

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

175

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to the President re Peru 1 p <del>C</del> <i>open 5-25-95 NLS 94-325</i>	10/15/68	A
#1a draft	draft letter, LBJ to Romulo Betancourt 1 p <del>PCI</del> <i>open 2/13/02</i>	10/15/68	A
#1b letter	Betancourt to LBJ, translation 2 p <del>PCI</del> <i>open 2/13/02</i>	10/07/68	A
#3 memo	Rostow to the President, 8:20 p.m. 2 p <del>C</del> <i>re Ghana [dupl # 4 NSF CF Ghana Vol 3] open 1/02</i>	10/15/68	A
#3a memo	Zwick to LBJ 1 p <del>C</del> <i>[dupl # 4b NSF CF Ghana, Vol 3] open 1/02</i>	10/10/68	A
#3b memo	Gaud and Freeman to LBJ 2 p <del>C</del> <i>[dupl # 4c NSF CF Ghana, Vol 3] open 1/02</i>	10/04/68	A
#3c rpt	Symington Amendment Determination 1 p <del>C</del> <i>[dupl # 4e NSF CF Ghana, Vol 3] open 1/02</i>	n.d.	A
#17 memo	Rostow to the President re Chad 1 p <del>C</del> <i>open 1/02</i>	10/14/68	A
#17a cable	Fort Lamy 2533 2 p <del>C</del> <i>open 1/02</i>	10/12/68	A
#20 memo	Rostow to the President, 5:30 p.m. 1 p <del>C</del> <i>open 1/02</i> (duplicate, #163, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 10)	10/14/68	A
#20a report	Situation Report 3 p <del>C</del> <i>open 1/02</i> (duplicate, #163a, as above)	10/14/68	A
#21 memo	Rostow to the President, 1:15 p.m. 1 p <del>C</del> <i>open 8-28-96 NLS 94-171</i> (duplicate, #20, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3)	10/14/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 99, October 10-15, 1968, Box 40)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#22 memo	Rostow to the President, 11:20 a.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p <del>C re Ambassador Elbrick</del> (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 14, 1968")	10/14/68	<del>A</del>
#22a memo	Katzenbach to the President <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p <del>S</del> (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 14, 1968")	n.d.	<del>A</del>
#28 cable	CAP 82561 re Panama <i>open NLJ 99-250 (1/02)</i> 2 p <del>S</del> (duplicate, #84, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 10)	10/12/68	<del>A</del>
#29 cable	CAP 82558 re Vietnam 2 p <del>S</del> <i>open 1-20-94 NLJ 93-221</i> (duplicate, #12, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "7 D (3) News Media Coverage of Vietnam, 4/68-12/68")	10/12/68	<del>A</del>
#30 cable	CAP 82555 re Panama <i>open #1/02</i> 1 p <del>S</del> (duplicate, #89, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 10)	10/12/68	<del>A</del>
#42 note	Rostow to the President, 2:10 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-134 9-2-98</i> 1 p <del>S</del> re Middle East <i>[dupl # 127 w/ Agency File, vol 11]</i>	10/11/68	<del>A</del>
#42a cable	USUN 7019 <i>Open NLJ 97-136 9-2-98</i> 1 p <del>S</del> <i>[dupl # 127a w/ Agency File, vol 11]</i>	10/11/68	<del>A</del>
#43 note	Rostow to the President, 10:15 a.m. <i>dupl # 32, NSF, CF, UN Paris</i> 1 p <del>S</del> re Vietnam <i>semi NLJ 019-040-4-2 (1/02)</i>	10/11/68	<del>A</del>
#43a cable <i>sanitized 5-13-03 NLJ [PAL 02-71]</i>	Intelligence report <i>dup # 32a as above</i> 2 p <del>S</del>	10/09/68	<del>A</del>
#43b cable <i>sanitized 5-13-03 NLJ [PAL 02-74]</i>	Intelligence report <i>dup # 32b as above</i> 3 p <del>S</del>	10/07/68	<del>A</del>
#44 note	Rostow to the President, 9:55 a.m. 1 p <del>S</del> <i>semi NLJ 019-040-4-5 (1/02)</i>	10/11/68	<del>A</del>
#44a cable <i>sanitized 5-13-03 NLJ [PAL 02-74]</i>	Intelligence report 2 p <del>S</del>	10/10/68	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#46 memo	Rostow to the President, 9:10 a.m. <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p <del>S</del> re France (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 11, 1968")	10/11/68	<del>A</del>
#46b cable	Paris 22225 <i>open 2/13/02</i> 5 p <del>S</del> (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 11, 1968")	10/11/68	A
#47 memo	Rostow to the President re Israel <i>open 2/13/02</i> 1 p <del>S</del>	10/11/68	<del>A</del>
#48 memo	Rostow to the President re Italy <i>open 2/13/02</i> 2 p <del>C</del> (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 11, 1968") <i>✓ # 6, NSF, Country File, Italy, "Unfiled - Filed by LBJ Library, Box 198"</i>	10/10/68	A
#48a memo	Katzenbach to the President re Italy <i>open 2/13/02</i> 2 p <del>C</del> (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 11, 1968") <i>✓ # 6a, usabme</i>	10/10/68	<del>A</del>
#48b report	Talking Points <i>open 2/13/02</i> 2 p <del>C</del> (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 11, 1968") <i>✓ # 6b NSF, Country File, Italy "Unfiled - Filed by LBJ Library, Box 198"</i>	n.d.	A
#49a memo	Katzenbach to the President re France <i>open 2/13/02</i> 3 p <del>C</del> (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 11, 1968") Sanitized, NLJ 85-284	10/10/68	A
#50a draft	draft cable, State to London <i>open 2/13/02</i> 2 p <del>S</del>	n.d.	A
#53 memo	Rostow to the President re U.K. <i>open NLJ 93-291 (1/02)</i> 2 p <del>C</del> (duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 11, 1968" and # 127, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 14)	10/10/68	A
#54 note	Rostow to the President, 4:45 p.m. <i>open 2-2-98 RAC</i> 1 p <del>S</del> re Vietnam	10/10/68	A
#54a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow <i>open NLJ 019-040-47 (1/02)</i> 1 p <del>S</del> re Vietnam	10/10/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#54b memo	MePherson to the President, 12:50 p.m. 1 p — S re Vietnam — <i>Open NLSJ 019-040-48(1/02)</i>	10/09/68	A
#56a memo	Adrian Fisher to the President — <i>open 9-16-94</i> 1 p — C re Non-Proliferation Treaty — <i>NLSJ 93-343</i>	10/10/68	A
#59b memo	Benjamin Read to Walt Rostow 1 p — C re Equatorial Guinea <i>open 2/13/02</i>	10/08/68	A
#61 note	Rostow to the President, 9:55 a.m. 1 p — S — <i>open 2/13/02</i> (dup., #78, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 8, Part 17)	10/10/68	A
#61a cable	Seoul 10338 2 p — S <i>open 2/13/02</i> (dup., #78a, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 8, Part 17)	10/10/68	A
#62 note	Rostow to the President, 9:15 a.m. <i>open 11-21-97 RAC</i> 1 p — S re Vietnam	10/10/68	A
[Aug # 55 #1, 1 EE (5) Box 44 ] #62a cable	Saigon 39970 5 p — S " "	10/10/68	A
#64a memo	Katzenbach to the President re Amb. Elbrick 2 p — C <i>open 2/13/02</i> (duplicate, #99f, NSF, Country File, Yugoslavia, Vol. 2)	10/08/68	A

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575

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
8 note <del>sanitized 6-6-03</del> NLJ 03-82	Rostow to the President, 4:05 p.m. 1 p TS <del>sanitized 3-25-05</del> NW/A204-183	10/15/68	A
8a memo <del>exempt 6-6-03</del> NW 03-83	Intelligence Memorandum 9 pp TS	10/15/68	A
<del>16 note</del>	<del>Rostow to the President, 5:30 p.m. <del>sanitized 8-22-97</del> NLJ 94-96</del> <del>1 p S</del> <del>Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 21, 6/26/84</del> <i>open 5-4-04 NLJ 03-186</i>	<del>10/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>16a cable</del>	<del>MAC 13895</del> <i>open nw 03-187</i> <del>7 pp S</del> <del>Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 8, 12/16/83</del> <del>Sanitized 3-19-96 NLJ 94-91 more released</del>	<del>10/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
23 note <del>sanitized 6-6-03</del> NLJ 03-82	Rostow to the President 1 p TS	10/14/68	A
23a report <del>sanitized 6-6-03</del> NLJ 03-83	Intelligence Report 1 p TS	[10/68]	A
33 cable	CAP 82547 <i>sanitized 5-9-04</i> NLJ 03-186 4 pp TS S Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 8, 12/16/83 <del>Sanitized 3-19-96 NLJ 94-91 more released</del>	10/12/68	A
51a cable	Intelligence Report <del>sanitized 10-21-97</del> NLJ 94-93 4 pp S <i>Move info released 5-4-04</i> NW 03-188	10/10/68	A
<del>63 note</del> <del>open 6-6-03</del> NLJ 03-95	<del>Rostow to the President, 9:15 a.m.</del> <del>1 p TS</del>	<del>10/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
63a cable <del>exempt 6-6-03</del> NLJ 03-84	Intelligence Report 1 p TS	10/9/68	A
<del>83b cable</del>	<del>CAP 82540</del> <i>open 5-8-01</i> NLJ/RAL 99-190 <del>1 p S</del>	<del>10/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Tuesday - October 15, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. Romulo Betancourt Concerning Peru  
          Coup

Former President Betancourt of Venezuela has written you about the coup in Peru (Tab B). He urges you to head a group of democratic governments in withholding recognition from the Peruvian Junta until it commits itself to holding elections.

A reply, recommended by the Department of State, is attached (Tab A).

W. W. Rostow

Approve     \_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_

Call me     \_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-325  
By lig, NARA, Date 5-11-95

Attachments

Tab A - Suggested Presidential letter for signature to former President of Venezuela, Dr. Romulo Betancourt.

Tab B - Letter of October 7, 1968 to the President from Dr. Romulo Betancourt.

SWLewis:mm

October 15, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciated receiving your letter of October 7 regarding the overthrow of the government in Peru by the military. We are also very concerned and disappointed by this unconstitutional action. I can assure you that it has been and will continue to be our firm policy to encourage democratic and constitutional rule in Latin America. To this end the United States has been consulting with our sister countries under Resolution 26 of the Second Inter-American Conference of Rio de Janeiro, 1965. As you suggest, we shall weigh very carefully the results of these consultations as well as indications from the military regime of its intentions prior to deciding about recognition.

I am pleased to have your advice and I can assure you this exchange will remain private and personal.

Sincerely,

*15/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

Dr. Romulo Betancourt  
Bern, Switzerland  
Kollerweg 5a, 3006.

*L*  
LBJ/SWLewis:mm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 1-29-02

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

16

(TRANSLATION)

R/II-R/32  
Spanish

Romulo Betancourt

LS NO.

Bern, October 7, 1968

His Excellency  
President Lyndon B. Johnson  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 1-29-02

Dear Friend:

I am writing to you on a personal basis, in the name of our good friendship.

What has happened in Peru has produced a wave of indignation in Latin America, whose reactions I know well. The Peruvian army has occupied Peru by force of arms, as the Soviet army occupied Czechoslovakia by force of arms. There are differences of degree but not of substance when it is national and not foreign soldiers who are occupying a country, availing themselves of their guns and tanks--brought, in the case of Peru, from the arsenals of the United States.

You would leave your name inscribed in indelible letters in the history of inter-American relations if the United States would head a group of democratic governments who would stand firm in making the establishment of diplomatic relations with those who have forcibly occupied the National Palace in Lima conditional on an express com-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

R/II-R/32  
Spanish

LS NO.

- 2 -

mitment to guarantee the full enjoyment of public liberties and the holding of elections within the next ten months, as provided by the Constitution, so that the people may elect a President and legislative bodies. This commitment could be imposed on the rebels through collective action by a group of governments pursuant to Resolution Twenty-Six of the Second Extraordinary Inter-American Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1965.

In highest esteem and sincere friendship,

/s/ Romulo Betancourt

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INFORMATION

Tuesday, October 15, 1968  
7:08 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk reports on  
the energetic and effective activities  
of Amb. McGhee.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

2a 3194

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I believe you will be interested in the attached summary of George McGhee's recent speaking engagements. You will recall that when we brought him back to Washington, we thought that speaking around the country would be one of his primary assignments. It seems to me he has done a very good job of it.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:  
Summary

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE

October 10, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THROUGH: S/S GR

FROM : Ambassador George C. McGhee

G.C.M.

SUBJECT: Speaking Engagements--INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. Pursuant to a request by the President in December of last year and by you upon my return from Germany in May, I have made 57 speeches or other appearances in 28 cities as follows: Boston, New York, Chicago, Milwaukee, Los Angeles, Palm Springs, Anaheim, Dallas, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Detroit, Salt Lake City, Las Vegas, San Diego, San Francisco, Bohemian Grove, Mobile, Atlanta, Minneapolis, St. Paul, Durham, Columbia, Charleston, Norfolk, Washington, Middleburg, and Hot Springs.
2. These audiences have ranged in size from dinner discussion groups--to the student body of The Citadel of 2,000, and have included many University groups and local Councils on Foreign Relations. The most important were: New York Council on Foreign Relations, New York Foreign Policy Association, Detroit Economic Club, Bohemian Grove Business Council, National Association of Manufacturers, Cleveland Committee and American Council on Germany. In each city I also held one or more press conferences and TV performances, usually panel discussions.
3. My subject matter varied somewhat, however, I basically sought to explain that the Administration has a sound and clear policy toward Europe and has not neglected Europe; that Europe was important to US interests and security; that there is still a strong Soviet threat to Europe; and that Americans should beware of isolationism and protectionism and support the Government's efforts in NATO and Europe.
4. I found, particularly after Czechoslovakia, almost complete acceptance of the themes I stressed, little criticism of Administration policy toward Europe, full appreciation of the importance of Europe and a general willingness to support a strong European policy. I found little sentiment, even before Czechoslovakia, for bringing our forces in Europe home.

MICROFILMED  
BY S/S: CMS

3  
ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 15, 1968 - 8:20pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: PL-480 for Ghana

Herewith Messrs. Freeman, Gaud and Zwick recommend a \$7 million PL-480 sale to Ghana. The package is mainly cotton textiles and dry milk. State and Treasury are on board.

This sale would supplement the \$12 million PL-480 deal for Ghana you approved in January. Their demand for textiles has been stronger than expected, and they need this cloth soon to keep the mills open. This agreement, however, will not add to our budgetary costs or total assistance to Ghana this year. As Zwick explains (TAB A), AID will simply hold back until next year the second tranche of the \$15 million program loan you authorized in April. This balances out to an even trade of a PL-480 sale Ghana needs and can use readily in place of AID money, which we will have in figuring next year's very lean loan proposal.

Whether PL-480 or a loan, the effect is to give General Ankrah crucial balance of payments help in rebuilding Ghana after the Nkrumah mess. The new government is doing a good job of self-help with reforms and devaluation; and our share in the Ghana aid group -- ten other donors plus the IMF -- is dropping. Last year we did 60%; this year less than half; and next year would have to be lower still.

There are no Conte-Long or Symington problems with Ghana, since Ankrah is keeping a tight rein on arms spending.

You may recall that Charlie Schultze had some misgivings about the relatively new use of textiles in PL-480 when you were deciding the first Ghana package in January. Charlie was concerned then about budgetary costs and inviting pressure from the textile industry. Your advisers agree now that those problems haven't materialized. Our main textile customers (Indonesia and the Dominican Republic as well as Ghana) haven't run up the cost of the total PL-480 program. In this sale to Ghana, for example, holding the AID money would make a simple budgetary swap. Moreover, the textile people have not been on us to inflate our shipments. The appeal comes

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By *plrg*, NARA, Date *1/21/02*

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straight from the Ghanaians, who badly need this temporary support to get back on their feet.

I vote you approve the sale.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:HS:RM:lw

Att: File #3182

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3182  
3a  
A

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 10 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Program for Ghana

In the attached memorandum, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your approval of a \$7.1 million P. L. 480 sale to Ghana. Sixty percent of the sale will be for local currency, and forty percent for convertible currency on forty years credit. The credit terms would be slightly harder than those in the agreement signed in January, 1968, because the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 raises the interest rate from 2-1/2% to 3% after the grace period. Commodities include cotton, cotton grey fabric and nonfat dry milk.


With this agreement, P. L. 480 sales to Ghana will total about \$20 million for calendar year 1968, in addition to a \$15 million program loan approved in April. This total level of assistance is about \$5 million more than was planned when you approved the program loan as part of a total \$70-\$80 million multilateral aid effort for this calendar year.

However, the strong demand for textiles requires larger than anticipated imports of cotton and grey cloth this year. In order to insure timely arrival, U.S. mills must receive orders now. For this reason, and to avoid a shutdown of Ghanaian textile mills, AID proposes to increase the P. L. 480 program. At the same time AID will reserve \$5 million of the 1968 \$15 million program loan. In this way, P. L. 480 will substitute for scarce AID funds.

Self-Help - Self-help conditions, dealing with stabilization and agriculture, will remain the same as those in the agreement signed in January.

Symington Amendment - The State/AID analysis of defense expenditures has not changed from that supplied in April and indicates no diversion of Ghana's resources to unnecessary military expenditures.

Recommendation - I recommend that you approve this P. L. 480 program.



Charles J. Zwisch  
Director

Attachment \_\_\_\_\_

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By gkg, NARA, Date 1/10/02

36 B

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

OCT 4 1968

SUBJECT: Public Law 480 Program with Ghana

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 supplementary agreement with Ghana to provide agricultural commodities during the remainder of calendar year 1968 having a total export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of \$7.1 million. Commodities to be offered would include 24.4 million linear yards of cotton grey fabric, 5,000 bales of raw cotton, and 250 tons of non-fat dry milk. Forty percent of the value of this program would be financed under convertible local currency credit terms over a 40-year period including a 10-year grace period. The interest rate during the grace period would be 2 percent and 2½ percent thereafter (or 3 percent thereafter if the rates are not yet in negotiation before you sign the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, which raises the minimum applicable rate). The balance of the program would be financed on local currency terms. The terms of this proposed agreement at 2 and 2½ percent interest are identical to those of the agreement signed January 3, 1968. The State and Treasury Departments concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

The Title I agreement for \$12.8 million signed in January 1968 provided for 20 million yards of cotton grey fabric, and 17,500 bales of cotton along with wheat flour, tobacco, and tallow. However, faced with a continuing strong demand for textiles and severely limited foreign exchange reserves, the Government of Ghana has found it necessary to request additional quantities of grey fabrics and cotton under PL 480 for the remainder of calendar 1968. The additional PL 480 commodities herein proposed will provide Ghana with balance of payments assistance as part of the overall U.S. strategy of support for Ghana's economic stabilization program. A.I.D. will in the light of the availability of these additional resources defer release of the second tranche of the FY 1968 program loan until the total FY 1969 PL 480 and program loan requirements are determined.

Self-Help

We are not proposing additional new self-help measures to be included in this agreement. However, we would make reference to the self-help measures contained in the PL 480 agreement signed January 3, 1968.

Symington Amendment

State/A.I.D. has determined that Ghanaian resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and that U.S. assistance is not being diverted to military purposes. (A summary of these conclusions is attached.)

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
Aid/Agri/ State Dept. Guidelines  
By Jrg, NARA, Date 1/21/02

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2

Recommendation

That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

September 25 1968

William L. Bond  
Administrator  
Agency for International Development

Donald H. Fausch  
Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3c

SYMINGTON AMENDMENT DETERMINATION

In May 1968, Ghana was listed as a "green light" country by the PPC Screening Committee. State/A.I.D., in consultation with the Inter-Agency Advisory Committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) (the Symington Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined (a) that Ghana's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and (b) that neither U.S. development assistance nor PL 480 sales are diverted by Ghana to military purposes. Among the principal factors in this determination are the following.

1. Defense expenditures as a per cent of GNP for 1966-1967 were 1.55 per cent, about the median for the region, and the trend of this defense share has been relatively stationary.

2. Defense expenditures as a per cent of central government expenditures for 1966-1967 were 9.3 per cent, again about the median for the region.

3. Foreign exchange spent for defense as a percentage of imports of goods and services is unknown, but it is clearly very small given the low level of defense expenditures.

4. The Country Team has reported that there is no evidence of U.S. development assistance (or PL 480 sales) being diverted to military expenditures.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
AID/State Dept. Guidelines  
By spjg, NARA, Date 1/20/02

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4

**INFORMATION**

**Tuesday - October 15, 1968 - 6:40pm**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: President Somoza's Personal Gratitude for US Assistance**

*Pres file*

President Somoza of Nicaragua has asked Ambassador Crockett to pass on to you his gratitude for your role in the AID loan for rural electrification cooperatives. He remembers the enthusiasm you expressed for this project during your Central American trip.

Crockett reports that Somoza recently briefed his nation via radio and television on the rural cooperative program. In his briefing, he stressed the role your personal support played in initiating this important Alliance for Progress effort.

Ambassador Crockett's letter with some accompanying press clippings are attached in case you wish to glance through them.

**W. W. Rostow**

**Attachment**

**10/11/68 letter from Ambassador Kennedy M. Crockett in Managua to William Bowdler.**

**SWLewis:mm**



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Managua, Nicaragua


October 11, 1968

William G. Bowdler, Esquire  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I thought you would be particularly interested in this expression of gratitude by President Somoza for President Johnson's support of the Nicaraguan rural electrification program. In this speech and in additional remarks to me yesterday, President Somoza praised the U. S. Government's role in helping his country to develop rural electrification cooperatives--and in particular asked me to convey to President Johnson his appreciation for this AID loan.

Sincerely,

  
Kennedy M. Crockett

Enclosure.

A-460

UNCLASSIFIED

TO : Department of State

FROM : Amembassy MANAGUA

Oct. 12, 1968

SUBJECT: President Somoza Praises U. S. Assistance to Nicaragua's Rural Electrification Cooperatives

JOINT STATE/AID

On October 10, 1968, President Somoza gave an hour-long briefing to the nation via radio and television, and subsequently reported in the press, on the rural electric cooperatives program which is being initiated with the assistance of an AID \$10.2 million loan. This briefing was the first step in the program designed to educate Nicaraguans as to the nature of the rural electric cooperatives, the steps necessary to carry out the program, and the economic and social benefits which will accrue to Nicaragua's people "regardless of race or political affiliation."

During the presentation the President emphasized the role of the United States, through AID, in Nicaragua's rural electrification program as well as President Johnson's specific interest in and support of the program. He also asked Ambassador Crockett to express his gratitude to President Johnson for the authorization of this loan. He added that during the San Salvador conference President Johnson had expressed his enthusiasm for the project, relating it to his own experience with rural electrification in Texas.

CROCKETT

Attachment:  
Press Clippings.

UNCLASSIFIED

AID:EW Coy:lm

10/11/68

DCM:MRBarnsby

PRESERVATION COPY

*Pres file*  
5

Tuesday, Oct. 15, 1968  
6:00 p. m.

**SECRET**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

If you want to know the mind of your field commander -- and read some first-rate prose -- go through the attached.

W. W. Reston

**SECRET-EYES ONLY attachment (MAC 13848 EO) "Operational Guidance"**

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 2-1-93

14 OCT 1968  
 O 130945Z ZYH ZFF-1  
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
 TO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
 GEN WHEELER CJCS  
 AMB BUNKER AMET SAIGON  
 ZEM

CSAF	/
CNO	/
CXC	/
DJ	/
J-3	/
J-4	/
J-5	/
SA	/
DIAP	/
WM	/
STATE	/
CIA	/
M/Plm	✓
PR	✓

*5a*

~~SECRET~~ MAC 13040 EYES ONLY

I HAVE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE TO MY COMMANDERS.  
 QUOTE SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE, REF: COMUSMACV MSG  
 DTG 230529Z SEP 68, SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE-4TH  
 QUARTER CY 68 (U).

1. THIS GUIDANCE IS IN EXTENSION OF THAT ISSUED IN REFERENCE.
2. THERE'S MORE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT THROUGHOUT VIETNAM TODAY THAN THERE'S BEEN SINCE THE START OF THE US BUILD UP. FRIENDLY UNITS ARE OPERATING IN AREAS ON WHICH THEY'VE NEVER BEEN BEFORE, E.G., THE SOUTHERN DMZ AND WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. LARGE CACHES HAVE BEEN CONFISCATED IN THESE AREAS. THE ENEMY LOGISTICS MACHINERY IS BEING EXPOSED, HIS CACHES SEIZED, AND HIS SUPPLY SYSTEM DISRUPTED. THIS SITUATION PRESENTS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS WHICH CAN DESTROY THIS MACHINERY AND HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR.

~~SECRET~~  
 EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3  
 DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1968  
 By *19* NARA, Date 2-193

3. THE ENEMY IS COMPELLED TO ACT IN CERTAIN WAYS BECAUSE HE'S CRITICALLY DEPENDENT UPON GUERRILLAS AND THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE FOR HIS EXISTENCE AND OPERATIONS. THE ENEMY HAS NO REAR PUSH SUPPLY SYSTEM. HE GETS HIS SUPPLIES STORED ALONG HIS AXES OF ADVANCE WELL AHEAD OF TIME. THESE AXES HAVE TO BE IN AND THROUGH VC CONTROLLED AREAS. ONCE SUPPLIES ARE IN FORWARD LOCATIONS CONTROLLED BY THE VC, THE ENEMY THEN ADVANCES ON HIS SUPPLIES. SO FAR, HE HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO ADVANCE HIS FORCES WITHOUT THESE SUPPLIES BEING IN PLACE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF HE PLANS TO ATTEMPT SOME ACTION TO COUNTER THE ALLIED OFFENSIVE, HE WILL BEGIN BY LOCATING HIS CACHES, MOVING IN EQUIPMENT, HOSPITAL SUPPLIES, AND FOOD. HE WILL ALSO MAKE PROVISION FOR EVACUATION OF HIS WOUNDED AND BURIAL OF HIS DEAD. THESE ARE THINGS THAT HE'S GOT TO DO IN ADVANCE, BECAUSE HIS DEPENDENCE ON THE VC MAKES HIS LOGISTICS SYSTEM FUNCTION WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF THAT REQUIREMENT. MOREOVER, EVEN A DEDICATED COMMUNIST SOLDIER HAS TO BE GIVEN ASSURANCE, HOWEVER ILLUSORY, THAT SOME PROVISION IS MADE FOR TAKING CARE OF THE WOUNDED.

4. ANOTHER POINT EVIDENT IN THE ENEMY'S OPERATIONAL PATTERN IN HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS IS JUST ONE, REPEAT ONE, WAR. HE KNOWS THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS A WAR OF BIG BATTALIONS, A WAR OF PACIFICATION, OR A WAR OF TERRITORIAL SECURITY. FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE GOT TO RECOGNIZE AND UNDERSTAND THE ONE WAR CONCEPT AND CARRY THE BATTLE TO THE ENEMY, SIMULTANEOUSLY, IN ALL THE AREAS OF CONFLICT. IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES, ALL ELEMENTS ARE TO BE BROUGHT TOGETHER IN A SINGLE PLAN--ALL ASSETS BROUGHT

~~SECRET~~

EVTC ANIV

EYES ONLY

TO BEAR AGAINST THE ENEMY IN EVERY AREA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WAY THE ENEMY DOES HIS BUSINESS. IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES, TACAIR, B-52'S, RF/PF, RD CADRES, AND CIDG, ALL ARE TO BE PART OF THE PLAN AIMED AT VC/NVA AND THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. ALL TYPES OF OPERATIONS ARE TO PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY, AGGRESSIVELY, PERSISTENTLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY-- PLAN SOLIDLY AND EXECUTE VIGOROUSLY, NEVER LETTING THE MOMENTUM SUBSIDE.

5. ASSUMING THAT THE ENEMY IS NOW PLANNING A WINTER-SPRING COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, IT CAN BE COMBATED SUCCESSFULLY, IF ONE DETERMINES THE WAY THE ENEMY WILL GO ABOUT IT. FIRST, HE WILL SET HIS OBJECTIVES. SECOND, HE WILL ESTABLISH HIS AXES OF ADVANCE, ALL BASED ON AREAS IN WHICH GUERRILLAS AND VC INFRASTRUCTURE ARE STRONG. THIRD, HE WILL WORK WITH THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND GUERRILLAS TO ESTABLISH HIS SUPPLIES IN DEPOTS OR CACHES. FOURTH, HE WILL MANEUVER HIS MAIN FORCE UNITS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SUPPLIES, SECURITY, RECONNAISSANCE, AND GUIDES PROVIDED BY THE GUERRILLAS AND VC INFRASTRUCTURE. HE WILL THEREBY MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF THE ONLY MANNER IN WHICH HE CAN MOVE, I.E., WITH THE HELP OF GUERRILLAS AND THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. THIS CAN BE DETECTED EARLY, USING RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ATTACK AGAINST ENEMY BASE AREAS, SUPPLY POINTS, MAIN AND LOCAL FORCES, AND THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE CAN CONTINUE UNABATED.

6. ACCORDINGLY, ALL COMMANDERS AT ALL ECHELONS ARE REQUESTED TO PLACE MORE EMPHASIS AND ATTENTION ON HOW THE ENEMY CONDUCTS HIS BUSINESS... HOW HE OPERATES, REQUESTING THEIR ARVN COUNTERPARTS TO DO THE SAME. THEN, UTILIZING THE KNOWLEDGE THUS GAINED, GO AFTER THE ENEMY'

~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

MACHINERY; CRACK HIS ENGINE BLOCK, DRAIN HIS OIL, STRIP HIS  
GEARS, BREAK HIS FUEL LINES, REMOVE HIS SPARK PLUGS, AND  
OTHERWISE PUT HIS ENGINE BEYOND REPAIR OR REBUILD. WE  
MUST DESTROY HIS LOCAL FORCES, GUERRILLAS, AND INFRA-  
STRUCTURE. BY DOING THIS HE CAN BE RENDERED INCAPABLE OF  
UNDERTAKING ANY FURTHER MAJOR ACTIONS. UNQUOTE

~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

*Pres file*  
*6*

Tuesday, Oct. 15, 1968  
5:45 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, as requested, a gung-ho message to General Abrams. My learned military colleague General Ginsburgh tells me that General Abrams will recognize the phrase "follow the enemy in relentless pursuit" as from Napoleon. He also tells me that every graduate of the Military Academy will know the quotation from Winfield Scott in the last paragraph.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 2-7-93

CONFIDENTIAL

(10/15/68)

6a

TO GENERAL ABRAMS FROM THE PRESIDENT

One hundred odd years ago President Lincoln found a general.

I have been lucky enough to find two field generals. In the last three months you have fully exploited the situation created during the last three years by your predecessor, General Westmoreland.

Today I have taken one more step which we all hope will lead toward peace -- the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. This step toward peace would not have been possible if you and Westy had not been successful on the field of battle.

But you and I know that the really crucial stage of both diplomatic and military operations is now upon us. If we are to win the kind of peace in Paris we want, you must keep the enemy on the run -- in South Vietnam and in Laos.

Make sure every plane and pilot released from bombing North Vietnam is brought to bear with full weight on good targets in Laos or in South Vietnam. In the three months in which I shall still be your Commander in Chief, I want you to lean on the enemy with all the manpower and equipment we have accumulated.

I want you to inspire the ARVN to do the same. If you need anything that we can get you quickly, let me know.

Your President and your country are counting on you to follow the enemy in relentless pursuit. Don't give them a minute's rest. Keep pouring it on.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 91-480  
By rs/jip, NARA, Date 2-17-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

**Let the enemy feel the weight of everything you've got.**

**With luck and with Abe, we shall conquer ourselves a peace in the next three months -- without the loss of a single battle or skirmish -- as General Winfield Scott did 120-some years ago.**

ACTION

*Pres file*

Tuesday, October 15, 1968 - 4:30pm

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed message to President Kenyatta of Kenya. October 20 ("Kenyatta Day") is the anniversary of his arrest by the British in 1952.

For the Kenyans this is a more meaningful anniversary than Kenyatta's birthday or maybe even the National Day. We have not advised sending messages on this occasion in years past in order to avoid a precedent for similar dates elsewhere in the post-colonial world. This year State points out that (1) a message would not be a precedent for the next Administration, and (2) Kenyatta has already suffered a severe stroke and might not live out the year.

I always try to guard your gates against needless messages. This one is not essential. But it would be a fitting gesture to one of the greats of African independence.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:HS:RM:iw

Att: File #3154

76

Proposed Message to President Kenyatta of Kenya

Dear Mr. President:

Our thoughts are much with you on this day which recalls your selfless struggle for the independence of Kenya. Your courage and dedication helped give birth to a great nation. Your strength and wisdom are building a just and progressive nationhood.

This is a date to be remembered, Mr. President, wherever men cherish freedom, dignity, and peaceful progress. America is deeply proud of our strong and lasting friendship with you and the people of Kenya.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

INFORMATION

8

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, October 15, 1968 -- 4:05 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a report on the status of Israeli nuclear weapons programs, which may bear on the Phantom negotiations.



3.3(b)(1)

There is a useful summary.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 04-183  
By sj, NARA, Date 3-2-05

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rln

**ACTION**

**Tuesday, October 15, 1968 -- 3:30 p.m.**

*Profile*

**Mr. President:**

**I have been invited as a dinner guest and speaker to The Tavern Club in Boston on the evening of October 17, Thursday.**

**It is a rather good, solid group of people who have, I suspect, invited me not merely as an old friend from the neighborhood but also to signal their distance from Ken Galbraith et al.**

**I once had to let them down at the last minute, and I would rather like to go up on Thursday unless something particularly acute is happening that evening.**

**I find that if I am to make a quick turn around, I could get up there by commercial aircraft but I could not return after dinner.  
Question: Would it be correct and agreeable for me to use a military aircraft to meet this speaking engagement?**

- Yes \_\_\_\_\_**
- No \_\_\_\_\_**
- Call me \_\_\_\_\_**

**W. W. Rostow**

**wwrostow:rla**

.10

INFORMATION

SECRET--SENSITIVE

Tuesday, October 16, 1968  
7:05 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith another indication of the  
accumulative effects of enemy operations  
in 1968.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET--SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 2-193

WWRostow:rln

10a

Document Reflects Communist Morale Problems

13. Morale problems among Communist units caused by the failure of battlefield results to match expectations are reflected in a notebook captured recently north of Saigon. The document indicates that the failure to achieve the expected "final victory" during the Tet and May attacks had caused some cadre and troops to become skeptical about the optimistic predictions of their leaders.

14. Notes dated mid-July assert perfunctory work among Communist forces prior to the Tet and May attacks was largely responsible for the subsequent morale problems. Cadre were again criticized for failing to indoctrinate the masses properly, precluding successful "uprisings." The document indicates that the Viet Cong high command was concerned over low morale, quoting a COSVN message which stated that despite the fact that the first two phases of the "general offensive" had not ended the war, no one must question the Communists' ability to win.

15. Among other difficulties cited in the notes, the "peace illusion"--a clear reference to the impact of the Paris talks--was said to be "tempting" some Communist cadre, and troops. In addition, several defectors were said to have disclosed Communist plans to the allies, with a "disastrous effect" on the subsequent attacks.

16. In view of the Communist failure to generate more military momentum during the third phase of their offensive in late August, more political reindoctrination seems likely to be of only limited value in bolstering Communist troop morale.

14 October 1968

**BRIEFING**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 15, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

**SUBJECT: Your telephone call from Prime Minister Gandhi --  
Tuesday, October 15, 12:35 p.m.**

Mrs. Gandhi is just passing through New York on her way from a visit to Latin America. She spoke to the UN yesterday on a development theme, and will leave tonight. She is just calling to say "hello."

We don't expect her to raise any matters of substance. You might draw on the following:

1. You hope she had a good trip to Latin America. (She visited Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia and Guyana. She had to scratch Peru because of the coup. We helped with her communications.)
2. You are sorry to hear about the floods in northeastern India. (This has been primarily a human tragedy with the death toll already in the thousands and the threat of a cholera epidemic. Their tea crop will be damaged. We have not been asked to help.)
3. Nick Katzenbach reported that our people had good talks in their mid-July session in New Delhi. We certainly hope that these frank and useful exchanges will continue.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ag, NARA, Date 2-1-93

WWR:HS:RM:lw

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, October 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Gift to President Tito

Nick Katzenbach has suggested that he take a gift from you to President Tito. At this time, with our concern for the stature of Tito and the continued independence of Yugoslavia, a gift from you would be a significant gesture.

State Protocol recommends that you send Tito a desk clock, like that you have given to other Chiefs of State. (The clock is provided, without cost, by the manufacturer.) It would be engraved as follows: "To President Tito from Lyndon B. Johnson, October, 1968."

If you approve, we can have this on Katzenbach's plane when he leaves this evening.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_  
Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ng, NARA, Date 2-93

CONFIDENTIAL

13

INFORMATION

Tuesday, October 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Here is the most comprehensive compilation of public statements you have made covering reciprocity.

The issue of a bombing halt did not become prominent until late in 1966.

W. W. Rostow

President's Message as Delivered Before a Joint Session of Congress, January 12, 1966

"We have also made it clear--from Hanoi to New York--that there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace. We stand by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any conference table, we will discuss any proposals--four points or fourteen or forty--and we will consider the views of any group. We will work for a cease-fire now or once discussions have begun. ~~We will respond if others reduce their use of force,~~ and we will withdraw our soldiers once South Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future.

News Conference of July 20, 1966

"Q. Mr. President, again in connection with the war in Vietnam, there is a recurrence of requests or recommendations that the United States again halt the bombing of North Vietnam. These requests have come from everybody from the Indian Prime Minister to factions in this country. What is your reaction to this sort of urging?

"THE PRESIDENT. The United States has made clear to the Government of India and to all other governments that at any time the Government of North Vietnam is willing to sit down at the conference table and discuss ways and means of obtaining peace in the world, that on a few hours' notice the United States will be there. "

"I do not think that we should spend all of our time, though, examining what the Government of the United States might be willing to do without any regard to what the enemy might be willing to do.

"We have stated again and again our desire to engage in unconditional discussions and I repeat them again today.

"But we can't talk about just half the war. We should talk about all the war, and we have not the slightest indication that the other side is willing to make any concession, to take any action that would lead to the peace table.

"~~And until there is some indication on their part, we, of course, would not expect to tie the hands of our men in Vietnam.~~"

News Conference of August 24, 1966

"Permanent" U. S. Bases in Southeast Asia

Q. Mr. President, on Viet-Nam, the point is sometimes made both by the Communists and some people in this country that the United States is building a lot of permanent-type bases in both Viet-Nam, and now Thailand.

Despite the fact that you have said that we don't want permanent bases out there, they don't seem to believe this and cite it as an obstacle in negotiation. Is there anything you could say to further clarify that point?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I can understand their doubt. I have made it as clear as I know how to make it, that we do not intend to maintain any bases in South Viet-Nam or Thailand, that we have no desire to keep our men there.

We are ready to stop the moment they are willing to stop. I have even asked that we give thought to planning how we could convert these bases to useful civilian purposes, and we are giving study to that now.

News Conference of September 8, 1966

"Q. Mr. President, President de Gaulle seems to feel that if the United States withdraws its forces from Vietnam, peace will come to southeast Asia.

"Could you comment on his remarks?

"THE PRESIDENT. We don't have any information to that effect. No one has communicated any evidence to that effect to us.

"I have made clear, I think, time and time again, that we love peace, we want peace, we are willing to do anything we can to achieve peace. But it is not a one-way street.

"We are willing to lay on the table at any moment our schedule for withdrawal from Vietnam, if someone can also lay on the table their schedule of withdrawal - and if we can give the freedom-loving, liberty-loving people of Vietnam any assurance that they will not be murdered, assassinated, or killed either by infiltrators or assassins."

"The great problem here is, as Mr. Steinbeck very properly stated it in his communication with his Soviet friend, 'We are very anxious to talk about the war and peace, but let's not talk about half the war. Let's talk about all the war. Let's not talk about just what the United States is doing; let's talk about what the aggressor is doing.'"

News Conference of September 21, 1966

"Q. Mr. President, could you please give us your assessment of the war in Vietnam, how it compares with the situation a year ago? And are there any chances of having it finished by June of 1967?

"We seek peace. We would like to see the shooting stop tomorrow. We would like to talk this thing out instead of fight it out. But as I have said so many times: Unless the aggressor is willing to give up his aggression, and sit down and talk, we have no choice except to try to defend and to protect these liberty-loving, free people. We are going to do that. And how long the aggressor will maintain his aggression will depend on his decision more than ours.

News Conference of October 13, 1966

"Q. Mr. President, a number of authorities have suggested that another pause in the bombing would bring about a good atmosphere for your trip. Could you discuss the pros and cons of another pause?

"THE PRESIDENT. No, Ray, I don't think I would like to discuss our strategy, the pros and cons. I would observe this: that we have had two pauses. It is about the same people, the same sources, who suggested the second pause. They asked for 12 days, and then 20, and it went 37 days that our boys sat there and watched the enemy.

"He didn't pause. He kept up his bombing. He threw his hand grenades. He lobbed his mortars into our troop encampments and killed our Marines, our airmen, our Army soldiers.

"I would be very interested at this moment in a pause if I could have ~~any assurance that it would be reciprocated~~ and the other people would pause.

"I don't quite understand, though, why you want me to have our Marines and our airmen pause and put their hands behind their backs while the other people don't pause, and continue to shoot at them.

"After all, those are our men. And if they will pause--the aggressor will pause, we will pause immediately. If they will withdraw, we will withdraw immediately. We will lay on the table tomorrow a schedule to move out of South Vietnam, to come home, to leave no troops in that area, to give up our bases--provided they will lay on the table their schedule for withdrawal, and their schedule to get their people to quit the killing and the murdering that is going on.

"Now if it develops that there is any hope that would flow from another pause, we always keep an open mind. We will make additional sacrifices if we need to. But I see nothing on the horizon at this moment that would justify my asking all 300,000 or 400,000 Americans to stand there with their hands in their pockets because someone here suggested they pause, unless their enemy would pause."

News Conference of November 4, 1966

"Q. Mr. President, on that point you said recently that only two nations want the fighting continued. Does this mean the United States has had some positive indication from the Soviet Union that it would like to see the fighting stopped?

"THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I believe most of the nations of the world would like to see the fighting stopped. I just can't conceive of any nation enjoying what is going on. I think most of them can realize the danger of continuing this unpleasantness.

"I don't know that many nations have much power to do anything about it.

"I know we want it stopped. We would like to stop it tomorrow. We would like to stop it today. We would like to stop it this minute.

"We will do anything we can, with honor, to stop it. We seek peace. We search for peace. ~~We are willing to do anything we can to get peace except surrender.~~ We are not asking any unconditional surrender on the part of the adversary. We are just saying to them, 'Come in the room, and let's reason together. Let's talk out our difficulties.'

"They refuse to do that.

"Now I don't know why they refuse to do it. I think as time goes on and they see that that is the better course, I hope they will do it. When they do, they will find us a willing participant in any meeting that can be agreed upon.

Q. Could you be more specific, sir, about the Soviet position?

"THE PRESIDENT. I said that I thought every nation, except our adversaries, would like to see the fighting stopped. I am not a spokesman for the Soviet Union. I cannot speak for Mr. Brezhnev, Mr. Kosygin, or Mr. Gromyko, but I have every reason to believe that they would like to see the fighting stopped as much as we would like to see it stopped. I think everybody else in the world would like to see it stopped.

"Perhaps the North Vietnamese would like to see it stopped but our communication is bad and at least up to this time we have been unable to convince them that the way to stop it is to come to the conference room.

"Now we don't know why. We wish we did know why. We would go more than halfway if we just knew which way to go.

"Mr. Harriman is going one way now. Mr. Bundy is going another way now. Mr. Black is going another way. Mr. Rusk will be going to the NATO meeting. I asked him to go back through Asia on his way there, the other way around.

"But until we can reason this thing out, we must maintain the strength to defend our men and to defend territorial integrity of the boundaries of our allies. We intend to do that."

13h

News Conference of December 31, 1966

"Q. Mr. President, would we consider dealing directly with the Vietcong in negotiating an end of the war, which U Thant seems to think is necessary and also stopping the bombing in the North sort of as a forerunner to peace negotiations?

"THE PRESIDENT. ~~We will be very glad to do more than our part in meeting Hanoi halfway in any possible ceasefire, or truce, or peace conference negotiations.~~

"I would be very interested in what their response is and what they would be agreeable to before irrevocably committing this country.

"If you can look at all the decisions they make and their reactions, I think we would better be able to determine our own.

"I have said on a number of occasions that we are ready to talk, any time and anywhere, that the Vietcong will have no difficulty in making their views known to us.

"But all the questions turn on when are we willing to do it, and are we willing to do it. The answer to those questions is a strong 'yes.' But up to this moment we have heard nothing from the other side.

"You just can't have a one-sided peace conference, or a one-sided cessation of hostilities, or ask our own boys not to defend themselves, or to tie their hands behind them, unless the other side is willing to reciprocate.

"Now, I assure you that we are willing to meet them more than halfway, if there is any indication of movement on their part."

News Conference of February 2, 1967

"Q. Mr. President, we have said in the past that we would be willing to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam in exchange for some suitable step by the other side. Are you prepared at all to tell us what kind of other steps the other side should take for this suspension of bombing?

THE PRESIDENT. ~~Just almost any step.~~

As far as we can see, they have not taken any yet.

And we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action that they or any of their spokesmen would care to suggest.

We have made one proposal after the other. We would like to have a cease-fire. We would be very glad to stop our bombing, as we have on two previous occasions, if we could have any indication of reciprocal action."

News Conference of March 9, 1967

"Q. Mr. President, sir, one point that some of your critics on Vietnam have discussed in the past week is the question of whether or not what we would ask in return for stopping the bombing has changed in the past year.

They say that a year ago, apparently we would have settled for simply getting talks if we stopped, whereas, now you are speaking of the need for reciprocal military action. Could you discuss this?

THE PRESIDENT. ~~We have talked about reciprocal military action in every pause we have had, Mr. Bailey.~~

We have had five pauses now.

On the first pause of 5 days we made it very clear that we were taking this action and we would keep our ear to the receiver and listen intently for any indication from the enemy that he would take reciprocal action.

Later, we had a 37-day pause. We were told before we went into that pause by some of the same people who are recommending a pause now, or urging a pause now, that if we would go into it for 12 days or at the most 20 days, we could get reciprocal action.

We went 37 days. They gave us no indication that they were willing to take any reciprocal action.

We have just finished a pause of 6 days during the Tet period.

At the beginning of each of these pauses we made it clear that we were going to pause, ask our men to withhold action, and give them an opportunity to agree to come to conditional discussions, unconditional discussion any kind of discussion. We have just completed that 6-day pause.

So I would respond to your question by saying at the beginning of each pause we made it clear that we would take action, we would listen intently for action on their part. We have. We have heard the same story every time."

"Q. Mr. President, you and Secretary Rusk have both talked of a military quid pro quo and reciprocal action in exchange for a halt in the bombing. I wonder if you could be specific and say what we would require from the other side as part of this quid pro quo?

THE PRESIDENT. I think a good, general way to express it is what I said at my last press conference--~~just almost any reciprocal action on their part~~ We have said that we would be glad to stop our invasion of North Vietnam if they would stop their invasion of South Vietnam."

~~We would be glad to halt our bombing if they would halt their aggression and their infiltration.~~ We are prepared to discuss anything that they are willing to discuss. But they are not willing to discuss anything, as of now. "

Tennessee Legislature, March 15, 1967

134  
"But reciprocity must be the fundamental principle of any reduction in hostilities. The United States cannot and will not reduce its activities unless and until there is some reduction on the other side."

News Conference of July 18, 1967

"Q. Mr. President, may I follow up Mr. Deakin's question and your answer? Is the United States position that we would only be willing to stop the bombing if there were reciprocal action on their side?"

"The President: The United States position is that we are ready to meet with them any time to discuss arrangements for bringing the war to an end on an equitable and just basis. We have never been able to get them or any of their friends to bring them to a conference table.

"Until we can, we are not able to explore with them what they might be willing to do. We hear from travelers and from self-appointed spokesmen from time to time this and that. On occasions we have attempted to confirm it, and we have negotiated directly with them.

"I think the last position stated by Mr. Ho Chi Minh is a safe statement of their viewpoint. I refer you--as I did Mr. Deakin--to their position as enumerated in that letter. Our position is that we would be glad to meet tomorrow, next week, or any time to discuss conditionally or unconditionally, on any basis, to see what they would be willing to do."

San Antonio, September 29, 1967

"The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."

News Conference, September 30, 1967

"Q. Mr. President, in the past you have mentioned a reciprocal move by North Vietnam as a condition for our either halting or decreasing the bombing. Last night in your San Antonio speech, you did not mention this reciprocity. Was this not mentioning it any change in our policy or any softening of our position?"

"The President: I will let that speech stand for itself. I don't agree, necessarily, with the first part of your statement, that in the past when I only referred to it I referred to it in a certain way. That is your statement and not mine."

Detroit, August 19, 1968

"This administration does not intend to move further until it has good reason to believe that the other side intends seriously to join us in deescalating the war and moving seriously toward peace."

New Orleans, September 10, 1968

" . . . the Commander in Chief has insisted that the bombing will not stop until we are confident that it will not lead to an increase in American casualties. That is why we have placed such emphasis on reestablishing the DMZ. "

14  
INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, October 14, 1968 - 7:10pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A Record Number of Treaties Ratified

*Pres file*

The Treaty Division at State tells me that the two treaty ratifications you have just signed will break the record since World War II for the number of treaties ratified during a single Congress.

With these two treaties, the 90th Congress will have given advice and consent--and you will have ratified--36 treaties. The previous record was 35 treaties, ratified by President Truman during the 82nd Congress. (Actually, the Senate has given advice and consent to six additional treaties, which are on their way to you for signature--including the Astronaut Assistance and Return Agreement. So your total for this Congress may rise to 42.)

You might wish to have George Christian put out these facts as a backgrounder, to show another accomplishment of the Congress and the Administration. Bill Hopkins will wait for word before he dates and forwards the two ratifications you just signed.

A table follows showing the top five figures for treaty ratifications since 1945:

90 Congress (President Johnson) -	36 ratified
82nd Congress (President Truman) -	35 ratified
84th Congress (President Eisenhower)-	30 ratified
83rd Congress (President Eisenhower)-	29 ratified
87th Congress (President Kennedy) -	25 ratified

cc: Mr. G. Christian

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MATTER. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12066  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY 19 ON 2-1-93

15

ACTION

Monday, October 14, 1968

6:50pm

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Departure message for Prime Minister and Mrs. Holyoake

The suggested text for the departure message to Holyoake follows:

"Dear Prime Minister and Mrs. Holyoake: As you depart the United States after this memorable visit, you carry with you the warm admiration and affection of my wife and myself, and indeed of all Americans. We know well the value of the contribution you and your country are making to the cause of peace with freedom in the world today. And we look forward to increasing progress and prosperity in your part of the world, for which New Zealand will deserve a full measure of credit.

"It is unlikely that I shall visit New Zealand again as President. Please tell the New Zealand people from me that the visit I made to your country in 1966 was one of the unforgettable experiences of my life. I will always remember the welcome you gave me, and I left your shores refreshed and buoyed up by the renewed conviction that New Zealand stands by our side. I have drawn strength -- as America draws strength -- from your loyal friendship.

"It is my most sincere hope that you leave America with that same feeling.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson."

I recommend you approve the message.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

STATE:MWright:wpt

W. W. Rostow

*Pres. file*  
16

Monday, Oct. 14, 1968  
5:30 p. m.

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This latest Abrams field assessment arrived today.

I believe you should read it to the end.

Note (p. 3) Abrams expects only 4600 infiltrators to arrive in the next two months.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~ attachment (fm Gen Abrams: MAC 13895 EYES ONLY)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-186  
By isw, NARA, Date 2-27-04

~~SECRET~~

DI' SECTION BY CJCS: /NRCS

*Admin*  
*16a*

- SEC DEF - MR CLIFFORD
- DEP SEC DEF - MR MITZE
- ASD/ISA - MR WARREN
- ASD/PA - MR GOULDING
- CSA - GEN WESMORLAND
- CSAF - GEN MCCONNELL
- CNO - ADM KOOPER
- CMD - GEN CHAPMAN
- DJS - ADM JOHNSON
- DJ-3 - GEN MEYER
- DJ-5 - GEN ROSSON
- SACSA - GEN DEPUY
- DLAAP - GEN BROWN

14 OCT 1968  
O 141102Z ZYH 288-1

~~ZEM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON~~

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS

ZEM

~~SECRET SAVIN MAC 13395 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF SOUTH VIETNAM THE ENEMY IS SUFFERING SEVERELY FROM PERSONNEL AND PARTICULARLY FROM LOGISTIC SHORTAGES. THESE SHORTAGES, AND OUR AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS, HAVE DRIVEN HIM OUT OF THESE AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, AND HE NOW MUST ATTEMPT TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE WE HAVE DONE HIM.

IN THE DMZ THERE WERE FURTHER INDICATIONS OF WITHDRAWALS. INTERCEPTS REVEALED THAT THE 164TH ARTY REGT WAS MOVING 152MM GUNS BACK TO REAR AREAS. THE HQ, 320TH NVA DIV AND ITS 43TH REGT HAVE ALSO REVEALED THAT THEY WOULD RELOCATE. THERE HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN NO GOOD EVIDENCE TO ENABLE US TO DETERMINE THE PURPOSES, SCOPE, OR DURATION OF THE CURRENT WITHDRAWAL.

ENEMY UNITS IN MR-1TH ARE STILL SUFFERING LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHICH INDICATES THAT THE EN SITUATION THERE WILL CHANGE IN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE.

IN NORTHERN MR-5, THE ENEMY FORCES UNDER FRONT A HAVE ALL BUT ABANDONED THEIR ONLY RECENT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY. THE ATTACKS ON THE 10TH DIV. INTERCEPTED RADIO MESSAGES REVEAL THAT THE ENEMY SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES AND IS SHORT OF FOOD. DESPITE THE FACT THAT <sup>that he</sup> ~~THE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 01-187  
By *ms*, NARA, Date 2-26-04

~~SECRET~~  
~~EYES ONLY~~

ATTACKED THUONG DUC WITH HIS 3 BEST REGTS, AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT INTERCEPTED MESSAGES REVEALED THE "THE CAMP MUST FALL", THE ENEMY'S EFFORT FAILED. ~~IT IS AN INDICATION OF THE ENEMY'S INEFFECTIVENESS THAT THUONG DUC HAS BEEN A HIGH PRIORITY TARGET SINCE APRIL. IT WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY 19 MAY -- SO THAT THE ENEMY COULD LINK ROUTE 614 WITH ROUTE 4 AND MOVE MEN AND SUPPLIES TOWARD DANANG. THE RECENT ATTACKS ON THUONG DUC MAY HAVE BEEN PROMPTED BY THE ENEMY'S NEED FOR A SUCCESS OF SOME SORT. THEY MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE WHAT THE ENEMY FEELS IS AN ALLIED SALIENT INTO IGS MOUNTAIN BASE AREAS. THE RECENT WESTERLY MOVE OF THE HQ, 31ST NVA REGT TO THE VICINITY OF THUONG DUC MAY BE A REFLECTION OF HIS CONCERN OVER WITHDRAWAL ROUTES. MR TTH'S EXPERIENCE WITH REGARD TO ALLIED OPERATIONS ALONG ROUTE 547, IN BASE AREA 114 AND 131 AND IN THE A SHAU VALLEY MUST WEIGH HEAVILY AMONG THE ENEMY'S FEARS AS HE WITHDRAWS FROM LOWLAND TARGETS UNDER PRESSURE. IN ANY EVENT, THE ATTACKS HAVE FAILED AND FRONT 4 NO LONGER POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO ALLIED POSITIONS.~~

FURTHER TO THE SOUTH IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE, WHICH IS THE 2ND DIV'S AREA, THE 4 BNS OF THE QUANG TIN PROVINCIAL UNIT HAVE AVOIDED CONTACT, ARE UNDERSTRENGTH AND ARE NOT CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING EFFECTIVE ATTACKS. THE 1ST VC AND 3RD NVA REGTS OF THE 2ND NVA DIV REMAIN IN OR NEAR BASE AREA 117 AVOIDING CONTACT. IN AUG AND SEP, THE 1ST VC REGT LOST MORE THAN 1,000 MEN. AN ENTIRE BN OF THE 3RD NVA REGT WAS ANNIHILATED LAST WEEK AT HAU DUC. IN ADDITION TO THEIR PERSONNEL SHORTAGES, THESE UNITS ARE SUFFERING FOOD SHORTAGES. WHAT THEY CAN GET MUST BE CARRIED UP FROM QUANG NGAI PROVINCE.

~~AS FOR THE 3RD NVA DIV IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, ITS PRINCIPAL 2ND VC~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~LEVEL ONLY~~

~~EVES ONLY~~

~~REGT HAVE WITHDRAWN TO THE SONG RE AND BAN TO VALLEYS. A PW REVEALS THAT THE 2ND VC REGT HAS BEEN REDUCED TO ONE THIRD OF ITS NORMAL STRENGTH. THE 22ND NVA REGT AND THE 3 BNS OF THE 101ST VC SAPPER REGT ARE AVOIDING CONTACT IN THE MOUNTAINS WEST OF HAITHANH. THERE IS, OF COURSE, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENTIRE 3RD NVA DIV WILL RETURN TO BINH DINH PROVINCE, ITS FORMER OPERATING AREA. THE 3 BNS OF THE QUANG NGAI PROVINCE UNIT ARE STILL IN THE LOWLANDS NEAR QUANG NGAI CITY BUT THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO AVOID CONTACT AND POSE NO SERIOUS THREAT.~~

THUS WE SEE THAT THE PRESSURE OF ALLIED OPERATIONS AND INCREASING LOGISTICS PROBLEMS HAVE FORCED THE ENEMY TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS EARLIER TARGETS. THE MOVEMENT OUT OF COUNTRY OR INTO REMOTE BASE AREAS OFFERS HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO AWAIT REPLACEMENT OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. IT ALSO ENABLES HIM TO POSE A THREAT IN THE DMZ AND IN SOUTHERN I CTZ IN HOPES OF TYING DOWN ALLIED FORCES WHILE REMAINING OUT OF REACH OF FRIENDLY SWEEP OPERATIONS. HE MAY ALSO BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE PEACE TALKS BY CLAIMING THAT HE HAS DE-SCALATED. AT THE SAME TIME, HE RETAINS THE OPTION OF RETURNING TO TARGET AREAS IF CONDITIONS PERMIT HIM TO RECONSTRUCT HIS UNITS AND ATTAIN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE FFW REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL STILL ENROUTE I CTZ. ONLY 4,500 MEN ARE ESTIMATED TO ARRIVE IN THE NEXT 2 MONTHS. CONTINUED INTERDICTION OF HIS LAOTION SUPPLY LINES WILL MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO REPLACE HIS RECENT CASUALTIES. IN THE LAST 2 WEEKS ALONE, THE ENEMY IN I CTZ HAS LOST OVER 100 TONS OF RICE, 4,000 MORTAR ROUNDS, 376 122 AND 107MM ROCKET ROUNDS AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EVES ONLY~~

NEARLY 5 TONS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES. IN NORTH NVN MR-5, WHAT LITTLE LOGISTIC SUPPORT HE CAN EXPECT MUST BE LABORIOUSLY CARRIED TO HIM BY MEN OR ANIMALS OVER RUGGED MOUNTAIN TERRAIN.

THE ENEMY NOW FACES THE GLOOMY PROSPECT OF HAVING TO WITHDRAW TO REFIT AND REGROUP WITHOUT ANY SERIOUS NEAR TIME PROSPECT OF RECEIVING THE NEEDED MEN AND MATERIEL. AT BEST, HE CAN HOPE TO SURVIVE IN BORDER SANCTUARIES AND BASE AREAS WHILE HE AWAITS FURTHER ORDERS FROM HIGH COMMAND HANOI.

BECAUSE OF THE MEAGER RESULTS OF HIS RECENT ACTIVITIES AND THE PROBLEMS IT HAS GENERATED, ~~THE ENEMY MAY HAVE ENDED THE THIRD OFFENSIVE.~~ SEVERAL KNOWLEDGABLE PW'S AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS RELATE THAT ~~THIS OFFENSIVE WAS TO HAVE TERMINATED 15 OCTOBER 1968~~ HOWEVER, THERE IS GOOD EVIDENCE THAT THE ENEMY PROBABLY ENDED THE THIRD OFFENSIVE SOMETIME IN THE LATTER HALF OF SEPTEMBER. THE HIGH VOLUME OF COMMUNICATIONS AROUND 27 SEPTEMBER BETWEEN HANOI HIGH COMMAND AND THE MAJOR ENEMY HEADQUARTERS IN SVN COULD INDICATE THE TRANSMISSION OF AN IMPORTANT DECISION AT THAT TIME.

AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FROM THE CENTRAL RESEARCH DIRECTORATE IN HANOI TO ALL MAJOR COMMANDS RELATES US, PW, AND RVNAF CASUALTIES FOR THE PERIOD 17 AUGUST TO 30 SEPTEMBER 68. THE MESSAGE THEN COMPARES US, PW, AND ARVN CASUALTIES FOR THIS PERIOD WITH THOSE OF THE FIRST (TET) PHASE AND THE SECOND (MAY) PHASE.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS TO SANCTUARIES IS AN IMPORTANT CLUE AS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. THE 32<sup>ND</sup> DIVISION AND THE 13<sup>TH</sup> REGIMENTS, (BOTH IN THE DMZ), WITHDREW INTO NVN AROUND  
(CONT)

~~SECRET SA VIN~~

~~REVISED~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

O 141132Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS

ZEM

~~SECRET SAVIN~~ MAACC J1395 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
25 SEPT. SLIGHTLY EARLIER, THE MR TTH HEADQUARTERS AND ITS UNITS  
MOVED TO LAOS. AROUND THE END OF SEPTEMBER ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST  
NVA DIVISION SHIFTED FROM DARLAC PROVINCE INTO CAMBODIA.

THESE WITHDRAWALS HAVE CONTINUED. ~~IN EARLY OCTOBER ELEMENTS~~  
~~OF THE 7TH NVA DIVISION IN NORTHERN ITT CTZ MOVED TO CAMBODIAN~~  
~~SANCTUARIES. THE 9TH VC DIVISION, NOW LOCATED IN STRIDENH~~  
~~CAMBODIAN-TAY NINH BORDER IS VIRTUALLY IN AN OUT-~~  
~~COUNTRY SAFE-HAVEN. THE 5TH DIVISION IN EARLY OCTOBER WITHDREW~~  
~~ITS HEADQUARTERS TO CAMBODIA.~~

ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE PROBABLE CESSATION OF THE THIRD  
OFFENSIVE IS THE SERIES OF MEETINGS SINCE 15 SEPTEMBER 68 WHICH  
HAVE BEEN CONVENED BY ALL ECHELONS OF THE ENEMY'S COMMAND. THESE  
MEETINGS ARE HISTORICALLY A PART OF THE TERMINATION OF A CAMPAIGN.  
IN ADDITION, THERE HAS BEEN A DECIDED DECLINE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY.  
WHILE THIS IS PRIMARILY A RESULT OF FRIENDLY OPERATIONS, IT SUGGESTS  
THE END OF HIS THIRD OFFENSIVE. THE KIA'S HE IS NONCOMBATANTS HAVE  
DROPPED BACK TO LEVELS WE SAW DURING THE MID-JUNE TO MID-AUGUST  
WHL RESULTING, OF COURSE, FROM HIS AVOIDANCE OF CONTACT. ONLY AT  
THOUNG DUC DOES THE ENEMY CONTINUE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET SAYIN~~ EYES ONLY

SIZE. WHILE THE PURPOSE OF THESE OPERATIONS IS UNCLEAR, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT HIS INTENT HERE IS TO IMPROVE HIS DAMAGED LOGISTIC POSTURE IN THE FRONT & AREA WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PREEMPT WHAT HE PROBABLY THINKS IS THE BEGINNING OF A THRUST FROM TUONG DUC TOWARD HIS REAR AREAS TO THE WEST AND NORTHWEST.

HIS PERSONNEL LOSSES, HIS LOSSES OF CACHES AND OTHER SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES, AND THE DECLINING MORALE OF HIS TROOPS HAVE BROUGHT HIM TO THE POINT WHERE HE MUST CEASE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND SEEK A RESPIRE.

HIS THIRD OFFENSIVE HAS ENDED AS DID HIS SECOND (MAY) OFFENSIVE. CONSTANT AND DEVASTATING PREEMPTIVE ACTIONS BY FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE CAUSED HIM NOT ONLY SERIOUS PERSONNEL, MORALE, AND LOGISTIC PROBLEMS, BUT HAVE ALMOST TOTALLY DISLOCATED HIS PLANS AND OPERATIONAL CAPACITY. ~~WHILE HE HAD LITTLE ENOUGH TO SHOW FOR HIS SECOND OFFENSIVE, HE HAS EVEN LESS TO SHOW FOR THE THIRD.~~

AT THIS POINT, ~~THE ENEMY'S OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE ARE BLANK. TO CONTINUE HIS PRESENT STRATEGY, HE MUST NOW ENTER ANOTHER PERIOD OF HULL WHILE HE RECONSTITUTES AND REEKS HIS FORCES. THERE IS SERIOUS QUESTION THAT HE CAN DO THIS EITHER MATERIALLY OR PSYCHOLOGICALLY. HIS LOGISTICS ARE BADLY BATTERED AND HIS REDISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS IMMENSE. INFILTRATION HAS DROPPED PRECIPITOUSLY, NOT ONLY PRESENTING IMMEDIATE PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT PROBLEMS, BUT ALSO STRONGLY SUGGESTING THAT HIS PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1965 SURGE EFFORT DID NOT GO BEYOND THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. HE HAS PROMISED VICTORY FOR 1967 AND~~

~~SECRET SAYIN~~ EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

~~SAVIN~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~ONLY~~

MORE SPECIFICALLY WITH THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. IN LIGHT OF A DETERIORATING MORALE, HE WILL ENCOUNTER SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES IN GOADING HIS FOLLOWERS TO YET ANOTHER ROUND AT WHAT HAS BEEN A MOUNTING SERIES OF MILITARY FAILURES. HE CAN, HOWEVER, CONSOLIDATE HIS REMAINING FORCES FOR AN ALL-OUT, LAST GASP EFFORT AT SAIGON BY COMMITMENT OF HIS DIVISIONS IN SANCTUARY. WE HAVE SOME HINTS THAT THIS MAY BE HIS PLAN OR AT LEAST HE MAY BE CONSIDERING IT, BUT BY SUCH AN ALL-OUT ATTACK HE FACES ALMOST CERTAIN DISASTROUS RESULTS WHICH WILL FULLY EXPOSE HIS FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESSES, THUS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING ANY MEANINGFUL POSITION OF STRENGTH AT THE BARGAINING TABLE AND LEADING HIM EVEN FURTHER TOWARD HIS INEVITABLE DEFEAT.

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, October 14, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I thought you would like to know that your message on African development got through loud and clear to President Tombalbaye of Chad. The attached telegram reports that he followed through as soon as he returned home. Specifically, he:

- went on radio with a strong pitch for regional projects and U. S. private investment;
- surprised a French diplomat (who was expecting to be collared again for bilateral aid) by lecturing on the virtues of regionalism and private capital;
- confided that he had learned more from 30 minutes with you than from four hours with another world leader.

We have good evidence that all the African visits here have been worth the effort. But this must break some sort of record for quick returns.

W. W. Reston

CONFIDENTIAL

WWR:HS:RM:lw

Att: Fort Lamy 2533

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001  
By *gpr/g* NARA, Date *1/29/02*



Department of State

17a  
TELEGRAM  
92

CONFIDENTIAL 897

PAGE 01 FORT L 02533 121614Z

51  
ACTION AF 16

INFO IO 13, EUR 15, NSA 02, AID 28, E 15, COM 08, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04,  
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, RSR 01,  
/168 W

----- 104521

R 120930Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2318  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FORT LAMY 2533

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT TOMBALBAYE RETURNS

USUN FOR AMBASSADOR VANCE

1. PRESIDENT TOMBALBAYE AND PARTY RETURNED FORT LAMY AT 1400 OCTOBER 11 ON DIVERTED AIR CONGO FLIGHT. PRESIDENT AND GROUP BEAMED WITH PLEASURE AND WERE EFFUSIVE TO ME AT AIRPORT COMMENTING ON TRIP.

2. RADIO CHAD'S EVENING BROADCAST CARRIED LONG TAPED INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT IN WHICH HE STRESSED ROLE IN CHAD FOR AMERICAN PRIVATE INVESTORS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR REGIONAL AID PROJECTS IN SUCH ORGANISMS AS CHAD BASIN COMMISSION. HE REITERATED HIS PLEASURE IN TRIP, AND WARMTH OF AMERICANS' WELCOME, BOTH OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE. STATED HIS BELIEF, TRIP WAS SUCCESSFUL "IN ALL RESPECTS".

3. MEMBER OF PRESIDENT'S STAFF TOLD ME LAST NIGHT PRESIDENT HAD BEEN SINGULARLY IMPRESSED WITH HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON. SAID HE HAD GOT MORE IN 30 MINUTE TALK WITH HIM THAN HE HAD IN FOUR HOUR VISIT WITH KING BAUDOIN. FRENCH CHARGE BLANC REGISTERED HIS SURPRISE THAT PRESIDENT SAID NOTHING CONCERNING BILATERAL AID AND THAT HIS ENTIRE FOCUS SEEMED TO BE IN REGIONALISM AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT.

4. COMMENT: FIRST RETURNS SEEM EXCELLENT. TOMBALBAYE AND GROUP

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-S-98001  
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 11/20/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM  
22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 FORT L 02533 121614Z

APPEAR TO HAVE GOTTEN THE MESSAGE AND ARE ACTING ON IT. MAIN  
AREA FOR EFFORT IS PRIVATE INVESTMENT FIELD WHERE DEPARTMENT'S  
HELP IN FOLLOW-UP WILL BE ESSENTIAL. WALKER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*F. Jones*

18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Monday - October 14, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Award from The Pan American Society of the United States

You have agreed to accept an award from The Pan American Society for your efforts on behalf of inter-American friendship. This is currently scheduled to occur in a brief ceremony in your office on October 18.

On further reflection, I believe you should defer the ceremony until some time in December or January.\* This occasion could provide an excellent setting for your "valedictory" on Latin American affairs. The Pan American Society is a very distinguished group, and this would provide the ideal setting for a major speech of this type. You could review the state of our relations with Latin America during your Administration and chart a course for your successor.

The Society had originally suggested making the presentation at a banquet in your honor. I am sure they would be delighted to schedule one at your convenience. Covey Oliver and I recommend that you agree to attend such a banquet for the presentation late in the year.

W. W. Rostow

*\* Because of Panama, mainly*

Approve

Disapprove

Call me

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDING, CANCELLED PER E.O. 11652, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO MAR. 16, 1993.

BY *SP* ON *2-1-93*

*cc - Jim Jones*  
SWLewis:mm

Monday, October 14, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Approval of Accession to the Convention  
Establishing a Customs Cooperation Council,  
together with the Protocol concerning the  
European Customs Union Study Group**

Attached for your signature is the instrument of U. S. Accession to the Convention Establishing a Customs Cooperation Council. The instrument includes a technical reservation, recommended by State, on privileges and immunities.

The Council is the major international organization for improving and simplifying customs procedures.

You asked for the Senate's advice and consent to our accession to this international convention on May 20, 1968. The Senate adopted its resolution of advice and consent to accession on October 4.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we will need your signature in duplicate on the attached instrument of approval of accession \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*WF*  
ERF:mst



s/s 13641

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 11, 1968

3184  
1- Fried  
2- Ret 19a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Approval of Accession to the Convention  
Establishing a Customs Cooperation Council,  
together with the Protocol concerning the  
European Customs Union Study Group

Enclosed for signature by the President is the instrument of approval of accession, in duplicate, of the Convention Establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, together with the Protocol concerning the European Customs Union Study Group, signed in Brussels on December 15, 1950.

On October 4, 1968 the Senate gave its advice and consent to accession to the Convention and Protocol, with the reservation recommended by the Department of State, which reservation is included in the enclosed instrument of approval of accession.

The Council established by the Convention is the major international organization for improving and simplifying customs procedures. The objectives of the Convention are to assist international trade by working for: uniformity and simplicity in the customs systems of its members; solutions to customs administration problems; and cooperation among governments in these matters. The Council's recommendations are not binding but they are widely accepted by most of our major trading partners and have an increasing importance for United States trade.

*Benjamin H. Read*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary *for*

Enclosure:

Instrument of approval  
of accession, in duplicate.

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 OCT 11 PM 5 38

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20  
INFORMATION

Monday - October 14, 1968 - 5:30pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

SUBJECT: Panama Coup

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By Officer, NARA, Date 1/20/02 *Pres file*

I am attaching the latest situation report on Panama, drafted by Covey Oliver's inter-agency working group. Its tenor is encouraging.

Avoidance of major bloodshed or violence which could threaten the canal has been the top priority governing US actions toward President Arias. We have denied him access to radio facilities in the Zone with which he might have fomented mob action against the Junta, and have, of course, refused to help him militarily. Time is now rapidly running out for him.

Although we have no formal relations with the Junta, key US moves in the last 36 hours have included:

- discreet efforts to persuade the Junta to take Arias back peacefully, or to install the Vice President in his place. (Unsuccessful.)
- stressing the importance of a civilian character for the government -- and promptly calling new elections. (Junta agrees.)
- allowing Arias to remain in the Zone, but insisting that he stop his political operations so long as he stays there. (Political activity apparently reduced or suspended since the warning was given last night.)
- trying to engage the OAS with some mediation role (Gale Plaza won't call the OAS Council into action unless ~~the~~ violence erupts; however, informal OAS consultation is now going on among eight key country representatives.)
- avoiding making public statements on the bankruptcy of Arias's situation as long as possible so as not to increase the possibility of his attempting to turn his followers' ire against the US. (pressure from the US press now is enormous, however -- and distorted news stories are appearing widely here. State will provide a full background briefing tomorrow.)

Multilateral consultations about recognition of the Junta will begin tomorrow -- after it is obvious to all that Arias's bid for forceful return has failed, and that the Junta's provisional government is indisputably in control.

Attachment  
cc - George Christian

W. W. Rostow

SWLewis:mm

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Panama Working Group

Situation Report, 1300 hours EDT. October 14, 1968

Panama remains calm. There is no general strike and no reported incidents of violence. There have been no other significant developments since the last Situation Report.

This Situation Report reviews the lines of U.S. policy and courses of action that have been developed.

The IRG over the weekend determined that in this situation there are three major U.S. Government objectives:

- A. The return as soon as possible to an elected government in Panama.
- B. The avoidance of prejudice to our special interests in Panama by the alienation of any major sector of Panamanian society.
- C. The discouragement of "coup-proness" elsewhere in the other American Republics.

The first issue which faced the Working Group early in the developing situation was whether some reconciliation between the Guardia and the Arias Government was possible. Pursuant to an IRG decision to try to persuade the Junta to reach some understanding with the Arias Government and not destroy constitutional succession, U.S. Embassy officers were instructed to talk to a key Junta member in a quiet, discreet manner. This was done Saturday, October 12, with Embassy officers pointing out that some formula for constitutional government was critical to future relations with the U.S., and further pointing out the desirability of taking Arias back or at least part of his government, perhaps naming Arias' First Vice President as provisional president. The Guardia made clear that it would never

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 1/20/02

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accept Arias back and no negotiations between the Guardia and the Arias Government have proved possible. The Junta had, however, endeavored without success to induce the Vice-President to serve. The new provisional government which took office Sunday, October 13, contains a largely civilian cabinet representing various segments of the political spectrum.

The second major issue faced was the political activity of Arias from the Canal Zone and the probability that this activity would provoke violence and bloodshed in Panama. Arias' efforts to incite the Panamanian people to violence through public proclamations and calls for revolt reached a climax Sunday afternoon and were augmented by his request to us for extensive military support. The IRG took an immediate policy decision not only to refuse his request but to require him to desist from such activity if he wished to remain in the Zone. This action was taken by Canal Zone Governor Leber (see Situation Report 0600 hours October 14). Arias did not contest our requirement that he cease political operations from the Zone and he chose to remain where he is. He has apparently not engaged in such activity to our knowledge since Governor Leber's conversation with him. Up to the present, the provisional government in Panama has not protested Arias' political actions.

A third issue involved the possibility of involving the other American Republics in some multilateral consideration of possible action with regard to the situation. We consulted Secretary General Galo Plaza of the Organization of American States about an emergency meeting of the OAS Council to consider means of avoiding violence in Panama. Plaza's initial reaction was that the OAS should not become involved until there is greater evidence of danger. He suggested that the prospects for the OAS to be helpful would be enhanced if the initiative for action came from some country other than the U.S. Ambassador Oribe, President of the OAS Council, called a meeting of selected OAS Council Representatives (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the US) for 1030 hours this morning to discuss informally the situation in Panama. The results are not yet known.

The fourth issue faced to date involves the question of whether to recognize the de facto government in Panama City. The over-

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- 3 -

throw of the Arias Government resulted automatically in the suspension of U.S. relations with Panama. Thus far there have been no official contacts by our representatives with the provisional government. The latter has, however, presented us with a note requesting recognition. We expect to initiate tomorrow bilateral consultations with the other American Republics under Resolution 26 of the Second Special Inter-American Conference. Since Resolution 26 assumes the existence of an uncontested de facto regime, the situation in Panama did not call for this kind of consultation earlier.

The Panama Review Committee asked the Department to refrain if it could from commenting publicly on the questions of U.S. relations and policy toward the Junta and Arias until Tuesday so as not to complicate the situation and increase the threat of violence. The IRG agreed. However, in the absence of any comprehensive statements by the Department, press reports about the situation have speculated widely about U.S. policies and have used quotes from Arias' sources and brief background comments from officials in Panama and the Zone. The result is contradictory and inaccurate reports. To put the situation in perspective, the Department will hold a comprehensive press background briefing tomorrow.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-171

By Wip, NARA, Date 8-9-96

INFORMATION

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Monday - October 14, 1968 - 11:15pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Peru

*Pres file*

The attached memorandum from Secretary Rusk summarizes the status of our relations with the new Peruvian Junta. Highlights include:

- IPC's expropriation does not so far imply any threat to other foreign investors.
- We are consulting with other American governments on eventual diplomatic recognition. Most governments seem disposed to recognize soon, but State is not yet ready to make a recommendation to you.
- Meanwhile, we are carrying on lower-level administrative contacts with the Junta which meet our operating needs.

Since Rusk's memorandum was drafted, the Junta has announced its intention to hold a national "referendum" on the question of whether a new constitution is required before any elections are to be held. None of the Latin governments, except Venezuela, is disposed to insist on a commitment to hold elections as a pre-condition for recognition.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

October 11 memorandum to President from Secretary Rusk.

SWLewis:mm

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTONAuthority MLG 91-406By ag/rip, NARA, Date 2-2-93CONFIDENTIAL

October 11, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Peruvian Situation

A Military Junta headed by Juan Velasco, Commanding General of the Army, deposed Peru's President Belaunde October 3, sending him into exile, installing an all-military Cabinet. As a result of the coup, diplomatic relations are in a state of suspension and U.S. assistance programs are under review. The Revolutionary Government, which appears to be highly nationalistic, justified its action on grounds of general unrest and loss of public confidence in the Government. The new regime particularly stressed the pretext that the August 13 agreement with the Government and the International Petroleum Company (IPC) over the La Brea y Pariñas oil fields was a sell-out. One of the Junta's first acts was to declare null the Act of Talara, which formed the basis of the IPC settlement, and on October 9 the President announced the expropriation of IPC's oil fields, refinery, and other assets. In other statements the regime has given no indication of plans for scheduling of elections, but it has stated that all international obligations will be met.

The United States has initiated bilateral consultations through its Embassies with other Latin American Governments on the situation in Peru and the question of recognition, in accordance with procedures established at the Second Inter-American Conference of 1965. Public comment by Department of State spokesmen has been limited to factual answers to questions about the situation and expressions of concern about the coup.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

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Preliminary indications are that, in addition to those countries which follow the practice of automatically recognizing new regimes on continuing relations, most Latin American countries will resume relations relatively soon. This would also be true of Western European and other trading nations. Only Venezuela has announced it is severing relations.

The implications of the IPC expropriation are being explored, including all relevant U.S. legislative provisions. These include the FAA and Sugar Act which can require a cut-off of U.S. assistance and of the sugar quota when property owned by U.S. citizens is taken without compensation. Standard Oil of New Jersey, the parent company of IPC, has asked that we take a reserved public position on the IPC take-over pending their own exploration of the possibilities of reaching some acceptable solution with the Peruvian regime.

In the period of "suspended" relations, we are making a realistic attempt to obtain from the military regime indications of its intentions to return to constitutional government within a reasonable time. We are also seeking its views as to international obligations to foreign citizens and property in Peru. While seeking clarification of these points, we are maintaining a flexible attitude to lower level administrative contact with the Military Government so that selectively we can do what we determine to be in our own interest, such as protecting American citizens, obtaining clearance for aircraft, and disbursing on loans to private parties. It is too early to judge when we will make a recommendation to you on resumption of relations.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, October 14, 1968 -11:20 AM

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Elbrick's Call (12:00 Noon Today)

Burke Elbrick, our Ambassador to Yugoslavia, is scheduled to see you at noon today, for 15 - 30 minutes.

Secretary Rusk and Nick Katzenbach recommended this appointment as an added way to show our interest and support to Yugoslavia. Nick Katzenbach is going to Belgrade later this week for the same purpose.

Nick Katzenbach for

In his memo at Tab A, Secretary Rusk recommends that Ambassador Elbrick make a short statement to the press as he leaves the interview (suggested text at Tab B). The statement would express our continuing interest in the independence, sovereignty and economic development of Yugoslavia. If you would prefer, George Christian could put out the substance of the statement at his afternoon press briefing.

You may wish to tell Jim Jones, or indicate to Ambassador Elbrick during the meeting, how you would like this handled.

At the meeting, Ambassador Elbrick expects to report briefly on the attitude of Yugoslav leaders since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tito hopes we will give Yugoslavia some economic help, and stand up with him against the Russian threat.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments  
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 1-29-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

3196

*Mr. Rostow* 22

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call by Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick  
Monday, October 14 at 12:00 Noon

Ambassador Elbrick is in Washington for a brief period of consultation.

The Ambassador is prepared to report to you on the attitudes of Yugoslavia's leaders following the Czech invasion and their continuing concern as to future Soviet moves. To underline our own concern as well as to convey a clear signal to the Soviets, it may be desirable for Ambassador Elbrick to make a statement following his meeting with you regarding United States interest in Yugoslavia's independence, sovereignty and continued economic development. A suggested text is enclosed.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Suggested statement by Ambassador Elbrick.
2. Biographic sketch.

~~SECRET~~  
GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *1-29-02*

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 OCT 14 AM 11 09

Suggested Statement by Ambassador Elbrick

I reported to the President on the course of US-Yugoslav relations. The President cited our long tradition of assistance to Yugoslavia and expressed his admiration for Yugoslavia's people and their dedication to freedom. The President made very clear his continuing interest in that country's independence, sovereignty, and economic development.

October 14, 1968

Mr. President:

As the attached indicates, there are two further indications in this mornings  that the enemy is moving his artillery north of the DMZ.

We have been getting this sort of indication now for some days.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(S)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANTITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 03-82  
By its, NARA, Date 5-30-03

3.4(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~



23<sup>n</sup>

3/0/STY/R246-68

I. SOUTH VIETNAM

COMMUNIST ACTIVITY

1. DMZ Area

3.4(b)(1) Sporadic tactical activity has been observed in the DMZ area with elements of the NVA 164th Artillery Regiment continuing to fire in support of NVA troop activity. In addition, [redacted] that Quang Binh Province may be the destination for artillery pieces previously reported being withdrawn from the eastern DMZ.

3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] elements of the 164th Regiment [redacted] that arrangements were to be made to provide support for the infantry.

3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] artillery regiment (M3726) [redacted] Quang Binh Province for the location of its rear base. NVA elements [redacted] that artillery pieces would be withdrawn to "the rear base." Since the location of this equipment cannot be determined, this may indicate that the artillery pieces may have been withdrawn across the Ben Hai River.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJ 03-83  
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-3-03

**ACTION**

24

**Sunday, October 13, 1968 -- 5:00 p.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith, as promised, what I have done with the Howard K. Smith material on foreign policy.**

**I have taken a copy home for Elspeth's sharp pencil.**

**I shall not make it available to others until you so direct.**

**An essay like this should have a central theme, running throughout, easy to understand -- and important.**

**I have built this essay around the alternative (between isolationism and over-commitment) which President Johnson built in 1966-68 and which his successors must pursue; namely, "partnership and fair shares."**

**But I have tried to keep all lecturing to your successors out of this.**

**I believe the theme is historically correct and the central problem the next President will face abroad.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rla**

The President Looks at Tomorrow

I. Some Thoughts on the Presidency

There are a few general thoughts about the Presidency with which I shall begin.

First, we came reluctantly to our strong Federal Constitution, and the mark of that reluctance is still with us. We began with the looser and weaker Articles of Confederation. The Articles met the desire of the states to handle their own affairs. They also reflected the strong suspicion of centralized power which began in colonial times and runs down to the present day. One basic reason the states finally accepted the Constitution was that the diplomatic and security position of the young nation in the 1780's was precarious. Our diplomats were ignored. The presence of foreign powers on the continent threatened our borders and our future. Committee government was ineffective. And so the powers of Commander in Chief and the responsibility for conducting foreign affairs were placed in the hands of a President.

Every President senses both the responsibility he bears in thinking and acting for the nation in these vital matters; but he also is aware of the abiding reluctance of the nation to engage more deeply in the world than is absolutely necessary. This imposes burdens on the President in the conduct of the nation's business. He is often in the position of struggling to make

the nation do what he knows is right, despite itself. But, in the end, this reluctance is an asset. We are a people who are not interested in empire. We do not wish to dominate other nations. We are content to see them independent and prosperous. When we say that our business is to build a stable peace, most of the world believes us, despite criticisms for this or that policy that we may undertake. The world is more fearful of our withdrawal from world responsibility than it fears our power.

But all Presidents must live with and accept this reluctantly granted responsibility -- a reluctance which from time to time becomes vocal in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- and elsewhere.

Another abiding characteristic of the office was once expressed by Woodrow Wilson. He said that every new President would like to write his own record from the start on his own blank sheet of paper. Instead, he is forced to squeeze most of his record between the lines of what past Presidents have already put down. This overstates the matter. In domestic and foreign affairs our Presidents have been able to launch many important initiatives. But President Wilson's observation has an <sup>significant</sup> ~~important~~ kernel of truth. The past is always at the President's shoulder. He must live with and honor the commitments made on behalf of the nation by his predecessors. And this is particularly the case in the postwar years when we have come to world responsibility. The continuity and reliability of America's word is one of the foundations for such stability as this turbulent planet enjoys.

Alone at night in the Mansion, wrestling with difficult decisions, I have known in my heart that those who would best understand were John Kennedy, Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, and Franklin Roosevelt -- whatever the Congress and the press might be saying the next day. Indeed, in my time Dwight Eisenhower and Harry Truman not only understood, but helped.

And all of us who have carried the responsibility of the Presidency in the last century have felt in that house the presence and memory of Abraham Lincoln who saw through the most difficult problem of all.

A third observation is this: surprise is certain in the office of the Presidency in modern times. We live in a time like no other in human history. The problem of atomic weapons is unique. The global ideological conflict -- changing its shape, but there every day in a thousand ways -- is unique. The struggle of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia to find their feet in the modern world means that revolutionary change is going on all the time in places where most of humanity lives. And this is unique.

Finally, it all comes upon us so fast with modern communications. Despite the conflicts among us, we on this planet are now, despite ourselves, a single inter-connected political community.

I remember staring at the ticker one day and then chuckling. There in Paris was a representative of the government of North Vietnam addressing himself to a Democratic Convention in Chicago. Hanoi had mounted an

offensive on August 18, 1968, which, as best we know, was timed to that convention. It had not been able to get into Saigon and before the television cameras. Moreover, the movement of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia had taken the headlines away from Vietnam for a while. And so a North Vietnamese was standing up in Paris and trying to get himself heard in Chicago. That is the kind of world -- tied together despite itself -- with which we shall continue to live.

If there is one thing I know, it is that my successor will be awakened in the night many times -- as I was -- with news of some surprising and often dangerous event which could not have been predicted. And he will have hard and lonely decisions to make -- and he will sometimes have not much time in which to make them, as we didn't have much time in that little conference room in the White House West basement, where we drafted and sent our hot line responses during the week of June 5, 1967.

Dr. Samuel Johnson once said: "Depend upon it, sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully." Being President of the United States does have features in common with facing hanging, daily. Our people can only hope that the experience evokes the best in the President's judgment and courage, experience and character.

## II. A Few Continuing Principles

Most of what I say here looks to tomorrow -- to the future, not to the past. We say it often, but it is truer than we know: this is a rapidly

changing United States, in a rapidly changing world. But there are a few principles that I believe will hold for the time ahead, as they have in the past.

First, if the Federal Constitution was only reluctantly accepted, the judgment of the Founding Fathers proved right -- and never more than in our own times. If the nation's interests at home and abroad are to be looked after, we need a strong government in Washington, strongly led.

We are living through a period of intense creative legislative activity and a period of turbulence, as critical issues of race and urban affairs have come to a head. At the same time, we have had to carry the burden of a protracted war in Southeast Asia. I can understand that our people would look for quieter times. I can understand that some would be tempted to believe that, perhaps, if the government in Washington did less, the problems at home and abroad would go away. But this is an illusion. Of course, the Federal Government should do <sup>no</sup> more at home than it must do. Of course, we must build the capacity of state and local governments to carry more of the tasks of our society. And we must work out -- as we have well begun -- new forms of partnership with the private sectors of our society which have so much vitality.

And we must work endlessly abroad in the same spirit, so that the burdens are shared among all willing to contribute to security and progress on the world scene. But let there be no mistake. At the center there must be a strong and active National Government of the United States.

Second, the international commitments of the United States must be honored. We have not made treaties and commitments everywhere. We have made them at certain points where the United States has direct and vital interests: in Western Europe, Latin America, Japan, and Southeast Asia. In all cases, searching hearings and debate in the Senate -- and extensive public discussion -- took place before the decision was made. As I shall emphasize later, it is critically important in the time ahead that others come to share responsibilities for security, peace and progress in the world. We are not and cannot try to be singlehanded the world's policeman. But where our word has been given through our constitutional processes, there we must stand.

Third, those commitments cannot be honored unless we remain strong: strong in military power; strong in the economic strength that supports it; strong, despite debates, in our ultimate unity.

Fourth, we cannot afford to draw back in our efforts to help the poorer nations move forward in growth and progress. Our fundamental interest in the world is, as I said, not in an American empire. It is to help build an environment around us which will permit our own society to move forward in its own way. We cannot live in the modern world as the rich man in the big white house on the hill: we need to be surrounded by nations which are strong, independent, proud of their own character, confident of their own

future -- and, therefore, prepared to live and let live. Every postwar President has known that the most effective dollars voted and spent in the interest of the United States have been the funds voted for foreign aid.

Fifth, we must put aside once and for all the notion that isolation is a realistic alternative for the United States. Our power is such -- and the world's interdependence is such -- that we are involved in the world whether we act or do not act. Our only choice is how we act in the world. There the central task for tomorrow is to carry forward a process already well begun; that is, to insist that others, along with the United States, carry their fair share of the common tasks of building peace and order and progress. That is the alternative -- between over-involvement and isolation -- that we have been building systematically in recent years -- a world of partnership and fair shares.

In turning now to discuss some tasks for tomorrow, I begin with foreign affairs. All of us as citizens of this great, absorbing nation would wish to concentrate our attention on life at home. But we know in our minds and hearts that the oceans have <sup>so</sup> shrunk in our lifetime that the agenda for Americans can no longer be what it was in the nineteenth century -- a familiar listing of internal issues. The safety and quality of our domestic life depends now on what happens in many far away places. And so I shall begin with foreign policy and with the most difficult of our postwar problems -- Vietnam.

### III. Vietnam and the Future of Asia.

So much has been said about Vietnam that I wish to make only a few points about the past and focus on the future. Vietnam has been for us not the most dangerous of the postwar crises, but the most difficult. The form of aggression, via infiltration, was more difficult to understand than, say, the crossing of the 38th parallel in Korea in 1950 or the placing of missiles in Cuba in 1962. Although the NLF is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hanoi, there was, of course, an element of civil war in the South. Progress and setbacks were difficult for our people to see because there was no fixed front. The nature of guerrilla-war requires a positive economic, social, and political response from the government; and so the building of a post-colonial nation in the South -- with all its difficulties -- was interwoven with the military conflict. And, finally, of course, since there is no fixed front, guerrilla war is slow, attritional combat, often appearing endless and without hope -- the way Hanoi wished it to appear.

All of this has, as I say, been very hard for our people to understand and to bear. But the simple critical fact is this: Southeast Asia is an area of such importance to the structure of Asia that no American President could fail to react if it were about to be taken over through aggression by a hostile power.

That is why Franklin Roosevelt reacted so strongly in 1941 when the Japanese moved into Indochina. His Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, described the area of South Vietnam as "pointing like a pudgy thumb toward

the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies." In a speech he drafted for the President, Secretary Hull wrote, "It is manifest that control of the South Sea area by Japan is the key to control of the entire Pacific area, and therefore to the life and commerce and other invaluable interests and rights in the Pacific area."

I do not believe that President Eisenhower, in the wake of the Geneva Conference of 1954, had any real choice but to initiate our commitment to protect the area through the Manila Treaty.

As President Kennedy said at a press conference in March 1963, the abandonment of our commitment would give the "Communists control of all of Southeast Asia with the inevitable effect this would have on the security of India, and, therefore, really begin to run perhaps all the way toward the Middle East."

I do not believe that President Kennedy could have done otherwise than continue to back that commitment when Hanoi expanded its campaign to seize South Vietnam.

And I know full well that I had no realistic option consistent with American interests and my responsibilities as President than to take the steps I did in 1965 to assure that South Vietnam was not taken over by force.

Think for a moment of what the situation was like in early 1965. Hanoi had in the previous year begun to send regular North Vietnamese units into the South to supplement the flow of guerrilla infiltration which had been going

on for the previous five years. Laos was two-thirds conquered by Communist forces, the heart of which consisted of North Vietnamese regulars. The Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, had publicly affirmed the intention to make Thailand the next target, and in Northeast Thailand a base for guerrilla warfare was being built every day. The Chinese Communists were gaining strength and influence in Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in the world and one of the most strategically placed. Above all, as the pressures mounted on the hard-pressed South Vietnamese armed forces, their morale weakened and the political life of the nation began to sink into chaos. *ff* This is the assessment the President was given in mid-july 1965 -- an assessment ~~unilaterally~~ <sup>unilaterally</sup> agreed among the President's advisers:

"We must choose among three courses of action with respect to South Vietnam:

"1. Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that can be arranged -- almost certainly conditions humiliating the United States and very damaging to our future effectiveness on the world scene;

"2. Continue at about the present level, with US forces limited to, say, 75,000, holding on and playing for the breaks while recognizing that our position will probably grow weaker; or

"3. Expand substantially the US military pressure against the Viet Cong in the South and the North Vietnamese in the North and at the same time launch a vigorous effort on the political side to get negotiations started."

When we made the decision to throw the weight of our air power against North Vietnam and to bring our own forces into the battle on the ground, there was no dissenting voice among us. (check this.) It was not a decision arrived at on a single day. We stared at the problem, looked for alternatives, and studied the facts over a period of weeks and even months. At the critical time, twice I went away to Camp David to be alone; to turn the problem and the choices around in my mind; and to make sure the decision was right, having taken counsel with all whom I believed might contribute wisdom.

This is not the occasion to try to tell in detail of all the factors that entered into that decision and how, precisely, it came about. We can leave that to history. It is not even the time to argue whether the decision was right; although I remain confident that it was right and necessary and inevitable.

But it is time for all of us to look to the future.

At the meeting in Manila in October 1966, those fighting the war agreed on four simple principles that would guide the seven nations concerned:

1. Aggression must not succeed.
2. We must break the bonds of poverty, illiteracy and disease.
3. We must strengthen economic, social and cultural cooperation within the Asian and Pacific region.
4. We must seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia.

These were not merely guideposts for a time of war. They incorporated a vision of the future shared among us -- and among others in the region we know. Looking to tomorrow, our common task is -- working with others -- to make good that vision.

The first requirement is a secure and well-monitored settlement in Southeast Asia. Only such a settlement can make worthwhile the terrible costs incurred by the people of Vietnam and Laos -- as well as the burden borne by the people of the United States and by our allies. This time the peoples of Asia and the Pacific must determine that it shall not happen again.

At the time I set down these thoughts, I cannot know the situation in Vietnam at the time they will be printed. But I do know that if the United States remains steady, peace is not far away. The first task for the future is to make that peace stick. That should be a task not merely for the United States -- not merely for the nations which have assumed responsibility under the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 -- but a task for all the governments and peoples of Asia and the Pacific.

In his first presentation of our position in Paris on May 13, 1968, I instructed Ambassador Harriman to say this:

"The Geneva Accords provided for international supervision. We envisage the continuation and strengthening of this function. Experience has demonstrated the shortcomings of existing procedures. We believe that one of our major tasks will be to devise more effective ways of supervising any agreement and ensuring the fair

and equitable investigation of complaints. We believe that the nations of Asia -- which have a crucial interest in the peace and stability of the region -- should be associated with the monitoring of the agreements at which we may arrive."

Second, in Vietnam itself we must do all we can to make constitutional government succeed. It is one of the miracles of our time that the people of South Vietnam, in the midst of war, created a constitutional government. We have all learned in these years how hard it is for a developing nation to maintain stable constitutional government. In the twentieth century we have seen democratic constitutional government collapse even in advanced Western Europe under the strains of depression and the unleashing of nationalist ambitions. We know in Latin America what a struggle it is to make democracy work and to gain the habit of passing power peacefully on constitutional terms. We know the vicissitudes of democratic government in Africa, the Middle East, and in other parts of Asia.

In Vietnam the job was particularly difficult. The country was split in 1954. There are strong historic divisions among the people based on region and religion and race. French colonialism had tended to fragment the society rather than pull it together. As I write this, I cannot predict that all will go smoothly with the processes of constitutional democracy in South Vietnam. But I do know that what was done in the period 1966-68 was remarkable -- even heroic. I do know that the vital, strongly

individualist people of South Vietnam want the dignity of constitutional democratic government; and to the extent that we can influence and help them along this course, we should do so.

Third, the economic and social progress of Southeast Asia has been remarkably hopeful in recent years. South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore are moving forward with high momentum and confidence. Indonesia is climbing out of the bankruptcy in which Sukarno left it, and is beginning to glimpse the future which its remarkable resources make possible, if political stability is sustained and the whole nation concentrates on its possibilities. In Vietnam, despite the war, postwar planning has gone forward. I have not the slightest doubt that South Vietnam can become, in less time than South Korea, a success story as heartening as the Korean story to its own people and to ours. We in the United States, the Japanese, the Australians, the New Zealanders, and all others who might help, must assume responsibility to keep this momentum in Southeast Asia moving forward in the time ahead.

Finally, we must not for a moment give up the dream and the fact of the New Asia. In the days when I bore the day-to-day burden of Vietnam, my greatest comfort, aside from the performance of our men in the field -- and their morale -- was the fact that our commitment in South Vietnam in 1965 had brought about a new spirit of cooperation and new confidence and determination throughout Asia and the Pacific. The peoples and governments of Asia had never cooperated before throughout their long history, except

when under a single master. After our troops were committed in 1965, they began seriously to come together. Moreover, the peoples of Australia and New Zealand made a critical decision about the time that they put their forces into South Vietnam. That decision was that, although they were of a different race, although their culture and standard of life were different, they, too, were now tied, as they looked to the future, to the fate of the peoples from Seoul and Tokyo to Djakarta and Bangkok. I went to Manila and toured Asia in the autumn of 1966 to fan the flames of this new spirit, of these new possibilities. The task for tomorrow -- for Americans as for the peoples most directly concerned -- is to make sure that these possibilities are fulfilled.

We cannot withdraw from our security commitments to Asia. In supporting the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we are asking these nations -- as others -- to forego the manufacture of nuclear weapons. And that treaty -- greatly to the interest of the American people -- carries with it also responsibilities. But we can hope that by their commitment to each other and to the common vision of a community of Asian and Pacific peoples who ask only what their people want -- which is peace and progress and dignity for one and all -- that they can do more to shape their own future and in time we can do less. If these peoples can work together, they have the manpower and capacity largely to assure their own security and prosperity, with the United States remaining as junior partner in the enterprise.

Finally, reconciliation. Reconciliation must first, somehow, be carried out inside South Vietnam -- and also within Laos -- if we are to

have peace. I believe the peoples of South Vietnam and Laos are ready for reconciliation, if Hanoi leaves them alone. But it must extend further. It was first in a talk at Johns Hopkins in April 1965 that I held before the North Vietnamese, obsessed as they then were with the dream of taking over South Vietnam and Laos, the vision of peaceful economic collaboration with their neighbors. I believe they will come to this. They do not wish to be a province of China. North Vietnam is, essentially, a small, underdeveloped nation with its future still to build. I was greatly heartened at Honolulu in July 1968 when President Thieu talked of a postwar period when decent relations could be established between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. North Vietnam belongs with the other countries of Southeast Asia in making the most of the Mekong and all the other resources in that potentially rich region.

Finally, in the tasks for tomorrow are our future relations with Communist China. China is a great nation with a long sense of identity and importance. It came late into the modern world under most painful circumstances. It is working its way through a period in which it must come to terms within itself, come to terms with Asia, and come to terms with the world as it is. That world has a place for a China which will find its fulfillment in modernizing its life in its own way and respecting its neighbors as it seeks respect for itself. No American postwar President has had to be told that mainland China is a reality. No postwar American

President has to be told that our international institutions will be incomplete until the day when mainland China takes its place among us in the world community. But those must be terms which respect the facts of life and history on Taiwan and which respect also the right of China's neighbors to go forward in security.

My simple point about Vietnam is, then, that we went to fight there because all of Southeast Asia was threatened by aggression and, therefore, the whole shape of Asia was at stake -- the region where two-thirds of humanity lives. As we look to tomorrow -- to Vietnam and beyond -- our policy must be addressed to building stable peace and progress throughout the region, on the basis of the partnerships we have built during the time of war.

If we do this, the sacrifices of our men and others will not be in vain.

#### IV. An Environment of Progress

In preparing for a talk I gave at the 1968 meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, I came upon an astonishing figure. World economic growth over the past century averaged barely 3% a year. In the last six years, due to international collaboration in monetary policy, in trade and development, world output has averaged 5% a year. If we return to the stop-and-go policies we have known in the past, we could be back to 3%. But if the world can work together and stay at 5% a year, the difference at the end of a decade would be \$500 billion of world production every year.

\$500 billion per year, then, is something like the measure of what is at stake in continuing the kind of economic cooperation that we managed to achieve in the 1960's.

But there is more to it than merely the extra resources that cooperation can bring to the world's men, women and children. Benjamin Franklin once said: "Yes, we must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately." Nations which understand this in economic affairs will find it easier to understand that they must also cooperate to settle their quarrels peacefully and to work together for peace and security.

The record of progress in the 1960's is heartening. But it is incomplete. The institutions of cooperation remain fragile and vulnerable. We have demonstrated in a number of countries that with hard work and external assistance intelligently used, the developing nations can graduate from reliance on aid and move into self-sustained growth. That is what has happened with Israel,

Iran, and Taiwan. Others are coming towards that point of graduation. But there are still many who will need special support in the 1970's if they, too, are to become success stories; for example, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, many of the countries of Africa, and some of the countries in Latin America.

We have weathered in remarkable shape a series of dangerous crises in international monetary affairs and we have used these crises to move towards a new cooperative international monetary system. But that new system, with the IMF Special Drawing Rights to supplement gold, is still incomplete.

We completed the trade negotiations called the Kennedy Round, the greatest multilateral trade negotiation in history. But the maintenance of liberal trading arrangements is an endless task. In almost every country there are strong protectionist forces ready to pounce if the forces working for liberal trade and cooperation waver.

I can tell you that several times, as I struggled for the tax bill in the Congress and struggled to help the world monetary system to stay together, I could peer over into an abyss which would have brought the world's economic system down, as it was brought down in the period 1929-1933. It was the memory of that tragic international failure -- remembered by some of the world's leaders old enough to have lived through it -- that helped bring us safely to the other side in some of these crises.

And so we must never be complacent or careless about the international economy we have built since the Second World War. It represents one of the

few occasions in human history where men have learned from mistakes of the past. But it does not work automatically. And it cannot work at this time in history unless the leadership of the United States is firm and clear. Nor can it work unless the American economy is both expanding steadily and accepting the discipline of sound fiscal and monetary policy.

Such a cooperative international monetary and trading system is the best background we can create for the developing nations to move forward, But they and we must build on the lessons we have learned together which, I believe, should be carried forward in the future. Here is my list of these lessons.

First, development is a full-time job, calling for all-out mobilization in each country. Those who assist from outside can only be the junior partners in the venture.

Second, development is serious nation-building -- a task for the doers and not just the talkers. There is no room for sterile dogma and there are simply not enough resources for empty foreign adventures.

Third, developing countries cannot carry the burden of excessive military expenditures. Every nation has legitimate security needs. But there can be neither security nor development with a senseless spiral of military purchases.

Fourth, agriculture is a development growth industry. Most of the people are in the countryside. Hungry people cannot be productive people. But prosperous farmers can be the firm foundation for prosperous factories.

Fifth, development requires diversified exports. Traditional products and traditional markets will not be enough to finance import needs. So the developing countries have the responsibility to create new and competitive export industries. The industrial countries have the responsibility to maintain an open and a growing world economy.

Sixth, development requires broad opportunities for the private sector -- domestic and foreign. The technology, management, and capital foreign investment provides is a critical component if it is brought into the right sectors and if it is brought in on fair terms.

Seventh, in some critically important nations, policies of family planning have been adopted. New seeds and new priorities have lifted agricultural production and they have bought time for family planning policies to try to become effective. But the fate of development efforts hinges on how vigorously that time is used.

Eighth, we have proved that development works. We have seen ancient fields reborn; new roads built to bridge the traditional gap between city and countryside; new schools to bring modern knowledge to age-old cultures. We have seen nations on the move reaching sustained rates of economic growth exceeding 6 percent a year. We now know that foreign aid is not an endless task. But there is still a vast amount of work ahead. Many nations have only just begun. We simply cannot turn our backs on the majority of our fellow human beings in the world.

-All my mature life I have found conditions of poverty a shock and a challenge. My first confrontation with poverty was in \_\_\_\_\_ where I came in from my father's farm to go to school. There I saw Mexican-American families living under conditions I had never imagined could be. We lived simply on our farm; but it was nothing like this. The children, especially, moved me because they didn't have enough food. They had virtually no medical care available. And they couldn't get the education which their bright-eyed natural intelligence could obviously absorb.

I remember seeing some of these children out behind a road stand where truck drivers stopped for breakfast. The garbage was dumped in the back. The children would shake the coffee grounds out of what was left of the grapefruit and suck out a little juice.

It may be that such memories started me thinking about political life rather than going on as a teacher. In any case, the terrible human waste of poverty, ignorance, and disease stayed with me.

-- What I learned over the years is that -- ~~and~~ not in a day, not in a year, but within a man's lifetime -- enormous changes can take place. They took place in Texas. They took place in many other parts of our land, notably in the South. One of my special ties to Secretary Rusk was that he, too, had seen with his own eyes small town and rural poverty in the South; and within the span of his life -- and mine -- we had seen so much accomplished here at home.

All this has strengthened my confidence, as I have travelled through Asia and Latin America and studied the conditions of poverty elsewhere. At

first sight the task is overwhelming. And, indeed -- as I said at the end of my Central American tour -- there is so much to do and so little time in which to do it. Nevertheless, I am sure it is a job that can be done.

As late as 1964 and 1965, for example, our best experts were telling us that there was no way to avoid a food-population crisis in the 1970's. They believed that the revolution in productivity in agriculture that was needed could not take place fast enough and would not permit us to buy much time. But by pressing hard for high priority for agriculture in our aid programs and with the coming in of the new wheat and rice strains and rapid increase in the use of chemical and fertilizers and pesticides, there has been a mighty lift in the last few years in critical areas. We do now have time, I believe, to balance the most fundamental of human accounts -- that between food and population -- if nations and families will take the problem of population control seriously and deal with it urgently in the developing world.

#### V. Organizing the Regions

With the commitment made in Vietnam, in 1965 and a good deal of Great Society legislation on the books, I turned, late in the year, recovering from a minor operation at the Ranch, to a great question: Looking ahead, how could the United States draw back from the lonely and disproportionate role it was being forced to play in many parts of the world without endangering its own security and that of others and without falling into isolationism?

As I talked with my friends in Congress and felt the pulse of the people, it was my belief that we, as a nation, knew in our minds and hearts that we could not safely return to isolationism; but there was, at the same time, a feeling that we were doing too much in the world and others too little.

At the same time, from my contacts with leaders abroad, I could see two other facts.

First, nations new and old, rich and poor, were coming to a stage where they wanted to take more of their destiny into their own hands. They resented their dependence on the major powers and wanted dignity and true independence. But, second, it was also clear that the nation-state was incapable of dealing with its problems of development and security acting alone. This was true of Europe; and it was true even of such a great nation as Japan. It was even more true of the developing nations.

Putting all this together, I began in 1966 to throw the weight of our government behind the movement towards regionalism, which was beginning to emerge in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

This new emphasis in our policy was first expressed during my visit to Mexico City in April 1966.

"...the drawing together of the economies of Latin America is critical to this hemisphere's future. Only in this way can the hemisphere develop

-- truly efficient industries

-- expanded foreign exchange earnings; and

-- a sound foundation for full Latin American partnership

in building a peaceful world community."

On this basis I threw our weight behind President Illia's proposal for a Latin American summit meeting. The conference took place the next year at Punta del Este.

In the Pan American conference at Punta del Este in 1967, the leaders of Latin American governments formally undertook a commitment to move towards economic integration beginning in 1970, and to complete the process by 1985. At that meeting I deliberately withdrew from the United States' traditional role of senior partner -- out in front -- to that of a junior partner in a process in which Latin America must take the lead.

I make no sanguine claims of progress. <sup>And</sup> ~~But~~ if the effort is to succeed, American policy will have to remain active and steady in support of the Latin American integration movement; for the habit of nationalist policy left over from the past is deeply imbedded, and strong vested interests work against Latin American economic integration. <sup>But</sup> Today the man in Lima, Peru, who wishes to talk to a man in Rio de Janeiro on the same continent must do so through the telephone exchange in Miami or New York. The traveller from southern Brazil to this nation's foremost city, Rio de Janeiro -- roughly the same distance as from Boston to Washington, may take as much as two or three days for that trip. Most of all, the nations throughout the continent have great natural resources which their neighbors cannot or do not use. Locked behind the high mountain ranges, deep rain forests and forbidding deserts of that continent, are fertile lands and unknown resources.

*All this must be changed. And it is changing.*

Latin America already has before it the success of a smaller regional grouping. The Central American nations have begun a common market. In seven years they have set up a common bank to provide funds for regional projects and a monetary council. In that time they have multiplied trade among their members by seven and achieved an annual economic growth rate of six percent, higher than our own. They have been able to increase by 50 percent the funds devoted to education. None of this would have been possible without integration. Encouraged by that success, in May of 1968 the five nations in the basin of the River-Plate began a plan for cooperative development of that river and its tributaries. And other regional and sub-regional initiatives are underway.

Progress in the whole of Latin America is still not rapid. But a mood is growing within to force the pace. In the fall of 1968, a working paper for the Council of Latin American Bishops said with unusual bluntness: "A lack of technical development, blind oligarchic classes and foreign big business block necessary reforms and offer active resistance to everything that could work against their interests, and, in consequence, create a situation of violence... A tiny minority receives the great part of income ... while the great masses have a minimum income and are subject to the constant peril of unemployment." Strong words like these from a source once considered the ally of conservative elements, are new, and a hopeful sign.

In the spring of 1966 I addressed the ambassadors in Washington from the African nations -- the first speech ever given by an American President

on Africa. We offered help in the development of regional and subregional projects on that continent. We then conducted a major study, headed by Ambassador Edward Korry who consulted all manner of experts, public and private, here and abroad. As a result, we began re-structuring our aid program to move away from bilateral assistance toward aid to regional and subregional institutions and projects.

As I said earlier, events forced me to develop a special interest in Asian regionalism. In April 1965, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University, I presented a plan for special aid to develop the great Mekong River, a river longer than our own Mississippi, and to commence on its course a plan for development that will exceed in its fruits those of our own TVA. In that speech I said that the first step towards that region elevating itself out of a condition of slow individual growth "is for the countries of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a greatly expanded cooperative effort for development." Despite the turbulence of the region, in September 1968, in Laos, the first component of the multilaterally financed Nam Ngum Dam was opened, and the plan was on its way.

All these developments are in their infancy. But regional cooperation is in the air. It is sound from the point of view of the nations concerned, leading them towards greater independence and dignity on the world scene. It is sound from the point of view of the United States, because the more they can do for themselves, the happier Americans are.

One of my fondest hopes would be to see serious movement towards Middle Eastern regionalism in the wake of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

The Middle East is a heartbreaking region, because its resources and possibilities are so great, but the poverty of the people remains. The UAR has oil and water, skilled economists and administrators, and a sense of nationhood to build on. Iraq has oil and water and sulphur and land. Syria has great untapped agricultural possibilities. I am sure some of the other states which have rich oil resources, would much rather put them into regional economic and social development than into arms purchases, for themselves or others. Moreover, regionalism is, in my judgment, the road to dignity in the Middle East. Because of the quarrels between Arabs and Israel, between some Arabs and others, between Arabs and other Moslems, it has been so easy for outside powers to move in and exploit these conflicts for their own power purposes. It is only when the governments of the region decide that their number one task is to improve the lives of their peoples -- and decide they must cooperate to this end above any other -- that they will find the common strength to prevent external interference and achieve the dignity of true independence.

What I know -- and what they must know in their hearts at quiet lonely moments -- is that there will be only tragedy if they pursue their old outworn vendettas.

Some people say over and over again: We must have no more Vietnams.

If that proposition means we must never again stand against aggression, it is unacceptable.

If it means we must work to avoid the creation of conditions in which such massive guerrilla operations can be launched, I agree. And we have been working with others on a preventive medicine basis for many years to head off this kind of conflict in many parts of the world. And I believe there is a good chance we can do so, because the base for guerrilla war in Vietnam and Laos was unique. It was laid far back in the 1940's in the war with Japan and then in the struggle against French colonialism. It will not be easy for Communists anywhere to reproduce the conditions that made the struggle in Southeast Asia so hard.

But, in addition, I do believe that regional cooperation, economic and political, is one of the major ways of insuring that there will be no more Vietnams.

#### VI. Europe and Japan

It would be wholly correct to discuss Western Europe and Japan under the general heading of regionalism. After all, the formula we are now applying to the other regions of the world first developed in our relations with Western Europe. President Truman, as the Marshall Plan was launched, had a choice. He could have dealt with Europe, country by country, on a divide-and-rule basis; or, he could have encouraged the Western Europeans to cooperate

and unify their efforts. He chose the latter course, because it was deep in the American people to seek partners in the world, not satellites. The United States became the great friend of those Western Europeans who wanted to see Western Europe strong and united, dignified, and once again a major power in the world. President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and I followed that lead, steadily, despite all disappointments and difficulties.

And, indeed, there is no other way for Western Europe. The problems of defense, of East-West negotiations, of dealing with the crises and possibilities in the developing world are simply too big for countries of fifty million, acting by themselves, to make a significant impact.

It was a sadness to me that Western European unity did not move forward during my term in office. The reason, quite simply, was the policy of the government of France.

I had and I have great faith in the underlying strength of the friendship between France and the United States. Moreover, I believe that France will one day again be a leader in the movement toward Western European unity.

But in the 1960's its policy took another course. I saw my task as acting so that whatever the differences were between France and the United States, I did nothing to make them greater.

I was not greatly troubled by anti-Americanism coming from Paris. Our shoulders are broad. I was troubled by the withdrawal of France from the integrated arrangements of NATO; but that, too, we could manage -- and did

manage quietly and with great skill. All the other members of NATO joined us in the move to Brussels. What most troubled me was that French policy prevented the effective unity of Western Europe; for that was the only realistic road to the dignity and stature which the French Government proclaimed as its European objective.

And so, when great issues arose, such as the Middle East crisis, where vital European interests were involved, Europe's voice was divided and barely heard. Europe could not organize itself to do what it ought to do in Latin America and in Africa where major, abiding European interests are involved. Europe virtually withdrew from Asia where more than half of the world's people live and where issues are at stake which will shape Europe's future as well as Asia's.

I remember feeling this European impotence acutely in the Congo crisis of 1967. With the white mercenaries pushing back Congolese forces, the people of that country felt humiliated. There was a real danger that they would turn on some ten thousand white Europeans in the Congo in reprisal. What was required was help to President Mobutu in the form of a few military transport aircraft so he could bring his best forces to bear against the mercenaries. It was obviously a task for Europeans to undertake. But no government in Europe could quite get itself organized. <sup>nevertheless,</sup> ~~But~~ (the danger to human lives and the danger of chaos were real and would not wait.) So I sent the three C-130's to the Congo.

There was a considerable outcry in the Senate and in the press about American overcommitment and all the rest. But the job was done. The situation quieted down. The planes came out.

But it troubled me -- and it still troubles me -- that even in such a minor matter, Europe could not move.

Although great movements forward were forestalled by the French frustration of European unity, we did get a good deal done together across the Atlantic. We all miss France from an integrated NATO; nevertheless, we have all worked harder and closer together in Brussels.

The NATO Nuclear Committee has turned out to be a significant unifying force in the Alliance.

During the Kennedy Round negotiations, we caught a quick glimpse of how much could be done between the United States and a unified Europe when a common basis of action existed; for we conducted much of the negotiation between the United States and the officials of the Common Market.

Cooperation between the United States and the other countries of Europe was essential to managing the international monetary system through a series of dangerous crises in 1967-68. Despite some difficulties with France, we found that cooperation in Europe and did the job.

As we look ahead, I am convinced that the Atlantic Alliance and Western European unity remain, after twenty years, still the right policy for Europe and the right policy for the United States.

As for East-West relations, the lesson of Czechoslovakia is not that detente is dead. It is not that changes will cease in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The lesson is: that detente and change in the East may be slow -- slower than we would like to see, slower than we would hope.

The ending of the split of Germany and the split of Europe will come in time; and it must come peacefully. But, in the meanwhile, if we are to be safe in the West and get on with the world's business, we need the strongest possible Atlantic Alliance and the strongest possible Western Europe.

And Western Europeans should remember this: The American people understand the importance to them and to the values we hold dear of a free and vital Western Europe. But the weakness of Europe, its isolationist mood, its fragmentation, encourage those who would like to pull our forces out and return to isolationism. But a Europe which takes its fair share of the burdens, in my judgment, has nothing to fear if it wants the friendship, collaboration and support of the United States.

Something of the same can be said about Japan. Japan's revival after the Second World War is a true miracle. It is primarily the product of a vital, determined and greatly talented people. We Americans can take a certain pride, also, in the success of Japan: Our occupation was as wise as any occupation is likely to be; our assistance was well used; our protection of Japan through the Mutual Security Treaty has permitted that country to concentrate on its own development.

But now is the time for Japan to begin to think of its relations with the United States as a two-way street. And it must think of its relations to the rest of Asia -- and the developing world -- in terms of responsibility. The key question is not: What can the United States do for Japan; it is -- what can Japan do for the cause of peace and progress in Asia and the world.

Japan is well on the way to becoming the world's third industrial power. There is no reason why it should abandon -- and every reason for it to maintain -- a policy of peace and friendship with all. But there is no doubt that a sound relationship of Japan to the United States, to Asia and the rest of the world, demands that the Japanese people and its political leaders move away from the habits of mind and policy that grew up when it was occupied, protected and isolated. The key question for Japan is: What duties and obligations to others is it prepared to assume.

The New Asia that is emerging is going to need the resources and wisdom and strength of Japan, operating within the new multilateral institutions that are being built. It is right that in the Asian Development Bank, Japan and the United States took up equal proportions of the capital: 20%. It is right that we should be thinking of putting up equal amounts for the supplementary Special Fund of the Asian Development Bank, and that we work as equals in assisting Indonesia.

I am confident that, if Western Europe and Japan can accept the doctrine of fair shares and partnership, there is little danger that the American people will relapse into isolationism.

## VII. Reconciliation

Close by the President of the United States when he travels is a member of the armed forces who carries the coded messages which the President would have to transmit if he ordered a nuclear counter-attack in the face of a nuclear attack upon us. And beside him always is a telephone which keeps him in touch with the military authorities.

Nuclear war is not an abstraction to the President. It is a possibility with which he must live; and his first objective is to protect the interests of the United States while deterring and avoiding an engagement of nuclear arms.

Only four Americans have really understood and felt in their bones this burden and responsibility: President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and myself. It has become much more acute since the 1950's when both sides developed H-bombs and then rockets to deliver them.

Although there are other nuclear weapons powers in the world, the possibility of nuclear war gives a special dimension to our relations with the Soviet Union ~~a nation~~ which has the capacity to destroy our society, as we have the capacity to destroy theirs, even if they should attack us first.

Elementary prudence and humanity require, therefore, that the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union be taken most seriously.

When we are in conflict with the Soviet Union, we must make sure that each side understands very clearly the other so that miscalculation can be avoided. That, I am sure, is why the Soviet leaders brought the hot line into

operation early on the morning of June 5 (?), 1967. But the same care must be exercised from day to day on many other issues.

Clearly, however, the avoidance of nuclear war is not enough. If we and the Soviet leaders are to do our duty to our own people and to humanity, we must strive patiently and stubbornly -- without illusion or false optimism, without expecting quick results -- to find areas of common interest so that, with the passage of time, the relations between the two countries can move from fixed hostility along the whole front of our relations to common efforts to keep the peace.

It was with that thought in mind that in mid-January 1964 I first addressed myself to Mr. Khrushchev in reply to a letter he had sent at the end of 1963. I set out a long list of specific matters on which we might go to work. Here is the list:

- to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
- to end the production of fissionable material for weapons;
- to transfer large amounts of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes;
- to ban all nuclear weapons tests;
- to place limitations on nuclear weapons systems;
- to reduce the risk of war by accident or design;
- to move toward general disarmament.

I had experienced too much as a leader in the Senate and as Vice President to be naive about the interests and objectives of the Soviet Union. In 1961, as Vice President, I was in Berlin in the face of the Wall, waiting for U. S. forces to come down the Autobahn, knowing that war might be very close, indeed.

I had sat through every meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council during the Cuba missile crisis when that crisis was at its height.

I knew there were strong forces in the ideological and political life of the Soviet Union which did not wish the United States well.


I also knew that while keeping our powder dry, that it was my duty to struggle against all odds to move forward the relationship between our two countries, Without risking our own security or that of our allies we tried hard. And we did a great deal; a treaty outlawing armaments in outer space; a treaty establishing consular relations which was the first bilateral treaty negotiated between the two nations since 1933; a civil air agreement; and most important of all, a treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, it was agreed to try to negotiate a limitation of the two nations' missile armaments, offensive and defensive.

Then came August 20, 1968. It was a Tuesday and we had had our regular lunch including my senior advisers in the field of national security policy. On the agenda was an item raising the possibility that the Soviet Union might move soon into Czechoslovakia. We knew the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party had met on Monday. It was also a day when we were considering the possibility of major moves forward in talk about strategic missiles with the Soviet Union. My advisers told me it was more likely rather than

less likely that the Soviet Union, fearful of the situation in East Germany and the Ukraine, fearful of liberal tendencies within its own nation, would move to crush the very modest liberalizing efforts of the Czechoslovaks.

We judged the Central Committee meeting as ominous, not hopeful.

And so I was immensely sad, but not surprised, when Ambassador Dobrynin came in that evening to tell me that the Warsaw Pact forces were marching into Czechoslovakia.



As I write these words, I cannot foretell the full consequences of that tragic decision by the Soviet leaders. It was of the greatest concern to me that a superpower to whom we looked hopefully, as a confident negotiating partner, would feel so threatened by so little. It was troubling, too, that they could misjudge the political situation in Czechoslovakia.

I do not believe the Czechoslovak tragedy will end the historic movement of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe towards more liberal and humane ways of organizing the life of those societies. I do not believe it should -- or will -- end forward movement in Soviet-United States relations; although it certainly set them back. The Czechoslovak tragedy did underline how long the road ahead may be; how cautious and alert we must be and how essential it is that we continue to move forward in the non-Communist world while awaiting the gradual changes that, in the end, will permit the peoples of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe -- and mainland China, too -- to join fully and peacefully and without reservation in the good works of the family of nations.

What is at stake here is the coming to life in the Soviet Union of a new way of looking at the world -- and a new way of looking at its relations with the United States.

The Soviet leaders were brought up as young men with a vision of a world Communist movement, run from Moscow, that would inevitably come to embrace the planet; for that was the historical prediction of Marx and Lenin.

They were brought up to believe that their way of organizing societies was the best way. And that other nations would come inevitably to that way.

Clearly, this is not happening and will not happen.

The Communist bloc of the 1950's has been pulled apart and strained by the <sup>abundance</sup> power of nationalism.

Western Europe, Japan, and the United States are showing every day that free societies, based on partnership between vital private enterprise and constructive government policies can do more for their people than Communist methods of organization. Among the developing nations there is not a single Communist success story -- neither Cuba nor mainland China, North Vietnam nor North Korea. There are many success stories in the non-Communist world.

We cannot ask and we cannot expect the Soviet leadership to abandon its ideology. But we can hope and expect that the Soviet Union will come to act more and more as a great nation state among other nation states.

That is why at Glassboro I told Chairman Kosygin what I thought the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union should become.

I said, in effect, that we are like the two eldest children of a large family where the other children were too big and assertive to control directly.

Therefore, we should first set an example to them in our bilateral relations. Where we might agree, we should try hard to find agreement. Where we disagreed, we should struggle to contain and live at peace with that disagreement.

If possible, we should use our influence together to prevent conflict among others; but, if we cannot prevent such conflict, we should make sure that others do not engage us in war.

And wherever we find it possible, we should use our influence together -- or in parallel -- to bring peace and order rather than conflict and chaos to the human family.

It was in that spirit that we had done a good deal since the dark days of the Cuban missile crisis: in our various bilateral agreements; in settling the Indo-Pak war of 1965; in the hot line exchanges on the Middle East; in containing our deep differences over Vietnam; and in trying to find our way to a limitation of the arms race in strategic missiles.

But clearly the vision I held up at Glassboro was not yet wholly acceptable as the guidelines for Soviet policy.

To achieve fully those guidelines is a task for tomorrow.

In the meanwhile, I believe we should hold to the national stance on the seal of the President: the eagle clutching both arrows and the olive branch -- a stance I often expressed to our people as: "our guard is up; but our hand is out."

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FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE WH82570

UNCLAS

HEREWITH THE SAD AND SOMEWHAT SINISTER PRESS RELEASE OF  
MAJOR LEWELL MERRITT.

THE FOLLOWING RELEASE BY MAJOR MERRITT TO MEMBERS OF THE  
FREEWORLD PRESS AND OTHER NEWS MEDIA AT 131630H OCT 68.

DEAR SIR:

I AM A BLACK AMERICAN NOW SERVING MY COUNTRY TO THE BEST  
OF MY ABILITY AS PART OF OUR ARMY IN VIETNAM. NOW AS IN THE  
PAST TWENTY YEARS I HAVE NOT ASKED WHAT MY COUNTRY COULD  
DO FOR ME (ALTHOUGH PAINFULLY AWARE OF WHAT NATIONAL CONDITIONS  
PREVENTED ME FROM DOING FOR MYSELF) BUT HAVE SOUGHT EVERY  
OPPORTUNITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF  
OUR COUNTRY BELIEVING THAT NATIONAL GROWTH MEANT GROWTH FOR ME  
AND MY PEOPLE. AS WE KNOW THIS HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE.

WITH COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMERICAN SITUATION I BELIEVE  
IT EVEN MORE IMPERATIVE THAT MY CONTRIBUSION CONTINUE  
- ESPECIALLY IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION. IT IS FOR THIS REASON  
THAT I REJECT TOTALLY THOSE WHO REPRESENT MAINTENANCE OF THE  
STATUS QUO, WHO BEGUILE THE PEOPLE WITH TWISTED TRUTHS AND  
SLANTED FACTS; THOSE WHOSE MASTERY OF DECEIT AND SUBTERFUGE  
IS LIKELY UNEQUALLED IN THE HISTORY OF ALL MANKIND.

HOW LONG MUST MEN OF INTELLIGENCE AND REASON BE EXPECTED  
TO ABSORB THE BAELE THAT RAINS FROM THE MOUTHS AND PENS OF  
THE MERCHANTS OF CONTENT, THOSE SPOKESMEN FOR THAT CIRCUMSPECT  
CLIQUE WHO WIELD FAR TO MUCH INFLUENCE - NEGATIVE INFLUENCE  
- WITHIN THE AMERICAN POWER STRUCTURE. THESE PEOPLE WOULD  
HAVE US BELIEVE THAT "TRULY WE'VE NEVER HAD IT SO GOOD". THE  
ANSWER LITERALLY SCREAMS BACK THAT WE WILL BE BOMBARDED  
WITH BULL MANURE AS LONG AS WE INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY  
DEMAND NOTHING MORE PALATABLE.

IN MY OPINION, THE AMERICAN MILITARY SERVICES ARE THE STRONGEST  
CITADELS OF RACISM ON THE FACE ON THE EARTH. DUE CONSIDERATION  
OF COURSE BEING GIVEN TO CERTAIN WHITE DOMINATED SOUTH AFRICAN  
NATIONS AND A FEW SCRAGGLY ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE WHITE  
CITIZENS COUNCIL AND KLU KLUX KLAN.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE FOR YEARS BEEN TOLD THAT THE MILITARY LEADS THE NATION IN BREAKING DOWN AND ELIMINATING ALL VESTIGES OF SEGREGATION AND DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF MINORITY GROUPS. THIS IS A BLATANT LIE. A LIE THAT I AND TO MANY OTHER GULLIBLE BLACK OFFICERS HAVE HELPED TO PERPETUATE AND EVEN SOME HAVE COME TO BELIEVE. WE HAVE DONE THIS WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE AND WILLING CONSENT WHILE GLORIFYING IN OUR PSEUDO ACCEPTANCE BY OUR FELLOW WHITE OFFICERS AND CLINGING TO THE MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT PATIENCE, DILIGENCE AND PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE WOULD YIELD THE BENEFITS ENJOYED BY THE MAJORITY ETHNIC GROUP.

THE TOKEN PROMOTIONS, TO INCLUDE THE CREATION OF BLACK GENERALS, AND THE CREDIT TO YOUR RACE PLATITUDES THAT ENSUE FROM THE POWER STRUCTURE HAVE BEEN HIGHLY EFFECTIVE IN ASSURING THE BLIND OBEDIENCE AND LOYAL SERVICE OF THE BLACK AMERICAN OFFICER. THE AVID WISH FOR ACCEPTANCE AND OVERWHELMING DESIRE TO ACHIEVE HAVE MADE US USEFUL PAWNS IN THE EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE FACADE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY. ACTUALLY, WE WERE NOT BLIND BUT HAVING ACCEPTED THE MYTH OF BLACK INFERIORITY AND BEING CONVINCED THE FUTILITY OF OVERCOMING THE SYSTEM WE CHOSE TO AVOID CONFRONTATION. WE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE UNDENIABLE PRIVILEGE "OF BEING" ACCORDED THE - WHITE-ANGLO-SAXON-PROTESTANT.

THE REAL TRAGEDY OF COURSE WAS IN OUR SELF-DENIAL OF MANHOOD. TRAGEDY IN THE SENSE THAT THERE ARE SOME THINGS THAT NO MAN WHO WOULD CALL HIMSELF A MAN WOULD LONG ENDURE. I SHOULD IMAGINE THAT TO BE A MAN ONE MUST FIRST THINK HE IS A MAN. THINKING AND CONCEPTUAL ABILITY BEING AN ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MAN AND ONE-MAN. BUT OF COURSE WE BLACK OFFICERS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN GREAT CREDITS TO OUR RACE (NEVER JUST CREDITS TO AMERICA) AND HAVE SET A SPLENDID EXAMPLE OF CONDUCT AND BEHAVIOUR FOR OUR LESS AMBITIOUS BLACK BROTHERS. THE BLACK MILITARY OFFICER GROUP IS THE LARGEST COLLECTION OF IDENTIFIABLE ACCOMODATIONIST IN AMERICA. (I USE THIS TERM AS A SYNONYM FOR UNCLE TOM BECAUSE I UNDERSTAND THAT UNCLE TOM'S ARE PASSE). FOR EMPHASIS I SAY AGAIN "GROUP". NATURALLY THERE ARE MANY MANY OUTSTANDING EXCEPTIONS. HAVING WRITTEN THUSLY I HASTEN TO ADD THAT ALL OF THE BLACK OFFICERS WHO KNOW ME (AND THERE ARE MANY AFTER TWENTY YEARS OF SERVICE) SHOULD NOT WRITE OR QUESTION ME AS TO WHAT I THINK THEY ARE. THEY KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN ALL THESE YEARS. THE IMPORTANT THING IS WHAT THEY INTEND TO DO ABOUT THEMSELVES, IF ANYTHING. FOR THOSE NOT SURE WHAT TO DO I SUGGEST THEY BEGIN BY ACTING LIKE MEN. ITS A WONDERFULLY REFRESHING EXPERIENCE. THOSE NOT QUITE SURE OF HOW A MAN ACTS NEED NOT DESPAIR IT IS THE SORT OF THING THAT GROWS WITH YOU.

AS WE KNOW THE MILITARY DOES NOT ENCOURAGE DISTURBANCE OF THE STATUS QUO BY ITS MEMBERS AND WILL TAKE QUICK ACTION TO CENSURE OR ELIMINATE MAVERICKS. THIS IS NOT MEANT AS A CRITICISM OF THIS PARTICULAR FACET OF THE MILITARY SYSTEM FOR I SUSPECT THE SAME COULD BE SAID OF ANY ORGANIZATION OF SIZE. THE POINT HERE IS THAT MERE THREAT OF CENSURE OR ELIMINATION AFFECTIVELY FRIGHTENS AND SILENCE FAR TOO MANY OFFICERS OF ALL ETHNIC ORIGINS. TO ILLUSTRATE: WHITE CAPTAIN BROWN IS FRIENDLY WITH BLACK CAPTAIN JONES (THEY ACTUALLY LIKE EACH OTHER) AND WHILE AT AN OFFICERS CLUB PARTY WHITE MAJOR SMITH TELLS THE FUNNIEST NIGGER STORY HE KNOWS.

JONES IS HUMILIATED AND OFFENDED. BUT SAYS NOTHING, HE MAY EVEN GRIN A BIT (ALTHOUGH SICKLY) BROWN ACUTALLY HEARD NOTHING OTHER THAN A DEMENTED RACIST TALE, YET HE LAUGHS UNTIL HE CHOKES. BROWN DOES NOT DARE GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE IS NOT A DEDICATED MEMBER OF THE POWER STRUCTURE. POOR JONES, HE ORDERS ANOTHER DRINK TO PREPARE HIMSELF FOR THE NEXT RACIST STORY OR THE INEVITABLE BLACK MAMMY STORY. AT LEAST SEVENTY FIVE PERCENT OF THE WHITE OFFICERS IN THE MILITARY WERE RAISED BY BLACK MAMMYS. AND EVERY ONE OF THEM WAS DEARLY LOVED BY THAT MAMMY WHO WAS ALSO HIS FATHERS MISTRESS. WE HAVE THIS IN COMMON, FOR I WAS ALSO RAISED BY A BLACK WOMAN AND I WILL ADMIT THAT SHE TOO SLEPT WITH MY FATER. WHAT MAY BE EASILY AND FREELY ADMITTED IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WILL NEVER BE REPEATED PUBLICLY AND HARDLY IN FRONT OF WITNESSES. AS A RESULT THE MOGULS OF CONTENT WITH THE STATUS OF MINORITY ASSIMILATIONS INTO THE MILITARY COMPLETELY DOMINATE THE DIALOGUE. WHILE ADMITTING TO A FEW SPOTS OF DISCONTENT THESE SPOKESMEN ARE ABLE TO RECITE STATISTIC AFTER STATISTIC TO SUPPORT THE FALSE PREMISES OF HARMONY, JUSTICE, THOROUGH INTEGRATION AND MINORITY ACCEPTANCE. WHEN A BLACK GENERAL MAKES STATEMENTS THAT SUPPORT THE FALSE PREMISES OF EQUALITY, FREEDOM, AND JUSTICE IN THE MILITARY WHO IS THERE TO CHALLENGE. I CHALLENGE THESE LIES. I DO SO IN THE NAME AND FOR THE SAKE OF TRUTH, FOR THE REAL ADVANCEMENT OF EQUALITY, FOR THE REAL ADVANCEMENT OF JUSTICE AND TO HASTEN THE ATTAINMENT OF FREEDOM WITH THE MEASURE OF DIGNITY OUR CONSTITUTION PRESCRIBES FOR ALL AMERICANS. I CHALLENGE THE LIES IN THE HOPE THAT MY FELLOW OFFICERS AND AMERICANS OF WHATEVER ETHNIC ORIGIN WILL ACCEPT THE OBLIGATION OF MANHOOD, AND SPEAK UP FOR TRUE EQUALITY, JUSTICE AND FREEDOM. "FOR WHAT SHALL IT PROFIT A MAN IF HE GAIN THE WORLD AND LOOSE HIS SOUL." THERE ARE INDEED A GREAT MANY LOST SOULS AMONG US.

THE PRINCE OF PEACE ASSURED US ALL AN EVENTUAL REBIRTH AS A REWARD FOR LIVING RIGHT. IT SEEMS THAT HIS INJUNCTION IS TO GET MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION-NOW-LESS WE ALL PERISH IN AN ABYSS OF IGNORANCE AND CONCERN. I RECENTLY TALKED WITH AN EXCEPTIONAL BLACK COLONEL WHO WAS WITH THE 82D AIRBORNE BRIGADE DURING THE 1967 DETROIT RIOTS. THIS COLONEL DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY LIVES WERE LOST IN THAT RIOT BUT HE WAS CERTAIN THAT MOST OF THE BLACK DEATHS WERE ATTRIBUTABLE TO OTHER BLACK PEOPLE. HE WILL CERTAINLY GO FAR IN THE ARMY. FOR WHAT PURPOSE ARE WE IN THE MILITARY IF NOT TO ASSURE AN ENVIRONMENT CONTRIBUTIVE TO EQUALITY, JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM. MOREOVER, WHAT IS OUR NATIONAL REASON FOR BEING IN SOUTH VIETNAM IF NOT TO ASSIST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TOWARD THE ENJOYMENT OF GREATER FREEDOM, JUSTICE AND EQUALITY. I ASSURE YOU THAT I WOULD WELCOME REAL ATTAINMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES WITH AS MUCH ENTHUSIASM AS THE VIETNAMESE. AND DO NOT BE HOODWINKED INTO BELIEVING I ENJOY ALL THE FREEDOM, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE I NEED FOR WITH LESS THAN WHAT WHITE AMERICANS ENJOY I CAN NOT BUT FEEL SHORT CHANGED. SOME VOICES ARE ALWAYS READY TO SAY "IF YOU PEOPLE WILL JUST BE A BIT PATIENT" (ONE OF MY COLONELS TOLD ME THAT IN 1962 ON OKINAWA AFTER I COMPLAINED ABOUT THE SEGREGATED BARS). I MUST ANSWER WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN PATIENT, BUT BEING PATIENT DOES NOT MEAN DOING NOTHING. THE DEARTH OF PROGRESS FOR THE MINORITY GROUPS OF AMERICA HAVE ALREADY COST US FAR TO MANY LIVES NEEDLESSLY WASTED AND FAR TO MUCH DESTRUCTION OF VALUABLE PROPERTY. I BELIEVE THAT A LARGE SHARE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS WASTE REST WITH THE AFLUENT BLACK CIVILIANS WHO WERE AND ARE TO BUSY ASSIMULATING AND BECOMING MORE AFLUENT, TO PROVIDE THE LEADERSHIP AND DIRECTION THE BLACK MASSES REQUIRE, THUS CREATING A LEADERSHIP VACCUUM THAT IS READILY FILLED BY THE "CARPETBAGGER". I AM REMINDED

OF THE WORDS ATTRIBUTED TO ONE INFAMOUS BLACK GENERAL (I ADMIT I NEVER HEARD HIM SAY IT) "YOU MAY BE MY COLOP, BUT YOU WILL NEVER BE MY KIND." THIS KIND OF STATEMENT EXEMPLIFYS THE ESCAPIST ATTITUDE OF THE MANY AFFLUENT BLACK PEOPLE. HAVING NOW ENJOYED A DOSE OF SPEAKING OUT I AM PREPARED TO PAY THE PIPER. INDULGE ME IF YOU WILL WHILE I SPECULATE ABOUT THE FUTURE. CERTAINLY I WILL BE SOUNDLY CASTIGATED BY THE MILITARY HIERARCHY, IF NOT DIRECTLY, THEN AFTER MY EXPULSION FROM THE ARMY FOR I SHALL CONTINUE TO SPEAK OUT AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY. THE BLACK ACCOMODATIONS WILL LABE ME A TROUBLE MAKER IF THEY DARE SPEAK AT ALL (LIKELY THE POWER STRUCTURE WILL SELECT ITS MOST PROMINENT KANKY HEAD TO PUT ME DOWN). THE REAL RACIST WILL SWEAR I AM A COMMUNIST, BLACK MUSLIM (NO OFFENSE INTENDED TO GOOD MUSLIMS) BLACK PANTHER, OR IF THOSE LABLES WILL NOT STICK THEY WILL INVENT SOMETHING. FORTUNATELY I AM TO UN-IMPORTANT AND INSIGNIFICANT TO ASSASSINATE WHICH SEEMS TO BE THE VOGUE WAY OF ELIMINATING PROBLEM PEOPLE, AND I HAVE NEVER JOINED ANY GROUP NOT EVEN THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA. THEN LASTLY THEY MAY ALL JUST IGNORE ME FOR WHICH I WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL BECAUSE THEN I COULD CONTINUE MY EFFORT TO AROUSE THE BLACK AFFLUENT OSTRICH WITHOUT SERIOUS INTERRUPTION.

ACTUALLY, I RATHER WELCOME THE REBUTTLE AND CHALLENGE OF MY STATEMENTS AND ASSERTIONS BY ANY CONTENT BLACK OFFICERS OR WHITE OR ANY OTHERS WHO REALLY BELIEVE THAT AS AN AMERICAN OFFICER I ENJOY THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF OUR SOCIETY. RACISTS I CAN DO WITHOUT.

TO RESTATE MY POSITION, I AM FOR MAKING A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE REALIZATION FOR BLACK PEOPLE OF A GREATER SHARE OF WHAT AMERICA OFFERS ALL OF HER CITIZENS. GREATER FREEDOM, GREATER JUSTICE, FULL EQUALITY-AND NOW. PROMISES SUCH AS FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1968 OPEN HOUSING LAW ARE A RIDICULOUS SLAP IN THE FACE WHEN THEY CONTAIN CLAUSES PUTTING THINGS OFF UNTIL 1972. WOULD IT MATTER SHOULD I HAVE TO GIVE MY LIFE IN THE INTEREST OF MY COUNTRY THIS YEAR-1968. BLACK PEOPLE DO NOT WANT CHARITY, SOCIAL SECURITY HAND OUTS OR POVERTY PROGRAMS. WHEN WE OBTAIN THE OBJECTIVES I HAVE MENTIONED WE WILL NOT NEED THE GIVE AWAYS.

HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE FOR A MAN TO KNOW HE IS A MAN. WHAT MUST HE FEEL BEFORE HE FEELS LIKE A MAN. AND HOW MUCH WILL HE ENDURE BEFORE HE DECIDES IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DIE LIKE A MAN. I AM A MAN, A BLACK AMERICAN MAN.

TO THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN MY GHETTO COMMUNITY OF CHICAGO I THANK YOU FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND PATIENCE IN ALLOWING ME TO FIND MANHOOD IN MY OWN TIME AND IN MY OWN WAY. TO MY FAMILY AND FRIENDS WHO HAVE HELD YOUR HEADS HIGH AND NEVER DIS-AVOWED ME WHEN IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE PRUDENT TO DO SO, I SHALL BE FOREVER GRATEFUL. FINALLY TO MY SONS WHO HAVE WITHSTOOD MY DEBASEMENT AND SUFFERED THE HUMILIATION AND INDIGNITY THAT I WAS TO INSENSITIVE TO FEEL ALL THESE YEARS I DEDICATE THE REMAINDER OF MY LIFE TO EARN AGAIN YOUR RESPECT.

/S/ LEVELL MERRITT  
/T/ LEVELL MERRITT  
MAJOR, INF  
UNITED STATES ARMY

MAJOR MERRITT HAS BEEN WITH THE TRAINING DIRECTORATE. HE IS CURRENTLY BEING REASSIGNED AS OPERATIONS STAFF OFFICER, OPERATIONS WAR PLANS BRANCH, OPERATION PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS DIVISION, J-3.

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FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE WH82568

*Profile*

UNCLAS

OCTOBER 13, 1968

YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING UNPLEASANT INCIDENT.

ON SUNDAY, 1630 HRS SAIGON TIME (0430 HRS EDT), FOLLOWING THE NORMAL BRIEFING OF THE PRESS, A US ARMY MAJOR LAVELL MERRITT (NEGRO), APPEARED AT THE BRIEFING AND PASSED OUT AN EIGHT PAGE TYPED STATEMENT ADDRESSED TO EDITORS AND PUBLISHERS OF THE FREE PRESS AND OTHER NEWS MEDIA.

THE STATEMENT HAD A TYPED (NOT OFFICIAL) MACV LETTERHEAD, "TRAINING CENTER BRANCH, TRAINING CENTER DIVISION, TRAINING DIRECTORATE".

THE STATEMENT IS HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY ACCORDING TO MACOI AND ACCUSES THE US ARMY OF ANTI-RACIAL POLICIES AND LISTS IN DETAIL INJUSTICES HE HAS SUFFERED OVER HIS ENTIRE MILITARY CAREER. AS AN EXAMPLE, "IN MY OPINION THE AMERICAN MILITARY SERVICES ARE THE STRONGEST CITADELS OF RACISM ON THE FACE OF THE EARTH."

HE GAVE THE DOCUMENT TO SEVERAL OF THE NEWS MEDIA. SOME HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL NOT USE IT, BUT AP STATED THAT IT WOULD. TWO TV NETWORKS, ABC AND CBS, HAVE FILMED INTERVIEWS WITH HIM.

AT THE MOMENT ALL THAT MACV INTENDS TO DO IS, IF ASKED, ACKNOWLEDGE THAT HE IS IN THE ARMY AND ASSIGNED TO MACV. IF ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF THE MAJOR HAD BEEN PASSED OVER FOR PROMOTION MACV WILL REPLY THAT HE WAS NOT SELECTED FOR PROMOTION, BUT WAS SELECTED FOR RETENTION ON ACTIVE DUTY IN HIS PRESENT GRADE.

ON BACKGROUND: MACV THINKS THAT THERE IS MORE TO THIS THAN "MEETS THE EYE", AND THERE MAY BE SIMILAR INCIDENTS.

DTG: 131411Z OCT 68

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FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82560

*Pres file*

68 OCT 12 PM 5:55

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: COUP IN PANAMA

1. AMBASSADOR ADAIR AND CANAL ZONE GOVERNOR LIEBERT ARRIVED AT HOWARD AFB, PANAMA AT 120337 EDT.
2. GENERAL PORTER, USCINCSO, IS DUE TO ARRIVE IN PANAMA FROM PARAGUAY AT 121927 EDT.
3. PANAMA CITY IS QUIET AND UNDER CONTROL OF THE GUARDIA NATIONALE (GN). NO FURTHER INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON PRESIDENT ARIAS' ALLEGED THREAT TO CALL HIS FOLLOWERS INTO THE STREETS IF THE REBEL GN OFFICERS FAILED TO CALL OFF THE COUP BY 0500 HOURS LOCAL. VICE PRESIDENT ARANGO, ACCORDING TO PANAMA CITY RADIO, HAS RECEIVED NUMEROUS CALLS TO TAKE OVER THE PRESIDENCY.
4. PRESIDENT ARIAS HAS BEEN TOLD THAT HE WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO USE HIS CANAL ZONE REFUGE TO ORGANIZE COUNTER-COUP ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE GUARD NATIONALE; HOWEVER, ARIAS HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL ASYLUM. HE HAS ISSUED A BRIEF PRESS STATEMENT AND REMAINS HOPEFUL THAT POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE COUP WILL DEVELOP LATER TODAY.
5. USSOUTHCOM HAS IMPLEMENTED SELECTED ACTIONS FROM THE CIVIL DISTURBANCE ANNEX TO USSOUTHCOM OP ORDER 1-68. THOSE ACTIONS ARE LISTED IN THE ATTACHMENT.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712 80-122  
By ag/ies, NARA, Date 2-2-93

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6. A PANAMA TASK FORCE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE US STATE DEPARTMENT AND PLANS TO ISSUE TWO SITUATION REPORTS A DAY.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE ACTIONS TAKEN BY USSOUTHCOM

ITEM	ACTION	FORCE
OVERALL READINESS	ALL HQ AND UNITS PREPARE FOR IMMEDIATE OPERATION (PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC).	ALL
RIOT CONTROL FORCE	MAINTAIN 3 COMPANIES ON A 1-HOUR READINESS STATUS (PACIFIC).	THREE COMPANIES
RIOT CONTROL FORCE	MAINTAIN 2 COMPANIES ON A 1-HOUR READINESS STATUS (ATLANTIC).	TWO COMPANIES
TASK ORGANIZATION	ESTABLISH TASK ORGANIZATIONS FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC).	ALL USARSO OPERATIONAL UNITS IN CANAL ZONE
VITAL INSTL REACTION FORCE	MAN CATEGORY I VITAL INSTLS (PACIFIC).	TWO OFFICERS, 51 ENLISTED, AND 7 AIR POLICE
VITAL INSTL REACTION FORCE	MAN CATEGORY I VITAL INSTLS (ATLANTIC).	ONE OFFICER AND 29 ENLISTED
INSTALLATION SECURITY	PROVIDE MILITARY SECURITY FOR FAA MICROWAVE STATION, ANCON HILL (PACIFIC).	AS REQUIRED
ROMEO-2	US PERSONNEL REMAIN INSIDE THEIR HOMES AT ALL TIMES AND PREPARE TO EVACUATE TO THE CANAL ZONE.	

DTG:122103Z OCT 68

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