

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--EYES ONLY

Monday, October 7, 1968
8:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith my outgoing back-channel to Amb. Bunker and Gen. Abrams, plus Abrams' response. We have not heard from Amb. Bunker yet.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 2-1-93

WWRostow:rlh

47a

OCTOBER 7, 1968

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND GENERAL
ABRAMS FROM WALT ROSTOW

PRESIDENT WISHES TO KNOW IF PLAN TO MEET YOU IN
HAWAII TOWARDS END OF THIS WEEK PRESENTS TO YOU ANY
MAJOR OR INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES.
PLEASE FLASH BACK
075

~~SECRET~~

CAP 82520

EYES ONLY

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DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 2-1-93

YES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

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TO WHITE HOUSE
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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 072348Z OCT 68 VIA CAS CHANNELS
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR WALT ROSTOW FROM
GENERAL ABRAMS

IT PRESENTS NO REPEAT NO MAJOR OR INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLES TO ME.

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS

GP-1
080

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~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAK 02-72

By cdm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

XEROX FROM QUEEN COPY

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Pres file

Monday, October 7, 1968
7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Wilson tells you
formally of his impending meeting
with Ian Smith of Rhodesia.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 1-25-02

38 OCT 7 23 34

48a

CABOFC 001

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM PRIME MINISTER

YOUR PEOPLE WILL HAVE TOLD YOU OF MY PLANS FOR A FURTHER MEETING WITH IAN SMITH TO SEE IF WE CANNOT AT LAST THRASH OUT TOGETHER AN HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THIS TRAGIC RHODESIAN BUSINESS. WE SHALL NOT ANNOUNCE IT UNTIL EARLY TOMORROW AFTERNOON (OUR TIME) BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH MY SENIOR COLLEAGUES PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED ARE NATURALLY AT ONE WITH ME IN THE ENTERPRISE, I HAVE TO SEEK THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE FULL CABINET AT OUR MEETING TOMORROW, THE FIRST THAT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE SINCE OUR CONFERENCE LAST WEEK.

ASSUMING, AS I HOPE AND BELIEVE, THAT MY COLLEAGUES ENDORSE THIS ACTION, I PLAN TO MEET SMITH IN GIBRALTAR ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, ON BOARD A WARSHIP AND TO ALLOW AS MUCH TIME AS MAY BE NEEDED DURING THE NEXT WEEK OR SO TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT.

I NEED NOT TROUBLE YOU WITH THE DETAILED BACKGROUND TO OUR POSITION. YOUR PEOPLE WILL KNOW IT. IN THIS MESSAGE I ONLY WANT TO SAY TWO THINGS.

FIRST I AM DETERMINED THAT, IF NO SETTLEMENT CAN BE AGREED, THIS WILL NOT BE THROUGH LACK OF GOODWILL, PATIENCE OR RESOLUTION ON OUR SIDE. THIS CONFLICT HAS BEEN A TRAGEDY NOT ONLY IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BRITAIN AND RHODESIA BUT ALSO FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR COMMONWEALTH TIES AND, MORE WIDELY, FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE. ITS CONTINUATION NOT ONLY THREATENS THE FUTURE PEACE AND PROSPERITY OF THE RHODESIAN AFRICANS BUT ALSO CAUSES THE DANGER OF A WIDER AND CONTINUING CONFLICT THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN AFRICA. I KNOW WHAT DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IT HAS RAISED FOR YOU AND I HAVE BEEN MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU HAVE SO CONSISTENTLY DISPLAYED.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68.10.24 #568

By jc NARA, Date 1-25-02

RESTRICTION COPY

SECONDLY, IF A SETTLEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED, I AM EQUALLY RESOLVED THAT IT SHALL NOT REPRESENT A SACRIFICE OF THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF RHODESIA - AND ESPECIALLY THE AFRICAN PEOPLES. WE HAVE MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR TO SMITH THAT FOR US CERTAIN POINTS ARE NOT NEGOTIABLE - AND THESE POINTS RELATE ESSENTIALLY TO THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE AFRICAN MAJORITY AND TO THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN RHODESIA WHICH, AS I HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY, WILL BE ESSENTIAL BEFORE THERE CAN BE ANY QUESTION OF OUR GOING BACK TO THE COMMONWEALTH TO RE-OPEN OUR COMMITMENT ON NO INDEPENDENCE BEFORE MAJORITY RULE.

I WILL NOT PRETEND THAT I AM OPTIMISTIC. LONG EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM - AND IN DEALING WITH SMITH PERSONALLY - HAS MADE ME TOO WARY FOR THAT. BUT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RHODESIA, THE PRESSURES OF SANCTIONS (AND OTHER PRESSURES TOO: I AM SURE FOR EXAMPLE THAT SOUTH AFRICA WOULD LIKE US TO SETTLE), COUPLED WITH THE WAY SMITH HAS HANDLED SOME OF HIS OWN RIGHT WING EXTREMISTS HAVE ALL CREATED A SITUATION IN WHICH, ONCE AGAIN I AM CONVINCED THAT WE SHOULD BE WRONG NOT TO TRY. I AM CONFIDENT THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR GOOD WISHES FOR OUR SUCCESS: AND THIS WILL BE A SOURCE OF ENCOURAGEMENT TO ME THROUGHOUT THE DIFFICULT AND DELICATE DISCUSSIONS THAT LIE AHEAD.

UNMESSAGE ENDS

OCTOBER 7, 1968.



INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Pres file*

Monday, October 7, 1968 -- 7:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You asked if Nat Davis could stay with us for some time if he were appointed Ambassador to Guatemala. The answer appears to be: Yes. There would be no particular problem in his waiting 30 to 60 days, although it might be helpful politically and psychologically in Guatemala if the announcement were made earlier.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 16, NARA, Date 2-1-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Lewis 50
ACTION
for file

Monday - October 8, 1968 - 7:15pm

Mr. President:

The attached memorandum from Ray Telles asks your approval for adding Governor Price Daniel to the US-Mexico Border Commission. He has in mind putting Governor Daniel, as Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, into the same formal relationship with the Commission played by several other federal agencies. The Office of Emergency Planning can be helpful to the Commission on joint disaster assistance planning, and in other ways.

I understand that Governor Daniel has been anxious to join the Commission and would very much like you to approve this recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ___
Disapprove ___
Call me ___

Attachment

Ambassador Telles' memorandum to the President of October 1, 1968.

Samuel W. Lewis:mmm

50a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT



UNITED STATES-MEXICO COMMISSION FOR BORDER DEVELOPMENT AND FRIENDSHIP

1800 G Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20525

Office of the Chairman
U.S. Section

October 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Membership of Director, Office of
Emergency Planning

As you know, we have had an excellent relationship with Governor Price Daniel and his staff in the Office of Emergency Planning. Among other things, with the OEP's collaboration we were able to conclude the exchange of notes with Mexico on mutual assistance in the event of natural disasters. Also, before Governor Peabody's resignation, he was extremely helpful to the Commission in his handling of our border sports competition.

In my opinion, I believe that it would be appropriate and most productive if Governor Daniel were to be designated formally a member of the US Section of the Commission. Not only do we have close working relationships in the implementation of joint disaster assistance planning but in the federal/state relationships. We work very closely with the governors of California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas.

If you approve this addition to the Commission, I shall be happy to inform Governor Daniel.

Raymond Telles
Ambassador

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

51

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, October 7, 1968 -- 5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Clark Clifford has notified me that Franklin Lincoln, a lawyer well known to him, has been appointed by Mr. Nixon as his chief man for the transition, if Mr. Nixon is elected. Lincoln has asked Clifford for a briefing on how he -- Clifford -- handled the transition in 1960-61.

Is it okay for Clifford to discuss this subject with Franklin Lincoln?

W. W. Rostow

Yes ✓

No

Call me

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATERIAL. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,
PAR. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
JUNE 16, 1983.

CV 18 ON 2-193

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET -- SAVIN~~*Pres file*

Monday, October 7, 1968 - 5:10 pm

Mr. President:

In light of our conversation this morning, you may be interested in Abe's (as opposed to Rostow's) assessment of enemy withdrawals.

Abe says:

Since the last ten days of September, most, if not all, elements of the 320th Division have been withdrawing from along Highway Nine to areas in or just north of the DMZ. A number of reasons could explain the recent northward move: assignment of a new mission; an effort to avoid further allied punishment; or the concern he has annually shown for the flooding and mud conditions in the Ben Hai River basin that will occur with advent of the northeast monsoon. However, his moves have been relatively short distance, just out of allied reach on the ground, and there is yet no indication of a significant move north or away from the central DMZ.

We have detected no groups entering the pipeline for the past three weeks. While this may reflect the historic decline in infiltration that has occurred at the end of each year, it could also suggest that North Vietnam has already supplied the maximum available manpower for input this year. The enemy has already sent more troops down in 1968 than he did during the previous four years, and, by conservative estimates, his training base has been exhausted and must be recycled before he can start another surge effort.

Some elements of military region Tri Thien Hue have recently been fixed out of Base Area 611 and deep in Laos. These are moves of a type we have not previously observed. While these units may have withdrawn to avoid our air strikes as they reconstitute their strength, it is more likely that they are primarily involved in the opening phases of a major logistics effort. The 803d, 812th, 4th, and 5th NVA Regiments are suffering from severe food shortages bordering on starvation. Food and supply difficulties in the entire region have been greatly aggravated by Typhoon Bess. Documents, prisoners of war, and [REDACTED] constantly speak of serious food problems, and mere survival seems to occupy all the enemy's attentions. It is the end of the rainy season and time to start the traditional logistics buildup in that region.

3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET -- SAVIN~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-87

By *id*, NARA, Date 1-26-04

~~SECRET -- S A V I N~~

The 7th Air Force analysis of recent air operations indicates a significant deterioration of the enemy's logistics capabilities through Laos.

- The Navy's systematic interdiction efforts in Route Package II have sharply curtailed the movement of enemy trucks and waterborne craft.

- Since 14 July, the 7th Air Force interdiction effort against key nonbypassable choke points along the principal North Viet Nam routes and water crossings into Laos and the DMZ have reduced the enemy's flow of observed traffic by better than 85 per cent.

- The enemy's flow of trucks through the strategic Ban Laboy Ford in Laos was impeded by continuous radar bombardment and the effects of high water. Judging from the number of sensor-detected trucks which reached but did not transit this ford during September and October, it is estimated that the enemy was forced to dump several thousand tons of supplies in the major truck parks just north of this ford.

- It is estimated that the net through-put of truck-borne logistics into southern Laos from North Viet Nam has decreased nearly ten-fold. These data would further suggest that through-put truck-borne tonnages have fallen well below the minimum daily external requirements for support of troops and construction workers permanently deployed in Laos. Thus, it is concluded that the sharp decrease in the flow of enemy logistics into Laos and the northern corps areas of South Viet Nam has forced the enemy to sustain himself from supplies already stored in Laos and in South Viet Nam.

In the southern B-3 front, during last week, a major movement of enemy forces out of South Viet Nam into Cambodia has occurred. Patterns between COSVN and the B-3 front and the northward move into Cambodia of rear service group 86 further suggest southward movement of II Corps units. Our tentative conclusion is that we may have seen a recent abandonment of the enemy's plans for Duc Lap, with some of the units being sent south to III Corps while others will refit in Cambodian sanctuaries and return for further offensive activity in the B-3 front area.

~~SECRET -- S A V I N~~

~~SECRET -- S A V I N~~

The supply situation in the south supported through Cambodia need not be a limiting factor in his offensive plans. There is no question but that supplies of food, arms and ammunition adequate to meet his needs are being obtained in or through Cambodia and infiltrated by waterway or overland to forward areas as required. It is the enemy situation in I and II Corps to which I wish to draw particular attention. It is fair to say that in the northern half of South Viet Nam the enemy is suffering severely from continuing mobile-effective allied operations, from the heavy losses imposed, from repeated defeats and forced displacements, and from personnel and particularly logistic troubles of many kinds. These difficulties and our operations have driven the bulk of his main forces out of South Viet Nam north of III Corps, and he now must attempt to repair the damage we have done him.

In sum, the enemy looks pretty weak right now, and Abe expects him to try to repair the damage we have done him.

This could take the form of another wave of his summer-fall campaign. It could take the form of a new winter-spring campaign. (Hanoi will have a tough -- but not necessarily insurmountable -- time explaining this to the troops who were looking for a decision in 1968.)

Or Hanoi could transfer its interest to Laos and try for a quick land grab.

Of course, the enemy could always negotiate seriously. His movements to sanctuary areas could be preparatory to a withdrawal to the north, once he had negotiated a cessation of bombing in Laos. However, unless he were prepared to abandon his objectives and most of his assets in the south, we would expect the enemy to try to expand his territorial control to the maximum extent possible just prior to calling for a ceasefire stand-in-place.

Key passages marked in Abrams' call which I commend to you despite this summary. It is an important evaluation.

W. W. Rostow

W

~~SECRET -- S A V I N~~

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O 071534Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GEN WHEELER
TO WHITE HOUSE (MR ROSTOW)
STATE DEPT (MR RUSK)
CIA (MR HELMS)
ZEM
O 061019Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS
ADM MC CAIN CINCPAC
ZEM

Rostow
SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-185

By *no*, NARA, Date 2-27-04

~~SECRET SAVIN~~ MAC 13512 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO

1. SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT ENEMY SITUATION SEEM WORTHY OF YOUR ATTENTION. WHILE FIRM CONCLUSIONS CANNOT BE DRAWN NOW, OUR TENTATIVE ASSESSMENTS INDICATE THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY BE SIGNIFICANT.
2. SINCE THE LAST TEN DAYS OF SEPTEMBER, MOST, IF NOT ALL ELEMENTS OF THE 320TH DIVISION HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWING FROM ALONG HIGHWAY NINE TO AREAS IN OR JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ. THE 320TH HAS SUFFERED OVER 1,100 CONFIRMED KIA DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS. B-52'S HAVE INFLICTED HEAVY CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE AND WE HAVE UNCOVERED EXTRAORDINARILY LARGE CACHES NORTH AND WEST OF THE ROCKPILE. SINCE 25 SEP, MULTI-REGIMENTAL SIZE FRIENDLY SWEEP OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN THE AREA, INFLICTING LOSSES, THROWING THE ENEMY OFF BALANCE AND PLACING HIS UNITS IN JEOPARDY. MOST IMPORTANT, THE 320TH DIVISION HAS BEEN UNABLE TO GET ANY SORT OF OFFENSIVE GOING DESPITE REPEATED EVIDENCE THAT THIS HAS BEEN HIS EFFORT AND HIS INTENT. A NUMBER OF REASONS COULD EXPLAIN THE RECENT NORTHWARD MOVE: ASSIGNMENT OF A NEW MISSION; AN EFFORT TO AVOID FURTHER ALLIED PUNISHMENT; OR THE CONCERN HE HAS ANNUALLY SHOWN FOR THE FLOODING AND MUD CONDITIONS IN THE BEN HAI RIVER BASIN THAT WILL OCCUR WITH ADVENT OF THE NORTHEAST MONSOON. HOWEVER, HIS MOVES HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY SHORT DISTANCE, JUST OUT OF ALLIED REACH ON THE GROUND, AND THERE IS YET NO INDICATION OF A SIGNIFICANT MOVE NORTH OR AWAY FROM THE CENTRAL DMZ. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF NEW ENEMY UNITS MOVING TOWARD THE DMZ TO FILL THE VACUUM THAT WOULD BE CREATED BY A DEPARTED 320TH DIVISION.
3. ANOTHER FACTOR TO BE WEIGHED IN ASSESSING THE MOVEMENT OF THE 320TH DIV IS THE DECIDED DROP IN NVA PERSONNEL INFILTRATION. WE HAVE DETECTED NO GROUPS ENTERING THE PIPELINE FOR THE PAST THREE WEEKS. WHILE THIS MAY REFLECT THE HISTORIC DECLINE IN INFILTRATION IT HAS OCCURRED AT THE END OF EACH YEAR IT COULD ALSO SUGGEST THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAS ALREADY SUPPLIED THE MAXIMUM AVAILABLE MANPOWER FOR INPUT THIS YEAR. THE ENEMY HAS ALREADY SENT MORE TROOPS DOWN IN 1968 THAN HE DID DURING THE PREVIOUS FOUR YEARS, AND BY CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES HIS TRAINING BASE HAS BEEN EXHAUSTED AND MUST BE RECYCLED BEFORE HE CAN START ANOTHER SURGE EFFORT.
4. THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE WE HAVE SUGGESTS THAT THE 320TH DIVISION HAS TAKEN SIGNIFICANT PUNISHMENT AND HAS CONSEQUENTLY WITHDRAWN FROM ALLIED REACH TO RESUPPLY AND REFIT.

[1]

5. SOME ELEMENTS OF MR TTH HAVE RECENTLY BEEN FIXED OUT OF BASE AREA 611 AND DEEP IN LAOS. THESE ARE MOVES OF A TYPE WE HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED. ON 2 SEP THE HQS ITSELF WAS FIXED 45 KMS WEST AT THE JUNCTION OF ROUTES 921, 92, 234, AND THE XE LANONG RIVER. ON 17 SEP AND 21 SEP WE FIXED THE 6TH AND 9TH REGIMENTS ALONG ROUTES 921 AND 92 RESPECTIVELY; AND ON 30 SEP, THE FORWARD ELEMENT OF HQ MR TTH RELOCATED FROM BA 611 TO WITHIN 7 KM OF THE HQS ITSELF. ON 4 OCTOBER WE FIXED THE 90TH REGT ALONG ROUTE 103 27ch
20 KM NORTH OF THE WESTERN DMZ IN NVN. ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS COMMUNICATIONS PATTERNS SUGGESTS THAT THE 90TH REGT IS NEARBY. WHILE THESE UNITS MAY HAVE WITHDRAWN TO AVOID OUR AIR STRIKES, AS THEY RECONSTITUTE THEIR STRENGTH, IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT THEY ARE PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN THE OPENING PHASES OF A MAJOR LOGISTICS EFFORT. OUR ACTIONS HAVE RENDERED THE A SHAU VALLEY/BA 611 COMPLEX OF QUESTIONABLE USE TO THE ENEMY. WE KNOW THAT UNITS IN THE 7TH FRONT/HUE AREA (SPECIFICALLY, THE 303D, 812TH, 4TH AND 5TH NVA REGTS) ARE SUFFERING FROM SEVERE FOOD SHORTAGES BORDERING ON STARVATION. FOOD AND SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES IN THE ENTIRE REGION HAVE BEEN GREATLY AGGRAVATED BY TYPHOON BESS. DOCUMENTS, PW'S, AND MESSAGE INTERCEPTS CONSTANTLY SPEAK OF SERIOUS FOOD PROBLEMS, AND HERE SURVIVAL SEEMS TO OCCUPY ALL THE ENEMY'S ATTENTIONS. THE MR TTH ELEMENTS NOW LOCATED IN LAOS ARE ASTRIDE MAJOR ENEMY LOCS. WE HAVE SEEN A RECENT BUILD UP OF U/I ARDF FIXES IN THE XE LANONG RIVER BASIN WEST OF BA 610 WHERE HQS MR TTH IS NOW LOCATED. IT IS THE END OF THE RAINY SEASON AND TIME TO START THE TRADITIONAL LOGISTICS BUILD-UP IN THAT REGION.

6. 7TH AIR FORCE ANALYSIS OF RECENT AIR OPERATIONS INDICATES A SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION OF THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES THROUGH LAOS. THE FOLLOWING MAJOR POINTS ARE DRAWN FROM THAT ANALYSIS:

A. THE NAVY'S SYSTEMATIC INTERDICTION EFFORTS IN ROUTE PACK II HAVE SHARPLY CURTAILED THE MOVEMENT OF ENEMY TRUCKS, AND WATERBORNE CRAFT.

B. SINCE 14 JULY, THE 7AF INTERDICTION EFFORT AGAINST KEY NONBYPASSABLE CHOKE POINTS ALONG THE PRINCIPAL NVN ROUTES, AND WATER-CROSSINGS INTO LAOS AND THE DMZ HAVE REDUCED THE ENEMY'S FLOW OF OBSERVED TRAFFIC BY BETTER THAN 85 PERCENT. SINCE 4 SEPTEMBER, WHEN TYPHOON BESS CONVERTED THESE CHOKE POINTS INTO QUAGMIRE OF MUD AND LANDSLIDES, VIRTUALLY NO THROUGH-PUT TRAFFIC HAS BEEN ABLE TO TRANSIT ROUTE 15 TOWARD THE NU GIA PASS. DURING THAT SAME PERIOD, THE ENEMY'S PRINCIPAL ACCESS ROUTE INTO LAOS THROUGH THE BAN KARAI PASS HAS BEEN CLOSED TO THROUGH TRAFFIC APPROXIMATELY 85 PERCENT OF THE TIME. NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE AND SIGINT HAVE CLEARLY REFLECTED THE SERIOUS IMPACT MARK-36 DESTRUCTOR SEEDINGS AND NIGHT CBU ATTACKS HAVE HAD IN DELAYING THE ENEMY'S MOVEMENTS ACROSS THE SONG GIANG AND SONG TROC WATERWAYS TOWARD THE DMZ. THIS SHARP REDUCTION OF TRAFFIC ALONG THE COASTAL ROUTES OF RP 1 HAS ALSO BEEN CONFIRMED BY NIGHTLY MOHAWK SLAR AND VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE.

C. THROUGHOUT THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER, THE ENEMY'S FLOW OF TRUCKS THROUGH THE STRATEGIC BAN LABOY FORD COMPLEX ON ROUTE 912B IN LAOS WAS IMPEDED BY CONTINUOUS RADAR, BOMBARDMENT AND THE EFFECTS OF HIGH WATER. JUDGING FROM THE NUMBER OF SENSOR DETECTED TRUCKS WHICH REACHED BUT DID NOT TRANSIT THIS FORD DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ENEMY WAS FORCED TO DUMP SEVERAL THOUSAND TONS OF SUPPLIES IN THE MAJOR TRUCK PARKS JUST NORTH OF THIS FORD.

(CONT'D)

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FM GEN WHEELER

TO WHITE HOUSE (MR ROSTOW)

STATE DEPT (MR RUSK)

CIA (M R HELMS)

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O 061019Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS

ADM MC CAIN CINCPAC

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SAVIN MAC 13512 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO
B-52 AND TACAIR STRIKES BETWEEN THE 18TH OF SEPTEMBER AND THE
1ST OF OCTOBER LED TO SIGINT AND PHOTO CONFIRMATION THAT
THE ENEMY WAS MAKING STRENUOUS EFFORTS THROUGH THE CONSTRU-
TION OF PONTOON, CABLE AND FERRY BRIDGING TO MOVE THESE
SUPPLIES SOUTHWARD. STRIKES OF 1 OCTOBER TEMPORARILY
CLOSED THIS AREA TO ALL THROUGH-PUT OTHER THAN BY PORTAGE.

D. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABOVE, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE
NET THROUGH-PUT OF TRUCKBORNE LOGISTICS INTO SOUTHERN LAOS
FROM NVN HAS DECREASED NEARLY TEN-FOLD. DURING THE PERIOD 18
SEPTEMBER THROUGH 1 OCTOBER, THE NET THROUGH-PUT OF TRUCKS FROM
NVN INTO LAOS THROUGH ROUTES 15 - 101 AND 137 WAS ESTIMATED
TO BE UNDER 15 TRUCKS PER DAY. WHILE PRECISE MEASUREMENT OF
TRUCK THROUGH-PUT TO THE DMZ HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE, SENSOR,
SLAR AND VISUAL SIGHTINGS SUGGEST THAT THE LEVELS OF FLOW
HAVE BEEN EQUALLY LIMITED. THESE DATA WOULD FURTHER SUGGEST
THAT THROUGH-PUT TRUCKBORNE TONNAGES HAVE FALLEN WELL BELOW,
THE MINIMUM DAILY EXTERNAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF
TROOPS AND CONSTRUCTION WORKERS PERMANENTLY DEPLOYED IN
LAOS. THUS IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE SHARP DECREASE IN
THE FLOW OF ENEMY LOGISTICS INTO LAOS AND THE NORTHERN
CORPS AREAS OF SVN HAS FORCED THE ENEMY TO SUSTAIN HIMSELF
FROM SUPPLIES ALREADY STORED IN LAOS AND IN SVN.

7. IN THE SOUTHERN B-3 FRONT, DURING LAST WEEK, A MAJOR
MOVEMENT OF ENEMY FORCES OUT OF SVN INTO CAMBODIA HAS OCCURRED.
SPECIFICALLY, ALL REGIMENTAL SIZE ENEMY UNITS SURROUNDING DUC LAP
HAVE BEEN LOCATED OUTSIDE SVN IN CAMBODIA WITHIN THE PAST SIX DAYS.
SINCE 22 SEP, THE 1ST NVA DIVISION MIE ACTIVITY CEASED, STRONGLY
SUGGESTING AN END TO ENEMY OFFENSIVE POSTURE IN THE AREA. THESE
UNITS HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES - AT LEAST 1000 KIA SINCE 23 AUGUST;
AND PW'S, RALLIERS AND MESSAGE INTERCEPTS TELL OF SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE
FROM B-52 STRIKES AS WELL AS SHORTAGES IN FOOD, SUPPLIES,
AND MEDICAL FACILITIES. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SOME
UNITS MAY BE MOVING SOUTH. ON 29 SEP WE FIXED A TERMINAL
ASSOCIATED WITH HQS 1ST NVA DIV 25 KM SOUTHWEST OF ITS 25
SEP LOCATION. IT WAS NEAR CAMP LE ROLAND ALONG A ROUTE
PREVIOUSLY USED BY II CTZ UNITS MOVING TO III CTZ. COMMUNI-
CATIONS PATTERNS BETWEEN NAS COSVN AND THE B-3 FRONT AND THE
NORTHWARD MOVE INTO CAMBODIA OF REAR SERVICE GROUP 86 FURTHER
SURGE SOUTHWARD MOVEMENT OF II CTZ UNITS ON THE OTHER

[3]

HAND, THE 95TH REGIMENT ARRIVED IN THE DUC LAP AREA PROBABLY AS LATE AS 17 SEP TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ATTACK THERE AND IT, AS WELL AS THE 95C REGT, CONTINUES TO COMMUNICATE WITH B-3 FRONT ASSOCIATES. OUR TENTATIVE CONCLUSION IS THAT WE MAY HAVE SEEN A RECENT ABANDONMENT OF THE ENEMY'S PLANS FOR DUC LAP, WITH SOME OF THE UNITS BEING SENT SOUTH TO III CTZ WHILE OTHERS WILL REFIT IN CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES AND RETURN FOR FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE B-3 FRONT AREA.

8. THE DIFFICULTIES THE ENEMY MAY BE ENCOUNTERING AT THE PRESENT TIME IN SUPPLYING HIS FORCES IN THE NORTHERN CORPS AREAS, STANDS IN SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST TO THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH. SPECIFICALLY, THE SUPPLY SITUATION IN THE SOUTH SUPPORTED THROUGH CAMBODIA, NEED NOT BE A LIMITING FACTOR IN HIS OFFENSIVE PLANS. THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT SUPPLIES OF FOOD, ARMS AND AMMUNITION ADEQUATE TO MEET HIS NEEDS ARE BEING OBTAINED IN OR THROUGH CAMBODIA AND INFILTRATED BY WATERWAY OR OVERLAND TO FORWARD AREAS AS REQUIRED. WE HAVE BEEN HAVING A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF SUCCESS IN DISCOVERING AND SEIZING SUPPLY CACHES IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS IN III AND IV CORPS, AND THIS HAS UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTED TO PRE-EMPTING HIS PLANS AND IMPEDING HIS OPERATIONS; HOWEVER, WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE HAS STOCKPILED SUPPLIES WE STILL HAVE NOT DISCOVERED.

JOM BUT IT IS THE ENEMY SITUATION IN I AND II CORPS, TO WHICH I WISH TO DRAW PARTICULAR ATTENTION. IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF SOUTH VIETNAM THE ENEMY IS SUFFERING SEVERELY FROM CONTINUING MOBILE EFFECTIVE ALLIED OPERATIONS, FROM THE HEAVY LOSSES IMPOSED, FROM REPEATED DEFEATS AND FORCED DISPLACEMENTS, AND FROM PERSONNEL AND PARTICULARLY, LOGISTIC TROUBLES OF MANY KINDS. AM THESE DIFFICULTIES AND OUR OPERATIONS HAVE DRIVEN THE BULK OF HIS MAIN FORCES OUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM NORTH OF III CORPS AND HE NOW MUST ATTEMPT TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE WE HAVE DONE HIM.

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS 900

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OCT 7 PM 5:09
WHITE HOUSE
ATTENTION ROOM

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OCTOBER 7, 1968
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND GENERAL
ABRAMS FROM WALT ROSTOW

PRESIDENT WISHES TO KNOW IF PLAN TO MEET YOU IN
HAWAII TOWARDS END OF THIS WEEK PRESENTS TO YOU ANY
MAJOR OR INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES.
PLEASE FLASH BACK
075

Pres file

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-72
By *ebm*, NARA, Date 3-24-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

54

Free file

Monday, October 7, 1968
5:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Before he goes to work at 5:30 p.m. ,
Clark Clifford wishes to discuss with you the
situation with respect to the military aid bill
and the Symington amendment on the Phantoms.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

55

Monday, October 7, 1968
5:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith some questions to enliven the Clark Clifford exposition this afternoon at 5:30.

1. Looking back, is there anything in the charge that is often made that too rigid an application of cost-benefit analysis has throttled or diminished research development and military innovation?

2. Is the F111 going to become a usable aircraft in our order of battle?

3. Has our margin of security against a Moscow temptation for a first nuclear strike been adequately maintained?

4. Taken overall, is our relative military power position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union better or worse than it was in January 1961?

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Califano

Pres. file
56

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, Oct. 7, 1968
3:00 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

(- as requested -)

Herewith a first crack by Bob Ginsburgh
at rules of engagement, in case the enemy violated
our "facts of life" about the DMZ -- if we take
that approach.

Walt Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date 2-1-93

56a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Rules of Retaliation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-479
By ing, NARA, Date 4-1-93

In the event of a bombing cessation, we must expect that Hanoi will test our restraint to see how much they can get away with.

Our responses to such tests should meet the following criteria:

- Prompt. To be prompt, authority for retaliation should be delegated to the lowest possible level of command.

- Detering. We should react on the basis of "two or three tits for a tat" in an effort to deter further violation of the conditions for a bombing cessation.

- Appropriate. The "punishment should fit the crime" so that Hanoi receives the censure for its violations instead of our receiving censure for appropriate retaliation.

Here is a list of enemy violations with possible retaliatory actions which might be authorized by the commanders listed:

| <u>Enemy Violation</u> | <u>Retaliatory Action</u> | <u>Authorized by</u> |
|----------------------------|---|--|
| Light patrols across DMZ. | Self-defense and immediate pursuit. | Tactical commanders at lowest levels have right of self-defense and immediate pursuit. |
| Ground attacks "in force." | Defense and counter-attack as far as provisional military demarcation line. | Division commander. |

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| <u>Enemy Violation</u> | <u>Retaliatory Action</u> | <u>Authorized by</u> |
|--|---|--|
| Attacks in excess of battalion size. | Massive counter-attacks as far as northern boundary of DMZ. | COMUSMACV. |
| Artillery, mortar or rocket fire from DMZ or north of DMZ. | Maximum counter-battery fire until silenced. | Division artillery commander. |
| AAA or SAM fire from DMZ or north of DMZ. | Immediate air attack until silenced by escort aircraft. | Escort flight commander. Any delayed retaliatory strikes must be authorized by Commander, 7th Air Force. |
| Air attack against ground forces or airborne aircraft in NVN, SVN or Laos. | Attack launching or staging bases, radars and supporting military facilities -- south of 20 degrees only. | Commander, 7th Air Force. |
| Increase infiltration through Laos; attacks on cities; enemy massing north of DMZ; major attacks in SVN; Hanoi refuses to talk with GVN. | Consider resumption of bombing on selective or total basis, south or north of 20 degrees. | Washington. |

7

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 7, 1968 - 1:40 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a paper on Israeli domestic politics, which will not surprise you.

W. W. Rostow

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

wwrostow:rlh

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-73
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

58

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 7, 1968 - 12:50 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith draft of Clark Clifford's
proposed statement on problems and
achievements of the Department of
Defense over the past few years.

Pres file
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W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng, NARA, Date 2-1-93

~~SECRET~~

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

October 7, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach copy of tentative draft of the statement covering the problems and achievements of the Department of Defense over the past few years, and the outlook for the future.

This is perhaps longer than you desired but it does contain the major areas that need to be covered.

Clark M. Clifford

Clark M. Clifford

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
BY THE SECURITY
AGENCY E.O. 12356,
EX-19 ON 2-26-93

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30 September 1968

DRAFT

Cabinet Presentation of
Secretary of Defense

Mr. President, I appreciate this opportunity to inform the Cabinet about some of the problems and achievements of the Department of Defense over the past few years, and to attempt to assess the outlook for the future.

Inasmuch as Bob McNamara was Secretary until March 1 of this year whatever I say about the past accomplishments of the Department will be primarily to his credit. As for my views on the future climate of our national security, however, I must assume the somewhat uneasy role and responsibility of a weather forecaster sitting in the eye of a hurricane. This is not the most advantageous position from which to predict the path and power of the storm. In any event, I should like to explore how we can best prepare for such heavy weather as may lie ahead. We are in a particularly advantageous position to do so in 1968 because of what has transpired in the Defense Department during the past two Democratic Administrations.

When I arrived at the Pentagon, I was highly gratified to find that the Office of The Secretary of Defense had in fact become the strong position that President Truman had intended it to be when he first proposed the establishment of the Department more than 20 years ago.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority MC87-74
Nj/izp., NARA, Date 3/10/93

The Department that existed prior to 1961 was one in which each military service looked on itself as the major protector of the United States. As a result, the strategic plans and programs of the military services were not fully meshed or completely in phase and balance with each other. Successive Secretaries of Defense had attempted to mold all elements of the Defense structure into a unified and coordinated establishment with only limited and mixed success. Perhaps the greatest weakness in the early years of the organization was the notion that the Secretary was principally a coordinator and a referee -- a referee whose responsibility it was simply to judge between alternate and often highly contradictory courses of action or to pass on a single course of action proposed to him by the somewhat parochial and personal considerations of the military services.

It was Bob McNamara who first began to make full use of the latent legal powers of his office. He conceived his role to be that of an active leader rather than a mere passive negotiator between contending factions. He immediately prodded the Services for specific answers to specific problems, insisting that they dispassionately review the range of options open to them, and be prepared to defend their proposals with as much logical and factual analysis as could be brought to bear on the complex issues of our military posture.

He did not simply wait for unsolicited position papers for decision to ooze up to him through a marshy bog of bureaucracy; rather, he felt that the Secretary should be an instigator of action. His concise memoranda requests

for information and action were labeled as "snowflakes", because of their number and coverage. By the time President Johnson assumed office in 1963, the entire Defense Department had undergone a major managerial overhaul. Over the past 5 years we have, I believe, attained an operational standard of teamwork which is effectively geared to the complexities of our national security problems. Since Secretary McNamara's stewardship embraced the period beginning in 1961, some of my remarks must of necessity address the base from which he started.

The President's instructions to Secretary McNamara were that he should procure, supply, and support whatever military forces were required to safeguard fully the Nation's security, and to buttress and support our foreign policy objectives. He was to do this without regard to arbitrary budget levels, but, at the same time, at the lowest possible and practical cost to the taxpayer.

In 1961, we charted the course this Nation would have to follow in recasting its national defense policies, programs, and organization if we were to have the military strength needed to cope with the dangers which would inevitably confront us in the decade of the 1960s. Four principal goals were set:

- . Create such strategic deterrent power that the Soviet and Chinese leaders would have no doubt that a nuclear attack on the United States would surely be followed by their own destruction.

- . Develop balanced limited war forces that would permit a response graded to the intensity of any threat of aggression.

- . Continuously modernize our forces through intensified research and development so as to ensure the maintenance of

our technological lead.

. Reexamine the organization and management of our armed forces with the aim of increasing effectiveness, eliminating duplication, and reducing costs.

I believe it is fair to say that these goals have, in large measure, been met.

. The Soviet leaders have clearly demonstrated an understanding of our strategic nuclear power and, although less candid on this subject, the Chinese leaders give evidence of a similar understanding.

. The achievement of balanced limited war forces was clearly demonstrated by the fact that in 1965 we were able to deploy a combat ready force of 100,000 men to Vietnam, some 10,000 miles from our shores, within 120 days.

. Our research and development program has resulted in significant advances in every field of military technology. Notwithstanding the enormous exertions of our principal antagonist, we are still well ahead in almost every area of technology of vital importance to our military strength.

. The entire defense effort is now organized as a unified whole and is directly related to the principle missions of the Defense Establishment. Economy in day-to-day operations is being maximized through the intensive application of the Department's Program, Planning and Budgeting System, systems analysis techniques,

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and the Cost Reduction Program.

These modern managerial tools have proved so effective that their application and use have been extended throughout the entire Executive Branch. Strong executive leadership and modern management methods are, however, only means to an end. The primary end of the Defense Department remains, of course, combat readiness. Let me describe these achievements in more detail.

We have created a massive strategic nuclear deterrent that is so overwhelming in its assured destruction capability that neither the Soviet nor the Chinese leaders can have any doubt that an attack upon the United States would inevitably result in their own destruction as viable societies. In doing so, we have increased the survivability of our forces, improved their ability to penetrate enemy defenses, and ensured that they remain subject at all times to the command and control of the constituted authorities. Indeed, the paradox is that our own superiority in strategic nuclear weapons is perhaps better understood by our potential adversaries than it is by certain segments of our own population.

The number of land and sea-based ballistic missiles in our strategic nuclear forces have grown from 108 on 30 June 1961 to 545 on 30 June 1963 to 1,710 on 30 June 1968. These increases have been achieved while constantly improving the quality of the force. Early generation missiles -- ATLAS, TITAN I, POLARIS A-1s, and many MINUTEMAN Is -- have been

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phased out of the force.

Because Soviet air defense developments obsolesced the B-47s, which made up the bulk of strategic bomber forces, we have reduced our strategic bomber forces from 1,645 on 30 June 1961 to 646 on 30 June 1968. Nevertheless, the number of missile and bomber alert nuclear weapons -- those ready to be launched within fifteen minutes -- have increased from 820 on 30 June 1961 to 1,920 on 30 June 1963 to 2,335 on 30 June 1968. Total megatons in the alert forces have gone from 1,730 on 30 June 1961 to 4,393 on 30 June 1968, an increase of 254%.

The Soviets have been rapidly increasing the numbers and megatonnage of their strategic offensive forces. The Soviet Union, however, is only now bringing into its operational arsenal its first generation of MINUTEMAN-type land-based missiles, and the first POLARIS-type submarine-launched missiles. We on the other hand, are well into production of MINUTEMAN III and are beginning to produce our fourth generation of submarine-launched missiles, the POSEIDON.

Nevertheless, as of 30 June 1968, compared to the Soviets we have twice the number of land and sea-based missile launchers, 4 times the number of intercontinental strategic bombers, and about 4 times the number of alert weapons. In terms of megatonnage, however, our superiority is only 1 1/2 times that of the Soviets. Soviet ICBMs carry heavier payloads than ours. It should be cautioned that numbers of missiles, bombers, and gross megatonnage are not the most reliable indicators of the destructive

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power of a strategic offensive force. Far more important is the number of separately targetable warheads, and particularly the number of serviceable, accurate, reliable warheads which can be expected to survive an enemy first strike and penetrate their targets. In these terms, our strategic forces are also superior to those of the Soviet Union. In spite of our superiority, both we and the Soviets possess sufficient strategic nuclear forces to assure the mutual destruction of each other.

Prior to 1961, our national defense strategy was based primarily on massive nuclear retaliation. The obvious inadequacy of this strategy is that it gives us no deterrent capability at a threshold lower than nuclear war. Clearly what was required was a broad spectrum of nuclear, conventional and limited war forces. These forces are now in being and provide us with the capability of varied responses appropriate to the magnitude of the threat. We have given particular emphasis to the achievements of a sound balance among all the various elements of our non-nuclear conventional force posture, between:

Active forces and the Reserve Components; Ground forces and the tactical air forces upon which they depend for close air support; Combat forces and the airlift and sealift capabilities needed to move them; Stocks of war reserves and projected combat consumption and attrition rates; and Conventional forces themselves and the requirement of the contingency war plans they are expected to support.

By achieving the proper balance and relationships, we have been able

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-8-

to maintain a well-balanced and integrated conventional military force in Southeast Asia of over a half-million men while at the same time maintaining a posture of alert readiness in Korea, and Europe, and the United States.

The number of Army and Marine Corps divisions in the active forces ready for combat in two months or less have grown from 14 on 30 June 1961 to 23 on 30 June 1968; those in the Reserve Forces combat ready in two to six months from 3 on 30 June 1961 to 7 on 30 June 1968.

The total number of artillery pieces authorized for the Army increased from 2,624 on 30 June 1961 to 4,692 on 30 June 1968, or 79%. The overall sustained fire capability of the field artillery force increased 85 percent. (Most of the new artillery pieces are larger caliber, longer range, self-propelled types.) During this same period, the number of Army mechanized infantry and armor units increased by 110 percent, and their tanks and tactical vehicles were modernized. (In 1961 about 90 percent of the medium tanks in units were M-48s equipped with 90mm gun, primitive sighting and aiming devices, and a gasoline engine. On 30 June 1968, about 40 percent were M-60s equipped with a 105mm gun, a modern fire-control system, and a diesel engine.) We now have a large number of M-60s and SHERIDAN light tanks equipped with the new 152mm SHILLELAGH missile system, which provides for the first time a long-range fire capability with a high first-shot kill probability.

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By emphasizing the use of helicopters, especially for our forces oriented toward underdeveloped areas where rail and road nets are likely to be poor or non-existent, the mobility of our land forces has been greatly enhanced. In 1961, Army and Marine Corps had about 3,100 helicopters, all but 200 of which had piston engines. By 30 June 1970, when helicopters ordered last year are delivered, our land forces will have about 7,500 modern turbine helicopters, with much greater capacity and speed, and higher potential use rates than the ones they replaced. The Army troop-mile helicopter lift capability has already been increased more than eight-fold and the Marine Corps nearly twelve-fold since 1961.

To take advantage of the capabilities which these helicopters offered, new air mobility concepts were introduced into land force operations. The creation of a provisional air assault division permitted us to test these airmobility concepts in 1964-65, and allowed us to form the first Airmobile Division in time to deploy it to Southeast Asia in the summer of 1965.

Support forces were also increased substantially. By 30 June 1968, for example, Army had 60 percent more tactical cargo trucks, trailers, and semi-trailers than it had in 1961. In terms of capability, Army's capacity to carry dry cargo was increased by 82 percent and liquid cargo by 125 percent.

Several actions were taken to improve the readiness of Reserve Forces and their ability to support effectively the active forces. In 1961 the Army

Reserve and National Guard had between them 37 divisions, a number of them only cadre organizations.

The Army Reserve forces, however, were poorly manned and equipped, and did not contain a balanced structure of divisions and non-divisional support. Late this spring, we finally completed a major reorganization that now gives us a balanced reserve force for the Army comprising 8 complete division forces plus the units needed to round out the Active Army in accordance with our present mobilization plans. In 1961 the Marine Corps Reserve consisted entirely of individual augmentation personnel. Now, a complete Marine Corps division force has been formed which upon mobilization would have the same capability as an active division force, except for helicopter lift which would have to be augmented upon call-up. Each Army reservist now receives twice the training time provided in 1961.

A major shortcoming that existed in FY 1961 was the imbalance between Air Force tactical air forces and the Army ground forces they were designed to support. The numerical inadequacy of the tactical air forces was compounded by the almost total orientation of these forces to nuclear warfare. To redress the quantitative imbalance, the number of Air Force tactical fighter wings was increased from 16 to 23, and procurement of the Navy designed F-4 for Air Force was initiated. As a longer range measure, a new, highly sophisticated fighter, the F-111A, was developed, and this aircraft is now entering operational units. Although we are experiencing the usual growing pains of any new

aircraft, we anticipate the ironing out of the problems which have arisen with the F-111A.

Possibly more important than the quantitative increase in Air Tactical air forces has been the new emphasis given to improving their capabilities for non-nuclear conflicts. Prior to FY 1962 Air Force had, for all practical purposes, no hardware developments program for new non-nuclear weapons and munitions and virtually no inventory of modern air ordnance. Prompt and vigorous action was taken to remedy these faults. Specific acquisition targets were established for war reserve stocks of air munitions and substantial sums were budgeted to achieve these targets promptly. Indeed, Air Force funding for munitions and associated equipment during FY 1962-65 (i. e. , prior to the Vietnam conflict) increased about 275 percent over the previous four-year period. Moreover, a major effort was undertaken to develop better conventional air-delivered ordnance at a cost of a quarter of a billion dollars during FY 1962-68. From this effort we have obtained such new weapons as laser guided bombs, improved cluster bombs and incendiary bomblets.

In Navy also, non-nuclear capabilities of the carrier air elements have been emphasized. A large number of new air-delivered munitions have been developed and introduced, including the WALLEYE TV-guided air-to-surface missile, the SHRIKE and STANDARD ARM anti-radar missiles and SPARROW air-to-air missile.

One important index of tactical air capability is the total bomb carrying capacity of the fighter/attack force. This capability has increased from

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7,300 tons on 30 June 1961 to 8,500 tons on 30 June 1963 to 18,100 tons on 30 June 1968, an increase of 112% since 30 June 1963 alone. Our fighter aircraft are considerably superior to those of the Soviets in this regard.

A most significant growth has occurred in our inter-theater airlift capability. Our 30 day airlift capability to the Southeast Asia area totaled 14,700 tons on 30 June 1961. By 30 June 1963 it had grown to 23,600 tons. On 30 June 1968 it was 75,100 tons. With the introduction into the operational forces of the mammoth new C-5A transport, this capability is expected to rise to 172,200 tons by 30 June 1973. Because of the shorter distances involved, the capability of this air fleet to carry personnel and materiel to Europe is even greater.

The picture in our naval surface fleet is also one of substantial growth. Our inventory of nuclear-powered naval ships has increased from 19 on 30 June 1961 to 32 on 30 June 1963 to 81 on 30 June 1968. Similarly, our guided missile surface ships have gone from 23 on 30 June 1961 to 43 on 30 June 1963 to 75 on 30 June 1968.

Because of the large Soviet submarine fleet we have given special attention to our anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Since 1961:

- . The nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet increased from 13 to 30 with another 30 funded.
- . The overall submarine kill capability of our attack submarine barriers rose by 130 percent.
- . Improved aircraft and sensor equipment have produced a 131

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percent increase in the total search capability of our anti-submarine warfare escort ships has risen by 14 percent, and with the introduction of improved sensors, the overall screening capability of the escort forces has risen by more than three-fifths.

Although the last seven and one half years have seen a much needed improvement in non-nuclear limited war capabilities, attention has also been given to enhancing our theater nuclear capabilities. For example, in Europe we have almost doubled the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. to over 7,000 weapons. We have made notable gains in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group on a greater understanding of when and how to use this awesome capability.

Combat readiness, however, is meaningless unless it can be applied with precision and speed. The crucial test occurred in 1965 when South Vietnam was on the verge of being cut in two by massive infiltration from the North. If our commitment to the people of South Vietnam was to be kept, we had, without to, without delay, deploy sufficient forces to save the South from total military collapse.

The logistical accomplishment, once the decision was made that the United States must indeed keep its commitment -- is, I believe, without parallel in military history.

Our forces in South Vietnam grew from 30,000 in March 1965 to 185,000 by 31 December 1965, to 385,000 by 31 December 1966, 485,000 by 31

December 1967, and nearly 550,000 today. At the same time we were deploying over 40,000 troops to Thailand and expanding our support base in other Pacific areas. Our fleet was expanded rapidly as well; the number of vessels operating in the waters off Vietnam increased from about 50 during 1965 to nearly 100 today. These large deployments were accomplished without reducing our forces in such other critical areas as Europe and Korea, and without calling up large numbers of Reserve and Guard personnel as had been true in past conflict.

- . We are now supporting in Southeast Asia and the adjacent waters about 1.6 million men under arms -- nearly 900,000 South Vietnamese, 60,000 other Free World forces in South Vietnam, and 80,000 U.S. military personnel in Thailand and aboard ships in the adjacent waters.

- . A completely new infrastructure -- such as ports, air bases, warehouses, maintenance facilities, cantonments -- has been constructed in South Vietnam and Thailand.

- . We are now shipping over one million short tons per month to Southeast Asia by ship and 30,000 short tons of cargo per month by air.

- . Some 125,000 U.S. military personnel are now being moved in and out of Southeast Asia each month, mostly by air.

The production of war materiel, particularly ammunition, tactical aircraft and helicopters, has been greatly expanded:

- . About \$6.5 billion of ammunition and other ordnance is now being

produced annually compared with about \$1 billion a year prior to the summer of 1965.

. We are producing about 125,000 tons of air ordnance per month compared to less than 10,000 tons per month in 1965.

The production of key ground ammunition items is up just as sharply.

. Helicopter and tactical aircraft production has doubled over that period.

While the policy of holding Vietnam duty tours to only one year has placed an immense burden on the training establishments of the military services, they have met this challenge in full measure. Our commanders in Southeast Asia are being provided with a steady flow of trained replacements, thereby spreading the risks of combat over the largest practical number of our American youth.

No efforts have been spared to provide our men in combat with the highest quality of medical care, and deaths from wounds have been reduced to the lowest level on record. Seasoned foreign military observers have marveled at the high level of support provided our men in South Vietnam, not only in fire power, transportation, but also in the creature comforts.

What, of course, we all desire in Vietnam is an honorable peace. It is my view that we are closer to that goal than we have ever been in the past. There are three significant indications of this. The first, is the

result of the March 31, 1968 announcement that we were unilaterally restricting the bombing of North Vietnam in the hope that meaningful negotiations might get underway. As a direct consequence, the negotiations in Paris did in fact begin. While these talks have not as yet produced the serious bargaining we had hoped for, the very fact that Hanoi continues them is, I am persuaded, meaningful.

In the meantime, we have continued to maintain a posture of strength on the battlefield itself, which is fully necessary if we are to expect any realistic results in Paris. Our strategy is to use our overwhelming advantage in mobility and firepower in spoiling attacks, thus preventing the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong from succeeding in large scale offensives against the urban centers of population. This strategy has been successful, and such localized gains as the enemy has achieved have only been made at the incredible high cost to him in casualties and weapons losses.

Since March 31 we have taken two further fundamental policy decisions. We are limiting the size of our own forces in South Vietnam to 549,500 men, and we are accelerating our efforts to equip the South Vietnamese forces with the most modern weapons and logistical support available. There is at least a measurable improvement in the training, morale, and leadership of the South Vietnamese, and gradually they should be able to assume more and more of the battlefield responsibility. In recent weeks they have demonstrated their ability to assume a greater share of the combat burden.

However intractable the enemy may remain either in Paris or on the ground in Vietnam, we are now in the posture of avoiding an open-ended and increasingly costly escalation of our own efforts, while, at the same time, we can now look forward to the day when a toughened, more experienced, and better-equipped South Vietnamese Army can carry the principal burden of their nation's defense -- just as the South Koreans, once as dependent and weakened a force as the ARVN, has in fact become.

Let me now turn to what I believe will be the chief concerns of the Nation in the security field over the next decade.

Eight years ago one of our major concerns was to create as soon as possible a true "second strike" strategic force -- a force which could survive an all-out nuclear surprise attack and then still be capable of destroying the attacker in retaliation. As I have already pointed out, we now have had such a force for several years but soon, if not already, the Soviet Union will also have such a force. In an all-out nuclear exchange both sides would inevitably suffer mortal damage, and it could threaten the survival of all the peoples of the world.

Although both we and the Soviet Union have made great strides during the last eight years in the development of anti-ballistic missile defense technology, neither side can count on erecting an effective defense against the other. Any attempt to do so would immediately cause the other side to increase the capabilities of its offensive forces.

Accordingly, the deterrent role of our strategic nuclear forces must be emphasized in the 1970s even more than in the past; deterrence must

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-18-

be the overriding objective. And this means that at all times the United States must have the unquestioned capability to destroy an attacker even after absorbing his first strike and even if he chooses to build an extensive anti-ballistic missile defense. It is this capability which, in the final analysis, provides the deterrent.

The inexorable progress of military technology -- more accurate offensive missiles, Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), penetration aides, ABMs, interceptor aircraft with downward looking radars and downward shooting air-to-air missiles -- will make that task much more difficult in the 1970s than in the 1960s. Short of an effective agreement with the Soviet Union to limit the expansion of such forces, the cost will continue to be very high. But regardless of the cost and regardless of the difficulties, the survival of our Nation and, indeed, of all humanity demands that we make the effort. The introduction of MIRVs in our MINUTEMAN III and POSEIDON missile force will dramatically increase the number of nuclear warheads in our strategic offensive forces of the 1970s if needed to overcome Soviet ballistic missile defenses. I can report that our first MIRV test flights achieved excellent and accurate results. We must maintain during the 1970s the overwhelming deterrent power of our strategic nuclear forces created during the 1960s, and pursue with unflagging determination our initiative in seeking out new areas of agreement with the Soviet Union to halt and eventually reverse the nuclear arms race.

Two recent events buttress my conviction that our best hope of negotiating new areas of agreement with the Soviets is that we should do it from a

~~SECRET~~

position on unquestioned strength. There was considerable controversy in the Nation and in the Congress on proceeding with the deployment of the SENTINEL ABM. The argument was made that to proceed with this program would inhibit the Soviets from serious discussions in the field of strategic arms limitation. But it seems to me not altogether insignificant that only three days after Congress finally authorized the funds for the SENTINEL program, the Russians agreed to open talks on this long-delayed issue.

An even more recent and relevant case is, of course, the agony of Czechoslovakia. While it is clear that the purely military aspect of the Soviet action was carried out with precision and effectiveness, the decision appears to have been singularly inept from a political and diplomatic point of view. The Soviets now find themselves in the ironical position of being criticized by everyone from the Red Chinese ultra conservatives to the Yugoslavian ultra liberals. Further, they appear to have completely underestimated the difficulty in bending the Czechoslovakians themselves to the blunt and stark fact of Russian military domination. Communist parties throughout the world are deeply divided over the issues, and one suspects that the Kremlin itself reflects the same dichotomy of views.

Superficially, it may be comforting to us to reflect that even in a totalitarian society dissent and debate are possible. But at a more profound level, I believe we have small cause for satisfaction in this whole unhappy episode. For what it seems most to suggest is that the Soviet policy makers -- whoever they are -- have seriously miscalculated. If they can miscalculate on so

grand a scale in their own Marxist backyard, what are we to think of the miscalculations they might be tempted to make in the free world, where they have so little practical experience and so meager an understanding of the dynamics of the democratic process?

The Soviet moves have, of course, a direct impact on the future of NATO. It would be my estimate that two preliminary lessons are clear: First, that we cannot afford substantially to reduce our on-the-ground presence in Western Europe; and Second, that we must now redouble our long-standing efforts that the other member nations of the Alliance make a greater contribution -- at least qualitatively, if not quantitatively -- to their own protection. I would hope that those who have been predicting the death of NATO would now realize that the obituary is a bit premature. The fact is that the Russians may well have achieved the dubious distinction of having converted the caustic critics of NATO into strong supporters.

Our long-term military policy in Western Europe, then, must be to continue to press for a greater cohesiveness and contribution from the member nations, and a renewed effort to make clear to them that though the United States intends to remain in Europe in reasonable force, it is no longer realistic to suppose that we can continue to carry a disproportionate share of the common burden.

Communist China has joined the nuclear club and has demonstrated a potential to pose a significant threat to our homeland in the 1970s. Because of the utterly unpredictable character of the present regime and because it is technically and economically feasible to erect an effective defense against

a relatively limited and unsophisticated ICBM threat, we have decided to deploy such a defense. Barring a marked change for the better in our relations with Communist China, we must complete the installation of the SENTINEL ABM system and continue our research and development efforts on more advanced ABM technology. Until an effective agreement is reached with the Soviet Union to limit the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic weapons, this Nation should not foreclose the possibility of perfecting a defense against a large and sophisticated nuclear attack.

The Asian Communists, under the mistaken impression that covert armed aggression masquerading in the guise of "wars of national liberation" (or "peoples' wars" as Chinese Communists choose to call them) could be palmed off on the world as a local insurrection or civil war, have precipitated a conflict of major proportions in Southeast Asia. We have made it clear that the Communists would not be permitted to impose their rule on the people of South Vietnam by force of arms. But it has always been our objective to seek a solution through peaceful means.

When the conflict in Vietnam is concluded on honorable terms, we are still going to be faced with trouble throughout the world for the foreseeable future. We will not be able to insulate ourselves against it. We will have to keep a close watch on developing conflicts elsewhere and try to head them off before they develop into serious conflagrations. I do not mean to suggest that we should get in every conflict that arises in the world. I believe that the basis of our policy in the future should be the development of a series of

regional agreements. Our role in these agreements would be that of a limited partner. Our emphasis would be in the economic rather than the military sphere.

Using Southeast Asia as an example, we should be able to reduce our on-the-ground commitment to the defense of the region, but only in consonance with a corresponding effort to promote a greater regional contribution all along the perimeter of Free Asia. China, with its growing nuclear capability, remains the great brooding question mark on the Pacific horizon. While we can hope and to a degree expect, that the current degree of irrational internal turmoil within China itself will gradually subside, there is no reason to believe that a strong and effective Pan-Asian defense capability will be any the less necessary. The natural hub of such a wheel of defense is Japan. Already the third most productive industrial power in the world, Japan simply cannot remain indifferent to either the defense or developmental needs of the entire Pacific region. We must, then, I believe, rely less in the future on loose organizational arrangements, and seek instead to foster an attitude of pragmatic and realistic awareness in the free nations of Asia. They must be urged to simply face the politically unpalatable fact that they have to depend more on their own collective defense resources and less on the supposedly unlimited ability of the United States to protect everyone everywhere.

With respect to the Middle East, there seems little likelihood that the basic issues there can be resolved in the short-term future. Our national interest lies in promoting as much tranquility in an essentially irrationally belligerent situation as may be possible. This will not be easy, nor in all probability, completely successful.

The principal danger lies in our allowing ourselves to be maneuvered into a confrontation with the Soviet Union over the Middle Eastern problems. While there is some evidence that the Soviets are also aware of this danger, we cannot assume that they will display the necessary diplomatic and military moderation that is required even for their own interests. We must, therefore, maintain a position of strength in the Mediterranean, and make it manifest that while we desire accommodation between the Arabs and the Israelis, we have no intentions of exacerbating an already inflammatory situation. We should look with the greatest seriousness upon any Soviet attempt to so manipulate the political passions in the Eastern Mediterranean that we would find ourselves in direct confrontation with Russian military power there. Here again, the promotion of a regional arrangement whereby those nations most affected would shoulder the primary burden is in order.

Finally, we must recognize, I believe, that throughout the entire Southern half of the planet we can expect a continuing series of local conflicts, sometimes instigated by Communist influence, always -- to the degree they find possible -- exploited by Communist interests, but, in the end, taking

place with or without the Communists. There can, I fear, be no question of the intrinsic relationship between the frustrations of underdevelopment and the incidence of local conflict. In the emerging nations some American military assistance will undoubtedly continue to be required, but by far the more serious problem is the underdevelopment itself. In the interest of national security, we must find a way to convince other affluent nations that a dollar's worth of developmental assistance can often buy more tranquility than an additional dollar's worth of status-symbol military hardware.

We have probably reached the point in this country where popular support for large-scale programs of foreign aid is no longer sustainable. A more promising solution would appear to lie in our promotion of international agencies such as the World Bank. The problem is to convince the Congress, and indeed all the nations of Western Europe, as well as Japan, that great contributions to international developmental aid programs is not philanthropy, but is a hardheaded and realistic premium that must be paid on the life insurance of us all.

Every possible difficult situation which might involve our entry into the conflict must be evaluated in the light of U.S. national security. ^PThe experience of the last eight years has proved once again that we dare not relax our research and development efforts. Technology, especially military technology, is moving forward at an ever accelerating rate with the result that the tools of war are becoming ever more complex. While we still have a significant lead in all vital areas of military technology, the Soviet Union is striving hard to catch up. Under the circumstances we

have no alternative but to press forward in all areas of science and technology of importance to our national defense. We must continue a vigorous and well-balanced program of military research and development, making full use of our scientific and technological resources in every part of the Nation.

I would like to close by remarking on an often overlooked aspect of the Department of Defense. It is being commonly, and somewhat irresponsibly, said that \$20 billion or so of the Federal budget could be available to spend on unmet domestic needs as soon as the conflict in Vietnam is over. Leaving aside for the moment the fact we cannot cut back overnight, what concerns me is the implication that our Defense programs are a total loss domestically. The Department of Defense spends around one-half of all U.S. government expenditures. We have become conscious of the great opportunities that we have in Defense to assist in the solution of internal problems having a direct and substantial impact on total national security. If there is a breakdown of law and order, if a disregard develops of the principles upon which our country are based, or if the education, housing, and medical care of parts of our population are deficient, all of these can affect the ability of the Department to accomplish its primary mission of combat readiness. While meeting this basic responsibility, we find that we can conduct some of our programs in such a way as to achieve breakthroughs benefiting all of our people and to serve as a catalyst to enable others to move forward.

We expend \$650 million annually in housing programs. If we give attention to exploring new methods for building low price housing it benefits our defense programs and blazes new trails for the domestic housing industry. Defense is the greatest user of hospitals. We can explore new types of hospitals, arranged, equipped, and operated with the most modern equipment and techniques the medical profession has devised.

In the personnel field, we have pioneered in new educational techniques. In Project 100,000, men heretofore regarded as unqualified for military service have been inducted, given special training, and are now serving with resounding success in the Army. This effort points the way to private industry, government and our educational system. With imagination and not too much extra effort, the unskilled and uneducated can indeed be usefully integrated into the mainstream of American life. The fact is there are enormous benefits derived to all aspects of our society from Defense programs.

As you are well aware from what I have said, I am convinced that we shall maintain significant military forces throughout the next decade. I am equally convinced that the Department of Defense can, and will, recruit, train and employ those forces in such a way so as not only to defend our Nation but also to substantially contribute to an alleviation of social problems at home.

I thank all of you again for this opportunity to share these thoughts about our Defense programs with you.

Pres. file

59

Monday, Oct. 7, 1968
11:15 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Thieu's Interior Minister (Khiem)
reports coup rumors to Berger:

- either because there are such rumors or activity;
- or because he wishes to make a record with us for later action against certain anti-Thieu political factions.

Key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Saigon 39695)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

U R 1647

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1968 OCT 7 12 51

~~SECRET~~

HCE539

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PA 15799 (#22)

By HJG NARA, Date 2-8-02

PAGE 21 SAIGON 39695 071234Z

42
ACTION SS 32

INFO SSO 03, NSCE 03, /030 W

071234Z OCT 68 ZAF-6
TO SECRETARY WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2037
INFO AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CINCPAC

068582

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 39695

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (PARA 5)

KATHMANDU FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FROM BERGER

Restow

SUBJECT: MINISTER OF INTERIOR REPORTS COUP PLOTTING.

1. MINISTER OF INTERIOR KHIEM ASKED ME TO SEE HIM URGENTLY WHICH I DID AT 1430 HOURS. HE SAID PRESIDENT ~~THIEU~~ HAD TOLD HIM TO ~~INFORM ME OF NEW REPORTS OF COUP PLOTTING.~~

2. KHIEM WAS SOMEWHAT AGITATED AS HE TALKED. HE SHOWED ME SOME SENTENCES IN ENGLISH, TRANSLATED OTHER SENTENCES FROM VIETNAMESE HANDWRITTEN NOTES, AND PROMISED TO SEND ME COPIES OF DOCUMENTS HE WAS USING. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF WHAT HE SAID:

A. NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF POLICE HAI IS HOLDING ONE DOAN CONG LAP IN CUSTODY. ~~INTERVIEWS SHOW LAP HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH ONE THAI HAI HUNG, WHO LAC ALLEGES, IS A CAPTAIN IN DANGANG, AND ONE OF THE MAIN PLOTTERS. HAI IS NOW TRYING TO ESCAPE HUNG.~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 39695 071234Z

B. THEY HAVE NAMES OF SIX OR SO YOUNGER ARMY, AIR FORCE, AND MSS OFFICERS WHO APPEAR TO BE INVOLVED. ~~THESE WILL BE RELIEVED FROM PRESENT DUTY IMMEDIATELY AND TRANSFERRED TO NEW ASSIGNMENTS WHILE INVESTIGATION CONTINUES.~~

C. ANOTHER PLOT WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE RELATED CALLS FOR ~~DEMONSTRATIONS IN SAIGON, NHA TRANG, DANANG, AND BIEN HOA ON OR BEFORE OCTOBER 9. THESE WILL DEMAND THAT VICE PRESIDENT KY TAKE CONTROL, ON GROUNDS THAT THIS GOVT. TOO SYMPATHETIC TO US AND FAVORS ACCORD WITH NORTH, AND ALSO DISSOLUTION OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.~~

D. ~~KHIEM BELIEVES PLOT OR PLOTS ARE BEING HATCHED BY COMBINATION OF CAN LAO AND REVOLUTIONARY DAI-VETS.~~ HE SAID PLOTTERS USING NAMES OF VICE PRESIDENT KY, GENERAL LAON (EX-NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR), HA THUC KY (DAI VET LEADER), FATHER LAM (CATHOLIC EXTREMIST HEAD OF GREATER SOLIDARITY FORCE), AND TRAN KIM TUYEN (FORMER SECRET POLICE CHIEF AND CAN LAO LEADER UNDER DIEM).

E. ~~KHIEM SAID THERE IS NO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THESE NAMES ARE INVOLVED,~~ AND IT COULD BE THAT YOUNGER OFFICERS ARE MAKING PLANS WITH IDLA IN MIND TO TURN TO THEM LATER. HE SAID LAP-HUNG EXCHANGES MENTIONED NEED TO HAVE US SUPPORT IF COUP IS TO SUCCEED, AND NEED TO KNOW WHICH VIETNAMESE UNITS WOULD SUPPORT COUP.

3. ~~I ASKED IF KHIEM OR THIEU HAD TALKED TO KY. HE SAID NOT YET, THEY WERE STILL COLLECTING INFORMATION. I SAID THEY OUGHT TO DO IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.~~ I ASKED WHAT WE COULD DO AND ~~OFFERED TO TALK TO PA THUC KY, LAON, LAM, OR ANYONE ELSE, TO DISABUSE THEM OF ANY IDEA THEY MIGHT HAVE THAT US WOULD SUPPORT ANY GOVT HERE THAT OVERTHREW THIEU. KHIEM SAID IT WAS NOT NECESSARY AT THIS TIME,~~ BUT THAT PRESIDENT THIEU WISHED TO HAVE GENERAL ABRAMS INFORM OUR COMMANDERS IN SAIGON, NHA TRANG, DANANG AND BIEN HOA TO KEEP AN EYE ON VIETNAMESE FORCES DURING NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. KHIEM SAID, "THESE PEOPLE MUST BE MAD. THE COUNTRY CANNOT STAND ANOTHER COUP, AND THEY WILL DESTROY THE COUNTRY IF THEY DO." HE SEEMED MORE RELAXED AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION THAN WHEN I FIRST CAME IN.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 23 SAIGON 39695 371234Z

5. COMMENT: WHILE KHIEU MAY BE DESCRIBING IN GOOD FAITH REPORTS OF COUP PLOTTING THAT ARE COMING TO HIM AND THIEU, I WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT KHIEU MAY BE USING LOW LEVEL LOOSE TALK ABOUT COUP PLOTS TO GET READY TO COLLECT OR WARN SOME OF THE MAIN CAN LAO AND DAI VET FIGURES WHOM THEY HAVE MORE REASON TO WORRY ABOUT. HIS UNWILLINGNESS TO HAVE ME TALK DIRECTLY TO ANY OF THE PRINCIPALS IS RATHER CURIOUS, AND SUGGESTS THAT IN CALLING ME IN HE MAY HAVE BEEN MAINLY CONCERNED WITH ESTABLISHING A RECORD FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE USE. FOR THE TIME BEING, I SIMPLY REGARD THIS AS A THOUGHT. WE ARE LOOKING FURTHER INTO THIS AND I MAY BE GOING BACK TO KHIEU IN A DAY OR SO.

BERGER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

60

INFORMATION

Monday, October 7, 1968 -- 11:00 am

Mr. President:

These two documentary samples
suggest the kind of military frustration
the enemy is now experiencing --
confirmed from all sources.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

"enemy" = our side

"friendly" = VC-North Vietnamese forces

WWRostow:rlh

October 4, 1968

SUBJECT: Difficulties

A letter, dated ~~September 5, 1968~~, signed by Hai Trung of D3 (possibly an element of Nha Be District, Sub-Region 3, COSVN), addressed to the Current Affairs Committee (possibly of Nha Be District Party Committee), pertains to a number of cadre of D3 to be trained and assigned to villages surrounding the Capital (Saigon) to act as CK and illegal forces. Trung indicates that ~~although the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) has reduced sweep activities~~ recently he has doubled his control in order to apprehend all youths and block friendly (VC/NVA) infiltration of personnel and weapons into the Capital (Saigon). This created numerous difficulties to friendly forces and restricted their movements. Trung further states that ~~both the civilian population and (VC) underground cadre in his area were now convinced that the enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) was too strong to be defeated.~~

CDEC #09-2362-68 (military cable)

October 4, 1968

Boston 606

SUBJECT: Difficulties

A situation report, dated September 12, 1968, prepared by X1 (possibly Nha Be District Party Committee, Sub-Region 3, COSVN), covers the period September 1 to 10, 1968, and reveals that the increasing enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) patrols and pacification activities considerably affected friendly (VC/NVA) activities in Nha Be District.

The document concludes that during the first ten days of September 1968 X1 could accomplish only one task and that was the dissemination of an unspecified resolution. During this period X1 failed to carry out assigned missions in regard to the elimination of (GVN) tyrants, annihilation of enemy potential, development of mass uprisings and expansion of local forces. The main reasons for this failure were the difficulties caused by the enemy. Report indicates that X1 military shortcomings were as follows: movement of troops, shortage of local forces such as village and secret guerrillas and Unit 265 being unfamiliar with the local area.

(CDEC Comment: The document gives the impressions that friendly activities in the Nha Be District area have caused serious material shortages and morale problems to the enemy.)

CDEC #09-2361-68, (Bulletin 16,803)

ACTION

61

Pres. file

Monday, Oct. 7, 1968
9:40 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a proposed announcement which would link a Honolulu meeting³ our military and economic support for Thieu's programs as outlined today to the National Assembly in Saigon.

Attachment

W. W. Rostow

(copy to George Christian)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988

By MF, NARA, Date 2-25-93

The President plans to meet for a two-day session with Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams on next Thursday, October 10, in Honolulu.

The primary purpose of the meeting will be to review U. S. military and economic assistance programs and to plan actions for the months ahead.

The Honolulu meeting will consider, among other matters, the ways in which the U. S. can support the policies and programs outlined by President Thieu in his address today to the National Assembly in Saigon.

President Johnson last met with Ambassador Bunker in Honolulu on 19-20 July 1968, and with General Abrams in Washington on March 26-27, 1968.

62

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 7, 1968 - 9:35 am

Mr. President:

As background to thoughts which we share with Bunker, Thieu, and Abrams, I thought you might like to read this back-channel message I sent on September 30 (Tab A) and Ellsworth's reply (Tab B).

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 2-1-93

WWRostow:rln

VIA CAS CHANNELS

September 30, 1968

62a
CAPY2501

~~SECRET~~

FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER, LITERALLY EYES ONLY, FROM WALT ROSTOW

This cable has the status only of a personal conversation.

The President's desire, as I understand it, is to get, within his term, either a substantial movement towards an honorable peace or to leave the situation of his successor in the best possible shape on 20 January 1969.

One cannot rate high the chances of the first alternative; although we have not abandoned hope or effort.

We must, therefore, turn our minds to the second. I would add that, even if negotiations turn serious, it will be essential to drive ahead hard on the various enterprises which comprise the second objective.

Only you and your colleagues can identify the priority areas for maximum drive and progress in the four months ahead. Most of them are areas of intense current effort where what we want is a second-stage booster on the part of the GVN.

For what it is worth, here are my thoughts on areas which do not represent merely doing a bit better what we are already doing; e.g., ARVN mobilization and re-equipment; anti-corruption; Lien Minh; protecting Saigon; keeping Ky in order; etc.

1. The countryside. At a distance I am frankly a bit worried by VC political consolidation in rural areas and sluggishness of pacification progress.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-73
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

~~SECRET~~

Tab A

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The picture here may be deceptive, but with enemy main forces so ineffective, guerrillas down in numbers, RF/PF being re-equipped, one might hope for something of a rural surge in the months ahead. Is this unrealistic?

2. Land reform. I am convinced that Saigon has been correct that land reform is not a burning issue; but I am equally convinced that serious progress in land reform would give the GVN a mighty lift in the countryside -- a different proposition. I trust that Grant and McDonald will produce something useful shortly. If an intelligent practical program could be accompanied by actually giving the villages the power to administer land reform law and regulation, we would be much further forward.

3. Get the rice out of the Delta. I must say I'm much disappointed that Ho's good talk on insurance, etc. at Honolulu still leaves us with that rice in the Delta and with reduced incentives for the farmers. Is Huong unmovable on this?

4. A draft postwar Economic Development Plan. I know the planners are in an intermediate stage; but it would be good if, without stretching beyond their actual performance, Thieu were to make public their concepts, objectives, hopes. They should clearly hold the stage but we might get Lillienthal to comment in the wake of such a release and statement.

5. Positive national objectives. I note that, in your own magnificent way, you are guiding the Vietnamese towards an articulation of what the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

nationalists want to achieve. Opposition to communism is clearly the essential cement, but as they struggle towards building a big political party they need a program; and its articulation in the weeks ahead could be helpful to the cause -- there as well as here.

These may be wrong. There may be others. But I believe we should develop this kind of list; see if Thieu agrees; then mount a joint effort of maximum military, political, and economic momentum over the next four months.

626

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DLA389 '68 OCT.. 2 AM 9:35

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FM SAIGON
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEN

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 021225Z OCT 68 VIA CAS CHANNELS
FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 034
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW
REF: CAP 02521

1. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR INTERESTING MESSAGE AND ITS
OBSERVATIONS. I AGREE THAT THESE ARE THE LINES ALONG WHICH
WE SHOULD WORK AND INDEED ARE WORKING. YOU SAID THIS DID
NOT REQUIRE A REPLY BUT I SHALL WANT TO COMMENT ON IT WHEN
I RETURN FROM MY WEEKEND IN KATHMANDU. YOU WILL NOTE
FROM THIS WEEK'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT THAT WE HAD A
VERY SUCCESSFUL MEETING WITH THIEU AND HIS ADVISORS
YESTERDAY ON PACIFICATION. THIEU WAS STEAMED UP AND RARING
TO GO. I AM DELIGHTED THAT HE IS TAKING PERSONAL GUIDANCE
AND LEAD IN THE MATTER FOR HE KNOWS MORE ABOUT PACIFICATION
THAN ANYONE IN THE GV". REGARDS.

GP-1
150

NNNN

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

Tab B

63

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/CACTUS

Pres file

Monday, October 7, 1968 - 9:30am

Mr. President:

The North Koreans herewith ask for a PUEBLO meeting.

Decision is, therefore, required on Nick's statement of the alternatives which I sent up to you on Saturday.

You may well wish to have a meeting on this today. Nick has followed the PUEBLO problem very closely.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 10274

~~SECRET~~/CACTUS

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 2-18-93



63a
T-I
Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

01963

1968 OCT 7 AM 5 29

RR RUEHC
DE RUALOS 10274E 2810850
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 070840Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3040
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 10274

NODIS/CACTUS

1. FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED 1659 HOURS LOCAL FROM
SECRETARY MAC KPA/CPV SIDE:

QUOTE. I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM YOU
AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE. OUR SIDE IS READY TO HOLD A MEETING
BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES ON OCTOBER 8, 1968, THAT IS, TOMORROW. UNQUOTE.

2. GENERAL WOODWARD IS SENDING A REPLY TO THE EFFECT
THAT WE WILL NOTIFY THE NK SIDE WHEN WE ARE READY FOR
A MEETING. GP-3 PORTER
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

SENT
WHCA

1968 OCT 6 17 00

EAA722
OO WTE5
DE WTE 3939~~SECRET~~FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS2513DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-136By vis, NARA Date 9-2-9868 OCT 6 PM 1:03
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVEYOU MAY WISH TO READ THIS RUSK - HASLUCK MEMCON TO GET
THE FEEL FOR AUSTRALIAN CONCERN.

1. SUMMARY. HASLUCK REPORTED AUSTRALIAN CONCERN AT EVIDENCE GAINED THROUGH TV AND PRESS OF GROWING VEHEMENCE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION ON VIET-NAM. HE WAS WORRIED THAT THIS MIGHT LEAD TO SOFTENING OUR POSITION AT PARIS. SECRETARY REASSURED HIM ON LATTER POINT AND HOPED AUSTRALIANS WOULD NOTE U.S. ACTIONS INSTEAD OF REPORTED WORDS. HASLUCK STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN ASIA AS BEST RESTRAINT AGAINST CHINESE EXPANSION AND HOPED SOVIETS WOULD NOT BECOME "ISOLATED." HE FELT WIDER ROLE FOR JAPAN IN SEA WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN AREA. HE THOUGHT CHINA AND KOREA VOTES WOULD BE ABOUT THE SAME AS LAST YEAR. HASLUCK SAID HIS GA SPEECH WILL REFLECT VIEW THAT GOA WOULD FAVOR NPT BUT FEELS IT MUST WAIT AND SEE IN ORDER TO JUDGE DEVELOPMENTS MORE CAREFULLY. IN CONNECTION WITH NUCLEAR PROBLEM HE SAID AUSTRALIA NOTED THE WORRISOME PROXIMITY OF CHINA AND POTENTIAL OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN; IN DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, SECRETARY STRESSED DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN HITHERTO UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM OF INSPECTION. END SUMMARY.

2. HASLUCK, ACCOMPANIED BY EXSTAFF PERMANENT SECRETARY SIR JAMES PLIMSOLL AND AUSTRALIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE SHAW, OPENED DISCUSSION WITH EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION TO SECRETARY FOR MAKING TIME FOR ANZUS MEETING IN WASHINGTON.

3. IN REPLY TO SECRETARY'S QUERY ON MOOD IN CANBERRA, HASLUCK SAID THERE WAS CONCERN AT SIGNS OF GROWING VEHEMENCE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION RE VIET-NAM AND A WORRY THAT THIS MIGHT LEAD TO SOME YIELDING AT PARIS TALKS ON US SIDE. SECRETARY SAID DESPITE CONSPICUOUS CHARACTER OF ANTI-VIET-NAM EXPRESSIONS IN U.S. THEY DID NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT AMERICAN OPINION AS SHOWN IN RECENT POLLS, AND HE NOTED THAT, ON OTHER HAND, AT TIME OF CZECH CRISIS NO WESTERN EUROPEAN NATION VOLUNTEERED A MAN TO MEET THAT THREAT. IN THIS CONNECTION HE NOTED IMPORTANT VOLUME OF TRADE WHICH WESTERN EUROPE APPARENTLY DESIRES MAINTAIN WITH EASTERN EUROPE. HE SAID WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF GIVING VIET-NAM AWAY AFTER WE HAVE SENT A HALF MILLION MEN TO HOLD IT. HE DEPLORED A RECENT STATEMENT BY AN AUSTRALIAN CABINET MINISTER MADE DURING VISIT OF A U.S. DEFENSE GROUP THAT U.S. WAS "SHILLY-SHALLYING" IN VIET-NAM. HASLUCK SAID HE TOOK IT UPON HIMSELF TO APOLOGIZE FOR SUCH A REMARK AND STATED THAT IT DOES NOT REFLECT GOA THINKING.

4. SECRETARY SAID HE RECOGNIZED DEBATE ON VIET-NAM IN U.S. MAY BE DISCONCERTING BUT HOPED AUSTRALIANS WOULD WAIT AND NOTE ACTIONS INSTEAD OF WORDS. PLIMSOLL STRESSED UNFORTUNATE INFLUENCE OF U.S.-ORIGINATED TV AND PRESS ITEMS ON VIET-NAM, RACIAL TENSIONS, ETC. SECRETARY REGRETTED IRRESPONSIBLE REPORTING AND SAID IN MEETING WHICH HE HELD WITH REPORTERS LAST NIGHT HE CHARGED THEM WITH HAVING FAILED TO PICK UP THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PART OF HIS G A SPEECH IN WHICH HE HAD CHALLENGED (BEGIN UNDERLINE) PRAVDA (END UNDERLINE) DOCTRINE THAT LAW OF CLASS WARFARE IS SUPERIOR TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LAW OF THE CHARTER. HE SAID THIS POINT HAD MADE HIS SPEECH ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT DECLARATIONS BY SECSTATE SINCE WW II. TV REPORTAGE HAD, HOWEVER, CHOSEN TO CONCENTRATE ON HIS INTRODUCTORY REMARKS WHICH EVOKED GALLERY DEMONSTRATIO N.

5. HASLUCK SAID HE FELT MILITARY SITUATION IN VIET-NAM WAS IMPROVED AND HE WILL PLAN TO DISCUSS PARIS TALKS IN COURSE OF ANZUS DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON. HE URGED THAT BOMBING NOT BE STOPPED UNLESS WE ARE SURE OF HANOI'S RESPONSE. SECRETARY SAID NO HUMAN BEING COULD FORECAST HANOI'S RESPONSE WITH THAT CERTAINTY.

6. ON NEW CANADIAN GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY SAID HE THOUGHT THAT AFTER SETTLING IN, TRUDEAU IS LIKELY TO GRAVITATE TOWARD TRADITIONAL CANADIAN POLICIES. SECRETARY THOUGHT THERE IS GROWING MOOD OF ISOLATION IN WEST AND THAT CENTRAL IDEA OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY DOES NOT GRIP POLITICAL LEADERS AS IT DID IN 1945-1950 PERIOD. HE SAID GREAT DEBATE ON THIS VITAL POINT IS NEEDED HERE AND IN EUROPE IN ORDER TO REVITALIZE CONCEPT OR FIND SOMETHING BETTER.

7. HASLUCK EXPRESSED VIEW THAT THERE IS GROWING APPREHENSION IN EUROPE DUE TO CZECH CRISIS BUT HE THOUGHT GROMYKO'S SPEECH CONCILIATORY IN TONE. SECRETARY SAID THAT IN INFORMING US OF MOVE INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, SOVIETS HAD SAID MOVE WOULD NOT INVOLVE US "STATE INTERESTS." SECRETARY SAID THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY INCLUDE BERLIN BUT HE RAISED DOUBTS AS TO VALUE OF SOVIET "SOLEMN ASSURANCES." USING EXAMPLE OF GROMYKO ASSURANCE TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON MISSILE BASES IN CUBA.

8. IN REPLY TO HASLUCK'S QUESTION, SECRETARY SAID HE EXPECTED SOVIET COOPERATION ON NPT BUT NOT ON MIDDLE EAST. SECRETARY SAID HE IS NOT ENCOURAGED ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUE. HE REMARKED THAT WHILE GROMYKO HAD USED MODERATE LANGUAGE, HIS THESIS THAT SOCIALISM HAS SOLVED PROBLEM OF NATIONALISM IS DANGEROUS, AS WAS HIS DECLARATION THAT MIDDLE EAST IS VITAL TO USSR. SECRETARY THOUGHT GROMYKO'S RESTRAINT ON VIET-NAM WAS DUE TO CLOSE SOVIET WATCH ON PARIS TALKS.

9. REMARKING THAT HE WAS LOOKING AHEAD INTO NEXT DECADE, HASLUCK SAID THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE WAS HIGHLY IMPORTANT IN ASIAN PICTURE, PARTICULARLY AS BEST RESTRAINT AGAINST CHINESE EXPANSION. HE THOUGHT USSR SHOULD NOT BE DRIVEN INTO ISOLATION NOR SHOULD COLD WAR BE REVIVED AND NOTED THAT THESE POINTS WERE VITAL FOR THOSE WHO LIVE NEARER CHINA.

10. SECRETARY THOUGHT HT MOSCOW WOULD BE CONTENT TO SEE HANOI SCORE SOME SUCCESSES AND WOULD SUPPORT IT TO THAT END. MOSCOW WOULD BE WILLING TO RESTORE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) STATUS QUO ANTE (END UNDERLINE) TO SEA TO KEEP HANOI FROM GOING INTO CHINESE ORBIT, HE SPECULATED. HASLUCK THOUGHT SOVIETS WANT TO SEE INDEPENDENCE OF SEA STATES AS BUFFER AGAINST CHINESES.

11. IN ANSWER TO HASLUCK'S QUERY AS TO OUR VIEWS ON A WIDER ROLE FOR JAPAN IN SEA, SECRETARY NOTED JAPAN'S EXTRAORDINARY ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS AND SAID WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE JAPANESE SHOULDERS MORE OF THEIR OWN DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITY BUT ANY MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE GRADUAL TO OVERCOME JAPANESE OPPOSITION. HE THOUGHT JAPANESE WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO ENGAGE FORCES OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY, EVEN IN KOREA. AMBASSADOR SHAW NOTED GREATER JAPANESE ACTIVITY IN UN. SECRETARY WELCOMED THIS AND SAID WE HOPE TO SEE MORE JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN SEA DEVELOPMENT.

12. SECRETARY SAID HE SAW NO CHANGE IN US POLICIES TOWARD AUSTRALIA UNDER ANY NEW US ADMINISTRATION.

13. FOLLOWING HASLUCK'S COMMENT THAT CHIREP AND KOREAN VOTES WILL PROBABLY BE MUCH THE SAME IN GA THIS YEAR, SECRETARY REMARKED THAT AT RECENT HONOLULU CONFERENCE SOUTH VIET-NAM FONMIN SHOWED INTEREST IN POSSIBLE ADMISSION OF BOTH NORTH VIET-NAM AND SOUTH VIET-NAM TO UN. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT CHECKED OUT THIS VIEW WITH THE KOREANS AND DID NOT EXPECT TO PRESS IT. PLIMSOLL RECALLED THAT SOVIETS HAD SUGGESTED SIX YEARS AGO THAT TWO KOREAS AND TWO VIET-NAMS BE ADMITTED TO UN BUT PLAN RAN INTO TROUBLE WITH PEKING. PEDERSEN NOTED THIS WAS USEFUL POINT-INDICATING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE, AT LEAST AT ONE STAGE, OF EXISTENCE OF SOUTH KOREA AND SOUTH VIET-NAM. PLIMSOLL REMARKED THAT DIVIDED GERMANY IS THE STUMBLING BLOCK.

14. ON CENTRAL EUROPE SECRETARY SAID SOVIETS MAY BE FRIGHTENED BY CONCEPT OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S BRIDGE-BUILDING, AND BY EXPANSION OF BONN'S RELATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE. HE THOUGHT HT WE MAY, THEREFORE, FIND A TIGHTENING OF THE IRON CURTAIN. WE MUST, HOWEVER, MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS FOR WE NEED THEIR ASSISTANCE IN SUCH MATTERS AS VIET-NAM, ME AND NPT.

15. HASLUCK SAID HIS GA SPEECH WILL REFLECT VIEW THAT GOA WOULD FAVOR NPT BUT FEELS IT MUST WAIT AND SEE. SECRETARY ASKED IF AUSTRALIA RENOUNCES A NUCLEAR OPTION. HASLUCK REPLIED IN NEGATIVE AND SAID, "WE DO NOT WANT TO MAKE A COMPLETE AND TOTAL RENUNCIATION UNTIL WE SEE THE SITUATION MORE CLEARLY." HE NOTED THAT CHINA IS A NUCLEAR POWER CLOSE AT HAND, AND THAT INDIA AND PAKISTAN ARE MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION. AUSTRALIA DEPLORES THESE DEVELOPMENTS BUT IT CAN'T DECLARE RENUNCIATION UNTIL IT KNOWS MORE ABOUT THE SITUATION AMONG ITS IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS. HE SAID AUSTRALIA CANNOT EXPECT WASHINGTON TO START A GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR IN ORDER RESPOND TO NUCLEAR THREAT AGAINST AUSTRALIA. SECRETARY EXPRESSED HOPE HASLUCK WOULD NOT MAKE SUCH A COMMENT PUBLICLY FOR MOSCOW MIGHT BELIEVE IT AND THIS WOULD CUT AT THE VERY FOUNDATION OF NATO. HASLUCK SAID AUSTRALIA CANNOT DENY ITSELF IN UNKNOWN CIRCUMSTANCES AND HE DOUBTED THAT AUSTRALIAN POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD CHANGE ANYTHING. SECRETARY STATED THERE IS NOTHING MORE DANGEROUS THAN A SMALL NUCLEAR FORCE. HE SAID DEGAULLE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THIS BUT WILL EVENTUALLY.

16. PLIMSOLL HOPES SAFEGUARDS FOR PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY COULD BE NEGOTIATED THROUGH IAEA. SECRETARY SAID THAT IF INSPECTION PROBLEM COULD BE SOLVED HE WOULD FAVOR RETURN TO BARUCH PROPOSALS OF 1956 AND HE STRESSED THAT OUR OWN SECURITY IS JEOPARDIZED BY PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE SAID NOT MORE THAN TWENTY PEOPLE IN THE WORLD UNDERSTAND IMPLICATION OF NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. FORTUNATELY SOME OF THOSE PEOPLE ARE IN MOSCOW, HE POINTED OUT. THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM IS THAT OF INSPECTION. THE ENDLESS REACHES OF SOVIET UNION MAKE EFFECTIVE INSPECTION-ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE AND THE SOVIETS HAVE NEVER BEEN WILLING TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT.

RUSK

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INFORMATION

Saturday - October 5, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mexican Riots - Extent of Communist Involvement

You asked about the extent to which the Cuban Communists or other foreign groups were involved in the Mexican riots this week.

The CIA analysis attached (Tab A) concludes that the student demonstrations were sparked by domestic politics, not masterminded by Cubans or Soviets. Their primary role was restricted to supplying some money to student groups.

CIA believes the weapons employed by the students could have been obtained locally. Although they did not start the trouble, Mexican Communists, Trotskyists, and Castroites all capitalized on the disorders once they began and took active parts.

An FBI report (Tab B) asserts that a Trotskyist group initiated the sniper fire at the police and army from prepared positions in various apartment buildings, and they were responsible for touching off the bloodshed. This so-called "Olympia Brigade" reportedly obtained automatic weapons from Cuban and Guatemalan extremist organizations and plans acts of sabotage during the Olympic games.

W. W. Reston

P. S. Bruno Pagliai called when he was in Washington for the Bank and Fund meetings. He had talked with President Diaz Ordaz. Diaz Ordaz vows that he will establish law and order and see the Olympics through.

Attachments

- Tab A - CIA Memorandum
- Tab B - FBI Report

Diaz Ordaz says that the riots were carefully planned. A good many people came into the country. The guns used were new and had their numbers filed off. The Castro and Chinese Communist groups were at the center of the effort. The Soviet Communists had to come along to avoid the charge of being chicken.

Samuel W. Lewis:swl

DECLASSIFIED

W. W. R.

Authority NLS 95-189 (#71)
By pc/cb NARA, Date 1-25-02

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[REDACTED]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
5 October 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Addendum to "Mexican Student Crisis,"
4 October 1968

SUMMARY

There is no hard evidence that either the Cuban or Soviet embassies in Mexico City masterminded the current disturbances despite repeated allegations to that effect by the Mexican Government. We have unconfirmed reports that they have given moral and possibly some financial assistance, however, and there is evidence that many known Mexican Communists have openly participated in the riots.

1. Despite the participation of many Communist groups in the disorders, [REDACTED] has no firm evidence that the Communists instigated the present crisis. As in other countries, the extremists have capitalized on the disorders and members of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM), the Communist Youth (JCM), the Communist-oriented National Democratic Students' Central (CNED), and the Trotskyist and Castroite groups have all participated in varying ways.


2. The PCM has gone on record as endorsing the student demands, but party leaders have privately stated that none of their principal functionaries should become directly involved in the violence. Known Communist students are associated with the National Strike Council and other organizations that have arisen during the disturbances, as are Trotskyists and members of the other Communist groups. The JCM has also instructed representatives to state organizations to participate in any local student activities in support of the Mexico City protests.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-101
By iss, NARA, Date 4-28-03

~~SECRET~~



6. The strongest circumstantial evidence that the students have received financial aid during the disturbances is the appearance of extensive ads in Mexico City dailies,

~~SECRET~~



[REDACTED]

which would cost many thousands of dollars. Funds could easily come from domestic opponents of the Diaz Ordaz government, however, in view of the disgruntlement of some former officials in both party and government who have fallen from favor. The students similarly would have little difficulty in obtaining their weapons stocks from ample domestic sources.

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

12:47 PM 10-5-68 FJB

RECEIVED
WHCA

PRIORITY

TO: THE PRESIDENT 01
TO: SECRETARY OF STATE 03
TO: DIRECTOR, CIA 01
TO: DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 01
TO: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 01
TO: DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 01
TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: SECRET SERVICE (PID)
TO: ATTORNEY GENERAL (BY MESSENGER)
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

1968 OCT 5 16 58

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROCOMMUNIST STUDENT ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO.

ALL SOURCES USED HEREIN HAVE FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION
IN THE PAST.

ON OCTOBER FOUR, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, THE FOLLOWING WAS
OBTAINED FROM A SOURCE WHO IS ACTIVE IN TROTSKYIST AFFAIRS.

THE LIGA COMUNISTA ESPARTACO (LCE7COMMUNIST SPARTACUS
LEAGUE) AND OTHER GROUPS OF THE TROTSKYIST FOURTH INTERNATIONAL
MET IN MEXICO CITY DURING THE PREVIOUS WEEK. DELEGATIONS
FROM VARIOUS STATES WERE PRESENT. THEY FORMED A SINGLE
JOINT SHOCK GROUP CALLED THE OLYMPIA BRIGADE WHICH MADE ITS
FIRST APPEARANCE OCTOBER TWO, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, AT THE
PLAZA OF THREE CULTURES.

END PAGE ONE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 95-122 Appeal

By cb, NARA Date 8-22-96

PAGE TWO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THAT AFTERNOON MEMBERS OF THE OLYMPIA BRIGADE POSITIONED
THEMSELVES AS SNIPERS IN APARTMENT BUILDINGS OVERLOOKING THE
PLAZA. OTHERS WERE ON THE GROUND FLOOR OF THE CHIHUAHUA
BUILDING UNDER THE SPEAKERS BALCONY WHICH THEY WERE TO
DEFEND.

SOURCE SAID SNIPERS HAD EARLIER BEEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS
TO SHOOT AND KILL GENERAL JOSE HERNANDEZ TOLEDO, IF OBSERVED.
HE HAD COMMANDED THE MILITARY FORCES WHICH IN THE RECENT
PAST HAVE OCCUPIED THE UNIVERSITIES OF SONORA AND MICHOACAN,
THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY AND VARIOUS SCHOOLS IN MEXICO CITY.

GENERAL HERNANDEZ TOLEDO APPEARED IN THE PLAZA TO
ANNOUNCE TO THE STUDENTS THEY WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO MARCH
FROM THE AREA. THE OLYMPIA BRIGADE OPENED FIRE ON THE
GENERAL'S PARTY WOUNDING HIM AND THREE OTHER OFFICERS AND
THEN FIRED INTO A GROUP OF SOLDIERS BEHIND THEM, KILLING
AT LEAST ONE AND WOUNDING MANY OTHERS. UNFORTUNATELY, AT
THE SAME TIME, POLICE ON THE THIRD FLOOR STARTED TO CARRY
OUT ARRESTS OF THE NATIONAL STRIKE COUNCIL AND SINCE SOCRATES
COMPOS LEMUS WAS ARMED, THEY FIRED WARNING SHOTS TO DETER
HIM FROM RESISTING. THE ARMY HEARD SHOTS ON THE THIRD FLOOR
AND FIRED INTO IT. IN THE CONFUSION MANY LCE MEMBERS FLED
HIGHER INTO THE CHIHUAHUA BUILDING AND WERE GIVEN REFUGE
BY TENANTS.

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOURCE REPORTED SNIPERS WERE FIRING ON THE TROOPS FROM OTHER BUILDINGS FROM VARIOUS ANGLES.

THE LCE GROUP HID UNTIL THE FOLLOWING DAY AND LEFT THE CHIHUAHUA BUILDING IN PAIRS WITHOUT BEING ARRESTED. SOURCE LATER DETERMINED THE OLYMPIA BRIGADE LED STUDENTS WHO BURNED BUSES AND STREETCARS ON THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER TWO.

THE BRIGADE HAS PLANS TO COMMIT ACTS OF SABOTAGE DURING THE OLYMPIC GAMES. IT IS MADE UP OF EXTREME RADICAL TROTSKYISTS KNOWN ONLY TO EACH OTHER AND THE LEADERS OF THE TROTSKYIST GROUPS. THEY ARE SAID TO HAVE CONTACT WITH GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS AND CUBAN TROTSKYISTS WHO ARE IN MEXICO ON A "SECRET MISSION." AUTOMATIC ARMS FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITY HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED BY THESE LATTER GROUPS.

A SECOND SOURCE HAS ADVISED THAT THE LCE IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT TROTSKYIST ORGANIZATIONS WHICH FOLLOWS THE PRO-CHINESE COMMUNIST LINE IN MEXICO.

THE SECOND SOURCE ADVISED THAT MEXICO CITY DETECTIVES WHO TOOK REFUGE BEHIND ARMORED CARS DURING THE FIRING, REPORTED THE SOLDIERS INSIDE WERE SMOKING MARIJUANA AND EMERGING LIKE CRAZY MEN AND FIRING WILDLY.
END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A THIRD AND FOURTH SOURCE, BOTH STUDENT ACTIVISTS, ADVISED THEY WERE BRIEFLY HELD BY TROOPS AT THE PLAZA AND REPORTED THE SOLDIERS ACTED DRUGGED, WERE VERY VIOLENT AND WERE LOOTING STORES.

A FIFTH SOURCE WHO IS AN EXPERIENCED SENIOR POLICE OFFICER, REPORTS THE FIRST SOLDIERS TO ARRIVE AT THE PLAZA WERE NOT FIRING THEIR WEAPONS. WHEN GENERAL HERNANDEZ TOLEDO WAS WOUNDED, SOURCE OBSERVED PERSONS FIRING INTO THE PLAZA FROM SURROUNDING BUILDINGS, SOME WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. HE OBSERVED PERSONS FALLING IN GROUPS OF FOUR OR FIVE AS THOUGH HIT BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE. THE SOLDIERS NEAR HIM, AT THIS EARLY MOMENT, WERE FIRING INTO THE AIR OR INTO BUILDINGS FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF TRACER ROUNDS FROM ARMORED CARS PINPOINTING SNIPERS. SOURCE BELIEVES MOST EARLY CASUALTIES WERE CAUSED BY SNIPERS. WHEN THE FIRST VIOLENT CLASH ENDED, ABOUT FOUR ZERO TO FIVE ZERO BODIES WERE IN THE PLAZA. BODIES WERE STILL BEING REMOVED FROM BUILDINGS ON OCTOBER THREE. SOURCE ESTIMATED THE TOLL OF DEAD AND MORTALLY WOUNDED COULD APPROACH TWO ZERO ZERO.

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END

PLS HOLD FOR ACKS TKS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

64
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 5, 1968
4:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick lays before you a memorandum on the PUEBLO, which he requests the President read in its entirety.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 2-1-93

WWRostow:rlh

66a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol 29, #317
By X, NARA, Date 2-12-01

~~SECRET~~

NODIS/CACTUS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: PUEBLO - ACTION MEMORANDUM

The Problem:

The fundamental issue at Panmunjom has been that the North Koreans have insisted on our signing an admission of espionage and intrusion into their territorial waters, apologies for both, and a promise of no further intrusion.

We have refused to admit espionage or to apologize for acts we do not believe were committed. Various forms of conditional apology (e.g., we regret any intrusion that may have occurred) have been rejected.

The "Overwrite" Solution:

To break this impasse, we have, with your authorization on May 18, been exploring the possibility of General Woodward writing the following sentence on the "document of apology and assurance" presented on May 8 by the North Koreans: "There have been turned over to me today at Panmunjom 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS PUEBLO and the body of Seaman Duane D. Hodges." He would sign this inscription. If the North Koreans accepted this, they would presumably claim that we had signed their piece of paper. We would say that we had signed only what Woodward had written.

Recent Progress:

For the last four months we have been pressing for a firm commitment by the North Koreans that if we were to "acknowledge receipt of the crew on a document satisfactory to them" they would simultaneously release the whole crew. At the 21st meeting (September 17) the North Koreans for the first time said unambiguously that if we would sign their document, they would return the crew. At the 22nd meeting (September 30), they were even more explicit, saying that the entire crew would be released simultaneous with our signing their document.

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified

The "Overwrite" Not a Deception:

In the negotiations since May we have on a number of occasions noted that the North Korean document of May 8 does not correspond to what we believe are the facts. Moreover, we have been scrupulous in using the words "acknowledge receipt on" in describing what we might be prepared to do, and when Pak has interpreted this to mean that we were "willing to sign" General Woodward has replied, "You are using words I did not use." Our Korean language experts tell us the difference between "sign" and "acknowledge receipt on" is even clearer in Korean than in English. Moreover, we have sent a message to the North Koreans through an Australian contact in Tokyo spelling out in more detail what we had in mind. We are not absolutely sure that this message got through to Pyongyang, but our Australian contact and his Korean friend are confident that it did.

Moreover, at the last (22nd) meeting, General Pak presented a slightly modified draft of his paper of May 8 with this additional paragraph at the bottom:

"Simultaneously with the signing of this document the undersigned acknowledges receipt of 82 former crew members of the Pueblo and one corpse." (The entire document is at Tab A.)

This added paragraph tends to undercut our overwrite and confirms our feeling that Pak knows what we have in mind. If in the end he accepts the overwrite, we will not have misled or duped the North Koreans; rather they will have accepted an ambiguous act as meeting their requirements. They have been as consistent as we: they never speak of acknowledging receipt, only of "signing our document". We are not at all sure that they will in fact accept the overwrite ploy.

The following courses of action appear open:

Track A: Attempt to negotiate a satisfactory receipt.

We do not believe that the North Koreans would accept any draft which did not contain an admission of espionage and intrusion and an apology for both. Yet a negotiation which reduced but did not eliminate these unacceptable elements would have succeeded only in making the draft our own as well as theirs and therefore more difficult to repudiate. The more extreme the document the easier the repudiation.

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NODIS/CACTUS

Track B: Sign, with an explanatory statement.

At the last Closed Meeting before the signing we could make a further statement for the record that it contains many assertions which we believe to be false, that we do not admit any crime, that the seizure was wholly illegal, and that we are signing the document only for humanitarian reasons to get back the crew. Our public statement at the time of signature and release would probably have to be limited to making clear that our signature was based entirely on the North Korean "evidence" as anything stronger might result in refusal to deliver the crew. Repudiation would follow, of course, immediately upon the crew's coming into our possession. (A draft of such a statement of repudiation is attached as Tab C.)

Track C: Try a last-minute overwrite.

We would move ahead to negotiate with Pak the technical arrangements for the release, leaving unresolved the ambiguity between "sign" and "acknowledge receipt on". We would then attempt the overwrite at the time of the actual delivery of the crew.

This might work, but if Pak rejected it we would be in a difficult position. He will probably insist on the press being present for the signature and release. For us to attempt the overwrite without a clear understanding and acceptance in advance might seem to the world to be sharp practice, and to stand firm on it would seem to many a heartless legalism. Rather than see the crew return to North Korea, Woodward would have to sign their form of receipt. And we could hardly argue that he had signed without instructions when faced by an unforeseen situation. If we proceed along this track we must be prepared to end up on Track B -- signature, with a statement for the record that takes some of the bite out of the document.

Track D: Clarify the overwrite.

We would firm up the detailed arrangements for a release and tell Pak precisely what we plan to do in the overwrite.

Pak will probably reject this, at least for a meeting or two, perhaps finally. But he may accept it if convinced that this is as far as we are prepared to go. If he does agree, we have an impeccable record of disclosure and there is no legitimate basis for any accusations of sharp practice. If he finally does not agree, Track B is not foreclosed.

~~SECRET~~

NODIS/CACTUS

~~SECRET~~
NODIS/CACTUS


4

RECOMMENDATION.

I prefer alternative D. Track A is a dead end which will lose time without taking us anywhere. Track C is probably only a round-about way of getting to B -- the outright signature. Though a public statement at the time of signing would help, the arguments against Track B are still strong. It would be demeaning to the United States to sign under blackmail imposed by an illegal act an apology for something we did not do and an admission that perfectly legal actions are illegal. We would not, for example, sign an admission that our actions in Viet-Nam constituted aggression and apologize for them even if this would insure release of 82 captured pilots. The repudiation of our signature would also be demeaning and could not wholly erase the stigma of the signature. The apology would confirm the belief of many in the United States and elsewhere that despite our denials and repudiation we were in fact engaged in improper acts, thus further tarnishing our reputation at home and abroad. Our men are dying and being captured in Viet-Nam and are risking their lives along the DMZ in Korea. The Pueblo crew are no different. Finally, there is no need to consider alternative B unless it becomes quite clear that the overwrite (Track D) will not work.

I recommend that we proceed with alternative D. If it works it would result in the release of the crew on a basis with which we can live and if it should fail would not foreclose other alternatives, should we later ever wish to use them. Secretaries Rusk and Clifford concur.

In addition to a copy of the North Korean document (Tab A), I attach at Tab B a draft statement such as might be used if we succeed with the overwrite and at Tab C a draft statement such as might be used if we signed the North Korean document under protest.


Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

1. North Korean document presented at 22nd meeting.
2. Draft press statement (acknowledge receipt).
3. Draft press statement (signature).

~~SECRET~~
NODIS/CACTUS

66b

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TAB A

To the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea the Government of the United States of America, acknowledging the validity of the confessions of the crew of the USS Pueblo and of the documents of evidence produced by the representative of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the effect that the ship, which was seized by the self-defense measures of the naval vessels of the Korean People's Army in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on many occasions and conducted espionage activities of spying out important military and state secrets of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Shoulders full responsibility and solemnly apologizes for the grave acts of espionage committed by the United States ship against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after having intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

And gives firm assurance that no United States ships will intrude again in future into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~SECRET~~

2

Meanwhile, the Government of the United States of America earnestly requests the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to deal leniently with the former crew members of the USS Pueblo confiscated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's side, taking into consideration the fact that these crew members have confessed honestly to their crimes and petitioned the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for leniency.

Simultaneously with the signing of this document, the undersigned acknowledges receipt of 82 former crew members of the Pueblo and one corpse. On behalf of the Government of the United States of America Gilbert H. Woodward, Major General, United States Army.

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TAB B

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

Today [yesterday] at Panmunjom, Major General Gilbert H. Woodward, the Senior Representative of the United Nations Command on the Military Armistice Commission, obtained the custody of the crew of the USS Pueblo, which had been captured by the North Koreans on the high seas last January 23rd. General Woodward acknowledged in writing the release of these men.

The document on which he signed had been prepared by the North Koreans and had been shown to General Woodward on May 8 at a meeting at Panmunjom between him and General Pak Chung-kuk, the Senior Representative on the Military Armistice Commission of the KPA/CPV side. General Woodward then and subsequently pointed out that the North Korean document contained allegations which were totally at variance with the facts of the situation and which could not be acknowledged as true by the United States Government. Despite this rejection of the North Korean draft, General Pak continued to insist that the crew would be released only in exchange for General Woodward's signature on the document.

Today [yesterday], after making clear that the United States Government continued to reject the allegations in the North Korean document, General Woodward acknowledged

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-25-02

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2

that he had received custody of the men by writing on the North Korean document the following phrase: "There have been turned over to me today at Panmunjom the 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the body of Seaman Duane D. Hodges."

General Woodward's signature did not imply acceptance by General Woodward or the United States Government of the North Korean allegations. It simply acknowledged receipt of the crew. The official record of the negotiations at Panmunjom, which will now be published, makes this perfectly plain.

The record is also clear, both in the public statements of the United States Government, in particular at the United Nations Security Council, and in the verbatim transcript of the negotiations at Panmunjom, on the baseless character of the North Korean charges. The United States Government formally reiterates its denial of the allegations of "espionage" made in the North Korean document and its rejection of the North Korean "evidence" that the Pueblo had "illegally intruded" into North Korean waters. It is obvious that the United States Government does not "apologize" for actions which it does not believe took place.

Before the release of the crew we had on many occasions clearly and publicly stated our view of the events leading

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3

to the capture of the Pueblo. We have seen no evidence whatever that would lead us to change that view. Now that these men have been liberated and are free to speak out, we will make a thorough investigation and will make public as soon as possible any new information that is developed.

EA/K:JFLeonard:lm:paw

10/1/68

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TAB C

66d

DRAFT PRESS STATEMENT

Today ~~Yesterday~~ at Panmunjom, Major General Gilbert H. Woodward, the Senior Representative of the United Nations Command on the Military Armistice Commission, obtained the custody of the crew of the USS Pueblo, which had been captured by the North Koreans on the high seas last January 23rd. General Woodward signed a receipt for these men.

The document which he signed had been prepared by the North Koreans and had been shown to General Woodward on May 8 at a meeting at Panmunjom between him and General Pak Chung-kuk, the Senior Representative on the Military Armistice Commission of the KPA/CPV side. General Woodward then and subsequently pointed out that the North Korean document contained allegations which were totally at variance with the facts of the situation and which could not be acknowledged as true by the United States Government. Despite this rejection of the North Korean draft, General Pak has continued to insist that the crew would be released only in exchange for General Woodward's signature on the document.

Today ~~Yesterday~~, after again denouncing this blackmail, denying the North Korean charges, and making clear that the facts of the situation were not in any way altered by his action, General Woodward, out of humanitarian considerations and purely

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DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAVAL SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(c).

BY ag ON 2-18-93

in order to obtain the release of the men, signed his name on the North Korean draft.

The United States Government formally reiterates its denial of the allegations of "espionage" made in the North Korean document and its rejection of the North Korean "evidence" that the Pueblo had "illegally intruded" into North Korean waters. It is obvious that the United States Government does not "apologize" for actions which it does not believe took place. Before the release of the crew we had on many occasions plainly stated our view of the events leading to the capture of the Pueblo. We have placed this account on record in public, at the United Nations Security Council, and in the verbatim transcript of the negotiations at Panmunjom, which will now be published. We have seen no evidence whatever that would lead us to change our view. Now that these men have been liberated and are free to speak out, we will make a thorough investigation and will make public as soon as possible any new information that is developed.

67

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

Saturday, October 5, 1968
3:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an assessment of enemy
difficulties solely from firm intercepts.
Rather impressive.

Key passages are marked.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-80
By Sj, NARA, Date 6-3-03

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

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PP [REDACTED]
DE [REDACTED] 20A 2791600
P 051400Z
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TO OSCAR/VICTOR ALFA
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SSO XXIV CORPS
USM-7
AFSSO NKP
[REDACTED]

SSO 3 AD
USM-626
WHITE HOUSE
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~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ SECTION ONE OF THREE

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-185
By ins, NARA, Date 2-27-04

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Restow

VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVES MEETING INCREASED DIFFICULTIES

XXCC

I. INTRODUCTION

VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY UNITS IN SOUTH VIETNAM CONTINUE TO ENCOUNTER A VARIETY OF PROBLEMS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO LAUNCH ATTACKS IN MANY AREAS OF THE COUNTRY. THE AGGRESSIVENESS WHICH GH OF THEIR

^RIT-THIR ACTIVITY THROUGH LAST SUMMER IS CONSTANTLY BEING MINIMIZED BY ALLIED OPERATIONS, B-52 STRIKES, AND SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES, AND COMMUNIST ACTIONS APPEAR TO BE TAKING ON A DEFENSIVE CHARACTER. ALLIED CONCENTRATION ON COUNTERMEASURES IS OF CONSIDERABLE CONCERN TO HANOI, AS EVIDENCED BY A WEEKLY REPORT FROM THE CENTRAL RESEARCH DIRECTORATE WHICH PROVIDES DETAILS OF ALLIED DEPLOYMENT IN EACH OF THE FOUR CORPS AREAS(1)).

IN A SETTING MARKED BY FREQUENT UNIT MOVEMENTS AND CONTINUAL PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS--WHICH ARE MORE FREQUENTLY BEING POSTPONED THAN ACTUALLY TAKING PLACE--A GENERAL LULL IN COMMUNIST TACTICAL ACTIVITY HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN SIGINT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY SINCE APPROXIMATELY 25 SEPTEMBER.

II. EXTERNAL SUPPORT

THE RESUPPLY EFFORT TO VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST UNITS WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS. SINCE 20 AUGUST, COMMUNICATIONS OF ELEMENTS OF THE NVA 559TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP HAVE DISCLOSED PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM ALLIED OPERATIONS, AIR STRIKES, AND HEAVY RAINS.

THE SUSPECTED HQ, BINH TRAM (BT) 7, WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY OPERATED IN AN AREA JUST WEST OF THE A SHAU VALLEY, WITHDREW INTO LAOS DURING AUGUST. THE RELOCATION WAS APPARENTLY IN REACTION

[13]

~~THE SUSPECTED HQ, BINH TRAM (BT) 7, WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY OPERATED IN AN AREA JUST WEST OF THE A SHAU VALLEY, WITHDREW INTO LAOS DURING AUGUST. THE RELOCATION WAS APPARENTLY IN REACTION TO ALLIED OPERATION SOMERSET PLAIN, WHICH ACCORDING TO COLLATERAL, WAS CONDUCTED IN THE A SHAU VALLEY-ROUTE 547 AREA FROM 4 TO 19 AUGUST. BY 11 SEPTEMBER, HQ, BT 7 HAD RETURNED TO ITS NORMAL AREA OF OPERATIONS(2)). COMMUNICATIONS HAVE ALSO REVEALED NUMEROUS REFERENCES TO AIR ATTACKS ON THE ROAD NETWORK WITHIN LAOS, AS WELL AS HEAVY RAINS IN EARLY SEPTEMBER(3)). THE RAINS APPARENTLY CAUSED FLOODING AND MUD SLIDES, DESTROYED SECTIONS OF LANDLINE, AND DAMAGED SUPPLIES AT SOME STORAGE AREAS.~~

IN ADDITION, SEVERAL REFERENCES HAVE BEEN NOTED TO THE MOVEMENT OF SICK AND WOUNDED NORTHWARD THROUGH LAOS. THE TIME FRAME OF THE ENTRANCE OF THESE PERSONNEL INTO THE INFILTRATION SYSTEM FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS THEIR ENTRY POINT IN RELATION TO BATTLEFIELD LOCATIONS, CANNOT, HOWEVER BE DETERMINED.

III. DMZ AND MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE

THE REPOSITIONING OF HEADQUARTERS ENTITIES AND CERTAIN MANEUVER ELEMENTS HAS DOMINATED RECENT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES. IN ADDITION, TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS HAVE REVEALED THAT MANY OBSTACLES HAVE INTERFERED WITH THE EXECUTION OF PLANNED COMMUNIST OPERATIONS IN BOTH THE DMZ AND MILITARY REGION (MR) TRI-THIEN-HUE (TTH).

BY LATE AUGUST, NVA FORCES WERE POSED FOR TACTICAL OPERATIONS AGAINST ALLIED UNITS IN THE DMZ AREA. HQ, NVA 320TH DIVISION AND ITS 52ND AND PROBABLE 64TH REGIMENTS HAD DEPLOYED TO POSITIONS IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF THE ROCKPILE(4)). BOTH DIRECT AND GENERAL COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS WERE OPERATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH THESE INFANTRY FORCES(5)). ARTILLERY AMMUNITION WAS BEING STOCKPILED IN THE EASTERN AREAS OF THE VINH LINH SPECIAL SECTOR, NORTH VIETNAM, AND EXTENSIVE RECONNAISSANCE WAS NOTED IN PREPARATION FOR FUTURE ARTILLERY FIRE AGAINST ALLIED POSITIONS THROUGHOUT THE DMZ(2)). ELEMENTS OF THE 27TH BATTALION, POSSIBLE NVA 27TH REGIMENT WERE ACTIVE IN THE EASTERN DMZ, NEAR CAM LO AND DONG HA. BY MID-SEPTEMBER, HOWEVER, THE TACTICAL SITUATION BEGAN TO CHANGE. ELEMENTS OF THE 42ND AND 64TH REGIMENTS, 320TH DIVISION, MOVED TO THE NORTHEAST, APPARENTLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH A CHANGE IN TARGET AREAS FROM THE ROCKPILE TO THE HO KHE HILL (16-50N 107-28E, YD 101641) AREA(6)). BY LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER, OTHER DIVISIONAL ELEMENTS--THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, 52ND REGIMENT AND 9TH BATTALION, 64TH REGIMENT--HAD EITHER INDICATED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO MOVE OR HAD DEPLOYED FARTHER NORTH(7)). TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS CONCURRENTLY REVEALED THAT ELEMENTS WERE BEING HAMPERED BY SUPPLY DEFICIENCIES, ILLNESSES, ADVERSE WEATHER, DETERIORATING MAINTENANCE, AND ALLIED OPERATIONS. TO THE EAST, THROUGHOUT SEPTEMBER, ELEMENTS OF THE 27TH BATTALION REPEATEDLY DISCUSSED MORALE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY FOOD DEFICIENCIES, MEDICAL SUPPLY INADEQUACIES, AND HIGH WATER. HEAVY RAINS REPORTEDLY COLLAPSED DEFENSIVE STRUCTURES AND HAMPERED OFFENSIVE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE BATTALION(8)). ELEMENTS ALSO FREQUENTLY DISCUSSED COUNTER-SWEEP ACTIVITIES(9)), WHILE ARTILLERY OPERATIONS WERE BEING SET BACK BECAUSE OF B-52 STRIKES, ADVERSE WEATHER, AND FAULTY VEHICLE MAINTENANCE(10))

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVES MEETING INCREASED DIFFICULTIES

XXCC

IN MR TTH, LITTLE TACTICAL ACTIVITY WAS NOTED AS MAJOR REDEPLOYMENTS CHARACTERIZED VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY DURING SEPTEMBER. BOTH THE NVA 803RD AND 812TH REGIMENTS, WHICH IN LATE AUGUST APPEARED TO BE POISED FOR OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN THEIR OPERATIONAL AREAS((11)), WERE ALSO BESET BY FOOD SHORTAGES, ILLNESSES, HEAVY RAINS, AND ALLIED GROUND ACTIONS AND AIR STRIKES((7, 12, 13)). HIGHLIGHTING ACTIVITY WITHIN THE REGION WERE THE EVENTS OF HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS OF MR TTH AND CERTAIN SUBORDINATE UNITS. DURING SEPTEMBER, HQ, MR TTH FORWARD ELEMENT AND AN ENTITY SERVING THE REGION HEADQUARTERS MOVED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE BASE AREAS, IN NORTH-CENTRAL THUA THIEN PROVINCE AND NEAR THE A SHAU VALLEY, TO AN AREA IN LAOS APPROXIMATELY 26 KM SOUTH OF KHE SANH. DURING THE SAME APPROXIMATE TIME FRAME, HQ, GROUP 6 AND THE PROBABLE HQ, GROUP 9 RELOCATED TO THIS SAME GENERAL AREA((14, 15)). A HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT, MR TTH MOVED TO THE A SHAU VALLEY IN SEPTEMBER, INTO THE GENERAL AREA PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED BY THE REGION HEADQUARTERS.

IV. MILITARY REGION 5

VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT MR 5 DURING SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER WAS CHARACTERIZED BY AGGRESSIVENESS IN TACTICAL OPERATIONS BUT HAMPERED BY SERIOUS LOGISTIC PROBLEMS AND ALLIED PRESSURE.

IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, NVA 31ST REGIMENT ASSOCIATES WERE INSTRUCTED IN MID-SEPTEMBER TO DETAIL COMBAT TEAMS TO SPECIFIC AREAS WITHIN THE PROVINCE. FOLLOWING ATTACKS ON 15 AND 27 SEPTEMBER, NVA 31ST REGIMENT ASSOCIATES INDICATED ON 1 OCTOBER AN INTENT TO CAPTURE THE THUONG DUC (15-50N 107-56E, ZC 1453) SPECIAL FORCES CAMP. OTHER ATTACKS WITHIN THE PROVINCE WERE ALSO INDICATED((14)).

[3]

IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, HQ, NVA 3RD DIVISION REPORTED IN LATE SEPTEMBER THAT A B-2 STRIKE HAD SEVERELY DAMAGED ITS COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES. HQ, NVA 3RD DIVISION HAS MAINTAINED A COMMUNICATIONS ALERT WHICH COMMENCED ON 23 SEPTEMBER. ANOTHER COMMUNICATIONS ALERT WAS EVIDENCED COMMENCING 21 SEPTEMBER BETWEEN HQ, MR 5 AND HQ, VIET CONG (VC) 2ND REGIMENT, 3RD DIVISION.

IN THE DARLAC-QUANG DUC PROVINCE-CAMBODIA BORDER AREA, A MAJOR BUILD-UP OF COMMUNIST FORCES WAS NOTED DURING SEPTEMBER. UNITS OF THE B3 FRONT, INCLUDING THE HQ, NVA 66TH REGIMENT, 1ST DIVISION, ARE CONCENTRATED IN THIS AREA, AND ATTACKS AGAINST THE DUC LAP SPECIAL FORCES CAMP ARE CURRENTLY INDICATED.

IN POSSIBLY RELATED ACTIVITY, HQ, NVA B3 FRONT, DARLAC PROVINCE, WAS NOTED ASSUMING WHAT MAY BE A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE IN B3 FRONT ACTIVITIES. ON 20 SEPTEMBER, HQ, B3 FRONT RECEIVED TWO MESSAGES FROM THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES OF NORTH VIETNAM AND RELAYED THEM TO THE DARLAC HEADQUARTERS(16)).

MI MESSAGES, MEANWHILE, INDICATED THAT COMMUNIST TACTICAL ACTIVITY WAS HAMPERED DURING SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER BY INTERNAL LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND ALLIED PRESSURE. ON 1 SEPTEMBER, THE MI SECTION (MIS), NVA 1ST DIVISION, PREDICTED THAT DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING LOGISTICS WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED THROUGHOUT SEPTEMBER(17)). SHORTAGES OF RICE, THE MOVEMENT OF WOUNDED PERSONNEL AND THE TRANSPORTATION OF RICE AND AMMUNITION WERE THE TOPICS OF SEVERAL MESSAGES EXCHANGED BY THE MIS AND A SUBORDINATE(18)). ADDITIONALLY, B3 FRONT-ASSOCIATED MI UNITS REPORTED RICE SHORTAGES, POSSIBLY IN PLEIKU AND KONTUM PROVINCES(19)). FINALLY, A 1 OCTOBER MESSAGE EXCHANGED BY MI ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NVA B3 FRONT DISCUSSED SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. THE REPORT NOTED A CONTINUOUS SHORTAGE OF PERSONNEL, POOR HEALTH OF THE TROOPS, RICE SHORTAGES, A DISPERSION OF COMMUNIST FORCES, AND APPARENT CONTINUOUS ATTACKS BY ALLIED FORCES DURING JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER. THE REPORT CONCLUDED WITH AN OPTIMISTIC STATEMENT OF THE UNIT'S MORALE AND AGGRESSIVENESS(20)).

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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVES MEETING INCREASED DIFFICULTIES

XXCC

V. NAM BO

FOLLOWING THE ATTEMPTS TO LAUNCH COORDINATED ATTACKS AGAINST ALLIED POSITIONS IN OR NEAR TAY NINH CITY AS THE OPENING MOVE IN THE THIRD "GENERAL OFFENSIVE" IN MID-AUGUST, COMMUNIST TACTICAL ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT NAM BO HAS DIMINISHED, AS REFLECTED IN COMMUNICATIONS. THE SIGINT INDICATIONS THAT SAIGON WOULD NOT BE ATTACKED WERE VERIFIED AND CLASHES ELSEWHERE HAVE BEEN MENTIONED ONLY SPORADICALLY IN COMMUNIST MESSAGES.

IN TAY NINH PROVINCE, MESSAGES EXCHANGED BY UNITS OF THE MIS, HQ, VIET CONG (VC) 9TH DIVISION AND BY ELEMENTS OF THE PROBABLE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST 96TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT CONTINUED TO REFLECT INTEREST IN TAY NINH CITY. CONCERN ABOUT ALLIED ACTIVITY NORTH OF THE CITY WAS EVIDENCED BY UNITS OF THE MIS IN THIS AREA ON 9 SEPTEMBER WHEN ORDERS FOR ARTILLERY ATTACKS ON D-DAY WERE OBSERVED. MI ELEMENTS OF THE 9TH DIVISION REPORTED ON 10 SEPTEMBER THAT ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION WAS REQUIRED, INDICATING THAT FUTURE COMMUNIST ATTACKS WERE ANTICIPATED((21)). THE PROJECTED D-DAY WAS DELAYED UNTIL LATE SEPTEMBER PROBABLY BECAUSE OF INCLEMENT WEATHER. THE ATTACK WAS THEN POSTPONED, ONCE MORE--THIS TIME UNTIL AT LEAST EARLY OCTOBER.

THE PROBABLE 96TH REGIMENT INDICATED THAT ATTACKS, POSSIBLY AGAINST TAY NINH CITY, WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE NIGHT OF 25-26 SEPTEMBER((15)). THE ATTACKS DID NOT MATERIALIZE AND THE REGIMENT CONTINUED TO DISCUSS AN "IMPENDING MISSION" THROUGH THE END OF SEPTEMBER.

[5]

TO THE SOUTHEAST, CONTINUED DETAILED REPORTING OF ALLIED DEPLOYMENT INTO AND MOVEMENT WITHIN THE AREA NORTH AND SOUTHWEST OF SAIGON WAS NOTED IN MESSAGES EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE MIS, HQ, VC 5TH DIVISION AND A SUBORDINATE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. IN MID-SEPTEMBER, THE MIS BEGAN TO DISCUSS A FUTURE ATTACK, POSSIBLY IN THE MICHELIN PLANTATION AREA OF BINH DUONG PROVINCE.

THE PROBABLE HQ, VC DONG NAI REGIMENT AND ITS SUBORDINATE BATTALIONS WERE ACTIVE IN VOICE COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH LATE AUGUST. THE SUBORDINATE UNITS WERE LOCATED NEAR THE NORTHERN BIEN HOA-EASTERN BINH DUONG PROVINCE BORDER WHILE THE REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS WAS OPERATING IN TAN UYEN DISTRICT OF NORTHERN BIEN HOA PROVINCE. THESE COMMUNICATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN OBSERVED SINCE 22 SEPTEMBER FOLLOWING MENTION OF EXECUTING THE "ORDER OF BATTLE" IN A 21 SEPTEMBER MESSAGE((15)).

IN MR 2, THREE CONCENTRATIONS OF SUSPECTED TACTICAL UNITS HAVE BEEN IN EVIDENCE SINCE EARLY SEPTEMBER. THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION WAS IN THE DINH TUONG-KIEN PHONG PROVINCE BORDER AREA, NORTHEAST OF SA DEC. THE SECOND WAS IN KIEN HOA PROVINCE AND THE THIRD IN THE DINH TUONG-LONG AN-GO CONG PROVINCE TRI-BORDER AREA EAST OF MY THO((22)). IN LATE SEPTEMBER, A SUSPECTED HQ MR 2 TACTICAL CONTROL AUTHORITY MOVED SOUTHWEST OF ITS KIEN PHONG PROVINCE LOCATION TO A POSITION NEAR MY DA SPECIAL FORCES CAMP IN EASTERN KIEN PHONG PROVINCE.

- ((1)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] T124-68.
- ((2)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R203-68.
- ((3)) 2/ [REDACTED] T8799, T7880, T7424-68.
- ((4)) 2/0/ [REDACTED] R459-68.
- ((5)) 2/0/ [REDACTED] R548, R496-68.
- ((6)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R227-68.
- ((7)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R228-68.
- ((8)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R225, R219-68.
- ((9)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R235, R234, R230-68.
- ((10)) 2/ [REDACTED] T7886-68.
- ((11)) 2/0/ [REDACTED] R488-68.
- ((12)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R229-68.
- ((13)) 2/ [REDACTED] T8817, T8738, T8574, T8514, T8450, T8100.
- ((14)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R237-68.
- ((15)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R231-68.
- ((16)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R235-68.
- ((17)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2160-68.
- ((18)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2162, T2157-68.
- ((19)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2341, T2298, T2039-68.
- ((20)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2363-68.
- ((21)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R219-68.
- ((22)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R220-68.

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(b)(1,3)

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~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

[63]

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, October 5, 1968 -- 3:40 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This is an absolutely first-class speech by Thieu.

He is leading his people towards peace, political development, and programs of social equity. The job now is for him to back his play with concrete programs. I am convinced this is possible.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 39594

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 29, NARA, Date 2-1-93

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority State Memo 9-11-95(433a)

By jd/g NARA. Date 1-25-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 39594 31 OF 35 251452Z

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ACTION 2A 15

INFO SAH 02, CIAE 03, DODE 03, NSAE 03, NSCE 03, SSO 03, USIE 03, GPM 04,
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 15, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, IO 13, SR 01,
ORA 03, AID 23, EUR 15, NIC 01, RSR 01, /137 W

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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMCONSUL DANANG
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 5 SAIGON 39594

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

KATHMANDU FOR AMB BUNKER

PARIS FOR VN MISSION

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT THIEU'S ADDRESS TO
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON OCTOBER 7

1. HIGHLIGHTS. WE FIND ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY THE
FOLLOWING PASSAGES:

A. "WE HAVE BEATEN THE COMMUNISTS MILITARILY.
THEREFORE, WHY SHOULD WE NOT DARE TO CONTEST WITH THEM
IN OTHER SPHERES?" THIS IS FOLLOWED BY A CALL FOR
PREPARATIONS FOR THE "POLITICAL WAR", BEGINNING
IMMEDIATELY. THE POST-WAR POLITICAL CONTEST WILL BE
"DRASTIC, DIFFICULT AND PROTRACTED." 15

2. THIEU CALLS FOR CRITICAL MEANS TO INCREASE
THE CAPACITIES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 32. SAIGON 39594 21 OF 35 251452Z

OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES AND AT THE SAME TIME TO REDUCE THE BURDEN OF THE ALLIES AS REGARDS THE NUMBER OF THEIR TROOPS.

C. A CALL TO WIDEN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM BY ACCEPTING INTO THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY "ANYONE, REGARDLESS OF HIS PREVIOUS RANK, REGARDLESS OF WHAT HE HAS DONE IN THE ENEMY RANKS, IF HE IS WILLING TO PUT ASIDE ARMS AND THE USE OF FORCE" AND RESPECTS THE CONSTITUTION, IN WHICH CASE HE WILL BE CONSIDERED LIKE ANY OTHER CITIZEN.

D. ENUNCIATION OF PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL POLICY INCLUDING A CALL FOR INCREASED TAXATION OF THE RICH, DISTRIBUTION OF LAND TO THE "POOR PLOWMAN", AND A GOVERNMENT POLICY THAT WILL HELP THE RURAL PEOPLE NOT ONLY TO BECOME LANDOWNERS BUT ALSO TO INCREASE THEIR PRODUCTION.

E. A CALL FOR DRASTIC MEASURES TO COPE WITH THE INCREASING GAP BETWEEN DEMAND AND SUPPLY, AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO THAT END WHICH WILL SOON BE TRANSMITTED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. END HIGHLIGHTS.

2. FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARIZED PASSAGES AND SIGNIFICANT EXCERPTS OF PRESIDENT THIEU'S PROPOSED ADDRESS TO A JOINT SESSION OF THE NA TO BE GIVEN ON OCTOBER 7. ADVANCE COPY OF SPEECH WAS OBTAINED BY OSA. SPEECH IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE.

3. PRESIDENT THIEU BEGINS HIS ADDRESS BY NOTING THAT THE 6 MONTHS SINCE HIS LAST ADDRESS TO A JOINT SESSION OF THE NA ON APRIL 15 HAVE BEEN FULL OF "CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES." HE NOTES THAT THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF IMPORTANT PROGRESS DURING THE LAST 6 MONTHS WHICH HAS SHOWN THAT THE EXECUTIVE, THE LEGISLATURE, THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE "HAVE ENOUGH WILL, STRENGTH AND CAPABILITY TO OVERCOME THE CHALLENGES AND SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES TO DEVELOP FOR OURSELVES A SECURE, LONG AND FINE FUTURE." HE SAYS "...IT IS NOT THAT WE DO NOT HAVE A LOT OF DIFFICULTIES," BUT THAT "EVEN THOUGH THE OPPORTUNITIES ARE NOT YET REALITIES, ...EVERY DAY THEY ARE MORE AND MORE REAL-

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ISTIC, EVERY DAY CLOSER TO OUR GRASP--THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR A JUST PEACE, A DEVELOPING, STABLE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND A PROGRESSIVE, JUST AND ORDERLY SOCIETY." THIEU THEN CONTINUES TO GIVE HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE AND NEEDS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION.

4. DEALING FIRST WITH THE "QUESTION OF WAR OR PEACE," THIEU STATES THAT "FOR MANY YEARS, SINCE THE NVN COMMUNISTS CAUSED THIS WAR OF INVASION, THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IN OUR EXISTENCE HAS BEEN RESISTANCE AGAINST THAT INVASION." HOWEVER, THIEU NOTES THAT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR, "ESPECIALLY SINCE THE BOMBING PAUSE OVER NVN AND THE PRELIMINARY MEETINGS BETWEEN THE US AND NVN IN PARIS," ...THERE HAVE BEEN CHANGES. "TODAY, THE QUESTION IS STATED IN TERMS OF 'WAR OR PEACE' INSTEAD OF 'RESISTANCE AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INVASION' AS IN THE PAST."

5. THIEU STATES THAT IN ORDER TO HAVE A CLEAR ATTITUDE AND APPROPRIATE MEASURES REGARDING THE QUESTION OF WAR OR PEACE, IT IS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND WHAT CAUSED THE CHANGES. THIEU TAKES TO TASK THOSE PERSONS WHOSE "PESSIMISM AND COWARDICE, WHOSE EXAGGERATED FEAR OF THE COMMUNISTS HAS LED THEM TO MISTAKENLY BELIEVE THAT EVERYTHING THAT HAS CHANGED, HAS CHANGED BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS WANTED THE CHANGES." SUCH FEAR, HE SAYS, HAS CAUSED PEOPLE TO ACT "BLINDLY." THIEU EMPHATICALLY DENIES THAT THE MOVE TOWARDS PEACE TALKS HAS BEEN BECAUSE NVN WANTS TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION. HE CHARACTERIZES THE TET ATTACKS AS THE ACT OF A "DESPERATE ENEMY" AND SAYS THAT "THE COMMUNISTS COMMITTED ALL THEIR CAPABILITY AND FORCE" IN AN ALL-OUT EFFORT WHICH FAILED AND CONSIDERABLY WEAKENED THE ENEMY.

6. IN SPITE OF THE ATTACKS, THIEU SAYS, "WE WITH OUR ALLIES,... DECIDED TO CEASE BOMBING NVN AND CALL FOR PEACE TALKS." HE EMPHASIZES THAT "WE, INDEPENDENTLY AND UNILATERALLY DEESCALATED THE WAR AND OPENED THE ROAD TO PEACE TALKS," AND SAYS "WE DID THAT NOT BECAUSE WE ARE WEAK, NOR BECAUSE WE WERE FORCED BY ANYONE TO DO SO, BUT ONLY BECAUSE THE SITUATION AND OUR STRENGTH ALLOWED US TO DO SO."

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P 051200Z OCT 68
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2633
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

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7. THIEU POINTS OUT THAT IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE BEEN FORCED TO FIGHT A WAR OF SELF-DEFENSE, "WE HAVE NEVER WANTED ANYTHING BUT PEACE, A JUST AND LASTING PEACE." RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF PEACE TALKS, THIEU TAKES TO TASK THOSE PERSONS WHO "MISTAKENLY BELIEVE THEY ARE BEING PATRIOTIC" AND BLINDLY OPPOSE PEACE TALKS. THIEU STATES THAT THE THREE BASIC OBJECTIVES WHICH THE RVN HAS AND MUST DEFEND ARE:

(A) THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND RIGHT OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE RVN.

(B) THE SURVIVAL AND DEVELOPMENT OF A FREE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.

(C) THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF A JUST AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIETY.

8. THIEU GOES ON TO SAY THAT "WE HAVE BEATEN THE COMMUNISTS MILITARILY. THEREFORE, WHY SHOULD WE NOT DARE TO CONTEST WITH THEM IN OTHER SPHERES. WITH OUR VICTORIES AND MILITARY MIGHT..."

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WHY SHOULD WE BE AFRAID WHEN WE HEAR (SOMEONE) SPEAK OF OPPOSING THE COMMUNISTS IN NON-MILITARY SPHERES. I BELIEVE THAT...WHETHER THEY WANT TO OR NOT, THE COMMUNISTS MUST ALSO SEEK A SOLUTION WHICH DOES NOT USE FORCE OF ARMS." THE ABOVE-MENTIONED THREE OBJECTIVES ARE THE ABSOLUTE OBJECTIVES WHICH CANNOT BE COMPROMISED OR BARTERED. THEREFORE, THIEU STATES, "OUR METHOD MUST BE ON THE ONE HAND TO INCREASE OUR FORCE TO OPPOSE THE COMMUNISTS, AND AT THE SAME TIME, OPEN THE DOOR WIDE AND ALWAYS BE READY TO ACCEPT PEACE TALKS WITH ONE REASONABLE CONDITION; THAT THEY BE IN KEEPING WITH (OUR) NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE, AND REALISTIC."

9. THIEU STATES THAT IN KEEPING WITH THE ABOVE-STATED AIMS THE RVN HAS INCREASED ITS CAPABILITY TO OPPOSE THE COMMUNISTS. THE GENERAL MOBILIZATION LAW HAS BEEN PROMULGATED AND MORE THAN 250,000 YOUTHS HAVE ENTERED THE MILITARY RANKS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES HAVE PROGRESSED ADDING OVER HALF A MILLION PEOPLE WHO HAVE ENTERED THE RANKS. THIEU ADDS THAT THE EXECUTIVE IS NOW PREPARING DRAFT LEGISLATION COVERING THE "REQUISITION OF THE NATIONAL RESOURCES." THIEU ALSO NOTES THAT THE RD MACHINERY IS BEING MOBILIZED AND PREPARED TO LAUNCH A LARGE-SCALE PROGRAM AT THE BEGINNING OF THE COMING YEAR.

10. THIEU NOTES THAT "NVN HAS BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT THE PRELIMINARY MEETINGS IN PARIS...BUT IS USING THOSE MEETINGS FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES,... ESPECIALLY AIMED AT EXPLOITING THE US ELECTIONS AND US PUBLIC OPINION...IN THE HOPE OF GAINING AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE WHAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO TAKE BY FORCE OF ARMS." HOWEVER, HE SAYS THAT SINCE THE COMMUNISTS CANNOT CONTINUE THE WAR INDEFINITELY, "WE MUST TRY HARDER AND MOVE FASTER" IN PREPARING FOR PEACE.

11. THIEU STATES THAT "RADICAL MEANS" WILL BE USED TO IMPROVE AND INCREASE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, AND "AT THE SAME TIME REDUCE THE BURDEN OF THE ALLIES CONCERNING NUMBERS OF TROOPS." HE CONTINUES, "DURING THE WAR, OUR ARMY HAS PLAYED THE MAIN ROLE IN THE FIGHTING; THEREFORE, IN PEACE THEY WILL STILL HOLD THE MAIN ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT AND ESPECIALLY THE ROLE OF GUARANTEE, TO PRESERVE PEACE."

12. THIEU ALSO STRESSES THE NEED TO OPEN THE ROAD FOR...

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PERSONS IN THE ENEMY RANKS TO RETURN." HE SAYS THAT IN THE PAST THIS PROGRAM HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CHIEU HOI, BUT "I WANT TO MAKE A WIDER CALL...ANYONE, REGARDLESS OF HIS PREVIOUS RANK, REGARDLESS OF WHAT HE HAS DONE IN THE ENEMY RANKS, IF (HE IS) WILLING TO PUT ASIDE ARMS AND USE OF FORCE" AND RESPECT THE CONSTITUTION THEN "HE WILL BE CONSIDERED LIKE ANY OTHER CITIZEN."

13. THIEU THEN TURNS TO POLITICS "OR MORE CLEARLY THE DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY", AND DIRECTS HIS COMMENTS TO "TWO MAJOR ASPECTS: (A) METHODS FOR DEVELOPING CIVIL RIGHTS AND (B) METHODS FOR DEVELOPING POLITICAL GROUPS."

14. REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS, THIEU SAYS THAT SINCE THE BEGINING OF THE YEAR, IN SPITE OF THE WAR, THIS EFFORT HAS PROGRESSED EVENLY AND SATISFACTORILY. THE EXECUTIVE HAS TWO BIG, IMPORTANT TASKS WHICH HAVE BEEN PUT FORTH: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND THE ERADICATION OF CORRUPTION. THIEU NOTES THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF GOVERNMENT CADRE, PARTICULARLY THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE CADRE, HAS RECEIVED SPECIAL ATTENTION. "MANY LOCAL CADRE SUCH AS PROVINCE CHIEFS AND DISTRICTS CHIEFS HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY CADRE WHO HAVE JUST RECEIVED TRAINING SO THAT THE (GOVERNMENT) MACHINERY WILL BE MORE CAPABLE THAN BEFORE." THIEU STATES THAT OTHER IMPORTANT CHANGES HAVE BEEN PLANNED, SUCH AS THE ABOLITION OF THE POSITION OF GOVERNMENT DELEGATE, AND THAT A BILL TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IS AWAITING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY APPROVAL.

15. CONCERNING THE ERADICATION OF CORRUPTION, THIEU STATES THAT EXECUTION OF SUCH A PROGRAM HAS REALLY ONLY JUST BEGUN, AND THEREFORE, THERE ARE STILL NOT MANY TANGIBLE RESULTS. HE POINTS OUT THAT THE ERADICATION OF CORRUPTION IS NOT ONLY THE WORK OF THE GOVERNMENT (EXECUTIVE) BUT ALSO OF EVERY OTHER BRANCH, ESPECIALLY THE NA; THIEU COMPLIMENTS THE NA FOR THE CONTRIBUTIONS IT HAS ALREADY MADE.

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P 051200Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2034
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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16. THIEU OBSERVES THAT THE NA HAS ACCOMPLISHED A GREAT DEAL, AND THAT NA MEMBERS HAVE SPOKEN OUT ON IMPORTANT ISSUES AND "ALWAYS SUPPORTED AND COOPERATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT." THIEU POINTS OUT THE IMPORTANT LAWS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN PASSED BY THE NA. "HOWEVER, IN ADDITION TO THE INSPECTORATE LAW, WHICH MUST BE PROMULGATED AND CARRIED OUT BEFORE THE END OF THIS MONTH...OUR PRESENT SITUATION DEMANDS THAT LAWS CONCERNING...POLITICAL PARTIES AND PRESS STATUTES, AND THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE ETHNIC MINORITIES DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, CULTURE AND EDUCATION COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, ETC., BE URGENTLY EXECUTED." FURTHERMORE, HE STATES, "THE PEOPLE ALSO EXPECT PENAL CODES, COMMERCIAL LAWS, CRIMINAL LAW AND LAWS GOVERNING CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAWSUITS." THIEU STATES THAT THE EXECUTIVE IS NOW PREPARING DRAFT LEGISLATION COVERING THESE FIELDS TO PRESENT, TO THE NA.

17. THIEU CONTINUES, "AS I HAVE SAID, THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSIBILITY DEMANDS OF YOU GENTLEMEN UNUSUAL EFFORTS. IF NOT, LEGISLATION WILL NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP UP WITH THE WORK OF DEVELOPING AND EVOLVING DEMOCRACY WHICH WE ARE

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TRYING TO CARRY OUT." THIEU THEN EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR PASSAGE OF THE POLITICAL PARTY STATUTE, THE PRESS STATUTE, AND THE BILL TO ABOLISH THE POSITION OF GOVERNMENT DELEGATE.

13. THIEU NOTES THE IMMINENT ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT, AND POINTS OUT THAT WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT THE BASIS FOR THE SEPARATION OF POWER AMONG THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC WILL BE COMPLETE. HOWEVER, HE ALSO POINTS OUT THAT LAWS GOVERNING THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND THE SPECIAL COURT STILL REMAIN TO BE PASSED. THIEU AGAIN NOTES THE EXECUTIVE HAS ALREADY SENT TO THE NA DRAFT LEGISLATION "WHICH ONLY AWAITS THE DEBATE AND APPROVAL OF YOU GENTLEMEN SO THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THOSE AGENCIES CAN BE CARRIED OUT." THIEU CONTINUES IN THIS VEIN, SAYING "IF THE NA GIVES PROMPT CONSIDERATION TO THE LAWS AIMED AT REPLACING THE OLD LAWS, AND WHICH THE EXECUTIVE WILL SOON SEND TO THE NA, I BELIEVE WE WILL PROGRESS VERY RAPIDLY IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERFECTLY DEMOCRATIC JUDICIAL SYSTEM."

19. TURNING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL GROUPS OAN THEL#, THIEU NOTES THAT THERE HAVE NOT BEEN MANY RESULTS. "THIEU ASKS RHETORICALLY IF THIS SLOW DEVELOPMENT IS BECAUSE "OUR POLITICAL CIRCLES HAVE NOT TRIED OR LACK CAPABILITY" AND ANSWERS "NO." HE SAYS "I BELIEVE THAT OUR POLITICAL CIRCLES HAVE TRIED VERY HARD AND HAVE GREAT CAPABILITY. HOWEVER, PERHAPS RESULTS ARE SLOW BECAUSE WE ARE STILL SERIOUSLY SCATTERED (DIVIDED) WHEN IT COMES TO THE ORGANIZATIONS AND NAMES THAT OUR POLITICAL GROUPS PRESENTLY HAVE. OR PERHAPS IT IS BECAUSE OUR POLITICAL GROUPS HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO FIND AND ASSEMBLE THE FORMULA AND NAMES THAT ARE APPROPRIATE TO ATTRACT AND IND PEOPLE TOGETHER."

20. HE NOTES THAT PERHAPS THERE ARE MANY FACTORS, BUT THAT ONE IS THAT NEITHER THE EXECUTIVE NOR LEGISLATURE HAVE DONE THEIR JOB IN THAT THERE IS STILL NO POLITICAL PARTY STATUTE. THIEU ALSO CALLS UPON THE DEPUTIES AND SENATORS TO PERSONALLY CONTRIBUTE MORE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE FUTURE.

21. THIEU THEN TALKS ABOUT THE LEGALITY OF GROUPS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY, NATIONAL SOLIDARITY, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT

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OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS. CONCERNING LEGALITY OF GROUPS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY THIEU SAYS THAT FOR A LONG TIME MANY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN MIXED-UP OR HAVE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE UNCLEAR SITUATION CONCERNING LEGALITY AND ILLEGALITY, AND THE NAMING AND OPERATION OF POLITICAL GROUPS. "UNTIL THERE IS A POLITICAL PARTIES STATUTE" HE SAYS, "THE PRESENT LAWS ARE STILL IN EFFECT. THIS MEANS THAT ONLY LEGAL GROUPS CAN DEMAND OTHERS TO CONSIDER THEM AS LEGAL GROUPS. I BELIEVE THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT A SITUATION IN WHICH A GROUP CONSIDERS ITSELF A LEGITIMATE GROUP BUT DISREGARDS THE AUTHORITIES, DISREGARDS OTHER LEGITIMATE GROUPS, AND DISREGARDS THE LAWS CURRENTLY IN FORCE."

2. CONTINUING IN THIS VIEN THIEU SAYS "THESE PEOPLE (IN SUCH GROUPS) ALWAYS DEMAND THAT THE AUTHORITIES OR OTHER GROUPS MUST TREAT THEM AS A LEGAL GROUP... WHILE THEY DISREGARD THE LAW. I BELIEVE THAT ONLY THOSE WHO ACT LEGALLY REGARDING OTHERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEMAND TO BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO THE LAW. IF PEOPLE DISREGARD THE LAW, THEY PLACE THEMSELVES OUTSIDE THE LAW AND, THEREFORE, THEY DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEMAND THOSE THINGS RESERVED FOR LEGAL GROUPS."

23. THIEU STATES "THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN POLITICAL GROUPS AND NON-POLITICAL GROUPS MUST BE CLEARLY DELINEATED. FOR INSTANCE, A PROFESSIONAL GROUP, EVEN THOUGH LEGAL, IS ONLY LEGAL AS A PROFESSIONAL GROUP... AND IF THE GROUP BECOMES ACTIVE POLITICALLY, PARTICULARLY IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES HARMFUL TO THE NATION, THOSE ACTIVITIES MUST BE CONSIDERED ILLEGAL AND CAN BE PREVENTED BY LAW." THIEU ALSO GIVES THE EXAMPLE OF "GROUPS AND POLITICIANS, WHO, LEGALLY OR ILLEGALLY, OFTEN USE 'THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE' TO PUT FORTH THEIR OWN IDEAS... WHICH OFTEN ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR CONTRARY TO NATIONAL LAW. FOR INSTANCE, HERE ARE PEOPLE WHO ADVOCATE COALITION WITH THE COMMUNISTS... I BELIEVE THAT... SUCH VIOLATIONS MUST BE CURBED AND NOT BE ALLOWED FREEDOM TO CONTINUE."

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2035

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMCONSUL DANANG

CINCPAC

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

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24. CONCERNING NATIONAL SOLIDARITY, THIEU OBSERVES THAT SUCH STEPS WILL BE TAKEN AS BENEFIT THE NATION. FOR INSTANCE, THE CASES OF THE HIGH RANKING EXILES WILL BE CONSIDERED CASE BY CASE. THEY WILL NOT BE GIVEN BLANKET PERMISSION TO RETURN. THERE ARE THOSE ELEMENTS WHOSE PRESENCE WOULD CAUSE TROUBLE AND DIVISION. "THOSE PERSONS WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF 'NATIONAL SOLIDARITY' TO RETURN WILLY-NILLY."

25. SPEAKING ABOUT RELIGIOUS GROUPS, THIEU SAYS "RECENTLY MANY RELIGIOUS GROUPS HAVE SENT LETTERS TO THE GOVERNMENT SEEKING RECOGNITION AS RELIGIOUS GROUPS, MEANING THEY DO NOT ACCEPT THE CONTROL OF ORDINANCE NO. 10, AND WHEN (THEY) ARE NOT GRANTED RECOGNITION THEY HOLD THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE." THIEU STATES THAT SUCH QUESTIONS ARE FOR THE NA TO DECIDE, AND FOR THAT REASON ON AUGUST 26, 1968, "I SENT OFFICIAL LETTERS TO THE CHAIRMEN OF BOTH HOUSES ASKING THE NA TO PAY ATTENTION TO AND RESOLVE THAT PROBLEM." HE ADDED THAT HE HOPES THE NA WILL SOON RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM.

26. "FREEDOM OF RELIGION WHICH IS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE HONORED... I BELIEVE THAT TO BE EQUAL MEANS THERE MUST

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BE FAIRNESS, THAT NO ONE CAN DEMAND A MONOPOLY, THAT THERE CANNOT BE USE OF FORCE OR OPPRESSION WITH EACH OTHER.

27. SUMMARIZING HIS COMMENTS ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, THIEU SAYS THAT "THE PROGRESS WHICH HAS BEEN MADE DOES NOT MEET THE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION. IF PEACE IS REALIZED THE MAIN BATTLEFIELD WILL BE THE POLITICAL SPHERE. WHEN THAT HAPPENS, IF WE CANNOT OVERCOME THE COMMUNISTS' POLITICAL PLOTS, THEN SURELY WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PRESERVE THE VICTORIES WHICH HAVE BEEN WON WITH THE BLOOD AND BONES OF THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE... THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT AND PREPARATION FOR THE POLITICAL WAR MUST BE URGENTLY CARRIED OUT, BEGINNING RIGHT NOW."

28. TURNING TO SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THIEU SAYS THE PRESENT SITUATION IS VERY DIFFICULT. IN THE COUNTRY SINCE, BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT OF THE WAR, IT HAS ONLY BEEN POSSIBLE VERY SLOWLY TO CARRY OUT SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION, WHICH IS CLOSELY TIED TO THE RD PROGRAM, AND THE TASK OF PROTECTING THE RESULTS ACHIEVED HAS BEEN VERY DIFFICULT.

29. AS FOR THE CITIES THIEU SAYS THE STANDARD OF LIVING IS MUCH HIGHER THAN TEN YEARS AGO, BUT HE GOES ON TO POINT OUT THAT THIS STANDARD OF LIVING IS BASED ON SERVICES RATHER THAN PRODUCTION, AND HENCE THE PRESENT SOCIAL ORDER IS NOT STABLE. THE DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS, ACCORDING TO THIEU, IS TENDING TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW WEALTHY CLASS BASED ON THE EXPLOITATION OF WAR-RELATED SERVICES, SPECULATION, AND SWINDLING. THIS SITUATION, THIEU CONCLUDES, HAS CAUSED THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR TO INCREASE MORE AND MORE.

30. IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, THIEU SAYS THAT DISPROPORTION BETWEEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND IS INCREASING. HE SAYS SVN HAS MOBILIZED ITS MANPOWER RESOURCES ENERGETICALLY AND WITH SUCCESS, BUT HAS DONE LITTLE WITH ITS ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES. TAXES ARE VERY LOW, THIEU NOTES, EVEN COMPARED WITH COUNTRIES AT PEACE, ESPECIALLY ON THE RICH WHO PROFIT FROM THE WAR. HE ADDS THAT DESTRUCTION AND REFUGEES CAUSED BY THE COMMUNISTS HAVE ADDED GREATLY TO THE PROBLEM.

31. THIEU THEN DECLARES "IN THE FACE OF THE ECONOMIC AND

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SOCIAL SITUATION DESCRIBED ABOVE, ... THERE MUST BE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE SOME TRULY RATIONAL AND DRASTIC ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES TO KEEP THESE CIRCUMSTANCES FROM DEGENERATING TO THE POINT WHERE IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONTROL THEM. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, THIEU REPORTS, ARE CURRENTLY PLANNING SUCH MEASURES AND WILL CARRY THEM OUT SO FAR AS THEIR AUTHORITY ALLOWS, AND MEASURES REQUIRING LEGISLATION WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

32. SHIFTING HIS ATTENTION TO THOSE BENEFITTING FROM THE WAR, THIEU DECLARES THAT THE SITUATION CANNOT CONTINUE WHEREIN THE MAJORITY CONTINUE TO SACRIFICE BLOOD AND PROPERTY AT AN INCREASING RATE, WHILE ANOTHER GROUP HAS AN EASY LIFE, AND HE SAYS THAT FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC HE HAS ADVOCATED A POLICY OF BASIC SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION.

3. THIEU STATES FURTHER, "IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, OUR POLICY IS TO CHANGE COMPLETELY THE LIFE OF THE POOR PLOWMEN: DISTRIBUTE LAND TO THEM SO EACH IS A LANDOWNER, HELP THEM REFORM TECHNIQUES OF CULTIVATION, HELP THEM WITH THE MEANS, AND CAPITAL FOR CULTIVATION."

34. THIEU GOES ON TO SAY HE HAS BEEN GREATLY CONCERNED WITH THESE MATTERS DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS BECAUSE THE RURAL PEOPLE ARE OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE IN VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. THE RURAL PEOPLE ALSO HAVE MADE THE GREATEST SACRIFICE IN OUR STRUGGLE, THIEU NOTES, ADDING THAT HE HIMSELF COMES FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE AND MUCH OF HIS FAMILY IS STILL THERE.

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2036
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMCONSUL DANANG
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35. THIEU DECLARES THAT THE COMMUNISTS CARRY OUT LAND REFORM JUST TO ENABLE THE STATE TO REPLACE THE EXPLOITING LANDLORDS, NOT TO HELP THE RURAL PEOPLE BECOME LANDOWNERS. HE STATES THAT THE RVN PURPOSE IS DIFFERENT; HE GVN DISTRIBUTES LAND PERMANENTLY AND GIVES OUT OWNERSHIP CERTIFICATES. THIEU ADDS THAT THE GVN ALSO ENERGETICALLY HELPS THE FARMER TO INCREASE PRODUCTION.

36. TURNING TO THE CITIES, THIEU SAY THE STANDARD OF LIVING IS HIGHER THERE THAN IN THE RURAL AREAS BUT THAT POVERTY, IGNORANCE AND SICKNESS ALSO EXIST IN THE CITIES. HE SAYS THAT GVN MUST MOBILIZE FURTHER THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE FAVORED CLASS IN ORDER TO REDUCE INEQUALITY, AND THAT PROGRAMS OF EDUCATION, HEALTH, AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT MUST BE PROMOTED.

37. THIEU FURTHER ADVOCATES THAT POOR PEOPLE IN THE CITIES BE GIVEN MORE GUARANTEES CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT, MINIMUM INCOME, AND THE FACILITIES NECESSARY FOR AN IMPROVING STANDARD OF LIVING.

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33. THIEU CONCLUDES THAT THE TASK OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IS A LONG- AND LONG-LASTING ONE, BUT NEVERTHELESS MUST BE CARRIED OUT STARTING IMMEDIATELY. HE ADDS THAT POLITICAL, PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL GROUP ARE NOT YET DOING ENOUGH IN FULFILLING THIS MISSION THIEU ENDS THE PORTION OF HIS SPEECH ON SOCIAL AFFAIRS BY SAYING THAT IF THESE GROUPS WILL PLAY A GREATER ROLE, AND IF THE GOVERNMENT AND OTHER PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS DO THEIR SHARE, THE GOAL OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION WILL BE MET.

39. IN SUMMING UP HIS SPEECH, THIEU RECALLS THAT AT THE BEGINNING HE HAD SAID THE SITUATION OF SVN IS ONE IN WHICH BASIC TRIALS HAVE BEEN OVERCOME AND BETTER PROSPECTS ARE APPROACHING. TO SAY BASIC TRIAL HAVE BEEN OVERCOME, HE GOES ON, DOES NOT MEAN SVN WILL NOT MEET FURTHER TRIALS. AND TO SAY BETTER PROSPECTS ARE APPROACHING DOES NOT MEAN THEY ARE ALREADY HERE OR WILL NECESSARILY COME, THIEU SAYS. DEFINING THE SITUATION FURTHER, HE SAYS SVN HAS PASSED THROUGH A DANGEROUS PHASE OF LIFE OR DEATH, BUT IN THE NEAR FUTURE IT WILL MEET MANY MORE DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS AND IF SVN CANNOT PASS THROUGH THEM IT WILL BE PUSHED BACK TO A DEGENERATING POSITION.

40. AS FOR THE BETTER PROSPECTS, THIEU GOES ON, THEY ARE APPROACHING BUT WE WILL NOT NECESSARILY REACH THEM. ONLY IF WE CONTINUE TO STRIVE, WILL THEY BECOME FACTS, THIEU EMPHASIZES. HE GOES ON TO SAY, "BUT IN THE NEAR FUTURE I FORESEE THAT THE PRESENT FAILURES OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS WILL REACH SUCH A POINT THAT THEY WILL CERTAINLY HAVE TO ACCEPT PEACE TALKS AND A PEACE SETTLEMENT. OF COURSE, IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE THAT THIS FORECAST WILL DEFINITELY BE FILLED, WE WILL HAVE NO OTHER MEANS THAN TO INCREASE WITH NIGHT AND DAY OUR EFFORTS IN THE STRUGGLE. IN ADDITION WHEN THE FORECAST CONCERNING PEACE IS REALIZED, IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER WE WILL CERTAINLY HAVE TO COPE WITH A POLITICAL COMPETITION WHICH WILL ALSO BE DRASTIC, DIFFICULT, AND LENGTHY, AND WHICH WILL NOT BE OF LESSER DEGREE THAN THE FIGHTING WITH WEAPONS PRESENTLY TAKING PLACE."

41. THIEU THEN CALLS UPON ALL THE PEOPLE, ALL THE MILITARY, EVERY PROFESSION, AND EVERY CIRCLE OF SOCIETY, TO ENERGETICALLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GREAT AND LASTING FORTUNE OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 23 SAIGON 39594 05 OF 05 051633Z

NATION. HE ALSO CALLS UPON THE CIVILIZED WORLD TO SHOW UNDERSTANDING AND JUSTICE, AND TO EXTEND MORAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO REALIZE PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND AN EQUITABLE AND PROGRESSIVE SOCIETY IN SVN.

42. CONCERNING THE ALLIES, THIEU EXPRESSES HIS GRATITUDE AND THAT OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE PEOPLE. IN ADDITION TO ASKING FOR ALLIED ASSISTANCE IN THE WAR, THIEU SAYS "I ALSO AWAIT FROM THESE COUNTRIES ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION WITH SPIRIT AND CONFIDENCE " DURING THE PHASE OF SEEKING PEACE AND EVEN AFTER ACHIEVING PEACE." THIEU AFFIRMED THAT THE COMMON IDEAL OF VN AND OF ITS ALLIES IS JUSTICE, DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM, AND WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY.

43. THIEU ALSO EXPRESSES THE GRATITUDE OF THE NATION TO THE SOLDIERS AND CADRE WHO HAVE BORNE SACRIFICES IN ORDER THAT THE NATION AND PEOPLE MIGHT LIVE, SURVIVE AND DEVELOP.

44. IN CLOSING, THIEU ASKS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO JOIN HIM IN PRAYING THAT EACH OF THEM WILL PERFORM HIS FULL DUTY TO REALISE A VIETNAMESE NATION WHICH IS INDEPENDENT, DEMOCRATIC, JUST AND PROGRESSIVE.

BERGER

BT

NNN

INFORMATION

Saturday, Oct. 5, 1968 - 2:50p

Mr. President:

You will wish to know of the
emergency indicated in the attached.

I would guess a C-130 short of one
engine would be okay.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

69a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


Saturday, October 5, 1968
2:45 PM

Mr. Rostow:

The FAA duty officer just reported that a C-130 aircraft enroute to Honolulu with Secretary of Transportation Boyd aboard has developed trouble in one engine. The pilot has shutdown the engine and declared an emergency aboard.

The aircraft is presently located 230 miles southwest of San Francisco, however, the pilot has turned the C-130 around and is returning to San Francisco.

Additionally the Coast Guard has sent out an aircraft to intercept and accompany Secretary Boyd's aircraft back to San Francisco.


Ray Wotring
Situation Room

Pres file

70

Saturday, Oct. 5, 1968
2:15 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is solid evidence that the IPC case was
not central to the Peruvian coup.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-102
By isa, NARA, Date 4-28-03

71

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 5, 1968
2:10 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This account of the situation at the
Thuong Duc Special Forces camp suggests
it is less beleaguered than press accounts
would suggest.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date 2-1-93

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 October 1968
0330 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Thuong Duc Special Forces Camp, Vietnam

1. The Thuong Duc Special Forces Camp, located 21 nautical miles southwest of Da Nang, is currently reported by press, radio, and television news media, as being surrounded and under siege by the enemy. This is also being reported by Hanoi news media.

2. Increased enemy presence in the central part of Quang Nam Province is indicated by the enemy activity there during the past week. This represents a greater enemy threat to the general area, as opposed to a specific confrontation with the camp itself, as reported in current news releases.

3. The largest recent attack on the camp and adjacent area occurred on 27 September (EDT) when the camp received 30 rounds of 82-mm mortar and 10 rounds of 122-mm rocket fire followed by a ground attack on Regional and Popular Force (RF/PF) elements and two villages adjacent to the camp proper. Seven RF/PF personnel were killed in this action while the enemy sustained 62 killed. The two villages came under enemy control.

4. Two Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) companies were heli-lifted into the general area of the camp following the 27 September action to pursue the enemy forces withdrawing to the west from the camp and adjacent villages. They were not given the mission of linking up with the camp since this was not required by the situation.

5. At no time during the past week has the enemy in the Thuong Duc area prevented the CIDG Camp Strike Force (CSF) troops within the camp from conducting normal patrol missions outside the camp.

6. The following personnel and units are located at the Thuong Duc Special Forces Camp:

United States Special Forces:
3 officers
11 enlisted men

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1993

By *Ng*, NADA, DCA, 2-1-93

SECRET

South Vietnamese Special Forces:

3 officers
9 enlisted men

One South Vietnamese Reconnaissance Platoon:

2 officers
70 enlisted men

Four Camp Strike Force Companies (CSF):

4 officers
425 enlisted men

Three Mobile Strike Force Companies (MSF):

Approximately 3 officers and 300 enlisted.

Forces listed above total about 15 officers and 815 enlisted men. In addition, there is an unknown number of Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF) personnel.

7. Thirty-six B-52 sorties are scheduled for the night of 4-5 October against reported enemy troop concentrations in the general vicinity of the Thuong Duc Special Forces camp.

Robert L. Baughman Jr.
ROBERT L. BAUGHMAN, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

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SECRET

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INFORMATION

Pres file
72

Saturday, October 5, 1968
2:05 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Participation in Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings,
October 1962

1. ExCom met with President Kennedy 42 times from the date of its establishment on October 22, 1962, until it ceased operations on March 29, 1963.

You were present at 37 of these 42 meetings.

2. During the first month of its life, when ExCom dealt only with the Cuban missile crisis, it met 30 times.

You were present at 27 of these 30 meetings. You did not attend the meetings on November 20, 21, and 23 -- long after the critical phase of the crisis had passed.

3. You also took part in numerous other meetings on the Cuban missile crisis:

a. NSC meeting of October 22 -- before ExCom was created.

b. Informal meetings of the ExCom group held without President Kennedy. Several of these were held in Secretary Rusk's conference room at the State Department.

A list of the ExCom meetings you attended is attached. The five meetings you did not attend are marked with an asterisk.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:ksb

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By DCH, NARA, Date 10-6-88

Meetings of the ExCom Committee1962

October 23, 10:00 a. m.
 October 23, 6:00 p. m.
 October 24, 10:00 a. m.
 October 25, 10:00 a. m.
 October 25, 5:00 p. m.
 October 26, 10:00 a. m.
 October 27, 10:00 a. m.
 October 27, 4:00 p. m.
 October 27, 9:00 p. m.
 October 28, 11:00 a. m.
 October 29, 10:00 a. m.
 October 29, 6:00 p. m.
 October 30, 10:00 a. m.
 October 31, 10:00 a. m.
 October 31, 6:00 p. m.
 November 1, 10:00 a. m.
 November 2, 11:00 a. m.
 November 3, 10:00 a. m.
 November 3, 4:00 p. m.
 November 5, 10:00 a. m.
 November 6, 6:00 p. m.
 November 7, 5:00 p. m.
 November 8, 4:00 p. m.
 November 12, 11:00 a. m.
 November 12, 5:00 p. m.
 November 16, 11:00 a. m.
 November 19, 10:00 a. m.
 * November 20, 3:30 p. m.
 * November 21, 4:00 p. m.
 * November 23, 10:00 a. m.
 November 29, 10:00 a. m.
 December 3, 10:00 a. m.
 December 6, 5:30 p. m.
 * December 10, 5:40 p. m.
 * December 11, 10:00 a. m.
 December 17, 10:00 a. m.
 December 17, 3:45 p. m.

1963

January 25, 4:00 p. m.
 January 31, 6:00 p. m.
 February 5, 4:00 p. m.
 February 12, 10:00 a. m.
 March 29, 12:30 p. m.

* Meetings which the Vice President did not attend.

~~SECRET~~

Pres file
73

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 5, 1968
2:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached letter from Eshkol to you says, in effect:

- the UAR doesn't want peace; please don't get in bed with the Soviet Union on the Middle East;
- the Israelis are trying to do something with Jordan;
- please give us the Phantoms;
- may I come and see you in December in the course of my trip to Latin America?

In the course of this, he has praise for your speech of September 10 (as he interprets it).

You may wish to know that Joe Sisco will be in touch with both the Jordanian and Israeli Foreign Ministers to establish whether the right words spoken by Eban on the November Resolution in his speech scheduled for next Tuesday would, in fact, open up negotiations between the two countries under Jarring.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 20, #273

By jc NARA. Date 1-25-82

73a

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

, 29 September 1968.

Dear Mr. President,

During our High Holy Days, a time of reflection and heartsearching for Jews, I am writing to you as a great and proven friend of my country and my people. I feel moved to share my thoughts with you on the present situation in our region in the light of your memorable address on 10 September, and the latest developments. The views of free governments are, of course, never identical. But even if there are points on which our formulation would differ from yours, we recognize the integrity and constructive statesmanship which inspired your words. We are moved by your tribute to the historic and spiritual forces which underlie Israel's national rebirth. We share your belief that a different and more durable situation than that existing on 4 June 1967 must be built, and we believe with you that it is the Middle Eastern States themselves which must do the building. We desire a real lasting peace and not makeshift arrangements such as were made in 1957. We, too, aim at the

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-103
By js NARA, Date 3-27-03

ממשלת ישראל
THE PRIME MINISTER

- 2 -

29 September 1968

replacement of the demarcation lines and cease-fire lines by agreed, permanent and secure boundaries worked out by the parties themselves as an integral part of the structure of peace.

We have given close attention to your emphasis on the fact that the Security Council Resolution of last November "is not self-executing." The last point is of special importance in the light of the Jarring mission to which, in your letters and statements, you have rightly ascribed great importance. Our Foreign Minister, Mr. Eban, is arriving in the United States, and I have asked him to discuss these matters with your Government in detail. Here I shall only put my finger on the crux of the problem. We are convinced that peacemaking is a complex process requiring solutions of intricate, concrete problems. The UAR talks and thinks more about eventual war than about early peace. But when, for tactical reasons, it talks about peace, it professes to believe that nothing is required but the recitation of the words of the Security Council Resolution with no attempt by the parties to work out their implications in terms of agreed boundaries, security arrangements, navigation guarantees, juridical contracts, specific mutual recognition, refugee integration, etc. Now this

ממשלת ישראל
THE PRIME MINISTER

- 3 -

29 September 1968

UAR view is, in our opinion, untenable. The transition from war to peace in our region is not a matter for declaratory solution. The war has revolved for twenty years on specific issues of contention. The peacemaking effort must, therefore, involve agreement on these specific issues and must finally eliminate the twenty-year conflict.

It has been and is our policy to promote a detailed discussion with our neighbours on the terms of a final peace settlement. We have proposed a peace agenda; we have clarified to Cairo and Amman that the territorial and boundary issues are open for negotiation and agreement; we have announced that when the permanent boundaries are fixed, armed forces would move from the cease-fire line in accordance with the agreed boundaries and security agreements. We have agreed to Dr. Jarring's proposal for joint meetings under his auspices, and we have tried to clarify through him the views of the Governments of the UAR and Israel on the nature of the lasting peace and the relations of the two countries after they will have agreed on all the matters contained in the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967.

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

- 4 -

29 September 1968.

We have used many procedures for conveying views to Cairo and Amman. We have diversified and multiplied our channels of communication. Nobody can seriously believe that peace will be concluded between two governments one of which permanently refuses to meet the other, but we do not rule out preliminary procedures or methods of communication which could pave the way for normal negotiation. What we said to your representatives on this point in Jerusalem in July continues to be our policy. On the other hand the UAR refuses to discuss the issues involved with us in any form and through any procedure.

To understand why our efforts have not yet been effective in promoting peace, we must get away from tactics and formulations in order to face the central political facts. The heart of the matter is simply that the UAR has no intention of concluding a genuine and definitive peace with Israel. Nasser's policy is to secure Israel's withdrawal while preserving his full ideological, political and military freedom of action and keeping all options open, including the option of a war of revenge. He therefore is unwilling to sign a contractual peace

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

- 5 -

29 September 1968

settlement. In short, he seeks to get us back to our old vulnerability and keep the basic conflict in existence. That this is the UAR's policy is for us a matter of deep certainty.

This appraisal has now been reinforced by the latest Soviet proposals, coordinated with the UAR. They seek expressly to restore the 5 June 1967 situation, a course rejected by you and ourselves. The proposals are those of the Soviet Union last year, with one new element: they suggest a four-Power guarantee. Under this guise they would not only restore the 5 June situation, but give the Soviet Union a recognized role in its enforcement. This is what the Soviet Union terms "normalization". It is ironical that the Soviet Union should claim a role as a guardian of the peace in the Middle East, when it helped unleash the June 1967 war; when it invaded Czechoslovakia and threatens other countries with a similar fate; when it displays savage hostility towards Israel and foments hatred of the Jews in Eastern Europe; when

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

- 6 -

29 September 1968.

it continues to inflame our region with arms and propaganda, and when it works to overthrow pro-Western regimes and subvert Western interests throughout the region.

The lesson of recent events in Europe should be to deepen our suspicion of Soviet policy and to sharpen our resistance to Soviet penetration. It is evident that the Soviet signature to a guarantee is the last thing that a small State mindful of its sovereignty and freedom can invite and accept. At any rate, the Soviet attitude towards Israel was highlighted by the strident and threatening declaration made in Moscow only a few days ago.

Multilateral guarantees can on no account be a substitute for a bilateral, negotiated peace settlement between the States directly involved in the conflict. The design lurking behind the Soviet plan is to impose a Munich-type settlement upon us. Israel will not submit to such a design.

A central aim of the Soviet proposals is to draw the United States away from its own policy, as formulated by you, and into an incongruous alignment with the Soviet Union

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

- 7 -

29 September 1968.

and Egypt. During the past year, Mr. President, we were informed of your resolute negative answer to Soviet, Yugoslav and other proposals inconsistent with the principles which you had laid down for United States policy. A vigorous United States reaction to the latest Soviet proposals in the spirit of your recent firm reaction to Soviet moves and threats in Europe, would leave no room for miscalculation. I strongly urge that this be done in an effort to clear the way for the pursuit of practical and realistic discussions within the framework of the Jarring mission.

The United States position as formulated on 10 September and Israel's position are in general proximity. It would therefore be natural for us to stand together in the tactical handling of the situation; and I have encouraged Foreign Minister Eban to seek a harmonized approach, such as that which we maintained last year. The position is not that you have a divergence with Israel on procedure, but that you and we are separated from present Soviet-UAR policy by a wide gulf.

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

- 8 -

29 September 1968.

In the Israel-Jordan problem different forces and prospects are at work on which the Foreign Minister will be in touch with your Government.

I wish to revert to the vital problem of the balance of forces in our region, especially in aircraft. Since our discussion last January, the reinforcement of the Arab air forces has gone forward more swiftly than we then predicted. In the meantime Israel's strength in the air has not kept pace. There has been a consequent revival of a belligerent UAR posture and of military provocation by it. Cairo now believes in the possibility of an eventual military solution. It did not believe this a few months ago. It is not too late to dispel this illusion. I doubt if any political progress can be expected so long as this new confidence in a military solution is not dispelled. I reiterate my firm confidence in your personal treatment of this matter in the spirit in which we discussed it together.

We are moving into a critical period,
Mr. President, when attempts are being made to divide our

משרד ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

- 9 -

29 September 1968.

counsels and to renew the perils from which our people escaped at great sacrifice fifteen months ago. Your forward-looking and courageous policies on the Middle East situation during those fifteen months have been of historic importance.

The quest for peace in the Middle East will not be easy or rapid, but Israel for its part will not give up the pursuit. It is important not to lose patience as it is not to lose heart.

I shall be in the Western Hemisphere in December to visit Latin American capitals and should welcome an opportunity of expressing to you personally the everlasting appreciation of our people for the strength and fidelity of your support.

Yours

Sincerely,

A. Eshkol

His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson,
The President of the
United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

74
ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Free file

Saturday, October 5, 1968 -- 1:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A is U Thant's proposal for a four-power summit to take place in 1969. However, he proposes contacts among the Foreign Ministers of the four major powers during the current session of the General Assembly.

At Tab B is a proposed negative response based on the proposition: "We are not prepared at this time to in effect commit a new administration to a summit in 1969."

The outgoing cable requires your approval.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 95-345
By cb, NARA Date 7-31-96

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

74a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 680

PAGE 01 USUN N 06862 050128Z

83

ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 042343Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3565

060383

~~SECRET~~ USUN 6862

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-136
By us, NARA Date 9-2-98

SUBJECT: SYG'S FOUR POWER PROPOSAL

1. BUNCHE GAVE US INFORMALLY FOLL LTR FOR COMMENT PRIOR TO FORMAL TRANSMISSION FROM SYG TO US, USSR, UK AND FRANCE. BUNCHE ASSURED US, SYG WOULD NOT TRANSMIT LTR UNTIL HE HAD RECEIVED OUR COMMENTS. AS DEPT WILL NOTE, SYG HAS IN MIND A FOUR-POWER MTG AS PRELUDE TO POSSIBLE SUMMIT MTG IN 1969. HE SUGGESTS THAT AGENDA MIGHT DEAL IN FIRST INSTANCE WITH WAYS TO STRENGTHEN UN, INCLUDING FINANCES AND PEACEKEEPING, AND LEAVES OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT DISCUSSION WOULD INCLUDE "REAFFIRMATION OF CHARTER PRINCIPLES", ADVICE TO JARRING, AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT. DEPT SHOULD NOT PENULTIMATE PARA IN PARTICULAR WHERE SYG SAYS IT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY "THAT THE FOUR FON MINS SHOULD MEET AS A GROUP".

2. WE WILL BE STUDYING LTR CAREFULLY AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEPT ON HOW TO HANDLE IT.

BEGIN TEXT.

MY DEAR FON MINISTER/SECRETARY,

YOU WILL PERHAPS RECALL THAT IN MY INTRODUCTION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION LAST YEAR I ADVANCED A SUGGESTION THAT AN ATTEMPT MIGHT BE MADE TO ASSESS THE VALUE OF HOLDING PERIODIC MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AT WHICH ITS MEMBERS MIGHT BE REPRESENTED BY A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT OR BY SOME SPECIALLY DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE. IT WAS ACTUALLY MY HOPE THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE ATTENDED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE MEMBER STATES CONCERNED AND THAT THIS WOULD GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A

~~SECRET~~



Department of State TELEGRAM

—SECRET—

PAGE 02 USUN N 06862 050128Z

FREE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF MAJOR PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

IT MAY ALSO BE RECALLED THAT AT AN INFORMAL DINNER I GAVE FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE FOUR MAJOR POWERS LAST YEAR, I DISCUSSED SOME OF THE IDEAS WHICH WERE AT THE BACK OF MY MIND WHEN I MADE THIS SUGGESTION. SINCE I PUT FORTH THIS POSSIBILITY LAST YEAR THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HAS FURTHER DETERIORATED AND THE HOPES FOR AN EAST-WEST DETENTE HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY SET BACK. I FEEL THAT SOME SPECIAL EFFORT SHOULD NOW BE MADE IN SPITE OF THE PRESENT UNFAVOURABLE

ATMOSPHERE - OR, INDEED, BECAUSE OF IT - TO IDENTIFY SOME IMPORTANT ISSUES WHERE A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST MAY FACILITATE BIG POWER AGREEMENT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES.

IS IS WITH THIS THOUGHT IN MIND THAT, IN MY LATEST INTRODUCTION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT WHICH WAS ISSUED LAST MONTH, I PROPOSED THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF FRANCE, USSR, UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES DURING THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SO THAT THEY MIGHT MEET AND DISCUSS SOME COMMON PROBLEMS. I FELT THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD HELP TO HALT THE GROWING FEELING OF INSECURITY IN THE WORLD AND PROVIDE SOME ANTIDOTE TO THE FEELING OF PESSIMISM ABOUT THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY THAT IS NOW SO WIDESPREAD.

LET ME STATE, MR. FOREIGN MINISTER, THAT I AM WELL AWARE OF SOME OF THE RISKS INVOLVED IN ORGANIZING SUCH A MEETING. AMONGST THESE MAY BE MENTIONED THE REAL RISK THAT HOPES MAY BE RAISED WHICH MAY NOT BE REALIZED. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT SOME CONCRETE RESULTS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED IF AN AGENDA COULD BE AGREED UPON WHICH WOULD BE REALISTIC AND NOT OVER-AMBITIOUS.

IF THE IDEA OF SUCH A MEETING IS ACCEPTABLE, I SHALL BE HAPPY, IF SO DESIRED, TO PREPARE A DRAFT AGENDA. I REALIZE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME SPECTACULAR RESULTS IN REGARD TO THE SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN MANY PARTS OF THE WORLD MAY NOT BE ACHIEVED. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT A MODEST START COULD AND SHOULD BE MADE IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH THE BASIC PROBLEM FACING THE ORGANIZATION, NAMELY, HOW CAN THE UNITED NATIONS BE ENABLED TO DEVELOP INTO A REALLY EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS AS ENVISAGED IN THE CHARTER. THIS OF COURSE, IS MY MAIN CONCERN; BUT ONE CANNOT IGNORE THE EXISTENCE

—SECRET—



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 USUN N 06862 050128Z

OF OTHER PROBLEMS WHICH ALSO HAVE A BEARING ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WORLD ORGANIZATION. I MAY MENTION AMONGST THESE THE FINANCIAL SOLVENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND ITS PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING FUNCTIONS. THESE PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED ONLY IF, TO START WITH, THE BIG POWERS COULD AGREE AMONGST THEMSELVES EITHER ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THEIR SOLUTION, OR ON A PRAGMATIC APPROACH WHICH, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE, MAY

ALLOW THE ORGANIZATION TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY. ANOTHER THOUGHT I HAVE IS THE NEED TO REAFFIRM THE CHARTER PRINCIPLES AND THE ACCEPTED RULES OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT. ONE COULD HOPE ALSO THAT SUCH A MEETING MIGHT GIVE ATTENTION TO WAYS OF MORE HELPFUL COLLECTIVE GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT FOR AMBASSADOR JARRING'S VITAL MISSION. IT MAY ALSO BE OPPORTUNE TO DISCUSS CERTAIN ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT AT SUCH A MEETING.

IN THE INTRODUCTION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT, I HAD STATED THAT HOPEFULLY A MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD LEAD TO A MEETING OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE FOUR MAJOR POWERS. I KNOW IT REQUIRES MOST CAREFUL PREPARATION TO ARRANGE SUCH A MEETING. I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT, IN VIEW OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES, SUCH A SUMMIT MEETING COULD HARDLY BE ENVISAGED UNTIL SOME TIME IN 1969. I CANNOT HELP FEELING VERY STRONGLY THAT THE MERE FACT OF AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO HOLD SUCH A SUMMIT MEETING WOULD SHINE AS A RAY OF HOPE IN THE PRESENTLY CLOUDED SKY AND BRING A SENSE OF RELIEF TO HUMAN BEINGS ALL OVER THE WORLD WHO ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TREND OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS TODAY.

LET ME ADD THAT IN MY THINKING IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD MEET AS A GROUP. IT WOULD BE EQUALLY EFFECTIVE IF THEY WERE TO MEET INDIVIDUALLY WITH EACH OTHER, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THEIR PRESENCE AT THE CURRENT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS NOW INITIATED COULD BE FOLLOWED UP BY SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS AT A TIME AND PLACE WHICH WOULD BE MUTUALLY CONVENIENT. IN ALL SUCH EFFORTS I SHALL OF COURSE BE HAPPY TO BE OF HELP, IF SO DESIRED.

I FEEL THAT THE IDEAS I HAD EXPRESSED, PERHAPS TOO TERSELY, IN MY INTRODUCTION TO THE ANNUAL REPORT, NEEDED TO BE SPELT OUT A LITTLE. IT IS WITH THIS THOUGHT IN MIND THAT I ADDRESS THIS LETTER TO YOU. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT YOU WILL WISH TO GIVE THIS SUGGESTION YOUR

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 USUN N 06862 050128Z

MOST EARNEST CONSIDERATION. END TEXT.

GP-3.

BUFFUM

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Classification

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: USUN, NEW YORK

Info

INFO:

SUBJECT: SYG's Four Power Proposal

REF: USUN's 6862

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 97-136

By 105 NARA Date 9-2-98

1. Pursuant Sisco-Popper telecon following are our tentative views re SYG's draft letter.
2. Letter does nothing to alter our generally adverse reaction to proposal when first made by SYG. SYG is clearly reaching for some area in which measure of agreement could be reached by Foreign Ministers, in hope that any progress announced, even if optical rather than real, would help to reverse current deterioration of international situation. While we would like nothing better than solid basis for engendering optimism, we see nothing in SYG's letter which would be likely to result in kind of improvement he has in mind. On contrary, negative reaction of those suspicious of or resentful at being omitted from four power meeting would be decidedly harmful factor.

Drafted by

IO:DHPopper:mtb

Pal. Ex.

5243

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by

The Acting Secretary

Clearance

EUR - Mr. Springsteen

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

S/S

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
Classification

3. SYG suggests that first concern of a Four Power Foreign Ministers meeting might be to tackle peacekeeping and financing problems of the UN. The tangle of UN constitutional and financial problems arising from UN peacekeeping expenses is so complex, and it has so solidly resisted solution by other means, that in our opinion it would be fruitless to present it to a Foreign Ministers meeting without lengthy technical preparation and a prior determination that sufficient area of agreement existed to warrant Foreign Ministers' consideration. Further, we do not believe that reaffirming Charter principles and accepted rules of international conduct could in itself provide basis for a Foreign Ministers meeting.

4. We find it equally difficult to believe that four Foreign Ministers meeting in immediate future could be of any assistance in Jarring's Mission. In the weeks ahead, what is required to help Jarring is not direct intervention/^{by four powers}-- three of which would in varying degrees be at odds with us as to what should be done -- but rather the exertion of influence by each of them upon the parties to cooperate with Jarring in reaching agreements. Similarly, Four Power discussion hardly seems best way to make progress on arms control problems at present.

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS
Classification

5. Disappointment and frustration which would arise from unfocussed Foreign Ministers meeting without clear substantive result would be enhanced if preparations were begun, as SYG suggests, for 1969

Summit - unless some element not now apparent makes such a ~~max~~ meeting

desirable. *{ We are not prepared at this time to in effect
commit a new administration to a summit in 1969. }*

6. In short, the risk of holding an unproductive meeting, which the SYG himself recognizes, seems to us overriding at this time. Since Foreign Ministers will shortly be leaving New York, and ~~an~~ adequate preparation for a Four Power meeting is hardly possible, we prefer to follow SYG's suggestion (which we ourselves originally made when SYG first broached Four Power idea) of bilateral discussions among Foreign Ministers. If these discussions should produce a feeling that a Four Power meeting would be useful, we would certainly inform U Thant. Meanwhile, we would see no problem with an informal dinner of the kind the SYG hosted for the Foreign Ministers in the past, if that should be ~~his~~ his desire this year.

7. Accordingly, we suggest you tell Bunche that, having studied the draft letter, we are still unconvinced that a formal request for a Four Power meeting is a good idea and that we hope the SYG will not send such a letter. We would not want to be put in position of formally

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

Classification

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~
Classification

turning down a specific proposal by the SYG, and we are sure that SYG would not want to make a formal proposal without advance assurance of forthcoming response.

GP-3

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Classification

Saturday, Oct. 5, 1968
1:25 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

The text of Sen. Muskie's letter of Jan. 18, 1968 (attached at Tab A) is, in context, something of a proposal (but short of a flat recommendation) because:

-- he says "it seems to me";

-- he presents a concrete alternative to San Antonio.

But, of course, he also says: "We might then consider...".

You may wish also to recall, however, his flat support for your March 31 formulation on Viet Nam (see Tab B).

The rest of his Viet Nam correspondence is on Democratic political difficulties with the Viet Nam issue.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

75a

January 18, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

First of all, I would like to extend my congratulations on one of the best State of the Union messages I have heard, both in terms of delivery and substance. It represented strong and effective leadership.

Secondly, I would like to take this opportunity to say just a word on the subject of possible talks with Hanoi.

What I am about to say is no part of any public statements which I am making or plan to make on the subject. This letter is a private communication and suggestion. Attached is my latest public statement made for the Japanese Broadcasting Company.

My principal purpose is to convey to you my opinion that, from the point of view of Maine people, the response to Hanoi's latest overtures should be positive and that we should take some risk that meaningful talks can be developed.

I assume the strong possibility that Hanoi will not satisfactorily meet the San Antonio formula, either publicly or in a private and indirect communication.

It seems to me that we might then consider the following response:

1. Announce a cessation of the bombing;
2. Announce that it is unconditional; but
3. Make it clear that the American people and the world will watch carefully to note whether Hanoi will respond promptly

Tef A

The President

- 2 -

January 18, 1968

with equivalent restraint and a good faith movement toward negotiations.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely,

A stylized, handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'E. Muskie'.

Edmund S. Muskie
United States Senator

Enclosure

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

756

REMARKS BY SENATOR EDWARD S. MUSKIE
ON VIETNAM
FOR JAPANESE BROADCASTING COMPANY INTERVIEW
JANUARY 16, 1968

I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TWO POINTS AT THE OUTSET WHICH ARE NOT EMPHASIZED ENOUGH.

1. NO MEMBER OF THE U. S. SENATE ADVOCATES A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM.

2. NO MEMBER OF THE SENATE SUPPORTS THE IDEA OF SUCH UNLIMITED AND UNRESTRAINED APPLICATION OF OUR MILITARY POWER AS WOULD RISK WAR WITH RED CHINA OR THE SOVIET UNION.

THERE IS DISAGREEMENT, OF COURSE, AS TO WHAT MILITARY MEASURES MIGHT CARRY SUCH RISKS.

THERE IS BROAD SUPPORT IN THE SENATE FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT THE WAR SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

THERE IS DISAGREEMENT AS TO THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS FOR INITIATING NEGOTIATIONS--THERE IS DISAGREEMENT ALSO AS TO WHETHER THERE IS ANY DISPOSITION ON THE PART OF HANOI TO MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS.

CENTRAL TO THIS DISAGREEMENT IS THE QUESTION OF STOPPING OUR BOMBING IN THE NORTH.

MY OWN POSITION ON THIS QUESTION IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. CESSATION OF THE BOMBING IS CLEARLY A RESULT STRONGLY DESIRED BY HANOI.

PRESERVATION COPY

2. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER, BECAUSE OF OUR BOMBING, OR FOR OTHER REASONS, HANOI CONSIDERS NEGOTIATIONS OR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO BE DESIRABLE IN ITS OWN INTERESTS.

3. MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS - i.e., NEGOTIATIONS WITH A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF ENDING THE MILITARY CONFLICT--ARE NOT LIKELY UNLESS EACH SIDE CONSIDERS THEM TO BE IN ITS OWN BEST INTERESTS.

4. IF AND WHEN A GOOD FAITH MOVEMENT TO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WOULD FOLLOW CESSATION OF OUR BOMBING OF THE NORTH, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE SUCH ACTION.

WE ARE NOW CAREFULLY EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY THAT HANOI IS PREPARED FOR SUCH MOVEMENT. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE INITIATIVES, AND REASONABLE RISKS, TO ENCOURAGE SUCH A POSSIBILITY.

TWO CLEAR-CUT ISSUES ARE INVOLVED IN VIETNAM:

1. THE RIGHT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINY.

2. THE USE OF THE SO-CALLED NATIONAL WAR OF LIBERATION AS A TECHNIQUE OF COMMUNIST EXPANSION.

TO SUPPORT THE FIRST AND TO RESIST THE SECOND, WE ARE INVOLVED IN A WAR OF LIMITED OBJECTIVES--WITH A LIMITED APPLICATION OF OUR MILITARY POWER. WE DO NOT SEEK TERRITORY, OR BASES, OR THE DESTRUCTION OF NORTH VIETNAM.

I THINK WE RECOGNIZE THAT, IN A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, EACH SIDE MUST TAKE SOME RISK THAT THE OTHER SIDE MAY ULTIMATELY ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVE BY NON-VIOLENT MEANS, ALTHOUGH EACH WILL SEEK TO PROTECT ITSELF AGAINST THAT POSSIBILITY.

B.K. 78. McC.
75c

January 19, 1963

Dear Ed:

The President has your letter of January 16 as you requested.

Your views will have careful consideration.

Sincerely,

Mike Manatos
Administrative Assistant
to the President

Honorable Edmund S. Muskie
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

fs/jf

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1968

FOR WALT ROSTOW:

For your information.

Mike Manatos

M. M.

Nothing else sent to
Central Files as of 1/30/68
2412

RECEIVED
JAN 26 1968
CENTRAL FILES

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 19, 1968
Friday - 11:30 a.m.

mid 1200 n

(20)

75d

85

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Mike Manatos *M.M.*

Senator Muskie asked that I hand this to you. It has been acknowledged.

COMMITTEE
7/1/68
RECEIVED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1968
Wednesday, 5:15 p.m.

EXECUTIVE - (6)

SP3-236/ST26

SP3-236/ST19

Ivi/1968/FG216 15c

FG-100

ND19/00312-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Mike Manatos *M.A.*

Senator ^XMansfield and Senator ^XMuskie *Edmund S.* called jointly to say they were delighted with your statement on Vietnam. They tell me the reaction in the Senate is overwhelmingly in favor of your position.

They also urged me to get word to you that they hope that you could stop by the Congressional Dinner tomorrow night even for just a few moments if you are pressed for time. Apparently they have a gift for you. Mansfield and Muskie indicated the response to your appearance would be completely overwhelming.

SEE IF WE
CAN GET GOOD
RECEPTION

MAINE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

April 1, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Your speech last night was one of the most moving and effective I have heard. The real Lyndon Johnson came through in a really magnificent way.

Jane and I pray that, in these next weeks, what you have done, and the sacrifice you have made, will bring the honorable peace to which you have dedicated yourself.

I want to add that I am proud to have been associated with you and your Administration in what I am sure will be counted as historic achievements.

Sincerely,

Edmund S. Muskie
United States Senator

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Tab B

Pres File
*76***CONFIDENTIAL**Saturday, October 5, 1968
1:15 p. m.**MR. PRESIDENT:**

Nick Katzenbach just called me about Bob Komer's situation.

1. We have Turkish agreement.
2. The story is likely to leak, since the agreement is known to the Turkish Embassy in Washington.
3. Nick has a genuine fear that Fulbright and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee doves will go to the wars against Bob because of his Vietnam connection. He even fears they might not report out his name favorably.
4. Therefore -- if you share his assessment -- he thinks you might make an interim appointment after the Congress goes home. It should, ideally, in Nick's judgment, be perhaps a week after Congress adjourns to avoid the charge of bad faith.
5. On the other hand, should the story leak, there may be trouble with this track.
6. Nick asked me simply to report to you his view of the dilemma, which he perceives.

W. W. Rostow**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 2-1-93

Pres. J. E.

77

Saturday, October 5, 1968 (12:45 p.m.)

Mr. President:

The most important part of this memo is on pages 2-3 -- where the refugee question is discussed. These Czechoslovak-Americans are genuinely concerned. However, they do understand the basis of our present policy. I took extensive notes in their presence, and I think they realize you are getting a full report of their views.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 42724
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 16, 1983.

BY 18 ON 2-1-93

77a

Thursday, October 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants:

Senator Frank J. Lausche
Mr. Martin Hrabik - Pres., Amer. Comm. for Liberation of Czech.
Mrs. Miloslava Hyvnar - Editor, Novy Svet-Czech Daily News
Honorable Ralph J. Perk - VP, Amer. Comm. for Liberation of Czech.
Mr. Alexander Mikula - Director, Slovak Voice of Cleveland
Mr. Steve Suhajcik - Nat. VP, Slovak League of America
Mr. Andrew Hudak, Jr. - Pres., N. Ohio District of Slovak League
Mr. W. W. Rostow
Mr. N. Davis

SUBJECT: Czechoslovak-American Leaders' Present Petition

Senator Lausche accompanied six Czech-American and Slovak-American leaders from Ohio to present a proclamation calling upon Americans from "the lowest to the highest office" to come to the aid of the Czech and Slovak people. The proclamation, sponsored by the American Committee for the Liberation of Czechoslovakia, was signed with about 10,000 names. Mr. Rostow accepted it on behalf of the President.

The visitors said they realized we could not go to war to aid the Czechs and Slovaks. Nevertheless, they were interested in the considerations that went into U. S. policy. Mr. Rostow explained that we had had to ask ourselves, first: whether we had a treaty or clear commitment to defend Czechoslovakia. The answer had to be no. We had had to ask ourselves if our Western European allies would join us in such an enterprise. The answer had to be that allied support would be unlikely. We had had to ask ourselves whether the Czechs and Slovaks wanted us to engage in war. The answer there, too, appeared to be no, as evidenced by the Czechs' own decision not to resist the invasion by force of arms. The Czechs apparently chose political rather than military struggle. They made no appeal to the United Nations for military assistance. Their attitude toward us seemed to be that we should "lie low" in the period before the invasion. We were really in no position to go to war. The visitors affirmed that they understood.

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER, DISCLOSED FOR E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 16, 1993.

BY NS ON 2-1-93

The visitors proposed the radical curtailment of cultural and economic relations with the Soviet Union. Messrs. Rostow and Davis explained what we had already done in the cultural and political field. So far as economic relations were concerned, Mr. Rostow explained that the Soviets' principal trade was with Western Europe, and the Western European nations were not prepared to enter into an economic boycott. Our economic relations with the Soviet Union are marginal, and do not provide a practical instrument to force a change in Soviet policy. The visitors raised the analogy of Rhodesia -- saying that the UN had voted sanctions. They said we seemed more willing to help Asians than a Christian nation in the heart of Europe.

The visitors proposed throwing the Russians and their allies out of the Olympic Games in Mexico City. They said the Olympics authorities had taken this step against South Africa -- so why not Russia? They said they had sent a message to Brundage along these lines. They hoped the Communist athletes, if they were expelled, would carry home a message about the outrage of the world.

The visitors raised the plight of the Czechoslovak refugees in Vienna and elsewhere. This, they said, was their greatest concern. They asked why the American government had not speedily opened our doors to the Czech refugees, as we had after the Hungarian uprising. Mr. Rostow pointed out that the two situations were different and explained why. The visitors said they must frankly acknowledge that there were suspicions of collusion or some sort of agreement between the Americans and the Russians. Canada and Australia had opened their doors, but America had not.

Mr. Rostow said he believed he was in a position to know whether there had been any understandings between the Soviet and American Governments. He could say categorically that no responsible American official had entered into any agreement or understanding with the Soviets about Czechoslovakia. The visitors indicated that they accepted this assurance.

Mr. Rostow explained some of the arguments for the refugees returning to Czechoslovakia or staying in Europe, closer to their homeland. Senator Lausche expressed his view that the Czechs should get out, and should come here. Another of the visitors said the Swiss were opening their doors to the ablest and best trained of the refugees -- people who would be a great asset to America.

Messrs. Rostow and Davis explained the present refugee situation. Briefly, there are 10,000 immigration numbers available this fiscal year for refugees. As of the present time only two or three thousand of these numbers have been exhausted. The problem is not in any non-availability of immigration numbers at the present time -- although this question could become acute in a few months. There is some problem in the processing time required for refugees -- which takes up to two or three months. Our people in State, INS and other agencies are working very hard to cut this lag and are having some success. Another problem is the fact that the Czechs in Vienna are often uncertain whether they want to become refugees. There are thousands who have not registered for immigration and who are waiting to see how events in Czechoslovakia come out.

The visitors raised the question of financial assistance to the Czech refugees in Vienna. Mr. Rostow said that private agencies -- principally church-related -- are working hard in this area, with substantial U. S. support. However, Mr. Rostow promised to look into the whole question of obstacles to entry into the U. S., and financial assistance.

Mr. Rostow said he would report the meeting and the visitors' concern to the President, as he knew the President wished to be informed. The visitors expressed their thanks.

ND:ksb

VIA LARRY TEMPLE

Saturday, Oct. 5, 1968
11:05 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bill Jorden postponed his departure to Paris until tonight in order to get some family things done.

If you had a moment to have him come by and shake your hand, it would strengthen his hand in Paris with the delegation and the press.

As I indicated yesterday, he can give you a more accurate picture of the delegation press contacts than anyone else. He would be completely candid with his President.

It is George Christian's judgment, so far as Bill's ability to handle the Paris press, that it would be useful if you could briefly see him.

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

79

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET CODEWORD~~

Saturday, October 5, 1968
10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read this
heartening account of the improve-
ment in the Saigon port.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-80
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-3-03

Saigon Port

6. "Outside of Yokohama this is the best port in the Far East," according to a US merchant ship captain. Two years ago, Saigon was one of the worst ports in the Far East. Today, however, congestion at the port, which had slowed down delivery of cargo essential to the military and economic stabilization efforts, has been eliminated.

7. Cargo unloading is now as efficient as in any other port of comparable size, and losses in delivery are no greater than those in other major ports in the world. Ship turn-around time has been reduced from 58 days in October 1966 to six days at present. The number of commercial ships waiting off shore for berthing space in Saigon has dropped during the same period from 25-35 to zero.

8. Two factors have led to this improvement: a reduction in the amount of cargo handled and better port management. Some of the burden has been lifted from the port of Saigon with the opening of other ports along the coast and the completion in mid-1967 of Newport, a purely military facility in Saigon. In addition, the slowdown of commercial import activity since Tet and faster pick-up of merchandise by importers have also reduced the amount of cargo in the port. Better management has been achieved through the joint efforts of Vietnamese port officials and US advisory teams.

9. Charges of corruption are also less frequent, as bribe demands have been reduced to more tolerable levels following the introduction of improved accountability controls in the port. Most of the remaining complaints now center on the stevedoring firms,

which can make life difficult for customs brokers, shipping agents, and importers by stacking goods carelessly to conceal thefts or claim difficulty in locating specified goods. Losses of US aid grant commodities between ship and final destination have been reduced to less than four percent, and wholesale diversions have been eliminated.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-182

By isl, NARA, Date 3-23-06

Pres file
80

Saturday, October 5, 1968
9:55 a. m.

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I recommend that you read this interesting CIA memorandum.

It arose from a question from Sect. Rusk. He asked if the substantial repositioning of enemy forces in the northern part of South Vietnam and around the DMZ could have anything to do with a decision to accept our DMZ proposition. The answer is that:

- the repositioning is substantial;
- it can be explained by operational factors;
- it is consistent with practice in previous years;
- the enemy continues to "pump large quantities of material into the area north of the DMZ;"
- there is no reduction in the average level of enemy firing from within and across the DMZ.

Report concludes:

"It seems unlikely, therefore, in view of the strategic value of the DMZ area to the Communists, that they would easily acquiesce in any agreements with the allies which tended to restrict their operations in, through, and south of the DMZ, let alone unilaterally reduce their forces to any substantial degree in this area for other than a short breathing spell. For Hanoi to agree to neutralizing the DMZ would require it to make a major shift in its basic strategy for waging war in South Vietnam."

I agree with the CIA assessment. But it is also true that what the enemy is doing is what he would do if he expected that he might enter into a DMZ agreement, since the forces pulled back into Laos would be very vulnerable under a DMZ agreement and the forces pulled north of the DMZ would be in violation of such an agreement.

We shall continue to watch this matter closely from both a military and a diplomatic perspective.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET - TRINE~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-87
By is NARA, Date 1-26-04

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

80a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
5 October 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Status of North Vietnamese Forces in the
DMZ Area

1. A partial repositioning of North Vietnamese combat units from the northern portion of South Vietnam to base areas in Laos and north of the DMZ has been under way since early August. Similar, although somewhat less extensive, moves in this area have been noted in the past when the weather has made it difficult for the enemy to keep his troops supplied or when enemy units have taken extremely heavy casualties. This year, successful allied spoiling operations and destruction of important caches of enemy food and munitions, coupled with the effects of Typhoon Bess, have made it unusually difficult for the North Vietnamese to keep their full complement of units in operation in this region.

Tri-Thien-Hue Area

2. The first North Vietnamese units noted in the current pullback from their operational area in northern I Corps were those which had been positioned in the A Shau Valley - Hue area. Beginning in early August and continuing through mid-September, the senior Communist regional headquarters in this sector, its forward tactical command headquarters, and elements of four North Vietnamese regiments--the 6th, 9th, 29th and 90th--were detected [] moving northwestward into the Laos panhandle. Some of these units may have subsequently moved farther northward into the western DMZ area.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-79
By ja, NARA, Date 5-30-03

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3. A number of North Vietnamese units, nevertheless, still remain deployed along the northern coastal plain from Hue to Quang Tri city. These units include the North Vietnamese 4th, 5th, 803rd, and 812th regiments and battalion-sized units from the 90th Regiment.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

4. There is a considerable body of evidence [REDACTED]

indicating that the pullback from the Hue - A Shau Valley area was caused by a combination of factors including heavy losses suffered in clashes with allied forces, disruption to their major logistics pipeline by allied operations in the A Shau Valley, and problems of health and resupply because of poor weather. It should be noted that most major enemy units in this sector were not included in the general pullback of Communist forces for rest and re-fitting which occurred elsewhere in South Vietnam during the combat lull last June and July. Units in this area remained relatively active in combat during the period. Thus, the enemy command probably had additional reason for pulling them out of line at this time when local conditions were working against them.

DMZ Area

5. The repositioning of major enemy units from south of the DMZ to base areas north of the Ben Hai River began on 23 September, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[]

7. In past years, Hanoi has made a practice of pulling its major units operating in and south of the DMZ back into base camps in North Vietnam after being on the firing line for a while or after suffering heavy casualties. []

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[]

8. In the eastern DMZ area, there has been a general lack of significant ground contact over the past two weeks. []

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[]

9. In the western portion of the DMZ area, there has also been a drop in enemy activity in recent weeks. Information on enemy units in this area is very scant, however, and there has been no heavy enemy action in the area since the siege of Khe Sanh was broken last spring.

Logistics Activity and NVA Artillery Firings in the DMZ Area

10. []
[] the enemy continues to pump large quantities of material into the area north of the DMZ. []
[]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

-3-

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

[]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

11. Despite heavy flooding south of the 20th parallel, the North Vietnamese continue to move large quantities of material toward the DMZ, using boats when roads become impassable. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Preliminary totals for September indicate that shipments to the DMZ area were substantially higher than in August. A good portion of these supplies consisted of heavy 130-mm. field artillery ammunition.

12. North Vietnamese artillery firings in the DMZ also remain fairly constant. Shellings from within and north of the DMZ during September averaged some 15 rounds per day compared with 23 per day in August and 20 per day in July. There has been no significant decrease in enemy fire in this area during the past few days. Enemy artillery firing from within South Vietnam just south of the DMZ also is continuing. On 3-4 October, for example, an allied position near Gio Linh received 170 rounds of 105-mm. artillery fire and 30 rounds of 82-mm. mortar fire. This was the heaviest barrage in the area just south of the DMZ since 29 June.

Enemy Strategy

13. All indications are that the current repositioning of North Vietnamese forces in the northern I Corps and DMZ areas fits in with past enemy military practice and can be explained adequately on the basis of the enemy's tactical military needs. The evidence indicates that the North Vietnamese continue to pump supplies into the area north of the DMZ and that, as in the past, they are keeping some units active in a harassing role in this area despite the current pullback of many major units into base areas.

14. There is ample documentation both in the statements of enemy military leaders and in the pattern of their military action in this area that

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[REDACTED]


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they regard the confrontation of military forces in the DMZ sector as having considerable strategic significance for their position in the war. They have managed through their operations in this area to keep a large complement of allied forces tied down in the northern two provinces. These forces have not been available for deployment to other combat areas in South Vietnam. The ready enemy access to safe refuge and short supply lines in this area has also been a major favorable factor in their operations.

15. It seems unlikely, therefore, in view of the strategic value of the DMZ area to the Communists, that they would easily acquiesce in any agreements with the allies which tended to restrict their operations in, through, and south of the DMZ, let alone unilaterally reduce their forces to any substantial degree in this area for other than a short breathing spell. For Hanoi to agree to neutralizing the DMZ would require it to make a major shift in its basic strategy for waging war in South Vietnam.

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Current Deployment of Major Communist Forces in the DMZ Area and Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue



SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NIJ 03-182

By: iol NARA, Date: 3-23-06

TOP SECRET

E.O. 12958

2.3(c)(1)

SECRET

TOP SECRET

506

Sat., Oct. 5, 1968
10:15 a. m.

Pres file
81

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft instruction
you requested.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

instruction not sent

81a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense

As the Presidential campaign moves into its final stages, I wish to reaffirm the instruction I have previously given.

All contacts between the candidates, or their representatives, and members of this Government should be reported to me -- if possible, before they take place. If that is not possible, I wish to be informed immediately of the nature of the contact and the full substance of any communications which occur.

I wish this instruction to be passed to your colleagues.

LBJ:WWR:mz

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADJUTANT
MARKING, CANCELLED FOR
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY 19 ON 2-25-93