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SITUATION ROOM

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82561

~~SECRET~~

OCTOBER 12, 1968

Pres file

HEREWITH THE LINE SECRETARY RUSK IS TAKING ON PANAMA.

STATE 254600 TO PANAMA

1. AT PRESENT SEEMS TO US WE HAVE THREE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES:

(A) PREVENT CIVIL STRIFE AND BLOODSHED;

(B) SEEK SOME SOLUTION TO POLITICAL CRISIS THAT WILL PRESERVE AS MUCH CONSTITUTIONALITY AS POSSIBLE; AND

(C) AVOID TO THE EXTENT WE CAN HAVING US BE TARGET ENMITY OF SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF PANAMANIAN NATION.

WHAT HAPPENS IN PANAMA ON HEELS OF PERU WILL ALSO BE RELEVANT IN TERMS ENCOURAGING OR DISCOURAGING SIMILAR ACTS OTHER COUNTRIES.

2. WE BELIEVE FOLLOWING IS APPROPRIATE SCENARIO FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE:

(A) WE SHOULD NOT FACILITATE ANY ATTEMPTS BY ARIAS OVERTURN JUNTA BY VIOLENCE. ALL YOUR REPORTS THUS FAR AND INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT HERE INDICATE HE CANNOT NOW BE SUCCESSFUL AND ANY EFFORT WOULD ONLY LEAD TO BLOODSHED WITHOUT SATISFACTORY SOLUTION. IT MAY IN FACT BE NECESSARY AT SOME FUTURE POINT TO ACTIVELY DISCOURAGE ARIAS' FROM ALL POLITICAL ACTIVITY, AND WE MAY HAVE TO RETURN TO OUR ORIGINAL POSTURE OF ASKING HIM AGAIN TO REFRAIN FROM POLITICAL ACTIVITY WHILE IN THE ZONE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 99-250

By *g/cb*, NARA Date *1/20/02*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

(B) WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD NOW APPROACH JUNTA AND GUARDIA THROUGH APPROPRIATE INFORMAL CHANNELS AND TELL THEM COMPROMISE WITH ARIAS COALITION AND UTILIZATION SOME FORMULA OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IS CRITICAL TO NATURE OF OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS, AND THAT US ATTITUDE TOWARD NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL BE GUIDED THEREBY. WE UNDERSTAND THIS MAY EVENTUALLY MEAN GIVING UP ON ARIAS, BUT CRITICAL NOW TO SEE IF HIS GOVERNMENT CAN BE UTILIZED TO FORM NEW CIVILIAN OR PART-CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, WE NOTE CIA SITREP HERE INDICATES COUP LEADERS HAVE ASKED FIRST VP ARANGO TO ASSUME PRESIDENCY BUT HE HAS THUS FAR REFUSED.

(C) PER TELCON, APPROACH TO ALEMAN WILL BE MADE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES.

"YOU KNOW THAT A COMPLETE BREAK WITH CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO DEAL WITH THAN IS SOME VARIATION ON THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT. FIRST PREFERENCE WOULD BE TO SEE IF SOMETHING CAN'T BE WORKED OUT FOR ARIAS TO RETURN. IF THIS PROVES IMPOSSIBLE, HOW ABOUT A GOVERNMENT HEADED BY ARANGO? THE WORST SITUATION WOULD BE FOR A MILITARY JUNTA TO SET ITSELF UP COMPLETELY APART FROM THE CONSTITUTION"

(D). IN ADDITION YOU ARE NOW AUTHORIZED HAVE SEDDON MAKE SIMILAR DISCREET AND QUIET APPROACH TO GUARDIA OFFICERS MAKING SAME POINTS AND POINTING OUT IN APPROPRIATE TONE HOW DIFFICULT IT WILL BE FOR US TO CONTINUE BE OF ASSISTANCE TO GUARDIA IN LONG-RUN FUTURE.

(E) ALL SUCH APPROACHES ARE, OF COURSE, TO BE QUIET, UNOFFICIAL AND UNDERTAKEN WITH UTMOST DISCRETION. RUSK

DTG: 122103Z OCT 1968

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1968 OCT 12 -20 33

Pre file

EAAS35
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DE VTE 4017.

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82558

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-221
By ing, NARA, Date 1-20-94

68 OCT 12 PM 4:33
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~

OCTOBER 12, 1968

DREW PEARSON'S COLUMN THIS MORNING MAKES TWO NEW
REPEAT NEW ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY
AND THE VIETNAM WAR. BOTH ARE FALSE.

1. VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY WAS NOT CUT OFF IN JANUARY
1966, AS ALLEGED BY PEARSON, FROM SEEING CABLES PERTAINING
TO THE WAR. NO CHANGE HAS EVER BEEN MADE BY THE STATE
DEPARTMENT OR THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE AMOUNT OF
INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE ON THE VIETNAM WAR WHICH
THEY HAVE BEEN SENDING MR. HUMPHREY FROM THE TIME HE BECAME
VICE PRESIDENT.

THE VICE PRESIDENT RECEIVES DAILY THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S
TOP SECRET SUMMARY AND CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES FROM
BOTH CIA AND THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

THE "NO DISTRIBUTION" STATE DEPARTMENT TELEGRAMS ON PEACE
EFFORTS HAVE NEVER BEEN DISTRIBUTED DIRECTLY TO THE VICE
PRESIDENT OR HIS STAFF. THESE CABLES HAVE BEEN SEVERELY
RESTRICTED TO THE TOP OFFICIALS ACTUALLY INVOLVED IN ADVISING
YOU ON OUR NUMEROUS PEACE PROBES. MR. HUMPHREY HAS RECEIVED
INFORMATION OF THESE EFFORTS DIRECTLY FROM YOU AND AT
VARIOUS MEETINGS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHICH HE HAS ATTENDED
OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS.

2. BOTH THE POSITION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THAT
OF THEN ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE BALL ARE MISSTATED BY
PEARSON. IN ADDITION, THE 2:00 A.M. MEETING HE DESCRIBES
TOOK PLACE EARLY IN THE EVENING. THE FACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE DECISION TO LAUNCH A RETALIATORY U.S. AIR STRIKE
IN NORTH VIETNAM WAS TAKEN FOLLOWING A NSC MEETING ON
FEBRUARY 6, 1969, WHICH BEGAN AT 7:45 P.M. AND ENDED AT
9:30 P.M. THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS NOT PRESENT. SPEAKER
MCCORMACK AND SENATOR MANSFIELD ATTENDED. SECRETARY RUSK WAS
IN FLORIDA ON VACATION FROM FEBRUARY 4 THROUGH 14.

PRESERVATION COPY.

ACTING SECRETARY BALL WAS PRESENT AND STATED FLATLY THAT EVERYONE AGREED THAT AN AIR STRIKE ON NORTH VIETNAMESE TARGETS SHOULD BE LAUNCHED. THE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT MADE THE FOLLOWING DAY STATED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION WAS BASED ON A UNANIMOUS RECOMMENDATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

B. AT A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING HELD THE FOLLOWING MORNING, FEBRUARY 7, AT 8:00 A.M., THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF ADDITIONAL AIR STRIKES ON NORTH VIETNAMESE TARGETS. THE VICE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY RUSK WERE BOTH OUT OF TOWN. SPEAKER MCCORMACK, SENATOR MANSFIELD AND REP. GERALD FORD DID ATTEND.

FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION, NO NEW TARGETS FOR U.S. PLANES WERE AUTHORIZED. HOWEVER, AUTHORIZATION WAS GIVEN FOR U.S. PLANES TO ACCOMPANY SOUTH VIETNAMESE PLANES STRIKING TWO TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM.

C. THE NSC MEETING OF FEBRUARY 10, DISCUSSED A PROPOSAL THAT U.S. PLANES BE AUTHORIZED TO STRIKE NORTH VIETNAMESE TARGETS IN RETALIATION FOR VIET CONG BOMBING OF A U.S. BARRACKS AT QUI NHON. THE VICE PRESIDENT ATTENDED BUT SECRETARY RUSK WAS STILL OUT OF TOWN.

QUOTE IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECT QUESTION, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD SOME DOUBTS AS TO WHETHER THE STRIKE SHOULD TAKE PLACE TODAY OR WHETHER IT SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL MR. KOSYGIN LEFT THE AREA. HE HAD MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT WHETHER WE SHOULD RETALIATE AS SECRETARY MCNAMARA HAD RECOMMENDED. HE SHARED THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW THAT KOSYGIN'S PRESENCE IN HANOI OR IN THE FAR EAST LIMITED OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION. END QUOTE

ACTING SECRETARY BALL FIRST SAID WE SHOULD HOLD OFF ANY REPRISAL ACTION UNTIL KOSYGIN LEFT THE AREA. LATER IN THE MEETING HE ARGUED FOR LIMITING THE STRIKE TO TARGETS CLOSE TO THE DMZ BUT IN THE END AGREED WITH THE RECOMMENDATION THAT A RETALIATORY STRIKE BE MADE ON TARGETS CLOSER TO THE DMZ. THE U.S. STRIKE TOOK PLACE ON FEBRUARY 11.

D. THE VICE PRESIDENT WAS PRESENT AT THE FEBRUARY 18 NSC MEETING WHEN ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS AGREED TO A DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT TO CONTINUE AIR AND NAVAL ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM WHENEVER AND WHEREVER NECESSARY.

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OCT 12 19 10

Pinjee

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO JIM JONES FOR THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP82555

68 OCT 12 PM 3:33

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM~~SECRET~~

PANAMA SITUATION REPORT, 1200 HOURS EST, OCTOBER 12, 1968

THE PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD, APPROXIMATELY 15 HOURS
AFTER MOUNTING A COUP AGAINST PRESIDENT ARNULFO ARIAS, REMAINS
IN COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY.

ARNULFO ARIAS IS STILL IN THE CANAL ZONE AS ARE MOST OF
THE MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT
OPPOSITION TO THE COUP. THE INTENTIONS OF THE COUP LEADERS
ARE STILL UNCLEAR, ALTHOUGH REPORTEDLY THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED
FORMATION OF A JUNTA COMPOSED OF COLONELS JOSE PINILLA AND
BOLIVAR URRUTIA. THEY ARE ALSO REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN THE
FOLLOWING STEPS:

1. THE SUSPENSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES;
2. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY;
3. THE INTENTION OF CALLING ELECTIONS AT THE PROPER TIME.

THERE ARE NO REPORTS OF VIOLENCE IN PANAMA OR THE CANAL
ZONE.

AMBASSADOR ADAIR AND CANAL ZONE GOVERNOR LEBER ARE IN PANAMA
AND ARE NOW MEETING WITH ARIAS TO ASSESS HIS INTENTIONS.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE, IN A STATEMENT ISSUED APPROXIMATELY
AT NOON, HAS EXPRESSED HIS DEEP DISTRESS OVER THE COUP WHICH
OVERTHREW THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF PANAMA.

DTG: 121841Z OCT 68

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. GuidelinesBy *011W* NARA, Date *20/02*~~SECRET~~

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WHCA

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1968 OCT 12 17 30

ZEVS93,599KK

AND HAVE ONE MORE FOR YOU

R. J. [unclear]

EEA600

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FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82552

UNCLAS

OCT. 12, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOV

FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT BIRTHDAY MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
HEINRICH LUESKE -- THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S CHIEF OF STATE.
HE WILL BE 74 ON OCTOBER 14.

YOUR MESSAGE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY APPRECIATED SINCE
THIS IS HIS LAST YEAR IN OFFICE.

QTE MRS. JOHNSON AND I SEND YOU OUR GREETINGS AND
WARM WISHES ON YOUR SEVENTY-FOURTH BIRTHDAY. WE
JOIN ALL AMERICANS IN HOPING THAT THE YEARS AHEAD WILL
BRING YOU HAPPINESS AND GOOD HEALTH. WE KNOW YOU WILL
USE THE FUTURE -- AS YOU HAVE THE PAST -- TO SERVE THE
GERMAN PEOPLE. UNQTE

APPROVE-----

DISAPPROVE-----

CALL ME-----

DTE 121701Z OCT 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

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1968 OCT 12 17 24

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82551

Free file

UNCLAS

OCTOBER 12, 1968

FOLLOWING IS A PROPOSED BIRTHDAY MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT EAMON DO VALERA OF IRELAND. HE WILL BE
EIGHTY-SIX ON OCTOBER 14.

YOU HAVE SENT HIM BIRTHDAY GREETINGS EACH YEAR.
"MRS. JOHNSON AND I SEND OUR GREETINGS AND WARM
WISHES AND THOSE OF ALL AMERICANS ON YOUR EIGHTY-
SIXTH BIRTHDAY. I KNOW THAT YOUR LEADERSHIP AND
WISDOM WILL CONTINUE TO GUIDE AND INSPIRE THE
PEOPLE OF IRELAND TO NEW LEVELS OF ACHIEVEMENT
IN THE YEARS AHEAD."

APPROVE -----

DISAPPROVE -----

CALL ME -----

DTG: 121731Z OCT 68

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DE WTE 4005

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82547

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-186

By *ins* NARA, Date *2-27-04*

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1968 OCT 12 17 03

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW
HERewith A GOOD DETAILED PICTURE OF ENEMY FORCE
MOVEMENTS AWAY FROM THE BATTLEFIELD ACROSS FRONTIERS
OR INTO BASE AREAS.

Pres file

I. INTRODUCTION

EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM SIGINT INDICATES THAT SOME VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY UNITS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF SOUTH VIETNAM ARE MOVING AWAY FROM AREAS OF RECENT MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS. INDICATIONS THUS FAR NOTED SUGGEST THAT THIS TREND REPRESENTS THE END OF THE THIRD GENERAL OFFENSIVE, LAUNCHED ON 18 AUGUST. IN THE DMZ, ELEMENTS OF THE 320TH DIVISION MAY BE MOVING TO NEW POSITIONS, POSSIBLY NORTH OF THE DMZ. ARTILLERY ELEMENTS HAVE ALSO DISCUSSED PULLING BACK EQUIPMENT TO BASE AREAS. FURTHER SOUTH, IN MILITARY REGION (MR) TRI-THIEN-HUE (TTH), A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS HAVE CONVERGED IN LAOS NEAR THE VIETNAM BORDER. THE RADIO FACILITIES SERVING THESE ELEMENTS--PRINCIPALLY HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS OF THE REGION--HAVE BEEN IN THE AREA OR MOVING TOWARD IT SINCE LATE SUMMER. IN MR 5, ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH FRONT 4 AND THE NVA 3RD DIVISION IN THE QUANG NAM-QUANG TIN-QUANG NGAI AREA HAVE PULLED BACK FROM THE SCENE OF STRIKES LAUNCHED IN EARLY OCTOBER. SOME FRONT UNITS ARE CURRENTLY GATHERING RICE AND SUPPLIES IN PREPARATIONS FOR LATER ATTACKS. SOME COMMUNIST UNITS IN THE B3 FRONT AREA REMAIN IN POSITIONS TO LAUNCH STRIKES WITH LITTLE WARNING BUT APPEAR TO BE UNDERGOING SOME KIND OF REGROUPMENT. IN THE NAM BO AREA, A NUMBER OF MAJOR TACTICAL AND INTELLIGENCE HEADQUARTERS HAVE PULLED BACK TO SAFE AREAS NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER SINCE THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER. THESE INCLUDE ELEMENTS OF THE THREE NAM BO DIVISIONS--THE VIET CONG (VC) 5TH AND 9TH AND THE NVA 7TH.

THESE MOVEMENTS THUS FAR RESEMBLE THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE FINAL STEP IN THE ADVANCE-RETREAT PATTERN NOTED DURING PAST COUNTRY-WIDE OFFENSIVES. BEYOND THIS SIMILARITY, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THE DIMENSION AND PURPOSE OF THE CURRENT TREND.

II. DMZ AND MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE

AN OVERALL LULL IN ACTIVITY WITHIN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES, WHICH HAS BEEN REFLECTED IN RECENT SIGINT, MAY INDICATE THAT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST FORCES IN THIS AREA ARE ASSUMING A REDUCED TACTICAL POSTURE.

(1)

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

THE NVA 320TH DIVISION CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN THE REDUCED COMMUNICATIONS LEVEL THAT HAS BEEN OBSERVED SINCE 1 OCTOBER. THE BULK OF DIVISION COMMUNICATIONS HAS INVOLVED HQ, NVA B5 FRONT, HQ, 52ND REGIMENT, AND THE 12TH BATTALION. ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION WHICH DEPLOYED NORTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER IN EARLY OCTOBER--THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, THE 52ND REGIMENT AND THE 9TH BATTALION, 64TH REGIMENT--HAVE NOT RETURNED SOUTH OF THE DMZ. COMMUNICATIONS OF DIVISION ELEMENTS, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO REFLECT MOVEMENT. SINCE EARLY OCTOBER NVA ARTILLERY ENTITIES HAVE BEEN MOVING ARTILLERY PIECES TO A POSSIBLE REAR BASE AREA. THE ACTUAL SCOPE OF THIS ACTIVITY IS PRESENTLY UNCLEAR. ELEMENTS AT LEAST OF THE NVA 164TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT REMAIN ACTIVE IN THE EASTERN DMZ AREA. THE STATUS OF THE 27TH BATTALION, POSSIBLE NVA 27TH REGIMENT REMAINS VIRTUALLY UNCHANGED, WITH BATTALION ELEMENTS NOTED IN SMALL-SCALE AND HARASSING ACTIONS ALONG ROUTE 9 AND SOUTH OF CAM LO. ELEMENTS OF THE BATTALION HAVE ALSO RECENTLY MENTIONED PREPARATIONS TO COUNTER A FORTHCOMING ALLIED SWEEP SOUTH OF ROUTE 9 IN THE CUA AREA.

COMMUNIST FORCES WITHIN MR TTH HAVE ALSO REMAINED RELATIVELY INACTIVE. THE POSSIBLE HQ, NVA 29TH REGIMENT WAS LOCATED ON 4 OCTOBER APPROXIMATELY 15 KM ABOVE THE WESTERN DMZ, A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM ITS PREVIOUS AREA OF OPERATION IN MR TTH. THE CURRENT DISPOSITION OF THE NVA 93TH REGIMENT IS UNCLEAR. THE NVA 803RD AND 812TH REGIMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN OBSERVED IN LOW-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS SINCE LATE SEPTEMBER, WHEN THEY WERE ACTIVE APPROXIMATELY 15 KM SOUTH OF QUANG TRI CITY AND 30 KM WEST OF HUE, RESPECTIVELY.

III. MILITARY REGION 5

THE MOVEMENT OF SOME COMMUNIST FORCES AWAY FROM POTENTIAL TARGETS, CONCURRENT WITH INDICATIONS OF PERSONNEL SHORTAGES AND ENDEAVORS TO ACQUIRE RICE, SUGGESTS A REDUCTION IN THE COMMUNIST CAPABILITY TO MOUNT IMMEDIATE ATTACKS OF SIGNIFICANT SCALE IN MR 5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, SOME SCATTERED UNITS HAVE REFERRED TO LOCALIZED CLASHES WITH ALLIED FORCES.

IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, FRONT 4 FORCES ARE CURRENTLY PREOCCUPIED WITH REGROUPING AND RESUPPLY. THE NVA 2ND DIVISION WAS TO ACTIVATE A "FIRST MOBILE RADIO STATION" ON 10 OCTOBER. THIS STATION WILL REPORTEDLY ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS WITH HQ, FRONT 4--AS WELL AS THE FORWARD ELEMENT OF THE DIVISION AND THE HEADQUARTERS ITSELF. THESE DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST CLOSER COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FRONT AND DIVISION--POSSIBLY IN PREPARATION FOR MOVEMENT BY ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO EASTERN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, WHERE THE FRONT AND THE NVA 21ST REGIMENT, A SUBORDINATE OF THE 2ND DIVISION, ARE CURRENTLY OPERATING. THIS ACTIVITY COULD INDICATE THAT THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FRONT WILL BE EXPANDED. IN ANY CASE, A REGROUPING OF THE FORCES OF THE 2ND DIVISION AND FRONT 4 IS APPARENTLY IN PROGRESS.

[27]

ANOTHER POSSIBLE REFLECTION OF THE LULL IN TACTICAL OPERATIONS IS THE SCHEDULING OF A SIGNAL CONFERENCE TO CONVENE ON 1 NOVEMBER, POSSIBLY AT THE MR 5 HEADQUARTERS BASE. REPRESENTATIVES FROM AT LEAST THE 2ND AND 3RD DIVISIONS AND, THE QUANG NGAI PROVINCIAL UNIT WILL ATTEND.

CENTRAL FLANK ASSOCIATES IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED WITH THE PROCUREMENT OF FOOD AND PERSONNEL. A 5 OCTOBER MESSAGE FROM THE CENTRAL FLANK HEADQUARTERS DIRECTED A SUBORDINATE BATTALION TO PICK UP AMMUNITION AND RICE FOR FORTHCOMING ATTACKS--DURING A TIME FRAME NOT SPECIFIED IN THE INSTRUCTIONS. SUBORDINATES INDICATED ON 6 OCTOBER THAT THEY HAD WITHDRAWN TO THE REAR BASE, AND ON 8 OCTOBER, THE 8TH BATTALION EXPLAINED TO THE HEADQUARTERS THAT THE TROOPS WERE ENGAGED IN RESUPPLY ACTIVITIES AND THEREFORE COULD NOT ENTER INTO COMBAT.

MEANWHILE, STEPS APPEAR TO BE IN PROGRESS TO UPGRADE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FROM LAOS TO VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST UNITS IN NORTHERN MR 5. A PROBABLE AREA CONTROL IN THE NVA 559TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP APPARATUS HAS EMERGED IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, AND A POSSIBLE NEW HEADQUARTERS MAY BE FORMING WITHIN THE GROUP STRUCTURE IN THE LAOS-QUANG NAM BORDER AREA. FURTHER, THROUGHOUT SEPTEMBER, AN UNUSUALLY HIGH VOLUME OF MESSAGES WAS OBSERVED BETWEEN HQ, MR 5 AND THE PROBABLE HQ, 559TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP, POSSIBLY INDICATING THAT MORE DEMANDS WERE BEING PLACED ON THE GROUP. BY EARLY OCTOBER, THE VOLUME HAD RETURNED TO NORMAL.

EMPHASIS ON RESUPPLY AND REGROUPING CHARACTERIZES COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE HIGHLANDS AS WELL AS IN THE OTHER PARTS OF THE REGION. TACTICAL ACTIVITY HAS NOTICEABLY DECLINED, ALTHOUGH OCCASIONAL CLASHES WERE REFLECTED IN COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH 7 OCTOBER.

IN NORTHERN PLEIKU PROVINCE ON 9 OCTOBER, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (MI) COMMUNICATIONS REVEALED SEVERE RICE SHORTAGES IN TWO AREAS. IN THE CAMBODIA-QUANG DUC PROVINCE BORDER AREA, HQ, NVA 66TH REGIMENT ASSOCIATES ON 5 OCTOBER DISCUSSED PROCUREMENT OF RICE AND PROVISIONS. IN THE SAME AREA, NVA 1ST DIVISION ELEMENTS APPEAR TO BE REGROUPING. THE CURRENT DECREASED LEVEL OF HQ, NVA 1ST DIVISION COMMUNICATIONS AND THE COMMUNICATIONS SILENCE OF MI ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THE DIVISION SINCE 22 SEPTEMBER--EXCEPT FOR BRIEF APPEARANCES ON 4 AND 5 OCTOBER--RESEMBLE ACTIVITY WHICH HAS IN THE PAST COINCIDED WITH REGROUPING. ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION, HOWEVER, REMAIN NEAR THE DUC LAP SPECIAL FORCES CAMP.

III. NAM BO

(3)

IN THE NAM BO AREA, MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN BY MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS SINCE 4 OCTOBER TOWARD THE CAMBODIAN BORDER AND SECURE AREAS MORE REMOTE FROM ALLIED INSTALLATIONS. VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY REMAINS AT A LOW LEVEL WITH NO INDICATION IN READABLE CORRESPONDENCE OF IMPENDING MILITARY ACTIVITY.

SINCE EARLY OCTOBER, THE SUSPECTED FORWARD ELEMENT, VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH VIETNAM (HQ, SVN); THE SUSPECTED FORWARD HQ, VC 9TH DIVISION AND AN ASSOCIATE [REDACTED]; THE POSSIBLE HQ, VC 5TH DIVISION AND AN UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENT [REDACTED]; THE PROBABLE HQ, VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST 96TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT; AND THE SUSPECTED HQ, NVA 165TH REGIMENT HAVE ALL RELOCATED NORTHWARD AND ARE OCCUPYING POSITIONS NEAR THE CAMBODIA-TAY NINH PROVINCE BORDER. THE POSSIBLE HQ, NVA 7TH DIVISION AND AN UNIDENTIFIED SUBORDINATE [REDACTED] HAD RELOCATED TO THE CAMBODIAN BORDER AREA OF BINH LONG PROVINCE EARLIER IN SEPTEMBER. TWO OF THREE NEWLY IDENTIFIED SUSPECTED REGIMENTAL-LEVEL SUBORDINATES [REDACTED] OF HQ, VC 5TH DIVISION MADE MAJOR MOVES FROM SOUTHEASTERN TAY NINH PROVINCE TO THE NORTHERN AREA OF THE PROVINCE DURING SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER. THE THIRD SUSPECTED REGIMENTAL-LEVEL SUBORDINATE [REDACTED] OF THE DIVISION WAS ALSO LOCATED IN THE NORTHERN AREA OF THE PROVINCE AS OF 7 OCTOBER. THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (CIB) COSVN FORWARD ELEMENT (FE) 1 WAS LOCATED ON 9 OCTOBER NEAR THE CAMBODIA-TAY NINH-BINH LONG TRI-BORDER AREA, ABOUT 65 KM NORTHEAST OF ITS 4 SEPTEMBER LOCATION. THE MIB COSVN FE 1 APPEARED IN BINH DUONG PROVINCE ABOUT TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE; COLLATERAL STATES THAT A FORWARD ELEMENT OF COSVN WAS LOCATED IN BINH DUONG TO DIRECT ATTACKS ON SAIGON DURING THE OFFENSIVE. BY EARLY APRIL, FE 1 HAD MOVED INTO NORTHERN TAY NINH PROVINCE AND REMAINED THERE THROUGH LATE JULY. IT MOVED TO THE WESTERN TAY NINH-CAMBODIA BORDER AREA IN LATE JULY, ABOUT TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO THE COMMUNIST ATTACKS IN TAY NINH PROVINCE ON 17 AUGUST. THE RECENT WITHDRAWAL INTO EXTREME WESTERN BINH LONG PROVINCE, NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER, MAY SIGNAL THE END OF COMMUNIST INTENT TO CONDUCT FURTHER ATTACKS IN TAY NINH AT THIS TIME.

TO THE EAST OF SAIGON, THE POSSIBLE TACTICAL COMMAND ELEMENT OF HQ, VC 274TH REGIMENT MOVED TO THE NORTHEAST IN EARLY OCTOBER. HQ, VC 274TH REGIMENT WITHDREW TO THE EAST IN LATE SEPTEMBER. THESE ELEMENTS ARE LOCATED IN BASE AREAS IN LONG KHANH AND PHUOC TUY PROVINCES, RESPECTIVELY.

CONCURRENT WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF MAJOR HEADQUARTERS TO AREAS IN AND NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER AT LEAST ONE UNIT IN THE NAM BO AREA HAS INDICATED THAT IT WAS SHORT OF FOOD. THE VC 46TH RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION INFORMED MIB COSVN THAT IT RAN OUT OF RICE ON 6 OCTOBER, AND REQUESTED THAT IT BE ISSUED RICE IMMEDIATELY.

COLLATERAL REPORTS SINCE EARLY OCTOBER INDICATE THAT ALLIED GROUND CONTACTS IN THE PROVINCES SURROUNDING SAIGON HAVE BEEN WITH LOCAL FORCE AND SUBREGION SUBORDINATE UNITS, RATHER THAN WITH MAIN FORCE UNITS. THE ABSENCE OF GROUND CONTACT WITH THE MAIN FORCE UNITS SUPPORTS INDICATIONS OF THEIR MOVEMENT.

[4]

~~SECRET~~
~~FOUO~~

DTG 121450Z OCT 68

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Authority 7129 1C/BS 10
By rg/dch, NARA, Date 2-19-93

SECRET

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NODIS

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP82536

SENT
WHCA

68 OCT 12 01 25

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

OCTOBER 11, 1968

SUBJECT: HERewith SUMMARY OF AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S 70TH
WEEKLY MESSAGE

A. GENERAL

-- PAST WEEK MARKED BY RUMORS OF DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST
GVN AND US.

-- THIEU'S REACTION RESULTED IN UNFORTUNATE EXAGGERATED
PRESS PLAY.

-- HE PUT GVN AND RVNAF ON FULL ALERT AND ORDERED ALL TO
FRUSTRATE ANY ATTEMPTS.

-- WE HAD NO EVIDENCE, ONLY LOOSE TALK, ABOUT A COUP.

-- THIEU THOUGHT PAST STATEMENTS BY KY HAD UNSETTLED THE
SITUATION AND CREATED SUSPICIONS ABOUT US INTENTIONS.

-- THIEU LEARNED OF PLANNED ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION FOR
SUNDAY; THIEU IS WATCHING SOME YOUNGER ELEMENTS IN THE
AIR FORCE WHO ARE LOYAL TO KY.

-- BUNKER DOUBTS THE CAPACITY OF ANY GROUP TO BRING OFF A
COUP; THIEU AGREES, BUT SAID THE PEOPLE TEND TO BELIEVE RUMORS.

-- THEREFORE, HE DECIDED ON PREVENTIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING
HIS SPEECH TO CALM DOWN THE SITUATION.

-- THIEU MAY UNDERSTAND BETTER THAN OTHERS HIS PEOPLES'
PYSCHOLOGY AND HOW TO COPE WITH THIS PROBLEM.

-- THIEU'S SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY STRESSED HIS
SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND APPEALED FOR COOPERATION.

-- THE SPEECH WAS CONFIDENT, OPTIMISTIC, AND FORCEFUL.

-- THE SPEECH UNCOMPROMISINGLY REITERATED THE GVN'S POSITION
ON PEACE AND NEGOTIATION; HE STRONGLY REJECTED A COMPLETE
BOMBING HALT WITHOUT RECIPROCITY.

-- ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE HAS PETERED OUT.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Per file

68 OCT 11 PM 9:29

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

-- ABRAMS REPORTS ENEMY KIA SINCE MID-AUGUST REACHED 95 PER CENT OF HIS LOSSES DURING "MINI-TET."

-- THESE LOSSES PLUS MANY UNCOVERED CACHES SHOW CLEARLY THE ENEMY WANTED TO GET A SUBSTANTIAL PUSH UNDER WAY LAST MONTH.

-- IF THE ENEMY PULLS BACK, WE WILL BE IN FOR ANOTHER "LULL," WITH HANOI PROBABLY TRYING TO MAKE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY.

-- RVNAF PERFORMANCE AND EFFORTS TO TAKE OVER STILL IMPROVE.

-- RVNAF HAS ALREADY EXCEEDED THE YEAR-END GOAL OF 800,000; INCLUDING PARA-MILITARY, SVN HAS OVER 1 MILLION UNDER ARMS.

-- THIEU, KY, AND HUONG ATTENDED FOLLOW-UP MEETING FOR THE PACIFICATION "COUNTER-OFFENSIVE;" THIEU SHOWED CONFIDENCE; GVN'S PLAN IS FEASIBLE.

-- THIEU AND HUONG SHARE SMOOTH WORKING RELATIONSHIP.

-- ABRAMS AND VIEN AGREE THAT PRE-TET GOAL IS FEASIBLE WITHOUT FORCE INCREASE; THE SUCCESS OF THIS PLAN COULD HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE ENEMY'S "WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE."

-- HUONG SAYS THE GVN WILL HALVE ITS IMPORTED RICE SUBSIDY WITH RESULTING INCREASE IN THE PRICE FOR DOMESTIC RICE.

B. POLITICAL

-- SOME WILL INTERPRET THE ALLEGED PLOT AS ANOTHER SIGN OF GVN INABILITY TO FORGE UNITY BUT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO OVERLOOK RECENT PROGRESS, HOWEVER SLOW.

-- SINCE TET AND DESPITE THE WAR, INSTITUTIONS HAVE DEVELOPED: A PEACEFUL CABINET CHANGE; THE COMING SUPREME COURT AND INSPECTORATE; AND THE LIEN MINH.

-- THIEU'S HANDLING OF MINH'S RETURN BOLSTERS NATIONAL POLITICAL UNITY.

-- THIEU SPOKE AT LAST WEEK'S LAUNCHING OF THE LIEN MINH'S NEW ACTION PROGRAM; HE PROBABLY WILL NOT ASSUME PUBLIC LEADERSHIP OF THE LIEN MINH UNTIL SOME NAP RESULTS ARE IN.

C. PACIFICATION

-- THIEU'S PERSONAL AND VISIBLE INTEREST HAS INCREASED THE ATTENTION HIS MINISTERS AND COMMANDERS GIVE PACIFICATION.

-- ALL SIX CAMPAIGNS OF THE OVERALL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE MOVE FOR A NOVEMBER 1 KICK-OFF; MILITARY SPOILING MOVES HAVE ALREADY BEGUN.

-- AFTER JGS TOLD THIEU IT WAS FEASIBLE TO UPGRADE 1,078 HAMLETS BY TET '69, HE ORDERED THE INTENSIFIED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN START NOV. 1.

-- THESE COORDINATED EFFORTS SHOULD HAVE A DECISIVE IMPACT ON THE ENEMY BUT RESULTS WILL DEPEND ON PERFORMANCE IN THE DISTRICTS.

D. ECONOMIC

-- SAIGON'S RETAIL PRICE INDEX DROPPED 3 PER CENT; DOMESTIC RICE PRICES DOWN.

-- MINISTER HO'S RICE PROGRAM, NOT YET APPROVED BY THIEU, AIMED AT RAISING PADDY PRICES TO FARMERS.

A. GENERAL

1. ALTHOUGH THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION WAS QUIET AND THERE WAS IN FACT SOME PROGRESS TOWARD GREATER UNITY, THE WEEK WAS MARKED BY RUMORS OF CONTEMPLATED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE GVN AND THE US. UNFORTUNATELY THESE RECEIVED EXAGGERATED PRESS COVERAGE, MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE WAY IN WHICH THIEU REACTED TO THEM. HE PUT THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT ON FULL ALERT ON OCT 8, ORDERING ALL OFFICIALS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL TO FRUSTRATE ANY ATTEMPTED DEMONSTRATIONS OR COUP. IT DID NOT SEEM TO US THAT THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF SERIOUS PREPARATIONS FOR A COUP. WE HAD FRAGMENTARY REPORTS THAT SOME PEOPLE, POSSIBILITY LINKED TO KY, WERE TALKING LOOSELY ABOUT A COUP, BUT NO EVIDENCE OF ANY PREPARATIONS, BUT IN MY TALK WITH THIEU YESTERDAY, WHICH I HAVE REPORTED FULLY IN SAIGON 33970, HE SAID THAT THERE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN INDICATIONS THAT TROUBLE WAS BREWING, AND WHAT WAS MORE ALARMING WAS THAT THE PEOPLE WERE BEGINNING TO TAKE SERIOUSLY THE MANY RUMORS AND REPORTS ABOUT COUP ATTEMPTS. HE ADDED THAT STATEMENTS WHICH KY HAD MADE IN THE PAST MONTHS HAD HAD AN UNSETTLING EFFECT ON THE SITUATION HERE AND CREATED SUSPICION AMONGST THE PEOPLE OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS. HE HAD MADE REFERENCE TO THESE RUMORS IN HIS SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON OCT 7, AND IN VIEW OF THESE REPORTS THOUGHT IT BEST TO PUT THE FORCES ON ALERT AS A WARNING TO ANYONE WHO MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATING ACTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE TAKEN BY SURPRISE. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THE PRESS HAD GOTTEN WIND OF THE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES AND WERE PUTTING OUT SENSATIONAL STORIES ABOUT COUP ATTEMPTS, DEMONSTRATIONS AND ARRESTS; THAT ALL OF THIS WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE, FOR IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR US TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANY SERIOUS THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT.

2. IN TALKING WITH THIEU AGAIN TODAY, HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD EVIDENCE THAT CATHOLIC ELEMENTS OF THE GREATER SOLIDARITY FORCE AND SOME OF THE AIR FORCE PERSONNEL HAD PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT FOR THIS COMING SUNDAY ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS SOFT ON THE PEACE QUESTION AND ON COALITION. IF THEY ATTRACTED SUPPORT, THEY WERE PREPARED TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS. HE ADDED THAT THERE WERE SOME YOUNGER ELEMENTS IN THE AIR FORCE WHICH THE COMMANDER, GEN TRAN VAN MINH, DID NOT CONTROL AND WHO WERE BEHOLDEN TO VP KY. THESE WOULD BEAR WATCHING. I AGAIN SAID THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO CONCEIVE OF ANYONE OR ANY GROUP HAVING THE ABILITY TO ATTEMPT A COUP, MUCH LESS THE CAPACITY TO BRING IT OFF.

THIEU AGREED THAT THIS WAS SO, BUT SAID THAT VIETNAMESE GENERALLY WERE UNSOPHISTICATED POLITICALLY AND HAD A TENDENCY TO GIVE CREDENCE TO RUMORS. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE THOUGHT IT BEST TO TAKE PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND TO MAKE HIS ADDRESS LAST NIGHT TO CALM DOWN THE SITUATION. I THINK THIEU OVER-REACTED IN THIS CASE, AND POSSIBLY DID NOT GET PROPERLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE FROM HIS NEW INTELLIGENCE AND POLICE OFFICIALS. HE REALIZES THAT SOME DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE TO HIS STANDING ABROAD AND THAT THIS IS UNFORTUNATE. BUT I SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THIEU HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE WITH COUPS AND ATTEMPTED COUPS, GOING BACK TO THE DAYS OF THE DIEM REGIME, AND MAY UNDERSTAND BETTER THAN OTHERS THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HIS PEOPLE AND HOW TO COPE WITH THE KIND OF PROBLEM WHICH A SITUATION OF THIS KIND PRESENTS.

3. PRES THIEU MADE A MAJOR SPEECH OCT 7 WHEN HE OPENED THE SECOND REGULAR SESSION OF THE NA. AS IN HIS THREE EARLIER APPEARANCES BEFORE THAT BODY, HE STRESSED HIS DEDICATION TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND APPEALED FOR A JOINT EFFORT BY THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES. HE NOTED TOWARD THE END OF HIS MESSAGE THAT "1967 WAS THE YEAR FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC. 1968 IS THE YEAR FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF POLITICAL STABILITY". THIEU MADE TWO REFERENCES IN HIS SPEECH TO ALLEGED PLOTS TO UNDERMINE AND OVERTHROW HIS GOVERNMENT. IN THE MAIN, HOWEVER, THE TONE OF THE SPEECH WAS CONFIDENT AND OPTIMISTIC.

4. SPEAKING ABOUT PEACE AND NEGOTIATIONS, THIEU RESTATED THE GVN POSITION IN A FORCEFUL AND RATHER UNCOMPROMISING WAY. HE REITERATED GVN REJECTION OF COALITION GOVERNMENT, CESSION OF TERRITORY, OR RECOGNITION OF THE NLF. HE ALSO INSISTED THAT HANOI MUST ACKNOWLEDGE ITS AGGRESSION AND RECOGNIZE THE GVN AS THE ONLY AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

5. THIEU CALLED FOR MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION, SAYING THAT "THE MOST REASONABLE WAY TO END THIS WAR IS FOR BOTH SIDES TO SCALE DOWN THE LEVEL OF HOSTILITIES, LEADING GRADUALLY TO A CEASE-FIRE EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED AND GUARANTEED." HE POINTED TO OUR PARTIAL HALT IN THE BOMBING AS THE FIRST STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF DE-ESCALATION AND INSISTED THAT THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO HANOI. HE STRONGLY REJECTED THE IDEA OF A COMPLETE HALT IN THE BOMBING WITHOUT ANY RECIPROCAL ACTION BY HANOI.

6. THE ATTEMPTS OF THE ENEMY TO LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE, WHICH HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED SINCE AUGUST, HAVE NOW PETERED OUT. THAT HE DID TRY, AND TRY HARD, TO GET AN OFFENSIVE GOING IS SUGGESTED BY HIS CASUALTIES. GENERAL ABRAMS REPORTED TO THE MISSION COUNCIL OCTOBER 10 THAT THE TOTAL ENEMY KILLED SINCE AUGUST 17 HAD REACHED 95 PERCENT OF THE LOSSES WHICH HE SUFFERED DURING THE SAME NUMBER OF DAYS IN THE ATTACKS DURING THE "MINI-TET" OFFENSIVE WHICH BEGAN MAY 5.

7. THESE LOSSES PLUS THE VERY LARGE PRE-POSITIONED CACHES WE HAVE BEEN UNCOVERING MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE ENEMY WANTED TO GET A SUBSTANTIAL PUSH UNDER WAY LAST MONTH. ONE GOOD ILLUSTRATION OF THE EXTENT OF ENEMY PREPARATIONS AND LOSSES IS WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ENEMY 320TH DIVISION. THEY HAVE SUFFERED OVER 1,100 CONFIRMED KIA DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS. IN RECENT ACTIONS THE 9TH

MARINES CAPTURED THE FOLLOWING MATERIAL: 20,506 MORTAR ROUNDS, 334 ROCKET ROUNDS, 1,319 ARTILLERY ROUNDS, 3,272 RPG ROUNDS, 1,000,224 SMALL ARMS ROUNDS, 7,062 CHICOM GRENADES, 2,077 LAND MINES, 1,000 CLAYMORE MINES, 11,459 POUNDS OF EXPLOSIVES, 250 SETS OF CLOTHING, 68,000 POUNDS OF RICE, AND 11,000 POUNDS OF SALT. THE 320TH HAS RECENTLY BEEN WITHDRAWING.

8. IF THE ENEMY IS IN FACT NOW PULLING BACK FOR A PERIOD OF REGROUPING AND RESUPPLYING HIS FORCES, WE WILL BE IN FOR ANOTHER "LULL". PROBABLY HANOI WILL AGAIN TRY TO MAKE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY AND SEEK TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEIR ENFORCED MILITARY INACTION IS A POLITICAL SIGNAL.

9. I HAVE IN RECENT MESSAGES POINTED OUT INSTANCES OF IMPROVED RVNAF PERFORMANCE AND VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO TAKE OVER MORE OF THE FIGHTING. THIS TREND WAS AGAIN EVIDENT THIS WEEK. MORE THAN TWO-THIRDS OF THE FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE VIETNAMESE IN THE WEEK ENDING OCTOBER 3. VIETNAMESE FORCES WERE ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR 55 PERCENT OF THE ENEMY KIA, WHILE U.S. FORCES ACCOUNTED FOR 40 PERCENT OF THE ENEMY KIA. FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST 18-OCTOBER 5, THE RVNAF FORCES SUFFERED 2,701 KILLED COMPARED TO 1,497 U.S. KILLED. DURING THAT SAME PERIOD, THE RVNAF KILLED 11,739 ENEMY COMPARED TO 10,472 KILLED BY U.S. FORCES.

10. ANOTHER STRONG INDICATION OF THE DETERMINATION OF THE GVN TO ORGANIZE ITSELF AND TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY, AND OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS IN MOVING TOWARD THAT GOAL, IS THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY EXCEEDED THEIR YEAR END GOAL OF THE 800,000 IN RVNAF. IN FACT THE TOTAL WILL SOON REACH 850,000. WE ARE RECOMMENDING THAT THE CEILING ON RVNAF FORCES BE RAISED TO 850,000 (PRESENT CEILING IS 800,215) WITH 39,000 OF THE ADDITIONAL MANPOWER TO GO INTO CRITICALLY NEEDED REGIONAL FORCES. IF ONE INCLUDES THE PARAMILITARY FORCES, THIS NATION, WITH A POPULATION OF ONLY A LITTLE OVER 11 MILLION THAT IT CAN DRAW UPON NOW, HAS OVER 1 MILLION UNDER ARMS.

11. TODAY WE HELD ANOTHER JOINT MEETING WITH THE GVN, FOLLOWING UP ON THE OCTOBER 1 MEETING I REPORTED LAST WEEK, TO CONSIDER THE BASIC DIRECTIVE AND THE BEGINNING OF DETAILED PLANNING FOR THE PACIFICATION "COUNTER-OFFENSIVE." PRESIDENT THIEU, VICE PRESIDENT KY, AND PRIME MINISTER HUONG ATTENDED, AS DID ALL THE MINISTERS AND TOP-LEVEL CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

12. THE PRESIDENT'S ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS ASPECT OF THE WAR WAS NEVER MORE EVIDENT. FURTHER, I HAVE RARELY SEEN HIM IN A MORE SELF-CONFIDENT MOOD. WHILE THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF THE GENERAL POLITICAL SITUATION HERE AT THE MEETING, IT WAS COMPLETELY CLEAR FROM THE ATMOSPHERE AT THIS MEETING THAT THIS IS NOT A GOVERNMENT IN CRISIS.

13. THE PLANS FOR THE PRE-TET PHASE OF THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AND FOR ITS COORDINATION WITH THE 1969 PLAN HAVE BEEN WELL LAID. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE GVN HAS PRODUCED A FEASIBLE PLAN, AND WE WILL GIVE IT OUR FULL SUPPORT.

14. THE SMOOTH WORKING RELATIONSHIP EXISTING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER WAS EVIDENT IN THEIR EXCHANGES DURING THE MEETING. I AM ESPECIALLY PLEASED TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER BROUGHT INTO THE PLANNING OF THIS OPERATION AT THIS STAGE AND GIVEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOLLOWING IT THROUGH. HUONG AGAIN REMARKED TO US ON HIS CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT.

15. GENERAL ABRAMS AND GENERAL VIEN BOTH AGREED THAT THE PRE-TET GOALS ARE FEASIBLE WITHOUT ANY INCREASE IN AVAILABLE FORCES, THOUGH SOME REDEPLOYMENTS WILL BE NECESSARY. BOTH AGREED FURTHER THAT IN ADDITION TO DIRECTLY SUPPORTING THIS EFFORT, A CONTINUOUS OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE ENEMY'S MILITARY UNITS WOULD BE MAINTAINED. GENERAL ABRAMS POINTED OUT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THIS COUNTER-OFFENSIVE, BY DENYING MANPOWER AND SUPPLIES AND ACCESS TO TERRITORY, COULD HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE ENEMY'S ABILITY TO MOUNT THE NEW "WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE" WHICH HE IS NOW BEGINNING TO TALK ABOUT.

16. WE DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVING THE GVN ADMINISTRATIONS IN THESE CONTESTED HAMLETS; THE IMPORTANCE A SOUND POLICY ON LAND TENURE IN AREAS LIBERATED FROM THE VC COULD HAVE IN WINNING AND HOLDING POPULAR SUPPORT; AND THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVING THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE ORDINARY FARMER. ON THE LATTER POINT, THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD US THAT A RESTRICTED CABINET SESSION THREE DAYS AGO HAD AGREED TO CUT THE SUBSIDY ON IMPORTED RICE IN HALF. THIS WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE TO FARMERS FOR LOCALLY PRODUCED RICE. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE GIVING THE PRESIDENT A FULL REPORT ON ECONOMIC MEASURES IN A FEW DAYS.

B. POLITICAL

17. THE FLURRY THIS WEEK OVER AN ALLEGED COUP PLOT WILL BE INTERPRETED AS ONE MORE INDICATION OF VIETNAMESE INABILITY TO FORGE NATIONALIST UNITY IN THE FACE OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT. THIS IS UNFORTUNATE, FOR IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO OVERLOOK THE GROWING COHESION OF THE NATIONALIST CAMP AND THE RECENT PROGRESS TOWARD POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS NO BLINKING THE FACT THAT DESPITE WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION OF THE CRUCIAL NEED FOR UNITY AND EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, PROGRESS IN THIS AREA IS PAINFULLY SLOW.

18. SINCE TET, DESPITE THE PREOCCUPATION WITH ENEMY ATTACKS, RELIEF FOR THE CITIES AND MEASURES TO MOBILIZE THE RESOURCES OF THE NATION FOR WAR, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE CONTINUED TO OPERATE AND DEVELOP. AN INDEPENDENT LEGISLATURE HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY WITH A STRONG EXECUTIVE THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD. THE FIRST LEGAL CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT, ACCOMPLISHED IN A COMPLETELY CONSTITUTIONAL WAY, TOOK PLACE WHEN THE HUONG CABINET REPLACED THE LOC GOVERNMENT. BY THE END OF THIS MONTH, THE TWO REMAINING BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE INSPECTORATE, WILL BE ES-

TABLISHED. I BELIEVE THESE CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE GROWING DEMOCRATIC SPIRIT WHICH THEY ENCOURAGE AND INSPIRE WILL PROVE A SOURCE OF NATIONALIST STRENGTH IN THE COMING STRUGGLE WITH THE COMMUNISTS. AS FOR NON-GOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL STRENGTH. AT LEAST THREE MAJOR POLITICAL GROUPS AND A NUMBER OF SMALLER POLITICAL ENTITIES HAVE COMBINED TO FORM THE LIEN MINH.

19. IF THIS WEEK WAS MARKED BY EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED SUSPICIONS OR DIVISIONS AMONG THE NATIONALISTS, IT ALSO WAS TWO MORE STEPS TOWARD NATIONALIST POLITICAL STRENGTH AND UNITY. ONE OF THESE STEPS WAS THE RETURN OF GEN DUONG VAN MINH AFTER FOUR YEARS OF EXILE IMPOSED BY NATIONALIST LEADERS WHO FEARED HIS POPULARITY. PRE THIEU'S AUTHORIZATION OF MINH'S RETURN HAS BEEN GREETED BY WIDESPREAD EXPRESSIONS OF APPROVAL, AND TO JUDGE BY EDITORIAL COMMENT IT HAS CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO NATIONALIST UNITY.

20. THERE IS OF COURSE THE RISK THAT BIG MINH WILL ALLOW HIMSELF TO BE EXPLITED BY RADICAL OPPOSITION GROUPS, PARTICULARLY THE EXTREMISTS AMONG THE AN QUANG BUDDHISTS. TRI QUANG WAS AMONG THE FIRST TO WELCOME HIS RETURN AND CALLED ON HIM THE DAY AFTER HE ARRIVED. MINH HAS NOT YET PUBLICLY ACCEPTED A POST AS THIEU'S ADVISOR NOR HAS HE IN ANY PUBLIC WAY SHOWN SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. HE REPORTEDLY TOLD TRAN VAN DON THAT HE WILL NOT JOIN THE LIEN MINH. THIEU HAS HAD A PRIVATE LUNCH WITH MINH, HOWEVER, AND I AM SURE HE IS SEEKING TO OFFER BIG MINH A ROLE WHICH WILL PERMIT MINH TO CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO NATIONALIST UNITY.

21. THE OTHER STEP TOWARD NATIONALIST UNITY THIS WEEK WAS THE LAUNCHING OF THE LIEN MINH'S NEW ACTION PROGRAM (NAP). THIS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED SELF-HELP SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAM WAS INAUGURATED WITH AN OCT 4 PRESS CONFERENCE AND AN OCT 6 CEREMONY FOR THE 840 NEW NAP CADRE.

22. PRES THIEU SPOKE AT THE OCT 6 MEETING, THEREBY FURTHER ASSOCIATING HIMSELF PUBLICLY WITH THE LIEN MINH. IN DISCUSSING THE ROLE OF THE LIEN MINH AND THE NAP CADRE, THIEU SAID THAT HE IS NOT ASKING THEM TO SUPPORT HIM PERSONALLY BUT HOPES THEY WILL BACK "A GOVERNMENT WHICH TRULY AND FAITHFULLY SERVES THE PEOPLE." THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NAP CADRE IN THE COMING WEEKS WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT IN FORMING THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE ORGANIZATION AND MAY WELL DETERMINE ITS ULTIMATE SUCCESS OR FAILURE. THIEU IS PROBABLY UNWILLING TO TAKE ON THE PUBLIC LEADERSHIP OF THE LIEN MINH UNTIL HE HAS OBSERVED AT LEAST SOME OF THE RESULTS OF THE NAP EFFORT.

C. PACIFICATION

23. PRES THIEU'S INTEREST IN PACIFICATION HAS HAD A MARKED EFFECT ON THE ATTENTION BEING GIVEN THE PROGRAM BY GVN MINISTERS AND CORPS COMMANDERS. FIRST, THIEU'S SWING THROUGH ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS HOLDING PACIFICATION SEMINARS WAS WELL RECEIVED BY LARGE GROUPS OF OFFICIALS GATHERED TOGETHER FOR EACH OCCASION. PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING EACH SEMINARY BROADENED THE IMPACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISITS. PROVINCE CHIEFS AND ALL OTHER KEY PACIFICATION OFFICIALS -- MILITARY AND CIVILIAN -- RECEIVED THE STRAIGHT WORD FROM BOTH HUONG AND THIEU THAT THEY MEANT PACIFICATION TO GET PRIORITY

ATTENTION. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS DISSATISFIED WITH THE CURRENT RATE OF PROGRESS AND EXPECTED EVERY EFFORT TO BE MADE TO ACCELERATE THE PROGRAM NOW AND TO EXPAND IT FURTHER IN 1969.

24. OUR PROPOSAL FOR A COUNTER-OFFENSIVE HAS RECEIVED FULL SUPPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT WHO WAS THINKING IN THE SAME VEIN. ALL SIX CAMPAIGNS WHICH MAKE UP THE OVERALL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE ARE MOVING TOWARD 1 NOV KICK-OFF. ACTUALLY RVNAF-US MILITARY SPOILING CAMPAIGN HAS STARTED WITH INCREASED OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY AGAINST ENEMY FORCES WHEREEVER THEY CAN BE LOCATED. THE INTERIOR MINISTER CALLED KEY PHUONG HOANG OFFICIALS TOGETHER AND VERBALLY ISSUED INSTRUCTION FOR STEPPED UP ATTACK AGAINST VCI -- AIMED AT GOAL OF 3,000 VCI NEUTRALIZED PER MONTH COMPARED TO THE GOING RATE OF JUST OVER 1,000. A DIRECTIVE TO THE FIELD WILL BE ISSUED WITHIN A FEW DAYS. THE CHIEU HOI MINISTER IS TAKING NECESSARY MEASURES TO ACCELERATE HOI CHANH DEFECTING DURING THE THREE-MONTH COUNTEROFFENSIVE STARTING 1 NOV. EXPANSION OF SELF-DEFENSE TO COVER ALL GVN-CONTROLLED RURAL HAMLETS AS WELL AS CITIES AND TOWN IS UNDERWAY. MINISTER OF INFORMATION THIEN IS MAKING NECESSARY PREPARATIONS FOR INCREASED PSYOPS SUPPORT, ALTHOUGH HIS STAFF HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED ADEQUATE PLANS.

25. DURING THE WAR COUNCIL SESSION WITH THIEU AND HIS PEOPLE LAST FRIDAY, A FINAL DECISION WAS MADE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE ESSENTIAL PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN PORTION OF THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. LAST WEEK, THIEU WAS CONCERNED WITH FEASIBILITY OF SECURING 1,000 CONTESTED HAMLETS IN THREE MONTHS BETWEEN NOVEMBER AND TET AND RAISING THEIR SECURITY STATUS TO AT LEAST "C" ON THE HES SCALE. HOWEVER, OUR OWN FEASIBILITY STUDY, WHICH SHOWED THIS GOAL WAS ACHIEVABLE WITH MORE AGGRESSIVE USE OF EXISTING RESOURCES, WAS CONFIRMED BY A JGS STUDY IN WHICH EACH CORPS AND EVERY PROVINCE PARTICIPATED. JGS REPORTED TO PRESIDENT THIEU THAT 1,078 CONTESTED HAMLETS COULD BE UPGRADED BY TET '69. WITH THE FEASIBILITY THUS CONFIRMED, THIEU GAVE THE SIGNAL TO LAUNCH THE INTENSIFIED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN ALSO ON 1 NOVEMBER. THESE COORDINATE EFFORTS SHOULD HAVE A DECISIVE IMPACT ON THE ENEMY WHO SHOWS SIGNS OF WEAKENING IN SEVERAL RESPECTS. HOWEVER, RESULTS ARE PEGGED TO GVN PERFORMANCE IN DISTRICTS AND PROVINCES WHICH ARE A LONG WAY FROM SAIGON AND ARE NOT YET CONVINCED THAT SOME NEW ENEMY OFFENSIVE WON'T FALL ON THEIR HEADS.

26. OUR ANALYSIS OF THE FEASIBILITY OF RATHER QUICKLY MOVING INTO 1,000 OR MORE CONTESTED HAMLETS REVEALED SEVERAL INTERESTING FACTS. BASED ON A PROBABLY VERY INCOMPLETE PICTURE OF THE ENEMY'S STRUCTURE OF LIBERATION COMMITTEES, WE NOTE THAT OF 808 HAMLET COMMITTEES IDENTIFIED WITH SPECIFIC HAMLETS, 15 PERCENT ARE IN RELATIVELY SECURE HAMLETS AND 18 PERCENT IN CONTESTED HAMLETS. BUT GVN INFLUENCE IN CONTESTED HAMLETS IS CONSIDERABLE -- 307 RF COMPANIES AND 1,163 PF PLATOONS ARE ALREADY STATIONED IN OR CLOSE BY CONTESTED HAMLETS.

D. ECONOMIC

27. THE SAIGON RETAIL PRICE INDEX OF OCTOBER 7 SHOWED A 3 PERCENT FALL IN THE LEVEL OF RETAIL PRICES FROM THE PREVIOUS WEEK. THE DECREASE RESULTED FROM A DROP IN DEMAND FOR MOST FOOD ITEMS FOLLOWING THE MID-AUGUST FESTIVAL. THE BLOWING UP OF THE BEN LUC BRIDGE ON OCTOBER 5 DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE AFFECTED FOOD DELIVERIES TO SAIGON. A PONTOON BRIDGE IS IN PLACE AND THE PRESENT MAXIMUM DELAY AT THE BRIDGE IS REPORTED TO BE 20 MINUTES. RICE PRICES FELL AGAIN THIS WEEK WITH THE BETTER GRADES OF DOMESTIC RICE FALLING 1 TO 2 PERCENT, INFERIOR GRADES FALLING 5 PERCENT, AND U.S. RICE UNCHANGED.

28. MINISTER OF ECONOMY AU NGOC HO TOLD US AT THE END OF THIS WEEK THAT HE HAD DRAWN UP A PROGRAM OF MEASURES ON RICE WHICH HE WOULD PRESENT TO THE PRESIDENT ABOUT OCTOBER 8. THE MEASURES INCLUDE: (1) NO MORE PURCHASES OF IMPORTED RICE FOR SOME TIME. (2) AN IMMEDIATE INCREASE IN IMPORTED RICE PRICES SUFFICIENT TO CUT THE CURRENT SUBSIDY IN HALF, WITH THE SECOND HALF TO BE ELIMINATED EARLY NEXT YEAR. (3) MOVEMENT BY COASTER VESSELS OF SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF RICE FROM SAIGON STOCKS TO CENTRAL VIETNAM. (4) IMMEDIATE PURCHASE OF 60,000 TONS OF RICE NOW STORED IN THE DELTA.

29. THE ABOVE PROGRAM, IF PUT INTO EFFECT, SHOULD HELP TO RESTORE THE RICE TRADE AND RAISE PADDY PRICES TO FARMERS.

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Per file

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP82541

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

A MILITARY COUP HAS TAKEN PLACE AGAINST PRESIDENT ARIAS AFTER 11 DAYS IN OFFICE. THE NATIONAL GUARD IS EVIDENTLY FOLLOWING ORDERS FROM GENERAL VALLARINO WHO WENT THROUGH THE MOTION OF RESIGNING AS GUARD CHIEF EARLIER YESTERDAY, ALONG WITH OTHER DISGRUNTLED OFFICERS. LT. COL. URRUTIA--A KEY FIGURE IN CONCLUDING A DEAL WITH ARIAS THREE DAYS AGO OSTENSIBLY TO HEAD OFF AN OVERTHROW--REPORTEDLY IS UNDER ARREST. TROOPS CONTROL THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE BUT ARIAS HAS ESCAPED TO THE CANAL ZONE AND HAS REQUESTED ASYLUM.

SPORADIC GUN FIRE HAS BEEN REPORTED IN PANAMA CITY. EARLIER SOME RADIO STATIONS ANNOUNCED THE MILITARY COUP AND APPEALED TO THE PEOPLE TO ACCEPT IT. MEANWHILE, PRO-ARIAS STATIONS HAVE BEEN CLOSED DOWN PRESUMABLY TO END EFFORTS BY ARIAS'S FORCES TO INCITE RESISTANCE. THE PRESIDENT'S SUPPORTERS ARE UNORGANIZED AND HIS LARGE POPULAR FOLLOWING CAN BE EXPECTED TO CAUSE SOME ARMED OPPOSITION, HOWEVER, A NUMBER OF CIVILIANS HAVE ANNOUNCED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY'S ACTIONS. THE COUP ELEMENTS CONTROL MOST OF THE KEY GUARD UNITS AND APPEAR TO HAVE THEIR PLAN WELL ORGANIZED AND COORDINATED.

AMBASSADOR ADAIR AND ZONAL GOVERNOR LEBER CURRENTLY IN WASHINGTON ARE FLYING BACK TO PANAMA IMMEDIATELY.

DTG: 123557Z OCT 68

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *plg*, NARA, Date *11/20/02*

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

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WHCA

EEA588
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3998

1968 OCT 12 04 41

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT *INFO MR CHRISTIAN*
CITE CAP82540

~~SECRET~~

YOU WILL PROBABLY SEE PRESS REPORTS TO THE EFFECT THAT A COUP
IS IN PROGRESS IN PANAMA; THE FOLLOWING ARE THE HARD FACTS
THUS FAR IN HAND:

--DISSIDENT NATIONAL GUARD ELEMENTS HAVE TAKEN OVER THE
CONTROL OF THE MAIN AIRPORT OUTSIDE PANAMA CITY.

--THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE HAS BEEN SURROUNDED AND WITH
SOME SHOOTING TAKING PLACE.

--A MILITARY JUNTA HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN CHERIQUE
PROVINCE, BORDERING COSTA RICA.

--CANAL ZONE GOVERNOR REPORTS THAT PRESIDENT ARIAS IS
SAFE IN ZONE.

WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH DEFENSE, STATE AND CIA AND WILL HAVE
A FULLER REPORT LATER.

DTG: 120426Z OCT 68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 99-190

By ctm, NARA Date 5-8-01

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

37

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WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA587
OO WTE 12
DE WTE 3996

37 OCT 11 23 03

68 OCT 11 PM 1:04
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82538

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCTOBER 11, 1968

SECRETARY RUSK, IN CONSIDERING A FORMAL RECOMMENDATION TO YOU ABOUT SEEING EBAN ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY, WISHED TO KNOW:

- WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S PLANS WOULD PERMIT YOU TO SEE EBAN THEN;
- WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WISHED TO SEE EBAN.

SECRETARY RUSK HIMSELF WOULD LIKE TO GET GOING WITH EBAN ON MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATING MATTERS AND WOULD BE GLAD TO TAKE AN APPOINTMENT WITH HIM MONDAY OR TUESDAY IF YOU THOUGHT THAT WISE.

ABE FEINBERG TOLD ME THAT EBAN HAD A MESSAGE AND INFORMATION FOR YOU WHICH HIS GOVERNMENT HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO PRESENT LITERALLY ONLY TO YOU.

I BELIEVE YOU CAN GUESS WHAT THAT INFORMATION IS.

DTG: 112245Z OCT 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769 84-168
By 15/100, NARA, Date 2-1-93

XEROX FROM QUOTE COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 11, 1968 *Pres file*

38

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk, in considering a formal recommendation to you about seeing Eban on Monday or Tuesday, wished to know:

- whether the President's plans would permit ^{you} him to see Eban then;
- whether the President wished to see Eban.

Secretary Rusk himself would like to get going with Eban on Middle East negotiating matters and would be glad to take an appointment with him Monday or Tuesday if you thought that wise.

Abe Feinberg told me that Eban had a message and information for you which his government had instructed him to present literally only to you.

I believe you can guess what that information is.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712 84468

By RG/MS, NARA, Date 2-1-93

ACTION

39

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Proposed Award of Legion of Merit to German General

General Polk, Commander of U.S. forces in Europe, has proposed the award of the Legion of Merit to General Albert Schnez, who is Commander of the German Federal Republic's III Corps.

The Secretary of the Army, Ambassador Lodge and the State Department concur in the award.

General Polk bases his recommendation on the major contribution General Schnez has made to NATO and to U.S. Forces as Commander of a German Corps.

The Secretary of Defense intends to approve the award but wishes you to know of his intention before he acts because:

1. There may be some Congressional criticism based on accusations, which we can neither prove or disprove, that General Schnez had pre-Nazi sentiments during World War II; and
2. There may be some unfavorable reaction in the Netherlands and Norway arising out of their objections to General Schnez being given a NATO command position in 1967. The Federal German Republic withdrew his nomination.

I recommend that you authorize Secretary Clifford to go ahead--with the understanding that the award ceremonies be kept very low-key, as suggested by Ambassador Lodge.

W. W. Rostow

____ Tell Secretary Clifford to go ahead

____ Do not make award

____ Call me

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 94-197
By Q/cb, NARA, Date 4/20/02

~~SECRET~~

BKS:d amc

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

Friday - October 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from President Pacheco of Uruguay

*1. copy
2. Pres file*

President Pacheco of Uruguay has written you to express his appreciation for your efforts in the Alliance for Progress and his concern about recent Congressional cuts in aid appropriations (Tab A).

A suggested reply is attached at Tab B. It stresses your efforts on behalf of the Alliance and underscores the importance of the Latin countries also meeting their Punta del Este commitments. I recommend that you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____.

Attachments

Tab A - Letter from President Pacheco to the President, September 25, 1968.

Tab B - Recommended Presidential reply.

SWLewis:mm

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By g/rq, NARA, Date 1/20/02

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

13322

5/00

40a

LS NO. 5073
T3/R-XX
Spanish

Office of the President of the Republic of Uruguay

Montevideo, September 25, 1968

Mr. President and distinguished Friend:

I have just returned from Santiago, Chile, where I spent two days with our mutual friend, President Eduardo Frei. During that time we discussed the steps we would take to achieve with the utmost speed our goal of economic integration in the Hemisphere. In our talks and in recent meetings with our colleague in Argentina, General Juan Carlos Onganía, and our colleague in Brazil, Marshal Arthur da Costa e Silva, I sincerely endeavored to advance the important objectives agreed on at the Conference at Punta del Este less than two years ago. Much still remains to be done, but we are making steady progress.

We Uruguayans, and I as their President, feel a special responsibility for, and special pride in, the Alliance for Progress since Uruguay was the birthplace of the Alliance and the place where the economic integration movement was started at the Conference of Presidents of America in April 1967, in which you played a very important role.

I am aware, Mr. President, of your efforts and your desire to achieve the high aims that led to the creation of the Alliance for Progress.

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the
United States of America.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By plg, NARA, Date 1/20/02

Therefore, Mr. President, I am certain that you share my feeling of deep concern over the decision adopted by a committee of the United States Congress, precisely while I was in Chile, which greatly reduces cooperation between the United States and its sister Republics.

Our united efforts have bolstered the hopes of our nations, and thus it has been possible to ward off the difficulties which have caused much anxiety in other regions of the world.

I cannot imagine that this decision represents the true spirit and actual policy of the American people.

It is my sincere desire, Mr. President--as I know it is yours--that none of us decrease our efforts, but rather that we endeavor to strengthen them to ensure peace and progress in the Americas. This is my government's definite aim as, I am certain, it must be that of all of us who met at Punta del Este.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.

[Signed] J. Pacheco Areco

Jorge Pacheco Areco

October 11, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I was pleased to receive your letter of September 25 concerning the future of the Alliance for Progress. Our governments throughout the hemisphere have made great efforts during the past seven years in the struggle to bring a better life to the people of the Americas. There have been obstacles and setbacks but the record, I believe, is one of which we can and should be proud.

Your recent talks with the Presidents of Chile, Argentina and Brazil are evidence of the usefulness of frequent conversations on regional and hemispheric problems. I hope that the progress toward economic integration, which we began together at Punta del Este in 1967, will be accelerated as a result of your recent conversations.

You may be sure that my Administration fully intends to make every effort to continue to do its share under the Alliance. I have noted your reference to the recent action by a committee of our Congress. As a result of strong efforts made by my Administration, our Congress has now appropriated a level of assistance for the Alliance substantially higher than the level recommended by the committee of our House of Representatives to which you referred.

As you know, we in the United States carry heavy responsibilities both at home and overseas. We are doing our best under the Alliance in spite of these competing demands. I sincerely hope that our partners in the Alliance for Progress will also make a maximum effort to meet the commitments to which we have twice agreed at Punta del Este.

I would like to close with my warm greetings and best wishes for the success of your administration and of the program of stabilization and development in which the people of Uruguay are engaged. Thank you again for having written.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Jorge Pacheco Areco
President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay
Montevideo.

LBJ/SWLewis:mm

Friday, October 11, 1968

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

As you instructed, John Schnittker consulted Poage and Purcell on the Korean rice package. Both approved the package, including specifically a Presidential waiver of the Purcell amendment provision for the PL-480 portion.

Schnittker will now go ahead to start the negotiation with Korea.

W. W. Rostow

ERF

ERF:mst

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

41a
Reid
7:05P~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, October 9, 1968 -- 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL-480 Rice for Korea

~~You asked me to look further into the Purcell amendment and the rice package for Korea. The Purcell amendment requires, in the case of the PL-480 credit portion of the sale, that the Koreans make an additional cash payment to cover U.S. expenses and other specified uses, unless you determine this would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act.~~

The recommendation is that you so determine. ~~These are the reasons:~~

1. ~~The PL-480 rice is part of a 400,000 ton package that has an exceptionally good commercial portion.~~

-- ~~245,000 pounds, valued at almost \$42 million, is under PL-480 terms: This includes the usual 5 percent cash down payment and the balance payable in dollars over forty years. In itself this is a shift for Korea from local currency to dollar repayable terms. This shift is in accordance with the objectives of the Act,~~

-- ~~100,000 tons, valued at \$17 million, is a straight commercial CCC transaction repayable in dollars in three years, one-third each year.~~

-- ~~55,000 tons, valued at \$9 million, is for cash.~~

2. ~~It would have been possible to apply the straight cash portion of the transaction to the PL-480 part of the package. This would have met the Purcell amendment requirement but would have been less advantageous to us. We would have gotten these dollar receipts over the course of a year but under the present package, we receive the cash payment immediately. Furthermore, the commercial part of the package would be smaller. This would be inconsistent with the stated objective in the Act to build up commercial markets.~~

3. ~~As the previous memo pointed out, we are competing with the Japanese. The Koreans, mindful of their long-term interest,~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By gfw, NARA, Date 1/20/02~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

might be pushed further but we cannot be sure. ~~There would be a risk.~~ In any event, there would be more delay and some balking at reopening what seemed in the preliminary negotiation to be a ~~fair deal for both of us.~~

~~Our prospective rice surplus situation is a further point.~~ If the 400,000 ton Korean sale does not go through, this rice would be added to our carryover at a storage cost of almost \$3 million a year. In addition, we would lose the immediate budgetary and balance of payments gain of the cash part of the sale.

In the legislative history, Purcell and the full Agriculture Committee made it clear that the amendment was a best effort rather than a mandatory provision. ~~Furthermore, in executive session, the Committee said that this and other amendments should be applied with maximum flexibility in the case of Korea and Vietnam. A Purcell waiver on this agreement should cause no problem on the Hill.~~

~~I believe that waiver of the Purcell amendment on this deal is consistent with the objectives of the Act and justified on commercial grounds. I recommend you approve negotiation of the agreement.~~

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Call me ☐

W. Rostow

✓ if you consult & is approved by Purcell & Poore

10/10/68
notified E. Fried.
office - re

The agreement will be negotiated if you approve.
The actual signing of the waiver will come to you only after the negotiation is completed.
W.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, October 2, 1968
12:50 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request for Approval of P. L. 480 Rice for Korea

Attached is a Zwick-Gaud-Freeman request for your authority to negotiate a P. L. 480 agreement with Korea for 245,000 tons of rice. The proposed agreement, amounting to \$41.7 million, would be repayable in convertible local currency over a forty-year period.

Serious drought for a second year is expected to leave Korea without an adequate supply of grains. Korea offers timely outlet for our rice surplus.

In addition to the 245,000 tons on P. L. 480 terms, Korea would agree to buy 155,000 tons on 35-month Commodity Credit Corporation terms.

Japan has made an offer of rice to Korea on very liberal terms. To meet that competition, Freeman and Gaud believe we should offer the proposed package now.

Account will be taken of the local currency generated in this sale when the Economic Assistance Program for Korea is submitted for your approval in November.

The recent Purcell Amendment to P. L. 480 requires in the case of credit sales that a cash payment be made to cover U.S. expenses and other specified uses, unless you determine that it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act. Freeman and Gaud recommend that you make such a determination by approving this proposal, since they expect we would lose the sale if we insisted on the cash payment.

State and AID report that Korea continues to satisfy the requirements of the Symington Amendment concerning military expenditures.

State also concurs in the above proposal.

Recommendation:

That you approve negotiation of this agreement.

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By SP1W, NARA, Date 1/20/02

CONFIDENTIAL

3076
41c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

SEP 27 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Rice Shipment to Korea

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your approval to negotiate a P. L. 480 agreement with Korea for 245,000 tons of rice. The agreement, amounting to \$41.7 million, is repayable in convertible local currency over a forty-year period.

A serious drought is expected to leave Korea without an adequate supply of grains. Korea thus offers a timely outlet for our rice surplus. In addition to the 245,000 tons of rice on P. L. 480 credit terms, Korea agrees to buy 155,000 tons of U. S. rice on 35-month CCC credit terms.

Japan presents an alternative source of rice for Korea and has made an offer on very liberal terms. In order to meet the Japanese competition, Freeman and Gaud believe we have to offer the Koreans the proposed package now.

This proposal will be negotiated separately from our CY 1969 economic assistance program to Korea (P. L. 480, supporting assistance and development loans) which will be submitted for your approval in November. However, we will take into account the local currency generated by this rice sale when we review the level of our support for the Korean budget.

Purcell Amendment - A recent amendment to P. L. 480 requires in the case of credit sales that a cash payment be made to cover U. S. expenses and other specified uses, unless you determine that it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act. Because they expect we would lose the commercial sale if we insisted on the cash payment, Freeman and Gaud recommend that you make such a determination by approving this proposal.

Military Expenditures - State/AID reports that Korea continues to satisfy the requirements of the Symington Amendment.

I recommend that you approve this agreement.

Charles J. Zwick
Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment _____

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By Qljw, NARA, Date 11/20/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41 d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

SEP 18 1968

To: The President

Subject: Title I Public Law 480 Program with Korea

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Korea a PL 480 convertible local currency credit sale of \$41.7 million for about 245,000 tons of rice including cost of ocean transportation. Payment terms would provide for 31 approximately equal annual payments, initial interest rate during ten-year grace period of 2 percent, and the continuing interest rate 2-1/2 percent. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

For the second consecutive year Korea has suffered drought in the Southeastern Provinces, a principal rice producing area. Korea's 1967 rice production was down about 300,000 tons below the 1966 crop and current estimates for the 1968 crop are down 200,000 tons below the 1967 crop. The ROKG has held exploratory discussions with Japan relating to a payment in kind transaction on most favorable terms for from 300 to 500,000 tons of rice but has now indicated terms along the lines of the above proposal for the purchase of U.S. rice will be acceptable. In addition to the 245,000 tons under Title I, the Korean Government has agreed to purchase 155,000 tons of rice from the United States using their own foreign exchange and up to 36 months CCC credit. This amount, together with other Free World purchases will give Korea assurances of being able to meet their rice import requirements, and will enable us to move a substantial part of our larger 1968 rice crop.

Military Expenditure Review

State/AID concluded that U.S. Development Assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, PL 480 sales proceeds and Korea's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditure to a degree that would materially interfere with its development.

Self-Help Measures

New self-help measures were included in the agreement signed with Korea May 10, 1968. No new self-help measures are proposed for this agreement. In the immediate month ahead, consideration will be given to additional wheat, feed grains and other commodities together with supporting assistance for CY 1969 and self-help measures will be considered at that time.

The proceeds accruing to the importing country from the sale of rice in this agreement would be devoted to the achievement of the agricultural self-help measures set forth in the May 10, 1968 agreement and to efforts to alleviate drought effects in the Southeastern Provinces in Korea.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Aib 10/16/95 memo
By 91/jw Agric: 10/28/82 memo
NARA, Date 1/20/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2


Requirement for Advance Payment of Dollars or Foreign Currencies

The recent extension and amendments to PL 480 provide that, except where it would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act, we require a cash payment in credit sales agreements of the amount needed for U. S. expenditures and for other specified uses in the Act. We believe with the foreign exchange purchase Korea will be required to make under this proposal and the alternative most favorable terms being offered by Japan, to insist on a further hardening of the terms by requiring a currency use payment would make it impossible at this time to negotiate this agreement and would lose to the U. S. a cash dollar market for 155,000 tons of rice. We therefore recommend no currency use payment be required for this agreement.


Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 agreement as described above.

September 12 1968



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Date: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 11, 1968
2:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Jarling takes your
Phantom negotiation announcement
rather well -- and gives us some
advice -- para. 2.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

USUN 7019

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-134
By us, NARA Date 9-21-98

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

42a W H
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

8

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DE RUEHDT 7019 2850203
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 110001Z OCT 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3744
STATE GRNC
BT

3587Q

1968 OCT PM 10:51

~~SECRET~~ USUN 7019

NODIS

Rostow

JARRING AND PHANTOMS

1. IN DISCUSSION OCT 10 WITH JARRING, WIGGINS EXPLAINED BACKGROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL RE SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT. WIGGINS EXPLAINED US NOT (REPEAT NOT) INSENSITIVE TO JARRING'S VIEW, BUT IN VIEW OF AMENDMENT TO AID BILL ON THIS SUBJECT, PRESIDENT COULD DO NO LESS.

2. JARRING SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR PROBLEM AND HAD NOT MISINTERPRETED ANNOUNCEMENT AS IN ANY WAY REFLECTING LACK OF CONCERN ABOUT HIS PROBLEMS. IN FACT, HE SAID, HE DID NOT READ THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS A DECISION TO SEND THE PLANES AND HE VERY MUCH HOPES THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT WILL BE USED AS LEVERAGE ON ISRAEL TO MOVE THEM TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THE ARABS ARE UPSET ABOUT THIS ANNOUNCEMENT AND THEY WOULD BE MUCH MORE SO ABOUT THE ACTUAL DECISION TO SEND THE PLANES. MOREOVER, HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONTINUING SPIRAL OF ARMS DELIVERIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH, AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION, HE HOPES CAN BE KEPT DOWN.

3. JARRING'S ONE SPECIFIC REQUEST WAS THAT IF POSSIBLE ANNOUNCEMENT ON DELIVERY OF AIRCRAFT BE KEPT IN SUSPENSION FOR SOME TIME.

GP-2

WIGGINS
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ

97-136

By *us*, NARA Date 4-2-98

43

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 11, 1968
10:15 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

We have been receiving all sorts
of reports about Hanoi's intentions,
but these two recent ones should interest
you.

conflicting

25X1A

W. W. Rostow



~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 019-040-4-2
By SP, NARA, Date 1/21/02

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN - 08222

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE ~~SECRET~~
Exo, Dn/1

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

DIST 9 OCTOBER 1968

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM
DOI EARLY OCTOBER 1968

09 15 04z Oct 68

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT 1. NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICER'S VIEW ON WAR AIMS;
2. CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOP PRESENCE IN NORTH VIETNAM

BOWDLER
BODGET
DAVIS
FRIED
GINSBURGH
HAWKIN
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENEY S
LEONHART
SAUNDERS
TAYLOR

ACQ

SOURCE

1.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

STATED THAT AN UNIDENTIFIED NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY OFFICER SPECULATED THAT IN REGARD TO THE WAR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MAY HAVE LOWERED THEIR GOALS. ~~THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICER OPINED THAT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD EVENTUALLY BE SATISFIED IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD AGREE TO HALT THE HOANG~~
~~LOC AND BEGIN WITHDRAWING TROOPS FROM THE SOUTH. THE~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-74
By edm, NARA, Date 3-27-03

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IN -08222

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Vietnam would be accepted and both sides would claim a
victory: the United States for saving the South and North
Vietnam for causing the United States to halt the bombing
and eventually to withdraw from the South.

2. [] remarked that he had heard rumors that
200,000 Communist Chinese troops are stationed in North
Vietnam; approximately 50,000 of these troops are supposed
to be combat troops. [] went on to say that recently he
has heard rumors that the 150,000 Communist Chinese con-
struction troops who work on the railroads and highways are
being replaced by combat troops.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. [] DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE NAVFORV
CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF []

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

44

Friday, October 11, 1968
9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this
report of what Gromyko told Debre
about Vietnam and Phantoms.

File

W. W. Rostow

25X1A



~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 019-040-4-5
By sp NARA, Date 11/21/02

45

ACTION

Friday, October 11, 1968 -- 9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Abba Eban would like to see you on October 14 (Monday) or the morning of October 15 (Tuesday).

Sec. Rusk has no objection and, I understand, thinks it might be a good idea.

Are you willing to do this?

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rln

SECRET

Friday, October 11, 1968 -- 9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two cables which Shriver wished you to see before your meeting with Debre this morning.

At Tab 1 is a British note on the question of the statement made by General de Gaulle to Shriver when he saw him; namely, that it is de Gaulle's "clear judgment that the Americans will not use their full nuclear power to protect Germany or the rest of Western Europe against Soviet attack." As you will see, the British suggest we make some sort of response to de Gaulle on this matter and that we should consider engaging France in talks with the UK and possibly Germany. (See paragraphs 4 and 5 of British note.)

Shriver also forwards to us an article by Henry Tanner (Tab 2) which suggests that the French may be loosening up in their policy towards the West and the U.S.

I would not go further at this time with Debre than to smoke him out on:

- His view of the prospects of detente with the East (presumably less optimistic than previously);
- French willingness to work closer in security and other matters with the West.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 22285

Paris 22224

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 1-29-02

SECRET

1968 OCT 11 11 01

4600

(2)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HCE941

PAGE 01 PARIS 22224 01 OF 02 111022Z

12
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,

RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,NSCE 02,SSO 00,USIE 00,MM 01,RSR 01,/080 W
----- 096606

0 110945Z OCT 68

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6951

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 22224

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AN ARTICLE BY HENRY TANNER GIVEN US PRIVATELY AND FILED FROM PARIS LAST NIGHT BUT WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL NOT BE REPRODUCED IN THE TIMES UNTIL TOMORROW. IN VIEW OF ITS UNUSUAL INTEREST I SUGGEST THAT IT BE BROUGHT TO THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION PRIOR TO HIS TALK WITH DEBRE THIS MORNING.

BENEATH THE UNRUFFLED APPEARANCE OF FRENCH DIPLOMACY THESE DAYS, THERE IS A WIDE ACCEPTANCE OF THE FACT THAT THE FOUNDATION OF PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S CONCEPT OF FOREIGN POLICY HAS BEEN SHAKEN IF NOT DESTROYED BY THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THE PRESIDENT IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE ORDERED A SWEEPING POLICY REVIEW UNDER THE DIRECTION OF PRIME MINISTER MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE, WITH CONCLUSIONS TO BE SUBMITTED TO HIM IN DECEMBER. THE VALIDITY OF GAULLIST MILITARY STRATEGY AS WELL AS ECONOMIC POLICIES AND DIPLOMACY ARE TO BE RE-EXAMINED, ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES.

THERE ARE RELIABLE REPORTS THAT THE GENERAL HIMSELF IS FAR MORE DEEPLY UPSET OVER THE SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION THAN HE LETS ON PUBLICLY. HE IS REPORTED TO FEEL THAT THE DANGER OF ARMED CONFLICT HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY INCREASED. AND HE IS KNOWN TO BE BITTERLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THE MAY-JUNE UPHEAVAL ROBBED HIM OF THE MEANS TO PURSUE HIS ATTACK ON THE WORLD MONETARY SYSTEM BASED ON THE DOLLAR.

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IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT HE COULD CARRY ON AS BEFORE.

THE FIRST OFFICIAL STATEMENTS WERE FORCEFUL CONDEMNATIONS OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION. BUT BY TREATING THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS AS JUST ANOTHER MANIFESTATION OF THE "SPIRIT OF YALTA," THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD BY THE SUPERPOWERS, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SEEMED TO SAY THAT THE REAL CULPRIT WAS NOT THE KREMLIN BUT THE ENTIRE EVIL "SYSTEM OF THE POWER BLOCS" OF WHICH WASHINGTON IS AS MUCH A PART AS MOSCOW. THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WAS MENTIONED IN ONE OF THESE STATEMENTS.

DURING THOSE EARLY WEEKS, UP THROUGH THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON SEPTEMBER NINE THE FRENCH APPEALED FOR A CONTINUATION OF THE POLICY OF DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT MAKING THIS CONTINGENT ON A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THIS POSITION CAME UNDER SHARP FIRE AT A CONFERENCE OF GAULLIST MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IN LA BAULE, AN ATLANTIC SEASIDE RESORT, IN MID-SEPTEMBER. THE CRITICS INCLUDED NOT JUST MEMBERS OF THE CONSERVATIVE WING OF THE PARTY BUT ALSO LEFTWING GAULLISTS NORMALLY INCLINED TO EMPHASIZE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW.

IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARD FOREIGN MINISTER MICHEL DEBRE LINKED CONTINUATION OF DETENTE FOR THE FIRST TIME WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS IN A PUBLIC SPEECH.

THE SECOND CRESCENDO CAME LAST WEEK. MR. DEBRE, IN A GOVERNMENT DECLARATION TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME DEFINED THE FRENCH POSITION NOT MERELY IN TERMS OF A CONDEMNATION OF MOSCOW BUT IN TERMS OF SUPPORT FOR THE CZECHS.

"THE RIGHTS OF THE HUMAN PERSON" WERE STILL BEING "HELD IN CONTEMPTS IN EASTERN EUROPE," AND THE CZECHOSLOVAKS HAD NOT YET BEEN ALLOWED TO REGAIN THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION," HE SAID. RESUMPTION OF DETENTE WITH MOSCOW THUS WAS MADE CONTINGENT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, ON THE SOVIET UNION'S WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND "PERSONALITY" OF HER NEIGHBORS.

FRENCH OFFICIALS DESCRIBED THIS AS A DELIBERATE AND

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IMPORTANT SWITCH.

IT WAS REGARDED AS THE FIRST ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY GENERAL DE GAULLE THAT THERE IS A CONFLICT BETWEEN HIS POLICY OF DETENTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND HIS CAMPAIGN FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF SMALL AND MIDDLE-SIZED NATIONS WITHIN BOTH THE AMERICAN AND THE SOVIET "HEGEMONIES." SHRIVER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 22224

HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS CONCEDE THAT THE BASIC GAULLIST ASSUMPTION WHICH EMERGED FROM GENERAL DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION IN JUNE 1966 HAS BEEN PROVED WRONG BY CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THIS ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE SOVIETS HAD MOVED FAR ENOUGH TOWARD PEACEFULNESS AND LIBERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS TO PERMIT A WESTERN STATESMAN TO CLAIM THEIR FRIENDSHIP WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ENCOURAGING THE POLES, CZECHOSLOVAKS, HUNGARIANS AND OTHERS TO DEMAND NATIONAL SOVERIGNTY.

PARIS OFFICIALS NOW ARE TALKING ABOUT WAYS TO GIVE ACTIVE HELP TO THE CZECHOSLOVAKS. THE POSSIBILITY OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, IN THE FORM OF LONGTERM CREDITS, IS BEING DISCUSSED.

THE FRENCH ARE PURSUING THEIR PROGRAMS OF TECHNICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIETS. BUT POLITICAL CONSULTATION, WHICH WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE RAPPROCHEMENT AFTER THE GENERAL'S MOSCOW VISIT, HAS BEEN HALTED.

THE UNPUBLICIZED BUT FREQUENT MEETINGS BETWEEN FRENCH AND SOVIET OFFICIALS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE IN BOTH CAPITALS FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS HAVE CEASED, ACCORDING TO INFORMED SOURCES.

THEREFORE, SINCE FRENCH GOVERNMENT SPECIALISTS ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF AN EARLY LOOSENING OF THE SOVIET GRIP ON THE CZECHOSLOVAKS, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT POLITICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PARIS WILL REMAIN AT A VERY LOW LEVEL FOR A LONG TIME.

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BY JDW/rch ON 3/25/92

THESE SPECIALISTS NOW FEEL THAT LIBERALIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE WILL REMAIN STAGNANT UNTIL "THE HERESY REACHES ROME," IE THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT THIS IS A LONG, LONG TIME OFF.

IT WOULD BE NICE TO REPORT THAT THE DETERIORATION IN FRENCH-SOVIET RELATIONS HAS LED TO A CORRESPONDING IMPROVEMENT IN FRENCH-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO THIS EFFECT.

FRENCH OFFICIAL BLANDLY OBSERVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN "NO UNPLEASANTNESS" BETWEEN PARIS AND WASHINGTON FOR THE PAST SIX OR SEVEN MONTHS, CONTRARY TO PRECEDING PERIODS.

THIS IS BECAUSE GENERAL DE GAULLE RECOGNIZED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MARCH 30 SPEECH WHICH LED TO NEGOTIATION ON VIETNAM AS A POSITIVE AND "COURAGEOUS" ACT; BECAUSE AMERICANS AND VIETNAMESE ARE NEGOTIATING IN PARIS, THUS IMPOSING ON THEIR FRENCH HOSTS THE OBLIGATION OF DISCRETION, AND BECAUSE THE FRENCH FRANC WAS SO WEAKENED DURING MAY AND JUNE THAT IT HAS CEASED TO BE A GOOD LEVER AGAINST THE DOLLAR.

ALL THESE CHANGES PRECEDE CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

SOME GAULLIST MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND NOT A FEW PLAIN CITIZENS WHO ARE USED TO GENERAL DE GAULLE'S HABIT OF EQUATING THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET "HEGEMONIES" CONFESS TO HAVING SOMEWHAT KINDLIER FEELINGS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET AFFAIR.

TWO WEEKS AGO, AMBASSADOR SARGENT SHRIVER'S SPEECH AT A COMMEMORATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF VERDUN WAS PERMITTED TO RUN FOR NEARLY FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE GOVERNMENT'S TELEVISION NETWORK--A VIRTUALLY UNPRECEDENTED KIND OF EXPOSURE OF AN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT.

BUT OBSERVERS POINT OUT THAT THIS MAY WELL HAVE BEEN A CASE OF GOOD DOMESTIC POLITICS--A DEMONSTRATION TO SLIGHTLY WORRIED FRENCH CITIZENS THAT WITH EVEN THOUGH ITS FRIENDSHIP WITH THE EAST HAS SOURED, THE GAULLIST GOVERNMENT IS NOT ANGRY AT EVERYBODY. SHRIVER

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6953

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MEMORANDUM HANDED TO THIS EMBASSY BY BRITISH MINISTER. THIS MEMORANDUM HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE AND WE SENDING IT TO DEPARTMENT FOR ITS INFORMATION SINCE WE UNDERSTAND BRITISH MAY BE BRINGING PART OF ALL OF IT TO DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION.

BEGIN TEXT.

1. THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE FEEL THAT THERE ARE DIFFICULTIES AND DANGERS ABOUT RESPONDING TO GENERAL DE GAULLE'S REMARKS TO MR. SHRIVER ON 23 SEPTEMBER. THIS IS NOT DOUBT TRUE. BUT THERE ARE ALSO DANGER IN MAKING NO RESPONSE.

2. AFTER ALL, THE GENERAL HAS TOLD THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR THAT IT IS HIS CLEAR JUDGMENT THAT THE AMERICANS WILL NOT USE THEIR FULL NUCLEAR POWER TO PROTECT GERMANY OR THE REST OF WESTERN EUROPE AGAINST SOVIET ATTACK; AND HE HAS SAID THAT THE WEST LACKS THE POWER TO RESIST SUCH AN ATTACK BY CONVENTIONAL MEANS. THIS AMOUNTS TO SAYING THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS A BLUFF WHICH THE RUSSIANS COULD CALL WITH SUCCESS IF THEY DECIDED TO TAKE THE RISK. THE GENERAL HAS ALSO ASKED THE DIRECT QUESTION WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IF THE RUSSIANS ATTACKED THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. THE GERMANS KNOW THAT HE HAS SAID ALL THIS.

3. THE HEAD OF THE FRENCH STATE IS SURELY ENTITLED TO A MORE FORMAL REPLY TO HIS REMARKS THAN THE IMMEDIATE REACTION OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SPEAKING WITHOUT

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 1-29-02

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INSTRUCTIONS. IF NO REPLY IS FORTHCOMING FROM WASHINGTON WE RISK MAKING A PRESENT TO THE GENERAL OF TWO ARGUMENTS OF WHICH HE COULD HAVE EFFECTIVE USE, IF HE DECIDED THE MOMENT HAD COME, BOTH WITH THE GERMANS AND WITH FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION. THESE ARGUMENTS ARE:

(I) AMERICAN SILENCE IS A TACIT ADMISSION THAT THE GENERAL IS RIGHT IN SAYING THAT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR COMMITMENT TO EUROPE IS INADEQUATE. THE AMERICANS HAVE NOT REPLIED BECAUSE THE GENERAL'S ARGUMENT IS UNANSWERABLE. HE COULD USE THIS AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR WITHDRAWING FRANCE FROM THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN 1959 ON THE GROUNDS THAT AFTER TALKING TO THE AMERICANS HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLIANCE DOES NOT ENSURE FRENCH SECURITY.

(II) AMERICAN SILENCE MEANS THAT WASHINGTON HAS REJECTED HIS OFFER TO OPEN A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE PROTECTION OF WESTERN EUROPE, I.E. THE AMERICANS HAVE SHOWN MORE THAT THEY ARE ONLY WILLING TO DISCUSS LIFE-AND-DEATH QUESTIONS SERIOUSLY WITH THE RUSSIANS AND NOT WITH THEIR ALLIES. THE GENERAL IS AN ADEPT AT CREATING MYTHS OF THIS KIND TO THE EFFECT THAT HIS ADVANCES HAVE BEEN REBUFFED. THIS IS WHAT HE DID OVER TRIPARTISM.

4. IF THE AMERICANS DECIDE TO GIVE SOME ANSWER TO THE GENERAL IT WOULD HARDLY BE ENOUGH TO OFFER HIM A SIMPLE ASSURANCE THAT HIS FEARS ARE UNFOUNDED. IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO OFFER TO DISCUSS HIS FEARS WITH HIM. A NATURAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION IS THAT OF THE THREE NUCLEAR POWERS, THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND FRANCE, WITH THE ADDITION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN SO FAR AS THE TALKS DEALT WITH GERMAN SECURITY. THE THREE WESTERN NUCLEAR POWERS HAVE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN GERMANY AND BERLIN AND THE REST OF THE NATO ALLIANCE IS ACCUSTOMED TO THEM TALKING ABOUT GERMAN PROBLEMS A TROIS, AND A QUATRE WITH THE GERMANS. THE CONDITION IS, OF COURSE, THAT THE NATO COUNCIL IS INFORMED AND CONSULTED AS APPROPRIATE ABOUT THESE TALKS.

5. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REASSURE THE REST OF NATO IF TRIPARTITE OR QUADRIPARTITE TALKS TOOK PLACE. AFTER ALL, THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO EUROPE IS THE CORNER-STONE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AND ANY DISCUSSION OF SUSTAINING CONFIDENCE IN IT SHOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO NATO IN PRINCIPLE. MOREOVER ONE OF THE CHIEF WORRIES OF NATO TODAY

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IS THE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE TOWARDS THE ALLIANCE. IF FRANCE IS SEEN TO BE DISCUSSING THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE WITH THE OTHER LEADING WESTERN POWERS THIS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGING RATHER THAN THE REVERSE, PROVIDED THAT THE WHOLE ALLIANCE WERE BROUGHT INTO TALKS AT THE PROPER MOMENT. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY BE WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE CONCLUSION OF ANY NEW AGREEMENT.
SHRIVER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6954

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6. IT MAY BE THAT THE GENERAL WILL REJECT A PROPOSAL FOR TALKS. IF SO, WE CAN AT LEAST SAY THAT WE TRIED. AND WE DEPRIVED HIM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SAYING THAT HIS ADVANCES HAVE BEEN IGNORED.

7. IT MAY ALSO BE THAT TALKS ARE HELD AND THAT THE GENERAL HANDLES THEM WITH A VIEW NOT TO REACHING AN HONEST AGREEMENT, BUT TO UNDERMINING EUROPEAN CONFIDENCE IN THE AMERICAN DETERRENT. WE MUST HAVE THE POSSIBILITY IN MIND. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, BE CAPABLE OF HANDLING THE TALKS SO THAT EVEN IF THEY FAIL THEY RUB INTO THE GERMANS AND THE FACT THAT THE NATO GUARANTEE AND THE AMERICAN DETERRENT IS THE BASIS OF THEIR SECURITY, AND THAT THE FRENCH DETERRENT IS NOT A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE.

8. IT WOULD HOWEVER BE WRONG TO TAKE IT FOR GRANTED IN ADVANCE THAT THE GENERAL IS ACTING IN BAD FAITH ON THIS OCCASION. THERE ARE SIGNS NOW THAT HE IS SERIOUSLY RETHINKING HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE RUSSIANS IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT THEY ARE DOING IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. DEBRE'S SPEECH IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LAST WEEK STRUCK A VERY DIFFERENT NOTE FROM HIS FIRST DESCRIPTION OF THE RUSSIAN INVASION AS A MERE "ROAD ACCIDENT". HE TOLD THE ASSEMBLY THAT, IF THE RUSSIANS MEANT TO ABANDON FRUITFUL COOPERATION WITH WESTERN EUROPE, THEN DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER EVERY OTHER CONSIDERATION. GENERAL DE GAULLE HAD ALREADY HINTED THE SAME THING IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE.

9. IT LOOKS, THEREFORE, AS IF THE GENERAL IS REVISING HIS ESTIMATE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. IF HE CONCLUDES THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE REVERTED TO POST-WAR STALINIST POLICIES HE COULD DO

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ONE OF TWO THINGS:

(I) HE COULD LEAVE THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT MEMBERSHIP PROVOKED THE RUSSIANS WITHOUT GIVING SECURITY AGAINST THEM.

(II) HE COULD REVERT TO HIS OWN POST-WAR POLICY AT THE TIME OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN 1947/48. THIS WAS THE PERIOD WHEN HE WAS CALLING FOR A ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN POWERS AGAINST SOVIET AGGRESSION AND FOR A STRONG AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO EUROPE. THE GENERAL COULD GO BACK TO THIS LINE WITHOUT ANY INCONSISTENCY. HE COULD SAY THAT IT WAS THE RUSSIANS WHO HAD CHANGED AND NOT HIMSELF. THIS WOULD BE A LOT EASIER FOR HIM THAT EMBRACING A NEW IDEA AT HIS AGE.

10. HERE IS ANOTHER STRONG ARGUMENT AGAINST PASSING OVER IN SILENCE WHAT THE GENERAL SAID TO MR. SHRIVER ON 23 SEPTEMBER. HE ALSO SAID TO MR. SOAMES ON 21 SEPTEMBER THAT THE SITUATION WAS DISTURBED AND MIGHT BECOME DANGEROUS AND THAT IN SUCH CONDITIONS FRANCE AND BRITIAN NATURALLY LOOKED TOWARDS EACH OTHER. THE GENERAL MAY GENUINELY BE WONDERING WHAT IS BEST FOR THE SECURITY OF FRANCE AND HOW FAR SHE CAN RELY ON THE AMERICANS AND BRITISH IF THE RUSSIANS GET REALLY NASTY. SURELY IT IS BETTER TO SOUND HIM OUT AND TRY A FEW IDEAS ON HIM THAN TO LET THINGS SLIDE IN SILENCE.

11. THE GENERAL MAY REALLY BE HESITATING BETWEEN LEAVING THE ALLIANCE OR NOTM IF WE CAN INFLUENCE HIM THE RIGHT WAY, THERE MAY BE A GERM HERE OF SOME KIND OF EXTENSION OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN MATTERS OF DEFENCE. END TEXT. SHRIVER

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Friday, October 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Message from Prime Minister Eshkol

Prime Minister Eshkol has sent you the following message in response to your decision on Phantoms:

"May I send you a personal word of deep appreciation for your decision to initiate negotiations for the sale of Supersonic aircraft to Israel. Over the years, it has been my privilege to feel the depth of your friendship to Israel reborn and your dedication to peace in the Middle East. It is my conviction that the strengthening of Israel's defense capacity through Phantom aircraft will be a powerful factor in deterring further hostilities and in advancing the hope of peace in the area."

We shall shortly provide you with a response both to this and to the longer letter he sent you the other day. This would be an opportunity to tell him directly that you will be glad to see him later this year.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *je*, NARA, Date 1-29-02

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Thursday, October 10, 1968, 8:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Italian Foreign Minister Medici
on Friday, October 11, at 12:00 Noon

Pres file

Attached is Secretary Rusk's briefing memorandum for your talk with Medici.

This should be a straightforward meeting, with the emphasis probably on NATO's response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The key points are:

- You may want to stress our commitment to the defense of Europe and the need to strengthen NATO. Italy is active and important in this. Our own response depends on what our European allies do.
- Medici would appreciate hearing about the Paris talks -- what the outlook is.
- Italy has a caretaker government. You might ask Medici about the prospects for the formation of a new coalition government after this month's Socialist Party Congress.

Medici may raise some specific bilateral problems:

- Civil aviation. The Italians want a new agreement. We are prepared to negotiate, but the Italian proposals are unbalanced. If they cut their demands, the negotiations could move more quickly. A balanced agreement is necessary.
- Protectionist trends in the U. S., particularly as they affect Italy. The Italians are worried about new restrictions on textiles and steel. They know you oppose protectionist measures, but are afraid of what may happen next year.

You may wish to tell Medici that protectionist measures in Europe weaken the hand of the U. S. Administration in dealing with protectionists. For example, we have been hurt by European border

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tax adjustments, subsidies, and various non-tariff barriers.
We will all have to work harder to keep trade growing.

Medici will be accompanied by Ambassador Ortona and Roberto Gaja of the Italian Foreign Ministry. State is sending Charles Johnson, the country director.

I will be standing by with Ed Fried.

W. W. Rostow

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Italian Foreign Minister
Giuseppe Medici

You have agreed to see Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Medici on Friday, October 11 at 12 noon. The Foreign Minister is in the United States to attend the opening session of the Twenty-Third United Nations General Assembly. He has an appointment with me on Monday, October 14, to be followed by a working luncheon. You have not previously met with Medici.

Medici assumed his position as Foreign Minister in June of this year in the minority, Christian Democratic, "caretaker" government of Prime Minister Giovanni Leone. The Leone Government replaced Moro's "Center-Left" Government following last May's election in which the Socialist party suffered severe losses and temporarily withdrew from the coalition.

The Leone Government is dependent on outside Socialist and Republican support to remain in power, and it is not in a position to take any strong initiatives either domestically or in foreign affairs. It is now expected that a new Center-Left Coalition Government (including Christian Democrats, Socialists and Republicans) will be formed this winter following a decision at this month's Socialist Congress to reconstitute the coalition. Mariano Rumor, now Secretary General of the Christian Democratic Party is the most likely candidate for Prime Minister in the new government.

Italian

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(with ~~SECRET~~ attachments)


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By jc, NARA, Date 1-29-02

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Italian Ambassador Egidio Ortona and Ambassador Roberto Gaja, Director General for Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, will accompany Medici. The Acting Country Director for Austria-Italy-and Switzerland, Charles Johnson, will also be present. Foreign Minister Medici is proficient in English and no interpreter will be required. Enclosed are a talking points paper and biographic sketches on Medici and Gaja.


Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Talking points.
2. Biographic sketches.

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THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN

MINISTER GIUSEPPE MEDICI - October 11, 1968

Points You May Wish to Raise

- stress our continued commitment to the defense of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, and point out to Medici the importance we attach to current efforts to strengthen NATO.
- encourage Italy's efforts in this regard, and underline that the U.S. response is dependent on European actions.
- give Medici your estimate of the situation in Viet-Nam and the progress of the Paris talks.
- express your disappointment that the Czech crisis has set back United States efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union.
- reiterate our support for the Jarring Mission and our understanding for Italy's concern over the Middle East situation, which is heightened by increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and France's withdrawal from the NATO Military Command.
- ask Medici about prospects for forming a new "Center-Left" Coalition Government following the Socialist Party Congress later this month.

Points Medici May Raise

While Medici will be most interested in having a general tour d'horizon with emphasis on the implications for the United States and NATO of the Czech invasion, he might raise the following bilateral issues:

1. U.S.-Italian Civil Air Relations

Medici may mention the Italian concern over the lack of progress toward conclusion of a new air transport agreement which would give the Italians substantial new benefits. (President Saragat raised the same subject with you last September.)

It is recommended

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By jc, NARA, Date 1-29-02

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It is recommended that you tell Medici that we are prepared at any time to negotiate a new air transport agreement. However, to be acceptable to us, such an agreement must be balanced in revenue potential. The current Italian proposals do not meet this criterion. If the Italians will cut their demands, we might be able to negotiate an agreement rather quickly.

2. Protectionist Trends in U.S.

Medici may mention Italian concern over protectionist tendencies in the U.S., specifically in the fields of textiles and steel products.

It is recommended that you refer to the strenuous and successful efforts thus far by the Administration to defeat protectionist bills in Congress. However, our efforts to fend off such moves are hampered by non-tariff barriers to trade in Europe such as border taxes.

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, October 10, 1968,

8:30 p.m.

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with French Foreign Minister
Michel Debre on Friday, October 11, at 10:30 a.m.

Attached is Secretary Rusk's good briefing and talking points memo for your meeting with Debre. I have nothing to add. The meeting may give you an opportunity to determine whether Czechoslovakia made any dent on de Gaulle's outlook on Europe.

Ambassador Lucet will accompany Debre. State is sending Charles Tanguay, the country director, and Mr. Toumayan, the interpreter.

I will be standing by with Ed Fried.

W. W. Rostow

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Authority MLG 85-283

By ng/vip, NARA, Date 2-26-93

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 10, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with French Foreign Minister
Michel Debre on Friday, October 11, 1968

Foreign Minister Michel Debre is scheduled to call on you at 10:30 a.m. Friday, October 11. He has come down to Washington from the UN General Assembly.

Debre was named Foreign Minister in the present French Government, formed after the elections in June 1968. Debre has previously visited Washington as French Finance Minister. Long a close confidant of General de Gaulle, Debre was Prime Minister under de Gaulle from 1958 to 1962. Debre is direct and candid, sometimes to the point of bluntness. He is one of the few men who speak to de Gaulle in complete candor. He has asked to call on you to make your acquaintance and to pay his respects.

The political position of the French Government is very strong, commanding an absolute majority in the National Assembly. The Government has pledged itself to social and economic reforms, beginning with an educational reform bill now before the National Assembly.

While the French Government has strongly condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia, General de Gaulle attributes the Soviet action to the policy of blocs and spheres of influence for which he erroneously holds the Yalta agreements responsible.

When I met him in New York Debre said that the Soviet invasion was motivated by a desire to maintain the status quo regarding Soviet security interests and the solidarity of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe. He considered a move against Romania unlikely. He thought that a move against either Yugoslavia or Austria would be for the purpose of changing the status quo and this, in his

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By jc, NARA, Date 1-29-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

opinion, would lead to war. Debre said that if NATO is preparing for conflict then the Europeans should address themselves to the question of U.S. nuclear intentions, since only nuclear retaliation will stop the Russians. However, if conflict is not likely, then NATO's efforts to beef up its conventional forces are unnecessary, provocative, and a deterrent to detente.

Enclosed are talking points for use in your conversation.


Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Talking Points.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

L
477
478

CONFIDENTIAL

TALKING POINTS

Points You May Wish to Raise

- Thank Debre for the facilities offered by the French Government for the Paris talks, and the French endeavors to maintain a neutral position;
- Regret that the Czechoslovakia crisis has set back our efforts to improve relations with the USSR;
- Ask Debre where he sees events leading us in Europe, now that there is apparently to be a permanent Soviet deployment in Czechoslovakia;
- What role does France intend to play in the defense of Europe.

Points Debre May Wish to Raise

While the French have indicated to us that the Debre visit to Washington was primarily to make your acquaintance, they have not alerted us to any questions that he may raise with you. He may reiterate some of the points that he made during his talks with me, described above. He may also ask you about certain aspects of the Paris talks and our policy toward Viet-Nam.

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 10, 1968
7:35 p. m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick suggests a hand-
holding message to King Hussein, now
in London.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm
(dictated over phone)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By rg, NARA, Date 2-1-93

1506

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

TO: Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE

INFO Amembassy AMMAN IMMEDIATE
USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-29-02

1. Appropriate Senior Embassy Officer should deliver following oral message from the President to King Hussein soonest: "Your Majesty, as you are aware, I have instructed the Secretary of State to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. I trust that you will understand the circumstances that led me to take this action, which in no way diminishes our full and unequivocal support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel crisis. Please be assured that it continues to be our policy to facilitate in every possible way Ambassador Jarring's important mission. I have been gratified by your cooperation with Ambassador Jarring and remain hopeful that our joint search for peace in the Middle East will come to a successful conclusion.
2. I would also like to assure you that our commitment to and support for your wise leadership, as affirmed in my messages to you of February 11 and June 4, remain undiminished. I highly value our close relations as being in the joint interests of our two countries. You can rest assured that my government desires to maintain -- and strengthen -- this relationship and that we are prepared to give full support to Your Majesty's efforts to find an honorable and equitable solution to the problems that beset you. Please accept my most cordial regards." End Quote.

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

-2-

3. In delivering this message you may wish to elaborate, drawing upon guidance contained in State 252286.

4. FOR AMMAN: Charge should inform Prime Minister of gist of message after London confirms delivery to King Hussein.

END

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, October 10, 1968
4:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read the summary of this, at least -- if for no other reason than to see how Vietnamese interpret each other's motives and actions.

Per file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 2-1-93

WWRostow:rlh

1968 OCT 10 19 28

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STATE (RCI)
CIA-CCI
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SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-188
By no, NARA, Date 3-1-04

EO 12958
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~~SECRET~~

SECTION ONE OF TWO

CITE [REDACTED] / (ADVANCED)
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 8 - 10 OCTOBER 1968
SUBJECT VIEW OF [REDACTED]

VICE PRESIDENT KY THAT PRESIDENT THIEU'S
COUP ALERT ORDER WAS NOT DIRECTED TOWARDS
KY BUT WAS RESULT OF CONCERN OVER FUTURE ROLE
OF GENERAL MINH

Pastor

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (10 OCTOBER 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE [REDACTED]

SUMMARY:

VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU BELIEVES THAT KY IS PLOTTING AGAINST HIM. [REDACTED] KY BELIEVE THAT THIEU IS CONCERNED OVER THE FUTURE ROLE OF GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH. [REDACTED] ONE OF THIEU'S MAJOR WORRIES HAS BEEN THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD LET HIM DOWN AND AT THE PRESENT THIEU BELIEVES THAT MINH IS GOING TO JOIN WITH THE BUDDHISTS AND WITH AMERICAN SUPPORT SET UP A NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH CAN BRING PEACE. [REDACTED] INFORMED OF THE COUP ALERT ORDER AT 1600 HOURS ON 8 OCTOBER AND DISCUSSED IT WITH KY AN HOUR LATER. [REDACTED] KY THOUGHT THE ORDER TO BE STRANGE SINCE IN THE PAST SUCH MATTERS WERE USUALLY HANDLED INFORMALLY AND DISCREETLY. [REDACTED] ALSO DISCUSSED THE ALERT WITH MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN [REDACTED] AND THEY BOTH LAUGHED OVER IT. [REDACTED] THIEU IS A LONELY MAN AND DOES NOT TRUST HIS CLOSE ADVISORS. KHANG [REDACTED] KY AND LOAN BELIEVE THAT THIEU WILL EVENTUALLY TURN BACK TO THE "YOUNG TURK" GROUP AND ASK THEIR HELP IN SERVING THE COUNTRY. AN ASTROLOGER'S OBSERVATION THAT OCTOBER WOULD BE A VERY BAD MONTH FOR HIM MAY ALSO BE INFLUENCING THIEU'S BEHAVIOR. END SUMMARY.

1. [REDACTED] VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY HAD DISCUSSED THE RECENT COUP ALERT ON 8 OCTOBER, AND [REDACTED] AGREED THAT DESPITE RUMORS TO THE CONTRARY PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU WAS NOT WORRIED THAT KY WAS PLOTTING AGAINST HIM. KY [REDACTED] REASONED THAT THE ALERT GREW OUT OF THIEU'S MOUNTING CONCERN OVER THE ROLE GENERAL DUONG VAN (BIG) MINH WILL PLAY AND WHAT ACTIONS THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE BETWEEN NOW AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THIEU PROBABLY BELIEVED MINH HAD INSISTED ON RETURNING TO VIETNAM EARLY RATHER THAN THE 1 NOVEMBER DATE THIEU DESIRED BECAUSE MINH FIGURED IN SOME AMERICAN SCHEME TO EFFECT SOME SORT OF SETTLEMENT WITH NORTH VIETNAM PRIOR TO ELECTION DAY. KY [REDACTED] THOUGHT IT SIGNIFICANT THAT THIEU ISSUED THE ALERT ORDER SHORTLY AFTER THIEU FINISHED HIS FIRST LUNCHEON MEETING WITH MINH. KY [REDACTED] THOUGHT THAT THIEU WAS PROBABLY CONCERNED OVER MINH'S RECENT MEETING WITH MILITANT BUDDHIST LEADER THICH TRI QUANG AND SPECULATED THAT MINH MIGHT HAVE BEEN LEYS COOPERATIVE AT THE LUNCHEON THAN THIEU HAD HOPED.

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

KY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THOUGHT THAT THE ALERT ORDER WAS STRANGE SINCE IT SEEMED UNNECESSARILY LONG AND DETAILED AND SUGGESTED THAT THIEU HAD BEEN UNNERVED WHEN HE WROTE IT. [REDACTED] IN THE PAST THE USUAL MANNER FOR HANDLING SUCH MATTERS WAS TO PASS THE WORD INFORMALLY AND DISCREETLY. [REDACTED] KY BELIEVED THAT BROADCASTING THE PRESIDENT'S FEARS TO THE ARMED FORCES WOULD ENGENDER MUCH UNCERTAINTY AND COULD HURT TROOP MORALE. [REDACTED] THE ALERT ORDER WILL PROBABLY PRODUCE MANY RUMORS THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF IMPORTANT OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS HAD BEEN JAILED. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAD ALREADY HAD A PHONE CALL FROM A UPI REPORTER ASKING IF IT WERE TRUE THAT SIX MARINE OFFICERS HAD BEEN ARRESTED TO WHICH HE SAID HE REPLIED ANGRILY THAT NO MARINE OFFICERS HAD BEEN ARRESTED.

GP-1

900

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

NNN

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STATE (RCI)
CIA-OCI
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~~SECRET~~

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

CITE

(ADVANCE)

4

IT WAS SO HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT KY
WAS CONSPIRING AGAINST THIEU THAT THE RUMORS TO THIS EFFECT
WERE "FUNNY"

EVEN

THOUGH KY AND OTHER GENERALS DO NOT LIKE THIEU, THEY
KNOW THAT THEY CANNOT SETTLE THESE SCORES
UNTIL THE REAL ENEMY --THE VIET CONG-- IS DEFEATED.

6.

LOAN AND KY BELIEVE THIEU WILL
EVENTUALLY TURN BACK TO THE "YOUNG TURK" GENERALS AND ASK
THEM TO RETURN AND HELP PULL HIS CHESNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE.
THIS IS NOT A NEW IDEA, BUT HE RECENTLY HAS
SEEN EVIDENCE WHICH MAKES HIM THINK IT MIGHT COME TO PASS
SOONER THAN MOST PEOPLE THINK. THIEU
IS A VERY LONELY MAN AND DOES NOT TRUST ANY OF HIS CLOSE ADVISORS.
HE IS DISAPPOINTED IN AND DISTRUSTFUL OF
LIEUTENANT GENERAL DO CAO TRI AND IS HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF
NGUYEN VAN HUONG, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY.
ALTHOUGH GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM STILL HAS THIEU'S
SUPPORT,

THIEU DOES NOT HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN KHIEM.

SINCE THIEU HAS NO ONE HE TRUSTS COMPLETELY.

NO ONE TO WHOM HE CAN TURN, HE IS ISOLATED.

WAS TIME FOR THEM TO MEND THEIR DIFFERENCES.

THIEU MAY HAVE THOUGHT HE COULD COUNT
ON MINH'S SUPPORT, BUT MINH MAY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR AT THE
LUNCHEON THAT WHILE HE WOULD NOT OPPOSE THIEU NEITHER
WOULD HE CLIMB ONTO THE THIEU BANDWAGON.

THIEU IS A "WITH ME OR AGAINST ME" TYPE AND
PROBABLY INTERPRETED MINH'S MOVE AS A BASICALLY HOSTILE ACT.

7.

THIEU
FEARS

[REDACTED] HAD A NUMBER OF
ONE OF THIEU'S MAJOR WORRIES WAS THAT THE
AMERICANS WOULD LET HIM DOWN. AT THE PRESENT TIME THIEU
UNDOUBTEDLY BELIEVES THAT MINH IS GOING TO GET
TOGETHER WITH THE BUDDHISTS AND WITH AMERICAN SUPPORT SET UP
A NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH CAN BRING PEACE TO THE COUNTRY.

[REDACTED] KY ALSO THINKS THIS IS WHAT THIEU
BELIEVES. [REDACTED] THIEU FEARS AN ALLIANCE OF
SENATOR TRAN VAN DON, BIG MINH AND HIS SOUTHERN SUPPORTERS,
THE MILITANT BUDDHISTS AND THE AMERICANS. IF SUCH AN
ALLIANCE OCCURS, THIEU CAN FEAR SOME STRONG PROTESTS AND REACTIONS
FROM THE MILITANT NORTHERN CATHOLICS. THUS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THIEU IS CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE AND FEELS MORE AND MORE
ISOLATED. THOSE HE CALLS IN TO HELP HIM EITHER LET HIM DOWN
OR CANNOT ADAPT TO THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GENERAL TRI IN THIS CATEGORY, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] BECAUSE [REDACTED] THIEU WAS
NOT HAPPY WITH TRI. THUS, [REDACTED]
YOUNG TURK GROUP EXPECT THE CALL TO RETURN AND SAVE THE
DAY AND [REDACTED] HAS HEARD THE INDICATIONS OF SUCH A CALL.

8.

COMMENT. KY DID RETURN TO SAIGON ON 10 OCTOBER)

9.

[REDACTED] A FINAL POINT [REDACTED] MIGHT BE
INFLUENCING THIEU'S BEHAVIOR. MRS. THIEU TOLD [REDACTED]
RECENTLY THAT THEIR ASTROLOGER HAD TOLD THEM THAT OCTOBER WOULD
BE A VERY BAD MONTH FOR THE THIEU'S. [REDACTED] WHEN
ONE HAS LIVED HIS LIFE BY THE STARS AND STARS HAVE BEEN
GOOD TO HIM HE IS NOT INCLINED TO TAKE ASTROLOGY'S WARNING
LIGHTLY.

10. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR
BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR
ROMER, MAJOR GENERAL DAVIDSON) AIR FORCE (GENERAL BROWN) CINCPAC
PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]

IP-1

65

NNN

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

52

ACTION

Thursday - October 10, 1968 - 4:45pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Award from The Pan American Society of the
United States

Pres file

The Pan American Society of the United States wishes to present you with its highest award in view of your outstanding efforts on behalf of inter-American friendship. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa are among the honorary presidents of this organization, which presented the award earlier to Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy.

State recommends that you accept the award and receive a small delegation from the Society for that purpose. I agree.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☐

Disapprove ☐

Call me ☐

Attachment - Letter to President from President of The Pan
American Society - October 3, 1968.

SWLewis:mm



52a

THE PAN AMERICAN SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, INC.

FOUNDED 1912

630 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10020

HONORARY PRESIDENTS

JOHN RUSK
LLESMO SEVILLA-SACASA
DERICK F. HASLER
JO SCHÖENRICH
WILLIE BRADEN
JES H. STEBBINS
FRY W. BALGOOVEN

HONORARY PRESIDENTS

A. BUTTENHEIM
ANOR J. EDER
ROBERT I. GANNON
DREW B. SHEA

IDENT

HERT M. REININGER

PRESIDENTS

CHARLES K. CAMPBELL
JOHN C. DUNCAN, III
JOHN R. WHITE

ASURER

JES H. REDINGTON

ETARY

E. MONTAMAT

ACTORS

HARD S. ALDRICH
THUR A. ANISANBEL
PER S. BAKER
LLIAM E. BARLOW
WARD BIRD, JR.
DERIC H. BRANDI
TER J. BRENNAN
ADE BRUNET
J. A. CARPENTER
I. CLARK
INN B. DAVIS, JR.
E DE CUBAS
JES A. FARLEY
JENT FRIELE
TER GARVIN
JES R. GREENE
NCIS E. GRIMES
JOHN R. HADDEN
LLIAM M. HICKEY
LTER L. NIETZMAN
JENT P. KOENIG
EDING L. LAWRENCE
A. LIBERATORE
ORGE E. McEVoy
JES R. MILLER
LLIAM T. MOORE
JERENCE E. NELSON
JENT J. PAPRENO
JOHN C. PIRIE
JOHN M. PORGES
JOHN V. ROBBINS
HENRY RYER
E. STINES
JOHNFORD W. STONE
JERT C. VAN DE MARLE
B. WESTFALL
E. WHITMYER
JOHN B. YOUNG

October 3, 1968

The Honorable
Lyndon Baines Johnson
The White House
Washington, D.C.


Dear Mr. President:

The Council of the Pan American Society of the United States in meeting October 1, 1968 unanimously voted to confer upon you the Society's Gold Insigne, its highest award, in recognition of the outstanding contributions you have made throughout your life, and particularly during your distinguished Presidency, to the cause of inter-American knowledge, understanding, friendship and well being.

We would be delighted if the presentation could take place at a banquet in your honor. If that would be impractical, however, we would welcome the opportunity to constitute a delegation to call upon you briefly at the White House.

We sincerely hope, Mr. President, that you will be favorably disposed toward our purpose of demonstrating our high esteem and respect for you.

Cordially and respectfully yours,


Robert M. Reininger
President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 10, 1968 - 4:45pm

53

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with British Foreign Secretary
Michael Stewart on Friday, October 11, at 11:15 a.m.

Pres file

At Tab A is Nick Katzenbach's briefing memorandum for your meeting with Michael Stewart.

The main points are:

- The need to strengthen NATO, both militarily and politically, following the Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia.

The British will not be able to increase defense spending. But they are prepared -- within their present budget -- to increase their Mediterranean fleet and provide one more infantry battalion for the NATO Mobile Force.

- Britain and Europe. You might ask Stewart whether -- in light of Czechoslovakia -- the UK plans any new initiatives toward the EEC countries; for example, technological cooperation, political consultations within the Western European Union, or a "European caucus" within NATO.
- Vietnam. Stewart would appreciate hearing about the Paris talks. Last July, he made a good statement on Vietnam in the House of Commons -- calling for de-escalation by North Vietnam in response to your reduction of the bombing.
- Middle East. Stewart may propose that we put pressure on the Israelis to declare their acceptance of the Security Council resolution and their willingness to discuss with Jarring a timetable for its implementation.

He raised this with Secretary Rusk in New York this week. Rusk pointed out that it would be difficult for the Israeli to accept the resolution without parallel acceptance by the Arabs. You might want to say that the important thing is to get beyond the words and have both sides get down to substance.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 93-291
By SP/jw, NARA, Date 1/29/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

-- Rhodesia. Wilson flew to Gibraltar Tuesday for talks with Ian Smith. You may want to ask Stewart for his assessment of the chances for a settlement.

I will be standing by with Ed Fried.

W. W. Rostow


ERF:JKH:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

13/4/64

October 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with British Foreign Secretary
Michael Stewart on Friday, October 11, 1968

Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart is scheduled to come down from the UN General Assembly and call on you at 5:30 p.m., Friday, October 11, following talks and a working lunch at the Department.

Stewart was reappointed Foreign Secretary in March 1968, and is No. 2 in the British Government. He last called at the White House in March 1965 during his previous term as Foreign Secretary (February 1965-August 1966) and wishes to renew his acquaintance with you.

The domestic political position of the Wilson Government continues to be relatively weak. Its post-devaluation economic program has been producing noticeable but slow results. In particular, the balance of payments deficit has not been reduced as rapidly as the government hoped. Chancellor Roy Jenkins had to tell the Labour Party congress last week that the "hard slog" would last another eighteen months. By a 5 to 1 vote, the congress disapproved of the government's mandatory incomes policy.

In the foreign affairs field, the congress (1) condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia; (2) showed considerable minority sentiment for cutting the British Army on the Rhine; (3) passed a resolution opposing the supply of arms to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria; (4) passed a resolution calling for a tough line with the Smith regime in

Rhodesia. The congress cannot bind the government, but these developments can inhibit Wilson's freedom of action.

Points You May Wish to Raise

- bring Stewart up to date on the Paris talks;
- regret that the Czech crisis has set back your efforts to improve relations with the USSR;
- encourage Stewart to continue efforts to provide forward motion to NATO, and emphasize that, regardless of our election, the scope of the US contribution to NATO would be affected by what the Europeans do;
- ask if Stewart sees any opportunity for new British initiatives toward European integration in the aftermath of the Czech crisis (in spite of the latest French objection to the German proposals);
- reiterate that we view the Jarring Mission as an important effort to promote Arab-Israeli agreement and that we do not feel that efforts to impose a solution would bring a genuine peace.

Points Stewart May Wish to Raise

We have not been alerted to any problems that Stewart might raise with you. However, he may refer to his July 18 statement in the House of Commons, when he called for de-escalation by North Vietnam in response to the reduction of bombing of the North. He may also tell you about developments regarding Rhodesia.


Acting Secretary

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, Oct. 10, 1968
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bob Glasburgh's salty comment on
Harry McPherson's bombing suggestion.

Mine is simpler: let's see where we are after
tomorrow.

But, in general, my feeling is: don't whittle
away at the bombing. It sends the wrong signal
to Hanoi.

If they don't come across on the GVN, we may
be in a real stalemate and wish to proceed in the
other direction: to the 20th -- at least.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 12160
By ics NARA, Date 1-20-98

14

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

10 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Harry McPherson suggested that, in view of recent withdrawals of NVN troops, we should consider scaling down the number of bombing attacks on North Vietnam.

I can't think of a worse way to fight a war -- or to negotiate a peace.

If the North Vietnamese were to initiate such a suggestion -- either directly or indirectly -- it would at least be worth considering. Lacking such an initiative on their part, I can see no basis for thinking that a scaling down of the bombing might open up any new avenues toward peace. Hanoi already knows by our word and deed that we are prepared to scale down as they do.

I agree that our intelligence is too uncertain to make a positive judgment that the North Vietnamese are only preparing for another round of attacks. But at least this would be consistent with past behavior. And there is no intelligence basis to make a positive judgment that they are not preparing for another round of attacks.

Such a strategy:

- would give the North Vietnamese the initiative;
- would allow them some respite from bombing at the very time they were hurting most and would allow them to infiltrate more men and supplies more quickly while they were getting ready for the next round of attacks against us; and
- might persuade them to hold out longer or fight harder instead of talking seriously.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 019-040-47
By QD, NARA, Date 12/1/02


ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~SECRET~~

1.45 pm
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 9, 1968

Wednesday - 12:50 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

The CIA summary for the past few days has reported substantial movements of NVN troops out of forward positions in I Corps, II Corps, and III Corps. In some cases the disengagement appears to be total, and the NVN forces have moved back into Laos and Cambodia. I understand current estimates are that between 1/8 and 1/10 of NVN forces formerly in I Corps have left in recent weeks.

It may well be that these units have decamped only in order to re-fit for further action. Or that Abrams and the monsoons have harassed them so successfully that they are simply retiring from a bad situation for a while. Nevertheless our intelligence seems too uncertain for us to make a positive judgment that the North Vietnamese are only preparing for another round of attacks.

In these circumstances, perhaps we should consider scaling down the number of bombing attacks on North Vietnam.

The daily sortie rate has been in the 420 range for a long time now -- with the exception of yesterday, when there were 324. By dropping the number of sorties into the 200's or high 100's, we might give some indication that we are prepared to scale down as they do. If they continue to move troops out of contact and out of country, we would further reduce the number of sorties. If they renew heavy activity with troops that have returned to action, we would scale up the number of sorties again.

Harriman could suggest this to them in Paris, reminding them that stopping the bombing altogether will take some assurance on the DMZ and participation by the GVN in the next round.

TO ROSTOW

Harry
Harry C. McPherson, Jr.

FOR COMMENT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 019-040-4-8
By SP, NARA, Date 1/21/02

ACTION

**Thursday, October 10, 1968
4:05 p.m.**

Mr. President:

**You may wish to give us guidance
on the attached request from Gen. LeMay,
on briefings, cooperation, etc.**

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

23

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 10, 1968

3:15 p.m.

TO: Walt Rostow

FROM: Bill Blackburn 

Jack Venable, Administrative Assistant to Congressman Bill Nichols (D-Ala.), called and requested White House assistance in obtaining necessary briefings and cooperation with regard to General Curtis LeMay's forthcoming trip to Vietnam.

General LeMay plans to leave Monday, flying commercially, and will be accompanied by five staff members and six Secret Service agents.

Venable said that Governor Wallace has asked that Congressman Nichols handle this request and Venable admitted the delicacy of the situation but pointed out that in Alabama the Democratic Congressmen are running on the same ticket with Wallace.

Venable said that to his knowledge no request had yet been made through other channels and asked that I call back as soon as possible.

CC: Barefoot Sanders

Note: Barefoot Sanders tells me that Congressman Nichols first contacted Deputy Secretary Nitze who referred them to the White House.

56

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 10, 1968 -- 2:30 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Butch Fisher and Bill Foster make available to you their views on the Presidential statement on the NPT. Sec. Rusk was anxious that you get them directly.

If you should wish to talk with Butch, he is, of course, available at any time.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 2-1-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

56 b

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ until
released)

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
ON NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

1. We have worked over these many years for a Non-Proliferation Treaty for one basic reason: it is in the interest of the United States and the people of the United States, including generations unborn. Every American President who has borne responsibility in the nuclear age has known that the danger to the United States would multiply as additional nations built nuclear weapons and there were additional fingers on nuclear triggers.

2. Our work with the Soviet Union on the Non-Proliferation Treaty was not a matter of detente and bridge-building: it was a matter of carrying out a United States interest which the Soviet Union happened to share for its own reasons.

3. If the United States does not proceed to ratify this Treaty promptly, the forces at work in other countries against the Treaty will quickly gain strength. If this Treaty does not go into effect soon there will be an increasing number of countries who will see it in their national interest to make the decision to go nuclear. Some may be about to do so. This is perhaps understandable on narrow nationalist grounds; although in every case it is our objective judgment that their security would be diminished,

(~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ until
released)

not increased, by developing small national nuclear capabilities. But so far as the United States is concerned, additional nuclear powers could force upon us this dilemma:

-- either withdrawing our influence and commitment from areas of the world which are vital to our interests; or

-- having other nations trigger nuclear conflict which could involve us.

4. Those who would now postpone action by the United States on the Non-Proliferation Treaty must assume, in my judgment, the grave responsibility for risking its failure.

I cannot guarantee that if we now go forward to ratify the Treaty in the Senate that we can bring other nations along. But I can tell you that our chance of doing so will be greatly reduced and the kind of world we want for our children and grandchildren may, after years of patient and devoted work on the Treaty, slip away from us.

As President, I cannot see this happen without calling to the attention of the Leaders of the Senate the consequences of a postponement, as Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, Bill Foster and I have done on many occasions. I understand the shortness of time and the pressures that are inevitable in a Presidential election year. But I ask you to pause; to consider the stakes; and to act now with the highest interests of the nation in mind.

56.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

October 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Senate Ratification of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty.

I have discussed a proposed Presidential statement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty with Bill Foster, who is in New York as a member of the United States Delegation to the United Nations. He and I both strongly urge that you issue a statement as soon as possible.

We do so in full recognition of the difficulties that the Senate majority leadership is having at this eleventh hour in its deliberations. At the same time we are of the view that even if stalling tactics should require the Senate to put off action until next year, the treaty would be no worse off than if the Leadership did not bring it up at all.

We urge this course of action in view of our deep convictions that you, as President, should counter any interpretation abroad that the United States has lost interest in the treaty. Without a statement, enemies of the treaty will strengthen their positions, and borderline countries may be pushed one step closer toward the development of nuclear weapons.

Adrian S. Fisher

Adrian S. Fisher
Acting

Encl: Proposed Statement.
(CONF. until released)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-343
By 128, NARA, Date 9-13-99

ACTION

57

Thursday, October 10, 1968 -- 12:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Abe Feinberg called with the following message.

chron

Eshkol will be coming through the United States in the period November 28-30. It happens to overlap the Thanksgiving day weekend. Eshkol -- and, Abe believes, the President -- does not want to have a formal or state visit.

The question is: If you plan to be at the Ranch over Thanksgiving, would you be prepared to have Eshkol drop in on you quite informally?

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rla

ACTION

58

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Friday, October 10, 1968

12:20pm

Per file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 82nd Birthday Message to President Chiang

President Chiang Kai-shek will be 82 years old by Chinese count and 81 by Western on October 31, 1968.

The State Department recommends that you send a congratulatory telegram to Chiang this year, as you have done in the past. President Chiang has observed your birthday with a message.

I recommend that you approve the attached suggested text.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

AJenkins:mmm

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

58a

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

Dear Mr. President:

**Mrs. Johnson and I together with the American people extend
our most sincere congratulations on the occasion of your birthday.
With our high esteem and warm friendship, we send you best wishes
for continued success and excellent health.**

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

**His Excellency
Chiang Kai-shek
President of the Republic of China
Taipei**

ACTION

Thursday, October 10, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed independence greeting to the new African state of Equatorial Guinea. They become independent October 12.

You have already approved U. S. recognition. This is a routine message. I recommend you send it.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message _____

Call me _____

WWR:HS:RM:lw

Att: File #3148

5-7-60

Proposed Message to President Nguema
of Equatorial Guinea

Dear Mr. President:

All Americans join me in sending to you and the people of Equatorial Guinea our warm congratulations on your independence.

We share your joy on this day because we know the thrill and promise of young nationhood. We share your hopes for peace and progress because we believe in the future of the new Africa.

The United States is proud to recognize Equatorial Guinea and welcome you to the family of nations. I know, Mr. President, that our two countries will enjoy a close and constructive friendship.

Sincerely,



13489
IN REPLY REFER TO:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1968

3142
1 - *[illegible]*
2 - *[illegible]*
3 - *[illegible]*

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Congratulatory Message from the President
to the Equatorial Guinean President on
Independence

On October 12 the Republic of Equatorial Guinea is scheduled to receive its independence from Spain. The new African country is composed of two provinces, Rio Muni on the west coast between Cameroon and Gabon and the island of Fernando Po, just off the coast of Cameroon in the Gulf of Guinea.

We were prepared to send a delegation to the independence ceremonies, as recommended in my memorandum of September 26. However, the shortness of time between the election of the chief of state and the independence date, combined with limited hotel space, caused the new country to limit invitations to the ceremonies to three neighboring states, the OAU and the UN. It is suggested that the enclosed draft message of congratulations from the President to the new Equatorial Guinean President be sent to Embassy Madrid and from there by commercial cable.

Approval and transmission of the message will constitute recognition of the State and the Government of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea. The recommendation to extend recognition was approved by the President on September 26.

Benjamin H. Read
for Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested Message

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *[initials]*, NARA, Date 1-29-02

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

60

INFORMATION

Thursday, October 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Draft Joint Communique for Holyoake visit

Pres file

Attached is the suggested Communique for issuance by George Christian after your meeting with Holyoake at noon today. The draft has the approval of Holyoake's senior advisor, George Laking. However, it is not clear that Holyoake has personally approved it. I suggest you review it with him at the meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Att

MWright:wpt

DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States, the Right Hon. Keith Holyoake, Prime Minister of New Zealand, paid an official visit to Washington on October 9 and 10. This visit afforded the President and the Prime Minister an opportunity to exchange views on matters of mutual interest, including the situation in Southeast Asia and economic relations between their two countries.

Viet-Nam

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the situation in South Viet-Nam, where New Zealand and American forces are assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam to resist aggression and to uphold the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own destiny free of outside interference. They noted that the situation has improved in several respects in recent months, but that North Viet-Nam still shows no disposition to scale down the fighting. They agreed that the establishment of a just and viable peace calls for both a strong military posture and intensive diplomatic efforts.

The Prime Minister expressed his gratification that the President's initiative of 31 March had led to conversations between representatives of the United States and of North Viet-Nam. The President reviewed the progress of the talks to date. He reaffirmed that the United States Government would continue to consult fully with the Governments of New Zealand and other allies as the talks proceed.

The President and the Prime Minister recognized that there is a continuing need for the kinds of assistance which New Zealand and the United States have been giving to the Republic of Viet-Nam. They also agreed that the nations which have been helping to defend it should participate in any settlement of the conflict.

Pacific Regional Cooperation

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the trend towards close cooperation among countries in the Pacific area. They noted with satisfaction the efforts that are being made by these countries, both individually and in concert, to promote economic and social progress. They reaffirmed their belief that the impressive growth of regional groupings in the area would continue.

The President and the Prime Minister noted with regret that the threat of Communist aggression and subversion in Southeast Asia remains. They recognized that the decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw its military forces increases the need for cooperation among the countries of the area.

New Zealand/United States Relations

The President and the Prime Minister noted with deep satisfaction that the relations between the United States and New Zealand, founded as they are on common traditions and a common outlook, have continued to grow in the spirit of friendship and cooperation which has always characterized them. They reaffirmed the importance of the ANZUS Treaty as an expression of the two countries' interest in the security and progress of the Pacific area and of their willingness to contribute towards it. They agreed that their Governments, in consultation with that of Australia, would study means of achieving still closer cooperation among the ANZUS partners.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed United States/New Zealand economic relations with special attention to cooperation on trade matters. The Prime Minister reiterated his understanding of the need to reduce the

United States balance of payments deficit and of the President's program to give effect to this policy.

The Prime Minister, in referring to the balance of payments problems New Zealand has also been encountering, emphasized the importance he and his Government attach to improved access for its primary exports in the developed markets of the world.

The President noted with satisfaction that the New Zealand Government's vigorous efforts to rectify the imbalance in New Zealand's international accounts are meeting with success and assured the Prime Minister that the United States would strive to avoid undesirable effects on New Zealand in implementing its own balance of payments program. The President also assured the Prime Minister of the United States Government's readiness to cooperate with New Zealand in expanding trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. In this context it was agreed that the particular problems relating to New Zealand/United States trade would continue to be examined jointly and that, inter alia, additional measures would be taken to ensure that New Zealand producers and manufacturers have every reasonable opportunity to participate in United States Government overseas procurement activities.

61

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/CACTUS

Thursday, October 10, 1968
9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

The North Koreans herewith pretend not to have understood the "over-write" ploy on the PUEBLO crew -- or, in fact, did not understand it.

The issue remains in the air.

See marked passages, paras. 7-9.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 10338

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-29-02



61
TAYLOR
JENKINS
w/12
Sec. 2g 8
in
Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

00 RUEHC
DE RUALOS 10338E 2841010
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 100955Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3087
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 10338

NODIS /CACTUS

SUBJECT: 23RD SENIOR MAC MEMBERS CLOSED MEETING AT PANMUNJOM
OCTOBER 10, 1968

REFERENCE: STATE 251495

CN-3248

October 10, 1968

7:11 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FEWS 64-68 u. 29 #319

By JC NARA Date 1-29-02

1. MEETING BEGAN AT 1100 HOURS OCTOBER 10 LOCAL TIME AND ENDED
1418 HOURS.

2. GENERAL WOODWARD OPENED MEETING BY SUGGESTING THAT DISCUSSION
OF PRACTICAL DETAILS OF RELEASE OF CREW BE HELD. HE ASKED IF HIS
ASSUMPTION WAS CORRECT THAT 24 HOURS WOULD BE ADEQUATE TIME FROM
THE MOMENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN SETTLED TO THE
MOMENT OF RELEASE.

3. GENERAL PAK DID NOT REPLY TO 24 HOUR QUESTION BUT HANDED
GEN WOODWARD DETAILED PAPER GIVING NK PROPOSAL FOR RELEASE OF
CREW (TEXT INCLUDED IN TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING WHICH FOLLOWS)
AND ROSTER OF CREW WITH PROPOSED ORDER OF RELEASE (BEING POUCHED).
PAPER MADE CLEAR NK DESIRE FOR MAXIMUM PUBLICITY AT TIME OF RELEASE
AND NK INTENTION TO PUBLICIZE AGREEMENT TO SIGN AS SOON AS AGREE-
MENT REACHED. PAPER MADE NO MENTION OF TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN
AGREEMENT TO SIGN AND ACTUAL RELEASE BUT DID SPECIFY TWO HOUR
INTERVAL BETWEEN ACTUAL SIGNING AND TIME OF RELEASE.

4. DEPARTMENT WILL NOTE FROM TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING THAT ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR RELEASE PROPOSED BY NK SIDE DIFFER CONSIDERABLY
FROM BREECHES BUOY CONCEPT AND ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM
NK ADVANTAGE. (E.G. BY USE OF BRIDGE OF NO RETURN RATHER THAN
(JSA) AS RELEASE POINT). NK SKETCH OF AREA OF RELEASE BEING POUCHED.

Joint Secured Area
5. GENERAL WOODWARD PUSHED HARD FOR EXCLUSION OF PRESS AT TIME
OF SIGNING. PAK TOOK LINE THAT NK WANTED TO HAVE THREE PHOTO-
GRAPHERS PRESENT AT SIGNING AND HAD NO OBJECTION IF US MADE
SIMILAR ARRANGEMENT. AS NOTED ABOVE, NKS OBVIOUSLY ARRANGING
FOR BIG PROPAGANDA SHOW AT TIME OF ACTUAL RELEASE OF CREW.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 10338 CN 3248 OCT 10 NODIS CACTUS

6. GENERAL WOODWARD THEN TOOK UP NEED TO MAINTAIN SECRECY AT THIS STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. GENERAL PAK DID NOT REPLY TO THIS POINT, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE NK PROPOSALS FOR ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING RELEASE OPENLY STATE NK INTENTION TO PUBLICIZE US AGREEMENT TO SIGN AS SOON AS AGREEMENT GIVEN.

7. FINAL MATTER RAISED BY GEN WOODWARD WAS STATEMENT FOR RECORD CONTAINED IN PARA 9 REFTEL AND EXPLANATION OUR CONCEPT OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT CONTAINED PARA 11 REFTEL. THERE WAS 33 MINUTE PAUSE WHILE NK CONSIDERED RESPONSE. PAK EVENTUALLY REPLIED THAT GENERAL WOODWARD'S STATEMENT MEANT THAT US WAS NOT WILLING TO SEE EARLY SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF THE PUEBLO CREW AND IT COULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD OTHERWISE. US SIDE COULD NEVER GET CREW BACK UNLESS IT MADE THE APOLOGY AND GUARANTEE SUGGESTED BY NK SIDE.

8. GENERAL PAK'S REPLY TO GEN WOODWARD'S STATEMENT ON ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT DID NOT DIRECTLY REJECT THIS CONCEPT. PAK STATED INTER ALIA "YOUR SIDE AGREED TO THE MATTER OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF THE PUEBLO CREW BUT HAS NOW TAKEN AN INSINCERE AND ARROGANT ATTITUDE FOR FRUSTRATING THE AGREEMENT. WHOM ARE YOU FOOLING?" GENERAL WOODWARD CONSIDERS IT POSSIBLE THAT OUR DEFINITION OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT CAME AS A SURPRISE TO PAK AND HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS TO COVER THIS MATTER.

9. IF NK SIDE GENUINELY BELIEVES WE WERE ON POINT OF AGREEING TO SIGN AND CONSIDERS OVERWRITE PLOY A "TRICK", IT IS POSSIBLE THEY WILL NOW SEEK TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON US THROUGH STEPPED-UP PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN. ONE OBVIOUS AVENUE OF APPROACH WOULD BE TO REITERATE THREAT TO TRY CREW. OTHER WOULD BE TO ANNOUNCE THAT NK HAD MADE SPECIFIC OFFER TO RELEASE CREW AND US HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO ACCEPT IT.

10. SUMMARIZING RECENT MEETINGS WE NOW KNOW:

1. DETAILS OF NK PROPOSALS CONCERNING ACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR RELEASE.
2. NK AGREEMENT TO "SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE" WHICH ACTUALLY WOULD BE TWO HOURS AFTER SIGNING.
3. TIME BETWEEN AGREEMENT TO SIGN AND ACTUAL RELEASE OF CREW WOULD BE LONG ENOUGH FOR NK TO PUBLICIZE US AGREEMENT.
4. QUESTION OF OVERWRITE STILL PENDING.

11. PRIOR TO RECESS GENERAL WOODWARD AGREED TO CONSIDER DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS PRESENTED BY NK SIDE AND TO COMMENT AT NEXT MEETING.

GP-3 PORTER

BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 10, 1968
9:15 a.m.

*1-10-68
2 file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker takes Thieu to task, gently but firmly, for over-reacting to coup talk.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 15954
By jis NARA, Date 11-20-97

You will wish to read Bunker's comment in the last paragraph (*at paper clip*).

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 39970

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

RECEIVED
WHCA

~~SECRET EYES~~
~~SECRET EYES~~

1968 OCT 10 12 23

~~SECRET~~

HCE 865

PAGE 01 SAIGON 39970 01 OF 02 101206Z

45
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE PPNCCO 00, MM 01, /031 W

0 101130Z OCT 68 ZFF-5
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2321
INFO AMEMBASSY PA
CS IMMEDIATE 2413
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 15955

By js NARA, Date 11-21-97

090097

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 39970

EXDIS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

REF: SAIGON 39944

SUBJECT: TALK WITH PRESIDENT THIEU ON LATEST COUP RUMORS.

1. I SPENT
OVER AN HOUR WITH PRESIDENT THIEU TODAY GOING OVER THE
GROUND OF THE CURRENT COUP FLAP. I SAID HIS IMPOSITION OF A RED ALERT
HAD PRODUCED SCORES OF RUMORS, AND THE US AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS
WERE PUTTING OUT SENSATIONAL STORIES ABOUT COUP ATTEMPTS, DEM-
ONSTRATIONS, ARRESTS, ETC. ALL THIS WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE, FOR
WE HAD NO EVIDENCE OF ANY COUP ATTEMPTS AND IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR
US TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS ANY SERIOUS THREAT TO THE
GOVERNMENT.

2. THIEU SAID THAT RUMORS ABOUT COUPS WERE A DAILY MATTER AND
HE NORMALLY PAYS LITTLE ATTENTION TO THEM. BUT RECENTLY THERE
HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF INDICATIONS THAT TROUBLE WAS BREWING,
AND WHAT WAS EVEN MORE
ALARMING WAS THAT PEOPLE WERE BEGINNING TO TAKE SERIOUSLY
THE MANY RUMORS AND REPORTS ABOUT COUP ATTEMPTS. HE HAD MADE
REFERENCE TO THESE RUMORS IN HIS SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
ON OCTOBER 7 AND IN VIEW OF THESE REPORTS, HE THOUGHT IT BEST
TO PUT THE FORCES ON ALERT AS A WARNING TO ANYONE WHO MIGHT BE
CONTEMPLATING ACTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE TAKEN BY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 39970 01 OF 02 101206Z

SURPRISE. THE ALERT HAD SERVED ITS PURPOSE AND HE WILL GO ON TV AND RADIO TONIGHT TO DISPEL APPREHENSION IN THE COUNTRY.

3. THIEU SAID THAT YOUNG HUNG, WHO IS BEING HELD FOR QUESTIONING, CLAIMS TO BE A FRIEND OF VICE PRESIDENT KY AND TO BE WORKING FOR HIM. IT WAS HE WHO WAS SPREADING RUMORS ABOUT OCTOBER 9 DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND NAMING A HALF-DOZEN MILITARY OFFICERS WHO WERE INVOLVED IN COUP PLOTTING. ORIGINALLY HUNG SAID THIS INFORMATION CAME FROM A PROFESSOR KHOI AT THE PALACE, WHO HE ALLEGED WAS ALSO WORKING FOR VP KY. HUNG LAST NIGHT SAID ALL THIS WAS FABRICATION AND HE WAS ONLY JOKING. THIEU SAID THERE IS NO PROFESSOR KHOI AT THE PALACE. HUNG HAD NOW SENT A LETTER TO KY ASKING HIM TO INTERVENE TO GET HIM RELEASED FROM CUSTODY. HUNG ALSO APPEARS TO HAVE SOME CONNECTION WITH HA THUC KY, THE REVOLUTIONARY DAI VET LEADER, WHO HAS LATELY BEEN SPREADING RUMORS ABOUT OVER-THROWING THE GOVT. THIEU IS GOING TO TALK TO HA THUC KY AND VP KY ABOUT ALL THIS AND ABOUT HUNG.

4. I SAID I COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT VP KY WAS INVOLVED IN ANY COUP ATTEMPT. I HAD SPOKEN TO KY IN APRIL AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT ANY ILLEGAL SEIZURE OF POWER WOULD MEAN THE END OF US SUPPORT AND PRESENCE IN VIET-NAM. I SAID KY UNDERSTOOD THIS PERFECTLY AND INDEED HAD PUBLICLY SAID THAT THERE WOULD BE NO COUP, AND THE LATEST DAI VET POSITION IS TO MODERATE ITS CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT.

5. THIEU SAID THAT HE HAS NO DOUBT ABOUT US SUPPORT FOR HIM, BUT THAT "UNPLEASANT MEN" WERE TRYING TO CREATE TROUBLE, TO DISTURB THE SITUATION, TO DISCREDIT THIEU AND TO CREATE INSTABILITY IN FURTHERANCE OF THEIR PERSONAL AMBITIONS. THIEU THEN LAUNCHED INTO AN ATTACK ON VARIOUS STATEMENTS WHICH KY HAD MADE IN THE PAST MONTHS: HIS DISPARAGING REMARKS ABOUT LAST YEAR'S FREE ELECTIONS; FREQUENT REFERENCES TO YOUNG OFFICERS WANTING TO STAGE COUPS WHOM HE IS KEEPING UNDER CONTROL; REFERENCE TO A "FOREIGN POWER," I.E. THE UNITED STATES, WHICH IS PLANNING TO OVERTHROW THE THIEU GOVERNMENT IF HE DOES NOT AGREE TO A COALITION. THESE REMARKS, THIEU SAID, HAVE BEEN BUILDING UP OVER MONTHS AND THEY HAVE BEGUN SERIOUSLY TO UNSETTLE THE SITUATION HERE AND TO CREATE SUSPICION AMONGST THE PEOPLE OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS.

6. I SAID I HAD MANY TIMES MADE CLEAR IN MY MESSAGES HOME AND IN MY CONVERSATIONS HERE THAT THE THIEU-HUONG GOVERNMENT IS THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 SAIGON 39970 01 OF 02 101206Z

MOST STABLE GOVERNMENT IN VIET-NAM SINCE THE EARLY DAYS OF DIEM;
THAT IT HAS BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT AND BACKING; THAT THE PRESIDENT IS
HANDLING THE SITUATION WITH GREAT SKILL; THAT THERE IS MORE CONFIDENCE

HERE NOW THAN THERE HAS BEEN FOR A LONG TIME; AND THAT WE WILL NOT
GO ALONG WITH ANY OVERTHROW OF THIS CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. I
SAID THE ALERT PUT ON ON TUESDAY NIGHT, AND ALL THIS TALK ABOUT
COUPS AND ARRESTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS ARE BAD FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL
POINT OF VIEW. IT HAS HURT THE THIEU GOVERNMENT HERE IN VIET-NAM
AND IN THE US, AND WILL HURT US IN PARIS WHERE HANOI WILL RIDICULE
THE GOVERNMENT WE ARE SUPPORTING.
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~EXDIS~~

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WHCA

1968 OCT 10 12 55

~~SECRET~~

HCE866

PAGE 01 SAIGON 39970 02 OF 02 101238Z

44

ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01,SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,/031 W

090292

O 101130Z OCT 68 ZFF-S
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2322
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 39970

EXDIS

7. THIEU SAID HE WAS VERY CONSCIOUS OF ALL THIS, AND IT IS ALL VERY REGRETTABLE. 99.9 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE BELIEVE THE SITUATION HERE IS STABLE AND WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE CONFIDENCE IN HIS GOVERNMENT "IF THE VICE PRESIDENT WOULD ONLY STOP MAKING THESE SPEECHES." IT ONLY SERVES TO CONFUSE THE PEOPLE, UNDERMINES POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND REQUIRES THE PRESIDENT TO BE CONSTANTLY REPAIRING THE DAMAGE. AT THIS JUNCTURE THIEU BECAME VERY HEATED, AND ASKED AGAIN AND AGAIN "WHY IS THE VICE PRES SO DESTRUCTIVE? WHY IS HE NOT HELPFUL?"

8. I SUGGESTED THAT WE HAVE A FRANK TALK WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT. I SAID FROM WHAT I HAVE OBSERVED THE VICE PRES DOES NOT FEEL HE HAS THE PRESIDENT'S CONFIDENCE, HE DOES NOT FEEL THAT HE IS BEING USED, OR THAT HE HAS ANY ROLE AND I THOUGHT A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFICULTY COULD BE CLEARED UP IF THERE WAS A FRANK TALK BETWEEN THE TWO. THIEU SAID THE VICE PRES WAS COMING FROM DALAT TODAY AND HE INTENDED TO TALK TO HIM, AND HE INTENDED TO TALK TO MA THUC KY AND SOME OTHERS. HE SAID THAT WHEN HE PUT ON THE ALERT HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT A COUP, AND THIS WAS EVIDENT IN THE FACT THAT HE HAD NOT BROUGHT ANY ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO GUARD THE PALACE. HE HAD SENT ONE COMPANY TO PROTECT THE PRIME MINISTER AND ONE TO PROTECT THE VICE PRESIDENT.

9. WHAT WORRIED HIM WAS THAT SOME CRAZY INDIVIDUALS, SOME AIR FORCE PILOTS OR MARINE COMMANDOS, HEARING ALL THIS TALK

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 39970 02 OF 02 101238Z

ABOUT COUPS, AND THIEU BEING SOFT ON COALITION AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO AMERICAN PRESSURE, MIGHT STAGE SOME DRAMATIC AND FOOLISH ACT. (IT WAS CLEAR HE HAD IN MIND THE BOMBING OF THE PALACE SUCH AS HAD TAKEN PLACE ON A PREVIOUS OCCASION, OR THE MORT-ARING BY COMMANDOS.) THIEU SAID HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE COMMAND OF THE AIR FORCE, OR THE COMMAND OF THE MARINES, BUT ONLY ABOUT SOME FOOLISH INDIVIDUALS.

10. HE SAID HE WOULD GO ON THE AIR TONIGHT TO QUIET PEOPLE'S FEARS AND TO DENY THE WILD REPORTS ABOUT ARRESTS, ETC. I SUGGESTED HE MIGHT EVEN IN ADVANCE OF HIS BROADCAST PUT OUT A STATEMENT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ARRESTS AND THE ALERT HAD BEEN LIFTED. THAT WOULD AT LEAST PUT AN IMMEDIATE STOP TO THE PRESS SPECULATION. I OFFERED TO BE HELPFUL AND SPEAK TO THE VP OR ANYONE ELSE, AND HE ONLY SUGGESTED THAT WE KEEP AN EYE ON THE AIR FORCE.

11. COMMENT: I THINK THIEU GOT THE WIND UP AS A RESULT OF THE LATEST CROP OF RUMORS AND HIS NEW INTELLIGENCE AND POLICE OFFICIALS, INEXPERIENCED AND UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW TO HANDLE THESE "POLITICAL" MATTERS, FAILED TO RESTRAIN HIM WHEN HE BECAME EXCESSIVELY NERVOUS. OBVIOUSLY SOME DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE TO HIS STANDING HERE AND ABROAD, BUT I THINK SOME GOOD MAY COME OF THIS, IF HE HAS FRANK TALKS WITH THE TWO KYS. I PLAN QUIETLY TO TALK TO THE VP AND SOME OTHERS MYSELF.

BUNKER
BT

NNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ ~~END~~

63

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, October 10, 1968
9:15 a.m.

*1. [unclear]
2. [unclear] file*

Mr. President:

Herewith sensitive information indicates that Brezhnev and Podgorny, as well as Kosygin*, are not feeling very well these days.

W. W. Rostow

** earlier intelligence*

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-95
By Sj, NARA, Date 6-3-03

Thursday, October 10, 1968

Mr. President:

At Tab A Nick Katzenbach recommends you receive Ambassador Elbrick sometime this week or next.

It would be a brief 15-30 minute call, which would again underline our interest in Yugoslavia.

If you receive Elbrick, Nick will probably suggest a brief public statement for the Ambassador to make on leaving the White House.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

64a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for
Ambassador Elbrick

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Ambassador to Yugoslavia
C. Burke Elbrick to discuss US-Yugoslav relations.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Ambassador Elbrick is arriving in Washington on the
evening of October 9 for a brief period of consultations.

The invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet-
led forces has met with condemnation from Yugoslavia. The
Yugoslavs are worried that they and the Romanians may be next.
Under the circumstances, the Yugoslavs clearly welcome
evidence that the United States continues strong in its support
for Yugoslavia's independence and economic development. On
Friday, October 4, when you received Kiro Gligorov, the Deputy
Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, you demonstrated publicly your
interest in Yugoslavia.

Your reception of Ambassador Elbrick, the first Ambassa-
dor in Eastern Europe to return on consultation since the

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-29-02

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invasion of Czechoslovakia, would again serve to underline that the United States supports Yugoslavia's independence and territorial integrity. Furthermore, on his return to Belgrade, scheduled for early next week, Ambassador Elbrick would be able to convey your personal views of support to the Yugoslavs.

Mark C. Skidgel

Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Profile

*Pouchard
Held*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1968

*sent up
mon, Oct 14, 1968*

Mr. President:

(conquested)

Herewith a study on Congressional
correspondence to you concerning
U.S. bombing policy in North Viet-
nam during 1966, 1967 and 1968.
The study was prepared from White
House files during the last few days
by the Vietnam Information Group.

W. W. Rostow