

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

106

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~#1 memo~~	~~Rostow to the President re Berlin~~ ~~3 p S~~ <i>open 1-10-95 NW 94-197</i>	~~10/4/68~~	~~A~~
#1a memo	Rostow to the President re Berlin 2 p C	09/17/68	A
~~#2 note~~	~~Rostow to the President, 7:15 p.m.~~ <i>open 1-6-10</i> ~~1 p S~~ (duplicate, #1, NSF, Agency File, Defense, Vol. VI)	~~10/04/68~~	~~A~~
~~#2a memo~~	~~Wheeler to Secretary of Defense, CM-3702-68~~ ~~3 p S~~ <i>open 1-6-10</i> (duplicate, #1a, as above)	~~10/04/68~~	~~A~~
~~#3 note~~	~~Rostow to the President, 7:10 p.m.~~ <i>open NLT 97-134 9-2-98</i> ~~1 p S re Middle East~~ <i>[dupl # 149, UN Agency File, Vol 11]</i>	~~10/04/68~~	~~A~~
~~#3a cable~~	~~USUN 6846~~ <i>Open NLT 97-136 9-2-98</i> ~~4 p S~~ <i>[dupl # 149, UN Agency File, Vol 11]</i>	~~10/04/68~~	~~A~~
~~#4 note~~	~~Rostow to the President, 6:20 p.m.~~ <i>open 616103 NW 03-96</i> ~~1 p S re Vietnam~~	~~10/04/68~~	~~A~~
~~#6 memo~~	~~Rostow to the President~~ <i>open 12-31-02 NW 94-171</i> ~~1 p C~~ (duplicate, #38, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3)	~~10/04/68~~	~~A~~
~~#7 memo~~	~~Rostow to the President~~ ~~1 p C~~ <i>open 12-31-02 NW 94-171</i>	~~10/04/68~~	~~A~~
#7a cable	President Lleras to LBJ 1 p PCI	09/28/68	A
#7b draft	Draft letter, LBJ to Lleras 1 p PCI	n.d.	A
#8 memo	Rostow to the President 1 p C (duplicate, #185, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. X)	10/04/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 97, 10/01-04/68, Box 40

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

236

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#10 note	Rostow to the President, 3:50 p.m. <i>open 1-6-10</i> ~~1 p~~ S (duplicate, #47, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 14)	~~10/04/68~~	~~A~~
#10a cable	London 13243 <i>open 1-6-10</i> ~~3 p~~ S (duplicate, #47a, as above)	~~10/04/68~~	~~A~~
#13a memo	Katzenbach to the President 1 p C (dup., #131, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11) Sanitized, 1986	10/03/68	A
#14 note	Rostow to the President, 11:45 a.m. 1 p S re Vietnam <i>sanitized 616103 WJ/APC 03-63</i>	10/04/68	A
#14a cable	Intelligence Report 3 p S <i>EXEMPT NET DP-040-2</i>	10/04/68	A
#16a memo	~~Katzenbach to the President~~ <i>open 7/19/01</i> ~~2 p~~ S (duplicate, #98, NSF, Country File, Yugoslavia, Vol. II, and Diary Backup, "October 4, 1968)	10/04/68	~~A~~
#16b report	Talking Points <i>open 7/19/01</i> (duplicate, #98a, as above)	n.d.	A
#19 note	~~Rostow to the President~~ ~~1 p~~ S <i>open 3-31-98 RAC</i>	~~10/04/68~~	~~A~~
#19a report	"RVNAF Effectiveness: An Update" 10 pp S	n.d.	A
#23 note	~~Rostow to the President, 6:25 p.m.~~ ~~1 p~~ S <i>open 1-10-95 NW 94-197</i>	~~10/03/68~~	~~A~~
#23b report	re Berlin 12 pp S	[10/68]	A
#24 note	Rostow to the President, 5:30 p.m. 1 p S	10/03/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#25 memo	Rostow to the President, 1:20 p.m. 1 p TS <i>open 8/23/02</i>	10/03/68	A
#25b report	Hubert Humphrey's report to NSC re Vietnam 38 pp S <i>open 8/23/02</i>	[11/08/67]	A
#27 memo	Rostow to the President, 10:50 a.m. 1 p C <i>open 12-31-02</i> (duplicate, #32, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3)	10/03/68	A
#28 memo	Rostow to the President 1 p S re Vietnam <i>open 6-8-95 NLJ 93-248</i>	10/03/68	A
#29a cable	USUN 6805 <i>Open 97-136 9-2-98</i> 1 p S <i>[Dup #134a, UN Agency File vol 11]</i>	10/02/68	A
#31a cable	Intelligence report 1 p TS <i>Exempt NY 019-040-2</i>	10/02/68	A
#33 memo	Rostow to the President, 5:30 p.m. 2 p TS re Vietnam <i>open 4-15-95 NLJ 93-248</i>	10/03/68	A
#35 note	Rostow to the President, 5:15 p.m. 1 p S	10/02/68	A
#35a cable	Intelligence report 5 p S <i>Exempt NY 019-040-2</i>	10/01/68	A
#38a cable	Paris 21737 (DELTO 788) <i>open 1-6-10</i> 4 p S <i>[Dup #111, NSF, CF, VN, "Harvan Paris TO DEL... XIII, " Bx 119"</i> <i>[Dup #34a, NSF, CF, VN, "HVN Chron v. 2.2"]</i>	10/02/68	A
#40 memo	Rostow to the President, 12:50 p.m. 1 p C re Korea <i>open 2/13/02</i> (dup., #2a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 98)	10/02/68	A
#40a memo	Zwick to the President <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p C re Korea (dup., #2b, as above)	09/27/68	A
#40b memo	Gaud and Freeman to the President <i>open 2/13/02</i> 2 p C re Korea (dup., #2c, as above)	09/18/68	A

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#43 note	Rostow to the President, 10:15 a.m. <i>Open 12-31-02</i> 1 p S re Vietnam	10/02/68	A
#46 memo	Rostow to the President re Middle East <i>Open 9.21.98</i> 1 p S [<i>#154 UN Agency File, Vol 11</i>] <i>MLT 97-134</i>	10/02/68	A
#46a cable	USUN 6764 re Middle East 8 p S [<i>dupl #154a, UN Agency File, Vol 11</i>]	10/01/68	A
#48 memo	Rostow to the President, 1:30 p.m. 2 p S re Vietnam <i>Open 12-31-02</i>	10/02/68	A
#48a memo	Robert Ginsburgh to Rostow 4 p S re Vietnam <i>Open 12-31-02</i>	10/02/68	A
#49 memo	Rostow to the President re Peru 2 p C <i>Open 8-28-96 NLS 94-171</i> (dup., #19a, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3)	10/02/68	A
#49c report	Annex re Peru <i>Open 1-6-10</i> 3 p C (dup., #19d, as above)	n.d.	A
#52 note	Rostow to the President, 7:00 p.m. 1 p C re Peru <i>Open 8-28-96 NLS 94-171</i> (dup., #22 as above)	10/01/68	A
#55 note	Rostow to the President, 6:30 p.m. 1 p S re NATO	10/01/68	A
#55a cable	draft, Rusk to US Mission NATO 2 p S	n.d.	A
#59 note	Rostow to the President, 5:15 p.m. <i>Open 6/6/03 NLS 03-96</i> 1 p S re Vietnam	10/01/68	A
#62a draft	re Arms Control 1 p C	n.d.	A
#63a memo	Maxwell Taylor to the President 2 p S re Vietnam	10/01/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#64 note	Rostow to the President (dup #18a, NSF, CF, VN Harvan/Controlle Andrew Reginald ... Box 13) 1 p S re Vietnam open 1-6-10	10/01/68	A
#64a cable	Saigon 39163 (dup #18b as above) 3 p S open 1-6-10 [Dup. #27a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN VOP XIII" Bx 119] [Dup. #10a, NSF, CF, VN, "HVN Chron 22"]	10/01/68	A
#64b cable	State 246008 to Paris, Saigon (dup #18f as above) 3 p S (dup., #47a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 96) (dup. #53, NSF, CF, VN "Harvan TOPDEL-DELTO XIII," Bx 119) open 2/13/02	09/27/68	A
#64c cable	Paris 21489 2 p S vol. 96 (dup., #33a, as above) [dup. #119a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN XIII" Bx 119] [dup. #10f, NSF, CF, VN, "HVN Chron 22"] open 2/13/02	09/27/68	A
#65 memo	Rostow to the President re meeting with President of Chad 2 p C	10/01/68	A
#65a memo	Katzenbach to the President 2 p C	09/28/68	A
#65b report	Talking Points 3 p S	n.d.	A
#65c report	Biographic sketch 1 p C	n.d.	A
#66a memo	Katzenbach to the President re meeting with Kiro Gligorov 2 p S open 7/19/01 (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 4, 1968")	10/01/68	A
#66b report	Biographic sketch 1 p C (duplicate in Dairy Backup as above)	n.d.	A
#67b memo	Katzenbach to the President re Humphrey 1 p S	10/01/68	A

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626

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
4a memo	McCafferty to Rostow 1 p S	10/4/68	A
4b report	Intelligence report 1 p S	[10/68]	A
44 memo	Rostow to the President, 8:45 a.m. 1 p TS	10/2/68	A
44a report	Intelligence report 1 pp TS	10/1/68	A
#44b report	Intelligence Report 1 p. "T.S."	10-1-68	A
57 note	Rostow to the President, 5:25 p.m. 1 p TS	10/1/68	A
57a report	Intelligence report 1 p TS	[10/68]	A
58 note	Rostow to the President, 5:20 p.m. 1 p TS	10/1/68	A
58a cable	Intelligence report 1 p TS	10/1/68	A
#59a memo	Art McCafferty to Rostow 1 p S	10/1/68	A

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AC 70N 1
Friday, October 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Crisis in Berlin

Pres file

I have gone over the Berlin situation with my people in light of the Kraemer paper I sent to you. This is the way we see it:

Military Indications

There is no significant change since Czechoslovakia in the Soviet military threat against Berlin. Their increased forces in Czechoslovakia cut down what they can mount immediately against Berlin. But the roads are good and they can change force dispositions in a day or two. Moreover, their alert status is improved.

The conclusion is that the current disposition of Soviet forces does not tell us much about their intentions toward Berlin.

The Soviet Propaganda Campaign against the Federal Republic:

The Russians are no longer coming down so hard on the claim that they have the right to intervene in the Federal Republic. They base this claim on Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter, which relate to actions against former enemy powers.

They began pushing this line pretty hard at the beginning of July. The Germans became very nervous. To counter this we took the following actions:

-- On August 31, when Secretary Rusk warned Dobrynin about Rumania, he specifically warned that Berlin was a "state interest" of the U.S.

-- On September 17, the U.S., the UK, and the French, in separate announcements, said publicly that Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter did not give the Soviet Union the right to interfere in the affairs of the Federal Republic. We also said that such intervention would bring a NATO response.

-- On September 20, Secretary Rusk repeated this position privately to Dobrynin.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-197
By CG, NARA, Date 1-5-95

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- 2 -

-- On October 2, Secretary Rusk made the point again in his speech at the UN.

-- The next day, Gromyko in his speech to the UN did not assert Soviet intervention rights in the Federal Republic under the UN Charter. For the moment, they seem to have backed off this line.

The most serious threat lies in Communist moves to put pressure on Berlin by challenging Federal Republic rights and activities in the city. They could do this by:

-- Putting more restrictions on the movement of people and goods between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Last spring they got away with new visa and passport restrictions and travel taxes. They may well try to step up this kind of pressure -- again without challenging Allied rights in the city.

-- Intensifying their propaganda charges that Federal Republic meetings and other activities in Berlin are provocative acts. This could weaken Berlin morale and threaten the viability of the city.

The Russians have been building up this kind of propaganda campaign. On September 20 Secretary Rusk told Dobrynin we were concerned about the menacing Soviet tone on Berlin. He made it clear that any move against Berlin would be very dangerous and that we cannot accept pressures against Berlin or against Berlin contacts with the Federal Republic.

Dobrynin took no notes at this meeting. We cannot be sure that the full weight of Secretary Rusk's warning was brought home to the Kremlin.

Gromyko, in his speech to the UN, repeated the Soviet position that the Federal Republic had no rights in Berlin -- but, with velvet glove, issued a warning that any "aggravation of tensions" would be Bonn's fault:

"The Federal Republic of Germany has ceaselessly laid claims on West Berlin, which has a special status of an independent political entity. Our answer is clear: West Berlin has never belonged, nor does it belong or will it ever belong to the Federal Republic of Germany. If sometimes an aggravation of tensions may occur here, the responsibility for this lies squarely with the West German Government."

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- 3 -

A crisis could be associated with some important meetings the Federal Republic has scheduled in Berlin the end of October and early November. These are:

-- October 27 to November 2: meetings in Berlin of about twenty committees of the Bundestag.

-- November 3 to November 7: the National Party Congress of the Christian Democratic Union.

These are high visibility meetings. If the East Germans -- with Russian support -- increase travel restrictions and the Russians intensify their propaganda campaign against Berlin so as to interfere with these meetings, the impact on the city and throughout the Federal Republic could be great. We could have another Berlin crisis on our hands.

This would be a good time, therefore, to try to negotiate quickly an Allied Declaration on Berlin along the lines of the memo we sent you on September 17 (attached). As you know, this is what the Germans requested. The Declaration would be negotiated with the UK, the French and the Germans in Bonn. If you approve, Secretary Rusk could get this moving in his bilateral talks with Brandt, Debre, and Stewart at the UN in New York.

You have previously set this aside as too openly provocative. The question is: do you now regard it as appropriate to move forward so as not to leave Gromyko's warning unanswered.

A fall-back position would be to agree that all three former Occupying Powers make a parallel demarche through diplomatic channels rather than in a public declaration. The experts believe this would not be as effective, but better than inaction -- which could mislead Ulbricht and Moscow.

A decision is urgent because Secretary Rusk dines with the NATO Foreign Ministers on October 7 (*Monday*).

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead with the Allied
Declaration on Berlin _____

A tripartite diplomatic demarche _____

No _____

Call me _____

ERF:mm

~~SECRET~~

16

TEXT OF DRAFT ALLIED DECLARATION ON BERLIN
(FRG TEXT AS AMENDED IN DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEPTEMBER 10, 1968)

Questions concerning the role of the Federal Republic of Germany in helping maintain the viability of Berlin having been raised recently, the Governments of France, the U.K., and the U.S. find it useful to make their own views clear. The Three Powers therefore issue the following declaration:

As a result of agreements reached among the Four Powers. in connection with the termination of hostilities in 1945, Greater Berlin, as a part of Germany, is subject to the joint administration of the Four Powers pending a peace settlement. Until the establishment of a final governmental organization on German soil, territories on German soil--including in particular Berlin--remain a part of Germany and their status cannot be changed without the consent of all of the Powers concerned.

The Three Powers have over the years welcomed the development of close contacts between the three Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany as an important contribution to the viability of Berlin and to the Three Powers in meeting their responsibilities in the city. These contacts are also in accord with the will of the people of West Berlin.

Maintaining the viability of Berlin is of great significance not only to the U.S., U.K. and France but to the entire world. Its absence could lead to tensions threatening peace not only in Berlin or in Germany, but throughout the world.

The Federal Republic has conducted certain activities in Berlin which contribute to the viability of Berlin. These activities threaten no one. The Three Powers will accept no outside interference with these legitimate activities or with peaceful passage of Germans and commerce between Berlin and the Federal Republic. At the same time, the Three Powers will continue to exercise fully their control and authority in Berlin as provided for by valid international treaty and practice. The Three Powers expect the Soviet Union to respect all decisions taken pursuant to the Three Powers' authority in Berlin.

The Three Western Allies pursue their obligations in Berlin in the spirit of furthering international peace, order, and well-being. The Fed Rep's contribution to Berlin's viability is consistent with this spirit. The three Western Allies hope that the same dedication to these international goals will guide the Soviet authorities in formulating their policies with respect to Berlin.

2

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 4, 1968
7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should know that we are all concerned by Bus Wheeler's assessment of the relatively poor state of readiness of our NATO forces.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

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CM-3702-68
4 Oct 1968

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec 3.4
By *jc/jc* NARA, Date *12-28-09*



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3702-68

4 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Europe (U)

1. (C) I believe a summary of the impressions and information I received during my 27 to 30 September trip to Europe would be useful in the course of the upcoming NPG meeting in Bonn. Although the principal reason for my trip was to attend a special meeting of the NATO Chiefs of Staff in Brussels which was called to consider the implications of the invasion of Czechoslovakia for the Alliance, I used the opportunity to visit EUCOM Headquarters at Stuttgart for a partial day of first-hand briefings and discussions with General Lemnitzer, General Burchinal and the EUCOM Service component commanders.

2. (C) At Brussels, the NATO Chiefs of Staff discussed and endorsed a series of reports on the implications of the Czech crisis which were drafted by NATO political and military authorities for the ultimate consideration of the North Atlantic Council and the Defense Planning Committee. Of these reports, I consider those analyzing the military and political implications of the invasion to be excellent documents which could provide a sound basis for revitalizing NATO militarily and politically. I found that all the Chiefs of Staff appreciated the necessity for improving NATO's posture. The German, Netherlands and Canadian Chiefs were particularly forthcoming in encouraging positive recommendations by the Chiefs of Staff. General Spivy, our permanent representative to the NATO Military Committee, and his staff had worked closely with Ambassador Cleveland and his staff in the preliminary coordination of the reports considered by the Chiefs and the results of this effort were apparent.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NIS 94-40 (2a)

By: ics/jc, NARA, Date: 12-28-19

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GROUP - 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

~~SECRET~~

3. (S) At Stuttgart, General Lemnitzer and his component commanders presented concise analyses of European Command's readiness for combat. The degree of readiness throughout the command has declined steadily since 1961. In the intervening period, the Command's NATO commitments have remained the same while a gradual reduction in manpower, facilities, and materiel has occurred. I came away from Stuttgart convinced that achieving economies in EUCOM is not a matter of trimming away fat but of accepting calculated risks in eliminating essential requirements.

4. (S) Each of the component commanders stressed the cumulative effect of personnel reductions. General Polk, CINCUSAREUR, noted that with completion of the REFORGER action USAREUR strength will have been reduced by some 93,000 spaces since 1961 without a reduction in NATO commitments. This decline, compounded by Southeast Asia priorities with respect to men and materiel, is largely accountable for the serious drop in USAREUR combat capabilities. Admiral Wendt, CINCUSNAVEUR, similarly attributed the low readiness state of the majority of the SIXTH Fleet units to a combination of manpower and materiel shortages. He also cited the fact that two really important changes have occurred in the last 20 years which have a direct bearing on the SIXTH Fleet's capabilities -- the increase in Soviet maritime activity and the impact of Southeast Asia requirements. General Wade, CINCUSAFE, noted that the recently adopted NATO strategy imposed increased personnel requirements on the already critically strained personnel resources of his command. He was particularly concerned regarding the effect which the reduction in airfield facilities has had on the survivability of his combat squadrons. Aircraft basing has currently arrived at the saturation point; Bitburg, for example, has 92 aircraft and is only 24 minutes from a MIG base in East Germany. In General Wade's expression, "supersaturation" will occur when programmed augmentation forces arrive. In the event of augmentation, 645 aircraft will be located on seven bases in the FRG. The status of conventional ammunition supply for USAFE is perhaps illustrative of materiel shortages in the other component commands. General Wade estimated that the conventional ammunition available to USAFE would suffice for only five days of sustained combat.

5. (S) General Lemnitzer concurred completely in the analyses of the component commanders. In addition, he emphasized the importance of reaching an early favorable decision in following through on our commitment to exercise REFORGER/CRESTED CAP units in FY 69. The importance of an early decision is linked to the need for quick and positive

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US action at this particular time and to the fact that on the order of 90 days is required for planning, obtaining exercise rights, contracting for airlift and readying the units involved. General Lemnitzer believes that the Czech situation represents a turning point for NATO; positive action now could revitalize the Alliance militarily and politically, while hesitation could lead to a continued downward spiral in the affairs of the Alliance.

6. (S) The impression I gained in the course of my trip substantiates General Lemnitzer's assessment. There is a necessity for concerted action on the part of the Alliance's principal members and this is perhaps best illustrated by the German Chief of Staff's analysis of the FRG problem in responding to the Czech crisis. General de Maizierre noted that the other NATO nations expected a significant response from the FRG, one of the Alliance's larger and wealthier nations. On the other hand, if the FRG goes too far out in front, not only the Soviets but the FRG's partners would become nervous. The solution, therefore, was a balanced, concerted effort on the part of all.

7. (C) Lieutenant General John McPherson, USAF, represented me during the NATO Chiefs of Staff tour of the ACE Southern Region (Turkey, Greece and Italy). He has informed me that the tour was weighted in favor of a review of military problems and observation of troops and units exercising in the field rather than in favor of ceremonial inspections and reviews. The most outstanding impression was that of the professional competence and determination of the Greeks and Turks to fight for their security. Activity in Italy was limited to a very well done exercise by the Alpine Troops. The short duration of the tour in Italy precluded a more thorough evaluation of the Italians.

(Sgd) EARLE G. WHEELER
EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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CM-3702-68


4 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Report of Visit to Europe (U)

1. ~~1st~~ I believe a summary of the impressions and information I received during my 27 to 30 September trip to Europe would be useful in the course of the upcoming NPG meeting in Bonn. Although the principal reason for my trip was to attend a special meeting of the NATO Chiefs of Staff in Brussels which was called to consider the implications of the invasion of Czechoslovakia for the Alliance, I used the opportunity to visit EUCOM Headquarters at Stuttgart for a partial day of first-hand briefings and discussions with General Lemnitzer, General Burchinal and the EUCOM Service component commanders.

2. ~~1st~~ At Brussels,



General Spivy, our permanent representative to the NATO Military Committee, and his staff had worked closely with Ambassador Cleveland and his staff in the preliminary coordination of the reports considered by the Chiefs and the results of this effort were apparent.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-106

By WJG, NARA, Date 7-7-88

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

3. ~~(S)~~ At Stuttgart, General Lemnitzer and his component commanders presented concise analyses of European Command's readiness for combat. The degree of readiness throughout the command has declined steadily since 1961. In the intervening period, the Command's NATO commitments have remained the same while a gradual reduction in manpower, facilities, and materiel has occurred. I came away from Stuttgart convinced that achieving economies in EUCOM is not a matter of trimming away fat but of accepting calculated risks in eliminating essential requirements.

4. ~~(S)~~ Each of the component commanders stressed the cumulative effect of personnel reductions. General Polk, CINCUSAREUR, noted that with completion of the REFORGER action USAREUR strength will have been reduced by some 93,000 spaces since 1961 without a reduction in NATO commitments. This decline, compounded by Southeast Asia priorities with respect to men and materiel, is largely accountable for the serious drop in USAREUR combat capabilities. Admiral Wendt, CINCUSNAVEUR, similarly attributed the low readiness state of the majority of the SIXTH Fleet units to a combination of manpower and materiel shortages. He also cited the fact that two really important changes have occurred in the last 20 years which have a direct bearing on the SIXTH Fleet's capabilities -- the increase in Soviet maritime activity and the impact of Southeast Asia requirements. General Wade, CINCUSAFE, noted that the recently adopted NATO strategy imposed increased personnel requirements on the already critically strained personnel resources of his command. He was particularly concerned regarding the effect which the reduction in airfield facilities has had on the survivability of his combat squadrons. Aircraft basing has currently arrived at the saturation point; Bitburg, for example, has 92 aircraft and is only 24 minutes from a MIG base in East Germany. In General Wade's expression, "supersaturation" will occur when programmed augmentation forces arrive. In the event of augmentation, 645 aircraft will be located on seven bases in the FRG. The status of conventional ammunition supply for USAFE is perhaps illustrative of materiel shortages in the other component commands. General Wade estimated that the [REDACTED]

5. ~~(S)~~ General Lemnitzer concurred completely in the analyses of the component commanders. In addition, he emphasized the importance of reaching an early favorable decision in following through on our commitment to exercise REFORGER/CRESTED CAP units in FY 69. The importance of an early decision is linked to the need for quick and positive

~~SECRET~~

US action at this particular time and to the fact that on the order of 90 days is required for planning, obtaining exercise rights, contracting for airlift and readying the units involved. General Lemnitzer believes that the Czech situation represents a turning point for NATO; positive action now could revitalize the Alliance militarily and politically, while hesitation could lead to a continued downward spiral in the affairs of the Alliance.

6. ~~(S)~~ The impression I gained in the course of my trip substantiates General Lemnitzer's assessment. There is a necessity for concerted action on the part of the Alliance's principal members and this is perhaps best illustrated



7. ~~(S)~~ Lieutenant General John McPherson, USAF, represented me during the NATO Chiefs of Staff tour of the ACE Southern Region (Turkey, Greece and Italy). He has informed me that the tour was weighted in favor of a review of military problems and observation of troops and units exercising in the field rather than in favor of ceremonial inspections and reviews. The most outstanding impression was that of the professional competence and determination of the Greeks and Turks to fight for their security. Activity in Italy was limited to a very well done exercise by the Alpine Troops. The short duration of the tour in Italy precluded a more thorough evaluation of the Italians.

(Sgd) EARLE G. WHEELER
EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

*Pres
Lee*
3

Friday, October 4, 1968
7:10 p. m.

~~SECRET / SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached cable, if true, is the most hopeful thing we have seen in the Middle East since the war.

After their secret and dangerous talks with the Israelis, the Jordanians indicated that what they required to negotiate overtly was a simple, flat, uncomplicated, unqualified statement by the Government of Israel that it accepted the November resolution of the Security Council. Jordan told the British and us that if they got this statement, they would take the risk of entering overt negotiations via Jarring. This telegram states that an Israeli representative in New York believes that the Government of Israel be prepared to make that kind of statement.

I never saw fellows who less needed advice from us as to how to negotiate; but if I were the Israelis, I would clear the statement with the Jordanians first, but also get it in writing as to the day, hour, and room in which the negotiations under Jarring would start.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-134
By is, NARA Date 9-21-98

USUN 6846 NODIS/SANDSTORM



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

WN 3a

6

OO RUEHC
DE RUEHDT 6846/1 2781755
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041731Z OCT 68 ZFF-4
FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3546
STATE GRNC
BT

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1968 OCT 4 PM 3 12

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 6846

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-136
By ies, NARA Date 1-2-98

Restaw

NODIS/SANDSTORM

MIDDLE EAST

SUMMARY: TEKOA (ISRAEL) ACCOMPANIED BY CAHANA CALLED ON SISCO, BUFFUM AND PEDERSEN OCT 2 TO DISCUSS CURRENT STATUS JARRING MISSION AND CONVEY LATEST ISRAELI VIEW. MOST NOTABLE STATEMENT WAS THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE PREPARED TO PRODUCE SIMPLE FORMULATION ON ACCEPTANCE (LATER INDICATING IMPLEMENTATION ALSO POSSIBLE) IN CONTEXT WHICH WOULD LEAD TO BRINGING CURRENT JORDANIAN CONTACTS INTO JARRING FRAMEWORK.

TEKOA BEGAN CONVERSATION BY SAYING JORDANIANS WERE NO LONGER ABLE TO SAY THEY DID NOT KNOW ISRAELI "CONCEPTS" ON BOUNDARIES, AND HE HOPED THAT WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS RIFAI (JORDAN) WOULD BE INFORMED HERE. (TEKOA SAID RIFAI IS NOT FULLY INFORMED RE SECRET TALKS.) ISRAEL ALSO HAD REASON TO BELIEVE JORDANIANS WERE READY TO GO AHEAD WITH FURTHER TALKS.

ISRAEL ACCORDINGLY WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER AT STATEMENT ON ACCEPTANCE IF THIS WOULD LEAD TO PROGRESS WITH JORDANIANS AND TO NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAELIS UNDERSTOOD FROM JORDANIANS THAT WHAT WAS REQUIRED WAS SOMETHING BRIEF AND SIMPLE IN ONE OR TWO SENTENCES. IF JORDANIANS OR ARAB WORLD NEEDED SOMETHING AND A STATEMENT WOULD ACTUALLY LEAD TO MOVE IN JORDANIANS CONTACTS UNDER JARRING FRAMEWORK, EBAN FELT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET CABINET APPROVAL FOR NECESSARY STATEMENT.

TEKOA SAID HE HAD JUST TALKED TO JARRING ABOUT STATUS OF JORDAN CONTACTS AND THAT ISRAELIS HAD GIVEN HIM GENERAL INDICATION OF WHAT THEY HAD PASSED TO JORDANIANS ON BOUNDARIES ALONG LINES SIMILAR TO THAT GIVEN SECY. HAD ALSO INDICATED THEIR VIEW ON EXPRESSING ACCEPTANCE FORMULA. BUT HAD ALSO ADVISED JARRING HE COULD NOT RAISE THESE MATTERS WITH RIFAI AS RIFAI SHOULD HEAR FIRST FROM HIS OWN GOVT. TEKOA SAID BIG PROBLEM NOW WAS TO MAKE JARRING UNDERSTAND SIGNIFICANCE OF CURRENT SITUATION. JARRING WAS STILL TALKING ABOUT ELABORATE DECLARATIONS OF PRINCIPLES TO BE MADE BY BOTH PARTIES AND WAS FOCUSED ON EFFORT TO PRODUCE INITIAL PROGRESS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND UAR. MORE DETAILED DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WOULD CAUSE MORE DIFFICULTY FOR ISRAELIS THAN AN ACCEPTANCE STATEMENT, AND ISRAEL REMAINED CONVINCED THAT UAR WAS NOT YET PREPARED TO MOVE SERIOUSLY TOWARD SETTLEMENT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- USUN 6846, 041731Z OCT, SECTION 1 OF 2, (NODIS/SANDSTORM)

AND THAT FIRST PROGRESS HAD TO BE MADE WITH JORDANIANS. SISCO OBSERVED THAT IF START MADE ON JORDANIAN SIDE IT WOULD STILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE SOME STATEMENT OR FORMULATION ON ACCEPTANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION WHICH WOULD NEUTRALIZE UAR DURING THAT PERIOD; OTHERWISE SITUATION WOULD EVOLVE IN SUCH A WAY THAT UAR WOULD BE PUSHING FOR SC MEETING BECAUSE OF "LACK OF PROGRESS" AND JORDANIANS WOULD COME UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO GO ALONG WITH SUCH A MOVE RATHER THAN CARRY FORWARD BILATERAL TALKS. SISCO STRESSED THERE WAS AN INTERACTION BETWEEN UAR AND JORDANIAN ASPECTS AND UAR SIDE COULD NOT REMAIN UNATTENDED.

TEKOAH SAID THAT PERHAPS SUGGESTION ALONG LINES MADE BY CARADON (UK) MIGHT BE WAY OUT, E.G. JARRING SHOULD GET A DECLARATION PRODUCED BY ABOUT END OF OCT INCLUDING POINTS (1) THAT PARTIES HAD AGREED TO PROCEED TOWARD SEEKING AGREEMENT ON JUST AND LASTING PEACE ON BASIS PRINCIPLES OF RES; (2) WE WERE NOW ENGAGED IN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS THROUGH JARRING; AND (3) SOME EXPRESSION OF HOPE FOR SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS EARLY NEXT YEAR.

EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THROUGH TO JARRING, TEKOAH SAID JARRING HAD DEVELOPED SOME (BEGIN UNDERLINE) IDEES FIXES (END UNDERLINE) DURING HIS ASSIGNMENT AND THAT WE WERE NOW ALSO PARTIALLY FACED BY ARTIFICIAL CRISIS RELATED TO HIS OWN POSITION WITHIN SWEDISH GOVT. TEKOAH THOUGHT JARRING FEARED THAT INDEFINITE FURTHER CONTINUATION OF HIS MISSION MIGHT COST HIM HIS POSITION IN MOSCOW. HE ALSO WAS PHYSICALLY TIRED OF LIVING IN HOTELS AND BEING AWAY FROM HIS FAMILY. TEKOAH THOUGHT IT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WITH SWEDISH GOVT TO PROTECT HIS POSITION AND THAT CHANGE OF VENUE OF DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE POSSIBEL; FOR EXAMPLE THEY MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN EUROPE, EVEN IN STOCKHOOM, INSTEAD OF NICOSIA.

TEKOAH SAID HE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED FRANKLY WITH JARRING SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH MIGHT ENSUE IN ME IF JARRING SHOULD END HIS MISSION BECAUSE HE WAS TIRED OR WITH A REPORT OF NO PROGRESS; TERMINATION OF JARRING MISSION COULD EASILY LEAD AREA CLOSER TO AN EXPLOSION.

SISCO SAID WE KNEW JARRING WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF THIS FACTOR, BUT HE ALSO WAS CONCERNED THAT IF HE AGREED TO CONTINUE HIS MISSION IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THERE WERE NO PROGRESS HE WOULD SIMPLY BE PROVIDING COVER WHILE PREPARATIONS FOR NEW WAR WEN AHEAD. TEKOAH REPLIED THAT PROBLEM NOW WAS THAT JARRING DID NOT REALIZE THAT DESPITE MANY DIFFICULTIES THAT HAD PREVAILED THERE NOW HAD BEEN "BREAKTHROUGH" WITH JORDANIANS. SISCO SAID SEVERAL FACTORS ACCOUNTED FOR THIS. FIRST, ISRAELIS HAD BEEN TELLING JARRING FOR LONG TIME IN VERY GENERAL TERMS THAT SOMETHING WAS GOING ON WITH JORDANIANS, BUT NOTHING HAD EVER JELLED. SECOND, COMMENTS AND ATTITUDES JARRING RECEIVED FROM JORDANIANS, AND IN PARTICULAR RIFAI, LED HIM TO BELIEVE JORDANIANS DENIED REALITY OF SUCH CONTACTS. THIRD, JARRING DID NOT FEEL HE HAD ENOUGH DETAILED INFO FROM ISRAELIS TO GIVE HIM BASIS TO JUDGE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANY CONTACTS. BUFFUM EXPRESSED VIEW ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT STEPS NOW WOULD BE FOR JORDANIANS TO CONVEY TO JARRING THEIR WILLINGNESS TO GO AHEAD WITH CONTACTS WITH ISRAELIS. TEKOAH AGREED. BUFFUM

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DE RUEHDT 6846/2 278183
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041731Z OCT 68 ZFF-4
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3547
STATE GRNC
BT

1530Q

OCT 4, 1968

3:31PM

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 6846

NODIS/SANDSTORM

EKOAH SAID RIFAI DID NOT YET KNOW MUCH. ADDED THAT EBAN HAD SENT CABLE YESTERDAY ASKING THAT MESSAGE BE GOTTEN TO JORDANIANS TO REQUEST THEM TO SEND APPROPRIATE INFO AND INSTRUCTIONS TO RIFAI. REITERATED CENTRAL PROBLEM WAS HOW TO ENCOURAGE THESE CONTACTS WITH JORDAN AND TO GET JARRING TO DO SO. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THEY COULD CONTINUE DIRECTLY, WHICH WOULD BE ALL RIGHT WITH ISRAEL, BUT THEY KNEW JORDANIANS WANTED TO PUT THEM IN A JARRING FRAMEWORK.

REVERTING TO PROBLEM OF WHAT TO DO WITH UAR WHILE MORE DETAILED EFFORT GOING AHEAD WITH JORDANIANS, BUFFUM OBSERVED THAT FROM COMMENTS MADE BY RIAD (UAR) TO SECY WE HAD IMPRESSION EGYPTAINS HAD TOLD JORDANIANS THEY COULD GO AHEAD ON THEIR OWN WITH ISRAELIS AS HUSSEIN HAD TOLD BRITISH WAS CASE IN LONDON. NEVERTHELESS WE THOUGHT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOMETHING TO COVER UAR ASPECT, INDICATING SOME PROGRESS. OTHERWISE THERE WAS DANGER EGYPTIANS WOULD BE TEMPTED TO TAKE ISSUE BACK TO SC, ABOUT WHICH THEY WERE ALREADY TALKING.

EKOAH RECALLED ISRAELIS SOME TIME BACK HAD TRIED TO SET UP CONTACT WITH EGYPTIANS (ALONG LINES CONTACTS WITH JORDANIANS) BUT HAD FAILED. SAID ISRAEL HAD MOVED AHEAD WITHIN JARRING CONTEXT AND, PARTLY AT OUR URGING, HAD GONE INTO PRE-NEGOTS STAGE. BUT EXCHANGE OF VIEW COULD NOT GO VERY FAR WHEN THEY GOT RESPONSES SUCH AS LAST ONE FROM CAIRO. SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS JARRING SHOULD GO BACK TO EGYPTIANS AND TELL THEM THEY SHOULD MAKE MOST OF OPENING PROVIDED BY ISRAELI QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO KEEP THIS EXCHANGE GOING. UNFORTUNATELY JARRING AS WELL AS ISRAELIS SAW LAST EGYPTIAN REPLY AS CLOSING OFF OF THAT PARTICULAR ROUND.

IN RESPONSE TO TEKOAH EXPRESSION OF VIEW THAT UAR WAS NOT YET PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO SEEK PEACE WITH ISRAEL,

~~SECRET~~

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2 - USUN 6846, OCT 4, 1968, SECTION 2 OF 2

SISCO REPLIED THAT WE WERE NOT AS SURE OF THIS AS ISRAELIS. HERE HAD BEEN A BIT OF MOVEMENT, AND WE HAD NOT THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT THEY DID NOT WANT PEACE. RIAD HAD TOLD US PRIVATELY THEY DID AND WHILE THEY WERE AMBIGUOUS ON DETAILS THEY HAD ALSO REPLIED TO ISRAELI QUESTIONS THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO END 20 YEAR STATE OF BELLIGERENCE. (AT OPENING OF CONVERSATION TEKOA, WHILE EXPRESSING CONCERN AT GROMYKO ASSERTION OF SOV SECURITY INTERESTS IN ME, HAD NOTED FAVORABLE HIS STATEMENT OF DESIRE FOR "PEACE" IN AREA.)

NOTING TEKOA HAD TALKED ABOUT SIMPLE STATEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE OF RES, PEDERSEN SAID OUR UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT JORDAN REQUEST WAS FOR STATEMENT OF ACCEPTANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION. WONDERED WHETHER TEKOA THOUGHT ISRAEL COULD RESPOND TO LATER POINT AS WELL. ALSO SAID STATEMENT OF JORDANIAN POSITION TO BRITISH WAS THAT SUCH DECLARATION BY ISRAEL WOULD BE FOLLOWED FIRST BY INDIRECT NEGOTS THROUGH JARRING, THEN BY NEGOTS WITH JARRING PRESENT AND POSSIBLY LATER WITHOUT HIM. AS JORDANIANS SEEMED TO HAVE GAP IN MIND BETWEEN STATEMENT AND JOINT MEETINGS WITH JARRING, WONDERED HOW LONG GAP ISRAEL MIGHT BE IN POSITION TO ACCEPT.

ON IMPLEMENTATION TEKOA SAID THAT WHILE THERE MIGHT BE SOME DIFFICULTIES WITHIN GOVT, ESAN DID NOT BELIEVE FORMULA WOULD CAUSE PROBLEM PROVIDED IT WAS CLEAR FORMULA WOULD IN FACT BE BASIS ON WHICH TALKS WOULD BEGIN AND NOT SIMPLY ANOTHER EXERCISE SUCH AS THEY HAD GONE THROUGH FRUITLESSLY AND WITH INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES LAST SPRING. ON EXTENT OF INDIRECT NEGOTS, HE DID NOT GIVE CLEAR REPLY BUT SAID SUCH EXCHANGES WERE GOING AHEAD WITHOUT ANY FORMULA FROM ISRAEL AND THAT ONLY POINT OF FORMULA WAS TO PERMIT MOVEMENT TO JOINT TALKS.

GP-2
BUFFUM
BT

~~SECRET~~

4

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Friday, October 4, 1968
6:20 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

As Art McCafferty says, the
mystery of Hanoi's Foreign Minister
Trinh deepens. Apparently in East
Berlin meeting the Oslo team.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-96
By Sj, NARA, Date 6-3-03

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

Friday, October 4, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gold Negotiations with South Africa

Most of the action at the Bank and Fund Meetings concerned gold.

Our European partners wanted very much to reach an agreement with South Africa. We were willing -- as long as it was the kind of agreement that kept the gold price in line and therefore strengthened the system. We worked out an offer -- pretty much along the lines of our position -- and presented it to the South Africans. After overnight reflection, they rejected it.

The situation therefore remains unchanged, but with one plus factor. Bill Martin, on behalf of the European Gold Pool countries, Japan, Canada, Sweden and ourselves, issued a brief statement this afternoon saying we had all agreed on a position regarding newly mined gold based on the Washington Declaration on Gold, but that it had not been possible to reach agreement with South Africa at the meeting.

This outcome should quiet the issue for a time. It showed the European central bankers who were nervous about South Africa that we were willing to reach a fair settlement, but that South Africa's terms are just too high.

Ed Rostow for

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71288-83By 12/10/83, NARA, Date 2-17-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Friday - October 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Peru Coup

Pres file

The Military Junta appears firmly in control in Peru, supported by a united military establishment and some conservative civilians. Scattered violent protest acts by students are being quickly suppressed. Labor has not heeded an effort to mount a general strike. Leaders of the majority APRA party strongly oppose the coup, but are apparently lacking weapons or capability for active resistance.

Detailed contingency plans for the coup were drawn up by the Peruvian Army many months ago which accounts for the smoothness of the operation. We don't know exactly what triggered their final decision, but the main motives apparently included:

- the growing conviction that a much hated APRA leader would succeed Belaunde as President if elections were held next year;
- unhappiness with political instability and economic doldrums;
- lack of confidence in Belaunde's choice of military ministers and his disregard of "military interests" in such matters as budgets and sophisticated weapons;
- resentment at the terms of the IPC oil settlement;
- personal ambition of General Velasco, Army Chief of Staff, soon to be retired.

State is carrying on consultations with other OAS governments prior to making any recommendation about recognition of the new regime. This process could go on for an extended period, perhaps as long as a month.

Unlike the case of the Argentine coup in 1966, we have made no official statement condemning the action of the military leaders, although State officials have made our unhappiness clear on a background basis. Oliver believes it better to allow the weight of Latin American sentiment to register first. So far, only Venezuela has officially deplored the coup.

Secretary Rusk appears Sunday morning on "Issues and Answers" and may, of course, be questioned about these events.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLJ 94-171 (#38)
By: *cbn/ies* NARA, Date: 12-11-02

W. W. Rostow

cc - George Christian
SWLewis:mmm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Friday - October 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telegram from Colombian President Lleras

President Lleras of Colombia sent you a telegram September 28 (Tab A) which makes two points:

- he thanks you for your help in the recent cotton textile settlement with Colombia;
- solicits a "fair and understanding attitude" by AID and other US agencies.

Lleras' second point refers to difficulties in implementing our program loan to Colombia because of Colombian reluctance to agree to procedures designed to help protect the US balance of payments. AID, Commerce and Treasury have been discussing this problem this week here with the Colombian Finance Minister. Some relief for Colombian concerns may be possible but not a great deal. A recommended response to ~~Lleras~~ telegram is attached (Tab B). If you approve the text, State will have it delivered by our Embassy in Bogota.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Attachments

- Tab A - Telegram to President from President Lleras of September 28.
- Tab B - Suggested Presidential response to Lleras' message.

Samuel W. Lewis:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm, NARA, Date 12-16-02

INFORMATION 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~--SENSITIVE

Friday, October 4, 1968 -- 6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk tells me that Scotty Reston told him in great confidence last night that on Sunday The New York Times will come out in support of Vice President Humphrey.

Scotty said a leak would be "upsetting" -- somehow amusing, from the press.

W. W. Rostow

RECEIVED TO BE KEPT
ORIGINAL CANCELLED
OCT. 13 AND ARCHIVED
MAY 16, 1983

by ag on 1-22-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~--SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rlh

15
INFORMATION

~~**SECRET**~~

Friday, October 4, 1968
3:50 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

In strictest secrecy we have been informed that Wilson and Smith will meet about October 9 to try to settle Rhodesia.

Chances for settlement not judged bright by experts.

W. W. Rostow

London 13243

~~**SECRET**~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 93-291 (*47)
E. *pc/pw* NARA. Date 12-28-09

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PAGE 01 LONDON 13243 041744Z

SECRET 4 33 01

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ACTION SS 30

INFO MM-01,SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,/031 W

057775

0 041650Z OCT 68

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6460

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 13243

EXDIS/WOFORN

REF: SALISBURY'S 1357

1. ASST. UNDER SECTY. BOTTOMLEY OF COMMONWEALTH OFFICE INFORMS US IN STRICTEST SECRECY THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED WITH RHODESIANS FOR MEETING BETWEEN PRIMIN WILSON AND IAN SMITH ABOARD BRITISH NAVAL VESSEL OFF GIBRALTAR ON OR ABOUT WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9. ACCORDING BOTTOMLEY, ALL ARRANGEMENTS FOR TALKS HAVE BEEN AGREED TO BY BOTH SIDES AFTER SEVERAL EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SMITH WILL DECIDE HE PREFERS TO BEGIN TALKS THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, ALLOWING NIGHT'S SLEEP AT GIBRALTAR BEFORE BOARDING SHIP, BUT THIS IS ONLY DETAIL STILL TO BE SETTLED.

2. BOTTOMLEY SAYS PLAN IS FOR TWO RAF BRITANNIAS TO LEAVE LONDON SOMETIME TOMORROW (OCT 5), ARRIVING ASCENSION SAME EVENING. THEY WILL REMAIN ASCENSION SUNDAY AND SUNDAY NIGHT AND PROCEED TO SALISBURY SOMETIME MONDAY, OCTOBER 7. THEN, DEPENDING ON SMITH'S DECISION ABOUT TIMING, AIRCRAFT WILL CARRY SMITH AND HIS PARTY AND GOV. GIBBS TO GIBRALTAR.

3. BOTTOMLEY IS NOT SURE HOW LONG TALKS WILL LAST. HE SAYS WILSON COULD CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS UNTIL SUNDAY NIGHT (OCT 13). IF AT THAT TIME FURTHER TALKS SEEMED NECESSARY BRITISH WOULD AGREE TO FOLLOW-UP MEETING LATER ON. PRIMIN DID NOT WANT TO STRING MEETINGS OUT, HOWEVER, AND IF THERE WERE SECOND MEETING HE WANTED IT TO BE BRIEF. ACCORDING BOTTOMLEY, BRITISH NEGOTIATING PARTY WILL NUMBER 35 PERSONS, INCLUDING, IN ADDITION PRIMIN, COMMONWEALTH SECTY THOMSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL, CO PERM. UNDER SECTY MORRICE JAMES, BOTTOMLEY AND HEAD OF RHODESIA POLITICAL DEPT.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec 3.4

By *jc/jc* NARA, Date *12-28-09*

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 13243 041744Z

FABER.

4. WE ASKED BOTTOMLEY WHETHER FACT TALKS WERE GOING FORWARD INDICATED SMITH OR WILSON HAD MADE CONCESSIONS ON KEY POINTS LIKE ELECTED AFRICAN BLOCKING QUARTER, APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL AND JETTISONING OF EXTREMISTS IN SMITH REGIME. HE REPLIED IN NEGATIVE, SAYING DECISION TO PROCEED WITH TALKS HAD BEEN TAKEN WITHOUT ANY PRELIMINARY PROGRESS HAVING BEEN MADE ON MAIN POINTS AT ISSUE.

5. BOTTOMLEY SAID THAT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS IT WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO HANDLE THIS INFO WITH UTMOST CARE. CABINET WOULD NOT BE INFORMED BY PRIMIN UNTIL MONDAY OR TUESDAY THAT NEW SUMMIT TALKS TAKING PLACE. CANADIANS, AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS WOULD ALSO NOT BE INFORMED BEFORE NEXT WEEK. BOTTOMLEY ASKED THAT WE NOT REPEAT INFO TO OTHER POSTS, INCLUDING SALISBURY, UNTIL HE GAVE US GREEN LIGHT. WE MADE NO PROMISES BUT ASSURED HIM INFO WOULD BE CIRCULATED ON NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS WITH MAXIMUM SAFEGUARDS.

6. RE USE OF ASCENSION, BOTTOMLEY STATED THAT RANKING BRITISH OFFICER ON ISLAND IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO INFORM COMMANDING OFFICER OF US BASE THAT TWO BRITANNIAS WILL BE ARRIVING SOME- TIME SATURDAY NIGHT (OCT 5) AND DEPARTING FOR UNSPECIFIED RPT. UNSPECIFIED DESTINATION MONDAY (OCT 7). BASE CO WILL BE TOLD THAT WASHINGTON HAS BEEN ADVISED OF NATURE OF AIRCRAFT'S MISSION. BOTTOMLEY REQUESTS THAT STATE DEPT AND MOD (WITHOUT REVEALING NATURE OF MISSION) TAKE ANY STEPS THEY DEEM NECESSARY TO ASSURE TWO BRITANNIAS GET SMOOTHLY IN AND OUT OF ASCENSION.

7. COMMENT: IT IS INTERESTING THAT WILSON HAS DECIDED TO PRESS ON WITH TALKS DESPITE HARDLINE TAKEN BY SMITH (REPORTED SALISBURY'S 1357). PRIMIN MUST REASON THAT EVEN IF TALKS DO NOT BRING SETTLEMENT HE CAN PROBABLY MAKE SURE THAT THEY BREAK DOWN ON GROUNDS POLITICALLY FAVORABLE TO BRITISH GOVT. BOTTOMLEY CONTINUES TO BELIEVE PERSONALLY THAT POSITIONS ARE TOO FAR APART TO BE BRIDGED, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITS THAT CO DOES NOT REALLY KNOW HOW FAR SMITH CAN GO (OR WILSON WILL GO) AND "WE MIGHT GET STUCK WITH AN AGREEMENT." IN BOTTOMLEY'S VIEW, THIS COULD ONLY COME THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS BY SMITH. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE BRITISH GOVT. COULD DEFY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 LONDON 13243 041744Z

ATTITUDE OF SIGNIFICANT NUMBER ITS OWN MP'S (EXPRESSED ONLY
YESTERDAY IN RHODESIA RESOLUTION AT BLACKPOOL) AND AFRICAN
COMMONWEALTH STATES TO SETTLE ON ANY BASIS NOT CLEARLY
CONSISTENT WITH SIX PRINCIPLES. BRUCE

~~SECRET~~ EMB

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11

Pres file

Friday, October 4, 1968 -- 3:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Elspeth's working notes on the draft, with the bark off. She believes it must be totally re-done. I have read it over once, and I agree with that judgment.

Rather than give you my comments in detail, which would take some hours of further work, I believe you should make a basic decision on whether you are prepared to go with relatively minor changes in this draft or with a new draft which would use a good deal of this material but be considerably different in structure, tone and language.

Tom Johnson suggested that I send this back to you before you decide to distribute it to Arthur Krim, Hardesty, etc.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

GENERAL COMMENT: Ugh! Amateur-schamateur!

Draft needs to be rather brutally redone, not just reworded. As it stands, it is awkward, unprofessional, inadequate. (For example:

- use of tenses..."you", "our", "my" are cloying-not LBJ's style at all, so unpersuasive.
- cliches abound..."My famous namesake" "The old Marquis de Talleyrand" "Point Four, now known as foreign aid..." "clear, cold light..." "immense credit is due..."
- The summary of "misconceptions" in the early pages is so poorly presented that the reader sides with the opposition;
- Summary of post-war policy..pp2-6- done in such an adolescent fashion I wouldn't accept it from an undergraduate...certainly not the tone for FOREIGN AFFAIRS etc etc.)

I should therefore start with p 7, scrapping all that preceded and rewrite the rest. (Not one tiny contribution to human knowledge is made in these first 6 pages...except that the Pres. is made to sound like an ass, which he isn't.

p. 7.

This is now p. 1.

Where and when did Wilson say this? A precise, crisp quote would help, and would provide a valid opening,

"W.W. once said that every new Pres. would like to write his own record from the start on his own blank sheet of paper; instead, he is forced to squeeze most of his record between the lines of what past Presidents have already put down. Although I don't wholly accept the concept of the Presidency as a set of interlinear insertions- each of us obviously writes some fresh copy- nonetheless Mr. Wilson had grasped a hard and important fact about the office

each of us held for a time. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

As we both learned, sometimes painfully, the past is always at the President's shoulder, sometimes providing momentum and direction, often dumping an intractable problem squarely in his lap.

In this essay I am therefore responding to the element of continuity in the Presidency in seeking to set down some comments, recommendations and even warnings for future occupants ~~of the White House~~ of that surprisingly small house on Pennsylvania Avenue. It is a commentary) on our times that I begin with foreign affairs rather than the field of domestic policy ~~which~~ on which I - like Wilson - hoped ~~to~~ originally to concentrate my efforts. The oceans have shrunk so in our lifetime that the agenda for Americans can no longer be what it was in the 19th century, a familiar list of internal issues. The American agenda must now cover the area of American vulnerability; and that is far beyond our continental frontiers. So, as one President in a lengthening chain, let me begin with the toughest of all the illustrations of this dramatically widened agenda. Let me begin with Vietnam.

Woodrow

p. 7A

Don't like "coming out of isolation in 1941". Say rather "...faced since 1945."

"Emotions have created a new mythology about our commitment which can't stand up to a reasoned analysis."

Rewrite next paragraph to describe the nature of the prior commitment..then comment on it if you will. And ny rewrite

(By the way — I've not persuaded necessarily that foreign affairs should come first —)

I mean do it chronologically...beginning with FDR (p. 8) and then take up Ike and then JFK. As it is, you run back and forward in time confusingly.

p. 9

Re-do and stress stuff on '65.

"Historians, I suspect, will spend a good deal of time on the year 1965, as a time of ugly crisis and crucial decision. ~~Take the month of~~ Take the month of _____, for example: the monsoons were about to begin.....

Personally, I find the Vietnam section unpersuasive. Nothing new is said. What might bring it to life is a development of the last par. on p. 9. Why was it evident to the Pres. at this time? How were the arguments presented? Give it some vividness, some life.

p. 10

Kind of a weak end to the Vietnam case-study.

p. 11

Who are "we"? (Does "our ultimate goal" mean strictly US goal?)

"Americans long since learned that one of the best ways to avoid conflict in society is to provide a workable mechanism for peaceful change. The amending clause in our Constitution did not, to be sure, prevent one civil war...but it may have averted others. That the Charter of the United Nations is not as yet as powerful an international mechanism to promote both stability and change we must all agree; but meanwhile our ultimate goal both within and outside the UN must be to help create ~~just such a peaceful yet~~ just such a peaceful yet productively changing world. In order to achieve this, nations must be made to shun force....

par. 2. What is a "vital region of the world"?

p. 12

IBJ did not retire. "...have not come to an end with the election of 1968; they..."

Correct Perkins quote: from "Foreign Aid and the Brain Drain", FOREIGNAFFAIRS, July 1966

"Europe did not have to be invented; it only had to be remembered."

p. 14.

Sounds as though Taiwan is only country which has graduated from aid dole.

Again, this is rather infantile as an argument.

p. 15.

The image leaves me cold. Food production is not easily grasped as a "hard spinal column."

Let Les Brown (if that is indeed his name) write this section. He says is better and more persuasively.

p. 17

An odd message to send Mrs. Gandhi from the sky. Or was there more to it than that?

Ah, I see he was using Mr. Brown after all...only he paraphrased better here.

p. 19.

I'd favor a less limp peroration for this section.

p. 20

"Man indeed shall not live by bread alone...even by the protein-enriched modern bread of the 1960s. People must grow..."

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p. 13

I'm not wholly persuaded that basic strength is economic. (par. 2

Quote Jim Perkins from FOREIGN AFFAIRS (~~This is by memory...needs to be looked up~~). The success of the Marshall Plan was due to the fact that Europe did not ~~have~~ have to be invented; it ~~needed~~ only to be revealed. ^{had} Using this, go on to say that we are in the far harder task of invention with LDCs. In short this page is rather infantile and needs reworking,

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p. 20

"Man indeed shall not live by bread alone...even by the protein-enriched modern bread of the 1960s. People must grow..."

- p. 20 par 1. last sentence... "there remains the problem of general growth." (Forget Economic.)
- p. 21 Things get a bit better here... isn't this the reworking of a speech?
- p. 23 Last sentence; "there will indeed be fewer and fewer Vietnam"?
- p. 25 Doesn't help again to say that the successses of aid have outweighed the failures (said earlier on p. 13) without proving it or at least giving illustrations.
- Again this is a feeble argument. Why not discuss the neo-isolationism inherent in aid opposition? Why not quote from Fulbright in the days when he advocated long term financing for aid? Why not, in short, do something to turn out a sophisticated instead of a naif argument?
- p., 26 Sounds as though all this is not being attempted now or at least advocated. CIAP exists, yet look at the first sentence on this page.. Also Par. 2... multilateralism hasn't gone far enough, God knows, but it isn't a new additive.
- p. 28. "Those who wish to vote for No More Vietnams had better start supporting foreign aid; and in so saying I am not exempting the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,"
- p. 29 "There is a peculiar irony in the fact that those Americans most verbally concerned over the issue of law and order at home are often the very ones who charge that the United States is trying to "police the world." The truth of the matter is that the world sadly needs some policing but that the United States has never been able or anxious to do the job alone. To be sure, in the past few years we have thrown out weight on the side of peaceful settlement in quite a few warlike crises: the Arab-Israeli War, the Cyprus s..... But in each case we have striven, often successfully, to....."
- "Those who have said that the Johnson Administration" is the kind of sentence that should come out. Peevish without being convincing.
- p. 30 "...understandable and intended..." Intended by whom? God?
- par., 3 "Yet the reasons for Europe's attitude..."
- p. 31. par. 1 a bit too didactic.
- par. 3 Mention Common Mkt here?
- last par. Don't understand "strait!"
- p. 32 I'd make a little more over the easing of the dollar crisis. Might point out that policy successes get much less of a press than policy failures. (Dominican Rep. a good illustration.
- Odds are fair that de Gaulle may be gone by the time this is published... therefore it could be kept a little less contemporary.
- p. 34 Cite Truman's statement that he went into Korea to bulwark UN position. (par. 2)
- p. 36 UN section pretty weak. Why not tie in regional argument above with UN, which, after all, has its regional components.

p. 37-8 More could and should be said about US-USSR relations. Diffusion of power might well be discussed. Maybe even the doctrine of convergence.

p. 39 I'd do this section as a gloss on the theme of foreign-policy-making in a democracy. And I'd begin by re-stating the newness of foreign policy to the important American agenda.

p. 41 par 1. What does "None of us has yet made it." mean?

Well, I'd like to round this out by talking about the Diplomatic Revolution of 1947, of which the Johnson Administration is obviously a part. Either here at the end...or perhaps way back at the beginning...the bone structure of that revolution should be stated clearly. Then and only then do the comments on 39-44 make much sense. This means a new ending is needed.

GENERAL OMISSIONS:

1. Military policy. Huge vacuum here, which makes everything else sound a bit off-center. Security not discusses, not yet the national interest.
2. Personal stuff too scanty. If there is a purpose to a president's talking, it is to say how things look from the top. Too much of this is the way it looks to "Washington, yes.. but not to that one man. He should take a leap from Mr. Truman and use more anecdote and narrative. Otherwise it is too theoretical and bland.
3. Role of the media scarcely discussed...and yet it will be vastly important to any future president. I'd like the President's comments on Scotty's article on "The Press, the President and Foreign Policy" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS July 1966.) Or on McLuhan, God help us.
4. Actual effects of past decisions...after starting with the bit about the importance of the past, lets have some illustrations beyond the few Vietnam references. Might be well to start out with something like: "When I took over the Presidency with tragic suddenness in 1963, the United States was already involved in a set of international commitments. We were in our second decade of UN membership, with that international body firmly planted on US soil. We were active in a set of security arrangements...NATO, SEATO, etc.. which..... Since 1961 we had been hopeful of a new hemispheric partnership, the Alliance for Progress....etc. etc.
5. Certain phrases and concepts are strangely lacking: cold war; third world; revolution in weaponry, etc. etc. I'm not asking the President to sound like a political scientist which heaven forbid...but I don't want him to sound like Baby Snooks, either.

Friday, October 4, 1968
3:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

As rather vivid background to your meeting with the Yugoslav at 5:45 this afternoon, you might wish to read these notes on the mood of Yugoslavia, written by an old friend of mine at MIT.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

12.

September 27, 1968

From: Lincoln P. Bloomfield

Subject: Some Highlights of Yugoslavia in late September, 1968

In a short but intense visit to Yugoslavia from September 13-19 I gained the following impressions which may be of general interest. I was there as a guest of the Institute for International Politics and Economy, where I lectured on three successive days.

First, an absolute determination to resist the Russians. There is no doubt whatever in the mind of any Yugoslav I talked to that if the Soviet Union lays a finger on their country, they will fight back with everything they have, retreat into the mountains, if necessary giving up half the country in the process, and fight on in a Vietnam-type war whether or not anyone helps them. Flying over Yugoslavia it is perfectly clear how they can still feel confident of their capacity to fight a partisan war, given the amount of fairly vertical terrain. The strength of this conviction is underscored by private statements on the part of responsible people that even if Tito's government should give in to the Russians, the people would repudiate Tito and fight on.

A variety of tangible steps have obviously been taken to back up Yugoslavia's determination to stand off the Russians if they should attack. Belgrade is full of soldiers, even though no general mobilization has been announced. Surcin airport looks fairly normal from the ground, but from the air a perimeter of anti-aircraft batteries is visible in what seem to be hastily-dug revetments. The manager of Austrian Airways told me that tanks were removed from Surcin only the weekend before I arrived.

The second vivid impression comes from the fact that high Yugoslav officials are making no bones about the possibility of assistance from the United States in the event of trouble with the Russians. During my stay I had lengthy conversations with senior officials of the Foreign Ministry, the Party, and the Parliament. Except for the latter, the individuals I talked to were extraordinarily frank in pressing me concerning my estimates of types and quantities of U.S. help under varying scenarios, despite my disclaimer of any official position or influence. One of the highest Yugoslav diplomatic officials asked me if I thought the United States would

intervene if the Soviets hit Rumania, and if not, whether I thought the U.S. would intervene if the Soviets hit Yugoslavia. I repeated my disclaimer about being a lone professor, which he impatiently waved aside. I hastily gamed the matter out in my mind, and concluded that if Yugoslavs were encouraged to believe that the United States would assist them in the event of Soviet aggression, it might reinforce their determination and therefore contribute to deterrence of any such Russian move. I therefore ventured to predict that if Rumania were invaded the United States would probably draft some very stern diplomatic notes and cancel some current bilateral agreements with the Soviets. But if Yugoslavia were invaded my own hunch was that there would be a response from the United States. We immediately got down to essentials; they indicated that what they would want first of all would be pressure on the Soviet Union, and second of all supplies. Following that would be air cover, and only as a last resort ground forces.

I was struck by the several circuitous references to the possibility under this scenario of NATO counteraction. In an acute historical irony, one who expressed to me the private hope that NATO would remain strong, and would consider a threat to Yugoslavia as a threat to the NATO southern flank, is someone I vividly remember from my own early UN days as probably the single most vitriolic spokesman of the Communist bloc. This same individual, who is high in party circles, told me of rumors of possible partition of Yugoslavia if the Russians should push to Serbia. He sought reassurance that the United States understood its interests sufficiently to go to great lengths to keep the Soviet Union from gaining a permanent base on the Mediterranean littoral. Finally, the same individual suggested the possibility of reviving the Balkan Pact! (This pact with Greece and Turkey has been moribund for years; it would be an amazing spectacle to see Communist Yugoslavia hold its nose and consort with the current colonels' junta in Athens).

Hatred of the Russians is positively palpable in Yugoslavia. At one end are simple quips, most of which are aimed at Brezhnev, universally

considered the arch villain among many in the Moscow Politburo. ("Brezhnev's eyebrows are Stalin's mustache at a higher level"--although after the use of East German troops in Czechoslovakia, as one senior Yugoslav official put it at a lunch given for me, the reference should really be to Brezhnev's beard as representing Stalin's mustache at a lower level). There seems to be little doubt in official minds in Belgrade that as the Soviet bloc crumbles, great dangers lie ahead.

One high Foreign Ministry official told me that the Russians would have to replace all the Eastern European armies with Soviet troops and would also try to reorganize the Warsaw pact to get complete reunification of forces. The same official blamed the military for carrying the Politburo in the Czech affair! He exculpated Suslov, who opposed the operation because of his responsibility for the November party gathering. The Yugoslav foreign office believes that Kosygin was opposed, but tends to dismiss him as such an ordinary and unimpressive individual that he is not very effective. I was also told that cables from the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow are reporting unprecedented criticism of the Soviet-Czech operation from Soviet foreign ministry officials and party members in Moscow, a kind of criticism never heard in 1956.

A senior member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Yugoslav Parliament told me that during the student riots last May (with which it will be recalled Tito expressed sympathy) Soviet agents were noticed agitating the students. My informer took great pride in telling me that nevertheless the Yugoslav police made no arrests. (He also went on to say that the students were ripe for agitation given their genuine grievances based on the high unemployment rate and uncertain job prospects, growing in turn out of the transition to a market economy, a condition which led to the government encouraging 300,000 of them to emigrate to West Germany).

While I was waiting to leave Belgrade last Thursday morning, during the usual unexplained two to three hour wait after scheduled departure time, I saw a Caravelle with Aeroflot markings arrive from Moscow. A total of four passengers disembarked, and walked off in close formation, looking neither to left nor right. I guess, given the still fairly obvious defenses around Surcin airport, that this is not the best season for Russian tourists to fly into Belgrade.

Profile

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Friday, October 4, 1968

9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Indian Deputy Prime Minister
Morarji Desai, Friday, October 4, 12:15 p.m.

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's brief. You know the aid picture, and I shall be discussing it with you Saturday as you requested. Morarji realizes it is bleak, but he probably does not know how bleak. We understand the Senate will move IDA out of committee--but with Senators Gore and Mansfield agreeing that it will not come up for floor action this session.

Aside from discussing issues he may raise, you might give him a few final thoughts on US-Indian relations. For instance, either of the following would be worthwhile:

1. When you took office you had high hopes for US-Indian cooperation. There were the agreements on economic liberalization with the World Bank and the new emphasis on agriculture. In the drought, we worked together to stave off hunger and to speed up India's agricultural revolution.

But while the economic cooperation grew more successful, India's political base for aid in our Congress weakened. In part, this resulted from our own domestic politics. But in some measure it was also the result of India's behavior.

The lesson today seems clear: India has made progress, and others like ourselves have helped substantially. But if this successful partnership is to continue, India will need to cultivate the politics of development just as she cultivates her miracle seeds.

2. You have thought often about the troubles the world suffers in picking up the pieces from the colonial period. Think how many of our problems come from that source--Arab-Israel, Cyprus, Cambodia, Vietnam, many African feuds, and India-Pakistan. The time has come to put some of these feuds to rest and get on with the job of development. Aid donors are not going to go on footing their costs.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 729-5451

By rg/lap, NARA, Date 2-26-93

CONFIDENTIAL

13a

S/S-13280

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Morarji Desai,
Deputy Prime Minister and Finance
Minister of India, October 4,
12:15 p.m.

This will probably be your last meeting as President
with an Indian political leader. As you know, Desai is
the most pro-US of all senior Indian officials. and

(A-5)

is a leading candidate to
replace her if she steps down.

Because it is so important to India, it is quite
possible that Desai will raise the question of continued
U.S. assistance. If you are at all disposed to go along
with Zwick's recommendation on PL-480, it would be in
our interest that Desai be the man to take this word
back.



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosure:
Talking Points

RECEIVED

NLS S+54

8-26-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

US-Indian Relations

- We are both aware of the problems that have existed between our two countries over the past five years.
- But, as the world's two largest democracies, we both have a great interest in strengthening our ties.
- I have always regarded you as a great proponent of closer US-Indian relations. You have been an articulate advocate of India's interests, but you have, as well, shown a deep understanding of our role and interests.

Indian Agricultural Revolution

- In looking back over the past five years, the truly great accomplishment in Asia has been the agricultural revolution.
- This great area seems to be winning the race between food and population.
- We are glad we have been associated with this remarkable agricultural achievement.
- The joint efforts of India and the US to meet man's need for food has created a bond between our two countries.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7119 5454

By ag/isp, NARA, Date 2-17-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14

Friday, Oct. 4, 1968
11:45 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This ~~SECRET~~ report from Hanbi suggests the North Vietnamese are wrestling with -- and possibly quarreling about -- whether to go with us on our three points.

3.3 (b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~

3.3 (b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 03-63
By ilo NARA, Date 5-30-03

Friday, October 4, 1968 -- 8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith notes and materials on UPI 178, attached at Tab A. At Tab B is McCloskey's statement of August 23 on spheres of influence. At Tab C is the relevant extract from Sec. Rusk's speech at New Haven on September 12.

So far as a response to Senator Gore is concerned, the State Department might handle it and say: "We do not agree with Senator Gore. We do not accept the logic of his position or the analogies he draws. With respect to spheres of influence, we refer you to the State Department briefing of August 23 and to Secretary Rusk's speech at New Haven on September 12. With respect to our position on Czechoslovakia, we refer you to Secretary Rusk's address before the United Nations General Assembly of October 2."

The background to the matter is this.

1. Churchill met Stalin in October 1944 without Roosevelt who was campaigning in the U.S. They talked bluntly in terms of spheres of influence. As Tab D indicates, Harry Hopkins stepped a cable which would have, in effect, let Churchill speak for us with Stalin.

2. At Yalta (Tab E) we successfully negotiated language which promised free elections in Eastern Europe. But, in the event, neither Britain nor the U.S. was prepared to make the political freedom of Poland, agreed at Yalta, a matter of war or peace, as the quoted passages in this tab suggested.

3. Nevertheless, a few days -- almost a few hours -- before Roosevelt died, Roosevelt was focusing on the Polish question in communications with Churchill and on April 23, 1945, President Truman was very rough with Molotov on the question of carrying out the wartime political agreements there. He sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow on May 23. (Tab F)

4. Nevertheless, neither Truman nor Vandenberg (Tab G) -- Democrats or Republicans -- was prepared to make the political shape of Eastern Europe a matter of war or peace.

5. In fact, Stalin was very cautious in taking over Eastern Europe in defiance of the Yalta agreement. He felt his way down to 1948 when he was sure enough there would be no U.S. military response, to move decisively in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The West, bedeviled by the economic weakness of Western Europe, had fallen back to the defensive in the Cold War, built around the split of Europe on the Elbe, was a reality.

6. Nevertheless, in 1948 Yugoslavia broke away from Moscow and, with considerable support from us, made its way forward in relative independence since 1948.

7. In short, we never surrendered our right to try to influence the evolution of Eastern Europe by non-military means. But the initial decision of Churchill-Roosevelt-Truman and Vandenberg that we should not bring military force to bear in Eastern Europe, has stuck -- confirmed by President Eisenhower's reaction to the Hungarian crisis of 1946; President Kennedy's reaction to the wall in Berlin in 1961; and our own reaction to the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. In that sense, there is something correct about Gore's view.

8. I suspect, as a matter of prediction, not of policy, that we would behave in a different way if Yugoslavia were attacked than we did with Czechoslovakia. Moreover, no one can predict what we and the world would do if Rumania were attacked, fought back, and came to the United Nations for help. It is, therefore, dangerous and misleading for an American Senator to make sweeping statements about Eastern Europe.

9. The Soviet Union takes the view -- as Gromyko stated yesterday -- that what it got out of the Second World War was the right to maintain control of the heart of Central Europe up to the Elbe. They claim the right to use military force to correct a shift in the balance of power in that area against them, even if it is brought about by no action of the West more ominous than increased trade, tourism, cultural contacts, and ideas.

10. As for the analogy with the position of the Western Hemisphere, as Scotty Reston points out, the application of the Soviet doctrine to this area would give us the right to invade Cuba and clean it out. Moreover, as the Punta del Este proceedings on Cuba, in early 1962, indicate, the doctrine in this Hemisphere that extra-continental powers shall not intrude militarily and that the ideology of this Hemisphere should be democratic, goes all the way back to Bolivar.

W. W. Reston

WWReston:rla

UPI-173

(GORE)

WASHINGTON--DEMOCRATIC SENATOR ALBERT GORE DECLARED TODAY THAT-- ALTHOUGH NO SECRET AGREEMENTS HAVE EVER BEEN NEGOTIATED--THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA DO, IN FACT, RECOGNIZE DEFINITE "SPHERES OF INFLUENCE" IN THE WORLD.

GORE RECALLED IN A SENATE SPEECH THAT SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK SAID IN NEW HAVEN, CONN., LAST MONTH THAT "THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT ENTERED INTO ANY SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS WITH ANYONE ANYWHERE IN THE WORLD."

"THE STATEMENT MANAGES TO BE BOTH TRUE AND MISLEADING," GORE SAID. "IT IS TRUE, SO FAR AS ANY OF US KNOW, IN DENYING THAT ANY SECRET AGREEMENT CONCERNING SOVIET DOMINANCE IN EASTERN EUROPE WAS CONCLUDED AT YALTA OR ANYWHERE ELSE."

"BUT IT IS, I BELIEVE, MISLEADING IN ITS IMPLICATION THAT NO SUCH UNDERSTANDING EXISTS. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT, WITHOUT EVER HAVING SIGNED AN AGREEMENT OR ISSUED A MANIFESTO, WE DO RECOGNIZE EASTERN EUROPE AS A SOVIET SPHERE, JUST AS THE RUSSIANS ACKNOWLEDGE LATIN AMERICA TO BE OUR SPHERE OF INFLUENCE."

GORE SAID RUSK HAD, AT THE SAME TIME, RECOGNIZED "THE REALITY OF THE SOVIET MILITARY POSITION AND THE EXISTENCE OF THE WARSAW PACT."

"PERHAPS THE SECRETARY'S POINT IS THAT IT IS NOT A SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, BUT A SPHERE OF DOMINANCE WHICH WE RECOGNIZE," GORE CONTINUED.

"PERHAPS IT IS SIMPLY THAT HE PREFERS NOT TO CALL THIS PARTICULAR THING BY ITS RIGHT NAME. BUT WHY NOT? I FULLY AGREE THAT SPHERES-OF-INFLUENCE POLITICS IS MORALLY INDEFENSIBLE, BUT I FAIL TO SEE ANY REDEEMING VIRTUE IN DENYING THAT WE ENGAGE IN IT WHEN IN FACT WE DO."

HE SAID THE MONROE DOCTRINE IS NOTHING MORE "BUT THE ASSERTION OF U.S. HEGEMONY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE," AND CHARGED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS DECEIVING "NO ONE BUT OURSELVES" IN DENYING IT.

AND BEFORE SHOWING TOO MUCH RIGHTEOUS INDIGNATION OVER RUSSIA'S INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GORE CONTINUED, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD "RECALL THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ARBENZ GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA WAS OVERTURNED; THE ABORTIVE RAY OF PIERCE EPISODE IN 1961. AND THE INTERVENTION WITH OUR OWN TROOPS ON THE SIDE OF A MILITARY JUNTA AGAINST A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT SEEKING TO RESTORE ITSELF IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN 1965."

17/3--PAID556ED

Tab A

Book
156

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

DPC 161

TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS AND RADIO NEWS BRIEFING, FRIDAY,
AUGUST 23, 1968, 12:40 P.M.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Clarke Ellis will be on for us over the weekend.

I have a statement. Now, this statement bears on a couple of things: 1, a story which appeared this morning, which had the effect of attributing to an unidentified source, that there has been a tacit understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States on the question of spheres of influence.

Q A question of what?

A Spheres of influence.

The United States Government has never entered into any sphere of influence agreements or understandings with anyone, anywhere in the world.

Q Will you slow down just a little bit, please?

A The United States Government has never entered into any sphere of influence agreements or understandings with anyone, anywhere in the world. There has been no discussion of any such idea in connection with recent

Int B

developments in Czechoslovakia.

Q Would you pick it up from "no discussion"?

A Of any such idea in connection with recent developments in Czechoslovakia, nor has any government attempted to elicit from the United States Government any such understanding. Any suggestion --

Q Wait a minute. Any suggestion what?

A Any suggestion that the United States, tacitly or otherwise, gave the Soviet Union to understand that the United States would be indifferent to the action which the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries -- and other Warsaw Pact countries -- have now taken in Czechoslovakia is malicious and totally without foundation.

Second, it has also been intimated that the Yalta Conference led to the creation of spheres of influence in Europe. In fact, the Yalta Conference, which was held from February 1 to 11, 1945 --

Q Dates again?

A . -- February 1 to 11, 1945, between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, did not in any manner, either directly or indirectly, deal with any questions of spheres of influence. The entire record of

the conference -- the entire record of the conference without exception -- was published by the United States Government in 1955 in the series -- and this is upper case -- "Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers - the Conferences of Malta and Yalta" -- "Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers - the Conferences of Malta and Yalta."

The United States attitude toward spheres of influence is set forth in a preconference paper on pages 103 - 108, which I will have in my office for your perusal.

Q I'm sorry. Will you just give us that again please -- "is set forth" --

A The United States attitude towards spheres of influence is set forth in a preconference paper on pages 103 - 108. The Zonal Agreements, which merely delimited -- delimited -- the zones of military occupation --

Q Did you say "delimited"?

A Delimited the zones of military occupation of Germany and Austria, were officially and finally confirmed at Yalta.

The zonal limits were actually negotiated in the

meetings of the European Advisory Council and were submitted to governments in November 1944.

The only substantial change affecting the zones --

Q "Substantial" or substantive?

A Substantial change affecting the zones was the final Soviet consent under British and American urgings to agree to granting a zone to France and a place for her on the Control Council for Germany.

The document adopted by the Conference entitled, "Declaration of Liberated Europe" -- upper case -- "Declaration of Liberated Europe" -- a document of American origin -- had as its purpose the exact opposite of spheres of influence -- the exact opposite of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe -- since it provided for tripartite participation in the Control Councils --

Q "Since it" --

A Since it provided for tripartite participation in the Control Councils and administration of former enemy states in Europe.

Q "And the administration"?

A And administration of former enemy states in Europe.

In Czechoslovakia, another special train departed from Prague this morning.

Q "Another special"?

A And will take, we expect, several hundred Americans to Frankfurt and Paris. Additionally, another small motor convoy left for West Germany, via Waidhaus, proceeding to Nuremburg.

Now, we don't have figures on those evacuated or those remaining. We will have difficulty getting an accurate count, since many of those Americans have not registered with U. S. Consuls.

Q Do you have a count, Bob, on the number that have left?

A I do not, I am sorry to say.

Q Bob, is the second half of your statement a comment on General de Gaulle's statement?

A FOR BACKGROUND, yes.

Q Bob, at this particular time, so many years after the Yalta Conference, do you regard the East European countries as independent of Soviet spheres of influence or independent of predominant Soviet influence?

A I have just expressed in a rather careful and studied way the American attitude on the concept of

spheres of influence, and I have nothing to add to it.

Q Bob, do you have any comment on a report which says that a meeting between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin was temporarily cancelled?

A No.

Q And that the purpose of this meeting was to discuss a limitation on anti-ballistic missile systems?

A No.

Q And that this temporarily cancellation occurred because of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

A No.

Q Bob, at the Secretary's last news conference, he said that he expected agreement on the missile talks fairly soon, I think were his words. Does the Department still subscribe to the Secretary's views?

A Yes.

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B-1

Q You say a meeting between Kosygin and Johnson is being considered sometime in the future.

A No, I didn't say that.

Q You didn't say that, but are you excluding the possibility that there would be such a meeting?

A I refer you to the White House.

Q Bob, on what basis is the -- do you still expect these missile talks fairly soon?

A I didn't say that I expect them fairly soon.

Q But I misunderstood, I'm sorry. Did you say that the Department still subscribed to the view of the Secretary of two weeks ago, that they would take place fairly soon?

A I think we better go back and read the Secretary's language. Let me just say that no final agreement, no final agreement, has been reached.

Q Is there any --

Q Is it still --

Q -- any tentative agreement on time or place?

A No comment.

Q Didn't the Secretary say the other night, before the Platform Committee, that he expected an early development on the missile talks? I seem to recall that phrase.

Q What's the question?

Q Did not the Secretary say the other night before the Platform Committee that he expected an early development regarding an agreement to begin the missile talks?

A I have nothing more to add on this subject, gentlemen.

Q Could it be inferred on our part, Bob, that the only thing that had not definitively been agreed upon was the timing of the announcement for such meetings?

A No comment.

Q Are you neither affirming or denying that a tentative agreement has been reached on time and place?

A I'm neither affirming or denying.

Q Would you say then that the Czech invasion had no substantial effect on the outcome of agreement on the talks?

A No, I haven't said that either.

Q Bob, has there been any move from the Czech Government, either through the oncoming visit of the Foreign Minister or any other representative, for handling refugees or for any visit of the Foreign Minister to Washington following the UN, or any knowledge of his role in the UN?

A Well, on the first part of it -- and speaking presently -- I don't know that there is a refugee problem yet. The United States -- and I think I said this here yesterday or the day before -- would, and has been, considering what we might appropriately do if we are presented with a substantial refugee problem.

With the Foreign Minister scheduled to come to New York, I think that's as far as we can take it at this point. I know of no plans, as of now, for him to come to Washington.

Q Bob, what effect do you believe the Czechoslovak intervention by the Russians has had upon the efforts to reach final agreement on the missile talks?

A No comment.

Q Are there any Czechs stranded in this country, as a result of the events there?

A I have difficulty with the word "stranded". I mean, there are Czechs here. They maintain an Embassy. We keep contact with it. I think that is a question you would have to address to them.

Q The question probably was Czech tourists, several groups of tourists here. Have they called for

help from you to get back?

A Again, I haven't seen anything to that effect.

Q Bob, on the basis that you said that a final agreement on talks at some level could be expected fairly soon, could you for the record explain --

A Now, wait a minute. Don't misquote me before I get out of the room.

[Laughter]

Q Can we do that when you leave, afterwards?

A I didn't say that at all. And I think so far as this subject is concerned, I have stopped discussing it. If you want to refer back to what has been said, we will get the transcript.

Q Well, may I go ahead with the question?

A You may go ahead with the question, indeed.

Q With the prospect that talks might at some point in the near future take place, could you explain the justification, for the record, the desire to want to continue doing business as soon as possible with the Russians who are charged at this point with aggression against a fraternal state?

A So far as U.S.-Soviet relations are concerned, as a result of the events in Czechoslovakia, the Secretary spoke to this on the White House steps yesterday, and I have nothing to add to it.

Q Bob, do you regard the trip of President Svoboda to Moscow at all encouraging, or do you have any other, any comment at all on that development?

A Not, really. We only have fragmentary information. So I don't think that there's anything substantive, or intelligent even, that one can say about it presently.

Q Bob, I believe as of yesterday there had been no --

A We would hope that he would be successful -- if that is his effort -- to have forces withdrawn from Czechoslovakia.

Say it again?

Q I'm sorry. As of yesterday, there was no public advice by the State Department to Americans, as to whether they should leave Czechoslovakia or, in fact, as to whether they should cancel plans to visit Czechoslovakia. I'm referring to tourists. Is that still the case today?

A Well, we did--on the second part of your question--on Wednesday morning issue an advisory publicly

that American tourists planning to go to Czechoslovakia should not do so until further notice.

As to whether we are advising Americans in Czechoslovakia to leave, I'm a little unclear on that. I have not myself read an instruction to that effect. Several hundred have departed, and I would think in most cases this has been voluntary. Official dependents -- official Americans and dependents have not been advised to leave.

Q Would it be fair to say the American Embassy in Prague is encouraging American tourists to leave though?

A Well, I just leave that as possible, and I'll check to see if it's confirmable.

Q Do you have any reports on Americans being injured or killed in Czechoslovakia?

A I'm glad to say that so far we have not had reports of injury or otherwise to American citizens.

Q Any request for asylum at any point?

A Again, so far as I am aware, no Czech has asked for asylum, either there or here.

Q Bob, what is the Department's evaluation of what appears to be a political stalemate in Czechoslovakia now? Does the Department feel that the Russians may have

miscalculated politically in the breadth and depth of loyalty to leadership?

A You know, I think there are two other governments that you might address those questions to for the present. I just don't think that we want to at this time attempt substantive judgments on the situation.

Q Bob, there is a report that U.S. intelligence was able to tell the President an hour before the visit of the Soviet Ambassador of the forthcoming Czechoslovak invasion by the Soviet Union. Have you any comment on that? Can you confirm that report?

A No. I have seen the report. I know nothing about it.

Q Bob, can you give a judgment on the scale of military activity in Viet-Nam, and whether or not this measures up to what the Secretary and the President have spoken of as a possible third offensive?

A No. I think what we had to say here yesterday still stands.

Q It's too early to say?

A Yes.

Q Can I go back to the tourists again for a second to clarify something? Do I understand that the

American Embassy in Prague is making available this transportation out of the country for those who wish to use it, but it is neither urging or discouraging people from using it?

A Well, I said I'd want to check to see whether, in fact, they have been encouraging tourists to leave. There have been no instructions that I have seen, and, indeed, we can't instruct nonofficial Americans to do one thing or another. There are no instructions to American officials, or their dependents, to leave. My hunch is that most people are leaving voluntarily. And I can quite understand why.

Q Bob, do you have any clue as to the fate of Mr. Dubcek or not?

A No.

Q Thank you, Bob.

A Thank you.

[At 1:01 p.m. the briefing was closed.]

VRVoce
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EXCERPT OF REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK BEFORE THE
CONNECTICUT MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
September 12, 1968

15d

FOR RELEASE 7 P.M., E. D. T., NOT TO BE USED IN ANY WAY PREVIOUSLY

I.

It has been alleged that:

The United States has a sphere-of-influence agreement or

understanding with the Soviet Union.

It has been intimated that such an arrangement was made

at the Yalta Conference.

It has been asserted that the Soviets acted in Czechoslovakia

with carte blanche from the United States — that we "concurred"

with or "connived" at that aggression.

These are absurd accusations without a shred of truth. The United States has not entered into any "sphere of influence" agreements or understandings with anyone anywhere in the world.

There was no discussion of spheres of influence at Yalta.

The "Declaration on Liberated Europe" adopted there was the

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exact opposite of spheres of influence. It provided for tripartite participation -- by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States -- in assisting the liberated states of Eastern Europe to set up interim governments in which all democratic elements were to be represented. And it provided for free elections, with allied assistance.

It is true that Europe is divided. But this is because the Soviet Union, in violation of its Yalta pledge, used force and the threat of force from its occupying armies to impose Communist regimes on Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet zone of Germany.

The Soviet Union has in fact established and maintained by force in Eastern Europe a sphere -- not of influence but of

dominance. We have recognized the reality of Soviet control and the existence of the Warsaw Pact. President Johnson, like President Eisenhower, recognized that there was little we could do through, for example, the use of military force to assist any of those countries without automatically engaging in general war with the Soviet Union.

Our military commitment in Europe, through NATO, is strictly defensive. And certainly we claim no "sphere of influence" in Western Europe. When France chose to withdraw its forces from the NATO command and to require all foreign military headquarters and troops to leave France, the other Fourteen members of NATO complied. And certainly they never, individually or collectively, dreamed of trying to impose

any government or economic system on the French people.

In regard to the Czechoslovakian crisis we did not, in any way, indicate that we would ignore an invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. To the contrary, through Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, I strongly protested the Soviet charges of "complicity" by the United States in an endeavor to overthrow socialism in Czechoslovakia -- a charge that appeared to be a pretext for a military move against that country. And I expressed the hope that Moscow was under no illusion about the sentiments of the United States, with our deep-rooted commitment to self-determination.

force Stalin to opt for this choice as the best alternative realistically open to him.

It is clear that Stalin did not share Churchill's vision. He was thinking in terms of the most immediate and concrete issues of short-run power, in which security issues and the extension of Moscow's domain through subservient Communist grouping were inextricably mixed. On October 22 Churchill included in a cable to Roosevelt the following summary of the final discussion:

Later, at my request, Stalin saw Mikolajczyk and had an hour and a half's very friendly talk. Stalin promised to help him, and Mikolajczyk promised to form and conduct a Government thoroughly friendly to the Russians. He explained his plan, but Stalin made it clear that the Lublin Poles must have the majority.

After the Kremlin dinner we put it bluntly to Stalin that unless Mikolajczyk had fifty-fifty plus himself the Western World would not be convinced that the transaction was *bona fide* and would not believe that an independent Polish Government had been set up. Stalin at first replied he would be content with fifty-fifty, but rapidly corrected himself to a worse figure. Meanwhile, Eden took the same line with Molotov, who seemed more comprehending. I do not think the composition of the Government will prove an insuperable obstacle if all else is settled. Mikolajczyk had previously explained to me that there might be one announcement to save the prestige of the Lublin Government and a different arrangement among the Poles behind the scenes. . . .

We also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. U. J. [Uncle Joe] wants Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to form a realm of independent, anti-Nazi, pro-Russian states, the first two of which might join together. Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of South German States, including Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, and Baden. As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which U. J. is strongly opposed.

As to Prussia, U. J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar detached and put out of action and probably under international control, and a separate state formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the internationalization of the Kiel Canal. I am not opposed to this line of thought. However, you may be sure that we came to no fixed conclusions pending the triple meeting.⁵

It was evident that Stalin intended to press Moscow's influence hard in Warsaw and elsewhere, and that he looked to a fragmentation of power in Central Europe. Although the issue of intimate Communist control was explicitly raised only in the references to the Lublin group, Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe toward the end of 1944 made it reasonably clear that Stalin's policy was to extend Moscow's power as far west and in as intimate a form as Western opposition permitted. The exchanges provided no grounds for believing that Stalin had accepted the posture of a major military power "easy and unworried" about the internal governments of European states; and this was

not because of Stalin's ideological devotion to communism but because the Eastern European Communists (except Tito) were reliable agents of Moscow's authority. Stalin had long since converted the international Communist movement into an instrument of his personal power; and it was to the maximum feasible extension of that power that he looked.

While Churchill and Stalin were indecisively exchanging views and forming *de facto* agreements on these matters, Roosevelt was in Washington. In October the presidential campaign was moving to a climax, and Hull resigned. Concrete issues of the postwar were emerging in the wake of advancing armies all over Europe. It was the reality and inescapable quality of these issues—and most notably the issue raised by the Red Army's advance into Poland—which had led to the Churchill-Stalin meeting; but it was impossible, given the American electoral process, for Roosevelt to attend. Preoccupied with other matters, his first instinct was “to avoid all semblance of American participation or even interest in the Moscow meetings by sending vague messages to Churchill and to Stalin merely wishing them good luck.”⁸ Hopkins stopped the dispatch of a cable which would, in effect, have permitted Churchill to speak for the United States as well as Britain; and, as the result of this intervention, Roosevelt explicitly informed Stalin and Churchill that pending the Big Three meeting which was already planned to follow upon the American election he reserved full freedom of action on all matters discussed. But the pattern of Churchill's percentages bit deep in Stalin's mind; and, whatever formal freedom of action the United States reserved, the October meeting of Churchill and Stalin left a permanent mark on events, subsequently inhibiting American as well as British diplomacy.

YALTA

At Yalta many issues were discussed: the terms and timing of Soviet entrance into the war against Japan, the organizational structure of the United Nations, the role of France in the occupation of Germany and in the negotiation of a German settlement, the principle of German dismemberment, German reparations, and the procedures for joint occupation. But it was Poland that dominated the proceedings, Churchill reports:

Poland was discussed at no fewer than seven of the eight plenary meetings of the Yalta Conference, and the British record contains an interchange on this topic of nearly eighteen thousand words between Stalin, Roosevelt, and myself.⁷

Despite a series of Anglo-American diplomatic difficulties and cross-purposes in the months preceding the Yalta Conference—most notably over Greece—Roosevelt and Churchill worked together effectively during the

meetings. In terms of their overlapping, but not identical, vision of the problem, they achieved a remarkable success; for they committed Stalin to the principle of early free elections in Poland and prevented a prompt movement of the Lublin Government to domination in Warsaw. Moreover, the Yalta communique contained the famous passage:

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.⁸

It was evident that only strong and united insistence by Roosevelt and Churchill had achieved the statement of these points so obviously contrary to Communist ambition and practice. That statement provided as clear a basis for further Anglo-American policy in Europe as diplomacy could afford. If Poland was to be politically free, then the balance of power in Europe would remain clearly beyond Moscow's grasp, and Germany could be dealt with in terms of a continuing common interest among the wartime allies to avoid a resurgent Germany. If Poland passed under Communist domination and became an active instrument of Soviet power, then the Soviet zone of occupation assumed a new, different, and more sinister role, the European balance of power was endangered for the West, and the competition for Germany between two power blocs—of which the opponents of dismemberment had warned since 1942—was inevitable. At Yalta the latter possibility was forestalled and the door held open for a German settlement in the spirit of Big Three unity.

It is impossible to read the memoirs and transcripts of Yalta, to reconstruct the time and place and personages, the intimate human by-play, the toasts and gestures, without understanding the sense of achievement and confidence that Churchill and Roosevelt brought back to their peoples. It was at Yalta that the hard-headed Hopkins passed a note to Roosevelt saying: "The Russians have given so much at this conference that I don't think we should let them down";⁹ and, given Anglo-American objectives and the American top-level military view of prospects in the war against Japan, this was the case.

There were also ample grounds for concern in the light of the Yalta discussions. There was the insistent unresolved Soviet demand for \$10 billion in German reparations. There was the dour struggle over Poland, with the limited opportunities afforded for direct Anglo-American contact with Poland

plan to come to the San Francisco Conference, which increased public uneasiness and confirmed within the government the impression that the United Nations did not enjoy in the minds of the Soviet leaders the importance attached to it by Americans. Finally, against this background, a most serious deadlock developed among the British, Russian, and American negotiators in Moscow who had been assigned at Yalta the task of agreeing on the composition of a Provisional Polish Government. Molotov simply sat tight in the face of British and American pressure, urging that the Lublin government should represent Poland at the United Nations Conference and stalling all efforts to enlarge its composition to include non-Communist elements.

In the light of the events and negotiations of the previous seven months, the troubles over Poland were recognized by both Roosevelt and by Churchill as a matter of first importance. From March 8 to April 11—the day before Roosevelt died—the Polish issue was the subject of numerous exchanges among Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. Roosevelt and Churchill sought to force the entrance of democratic elements into the government. Stalin, holding the trump card of the Red Army's presence in Poland, kept the negotiations going on the basis of minimum modification in the Lublin base. Each day that passed gave the Lublin government the possibility of strengthening its hold on the country.

Although London and Washington moved together on the Polish question, the underlying difference in emphasis and priority persisted. Soviet and Western armies were moving rapidly across the face of Germany. Issues rose as to how this climactic campaign should be conducted and whether Western military strength and dispositions should be used to maximize the diplomatic bargaining position of the West vis-à-vis Moscow. The first such question arose toward the end of March and concerned Eisenhower's plan for the final offensive against Germany. Eisenhower wished to detach the Ninth Army from the Twenty-First (Montgomery's) Army group and thrust hard across the south of Germany to minimize the possibilities of a last-ditch German redoubt being formed up. Churchill argued strongly for maintaining momentum in the North, for leaving the Ninth U.S. Army Group with Montgomery, and for getting the Western forces into Berlin before the arrival of Soviet troops. Churchill believed that it mattered greatly that Western forces shake Soviet hands as far east as possible; and he was angered that Eisenhower had determined the shape of the final offensive and communicated it to Stalin without consulting either the British members of his staff or those politically responsible for British and American policy. Eisenhower and the American military in Washington made their decision on tactical grounds, their view being that Berlin no longer mattered militarily or politically.

It was at this stage, in the gathering gloom of the post-Yalta situation, that

Tab F
B
Tab E

Roosevelt died. Roosevelt had shared Churchill's anxiety and concern with the development of Soviet attitudes ever since the Yalta conference; but, whereas Churchill had felt that the issue must be put to the test as soon as possible or all would be lost in Poland and elsewhere, Roosevelt had argued for patience in applying pressure on Stalin and had seemed less eager for an early showdown.

Roosevelt's mixture of deep concern and reluctance to force the issue of Western-Soviet relations is illustrated clearly by two of his last communications with Churchill.

We shall have to consider most carefully the implications of Stalin's attitude [on Poland] and what is to be our next step. I shall, of course, take no action of any kind nor make any statement without consulting you, and I know you will do the same. (April 11)¹²

We must be firm however, and our course thus far is correct. (April 12)¹³

It was evident in the exchanges with Roosevelt during the President's last two weeks that Churchill was anxious to use the full weight that the Allies could then bring to bear on Moscow—including the American military weight that Roosevelt had stated at Yalta would be gone from Europe in two years—to make sure that the diplomatic commitments made by Stalin at Yalta would be honored.

Within a week of assuming office, Truman was plunged fully into the problem of Allied relations with the Soviet Union and had assumed a position consistent with the hardening mood of Roosevelt in his final weeks. Specifically, Truman faced the question of Poland and whether or not the military disposition of British and American forces should be used in the effort to make the Yalta agreements stick.

On April 18 Truman received from Churchill a cable urging that the Allied armies hold their positions as far east as possible until the diplomatic position was clarified. On April 20 Harriman, in Washington from Moscow to brief the new President, explained the general character of the difficulties which had developed with Moscow and the unresolved issue of a balanced interim Polish government. On April 23 Truman reviewed with his principal diplomatic and military advisers the whole question of relations with the Soviet Union; and later that afternoon he handed to Molotov an extremely strong message to be transmitted to Stalin, insisting that the Yalta decision on Poland be carried out, bluntly insisting to Molotov that the Soviet Union was acting in violation of the Yalta accord. Truman reports that exchange as ending:

"I have never been talked to like that in my life," Molotov said.

"I told him, 'Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like this.'"¹⁴

When this message failed to yield results, Truman sent Hopkins to Moscow on May 23 in an effort to end the impasse with the Soviet Union on the question of Poland and to clear up other issues which threatened the United Nations organization and the joint occupation of Germany. Within their limits, these initiatives succeeded. Hopkins got Stalin to agree that a Polish government of national unity be formed, including Mikolajczyk as Vice-Premier, with three additional ministries granted to non-Lublin Poles acceptable to Great Britain and the United States. With this (and several lesser) concessions, the ground was cleared for the Big Three meeting at Potsdam.

At Potsdam the recognition of the reorganized Polish Provisional Government (granted by the United States on July 5) was confirmed; and agreement was made to hold free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, with guarantees of access to the world press to report events before and during the elections.

In a sense, then, Truman's diplomacy on Poland in the first four months of his administration appeared to have moved the Polish question forward in terms of the Yalta agreement. However, in the year and a half following Potsdam, Moscow-dominated Communists took over Poland in successive stages, climaxed by the rigged election of February 1947; and in the autumn of 1947 Mikolajczyk, long since rendered politically impotent, fled the country to avoid arrest.

The story of this American and British failure belongs to the postwar years, but its roots can be detected in the radical differences of Churchillian and American attitudes in the spring of 1945. On May 12 Churchill dispatched the following cable to Truman:

I am profoundly concerned about the European situation. I learn that half the American Air Force in Europe has already begun to move to the Pacific theatre. The newspapers are full of the great movements of the American armies out of Europe. Our armies also are, under previous arrangements, likely to undergo a marked reduction. The Canadian Army will certainly leave. The French are weak and difficult to deal with. Anyone can see that in a very short space of time our armed power on the Continent will have vanished, except for moderate forces to hold down Germany.

Meanwhile what is to happen about Russia? I have always worked for friendship with Russia, but, like you, I feel deep anxiety because of their misinterpretation of the Yalta decisions, their attitude towards Poland, their overwhelming influence in the Balkans, excepting Greece, the difficulties they make about Vienna, the combination of Russian power and the territories under their control or occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many other countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the field for a long time. What will be the position in a year or two,

thus superficially undoing the Churchill-Stalin proportional distribution of Eastern Europe in October 1944. In a sense, also, the agreement on German occupation and the principles that would govern it had removed, for the immediate future, the question of Germany's emerging as an independent danger to the Soviet Union. The ambiguity present in Vandenberg's speech and in the American position was this: What sanctions was the United States prepared to apply if the Soviet Union persisted on a unilateral course in Eastern Europe? Would the United States withdraw into isolation and refuse to join the international organization as a gesture of pique against its allies' unilateral behavior? Or would the United States be prepared to use force to make the Yalta agreements stick?

As the unsatisfactory aspects of the Polish settlement became clear early in 1945, Vandenberg—peculiarly sensitive to this issue because of the important bloc of Polish-Americans in his electorate—reflected the fatal flaw in the American position.

The desperately important question now is "what can we do about it?" Manifestly America will not go to war with Russia to settle such an issue—particularly when the President of the United States has endorsed the settlement. In the final analysis, we could not afford to upset our postwar peace plans on account of this issue. Yet I do not want to surrender to this decision insofar as we have any practical means at our disposal to continue to fight it. It seems to me that the best *practical* hope remaining to us is in my proposal that the new Peace League shall have a right to review all these interim decisions.¹¹

Neither Vandenberg nor any other responsible American politician was prepared to envision the serious threat of force to make Yalta stick; and this was, almost certainly, the only policy that would have made it stick. And behind the American inhibition lay a lack of clarity concerning the strategic meaning of Eastern Europe and, perhaps, a false prejudging of what the American public would support if the choices were clearly put to it.

In the first half of 1945, however, there were, in Vandenberg's phrase, "practical means" still available to continue the fight over Poland; and the issue of Poland pervaded from beginning to end the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations. To the American delegation the immediate context of the Conference was Truman's stiff note to Stalin demanding that he carry out the Yalta decision on Poland; and Hopkins' success in getting Stalin's agreement on the reconstitution of the Polish Provisional Government marked its latter stage. Thus, as of the end of the San Francisco Conference in the last week of June 1945, the issue of freedom for Poland and Eastern Europe had not yet been foreclosed; the incompatibility of a collective security organization with unilaterally determined peace treaties had not

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Friday, October 4, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Gligorov of Yugoslavia, 5:30 P.M. Today

In the attached memo, Nick Katzenbach says the main purpose in today's meeting with Gligorov (~~GLEE~~-gore-off) is to demonstrate publicly your interest in Yugoslavia.

At Tab A Nick has provided talking points. Briefly, he suggests:

- You tell Gligorov we condemn the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and want foreign troops out as soon as possible.
- You assure Gligorov that our interest in Yugoslavia's independence is as great today as ever. Over the years we have provided \$2.5 billion in economic and military assistance.
- We will be glad to look at any current proposals for assistance Yugoslavia may have. (Gligorov has been talking about US support for EXIM and World Bank loans, and a stretch-out of PL-480 debt repayments. He has not raised the question of military assistance and probably won't.)
- You will be glad to have any suggestions or thoughts President Tito may have on the situation in Eastern Europe.

Gligorov will be accompanied by Ambassador Crnobraja (Sir-no-BURN-ya) and an interpreter.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

a/s

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16

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 4, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call by Kiro Gligorov, Vice President
of Federal Executive Council of Yugo-
slavia; October 4, 1968; 5:30 p.m.

Gligorov (GLEE-gore-off) is in Washington as head of his delegation to the IMF/IBRD meetings. He has used the week to talk with senior USG officials about the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the problems this raises for the Yugoslavs. He has seen Secretary Smith, John Leddy, Tony Solomon, the Rostow brothers and me.

The Yugoslavs--from Tito down--have condemned the invasion, and are worried that they and the Romanians may be next. There is little doubt--either here or in Belgrade--that the Yugoslavs would put up stiff resistance to any Soviet invasion.

Gligorov clearly would like to take word back that the US continues strong in its support for Yugoslavia's independence and economic development. His pitch during the week has been to emphasize the need for economic assistance (a stretch out of debt repayments, support for EXIM and World Bank loans, etc.). He has made no mention of any military assistance.

I told Gligorov that while I could make no promises, we were prepared to look sympathetically at any specific suggestions they might have in the economic field.

~~SECRET~~


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-11-01

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-2-

Gligorov's main purpose (and ours) in seeing you today is to demonstrate publicly your interest in Yugoslavia. While he will want to come away with general assurances of US sympathy and support, he will not expect any specific commitments.

Ambassador Crnobrnja (sir-no-BURN-ya) will accompany Gligorov. Gligorov's English is only fair, so he will bring an interpreter.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Attachments:

Tab A - Talking Points

Tab B - Biographic sketch of Gligorov

~~SECRET~~

146

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TALKING POINTS

Czech Invasion

- The US position on the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia has been stated in the clearest possible terms. We condemn it, and want foreign troops out as soon as possible.
- We watched Czechoslovakia's moves toward political and economic liberalization with sympathy, and deeply regret that this hopeful trend has been stopped by brutal Soviet action.
- But the Soviets cannot, over the longer run, prevent Eastern European countries from determining their own future. They may delay things for a while, but history is against them.

US Support for Yugoslavia

- In the years since World War II the US has demonstrated its interest in the independence of Yugoslavia. Our expenditure of over \$2.5 billion in economic and military assistance over these years has been a clear demonstration of the high priority we attach to your country.
- Our interest in the continued independence of Yugoslavia is as great today as ever.
- We have watched your courageous efforts over the past few years to move toward a market economy. It has been difficult, I know, but I am glad to hear that the program is going well.
- Your liberalization program has been a model that all Eastern Europeans watch with interest and envy.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-11-01

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-2-

- I know that you understand that the legal and congressional obstacles to US economic help. But, within these limitations, we will be glad to look at any proposals for assistance that you may have.
- Ambassador Elbrick stands ready to exchange views regularly with your people on events in Eastern Europe. We will be glad to have any suggestions President Tito may have over the coming months on what we might say or do to ease the situation in Eastern Europe.

~~SECRET~~

Pres. File

INFORMATION

17
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~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Participation in Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, October 1962

The record shows that you attended every Executive Committee Meeting during the critical period of the Cuban Missile Crisis. (An earlier memorandum indicated you were not present at the meeting on Friday, October 26. However, your personal records indicate that you were present.)

The two National Security Council meetings which you missed, on October 20 and October 21, occurred while you were in Hawaii.

Your personal records show that October 16, the first day when knowledge of the Soviet missiles being deployed to Cuba was circulated to top officials, you were in the West Wing of the White House from 6:20 to 7:50 P. M. We are searching the records further to find out whether you spent this time with President Kennedy or members of the small group discussing the U.S. reaction to the new intelligence.

On October 17 you left on a trip across the country including Kansas City; Omaha; Casper, Wyoming; Salt Lake City; Idaho; Washington; Oregon and finally San Francisco on the night of October 19. On October 20 you left for Hawaii.

On October 21 you returned to Washington. At 5:30 P. M. that day you saw McGeorge Bundy and spent the remainder of the evening, until midnight, with President Kennedy.

The following day you were present at the NSC meeting. Henceforth you attended every Executive Committee Meeting.

The Robert Kennedy manuscript contains numerous inaccuracies as to the meetings and those who attended them. The only quotation in the manuscript referring to your participation reads:

"Others in the group which was later to be called the 'Ex-Comm' (the Executive Committee of the National Security Council) included Secretary of State Dean Rusk. . . ; and intermittently at various meetings Vice President Johnson, Adlai Stevenson, Ken O'Donnell and Don Wilson. This was the group that met, talked, argued, and fought together during the crucial period of time."

BKS:amc

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By rg, Ref A, Date 1-22-93

Mr. Rostow

18

Pres file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Friday, October 4, 1968

SUBJECT: Oral Condolences to Nasser

We understand that President Nasser's father died a few days ago. State is asking your permission to have Don Bergus, our man in Cairo, simply say at some appropriate time that you send your personal sympathies.

I always feel when human sorrow is involved that this is a nice sort of thing to do. Nothing would be in writing and Don would not make a big deal of it. He is very discreet.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 4, 1968

Free file

Mr. President:

The Systems Analysis people at Defense have developed a method of measuring the effectiveness of South Vietnamese armed forces in comparison with US forces which, although incomplete, gives a heartening picture of forward movement.

For this study they used enemy killed per 1,000 friendly forces to compare operational achievement. The main conclusions are as follows:

--ARVN battalions have been 56% as effective this year as US battalions in killing the enemy versus 48% last year--an increase of 17 percent.

--Adding in Regional and Popular forces, total South Vietnamese forces effectiveness has gone from an average 44% in 1967 to 58% this year--an increase of 35%.

--The number of days in which ARVN battalions have had contact with the enemy has increased, indicating that ARVN is finding the enemy better this year.

--Most important, South Vietnamese armed force expansion and better performance in 1968 has added the equivalent of an additional 200,000 Americans since December.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 09990
By ies NARA, Date 3-20-98

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

20

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 3, 1968
6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read this
analysis by our Ambassador in Lima
on the military motives for the coup.

W. W. Rostow

Lima 7661

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By sg, NARA, Date 2-2-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20a

CONFIDENTIAL 54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCE258

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769909

By slp, NARA, Date 2-2-93

PAGE 01 LIMA 07661 032134Z

88
ACTION ARA 16

INFO CIAE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,
NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,USIA 12,AID 28,PC 04,IO 13,NIC 01,
SAH 02,RSR 01,/135 W

052041

O R 032045Z OCT 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7665
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
USCINCSO
DOD
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMA 7661

Rustow

USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD
DOD FOR DIA

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF COUP MOTIVES

1. EMBASSY TELEGRAM 7578 OF SEPTEMBER 27 REPORTED DRASTIC
DETERIORATION IN POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE WHICH REDUCED
CONFIDENCE IN DEMOCRATIC MACHINERY AND PRODUCED AIR
OF EXPECTANCY ON POSSIBLE COUP. IT ALSO CONTAINED ONE
CLEAR REPORT OF A COUP THREAT. IT IS OUR PRELIMINARY
VIEW THAT MILITARY MOVE WAS BASICALLY MOTIVATED BY A
DETERMINATION TO PREVENT AN APRA VICTORY IN THE ELECTION
SCHEDULED FOR NEXT JUNE. THE TOTAL DISARRAY OF ALL OTHER
POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH SPLIT ALONG FACTIONAL LINES,
CULMINATING IN THE DIVISION OF BELAUNDE'S ACCION POPULAR
PARTY INTO WARRING FACTIONS, ONE HEADED BY HIM AND ONE
HEADED BY VICE PRESIDENT SEOANE, SERVED TO DRAMATIZE
THE FACT THAT THE SINGLE, UNIFIED AND DISCIPLINED PARTY
REMAINING WAS APRA. THE FACT THAT APRA LEADERS WERE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~PAGE 02~~ LIMA 07651 032134Z

INCREASINGLY CONFIDENT OF VICTORY AND INSISTED THAT HAYA DE LA TORRE WOULD BE THEIR CANDIDATE SERVED TO IGNITE THE FEARS OF THOSE IN THE MILITARY DETERMINED THAT HAYA WOULD NEVER BECOME PRESIDENT OF PERU.

2. IN THE ABOVE CONDITIONS, MILITARY GOLPISTAS COULD TAKE PREVENTIVE ACTION NOW, UTILIZING A PRETEXT, OR THEY COULD WAIT TO SEE WHAT HAPPENED. APPARENTLY THEIR PREFERENCE WAS TO EXECUTE A PREVENTIVE COUP RATHER THAN RISK NULLIFYING THE RESULTS OF AN ELECTION WHICH PROBABLY, AS VIEWED AT THIS TIME, WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN APRA VICTORY.

3. THE POLITICAL CONFUSION AND DIVISIONS WHICH ERUPTED OUT OF CRITICISM OF THE LA BREA Y PARINAS SETTLEMENT, AND GENERAL PUBLIC BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN FULLY HONEST IN WHAT IT REVEALED ABOUT THIS SETTLEMENT, PROVIDED A PRETEXT WHICH WAS SIEZED BY THE GOLPISTAS.

4. FACTORS WHICH HELPED CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE MILITARY GOLPISTAS COULD FIND PRETEXT TO MOVE WERE SUCH THINGS AS THE UNRELENTING, BITTER ATTACK ON THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES MADE BY PEDRO BELTRAN AND HIS LA PRENSA NEWSPAPER, AS WELL AS BY EL COMERCIO NEWSPAPER, ONCE A STAUNCH SUPPORTER OF BELAUNDE, WHICH WAS BITTER IN ITS ATTACK ON THE GOVERNMENT OVER THE LA BREA Y PARINAS ISSUE. THE INEPTNESS OF APRA LEADERSHIP WHICH FORCED RESIGNATION OF THE HERCELLES CABINET AND THUS CONTRIBUTED TO THE ATMOSPHERE OF POLITICAL CRISIS ALSO HELPED BRING ON THE COUP WHICH APRA DID NOT WANT.

5. THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY MANY CONSERVATIVE PERUVIANS WHO WILL WELCOME THIS MOVE AND SOME MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN IT. SUCH PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY HOSTILE TO THE GENERAL TREND OF THE BELAUNDE GOVERNMENT AND TO MANY OF THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE HERCELLES CABINET UNDER ITS SPECIAL POWERS SUCH AS THE IMPOSITION OF A LAND TAX, THE TAX ON PROFITS, THE ABOLISHMENT OF BEARER SHARES, AND THE REFORM OF THE TAX COLLECTION SYSTEM. JONES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 LIMA 07651 032134Z

21
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, October 3, 1968
6:30 AM

Mr. President:

The attached cable from the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru indicates that a possible coup is in progress.

I have briefed Mr. Rostow on the cable.

White House Situation Room

Raymond A. Wistling
Briefing Officer

Pres file

UNCLASSIFIED

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UNCLASSIFIED

HCE178

PAGE 01 LIMA 07639 030926Z

20
ACTION ARA 16

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,CCO 00,AID 28,
FBO 01,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NIC 01,NSC 10,0 02,OC 06,OPR 02,
P 04,PER 02,RSC 01,SAH 02,SCA 02,SCSE 00,SP 02,SS 25,SY 03,
RSR 01,PC 04,/128 W

----- 047923

O Z 030859Z ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7648
USCINCSO IMMEDIATE 1057

UNCLAS LIMA 7639
SUBJECT: ARMY ON THE MOVE

AT 2:54 AM THURSDAY TELEPHONE COMPANY EXECUTIVE INFORMED
EMBASSY OFFICER THAT ARMY TROOPS OCCUPYING CENTRAL
TELEPHONE EXCHANGE. AT SAME TIME EMBASSY MARINE GUARD
OBSERVED SIX TANKS ENROUTE TOWARD CENTER OF LIMA.
CALL TO MINISTRY GOVERNMENT DUTY OFFICER RECEIVED NON
COMMITAL REPLY. TANK VISABLE BEHIND AMBASSADOR'S
RESIDENCE. APPARENT GOLPE IN PROCESS, BUT HAVE NO
DETAILS. NO AUDIBLE SOUNDS OF ACTIVITY AND CITY APPEARED
QUIET TO EMBASSY OFFICERS REPORTING FOR DUTY AT
CHANCERY. JONES

Coup

22

INFORMATION

For file

Thursday, October 3, 1968 -- 6:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should know that Clark Clifford and Bus Wheeler:

- Are going to the regular Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Bonn next Wednesday, October 9.
- They now plan to go on Saturday, October 12, to Berlin. They believe it is right that they go. Sec. Rusk believes it is a good idea.
- They will also visit our military commanders in Stuttgart.

Clark wished me to tell you in case you wished to veto Berlin and/or Stuttgart.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

INFORMATION

23

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, October 3, 1968 -- 6:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should know that the attached memorandum by an extremely intelligent civilian who works in the Department of the Army, Fritz Kraemer, had some influence on the thinking of Clifford, Nitze, E. V. Rostow, etc.

I shall be studying it with my staff and will report back.

It is a scholarly and thoughtful argument that:

- Ulbricht is moving, with Soviet support, towards progressive pressure on Berlin.
- Communists are heartened by what they regard as an exceedingly passive U. S. and NATO response to the Czech crisis.
- They may feel that some bold measures against Berlin, short of war, could produce a complete breakdown in Berlin morale -- morale already weakened by recent events.

Paragraphs 18-22 (pp 9-12) will give you the main conclusions.

It is well written paper and you may wish to read all of it.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-197
By CG, NARA, Date 1-5-95

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

cc: Fried
Ginsburg
Davis

23a

2 October 1968

Honorable W. W. Rostow
The White House

Dear Mr. Rostow:

Enclosed you will find my comments on the Berlin
situation which you wished to see in written form.

Sincerely,

F. G. A. Kraemer

F.G.A. Kraemer

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from
CLASSIFIED inclosures

~~SECRET~~

24

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

for file

Thursday, October 3, 1968 -- 5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk will be having dinner with Gromyko on Sunday night.

Sec. Rusk offered him four dates; he chose Sunday. It is Sec. Rusk's view that he may have wanted some time to turn around for instructions.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm, NARA, Date 12-16-02

SECRET--SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

25

Thursday, October 3, 1968 - 1:20pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Position Taken on Bombing North Vietnam
by Vice President Humphrey**

In the earlier memorandum which we gave you containing a summary of the positions taken by Vice President Humphrey in the National Security Council meetings on bombing North Vietnam, no mention was made of the Vice President's report to the Council on November 8, 1967. The reason was that the Vice President's report did not either approve or disapprove of the bombing. His comments were limited to the following two paragraphs:

A. "It was the judgment of all our military commanders, civilian advisers, and the Vietnamese leadership that the bombing is hurting the NVA badly. This is not only true in the DMZ but also in North Vietnam where thousands of people and great resources are diverted to repair the damage."

B. "Both American and Vietnamese military and civilian officials agreed that the bombing of North Vietnam is inflicting severe damage on the enemy and is certainly slowing down the rate of infiltration of men and materiel. They are convinced that the population of North Vietnam is feeling the effects of sustained bombing, and that severe logistical and psychological problems will continue throughout North Vietnam. Already thousands of people have been relocated and dislocations are widespread."

W. W. Rostow

BKS:ksb

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5
DATE 06/09/01
By chm NARA 030 P-23-02

25a
~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM

For: The President

From: The Vice President

It was my privilege, along with William Randolph Hearst, III, President of the Hearst Newspapers, and James A. Suffridge, President of the Federation of Retail Clerks, to represent our government at the Inaugural of President Thieu and Vice President Ky, October 29 - November 1, in Saigon, and to visit Malaysia and Indonesia, November 1 - 6.

Attached is a summary report.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESSING CANCELLED PER E.O. 12812
DATE 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
DATE 16. 1983.

179 ON 2-22-93

INTRODUCTION

My overwhelming impression is that Americans must fully realize that Southeast Asia is destined to play an increasingly vital role in world affairs in the last third of this century.

The American people must acquire a better understanding of our stakes in Southeast Asia -- of the resources, the population and the strategic importance of this part of the world.

In Vietnam, I was encouraged by the evident progress since my last visit in February 1966.

Our military progress is clear: A full infrastructure and supply system has been established, our troop build-up essentially completed; our troops are superbly led; their morale is high. During my visits with them, I found nothing but dedication, professionalism and high resolve.

Beyond this, the performance of ARVN troops has modestly improved, but there remains a long way to go.

It was the judgment of all our military commanders, civilian advisers, and the Vietnamese leadership that the bombing is hurting the NVA badly. This is not only true in the DMZ but also in North Vietnam where thousands of people and great resources are diverted to repair the damage.

Behind this shield of military progress, the RVN is making gradual and encouraging political, economic and social progress.

The critical task in the immediate months ahead will be to help the Thieu-Ky government build a base of popular support throughout the country and follow through on the establishment of a constructive relationship with the new parliament. Unless this is achieved, there is danger of a fallback into chaos and decomposition.

A major concern of Vietnamese leaders (as well as those in Malaysia and Indonesia) was whether the U. S. had the patience and resolve to persevere in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Both President Thieu and Vice President Ky felt that if American resolve were made clear and Hanoi would recognize that there would be no American withdrawal after November 1968 -- the war might be shortened considerably.

In summary, I was encouraged by clear progress since my last visit. The South Vietnamese have a tremendous distance yet to go, notably in building responsive, strong political institutions and in integrating all Vietnamese into a truly national government.

If we have periodic discouragement and impatience regarding Vietnam, Malaysia presents a different picture.

After 12 long years of resistance to Communist terror and subversion, Malaysia today stands independent and strong. Most significantly, there is a stable government which is meeting the needs of its people. Much of this is due to an integrated, national rural development program including the essentials of education, health, land reform, public works and vocational agriculture.

During my visit, the Malaysian government indicated a willingness to increase nonmilitary assistance to South Vietnam. Malaysian stability and ultimate progress -- despite great efforts by the government -- still remain largely at the mercy of world rubber prices.

In Indonesia, the first and overwhelming impression is one of the immense and urgent efforts needed if this critical country is to have any chance of long-term political and economic health.

In all directions, there are signs of Sukarno's massive mismanagement and false dreams of Asian-African glory. Yet -- desperate as the situation is -- it is evident that there has been clear improvement since the installation of the Suharto government.

The Suharto government is struggling to establish honest, decent administration and stabilization in Indonesia while giving the people some measure of hope for the future.

The Indonesian army today seems to be the only disciplined and capable instrument of administration. Americans must recognize this and temper our almost automatic distrust of military involvement in nonmilitary matters.

The Indonesians agree that the multilateral approach to aid is right for them. And within this framework we should contrive to provide whatever bilateral assistance we can. Indonesia must make its own case for aid from other countries, but we should be ready to help where we can.

Will Indonesia make it? I am not sure. But I am sure that, if it does not, there will be fearful consequences for Southeast Asia and the United States.

I believe Indonesia should be given a position of equal importance on our scale of international priorities with Vietnam or India.

All three countries expressed fear of Communist China and made clear their enemy was militant Asian communism, aided and abetted by Peking. All agreed failure in Vietnam would seriously jeopardize their futures.

Finally, in all three countries, there is an inescapable impression of people filled with energy, aspirations, and talent if only their potentialities can be unleashed.

The question for Asians and for ourselves is this: Can their energies, aspirations and talents be channeled constructively into nation-building? Or will they be frustrated and thwarted with the inexorable result of war, chaos and disorder?

A more detailed report, country by country, and recommendations follow.

VIETNAMMilitary Situation

Since my last visit to Vietnam in February 1966, a marked improvement in the military structure of U. S. and ARVN forces has become evident. A military victory by the Viet Cong or North Vietnamese is no longer a realistic possibility.

The building of an infrastructure capable of sustaining a large-scale war has now been nearly completed. Necessary ports, airfields, communications and bases have been established. Having achieved this base, American troops have been able to concentrate on anti-NVA main force activities during the past year.

From my conversations with General Westmoreland, General Abrams and General Cushman, and with officers and troops in the field, I conclude that we are continuing to make steady progress in defeating the North Vietnamese in main force confrontations and in repelling Viet Cong attacks. To gain a first-hand impression of U. S. military forces stationed in Vietnam, I visited the Riverine Forces operating in the Delta, Third Marine Amphibious Forces at Da Nang, and the Americal Division at Chu Lai.

At all of these installations I was impressed by the superior leadership, high morale, and courage of the American troops. They are a highly dedicated, professional and efficient force.

My conversations with U. S. military and civilian officials, with Vietnamese governmental and non-governmental leaders, and with experienced journalists who cover Vietnam led me to conclude that progress has been made in improving the performance of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) in selected units and areas. There were several ARVN successes during my visit. There can be little doubt, however, that the ARVN needs further improvement before it becomes an effective national, professional military force. Most observers suggest that the Vietnamese soldier fights well if ably led. Able leadership is still an exception. The higher priority now given to training leadership for the ARVN (stimulated by the recent arrival of General Abrams) should lead to further improvement in ARVN forces.

Progress has been made, but more is still needed, in building popular and regional forces. There has been limited improvement in their training, equipment and pay. However,

there are reliable reports that the popular forces in particular continue to receive inferior training, inferior equipment and a salary insufficient to sustain them and their families. It is not likely that this situation will be remedied unless we use our leverage on the Vietnamese government to stimulate a change.

Reports on third country forces, particularly the Koreans, the Australians, the New Zealanders and the Thais continue to be favorable. The Koreans are especially well regarded.

Both American and Vietnamese military and civilian officials agreed that the bombing of North Vietnam is inflicting severe damage on the enemy and is certainly slowing down the rate of infiltration of men and materiel. They are convinced that the population of North Vietnam is feeling the effects of sustained bombing, and that severe logistical and psychological problems will continue throughout North Vietnam. Already thousands of people have been relocated and dislocations are widespread.

Political Situation

My conversations with President Thieu, Vice President Ky and other officials of the Government of Vietnam led me to believe that the new government is resolved to provide firm

leadership and become a truly effective national government for all of South Vietnam. Both Thieu and Ky indicated a strong commitment to work closely together, putting aside past rivalries, but I anticipate possible problems: Thieu is a quiet, reserved clever inside military politician; Ky is a dynamic, intensely patriotic, but often impulsive man fundamentally lacking a power base. Both acknowledge that the accomplishment of visible results during the next six to nine months is important not only to the future of their government in South Vietnam but to the support of U. S. opinion. Despite its election victory, the present government has generated little real enthusiasm throughout the country. But most observers believe it can win such support if it moves rapidly with specific economic and social reforms, as outlined in Thieu's excellent and forthright inaugural speech.

Critical to the Thieu/Ky government's popular support will be the enlistment of young people and the youth movement. The average age level in South Vietnam is even younger than our own, and Saigon is filled with thousands of young people -- among whom the Communists are hard at work. I talked with several youth leaders, including Dr. Ho Van Minh whom I met

in a Saigon slum in 1966 and who is now a newly elected member of the Lower House. He, as well as others, expressed concern at lack of present government activity among young people.

Neither Thieu nor Ky, in my discussions with them, acknowledged or made reference to this problem. This matter merits serious attention in the U. S. establishment in Vietnam in its contacts with Thieu and Ky and General Thang.

I outlined for both Thieu and Ky the sensitivity of public opinion in the U. S. to widely-publicized charges of corruption; deficiencies in the performance of the ARVN; and to the neglect of refugees and civilian casualties. I indicated that early evidence of additional Vietnamese military effort along the DMZ would be especially helpful with U. S. public opinion.

I sought to impress upon Thieu and Ky the importance of good relations between the Executive and the Legislative branches. I emphasized that their programs should be pressed forward in the legislature during the "honeymoon period" of the first 100 days. I underlined the need for close consultation between the President and the leaders of the Senate and Lower House. This same point was emphasized on my visits with the newly elected members of the Vietnam Senate and Lower House.

Vice President Ky stated that he favored a general mobilization decree as a means of dramatizing the accelerated Vietnamese conduct of the war, and had already directed a seven-day work week for the Army. He acknowledged the need for a strengthened information service and better Foreign Service representation around the world.

In response to my observations about the role of the Vice President, Ky gave assurances that he would promote unity and encourage loyalty within the government. He did this in the most direct and outspoken terms.

To become a truly responsive government, the Thieu-Ky government must work out a constructive relationship with the new parliament, specifically with the Lower House. The Upper House is more representative of established conservative political groups in Vietnam, while the Lower House includes representatives of many of the disinherited and discontented groups in South Vietnam.

Thieu displayed no anxiety about the permanence of the U. S. commitment in Vietnam, although he recognized the problem of eroding public support in the U. S. He believes that Hanoi hopes to hang on until the November 1968 elections in the

hope and expectation that the present Administration's policy in Vietnam will be repudiated.

Thieu is considering a direct appeal to Hanoi for negotiations, although he anticipates that it will be rejected. He stated that he does not object to a bombing pause, which could be useful for political and diplomatic purposes. But he emphasized that accelerated bombing should precede any pause.

Thieu expressed satisfaction with current relations with the United States Government, and warmly praised Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. He is very much aware of the extent of American power and American presence in Vietnam, but expressed no resentment against it. He did not voice the same concern about the consequences of "Americanization" that was indicated by some leading Vietnamese politicians.

There can be little doubt that the dilemma of "Americanization" will continue to haunt the new government. Continued American pressure will be required to stimulate decisive action in a number of sensitive areas. Unless deficient military commanders and province chiefs are replaced, the government will have trouble sustaining an effective program and winning allegiance of a clear majority of the South Vietnamese people.

American influence and pressure in the delicate political areas, though essential, must be exerted indirectly and with utmost care to avoid a sharp reaction from the increasing number of Vietnamese who are disturbed by the overwhelming American presence. This may be an increasingly sensitive problem with the newly elected legislature, particularly the Lower House, where a number of political leaders may vent their discontent with their own government by attacks on the United States.

Pacification

This might better be called "nation-building" or "reconstruction and development."

One of the more hopeful signs of progress in Vietnam today is the cadre training program which trains leaders for revolutionary development. During a visit to the Cadre Training Center at Vung Tau, I observed the training program, under the inspired leadership of Major Be, which trains between 8-9,000 Vietnamese recruits every 12 weeks. Although working closely with U. S. political officials, this is primarily a Vietnamese effort. By including young men from every province in Vietnam, the Center hopes to provide trained local leadership for hundreds of communities throughout the country. The program develops a sense of nationalism.

Twenty months ago, when I visited previously, the training program was barely started. By the end of 1968, there will be 70-75,000 cadre in the hamlets.

Most of the present cadre are now employed in the Northern provinces where there are typically 18 or 19 RD teams working. These are areas where the Viet Cong infrastructure has been entrenched for years. Provincial advisers and U.S. military commanders are encouraged by the progress these teams are making, although performance varies, depending on leadership.

I doubt the American people understand that this work is dangerous and that RD teams are frequently singled out for Viet Cong assassination. Nor do they understand that the struggle at hamlet level can be as brutal as battalion operations.

"Pacification" is a misnomer. In fact, it is providing security, construction, and development. It is hard, tough business.

Such work requires a high degree of motivation and patriotism and the training of the cadre, under Major Be, puts a heavy emphasis on this.

Major Be, a protege of General Thang (who has over-all responsibility for the RD program) is a dedicated anti-Communist revolutionary. He is a former Viet Minh battalion commander who fought the French for six years and has fought Communism

for 16. He specifically emphasized that the RD cadre must have support from other government military and nonmilitary elements to gain loyalty in the hamlets. This is not now fully given, or available.

The cadre themselves are recruited in their own provinces and then returned to serve a four-year tour of duty. They are typically "country boys," many of whom have to be educated from the ground up after recruitment.

Their task: to build "communities of responsibility" -- communities with local self government and initiative -- which are the prelude to "communities of prosperity."

I was highly impressed with all that I saw of this training program -- but I feel the Vietnamese government does not yet fully appreciate its potential. But its success will depend upon the full support, acceptance, and cooperation of the Government in Saigon, the military, the province chiefs.

Thieu and Ky informed me that province and district chiefs, and ranking ARVN officers, would soon be given training and indoctrination in similar fashion -- a good idea.

Although the government of Vietnam has apparently implemented the commitment made in Manila to apply the bulk of ARVN strength to supporting revolutionary development, the

continued neglect of the popular forces assigned to revolutionary development campaign areas has impaired the effectiveness of the pacification program. The stipulated goal of 1,100 newly-pacified hamlets by the end of 1967 will not be realized unless the popular forces are strengthened and hamlet security thereby assured.

Pacification is moving forward. But the Viet Cong continues to disrupt the pacification program in many areas, and the basic Viet Cong apparatus has not yet been broken.

The CORDS program of replacing many U. S. advisers on "pacification" with a single Provincial Adviser, has introduced an apparent new efficiency in our American effort. It will, of course, be important to remind U. S. personnel that the "S" in CORDS stands for "support" and not "take-over."

An added benefit of the revolutionary development and pacification programs is this: In training cadre, in building secure and stable communities and localities, the Vietnamese are also training future political and civic leaders and setting the foundations for enduring nationhood.

Refugees

As you know, the refugee program works solely through the Vietnamese with cooperation with MACV and CORDS. Private

voluntary agencies have doubled in the past year. The estimated refugee flow has risen from almost a half million to approximately 800,000 in two years.

In the past three years approximately 1,200,000 out of 1,900,000 displaced persons have been adequately resettled. As of September of this year one-half of these refugees still in camps are in Corps I.

The urgent problems are education and training of more Vietnamese refugee workers.

In general, the refugee program, as related by the representative of the U. S. Refugee Mission and the Voluntary Agencies has been done as well as possible under the circumstances of war. There is no necessity of increased budgetary support. Generally, the situation is progressing as quickly as it can be digested and is a plus in both U. S. and GVN efforts. The most serious existing difficulty seems to be in I Corps.

The situation of the International Voluntary Service was examined, with the strong indication that the recent publicized resignations were individual and personal in nature and did not reflect organizational disagreement with U. S. policy. The situation now appears to be stable.

President Thieu told me he was particularly concerned that there should be better coordination of military operations with the resettlement of refugees. He said military clearing operations are often undertaken without any prior planning for handling or resettling of refugees. Refugees then either flow behind the lines without proper handling, or are left to the mercy of the Viet Cong once the clearing operation has concluded. He suggested that refugee camps should be set up in advance of such operations, or the operations be deferred. He puts the emphasis on "hold" as well as "clear." He intends to be in contact concerning this with General Westmoreland, with whom I also discussed the problem.

Economic Situation

Inflation continues to be a problem in Vietnam, although under greater control than previously -- thanks in great part to massive importation of consumer and capital goods, strict U.S. and GVN controls on piaster spending, devaluation last year, and increased taxation.

A substantial increase in government salaries is needed to bring them into line with those of non-government people. But this could create new inflationary pressures.

The shortage of rice continues to be a major problem, with an anticipated need for 800,000 tons of imported rice in 1968. It is

hoped that some of this shortage can be off-set by increasing the price paid to local producers, stimulating increased Vietnamese production.

Consideration should also be given to urging the Vietnamese to put their economy on a war footing. It might even be necessary to put an economic manager in charge of the economy in the offices of the present government. Vietnam needs a counterpart of our World War II, War Mobilization Board.

The Press

The course of the struggle will depend in large part on American public opinion. And public opinion, in turn, is largely determined by reporting out of Saigon. I regret to report that relations between the U. S. press in Saigon and the U. S. military are in a serious state of deterioration. The press itself is largely to blame. A large percentage of Saigon-based reporters are young, inexperienced, and not fully equipped to cope with the flow of data and events which confront them. On the other hand, however, several experienced and stable reporters told me that -- although they personally supported our effort in Vietnam -- they felt they could not trust the briefings of the American military. They cited several instances in which they felt they had been purposely misled. This feeling extends to a much lesser degree to civilian briefings. This

small-scale "credibility gap" should have close and first-hand attention as it hinders and colors all news out of Vietnam.

Another difficulty lies in the lack of stress on Vietnamese military efforts. The ARVN, as well as regional and popular forces, seldom receive coverage of a successful action. The American press do not like to go with the ARVN, not only because of the language difficulty but also because it is uncomfortable and dangerous. The Saigon government itself has the only most primitive briefing capacity and information service.

There is no question that the ARVN's image will improve as its performance improves. However, in the meantime, ways must be found to help the Vietnamese to better tell their story.

Another story which needs to be better told is that of the first class medical care which our troops receive. The simple device of breaking out the figures for "wounded, returned to action" gives reason for public confidence and encouragement. Also, the rapid and prompt removal of the wounded from the battlefield to the hospital plus the outstanding service of our doctors and nurses needs to be dramatized.

MALAYSIA

This is a stable and forward-moving country which should give us reason for optimism and hope -- as you no doubt concluded during your visit last year. In addition to ceremonial visits to the Parliament building and Mosque and with the King, I had very productive talks with the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, and the Cabinet.

I visited the rural development Operations Center, formerly the command post where the war against the Communist terrorists was directed, now the center where Deputy Prime Minister Razak controls an imaginative and aggressive program of help to the countryside.

In the Operations Center "red books" are maintained for each of the regional development projects. In each region there are operation rooms where "red books" are maintained for the individual projects.

Each project has a rigid schedule with periodic reporting on progress achieved. When a project falls behind a query goes out to learn the reason why. If the reply is unsatisfactory, Tun Razak himself goes out to check up. He spends two to three days out of every week traveling from one Center to another inspecting and prodding. There are also unexpected periodic spot checks.

The development program itself is a mixture of clearing land for new settlements, financing small holder rubber projects, rural health centers, feeder roads and community buildings, and improved education.

I went also to the agricultural college just out of Kuala Lumpur and the technical and medical colleges where our Peace Corps Volunteers are serving.

As I told several audiences in Malaysia, 10 years of independence have produced what looks like a hundred years of progress. Here was a country which had in 1957 every excuse for poor performance. Its economy was disrupted by 12 years of Communist insurgency. It was a multi-racial country with all the tensions and strains created by the largest population percentage of Chinese in Southeast Asia. Its soil is poor.

Malaysia's achievement has been accomplished first of all due to political stability. The same government has been in control for the entire 10 years, increasing its majority in two fair and democratic elections. It now holds 75 per cent of the seats. It has had pragmatic, tough leadership. It has recognized that racial harmony is essential. And, finally, it has created an atmosphere releasing the energy and initiative of private enterprise.

Vietnam and rubber were the two principal subjects of conversation. The Tunku was forthright and direct in his support of our position in Vietnam, and made it clear that he was ready to do everything within his power to help, including sending of rural development teams to Vietnam. He indicated, however, annoyance with what he felt was GVN indifference to his past offers of help. He will try again.

The Tunku suggested that the South Vietnamese government might consider an initiative toward negotiations with the Viet Cong rather than Hanoi, just as he had dealt directly (against British advice) with the Communists in Malaysia. The initiative would fail, but by its failure, the true nature of Communist objectives and methods would be dramatized. This is what happened in Malaysia, resulting in much wider support for the government by the people and other nations.

I was asked if the United States could provide rice experts to evaluate some promising land development projects in Borneo, and housing and savings and loan specialists to advise on financing of a low-cost urban housing program. I indicated our willingness to help through U.S. public or private institutions.

Re rubber: You have just talked with Malaysian officials on this subject. This for them is the paramount issue. They see

all that they have accomplished threatened by a continuing fall in rubber prices. We provide no significant economic assistance to Malaysia, but aid is not the answer. Instead of substantial rubber earnings, which they can spend anywhere, aid means tied loans and dependency. Diversification is taking place in Malaysia, but for the next few years improved rubber prices and production will continue to be critical to growth and stability.

I was favorably impressed by Malaysian leadership. The Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, is sound, sensible, a man with good instincts, a keen political sense, and a delightful sense of humor. He is held in affection and respect by his people. Razak, who will become Prime Minister when the Tunku steps down, is tough and shrewd, a doer and not a talker, tireless, capable of being ruthless, and a first-rate administrator. The Cabinet, too, is able. This is the team that has worked together for 10 years with the single purpose of consolidating their victory over Communist insurgency by social, political and economic progress.

INDONESIA

In Indonesia, in addition to ceremonial and courtesy calls, I toured the countryside in Bali and Central Java, visited development projects, and was warmly received in the former Communist belt by hundreds of thousands of people lining the roadside. I had lengthy substantive talks with General Suharto, General Nasution, the Chairman of the People's Council, and Achmad Sjaichu, the Speaker of the Parliament, and leading members of the President's Cabinet. (Foreign Minister Malik was attending an important conference in Europe during my visit. I sent a personal letter to him, delivered by Ambassador McGhee in Bonn.)

Indonesia is a big country with big problems. Its importance for the future is equal to that of India and Japan. In my three-day visit I was left with three basic impressions: (1) Indonesia has good leadership; (2) it has the right priorities; (3) it is attacking its problems with determination and energy. The physical decay of Djakarta after two decades of Sukarno mismanagement is clearly visible. It is a dirty, shabby, overcrowded city, filled with unfinished buildings and monuments begun by Sukarno to glorify his dreams of Afro-Asian grandeur. Sukarno left also a heritage of moral decay. Corruption and smuggling continue, but the new

government is facing the problem squarely and trying to do something about it. It has the advantage of popular revulsion against Communist violence and atheism.

In my talks with Indonesian leaders, their major concern was the economic program for the year ahead and the part of the budget which would be provided by foreign aid. Working with the IMF, they have projected for Calendar 1968 a need for \$325 million of foreign assistance. They are hoping for \$150 million from the United States: \$80 million in PL 480 commodities and \$45 million in budgetary support, plus \$25 million in project loans. They would like us to make some kind of firm pledge at the Amsterdam meeting later this month. They would like our PL 480 contribution to include 200,000 tons of rice; 150,000 bales of cotton; and 150,000 bales of cotton yarn. Suharto stressed particularly the political importance of the rice. I outlined the status of our aid legislation. I explained our U.S. rice shortage but told him we would do our best, and urged them to substitute to the maximum extent possible bulgur wheat for rice. I assured them that the U.S. intended to exert leadership in the multilateral effort to help Indonesia. I also urged him to contact Ambassador Green re all matters relating to our assistance program, and to avoid out-of-channel, back-door approaches.

Their internal needs are food and fiber to satisfy consumer demand; spare parts to reactivate equipment; new equipment to repair roads, dredge ports, resurface air fields and rehabilitate telecommunications. In addition, non-combat emergency equipment is needed to enable the military civic actions teams to sparkplug this rehabilitation effort.

General Suharto and other Indonesian leaders showed a keen interest in Vietnam and listened carefully to my impressions. The Indonesians understand completely the reasons why Communist aggression must be stopped. They value the shield which is giving them time to develop their own strength. They left no doubt that they wanted us to stay in Southeast Asia. In all my talks I made it clear that Indonesia was making a major contribution to the peace and stability of the area by getting their country back on its feet. We are not asking for Indonesian participation in the war in South Vietnam. We do want their understanding and moral support. Suharto indicated he would do what he could to (1) pass the word to Hanoi of our resolution in Vietnam, and (2) see what might be done to stimulate discussions or negotiations.

Suharto knows some English but is uncertain of his command of the language and requires an interpreter. This would be a handicap in a visit to the United States, but I understand he is studying

English and may have gained fluency and confidence by the time of his projected visit next year. His confidence in his new political role needs bolstering and I tried at every opportunity to do that.

With the exception of Adam Malik, and the group of economists charting Indonesia's stabilization course, most of Indonesia's leadership is now drawn from the military. It is important, however, to make a distinction between the Indonesian officer and his counterpart elsewhere in the world. The officer corps has a tradition of civilian orientation and civic responsibility. The Indonesian Army remains the only truly stable and effective source of management and administration within the country. Suharto is clearly evolving from a military leader to a national leader, and I stressed -- and I believe he understands -- the importance of drawing competent civilians into his government and will do so when and where he can find them. Throughout my visit Suharto was in civilian clothes -- an important change in his public image.

POLICE CONDITIONS

One additional observation -- the quality of police work in Vietnam and Malaysia is worthy of note. Our Secret Service observed that the police work in Saigon in 1967 was considerably better than when we visited in February 1966. The Vietnamese seem to be more confident and much more in charge of their own operation.

An example was the activity of the police on the evening of the reception at the Presidential Palace. There was quick reaction on the part of the police in apprehending the individuals responsible for the mortaring of the palace grounds. Also the police intelligence had contact with an informer who gave accurate information. This did not and would not occur less than two years ago.

A word about the mortaring: It took place about 4 minutes after my arrival at the palace. The first mortar was about 150 yards from the palace itself, landing at a gatehouse on the palace grounds. The fourth mortar was within 100 yards. The fifth mortar exploded in the firing chamber of the mortar tube, killing the operator. There were three unexpended mortars which were destined for the palace. The police apprehended the attackers in less than an hour.

As for Malaysia, the quality of police work was superb. It was observed by some of our party that we could learn a great deal from Malaysian police on control of demonstrations and riots and improved performance of police personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONSVietnam

1. We should recognize that, despite our best efforts, the "Americanization" of the war is likely to intensify rather than abate during the next year. Given the state of American public opinion, the pressure for immediate, visible results will mount. Although we must continue to apply pressure, particularly on the military and economic side, we must recognize that excessive pressure applied on the political side can be counter-productive. We must be prepared to recognize that a government that is responsive and representative of Vietnamese interests may also be an increasingly independent government. (But if it produces results, so much the better.)

2. We must take care that our bureaucracy does not become too visible, too numerous or too conspicuous -- and that we do not press too many "projects" on the Vietnamese. Despite the falsity of such an impression, many Vietnamese clearly believe that both our bureaucracy and our "projects" must be for our own profit, as per the previous French example. The level of AID personnel is already too high. It needs cutting.

3. In our efforts to reduce corruption, we must take a firm position with the Government of Vietnam in requiring checks

by AID on use of U. S. commodities. In many instances up until now the Government of Vietnam has refused to permit AID to check on the use of commodities after they have once been unloaded and reached the warehouse. This is known to be a source of extensive corruption in Vietnam.

(According to Dr. Do, the honest and capable Vietnamese foreign minister, we should be most careful, however, in counseling action against businessmen, or encouraging any "purge". Low esteem for businessmen in Vietnamese society, according to Dr. Do, makes it easy to send them to jail -- but does not necessarily eliminate real corruption, while meantime taking necessary technicians out of the society. In this wartime economy, Dr. Do points out, we must be most careful not to confuse wealth or profit-making with corruption per se. He did, however, favor strong action against corrupt government and military officials who now clearly represent "the power structure" in the country.)

4. An intensive effort should be made to find qualified public affairs officers for MACV who can effectively tell the story of what is happening in Vietnam, and who can assist visiting or resident correspondents in getting the story without antagonizing them. They should be experienced journalists, not untrained military officers.

An intensive effort should also be made to help the Vietnamese build a solid information program of their own, and to encourage American reporters to become exposed to it.

5. Given the great importance of U. S. public opinion, GVN leaders who would make a favorable impact -- such as Major Be of the Vungtau training center -- should be encouraged to visit the U. S. and appear on public platforms.

6. We should respond promptly to any GVN request for a public administration team to assist the Vietnamese in reforming district and local governments. Here is where Malaysian assistance could be effective.

7. The rice problem is approaching emergency proportions. In spite of inflation, the cure for high prices may be high prices. Rice prices should be permitted to rise to the world level and perhaps slightly above. This would encourage production by encouraging a flow of capital into pumps, fertilizer, irrigation, farm machinery, and all of the other factors necessary to increase the rice production. It would also stop the leakage of rice into the world market, which I am informed is taking place on a large scale, perhaps 150,000 tons annually. (Such a price increase would be important not only to Vietnam but to all the rice producing areas of Southeast Asia, if equally applied.) If this were done, one plausible

alternative would be for the GVN to become the sole purchaser of rice and to offer it to the consumer at reduced rate.

Malaysia

8. We should quietly encourage other Asian states to study the Malaysian experience. This country is moving down the road we hope others will travel. It can offer much by an expansion of its existing programs of seminars and exchanges for foreign leaders.

9. We should respond promptly to the request for rice experts to survey the projects in East Malaysia and facilitate a visit of urban housing and building and loan experts, preferably from our private sector.

10. We must take a more flexible and imaginative approach to the long-range problem of achieving price stabilization for commodities such as rubber and tin. Our representatives at the UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi in February 1968, and at regular meetings of the World Bank, must promote leadership in encouraging these multilateral institutions to come up with specific realistic recommendations on this subject. International financial institutions would seem to be a far better place for this than UNCTAD. We should seek prompt action by the Bank on commodity-price proposals made at the Rio meeting.

We should seek to avoid any form of bilateral rubber price support operation. The proper forum for the commodity problem is in a multi-lateral broadly based international institution. The long-term solution to Malaysia's rubber problem may necessitate a Malaysian initiative at more intensive crop diversification. Such might require a long-term, low-interest loan from an international or commercial bank in order to fund the capital costs of such diversification and the economic adjustments that follow.

Indonesia

11. Given the fact that Indonesia represents half the population of Southeast Asia and has most of its natural resources, and in view of its strategic location between two continents, we must give a high priority to providing our share of the assistance Indonesia needs. Indonesia is critical to our own security and that of Southeast Asia.

12. The multilateral approach to foreign assistance for Indonesia represents the only sound strategy for the U.S. The international organizations -- IMF, IBRD and ADB -- insulate us from political pressure, and spread the financial burden. It is popular on Capitol Hill. We should exert leadership to further expand and implement the consortium approach, as discussed

in Amsterdam. This entails reliance on international organizations as a principal channel for advice and suggested courses of action. But we must not hesitate to act promptly and bilaterally if an extreme crisis situation demands it.

13. In dealing with the Indonesians we must be sympathetic and responsive, but avoid giving the impression that we are more eager for Indonesia's economic recovery than they themselves. We should recognize that Indonesia is more effective than we are in pleading its case with other countries and that the natural resources and market of 100 million people are more persuasive reasons for giving help than any pressure or arguments we can muster.

14. We should continue to support the Indonesian military civic action program through a MAP program providing non-combat equipment. In this connection we should expedite acquisition and shipment of used but serviceable trucks, tractors, dredges, earth moving, road building and other equipment to make the available funds go further.

15. Our food and fiber surpluses can make a major contribution in Indonesia. Rice is a political necessity and we should be prepared to increase rice acreage to meet this need. Bulgur wheat is being introduced in trial tonnages. The Indonesians are willing to accept it. It can be made in matting plants with little investment.

I understand there is a 20-25 percent unused bulgur capacity in the U.S. We should expand our bulgur shipment here, as to other Southeast Asian nations. We should also expand our successful Food-for-Work programs as they come forth with worthwhile projects. Corn -- in surplus in the United States -- and vegetable oil are also great opportunities for later commercial sale, once markets are developed.

16. We should ask AID, in coordination with the Department of Commerce, to undertake economic studies and create a priority list of industries which could be promptly developed in Indonesia. Large capital investment in such things as cement and fertilizer plants, and food processing plants, might be attracted in a very short time.

17. We should work out, with cooperation of the Indonesian government, a plan for credit -- preferably through credit unions -- to farmers for capital goods such as pumps, tractors, trucks, and other inputs to increase agricultural production.

Indonesia's requests are modest and well-conceived.

They should be acted on immediately.

18. Finally, in light of the cut in AID funds by the Congress, and the impending rice crisis in Southeast Asia, we should effectively

use now funds authorized under PL 480. Such a program would not only use funds effectively and help our friends in Asia, it would help us with budgetary problems and assist our own farm economy in 1968.

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ACTION

Thursday, October 3, 1968 -- 12:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Ben Read reports the Foreign Relations Committee, by voice vote, has reported out Russ Wiggins; and may take it up and pass on the nomination in the Senate this afternoon or tomorrow morning.

What is your pleasure regarding swearing him in? The last two were sworn in here at the White House. It might be well to swear Wiggins in here, also, in view of some of the criticism on his appointment.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange swearing-in at White House _____

Do it at State _____

Call me _____

rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Thursday - October 3, 1968 - 10:50 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Peru Coup

Pres file

Contrary to our latest intelligence assessments, the Peruvian Army moved early this morning to oust President Belaunde and install a "Revolutionary Junta". Unhappiness over the IPC settlement was one obvious motive.

No violence or active resistance has yet occurred, but some could develop during the day. Early reports suggest the Navy and Air Force were not fully supporting the Army.

President Belaunde was arrested by the Army at his palace and flown to exile in Buenos Aires by the military.

We will soon have to face the question of recognition of the Junta, but should not do so until the dust settles. Full consultation with the other OAS governments will be required. Meanwhile, our AID Mission Director -- now here on consultation -- will remain here and AID will suspend plans for new aid to Peru.

The last coup in Latin America occurred June 1966 in Argentina.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 94-171 (#32)
By cm/ies, NARA, Date 12-11-02

cc - George Christian

SWLewis:mmm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-248

By cb, NARA, Date 5-8-95INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US Air Strikes During Kossygin's Visit to Hanoi--February 1965

The timing of U.S. air strikes in Vietnam in February 1965 and Chairman Kossygin's presence in the Far East is as follows:

Chairman Kossygin arrived in Hanoi on February 6, 1965;

Mr. Kossygin left Hanoi on the morning of the 10th for Peking;

On February 11 he flew from Peking to North Korea arriving the same day;

On February 15, Mr. Kossygin left for Moscow, arriving the same day.

During February 1965, U.S. planes struck only two targets in North Vietnam:

1. On February 7, barracks at Dong Hoi were struck. This target is 250 miles from Hanoi.
2. On February 11, the Chan Hoa barracks were struck. This target is 225 miles from Hanoi.

Mr. Kossygin had left Hanoi before the second air attack took place. He was either in Peking or on route to North Korea.

Mr. Kossygin, in referring to his presence in Hanoi when U.S. bombs dropped in North Vietnam was speaking of the first U.S. strike which took place on February 7.

You will recall Ambassador Thompson during the February 10 NSC meeting urged that the second strike be deferred until Mr. Kossygin had returned to Moscow or at least until he had left Peking.

In short, the NSC debate took place after the Dong Hoi raid when Kossygin was in Hanoi (Feb. 7)

BKS:amc

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Fostow

29

October 3, 1968

SECRET NODIS

Mr. President:

I just wish you to be aware of
the attached from Ambassador
Jarring on the Phantoms for Israel.

W. W. Rostow

Att: USUN NY 6805, 10/2/68

SECRET NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988

By rg NARA, L-1-2593



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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NODIS

SECTO 17

MIDDLE EAST: PHANTOMS

1. AT CONCLUSION OF LENGTHY DISCUSSION ON MIDDLE EAST WITH SISCO AND BUFFUM OCT 2, AMB JARRING RAISED WHAT WAS OBVIOUS PURPOSE IN HIS ASKING FOR SUCH QUICK FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION TO HIS MTG WITH SECRETARY OCT 1.

2. JARRING SAID HE FEARED HE HAD GAINED IMPRESSION FROM ONE COMMENT MADE BY SECRETARY THAT ANNOUNCEMENT TO SELL PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL MIGHT BE MADE SOON. HE ALSO RECALLED SECRETARY HAD ASKED WHAT WE CLD DO TO HELP HIM. JARRING SAID HE WAS MOST DISTURBED ABOUT EFFECT SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD HAVE ON HIS MISSION. WHILE IT WLD OBVIOUSLY NOT BE PROPER FOR HIM TO TAKE POSITION ON SUBSTANCE OF MATTER, HE INDICATED STRONG HOPE US WLD FIND IT AT LEAST POSSIBLE TO DELAY ANY SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT DURING IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WHICH HE CONSIDERS IS CRITICAL PERIOD IN DETERMINING FATE OF HIS MISSION.

GP-1
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 97-136
By isa NARA Date 7.2.18

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THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

WASHINGTON

Thursday, October 3, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Ambassador Bunker's 69th weekly message.

A. General

- New pacification concept understood and supported by GVN at Oct. 1 meeting.
- 3800 contested hamlets with 3 million people to be focus of two-phase drive.
- Success would bring over 82% of SVN population under GVN control.
- First phase target of 1000 hamlets to be completed by Tet 1969.
- Enemy efforts to launch new attacks stymied, vital caches seized.
- Level of fighting results reflect increased ARVN role and performance despite lower firepower ratio than US forces.
- Study of Hanoi position and rhetoric indicates possible strategy debate underway.
- Hardliners use 1954 French parallel for US position and urge more attacks.
- Possible doubters feel present level premature; urge return to second stage "protracted struggle."
- Big Minh's planned return from Thai exile Oct. 5 viewed as beneficial; more so than other exiles.
- Thieu confirms attractive land program aimed at peasant support with retention of VC grants, back-rent waiver and tax-free pledges.

B. Political

- Thieu to make significant address to National Assembly Oct. 7.
- Thieu may propose reform of controversial military courts and restoration of civilian jurisdiction over security cases.
- Thieu and US Mission think Lower House version of political party law is not sufficiently restrictive.
- If Thieu and Senate can agree to limit number of parties, law could be major instrument to bring about nationalist unity.
- Student union reorganized with pro-GVN leadership.
- Other hopeful signs show constructive political commitment among youth.

C. Military (See General Section)D. Pacification

- August Regional and Popular Forces strength up over 10,000; quality better.
- Enemy KIA and captured weapons doubled during August.
- Leadership improvement apparent in more enemy contacts and KIA.

Economic

- Thieu may ask Assembly for special fiscal powers Oct. 7.
- Powers could raise customs piaster exchange rate from 80/1 to 118/1, increase customs revenues by 9 billion piasters.
- Price index rose 1%; rice prices declined slightly.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 24, NARA, Date 2-19-93

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Wednesday, October 2, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 39276)

Herewith my sixty-ninth weekly message:

A. General

For some weeks we have been developing our concept of a "counter-offensive", with emphasis on pacification, moving from the improved allied military position and the growing political strength of the GVN to more extensive and more secure control of the countryside. At our October 1 joint meeting with President Thieu and his principal advisors on military and pacification matters, it was most encouraging to have confirmation that they have been working along generally similar lines toward these objectives.

Thieu not only has the keenest interest in pacification but the most thorough knowledge of the problems involved of any of the GVN officials. He has demonstrated his personal leadership in the seminars he has held for top officials in each of the Corps areas in the past few weeks, the final one to be held in the Second Corps today. He is determined to launch a broad pacification offensive that should move substantial numbers of hamlets from the "contested" to the "relatively secure" category. The extent of GVN homework on the new planning concepts was evident in our October 1 meeting.

The concept targets primarily on the some 3800 contested hamlets where approximately 3 million people live rather than on the Viet Cong held areas with the remaining 3 million of a total population of 17-1/2 million. As Thieu points out, adding these 3800 hamlets to the 5,000-odd already relatively secure would bring over 82 percent of South Vietnam's population under reasonable GVN control. It would forestall any Viet Cong effort to partition the country or justify any claim to coalition government. It would involve a shift of Regional Forces, and the creation of new local defense forces in the areas to be secured plus a concerted attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure and an intensified Chieu Hoi program. The plan would also stress strengthening hamlet and village administration to compete with Viet Cong "Liberation Committees". We are all agreed here that the concept is basically sound. Thieu and his advisors have been thinking in terms of a year-long campaign to begin in December. At our suggestion, however, Thieu agreed to a two-phase approach, the first phase with a goal of 1,000 hamlets to start hopefully within one month and to be completed by Tet, in order to take advantage of the opportunities that now exist to expand the GVN's control in the countryside, for the enemy is clearly faltering in his efforts to keep the initiative.

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Friendly forces continued to forestall the enemy's efforts at mounting offensive operations. In the First Corps, the Third Marine Division continued to seize large caches of ammunition, weapons, food and supplies which had been pre-positioned to sustain multi-regimental size attacks by the enemy against our positions south of the DMZ. In the Third Corps a series of unglamorous operations northwest of Saigon in Hau Nghia Province discovered similar caches, and also uncovered dispensaries which had been set up to care for thousands of wounded, complete with generators, operating tables, and refrigeration equipment. In the same area our forces have destroyed over a thousand bunkers and over 2500 more have been identified. These are all indications of the magnitude of the enemy's preparation for large-scale attacks. He was clearly preparing to support sustained offensive action against Saigon.

The level of fighting did not change greatly with enemy killed increasing slightly to 3,782 (47 percent by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, 48 percent by U. S.) and friendly killed down slightly to 501 (67 percent Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and 30 percent U. S.). I have tried in my recent messages to highlight the growing number of examples of fine Army of the Republic of Vietnam performance. I think nothing better illustrates the full ARVN participation in the successful blunting of Communist offensive action than these figures, especially when one recalls that the ARVN fights without the same fire-power in their battalions, without the same lavish artillery and air support that our forces have. As General Abrams has put it, "They are in the fight and they are doing well. They are paying the price and they are exacting the toll". There are, of course, still weaknesses in ARVN to be overcome. But not only are these weaknesses being corrected, the ARVN in its present state has turned in a truly fine performance in recent weeks. As General Abrams has said, in some cases "heroic".

Enemy strategy continues unchanged. Although he made battalion-sized attacks only against Special Forces camps and Regional and Popular Forces posts in the First and Third Corps during the week, it is clear that he wanted and intended to do much more with the vast stores we have seized from him, but he was unable to bring it off. He was undoubtedly trying, without success, to clear the way to Saigon and other cities.

There is one view that sees the enemy bound to continue this same course, largely by his doctrinal approach which to a large degree determines his long-term goals and which tends also to shape his view of the situation. There are some striking parallels between the strategy pronounced in the Central Office for South Vietnam 6th Resolution, the principal current statement of strategy, and the pronouncements of Truong Chinh prior to the shift to the "general offensive" in 1954. The Communists apparently see us in the same position that the French were just before Geneva. The emphasis on loss of morale of U. S. and GVN forces, on the adverse effects of the war on the U. S. economy, its divisive effect in the United States, and the movement of world opinion against the United States all find parallels in the earlier documents relating to the French war against the Viet Minh.

Other doctrinal points which might incline the enemy towards continuing the offensive are the belief that the negotiations will only ratify what he must win on the battlefield; and the belief that the "balance of forces" shifts in his favor continually as the fighting goes on. His determination to bring about the "popular uprising" might lead to increasingly reckless -- and costly -- attacks, spearheaded at the "puppet forces" in the belief that this will lead to the destruction of the GVN.

Great claims are made by Hanoi for the progress this strategy has brought about since Tet, while, as I have pointed out previously, his cadre who are doing the fighting on the ground are increasingly questioning whether the effort has been worth the cost. It is claimed that we have been forced to adopt a defensive posture, concerned only with the protection of major urban centers. At the same time, fantastically exaggerated claims are made about the defeats which are allegedly being inflicted upon us. I suppose it is possible that someone in Hanoi may be persuaded by these claims.

However, while support for this view abounds in the enemy's current strategic pronouncements, it may well exaggerate the rigidity of the enemy's strategic thinking. For example, while the Central Office for South Vietnam Resolution parallels Truong Chinh's language, it seems likely that Truong Chinh, who reportedly adheres more closely than some others to the classic Maoist line, probably feels that the attempt to move to the general offensive was made prematurely, and that it may be necessary to return to the second stage offensive and the concept of "protracted war". Further, there may well be those in the Hanoi hierarchy who believe that gains can be made at the negotiating table without further heavy battlefield sacrifices. In other words, I think it possible that the use of rhetoric traceable to Truong Chinh's 1954 writings and in some cases to Mao Tse Tung's work, serves in part to conceal a considerable range of differences among the leaders in Hanoi, and I believe that it is quite possible that the advocates of continuing the present strategy may be under considerable pressure.

In my last message I reported on the likely return from exile of General Duong Van Minh. Thieu told me yesterday that he will return on Saturday, October 5. Thieu sent his Interior Minister to Bangkok to discuss "Big" Minh's future role which may be that of advisor to the President. Most knowledgeable Vietnamese consider Minh's return as a positive factor making for greater nationalist unity and I am inclined to agree, although working out a proper role for him will not be easy. The same beneficial results are not likely to be obtained, however, from the return of some of the other exiled generals and I am planning to make some remarks along these lines to Thieu at the next appropriate occasion. I think he already shares these views.

In our joint meeting yesterday I referred to the problem of land tenure as it applied to farmers who had been cultivating lands under Viet Cong control. In response to a question I had raised during Thieu's visit to Ba Tri in Kien Hoa Province, he had described a three-point GVN policy:

1. That land lords would not be permitted to collect back rents from such tenants;
2. That farmers given land by the Viet Cong would not be expected to pay taxes for several years;
3. That farmers given land by the Viet Cong would be allowed to keep the land they are farming and would be given titles to regularize possession of it.

I pointed out that the third point differed from the provisions of the ordinances now in effect but that I thought that if carried out, it would have far reaching consequences in gaining the allegiance and support of farmers who had been cultivating lands under Viet Cong control. Thieu reaffirmed his statement and said that the farmers would definitely be allowed to keep these lands and that a government committee was now working out the details. This I believe can prove to be a highly constructive development and a useful weapon in gaining the adherence of the peasant.

B. Political

Preparations for opening of the National Assembly. On October 7, President Thieu will address a special joint session of the National Assembly, thus marking the opening of the second regular Assembly. I expect that Thieu, who is very conscious of the importance of the Assembly and is always careful to praise its leaders and accomplishments, sees this occasion as another opportunity to improve his image as a civilian and popularly elected president. Among the items he may propose could be the reorganization -- or abolition -- of the special military field courts whose jurisdiction over national security cases is quite controversial. These are the courts which sentenced Dzu for advocating a coalition government. While I do not expect the President to announce any significant softening in the government's policy on such matters, a move to restore civilian jurisdiction over national security cases would be very popular. In the meantime, preparations are proceeding for the election of the Supreme Court, which will be installed this month.

Political party law has high priority. One of the important matters before the Assembly is to complete action on the political party and political opposition law. This bill, with far-reaching implications for the development of a viable democracy, has passed the Lower House and awaits action by the Senate. Properly drafted, the law could be a major instrument in bringing about the nationalist political unity which is so urgently required. Unfortunately, in a version which emerged from the Lower House, the provisions which regulate the registration of political parties are not sufficiently restrictive. We estimate that perhaps 10 to 15 political parties could immediately meet these validation requirements. Although this would be a measurable improvement over the 50-plus political parties now in existence, it falls short of

what is required if the necessary degree of nationalist cohesion is to be achieved. Thieu has told me that he is also unhappy with the draft measure as it emerged from the Lower House because he, too, sees the need to limit the number of political parties. He intends to consult with members of the Senate and the Lower House to try to bring about some changes in the bill. If Thieu lends his full weight to this, I think there is a fair chance that amendments can be approved, significantly improving the measure. We are urging on our Assembly contacts the desirability of amending the law to inhibit the number of political parties.

Controversial Saigon student union reorganized. This week the controversial Saigon student union was replaced by a five-man provisional student standing committee. This was a rather well organized pro-government "palace coup" within the student union, which many suspected had come increasingly under Communist influence. The new officers charged their predecessors with irresponsibility and with damaging student prestige, and pointed to the scandal when Communist literature was discovered in the union headquarters building. We suspect the GVN had a hand in this "palace coup", which on balance is probably a good thing, especially if it results in a more representative student organization.

What I would like to see -- and of which there has been lamentably little evidence to date -- is a more constructive participation of young people in building a new society. There seem to be some small signs of an increasing awareness among Vietnamese youth of a need for political organization. This summer has seen the establishment of the school youth activities program in the provinces. The program's project is a GVN-sponsored program designed to involve high school and university youth in welfare projects and work camps. Also, several Saigon area youth leaders are actively engaged in the Lien Minh New Action Program activities, on which I reported in my last message. A good deal of all this is still in the planning stage, meager though it is, this evidence of nationalist political activity among young people is encouraging. There has long been a woeful lack of political commitment among Vietnamese youth which, unless corrected, could be a dangerous liability for the nationalist cause in any post-war confrontation with the Communists.

C. Military

I have discussed the overall military situation in the General Section. ARVN forces defended against three battalion-size attacks on small outposts during the week.

The attack on the Regional Force outpost near Ben Soi (I mentioned this in my previous message) was resumed on September 26-27, with no more favorable outcome for the enemy than before. In the three attacks (beginning September 20) the ARVN and Regional Forces killed 306 enemy and captured 113 weapons, including 27 crew-served weapons. Friendly losses were 28 killed and 184 wounded.

The enemy also attacked a Special Forces camp in Tay Ninh on September 26-27, losing 142 killed and 55 weapons, including 5 crew-served weapons, while inflicting 4 friendly killed and 13 wounded.

In Quang Nam Province, an attack on Thuong Duc Special Forces Camp cost the enemy 62 killed and 24 weapons captured (7 crew-served). Regional and Popular Force defenders suffered 7 killed and 8 wounded.

D. Pacification

The attention to improving Regional and Popular Forces is showing signs of payoff. End-August reports from our district advisors -- who are now reinforced by over 250 five-man mobile advisory teams -- show that Regional Force strength increased again by almost 6,900 men in tactical units. Popular Forces grew by 4,500. More important, quality looks better. Regional Forces small unit operations jumped by 8,000 (16 percent) over July and contacts increased 22 percent. Both enemy killed in action and weapons captured doubled. The same trend held for the Popular Forces, which ran 7,600 (9 percent) more operations and increased contacts by 26 percent. Enemy killed in action by Popular Forces also almost doubled.

Since leadership has always been poor in the Regional and Popular Forces, the improvement program has concentrated on this deficiency. Many tactical units simply didn't have their authorized number of officers and NCO's, while headquarters were overstrength and school training quotas weren't being filled. By end-August, after several months of progress, about three-fourths of Regional Force officers and NCO's authorized in tactical units are now assigned there. The critical Popular Force platoon leader category has improved even more, from about 60 percent assigned six months ago to 95 percent assigned at mid-August. The correlation between leadership and more contacts and kills is apparent.

The value of the hamlet evaluation system as a management tool is gradually being recognized by GVN officials. Some province chiefs use it extensively for detailed planning. The corps commanders are using it in briefings and analyses. President Thieu himself used the hamlet evaluation system when describing to us yesterday his 1969 pacification concepts on which I have reported in the General Section.

E. Economic

For the first time in many weeks, the GVN seemed about to take action on significant steps to increase budget revenue. We were told by Minister of Economy Ho that the President, in his budget message on October 7, intends to ask the National Assembly for special powers in fiscal matters. With these powers, Thieu would change the base of customs calculations from the official exchange rate of 80/1 to the de facto rate of 118/1, a measure that could increase customs revenues by nine billion piasters. He would also cut the rice deficit, by increasing the price of imported rice,

and sell several government-owned companies to the public. The measures seem appropriate, and we welcome especially the rice price increase, which would at least partially meet our insistence on moves to make rice farming more profitable.

The US AID index rose one percent in the week ending September 30. Deliveries of most foodstuffs were normal and the seasonal decline in fish prices continued. Rice prices fell, the better grades by one to two percent and US rice by five percent. During August and September, our index rose 3.5 percent. Since the beginning of the year, it has risen 33 percent.

Last week the Ministry of Economy issued a decree abolishing provincial rice export permit requirements. These permits were one of several types of control on movement of rice that have served mainly as instruments for petty bribery. The decree should make rice transport to Saigon a little easier and less costly.

The GVN last week sent to Washington a delegation to the annual IMF/IBRD meeting headed by Minister of State Dao. The delegation is empowered to complete prepayment of \$35 million in outstanding DLF loans, a measure that should cut GVN foreign exchange reserves to a level slightly below \$300 million.