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68 SEP 22 20 20

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82464

~~S E C R E T SENSITIVE~~

68 SEP 22 PM 4:39

YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN THE TWO FOLLOWING CABLES OF INSTRUCTION WE SENT TO OSLO.

CABLE NUMBER ONE

1. YOU SHOULD EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO THE NORWEGIANS FOR THE OBVIOUS CARE AND PERSISTENCE THEY ARE DISPLAYING.

2. AT THE SAME TIME, YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT EXACT DETAILED LANGUAGE COULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN A SERIOUS EXCHANGE OF THE SORT WHICH MAY BE DEVELOPING HERE. WHILE NOT REPEAT NOT NECESSARILY DEMURRING TO THE PRACTICE OF JOTTING DOWN POINTS RATHER THAN TAKING FULL NOTES, WE HOPE THE NORWEGIANS CAN RETAIN AND CROSS-CHECK EXACT LANGUAGE USED ON CRITICAL POINTS AND THAT YOU WILL CROSS-EXAMINE TO THIS END. MOREOVER, WE MAY WELL WISH TO SUGGEST THEIR RESTATING WHAT THEY HAVE UNDERSTOOD DRV REPRESENTATIVES TO SAY, SO THAT IT IS NAILED DOWN AND CONFIRMED.

3. AS WE HAVE ALREADY SUGGESTED, WE ALSO NEED FULL AND EXACT ACCOUNT OF WHAT YOU YOURSELF ARE TELLING THE NORWEGIANS ON KEY POINTS, AND WOULD APPRECIATE EXACTLY WHAT YOU HAVE ALREADY SAID IN YOUR FIRST BRIEFING ON SEPTEMBER 19. THIS AGAIN IS FOR THE SAKE OF EXACTNESS.

4. IN CONVEYING TO THE NORWEGIANS OUR REQUIREMENTS IN RELATION TO THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING, WE ASSUME YOU HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO GET INTO SUCH WORDS AS "CONDITIONS", "RECIPROCITY," OR OTHER LANGUAGE THAT MIGHT RUN INTO CONSIDERATIONS OF FACE OR PRESTIGE ON EITHER SIDE. IT IS A SIMPLE FACT OF LIFE THAT A CESSATION OF BOMBING COULD NOT CONTINUE IF THE DMZ WERE NOT RESPECTED, IF THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS ON MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM OR IF NORTH VIETNAM REFUSED TO SIT DOWN IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AS ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS.

5. AS TO THE DMZ, WE GET THE IMPRESSION -- WHICH MAY OF COURSE DEPEND ON YOUR GETTING THE FULLER DEBRIEFING REFERRED TO IN YOUR PREVIOUS MESSAGE -- THAT THE NORWEGIANS MAY HAVE CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE CONCERNED SOLELY WITH THE PROTECTION OF US FORCES. OBVIOUSLY, OUR CONCERN EXTENDS EQUALLY TO GVN AND ALLIED FORCES IN THE DMZ (AND ELSEWHERE).

6. SECONDLY, WE ARE OF COURSE CONCERNED NOT MERELY WITH FIRING ACROSS THE DMZ, BUT WITH ANY MOVEMENT OF FORCES AND EQUIPMENT IN AND THROUGH THE DMZ, OR ANY MASSING OF FORCES NORTH

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OF THE DMZ. THESE ARE ASPECTS THAT THE NORWEGIANS SHOULD ALREADY UNDERSTAND, AND WHICH WE HOPE THEY IN TURN WILL BE MAKING CLEAR. AS YOU HAVE ALREADY RECOGNIZED, THE ONE DEFINITE STATEMENT THAT EMERGES FROM YOUR PREVIOUS MESSAGE SIMPLY DOES NOT COVER ALL THE POINTS THAT CONCERN US.

7. THIS LEADS TO A STATEMENT IN YOUR MESSAGE THAT WE FIND BOTH INTERESTING AND PUZZLING, NAMELY, THE NEXT TO LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 7. THE REFERENCE TO OUR STOPPING "BOMBING AND SHELLING" HAS CLEAR IMPLICATIONS WITH REGARD TO RECONNAISSANCE, WHILE THE REFERENCE TO ACTS OF WAR BY NVN "AGAINST THE US" IS A WHOLLY NEW WRINKLE THE MEANING OF WHICH -- PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO THE DMZ -- WE SIMPLY CANNOT ASSESS. THIS IS ANOTHER ILLUSTRATION OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF AS NEARLY VERBATIM REPORTING AS YOU CAN OBTAIN AND CONVEY TO US. MOREOVER, IT IS THE KIND OF GENERAL EXPRESSION THAT MIGHT SERVE AS A VEHICLE FOR PROBING AND FOR THE NORWEGIANS ASKING JUST WHAT ACTS OF WAR BY NVN ARE MEANT TO BE COVERED BY THE STATEMENT, AND WHAT IS NVN NOW DOING THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DOING IF THE BOMBING STOPPED.

8. ANOTHER POINT THAT DEPENDS ON EXACTLY WHAT WAS SAID AND PERHAPS ON FURTHER PROBING IS THE REFERENCE IN PARA 2 OF YOUR MESSAGE IN WHICH THE SENTENCE ABOUT STOPPING THE FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM -- AS IT APPEARS IN THE SEQUENCE -- COULD BE TAKEN TO SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASEFIRE DURING NEGOTIATIONS. A SIMILAR SUGGESTION CROPPED UP IN THE OHIO CHANNEL IN FEBRUARY, AND THE POINT IS CERTAINLY WORTH PROBING A BIT WITH THE NORWEGIANS TO SEE JUST WHAT WAS SAID. (WE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT WISH TO HAVE THEM PURSUE IT WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN ANYWAY, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT)

9. TURNING NOW TO WHAT YOU MIGHT BE STRESSING WITH THE NORWEGIANS, OUR TENTATIVE ADVICE -- IN THE ABSENCE OF YOUR REPORT OF SATURDAY'S MEETING -- IS THAT YOU MUST GET ACROSS TO THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF INCLUSION OF THE GVN IN POLITICAL TALKS FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS IS NOT REPEAT NOT A CONDITION, BUT RATHER A MINIMUM DESCRIPTION OF WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE APPEAR TO ENVISAGE. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE PRESSING THIS POINT HARD IN PARIS AT THE MOMENT, AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE NORWEGIANS INCLUDE IT VERY CLEARLY IN THEIR PRESENTATION OF OUR POSITION IN ORDER, AT A MINIMUM, NOT TO MISLEAD HANOI ABOUT OUR MAJOR EFFORT IN PARIS TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE "YOUR SIDE/OUR SIDE" FORMULA. YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO THE NORWEGIANS THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO REAL UNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT.

CABLE NUMBER TWO

NOTING LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 10 OF YOUR MESSAGE, WE ARE SURE YOU APPRECIATE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF YOUR AVOIDING ANY DISCUSSION WHATEVER OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL MATTERS WITH NORWEGIANS. YOU SHOULD OF COURSE CONTINUE TO REPORT STATEMENTS MADE BY NORTH VIETNAMESE IN THE TALKS ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT YOU YOURSELF SHOULD LEAN OVER BACKWARDS TO SAY NOTHING WHATEVER THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED IN ANYWAY, EVEN INADVERTENTLY.

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Attached is
Harriman - the talk of Sept. 20

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82462

S E C R E T SENSITIVE

THIS IS A VERY LONG ACCOUNT OF THE LAST HARRIMAN-THO TALK ON SEPT. 20. IT COMES TO REST ON THE GVN'S ROLE. WE ARE NOW AT SUCH A CRITICAL STAGE YOU MAY WISH TO READ THIS TO GET YOUR OWN FEEL.

SUBJECT: FULL REPORT MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 20

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. WE HAD OUR FOURTH PRIVATE MEETING WITH LE DUC THO AND XUAN THUY THE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 20. SAME PERSONS ATTENDED ON BOTH SIDES AND THE MEETING LASTED THREE HOURS AND THIRTY-FIVE MINUTES.

2. WE OPENED BY SAYING THAT HARRIMAN HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND CONSULT LEADERS OF OUR GOVT. HE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE DISCUSSION AT OUR MEETING SEPT. 15 WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO STOP THE REMAINING BOMBARDMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM. HARRIMAN ALSO REVIEWED THE TALKS BETWEEN AMBASSADORS LAU AND VANCE AND THE MATTERS DISCUSSED. HE REPORTED TO WASHINGTON THAT WE HAD EMPHASIZED TO THO AND THUY THE IMPORTANCE US ATTACHED TO THE CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN, THRU AND ACROSS THE DMZ AND THE MASSING OF TROOPS NORTH OF THE DMZ.

3. HARRIMAN HAD EXPLAINED THAT AS A RESULT OF THESE SERIES OF PRIVATE TALKS WE BOTH UNDERSTOOD BETTER WHAT SERIOUS TALKS MEANT TO EACH OTHER AND WE WERE SURE THAT THO AND THUY UNDERSTOOD THE KIND OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WERE NEEDED TO MAKE POSSIBLE PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IN ADDITION, HARRIMAN HAD STATED THAT IF SERIOUS TALKS STARTED AND WERE BROKEN OFF, IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS SETBACK WHICH WE ASSUMED THAT NEITHER OF US WANTED. WHEN WE SAY NEITHER OF US, WE MEAN THE GOVTS OF THE DRV AND THE UNITED STATES.

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4. HARRIMAN SAID HE HAD REPORTED THAT AMBASSADORS VANCE AND HIMSELF HAD COME TO THE CONSLUSION THAT IF SERIOUS TALKS STARTED THE DRV FOR ITS PART WOULD WANT THEM TO BE PRODUCTIVE WITH GIVE AND TAKE ON BOTH SIDES, BUT THAT THEY HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO DRV REPRESENTATIVES THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN MATTERS WHICH WERE QUITE OBVIOUSLY ESSENTIAL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AND THAT DRV REPRESENTATIVES UNDERSTOOD THAT. WE SAID THAT HIS PART OF HARRIMANS REPORT WAS NOTED WITH INTEREST IN WASHINGTON.

5. HARRIMAN HAD ALSO REPORTED OUR DISCUSSION WITH RESPECT TO THE NECESSITY FOR INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN ANY SERIOUS DISCUSSION AS TO THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNM. WE SAID WE MUST TELL THO AND THUY THAT OUR GOVT IS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS SUBJECT WAS LEFT AT THE END OF THE LAST MEETING AND THEREFORE WE WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK OF IT TODAY IN GREATER DETAIL.

6. FIRST OF ALL, IT IS OUR CONVICTION THAT THERE CANNOT BE SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS ON THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITHOUT INCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. WE HAVE PLEDGED AS OUR OBJECTIVE THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM SHALL BE PERMITTED TO SETTLE THEIR OWN FUTURE. WE HAVE STATED ON INNUMERABLE OCCASIONS, BOTH IN PARIS AND ELSEWHERE, THAT WE WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE FUTURE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. THUS WE CANNOT PROCEED TO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF THESE REPRESENTATIVES ON OUR SIDE.

7. IN THE SAME SPIRIT, WE HAVE STATED TO DRV REPS THAT WE WOULD BE QUITE READY TO HAVE THEM INCLUDE ON THEIR SIDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NLF, THE ALLIANCE OR ANY OTHER GROUP THEY CONSIDER REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

8. WE SAID WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THERE CAN BE SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH. WE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE QUITE PREPARED TO CONTINUE OUR BILATERAL TALKS AS WE ARE HAVING TODAY, AS OFTEN AS DRV SIDE WISHES, ON SUBJECTS WHICH EITHER OF US BELIEVE ARE OF BILATERAL INTEREST OR CONCERN.

9. WE SAID, A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON THE MANNER IN WHICH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ARE TO BE CONDUCTED IS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE TO PERMIT THEM TO BEGIN. THEREFORE, AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SUBJECT COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING. THUS, WE WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT FOR THE US SERIOUS DISCUSSION LEADING TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT MEANS THE INCLUSION OF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ON OUR SIDE AND THE DRV CAN INCLUDE ON ITS SIDE REPRESENTATIVE OF ANY GROUP WHICH THEY MIGHT FEEL APPROPRIATE.

10. WE SAID, WE RECOGNIZE THAT WE EACH HAVE A DIFFERENT VIEW REGARDING THE REPBULIC OF VIETNAM AND THE NLF. WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING THAT EITHER OF US CHANGE OUR VIEWS. WE ARE NOT ASKING

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THE DRV TO RECOGNIZE THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, JUST AS WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE NLF. BUT WE DO NOT DENY THE EXISTANCE OF THE NLF AND DRV CANNOT DENY THE EXISTANCE OF THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. DRV SIDE OFTEN SPEAKS OF ACCEPTING REALITY. WHAT WE PROPOSE IS FOR BOTH OF US TO ACCEPT REALITY AND TO PROCEED ON THAT BASIS.

11. WE SAID THAT WHEN THE REMAINING BOMBARDMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM STOPS THE "OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS" IN PARIS WILL END AND SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS OR DISCUSSIONS, WHATEVER DRV WISHES TO CALL THEM, WILL BEGIN. THIS WILL BE A NEW PHASE AND AT THAT TIME THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WILL BE ON OUR SIDE AND DRV MAY HAVE WHOMEVER IT WISHES ON ITS SIDE. WE SAID THAT IF DRV SIDE UNDERSTANDS OUR POSITION AND AGREES TO RAISE NO OBJECTION, THIS COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING AND THUS PERMIT SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS FOR A PEACEFUL, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO COMMENCE. WE SAID WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THEY MIGHT HAVE.

12. THUY SAID THAT HE HAD A QUESTION. WE HAD PREVIOUSLY SPOKEN ABOUT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD PERMIT CESSATION OF BOMBING TO TAKE PLACE AND DRV SIDE HAD REJECTED THIS BECAUSE IT WAS STILL ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY. TODAY, WE RAISED THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN IN FUTURE TALKS. THUY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WERE WITHDRAWING OUR PROPOSAL REGARDING CIRCUMSTANCES AND REPLACING IT WITH THE QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION. OR HAD WE ADDED THE QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION?

13. WE REPLIED THAT AT THE LAST MEETING WE HAD SPOKEN ON MATTERS WE CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT, NAMELY, THE QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE DMZ. WE HAVE NEVER CONSIDERED THE QUESTION OF WHO WOULD SIT ON OUR SIDE OF THE TABLE TO BE A CONDITION. THE DRV SIDE HAS SAID THAT SERIOUS TALKS COULD TAKE PLACE SOON AFTER CESSATION OF THE BOMBING.

14. OUR DEFINITION OF SERIOUS TALKS IS THAT EITHER SIDE CAN INCLUDE WHOMEVER IT PLEASES. NEITHER SIDE CAN DICTATE WHO WILL SIT ON THE OTHER SIDE. WE DO NOT KNOW IF THIS QUESTION WOULD EVEN COME UP, WERE IT NOT FOR THE PROCEDURAL AGREEMENTS MADE AT THE BEGINNING OF THESE CONVERSATIONS IN WHICH WE AGREED THAT ONLY AMERICANS COULD SIT ON OUR SIDE AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ON THE OTHER SIDE.

15. AS WE HAVE SAID, THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS WILL END WHEN THE BOMBING STOPS. A NEW SITUATION WILL DEVELOP IN THIS NEW PHASE INVOLVING SERIOUS TALKS WHICH WE HOPE WILL LEAD TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. SINCE THIS MATTER HAS BEEN RAISED, WE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR OUR POSITION.

16. WE CONSIDER THE INCLUSION OF THE GVN AS PART OF THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE "SERIOUS DISCUSSION." WE WERE RAISING THIS QUESTION TODAY EXACTLY AS WE HAD DURING THE LAST MEETING, ONLY IN MORE DETAIL. WE SAID WE HAD BEEN THROUGH FOUR MONTHS WITH MISUNDERSTANDING AND NO PROGRESS. WE DO NOT WANT TO START SERIOUS TALKS AND HAVE A FRUITLESS DELAY OVER WHO IS GOING TO SIT AT THE TABLE.

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17. WE SAID THAT WE WERE AUTHORIZED TO TELL THO AND THUY THAT THERE ARE SOME SPECIFIC BILATERAL PROBLEMS THAT WE BOTH HAVE AND WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING THEM PRIVATELY WITH THEM WHENEVER THEY WISH. AND ASSERT DRV SIDE IS PREPARED TO TALK WITH US WHENEVER WE WISH.

18. THO SAID WE HAD TWO QUESTIONS. HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW FIRST IF THIS IS THE ONLY CONDITION ON WHICH WE SHOULD COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. SECONDLY, HE WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER IT WAS ONLY WHEN WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION THAT THE US WOULD STOP THE BOMBING.

19. WE REPLIED FIRST TO THO'S SECOND QUESTION SAYING THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A CESSATION OF BOMBING UNLESS WE REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT BECAUSE WE DO NOT WANT FOUR MORE MONTHS OF NO PROGRESS. IF WE STOP ALL BOMBING WE WANT TO BEGIN TO TALK SEROUSLY.

20. AS FOR HIS FIRST QUESTION, WE COULD NOT ANSWER IT AS POSITIVELY AS THO HAD PUT IT FORWARD. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THO THAT IT COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING. THIS GOES A LONG WAY TOWARD ANSWERING THO'S QUESTION, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT A COMPLETE ANSWER. THO SAID OUR REPLY WAS CLEAR.

21. THUY THEN SAID THAT WE HAD NOT CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES FOR A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING. WERE WE STILL INSISTING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAD PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED? WE ASKED THUY WHAT HE MEANT. HE REPLIED THAT IN PREVIOUS SESSIONS WE HAD PUT FORWARD CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND TODAY WE RAISE THE QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION. THUY SAID HE WONDERED WHETHER WE HAD WITHDRAWN OUR PROPOSAL REGARDING CIRCUMSTANCES AND SUBSTITUTED THE ISSUE OF GVN REPRESENTATION, OR HAD WE KEPT BOTH.

22. WE ANSWERED THAT AT OUR LAST MEETING WE HAD EMPHASIZED TWO QUESTIONS. ONE WAS THE ISSUE OF GVN REPRESENTATION, AND THE OTHER WAS THE QUESTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN AND AROUND THE DMZ. WE HAD DISCUSSED THE LATTER IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND TODAY WE OUTLINED WHAT HARRIMAN HAD REPORTED TO WASHINGTON. THAT IS TO SAY, THAT THE DRV SIDE UNDERSTOOD OUR POINT OF VIEW ON THIS, AND THAT LE DUC THO HAD SAID ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT THE DRV HAD SERIOUS INTENT AND GOOD-WILL. NEITHER SIDE WANTS TALKS TO START AND THEN BREAK DOWN BUT BOTH WANT SERIOUS TALKS. DRV UNDERSTANDS THAT ONCE THE BOMBING STOPS WE WOULD WITHDRAW OUR FORCES FROM THE DMZ AND IT UNDERSTANDS THAT WE CLEARLY EXPECTED DRV TO DO LIKEWISE. THEY HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY AGREED TO ANY ACTION ON THEIR PART BUT THEY CERTAINLY GAVE THE IMPRESSION THEY UNDERSTOOD US POINT OF VIEW AND DID NOT WANT TO STOP ANY NEGOTIATION THAT WOULD BEGIN.

23. THIS POINT OF VIEW, WE CONTINUED, IS BEING CONSIDERED BY ALL CONCERNED IN WASHINGTON. WE WOULD NATURALLY LIKE TO HAVE HAD A DEFINITE COMMITMENT ON DRV PART BUT WE HAD EXPLAINED THAT DRV WAS NOT READY TO GIVE IT BECAUSE IT THOUGHT IT WAS RECIPROCITY. IF DRV WILLING TO CHANGE ITS POSITION AND GIVES US AN IMMEDIATE COMMITMENT, IT WOULD BE VERY WELCOME, BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT DRV SIDE DOES NOT WANT TO DO THIS. WE SAID WE WERE NOT RAISING THIS MATTER AGAIN BUT WANTED TO MAKE SURE THEY UNDERSTOOD HOW WE UNDERSTOOD IT.

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24. THUY REMARKED THAT IT SEEMED HARRIMAN HAD BROUGHT BACK NOTHING NEW FROM HIS WASHINGTON TRIP. WE SAID THIS WAS NOT TRUE AT ALL. THUY SAID THAT THE LAST TIME WE HAD MADE A DEMAND REGARDING THE DMZ AND NOW WE WERE REITERATING THE SAME DEMAND. WE REPLIED THAT IF DRV IS WILLING TO CHANGE ITS VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT, IT WOULD BE WELCOME. WASHINGTON HAS TAKEN NOTE OF DRV VIEW. WE HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO EMPAHSIZE THE QUESTION OF INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES IN SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS. THIS COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION ON THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE WERE NOT AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT THIS IS THE ONLY QUESTION BUT WE WERE AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON REPRESENTATION COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION. THOSE ARE VERY STRONG WORDS. WE SAID WE DID NOT RAISE AGAIN THE QUESTIONS OF ACCEPTANCE OF OR AGREEMENT ON RECIPROCITY REGARDING THE DMZ BUT SIMPLY REPEATED WHAT DRV SIDE HAD SAID AT THE LAST MEETING AND REPORTED OUR IMPRESSION. WE ARE NOT RAISING THAT SUBJECT AGAIN, NOR ARE WE RAISING AGAIN THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED BETWEEN LAU AND VANCE. THEY KNOW OUR VIEWS--THESE MATTERS TO WHCICH WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE AND THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

25. WHAT IS NEW, WE CONTINUED, IS THAT OUR GOVT HAS AUTHORIZED US TO STATE THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON GVN REPRESENTATION COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING.

26. THO SAID HE HAD SOME REMARKS ON OUR STATEMENT. FIRST OF ALL, THIS WAS THE FOURTH PRIVATE MEETING. GOV HARRIMAN HAD RETURNED TO WASHINGTON AND REPORTED TO HIS GOVT BUT DRV SIDE MUST SAY THAT THEY DO NOT FIND ANYTHING NEW THO SAID HE WOULD EXPLAIN CLEARLY WHY THERE WAS NOTHING NEW. THE DRV HAS NOT CHANGED ITS POSITION. THEIR POSITION IS TO DEMAND THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV. US PROPOSALS SHOW CLEARLY THAT THERE MUST BE SOME RECIPROCITY. AT OUR LAST MEETING US SIDE HAD EMPHASIZED THE DMZ AND IN THIS CONNECTION, US KNOWS THAT DRV IS NOT WILLING TO DISCUSS THIS BEFORE CESSATION OF BOMBING. NOW THE US SIDE RAISES THE QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION IN NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM, AND SAYS THAT WE MUST DISCUSS AND REACH AN UNDERSTANDING OF THIS QUESTION BEFORE DECIDING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. IS THIS A CONDITION? MOREOVER WE SAY, THAT THE DISCUSSION AND UNDERSTANDING ON THIS QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION, "COULD BE", ONLY "COULD BE" A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING; THO SAID HE WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS THE ONLY CONDITION FOR THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING, BECAUSE WHEN WE SAY "A MAJOR FACTOR" IT MEANS THAT THERE WILL BE OTHER FACTORS AS WELL. THO AGAIN ASKED, IS IT THE ONLY FACTOR, SINCE "MAJOR FACTOR" MEANT THERE WILL BE OTHERS.

27. WE SAID WE COULD NOT TELL THO THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO STOP THE BOMBING. HE WILL DECIDE WHEN ALL THE INFORMATION FROM ALL SOURCES IS IN. WE NOTED THAT WASHINGTON WAS IMPRESSED BY THO'S STATEMENT THAT DRV SIDE HAS SERIOUS INTENT

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OF GOOD-WILL; THIS IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT WANT TO HAVE ANOTHER PERIOD OF ENDLESS AND FRUSTRATING TALKS AS WE HAVE HAD IN THE PAST FOUR MONTHS WITHOUT ANY PROGRESS. IF THE BOMBING IS STOPPED UNCONDITIONALLY AND WITHOUT RECIPROCITY THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO BE SURE THAT SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS CAN START. AT THIS POINT WE DON'T KNOW WHERE THOSE DISCUSSIONS WILL LEAD, BUT WE DO NOT WANT THE SPECTACLE OF AN ARGUMENT OVER WHO IS GOING TO SIT AT THE TABLE;

28. WE SAID THAT DRV SIDE HAD SPOKEN AS IF THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION HAD BEEN RAISED. THIS IS NOT A FACT. IT WAS RAISED BEFORE AND AGAIN AT THE LAST MEETING. WE HAD EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF IMPORTANCE. IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH RECIPROCITY BUT IT DEALS WITH THE QUESTION OF WHETHER DRV IS INTERESTED IN SERIOUS TALKS, BECAUSE THERE CANNOT BE SERIOUS TALKS ABOUT POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN. AND WE HAVE SAID DRV SIDE CAN INCLUDE WHOMEVER IT WISHES. THUS IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY; BUT A QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DRV IS INTERESTED IN SERIOUS TALKS.

29. THO SAID HE WISHED TO CONTINUE. WE HAD SAID WE MUST DISCUSS AND REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT GVN REPRESENTATION BEFORE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THAT IS A CONDITION; US SIDE SAYS THIS COULD BE A "MAJOR FACTOR" IN FACILITATING THE DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING. THO SAID HE WONDERED WHETHER IF THEY DISCUSS THIS QUESTION, THE US SIDE WOULD THEN LEAD THEM TO AN ENDLESS DISCUSSION OF OTHER FACTORS. WE REPLIED THAT IF DRV ANSWERS THIS QUESTION, WE WOULD HOPE IT WOULD NOT LEAD TO ENDLESS DISCUSSION BUT TO PROMPT ACTION.

30. THO THEN SAID THAT THE BASED WHAT HE SAID ON OUR STATEMENT THAT THIS "COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR, ETC;" WE HAD SAID WE COULD NOT GIVE A CLEAR AND DEFINITE ANSWER AS TO WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER DISCUSSION THIS MATTER, THERE WOULD BE DISCUSSION OF OTHER MATTERS. THE US DEMANDS DISCUSSION AND AGREEMENT OF GVN REPRESENTATION BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING IT ALSO HAD NOT ABANDONED ITS DEMAND REGARDING THE DMZ. THUS CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN ADDED RATHER THAN DECREASED AND IF THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT; THEN THE BOMBING WILL NOT STOP.

31. THE DRV DEMAND, THO SAID, FOR UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE BOMBING IS A LEGITIMATE AND SERIOUS DEMAND. WHEN U THANT WAS IN PARIS HE SAID THAT THE COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION BOMBING IS THE FIRST STEP LEADING TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM; THO SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THANT WAS NOT ONLY EXPRESSING HIS PERSONAL VIEWS BUT AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF UN HE WAS ALSO REFLECTING WORLD OPINION;

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32. AS FOR US INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE "SERIOUS TALKS," THE DRV UNDERSTANDS THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WILL USHER IN A NEW STATE OF TALKS LEADING TO A PEACEFUL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE DEMAND FOR BOMBING CESSATION IS A LEGITIMATE ONE SUPPORTED BY WORLD OPINION. IF THE US DOES NOT STOP THE BOMBING, THE DRV WILL CONSIDER THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE SERIOUS INTENT. THERE MUST BE SERIOUS INTENT ON BOTH SIDES. IF THE DRV SHOWS SERIOUS INTENT AND GOOD-WILL, SO MUST THE UNITED STATES.

33. AT THE PREVIOUS SESSION, THO SAID, THE DRV HAD SHOWN ITS SERIOUS INTENT IN CONNECTION WITH FINDING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM EVER SINCE THEY FIRST PUT FORWARD ITS DEMAND FOR CESSATION OF BOMBING SEVERAL YEARS AGO. FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, WE SHALL USHER IN A NEW STAGE IN WHICH DRV WILL SHOW EVIDENCE OF GOOD-WILL AND SERIOUS INTENT AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, AND DRV BELIEVES THAT IF US HAS GOOD-WILL AND SERIOUS INTENT, WE SHALL CERTAINLY COME TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THUS, THO SAID, HE HAD AMPLY EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS ON WHAT DRV MEANS BY SERIOUS INTENT AND GOOD-WILL.

34. US SIDE, THO CONTINUED, SAYS THE DRV SHOULD ACCEPT REALITY AND ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF THE PUPPET ADMINISTRATION. IF WE ASK IN REALITY DOES SUCH A GOVERNMENT EXIST, IN FACT THERE IS SUCH A GOVERNMENT BUT WHAT IS THE TRUTH ABOUT THIS PUPPET GOVERNMENT, XUAN THUY AND THO HAVE SPOKEN REPEATEDLY ABOUT THIS AND THO SAID HE WOULD NOT SPEAK AGAIN ON THIS SUBJECT BECAUSE EACH SIDE HAS ITS OWN VIEWS REGARDING THE GVN AND THE NLF. DOES US REALLY WANT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM, HE ASKED. IF WE DID, HOW COULD WE USE THIEU AND KY TO REACH A SOLUTION. THEY ARE MILITARISTS, THO SAID, AND US UNDERSTANDS THEIR SHORTCOMINGS; THESE PUPPETS, THIEU AND KY, WILL NEVER ACCEPT TO TALK WITH OR RECOGNIZE THE NLF, AND THEY WILL NEVER ACCEPT A NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT--A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. IF THE US WANTS TO USE THIEU AND KY, HOW CAN IT TALK WITH DRV AND SETTLE MATTER WITH GRV. EVEN TRUONG DINH DZU, WHO IS PRO-AMERICAN, SPOKE ABOUT TALKING WITH THE NLF AND ABOUT PEACE, AND THE THIEU/KY GOVERNMENT PUT HIM IN PRISON; HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES USE THIS GROUP TO TALK WITH THE DRV? WHAT RESULTS WOULD THE DRV GET IF IT TALKED TO SUCH PEOPLE? SUCH ARE THE PEOPLE, AND SUCH ARE THE POLICES OF THE THIEU/KY PUPPETS, AND THE US WANTS TO USE THEM TO FIND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOR THE VIETNAM PROBLEM. THO SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE.

35. THO SAID HE HAD SPOKEN AT GREAT LENGTH BUT THAT HE WANTED TO ADD THESE VIEWS. IF THE US WANTS TO FIND A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM IT SHOULD CEASE BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR. THEN WE SHALL DISCUSS WHATEVER QUESTIONS US DEEMS NECESSARY. AND IF BOTH SIDES HAVE SERIOUS INTENT AND GOOD-WILL, THO SAID HE WAS SURE WE WILL REACH A SETTLEMENT. THO SAID HE THOUGHT THAT IF WE SIT TOGETHER AND TALK, WE MUST LOOK AT REALITY AND BE LOGICAL, BUT AT THE MOMENT THE UNITED STATES INSISTS THAT ALL THE ADVANTAGE BE ON ITS SIDE AND SHOWS NEITHER SERIOUS INTENT NOR GOOD-WILL. DRV DEMAND FOR UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING IS A LEGITIMATE DEMAND AND NOT A SUBJECTIVE ONE. IT IS ALSO THE DEMAND OF WORLD AND US OPINION.

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36. THE US SIDE IS AFRAID, THO CONTINUED, THAT ONCE THE BOMBING IS STOPPED, DISCUSSIONS WILL DRAG ON FOR MONTHS AND MONTHS. BUT IF THE BOMBING DOES NOT STOP THE DISCUSSIONS WILL DRAG ON EVEN LONGER BECAUSE THE DRV WILL NOT CHANGE ITS POSITION. THO SAID HE DID NOT REMEMBER EXACTLY WHAT MR. GOLDBERG HAD WRITTEN IN HIS RECENT ARTICLE BUT THE IDEA WAS THAT REALITY CALLS FOR THE CESSATION OF BOMBING FIRST.

37. WE POINTED OUT THAT GOLDBERG HAD ALSO SAID THAT THE GVN SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DRV AND THE NLF AND OFFERED TO SEND HIM THE ARTICLE. THO SAID HE HAD READ IT AND THAT THE FIRST THING WAS THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THEN WE WILL COME TO THIS STAGE AND DISCUSS IT. THO SAID WE SHOULD STOP THE BOMBING FIRST, AND AS FOR THE OTHER QUESTIONS, DRV WOULD BE WILLING TO BEGIN DISCUSSING THEM WITH US THE DAY FOLLOWING SUCH CESSATION; AND IN THE DISCUSSION OF ANY PROBLEM BOTH SIDES SHOULD HAVE SERIOUS INTENT, SHOW GOOD-WILL AND LOOK AT REALITY.

38. WE SAID THAT THE DRV SPEAKS ABOUT SERIOUS INTENT. IF WE STOP THE BOMBING, WE WOULD SHOW OUR GOOD INTENT. IF OUR GOVERNMENT STOPS THE BOMBING, IT HAS THE RIGHT TO KNOW THAT THE TALKS WILL BE SERIOUS AND NOT A FARCE. WE THINK THAT IF WE MARCH UP TO THE MAJESTIC HOTEL WITH GVN REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE FIRST SERIOUS TALKS AND DRV REFUSES TO COME IN, IT WILL BE A FARCE.

39. WE HAVE MADE IT PLAIN THAT NEITHER HANOI NOR WASHINGTON SHOULD DICTATE THE GOVERNMENT THAT WILL RESULT FROM A SETTLEMENT. IT SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES. THE WAR HAS CREATED GREAT STRAIN AND WE COULD TELL THE DRV SIDE WHAT WE THOUGHT OF THE NLF IN EVEN MORE VICIOUS TERMS THAN DRV HAS SPOKEN OF GVN, BUT WE DON'T THINK IT IS PROFITABLE TO DO SO. HOW THESE TALKS WILL DEVELOP IS FOR THE FUTURE, BUT WE WANT THEM TO DEVELOP IN A SERIOUS MANNER AND THAT IS WHAT WE ASK TODAY. THO INTERUPTED THAT DRV SIDE IS SERIOUS NOW.

40. WE THEN SAID THAT THO HAD QUESTIONED WHETHER THE INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD LEAD TO PROGRESS. WE HAD STATED THAT THEIR INCLUSION IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAKE PROGRESS IT IS UP TO US TO DECIDE WHO IS ON OUR SIDE OF THE TABLE IN ORDER TO MAKE SURE OF PROGRESS. IF THE DRV IS SERIOUS THEN WHY DOES IT OBJECT TO THE INCLUSION OF THE GVN ON OUR SIDE? WE DO NOT OBJECT TO THE INCLUSION OF ANYONE IT WANTS TO BRING ON ITS SIDE.

41. THUY SAID THAT JUDGING FROM OUR DISCUSSION HIS QUESTION HAD NOT BEEN UNJUSTIFIED. AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS, WE HAD SPOKEN A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE DMZ WHICH BOTH SIDES MUST RESPECT. THE US STILL MAINTAINED THIS POSITION AND WE ADD A NEW PROPOSAL, THAT IS, THAT THE DRV SHOULD ACCEPT THE INCLUSION OF THE GVN IN PHASE 2. THIS, THUY SAID, IS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION AND IT IS AN ITEM OF PHASE 2 ON WHICH THEY MUST AGREE UPON IN PRINCIPLE NOW, OTHERWISE THERE WILL BE

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NO CESSATION OF BOMBING. THUS IT IS A CONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND NOT UNCONDITIONAL, AND THAT CONDITION IS HARDER THAN PREVIOUSLY.

42. WE THEN SAID THAT WE ARE CONCERNED THAT DISAGREEMENT OVER THE MEANING OF SERIOUS TALKS WILL LEAD TO ANOTHER PERIOD OF WRANGLING WHICH NEITHER OF US SHOULD WANT. THE DRV SIDE HAS AGREED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE SERIOUS TALKS WITH GOOD-WILL AND WE HAVE INDICATED TO DRV SIDE OUR DEFINITION OF SERIOUS TALKS. IF WE COULD HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING ON THAT, IT COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING. WE DID NOT THINK THAT THO HAD UNDERSTOOD FULLY WHAT WE HAD SAID.

43. THO SAID AT THE LAST MEETING WE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE DMZ. BUT NOW, THO SAID, WE TAKE UP ANOTHER MATTER, AND THO HAD ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS THE ONLY CONDITION FOR THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND WE HAD REPLIED THAT IT COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR AND DID NOT RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE DMZ. SO, THO SAID, IN ADDITION TO THE DMZ, THERE IS ANOTHER CONDITION -- THE QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION.

44. THO SAID THAT HE HAD ASKED WHETHER THE ISSUE OF GVN REPRESENTATION WAS THE ONLY QUESTION, AND WE HAD REPLIED THAT IT COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR. THO SAID THAT WE HAD NOT GIVEN A CLEAR ANSWER. WE REPLIED THAT WE HAD GIVEN A STRONG ANSWER BUT NOT AN ABSOLUTE ONE.

45. THUY THEN SAID THAT IF WE HAD MORE TO SAY PERHAPS WE COULD BREAK FOR TEA FIRST. OTHERWISE WE COULD ADJOURN. WE AGREED TO A BREAK, SAYING THAT WE WERE NOT WILLING TO TAKE AN EASY ANSWER ON THIS MATTER, WE WANTED TO DISCUSS IT FURTHER. IT WAS TOO SERIOUS A QUESTION TO TREAT LIGHTLY. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION DURING THE TEA BREAK.

46. UPON RESUMING THE MEETING, WE SAID WE HOPED THAT DRV SIDE WOULD REVIEW THIS MATTER SERIOUSLY. WE HAD MADE A SERIOUS STATEMENT WHICH CANNOT BE TAKEN LIGHTLY. WE FEEL WE MAY BE CLOSE TO AN UNDERSTANDING. IF DRV REPRESENTATIVES DO NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO INDICATE THAT THEY CAN ACCEPT WHAT WE HAD ASKED FOR, NAMELY, THE INCLUSION OF THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES, THEN WE URGE THEM TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENT, BUT WE WOULD HOPE THAT ACTION CAN BE TAKEN QUICKLY.

47. WE SAID WE HOPED WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE MATTER WE ARE SPEAKING ABOUT IS THE MATTER OF INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES ON OUR SIDE. WE WANT TO EMPHASIZE ANOTHER IMPORTANT PART OF OUR STATEMENT AND THAT WAS THAT WE COULD CONTINUE TO HAVE BILATERAL TALKS ON ANY MATTERS THAT EITHER OF US CONSIDERED OF BILATERAL CONCERN. WE CAN UNDERSTAND THAT THERE ARE MATTERS WHICH DRV WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS WITH US WITHOUT GVN REPRESENTATIVES PRESENT. THERE ARE ALSO MATTERS WHICH WE MAY HAVE TO RAISE BILATERALLY. WE FEEL THAT THESE BILATERAL TALKS CAN BE VERY IMPORTANT IN REACHING A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION.

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48. THO SAID WE HAD PROPOSED THAT DRV GIVE SERIOUS STUDY TO OUR PROPOSAL. HE COULD ASSURE US THAT ANY PROPOSAL WE MAKE GETS SERIOUS CONSIDERATION BY THE DRV, AND FOR ITS PART DRV SIDE HOPES THAT ALL OF ITS VIEWS WILL BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED BY US SIDE. THE US HAS EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT PROMPT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN. THIS DEPENDS ON THE US BECAUSE THE DRV DEMAND IS KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES.

49. AS FOR OUR PROPOSALS REGARDING BILATERAL TALKS, THO CONTINUED, WE ARE HOLDING BILATERAL TALKS NOW AND THEY WILL CONTINUE. THERE IS NO PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD. THO SAID HE HAD EXPRESSED ALL HIS VIEWS AND HOPED WE WOULD CONSIDER THEM SERIOUSLY.

50. LAU THEN SPOKE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THIS SERIES OF PRIVATE TALKS. HE SAID HE NOTED THAT WE FEARED A MISUNDERSTANDING ON WHAT WE HAD SAID. LAU SAID HE WOULD GIVE HIS UNDERSTANDING TO SEE IF IT WERE CORRECT. FIRST OF ALL, THE US SIDE HAS REPORTED THE VIEWS OF LE DUC THO AND XUAN THUY REGARDING THE DMZ TO ITS GOVT. THESE VIEWS ARE CLEAR TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPORT WHICH HARRIMAN MADE WAS NOTED WITH INTEREST BY THE USG. THE SECOND POINT IS THAT WE HAVE RAISED ONCE AGAIN THE QUESTION, OF GVN REPRESENTATION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING A POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM. THE RAISING OF THIS QUESTION, LAU CONTINUED, IS NOT NEW, AND THE DRV SIDE HAS COMMENTED ON IT IN THE PAST. BUT TODAY, LAU SAID, HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING NEW IN THAT THE US WANTS TO OBLIGE THE DRV TO ACCEPT THE PRESENCE OF GVN REPS AT FUTURE TALKS, AND COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THIS BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, BECAUSE WE HAD SAID THAT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING. LAU SAID THAT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON INCLUSION OF GVN REPS IS TANTAMOUNT TO RECIPROCITY AND DRV REJECTS IT.

51. WE SAID WE REJECTED THAT VIEW -- IT IS NOT RECIPROCITY. LAU THEN CONTINUED, THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TODAY AND OUR PREVIOUS MEETING, WAS THAT WE DID NOT LINK THE QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION WITH THE QUESTION OF CESSATION OF BOMBING. BUT NOW WE HAVE LINKED THEM BECAUSE WE SAY IT COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR. SO THIS, LAU SAID, IS RECIPROCITY, BECAUSE PREVIOUSLY WE HAD NOT SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE CESSATION OF BOMBING.

52. WE REPLIED THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN INCLUDED IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT WE COULD NOT HAVE SERIOUS TALKS UNLESS THEY WERE THERE. WHEN WE PUT THIS ON THE TABLE THE LAST TIME. DRV SIDE HAD SAID WE COULD TALK ABOUT IT AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THIS IS NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT SERIOUS TALKS MEAN. DRV SIDE HAS SAID FOR A LONG TIME THAT WE WOULD HAVE SERIOUS TALKS AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE DEFINED SERIOUS TALKS AS INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN IN TALKS RELATED TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. DRV SIDE MAINTAINS THAT IT IS SERIOUS AND WE SAY IT IS NOT SERIOUS UNLESS IT RECOGNIZES THAT WE HAVE A RIGHT TO HAVE AT OUR SIDE OF THE TABLE WHOMEVER WE WISH. WE

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CONSIDER DRV ATTITUDE AS ATTEMPTING TO VETO WHO WE HAVE ON OUR SIDE OF THE TABLE, WHICH WE CONSIDER NOT LEGITIMATELY DRV AFFAIR.

53. WE SAID THAT FOR MONTH DRV HAS TALKED ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF THE NLF. WE HAVE REMOVED THAT QUESTION FROM DISCUSSION BY INDICATING THAT IT IS NOT OUR AFFAIR WHO DRV HAS ON ITS SIDE OF TABLE. IT CAN HAVE ON ITS SIDE ANYONE IT WISHES. THERE WILL BE SOME WHO CONSIDER THIS A CONCESSION ON THE PART OF THE US, BUT WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT A CONCESSION. WE CONSIDER THAT DRV BUSINESS TO SELECT WHOM IT WISHES AND IN THE SAME SPIRIT WE DO NOT THINK IT HAS THE RIGHT TO QUESTION WHO IS ON OUR SIDE. THIS QUESTION IS ONLY AN ISSUE BECAUSE THE DRV HAS RAISED IT. WE DID NOT RAISE IT.

54. THUY SAID HE FELT IT NECESSARY TO REPEAT WHAT HE SAID AT OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS FROM THE BEGINNING. THE DRV SIDE HAD NEVER RAISED THE QUESTION OF STAGES FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM. THE PRIMARY QUESTION, WHEN THE DRV REPRESENTATIVES ARRIVED IN PARIS, WAS THE DEMAND FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING, BUT AMB VANCE RAISED WITH LAU THE QUESTION OF PHASE 1 AND PHASE 2. THE FIRST PHASE IS THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THE SECOND PHASE IS THE DISCUSSION OF THE ENTIRE VIETNAM QUESTION, PARTICULARLY QUESTIONS REGARDING SOUTH VIETNAM. IN BETWEEN THOSE TWO PHASES, THERE IS AN INTERVAL. IN THIS CONNECTION, THUY CONTINUED, DRV AGREES WITH THE US MANNER OF RAISING THIS PROBLEM AND SO IT HAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT OUR IDEA. ANY IDEA WHICH THE DRV THINKS IS REASONABLE, IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT.

55. SECONDLY, THUY SAID, WE RAISED OUR QUESTION OF RESPECT FOR THE STATUS OF THE DMZ BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. IN OTHER WORDS, WE SPEAK OF THE STATUS OF THE DMZ BY TALKING ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH WE WILL STOP THE BOMBING. THIS THE DRV HAS REJECTED BECAUSE IT CONSIDERS IT TANTAMOUNT TO A DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY. THE DRV PROPOSES THAT THE US STOP THE BOMBING. THEN WE WILL DISCUSS AND ELABORATE AN AGENDA FOR PHASE 2 AND BOTH SIDES WILL BE FREE TO RAISE ANY QUESTION WHICH INTERESTS THEM, BUT WE SHOULD NOT RAISE ANYTHING NOW BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING.

56. THIRDLY, THUY SAID, US HAS SAID THAT BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES THERE WILL BE A PERIOD OF TIME FOR PREPARATION. DRV SIDE SAYS THE LENGTH OF THIS PERIOD WILL DEPEND ON THE US. IT CAN BE LONG OR SHORT; TALKS COULD BE ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. THIS WILL DEPEND ON THE UNITED STATES. THUS THE DRV SIDE IS POSITIVE IN ITS DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS. IT REPEATS ITS POSITION NOW TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT HAS MADE NO CHANGE ON THIS POINT AND PROPOSES THAT THE UNITED STATES GIVE ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATION TO ITS VIEWS.

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57. TODAY, THUY CONTINUED, WE HAD SAID THAT WE HAD REPORTED DRV VIEWS ON THE DMZ TO THE US GOVERNMENT AND THAT REPORT HAD BEEN NOTED WITH INTEREST, BUT NOW WE WENT FURTHER ON THE QUESTION OF INCLUSION OF THE GVN AND WE SAY AN UNDERSTANDING MUST BE REACHED BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THE US SIDE HAS EXPRESSED ITS VIEWS ON THE GVN MANY TIMES IN THE PAST, BUT NOW IT HAS PUT FORTH AS A CONDITION FOR THE CESSATION OF BOMBING THAT DRV MUST ACCEPT INCLUDING GVN REPS BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. US KEEPS SAYING THAT IT DOES NOT DEMAND RECIPROCITY AND THAT IT DOES NOT POSE ANY CONDITIONS, BUT OUR MEETING TODAY SHOWS THAT THIS IS NOT SO.

58. WE SAID THAT WE DID NOT AGREE WITH THUY. DRV SAYS IT WANTS TO HAVE SERIOUS TALKS. WE SAY GVN REPS MUST BE INCLUDED DRV SIDE IS REJECTING OUR INTERPRETATION OF SERIOUS TALKS. IT WOULD NOT HAVE A FRIEND LEFT IN THE WORLD IF ITS POSITION ON THIS SCORE BECAME KNOWN. DRV WANTS TO DICTATE THE FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. THAT'S WHAT IT IS TALKING ABOUT.

59. THUY REPLIED THAT THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT IS NOT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THE DRV DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE THIEU/KY CLIQUE. WE SAY WE WANT SERIOUS TALKS. WHAT IS THE MEANING OF SERIOUS TALKS? SERIOUS IS THE CONTRARY OF A JOKE. JOKES AND SERIOUS TALK ARE DIFFERENT. IS US SIDE SAYING THAT THE TALKS OF THE LAST FOUR MONTHS HAVE BEEN A JOKE?

60. WE REPLIED THAT THUY WAS DISTORTING OUR POSITION. WE ARE NOT ASKING DRV TO RECOGNIZE THE GVN. WE ARE SAYING THAT WE WILL HAVE THE GVN WITH US AT DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM.

61. THO INTERRUPTED. WE HAD SAID THAT THE INCLUSION OF THE GVN WILL MEAN SERIOUS TALKS. THE DRV POSITION IS THAT THE DEMAND FOR THE CESSATION OF BOMBING IS SERIOUS AND ONLY AFTER SUCH CESSATION WILL DISCUSSION OF OTHER MATTERS BE POSSIBLE. UNLESS DRV SIDE HAS MISUNDERSTOOD, THE US IS SAYING UNDERSTANDING ON GVN REPRESENTATION MUST COME BEFORE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THE DRV DEMAND IS SERIOUS AND AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING IT IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH THE US ANY QUESTIONS LEADING TO A SETTLEMENT.

62. WE SAID WE WISHED THAT THE DRV SIDE WOULD LOOK AT OUR WORDS. WE WANT THEM TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE INTEND TO BRING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN AND WE DO NOT EXPECT THE DRV TO RAISE ANY OBJECTION. THO SAID HE UNDERSTOOD OUR INTENTION BUT DRV SIDE SAID THERE MUST FIRST BE AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING, AND THEN DISCUSSION OF OTHER QUESTIONS. WERE IT NOT FOR DRV GOOD WILL IT WOULD REJECT OUR POSITION BEFORE HAND, BUT IT SAYS THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE THE ONLY WAY TO COME TO A SETTLEMENT. BUT TODAY THE US HAS RAISED A CONDITION.

63. THO SAID THAT IF WE WERE SPEAKING OF COMPREHENSION, THEN HE UNDERSTOOD OUR INTENTION TO BRING GVN REPS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT US SIDE WANTS TO DISCUSS AND COME TO AN

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AGREEMENT ON THIS BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THIS THO COULD NOT ACCEPT. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE ASKING THE DRV TO UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION AND NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTION. THO ANSWERED WHETHER DRV OBJECTS OR NOT, THE US SIDE WILL ONLY KNOW AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, AT WHICH TIME WE COULD RAISE THIS OR ANY OTHER QUESTION WE WISH.

64. WE NOTED THAT THO SPOKE OF LOGIC, THEN, DIDN'T WE HAVE A RIGHT TO QUESTION THE SERIOUSNESS OF DRV'S INTENT? THO ANSWERED THAT WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO RAISE ANY QUESTIONS WE WISH. THE POINT IS THAT NO QUSTIONS CAN BE DISCUSSED AND AGREED UPON BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE SAID DRV SIDE SHOULD CONSULT ITS GOVERNMENT. WE WANT TO BE SURE THAT DRV UNDERSTANDS WE DON'T WANT A SPECTACLE WHEN WE BRING THE GVN REPS TO THE MAJESTIC HOTEL. THO ANSWERED THAT WE HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THIS MATTER, THEREFORE THE US SIDE DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THE DRV OBJECTS OR NOT. DRV HAS NOT YET EXPOUNDED ITS VIEWS. THIS IT WILL ONLY DO AFTER THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING.

65. THO SAID WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE DRV IS CONSISTENT AND THAT THIS CONSISTENCY IS LOGICAL AND REASONABLE. NOT ONLY FOR THE DRV, BUT FOR GOLDBERG, U THANT AND MANY OTHERS. THE DRV DEMAND IS CONCRETE, LOGICAL AND REASONABLE. THO HAD SAID MANY TIMES THAT WE SHOULD STOP THE BOMBING AND THEN WE WOULD SHIFT IMMEDIATELY INTO THE STATE OF SERIOUS TALKS. THIS, HE SAID, WAS EVIDENCE OF DRV GOOD WILL AND SERIOUS INTENT. THO SAID THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THE GOLDBERG ARTICLE HERE, BUT HE REMEMBERS GOLDBERG HAVING WRITTEN THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING IS THE FIRST STEP. BUT, THO SAID, THAT U THANT HAS RAISED UNREASONABLE PROBLEMS FOR THE DRV SIDE.

66. WE THEN PUT THE FOLLOWING QUESTION TO THEM: IF WE STOP THE BOMBING AND SERIOUS TALKS BEGIN, AND WE BRING TO THOSE TALKS REPS OF THE GVN WILL THE DRV RAISE OBJECTION?

67. THUY REPLIED: IF THE US STOPS THE BOMBING THIS EVENING AND TOMORROW WE MEET AT 13:30 AM, ALL THE CARDS WILL BE ON THE TABLE. WE CAN RAISE THE QUESTION ABOUT BRINGING REPS OF GVN, AND THE DRV SIDE WILL RAISE ITS QUESTIONS. WE REPLIED THAT THIS DID NOT ANSWER OUR QUESTION AND THAT DRV HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD. THO ANSWERED THAT IF DRV RESPONDED TO THE QUESTION, IT WOULD BE A CONDITION FOR STOPPING THE BOMBING.

68. AT THIS POINT THO LEANED FORWARD AND SPOKE INTENTLY. THO SAID SERIOUS TALKS MEAN THAT BOTH SIDES WILL COME TO THE TABLE WITH GOOD WILL FOR A SETTLEMENT. BOTH SIDES HAVE GOOD

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WILL. XUAN THUY CAME TO PARIS TO SIT WITH US SIDE TO FIND A SETTLEMENT. FROM THE PUBLIC MEETINGS, WE MOVED TO PRIVATE MEETINGS, AND AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WE SHALL CONTINUE OUR TALKS TO FIND A SOLUTION. SERIOUS, THO SAID, MEANS THAT BOTH SIDES MUST HAVE GOOD WILL. DRV HAS TOLD US MANY TIMES THAT ITS DEMAND IS CONCRETE, LOGICAL, AND SERIOUS, AND AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING IT SHALL CONTINUE WITH THE US TO SEEK A SOLUTION. THE DRV DIRECTION IS TO PEACE AND THAT OF THE US SIDE MUST BE THE SAME. IF WE NOW SIT DOWN TO TALKS AND THE DRV DIRECTION IS TOWARDS PEACE, WHILE THE US DIRECTION IS TOWARDS WAR, NO SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE. THO SAID THAT WITH THE CESSATION OF BOMBING A NEW PHASE WILL OPEN AND THE VIETNAMESE ARE PEOPLE WHO KNOW HOW TO HOLD TALKS.

69. WE ASKED THAT THO REPORT TO HIS GOVT BECAUSE THIS IS A SERIOUS MATTER AND HE SHOULD SO INDICATE TO HIS GOVT.

70. WE THEN ASKED WHERE AND WHEN WE SHOULD MEET AGAIN. THO SAID HE WAS AFRAID THAT THIS QUESTION COULD NOT BE SETTLED TODAY BECAUSE OF WE MEET AGAIN, THE SAME THING WILL BE SAID AGAIN. THO ASKED WHAT WE PROPOSED. WE ANSWERED THAT THE DRV SIDE COULD CONSULT ITS GOVT AND WE WOULD MEET AGAIN ON MONDAY TO DISCUSS THE RESULTS. THO SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO HIS GOVT AND WE WOULD REPORT TO OURS, AND THEN WE WOULD FIX A DATE FOR A MEETING. WE PROPOSED SETTING A DATE NOW. EACH SIDE COULD COMMUNICATE WITH ITS GOVT AND WE COULD MEET ON MONDAY, OR PERHAPS TUESDAY, IF DRV SIDE HAD NOT RECEIVED A REPLY BY MONDAY.

71. THO SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHEN THEY COULD GET AN ANSWER, BUT THAT THE VIEWS OF HIS GOVT WERE KNOWN TO US. THE VIEWS WHICH THEY HAD REPRESENTED HERE WERE THE VIEWS OF HIS GOVT.

72. THUY THEN SUGGESTED THAT WE NOT MEET ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY BUT WAIT UNTIL WEDNESDAY'S REGULAR MEETING TO AGREE ON ANOTHER PRIVATE MEETING, BECAUSE ALTHOUGH DRV SIDE KNOWS ITS GOVT'S POSITION, IT MUST WAIT. THUY SAID THE DRV SIDE WAS PREPARED TO MEET ON SCHEDULE BUT IF WE MET AGAIN ON MONDAY HE WAS AFRAID THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS. THO THEN ADDED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BREAK THE SCHEDULE AND THAT IF THERE WERE SOMETHING NEW WE COULD MEET ON MONDAY.

73. WE SAID WE HOPED THERE WOULD BE SOMETHING BEFORE WEDNESDAY, BUT WE DID NOT WANT TO PRESS THE DRV SIDE IF IT TOOK THEM LONGER TO GET WORD FROM THEIR GOVT. THO SAID THAT IN ANY EVENT, THAT WE WOULD WAIT UNTIL WEDNESDAY, WE COULD TALK AT THE TEA BREAK THEN, BUT THAT IF EITHER SIDE HAD SOMETHING NEW BEFORE HAND, WE WOULD MEET ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY.

74. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT WE WOULD CHANGE THE LOCATION OF OUR NEXT PRIVATE MEETING AND USE A HOUSE WHICH WE HAD SUGGESTED AND SHOWN TO THEIR STAFF EARLIER. HARRIMAN

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82456

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~~LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR T~~HE PRESIDENT

HEREWITH 2 CABLES WHICH DO NOT ADD MUCH TO THE PRESENT SITUATION, BUT INDICATES WHERE THE TRACK IS AS OF TONIGHT:

CABLE 1. A FUTHER REPORT FROM DAVIDSON IN OSLO ON THE SECOND DAYS TALK BETWEEN THE NORWEGIANS AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

CABLE 2. A CONVERSATION IN PARIS IN WHICH OUR TEAM DRIVES HOME THE POINT ABOUT THE GVN.

CABLE 1.

1. THIS MORNING'S (SATURDAY, SEPT 21) MEETING BETWEEN ALGARD, VRAALSEN AND NORTH VIETNAMESE BEGAN AT 10:30 AND ENDED AT 1:00 AND NORWEGIANS GAVE FOLLOWING REPORT TO DAVIDSON AND RIDGWAY LATER IN AFTERNOON.

2. ALGARD BEGAN SATURDAY SESSIONS. PICKING UP NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENT YESTERDAY THAT NLF HAD RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE. ALGARD ASKED WHETHER IT WAS CORRECT TO UNDERSTAND THAT IF US TROOPS DID NOT TAKE OFFENSIVE ACTION, THEY WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED. CHAN REPLIED HE HAD NOT SAID THAT YESTERDAY AND THEN SAID THAT THE US SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE NLF AND SHOULD TALK ABOUT ABOVE ISSUE DIRECTLY WITH THE NLF NOW IN PARIS. THERE WAS MORE EMPHASIS ON TALKING TO NLF THAN ON RECOGNITION. (ALTHOUGH ALGARD SAYS HE CLEARLY RECOLLECTS THE NORTH VIENAMESE SAYING THAT WE SHOULD TALK TO THE NLF NOW IN PARIS, VRAALSEN, THE NOTE TAKER, DOES NOT REMEMBER ANY NORTH VIETNAMESE REFERENCE TO PARIS IN THIS CONTEXT AND HIS NOTES DO NOT CONTAIN ANY SUCH REFERENCE.)

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3. CHAN SAID US DECLARES IT CAN'T LET SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIME GO. HE DERIDED SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVT AS BAD SONS OF VIETNAM, SAYING THAT VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WILL KNOW HOW TO EDUCATE THEM. ALGARD USED STATEMENT AS OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION IN DICUSSIONS AFTER THE BOMBING HALT. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF GVN PRESENCE WAS A MATTER THAT COULD BE DISCUSSED AFTER THE BOMBING STOPPED. CHAN ALSO SAID THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION IN OSLO DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION.

4. MOST OF THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON US POLITICS AND ITS INTENTIONS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SAID THAT AFTER PUTTING THE TWO PARTY PLATFORMS UNDER A "MICROSCOPE" THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE REPUBLICAN PLANK WAS GENERAL AND DID NOT CONTAIN ANY CONCRETE SUGGESIONS ON ENDING WAR BUT SAID THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE KNOW "WHO (REPUBLICANS) ARE AND HOW THEY ARE," OBVIOUSLY IMPLYING DISAPPROVAL. THE FORTH VIETNAMESE SAID THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM DID MENTION HOW TO SOLVE THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM BUT WAS MAINLY DEVOTED TO JUSTIFYING THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY. TWO ELEMENTS IN THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM WERE PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS AND HAD TO BE REJECTED FIRMLY. THE FIRST WAS THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY WHICH WAS THE EQUIVALENT OF ASKING A VICTIM TO PAY RANSOM. THE SECOND DANGEROUS ELEMENT WAS CONTINUED US SUPPORT TO THE PRESENT SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME INCLUDING ELABORATE PLANS FOR STRENGTHENING AND EQUIPPING ITS FORCES COUPLED WITH IGNORING THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WHOSE REPRESENTATIVE IS THE NLF. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE APPEARED TO BE AFRAID OF NIXON AND POINTED OUT THAT ACCORDING TO EVERY EVALUATION, PROGRESS IN PARIS WOULD WORK TO HUMPHREY'S ADVANTAGE.

5. ALGARD TOLD THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT IF PRESIDENT JOHNSON STOPS THE BOMBING AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MISUSE THE CESSATION IT WILL BACK FIRE ON THE PRESIDENT, ON THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND MOST OF ALL UPON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. CHAN NODDED BUT MADE NO COMMENT. DURING THEIR DISCUSSION THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CLAIMED THAT THE US ELECTION CAMPAIGN IS LIKE A POKER GAME BETWEEN TWO GAMBLERS AND THAT IS WHY IT IS DANGEROUS FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT TO THE US.

6. AT ANOTHER POINT IN THE DISCUSSION, CHAN SAID CONCERNING THE SITUATION AROUND THE DMZ THAT IT WAS THE US THAT HAD VIOLATED THE ZONE BY SENDING TROOPS INTO IT AND FIRING ACROSS IT. THE US BELIEVED THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SHELL BACK. BY SHELLING THE US COMMITTED AN ILLEGAL ACT AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE. IN THIS CONNECTION (APPARENTLY MEANING SELF-DEFENSE) US REPRESENTATIVES HAD TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN PARIS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INDICATED THAT US SHELLING OF NORTH VIETNAM WAS ONE PART OF A PACKAGE OF ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM WHICH ALSO INCLUDED BOMBING AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT. CHAN SAID THAT AFTER THE US HAD STOPPED BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR, NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT HAVE ANY TARGET TO FIGHT.

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7. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SUGGESTED THAT EITHER DURING THEIR STAY IN OSLO OR AT THE TIME OF THEIR DEPARTURE, THE GON ISSUE SOME PUBLIC STATEMENT ABOUT THE VISIT IN ORDER TO AVOID POSSIBLE IMPRESSION, IF VISIT LATER REPORTED, THAT NVN DELEGATION CAME TO SUE FOR PEACE, NORTH VIETNAMESE SUGGESTED WITH THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT AND TO RETURN ALGARD'S VISIT TO HANOI, THE DRV SENT AMBASSADOR CHAN TO OSLO TO GIVE THE GON AN EXPOSE OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM. ALGARD TOLD THEM THAT HE STILL BELIEVED THAT SERIOUS PURPOSE WAS BEST SERVED BY SECRECY BUT SINCE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE GON, HE WOULD GIVE THEM THE GON POSITION AFTER DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER.

8. ALGARD ASKED US TO GIVE HIM OUR THOUGHTS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF A GON STATEMENT BY NOON ON MONDAY, SEPT 23. PRELIMINARY FONOFF VIEW IS THAT GON PUBLIC STATEMENT MIGHT END GON USEFULNESS AS CHANNEL SINCE IT WOULD BOTH DECREASE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER SECRET CONVERSATIONS AND CREATE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES ON FOREIGN MINISTER LYNG'S RIGHT.

9. CHAN TOLD THE NORWEGIANS THAT BECAUSE OF HIS POSITION AS AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT HE WAS TAKING A TRIP TO OSLO AND HAD CONTACTED THEIR EMBASSY IN OSLO. HOWEVER HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS NOT TELLING ANYONE (INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION) THE CONTENTS OF HIS TALKS.

10. ALGARD SIAD THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE MARKING TIME TODAY EITHER BECAUSE THEY HAD NOTHING MORE TO SAY OR BECAUSE THEY WERE WAITING FOR THEIR APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER LYNG ON TUESDAY. HE STILL BELIEVES THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO CONVINCE GON THAT IF US STOPPED THE BOMBING THE DANGER TO US TROOPS WOULD NOT BE INCREASED. ALGARD SAID THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE APPEARED TO WANT THE GON TO CERTIFY NORTH VIETNAMESE GOOD INTENTIONS TO US.

11. WHEN DAVIDSON ASKED ALGARD WHETHER HE BELIEVED THAT US TROOPS WOULD NOT BE FURTHER JEOPARDIZED IF THE US STOPPED THE BOMBING, ALGARD REPLIED THAT, REALIZING FULL SERIOUSNESS HIS WORDS, IT IS HIS BELIEF THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT ACT IN A WAY TO INCREASE THE DANGER TO US TROOPS AFTER BOMBING CESSATION AND THAT THEY ARE SINCERE IN THEIR INTENTIONS. ALGARD BELIEVES THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD FOLLOW THEIR TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ANY BOMBING CESSATION. ALGARD RECALLED THAT THIS SUMMER LOAN HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF GOOD PUBLIC OPINION AND ASKED ALGARD WHETHER HE THOUGHT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD DESTROY IT BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A BOMBING CESSATION. VRAALSEN SAID HE AGREED WITH ALGARD'S EVALUATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE SINCERITY.

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12. DAVIDSON READ OPERATIVE PORTIONS OF PARIS 21180 AND ASKED IF ALGARD WOULD RAISE THESE MATTERS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE. ALGARD AND VRAALSEN PROMISED TO DO SO BUT INDICATED THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE MORE OBLIQUELY AND SAID THAT THEY ANTICIPATED GREAT DIFFICULTIES IN ASKING NORTH VIETNAMESE HOW THEY INTENDED TO DEPLOY TROOPS ON THEIR OWN TERRITORY. DAVIDSON ALSO ASKED GON NOT TO CONVEY ANY IMPRESSION THAT US MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN EXCHANGING FREEDOM OF US BASE CAMPS FROM ATTACK FOR COMMITMENT NOT TO TAKE OFFENSIVE ACTION OR MOVE FREELY THROUGH COUNTRYSIDE (SEE PARA 2 ABOVE). THE NORWEGIANS SAID THEY WOULD DO SO.

13. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL BE TAKING SIGHTSEEING TRIP ON SUNDAY AND FLY TO BERGEN WITH VRAALSEN ON MONDAY, RETURNING MONDAY NIGHT FOR DINNER AT SOVIET EMBASSY (COMPOSITION OF GUEST LIST UNKNOWN). ON TUESDAY MORNING NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL MEET WITH ALGARD WHO WILL THEN ACCOMPANY THEM FOR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER. ALGARD HAS TOLD NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER IS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE QUESTION OF BRINGING ABOUT A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING AND WOULD PREFER TO DEVOTE MOST OF THE CONVERSATION TO DISCUSSION OF MODALITIES WHICH MIGHT ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTCVE. HE ALSO ASKED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO AVOID ANY LONG PREPARED STATEMENT.

14. NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION HAS ASKED VRAALSEN TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE DEPARTURE WEDNESDAY VIA BERLIN.

15. ALGARD AND VRAALSEN HAVE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT WHILE CHAN ACTS AS SPOKESMAN FOR DELEGATION, SUNG IS REALLY ITS BOSS.

16. FOREGOING ACCOUNT (AS WELL AS YESTERDAY'S) LARGELY EPISODIC BECAUSE VRAALSEN SPENDS ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME WITH US BEFORE RUSHING OUT TO ACCOMPANY NORTH VIETNAMESE ON SIGHTSEEING EXPEDITIONS.) VRAALSEN AGAIN PROMISED TO GIVE US HIS NOTES AS SOON AS THEY ARE TRANSCRIBED BUT INDICATED THEY MIGHT NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL "SOMETIME NEXT WEEK." VRAALSEN SAID THAT TO PRESERVE SECRECY HE IS NOT ALLOWED TO USE A SECRETARY AND THIS PLUS HIS DUTIES AS SHEPHERD TO NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION SLOWS PROCESS DOWN CONSIDERABLY.

17. WE HAVE PROMISED TO ADVISE ALGARD OF US VIEWS ON DESIRABILITY OF PRESS RELEASE MONDAY MORNING. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE ON THAT ISSUE, BEARING IN MIND THAT FONOFF STAFF WILL NO DOUBT NEED OUR HELP IN PERSUADING FONMIN OF DISADVANTAGES OF INITIATING PUBLICITY. ALSO APPRECIATE ANY POINTS WE MIGHT MAKE TO GON BEFORE ALGARD NEXT MEETS NORTH VIETNAMESE.

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CABLE 2.

1. THIS MORNING VANCE MET AT SOVIET EMBASSY WITH MINISTER COUNSELOR OBEREMKO, WHO IS CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN ZORINS ABSENCE. NEGROPONTE WAS ALSO PRESENT.

2. VANCE TOLD OBEREMKO THAT WE HAD NOW HAD FOUR PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH THO AND THUY. THE THIRD MEETING, ON SEPTEMBER 15, HAD BEEN AN IMPORTANT ONE. AT THE MEETING WE HAD DEFINED OUR POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES BECAUSE THE DRV SEEMED TO HAVE SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON OUR POSITION IN RESPECT TO THE MANILA DECLARATION. NEXT WE HAD GONE INTO THE QUESTION OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR SUCH CESSATION. WE HAD REFERRED TO THE LAU/VANCE TALKS AND HAD THEN SAID THERE WERE TWO MATTERS WE CONSIDERED OF GREAT IMPORTANCE: ONE WAS THE QUESTION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE DMZ, THE OTHER WAS THE INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES IN ANY DISCUSSION OF THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

3. VANCE SAID THAT WE HAD COME AWAY FROM THE THIRD MEETING WITH THO AND THUY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION ON THE DMZ BUT THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION HAD NOT BEEN SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED.

4. AT OUR FOURTH MEETING ON SEPT 20, WE CONCENTRATED ON THE MATTER OF GVN PREPRESENTATION WHICH WE FELT HAD BEEN LEFT IN UNSATISFACTORY CONDITION AT OUR LAST MEETING. THE MATTER WAS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH, VANCE TOLD OBEREMKO, AND THE DRV SIDE'S ATTITUDE WAS TOTALLY UNREALISTIC. THEY REPEATEDLY SPOKE IN PLATITUDES ABOUT "SERIOUS INTENT" AND "GOOD WILL". IT IS EASY TO TALK ABOUT SERIOUS INTENT AND GOOD WILL, BUT WHAT IS IMPORTANT AND NECESSARY IS THAT IT BE DEMONSTRATED BY ACTS AND NOT JUST WORDS.

5. VANCE THEN GAVE OBEREMKO VERBATIM ACCOUNT OF THAT PORTION OF OUR SEPT 20 STATEMENT WHICH DEALT WITH THE REPRESENTATION OF ISSUE (PARAGRAPHS 6-11 OF PARIS 21191 DELTO 753). VANCE THEN EXPLAINED THAT DRV SIDE HAD RESPONDED BY SAYING WE WERE IMPOSING A CONDITION AND OUR POSITION WAS TANTAMOUNT OF RECIPROCITY. WE HAD REPLIED THAT IS WAS INACCURRATE AND IMPROPER TO CHARACTERIZE OUR DEMAND AS RECIPROCITY. WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR FOR A LONG TIME THAT WE COULD NOT HAVE SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN ON OUR SIDE BECAUSE THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD NOT BE DECIDED BY EITHER WASHINGTON OR HANOI, BUT BY PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. WE HAD SAID THAT THE INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES ON OUR SIDE WAS NECESSARY TO PERMIT SERIOUS CONVERSATIONS TO TAKE PLACE, AND THAT THE DRV COULD INCLUDE THE NLF OR ANY OTHER THEY WANTED ON THEIR SIDE. THUS BY INSISTING ON THIS, WE WERE MERELY DEFINING WHAT WE MEANT BY SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS. WE HAD INDICATED TO DRV SIDE THAT THEIR OPPOSITION TO OUR TOTALLY REASONABLE REQUEST RAISED GRAVE QUESTIONS IN OUR MIND AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE REALLY SERIOUS.

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6. VANCE THEN REMARKED THAT SOVIET GOVT HAS OFTEN EXPRESSED ITS INTEREST IN SEEING THIS CONFLICT RESOLVED. WE BELIEVE THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR SOVIET GOVT TO WEIGH IN HEAVILY TO MAKE DRV REALIZE THAT THEY ARE TAKING A WHOLLY UNREASONABLE AND UNREALISTIC POSITION WHICH IS BLOCKING THE WAY TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE BELEIVE WE ARE NOW AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE, AND WE FEEL IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE DRV FACE UP TO REALITY. VANCE NOTED THAT THE WORLD THINKS WE ARE INTRANSIGEANT ON THE NLF, WHEREAS IN FACT WE ARE WILLING TO SEE THEM SEATED ON DRV SIDE. THE WORLD WOULD THINK IT TOTALLY UNREASONABLE IF IT KNEW THAT HANOI WOULD NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE GVN IN DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF VIETNAM. THE WORLD WOULD THEN REALIZE THAT HANOI SIMPLY WANTS TO DICTATE BY FORCE OF ARMS WHAT THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE.

7. VANCE REITERATED THAT WE WERE APPROACHING OBEREMKO TODAY BECAUSE WE ARE A[illegible] A CRITICAL JUNCTURE AND I[illegible]S IMPORTANT THAT THE SOV[illegible]T GOVT USE ITS INFLUENCE A[illegible]. THIS TIME TO PERMIT US TO GET AROUND THE ROADBLOCK AND MOVE FORWARD.

8. OBEREMKO REPLIED THAT HE WOULD TRANSMIT OUR VIEWS TO HIS GOVT WITHOUT DELAY. HE SAID HE HAD A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS. HE NOTED THAT OUR PROPOSAL REGARDING THE INCLUSION OF THE GVN IN FUTURE TALKS COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING. WAS THE INCLUSION OF THE GVN THE ONLY US CONDITION BEING PUT FORWARD AT THE MOMENT, OR DOES THE US HAVE ANYTHING IN MIND REGARDING THE DMZ? IN OTHER WORDS, OBEREMKO SAID, DOES THE US HAVE ONE OR TWO CONDITIONS FOR THE CESSATION OF BOMBING"?

9. VANCE REPLIED THAT WE HAVE STATED TO THE DRV WHAT WE WOULD DO IN THE DMZ IF THE BOMBING STOPPED AND WE HAVE INDICATED TO THE DRV SIDE WHAT WE EXPECT THEM TO DO IN AND AROUND THE DMZ AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE HAVE DRAWN OUR CONCLUSIONS AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE DRV WOULD KNOW WHAT TO DO.

10. OBEREMKO SAID THAT IS SEEMED TO HIM THAT THE QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION HAD BECOME THE MAJOR ROADBLOCK TO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS. VANCE REPLIED THAT IT WAS A MAJOR ROADBLOCK. OBEREMKO THEN NOTED THAT VANCE HAD MENTIONED THE MANILA FORMULA AND THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL. VANCE THEN GAVE OBEREMKO THE PRECISE WORDING WE HAD USED ON THIS SUBJECT AT OUR SEPT 15 MEETING WITH THO AND THUY.

11. OBEREMKO SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE POINT CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF US AND FREE WORLD FORCES REMAINING IN SOUTH VIETNAM NOT LATER THAN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES.

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HE ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT ONCE ALL OF THE DRV TROOPS WHOM WE CONSIDER TO BE IN SVN HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN THAT THERE WOULD STILL BE SOME OF US TROOPS IN SVN. VANCE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, SAYING THAT THE US HAD MORE TROOPS AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE A LONGER WAY TO GO. VANCE SAID THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT MUTUAL WITHDRAWALS SHOULD BEGIN AND THAT THEY BEGIN SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE MADALITIES AND TIMING OF MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AND AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE US AND THE DRV.

12. OBEREMKO AGAIN SAID THAT HE WOULD COMMUNICATE OUR VIEWS TO HIS GOVT. HE DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO COMMENT AT THIS TIME. THE US, HE SAID, ALREADY KNOWS THE COMMENTS OF THE DRV SIDE. HE SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED THAT THE MAJOR OBSTACLE IN OUR TALKS IS THE CONTINUATION OF THE BOMBING AND HE FELT THAT AN UNCONDITIONAL AND DEFINITIVE BOMBING CESSATION COULD OPEN THE WAY TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. VANCE REPLIED THE MAJOR OBSTACLE WAS WHETHER THE DRV WERE REALLY SERIOUS ABOUT SEEKING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THAT THE DRV POSITION OF GVN REPRESENTATION CAST REAL DOUBT ON THEIR SERIOUSNESS.

13. AFTER THE MEETING VANCE DISCUSSED THE CONVERSATION WITH GOV HARRIMAN AND SUPPLEMENTED IT BY THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS HAND DELIVERED.

BEGIN QUOTE

DEAR MR MINISTER:

AFTER RETURNING TO OUR EMBASSY THIS MORNING, I DISCUSSED OUR CONVERSATION WITH GOVERNOR HARRIMAN.

I WISH TO ADD ONE THOUGHT TO WHAT I SAID THIS MORNING, TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU HAVE IT IN MIND IN REPORTING TO YOUR GOVERNMENT.

AS WE HAVE SAID MANY TIMES, WE ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT WE WILL NOT DISCUSS MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE POLITICAL FUTIRE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. IT IS UNTHINKABLE FOR US TO STOP THE BOMBING, AND THEN BE FACED WITH A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION--MONTHS OF FRUITLESS DEBATE. THIS WOULD BE THE RESULT IF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WERE NOT INCLUDED ON OUR SIDE. SINCERELY YOURS
CYRUS VANCE. END QUOTE

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Authority E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.4
By [illegible] NARA, Date 10-12-01

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OO WTE 10
DE WTE 3830

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82460

S E C R E T SENSITIVE

TO SEP 22 PM 12:30

I CHECKED QUICKLY WITH NICK ON THE FOLLOWING OUTGOING ON THE PUEBLO.

IT TURNS OUT:

-IT HAD BEEN CLEARED WITH BOTH SECTS. RUSK AND CLIFFORD

- CLIFFORD WITHDREW HIS OBJECTIONS (EXPRESSED AT LAST WEEK'S LUNCH) WHEN HE UNDERSTOOD THE NORTH KOREANS WERE CLEAR ABOUT THE AMBIGUITY

- NICK DOESN'T THINK THE OTHER SIDE WILL ACCEPT, BUT ITS' WORTH PLAYING OUT THE HAND

Pres file

W.W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR 22ND MEETING

1. PROGRESS AT LAST MEETING MAKES IT APPEAR AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT OVERWRITE PLOY WILL WORK AND NEXT MEETING SHOULD BE USED TO PRESS IT HARD. WE NOTE THAT PAK CONSTANTLY REITERATES IDEA THAT WOODWARD WILL "SIGN" BUT NEVER HIMSELF CONTRASTS OR PROBES DISTINCTION BETWEEN "SIGN" AND WOODWARD'S LANGUAGE. IT MAY THUS BE THAT PAK WILL BE SATISFIED WITH MAKING A NEGOTIATING RECORD TO SUPPORT CONTENTION WOODWARD IS "SIGNING" WHILE ALLOWING US TO KEEP OUR OWN NEGOTIATING RECORD CLEAN OF ANY ASSENT TO HIS ASSERTION. SUCH AGREEMENT TO DISAGREE ON RECORD WOULD SATISFY US, PARTICULARLY SINCE AUDIENCES RECEPTIVE TO NK PROPAGANDA ARE NOT LIKELY TO PORE OVER TRANSCRIPTS OF TALKS, AND CAREFUL READING BY IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS WILL BEAR US OUT.

2. PAK WILL PRESUMABLY OPEN NEXT MEETING BY RESTATING ASSURANCE GIVEN AT LAST MEETING THAT CREW WILL BE RETURNED "IF YOUR SIDE SIGNS DOCUMENT OF MAY 8" AND ASKING IF WOODWARD CAN NOW AGREE TO SIGN. OR HE MAY AGAIN STATE HIS "UNDERSTANDING" THAT WOODWARD IS READY TO SIGN (AS IN PARA 25 OF SEOUL 0890) AND ASK WOODWARD'S CONCURRENCE.

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3. IN EITHER CASE WOODWARD SHOULD RESPOND AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE I HAVE REPEATEDLY ASKED YOU WHETHER YOU AGREE TO RELEASE THE CREW AT THE SAME TIME AS I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I AM RECEIVING THEM. YOU HAVE REPEATEDLY RESPONDED THAT I AM REITERATING A QUESTION WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE CLEAR, BECAUSE YOU ARE WELL AWARE THAT I INSIST ON THE SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF THE ENTIRE CREW AND YOUR SIDE HAS ALREADY AGREED TO THEIR RELEASE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. YOU THEN HAVE REPEATEDLY ASKED ME WHETHER, WHEN I SPOKE OF A DOCUMENT WHOSE LANGUAGE WAS SATISFACTORY TO YOU, I HAD IN MIND THE DOCUMENT WHICH YOU PRESENTED HERE ON MAY 8. SINCE YOUR SIDE PRESENTED THAT DRAFT, OUR SIDE OF COURSE ASSUMES THAT ITS LANGUAGE IS SATISFACTORY TO YOU, EVEN THOUGH ITS LANGUAGE DOES NOT REFLECT WHAT WE BELEIVE TO BE THE TRUE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND IS IN OTHER RESPECTS INACCURATE. THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS THEREFORE YES, YOUR DRAFT OF MAY 8 IS OBVIOUSLY A DOCUMENT SUCH AS WE HAD IN MIND. I AM NOW PREPARED TO STATE THAT IF TOMORROW YOU WILL RELEASE TO ME THE ENTIRE CREW, I WILL TOMORROW ACKNOWLEDGE ON YOUR DRAFT OF MAY 8 THAT I AM RECEIVING THEM. I ASSUME THAT THIS STATEMENT ON MY PART WILL NOW MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO TAKE THE NEXT STEP, THAT IS, TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CREW TOMORROW. IS THAT CORRECT? END QUOTE

4. PAK WILL PRESUMABLY RESPOND BY NOTING "THAT YOUR SIDE INTENDS TO SIGN OUR DOCUMENT OF APOLOGY AND ASSURANCE PRESENTED MAY 8" AND WILL SAY THAT HE CANNOT POSSIBLY MAKE ANY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NEXT DAY, THAT HE MUST CONSULT WITH HIS AUTHORITIES, ETC. HE WILL PROBABLY AGAIN SEEK RATIFICATION BY WOODWARD OF HIS "UNDERSTANDING" OF US POSITION.

5. WOODWARD SHOULD HANDLE SUCH EFFORTS ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE YOU ARE MISQUOTING ME. YOU HAVE SAID THAT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS YOUR SIDE WOULD RELEASE THE ENTIRE CREW. I HAVE SAID THAT UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS I WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE CREW ON YOUR DOCUMENT OF MAY 8. FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU WILL AGREE TO RELEASE THE ENTIRE CREW TOMORROW, THEN I CAN AGREE TODAY THAT I WILL TOMORROW ACKNOWLEDGE THEIR RECEIPT ON YOUR MAY 8 DOCUMENT. I SEE NO REASON WHY THE CREW CANNOT BE BROUGHT HERE TOMORROW. (WOODWARD MAY EXPAND ON THIS POINT AS HE JUDGES APPROPRIATE.) YOU SAY THAT THESE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS CANNOT BE CARRIED THROUGH TOMORROW. I ASK, WHY NOT? AND IF IT REALLY IS NOT POSSIBLE, THEN WHEN CAN THE CREW BE BROUGHT HERE? HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE YOU TO ASSEMBLE AND TRANSPORT THEM? THESE ARE THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WHICH YOU SAID COULD BE DISCUSSED IF I WOULD INDICATE MY GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR DEMAND THAT YOUR DOCUMENT OF MAY 8 BE USED WHEN I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I AM RECEIVING THE CREW. LET US NOW MOVE ON TO DISCUSS THESE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS. I AWAIT YOUR ANSWER TO MY QUESTION ON WHEN THE RELEASE CAN TAKE PLACE. END QUOTE

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6. AS YOU SEE, OUR OBJECTIVE IN FOREGOING IS TO DRAW PAK INTO DISCUSSIONS ON TIME AND PLACE OF RELEASE, BYPASSING ANY DISCUSSION OF WHAT PAK CALLS "DETAILED MATTERS CONCERNING SIGNING OF THE DOCUMENT". IT MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, BE EASIER FOR PAK TO AGREE TO SIMULTANEITY IF HE DID NOT HAVE TO AGREE TO IT IN PRINCIPLE BUT ONLY HAD TO TALK OF FIXING DATES. WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY COMMITMENT ON TIME AT THIS MEETING, BUT WOODWARD SHOULD HAMMER AT NECESSITY FOR FIRM DATE AS NEXT MOVE, WHILE AVOIDING ANY UNCONDITIONAL STATEMENT OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO USE MAY 8 DOCUMENT, I.E., ABSENT THEIR AGREEMENT TO IMMINENT, SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE.

7. AS YOU CAN GATHER, IT IS MOST HELPFUL TO HAVE ON RECORD REPEATED RESTATEMENTS OF WHATEVER COMMITMENTS PAK HAS AUTHORITY TO MAKE, NOT MERELY FOR SAKE OF NEGOTIATION RECORD, BUT IN ORDER TO TO BE SURE THEY ARE SOLID COMMITMENTS AND NOT MERELY RESULT OF SLIP BY PAK OR HIS TRANSLATORS.

8. AFTER SQUEEZING FROM PAK AS MUCH BLOOD AS THIS TURNIP HAS IN IT, WOODWARD SHOULD ATTEMPT TO CLOSE MEETING ON FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE YOU HAVE SAID THAT DESPITE STATEMENTS I HAVE MADE YOU STILL ARE NOT READY TO DISCUSS WITH ME THE TIME AND PLACE FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CREW. I PROPOSE THAT WE RECESS UNTIL 11 A.M. TOMORROW SO THAT YOU CAN OBTAIN THE AUTHORITY TO DISCUSS THAT MATTER. DO YOU AGREE? CLOSE QUOTE

9. WE DOUBT THAT PAK WILL, IN FACT, AGREE TO RECONVENE 24 HOURS OR ANY OTHER SPECIFIED PAUSE, BUT WOODWARD SHOULD PRESS ON ABOVE LINES TO INDICATE THAT US SIDE DEMANDS MINIMUM AND CLEARLY SPECIFIED DELAY FROM THE MOMENT WHEN IT GIVES UNCONDITIONAL AGREEMENT TO ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT ON MAY 8 DOCUMENT. (SEE FYI AT END OF PARA 11, STATE 237348).

10. IF PAK SHOULD INDICATE EITHER FIRM OR APPROXIMATE DATE WHEN CREW MIGHT BE RELEASED, WOODWARD SHOULD PROPOSE MEETING 24 HOURS IN ADVANCE " TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT AND MAKE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE CONDITIONS OF THE RELEASE ".

11. WE WOULD PREFER THAT NEXT MEETING COME QUICKLY, AND IN YOUR DISCRETION YOU MAY INDICATE TO OTHER SIDE THAT WE ARE READY.

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SECRET

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RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 SEP 22 15 36

EEA538
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3831

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82461

'70 SEP 22 AM 11:51

Pres file

UNCLAS

THIS REPORT OF IMPROVED RF/PF PERFORMANCE IS HEARTENING

FM COMUSMACV

SUBJ: RF/PF PERFORMANCE
FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR, THUA THIEN, IS AN INTERESTING VIGNETTE ON RF/PF PERFORMANCE THAT MIGHT BE USED IN CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS:
1. IN VIEW OF RECENT EXPRESSED INTEREST IN UPGRADING OF RF/PF PERFORMANCE, I WOULD LIKE TO CITE EXAMPLE OF RF/PF OPERATIONS WHICH DEFIES UPGRADING AND STANDS AS EXAMPLE FOR EMULATION.
2. DURING PERIOD 1 JULY TO 18 AUGUST 1968 QUANG DIEN DISTRICT FORCES (RF/PF) HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR 130 VC KIA'S, 96 POW'S AND 58 HOI CHANHS. 143 INDIVIDUAL AND 2 CREW-SERVED WEAPONS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 1 KIA AND 31 WIA -- THIS KILL RATIO CAN BE LIVED WITH.
3. MOST SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS ARE COMBINED USING BOTH US TROOPS AND SUPPORT FOR TERRITORIAL FORCES. FOR EXAMPLE, QUANG DIEN OPERATION 83 CONDUCTED ON 18 AUGUST. OPERATION WAS INITIATED WHEN DISTRICT CHIEF, MAJOR TRAN TIEN DAO RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM VILLAGE OF POSSIBLE VC LOCATION. AFTER S-2 EVALUATION, MAJOR DAO APPROACHED LTC LESLIE D. CARTER, CO 1/502 INFANTRY, 101 AIR CASDUC ON FEASIBILITY OF COMBINED OPERATION NEXT MORNING; PLANNING WASCOMPLETED AT 2340 HOURS, PF PLATOONS 12, 13, AND 115 WERE AIRLIFTED AT 230600 AUGUST TO OPERATIONAL AREA, COD, 2/7 CAV SECURED LZ AND PROVIDED BLOCKING FORCE AND REACTION FORCE FOR PF PLATOONS. EIGHT HOURS LATER WITHOUT FRIENDLY CASUALTIES, PF SCORE READ 17 VC KIA'S, 4 NVA KIA'S, 4 VCC, 4 NVAC AND 17 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED. THIS IS EPITOME OF TERRITORIAL FORCES OPERATIONS.

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4. GERMANE TO SUCH SUCCESS ARE:
A. OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP IN BOTH DISTRICT AND FREE WORLD FORCES. MAJOR DAO (RECENTLY PROMOTED) IS AGGRESSIVE, KNOWLEDGEABLE, AND DETERMINED TO DEFEAT ENEMY. LTC CARTER AND LTC DAVIS, US COMMANDERS IN AREA, ACTIVELY WORK TO SUPPORT TERRITORIAL FORCES AND BY PERSONAL EXAMPLE INSPIRE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. DISTRICT SENIOR ADVISOR, MAJOR TRAUGOTT, WORKS BOTH VN AND US SIDES TO PROVIDE INSTANT COORDINATION WHICH MAKES COMBINED OPERATIONS POSSIBLE.
B. COLLOCATION OF US COMMAND POST AND DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS. COORDINATION IS EYE BALL-TO-EYE BALL, NIGHTLY CONFERENCES ENSURE POSITIVE UNDERSTANDING AND ELIMINATE CONFUSION AND DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY VAGUENESS OF OTHER MORE SOPHISTICATED COMMUNICATION MEANS.
C. MOBILITY PROVIDED TERRITORIAL FORCES. EXPLOITATION OF FRESH INTELLIGENCE IS POSSIBLE WITH COLLOCATION, LEADERSHIP AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING.
5. OTHER RF/PF UNITS MAY REQUIRE UPGRADING. HAVE JUST AWARDED 25,000 PIATERS TO DISTRICT CHIEF FOR WELL-EARNED RF/PF CELEBRATION. FEEL THIS IS MOST JUSTIFIED EXPENDITURE. THUA THIEN IS SATISFIED WITH QUANG DIEN AS IS. PROVINCE CHIEF, THUA THIEN CONCURS WITH THIS SPOT REPORT.

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CO WTE13
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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP82450

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. [redacted] SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO [redacted] MAR. 16, 1983.
BY [redacted] ON 12-1042

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEPTEMBER 21, 1968

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HEREWITH THE USIA SUMMARY OF A BACKGROUNDER GIVEN BY SECRETARY RUSK TO A SELECTED GROUP OF NEWSMEN YESTERDAY.

WASHINGTON, SEPT. 20 -- THE SOVIET UNION APPEARS TO BE CARRYING ON A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, UNITED STATES OFFICIALS SAID TODAY.

HOWEVER, THEY EMPHASIZED, THE RIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION WITH RESPECT TO WEST BERLIN, LIKE THOSE OF THE OTHER ALLIED VICTORS OF WORLD WAR TWO, ARE MULTILATERAL, NOT (RPT NOT) UNILATERAL. THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT (RPT NOT) ASSERT A UNILATERAL RIGHT WITH RESPECT TO WEST BERLIN AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC ANY MORE THAN THE UNITED STATES COULD ON EAST BERLIN AND EAST GERMANY.

IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF MAJOR CURRENT ISSUES, LARGELY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, OFFICIALS OFFERED THE FOLLOWING FURTHER OBSERVATIONS:

THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT (RPT NOT) ACCEPT THE CONCEPT THAT WEST BERLIN IS A PART OF WEST GERMANY, AND APPLIES THE SAME CONCEPT TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST BERLIN AND EAST GERMANY.

IT WAS THE SOVIETS WHO BROKE UP THE FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITY FOR WEST BERLIN, LEAVING THAT RESPONSIBILITY IN THE HANDS OF THE THREE WESTERN OCCUPYING POWERS. THE SOVIETS MAY PUT PRESSURE ON WEST BERLIN, BUT THE WESTERN POWERS WILL NOT (RPT NOT) ALLOW IT TO BE ISOLATED, AND ANY SOVIET MOVE AGAINST IT WOULD RESULT IN WAR.

IT IS REASONABLE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS AN EXTENSION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SITUATION. FIRST, THE RUSSIANS CLAIMED THEY WERE INVITED INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. WHEN THAT LINE FAILED TO GAIN CREDENCE THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE WORLD, THEY TURNED TO THE CLAIM THAT THEIR INVASION WAS A REACTION TO IMPERIALIST THREATS AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA, A LINE THEY ARE STILL TRYING TO SELL.

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THE CZECH SITUATION IS STILL ALIVE AND FLUID, AND IS A BASIC ISSUE FOR THE SOVIETS, WHO SAW DUBCEK LEADING THE COUNTRY INTO A MIXED SOCIETY IN WHICH THE COMMUNIST PARTY WOULD NOT (RPT NOT) HAVE COMPLETE POWER. WHILE THIS SITUATION REMIANS FLUID, IT IS A MAJOR FACTOR, BUT ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, IN THE MATTER OF WHETHER THERE CAN BE U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT TALKS. OTHER MAJOR ITEMS INCLUDE VIET NAM, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TALKS. BEFORE THERE CAN BE SUMMIT NEGOTIATIONS, THERE MUST BE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE STATUS OF SUCH MAJOR ISSUES. PRESENTLY, THE IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT (RPT NOT) CONTEMPLATING PARTICIPATION IN A SUMMIT MEETING.

LIVELY DISCUSSION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION IS EXPECTED AT THE FORTHCOMING UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT (RPT NOT) YET CLEAR IN WHAT WAY THE MATTER WILL APPEAR ON THE AGENDA.

ANOTHER MAJOR ISSUE, THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, ALSO IS EXPECTED TO RESULT IN MUCH WORK AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE FIRST STEP WILL BE TO HEAR THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL UNITED NATIONS EMISSARY TO THE MIDDLE EAST, GUNNAR JARRING. ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF ARMS LIMITATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT (RPT NOT) EXPECT TO SEE MUCH MOVEMENT UNTIL THERE IS A PEACE SETTLEMENT, OR UNTIL SUCH A SETTLEMENT IS WELL IN SIGHT.

ON THE MATTER OF WHETHER HEAVY SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE ARAB NATIONS ARE AFFECTING THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IT IS FELT THAT, DEPENDING ON THE SIZE AND TYPES OF SUCH WEAPONS, SUBSTANTIAL FURTHER SHIPMENTS COULD TIP THE BALANCE. THERE HAS BEEN AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WASHINGTON FEELS THAT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE HAS NOT (RPT NOT) CHANGED -- THAT IT IS NOT (RPT NOT) INTERESTED IN ANY ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT UNTIL THERE IS A PEACE SETTLEMENT.

ON A STRICTLY ISRAELI-U.S. MATTER, COMPENSATION FOR THE U.S. NAVY CRAFT LIBERTY THAT WAS ATTACKED BY THE ISRAELIS DURING THE WAR LAST JUNE, THE UNITED STATES FEELS ISRAEL WOULD DO WELL TO GET THIS MATTER OUT OF THE WAY QUICKLY.

ON VIET NAM, THERE HAS BEEN NO (RPT NO) PROGRESS IN THE PARIS TALKS. IN THE WAR ITSELF, IT MAY BE THAT THE OFTEN-PREDICTED THIRD COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE IN THE SOOTH EITHER IS UNDER WAY OR TO START SHORTLY, CONSIDERING CURRENT SHARP GROUND ACTION NEAR SAIGON, WHERE AN OFFENSIVE MIGHT HAVE BEEN FULLY UNDER WAY AT THE MOMENT IF COMMUNIST TROOPS IN THE AREA HAD BEEN ABLE TO GET THROUGH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. DEFENSES. IT MAY BE THAT PROBES BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND UNITED STATES FORCES HAVE HIT AND BROKEN UP ELEMENTS DESIGNED FOR AN OFFENSIVE. SUBSTANTIAL INFILTATION FROM NORTH VIET NAM CONTINUES, BUT IT MAY LESSEN DURING THE RAINY SEASON IN LAOS.

ON THE STILL IMCOMPLETE CONGESSIONAL ACTION ON THE FOREIGN AID BILL, THE ADMINISTRATION IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH DEEP CUTS BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN TWO PROGRAMS, SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT LOANS, AND THE CUT IN THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, IN THE FACT OF A CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION OFFERING MORE AID, ADOPTED BEFORE THE PUNTA DEL ESTE CONFERENCE.

ON THE MATTER OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR RENEWAL OF BASE RIGHTS IN SPAIN, THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER IS TO SEE THE SECRETARY OF STATE SATURDAY. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL GO ALL THE WAY TO THE DEADLINE,

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82451

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 10-16-01

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Pre file

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SEPTEMBER 21,1968

THIS REPORT ON COMMUNIST MATERIEL LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS OF SOME INTEREST.

COMMUNIST MATERIEL LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE BEEN SIZABLE IN RECENT WEEKS AND MAY INCREASE.

FREE WORLD FORCES UNCOVERED CACHES CONTAINING 135 SHORT TONS OF SUPPLIES DURING THE PERIOD 18 AUGUST - 17 SEPTEMBER; MOST WERE FOUND IN 1ST AND 3D CORPS. CACHES DISCOVERED IN NORTHERN 1ST CORPS AND IN 3D CORPS' PHUOC LONG PROVINCE AND THE SAIGON AREA REPRESENTED NEARLY 80 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL TONNAGE TAKEN DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. MOST WERE UNCOVERED DURING SWEEP OPERATIONS NOT ONLY IN THE HIGH-THREAT AREAS BUT ALSO IN REGIONS NORMALLY CONTROLLED BY THE ENEMY; THE 90 SHORT TONS CAPTURED INCLUDED ARMS AND MUNITIONS AND ALL CLASSES OF SUPPLIES.

THE LARGEST CACHE AMONG THE 10 UNCOVERED DURING A 15 SEPTEMBER ARVN SWEEP OPERATION IN PHUOC LONG PROVINCE WAS ONE OF THE BIGGEST OF THE WAR. THE CACHE'S 40 SHORT TONS INCLUDED 306 B-41 ROUNDS; 2,436 B-40 ROUNDS; 1,128 60-MM MORTAR ROUNDS; 574,560 AK-47 ROUNDS; 572 82-MM MORTAR ROUNDS; 336 GRENADES; AND OVER 2,000 POUNDS OF TNT.

BASED ON AN ESTIMATED NEED OF 24 SHORT TONS PER DAY, THE 90 SHORT TONS CAPTURED FROM 9 TO 16 SEPTEMBER COULD HAVE SATISFIED ALMOST FOUR DAYS OF COUNTRYWIDE MUNITIONS REQUIREMENTS. RICE CAPTURED DURING THE SAME PERIOD COULD HAVE SUSTAINED A 600-MAN BATTALION FOR A MONTH, AND THE WEAPONS CAPTURED COULD HAVE EQUIPPED THREE SUCH UNITS FOR SIX TO 12 MONTHS.

THE CAPTURES REPRESENT MORE AGGRESSIVE SEARCH EFFORTS BY ALLIED FORCES, MORE FREQUENT SEARCH OPERATIONS IN AREAS NORMALLY CONTROLLED BY THE ENEMY, AND AN INCREASED WILLINGNESS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO REPORT CACHES.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82445

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

OUR NAT DAVIS HAD LUNCH ON THE 19TH WITH JAROMIR PRIBYL, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. THE FOLLOWING MEMCON IS INTERESTING AND RINGS TRUE IN REFLECTING CZECH ATTITUDES AND THE SITUATION.

PRYBIL RETURNED TO THE U.S. ABOUT TEN DAYS AGO FROM PRAGUE, WHERE HE HAD BEEN WORKING PART-TIME IN THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT SVOBODA. APPARENTLY SVOBODA'S SON-IN-LAW, MILAN KLUSAK, HAD KNOWN PRIBYL AND BROUGHT HIM OVER TO HELP OUT. PRIBYL SAID KLUSAK IS HANDLING FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE.

PRIBYL TOLD ME HE HAD JUST FINISHED CROSS-EXAMINING AN EMBASSY COLLEAGUE WHO HAD RETURNED FROM PRAGUE A DAY OR TWO AGO. THEREFORE, SOME OF HIS INFORMATION IS MORE RECENT THAN HIS OWN DEPARTURE FROM PRAGUE.

U.S. POLICY

PRIBYL SAID HE HOPED I HAD ENJOYED MY SUMMER VACATION. WHEN I INDICATED THAT THE CZECH CRISIS HAD INTERFERED, PRIBYL INQUIRED WITH A SMILE WHAT I HAD BEEN OCCUPYING MYSELF WITH THESE PAST WEEKS. I LAUGHED, AND ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A LACK OF ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT HAD BEEN WHAT HE HAD HAD IN MIND, AND ASKED WHAT U.S. POLICY WAS.

I SAID I HAD BEEN ABOUT TO ASK HIM WHAT U.S. POLICY SHOULD BE. AFTER A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF BACK AND FORTH, PRIBYL EXPLAINED HIS IDEA OF A "HELPFUL" AMERICAN POLICY. THE CONVERSATION WAS A LITTLE LIKE PEELING AN ONION, AND PRIBYL KEPT REPEATING THAT HIS REMARKS WERE STRICTLY PERSONAL, INFORMAL AND SOMETIMES AT VARIANCE WITH OFFICIAL CZECH POLICY. HE SAID HE TRUSTED MY DISCRETION.

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PRIBYL SAID THAT A FAIP AMOUNT OF ATTENTION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE UN GENERAL DEBATE WOULD BE HELPFUL. I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT A SEPARATE CZECH ITEM WOULD BE A POOR IDEA. PRIBYL ANSWERED THAT THE CZECH DELEGATION WOULD WALK OUT. NEVERTHELESS, FRANKLY, THE MORE CONDEMNATION THE BETTER. HE SAID THE STRONG U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION WAS ALSO HELPFUL -- BUT THAT IT WOULD BE NICE IF IT DIDN'T ALL COME FROM THE RIGHT-WINGERS.

ON EXCHANGE POLICY, PRIBYL THOUGHT THE GESTURES IN THE CULTURAL FIELD WERE A GOOD THING. THEIR EFFECT WAS TO HURT THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES MORE THAN THE SOVIETS, BUT THE PRESSURE WAS TRANSMITTED TO MOSCOW TO SOME EXTENT. HE SAID WE OUGHT TO THINK ABOUT CUTTING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES, AS THAT WAS THE AREA THE SOVIETS WERE REALLY INTERESTED IN.

ON THE QUESTION OF DETENTE, PRIBYL SEEMED HIGHLY AMBIVALENT. ON THE ONE HAND, HE SAID THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT'S ONLY HOPE IS FOR SOME SORT OF REESTABLISH MENT OF DETENTE. A RETURN TO THE COLD WAR WOULD SIMPLY SQUEEZE THE CZECHS IN A VISE. I SAID THIS DIDN'T SEEM CONSIS-TENT WITH WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT THE UN CONDEMNATION. PRIBYL SAID HE REALIZED THAT, AND THOUGHT ANY SUCCESSFUL U.S. POLICY WOULD HAVE TO BE "MIXED." BUT WE SHOULD NEVER FORGET THAT THE SOVIETS REALLY CARE ABOUT OUR REACTIONS, AND WILL LISTEN NO MATTER WHAT WE DO AND SAY. IF WE COULD SOMEHOW OFFER THE CHANCE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITHOUT GOING BACK TO BUSINESS AS USUAL, THIS MIGHT BE THE CZECH'S HOPE.

ON THE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS, PRIBYL SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF DISARMAMENT. YET HE HOPED WE WOULD NOT BE TOO EAGER. PRIOR TO THE INVASION, HE SAID, SOVIET EMBASSY CONTACTS GAVE HIM THE IMPRESSION THEY WERE COUNTING ON THE INTENSITY OF AMERICAN INTEREST TO GIVE THEM LEVERAGE. HE HAD JUST BEEN TALKING TO THE SOVIET EBMASSY'S DISARM-AMENT MAN (YULY VORONTSOV) AND STILL HAD THIS IMPRESSION OF THEIR ATTITUDE. HE SAID HE COULD NOT JUDGE HOW ANXIOUS THE SOVIETS REALLY ARE FOR TALKS AND THEREFORE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE U.S. OR THE USSR WAS THE ARDENT SUITOR, AND WHO MIGHT THEREFORE HAVE THE LEVERAGE. HE RECOGNIZED THAT SOVIET INTEREST HAS INCREASED BECAUSE OF THEIR DESIRE TO LEGITIMIZE THEMSELVES, BUT DIDN'T KNOW HOW MUCH OF A FACTOR THIS WAS. HE GAVE ME A RATHER OBVIOUS OPENING TO TELL HIM WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAD RECENTLY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH US, BUT I DID NOT ANSWER.

ON THE NPT, PRIBYL EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING IT RATIFIED. HE SAID THE CZECHOSLOVAK EMBASSY IS CONSIDERING DELIVERING A NOTE TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHICH WOULD DISSOCIATE THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT FROM ANY INITIATIVE TO DEFER NPT RATIFICATION. THE CZECHS ARE WORRIED BY THE TENDENCY OF SOME SENATORS TO MAKE THE CZECH CRISIS THE EXCUSE TO BLOCK NPT PASSAGE. APPARENTLY PRIBYL HAD BEEN TALKING WITH VORONTSOV ABOUT THIS MATTER BEFORE LUNCH.

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PRIBYL SAID THE CZECHS WANTED TO MAKE ENTIRELY CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS AND THE WORLD THAT THEY OPPOSED ANY SUCH LINKAGE. I REMARKED THAT THIS WAS AN ADMIRABLE SENTIMENT AND, AS HE KNEW, THE ADMINISTRATION STRONGLY SUPPORTED NPT PASSAGE. I SAID I HOPED THE CZECHS HAD THOUGHT THROUGH THE POSSIBLE EFFECT IN THE SENATE AND ON THE PUBLIC OF SUCH A DEMARCHE.

REGARDING THE NPT, PRIBYL SAID THE RUSSIANS WERE INTERESTED IN ONE THING -- THE GERMANS. THE RUSSIANS JUST MIGHT BE RECONCILING THEMSELVES TO THE GERMANS' NOT SIGNING. THEY COULD THEN SPEND THE NEXT FEW YEARS BERATING THE GERMANS, AND USE GERMAN FAILURE TO SIGN AS A WAY TO WHIP THE EASERN EUROPEANS INTO LINE. I REMARKED THAT, DEPENDING ON HOW MACHIAVELLIAN YOU BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WERE, YOU COULD COME OUT ON EITHER SIDE OF THAT ONE.

PRIBYL HOPED THERE WAS NO SUMMIT IN THE OFFING. I PARAPHRASED THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AT HIS SEPTEMBER 6 PRESS CONFERENCE, AND SAID THAT, SO FAR AS I KNEW, THAT REPRESENTED HOW THE PRESIDENT REALLY FELT.

WHEN PRIBYL TURNED TO ASK ME WHAT AMERICAN POLICY WAS, I SAID WE FACED A DILEMMA -- AS HE HAD INDICATED IN HIS OWN COMMENTS. I HAD TO SAY FRANKLY THAT THE GREAT ISSUES OF ARMS CONTROL AND PEACE REMAIN, DESPITE THE TRAGEDY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. I NOTED THAT RECOURSE TO ULTIMATE MEASURES WAS NOT IN THE CARDS. AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO ITS NATO ALLIES IS DIFFERENT IN KIND FROM THE SITUATION WE FACED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THERE HAD BEEN NO "UNDERSTANDING" OR "COLLUSION" WITH THE SOVIETS. AS SECRETARY RUSK HAD SAID PUBLICLY IN NEW HAVEN, WE HAD WARNED THE SOVIETS OF THE CONSEQUENCE OF INTERVENTION BEFORE THE 20TH OF AUGUST. AMERICA IS DEEPLY ATTACHED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER, AND CANNOT BUT BE PROFOUNDLY AFFECTED WHEN A SMALL STATE IS INVADED BY HER NEIGHBORS.

BILATERAL QUESTIONS

ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS, PRIBYL REMARKED THAT IT WOULD BE "JUST AS WELL TO WAIT A FEW WEEKS" BEFORE DOING ANYTHING ON THE GOLD QUESTION. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT, BEFORE WE DECIDED TO DO ANYTHING, WE WOULD GIVE THE CZECHS SOME DISCREET OPPORTUNITY TO REACT.

AT ONE POINT THE SEJNA CASE CAME UP. PRIBYL MENTIONED THE ARTICLE IN YESTERDAY'S ISSUE OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES' EXCHANGE -- WHICH ALLEGED SEJNA'S PRESS INTERVIEW HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE WHITE HOUSE IN ORDER TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS AND THE CZECHS A "MESSAGE." I HADN'T SEEN THE ARTICLE, AND ASKED WHAT THE "MESSAGE" MIGHT HAVE BEEN. PRIBYL SAID THAT WASN'T CLEAR TO HIM. I ASSURED HIM I HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY WHITE HOUSE INVOLVEMENT IN THE SEJNA INTERVIEW AND DID NOT THINK THE STATE DEPARTMENT, OR ANY PART OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD FAVORED IT. I REMARKED THAT THE CZECHS HAD HAD SOME EXPERIENCE RECENTLY WITH THE PROBLEMS OF A FREE PRESS AND HE WOULD UNDERSTAND OUR SITUATION. I ADDED THAT IT WAS HARD FOR ME TO BELIEVE THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT WANTED SEJNA EXTRADICTED AT THIS POINT.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIBYL SAID HE WAS A CAUTIOUS OPTIMIST. IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE DUBCEK-CERNNK GOVERNMENT IS OPERATING ON PERCEPTEBLY WIDENING TERRAIN -- ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL VERY NARROW. HE BELIEVES THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DOES WANT TO STOP SHORT OF AN OCCUPATION REGIME. HIS EVIDENCE FOR THIS IS THE WAY THE CZECH GOVERNMENT ITSELF IS OPERATING. THEY WOULD NOT BE ACTING THE WAY THEY ARE IF THEY DID NOT HAVE SOME CONFIDENCE OF THEIR GROUND.

PRIBYL DESCRNBED THE OCCUPATION AS "THE MOST PECULIAR IN HISTORY." SO FAR AS HE KNEW, THE ONLY ARRESTS THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES MADE WERE THE FIVE INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIALS TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INVASION. PRIBYL SAID HE BELIEVES THESE PEOPLE HAVE SINCE BEEN RELEASED. HE CREDITS PRESIDENT SVOBODA WITH ABSOLUTE FIRMNESS ON THE ISSUE OF POLICE TERROR. SO FAR AS THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IS CONCERNED, PRIBYL SAID THERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN HALF A DOZEN SOVIET ADVISERS IN THE MINISTRY, AND THERE ARE NO MORE NOW THAN THERE WERE BEFORE.

REGARDING TRAVEL, PRIBYL SAID PASSPORTS ARE STILL BEING ISSUED AND CZECHS CAN STILL LEAVE. HE HIMSELF DEPARTED CZECHOSLOVAKIA OVER THE AUSTRIAN BORDER. THE SOVIETS ARE IN THE WOODS A FEW KILOMETERS BACK, BUT THEY DON'T STOP YOU.

PRIBYL SAID THE SO-CALLED SIXTEEN POINT AGREEMENT HAD SUPER-SECRET 17TH AND 18TH POINTS. THE 17TH WAS AN UNDERTAKIN BY THE CZECHS TO DENY THAT THE EAST GERMANS HAD EVER ENTERED THE COUNTRY -- BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEM OF THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT. PRIBYL LAUGHED. I ASKED HIM IF THE EAST GERMANS WERE STILL THERE. HE SAID THAT, AS OF THE TIME HE LEFT PRAGUE, HE UNDERSTOOD THEY STILL WERE.

THE 18TH POINT WAS THE AGREEMENT TO DISMISS CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE CZECH LEADERSHIP [illegible]NCLUDING SIK, PAVEL [illegible]PIE[illegible]., HAJEK AND A FEW OTHERS. [illegible]E SAID THE ONLY ONE WHO HAS STILL NOT GONE IS HAJEK -- AND PRESIDENT SVOBODA IS DOING HIS BEST SUPPORT AND PROTECT HIM. I SAID I THOUGHT I HAD SEEN A TICKER ITEM SAYING HAJEK HAD NOW RESIGNED. PRIBYL SAID HE WOULD NOT BE AT ALL SURPRISED. HE CONFIRMEND THAT THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS BEING RUN BY PLESKOT (WHO WAS SIGNING ALL OUTGOING INSTRUCTIONS). PRIBYL SAID NEW APPOINTEES WERE JUST AS GOOD CZECHS AS THOSE REPLACED, AND THE SOVIETS HAD NOT GAINED BY THEIR PERSONAL VENDETTA.

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REGARDING DIVISIONS IN THE KREMLIN, PRIBYL SAID THE WORD IN PRAGUE WAS THAT THE DECISION TO INVADE WAS TAKEN IN THE SOVIET POLITURO BY A 6 TO 5 VOTE. SHELEST (UKRAINIAN PARTY CHIEF), AND THE OTHERS WITH UKRAINIAN AND BELORUSSIAN CONNECTIONS HAD BEEN STRONG ADVOCATES OF INVASION BECAUSE OF THEIR FEARS OF BEING INFECTED BY HUMANISTIC SOCIALISM. THE ARMY HAD FAVTRED INVASION -- ALTHOUGH GRECHKO PERSONALLY HAD NOT. BREZHNEV HAD WAIVERED AND FINALLY COME OVER TO THE INTERVENTION SIDE. KOSYGIN, SHELEPIN AND SUSLOV HAD OPPOSED THE INVASION, AND SUSLOV HAS SINCE BEEN ACTIVE, POINTING OUT THE IMPACT ON THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, SAYING IN EFFECT, "I TOLD YOU SO."

PRIBYL BELIEVES THE SOVIETS ARE STILL INTERESTED IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MEETING AND ARE MOST ANXIOUS FOR THE CZECH PARTY TO PARTICIPATE. I ASKED IF THAT GAVE THE CZECH PARTY ANY LEVERAGE. PRIBYL SAID "WE CAN'T BLACKMAIL THEM. OUR BEST MOVE IS TO BE WHOLEHEARTEDLY IN FAVOR."

REGARDING HUSAK, PRIBYL REMARKED FAVORABLY ON HIS STRENGTH, BALANCE AND POLITICAL REALISM. WHEN I ASKED HIM ABOUT PRESS SPECULATION THAT KUZNETSOV MIGHT BE LOOKING HUSAK OVER AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO DUBCEK, PRIBYL ADMITTED TO HAVING A FEW WORRIES -- AS YOU NEVER COULD BE ENTIRELY SURE WHEN A MAN IS TEMPTED BY GREAT POLITICAL OFFICE. PRIBYL SAID HE THOUGHT HUSAK WAS LOYAL TO DUBCEK, HOWEVER, AND THOUGHT THE SOVIET STRATEGY MIGHT BE TO COURT HUSAK AS A MEANS OF PRESSURE TO KEEP DUBCEK IN LINE. HE SAID HUSAK MUST REALIZE THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD REPUDIATE HIM IF HE LENT HIMSELF TO SOVIET DESIGNS.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-409
By ics, NARA Date 9-29-98

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82446

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

SEPT. 21, 1968

FOLLOWING ARE FOUR CABLES ON THE OSLO CHANNEL.

CABLE 1. THE NORWEGIANS DEBRIEF THE MEN WE SENT TO OSLO ON THEIR FIRST DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

CABLE 2. OUR BRIEF INSTRUCTION, SENT DURING THE NIGHT, TO DAVIDSON IN OSLO.

CABLE 3. HARRIMAN'S COMMENT AND, QUITE HELPFUL, ELABORATION OF OUR INSTRUCTION.

CABLE 4. NORTH VIETNAMESE PLANS FOR TODAY, SATURDAY.

WWR COMMENT:

THE HEART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MESSAGE (CABLE 1) IS IN PARA. 7 AND, PERHAPS, IN PARA. 10.

PARA. 7 STATES: "CONCERNING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WHICH WERE SHELLING SOUTH VIETNAM, IF THE U.S. STOPS ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND STOPS SHELLING ACROSS THE DMZ, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL NOT SHOOT AT U.S. AIRPLANES (BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT BE ABOVE NVN) AND WILL NOT SHELL U.S. POSITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM ACROSS THE DMZ. WARSHIPS OUTSIDE NORTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORIAL WATERS WOULD NOT BE FIRED UPON. CHAN SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE CESSATION OF U.S. BOMBING AND SHELLING OF NVN WOULD BRING AN END TO ALL ACTS OF WAR BY NORTH VIETNAM AGAINST THE U.S. HOWEVER, WHEN THE U.S. HITS AT NORTH VIETNAM, NORTH VIETNAM MUST GIVE THEM SEVERAL BLOWS BACK."

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PARA. 10 STATES THAT THE NORTH VETNAMESE TOLD THE NORWEGIANS THAT "THEY DID NOT WANT NIXON."

IT SOUNDS A LITTLE AS IF HANOI HAD TAKEN RATHER LITERALLY TWO MINIMAL STATEMENTS MADE BY SECRETARY RUSK AND THE PRESIDENT:

-- SECRETARY RUSK'S OFTEN REPEATED STAEMENT THAT "NO ONE HAS EVER BEEN ABLE TO TELL US WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE BOMBING STOPPED."

-- THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT THAT "ALMOST ANYTHING" FROM THE OTHER SIDE WOULD BE HELPFUL IN STOPPING THE BOMBING.

IN ANY CASE, IF THE NORWEGIANS ARE ACCURATE REPORTERS -- AND THEY HAVE A REPUTATION FOR BEING ACCURATE, PROFESSIONAL, AND HARD-HEADED -- THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT ANYONE FROM HANOI HAS SAID THAT EVEN THE SHELLING ACROSS THE DMZ WOULD STOP IF OUR BOMBING STOPPED.

WE MUST, OF COURSE, PROBE FURTHER.

IT IS INTERESTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTACTED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN OSLO. IT IS ALSO INTERESTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

TEXT OF CABLES FOLLOWS.

CABLE 1. FROM OSLO TO WASHINGTON.

"1. THIS AFTERNOON ALGARD AND VRAALSEN MET DAVIDSON AND RIDGWAY IN DAVIDSON'S HOTEL ROOM AND SUPPLIED FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THROUGH AFTERNOON SEPT. 20. (IN AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE AN INFORMAL ATMOSPHERE VRAALSEN HAD JOTTED DOWN POINTS RATHER THAN TAKING FULL NOTES AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID THE SAME. WHEN VRAALSEN TRANSCRIBES HIS NOTES A COPY WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US.)

2. ALGARD AND VRAALSEN MET AND DINED NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION THURSDAY EVENING. CONVERSATION WAS COMPLETELY NONSUBSTANTIVE. CHAN, SUNG AND INTERPRETER GIAI, ALGARD, BOYE AND VRAALSEN MET 9:30 A.M. FRIDAY SEPT. 20 FOR FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING. AFTER EXCHANGE OF FORMALITIES CHAN SAID THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED CONSIDERABLY BOTH MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY SINCE ALGARD'S VISIT TO HANOI IN FEB-MAR AND ASKED IF HE COULD GIVE A SHORT STATEMENT SETTING FORTH THE CURRENT SITUATION. SPEAKING GENERALLY WITHOUT NOTES CHAN REFERRED TO THE GREAT VICTORIES WON BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN THEIR THREE GREAT OFFENSIVES, JAN-FEB, MAY AND AUGUST. HE USED THE HIGHLY EXAGGERATED MILITARY STATISTICS CONTAINED IN RECENT NLF COMMUNIQUE AND MENTIONED THE GREAT DAMAGE THE WAR WAS DOING TO U.S. DIGNITY AND HONOR. CHAN STATED THAT NORTH VIETNAM WISHED TO LIVE IN PEACE BUT THAT IT WAS ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AS AGREED IN THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS. HE SAID THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WANTED TO SEE AN EARLY END

PRESERVATION COPY

TO THE WAR AND THAT EVERY COUNTRY COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THIS, BASED ON ITS SPECIAL POTENTIALITIES. TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM ITS ROOT -- US AGGRESSION -- HAD TO BE REMOVED. THE WAR WAS THE RESULT OF U.S. MISCALCULATION AND THE U.S. WOULD MEET WITH DEFEAT. WHAT IS NEEDED IS THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALSO OTHER ACTS OF WAR SO THAT THE PARTIES COULD GO ON TO TALK ON OTHER MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES. THE FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM MUST BE STOPPED. (WWR COMMENT: I REPORTED TO YOU SOME TIME AGO THAT IN THE PRELIMINARIES LEADING UP TO OSLO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN PEKING HAD SAID, IN FEBRUARY 1968, "HANOI PRESUPPOSED THAT MILITARY OPERATIONS BE STOPPED WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONDUCTED.") QUESTIONS CONCERNING SOUTH VIETNAM MUST BE DISCUSSED WITH THE NLF. U.S. FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN SO THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CAN DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY. CHAN CONCLUDED HIS THIRTY-MINUTE PRESENTATION WITH THE USUAL REMARKS ABOUT THE U.S. RESPONSIBLITY FOR THE IMPASSE IN PARIS. HE THEN SAID TO ALGARD QUOTE YOU'VE HEARD ALL THIS BEFORE UNQUOTE.

3. BOYE OPENED DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVT'S ONLY INTEREST IS TO HELP IN BRINGING THE VIETNAMESE WAR TO AN END, THAT IT WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE LACK OF PROGESS IN PARIS AND WILLING TO DO ANYTHING IT COULD TO HELP. HOWEVER, THE GON COULD ITSELF ACT AS A CHANNEL AND NOTHING MORE.

4. ALGARD SAID HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT PARIS BECOMING A BLIND ALLEY. THE NORWEGIAN GOVT STOOD BEHIND ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS FAVORING A UNILATERAL CESSATION OF BOMBING BUT FULLY UNDERSTOOD WHY THE U.S. PRESIDENT NEEDED ASSURANCES OF THE SAFETY OF HIS TROOPS BEFORE HE COULD STOP THE BOMBING. ALGARD TOLD VIETNAMESE HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH AN INDIRECT MESSAGE THAT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT ENDANGER THE SAFETY OF U.S. TROOPS AND THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT REQUIRING ASSURANCES IN ANY ATTEMPT TO TRICK THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INTO DROPPING THEIR PRINCIPAL POSITION. HE SAID THAT THE GON WAS SURE THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND WOULD LIKE TO STOP THE BOMBING PROVIDING IT RECEIVES ASSURANCES ABOUT THE SAFETY OF ITS TROOPS, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE AREA OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. AT THIS POINT CHIN INTERRUPTED TO ASK WHETHER THE U.S. HAD SAID SO AND ALGARD REPLIED YES.

5. CHAN REPLIED THAT THE NLF COULD NOT STOP DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST AGGRESSION, THAT U.S. FORCES MASSACRING THE PEOPLE WOULD MEET NATURAL RESISTANCE FROM THE PEOPLE AND THAT WHAT THE U.S. WAS ACTUALLY ASKING FOR WAS RECIPROCITY.

6. ALGARD SAID HE DISAGREED. THE U.S. WAS NOT TRYING TO GET NORTH VIETNAM TO CHANGE ITS POSITION BUT MUST HAVE ASSURANCES THAT SECURITY OF ITS OWN FORCES WOULD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED IF IT STOPPED THE BOMBING.

7. CHAN THEN SAID THE U.S. HAD TO TALK TO THE NLF ABOUT NLF MILITARY ACTIONS. CONCERNING THE NORTH VITNAMESE FORCES WHICH WERE SHELLING SOUTH VIETNAM, IF THE U.S. STOPS ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND STOPS SHELLING ACROSS THE DMZ, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL NOT SHOOT AT U.S. AIRPLANES (BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT BE ABOVE NVN) AND WILL NOT SHELL U.S. POSITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM ACROSS THE DMZ. WARSHIPS OUTSIDE

PRESERVATION COPY

NORTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORIAL WATERS WOULD NOT BE FIRED UPON. CHAN SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE CESSATION OF U.S. BOMBING AND SHELLING OF NVN WOULD BRING AN END TO ALL ACTS OF WAR BY NORTH VIETNAM AGAINST THE U.S. HOWEVER, WHEN THE U.S. HITS AT NORTH VIETNAM, NORTH VIETNAM MUST GIVE THEM SEVERAL BLOWS BACK.

8. CHAN THEN STATED NORTH VIETNAMESE BELIEVED IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO GET THE PARIS TALKS GOING. THE U.S. MUST STOP ALL BOMBING. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE SERIOUSLY FIGHTING AND ARE SERIOUS CONCERNING PEACE. THEY ARE HONEST AND SERIOUS, CONCERNING OTHER QUESTIONS, CHAN CONTINUED TELL THE AMERICANS THAT QUOTE THIS WILL ALSO BE GOOD UNQUOTE. QUOTE THIS UNQUOTED WAS APPARENTLY THE STOPPING OF BOMBING (WWR COMMENT: I BELIEVE THE REFERENCE IS TO "HONEST AND SERIOUS TALKS" - NOT TO STOPPING THE BOMBING.)

9. ALGARD TOLD THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT NEITHER GON NOR U.S. WOULD MISUSE ANY STATEMENTS MADE TO GON.

10. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS MORNING'S TALKS ALGARD EXPLAINED AGAIN TO THE VIETNAMESE THE REASONS THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT STOP THE BOMBINGS WITHOUT ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF THE SAFETY OF ITS TROOPS. HE POINTED TO THE RECENT HARRIS POLL WHICH SHOWED 61 PERCENT OF THE U.S. PEOPLE WERE AGAINST UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION, MENTIONED THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT UNCONDIDITONAL CESSATION WOULD CAUSE IN THE U.S., (NOTING THAT BOTH PARTY PLATFORMS HAD REJECTED IT) AND REMARKED THAT THE COURSE OF THE PARIS TALKS AND OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM COULD NOT HELP AFFECTING THE U.S. ELECTIONS. CHAN REPLIED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD A DEFINITE OPINION AS TO WHICH CANDIDATE THEY PREFERRED AND INDICATED THAT THEY DID NOT WANT NIXON.

11. ALGARD TOLD DAVIDSON THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE TRYING TO CONVINCE THE NORWEGIANS THAT THEY SHOULD TELL THE U.S. THAT WE COULD STOP BOMBING WITHOUT RISK TO OUR TROOPS. ALGARD FOUND IT VERY HARD TO PIN THIS IMPRESSION DOWN TO ANY DIRECT STATEMENTS THEY MADE BUT CITED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FLAT STATEMENT THAT THEY WOULD CEASE ARTILLERY FIRE ACROSS THE DMZ IF THE U.S. STOPPED ARTILLERY FIRE ACROSS THE DMZ AND ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO TWICE REPEATED THAT IF AMERICANS ONLY STOPPED THE BOMBING EVERYTHING AFTER THAT WOULD BE EASY. ALGARD DID NOT INDICATE TO DAVNDSON THAT HE ACCEPTED VIETNAMESE LINE ABOUT LACK OF RISK TO U.S. TROOPS.

12. ALGARD FOUND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DECIDEDLY LESS AGRESSIVE AND MORE INFORMED THAN ANY NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN WITH HIM.

13. ALGARD WILL BE SEEING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SATURDAY SEPT 21 AT 10:30 A.M. HE INTENDS TO DEVOTE MOST OF THE SESSION TO TRYING TO ELICIT MORE SATISFACTORY RESPONSE TO QUESTION OF WHAT WILL HAPPEN ON THE GROUND IF US STOPS THE BOMBING. HE WILL POINT OUT SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD ARISE IF U.S. STOPPED BOMBING AND EVENTS SHOWED THAT THIS ENDANGERED THE SECURITY OF U.S. TROOPS. HE WILL STATE THAT THE ROAD AHEAD AFTER CESSATION OF BOMBING WILL NOT BE EASY AND MAY INDEED BE IMPOSSIBLE IF NORTH VIETNAM DOES NOT RESPOND FAVORABLY.

14. WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLETELY DEBRIEF ALGARD AND VRAALSEN. VRAALSEN HAD TO RETURN) TAKE THE NORTH VIETNAMES' SIGHTSEEING AND ALGARD RECEIVED CALL TO REPORT BACK TO FONOFF.

PRESERVATION COPY

15. COMMENT: MOST INTERESTING ASPECT OF CONVERSATION WAS DEFINITE NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENT THAT THEY WOULD STOP THEIR ARTILLERY FIRE ACROSS DMZ IF U.S. STOPPED ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND ITS ARTILLERY FIRE ACROSS DMZ. HANOI HAS THUS INDICATED ITS READINESS TO PAY A SPECIFIC MILITARY PRICE (ALTHOUGH NOT A VERY HIGH ONE) FOR THE STOPPING OF BOMBING.

16. WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY COMMENTS THAT WASHINGTON OR USDEL WISH PASSED ON TO ALGARD."

CABLE 2. FROM STATE TO OSLO.

"PROPOSED POSITION OUTLINED PARAGRAPH 13 FOR TOMORROW'S TALKS IS SOUND AND WE HAVE NO FURTHER COMMENTS AT THIS STAGE OF OSLO TALKS."

CABLE 3. FROM HARRIMAN TO OSLO.

"1. WE AGREE WITH DEPARTMENT THAT PROPOSED POSITION PARA 13 REFTEL IS SOUND.

2. AS AN ADDITIONAL REFINEMENT YOU SHOULD POINT OUT TO NORWEGIANS, THAT AS THEY SEEK TO EXPLORE WHAT WILL HAPPEN ON GROUND, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THEY WOULD KEEP IN MIND U.S. EXPECTATION THAT DRV WILL CEASE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN, THROUGH AND ACROSS THE DMZ AND CEASE MASSING TROOPS NORTH OF DMZ. IN OTHER WORDS THEY SHOULD SOLICIT DRV VIEWS ON ALL THEIR MILITARY INTENTION IN DMZ AREA IN EVENT U.S. STOPS ALL BOMBARDMENT OF DRV."

CABLE 4. FROM OSLO TO WASHINGTON.

"1. ALGARD TELEPHONED DAVIDSON 8 A.M. THIS MORNING (SATURDAY, SEPT 21) AND ASKED IF HE COULD COME UP TO DAVIDSON'S HOTEL ROOM. WHEN HE ARRIVED HE INFORMED DAVIDSON THAT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THE SOVIET EMBASSY HAD CALLED LEADING OSLO HOTELS TO ASK WHETHER QTE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION UNQTE WAS REGISTERED THERE. SOVIETS FINALLY CONTACTED NORTH VIETNAMESE AND MET WITH THEM LATER IN THE DAY. SOVIET EMBASSY IS GIVING A DINNER FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE MONDAY NIGHT. GON HOPES THAT NO NORWEGIANS WILL BE INVITED.

2. ALGARD MENTIONED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD TOLD HIM THEY WOULD REPORT HIS COMMENTS TO HANOI. ALGARD SPECULATED THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE MIGHT BE USING SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.

3. ALGARD SAID IN A RELIEVED TONE THAT NOTHING ABOUT NORTH VIETNAMESE VISIT HAD APPEARED IN THIS MORNING'S OSLO NEWSPAPERS."

PRESERVATION COPY

61

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

SEP 21 16 01

EEA546
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 3816

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82449

'69 SEP 21 PM 12:10

Rostow

~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE

[redacted]

1.5(c),
3.4(b)(1)(3)
6.1(c)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-7
By atm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

~~XEROX~~ FROM CHECK COPY



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DTG: 211506

SENT
WHCA

1968 SEP 21 15 54

'69 SEP 21 PM 12:11

62

EEA545
CO WTE10
DE WTE 3815

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82448

~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE

SEPTEMBER 21, 1968

[redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1),(3)
6.1(c)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-7
By obm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



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SECRET

DTG: 211506Z SEP 68

43

SENT
WHCA

'69 SEP 21 PM 12:33

Rem file

EEA550
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3819

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82452

UNCLAS

SEPTEMBER 21, 1968

IF CONFIRMED BY MOSCOW, THIS COULD BE GOOD NEWS.

QUOTE:

CERNIK ANNOUNCED THAT A GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM OUR TERRITORY WOULD START WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. AT THIS POINT HE DREW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT CERTAIN CONTINGENTS OF FOREIGN TROOPS WOULD REMAIN IN OUR COUNTRY--HOW GREAT THESE WOULD BE AND HOW LONG THEY WOULD STAY, THE PUBLIC WOULD LEARN IN GOOD TIME.

END QUOTE

DTG: 211611Z SEP 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Prosfile
64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Sept. 21, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

COPY TO GEORGE CHRISTIAN

Herewith the USIA summary of a backgrounder given by Secretary Rusk to a selected group of newsmen yesterday.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1993.
BY RG ON 12-10-92

IPS

U. S. OFFICIALS SEE SYSTEMATIC SOVIET CAMPAIGN (gridiron) (800)

by a Diplomatic Correspondent

Washington, Sept. 20 -- The Soviet Union appears to be carrying on a systematic campaign against the Federal Republic of Germany, United States officials said Friday.

However, they emphasized, the rights of the Soviet Union with respect to West Berlin, like those of the other allied victors of World War Two, are multilateral, not (rpt not) unilateral. The Soviet Union could not (rpt not) assert a unilateral right with respect to West Berlin and the Federal Republic any more than the United States could on East Berlin and East Germany.

In a general review of major current issues, largely in the framework of East-West relations, officials offered the following further observations:

The United States does not (rpt not) accept the concept that West Berlin is a part of West Germany, and applies the same concept to the relationship between East Berlin and East Germany.

It was the Soviets who broke up the four-power responsibility for West Berlin, leaving that responsibility in the hands of the three western occupying powers. The Soviets may put pressure on West Berlin, but the western powers will not (rpt not) allow it to be isolated, and any Soviet move against it would result in war.

It is reasonable to conclude that the Soviet pressure on the Federal Republic is an extension of the Czechoslovakian situation. First, the Russians claimed they were invited into Czechoslovakia. When that line failed to gain credence throughout most of the world, they turned to the claim that their invasion was a reaction to imperialist threats against Czechoslovakia, a line they are still trying to sell.

The Czech situation is still alive and fluid, and is a basic issue for the Soviets, who saw Dubcek leading the country into a mixed society in which the communist party would not (rpt not) have complete power. While this situation remains fluid, it is a major factor, but only one of several factors, in the matter of whether there can be U.S.-Soviet summit talks. Other major items include Viet Nam, the Middle East, and the possibility of anti-ballistic missile talks. Before there can be summit negotiations, there must be a clear understanding of the status of such major issues. Presently, the impression is that the Soviets are not (rpt not) contemplating participation in a summit meeting.

Lively discussion of the Czechoslovak situation is expected at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly, although it is not (rpt not) yet clear in what way the matter will appear on the agenda.

Another major issue, the Middle East situation, also is expected to result in much work at the General Assembly. The first step will be to hear the report of the special United Nations emissary to the Middle East, Gunnar Jarring. On the important issue of arms limitations in the Middle East, the United States does not (rpt not) expect to see much movement until there is a peace settlement, or until such a settlement is well in sight.

On the matter of whether heavy Soviet arms shipments to the Arab nations are affecting the balance of power in the Middle East, it is felt that, depending on the size and types of such weapons, substantial further shipments could tip the balance. There has been an exchange of views between Washington and Moscow on the Middle East, and Washington feels that the Soviet attitude has not (rpt not) changed — that it is not (rpt not) interested in any arms limitation agreement until there is a peace settlement.

On a strictly Israeli-U.S. matter, compensation for the U. S. navy craft Liberty that was attacked by the Israelis during the war last June, the United States feels Israel would do well to get this matter out of the way quickly.

On Viet Nam, there has been no (rpt no) progress in the Paris talks. In the war itself, it may be that the often-predicted third communist offensive in the south either is under way or to start shortly, considering current sharp ground action near Saigon, where an offensive might have been fully under way at the moment if communist troops in the area had been able to get through the South Vietnamese and U.S. defenses. It may be that probes by the South Vietnamese and United States forces have hit and broken up elements designed for an offensive. Substantial infiltration from North Viet Nam continues, but it may lessen during the rainy season in Laos.

On the still incomplete Congressional action on the foreign aid bill, the administration is particularly concerned with deep cuts by the House of Representatives in two programs, support for development loans, and the cut in the Alliance for Progress, in the fact of a Congressional resolution offering more aid, adopted before the Punta del Este Conference.

On the matter of negotiations for renewal of base rights in Spain, the Spanish foreign minister is to see the Secretary of State Saturday. It is expected that the negotiations will go all the way to the deadline.

65

SENT
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SECRET
DD WTE 10
DE WTE 3309

1968 SEP 21 13 40

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82444

[redacted] T SENSITIVE

69 SEP 21 AM 9:45

Pres file

SEPTEMBER 21, 1968

HEREWITH THE REPORT OF YESTERDAY'S PARIS SESSION. IT LENDS A LITTLE COLOR TO THE INDIAN REPORT THAT THEY WANT CLEARLY AND AUTHORITATIVELY OUR MINIMUM TERMS FOR A BOMBING CESSATION.

1. WE MET AGAIN WITH THO AND THUY FOR 3-1/2 HOURS ON SEPTEMBER 20. THE SAME PEOPLE WERE PRESENT ON BOTH SIDES.

2. WE OPENED BY PRESENTING OUR POSITION PRECISELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS. OUR MAIN EMPHASIS CENTERED ON NECESSITY OF GVN REPRESENTATION IN "SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING."

3. WE CANNOT REPORT PROGRESS FROM OUR DISCUSSION TODAY. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INSTRUCTIONS TO ENABLE A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSALS WE WERE MAKING ON GVN REPRESENTATION. AT OUR SUGGESTION, THEY AGREED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR GOVERNMENT AND SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. APPARENTLY BECAUSE OF THE TIME REQUIRED FOR THEM TO HAVE A TURN-AROUND WITH HANOI, THEY DID NOT AGREE TO MEETING AGAIN ON MONDAY. THEY SUGGESTED WE DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF ANOTHER MEETING ON WEDNESDAY AT THE TEA BREAK WITH THE PROVISO THAT IF EITHER SIDE HAS ANYTHING TO SAY AS A RESULT OF COMMUNICATION WITH ITS GOVERNMENT, AN EARLIER MEETING COULD BE HELD. THO INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS PREPARED TO MEET AGAIN ON OUR REGULAR SCHEDULE, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO MEET UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WERE RECEIVED FROM OUR GOVERNMENTS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo. 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By c, NARA, Date 10-16-01

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4. THE GIST OF THE DISCUSSION FOLLOWING ON OUR PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO GVN PARTICIPATION CONCERNED THEIR CLAIM THAT THIS WAS A PRIOR CONDITION WHICH DID NOT MEET THEIR DEMAND FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE RESPONDED TIME AND AGAIN THAT THIS WAS NOT A CONDITION OF CESSATION OF BOMBING, BUT IT WAS A QUESTION OF A DEFINITION OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. WITHOUT THIS UNDERSTANDING, WE QUESTIONED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THEIR INTENT.

5. FURTHER ARGUMENT CENTERED AROUND TWO QUESTIONS PUT BY THO FIRST, HE WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS THE ONLY "CONDITION" ON WHICH WE HAD TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING BEFORE WE WOULD STOP ALL BOMBING; SECOND, WHETHER WE WOULD DECIDE TO STOP THE BOMBING ONLY WHEN WE HAVE COME TO AGREEMENT ON THIS QUESTION. WE ANSWERED THE SECOND QUESTION FIRST BY SAYING THAT THE BOMBING WOULD NOT BE STOPPED UNLESS WE COULD REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS QUESTION. WE ANSWERED THE FIRST QUESTION BY SAYING THAT WE COULD NOT SAY THIS WAS THE ONLY QUESTION, BUT WE COULD INFORM HIM THAT AGREEMENT ON THIS MATTER COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION ON THE CESSATION OF BOMBING.

6. BOTH THO AND THUY REPEATEDLY REMARKED THAT OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO STATE THAT THE QUESTION OF GVN REPRESENTATION WAS THE ONLY CONDITION ON WHICH WE SHOULD COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, PLUS USE OF THE WORDS "COULD REPEAT COULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR," WAS AN INDICATION THAT WE WOULD HAVE MANY MORE FACTORS TO RAISE. THEY SAID THIS WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO LEAD THEM INTO ENDLESS DISCUSSION OF OTHER FACTORS BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING--WHICH THEY HAD REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF DOING.

7. WE WENT OVER THE GROUND WITH THEM A NUMBER OF TIMES BUT THEY CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT WE WERE ASKING FOR PRIOR AGREEMENT ON MATTERS WHICH THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS BEFORE THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING. THEY REPEATED AGAIN THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MEET IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A CESSATION OF BOMBING FOR DISCUSSION OF ANY SUBJECT THE OTHER SIDE WISHED TO RAISE.

DTG 211230Z SEPTEMBER 1968

SECRET

Xerox from Quick Copy

Pres. file

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Sept. 21, 1968

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

sent Rostow Reads CAP82446

Following are four cables on the Oslo channel.

Cable 1. The Norwegians debrief the men we sent to Oslo on their first discussions with the North Vietnamese.

Cable 2. Our brief instruction, sent during the night, to Davidson in Oslo.

Cable 3. Harriman's comment and, quite helpful, elaboration of our instruction.

Cable 4. North Vietnamese plans for today, Saturday.

WWR comment:

The heart of the North Vietnamese message (cable 1) is in para. 7 and, perhaps, in para. 10.

Para. 7 states: "Concerning the North Vietnamese forces which were shelling South Vietnam, if the U. S. stops all bombing of North Vietnam and stops shelling across the DMZ, the North Vietnamese will not shoot at U. S. airplanes (because they will not be above NVN) and will not shell U. S. positions in South Vietnam across the DMZ. Warships outside North Vietnamese territorial waters would not be fired upon. Chan summed up by saying that the cessation of U. S. bombing and shelling of NVN would bring an end to all acts of war by North Vietnam against the U. S. However, when the U. S. hits at North Vietnam, North Vietnam must give them several blows back."

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-409
By ics, NARA Date 9.29.98

Para. 10 states that the North Vietnamese told the Norwegians that "they did not want Nixon."

It sounds a little as if Hanoi had taken rather literally two minimal statements made by Secretary Rusk and the President:

-- Secretary Rusk's often repeated statement that "no one has ever been able to tell us what would happen if the bombing stopped."

-- the President's press conference statement that "almost anything" from the other side would be helpful in stopping the bombing.

In any case, if the Norwegians are accurate reporters -- and they have a reputation for being accurate, professional, and hard-headed -- this is the first time that anyone from Hanoi has said that even the shelling across the DMZ would stop if our bombing stopped.

We must, of course, probe further.

It is interesting that the Soviets have contacted the North Vietnamese in Oslo. It is also interesting that the Soviets had to take the initiative.

Text of cables follows.

Cable 1. From Oslo to Washington.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

666

OO RUEHCR RUFHOL
DE RUDKSO 6685L/1 2641935
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201930Z ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1983
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 351
STATE GRNC
BT

68980
1968 SEP 20 PM 6 43

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 6685

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-409
By ya, NARA Date 9-29-98

NODIS OKIO

Cable 1

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: OSLO 6334

1. THIS AFTERNOON ALGARD AND VRAALSEN MET DAVIDSON AND RIDGWAY IN DAVIDSON'S HOTEL ROOM AND SUPPLIED FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THROUGH AFTERNOON SEPT 20. (IN AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE AN INFORMAL ATMOSPHERE VRAALSEN HAD JOTTED DOWN POINTS RATHER THAN TAKING FULL NOTES AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID THE SAME. WHEN PRAALSEN TRANSCRIBES HIS NOTES A COPY WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US.)

2. ALGARD AND VRAALSEN MET AND DINED NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION THURSDAY EVENING. CONVERSATION WAS COMPLETELY NON-SUBSTANTIVE. CHAN, SUNG AND INTERPRETER GIAI, ALGARD, BOYE AND VRAALSEN MET 9:30 A.M. FRIDAY SEPT 20 FOR FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING. AFTER EXCHANGE OF FORMALITIES VHAN SAID THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED CONSIDERABLY BOTH MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY SINCE ALGARD'S VISIT TO HANOI IN FEB-MAR AND ASKED IF HE COULD GIVE A SHORT STATEMENT SETTING FORTH THE CURRENT SITUATION. SPEAKING GENERALLY WITHOUT NOTES CHAN REFERRED TO THE GREAT VICTORIES WON BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN THEIR THREE GREAT OFFENSIVES, JAN-FEB, MAY AND AUGUST. HE USED THE HIGHLY EXAGGERATED MILITARY STATISTICS CONTAINED IN RECENT NLF COMMUNIQUE AND MENTIONED THE GREAT DAMAGE THE WAR WAS DOING TO US DIGNITY AND HONOR. CHAN STATED THAT NORTH VIETNAM WISHED TO LIVE IN PEACE BUT THAT IT WAS ENTITLED TO SOVEREIGNTY, UNITY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AS AGREED IN THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS. HE SAID THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WANTED TO SEE AN EARLY END TO THE WAR AND THAT EVERY COUNTRY COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THIS, BASED ON ITS SPECIAL POTENTIALITIES. TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM ITS ROOT -- US AGGRESSION -- HAD TO BE REMOVED. THE WAR WAS THE RESULT OF US MISCALCULATION AND THE US WOULD MEET WITH DEFEAT. WHAT IS NEEDED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~-2- OSLO 6689, SEPTEMBER 20, SECTION 2 OF 2~~

IS THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALSO OTHER ACTS OF WAR SO THAT THE PARTIES COULD GO ON TO TALK ON OTHER MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES. THE FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM MUST BE STOPPED. QUESTIONS CONCERNING SOUTH VIETNAM MUST BE DISCUSSED WITH THE NLF. US FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN SO THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CAN DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY. CHAN CONCLUDED HIS THIRTY-MINUTE PRESENTATION WITH THE USUAL REMARKS ABOUT THE US RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMPASSE IN PARIS. HE THEN SAID TO ALGARD QUOTE YOU'VE HEARD ALL THIS BEFORE UNQUOTE.

3. BOYE OPENED DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVT'S ONLY INTEREST IS TO HELP IN BRINGING THE VIETNAMESE WAR TO AN END, THAT IT WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE LACK OF PROGESS IN PARIS AND WILLING TO DO ANYTHING IT COULD TO HELP. HOWEVER, THE GON COULD ITSELF ACT AS A CHANNEL AND NOTHING MORE.

4. ALGARD SAID HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT PARIS BECOMING A BLIND ALLEY. THE NORWEGIAN GOVT STOOD BEHIND ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS FAVORING A UNILATERAL CESSATION OF BOMBING BUT FULLY UNDERSTOOD WHY THE US PRESIDENT NEEDED ASSURANCES OF THE SAFETY OF HIS TROOPS BEFORE HE COULD STOP THE BOMBING. ALGARD TOLD VIETNAMESE HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE US WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH AN INDIRECT MESSAGE THAT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT ENDANGER THE SAFETY OF US TROOPS AND THAT THE US WAS NOT REQUIRING ASSURANCES IN ANY ATTEMPT TO TRICK THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INTO DROPPING THEIR PRINCIPAL POSITION. HE SAID THAT THE GON WAS SURE THAT THE US WANTS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND WOULD LIKE TO STOP THE BOMBING PROVIDING IT RECEIVES ASSURANCES ABOUT THE SAFETY OF ITS TROOPS, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE AREA OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. AT THIS POINT CHAN INTERRUPTED TO ASK WHETHER THE US HAD SAID SO AND ALGARD REPLIED YES.

5. CHAN REPLIED THAT THE NLF COULD NOT STOP DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST AGGRESSION, THAT US FORCES MASSACRING THE PEOPLE WOULD MEET NATURAL RESISTANCE FROM THE PEOPLE AND THAT WHAT THE US WAS ACTUALLY ASKING FOR WAS RECIPROCITY.

6. ALGARD SAID HE DISAGREED. THE US WAS NOT TRYING TO GET NORTH VIETNAM TO CHANGE ITS POSITION BUT MUST HAVE ASSURANCES THAT SECURITY OF ITS OWN FORCES WOULD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED IF IT STOPPED THE BOMBING.

~~GP-1. TIBBETTS~~
BT

(WWR Comment: I reported to you some time ago that in the preliminaries leading up to Oslo the North Vietnamese in Peking had said, in February 1968, "Hanoi presupposed that military operations be stopped while negotiations are conducted.")

~~SECRET~~

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHCR RUFHOL
DE RUDKSO 6685L/2 2642010
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 2019302 SEP 68 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1984
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 352
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BT
~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 OSLO 6685

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1968 SEP 20 PM 6 41

The reference is to "honest and serious talks" not to stopping the bombing.)

NODIS OKIO

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

7. CHAN THEN SAID THE US HAD TO TALK TO THE NLF ABOUT NLF MILITARY ACTIONS. CONCERNING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WHICH WERE SHELLING SOUTH VIETNAM, IF THE US STOPS ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND STOPS SHELLING ACROSS THE DMZ, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL NOT SHOOT AT US AIRPLANES (BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT BE ABOVE NVN) AND WILL NOT SHELL US POSITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM ACROSS THE DMZ. WARSHIPS OUTSIDE NORTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORIAL WATERS WOULD NOT BE FIRED UPON. CHAN SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE CESSATION OF US BOMBING AND SHELLING OF NVN WOULD BRING AN END TO ALL ACTS OF WAR BY NORTH VIETNAM AGAINST THE US. HOWEVER, WHEN THE US HITS AT NORTH VIETNAM, NORTH VIETNAM MUST GIVE THEM SEVERAL BLOWS BACK.

8. CHAN THEN STATED NORTH VIETNAMESE BELIEVED IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO GET THE PARIS TAKS GOING. THE US MUST STOP ALL BOMBING. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE SERIOUSLY FIGHTING AND ARE SERIOUS CONCERNING PEACE. THEY ARE HONEST AND SERIOUS. CONCERNING OTHER QUESTIONS, CHAN CONTINUED, TELL THE AMERICANS THAT QUOTE THIS WILL ALSO BE GOOD UNQUOTE. QUOTE THIS UNQUOTE WAS APPARENTLY THE STOPPING OF BOMBING. (WWR comment: I believe)

9. ALGARD TOLD THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT NEITHER GON NOR US WOULD MISUSE ANY STATEMENTS MADE TO GON.

10. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS MORNING'S TALKS ALGARD EXPLAINED AGAIN TO THE VIETNAMESE THE REASONS THAT THE US COULD NOT STOP THE BOMBINGS WITHOUT ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF THE SAFETY OF ITS TROOPS. HE POINTED TO THE RECENT HARRIS POLL WHICH SHOWED 61 PERCENT OF THE US PEOPLE WERE AGAINST UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION, MENTIONED THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION WOULD CAUSE IN THE US, (NOTING THAT BOTH PARTY PLATFORMS

~~SECRET~~

HAD REJECTED IT) AND REMARKED THAT THE COURSE OF THE PARIS TALKS AND OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM COULD NOT HELP AFFECTING THE US ELECTIONS. CHAN REPLIED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD A DEFINITE OPINION AS TO WHICH CANDIDATE THEY PREFERRED AND INDICATED THAT THEY DID NOT WANT NIXON.

11. ALGARD TOLD DAVIDSON THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE TRYING TO CONVINCE THE NORWEGIANS THAT THEY SHOULD TELL THE US THAT WE COULD STOP BOMBING WITHOUT RISK TO OUR TROOPS. ALGARD FOUND IT VERY HARD TO PIN THIS IMPRESSION DOWN TO ANY DIRECT STATEMENTS THEY MADE BUT CITED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FLAT STATEMENT THAT THEY WOULD CEASE ARTILLERY FIRE ACROSS THE DMZ IF THE US STOPPED ARTILLERY FIRE ACROSS THE DMZ AND ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO TWICE REPEATED THAT IF AMERICANS ONLY STOPPED THE BOMBING EVERYTHING AFTER THAT WOULD BE EASY. ALGARD DID NOT INDICATE TO DAVIDSON THAT HE ACCEPTED VIETNAMESE LINE ABOUT LACK OF RISK TO US TROOPS.

12. ALGARD FOUND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DECIDEDLY LESS AGGRESSIVE AND MORE INFORMED THAN ANY NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN WITH HIM.

13. ALGARD WILL BE SEEING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SATURDAY SEPT 21 AT 10:30A.M. HE INTENDS TO DEVOTE MOST OF THE SESSION TO TRYING TO ELICIT MORE SATISFACTORY RESPONSE TO QUESTION OF WHAT WILL HAPPEN ON THE GROUND IF US STOPS THE BOMBING. HE WILL POINT OUT SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD ARISE IF US STOPPED BOMBING AND EVENTS SHOWED THAT THIS ENDANGERED THE SECURITY OF US TROOPS. HE WILL STATE THAT THE ROAD AHEAD AFTER CESSATION OF BOMBING WILL NOT BE EASY AND MAY INDEED BE IMPOSSIBLE IF NORTH VIETNAM DOES NOT RESPOND FAVORABLY.

14. WE WERE UNABLE TO COMPLETELY DEBRIEF ALGARD AND VRAALSEN. VRAALSEN HAD TO RETURN TO TAKE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIGHTSEEING AND ALGARD RECEIVED CALL TO REPORT BACK TO FONOFF.

15. COMMENT: MOST INTEREYTING ASPECT OF CONVERSATION WAS DEFINITE NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENT THAT THEY WOULD STOP THEIR ARTILLERY FIRE ACROSS DMZ IF US STOPPED ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND ITS ARTILLERY FIRE ACROSS DMZ. HANOI HAS THUS INDICATED ITS READINESS TO PAY A SPECIFIC MILITARY PRICE (ALTHOUGH NOT A VERY HIGH ONE) FOR THE STOPPING OF BOMBING.

16. WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING ANY COMMENTS THAT WASHINGTON OR USDEL WISH PASSED ON TO ALGARD.

GP-1 ~~TIBBETTS~~

66c

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AMEMBASSY OSLO Immediate

INFO

Cable 2. From State to Oslo.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-409
By ies, NARA Date 9-29-98

"Proposed position outlined paragraph 13 for tomorrow's talks is sound and we have no further comments at this stage of Oslo talks."

~~GP-1~~

~~END~~

RUSK

Drafted by: S/S:Leonard P. Walsh | Tel. Ext. | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Leonard P. Walsh

Clearances:

662

Department of State TELEGRAM

Cable 3. From Harriman to Oslo.

SECRET

ZCZCSPR419 FJL839
ZZ RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUFHCR 211[illegible] 2651015
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211011Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6280
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OSLO FLASH 709
STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 2130

DELTO/USUN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-409
By ir, NARA Date 9-29-98

1. WE AGREE WITH DEPARTMENT THAT PROPOSED POSITION PARA 13 REFTEL IS SOUND.

2. AS AN ADDITIONAL REFINEMENT YOU SHOULD POINT OUT TO NORWEGIANS, THAT AS THEY SEEK TO EXPLORE WHAT WILL HAPPEN ON GROUND, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THEY WOULD KEEP IN MIND US EXPECTATION THAT DRV WILL CEASE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN, THROUGH AND ACROSS THE DMZ AND CEASE MASSING TROOPS NORTH OF DMZ. IN OTHER WORDS THEY SHOULD SOLICIT DRV VIEWS ON ALL THEIR MILITARY INTENTIONS IN DMZ AREA IN EVENT US STOPS ALL BOMBARDMENT OF DRV.

~~HARRIMAN~~
~~BT~~

NOTE: PASSED OSLO PER MR. WALSH S/S

~~SECRET~~

46e

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

DE RUDKSO 6637 2651200
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211035Z SEP 68 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1985
INFO Cable 4. From Oslo to Washington, TE 355
STATE GNSC
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ SLO 6637

7045Q
Sept. 21, 1968
7:05 A.M.

1. ALGARD TELEPHONED DAVIDSON 8 A.M. THIS MORNING (SATURDAY, SEPT 21) AND ASKED IF HE COULD COME UP TO DAVIDSON'S HOTEL ROOM. WHEN HE ARRIVED HE INFORMED DAVIDSON THAT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THE SOVIET EMBASSY HAD CALLED LEADING OSLO HOTELS TO ASK WHETHER QTE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION UNQTE WAS REGISTERED THERE. SOVIETS FINALLY CONTACTED NORTH VIETNAMESE AND MET WITH THEM LATER IN THE DAY. SOVIET EMBASSY IS GIVING A DINNER FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE MONDAY NIGHT. GON HOPES THAT NO NORWEGIANS WILL BE INVITED.

2. ALGARD MENTIONED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD TOLD HIM THEY WOULD REPORT HIS COMMENTS TO HANOI. ALGARD SPECULATED THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE MIGHT BE USING SOVIET COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.

3. ALGARD SAID IN A RELIEVED TONE THAT NOTHING ABOUT NORTH VIETNAMESE VISIT HAD APPEARED IN THIS MORNING'S OSLO NEWSPAPERS. H

GP-1 ~~THOMAS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-409
By ies, NARA Date 9-29-98

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CONFIDENTIAL 67

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 3797

SENT
WHCA

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82432

1968 SEP 20 21 19

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

Prefile

SEPTEMBER 20, 1968

YOU MAY WISH TO KNOW THAT I WENT OVER WITH ED FRIED AN OUTLINE FOR A POSSIBLE SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT AT THE WORLD BANK AND FUND MEETINGS WHICH OPEN ON 30 SEPTEMBER IN WASHINGTON.

I BELIEVE JOE FOWLER HAS RAISED WITH YOU THE DESIRABILITY OF YOUR MAKING SUCH AN ADDRESS.

I AM QUITE PLEASED WITH THE OUTLINE. THE SPEECH COULD BE ONE OF THE OCCASIONS FOR YOU BOTH TO RECALL PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND TO HOLD UP A VISION OF WHERE WE OUGHT TO GO IN THE FUTURE.

WE SHALL HAVE A FIRST DRAFT BY MONDAY. ED WILL CHECK OUTLINE WITH FOWLER.

DTG: 202100Z SEP 68

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1983.
BY RG ON 12-10-92

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Pres file

68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Sept. 20, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may wish to know that I went over with Ed Fried an outline for a possible speech by the President at the World Bank and Fund meetings which open on 30 September in Washington.

I believe Joe Fowler has raised with you the desirability of your making such an address.

I am quite pleased with the outline. The speech could be one of the occasions for you both to recall past achievements and to hold up a vision of where we ought to go in the future.

We shall have a first draft by Monday. ~~xxxxx~~

Ed will check outline with Fowler.

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DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR 16, 1983.
BY RG ON 12-10-92

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EYES ONLY

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 3793

Pre file

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82428

~~S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

SEPT. 20, 1968

YOU MAY WISH TO KNOW THAT DOBRYNIN CAME IN TO SEE SECRETARY RUSK AT 12:30 TODAY. HIS QUESTION: ARE WE READY TO ENGAGE IN TECHNICAL TALKS ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS?

AS YOU RECALL, THAT REMAINS A LOOSE END. SECRETARY RUSK REPLIED THAT HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER.

SECRETARY RUSK TOOK THE OCCASION TO HIT DOBRYNIN VERY HARD INDEED ON THE SOVIET POSTURE TOWARDS GERMANY AND BERLIN. HE CITED, FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT THAT THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER NOT GO TO BERLIN TO ATTEND THE OPENING OF A HANDICRAFT EXHIBIT.

DOBRYNIN REAFFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NO HOSTILE INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BERLIN, NATO COUNTRIES, OR RUMANIA.

NEVERTHELESS, SINCE NONE OF US LIKE THE RATHER UGLY NOISES BEING MADE, AND WE HAVE REPORTS OF THE WARSAW PACT GENERAL YAKUBOVSKY GOING TO BULGARIA FOR MANEUVERS, WE HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AT A QUITE HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT ON POSSIBLE OTHER SOVIET MILITARY ACTIONS.

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

DTG 201858Z SEP 68

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-9
By ks NARA, Date 2-3-03

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 3788

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82424

S[redacted]/SENSITIVE LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

Profile

SEPT. 20, 1968

HEREWITH SECRETARY RUSK'S PROPOSED DRAFT, FOR YOUR EMENDATION AND APPROVAL, OF A BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE TO THE THAI AMBASSADOR, AS PER YOUR INSTRUCTION.

QUOTE
1. YOU SHOULD ARRANGE TO SEE THANOM PRIVATELY JUST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR AN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OCTOBER MEETING OF THE MANILA CHIEFS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT IN THAILAND.

2. IN SO DOING, YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. THE PRESIDENT HAS REACHED NO CLEAR OR FIRM JUDGMENT IN HIS OWN MIND AS TO WHETHER SUCH A MEETING IS DESIRABLE DURING THE FALL.

B. HOWEVER, THE POLITICAL FACTS HERE ARE THAT, IF A MEETING IS NOT HELD THIS FALL, IT WOULD PROBABLY NECESSARILY BE SOME MONTHS INTO A NEW ADMINISTRATION BEFORE A NEW PRESIDENT WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DO IT.

C. WHILE THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT FORSEE ANY IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN THE SITUATION IN PARIS, THE MERE FACT THAT TALKS HAVE GONE ON THIS LONG WITHOUT PROGRESS MEANS THAT IT MAY BE WISE TO CONSULT CAREFULLY AND TO DISCUSS THE KINDS OF POSSIBILITIES THAT MIGHT ARISE IN THE FUTURE.

D. IN TERMS OF TIME, IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT FROM THE AMERICAN STANDPOINT TO HOLD A MEETING SHORTLY BEFORE OUR ELECTION, OR AFTER IT BECAUSE OF THE TRANSITION PROBLEMS.

E. HENCE, THE PRESIDENT WISHES IN A PURELY EXPLORATORY INQUIRY TO ASK FOR THANOM'S VIEWS IN GENERAL, AND TO ASK SPECIFICALLY WHETHER A SUMMIT MEETING IN BANGKOK IN, SAY, THE SECOND OR THIRD WEEK OF OCTOBER, WOULD BE POSSIBLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE RTG. IF THE ANSWER IS THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE POSSIBLE, THE PRESIDENT WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE KNOWING HOW MUCH CLEAR NOTICE THE RTG WOULD REQUIRE TO MAKE APPROPRIATE PREPARATIONS FROM THE TIME THAT A FIRM JOINT DECISION WAS REACHED THAT A MEETING WAS APPROPRIATE AND WISE.

F. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT. HE WOULD WELCOME THANOM'S ADVICE ON HOW THE SUBJECT MIGHT BE APPROACHED IF IT SEEMS WISE, BUT THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT INQUIRY IS SOLELY TO SEE IF THE RTG WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO ACT AS HOST FROM THE STANDPOINT OF OTHER COMMITMENTS AND ANY SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE RELEVANT TIME PERIOD.
END QUOTE

[redacted] EYES ONLY

DTG: 201502Z SEP68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 10-16-01

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~~TOP SECRET~~

1968 SEP 20 20 33

EYES ONLY

Profile

VZCZCEEA529
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3796

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82431

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ SENSITIVE LITERALLY EYES ONLY

SEPT. 20, 1968

CY VANCE REPORTS AS FOLLOWS ON THE CLASSIFIED TELEPHONE:

--TODAY'S PRIVATE SESSION WENT THREE HOURS; AVERELL LAID DOWN THE THREE POINTS WITH GREAT FORCE AND PRECISION, EXACTLY AS INSTRUCTED. THERE WAS ARGUMENT BACK AND FORTH AND THE QUESTION RAISED AS TO WHETHER WE WERE LAYING DOWN "CONDITIONS."

--THERE WAS NO PROGRESS AND NO STATEMENT OF "UNDERSTANDING".

--CY BELIEVES THAT THEY HAD NO AUTHORITY FROM HANOI TO RESPOND IN THE FACE OF OUR RATHER PRECISE STATEMENTS.

--THEY DID SAY THEY WOULD CONVEY OUR VIEWS TO THEIR GOVERNMENT. THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THEY WOULD HAVE A REPLY BY MONDAY. THEY ASKED, THEREFORE, IF WE WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET ON NEXT WEDNESDAY IF THE REPLY DID NOT COME BACK IN TIME FOR THE MONDAY MEETING.

EYES ONLY

DTG 202013Z SEP 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 10-16-01

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Pres File

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE Sept. 20, 1968 72

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Cy Vance reports as follows on the classified telephone:

-- Today's private session went three hours; Averell laid down the three points with great force and precision, exactly as instructed. There was argument back and forth and the question raised as to whether we were laying down "conditions."

-- There was no progress and no statement of "understanding".

-- Cy believes that they had no authority from Hanoi to respond in the face of our rather precise statements.

-- They did say they would convey our views to their government. They did not believe they would have a reply by Monday. They asked, therefore, if we would be willing to meet on next Wednesday if the reply did not come back in time for the Monday meeting.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 10-16-01

Pres file

73

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE Sept. 20, 1968

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may wish to know that Dobrynin came in to see Secretary Rusk at 12:30 today. His question: Are we ready to engage in technical talks on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions?

As you recall, that remains a loose end. Secretary Rusk replied that he would look into the matter.

Secretary Rusk took the occasion to hit Dobrynin very hard indeed on the Soviet posture towards Germany and Berlin. He cited, for example, Soviet pressure on the Netherlands Government that their Foreign Minister not go to Berlin to attend the opening of a handicraft exhibit.

Dobrynin reaffirmed that the Soviet Union had no hostile intentions with respect to Berlin, NATO countries, or Rumania.

Nevertheless, since none of us like the rather ugly noises being made, and we have reports of the Warsaw Pact General Yakubovsky going to Bulgaria for maneuvers, we have the intelligence community at a quite high degree of alert on possible other Soviet military actions.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-9
By iez NARA, Date 2-3-03

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Pres. File

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1968 SEP 20 14 43

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EEA521
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3786

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82422

UNCLAS

SEPTEMBER 20, 1968

AN EASTERN AIRLINES AIRCRAFT GOING FROM SAN JUAN TO MIAMI WAS HIGHJACKED THIS MORNING. ACCORDING TO THE LATEST INFORMATION, THE AIRCRAFT LANDED IN HAVANA AT 9:45 A.M. THERE WERE 50 PASSENGERS AND 7 CREW ABOARD.

DTG 201431Z SEP 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC-NLJ 001-180-1-S
By jcs, NARA, Date 5-15-02

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SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCEEA530
CO WTE18
DE WTE 3795

1968 SEP 20 20 35

Pres. file

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82430

~~S E C R E T~~

SEPTEMBER 20, 1968

IF THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT IS TRUE -- AND THE SOURCE IS GOOD -- IT'S HARD TO SEE HOW THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE GOING TO BE ABLE TO LIVE FOR LONG WITH DUBCEK, CERNIK, AND SMRKOVSKY. BUT MAYBE SO....

QUOTE

IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1968, LUDVIK VESELY, ASSISTANT CHIEF EDITOR OF THE CZECH WEEKLY "LITERARNI LISTI", SAID THAT CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER ALEXANDER DUBCEK HAD GIVEN HIM AN ACCOUNT OF HIS ARREST AND SUBSEQUENT MISTREATMENT IN THE USSR. VESELY'S REPORT OF DUBCEK'S STORY FOLLOWS.

DUBCEK STATED THAT THE SOVIET SOLDIER WHO ARRESTED HIM ON 21 AUGUST 1968 DID SO "IN THE NAME OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF ALOIS INDRA". THIS WAS THE FIRST INDICATION DUBCEK HAD OF THE PERSON SELECTED BY THE SOVIETS TO REPLACE OR CLEAN THEMSELVES. NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN, ALTHOUGH THE FOUR MEN WERE REFUSED PERMISSION TO SPEAK. IT WAS NOT UNTIL AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED THAT THEY WERE ALLOWED TO WASH AND GIVEN FRESH CLOTHES. THE RETURN TO PRAGUE WAS THEN DELAYED AS THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES INITIALLY REFUSED TO ALLOW KRIEGEL TO RETURN HOME WITH HIS COLLEAGUES. THE SOVIETS GAVE WAY ON THIS POINT WHEN THE OTHERS REFUSED TO DEPART WITHOUT HIM.

END QUOTE

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Pres file

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82421

~~S E C R E~~T SENSITIVE

SEPTEMBER 20, 1968

IN THE FOLLOWING MEMO FROM BEN READ TO SEC. RUSK ANOTHER SOVIET OFFICIAL, NOT WELL INFORMED, GETS INTO THE ACT.

BILL MILLER, WHO USED TO BE AN FSO AND WHO WORKED FOR ME BEFORE HE BECAME LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO SENATOR COOPER, CALLED AT 3:00 P.M. TODAY. HE HAD HAD LUNCH WITH MR. ALEXANDER S. ERESKOVSKI, 3RD SECRETARY OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

ERESKOVSKI TOLD MILLER THAT KOSYGIN WOULD WRITE TO THE PRESIDENT SOON SUGGESTING THAT THEY MEET TO DISCUSS:

(1) THE MIDDLE EAST;

(2) OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MISSILE LIMITATIONS;

(3) VIETNAM; AND

(4) OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

HE DID NOT RESPOND TO MILLER'S INQUIRIES ABOUT WHERE THE SUGGESTED MEETING MIGHT TAKE PLACE. AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION ERESKOVSKI ADDED THAT CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY ASCERTAINING WHETHER WE WOULD ANSWER SUCH A LETTER IF SENT. MILLER WILL SEND TO ME A FULL MEMCON LATER TODAY.

IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER DIRECT QUESTION ERESKOVSKI SAID NEITHER KOSYGIN NOR BRESHNEV WERE PLANNING TO ATTEND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THERE WAS MUCH CONCERN IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ABOUT HOW THE CZECH ISSUE WOULD BE HANDLED.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 10-16-01

DTG: 201327Z SEP 68

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Pres. File
77

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE Sept. 20, 1968

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith Secretary Rusk's proposed draft, for your emendation and approval, of a back channel message to the Thai Ambassador, as per your instruction.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By NJ, NARA, Date 12-10-92

78

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DE WTE 3773

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP82411

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

SEPTEMBER 19, 1968

HEREWITH A CAPSULE OF AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S 67TH WEEKLY MESSAGE.

A. GENERAL

-- LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY CONTINUED BELOW THAT OF AUGUST HIGH.
-- ALLIED FORCES KEPT CONSTANT PRESSURE ON ENEMY; KEPT INITIATIVE IN ALL CORPS.
-- LARGE STOCKS OF CAPTURED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION ARE EVIDENCE OF ENEMY BUILDUP FOR OFFENSIVE HE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO MOUNT.
-- ARVN FORCES CONTINUE IMPROVEMENT, ACCOUNTING FOR 60 PERCENT OF 2,284 ENEMY KILLED DURING WEEK AND SUFFERING 60 PERCENT OF THE 635 FRIENDLY KIA.
-- TERRORISM DOWN FROM PREVIOUS WEEK BUT STILL HIGH AND COMBINED WITH EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES.
-- THIS PATTERN HAS CAUSED THIEU TO BELIEVE ENEMY WILL NOW ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY MORE AND MORE VILLAGES, HOPING TO GAIN POSITION TO PROPOSE A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE -- THEN HOLD ELECTIONS IN CONTROLLED AREAS.
-- DOUGLAS PIKE BELIEVES HANOI IS MULLING THREE LINES OF POLICY: NEGOTIATIED SETTLEMENT, "PROTRACTED WAR," AND CONTINUED MILITARY OFFENSIVE PRESSURE -- WITH PROTRACTED WAR THE LIKELIEST APPROACH.
-- CAPTURED DOCUMENT INDICATES PRESSURE FOR A CHANGE FROM CONTINUED OFFENSIVE STRATEGY BECAUSE SOME CADRE HAVE INCORRECTLY ASSESSED ALLIED STRENGTH AND BECAUSE OFFENSIVES POORLY COORDINATED.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-10
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-25-02

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-- THIEU IS CONCERNED THAT A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE OR A TEMPORARY ONE WOULD PERMIT ENEMY TO REALIZE POLITICAL GAINS HE COULD NOT WIN MILITARILY.

-- THIEU ADVOCATES HONOLULU CEASE-FIRE POSITION; HE STRESSES NEED FOR SHORT TIMETABLE FOR REGROUPING ENEMY FORCES AND ASSURANCES OF PRIOR GVN POLICE ACCESS TO ALL AREAS.

-- IF ALL STRAWS IN THE WIND PORTEND WHAT THEY SEEM TO, OUR POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN NEXT FEW WEEKS MAY HAVE CRITICAL BEARING ON THE OUTCOME OF OUR ENTIRE EFFORT.

-- THIEU AGREES THAT WE MUST BE FORTHCOMING, THAT WE MUST NOT TAKE AN ADAMANT STAND AGAINST ANY PROPOSED CEASE-FIRE.

-- BUT IF ENEMY TRIES THIS TACTIC, WE MUST INSIST ON CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD DENY HIM ANY UNDESERVED MILITARY OR POLITICAL ADVANTAGES.

-- WHILE GVN CONTROL OF COUNTRYSIDE SHOWED MODEST GAIN, ENEMY HAS CAPABILITY OF CONSIDERABLY MORE EFFORT IN THIS AREA AND WE MUST BE READY TO COUNTER HIM.

-- IN PREPARATION FOR POLITICAL TYPE STRUGGLE, GVN WILL CONCENTRATE ON HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS IN COUNTRYSIDE -- STRESSING SECURITY AND PACIFICATION.

-- GVN WORKING ON PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY A SHIFT TO CEASE-FIRE AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE.

-- EMBASSY ALSO BRIEFING KEY GOVERNMENT FIGURES DOWN TO PROVINCE LEVEL, ALERTING THEM TO POSSIBLE MAJOR ENEMY MOVE TOWARD POLITICAL FIELD.

B. POLITICAL

-- GEN. "BIG" MINH WILL BE ALLOWED TO RETURN FROM EXILE AS PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR AROUND NATIONAL DAY, NOV. 1.

-- SOME LEADERS FEAR MINH'S POLITICAL "NAIVETE" WILL BE EXPLOITED BY OPPOSITION, BUT ON BALANCE HIS POPULARITY SHOULD STRENGTHEN GVN.

-- THIEU HAS ARRANGED JAPAN EXILE FOR EX-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DZU, WHO WAS SENTENCED IN JULY FOR ADVOCATING TALKS WITH NLF.

-- CERTAIN OTHER LEADING POLITICAL DETAINEES MAY BE AMNESTIED NOV. 1.

-- THIEU AND HUONG WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER AS TEAM AND NO DISAGREEMENTS EVIDENT.

-- NATIONALIST POLITICIANS GIVING MORE THOUGHT TO POSTWAR COMPETITION WITH COMMUNISTS AND TO MASS ORGANIZATIONS TO ORGANIZE AND MOTIVATE PEOPLE.

-- THIEU WAS URGED TO DEVELOP A "CHARTER OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION" WHICH WOULD ARTICULATE FUTURE GVN PROGRAMS AND GIVE PEOPLE MORE TO FIGHT FOR.

-- EDUCATION MINISTER ON HIS WAY OUT FOR OPPOSING HUONG'S INVESTIGATION OF EXAM BRIBERY.

-- MANY OUTSTANDING CANDIDATES HAVE FILED FOR SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS.

C. MILITARY (SEE GENERAL SECTION)

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D. PACIFICATION

-- AUGUST HAMLET EVALUATION SURVEY SHOWED NO MARKED VC/NVA SUCCESS IN COUNTRYSIDE AS 159,000 ADDED TO RELATIVELY SECURE CATEGORY.
-- CURRENT FIGURE OF 66 PERCENT, THOUGH STILL SHORT OF PRE-TET PEAK OF 67.2 PERCENT, IS SOLID GAIN OF 6 PERCENT ABOVE POST-TET LOW.
-- CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM, WITH 500,000 ENROLLED AND 40,000 ARMED, IS MOVING AHEAD WITH STRONG TOP ECHELON SUPPORT.
-- MOST OTHER ASPECTS OF GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAM ALSO ON UPGRADE.

E. ECONOMIC

--PRICE INDEX UP 1 PERCENT FOR WEEK AND 2 PERCENT SINCE EARLY AUGUST.
-- GVN RESUMED SALES OF US RICE UNDERCUTTING EFFORTS TO REVIVE LOCAL RICE TRADE WHICH REQUIRES HIGHER PRICES.
-- GVN TAX COLLECTIONS NEAR RECORD IN AUGUST.

FULL TEXT FOLLOWS (SAIGON 38228)

A. GENERAL

1. WHILE THE LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY LAST WEEK CONTINUED TO BE BELOW THAT OF THE AUGUST HIGH, I THINK ITS PATTERN WAS SIGNIFICANT. FRIENDLY FORCES KEPT CONSTANT PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY, HOLDING THE INITIATIVE IN ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. LARGE STOCKS OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION WERE CAPTURED, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF THE BUILDUP FOR AN OFFENSIVE THE ENEMY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO GET OFF THE GROUND. ARVN FORCES CONTINUED TO IMPROVE, ACCOUNTING FOR 60 PERCENT OF THE 2,284 ENEMY KILLED AND SUFFERING 60 PERCENT OF THE 635 FRIENDLY KILLED DURING THE WEEK.

2. WHILE TERRORISM WAS DOWN FROM THE PREVIOUS WEEK, IT WAS STILL HIGH AND VC EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES PROCEEDED APACE. THIS PATTERN OF COMBINED ENEMY MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY HAS LED THIEU TO REVISE SOMEWHAT HIS ANALYSIS OF CURRENT ENEMY STRATEGY.

3. FAILING TO GET A MAJOR OFFENSIVE OFF THE GROUND, HE BELIEVES THE ENEMY WILL NOW REVERT TO THE TACTIC OF ATTEMPTING TO CONTROL MORE AND MORE TERRITORY AND THUS DIVERT MORE OF HIS ATTENTION TO RURAL AREAS. WHILE HE WILL EXPLOIT ANY OPPORTUNITY HE MAY DISCOVER TO CARRY OUT ATTACKS ON CITIES, AND WILL ATTEMPT TO EXERT ENOUGH PRESSURE TO HOLD ALLIED TROOPS NEAR THE URBAN AREAS, HIS REAL OBJECTIVE WILL BE THE COUNTRYSIDE. HE BELIEVES THE ENEMYS PURPOSE WILL BE TO ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY MORE AND MORE VILLAGES HOPING TO MOVE TO A POSITION TO PROPOSE A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE. THEN PERHAPS TO ASK FOR ELECTIONS IN THE BELIEF THAT PEOPLE IN THE AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE COMMUNISTS WOULD VOTE FOR THEM.

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4. DOUGLAS PIKE, WHO HAS FOLLOWED ENEMY STRATEGY CLOSELY FOR MANY YEARS, TOLD ME DURING THE WEEK THAT HE BELIEVES THE ENEMY IS GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF GREAT DOCTRINAL INDECISION. HE BELIEVES THREE LINES OF POLICY ARE CURRENTLY BEING ADVOCATED IN HANOI. THE FIRST, FAVORED BY FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH, SEES A WAY OUT THROUGH NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THE SECOND, FAVORED BY TRUONG CHINH, WANTS TO GO BACK TO "PROTRACTED WAR" ALONG CLASSIC MAOIST LINES. THE THIRD, FAVORED BY GENERAL GIAP, CLAIMS THAT THE ONLY ROAD TO VICTORY LIES IN CONTINUED MAXIMUM OFFENSIVE MILITARY PRESSURE. PIKE FEELS THAT THE STRATEGY OF THE WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE, FAVORED BY GENERAL GIAP, HAS BECOME SO PATENTLY BARREN THAT HE TOO FORESEES A SHIFT IN HANOI STRATEGY. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ADVOCATES OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WILL PREVAIL, LARGELY BECAUSE OF HANOI'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE 1954 AGREEMENTS. HE, THEREFORE, BELIEVES THAT THE "PROTRACTED WAR" SCHOOL WILL FINALLY PREVAIL IN THE NORTH. INDICATIONS THAT THEY WERE MAKING SUCH A SHIFT WOULD BE A RENEWAL OF TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION IN GUERRILLA WARFARE, AVOIDANCE OF CONTACT WITH LARGE FRIENDLY MILITARY FORMATIONS AND GREATER ATTENTION TO SECURING A FIRM HOLD ON THE COUNTRYSIDE. HE AGREED THAT SUCH A STRATEGY MIGHT BE PURSUED ONLY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL WAS ACHIEVED; THEN A RETURN TO THE "GENERAL OFFENSIVE" COULD BE MADE.

5. QUITE OBVIOUSLY, NO ONE CAN PREDICT WHICH WAY THE ENEMY WILL TURN, BUT THE EVIDENCE THAT HE IS AT A FORK IN THE ROAD IS MOUNTING. IT IS NOT YET CONCLUSIVE. A REPORT OF A LATE AUGUST STUDY SESSION FOR CADRE FROM COSVN AND MILITARY REGION 4 REVEALED THE LEADERSHIP DEFENDING THE STRATEGY OF THE WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE, WHICH CALLED FOR "PROLONGED COMBAT, CONTINUOUS ATTACK, AND UNRELENTING STRIVING FOR VICTORIES, INTENSE GUERRILLA WARFARE AND MOBILE WARFARE COUPLED WITH CONCENTRATION OF FORCES IN ORDER TO WEAR DOWN AND DESTROY THE ENEMY'S FORCES." IT ALSO REVEALED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS STRATEGY IS INCREASINGLY QUESTIONED BY THE CADRE AND THAT THE LEADERSHIP IS ON THE DEFENSIVE IN DISCUSSING IT. THEY ARE ABLE TO CLAIM ONLY A MOST LIMITED SUCCESS AND ARE FORCED TO RESORT TO EXPLAINING OBVIOUS FAILURES AS RESULTING FROM "SUBJECTIVE VIEWS" OF A NUMBER OF LEADING CADRE WHO DID NOT CORRECTLY ASSESS THE ENEMY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITY, AND FROM LACK OF COORDINATION OF THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE OFFENSIVE. SO IT WOULD APPEAR PRESSURE FOR A CHANGE OF COURSE IS IMPLICIT EVEN IN THIS.

6. YOU WILL RECALL THAT I HAVE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY, FACED WITH A DETERIORATING MILITARY SITUATION, MIGHT TRY TO MAKE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY BY SOME DRAMATIC CALL FOR DE-ESCALATION. IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD, HIS OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION AND GAIN A PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE. HERE, AS A MINIMUM, HE WOULD HOPE FOR A RESPITE FROM OUR PRESSURES AND A CHANCE TO REBUILD FOR RENEWED ATTACKS. AS A MAXIMUM, HE MIGHT HOPE TO EXPLOIT THE RESULTANT SITUATION POLITICALLY TO REALIZE GAINS HE COULD NOT HOPE TO MAKE ON THE BASIS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND.

7. IN MY TALK WITH THIEU ON SEPTEMBER 13, IT WAS CLEAR THAT HE HAS GIVEN THIS POSSBILITY A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT. HE IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASE-FIRE "IN PLACE" OR "TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE," WHICH COULD LEND ITSELF TO THE ENEMYS PURPOSES I HAVE MENTIONED. THUS HE VIEWS IT AS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO KEEP ANY SUCH CEASE-FIRE UNDER A PRECISE TIME LIMIT, WITH THE GVN HAVING ACCESS TO EVERY AREA OF THE COUNTRY.

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8. THE BEST COURSE, HE BELIEVES, WOULD BE TO STICK TO THE HONOLULU POSITION THAT A CEASE-FIRE SHOULD BE PART OF THE FINAL SETTLEMENT TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH A SPECIFIC TIMETABLE WHICH ALSO ENCOMPASSES REGROUPING AND WITHDRAWAL OF ENEMY FORCES. THE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF SUCH A CEASE-FIRE, HE SAID, SHOULD BE A) TO KEEP THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE BEGINNING OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE SCHEDULED MOVE TO REGROUPING AREAS AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE, AND B) TO ASSURE THE GVN OF THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO ALL AREAS DURING THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE REGROUPING (THIS COULD BE POLICE RATHER THAN MILITARY ACCESS).

9. ALL THESE STRAWS IN THE WIND MAY NOT PORTEND WHAT AT THE MOMENT THEY SEEM TO. IF THEY DO, HOWEVER, OUR POLICIES AND ACTIONS OVER THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WILL HAVE A CRITICAL BEARING ON WHAT WE REALIZE, OR FAIL TO REALIZE, FROM THE GREAT EFFORT WE HAVE MADE HERE.

10. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT BE WISE TO TAKE AN ADAMANT POSITION AGAINST ANY PROPOSED CEASE-FIRE; THIEU ALSO AGREES THAT OUR POSTURE MUST BE FORTHCOMING. HOWEVER, SHOULD THE ENEMY TRY THIS TACTIC, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO INSIST ON THOSE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL DENY HIM ADVANTAGES TO WHICH NEITHER HIS MILITARY STRENGTH NOR HIS POLITICAL POSITION (WHICH HE CONSTANTLY, AND TO SOME EXTENT SUCCESSFULLY, INFLATES THROUGH PROPAGANDA) ENTITLE HIM.

11. THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES) FIGURES FOR AUGUST, WHICH I SHALL DISCUSS IN GREATER DETAIL BELOW, DO NOT REFLECT ANY COMMUNIST SUCCESS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE DURING THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE. THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTROL HELD UP VERY WELL AS THE ENEMY MILITARY THRUSTS DURING AUGUST WERE FRUSTRATED, AND IN FACT A MODEST GAIN WAS SHOWN. HOWEVER, THE ENEMY HAS THE CAPABILITY OF DIRECTING CONSIDERABLY MORE EFFORT TOWARD GAINING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRYSIDE THEN HE IS NOW DOING, AND WE MUST BE READY TO COUNTER HIM IF HE DECIDES ON SUCH A MOVE.

12 2THE BROAD OUTLINES OF GOVERNMENT STRATEGY FOR PREPARING FOR A NEW, MORE POLITICAL TYPE STRUGGLE ARE, I BELIEVE, SOUND. IN THE CABINET MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 12, IT WAS DECIDED THAT DURING THE COMING YEAR, EFFORTS WOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON THOSE AREAS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE CONTAINING 75-85 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION (HES FIGURES AS OF THE END OF AUGUST SHOW ALMOST 66 PERCENT RELATIVELY SECURE). THIS WILL MEAN MORE EMPHASIS ON PACIFICATION AND SECURITY, LESS ON DEVELOPMENT. AT THE WORKING LEVEL, THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR IS ENGAGED IN THE STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITES WHICH WOULD BE PRSENTED BY A SHIFT TO A CEASE-FIRE AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE.

13. FURTHER PROGRAMS ARE UNDER STUDY. WE OURSELVES ARE ENGAGED IN PREPARING NEW ACTION PROGRAMS AIMED AT COUNTERING COMMUNIST STRATEGY DIRECTED TOWARD CONTROL OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. WE ARE BEGINNING THIS WEEK A SERIES OF BRIEFINGS OF KEY GOVERNMENT FIGURES AT THE NATIONAL, CORPS, DIVISIONAL, AND PROVINCIAL LEVEL DESIGNED TO FOCUS THOUGHT AND ATTENTION ON THE PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF A LESS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY, MORE POLITICAL STRUGGLE, ALERTING THEM TO THE SIGNS THAT THE COMMUNISTS MAY BE MOVING TOWARD CONVERTING THEIR MAIN EFFORT TOWARD THE POLITICAL FIELD.

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B. POLITICAL

14. THE PACE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY PICKED UP SOMEWHAT THIS WEEK. ATTENTION TURNED TO THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL AMELIORATION AND RECONCILIATION; THIEU AND HUONG CONTINUED THEIR ACTIVE SCHEDULES OF TRAVEL IN THE COUNTRYSIDE; THE ATTACK ON CORRUPTION WAS PRESSED; AND INCREASING ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION.

15. WHEN I SAW THIEU ON SEPTEMBER 11, HE WAS STILL CAREFULLY WEIGHING THE PROS AND CONS OF PERMITTING THE RETURN OF "BIG" MINH, WHO HAS BEEN IN COMFORTABLE EXILE IN THAILAND. SOME OF THIEU'S ADVISERS HAVE WARNED HIM THAT IF MINH WERE TO RETURN TO VIET NAM NOW, HIS PRESENCE COULD BE EXPLOITED BY ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE MORE MILITANT BUDDHISTS. THIEU TOLD ME HOWEVER, THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE MINH IS A DANGEROUS MAN, BUT THAT HE IS NOT VERY BRIGHT, NOT A POLITCIAN, AND IS QUITE NAIVE. THIEU REMARKED IF HE WERE A POLITICIAN, HE WOULD BE LESS DANGEROUS; IT IS HIS NAIVETE WHICH IS WORRISOME, FOR IT MIGHT LEAD TO HIS BEING USED BY POLITICIANS FOR THEIR OWN ENDS. THIEU ASKED FOR MY ADVICE, AND I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT ON BALANCE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO PERMIT MINH'S RETURN. THIS WOULD BE A WAY TO DEMONSTRATE GOVERNMENT CONFIDENCE IN ITSELF AND THE STABILITY OF THE REGIME.

16. SUBSEQUENTLY THIEU TOLD REPORTERS THAT MINH WILL RETURN AROUND NOVEMBER 1, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL DAY, AND THAT HE WILL INVITE MINH TO SERVE AS A PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER. YESTERDAY HE TOLD ME THAT HE PLANNED TO SEND INTERIOR MINISTER KHIEM TO BANGKOK TO SEE MINH AND TO IMPART "THE FACTS OF LIFE" TO HIM.

17. I RATHER SUSPECT THAT AFTER SOME MORE JOCKEYING OF THIS NATURE, MINH WILL RETURN TO SERVE THE PRESIDENT IN SOME CAPACITY. I THINK THIS WILL PROVE TO BE A GOOD THING. HIS RETURN WOULD PROVE A SUCCESSFUL DEMONSTRATION OF THE CONFIDENCE AND STABILITY OF THE ELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND MINH MAY WELL HAVE MORE THAN A SYMBOLIC CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE IN RALLYING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT.

18. WITH REGARD TO THE CASE OF TRUONG DINH DZU, THIEU SAID HE HAD ARRANGED FOR DZU TO RECEIVE VERY GOOD TREATMENT WHILE IN JAPAN; THIS WILL BECOME KNOWN TO MRS DZU AND THE PUBLIC GENERALLY. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE AND THE PRIME MINISTR HAVE AGREED TO ASK DZU TO WRITEA LETTER EXPLAINING AND CLARIFYING HIS POSITION MUCH AS DR DAN DID ABOUT HIS REMARKS IN THE UNITED STATES. THIEU HOPES THAT SUCH A LETTER CAN BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR AN ACT OF CLEMENCY.

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19. IN THE INTEREST OF PROMOTING NATIONAL SOLIDARITY. THIEU IS HAVING THE CASES OF A NUMBER OF PROMINENT POLITICAL PRISONERS (BUDDHIST, CATHOLIC, AND OTHERS) REVIEWED. AT SOME POINT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HE INTENDS TO ANNOUNCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL REVIEW SUCH CASES AND DEAL WITH THEM BEFORE NOVEMBER 1. THIS IS ANOTHER ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT. IF THE GVN ALSO AMNESTIES SOME OF THE LEADING CAN LAO AND BUDDHIST "STRUGGLE" DETAINEES, THIS SHOULD PROVIDE FURTHER IMPETUS TOWARD GREATER NATIONAL UNITY.

20. AS THIEU CONTINUES HIS VIGOROUS SCHEDULE OF TRAVEL IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, MAKING HIMSELF KNOWN TO THE PEOPLE AND TALKING TO THEM ABOUT THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEM FACING THE NATION, THE NEED FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN PREPARATION FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL CONFRONTATION WITH THE COMMUNISTS. ON THESE TRIPS, HE REVIEWS PEOPLES SELF-DEFENSE FORCES, DISTRIBUTES LAND OWNERSHIP CERTIFICATES, TALKS TO THE FARMERS ABOUT THEIR CROPS, AND EXHORTS LOCAL OFFICIALS TO PERFORM THEIR JOBS DILIGENTLY AND HONESTLY. I EXPECT TO ACCOMPANY HIM ON ANOTHER ONE OF THESE TRIPS TOMORROW TO BA TRI IN THE DELTA. THE PRESIDENT APPEARS TO ENJOY THESE VISITS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT HE IS LEARNING TO ACT LESS AND LESS LIKE A GENERAL MORE AND MORE LIKE A POLITICIAN, AND IN THE PROCESS OF BECOMING A VERY GOOD ONE. PRIME MINISTER HUONG SOMETIMES TRAVELS ON HIS OWN, SOMETIMES ACCOMPANIES THE PRESIDENT, AND THEY MAKE A GOOD TEAM. HUONG IS PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE WHEN HE TALKS ABOUT CORRUPTION; HIS AUDIENCES RECOGNIZE AND RESPOND TO HIS OBVIOUS SINCERITY.

21. I DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE IN MY LAST TWO MESSAGES. I AM HAPPY TO BE ABLE TO REPORT THIS WEEK THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE NO REAL SUBSTANCE TO THE RUMORS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THIEU AND HUONG ON THIS MATTER WHICH WERE THE SUBJECT OF SOME RECENT SPECULATION. I SPOKE TO THE PRIME MINISTER SEPTEMBER 14 ABOUT THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE TO WHICH HE HAS DEVOTED SO MUCH ENERGY AND PERSONAL ATTENTION, AND COMPLIMENTED HIM ON THE MOMENTUM WHICH IT SEEMS TO BE ACQUIRING. I ADDED THAT OUR COUNTRYWIDE REPORTS SHOWED AN ENCOURAGING INCREASE IN GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS. HUONG VOLUNTEERED IN REPLY THAT WHATEVER SUCCESS HE IS HAVING IN DEALING WITH THIS MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM IS DUE LARGELY TO THE COMPLETE SUPPORT WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS GIVING HIM.

22. IT IS OBVIOUSLY VITAL THAT THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER WORK CLOSELY AND IN CONFIDENCE WITH ONE ANOTHER AND IT IS INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT THIS IS THE CASE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE BE NO DIFFERENCES WHATSOEVER FOR THE TWO REPRESENT DIFFERENT GENERATIONS AND ARE OF ENTIRELY DIFFERENT BACKGROUND. HOWEVER, THEY BOTH SEEM TO BE DETERMINED TO MAKE THEIR POLITICAL PARTNERSHIP WORK AND APPEAR QUITE ABLE TO OVERCOME ANY DIFFERENCES THEY MAY HAVE WITHOUT HAMPERING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS.

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23. IN MY SIXTY-FIFTH MESSAGE, I POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS A GREATER REALIZATION AMONG NATIONALIST POLITICIANS OF THE NEED TO PREPARE FOR THE ANTICIPATED POST-HOSTILITIES POLITICAL COMPETITION WITH THE COMMUNISTS. WE HAVE NOTED A GREAT DEAL OF SERIOUS THOUGHT BY NATIONALIST POLITICIANS IN THESE PAST FEW WEEKS ON HOW TO BRING THIS ABOUT. FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OF THE LARGER AND BETTER ORGANIZED NATIONAL PARTIES, THE REVOLUTIONARY DAI VIETS, IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING A MAJOR REORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY AND ITS MERGER WITH OTHER GROUPS INTO AN OVERT, NATIONWIDE GROUP. AN INFLUENTIAL NORTHERN CATHOLIC PRIEST, FATHER QUYNH, TELLS US THAT HE IS BEING CONSTANTLY CONSULTED BY POLITICIANS WHO ARE SEEKING SOME FORMULA TO BUILD A LARGE, MASS-BASED POLITICAL PARTY. THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS OF A PERHAPS LESS HEALTHY INTEREST BY SOME EX-CAN LAO ELEMENTS IN PUTTING TOGETHER A NEW POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. WHILE THESE EFFORTS HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE UNITY IS REALIZED, IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT SO MUCH THOUGHT IS CURRENTLY BEING DEVOTED TO THE PROBLEM BY NATIONALIST POLITICIANS.

24. THE MAJOR EFFORT IN BUILDING A MASS-BASED PRO-GOVERNMENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IS, OF COURSE, DIRECTED TOWARD THE LIEN MINH. IT HAS DEVELOPED AN AMBITIOUS, BUT WELL THOUGHT-OUT SOCIAL ACTION WELFARE PROGRAM, WHICH I MENTIONED IN MY SIXTY-FIFTH MESSAGE. PREPARATIONS FOR LAUNCHING THIS EFFORT, WHICH IS CALLED THE "NEW ACTION PROGRAM" ARE WELL UNDERWAY. ABOUT 800 CADRE WILL HAVE BEEN TRAINED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS FOR THIS PROJECT, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO HAVE IMPACT AS A SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAM; THE OBJECT IS TO POPULARIZE THE LIEN MINH. I THINK IT FAIR TO SAY THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME, SINCE THE 1963 REVOLUTION, THAT AN ORGANIZATION WITH AVOWED POLITICAL AIMS HAS DEVOTED SO MUCH ATTENTION AND ENERGY TO A PROGRAM DESIGNED TO HAVE AN IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON THE LOWEST LEVELS OF SOCIETY.

25. IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION LAST WEEK WITH THIEU ON THE PUBLIC "PLATFORM" WITH REGARD TO A PEACE SETTLEMENT WHICH THE GVN HAS BEEN DEVELOPING, I SAID THAT I THOUGHT IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO DEVELOP A "CHARTER OF SOCIAL REVOLUTION" WHICH WOULD SET FORTH THE GVN'S AIMS FOR VIETNAMESE SOCIETY IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE BETTERMENT OF THE LOT OF THE FARMER, THE URBAN WORKER AND THE CIVIL SERVANT. WHILE I REALIZE THAT THE BEST MEANS OF GAINING POPULAR SUPPORT IS THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT AND GREATER SECURITY, THE GOVERNMENT MUST ALSO ARTICULATE HOPE FOR THE FUTURE. THIS COULD BE THE PURPOSE OF THE "CHARTER". IT SHOULD BE COUCHED IN TERMS WHICH WOULD STIR PEOPLE'S IMAGINATION; THEY MUST BE GIVEN A VISION OF A FUTURE WORTH STRUGGLING FOR, WHICH THEY FEEL WILL COMPENSATE FOR THE SACRIFICES BEING DEMANDED OF THEM, AND FOR THE LONG YEARS OF WAR THEY HAVE ENDURED. I SAID, YOU MUST HOLD OUT TO THE PEOPLE THE HOPE OF SOMETHING BETTER THAN THE COMMUNISTS CAN OFFER.

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26. THIEU SEEMED TO BE IN AGREEMENT AND I HAVE ASKED MY STAFF TO PREPARE SOME SUGGESTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN SUCH A DOCUMENT, AND ON AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION WILL RAISE THE MATTER AGAIN WITH THE PRESIDENT.

27. AN QUANG BUDDHISTS ASK PERMISSION TO SEND A PEACE DELEGATION ABROAD: THE VENERABLE THIEM MINH, A LEADER OF THE MILITANT AN QUANG BUDDHISTS, HAS ASKED FOR AN INTERVIEW WITH THIEU AT WHICH HE INTENDS TO REQUEST PERMISSION FOR A BUDDHIST PEACE DELEGATION TO GO ABROAD. MINH IS REPORTEDLY WORKING TO ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO REJECT UNACCEPTABLE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION, AND HAS AGREED THAT THE DELEGATION WILL FOLLOW THE GVN POLICY LINE ON A PEACE SETTLEMENT WHILE ABROAD. I DOUBT THAT THIEU WILL AGREE TO SUCH A REQUEST AND IT SEEMS TO ME IT WOULD BE VERY UNWISE TO DO SO. RATHER THAN PROMPT THE CAUSE OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, IT SEEMS TO ME A ROVING DELEGATION SUCH AS THIS COULD STIR UP ALL KINDS OF CONTROVERSY BOTH HERE AND ABROAD. THERE ALSO APPEAR TO BE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE AN QUANG FACTION ITSELF WHO ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE IDEA, ESPECIALLY UNDER THE TERMS THEY EXPECT THE GOVERNMENT TO DEMAND OF THEM.

28. CONTROVERSY OVER EXAMINATIONS BRIBERY CONTINUES: IN MY LAST MESSAGE, I MENTIONED THAT PRIME MINISTER HUONG HAD SUSPENDED THE DIRECTOR OF EXAMINATIONS IN THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION BECAUSE OF ALLEGATIONS OF BRIBERY AND IRREGULARITIES IN THE RECENT COUNTRYWIDE BACCALAUREATE EXAMINATIONS. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE SEPTEMBER 10, MINISTER OF EDUCATION THO DENIED THE ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT AND QUESTIONED THE LEGALITY OF THE PRIME MINISTERS SUSPENSION OF THE DIRECTOR. VARIOUS SOURCES TELL US THAT BRIBERY IN CONNECTION WITH THESE EXAMINATIONS IS NOT UNCOMMON. IT HAS BEEN MORE PREVALENT THIS YEAR THAN IN THE PAST PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT DRAFT PRESSURE ON STUDENTS. REGARDLESS OF HOW THE ISSUE IS RESOLVED, THO'S PUBLIC DISAGREEMENT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER PROBABLY MEANS THAT HIS DAYS AS MINISTER OF EDUCATION ARE NUMBERED. HE IS A WEAK MINISTER, AND HUONG PLANNED TO REPLACE HIM EVEN BEFORE THIS CONTROVERSY.

29. MANY OUTSTANDING JUDGES AND LAWYERS FILE FOR SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS: IT IS GRATIFYING TO NOTE THE NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING ETNAMESE JUDGES AND LAWYERS WHO HAVE FILED THEIR CANDIDACIES FOR ELECTION AS JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE OCTOBER 15. NINE JUDGES WILL BE SELECTED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FROM A LIST OF THIRTY CANDIDATES. AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE COME FORWARD ARE VU TINE TUAN, THE PRESENT FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF CESSATION, PRESENTLY THE HIGHEST CIVILIAN TRIBUNAL IN VIETNAM; TRAN MINH TIET, FORMER MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND INTERIOR; AND VU GAN VI, ANOTHER FORMER MINISTER OF JUSTICE. THESE ARE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF WELL QUALIFIED LAWYERS AND JUDGES WHO ARE STANDING FOR ELECTION. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT WILL MARK ANOTHER SIGNIFICANT MILESTONE IN SOUTH VIETNAM'S RETURN TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE OF LAW.

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C. MILITARY

30. AS I NOTED ABOVE, LARGE AMOUNTS OF AMMUNITION WERE CAPTURED FROM THE ENEMY THIS WEEK (SEPTEMBER 12-18). THESE INCLUDED 4,600 B-40 AND B-41 ROUNDS; 5,100 60 MM AND 82 MM MORTAR ROUNDS; 690,000 AK 47 ROUNDS; 300,000 OTHER SMALL ARMS ROUNDS; 3,900 GRENADES; 24 COMPLETE AND 20 INCOMPLETE 122 MM ROCKETS; 3,600 POUNDS OF TNT AND OTHER EXPLOSIVES.

31. ALSO NOTED IN THE INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH WAS THE FACT THAT ARVN CARRIED A LARGE SHARE OF THE BURDEN OF THE FIGHTING, INCLUDED AMONG THEIR SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONS WERE THE FOLLOWING:

A. ELEMENTS OF THE 2ND REGIMENT (1ST DIVISION) PARTICIPATED IN THE HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL THRUST INTO THE EASTERN DMZ AREA ON SEPTEMBER 13, IN WHICH 186 ENEMY WERE KILLED AT A COST OF 4 FRIENDLY KILLED (ARVN) AND 46 WOUNDED (24 ARVN, 22 US).

B. EAST OF HUE, THE 54TH REGIMENT (1ST DIVISION) CARRIED THE BRUNT OF AN OPERATION (WHICH ALSO INVOLVED ELEMENTS OF THE 7TH ARVN CAVALRY, REGIONAL FORCE, POPULAR FORCE, AND POLICE) AGAINST A VC "SAFEHAVEN" AREA OF LONG STANDING ON VINH LOC ISLAND. THEY KILLED 114 ENEMY, TOOK 242 POW'S AND DETAINED 181 "CIVIL DEFENDERS," RECOVERED 12 HOI CHANHS AND CAPTURED A LARGE NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS.

C. IN THE HOI AN AREA OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE, A SERIES OF SHARP FIGHTS ON SEPTEMBER 13-17 INVOLVED THE 21ST, 37TH AND 39TH RANGER BATTALIONS AND ELEMENTS OF THE 51ST ARVN REGIMENT AGAINST NVA FORCES. DURING THE NIGHT OF 16 SEPTEMBER THE COMMAND POST OF THE 39TH BATTALION WAS REPORTEDLY OVERRUN, BUT THE BATTALION REGROUPED AND WAS REINFORCED BY THE 37TH BATTALION THE FOLLOWING MORNING. THE ARVN FORCE KILLED OVER 280 OF THE ENEMY OVER THIS 5-DAY PERIOD AND CAPTURED 43 WEAPONS (10 CREW-SERVED), WHILE SUFFERING 44 KILLED, 117 WOUNDED AND 21 MISSING.

D. IN SOUTHERN I CORPS, THE 4TH ARVN REGIMENT (2ND DIVISION) ENGAGED THE ENEMY ON SEPTEMBER 15, KILLING 29 AND CAPTURING 11 WEAPONS WITHOUT SUFFERING ANY CASUALTIES ITSELF.

E. IN II CORPS, ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD ARVN CAVALRY ON SEPTEMBER 16TH ENGAGED AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY NORTHWEST OF PLEIKU, KILLED 25 AND CAPTURED 14 WEAPONS AT A COST OF 2 WOUNDED.

F. IN III CORPS, THE 36TH RANGER BATTALION KILLED 17 AND CAPTURED 7 WEAPONS ON SEPTEMBER 12TH IN BINH LONG PROVINCE. THE FOLLOWING DAY THE 6TH ARVN AIRBORNE BATTALION KILLED 45 AND CAPTURED 12 WEAPONS IN TAY NINH PROVINCE WHILE LOSING 9 KILLED AND 36 WOUNDED.

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C. IN IV CORPS, THE 4TH REGIMENT (9TH DIVISION) IN AN OPERATION IN VINH BINH ON SEPTEMBER 14TH KILLED 40 ENEMY AND CAPTURED 14 WEAPONS WHILE LOSING 6 KILLED AND 32 WOUNDED.

D. PACIFICATION

32. ONE OF THE ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS IS THE DISTINCT THOUGH SPOTTY RECOVERY OF PACIFICATION FROM THE TET OFFENSIVE LOW. END-AUGUST HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM FIGURES, THE BEST MEASUREMENT WE HAVE, SHOW AN INCREASE OF 159,000 IN RELATIVELY SECURE POPULATION--BRINGING IT UP TO ALMOST 66 PERCENT. THIS IS A SOLID 6 PERCENT INCREASE IN SIX MONTHS FROM THE POST-TET LOW, THOUGH STILL SHORT OF THE 67.2 PERCENT PEAK JUST BEFORE TET. EVEN IF WE TAKE OUT ALL THE TOWNS AND CITIES, RELATIVELY SECURE RURAL POPULATION EXCEEDS 50 PERCENT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE FEBRUARY.

33. MOST ASPECTS OF THE COMPLEX AND DIFFUSE GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAM SEEM TO BE ON THE UPGRADE. THE KEY RF/PF ARE GROWING STRONGER AND BETTER EQUIPPED. THE ATTACK ON THE VIET CONG POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IS GAINING MOMENTUM THOUGH IT STILL LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED. THE GVN CONTINUES TO PURGE CORRUPT OR INEFFECTIVE PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEFS AND OTHER LOCAL OFFICIALS. IT PLANS TO CHANGE SIX MORE PROVINCE CHIEFS SHORTLY.

34. A RECENT BRIGHT SPOT IS THE NEW GVN INTEREST IN A MEANINGFUL CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM. ABOUT 500,000 CIVILIANS HAVE BEEN ENROLLED AND OVER 40,000 ARMED TO DATE. TOP GVN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THIEU AND HUONG, PRESIDED AT OVER 40 CEREMONIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY PROMOTING "SELF-DEFENSE MONTH."

35. MUCH OF THE CREDIT FOR THIS FORWARD MOTION GOES TO THE PUSH BEING EXERTED BY INTERIOR MINISTER KHIEM, PRIME MINISTER HUONG, AND ABOVE ALL THE PRESIDENT. THEY SEE THE ENEMY REVERTING AGAIN TO PRESSURE ON THE COUNTRYSIDE, AND THEREFORE THE NECESSITY TO PRESS EVEN HARDER ON PACIFICATION IN THE RURAL AREAS.

36. MUCH CREDIT IS ALSO DUE TO OUR CORDS ORGANIZATION. THEY HAVE WORKED TIRELESSLY. I HAVE NOW VISITED MANY OF THESE TEAMS AND AM IMPRESSED BY THE ENERGETIC AND DEDICATED WAY IN WHICH THEY ARE GOING ABOUT THE JOB.

E. ECONOMIC

37. PRICES ROSE SLIGHTLY DURING THE WEEK ENDING SEPTEMBER 16 AS THE INDEX FOR ALL ITEMS ROSE 1 PERCENT FROM THE PREVIOUS WEEK. PRICES FOR FOOD ITEMS ROSE 1 PERCENT, AND NON-FOOD ITEM PRICES WERE UNCHANGED. AMONG INDIVIDUAL FOOD ITEMS, PRICE CHANGES WERE MIXED AND NO MAJOR TRENDS WERE DISCERNIBLE. THE RETAIL PRICE OF US RICE FELL 6 PERCENT AS THE GVN RESUMED SALES TO MERCHANTS.

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38. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN MARKED WEEK TO WEEK PRICE FLUCTUATIONS IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, THE GENERAL PRICE LEVEL IS NOW ONLY 2 PERCENTAGE POINTS ABOVE THAT PREVAILING AT THE BEGINNING OF AUGUST.

39. THE WEAKENING OF RETAIL RICE PRICES FOLLOWING THE GOVERNMENTS RESUMPTION OF THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF US RICE DURING THE PAST WEEK IN THE SAIGON-GIA DINH AREA DAMPENS OUR HOPES THAT HIGHER MARKET PRICES IN SAIGON WOULD BEGIN TO DRAW RICE OUT OF THE DELTA WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION. SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, THE GOVERNMENT STOPPED THE SALE OF IMPORTED RICE TO COMMERCIAL DEALERS IN THE SAIGON AREA. AS WE HAD EXPECTED, THE PRICE OF BOTH DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED RICE BEGAN TO RISE. NOW THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN CUT SHORT, SOME FORM OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IS NECESSARY TO REVIVE THE RICE TRADE UNLESS WE ARE ABLE TO CONVINCE THE GVN AGAIN TO STOP TEMPORARILY THE SALE OF IMPORTED RICE IN THE SAIGON AREA AND TO RAISE THE PRICE OF THIS RICE WHEN ITS SALE IS RESUMED. I SPOKE TO THIEU ABOUT THIS YESTERDAY.

40. THE MINISTER OF ECONOMICS LAUNCHED WHAT APPEARS TO BE TRIAL BALLOONS FOR A SCHEME TO PROVIDE CIVIL SERVANTS WITH SUBSIDIZED FOOD AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A WAGE INCREASE. THE SCHEME WAS OUTLINED TO US MISSION REPRESENTATIVES IN A MEETING LAST WEEK AND RELEASED TO THE PRESS ON TWO OCCASIONS. WE ARE DUBIOUS ABOUT IT BUT HAVE NOT YET TAKEN UP A FIRM POSITION.

41. THE MINISTER HAS ALSO TOLD US THAT THE LONG DELAYED WAR RISK INSURANCE DECREE WILL BE ISSUED THIS WEEK.

42. AUGUST TAX COLLECTIONS WERE 1.9 BILLION PIASTERS, THE SECOND HIGHEST MONTHLY TOTAL EVER ATTAINED. INCLUDED IN THE AUGUST TOTAL IS 275 MILLION PIASTERS RESULTING FROM THE NEW 20 PERCENT SURTAX IMPOSED JULY 4, 1968.

43. TOTAL COLLECTONS FOR THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF 1968 ARE VN$12,009,749,999, AN INCREASE OF 6.6 PERCENT OVER THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD IN 1967; THIS DESPITE THE FALL-OFF IN COLLECTIONS DURING THE IMMEDIATE POST-TET MONTHS.

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Pres. file

September 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. A. B. Won Pat, the elected Representative of Guam resident in Washington, has written you expressing his appreciation for your approval of S. 449, the Guam Elective Governor Act. He also suggests that you consider assigning a U.S. statesman of oriental background, such as Senators Inouye or Fong, to the Harriman Mission in Paris.

The State Department has drafted a reply for your signature expressing appreciation for Mr. Won Pat's suggestion, but stating that it would not be advisable to change the composition of the delegation at this time.

I recommend that you sign the suggested reply attached herewith.

W. W. Rostow

Doc 79a

September 21, 1968

Dear Mr. Won Pat:

It was a privilege for me to sign into law the Guam Elective Governor Act. As you so aptly stated: "this Act is truly a great step forward in the development of American democracy, extending its principles to the very edge of the Asian continent." One of the rewards of this office is being able to participate in the development of democratic principles, wherever it might be.

The people of Guam and you can take just pride in serving as one of the windows for Asian people coming to the United States. Guam, together with Hawaii and its able leaders, must continue to stand as symbols for other Asians looking to the United States for guidance.

With respect to the talks in Paris, our distinguished United States delegation, headed by Ambassadors Harriman and Vance, has a deep understanding of Asia as well as broad experience in negotiating with the Communists. Grateful as I am for your offer to be of service, I do not believe that it would be advisable to change the composition of the delegation at this time. Of course we will continue to keep you and all representatives of the American people informed of developments in Paris and on the ground in Vietnam.

Sincerely,

Honorable Antonio B. Won Pat
Guam's Washington Representative
200 Maryland Avenue, N.E. - Suite 301
Washington, D. C. 20242

LBJ:State:CEJ:WWR:mz

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Territory of Guam

U.S.A.

OFFICE OF GUAM'S REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON
200 MARYLAND AVENUE, NE - SUITE 301
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20242

A. B. WON PAT
REPRESENTATIVE

TELEPHONE:
WO 3-4065
CODE 13 EXT 34655
AREA CODE 202

September 11, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the people of Guam, I again express to you our heartfelt thanks and appreciation of your approval of S. 449, the Guam Elective Governor Act. As the holder of the highest elective office of the Territory, representing every segment of the people, I am convinced that the majority feel, as I do, that this Act is truly a great step forward in the development of American democracy, extending its principles to the very edge of the Asiatic continent. This letter, however, is chiefly concerned with a different but related matter of national interest.

I, like many other fellow American citizens, was deeply impressed in Chicago with the statesmanlike performance of Senator Danny Inouye of Hawaii as convention keynoter and temporary chairman; and even though people of his oriental heritage occupied my home island during World War II, that of course, was readily forgotten in the fine relationship that I have had with him here in Washington. Moreover, we share our pride in American citizenship, our activity in the Democratic party, and that we have been elected by our Pacific Island people to represent them in Washington.

It occurs to me, that you may wish to consider assigning Senator Inouye to the Harriman Mission in Paris, since there is no one of oriental origin or heritage currently assigned there. And if you feel that it has any value, I should be happy to share in any such duties. I have not discussed this with the Senator, but even though both of us will be campaigning for re-election until November, I am sure we could interrupt these activities for any assignment you may see fit to direct. You may also wish to consider the possibility of including Senator Hiram L. Fong of Hawaii.

Naturally, I shall not discuss this matter publicly or privately unless and until released by your office.

Respectfully yours,

Antonio B. Won Pat

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Rostow

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~~SECRET~~

Thursday, September 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Secretary Rusk's Talk with Ambassador Rabin

2. Pres file

The Secretary had a vigorous talk with Rabin last night. He said it's up to Israel to make its position clear--to move beyond generalities and get into specifics. When Rabin said this is impossible until Israel knows whether the Arabs want peace, the Secretary replied that this must be possible because it is the whole purpose of the exercise. The only way to find out what the Arabs want is to test them with specific proposals.

Rabin left the attached Aide-Memoire. It says, in essence, that Israel wants real peace--not just the end of belligerency. To Rabin "real peace" means open boundaries and full recognition. But the Aide-Memoire does not go that far; it speaks of permanent boundaries, agreed security arrangements, and the other issues in the UN Resolution.

The Aide-Memoire argues that the Soviet proposal is "totally and drastically opposed" to Israel's policy and ours, because it aims only at withdrawal and not at permanent peace. The Israelis somehow know the full details of the Soviet proposition. They urge us to reject it out of hand. Rabin argued that the US response to the Czech crisis, failure to make the decision on Phantoms, and indication that it might even consider the Soviet plan have all created a Soviet and Arab impression that the US is weak and is about to back down.

The Secretary did not say how we planned to respond to the Soviet plan. He told Rabin only that the Soviet proposition was a mixed bag--one that we could not reject 100% out of hand.

This was a fairly tough conversation and highlights our main problem in moving toward peace. We don't really disagree with the Israelis that the Soviet proposal is generally unacceptable. We do disagree with their definition of "peace." They seem to be holding out for a complete Arab "change of heart" whereas we have thought more of the step-by-step evolution of peace through a series of practical arrangements. We've thought of a settlement as a framework within which peace could evolve. The Israelis seem unwilling to launch that process until they are assured that the Arabs have caved, but the Secretary is right in saying there will be no progress until they do.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 20, #257
By JC, NARA, Date 10-16-01

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
וושינגטון

AIDE-MEMOIRE

The Israel position is well-known to the United States Government. What we seek primarily is a just and lasting peace and not just a declaration about the absence of belligerency. The peace should be worked out by the parties and expressed in an agreed, binding and contractual form setting out their reciprocal rights and obligations. Permanent boundaries, as distinct from demarcation lines and cease-fire lines, would be established by agreement. Dispositions of armed forces would comply with these boundaries and agreed security arrangements, and as long as a just and lasting peace has not been established, the existing cease-fire must be fully observed and respected. We have noted the United States position on peace in the Middle East as formulated by President Johnson in his speeches of June 19, 1967 and September 10, 1968. The U.S.S.R. is now purveying to various governments a plan for a Middle Eastern settlement which is totally and drastically opposed to these principles and objectives. According to our detailed and authoritative information, the Soviet Plan provides for the withdrawal of Israeli forces by stages to the June 5 lines, without the establishment of permanent peace, the determination of agreed boundaries, specifically, in return for mere declarations on the end of belligerency.

It is obvious that Israel will oppose and resist this plan and cannot enter any discussions or engagements based thereon. The Plan aims at the restoration of a situation which the United States has described as "a prescription for the renewal of hostilities." The Foreign Minister assumes that the Soviet Plan known to him in detail is that to which Mr. Battle and Mr. Sisco have referred in their conversation with our representatives. If this is so, it is hard to understand why there has been no indication of firm United States opposition to a plan so clearly at variance with the policy formulated by President Johnson on September 10. That policy and the Soviet Plan do not meet at any point. The Soviet Plan is incompatible with President Johnson's formulation in the following respects, among others: It prescribes a precise return to the situation existing before the June 1967 War. It is not worked out or agreed by the parties to the conflict. It is not a real, formal, solid contractual peace. It does not provide for the parties themselves to determine their own boundaries. It does not guarantee unconditional equality of navigation rights for Israel in the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. This does not exhaust its shortcomings. In brief, the Plan is nothing else than the doctrine of withdrawal without peace

and restoration of the June 1967 situation which the United States has always opposed. But on every previous occasion the United States has not hesitated to inform the U.S.S.R. of its rejection of such plans with the result that they have been withdrawn. This Plan is nothing but a proposal for the implementation of the Soviet Draft Resolution presented to the Security Council on November 20, 1967 and described by the U.S. representative as "unacceptable."

In these conditions any United States hesitation in giving a negative reaction to the U.S.S.R. would invite grave complications both in the parliamentary field at the U.N. and in the region itself. The first need, in the Foreign Minister's view, is for the United States to indicate its opposition to the Soviet Plan, the very object of which is to try to entice the United States into the abandonment of the principles enunciated by President Johnson. It is anticipated that there will be close consultations between us on the course to be taken to maintain and advance our common goals, particularly in view of the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly.

Washington, D.C.
18 September 1968

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82413

Pre file

UNCLAS

SEPTEMBER 19, 1968

HEREWITH SEABORG'S PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO IAEA CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 24.

IT HAS BEEN CLEARED BY STATE, ACDA, AND DEFENSE.

QUOTE

I WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK, THROUGH CHAIRMAN SEABORG, TO THE DELEGATES TO THE TWELFTH GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

A YEAR AGO, I SAID THAT WE STOOD AT A CROSSROADS IN MAN'S QUEST FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS IN THAT, IF WE COULD CONFINE THE FUTURE USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY TO PEACEFUL PURPOSES, WE COULD IMPROVE THE LIVES OF PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD; WHEREAS IF MORE NATIONS SHOULD BE INCLINED TO FOLLOW THE COSTLY ROAD TOWARD MILITARY EXPLOITATION, THE ATOM WOULD BE A HEAVY BURDEN ON THEIR ASCENT TO A BETTER LIFE AND AN INCREASING THREAT TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, WHICH HAS BEEN SIGNED BY MANY NATIONS, IS A FURTHER STEP TOWARD ENDING THE PERIL OF NUCLEAR WAR AND ENSURING THE EQUITABLE SHARING OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY UNDER EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL NATIONS. AS I SAID AT THE UNITED NATIONS ON JUNE 12, "NATIONS THAT WERE LONG BESET BY DIFFERENCES HAVE IN THIS GREAT TREATY FOUND COMMON GROUND IN THEIR NEEDS TO USE THE INCREDIBLE FORCE OF THE ATOM FOR PEACE AND NOT FOR WAR."

WE MUST NOT PERMIT THIS OPPORTUNITY, WHICH THIS TREATY HAS GIVEN US, TO BE LOST. EACH OF US SHOULD DO ALL WITHIN OUR POWER TO BRING ABOUT EARLY RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY.

WITH CONGRATULATIONS FOR YOUR PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS, I SEND YOU THE BEST WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR YOUR FUTURE ENDEAVORS.

END QUOTE

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

CALL ME

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82409

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4
NLJ 95-188
By ltp, NARA, Date 11-3-95

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SEPTEMBER 19, 1968

EMBASSY MEXICO REPORTS THAT SOME 10,000 TROOPS, INCLUDING ARMORED UNITS, OCCUPIED THE UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO CAMPUS LAST NIGHT.

THE REASON GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT WAS THE ILLEGAL OCCUPANCY OF UNIVERSITY BUILDINGS BY STRIKING STUDENTS.

THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE ACTION TAKEN RESPONDED TO SOME NEW OR THREATENED MOVE BY THE STRIKING STUDENTS OR WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVED IT COULD NO LONGER TEMPORIZE IN VIEW OF THE APPROACHING OLYMPIC GAMES AND THE LOCATION OF A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT OLYMPIC INSTALLATIONS ON THE CAMPUS.

STUDENTS ARE REPORTED TO BE MEETING TODAY TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION YET ON THEIR REACTION AND PLANS.

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September 19, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR JI M JONES

Pres file

Herewith commitments on visits through December.

October 2: President Tombalbaye of Chad

October 9-10: Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand

October 11: Foreign Minister Stewart of Great Britain

October 23: President Pacheco of Uruguay. (The President agreed in principle to this visit. However, he is not committed and can back out if he so wishes.)

December 4: Prime Minister Hoveyda, of Iran

December 11-12: Ruler of Kuwait (state visit)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By NG, NARA, Date 12-10-92

~~SECRET~~

September 19, 1968

Pres. File
85

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

You should know that it is the judgment of your in-house intelligence team that the recent typhoons in North Vietnam have probably done more damage than, perhaps, six months of bombing.

The following report is typical. Couldn't happen at a better time.

"The recent typhoons, the most recent of which hit the Hanoi area on 9 September, have caused serious flooding of the rice crop. The pumps have not been able to clear the fields rapidly enough to prevent damage to the crop. Following the late August typhoon the water was pumped out and the winter crop replanted. However, the latest typhoon may have come too late to permit replanting. The results could be disastrous. In addition to the flooding, the rice crop is threatened by worms and a serious lack of fertilizer. Although great emphasis has been placed on proper fertilizing, the main effort is directed toward replanting. In some areas, the winter crop has been replanted as many as five times, including the relocation of seedlings. An unusual number of farm tools have been lost in the floods caused by the typhoons.

"The 9 September typhoon caused widespread damage and destruction. Some sections of Hanoi were without electricity for more than five days.

"Vice Premiers Pham Hung and Nguyen Con were absent from the National Day ceremonies as well as other functions recently. Vice Premier Hung is reported to be in South Vietnam while Vice Premier Con has simply dropped out of sight."

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-9
By ics, NARA, Date 2-3-03

86

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, September 19, 1968 -- 2:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pursuant to your query on Debre, relayed to me by Larry Temple, the problem is this:

-- We have already committed ourselves to your seeing the UK Foreign Secretary in this awkward period;

-- Sec. Rusk will be dealing with both Foreign Ministers in New York;

-- The French will know that Stewart is scheduled for Washington in this period; therefore, they will take a brush off of Debre as being some kind of slight, until they learn that Stewart also was cancelled.

That is why I suggested that we schedule Debre on the same basis as Stewart and then cancel both if travel takes place. The other way to do it would be to go back to the British now and say they should not count on the Stewart appointment with the President because the President may be out of town, etc. The trouble with that is that it might stir up speculations with the British and with the press that we would not like.

W. W. Rostow

Indicate to British that Stewart appointment might not be possible and indicate to French that President likely to be out of town Oct. 10-12_____

Leave Stewart appointment as is and give above message to French_____

Schedule Debre on same basis as Stewart_____

Call me_____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By_____, NARA, Date 10-16-01

WWRostow:rln

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87

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 19, 1968
12:40 p.m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is Ambassador Lodge's report of his discussion with Kiesinger yesterday on German reactions to Czechoslovakia.

Kiesinger was satisfied with the results of the Birrenbach mission and made it clear the Germans will take a serious look at their defense budget and new forms of neutralization. He is not hopeful of any change in deGaulle's position.

(W) Walt Rostow

Attachment

87a

Department of State TELEGRAM

23

~~SECRET~~ 526

FILE COPY

PAGE 01 BONN 17052 181658Z

53
ACTION SS 70

INFO CCO 00,CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,USUE 00,
/070 W

P 181525Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 55
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-198
By jw, NARA, Date 7-28-94

BOWDLER
BUDGET
~~DAVIS~~
~~FRIED~~
~~GINSBURGH~~
HAMILTON
~~JESSUP~~
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENY P
LEONHART
SAUNDERS
~~TAYLOR~~

~~S E C R E T~~ BONN 17052 SECTION 1 OF 2

~~L I M D I S~~

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TALK WITH CHANCELLOR ON IMPLICATIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

REF: STATE 239442

1. SUMMARY: THE AMBASSADOR PRESENTED THE INSTRUCTIONS IN THE REFTEL, SUPPLEMENTED BY STATE 238789 ON THE BIRRENBACH VISIT, TO CHANCELLOR KEISINGER. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT POINTS IN THE CHANCELLOR'S REPLY WERE (A) SATISFACTION WITH THE BIRRENBACH VISIT, (B) WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER LATER INCREASES IN THE GERMAN DEFENSE BUDGET IF BASED ON A CAREFUL NATO APPRAISAL OF THE NEW SECURITY SITUATION, (C) WILLINGNESS ALSO, HEDGED WITH EXPRESSIONS OF REAL CONCERN TO CONSIDER AT LEAST THE POSSIBILITY OF DEFENSE BUDGET INCREASES TO ASSIST US ON OUR MILITARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM, (D) PESSIMISM REGARDING THE PROSPECTS OF GETTING INCREASED COLLABORATION FROM DE GAULLE, COUPLED WITH NO APPARENT WILLINGNESS BY THE CHANCELLOR TO PRESS HIM VERY HARD. END SUMMARY.

2. THE CONVERSATION, WHICH LASTED MORE THAN AN HOUR AND A HALF, TOOK PLACE IN A RELAXED, FRANK ATMOSPHERE. CARSTENS AND THE DCM WERE ALSO PRESENT.

3. THE CHANCELLOR BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE HAD HAD A ONLY A

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BRIEF CONVERSATION WITH BIRRENBACH, WHO WAS TIRED AFTER HIS TRIP, BUT THAT HE WAS PLEASED TO LEARN THAT THE US ANALYSIS IN ALL ITS ESSENTIALS WAS THE SAME AS THAT OF THE FRG. THE CENTRAL PROBLEM, THE CHANCELLOR SAID, IS THAT WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH A SERIOUS NEW MILITARY SITUATION, INVOLVING A FORWARD POSITION OF MANY ADDITIONALSOVIET DIVISIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT NATO DRAW THE RIGHT CONCLUSIONS FROM THIS SITUATION.

4. RESPONDING TO THIS, THE AMBASSADOR THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION, BASED ON THE REFTEL: THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE SOMETHING HAZARDOUS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH PRESENTS NEW DANGERS FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A STRONG GERMAN AND ALLIANCE VIEW THAT A NATO RESPONSE IS REQUIRED IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. WITHOUT BEING PROVOCATIVE, SUCH A RESPONSE SHOULD INVOLVE SPECIFIC ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE ALLIED DEFENSE POSITION IN EUROPE. IT SHOULD ALSO BE PROMPT IF IT IS TO BE EFFECTIVE. A NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING IN THE NEAR FUTURE WOULD BE USEFUL--PROVIDING SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS CAN BE ACHEIVED. FOLLOWING OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH GERMANY AND OTHER MEMBERS OF NATO, WE INTEND TO PROPOSE A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AT THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE LEVEL TO BE HELD IN BRUSSELS IN LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER TO DETERMINE WHAT GOVERNMENTS ARE WILLING AND ABLE TO DO. THE SECRETARY ALSO PLANS A DINNER OCTOBER 8 OF THOSE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS WHO ARE IN NEW YORK. THIS MEETING COULD APPRAISE WHETHER PROGRESS ON REAL SUBSTANCE JUSTIFIED A SPECIAL, EARLY MINISTER'S MEETING IN BRUSSELS. TO SUM UP THE GENERAL NATO SITUATION, THE KEY QUESTION IS THE WILLINGNESS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE FIRM DECISIONS REGARDING THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENSE EFFORT.

5. THE AMBASSADOR CONTINUED THAT THIS IS A HIGHLY IMPORTANT JUNCTURE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSTWAR EUROPE. THERE IS A NECESSITY FOR REAL ACTION. TO TAKE IT CAN SET US AHEAD AND START SOMEWHAT OF A AN UPWARD SPIRAL: FAILURE TO TAKE IT WILL HAVE SERIOUS EFFECTS ON THE FUTURE OF NATO AND OF EUROPE. NATO CAN BE COMPARED TO A BOAT IN FRONT OF A BOATHOUSE ON A LAKE: IT EITHER GOES FORWARDS OR BACKWARDS: IT DOES NOT STAY STILL. ALL NATO COUNTRIES-- IN COMMON INDEED WITH COUNTRIES EVERYWHERE-- CONFRONT COMPLEX DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL DIFFICULTIES. THIS MAY PERHAPS BE TRUER FOR THE US AT PRESENT THAN FOR OTHERS BECAUSE OF OUR ELECTIONS. CERTAINLY WHAT IS DONE BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF THIS YEAR IN NATO WILL HAVE A VERY STRONG EFFECT ON THE NEW AMERICAN GOVERN-

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MENT, WHOEVER HEADS THE GOVERNMENT. GERMANY IS THE COUNTRY MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE SOVIET MOVE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IF GERMANY SHOWS WITHIN NATO THAT IT THINKS THE SITUATION IS SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS FOR THEM TO TAKE CONCRETE STEPS, THEN WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THIS WILL LEAD TO POSITIVE ACTION BY OTHERS. THIS MEANS DECISIONS ON THE MILITARY BUDGET, BOTH IN THE SENSE OF MONEY SPENT FOR GERMANY'S OWN FORCES AND FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PURPOSES ARISING FROM THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES. A STATESMANLIKE GERMAN DECISION ON THIS LATTER SUBJECT COULD BE POLITICALLY VERY IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING THE POSITION OF THE NEW AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. THE CHANCELLOR HAS HEARD THE TALK OF A DECLINE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC INTEREST IN EUROPE IN RECENT YEARS. THE CZECHOSLOVAK EVENTS PRESENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVERSE THIS TREND IF POSITIVE ACTION IS TAKEN TO ENERGIZE NATO AND RESUME PROGRESS TOWARD EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. THEY ALSO PRESENT A RISK OF ITS INTENSIFICATION IF ACTION IS NOT TAKEN.

6. THE CHANCELLOR REPLIED THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE THE GERMAN POSITION CLEAR ON INCREASED MILITARY EFFORT. THE FRG FELT THAT IT MADE NO SENSE, AS AN IMMEDIATE REFLEX REACTION TO THE SOVIET INVASION, TO INCREASE INDISCRIMINATELY THE GERMAN DEFENSE BUDGET ANY DECISIONS ON THE DEFENSE BUDGET MUST BE BASED ON A CAREFUL GERMAN AND NATO STUDY OF THE NEW SITUATION. DEFENSE MINISTER SCHROEDER MUST FIRST MAKE CONSIDERED PROPOSALS TO THE CABINET. HE WILL SOON HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS IN THE FORM OF THE ANNUAL WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE WHICH MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE BUNDESTAG.

7. MORE SPECIFICALLY, ON NEUTRALIZATION OF US MILITARY EXPENDITURES, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE US POSITION. HE ADDED THAT, HOWEVER, ANY SOLUTIONS INVOLVING AN INCREASE IN THE GERMAN DEFENSE BUDGET PRESENTED VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. IT COULD INVOLVE A KIND OF DOUBLE BURDEN COMING ON TOP OF ANY GENERAL INCREASE REQUIRED TO STRENGTHEN THE BUNDESWEHR ITSELF. HE POINTED TO THE VERY GREAT DIFFICULTIES RECENTLY IN HAMMERING OUT THE BUDGET DECISIONS IN THE MEDIUM TERM FINANCIAL PLAN. NEVERTHELESS, THE CHANCELLOR SAID, THE FRG WAS PREPARED TO QTE LOOK VERY CAREFULLY INTO THIS UNQTE.

8. REGARDING DE GAULLE, CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE WILL HEAR FROM HIM SEPTEMBER 27 HOW HE SEES THE NEW SITUATION CREATED BY

~~SECRET~~

Department of State TELEGRAM 23

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 BONN 17052 181658Z

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BUT THAT HE DOES NOT EXPECT ANY GREAT CHANGE IN DE GAULLE'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE. IT IS LIKELY THAT THE ONLY POSITIVE THING WHICH CAN BE EXPECTED FROM DE GAULLE IS A COMMITMENT THAT HE WILL NOT WITHDRAW FROM NATO AT THIS TIME. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT THE GERMANS WILL LOOK INTO WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT MORE COLLABORATION BETWEEN NATO FORCES AND FRENCH FORCES, BUT THAT HE WAS NOT AT ALL CERTAIN THAT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT.
LODGE

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Department of State TELEGRAM

47

~~SECRET~~ 945

PAGE 01 BONN 17052 02 OF 02 182129Z

81
ACTION SS 70

INFO CCO 00,CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,USUE 00,
/070 W

P 181525Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 56
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BONN 17052

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TALK WITH CHANCELLOR ON IMPLICATIONS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

REF: STATE 239442

9. REGARDING THE SITUATION IN GENERAL, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT THE GERMANS HAD NO NEW REPORTS OF AN IMMINENT MILITARY THREAT TO ROMANIA OR YUGOSLAVIA. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT WE ALSO HAD NO NEW INFORMATION POINTING IN THIS DIRECTION. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT IT IS NOW VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT HOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL REACT IN A GIVEN SITUATION. THE GERMAN APPRAISAL IS THAT THE KREMLIN IS A DISUNITED, LEADERLESS TEAM, WHICH MAKES IT POTENTIALLY MORE DANGEROUS. KRUSHCHEV, ALTHOUGH HE EMBARKED ON SOME VERY DANGEROUS VENTURES INDEED, WAS SUFFICIENTLY IN CHARGE TO BACK DOWN AGAIN WHEN THE SITUATION REQUIRED (E.G. CUBA). THE DIFFICULTY WITH THE PRESENT DISUNITED KREMLIN TEAM IS THAT IT IS MUCH HARDER FOR IT TO DECIDE TO PULL BACK WHEN IT HAS MADE AN OBVIOUS MISTAKE. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH HE LIKE OTHERS COULD HARDLY SAY HE PREDICTED THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, LOOKING BACK ON IT NOW HE REALIZES THAT THERE WAS A CERTAIN INEVITABILITY TO IT. THERE WERE CERTAIN THINGS, BOTH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THEIR IDEOLOGY AND THEIR STRATEGIC VIEWS WHICH THE SOVIETS QTE SIMPLY

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COULD NOT LET HAPPEN UNQTE. WHAT THEIR BRUTAL INVASION CAN ONLY MEAN IS THAT THEY LOST THEIR HEADS IN THE KREMLIN. THE CHANCELLOR ALSO FELT THAT CZECHOSLVAKIA REALLY WENT TOO FAR; PERHAPS DUBCEK REALIZED THIS, BUT LOST CONTROL OF THE SITUATION. HE STRESSED AGAIN, AS HE HAD IN THE PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, HOW THE FRG HAD REALLY BENT OVER BACKWARDS TO AVOID GIVING THE SOVIETS ANY PRETEXT WHATEVER TO CHARGE GERMAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE LIBERALIZATION PROCESS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE EVEN FELT AT ONE POINT THAT A WESTERN LEADER SHOULD HAVE WARNED DUBCEK TO QTE TAKE IT EASY UNQTE IN HIS CONTACTS WITH THE WEST.

10. ON THE NATO REACTION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE HAS BEEN CONCERNED WITH THE SLOW EROSION OF NATO OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. HE AGREED THAT THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA PROVIDE A NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR REVITALIZATION. HE ALSO AGREED FULLY THAT WHATEVER NATO DOES SHOULD NOT BE DRAMATIC, BUT MEASURED AND CONSIDERED. THE CHANCELLOR FELT A STRONGER AND UNITED NATO DOES HAVE AN EFFECT IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ON THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIETS WILL NEGOTIATE DIFFERENTLY AND MORE RESPONSIBLY IF NATO IS STRONGER AND MORE UNITED. THE OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WILL ALSO BE HEARTENED. THE CHANCELLOR ALSO MENTIONED, ALTHOUGH QUITE BRIEFLY, THE NEED FOR THE US TO EXERCISE AT LEAST FULL CO-LEADERSHIP IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A PROPER NATO REACTION. THE CHANCELLOR CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT QTE WE WILL DO ALL THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR US TO DO TO BRING ABOUT A PROPER NATO RESPONSE. UNQTE.

11. THE CHANCELLOR'S COMMENTS ON HIS TRIP TO TURKEY, IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN WILL BE REPORTED IN SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE. LODGE

Pres File
88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thurs., Sept. 19, 1968
12:35 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

More Soviet leadership rumors.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Bucharest 2613)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 12-10-92

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ACTION EUR 20

1968 SEP 19 12 10

INFO SSO 00,NSCE 00,CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,

NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,USIA 12,NIC 01,ACDA 16,IO 13,

OPR 02,O 02,SY 03,OC 06,CCO 00,RSR 01,/134 W

R 191010Z SEPT68
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2910
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONGEN MUNICH
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW
BT
C ~~O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BUCHAREST 2613

REF: MOSCOW 5511

SUBJECT: RUMORS OF IMMINENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGES

ACCORDING TO USUALLY RELIABLE ROMANIAN SOURCE, HE WAS TOLD SEP 17 BY MIDDLE LEVEL RCP CC FUNCTIONARY THAT KOSYGIN, SUSLOV AND PONOMAREV HAD SENT LETTER TO ALL CPSU PARTY ORGANIZATIONS ADMITTING THEIR ERROR IN OPPOSING MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. DAVIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 10-16-01

PRESERVATION COPY

Pres. File

89

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, Sept. 19, 1968
11:25 a.m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have considered the problem posed by the possibility that you may be in Asia at the time (Oct. 10-12) when Debre plans to come to Washington.

You already have in that time period a commitment to Foreign Minister Stewart.

It will be wholly understood by the Foreign Ministers if their appointments, under these circumstances, have been cancelled. If we indicate to State that there is some question of your not being here, it will be all over the world in no time at all. Therefore, I recommend that we tell the French Embassy, which raised this question, that the President plans to see Debre in the period October 10-12; that we schedule a tentative appointment; but have no qualms about cancelling it if you should then be elsewhere.

W. W. Rostow

Schedule tentative Debre appointment_____

No_____

Call me_____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 10-16-01

90

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, September 19, 1968
11:15 a.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith George Ball picks up from the Indian delegate in New York a reflection of their Consul General's report from Hanoi that Hanoi is seeking our minimum terms for bombing halt. You will note the Indian judgment in para. 2.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 6558

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WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 10-16-01

WH (6) 90a

Department of State TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 6019Q
RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 18, 1968
9:12 P.M.

RR RUEHC
DE RUEHDT 6558 2630035
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 190010Z SEP 68
~~FM USMISSION USUN NY~~
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3220
STATE GRNC
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ USUN 6558

Rostow

NODIS

VIETNAM

FOL COMMENTS MAY NOT BE NEW TO DEPT BUT I CONVEY THEM BECAUSE THEY COME FROM INDIAN PERM REP PARTHASARATHI, WHO IS FORMER ICC CHRMN AND HAS SERVED BOTH IN HANOI AND PEKING.

1. PARTHASARATHI SOUGHT ME OUT AFTER SC LUNCHEON TODAY TO SAY THAT, ON BASIS HIS READING OF LATEST TELS FROM HANOI, HE BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO CONVEY IN MORE PRECISE TERMS WHAT US REQUIRES TO STOP BOMBING, E.G. RESPECT FOR DMZ, CESSATION OF ATTACKS ON SVN CITIES, ETC. HE SAID IT NOT NECESSARY FOR US TO CONVEY THIS IN PARIS TALKS, THAT IT COULD BE DONE THROUGH THIRD PARTY.

2. HE BELIEVES FURTHER THAN THIS IS CRITICAL TIME AND THAT HANOI WOULD LIKE TO SHOW SOME PROGRESS BEFORE US ELECTIONS.

GP-1.

BUFFUM
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 3271B
By iis NARA, Date 6-15-98

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