

Lois 31

~~1~~
2 Pres. file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, October 2, 1968
11:37 PM

Mr. President:

While waiting for my report you
might want to read this assessment
by the British Consul General in
Hanoi of expectations there.

W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

ACTION

32

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, October 2, 1968 - 6:10 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: 50th Anniversary of Czechoslovakia

On October 18, fifty years ago, Masaryk presented Woodrow Wilson with Czechoslovakia's Declaration of Independence, issued that day by the Czechoslovak Provisional Government. The document was formally proclaimed in Washington eight days later. The Czechoslovak National Council is having a series of commemorative meetings in Washington this year, and has requested the opportunity to call on you on October 18, 19 or 20 -- preferably October 18 (their letter is at Tab A).

We have been in touch with the Council, and they tell us the ceremony would consist of a presentation of two leatherbound books with photographs of the Czech and Slovak lands. There would be brief general remarks about Masaryk, Woodrow Wilson and America's role in Czechoslovak independence 50 years ago.

The Czechoslovak National Council unites almost all of the established Czechoslovak organizations in this country (the main exception being some Slovak separatists).

The State Department believes it would be appropriate for you to receive this group. These are Americans of Czechoslovak descent -- not emigres. America's role in the founding of Czechoslovakia and the fact that its independence was declared in this country are unique. The occasion would provide an opportunity to recall America's attachment to Wilsonian principles of freedom and self-determination and indicate America's sympathy for Czechoslovakia in a non-political and American setting.

W. W. Rostow

Speak to Jim Jones tentatively about a time _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

INDEXED TO BE AN ADDITIONAL COPY OF THE RECORDS OF THE PRESIDENT AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES
OCT 13 1968
19 2-22-93

CONFIDENTIAL



Liberty
For All

Czechoslovak National Council

COMMITTEE TO COMMEMORATE THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY
OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

32a
of America

2138 South 61st Court

Cicero, Illinois 60550

Telephone: 312--242-2224

September 3, 1968

JAMES V. KRAKORA
Chairman

VLASTISLAV CHALUPA
Secretary

ADOLPH CIERNY
EDWARD DELLIN
DR. MIKULAS FERJENCIK
VACLAV HESOUN
ALOIS SALAMOUN
MISS VLASTA VRAZ

**PARTICIPATING
ORGANIZATIONS**

Alliance of Czechoslovak
Democratic Associations in
Australia and New Zealand
American Czechoslovak
Engineers Society
American Sokol Organization
Association of Czechoslovak
Sportsmen in Western World
Central Committee of
Czechoslovak Legionnaires
Committee for a Free
Czechoslovakia
Council for a Free Czechoslovakia
Council of Higher Education
Czech Catholic Union
Czechoslovak Association in Sydney
Czechoslovak Association in Victoria
Czechoslovak Free Trade
Union Federation
Czechoslovak National Alliance
of Canada
Czechoslovak National Council
of America
Czechoslovak Orel in Exile
Czechoslovak Society of America
Czechoslovak Society for
Arts and Sciences
Czechoslovak Sokol Abroad
Federation of Former Czechoslovak
Army Officers in Exile
Gymnastic Union Sokol Sydney
National Alliance of
Czech Catholics
Permanent Conference of
Democratic Slovaks in Exile
Slavonic Benevolent Order
of the State of Texas
Slovak Gymnastic Union
Sokol of the U.S.A.
Unity of Czech Ladies and Men
Western Bohemian
Fraternal Association

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

On October 18, 1918, Professor Thomas G. Masaryk, Chairman of the Committee for the Liberation of the Czech and Slovak peoples from hundreds of years of subjugation to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, presented to President Woodrow Wilson at the White House the Declaration of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, issued that day by the Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government in Paris.

This Declaration of Independence was then formally proclaimed by Professor Masaryk in Washington on October 26, 1918. It was proclaimed in Prague on October 28, now "Czechoslovak Independence Day" and ratified in Slovakia at Turcanky Sv. Martin on October 30, 1918.

In this Declaration, the new Czechoslovak Republic accepted "the ideals of modern democracy, as they have been the ideals of our nation for centuries." It accepted "the American principles as laid down by President Wilson - the principles of liberated mankind, of the actual equality of nations, and of governments deriving all their just power from the consent of the governed... expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, the principles of Lincoln, and of the declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen."


The 50th anniversary of this historic Proclamation will be commemorated by the Czechoslovak National Council of America, with the active participation of 25 leading American organizations of people of Czech and Slovak extraction, in Washington, D. C., on October 18, 19 and 20, 1968, with appropriate ceremonies at the Statler-Hilton Hotel.

As part of this observance, there will be a Convention of Americans of Czech and Slovak descent and of Czechoslovaks from throughout the Free World on Friday, October 18, 1968, to commemorate the presentation fifty years ago of the Czechoslovak Declaration of Independence by Professor Masaryk to President Wilson.

We would be most grateful, Mr. President, if you could receive a delegation from this Convention at the White House and accept a token of appreciation from American citizens of Czech and Slovak descent for the way in which you have carried forward the human spirit that marked the historic meeting of Professor Masaryk and President Wilson whose anniversary we celebrate.

It is our sincere hope that you will find it possible to grant our request. The participation of our great President in this memorial of two of the world's outstanding democratic leaders would be most meaningful. And it would always be remembered and appreciated by the hundreds of thousands of loyal and patriotic citizens of the United States of America who are proud of their Czech and Slovak ancestry.

Respectfully yours,


James V. Krakora,
Chairman - Commemorative
Committee

JVK;af

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 2, 1968, 5:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Bombing North Vietnam during Kossygin's Visit to Hanoi--1965

The National Security Council meeting on February 10, 1965, discussed the North Vietnamese targets to be hit by US and South Vietnamese planes in reprisal for attacks on U.S. forces in South Vietnam.

Soviet Chairman Kossygin was in Hanoi and scheduled to leave that day for North Korea, Peking and then home to Moscow.

Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Taylor and the Joint Chiefs recommended the retaliatory strike. Targets available to be struck included four North Vietnamese barracks between the 17th and the 18th parallels and the Thanh Hoa Bridge some 220 miles north of the 17th parallel. None of the targets were closer than 170 miles to Hanoi.

Following the discussion, the bridge target was eliminated. One U.S. target, number 24, the Chanh Hoa barracks, about 60 miles north of the demarcation line, was approved. An alternate weather target was a second North Vietnamese barracks at Deng Hai, closer to the demarcation line. The target for the South Vietnamese Air Force was Vu Con barracks number 32, right on the demarcation line and an alternate weather target nearby. The number of possible targets was reduced and these chosen involved a shallower penetration of North Vietnam.

Four factors influenced the decision:

- a. The visit of Kossygin to North Korea was expected to make the Communist Chinese very unhappy and further the split between the Chinese and the Russians. It was argued that our bombing should not produce the result of bringing the two Communist powers closer together.
- b. Bombing during Kossygin's presence might prompt him to increase the degree of Soviet commitment to the North Vietnamese.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- c. Domestic opinion required the response to North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacks on U.S. forces.
- d. The incident provided a means of shifting from a "tit-for-tat" bombing policy to a continuing program striking North Vietnamese targets.

Ambassador Thompson argued that the air strike should be delayed until Kossygin had returned to Moscow or in any case until he had left Peking. He thought that before we launched continued bombing attacks on North Vietnam, we should warn them to stop their aggression or the safe haven which they had enjoyed up until now would be ended.

The Vice President doubted that the air strike should take place before Chairman Kossygin left the area. He said he had mixed feelings as to whether we should retaliate as Secretary McNamara recommended. He shared the view that Mr. Kossygin's presence in Hanoi or in the Far East limited our freedom of action.

Acting Secretary Ball said our action should be cautious but the strike, minus a Thanh Hoa Bridge, would minimize any possible Soviet reaction.

The two-target strike, which was acceptable to Secretary McNamara, Acting Secretary Ball, Director McCone, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, and USIA Director Rowan was then approved.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

INFORMATION

Pres file

Wednesday, October 2, 1968 -- 5:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

You asked me to check on Ryan versus Nat Davis with Dovey Oliver.

Covey says:

- As between the two, he would rank Nat Davis above Ryan. They considered Davis favorably at an earlier time but thought, because of his present duties, they would not put him on their list.
- Ryan he regards as a fine man and a good Latin American hand but without experience for this very tough and delicate post. There is, however, one virtue in putting Ryan forward: It would raise USIA morale in the wake of the law which converts its personnel onto a career service basis.
- But he would still stand behind the list he forwarded to John Macy: Henry Dearborn, DCM at Mexico City, and Ernest Siracusa, DCM at Lima.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

36

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, October 2, 1968, 3:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Background on Howard E. Haugerud

Pres file

In checking on the background of Howard Haugerud, I have turned up the following:

1. His greatest asset is his solid ties to the Hill.
2. Although almost a second son to John McClellan, he worked for Hubert Humphrey for three years. His political outlook is closer to Humphrey than McClellan.
3. He is described as a good operator, faithful and shrewd. He has not been deeply involved in substantive issues. He is more of a trouble shooter--one who puts people together.
4. In his present position, that of Deputy Inspector General, Office of Foreign Assistance, he is traveling almost constantly to our various AID Missions overseas. He is therefore very knowledgeable of the operations side of U.S. Missions. His inspection work is revealed in reports which are made to Congress. These reports are the joint work of an inspection team. Consequently, it is not possible to identify his contribution.
5. In his present position he has the rank of Assistant Secretary which came as a result of Congressional initiative.

A summary of his Government service is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

BKS:amc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR 16, 1983.

BY ON 1-25-93

36a

HOWARD E. HAUGERUD

born - Minnesota, August 22, 1924

married

U.S. Army, 1942-1945; U.S. Air Force, 1948-1953 (pilot)

Assistant to Senator H. H. Humphrey, 1956-1959

Professional Staff Member, U. S. Senate Subcommittee on National
Policy Machine, 1959-1961

Deputy Under Secretary of Army for International Affairs, 1961-1963

Appointed Deputy Inspector General, Office Foreign Assistance
(Assistant Secretary Rank) Department of State, July 15, 1963
to present

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 1, 1968

Tuesday - 5:50 p.m.

PERSONAL

FOR THE PRESIDENT

I hear that Hewson Ryan's name is on the list of possible appointees to Guatamala. I have known Hew Ryan for several years, and have worked with him on a number of projects. He is a tough-minded pro who has extensive experience in, and understanding of, Latin America. I think he would be an excellent choice for Guatamala.

There is another fellow whom you might want to consider naming while there is time. He is Howard Haugerud, Deputy Inspector General of Foreign Assistance. He would like very much to go to Norway as ambassador. (Our ambassador there is an FSO lady, who has been there four years.) Howard is a long-time Johnson supporter (he showed me a check for \$100, which he contributed on June 3, 1960, and which reduced his bank balance to \$80). I believe he is extremely able and from all accounts has done an outstanding job in State. He is of Norwegian extraction. He used to work for Government Operations, and has become over the years almost a second son to John McClellan. He believes his chances of remaining in Norway would be good under any Administration, as McClellan is chairman of the State Appropriations Subcommittee. Howard's wife is making good progress in her fight against cancer, and he understands that cancer care in Norway is exceptionally good. His Marine son was severely wounded in Vietnam, but came through well and returned to I Corps this week.

Hm
Harry C. McPherson, Jr.

Walt -

Check this out -

He looks good

Call me -
a

27
—

ACTION

Wednesday, October 2, 1968 3:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk called about the NPT on the assumption that the Senate has been sadly cleared by the withdrawal of Abe's name. He said:

-- He understands that Mike Mansfield is making a nose count on the NPT among the Democrats in the Senate:

-- He wondered if you might not ask Dirksen to make a nose count among the Republicans.

Sec. Rusk feels that, aside from the foreign policy advantage, you have worked so hard on the NPT that it would be good to get it through in this session if there were enough votes to make the concurrence of the Senate solid.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Pres file
38

Wednesday, Oct. 2, 1968
1:35 p. m.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Harriman's account of the tea break.
In para. 6, page 2, Harriman gets in all three
points together.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET/HARVAN/PLUS attachment (Delto 788 Paris 21737)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By , NARA, Date 1-25-93



Department of State

314 W H
TELEGRAM

SECRET

9

VV CRB567
OO RUEHDT
DE RUFNCR 21737/1 2761428
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 021410Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6626
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 1344
STATE GRNC

5 7 2 Q

1968 OCT 2 AM 11 16

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 21737

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 788

USUN FOR SECRETARY

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10351 (289)

By vic/je NARA. Date 12-28-09

1. THUY AND LAU JOINED US AT THE TEA BREAK WHICH LASTED 42 MINUTES. THO WAS ABSENT FROM TODAY'S MEETING.
2. AFTER NON-SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION, WE ASKED THUY WHETHER HE HAD ANYTHING NEW TO ADD TO OUR CONVERSATIONS. HE REPLIED THEY HAD NOTHING NEW FOR THEIR PART BUT THAT THEY HAD JUST HEARD OF STATEMENT BY VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY. THUY SAID AS THEY READ THE STATEMENT IT DEMANDED RECIPROCITY.
3. WE ASKED IF THEY HAD A COPY OF THE SPEECH AND OFFERED TO MAKE ONE AVAILABLE TO THEM. THUY SAID THEY WOULD LIKE A COPY. WE SAID WE HAD NOT TALKED TO HUMPHREY ABOUT THE SPEECH AND THAT THUY COULD READ THE SPEECH AND JUDGE IT FOR HIMSELF.
4. WE EMPHASIZED THAT UNTIL JAN. 20TH, PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS RESPONSIBLE FOR US FOREIGN POLICY AND WHAT CANDIDATES SAY IS NOT IMPORTANT DURING THIS PERIOD. WHAT IS IMPORTANT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE DRV IS WHAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO STOP THE BOMBING. WE SAID IT WAS A MYSTERY TO US WHY THE DRV WANTED TO GO ON FIGHTING.
5. THUY REPLIED PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS ALL THE POWER IN HIS HANDS. WHY DOESN'T HE STOP THE BOMBING TO SETTLE THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM?

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 21737, 021410Z OCT, SECTION 1 OF 2, (NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

6. WE REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID THAT WE WOULD STOP THE BOMBING WHEN WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE DRV IS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN JOINING WITH US IN DE-ESCALATING THE WAR AND IS SERIOUSLY SEEKING PEACE. WE EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAD TOLD THUY AND HIS COLLEAGUES WHAT WE WOULD DO IN AND AROUND THE DMZ IF THE BOMBING WERE STOPPED AND THAT WE HAD HEARD WHAT THEY HAD SAID AND HAD CONCLUDED THEY KNEW WHAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO DO ON THEIR PART IN AND AROUND THE DMZ. WE SAID WE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED WITH THEM THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD HAPPEN IF ATTACKS WERE TO TAKE PLACE AGAINST MAJOR CITIES. WE SAID WE HAD ALSO DISCUSSED AT (DEL)IGHT THE FACT THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE SERIOUS TALKS AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE DRV COULD HAVE WHOM THEY WANTED ON THEIR SIDE. WE SAID THIS IS A REASONABLE POSITION.

7. THUY ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF WHAT WE HAD SAID ABOUT DMZ. WE SAID WE HAD TOLD THEM WHAT WE WOULD DO AND WE HAD HEARD WHAT THEY HAD SAID AND THAT WE EXPECTED THAT THEY WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO IN AND AROUND THE DMZ IF THE BOMBING WERE STOPPED.

HARRIMAN
BT

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

9

VV CRC69T
OO RUEHC RUEHDT
DE RUFNCR 21737/2 2761438
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 021410Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6627
INFO RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 1345
STATE GRNC

1968 OCT 2 AM 10 45

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 21737

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 788

8. WE SAID THAT THEY HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THEY WANTED SERIOUS TALKS, BUT THEIR REFUSAL TO AGREE TO THE INCLUSION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS HAS HAD AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON OUR BELIEF THAT THE DRV IS READY FOR SERIOUS TALKS. THAT BOTHERED US VERY MUCH IN OUR LAST MEETING.

9. THUY REPLIED THAT AS THO, LAU AND THUY HAD SAID BEFORE, THEY CAME WITH A SERIOUS ATTITUDE AND HAVE WANTED TO HAVE SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS, BUT IT WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT RECIPROcity. ACCORDINGLY, THEY HAD SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD STOP THE BOMBING AND THEY WE CAN DISCUSS MANY QUESTIONS. WE COULD EVEN DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION FIRST.

10. WE ASKED WHETHER THEY HAD ANYTHING NEW WHICH THEY WANTED TO SAY AS VANCE WAS GOING BACK TO THE UNITED STATES THIS AFTERNOON. THUY REPLIED THAT THEY THOUGHT THEIR POSITION WAS CLEAR. THEY ARE PREPARED TO TALK WITH US AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND, REGARDING THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE RAISED, TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION RIGHT AWAY. WE SAID AS WE RECALLED IT, THEY HAD SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS IT THE NEXT DAY, AND THUY REPLIED THAT WAS CORRECT. THUY SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THERE WERE QUESTIONS ON WHICH WE WILL COME TO IMMEDIATE AGREEMENT AND OTHERS WHERE THROUGH DISCUSSION WE MAY COME TO AGREEMENT. WE ASKED IF THE FIRST QUESTION ON THE AGENDA WAS ONE ON WHICH

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 21737, 021410Z OCT, SECTION 2 OF 2, (NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

WE COULD REACH QUICK AGREEMENT. THUY REPLIED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT WILL BE QUICK IF BOTH SIDES TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER.

11. WE SAID THAT VANCE'S TRIP WAS ROUTINE BUT, IF THEY HAD ANYTHING NEW, THIS WAS A GOOD TIME FOR THEM TO STATE IT. THUY SAID HE WOULD LIKE VANCE TO TELL THE US SIDE THAT THE DRV WANTS PEACE, BUT THAT IT WANTS A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THUY SAID IT IS AGAINST THE DRV'S WILL TO MAKE WAR, BUT IF IT IS OBLIGED TO MAKE WAR, IT IS THEIR DUTY TO DO SO AND THEY WILL BE RESOLUTE IN THE STRUGGLE. THUY ADDED THAT THEY WANTED TO END THE WAR AND THE SOONER THE BETTER, BUT ON THE BASIS THAT BOTH SIDES TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER. HE SAID THAT THEIR VIEW IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO RECIPRO-
CITY CONCERNING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE THEN ENDED THE CONVERSATION.

HARRIMAN

BT

SECRET

Wednesday, October 2, 1968 - 12:50 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request for Delegation of Authority to the
Secretary of State to Issue Full Powers

Pres file

At Tab A is Secretary Rusk's memo recommending you delegate to the Secretary of State, or the Acting Secretary of State, authority to issue Full Powers to negotiate and sign treaties or other international agreements for the United States.

This is a housekeeping proposal designed to avoid having the President spend time on formalities.

Under present procedures, the Secretary of State or his Deputy makes the decision as to whether the United States should enter into an international negotiation -- bilateral or multilateral. The decision is made after careful staff study and in accordance with the President's policies. If important national policy questions are involved, the Secretary asks for Presidential approval before authorizing U. S. participation.

Sometimes, it is necessary to issue a Full Power to the U. S. representative at the negotiation. A Full Power is a diplomatic document which merely gives evidence to the depository country that the United States representative who will sign the treaty on behalf of the United States possesses the required authority.

In the United States, Full Powers are issued only by the President. But this is not required by our law or by international law. Many countries have Foreign Ministers issue Full Powers. In the past two years you signed 36 Full Powers. Of these, 30 were for routine agreements such as bilateral tax conventions, or amendments to existing agreements.

Delegating the authority to issue Full Powers to the Secretary would not change substantive procedures. The Secretary would continue to ask the President's approval to take part in any important international negotiations. If a treaty is successfully negotiated, the President then decides whether to send it to the Senate for advice and consent.

I believe this recommendation makes sense. I am sending it through Harry McPherson so that he can give you his expert legal counsel.

ERF
ERF:mst

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Call me _____

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2889
372

September 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Delegation of Authority to the Secretary of State
to Sign Treaties and to Issue Full Powers to
Other Persons for that Purpose

Recommendation:

That you authorize the Secretary of State and, in his absence, the Acting Secretary of State, to issue, as required, Full Powers to negotiate and sign treaties and other international agreements for the United States.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Under our present practice the authorization to negotiate and sign treaties and other international agreements for the United States is given by the Secretary of State, one of the Under Secretaries, or a Deputy Under Secretary, in accordance with Department of State Circular 175. That Circular requires a staff study and legal analysis before negotiations are undertaken or arrangements made for the signature of treaties or other agreements. This procedure is carried on in conformity with the President's policies and directions, and, where the agreement involves important questions of national policy, the President is requested to authorize the negotiation or signature.

Once these substantive steps have been taken, it is sometimes necessary to issue a so-called Full Power to the United States representative who will sign the treaty or other agreement on behalf of the United States. A Full Power is intended to assure a depositary that the U.S. representative possesses the required authority.

It has been our practice to have Full Powers issued by the President. However, neither the law of the United States nor international law requires that the President fulfill this function. Many countries now have Full Powers issued by Foreign Ministers, for example, the United Kingdom, Canada, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Yugoslavia.

Since the issuance of Full Powers is a formality and does not relate to the substantive decision to negotiate or sign a treaty or other international agreement, I believe this authority should be delegated to the Secretary or Acting Secretary of State. We would continue the present practice in all other respects and would notify the President of each Full Power that had been issued.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

ACTION 40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 2, 1968
12:50 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of P. L. 480 Rice for Korea

Attached is a Zwick-Gaud-Freeman request for your authority to negotiate a P. L. 480 agreement with Korea for 245,000 tons of rice. The proposed agreement, amounting to \$41.7 million, would be repayable in convertible local currency over a forty-year period.

Serious drought for a second year is expected to leave Korea without an adequate supply of grains. Korea offers timely outlet for our rice surplus.

In addition to the 245,000 tons on P. L. 480 terms, Korea would agree to buy 155,000 tons on 35-month Commodity Credit Corporation terms.

Japan has made an offer of rice to Korea on very liberal terms. To meet that competition, Freeman and Gaud believe we should offer the proposed package now.

Account will be taken of the local currency generated in this sale when the Economic Assistance Program for Korea is submitted for your approval in November.

The recent Purcell Amendment to P. L. 480 requires in the case of credit sales that a cash payment be made to cover U.S. expenses and other specified uses, unless you determine that it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act. Freeman and Gaud recommend that you make such a determination by approving this proposal, since they expect we would lose the sale if we insisted on the cash payment.

State and AID report that Korea continues to satisfy the requirements of the Symington Amendment concerning military expenditures.

State also concurs in the above proposal.

Recommendation:

That you approve negotiation of this agreement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

AJenkins:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/jc, NARA, Date 2-8-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3076

40a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

SEP 27 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Rice Shipment to Korea

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your approval to negotiate a P. L. 480 agreement with Korea for 245,000 tons of rice. The agreement, amounting to \$41.7 million, is repayable in convertible local currency over a forty-year period.

A serious drought is expected to leave Korea without an adequate supply of grains. Korea thus offers a timely outlet for our rice surplus. In addition to the 245,000 tons of rice on P. L. 480 credit terms, Korea agrees to buy 155,000 tons of U. S. rice on 35-month CCC credit terms.

Japan presents an alternative source of rice for Korea and has made an offer on very liberal terms. In order to meet the Japanese competition, Freeman and Gaud believe we have to offer the Koreans the proposed package now.

This proposal will be negotiated separately from our CY 1969 economic assistance program to Korea (P. L. 480, supporting assistance and development loans) which will be submitted for your approval in November. However, we will take into account the local currency generated by this rice sale when we review the level of our support for the Korean budget.

Purcell Amendment - A recent amendment to P. L. 480 requires in the case of credit sales that a cash payment be made to cover U. S. expenses and other specified uses, unless you determine that it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act. Because they expect we would lose the commercial sale if we insisted on the cash payment, Freeman and Gaud recommend that you make such a determination by approving this proposal.

Military Expenditures - State/AID reports that Korea continues to satisfy the requirements of the Symington Amendment.

I recommend that you approve this agreement.

Charles J. Zwick

Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment _____

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc/jc*, NARA, Date *2-8-02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

SEP 18 1968

To: The President
Subject: Title I Public Law 480 Program with Korea

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Korea a ~~PL~~ 480 convertible local currency credit sale of \$41.7 million for about 245,000 tons of rice including cost of ocean transportation. Payment terms would provide for 31 approximately equal annual payments, initial interest rate during ten-year grace period of 2 percent, and the continuing interest rate 2-1/2 percent. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

For the second consecutive year Korea has suffered drought in the Southeastern Provinces, a principal rice producing area. Korea's 1967 rice production was down about 300,000 tons below the 1966 crop and current estimates for the 1968 crop are down 200,000 tons below the 1967 crop. The ROKG has held exploratory discussions with Japan relating to a payment in kind transaction on most favorable terms for from 300 to 500,000 tons of rice but has now indicated terms along the lines of the above proposal for the purchase of U.S. rice will be acceptable. In addition to the 245,000 tons under Title I, the Korean Government has agreed to purchase 155,000 tons of rice from the United States using their own foreign exchange and up to 36 months CCC credit. This amount, together with other Free World purchases will give Korea assurances of being able to meet their rice import requirements, and will enable us to move a substantial part of our larger 1968 rice crop.

Military Expenditure Review

State/AID concluded that U.S. Development Assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, PL 480 sales proceeds and Korea's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditure to a degree that would materially interfere with its development.

Self-Help Measures

New self-help measures were included in the agreement signed with Korea May 10, 1968. No new self-help measures are proposed for this agreement. In the immediate month ahead, consideration will be given to additional wheat, feed grains and other commodities together with supporting assistance for CY 1969 and self-help measures will be considered at that time.

The proceeds accruing to the importing country from the sale of rice in this agreement would be devoted to the achievement of the agricultural self-help measures set forth in the May 10, 1968 agreement and to efforts to alleviate drought effects in the Southeastern Provinces in Korea.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID 10-16-75; Agri. 10-2882
By jcl/jc NARA. Date 2-8-02

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
Requirement for Advance Payment of Dollars or Foreign Currencies

The recent extension and amendments to PL 480 provide that, except where it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act, we require a cash payment in credit sales agreements of the amount needed for U. S. expenditures and for other specified uses in the Act. We believe with the foreign exchange purchase Korea will be required to make under this proposal and the alternative most favorable terms being offered by Japan, to insist on a further hardening of the terms by requiring a currency use payment would make it impossible at this time to negotiate this agreement and would lose to the U. S. a cash dollar market for 155,000 tons of rice. We therefore recommend no currency use payment be required for this agreement.


Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 agreement as described above.

September 12 1968



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Date: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

41

Wednesday, Oct. 2, 1968
12:15 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. PRESIDENT:

As you know, I have kept away, as far as I could, from appointments. You may wish to know, however, what my reflections are on the appointment to Guatemala. I have talked about this with Bill Bowdler, whose judgment and discretion I have reason completely to trust.

1. ^{*Haris*} Hugh Ryan. We both know him as an extremely nice and able Information Officer on Latin America. To the best of our knowledge, he has had no experience outside the information field. Guatemala is a place where the following two criteria are central:

- a tricky and potentially explosive security situation;
- economic and social development within the context of the Central American Common Market.

Ryan does not have operational experience in these two fields. In particular, if anything should blow on the security side, the President could be criticized for appointing a man without requisite experience in Latin American security problems.

2. Nat Davis is more qualified in this respect. If, for the reasons that we discussed, you prefer that Nat stay here, there are three other men who are qualified to walk into the complex Guatemala situation with a background of experience and performance which could give the President reasonable confidence:

- Henry Dearborn, now DCM in Mexico City;
- Robert Harwitch, now DCM in Laos. He was the Cuba Desk Officer at the time of the Cuba missile crisis and was steady as a rock throughout. (I know, because he sat on my Planning committee which served the ExCom during that crisis.) He was also Labor Attache in Bogota, which gave him a good feel for the volatile elements in a Latin American political situation.
- Harry Shlaudeman, now Sect. Rusk's aide. He marched through the whole Dominican Republic crisis with John Bartlew Martin, Mac Bundy, and Ellsworth Buaker in turn. He is an exceptionally able man for a crisis situation, although younger than Dearborn or Harwitch.

W. W. Rostow

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 16 1983.

W. W. Rostow ON 9-25-93

SECRET

INFORMATION

Wednesday, October 2, 1963

11:15 AM

42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Attendance at NSC Executive Committee Meetings in October-November, 1962

There is attached a copy of National Security Action Memorandum No. 196, dated October 22, which established the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. Certain changes in the composition of the group were made but the basic NSAM does not reflect these changes.

Also attached is a breakdown of the attendance of officials at each ExCom meeting. The record shows that you attended every meeting during the critical period except the one on Friday, October 26. You were not present at meetings on November 20, 21, and 23 which dealt with cleanup problems following the crisis.

Numerous other informal meetings are not reflected in these records of the ExCom.

Prior to the establishment of ExCom, the National Security Council met three times, on October 20, October 21, and October 22. The attendance record shows that you were present at the October 22 meeting.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:ksb

DECLASSIFIED
WHAR House Guidelines, Feb 24, 1988
By rg NARA, 1-26-93

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42a

Permanent File Copy)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1962

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM 196

TO: The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT Establishment of an Executive Committee
of the National Security Council

I hereby establish, for the purpose of effective conduct of the operations of the Executive Branch in the current crisis, an Executive Committee of the National Security Council. This committee will meet, until further notice, daily at 10:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. I shall act as Chairman of this committee, and its additional regular members will be as follows: the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Ambassador-at-Large, the Special Counsel, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The first meeting of this committee will be held at the regular hour on Tuesday, October 23rd, at which point further arrangements with respect to its management and operation will be decided.

cc:
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Ambassador-at-Large
The Special Counsel
The Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
bc:
Mr. O'Donnell
Mr. Salinger



CC: Mrs. Lincoln
Mr. Bundy (3)
Mr. Johnson
NSC Files

ATTENDANCE AT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETINGS

- | | |
|--|--------------------------------|
| 1. The President | 44. Roger Hilsman |
| 2. The Vice President | 45. Henry Fowler |
| 3. The Secretary of State | 46. Wm. Bundy |
| 4. The Secretary of Defense | 47. General Adams |
| 5. The Secretary of the Treasury | 48. Michael Forrestal |
| 6. The Attorney General | 49. Robert Komer |
| 7. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff | 50. Carl Kaysen |
| 8. The Director of Central Intelligence | 51. Director Bell |
| 9. The Under Secretary of State | 52. Wm. Gaud |
| 10. The Deputy Secretary of Defense | 53. James Grant |
| 11. The Ambassador-at-Large | 54. General LeMay |
| 12. The Special Counsel | 55. Mr. Moscoso |
| 13. The Special Assistant to the President for NSA | 56. J. C. King |
| 14. ^{Ray} Acting Director of USIA | 57. Ambassador Gordon |
| 15. Deputy Under Secretary of State | 58. Ralph Dungan |
| 16. Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) | 59. Mr. Bowles |
| 17. The Press Secretary | 60. Mr. McGhee |
| 18. Mr. Bromley Smith | 61. Mr. Frank Sloan |
| 19. Ambassador Stevenson | 62. Ambassador Yost |
| 20. Mr. McCloy | 63. Asst. Secy Williams |
| 21. Mr. Foster | 64. Sterling Cottrell |
| 22. Mr. Charyk | 65. Asst. Secy Tyler |
| 23. Mr. Cleveland | 66. William Jordan |
| 24. Capt. Shepard | 67. Dean Acheson |
| 25. Mr. Rostow | 68. Ambassador Bruce |
| 26. Mr. O'Donnell | 69. Ambassador Merchant |
| ✓27. Mr. Yost | 70. Ambassador Dowling |
| 28. Mr. Edward Martin | 71. Mr. Herter |
| 29. Mr. Charles Noyes USUN | |
| 30. Adm. Wellborn USUN | |
| 31. Mr. Pedersen USUN | |
| 32. The Assistant Secretary of Defense Pittman | |
| 33. Mr. Weisner | |
| 34. Mr. Seaborg | |
| 35. Mr. Kaysen | |
| 36. Mr. Haworth | |
| 37. Deputy Director of CIA Gen. Carter | |
| 38. Mr. Sylvester | |
| 39. Mr. Manning | |
| 40. General Clifton | |
| 41. Ray Cline | |
| 42. Ambassador Harriman | |
| 43. Phillips Talbott | |

ATTENDANCE AT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETINGS

1. The President
2. The Vice President
3. The Secretary of State
4. The Secretary of Defense
5. The Secretary of the Treasury
6. The Attorney General
7. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
8. The Director of Central Intelligence
9. The Under Secretary of State
10. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
11. The Ambassador-at-Large
12. The Special Counsel
13. The Special Assistant to the President for NSA
14. ^{Acting} Director of USIA
15. Deputy Under Secretary of State
16. Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
17. The Press Secretary
18. Mr. Bromley Smith
19. Ambassador Stevenson
20. Mr. McCloy
21. Mr. Foster
22. Mr. Charyk
23. Mr. Cleveland
24. Capt. Shepard
25. Mr. Rostow
26. Mr. O'Donnell
- ✓27. Mr. Yost
28. Mr. Edward Martin
29. Mr. Charles Noyes USUN
30. Adm. Wellborn USUN
31. Mr. Pedersen USUN
32. The Assistant Secretary of Defense Pittman
33. Mr. Weisner
34. Mr. Seaborg
35. Mr. Kaysen
36. Mr. Haworth
37. Deputy Director of CIA Gen. Carter
38. Mr. Sylvester
39. Mr. Manning
40. General Clifton
41. Ray Cline
42. Ambassador Harriman
43. Phillips Talbott

Pres. file
43

Wed.
Tuesday, October 2, 1968
10:15 a. m.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

The classified telephone to Paris was not very good today, but this is what we have on this morning's talk:

- during the tea break, Averell delivered, without the slightest ambiguity, our three points;
- the Hanoi delegation said it was interested in rapid progress after a total cessation of the bombing;
- they said that the question of GVN participation could be "the first order of business";
- no private meeting was set for Friday;

Vance is on his way back. He should be in Washington at 7 or 8 o'clock this evening. Query: Do you wish to see him this evening, or can it wait until tomorrow?

Mrs. Vance is going up to meet him in New York. They plan to stay with the Stan Resors in Washington, we believe.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By abm, NARA, Date 12-16-02

INFORMATION

45
Pres file

Wednesday, October 2, 1968
8:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's draft
speech, for delivery at 11:00 a. m.
this morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 5 USUN 6784

SECTO 10

WHITE HOUSE FOR WALT W. ROSTOW

1. FOLLOWING IS FINAL TEXT OF ADDRESS SECRETARY RUSK WILL GIVE IN UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY WEDNESDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 2, AT APPROXIMATELY 11 A.M.

2. BEGIN TEXT: QUOTE

IT IS MY HONOR AND PLEASURE TO CONVEY TO MY DISTINGUISHED FELLOW DELEGATES THE CORDIAL GREETINGS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND HIS BEST WISHES FOR THE SUCCESS OF THIS TWENTY-THIRD GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

AND TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, I AM HAPPY TO EXTEND, ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S BEHALF AS WELL AS THAT OF MY DELEGATION, HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AN OFFICE FOR WHICH YOU ARE EXCEPTIONALLY QUALIFIED BY YOUR OUTSTANDING RECORD IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY. WE ARE HAPPY TO HAVE YOUR GUIDANCE IN OUR DELIBERATIONS IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

THESE DELIBERATIONS WILL NOT BE EASY. FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS FOR MANY YEARS BORNE A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF THAT TRANSCENDENT DUTY IMPOSED BY THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD UPON THE UNITED NATIONS: THE DUTY "TO SAVE SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS FROM THE SCOURGE OF WAR." AND, AS WE MEET TODAY, OUR WORLD IN TOO MANY PLACES IS STILL PAINFULLY AFFLICTED BY WAR, BY THE WRONGS AND QUARRELS THAT CAN ENDANGER PEACE, AND BY THE LAWLESS USE OF ARMED FORCE AMONG NATIONS.

IN THE HEART OF EUROPE, ARMIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CERTAIN OF ITS WARSAW PACT PARTNERS HAVE INVADDED AND OCCUPIED THEIR OWN ALLY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AN INDEPENDENT STATE WHICH THREATENED NOBODY. THIS ACT HAS SENT A SHOCK WAVE OF INDIGNATION AND APPREHENSION AROUND THE WORLD AND HAS SHAKEN HOPES FOR BETTER EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE TRAGIC STRUGGLE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM CONTINUES IN FULL FURY, AND STILL ENGAGES THE ANXIOUS ATTENTION OF THE WORLD -- WHILE IN THE PARIS TALKS MY GOVERNMENT STILL PRESSES FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE NORTH VIET-NAMESE RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS FOR PEACE.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CEASE-FIRE OF 1967 IS IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY; THE CHASM BETWEEN THE PARTIES REMAINS WIDE; AND THE HOPE FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE HANGS IN PRECARIOUS BALANCE.

ALL THESE DISTRESSING AND EXPLOSIVE ISSUES ARE SURE TO BE DISCUSSED IN THIS WORLD ASSEMBLY OF NATIONS. INDEED, THE ASSEMBLY'S CONCERNS INEVITABLY INCLUDE THE GREATEST TROUBLES AND GREATEST NEEDS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY. THEY INCLUDE THE SUFFERING IN NIGERIA, WHERE, DESPITE DEDICATED EFFORTS WITHIN AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE, CIVIL CONFLICT CONTINUES TO BRING DEATH BY WAR AND STARVATION TO UNCOUNTED THOUSANDS. THEY INCLUDE THE MANIFOLD PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHERE, IN DEFIANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, RULING MINORITIES STILL UNLAWFULLY SUPPRESS THE RIGHTS OF THE AFRICAN POPULATION. THEY INCLUDE THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S TWENTY-YEAR SEARCH FOR PEACE AND UNITY IN FREEDOM -- A SEARCH STILL BLOCKED BY NORTH KOREAN LAWLESSNESS. THEY INCLUDE THE PERENNIAL DEMAND OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO EXPEL FROM THE UNITED NATIONS THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, A CHARTER MEMBER, AND TO SIT IN ITS PLACE.

FINALLY, THE ASSEMBLY'S CONCERNS INCLUDE ALL OF HUMANITY'S PRESSING MATERIAL AND SOCIAL NEEDS.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

MOST RECENT AMONG THESE CONCERNS IS THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA TODAY IS AN OCCUPIED COUNTRY. SIX WEEKS AGO, IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT, SUDDENTLY AND WITHOUT WARNING, THAT SMALL INDEPENDENT STATE WAS INVADDED BY A MASSIVE ARMY LED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THUS A WORLD WHICH HAD BEGUN TO SPEAK OF A THAW IN THE COLD WAR FEELS ONCE AGAIN A CHILL OF APPREHENSION CONCERNING SOVIET PURPOSE.

IN RECENT MONTHS THE NEW LEADERS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD SET OUT, WITHIN THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM, TO CONDUCT THEIR COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN ACCORDANCE WITH NEW POLICIES, MORE RESPONSIVE TO THE NEEDS AND DESIRES OF THE PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE SOVIET INVASION WAS MOUNTED IN ORDER TO REVERSE THESE POLICIES AND TO SUBJECT CZECHOSLOVAKIA ONCE AGAIN TO MOSCOW'S WILL.

THOSE ARE THE FACTS, AND THEY CANNOT BE CHANGED BY ANTI-FACTS MANUFACTURED IN MOSCOW. THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT FROM THE WEST TO FOMENT A COUNTER-REVOLUTION. IF THERE WERE SIGNS OF A DESIRE FOR A LITTLE BREATH OF FREEDOM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THIS DESIRE AROSE NOT FROM ANY WESTERN PLOT BUT SIMPLY FROM THE NATURE OF MAN.

NOR WAS THERE AN INVITATION OR REQUEST FROM ANY CZECHOSLOVAK AUTHORITY FOR ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT TO ENTER THE COUNTRY AND RENDER SO-CALLED "FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE." I DOUBT THAT ANYBODY IN THIS HALL BELIEVES THERE WAS SUCH AN INVITATION.

YET TODAY, SIX WEEKS LATER, DESPITE REPEATED PROMISES, THE OCCUPYING FORCES REMAIN IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. WE ARE TOLD THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE FORCES WILL DEPEND ON THE "NORMALIZATION" OF CONDITIONS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA; EVIDENTLY THE SOVIET UNION WILL DECIDE WHAT CONSTITUTES "NORMALIZATION." WARNINGS APPEAR IN THE SOVIET MEDIA TO GET ON WITH THE JOB OF REIMPOSING CENSORSHIP ON THE PRESS, RADIO AND TELEVISION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA; TO ABOLISH THIS OR THAT ORGANIZATION NOT CONGENIAL WITH SOVIET IDEAS; TO GET RID OF THIS OR THAT LEADER OF WHOM MOSCOW DISAPPROVES. DESPITE SOVIET ASSURANCES THAT THEIR OCCUPYING FORCES WOULD NOT INTERVENE IN INTERNAL MATTERS, SOVIET MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE FORCIBLY OCCUPIED AND CLOSED CERTAIN NEWSPAPERS; AND THAT SAME "FRATERNAL ASSISTANCE" IS NOW BEING FURNISHED TO MINISTRIES OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT.

THESE ACTS AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA, SO REPUGNANT IN THEMSELVES AND SO DANGEROUS TO PEACE, HAVE AROUSED THE CONSCIENCE OF MANKIND. A LARGE MAJORITY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS; THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD; ARTISTS AND INTELLECTUALS WITH A LONG RECORD OF FRIENDSHIP FOR THE SOVIET UNION; EVEN THE LEADERS OF SOME OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMMUNIST PARTIES -- ALL HAVE CONDEMNED THE INVASION AND CALLED ON THE INVADING POWERS PROMPTLY TO WITHDRAW.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 5 USUN 6784

SECTO 10

WHITE HOUSE FOR WALT W. ROSTOW

TWENTY-THREE YEARS AGO, WHEN THE UNITED NATIONS CAME INTO EXISTENCE, IT WAS HAILED AS THE HOPE OF THE WORLD. ONE MAIN REASON FOR THIS HOPE WAS THE RESTRAINT WHICH THE CHARTER PLACED ON THE HISTORICAL TENDENCY OF GREAT NATIONS TO ABUSE THE RIGHTS OF SMALLER STATES. THIS CENTRAL RESTRAINT OF THE CHARTER HAS BEEN BRUSHED ASIDE BY THE USSR. THE UNITED NATIONS HAS BEEN TOLD, IN A SINGULARLY CRUDE PHRASE, NOT TO "STICK ITS NOSE" INTO THE AFFAIRS OF ANY OF ITS MEMBERS THAT HAPPEN TO LIE IN EASTERN EUROPE WITHIN REACH OF SOVIET ARMIES.

TRUE, IN RECENT YEARS, ESPECIALLY IN THE 1960'S, SIGNS SLOWLY APPEARED THAT MOSCOW WAS BEGINNING TO PERMIT ITS NEIGHBORS IN EASTERN EUROPE TO ENJOY SOME MEASURE OF INDEPENDENCE. THE IDEA OF "DIFFERENT ROADS TO SOCIALISM" BECAME RESPECTABLE IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS WARSAW PACT ALLIES. EVEN AS LATE AS AUGUST 3, THEY JOINED IN A COMMUNIQUE AT BRATISLAVA DECLARING THAT COOPERATION AMONG THEM WOULD BE BASED ON "EQUALITY, RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, (BEING BRACKET) AND (END BRACKET) TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY."

ALONG WITH THIS TREND WERE OTHER DEVELOPMENTS EQUALLY HOPEFUL FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE. THESE INCLUDED NOTABLE AGREEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL, AS WELL AS A NEW WILLINGNESS BY THE SOVIET UNION TO ALLOW ITS PEOPLE A DEGREE OF CONTACT WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD.

NOW THE SUBJUGATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS RAISED DOUBT AND DISCOURAGEMENT ABOUT MANY A HOPEFUL VENTURE. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DILIGENT EFFORTS TO BUILD BRIDGES OF COMMON INTEREST AND CONTACT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAVE BEEN ATTACKED AND MISREPRESENTED. POLICIES INITIATED BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE HAVE LIKEWISE BEEN CONDEMNED.

ONE MIGHT THINK THAT TO DEVISE A JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH GROSS VIOLATIONS OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER WOULD BE AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK. BUT LAST WEEK THIS TASK WAS ATTEMPTED IN AN ARTICLE IN MOSCOW'S MOST AUTHORITATIVE ORGAN, PRAVDA. THEREIN WE READ THAT, CONTRARY TO THE GENERAL IMPRESSION, THE FOREIGN OCCUPYING ARMIES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE ACTUALLY "FIGHTING FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLES OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA." WE READ FURTHER THAT TO CONDEMN THE INVASION AS A VIOLATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION BETRAYS "AN ABSTRACT AND NON-CLASS APPROACH" TO THE SUBJECT, BECAUSE "IN A CLASS SOCIETY THERE IS NOT AND THERE CANNOT BE NON-CLASS LAWS." AND STILL FURTHER WE READ THAT "LAWS AND LEGAL NORMS ARE SUBJECTED TO THE LAWS OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE..."

FINALLY, IN THE SAME ARTICLE WE READ THAT "THE SOVEREIGNTY OF EACH SOCIALIST COUNTRY CANNOT BE OPPOSED TO THE INTERESTS OF THE WORLD OF SOCIALISM, OF THE WORLD REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT." AND AS IF TO MAKE SURE THAT THIS INSTRUCTION FROM THE LARGEST COMMUNIST COUNTRY IS FULLY UNDERSTOOD BY CITIZENS OF SMALLER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, THE WRITER ADDS THIS REMINDER: "LENIN DEMANDED THAT ALL COMMUNISTS FIGHT AGAINST SMALL-NATION NARROW-MINDEDNESS."

SUCH ARE SOME HIGHLIGHTS OF THIS NEW CONTRIBUTION FROM MOSCOW TO THE DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW - A CONTRIBUTION WHICH DOES NOT ONCE MENTION THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS, THIS ASSEMBLY IS ENTITLED TO KNOW WHAT THE SOVIET LEADERS MEAN BY THIS DOCTRINE OF THEIRS.

DOES IT MEAN THAT AMONG THE STATES ALLIED WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THE "NON-CLASS" LAWS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER ARE MERE ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES, SUBORDINATE TO WHATEVER MOSCOW DETERMINES TO BE THE LAWS OF THE "CLASS STRUGGLE"?

DOES IT MEAN THAT THE CHARTER'S LAWS OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES, AND OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION, ARE POWERLESS TO SHIELD SMALLER STATES WITHIN THE COMMUNIST BLOC FROM INVASION AND DOMINATION BY THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NAME OF THE "CLASS STRUGGLE"?

DOES IT MEAN THAT THE CHARTER'S LAW PROHIBITING THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST OTHER STATES WILL BE DISMISSED AS A MERE "ABSTRACTION" WHENEVER THE SOVIET UNION FINDS IT IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAWS OF THE "CLASS STRUGGLE"?

DOES IT MEAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S DOCTRINE OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE" DOES NOT APPLY TO ITS OWN ALLIES OR THOSE WITH THE SAME SOCIAL SYSTEM?

FINALLY: WHEN WILL THE SOVIET UNION, WHOSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, MAKE GOOD ON ITS OWN REPEATED PROMISE BY REMOVING ITS OCCUPYING FORCES FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA?

THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD WILL LOOK TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS, AND FOR ASSURANCE THAT IT IS NOT SEEKING TO PLACE ITSELF ABOVE THE LAW OF THE CHARTER.

LET US SAY VERY PLAINLY TO THE SOVIET UNION: THE ROAD TO DETENTE IS THE ROAD OF THE CHARTER.

NEW THREATS AGAINST GERMANY

THERE ARE OTHER PROBLEMS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL PEACE IN EUROPE. WE HAVE RECENTLY HEARD ASSERTIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION THAT IT HAS A RIGHT, BASED ON CERTAIN LANGUAGE OF THE CHARTER, TO INTERVENE BY FORCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

NEITHER ARTICLE 107 NOR ARTICLE 53 OF THE CHARTER, NOR THE TWO ARTICLES TOGETHER -- NOR, FOR THAT MATTER, ANY PART OF THE CHARTER OR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW -- GIVES THE SOVIET UNION OR OTHER WARSAW PACT MEMBERS ANY RIGHT TO INTERVENE BY FORCE UNILATERALLY IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD LEAD IMMEDIATELY TO SELF-DEFENSE MEASURES PURSUANT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, A TREATY WHOSE VALIDITY UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IS UNQUESTIONABLE.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 3 OF 5 USUN 6784

SECTO 10

WHITE HOUSE FOR WALT W. ROSTOW

RECENTLY THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A RENEWAL OF PRESSURES ON THE FREEDOM OF WEST BERLIN. THE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE BORNE FOR MANY YEARS A COMMON RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FREEDOM OF WEST BERLIN. AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS RECENTLY STATED WITH UNMISTAKABLE CLARITY, WE WHO BEAR THAT RESPONSIBILITY WILL NOT TOLERATE THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST WEST BERLIN.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES HAVE CERTAIN SOLEMN DEFENSIVE COMMITMENTS IN EUROPE WHICH ARE KNOWN TO THE WORLD AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND WHICH NO LAW-ABIDING NATION NEED FEAR. THESE INCLUDE COMMITMENTS TO UPHOLD THE SECURITY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND OF WEST BERLIN UNTIL THE DAY COMES WHEN THE GERMAN NATION CAN BE REUNIFIED IN PEACE AND FREEDOM IN A SECURE EUROPE. WE SHALL BE FAITHFUL TO OUR COMMITMENTS.

VIET-NAM

I TURN NOW TO THE STRIFE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHERE OUR DUTY -- OUR FERVENT DESIRE -- IS TO SEEK AN END TO THE VIOLENCE WITH ITS TRAGIC SUFFERING AND ITS RISKS OF LARGES WAR. WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO TURN FROM WAR TO THE WORKS OF PEACE.

IN VIET-NAM, THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES ARE VERY SIMPLE.

WE WANT NO PERMANENT MILITARY BASES IN VIET-NAM. WE ARE NOT TRYING TO TAKE OVER ANY PART OF VIET-NAM, NOR DO WE THREATEN ANY LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF ANY NATION IN ASIA. WE WANT NO AMERICAN EMPIRE IN ASIA.

WHAT WE DO WANT IS A POLITICAL SOLUTION ON HONORABLE TERMS -- A SOLUTION CONSISTENT WITH THE SAFETY AND NATIONAL EXISTENCE OF ALL OF THE SMALLER NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

WE WANT TO ASSURE THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM CAN DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY FREE OF FORCE.

WE BELIEVE THE QUESTION OF THE REUNIFICATION OF VIET-NAM SHOULD BE DECIDED THROUGH FREE CHOICE BY THE PEOPLES OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

WE WANT A SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE 1954 AND 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS.

THESE PEACEFUL PURPOSES CONTINUE TO GUIDE US. LET NO ONE MISTAKENLY SUPPOSE THAT MILITARY PRESSURE OR ANY OTHER KING OF PRESSURE CAN MAKE US ABANDON OUR COMMITMENT TO HELP THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM DEFEAT AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH AND DETERMINE ITS OWN FUTURE. BUT IN CARRYING OUT THAT COMMITMENT WE SHALL CONTINUE SCRUPULOUSLY TO AVOID STEPS THAT WOULD WIDEN THE WAR AND SHALL PURSUE ENERGETICALLY THE ROAD TO AN HONORABLE PEACE.

TO THIS END, LAST MARCH PRESIDENT JOHNSON EXCLUDED FROM AIR AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT ALL OF NORTH VIET-NAM NORTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL, AN AREA CONTAINING 78 PER CENT OF THE LAND AND 90 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION OF NORTH VIET-NAM. HE TOOK THIS STEP DESPITE THE FACT THAT EVEN TODAY NOT ONE SQUARE MILE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM IS IMMUNE FROM ATTACK. THIS MAJOR INITIATIVE LED TO THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS LAST MAY.

IN THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVES HAVE OFFERED A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR DE-ESCALATION AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.

WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE BE RESTORED.

WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT ALL PARTIES COMPLY FULLY WITH THE GENEVA AGREEMENT OF 1962 ON LAOS.

WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT ALL CONCERNED RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND NEUTRALITY OF CAMBODIA.

WE HAVE STATED OUR BELIEF THAT ALL THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE PEACEFULLY IN THEIR COUNTRY'S FUTURE, AND HAVE REAFFIRMED OUR BELIEF IN SELF-DETERMINATION ON THE BASIS OF "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE."

WE HAVE RESTATED OUR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW OUR FORCES FROM VIETNAM AS THE OTHER SIDE WITHDRAWS, AS INFILTRATION STOPS AND THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE THUS SUBSIDES. AND WE HAVE PROPOSED A NUMBER OF WAYS IN WHICH THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN VIETNAM COULD BE REDUCED AND ULTIMATELY ENDED.

BUT HANOI HAS REJECTED ALL THESE AND MANY OTHER PROPOSALS. WE LOOK TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NORTH VIETNAM TO INDICATE HOW THEY PROPOSE THAT THE FIGHTING BE SCALED DOWN. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE PREPARED TO STOP THE BOMBING THE MINUTE WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT THIS WOULD LEAD TOWARD PEACE.

~~THE~~ BUT TAKES TWO SIDES TO MAKE PEACE. THE WILL TO PEACE IN THE UNITED STATES -- BOTH AMONG ITS LEADERS AND PEOPLE -- IS DEEP AND ABIDING. AN HONORABLE SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE. WHAT REMAINS IS FOR HANOI TO GET DOWN TO THE SERIOUS BUSINESS OF MAKING PEACE IN PARIS. THEY WILL FIND THE UNITED STATES RECEPTIVE AND WILLING TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH.

THE MIDDLE EAST

I TURN NOW TO THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH HAS SUFFERED SO MUCH TORMENT AND TRAGEDY IN THIS GENERATION.

MORE THAN FIFTEEN MONTHS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE SIX-DAY WAR OF 1967 WAS HALTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS CEASE-FIRE. THE ESSENTIALS OF PEACE HAVE NOT CHANGED SINCE THEN. THEY WERE SUCCINCTLY STATED IN AN ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON JUNE 19, 1967, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH HE SAID:

"CERTAINLY, TROOPS MUST BE WITHDRAWN; BUT THERE MUST ALSO BE RECOGNIZED RIGHTS OF NATIONAL LIFE, PROGRESS IN SOVING THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, FREEDOM OF INNOCENT MARITIME PASSAGE, LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE, AND RESPECT FOR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY."

LAST NOVEMBER 22, IN HARMONY WITH THESE OBJECTIVES, THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED A RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING REALISTIC AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE, AND ASKING THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE "TO PROMOTE AGREEMENT AND ASSIST EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL AND ACCEPTED SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES IN THIS RESOLUTION."

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 4 OF 5 USUN 6784

SECTO 10

WHITE HOUSE FOR WALT W. ROSTOW

I HERE REAFFIRM THE COMPLETE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NOV 22 RESOLUTION IN ALL ITS PARTS. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO HELP AMB JARRING AND THE PARTIES TO ACHIEVE ITS PURPOSES.

HERE AS IN EVERY CONFLICT, THE FIRST PREREQUISITE OF PROGRESS IS THAT THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT SUMMON THE WILL TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES BY PEACEFUL MEANS.

IF SUCH A WILL EXISTS, THE PARTIES CAN FREE THEMSELVES FROM STERILE ARGUMENTS OVER PROCEDURE AND BEGIN TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE ISSUES THAT DIVIDE THEM. IN THE FLEXIBLE SPIRIT OF TRUE NEGOTIATION, THEY CAN FIND WAYS TO ACCOMMODATE THEIR RESPECTIVE CLAIMS. AND, WHAT IS EQUALLY VITAL, THEY CAN MAKE THE NECESSARY EFFORTS, WITH THE HELP OF THE UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY ON THE SPOT, TO AVOID FURTHER INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAVE COME BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN RECENT WEEKS, WHICH CAN ALL TOO EASILY PASS BEYOND CONTROL AND DESTROY THE ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATION.

FOR THE INESCAPABLE FACT IS AS PRES JOHNSON RECENTLY STATED IT:

"THE PROCESS OF PEACEMAKING WILL NOT BEGIN UNTIL THE LEADERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST BEGIN EXCHANGING VIEWS ON THE HARD ISSUES THROUGH SOME AGREED PROCEDURE WHICH COULD PERMIT ACTIVE DISCUSSIONS TO BE PURSUED."

I THEREFORE RENEW THE PRESIDENT'S URGING TO THE LEADERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO MAINTAIN AND ACCELERATE THEIR EXCHANGES ON THE SUBSTANCE OF PEACE.

TODAY A SMALL AND PRECIOUS MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACE APPEARS TO EXIST IN THE DIPLOMACY OF THE MIDDLE EAST. AMB JARRING AND MANY FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE PRESENT HERE AT THIS GA. ALL OF US SHOULD SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ENCOURAGE THE PARTIES TO MOVE RESOLUTELY TOWARD A SETTLEMENT. OTHERWISE, THE DANGER IS GREAT THAT THE AREA WILL SLIP BACK ONCE MORE TOWARD CHAOS AND WAR.

ARMS CONTROL

ONCE AGAIN AT THIS SESSION, THE ASSEMBLY WILL CONDUCT A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT.

LAST SPRING, WITH HIGH HOPES, THE GA OVERWHELMINGLY COMMENDED THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. ITS ACTION REFLECTED THE BELIEF, WIDELY SHARED THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, IN THE CONSTRUCTIVE EFFECTS THIS TREATY COULD EXERT IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE: THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS NEED NEVER BE USED IN WAR -- THAT, IF GENERALLY RATIFIED, THE TREATY WOULD CREATE A POWERFUL BARRIER TO THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- THAT IT WOULD SPUR THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY -- AND THAT IT WOULD COMMIT ALL SIGNATORIES TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH FOR BOTH NUCLEAR AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT. TO BOLSTER THESE HOPES, THE TREATY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY IMPORTANT ASSURANCES TO NON-NUCLEAR POWERS OF SECURITY AGAINST NUCLEAR ATTACK AND NUCLEAR THREATS.

ALREADY MORE THAN 80 STATES HAVE SIGNED THE TREATY, BUT STILL OTHERS MUST AND SIGN AND RATIFY IT IF ITS PURPOSES ARE TO BE FULLY ACHIEVED.

MY GOVT IS WELL AWARE OF THE BLOW WHICH RECENT EVENTS HAVE DEALT TO INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE. BUT PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, TO WHICH GREAT-POWER COOPERATION IS PARTICULARLY ESSENTIAL, IS NOT A NARROW INTEREST OF ANY ONE POWER OR GROUP OF POWERS, GREAT OR SMALL; IT IS AN URGENT AND OVERRIDING INTEREST OF THE HUMAN RACE IN SHEER SURVIVAL. NO MATTER WHAT OUR DIFFERENCES, WE ALL LIVE ON THE SAME PLANET AND WE ALL HAVE CERTAIN ELEMENTAL HUMAN NEEDS -- ONE OF THE GREATEST OF WHICH IS TO BE FREED FROM THE WASTE AND DANGER OF ARMS RACES, BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL, THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

WE ARE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A NUMBER OF ARMS CONTROL MEASURES NOW PENDING IN THE EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT COMITE. WE WOULD BE READY TO EXPLORE THE FEASIBILITY OF A VIABLE AND EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT TO PREVENT THE EMBLACEMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE OCEAN FLOOR. MY GOVT, FOR ITS PART, MAINTAINS GREAT INTEREST IN THE MAJOR GOALS WE HAVE THUS FAR PURSUED IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

LET ME NOW SPEAK BRIEFLY OF THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN OF PEACE: THE CREATIVE WORKS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR HUMAN BENEFIT.

THERE IS ONLY ONE FAMILY OF MAN, AND ALL OF US, REGARDLESS OF RACE OR CREED OR IDEOLOGY, BELONG TO IT. ALL OF US SHARE THE COMMON NEEDS OF THE HUMAN BODY AND SPIRIT. IT IS IN MINISTERING TO THOSE NEEDS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAS WRITTEN SOME OF ITS BRIGHTEST PAGES, AND HAS WON NEW RESPECT FOR MULTILATERAL AGENCIES AS INSTRUMENTS OF PROGRESS.

THE US DERIVES GENUINE SATISFACTION FROM THE PART WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY IN THIS UNITED NATIONS WORK -- IN THE CREATION AND FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM; IN THE WORK OF THE MAJOR MULTILATERAL AGENCIES FOR FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, PARTICULARLY THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION; IN THE INITIATION OF PIONEERING UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS IN MANY NEW FIELDS OF HUMAN ENDEAVOR, NOTABLY THOSE OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, OF OUTER SPACE, AND OF THE DEEP SEA-BEDS.

IN THE SAME SPIRIT, THE US HOPES, AT THIS GA, TO WORK WITH OUR COLLEAGUES IN WRITING STILL BRIGHTER PAGES IN THE RECORD OF HUMAN COOPERATION.

WE HOPE THIS ASSEMBLY WILL DRAW PLANS FOR COOPERATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LOW-INCOME NATIONS THAT WILL PROFIT BY THE LESSONS OF THE FIRST DECADE OF DEVELOPMENT AND LAY FOUNDATIONS FOR BETTER SUCCESS IN THE SECOND.

WE HOPE IT WILL FIND WAYS TO LESSEN THE DANGEROUS IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE WORLD'S CAPACITY TO PRODUCE FOOD AND THE WORLD'S GROWING POPULATION. TO THIS END MANKIND SHOULD TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE RECENT ENCOURAGING BREAKTHROUGHS IN THE PRODUCTION OF FOOD, AS WELL AS THE RAPIDLY INCREASING KNOWLEDGE OF WAYS TO MODERATE SHARP RATES OF POPULATION GROWTH.

AND WE HOPE TO SEE THIS ASSEMBLY BREAK IMPORTANT NEW GROUND IN A FIELD OF GROWING IMPORTANCE TO MANKIND: THE PRESERVATION OF MAN'S NATURAL ENVIRONMENT. THE SPREAD OF MODERN INDUSTRIAL CIVILIZATION IS NOT AN UNMIXED BELSSING. IT HAS, TO BE SURE, PRODUCED IMMENSE LIBERATING EFFECTS IN THE REDUCTION OF HUMAN TOIL AND THE MANUFACTURE OF PRODUCTS OF GREAT PRACTICAL AND AESTHETIC VALUE FOR COUNTLESS MILLIONS OF PEOPLE. AND THESE THINGS IT WILL CONTINUE TO DO.

RUXRUSK
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 5 OF 5 USUN 6784

SECTO 10

WHITE HOUSE FOR WALT W. ROSTOW

BUT THIS SAME INDUSTRIAL PROCESS, UNLESS WE CAREFULLY CONTROL ITS SIDE-EFFECTS, CAN ALSO DAMAGE OUR ENVIRONMENT IN MANY RESPECTS, SOME OF THEM KNOWN TODAY AND SOME ONLY SUSPECTED. THIS DANGER IS BECOMING A WORLD-WIDE PHENOMENON, AND THE SOONER THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COMES TO GRIPS WITH IT, THE MORE FUTURE GENERATIONS WILL BE GRATEFUL TO US. MY GOVT WILL THEREFORE ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORT, AT THIS SESSION OF THE GA, THE INITIATIVE OF SWEDEN TO MAKE THE PROBLEMS OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT A NEW AND MAJOR CONCERN OF THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS.

CONCLUSION

IN CONCLUSION, MR PRES, I ASK YOUR INDULGENCE FOR A BRIEF PERSONAL WORD. IT HAS BEEN MY PRIVILEGE, IN ONE CAPACITY OR ANOTHER, TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF TWO-THIRDS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS - BEGINNING WITH HUNTER COLLEGE AND LAKE SUCCESS. WITH OTHERS OF MY GENERATION, I HAVE FELT DEEPLY THAT THE PARAMOUNT TASK FOR ALL MANKIND IS "TO SAVE SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS FROM THE SCOURGE OF WAR". MANY OF US IN THIS ROOM HAVE SEEN THE SCOURGE OF WAR AND WANT NOTHING MORE EARNESTLY THAN THE PROMISE OF A SECURE PEACE.

PERHAPS THE UN, AS SOME HAVE SUGGESTED, HAS FALLEN SHORT OF THE HIGH HOPES THAT WERE ENTERTAINED FOR IT AT ITS BIRTH. BUT WE CAN REMEMBER THE REVERED STATESMAN WHO LAUNCHED THIS ORGANIZATION UPON ITS COURSE. WE CAN RECALL MAJOR CRISES OF DESPERATE DANGER WHICH WE HAVE OVERCOME. WE CAN RECALL MAJOR AGREEMENTS WHICH REPRESENT GIANT STEPS TOWARD PEACE. WE CAN TAKE DEEP SATISFACTION FROM THE HISTORICAL PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION WHICH IS REFLECTED IN THE RISE OF OUR MEMBERSHIP FROM 51 TO 125. AND WE CAN BE GRATEFUL FOR THE DEDICATED SERVICE WHICH THE WORLD HAS RECEIVED FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THIS ORGANIZATION AS THEY HAVE TOILED TIRELESSLY AND PATIENTLY, OFTEN WITHOUT THANKS OR PRAISE TO BRING REASON TO BEAR IN THE AFFAIRS OF MANKIND. THIS ORGANIZATION WAS NOT CREATED TO PRESIDE OVER AN EARTHLY PARADISE; IT WAS CREATED TO ENABLE FRAIL HUMAN BEINGS TO FIND A WAY TO RESOLVE THEIR DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS AND TO JOIN HANDS IN CONQUERING THEIR DIFFICULTIES, ANIMOSITIES, PASSIONS AND FEARS - ALL IN FIDELITY TO THE CHARTER.

MY FELLOW AMERICANS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN A GREAT DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, ORDAINED BY OUR CONSTITUTION, TO DETERMINE WHO SHALL LEAD US IN THE NEXT FOUR YEARS. OF ONE THING YOU CAN BE SURE - THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL REMAIN FAITHFUL IN SUPPORT OF THE UN, THEIR PURPOSES WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES INSCRIBED IN THE CHARTER AND THEY WILL REMAIN READY TO WORK IN THIS ORGANIZATION FOR THE PEACE AND PROSPERITY OF ITS MEMBERS, AND FOR DIGNITY AND JUSTICE FOR THOSE WE REPRESENT.

END TEXT

DECONTROL AFTER RELEASE TO PRESS ON OCT 2.

RUSK

INFORMATION

46

~~SECRET NODIS~~

Wednesday, October 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Secretary Rusk's Mid-East Talks in New York

2. Purple

Herewith Secretary Rusk's talk with Abba Eban Monday. While the Secretary felt Eban was as straightforward with him as he had ever been, the position Israel has staked out is not as good as we had hoped.

It is clear from all our contacts that the Israeli Cabinet has settled on some modification of the Allon plan--Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank but retention of a line of military posts along the Jordan River. The Israelis feel this is the only way they can assure that the West Bank remains demilitarized.

It doesn't look to us as if this is good enough for the Jordanians. We assume Eban will at least hint at this in his speech to the General Assembly October 8. Jarring and others are afraid this could paint Israel into such a narrow corner that no negotiation would be possible.

Nick Katzenbach is taking stock this afternoon. We may wish to go back at the Israelis quickly to try to persuade them to dress up their proposal to make it more palatable.

The Secretary has also seen the Jordanian and Egyptian foreign ministers and Ambassador Jarring. Nothing new of major importance came out. Jarring still feels he needs more concrete proposals from Israel to get him going--or even a general statement that Israel has no territorial designs.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-134
By iss, NARA Date 9-21-98 W. W. Rostow

Att: USUN NY 6764, 10/1/68

** Summary marked*

~~SECRET NODIS~~

ACTION

Wednesday, October 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.,
October 3, at 11:30 a. m.

Art Hummel is your new Ambassador to Burma, and will be leaving to take up that post in the next few days.

This is his first ambassadorial appointment. He is a career man, who served previously in Burma from 1957 to 1960 as head of the USIA establishment there. The past three years he has been the Deputy Chief of Mission in Taiwan. Hummel is a Chinese expert, speaks the language fluently and fought with a group of Chinese guerrillas during the Second World War.

As you know, General Ne Win's visit with you was something of a turning point in our relations with Burma. Ne Win came away convinced you genuinely accepted Burma's policy of neutrality, and this has resulted in the more relaxed although still minimal nature of our relations. I think it would greatly assist Hummel if he could carry a personal oral message from you to Ne Win and if you would give him a personal feeling of your private conversation with Ne Win during the 1966 visit.

I suggest the following points for discussion:

1. Authorize Hummel to convey a brief oral message of good wishes to Ne Win.
2. Discuss with Hummel your position toward Burmese foreign policy as expressed to Ne Win during his 1966 visit.
3. Ask Hummel for his assessment of the current situation in Burma. (There are some signs that Ne Win plans to broaden the political base of his government, but the economic situation continues to be dismal.)
4. Hummel is scheduled to call on the Secretary General the day before his meeting with you. You might ask him whether U Thant said anything of interest.

Marshall Wright of my staff will escort Hummel to your office.

W. W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON 49Wednesday, October 2, 1968
1:30 p. m.~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

As you were talking to Richard Nixon the other evening -- and putting our three points on Vietnam to him -- there seemed to me to be a certain ambiguity which required clarification. You recall he asked you if any one of the three conditions would satisfy us -- or all three. Your answer was purposefully fuzzy. I don't think we've made up our minds exactly what the "fact of life" formula you gave Harriman means operationally. And it is conceivable that some clarification is required in our conversations with the North Vietnamese in Paris.

In the argument that follows we would deal with all three conditions, but in different ways.

1. GVN Participation

It is absolutely essential that we have prior agreement that the serious talks that would follow a bombing cessation should include the GVN. I believe you now have unanimous agreement among your advisers that nothing could be more dangerous than for us to have a bombing cessation and then a prolonged wrangle with Hanoi as to whether the GVN could participate. For Hanoi to have a veto, under the circumstances of a bombing cessation, over GVN participation could produce a major political and military crisis in Saigon. Therefore, the participation issue must be nailed down before the event.

2. On the DMZ, in the Vance-Lao talk of July 16, Lao said the DRV "will know what to do" about shelling across the DMZ in the case of a bombing cessation. The point of Oslo was to go further on shelling and say they would not shell across the DMZ if we stopped bombing. This is obviously insufficient. But it is doubtful that we can negotiate a full detailed DMZ deal before a bombing cessation, at least at the present time. You have formulated your position -- for example, to Harriman -- in the form not of prior agreement but "facts of life." Specifically, Hanoi must be made to understand that the violation of the DMZ would meet an instant response. And we must mean that. For example, if they shelled across the DMZ, the post-bombing rules of engagement would have to require that we fire back instantly, at, say, three times the level of the incoming. And Abrams should have that right, before the event. If they began to mass major forces at the DMZ, we should be prepared to bomb them with B52's or anything else. If they tried to send across the DMZ -- as they have been doing -- substantial military units, we would have to return, in my judgment, to full-scale bombing of their supply routes through the panhandle.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cbm, NARA, Date 12-16-02~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~Therefore, on the DMZ, we might live with~~

- ~~-- a "fact of life" statement;~~
- ~~-- a very clear definition of the DMZ behavior we would require to maintain a bombing cessation;~~
- ~~-- rules of engagement agreed between Saigon and Washington in case of violation.~~

Personally, I have never ruled out some retaliatory bombing of the North during negotiations if they cheated; and I don't think they would blow serious talks, if they ever started.

3. With respect to attacks on the cities, Hanoi takes the view that this is a matter for the NLF. With 80% of the main forces North Vietnamese, this is clearly nonsense. ~~But again, that is an item in which they should know, as a "fact of life," that substantial attacks on cities, especially Saigon, would meet with prompt response. And we would have to mean it to maintain our credibility in Moscow as well as Hanoi.~~

4. Therefore, you may wish to consider with Gy, ~~for the next round in Paris, a formula in which we seek an absolutely firm assurance of GVN participation before the bombing stops plus "fact of life" statements by us on the DMZ and the cities, with all preparations made to back our play if they violate.~~

5. Although I am not enamoured of the device for a one-day bombing cessation, to give them a chance formally to agree to GVN participation on that day, that device might also be considered in your talks with Vance. (A clear paper will be coming to you on the two devices later in the day.) *

Walt Rostow

* paper, by Bob Ginsburgh, attached, at Tab A.

48a

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: ~~Negotiating Alternatives~~

Here is my analysis of the reactions to the two following devices designed to break the negotiating logjam on GVN representation.

- ~~First Device. Appearance with GVN representatives after an unannounced bombing cessation.~~

- ~~Second Device. Military conference in the DMZ~~

First Device. Bunker, Harriman and General Taylor are all opposed to the first device.

- ~~Ambassador Harriman states that it "carries the serious risk of a public spectacle." He thinks it's important to know before the meeting whether GVN representation is acceptable.~~

- Ambassador Bunker raises three difficulties:

-- ~~If Hanoi refuses to talk, the GVN would suffer a humiliating rebuff before world and Vietnamese opinion for which we would have nothing to show.~~

-- ~~We would be unable to give a clear answer if Hanoi asked us publicly whether the bombing cessation was definitive and unconditional.~~

-- ~~GVN concurrence would be difficult.~~

- General Taylor agrees generally with Ambassador Bunker.

Second Device. All three are also opposed to the second device.

- Ambassador Harriman argues that:

-- It would probably be rejected by both Hanoi and Saigon.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS~~

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By abm, NARA, Date 12-16-02

-- It does not satisfy the basic problem of GVN representation in serious discussions.

-- It requires prior agreement by Hanoi about meeting in the DMZ -- which he believes Hanoi would reject as a demand for reciprocity.

- Ambassador Bunker agrees with Harriman's comments and also raises the following issues:

-- Difficulty of maintaining a common U. S. -GVN position in a two-tiered approach to negotiations.

-- We are not yet ready to move on a cease-fire approach until we arrive at more definite conclusions in our own minds and with the GVN what kind of a cease-fire we can live with.

-- A cease-fire proposal prior to the U. S. elections could have dangerously adverse effects on U. S. morale.

- General Taylor objects because the termination of the bombing should be an essential part of any cease-fire and should not be isolated from it or given away in advance. (I believe he misinterprets the original intent of this device.) In any event, with this amendment, he thinks this device should be reserved for possible use in the future.

- ~~Harriman Alternatives.~~ Ambassadors Bunker and Harriman agree that ~~the variation proposed for consideration to the first device meets some, but not all of their concerns. Accordingly, Ambassador Harriman proposed two alternatives.~~

First Alternative:

-- ~~Privately inform Hanoi that (a) we will stop bombing and (b) then call for a private meeting in which we will insist on GVN representation.~~

-- ~~Privately inform the Soviets and seek their support.~~

-- ~~If Hanoi agrees at private session, (a) make public announcement of bombing cessation and (b) meet on Wednesday with GVN representatives on our side.~~

-- ~~If Hanoi does not agree at private meeting,~~
resume bombing.

Second Alternative: (Ambassador Bunker believes this should be combined with the first alternative.)

-- Inform Soviets we will stop bombing if Hanoi agrees to GVN representation promptly after cessation.

-- Inform Soviets we will accept their word on Hanoi's agreement if Hanoi does not wish to tell us directly.

- General Taylor feels that both the alternatives are more disadvantageous than the original in that:

-- We would give up bombing without any assurance as to the length of time we would debate GVN participation with Hanoi. (I think he misinterprets the Paris proposal.)

-- We would look naive if we accepted the Soviet Union's word about Hanoi's future behavior -- especially after Czechoslovakia.

Several other relevant thoughts emerge from these exchanges:

- Ambassador Bunker points out that we could not keep the knowledge of a bombing cessation from the press for more than 13 hours. Bunker discounts the belief that Hanoi is essentially concerned with "face" rather than operating from a cold calculation of how they can best wring benefit from the U. S. with minimal concessions on their part. He doubts that an arrangement that allows them to give in more gracefully would really induce them to enter into serious negotiations, since sooner or later the world would know that they had had to make important concessions to get the bombing stopped.

- General Taylor proposes that we denounce the preposterous claim of the Hanoi delegates that we are not entitled to any form of reciprocity for any concession we make. General Taylor regards the proposals as an apparent de facto abandonment of all points in our Package II except GVN participation. (Again, I think he misinterprets the intent of the original proposals.) General Taylor expresses his view that we are not doing badly and certainly would give nothing of value away to change the situation. He suggests we get the views of Paris and Saigon on this point.

Ginsburgh's Conclusions:

- There is widespread misunderstanding of the two proposals.
- ~~With redrafting it might be possible to bring all three on board both the Harriman alternative to the first device and the second device.~~
- Before we seek agreement on a redraft of these proposals, we ought to seek answers to the following underlying issues:
 - How well are we doing now and is time on our side or Hanoi's?
 - Is Hanoi really concerned about "reciprocity" for reasons of face, or is this simply a tactical ploy for the time being, or is Hanoi still determined to avoid any settlement unless it is on their terms?
- The answers to these two questions should determine whether further consideration of the proposals are worthwhile.

g

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

49

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-171

By sig, NARA, Date 8-9-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Wednesday - October 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Peru - PL 480 Agreement for Rice

The attached memorandum from Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman (Tab A) recommends that you authorize a \$10.7 million PL 480 sales agreement with Peru for 60,000 tons of rice. Charlie Zwick concurs (Tab B).

This agreement will be the first major new aid for Peru in over a year. A proposed AID loan package of about \$25 million will also be ready for your approval in the near future. This proposal serves three important purposes:

- to provide much needed food supplies after a severe drought struck Peru this year;
- to provide tangible political support for President Belaunde at a key point in his administration, after he has taken several difficult development decisions;
- to help increase US commercial sales of rice and counter Communist Chinese competition.

In recent months, Belaunde has shown real courage in tackling Peru's economic problems, including putting through a major tax reform. He has also resolved the old and vexing dispute with the International Petroleum Company to IPC's satisfaction, thereby removing it as an irritant from US-Peruvian relations. These acts have produced expected political turmoil, and a Cabinet shake-up has just occurred. However, the new Cabinet, headed by a respected close friend of Belaunde, includes the key Ministers from his predecessor's Cabinet. It should continue the encouraging direction the Peruvian Government has recently followed.

Ambassador Jones has appealed for quick action on this request to help demonstrate our support for Belaunde's position. I agree that a show of support at this moment is both warranted and needed.

As outlined in Charlie Zwick's memorandum, there was a question last year as to whether Peruvian military expenditures would not warrant application of the Symington Amendment. Belaunde has held down the level of military spending since that time, however, and State/AID have now determined that Peru is not diverting any US assistance to military expenditures, nor investing its own resources unnecessarily to a degree that interferes with its development.

All interested parties agree in recommending that you approve the PL 480 program for Peru at this time. The only difference in view concerns whether some notice should be given to Congress that you are proposing new aid to Peru after a hiatus. Katzenbach and Zwick think it might be advisable to inform key members of the Congress, particularly Senators Symington and Morse, that Peru does not fall within the purview of the Symington Amendment. Gaud and Oliver prefer not to take any initiative towards the Congress, but are fully prepared to defend the determination should any question be raised. Mike Manatos agrees with Gaud and Oliver that the less said the better at this moment. I also share this view.

W. W. Rostow

Approve loan _____

Disapprove loan _____

Call me _____

Inform key mem- _____
bers of Congress,
particularly Sena-
tors Symington and
Morse

Do not inform _____
Congress

Call me _____

Attachments - Tabs A and B.

SWLewis:mm

CONFIDENTIAL

3083

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

SEP 30 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Program for Peru

Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman request your approval to negotiate a \$10.7 million credit sales agreement with Peru for 60,000 tons of rice. Repayment will be in dollars over twenty years with 5 percent down plus a 5 percent currency use payment. If we make this P. L. 480 offer, the Peruvians are expected to purchase an additional 20,000 tons under CCC terms.

Reinstating of Aid Program - This P. L. 480 agreement will be the first major new commitment for Peru in more than a year. Last year, State, based on a preliminary review of Peruvian military expenditures, concluded that Peru was a borderline case under the Symington Amendment, and therefore decided to withhold major new programs until the situation was clarified. A formal Symington review was in progress when the attached Freeman/Gaud memorandum was submitted. Gaud has subsequently reported that, based on a current analysis of Peruvian military expenditures, State/AID have determined that Peru is not in violation of the Symington Amendment.

The review findings include the following points:

- defense expenditures in relation to total government expenditures are expected to decline from 15.3 percent in 1967 to 14.7 percent in 1968 and 1969, and as a percentage of GNP are expected to decline from 3.1 percent in 1967 to 2.8 percent in 1968 and 1969,
- over 10 percent of the Peruvian military budget is for non-military activities, particularly civic action,
- despite the budget authority voted by the Peruvian Congress, the Peruvian military has cooperated in the government's overall policy of fiscal stringency, accepting a delay in a military pay raise.

On the basis of the full analysis I concur with State/AID's assessment that Peru is not in violation of the Symington Amendment.

This agreement is the first step in renewing support for Peru's development efforts. AID is considering a \$20-\$30 million loan program for negotiation later in the year. The P. L. 480 agreement is proposed for negotiation at this time to meet a specific rice requirement. The resources made available through this program will be considered in our review of subsequent AID proposals.

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Authority 71990-17

By g/lip, NARA, Date 2-2-93

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Recent Performance - Last September, President Belaunde devalued the currency in an attempt to resolve the fiscal and balance of payment crisis. A period of confusion and political maneuvering followed in which the opposition parties prevented him from taking other necessary corrective measures. Since April however, Belaunde has taken strong executive actions to improve the economic situation and to work out an acceptable economic program:


- a major tax reform was decreed which is expected to yield over \$60 million in additional revenues in fiscal 1969.
- the budget was reduced by \$25 million.
- negotiations for a \$75 million IMF standby and a \$100 million debt refinancing effort are in process and should ease balance of payments pressures during 1968 and 1969.

In addition to an impressive self-help effort, Belaunde has satisfactorily resolved the long standing Peruvian dispute with the International Petroleum Company which has plagued U. S. relations with Peru for the past six years.

This agreement will serve two purposes. It will

- help to increase U. S. commercial sales of rice and to counter Communist Chinese competition,
- constitute U. S. recognition of Peru's self-help performance and indicate our desire to support the government's development efforts.

Recommendation - I recommend that you authorize negotiations for this proposed P. L. 480 agreement.


Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3083

496

SEP 20 1968

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Peru

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 credit sale with Peru to provide approximately 60,000 tons of rice, for which the current export market value (including applicable ocean transportation costs) is \$10.7 million. The proposed terms are payment in dollars of 5 percent on delivery, a 5 percent currency use payment (Purcell Amendment) and the balance in approximately equal annual installments over 19 years; interest would be 2 percent per annum during a two-year grace period and 2.5 percent thereafter. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

Production in the principal rice areas of Peru has been sharply reduced by a severe drought in 1968. Peru is expected to import 150,000 metric tons of rice during the 1968-1969 marketing year--three times the amount originally forecast for the year. The internally produced rice crop has already been consumed and the country must rely on imports for the next eight months. The Government of Peru plans to issue a tender promptly for 20,000 metric tons of rice, to be followed by other purchases of 50,000 to 70,000 metric tons. The Communist Chinese, who sold the Peruvians 20,000 metric tons early this year, are offering brown rice at \$129 per metric ton f.o.b., while U.S. brown rice is now offered at \$151 and U.S. white rice at \$167 per metric ton f.o.b. We have offered 20,000 tons of rice on CCC credit terms, repayable in three annual installments, which our Embassy in Lima believes the Peruvians will take if the PL 480 sale recommended herein can be negotiated.

We view this proposal as an important and unique instance where Public Law 480 can be utilized to increase United States commercial sales of rice and to counter Communist Chinese competition. Approval by you of PL 480 negotiations will permit us to make a prompt offer to Peru before it has made final commitments to other supplier countries, and the concessionary terms of PL 480 will help to make our offer competitive.

Self-Help Measures

In June of this year the Peruvian Government took major steps to improve the economic situation in the country. Among these were the enactment of

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Authority 7129 90-12

By rg/wsp, NARA, Date 2-2-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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a series of tax reforms and tax increases which are expected to increase tax revenues by more than 15 percent in 1969 and by an increasing percentage thereafter. The International Monetary Fund has labeled the recent action by the Government of Peru as the greatest financial self-help effort Latin America has seen under the Alliance for Progress.

The Peruvian Government has also recently adopted and has been implementing measures favorably affecting development of the agricultural sector. In negotiating this agreement we will seek commitment from the Government of Peru on the following self-help steps, which will continue emphasis on the aforementioned agricultural measures and also require some new actions.

1. Peru shall continue implementation of the new Agricultural Promotion Law to assure: (1) increased per capita production of basic foodstuffs, (2) increased food availability through improved marketing and distribution systems, including adequate storage facilities, and (3) development of related private agro-industries.
2. Peru shall provide adequate producer incentives, including commodity price incentives and measures to make fertilizer and other essential agricultural inputs available at reasonable prices.
3. Peru shall carry out commitments entered into under previous AID loans for increasing Government support to the supervised agricultural credit fund administered by the Agricultural Bank.
4. Peru shall utilize foreign currencies generated through the PL 480 agreement for economic development purposes which are mutually agreed upon by the United States and Peru.

General Policy Considerations:

1. Recent data reported by our Embassy show that during 1968 Peru has exercised restraint in military expenditures, and that such expenditures in 1968 will represent a smaller proportion of both total government expenditures and gross national product than in 1967. (An annex to this paper discusses the military expenditures issue in detail, including questions relating to the application of the Symington Amendment to Peru).
2. The Peruvian Government has signed an agreement with the International Petroleum Company (IPC) which is satisfactory to the U.S. -owned company, thus putting an end to the dispute that has hurt U.S. relations with Peru for the past six years.

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3. We therefore feel that going ahead with a PL 480 sales agreement will not only help U.S. rice growers to compete with Communist China for the Peruvian market, but will also constitute recognition by this country of Peru's impressive recent self-help efforts in the fiscal and agricultural fields and its initiatives to improve relations with us. In view of the recent evidence of restraint in Peru's military expenditures, we believe prompt action is justified, while awaiting the outcome of the comprehensive analysis for a formal Symington determination.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with this PL 480 sales agreement.

William P. Gaud
Administrator
Agency for International Development

September 20 1968
Donald H. Jensen
Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

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ANNEX

PERUVIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES

The Department of State reviewed the record of Peruvian military expenditures early in 1968, following enactment of the Symington Amendment.

This first review showed that the ratio of Peruvian military expenditures to total government expenditures had decreased sharply from 1961 to 1966, but had taken a sizeable jump upward during 1967. The 1967 increase was due to Peru's failure during the previous years to allocate sufficient funds to replace military equipment that was becoming unusable, hazardous, or uneconomic; as a result, Peru's democratically-elected Congress appropriated funds in 1966 and 1967 for a re-equipment program designed to up-date the major equipment of the three armed services. Moreover, the personnel strength of the Peruvian armed forces was not increased.

The review in early 1968 concluded that Peru was a borderline case under the Symington Amendment but that the evidence as a whole did not call for termination of assistance under the Amendment. It was further concluded that continuing scrutiny would be maintained of military expenditure trends, until a fuller Symington analysis could be completed. Meanwhile, we went forward with our technical assistance and food grant programs, as well as with housing and investment guarantees. On April 25 and July 22, 1968, we held signings in Lima of two AID loans to Peru which had been authorized during FY 1967 but had never been finalized. No new development loans or PL 480 sales agreements were authorized during FY 1968, however.

Preliminary data for 1968 now available to us indicate that there will be a decrease of more than 0.5 percentage points between 1967 and 1968 in Peru's ratio of military to total government expenditures. This is shown in the following table:

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *jc/jw*, NARA, Date *12-28-09*

Peruvian Military Expenditures

1961-1968

(billion soles)

(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)
<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Military Expenditures</u> ^{b/}	<u>Consolidated Public Sector Expenditures</u>	<u>(B) as % of (C)</u>	<u>GNP</u>	<u>(B) as % of (E)</u>
1961	1.8	10.1	17.7%	62,294	2.8%
1962	1.8	12.7	14.4%	71,400	2.5%
1963	2.2	15.9	14.1%	78,710	2.8%
1964	2.8	21.1	13.3%	95,481	2.9%
1965	3.1	25.0	12.3%	114,722	2.7%
1966	3.1	30.0	10.5%	134,780	2.3%
1967	5.2	34.0	15.3%	168,500 ^{a/}	3.1%
1968 ^{a/}	5.5	37.7	14.7%	198,805 ^{a/}	2.8%

^{a/} Estimate

^{b/} Net of civic action for development and other civilian-type expenditures by military.

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- 3 -

It is clear from recent developments that the Peruvian military do not have unlimited spending authority and have been subject to the restraints and pressures resulting from the country's recent fiscal difficulties. Military ministries have even had difficulty in obtaining the use of funds specifically earmarked for them under Peru's tax laws. While other public sector employees were granted a post-devaluation wage increase last November, the military agreed to postpone such an increase. Not long ago, it was expected that the Congress would restore the 1966 and 1967 military procurement authorizations to the dollar value they had prior to Peru's currency devaluation of September 1, 1967, but no action has been taken to do so. Failure to restore the original value would be tantamount to a 43 percent reduction in the amount of the procurement authorizations for foreign military equipment.

The Minister of Finance has told our Ambassador in confidence that the Peruvian Air Force was turned down in its desire to purchase a second squadron of Mirage fighters, and that the Navy has postponed its plans to purchase submarines and destroyers. Finally, in his widely-commended program to correct Peru's fiscal imbalance, the Finance Minister cut 700 million soles (US \$18 million) from the 1968 budget, and of this amount 300 million (US \$8 million) was cut from the military budget.

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Pres. file
56

Wednesday, October 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Invitation to speak in mid-November to Foreign Policy Conference

On November 14-15, the American Foreign Service Association will sponsor at the State Department a foreign policy conference. There will be some 500 business executives, scholars, and leaders of private foreign affairs organizations present. The theme of the conference is: "Foreign Affairs in the 1970's."

This will be a stellar group, and it will be well covered by the media. Joe Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment, is the Conference Chairman, and the speakers will include Senators Mansfield, Mondale, and Brooke, Kermit Gordon of Brookings, Secretary Rusk, former Secretary Acheson, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The occasion has much to commend it. It will be after the election. It is a distinguished and informed audience, part private and part government. Its entire purpose is to ponder the future of American foreign policy.

I have discussed this with Harry McPherson and Doug Cater, both of whom share my belief that this is an ideal occasion for a major speech on our unfinished foreign affairs business.

I recommend that you accept the invitation to speak on November 14 or 15, with the details to be worked out later.

Attachment

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWright:WWR:ms

Dear Mr. President:

Five hundred business executives, scholars, leaders of private foreign policy organizations and foreign affairs professionals will meet in Washington November 14-15 to consider foreign policy issues of the 1970's. They will be the guests of the American Foreign Service Association, an organization of 8,000 professionals in AID, the Department of State and USIA.

On behalf of the Association I should like to invite you either to address the conference on the afternoon of November 14 or 15 or to attend a reception in honor of Secretary and Mrs. Rusk at 6:00 p.m., November 15.

By inviting a distinguished audience to Washington, the Foreign Service Association hopes to broaden the public interest not only in foreign policy problems but also in organization and staffing for the conduct of foreign affairs. We are inviting an outstanding group of speakers to participate in the conference; they include two Secretaries of State, Members of Congress, foreign affairs experts, scholars and newsmen. Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, will serve as Conference Chairman. I am attaching a copy of our tentative program.

Mid-November seems to us a good time for the nation to begin a non-partisan examination of the foreign policy problems of the future. It seems a good time for Foreign Service professionals to get together with people in private life to discuss these problems and exchange ideas.

We believe you could make an immense contribution to the nation's consideration of these problems at this time. It is for this reason that we ask you to consider our conference as a possible forum for any observations you might wish to make regarding where the nation stands on the current stage of world events.

We hope we may have the honor of your presence, and the very great benefit of your wisdom and experience.

Sincerely yours,

Lannon Walker
Chairman of the Board

Attachment:
Tentative Program

506

FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE 1970's

International Conference Area
 Department of State
 November 14-15, 1968

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14

- 8:30 - 9:30 - Registration
- 9:30 - 9:45 - Welcome by Philip C. Habib, AFSA President
- 9:45 - 10:00 - Introductory Remarks by Joseph E. Johnson,
 President of Carnegie Endowment for
 International Peace and Conference Chairman
- 10:00 - 11:00 - Dimensions of Foreign Affairs in the 1970's. Panel
 presentations by:
 Senator Edward W. Brooke
 Herman Kahn, Director, Hudson Institute
 Edward Schwartz, past President, National
 Student Association
- 11:00 - 11:30 - Coffee Break
- 11:30 - 12:30 - Discussion following panel presentations
- 12:30 - 2:00 - Buffet Luncheon, Diplomatic Reception Area
- 2:00 - 3:00 - Foreign Affairs: Is the Nation Organized for the
 1970's? Panel presentations by:
 Kermit Gordon, President, The Brookings Institution
 Ambassador Foy D. Kohler, Center of Advanced
 International Studies, University of Miami,
 and former Deputy Under Secretary of State
 Frederick C. Mosher, Visiting Professor, University
 of Virginia, and former Staff Director of the
 Herter Committee
- 3:00 - 3:15 - Coffee Break
- 3:15 - 4:00 - AFSA Recommendations for Organizational Change.
 Lannon Walker, Chairman of AFSA Board of
 Directors
- 4:00 - 5:00 - Discussion
- 5:00 - 6:00 - Retired Officer Workshop with Idar Rimestad,
 Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
- 8:00 - DACOR Lecture - Charles E. Bohlen,
 Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15

- 9:15 - 10:15 - Europe and America: Problems and Prospects. Panel presentations by:
Dean Acheson, former Secretary of State
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University
Senator Michael J. Mansfield
- 10:15 - 10:30 - Coffee Break
- 10:30 - 12:00 - Discussion following panel presentations
- 12:00 - 2:00 - Lunch (open)
- 2:00 - 3:00 - Congress and Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs. Panel presentations by:
Senator Walter F. Mondale
Representative F. Bradford Morse
Bill D. Moyers, Publisher, Newsday
- 3:00 - 3:30 - Discussion
- 3:30 - 3:50 - Coffee Break
- 4:00 - 4:45 - Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
- 6:00 - 8:00 - Reception for Secretary and Mrs. Rusk

51
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INFORMATION

Pres file

Wednesday, October 2, 1968

Mr. President:

The following may be useful tonight in your dinner conversation with President Tombalbaye:

His Visit to Texas

- Friday he tours HemisFair; dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Louis Stumberg in San Antonio.
- Saturday he goes to Lubbock; sees feed lot, packing house and John B. Slaughter Ranch; visits Texas Tech for night football game.

Chad's Cattle Potential

- They have the herds and grazing in the south to build a real beef market.
- We're encouraging private firms to look at the feed export potential.
- Cattle are also a good regional prospect with Chad's beef-hungry neighbors.

W. W. Restew

WWR:HS:RM:lw

INFORMATION

52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 1, 1968 - 7:00 pm

Mr. President:

As a result of his IPC settlement, Belaunde has faced a crisis within his own party. His Vice President defected to the left. Belaunde has the support, however, of the opposition party on this matter. The attached message from Lima indicates that he is reorganizing his cabinet.

There is some talk of a military coup; but it does not appear imminent.

W. W. Rostow

Lima 7610

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WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-121
By kg, NARA, Date 8-9-96

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USCINCSO FOR POLAD

SUBJ: CABINET RESIGNS

LIMA RADIO QUOTING PALACE INFORMATION OFFICE AS

ANNOUNCING RESIGNATION OF HERCELLES CABINET.
ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE PRESIDENT HAS ACCEPTED
RESIGNATION. AS OF 4 P.M. NO ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN
MADE RE COMPOSITION NEW GOVERNMENT. JONES

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INFORMATION

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Pres file

Tuesday, October 1, 1968
6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

These two reports on conversations with Governors Shapiro and Romney may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By *lg*, NARA, Date 1-26-93

WWRostow:rlh



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM

September 30, 1968

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *GR*VIA : S/GOV - Winthrop G. Brown *W*FROM : S/GOV - A.E. Manell *AM*SUBJECT: Visit with Governor Shapiro of Illinois, Democrat,
in Chicago, September 26, 1968. INFORMATION MEMORANDUM*Postow*

Except for Vietnam, the Governor said, there isn't much talk these days about the important international issues among the rank and file in Illinois. There is scant discussion about Czechoslovakia, or NATO, or Pueblo, or the nuclear peril, or the race to the moon. The great issues, even the state of the nation's economy, recede far into the background beside the dominating sense of indignation, hate and fear which surface and ride with the tide of violence and racial tension in the cities. Concern over 'law and order', fed by newspaper and TV reports about mounting crime, is charged with emotion and bitterness. Perhaps that is why so many people in the state, the Governor observed, are turning to George Wallace, less in the expectation that he will reach national office than as an expression of brooding resentment over the decline of decent and orderly standards in community life. Our perspectives and our values are out of joint.

In these circumstances, the Governor said, the popular simplification about Vietnam often runs in these terms: Let's stop the bombing for a month and see if that will get us off dead center in the Paris talks and on the stalemated battlefield, first warning the North Vietnamese that we're dead serious. If that doesn't work, let's throw the book at them. But above all, let us get the war over with, and turn our resources and minds and our national drive toward a resolution of the tremendous problems at home.

Related considerations seem to govern public attitudes in Illinois on such issues as foreign aid and the space program,

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the Governor said. Beating the Russians to the moon and the planets is not a particularly enticing prospect if that effort should bleed away the vast sums and energies so desperately needed for national renewal. Foreign aid becomes a more dubious proposition when it is so imperative to heal our own society. The call for good works abroad, even in a prosperous period, has small appeal with rising tax rates and continuing inflation at home.

If he is successful in the election this fall, the Governor said, he means to devote special attention to two areas in which his friend and predecessor, Governor Kerner, achieved big strides. One focus will be on meaningful education which fits men and women for decent jobs to provide the feeling of personal dignity and security which together make for a more stable society. Secondly, he hopes to enhance the state's already flourishing foreign trade in manufactures and agriculture. The Governor said that he realized that this was hardly a propitious time to get on with bridge building through trade with Eastern Europe and with Russia - but perhaps more favorable conditions for such enterprise will appear in the long range.

When I took my leave, the Governor asked if I could return later that morning - he had to deliver an important budget message to a commission - to resume our talk. I came back to brief him on Israel in the context of Soviet moves in the Mediterranean and in the Arab states, on Pueblo, on Vietnam, and on Czechoslovakia. He expressed satisfaction with the Department's liaison initiative.

I also visited the headquarters of the Council of State Governments on the campus of the University of Chicago to call on Brevard Carihfield, the Executive Secretary of the National Governors' Conference. Mr. Carihfield noted that with 21 elections for Governor this fall, it appears likely that the gubernatorial tally next November will probably be around 30 Republicans, 20 Democrats. (The present balance is 26 Republicans, 24 Democrats.) Whatever the outcome in state and national elections, however, Mr. Carihfield believes that larger efforts to achieve further improvement in Federal-State relations, including the Department's liaison with the Governors, will be necessary.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Rostow

MEMORANDUM

September 30, 1968

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *DKR*VIA : S/GOV - Winthrop G. Brown *WGB*FROM : S/GOV - A.E. Manell *AM*SUBJECT: Visit with Governor Romney of Michigan, Republican,
in Lansing, September 25, 1968. INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

The Governor said that the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia is the starkest evidence since the Cuban missile crisis of the fundamental Soviet determination to consolidate and to extend their dominion and influence in the world. Without resuming the cold war, our response must be strong enough to convince the Russians, and to reassure the Europeans, that we fully mean to live up to our obligations under NATO. Perhaps George Kennan is right in suggesting that we should consider beefing up our military presence in Europe to get our message across to the Russians. In any case, the Governor said, it is particularly important to sustain and strengthen West Germany's confidence in NATO and in the United States. That seems one of the essentials in order to move forward effectively on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Our preoccupation with Vietnam tends to produce an imbalance in the exercise of our world responsibilities. Whatever our future may be in Asia, the Governor said, our interests in Europe remain paramount.

In our reappraisal, we should take into account the spirit, as well as the structure and substance of NATO. Perhaps the greatest merit of the Marshall Plan, the Governor observed, is that we let the Europeans have the biggest part of the action in shaping their own future. We have not done as well in NATO, in obtaining the major role for ourselves, with an American commander invariably in the forefront.

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BY S/S: CMS

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As to Vietnam, the Governor said, developments this year have not changed his mind about the basic soundness of the proposal he put forward for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. He came away from his meeting with Kosygin in Moscow last year with the impression that the Russian leaders derive considerable satisfaction from seeing us bogged down in Vietnam. The Soviet Union and Communist China have different aims, of course, in supplying aid to North Vietnam. Nevertheless, the Governor observed, it is a pity that while Russia and China are at each other's throats in their objectives around the world, our policies in Southeast Asia have made for a convergence of their attention, if not of their specific interests, in Vietnam.

The Governor said that the growing volume of Michigan's exports of manufactures, especially transport equipment, as well as of agricultural products, has been most encouraging. He means to contribute further to this momentum, with a trade mission of leading Michigan industrialists representing the Tooling Association going to several Western European countries in late October. In Michigan, those who grasp the importance of foreign trade are doing what they can to hold the line against protectionist sentiment.

The Governor renewed his thanks for the excellent briefings he received in the Department before he went on his trip around the world last December. When I mentioned that the Department is scheduling a Foreign Policy Conference next April in Michigan, at the invitation of the World Affairs Council of Detroit, and that we hoped he would participate, he said that he thought well of these conferences, and that he would certainly come if this did not interfere with his duties at that time.

At Governor Romney's suggestion, I met at lunch with six of his principal staff members, including Mr. DeJonge, Director of the Department of Commerce, and Mr. Ball, Director of the Department of Agriculture. A point which emerged in the discussion is that the remarkable growth of Michigan's exports, and the increased overseas experience in Europe and Asia of some of the state's leading industrialists and farmers over the past decade, has contributed a more enlightened and responsible international outlook among them regarding trade, foreign aid, and related

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issues. Michigan's participation in the American Farm Festival in Tokyo last April was a useful step in this process. The development of the St. Lawrence Seaway presents important trade opportunities for Michigan and other mid-western states. Bordering on 4 of the 5 Great Lakes, Michigan's climate of understanding with the Canadians is good. The sound work of the International Joint Commission is a significant factor for good relations.

As for Federal-State relations, Lansing has no quarrels, by and large, with key officials in Washington, who have done their best to improve matters the last couple of years: the difficulties that arise are generally with the narrow-minded Federal bureaucrats down the line in various Departments who can't stretch their minds beyond the letter of existing regulations and practices. The luncheon concluded on a note of appreciation for S/GOV as a welcome focal point for state problems touching on the foreign field.

INFORMATION

4
Pres file

Tuesday, October 1, 1968 -- 6:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

I don't know what Nick or Bill Bundy will say, but it is reassuring that Le Duc Tho, in the attached, says that "there is nothing new in statements made Monday night by Hubert Humphrey... It is still the same demand for reciprocity, which we reject."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

54a

FBIS 08 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (SEE 64)

DRV SPOKESMAN ON HUMPHREY

PARIS AFP IN FRENCH 1932 GMT 01 OCT 68 C

(TEXT) PARIS--SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION AT THE PARIS TALKS LE DUC THO SAID TUESDAY THAT THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN THE STATEMENTS MADE MONDAY NIGHT BY HUBERT HUMPHREY ACCORDING TO WHICH HE MIGHT PUT AN END TO THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IF ELECTED PRESIDENT . IT IS STILL THE SAME DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY, WHICH WE REJECT , LE DUC THO ADDED.

THE SPECIAL ADVISER ALSO SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE VARIOUS CANDIDATES FOR U.S. PRESIDENT. CANDIDATES OFTEN MAKE LOFTY-SOUNDING STATEMENTS, AND WHEN ELECTED DO SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT, HE REMARKED.

ASKED ABOUT A REPORT IN AN AMERICAN PAPER THAT PEOPLE'S CHINA HAS REPROACHED NORTH VIETNAM FOR PURSUING THE PARIS TALKS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ADVISER DECLARED: CHINA FULLY SUPPORTS US IN OUR STRUGGLE .

A SPOKESMAN OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY HAS SAID THAT IT WAS A QUESTION OF PROVOCATION BY THE AMERICAN PRESS. EVERY COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT ITS STRUGGLE AS IT DEEMS BEST , AND WE SUPPORT THE STRUGGLE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE , HE DECLARED .

1 OCT 2047Z PAK/HH

Pres. file
56

Tuesday, Oct. 1, 1968
6:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This interesting little historical note from Bob Ginsburgh suggests that Hanoi, which keeps thinking back to its French experience, may think it has more time to negotiate a settlement with us than we think.

The truth is the settlement was negotiated in almost exactly one month from the time negotiations became serious.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

56a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: How fast is time running out on negotiations?

On the basis of the experience in Geneva in 1954, we can conclude that it need not take a long time to negotiate a settlement.

The Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference only lasted from 8 May to 21 July -- 74 days. (There are 74 days from 6 November to 19 January.)

In 1954, productive discussions did not really start until 16 June when the issue of representation was finally solved.

On the basis of their reading of history, Hanoi may have concluded that they can still arrive at a settlement during the Johnson Administration even if they wait until after the U.S. election to start talking seriously.

2

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 41-480

By rg/wsp, NARA, Date 2-22-93

59

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 1, 1968 -- 5:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

As the attached indicates, the Hanoi Foreign Minister and the Chief of the NLF in Hanoi appear to be out of Moscow and back home.

If there is no movement this week in Paris, we ought to take stock on where we go.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-96
By: Sj, NARA, Date 6-3-03

WWRostow:rln

ACTION

Tuesday, October 1, 1968
4:00 p.m.

fr-

Mr. President:

Herewith Leonard Marks recommends
Hewson Ryan as Ambassador to
Guatemala.

W. W. Rostow

cc: John M...

WWRostow:rlh



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

602
October 1, 1968

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

I would like to recommend for your consideration as Ambassador to Guatemala my Deputy Director, Hewson A. Ryan.

Mr. Ryan has the top staff position in the U.S. Information Agency and has served in that capacity during my tenure. He has demonstrated great ability, a dedication to this Administration and a devotion to the principles which you have advocated. I know of no man in this Administration with better qualifications for this position.

During the time that Tom Mann served as Assistant Secretary, Mr. Ryan was USIA Director for Latin America. He and Tom worked closely together and I am confident that Tom would give him the highest recommendation.

He is well known to Assistant Secretary Covey Oliver and Secretary Rusk. Since 1951 he has served in various positions in Latin America, is thoroughly familiar with the political, economic and informational problems, speaks and reads Spanish with a S-5, R-5 fluency (this is the highest grade that can be obtained). His wife is also bilingual in Spanish.

Mr. Ryan is well known to Frank Stanton, whom I am sure would also recommend him highly.

Leonard H. Marks

bc: Mr. Walt Rostow, WH
Mr. Ryan

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 1
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO
MAR 16, 1983.

BY RG ON 2-22-93

61

INFORMATION

Tuesday, October 1, 1968 -- 4:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Cy Vance will be returning late tomorrow afternoon, after the morning meeting.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

ACTION

**Tuesday, October 1, 1968
3:15 p.m.**

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's proposed language for a critical passage in his General Assembly speech on Wednesday.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Approved as amended _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rln

63

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/HARVAN/PLUS~~

Tuesday, October 1, 1968
1:10 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor comments
on the "two devices."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/HARVAN/PLUS~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House, Dec. 24, 1993
By *rg*, NARA, Date 1-26-93

WWRostow:rlh

21

INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~--HARVAN/PLUS

Tuesday, October 1, 1968 -- 12:45 am

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker comments on the two devices, coming out pretty close to Paris regarding a variation of the first as probably viable; rejecting the second for the present.

Sec. Rusk and I agree that before we make any such move, we should await -- or, perhaps, prod -- a response from Moscow.

Free file

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 39163

P. S. For your ready reference, the original message is at Tab A. The Paris response is at Tab B.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
Bj/rq NARA, Date 12-28-09



Department of State

W.F. 4
TELEGRAM 64a

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC RUEHDT RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 39163 2750240
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 010145Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1721
RUEHDT/USUN NEW YORK 377
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2303
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 39163

12Q
OCTOBER 1, 1968
12:23 A.M.

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

Roston

USUN FOR SECRETARY ONLY

PARIS FOR AMBASSADORS HARRIMAN AND VANCE ONLY

REF: A. STATE 246008; B. SAIGON 39022; C. PARIS 21489

1. I SEE THREE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE INGENIOUS "FIRST DEVICE"
IN REF A.

A. IF ON THE DAY AFTER BOMBING CESSATION WE SHOW UP WITH THE
GVN DELEGATION AND THE DRV REFUSES TO TALK OR ATTEND THE
MEETING, THE GVN WOULD SUFFER A HUMILIATING REBUFF BEFORE WORLD
AND VIETNAMESE OPINION, FOR WHICH WE WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO
SHOW SINCE EVEN OUR GOOD WILL IN CEASING THE BOMBING WOULD
HARDLY BE APPARENT AS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNANNOUNCED AND ONLY
LASTED A DAY. THE STANDING OF THE GVN WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE
AND INTERNATIONALLY COULD BE SEVERELY DAMAGED AND WE, TOO, I
SHOULD THINK, WOULD NOT LOOK TOO GOOD. I NOTE THAT PARIS (REF C)
ALSO SEES DIFFICULTY IN WORKING OUT GVN PARTICIPATION IN A PUBLIC
SESSION.

B. THE DRV COULD ASK US PUBLICLY WHETHER WE HAD CEASED THE
BOMBING AND WHETHER THIS WAS DEFINITIVE AND UNCONDITIONAL. IF
WE DID NOT GIVE A CLEAR ANSWER, AS WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO DO, THEY
WOULD HAVE A PLAUSIBLE BASIS (IN TERMS OF THEIR ESTABLISHED POSITION)
ON WHICH TO REFUSE TO ENGAGE IN "SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS," AND WE
OURSELVES WOULD NOT REALLY BE IN THE STRONG POSITION (PARA 3D,
REF A) THAT IS ENVISAGED BY THE PROPONENTS OF THIS DEVICE.

C. FINALLY, WE WOULD HAVE TO GET GVN CONCURRENCE, WHICH
WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10353(10a)

by *icjpc* NARA. Date 12-28-09

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 39163, OCTOBER 1. NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

2. THE ALTERNATIVE ENVISAGED IN PARA 4 REF A OF FOLLOWING A BOMBING HALT WITH A SESSION AT WHICH DRV WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT FUTURE GVN PARTICIPATION, WOULD BE SOMEWHAT LESS DIFFICULT TO SELL HERE BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT INVOLVE A DANGER OF PUBLIC HUMILIATION. I AM DOUBTFUL HOWEVER THAT THE PROBLEM WOULD BE SOLVED AT THE PUBLIC SESSION ENVISAGED UNDER THIS SCHEME, FOR IT WOULD NOT REALLY GIVE THE DRV A WAY OUT OF THEIR DOCTRINAL POINT THAT THE BOMBING CESSATION MUST PRECEDE ARRANGEMENTS PERMITTING SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE TIME OF THE MEETING ENVISAGED IN PARA 4 B IT WOULD NOT YET BE PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE THAT WE HAD CEASED THE BOMBING NOR (SEE PARA 1B ABOVE) WOULD WE BE ABLE TO SATISFY THE DRV THAT THE CESSATION WAS UNCONDITIONAL.

3. WE REGARD THE IDEA IN PARA 2 OF REF C INVOLVING A PRIVATE RATHER THAN PUBLIC SESSION IMMEDIATELY AFTER A BOMBING HALT, AS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE ALTERNATIVE DISCUSSED ABOVE. PARIS ALSO ENVISAGES THAT IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH THE DRV, A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BOMBING CESSATION WOULD BE MADE PROMPTLY. IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS WORTH POINTING OUT THAT UNDER ANY OF THESE SCHEMES, THE TIME WHEN WE CAN KEEP THE WORLD FROM KNOWING THAT WE HAD STOPPED THE BOMBING OF NVN WOULD IN ANY CASE BE LIMITED. COMUSMACV INFORMS ME THAT IF WE WISH TO BE IN A POSITION TO SAY AT A MEETING IN PARIS AT 1030 PARIS TIME ON A MONDAY, THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO BOMBING FOR THE PRECEDING 24 HOURS, THIS WOULD MEAN A STANDDOWN STARTING FROM 1730 HOURS SAIGON TIME SUNDAY. THE PRESS AT SAIGON GETS PRESS RELEASES EVERY MORNING AND AFTERNOON AND IS REGULARLY BRIEFED ON MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE PRECEDING DAY AT 1630 HOURS SAIGON TIME; SO THAT AT THE TIME OF A MONDAY MORNING MEETING THE STANDDOWN WOULD NOT YET BE PUBLICLY KNOWN; BUT THE NEXT MORNING (0830 HOURS TUESDAY SAIGON TIME, OR 2030 HOURS MONDAY WASHINGTON TIME) THE PRESS WOULD INEVITABLY KNOW THAT THERE HAD BEEN A BOMBING CESSATION.

4. AS FOR THE "SECOND ALTERNATIVE" IN PARA 3 REF C OF GIVING THE DRV ALSO THE OPTION OF FURNISHING ASSURANCES ON GVN PARTICIPATION THROUGH THE SOVIETS, I THINK IT COULD BE COMBINED WITH THE APPROACHES DISCUSSED IN THE PRECEDING TWO PARAGRAPHS. I SEE THIS AS A REFINEMENT OF THE BASIC IDEA, RATHER THAN ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE.

5. RUNNING THROUGH THE DISCUSSION OF THESE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES IS THE BELIEF THAT THE DRV IS ESSENTIALLY CONCERNED WITH "FACE" RATHER THAN OPERATING FROM A COLD CALCULATION OF HOW THEY CAN BEST WRING BENEFIT FROM THE US WITH MINIMAL CONCESSIONS ON THEIR PART. I MUST CONFESS THAT I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT AN ARRANGEMENT THAT ALLOWS THEM TO GIVE IN MORE GRACEFULLY WILL REALLY INDUCE THEM TO ENTER INTO "SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS." THEY MUST KNOW THAT SOONER OR LATER IT WOULD REMAIN NO SECRET FROM THE WORLD THAT THEY HAD HAD TO MAKE IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS IN ORDER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 39163, OCTOBER 1. NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

TO GET THE BOMBING TO STOP. I AM ASSUMING OF COURSE THAT IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTION OF GVN PARTICIPATION WE WOULD HAVE SATISFIED OURSELVES ON THE OTHER ESSENTIAL POINTS (I.E., DMZ AND ATTACKS ON CITIES) BEFORE ANY BOMBING CESSATION IS EXTENDED BEYOND 24 HOURS.

6. HAVING ALREADY COMMENTED ON THE IDEA OF SPLITTING THE NEGOTIATIONS PARA 5 REF A) IN MY MESSAGE OF SEPT 29 (REF B), I WILL JUST CONFINE MYSELF TO RECORDING FULL AGREEMENT WITH PARIS, WHICH HAD ADDED FURTHER REASONS WHY THIS ALTERNATIVE IS UNWORKABLE AND UNDESIRABLE AT THIS TIME. BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

7-110R
611500267 (B)

646
246008

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

Classification

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy PARIS TODEL _____ IMMEDIATE
AmEmbassy SAIGON

27 SEP 68 00 55z

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10354

Pr relies NARA; Date 28-02

STATE 246008
TODEL 1164
NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

FOR AMBASSADORS BUNKER; HARRIMAN 'AND' VANCE 'ONLY'

1. In briefing Thieu on status of Paris talks, Saigon should convey that we have made no substantive advances in our recent exchanges with Tho, although we cannot conclude that DRV has rejected outright our position on GVN representation. Thus we appear at least temporarily stalled over this crucial question.

2. / We have been considering ways to break this logjam. Out of our discussions at working level have emerged two basic devices, on which we would like comments from both Paris and Saigon before review with highest levels. Both devices are attempts to find a way to make a maximum effort to break through on the question of GVN representation, /are premised on fact that ^{would have to be} USG/XX satisfied as to DMZ and attacks on cities.

3. The first device under consideration here would involve informing the Hanoi delegation about five days in advance that:

a) On the following Tuesday bombing would stop but there would be no public announcement;

Dispatched by: U:RHolbrooke:ldp 9/26/68	Int. Co. 6DC5	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: THE SECRETARY
--	------------------	---

U - Under Secretary
White House - Mr. Wostow
S/S - Mr. Walen

OSD - Mr. Nitze
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
EA - Mr. Bundy

~~SECRET~~
Classification

b) On Wednesday serious discussions would begin and we would bring with us to the meeting representatives of the GVN;

c) If serious talks were launched on this basis on Wednesday, we would then announce that bombing had stopped 24 hours earlier and that serious talks were now underway;

d) If talks did not begin, bombing would resume and there would be no announcement. If the fact that there had been a 24-hour standdown over the North leaked, we would be in a strong position, explaining that we had made a major effort to break through in Paris, even taking the risks involved in a short standdown, but it had failed because of DRV rigidity.

4. In a slight variation of this approach, also under discussion here, we would offer the DRV a choice between:

a) agreeing in advance to GVN representation at the Wednesday meeting following the Tuesday cessation; or,

b) coming ~~xxxxxx~~ to the Wednesday meeting which follows the cessation and agreeing at that time to the inclusion of the GVN at the first serious talks which would take place the following day.

COMMENT: This variation would offer the DRV a possible way out of their doctrinal point since it would allow the DRV to make no commitment until after the bombing had stopped. The DRV would know that if they stalled over GVN representation on Wednesday, then we would resume the bombing.

5. The second device under consideration here would propose to Hanoi that:

a) Immediately after the bombing cessation, military representatives



Department of State

Taylor
GINSBURG 9
TELEGRAM

64c

~~SECRET~~

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6501
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1968 SEP 27 AM 8 04

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 21489

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 778

REF: STATE 246008

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RA 10356

By plios NARA, Date 2-8-02

1. WE HAVE STUDIED REFTEL AND HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:
A. THE FIRST DEVICE PROPOSED IN PARA 3 CARRIES THE SERIOUS RISK OF A PUBLIC SPECTACLE IF WE SHOW UP AT WEDNESDAY PLENARY MEETING WITH THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES WITHOUT PRIOR ACCEPTANCE BY DRV. WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW BEFORE THE MEETING ON WEDNESDAY WHETHER OR NOT GVN REPRESENTATION IS ACCEPTABLE ON AN "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" BASIS.

B. THE ALTERNATIVE VARIATIONS IN PARA 4 SEEM PARTIALLY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THIS PROBLEM BUT REQUIRE EITHER THAT THE DRV AGREE IN ADVANCE OF ACTUAL CESSATION OF BOMBING WHICH THE DRV HAS ALREADY REJECTED OR TRYING TO WORK IT OUT IN A PUBLIC SESSION WHICH WE SHOULD SEEK TO AVOID.

C. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SECOND DEVICE PARA 5 REFTEL WOULD PROBABLY BE REJECTED BY BOTH HANOI AND SAIGON. IT DOES NOT SATISFY THE BASIC PROBLEM OF GVN REPRESENTATION IN SERIOUS TALKS WHICH SAIGON HAS EMPHASIZED. IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES PRIOR AGREEMENT BY HANOI ABOUT MEETING IN THE DMZ UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, WE BELIEVE THAT DRV WOULD REJECT THIS AS A DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY. THIS PROPOSAL ALSO RAISES A RANGE OF OTHER PROBLEMS THAT WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO MEET AT THIS TIME.

2. WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING MINOR VARIATION OF FIRST PROPOSAL.

A. INFORM THE DRV ON A WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON AT A SPECIAL PRIVATE MEETING -

1) THAT THE FOLLOWING SUNDAY WE WILL STOP ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIET-NAM AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 21489, SEPTEMBER 27

2) THAT ON MONDAY MORNING FOLLOWING CESSATION WE WISH TO HOLD A PRIVATE MEETING IN PARIS, AT WHICH THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WILL BE TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS TO FOLLOW CESSATION AND THAT WE WILL INSIST ON THE INCLUSION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN ON OUR SIDE

B. INFORM THE SOVIET UNION OF OUR PROPOSED ACTIONS AT THE SAME TIME WE INFORM THE DRV AND SEEK THEIR ACTIVE SUPPORT

C. IF DRV AGREES TO INCLUSION OF GVN, WE MEET ON WEDNESDAY WITH GVN REPRESENTATIVES ON OUR SIDE

D. IF THE DRV DOES NOT AGREE AT MONDAY MEETING TO INCLUSION OF GVN REPRESENTATIVES ON AN "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" BASIS, RESUME THE BOMBING.

E. IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH DRV, MAKE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING PROMPTLY THEREAFTER.

COMMENT: YOU WILL NOTE THAT TIME INTERVALS INVOLVED ARE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS IN DEPARTMENT'S PROPOSAL BUT OUR PROPOSAL AVOIDS PUBLIC SPECTACLE OF WEDNESDAY MEETING WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON PARTICIPATION.

3. A SECOND ALTERNATIVE.

A. INFORM USSR:

(1) THAT WE WILL STOP THE BOMBING IF THE DRV AGREES TO THE INCLUSION OF THE GVN IN THE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL START PROMPTLY AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING.

(2) THAT WE WILL ACCEPT THEIR WORD THAT THE DRV HAS AGREED TO MEET ON AN "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" BASIS PROMPTLY AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, IF THE DRV DO NOT WISH TO TELL US THEMSELVES. HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

66

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, October 1, 1968

Mr. President:

In the attached memo, Nick Katzenbach recommends you receive Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Gligorov.

Pres file

Apparently the Yugoslavs believe this public sign of your interest would help them. From our point of view as well, Nick believes this would be the right kind of sign to give the Russians.

Gligorov is an alert, youngish, highly respected Yugoslav leader. He speaks fair English, but will almost surely choose to use an interpreter. Half an hour at most would be adequate -- but he is only here this week.

W. W. R.

Check with Jim Jones
for a time _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

~~SECRET~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment with Kiro Gligorov,
Vice President of the Yugoslav Federal
Executive Council

Kiro Gligorov (who is a Deputy Prime Minister) is in Washington this week to head the Yugoslav Delegation to the IBRD and IMF meetings. (A biographic sketch is at Tab A.) It was apparent from a talk I had with him yesterday that he was sent here by the Yugoslavs--under IMF cover-- to feel us out on how far we might go to help economically in supporting them with the World Bank and making available Ex-Im loans should the Soviets put the squeeze on them.

We have received an informal feeler from the Yugoslav Embassy, asking whether it would be possible for Gligorov to meet with you for a few minutes this week. The Yugoslavs know of your tight schedule and don't want to make any formal request for an appointment until they are sure you will see him. But they appear to believe that an on-the-record meeting with you would help them vis-a-vis the USSR. In my judgment--in addition to meeting a Yugoslav need--this is the right kind of sign for us to be giving the Soviets right now.

Therefore, I hope that it will be possible for you to see Gligorov for a few minutes some time this week. You need not take a position on specifics, but you can meet both their needs and ours by hearing him out sympathetically.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-11-01

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Recommendation:

That you agree to see Gligorov for a few minutes
this week.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Attachment:

~~SECRET~~ - Biographic Sketch

~~SECRET~~

67

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1968
9:54pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the two memoranda
you requested.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

67a

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM

Subject: The Vice President's Speech of September 30

My reading of the Vice President's speech -- as I understand from the New York Times version that it was delivered -- is that the Vice President would in practice be prepared to stop the bombing on the basis of almost any indication that Hanoi would respect the DMZ.

In short, although the wording of the speech is certainly not totally clear, I would not read it as a categorical statement that he would stop the bombing without anything whatever from North Vietnam. The fact that he would place "key importance" on the DMZ "before taking action" seems to me to point to this interpretation.

At the same time, the thrust of the discussion would be to confine what he would need from North Vietnam to the DMZ, and to **evidence in this respect.**

At a later point in the speech, the Vice President speaks of "taking account of Hanoi's actions and assurances of prompt good faith negotiations." I would not read into this any additional requirement.

Plainly, the Vice President would think in terms of resuming the bombing in the event of "bad faith" on the part of the North Vietnamese.

The above are of course simply verbal interpretations. I have no personal evidence -- direct or indirect, by deed or word -- as to the meaning that may have been intended by the Vice President or by those who participated in the drafting of the speech. I do believe that its meaning is reasonably clear in the sense I have summarized it above.

W.P. Bundy

William P. Bundy

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