

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

136

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 note	Rostow to the President, 8:15 p.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — S (duplicate of #180, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. X)	09/30/68	A
#6 note	Rostow to the President, 2:30 p.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — TS	09/30/68	A
#6a letter	Chancellor Kiesinger to LBJ Official translation <i>Exempt 4/15/03 NLS 02-98</i> 3 p TS	09/17/68	A
#11 note	Rostow to the President, 9:15 a.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — C	09/30/68	A
#11a cable	Moscow 5745 <i>open 2/13/02</i> 4 p — C	09/29/68	A
#14 note	Rostow to the President, 8:10 a.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — S (duplicate, #68, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 8, Part 17)	09/30/68	A
#14a cable	Seoul 10157 <i>open 2/13/02</i> 3 p — S (duplicate, #69a, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 8, Part 17)	09/30/68	A
#14b cable	Seoul 10159 <i>open 2/13/02</i> 2 p — S (duplicate, #69b, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 8, Part 17)	09/30/68	A
#15a cable	MAC 13145 3 p — TS <i>open 3-19-96 NLS 94-26</i> (duplicate, #8a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C (15) b, General Military Activity)	09/28/68	A
#16a cable	Saigon 39022 2 p — S <i>open 7-14-94 NLS 94-25</i>	09/29/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 96, 9/26-30/68, Box 40

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17a cable	Bonn 17480 2 p — S <i>open 2/13/02</i>	09/28/68	A
#18 note	Rostow to the President, 12:00 noon 1 p — S <i>open 8-28-96 NLJ 95-305</i> (duplicate, #11a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Rusk-Dobrynin")	09/29/68	A
#18a report	Talking Paper re Middle East 7 p — S <i>open 8-28-96 NLJ 95-305</i> (duplicate, #11b, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Rusk-Dobrynin")	[09/68]	A
#21 note	Rostow to the President, 12:25 p.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — C	09/28/68	A
#21a cable	Montevideo 4036 2 p — C <i>open 2/13/02</i>	09/28/68	A
#22a cable	For the Ambassador from the Secretary 1 p — S re Thailand <i>open 7-14-94 NLJ 94-25</i>	09/28/68	A
#25 note	Rostow to the President, 6:40 p.m. <i>open 6/22/95 NLJ 94-344</i> 1 p, C re Non-Nuclear Conference	09/27/68	A
#26a cable	Saigon 38867 7 p — S <i>open 7-14-94 NLJ 94-25</i>	09/27/68	A
#27 note	Rostow to the President, 6:10 p.m. 1 p — S (duplicate #27, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Rusk-Dobrynin")	09/27/68	A
#28 note	Rostow to the President, 5:00 p.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — S	09/27/68	A
#28a cable	Draft State cable to Bangkok <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — S	09/27/68	A
#30 memo	Rostow to the President, 4:30 p.m. 1 p — S re Vietnam <i>open 12-15-95 NLJ 95-207</i>	09/27/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#31 memo	Rostow to the President, 4:00 p.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — S — (duplicate, #55, NSF, Country File, Mexico, Volume IV <i>Box 60</i>)	09/27/68	A
#31a memo	Helms to the President <i>open 6-27-95 NLJ 93-117</i> 1 p — S — (duplicate, #55a, as above)	09/27/68	A
#31b report	Intelligence Report <i>open 6-27-95 NLJ 93-117</i> 2 p — S — (duplicate, #55b, as above)	09/26/68	A
#33 note	Rostow to the President, 1:15 p.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — S — re Vietnam [dup #119, NSF, CF, UN, "HARVARD XIII ", "BX119"] <i>4186, NSF, CF, VN. Harvan - Citrusville Indian Agency - Box 134</i>	09/27/68	A
#33a cable	Paris 21489 (DELTO 778) 2 p — S — <i>4186 cable open 2/13/02</i> (duplicate, #64c, NSF, Memos to the President, Volume 97) [dup #119a, NSF, CF, UN, "HARVARD XIII ", "BX119"]	09/27/68	A
#34 note	Rostow to the President, 12:45 p.m. 1 p — S — <i>open 9-25-95 NLJ 94-105</i> (duplicate, #92c, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Kosygin")	09/27/68	A
#34a report	Talking paper re Middle East <i>open 2/13/02</i> 11 p — S —	09/23/68	A
#35 note	Rostow to the President, 10:30 a.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — S —	09/27/68	A
#35a cable	Bangkok 20846 <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p — S —	09/27/68	A
#35b cable	Bangkok 20876 2 p — S —	09/27/68	A
#37 note	Rostow to the President, 9:45 a.m. 1 p — TS — re Rusk <i>OPEN 6/28/95 NLJ 94-457</i>	09/27/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#38 note	Rostow to the President 1 p — C re India <i>open 2/13/02</i>	09/27/68	A
#39a memo	Zwick to the President 1 p — C re Tunisia <i>open 2/13/02</i>	09/25/68	A
#39b memo	Gaud and Freeman to the President 2 p — C re Tunisia <i>open 2/13/02</i>	09/19/68	A
#41 note	Rostow to the President, 8:30 a.m. 1 p — TS re Vietnam <i>open 2/13/02</i>	09/27/68	A
#42 note	Rostow to the President, 8:30 a.m. 1 p — S <i>open 2/13/02</i> (duplicate, #186, NSF, Country File, Panama, Volume 10)	09/27/68	A
#42a cable	Intelligence Report 3 p S <i>exempt NLS 019-040-1-1</i> (duplicate, #186a, as above)	09/26/68	A
#45a cable	Paris 21423 (DELTO 776) 6 p S <i>Box 114 open 2/13/02</i> [dup. #121, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN" XIII , "Box 119"]	09/26/68	A
#47a cable	draft State cable to Paris/HARVAN 3 p S <i>open 2/13/02</i> (duplicate, #64b, NSF, Memos to the President, Volume 97)	09/26/68	A
#48 note	Rostow to the President, 5:20 p.m. 1 p S <i>open 2/13/02</i> (duplicate, #187, NSF, Country File, Panama, Volume 10)	09/26/68	A
#48a memo	Intelligence Memo 1 p S <i>semi NLS 019-040-1-2 (1/02)</i> (duplicate, #187a, as above)	09/26/68	A
#49 note	Rostow to the President, 5:20 p.m. 1 p S <i>open 1-11-94 NLS 92-200</i> (dup., #52, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. 13)	09/26/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#49a memo	Alfred Jenkins to Rostow 2 p S Sanitized 5-19-95 NLJ 92-199 same Sanitization 6/6/03 NLJ 02-95 (duplicate, #52a, NSF, Country File, China, Volume 13)	09/26/68	A
#49b cable Sanitized 5-13-03 NLJ 02-94	Intelligence report 5 p S (duplicate, #52b, as above)	09/25/68	A
#52a memo on	Rusk, Dobrynin, Assistant Secy. Leddy 2 p TS <i>open 7-14-94 NLJ 94-25</i> (duplicate, #9a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Kosygin", Box 10)	09/20/68	A
#54 memo	Rostow to the President <i>open 2/13/02</i> 2 p S (duplicate, #38, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8 B (3) Bunker's Weekly Report to the President")	09/26/68	A
#54a cable More info released 5-13-03 NLJ 02-97	Saigon 38774 (Bunker's 68th weekly report) 9 p S (duplicate, #38a, as above) Sanitized, NLJ/CBS-10	09/26/68	A
#56 memo	Rostow to the President <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p PCI re Brazil	09/26/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
10 memo	Rostow to the President, 10:20 a.m. 1 p S OPEN 4/4/03 NLS/RAC 02-67	9/30/68	A
10a cable	Intelligence report 2 pp S SANITIZED 5/29/03 NLS/RAC 02-68	9/30/68	A
36 memo	Rostow to the President, 10:15 a.m. sanitized 8-22-99 NLS 94-76 1 p TS same sanitization 4/4/03 NLS/RAC 02-69 & NLS 94-76	9/27/68	A
36a report	Intelligence report 2 pp TS SANITIZED 3.22.05 NLW/RAC 02-70	9/26/68	A
41a report SANITIZED 7-23-03 NLW/RAC 02-70	Intelligence report 2 pp TS	9/26/68	A
44 memo SANITIZED 2-26-04 NLW 02-99	Rostow to the President 1 p S	9/27/68	A
44a memo OPEN 2-26-04 NLW 02-99	Rostow to Chairman, AEC 1 p S	9/28/68	A
44b letter SANITIZED 2-26-04 NLW 02-99	Chairman, AEC, to the President 2 pp S	9/17/68	A
44c report SANITIZED 2-26-04 NLW 02-100	Enclosure 1 to #44b 7 pp S	[9/17/68]	A
50 memo	Rostow to the President, 5:15 p.m. sanitized 8-22-99 NLS 94-76 1 p TS OPEN 4/4/03 NLS/RAC 02-67	9/26/68	A
50a report	Intelligence report 2 pp TS SANITIZED 5/29/03 NLS/RAC 02-68	9/26/68	a
51 memo	Rostow to the President, 2:30 p.m. OPEN 4/4/03 NLS/RAC 02-67 1 p S	9/26/68	A
51a report	Intelligence Report 1 p S SANITIZED 5/29/03 NLS/RAC 02-68	9/26/68	A

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1/
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Pres file

Monday, September 30, 1968 -- 8:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk saw Eban this afternoon. Eban levelled, for the first time, with respect to the Israeli-Jordanian private exchanges. Sec. Rusk said that he felt it to be an "honest exchange."

On the substance, we talked about Jerusalem. He may explore certain compromise ideas in his further contacts in New York.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Pres. file
2
/

Monday, Sept. 30, 1968
8:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Having read the Vice President's speech, I believe that:

- you should not comment on it at all;
- George should take the line that "As you know, we are not commenting on statements made by the Presidential candidates." In backgrounding, we can say simply, on the key Vietnam points:
 - the President's position on bombing is to be found in many places, but most recently in his New Orleans speech;
 - on the withdrawal of U. S. forces, the President has said that, in his judgment, no one can now set a timetable of withdrawal; but we all know that the South Vietnamese are now expanding very substantially their forces and we are modernizing their equipment;
 - on the question of a cease-fire, the United States and the GVN responded positively to U Thant's appeal by agreeing to discuss a cease-fire; and at Honolulu, President Thieu and President Johnson agreed that they were prepared to discuss "a total cessation of hostilities -- a true cease-fire."
 - the GVN and the U. S. have agreed that the ultimate political solution in the South must be based on the principle of one-man, one-vote, and that all those who accept the Constitution and set aside violence could participate fully in the political life of the South.

Our general attitude towards the speech should be, in backgrounding, that we don't see a great deal of difference between the Vice President's position and the President's.

W. W. Rostow

(cc: George Christian)

P. S. Sect. Rusk just called, having heard the Vice President's speech. His judgment is that it need not give us trouble. He would not have expressed the matter in precisely the Vice President's terms; but we should not go looking for marginal differences.

SECRET
Monday, Sept. 30, 1968
7:45 p. m.

Pres file
3/

MR. PRESIDENT:

As requested, herewith a compilation
of statements on troop withdrawals, the
length of the war, etc.

I have marked key passages.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

3a

NEWS CONFERENCE

March 22, 1968

Question: Mr. President, are we any closer to peace?

The President: I cannot answer that question. Peace is a very elusive thing. We cannot pinpoint a time or a date that may be in other people's minds. We are trying constantly each day to think and plan in every way we can for a solution that would bring a resolution to what is happening in South Vietnam.

THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION

March 31, 1968

So tonight I reaffirm the pledge that we made at Manila -- that we are prepared to withdraw our forces from South Vietnam as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, stops the infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides.

I believe that a peaceful Asia is far nearer to reality because of what America has done in Vietnam. I believe that the men who endure the dangers of battle -- fighting there for us tonight -- are helping the entire world avoid far greater conflicts, far wider wars, far more destruction, than this one.

The peace that will bring them home someday will come. Tonight I have offered the first in what I hope will be a series of mutual moves toward peace.

MEDAL OF HONOR

May 1, 1968

There will come a day when the last American soldier will have stacked arms in Vietnam. The last sortie will have been flown. The last ship will have sailed out.

No American bases will remain. No American flag will mark the presence of American strength.

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

May 23, 1968

We have faith that an honorable peace can be achieved in Vietnam. But if there must be more fighting before it comes, then we shall not be found wanting.

HONOLULU CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT
THIEU OF SOUTH VIETNAM

July 20, 1968

Until these hopes are realized, the two Presidents confirmed their determination to halt aggression and to defend the Republic of Vietnam. Toward that end, the President of the Republic of Vietnam affirmed the unrelenting efforts of his Government and people, and President Johnson pledged the continued support and assistance of the United States to the people and Government of the Republic of Vietnam as long as such aid is needed and desired.

VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS, DETROIT, MICH.

August 19, 1968

I can tell you that I believe peace is going to come -- that is, if we are steady and it is going to come, if I have anything to do with it, on honorable terms. I cannot tell you precisely when it will come, but I believe that it will come:

- Because I believe military victory is beyond the enemy's grasp;
- Because the South Vietnamese are gathering political and military strength and confidence day by day;
- And finally because I believe in America.

One day -- and I pray every night that it will be soon -- the men who bear the brunt of battle are going to come back home.

AMERICAN LEGION, NEW ORLEANS, LA.

September 10, 1968

We yearn for the day when the violence subsides. We yearn for the day when our men can come home. No man can predict when that day will come, because we are there to bring an honorable, stable peace to Southeast Asia, and no less will justify the sacrifices that our men have died for.

THE STATE OF THE UNION

January 10, 1967

Until such efforts succeed, or until the infiltration ceases, or until the conflict subsides, I think the course of wisdom for this country is that we just must firmly pursue our present course. We will stand firm in Vietnam.

JOINT SESSION OF THE TENNESSEE STATE LEGISLATURE March 15, 1967

Let me conclude by saying this: I so much wish that it were within my power to assure that all those in Hanoi could hear one simple message--America is committed to the defense of South Vietnam until an honorable peace can be negotiated.

If this one communication gets through and its rational implications are drawn, we should be at the table tomorrow. It would be none too soon for us. Then hundreds of thousands of Americans--as brave as any who ever took the field for their country--could come back home.

And the man who could lead them back is the man that you trained and sent from here, our own beloved, brilliant General "Westy" Westmoreland. As these heroes came back to their homes, millions of Vietnamese could begin to make a decent life for themselves and their families without fear of terrorism, without fear of war, or without fear of Communist enslavement.

That is what we are working and what we are fighting for. We must not--we shall not--and we will not--fail.

NEWS CONFERENCE

September 1, 1967

Q. Mr. President, do you concur with General Johnson's prediction that the troops will be brought home in 18 months from Vietnam?

The President. That is General Johnson's opinion. I have made no prediction and wouldn't care to at this time.

General Johnson is a very competent military officer and he has been out there and reached some conclusions. He expressed those to me. But I haven't made any prediction. I believe I will just leave that up to others.

STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE

January 12, 1966

We will stay (in South Vietnam) until aggression has stopped...

* * * *

I wish tonight that I could give you a blueprint for the course of this conflict over the coming months, but we just cannot know what the future may require. We may have to face long, hard combat or a long, hard conference, or even both at once.

* * * *

Until peace comes, or if it does not come, our course is clear. We will act as we must to help protect the independence of the valiant people of South Vietnam.

REMARKS, NATIONAL FREEDOM AWARD
NEW YORK CITY

February 23, 1966

...some ask how long we must bear this burden in Vietnam. To that question, in all honesty, I can give you no answer tonight... If the aggressor persists in Vietnam, the struggle may well be long. Our men in battle know and they accept this hard fact...there is no computer that can tell the hour and the day of peace.

REMARKS, DEMOCRATIC PARTY DINNER
CHICAGO

May 17, 1966

We must get on with the job until these men can come marching home, someday, when peace is secure not only for the people of America, but peace is secure for peace-loving people everywhere in this world.

REMARKS, CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

June 16, 1966

But we cannot tell what the days ahead hold for us. We know they are going to be difficult. We know they are going to require sacrifice. Everything we have ever done in our history to preserve freedom has required it. But we are going to continue on, to carry our military effort to prevent that deterrent...

REMARKS AT OMAHA, NEBRASKA,

June 30, 1966

Until the day they (the North Vietnamese) decide to end this aggression and to make an honorable peace, I can assure you that we, speaking for the United States of America, intend to carry on. No one knows how long it will take. Only Hanoi can be the judge of that. No one can tell you how much effort it will take. No one can tell you how much sacrifice it will take. No one can tell you how costly it will be.

But I can and I do here and now, tell you this: the aggression that they are conducting will not succeed ...

NEWS CONFERENCE

July 20, 1966

We ceased speculating a long time ago on how long this situation (in Vietnam) is going to endure. But I have said to you and to the American people time and again, and I repeat it today, that we shall persist.

REMARKS AT INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA

July 23, 1966

We are not going to run out on South Vietnam. We are not going to break America's word. However long it takes, we will persist until the Communists end the fighting or until we negotiate an honorable peace.

REMARKS TO THE PRESS, LBJ RANCH

August 14, 1966

My talks with General Westmoreland have confirmed the conviction that ...

- that the single most important factor now is our will to prosecute the war until the Communists, recognizing the futility of their ambitions, either end the fighting or seek a peaceful settlement...
 - no one can say when this will be or how many men will be needed, or how long we must persevere. The American people must know that there will be no quick victory, but the world must know that we will not quit.
-

REMARKS, NAVY LEAGUE LUNCHEON
MANCHESTER, NEW HAMPSHIRE

August 20, 1966

So it may be one month, or it may be one year, or it may be several years. No one knows but the men in Hanoi. They hold the passkey to stopping the fighting. They hold the passkey to the room where the peace talks can take place. Only they can decide when the objective that they seek is no longer worth the cost that it carries.

Until that time comes, until peace comes, our course is clear. We will carry on with our determination. We will do what we must do to help protect South Vietnam and to help maintain the stability of Asia.

* * * *

Our task in this country, in the meantime, is to try to unite our people, to ask them to carry on until the communists grow weary and until they are willing to turn from the use of force. When that day comes, our men can then come home and the people of Vietnam can go on with the work of building their country themselves.

REMARKS, IDAHO FALLS AIRPORT

August 26, 1966

This week we lost almost 100 boys in Vietnam. The enemy lost 1,900 boys. We hated to see anyone lose their life, but as long as they are infiltrating, as long as they are determined to conquer that country by force, we just cannot pick up and pull out and run.

REMARKS AT COBO HALL, DETROIT, MICHIGAN

September 5, 1966

They are there at this hour, because aggression is there at this hour. Those troops will come home, those bases will be turned over for constructive peace-time purposes as soon as that vicious aggression stops. And I may add: To all whom it may concern: If anyone will show me the time schedule when aggression and infiltration and might makes right will be halted, then I, as President of this country will lay on the table the schedule for the withdrawal of all of our forces from Vietnam.

NEWS CONFERENCE

September 8, 1966

We are willing to lay on the table at any moment our schedule for withdrawal from Vietnam, if someone can also lay on the table their schedule of withdrawal -- and if we can give the freedom-loving, liberty-loving people of Vietnam any assurance that they will not be murdered, assassinated, or killed either by infiltrators or assassins.

NEWS CONFERENCE

September 21, 1966

Q. Mr. President, could you please give us your assessment of the war in Vietnam, how it compares with the situation a year ago? And are there any chances of having it finished by June of 1967?

The President: ...

They feel **very good** about the results they have been able to obtain. We have definite plans that we believe will be achieved. But just to say precisely what day these plans will be achieved is a very difficult thing in war.

REPORT FROM MANILA

October 27, 1966

We agreed at Manila that our own forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam as the forces sent down from the North are also withdrawn and as violence disappears. And we made it clear that this could be accomplished from our side in not more than six months after the conditions we set out were met -- and perhaps even sooner.

* * * *

For we mean what we say: When the aggression from the North has ceased, we do not want and we do not intend to remain in South Vietnam.

NEWS CONFERENCE

July 28, 1965

Yes, I think the American people ought to understand that there is no quick solution to the problem that we face there. I would not want to prophesy or predict whether it would be a matter of months or years or decades. I do not know that we had any accurate timetable on how long it would take to bring victory in World War I. I don't think anyone really knew whether it would be 2 years or 4 years or 6 years, to meet with success in World War II. I do think our cause is just. I do think our purposes and objectives are beyond any question.

ACTION

for file

Monday, September 30, 1968

6:40pm

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval is a proposed Independence Day message to General Gowon of Nigeria. Their holiday is tomorrow, October 1.

The message is short and formal in order to:
(1) maintain our hands-off policy on the political issues of the civil war, and (2) keep your options open on the relief front until Joe Palmer has a chance to size up the situation in person this week.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Call me _____

WWR:HS:RM:lw

Att: File #3073

4a

Proposed Message to
General Gowon (Nigeria)

Dear General Gowon:

All Americans join me in extending warm greetings to you and to the people of Nigeria on the eighth anniversary of your independence. We fervently share the worldwide hope that peace will soon return to your great land, that the terrible suffering will cease, and that the years ahead will bring progress and prosperity.

Sincerely,

5

Monday, September 30, 1968 -- 6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

On the Vice President's statement:

1. George Christian has reported to me his conversation with Clark Clifford. Clark believes that the Vice President is trying to reach out as far as he can to the doves without actually breaking on anything you have said publicly. Clifford believes we should keep out of this as much as possible and avoid a direct confrontation.
2. I have just completed a call to Sec. Rusk. His instinct was, also, to find ways to deal with the problem which minimized confrontation with the Vice President but left our hands free on our three conditions. Specifically, he asked the question if the full text of the Vice President's speech mentioned the Democratic platform. If it did, then we could merely say that the platform is an agreed common basis and the rest is a matter for detailed negotiation. Another approach, he said, would be to comment, simply: We would be much interested if Hanoi were prepared to give evidence of a willingness to restore the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. He opined that Hanoi is almost sure to knock this down promptly.
3. At the moment my recommendation would be that, at a routine time, George Christian should say: "As you know, we are keeping away from comments on statements made by the Presidential candidates. For ready reference, however, I have the last major statement made by the President on this subject at New Orleans on September 10."

Here is the critical passage, which doesn't greatly differ from the Vice President's formulation, although, of course, he is reaching out in tone to the left:

"Now let me make it as clear as I possibly can why we are still bombing and will continue to bomb the panhandle of North Vietnam -- why re-establishing the DMZ, I think, is so critical to peace in Vietnam."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

WWR

6

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Monday

September 30, 1968 -- 2:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached for your information is a translation of Chancellor Kiesinger's reply to your letter of September 9 concerning consultations between the US and the FRG on the selective release of nuclear weapons. Chancellor Kiesinger concurs in the arrangements that you proposed. Agreement has also been reached on arrangements for a secure teletype link between the NMCC in Washington and the German War Emergency Headquarters in Bonn. No further action is necessary on your part.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment:

Translation of ltr 9/17
fm Chancellor Kiesinger

(No cy made here of att - #3057/678)

SMKeeny:jb:9-30-68/2:00 pm

bcc: SMK file and chron

→ WWR (2)

SMK comeback copy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

7

INFORMATION

**Monday, September 30, 1968
12:00 noon**

Pres file

Mr. President:

**Herewith from the minutes of the
Advisory Group meetings, Nov. 2-3,
1967, more on Ball on bombing.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

7a

Advisory Group meeting, Thursday, November 2, 1967

George Ball and Dean Acheson urged that we use bombing as a negotiating chip against pressure across the DMZ. Acheson said that we should stop bombing when they did not press across the DMZ and resume bombing when they did until they got the point.

Advisory Group meeting, Friday, November 3, 1967

George Ball: stop bombing, except across the DMZ, to create climate for negotiation.

Advisory Group meeting, Thursday, November 2, 1967
(from Jim Jones' notes)

What about our course in North Vietnam? Should we continue as is; go further; moderate it; eliminate the bombing?

All but George Ball agreed the bombing should continue. Ball suggested a shifting of the bombing from the dikes and harbors to the DMZ.

George Ball said that no one in the group thinks we should get out of Vietnam, and no one gives propriety to the Gavin or Galbraith enclave theory.

"In the South, the report we received was very reassuring. The war of attrition and civil action is in competent hands and we are doing very well there. We should focus on the conditions that will lead the other side to stopping the fighting. We must look and see how the war looks to them. There are two wars in the eyes of Hanoi. First the war in the South. This one they can afford to lose or to withdraw from. Second is the war in the North which is viewed as a war by the greatest imperialist force against a sister socialist state. Can they afford to lose that one, we must ask," Ball said.

"In light of that then, is the bombing useful in the North. Bombing in the North won't limit the flow of supplies into the South significantly. On the other hand, it will make it almost impossible for them to stop the war." Ball recommended a change of tactics, that is, shifting of the bombing away from the harbor and dikes to the bombing of the DMZ as an interdiction of men and supplies. "This would clearly show the other side that we are creating the conditions to let them stop the fighting," Ball said.

8

ACTION

Monday, September 30, 1968

12:40 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your New Ambassador to Burma

Pres file

Attached is a recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you receive Arthur Hummel, your new Ambassador to Burma. Hummel is being sworn in on October 1. He must then leave very quickly in order to present his credentials to General Ne Win before the General leaves Burma for what may turn out to be an extended visit to West Germany for medical treatment.

I think it is particularly important that Hummel have a visit with you before he leaves. Ne Win's personal confidence in you is the basis for the better position our Ambassador in Rangoon has enjoyed in the past two years. Hummel's access to Ne Win, and therefore his effectiveness in Burma, will be greatly enhanced if he can speak authoritatively as your personal representative. You might wish to give Hummel a fill-in on your personal conversations with Ne Win in 1966.

I recommend you give Hummel an appointment at anytime convenient to you prior to his planned departure on October 4; *although Oct. 2 would involve cancellation of a trip to New York to see U Thant and the Burmese Ambassador there*

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____ Date _____ Time _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWright:wpt
Att

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

8a

September 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Mr. Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.,
Ambassador-designate to Burma

RECOMMENDATION

I suggest you receive Mr. Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.,
Ambassador-designate to Burma, between now and
October 4, when he is scheduled to depart for Rangoon.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

BACKGROUND

In view of the special relationship which you
developed with General Ne Win during his visit to
Washington in September 1966, it would be helpful to
Mr. Hummel in his new assignment if you would see him
for a brief discussion of U.S. relations with Burma.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic sketch

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATIONARTHUR WILLIAM HUMMEL, JR.

Born June 1, 1920, in China of American parents, Mr. Hummel attended Antioch College from 1937 to 1939 and the College of Chinese Studies in Peking from 1940 to 1941. He received a Master of Arts degree in Chinese (Phi Beta Kappa) from the University of Chicago which he attended from 1947 to 1949.

Between 1938 and 1941 Mr. Hummel worked successively as a hospital orderly, a salesman, and a laboratory assistant. He was teaching English in Peking, China, from 1940 to December 8, 1941, when he was interned by the Japanese. He escaped from the internment camp in 1944 and joined a unit of Chinese guerrillas, which he remained with, in Eastern China, until V-J Day, 1945.

In 1945 and 1946 he worked as a Liaison Officer at Tientsin, China, for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Also in 1946 he was a Staff Lecturer in New York City for United Service to China until 1947, when he entered the University of Chicago Graduate School.

He began his career with the Department of State in 1950 as a Foreign Affairs Officer. In 1952 he went to Hong Kong as Public Affairs Officer and in 1955 he was transferred to Tokyo as the Deputy Public Affairs Officer. From 1957 to 1960 Mr. Hummel served at Rangoon, Burma, as Country Public Affairs Officer. He returned to Washington in 1960 and after attending the National War College was assigned as Deputy Director of the Voice of America. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the Department of State from 1963 to 1965 when he went to Taipei as Deputy Chief of Mission.

Mr. Hummel is married to the former Betty Lou Fristenberger of Elkhart, Indiana, and they have two sons, Timothy, 15, and William, 14. Mr. Hummel's father, Arthur W. Hummel, Sr., was for twenty-seven years, until retirement in 1954, Chief of the Division of Orientalia of the Library of Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

Monday, September 30, 1968

11:43 AM

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Eugene Black at 1:30 p.m., September 30

Black wishes to report on his trip to Asia. I expect there will be three areas of particular interest to you:

1. His experiences in Cambodia. The Black visit accomplished nothing. The Cambodians adhered to their stiff position regarding Communist use of Cambodian territory, and were uncompromising about the release of the LCU crew. However, it is Black's feeling that the Cambodians are concerned at being left behind in economic development, and are now more disposed to cooperate with international programs than at anytime in the recent past.
2. Japan. Japanese were surprisingly responsive to Black's exhortation that they should do more in Southeast Asia. In fact, they virtually pledged to double their contribution to the Asian Development Bank's Special Fund. Black feels that it is certain that the Japanese will be extremely active in Southeast Asia. As he sees it, the question is whether their efforts can be folded into a healthy multi-lateral effort sponsored by the United States -- or whether the Japanese will concentrate on bilateral programs aimed mainly at seeking shortrun commercial benefits.
3. Mekong development. Black believes things are moving along well, and the nations of the area are generally committed to moving ahead both with the large projects and the smaller ones.

Black will leave with you a written report, which will include four recommendations. The first, and most important, is that the time is ripe for the Asians to organize themselves to handle aid from the United States and Japan as the Europeans organized themselves in the OECD to handle the Marshall Plan. You might question Black on how he sees the timing of such a development, that is, is it practical now or is this something for the next administration to pursue. Black will also recommend that our aid programs for Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and ultimately Cambodia, be placed under the umbrella of an international consortium looking to the development of the Mekong Basin.

The other two recommendations are that we press forward on the Special Fund and on the mainstream Pa Mong Dam, neither of which require any action on your part that is not already afoot.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

10

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Monday, Sept. 30, 1968
10:20 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Abrams assesses the military situation roughly as follows:

-- In spite of gross ineffectiveness in carrying through previous plans, "the enemy appears determined to maintain a semblance of offensive momentum."

-- Intelligence suggests an effort sometime in October at Duc Lap in the highlands, plus another effort to mount an attack on Saigon.

-- Abrams thinks the Saigon effort will probably be delayed until around or after mid-October.

-- He believes he can frustrate the Saigon attack, as he has other plans in recent months to get into town and in front of the television cameras.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~ attachment (MAC 13217)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-67
By ctm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

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INFO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE
MR RUSK STATE
MR HELMS CIA
O 300701Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS
INFO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC
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~~SECRET~~ SAVIN-MAC 13217 EYES ONLY

THE SITUATION COUNTRY WIDE THIS PAST WEEK REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED, ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY APPEARS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN A SEMBLANCE OF OFFENSIVE MOMENTUM.

B-5 FRONT FORCES REMAIN DEPLOYED IN AND SOUTH OF THE DMZ. ALTHOUGH SOME ELMS OF THE 320TH NVA DIV MAY BE MOVING NORTHWARD TO AVOID FRIENDLY OPNS, THE BULK OF THE DIV REMAINS NORTH OF RTE 9 PROBABLY INTENDING TO MAINTAIN A PRESENCE IN THE AREA. IN MR TTH, THE MOVEMENT OF 2 REGTS AND THE HQ, MR TTH INTO LAOS AND THE FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE FOOD SUPPLY SITUATION INDICATE THAT HIS ALREADY LIMITED ABILITY TO INITIATE SIGNIFICANT OFFENSIVE ACTION HAS BEEN FURTHER REDUCED. THE DISPOSITION OF EN FORCES IN FRONT 4 REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED, AND THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE THREAT TO DANANG. THE ABF IN THE 3 SOUTHERN PROV OF I CTZ DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 22 SEP INDICATE THAT THE EN IS STILL CAPABLE OF COORDINATING LIMITED ACTION THROUGHOUT MR-5, ALTHOUGH HE APPEARS UNABLE TO SUSTAIN SERIOUS ATKS. IN SOUTHERN I CORPS, EN INITIATED ACTIVITY FOLLOWED BY A FRIENDLY SWEEP HAS FURTHER REDUCED THE COMBAT EFFICIENCY OF THE 2ND NVA DIV. THE 3RD NVA DIV IN BA 121 THREATENS HA THANH SF CAMP AND QUANG NGAI CITY. THERE ARE INDICATIONS ATKS MAY BE CONDUCTED AGAINST THE SF CAMP IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

IN THE B-3 FRONT, IN THE II CTZ, THE EN APPARENTLY HAS ABANDONED BAN HE THUOT AS HIS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE. HE IS NOW INCREASING HIS OFFENSIVE POSTURE NEAR DUC LAP BY MOVING ADDITIONAL UNITS INTO THE AREA. THE RECENT MOVES OF THE 95TH AND 66TH NVA REGTS GIVES THE EN A 4 REGT FORCE IN THE DUC LAP AREA. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF HEAVY LOSSES SUFFERED SINCE 23 AUG, AT LEAST 2 OF THESE REGTS ARE PROBABLY UNDERSTRENGTH. OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY WILL PROBABLY INCREASE IN THE DUC LAP AREA, PARTICULARLY IF THE 188 REGT ALSO MOVES SOUTH AS ONE PW HAS REPORTED. IN THE CENTRAL AND COASTAL PROVS, THE INCREASE IN TERRORISM IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE.

IN OUTER III CTZ THERE WERE NO MAJOR UNIT RELOCATIONS. ALL REGTS OF THE 7TH DIV PROBABLY REMAIN IN NORTHERN BINH LONG PROV AND THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION OF SOUTHWARD MOVEMENT BY THIS DIV. ELMS OF THE 9TH DIV CONTINUE TO OPERATE THROUGHOUT WESTERN AND CENTRAL TAY NINH PROV. ELMS OF THE 5TH DIV REMAIN IN THE TAY NINH/BINH DUONG PROV BORDER AREA. THEY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO CONDUCT HARASSING ATKS IN THE SAIGON-TAY NINH CORRIDOR IN A CONTINUING EFFORT TO ATTRIT ALLIED FORCES IN THAT AREA. THE SITUATION IN THE SUB-REGIONS SURROUNDING SAIGON REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO GET INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY PLANS TO CONDUCT ATKS ON SAIGON SOON.

IN IV CTZ, THE EN REMAINS DEPLOYED NEAR CAN THO, HIS PRIMARY TARGET. HOWEVER, THE AIR BASES AT MY THO, BEN TRE, VINH LONG, AND BINH THUY AS WELL AS DIST TOWNS ON HWY 4 IN BINH DUONG PROV MAY RECEIVE ABF AND GND PROBES.

IN SUMMARY, ALTHOUGH THE EN CONTINUES TO SUFFER SEVERE LOSSES IN BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL, HE APPEARS TO BE CONTINUING TO ATTEMPT FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY TO TIE DOWN AND INFLECT MAXIMUM CASUALTIES ON ALLIED FORCES. HOWEVER, HE IS HAVING INCREASING DIFFICULTY IN LAUNCHING ANY SIGNIFICANT ATK IN THE FACE OF FRIENDLY OPNS.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 02-68

By ebm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

IN SUMMARY, ALTHOUGH THE EN CONTINUES TO SUFFER SEVERE LOSSES IN BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL, HE APPEARS TO BE CONTINUING HIS OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY TO TIE DOWN AND INFLECT MAXIMUM CASUALTIES ON ALLIED FORCES. HOWEVER, HE IS HAVING INCREASING DIFFICULTY IN LAUNCHING ANY SIGNIFICANT ATTACK IN THE FACE OF FRIENDLY GUNS.

INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE ENEMY IS PROBABLY COMPLETING ONE PHASE OF HIS THIRD OFFENSIVE, WHICH BEGAN 13 AUG 68. THE ENEMY'S OPERATIONS IN THIS FIRST PHASE HAVE BEEN LARGELY OF AN ATTRITIVE AND DIVERSIONARY NATURE. HIS LATEST ATTACKS AT KATUM, THIEN NGON, AND SW OF BEN SOI WERE CARRIED OUT FOR THIS REASON. HE HAS MADE ONLY ONE SERIOUS EFFORT TO SEIZE A KEY CITY DURING THE FIRST PHASE AND THAT WAS DANANG. BOTH HIS DIVERSIONARY AND ATTRITIVE EFFORTS AND HIS THRUST AT DANANG MET WITH FAILURE.

WE NOW HAVE REPORTS FROM VERY RELIABLE AGENTS TELLING US THAT HIS NEXT PHASE WILL START SOMETIME IN OCTOBER. THIS PHASE WILL PROBABLY FEATURE ATTEMPTS AT SAIGON AND A MAJOR EFFORT AT DUC LAP. THE AGENTS SPEAK OF THE NEXT ATTACK ON SAIGON AS "BIGGER THAN EVER" AND "THE VICTORY OFFENSIVE".

IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE I EXPECT THAT HE WILL ATTEMPT TO COMPLETE HIS LOGISTIC EFFORTS NEAR SAIGON, BUILD UP HIS SUB-REGION FORCES, AND CLOSE THEM IN TOWARDS THE CAPITAL. MEANWHILE, HE WILL USE HIS THREE DIVISIONS IN III CTZ TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE IN THE OUTLYING AREAS USING ECONOMY OF FORCE MEASURES. AFTER THE SUB-REGION FORCES ARE IN POSITION WE EXPECT THE ENEMY DIVISIONS TO ATTEMPT A SOUTH WARD MOVEMENT TOWARDS SAIGON.

TIMING IS DIFFICULT TO FORECAST. I LOOK FOR THE SUB-REGION FORCES TO BEGIN THEIR MOVEMENTS AND OPERATIONS AROUND SAIGON IN EARLY OCTOBER. THE ENEMY'S TIMING PROBLEM IS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE COMING OF THE FULL MOON ON 6 OCTOBER. MY GUESS IS THAT HE WILL NOT COMPLETE HIS PREPARATIONS PRIOR TO THE FULL MOON PHASE AND THAT HE WILL PROBABLY DELAY MAJOR ACTIVITY UNTIL AROUND OR AFTER MID-OCTOBER.

WHAT I HAVE BEEN RELATING IS, OF COURSE, ENEMY PLANS AND INTENTIONS. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT THE ENEMY HAD SERIOUS PLANS TO ATTACK SAIGON IN LATE JULY OR AUGUST AND IN SEPTEMBER.

BY END JULY, HE WAS FORCED TO POSTPONE HIS PERIPHERAL ATTACKS BECAUSE OF OUR SPOILING ACTIONS, PARTICULARLY B-52 STRIKES, AND FEAR OF COMPROMISE OF HIS PLANS. SUB-REGION UNITS WERE HAVING SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES MUSTERING THEIR FORCES, STOCKING THEIR CACHES, AND INFILTRATING SAIGON. THUS BY THE TIME THE THIRD OFFENSIVE STARTED IN LATE AUGUST, ALL HE COULD MOUNT AGAINST SAIGON WERE A FEW ROCKET ROUNDS. THEN WE LEARNED OF A NUMBER OF MEETINGS THAT SUBSEQUENTLY TOOK PLACE IN COSVN WHILE THE ENEMY REVISED HIS PLANS AND REORIENTED HIS CADRE.

HIS NEXT DATE FOR SAIGON WAS 2 SEPTEMBER, A SCHEDULE BORNE OUT BY PWS, HOI CHANHS AND RELIABLE AGENTS. FURTHERMORE, WE SAW ELEMENTS OF THE DONG NAI REGT MOVE SOUTH TO GIA DINH BORDER AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, WE LEARNED THAT AS OF 29 AUGUST THE SUB-REGION ATTACK ORDERS HAD AGAIN BEEN POSTPONED. MORE MEETINGS FOLLOWED AND THE NEW PLAN WAS A REPEAT OF THE EARLIER FORMULA - FRESH DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS IN TAY NINH PROVINCE, WHICH ACTUALLY RECOMMENCED 11 SEP, TO BE FOLLOWED BY SAIGON ATTACKS THE WEEKEND OF 21-22 SEPTEMBER. AGAIN HIS DIVERSIONARY EFFORTS FAILED AND THE SAIGON ATTACKS DID NOT MATERIALIZE.

AS IN THE PAST, WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO THWART HIS PRESENT PLANS, PARTICULARLY AROUND SAIGON. I BELIEVE WE CAN.

SSO OTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
900

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

NNNN

FILE COPY

Pres. file
11

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, Sept. 30, 1968
9:15 a. m;

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Pravda's Foreign Editor discusses the
Czech problem with Topping of the Times.

I have marked Thompson's key comment.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL attachment (Moscow 5745)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 21 MOSCOW 05745 291522Z

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ACTION EUR 20

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, DODE 00, CIAE 00, USIE 00, NSAE 00, CCO 00, GPM 04,
NSC 10, SP 02, SS 25, RSC 01, L 03, H 02, P 04, INR 07, NIC 01, SA 01,
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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BONN
USNATO 206
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USUN 554
AMCONGEN MUNICH 421

~~CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 5745~~

SUBJECT: SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. NEW YORK TIMES FOREIGN EDITOR SEYMOUR TOPPING TOLD DCM THAT HE CALLED SEPTEMBER 27 AT PRAVDA OFFICE ON CHIEF EDITOR M.V. ZIMYANIN, FOREIGN EDITOR B. M. RATIANI (JUST RETURNED FROM USA), AND CORRESPONDENT NEKRASOV.

2. TOPPING STATED THAT FROM CONVERSATIONS, WHICH CENTERED ON SOVIET ACTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HE DERIVED THESE IMPRESSIONS:

A. DECISION TO RESORT TO MILITARY INTERVENTION HAD BEEN TAKEN WITH GREAT RELUCTANCE AND ONLY AFTER SEARCHING ANALYSIS OF LOSSES WHICH WOULD BE INCURRED IN RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES AND WITH WEST.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 05745 291522Z

B. THERE IS EVIDENT DESIRE ON SOVIET SIDE TO MINIMIZE THESE LOSSES AND TO RESTORE EXTERNAL RELATIONS TO PRE-INVASION NORMS.

C. THERE IS EQUAL RECOGNITION THAT THIS MAY PROVE TO BE A DIFFICULT PROCESS SINCE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS FAR FROM RESOLVED ALONG LINES SATISFACTORY TO SOVIETS.

D. SOVIETS NEVERTHELESS INDICATED TO TOPPING THAT THEY WISHED ABSTAIN FROM INTERVENTION IN CZECH INTERNAL AFFAIRS ON SCALE WHICH WOULD PLACE FOREIGN RELATIONS IN FURTHER JEOPARDY. TOPPING ASSUMED FROM THIS FORMULATION THAT MILITARY CENSORSHIP OF PRESS, PURGES, AND OTHER TACTICS OF COERCION WILL OCCUR ONLY AS LAST RESORT AND THAT SOVIETS FULLY AWARE OF PROBLEMS SUCH TACTICS WOULD POSE.

3. TOPPING SAID THAT HE HAD ARGUED, HE THOUGHT TO SOME EFFECT, THAT JUST AS US HAD LEARNED IN VIETNAM LIMITS TO WHICH MILITARY POWER CAN BE APPLIED TO SOLUTION OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS SO SOVIET SIDE IS LEARNING ABOUT THESE LIMITS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE SAID ATMOSPHERE OF MEETING WAS FORMAL BUT NOT UNFRIENDLY.

4. COMMENT. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS SO LARGELY CONFINED TO THE PRESS THAT WE REPORT TOPPING'S IMPRESSIONS FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH. ZIMYANIN IS FULL MEMBER OF CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND HIS STATEMENTS PRESUMABLY REFLECT KNOWLEDGE OF CURRENT POLICY DISCUSSIONS.

5. IT IS PLAUSIBLE THAT SOVIETS SHOULD VIEW DESCENT TO TERRORIST TACTICS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WITH SOME RELUCTANCE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF REPURCUSSIONS ON FOREIGN RELATIONS MENTIONED BY ZIMYANIN BUT ALSO BECAUSE RESORT TO METHODS REMINISCENT OF EXCESSES OF STALINIST ERA COULD HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS INTERNALLY IN SOVIET UNION AND WOULD BE UNPOPULAR AMONG LARGE SEGMENTS OF POPULATION WHO SINCE TWENTIETH PARTY CONGRESS HAVE COME TO PLACE CREDENCE IN PRESERVATION OF SOME DEGREE OF "SOCIALIST LEGALITY." THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT SOVIET LEADERSHIP FACES A SERIOUS DILEMMA IN DECIDING HOW FAR TO MOVE DOWN STALINIST ROAD IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THEY CAN ACHIEVE THEIR STATED OBJECTIVES WITHOUT DOING JUST THAT.

GP-3. THOMPSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

12

Monday, Sept. 30, 1968
9:15 a. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, in response to your query of yesterday, notes from NSC meetings on the Vice President's and Ball's positions on bombing in the period 1965-66.

You should note:

-- these come from Brem Smith's notes which are available for the President and no one else;

-- there were certainly other meetings besides NSC meetings in which bombing came up and views by the Vice President and Ball might have been expressed;

-- we are conducting a further check to make sure all NSC meetings where bombing issues arose are covered.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 2-18-93

POSITIONS TAKEN ON BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM BY VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY AND UNDER-SECRETARY BALL

February 6, 1965-7:45 PM

Subject: US Retaliatory strike against North Vietnam because of Viet Cong attacks against several Allied installations on February 6.

BALL: Said everyone present was in accord to take action against the North Vietnamese targets discussed.

HUMPHREY: Not Present.

February 7, 1965-8:00 AM

Subject: Same as above.

BALL: Agrees with Secretary McNamara that it was ok for South Vietnamese to carry out air attack in North Vietnam but not with US planes. US would supply MIG Cap and Flack suppression. Communist may get wrong signal that we are launching offensive.

HUMPHREY: Not Present.

February 8, 1965-10:30 AM

Subject: US-SVN Air Strike in North Vietnam while Kosygin was in Hanoi
BALL: Spoke of the effect of the North Vietnamese attack on Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Hanoi. He said it may be that Soviet Union was not aware of plans for the North Vietnamese attack. If so, they may have been mouse-trapped by Hanoi. If they had known of the attack, the Russians might not have sent Kosygin to Hanoi. The North Vietnamese action has put the Russians on the spot. We have talked to the Russians in an effort to explain why we had to retaliate as we did. Our hope is that they will understand why we acted as we did, at least to the extent of being annoyed by the North Vietnamese action.

February 10, 1965-1:30 PM

Subject: US-SVN air strike in North Vietnam while Kosygin was in Hanoi

HUMPHREY: In response to the President's direct question, the Vice President said he had some doubts as to whether the strike should take place today or whether it should be delayed until Mr. Kosygin left the area. He had mixed feelings about whether we should retaliate as Secretary McNamara had recommended. He shared the State Department's view that Kosygin's presence in Hanoi or in the Far East limited our freedom of action.

BALL: Repeated his view that our action should be cautious. He said the strike as now planned, i.e., deleting the Thanh Hoa bridge, minimized the effect on a possible Soviet reaction to the strike.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
nsc letter 10/24/80; NLJ 83-44;
Authority NLJ 83-45; NLJ 86-83
By 18, NARA, Date 2-18-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 18, 1965, 5:00 PM
Subject: Increased Bombing of North Vietnam

HUMPHREY: Approved

BALL: Approved.

January 29, 1966-noon
Subject: Review of Vietnam Policy

HUMPHREY: Suggested Senators be told that bombing of North Vietnam is effective--
as it was in Korea--in slowing down movement of troops.

BALL: Not Present.

June 16, 1966-6:40 PM
Subject: Additional North Vietnamese targets

HUMPHREY: Agreed reluctantly to add POL targets to be bombed because not to do
so would be to contribute to North Vietnamese strength. By hitting more
targets, pressure can be put on Hanoi.

BALL: Not Present.

June 22, 1966-12:30 PM
Subject: POL Targets in North Vietnam

HUMPHREY: Reaffirmed approval stated during June 16 meeting.

BALL: Disapproved on ground disadvantages outweighed advantages.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres file
13

Monday, Sept. 30, 1968
9:10 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bob Komer puts in a plea for the
Ambassadorsip in Ankara.

Jerry Komer tells me that, aside from the bug
he acquired and will have to suppress for the rest
of his life, Bob is tired.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-EYES ONLY attachment (MAC 13221)

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
DOCUMENT, CONCEALED FROM GAO BY
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S INQUIRY ON
MAR. 16, 1993.

BY 19 ON 2-18-93

EYES ONLY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM AMB KOMER MACV

TO MR WALT ROSTOW WHITE YOUSE

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 13221 EYES ONLY

JUST READ IN PAPERS THAT PETE HART RETURNING TO TAKE
LUKE BATTLE'S PLACE. AS YOU MAY RECALL, TURKEY IS ONLY
DIPLOMATIC POST I WAS EVER EAGER FOR. MOREOVER, AS AN
OLD TURCOPHILE, I'LL MATCH MY QUALIFICATIONS AGAINST
MOST OTHERS. ANY CHANCE OF THROWING MY HAT IN RING?
AM WORKING AS HARD ON THIS FRUSTRATING JOB AS EVER, BUT
WITH MANY CHANGES OVER LAST SEVERAL MONTHS NO LONGER
FEEL I'M NEEDED AS MUCH OUT HERE.

SSO NOTE:

DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

150

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGING
NOT NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356
SEC. 1.1(c)

BY 19 ON 2-18-73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

APPROX FROM QUICK COPY

14

Pres file

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Monday, September 30, 1968
8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

The attached appears to indicate that the device of our "acknowledging receipt of the crew" on a document of apology may be about to work with respect to the PUEBLO.

Although the device is a trick, I must say that Woodward is so clear in this exchange as to what he is doing that we have a good basis for defending our position if, in fact, the release does take place.

Key Woodward passages are marked. (Tab A)

At Tab B is Porter's comment. Clearly, we are up against a go-no-go decision on this device.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 10157 (CACTUS)

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED *st/WH Guidelines,*
Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 29, #316, n.3
By jc NARA Date 1-25-02



Department of State

TELETYPE

15

~~SECRET~~

CN: 9664Q
RGCD: 30 SEP 68
547AM

VV ORC560

00 RUEHC
DE RUALOS 1015Z 2740980
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 300830Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2949
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 1015Z

NODIS/CACTUS

SUBJ: TWENTY-SECOND SENIOR MAC MEMBERS MEETING AT PANNUNJON,
SEPT 30, 1968

1. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT OF TWENTY-SECOND SENIOR MEMBERS CLOSED MEETING. TEXT OF PAK'S STATEMENT BEGINNING PARA NO 2 PASSED TO UNC SIDE BY KPA SIDE. STATEMENTS BY PAK ARE RENDERED IN ENGLISH BY KPA INTERPRETER, AND CHECKED BY UNMAC LANGUAGE OFFICER FROM TAPE RECORDING. MEETING BEGAN AT 1100 HOURS LOCAL TIME.

2. PAK: A. OUR SIDE HAS ALREADY TOLD CLEARLY YOUR SIDE WHAT YOUR SIDE SHOULD DO IF YOUR SIDE WANTS TO GET THE PUEBLO CREW BACK.

B. NEVERTHELESS, YOUR SIDE PERSISTENTLY ASKED US AT THE LAST MEETING WHETHER WE WERE READY TO RELEASE THE ENTIRE CREW OF THE PUEBLO SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH YOUR SIGNING THE DOCUMENT WE HAD PRESENTED AT MEETING OF MAY 8.

C. THE POSITION OF OUR SIDE REMAINS UNCHANGED.

D. THOUGH THE CREW OF THE PUEBLO MUST NATURALLY BE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA SINCE THEY ARE THE CRIMINALS CAUGHT IN THE VERY ACT OF ESPIONAGE, OUR SIDE, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE ALL CONFESSED HONESTLY TO THEIR CRIMINAL ACTS AND PETITIONED REPEATEDLY FOR LENIENCY AND THAT THEIR CRIMES WERE COMMITTED ON "ORDERS" OF THEIR SUPERIORS, IS READY TO SEND BACK ONLY THE CREW OF THE "PUEBLO" IF THE USG APOLOGIZES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND GIVES ASSURANCES THAT IT WILL NEVER PERPETRATE AGAIN SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS IN FUTURE.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

CN: 9664Q SEOUL 10157

E. THESE MEETINGS HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF THE CREW OF THE PUEBLO BECAUSE YOUR SIDE HAS REFUSED TO REALIZE ITS DUE RESPONSIBILITY AS THE ORGANIZER OF THE CRIMES AND TO MAKE A PROPER APOLOGY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

F. SO LONG AS YOUR SIDE PERSISTS IN SUCH POSITION, THE QUESTION OF THE CREW WILL NEVER BE SETTLED FOR GOOD.

G. IF YOUR SIDE IS CONCERNED EVEN A BIT ABOUT THE FATE OF THE CREW AND HAS THE INTENTION OF SETTLING THEIR QUESTION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, YOUR SIDE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO MAKE AN APOLOGY AND GIVE ASSURANCE JUST AS WE HAVE DEMANDED.

H. IF YOUR SIDE SIGNS THE DOCUMENT PRESENTED BY OUR SIDE, OUR SIDE WILL SIMULTANEOUSLY RELEASE THE WHOLE CREW OF THE PUEBLO AS FAR AS THEY ARE CONCERNED.

I. THIS IS THE DOCUMENT WHICH WILL ENABLE YOUR SIDE TO HAVE THE CREW OF THE PUEBLO SENT BACK. (NOTE: THE DOCUMENT PASSED TO THE US SIDE AT THIS TIME).

J. WHETHER THE CREW OF THE PUEBLO CAN RETURN TO THE US OR NOT DEPENDS NOW ON WHETHER YOUR SIDE SIGNS THIS DOCUMENT OR NOT.

K. IS YOUR SIDE PREPARED NOW TO SIGN THIS DOCUMENT?

L. I AWAIT YOUR SIDE'S DEFINITE ANSWER.

M. I NOW HAND YOU THE STATEMENT I HAVE JUST MADE AS WELL AS ITS ENGLISH VERSION.

3. WOODWARD: A. I WELCOME YOUR AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE. IF I AGREE TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE CREW ON THAT PARTICULAR DOCUMENT WHICH YOU HAVE JUST PRESENTED, CAN YOU WITHIN 24 HOURS ASSEMBLE THE CREW AT PAMUNJOM AND RELEASE THEM TO ME AGAINST MY SIGNATURE?

4. PAX: A. IN UNDERSTAND YOUR LAST STATEMENT AS AN INDICATION THAT YOUR SIDE IS READY TO SIGN THE DOCUMENT I HAVE PRESENTED TODAY. IF YOUR SIDE IS PREPARED TO SIGN THE DOCUMENT WE HAVE PRESENTED, THE QUESTION OF DELIVERY AND RECEIPT OF THE CREW CAN BE SETTLED SIMPLY. (LAST SENTENCE REPEATED AT GEN WOODWARD'S REQUEST).

5. WOODWARD: A. IF I WERE TO AGREE TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THE CREW ON SUCH A DOCUMENT AS YOU HAVE PRESENTED TODAY, WHY IS IT THAT THE CREW COULD NOT BE BROUGHT HERE TOMORROW? WHAT ARE THE REASONS THAT THE CREW CANNOT BE BROUGHT HERE TOMORROW? IF THIS IS REALLY NOT POSSIBLE, WHEN CAN THE CREW BE BROUGHT HERE? HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE YOU TO ASSEMBLE AND TRANSPORT THEM? THESE ARE THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS THAT MUST BE DISCUSSED IF I WOULD INDICATE MY GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR DEMAND THAT YOUR DOCUMENT BE USED WHEN I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I AM RECEIVING THE CREW. LET US NOW MOVE ON TO DISCUSS THESE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS. I AWAIT YOUR ANSWER TO MY QUESTION AS TO WHEN THE RELEASE CAN TAKE PLACE.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

CN: 9664Q SEOUL 1C157

6. PAK: A. SINCE YOU HAVE STATED THAT YOU INTEND TO SIGN THE DOCUMENT WE HAVE PRESENTED, THE QUESTION OF PROCEDURES ON DELIVERY AND RECEIPT OF THE CREW OF THE PUEBLO MAY BE DISCUSSED AT THE NEXT MEETING.

B. IF YOUR SIDE HAS NOTHING FURTHER TO BRING UP I PROPOSE TO RECESS THIS MEETING.

7. WOODWARD: A. I HAVE SAID THAT I WILL NEED TO KNOW THE TIME THAT YOUR WILL REQUIRE TO ASSEMBLE AND DELIVER THE CREW TO ME HERE AT PANMUNJOM IF I AM TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THEM ON THE DOCUMENT YOU HAVE PRESENTED TODAY. I WOULD HOPE THAT THIS INFORMATION COULD BE QUICKLY PROCURED SO THAT WE COULD MEET AGAIN QUICKLY. I AGREE TO YOUR PROPOSAL TO RECESS.

8. MEETING ADJOURNED AT 1219 HOURS LOCAL TIME. GP-3. PORTER
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



Department of State

146
TELEGRAM
15

~~SECRET~~

O 300913Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE, WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2951
STATE GRNC
BT

CH-9677

September 30, 1968
6:32 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 10159

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ALJ 97-347 (49b)

NODIS/CACTUS

By file NARA, Date 1-25-02

SUBJ: 22ND SENIOR MAC MEMBERS CLOSED MTG AT PANMUNJOM SEP 30, 1968

REF: SEOUL 9889

1. MEETING BEGAN AT 1100 HRS SEP 30 AND ENDED 1219 HRS LOCAL TIME. GEN WOODWARD COMMENTED THAT GEN PAK HAD NEVER BEEN SO POLITE.

2. GEN PAK MADE OPENING STATEMENT, RESTATING STANDARD NK LINE, BUT ENDING WITH COMMITMENT TO RELEASE CREW SIMULTANEOUSLY ON SIGNATURE OF APOLOGY.

3. GEN PAK AT SAME TIME HANDED GEN WOODWARD COPY IN ENGLISH AND KOREAN OF EXACT STATEMENT TO BE SIGNED. COMPLETE TEXT IN ENGLISH AS FOLLOWS:

"TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA THE GOVERN OF THE USA, ACKNOWLEDGING THE VALIDITY OF THE CONFESSIONS OF THE CREW OF THE USS 'PUEBLO' AND OF THE DOCUMENTS OF EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY THE REP OF THE GOVERN OF THE DPRK TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SHIP, WHICH WAS SEIZED BY THE SELF-DEFENSE MEASURES OF THE NAVAL VESSELS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DPRK ON JANUARY 23, 1968, HAD ILLEGALLY INTRUDED INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DPRK ON MANY OCCASIONS AND CONDUCTED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES OF SPYING OUT IMPORTANT MILITARY AND STATE SECRETS OF THE DPRK."

"SHOULDERS FULL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOLEMNLY APOLOGIZES FOR THE GRAVE ACTS OF ESPIONAGE COMMITTED BY THE US SHIP AGAINST THE DPRK AFTER HAVING INTRUDED INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DPRK,

"AND GIVES FIRM ASSURANCE THAT NO US SHIPS WILL INTRUDE AGAIN IN FUTURE INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DPRK.

"MEANWHILE, THE GOVERN OF THE USA EARNESTLY REQUESTS THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DPRK TO DEAL LENIENTLY WITH THE FORMER CREW MEMBERS OF THE USS 'PUEBLO' CONFISCATED BY THE DPRK SIDE, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT THESE CREW MEMBERS HAVE CONFESSED HONESTLY TO THEIR CRIMES AND PETITIONED THE GOVERN OF THE DPRK FOR LENIENCY.

"SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SIGNING OF THIS DOCUMENT, THE UNDER-SIGNED ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF 82 FORMER CREW MEMBERS OF THE 'PUEBLO' AND ONE CORPSE.

"ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERN OF THE USA GILBERT H. WOODWARD, MAJ GEN, USA

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 10159 9677Q 9/ 68 MODIS CACTUS

4. SINCE PAK'S STATEMENT AND DOCUMENT HE PRESENTED TO GEN WOODWARD ANSWERED QUESTIONS REGARDING NATURE OF SIGNATURE AND SIMULTANEITY RAISED STATE 242963, GEN WOODWARD PROCEEDED TO PRESS GEN PAK AS TO WHETHER NK SIDE PREPARED TO RELEASE CREW WITHIN 24 HOURS IF HE WERE TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THEM ON THE DOCUMENT WHICH GEN PAK HAD HANDED HIM.
5. GEN PAK REPLIED THAT QUESTION OF PROCEDURES ON DELIVERY AND RECEIPT OF THE CREW COULD BE DISCUSSED AT NEXT MEETING. GEN WOODWARD DID NOT PRESS FURTHER AS IT OBVIOUS GEN PAK HAD NO REPEAT NO INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING TIME OF RELEASE.
6. GEN WOODWARD DID NOT REPEAT NOT RAISE POINTS RAISED STATE 245979 REGARDING ADDITIONAL "INTRUSIONS".
7. WE INTEND TO TELL ROKG AT THIS STAGE ONLY THAT NK SIDE HAS AGREED TO SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE AND THAT "ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT" QUESTION HAS NOT BE RESOLVED. ROKG MAY SUSPECT ON THE OTHER HAND THAT AGREEMENT IS NEAR AND PROBLEM OF BRIEFING THEM (FONOFF) AT THIS TIME IS BECOMING ACUTE.
8. DISPATCH NOW OF PUBLIC RELATIONS TEAM MENTIONED STATE 246749 WOULD CERTAINLY FEED THIS IMPRESSION AND MIGHT LEAD TO SPECULATION JEOPARDIZING CHANCES OF RELEASE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE TEAM SHOULD NOT BE SENT UNTIL ALL ARRANGEMENTS FOR RELEASE COMPLETED.
9. IF US SHOULD AGREE TO PRESENT NK PROPOSAL, IT WOULD BE IMPERATIVE THAT AND GIVE PRES PARK FULL BRIEFING AT LEAST 24 HRS BEFORE TIME OF ACTUAL RELEASE, THOUGH THIS WILL ENTAIL CERTAIN RISKS. WE WILL NEED ALL THE COOPERATION WE CAN GET FROM ROKG IN HANDLING PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM HERE. IT IS ALSO HIGHLY DESIRABLE THAT SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT OF RELEASE BE MADE IN WASHINGTON AND SEOUL.
10. IF US SHOULD DECLINE PRESENT NK PROPOSAL DANGER EXISTS THAT NK SIDE MAY RELEASE TEXT OF DOCUMENT STATING THAT US HAS REFUSED OFFER FOR RETURN OF CREW.
11. EMBASSY POUCHING KOREAN TEXT OF NK DOCUMENT. KOREAN TEXT APPEARS TO COINCIDE CLOSELY WITH ENGLISH VERSION.
12. DEPARTMENT WILL NOTE HEADING ON NK DOCUMENT OF "TO THE GOVERN OF THE DPRK" IN HEAVY BLOCK LETTERS. TO BEST OF EMBASSY'S KNOWLEDGE THIS SALUTATION HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN USED IN ANY DEALING WITH NK. PHRASE HAS APPEARED IN BODY OF MILITARY DOCUMENTS SUCH AS RECEIPT SIGNED BY GEN COMBS FOR HELICOPTER PILOTS IN 1964. DEPT WILL ALSO WISH TO NOTE LANGUAGE OF CONCLUDING PARA OF DOCUMENT WHICH IS COMBINATION OF SIMULTANEITY, SIGNATURE, AND RECEIPT. GEN WOODWARD STATES THAT TONE OF MEETING SUCH THAT HE EXPECTS NOTIFICATION NK SIDE READY FOR US CALL NEXT MEETING IN VERY NEAR FUTURE.

PORTER
BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

15

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Sunday, September 29, 1968

*to Mission
sent at 2:00pm*

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith key passages from
Gen. Abrams' cable, as requested.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House EOP, Feb. 24, 1983
By ra, NARA, Date 11-17-92

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-26

By CG, NARA Date 1-25-96

15

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

September 28, 1968

MAC 13145, From General Abrams to W. W. Rostow

The enemy persists in attempting to carry on his phased offensive plans in spite of the losses he has suffered. In fact, we have new evidence of his intention to attack Saigon soon. During the past month, we have captured increasingly large amounts of supplies involving extensive quantities of munitions in Northern I Corps and within the DMZ. His replacement of these supplies and the assurance of follow-on resupply currently is crippled by our bombing north of the DMZ.

The factor of weather will change shortly -- that is, the shift from the Southwest to the Northeast monsoon. In anticipation of the shift in weather, the enemy is engaged in the repair and improvement of his Laotian roadnets extending from north of the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes into and throughout the length and breadth of the Laotian road system. As the weather begins to close in over route package 1, it will become more important than ever that we continue our current all-weather radar bombing operations against those approaches to Mu Gia and Ban Karai which have been blocked with unprecedented effectiveness since July. We can expect that the enemy will shortly undertake to mount logistic operations on a scale comparable to those which preceded Tet and post-Tet offensives. In light of this experience, the continuation of our present scale of out-country bombing effort is deemed an essential element in our ability to frustrate the enemy's military plans through the next monsoonal period. Any cessation of bombing either north of the DMZ or in Laos at this time could alter the strategic balance now swinging in our favor.

Question No. 1: What is the effect of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam?

A. Deterrence is the first effect. Our Air presence is keeping the enemy from moving his Air Forces, rail system and logistic base southward toward the DMZ, along with the drastically reduced in-transit times this would entail. After better than 70 days of effort, it is now clear that our concentrated efforts to choke traffic at four primary, and six secondary non-bypassable road points and at six critical water-crossing points in North Vietnam have reduced the enemy's detected flow of trucks from the mid-July high of over 1,000 per day to less than 150 per day since that time. Southbound truck detections of the past few weeks have numbered fewer than 100 per day. If the bombing in North Vietnam ceases, a return to the level of 1,000 per day would have to be expected. These efforts have also prevented the enemy from massing artillery, forces, supplies and air defense means for sudden attacks against the DMZ. Possibly of greater consequence is that the combined Navy and 7th Air Force interdiction efforts in North Vietnam have effectively impeded the transshipment southward of the significant stocks of supplies which continue to move into the Thanh Hoa and Vinh areas by rail, road, and boat.

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

-2-

Question No. 2: What would be the military effect of a cessation of that bombing?

A. The major result of a bombing halt would be the enemy's increased capability to position and maintain large ground forces immediately north of the DMZ in close proximity to U.S. and ARVN forces deployed to defend I Corps. He could concentrate his artillery, armor, air forces and air defense forces in direct support of these ground forces and place them in a position to initiate a large-scale invasion of South Vietnam with minimum warning time.

B. We can expect the enemy to develop forward logistics complexes.

C. The enemy will probably devote a maximum initial effort to reconstruction of his lines of communication south of 19°.

D. Airfields south of 19° will return to service.

E. A bombing pause would also permit North Vietnamese army to make fuller use of land lines in communications.

F. Countrywide, the North Vietnamese army presently devotes an estimated 80,000 troops to his air defense mission, plus perhaps 110-200,000 laborers. Complete bombing cessation would allow the North Vietnamese army several options, any of which would increase the threat to our forces in or near South Vietnam.

Question No. 3: Since March 31 what is the average number of trucks destroyed and trucks damaged per week? What is the average number of trucks sighted in the Panhandle per week? What is your best estimate of the total number of trucks (sighted and unsighted) that flow through the Panhandle each week and the proportion of this total that we are not getting?

The enemy's day movements of trucks has been virtually halted. As a consequence of night attacks against the above areas, the enemy has ceased moving in convoys and has been unwilling to allow his trucks to wait behind crossing points. As a result, most of his trucks have been kept north of route package 1, moving out singly under cover of darkness. Consequently, fewer kills have been possible. In the week of 14-20 July an average of 508 trucks per day was sighted from all sources. After that period there was a steady decrease in truck traffic as the enemy felt the full weight of our interdiction campaign concentrated at key traffic choke points. In the week prior to typhoon Bess on 4 September, the sightings had decreased to

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~-- SENSITIVE

-3-

151 per day. Since 4 September truck kills and damaged have averaged 32 per week as a consequence of nearly complete blockage of his mired choke points.

Question No. 4: What is the estimate of military casualties we inflict on the enemy each week in the bombing of North Vietnam?

We believe military casualties resulting from intensified air strikes since mid-July 1968 have increased significantly. As in our previous submission, casualties on the order of 5 to 10 thousand per month do not seem unreasonable.

Question No. 5: Is there any possibility of your providing for the President even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam?

I have reviewed the factors considered in my response to this question in reference B. Further examination of the results of the air interdiction campaign convinces me that my estimate at that time remains valid.

In summary, a cessation of offensive action north of the DMZ would enable the enemy to mass personnel and equipment along the DMZ; facilitate his infiltration and logistic support across and around the DMZ; and increase the air, artillery and ground threat to our forces located in Northern I Corps. I must emphasize the adverse effect of a cessation without reciprocity on the morale of the officers and men of my command, as well as those of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces who would be exposed to increased enemy pressure from a newly created sanctuary. Conversely, a complete bombing cessation would raise the enemy's confidence and aggressiveness. It will validate his doctrine of the insurgency war and will confirm his unrealistic view of the military, political, and psychological postures of the warring parties. It will portray to him increasing strength on his part and growing weakness on ours. It will demonstrate to him that he is winning. Above all, it will convince him that he must continue, or increase, the current tempo of the war to gain the ultimate victory. Militarily and psychologically a complete bombing cessation will shift the balance significantly toward the enemy.

~~TOP SECRET~~-- SENSITIVE

Lair 16

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday, September 29, 1968
10:00 PM

Mr. President:

Herewith, in a preliminary cable, Bunker comments tentatively, but negatively on the second device for engaging the GVN (negotiations on a total cessation of hostilities, to be used as a cover for negotiations for a political settlement).

His final views should be in tomorrow on both devices.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow



Department of State

TELEGRAM

8

~~SECRET~~

PP RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 39022 2730525
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 290515Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1641
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2282
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 39022

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE ONLY

REF: STATE 246808 (TODEL 1164)

9614Q

1968 SEP 29 AM 2 05

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

DEJ 94-25

By 4p, NARA, Date 6-17-94

1. THIS IS AN INTERIM REPLY TO YOUR MESSAGE TO WHICH I WANT TO GIVE VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION BEFORE GIVING YOU MY DEFINITE VIEWS. I SHALL TRY TO DO THIS BY MONDAY.

2. I HAVE SOME PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO THE "SECOND DEVICE" (PARAGRAPH 5) WHICH IT SEEMS TO ME INVOLVES DIFFICULTIES FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. SOME OF THESE REASONS, HAVING TO DO WITH A TWO TIER APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS THAT WAS SUGGESTED THREE MONTHS AGO IN STATE 193328 HAVE BEEN SET FORTH IN DETAIL IN MY 31594 TO THE UNDER SECRETARY AND AGAIN IN MY COMMENTS (SAIGON 39677) IN REPLY TO STATE 223146. THERE ARE ALSO ADDITIONAL REASONS WHICH HAVE TO DO WITH INTERVENING DEVELOPMENTS.

3. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE MESSAGE I ASSUME THAT THE IDEA OF SEPARATE QUADRPARTITE DISCUSSIONS ON A CEASEFIRE ENVISAGES A CEASEFIRE THAT WOULD BE PART OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT. THIS OF COURSE IS IN LINE WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT HONOLULU AND SET FORTH IN THE COMMUNIQUE AND ALSO WITH THE GENERAL DRIFT OF THE CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE BEEN HAVING LATELY WITH THIEU HERE IN SAIGON. AS WILL BE NOTED FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE PAPER ON THE SUBJECT OF A CEASEFIRE WHICH WE RECEIVED RECENTLY FROM WASHINGTON AND FROM THE LATEST MEETING THIS WEEK WITH THE GVN (SAIGON 38942) DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO THE PROBLEMS OF A CEASEFIRE IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THIS PRESENTS MANY COMPLEX PROBLEMS WHICH NEED RESOLVING. I THINK WE ARE HARDLY PREPARED TO MOVE ON THIS YET UNTIL WE ARRIVE AT MORE DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS IN OUR OWN MINDS AND WITH THE GVN WHAT KIND OF CEASEFIRE WE CAN LIVE WITH. GENERAL ABRAMS IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THIS VIEW.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 39022, 29 Sept 1968

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

4. AS WILL BE NOTED FROM THE REPORT OF OUR LAST MEETING BOTH THIEU AND KY FEEL THAT THE PROPER TIME FOR ANY CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL FROM OUR SIDE WILL COME ONLY AFTER THE US ELECTIONS AND WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED OUR DETERMINATION AND PERSEVERANCE WHICH ARE CURRENTLY IN SOME DOUBT HERE IN THE PRE-ELECTION ATMOSPHERE WHEN VIETNAMESE OPINION IS INCLINED TO BE NERVOUS AND APPREHENSIVE ABOUT AMERICAN POLICY. TO MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL NOW, BOTH THIEU AND KY THINK, COULD HAVE DANGEROUSLY ADVERSE EFFECTS ON VIETNAMESE MORALE. I AM INCLINED TO AGREE WITH THAT ASSESSMENT.

BUNKER

BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

17

Presfile

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, September 29, 1968
12:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge on German
attitudes and anxieties, including
anxiety about possible missile talks.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 17480

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-17-92



Department of State

3 17a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEHC
DE RUFHOL 17480 2721635
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281615Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 249
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ BONN 17480

9 5 8 0Q

1968 SEP 28 PM 217

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

1. THIS MESSAGE CONCERNS AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD GERMANY IN THE LIGHT OF THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

2. THIS EVENT -- DEEPLY SHOCKING TO VIRTUALLY ALL GERMANS -- HAS RESULTED IN INCREASED READINESS TO PROVIDE MORE MONEY FOR DEFENSE AND TO MOVE FURTHER ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, INCLUDING BRITISH ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET. ALTHOUGH MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION IS HESITANT AND AS YET INCONCLUSIVE, IT IS MORE POSITIVE THAN ANY HERETOFORE UNDER THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT AND CLEARLY MARKS A WANING OF DE GAULLE'S INFLUENCE HERE.

3. I WELCOME THIS EVOLUTION AND BELIEVE IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF THE US. CONVERSELY, I BELIEVE THAT IF THE GERMANS DO NOT ACT NOW, THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN NATO IN THE LIGHT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS WILL HAVE BEEN MISSED THIS WILL MAKE THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AN EVEN GREATER SHORT TERM SOVIET SUCCESS THAN IT IS ALREADY AND WILL SHARPLY REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVERTING IT INTO A LONG TERM SOVIET FAILURE.

4. IF THE CRISIS DOES NOT LEAD TO STRENGTHENING NATO, I BELIEVE THE RESULT IN GERMANY WILL BE A MOOD OF PESSIMISM AND OF ACCOMMODATION TOWARDS THE USSR. THE RESULT IN THE US WILL BE DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE LACK OF EUROPEAN RESPONSE AND CONTINUING PRESSURES TO WITHDRAW MORE AMERICAN TROOPS FROM EUROPE. THE OUTCOME EITHER WAY MAY BE A HISTORIC TURNING POINT. IF IT IS NEGATIVE, IT WILL GIVE IMPETUS TO A DOWNWARD SPIRAL IN THE US RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE, WHICH, GERMANS TELL ME, MUST EVENTUALLY RESULT IN WESTERN EUROPE'S BECOMING AN ENLARGED FINLAND.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 15, #291

By *jc* NARA. Date 1-25-02

~~SECRET~~

-2- 17480 FROM BONN., SEPT. 28, 1968 (NODIS)

5. THE GERMAN DECISION IS NOT FIRM YET. IT MAY NOT TAKE FINAL FORM FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. PERHAPS THE MAJOR CONCERN OF GERMAN LEADERS WITH REGARD TO IT IS THAT, IF THEY FINALLY DECIDE ON A GO-AHEAD POLICY, THEY WILL BE LEFT IN ISOLATION BY THEIR ALLIES, AND THUS EXPOSED TO SOVIET ATTACK AND TO BOTH EUROPEAN AND GERMAN CRITICISM AS BEING HASTY AND FOOLISH "HARDLINERS".

6. I HOPE I APPRECIATE AT LEAST SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF YOUR PRESENT SITUATION, BUT I BELIEVE IT MOST DESIRABLE IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GERMAN DECISION TO GIVE THEM SOME ENCOURAGEMENT BY POSITIVE MOVES OF OUR OWN IN RESPONSE TO SOME POSITIVE PRIOR EUROPEAN MOVES. ONE SUCH MOVE WOULD BE A STATEMENT FROM YOU THAT YOU WILL RECOMMEND TO THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION THAT THE US SHOULD COMMIT ITSELF TO CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO THE NATO TREATY BEYOND THE 1969 DEADLINE. ANOTHER WOULD BE A SIMILAR RECOMMENDATION TO RETAIN AT LEAST THE PRESENT LEVEL OF TROOPS IN EUROPE IN THE FACE OF THE NEW SITUATION CAUSED BY THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND PREFERABLY, TO RETURN TO EUROPE PERMANENTLY THE TWO WITHDRAWN BRIGADES OF THE 24TH DIVISION.

7. THE REPORTS ABOUT STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS ARE A REAL WORRY HERE -- AT WHATEVER LEVEL TALKS MIGHT BE HELD. ALTHOUGH I KNOW LITTLE OF CURRENT PLANS, I ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT A WORKABLE ARRANGEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE US AND THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE PURSUED WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE FUTURE.

8. NONETHELESS, GIVEN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE IN GERMANY, A DECISION APPARENTLY TO REWARD SOVIET AGGRESSION BY EMBARKING ON ARMS TALKS WOULD, I FEAR, BE INCOMPREHENSIBLE HERE. HOW, IT WOULD BE ASKED, CAN ONE EXPLAIN A WILLINGNESS TO TRUST THE SOVIET WORD WHEN THEY HAVE JUST BROKEN IT SO FLAGRANTLY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA?

9. ANOTHER EFFECT OF AN EXPRESSION OF US WILLINGNESS TO START TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS NOW WOULD BE PUT IN DOUBT THE JUDGMENT AND GOOD SENSE OF GERMAN LEADERS IN PRESSING FOR INCREASES IN DEFENSE. SUCH A US DECISION MIGHT WELL ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A POSITIVE GERMAN DECISION ON DEFENSE.

10. YOU MAY HAVE A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE IN WASHINGTON. BUT AS I VIEW IT, THE CHANCE FOR STRENGTHENING NATO, AND THE DAMAGE WHICH WOULD ARISE FROM NOT DOING SO, OUTWEIGH IN TERMS OF OUR NATIONAL INTEREST THE POTENTIAL GAIN FROM OPENING ~~THE~~ TALKS WITH SOVIETS THIS TIME.

LODGE/
BT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

Pres file

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

Sunday, September 29, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk and I agree that there is wisdom and advantage in handing Debrynia a piece of Middle East paper today. The reason: it appears to bear in some way on a response to our last bilateral communication.

Therefore, I have edited it in the light of your instruction:

- cutting down the waffly paragraphs;
- toughening up reference to direct negotiations;
- leaving you complete freedom of action on the Phantoms.

Personally, I believe Moscow and Cairo have already discounted the Phantoms.

The best way to lay the predicate is to make no reference to arms control at all and tell the Soviets, when we deliver, that all we ever got out of them since the June war were:

- massive deliveries;
- a postponement of arms talks.

But an alternative is included: a brief note of regret at their position.

W. W. Rostow

Message approved as redrafted _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 95-305
By ing, NARA Date 8-26-96

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

18a

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

1. The United States Government has noted with interest the views of the Soviet Government concerning a Middle East settlement presented by Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Rusk on September 4, 1968.

2. The United States shares the view of the Soviet Union that peace in the Middle East is not the concern only of the countries of the region and that the persistence of tension in that area, and the absence of peace, threatens the general peace.

3. While sharing Soviet concern over the situation in the Middle East, the United States cannot accept the description contained in the Soviet document of the causes of that situation and the positions and actions taken by the parties since the cessation of hostilities. Moreover, it must reject as totally unfounded the allegation that the United States Government has supported a negative and deliberately obstructionist policy on the part of the Government of Israel. This statement is unwarranted and untrue.

4. The views of the United States have been set forth by the President and other senior U.S. Government representatives on a number of occasions and are well known to the Government of the Soviet Union. The five principles enunciated by the President in his address of Jun4 19, 1967, as reiterated by him on September 10, 1968, remain the basis for United States policy concerning a Middle East settlement.

5. Since the adoption of the Security Council resolution, the United States has given its full support to the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 95-305
By 110, NARA Date 8-26-96

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

-2-

to fulfill his mandate "to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles" in the Council resolution. The United States Government believes that its primary effort, along with that of the Soviet Union and other governments, should be directed at supporting Ambassador Jarring and in doing nothing that would in any way detract from or interfere in his activities. This attitude is reflected in the Security Council's resolution of September 18, 1968, to which both the United States and the Soviet Union gave their support.

6. The United States, on its part, will make a renewed effort to encourage the parties to engage in the fullest and freest exchange of substantive proposals under his auspices and to accept such procedures as he may suggest to promote agreement as required by the resolution. It is hoped the USSR will do likewise. Just as we have felt that insistence upon direct negotiations as a pre-condition to serious substantive exchanges is unrealistic, so we believe the view that no joint talks can take place under Jarring's auspices is equally unrealistic. We hope the USSR will give this critical point the serious attention it deserves; for it is most difficult for us to conceive that stable peace can be achieved in this area without direct negotiations at some stage, given the complexity of the issues involved.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

7. The Soviet document requests the views of the United States Government concerning steps which in its view must be taken for a prompt settlement of the Middle East problem. In response to that request, the United States Government would like to seek certain clarifications and present the following observations, which inter alia could be explored in future consultations:

(a) The Soviet document refers in paragraph (a) to the readiness of the parties to implement the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. The United States wishes to point out that an essential part of the obligation to implement the resolution is the obligation to cooperate fully with Ambassador Jarring in the carrying out of his mandate as set forth in paragraph three of the resolution to promote agreement among the states concerned. It does not regard the Security Council resolution as self-implementing. It believes, on the contrary, that under the resolution the parties must take responsibility for an agreed settlement and that a settlement cannot be imposed upon the parties by others. The United States would welcome further clarification of the Soviet views on this point.

(b) The United States notes with interest that the Soviet document refers in paragraph (a) to the possibility of consultations "through Jarring or in some other form." The United States believes that consultations involving the parties will be essential to the development of agreement on a peaceful settlement envisaged by the November 22, 1968 Security Council

resolution. Does the Soviet Union share this view?

(c) The United States agrees that it may be desirable for United Nations forces to be employed to assist in the carrying out of the terms of a settlement agreed by the parties and notes in this connection that the Soviet document makes a number of suggestions in this regard. While not being able to accept some of the concepts reflected in these suggestions, the United States would be prepared to discuss with the Soviet Government the idea of use of United Nations forces in connection with an agreed settlement.

(d) The United States further notes that paragraph (b) 5 of the Soviet document provides that the declarations of the Arab countries and Israel on the cessation of the state of war and the establishment of peace would become effective "either through the instrumentality of the Security Council or through the signing of a multilateral document." The United States believes that the peace must be based upon arrangements which directly bind the parties. Is this what is intended by the reference to a "multilateral document"? The United States believes that a document signed jointly by the parties is the most desirable means of obligating the parties to carry out the agreement worked out in accordance with the resolution of November 22, 1967. It believes, also, that Security Council endorsement of the terms of a settlement agreed by the parties could serve a useful purpose. The United States is not clear what a Four Power

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

-5-

guarantee would add to such a Security Council endorsement of the agreement of the parties, but it is willing to examine this possibility at the appropriate time.

(e) Concerning the above point on the cessation of the state of war, does the USSR share the view of the United States that a termination of the state of belligerency would mean that there would be complete freedom of passage through international waterways, including the Suez Canal, for all vessels?

8. The Soviet document comments at some length on the desirability of a plan or timetable for implementation of the Security Council resolution. The United States has no objection to the concept of a plan under which the steps required for carrying out the peace settlement agreed to by the parties, and the timing of those steps, would be spelled out. It may be that the parties would find such a detailed plan necessary since, as the Soviet document also notes, the actions to be taken by the parties in carrying out their agreed settlement would inevitably be interrelated and in some degree interdependent. It is in light of this interrelationship that the United States firmly adheres to the view that all elements of a settlement must be dealt with in arriving at the terms of a settlement. It is the understanding of the United States, moreover, that the parties, including the UAR, all recognize that the Security Council

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

resolution requires a "package" which would settle all the problems left open for negotiations by the resolution, whatever the chronology for implementation on which they might agree. In our view this position represents a proper interpretation of the resolution.

9. There is one specific aspect of the program outlined in the Soviet document which in particular merits comment: the idea of Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5 line. The essence of United States policy since June 5, 1967, has been and remains that the state of armistice among the parties must be replaced, as the resolution of November 22, 1967, states, by a condition of peace. The armistice agreements of 1949 called for a transition to peace and specifically contemplated the possibility of agreed changes in the armistice lines of 1949 as part of that transition. The Security Council resolution calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force, but does not specify that those boundaries should be precisely the lines held prior to June 5, 1967, or on any other date. In view of the complexity of this question, the United States believes that this is a matter which requires the priority attention of both the parties and Ambassador Jarring.

10. The United States believes it important that the Soviet and United States Governments continue to consult on all possibilities for a settlement of the Middle East situation. It expects to be in contact with Ambassador Jarring in the days immediately ahead and, of course, there will be further opportunity for the two governments to exchange views during Minister Gromyko's forthcoming visit to New York during the General Assembly session.

NOTE: The following paragraph could be either:

- omitted
- or included in present form

leaving complete freedom of action on Phantoms.

11. The United States regrets the Soviet view that the limitation of the arms flow to the area must await a peace settlement.

ACTION

**Sunday, September 29, 1968
10:55 a.m.**

Pres. file

Mr. President:

This memorandum and draft statement to you from Wilbur Cohen came, by misadventure, through my office.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Douglass Cater

WWRostow:rlh



THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20201

19a

September 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: HEW Appropriation bill

The HEW Appropriation bill as reported out by the Conference Committee will be taken up in the House of Representatives on Tuesday. The Conferees included in it the Whitten Rider dealing with the Civil Rights program. The attached statement explains the Rider and the view which the Attorney General and I believe ought to be taken in regard to the bill. Obviously the view we present would start a first class fight and it is very likely that we would lose in the House.

The statement has been written in such a way that if the bill is passed in its present form you could still retain your options to (1) instruct the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare not to enforce the Rider or (2) to veto the bill. The Attorney General has stated to me that he wishes to keep his options open as to whether to advise you that the Rider is unconstitutional or its construction is such that it does not effectively result in what its sponsors intended for it to do.

I will undoubtedly be pressed to express my views on Monday or Tuesday. Do you have any objection to my issuance of the attached statement or some modification thereof?


Secretary

Approval _____
Disapproval _____
Drop last paragraph _____
Other _____

Possible Statement by the Secretary of HEW

The action of the House-Senate Committee in recommending the adoption of the House-passed language originally proposed by Congressman Whitten of Mississippi, to prohibit this Department from using appropriated funds to carry out certain aspects of its legal responsibility under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a backward step.

In 1964 Congress decided that ten years of delay in abolishing racially segregated schools were enough, that the Federal Government should no longer subsidize schools operating in defiance of the law and directed the Federal agency to withhold funds when a school district was not in compliance with the law as interpreted by the Courts. The importance of this action would be hard to exaggerate. As Judge Wisdom, one of our most distinguished Southern judges, put it: "But one reason more than any other has held back desegregation of public schools on a large scale. This has been the lack, until 1964, of effective congressional statutory recognition of school desegregation as the law of the land." The rider now recommended by the Committee would withdraw a part of this recognition.

The Whitten rider is intended to give "freedom of choice" desegregation plans special insulation from certain of the enforcement efforts of this Department under Title VI. It is intended to prevent us from negotiating with a local school board for adoption of a nonracial geographic attendance zone plan, even though, under legal principles announced by the Federal courts, such a plan might be the best or even the only means of abolishing the segregated system. Despite the limitation which would be imposed on our use of appropriated funds in obtaining compliance with Title VI, the Whitten rider does not purport to amend Title VI itself, and indeed, its sponsors made it clear that they intended no such amendment. Thus, the Secretary is left with a clear responsibility under the law to withhold the payment of Federal funds for educational programs in which racial discrimination is found, while at the same time, the Whitten rider is intended to prevent using appropriated funds in administrative efforts to eliminate forms of discrimination which the courts have condemned. It is difficult to see how this basic contradiction can be resolved without repealing or ignoring the rider. It is, however, absolutely clear that the rider, if effective as intended, will introduce

great confusion and uncertainty into enforcement of the nondiscrimination requirements of the 1964 Act both for local school districts and the Federal agency. I will consult with the Attorney General before determining our course of action.

The two Houses of the Congress should reject the Whitten rider and should recommit the bill, with directions to adopt the language passed by the Senate so that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare can carry out his constitutional duty of enforcing the law.

September 29, 1968

SagilDX to S/S, State, from Walt Rostow

Please transmit the following message to Dame Mabel Brookes from the President, via Embassy, Australia.

Mrs. Johnson and I grieve with you in your loss and shall always remember Sir Norman's many courtesies to us.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, September 28, 1968
12:25 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the President of
Uruguay expresses ^{to you} his anxiety about
the Congressional moves in the
direction of reducing the Alliance for
Progress funds.

W. W. Rostow

Montevideo 4036

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

21a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BOGOWLEA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCE719

PAGE 01 MONTEV 0403S 230149Z

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ACTION ARA 16

1968 SEP 28 02 11

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CC0 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, R 02, INR 07,
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0 202115Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4745

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MONTEVIDEO 403S

OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

REF: MONTEVIDEO 4327

1. FOLLOWING IS SPANISH TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON
FROM PRESIDENT PACHECO, FURNISHED ME ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS:

2. MR. PRESIDENT AND DISTINGUISHED FRIEND: I HAVE JUST RETURNED
FROM SANTIAGO, CHILE, WHERE I SPENT TWO DAYS WITH OUR MUTUAL
FRIEND, PRESIDENT EDUARDO FREI. DURING THAT TIME WE DISCUSSED
THE STEPS WE WOULD TAKE TO ACHIEVE WITH THE UTMOST SPEED OUR
GOAL OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE HEMISPHERE. IN OUR TALKS
AND IN RECENT MEETINGS WITH OUR COLLEAGUE IN ARGENTINA, GENERAL
JUAN CARLOS ONGANIA, AND OUR COLLEAGUE IN BRAZIL, MARSHAL
ARTHUR DA COSTA E SILVA, I SINCERELY ENDEAVORED TO ADVANCE THE
IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES AGREED ON AT THE CONFERENCE AT PUNTA DEL
ESTE LESS THAN TWO YEARS AGO. MUCH STILL REMAINS TO BE DONE, BUT WE
ARE MAKING STEADY PROGRESS.

3. WE URUGUAYANS, AND I AS THEIR PRESIDENT, FEEL A SPECIAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR, AND SPECIAL PRIDE IN, THE ALLIANCE FOR PRO-
GRESS SINCE URUGUAY WAS THE BIRTHPLACE OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE PLACE
WHERE THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION MOVEMENT WAS STARTED AT THE CONFERENCE
OF PRESIDENTS OF AMERICA IN APRIL 1967, IN WHICH YOU PLAYED
A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE.

4. I AM AWARE, MR. PRESIDENT, OF YOUR EFFORTS AND YOUR DESIRE TO
ACHIEVE THE HIGH AIMS THAT LED TO THE CREATION OF THE ALLIANCE
FOR PROGRESS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Group 4
By jc NARA. Date 1-25-02

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 MONTEV 04036 280149Z

5. THEREFORE, MR PRESIDENT, I AM CERTAIN THAT YOU SHARE MY FEELING OF DEEP CONCERN OVER THE DECISION ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, PRECISELY WHILE I WAS IN CHILE, WHICH GREATLY REDUCES COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS SISTER REPUBLICS.

6. OUR UNITED EFFORTS HAVE BOLSTERED THE HOPES OF OUR NATIONS, AND THUS IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO WARD OFF THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE CAUSED MUCH ANXIETY IN OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD.

7. I CANNOT IMAGINE THAT THIS DECISION REPRESENTS THE TRUE SPIRIT AND ACTUAL POLICY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

8. IT IS MY SINCERE DESIRE, MR. PRESIDENT-- AS I KNOW IT IS YOURS-- THAT NONE OF US DECREASE OUR EFFORTS, BUT RATHER THAT WE ENDEAVOR TO STRENGTHEN THEM TO ENSURE PEACE AND PROGRESS IN THE AMERICAS. THIS IS MY GOVERNMENT'S DEFINITE AIM AS, I AM CERTAIN, IT MUST BE THAT OF ALL OF US WHO MET AT PUNTA DEL ESTE.

9. I AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND ESTEEM.
JORGE PACHECO ARECO.

GP-4. SAYRE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

SECRET -- EYES ONLY

**Saturday, September 28, 1968
10:25 a.m.**

Pres file

Mr. President:

**Herewith a redrafted message to
Unger. You may wish to give the message
to Sec. Rusk when you see him today.**

W. W. Rostow

Approved_____

Mo_____

Call me_____

SECRET

WWRostow:rin

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 11-17-92

~~SECRET~~

September 28, 1968

NODIS/COLUMBIA

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

Following receipt of original negative Thai response, the President accepted their judgment. It is unlikely that a troop contributors meeting in Thailand will be given further consideration in the months ahead.

In conveying this position to Thai authorities, you may indicate we appreciate their willingness to reconsider the matter.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-25
By 128, NARA, Date 6-17-94

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

23

Saturday, September 28, 1968 -- 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to Harry McPherson's redraft of the World Bank and Monetary Fund speech for Monday (attached):

-- I believe the speech is good and should be delivered at the opening session on Monday;

-- I propose, on page 7, an insert of 343 words (insert A, attached). The reason: Your summation of the lessons of development experience could give the speech more substance; underpin the effort to carry forward development on a realistic, hardheaded basis; underline the principles you have stood for and given vitality to in these 5 years.

-- I also propose an insert of 71 words (insert B, attached) on page 8 to indicate that the work is not yet done in ~~strengthening~~ the international monetary system, despite the progress detailed earlier in the text.

The draft would still be under 1800 words in total.

If you approve, you may wish to have the text checked out by State and AID. It already has, in its earlier form, Joe Fewier's approval.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Insert A

243 - an

What have we learned together about development?

- First, development is a full time job calling for all-out mobilization, in each country. Those who assist from outside can only be junior partners in the venture.**
- Second, development is serious nation building -- a task for doers, not talkers. There is no room for sterile dogma, and there are simply not enough resources for empty foreign adventures.**
- Third, developing countries cannot carry the burden of excessive military expenditures. Every nation has legitimate security needs. But there can be neither security nor development with a senseless spiral of military purchases.**
- Fourth, agriculture is a development growth industry. Most of the people are in the countryside. Hungry people cannot be productive people. But prosperous farmers can be the firm foundation for prosperous factories.**

Insert A - page 2

- **Fifth, development requires diversified exports. Traditional products and traditional markets will not be enough to finance import needs. The developing countries have the responsibility to create new and competitive export industries. The industrial countries have the responsibility to maintain an open and growing world economy.**
- **Sixth, development requires broad opportunities for the private sector -- domestic and foreign. The technology, management, and capital foreign investment provides is a critical component, if it is brought into the right sectors, on fair terms.**
- **Seventh, in some critically important nations policies of family planning have been adopted. New seeds and new priorities have lifted agricultural production and bought time for family planning policies to become effective. But the fate of development efforts hinge on how vigorously that time is used.**

Insert A - page 3

-- Eighth, we have proved that development worked. We have seen ancient fields reborn; new roads built to bridge the traditional gap between city and countryside; new schools, to bring modern knowledge to age-old cultures. We have seen nations on the move reaching sustained rates of economic growth exceeding 6% a year. There is still a vast amount of work ahead. Many nations have just begun. But we now know that foreign aid is not an endless task.

Insert B

11 ...

And we must continue equally to work hard to strengthen the international monetary system.

- Balance of payments problems affect: our growth policies;
our trade policies; and our aid policies.
- Monetary crises can lead to panic and world depression with
disastrous consequences for world security and welfare. The
machinery we have built over the past 25 years prevented the
recurrence of monetary panics. It must continue to do so in the
future.

24

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Sat
Friday, September 27, 1968 - 9:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Conversation with South Africans on Gold

Pres. file

Bill Martin met quietly today with his South African counterpart, T. W. de Jong, to talk about gold.

Martin laid out our ideas of an arrangement under which South Africa could be brought into the two-tier system:

- The Fund would buy limited amounts of gold from South Africa when the market price fell below \$35 (\$35 less a handling charge). The amount would be limited to what South Africa needed to meet a deficit in its own accounts. (This would not put a floor under the market but would give South Africans some price assurance for its newly-mined gold.)
- South Africa would return to its normal practice of selling newly-mined gold regularly on the market.
- South Africa would not offer newly-mined gold to other Central Banks.

The conversation was cordial but de Jong did not commit himself. His comments gave no indication of acceptance or outright rejection of the proposal -- either in whole or in part.

The next move is up to the South Africans. They may make it during the Bank and Fund meetings. In any event, we are better able to keep the support of our European partners for having made the proposal.

W. W. Rostow

W
ERF:mst

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 88-83
By rg/wip, NARA, Date 2-17-93

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-7-95

INFORMATION

Pres file~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, September 27, 1968 -- 6:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested in the following.

The Non-Nuclear Conference today voted 79-0 in favor of the attached resolution which "urges governments of USSR and US to enter at an early date into bilateral discussions on limitation of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles." All NATO allies present, including Federal Republic of Germany, voted in favor of the resolution.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~rlh~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres File
26

~~SECRET~~

Friday, Sept. 27, 1968
6:25 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have marked the key passages in this rather interesting report of lunch between Berger and Ky.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Saigon 38867)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988
By RG, NARA, Date 11-17-92

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 38867 01 OF 02 271129Z

12

ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO DB, NSCE 00, /030 W

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1502

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

CINCPAC

1968 SEP 27 11 59

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 38867

EXCIS

Rostow

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

SUBJECT: BEAGER TALK WITH KY SEPTEMBER 21

1. VICE PRESIDENT KY ACCEPTED BERGER'S INVITATION TO LUNCH AND THEY TALKED FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS. THIS WAS THEIR FIRST TETE-A-TETE SINCE THE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT IN MAY-JUNE, THE ATROPHY OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL, THE ELIMINATION OF GENERAL LOAN AND OTHER KY COLLEAGUES, AND THE ECLIPSE OF KY'S POLITICAL POWER AND FORTUNE.

2. KY LOOKED PHYSICALLY FIT AND HIS EYES WERE CLEAR, IN CONTRAST TO HIS DULL, PASTY AND SAGGING APPEARANCE ABOUT SIX WEEKS AGO. THE BELLIGERENT VOICE AND GESTURES, SO NOTICEABLE IN APRIL AND MAY, WERE MISSING: HIS WHOLE MANNER WAS SUBDUED, PENSIVE, AND INTROSPECTIVE. AFTER SOME CHAT ABOUT VIETNAMESE WORKS OF ART AND FISHING, KY ASKED HOW THINGS LOOKED. BERGER SAID WHEN THEY LAST TALKED IN APRIL HE HAD ONLY JUST ARRIVED AND WAS IN NO POSITION TO TALK ABOUT VIETNAM. HE HAD NOW BEEN IN THE COUNTRY SIX MONTHS AND WAS BEGINNING TO GET A FEELING FOR THE THREE OR FOUR REALLY BASIC PROBLEMS. HE HOPED THEY COULD DISCUSS THESE.

3. KY INTERRUPTED THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE PROBLEM IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND BERGER HAD HIMSELF STATED IT IN

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-25

By *kip*, NARA, Date *6-17-94*

PROCESSED BY NARA

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 30867 01 OF 02 271129Z

THEIR FIRST TALK, I.E. THE COUNTRY NEEDED A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT. UNFORTUNATELY, KY SAID, IT LACKED THAT. HENCE ALL THE NEW RUMORS ABOUT COUPS, PUBLIC CONFUSION AS TO WHERE SOUTH VIET NAM WAS GOING, DIVISION IN AND OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT WHERE THERE SHOULD BE UNITY, AND A KIND OF MALAISE AND FEAR OF THE FUTURE.

4. BERGER SAID HE CERTAINLY AGREED THAT A STRONG AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT WAS THE FIRST REQUIREMENT, AND HE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT THAT, BUT TO BEGIN WOULD KY, WHO CAME FROM THE NORTH, GIVE HIM AN INSIGHT INTO WHAT HANOI WAS THINKING. THE VC/NVA HAD ALREADY LOST 150,000 OR SO KILLED THIS YEAR, AND WITH CRITICALLY WOUNDED, DEFECTORS, PRISONERS, ETC. THE FUTURE WILL BE 200,000 OR MORE BY THE END OF THE YEAR. THERE WERE 17,000 KILLED SINCE AUGUST 18 AND THEY HAD NOTHING TO SHOW FOR IT. HOW LONG CAN THIS GO ON?

5. KY SAID HANOI WAS IN A DILEMMA, AND WHICHEVER COURSE IT EXAMINED OFFERED NO SOLUTION: IT COULD NOT CONTINUE WITH SUCH LOSSES; IT COULD NOT MOUNT ANOTHER MAJOR OFFENSIVE; IT COULD NOT TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT; IT COULD NOT GO BACK TO GUERRILLA WARFARE; AND IT COULD NOT ACHIEVE ITS AIMS BY NEGOTIATIONS. HANOI WAS HOPING THE US WOULD TIRE AND WITHDRAW, BUT EVEN THAT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION, AS THEY WILL REALIZE WHEN THE NEW PRESIDENT TAKES OFFICE. ON BALANCE HE THINKS HANOI WILL NEGOTIATE, AND WHILE THEY MIGHT BEGIN TO TALK SERIOUSLY AT ANY TIME, HE DOES NOT EXPECT THEM TO DO

SO

UNTIL EARLY NEXT YEAR. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, HE DISMISSED AS "NONSENSE" SPECULATION THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HANOI AND THE NLF, OR BETWEEN THE NORTHERNERS AND SOUTHERNERS IN THE COMMUNIST CAMP. "THE NLF IS THE BRANCH OFFICE OF HANOI AND THEY ARE BOTH AFTER THE SAME THING--TAKING POWER AND UNITING THE COUNTRY UNDER COMMUNISM."

6. BERGER SAID, "IF NEGOTIATIONS START IN THESE NEXT WEEKS OR MONTHS, IT IS THE THIEU-KY-HUONG GOVERNMENT THAT IS GOING TO HAVE TO NEGOTIATE, WHETHER YOU ARE READY OR NOT, WHETHER STRONG OR WEAK, UNITED OR DIVIDED. THERE IS NONE OTHER." HE SAID WE DID NOT SHARE KY'S VIEWS OF THE THIEU GOVERNMENT. MANY LONG OVERDUE REFORMS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE POLICE AND IN

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PAGE 93 SAIGON 38867 01 OF 02 271129Z

THE MILITARY DEFENSE OF SAIGON AND GIA DINH. MINISTER OF INTERIOR KHIEM HAD TAKEN HOLD WITH ENERGY AND WAS REVITALIZING THIS KEY MINISTRY. OUR REPORTS FROM THE FIELD SAY WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS THE NEW PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEFS ARE A GREAT IMPROVEMENT. THE NEW IV AND II CORPS COMMANDERS ARE GIVING STRONG AND AGGRESSIVE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. THE PRIME MINISTER'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION IS BEGINNING TO PRODUCE RESULTS. THE HUONG GOVERNMENT IS A VAST IMPROVEMENT OVER LOC'S GOVERNMENT, AND

PEOPLE SEEMED TO HAVE MORE FAITH AND CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES, AND IN THE FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM NOW THAN THEY HAD SIX OR EIGHT MONTHS AGO. MANY LONG-TERM-OBSERVERS SAY THE HUONG GOVERNMENT IS THE BEST ONE IN A DECADE.

7. KY SAID HE AGREED THAT THE HUONG GOVERNMENT WAS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE LOC GOVERNMENT, BUT THE TROUBLE WAS LACK OF UNITY WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, WHILE THOSE OUTSIDE WILL NOT COMMIT THEMSELVES TO SUPPORT THIEU. HENCE ALL THE NEW TALK ABOUT COUPS. "THERE WAS NO TALK OF COUPS WHEN I WAS PRIME MINISTER," HE ADDED. (BERGER REFRAINED FROM SAYING THIS WAS NOT TRUE.)

8. BERGER ASKED KY, "HOW MANY LEADERS ARE INVOLVED AROUND WHOM NATIONAL UNITY HAD TO BE BUILT, STARTING WITH THE FOUR KEY ONES WHO HAD POWER: THIEU, YOU, THE PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER KHIEM. HOW MANY MORE NEED TO BE BROUGHT TOGETHER TO PRODUCE NATIONAL UNITY: TWENTY, FIFTY, A HUNDRED?" KY SAID NOT MANY-- ABOUT TWENTY. BERGER SAID IF TWENTY VIETNAMESE-- WITH THE END OF THE WAR AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN SIGHT-- CAN'T FIND A WAY TO REACH UNITY THEN THE COUNTRY IS IN REAL TROUBLE. BERGER THEN REFERRED TO A VIEW HELD ~~FOR US~~ ^{that U.S.} CANNOT LEAVE SOUTH

VIET NAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE, BECAUSE THE NATIONALISTS ARE TOO DIVIDED TO FACE THE COMMUNISTS IN POLITICAL COMPETITION AFTER A SETTLEMENT. "IT WOULD BE A GRAVE MISTAKE FOR ANYONE TO ASSUME THAT WE SHALL STAY HERE BECAUSE THE NATIONALIST LEADERS ARE INCAPABLE OF UNITING TO WIN THE PEACE. ONCE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS LEAVE, WE WILL LEAVE, AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS MUST EITHER CLOSE RANKS OR PERISH."

BUNKER
BT

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 33867 02 OF 02 271837Z

1968 SEP 27 19 06

41
ACTION SS.33

INFO SSO 02, NSCE 02, /032 W

P R 271837Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0002
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 33867

EXDIS

9. KY SAID UNITY WAS EASY TO TALK ABOUT BUT DIFFICULT TO **ACHIEVE**. BERGER SAID THIS WAS A VIETNAMESE PROBLEM ABOUT WHICH WE **COULD** DO LITTLE HE ADDED THAT SOME POLITICAL LEADERS WERE COMING TO US TO HELP FINANCE GRANDIOSE SCHEMES TO BUILD A NEW POLITICAL PARTY TO REPLACE THIEU AND HIS GOVERNMENT WHEN IT COLLAPSES. IT IS BEING MADE CLEAR TO EACH OF THEM THAT THE THIEU GOVERNMENT IS THE ONLY GOVERNMENT THEY HAVE AND THEY HAD BETTER MAKE IT WORK. WE ARE ALSO MAKING IT PLAIN THAT WE DO NOT THINK IT IS GOING TO COLLAPSE, AND THAT WE ARE NOT WORRIED ABOUT A COUP, FOR ANOTHER COUP WOULD MARK THE END OF AMERICAN HELP TO VIET-NAM. FINALLY, THEY ARE BEING TOLD WE HAVE NO INTEREST IN HELPING FRAGMENTS.

10. KY WAS LISTENING INTENTLY. HE REALIZED THAT ALL THE POINTS WERE DIRECTED AT HIM, AS WELL AS OTHERS, FOR HE AND LOAN HAVE BEEN THE SOURCE OF MANY RUMORS DESIGNED TO DISCREDIT THIEU AND HUONG, RUMORS ABOUT COUP PLOTS--INCLUDING PLOTS BY THE US TO OVERTHROW THIEU IF HE DOES NOT AGREE TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT--DIVISIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT, RESIGNATIONS, ETC.

11. BERGER THEN OPENED A NEW SUBJECT. REFERRING TO A REMARK MADE TO HIM BY KY SOME MONTHS AGO THAT COMPROMISES WOULD BE REQUIRED OF THE SOUTH VIET-NAM GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS THE NORTH, TO PRODUCE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, HE ASKED WHAT KIND OF COMPROMISES KY HAD IN MIND THAT

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 38867 02 OF 02 271337Z

COULD BE MADE BY THE SOUTH, AND HOW THEY COULD BE ACHIEVED. "WE WOULD BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED TO KNOW HOW THE PROBLEM OF BRINGING THE NLF BACK INTO THE LIFE OF THE COUNTRY CAN BE SOLVED."

12. KY'S ANSWERS WERE VAGUE. ABOUT ALL THAT EMERGED WAS THAT VIETNAMESE ARE ACCUSTOMED IN THEIR LONG HISTORY TO COMPROMISE AND ACCOMMODATION, AND IF HANOI AND THEN THE NLF, WOULD SIT DOWN WITH THE SOUTH, THEY CAN WORK THINGS OUT. THIS LED KY TO SAY THAT HE WANTS TO GET INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS, ~~NOT AS A MEMBER~~ OF THE DELEGATION, BUT WORKING FROM BEHIND THE SCENES. THE ~~INFERENCE~~ WAS HE WOULD LIKE TO GO TO PARIS.

13. KY ASKED HOW THE TALKS WERE GOING. BERGER SAID THERE WAS NO BREAK IN THE KEY ISSUE: HANOI WANTS US TO CEASE THE BOMBING AND THEN THEY SAY THEY WILL ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE INSISTING THAT WE HAVE TO KNOW WHAT WILL HAPPEN AFTER THE BOMBING STOPS, IN THE DMZ AND IN RESPECT TO ATTACKS ON THE CITIES. ALSO HANOI HAS BEEN TOLD THAT THE GVN MUST BE BROUGHT INTO THE MEETINGS ONCE THE BOMBING STOPS, IF THERE ARE TO BE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. ON ALL THIS, HANOI HAS SO FAR BEEN ABSOLUTELY UNYIELDING.

14. AS THE LUNCH ENDED BERGER TOLD KY THE AMBASSADOR WOULD EXTEND AN INVITATION TO HIM AND HIS WIFE TO COME TO DINNER THE NEXT TIME MRS. BUNKER VISITS HERE FROM NEPAL. KY SAID THEY WOULD BE DELIGHTED. BERGER THEN REMINDED KY THAT HE LIKES TO FISH AND HE HOPED THE VICE PRESIDENT WOULD ASK HIM TO JOIN HIM ONE DAY. (AN INVITATION WAS FORTHCOMING A DAY LATER.)

15. COMMENT: FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES OUR GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF WHERE KY STANDS, BASED ON THIS AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS AND REPORTS.

A. KY FEELS HIMSELF ON THE SIDELINES. HIS BID FOR THE PRESIDENCY LAST YEAR FAILED. THE LOC GOVERNMENT, WHICH WAS LARGELY HIS MAKING, PROVED INCOMPETENT. THE MILITARY COUNCIL, WHICH HE DESIGNED TO KEEP CONTROL OVER THIEU, HAS DISAPPEARED. HIS CLOSEST FRIENDS HAVE BEEN KILLED OR ELIMINATED.

B. THE RESULTANT BITTERNESS DROVE KY TO WITHDRAW TO CHA TRAN IN JUNE TO FISH, DRINK, PLAY MAJ-JONG,

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 38867 02 OF 02 271837Z

AND NURSE HIS WOUNDS.

C. HE SEEMS TO HAVE COME OUT THISSELF-EXAMINATION CHASTENED AND SUBDUED. WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT FOR THE TIME BEING HE HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO WAIT THINGS OUT, AND THAT SINCE HE IS CLEVERER THAN THIEU (WHICH IS DOUBTFUL) HE YET WILL EMERGE ON TOP. HE SEEMS ALSO TO HAVE DECIDED TO REPAIR HIS RELATIONS WITH THE US.

D. KY, WHO HAS BEEN ABSENT FOR WEEKS, IS BEGINNING TO COME INTO CIRCULATION AGAIN. HE HAD A LONG TALK WITH THIEU A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO IN WHICH HE TOLD THIEU OF THOSE PLOTTING COUPS AGAINST HIM (HUONG, KHIEM, TRI, AND THE US) AND ALSO TELLING THIEU THAT HE WANTS A JOB. IT IS CERTAIN THAT THIEU WAS NOT IMPRESSED WITH THE REVELATIONS ABOUT THE COUPS, SINCE MANY OF THESE RUMORS EMANATED FROM THOSE AROUND KY.

E. KY HAS WORK TO DO, IF HE WILL ONLY DO IT, AND THAT IS TO BUILD UP THIEU AND THE GOVERNMENT. KY COULD BE VERY HELPFUL, AND THIEU WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO RESPOND TO THESE GESTURES AND TRY TO ENLIST KY'S HELP. BUT THIEU IS UNLIKELY TO DO MORE THAN GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS, FOR THE MUTUAL DISTRUST BETWEEN THEM IS EXCEEDED ONLY BY THAT BETWEEN HUONG AND KY. IF KY REALLY WANTS TO WORK IN GOOD FAITH WITH THIEU AND HUONG, KY WILL HAVE TO MAKE THE RUNNING AND RIDE HERD ON HIS SUPPORTERS AND ASSOCIATES. IF KY IS SERIOUS, HE WILL HAVE TO PUT A STOP TO THE INSPIRED RUMORS DESIGNED TO DISCREDIT THIEU, HUONG, AND THEIR GOVERNMENT.

F. KY MUST BE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT HIS FLAMBOYANCE, IMPULSIVE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND INDISCRETIONS, HIS DEVISSNESS, AND HIS BARELY CONCEALED SUSPICIONS OF THE US, ARE LIABILITIES IN HIS COMPETITION WITH THIEU. HE KNOWS THAT SUPPORTERS GRAVITATE TO THOSE WHO SUCCEED, NOT TO THOSE WHO FAIL. THIEU IS ON TOP, KY IS IN ECLIPSE, WHETHER HE WILL BEGIN TO RESIGN HIMSELF TO SECOND PLACE AND BECOME A CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE REMAINS TO BE SEEN HE MAY YET DECIDE THAT HIS AMBITION AND LONG-TERM FUTURE MAY BEST BE SERVED BY ABANDONING HIS HOSTILITY

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PAGE 04 SAIGON 38867 02 OF 02 271837Z

TO THIEU AND HUONG AND TRYING IN GOOD FAITH TO HELP THEM.
WE ARE DUBIOUS BUT KY IS A PATRIOT AND WHILE SOMETIMES
FOLLISH, HE IS NOT A FOOL, AND WE DO NOT RULE THIS OUT.

BUNKER

BT

NNN

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~~SECRET~~

THIS IS

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET -~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

Friday, Sept. 27, 1968
6:10 p. m.

DECLASSIFIED

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to know that Dobrynin came in at 5 p. m. to see Sect. Rusk on one question: Is the U. S. likely to respond to their note on the Middle East? He wanted to know if newspaper accounts of a complete brush-off by the Israelis of the Soviet proposal was shared by the U. S.

Sect. Rusk told him that it was likely that we would be getting a response to him in the next several days. The Soviet paper gave us certain problems, but our response was not a complete brush-off.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-04
By kip, NARA Date 10-21-96

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Friday, September 27, 1968
5:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a cable in response to the positive position taken by the Thais, for your clearance. The cable preserves your options without any commitment at this time.

I have spoken to Sec. Rusk about this matter. He will be thinking over the problem and will be prepared to talk to it tomorrow when you see him.

I have informed Jim Jones that Sec. Rusk is wholly at your disposal except for an appointment at 11:00 a.m. tomorrow. He leaves for New York on Sunday.

W. W. Rostow

Cable cleared _____

Cleared as modified _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

WWRostow:rlh

28a

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Rostow

For Clearance

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy BANGKOK PRIORITY

Info

STATE

NODIS/COLUMBIA

Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary.

1. You should see Prince Wan privately to convey President's deep appreciation of Prime Minister and RTG reconsidering and now being willing to host meeting.
 2. In the process, you should again mention the question of dates, in order to be sure that they ~~xxx~~ are willing and able to hold a meeting either in the week beginning October 14 or in the week beginning October 21.
 3. You should indicate at the same time that President has not repeat not reached a final view, but would like to be in touch just as soon as possible in the light of all factors.
- GP-3.

End.

Drafted
EA:WPLundy:mk 9/27/68

4235

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by

The Secretary

Clearance:

White House -- Mr. Rostow

S/S

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~
Classification

By pc, NARA, Date 12502

ACTION

Friday, September 27, 1988 - 4:40pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

Attached for your approval is a message of congratulations to Prime Minister Caetano of Portugal, who succeeded Salazar today.

Caetano is supposed to be more pragmatic than Salazar and looks as though he means to branch out a bit from Salazar's rigid policies.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

unl

ERF:mst

29a

**CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO
PRIME MINISTER CAETANO OF PORTUGAL**

**Please accept my warm congratulations on your
appointment to lead Portugal's Government. I look forward
to a continuation of the traditionally close and friendly rela-
tions between our two governments and of the cordial contacts
maintained with your eminent predecessor whose illness
saddens us all.**

ERF:mst

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-201

Friday, September 27, 1968
4:30 p. m.

Pres

30

MR. PRESIDENT:

By *sig*, NARA, Date *11-3-95*

You asked for a compilation of your statements -- especially recent statements -- on the conditions under which you would stop the bombing.

It so happened that on an insurance basis, I had such a manual developed very recently, including your remarks in Detroit and New Orleans. There is also a computer read-out of all your statements on this subject attached to the front cover.

The key passages are marked in texts, and I have had paper clips affixed to the passages which contain marked passages.

I have gone out to Abrams with a back channel message. If you should ask me what has changed since Abrams reported, this would be my answer:

-- When Abrams replied, they were on the eve of a third wave. He said: "We are convinced that the enemy has determined to make, over the next days and weeks, the maximum military effort of which he is capable at this time." Since then, the enemy has tried and failed. He is now dissipating the 60,000 men he brought in in the previous two months at a rate about twice the average for 1967, but getting nowhere. So Abrams is less concerned and now, in fact, feels that the enemy is hurting so bad that his weakening could take on "strategic significance" in the future.

-- Infiltration in the pipeline has greatly reduced. Due to the weather in Laos and North Vietnam -- and perhaps other factors -- there is a general feeling that infiltrators now arriving or about to arrive are at a very low level. The infiltration rate could pick up in late October, November and December, when Laos dries up, but the weeks ahead do not appear to present Abrams with an enemy capable of bringing a great many additional forces onto the battlefield.

-- With respect to supplies through the panhandle against the DMZ, there is considerable supply activity at the moment, but the rains have helped and the monsoons are coming sometime from mid-October. Moreover, Abrams has demonstrated that the U. S. and ARVN forces in DMZ area are capable of knocking back the enemy onto his heels every time they form up for attack. So, I would guess, Abrams would be considerably less worried about the flow of supplies against the DMZ than he was when we last put the question to him.

Taken together, this is a quite substantial shift in perspective since Aug. 23 when he last responded to these questions.

In my judgment, they reduce the military risk of a bombing cessation, but they do not eliminate that risk, including the risk that a bombing cessation "could lead to an increase in American casualties."

W. W. Rostow

(folder attached)

Pres file

31

SECRET

Friday, September 27, 1968, 4:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Security Considerations in Mr. Nixon's Planned Visit to Mexico

Director Helms is forwarding to you the attached CIA memorandum citing the potential dangers inherent in a visit to Mexico City October 15 which Mr. Nixon is planning.

The Secret Service has the legal responsibility for the security of Candidate Nixon under the provisions of the June 6, 1968, Joint Resolution. CIA is furnishing pertinent information to the Secret Service. Mr. Helms is indirectly asking whether he should also provide information directly to Mr. Nixon.

I believe it would be best to deal with Mr. Nixon on this subject through the Secret Service. If Mr. Nixon actually goes through with his plan and there are questions about whether he had been informed by CIA of the dangers of the trip, the response would be that Director Helms had made available to the Secret Service all information CIA had on the security situation in Mexico, in accordance with the Joint Resolution, bearing on this subject.

W. W. Rostow

_____ Tell Director Helms to send his information to the Secret Service only.

_____ Tell Helms that he should be responsible for getting security information to Mr. Nixon, in addition to sending it to the Secret Service.

_____ Call me

BKS:amc

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 95-189 (#55)

By PC/GB **NARA. Date** 1-25-02

3053

~~SECRET~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

312

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

27 September 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

I agree with the attached note and believe that Mr. Nixon should be made aware of the potential dangers inherent in his planned visit to Mexico City.

This may smack of excessive caution, but I recall rather vividly the public criticism leveled at this Agency when Mr. Nixon had a close call in Caracas some years ago.

I am not clear on the channels to Mr. Nixon on a matter of this kind. I know that the Secretary of State and the Secret Service have the responsibility for the safety of American officials when outside the United States.

Rich
Richard Helms
Director

Attachment - 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-117
By *ing*, NARA, Date 5-16-95

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 September 1968

Note for the Director re Mr. Nixon's Planned Visit to Mexico

The Secret Service has requested an estimate on security conditions for Mr. Nixon's planned visit to Mexico City on 15 October. Because we are now even more concerned about security conditions than we were a few weeks ago, we are updating our note to you of 6 September on the proposed visit, since cancelled, of Vice President Humphrey.

1. We have judged prior to past visits to Mexico by President Johnson or Vice President Humphrey that there would be little or no danger involved, either of an assassination attempt or of violent demonstrations on any major scale. But in view of the recurring troubles between Mexican students and the Diaz Ordaz administration, we cannot make the same judgment with any confidence for Mr. Nixon's proposed visit. The Mexican government has been able to control the student riots only through the use of army troops to back up the police. There have been scores of casualties and a number of fatalities on both sides, as the students have used firearms and Molotov cocktails. We believe that the situation will remain tense at least for some months, and that, with or without the occasion of a prominent visitor from the US, student extremists will attempt to mount demonstrations during the Olympics in order to embarrass the Mexican government.

2. If Mr. Nixon does make a visit in October to view the Olympic games, we think that the Mexican security forces would have appreciably more difficulty in protecting him than has been the case in the past for prominent visitors. We think that anti-US extremists among the Mexican students would undertake

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-117

By ig, NARA, Date 5-16-95

~~SECRET~~

demonstrations directed against him specifically, and that these would be likely to turn ugly, producing some nasty incidents, before the security forces could suppress them.

Abbott Smith

ABBOT SMITH

Director

National Estimates

- 2 -

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ALL OFFICE
RECEIVED

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Public Law 90-331
90th Congress, H. J. Res. 1292
June 6, 1968

Joint Resolution

82 stat. 170

To authorize the United States Secret Service to furnish protection to major presidential or vice presidential candidates.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the United States Secret Service, in addition to other duties now provided by law, is authorized to furnish protection to persons who are determined from time to time by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the advisory committee, as being major presidential or vice presidential candidates who should receive such protection (unless the candidate has declined such protection).

Presidential
candidates.
Secret Service
protection.

(b) The advisory committee referred to in subsection (a) shall consist of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, the majority leader of the Senate, the minority leader of the Senate and one additional member selected by the other members of the committee.

Advisory
committee.

SEC. 2. Hereafter, when requested by the Director of the United States Secret Service, Federal Departments and agencies, unless such authority is revoked by the President, shall assist the Secret Service in the performance of its protective duties under section 3056 of title 18 of the United States Code and the first section of this joint resolution.

65 Stat. 122;
79 Stat. 890.
Appropriation.

SEC. 3. For necessary expenses of carrying out the provisions of this resolution, there is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968, the sum of \$400,000.

Approved June 6, 1968.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 114 (1968):
June 6: Considered and passed House and Senate.

ACTION

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Friday, September 27, 1968

4:00 pm

SUBJECT: Twelve More Skyhawks for Israel

4:00 pm
2. Pres file

Secretaries Rusk and Clifford recommend that we accede to an Israeli request for 12 more Skyhawks.

You will recall that our 1966 agreement sold 48 and that you added another 40 after Prime Minister Eshkol's visit last January. Now the Israelis have asked for 12 more, since the production line is going to close down by April 1970 and they would like to have a few extras to cover possible losses over the next few years.

Secretaries Rusk and Clifford recommend you go ahead. The Arab world is still unaware of the total number of Skyhawks going to Israel, and a few more added to the end of the delivery line would make little difference on the diplomatic front. While this wouldn't reduce pressure for the Phantoms, it would give us additional evidence for proving that we are not totally insensitive to their security requirements. That plus our general interest in Israel's defense are the main reasons for going ahead; I don't think there's much room for a bargain here.

The only reason this comes up for decision now is that we must notify Douglas Aircraft by September 30 to avoid a break in the production line which would add to the price. If we're going to do it, we might as well keep the line going.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

9/28/68

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Lia 10-22-80

By g/isp, NARA, Date 2-1-93

SECRET

S/S 12,982

3051

32a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1968

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Sale of 12 Additional A-4H Skyhawk
Aircraft to Israel

Recommendation:

That you approve the sale of 12 additional A-4H Skyhawk aircraft to Israel to meet normal peacetime attrition requirements.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

Our June 2, 1966 agreement for the sale of A-4H Skyhawks to Israel provides that the Government of Israel will have the further right to purchase additional A-4H aircraft to replace those lost in normal peacetime training. The Israelis have now asked to buy 12 A-4H aircraft in order to compensate for normal attrition requirements and in view of the expected cessation of the A-4H production line by April 1970. (Douglas Aircraft Corporation has informed us that the order must be placed by the end of September 1968 to avoid a break in the production line which will add considerably to the cost.)

Including the 40 A-4's you authorized at the time of Prime Minister Eshkol's visit last January, Israel will have received a total of 88 A-4H aircraft in-country by January 1970. Given this figure, the request for 12 additional aircraft for anticipated attrition requirements--although the Israelis have not yet lost any of the A-4's delivered to date--does not seem excessive.

SECRET

Group-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Letter 11-21-78

By ag/ip, NARA, Date 2-1-93

~~SECRET~~

2

The sale of these additional A-4H aircraft would avoid what could otherwise become a new if minor irritant in our relations with Israel and should not pose any new political problems for us in the Middle East.

Clark Clifford concurs in the proposed sale.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

33

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

Friday, September 27, 1968
1:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Harriman and Vance's reaction to the two tactical devices on which we asked for their comment last night. They come out suggesting (paras. 2 and 3) alternative variations of the first device; namely, ways of getting the GVN into the Paris talks.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Paris 21489 (DELTO 778)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 10355
By jc/ios NARA, Date 1-25-02



Department of State

TAYLOR
GINSBURG 9
TELEGRAM

33a

~~SECRET~~

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O 271140Z SEP 68
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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 21489

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10356

By j/c, NAKA, Date 1-25-02

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 778

REF: STATE 246008

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. WE HAVE STUDIED REFTEL AND HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:
A. THE FIRST DEVICE PROPOSED IN PARA 3 CARRIES THE SERIOUS RISK OF A PUBLIC SPECTACLE IF WE SHOW UP AT WEDNESDAY PLENARY MEETING WITH THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES WITHOUT PRIOR ACCEPTANCE BY DRV. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW BEFORE THE MEETING ON WEDNESDAY WHETHER OR NOT GVN REPRESENTATION IS ACCEPTABLE ON AN "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" BASIS.

B. THE ALTERNATIVE VARIATIONS IN PARA 4 SEEM PARTIALLY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THIS PROBLEM BUT REQUIRE EITHER THAT THE DRV AGREE IN ADVANCE OF ACTUAL CESSATION OF BOMBING WHICH THE DRV HAS ALREADY REJECTED OR TRYING TO WORK IT OUT IN A PUBLIC SESSION WHICH WE SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID.

C. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SECOND DEVICE PARA 5 REFTEL WOULD PROBABLY BE REJECTED BY BOTH HANOI AND SAIGON. IT DOES NOT SATISFY THE BASIC PROBLEM OF GVN REPRESENTATION IN SERIOUS TALKS WHICH SAIGON HAS EMPHASIZED. IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES PRIOR AGREEMENT BY HANOI ABOUT MEETING IN THE DMZ UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT DRV WOULD REJECT THIS AS A DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY. THIS PROPOSAL ALSO RAISES A RANGE OF OTHER PROBLEMS THAT WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO MEET AT THIS TIME.

2. ~~WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING MINOR VARIATION OF FIRST PROPOSAL~~

A. ~~INFORM THE DRV ON A WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON AT A SPECIAL PRIVATE MEETING~~

1) ~~THAT THE FOLLOWING SUNDAY WE WILL STOP ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIET NAM AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV.~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 21489, SEPTEMBER 27

2) ~~THAT ON MONDAY MORNING FOLLOWING CESSATION WE WISH TO HOLD A PRIVATE MEETING IN PARIS, AT WHICH THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WILL BE TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO FOLLOW CESSATION AND THAT WE WILL INSIST ON THE INCLUSION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN ON OUR SIDE~~

B. ~~INFORM THE SOVIET UNION OF OUR PROPOSED ACTIONS AT THE SAME TIME WE INFORM THE DRV AND SEEK THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORT~~

C. ~~IF DRV AGREES TO INCLUSION OF GVN, WE MEET ON WEDNESDAY WITH GVN REPRESENTATIVES ON OUR SIDE~~

D. ~~IF THE DRV DOES NOT AGREE AT MONDAY MEETING TO INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES ON AN "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" BASIS, RESUME THE BOMBING.~~

E. ~~IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH DRV, MAKE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING PROMPTLY THEREAFTER.~~

COMMENT: YOU WILL NOTE THAT TIME INTERVALS INVOLVED ARE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS IN DEPARTMENT'S PROPOSAL BUT OUR PROPOSAL AVOIDS PUBLIC SPECTACLE OF WEDNESDAY MEETING WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON PARTICIPATION.

3. A SECOND ALTERNATIVE

A. ~~INFORM USSR:~~

(1) ~~THAT WE WILL STOP THE BOMBING IF THE DRV AGREES TO THE INCLUSION OF THE GVN IN THE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL START PROMPTLY AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING.~~

(2) ~~THAT WE WILL ACCEPT THEIR WORD THAT THE DRV HAS AGREED TO MEET ON AN "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" BASIS PROMPTLY AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, IF THE DRV DO NOT WISH TO TELL US THEMSELVES. HARRIMAN~~

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

34

Friday, September 27, 1968
12:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Dobrynin has asked to see Sect. Rusk at 5 p. m. this afternoon.
We do not know the subject matter.

If -- but only if -- you have time to go over this paper on the Middle East, this afternoon would be a good occasion to hand it to Dobrynin.

As you will see, it is a thoughtful counter-probe suggesting:

- the areas where we disagree with the Soviet paper;
- the areas which interest us;
- the areas where we seek clarification of the Soviet document.

I believe it does what Dobrynin asked us to do -- namely, to be responsive -- without altering our basic Middle East policy or getting us into trouble with the Israelis at this stage.

It could help to clear some ground and narrow some issues before Sect. Rusk sees Gromyko in New York.

W. W. Rostow

Paper approved _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-105
By sig, NARA, Date 9-25-95

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

1. The United States Government has noted with interest the views of the Soviet Government concerning a Middle East settlement presented by Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Rusk on September 4, 1968.
2. The United States shares the view of the Soviet Union that peace in the Middle East is not the concern only of the countries of the region and that the persistence of tension in that area, and the absence of peace, threatens the general peace. The United States remains firmly opposed to any resumption of hostilities and is determined to use all its influence to achieve peace in accordance with the principles of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. It therefore welcomes the indication contained in the document given to Secretary Rusk by Ambassador Dobrynin that the Soviet Union wishes to discuss steps to help achieve a peaceful and enduring settlement called for by the resolution of November 22, 1967.
3. While sharing Soviet concern over the situation in the Middle East, the United States cannot accept the description contained in the Soviet document of the causes

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

By JC, NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

-2-

of that situation and the positions and actions taken by the parties since the cessation of hostilities. Moreover, it must reject as totally unfounded the allegation that the United States Government has supported a negative and deliberately obstructionist policy on the part of the Government of Israel. This statement is unwarranted and untrue.

4. The views of the United States have been set forth by the President and other senior U.S. Government representatives on a number of occasions and are well known to the Government of the Soviet Union. The five principles enunciated by the President in his address of June 19, 1967, as reiterated by him on September 10, 1968, remain the basis for United States policy concerning a Middle East settlement.

5. Since the adoption of the Security Council resolution the United States has given its full support to the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring to fulfill his mandate "to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

SECRET/EXDIS

-3-

with the provisions and principles" in the Council resolution. It has noted in the Soviet document the reference to Soviet support for Ambassador Jarring's mission but also the implicit assumption that Ambassador Jarring has failed in his effort to obtain the agreement of the parties called for in paragraph three of the Security Council resolution. In the view of the United States Government, such an assumption is not warranted at this stage.

Ambassador Jarring, in fact, is about to embark on a new, intensified effort with the parties in New York. The United States Government believes that its primary effort, along with that of the Soviet Union and other governments, should be directed at supporting Ambassador Jarring and in doing nothing that would in any way detract from or interfere in his activities. This attitude is reflected in the Security Council's resolution of September 18, 1968, to which both the United States and the Soviet Union gave their support.

6. The United States, on its part, will make a renewed effort to encourage the parties to engage in the fullest and freest exchange of substantive proposals under his auspices and to accept such procedures as he may suggest

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

-4-

to promote agreement as required by the resolution. It is hoped the USSR will do likewise. We believe no specific method for discussion should be excluded in seeking the agreement called for in the Security Council resolution of November 1967. The U.S. has urged, and both parties have participated in recent weeks in an indirect process to explore the essentials of a settlement under Jarring's auspices. But if progress is to be accelerated, more effective procedures of consultation by the parties are urgently required for the days immediately ahead. Just as we have felt that insistence upon direct negotiations as a pre-condition to serious substantive exchanges is unrealistic, so we believe the view that no joint talks can take place under Jarring's auspices is equally unrealistic. We hope the USSR will give this critical point the serious attention it deserves.

7. The Soviet document sets forth certain ideas which it states summarize the thoughts of various statesmen of the Arab countries, including President Nasser. The U.S. cannot speak for any of the parties, but it believes there are several points of major importance deriving from the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967,

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

-5-

from which further discussions could proceed:

(a) The resolution envisages the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories to secure and recognized boundaries as an element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

(b) It follows that, in the exercise of his mandate to promote agreement, the Special Representative of the Secretary General must facilitate discussion regarding the location of such secure and recognized boundaries, together with all other significant elements of an over-all peace settlement.

(c) Consistent with the above, a peaceful settlement must obviously embrace elements important to both sides, without subordinating in time or in emphasis the demands of one side to the demands of the other.

8. The Soviet document requests the views of the United States Government concerning steps which in its view must be taken for a prompt settlement of the Middle East problem. In response to that request, the United States Government would like to seek certain clarifications and present the following observations, which inter alia could be explored in future consultations:

SECRET/EXDIS

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

-6-

(a) The Soviet document refers in paragraph (a) to the readiness of the parties to implement the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. The United States wishes to point out that an essential part of the obligation to implement the resolution is the obligation to cooperate fully with Ambassador Jarring in the carrying out of his mandate as set forth in paragraph three of the resolution to promote agreement among the states concerned. It does not regard the Security Council resolution as self-implementing. It believes, on the contrary, that under the resolution the parties must take responsibility for an agreed settlement and that a settlement cannot be imposed upon the parties by others. The U.S. would welcome further clarification of the Soviet views on this point.

(b) The United States notes with interest that the Soviet document refers in paragraph (a) to the possibility of consultations "through Jarring or in some other form." The United States believes that consultations involving the parties will be essential to the development of agreement on a peaceful settlement envisaged by the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution. Does the Soviet Union share this view?

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

-7-

(c) The United States agrees that it may be desirable for UN forces to be employed to assist in the carrying out of the terms of a settlement agreed by the parties and notes in this connection that the Soviet document makes a number of suggestions in this regard. While not being able to accept some of the concepts reflected in these suggestions, the United States would be prepared to discuss with the Soviet Government the idea of use of UN forces in connection with an agreed settlement.

(d) The United States further notes that paragraph (b) 5 of the Soviet document provides that the declarations of the Arab countries and Israel on the cessation of the state of war and the establishment of peace would become effective "either through the instrumentality of the Security Council or through the signing of a multilateral document". The United States believes that the peace must be based upon arrangements which directly bind the parties. Is this what is intended by the reference to a "multilateral

SECRET/EXDIS

document"? The United States believes that a document signed jointly by the parties is the most desirable means of obligating the parties to carryout the agreement worked out in accordance with the resolution of November 22, 1967. It believes, also, that Security Council endorsement of the terms of a settlement agreed by the parties could serve a useful purpose. The United States is not clear what a Four Power guarantee would add to such a Security Council endorsement of the agreement of the parties, but it is willing to examine this possibility at the appropriate time.

(e) Concerning the above point on the cessation of the state of war, does the U.S.S.R. share the view of the United States that a termination of the state of belligerency would mean that there would be complete freedom of passage through international waterways, including the Suez Canal, for all vessels?

9. The Soviet document comments at some length on the desirability of a plan or timetable for implementation of the Security Council resolution. The United States has no objection to the concept of a plan under which the steps required for carrying out the peace settlement agreed to by the parties, and the timing of those steps, would be spelled out. It may be that the parties would find such a detailed plan necessary since, as the Soviet document also notes, the actions to be taken by the parties in carrying out their agreed settlement would inevitably be interrelated and in some degree interdependent. It is in light of this interrelationship that the United States firmly adheres to the view that all elements of a

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

- 10 -

settlement must be dealt with in arriving at the terms of a settlement. It is the understanding of the United States, moreover, that the parties, including the UAR, all recognize that the Security Council resolution requires a "package" which would settle all the problems left open for negotiations by the resolution, whatever the chronology for implementation on which they might agree. In our view this position represents a proper interpretation of the resolution.

10. There is one specific aspect of the program outlined in the Soviet document which in particular merits comment: the idea of Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5 line. The essence of United States policy since June 5, 1967, has been and remains that the state of armistice among the parties must be replaced, as the resolution of November 22, 1967, states, by a condition of peace. The armistice agreements of 1949 called for a transition to peace and specifically contemplated the possibility of agreed changes in the armistice lines of 1949 as part of that transition. The Security Council resolution calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to secure and recognized boundaries,

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

-11-

free from threats or acts of force, but does not specify that those boundaries should be precisely the lines held prior to June 5, 1967, or on any other date. In view of the complexity of this question the United States believes that this is a matter which requires the priority attention of both the parties and Ambassador Jarring.

11. The United States also believes consultations on policies of arms limitation for the area is particularly urgent. The continuing supply of Soviet arms to Arab countries contributes to the instability in the area. The United States Government is prepared to discuss this problem promptly.

12. The United States believes it important that the Soviet and United States Governments continue to consult on all possibilities for a settlement of the Middle East situation. It expects to be in contact with Ambassador Jarring in the days immediately ahead and, of course, there will be further opportunity for the two governments to exchange views during Minister Gromyko's forthcoming visit to New York during the General Assembly session.

9/23/68

35

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 27, 1968
10:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the Thais have second thoughts and now would welcome a Bangkok summit meeting round about October 14.

W. W. Rostow

Bangkok 20846
Bangkok 20876

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02



Department of State

TELEGRAM

10

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~~SECRET~~ BANGKOK 20846

NODIS/COLUMBIA

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMB UNGER

THIS AFTERNOON POTE SARASIN CALLED TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT I WOULD SHORTLY BE INFORMED THAT THE THAI GOVT ON FURTHER REFLECTION IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER HOSTING THE TCC SUMMIT MEETING IN OCTOBER. POTE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN CONCERNED AT THE SHORTNESS OF TIME AND THE ABSENCE OF KEY OFFICIALS AND PARTICULARLY AT THE SECURITY PROBLEMS PRESENTED, BUT ON REFLECTION HAD CONCLUDED THAT IF PRESIDENT JOHNSON WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN A MEETING HERE AS ALMOST HIS LAST MAJOR ACT BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, THE THAI GOVT WOULD DO ITS BEST TO MAKE ADEQUATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETING. HE THOUGHT OCT-14 WOULD PROBABLY BE THE EARLIEST DATE FEASIBLE.

2. POTE INSISTED THAT I NOT REVEAL THAT HE HAD GIVEN ME THIS ADVANCE WORD BUT HE SPOKE AS IF HE WERE SURE THAT I WOULD BE INFORMED SHORTLY. NEEDLESS TO SAY I WILL LET YOU KNOW WHAT NEXT OCCURS IMMEDIATELY.

GP-3. UNGER

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 12502

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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1968 SEP 27 AM 8 39

BT
~~SECRET~~ BANGKOK 20876

NODIS/COLUMBIA

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMB UNGER

REF: BANGKOK 20846

1. PRINCE WAN, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER CALLED ME IN AT END OF AFTERNOON (BIRABHONGSE, SECRETARY TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ALSO PRESENT) TO ASK WHETHER I HAD HEARD ANYTHING FROM WASHINGTON FOLLOWING MY CONVEYING WORD THAT RTG FELT UNABLE HOST TCC SUMMIT MEETING. I REPLIED IN NEGATIVE, ADDING I WAS SURE WASHINGTON MUST HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN THAI REPLY. I ALSO NOTED THAT FACT I HAD HEARD NO MORE DID NOT MEAN THAT DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ALTERNATIVE SITES OR CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ABOUT MEETING ITSELF HAD NOT BEEN TAKING PLACE, OR EVEN THAT SOME COMMITMENTS HAD NOT BEEN MADE IN THIS REGARD.
2. PRINCE WAN THEN SAID THAT IN VIEW US AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DISAPPOINTMENT, PRIME MINISTER THANOM HAD COME TO DECISION THAILAND WOULD HOST MEETING. HE MADE UNCLEAR REFERENCE TO THANOM'S HAVING TALKED BY TELEPHONE WITH THANAT AND SPECULATED WHETHER, PRIOR TO THAT, THANAT MIGHT HAVE TALKED TO "PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON". HE ADDED THAT PRIME MINISTER MENTIONED AROUND OCTOBER 20 AS PREFERRED DATE BUT PRINCE WAN ALSO REFERRED TO "THIRD WEEK OF OCTOBER" WHICH I POINTED OUT BEGINS OCTOBER 14.
3. ON MATTER OF HOW MUCH ADVANCE NOTICE RTG WOULD REQUIRE, I RECEIVED NO PRECISE REACTION EXCEPT THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT THE SOONER THEY HAD DEFINITE WORD, THE BETTER.
4. I THEN ASKED PRINCE WAN TO CONVEY MY APPRECIATION TO PRIME MINISTER FOR HIS NEW DECISION WHICH I KNEW WOULD GREATLY PLEASE WASHINGTON. IN CONCLUSION I AGAIN EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY (CITING THIS AS PROBABLY REASON I HAD RECEIVED NO INFORMATION ON SUBJECT SINCE SENDING IN RTG REPLY) AND PRINCE WAN ACKNOWLEDGED THIS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 12502

~~SECRET~~

-2- BANGKOK 20876, 271130Z SEP, (NODIS/COLUMBIA)

5. COMMENT: EARLIER WORD FROM POTE (REFTEL) AND MESSAGE CONVEYED BY PRINCE WAN LEFT ME WITH STRONG IMPRESSION THAIS, ON REFLECTION, REGRETTED NOT GOING ALONG WITH PROPOSAL WHICH US, AND ESPECIALLY THE PRESIDENT, WOULD LIKE TO SEE GO THROUGH. SAME OBSTACLES AS EARLIER MENTIONED EXIST BUT THEY WILL HANDLE PROBLEMS AS WELL AS THEY CAN AND WILL ASSUME ALL WILL UNDERSTAND IF SOME OF ARRANGEMENTS LEAVE SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED. I REALIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THERE MAY BE ADDITIONAL FACTORS AT PLAY IF THERE WERE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THANAT AND WASHINGTON OF WHICH I AM NOT AWARE.

6. AS TO TIMING, I BELIEVE THAI WOULD PREFER BEGIN MEETING OCTOBER 21 BUT MIGHT ALSO BE PREPARED MAKE IT OCTOBER 14.

GP-3, UNGER

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

Friday, Sept. 27, 1968
10:15 a.m.

36

MR. PRESIDENT:

Just as background information, you may want to read this Watch Report on the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] attachment (from Watch Report 26 Sept 68)

3.4(2)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-698 NLJ 84-76
By abm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

36a
26 September 1968

I. Communist International Developments

The USSR is engaged in a determined effort to restore its political hold over Czechoslovakia. The Soviets continue to stress that Prague must accept the Kremlin's definition of normalization, while the Czechoslovaks hold out for a negotiated resolution of the differences. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

The Soviet Union is conducting an intense war of nerves against Yugoslavia and Rumania, and the situation in the Balkans remains unsettled. Whether or not Moscow ever intended or intends any move against Rumania, suspicions of such a move have been aroused among the countries of the area. The Soviets, for their part, may be content to have worried the Rumanians about their intentions. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

Moscow's psychological pressure on West Germany seems designed to convey traditional threats of reactions should the West Germans fail to heed Moscow's demands for a curtailment of Bonn's activities in West Berlin and its policies toward Eastern Europe. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

II. Soviet and Eastern European Military Developments

The USSR continues to maintain in Eastern Europe the strong additional forces deployed there for the Czechoslovak intervention. Ground forces which were mobilized but remained in the western USSR have been kept in a state of readiness, including those forces near Rumania. Marshal Yakubovskiy has visited Sofia, East Berlin and Warsaw during the past week for the announced purpose of "further strengthening the Warsaw Pact." ~~(SECRET)~~

[REDACTED]

Rumors of Soviet troop movements into Bulgaria and of internal Bulgarian troop movements remain unconfirmed. If, however, the Soviets should elect to intervene in Rumania, they could do so with little or no warning in a short period of time. ~~(TOP SECRET)~~ [REDACTED]

We continue to receive reports from legal travellers of the arrival in East Germany of additional Soviet troops, in increments not larger than battalion size, and equipment from the USSR. Some of these troops have moved into the Berlin area. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Although the total number of troops involved in these movements is not known, we do not believe that they have compensated for the forces from the GSFG which deployed to Czechoslovakia. ~~(TOP SECRET)~~ [REDACTED]

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 02-70

By 100, NARA, Date 3-22-05

PERMANENT COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

A minimum of 19 Soviet and four Polish divisions remain in Czechoslovakia and in the Czechoslovak-East German border area. About half of these Soviet divisions remain concentrated near the West German and Austrian borders. ~~(SECRET)~~

The deployment on 20 September of the first operational Soviet naval helicopter carrier Moskva and two SAM-equipped Kashin-class frigates from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean has significantly augmented the Soviet Mediterranean naval force. These units moved into the Ionian Sea, where they are conducting ASW operations utilizing their newest ASW detection equipment. ~~(SECRET)~~

37

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~
LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Friday, September 27, 1968 -- 9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested in a private conversation yesterday with Sec. Rusk.

He said, if I were chatting sometime with the President, I might indicate to him that he, the Secretary, took the position on Vietnam he did at the NSC meeting for two reasons:

- First, he believes it to be the President's position.
- Second, he believes it to be the right position: the stakes involved in how we resolve the bombing question are enormous for both sides: one side or the other could unravel; it must not be our side.

On the other hand, the President should know that he is, above all, the President's servant and, should the President wish to move in another direction, he would bring to the task every ounce of skill and imagination he had.

We joked a bit on the theme that it looked sometimes as if we were the only two standing with the President; but concluded two were quite enough when the third was the President of the United States!

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-457
By CLB, NARA, Date 6-2-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

INFORMATION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, September 27, 1968

*sent to Pres
Sat 9/28/68
9:40 am*

Mr. President:

*1. summary
2. Pres file*

I know India isn't your favorite subject, but I thought you might wish to have again this year the intelligence we begin to gather about now on the prospects for the next Indian harvest.

This year's monsoon rains are about 3/4 over and are clearly much weaker than last year's. It is still too early for a really sound guess. But working from what hard figures we have for past rainfall and harvests, our experts say the crop could conceivably fall from last year's record of 96 million tons to as low as 80 million tons, which India got with comparable rainfall to this point in the lean year 1966-67. The experts underscore the tentativeness of this guess at this stage. But there's little doubt that the crop will be down, and prospects of a smaller crop have already pushed up Indian food prices in recent weeks.

There are two factors our projections can't measure at this stage: (1) the amount of rainfall in early October, which could make a difference of 5-6 million tons; and (2) how much increased production the Indians will get as a matter of course--good rains or bad--from the 10 million acres under new varieties of wheat which they didn't have two years ago.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow

31

ACTION

sent to Pres 9/28/68
9:00 AM

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, September 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Approval of FY 1969 Tunisian PL 480 Program

1. Pres
2. Pres file

Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman recommend a \$15.6 million PL 480 sales program for Tunisia in FY 1969.

This is part of our continuing program, and you will recall Bourguiba's description of his development effort. Reflecting the gradual phasing down of assistance to Tunisia, this is less than last year's \$23 million, and the terms are harder (60% repayable in dollars instead of 50%). This agreement includes further self-help efforts, even though the Tunisian self-help record is among the best.

Charlie Zwick and Treasury are aboard.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

9/30/68

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Att: Memo for the President from Charles J. Zwick, Director, Bureau of the Budget, 9/25/68, Subj: P. L. 480 Sales Program with Tunisia
Also Memo to The President from William Gaud, Administrator, AID, and Orville Freeman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, 9/19/68 (WH-3044)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 28, NARA, Date 11-17-92

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3044

39a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

SEP 25 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Sales Program with Tunisia

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud recommend that you authorize negotiation of a \$15.6 million P. L. 480 sales agreement with Tunisia. This is the only sale presently anticipated for FY 1969. It would supply wheat, edible oil, cotton and tallow, with repayments to be made 60% in dollars over twenty years and 40% in local currency. This reflects a progressive hardening in terms from last year's 50-50 breakdown.

Last year, responding to drought conditions, we negotiated \$23 million in P. L. 480 sales to Tunisia. We also provided \$10 million in dollar assistance through a program loan signed in June 1968. At present, AID is planning \$13.5 million in program and project loans for Tunisia in FY 1969, but this level will probably be reduced in view of congressional cuts in the development loan appropriation. The food aid and dollar aid levels also reflect a gradual phasing down of our total assistance to Tunisia, which it appears, is being accompanied by increases in assistance from other donors. Joint negotiation of the food aid and dollar aid programs is not feasible, since a program loan request will not be considered until late next spring and the P. L. 480 commodities are required now.

Self-Help - Self-help conditions in this agreement focus on actions which will promote greater productivity from existing Tunisian agricultural investments and techniques: improved surface and ground water utilization, better performance from farmers' cooperatives, increased credit to individual farmers, and accelerated use of fertilizer.

Military Expenditures - In approving the last program loan on May 18, 1968 you concurred in the State/AID determination that sanctions under the Symington Amendment are not required for Tunisia. State/AID reports that Tunisia's military budget level has not changed significantly since May.

I recommend that you approve this proposed agreement.

Charles J. Zwick

Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *1-25-02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

396

SEP 19 1968

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Tunisia

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 sales agreement with Tunisia to provide approximately 30,000 tons of edible vegetable oil, 11,500 bales cotton, 120,000 tons wheat and 400 tons tallow for which the current export market value (including applicable ocean transportation costs) is approximately \$15.61 million. Sixty percent of the sale will be financed under a 20 year dollar credit with interest at two percent during the two-year grace period and two and one-half percent thereafter. Forty percent of the sale will be for local currency with 92 percent for development loans and 8 percent for United States uses. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

The proposed sale of these commodities will reduce, to some extent, the disruptive effect of 3 years of unfavorable growing conditions and the diversion of scarce Tunisian foreign exchange from crucial imports needed for development.

Self-Help Efforts

In negotiating this agreement we will seek the agreement of the Government of Tunisia to undertake the following measures:

1. Accelerate (a) the wise utilization of water from wells already drilled and (b) surface water projects already under construction.
2. Devote more resources to the control and use of surface water in upper watersheds.
3. Accelerate economic research to evaluate performance of various systems of farm organizations.
4. Continue variety testing program for wheat, sorghum and forages in order to increase food production.
5. Increase use of fertilizers by Tunisian farmers.
6. Increase funds devoted to credit and other services for individual farm owners.

DECLASSIFIED

Agriculture guidelines 10/28/82

Authority A10 guidelines 10/16/95

By JC NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Military Expenditures Review

With respect to Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, State/AID have concluded that United States development assistance is not being diverted to military expenditures and that Tunisian resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with this PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

September 9 1968

SEP 19 1968

William F. Sand
Administrator
Agency for International Development

Quill F. Furman
Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

40
—
INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Pres file

Friday, September 27, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

You should know that Russ Wiggins is scheduled to give a major valedictory speech on the state of journalism early in October, when he receives a major journalistic award.

He went over his draft with me last night. It is a great speech which says vividly some things that ought to be said about the superficial character of a good deal of contemporary journalism; and it contains a great attack on television, built around the theme: "the camera does lie."

I urged him to let you see the draft before delivery, both to enjoy it and to look at certain phrases which might conceivably be a little delicate politically.

He may be asking for a jet star to take him out to deliver it in South Dakota, I believe, and get him back promptly to his job.

W. W. Rostow

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12058
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 16, 1983.

BY AS ON 11-17-92

WWRostow:rlh

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

41

~~TOP SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Friday, September 27, 1968
8:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This account of the heavy rains in the Panhandle and in the northern part of South Vietnam -- coming as they did about a month before the monsoon shifts -- indicates that our people have been aided in dealing with an offensive in the DMZ area.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

4/a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Effect of Recent Heavy Rains on the Enemy Forces in
I Corps

7. The recent severe weather in the northern provinces of South Vietnam has caused a reduction in Communist capabilities that is likely to be felt for some time.

8. Abnormally heavy rains were followed by Typhoon Bess, which struck the Indochina land mass near Da Nang on 4 September. Heavy rains in the northern provinces also fell this week. Normally, the regular transition period from the southwest monsoon to the northeast monsoon in this area occurs in late October. Rain in great amounts falls throughout the winter months with the peak usually coming in November.

9. This year, torrential rains came unexpectedly early and subsequent flooding significantly affected the Communist military effort. Infiltration and supply routes from North Vietnam were hit hard by landslides and flooding. Many enemy field positions in northern South Vietnam, including entrenchments, bunkers, and artillery positions, were rendered useless by the adverse weather. Malaria and other tropical diseases will undoubtedly increase among the enemy troops.

26 September 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-70
By SJ, NARA, Date: 10-03

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only

10. Probably the most critical damage suffered by the enemy's forces was the loss of food and munitions due to the flooding. Intercepted enemy messages have linked severe enemy food shortages with losses caused by the rains and with vigorous allied spoiling operations. Much of the enemy's cached food stores recently uncovered by allied sweeps have been damaged by water.

11. The potential lack of food supplies over the near term poses a serious threat to many of the enemy's troops in northern South Vietnam. Early official estimates suggest that more than half of the current rice crop in Quang Tri Province was destroyed. Many enemy units must procure a large part of each rice crop in order to remain in the coastal areas of the northern provinces.

12. Although it is difficult to assess to what extent Communist forces have been forced to alter current offensive strategies, the unseasonal heavy rains almost certainly caused the enemy to revise some plans and, together with allied military efforts, may help prevent a major new enemy campaign south of the Demilitarized Zone.

26 September 1968

I-3

No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

42

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 27, 1968
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Apparently a negotiation between
Arias and Vallarino has led to agree-
ment on the three top officers of the
National Guard, possibly avoiding a
coup.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc/jw*, NARA, Date *1-25-02*

Friday, September 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Mr. John Macy

Pres file

SUBJECT: Attached Memorandum From Secretary Rusk

In the attached memorandum, Secretary Rusk recommends that you authorize the nomination of John Thomas as Director of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).

Thomas is now in charge of our refugee program in Vietnam. He has done an excellent job, and we want to keep him there as long as possible. However, he accepted the Vietnam job only under great pressure and on the understanding that his assignment would not last beyond 1968. The present chief of ICEM does not step down until January, 1969. In other words, nominating Thomas for ICEM does not deprive us of his services in Vietnam, for he could not, in any event, stay beyond the end of the year.

If you approve his nomination, we would concert with Ellsworth Bunker before making any public announcement -- which in any case would not be necessary before late November.

This year we plan to contribute approximately \$2.8 million to ICEM's operating budget -- approximately 17% of it. This is less than the Australians pay, and far less than the 28 - 33% we contribute to most other international organizations. Having a reliable American as Director would make it easier to ensure that Czech refugees are resettled -- so far as possible -- in Europe, and that pressures to bring them in large numbers to the United States are controlled.

Thomas was the fellow who did such a superb job with the Cuban refugees. A Negro, Thomas has thoroughly earned his reputation as one of the best refugee men in the world. Particularly in view of the situation in Eastern Europe, ICEM is in need of a chief who can breathe new life into it. Thomas could do so.

I recommend you approve the nomination of John Thomas as Director of ICEM.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

September 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Czech Refugee Situation

We have, of course, kept the Czech refugee situation under continuing review. It occurs to me that one of the things we might do to encourage the Europeans to do more to meet the growing demands of the problem is to proceed promptly with the designation of an American candidate for the position of Director for the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).

As you know, ICEM had its origin in the concern of Congressional leaders to create an organization outside the United Nations framework, and thus without Soviet Bloc participation, to facilitate movement and resettlement of refugees from Europe. These were primarily from the Eastern European Bloc. An additional purpose was to assist in the movement from countries of surplus populations to countries in need of manpower. Thirty countries are members. ICEM has moved more than one and one-half million persons since its creation in 1951.

International organizations are not immune to the acquisition of organizational rigidity which beset all bureaucracy in time. ICEM could use a tightening-up and with vigorous leadership could considerably heighten European concern and bring about an increased awareness on the part of European countries of the necessity to do more to care for the Czech refugees whose movement is steadily increasing.

The present Director, Mr. B. W. Haveman of The Netherlands, will retire at the end of this year. We have received

U.S. OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT

indications that the appointment of an American would be welcome if he were able, aggressive and had a thorough knowledge of the refugee and migration field. This caveat is included because the last American director, a candidate suggested during the Eisenhower Administration, was a low level New Jersey Republican politician whose incumbency was a near disaster.

I would propose the appointment of Mr. John Thomas who would meet all of the qualifications I have mentioned above and who has the best background of any American we know to give the kind of leadership needed to revitalize ICEM.

Thomas has spent his life in this field. He had served as a Staff Director of ICEM quite some time ago. In the more recent past his direction of the Cuban Refugee Program has been very well received in the Congress, by the American family of voluntary agencies, and by the State Government officials with whom he worked most effectively. His appointment would receive complete support of the American voluntary agencies and the other Member Governments of ICEM. At present Mr. Thomas is directing the refugee activities on the American side in Vietnam. He has completely turned the situation around since his arrival there last spring. He would like the job and I believe your approval of his candidacy is consonant with the principle of giving some mark of recognition to one who has willingly carried out a most difficult assignment in Vietnam.

Although I do not consider it relevant, Mr. Thomas is a Negro.

Mr. Thomas had previously served in Vietnam, returning to Washington in 1965. Therefore, when we secured his reluctant assent to again undertake this thankless task, it was not expected that he would serve a normal tour. It was necessary to move rapidly last winter to correct a situation which was being exploited by Senator Edward Kennedy. Thomas did accomplish this necessary corrective action. It is contemplated

that if he is withdrawn he would be succeeded by Lou Weisner, his Deputy, who has the full confidence of Ambassador Komer and who was, in fact, Komer's original choice.

There has been some Congressional support for Walter Besterman, present Deputy Director of ICEM and a former staff member of the House Judiciary Committee. A thorough canvass has established that we simply could not get the votes from the other Member Governments for Besterman, and this has been explained to his House sponsors. We can arrange to continue his tenure until 1970 which will afford certain retirement emoluments from ICEM in addition to his Congressional retirement. We have received indications that his friends on Capitol Hill think such an arrangement will be eminently fair.

If you approve, I would not suggest any immediate announcement but that I be authorized to begin the necessary quiet consultation with other Member Governments.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

September 27, 1968

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten: P. [unclear]]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Second Quarter FY 1969 Underground Nuclear Test Program
(BOWLINE II)

The Atomic Energy Commission has submitted for your approval the AEC-DOD underground nuclear tests proposed for the second quarter underground nuclear test program (BOWLINE II). This program has been reviewed by the agencies represented on your Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and they have no objection to your approval of the recommended AEC-DOD program.

The proposed program consists of 20 tests: nine to demonstrate the performance, reliability, and safety of prototype warheads; one devoted to the development of improved penetration capability; three directed at development of primaries for multistage weapons or to single weapon development; four devoted to the advancement of nuclear weapon technology; one devoted to the advancement of PLOWSHARE program technology; and two Department of Defense experiments. [redacted]

6.1(a)

[redacted] However, AEC understands that it will have to obtain your specific approval in advance for the conduct of Project SCHOONER and the BENHAM event.

I recommend that you authorize the AEC to go ahead with the proposed program. If you agree, I will sign the attached memorandum to Chairman Seaborg.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____
Disapproved _____
Speak to me _____

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-99
By *[initials]* NARA, Date 9-25-03

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

CEJ:mb:9/26/68
cc: Mr. Kaeny

44a
/

September 28, 1968

~~SECRET~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Second Quarter FY 1969 Underground Nuclear Test
Program (BOWLINE II)

Reference is made to the request contained in your letter to the President of September 17, 1968, on behalf of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense for approval of the underground nuclear tests planned for execution in the second quarter of FY 1969 (BOWLINE II).

The testing program as described in your letter, except for BENHAM and Project SCHOONER, is approved. It consists of 16 tests sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission and two Department of Defense tests. Approval of the BENHAM event and of the PLOWSHARE cratering experiment, Project SCHOONER, is withheld and is subject to specific approval as set forth in my memorandum of June 28, 1968.

/s/ W W Rostow
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJ 02-99
By *SJ*, NARA, Date *9-25-03*

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~~SECRET~~

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446



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

SEP 17 1968

This document consists of 2 pages
No. 3 of 8 Copies, Series B

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

The purpose of this letter is to present for your approval the underground nuclear test program planned for execution in the second quarter of FY 1969. This program has been designated BOWLINE II.

The BOWLINE I test program has proceeded with the execution thus far of nine events. However, programmatic and technical difficulties have caused deferral of six previously approved Atomic Energy Commission events - BIT, FILE, THISTLE, HULA, WELDER, and KNIFE C - which are now included in the program proposed for the second quarter. Besides the above, one experiment, CHISEL, has been cancelled as a result of additional laboratory studies which show that performance would be below earlier expectations. In addition, the Department of Defense event, HUDSON SEAL, is currently scheduled for execution late in the first quarter. If any delays are encountered, this event may slip into the second quarter. For this reason, it has been included in the proposed BOWLINE II program.

The proposed BOWLINE II underground test program includes 18 tests sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission: nine to demonstrate the performance, reliability, and safety of prototype warheads; one devoted to the development of improved penetration capability; three directed at development of primaries for multistage weapons or to single stage weapon development; four devoted to the advancement of nuclear weapon technology; and one devoted to the advancement of PLOWSHARE program technology. Two Department of Defense experiments are also proposed for the second quarter. A description of the individual test events proposed for the second quarter is provided in Enclosure 1.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJ 02-100
By SJ, NARA, Date 9-25-03

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This document contains restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmittal or the disclosure of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~SECRET~~

The President

- 2 -

(b)(1)(a)

With the exception of the PLOWSHARE cratering experiment, Project SCHOONER, all of the test events included in the second quarter, BOWLINE II, program are designed to be fully contained. All test events will be carefully reviewed by the agencies concerned and will be executed only with the expectation that they can be conducted within the provisions of the limited test ban treaty.

Respectfully,

Chairman

Enclosures:

1. Cy 1A, BOWLINE II Events
2. Cy 1A, Draft Endorsement

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

44c

This document consists of 7 pages
No. 3 of 8 Copies, Series B

BOWLINE II EVENTS

I. AEC Weapon Development Tests

a. Weapon Performance and Safety

<u>Device</u> <u>(Sponsor)</u>	<u>Estimated</u> <u>Yield (KT)</u>	<u>Event</u> <u>Name</u>	<u>Approximate</u> <u>Date</u>
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b.1(a)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-100
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-25-03

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure 1
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

This document contains restricted data as defined
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmission
or the disclosure of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -


The objective of the experiments in this category is to demonstrate the performance and reliability of prototype weapon designs through the conduct of proof and safety tests.

6.1(a)

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
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- 3 -



6.1(a)

b. Penetration Capability

<u>Device</u> <u>(Sponsor)</u>	<u>Estimated</u> <u>Yield (KT)</u>	<u>Event</u> <u>Name</u>	<u>Approximate</u> <u>Date</u>
			

6.1(a)


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- 4 -


The objective of the experiment in this category is to further the development of warheads which will improve the capability to penetrate nuclear defenses.

G.I(a)




c. Primary/Single Stage System Development

G.I(a)



The objective of the experiments in this category is to establish the performance of primary or single stage fission devices which could be weaponized for application as primaries in multistage weapons or as single stage weapons.

G.I(a)



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
- 5 -

b.1(a)




d. Advanced Technology

b.1(a)



The objective of the experiments in this category is to advance basic nuclear weapon technology.

b.1(a)




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- 6 -

6.1(a)



II. PLOWSHARE Tests

6.1(a)

Device
(Sponsor)

Estimated
Yield (KT)

Event
Name

Approximate
Date



40

SCHOONER November

The objective of the experiments in this category is to further the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.

SCHOONER will be a nuclear excavation experiment at the Nevada Test Site. An approximately 40 KT thermonuclear explosive will be detonated underground for the purpose of obtaining data on the physical and chemical parameters which affect cratering at low intermediate yield in hard rock.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 7 -

III. DOD Tests

Device
(Sponsor)

Estimated
Yield (KT)

Event
Name

Approximate
Date

HUDSON
SEAL

September -
October

MING
VASE

November

6.1(a)

~~SECRET~~

45
-

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

Thursday, September 26, 1968
7:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

If you want the full text of Harriman
and Tho eyeball-to-eyeball on the GVN,
here it is.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 21423 (DELTO 776)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-17-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6456

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 PARIS 21423

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 776

SUBJECT: FULL REPORT ON TEA BREAK, SEPTEMBER 25

1. WE OPENED BY SAYING THAT AT OUR LAST PRIVATE TALK WE SPENT A GREAT DEAL OF TIME DISCUSSING THE PARTIES WHO WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD FOLLOW A CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE SAID THAT THIS SUBJECT HAS BECOME A MAJOR ROADBLOCK TO PROGRESS.

2. WE ADDED THAT WE COULD SAY TO THO AND THUY TODAY THAT UNDERSTANDING ON THIS SUBJECT WOULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING. WE CALLED TO THEIR ATTENTION THAT WE WERE USING THE WORD "WOULD" RATHER THAN "COULD." WE SAID WE EMPHASIZED THIS WORD BECAUSE IN OUR LAST MEETING THEY HAD COMMENTED ON OUR USE OF THE WORD "COULD" AS INDICATING UNCERTAINTY. NOW WE HAD TAKEN THEIR COMMENT INTO ACCOUNT AND HAD CONSULTED WASHINGTON. WE COULD NOW TELL THEM THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE SUBJECT WOULD BE A MAJOR FACTOR IN FACILITATING A DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING. WE SAID WE TRUSTED WHAT WE HAD SAID TODAY WOULD CLEAR THE ROADBLOCK.

3. THO ASKED IF THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE REPLIED THAT WE HAVE TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING THAT SERIOUS TALKS WILL BEGIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BOMBING CESSATION, AND OUR DEFINITION OF SERIOUS TALKS IS THE INCLUSION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN IN DISCUSSIONS REGARDING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE HAVE MADE IT PLAIN THAT WE CONTINUE TO BE READY TO HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DRV ON MATTERS OF BILATERAL INTEREST, BUT WHEN IT COMES TO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS REGARDING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THE DRV MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES MUST BE INCLUDED. WE SAID THAT THE ENTIRE BASIS OF THE US POSITION WAS THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE MUST DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT THE IMPOSITION OF A GOVERNMENT FROM WASHINGTON OR HANOI.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10371

By ~~selin~~ NARA, Date 1-25-02

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1968 SEP 26 PM 1 30

WH 459

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~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 21423, 261600Z SEP, SECTION 1 OF 3, (NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

TALK ABOUT

4. THO REPLIED THAT HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO ~~TALK ABOUT~~ THE DRV CONCEPTION OF SERIOUSNESS. BOTH SIDES HAVE TALKED ABOUT THIS, AND THEIR VIEWS DIFFER. THE DRV WILL CONSIDER TALKS TO BE SERIOUS ONCE THE US HAS CEASED BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV. THAT IS SERIOUSNESS, THO SAID, AND ONLY AFTER SUCH UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION WILL THE DRV CONSIDER THE US TO BE SERIOUS. THE DRV THINKS THIS IS A LEGITIMATE DEMAND AND FOR CLOSE TO FIVE MONTHS XUAN THUY HAS BEEN SPEAKING ON THIS SUBJECT. THE DRV SIDE HAS MADE THIS POINT IN BOTH OPEN AND PRIVATE SESSIONS.

5. THE US, THO CONTINUED, HAS A DIFFERENT CONCEPTION OF SERIOUS TALKS. IT WANTS TO FORCE AGREEMENT ON THE INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THE DRV THINKS THIS POSITION IS A DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY. THIS, THO SAID, IS A LACK OF SERIOUSNESS WHILE THE DRV SIDE IS SERIOUS.

6. THO SAID THAT AFTER THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV, WE COULD DISCUSS IMMEDIATELY WITH THE DRV THE SUBJECT WE WERE RAISING TODAY. THIS, THO SAID, IS A POSITIVE PROPOSAL OF THE DRV SIDE, THAT IS TO SAY THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, WE SHALL DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS. THO SAID HE THOUGHT THAT OUR RESPECTIVE ASSESSMENTS OF THE NLF AND THE GVN WERE DIFFERENT.

7. WE SAID THAT OUR DEFINITION OF SERIOUSNESS WAS VERY CLEAR, AND WE DON'T THINK THE DRV IS SERIOUS IF IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM IT WISHES TO EXCLUDE GVN REPRESENTATIVES. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE QUITE READY FOR THE DRV SIDE TO INCLUDE WHATEVER GROUPS IT WISHES, EVEN THOUGH OUR RESPECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF THE NLF ARE DIFFERENT. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT HE IS NOT WILLING TO STOP THE BOMBING AND THEN HAVE ANOTHER LENGTHY DELAY ON ANOTHER MATTER. IF, AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, WE COME TO THE MAJESTIC WITH THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES AND THE DRV SIDE REFUSES TO COME IN, IT WOULD BE A FARCE. THIS NOT RECIPROCITY. IT IS A QUESTION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SERIOUS TALKS."

8. THO SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY GIVEN HIS COMMENTS IN REPLY. THE DRV THINKS THAT SERIOUS TALKS MEANS UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV. AS FOR OUR FEAR ABOUT TALKS DRAGGING ON ENDLESSLY, THO SAID, HE HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS IN PRIVATE MEETINGS. IF THE UNITED STATES STOPS THE BOMBING, THE DRV AND THE US SIDES WILL DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT (I.E. GVN REPRESENTATION), BUT IF THE UNITED STATES REFUSES TO STOP THE BOMBING, THEN THE TALKS WILL DRAG ON BECAUSE THE DRV WILL NOT GIVE UP ITS POSITION.

HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

00 RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 21423/2 2701630 **SECRET**
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 261600Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6457
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF THREE PARIS 21423

1968 SEP 26 PM 12 48
08678

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 776

SUBJECT: FULL REPORT ON TEA BREAK, SEPTEMBER 25

9. SUPPOSE THE BOMBING STOPS TODAY, THO CONTINUED. TOMORROW THE DRV SIDE WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE US. THIS, THO SAID, IS VERY SERIOUS. HE SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE IT VERY CLEAR TO US THAT WE SHALL DISCUSS THIS QUESTION.

10. AS FOR THEIR ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION OF THE NLF AND THE PUPPET ADMINISTRATION, THO SAID THE DRV WILL CONSTANTLY MAINTAIN ITS POSITION AND WILL NOT CHANGE IT. AS HE HAD SAID, IF THE US STOPS THE BOMBING, THEN THE DRV WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS IMMEDIATELY THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION. THERE ARE POINTS, THO SAID, ON WHICH WE SHALL COME TO AN AGREEMENT AND OTHERS ON WHICH WE SHALL DISAGREE, BUT IF THE UNITED STATES HAS SERIOUS INTENT AND GOODWILL, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT WE MAY COME TO AN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, HE WONDERED IF THE US HAS SERIOUS INTENT AND GOODWILL.

Q. THO SAID HE THOUGHT THAT HIS STATEMENT WAS SERIOUS AND POSITIVE. THE DRV IS NOT PREPARED TO BE FORCED TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH THE US CLAIMS THIS IS NOT A DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY, IN FACT, IT IS. IF WE STOP THE BOMBING, THO SAID, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD HASTEN MOVEMENT TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM. IT WOULD BE QUICKER THAN ASKING FOR AN UNDERSTANDING BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. IF WE HAD STOPPED THE BOMBING WHEN WE FIRST CAME TO PARIS, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN QUICKER THAN TALKING FOR FOUR AND A HALF MONTHS. IT IS THE UNITED STATES SIDE WHICH HAS DRAGGED ON THESE CONVERSATIONS. AS FOR CONTINUATION OF BILATERAL TALKS ON SUBJECTS OF BILATERAL CONCERN, THERE IS NO PROBLEM IF THE UNITED STATES WISHES TO CONDUCT SUCH TALKS.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 21423, SEPTEMBER 26, SECTION 2 OF 3

12. WE SAID THAT THO HAD CHARACTERIZED OUR STATEMENT AS A DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY. IT WAS NOT AND IT DOES NOT BECOME SO BECAUSE THE DRV SIDE DEFINES IT AS SUCH. THE DRV SIDE SEEMS TO DEMAND THAT WE ALWAYS ACCEPT THEIR DEFINITIONS. WE HAVE HEARD NO INDICATION THAT IF THE BOMBING STOPPED THERE WOULD NOT BE ENDLESS DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN IN SERIOUS TALKS. AS WE HAVE SAID, THIS WOULD BE A FARCE. THE DRV SIDE TALKS ABOUT SERIOUSNESS OF INTENT. WE MUST SAY THAT THE DRV POSITION RAISES QUESTIONS IN OUR MINDS ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THEIR INTENT.

13. THO ANSWERED THAT HE WAS NOT FORCING US TO ACCEPT HIS DEFINITION OF RECIPROCITY. THE US WANTS US TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, BUT THE DRV SIDE DOES NOT ACCEPT A DISCUSSION OF ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THIS QUESTION (GVN REPRESENTATION) THE DRV SIDE HAS NOT YET DISCUSSED. ONLY WHEN DISCUSSIONS BEGIN WILL THE US KNOW THE DRV MIND, AND VICE-VERSA. THEREFORE THE US SHOULD STOP THE BOMBING, AND WE SHALL DISCUSS THIS QUESTION AS WELL AS OTHERS. THERE WILL BE POINTS OF AGREEMENT AND OTHERS OF DISAGREEMENT BUT, THO SAID, HE WAS SURE IF THE US HAS SERIOUS INTENT AND GOODWILL, PROGRESS COULD BE MADE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT. IF THE US SAYS IT LOOKS AT REALITY, SO DOES THE DRV LOOK AT REALITY. THO SAID, ~~HE~~ IN HIS VIEW, HIS PROPOSAL WAS A QUICKER WAY TO SETTLE THE MATTER THAN THE WAY WE ARE PRESENTLY PROCEEDING.

14. LAU THEN SPOKE. HE SAID THAT HE FELT WE WERE GOING DEEPER INTO THE DEFINITION OF WORDS. AND HE WAS AFRAID IF WE CONTINUED THIS WAY, WE WOULD NOT COME TO A SETTLEMENT. WE MUST GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THINGS, AS LAU HAD ONCE TOLD VANCE. VANCE HAD SAID WE MUST COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THUS, LAU REMARKED, OUR POSITIONS ARE DIFFERENT. THE US POSITION IS CONDITIONAL. THE DRV POSITION IS NOT.

15. WE SAID WE HAD A CLEARER AND CLEARER IMPRESSION THAT THE DRV IS NOT GOING TO LET REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN DISCUSS THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. FOR MONTHS AND MONTHS THE US GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE MUST DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE. IF THE DRV IS NOT READY TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT

25

~~SECRET~~



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC 21423/3 2701630
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 261600Z SEP 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6458
STATE GRNC
BT

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 PARIS 21423

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

1968 SEP 26 PM 1 46

DELTO 776

WE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY GVN REPRESENTATIVES, THEN TALKS WILL IN NO WAY BE SERIOUS. WE ARE GAINING THE IMPRESSION THAT THE DRV WANTS TO FORCE US TO ACCEPT THE NLF POSITION. THERE THUS SEEMS TO BE LITTLE USE TO GETTING ON TO SERIOUS TALKS. WE HAD ASKED THE DRV SIDE TO CONSULT ITS GOVERNMENT, AND THEY HAD ASKED US TO CONSULT OURS. WE HAD COME BACK WITH A CHANGE IN WORDS ("COULD" TO "WOULD") IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD FACILITATE THINGS ON THE DRV SIDE. THIS IS SUCH A SERIOUS MATTER THAT WE ASKED THEM TO CONSULT THEIR GOVERNMENT AGAIN, MAKING CLEAR THE UNITED STATES POSITION, NAMELY, THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT TALKS REGARDING THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES. IF THE DRV UNDERSTANDS THAT TO BE OUR POSITION, AND ACCEPTS IT, THEN SOME PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. WHAT WE ASK THE DRV TO DO IS TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE WILL HAVE GVN REPRESENTATIVES WITH US AND NOT TO OBJECT. IF THE DRV OBJECTS, THERE WILL BE NO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS.

16. THUY THEN SPOKE. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD REPORTED OUR LAST MEETING TO THEIR GOVERNMENT AND THEY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE DRV HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT RECIPROCITY. IN THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, HANOI HAD ALSO REITERATED THAT FIRST THERE MUST BE THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AND THEN A DISCUSSION OF OTHER QUESTIONS OF INTEREST. IN THE SPIRIT OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS, THUY SAID, THO AND LAU HAD SPOKEN TODAY. AS FOR THE MEANING OF WORDS, IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT. THE PROBLEM, THUY SAID, IS HOW TO SOLVE THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE US WANTS THE DRV TO COME TO AN UNDERSTANDING ON GVN REPRESENTATION BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THE DRV SIDE DEMANDS UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THEN WILL DISCUSS MATTERS RAISED BY THE US SIDE. THE US SIDE, THUY CONTINUED, HAS SAID THAT ONLY PRIOR UNDERSTANDING ON INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES CAN PERMIT RAPID PROGRESS TO BE MADE. THE DRV SIDE SAYS THAT BY STOPPING THE BOMBING FIRST, THE LENGTH OF DISCUSSIONS WILL BE SHORTENED.

~~SECRET~~

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-2- PARIS 21423, 261600Z SEP, SECTION 3 OF 3, (NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

THEREFORE, THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ON THIS POINT AND THE US SIDE SHOULD THINK THIS OVER.

17. WE SAID THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE QUESTIONS THAT HARRIMAN HAD TALKED OVER IN DETAIL WHEN HE WAS IN WASHINGTON. WE COULD ASSURE THE DRV THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF STOPPING THE BOMBING IF THERE-AFTER THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER LENGTHY WRANGLE. THE US HAS BEEN CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF CESSATION OF BOMBING WITH THE THOUGHT THAT A CESSATION WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY SERIOUS TALKS AND WE WOULD SIMPLY NOT TOLERATE ANOTHER PROLONGED PERIOD OF WRANGLING. WE SAID WE HOPED THAT THE DRV SIDE WOULD ONCE AGAIN CONSULT WITH ITS GOVERNMENT, AND ~~W~~ WOULD MEET AGAIN ON FRIDAY UNLESS THIS WAS TOO SHORT A TIME TO PERMIT A REPLY FROM HANOI.

18. THO SAID THAT WE HAD MENTIONED CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR GOVERNMENT. WHEN HE HAD BEEN TO HANOI, THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AND THE DRV DELEGATION HAS ALREADY CONSULTED ITS GOVERNMENT. THO SAID THAT THE DRV SIDE HAS NOT YET DISCUSSED THE MATTER OF PARTICIPATION IN SERIOUS TALKS AND THAT THO HAD NOT YET EXPRESSED HIMSELF ON WHETHER OR NOT THE DRV AGREES TO THE INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES. THE US MUST STOP THE BOMBING, AND WE WILL DISCUSS THIS QUESTION AFTERWARDS.

19. WE SAID THIS IS A VERY UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION. FOR MONTHS THE ARGUMENT HAS BEEN WHETHER THE NLF WOULD BE ALLOWED AT A CONFERENCE, NOT ABOUT THE GVN. WE NOW AGREE TO THE INCLUSION OF THE NLF, THE ALLIANCE, OR ANY OTHER GROUP IN THE DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE SOUTH, BUT IT IS A COMPLETELY FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE WITH US THAT NEITHER WE NOR HANOI IS GOING TO IMPOSE THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. THEREFORE, THE GVN MUST BE INCLUDED IN ANY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE SOUTH. WE SAID WE HAD NOTHING MORE TO SAY. WE ARE PREPARED TO MEET WITH THE DRV REPRESENTATIVES BUT IF THEY DON'T THINK THERE IS ANYTHING TO TALK ABOUT ON FRIDAY, THEN THE MEETING SHOULD BE PUT OFF UNTIL ANOTHER DAY.

20. THUY SAID THAT, TO SUM UP, THE ISSUE OF INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES IS THE ONE ON WHICH THERE IS A DIS-AGREEMENT. THE DRV SIDE IS READY TO MEET AT 9:30 ON FRIDAY IF WE HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY; OTHERWISE, WE WILL MEET AGAIN AT OUR REGULAR SESSION NEXT WEDNESDAY. IF EITHER SIDE HAS ANYTHING NEW BEFORE THEN, THEY WILL GET IN TOUCH. WE SAID WE DID NOT LIKE THE WORD "NEW -- AND LEFT IT THAT IF EITHER SIDE HAD SOMETHING TO SAY TO THE OTHER BEFORE NEXT WEDNESDAY, WE WOULD GET TOGETHER.

HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

46
-

Thursday, September 26, 1968 - 7:20 PM

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a brief message to Crown Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands and her husband, Prince Claus, congratulating them on the birth of their second son on September 25.

You sent a similar message to the Crown Princess and her husband on the birth of their first son in April 1967.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____


ERF:JKN:mst

416

**CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO NETHERLANDS
CROWN PRINCESS ON ROYAL BIRTH**

**Mrs. Johnson and I send our warm congratulations on
the joyful occasion of the birth of your second son and our
best wishes for his long and happy life.**

ACTION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS*Pres file*

Thursday, September 26, 1968 -- 7:10 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft cable for your clearance.

It seeks preliminary reactions from Harriman and Bunker on two ideas for dealing with the GVN representation problem, with which you are familiar.

The cable makes clear that these are working level ideas which have not yet been reviewed at the highest levels. Nevertheless, Sec. Rusk and I did not wish even this exploratory cable to go forward without your assent.

W. W. Rostow

Cable approved _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988
By *rg*, NARA, Date 2-25-93

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

47a

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy PARIS TODEL _____ IMMEDIATE
AmEmbassy SAIGON "

STATE

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10354
By KLH NARA, Date 1-25-02

1. In briefing Thieu on status of Paris talks, Saigon should convey that we have made no substantive advances in our recent exchanges with Tho, although we cannot conclude that DRV has rejected outright our position on GVN representation. Thus we appear at least temporarily stalled over this crucial question.

2. We have been considering ways to break this logjam. Out of our discussions at working level have emerged two basic devices, on which we would like comments from both Paris and Saigon before review with highest levels. Both devices are attempts to find a way to make a maximum effort and to break through on the question of GVN representation, /are premised on fact that ~~USG/XX~~ would have to be satisfied as to DMZ and attacks on cities.

3. The first device under consideration here would involve informing the Hanoi delegation about five days in advance that:

a) On the following Tuesday bombing would stop but there would be no public announcement;

Dated by:

U:RHolbrooke:ldp 9/26/68

Clearances:

Tel. No.
6005

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

THE SECRETARY

U - Under Secretary
White House - Mr. Rostow
S/S -

OSD -
JCS - General Wheeler

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Page 2 of telegram to AmEmbassies PARIS and SAIGON

~~SECRET~~
Classification

b) On Wednesday serious discussions would begin and we would bring with us to the meeting representatives of the GVN;

c) If serious talks were launched on this basis on Wednesday, we would then announce that bombing had stopped 24 hours earlier and that serious talks were now underway;

d) If talks did not begin, bombing would resume and there would be no announcement. If the fact that there had been a 24-hour standdown over the North leaked, we would be in a strong position, explaining that we had made a major effort to break through in Paris, even taking the risks involved in a short standdown, but it had failed because of DRV rigidity.

4. In a slight variation of this approach, also under discussion here, we would offer the DRV a choice between:

a) agreeing in advance to GVN representation at the Wednesday meeting following the Tuesday cessation; or,

b) coming ~~xxxxxx~~ to the Wednesday meeting which follows the cessation and agreeing at that time to the inclusion of the GVN at the first serious talks which would take place the following day.

COMMENT: This variation would offer the DRV a possible way out of their doctrinal point since it would allow the DRV to make no commitment until after the bombing had stopped. The DRV would know that if they stalled over GVN representation on Wednesday, then we would resume the bombing.

5. The second device under consideration here would propose to Hanoi that:

a) Immediately after the bombing cessation, military representatives

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Classification

of both sides (Hanoi, NLF, GVN, and U.S.) would meet say, at the DMZ. They would discuss QTE the total cessation of hostilities--that is, a true cease-fire. UNOTE

b) In fact, we would indicate that this would be a good occasion for the southerners to begin to talk about a political settlement.

c) Meanwhile, the Paris talks would continue on bilateral matters between the U.S. and Hanoi, but with the understanding that the other parties (NLF and GVN) would ~~join~~ join the talks when the outlines of the political settlement had become clear.

6. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ These of course are bare bones sketches, and we are interested in your comments on each idea or any other suggestions you may have, as soon as possible.

END

DS-322A

Classification

48

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Thursday, September 26, 1968
5:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to be aware that trouble could be brewing in Panama as the President-elect tries to eliminate the very considerable political power of Vallarino.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By xc/rn, NARA, Date 1-25-02

48a

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
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Copy sent Bandler

OK

Roston

26 September 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Panamanian Situation as of 2 PM EDT

25X1C

1. Recent reports that president-elect Arias intends to make drastic changes in the top leadership of the National Guard, including the retirement of First Commandant Vallarino and the "relief" of other key officers, has prompted coup talk among those officers likely to be affected. According to [REDACTED] the dissidents, including all guard troop commanders, have asked General Vallarino to present an ultimatum to Arias.

2. Although the officers involved have discussed taking over the government as early as this evening, the decision to act apparently hinges on a meeting between Vallarino and Arias now taking place. Confronted with this sort of ultimatum, Arias may back off, at least temporarily, in order to avoid a coup that would prevent his inauguration next Tuesday.

(THESE ARE OUR HASTY INFORMAL COMMENTS)

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 019-040-1-2

By Sp, NARA, Date 11/20/02

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

INFORMATION

Pres. file

49

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, Sept. 26, 1968
5:20 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Our China-watcher has come up with the feeling that something big might be about to happen in Communist China about October 1st (*National Day*);

The evidence includes:

- ~~a million laborers coming to march in Peking;~~
- a Chicom diplomatic instruction suggesting that the words of Chou En-lai are the appropriate guidelines;
- ~~unprecedented aircraft movements within~~ China; and
- the mysterious instructions about sending files back to Peking.

We shall be following this. Frankly, we don't know what it means. But I did wish you to share whatever background and insight we have.

Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-200
By *ju*, NARA, Date *1-11-94*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Lull Before the Next Mainland Storm?

I had earlier speculated that to register overtly at the National Day celebrations on October 1 the recent power shift to the right might be a tactic adjudged too disruptive to the regime's facade of unity to be adopted, and that the registering may have to be more gradual. It seems to me that the chances of these two tactics are now nearer 50-50.

Some million laborers from all over the country are gathering in Peking to march on October 1. This could well be designed as a show of strength on the part of the bureaucrats and the conservatives similar to that employed by the extremists in August 1966 in the massive parades of Red Guards.

The attached [] is particularly interesting in this regard. It adds to other indices that the position of Chou En-lai and his bureaucracy has been clearly strengthened since June. []

3.4
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It may be farfetched to link the directive [] with the unprecedented aircraft movements of recent days and the calendar date (less than a week before National Day). Nevertheless, it is difficult for me to buy

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-95

By hls, NARA, Date 5-21-03~~SECRET~~

the explanation that these are simply training flights, long delayed because of earlier unsettled conditions. It seems to me at least as likely that Peking has become concerned about evidences of "localitis" and that movement of personnel to unfamiliar areas might make more likely responsiveness to altered policies in Peking, if they are in the offing, rather than to the special demands of local interests.

I should stress that we do not have enough indication of a coming storm, confidently to predict that it is near. I am a bit surprised, however, that initial reaction, particularly from CIA, to the attached document was to consider it as routine and probably unrelated to any likely early event. The Agency's own special report attached to the Weekly Review of September 20, entitled "Mao Tse-tung and His Associates: Uneasy Alliance" concludes with the following two sentences:

"There can be no security at the pinnacle of power in China today, save perhaps for Mao himself. A new, ruthless purge would seem to be near and this time it might reach into the inner circle."

If the next purge is near and is to reach into the inner circle, it would certainly make sense to batten down the hatches both at embassies abroad and at military installations at home. That the next purge may be more definitive and basic than previous ones is made the more likely by the fact that for the first time the one remaining major force in China still intact (the military) is apparently in league with the semi-intact bureaucracy against party extremists who are now largely bereft of their power base (Red Guards and the beleaguered Cultural Revolution Group in Peking).

Admittedly, if something really big were close at hand, we might expect reports of tension in Peking, and these are lacking. It may be that the several possible indicators of a storm, in fact, have other explanations and are unrelated. We simply do not know. I still come out believing, however, that when policies have so clearly failed and the power exists to insist upon change, then such insistence is likely. When that change comes, I would expect it to be only in tactics and to some extent in strategy rather than in basic objectives. We should not get our hopes very high.



Alfred Jenkins

Attachment

496

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 98336

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	EDO	ONE	CRS
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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic

downgrading and

declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

CITE.

DIST 25 SEPTEMBER 1968

COUNTRY: CHINA

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

DOIE: 6 SEPTEMBER 1968 25 16 43z SEP 68

SUBJECT: CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTIVE
ON CONDUCT OF DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS AND
INSTRUCTIONS ON REDUCTION OF CLASSIFIED FILES

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

ACC:

SOURCE:

ACCORDING TO

RFA INSTRUCTIONS, EMBASSIES ABROAD SHOULD FOLLOW CLOSELY
SPEECHES MADE BY PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI AS THE BASIC GUIDANCE
IN CONDUCTING DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN
OFFICIALS. THE DIRECTIVE INSTRUCTED THE MINUTES OF

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED

R.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-96

By alm, NARA, Date 3-27-93~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IN 98335 336

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

CONVERSATIONS, DISCUSSIONS, AND NEGOTIATIONS; EMBASSY PERIODICALS; AND MONTHLY, QUARTERLY AND ANNUAL REPORTS SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO THE MFA AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE ACCURACY AND CORRECT SHADING OF CONVERSATIONS, REPORTS SHOULD BE PREPARED JOINTLY BY THE CHIEF OF MISSION AND RESPONSIBLE INTERPRETER AFTER A CONFERENCE OR MEETING. THE DIRECTIVE STATED THAT ALL REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS SENT TO MFA SHOULD FOLLOW THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OUTLINED BY CHAIRMAN MAO.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25
(C)

2. [REDACTED] THE MFA DIRECTIVE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE REPORTING. THE DIRECTIVE INSTRUCTED THAT BECAUSE OF THE SHARPENING OF STRUGGLES AROUND THE WORLD AND UNPREDICTABLE CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO ALERT ALL EMBASSIES OF THE DANGER OF KEEPING UNNECESSARY DOCUMENTS. IT DIRECTED THAT ALL IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS, INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND FILES SHOULD BE RETURNED TO MFA FOR STORAGE AND SAFEKEEPING IMMEDIATELY. IT WARNED THAT EMBASSIES ABROAD MIGHT NOT HAVE TIME TO BURN ALL DOCUMENTS OR DESTROY IMPORTANT PAPERS IF AN EMERGENCY UNEXPECTEDLY OCCURRED.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IN 98386336

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

THEREFORE, THE DIRECTIVE INSTRUCTED ALL EMBASSIES TO EXAMINE ALL DOCUMENTS, FILES AND RECORDS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHAT MATERIAL SHOULD BE BURNED OR DESTROYED AND WHAT FILES AND PAPERS SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO MFA. THIS WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DOCUMENTS FALLING INTO THE WRONG HANDS DURING A DISASTER.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. [] MFA [] ALSO REISSUED DIRECTIVE NO. EIGHT DATED 1964, WHICH DIRECTED ALL EMBASSIES, ALL DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS TO PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR AN EMERGENCY AND ALWAYS TO BE READY FOR THE UNEXPECTED. IN THIS REGARD, DOCUMENTS, FILES AND RECORDS SHOULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM FOR BETTER CONTROL AND SECURITY. DOCUMENTS CONTAINING HISTORICAL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND PARTY SECRETS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY SCREENED SO THE RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL CAN DECIDE ON THE DOCUMENTS TO SEND BACK, BURN OR DESTROY. THE DOCUMENTS KEPT IN THE EMBASSIES SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THOSE NEEDED ON A REGULAR BASIS AND THE FEWER THE BETTER.

4. THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS OF HISTORICAL VALUE TO BE RETURNED TO MFA INCLUDE: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS,

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IN 98336 336

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

SECRET CORRESPONDENCE IN THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT

BUSINESS, IMPORTANT MEMORANDUMS, SIGNIFICANT NOTES,

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES, DOCUMENTS, AND CORRESPONDENCE

WITH PARTIES, ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONALITIES. MEMORANDUMS

OF CONVERSATION PREPARED BY AMBASSADORS, COUNSELORS,

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, CONSULS GENERAL AND OTHER IMPORTANT

COMRADES SHOULD BE CHECKED AND EDITED BY THE EMBASSY

PARTY COMMISSAR WHO IN TURN WILL DECIDE THE TIME LIMIT

FOR KEEPING THESE DOCUMENTS AT THE EMBASSY PREMISES.

RECEIPTS FOR PAYMENTS AND OTHER IMPORTANT IDENTIFICATIONS

AND CERTIFICATES SHOULD BE FORWARDED IMMEDIATELY TO MFA FOR SAFE
KEEPING.

EMBASSIES SHOULD NOT KEEP

SUCH DOCUMENTS ON THEIR PREMISES OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD.

5.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IN 98336 536




PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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(classification)

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


EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

6.



DISSEM: CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACF (ALSO SENT



EO-12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~



INFORMATION

Pres file
50

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

Thurs., Sept. 26, 1968
5:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith sensitive information that Costa
e Silva's health may not be all it should be.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-67
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

~~TOP SECRET TITINE~~

50a

2.

3.4(b)
(1),(3)
6.1(c)

INR Comment: There is mounting evidence that the President's health is deteriorating. He reportedly suffers from arteriosclerosis and thus could easily become distraught,

-4-


DIPSUM 26 Sept 63

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-68
By cm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

~~TOP SECRET TITINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

particularly when the blood supply to the brain is diminished during so-called cerebral episodes. Furthermore, the facts of his condition, although not yet made public, could hardly be very well kept secrets within the military establishment. It is entirely possible that Foreign Minister Magalhães Pinto took part in what appears to have been an informal gathering in São Paulo. If so, he may have answered some questions about the President's health, particularly if the occasion was in memoriam of another old soldier.



3.4(b)(1),
(3)
6.1(c)

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

51

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Thursday, September 26, 1968
2:30 p.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

With this piece of intercept information, I believe our two tracks are crossing in Moscow; that is, the stalemate in Paris and my private conversation. I would guess we would know the answer in a relatively few days.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-67
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

51a

26 September 1968


DAILY SEAS

Roston

This is an advance NSA item.

3.406X(1), (3)
6.1(c)

E63



~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-68
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-20-03

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

Thursday, September 26, 1968
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

I am not sure you have seen the
text of this sensitive exchange between
Sec. Rusk and Dobrynin on Sept. 20.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-17-92

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Ambassador Dobrynin
Assistant Secretary Leddy

DATE: September 20, 1968

PLACE: Department of State

TIME: 12:30 p.m.

Copies to:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-25
By ig, NARA, Date 6-17-94

This meeting took place at the request of Ambassador Dobrynin who asked to see the Secretary on the question of US/Soviet discussions on peaceful explosive nuclear devices (PNEDS). (There is a separate memorandum of conversation on this subject and on the question raised by the Secretary of the Soviet propaganda campaign against Germany and Berlin.) What follows is a note, in one copy, of off-the-record remarks made by the Secretary, and Dobrynin's responses.

The Secretary said that when he came into office he had been convinced that the Soviets were sincere when they said that they wanted to pursue a policy of "peaceful co-existence". He had continued to hold this view during the past few years. There had apparently been a real desire on the part of the Soviet Union to see a broadening of contacts between East and West, a lessening of tensions, a degree of liberalization, a disposition to come to grips with some of the real problems in the world. However, the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia had raised questions in his mind. He didn't understand why the Soviets had felt it necessary to do what they did in Czechoslovakia. Were there new elements or forces at work in the Soviet system? Was there a different orientation of Soviet foreign policy in the making? What might this mean in terms of a policy of peaceful co-existence?

PRESERVATION COPY

It was at this point, reported in the other memorandum, that Dobrynin asserted, not on a purely personal basis but with official force, that the Soviet Union continued to pursue the policy of peaceful co-existence. He added that he had gained the impression that a number of American officials somehow thought that the Soviets were now deliberately attempting to intensify contacts with the United States and other western countries because of Czechoslovakia (i.e., presumably to help the Soviets in shoving Czechoslovakia under the rug). He denied that this was the case and said that these efforts at contact were simply the continued pursuit of peaceful co-existence, as before.

The Secretary then referred to the fact that the invitation for a meeting between the President and Soviet leaders in the Soviet Union and the Czech invasion had occurred about the same time; that he had concluded that the Soviet decisions on both matters must have been made by the same people at about the same time, presumably over the weekend; and that the coincidence of the actions was like throwing a dead fish in the face of the President of the United States.

Dobrynin said that he could not give an official explanation of this coincidence, but being familiar with the Soviet bureaucracy, he had personally concluded that the decision to invite President Johnson to the Soviet Union (communicated to Secretary Rusk aboard the HONEY FITZ on the evening of August 19) had been made in Moscow about a week before. He said that a decision of this kind, although having been made, nevertheless had to go through a bureaucratic process of several days. On the other hand, it was clear that the decision to invade Czechoslovakia had been made considerably later, perhaps on the weekend of the 17th-18th or even Monday, the 19th. He pointed to the fact that several of the Soviet leaders had been on vacation and were called back to Moscow over this weekend.

EUR:JLeddy

3 53

ACTION

Limited Official Use

Thursday - September 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to President Arias

Panama President-elect Arias assumes office on Tuesday, October 1. The customary message of congratulations is in order.

President Arias has followed a conciliatory policy since winning the bitterly contested election last May. Towards us he has displayed a desire to continue close cooperation. In a recent visit to this country, he spoke at length with Bob Anderson about the Canal treaties. It is clear that he wants to reopen negotiations, but will probably wait until February or March of next year.

At Tab A is a suggested congratulatory message for your consideration. At this stage, I think it best not to cast it in warmer terms than those used.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Attachment

Tab A - Suggested Presidential congratulatory message to Panamanian President-elect Arias.

Suggested Presidential Message of Congratulations to Panamanian
President-elect Arias

On the Occasion of Arias' Inaugural on October 1, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I extend warmest congratulations on your inauguration as President of the Republic of Panama. I wish you every success as you guide the destinies of the Panamanian people. My sincere hope is that the traditional bonds of friendship which have linked our two countries will be further strengthened in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Dr. Arnulfo Arias Madrid

President of the Republic of Panama.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 26, 1968

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Ambassador Bunker's 68th weekly message—

*containing a good many interesting items*A. General

- Pacification, political development, upgrading effectiveness and anti-corruption getting GVN emphasis.
- Week's military activity somewhat higher but no change in general pattern.
- Thieu thinks enemy pressure will continue for several months.
- Evidence of decline in enemy morale and performance suggests enemy may be forced to reassess strategy.
- Enemy placing great emphasis on setting up "liberation committees" to tighten control of rural areas.
- Facilities being improved and expanded to accommodate new prisoners and keep stride with attack on VC infrastructure.
- Thieu wants 1969 plan to emphasize pacification and greater use of RF/PF as against conventional military warfare.
- Thieu says it might be possible to reduce U.S. combat and support troops in 1969 and 1970.
- National Day (Nov. 1) will play down military aspects and stress development and pacification themes.
- Eugene Black visit focused attention on promising postwar future for Vietnam and region.

B. Political

- Thieu says nation understands Lien Minh has his full support.
- Lien Minh's "New Action Program" has sent 450 trained personnel into Saigon wards. Eight hundred more are currently being trained for political field work.
- While Thieu generally gets along with press, recent temporary suspensions and warnings to newspapers indicate that GVN has been applying more pressure to press.
- New draft press law now in lower house is considered by press too restrictive. Information Minister says he must administer current laws, tells critics to seek remedial legislation.
- Gen. "Big" Minh's return should help national unity; Thieu ready to make him special advisor.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *1-25-02*

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

-- Opposition to Minh by Northern Catholic and Dai Viet party could raise problems, as could his exploitation by militant Buddhists. Thieu is aware of these possibilities and is on guard.

-- Sihanouk has ignored our evidence, given him through Australians, of massive NVA/VC use of Cambodian border territory at Ba Thu. We are releasing this evidence unofficially to friendly newsmen.

-- Disclosure hopefully will jolt Sihanouk into greater activity on border. It will at least be on public record and help counter Cambodian propaganda.

C. Military

-- Capture of enemy arms caches continues at high level.

-- South Vietnamese forces, including RF and PF, fought well in several major actions during week.

D. Economic

-- Overall price level remained unchanged.

-- New draft of war risk insurance decree should be promulgated within next two weeks. It reportedly contains major U.S. recommendations.

-- David Lilienthal's Development and Resources Corporation has started in-country feasibility studies on proposed Mekong Delta development project.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Thursday, September 26, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 38774)

Herewith my sixty-eighth weekly message:

A. General

With the Assembly in recess the past week -- relatively quiet politically on the administrative side. However, the government continued to move ahead with its program for political organization, with Thieu's increasing emphasis on pacification as a national program having top priority in winning the political side of the war, and with the continuing efforts of Prime Minister Huong to improve the effectiveness of the government and to root out corruption. Military activity was at a somewhat higher level the past week but the general pattern as described in my last message continued. Thieu told me yesterday that he believes it will continue for several months with the enemy attempting to keep up as high a level of pressure as he is capable of.

The enemy killed increased to 3,757 (41 percent by Army of the Republic of Vietnam Forces) while friendly killed was down slightly -- 629 (63 percent ARVN). The initiative remained with friendly forces. Further large caches of enemy weapons and ammunition were captured in the continuing and successful effort to forestall his offensive plans.

Thus the pressures on the enemy toward a re-examination of his strategy grew. We have nothing specific yet to indicate that a change has in fact been decided upon; and I mentioned Thieu's views above. However, new evidences of his mounting problems with his present strategy have come to light. Since August 18, he has lost 18,470 killed in action. These heavy losses, plus the large but unknown number of casualties being inflicted by air strikes, especially B-52 strikes, are beginning to tell on his morale. The impact is heightened by his almost total lack of success in the series of attacks he has attempted to mount.

For example, a notebook captured in Quang Nam Province in the First Corps, possibly that of a company commander in the ^aband North Vietnamese Army Division, indicated that his regiment was given the task during the August attacks of drawing one or two allied brigades to favorable areas so they could be destroyed. September 9 entry indicated the regiment took heavy casualties and failed in its mission due to poor fighting spirit, fear of fighting in mountainous areas or attacking strongholds, lack of determination because of the peace talks and fear of hardships and difficulties. A rallier from the 24th North Vietnamese Army Regiment near Kontum said his

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-97

By cbm, NARA, Date 32703

battalion had to help bury the dead of another battalion of the same regiment which had only 40 survivors out of 450 following air strikes. His own battalion had lost 150 of its 450 men. In the Third Corps, agent reports say that many enemy troops feel an attack on Saigon would be suicidal, while others hope the attack will be made, thus opening up the possibility of deserting.

Other reports of this kind could be cited. While I do not wish to over-emphasize their importance, it is a new phenomenon to have them coming in such numbers. It would seem that the problems they reflect must influence the enemy's assessment of his future strategy.

A Central Office for South Vietnam document dated April 12, obtained here September 16, casts additional light on the importance it places on the establishment of "Liberation Committees." The document states that the failure to overthrow GVN administrations and establish revolutionary administrations in their place was a marked weakness of the "general offensive and general uprising." It noted that even in places where the GVN had no administrations, revolutionary administrations were not set up. A Viet Cong training document captured in Quang Nam in August also stressed the importance of setting up "People's Councils" and "People's Liberation Committees." It is notable that the reports of establishment of such councils and committees generally place them in villages and hamlets already controlled by the Viet Cong. It is obvious, however, that heavy emphasis is being placed on this effort and both we and the GVN are keeping careful watch on it.

The GVN effort against the enemy infrastructure continues to make progress, although there is still a long way to go. Infrastructure elimination in August at 1100 remained at about the level of the previous three months. We need to double or triple this figure. An element of the program I have not reported on before where progress is being made relates to the handling of those captured. Progress includes:

1. Thwarting Viet Cong attacks against the prisons through better defenses; the Viet Cong have made four attacks against prisons since Tet, but have not succeeded in releasing any prisoners;
2. Increasing capacity of prisons and detention camps by over 12,000 spaces;
3. Erection on Con Son Island of a 5,000 man tent camp with prison labor and beginning construction of a 4,000 man permanent prison;
4. Moving 4,523 dangerous prisoners from the mainland to Con Son Island;
5. Speeding construction of military prisons to relieve pressure on civilian institutions.

The net increase of prisoners and detainees for the year is approximately 9,000. The Prime Minister rightly insists on prompt release of those not remanded for trial. While we support him in this policy, we are making an effort to avoid the release of members of the infrastructure.

I asked Thieu on September 25 what progress was being made in developing his new concept for the 1969 military operations plan. You will recall that Thieu told me he wanted to give the territorial Regional and Popular Forces much more responsibility next year. Thieu said he had been working on this and would like to discuss this and the whole question of the need for greater emphasis on Revolutionary Development and pacification in 1969 as against conventional military warfare. He suggested a combined meeting of the senior Cabinet and our seniors on Tuesday, October 1.

I then said that I had noticed in one of his speeches a few days ago he had referred to the possibility of American units being withdrawn in 1969. I said I thought it was very desirable that some studies with a view to specific reduction in 1969 be made, and that I hoped that he and his people could work out with General Abrams a plan for reducing some units. This would have a very profound and beneficial effect on the American public, and it would bring home the increased capacity of the South Vietnam Government and forces to manage their military problems.

Thieu said he thought it might be possible to move one division about July, possibly two or three more divisions in 1970. There were also other possibilities; for example, non-combat U. S. forces might be withdrawn, and their work, along with their equipment, assigned to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Also, if the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam could reduce its logistical problems, certain non-combat support forces would be able to leave.

We will not take this subject up at the October 1 meeting, but General Abrams and I will pursue it further with his people at an early date.

Thieu is continuing his active program of visiting the countryside and showing himself to the people. I accompanied him on September 20 to Ba Tri District in Kien Hoa Province in the delta. People turned out in great numbers in all the hamlets and villages. Thieu talked to farmers, workers, women, children, the village elders, to members of the territorial forces, to civil servants, showed an interest in their needs, and they seemed to respond. He had especially wanted to visit this area to compare it with its condition when he was last there fifteen months ago. Then all the young men had disappeared, drifted to Saigon or other more secure areas. Today they had returned; 3,000 of them were in the Armed Forces; and 2,000 were sworn into the self-defense forces with a symbolic presentation of weapons by the President. Security has returned to the area and the countryside is prosperous. Thieu told me he plans to continue to make at least two visits to the countryside each week and hopes to visit every province in the country.

While the President was in the Second Corps this week he announced that this year's National Day, November 1, will be celebrated in a manner quite different from that of previous years. There would be no ostentatious parade or military display: emphasis will be put on economic and rural development. Thieu intends to invite outstanding representatives of the people -- soldiers, civil servants, farmers and workers -- to come to Saigon to meet with him to discuss the country's future. Press

accounts have termed the National Day convocation a "congress of people from the lower classes," and report that the congress is to participate in the drafting of a ~~board~~ plan for economic development for the country. Thieu intends it to be another step in his effort to dramatize the effort to bring the government to the people.

In my last message I reported that I mentioned to Thieu the desirability of developing a "charter of social revolution." I envisage such a "charter" as setting forth the GVN's aims for Vietnamese society in terms of economic, social, political, and cultural development, with emphasis on the betterment of the lot of the farmer, worker and the average man. I believe that Thieu may use the commemoration of National Day to launch such a charter. In any case, Thieu's decision to eliminate the military ceremonies on National Day and concentrate on programs of peaceful purposes is a further indication of the new orientation he is giving the government.

Forward movement in the attack on corruption continues. I have reported on this important program in my last three messages. During the visit to the delta, Thieu told me that he had replaced the mayor of Cam Ranh. You may recall the recent scandal surrounding allegations of corruption in that coastal city, some of which were regrettably all too true. Another example of progress is a report we have had that at the orders of the Director General of National Police, Colonel Tran Van Hai, over 500 police officials have been dismissed or removed, some of them quite senior.

Thieu made an interesting observation during a press conference in Ba Tri, in connection with allegations that dismissals of officials have largely been directed at those loyal to General Ky. He said that there is no truth to such rumors, or to those which had also alleged that he is putting members of the old Diemist Can Lao Party back into power. He said that his policy is to replace those who are not doing a good job with people who will. He cited as an example the commander of the Palace Guard, a "Ky man", who had been "removed" from his position. Actually, the man had been promoted and appointed mayor of Cam Ranh, succeeding the notoriously corrupt official there.

Eugene Black's visit here this week served to stress our interest in Vietnam's post-war future, and should also further stimulate the GVN to proceed with its own planning for peace. During an excellent two-hour meeting with the Prime Minister and others of his Cabinet, we had an opportunity to discuss the directions of Vietnamese post-war planning. At this meeting, and the meeting with Thieu, Black commended the Vietnamese planning effort which, he noted, is being carried out in the midst of a war. He remarked that he believed the possibility for economic development here is greater than in Korea.

I was also glad to see Black made the point to the Vietnamese that it is important that the leaders of Southeast Asia take the initiative of proposing plans for regional development. He pointed out that it is much easier for us to respond to such initiative rather than to propose new projects ourselves. As he left, Black told me that he had been much impressed by the evident improvement in the situation here since his last visit in November, 1966.

I reported last week on the slow but steady progress in pacification and our Hamlet Evaluation System figures showing the increasing percentage of population coming under GVN control. There have been no particular developments during the past week on which I wish to report. Thieu plans to hold a seminar on pacification in the First Corps September 27 and in the Second Corps September 30.

B. Political

Lien Minh organizes for political action: I asked Thieu on September 18 what progress is being made in forming the Lien Minh into a broadly based political organization. I referred to opinions that have been expressed to us that the country is waiting for him to issue appeals and directions to the nationalist elements that are ready to band together. Thieu replied that he is deliberately refraining from such a step at this time. He is convinced that the responsible nationalist politicians themselves must first come to a realization that political unity is essential. In response to my remark that it is important that people should have no doubt that the Lien Minh has his full support, Thieu replied that this is clearly understood in the country.

Meanwhile, the Lien Minh is making progress. I reported in my last message on its "new action program," which is designed to have an immediate political impact on the lowest levels of society, first in Saigon and later countrywide. The training of new action program personnel is proceeding. Members of my staff visited the Lien Minh training center in Saigon, where about 800 persons are being trained to carry out the program. The training is being conducted with efficiency and sincerity. Three classes have already passed through the center, and about 450 people are now being sent into the wards and precincts of Saigon to implement the Lien Minh social welfare projects.

The Lien Minh has also taken a step forward in the First Corps where Dr. Tran Dinh Nam, a widely respected and admired figure and one of the most influential civilians in central Vietnam, has agreed to serve as advisor. He is the type of person Thieu was talking about when he said that the Lien Minh must attract the most responsible nationalist leaders.

Thieu and the press: Thieu has generally gotten along quite well with the press. He has handled himself well at his news conferences. He has, however, not escaped criticism, particularly in regard to his statements about limitations on the scope of press freedom, especially in relation to the subject of peace and negotiations. His statement at Nha Trang that the government will not allow "wanton liberty" which would permit people to set forth "unsuitable peace positions of their own" and his statement the following day in Kien Hoa that if a peace proposal advocated surrender, or coalition with the Communists, the paper would be closed and the publisher prosecuted, as might have been expected, aroused some controversy. Several newspapers and legislators have come to Thieu's defense but the weight of the comment has been critical. The incident highlights the matter of press censorship which involves the image of the GVN with its own people and affects it abroad. We have noted indications over the past few weeks that the GVN has been applying more pressure on the press.

The most noteworthy recent example was the suspension, for a week, of three Saigon newspapers for printing a story (alleging differences between Thieu and Huong on how to deal with corruption) which had been denied in advance by the Government of Vietnam. Another newspaper, Tin Sang, has been officially warned twice for printing pictures of Ho Chi Minh and Xuan Thuy on the front page. Other press warnings have been issued since. Actions of this kind attract a good deal of attention especially from the foreign press which tends to discount the constitutional provisions for freedom of the press as meaningless. This obviously does not help the image of the Government of Vietnam abroad. However, it should be kept in mind that a great deal of press freedom does exist here as evidenced by much comment critical of the government which appears every day in the press; criticism of Thieu's remarks at Nah Trang is an illustration. Nor has the temporary suspension of the three newspapers which I mentioned above noticeably affected their subsequent position. On the day they reappeared, two of the papers carried editorials outspoken against the government's decision in closing them down.

Clearly, new legislation consistent with the constitution and responsive to current needs is needed. A comprehensive press law is still pending in the National Assembly. The draft bill as it has emerged from the Lower House is considered by the press as too restrictive. It remains to be seen what form the bill will finally take. Much, of course, will also depend on how the new legislation is administered. The Minister of Information, Ton That Thein, has replied to criticism by the press that he must administer the law as it stands and that the remedy is available to them through new legislation by the Assembly.

The possible return of "big" Minh: perhaps the most discussed political topic of the week has been the possible return of General Duong Van "big" Minh from exile in Thailand. I think that on balance this would be a step that would reinforce national unity. Thieu has said that he is prepared to offer Minh the post of Special Presidential Advisor. I believe that when Minister of Interior Khiem sees Minh in Bangkok, he will warn him against the possible attempt of anti-Government elements to try to exploit his presence to try to divide the country. Thieu, I think, would obviously like to have Minh return in connection with the November 1 National Day celebration. Minh, the hero of the 1963 overthrow of Diem, is widely popular, especially among southerners, Buddhists, and in the army. His return, especially if he associates himself closely with Thieu (as many hope he will) is also seen as strengthening the Government of Vietnam negotiating position vis-a-vis the communists in the south and vis-a-vis Hanoi.

The political opposition which Minh faces comes largely from northern Catholics and revolutionary Dai Viet circles, which are already rather disaffected as far as the government is concerned. Problems could arise if, through Minh's political naivete, he should allow his presence in South Vietnam to be exploited by anti-Government of Vietnam elements, especially among the An Quang Buddhist. Thieu is certainly aware of this and will be on his guard. As I have reported, I am convinced that on balance Minh's return will be helpful.

Problems with Cambodia: Thieu on September 18th expressed concern to me about the amount of communist war material coming into Third and Fourth Corps from Cambodia. He said that while the Cambodian army had been reinforced along some parts of the border, the effect on communist sanctuaries has been nominal. Thieu does not believe Sihanouk will do much more than caution the Viet Cong to be less obvious.

The Canadian member of the International Control Commission in Cambodia paid a private visit to Saigon on September 18th for discussions.

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(b)(6)

We have passed to Sihanouk, through the Australians, evidence of massive Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army use of Cambodian border territory at Ba Thu, only 35 miles west of Saigon. However, the Prince has ignored this evidence and told us, in effect, to mind our own business. I have recommended, and I am pleased that approval has been granted, that we release this evidence unofficially to friendly newsmen in order to show the U.S. side of the story in a more concrete manner. While Sihanouk may react to this disclosure the revelation will hopefully also jolt him into greater activity on the border. At any rate, it will establish a public record that should counteract to some extent the propaganda from Cambodia about unprovoked U.S. -Government of Vietnam "aggression" against that country.

C. Military

Stocks of captured ammunition continue high. From August 18 to September 25, 7,426 individual weapons and 930 crew-served weapons were captured. During the same period, enemy ammunition taken or destroyed included 1,491,527 small arms rounds, 24,963 rocket propelled anti-tank grenades, 17,277 mortar rounds, 1,033 recoilless rifle rounds, 788 artillery and 427 rocket rounds. These figures provide dramatic evidence of the extent of the enemy's buildup for offensive action and of the success of efforts to forestall such action.

Army of the Republic of Vietnam Forces, including Regional and Popular Forces, turned in a good account of themselves in a number of actions during the past week.

On September 22-23, the Second Regiment, First Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division, killed 103 enemy and captured 23 weapons in action near the DMZ at a cost of 3 killed and 38 wounded.

On September 22, Regional and Popular Forces reacting to a mortar and ground attack on Thang Binh village, Quang Tin Province (First Corps), killed 16 enemy and captured 8 weapons (2 crew-served). Four Regional Force men were killed and 14 Regional and Popular Force men wounded. Ten civilians were killed and 26 wounded in the enemy attack.

On September 21-22, Regional and Popular Forces repelled an attack on Hau Duc sub-sector headquarters, Quang Tin Province. They killed 186 enemy, detained 11 and captured 37 weapons (4 crew-served). Twenty-eight Regional and Popular Force men were killed and 32 wounded.

The enemy made fruitless attacks against a Regional Force outpost near Ben Soi in Tay Ninh Province (Third Corps). The first attack, by an estimated company, came about 0100 on the 20th. Nineteen enemy were killed inside the perimeter wire. Two Regional Force companies reinforced the post and swept the area the next day, resulting in a cumulative total of 35 enemy killed and 19 weapons captured (3 crew-served). A total of 9 Regional Force men were killed, 28 wounded, and 2 missing. The post was further reinforced later the same day by the First Vietnamese Marine Battalion. It was again attacked early the following morning, this time by an estimated enemy battalion. The enemy lost 125 killed and 32 weapons (10 crew-served) as compared to 4 Marines and one Regional Force killed, 55 Marines and 5 Regional Force wounded.

Also in Tay Ninh, the enemy attacked Katum Special Forces Camp on September 25. He lost 135 killed, 10 detained, 39 individual weapons and four flame throwers, plus explosives and ammunition. Twelve Civilian Irregular Defense Group were killed and 16 wounded.

In the Fourth Corps, an Army of the Republic of Vietnam 9th Division operation near Sa Dec on September 21 resulted in 61 enemy killed and 19 weapons captured, with friendly losses 7 killed and 22 wounded. In An Xuyen, the ARVN 32nd Regiment (21st Division) engaged an estimated enemy company on September 23, killing 42 and capturing 22 weapons (3 crew-served). ARVN losses were one killed and ten wounded. Three U. S. were also wounded in the action.

D. Economic

The week has been a quiet one on the economic front. The overall price level remained unchanged with declines in the price of shrimp and fish offset by increases in most meat prices. The price of domestic rice was firm, while U. S. rice continued to fall slightly in price due to the relatively poorer quality of recent releases by the GVN from storage.

The war risk insurance decree has been redrafted in order to strengthen the version prepared by the Ministry of Finance. The compromise redraft reportedly contains the major recommendations of the U. S. insurance expert recently here. We are told that the decree should be promulgated within the next two weeks.

David Lilienthal's Development and Resources Corporation has now started feasibility studies in the country on its proposed Mekong Delta development project. The project is intended to provide year-round water control and irrigation in the delta through the construction of a series of levees, of a spillway to the Gulf of Siam and through barriers against salt-water intrusions.

I have an announcement to make. I have accepted with great reluctance the resignation of Ambassador George Ball as United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

I understand he will be issuing shortly a statement covering the reasons for his resignation. As you will see, they have nothing to do with public policy but something to do with domestic politics.

As my letter to him indicates, I feel most grateful for his dedicated and distinguished contribution to the public service.

As Ambassador Ball's successor, I am nominating Mr. James Russell Wiggins, known to us all as one of the most distinguished journalists and publishers of our time. I shall be sending his nomination up to the Senate tomorrow.

WWRostow:rln
Sept. 26, 1968

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ACTION

Pres file

Limited Official Use

Thursday - September 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Message to Brazilian President Costa e Silva

On Wednesday, October 3, President Costa e Silva celebrates his 66th birthday and second anniversary of his election. I thought you might want to send him a congratulatory message as you did last year. I am confident it would be appreciated and, looking into the future, will serve to maintain your personal ties with him. At Tab A is a draft message for your consideration.

Incidentally, the Brazilian Charge yesterday informed State of Costa e Silva's decision not to go supersonic with the purchase of new planes for the Air Force. He has settled instead on subsonic A4-B's -- the aircraft now in the Argentine inventory. This will help deflate the concern over an arms race in Latin America.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Attachment

Tab A - Suggested draft message to President Costa e Silva.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

*reference
9/24/68 Read to
Rostow*

56-

Suggested Presidential Message to Brazilian President Costa e Silva
On the Occasion of his 66th Birthday and Second Anniversary
in Office - October 3, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

**I do not want to let this day pass by without letting you know
that you have been in my thoughts. Best wishes on your birth-
day and continued success on the second anniversary of your
election as President of Brazil.**

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Arthur da Costa e Silva

President of the Federative Republic of Brazil

Brasilia.

WWR 57

Thursday, September 26, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 1967 Report to the Congress on the
Trade Agreements Program

At Tab A, for your approval and signature, is a draft Presidential letter to cover your annual report to the Congress on trade agreement activities. An annual report to the Congress on this subject is required by the Trade Expansion Act.

A copy of the report is at Tab B. It is a straight-forward account of our activities in the trade field and should create no problems.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve we will need your signature at Tab A _____

No _____

Call me _____

ERF:met

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am pleased to transmit the Twelfth Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program, as required by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The report covers the year 1967.

The remarkable postwar growth of international trade continued uninterrupted in 1967, but at a slower pace. World trade grew by almost 5%, to a new record of \$191 billion.

U. S. trade grew by a little more than 5%. Our trade surplus for the year reached \$4.1 billion, an improvement over the preceding year. The trade surplus fell off sharply, however, in the fourth quarter of 1967 and through the first half of 1968. We acted to reverse this trend through the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 and by new export promotion measures.

The year was highlighted by the successful completion of the Kennedy Round -- a milestone in the history of the bipartisan U. S. policy of trade expansion. Tariffs have already begun to come down. The U. S. made the first of five annual tariff reductions on January 1, 1968. The European Economic Community, the UK, Japan and some other major trading countries put into effect two-fifths of their scheduled tariff reductions on July 1, 1968. These tariff cuts will promote trade, higher employment, and higher income among all countries.

America's economic well-being and the strength of the dollar are linked to our sharing fully in the future growth of world trade. I therefore directed the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

to conduct a long-range study of trade policy. This study will benefit from the views and recommendations of members of the Congress, the interested agencies of the government, and a distinguished group of private citizens serving on the Public Advisory Committee on Trade Policy. We must continue to seek ways in which foreign trade can help to keep our economy competitive and healthy and give to all our people the advantages of greater efficiency in production.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

ERF:mst
9/26/68