICAL EXAM WHILE THERE. IF YOU HAVE NO OBJECTION, REQUEST PROMPT TRAVEL ORDERS IN ORDER GIVE FOREIGN OFFICE REQUIRED NOTIFICATION.
2. I SEE NO REASON CHANGE PREVIOUS ESTIMATE THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT USE FORCE AGAINST ROMANIA OR YUGOSLAVIA, MUCH LESS AUSTRIA AT THIS TIME. THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE ECONOMIC AND OTHER PRESSURES SUCH AS THE RUMORS REFERRED TO. I AM HOWEVER CONCERNED THAT SOVIETS MAY FEEL OBLIGED TO GO FURTHER IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA EVEN TO ESTABLISHMENT OF QUISLING GOVERNMENT AND TERRORIST ACTIONS. IF THIS HAPPENS AND BRINGS RECURRENCE OF ALL-OUT COLD WAR AND ISOLATION OF COMMUNIST BLOC, SOVIETS MIGHT WELL CONCLUDE THEY COULD NOT TOLERATE INDEPENDENT ROMANIA BEHIND REINFORCED IRON CURTAIN AND EITHER EXCLUDE HER OR BRING HER INTO LINE BY FORCE IF EXAMPLE OF HARSH ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA DID NOT DO THE TRICK. EVEN IN SUCH CASE, I BELIEVE YUGOSLAVIA WOULD BE SAFE UNLESS SHE INTERVENED ON BEHALF OF ROMANIANS.
3. COST OF SUCH SOVIET POLICY WOULD BE EXTREMELY HIGH AND COULD LEAD TO COMPLETE BREAK WITH MOST OF THE NON-RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES. THERE IS REAL QUESTION WHETHER SOVIET LEADERSHIP CAN MAINTAIN ITS UNITY IN CARRYING OUT SUCH A POLICY. THEREFORE THE CURRENT SOVIET DILEMMA OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA MUST BE PAINFUL INDEED.
GP-1. THOMPSON
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 9-24-01

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pass file

Wednesday, September 25, 1968 -- 9:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a quick flash report on the four questions you raised with me in relation to Laird's statement.

1. Gen. Wheeler, in his testimony, stated that no troop reductions were planned. The text of his statement will be sent to you immediately upon its arrival here.

2. There is no planning of troop reductions going on in the Joint Staff except planning for T-day (termination of hostilities).

3. No instructions have gone to MACV from the Pentagon concerning the planning of troop reductions except with respect to T-day planning.

4. MACV is studying the possibility of troop reductions in two categories: combat support and service support. Such studies on the possibilities of economizing manpower are automatic, routine, and continuing in any such field command. They take place at the present time against the background of a virtual completion of the build up of military bases and support facilities, on the one hand, and the enlargement of the ARVN, on the other.

W. W. Rostow

cc. George Christian

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-248
By ijp, NARA, Date 8-18-95

WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Wednesday - September 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bill Bowdler's Successor

Pres file

Covey Oliver has recommended Samuel W. Lewis to replace Bill Bowdler as my Latin American adviser. Bill concurs in the choice.

Sam is one of the brightest young Foreign Service Officers in the Latin American circuit. He is a 38-year old Texan, educated at Yale (BA-'52), Johns Hopkins (MA-'54) and Princeton (advanced economic studies-'63). He has worked for Bill Gaud in his program office and knows the Washington end of aid business well. He served two years in Brasil, so he also has the field perspective. For the past two years, he has been deputy director of the Brazilian office at State where he has dealt with Brazilian political, economic and military relations with us and the Latin American states. Lately, Covey has been grooming him for wider responsibilities.

Subject to your approval, I plan to bring Sam on board on Monday, September 30. Bill will be staying here as long as necessary to document the Dominican, Panama and Guantanamo crises and the OAS Summit. Bill will be devoting full time to this research, but will be available to help Sam pick up the reins.

W. W. Rostow

Approve —
Disapprove —
Call me —.

ACTION

Tuesday, September 24, 1968 - 4:10pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a birthday message from you to Federal President Frans Jonas of Austria. He will be sixty-nine on October 4. He sends you birthday greetings each year. A message to him this year would be particularly appreciated because of Austria's nervousness over Czechoslovakia.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Disapprove

Approve

Call me

ERF
ERF:mst

23C

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JONAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

Mrs. Johnson and I join all Americans in sending you our congratulations on your birthday and our best wishes for a happy and healthy future for yourself and for the continued well-being of the Austrian people.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Sept. 24, 1968
6:25 p. m.~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have had the attached material pulled together on the military situation in Europe.

The eleven Czech divisions must now, at least temporarily, be ruled out of the Warsaw Pact order of battle; but the additional Soviet forces brought forward and their present dispositions are a cause for attention and anxiety but not, at the moment, alarm.

Some of the evidence indicated in para.2 is, as you will note, fragmentary and tenuous. It is nonetheless suggestive of positionings we must follow closely.

Probably the best assessment is this:

- Soviet diplomacy and military movements inside East Germany are designed to keep NATO anxious and on the defensive. A general assault on the NATO area or Berlin remains the least likely contingency;
- the positioning around Rumania, the Soviet forces now in Hungary, the forward positioning of Hungarian divisions on the Yugoslav frontier, and the possible westward movement of a Bulgarian division, all justify considerable concern about the Soviet intentions with respect to Rumania and Yugoslavia.

There is still about a month of good weather in that part of Europe.

You may wish to have Bus Wheeler present an assessment of this matter in the course of tomorrow's NSC meeting.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET-TRINE~~ attachment

24a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET - TRINE~~

24 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Situation in Europe

1. The attached SSO Heidelberg message (Inclosure 1) appears to be the best summary estimate of the on-going situation in Eastern Europe. In essence, the Soviets and other Warsaw Pact nations (less Czechoslovakia and Rumania) have deployed, and are continuing to deploy, in such a manner as to facilitate air and ground operations against West Berlin, FRG, Austria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia/Albania (Inclosure 2).

2. Additional fragmentary evidence, some of which is very tenuous, includes the following:

a. Field deployment of Soviet units on the east Rumanian border, accompanied by sizeable quantities of bridging and amphibious equipment.

b. Possible buildup of Soviet divisions in Hungary from four (pre-Czech) to seven/eight as of 23 September 1968.

c. Opening of a major reserve airfield in Hungary which could support operations against either Rumania or Yugoslavia.

d. Movement of one Bulgarian division to the Yugoslav border.

e. Possible airlift of cargo (not troops) from Transcaucasus MD to Odessa area.

f. Buildup of 3 Soviet tank divisions in West-Central USSR (Byelorussian MD).

g. Small elements of perhaps five new Soviet divisions deployed west of Berlin near the FRG/GDR border, plus other small elements elsewhere in GDR.

~~TOP SECRET - TRINE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-7 + NLS 94-76
By dm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

~~TOP SECRET -- T R I N E~~

3. On the other hand, there is no evidence of certain other indicators which might be expected under the circumstances, such as:

a. Major shifts of tactical air forces to achieve a show of force against any country; however, the current deployments are probably adequate to support any ground moves contemplated and could be very quickly improved at the last moment prior to attack.

b. Naval or amphibious force preparations in the Black Sea area to support operations against Rumania or to introduce sizeable Soviet ground forces into Bulgaria are not evident; however, assault operations could probably be mounted by a brigade of Soviet naval infantry against the Rumanian beaches with very little warning.

c. There is no evidence of unusual alert in Soviet strategic forces; however, such evidence was not recognized during the Czech crisis until several days after the intervention by ground forces.

4. NATO forces are still generally deployed at home station under normal alert. Their strengths and dispositions in the western European area are shown in Inclosure 3.


WILLIAM L. LEMNITZER

3 Incls

~~TOP SECRET -- T R I N E~~

2

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-7
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-17-01

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 02-8

By , NARA, Date 4-30-04

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CINCUSMAVEUR LONDON ENG

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3.3(b)(3)

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

SECTION ONE OF TWIC
FROM USAREUR, CISC
SUBJECT: USAREUR WEEKLY WATCH REPORT NR 36/68.
23 SEPTEMBER 1968.

B

PART I - MILITARY SITUATION
1. RECENT EVENTS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY CHANGED THE THREAT TO NATO AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE. THIS CHANGE HAS INVOLVED THE REPOSITIONING OF A NUMBER OF DIVISIONS, THE TEMPORARY NEUTRALIZATION OF THE ELEVEN CZECH ARMY DIVISION, A LOGISTICAL BUILD-UP IN THE FORWARD AREA, THE CALL-UP OF SOME RESERVES IN PROBABLY EVERY EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY AND THE USSR AND A GENERAL INCREASE IN THE ALERT/READINESS STATUS OF COMMUNIST (LESS CZECH) MILITARY UNITS.

J D FLINT
LT USA
OPS OFF

2. ELEMENTS FROM AT LEAST THE CARPATHIAN MD, BELO-REUSSIAN MD AND BALTIC MD HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE FORWARD AREA AND REPORTS AS LATE AS 22 SEP INDICATE A CONTINUED WESTWARD MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT. REPORTS WHICH COULD REPRESENT TWO TO THREE DIVISIONS FROM THE USSR PLUS POLISH UNITS IN EAST GERMANY IN THE AREAS OF JUETERBOG, LETZINGER HEIDE, WITTSTOCK/TEMPLIN AND EAST OF BERLIN HAVE BEEN RECEIVED. IN ADDITION, ELEMENTS OF THE BULGARIAN 17TH MRD, KHASKOVO, HAVE REPORTEDLY RECENTLY MOVED TO THE YUGOSLAV BORDER, AND THE SOUTHERN GROUP OF FORCES 35TH GMRD, KECSKEMET, HAS RETURNED TO HUNGARY FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA, PLACING THIS DIVISION WITHIN 100 KM OF BOTH RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA. OTHER RECENT MOVES INCLUDE THE ACTIVATION OF A NEW RADAR SITE (PROBABLY EARLY WARNING) NEAR GERA, EAST GERMANY; INTRODUCTION OF A NEW RADAR (POSSIBLY AN ACQUISITION RADAR FOR A NEW SAM SYSTEM) AT PRITZWALK, EAST GERMANY; ACTIVATION OF AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS NEAR HASSLEBEN, EAST GERMANY (P84165) AND MEZOKOVESD, HUNGARY (DT6296); DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE GSFG 18TH GRD OUT OF GARRISON WITH NO INDICATIONS AS YET OF EXERCISE ACTIVITY; THE POSSIBLE INTERGRATION OF EAST GERMAN VPO UNITS INTO THE EAST GERMAN ARMY (EGA); AND RECENT VPO/EGA MOVEMENT ACTIVITY (POSSIBLE EXERCISE ASSOCIATED) SOUTH OF BERLIN.

3. TO DATE, THERE HAVE BEEN NO CONFIRMED REPORTS OF

MAJOR SOVIET UNITS RETURNING TO THE USSR. THE ONLY DIVISION KNOWN TO HAVE LEFT THE CSSR IS THE 35TH GMRD WHICH RETURNED TO HUNGARY. BY COMPARISON, THERE HAVE BEEN CONTINUED REPORTS THAT WESTWARD MOVEMENT CONTINUES FROM AT LEAST THE BALTIC, BELORUSSIAN, AND CARPATHIAN MDS. SOME OF THIS MOVEMENT OBVIOUSLY HAS BEEN RESUPPLY OF THOSE UNITS DEPLOYED TO THE FORWARD AREA, BUT THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS - SUCH AS THE SIGHTINGS OF TANKS, ARTILLERY PIECES, AND COMBAT ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT - WHICH POINT TO A CONTINUED BUILD-UP IN THE FORWARD AREA, ESPECIALLY IN EAST GERMANY. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LONGER SOVIET FORCES NOT ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED TO THE FORWARD AREA CONTINUE TO BE LOCATED THERE, THE LONGER THE THREAT TO NATO EXISTS AND THE STRONGER IT BECOMES. SOME OF THE FACTORS WHICH INDICATE OR FAVOR WARSAW PACT OFFENSIVE ACTION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. NO MAJOR UNITS HAVE RETURNED TO THE USSR.
- B. WARSAW PACT FORCES CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN MORE THAN AMPLE TO NEUTRALIZE CZECHOSLOVAKIA REMAIN THEREIN.
- C. DESPITE SOME REPORTS OF LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS, SSUPPLIES HAVE CONTINUED TO FLOW AND SERVE THOSE DEPLOYED UNITS IN QUANTITIES APPARENTLY CONSISTENT FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS.
- D. THE CALL-UP OF RESERVISTS APPARENTLY CONTINUES WITH ONLY LIMITED INDICATIONS OF RELEASING THOSE ALREADY CALLED UP.
- E. THE IMBALANCE OF FORCES OPPOSING CENTAGE CONTINUES, AND NEW DIVISIONS ARE BEING RELOCATED IN CENTRAL EAST GERMANY, INDICATING AT LEAST A RESTORATION OF THE PRE-MAY CAPABILITY AGAINST NORTHAG AND BERLIN WITHOUT DIMINISHING THE CENTAGE THREAT.
- F. THE CONTINUATION OF GOOD OPERATIONS WEATHER FOR AT LEAST ONE MORE MONTH.
- G. THE LACK OF NATO REACTION TO THE CZECH INVASION.
- H. THE NATO REDUCTION OF FORCES TREND.
- I. THE PREOCCUPATION BY THE UNITED STATES WITH VIET NAM WITH NO SIGN OF PROGRESS FROM THE PARIS TALKS.
- J. THE DISUNITY OF THE US AND THE FREE WORLD OPINIONS OVER MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN VIET NAM.
- K. THE EASE OF THE CZECH OCCUPATION DUE PARTLY TO DUBCEK'S URGING COMPLIANCE WITH THE SOVIETS

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B. J. Flint

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SECTION FINAL OF TWO

L. THE PREPONDERANCE OF ARMOR IN WARSAW PACT DEPLOYMENTS ADJACENT TO FRG-CZECH BORDER IS CONSISTENT WITH SOVIET OFFENSIVE DOCTRINE.

M. RECENT MILITARY MOVEMENTS ARE TOWARD BERLIN, WEST GERMANY, RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA, RATHER THAN IN THE OTHER DIRECTION.

4. DESPITE THE INCREASE OF FORCES IN BOTH EAST GERMANY AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THERE IS NO CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT WARSAW PACT FORCES ARE PREPARING FOR AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF INDICATORS CAN NOT BE DENIED. SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS INTO THE FORWARD AREA NOW REPRESENT THE HEAVIEST INVESTMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCE OUTSIDE THE USSR SINCE WORLD WAR II. IN SPITE OF WHAT MUST BE AN OBVIOUS FACT THAT NATO INTENDS NO REACTION TO THE CZECH INVASION, THIS DEPLOYMENT CONTINUES. EXTENSIVE RESERVIST CALL-UPS, MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN TRANSPORT AND RESUPPLY OF SOME 30 SOVIET DIVISIONS WHICH ARE FAR FROM HOME STATIONS MUST ADD UP TO A SEVERE DRAIN ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND BUDGET. THIS HUGE AND COSTLY INVESTMENT IS IN PLACE TO BE FURTHER EXPLOITED WHILE THE OPPORTUNITY EXISTS. THEREFORE, THE LONGER THE PRESENT BUILD-UP REMAINS IN PLACE, THE MORE THE PROBABILITY INCREASES THAT FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTION WILL TAKE PLACE. THIS ACTION COULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST LIMITED OBJECTIVES SUCH AS ONE OR ALL OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES (RUMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA), AUSTRIA OR WEST BERLIN. THE CAPABILITY HAS ALSO INCREASED TO CONDUCT AN OFFENSIVE (OR OFFENSIVES) INTO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

J D FLINT
SET UP
OPS OFF

PART II - POLITICAL SITUATION

5. THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE PRESENTLY SURROUNDING THE BERLIN AND WEST GERMAN QUESTIONS CONTINUES TO BE TENSE, LARGELY BECAUSE OF MOSCOW'S PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER

THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS CAMPAIGN IS TO DEFLECT ATTENTION AWAY FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND OTHER PARTS OF EASTERN EUROPE OR TO PREPARE A JUSTIFICATION FOR AGGRESSIVE ACTION AGAINST BERLIN AND/OR WEST GERMANY. IT IS ALSO UNCLEAR HOW FAR SUCH AGGRESSIVE ACTION MIGHT GO, IF UNDERTAKEN. THE WEST GERMANY PARLIAMENTARY MEETINGS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN WEST BERLIN FROM 28 OCTOBER TO 1 NOVEMBER AND THE CDU PARTY CONGRESS TO TAKE PLACE THERE DURING THE PERIOD 4-8 NOVEMBER CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRIGGER A SOVIET/EAST GERMANY REACTION. IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SOVIET PROPAGANDA LINE, THIS REACTION WILL PROBABLY BE MORE VIGOROUS THAN THOSE REPORTED EARLIER THIS YEAR AND LAST YEAR. FURTHER, THE IRRATIONAL SOVIET ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA PROVIDES A PRECEDENT FOR EVEN MORE SERIOUS ACTION AGAINST BERLIN OR WEST GERMANY.

6. HOWEVER, FROM THE POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC POINTS OF VIEW, RUMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA MUST HAVE GREATER IMPORTANCE FOR SOVIET PLANNERS THAN BERLIN AND WEST GERMANY.

THE INDEPENDENT ACTIONS OF THESE ONCE-LOYAL MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET BLOC ARE OF THE SAME SORT WHICH APPEARED TO PROVOKE SOVIET MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE USSR. BOTH OF THESE BALKAN COUNTRIES ARE SEEKING INCREASINGLY TO DRAW ON WESTERN INDUSTRIAL ASSISTANCE AND TRADE, THEREBY REDUCING THEIR ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON MOSCOW; AND YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY IS IN SOME RESPECTS EVEN MORE HERETICAL THAN THAT OF THE CZECHS. FINALLY, YUGOSLAVIA AND RUMANIA COULD BE OCCUPIED MILITARILY WITH FAR LESS RISK OF A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST THAN SUCH AN ACTION AGAINST BERLIN OR WEST GERMANY WOULD ENTAIL. FOR THESE REASONS, AN INTERVENTION IN THE TWO BALKAN COUNTRIES (AND PROBABLY ALBANIA AS WELL) IS THE MORE PLAUSIBLE SUBJECT OF CURRENT SOVIET PLANNING. IF THIS IS THE CASE, SEVERE HARASSMENT OF BERLIN COULD SERVE AS A SCREENING ACTION UNTIL THE OCCUPATION OF THE BALKANS IS COMPLETED

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~~TOP SECRET~~

24c

Net Changes in Force Posture in Eastern Europe

Division Forces

| Country | Pre-Czech | Current | Net Change | Remarks |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| GDR | 20 SU 6 EG | 12-17 SU 6 EG | -8 to -3 SU -- | Reports of new divisions tenuous |
| Poland | 2 SU 15 POL | 2 SU 11 POL | -- -4 POL | |
| Czechoslovakia | 11 CZ | 20-24 SU 4 POL 11 CZ | +20 to +24 SU +4 POL -- | |
| Hungary | 4 SU 6 HUN | 1-8 SU 6 HUN | -3 to +4 SU -- | |
| Rumania | 9 RU | 9+ RU | + ? | Two militia units added; units mostly in garrison. |
| Yugoslavia | 13 YU | 13 YU | + ? | Some mobilization and deployment toward north and east borders. |
| Bulgaria | 12 BU | 12 BU | -- | Some movement toward Yugoslavia. |
| USSR (Western Military Districts) | 38 SU | 27-32 SU | -11 to -6 SU | Considerable mobilization evident. |
| TOTAL SU Divisions | 64 SU | | -2 to +19 SU | Decrease not likely; evidence supports five new divisions in USSR. |

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-11
By Sj, NARA, Date 5-7-02

NATO ACTIVE DIVISIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|
| 1st NL Mech Div | Schaarsbergen |
| 4th NL Mech Div | Harderwijk |
| 1st UK Armd Div | Verden |
| 2nd UK Mech Div | Lubbecke |
| 4th UK Mech Div | Herford |
| 8th US Mech Div | Bad Kreuznach |
| 3rd US Mech Div | Wurzburg |
| 3rd US Armd Div | Frankfurt |
| 4th US Armd Div | Goeppingen |
| 1st BE Mech Div | Bensberg |
| 16th BE Mech Div | Neheim |
| 4th Can Bde Gp (Mech) | Soest |
| 1st GE Mech Div | Hannover |
| 2nd GE Mech Div | Marburg |
| 4th GE Mech Div | Regensburg |
| 1st GE Abn Div | Bruchsaal |
| 3rd GE Armd Div | Buxtehude |
| 5th GE Armd Div | Wetzlar |
| 6th GE Mech Div | Neumunster (AFNORTH unit) |
| 1st GE Mtn Div | Garmisch |
| 11th GE Mech Div | Oldenburg |
| 7th GE Mech Div | Unna |

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5By CTS NWJ 02-11
NARA, Date 5/23/19

~~SECRET~~

| <u>UNIT</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|-----------------------|---|
| 10th GE Mech Div | Sigmaringen |
| 12th GE Armd Div | Tauberbischofsheim |
| 2nd US Armd Cav Regt | Nurnberg |
| 14th US Armd Cav Regt | Fulda |
| 3rd US Armd Cav Regt | Baumholder |
| <u>SUBTOTALS</u> | |
| Netherlands | 2 Mech Div |
| United Kingdom | 1 Armd Div, 2 Mech Div |
| United States | 2 Armd Div, 2 Mech Div, 2 Armd Cav Regt |
| Belgium | 2 Mech Div |
| Canada | 1 Mech Bde |
| West Germany | 3 Armd Div, 7 Mech Div, 1 Abn Div, 1 Mtn Div |


NATO TOTALS - 6 Armd Div, 15 Mech Div, 1 Abn Div, 1 Mtn Div,
1 Mech Bde, 2 Armd Cav Regt.

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
NORTH SEA

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CENTRAL REGION
ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE



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SOURCE FREE WORLD AOB
VOL 1
W. EUR AND CANADA
1 NOV 67
(ON HAND ACFT)
(Modified to reflect CRESTED CAP redeployments)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 02-11
By CTS NARA, Date 2/28/15

AIR ORDER OF BATTLES

BELGIUM

| <u>F 104G</u> | <u>F 84F</u> | <u>RF 84F</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|---------------|--------------|---------------|-------------------|
| | | 18 | Bierset, BE |
| | 53 | | Florennes, BE |
| 39 | | | Kleine Brogel, BE |
| 37 | — | — | Beauvechain, BE |
| 76 | 53 | 18 | |

CANADA

| <u>CF 104</u> | | |
|-------------------|--|----------------------|
| 36 (Recon/Attack) | | Lahr, Germany |
| 44 | | Zweibrucken, Germany |
| 40 | | Sollingen, Germany |
| 120 | | |

FRG

| <u>F 104G</u> | <u>RF 104</u> | <u>G 91</u> | <u>G 91(R)</u> | |
|---------------|---------------|-------------|----------------|--------------------------|
| 42 | | | | Lechfeld, Germany |
| 30 | | | | Memingen, Germany |
| 37 | | | | Neuberg, Germany |
| 40 | | | | Buchel, Germany |
| | | 17 | 17 | Pferdsfeld, Germany |
| | | 23 | 24 | Leipheim/Donau, Germany |
| | 38 | | | Ingulstadt-Manching, Ger |
| 40 | | | | Norvenich, Germany |
| 34 | | | | Hopstein, Germany |
| | | 15 | 15 | Oldenburg, Germany |
| 42 (Intcp) | | | | Wittmunhafen, Germany |
| | | 23 | 24 | Husum, Germany |
| | 35 | | | Leck, Germany |
| 30 (Navy) | | | | Schleswig, Germany |
| 15 (Navy) | 15 | — | — | Eggebek, Germany |
| 310 | 88 | 84 | 86 | |

~~SECRET~~

NETHERLANDS

2/13

| <u>F 104 G</u> | <u>F 84F</u> | <u>RF 104 G</u> | <u>LOCATION</u> |
|----------------|--------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 39 (Intcp) | | | Lecwarden, NE |
| | | 25 | Twenthe, NE |
| 41 | | | Volkel, NE |
| — | <u>62</u> | — | Eindhoven, NE |
| 80 | 62 | 25 | |

UK

| <u>HUNTER</u> | <u>CANBERRA</u> | <u>LIGHTNING</u> | |
|----------------|---------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| 20 (FTR/Recon) | | 13 | Gutersloh, Ger |
| | 13 | 13 | Geilenkirchen, Ger |
| | 21 (9 Recon) | | Wildenrath, Ger |
| | 23 (10 Recon) | | Laarbruch, Ger |
| — | <u>21</u> (8 Recon) | — | Bruggen, Ger |
| 20 | 78 | 26 | |

US

| <u>F 4D</u> | <u>RF 4D</u> | <u>F 102</u> | |
|---------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------|
| 72 | | 20 | Bitburg, Ger |
| 48 | | 20 | Hahn, Ger |
| | 16 | 27 | Ranstein, Ger |
| — | — | <u>19</u> | Soesterberg, NE |
| 120 | 16 | 86 | |
| 1 MSL Sq MACE | 16 (MSLS) | | Bitburg, Ger |

SOURCE

- DIA: Free World Air Order of Battle Vol I, Western Europe and Canada 1 Nov 67 (on hand ACFT)
- EUCOM: Location of Major Forces 6 Mar 68; Modified to reflect CRESTED CAP redeployments.

Pres file
25

Tuesday, Sept. 24, 1968
5:25 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Abe Feinberg is just back from seeing Eshkol. His message is as follows:

1. The reason the Israelis took the UAR incidents to the Security Council was so as not to complicate your life while the Czech crisis was on.

2. The Israelis say that Nasser has already made an arms deal with Moscow involving some:

- 150 MIGs;
- 450 tanks;
- the training of 200 pilots in the USSR;
- the sending of an additional 200 pilots to Egypt in mid-1969.

3. While Abe was here, I checked with our intelligence people and found:

- we have no independent confirmation of the alleged Soviet-UAR deal;
- the Israelis have reported the deal to us but not shared the source or quality of the intelligence;

4. In the light of the arms deal, Eshkol is worried about the Soviet proposal to confer ^{with us} about a Middle Eastern settlement. I explained to Abe that there was a good deal of nonsense in the Soviet proposal, but two points that deserved serious consideration:

- the Arabs signing a "multilateral document;"
- the notion of a 4-power guarantee which might be the best security Israel could ever get if the Senate would buy it, since the Senate does not appear about to buy a bilateral security treaty with Israel.

5. Abe said he would advise the Israelis to share with us fully their intelligence on the Moscow-Caire deal. He said he was relieved that we were not buying the whole Soviet document.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 20, #260

By jc, NARA, Date 9-24-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

6. I was in the midst of talking about the importance of the Israeli's clarifying their border position when I decided I ought to get this memo up to you.

W. W. Rostow

26

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, September 24, 1968, 5:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Order of Business for NSC Meeting, Wednesday, on Issues Coming Up in the UN General Assembly

The purpose of the meeting is to:

- a. review the current issues before the UN General Assembly and
- b. discuss our position on these questions.

(Attached is a State Department summary of the major issues: Czechoslovakia, the Middle East, Nigeria, Disarmament, Seabeds, Southern Africa and Chinese Representation)

1. Ask Secretary Rusk for any comments on the General Assembly meeting.
2. Ask Ambassador Ball to list the major problems and discuss how we plan to deal with them.
3. Questions you may wish to ask:
 - a. Will Secretary General U Thant's proposed resolution for a bombing halt be pushed? Do we expect him to be active publicly on issues other than Vietnam?
 - b. Are there any steps we can take to make sure that the General Assembly Debate produces a powerful expression of world opinion on the Czech crisis?
 - c. Are the Presidential candidates being briefed on the UN?
4. Conclude the meeting by asking Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Ball to get to you promptly any specific recommendations which need to be acted on now.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7169 82-206

By ves/rs, NARA, Date 11-17-92

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

CONFIDENTIAL

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Tuesday, September 24, 1968 -- 4:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

You should know that we considered two devices at last Thursday's Katzenbach meeting on Vietnam for breaking the log jam over ~~NLF~~ GVN participation.

1. Ploy A would involve informing the Hanoi delegation that:

- On Tuesday bombing would stop but there would be no announcement.
- On Wednesday serious discussions would begin and we would bring to the meeting representatives of the GVN.
- If serious talks were launched on this basis on Wednesday, we would announce the bombing halt.
- If not, bombing would resume and there would be no announcement.

This ploy assumes, of course, that the points about the DMZ and attacks on the cities were understood and honored.

2. Ploy B would propose to Hanoi that:

- Immediately after the bombing cessation, military representatives of both sides (Hanoi, NLF, GVN, and U. S.) would meet; say, at the DMZ. They would discuss "the total cessation of hostilities -- that is, a true cease-fire."
- In fact, we would indicate that this would be a good occasion for the southerners to begin to talk about a political settlement.
- Meanwhile, the Paris talks would continue on bilateral matters between the U. S. and Hanoi, but with the understanding that the other parties (NLF and GVN) would join the talks when the outlines of the political settlement had become clear.

If there is no progress on Wednesday or Friday of this week, we may wish to move fairly rapidly on one or the other proposal -- or, even, both.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Pres file

28
/

Tuesday, Sept. 24, 1968
4:15 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the extract on Hanoi's intentions from the INR report to which Bunker refers in the cable I sent you.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *sg*, NARA, Date *11-17-92*

Will Probably Grant Measure of Tacit Reciprocity. In order to maintain ^{28a} the talks, and to stop the rest of the bombing, Hanoi may be willing to resolve the reciprocity question. It probably hoped that its military pressure during the spring or the later "lull" would lead to a change in the American attitude. Neither has worked. The next step is to try to persuade us to accept some limited gesture of tacit reciprocity, in one or another area of potential de-escalation. Hanoi's position may even have advanced to the point where it is prepared to be somewhat more explicit than before about the connection between an American bombing halt and the steps it is prepared to take. However, we do not believe Hanoi is yet prepared to issue a categorical assurance. Instead, it may give us a slightly better basis for an "assumption," hoping that we will accept this under the framework of the San Antonio formula.

However, any such concession will almost certainly be accompanied by continued and perhaps intensified military and political pressure in South Vietnam. It may, in fact, be designed in part to forestall US reaction to such pressure. And, if Hanoi's move does produce the much-desired full bombing halt, it will not feel any urgency to yield its stiff position on the next matter to be discussed: the roles of the GVN and the NLF in negotiations. Heartened by our readiness to refer to the NLF in the official conversations, it might then believe that we will be prepared to accept direct discussions with the NLF to the exclusion of the GVN. It will certainly exert maximum pressures for direct US-NLF conversations before being prepared to review its position on that issue (e.g., by falling back on the "Alliance" and/or accepting some GVN role). And it will also probably reject any effort to discuss North Vietnamese troop presence in the South.

(Extract from Intelligence Note 744, Sept. 20, 1968, Dept of State, Dir. of Intelligence and Research)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-25

By kg, NARA, Date 6-17-94

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

LIMDIS

INFORMATION

Tuesday, September 24, 1968
4:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read this sturdy
memo from John Walsh on Cy Vance's
state of mind.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~Mr. George Christian~~

WWRostow:rlh



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 23, 1968

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a).

TO: Mr. Walt Rostow

FROM: S/S - Mr. John Walsh

John P. Walsh

BY ON 1-13-93

SUBJECT: The Pearson Article of September 23

Cy Vance called me at 4:30 this afternoon (10:30 p.m. in Paris) to express his deep personal anguish about Pearson's allegations. While characterizing the entire article as "baloney", and emphasizing that he had not seen Pearson for at least two years, he was particularly upset about Pearson's description of his alleged reactions to the President's invitation in August to visit the Ranch and to brief Richard Nixon. He felt this article was part of a plot to hurt the President, his friend, by imputing to Cy sentiments that were totally untrue. Furthermore, Cy felt that the Department's statement today on the article was far too weak. He urged us to deny categorically the allegations about him.

In response, I endeavored to ease some of the anguish of my friend. I reminded him that Pearson was notoriously inaccurate and that no plot was required for him to pillory a public figure. I assured Cy that we would sharpen our rebuttal at the first opportunity.

When Cy reiterated his deep anguish about his name being used to hurt the President, I told him that I would ask you to convey his feelings to the President. I also assured him that I would bring to your attention my personal knowledge of his feelings about the President and his reactions to the invitation to the Ranch.

I have been intimately associated with Cy since the Middle East crisis in May 1967. We were on the Control Group together, prayed and fought our way through the Eastern Mediterranean crisis in late 1967, fought to-

gether last February to control Korean emotions, and subsequently spent endless hours working together and discussing Vietnam and the many problems of peace negotiations. During all that time, Cy has never once uttered a harsh or critical word about the President. Without exception, he has always been completely loyal and intensely aware of the enormous burdens borne by the President. Under no circumstances that I can visualize would this man say or do anything that could hurt the President.

Last August I made the technical arrangements for Cy's return to New York, his trip to Washington, and his schedule while in Washington. I spent many hours with him during that period. I have a very graphic memory of his reactions when the President called from Texas on Thursday afternoon, inviting him to the Ranch on Saturday to meet with him and to participate in the briefing of Richard Nixon. Cy was delighted. We had a very animated conversation about this opportunity and worked that evening and the next day preparing his briefing material.

When Cy returned to Andrews Saturday night, he passed me a message that all had gone very well in Texas. Subsequently, in telephone conversations, he reiterated his pleasure at meeting with the President and briefing Mr. Nixon and the Vice President.

I would also wish to address Pearson's basic charge that the President has too tight a leash on our delegation. I do not believe this to be true and, more importantly, neither does Cy. While we were in Korea last February, Cy told me that, if he were honored with a negotiating assignment, he would wish me to accompany him. Since that time we have spent many hours discussing the negotiations. At all times Cy fully recognized the great national interests involved in this matter and the absolute necessity for the President to be intimately involved in the preparations of our negotiating position. At no time did he tell me that Washington was too restrictive in respect to the negotiators. When I asked him point-blank in respect to the Pearson assertion whether the leash was too tight, his answer was a categorical negative.

In the light of the above, it is my utter conviction that the Pearson allegations are totally false.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 24, 1968
2:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith, quite independently,
Gen. Taylor finds himself in sympathy
with Tho on September 20.

I believe we are in pretty good
shape now for the critical sessions
on Wednesday and, probably, a
private session on Friday which
could be the most important.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 9-24-01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Where do we stand on a cessation of the bombing?

As a regular reader of the cables to and from our Paris negotiators, I must admit to some of the confusion and doubt which seem to be in the minds of Tho and Thuy at the end of the September 20 private meeting as to our position on ending the bombing. For my own edification, I have reviewed the pertinent September cable traffic to see what the record shows with regard to our objectives and tactics bearing on this issue.

Unless I have missed some important point (such as verbal instructions which may have been given to Harriman during his recent visit), our present objective is to probe the points of agreement and disagreement with the Hanoi representatives with regard to the elements of our Phase II package. The method of probing used thus far has been to concentrate largely on the issues of the DMZ and of GVN participation, explaining what we mean by these issues and the importance which we attach to them. We seem to feel that the other side understands what we would expect from them with regard to the DMZ, but that we are not satisfied with their attitude with regard to the GVN participation.

I am not sure where we stand on the other points of the Phase II package. On September 18, instructions to Paris mentioned our continuing interest in the other items discussed in the Vance-Lau conversations and our feeling that attacks on major cities would have very grave unspecified consequences. We still appear to hope for evidence of restraint on the part of the enemy in South Viet-Nam but find little in their current offensive actions to encourage us to cease the bombing.

What then is the price which we set on stopping the bombing? Tho and Thuy want to know as does Oberemko. If our own negotiators know the answer, I can not find it in the guidance furnished by our cables. Our instructions of September 5 indicate that our negotiators should convey the impression that we could stop the bombing in return for some understanding on the Phase II package or some modification of it. When we talk about an understanding on these issues, does it mean only comprehension by Tho and Thuy of their content and importance or does it mean agreement on their part to do something? Does the possible modification of the package consist of insistence only upon satisfaction with regard to the DMZ and GVN participation? It seems to me that we have encouraged the other side to believe that such probably is our fall-back position.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 10-16-01

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

With regard to the DMZ at least, we have indicated in our September 5 instructions that we would be willing to proceed if we believed that the enemy had an understanding of the principle and would observe it. But in the same paragraph, we mention the difficulty of ending the bombing "in the absence of some understanding." Here we have a double use of "understanding" side by side, in one sense meaning comprehension and in the other, meaning something like an agreement.

The same ambiguity arises again in our supplementary instruction of September 18 when we tell Harriman that, in view of the unsatisfactory position on the GVN issue, we require a "further degree of understanding" on the subject which if obtained "could be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing." Which kind of understanding are we talking about here, comprehension or agreement?

In summary, I find myself in sympathy with Tho when on September 20 he asked us to be specific about our conditions for ending the bombing. If he suspects that we are playing some kind of "shell game" with him, I think he has some justification. Furthermore, I do not see from the cables how our own negotiators can be sure of our final position on the bombing. While there may be subtleties in our negotiating tactics which escape me, it seems to me time to clarify our own position among ourselves and then, in the near future, with Tho and Thuy.

As to the content of our position, I am generally in support of the views expressed by Ambassador Bunker in his recent cable of September 24 (Saigon's 38599).

M. D. T.
M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

3
ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, September 24, 1968, 1:30 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Attendance at NSC Meeting on United Nations

Pres file

The following officials will attend the National Security Council Meeting at noon tomorrow to participate in the discussion of current issues facing us in the United Nations General Assembly which is now in session:

Secretary of State Rusk
UN Ambassador Ball
Assistant Secretary of State Sisco
Secretary of Defense Clifford
Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze
Secretary of Treasury Fowler
CIA Director Helms
JCS Chairman Wheeler
USIA Director Marks
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Nathaniel Davis
Bromley Smith
Walt Rostow

The Vice President will probably not attend. Governor Daniel is out of town. Richard Helms expects to be on time but may be delayed if his Hill appearance goes longer than now expected.

Captain Robert Sansom, a Presidential Fellow assigned to my staff, is working with Nat Davis on UN problems. Should he be invited to sit in the back row to observe the Council in operation?

W. W. Rostow

_____ yes
_____ no
_____ call me

BKS:amc

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By RA, NARA, Date 11-19-92

Pres file
32

Tuesday, Sept. 24, 1968

~~SECRET~~/OHIO/PLUS 12:55 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

The North Vietnamese meeting with the Norwegian Foreign Minister ended with propaganda -- no serious message.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/OHIO/PLUS attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 9-24-01



Department of State

32a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHCR
DE RUDKSO 6737 2681500
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241455Z SEP 68 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1996
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 358
STATE GRNC

7 7 9 5 Q
Sept. 24, 1968
11:21AM

~~SECRET~~ OSLO 6737

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.6

NIJ 97-407

By us, NARA Date 9-21-98

MODIS/OHIO/PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE FROM AMBASSADOR

1. BOYE TOLD DAVIDSON AND ME HE BEGAN MORNING MEETING BY ASKING NORTH VIETNAMESE TO POSTPONE THEIR DEPARTURE UNTIL FRIDAY, INDICATING HE THOUGHT VISIT HAD BEEN TOO SHORT TO HAVE ALL DISCUSSIONS NEEDED IN VIEW GREAT DESIRE NORWEGIANS TO SEE CONFLICT BROUGHT TO AN END. AFTER AMBASSADOR CHAN REPLIED WITH LENGTHY PROPAGANDA SPEECH REITERATING IT WAS AN UNJUST WAR, ETC., BOYE REVERTED TO QUESTION NORTH VIETNAMESE STAYING. THEY ASKED HIM TO ELABORATE. HE SAID NORWEGIANS HOPED THAT ON BASIS THEIR DISCUSSIONS SO FAR THEY MIGHT CONTINUE TO GET SOME ONWARD MOVEMENT AND PERHAPS HAVE REASON TO PURSUE SOME OF THESE QUESTIONS FURTHER. NORTH VIETNAMESE SAID THEY HAD OTHER ENGAGEMENTS AND MUST DEPART. HOWEVER SUNG WILL BE STOPPING OVER IN MOSCOW AND NORTH VIETNAMESE LEFT IT THAT IF NORWEGIANS SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER TO SAY, ALGARD COULD FOLLOW ON TO MOSCOW TO DISCUSS WITH SUNG THERE.

2. FONMIN THEN JOINED GROUP. FROM BOYE'S ACCOUNT, MEETING WAS MAINLY PROPAGANDISTIC HARANGUE ABOUT NEED TO STOP BOMBING. WHEN NORWEGIANS HAD ASKED WHAT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING AFTER BOMBING STOP, NORTH VIETNAMESE SAID ONLY THAT DISCUSSIONS COULD THEN BEGIN ON A NUMBER OF THINGS. BOYE ENTERED A CAVEAT IT WAS OBVIOUS NORTH VIETNAMESE INTERPRETER VERY POOR.

3. IT WOULD APPEAR FROM BOYE ACCOUNT THAT ALGARD DID NOT RPT NOT GET CHANCE WHEN BOYE AND FONMIN PRESENT TO RAISE POINTS RE DMZ, GVN REPRESENTATION, ETC., AS HE HAD PROMISED. AFTER LEAVING FONMIN, ALGARD WENT OFF WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE AND POSSIBLY HIS DEBRIEFING WILL CONTAIN MORE MATERIAL. BOYE HOWEVER FOUND THEIR REMARKS VAGUE AND PROPAGANDISTIC FROM BEGINNING TO END. AT MEETING LATER TODAY DAVIDSON WILL PRESS ALGARD TO TRY TO ARRANGE TO MEET NORTH VIETNAMESE BEFORE THEY LEAVE TO MAKE POINTS WHICH HE HAS PROMISED TO RAISE.

GP-1. TIBBETTS
BT

~~SECRET~~

Pres. file

33

Tuesday, Sept. 24, 1968

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS 12:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is a most important cable from Bunker, with Abrams' concurrence. It says that it is absolutely essential for our position that we nail down GVN participation before stopping bombing. Abrams, in a remarkable statement, says that GVN participation is more important than the DMZ. You will wish to consider this most carefully.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS attachment

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 10-4-01

Sept. 24, 1968 33a~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

Copy of SAIGON 38599 from Ambassador Bunker

Subject: GVN Participation in Negotiations

(Note: Paras. 1-10 of this message were in finished form and about to be sent on Sept. 22 when the reports of the 4th private meeting were received. I have decided to send it in its original form rather than recast it in the light of the latest developments, for most of its contents are still relevant.)

1. I do not, repeat not, know the latest high level thinking on a total cessation of bombing in the light of the Sept. 15 private meeting, but a variety of factors and my instinct suggest to me that we may be re-examining our present stance and possibly make a decision on relatively short notice to suspend all bombing in an effort to move into substantive talks and test Hanoi's willingness to engage in "serious negotiations." If that is the train of events, I want Washington to have my views as you re-examine this matter.

2. I assume in this cable that Hanoi will not abandon its stand that it will make no, repeat no, commitments or accept any conditions as a quid pro quo for cessation, and that we may proceed unilaterally on the basis of assumptions which include an implied acceptance by Hanoi.

3. As I read the play of exchanges in the private talks and other material I have seen on this subject, I gather that the minimum key assumptions we would make clear to Hanoi in advance of a total bombing stop would be:

- A. The cessation of North Vietnamese military use or abuse of the DMZ.
- B. The GVN presence at the negotiations.
- C. And, presumably, we would also say that a renewed rise in infiltration or attack on the cities once "serious negotiations" start would also endanger these discussions.

4. If this is the course that we decide to follow, the issue that gives me the greatest concern is getting the GVN into the talks. If Hanoi does not, repeat not, agree in advance to this and tries to make it an agenda item, and possibly a low priority one, I see us bogged down in an interminable discussion about the GVN presence or where on the agenda this subject will be placed. I can see nothing but trouble of the most serious kind here if we allow this to happen.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~Authority RAC 10384By jd/ics NARA, Date 10-4-01

5. GVN suspicion of us and our intentions, which is now quiescent, will again be aroused. Thieu is not likely to go along with a total cessation unless he knows in advance that he will be in on the consequent talks, and he will have to differ with us publicly if the GVN are not in on them. Once opened, the breach could widen rapidly, affecting unity and morale in South Vietnam and endangering the trust and confidence in us which we have taken so much pains to build. On the other hand, even if we could persuade Thieu to agree to cessation without GVN participation firmly tied down, he will be under the heaviest attack here. The strains on our relations will be very severe, Thieu's position, prestige, and ability to hold the country together could be threatened, and the Communists would have a field day feeding the suspicions and promoting the strains and working to destroy Thieu.

6. It seems to me, therefore, that in stating our assumptions, we should not just say that the GVN must take part in serious discussions, but that we will bring them into the negotiations from the start. In effect, if we are unable to get Hanoi's agreement in advance to GVN participation, then we should unilaterally establish the "our-side, your-side" procedure for the "serious negotiations" by means of assumption.

7. If at that point they balk and say they will not take part in joint meetings on this basis, it is clear, at least to me, that they have no, repeat no, serious intentions of negotiating once the bombing stops. I fear they will treat total cessation as a capitulation by us, and then move on to their next rigid positions which may be:

- A. That the US must stop its aggression against the South and withdraw, and
- B. Hanoi and the NLF will only talk to the US, Should this eventuate we shall be endlessly arguing the question of GVN representation after the bombing cessation. On this point I share the views expressed in INR's intelligence note, "Where does Hanoi go from here" and especially paras. 9 and 10.

8. I most strongly urge that we hold firmly to the position that GVN participation is a must. I continue to maintain that Hanoi is in trouble. It has four alternatives available to it, i. e., another "spectacular offensive" accompanied by a spectacular defeat, rolling attacks such as we have had since August 18 with nothing but continuous losses to show for them; retreat to protracted

guerrilla warfare because they cannot achieve a breakthrough in the face of our growing strength and their heavy losses; or negotiations for the best possible terms while they are still in a good bargaining position. I think they will choose the last, and before long, if we hold firm.

9. My final thought is that we must inform the GVN and our allies in advance of making a final decision and announcement on total cessation. They would view with the gravest disquiet a bombing cessation without having nailed down GVN participation. Thanem has already spoken out on this, and the Australian Ambassador told me of his Government's great concern when he handed me the Aide Memoire which he informed me had also been given to Harriman and Bundy.

10. Gen. Abrams, who has seen this message and concurs, has asked me to add the following additional observation from the purely military viewpoint. He considers that as between restraints in the DMZ and giving the GVN a place in the negotiations from the beginning, the latter is more important. He has commented separately on the military risks and costs of a bombing halt based on "assumptions" about enemy behavior in the DMZ and feels that if necessary he can cope with these risks and cost even though we have to pay a price; but if the GVN does not, repeat not, have a role in the negotiations from the time they start, this would strike at something that is basic to our whole military effort here, namely, the cooperative relationship between the US and South Vietnamese military leaders and forces. If this is shaken, it could have not only the serious political consequences which I mentioned above, but could jeopardize the very basis of our military effort here. I wish to associate myself with this assessment.

11. My comments on latest developments: Since writing the foregoing I have received and studied references D-G and am pleased with the strong stand we are taking on GVN participation. I would have preferred the phrase this "would" be a major factor in facilitating a decision to stop the bombing, instead of "could." But I am not carping if this represents our basic condition. It is the touchstone of all our efforts and sacrifice here, and if we persist in holding th this position and do not appear too anxious, Hanoi will have no choice but to accept it.

12. This message goes along with our efforts to find the key to induce Hanoi to move into serious discussions, but I do not want to leave the impression that I would concur in any cessation that leaves in doubt GVN participation. I am convinced that Hanoi cannot go on much longer on its present course.

Its only hope now of saving something from the wreckage of its design to take South Vietnam by force is American policy and American opinion. If we cave in on GVN participation they will only read this as a sign that we are ready to sacrifice the GVN, and it will harden every one of their positions once the talks start. If they cave on this, there is a good prospect that, however difficult, we will have a serious negotiation whose outcome will be compromises acceptable to US and to the GVN.

BUNKER

34

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tuesday, September 24, 1968
12:15 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the Thais have second thoughts on Bangkok and propose Honolulu instead.

Among other places, we might consider Seoul.

W. W. Rostow

Bangkok 20707

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 10-4-01



Department of State

34a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

9

OO RUEHC
DE RUMTBX 20707K 2681150
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241141515Z SEP 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 828
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ BANGKOK, 20707

7 7 4 1 Q
Sept. 24, 1968
8:48A

NODIS/COLUMBIA

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMB UNGER

1. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE WAN CALLED ME TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE THIS AFTERNOON TO SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED HIM TO GIVE ME MESSAGE SINCE LATTER WAS TIED UP IN ROYAL CEREMONY.
2. PRINCE WAN SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER WAS GRATEFUL TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FOR THINKING OF BANGKOK AS SITE FOR THE PROPOSED MEETING. HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER REGRETS THAT OCTOBER WOULD BE A BAD MONTH FOR HOLDING SUCH A MEETING IN BANGKOK AND WOULD POSE MANY DIFFICULTIES. PRINCE WAN THEN CITED THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS WHICH WERE DISCUSSED IN CABINET AND WHICH REVOLVE PRIMARILY AROUND POLITICAL WORK IN PREPARATION FOR ELECTIONS UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION. THE PRIME MINISTER ANTICIPATES THE PROMULGATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAW IN ABOUT ONE WEEK WHICH WILL THEN BE FOLLOWED PROMPTLY BY HIS EFFORTS TOWARDS THE ORGANIZATION OF A GOVERNMENT PARTY. THERE IS ALSO THE ELECTORAL LAW WHICH THE CABINET IS EXPECTED TO PASS NEXT TUESDAY AND WHICH WILL BE SUBMITTED SOON THEREAFTER TO THE PARLIAMENT, AND WHICH MUST BE SEEN THROUGH THAT BODY. (WE ALSO HAVE BEEN AWARE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS PLANNING AN UPCOUNTRY POLITICAL TOUR DURING PERIOD IN QUESTION.)
3. PRINCE WAN SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO MENTIONED AGAIN THE PROBLEM OF SO MANY OF HIS KEY OFFICIALS BEING ABSENT IN THE PERIOD WHEN THE MEETING WOULD BE HELD AND, IN ADDITION TO PRAPHAT AND SERM MENTIONED EARLIER, HE ADDED POTE SARASIN AND THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE POLICE, GENERAL PRASERT. PRINCE WAN SAID MARSHAL DAWEE ALSO MENTIONED THE SEATO MILADS MEETING TAKING PLACE DURING THIS PERIOD.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 10-4-01

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 Bangkok 20707 Sept 24, 1968

4. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING THE PRIME MINISTER HARKS BACK TO THE SUGGESTION DISCUSSED LAST MAY IN WASHINGTON THAT A MEETING BE HELD IN HONOLULU AND HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO ATTEND.
5. I THEN RECALLED TO PRINCE WAN OUR EARLIER CONVERSATION (BANGKOK 20597) IN WHICH WE HAD DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY OF SUCH A MEETING BEING HELD IN ASIA. PRINCE WAN SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER CALLED THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE CABINET TODAY BUT IT WAS THE COLLECTIVE VIEW, FOR ALL THE REASONS MENTIONED ABOVE AS WELL AS THE SHORTNESS OF TIME, THAT IT WAS NOT FEASIBLE TO HOLD A MEETING IN BANGKOK. I SOLICITED FROM PRINCE WAN ANY FURTHER VIEWS OF THE PRIME MINISTER CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE MEETING, ITS TIMING, ALTERNATIVE LOCATIONS, ETC. THIS ONLY ELICITED THE WORD THAT THE THIRD OR FOURTH WEEK IN OCTOBER WOULD SUIT PRIME MINISTER THANOM EQUALLY WELL AND, IN REPLY TO MY SPECIFIC QUESTION, PRINCE WAN ALSO THOUGHT THE SECOND WEEK (BEGINNING OCTOBER 7) WOULD BE SATISFACTORY ALTHOUGH THE PRIME MINISTER HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY EXPRESSED HIMSELF ABOUT THAT DATE.
6. I TOLD PRINCE WAN I WAS SURE MY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE DISAPPOINTED WITH THIS MESSAGE AND ASKED HIM WHETHER I SHOULD TAKE WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME AS A FINAL, CONSIDERED VIEW, AND ALSO WHETHER I COULD RE-OPEN THE QUESTION IF THERE WERE NEW FACTORS. HE REPLIED THAT WHAT HE HAD CONVEYED TO ME WAS A CABINET DECISION TAKEN TODAY. THE PRIME MINISTER, OF COURSE, WOULD ALWAYS BE READY TO CONSIDER ANYTHING FURTHER I WOULD WISH TO PUT BEFORE HIM.
7. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION PRINCE WAN CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A REPLY FROM FOREIGN MINISTER THANAT THIS MORNING, IN TIME FOR THE CABINET MEETING.
8. BEFORE LEAVING PRINCE WAN I ONCE MORE MENTIONED THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN THIS MATTER.
9. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THE THAI ANSWER IS TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES A FINAL ONE AND THAT BANGKOK SHOULD NOT RECEIVE ANY FURTHER CONSIDERATION AS A MEETING SITE UNLESS THERE ARE COMPLETELY NEW FACTORS THAT ENTER THE SCENE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE THAI ARE FULLY PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN A MEETING AT ANOTHER SITE AND WOULD, I BELIEVE, ACCEPT WHATEVER TIME WE PROPOSE FROM OCTOBER 7 ON.

GP-3 UNGER
BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Tuesday, September 24, 1968
10:15 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

There is an increasing amount
of this kind of evidence coming in.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

35a

September 20, 1968

SUBJECT: Troop Morale

A letter, dated August 19, 1968, signed by Duong Van Bau of the Corridor Unit, addressed to Bach, states that the situation of his Unit was deplorable. One half of the Unit personnel was sick and the others performed their duty idly, proving that they were completely demoralized by the number of people killed or wounded in the Unit's last battle. In addition, a group of members of his Unit while evacuating the wounded to the Dispensary, witnessed the terrible casualties inflicted on K10 (possibly 810th Infantry Battalion) by airstrikes; and when they came back to the Unit, they saw that 25 more of the wounded had died. In addition three men of the group were killed in a recent ambush.

All the above terrors destroyed the spirit of his Unit. Bau ends the letter by stating that continuous meetings were held for all Party and Group members to stabilize the morale of the members of his Unit.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Tuesday, September 24, 1968
10:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read Tommy
Thompson's appreciation of where the
Soviet Union now stands on Czechoslovakia.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 5633

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jo, NARA, Date 10-4-01



Department of State

36a
TELEGRAM

SUMMARY

47

~~SECRET~~ 287

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 05633 232041Z

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

83
ACTION EUR 20

By jc NARA. Date 10-16-00

INFO NEA 13, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, SAH 02, SAL 01, SR 01, IO 13,
NIC 01, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /139 W

R 231410Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9846
INFO USMISSION USUN
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 5633

REF: US NATO 4825

1. SOVIET INVASION CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS BRUTAL ACT OF AGGRESSION. NATO MUST OF COURSE TAKE ACCOUNT OF REDEPLOYMENT SOVIET TROOPS AS WELL AS INDICATION OF DOMINANT HARD LINE TREND IN SOVIET POLITBURO.
2. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT SOVIETS REGARD THEIR MOVE AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS DEFENSIVE IN SENSE THAT THEY WERE MEETING WHAT THEY CONSIDERED A THREAT TO THE EXISTING COMMUNIST ORDER AS WELL AS A POSSIBLE EVENTUAL DEFECTION OF A BLOC MEMBER. THEIR CONCENTRATION ON WEST GERMANY IN THEIR PROPAGANDA IS NATURAL AS THIS IS THE ONLY DEFENSE OF THEIR ACTION WHICH CARRIES CONVICTION WITH THEIR OWN PEOPLE AND THEY DOUBTLESS CONSIDER THAT FRG'S EASTERN POLICY AT LEAST CONTRIBUTED TO CZECH DEVELOPMENTS.
3. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT USE OF FORCE AGAINST ROMANIA OR

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 05633 232041Z

YUGOSLAVIA MOST UNLIKELY, ALTHOUGH THEY WILL CERTAINLY KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON BOTH.

4. AN IMPORTANT INDICATOR OF SOVIET POLICY WILL BE THEIR DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT THEY DECIDE TO GO AHEAD WITH WORLD COMMUNIST MEETING IN NOVEMBER. INDEFINITE POSTPONEMENT IS MOST LIKELY, BUT IF THEY PROCEED THEY WILL SURELY HAVE TO WITHDRAW SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF THEIR FORCES FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA BEFORE SUCH MEETING.

5. SO FAR IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT CZECH LEADERS ARE WILLING OR ABLE TO MEET FULLY WHAT SOVIETS APPEAR TO CONSIDER THEIR MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS.

IF THIS SITUATION PERSISTS, UNCERTAIN WHETHER SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT PARTIAL COMPLIANCE OR ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE IN CZECH LEADERSHIP AND POSSIBLY COW OPPOSITION BY WHOLESAL ARRESTS. THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO INTERFERE IN CZECH INTERNAL AFFAIRS WILL NOT DETER THEM IF THEY DECIDE A PURGE IS THEIR BEST COURSE.

GP-4. THOMPSON

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 24, 1968
8:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read this guidance we gave Tom Johnson on Jim Webb's statement, plus an interesting, well-balanced CIA comparison (Tab A) of the U. S. and Soviet space programs.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS.019.039.004/3
p. jc. NARA. Date 10-16-01

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: ZOND-5 and Jim Webb

At your request, I talked with Tom Johnson this morning about the Soviet's ZOND-5 circumlunar space event. I took the general line that while this is obviously an impressive technical accomplishment, it certainly is not another "Sputnik" as claimed by the Washington Post this morning. I noted that I considered General Phillips' reported statement of "fantastic" and Jim Webb's comments (~~see attached AD - please~~) as irresponsible efforts to use the event to obtain support for the NASA budget.

I noted that over the next year or two both the US and Soviets are going to have to have a succession of increasingly impressive space tests if either of them is to put a man on the moon in the 1969-70 time period. In this connection, I pointed out that the ZOND-5 test, while presumably leading to a manned circumlunar flight, may well represent a dead-end branch of the Soviet space effort and not be the central effort toward placing a man on the moon in view of the limited size of the booster involved.

If detailed questions are raised, I suggested to Tom Johnson that they would probably have to refer them openly to NASA; however, I also suggested that they privately refer any questioners to Don Hornig or Ed Welsh who could be counted on to put the problem in better perspective.

In response to Tom Johnson's question, I also indicated that I didn't think it is necessary or desirable in this instance to send Kosygin a congratulatory message on the event.

At my request, CIA has prepared the attached classified and unclassified versions of a comparison of the US-Soviet space programs as a follow-up to Jim Webb's resignation press statement (~~attached~~) which contained highly pessimistic statements about the US space program. I think the CIA statements give an accurate and balanced summary of the situation.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-3
By us, NARA, Date 2-4-03


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Attachments:

1. **AP** press release 9/23
2. **Webb's** resignation press statement 9/16
3. **CIA's Top Secret Comparison**
4. **CIA's Unclassified Comparison**

cc: Dr. Hornig - w/atts.

~~TOP SECRET~~

A COMPARISON OF THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET
SPACE PROGRAMS

On the basis of a comparison of achievements to date, one would have to conclude that the U.S. is presently leading in the "space race". In the fields of manned lunar landing, manned space flight, unmanned lunar and interplanetary exploration, orbital applications, and near and deep-space scientific experimentation the U.S. is in almost every instance ahead of the U.S.S.R. in solid accomplishments. It should be borne in mind, however, that our examination of test programs really compares the results of policy decisions regarding the size and scope of space programs made by the two countries a number of years ago. The funds supporting the U.S. program have been reduced in recent years, and this will have a long-term impact on the U.S. program. So far as we can tell the Soviets have not to date reduced their funding level, and it is entirely possible that their space program will eclipse ours some years from now.

In preparation for the planned manned lunar landing within this decade, the U.S. launched its first Saturn V vehicle in November of 1967. Overhead photography of the U.S.S.R. reveals that construction of facilities similar to those at Cape Kennedy for the Saturn V are nearing completion at the Soviet launch site at Tyuratam. A giant booster vehicle was observed erected at the launch site in August which most likely is scheduled for its initial launch sometime within the next six months. We estimate that it weighs about 10 million pounds and will have a lift off thrust of approximately 12 million pounds. While this is larger than the Saturn V lift off thrust of 7.5 million pounds we believe it will not be capable of sending as large a payload to the moon as Saturn V. This is because the Soviet booster will employ conventional propellants, while the U.S. Saturn V uses liquid hydrogen as a fuel in its upper stages. In fact, we estimate that the Soviets will have to launch two of these vehicles and rendezvous in orbit in order to send sufficient weight to the moon for a manned landing. Because the Soviet counterpart has not yet flown and because of this difference in capability, the U.S. has now and probably will continue to enjoy a lead of a year or more in this area. There is also evidence that the U.S. has a comparable lead in spacecraft development and testing for this program.

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Copy 1 of 4

GROUP 1
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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-4
By idh, NARA, Date 9-7-06

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The United States has made five soft landings on the lunar surface with the Surveyor spacecraft, the first successful one occurring on 2 June 1966. We have also accomplished five highly successful lunar orbiters whose mission was to survey the lunar surface for potential Apollo landing sites. Although the Soviets have landed both Luna 9 and Luna 13 on the surface of the Moon, these probes lack the sophistication of the United States Surveyor series. As an example, the quality of the U.S. pictures was far superior to that of the **photographs obtained** by the Soviets. The Soviets have also placed payloads in orbit about the Moon on four occasions but evidence that they obtained high quality photographs of the lunar surface is completely lacking. The United States appears significantly ahead in these areas.

One interesting flight now under way is the Soviet Zond-5 mission, which is clearly an unmanned circumlunar flight where the probe is intended to return to earth and be recovered. If the mission is successful, then the Soviets will score a lunar "first". Furthermore, we feel that in the not-too-distant future they will try the same mission with men aboard. However, the booster for Zond-5 is only slightly larger than Saturn 1B, and is not capable of carrying the heavy payload needed for a manned landing. It must be therefore considered a "dead-end" program insofar as manned lunar exploration is concerned.

The United States through its Mercury and Gemini programs has taken a substantial lead. This lead is in total number of launches, **total time in orbit**, as well as the total number of astronauts with flight experience. The role of the United States astronaut appears to far outshadow that of his Soviet counterpart. The last successful Soviet flight occurred in late 1965 as their SOYUZ-1 flight in April 1967 culminated in the death of the cosmonaut, Vladimir Komarov.

The Soviets have launched 19 probes to Venus and Mars but only one successfully returned data from a planet (Venus-4). The U.S. have tried only 5 times, but three of our probes were successful. The U.S. Mariner flight is still the only probe to successfully fly by Mars and return data. The American and Soviet probes of Venus were complimentary in nature -- we flew by the planet and they penetrated deep into the Venus atmosphere. Thus the U.S. achievements measure **up very well** with those of the U.S.S.R. so far. It should be noted however, that unmanned interplanetary exploration is one field where **the Soviets are very likely to take over world leadership. This is because of the lack of any significant U.S. programs presently**

planned beyond the 1969 Mars probes, and the fact that we are **convinced the Russians** will continue to have a very ambitious and **long-term planetary program.**

The United States weather satellite program began in 1960. The Soviets **began to test their weather satellite in 1964** but did not obtain usable cloud pictures until 1966. Since then the Soviet weather satellites have generally performed as well as United States satellites but have been plagued by unreliability and short active lifetimes. It is also true that the U.S. transit navigation satellite program started years before the Soviet counterpart.

The United States took an early lead in satellite communications and **has held it.** Our communications satellites are fully operational and are shared by the many nations belonging to Intelsat. The Soviet Molniya communications satellite system is still in an experimental phase even by their standards. The feasibility has been demonstrated by the USSR's Molniya, but the system has yet to be put into daily use outside Russia.

The United States has an overwhelming lead in the exploration of **near earth and interplanetary space.** NASA has flown more scientific payloads over a wider range of orbits and trajectories. These satellites typically carry more experiments, produce much more data of a higher quality and last longer than their Soviet counterparts. The Soviets still use obsolete data transmission techniques requiring hand processing on the ground. Thus they typically take many times longer than United States scientists to analyze and publish the results of their experiments. Consequently, most of the existing scientific data on outer space **is of U. S. origin.**

The Soviet Union is currently supporting a satellite reconnaissance program which exceeds that of the United States in terms of total number of launches per year. However, this Soviet program is inferior to that of the United States in both quality (resolution) as well as total land area covered per mission. In these comparable programs the United States technological lead is clear.

Plans for the future Soviet space program, unknown to us, could cause a reversal in the present trend. For example, although the new large Soviet space booster is currently estimated to employ conventional propellants, it has the potential, if combined with new upper stages, to far surpass any capability planned by the United States.

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EYES ONLY

1968 SEP 24 03 02

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DD WTE18
DS WTE 3856

FROM: WALT ROSTON
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82482

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NLI/ERC 02 2
By *cbm* NARA, Date 3/17/03

Pres file

SEP 23 PM 11:05

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

SEPTEMBER 23, 1968

HEREWITH A SITUATION REPORT FROM GENERAL ABRAMS
YOU WILL WISH TO READ.

IN REVIEWING THE ENEMY SITUATION OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS WE
SEE EVIDENCE THAT HE IS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN CARRYING OUT
HIS THIRD OFFENSIVE. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE INDICATIONS OF AN
INTENT TO LAUNCH A SECOND OR "INTERMEDIARY" PHASE TOWARDS
THE END OF SEPTEMBER, WE SEE EVIDENCE OF NEW DELAYS. HIS
HEAVY LOSSES OF 18,473 KIA SINCE 13 AUGUST ARE ONLY A PART
OF HIS PROBLEM.

IN THE DMZ (3-5 FRONT) AREA THE ENEMY FINDS IT DIFFICULT
TO BUILD UP AN OFFENSIVE POSTURE. HIS EFFORT TO MAINTAIN A
PRESENCE SOUTH OF THE DMZ IS INCREASINGLY COSTLY. A MASS
GRAVE WITH OVER 200 BODIES DISCOVERED NORTHWEST OF THE
ROCKPILE 21 SEPTEMBER IS RECENT EVIDENCE OF B-52 EFFECTIVENESS.
IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS WE HAVE CAPTURED IN THE DMZ AREA OVER
920 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, APPROXIMATELY 15,000 MORTAR ROUNDS, OVER
1500 ROCKET ROUNDS (3-40 AND 8-41) AND OVER 1,000,000 ROUNDS
OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION. THE SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION ALONE
WOULD SUPPLY AN ENEMY REGIMENT FOR APPROXIMATELY 15 DAYS
AT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF CONTACT.

IN NR TTH, THE ENEMY HAS BEEN BADLY HURT. THE DESTRUCTIVE
EFFECTS OF RECENT HEAVY RAINS FROM TYPHOON BESS WORSENERD
AN ALREADY SERIOUS FOOD PROBLEM. PRISONER AND RALLIER
STATEMENTS EMPHASIZE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS FOOD PROBLEM.
THE LOSS OF LARGE CACHES OF AMMUNITION AND OTHER EQUIPMENT, IN-
CLUDING TWO HOSPITALS, OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS, WILL ADD
TO THE MORALE PROBLEM IN THE AREA. THE 127 KIA AND 311 PW'S
LOST DURING THE PREDOMINATELY ARVN OPERATION ON VINH LOC
ISLAND ON 11 SEPTEMBER COMPOUND HIS PROBLEM. COMINT SHOWS
THAT HQ, NR TTH, AND 6TH AND 9TH NVA REGIMENTS HAVE NOW
WITHDRAWN TO LAOS.

IN CENTRAL I CTZ FRIENDLY OPERATIONS ARE KEEPING THE ENEMY
OFF BALANCE AND COSTING HIM HEAVILY. ARVN UNITS KILLED 350
ENEMY WEST OF HOI AN BETWEEN 13 AND 17 SEPTEMBER AND A USMC

CONTACT ON THE 20TH COST THE ENEMY ANOTHER 47 KILLED. COMINT
EVIDENCE OF A PARTY CONGRESS STARTING 13 SEPTEMBER SUGGESTS
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION BY THE ENEMY IN THAT AREA.

IN THE II CTZ AREA THE DEFEAT OF THE EFFORT AT DUC LAP HAS
APPARENTLY UPSET PLANS FOR A MAJOR EFFORT AGAINST BAN ME THUOT.
DESPITE HIS HEAVY LOSSES THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ELEMENTS OF
THREE REGIMENTS AND POSSIBLY OF A FOURTH CONCENTRATED IN THE
DUC LAP AREA INDICATES HE MAY INTEND TO PERSIST IN HIS EFFORT
THERE. INDICATIONS OF THE PROBLEM FACING THE ENEMY ARE IN-
CREASED REPORTS OF FORCEABLY TAKING FOOD FROM THE POPULATION IN
VARIOUS PARTS OF II CTZ. A POW CAPTURED ON 28 AUGUST NEAR
PLEIKU CITY SPOKE OF HIS BATTALION LOSING 170 KILLED TO B-52
STRIKES, ARTILLERY AND TAC AIR. HE ADDED THAT 37 MEN HAD
DESERTED BECAUSE OF THE B-52'S. HE JUDGED THAT A THIRD OF THE
REGIMENT WANTED TO DESERT.

IN III CTZ WE HAVE A 20 SEPTEMBER REPORT FROM A
RELIABLE AND HIGHLY PLACED AGENT. HE ATTENDED AN EARLY
SEPTEMBER COSVN CADRE MEETING DURING WHICH A SENIOR COSVN
OFFICIAL ATTRIBUTES THE DELAY IN THE "PHASE III" OFFENSIVE
PARTIALLY TO FAILURE IN MILITARY PROSELYTING. THIS FAILURE
WAS ATTRIBUTED PRIMARILY TO LOSSES OF KEY CADRES HE
THEN SUMMARIZES THE PROBLEMS FACING THE ENEMY IN THE SAIGON
AREA IN THESE WORDS: QUOTE. FEAR OF ATTACKING SAIGON IS
WIDESPREAD AMONG MILITARY AND MILITARY PROSELYTING CADRES.
THEY FEEL THAT SENDING TROOPS, ESPECIALLY WITHOUT THE SUPPORT
OF ARMOR OR AIR POWER, TO ATTACK ENTRENCHED SAIGON DEFENDERS IS
TANTAMOUNT TO SUICIDE. NOT ONLY ARE THERE HIGH RISKS ON THE
BATTLEFIELDS BUT ALSO IN TRYING TO RETURN TO BASE AREAS.
THERE IS DISCOURAGEMENT AMONG TROOPS AND CADRES AT THE LENGTH
OF THE WAR. SOME MILITARY CADRES HAVE SAID IT WOULD BE BETTER
TO STAKE EVERYTHING ON ONE ALL OUT BATTLE THAN TO CONTINUE TO
SUFFER THE LOSSES OF LONG DRAWN OUT WARFARE. REPLACEMENTS FOR
TROOPS PREVIOUSLY LOST ATTACKING SAIGON ARE ENTIRELY FROM NORTH
VIETNAM. THEY ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THEY DO
NOT KNOW THEIR WAY AROUND SAIGON. ARVN FORCES ARE DEFENDING
SAIGON SO TIGHTLY IT IS HARD TO FIND A WEAK POINT TO ATTACK.
THE MILITARY THEMSELVES DO NOT AGREE ABOUT ATTACKING SAIGON. A
MINORITY WANT A DIRECT ATTACK BUT THE MAJORITY BELIEVE AN ATTACK
IS POSSIBLE IF DEFENSIVE UNITS CAN BE LURED OUT OF THE CAPITAL
AREA. THE SUPPLY SITUATION IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT.
SECRET ZONES ARE UNDER CONSTANT B-52 ATTACK. FOOD IS SHORT.
MORALE IS SHAKEN. CACHES ARE DISCOVERED. ALL THIS MAKES IT
IMPOSSIBLE FOR VC COMMANDERS TO PLAN RISKY OPERATIONS.
THE MORALE OF MILITARY PROSELYTING AND POLITICAL CADRES IS
BADLY SHAKEN. THEY DO NOT DARE OPERATE IN THE CAPITAL FOR
FEAR OF CAPTURE. THUS THEY CANNOT SUPPORT MILITARY OPERATIONS.
TROOP MORALE IS LOW BECAUSE OF CONSTANT BOMBARDMENT. SOME WANT
TO DESERT BUT CANNOT IN THEIR BASE AREAS. THEY HOPE FOR AN
ATTACK ON SAIGON WHERE THEY THINK IT WILL BE EASIER TO
DESERT. UNQUOTE.

I AM NOT FORECASTING THE EARLY COLLAPSE OF THE ENEMY
NOR THE IMMINENCE OF LARGE SCALE DEFECTIONS. HIS COMBAT
CAPABILITIES ARE DECLINING, HOWEVER, AND THIS DETERIORATION
IS BECOMING A FACTOR OF STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE.

DTG 242226Z SEPT 68

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

Xerox from Quick Copy

Tuesday, September 24, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bank and Fund Speech

If you decide to speak to the Bank and Fund meeting, I recommend you do so at the beginning of the meeting on Monday morning, September 30. You could then welcome the delegates; your remarks could serve as guidance for the meetings; and you would not have to take into account the Bank and Fund reports or other comments.

The meeting ends Friday, October 4.

W. W. Rostow

ERF
ERF:mst

40

ACTION

**Tuesday, September 24, 1968
8:00 a. m.**

Pres file

Mr. President:

**Here is the draft, as promised,
for the Bank and Fund meeting.**

W. W. Rostow

*cc to Harry McPherson
Charles Maguire*

WWRostow:rln

BRETTON WOODS AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY

I am pleased to meet with you again and to wish you well -- at this meeting and in your working sessions throughout the year.

Your business is truly the world's business. You are guardians of what we have done, and innovators of what we must do, in world economic cooperation. You are custodians of the world's welfare -- and ultimately of its security.

This was clear from the beginning. Bretton Woods was more than a financial conference:

- It set up the machinery by which nations could work together -- day by day, and year after year.
- It forcefully disavowed the economic nationalism that brought us to the ruins of world depression and led to World War II.
- It committed us to build a new world economic order, step by step as experience showed the way.

President Roosevelt saw these beginnings for the great event they were.

When he asked our Congress to adopt the Bretton Woods agreements, he said:

"This point in history at which we stand is full of promise and of danger. The world will either move toward unity and widely shared prosperity or it will move apart into necessarily competing economic blocs.

"We have a chance, we citizens of the United States, to use our influence in favor of a more united and cooperating world. Whether we do so will determine, as far as it is in our power, the kind of lives our grandchildren can live."

We have come a long way toward fulfilling the promise that President Roosevelt saw in Bretton Woods. But what he said then to the people of the United States, all of us here can heed today. We still have much to do to meet our responsibilities to our grandchildren. And we must think hard about how we get on with this job.

I am particularly proud of our record in monetary cooperation. This has been a nervous year in international financial markets -- a year of crises. But these crises did not lead to panic and depression. We overcame each one; learned from each one; and used each one to make our house stronger.

When the UK devalued its currency, we closed ranks to prevent a senseless round of competitive actions by other countries. Compare this with the nineteen thirties -- or even with 1949.

When currencies came under speculative attack, we increased our credit lines to each other. Cooperative government action could offset the senseless flows of panic funds and the predatory flows of speculative funds. Currency exchanges remain stable -- and trade went on unhurt and unhindered. It is our job to keep it that way.

When gold speculators threatened to create a monetary panic by betting again -- and unsuccessfully again -- that they could force an increase in the official price of gold, we set up the two-tier system. Monetary gold reserves are now insulated from speculative activity and the private markets -- and the international monetary system is the stronger for it.

When I met with you last in 1965, I congratulated the Managing Director on your decision to begin negotiations on a plan to meet the world's future reserve needs. Today, this plan is a reality. We are close to seeing the Special Drawing Rights facility put into place as a major addition to the

structure of international financial cooperation. I am proud that the United States was among the first countries to complete its process of ratification.

I could go on with this remarkable listing: for example, to the enlargement of fund quotas, to the coordination of interest rates, to the new sterling credit network. The fact is that cooperation among nations is moving steadily -- and properly -- to the heart of the economic policies of each.

When I asked our Congress for a tax increase in 1967, and announced a new balance of payments program on January 1 of this year, I realized these measures were strong medicine, particularly for an election year. But the overriding need was to keep the United States economy and the dollar strong. It was important not only to the United States, but to the world economy. Other countries saw this clearly. Some could be hurt by these measures but they strongly supported them and, indeed, pressed us to carry them through. While they did not have votes in our Congress, their voices were heard nonetheless.

We, in turn, have urged some European nations to move more actively to expand their economies -- in their own interests and in the interest of a better balance of payments situation for all of us.

Why are we becoming more concerned about the economic policies of our neighbors? Why must we act together to set ground rules and to meet crises in this area? Benjamin Franklin explained it to his colleagues at the signing of our Declaration of Independence in 1776 in terms they could all understand. "We must all hang together," he warned, "or assuredly we shall all hang separately."

In the world that started with Bretton Woods, the more we move out of phase with each other, the more we will each have to restrict ourselves. The more we move together, the more rapidly we will each be able to advance the prosperity of our people.

We are moving steadily toward the same principle in lending for international development. It is right that we meet a common challenge through common action. Development is not the responsibility of a few countries

but of many countries. A multilateral approach can be a practical way to get at the job, both for countries providing assistance and for those receiving assistance.

Our record in this field is encouraging, but we must improve on it.

The World Bank is now able to borrow capital all over the world. This will help to expand its activities. It will also contribute to the achievement of better balance in world payments. The Bank has also learned, as we all have, that heavy industry and dams and other large projects cannot guarantee development. We must reach far into agriculture, education, health and all other possible ways of improving the quality of human resources. These activities may not seem commercially promising, but they can pay the largest dividends.

People are the key to development.

We have also learned the critical value of the International Development Association. In the development business, we cannot always behave like bankers. Some projects have a quick pay-off; others will take a long time.

Some carry large risks; others less so. But all are needed for balanced growth. The development arsenal must include long-term risk capital. It is essential and equitable that we do everything possible to provide enough of this capital and that we provide it together. The new replenishment of IDA resources is a first priority development need and exercises a first call on the international community.

We must build on the good start we have made in expanding the activities of the regional banks. This is a way in which cooperation among lending countries can combine effectively with cooperation among borrowing countries.

We have a good base:

- The Inter-American Development Bank -- senior member of the group -- is at the center of the Alliance for Progress.
- The Asian Development Bank is already a focal point for development plans and cooperation.
- The African Development Bank -- financed entirely by African nations -- is identifying new investment opportunities throughout Africa and has made its first loan.

These banks are a symbol of a new era of regional cooperation in economic development. I have seen for myself the achievements of the Central American Common Market -- the joint work on roads, in health, in trade. From the Mekong, to the Indus, to the Volta, to the Amazon, nations are beginning to put aside ancient quarrels so that they may develop together the rivers and the other great natural resources they share.

We have also learned the value of working together in the India and Pakistan consortia. We should apply this experience on the broadest possible scale. It is an equitable way to organize our common effort. It works as effectively for small countries as for large ones. And it is based on the necessary principle that countries should band together to provide aid whenever and wherever nations need and can use it.

What is the meaning of our experience?[?] Again it shows that the more we do together, the more each of us can do and the better we can do it. But as we do more together, our common institutions must be prepared to take on new responsibilities. They must adopt a broad development outlook. They

must take the lead to insure that developing countries and industrial countries alike meet their responsibilities.

In the last analysis, the battle of development will be won or lost on the ground. Foreign aid is necessary and must continue. But the experience of a decade tells us that development is a test of nationhood, that it requires a single-minded commitment, that it rewards vision and patience. It is a job for the long distance runner.

What are the lessons of this decade of development experience?

-- First, development is a full time job calling for all-out mobilization. Every success story has been one part foreign aid and several parts the steady growth of domestic savings and investment.

-- Second, development is serious nation building -- a task for doers not talkers. There is no room for sterile dogma. There are not enough resources for empty foreign adventures.

- Third, developing countries cannot carry the burden of excessive military expenditures. Every nation has legitimate security needs. But there can be neither security nor development with a senseless spiral of military purchases.

- Fourth, agriculture is a development growth industry. For quick results there is nothing like engaging the countryside in the development process. This is where the people are. Hungry people cannot be productive people. But prosperous farmers can be the firm foundation for prosperous factories.

- Fifth, development requires diversification of exports. Traditional products and traditional markets will not be enough to finance import needs. The developing countries have the responsibility to create new and competitive export industries^{ies}. The industrial countries have the responsibility to maintain an open and growing world economy.

- Sixth, development requires broad opportunities for the private sector. Private initiative is still the most efficient instrument for economic progress. No country can afford to waste this precious asset.

- Seventh, development can only be measured by the headway made with each individual. It is simple arithmetic: resources must outrun people. Too many people will mean too little growth. Family planning must be a family decision. But on that decision will depend the fate of the world's development effort.

- Eighth, and finally, development works. We have seen ancient fields reborn: new roads built to bridge the traditional gap between city and countryside; new schools to bring modern knowledge to age-old cultures. We have seen nations on the move reaching sustained rates of economic growth exceeding 6% a year. Yet, we should be under no illusions. There is a vast

amount of work ahead. Many nations have just begun. But this is not an endless task.

We may want to shape the future in our own ways and at our own pace.

This is as it should be. But how well each of us succeeds separately will depend in the future, as in the past, on how well we hang together.

The machinery we create to guide economic and financial policies among ourselves affects what each of us can do at home and what we can do for each other.

We must continue to work hard to strengthen the international monetary system. This is critical to our common future.

-- Balance of payments problems affect: our growth

policies; our trade policies; and our aid policies.

-- Monetary crises can lead to panic and world depression with

disastrous consequences for world security and welfare. The

machinery we have built over the past 25 years prevented the

recurrence of monetary panics. It must continue to do so in the future.

In the same way we must strengthen and refine our machinery for dealing with world poverty. We cannot afford to become weary of aid:

-- We all have problems at home -- and must meet them.

-- But we all have responsibilities abroad -- because in today's world our home is the entire planet.

-- We have a right to demand new ideas and new techniques.

We must put to work our new technology. Why can't we use television for inter-continental education and city to village communication? Why can't we apply desalting technology to the development of an entire region? Of course, the costs are large -- but the costs of doing nothing are larger. This is an international responsibility: it must be high on the development agenda.

-- But we cannot slash our aid programs and turn our backs on the majority of mankind. This would be a tragic and ironic end to a decade of rich experience, hard won success and high hopes.

We must work more and more closely together to our mutual benefit -- in the quality of our lives, in the furtherance of our security, and in the advancement of our welfare.

Again, I cite President Roosevelt's guidance of 25 years ago when he said that Bretton Woods was part of:

"... our hope for a secure and fruitful world, a world in which plain people in all countries can work at tasks which they do well, exchange in peace the products of their labor, and work out their several destinies in security and peace; a world in which governments, as their major contribution to the common welfare, are highly and effectively resolved to work together in practical affairs and to guide all their actions by the knowledge that any policy or act that has effects abroad must be considered in the light of those effects."

The world then was half destroyed from a terrible war. Total world income was probably little more than \$750 billion in today's prices. The institutions we created at Bretton Woods and the cooperation built on these institutions led to the highest sustained rate of economic growth in the history of the world. Total world income today is \$2.5 trillion.

By working closely together: in monetary policy, in economic policy, and in development policy, we can realistically hope to increase world output by 5% a year over the next decade. This is what we averaged over the

past six years.

If we fail to strengthen our international financial institutions, if we stand still or retreat in the coordination of our economic policies, if we falter in our effort to encourage economic development among the poor nations, total world income will grow by much less. We could expect to fall back to a period of boom and bust -- to stop and go economic growth. This would be a sad replay of the record of the past century, when world economic growth barely averaged 3% a year.

The difference at the end of a decade would be \$500 billion of world production a year. That is the measure of what we can afford to do to keep full employment at home and to maintain an open world economy. That is the measure of the stakes involved in constructive relations:

- among the industrial countries;
- between industrial and developing countries;
- among the developing countries;

-- between East and West.

That is the measure of our commitment to each other in an integrated
and peaceful world economy.

Mr. Rostow 41
Pres file

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo. 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By J, NARA, Date 10-4-01

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Tuesday, September 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Abe Feinberg's Call--Tuesday, September 24

I see Abe Feinberg at 5:00 p. m. today before he sees you at 5:30 p. m.

After talking with Secretary Rusk, here is what I would propose to say about Phantoms, subject to your correction:

1. As Abe knows, the Phantoms have been much on the President's mind since before Prime Minister Eshkol's visit. Although the President has not made a decision, Abe knows as well as anyone the President's deep sympathy and concern for Israel's security.

2. Our main concern right now is for what Israel and the world urgently need--a decisive step toward peace in the Mid-East. That is the key to Israel's survival over the long term. We want to make a maximum try at making the Jarring mission a success during the UN General Assembly, while Jarring and the Israeli and Arab foreign ministers are all together there. We are afraid a decision on Phantoms without progress toward peace would jeopardize this effort.

3. If we're to have a breakthrough in New York, we believe the Israeli Cabinet must bring itself to define what it means by secure and recognized boundaries--what boundaries it would withdraw to and what would make them secure. There are two missing elements if we are to get negotiations started. This is one, and the other is whether the UAR really wants peace. We think the only way to find out how far the UAR will go is to test it with specific proposals. Israel can do that only if the Cabinet defines its peace terms, at least on a contingent basis. We know this would be painful, but we know from our own experience in defining our conditions for stopping the bombing of North Vietnam that this step is essential for an honest probe of the adversary's position.

Secretary Rusk would add that we are also vitally concerned that Israel be able to say credibly that the Phantoms would not carry nuclear weapons. The only way to make that credible is to sign the NPT. Although this is one of our important objectives, I'm not sure we want to overload the circuit at this point. Just asking the Cabinet to define its peace terms may cause a Cabinet crisis, and I think the NPT would fall into place if we could get a settlement. But we could mention it.

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This is where I would leave the matter with Abe--as a statement of the President's sympathy and concerns. I would leave the notion of a deal implicit rather than explicit, so that we will not seem to be bargaining with Israel's security. It would be up to them to put the two together.

As I wrote you last week, Secretary Rusk has already told Rabin we want Israel to get down to specifics. He is scheduled to see Eban in New York next Monday, September 30. If there were to be a tacit understanding about Phantoms, it might proceed on two separate tracks--Israeli diplomatic performance in New York and movement toward a decision on planes here. But I do not believe we would want to commit ourselves to anything until we are sure the Israelis are really going to perform this time.

W. W. Restow

Approve your line with Abe _____

Call me _____

Tuesday, Sept. 24, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Ralph A. Sawyer, retired Dean of the Graduate School of the University of Michigan and a former President of the American Institute of Physics, would greatly appreciate an inscription on the attached photograph. It was taken during the Medal of Science Ceremony in February.

I recommend the follow inscription:

"To Ralph A. Sawyer
with best wishes."

W. W. Rostow

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Authority FRS 64-68, vol. 13, # 328By jc NARA, Date 10-4-01*Pres file*

FROM WALT ROSTOV
 TO THE PRESIDENT
 CITE CAP92480

~~SECRET~~

SEPTEMBER 23, 1963

HEREWITH SHRIVER'S ACCOUNT OF A 50-MINUTE MEETING TODAY WITH GENERAL DE GAULLE. THE SUBJECT TURNED OUT TO BE GERMANY.

SUMMARY

GENERAL DE GAULLE CAREFULLY RESTRICTED CONVERSATION AT TODAY'S 50-MINUTE MEETING TO ONE ISSUE, NAMELY, GERMANY. APPARENTLY DE GAULLE IS PLANNING HIS OWN POSITION FOR HIS MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KEISINGER AND HE IS REVERTING WITH SINGLEMINDED CONCENTRATION TO HIS THESIS THAT U.S. COMMITMENTS TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY GERMANY, ARE INADEQUATE. IT IS THIS INADEQUACY WHICH EXPLAINS, IN HIS MIND, WHY THE GERMANS ARE SO DISTURBED AND EDGY. DESPITE HIS REPEATED SUGGESTIONS THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMMITTED TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE TO ALLAY WEST GERMAN WORRIES, HE REPEATEDLY REFUSED TO GIVE ANY INDICATION THAT FRANCE WOULD UNDERTAKE ANY NEW COMMITMENTS OR MAKE ANY NEW STATEMENTS, PUBLIC OR PRIVATE, BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL, FOR THE SECURITY OF THE WESTERN WORLD.

END OF SUMMARY

1. DE GAULLE OPENED THE CONVERSATION IMMEDIATELY WITH A QUESTION ASKING FOR OUR EVALUATION OF THE CZECH INVASION. I RESPONDED IN DETAIL UTILIZING THE DEPARTMENT'S 242962. I EMPHASIZED THAT INVASION HAD CREATED NEW MILITARY SITUATION WHICH IN TURN REQUIRED COLLECTIVE ACTION AS WELL AS BILATERAL ACTION BY WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO STRENGTHEN MILITARY DETERRENT AS BEST ANTIDOTE TO POSSIBLE SOVIET RECKLESSNESS. I REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO NEED FOR LARGER CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

DE GAULLE RESPONDED BY STATING THAT IN HIS OPINION THE SOVIETS COULD BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE AND HEIGHTEN THEIR PROPAGANDA WAR AGAINST WEST GERMANY, THAT THEY WOULD MAINTAIN PRESSURE ALL ALONG THE LINE, PSYCHOLOGICAL, MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, THAT IT WAS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE TO KEEP A FEAR OF GERMANY ALIVE IN EUROPE AND TO UTILIZE REVANCHISM AS AN EXCUSE FOR STRENGTHENING THEIR POSITION THROUGHOUT THE SATELLITE NATIONS. I NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS WERE USING ALLEGED ACTIVITIES BY WEST

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GERMANS IN CZECHOSLAVAKIA AS AN EXCUSE FOR THEIR OWN INVASION. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY WESTERN NATION THREATENING CZECHOSLAVAKIA. DE GAULLE SAID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT THE RUSSIANS WERE WORRIED BY THE THREAT OF A REVITALIZED GERMANY JOINING WITH CZECH AND PERHAPS EVEN EAST GERMANY, PLUS THE CHINESE, IN JOINT ACTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA ITSELF. THE RUSSIANS, HE SAID, WERE NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN WHICH THERE WAS NOTHING TO JUSTIFY SUCH A MASSIVE ACTION AS THE RUSSIANS HAD UNDERTAKEN AGAINST CZECH. RATHER, IT WAS THE SPECTRE OF CHINA AND GERMANY WORKING TOGETHER AGAINST RUSSIA IN THE NEXT FIVE OR TEN YEARS THAT WAS THE REAL CAUSE OF THEIR ALARM AND ACTIONS. HE REPEATED THAT HE ANTICIPATED FURTHER DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BY THE RUSSIANS AGAINST THE EAST GERMANS LOOKING TOWARD THE DAY WHEN HAVING BUILT A SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION, THE RUSSIANS WOULD INVADE HANOVER OR HAMBURG. WHEREUPON HE ASKED: IF THE RUSSIANS DID INVADE WEST GERMANY IF THEY DID BREACH THE WESTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY, WHAT WOULD THE U.S. DO?

II. RESPONDING TO DE GAULLE'S QUESTIONS I DREW HEAVILY ON THE DEPARTMENT'S 241234 AFFIRMING THAT THE U.S. HAS ALWAYS FULFILLED ITS TREATY RESPONSIBILITIES; THAT THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAD REAFFIRMED OUR COMMITMENTS TO THE ALLIANCE IN RECENT MEETINGS WITH FRG; THAT WE HAVE INFORMED THE SOVIETS THAT WE INTEND TO KEEP OUR OBLIGATIONS TO THE GERMANS; BUT THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE GREATLY ASSISTED BY A SHOW OF DETERMINATION AND COMMITMENT FROM THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE.

DE GAULLE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT NO COUNTRY IN EUROPE HAD SUFFICIENT POWER TO STAND UP TO THE RUSSIANS AND THAT, IN FACT, EVEN COLLECTIVELY THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT POWER. THUS, HE SAID, THE FIRST QUESTION REMAINED: WHAT WOULD THE U.S. DO? I REPEATED THAT THE U.S. HAD A RECORD OF LIVING UP TO ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND THAT OUR COUNTRY WOULD DO SO IN THIS CASE EVEN IF IT MEANT WAR. DE GAULLE ASKED WHETHER OR NOT THE U.S. WOULD BE PREPARED TO RESPOND IMMEDIATELY WITH OUR NUCLEAR POWER IF THE BORDERS OF GERMANY WERE VIOLATED, TO WHICH I RESPONDED THAT OUR COUNTRY WOULD PROBABLY NOT RESPOND INITIALLY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO AN INVASION BY CONVENTIONAL FORCES. RATHER, WE WOULD FIRST WANT TO UTILIZE OUR OWN CONVENTIONAL FORCES TOGETHER WITH THOSE OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES, THAT WE WISHED TO AVOID A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST. I POINTED OUT THAT THESE WERE MY OWN OPINIONS, THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT ON THIS ISSUE, BUT THAT SINCE HE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW FROM HIM WHAT FRANCE'S RESPONSE WOULD BE IF THE SOVIETS INVADED HANOVER OR HAMBURG AS HE HAD SUGGESTED.

DE GAULLE RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT A QUESTION OF FRANCE'S RESPONSE BECAUSE FRANCE DIDN'T HAVE THE POWER TO RESPOND ADEQUATELY TO SUCH AN ATTACK THAT FRANCE'S RESPONSE WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE U.S. RESPONSE; BUT THAT IF THE U.S. RESPONDED WITH ALL OF ITS POWER, FRANCE WOULD RESPOND WITH ALL OF ITS POWER.

I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD ADVISE ME IN GREATER DETAIL WITH HIS OWN OPINION OF FRANCE'S RESPONSE TO AN INVASION OF WEST GERMANY. HE RESPONDED BY SAYING AN INVASION OF WEST GERMANY WAS NOT AN INVASION OF FRANCE; THAT FRANCE HAD NO COMMON BORDER WITH RUSSIA; AND THAT FRANCE MUST LOOK TO ITS OWN LIFE AND DEATH AND TO ITS OWN FUTURE. HE SAID EXPLICITLY THAT THE U.S. WOULD DO THE SAME AND HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT THAT U.S. WOULD NOT RISK NUCLEAR WAR FOR THAT DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE. APPARENTLY HE BELIEVES THAT SINCE FRANCE WOULD NOT RESPOND TO A MILITARY INVASION OF WEST GERMANY BY DEPLOYING ALL OF ITS RESOURCES, NEITHER WOULD THE U.S. AND BECAUSE THE U.S. WOULD NOT REALLY MAKE AN ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT OF ITS MILITARY POWER BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR TO GERMANY, THE GERMANS ARE WORRIED AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE WORRIED NO MATTER WHAT THE FRENCH, ENGLISH OR ITALIANS SAY OR DO.

AT THREE DIFFERENT POINTS IN OUR CONVERSATIONS I SPECIFICALLY ASKED DE GAULLE TO SUGGEST WHAT THE U.S. COULD DO, ABOVE AND BEYOND WHAT WE HAVE ALREADY DONE, TO ALLAY HIS DOUBTS AND THE DOUBTS WHICH HE SAYS THE GERMANS HAVE. WHAT COULD BE DONE, I SAID, TO CONVINCE YOU THAT THE U.S. WILL LIVE UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS?

DE GAULLE WAS UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO SUGGEST ANY ACTION PUBLIC OR PRIVATE. MOREOVER WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT FRANCE MIGHT WELL CONSIDER ENLARGING ITS OWN COMMITMENTS, INTENSIFYING ITS MILITARY COOPERATION WITH GERMANY, AND REESTABLISHING CONTACTS WITH THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE. HE DECLINED TO RESPOND EITHER NEGATIVELY OR POSITIVELY. OUR CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH HIS OBSERVATION THAT THE SUBJECT WE WERE DISCUSSING WAS IMMENSE AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE MANY ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES TO TALK ABOUT IT, THAT HE WELCOMED THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING ME AGAIN.

HE MADE NO ALLUSION TO VIETNAM AND GAVE ME NO OCCASION TO DO SO BEFORE HE INDICATED HIS TIME HAD RUN OUT.

CONCLUSION

DE GAULLE APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AND IN A GOOD FRAME OF MIND. HE EVEN SMILED WARMLY AND SAID "THANK YOU VERY MUCH" IN ENGLISH WHEN, AS I WAS LEAVING, I CONGRATULATED HIM FOR HIS COURAGE AND VISION IN SUPPORTING THE NEW EDUCATIONAL REFORMS PROPOSED BY EDGAR FAURE IN WHICH SO MUCH EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON DECENTRALIZATION AND RELIANCE ON YOUTH. SHRIVER

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82479

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By ia, NARA Date 9-21-98

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SITING ROOM
WHITE HOUSE

SEPTEMBER 23, 1968

HEREWITH OUR MAN DAVIDSON IN OSLO REPORTS HIS LATEST CONVERSATIONS WITH NORWEGIANS.

OLSO 6683

1. JUST BEFORE NOON MONDAY SEPT 23, RIDGWAY AND I MET WITH ALGARD AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE. I OPENED BY LETTING HIM READ BUT NOT RETAIN GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON ON QUESTION OF POSSIBLE PUBLIC STATEMENT. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS HARRIMAN'S RECOMMENDATION TO WASHINGTON AND WAS NOT INTENDED AS A MESSAGE TO THE NORWEGIANS. I THEN TOLD ALGARD OF WASHINGTON'S VIEWS. ALGARD SAID THAT THE MESSAGES WERE "JUST WHAT HE NEEDED" TO DEAL WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING POSSIBLE FALLBACK POSITIONS BUT HOPED THAT A STATEMENT COULD BE AVOIDED ENTIRELY.

2. FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS I EMPHASIZED THAT EXACT DETAILED LANGUAGE WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN SERIOUS EXCHANGE SUCH AS MAY BE DEVELOPING HERE AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT NORWEGIANS WERE GETTING EXACT LANGUAGE NORTH VIETNAMESE USED AT CRITICAL POINTS. ALGARD SAID HE BELIEVED THAT NORWEGIANS HAD VERBATIM RECORD OF KEY POINTS. I THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE NORWEGIANS MIGHT RESTATE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF KEY POINTS MADE BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SO THAT THE NORWEGIAN UNDERSTANDING COULD BE CONFIRMED. (WE UNDERSTAND FROM VRAALSEN THAT RECORD OF FRIDAY AND SATURDAY SESSIONS NEARLY COMPLETED. HE HOPES TO HAVE COPIES AVAILABLE FOR US BEFORE WEDNESDAY.)

Presfile

3. YOU ARE CORRECT IN ASSUMING THAT IN CONVEYING OUR REQUIREMENTS IN RELATION TO THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING TO THE NORWEGIANS I MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO USE SUCH WORDS AS "CONDITIONS", "RECIPROCITY" OR OTHER LANGUAGE THAT MIGHT RUN INTO CONSIDERATIONS OF FACE OR PRESTIGE. HOWEVER, TO BE COMPLETELY CERTAIN ON THIS POINT I TOLD ALGARD THAT I HOPED I HAD NOT USED SUCH LANGUAGE. I SAID IT WAS A SIMPLE FACT OF LIFE THAT A CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENT COULD NOT CONTINUE IF DMZ WERE NOT RESPECTED, IF THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS ON THE MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS OR IF NORTH VIETNAM REFUSED TO SIT DOWN TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE GVN AS ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS. ALGARD REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOTED MY CAREFUL AVOIDANCE OF SUCH WORDS AND THAT WHEN WE SAW THE FULL NORWEGIAN RECORD OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WE WOULD SEE THAT HE HAD CONSISTENTLY TOLD THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT U.S. WAS NOT SEEKING RECIPROCITY BUT ONLY "SOME UNDERSTANDING" OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING.

4. I EMPHASIZED THAT U.S. CONCERN EXTENDS BEYOND THE PROTECTION OF U.S. FORCES TO OBTAINING EQUAL PROTECTION FOR GVN AND ALLIED FORCES IN THE DMZ AND ELSEWHERE. ALGARD SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN EMPHASIZING NEED FOR PROTECTION OF U.S. TROOPS BOTH IN CONTEXT OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC REQUIREMENTS AND BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT FOR THE SAFETY OF HIS TROOPS. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE REGARDED EXTENDING HIS REMARKS TO CLEARLY COVER ALLIED AND GVN TROOPS AS SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT HE WOULD DO SO.

5. I ASKED ALGARD IF HE COULD PROBE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FURTHER AS TO WHAT THEY MEANT WHEN THEY SAID THAT A CESSATION OF U.S. BOMBING AND SHELLING OF NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BRING AN END TO ALL ACTS OF WAR BY NORTH VIETNAM AGAINST THE U.S. ALGARD SAID THAT IT WAS HIS "FIRM UNDERSTANDING" THAT THEY MEANT ALL KINDS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY THEY WERE CONDUCTING AGAINST THE U.S. HE SAID HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS SO FIRM THAT HE HAD NOT THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO PRESS NORTH VIETNAMESE FOR FURTHER AMPLIFICATION. I POINTED OUT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD SPECIFICALLY ONLY REFERRED TO THEIR FIRING OF ARTILLERY ACROSS THE DMZ AND THEIR FIRING AT U.S. PLANES AND SHIPS FROM EMBLEMMENTS WITHIN NORTH VIETNAM AND THAT IT SEEMED DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET THEIR LANGUAGE AS APPLYING ALSO TO MOVEMENT IN OR THROUGH THE DMZ OR PASSING ABOVE THE DMZ. ON REFLECTION ALGARD AGREED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMENT WAS INDEED AMBIGUOUS AND THAT HE WOULD TRY TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION.

6. FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION, I URGED THAT NORWEGIANS ONCE AGAIN RESTATE THE NEED FOR GVN INCLUSION IN SUBSEQUENT TALKS IF THEY ARE TO BE SERIOUS. I SAID THIS WAS NOT A CONDITION BUT RATHER A MINIMUM DESCRIPTION OF WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE APPEAR TO ENVISAGE. I TOLD ALGARD THAT IN SPITE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REFUSAL TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER IN OSLO IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT IT BE RAISED WITH THEM AGAIN SO AS NOT TO MISLEAD THEM AS TO THE U.S. POSITION. ALGARD SAID HE WOULD BRING UP THE MATTER AGAIN.

7. I ASKED ALGARD IF AFTER WE HAD THEIR FULL RECORD OF CONVERSATIONS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE I COULD HAVE A LONG MEETING WITH HIM AND VRAALSEN TO REVIEW THEIR NOTES. HE AGREED.

8. VRAALSEN LEFT AT 7:20 THIS MORNING WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATE TO SIGHTSEE IN BERGEN AND WILL RETURN WITH THEM THIS EVENING IN TIME FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE TO MAKE DINNER AT SOVIET EMBASSY. BEFORE LEAVING VRAALSEN REPORTED TO U.S. THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE IN INTEREST OF MAINTAINING BALANCE HAD CALLED AT COMMUNIST CHINESE EMBASSY ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON AND HAD DINED THERE SUNDAY EVENING. ALGARD EXPECTS TO SEE NORTH VIETNAMESE THIS EVENING BEFORE THEY LEAVE FOR SOVIET EMBASSY. ALGARD WAS UNHAPPY WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE BRINGING CHINESE INTO PICTURE SINCE HE FELT IT WOULD MAKE HIS POSITION IN PEKING JUST THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT BUT HE ACCEPTED THE EXPLANATION RE BALANCE WHICH THEY OFFERED AND ALSO THEIR ASSURANCE THEY HAD NOT TOLD CHINESE SUBSTANCE OF VISIT.

9. I HAVE OF COURSE AVOIDED ANY DISCUSSION WHATSOEVER OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL MATTERS WITH THE NORWEGIANS.

10. I BELIEVE AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREES THAT ALL POINTS I WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE (OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH AROSE AFTER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARRIVED) WERE MADE IN MY INITIAL PRESENTATION TO THE NORWEGIANS.

DTG 232151Z SEPT 1968

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82474

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SEP 23 1968
SEP 23 1968

THANOM, THE THAI PRIME MINISTER, SUGGESTED WE GET WITH THANAT IN SWITZERLAND ON A MEETING DURING OCTOBER IN BANGKOK.

AS FOLLOWING INDICATES, THANAT IS WILLING AND SUGGESTS OCTOBER 14.
BERN 4408

Columbia

free file

QUOTE

1. I MET TODAY, SEPTEMBER 23, AT NOON LOCAL TIME IN GENEVA WITH THAI FOMIN THANAT AS PER INSTRUCTIONS. ALSO PRESENT AT REQUEST OF THANAT WAS THAI AMBASSADOR TO SWITZERLAND (CHOONHAVAN).

2. THANAT'S COMMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. INSOFAR AS HE IS CONCERNED, BANGKOK IS SATISFACTORY AS LOCUS FOR SUGGESTED CONFERENCE. (NO NEED AROSE TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVE SITES.)

B. INSOFAR AS DATES ARE CONCERNED, HE BELIEVES WEEK BEGINNING OCTOBER 7 IS NOT FEASIBLE. HOWEVER, WEEK BEGINNING EITHER OCTOBER 14 OR OCTOBER 21 IS SATISFACTORY FOR HIM, ALTHOUGH OCTOBER 21 OBVIOUSLY GIVES MORE LEAD TIME FOR CONSULTATION, PREPARATION, ETC. HE UNDERSTANDS HOWEVER OUR POSITION AND STATES THAT IF OCTOBER 14 IS MOST DESIRABLE DATE FROM U.S. POINT OF VIEW AND FITS THE PLANNING OF OTHER ALLIES, THAT DATE IS AGREEABLE TO HIM.

C. HE WILL COMMUNICATE WITH BANGKOK REFLECTING THESE VIEWS. I GAVE HIM CODE NAME (PARAGRAPH 5, BANGKOK 20597).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 10-4-01

3. THANAT FURTHER OBSERVED:

A. HE BELIEVES PRIMARY IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO MANNER IN WHICH NEED FOR CONFERENCE IS PRESENTED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION AND ESPECIALLY TO AMERICAN PRESS. HE OBSERVED HE DID NOT BELIEVE MUCH CONSTRUCTIVE PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED IN ANNOUNCING MEETING IF IT APPEARED ONLY REASON WAS "TO MEET". HE BELIEVES PUBLIC REASONS ADVANCED FOR NEED OF CONFERENCE MUST BE "PLAUSIBLE". HE DID NOT SEEM TO ME TO REACT STRONGLY TO NEED FOR CONFERENCE BASED ON AMERICAN POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OR TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIONS. HE SEEMED RATHER TO BELIEVE REASONS FOR CONFERENCE MUST BE "PLAUSIBLE" AND "LARGE". ALTHOUGH HE ADVANCED NO REASONS OF HIS OWN, HE APPEARED TO APPROVE OF REASONS ADVANCED BY AMBASSADOR UNGER IN PARAGRAPH 5, BANGKOK'S 20597, I.E. ALLIED DETERMINATION TO STAND BY VIET NAM AND PERSUADE NORTH VIETNAMESE THEY WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO BEGIN SERIOUS TALKS IN PARIS.

B. HE BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT TO BEGIN IMMEDIATE PRELIMINARY TALKS WITH OTHER ALLIES SO THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF CONFERENCE AND OTHER PERTINENT MATTERS CAN BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED.

C. HE FURTHER BELIEVES THAILAND CAN MAKE "APPROPRIATE PERPARATIONS" VERY QUICKLY. HE HIMSELF HAD INTENDED TO BE IN NEW YORK FOR UNITED NATIONS SESSION AROUND OCTOBER 14 BUT BELIEVES HE CAN ADJUST THIS DATE TO OCTOBER 13 SO HE CAN BE PRESENT IN BANGKOK IF SUGGESTED CONFERENCE IS HELD WEEK BEGINNING OCTOBER 14.

D. THANAT STATED THAILAND IS "PLEASED TO BE COOPERATIVE WITH OUR FRIEND AND ALLY THE UNITED STATES" IN ARRANGING LOCUS AND DATES OF MEETING AS PER EXPLORATORY SUGGESTIONS.

HAYES

END QUOTE

DTG: 231819Z SEP 1968

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82478

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: DIGEST OF STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS FOR
SEPTEMBER 23, 1968

E A S T A S I A

SABAH: MOVE TO MEDIATION

PRESIDENT MARCOS AND PRIME MINISTER RAHMAN HAVE BOTH SAID THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET FOR DISCUSSIONS ON SABAH. EMBASSY MANILA REPORTS MARCOS IS ANXIOUS FOR A MEDIATED SOLUTION AND THINKS SUCH A MEETING MAY BE THE BEGINNING OF A SOLUTION. THE MALAYSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY TOLD EMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IT HAS RECOMMENDED TO RAHMAN THE RETURN OF A DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE TO MANILA.

SABAH: MALAYSIAN REACTION

ALTHOUGH THE MALAYSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY HAS ADOPTED A RELATIVELY RELAXED POSTURE AND BOTH PRESIDENT MARCOS AND PRIME MINISTER RAHMAN HAVE SAID THEY WILL NOT RESORT TO FORCE, A MALAY REGIMENT IS BEING SENT TO SABAH "FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES ONLY," AND THE MALAYSIANS HAVE INDICATED THEY ARE DETERMINED TO REMOVE PHILIPPINE CUSTOMS OFFICIALS FROM SABAH. A PENANG YOUTH GROUP IS REPORTEDLY CALLING FOR VOLUNTEERS TO DEFEND SABAH.

BRITISH ON SABAH

THE BRITISH TOLD EMBASSY LONDON THEY FULLY SHARE OUR VIEW THEY MUST USE ALL THEIR INFLUENCE TO KEEP THE SABAH ISSUE FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND. THE BRITISH FEEL THEIR RECENT NAVAL EXERCISE KEPT THE MALAYSIAN PRIME MINISTER FROM DEMANDING SOME OTHER ACTION THAT COULD HAVE BEEN MORE EMBARRASSING.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NJ 02-10

By sj, NARA, Date 6-25-02

XEROX FROM QUECK COPY

N E A R E A S T

EGYPT ON ARAB/ISRAELI CONFLICT

EGYPTIAN PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER AL-KHOULI TOLD ASSISTANT SECRETARY BATTLE THAT THE UAR IS WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE OF COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAEL, BUT FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE THE POINT IN PUBLIC WHILE ISRAEL OCCUPIES ITS TERRITORY. BATTLE STRESSED BOTH SIDES' PRIVATE POSITIONS WERE MUCH LESS INFLAMMATORY THAN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND URGED EGYPT MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THE CLIMATE CONDUCIVE TO FRUITFUL RESULTS.

E U R O P E

FRENCH RELUCTANT ON TRIPARTITE NOTE

THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN BONN SAYS OUR AMENDED DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED TRIPARTITE NOTE ON THE USE OF EAST GERMAN TROOPS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA DIFFERS FROM THE GUIDELINES SENT FROM PARIS. THE FRENCH AGREED TO SEND OUR DRAFT TO PARIS, AND EMBASSY BONN HOPES WE WILL APPROACH THE FRENCH AND ASK FOR IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT, WHICH MAY BE EASIER TO OBTAIN BEFORE DE GAULLE GOES TO BONN.

A F R I C A

BIAFRAN AIR DROP

EMBASSY LAGOS RECOMMENDS WE NOT ENDORSE THE PROPOSED BRITISH AIR DROP UNLESS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SAYS IT WOULD WELCOME IT. AMBASSADOR MATHEWS THINKS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL OPPOSE AN AIR DROP, PREFERRING TO COAX THE IBOS OUT OF THE BUSH WITH FOOD IN THE WAKE OF EXPECTED VICTORY RATHER THAN SEE FOOD GO INTO POCKETS OF REBEL-HELD TERRITORY AND PROLONG RESISTANCE.

CONGO/RWANDA RELATIONS

AMBASSADOR CYR REPORTS RWANDAN PRESIDENT KAYIBANDA SAID DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WOULD SOON BE REESTABLISHED BETWEEN RWANDA AND CONGO (KINSHASA). CYR SUGGESTS WE URGE GENERAL MOBUTU TO BE MAGNANIMOUS AND MAKE THE FIRST MOVE.

DTG 232129Z SEPTEMBER 1968

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-158
By us, NARA Date 11-20-98

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAPE2475

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Profile

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEPTEMBER 23, 1968

HERewith BEAM ASSESSES TANGLED STATE OF AFFAIRS ONE MONTH AFTER INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

1. ONE MONTH AFTER SOVIETS AND THEIR FRIENDS OCCUPIED CZECHOSLOVAKIA, QUESTION CAN BE ASKED WHETHER RESULTS FROM MOSCOW'S POINT OF VIEW JUSTIFY COSTS WHICH HAVE BEEN INCURRED.
2. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE IN POSITION TO PUT UNLIMITED DEMANDS ON CZECHS, BACKED BY THREAT OF APPLYING OVERWHELMING MILITARY FORCE ALREADY ON SCENE, SOVIETS CLEARLY HAVE NOT OBTAINED OPTIMUM AIMS IN NUMBER OF FIELDS.
3. SITUATION IN MASS MEDIA IS GOOD EXAMPLE. WHILE CENTRAL DAILY PRESS HAS BEEN LYING LOW, PERIODICALS HAVE BEEN MUCH LESS INHIBITED THAN MIGHT BE EXPECTED IN OCCUPIED COUNTRY (THIS WEEK'S ISSUE OF REPORTER IS ONE OF MORE EXTREME EXAMPLES), AND PROVINCIAL PRESS HAS IN SOME INSTANCES INCURRED RE-OCCUPATION BY SOVIET TROOPS. CSCP HAS FORMALLY SANCTIONED OPERATIONS OF CLANDESTINE RADIO DURING OCCUPATION.
4. CERTAIN PERSONNEL CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE TO MEET SOVIET WISHES, BUT SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTIONS COME TO MIND: CISAR, SOVIET BETE NOIRE OF LONG STANDING, REMAINS AS HEAD CZECH NATIONAL COUNCIL FROM WHICH VANTAGE POINT HE IS FREQUENTLY IN PUBLIC EYE: SIX, ALTHOUGH OUT OF GOVERNMENT, MAY GET BELGRADE ASSIGNMENT AND IN ANY CASE HAS NOT BEEN REMOVED AS HEAD IMPORTANT ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, AND ECONOMIC REFORM LINKED WITH HIS NAME WAS VIGOROUSLY DEFENDED IN RUDE PRAVO: HAJEK RESIGNATION WAS OFFSET BY CONCURRENT DISMISSAL OF SOVIET AGENT HOFFMAN; MOST IMPORTANT, DUBCEK, WHOM SOVIETS APPARENTLY DOING BEST TO UNDERCUT (WITH SOME SUCCESS IN CERTAIN PARTY CIRCLES), IS BEING BUILT UP BY MEDIA AS SYMBOL OF NATIONAL UNITY AND POPULAR HOPES.

PRESERVATION COPY

5. CZECHS PROCEEDING WITH REHABILITATION PROCEEDINGS DESPITE ANTI-SOVIET IMPLICATIONS.

6. CZECHS AND SLOVAKS ALSO PRECEEDING WITH PLANS FOR FORMALIZING FEDERAL SET-UP. WE HAVE IMPRESSION SOVIETS ARE PLAYING COMPLEX GAME ON THIS ISSUE. ON ONE HAND, THEY PRESUMABLY ARE NOT UNHAPPY TO SLOVAK/CZECH FRICTION AS MEANS OF CUTTING PRAGUE LEADERSHIP DOWN TO SIZE; INDEED THEIR BUILDING UP HUSAK MAY WELL HAVE BEEN FOR PURPOSE ENCOURAGING SUCH FRICTION. ON OTHER HAND, ONE STORY HERE HAS IT THAT KUZNETSOV IS URGING CZECHS TO GO SLOW WITH FEDERALIZATION BECAUSE ESTABLISHMENT OF MEANINGFUL FEDERATED SETUP HERE COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS AMONG NATIONALITIES IN SOVIET UNION (AND BRING CLOSER TO HOME CHALLENGE POSED BY YUGOSLAVS TO SOVIET CONCEPT OF HIGHLY CENTRALIZED PARTY OPERATING BEHIND FACADE OF WEAK REPUBLICAN INSTITUTIONS). IF SOVIETS WERE TO SUCCEED IN IMPEDING FEDERAL ARRANGEMENT (WITHOUT EXPOSING THEMSELVES AS PRINCIPAL OBSTACLE) THEY WOULD BE ADVANCING THEIR INTERESTS ON BOTH COUNTS, SINCE FAILURE BY SLOVAKS TO ACHIEVE DEMANDS WOULD FURTHER EXACERBATE SLOVAK-CZECH RELATIONS.

7. WE CONCLUDE THAT IN SPITE OF SETBACK WHICH SOVIETS HAVE ADMINISTERED TO CZECHOSLOVAK LIBERALIZATION, THEY HAVE FALLEN SHORT OF WHAT APPLICATION OF THIS MUCH MILITARY POWER MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO ACCOMPLISH. IN ABSENCE OF MAJOR CHANGE OF POLICY DIRECTION IN MOSCOW, WE WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT THAT SOVIETS WILL TAKE FURTHER STEPS. ACTIONS SUCH AS OCCUPATION OF MASS MEDIA OFFICES OFFER ONE MEANS OF GRADUALLY STEPPING UP PRESSURE, DEMONSTRATING INABILITY DUBCEK PROTECT CZECHOSLOVAK INSTITUTIONS AND AT SAME TIME MAKING CLEAR THEY BELIEVE DUBCEK INCAPABLE OF IMPLEMENTING MOSCOW PROTOCOL ON HIS OWN.

8. UPCOMING BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH PRAGUE LEADERS WILL OFFER SOVIETS OPPORTUNITY TO BE MORE IMPLICIT ABOUT THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF PRAGUE'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER MOSCOW PROTOCOL. APPARENT FOR EXAMPLE THAT TWO SIDES HAVE QUITE DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT WHAT CONSTITUTES INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. INCREASINGLY BOLD LINE FOLLOWED BY CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS POSES NEW QUESTIONS FOR SOVIETS.

9. WHETHER MOSCOW WILL NOW TAKE SIGNIFICANTLY HARDER LINE WITH CZECHS, MERELY ACCELERATE SOFTENING UP PROCESS, OR RESUME DISCREET RETREAT FROM EXTREME POSITION TAKEN AUGUST 21, OBVIOUSLY IS QUESTION WHICH IS BEYOND ANALYSIS FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT SINCE IT INVOLVES NOT ONLY INTENTIONS OF SOVIET LEADERS TOWARD CZECHOSLOVAKIA BUT ALSO THEIR BROADER STRATEGIC OUTLOOK.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG 231907Z SEP 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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DE WTE 3848

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82475

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEPTEMBER 23, 1968

BILL JORDEN CALLED. HE HAD NOT RECEIVED MY BACK-CHANNEL
BUT HE WAS AWARE OF THE PEARSON STORY.

See file

HE SAID THEY HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH STATE AND WERE
KNOCKING IT DOWN HARD.

AS FOR NOEL-BAKER, HE DID CALL ON HARRIMAN ABOUT A MONTH
AGO. HE HAD NO PLAN AND DID NOT PRETEND TO HAVE A PLAN.
THE CALL WAS SOCIAL -- SO TRIVIAL AVERELL DID NOT EVEN
REPORT IT.

FOLLOWING IS THE MANNER IN WHICH MCCLOSKEY OF STATE
HANDLED THE PEARSON STORY THIS MORNING.

Q. BOB, THERE IS AN ARTICLE IN THIS MORNING'S
PAPER INDICATING THAT THE AMBASSADORS AT THE PARIS TALKS
ARE HAVING THEIR HANDS HELD BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THEIR LATTITUDE IN NEGOTIATING IS BEING CRIMPED.

A. WELL, WE HAVE LOOKED AT THIS COLUMN THOUOUGHLY.
IT'S BEEN DISCUSSED WITH OUR DELEGATION IN PARIS
THIS MORNING. THERE IS A REFERENCE, FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO
HAVE READ IT, TO PHILIP NOEL-BAKER, AND I CAN ASSURE YOU
THAT THERE IS NO BASIS IN FACT FOR THE TERMS IN WHICH HE
IS REFERRED TO IN THE COLUMN. HE DID SEE AMBASSADOR
HARRIMAN BRIEFLY ON A VISIT, I BELIEVE IT WAS IN JUNE,
WHICH IS DESCRIBED TO ME AS HAVING BEEN A SOCIAL VISIT.
THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF PEACE PLANS.

ON ANOTHER POINT, THERE WAS NO TIME IN JULY OR
ANY OTHER TIME WHEN WE WERE ON THE VERGE OF AN AGREEMENT.
THIS IS WITH RESPECT TO A LULL IN THE FIGHTING AS A MEANS
OF UNLOCKING THE TALKS SO THAT THEY WOULD PROGRESS FURTHER.

AMBASSADOR VANCE HAS ADVISED US THAT ON THE
THIRD POINT HE WAS NOT SURPRISED, AS IT WAS ALLEGED IN THE
COLUMN, THAT WHEN HE WAS ASKED TO COME DOWN TO THE PRESIDENT'S
RANCH, HE KNEW THAT RICHARD NIXON WOULD BE THERE.

AND ON THE MATTER OF THE DELEGATION BEING LEASHED,
THAT IS DESCRIBED AS NONSENSE! THE PRESIDENT IS, OF COURSE,
DZEPLY INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATIONS AND FOLLOWS THEM CLOSELY,
AS I THINK MIGHT BE APPRECIATED AND UNDERSTOOD BY MOST OF US.

DTG 231851Z SEP 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 12-10-92

PLEASE QUEUE COPY

49

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FR 4604-68, vol. 25, #512

By JC. NARA. Date 10-12-01

Free file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 23, 1968 -- 6:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

The attached memorandum and file (Tab 1) are, in a sense, a reclama from Secretaries Rusk and Freeman, Bill Gaud, and Charlie Zwick on your decision of August 5 on India. (See Tab 2) The history is as follows.

-- We reported firmly and clearly to one and all that you wished to make no further decisions on India in your administration.

-- In examining the political and economic consequences of this judgment, Sec. Rusk, for one set of reasons, Sec. Freeman for another, Bill Gaud and Charlie Zwick for a third, all felt that they had a duty to lay the matter once more before you on the following basis: What absolutely minimal decisions on Indian aid were required to keep alive the political and economic assets which you had built up there through your policies. (Sec. Freeman's anxiety has another dimension which is wholly familiar to you.) They concluded by raising for your decision:

- A \$50 million fertilizer loan (as opposed to \$200 million in general AID funds because, as Zwick's memorandum says: "Failure to order this fertilizer now will mean a serious shortage of fertilizer for India next year which cannot be made up later. "
- Similarly, this minimal program would cut the proposed 5.5 million tons of wheat to 1.5 million tons: the reason "If there is a break in PL 480 shipments from August through next March, we are all concerned that the buffer stocks will be drawn down to a point where the Indian government will be unable to move ahead in breaking down the food zones that prevent building a national agricultural market. "

Secretary Rusk, I gather, is prepared to make this case to you on political grounds.

Since you know so well the arguments surrounding Indian aid, I forward the attached file unsigned by me: another signature is of no help. I do feel it is my duty, however, to make available to you this proposed minimal package which is, in the judgment of your responsible advisers, the recommended course of action in the light of your well understood reservations.

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Monday, September 23, 1968

SUBJECT: Remaining Decisions in Your Indian Policy

The attached recommendation for a \$50 million fertilizer loan to India prompted Charlie Zwick to pull together a complete picture of all the Indian aid decisions you will face through January, assuming Congress votes the IDA replenishment. With the full support of Secretaries Rusk, Freeman and Bill Gaud, he recommends a final minimum program--a \$50 million fertilizer loan and 1.5 million tons of PL 480 wheat. This is designed to sustain the momentum of the major Indian turnaround your policy has made possible since 1965, while still leaving most FY 1969 Indian aid decisions to the next Administration. Secretary Fowler concurs.

The framework for Zwick's review was (1) the roughly \$200 million (of \$385 million requested) AID will have for India this fiscal year, and (2) the 5.5 million tons of wheat we planned for India when you approved our 1968 acreage allotments and the first half of this year's PL 480.

Fertilizer

There is a strong development case for obligating the entire \$200 million of AID money in the next few months. The Indians continue moving ahead on self-help and reform measures. This year's bumper harvest triggered a general recovery. Under normal circumstances, the AID economists would argue for dividing the \$200 million in half between fertilizer loans to sustain the food-growing revolution and program loans to spur industrial recovery.

The Zwick review, however, pared away all industrial lending and cut the fertilizer to \$50 million. It is hard to be precise about the costs of this approach. The main problem is that the Indian Cabinet has continuously before it decisions necessary to maintain economic momentum--important projects, further steps toward a national food market and major investment decisions for the new budget in January. How bold they are will depend on how they judge our continued participation. In this short-term context, the continuity of our effort is almost more important than the level of our aid.

The fertilizer loan is one exception. Fertilizer deliveries must begin this fall in order to nourish the next Indian harvest--an important one in further consolidating India's agricultural turnaround. Although India produces an increasing amount of its own fertilizer, it still must import about \$300 million a year--about half from us if we add this loan to others you have approved. Zwick's main point is that this is one thing we either do now or not at all.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tab 1

Limited PL-480

Zwick and the others did the same selective surgery on the remaining half of the 5.5 million tons of wheat planned for India this year. To meet your desire to do as little as possible, they recommend paring their earlier proposal to 1.5 million tons. This would leave the Indians below target in building a buffer to support the CCC-type operation we have been pushing them to adopt. But again it is more a problem of providing a sense of continuing support than of a specific level. If there is a break in PL 480 shipments from August through next March, we are all concerned that the buffer stocks will be drawn down to a point where the Indian government will be unable to move ahead in breaking down the food zones that prevent building a national agricultural market.

Recommendation

Your close advisors understand your position on Indian aid. Zwick put first priority on minimizing your decisions and offering leeway to the next Administration. All believe we should do at least this much to keep present momentum and hopes intact for your successor.

My time with you in the White House almost exactly parallels the great turnaround in Indian development policy and in India's historic breakthrough in agriculture. Much of this is your own personal success. I would hate to see anything jeopardize it. The minimum program Zwick outlines is an attempt to protect it while taking your other concerns into account. I strongly recommend you approve.

I know Secretary Rusk has personally reviewed this recommendation. Perhaps you would wish to discuss it with him before making a decision.

W. W. Rostow

Approve fertilizer loan _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Approve limited PL 480 _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

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1-~~Ret~~
2-Ret
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SEP 12 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Aid to India

In the attached memorandum Bill Gaud requests your approval to provide a \$50 million loan to India for fertilizer.

I know that you are concerned about new food and aid commitments to India and want to keep as many options open as is possible for the new Administration. With this in mind I have reviewed the possible upcoming commitments to India through January with Dean Rusk, Orville Freeman, and Bill Gaud to determine what can best be postponed and what you still might want to consider.

AID fertilizer loan

The reduced level of appropriations will probably leave AID with \$170-200 million for India this fiscal year. We have reviewed the timing of our AID commitments and conclude that only the \$50 million loan for fertilizer need be provided before January. The balance of our economic aid to India (\$120-150 million) would be left for review by the next Administration.

Continuation of high Indian agricultural yields next year depends on timely arrival of fertilizer. Although India's own production is rising rapidly, her fertilizer import requirement is still \$300-350 million annually. The proposed \$50 million AID loan, together with previous loans, would continue at about half the share of India's fertilizer imports financed by U. S. aid. Failure to order this fertilizer now will mean a serious shortage of fertilizer for India next year which cannot be made up later. Moreover, approving this loan now would stretch the AID dollar because U. S. manufacturers offer lower prices on orders placed now before the peak production period early next year.

The fertilizer loan would be used only for the purchase of goods and services in the United States. Since it covers only a portion of India's need for fertilizer imports, it also leaves room for some commercial purchases to the extent the balance is not financed by other donors' aid. AID will advise the Indians that in making the loan we expect that an appropriate share of any commercial purchases of fertilizer will be made in the United States. On the basis of these considerations, Secretary Fowler concurs in this loan.

I recommend authorizing the proposed fertilizer loan.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 10-16-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CH-1117

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2

P. L. 480

The 1968 wheat acreage allotments were based upon estimated shipments of 5.5 million tons to India during fiscal year 1969. This would provide our share of the jointly planned build-up of buffer stocks with targets of 3 million tons by December 31, 1968, and 6 million tons by December 31, 1969.

Your disapproval of the proposed 2.3 million ton shipment for the balance of this calendar year will leave the Indians significantly below this year's target and make a real break in the planned build-up for next year. The absence of our wheat during this period could undermine the Indians' ability to continue with their buffer stock program and related pricing policies. If we agreed now to provide a limited program of 1.5 million tons, it would complete the necessary build-up through January on schedule leaving the balance (4 million tons) for review by the new Administration.

The consistent accumulation of buffer stocks is an integral part of the two-year success story of the set of agricultural policies which you have achieved in India. The Indians have performed well on this important measure by accumulating stocks during the harvest season and holding the price support line.

I recommend you authorize this minimum wheat shipment for the balance of your Administration plus 76,000 tons of tallow for a total value of \$110 million.

Both the proposed fertilizer and P. L. 480 loans are within the 1969 budget cutback levels.



Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Fertilizer loan

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Limited P. L. 480 shipments

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

49c

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

JUL 26 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Fertilizer Loan for India

Proposal: We propose that you approve a \$50 million loan for India to finance about 250 thousand metric tons of fertilizer imports under Continuing Resolution authority.

Discussion: In my memorandum of June 3, 1968, I described to you the urgent need to make available to India \$75 million or more in development loans so that India could procure fertilizer in the U.S. in time to prepare for the crucial crop of 1969. You approved my request to obligate up to \$30 million out of our FY 1968 appropriation -- the exact size of the loan was to be determined by the availability of funds at the end of the fiscal year. Actually available was \$23 million for this loan; thus, there remains still uncovered a requirement of at least \$50 million to cover tendering through September for delivery to U.S. ports between February and June 1969.

The GOI now requests another \$75 million for immediate procurement of fertilizer. We have some questions about the possible impact of purchases in this magnitude on the U.S. market, as well as on shipping facilities and port capacity. Therefore, we decided that it would be prudent to limit additional A.I.D. financed tenders by India to \$50 million at least until we can get a better fix on the effect of these purchases. This \$50 million loan should meet the requirements for delivery through next June except for the \$25 million which we still have under examination. If we have the funds, we will need to make available before next spring additional loans from the FY 1969 appropriations to permit India to issue tenders for delivery after June 1969.

Total FY 1969 Assistance Plans

In the May 1968 meeting of the Aid-India Consortium, the IBRD estimated that India required about \$950 million of Consortium assistance to carry forward its economic reform program during the Indian Fiscal Year which began April 1, 1968. The first \$100 million of this requirement

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- 2 -

was met through successful conclusion of the debt relief negotiations. The U.S. delegate made no commitment with respect to the U.S. contribution, but assured the Consortium of our continued support of India's new economic policies. The current prospects for our FY 1969 appropriations make it highly unlikely that we can provide our historical share of 42 per cent of total Consortium contributions to India. The requested loan of \$50 million -- plus the recently approved \$23 million loan which also counts toward our program for the Indian Fiscal Year 1968/69 -- still leaves us wide flexibility in determining the ultimate size of the U.S. share.

The IBRD estimates that India's fertilizer import needs for Indian Fiscal Year (IFY) 1968/69 will cost \$330 million. As the growth in demand will continue to outpace India's productive capability at least through this period, an import bill of roughly \$350 million seems likely for IFY 1969/70. Funding arrangements must precede actual imports by a minimum of seven months. The timing of our loans should also be related to the summer slack in demand by the U.S. farmer.

The A.I.D. appropriation request pending before Congress includes \$385 million for commodity aid to India, of which \$200 million was intended for fertilizer. Even on the basis of the most pessimistic assumptions concerning the size of the FY 1969 appropriations, the \$50 million now requested is much less than the allotment we plan for India. Within the inevitably reduced availabilities, we attribute top priority to keeping the fertilizer pipeline full in order to maintain momentum of the revolution in Indian agriculture which we helped induce.

The Role of Fertilizer in India's Agriculture Revolution

Perhaps the most important component of the economic policy reform package taken by the Indian Government in 1966 was the shift in emphasis of its comprehensive development plan to agriculture. A massive increase in the use of fertilizers, pesticides, and high-yielding seeds by the Indian farmer was the keystone of the effort to increase food and agriculture production. Clear evidence of the vigorous efforts made by the GOI to implement the new strategy is found in the fertilizer consumption statistics. The kink in the trend line which occurred in IFY 1966/67 marks the impact of the new agriculture policy.

| <u>Indian Fiscal Year</u> | <u>Nutrient Tons</u> |
|---------------------------|----------------------|
| 1961/62 | 380,000 |
| 1962/63 | 490,000 |
| 1963/64 | 570,000 |
| 1964/65 | 650,000 |

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- 3 -

| <u>Indian Fiscal Year</u> | <u>Nutrient Tons</u> |
|---------------------------|----------------------|
| 1965/66 | 800,000 |
| 1966/67 | 1,320,000 |
| 1967/68 | 1,925,000 |

For the current year and the next two years, the consumption targets call for continuation of the steep upward trend.

| | |
|---------|-----------|
| 1968/69 | 2,650,000 |
| 1969/70 | 3,330,000 |
| 1970/71 | 4,100,000 |

The sharp upturn in fertilizer consumption coincides with the introduction and rapid expansion in use of new high-yielding grain varieties. From negligible number of acres, plantings with improved seeds rose rapidly.

| | |
|----------------|------------------|
| 1966/67 | 3 million acres |
| 1967/68 | 15 million acres |
| 1968/69 Target | 21 million acres |

The Indian Government has been living up to its commitment to maintain grain prices at levels which will assure the farmer of an adequate return for his investment in fertilizer, pesticides, and improved seeds. Now that the Indian farmer has seen how government policies can influence crop prices and supply of essential inputs, a vested interest among the farmers is being rapidly created which in turn should provide increasingly forceful indigenous political support for the maintenance and extension of the new policies.

The agriculture reform policies have now started to pay off. The actual harvest for the crop year ending in this past March set an all time record. About 100 million metric tons of grains were harvested which is 12 per cent greater than the previous records of 1964/65. A harvest this year as good or better than the one just past will brighten the prospect not only for agriculture but for the entire Indian development effort. For this reason, we consider it crucial that no shortages be permitted to develop in fertilizer supplies.

Additionality

On the basis of our negotiations, we are convinced that India understands the importance which the United States attaches to the problem of additionality, and that within the narrow limits of free foreign exchange availability, she will continue her efforts to increase

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 4 -

purchases in the United States. The fertilizer imports proposed from the U.S. would, in the absence of the proposed loan, probably be purchased from other suppliers.

Symington and Conte-Long Amendments

There has been no change in our approach or in the situation regarding these amendments from that described in my memorandum of April 8, 1968 on the \$225 million production loan and which I reaffirmed on June 3, 1968 in my recommendation to you regarding the authorization of the \$23 million development loan for fertilizer.

When a general program loan is proposed for India later this fiscal year, we will have an opportunity to make a set-aside to cover the possible need for a Conte-Long deduction. To cover the interim, we may wish to extend our right to draw down the \$25 million set aside for such purpose last fiscal year.

Recommendation: It is recommended that you authorize an initial development loan to India of \$50 million from FY 1969 funds for fertilizer of U.S. origin.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday, August 5, 1968

Ranch
Aug 6, 1968
8:30 a

HOLD
THIS
LONG
AS
POSSIBLE
THEY
DISAPPROVE

49d
Ans. to Ed Hamrick

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Wheat for India

Herewith Messrs. Freeman, Gaud and Zwick recommend a \$169 million PL-480 agreement with India. Zwick's memorandum (Tab A) is a concise summary of the proposal. The more detailed Freeman/Gaud memorandum is at Tab B.

This agreement would provide for the second half of calendar 1968. Last December you approved a \$216 million bargain providing 3.5 million tons of grain to cover the first half. This agreement will provide another 2.3 million tons of grain, along with small amounts of tallow, milk and tobacco. Total: 5.8 million tons of grain to India in 1968 -- about the same as last year.

The development case for providing the food is strong. The Indians have moved on all the self-help measures called for in the December agreement and are ahead of schedule on the important ones. The new wheat would go primarily to build buffer stocks to back the CCC-type price support operation we have been pushing the Indians to adopt. Taken with India's own bumper grain crop, this will provide the best grain supply situation and outlook in recent Indian history. However, this agreement gives us little new political leverage because the Indians aren't in the dire need of the famine years.

The most compelling argument for the agreement is our domestic wheat situation. Despite reduced acreage the 1968 U.S. crop will be another record, and the wheat price has now dipped under \$1.25 for the first time in a decade. Freeman frankly does not expect to reach our wheat export target of 750 million bushels for this crop year. But this agreement is the core of any fighting chance he may have.

Commercial Purchases -

India now plans to acquire 1.5 million tons of grain in 1968 beyond the amounts we provide through PL-480. At least one million tons of this will come in food aid from other donors. This leaves 500 - 700,000 tons to be bought on the world market. We have pushed hard to get the Indians to buy as much as possible from the U.S. So far this year they have bought 146,000 tons from us (and 200,000 tons from others). We hope to get another 200,000 tons or so.

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Authority FRUS 64-68, v.1, 25, 507

By JC, NARA, Date 10-12-01

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Tab 2

Cuban Problems in the Wings

As you consider this, you should know that we have evidence of a new transaction by an Indian firm in Cuba. An Indian engineering company has contracted with the Castro Government to do the plans for a metal refinery which will probably process products of an expropriated American mine. The Indian involvement is entirely private, so there is no legal restriction on PL-480 or other aid. But it is hard to believe that the aid-haters on the Hill would let this one slip by if it caught their attention. The deal has been in the Indian press but not, so far as we know, in the American papers. It may pass unnoticed, but it may also give us real trouble.

We have made it clear to the Indians that we are unhappy about this, and that the Congress is likely to be more so. They have listened politely and explained that it is a private transaction over which the Government has no control. In fact, of course, the GOI could make it practically impossible for the firm to go ahead. But the Government would take a lot of political heat. State's judgment -- which I share -- is that the Indians aren't about to pay that political price to safeguard wheat they don't really need for immediate consumption. If we push them and make the wheat a condition, my guess is the only effect will be that we won't move the wheat.

Recommendation

I recommend you approve the agreement.



Edward K. Hamilton

Agreement approved _____

Agreement approved but hold off
announcement until Congress is out of town _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

49e

AUG 3 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Agreement for India

In the attached, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate a \$169 million P. L. 480 sale with India. Forty percent of the value would be repayable in dollars over 40 years, compared with twenty percent in the last two agreements.

This agreement would include 2.3 million tons of wheat, bringing the total provided under P. L. 480 to 5.8 million tons for calendar year 1968. Over half of the balance needed to meet India's total estimated import requirements of 7.5 million tons is expected to come in the form of food aid from other donors, primarily Canada, the EEC, Australia, Japan, and the U.K. India plans to purchase up to 700,000 tons commercially with her own foreign exchange, and we would continue to press her to buy as much as possible in the U.S. In spite of high transportation costs, India bought over 40 percent of her commercial wheat imports from the U.S. in FY 1968.

This agreement, which covers 85 million bushels for six months from a total P. L. 480 target of 370 million bushels this fiscal year, is our only current hope for moving a lot of wheat when it is needed. Freeman describes our expected difficulties in meeting our wheat export targets this year in the face of record crops both here and in other Free World countries. Cash prices are generally below the support price for the first time since the current wheat program was adopted in 1965, and wheat is flooding to CCC under the price support program. The other commodities proposed for this agreement -- tallow, nonfat dry milk, and tobacco -- are also in surplus in the U.S.

Self-Help - The Freeman/Gaud memo describes India's mixed, but on the whole excellent, progress in meeting the self-help conditions we included in the P. L. 480 agreement signed last December. The general measures proposed for this agreement would help to reinforce the progress now under way.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc* NARA, Date 10-16-01

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Political Considerations - The facts underlying your determination that it is not necessary to suspend aid under the terms of the Symington amendment have not changed since June. I agree with Gaud that no action is required on this front.

We have recently learned that an Indian engineering firm has apparently contracted with the Government of Cuba to provide the plans for a metal refinery. Worse, the refinery would probably utilize concentrates produced in a plant confiscated by Castro from the U. S. Since the Indian firm is a private one, there is no legal requirement that we penalize them under the terms of P. L. 480. However, the deal could raise problems for us on the Hill. We have expressed our concern to the GOI but, as a practical matter, it would be very difficult politics for them to do anything about it even if they wanted to. Withholding this food aid would almost certainly not get them to reverse course, but it would make it impossible for us to meet our wheat export targets.

Recommendation - I recommend that you authorize negotiation of this P. L. 480 agreement. The CCC would have to take over most of the wheat under the price support program if it did not buy it for export. The agreement is within your 1969 budget, even after taking into account the cutback.

Charles J. Zwick
Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve

Disapprove

 ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 26 1968

49f

To: The President
Subject: PL 480 Program for India

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a FY 1969 Title I, PL 480 agreement with India to provide approximately 2.3 million tons of wheat/wheat flour (covering last half CY 1968 requirements); 90,000 tons of tallow; 4,000 tons of nonfat dry milk; and 700 tons of tobacco with a current export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of \$169 million. Forty percent of the commodity value would be provided under Convertible Local Currency Credit terms with payment over 40 years including a 10 year grace period. The interest rate during the grace period would be 2 percent and 2½ percent thereafter. Sixty percent of the commodity value would be provided under Local Currency terms. These are somewhat harder terms than the previous agreement which called for a mix of 20 percent under Convertible Local Currency Credit terms and 80 percent under Local Currency terms.

Need for Program

The Government of India has set its total foodgrain import requirements for CY 1968 at 7.5 million tons. The agreement signed last December provided for 3.5 million tons of foodgrains covering part of India's first half CY 1968 import requirements. The 2.3 million tons included in this proposal would bring the total U. S. grains for CY 1968 to 5.8 million tons leaving a balance of 1.7 million tons. India has indicated that the remaining 1.7 million tons would be made up of a combination of aid imports from other donor countries and commercial purchases.

The tallow would be used for soap making and the milk to help India supplement her nutrition efforts. The tobacco would be for use in the manufacture of certain special brands of cigarettes requiring high-grade U. S. tobacco.

We expect great difficulty in meeting our wheat export target of 750 million bushels for the crop year beginning July 1, 1968. We will be facing sharp competition from other wheat exporting countries for the commercial market while prospects for programing under PL 480 at this time are limited because of large crops in major recipient countries.

Despite reduced acreage, the July Crop Report forecasts production of wheat at a record of just under 1.6 billion bushels, 4 percent above the previous high of 1967. India has been by far the largest outlet for PL 480 wheat exports. The current request for 2.3 million tons (approximately 85 million bushels) is well below previous requests and there is an urgent need to move this quantity as early as possible in the crop year.

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Authority AID & Agriculture Guidelines

By jc NARA. Date 10-16-01

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Food Aid and Commercial Purchases

In our memorandum of November 22, 1967, we said that we would urge the Indians to make strong efforts to seek contributions from members of the International Grains Arrangement and from the Soviet Union. Indicated imports from other donor countries reflect the Indians' efforts. Their expected Calendar Year 1968 food aid from other countries now includes 500,000 metric tons from Canada; 150,000 metric tons from Australia; 200,000 metric tons from the EEC countries; 50,000 metric tons from the United Kingdom; 50,000 metric tons from Japan; and 50,000 metric tons from The World Food Program.

It is estimated that India's commercial purchases during CY 1968 may go as high as 500,000 to 700,000 tons. We will continue to press the Indians to make a fair share of their commercial wheat purchases in the U. S.

Self-help Progress

India's record 1967/68 foodgrain harvest of 98-100 million tons was the first major payoff from markedly improved self-help efforts. The last crop year alone saw an increase of over 50 percent in fertilizer use, and a five-fold expansion of the acreage planted to high-yielding seed varieties. Further major increases are targeted for next year. In addition, the installation of state and private tubewells is now proceeding at a rate of 41,000 per year.

The 3.5 million ton PL 480 agreement we signed last December was conditional on the following food distribution policy reforms: a major relaxation of the restrictive food zone system starting next fall; a firm incentive procurement price policy; the building of a 3 million ton buffer stock; and wider authority for the Food Corporation of India. On the key issue of food zones, India moved ahead of schedule with a first step toward liberalization in late March. If the 1968 monsoon proves favorable, we would expect India to undertake further liberalization of zones this fall in accordance with the above commitment. Lags in rice procurement for buffer stocks have been largely offset by Indian Government domestic wheat purchases well above original targets. The procurement price policy has generally held up, though the remarkable wheat harvest in northern India has caused some breaks in prices to farmers. The strengthening of the organization of the Food Corporation has not moved as rapidly as desirable, and we are initiating meaningful negotiations on this point.

The self-help provisions we propose for this agreement would build on past achievements and focus on key problems of distribution and storage. Specific provisions would include:

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- 1) An intensive Government of India program to construct additional storage facilities in important interior foodgrain producing areas;
- 2) Continuation of India's commitment to procure foodgrains at incentive price levels;
- 3) Increasing attention to minor irrigation, including exploration of new water sources and strengthening of soil and water research;
- 4) Adapting major irrigation works to improve delivery of water to individual fields;
- 5) Strengthening of agricultural research;
- 6) Exploration of new sources for agricultural credit and credit-related services.

Military Expenditure Review

State/AID has determined that Indian resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and that U. S. assistance is not being diverted to military purposes. This determination was made in connection with a program loan approved by you on May 10, 1968, and the basis for it remains unchanged.

Economic Dealings with Cuba

A private Indian firm of consulting engineers has signed a contract to provide the plans and specifications for a non-ferrous metals refinery for the Cuban Government. On the basis of our limited available information, it appears that we have no immediate legal problem under existing PL 480 legislation. We are seeking more detail from New Delhi and will review the legal aspects in light of the new information. However, in any event, we may face a serious Congressional problem, particularly in view of the fact that the refinery is expected to refine concentrates produced in the Nicaro Mine and Plant owned by the U. S. Government but confiscated by Castro without compensation.

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Recommendation

That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

JUL 26 1968

July 19 1968

William P. Gaud
Administrator
Agency for International Development

Quillan T. Mason
Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

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cc: Ed Hamilton

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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

AUG 7 1968

TO : The President
The White House

FROM : Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture *OLF*

SUBJECT : P. L. 480 Program for India

Ed Hamilton told me of your decision on the India P. L. 480 program. This causes me great concern.

Mr. President, I can assure you I am fully aware and deeply concerned that P. L. 480 wheat to India immediately following a record Indian wheat crop, widely reported, might be misunderstood. However, if the groundwork is carefully laid the merits of such a transaction will I am confident blunt any criticism and bring wide support. The truth is -- the proposed 2.3 million tons of wheat for India is of critical importance to the U. S. wheat economy and is also important to India.

Despite reduced wheat acreage, we have a record wheat crop (about 100 million bushels over our original careful estimate) of 1,588 million bushels, 4 percent above the previous high of 1,524 million bushels in 1967. This record crop combined with good crops around the world has depressed average farm prices for wheat to \$1.15 per bushel -- 10 cents below the loan rate, and the lowest wheat price in 20 years.

During the first half of FY 1968 we exported 4.1 million tons of wheat under Title I of P. L. 480. Our most optimistic estimates for the first half of FY 1969 including India is 3.9 million metric tons. Without India, we would ship no more than 1.6 million tons. This would be a disaster to farmers and to Democrats. The cost of taking this wheat under loan will be almost as much in fiscal 1969 as moving it to India.

India needs grain, even though she has harvested a record crop of about 100 million tons this past year. After two years of severe drought, much of India's record crop has rebuilt depleted levels of working stocks within India. Also, India, at our insistence, has started to build a buffer-stock of grain. She strongly wishes to increase the size of this stock so as to be less dependent on imported grain in any future emergency.

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In addition, India plans to purchase for cash about 500,000 to 700,000 tons of wheat in CY 1968. India has already purchased 146,000 tons from the U. S. and 206,000 from Australia and Canada, all for cash in 1968. India plans to buy more commercial wheat in the U. S. in the near future.

At our insistence, India has sought and will get food aid from other countries in the form of grain in the amount of 1.05 million tons.

India wants to start shipping wheat under a new agreement in early September. We need sales right now. Any delay in a new P. L. 480 agreement reduces the likelihood that India could ship the full amount in the first half of FY 1969.

Because India can effectively use the 2.3 million tons of wheat in the proposed P. L. 480 agreement and because it is essential to prevent record low wheat prices at home in the coming months, I earnestly request your reconsideration of this question.

It would be tremendously helpful for reasons I have given if you would permit us to negotiate the proposed program with India as promptly as possible.

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INFORMATION

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~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

Monday, September 23, 1968
6:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this file of Australian views on the situation in Paris. It is clear that the Australians are worried that we will stop bombing before we have really secured the critical point about GVN participation.

They also have some anxieties on the level of infiltration.

I have marked, in the attached cable, para. 8, their ~~view and~~ shrewd assessment on the propaganda position in which we could find ourselves if the bombing stopped before we had a firm commitment on the role of the GVN.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 10-16-01

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

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W Jd
Roston
The Assistant Secretary
[Signature]
BS

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

September 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE:

Subject: Australian Views on the Current Situation
in Paris.

1. Following my full briefing of Ambassador Waller on September 16 (fact of this briefing was reported in Deptel 293176), Waller on September 19 brought me the Australian written comment attached as Tab A.

2. Waller noted that this comment was not simply from External Affairs, but reflected cabinet-level discussion. The term "Ministers" is of course customary for such a paper. Comment: On the Secretary's instructions, I subsequently expressed to Furlonger--Waller's Deputy and present at the conversation--our deep concern lest the Australians were cutting in any wide circle such as their whole cabinet. Furlonger said that it was his impression that this paper would be the work of the Prime Minister, Hasluck, and Fairhall, with only one or two assistants in each department. He undertook to relay our concern immediately to Hasluck, however, and to remind them of the vital importance of security.

3. I read Tab A with some care in Waller's presence, and gave him the following as our preliminary responses, noting that developments in the next two meetings in Paris would have to be awaited before we really could come to grips with any possible decisions in any event.

a. Concerning paragraphs 2-4 of Tab A, I questioned whether second sentence of paragraph 4 meant that the GOA expected us to secure an undertaking on complete halt of infiltration before we stopped bombing. If so, this would not be consistent with San Antonio formula on no advantage. As a practical matter it would be most difficult to get from the NVN such an undertaking of any sort. Moreover, it would be difficult to base

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJ 02-10
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-25-02

resumption of bombing merely on increased level of infiltration since there were major problems in both ascertaining and publicly proving the degree of any such increase. Our judgment therefore was that a generalized understanding on the rate of infiltration was as much as we could expect.

b. As to DMZ restraint (paragraphs 4 and 5), I told Waller that the military actions we had in mind in the DMZ area included firing across the DMZ, movement of men or equipment through the DMZ, and massing of forces north of the DMZ. I then added that, on the question apparently raised by the use of the term "concrete conditions" in paragraph 5 of Tab A, we had not yet come to a conclusion on whether we could act in the absence of an express NVN undertaking. Given Hanoi's theology on reciprocity, such an undertaking might be difficult to obtain. We were therefore weighing whether on the basis of the bilateral exchanges in Paris we could draw a clear judgment that they understood what would happen in case of violation in the DMZ area, where breaches would be readily identifiable and the practical situation was such that the North Vietnamese would suffer the consequences of a breach.

c. On paragraphs 7, 8, and 10, I said there was no difference between us on the importance of pressing for "our side, your side," which was exactly what we were doing. This might not be an immutable formula, but at present we could see no other, and we agreed we had to insist on that.

d. On paragraph 9, I expressed doubt as to how much insight into NVN's negotiating position we could obtain from their attitude on "our side, your side." He said that US and GOA views on coalition were entirely in accord: we opposed any imposed coalition. In response to Waller's question, I said if the GVN were freely to work out some coalition arrangement with the other side, we would not be opposed in principle, but he thought the prospects of that happening soon were slight.

4. Finally, the conversation turned to the San Antonio formula. Waller asked whether it was the USG assumption that the GOA accepted this formula. I reacted with some surprise to this question, and said we had never to my knowledge been given any reason to believe that the GOA took exception to it, at the time it was put forward publicly a year ago (or, I might have added, when we gave Waller a full although belated read-out on the whole Kissinger exercise). At any rate, I went on to say that the possibility of our acting now on the basis of "assumptions" concerning military restraint went to some extent beyond the literal reading of San Antonio--in that we were not thinking of stopping the bombing unless we had good reason to believe that our "assumptions" were well founded. I again emphasized that it was not a final position, but added that, if the GOA was now saying that the San Antonio concept was not acceptable, we had better know this pretty soon.

5. Distribution: Because of the bulk of the Australian comments and their rather diffuse character, this memorandum is being circulated to Washington holders of the HARVAN/PLUS series and by pouch to the Paris Delegation and Embassy Saigon.

W.P. Bundy

William P. Bundy

Attachment:

Tab A - Australian Cablegram, 9/19/68.

EA:WPBundy:mk

INWARD CABLEGRAM

No. FROM: CANBERRA

Desp. 19th September, 1968 Rec'd. 19th September, 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

VIETNAM.

30 per text
1. MINISTERS HAVE STUDIED RECENT TELEGRAMS INDICATING THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY BE MOVING TOWARDS STOPPING THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM.

THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT THE PRESENT INTENTION TO REQUIRE THAT CERTAIN CONDITIONS SHOULD FIRST BE MET MIGHT CHANGE TO THE STOPPING OF BOMBING IN THE HOPE THAT SOME RESPONSE MIGHT SUBSEQUENTLY BE MADE.

MINISTERS NOTED THAT WHILE TWO CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS BEING OF BASIC IMPORTANCE, NAMELY, THE SECURITY OF ALLIED FORCES IN THE DEMILITARISED ZONE AREA AND AN UNDERSTANDING WITH NORTH VIETNAM ON THE "OUR SIDE, THEIR SIDE" FORMULA, THESE TWO CONDITIONS HAVE NOT BEEN PRECISELY DEFINED.

THERE MAY ALSO BE OTHER UNITED STATES REQUIREMENTS BEFORE THE BOMBING IS STOPPED.

2. WITH REGARD TO OTHER POSSIBLE REQUIREMENTS MINISTERS HAVE NOTED THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE RATE OF INFILTRATION TO POLICY ON THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IS NOT CLEAR

SOME REPORTS SUGGEST THAT THE AUGUST RATE APPEARED TO HAVE SLOWED DOWN AND THAT A LOWER RATE MIGHT BE EXPECTED IN THE COMING MONTHS AND THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD POSSIBLY LIVE WITH SUCH A

Distribution:

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJ 02-10
By *sj*, NARA, Date *6/25/02*

~~TOP SECRET~~

REDUCED LEVEL.

WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT MIGHT BE REGARDED AS AN ACCEPTABLE RATE OF INFILTRATION.

THE VIEW OF OUR EXPERTS ANALYSING INFILTRATION FLOW IS THAT IT IS FAR TOO EARLY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE AUGUST RATE HAS IN FACT DROPPED SUBSTANTIALLY AND THERE IS NOTHING ON WHICH TO MAKE A JUDGMENT THAT THE RATE FOR THE COMING MONTHS WILL BE REDUCED AS COMPARED WITH THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR.

IN JULY THERE WAS SIMILAR SPECULATION ABOUT A BIG REDUCTION IN THE RATE OF INFILTRATION IN JUNE, LEADING TO HOPEFUL SPECULATION ABOUT THE POLITICAL MOTIVES OF NORTH VIETNAM, BUT EVIDENCE LATER BECAME AVAILABLE THAT THE JUNE AND JULY RATES WERE HIGH.

3. THERE IS A DOUBT IN OUR MINDS AS TO THE IMPORTANCE THE AMERICANS NOW ATTACH TO THE RATE OF INFILTRATION IN THE DETERMINATION OF BOMBING POLICY.

IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE AMERICANS MAY BE THINKING THAT, UNLESS INFILTRATION ASSUMES NEW AND MASSIVE PROPORTIONS, THE ISSUE SHOULD BE PUT ASIDE.

MINISTERS WOULD BE DISTURBED IF THIS WERE TRUE.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE CONDITION THAT THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE STOPPING THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, WOULD NEED TO BE SATISFIED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO DETERIORATION IN THE SECURITY OF ALLIED FORCES IN THE D.M.Z. AREA, AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS ARE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

HOWEVER THE LIVES OF AUSTRALIAN TROOPS ARE INDIRECTLY VERY MUCH INVOLVED AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO SUPPORT A POSITION WHERE THE SAFETY OF OUR TROOPS IS ENDANGERED BECAUSE BOMBING STOPS AND INFILTRATION CONTINUES.

MOREOVER, WE ARE OF COURSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED FROM THE GENERAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT COULD BE INFLUENCED EVEN BY A CESSATION OF SHELLING OR ROCKETING ACROSS THE D.M.Z. AS EVIDENCE OF RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

THE PENTAGON WILL NO DOUBT WANT STRONGER ASSURANCE THAT THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE D.M.Z. AREA WOULD NOT TURN AGAINST THE

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~~TOP SECRET~~

ALLIES AND EXPOSE THEIR FORCES TO RISK IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SHOULD LAUNCH ATTACKS.

THE UNDISTURBED STRENGTHENING OF THE CAPABILITY OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARTILLERY WOULD ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT MILITARY FACTOR.

OUR IMPRESSION FROM THE PRESIDENT'S NEW ORLEANS SPEECH IS THAT THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE SECURITY OF ALLIED FORCES IN THE D.M.Z. AREA WEIGHS HEAVILY WITH HIM.

5. THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS LEAD MINISTERS TO MAINTAIN THEIR PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED POSITION THAT BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM SHOULD NOT STOP UNLESS CONCRETE CONDITIONS ARE FIRST AGREED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

IN OUR VIEW IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT, BEFORE ANY CALCULATED MILITARY RISKS ARE TAKEN OR BEFORE WE DENY OUR SIDE THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM, THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DEFINITE RESULTS FROM THE PARIS TALKS.

WE WELCOME THE EMPHASIS NOW BEING PLACED BY THE UNITED STATES ON GAINING ACCEPTANCE OF THE "OUR SIDE, THEIR SIDE" FORMULA, PROVIDING FOR ACCEPTANCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

6. HITHERTO THE UNITED STATES PUT THE BOMBING ISSUE INTO THE CONTEXT OF MILITARY RESTRAINT AND DE-ESCALATION, AND RELATED THE DECISION ON WHETHER BOMBING WOULD CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE TO MATCHING MILITARY RESTRAINT AND RECIPROCITY ON THE PART OF THE OTHER SIDE.

THE ONLY POLITICAL REQUIREMENT THE UNITED STATES STATED WAS THAT THEY WOULD EXPECT THE END OF BOMBING TO "LEAD PROMPTLY TO PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION".

7. AFTER THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 21 MEETINGS IN PARIS IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE NOTHING PROMPT AND PRODUCTIVE ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS AFTER THE BOMBING HAS STOPPED, UNLESS SOME IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS MILITARY AS WELL AS POLITICAL WERE EXTRACTED BEFORE THE BOMBING WAS STOPPED.

WE AGREE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO FOCUS ON THE PROBLEM OF OBTAINING NORTH VIETNAM'S ACCEPTANCE TO THE PRESENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

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IT IS CLEAR THAT THE STATUS AND PARTICIPATION OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE ARE CENTRAL ISSUES FOR NORTH VIETNAM.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE SAID THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE SOUTH ARE TO BE SOLVED BY THE UNITED STATES TALKING WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT BEEN OBLIGED TO DECLARE THEMSELVES ON THE POINT WHETHER THEY WOULD AGREE TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TAKING PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY TAKEN THE VIEW THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT STANDS FOR NOTHING.

THE MOST RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT, BY PHAM VAN DONG IN HANOI ON 2ND SEPTEMBER STRONGLY REJECTED THE "SAIGON PUPPETS" AND THE "U.S. PUPPETS" CLAIMS ABOUT THEIR "SO-CALLED ELECTION, CONSTITUTION, AND PARLIAMENT."

8. IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO STOP BOMBING AND TO ASK FOR PROMPT PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT HAVING SECURED AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE ON AN "OUR SIDE, THEIR SIDE" FORMULA THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD PROBABLY BEGIN THE DISCUSSIONS BY SAYING THAT THEIR POSITION HAD BEEN MADE PERFECTLY CLEAR AND THAT THE FRONT WAS READY IMMEDIATELY TO TALK TO THE UNITED STATES.

THEY WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ATTRIBUTE DELAY IN SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES.

LONG PROCEDURAL WRANGLES COULD FOLLOW ABOUT PARTICIPATION, MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED, SEATING ARRANGEMENTS ETC., WITH THE CONTINUED EMPHASIS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ON THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE AMERICANS TO HAVE DEALINGS WITH THE FRONT.

IN TERMS OF PROPAGANDA, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD TURN THE ISSUE AWAY FROM THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE DEADLOCK WAS DUE TO THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE AMERICANS TO HAVE ANY DEALINGS WITH THE FRONT.

IN NOTHING ELSE, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COULD SO CONFUSE MATTERS AS TO GIVE THE UNITED STATES NO SOUND POLITICAL BASIS FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE BOMBING.

THEY WOULD ALSO BE WELL PLACED, IF THEY SO CHOOSE, TO PRESS HARD FOR CONCESSIONS ON THE STATUS OF THE FRONT IN NEGOTIATIONS AS THEIR PRICE FOR ADMITTING EITHER THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT AS SUCH OR SOME OF THE PRESENT PERSONALITIES OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT INTO THE TALKS.

IT SUITS NORTH VIETNAM AT PRESENT NOT TO HAVE THESE ISSUES RAISED IF THEY CAN GET THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WITHOUT HAVING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES ON THEM.

THEIR BARGAINING POSITION WOULD BE MUCH STRONGER AFTER THE BOMBING HAS STOPPED.

9. THERE IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT ASPECT.

IF THE DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT CAN BE OPENED UP WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FURTHER INSIGHTS INTO THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION MAY BE OBTAINED.

AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE HAVE VERY LITTLE INDICATION FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE/FRONT SIDE OF WHAT IT WILL ULTIMATELY ACCEPT IN A SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

THEY APPEAR TO ENVISAGE A COALITION OF THE FRONT, THE SO-CALLED NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC AND PEACE ALLIANCES (THEIR OWN CREATION) AND SOME ACCEPTABLE PERSONALITIES SELECTED FROM THE PRESENT SAIGON ADMINISTRATION.

IN THE OPINION OF MINISTERS THIS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO CONCEDING DEFEAT.

THE WAY THEY HANDLE THE PROPOSED REPRESENTATION BY THE PRESENT SAIGON GOVERNMENT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE SHOULD HELP US TO ASSESS WHAT SORT OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE THEY WILL ACCEPT IN SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER A SETTLEMENT.

FOR THIS REASON, DISCUSSION WITH THEM ABOUT THE "OUR SIDE, YOUR SIDE" FORMULA HAS FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS AND COULD HELP IN EVALUATING THE PROSPECTS FOR AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME TO NEGOTIATIONS.

10. MINISTERS BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PRESS THIS ENQUIRY AND SEEK A SATISFACTORY UNDERSTANDING AS A PREREQUISITE FOR STOPPING THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM.

THEY ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO CLARIFYING NORTH VIETNAM'S ATTITUDE TO THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT AND IN FACT WOULD HAVE STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT FURTHER UNITED STATES GESTURES OF RESTRAINT IN THE MILITARY FIELD BEFORE THIS CRUCIAL AREA IS THOROUGHLY EXPLORED.

End Part
~~TOP SECRET~~

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ACTION

Monday, September 23, 1968

3:00 pm

Pres. file

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to see the attached draft of the remarks Secretary Cohen will make when he goes to Berlin as your representative to the ceremonies dedicating the Berlin Medical Center. They were sent over from State and revised here.

W. W. Rostow

OK _____

Call me _____

ERF

ERF:mst

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**Text of Speech to be Delivered
by Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Cohen
at Dedication of Berlin Medical Center**

Frau Minister Dr. Stroebe, Governing Mayor Schuets, Honored
Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, the President of the United States,
who knows and admires the people of Berlin, asked me to come here
and personally represent him on this very special occasion. And, indeed,
this occasion is special. The Berlin Medical Center is the last major
project in Europe in which there has been a direct contribution by American
aid. In a sense, therefore, the completion of this new project marks the
end of an era. This event, understandably, evokes a certain nostalgia,
but it should cause no regret. The Marshall Plan is over -- and the reason
is its success. West Berlin and Western Europe are prosperous and free.

If the construction of the Berlin Medical Center marks the end of
one era, it also marks the beginning of a new one. This great city of
Berlin will once more play a leading role in the various branches of
medicine where the medical heroes of the past -- Virchow, Heim, Bier,
Bergmann and Sauerbruch -- are succeeded by new names, who will work
in close cooperation with the physicians and researchers active in my
country and elsewhere today. President Johnson has given strong leader-
ship to these efforts in the United States. During the past five years, the
United States has more than tripled its investment in health. Our infant
mortality rate has been cut by 13 per cent, and over 20 million elderly

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Americans are now medically protected by a government-sponsored program. In this connection we recognize the pioneer achievements in medical care that were recorded right here in Berlin.

As Secretary for Health, Education and Welfare, I have a professional interest in the Medical Center. I am particularly impressed by the example it affords of a joint undertaking, designed to harmonize the best that German and American talent and experience offer in a variety of areas, across a wide spectrum, from architecture to teaching and research, from electronics to the feeding and care of patients. The resulting synthesis will yield something of far greater value than the mere sum of its parts. It will redound not only to our mutual advantage but that of many others as well.

We are proud of the modest role we have played in this project. We especially welcome the fact that one of the disadvantages Berlin has suffered from the ravages of war and cruel division is finally about to be overcome through the dedication of this most modern hospital complex, which brings under one roof the three disciplines -- practicing medicine, teaching and research.

In conclusion, Mr. Governing Mayor, may I express my appreciation for your gracious words and convey to you and your fellow Berliners the heartfelt greetings of President Johnson, who holds warm memories of

of his own visit to Berlin in 1961 and of your visit to Washington last January. The President has asked me to extend his best wishes for the future of the Medical Center. He trusts it will serve as yet another symbol of solidarity and fruitful cooperation between the people of Berlin and their many friends in America. In a wider sense, this kind of solidarity and this kind of cooperation are the manifestations of the mutual dedication to freedom, peace, security, and welfare which ties our two people so closely together. We have stood together on these grounds for more than twenty-three years. We shall stand together in the future.