

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--|--|---------------------|--------------|
| #2 memo | Rostow to the President, re Korea <i>open 2/14/02</i> 2 p C [Dup. #91a, NSF, CF, KOREA, "Vol. 6, Box 256"] | 10/09/68 | A |
| #2a memo | Rostow to the President, 12:50 p.m. <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p C (duplicate, #40, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 97) [" #91b, see above] | 10/02/68 | A |
| #2b memo | Zwick to the President <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p C (duplicate, #40a, as above) [dup. #91c, see above] | 09/27/68 | A |
| #2c memo | Gaud and Freeman to the President <i>open 2/14/02</i> 2 p C (duplicate, #40b, as above) [Dup. #91d, see above] | 09/18/68 | A |
| #3 note | Rostow to the President, 7:40 p.m. re Vietnam 1 p S <i>DNi NY 019-040-3-1 (1/02)</i> | 10/09/68 | A |
| #3a cable | Intelligence report 4 p S <i>EXempt NY 019-040-3-2</i> | 10/09/68 | A |
| #4 note | Rostow to the President, 7:00 p.m. <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p S (duplicate, #184, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 10) | 10/09/68 | A |
| #4a cable <i>den 6-30-03 NW 02-64</i> | Panama 4872 3 p S (duplicate, #184a, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 10) | 10/09/68 | A |
| #8 note | Rostow to the President, 10:30 a.m. 1 p S <i>DNi NY 019-040-3-3 (1/02)</i> | 10/09/68 | A |
| #8a cable <i>SAM HEB SR-03 NW BAL 02-71</i> | Intelligence report 10 p S | 10/07/68 | A |
| #12 memo | Rostow to the President re Israel <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p C (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 9, 1968") | 10/09/68 | A |

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 98, 10/05-09/68, Box 40

RESTRICTION CODES

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|----------------------|--|---------------------|--------------|
| #14a memo | Katzenbach to the President <i>agen 12-15-95 NLJ 91-103</i> 2 p C (duplicate, #2, NSF, Country File, New Zealand, "Visit of PM Keith J. Holyoake") | 10/08/68 | A |
| #14b rpt | re DOD Procurement <i>agen 12-15-95 NLJ 91-103</i> 2 p C (duplicate, #2a, as above) | n.d. | A |
| #15 memo | Rostow to the President, 10:15 a.m. <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p S re Paris talks | 10/09/68 | A |
| #16a cable | Saigon 39892 <i>open 4/15/03 NLJ/KAC 02-72</i> 1 p S | 10/09/68 | A |
| #17 note | Rostow to the President, 9:05 a.m. <i>open 9-25-97 NLJ 97-14</i> 1 p C re Czechoslovakia | 10/09/68 | A |
| #17a cable | Prague 3820 <i>opened NLJ 97-158 11-17-98</i> 3 p C | 10/09/68 | A |
| #18 note | Rostow to the President, 9:00 a.m. 1 p C re Vietnam <i>with Sanit NLJ 014040-3 (1/02)</i> | 10/09/68 | A |
| #18a cable | Bunker 171 091116Z <i>open 4/15/03 NLJ/KAC 02-72</i> 1 p C | 10/09/68 | A |
| #20 note | Rostow to the President, 6:10 p.m. <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p TS | 10/08/68 | A |
| #24 memo | Rostow to the President, 4:05 p.m. 1 p S re Greece <i>open NA 21-03</i> <i>dup #18b, re, Spec. Head of St, Israel 8/11/68 - 12/12/68, by 27</i> | 10/08/68 | A |
| #24a memo | Katzenbach to the President <i>Open 6-30-03 NLJ 02-109</i> 4 p S | 10/03/68 | A |
| #25 memo | Rostow to the President, 3:40 p.m. <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p C (duplicate, #249, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. X Sanitized, NLJ 84-196) | 10/08/68 | A |

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|------------------|--|----------|-------------|
| #26 note | Rostow to the President, 3:20 p.m. <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p S (duplicate, #248, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. X Sanitized, NLJ 84-196) | 10/08/68 | A |
| #31 note | Rostow to the President, 2:05 p.m. <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p S re Berlin | 10/08/68 | A |
| #31a note | Katzenbach to the President <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p S | 10/08/68 | A |
| #31b draft | Draft letter, LBJ to Mayor Schuetz <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p PCI | n.d. | A |
| #31e draft | Alternative draft letter, LBJ to Schuetz <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p PCI | 10/08/68 | A |
| #35a memo | Katzenbach to the President <i>open 2/14/02</i> 2 p C re foreign visitors | 10/05/68 | A |
| #37 memo | Rostow to the President, 12:20 p.m. <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p S <i>Dupe in file of WHR BOX 2 ATGS JULY-DEC. 68) (C) #31</i> | 10/08/68 | A |
| #39a memo | Intelligence report 6 pp S <i>sanitized 5129103 NLJ 02-101 + NLJ 94-288</i> (duplicate, #48b, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3) | 10/07/68 | A |
| #45a cable | Bunker Kathmandu 164 1 p S <i>SANITIZED NY 019-040-3 (1/02)</i> | 10/08/68 | A |
| #47b cable | Saigon 072340Z, Abrams to Rostow <i>open 4/15/03 NLJ/MAC 02-72</i> 1 p S | 10/07/68 | A |
| #48 note | Rostow to the President, 7:45 p.m. <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p S re U.K. | 10/07/68 | A |
| #48a cable | Prime Minister Wilson to LBJ <i>open 2/14/02</i> 2 p S | 10/07/68 | A |
| #53 cable | White House 072101Z to Bunker and Abrams 1 p S <i>open 4/15/03 NLJ/MAC 02-72</i> | 10/07/68 | A |

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|---|--|---------------------|--------------|
| #56a memo 2 p TS | Ginsburgh to Rostow, "Rules of Retaliation" open 5-14-93 NLS 91-479 | 10/07/68 | A |
| #57 note sumitized S 13-03 NW/RA 102-73 | Rostow to the President, 1:40 p.m. re Israel 1 p S | 10/07/68 | A |
| #59 note 1 p S | Rostow to the President, 11:15 a.m. open 2/14/02 | 10/07/68 | A |
| #59a cable 3 p S | Saigon 39695 Corrected Copy open 2/14/02 | 10/07/68 | A |
| #62a cable 3 p S | CAP 82501, Rostow to Bunker OPEN S 13-03 NW/RA 102-73 | 09/30/68 | A |
| #62b cable 1 p S | Bunker 034 to Rostow OPEN S 13-03 NW/RA 102-73 | 10/02/68 | A |
| #63a cable 1 p S | Seoul 10274 open 2/14/02 (dup., #96, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, 1968, Vol. 18) | 10/07/68 | A |
| #64 cable 4 p S | CAP 82513 re Australia Open NLT 97-136 9-2-98 dup in 132a, NSF Agency File, VN, vol. 11 Box 70 | 10/06/68 | A |
| #65 memo 1 p S | Rostow to the President open 2/14/02 (dup., #71, NSF, Country File, Mexico, Vol. 4) | 10/05/68 | A |
| #65a memo 3 p S | Intelligence report sanitized 9-19-95 NLS 93-117 (dup., #71b, as above) same sanitization 9-16-95 NLS 98-057 [dup & 56a, Mexico, vol. 4, Box 60] same sanitization 5/29/03 NLT 02-101 | 10/04/68 | A |
| #65b cable 2 p S | Intelligence report open 9-3-96 NLS 95-02 appeal ES exempt 9-1-95 NW 96-122 (dup., #71d, as above) | 10/05/68 | A |
| #66a memo 4 p S | Katzenbach to the President open 2-16-01 (dup., #72a, NSF, Nsc History, Pueblo Crisis, 1968 Vol. 8, Part 17) | n.d. | A |

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|------------------------|---|---------------------|--------------|
| #66b rpt | Tab A <i>open 2/14/02</i> 2 p S (dup., # 72b, NSF, Nsc History, Pueblo Crisis, 1968 Vol. 8, Part 17) | n.d. | A |
| #66c rpt | Tab B, Draft Press Statement <i>open 2/14/02</i> 3 p S (dup., #72c., as above) | n.d. | A |
| #68a cable | Saigon 39594 <i>open 2/14/02</i> 14 pp C | 10/05/68 | A |
| #70 note | Rostow to the President, 2:15 p.m. 1 p S <i>sanitized 5/29/03 NLJ 02-102</i> (near duplicate, #39, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3) | 10/05/68 | A |
| #70a cable | Intelligence report 3 p S <i>Exempt 5/29/03 NLJ 02-101</i> (dup., #39a, as above) | 10/05/68 | A |
| #73 note | Rostow to the President, 2:00 p.m. <i>open 2/14/02</i> 1 p S | 10/05/68 | A |
| #73a letter | Prime Minister Eshkol to LBJ 9 pp PCI <i>open 4/29/03</i> Dup. # 19, NSF, CF, 6 pieces Vol. 9, box 127 | 09/29/68 | A |
| #74 note | Rostow to the President, 1:45 p.m. <i>open 9-19-96 NLJ 95345</i> 1 p S [dup # 148a, UN Agency File, Vol 11] | 10/05/68 | A |
| #74a cable | USUN 6862 <i>Open NLJ 97-136 8-2-98</i> 4 p S [dup # 148c, UN Agency File, Vol 11] | 10/04/68 | a |
| #74b draft | draft State cable to USUN " " " " " " 4 p S [dup # 148e, UN Agency File Vol 11] | n.d. | A |

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| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------|--|--------------------|--------------|
| 20a memo | Intelligence Memorandum <i>Ami 9-13-87 NLJ 03-182</i> 3 p TS | 10/8/68 | A |
| 22 note | Rostow to the President, 6:05 p.m. 1 p S Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 21, 6/26/84 | 10/8/68 | A |
| 22a memo | to Walt Rostow 1 p S Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 24, 9/25/84 | 10/8/68 | A |
| 22b chart | Figure 1 <i>open 3-17-05 NW 03-184</i> 1 p S Exempt, NLJ/CBS 4, 12/7/83 | 9/10/68 | A |
| 22c chart | Figure 4 1 p S <i>open 3-17-05 NW 03-184</i> Exempt, NLJ/CBS 4, 12/7/83 | 9/10/68 | A |
| 27a memo | William Lemnitzer to Rostow 2 pp TS <i>open 3-4-04 NW 03-183</i> Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 26, 10/9/84 | 10/7/68 | A |
| 27b report | Bombing Effects Spread Sheet 10 pp TS <i>open 3-17-05 NW 03-184</i> Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 4, 12/7/83 | 10/4/68 | A |
| 38 note | Rostow to the President, 12:15 p.m. 1 p S <i>open 2-26-04 NW 03-87</i> | 10/8/68 | A |
| 43 note | Rostow to the President, 10:30 a.m. 1 p TS <i>open 2-26-04 NW 03-87</i> | 10/8/68 | A |
| 43a report | Intelligence Report 1 p TS <i>sanitized 6/16/83 NW 03-79</i> | 10/7/68 | A |
| 46a report | Intelligence Report 1 p TS Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 2, 7/5/84 <i>more info released 9-13-87 NLJ 03-182</i> | 10/7/68 | A |

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|--------------------|--|--------------------|--------------|
| 52 memo | Rostow to the President, 5:10 p.m. 3 pp Sanitized 2-26-01 NLJ 03-87 | 10/7/68 | A |
| 52a cable | Intelligence Report 4 pp S Sanitized 3-17-05 NY 03-185 | 10/7/68 | A |
| 67 note | Rostow to the President, 3:45 p.m. open 616103 NY 03-80 1 p TS | 10/5/68 | A |
| 67a cable | Intelligence Report 6 pp TS Sanitized 3-17-05 NY 03-185 | 10/5/68 | A |
| 79 note | Rostow to the President, 10:55 a.m. open 616103 NY 03-80 1 p TS | 10/5/68 | A |
| 79a report | Intelligence report 1 p TS Sanitized 9-13-07 NLJ 03-182 | [10/68] | A |
| 80 memo | Rostow to the President, 9:55 a.m. 1 p TS open 2-26-01 NY 03-87 | 10/5/68 | A |
| 80a memo | Intelligence Memorandum 5 pp TS Sanitized 6-16-03 NY 03-79 | 10/5/68 | A |
| 80b map | Map 1 p S Sanitized 9-13-07 NLJ 03-182 | [10/68] | A |

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Wednesday, October 9, 1968
12:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft statement on
the non-proliferation treaty, as cleared
by Sec. Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

1
Rusk file

1a

DRAFT STATEMENT FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have worked over these many years for a Non-Proliferation Treaty for one basic reason: it is in the interest of the United States and the people of the United States, including generations unborn. Every American President who has borne responsibility in the nuclear age has known that the danger to the United States would multiply as additional nations built nuclear weapons and there were additional fingers on nuclear triggers.

Our work with the Soviet Union on the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not a matter of detente and bridge-building; it was a matter of carrying out a United States interest which the Soviet Union happened to share for its own reasons.

If the United States does not proceed to ratify this Treaty promptly, the forces at work in other countries against the Treaty will quickly gain strength. There are those who are reluctant to abandon the option of nuclear weapons. This is perhaps understandable on narrow nationalist grounds; although in every case it is our objective judgment that their security would be diminished, not increased, by developing small national nuclear capabilities. But so far as the United States is concerned, additional nuclear powers could disrupt existing reliable security arrangements and gravely increase the risk of nuclear war.

Those who would now postpone action by the United States on the Non-Proliferation Treaty must assume, in my judgment, the grave

responsibility for risking its failure. If we let momentum fall away now the forces against the Treaty may gather momentum and it may be most difficult to find the political basis for the Non-Proliferation Treaty next year.

I cannot guarantee that if we now go forward to ratify the Treaty in the Senate we can bring all nations along. But I can tell you that our chance of doing so will be greatly reduced and the kind of world we want for our children and grandchildren -- and for all humanity -- may, after years of patient and devoted work on the Treaty, slip away from us.

As President, I cannot see this happen without calling publicly to the attention of the Leaders of the Senate the consequences of a postponement, as Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and I have done on a number of occasions. I understand the shortness of time and the pressures that are inevitable in a Presidential election year. But I ask you to pause; to consider the stakes; and to act now with the highest interests of the nation and of the human family in mind.

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 29 #205

By JC. NARA, Date 1-25-02

2

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, October 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL-480 Rice for Korea

Pres file

You asked me to look further into the Purcell amendment and the rice package for Korea. The Purcell amendment requires, in the case of the PL-480 credit portion of the sale, that the Koreans make an additional cash payment to cover U.S. expenses and other specified uses, unless you determine this would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act.

The recommendation is that you so determine. These are the reasons:

1. The PL-480 rice is part of a 400,000 ton package that has an exceptionally good commercial portion.

-- 245,000 pounds, valued at almost \$42 million, is under PL-480 terms: This includes the usual 5 percent cash down payment and the balance payable in dollars over forty years. In itself this is a shift for Korea from local currency to dollar repayable terms. This shift is in accordance with the objectives of the Act.

-- 100,000 tons, valued at \$17 million, is a straight commercial CCC transaction repayable in dollars in three years, one-third each year.

-- 55,000 tons, valued at \$9 million, is for cash.

2. It would have been possible to apply the straight cash portion of the transaction to the PL-480 part of the package. This would have met the Purcell amendment requirement but would have been less advantageous to us. We would have gotten these dollar receipts over the course of a year but under the present package, we receive the cash payment immediately. Furthermore, the commercial part of the package would be smaller. This would be inconsistent with the stated objective in the Act to build up commercial markets.

3. As the previous memo pointed out, we are competing with the Japanese. The Koreans, mindful of their long-term interest,

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might be pushed further but we cannot be sure. There would be a risk. In any event, there would be more delay and some balking at reopening what seemed in the preliminary negotiation to be a fair deal for both of us.

Our prospective rice surplus situation is a further point. If the 400,000 ton Korean sale does not go through, this rice would be added to our carryover at a storage cost of almost \$3 million a year. In addition, we would lose the immediate budgetary and balance of payments gain of the cash part of the sale.

In the legislative history, Parcell and the full Agriculture Committee made it clear that the amendment was a best effort rather than a mandatory provision. Furthermore, in executive session, the Committee said that this and other amendments should be applied with maximum flexibility in the case of Korea and Vietnam. A Parcell waiver on this agreement should cause no problem on the Hill.

I believe that waiver of the Parcell amendment on this deal is consistent with the objectives of the Act and justified on commercial grounds. I recommend you approve negotiation of the agreement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ER

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION 2a

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, October 2, 1968

12:50 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of P. L. 480 Rice for Korea

Attached is a Zwick-Gaud-Freeman request for your authority to negotiate a P. L. 480 agreement with Korea for 245,000 tons of rice. The proposed agreement, amounting to \$41.7 million, would be repayable in convertible local currency over a forty-year period.

Serious drought for a second year is expected to leave Korea without an adequate supply of grains. Korea offers timely outlet for our rice surplus.

In addition to the 245,000 tons on P. L. 480 terms, Korea would agree to buy 155,000 tons on 35-month Commodity Credit Corporation terms.

Japan has made an offer of rice to Korea on very liberal terms. To meet that competition, Freeman and Gaud believe we should offer the proposed package now.

Account will be taken of the local currency generated in this sale when the Economic Assistance Program for Korea is submitted for your approval in November.

The recent Purcell Amendment to P. L. 480 requires in the case of credit sales that a cash payment be made to cover U. S. expenses and other specified uses, unless you determine that it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act. Freeman and Gaud recommend that you make such a determination by approving this proposal, since they expect we would lose the sale if we insisted on the cash payment.

State and AID report that Korea continues to satisfy the requirements of the Symington Amendment concerning military expenditures.

State also concurs in the above proposal.

Recommendation:

That you approve negotiation of this agreement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
Call me _____

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 1-25-02

AJenkins:mm

CONFIDENTIAL

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

SEP 27 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Rice Shipment to Korea

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your approval to negotiate a P. L. 480 agreement with Korea for 245,000 tons of rice. The agreement, amounting to \$41.7 million, is repayable in convertible local currency over a forty-year period.

A serious drought is expected to leave Korea without an adequate supply of grains. Korea thus offers a timely outlet for our rice surplus. In addition to the 245,000 tons of rice on P. L. 480 credit terms, Korea agrees to buy 155,000 tons of U. S. rice on 35-month CCC credit terms.

Japan presents an alternative source of rice for Korea and has made an offer on very liberal terms. In order to meet the Japanese competition, Freeman and Gaud believe we have to offer the Koreans the proposed package now.

This proposal will be negotiated separately from our CY 1969 economic assistance program to Korea (P. L. 480, supporting assistance and development loans) which will be submitted for your approval in November. However, we will take into account the local currency generated by this rice sale when we review the level of our support for the Korean budget.

Purcell Amendment - A recent amendment to P. L. 480 requires in the case of credit sales that a cash payment be made to cover U. S. expenses and other specified uses, unless you determine that it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act. Because they expect we would lose the commercial sale if we insisted on the cash payment, Freeman and Gaud recommend that you make such a determination by approving this proposal.

Military Expenditures - State/AID reports that Korea continues to satisfy the requirements of the Symington Amendment.

I recommend that you approve this agreement.

Charles J. Zwirk

Charles J. Zwirk
Director

Attachment _____

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2c

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MEMORANDUM

SEP 18 1968

To: The President
Subject: Title I Public Law 480 Program with Korea

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Korea a PL 480 convertible local currency credit sale of \$41.7 million for about 245,000 tons of rice including cost of ocean transportation. Payment terms would provide for 31 approximately equal annual payments, initial interest rate during ten-year grace period of 2 percent, and the continuing interest rate 2-1/2 percent. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

For the second consecutive year Korea has suffered drought in the Southeastern Provinces, a principal rice producing area. Korea's 1967 rice production was down about 300,000 tons below the 1966 crop and current estimates for the 1968 crop are down 200,000 tons below the 1967 crop. The ROKG has held exploratory discussions with Japan relating to a payment in kind transaction on most favorable terms for from 300 to 500,000 tons of rice but has now indicated terms along the lines of the above proposal for the purchase of U.S. rice will be acceptable. In addition to the 245,000 tons under Title I, the Korean Government has agreed to purchase 155,000 tons of rice from the United States using their own foreign exchange and up to 36 months CCC credit. This amount, together with other Free World purchases will give Korea assurances of being able to meet their rice import requirements, and will enable us to move a substantial part of our larger 1968 rice crop.

Military Expenditure Review

State/AID concluded that U.S. Development Assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, PL 480 sales proceeds and Korea's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditure to a degree that would materially interfere with its development.

Self-Help Measures

New self-help measures were included in the agreement signed with Korea May 10, 1968. No new self-help measures are proposed for this agreement. In the immediate month ahead, consideration will be given to additional wheat, feed grains and other commodities together with supporting assistance for CY 1969 and self-help measures will be considered at that time.

The proceeds accruing to the importing country from the sale of rice in this agreement would be devoted to the achievement of the agricultural self-help measures set forth in the May 10, 1968 agreement and to efforts to alleviate drought effects in the Southeastern Provinces in Korea.

DECLASSIFIED

AID guidelines 10/16/95
Agriculture guidelines 10/28/82

Authority
By jc NARA, Date 1-25-02

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2


Requirement for Advance Payment of Dollars or Foreign Currencies

The recent extension and amendments to PL 480 provide that, except where it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act, we require a cash payment in credit sales agreements of the amount needed for U. S. expenditures and for other specified uses in the Act. We believe with the foreign exchange purchase Korea will be required to make under this proposal and the alternative most favorable terms being offered by Japan, to insist on a further hardening of the terms by requiring a currency use payment would make it impossible at this time to negotiate this agreement and would lose to the U. S. a cash dollar market for 155,000 tons of rice. We therefore recommend no currency use payment be required for this agreement.


Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 agreement as described above.

September 12 1968



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Date: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 9, 1968 -- 7:40 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Thieu's own view of the alleged coup plotting.

The key sections are marked in red; the summary at the beginning and the skeptical field comment at the end.

My only comment is: Ellsworth ought to stay close by in Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A



~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-040-3-1-6

SANTITIZED
Authority NLJ 019-040-3-1
By [Signature], NARA, Date 1/20/02

4

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 9, 1968
7:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The attached indicates that there are now again thoughts within the National Guard in Panama of a coup against Arias.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

Panama 4872

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *je/jw*, NARA, Date 1-25-02

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PAGE 01 PANAMA 04872 092152Z

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ACTION SS 30

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FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4923
INFO PANCANAL GOVT IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO IMMEDIATE
ANALYSIS UNIT IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 (d/1834)
NLJ 02-140 and NLS/RAC 99-1
By NSA/NARA, Date 6-26-03

~~SECRET~~ PANAMA 4872

IMMEDIATE/EXDIS

FOR ASST SECRETARY OLIVER AND SANDERS ARA/PANNEL

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE NEW
CRISIS IN NATIONAL GUARD

1. NEW GN CRISIS IS PRESENTLY IN THE MAKING. DEPT HAS BY NOW RECEIVED REPORTS SUBMITTED THIS MORNING THROUGH INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS.

2. AT NOONTIME COL URRUTIA ASKED MLGP CMDR SEDDON TO COME TO HIS OFFICE WHERE HE EXPLAINED THAT PRESIDENT ARIAS WAS NOT KEEPING HIS EARLIER PROMISES RELATIVE TO THE GN AND THAT THE GN OFFICERS FEARED THE PRESIDENT WAS EVENTUALLY GOING TO DESTROY THE GN ORGANIZATION. AS EXAMPLES OF BROKEN PROMISES HE MENTIONED (1) ARIAS' LATEST INTENT NOT FORMALLY TO NAME PINILLA AS FIRST COMMANDANT BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE OF FUNDS AND (2) ARIAS' STATEMENT TO URRUTIA (WHICH URRUTIA SAYS HE DID NOT PASS ON TO THE OFFICERS CONCERNED) THAT TORRIJOS AND BORIS MARTINEZ WOULD HAVE TO GO. URRUTIA DID NOT MENTION TO SEDDON ANYTHING ABOUT A COUP.

2. URRUTIA SAID HE WANTED TO BE SURE THAT AMBASSADOR ADAIR WAS AWARE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THAT HE WOULD LIKE AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH ME. HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY ASK SEDDON TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT FOR HIM. SEDDON PROMISED TO CONVEY URRUTIA'S EXPLANATION TO ME. SEDDON, HAVING TALKED WITH ME

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~~PAGE 02 PANAMA 04872 092152Z~~

BEFORE MEETING URRUTIA, TOLD THE LATTER THAT THE AMBASSADOR COULD NOT INVOLVE HIMSELF IN CHANGES OF PERSONNEL IN THE GN. SEDDON ALSO COMMENTED THAT AS CMDR IN CHIEF THE PRESIDENT HAD RIGHT TO ASSIGN GN OFFICERS AS HE DEEMED FIT. URRUTIA ACKNOWLEDGED THIS BUT ADDED THAT THE OFFICERS "WERE NOT FOOLS AND COULD SEE THE HANDWRITING ON THE WALL."

3. A FEW MINUTES AFTER TALKING TO URRUTIA THIS NOON, SEDDON TALKED WITH VALLARINO WHO TOLD HIM THE OUTLOOK WAS NOT GOOD AND THAT HE SHOULD WATCH DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY. HE EXPECTED TROUBLE--NOT NOW--BUT IN ABOUT SIX MONTHS TIME.

4. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER I SHOULD SPEAK WITH URRUTIA AND IF SO WHAT TO TELL HIM. MY DOOR HAS ALWAYS BEEN OPEN TO ANYONE WANTING TO SEE ME. IF URRUTIA CALLS ON ME, ARIAS WILL KNOW IT SOON THEREAFTER. I FEEL IT WOULD BE ALMOST IMPERATIVE FOR ME TO TELL ARIAS OF URRUTIA'S CALL. URRUTIA PROBABLY WOULD NOT OBJECT. BY SUCH ACTION I AND THE USG WOULD BE IN THE MIDDLE. OTHER GN OFFICERS AS WELL AS POLITICAL SUPPORTERS OF BOTH ARIAS AND SAMUDIO WOULD SOON KNOW OF MY INVOLVEMENT.

5. IF ARIAS AND THE GN SHOULD BECOME RECONCILED THEREAFTER, WE MIGHT GAIN GOOD WILL. IF THE GN SHOULD RELUCTANTLY ABANDON THE REPORTED BUT STILL UNVERIFIED PLANS FOR A COUP ON GROUNDS OF AN INFERRED DISAPPROVAL ON PART OF US AFTER MY TALK WITH URRUTIA, THE OPPOSITION PRESS WOULD PROBABLY CHARGE INTERFERENCE AND CLAIM THIS WAS PROOF OF US SUPPORT OF ARIAS IN THE RECENT ELECTIONS.

6. IF A COUP OCCURS AND URRUTIA SHOULD CLAIM HE ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT BEFOREHAND WITH THE US AMBASSADOR AND WAS REFUSED, WE MAY COME IN FOR CRITICISM FROM OTHER SOURCES.

7. IN THE EVENT URRUTIA SHOULD COME TO MY OFFICE, I COULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
(1) THE USG HAS MADE CLEAR ITS STAND ON RESPECT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. (2) USG HAS MAINTAINED STRICTLY NEUTRAL ATTITUDE IN PANAMA'S RECENT ELECTIONS AND DOES NOT INTEND TO INTERFERE IN PANAMA'S DOMESTIC POLITICS. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC AND GN IS DOMESTIC MATTER.
(3) PANAMA HAS ESTABLISHED REPUTATION IN RECENT YEARS FOR LAW AND ORDER. PANAMA HAS COMPLETED THREE 4-YEAR TERMS OF OFFICE

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~~PAGE 03 PANAMA 04872 092152Z~~

WITHOUT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE. THESE ARE IMPORTANT FACTS TO BEAR IN MIND RELATIVE TO GOP'S IMAGE BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD.

(4) I TRUST THAT WHATEVER GN DOES, IT WILL HAVE GOOD OF COUNTRY AT HEART RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL ADVANTAGE.

(5) SUGGEST THAT GN MAKE EVERY EFFORT RESOLVE ITS PROBLEMS THROUGH PEACEFUL DISCUSSIONS.

8. I PROPOSE (BUT WILL AWAIT DEPT REPLY) TO SEND SEDDON BACK TO URRUTIA TO SAY HE HAS GIVEN ME URRUTIA'S MESSAGE N THAT I APPRECIATE THE INFORMATION AND THAT I HOPE DIFFERENCES CAN BE RESOLVED THROUGH FRIENDLY REASON AND DISCUSSION. IF URRUTIA AGAIN RAISES POINT OF MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR, SEDDON WOULD TELL HIM THE DOOR OF MY OFFICE WAS ALWAYS OPEN AND IF HE WANTED TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT SEDDON WOULD ARRANGE IT. IF URRUTIA ASKS FOR THE APPOINTMENT, SEDDON WILL TELL URRUTIA THAT I WOULD PROBABLY FEEL COMPELLED TO INFORM PRES ARIAS OF THE DISCUSSION.

9. IF URRUTIA COMES TO MY OFFICE, I WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH ARIAS M FAILURE TO DO THE LATTER WOULD ALMOST INEVITABLY LEAD TO GREATER CRITICISM OF US INVOLVEMENT IF A COUP WERE TO FOLLOW MY TALK WITH URRUTIA.

10. EMBASSY HAS NO HARD EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD SUPPORT CLAIM OF SOME GN OFFICERS THAT ARIAS IS PLANNING TO DESTROY THE GN ALTHOUGH INTELLIGENCE REPORTS DO INDICATE THAT ARIAS IS PLANNING FURTHER CHANGES TO CONSOLIDATE HIS CONTROL OVER THE GN. ON THE CONTRARY, THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY ARIAS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE INAUGURATION BESPARE RESPECT FOR GN AND INTENT NOT ONLY TO PRESERVE PROMOTION SYSTEM BUT TO RAISE SALARIES. TORRIJOS AND BORIS MARTINEZ ARE BOTH STRONG-MINDED OFFICERS AND BEING THE MOST VULNERABLE MAY WELL BE THE FORCE BEHIND THE PRESENT CRISIS.

STATE PASS TO CIA

ADAIR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, October 9, 1968 - 7:00pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres. file

If you are here on Friday, can we schedule an appointment for French Foreign Minister Debre, as well as British Foreign Minister Stewart?

You previously approved an appointment with Stewart. It is scheduled for 5:30 on Friday.

Debre, who will be in Washington between noon October 10 to noon October 12, understands that an appointment with you is tentative. If you are here, I recommend you see him. Secretary Rusk's previous recommendation is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange appointment with Debre _____

No _____

Call me _____

ERF
ERF:mm

PROCESSED
White House Communications Section
By *19* (NAME), LEO 2-193

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2970
5a
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Call on You by
French Foreign Minister

Recommendation:

That you meet for a half hour with the French Foreign Minister, Michel Debre, between noon October 10 and noon October 12 at a time convenient to you.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The French Foreign Minister, Michel Debre, will attend the General Assembly session at New York, and will visit Washington during October 10-12. I plan to give a lunch here for him on October 12.

The French Ambassador in a formal note has submitted a request for Debre to pay a courtesy call on you. Ambassador Shriver has warmly endorsed this request, as a contribution to the improved atmosphere of relations with France. In addition, this would be an important gesture of reciprocity, since General de Gaulle has always granted requests to receive United States officials.

I hope you can find the time to meet with Mr. Debre.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

*People**6*

VIA JIM JONES

Wednesday, Oct. 9, 1968
1:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith notes on paras. 2 and 3 of attached memorandum covering questions for your 1:30 p. m. discussion today with Ray Scherer.

Vietnam

The Paris talks have been useful because the other side now knows fully and clearly our position. Our position to them is no different than our position as publicly expressed. Whether they move is something that the President -- for anyone else in the Government -- can confidently predict. But contrary to newspaper stories, the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, and the Paris and Saigon teams are 100% together on our negotiating position. This was not inevitable; and a Government can operate with differences of view. But it happens to be a hard fact.

With respect to the military position, it is good and getting better. The President and Gen. Abrams are agreed that we should let the facts speak for themselves. We are not out trumpeting about victory or an imminent enemy collapse. We have no evidence that this will happen. We do have the most solid kind of evidence, however, that the enemy's military plans and hopes have been frustrated and that he is hurting badly.

With respect to the government in Saigon, our impression is that it is gaining in popular support, in competence, and stability. It is unnecessary to point out that a constitutional government built during this kind of war is a precarious -- even gallant -- enterprise. But we are encouraged.

So far as peace talks are concerned, we believe the government ^{in Saigon} can handle the political consequences of peace talks so long as they are participants -- at the center of the negotiation. What would disrupt the government is any suggestion that we would negotiate the political future of the South without the government's participation. I can assure you that we will not do this.

As for the Vietnam discussion during the campaign, we cannot assess its impact on Hanoi. The simple truth is that they have rejected the position of all three candidates. They may still be hoping for a cave-in in U. S. public support for the war, but they must weigh this against the possibility that their bargaining positions six months from now, or a year from now, would be less than at present because of the progress of the South Vietnamese government; the expansion and improvement of the ARVN; and the effectiveness of General Abrams' military operations in the field.

As for moving Hanoi, we have done everything that we know how; but we ask ourselves every day if there is anything more that we could do to move them towards an honorable peace. Contrary to a popular view, this government is full of energy and imagination and very active in ways that cannot now be revealed.

As for the President's view of his Presidency, he can only say -- as he said on the day he assumed the office -- that he has been the best President he knows how to be. The issues -- foreign and domestic -- with which any President is confronted at this time in our history are so great that no Administration can expect neat, tidy, and final results. It is the President's hope and belief that what he has done in foreign policy was right in Vietnam and Asia; in Latin America and Africa; in the Middle East; in dealings with the Soviet Union; and in monetary and trade affairs. But it is certainly true that the next President will have plenty to do. This is a world which is full of dangerous and explosive forces. The next President will also be called in the night and have to face the test of crisis decisions.

On the whole, the things that have happened between the end of 1963 and 1968 have, on balance, been positive. But we shall have to leave a good deal of the assessment to history.

At home, the President is confident that the legislative achievements of these years will stand the test of time, as will the progress made in civil rights. Both abroad and at home these have been years of action and turbulence. And there is an understandable reaction in the country on the questions of race and Vietnam. But the President has faith that the country is not about to lose its equilibrium and sense of direction. He hopes that his children and grandchildren will look back with pride at what was done in these years. But, in any case, he will leave with a clear conscience.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM JONES

FROM: Loyd Hackler

Ray Scherer, NBC, wants to get the President's latest thinking on several subjects at his meeting set for 1:30 p.m. Wednesday. Scherer wants to reflect that thinking in a series of speeches he is making next week before NBC correspondents at regional meetings. He has talked to the President briefly about it.

He would like to hear the President discuss:

1. How the President feels about the elections. What can the President do to help Vice President Humphrey? How does he view the Wallace threat? Is there time for the Vice President to catch Mr. Nixon? How would the President view Mr. Nixon's presidency if he is elected?
2. What is the President's present thinking about Vietnam, and the Paris talks? Does the President feel the military aspect of the war is progressing? Does the President feel that the South Vietnamese government is gaining in popular support, and can it withstand the stresses of a "peaceful settlement?" How does the President view the course of the Paris talks? Does the President feel the discussion on Vietnam in the campaign has been enlightening or harmful? Is there anything the President can do to move Hanoi?
3. How does the President view his presidency as it nears its end? Is he buoyed by the review of the tremendous accomplishments? Is he disappointed as it nears its end?

Scherer understands the meeting is off-the-record. He also would like to hear the President discuss any subject which the President would like reflected in Scherer's appearances before NBC correspondents.

7
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

Wednesday, October 9, 1968

1:15 p. m.

Profile

Mr. President:

Herewith the text on the tea break.

Worth reading for underlined passages.

The most forthcoming business yet with Hanoi -- but still utterly inconclusive.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 22106
(DELTO 885)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 2-7-93

WWRostow:rlh

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~~SECRET/MARVAN/PLUS~~

PARIS 22106 (DELTO 885), October 9, 1968

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7LJ 91-478

By ag/jw, NARA, Date 2-17-93

1. Le Duc Tho, Xuan Thuy and Lau joined us during the tea break, which lasted about 30 minutes.
2. After a few minutes of non-substantive conversation, they said they would like to hear about Vance's visit to the United States.
3. We said that Vance had returned directly to Washington where he met with the President and subsequently with Secretary Rusk.
4. We said Vance had reported on the various matters which have been discussed in our private meetings here in Paris.
5. In accordance with understanding between Vance and Secretary Rusk to hammer first on issue of GVN representation, we followed the outline Vance had worked out with Secretary Rusk.
6. We said we could confirm as a result of Vance's conversations in the US, that the issue of the inclusion of GVN in the negotiations which would follow a cessation of bombing was utterly indispensable.
7. We said that each of us recognizes that the other has strong views on this matter. But the question is not whether the two sides like each other, but rather whether they are prepared to sit down together and talk about how to make peace.
8. We said we had already opened the door by agreeing to have the NLF or anyone else the DRV wishes on their side. We have made it clear that it is indispensable that the GVN participate on our side.
9. We said it was up to the DRV now to understand the realities of the situation. We added that all the crises that we have known about in recent years have been resolved by contact between the parties. We saw no reason why this situation should be any different from all the others.
10. We said we would like to know whether they had anything new to say on this subject.
11. Thuy said that we did not have enough time to discuss this subject at the tea break and suggested a private meeting. Tho then said, "If you want to discuss this matter further we are prepared to do so." He added that speaking in the Majestic would not be convenient -- gesturing toward the walls and ceiling.

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-2-

He suggested we fix a date immediately. Thuy said in this connection the position of the two sides are clear but since we wished to further discuss the matter, the DRV is willing to do so. Tho concluded by saying that what is necessary is good will and serious intent and that the DRV has such an attitude.

12. We then fixed the time and place of the meeting for Friday at 9:30 am at our house (the one the agency has hired for us).

13. We then gave Thuy a memorandum concerning Christmas packages for the captured pilots. Thuy said they would study it and give us their comments later.

Harriman

~~SECRET~~

8

Wednesday, Oct. 9, 1968
10:30 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I recommend that you read to the end
this probably accurate account of the De Gaulle-
Kiesinger exchanges. The flirtation with Paris
is over -- with a vengeance!

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment



25X1A

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ-019-040-3-3
By [signature], NARA, Date 1/20/02

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

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IN 06764

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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EXC DDI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

[Redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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CITE

[Redacted]

DIST 7 OCTOBER 1968

COUNTRY: WEST GERMANY/FRANCE

DOI :

[Redacted]

47Z OCT 68

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT: AHLERS' OFF-THE-RECORD COMMENTS ON DE GAULLE'S VISIT
TO BONN

ACQ :

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SOURCE :

[Redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SUMMARY: DEPUTY PRESS CHIEF CONRAD AHLERS DELIVERED AN OFF-THE-RECORD BRIEFING

[Redacted]

IN WHICH HE SUMMARIZED THE TALKS
BETWEEN GERMAN AND FRENCH LEADERS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-71
By *ebm*, NARA, Date 3-24-03

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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IN 06764

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(classification)

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HE SAID THAT THE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING THE TALKS WAS SO FROSTY THAT, AS FAR AS FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS WERE CONCERNED, IT WAS INDEED GOING TO BE A COLD WINTER. GERMAN LEADERS HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION AS A RESULT OF THESE TALKS THAT THE FRENCH WILL GO ONLY AS FAR IN THEIR COOPERATION WITH WEST GERMANY AS THEY BELIEVE WILL SERVE FRENCH INTERESTS AND THAT FRENCH POLICY WILL MORE THAN EVER BE CONCENTRATED ON FRENCH NATIONAL INTERESTS ALONE. IN THE FIELD OF EASTERN POLICY THEY FEEL THAT GERMANY CAN NO LONGER EXPECT ANY FRENCH SUPPORT AND THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT FRANCO-GERMAN EFFORT IN THIS AREA IS DEAD. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE WHOLE FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP WILL TAKE ON A NEW CHARACTER. THE TALKS WITH THE FRENCH HAVE UNITED THE CHANCELLOR AND HIS SPD FOREIGN MINISTER IN MANY AREAS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND THIS IDENTITY OF VIEWS HAS ALSO EXTENDED TO OTHER LEVELS OF THE CDU AND SPD. AHLERS ALSO COMMENTED ON ACRIMONIOUS EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR AND DE GAULLE, PARTICULARLY DURING DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE. AHLERS SAID THAT IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE FRENCH HAD COME TO BONN BELIEVING THAT THE WEST GERMANS WOULD ACCEDE TO ALMOST ANYTHING THE FRENCH HAD TO SAY OUT OF THEIR FEAR OF EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs (C)

IN 06764

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs (C)

GENERALLY. END SUMMARY.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs (C)

1. [REDACTED] DEPUTY PRESS CHIEF CONRAD AHLERS GAVE AN OFF-THE-RECORD BRIEFING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ON THE RECENT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN FRENCH AND GERMAN LEADERS IN BONN. [REDACTED] COMMENT: FOR INFORMATION ON THE DE GAULLE-KIESINGER TALKS GIVEN TO EMBASSY BONN OFFICERS (SEE EMBASSY BONN TELEGRAMS 17687 AND 17735, 4 OCTOBER 1968). AHLERS SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD APPARENTLY COME TO BONN FEELING SURE THE THE GERMANS WOULD ACCEDE TO ALMOST ANYTHING THE FRENCH HAD TO SAY BECAUSE OF THE GERMAN UNEASINESS OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND OVER THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE GENERALLY. HE SAID THAT THE ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING THE TALKS WAS SO FROSTY AND UNRELENTING THAT ONE COULD ONLY ASSUME THAT, AS FAR AS FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS WERE CONCERNED, IT IS INDEED GOING TO BE A COLD WINTER.

2. SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS HAD BEEN DRAWN BY THE GERMAN LEADERS IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR TALKS WITH THE FRENCH. THEY FEEL AS A RESULT OF THESE TALKS THAT FROM NOW ON THE FRENCH WILL FOLLOW MORE THAN EVER A POLICY OF "NATIONAL EGOISM" AND THAT THE FRENCH WILL GO ONLY AS FAR IN THEIR COOPERATION WITH WEST GERMANY AS THEY.

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(classification)

(GROUP CONTROL)

BELIEVE SERVES THE INTERESTS OF FRANCE, THEY BELIEVE ALSO THAT FRANCE WILL CONTINUE ITS OWN POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE WHETHER IT COINCIDES WITH GERMAN INTERESTS IN THIS AREA OR NOT. AHLERS SAID THAT IT HAS BECOME CLEAR TO THE BONN GOVERNMENT THAT IN THE LONG RUN FRENCH POLICY IS DIRECTED AT NEUTRALISM. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE WHOLE FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP WILL TAKE ON A NEW CHARACTER.

3. AS FAR AS THE EFFECT OF THE TALKS ON THE INTERNAL GERMAN SITUATION IS CONCERNED, AHLERS SAID THAT IT HAS BROUGHT THE COALITION PARTNERS MUCH CLOSER ON MANY FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES THAN THEY EVER HAD SEEN. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF KIESINGER AND BRANDT, BUT IT ALSO EXTENDS TO OTHER LEVELS OF THE SPD AND THE CDU. THE TALKS HAVE ALSO HAD THE EFFECT, ACCORDING TO AHLERS, OF STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF THOSE WHO HAD ALL ALONG OPPOSED CLOSE TIES WITH FRANCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT GERMANY COULD NOT COUNT ON DE GAULLE.

4. THERE WERE FEW POINTS OF REAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE GERMAN LEADERS. DE GAULLE APPEARED, HOWEVER, TO UNDERSTAND GERMAN NEED FOR NATO AND HE AGREED WITH KIESINGER THAT THE REAL TARGET OF ALL DETENTE POLICY IS MOSCOW RATHER THAN THE STATES OF EASTERN EUROPE. IT BECAME APPARENT, HOWEVER, AHLERS SAID, THAT IF WEST GERMANY WOULD EVER DECIDE TO MAKE AN APPROACH TO THE SOVIET

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UNION, IT MIGHT HAVE TO BE DONE WITHOUT FRANCE. DE GAULLE ALSO SEEMED INTERESTED IN EAST-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY WHETHER OR NOT THERE WERE ANY CONCRETE PROJECTS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

5. ON THE SUBJECT OF SECURITY POLICY, THE FRENCH HAD SOME VERY INTERESTING VIEWPOINTS WITH REGARD TO GERMAN SECURITY. DE GUALLE SAID THAT "NATURALLY" WEST GERMANY COULD COUNT ON FRANCE'S SUPPORT IN CASE OF A MILITARY THREAT, BUT ONLY IF THERE WERE A CLEAR PROVOCATION. THIS GUARANTEE WOULD NOT BE AUTOMATIC. THIS MEANS, AHLER SAID, THAT WEST GERMANY IS AT THE MERCY OF A FRENCH INTERPRETATION OF WHAT IS OR IS NOT A PROVOCATION. IF THE FRENCH WERE TO DECIDE THAT GERMANY HAD NOT RECEIVED A CLEAR PROVOCATION, GERMANY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO RELY ON FRENCH SUPPORT.

6. THE FRENCH TOOK A VERY TOUGH POSITION ON THE SUBJECT OF MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. THEY WANTED - AND THEY ALMOST MADE ALL FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY CONDITIONAL ON GERMAN ACCEPTANCE OF THIS DEMAND - COMPLETE WEST GERMAN MILITARY RE-ORIENTATION TOWARD FRANCE, INCLUDING FRENCH EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENTS. IN OTHER WORDS, AHLERS SAID, THE FRENCH WANTED "MONEY, MONEY, MONEY".

7. DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND ITS

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(dissem controls)

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST WAS THE MOST HEATED PART OF THE CONVERSATIONS. CAUTIONING THAT WHAT HE WAS ABOUT TO SAY MUST BE TREATED AS A STATE SECRET, PARTICULARLY AS IT CONCERNED THE BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDES OF THE CHANCELLOR, AHLERS SAID THAT DE GAULLE'S TREATMENT OF THE CHANCELLOR HAD BEEN SO BRUTAL THAT KIESINGER, WHO IS KNOWN FOR HIS PERSONAL CHARM TO VISITORS, SEVERAL TIMES LOST HIS COMPOSURE. WHEN DE GAULLE ACCUSED THE GERMANS OF HAVING BROUGHT ABOUT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FOR INSTANCE, KIESINGER BECAME FURIOUS AND TOLD DE GAULLE THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN A WEST GERMAN BUT A FRENCH HEAD OF STATE WHO HAD VISITED POLAND AND RUMANIA AND WHO HAD CALLED UPON THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN EUROPE TO THROW OFF THE YOKE OF SOVIET HEGEMONY.

8. IN THEIR TALKS WITH BOTH KIESINGER AND BRANDT, THE FRENCH ECHOED ALMOST WORD FOR WORD THE SOVIET ARGUMENT ON EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY THAT WEST GERMANY HAD BEEN TO BLAME SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD SEEN THAT WEST GERMANY WAS ABOUT TO DRAW CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN-

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IN 06764

PAGE 7 OF 10 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(disarm controls)

TO ITS ECONOMIC SPHERE OF INFLUENCE. EVEN BEFORE THE FRENCH VISIT, AHLERS SAID, THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD HEARD THAT FRENCH DIPLOMATS IN MANY COUNTRIES HAD BEEN SAYING TO ALMOST ANYONE WHO WOULD LISTEN THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS UNDERSTANDABLE SINCE GERMAN INDUSTRY WAS UNDERTAKING A MAJOR COMMERCIAL OFFENSIVE IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE FRENCH MADE IT CLEAR IN THEIR TALKS IN BONN THAT IF THE GERMANS HOPED FOR FURTHER FRENCH SUPPORT ON RELATIONS WITH THE EAST, THEY WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR IT IN THE FORM OF LIBERAL GERMAN SUPPORT OF THE FRENCH ECONOMY.

9. DE GAULLE ALSO CRITICIZED THE GERMANS FOR ALWAYS BEING WORRIED ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER. WHEN HE TOLD KIESINGER THAT THE WEST GERMANS SHOULD ASK THEMSELVES WHETHER THEY WERE NOT PERHAPS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EVENTS OF 21 AUGUST IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE CHANCELLOR TURNED CHALKY WHITE. THEN DE GAULLE ADDED WHAT FOR THE CHANCELLOR WAS THE LAST STRAW BY SAYING THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO ASSUME THE SOVIETS HAD ANY INTENTION TO COMMIT AGGRESSION AND THAT THE WEST GERMAN DEMAND FOR A STRENGTHENING OF NATO WAS EXAGGERATED. AT THIS POINT THE CHANCELLOR EXPLODED AND TOLD DE GAULLE THAT TWICE THE GERMANS HAD DEFEATED FRANCE AND ADVANCED TO THE ATLANTIC COAST. NEITHER TIME

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(dissem controls)

HAD THE GERMAN FORCES BEEN AS STRONG AS THE SOVIETS WERE NOW. OF COURSE, IF THE SOVIET ARMIES INTENDED TO DO SO, THEY COULD OVERRUN GERMANY IN 24 HOURS, KIESINGER SAID, BUT HE TOLD DE GAULLE NOT TO FORGET THAT THEY WOULD NOT STOP AT THE RHINE. IF THE GERMAN ARMIES OVERRAN FRANCE IN A SHORT TIME, THIS WOULD LOOK SLOW IN COMPARISON TO THE AMOUNT OF TIME IT WOULD TAKE THE SOVIETS. "THEN," SAID THE CHANCELLOR, "YOU WILL HAVE THE EUROPE YOU HAVE DREAMED OF, A EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS, BUT IT WILL BE UNDER SOVIET CONTROL".

EO 12958 3.A(b)(1)>25Yrs

10. AS FAR AS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE TALKS FOR GERMANY'S EASTERN POLICY IS CONCERNED, AHLERS STRESSED THAT GERMANY MUST EXPECT NO FURTHER JOINT FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION. ONCE THE FRENCH FEEL THAT THEIR OWN POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE IS ENDANGERED, THEY WILL MAKE NO MOVE TO SUPPORT THAT OF THE WEST GERMANS. IT MUST ALSO BE EXPECTED THAT FRANCE, IN AN EFFORT TO FURTHER HER OWN INTERESTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, WILL ATTEMPT TO CAST GERMANY IN A BAD LIGHT AND BLAME GERMANY FOR THE FRENCH LACK OF SUCCESS IN THAT

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EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

IN 06764

PAGE 9 OF 10 PAGES

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

AREA. DURING BRANDT'S TALKS WITH DEBRE AND KIESINGER'S CONVERSATIONS WITH DE GAULLE, THE FRENCH CRITICIZED THE GERMANS FOR HAVING FAILED TO SETTLE THE QUESTIONS OF THE ODER-NEISSE BOUNDARY OR THE MUNICH AGREEMENT AND FOR NOT HAVING MADE MORE PROGRESS TOWARD RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR TOWARD SIGNING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. FROM THESE CONVERSATIONS, AHLERS SAID, BOTH KIESINGER AND BRANDT HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE HAD NOW BEEN A BREAK IN THE SOLIDARITY WHICH PREVIOUSLY EXISTED BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. A GREAT CHANGE IS TAKING PLACE IN FRENCH POLICY, AHLERS SAID, AND IT WILL IN FUTURE BE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THE WEST GERMAN. DE GAULLE EVEN TOLD THE CHANCELLOR, AHLERS SAID, THAT FROM NOW ON THE FRENCH ARE LOOKING OUT ONLY FOR FRANCE. IN THE FACE OF ALL THIS, GERMANY MUST STEER A VERY CAREFUL COURSE. DE GAULLE MADE IT BRUTALLY CLEAR THAT IF THE WEST GERMANS WERE NOT FOR FRANCE, THEN THEY MUST BE AGAINST HER. MUCH OF THE BASIS OF THE FRENCH ATTITUDE, AHLERS SAID, CAN BE FOUND IN FRENCH ENVY OF WEST GERMAN ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND JEALOUSY OF THE SUCCESS THE WEST GERMANS HAVE HAD IN ADVANCING THEIR ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE. THE GERMANS HAVE IN MANY CASES TAKEN OVER THE POSITION PREVIOUSLY ENJOYED BY FRANCE. IN ANY CASE,

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EO 12958 3.A(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

IN 06764

[Redacted]

PAGE 10 OF 10 PAGES

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AHLERS SAID, ANY HOPE THAT HAD EXISTED FOR A JOINT EFFORT BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY IN EASTERN EUROPE MUST BE REGARDED AS DEAD AND BURIED.

EO 12958 3.A(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

11.

[Redacted]

AHLERS HAD ALSO SPOKEN

OF DE GAULLE'S COMMENTS TO THE CHANCELLOR ON UNITED STATES POLICY. ALTHOUGH NOT MUCH OF THE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS HAD CONCERNED THE UNITED STATES, DE GAULLE TOLD KIESINGER AT ONE POINT THAT NOTHING COULD REALLY BE DONE UNTIL AFTER THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. DEGAULLE SAID HE EXPECTS THE NEW PRESIDENT TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND THEN GO TO MOSCOW. DE GAULLE SAID THAT IF EUROPE DOESN'T HURRY, THERE WILL BE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW WHICH WILL LEAVE EUROPE OUT IN THE COLD.)

12.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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EO 12958 3.A(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

INFORMATION

Wednesday, October 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

SUBJECT: Your second meeting with Prime Minister Holyoake at 12:00 noon
October 10

The only certain business at this meeting is the approval of the joint statement.

However, Holyoake may want to fill you in on his conversations with Orville Freeman and others about the meat and dairy problems. On meat, Holyoake told Freeman that he would cooperate by holding New Zealand meat exports to the level requested by us. However, he made it very plain that he did it with reluctance and the conviction that it would hurt him politically at home. On dairy products, Holyoake told Freeman he was prepared to have his people withdraw the request for countervailing duties, on the condition that New Zealand was included in the quotas to be declared by us later in the year. Should Holyoake raise this with you, you could tell him that we are favorably inclined toward a quota for New Zealand and will be as fair as we possibly can. I suggest you avoid any discussion on specific figures. However, should Holyoake do so (he has been pushing hard for \$15 million) you might assure him that we shall do the very best that we can but that his figure sounds very high.

W. W. Rostow

*P.S. You may wish to tell Holyoake where we
now are in Paris.*

MWright:wpt

WWR
10

October 9, 1968

Mr. President:

In the attached, Nick Katzenbach transmits for your signature messages to Congress submitting for appropriate action an Amendment to the 1958 US-UK Atomic Energy Agreement which will make possible the transfer of special nuclear material for use in the UK submarine program.

The Amendment was signed by US and UK representatives on September 27 in accordance with your authorization granted on September 26.

The State Department is anxious to have this Amendment submitted to Congress during this session. The Amendment will become effective after it lies before Congress for sixty days unless objections are raised.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

SMKeeny:jb:10-9-68:10:55am

bcc: SMK file and chron

→WWR (2)

CEJ

SMK comeback copy

Attachments to this memo:

1. Message to Congress (2 originals) att'g
2. Cy Katzenbach ltr to President 10/4
3. Amendment to the Agreement
4. Cy ltr DOD/AEC to President 9/18
5. Cy Memo of Presidential approval to DOD/AEC 9/26

CONFIDENTIAL

October 9, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

I am informed by Adrian Fisher, ACDA, that Senator Russell's position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty was misrepresented yesterday in the attached dispatches (AP 155 and 156). Senator Russell told Bill Darden, Chief of Staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that Jack Bell of the AP had not gotten the story quite right and that he (Senator Russell) still is favorably inclined toward the treaty although he did not think it should be put to a vote now.

I would also note that the position of the JCS was misrepresented in the same dispatch (AP 156). The alleged reluctance of the JCS toward the treaty, referred to in the penultimate paragraph, is not correct. It is in fact clearly contradicted by General Wheeler's statement, quoted in the last paragraph, agreeing with the objectives of the treaty and supporting its ratification.

W. W. Rostow

Att. - AP 155-156

SMKeeny:jb:10-9-68/4:45pm

bcc: SMK file and chron

WWR (2)

SMK comeback copy

RESTRICTED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
SEARCHING, CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 18, 1963.

BY 19 ON 2-1-93

CONFIDENTIAL

11a.

155

NUCLEAR TREATY (TOPS 123)

WASHINGTON (AP)-SEN. RICHARD B. RUSSELL, D-GA., CAST A CLOUD OVER ANY EARLY SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TODAY WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE IS UNSATISFIED WITH ITS TERMS AND OPPOSES ACTION ON IT NOW.

RUSSELL, WHO HEADS THE INFLUENTIAL SENATE ARMS SERVICES COMMITTEE, SAID IN AN INTERVIEW THAT DOES NOT BELIEVE THE TREATY--DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS--SUFFICIENTLY PROTECTS AMERICAN INTERESTS.

"IT HAS NO INSPECTION PROVISIONS WORTHY OF THE NAME," HE SAID. "IT WOULD NOT PROTECT US AT ALL. IT WOULD NOT PREVENT THE RUSSIANS FROM SETTING UP NUCLEAR DEVICES IN EGYPT, FOR EXAMPLE.

"I AM OPPOSED TO ACTING ON IT UNTIL THERE CAN BE FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF ITS TERMS."

THE TREATY PROVIDES FOR AN 18-MONTH PERIOD IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY WOULD SEEK TO WORK OUT INSPECTION PROCEDURES TO CHECK ON WHETHER ITS PROVISIONS WERE BEING CARRIED OUT.

RUSSELL SPOKE OUT SHORTLY AFTER SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD OF MONTANA HAD PROMISED A FINAL DECISION THIS WEEK ON WHETHER TO BRING UP THE TREATY. IT HAS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED SEPT. 17 BY THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE BY A 13-3 VOTE, WITH THREE ABSTENTIONS.

CZ/PD523PED 10/8

156

WASHINGTON--ADD NUCLEAR TREATY (155)

MANSFIELD TOLD A REPORTER THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON WANTS SPEEDY ACTION ON THE TREATY BUT HAD LEFT IT UP TO THE MAJORITY LEADER TO DECIDE ON THE TIMING.

SENATE REPUBLICAN LEADER EVERETT M. DIRKSEN OF ILLINOIS TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO ITS CONSIDERATION NOW.

DIRKSEN CONCEDED THAT THE SOVIET ACTION IN EASTERN EUROPE WOULD BE LIKELY TO "INSPIRE SOME MEMBERS TO VOTE AGAINST THE TREATY" AT THIS POINT. HE NOTED THAT ISRAEL, SWEDEN, ITALY, WEST GERMANY, RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE NOT RATIFIED IT YET.

DIRKSEN SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION THE TREATY HAS "NO REAL INSPECTION POWER AND WE ARE NOT GETTING ANYTHING WE DON'T ALREADY HAVE." BUT HE ADDED HE BELIEVES IT WOULD ACT AS A "PSYCHOLOGICAL FORCE" AGAINST THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

RUSSELL'S OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY'S TERMS APPEARED TO REFLECT THE RELUCTANCE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, CHAIRMAN OF THE CHIEFS, SUMMED THIS UP WHEN HE TOLD THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THAT THE MILITARY LEADERS "ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE EXPRESSED OBJECTIVES OF THIS TREATY AND SUPPORT RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY AS NOT INIMICAL TO U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS."

CZ/PD527PED 10/8

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, October 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RW file

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Ambassador Barbour--6:15 p. m.,
Wednesday, October 9

Your chat with Wally Barbour will give you a chance to get firsthand judgments from another quarter on Eshkol's position. You will have your own questions, but the following might also be interesting to ask:

1. Could he describe the election process Eshkol faces? The question is when Eshkol will settle the intra-party struggle for power and whether that will give him greater freedom to deal with the Arabs. We don't want to count on any breaks we're not going to get.

2. What can we get from Eshkol for Phantoms?

Wally has a good relationship with Eshkol and is close to Eban, so he will have a good sense--perhaps more official than Abe Feinberg's--of their real thinking.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *1-25-02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10/9/68 ¹³

I have taken note of Section 651 concerning the sale of planes to Israel.

In the light of this expression of the sense of the Congress, I am asking the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with the Government of Israel and to report back to me.

person brings suit for recovery, which is hereby authorized, against the United States in any United States district court.

“(c) For purposes of this section, the term ‘person’ includes any individual, corporation, partnership, association, or other legal entity.”

CHAPTER 3—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 303. Chapter 3 of part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which relates to miscellaneous provisions, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

“SEC. 651. SALE OF SUPERSONIC PLANES TO ISRAEL.—It is the sense of the Congress that the President should take such steps as may be necessary, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression by offsetting sophisticated weapons received by the Arab States and to replace losses suffered by Israel in the 1967 conflict.”

PART IV—AMENDMENTS TO OTHER ACTS

SEC. 401. The Act of April 12, 1926 (44 Stat. 242; chapter 117) is amended by adding at the end thereof a new section as follows:

“SEC. 2. (a) For each of the calendar years 1969 through 1971, inclusive, not more than 350 million board feet, in the aggregate, of unprocessed timber may be sold for export from the United States from Federal lands located west of the 100th meridian.

“(b) After public hearing and a finding by the appropriate Secretary of the department administering Federal lands referred to in subsection (a) that specific quantities and species of unprocessed timber are surplus to the needs of domestic users and processors, such quantities and species may be designated by the said Secretary as available for export from the United States in addition to that quantity stated in subsection (a).

“(c) The Secretaries of the departments administering lands referred to in subsection (a) may issue rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of this section, including the prevention of substitution of timber restricted from export by this section for exported non-Federal timber.

“(d) In issuing rules and regulations pursuant to subsection (c).

See file
14

ACTION

Wednesday, October 9, 1968
11:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Prime Minister Holyoake

Attached is a memorandum from Nick Katzenbach which recommends that you tell Prime Minister Holyoake:

- we are prepared to discuss purchase of up to \$500,000 of New Zealand lamb.**

- we plan to make greater use of New Zealand for the overhaul of airplanes and vehicles used by the Navy in Antarctica (Operation Deepfreeze) and to procure more supplies for this Operation in New Zealand. This would involve up to \$200,000 during the current fiscal year.**

- a DOD procurement officer will visit New Zealand regularly and we look forward to the time when there is enough Defense procurement in New Zealand to justify a permanent procurement officer there.**

Action on the first two points above will require a decision by you that they are desirable. The objection to the purchase of lamb, if any, would come from domestic producers. However, the lamb would be sold exclusively in overseas commissaries where there is a genuine consumer demand for it. State and Defense believe, therefore, that the problem is manageable.

Greater use of New Zealand by Operation Deepfreeze is thoroughly justifiable on a cost basis. The only objection is the slight adverse effect on the gold flow.

I recommend you approve the two programs and inform Prime Minister Holyoake of your decisions.

W.W. Rostow

Att

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWright:wpt



13491

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

142

October 8, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with the Prime Minister
of New Zealand

In addition to the points mentioned in my memorandum of October 7, I recommend you tell Prime Minister Holyoake the following with respect to DOD procurement:

1. We are prepared to discuss the purchase of up to \$500,000 worth of New Zealand lamb for use by our armed forces.
2. We are planning to overhaul in New Zealand aircraft and vehicles used by the Navy's Antarctic operation, and also to procure more supplies and equipment for this operation in New Zealand. This could involve up to \$200,000 during the balance of fiscal year 1969.
3. The DOD Procurement Information Officer stationed in Australia will continue to pay visits to New Zealand at three-months intervals. We look forward to the day when enough procurement business has developed to enable us to meet the GNZ's request to station a procurement representative in New Zealand permanently.

The foregoing points are derived from the conclusions of a study just completed by DOD on the possibilities of expanding procurement in New Zealand. The attached

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4


NEJ 91-103

By 129, NARA, Date 12-13-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

discussion is drawn from a DOD memorandum approved October 8 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. You will note that the main objection to the lamb purchase is the likelihood of an adverse reaction in Congress, as was the case with the 1966 purchase. However, we concur with DOD that this smaller purchase could be justified.


The Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

DOD Procurement from
New Zealand.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

146

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DOD PROCUREMENT FROM NEW ZEALAND

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-103By mg, NARA, Date 12-13-95Purchase of Lamb

The most likely food product for DOD procurement is lamb. Following the \$750,000 purchase of lamb from New Zealand directed by the President in October 1966, it was apparent that there was a positive demand for lamb in commissary stores. On a tentative basis, Army has indicated a possible purchase of New Zealand lamb up to \$500,000 with approximately 800,000 to 1,000,000 pounds destined for commissary stores in Europe to be completed during the balance of FY 1969. Deliveries under the previous New Zealand contract have been completed and upon a similar Presidential decision, a program could be implemented on similar terms. The lamb would be for overseas resale in commissary stores thereby avoiding legal problems and administrative controls applicable to government messes. The previous lamb procurement aroused considerable congressional interest which resulted in approximately 90 inquiries to DOD. At that time, we stated that this was a one-time procurement and no further purchases were contemplated. However, customer demand could be raised in defense of this smaller procurement.

Aircraft/Vehicle Maintenance and Overhaul

In-country overhaul of aircraft and vehicles used by the Navy's Antarctic operation as well as procurement of certain supplies and equipment could contribute up to about \$200 thousand to the New Zealand economy during the balance of FY 1969 over and above current DOD procurement. This figure would include procurement of supplies, equipment, vehicle repair parts, and medical items in addition to food products now being procured. Cost considerations, in general, favor this action although there is an adverse gold flow aspect. All things considered, it is worth doing to the extent practicable and Mr. Holyoake should be informed of our intention.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOD Procurement Officer in New Zealand

The cognizance of the DOD Procurement Information Office in Canberra, Australia, was extended in recent months to include New Zealand. Lieutenant Colonel Smith from that office visited New Zealand 23 August - 3 September 1968 to discuss procurement objectives and examine the possibility of developing DOD sources in New Zealand. His visit produced no new specific trade leads, although there was a useful exchange of information. Smith's visits to New Zealand will continue at approximately three-month intervals. Subsequently, Army will consider the New Zealand request to station a permanent procurement representative in New Zealand if it appears that enough procurement business has been generated in the area to justify such action. Although New Zealand officials and our Ambassador believe that such an action at this time would be a significant symbol of our good intentions and would relieve trade tensions, it cannot be justified at this time on the basis of efficient use of personnel.

15

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~
HARVAN

Wednesday, October 9, 1968

10:15 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: North Vietnamese Ask for Private Meeting in Paris

Cy Vance reported by secure telephone on today's "tea break" discussions with the North Vietnamese as follows:

In response to Vance making clear that GVN participation in any negotiations for the decisive factor in our deciding on a bombing halt, the North Vietnamese said

- a. There is not time enough during ^{the tea} that break to discuss the subject; and
- b. We are prepared to discuss the GVN participation issue.

A private meeting was scheduled for 9:30 Friday.

Mr. Vance said that the North Vietnamese reply came after he had placed overriding emphasis on the issue of GVN participation. He said too much should not be read into the North Vietnamese response but is encouraged by the request for a private meeting--the first time the North Vietnamese have ever requested such a meeting.

The official head of the North Vietnamese delegation, Mr. Thuy, suggested the meeting while Mr. Tho, the unofficial political representative from Hanoi, made the statement with respect to being prepared to discuss the participation issue.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

16

SECRET

Wednesday, October 9, 1968
9:50 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker is reassuring
on Saigon coup rumors.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 39892

~~SECRET~~

cc: George Christian

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 2-1-83

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 39892 091248Z

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ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,GPM 04,H 02,
INR 07,L 03,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,IO 13,AID 28,SAH 02,
O 02,OC 06,OPR 02,CCO 00,MM 01,NIC 01,RSR 01,EUR 15,/144 W
----- 082920

O 091128Z OCT 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2281
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC

Roston

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 39892

PARIS FOR US DELEGATION
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
SUBJ: COUP RUMORS

1. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MESSAGE GIVES LINE WE ARE TAKING WITH PRESS ABOUT LATEST RUMORS ABOUT A COUP.
 2. WE ARE REPORTING THROUGH CAS CHANNELS WHAT THESE RUMORS WERE BASED ON AND HOW THEY CAME TO BE CIRCULATED.
 3. HAVING EXAMINED ALL THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION WE FIND THAT EVIDENCE IS TOO INSUBSTANTIAL TO BE REGARDED AS REPRESENTING ANYTHING SERIOUS.
- BUNKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-72
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

~~SECRET~~

17

Pres file

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, October 9, 1968 - 9:05am

Mr. President:

This is the most optimistic picture we have had of the Moscow-Prague agreement. If, in fact, they pull most of the troops out by the end of October, the atmosphere will be a good deal better.

As you know, a good deal of hopeful Czech reporting is that the partial withdrawal will be buttoned up by October 28 -- the Czech national holiday.

W. W. Rostow

Prague 3820

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-162
By is, NARA Date 9-8-97

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ACTION EUR 20

INFO IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, CCO 00,
SAH 02, SA 01, SAL 01, ACDA 16, RSR 01, E 15, NEA 13, NIC 01, GPM 04,
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, /141 W
----- 082430

P 081745Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5241
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION USUN NY
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-158
By isa, NARA Date 11-17-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRAGUE 3820

A. IRVING LEVINE OF NBC WAS GIVEN A RUNDOWN BY A CZECH JOURNALIST, USUALLY CONSIDERED RELIABLE, OF PRIME MINISTER CERNIK'S REPORT ON LAST WEEK'S MOSCOW CONFERENCE GIVEN YESTERDAY AFTERNOON TO CZECH JOURNALISTS' MEETING. LEVINE WAS ASKED NOT TO REVEAL IT IMMEDIATELY IN ITS ENTIRETY BUT TO USE IT POINT BY POINT. IN SKELETON OUTLINE FOLLOWING ARE CERNIK'S MAIN ASSERTIONS.

1. THERE WILL BE NO ARRESTS OR PURGES, ESPECIALLY OF MEDIA PERSONNEL.
2. THERE WILL BE NO TOP REGIME CHANGES AND NONE WERE ASKED BY THE SOVIETS "NONE OF US WISH TO LEAVE." THERE WILL HOWEVER BE SOME CHANGES IN CERTAIN "POLITICAL POSTS." POSSIBLY MINISTRIES,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 PRAGUE 03820 091122Z

ETC.

3. "HARD DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE BUT WE GOT THROUGH THEM."
4. NEGOTIATIONS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL WILL START WITHIN A WEEK. ABOUT TEN PERCENT OF PRESENT STRENGTH, AND ONLY , WILL REMAIN, AND MOST OF THE FORCES SHOULD LEAVE BY OCTOBER 28.
5. NO SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO FEDERALIZATION PROGRAM BUT CZECH PARTY SHOULD NOT BE ORGANIZED UNTIL AFTER "FURTHER NORMALIZATION MZ IN ANY EVENT CZECH PARTY CONGRESS SHOULD BE HELD ONLY AFTER HOLDING OF CZECHOSLOVAK 14TH PARTY CONGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN INDEFINITELY POSTPONED.
6. DIFFERENCES ON DEFINITIONS OF NORMALIZATION CONTINUE.
7. CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATION DID NOT CONCEDE DANGERS OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION NOR DID IT ACCEPT ACCUSATIONS IN WARSAW FIVE LETTER.
8. SOVIETS AGREE BEHAVIOR OF CZECH PRESS HAS IMPROVED BUT EVEN CZECHS THEMSELVES ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME "POLITICALLY NAIVE" ARTICLES HAD RECENTLY BEEN PUBLISHED. KAPPARENTLY AT THIS POINT CERNIK REJECTED RUMORS THAT "COLLABORATION" IN SENSE OF SUBMISSION TO THE SOVIETS HAD BEGUN).
9. "THOSE JOURNALISTS WHO DO NOT AGREE WITH US SHOULD LEAVE THE MEDIA BECAUSE WE DO NOT WISH THEM TO WORK WITH US."
10. ALL TOP CHANGES THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE SO FAR OCCURRED ONLY AS A RESULT OF RESIGNATION.
11. SOVIET POLEMICS AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE NOT MENTIONED BUT CZECHS PROTESTED AGAINST THE ACTIVITIES OF RADIO VLTAVA AND THE ILLEGAL CIRCULATION OF THE PAPER "NEWS" (APPARENTLY PUBLISHED IN EAST GERMANY). SOVIETS CLAIMED LACK OF COMPETENCE IN THESE MATTERS.
12. NKVD-INTERIOR MINISTRY AGREEMENTS PREDATED AUGUST AND APPLIED ONLY TO COUNTER-ESPIONAGE.
13. SOVIETS DID NOT OBJECT TO CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMIC REFORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 PRAGUE 03820 091122Z

PROGRAM.

14. CERNIK COMPLAINED CZECH PRESS DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY EXPLAIN AUGUST 26 MOSCOW PROTOCOL. HE ALSO CHIDED THEM FOR LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF CLASS STRUGGLE AND WEST GERMAN MENACE.
15. CERNIK'S REFERENCES TO SOVIET "ASSISTANCE" SPECIFIED IN LAST COMMUNIQUE WERE QUITE VAGUE AND SEEMED TO INCLUDE ECONOMIC HELP AS WELL AS HELP IN STOPPING PRESS ATTACKS.
16. CERNIK SAID REGIME WOULD APPLY MARXISM-LENINISM IN CZECHOSLOVAK SENSE. CENSORSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THE SAME WAY.

B. WEST GERMAN TRADE MISSION ALSO HAD ELEMENTS OF THE ABOVE WHICH WAS DESCRIBED TO THEM BY THEIR SOURCE AS BEING NOT UNDULY UNFAVORABLE. IMPRESSION GIVEN THEM THAT SOVIETS, HAVING FAILED TO DISRUPT TOP CZECH LEADERSHIP, WILL CONCENTRATE ON MEDIUM LEVEL INFILTRATION BUT THIS IS PROBLEM CZECHS FEEL THEY CAN HANDLE THEMSELVES.

C. COMMENT: CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE CZECH PRESS HAVE OF COURSE BEEN CONGENITALLY OPTIMISTIC AS FOR INSTANCE AFTER BRATISLAVA AND IF THIS IS THE WHOLE STORY CZECHS WOULD SEEM TO HAVE DONE WELL FOR TIME BEING. POTENTIAL STILL REMAINS OF COURSE FOR NEW PRESSURES AND EVEN ASSAULTS ON LEADERSHIP TO ENFORCE SOVIET CONCEPT "NORMALIZATION." MORE SPECIFIC RESULTS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATIONS MAY EMERGE FROM TODAY'S PRESIDUM MEETING AND PENDING CC PLENUM.

GP-3
BEAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

X
V

18

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, October 9, 1968 - 9:00 am

Mr. President:

25X1A

Herewith Bunker recommends [redacted]
as Bob Komer's successor.

Pres file

25X1A

I know [redacted] well and have talked with him recently while on home leave. I am convinced he is the right man: professional; sensitive to the political and psychological problems of galvanizing rural life; extremely good with the Vietnamese; works well with the military; and one of the most knowledgeable men about Vietnam in the U. S. Government.

You will have to instruct me on the last paragraph.

25X1A

W. W. Rostow

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-040-3-6-1

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 019-040-3-6
By [initials], NARA, Date 1/20/02

18a

EYES ONLY

RECEIVED
WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 OCT 9 12 16

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ZNYM09
OO YEKADS
DE YEKADL 2702 2831210
O 091116Z
FM SAIGON
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY 091116Z OCT 68 VIA CAS SHANNELS

FM AMB BUNKER 171
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

REF: CAP 82504, CAS 97

1. WITH REGARD TO REFERENCED MESSAGES AND MY PROMISE TO SEND RECOMMENDATION AS TO SUCCESSOR FOR BOB KOMER, GENERAL ABRAMS AND I HAVE DISCUSSED QUESTION AND BOTH STRONGLY RECOMMEND APPOINTING BILL COLBY TO SUCCEED KOMER. BOB ALSO CONCURS. COLBY HAS DONE OUTSTANDING JOB AS KOMER'S DEPUTY. ABRAMS HAS DEVELOPED HIGH REGARD FOR HIS ABILITY AND COMPETENCE. HE GETS ALONG WELL WITH VIETNAMESE AND IS HIGHLY REGARDED BY THEM. IT WOULD TAKE SOMEONE FROM OUTSIDE A LONG TIME TO ACQUIRE THE EQUIVALENT OF COLBY'S COMPREHENSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF CORDS PROGRAMS AND PERSONNEL. COLBY'S PREVIOUS SERVICE AND FAMILIARITY WITH THE VIETNAMESE SCENE ALSO COMMENDS HIM. APPOINTMENT OF COLBY WILL HAVE THE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF CAUSING NO BREAK IN CONTINUITY.

2. BOB, OF COURSE, IS HIGHLY PLEASED AT PROSPECT OF APPOINTMENT AS AMBASSADOR TO TURKEY. AS I SAID IN PREVIOUS MESSAGE, I BELIEVE THIS IS A WELL MERITED PROMOTION. CAN YOU LET ME KNOW WHEN WE MIGHT EXPECT THIS TO OCCUR SO THAT WE CAN MAKE PLANS HERE?

GP-1
500

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/rac 02-72
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN

19

INFORMATION

Tuesday, October 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake
October 9-10

Pres file

You last saw Holyoake in December 1967 at the memorial services for Harold Holt. Holyoake was last in Washington in April of 1967 for the SEATO/ANZUS/Troop Contributing Country meetings.

Holyoake has political difficulties at home. They stem mainly from the economic problems caused by a 1967 balance of payments crisis and the stringent measures taken by Holyoake's Government to meet it. There is also some complaint that Holyoake (who is Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister) has concentrated excessively on the political and security aspects of New Zealand's foreign policy to the detriment of New Zealand's economic interest.

Holyoake is a consummate politician, the undisputed master of his party and cabinet, and a man who is both cautious as well as acutely sensitive to public opinion.

He will be primarily interested in three things:

- our elections and what they mean for our future policy in Asia.
- the Vietnam situation.
- getting some help in connection with New Zealand's economy.

The attached memorandum from Nick Katzenbach has good talking points on all three of these subjects.

Our response to New Zealand's economic requests will probably be disappointing to them. There is little that we can do for them on meat exports to the United States. We are, however, offering them more access to American markets for their dairy products in a negotiation which is now going on and will probably take some time to work out.

There are some additional things we might do in way of Defense Department expenditures. There is a possibility of a purchase of up to \$500,000 of lamb for military use, some additional expenditures in New Zealand by Operation Deepfreeze, and an R & R program for New Zealand. These matters will require a decision by you and we are trying to get to you a State/Defense recommendation prior to your meeting with Holyoake. In any event, you might want to mention these as things we have under active consideration.

In addition to the topics mentioned above, Holyoake has indicated a desire to talk to you about Communist China, the problem posed by the British military withdrawal from East Asia, and the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia. I would not expect any of these to be major topics, however.

Finally, you should be aware that, as Foreign Minister, Holyoake is meeting with Secretary Rusk and Australian Foreign Minister Hasluck on October 10 for an ANZUS Ministerial Meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Att

MWright:wpt

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Tuesday, October 8, 1968
6:10 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith some evidence that Svoboda is on his way to Moscow for another round in the painful Moscow-Prague negotiation.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 1-25-02

20a.

SC #11723/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
8 October 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Czechoslovakia
(As of 4:00 P.M. EDT)

1. ~~Yesterday~~ ^{TODAY} Some Czechoslovak leaders may have returned to Moscow for further discussions on the new commitments Dubcek made to the Soviets last week.
2. A VIP-associated IL-18--which is used by President Svoboda--left Prague for Moscow in the early afternoon. This second trip may reflect dissonance among Czechoslovak leaders during a presidium meeting held this morning. President Svoboda, who did not go to Moscow with the Dubcek delegation, and other Czechoslovak officials may be making one last attempt to convince Moscow to water down the new demands it has imposed, or face a new crisis.
3. In addition, a Czechoslovak party central committee plenum, believed to have been scheduled for this week to approve the most recent Moscow agreement, will probably be postponed until those who went to Moscow return home.
4. Soviet special emissary Kuznetsov has apparently returned to Prague--probably to preside over the implementation

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

-NLJ 03-182

By iol NARA Date 3-23-06

E.O. 12958

3.3(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

of Soviet demands. High-level personnel changes in the party and government may be among them. / [REDACTED] Prior to the presidium meeting the US Embassy, however, had discounted recurrent rumors of Dubcek's impending resignation.


5. Slovak party chief Husak, who went to Moscow with Dubcek last week, reported today to his party presidium. After approving the report, the presidium took immediate steps to impose new controls on Slovak information media. The new party directive orders an increase in the amount of time and space devoted to propaganda and to political indoctrination in the press, radio and television.

6. The Soviet ambassador in Prague met with the Czechoslovak Minister of Justice on 7 October, possibly to discuss the termination of another phase of Dubcek's liberalization program--the rehabilitation of former political prisoners. The USSR will surely want to prevent the reopening of any more trials that would again expose Moscow's role in the bloody purges of the late 1940's and early 1950's and its involvement in Czechoslovak "show trials" until the early 1960's.

7. There are indications that one of the four Polish divisions that occupied north central Czechoslovakia may have returned to Poland. [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

Tuesday, October 8, 1968 - 6:40 PM

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. President --

Pres file

There is no one in this town who knows the Congressional game better than you, but I thought I should pass on to you Covey Oliver's concern that the Congress may recess before we are able to obtain agreement for the person you have in mind for the Guatemala vacancy.

Covey understands that the Congress may recess this Thursday. This would allow very little time in which to approach the Guatemalans with agreement and get their reply in time to process the nomination for submission to the Senate. Covey is concerned that if this last transaction is not completed in time, a recess appointment will be out of the question, causing further delay and consequent concern in the Guatemalan Government over designation of a replacement for Gordon Mein.

W. W. Rostow

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
DRAFTING, CANCELLED PER E.O. 12305,
PART 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 16, 1983.

NY ON 2-19-83

CONFIDENTIAL

Ros file

22

Tuesday, Oct. 8, 1968
6:05 p. m.

~~SECRET-CODEWORD~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

As you can see from the attached, Byrd's statement is technically correct, but misleading. The big increase, as I told you over the telephone, started during March as a result of the Tet losses.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-SAVIN~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-183
By 40, NARA, Date 2-27-04

22a

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET - SAVIN~~

October 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Senator Byrd's statement that infiltration increased after the March 31 bombing limitation would appear to be correct from looking at the timing of group starts within North Vietnam (Tab A) and their arrival in South Vietnam (Tab B).

This does not, however, give the complete picture. The following points are also pertinent:

- ~~The surge increase in input in North Vietnam began in March and ran through May~~
- ~~about 45% of the groups detected in these three months had already entered the pipeline by March 31~~
- two thirds of the groups had entered the pipeline by the time the Paris talks were convened
- the drop-off in infiltration inputs began in early June and has progressively decreased to date.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-183
By ind, NARA, Date 2-27-04

22-6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-184
By *iso*, NARA, Date 3-17-04

SIGINT DETECTED GROUPS BY MONTH

(000s)




FIGURE-1

~~SECRET SAVIN~~
10 SEP 68

see

(000s)

TOTAL INFILTRATION ESTIMATED ARRIVING SVN BY MONTH - 1968




FIGURE 4

22c

INFORMATION

Tuesday, October 8, 1968 - 5:35pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Participation in Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings

Pres file

A careful check by the Executive Secretary of the State Department fails to reveal any records covering your participation in numerous meetings held in the State Department during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The search covered the Historical Division of the Department as well as Secretary Rusk's office files. The only possibility of reconstructing these meetings would be to ask Mac Bundy for his recollection.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

ACTION

24

Handwritten notes:
1. [unclear]
2. Pres file
-4:05pm

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Partial Resumption of Military Shipments to Greece

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's recommendation that you release about 40% of the equipment we've held in suspense since the April 1967 coup. Most of the items to be released would be replacement items for the air force and navy, though there would be some tank ammo and heavy guns. We would continue to hold the tanks and new F-5 aircraft.

The main argument is that the time has come to separate our NATO relationship from our disapproval of domestic Greek politics. The colonels have had their constitutional referendum, but they won't hold elections under it until they're ready. We can keep prodding them, but we can't make them. Meanwhile, it doesn't make sense to let our security relationships with Greece--NATO role, commo facilities, Sixth Fleet support--deteriorate further.

A vocal group on the Hill will object to any resumption. You have already had letters from Congressmen Edwards and Fraser, who are active with Melina Mercouri and other friends of Greek democracy. But, if you approve, Nick plans to consult with key members--before telling the Greeks but after the foreign aid appropriation--and lay it on the line that we can't let our interests suffer further. He feels now is the time to face these people with the facts of the problem and tell them we have to move. He would like to do this before they go home.

The rationale for releasing only 40% is to keep some pressure on the colonels and to put ourselves on a more reasonable policy footing while leaving your successor room to move either way. I believe Nick is right that we've about run our course on the suspension. The question is whether you want to begin correcting course yourself.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-103
By is, NARA, Date 3-27-03

W. W. Rostow

Approve Nick's recommendation _____
Leave it till January _____
Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

S/S-13273

3102

24a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Supply Policy Toward Greece

As you know, deliveries of major MAP items to Greece have been suspended since the Colonels' coup. We have several times looked at the possibility of resuming some of these deliveries, but each time something has happened to prevent our moving.

The Greek regime has now held its constitutional plebiscite--at best a small step toward a return to constitutional government. It is about all we can expect for some time, given the Colonels' determination not to relinquish power.

I believe it is now time to move toward a partial resumption of suspended MAP items. This makes sense because:

- The suspension has led to some real distortions in Greece's military capabilities, including its NATO role. When, as a result of the Czech crisis, we are asking Western European nations to do more in NATO, it makes little sense to continue a policy which materially weakens the Greek military contribution to the Alliance.
- The suspension has become a sharp irritant in our bilateral relations with Greece. It is becoming more difficult for us to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean, while Soviet influence in the area is rising and we may have more trouble in the Middle East. We can ill afford, therefore, to continue a policy which could--over time--lead the Colonels to cut back our facilities in Greece and our easy 6th Fleet access to Greek ports.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-104
By id NARA, Date 5-7-03

~~SECRET~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

Congress

We will run into some trouble on the Hill. A number of liberal Congressmen and Senators who believe we should do nothing to support the Colonels will argue that a resumption of deliveries only strengthens the regime's ability to remain in the saddle. Because of these reactions I would argue for a partial rather than a full resumption of MAP deliveries at this time.

Suggested for Release

After examining the suspended items—with particular attention to their NATO support role, storage costs and the danger of deterioration—we have prepared, in consultation with DOD, the attached list (Tab A) of items for early release. Worth \$19.8 million, they constitute about 2/5 of the total value (\$48.5 million) of all items under suspension. At Tab B is a list of the items that would remain under suspension.

Timing

We would not tell the Greeks of our change in policy until we had consulted with the appropriate Members of Congress. Nor would we go to the Hill at all until after Congress has acted on the FY 69 Foreign Aid appropriation.

If you approve a partial resumption of MAP deliveries, we will proceed with Congressional consultation and—barring any major problems arising from the consultation—then go ahead with notification to the Greeks.

Recommendation:

That you approve a partial resumption of MAP deliveries to Greece as set forth in the list at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Nashley deS Keyser
Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

- Tab A - Suspended MAP Items Proposed for Release to Greece
- Tab B - MAP Items that Would Remain under Suspension

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Suspended MAP Items Proposed for Release to Greece

| <u>Quantity</u> | <u>Item</u> | <u>Value</u> | <u>Availability</u> |
|------------------|--|--------------------|---------------------|
| <u>NAVY</u> | | | |
| 2 | Coastal Minesweepers | \$5,409,000 | 90-120 days |
| <u>AIR FORCE</u> | | | |
| 5 | F-104-G (Attrition) | 6,510,000 | 90 days |
| 22 | F-102 (Air National Guard- excess being overhauled) | 2,400,000 | 120-180 days |
| 3 | C-119 Cargo Plane C-119 Support Equipment and Spares | 363,000 672,000 | 60 days |
| 20 | T-41 Basic Single Engine Cessna Trainer Aircraft with Support and Spares | 294,000 | 60 days |
| 10 | T-33 Jet Instrument Trainer Aircraft | 618,000 | 90 days |
| <u>ARMY</u> | | | |
| 41,073 rounds | 90 mm Tank Ammunition (stored in Italy at high cost) | 1,875,000 | 60 days |
| 12 | 175 mm Guns | <u>1,668,000</u> | 60 days |
| | TOTAL | \$19,809,000 | |

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MAP Items That Would Remain Under Suspension

| <u>Quantity</u> | <u>Item</u> | <u>Value</u> |
|-------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|
| 1 | Coastal Minesweeper | \$ 2,704,000 |
| 24 | F-5 Aircraft | 16,749,000 |
| 170 | Bullpup Missiles | 597,000 |
| 123,217 rounds | 90 mm Tank Ammunition | 5,625,000 |
| 65 | M-48 Tanks (CONUS) | 2,030,000 |
| 15 | M-48 Tanks (Livorno, Italy) | 475,000 |
| 15 | M-8 Bulldozers (Livorno, Italy) | 22,000 |
| 4 | M-88 Tank Recovery Vehicles | <u>542,000</u> |
| | TOTAL | \$28,744,000 |

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 8, 1968
3:40 p. m.

Pres file
25

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Clifford just called me, with his Legislative Assistant, Jack Stempler, in his office. He reported that Sparkman had just phoned Stempler. Symington has just told Sparkman that he is withdrawing the Symington Amendment; that Sparkman can proceed to get the Military Aid bill out, and that Sparkman has Symington's proxy.

The background is that only this morning Sparkman said he had failed to budge Symington on his amendment.

Clifford then talked for half an hour with Symington, asking him to withdraw it and saying that the President had told Eshkol that he would give "sympathetic consideration" to Israeli's needs in this field and make a decision this year.

This morning Symington told Clifford that he needed some "more definite understanding" before he would withdraw. Clifford asked me:

- was some word passed to Symington?
- is it possible that his talk with Symington this morning was effective?

I said I did not know the answer, but would report that promptly to the President.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. I now am more clear than Ben Read was to me about why we might wish to flash Amman and Cairo if we go ahead with the Phantom announcement. Our NEA people think there could be some riots. The purpose of the flash is not to inform any Arabs, but to pull down their shutters and keep the women off the streets. Incidentally, it would also prepare them to put the best face on our decision with their clients when it was announced.

Symmes is our Amman Ambassador. He is now in Washington.
(handwritten)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc/jw*, NARA, Date 1-25-02

ACTION

24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 8, 1968 -- 3:20 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Hal Saunders and the NEA people concerned with the negotiations in New York ask this question: Would it be possible to tell Symington you are instructing Sec. Rusk to open the negotiations and get him to turn off the Symington amendment without making a public announcement. They have in mind that the one thing Jarring has asked us to do is to hold up the Phantom decision while he tries to do his job in New York.

I suspect the answer is no, but I did feel it proper for me to forward to you this question.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc/pw* NARA, Date 1-25-02

W. W. Rostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

27

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Free file

Tuesday, October 8, 1968 -- 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

In Gen. Abrams' answers to the five questions I have twice put to him at your direction, I have been troubled by statistical discrepancies with respect to the intelligence community in Washington.

Herewith Bob Ginsburgh details the differences and similarities between MACV and DIA estimates.

Recommendation. The President should not commit himself to Abrams' statistics; although the general line of his analysis has been sound.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AG, NARA, Date 2-1-93

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET - SAVIN~~

7 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

In the MACV and DIA answers to your five questions (see attachment), there are both agreements and contradictions in the statistics cited.

The greatest discrepancy appears in the mid-July truck sightings, 508 trucks per day sighted, averaged during the week 14-20 July 1968, as reported by MACV, compared to 187 averaged over the same period by DIA. However, MACV quotes "all sources," presumably including IGLOO WHITE sensors, whereas DIA uses only pilot and roadwatch team sightings, refined to eliminate duplicate sightings. Another apparent internal discrepancy for each source is the "high" in truck sightings, over 1,000 per day reported by MACV for "mid-July" and 102 for July by DIA; this probably results from a one-day event in MACV statistics and a monthly average for DIA statistics. The estimate by MACV that the rate would return to 1,000 trucks per day probably misrepresents a one-day event as a sustained capability.

Another significant discrepancy appears to be the supply tonnage through-put, which MACV estimates as 50 trucks per day currently, and DIA estimates as 254 short-tons per day for Laos, DMZ, and SVN combined, or 60 short-tons per day for the DMZ and SVN alone. Neither DIA figure adequately reconciles with the MACV figure, though they are of the same order of magnitude.

The number of secondary explosions and fires reported by MACV (2,535 and 5,506, respectively), presumably for a 70-day period, can only be reconciled with the secondary explosions of August and September for RP-1 only (8,661), and then only approximately. In addition, the 15% trucks damaged or destroyed of those sighted (MACV) differs somewhat from the 19% estimated by DIA. Considering the wide difference in truck sightings reported by each source, it is surprising that the percentage destroyed or damaged is as close as it is. Finally, the estimates of laborers involved along the NVN lines of communications just barely overlap, 50-100,000 for DIA and 100-200,000 for MACV.

~~TOP SECRET - SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-183
By ms, NARA, Date 2-27-04

On the other hand, some data from the two sources compare favorably. Current truck sightings and implied truck destruction rates are close, total trucks and waterborne logistic craft destroyed or damaged in a 70-day period agree within 6%, and the more than 50% closure time of three principal routes claimed by MACV is supported by DIA. The MACV estimate of 5-10,000 NVN casualties per month resulting from the bombing is tentatively supported by DIA (8-10,000 per month).

On balance, the statistical discrepancies notwithstanding, it would appear that both MACV and DIA can at least qualitatively support the same conclusions.



WILLIAM L. LEMNITZER

Attachment

BOMBING EFFECTS SPREAD SHEET

ROSTOV'S QUESTION

MACV RESPONSE

DIA RESPONSE

1. What is the effect of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam?

Many of the basic comments previously submitted in response to this question still apply. Deterrence is the first effect. Our air presence is keeping the enemy from moving his air forces, rail system and logistic base southward toward the DMZ. Approximately 15 percent of the enemy's trucks are still being destroyed and damaged along with a very significant number of waterborne logistic craft and supplies. After better than 70 days of effort it is clear our efforts reduced the enemy's detected flow of trucks from the mid-July high of over 1,000 per day to less than 150 per day. 698 trucks have been destroyed or damaged. 1019 waterborne logistic craft have been destroyed and damaged. Better than 2535 secondary explosions and 5506 secondary fires have been achieved by day and night attacks against these points. The enemy's three principal access routes have been closed well in excess of 50 percent of the time by some 2953 interdiction cuts and 489 landslides. Southbound truck detections past few weeks have numbered fewer than 100 per day. Throughput of trucks after attrition and delay factors is estimated at well under 50 trucks per day. If bombing in NVN ceases, return to level of 1000 per day would have to be expected. These efforts have prevented enemy from massing artillery, forces, supplies and air defense for sudden attacks against DMZ. Possibly of greater consequence is that the combined Navy and 7 AF interdiction efforts in NVN have effectively impeded the transshipment southward for the significant stocks of supplies which con-

The bombing campaign has disrupted, impeded, and slowed the movement of men and supplies. It is estimated that about 19 percent of trucks sighted in Route Package I since 31 March have been destroyed or damaged. During this time, 12,850 trucks were sighted and 2,400 were reported destroyed or damaged. Attacks against at least 6,400 waterborne logistic craft have resulted in about 2,200 of them destroyed or damaged.

There has been a significant reduction in truck movement, probably caused by bombing. Since 20 July, increased air interdiction along critical Route 101, and Routes 15 and 137 leading to the Lao supply corridor has reportedly resulted in their closure as stated. Inundation of these routes by the adverse affects of weather in early September was also instrumental in causing a reduction in the detected flow of trucks. Figures based on daily visual sightings support a 65 percent reduction (102 in July down to 36 in Sept.) During the 70 day period, about 700 trucks have been reported destroyed or damaged as well as 1081 waterborne logistic craft.

Total secondary explosion in RPs I, II, and III are shown below. The reduction in August reflects the lessening activity due to the wet weather.

| | JUL | AUG | SEP | TOTAL |
|--------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| RP I | 4,445 | 3,525 | 5,136 | 13,106 |
| RP II | 829 | 838 | 1,347 | 3,014 |
| RP III | 640 | 220 | 358 | 1,218 |
| TOTAL | 5,914 | 4,583 | 6,841 | 17,338 |

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-184
By ms, NARA, Date 3-17-04

MACV RESPONSE (continued)

tinued to move into the Thanh Hoa and Vinh area by rail, road, and boat.

DIA RESPONSE (continued)

Movement of supplies during the period July through mid-September reflects approximately 18,600 short tons moved in the area south and southwest of Thanh Hoa. This compares to approximately 25,300 short tons moved during the period April through June. The percentages of these supplies going to probable destinations in Laos, the DMZ area, and SVN for these comparative periods are as follows:

| <u>April-June</u> | <u>July-Mid-September</u> |
|-------------------|---------------------------|
| Laos - 23% | Laos - 17% |
| DMZ - 10% | DMZ - 23% |
| SVN - 7% | SVN - 11% |
| 40% | 41% |

Based upon incomplete figures since mid-September the month of September may reflect approximately 8,000 short tons moved, 29 per cent higher than August's total of 6,200 short tons.

The bombing is preventing the logistic base from being moved further south. In fact, there is some evidence that supplies are being moved northward from interdicted areas in RP I, II, and III to noninterdicted areas of NVN.

US lives have been saved both directly and indirectly, and Hanoi's freedom to support and take part in the war in the south has been restricted. For example, Operation THOR, a seven day concentrated bombing campaign in the coastal area from DMZ north of 17°10'N, destroyed/damaged 1,200 military positions (AAA, SAN, artillery, bunkers), reducing the enemy threat to at least nine FWP installations. The secondary explosions noted attested to the destruction of large quantities of POL/ammunition.

~~TOP SECRET/SAVVY~~

BOMBING EFFECTS SPREAD SHEET

ROSTOW'S QUESTION

MACV RESPONSE

DIA RESPONSE

2. What would be the military effect of a cessation of that bombing?

The major result of a bombing halt would be the enemy's increased capability to position and maintain large ground forces immediately north of the DMZ in close proximity to US and ARVN forces deployed to defend I CTZ. He could concentrate his artillery, armor, air forces and air defense forces in direct support of these ground forces and place them in a position to initiate a large-scale invasion of SVN with minimum warning time. We can expect the enemy to develop forward logistics complexes. Thanh Hoa is an example of what he could do. Since the bombing pause, the level of activity in this complex has increased and a significant portion of NVN logistic storage and distribution efforts has shifted southward from Hanoi/Haiphong. A complete bombing pause would permit North Vietnam to shift major logistic storage and distribution points even further south to areas such as Ha Tinh, Dong Hoi, and Vinh. Direct water, rail, or road shipping to these points would permit the support of larger forces near the DMZ and greatly intensified combat throughout SVN. The enemy will probably devote a maximum initial effort to reconstruction of his lines of communication south of 19 degrees. Key interdiction points north of the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes will be restored and efforts to complete route 1036 will be pushed. The main north-south railroad will be put back in service, reducing travel

Experience shows enemy has used every previous bombing pause to improve his military posture. For example, north of N since 1 April, Hanoi has repaired most essential LOCs, has moved supplies on a 24-hour basis, and has been repairing severely damaged war-supporting installations. It is prudent to assume that North Vietnam will do so throughout the entire country in a bomb-free environment. Without constraints, the enemy will be more capable of increased actions against FWFs in those areas contiguous to the DMZ.

At the onset of the bombing restriction on 1 April, the amount of supplies noted in COMINT moving south approximately doubled in the following 30 days. This increased flow of supplies has been accompanied by the movement of stockpiled supplies out of the hitherto restricted areas of Hanoi and Haiphong. The movement of goods south places them nearer the combat zone, but still safe from interdiction and attack. Further restriction of the bombing to a point closer to the DMZ or to cease bombing altogether would permit the North Vietnamese to move their protected supply base still closer to the combat area.

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~~TOP SECRET/SAVVY~~

MACV RESPONSE (CONTINUED)

time from Hanoi to the DMZ by about a month. Ferry crossing, inland waterways, and coastal shipping which have cost the enemy dearly to operate will assume a major role in the logistics efforts. Once reconstruction of LOCs is completed, personnel devoted to road maintenance could be transferred to other tasks. Airfields south of 19 degrees will return to service. The enemy will probably deploy fighter aircraft to them as he did at Bai Thuong. These will pose a threat to US aircraft operating over I CTZ and could be used to attack our ground troops. Enemy forces will be able to refit just north of the DMZ, utilizing pre-positioned replacements and equipment and return rapidly to action. The NVA 304th division was withdrawn from the Khe Sanh area in June and moved to NVN, apparently to refit and rebuild its forces. To find sanctuary from our air interdiction, the division was forced to make a 3-month march to the area north of the 19th parallel. This deep withdrawal will no longer be necessary. A bombing pause would also permit NVA to make fuller use of land lines in communications. The security thus provided would deprive us of the information presently derived from COMINT on infiltration of personnel and supplies. Loss of this information would increase enemy's chances of achieving strategic and tactical surprise. Country-wide, the NVA presently devotes an estimated 90,000 troops to his air defense mission plus perhaps 100-200,000 laborers. Complete bombing cessation would allow the NVA several options, any of which would increase the threat

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DIA RESPONSE (CONTINUED)

North-South travel time would be reduced as the rail system and highways are restored; the reconstruction of the rail line from Vinh to the DMZ, however, would require several months.

Enemy would probably repair airfields at Vinh and Dong Hoi and probably station small number of MIGs at Vinh. Aircraft operating from airfields farther north already possess capability to attack ground forces in and south of DMZ.

The analysis of communications for the GDRS communications net which controls the flow of men and materiel through the North Vietnamese Panhandle indicates that between November and March an average of 150 STPD of supplies transited the Thanh Hoa area. In April, the average jumped to 320 STPD. Subsequent monthly tonnages moved have averaged 60 per cent higher than those noted prior to the bombing restriction.

We believe an additional 50-100,000 laborers are also employed.

~~TOP SECRET/SAVIN~~

MACV RESPONSE (CONTINUED)

to our forces in or near SVN. They are:
(1) dismantling some air defense units to provide additional maneuver forces. (2) shifting more air defense into area adjacent to DMZ and into Laos. His threat would put at serious risk the use of Arc Light strikes anywhere in proximity to the DMZ and areas bordering on Laos. Additionally, this would pose a serious threat to the tactical air forces providing close air support to the ground forces in I CTZ tactical zone, and to interdiction operations in Laos. Some AAA weapons can also be used for direct ground fire. (3) Increasing air defense (Aw and AAA) in SVN proper.

~~TOP SECRET/SAVIN~~

Ref: Abrams to Rostow

Ref: Msg MAC 13145 281214Z Sep 68

BOMBING EFFECTS SPREAD SHEET

ROSTOW'S QUESTION

3. Since March 31 what is the average number of trucks destroyed and trucks damaged per week? What is the average number of trucks sighted in the Panhandle per week? What is your best estimate of the total number of trucks (sighted and unsighted) that flow through the Panhandle each week and the proportion of this total that we are not getting?

MACV RESPONSE

As a consequence of the sustained day, night and all weather operations against the enemy's choke points and water crossing in Route Package I, the enemy's day movement of trucks has been virtually halted. As a consequence of night attacks against the above areas, the enemy has ceased moving in convoys and has been unwilling to allow his trucks to wait behind crossing points, as a result, most of his trucks have been kept north of Route Package I, moving out singly under cover of darkness. Consequently fewer kills have been possible. In the week 14-20 July an average of 508 trucks per day were sighted from all sources. After that period there was a steady decrease in truck traffic as the enemy felt the full weight of our interdiction campaign concentrated at key traffic choke points. In the week prior to Typhoon Bess on 4 September the sightings had decreased to 151 per day. Since 4 September, truck kills and damage have averaged 32 per week as a consequence of nearly complete blockage of his mired choke points. As indicated above, the major impact of the interdiction campaign has been in reduction of flow.

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DIA RESPONSE

Since 31 March:

Average number of trucks reported destroyed and damaged per week in NVN Panhandle - 280; estimated actual truck loss average per week - 125.

Average number of trucks sighted by pilots in the NVN Panhandle per week - 868; in Route Package I - 504.

DIA figures for 14-20 July reflect pilot sightings which average 155 trucks per day and road watch sightings which average 32 trucks per day along Route 15 and 137/912 giving a total of 187 truck sightings per day average in Route Package I. Figures refined to extent possible to eliminate duplicate sightings on basis of time and location factors.

DIA truck sightings for 28 Aug - 4 Sep average 117 per day. This compares with DIA truck sightings for 4-11 Sep which averages 24 trucks per day and supports MACV's conclusion of reduced flow. Reportedly 92 trucks were destroyed or damaged for the week prior to Typhoon Bess and only 32 trucks the following week.

MACV RESPONSE (CONT.)

In anticipation of poor weather over Route Package I and better road trafficability in Laos the enemy is now expending very heavy effort in the repair and improvement of his roads. It is estimated that the enemy will shortly undertake a significant surge in his Laotian traffic in order to support his seriously undersupplied units in I and II Corps.

Ref: Abrams to Rostow
Ref: Msg MAC 13145 281214Z Sep 68

BOMBING EFFECTS SPREAD SHEET

ROSTOW'S QUESTION

4. What is the estimate of military casualties we inflict on the enemy each week in the bombing of North Vietnam?

MACV RESPONSE

We believe military casualties resulting from intensified air strikes since 14 July 1968 have increased significantly. While any quantifications are difficult to estimate, AAA sites, road construction crews and water crossing logistic crews have been subjected to sharply increased night harassment attacks with anti personnel munitions. Heavy increases in secondary fires and explosions have been noted at these points as a consequence of these attacks. Current rates of truck attrition probably account for some 150 casualties (KIA and WIA) per week. SIGINT reflections of sick and wounded personnel tend to substantiate the results of these operations. As in our previous submission, casualties on the order of 5 to 10 thousand per month do not seem unreasonable. However, the more significant impact of these operations has been in the marked reduction in weight of effort the enemy has been allowed to apply against our forces.

DIA RESPONSE

Data concerning bombing casualties is sparse and does not permit firm estimates. Repair workers, air defense crews, transportation personnel, and infiltration groups moving through the Panhandle, all necessary to support the war, are vulnerable to air strikes. A conservative estimate, based on POW, Hoi Chanh and other data, would suggest that military related casualties could be 8-10,000 per month. This figure is, however, very speculative.

~~TOP SECRET/SAVIN~~

BOMBING EFFECTS SPREAD SHEET

ROSTOW'S QUESTION

5. Is there any possibility of your providing for the President even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam?

MACV RESPONSE

I have reviewed the factors considered in my earlier response to this question. Further examination of the results of the air interdiction campaign convinces me that my estimate at that time remains valid. There are those who make the point that we can afford to give up bombing NVN during the northeast monsoon because of its difficult weather conditions and concentrate on Laos with its good weather. We have addressed this thesis implicitly in several parts of the message, but I think it important enough to address directly. This proposition misses several points. The advent of poor weather over route package I increases the importance of continuing all weather operations in that area. Since Route Package I controls the access to the Mugia and Ban Karai passes and provides the only readily interdictable points at which to control the flood of traffic soon expected to surge into Laos-all weather operations become a crucial factor in controlling the magnitude of the enemy's input into Laos. Continued all weather reconnaissance of Route Package I becomes more essential than ever in order to detect the surprise massing of enemy forces, trucks and waterborne craft towards the DMZ or Laos. Such massing can be detected despite weather limitations and effective attacks mounted though on a reduced scale. Cessation of air operations over NVN would also allow the enemy to shift significant AAA defenses into Laos. These could seriously impair the conduct of interdiction operations in Laos during the forthcoming dry season. In summary, a cessation of offensive action

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DIA RESPONSE

North Vietnam would take full advantage of a bombing cessation to move large quantities of artillery and ammunition to the DMZ, where operations could be staged with relative impunity against FW positions within range of I Corps. Such weapons could be used to support large-scale ground actions launched from the bomb-free area against selected friendly positions at a time and place of the enemy's choosing. At a minimum, it is estimated that increased enemy capabilities and flexibility would result in a sharp increase in friendly casualties; however, it is impossible to quantify same.

~~TOP SECRET/SAVIN~~

MACV RESPONSE (CONT.)

north of the DMZ would enable the enemy to mass personnel and equipment along the DMZ; facilitate his infiltration and logistic support across and around the DMZ; and increase the air, artillery and ground threats to our forces located in northern I CTZ. I must emphasize the adverse effect of a cessation without reciprocity on the morale of the officers and men of my command, as well as those of the RVNAF, who would be exposed to increased enemy pressure from a newly created sanctuary. Conversely, a complete bombing cessation will raise the enemy's confidence and aggressiveness. It will validate his doctrine of the insurgency war and will confirm his unrealistic view of the military, political, and psychological postures of the warring parties. It will portray to him increasing strength on his part and growing weakness on ours. It will demonstrate to him that he is winning. Above all, it will convince him that he must continue, or increase, the current tempo of the war to gain the ultimate victory. Militarily and psychologically a complete bombing cessation will shift the balance significantly toward the enemy.

BOMBING EFFECTS SPREAD SHEET

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AFAP-602. Rev. 7-62
4 October 1968

SANITIZED

ROSEY'S QUESTION

1. What is the effect of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam?

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MACV RESPONSE

Many of the basic comments previously submitted in response to this question still apply. Deterrence is the first effect. Our air presence is keeping the enemy from moving his air forces, rail system and logistic base southward toward the DMZ. Approximately 15 percent of the enemy's trucks are still being destroyed and damaged along with a very significant number of waterborne logistic craft and supplies. After better than 70 days of effort it is clear our efforts reduced the enemy's detected flow of trucks from the mid-July high of over 1,000 per day to less than 150 per day. 698 trucks have been destroyed or damaged. 1019 waterborne logistic craft have been destroyed and damaged. Better than 2535 secondary explosions and 5506 secondary fires have been achieved by day and night attacks against these points. The enemy's three principal access routes have been closed well in excess of 50 percent of the time by some 2953 interdiction cuts and 489 landslides. Southbound truck detections past few weeks have numbered fewer than 100 per day. Throughput of trucks after attrition and delay factors is estimated at well under 50 trucks per day. If bombing in NVN ceases, return to level of 1000 per day would have to be expected. These efforts have prevented enemy from massing artillery, forces, supplies and air defense for sudden attacks against DMZ. Possibly of greater consequence is that the combined Navy and 7 AF interdiction efforts in NVN have effectively impeded the transshipment southward for the significant stocks of supplies which con-

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DIA RESPONSE

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Total secondary explosion in RPs I, II, and III are shown below. The reduction in August reflects the lessening activity due to the wet weather.

| | JUL. | AUG | SEP | TOTAL |
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SANITIZED
Authority NLJ/CBS
By jid rams, Date 12-7-83

WR 98

MACV RESPONSE (continued)

tinued to move into the Thanh Hoa and Vinh area by rail, road, and boat.

DIA RESPONSE (continued)

Movement of supplies during the period July through mid-September reflects approximately 18,600 short tons moved in the area south and southwest of Thanh Hoa. This compares to approximately 25,300 short tons moved during the period April through June. The percentages of these supplies going to probable destinations in Laos, the DMZ area, and SVN for these comparative periods are as follows:

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The bombing is preventing the logistic base from being moved further south. In fact, there is some evidence that supplies are being moved northward from interdicted areas in RP I, II, and III to noninterdicted areas of NVK.

US lives have been saved both directly and indirectly, and Hanoi's freedom to support and take part in the war in the south has been restricted. For example, Operation THOR, a seven day concentrated bombing campaign in the coastal area from DMZ north of 17°10'N, destroyed/damaged 1,200 military positions (AAA, SAM, artillery, bunkers), reducing the enemy threat to at least nine FWP installations. The secondary explosions noted attested to the destruction of large quantities of POL/ammunition.

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BOMBING EFFECTS SPREAD SHEET

ROSTOW'S QUESTION

2. What would be the military effect of a cessation of that bombing?

MACV RESPONSE

The major result of a bombing halt would be the enemy's increased capability to position and maintain large ground forces immediately north of the DMZ in close proximity to US and ARVN forces deployed to defend I CTZ. He could concentrate his artillery, armor, air forces and air defense forces in direct support of these ground forces and place them in a position to initiate a large-scale invasion of SVN with minimum warning time. We can expect the enemy to develop forward logistics complexes.

[REDACTED]

A complete bombing pause would permit North Vietnam to shift major logistic storage and distribution points even further south to areas such as Ha Tinh, Dong Hoi, and Vinh. Direct water, rail, or road shipping to these points would permit the support of larger forces near the DMZ and greatly intensified combat throughout SVN. The enemy will probably devote a maximum initial effort to reconstruction of his lines of communication south of 19 degrees. Key interdiction points north of the Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes will be restored and efforts to complete route 1036 will be pushed. The main north-south railroad will be put back in service, reducing travel

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Experience shows enemy has used every previous bombing pause to improve his military posture. For example, north of N since 1 April, Hanoi has repaired most essential LOCs, has moved supplies on a 24-hour basis, and has been repairing severely damaged war-supporting installations. It is prudent to assume that North Vietnam will do so throughout the entire country in a bomb-free environment. Without constraints, the enemy will be more capable of increased actions against FWFs in those areas contiguous to the DMZ.

[REDACTED]

The movement of goods south places them nearer the combat zone, but still safe from interdiction and attack. Further restriction of the bombing to a point closer to the DMZ or to cease bombing altogether would permit the North Vietnamese to move their protected supply base still closer to the combat area.

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MACV RESPONSE (CONTINUED)

time from Hanoi to the DMZ by about a month. Ferry crossing, inland waterways, and coastal shipping which have cost the enemy dearly to operate will assume a major role in the logistics efforts. Once reconstruction of LOCs is completed, personnel devoted to road maintenance could be transferred to other tasks. Airfields south of 19 degrees will return to service. The enemy will probably deploy fighter aircraft to them as he did at Bai Thuong. These will pose a threat to US aircraft operating over I CTZ and could be used to attack our ground troops. Enemy forces will be able to refit just north of the DMZ, utilizing pre-positioned replacements and equipment and return rapidly to action.

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DIA RESPONSE (CONTINUED)

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We believe an additional 50-100,000 laborers are also employed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MACV RESPONSE (CONTINUED)

to our forces in or near SVN. They are:
(1) dismantling some air defense units to provide additional maneuver forces. (2) shifting more air defense into area adjacent to DMZ and into Laos. His threat would put at serious risk the use of Arc Light strikes anywhere in proximity to the DMZ and areas bordering on Laos. Additionally, this would pose a serious threat to the tactical air forces providing close air support to the ground forces in I CTZ tactical zone, and to interdiction operations in Laos. Some AAA weapons can also be used for direct ground fire. (3) Increasing air defense (Aw and AAA) in SVN proper.

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Ref: Abeam to Rostow

Ref: Msg MAC 15145 281214Z Sep 68

BOMBING EFFECTS SPREAD SHEET

ROSTOW'S QUESTION

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MACV RESPONSE

As a consequence of the sustained day, night and all weather operations against the enemy's choke points and water crossing in Route Package I, the enemy's day movement of trucks has been virtually halted. As a consequence of night attacks against the above areas, the enemy has ceased moving in convoys and has been unwilling to allow his trucks to wait behind crossing points, as a result, most of his trucks have been kept north of Route Package I, moving out singly under cover of darkness. Consequently fewer kills have been possible. In the week 14-20 July an average of 508 trucks per day were sighted from all sources. After that period there was a steady decrease in truck traffic as the enemy felt the full weight of our interdiction campaign concentrated at key traffic choke points. In the week prior to Typhoon Bess on 4 September the sightings had decreased to 151 per day. Since 4 September, truck kills and damage have averaged 32 per week as a consequence of nearly complete blockage of his mixed choke points. As indicated above, the major impact of the interdiction campaign has been in reduction of flow.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

MACV RESPONSE (CONT.)

In anticipation of poor weather over Route Package I and better road trafficability in Laos the enemy is now expending very heavy effort in the repair and improvement of his roads. It is estimated that the enemy will shortly undertake a significant surge in his Laotian traffic in order to support his seriously undersupplied units in I and II Corps.

Ref: Abrams to Rostow
Ref: Msg MAC 13145 281214Z Sep 68

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BOMBING EFFECTS SPREAD SHEET

ROSTOW'S QUESTION

4. What is the estimate of military casualties we inflict on the enemy each week in the bombing of North Vietnam?

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BOMBING EFFECTS SPREAD SHEET

ROSTOW'S QUESTION

5. Is there any possibility of your providing for the President even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam?

MACV RESPONSE

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DIA RESPONSE

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MACV RESPONSE (CONT.)

north of the DMZ would enable the enemy to mass personnel and equipment along the DMZ; facilitate his infiltration and logistic support across and around the DMZ; and increase the air, artillery and ground threats to our forces located in northern I CTZ. I must emphasize the adverse effect of a cessation without reciprocity on the morale of the officers and men of my command, as well as those of the RVNAF, who would be exposed to increased enemy pressure from a newly created sanctuary. Conversely, a complete bombing cessation will raise the enemy's confidence and aggressiveness. It will validate his doctrine of the insurgency war and will confirm his unrealistic view of the military, political, and psychological postures of the warring parties. It will portray to him increasing strength on his part and growing weakness on ours. It will demonstrate to him that he is winning. Above all, it will convince him that he must continue, or increase, the current tempo of the war to gain the ultimate victory. Militarily and psychologically a complete bombing cessation will shift the balance significantly toward the enemy.

COPY FOR LIBRARY

Tuesday, October 8, 1968 -- 2:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Although Jarring will take a dim view of a Phantom deal at this time (and Russ Wiggins), it is Sec. Rusk's judgment that this is the most we can get away with in the light of the action of the Congress.

We can use the negotiations to work in parallel on their UN position.

Therefore, he approves the attached language.

Sec. Clifford is also agreeable.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rin

2.8a

I have taken note of Section 651 concerning the sale of supersonic planes to Israel. I understand it to be the sense of the Congress that "the President should take such steps as may be necessary, as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of this section, to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression by offsetting sophisticated weapons received by the Arab States and to replace losses suffered by Israel in the 1967 conflict."

In the light of this expression of the sense of the Congress, I am today asking the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with the Government of Israel and to report back to me in the days ahead.

October 8, 1968

Dear Mayor Schuets:

We have shared peaceful times and troubled times for more than two decades. The miracle of Berlin's rebirth is a testament to the cooperation of all free people in peace. And I myself witnessed the magnificent spirit of the people of Berlin in a time of trouble. Through it all, the American commitment to the freedom of your city was firm. It is so today. It will be so tomorrow. The United States stands squarely, fully, and unreservedly with Berlin.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Klaus Schuets
Governing Mayor of Berlin
Berlin, Germany

LBJ:WWR:ms

October 8, 1968

Dear Mayor Schuets:

We have shared peaceful times and troubled times for more than two decades. The miracle of Berlin's rebirth is a testament to the cooperation of all free people in peace. And I myself witnessed the magnificent spirit of the people of Berlin in a time of trouble. Through it all, the American commitment to the freedom of your city was firm. It is so today. It will be so tomorrow. The United States stands squarely, fully, and unreservedly with Berlin.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Klaus Schuets
Governing Mayor of Berlin
Berlin, Germany

LBJ:WWR:mz

carried by Sec Clifford

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 8, 1968
2:05 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

At Tab A is Nick Katzenbach's memo enclosing a draft letter from you to Berlin Mayor Schuetz which Secretary Clifford would like to deliver on October 12 when he visits the city.

The draft letter quotes from the statement you made in Berlin in 1961. Ambassador Lodge will already have used the same quotation in his brief remarks at the ceremonies dedicating the new Berlin medical center on October 9.

I therefore drafted an alternative letter at Tab B that you could send to Mayor Schuetz through Secretary Clifford. It is quiet but makes the point.

Secretary Clifford wants to raise this when he sees you this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

Approve original draft
at Tab A _____

Approve revised draft
at Tab B _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~SECRET~~

31a
see A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


October 8, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

As you know, Clark Clifford plans to visit Berlin on October 12. In the present state of anxiety in that City, I think it would serve a highly useful purpose if he could deliver a Presidential letter to the Mayor of Berlin when he sees him.

The attached draft is a strong restatement of our earlier pledges to the freedom of Berlin. Clark has seen and approves it.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Acting Secretary

Attachment:

Suggested letter.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

Dear Mayor Schuetz:

I have asked Secretary Clifford to visit you and to tell you in plain, clear terms where the United States stands: The United States stands squarely, fully, and unreservedly with Berlin.

I want Secretary Clifford's visit to serve as a reminder--to anyone beyond the Wall who might still need a reminder--that the American commitment to the freedom of your city remains firm. When I visited Berlin in 1961 I said that "to the safety and the creative future of this city we Americans have pledged in effect, what our ancestors pledged in forming the United States: 'our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor'." Let me make clear, through Secretary Clifford and through this letter, that that pledge remains in effect.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Klaus Schuetz,
Governing Mayor of Berlin,
Berlin, Germany.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

Tab-B
31c

Dear Mayor Schuetz:

I have asked Secretary Clifford to visit you and to tell you in plain, clear terms where the United States stands: The United States stands squarely, fully, and unreservedly with Berlin.

We have shared peaceful times and troubled times for more than two decades. The miracle of Berlin's rebirth is a testament to the cooperation of all free people in peace. And I myself witnessed the magnificent spirit of the people of Berlin in a time of trouble. Through it all, the American commitment to the freedom of your city was firm. It is so today. It will be so tomorrow.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Klaus Schuetz,
Governing Mayor of Berlin,
Berlin, Germany.

LBJ:ERF:mm
10/8/68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

ACTION

Tuesday, October 8, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed farewell message to President Tombalbaye of Chad. He plans to leave from New York tomorrow evening.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Call me _____

WWR:HS:RM:lw

Att: File #3081

Proposed Farewell Message to President Tombalbaye of Chad

Dear Mr. President:

I hope you have enjoyed your visit to the United States.
It was a great honor to have you with us.

I was most pleased by our good talk about the important questions which concern us both. Your visit has given all Americans a deeper understanding of your wise and devoted work for Chad and the new Africa.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in wishing you a warm farewell and a happy journey home.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

WWR:HS:RM:lw

INFORMATION

Tuesday, October 8, 1968 -- 1:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

I have checked with Bob McNamara on the IDA legislation. He takes a somewhat different view than Manatos, Macomber and company. He believes there is an outside chance that we might get the Senate to act if we could get the House to issue a rule and vote on the IDA bill.

In any case, he is all for trying to move IDA in the House and then seeing if the Gore deal can be overcome in the Senate.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Mike Manatos

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 8, 1968 -- 1:10 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith MACV reports an ARVN Red Alert on the grounds that there may be "demonstrations against the government, protesting its soft stand on the peace negotiations." MACV does not expect serious disorders at the present time.

"The ARVN III Corps and Capital Military District have been placed on a Red Alert by the Government of Vietnam. This means that Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces military personnel will be restricted to quarters and barracks. The reason given for the Red Alert is that there are rumors that there will be demonstrations against the government protesting its soft stand on the peace negotiations.

"The probability of serious disorders does not appear to be great at this time."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1968
By 19, NARA, Date 2-1-93

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 2-1-93

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 8, 1968
12:30 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick raises a question about the Italian Foreign Minister, as well as Debre, calling on you. It obviously depends on your wishes as well as on your travel plans.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AG, NARA, Date 2-1-93



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

3127
35a
October 5, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Calls on You by Visiting Foreign Ministers

This is the season, because of the General Assembly, when many visiting Foreign Ministers attending the United Nations wish to come to Washington. Some of these have advanced specific requests for calls on you.

You have tentatively agreed to receive the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Mr. Michael Stewart, at 5:30 p.m. on October 11. This appointment is in the tradition of receiving the British Foreign Secretary.

The French had earlier requested an appointment with you for the French Foreign Minister, Michel Debre, but we were informed, pursuant to instructions from the White House, that while you would like to receive Debre, present uncertainties for the period October 10-12 made it impossible to set a specific date. This has been interpreted by the French as a negative response. Ambassador Shriver is quite distressed about this situation and has asked that it be reviewed.

The visit of Mr. Debre to Washington will be followed by a visit by Mr. Medici, the Italian Foreign Minister. The Italians, too, would like you to see their Foreign Minister.

We are reluctant to encourage appointments of this kind because of your heavy schedule. Also, these individuals will have already had discussions with the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials both in New York and Washington.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

However, great store is set by the foreigners in having an appointment with you. If you should decide to see Debre, the Italians will undoubtedly increase their pressure for an appointment. It is our view, because of Italian sensitivities, that if Debre is received, a Medici appointment should also be granted.

I wish to bring these matters to your attention and determine your own personal desires as to the Debre and Medici appointments. Here in the Department, we have not been encouraging requests for these appointments. However, if you wish to see both Messrs Debre and Medici, we can make the necessary arrangements.


Acting Secretary

Will see Debre and Medici _____ Do not wish to see either _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file
36

Tuesday, Oct. 8, 1968
12:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Wally Barbour is in town. He says he has nothing in particular to report to you that you don't know about Israel; but he did not wish to be in town and not make himself available to the President.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 8, 1968 -- 12:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will undoubtedly have things of your own which you wish to raise at the 6:00 p. m. meeting today, but these are matters which you may wish to include on the agenda:

1. Sec. Clifford's proposed trip to Berlin.
2. What, if anything, we do about the tripartite declaration on Berlin. (Chip Behlen is comfortable with it; but we are also asking Tommy Thompson for his view which may be more negative.)
3. The military aid sales legislation and the Symington amendment. (The problem seems to be: Can a quorum in the Committee be raised? Can the Symington amendment be defeated on the floor or softened in conference so that it does not bind you?)
4. Report of Sec. Rusk on his meetings with the NATO Foreign Ministers last night and, in general, prospects for serious contributions to strengthen NATO from our allies. (As the allies come forward, the question will increasingly arise: What is the U. S. prepared to do to strengthen NATO?)
5. Middle East prospects in New York. (Eban is letting word go out to the Arabs not to take his speech too seriously or regard it as the final word.)
6. Follow-up on Rusk-Gromyko private conversation. (You may wish to talk about this with Sec. Rusk only)

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. ~~Guidance~~
 By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

Pres file
38

Tuesday, Oct. 8, 1968

~~SECRET - CODEWORD~~ 12:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will wish to read the summary of this
NIE, at least. Subject: Warsaw Pact Capabilities
Against NATO.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET SAVIN~~ attachment (SC 05894-68 SNIE 11-17-68 3 Oct 68)
cy No. 1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-87
By ico, NARA, Date 1-26-04

Profile
39

Tuesday, October 8, 1968
12:15 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a CIA analysis of the motivations
for the Peruvian coup -- and how the IPC
case figured.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (log 3133)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By 18, NARA, Date 2-2-93

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

7 October 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The IFC and Peruvian Politics

The fundamental reasons for the military coup in Lima were the personal ambition of a few officers and, more important, the belief of many that the army's aged adversary, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, was likely to win the presidential election scheduled for June 1969. Although specific plans for this coup were closely held by the military, poorly disguised plotting has been a favorite pressure tactic used by the military against the politicians. Furthermore, a pre-emptive coup to prevent Haya's election would not have been a surprise at any time during this election year.

Yet in its manifesto, the new military government chose to condemn not Haya, but rather "the soldout pseudosolution to the problem of La Brea and Pariñas, which is evidence that the moral decay of the nation has reached such grave extremes that its consequences are unforeseen." The reference was to the recent settlement between the Peruvian government and Standard Oil's International Petroleum Corporation (IFC). This memorandum outlines the ways in which a US company became the center of a dispute which was an important factor in the disruption of Peruvian politics. Implicit in the description is a commentary upon the frailty of at least this one Latin American political system, and upon the intensity of anti-American nationalism in at least this one country.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
✓ NLJ 02-101 and 11394-288
By cb/in NARA, Date 4-28-03

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

1. On 28 July President Fernando Belaúnde Terry announced that the long-awaited solution to Peru's "problem" with IPC had been achieved. For five years, the Belaúnde administration had been criticized openly by opponents in the legislature, and by the military, for not having done anything to terminate what in their view was IPC's favored economic position. More recently, he had been criticized for having taken the "wrong" action. Under the so-called Act of Talara, IPC would surrender its concession at La Brea y Paríñas, including its crude oil production facilities, to the State Petroleum Agency (EPF), and would waive its right to any claim to sub-surface mineral rights at that location. In return, the government would cancel any IPC debts related to unpaid taxes or to fines for past "unjust enrichment." EPF agreed to sell to IPC, at "acceptable prices," the entire output of crude oil, natural gas, and liquid gases from the La Brea y Paríñas area. These would be refined by IPC at its Talara refinery (a refining and manufacturing concession renewed and expanded by the Act). The Talara refinery could be developed as IPC deemed necessary. Capital equipment, and non-Peruvian crude oil to maximize refinery use, could be imported by IPC duty-free.

- 2 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S-E-C-R-E-T

2. IPC originally had included as a part of this so-called Act of Talara the requirement that it must be ratified by the Congress. President Belaunde did not wish to give the Congress this authority, reasoning that the contract would never pass in an election atmosphere sensitive to nationalistic issues. Thus, IPC apparently agreed to sign the Act and allow the executive to submit it to the Congress as a fait accompli. On 13 August the Act was signed -- two xerox copies signed in ink with certain changes written in by hand. Included in the document was a chart showing the basis upon which EPF would charge IPC for crude oil.

3. When the document reached the Congress there was a considerable negative reaction -- viscerally nationalistic on the part of some who simply dislike the IPC and the US, and "opportunistically nationalistic" on the part of the regular opposition parties. The president of EPF* resigned, saying that the documents which he himself had signed were not legal because they were not printed on official paper, and claiming

2958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

- 3 -

S E C R E T

that the chart of IPC crude oil purchase prices had not been presented to Congress with the rest of the document. The executive branch claimed that the document was perfectly legal, on any kind of paper, and produced a copy of the Act and the chart on television.

4. Complicating the issue, and the political debate, was an increase in the ever-present rumors concerning the possibility of a military coup, this time directed toward the prospect that the government would become destabilized by argumentation over IPC and that public confidence in the government would be severely reduced. The military were no less critical of the Act than the politicians had been, but were less vociferous. They have stated privately their suspicion that IPC achieved agreement by bribing Peruvian officials. They viewed the cancelled IPC debts and fines as money from which they could have received pay raises* and new equipment. The opposition APRA Party vacillated on the issue in Congress because it wanted to avoid precipitating a coup more than it wanted to embarrass the Belaúnde government.

*The military in Peru have not had a pay raise since 1962. Many officers saw the Symington Amendment to the US Foreign Aid Bill as interfering with their future pay increases because it penalizes governments whose military budgets increase. Thus, there was a double dose of anti-Americanism on this money issue.

5. As it developed, AFRA and Belaúnde's party were able to prevent congressional censure of the cabinet over the Act of Talara, although debate was heated and censure was proposed twice. The cabinet resigned on 2 October in a move designed to prevent further discussion of censure in the legislature and thus to forestall a military move based on governmental instability. For its part, the military denied coup-plotting, although some military leaders were known to be politically ambitious, and it was widely known that many, particularly in the army, felt a coup would ultimately be necessary.

6. Recognizing the tension in the situation, AFRA, Belaúnde, and the cabinet agreed that the government should re-negotiate the Act with IPC. Not much real change was contemplated; they hoped that stylistic rather than substantive changes would satisfy opponents of the original terms. The new Act would be printed on proper paper, and the signing would be done publicly on television, where all could see its legitimacy.

7. This being an election year in Peru, it is likely that the IPC "problem" would have remained unresolved. The options for government action had become narrow. The only decision about IPC's holdings which would silence most Peruvian politicians was the

least reasonable one -- nationalization or expropriation; yet few responsible Peruvians advocated this step because of the damage it would do to Peru's efforts to attract foreign capital. Nonetheless, in order to make proper reputations, some important politicians would have opposed any solution which either granted concessions to IPC or failed to penalize it for past "unjust enrichment."

8. This was made clear by the recent split within Belaúnde's party. The party's nominee for President, Edgardo Seoane, had denounced the Act for its failure to declare Peruvian ownership of all production and refining facilities, to the exclusion of outside interests. The Seoane faction and other parties might have joined in the election campaign to advocate the nationalization of IPC's holdings without compensatory concessions if renegotiation of the agreement failed to yield terms much more favorable to Peru. The military junta will probably seek initially not to offend these and other outspoken groups in Peru in order to stabilize its hold on power as quickly as possible. Thus, having used the IPC problem as an important part of its rationale for the coup, the junta moved immediately to abrogate the Act of Talara. Indeed, it probably has forced itself into a position from which it will have to take action against the IPC along lines advocated by the most nationalistic and anti-American groups in Peru.

Tuesday, Oct. 8, 1968
12:10 p.m.

Pres file
50

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a London Times story on the allegedly
very tough terms given the Czechs in Moscow.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment (FBIS 15 8 Oct 68)

40a

FBIS 15 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

HINTS OF SOVIET DEMANDS

Rostow

LONDON THE TIMES 8 OCT 68 L

(HEADLINE : "MOSCOW DEMANDS CURB ON CZECHS GOING ABROAD ")

(TEXT) PRAGUE, 7 OCT--JOHN ARDAGH DISPATCH--DETAILS OF LAST WEEK'S MOSCOW TALKS BETWEEN THE CZECHOSLOVAK AND RUSSIAN LEADERS TODAY BEGAN TO FILTER OUT FROM GOVERNMENT SOURCES, AND THEY ARE DESCRIBED AS "UNBELIEVABLY BAD--WORSE THAN THE COMMUNIQUE ITSELF INDICATED ."

THE RUSSIANS PRESENTED A DIKTAT AND WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EVEN LISTENING TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK POINT OF VIEW . THEY MADE IT PLAIN THAT THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO TOLERATE CZECHOSLOVAK PREVARICATION ANY LONGER, AND WOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION IF THE CZECHS DID NOT SATISFY THEIR DEMANDS .

THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE DEMANDS IS NOT YET ENTIRELY CLEAR , BUT THEY ARE BELIEVED TO INCLUDE AN "IMMEDIATE REPROLETARIANIZATION" OF ALL MAIN OFFICIAL POSTS, THE DISMISSAL OF LIBERALS, AND THEIR REPLACEMENT BY ORTHODOX HARD -LINE COMMUNISTS.

RUSSIANS ARE BELIEVED HERE TO HAVE LAID DOWN SEVEN POINTS IN THEIR DEMANDS TO THE CZECHOSLOVAKS.

1--ACTION MUST BE TAKEN AGAINST THE JOURNALISTS WHO PRODUCED THE CLANDESTINE NEWSPAPERS AND BROADCASTS IN THE DAYS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INVASION .

2--EACH NEWSPAPER MUST HAVE ITS OWN GOVERNMENT CENSOR .

3--CURBS MUST BE PLACED ON TRAVELING ABROAD, WHICH THIS YEAR HAD BECOME EASY FOR THE CZECHOSLOVAKS.

4--THE CZECHOSLOVAKS MUST CONSULT WITH THE RUSSIANS BEFORE MAKING ANY TRADE DEAL WITH A WESTERN COUNTRY.

5--THE SAME APPLIES TO POLITICAL DEALS WITH WESTERN COUNTRIES.

6--THE CZECHOSLOVAKS MUST CONSULT WITH THE RUSSIANS BEFORE MAKING ANY SENIOR APPOINTMENTS IN THE ARMED FORCES.

7--THE PLANS FOR FEDERALIZATION MUST BE POSTPONED AND THE PROPOSED CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS CANCELLED.

THESE TERMS, ESPECIALLY POINTS THREE AND FOUR, ARE CONSIDERABLY TOUGHER THAN ANYTHING THE CZECHOSLOVAKS HAD FEARED.

THE RUSSIANS STATED THAT THE CLOCK MUST BE PUT BACK NOT ONLY

THE RUSSIANS STATED THAT THE CLOCK MUST BE PUT BACK NOT ONLY TO THE LATE NOVOTNY PERIOD, BUT EARLIER. THEY EVEN BLAMED NOVOTNY HIMSELF FOR HAVING BELONGED TO LIBERAL AND HAVING STAKED THE ROT. THEY REFUSED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. WHEN THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS COMPLAINED THAT THE SOVIET FORCES WERE HERE FAR LARGER THAN NEEDED AND THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK ARMY COULD DEFEND ITS OWN SOIL, THE RUSSIANS REPLIED: "IF WE CHOOSE, WE SHALL TRANSFER YOUR ARMY TO THE CHINESE BORDER."

FACED WITH THIS SITUATION, THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS HAVE THREE CHOICES: TO DO WHAT THE RUSSIANS DEMAND, TO RESIGN AND LEAVE IT FOR OTHERS TO DO THIS, OR TO CONTINUE TO RESIST AND SO FACE A NEW RUSSIAN COUP. IT IS THOUGHT THAT THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO DO THE THIRD, ALTHOUGH AN INCREASING NUMBER OF PEOPLE HERE, NOTABLY THE YOUNGER ONES, WOULD WELCOME SOME LAST-DITCH PHYSICAL RESISTANCE EVEN IF IT LED TO CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF LIFE.

MORE PROBABLY THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS WILL TAKE A MIXTURE OF THE FIRST AND SECOND COURSES. RUMORS THAT MR DUBCEK HIMSELF MAY RESIGN HAVE BEEN GAINING STRENGTH HERE TODAY AND ARE NOW COMING FROM QUITE RELIABLE CZECHOSLOVAK SOURCES. BUT IT IS THOUGHT THAT MR CERNIK WILL REMAIN IN OFFICE AS PREMIER. HE IS AN ADAPTABLE MAN WHO SERVED AS A MINISTER UNDER MR NOVOTNY. AND MOSCOW DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY GREAT OBJECTION TO HIM.

IT IS NOW THOUGHT THAT NO OFFICIAL SPEECHES EXPLAINING THE GRIM COMMUNIQUE ARE LIKELY TO BE MADE BEFORE WEDNESDAY AT THE EARLIEST. TODAY MR CERNIK REPORTED TO A FULL PLENARY MEETING OF THE GOVERNMENT. AND TOMORROW HE, MR DUBCEK, AND DR HUSAK, THE SLOVAK LEADER, ARE DUE TO ADDRESS A MEETING OF THE PRESIDIUM. MR DUBCEK HAS SPENT THE PAST TWO DAYS IN HIS HOME TOWN OF BRATISLAVA, AND WAS DUE TO RETURN TO PRAGUE TONIGHT.

THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE THEMSELVES STILL KNOW ALMOST NOTHING ABOUT MOSCOW'S LATEST TERMS EXCEPT FOR WHAT THE COMMUNIQUE HINTS. THIS MORNING'S PAPERS CARRIED HARDLY A BREATH OF COMMENT. BUT THE MOOD HERE HAS GROWN BLACKER THAN EVER TODAY AS THE FIRST DETAILS OF TALKS LEAKED OUT.

RUDE PRAVO TODAY SOUNDED A CALL IN SUPPORT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP. VOICES COULD BE HEARD, THE PAPER SAID, ASKING WHETHER THERE WAS NOT A KIND OF NEW PERSONALITY CULT WITH EXCESSIVE POPULARIZATION OF SOME INDIVIDUALS.

IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY STATED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. THE LEADERS HAD DONE WELL IN SERIOUS TESTS, PROVED THEMSELVES CONFIDENT, AND WON THE PEOPLE'S TRUST.

"THESE PEOPLE ARE COMMUNISTS AND, THEREFORE, CONFIDENCE PUT IN THEM IS CONFIDENCE IN THE PARTY," THE PAPER ADDED.

MICHAEL KNIPE WRITES FROM PRAGUE :

IN A REMARK TO CZECHOSLOVAK JOURNALISTS AFTER TODAY'S GOVERNMENT SESSION MR SMRKOVSKY SAID THAT IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HE RESIGN HIS POSITION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

AFTER THE GOVERNMENT SESSION MR CERNIK BRIEFED A MEETING OF SENIOR CZECHOSLOVAK JOURNALISTS ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MOSCOW TALKS, AND LEFT THEM WITH THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT CONSIDERABLE CONCESSIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE TO THE RUSSIANS ON PRESS CENSORSHIP.

8 OCT 1120Z JWG/JMP

has file

41

Tuesday, October 8, 1968
12:05 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Andy Goedpaster just called from Saigon. Without referring on the telephone to the Honolulu meeting, he indicated that he was aware of it. He wishes to recommend to you that you award the DSM to General Abrams if the meeting should come off.

He added that Abrams' performance is "simply superb." He said, "We do not wish to say this in public, but things are going very, very well. All we need here is some time and it will come out fine." A large part of the progress we are making is due to Abrams' leadership."

He said that I knew how much he had wanted to get to Vietnam. He finds his association with General Abrams the "highest reward" he could have in his professional life.

Finally, he asked me to send to you his "warm personal regards and best wishes in the face of the burdens you are carrying."

W. W. Rostow

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATERIAL CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958
DATE 1-2-93 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
NOV 16 2001

BY 19 ON 2-1-93

INFORMATION

Tuesday, October 8, 1968 - 11:10 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

Here is how the Indian monsoon rainfall came out this year as opposed to previous years -- a considerable disappointment.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

42a

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20250

October 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: Walter Rostow
FROM: Lyle Schertz *LS*



India's June-September monsoon season came to a close with continued dryness in the north and substantial but belated rains in the south. Overall the season was well below normal. While the water shortfall has not been of the proportions of 1965, the attached maps show it closer to the poor season of 1966 than the good monsoon last year. Overall foodgrain production for 1968/69 seems likely to be below the record crop of 100 million tons in 1967/68, despite increased use of fertilizer, new seeds, and other inputs.

Our rough weighted monsoon index for the past five years shows the following figures (100 equals normal):

| <u>YEAR</u> | <u>INDEX</u> |
|-------------|--------------|
| 1968 | <u>87.7</u> |
| 1967 | 103.3 |
| 1966 | 83.7 |
| 1965 | 73.4 |
| 1964 | 112.2 |


Attachment

cc: Roger Morris



RAINFALL IN INDIA

- EXCESS +20% OR MORE
- NORMAL +19% TO -19%
- DEFICIENT -20% TO -59%
- SCANTY -60% OR LESS



Pres. file
43

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~CODEWORD~~

Tuesday, Oct. 8, 1968
10:30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith first tentative evidence that the pull-back of forces could be related to preparations for another offensive; although the troop movements away from the battlefield to the frontiers is the most massive I have seen in the war.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-87
By isw, NARA, Date 1-26-04

43a

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]
[redacted]

Document Indicates Communists Preparing for New Offensive

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

12. [redacted] Communist forces may be undergoing a period of refitting in preparation for further large-scale attacks.
[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

13. Communist intentions to keep some kind of pressure on allied forces while preparing for larger attacks are reflected [redacted] Troops are to "maintain the initiative throughout South Vietnam and prevent the allies from strengthening their forces. They are also to "maintain heavy pressure" on the outskirts of cities and to "widen guerrilla warfare" in order to gain control of manpower and material resources. These efforts are designed to "create a favorable situation for the winter-spring campaign," [redacted]
[redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

14. [redacted] no large-scale battles are expected in the district, at least until the end of October. Subordinate agencies are instructed to prepare additional shelters for wounded troops before 30 October.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

15. Unfavorable factors which will hamper Communist forces during the "upcoming phase" are listed [redacted] These include fighting in open areas, inclement weather which affects troop movements and combat effectiveness, intensive allied air and artillery strikes, and poor logistical support. Despite these difficulties, [redacted] the Communist units are familiar with the local terrain and "greater military successes will be achieved" during the next attacks.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJ 03-79
By id, NARA, Date 5-30-03

7 October 1968

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[redacted]
~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] [redacted]

44
/

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

Tuesday - October 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Deposed President Belaunde of Peru

State has been asked by President Belaunde of Peru for a visa to come to the United States. It has been granted and will be issued in Buenos Aires today.

We don't know how long he intends to stay.

W. W. Rostow

cc - George Christian

Samuel W. Lewis:mm

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 2-2-93

45

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--EYES ONLY

Tuesday, October 8, 1968
10:10 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker's positive reply.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 2-1-93

45a

~~SECRET~~

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1968 OCT 8 02 38

DLAASZ
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 DE 613 282235
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 FM KATHMANDU, NEPAL
 TO WHITE HOUSE 25X1A
 ZEN
~~SECRET~~ 080210Z
 FM AMBASSADOR BUNKER KATHMANDU 164
 TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR WALT ROSTOV LITERALLY EYES ONLY
 PLAN TO MEET TOWARD END OF WEEK PRESENTS NO MAJOR OR
 INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES TO ME.
~~SECRET~~

1968 OCT 7 7 10:38 PM
 SITUATION ROOM
 WHITE HOUSE

25X1A

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 019-040-3-8
 By [Signature], NARA, Date 1/20/02

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

46

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, October 8, 1968
10:15 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the current state of
infiltration.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By 18, NARA, Date 2-1-93

WWRostow:rlm

III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. The status of North Vietnamese infiltration to South Vietnam continues to be unclear. The once steady flow of information on personnel infiltration groups [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ground to a virtual halt during September.

2. No new infiltration groups have been detected [REDACTED] moving southward through North Vietnam since 3 September. Only four, possibly five, groups totaling about 2,200 troops were noted during the month. In contrast, a monthly average of about 14,600 personnel were noted during the preceding three months.

3. After peaking in April and May, there was an apparent downward trend in the number of infiltrators detected entering the pipeline in North Vietnam during June and July. An estimated 30,000 troops were detected in May, but the figure dropped to about 17,000 in June and 19,000 in July and then to about 7,300 in August.

4. It cannot be determined whether the current information gap represents a marked reduction, or even a virtual halt in North Vietnamese troop deployments to the South, or whether new factors are obscuring detection of the movement of these groups [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On the other hand, there are some indications that the North Vietnamese may have instituted new reporting procedures on the progress of the southbound groups late this summer--perhaps in the interest of efficiency. This could explain, at least in part, the lack of information.

5. Increased Communist employment of train and truck transport for the infiltrators could also possibly account for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Such modes of transport would likely bypass several of the stop-over stations in North Vietnam [REDACTED]

III-1

7 October 1968

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-182

By id, NARA, Date 3-23-06

E.O. 12958

3.3 (b)(1)

III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

SANITIZED

1. The status of North Vietnamese infiltration to South Vietnam continues to be unclear.

2. |

3. |

4. |

5. |

Approved for Release
Date 11 Jun 84

SANITIZED

Authority NLS-CBS 2
By ics NARS, Date 7-5-84

III-1

7 October 1968

No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only

~~TOP SECRET~~

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