

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

187 #47

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	Rostow to the President, 3:00 p.m. <i>open 6-26-95 NLJ 94-407</i> <del>1 p S re Peru</del> (duplicate, #33, this volume, and #84f, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol, 3) <i>(dup of #1c, Files of W Rostow, Lunch mtg w/ Pres 10/22/68, Box 3)</i>	<del>10/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#1b memo	Rusk to the President <i>open 1-31-96 NLJ 94-282</i> <del>3 p S</del> (duplicate, #33a, this volume, and NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol, 3, Exempt, NLJ 91-69, 1/93)	<del>10/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#1c memo	Rostow to the President, re Panama <del>2 p S</del> <i>open 6-26-95 NLJ 94-407</i> (duplicate, #30, and #140, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 10) <i>(dup of #1f, Files of W Rostow, Lunch mtg w/ Pres, 10/22/68, Box 3)</i>	<del>10/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#1d letter	Arias to LBI, translation <del>1 p PCI</del> <i>open 6-26-95 NLJ 94-407</i> (duplicate, #140a, as above) <i>(dup of #1g, see above)</i>	<del>10/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#1e memo	Rostow to the President, re military exercise <del>1 p S</del> <i>open 6-26-95 NLJ 94-407</i> (duplicate, #48 this volume) <i>(dup of #1i, see above)</i>	<del>10/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#1f memo	Warnke to Rostow re military exercise <del>2 p S</del> <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-408</i> <i>(dup of #1j, see above)</i>	<del>10/17/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#1i cable	Joint State/AID message re Vietnam <i>open 3/15/02</i> <del>8 p C</del> (duplicate, #2a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1 D Land Reform")	<del>10/15/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#1n memo	Malcolm Toon to S/S - Mr. Read <i>open 3/15/02</i> <del>1 p C</del> (duplicate, #53d, Volume 102) <i>IN, 10 ALSO IN FILES OF WWR, BOX 2, MT65 JULY-DEC 1968, SOC 45 23C, 24C 23D, 24D</i>	<del>10/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#1o memo	Adrian Fisher to S/S - Mr. Read <i>open 3/15/02</i> <del>2 p C</del> (duplicate, #53c, Volume 102)	<del>10/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
NOTE:	All of the above documents are also duplicated in NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Lunch Meeting with the President, Tuesday, October 22, 1968 - 1:00 p.m.," Box 3		

## FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 100, October 16 - 22, 1968, Box 41

## RESTRICTION CODES

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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

297

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#10 note	Rostow to the President, 3:55 p.m. <i>open 3/15/02</i> 1 p — S —	10/22/68	A
#10a note	McCafferty to Rostow <i>open 3/15/02</i> 1 p — PCI —	10/22/68	A
#16 cable <i>open 7-23-03</i>	Rostow to Bunker, 221415Z 2 p — C — (duplicate, #13, <del>13a, 13b</del> <sup>#14</sup> NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I" Sanitized, NLJ 91-479)	10/22/68	A
#18 note	Rostow to the President, re Israel <i>open 3/15/02</i> 1 p — S — (duplicate, #144k, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 10, Sanitized, NLJ 64-168)	10/22/68	A
#19 note	Rostow to the President, 5:50 p.m. 1 p S <i>Example 2-27-97 NLS 93-507 6-26-95 NLJ 94-407</i> (duplicate, #5, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Arab-Israeli Private Talks") <i>more info released 3-17-05 NLJ 03-200</i> <i>Same Sanitized 8-17-16 NLJ 07-349 (45)</i>	10/21/68	A
#22 note	Rostow to the President, 12:55 p.m. <i>open 3/15/02</i> 1 p — S —	10/21/68	A
#25 note	Rostow to the President, 11:15 a.m. 1 p — S re China <i>open 8-7-95 NLS 93-509</i>	10/21/68	A
#27 note	Rostow to the President, 9:45 a.m. <i>open 3/15/02</i> 1 p — S re Vietnam	10/21/68	A
#30 memo	Rostow to the President re Panama 2 p — S (duplicate, #1c above) <i>open 6-26-95 NLJ 94-407</i>	10/21/68	A
#33 memo	Rostow to the President, 3:00 p.m. <i>open 6-26-95</i> 1 p — S (duplicate, #1 a above) <i>NLS 94-407</i>	10/19/68	A
#33a memo	Rusk to the President re Peru <i>open 1-31-96 NLJ 94-282</i> 3 p — S (duplicate, #1b above)	10/19/68	A
#34a cable	Wheeler to Abrams <i>open 3/15/02</i> 1 p — TS —	10/16/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 100, October 16 - 22, 1968, Box 41

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37

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#35 note	Rostow to the President, 8:10 p.m. <del>open 3/15/02</del> 1 p <del>C</del> (duplicate, #157, NSC, Country File, Panama, Vol. 10)	10/21/68	A
#40 memo	Rostow to the President re Israel 1 p S Sanitized 6/5/03 NJ 02-119	10/21/68	A
#43 note Sanitized 5-13-03 NW/PA 02-102	Rostow to the President, 11:30 a.m. 1 p S re Vietnam	10/19/68	A
#43a memo	Helms to Rostow and Rusk 3 p S Exempt 4/15/03 NJ/RAC 02-103	10/19/68	A
#43b memo	Helms to Rostow and Rusk 3 p S Exempt 4/15/03 NJ/RAC 02-103	10/19/68	A
#46a cable	Saigon 40693 <del>open 3/15/02</del> 4 p <del>C</del>	10/19/68	A
#48 memo	Rostow to the President <del>open 6-26-95 NJ 94-407</del> 1 p <del>S</del> (duplicate, #1e above)	10/19/68	A
#49 note	Handwritten note, Ginsburgh to the President 1 p PCI <del>open 8-29-03 NW/PA 02-104</del>	10/19/68	A
#49a note open 8-29-03 NW/PA 02-104	Rostow to the President 1 p PCI <del>Exempt NJ 019 041 E-3 (5/02)</del>	10/18/68	A
#49b map open 8-29-03 NW/PA 02-104	Map 1 p PCI	n.d.	A
#49c cable	Intelligence report 1 p C Sanitized 5-5-04 NW/RAC 02-105	10/19/68	A
#54a cable	Joint State-AID message <del>open 3/15/02</del> 8 p <del>C</del> (duplicate, #11 above)	10/15/68	A
#55 note	Rostow to the President, 12:05 p.m. <del>open 3/15/02</del> 1 p <del>S</del>	10/18/68	A

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4867

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#61a memo	<del>Fowler to the President</del> <i>open 3/15/02</i> <del>2 p</del> <del>C</del> (dup., #3c, NSF, Country File, Indonesia, "Filed by LBJ Library" and "1a, Papers of Henry Fowler, "Countries - Indonesia")	10/17/68	<del>A</del>
#61b memo	<del>Zwick to the President</del> <i>open 3/15/02</i> <del>2 p</del> <del>C</del> (duplicate of #3d and #1c in files listed above)	10/16/68	<del>A</del>
#61c memo	<del>Gaud and Freeman to the President</del> <i>open 3/15/02</i> <del>5 p</del> <del>C</del> (duplicate of #3e and #1d in files listed above)	10/14/68	<del>A</del>
#63a memo	<del>John P. Walsh for the Record</del> <i>open 3/15/02</i> <del>1 p</del> <del>C</del>	10/17/68	<del>A</del>
#65 note	Rostow to the President, 8:20 a.m. 1 p S <i>Example 2-27-77 NJ 95-307 Example 6-15-03 AUT 02-19</i> (duplicate, #6, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Arab-Israeli Private Talks") <del>SANITIZED 3-17-05 NJ 63-200 more info released 3-17-10 NJ 05-349</del>	10/18/68	A
#66 note	<del>Rostow to the President, 8:15 a.m.</del> <i>open 3/15/02</i> <del>1 p</del> <del>TS</del>	10/18/68	<del>A</del>
#66b cable	<del>State 257359 to Paris and Saigon</del> <i>open 3/14/02</i> <del>2 p</del> <del>S</del>	10/13/68	<del>A</del>
#67 cable <i>Sanitized 5-13-03 NJ/PAL 02-102</i>	CAP 82582, Rostow to Bunker and Abrams 1 p S	10/17/68	A
#68a draft	draft cable, partial duplicate, #67 1 p S	10/17/68	A
#70 note	<del>Rostow to the President, 12:35 p.m.</del> <i>open 3/15/02</i> <del>1 p</del> <del>S re Vietnam</del>	10/17/68	<del>A</del>
#70a cable	<del>USUN 7131</del> <i>open 3/15/02</i> <del>1 p</del> <del>S</del>	10/16/68	<del>A</del>
#71 memo	<del>Rostow to the President, 12:20 p.m.</del> <del>2 p</del> <del>PCI</del> <i>OPEN 6/29/95 NJ 94-469</i> (dup., #5a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Harris (Lou) Kosharyan")	10/17/68	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 100, October 16 - 22, 1968, Box 41

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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

58#7

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#71a transcript	telcon, Harris and Jim Jones 5 p PCI OPEN 6/29/93 NY 94-469 (dup., #5a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Harris (Lou) - Kosharyan")	10/16/68	A
#72a cable	LBJ to Bunker 1 p TS Sanitized, NLJ 91-479, 2/25/93 Same Sani NY 019-041-1-6 (1/02)	10/17/68	A
#72b cable	Rusk to Ambassadors, Troop Contributing Countries 2 p TS Sanitized, NLJ 91-478 open 5/29/03 NY 02-133	10/17/68	A
#74 note sanitized 5-13-03 NW/RAC 02-102	Rostow to the President, 9:50 a.m. 1 p TS (partial dup., #42, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I")	10/17/68	A
#74a cable open 7-23-03 NW 02-118	Saigon 341 Sanitized 4-1-93 NLJ 91-478 1 p TS (dup., #42a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I")	10/17/68	A
#74b cable open 7-23-03 NW 02-118	Rostow to Bunker 1 p TS (dup., #42b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. I") Sanitized, NLJ 91-479 (dup. #80, NSF File)	10/16/68	A
#75 note sanitized 5-18-03 NW/RAC 02-102	Rostow to the President, 9:20 a.m. dup # 27, NSF, CF, VN Paco 1 p S re Vietnam	10/17/68	A
#75a cable	Intelligence report dup # 27a as above 3 p S EXEMPT 4/15/03 NY/RAC 02-103	10/16/68	A
#79 memo	Rostow to the President 1 p C OPEN 7/24/95 NY 94-18 (duplicate, #55, NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 5)	10/17/68	A
#79a memo	Zwick to the President 1 p C " " " (duplicate, #55a, NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 5)	10/15/68	A

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67 7

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#79b memo	Gaud and Freeman to LBI 2 p — C open 4-18-94 NLS 94-23 (duplicate, #55b, NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 5)	10/10/68	A
#80 cable open 7-23-03 NLS 02-118 #81 cable	Rostow to Bunker 1 p — TS (duplicate, #74b) duplicate, #80, 74b #81	10/16/68	A
#83 note	Rostow to the President, 5:45 p.m. 1 p S SANITIZED 015103 NLS 02-119	10/16/68	A
#83a cable	text of Paris 22492 open 5129103 NLS 02-133 2 p — S	10/16/68	A
#90a cable	Berlin 2489 open 3115/02 2 p — C	10/15/68	A

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

297

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#10b cable	Intelligence report 1 p S - <del>sanitized 9-28-94 NLJ 94-413</del> same sanitization 4/23/04 NLJ 94-413 + NLJ/RAC 02-109	10/22/68	A
#31 cable	<del>CAP 82588</del> <del>3 pp S - OPEN 1-19-96 NLJ 94-414</del>	<del>10/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#36 note	<del>Rostow to the President, 6:25 p.m. Sanitized 1-19-96 NLJ 94-414</del> 1 p TS - <del>OPEN 3-17-05 NLJ/RAC 02-110</del>	<del>10/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#36a cable	Intelligence report 3 pp TS - <del>Sanitized 10-31-94 NLJ 94-416</del> more info released 1/16/2020 per NLJ 18-59 same sanitization 4/23/04 NLJ 94-413 + NLJ/RAC 02-109 (Dup. #15a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, memos to Pres / Bombing Hanoi Vol. 1, "Rac 137")	10/21/68	A
#45 note	<del>Rostow to the President, 9:40 a.m. Sanitized 1-19-96 NLJ 94-414</del> 1 p TS - <del>OPEN 3-17-05 NLJ/RAC 02-110</del>	10/19/68	A
#45a rpt.	Intelligence report 1 p TS - <del>Sanitized 10-31-94 NLJ 94-416</del> same sanitization 6/5/03 NLJ/RAC 02-111	10/18/68	A
#66a rpt.	Intelligence report 4 pp TS - <del>Sanitized 10-31-94 NLJ 94-416</del> ; same sanit per RAC 8/23/01	10/18/68	A
#89b cable	MAC 13895 open 4/23/04 NLJ/RAC 02-109 7 pp S - <del>Sanitized 9-24-96 NLJ 94-415</del> Country File, Vietnam *2 C(16)b) <del>Sanitized NLJ 94-415</del>	10/14/68	A
#92a cable	(dup. #27a, NSF, memos to the President, Vol. 1) Intelligence report 1 p TS - <del>Sanitized 9-28-94 NLJ 94-413</del> same sanitization 4/23/04 NLJ/RAC 02-109 + NLJ 94-413	10/15/68	A

FILE LOCATION  
National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 100, 10/16-22/68, Box 41

189/16/92

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Meetings with the President

Tuesday, October 22, 1968, 12 Noon and Luncheon

Agenda: 12 Noon

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-1-93

1. Vietnam (Sect. Rusk)
  - preliminary thoughts on next moves in Paris;
  - NEW JERSEY (Sect. Clifford).
2. Israel and Eban Meeting (Sect. Rusk)
  - negotiating position for Sect. Rusk in dealings with Eban;
  - timing of Phantom deal;
  - the President may wish to report on his 10:30 meeting with Eban.

Agenda: Luncheon

3. Peru (Tab A) (Sect. Rusk)
  - Recognition?
4. Panama (Tab B) (Sect. Rusk)
  - how to get Arias out of the Canal Zone without triggering riots in Panama City anti-American in character;
  - recognition.
5. U.S. -Korea Military Exercise (Sect. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler)
  - See Tab C.
6. Another Black Mission to Cambodia? (Sect. Rusk)
  - See Tab D.
7. Land Reform Message: The President to Bunker (Sect. Rusk)
  - See Tab E.
8. Talk with USSR on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (Sect. Rusk)
  - See Tab F, first page.
9. Authorization for Limited Number of Wives to Saigon (Sect. Rusk)
  - See Tab G.
10. Other.

W. Rostow



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-407  
By 4-8, NARA, Date 4-17-95

12  
ACTION

(A)

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 19, 1958 -- 3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk requests your authorization to resume diplomatic relations with the new Peruvian Government which took power on October 3. (Tab A) His memorandum projects this action on or about Wednesday, October 23. I understand, however, that State may now wish to recognize as early as Monday, October 21.

-- The Military Government is in full control, and no significant opposition has materialized. It has met all the traditional tests for recognition.

-- We have carried out full consultations with other OAS members. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and several others have already recognized. Most of the others will have recognized by Monday.

-- The new government has assured it will honor its international obligations and that it will hold a referendum to decide whether a new constitution shall be drafted before holding new elections. However, it may be many months, or even years, before freely elected government returns to Peru.

-- The IPC expropriation will gravely complicate our future relations, but should be kept separate from the diplomatic recognition question. Prompt recognition may help us protect IPC's interest in obtaining a reasonable settlement.

-- Resumption of relations does not imply resumption of all assistance programs.

Events in Panama are also moving toward early recognition by most countries. State may recommend that we follow suit next week. The Peru case should be resolved first.

I recommend that you authorize the resumption of diplomatic relations with Peru whenever Sec. Rusk wishes to move.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Tab A



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-282

By 129, NARA, Date 1-25-96THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1968

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Resumption of Relations with the New Peruvian Government

Recommendation:

That you authorize the resumption of diplomatic relations with the new Government of Peru on or about Wednesday, October 23, by which time we believe most other members of the OAS and industrialized countries will have done so.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

The Military Government which ousted President Fernando Belaunde on October 3 is in full control of Peru. There has been no significant opposition to the Military Government which has consolidated its position with the public largely through the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company (IPC).

At the present time, our relations with Peru are suspended. Nevertheless, informal channels of communication, both in Washington and Lima, have been used. We have carried out an extensive round of bilateral consultations with the other OAS member states under Resolution XXVI of the 1965 Rio Conference. Our discussions indicated a general attitude of disapprobation over the military takeover and concern about the interruption of constitutional rule in Peru. Nevertheless, most Latin American countries see no choice but to continue relations with the new Government. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and several other Latin American states have already resumed relations, and we understand that Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay and

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.



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- 2 -

Colombia will do so this week. They will be followed by the Central American countries, Ecuador and others with the exception of Venezuela, which follows the "Betancourt Doctrine" of non-recognition of military governments. Western Europe and other trading nations such as Australia and Japan either have resumed relations or will in the next few days and have been in close touch with the United States in order to learn of our plans.

The military regime, in soliciting continuation of relations, has made the traditional guarantees of honoring international obligations. It has actively assured private investors that it will honor its commitments and contracts and will encourage private investment. The Prime Minister, on the subject of return to democratic processes, has announced that the Government will conduct a referendum to determine whether the Peruvian people wish to have elections under the present constitution, or would prefer constitutional reform.

On instructions, our Ambassador inquired informally of the new Government its intentions with regard to a return to constitutional processes and in regard to the Government's intentions toward private American investment. The Foreign Minister outlined a plan for a national referendum to decide on the question of a constitutional revision before new elections. While he stated that all international norms regarding private investment would be respected, he stated that the IPC case was a unique situation. The Company's claim for compensation would be determined by Peruvian courts. (The courts, however, seldom rule against the Government.)

The immediate pretext for the military takeover was the alleged impropriety and deficiency of the settlement made between the previous Government and the International Petroleum Company. In a dramatic move, the President of the military regime, General Juan Velasco, announced the definitive expropriation of IPC. This has received universal acclaim in Peru but has complicated our bilateral problems. Confiscatory actions such as this are subject to provisions in both the Foreign Assistance Act and the Sugar Act; and, unless the Peruvian Government takes steps to reach a fair solution with the Company, the United States Government could be obliged to take action under existing legislation. Nevertheless, the

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- 3 -

IPC question should be distinct from that of diplomatic relations. If there is some flexibility in the Peruvian Government position on this problem, our best effort to protect the Company from arbitrary and unjust action will be needed and will necessitate official contact with the Government. Our efforts may also be needed on behalf of other large American private interests as they deal with the Military Government.

I do not believe that a lengthy period of suspension will benefit our immediate or long-range interests in Peru, either from an official, private or hemispheric standpoint. Our flexibility will be greater after resumption of relations which, in any event, does not imply a resumption of all AID and assistance programs of the past nor a promise or obligation for the future without correct and constructive policies and actions by the new Government.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

1c  
(B)  
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

Monday - October 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-407  
By 10, NARA, Date 4-17-95

Two issues will very soon require your decision:

1. What to do about President Arias, still a refugee in the Canal Zone.
2. Recognition of the new provisional government.

Arias' Future

Ten days after taking refuge in the Zone, Arias still refuses to leave the Zone voluntarily, either to seek asylum in other countries (several have offered it) or in the US. The OAS refuses to become involved. Bob Anderson is trying today to persuade him to come to the US. There is some chance he may succeed.

We have progressively tightened control on his visitors and communications. Yet despite his repeated assurances of "good behavior" to Governor Leber, ~~he continues political activity which threatens to incite violence.~~ Recent examples include:

- telegrams to you, other American Presidents, the UN, and the OAS Council; (Tab A).
- a press conference Saturday by his principal advisor;
- supply of money and encouragement to supporters in Panama;
- calls via clandestine media for violent resistance to the Guard.

Initially stunned and disorganized by the National Guard's coup, Arias' supporters are regrouping. A general strike today is eighty percent effective in Panama City; some skirmishes with the Guard have occurred; tension is rising, and a spark could ignite serious bloodshed. Arias now has no chance to return to office except through violence. Should it erupt while he is in the Zone, the National Guard will blame the US and might well stand aside from protecting US installations.

Tab



According to Governor Leber, Ambassador Adair and General Porter at CINCSOUTH, Arias' presence in the Zone can be tolerated only 2 or 3 more days at most. If persuasion fails, forcible expulsion would raise the spectre of a western hemisphere "Dubcek case". Army and State are working on "scenarios" in which we would expel him using plausible legal procedures to minimize the "kidnapping" appearance. Nonetheless, involuntary removal would undoubtedly be widely condemned, no matter how justified.

### Recognition

Several factors bear on the timing of diplomatic recognition:

- ~~no other governments have yet recognized and they are moving slowly so long as Arias is in the Canal Zone.~~
- ~~rapid recognition by the US will imply to many Latins US support for the military coup and probable connivance.~~
- ~~prompt recognition would reassure the new government that we are not favoring Arias and would calm their nerves (they are getting extremely nervous and unpredictable).~~
- ~~early recognition might make expulsion of Arias easier to justify, since he would no longer be a President still technically in his own country.~~

~~In light of the conflicting arguments, Secretary Rusk has not yet decided to recommend early resumption of relations.~~

*W. A. R.* Rostow

### Attachment

Tab A - Note to the President from Dr. Arias in the Canal Zone, October 20, 1968.

1d

Free Translation of Note Sent by Dr. Arias to President Johnson  
From Canal Zone and Dated October 20, 1968:

The Constitutional Government of the Republic of Panama takes note of the principles solemnly consecrated in the Charter of the Organization of American States. In conformity with these principles, Article 5, Section D of Chapter 2 (of the Charter) states that "the solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the exercise of representative democracy." The Constitutional Government of the Republic of Panama further takes note of the doctrine of non-recognition of de facto military regimes resting on military uprisings against legitimate governments, a doctrine invariably sustained by the people and government of your brother country. The Constitutional Government of the Republic of Panama trusts that the illustrious government of Your Excellency will maintain the very worthy position of principle it has traditionally proclaimed and sustained in defense of American democracy, which is today threatened on Panamanian soil.

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-407

By if, NARA, Date 4-17-95

Arnulfo Arias

Presidente Constitucional de la  
Republica De Panama



2:12 pm

MEMORANDUM

ACTION

1e

C

Bob G. is assuring  
that the military  
will hold  
until Tuesday  
for the President's  
decision

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, October 19, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US-Korea Military Exercise

Beginning November 20, US and South Korean air, sea and land forces are scheduled to hold a ten-day joint exercise.

The purpose is:

1) to demonstrate our capability to deploy forces rapidly from Continental US to the Pacific and

2) to reassure the Koreans that we can quickly and substantially increase our forces in Korea to meet jointly any threat.

All activity will take place outside North Korean air space and territorial waters. Simulated use of nuclear weapons will not be made.

The State Department approved the exercise on the understanding that it could be cancelled or postponed on short notice if the political situation in Korea changed, or if the Pueblo negotiations would be harmfully affected.

Unless otherwise instructed, the Defense Department will announce the exercise on October 28. Because of its nature and size, the exercise will attract considerable press coverage in advance of its November 20 opening date. This raises the question of whether the Presidential candidates should be briefed in advance of the October 28 announcement.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_\_ Exercise approved

\_\_\_\_\_ Exercise disapproved

\_\_\_\_\_ Have candidates briefed before October 28

\_\_\_\_\_ Briefing of candidates not necessary

\_\_\_\_\_ Call me

Let's discuss this  
on Tuesday -  
I have doubts -

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-407

By sig, NARA, Date 4-17-95

~~SECRET~~

Tab C



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

17 OCT 1968

In reply refer to:  
I-25454/68

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Exercise FOCUS RETINA FY 69

Three copies of a brief on the military exercise FOCUS RETINA FY 69 are enclosed in accordance with NSAM 316. This exercise has been coordinated with the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency who concur in the understanding that the political situation or the Pueblo negotiations could cause cancellation or postponement on short notice at any given point during the preparation phase of the exercise. Both State and Defense are alert to the delicate nature of this exercise and will maintain close liaison throughout the planning and implementation stages.

The general public information policy planned for this exercise is as stated in paragraph 14 of the brief.

In addition, State has made the following recommendations to which Defense does not object.

a. That, in the event there will be any overflights of Japanese territory or landings in Japan by participating aircraft, GOJ be notified in advance of the public announcement. Such notification would be made, low-key, through Command U.S. Forces Japan to their Japanese service counterparts.

b. That the White House may wish to consider notification of the Presidential candidates in advance of the public announcement.

Approval for the exercise is requested. The critical date for Presidential cancellation is 20 October 1968. Additional critical dates are as follows:

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-408  
By sig, NARA, Date 11-1-95



~~SECRET~~

a. 28 October 1968: Scheduled date for release of the public announcement of the exercise. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, can withhold the release if the situation warrants.

b. 5 November 1968: Provides time to stop the movement of the advance party from STRICOM to Korea.

c. 14 November 1968: Deployment of the main body of the STRICOM forces from CONUS. Cancellation can be made at a later date; however, the resulting complications in military airlift schedules, troop movements, etc., create an undesirable situation.

State Department will be given the opportunity to review the matter prior to each of the above listed critical dates.



Enclosure:

Brief FOCUS RETINA FY 69  
(3 copies)

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

26 September 1968

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC  
BRIEF OF A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE

1. (U) Name of Exercise. FOCUS RETINA.
2. (U) Type. Joint-Combined Strategic Mobility Exercise.
3. (S) Aims
  - a. To demonstrate the rapid reaction capability of Continental United States (CONUS) based United States Strike Command (STRICOM) forces to deploy to the Pacific Command.
  - b. To enhance the confidence of free nations in the Far East that the US is capable of meeting its treaty agreements.
  - c. To demonstrate the US capability and will to oppose aggression in Korea.
  - d. To provide strategic mobility training to STRICOM forces and subsequent tactical training with units of US Forces, Korea (USFK) and Republic of Korea (ROK) Forces.
  - e. To provide strategic and tactical training to Military Airlift Command (MAC) airlift forces.
  - f. To increase combat readiness capabilities of both the US and ROK forces.
  - g. To evaluate and further develop procedures for the command and control of joint and combined forces.
  - h. To provide experience in joint combined operations with ROK forces.

GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 12a, 12b, 12c, 12d, 12e, 12f, 12g, 12h, 12i, 12j, 12k, 12l, 12m, 12n, 12o, 12p, 12q, 12r, 12s, 12t, 12u, 12v, 12w, 12x, 12y, 12z  
By 12, NARA, Date 3-11-93



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4. (S) Dates. 20-30 November 1968.

5. (S) Critical or Limiting Date for Presidential Decision to Cancel Exercise. 20 October 1968.

6. (S) Political Implications

a. US commitment to Allies for Conduct of the Exercise. ROKG has been advised of intent, scope and duration of Exercise. Liaison and coordination with the ROK and ROK Air Force have been effected and staff planning initiated by ROK Army and Air Force participants.

b. Date commitment was made. Commander United Nations Command Korea and Commander United States Korea formally advised ROK on 7 August 1968 of US intention to conduct exercise.

c. Other Political Implications. The location of the Republic of Korea with respect to Communist China industrial heartland in Manchuria, to the USSR's major pacific port of Vladivostok and to Japan make the Korean peninsula of strategic interest to those nations as well as to the United States. The Republic of Korea has made a major troop contribution to Vietnam but continues to be concerned over its own security because of the threat from North Korea. Indications are that the North Korean leaders believe the US unable to effectively reinforce the ROK in the event of aggression. Conduct of the exercise will demonstrate that the US possesses the capability to come to the aid of Korea while the US is engaged elsewhere. This exercise will assist in assuring the ROKG of our capability to come to their aid and it may deter miscalculation on the part of the North Koreans.

7. (S) Geographical Area. The ground exercise area includes all of South Korea south of the Korean Prohibited Area (KO-P)-518 except flights to and from Kimpo Air Base approved by the Commander Air Forces Korea. The southern boundary of KO-P-518 extends from a point (37°38'N126°10'E) on the west coast to the east through the following points: (37°42'N126°40'E) (37°35'N127°05'E) (37°57'N127°40'E) (37°50'N128°53'E).

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8. (S) Brief Outline

a. The exercise area simulates the Nation of SARANG, a friendly Asian nation. SARANG is invaded by the aggressive, dictatorial nation on its northern border. SARANG, as a member of the Far East Treaty Organization (FEATO), requests members to come to its aid. The US as a member of FEATO provides Strike Command Forces from Continental US who in conjunction with US Forces in Korean and ROK units restore the national integrity of SARANG.

b. The exercise will be a controlled exercise employing opposing blue and aggressor forces. The concept of operation is for a STRICOM Brigade in a combined air landed and airborne assault to link up with a US Forces Korea Brigade consisting of one US infantry battalion, two ROK infantry battalions, one US artillery battalion and appropriate combat and combat service support units. These forces will conduct offensive operations and defeat the enemy forces in SARANG.

c. The aggressor force will be composed of one US infantry battalion reinforced with one ROK infantry company.

9. (S) Directing Headquarters. Commander, United States Forces, Korea.

10. (S) Participating Commands, Headquarters, and Forces

a. US Participation:

(1) US Forces Korean/Exercise Directors Headquarters

- (a) Hq Component Eight United States Army
- (b) 1 infantry brigade headquarters
- (c) 2 infantry battalions
- (d) 1 artillery battalion
- (e) 1 combat engineer battalion
- (f) 1 corps signal battalion

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- (g) 1 military police company
- (h) 1 float bridge company
- (i) Combat support and combat service support as required by maneuver elements
- (j) Special forces detachment from US Army Ryukyu
- (2) Strike Command Participation
  - (a) Joint task force headquarters
  - (b) Hq airborne brigade
  - (c) 2 airborne infantry battalions
  - (d) 1 airborne artillery battalion
  - (e) 1 engineer company
  - (f) 1 military police platoon
  - (g) 1 signal forward support platoon
  - (h) Strike AF component (trooplift)
- (3) Air Force Participation
  - (a) Military Airlift Command (MAC) Hq Component
  - (b) MAC Airlift Component
  - (c) Hq Component US Air Force Korea
  - (d) 1 combat support wing
  - (e) 1 air base group
  - (f) Weather squadron
  - (g) Tactical air control center/air defense control center
  - (h) 1 direct air support center
  - (i) 6 tactical air control parties

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b. Allied:

(1) ROK Army

- (a) Appropriate staff representation
- (b) 2 infantry battalions
- (c) 1 infantry company
- (d) 1 special forces group (airborne)
- (e) Umpires/controllers

(2) ROK Air Force

- (a) Appropriate staff representation
- (b) Reconnaissance and close air support aircraft
- (c) Umpires/controllers

11. (S) Scope of Anticipated Participation

- a. Other Unified or Specified Commands. None
- b. Unassigned Forces of the US Military Services.  
None
- c. Other Federal Agencies or Departments. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) and United States Information Service.
- d. Allied Nations. Utilization of one Thailand Infantry Company is under consideration.

12. (S) Simulated Use of Nuclear Weapons. Will not be made during Exercise Focus Retina.

13. (S) Coordination Effected With Other Unified, Specified or Service Commands, Governmental Departments, or Agencies or Representatives Thereof

- a. Initial planning conference for all participants hosted by CINCPAC at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii during period 2 through 5 July 1968.

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b. Final planning conference for participating forces hosted by Commander United States Force Korea in Seoul during period 9 through 14 September 1968.

c. The American Embassy, Seoul and the United States Information Services (USIS) were fully advised as to intent, scope and duration of the exercise. USIS is participating in effort.

14. (S) Recommended General Public Information Policy

a. Within the United States. Simultaneous release of initial announcement by OSD/PA, STRICOM, Hq Military Airlift Command, CINCPAC, COMUSK. Widest possible dissemination within the US of the announcement of the exercise.

b. Outside the United States. USIS to give widest possible dissemination.

c. Diplomatic information. US Embassies be provided background and guidance to answer possible queries.

d. Security restrictions to be lifted upon release of initial press announcement on 28 October 1968.

e. Propaganda. Stress objectives of the exercise with emphasis on the first three objectives.

f. Proposed press release to be issued by OASD (PA), ROK, PACOM, STRICOM, MAC, COMUSK at 281500Z October 1968.

"Defense officials of the ROK and US today announced that a joint training exercise called FOCUS RETINA is scheduled to begin in the Republic of Korea in mid-November 1968.

United States and Republic of Korea forces will be augmented by elements of the United States Strategic Reserve Forces under simulated conditions of enemy attack.

The United States Strike Command will move the augmentation forces by military aircraft to Korea where they will participate in both ground landings and parachute assaults during the exercise. The exercise will take place in an area approximately 40 miles southeast of the ROK capital city of Seoul.

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A DOD spokesman stated that the exercise is designed to demonstrate the capability to deploy Strategic Reserve Forces in the United States to an overseas area rapidly in support of US treaty arrangements for the defense of free nations against communist aggression, with the troops being deployed in force and ready for tactical employment. Approximately (TBA) U.S. military personnel will be involved in the exercise. FOCUS RETINA will be the first exercise of its type to take place in the Republic of Korea."

15. (S) Proposed information activity

a. Period 28 October - 20 November 1968:

(1) Feature on STRICOM, including past exercises similar to FOCUS RETINA. Focus on the 82d Airborne Division.

(2) Feature on the Military Airlift Command.

(3) Biographies of key out-of-country commanders involved in the exercise.

(4) News release, shortly before FOCUS RETINA begins field play, on overall concept of the exercise.

b. During period 20 November - 26 November 1968:

(1) Processing and accreditation of press (both in-country and invited out-of-country correspondents) at press camp; press kits, logistic support, etc. Briefing on overall concept and objectives of the exercise.

(2) Morning briefing on scheduled plan and movement of press to exercise area.

(3) Evening summary release by Public Affairs Office and briefing for correspondents.

(4) Security review and release of stories prepared by Information Officers of participating elements.

(5) Processing of correspondents news and film to dispatch points (Seoul).

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(6) Other briefings as required.

c. During period 26 November and after. Summary release on the exercise to stress achievement of objectives contained in public affairs annex. Participating commands upon redeployment to home bases should also release follow-up stories for CONUS media.

d. News media personnel will be invited and authorized transportation with STRICOM deploying forces.

e. Voice of America coverage will be requested through USIA.

f. Background information of CONUS participating units will be forwarded to the Public Affairs Officer US Forces Korea for in-country releases prior to 20 November 1968.

g. CINCPAC is preparing for up to 75 total news media personnel. Names and number of CONUS invited news media personnel should be submitted to CINCPAC not later than 10 November 1968.

Prepared by:

LTC E. F. Crooks, USA  
Pacific Division, J-3  
Extension 77254/26Sep68/bjh

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1992  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-19-93

17 October 1968

MEMO FOR: Mr. Smith  
Mr. Jenkins

SUBJ; Military Exercise FOCUS RETINA FY 69

Attached is a copy of the brief for subject exercise with cover letter from Mr. Warnke. This is a joint-combined strategic mobility exercise, scheduled to be conducted in Korea 20-30 November 1968.

State Department and U. S. Information Agency concur as outlined in cover letter.

The critical date for Presidential cancellation is 20 October 1968.

Please let me know if you have any objections.

9

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

→ Mr. Roston: Do you have a view on whether Presidential candidates should be briefed in advance?  
BKS

~~SECRET~~



I want to get Dean Rusk's reaction to sending  
Black back re.

LBJ/mf  
10-19-68  
7:30p

Dear Mr. President:

I am on the eve of departure for an extended trip to western European capitals and I wanted to write you prior to leaving to send you my renewed expression of appreciation for your generosity and thoughtfulness in allowing me to use one of the Presidential jets on my recent Mission to Southeast Asia.

I can frankly state that without the use of the plane the trip would have been extremely hard - as it was we covered seven nations in some twenty-one days but the great distances were seemingly shortened when we had the convenience of using the SAM jet. Over and above the physical comfort which the plane afforded me and the members of my team, I think the very fact that a Presidential jet arrived at a busy international airport created the proper image which added weight to the Mission.


I have made plans to meet with Messrs. Harriman and Vance during my visit to Paris the week of October 28. I will, of course, give them a full report on my recent tour of Asian countries.

I am taking the liberty of attaching a copy of my short report to Dean Rusk outlining my thoughts on the current developments in Cambodia.

With this in mind I want you to know that I stand ready to come back from Europe and proceed to Cambodia if you decide that you would want me to return there.

Warmest regards.

Respectfully,

  
Eugene R. Black

Special Adviser to the President

encl

The President  
The White House

Tab D

1j

EUGENE R. BLACK  
1 CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10005

October 17, 1968

Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dean:

I am in the final stage of preparing to leave for a four-week business trip abroad where I will be visiting several European countries. I wanted to send you my current thoughts on Cambodia which are:

I believe that the United States should give serious consideration to early issuance of a border declaration and re-establishment of diplomatic relations. This could be effected should Prince Sihanouk release the eleven U.S. servicemen on occasion of Cambodian Independence Day, November 9 or in some other context.

It might be a good idea to let Sihanouk know we have noted with considerable satisfaction:

1. The visits to the Parrot's Beak by his Chief of Security.
2. The RKG's request to the ICC for an investigation of the Nam Lyr area (fruitless at this move is likely to be in military terms)
3. The increased publicity being given to Cambodian army engagements with the VC.

These are precisely the kind of actions, along with the release of the U.S. prisoners, which I think it is reasonable for the USG to expect of Sihanouk under the circumstances.

I doubt it is in the cards to expect much more help with the VC/IVA problem -- given his serious problems with his neighbors and the Red Chinese - I am not, of course, in a position to comment on the question of possible Cambodian collusion in supplying the VC/IVA.

In any event, I would expect the balancing act in Phnom Penh to continue. I also expect that there will continue to be many inconsistencies on Cambodian behavior even if the USG issues a border declaration.

I think the following are new and interesting possible/probable developments:

1. Sihanouk would receive and work with an American Ambassador in an acceptable manner.
2. Sihanouk is concerned over:
  - (a) The implications to himself and his country of communist activities in Cambodia.
  - (b) The declining fortunes of the North Vietnamese
  - (c) The stagnation of the economy of Cambodia

If my assessment is correct, then I think the stage is tolerably well set for a move on the USG's part, if all things considered, we want to make one.

Should you wish to send me on another trip to Phnom Penh to complete the negotiations, I would be more than willing to do so. My office at the White House can reach me in Europe between October 20 and November 16.

On a second and parallel front I had luncheon with Thanot Khman here at the Bank and discussed at great length the Cambodian situation.

I am confident he would raise no objection should the USG decide to sign the border declaration and then resume diplomatic relations with Cambodia.

Thanot was skeptical of the beneficial results which might ensue from this action. However, he could understand and appreciate that it might be a good gamble for the USG in the hope that it would improve the situation.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Eugene R. Black



## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

Friday, October 18, 1968

1:15 p.m.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

## SUBJECT: Land Reform in Vietnam

Attached is a watershed cable to Saigon on this subject. It states Washington's conviction that a major land reform program would bear great dividends both within Vietnam and internationally. It proposes:

1. Legislative action to reduce rice land ownership to 30 hectares (about 74 acres) to be effective two years after the date of enactment.
2. Implementation during the interim two-year period of a Voluntary Land Purchase Program with attractive financial incentives to landlords to sell prior to the expropriation date.
3. Heavy reliance on village local government for implementing transfers under the Voluntary Program and for general land administration.
4. Guaranteed relief to tenants from eviction and back rents and taxes on land recovered from the Vietcong.

We now believe that the political risks to the Government of implementing a fair land reform scheme is manageable. Studies reveal that, with very few exceptions, only absentee landlords own over 20 hectares of land. Moreover, most of the absentee landlords indicate receptivity to a land reform program with fair compensation. The reduction of the ownership limit to 30 hectares would affect about 9,000 landlords in the delta and III Corps, and would make 800,000 acres available for sale to the tiller. (We do not have good figures for the rest of the country, but the overwhelming proportion of the rice land is covered by the figure cited above.)

The land subject to expropriation under the plan would have a value of about \$150 million. As an incentive to the GVN to get on with it, and to make sales more attractive to landlords we would provide U.S. financial assistance. The details would have to be worked out but we are thinking of a scheme which transfers capital holdings in land into productive enterprises, perhaps through bonds which guarantee the holder the right to import production goods from the United States after the war. Although the figures are tentative, we think our involvement would be in the range of \$30-50 million. Our financial assistance, of course, would be contingent upon a comprehensive and urgent land program satisfactory to us.

Tab E

Ellsworth Bunker has consistently attached low priority to land reform in Vietnam. His full support of this program will be essential if we are to induce Thieu and company to move on this within the next few months. If the proposal has your approval I think it would be a good idea to send a personal message to Bunker on the subject. A suggested draft follows:

"FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

"Your recent reports have encouraged us to believe that the time may be right for a broad new initiative on land reform. You will be receiving through regular channels the outline of a proposal that looks good to us and to which we wish your reaction. We believe that the political risks of an equitable program are manageable, and the potential benefits great. I am looking forward to getting your current thinking, and your suggestions for improving the package. In the meantime I wanted you to know of my profound hope that we can show significant progress on land reform in the next few months."

I recommend you approve the new initiative on land reform outlined above, and approve the personal message to Bunker.

Att

1. Approve the initiative on land reform ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

2. Approve the message to Bunker \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

W. A. Rostow

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

Info:

STATE

LIMDIS

JOINT STATE/A.I.D. MESSAGE

SUBJECT: Land Reform Step Up

1. Have noted with particular interest the emphasis in President Thieu's October 7 National Assembly speech on importance of stronger and more effective land distribution program. Your recent reporting has provided many other encouraging indicators of real and growing interest by Thieu, Huong, and other senior GVN officials in accelerating and broadening land reform efforts. Despite this obvious support, however, momentum of present stepped up effort still best described as "creaking," and commendable new Voluntary Land Purchase Program now under consideration by GVN probably will not be implemented until well into 1969, and then on such a basis that broad impact will not be felt for a long time.

A substantially more effective and broadened effort would appear to be required if the desired significant internal and international impact is to be achieved in a matter of months rather than years.

Drafted by:

AA/VN-JP Grant 10/15/68

Ref. No.

7871

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: A/AID-R. M. Poats

Clearances:

EA- Wm. Bundy

WH

S/S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

NARA, Date 3-6-02

FOR OC/T USE ONLY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Classification

If, in your judgment, GVN with its currently greater interest in land reform is prepared to seriously consider the additional measures required for a major effort having such an impact, we on our part would be prepared to sympathetically consider the use of unusual means to assist the GVN in overcoming the serious political and administrative problems involved in such an effort.

2. The new information developed by SRI in its 1968 survey of landlords and tenants and belatedly reported in Volume V of its draft report also encourages us to believe that new initiatives in land redistribution are within reach at this time. SRI survey indicates that in 26 provinces encompassing most of III Corps and entire Delta:

(a) Very few landlords residing in villages and district towns own over 20 hectares of land; large landlords are virtually all absentee.

(b) More than three-quarters of the absentee landlords interviewed indicated they would not resist a new land reform program if, repeat if, compensation administered equitably. In fact, only 9 percent indicated their strong opposition to a new program of reducing the hectarage ceiling if not only program administered equitably but also GVN would effectively distribute land it previously acquired from French and under Ordinance 57.

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Classification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Classification

(c) Reduction of current 100 hectarage ownership limit to 30 hectares (which is current farmer operator limit even under 100 hectare rule) would affect nearly 9,000 landlords and make available 334,000 hectares valued at approximately \$124 million. Reducing hectarage limit to 20 would affect 12,400 farmers and make available 430,000 hectares valued at approximately \$160 million.

(d) Landlord tenant relationships in relatively secure areas are not major source of grievance to tenant farmers; on the other hand, there is an overwhelming desire to own land among tenant farmers who place land ownership above, <sup>repeat above,</sup> all other felt materiel needs for such items as fertilizer, pumps, schools, et cetera.

3. As we see it, GVN during 1968 has been constantly improving its efforts in land reform, and many of the elements required for a successful program are now falling into place but key elements are still missing for a program of significant impact. Each improvement has been sufficiently modest and the GVN has made so many undelivered or only partially delivered promises in recent years to improve implementation existing land reform program that further general assurances along these lines

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

tend to have very little current credibility either within Vietnam or internationally prior to successful implementation. Even the apparently effective technique developed during last six months of relying on greater utilization village councils does not appear to have the distributing administrative support required to reach the goal of 70,000 of publicly-held lands hectares/during 1968. Also, we question whether President Thieu put into effect his apparent desire yet able to implement effectively his decision to give title to farmers given land by the VC. As you have mentioned to GVN, there are problems of coordinating this aspect of policy with land tenure policy in GVN-controlled areas and of providing compensation for former landlords. Finally, the draft versions of the Voluntary Land Purchase Program we have seen to date represent useful but <sup>only</sup> modest efforts whose value and impact probably can only be identified after a considerable period of implementation.

Without a more forceful approach it appears that more than a year will be required at best before the new GVN emphasis will have any significant psychological impact outside of localized areas. On the other hand, sufficient progress has been made by GVN in recent past and political climate may be such that we can visualize situation where the addition of certain key elements by GVN could bring same dramatic

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Page 5 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Classification

results in land reform as introduction IR-8 accomplishing in rice production.

4. Obviously, you in best position determine the key additional elements required to raise land reform to new level of impact.

From here these would appear to include:

- (a) A strong clearcut legislative endorsement which makes strengthened program national policy and places mandate on Executive for prompt execution.
- (b) A sufficiently strong mixture of carrot and stick so that landlords will not vigorously oppose proposal in legislature and will be induced to voluntarily seek to sell land to tenants and thereby ease administrative burden on GVN.
- (c) Sufficient decentralization and incentives so that GVN can avoid major defect of past programs in over-relying on Central Government bureaucracy initiative and implementation capacity.
- (d) Reasonable equality of treatment of tenants and landlords wherever GVN writ effective.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 6 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
*Classification*

5. Specifically, we could visualize building on the progress to date as follows:

(a) National Assembly action calling for reduction of ceiling retention level to 30 hectares of rice land to be effected by expropriation two years after date of enactment.

(b) Implementation of a Voluntary Land Purchase Program during the interim two-year period which provides equitable payments to landowners and sufficiently more favorable financial incentives over that to be available under expropriation that landlords have major incentive not only to cooperate with Land Purchase Program but to actively seek sales.

(c) Formalization and expansion of new techniques placing primary reliance for land administration on village councils for (1) distribution under present laws, (2) processing land transfers under Voluntary Land Purchase Program, and (3) enforcement of legal limits on rents. This decentralization also could serve as inducement for villagers in contested areas to improve security to point where effective village councils could operate.

(d) Effective formalization of policy stated by Thieu at Ba Tri guaranteeing that tillers previously given land by VC (1) would not be thrown off it, (2) would not have to pay back rent and taxes, and (3) would be given opportunity to acquire legal title to such land.

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Classification

We can see benefits from having all four elements described above being subject of National Assembly action. However, believe legislative endorsement of the ceiling reduction and Voluntary Land Purchase Program most important.

6. As an incentive for GVN to pursue a course of action through the National Assembly and to initially lessen landlord opposition and later secure landlord support in implementation of the land purchase scheme we would be prepared to consider sympathetically the possibility of U.S. financial assistance, <sup>through the GVN</sup> ~~directly~~ or through a joint development fund, to an equitable compensation program for landlords which also would encourage landlords to move into other socially productive fields. We might provide dollar support for landowner compensation under Voluntary Purchase Program in which 50 percent of balance owing landlord after GVN piaster down payment could be provided in dollar denominated certificates guaranteeing holder right to import investment or production goods from the U.S. after the war or within, say, three years of date of issuance, whichever is earlier. (Alternative versions also could permit former landlords option utilize such certificates for equity in new postwar plants, e.g., fertilizer.) The balance payable in GVN piaster bonds could have value maintained through some such device as maintenance of value tied to rice price.

Initial down payment might be 20 percent in piasters since SRI surveys indicate major landlord dissatisfaction with the 1950s GVN repayment scheme where down payment was less.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Page 8 of telegram to AmEmbassy SAIGON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Classification

In order to provide the necessary spur to the Voluntary Land Purchase Program, there should be a marked differentiation between it and the expropriation compensation. Thus, compensation under the expropriation provision might parallel the earlier GVN programs, e. g. 10 percent initial payment, 90 percent in regular GVN bonds without any compensation in the form of import certificates.

Obviously, there are limits on U.S. dollar financial participation. Our preliminary thinking has been in terms of a range of \$30 to \$50 million. As noted earlier, we would be prepared to consider such unprecedented dollar support of a land reform program only where it appears that the program will have an early significant impact and the total program appears to be implementable. We have visualized a reduction of the hectare limit by legislative action from 100 to 30 or less as a sine qua non of such a program.

7. Would appreciate greatly your exploring these ideas/and advising us of your appraisals. We strongly agree that a comprehensive and effective program would be highly constructive and a useful weapon in gaining adherence of the peasant. Also, given the extremely high symbolism placed on land reform outside of Vietnam, such a program would assist very substantially our efforts to convince others of the character of the new Constitutional Government and of the just war being fought.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. US/Soviet Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Talks ~~(ZAB7C)~~

We owe the Soviets our views on when these talks, originally scheduled for Moscow October 7, should be rescheduled.

ACDA suggests holding these talks on the side between November 10 and 15 at a conference on Peaceful Nuclear Activities scheduled for Washington which is sponsored by the Atomic Industrial Forum and American Nuclear Society. A number of foreign countries, including the Soviet Union will be sending scientists and ACDA suggests that a bilateral US/Soviet PNE talks would attract minimal public attention.

EUR suggests that we first consult our NATO allies about our plans to hold the PNE talks and then inform the Soviets that the US would be prepared to hold such talks on November 11-12 in Vienna. EUR notes that although a few Soviet scientists will come to the Washington conference November 10-15 they are not at the level of Federov and his associates who would be undertaking the PNE talks for the USSR.

Tab F.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCT 14 1968

S/S - Mr. Read

SUBJECT: Technical Talks on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

1. I interpret Mr. Fisher's memorandum of October 11 (attached) to mean that ACDA will not insist on its objections to the technical talks if the Secretary, for political reasons, wishes to go ahead with them. It might be useful for the Secretary to raise the matter at the Tuesday Lunch and obtain an indication of the President's thinking.

2. With the Secretary's approval, EUR would propose to consult our NATO allies concerning our plan to hold these talks with the Soviets. EUR would then inform the Soviet Embassy at the Bureau level that the U.S. would be prepared to hold the talks on November 11-12, in Vienna. If necessary, a low-key public announcement would be made a few days before the talks are to begin.

3. We have considered ACDA's suggestion to have the talks in Washington in connection with an already scheduled conference on peaceful nuclear activities, November 10-15. Although a few Soviet scientists were invited, none are presently expected, and we believe that the appearance of Academician Federov and his associates would be bound to arouse press interest and inquiry. As between neutral European cities, we concur in ACDA's preference for Vienna, the established center for international nuclear activities, as the proposed site for the technical talks.

*MT*  
Malcolm Toon  
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for European Affairs

Attachment:

Mr. Fisher's memorandum  
dated October 11, 1968.

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading  
and declassification.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*TD* *AM*  
EUR:SOV:JGMacCracken:erk 10/14/68

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3602*

*Tal F*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

October 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/S - Mr. Read

FROM: Adrian S. Fisher  
Acting Director

*AS Fisher*

SUBJECT: Technical Talks on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

At the small staff meeting on October 8, I told the Acting Secretary I believe that, viewed purely from the substantive point of view, we should be in no hurry to start bilateral talks with the Soviets on PNE's. These talks will only whet the appetites of non-nuclear, non-aligned countries. Neither we nor presumably the Soviets will be in a position to offer PNE's to such countries for some time to come. We may have a problem at the UNGA--as we had at the NNC--over PNE's. Moreover, there could be domestic political difficulties if bilateral talks, relating to Article V of the NPT, were started before Senate action on the Treaty.

However, if there is a political reason for agreeing to hold bilateral talks on a technical subject in the near future, ACDA would have no objection to them. And I would of course agree that bilateral talks with the Soviets on PNE's will be desirable at some time in the future.

If a decision is made to go ahead with such talks in the near future, I suggest that an alternative to having the talks in Vienna or Geneva would be to hold them on the margin of a conference on peaceful nuclear activities being held November 8 - 10 in Washington. This

10 - 15

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3602*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

conference is being sponsored by the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Society and a number of foreign countries, including the USSR, have been asked to send representatives. If bilateral PNE talks were held before, during, or after this conference, I believe they would be less likely to attract public attention than a meeting in Geneva or Vienna. We would not have to make a public announcement, nor should we make any special effort to conceal the talks. If they become known publicly, we could explain that they were routine. There is no reason why we could not explain to NAC in advance what we are doing.

If it is decided that we should nevertheless hold talks in a neutral European city sometime around mid-November, we think Vienna, as a center for international nuclear activities, is distinctly preferable to Geneva.

CONFIDENTIAL

1p (9)  
ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 18, 1968 -- 1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Your clearance is required on this proposed letter of Sec. Rusk's to Ellsworth Bunker, which would permit a certain number of wives to join civilian officials in Saigon in response to Bunker's request.

*W.W. Rostow*  
W.W. Rostow

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me 1 ✓

*Take up at  
Tues. meeting.*

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 3/1/93

~~SECRET~~



13932

~~SECRET~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, D.C. 20520

October 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Authorization for Limited Number  
of Wives to Join Civilian Officers  
in Saigon

Ambassador Bunker has written the Secretary that he intends to permit a limited number of wives to come to Saigon as an inducement to certain outstanding civilian officers to extend their tours in Saigon, unless the Secretary feels that such action would jeopardize Section 911 (11) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

The Secretary has signed a reply, subject to White House concurrence, stating that the Ambassador's proposal would not appear to jeopardize Section 911 (11).

Unless the White House perceives objection to the Ambassador's proposal, the Secretary's letter will be sent.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Letter to Ambassador Bunker
2. Letter from Ambassador Bunker
3. Foreign Service Inspectors'  
Recommendation (extract)
4. Section 911 (11)
5. President's Statement of  
February 7, 1965 re withdrawal  
of Dependents

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority OLJ 8457  
By glsip, NARA, Date 3-9-93

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

12

October 18, 1968

Dear Ellsworth:

I am sympathetic to the proposal you make in your letter of October 2, 1968 to permit a small number of wives only at Saigon as an inducement to their husbands to extend their tours.

Such a limited action for the purpose you describe would not appear to jeopardize Section 911 (11) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended. I sense, however, that each time we take an action which suggests that the danger to dependents from hostile activity is diminishing, we undercut to some degree the principal justification for Section 911 (11) as it applies to personnel in Vietnam.

I do not envy you this added responsibility, but appreciate fully the reasons which have led to your decision.

With all best wishes.

Sincerely,



Dean Rusk

The Honorable  
Ellsworth Bunker,  
American Ambassador,  
Saigon.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 7228457  
By sp/isp, NARA, Date 3-9-93



13481 15

SECRET

Saigon, Republic of Viet-Nam  
October 2, 1968

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Dean:

For some time I have been convinced that we should allow a limited number of wives to come to Saigon as an inducement to certain outstanding civilian officers to extend their tours here. Initially, the number involved would be quite small, probably 30 to 35 in the first few months, and I would personally make the decisions on a case by case basis. Only an officer who agrees to a second tour would be given permission, and he could only be joined by his wife. We cannot at this time handle any children here.

Cecil Lyon and his team of Foreign Service Inspectors have just recommended that we "initiate advance planning looking toward the return of dependents and, when such occurs, longer tours for officer personnel, and, as an interim measure, give consideration to permitting working wives and wives without children to return to Saigon." Although we cannot, for logistical reasons, authorize the return of wives even without children on an overall basis, I agree with the recommendation and believe the proposal mentioned above is a logical and workable first step.

I intend to implement the recommendation of the Inspectors with the constraints noted above unless you feel such action would jeopardize Section 911(11) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as

The Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

SECRET**DECLASSIFIED**Authority 712988-57By ALP, NARA, Date 3-9-93


~~SECRET~~

2

amended. This authorizes the payment of travel expenses to officers and employees of the Service to visit dependents residing outside Viet Nam. There is a feeling in some quarters that if we allow some wives to come here, Congress might eliminate this important provision. I myself do not believe that would be the case, because the number of wives involved is so small it would not violate the spirit of the Act.

With affectionate regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Ellsworth Bunker".

Ellsworth Bunker

~~SECRET~~

17

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Extract from the Department of State, Foreign Service  
Inspection Corps, INSPECTOR'S MEMORANDUM, Post: American  
Embassy, Saigon, September 11, 1968.

\* \* \* \* \*

Tours of Duty - Job continuity under the present tour of duty policy constitutes a continuing problem of the Mission. With 18 and 24 month tours considering normal break-in and disengagement time, a difficult language, and absences due to family visitations, the period of high job effectiveness is severely limited. While the Inspectors do not recommend longer tours for all personnel at this time, it is believed that single officers and key senior officers should remain in their posts for two 18 month tours. The Mission should, at an early date, initiate planning designed to cope with the support problems which will arise once the security situation permits the return of dependents. When dependents are permitted to return, two successive two-year tours should become the norm for officer level personnel. Housing and schooling will constitute the most serious problems. The post has already made good progress in establishing medical facilities which can be expanded if required. As an interim measure it is recommended the Mission give consideration in the very near future to the return of working wives and wives of families without children as a means of increasing continuity. It is realized that security, scarcity of housing, and the basic justification for visitation travel are involved. However, it is believed that the plus factors outweigh the negative ones.

- 
10. That it initiate advance planning looking toward the return of dependents, and when such occurs, request longer tours for officer personnel and as an interim measure give consideration to permitting working wives and wives without children to return to Saigon;

\* \* \* \* \*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES  
(90th Congress, 2d Session)

-----  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
United States Senate  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
U.S. House of Representatives  
-----

March 11, 1968  
-----

\* \* \* \* \*

(11)<sup>107</sup> the travel expenses of officers and employees of the Service for up to two round trips each year for purposes of family visitation in situations where the family of the officer or employee is prevented by official order from accompanying such officer or employee to, or has been ordered evacuated from, his assigned post because of danger from hostile activity, except that, with respect to any such officer or employee whose dependents are located abroad, the Secretary may authorize such additional trips as he deems appropriate not to exceed the equivalent cost of two round trips of less than first class to the District of Columbia, and the travel expenses of officers or employees stationed abroad (or their dependents located abroad), for purposes of family visitation in emergency situations involving personal hardship: Provided, That the facilities of the Military Airlift Command shall be utilized whenever possible for travel authorized under this section

-----  
107 Paragraph (11) added by section 1 of P.L. 90-221 (81 Stat. 671).

\* \* \* \* \*



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

122  
1 v  
FEBRUARY 7, 1965

Office of the White House Press Secretary  
-----

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Following meetings with the National Security Council, I have directed the orderly withdrawal of American dependents from South Vietnam.

It has become clear that Hanoi has undertaken a more aggressive course of action against both South Vietnamese and American installations, and against Americans who are in South Vietnam assisting the people of that country to defend their freedom. We have no choice now but to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued determination to back South Vietnam in its fight to maintain its independence.

In addition to this action, I have ordered the deployment to South Vietnam of a HAWK air defense battalion. Other reinforcements, in units and individuals may follow.

# # #

*Pres.*

*2*

**SECRET**  
**LITERALLY EYES ONLY**

**Tuesday, Oct. 22, 1968**  
**7:05 p. m.**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

Herewith a hasty rendering of the kind of passage you wanted which might be inserted just before the final paragraph of any statement you might make on a bombing pause.

**~~SECRET~~ attachment**

**W. W. Rostow**

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *19*, NARA, Date *3-1-93*

DRAFT

2a  
(10/22/68)

The timing of this decision to move forward towards peace in Vietnam has not been under the control of the President. If it were, there would have been peace in Southeast Asia long ago. From the moment we made our commitment to prevent the takeover of South Vietnam by force in 1965, we have held out, in deepest sincerity, the olive branch of the Presidential Seal.

Historians will be astonished when they finally see the files -- dozens of thick files -- each containing a separate effort to find the road to peace.

You will remember that in a news conference in February 1967 I was asked:

"Are you prepared at all to tell us what kind of other steps the other side should take for this suspension of bombing?"

I responded:

"Just almost any step. As far as we can see, they have not taken any yet. And we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action that they

---

or any of their spokesmen would care to suggest. We have made one proposal after the other. We would like to have a cease-fire. We would be very glad to stop our bombing, as we have on two previous occasions, if we could have any indication of reciprocal action."

Then at San Antonio on September 29, 1967, I said this:

"The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."

On March 31 of this year when I withdrew from the political arena, I said this:

"When I announced the cessation of bombing over that part of North Vietnam where 90% of its people live -- last March 31 -- I said:

"Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end -- if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi -- whether a complete bombing halt becomes possible in the future will be determined by events."

---



When Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance went to Paris, their instructions centered on two major points: first, that the legitimate government of South Vietnam must take its place in these negotiations should they become serious and, second, the bombing halt would not be possible if the demilitarized zone were not respected. For month after month there was no movement. Now there is movement. If you ask me why, I cannot give you a confident answer:

-- perhaps the steady and vigorous performance of the Constitutional Government of South Vietnam has something to do with it;

-- perhaps the remarkable expansion of the ARVN to a point where a million South Vietnamese have now taken up arms in defense of their country <sup>has</sup> ~~have~~ something to do with it;

-- perhaps the performance of our own men under the great leadership of General Westmoreland and General Abrams has something to do with it;

-- perhaps the influence of some of their allies and ours.

Frankly, I must tell you that I wish this break had come a long time ago, and I regret that it comes so close to our own elections. I can only tell you that there has not been one move made by your President which did not conform to the instruction I gave to our Paris team before they left Washington: "We shall seek the peace in terms of the interests of the United States -- now and ten years from now."

I know that your prayers will be joined with mine, etc....

ACTION

Tuesday, October 22, 1968

6:40 pm

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message on 25th anniversary of the Battle of Tarawa

*Lang  
2 P. v. fle*

November 21-23 is the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Tarawa. The Island, now a British colony, is planning a ceremony to commemorate the event. You have been asked to provide a taped message. Instead State recommends a written message to be read by our Consul. A suggested message is attached. I recommend you approve the message.

Att

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

STATE:MW right:wpt

3.

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE  
25th ANNIVERSARY, BATTLE OF TARAWA

I am honored to be able to take part in the ceremonies commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the battle of Tarawa, if only by way of the written word. Although Tarawa is a small bit of land in the vastness of the Pacific, and although the battle there was only one of the many struggles that took place over Pacific islands and atolls during the Second World War, Tarawa had special significance for Americans:

It was the first step in the Central Pacific campaign, which was, in turn, the key element in the allied strategy of striking directly westward in an effort rapidly to regain control of the western Pacific.

It was the first major amphibious assault of the war against a strongly defended island and as such a momentous trial of the techniques developed for this kind of warfare. A test of tactics, it would also show whether the Central Pacific strategy itself was feasible and thus determine whether the war could be ended in a relatively short time.

The battle of Tarawa was, finally, a sobering reminder to the American people that the war in the Pacific would be



hard fought and costly, for the defense of Tarawa was tenacious and the loss of life appallingly high.

The Second United States Marine Division bore the chief burden of the fighting for the allies at Tarawa during those few days of fierce combat. The Marines lost more than 3000 men in that brief battle. The Japanese defenders lost even more -- about 5000 -- as they fought bravely and stubbornly, though unsuccessfully in the end, to hold the heavily fortified islands of Tarawa. In Japan as in the U. S., the significance of the battle must have been sensed, both as a sign of the bitterness of the struggles that were ahead and as the beginning of the final major phase of the war.

Because it was of such crucial importance, the battle seems startlingly recent in my memory, as I am sure it does also in the recollections of those of you gathered on the very scene. It is a fact, nevertheless, that twenty-five years have passed -- a quarter century. More importantly, however, times have changed:

The adversaries of twenty-five years ago are now friends, cooperating in the enterprises of peace.

The great Pacific Ocean, which then separated us, now unites the peoples who live in and around it in a budding sense of Pacific community.

The myriad islands of this vast ocean, once cruelly battered stepping stones in the surging tides of war, are now embarked on peaceful development and are an increasingly significant part of that Pacific community.

This is the way things should be in this ocean we share. Let us keep them that way. Let us not forget the brave men on both sides who died in heroic battles like that fought at Tarawa, but in honoring them let us do so for the part they played in paving the way for a new era of peace and cooperation in the Pacific. The very name of this ocean means peaceful. Let us resolve that so it shall remain in fact.

## MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION 4/

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, October 22, 1968

6:40 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Here is a summary of 152 letters and telegrams, received by the White House since October 16, dealing with the reports and rumors of a total bombing halt.

The letters and telegrams fall into two broad categories -- with a majority expressing opinions against a bombing halt.

<u>Against Bombing Halt</u>		<u>% of Total Telegrams</u>	<u>% of Total Letters</u>	<u>% Total</u>
Telegrams	45	59%		
Letters	32		43%	
<u>Total:</u>	77			51%
<u>Favor Bombing Halt</u>				
Telegrams	31	40%		
Letters	34		45%	
<u>Total:</u>	65			43%
<u>Comment (Neither Pro nor Con)</u>				
Telegrams	1	1%		
Letters	9		12%	
<u>Total:</u>	10			6%
<u>Total:</u>	152	100%	100%	100%

Against Bombing Halt -- Parents, relatives and friends of servicemen are among the most vigorous in opposing a bombing halt. A general theme is that, without continued bombing, the lives of American troops would be greatly endangered. Another opposing group views a bombing halt as a political move to help Vice President Humphrey before Election Day.

Some sample comments are:

- Bombing halt would allow Marines to be slaughtered.
- Marine son in Vietnam says without bombing they would not survive.
- Unconditional bombing halt is last-minute attempt to help Humphrey.
- Bombing halt is abject surrender for political purposes.
- Another Democratic trick; stop Communism, not bombing.

For Bombing Halt -- Some want an end to the bombing simply as a step toward peace. Several urge an end to the bombing as a means to increase the Vice President's chances for victory next month.

Some comments are:

- Unconditional bombing halt would be worthy climax to your great career.
- Halt will help bring about serious discussions in Paris.
- Arguments in its favor are strong; why not try it?
- For Democratic Party's sake, country's sake and God's sake, stop bombing.
- Stop the bombing and Humphrey will win.

Neither For Nor Against -- This third group states that they will trust your judgment in the matter.

Some of their comments are:

- I know you will make the right decision in this matter.
- Do everything possible to consummate the first steps toward peace.
- God will help make the right decision.

W. W. Rostow



Mr. Rostow

5

ACTION

for file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Tuesday, October 22, 1968 - 6:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings to the Shah

The Shah's birthday is Saturday, October 26. State recommends the following message:

Mrs. Johnson and I send our congratulations and best wishes for your birthday. We know this is a doubly important occasion for you and your family now that it has become the anniversary of your coronation. Our thoughts are with you and your people.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Att: Read ~~R~~ostow memo, 10/17/68, att. draft telegram to Tehran (WH-3234)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

*Pres file*

*6*

Tuesday, October 22, 1968  
5:45 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Two-Week Weather Forecast for North Vietnam

The ending of two typhoons in North Vietnam should produce better weather than in the past two weeks.

The forecast is as follows. Weather over North Vietnam for the next two weeks will be climatologically good. There will be broken clouds at two to six thousand feet; fog in the early morning and clearing as the sun comes up; some showers in the mountainous areas, mostly in the south.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-1-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM.

*Pres file*  
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

7

Tuesday, Oct. 22, 1968  
5:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Lam, the South Vietnamese Ambassador in Paris, comes in with two "policy" problems:

- a desire that agreement be reached between the U. S. and Hanoi on all points of procedure before negotiations start, even after a bombing cessation;
- and that there be two flags on our side of the table and only one flag of the DRV on the other side of the table.

I presume Ellsworth will work on this in Saigon, but it is clear that we haven't got the theology straightened out with Saigon and translated into agreed procedures yet.

*W.C.W.* Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-479  
By ig, NARA, Date 2-25-93



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM  
ACTION COPY

NNNNVV CRB403  
OO RUEHC RUMJIR  
DE RUFNCR 22797 2951905  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 221850Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7335  
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 1879  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ PARIS 22797

MODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 861

1968 OCT 22 PM 3 27

073300

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 91-478

By g/jw, NARA, Date 3-1-93

1. HABIB SAW LAM AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST. LAM HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO DISCUSS PROCEDURAL MATTERS WITH US. LAM SHOWED HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO HABIB. THEY INFORM LAM THAT MATTERS INVOLVING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA WOULD BE SETTLED IN WASHINGTON AND SAIGON BUT THAT ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS HE WAS TO TALK TO THE US DELEGATION. HIS INSTRUCTIONS APPEARED TO BE SIMILAR IN MANY RESPECTS TO THE MEMORANDUM WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER THANH GAVE TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER AS REPORTED IN SAIGON'S 40788. THERE WERE DIFFERENCES, ALTHOUGH THE MAJOR THRUST OF LAM'S INSTRUCTIONS WAS THE SAME.

2. LAM SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO PROBLEMS IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE DID NOT CONSIDER PROCEDURAL. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT DESIRED THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED BETWEEN THE US AND HANOI ON ALL POINTS OF PROCEDURE BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS START. THIS COULD BE DONE AFTER CESSATION OF BOMBING BUT BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE GVN. HABIB TOLD LAM THAT PROCEDURAL MATTERS WOULD BE DISCUSSED BEGINNING AT THE FIRST MEETING FOLLOWING A CESSATION OF BOMBING. AT THAT TIME THE GVN WOULD BE PRESENT. LAM SAID THAT THE GVN DID NOT AGREE AND REPEATED HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT PROCEDURAL DETAILS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT WITH HANOI IN ADVANCE. HABIB SAID THAT WE HAD EXPECTED THAT THE US AND THE GVN WOULD DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF PROCEDURES AND THEN NEGOTIATE THEM WITH THE OTHER SIDE. LAM INSISTED THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT ALLOW FOR THIS.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 22797, OCTOBER 22 (NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS)

3. THE NEXT POINT LAM RAISED WAS THE QUESTION OF FLAGS ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT A QUESTION OF PROCEDURE BUT WAS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE BASIC TO THE "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA. THE GVN DEMANDED THAT THERE BE TWO FLAGS ON OUR SIDE OF THE TABLE, US AND RVN, AND ONLY ONE FLAG, THAT OF THE DRV, ON THE OTHER SIDE. HABIB REPLIED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO FLAGS AT ALL ON EITHER SIDE OF THE TABLE. MOREOVER, THIS WAS A QUESTION OF PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS. AGAIN LAM INSISTED THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE SUCH THAT THIS WAS NOT A QUESTION THAT HE COULD SETTLE BUT WAS A MATTER OF POLICY AND WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED IN SAIGON.

4. LAM SAID THAT WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER MATTERS IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS, THESE WERE QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURES ON WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO OPEN DISCUSSION WITH US. HABIB REPLIED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO SO.

5. COMMENT: LAM APPEARS TO BE RECEIVING RIGID INSTRUCTIONS FROM THANH WHICH DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE POINTS MADE BY THE EMBASSY TO THE GVN. WE HAVE INDICATED IN A PREVIOUS CABLE (PARIS 22776) OUR VIEW REJECTING GVN DESIRE FOR SETTLEMENT IN ADVANCE ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS. WE EXPECT THAT WE WILL LEAVE IT TO SAIGON TO SEE TO IT THAT LAM GETS THE NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT. SIMILARLY, WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF FLAGS, WE REQUEST THAT SAIGON HAVE THE FOREIGN MINISTER INFORM LAM THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT ARE NO LONGER CURRENT AND THAT THERE WILL BE NO FLAGS ON THE TABLES.

6. WE SENSE THAT LAM IS BEING PUT UP TO TAKING EXTREMELY RIGID AND IN SOME CASES UNREASONABLE POSITIONS BY HIS FOREIGN MINISTER. WE WILL BE GOING OVER THE VARIOUS POINTS WITH LAM SOON BUT HE DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE AUTHORITY TO DEAL WITH THESE QUESTIONS WITH THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF REASONABLE OPEN-MINDEDNESS.

HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~



*Pres file**8*~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUSTuesday, Oct. 22, 1968  
5:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In a casual classified telephone conversation, I asked Jorden: Why are they insisting on a week? Is it merely to make political trouble in Saigon?

He said: I think it is to preserve the myth that the NLF had to get from the jungle in Tay Ninh province, to Phnom Penh, Hanoi, Peking, Moscow, and Paris -- after the bombing stops. That would take five days if it were the truth.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-479By ing, NARA, Date 2-25-93~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

9

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Tuesday, October 22 1968 - 4:00 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith the precise nature of Thieu's anxiety becomes clear; namely, that Hanoi won't talk to Saigon, only to the U.S.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 40884

*Pres file*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-479  
By 118, NARA, Date 2-25-93

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

W 14 9a  
TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

~~SECRET~~

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O 221220Z OCT 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2989  
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2544  
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1968 OCT 22 AM 10 36

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 40884

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS TODEL

FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJ: TALK WITH PRESIDENT THIEU OCTOBER 22.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: 719 91-478

By: 14/jw, NARA, Date: 3-1-93

1. HERZ TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON ON PROCEDURAL DETAILS (SEE SEPTTEL), AND BERGER AND I TALKED FOR AN HOUR WITH THIEU. I THINK I AM SAFE IN SAYING THAT WE ARE MAKING GOOD PROGRESS GETTING RID OF THE UNDERBRUSH, AND DEFINING AND NARROWING THE ISSUE WHICH WORRIES THEM.
2. THIEU SENT ME MESSAGE THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT WHEN HE AGREED TO THE PROPOSED JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT FOR A CESSATION, ~~"IT WAS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NLF WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE AS A SEPARATE ENTITY."~~
3. WE SPENT MOST OF THIS SESSION TRYING TO DEFINE WHAT THIS MEANT AND WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS. WE DENDE WITH AN AGREEMENT TO HAVE A REGULAR MEETING OF JOINT NEGOTIATING GROUP, WHICH WILL INCLUDE VICE PRESIDENT KY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, TOMORROW AT 1700 HOURS TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION.
4. IN OUR DISCUSSION WE POINTED OUT ~~ALL THE DEVICES WE WOULD EMPLOY TO AVOID HAVING THE NLF APPEAR AS A SEPARATE ENTITY. (FLAGS, NAME PLATES, NAME OF CONFERENCE, ETC.)~~ THIS WAS FINE, THIEU SAID, BUT HE WASN'T CONVINCED THAT HANOI WANTED SERIOUSLY TO NEGOTIATE, WITH THE GVN. HE WAS AFBAID HANOI WOULD ADDRESS THEIR REMARKS TO THE US; THAT ONLY THE NLF WOULD RESPOND TO GVN STATEMENTS; THAT HANOI WOULD WALK OUT OF THE ROOM WHEN THE GVN TALKED, ETC. ETC. WE WAID WE DIDN'T THINK THIS WOULD HAPPEN, BUT IF IT DID WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THESE WERE NOT A SERIOUS WAY TO CONDUCT THE TALKS, AND WE COULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH BEHAVIOR.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 40884, OCTOBER 22

5. THIEU THE SAID THAT WHAT HE WOULD LIKE IN ADVANCE OF THE TALKS IS AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND HANOI THAT HANOI WILL TALK SERIOUSLY TO THE GVN. IF THAT ASSURANCE WAS OBTAINED HE WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE NLF PRESENCE. HAS HANOI ACCEPTED TO TALK TO SAIGON, HE ASKED REPEATEDLY.

6. WE POINTED OUT THE DANGER THAT IF A FORMAL ASSURANCE OF THIS KIND WAS SOUGHT, HANOI MIGHT WELL SAY, "OF COURSE WE WILL TALK TO SAIGON ABOUT A, B, AND C, BUT WE EXPECT SAIGON TO TALK TO THE NLF ABOUT X, Y, AND Z," AND THIS WOULD IMMEDIATELY PRESENT THEM WITH ANOTHER DIFFICULTY, I.E. THE SEPARATE CHARACTER OF THE NLF. WOULD IT NOT BE BEST TO LEAVE THIS UNDEFINED, SO THAT SAIGON WOULD TALK TO THE NLF AT TIMES AND ISSUES OF THEIR CHOOSING.

7. OUR DISCUSSION RANGED AROUND THE FOREGOING THREE PARAS. I PROMISED TO GET A VIEW FROM WASHINGTON AND PARIS OF THIS WHOLE PROBLEM, AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF I WOULD HAVE THIS BEFORE OUR MEETING TOMORROW. BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

10

INFORMATIC N

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Tuesday, October 22, 1968  
3:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

I agree with Art McCafferty's comment on the probability that the North Vietnamese may make a major public statement -- quite possibly at the regular Wednesday session tomorrow.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02



10a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1968

Mr. Rostow:

The multiple-part  
circular message in this report  
would indicate to me that the  
North Vietnamese are preparing to  
make an important public statement.

  
Art McCafferty

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02

108

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 OCT 22 19 06

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00 [REDACTED]  
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3.4 (b)(1,3)

62 OCT SAVIN F3404-32539  
MESSAGE REPORT NR 06 FOR 22 OCT 68  
THE FOLLOWING MESSAGES WERE EXCHANGED BETWEEN NVN  
[REDACTED] DURING 1500Z

SKED:

A. SECTION ALPHA [REDACTED]  
Z TIME [REDACTED] TIME FILE TIME MSG NR

				COMMENTS	
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	1540		NOTE 1
			-	"	"
			-	"	"
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			2140	"	NOTE 2
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	-	"	"
			2140	"	NOTE THREE

3.4  
(b)(1,3)

SECTION BRAVO  
NIL

COMMENTS:  
NOTE ONE:

[REDACTED]

3.4  
(b)(1,3)

NOTE TWO:

NOTE THREE:

[REDACTED]

297

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 94-413 and NLJ/RAC 02-109  
By iso, NARA, Date 3-26-04

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Tuesday, October 22, 1968  
12:55 p.m.

11  
Pre file

Mr. President:

Foreign Minister Eban thinks he has your  
OK to mention the Eshkol visit publicly,  
but he does not wish to speak out of turn.  
He is seeing the press later this afternoon  
and has asked us to check.

May he mention that Eshkol will  
be dropping by in connection with  
his Latin American trip? \_\_\_\_\_

Or would you prefer to work  
out the usual White House and  
Israeli Government announcement  
in a few days? \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. R.

HHS:ksb

MEMORANDUM

Pres file  
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

12

Tuesday, October 22, 1968  
12:00 noon

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bill Jorden just called and said he wished to lay before me at this critical moment his views.

1. He believes the other side is in a mood to settle:

- they have backed off on recce;
- they have backed off on a joint communique.

2. The issue now is, first, time. He believes that they would accept five days. He recommends that we be "adjustable" and not insist on two or three days. He does not believe that it would be easy to explain a hang-up and failure of negotiation on a question of 48 or 72 hours.

3. He believes that the military situation in the field is such that our forces and our allies have never been as secure over the past two years as they now are.

4. The second hang-up issue is what we say. The other side has given up the idea of a joint public statement. As for a secret minute, Jorden believes that the minute should simply state that we have agreed to stop as of a certain time and meet as of a certain subsequent time.

5. Jorden went on to say they know we have reserved our right to resume bombing. This will be clear to the world. The time is ripe to move forward. He felt that he had a responsibility to let me know his personal views at this critical moment.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-479  
By 1-8, NARA, Date 2-25-93

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

*Res Lee*

13

Tuesday, Oct. 22, 1968  
11:25 a. m.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is Cy Vance's latest, plus a note of mine for the 12 o'clock meeting.

The Russians are obviously trying very hard to pull this off -- and in a hurry.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachments

*(minus Cy Vance's latest)*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-479  
By WJ, NARA, Date 2-25-93



Pres. file

13-

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Tuesday, Oct. 22, 1968  
11:05 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

For the Vietnamese meeting at 12 o'clock, here are some points on the timing of the first your-side-our-side session:

1. Oberemke's proposition this morning was nothing more nor less than the final position taken yesterday by Thuy:

-- Thuy fell back from a "four-power conference" to naming the four participants;

-- Thuy fell back from a meeting some weeks after the bombing halt to one week.

2. It was the DRV which suggested that "serious talks" could start the next day after a bombing cessation; and they have now accepted the view that "serious talks" involve the participation of the GVN. On Sept. 15 Le Duc Tho told Harriman and Vance "the DRV would be willing to meet the next day after a bombing cessation and discuss the agenda items with 'serious intent and good will.'"

3. A week's bombing halt without visible GVN participation in Paris would put the greatest possible strain on the GVN. Its participation is the one solid and overt sign of the understanding at which we have arrived.

4. We will, of course, have to background on the DMZ, and we can either point to that or point to Abrams' executing his standing orders on rules of engagement in case of DMZ violations. But we need the change in the character of the meetings in Paris to validate the deal in South Vietnam and keep the politicians quiet.

5. Much the same is talk at home where you have emphasized to all three candidates the critical nature of GVN participation as part of the quid pro quo for a bombing cessation.

6. I have put the question on the military implications to Gen. Wheeler. He will formulate his views. In general, I suspect that the military effects of political uneasiness will rank higher in Abrams' mind than anything the enemy might do to take advantage in one week of the bombing cessation; although we should be conscious that there are some reports of an attack on Saigon scheduled for late October or early November.

7. We told the TCC's, "since whole objective of bombing cessation would be to move on to serious talks, we must have clear understanding that such talks would get under way at once and would include the GVN on our side of the table....".

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-479

By 140, NARA, Date 2-25-73

Tuesday, Oct. 22, 1968  
10:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

On the understanding that Nat Davis accepts it as a "fact of life" that he cannot leave until his work on the Major Decisions is completed, would a departure date of Wednesday, November 27, be acceptable to you? I can attest to the fact that he is working hard on his part of the history.

W. W. Rostow

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

15

Tuesday, Oct. 22, 1968  
9:30 a. m.

**SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS**

Mr. President;:

Herewith the Soviet proposition.

W. W. Rostow

**SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachment**

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By AJ, NARA, Date 3/1/93

16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

SENT  
WHCA

1968 OCT 22 14 43

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
68 OCT 22 AM 10:54

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY HANDLE VIA CAS CHANNELS CAP02589  
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER FROM WALT ROSTON

THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION TO THE AP STORY, WHICH FOLLOWS AT THE END OF THIS MESSAGE, IS:

1. YOU SHOULD SEE THIEU PROMPTLY AND GO OVER IT WITH HIM.
2. YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CONSULT IN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS GOING TO CONDUCT THE DISCUSSIONS WITH US VIA THE PRESS.

3. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT, AS WE WORK OUT OUR UNDERSTANDINGS, WE DO SO STRICTLY BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS THROUGH ESTABLISHED CHANNELS.

THE FOLLOWING DISPATCH IS A REAL DANGER TO OUR RELATIONS AND OUR ABILITY TO MOVE TOWARDS OUR AGREED JOINT OBJECTIVES.

"PARIS (AP)-INFORMED DIPLOMATS DISCLOSED TODAY SOUTH VIETNAM'S MAIN TERMS FOR TAKING PART IN A BROADENED PARIS PEACE PARLEY. THEY APPEAR TO CLASH WITH CONDITIONS PUBLICLY SET BY NORTH VIETNAM.

THE FOUR CHIEF SAIGON REQUIREMENTS, AS REPORTED IN PARIS, ARE FEATURED BY THE WILLINGNESS OF PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S REGIME TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN PARIS. BUT THEY STIPULATE THAT THE COMMUNIST-LED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM MUST NOT BE ALLOWED INDEPENDENT STATUS AT THE PEACEMAKING PROCESS AS BOTH HANOI AND THE FRONT DEMAND. THE FRONT IS THE POLITICAL ARM OF THE VIET CONG.

THE ROLE OF THE FRONT AT A BROADENED PEACE CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD FOLLOW ANY AMERICAN HALT IN BOMBING IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER AND THIEU IN SAIGON. THEY HAVE MET FIVE TIMES SINCE LAST WEEK. IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED BUNKER HAS BEEN SEEKING TO MODIFY SOME ASPECTS OF THIEU'S POLICY.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-118  
By iso, NARA, Date 7-11-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

THE INFORMANTS SAID THE THIEU GOVERNMENT INTENDS VERY SHORTLY TO ANNOUNCE ITS TERMS FOR A PEACE PARLEY--UNDERLINING THE EXPECTATION OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THAT A U. S. BOMB-HALT SOON WILL BE ANNOUNCED.

HERE ARE SAIGON'S FOUR CONDITIONS, AS REPORTED BY THE DIPLOMATS: WITH HANOI'S ATTITUDE ALSO SHOWS:

--THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO DEAL AND NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WITHIN AN EXPANDED PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE. HANOI HAS NEVER SAID IT WOULD MEET WITH THIEU'S REGIME.

--SAIGON INSISTS THE PROJECTED PEACE CONFERENCE MUST PROCEED RAPIDLY AND CONTINUOUSLY FROM AN AMERICAN BOMB HALT TO A CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT STALLING OR FILIBUSTERING. HANOI HAS INSISTED THAT THE PROBLEM OF PEACE IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS A MATTER NOT FOR IT BUT FOR THE AMERICANS AND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

--SAIGON DEMANDS THAT HANOI MUST NOT EXPLOIT PEACE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH TROOP INFILTRATION AND OTHER ACTS OF HOSTILITY AGAINST THE SOUTH.

--SAIGON'S GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO CONCEDE THE CLAIMS OF THE FRONT TO SIT IN AT A PEACE CONFERENCE AS AN INDEPENDENT PARTY, OR PARTICIPANT."

580

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY



INFORMATION

Limited Official Use

Tuesday - October 22, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Dr. Arias arrived via a U.S. military aircraft at Dulles Airport this morning at 9:10 a.m., accompanied by the Lieutenant Governor of the Canal Zone and three of Arias' associates. He was met by the press and by close friends, who took him to the Woodner Hotel. He is in the U.S. as a tourist.

Press statements issued in Panama and here make it clear that he left voluntarily to avoid bloodshed in Panama. We furnished military transportation because there is no commercial air service in the Canal Zone, and no charter aircraft were available.

W. W. Rostow

SWLewis:mm

*No Christian*  
**SANITIZED**

~~SECRET NOBIS~~

Tuesday, October 22, 1968.

Mr. President:

For your talk with Foreign Minister Eban:

In addition to the talking points I gave you yesterday, we expect Secretary Rusk to use the attached [REDACTED] in his talk with Eban at 3:00 p.m. this afternoon. He will be discussing the issue with Secretary Clifford at noon today.

1.3(a)(5)

We have not been able to reach the Secretary on this issue this morning. However, depending on your understanding with him last night, we feel it would be appropriate for you to speak from the marked paragraphs on page 2 of the attached. Secretary Rusk's fuller background memo, which just arrived, is also attached.

W. W. Rostow

*Secretary Rusk has now approved the suggestion that you use paras -3-7 on p. 2.*  
*WWIR*

~~SECRET NOBIS~~

**SANITIZED**

Authority NLS 84-168

By ics NARA, Date 10-1-84

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Tuesday, October 22, 1968

Mr. President:

For your talk with Foreign Minister Eban:

In addition to the talking points I gave you yesterday, we expect Secretary Rusk to use the attached on the nuclear issue and the Phantoms in his talk with Eban at 3:00 p.m. this afternoon. He will be discussing the issue with Secretary Clifford at noon today.

We have not been able to reach the Secretary on this issue this morning. However, depending on your understanding with him last night, we feel it would be appropriate for you to speak from the marked paragraphs on page 2 of the attached. Secretary Rusk's fuller background memo, which just arrived, is also attached.

W. W. Rostow

*Secretary Rusk. has now approved the suggestion that you use paras. 3-7 on p. 2. lwwr*

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02

112

SECRET/NODIS

Talking Points for the Secretary's Meeting with  
Israeli Foreign Minister Eban  
October 22

Negotiating with Arabs

-- We are encouraged by the turn of events in New York since your last meeting with Eban. There is at last an atmosphere of getting down to business. Israel's recent actions have had much to do with this. Both the Foreign Minister's speech to the GA and Israel's "note" to the Egyptians were steps that should help the negotiating process.

-- It is vital to keep up this momentum. Israel's "note" is a useful first step but we think Israel will have to go farther to clear up doubts on the crucial question of territory if the Arabs are to be induced to enter negotiations. Israel needs to make it clear that what it wants are minor border changes for security reasons, not the retention of territory for its own sake. The Arabs can tolerate the former; the latter will make a settlement impossible to achieve. Until Israel clarifies its position on this crucial point there will be a lingering doubt as to the sincerity of Israel's professions that peace is its paramount objective.

-- We hope, also, that Israel will pursue its exchanges with the UAR in the conviction that progress is possible on this front. Keeping the UAR engaged in exchanges on the basis of viable proposals will be important to protect Jordan's flank as Hussein moves toward negotiations with Israel.

Refugees

-- We were pleased at the Foreign Minister's announcement of Israel's willingness to expand the return flow of refugees to the West Bank. We think this is a compassionate step as well as one that will improve the political climate for negotiations. We hope the GOI will move rapidly toward implementation, and that there will be a significant number of refugees returning.

SECRET/NODIS

Group-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals  
not automatically declassified.

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 719 91-211

By rg/lip, NARA, Date 3-9-93

F-4 Negotiations

-- As the President indicated in his public statement of October 9, we are prepared to open negotiations for the sale of F-4 aircraft to Israel.

-- We recognize the importance of these negotiations to Israel. The F-4 is a superior aircraft and possession of it will go a long way toward assuring Israel's security in the foreseeable future.

-- We assume also that if Israel gets the F-4's it will relieve whatever political pressures there may be to develop other forms of deterrent--such as nuclear weapons, or strategic surface-to-surface missiles.

-- Israel knows the great importance the US attaches to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the Near East. That is why we have attached great weight to Prime Minister Eshkol's statements that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, and also to the Foreign Minister's statement of April 1966 that Israel would not initiate the introduction of "any sort of new weapon" into the area.

-- In view of these assurances, and in view of Israel's positive support for the NPT at the last session of the General Assembly, Israel's early signing and ratification of the NPT should not pose significant problems for Israel. For the US, it will be a matter of great importance. Israel's action--or non-action--bears directly on our global non-proliferation efforts and most specifically on our current efforts to have other states adhere to the NPT.

-- There is also the equally important issue of nuclear weapon delivery systems. If Israel produces or deploys a strategic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead it will vitiate the effect of Israel's assurances that it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons.

-- We are aware Israel has spent a lot of money to have the French develop a nuclear-capable, strategic missile for Israel. If Israel deploys such a missile, or if it is known to be producing it, no one will believe Israel is not clandestinely developing nuclear weapons. As a deterrent,



the missile is meaningful only on the assumption that someday it will be equipped with nuclear weapons.

-- In short, an F-4 sale would be a major commitment by the US to maintain Israel's superiority in the conventional field. In return, because it bears directly on US security interests, we would like Israel's assurance that it will forego nuclear weapons and strategic missiles and will adhere to the NPT. We will also want to manage the F-4 sales negotiations carefully, particularly in terms of any public disclosure, so as to minimize adverse impact on the proceedings in New York.

-- Ambassador Hart, assisted by arms control experts, will be happy to follow up with Ambassador Rabin to work out the details of these assurances. Once the political issue is satisfactorily dealt with, we are confident that the technical details of the sale--such as delivery schedules and financing--can be readily settled.

SECRETARY APPROVED AND RECOMMENDS  
PRESIDENT USE PARA 3-7 ON PAGE 2.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1968

SECRET/NODIS

325  
186  
**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 76991-211  
By as/imp, NARA, Date 3-9-93

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Israeli Foreign  
Minister Abba Eban - Tuesday, October  
22 at 10:30 a.m.

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, accompanied by Ambassador Rabin, is calling on you at his request at 10:30 a.m. Tuesday. He will see me later in the afternoon to open negotiations on Israel's request for F-4 Phantoms. Eban then plans to leave for a brief visit to Israel before returning to New York.

Eban will probably wish to discuss:

(1) The Middle East situation in general, including the status of efforts to achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement.

(2) The F-4 Phantom negotiations.

(3) Prime Minister Eshkol's request, in a recent letter to you, to see you toward the end of the year in conjunction with a trip he is planning to Latin American capitals in December.

We want to encourage Israel to cooperate fully with the Jarring Mission at this critical stage. Israel has recently been more forthcoming tactically. We now want to persuade Israel to be equally flexible, within the limits imposed by valid security considerations, on the territorial and other substantive problems at issue. During his forthcoming visit to Israel, Eban will be reporting to his Government on the status of the negotiations in New York. Our talks with him Tuesday could strengthen his hand and that of other moderates in the Israeli Cabinet in seeking maximum negotiating maneuverability. We should impress on Eban our conviction that (a) now may well be the last chance for years to make real movement toward a peaceful and lasting solution of the Arab-Israel

SECRET/NODIS

Group-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals  
not automatically declassified.

conflict, and (b) territorial claims, as opposed to minor border adjustments, will make a peaceful solution unattainable.

We also want to reassure Israel that its security remains uppermost in our minds. The decision to begin negotiations on the Phantoms should be evidence of this. At the same time we must be careful that the Phantom question does not hamper Jarring's efforts.

Finally, we want again to impress on the Israelis the importance we attach to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We trust the decision to begin negotiations on the Phantoms will now make it possible for Israel to make clear its intention not to seek a nuclear option, including signature of the NPT.

I recommend you tell Eban you will be happy to receive Mr. Eshkol while he is here.

Suggested talking points are enclosed.

Background:

1. Middle East Situation and Peace Negotiations

Israel continues to seek a definitive peace negotiated directly with the Arab Governments concerned and recorded in bilateral agreements. Israel believes that the UAR does not want such a peace and that the Soviets support UAR intransigence while improving the Egyptian military position and their own political-military presence in the area.

Israel is therefore concentrating on reaching a settlement with Jordan, seeking through "private channels" to prepare the way for early joint meetings with the Jordanians under Jarring's auspices. Jordan, before agreeing, wants a clear idea through Jarring of Israel's territorial terms with respect to the occupied West Bank and Jerusalem. Israel, for its part, wants firm assurances that joint meetings will then take place. Eban may seek broader negotiating instructions on these points while in Israel later this week. His consultations could be critical, since (a) the territorial question will weigh heavily in King Hussein's decision whether or not to risk

a separate settlement with Israel and (b) all our indications are that the GOI is thinking of territorial changes and a Jerusalem solution which Hussein could not accept.

Meanwhile, Eban has done much to improve Israel's public image and give the Jarring Mission a psychological boost by his speech October 8 before the General Assembly. This was followed by a detailed memorandum setting forth the Israeli position which was handed Jarring on October 15 for transmittal to the UAR. While not in themselves enough to bring the Arabs around, these moves could represent an important start--especially on the issues of Israeli troop withdrawal and willingness to begin negotiations indirectly through Jarring, both of which are critical for the Arabs. Much now depends on the Arab (especially UAR) reaction and on Israel's own diplomatic follow-through.

## 2. Phantom Negotiations and NPT

The Israelis hope for rapid progress on the Phantom negotiations and for the early signing of a sales contract. They would prefer to have the negotiations go forward without relation to other questions but are probably prepared for some political bargaining. On the NPT, the Israeli Government position has been that (a) it stands on Eshkol's commitment not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, (b) it nevertheless sees some advantage in keeping the Arabs in doubt about Israel's nuclear capabilities, and (c) it has not decided not to sign the NPT but wants to stay in step with other states which have doubts about the security assurances provided by the NPT.

In my meeting with Mr. Eban Tuesday afternoon, I plan to discuss Israel's Phantom request in the context of our desire to see rapid progress toward peace and our need to get an Israeli assurance not to go nuclear and not to deploy strategic surface-to-surface missiles.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Suggested Talking Points.



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING  
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN

-- You appreciated receiving Mr. Eshkol's recent communications and will be happy to see him, as he has suggested, when he comes to this hemisphere in December to visit Latin American capitals.

-- You are pleased that it is now possible to move into negotiations on Israel's request for Phantoms. Secretary Rusk has your detailed views on this matter and will be discussing them with Mr. Eban this afternoon. Given our deep desire to see a stop to the arms race, and the top priority we still attach to achieving peace in the Middle East, this question has posed many difficulties for us. The decision to begin negotiations was not an easy one; and you trust it will have reassured Israel about our steadfast concern for Israel's security. You also trust it will now be possible for Israel to make clear its intention not to seek a nuclear option, inter alia by signing the NPT. Mr. Eban told Secretary Rusk this question would be considered by his Government following the Geneva Non-Nuclear Conference. Has it been decided? If not, when is a decision expected?

-- You are familiar with Mr. Eban's General Assembly speech, his recent approach to the UAR through Ambassador Jarring and his efforts to get into substantive negotiations with the Jordanians.

-- You are gratified to see Israel persevering in the search for peace. This is never a short or easy path, as we know from our own experience. Attitudes of hostility cannot be changed overnight, and the foundations of trust must be laid not only with care and precision but with great patience and imagination. The final edifice will not emerge fullblown, but only step by step. We can never know whether it will emerge at all, however, without taking the resolute first steps in its construction.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Group-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals  
not automatically declassified.

-- At this point in the process, no one can know whether or not there is a will to peace on the Arab side. It is doubtful that the Arabs themselves will know until the shape of a possible peace begins to emerge in the negotiating process.

-- That is why it is so important to carry forward the step by step process of building peace. Every negotiating process involves certain political risks, but Israel is happily now in a position to protect its vital security interests while the negotiating process goes forward.

-- We believe that Israel has made a good start in recent weeks toward helping overcome the obstacles to a true negotiating process. We continue to believe that a peace worked out by the parties stands the best chance of lasting. We are pleased that Israel now seems to agree, as you said in addressing B'nai B'rith on September 10, that "How the talking is done at the outset is not important today." By maintaining real flexibility in this respect, Israel can do much to head off Soviet and other efforts to substitute imposed solutions for those agreed among the parties themselves.

-- We are also pleased that Israel has begun, as you suggested on September 10, to "persuade its Arab neighbors that Israel has no expansionist designs on their territory." We are convinced that any attempt to retain territory occupied last year, as opposed to simple adjustments in the old borders, or to deny Jordan a meaningful role in Jerusalem, will make any peace impossible of achievement.

-- The days immediately ahead must see Ambassador Jarring make substantial progress. His Mission represents the best hope for peace and, unless there is real movement soon there may not be another chance for many years to come. You will be watching the New York scene closely following Mr. Eban's return from Israel. Meanwhile, you send warm personal greetings to Prime Minister Eshkol, in whose wisdom, courage, and vision you have great confidence.

19

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Monday, October 21, 1968 -- 5:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the latest in the secret Israel-Jordan negotiations.

You will wish to read this before you see Eban.

[REDACTED]

3.3  
(b)(1)

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 09-349 (#5)  
By isl, NARA, Date 2-24-10

~~SECRET~~--EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, Oct. 21, 1968

4:10 p. m.

*Pres. file*

*20*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a summary of the proposed  
Pacification "Counter-Offensive" --  
starting formally November 1.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment(16 Oct 68 Section 1 Revolutionary Development 2 pages)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989

By 19, NARA, Date 3-1-93

21

INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

*Pres file*

Monday, October 21, 1968 -- 1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

This latest Lou Harris-Kosharyan conversation suggests that Sec. Rusk might well have a word this afternoon with Dobrynin, making two points:

-- Hanoi must understand that the approach of the election is making it more difficult for President Johnson to move in the next two weeks rather than putting pressure on him to accept a bad arrangement in Paris.

-- Hanoi should not expect us to settle for any other arrangement than your-side our-side in which each side could interpret the deal in terms of its own theology. By trying to force us to recognize the NLF and to have a long delay between a bombing cessation and the first talks, Hanoi is simply holding up any possibility of forward movement.

W. W. Rostow

EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rlh



INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 21, 1968 -- 12:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Clark Clifford reports the following:

-- From the time it went on the line, the Navy has scheduled the return of the NEW JERSEY to Subic Bay for early November. The purpose: to pick up ammunition which it has been firing at a great rate and for general servicing. No civilian had anything to do with setting that routine schedule. The only civilian decision made was that the NEW JERSEY should operate not further north than the 18th parallel.

-- Its disposition and use while on station has been wholly in military hands.

-- If you desire Clifford to look into the possibility of holding it on station beyond the November 2 date for its presently scheduled return to Subic Bay, Sec. Clifford will be glad to explore the matter.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02

~~SECRET~~

23

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Monday, October 21, 1968  
12:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the GVN focuses sharply  
on the modalities for a your-side our-  
side conference.

It is good that they have moved  
from a straight emotional reaction to  
brass tacks.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 40788  
~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-1-93

24

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Monday, October 21, 1968 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, from Bunker:

-- a reassuring confidence that we can bring the GVN along;

-- a warning note to Paris against any U. S. indication that we regard the NLF as an "independent entity" -- until a later time, late in the negotiations when the GVN might be prepared to work out final details with the NLF.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 40794

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-479  
By ig, NARA, Date 2-25-93

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rln

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 21, 1968  
11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to glance at this  
summary of the Chicoms military position.

Paras. 15-16 (at paper clip, p. 7)  
not reflected in the summary, are  
reassuring: the Chicoms are not  
~~pledged~~ *judged* to have much out-of-country  
capability. They are primarily a force  
to defend the homeland.

W. W. Rostow

NIE 13-3-68  
1 August 1968  
Cy 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 93-509  
By cb, NARA, Date 5-26-95

WWRostow:rln

ACTION

24

Monday, October 21, 1968 - 10:50 AM

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk recommends you send the attached Fiftieth Anniversary message to Czechoslovak President Svoboda, for delivery on October 28th. The message notes President Wilson's role in the founding of the Czechoslovak nation.

Pres file

We would approach the Czechoslovaks informally on the question of public release. If they have no objection, the statement will be released here on the 28th following its delivery in Prague.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_



PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

On behalf of the American people and myself, I ~~wish to~~ congratulate you and the Czechoslovak people on the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak State.

Fifty years ago, President Wilson and the United States Government played an active role in the founding of Czechoslovakia. Today I assure you, Mr. President, of the continuing interest and understanding of the United States in Czechoslovakia's historic course. This course has been marked by great challenge and great tragedy. The Czechoslovak people have clearly demonstrated their capacity to meet challenge and tragedy with courage, determination and hope.

I am confident this spirit will continue to prevail among the Czechoslovak people and their leaders.

Lyndon B. Johnson

*Pres. Jelle*

27

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 21, 1968  
9:45 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

On 14 October, NEW JERSEY was directed to stay south of 18 degrees.

NEW JERSEY is presently located at 12° 34' N.

MACV spokesman has said there is no special significance in the ship's change of station, noting that gunfire support is required up and down coast in both NVN and SVN.

Since the NEW JERSEY is scheduled to arrive at Subic Bay on the 23rd, she should be leaving SVN in a matter of hours.

NEW JERSEY will stay in Subic through 2 November, for routine maintenance and R and R. It has been on the line since 30 September.

W. W. Rostow

(copy for George Christian)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02



29

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Monday, October 21, 1968  
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to see exactly how  
Sec. Rusk reported his conversation  
with Dobrynin.

He suggested that you have this  
text available.

*Handwritten:*  
Pres file

W. W. Rostow

State 258563

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Ng, NARA, Date 3-1-93

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

30  
INFORMATION

Monday - October 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-427  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-20-95

Two issues will very soon require your decision:

1. What to do about President Arias, still a refugee in the Canal Zone.
2. Recognition of the new provisional government.

Arias' Future

Ten days after taking refuge in the Zone, Arias still refuses to leave the Zone voluntarily, either to seek asylum in other countries (several have offered it) or in the US. The OAS refuses to become involved. Bob Anderson is trying today to persuade him to come to the US. There is some chance he may succeed.

We have progressively tightened control on his visitors and communications. Yet despite his repeated assurances of "good behavior" to Governor Leber, he continues political activity which threatens to incite violence. Recent examples include:

- telegrams to you, other American Presidents, the UN, and the OAS Council; (Tab A).
- a press conference Saturday by his principal advisor;
- supply of money and encouragement to supporters in Panama;
- calls via clandestine media for violent resistance to the Guard.

Initially stunned and disorganized by the National Guard's coup, Arias' supporters are regrouping. A general strike today is eighty percent effective in Panama City; some skirmishes with the Guard have occurred; tension is rising, and a spark could ignite serious bloodshed. Arias now has no chance to return to office except through violence. Should it erupt while he is in the Zone, the National Guard will blame the US and might well stand aside from protecting US installations.

Tab B

According to Governor Leber, Ambassador Adair and General Porter at CINCSOUTH, Arias' presence in the Zone can be tolerated only 2 or 3 more days at most. If persuasion fails, forcible expulsion would raise the spectre of a western hemisphere "Dubcek case". Army and State are working on "scenarios" in which we would expel him using plausible legal procedures to minimize the "kidnapping" appearance. Nonetheless, involuntary removal would undoubtedly be widely condemned, no matter how justified.

### Recognition

Several factors bear on the timing of diplomatic recognition:

- no other governments have yet recognized and they are moving slowly so long as Arias is in the Canal Zone.
- rapid recognition by the US will imply to many Latins US support for the military coup and probable connivance.
- prompt recognition would reassure the new government that we are not favoring Arias and would calm their nerves (they are getting extremely nervous and unpredictable).
- early recognition might make expulsion of Arias easier to justify, since he would no longer be a President still technically in his own country.

In light of the conflicting arguments, Secretary Rusk has not yet decided to recommend early resumption of relations.

W. W. Rostow

### Attachment

Tab A - Note to the President from Dr. Arias in the Canal Zone,  
October 10, 1968.

SWLewis:mm



RECEIVED  
WHCA

31

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OO WTE5  
DE WTE 4076

1968 OCT 20 17 12

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82588

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

HERewith TWO CABLES THIS MORNING WHICH I THOUGHT YOU WOULD  
WISH TO SEE.

CABLE N O. 1

THE ENEMY HAS SHIFTED FROM AN OFFENSIVE TO A RECOVERY  
POSTURE. HE IS ATTEMPTING TO AVOID CONTACT WITH ALLIED  
FORCES WHILE HE ATTEMPTS TO REFIT HIS UNITS OUT OF COUNTRY  
OR IN REMOTE AREAS. WITH ONE EXCEPTION THERE ARE NO  
INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY IS PREPARED TO INITIATE MAJOR  
OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE EXCEPTION IS IN  
III CTZ WHERE WE SEE SIG NS OF CONTINUED PLANNING OF LARGE  
SCALE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST SAIGON TO BE LAUNCHED AT  
SOME FUTURE DATE.

THE 320TH NVA DIV HAS APPARENTLY WITHDRAWN FROM SVN. THE  
29TH AND 30TH NVA REGTS WHICH HAD OPERATED IN MR TTH HAVE ALSO  
WITHDRAWN TO NVN. THE HQ, MR TTH REMAINS IN LAOS WITH IT'S  
6TH AND 9TH REGTS, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT OTHER ELEMENTS  
FROM MR TTH WILL JOIN THEM.

IN CENTRAL I CTZ, THE ENEMY FORCES SUBORDINATE TO FRONT 4  
HAVE ABANDONED THEIR ONLY RECENT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY, THAT AT  
THUONG DUC. THE 2ND NVA DIV HAS WITHDRAWN TO BASE AREAS TO  
RECOVER FROM ITS RECENT LOSSES IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE. THE 3RD  
NVA DIV HAS DRAWN BACK TO THE SONG RE VALLEY OF QUANG NG AI  
PROVINCE FOR THE SAME PURPOSE.

B-3 FRONT FORCES HAVE PULLED BACK FROM KONTUM AND DARLAC  
PROVINCES INTO CAMBODIA AND THE UNITS IN COASTAL II CTZ ARE  
DIRECTING THEIR EFFORTS TO ACQUIRING A PORTION OF THE COMING  
RICE HARVEST.

IN III CTZ THE DIVISIONAL FORCES REMAIN IN REMOTE IN-  
COUNTRY BASE AREAS OR ALONG THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. SUBREGION FORCES  
CONTINUE TO AVOID CONTACT WHILE REMAINING IN THEIR NORMAL AREAS  
OF OPERATIONS. THE ARRIVAL IN NORTHERN BINH LONG PROVINCE/  
CAMBODIAN BORDER AREA OF THE HQ, 1ST NVA DIV INDICATES INCREASING  
ENEMY INTEREST IN III CTZ BUT DOES NOT APPRECIABLY INCREASE THE  
ENEMY THREAT SINCE WE DO NOT YET KNOW IF ANY MANEUVER ELEMENTS  
ACCOMPANIED THE HQ.

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS OF PWS AND VARIOUS AGENTS  
SUGGEST THAT THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO PLAN FOR AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST  
SAIGON AT SOME FUTURE DATE. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE TELLS US THAT

68 OCT 20 PM 1:19  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

THE ENEMY HAS SET THE ATTACK DATE FOR LATE OCTOBER OR EARLY NOVEMBER. THE ENEMY PLANS TO HOLD TO HIS OPERATIONAL SCHEME OF THE RECENT PAST-ATTACKS AGAINST THE OUTLYING AREAS OF III CTZ TO BE FOLLOWED BY AN ATTACK ON SAIGON. HIS PRESENT PLANS FEATURE A THRUST BY ELEMENTS OF THE 9TH VC DIVISION FROM THE WEST AND BY PARTS OF THE 7TH NVA DIVISION FROM THE NORTHEAST. THE SUB-REGIONAL COMMANDS WILL PARTICIPATE AS IN THE PAST. THE KEY QUESTION, HOWEVER, IS WHETHER THE ENEMY WILL IMPLEMENT THESE PLANS. HE HAS MADE A SERIES OF SIMILAR PLANS SINCE JULY AND, DUE TO OUR PRE-EMPTIONS AND HIS OWN DEFICIENCIES, HAS BEEN ABLE TO EXECUTE NONE OF THEM.

IN IV CTZ, MR-2 MAIN FORCE UNITS ARE PROBABLY ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE OUR OPERATIONS IN BASE AREA 470 AND MAY BE MOVING TO GO CONG PROVINCE. THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE ENEMY CAN OR WANTS TO RENEW OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY. IN MR-3, THE MAIN FORCE ELEMENTS HAVE DEPLOYED AWAY FROM THEIR PRINCIPAL TARGETS, AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY INTEND TO LAUNCH ANY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

I AM SURE THAT YOU HAVE NOTED THAT OUR CASUALTIES HAVE DECLINED SHARPLY OF LATE. IT MAY NOT BE EQUALLY APPARENT THAT THE ENEMY'S CASUALTIES, WHILE DECREASING, ARE STILL SUBSTANTIAL. HE LOST 2260 KIA FOR THE WEEK OF 11-13 OCTOBER AND 2524 KIA FOR THE PRECEDING WEEK. WHILE THESE FIGURES ARE LOWER THAN WHAT WE HAVE SEEN SINCE THE START OF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE, NEVERTHELESS, THEY SHOW THAT CONSIDERABLE ACTIVITY AND FIGHTING CONTINUES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN PARTICULAR, THEY REFLECT THE NUMBER, SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF OPERATIONS OF OUR INITIATION CONDUCTED UNDER OUR CONTINUING COUNTRY-WIDE OFFENSIVE.

THE ENEMY'S THIRD OFFENSIVE IS OVER. HIS BATTERED UNITS ARE ATTEMPTING TO AVOID US AND TO RECOVER FROM THIS DEFEAT. GIVEN TIME AND ACCESS TO REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES, HE MIGHT ATTEMPT TO LAUNCH ANOTHER OFFENSIVE. WE SEEK TO DENY HIM THIS TIME AND ACCESS.

CABLE NO. 2

SUBJECT: PESHAWAR/TANKS

FROM AMBASSADOR RAWALPINDI 8623

1. LAST EVENING PRESIDENT AYUB PHONED ME TO SAY THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO QUOTE TAKE A CALCULATED RISK UNQUOTE AND AGREE TO SOME EXTENSION OF BASE OPERATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF MY PREVIOUS PROPOSAL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS WILLING TO TAKE SUCH A RISK BECAUSE HE WAS ANXIOUS TO BE HELPFUL TO USG IN ANY WAY HE COULD.

2. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED SECRETARY YUSUF TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AND WORK OUT THE DETAILS.

3. AYUB THEN SAID THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER MATTER HE HAD MEANT TO DISCUSS WITH ME THE EVENING BEFORE. HE REMINDED ME OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND ME IN KARACHI LAST DECEMBER 23 ABOUT QUOTE HORSES UNQUOTE; SAID HE GREATLY APPRECIATED ALL THE EFFORTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE IN THAT DIRECTION; AND THAT HE HOPES THAT THOSE EFFORTS WOULD BE CARRIED FORWARD TO EARLY FRUITION BECAUSE HE BADLY NEEDED THE QUOTE HORSES UNQUOTE.

4. I ASSURED HIM THAT EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT WAS BEING MADE.

AMTOK FROM QUICK COPY

5. PURSUANT TO APPOINTMENT I MET WITH YUSUF AT 1000 HOURS THIS MORNING. HE HANDED ME AN UNOFFICIAL UNSIGNED AIDE MEMOIRE READING AS FOLLOWS:

A. DISMANTLING, PACKING AND REMOVAL OF THE FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT SHALL COMMENCE IN JANUARY 1969. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A STAGGERED THINNING DOWN OF PERSONNEL.

B. ALL FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT NOT DISMANTLED BY THE CUT-OUT DATE (I.E. 17 JULY 1969) WILL BE DISMANTLED NOT LATER THAN 31ST DECEMBER 1969 IN ACCORDANCE WITH A FIXED MONTHLY PROGRAMME.

C. ALL DISMANTLED FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT SHALL BE PACKED AND CRATED AND BE REMOVED FROM PAKISTAN AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AND IN NO CASE LATER THAN 28TH FEBRUARY 1970. ALL REMAINING BASE PERSONNEL WILL BE EVACUATED COMPLETELY BY THE SAME DATE.

6. ATTENTION IS CALLED TO THE REFERENCE TO QUOTE A FIXED MONTHLY PROGRAM UNQUOTE IN PARAGRAPH 5 (2) ABOVE. YUSUF AND I AGREED THAT WE WOULD MEET AGAIN ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 28.

A. FOR HIM TO RECEIVE OUR FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE PROPOSAL (I WOULD HOPE AND URGE THAT IT BE ACCEPTED, SINCE IT COVERS ALL DESIRED POINTS EXCEPT FOR SUGAR TREE OPERATION FOR SAME MONTHS AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1969); AND

B. IF POSSIBLE FOR US TO SUBMIT A PROPOSED FIXED MONTHLY SCHEDULE ALTHOUGH IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES ALONG THE LINES OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE WITH THE FIXED MONTHLY SCHEDULE TO BE FURNISHED LATER. WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SUBMIT THE SCHEDULE ON OCTOBER 28 AND WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE ALONG THOSE LINES ASAP.

7. THERE WAS ONE DISTURBING ELEMENT IN THE YUSUF CONVERSATION, BUT I DO NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER IT INSURMOUNTABLE. HE STATED THAT, IN ADDITION TO AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS EMBODYING THE POINT OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE, THERE SHOULD BE A VERBAL UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL ANTENNA WOULD BE DOWN BY JULY 17, 1969.

8. I TOLD HIM THAT, WHILE I WAS NOT RPT NOT TECHNICALLY INFORMED, I BELIEVE THAT SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD NEGATE THE INTENTION FOR US TO BE ABLE TO OPERATE SELECTED EQUIPMENT THROUGH 31 DECEMBER AND I DID NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT THE EQUIPMENT WAS OPERABLE WITHOUT ANTENNA.

9. RE RESPONDED THAT WHAT THEY WANTED WAS CONTINUED USE IN QUOTE A DISCREET MANNER UNQUOTE WITH ALL ANTENNA INDOORS IF POSSIBLE OR AT LEAST AS UNOBTUSIVE AS POSSIBLE.

10. THE GIST AND TONE OF THE CONVERSATION WAS SUCH THAT I BELIEVE THEY WILL NOT RPT NOT INSIST ON THE ANTENNA POINT PROVIDED MUCH OF THE MOST OBTUSIVE ELEMENTS ARE DOWN BY JULY 17 AND FURTHER PROGRESS IN THAT DIRECTION IS EVIDENT THEREAFTER.

OENLERT

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DTG: 201535Z OCT 68



Pres file

32

Monday, October 21, 1968  
10:40 a. m.

~~TOP SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-479

By 1-8, NARA, Date 2-25-93

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a pessimistic analysis of this morning's meeting. I am not sure it is right, but we ought to consider it.

They ask for three things, any one of which alone could destroy the Saigon government; all three certainly would:

- our acceptance of their theological language about an "unconditional" bombing halt;
- a long delay before the first "serious" negotiating meeting;
- 4 powers rather than our-side-year-side.

They may believe that our anxiety for a bombing halt and forward movement for domestic political purposes is so great we would fall into the trap of opening up this kind of gap between Washington and Saigon. Even the Chinese Communists are bringing the election into the bombing halt question.

Communists always think in terms of what they call "inner contradictions" in the camp of their enemies.

It is possible that:

- they have no interest in forward progress unless it broke the GVN or greatly strained the U. S. -GVN relation;
- they are taking our temperature on the pre-election question, in which case Sect. Rusk might quickly disabuse Debrynia;
- they may be waiting to see if Vice President Humphrey wins, whom they may regard as an easier negotiating partner;
- they may accept our terms, if we hold steady.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-407  
By rip, NARA, Date 4-17-95

ACTION

33

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 19, 1968 -- 3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk requests your authorization to resume diplomatic relations with the new Peruvian Government which took power on October 3. (Tab A) His memorandum projects this action on or about Wednesday, October 23. I understand, however, that State may now wish to recognize as early as Monday, October 21.

-- The Military Government is in full control, and no significant opposition has materialized. It has met all the traditional tests for recognition.

-- We have carried out full consultations with other OAS members. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and several others have already recognized. Most of the others will have recognized by Monday.

-- The new government has assured it will honor its international obligations and that it will hold a referendum to decide whether a new constitution shall be drafted before holding new elections. However, it may be many months, or even years, before freely elected government returns to Peru.

-- The IPC expropriation will gravely complicate our future relations, but should be kept separate from the diplomatic recognition question. Prompt recognition may help us protect IPC's interest in obtaining a reasonable settlement.

-- Resumption of relations does not imply resumption of all assistance programs.

Events in Panama are also moving toward early recognition by most countries. State may recommend that we follow suit next week. The Peru case should be resolved first.

I recommend that you authorize the resumption of diplomatic relations with Peru whenever Sec. Rusk wishes to move.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-282  
By ig, NARA, Date 1-25-96

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Resumption of Relations with the New Peruvian Government

Recommendation:

That you authorize the resumption of diplomatic relations with the new Government of Peru on or about Wednesday, October 23, by which time we believe most other members of the OAS and industrialized countries will have done so.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

The Military Government which ousted President Fernando Belaunde on October 3 is in full control of Peru. There has been no significant opposition to the Military Government which has consolidated its position with the public largely through the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company (IPC).

At the present time, our relations with Peru are suspended. Nevertheless, informal channels of communication, both in Washington and Lima, have been used. We have carried out an extensive round of bilateral consultations with the other OAS member states under Resolution XXVI of the 1965 Rio Conference. Our discussions indicated a general attitude of disapprobation over the military takeover and concern about the interruption of constitutional rule in Peru. Nevertheless, most Latin American countries see no choice but to continue relations with the new Government. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and several other Latin American states have already resumed relations, and we understand that Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay and

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Colombia will do so this week. They will be followed by the Central American countries, Ecuador and others with the exception of Venezuela, which follows the "Betancourt Doctrine" of non-recognition of military governments. Western Europe and other trading nations such as Australia and Japan either have resumed relations or will in the next few days and have been in close touch with the United States in order to learn of our plans.

The military regime, in soliciting continuation of relations, has made the traditional guarantees of honoring international obligations. It has actively assured private investors that it will honor its commitments and contracts and will encourage private investment. The Prime Minister, on the subject of return to democratic processes, has announced that the Government will conduct a referendum to determine whether the Peruvian people wish to have elections under the present constitution, or would prefer constitutional reform.

On instructions, our Ambassador inquired informally of the new Government its intentions with regard to a return to constitutional processes and in regard to the Government's intentions toward private American investment. The Foreign Minister outlined a plan for a national referendum to decide on the question of a constitutional revision before new elections. While he stated that all international norms regarding private investment would be respected, he stated that the IPC case was a unique situation. The Company's claim for compensation would be determined by Peruvian courts. (The courts, however, seldom rule against the Government.)

The immediate pretext for the military takeover was the alleged impropriety and deficiency of the settlement made between the previous Government and the International Petroleum Company. In a dramatic move, the President of the military regime, General Juan Velasco, announced the definitive expropriation of IPC. This has received universal acclaim in Peru but has complicated our bilateral problems. Confiscatory actions such as this are subject to provisions in both the Foreign Assistance Act and the Sugar Act; and, unless the Peruvian Government takes steps to reach a fair solution with the Company, the United States Government could be obliged to take action under existing legislation. Nevertheless, the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

IPC question should be distinct from that of diplomatic relations. If there is some flexibility in the Peruvian Government position on this problem, our best effort to protect the Company from arbitrary and unjust action will be needed and will necessitate official contact with the Government. Our efforts may also be needed on behalf of other large American private interests as they deal with the Military Government.

I do not believe that a lengthy period of suspension will benefit our immediate or long-range interests in Peru, either from an official, private or hemispheric standpoint. Our flexibility will be greater after resumption of relations which, in any event, does not imply a resumption of all AID and assistance programs of the past nor a promise or obligation for the future without correct and constructive policies and actions by the new Government.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

34

*Pres file*

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

October 19, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's message telling Abe to maintain relentless and persistent pressure on the enemy and Abe's acknowledgment that he will do so.

*W. Rostow*

~~TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989

By 19, NARA, Date 3-1-93

16 October 1968

(OK)  
W  
342

~~TOP SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

From: General Wheeler, CJCS, Washington  
To: General Abrams, COMUSMACV, Saigon  
(Deliver during waking hours)

1. Since I know that you are in close touch with Ambassador Bunker, you will place the following in context. During a conversation with Secretary Clifford this morning, he told me that the ~~highest authority desires that you maintain constant, relentless, and persistent pressure on the enemy in South Vietnam wherever and whenever you can do so. Other overt programs in Laos and North Vietnam (to include naval activity) should be maintained at the most productive level possible in view of the weather, operational considerations and your requirements in South Vietnam.~~ In setting forth the above, the highest authority desires to avoid any <sup>sudden</sup> dramatic increases in out-of-country operations; the same does not apply to operations in South Vietnam.

2. As you know, I sent a directive via CINCPAC the other day to move the NEW JERSEY to an operating area south of 18 degrees north latitude. She should adhere to these instructions until otherwise directed. Warm regards.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30  
By *plg* NARA, Date 3-11-02

346

*indist*

EYES ONLY

BOOK COPY  
17 OCT 1958

SECDEF	
DEPSEC	
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~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

O 170217Z ZYH ZFF-1  
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS  
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 14004 EYES ONLY

I HAVE YOUR JCS 11390 OCT 68. WE ARE AND  
WILL CONTINUE TO COMPLY WITH THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED  
THEREIN.

DECLASSIFIED  
EO 12958, Sec 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1993  
By 19 NARA Date 3-193

35  
INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, October 21, 1968 -- 8:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

President Arias of Panama will leave voluntarily for the U.S. tonight by U.S. military aircraft. He will arrive at Dulles airport tomorrow morning about 9:00 a.m. and soon thereafter will undoubtedly be seeking appointments with you and other officials in Washington to plead his cause.

Bob Anderson's telephone call apparently did the trick.

W. W. Restow

SLewis:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02



*Pres. file*  
36

~~TOP SECRET -~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~

Monday, Oct. 21, 1968  
6:25 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is how South Vietnamese reported  
their conversation with Harriman on your-side-our-  
side.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ attachment *(in Suspense & Pres. file)*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-110 and NLJ/RAC 139.030.003/1  
By JC/is, NARA, Date 7-26-84

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

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1968 OCT 21 16 33

*This is complete text of  
msg received earlier in garbled  
form.*

OO [REDACTED]  
DE [REDACTED] 2951555  
O 211540Z ZYH  
FM DIRNSA  
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)  
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE.  
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.  
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.  
VIETNAMESE (SOUTH) -- WS--  
XXMMENP01 FTB21108  
3/O/TT-VND/T - 68 CHANGE 1((A))

REPORT ON 19 OCTOBER PARIS MEETING BETWEEN U.S. AND SOUTH  
VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS CONCERNING TRUCE TALKS

XXCC

FR PARIS: LIAISON MISSION 20 OCT 68 ((M))  
TO SAIGON: FOREIGN MINISTRY -- 247/68/PM

I HAD A LONG TALK WITH HARRIMAN, WITH VANCE AND HABIB  
PRESENT, TODAY, 19 OCTOBER FROM 1500 TO 1800 HOURS. FIRST OF  
ALL I INFORMED HARRIMAN THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WAS CATEGORICALLY  
OPPOSED TO THE NLF ((NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT)) PARTICIPATION IN  
THE CONFERENCE AS A SEPARATE ENTITY FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE  
DELEGATION AND THAT WE WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS  
IF THE NLF IS ADMITTED IN THIS WAY. I ALSO ADDED THAT WE  
COULD NOT CONSIDER OUR PARTICIPATION AT A CONFERENCE WITH THE  
NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE NLF AS SEPARATE ENTITIES AN ADVANTAGE  
THAT COULD JUSTIFY A TOTAL BOMBING HALT OF NORTH VIETNAM. I  
ALSO WARNED HARRIMAN ABOUT COMMUNIST MANEUVERS TO DIFFERENTIATE  
THE TWO WARS. HERE ARE HARRIMAN'S OFFICIAL REPLIES:

1. YOU REALLY SHOULD BRING THESE MATTERS UP WITH  
WASHINGTON. IN ANY CASE, I AM EXTREMELY SURPRISED THAT THE  
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAS GONE BACK TO A QUESTION  
ON WHICH AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, TO  
WIT, THE NLF'S PARTICIPATION.

SANITIZED

Authority N418-59  
By CTS, NARA, Date 6/20/19

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

2. IT IS A BIG MISTAKE FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT NOT TO REALIZE HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO ARRANGE FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAS MORE TO GAIN THAN THE FRONT AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE, FOR IN THIS WAY HANOI DOES RECOGNIZE SOUTH VIETNAM.

3. YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WILL FIND NO SUPPORT IN THE U.S., I AM ABSOLUTELY SURE, REGARDLESS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FUTURE, AND EVEN AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

4. I REALLY FAIL TO UNDERSTAND HOW YOUR GOVERNMENT CAN CONTINUE TO CONFUSE REALITY WITH FANTASY.

5. UNVISIBLY WORKED UP, HARRIMAN STATED THAT THE U.S. WAS SENDING A MILLION TROOPS AND SPENDING THIRTY BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR "FOR PRINCIPLES AND NOT FOR FANTASY."((B))

I ANSWERED HARRIMAN, STRESSING THE FACT THAT WE WERE NOT DISCUSSING THE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM NOR WERE WE OBLIVIOUS TO THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS COMMITMENT. MOREOVER, CONTRARY TO HANOI WHICH HAS SYSTEMATICALLY REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE US, FOR A LONG TIME NOW WE HAVE ADMITTED THE PRINCIPLE OF NLF PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE TALKS.

THERE IS NOTHING ELSE LEFT SAVE THE CONDITIONS FOR THIS PARTICIPATION, WHICH MUST BE SET UP IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE NLF CANNOT EXPLOIT THIS EVENT AS A POLITICAL VICTORY AND IT IS INDEED THIS POINT THAT HAS BEEN OUR GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS ARE AS IMPORTANT AS OTHER BASIC PROBLEMS.

AFTER THIS CLARIFICATION, I PUT SEVERAL QUESTIONS TO HARRIMAN:

1. CAN WE CONSIDER AS FACT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AGREES THAT THE NLF DELEGATION WILL NOT BE A SEPARATE ENTITY FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION? ANSWER: "I DON'T . . . BUT WE BELIEVE THEY WILL ACT AS SEPARATE DELEGATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WILL GIVE PRESS CONFERENCES; THEY WILL SAY WHAT THEY WISH TO SAY; THEY ARE MEN, THEY CAN WALK ON THEIR FEET."((B))

2. WILL THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION BE CONSIDERED AS A SEPARATE ENTITY IN SPITE OF THE TWO SIDES FORMULA? ANSWER: HARRIMAN HESITATED, TRYING TO HIDE BEHIND THE TWO SIDES FORMULA, BUT LATER VANCE. . . REPLIED, WITH HABIB PRESENT: "THERE WILL BE TWO CHIEFS ON OUR SIDE, YOU AND US."((B))

3. WHAT WOULD THE U.S. DELEGATION'S REACTION BE IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE TO ALLOW THE NLF TO SPEAK ON QUESTIONS CONCERNING SOUTH VIETNAM? ANSWER: "IT IS THEIR RIGHT. HOWEVER, WE WILL NOT REPLY TO THEM AS SUCH BUT WE WILL ADDRESS THE OTHER SIDE ONLY BY YOUR EXCELLENCY."((B))

XXHH  
900

~~TOP SECRET THREE~~

NNNN

ZCZCKAB519

.....

1963 OCT 21 16 42

00  
DE 2951555  
O 211540Z ZYH  
FM DIRNSA  
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)  
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE.  
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.  
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.  
3/0/TF VND/T -68 CHANGE 1((A))

4. WILL THE OTHER ALLIES PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS  
WHEN MILITARY PROBLEMS COME UP FOR DISCUSSION? ANSWER:  
"NOT NECESSARILY. WE WILL KEEP THEM INFORMED."((B))

5. DO YOU AGREE THAT POLITICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING  
SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH  
VIETNAMESE DELEGATIONS ONLY? REPLY: "YES."((B))

6. GIVEN THE TWO SIDES FORMULA, HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN  
THE AMERICAN PRESENCE -- AS PRINCIPAL ALLY, AS THE  
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ALLIES OR, FINALLY, AS A PARTICIPANT  
IN THE FIGHTING? ANSWER: WE HAVE BILATERAL PROBLEMS TO BE  
RESOLVED WITH THE OTHER PARTY.

7. DO YOU FORESEE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AS A  
FINAL STAGE, WITH ALLIED PARTICIPATION AND PROBABLE  
PARTICIPATION BY OTHER POWERS? ANSWER: "IT IS NOT  
EXCLUDED."((B))

IN CONCLUSION, IT SEEMS TO ME DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THE TWO  
SIDES FORMULA OR TO AVOID THE NLF'S APPEARING AS A  
SEPARATE ENTITY. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE NLF DELEGATION  
WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS SUCH. ALL WE CAN DO IS TO PAY NO  
ATTENTION TO THE PRESENCE OF THE NLF ACROSS FROM US AND ADDRESS  
OUR REMARKS TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION ONLY, EVEN  
IF THE . . . INTERVENE. IT. . . HOWEVER, THAT THE HANOI  
DELEGATION WILL TAKE THE SAME. . . IN THIS REGARD. IN ALL  
PROBABILITY, THEREFORE, EVERYTHING WILL TAKE PLACE AS IF THERE  
WERE ONLY TWO PARTIES, EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE FOUR DELEGATIONS  
PARTICIPATING.

ON PARTING, HARRIMAN REASSURED ME, SAYING, "WE DO NOT  
BEHAVE LIKE THE FRENCH."((B)) ALSO, HE QUOTED SOMETHING  
ROSTOW TOLD BUI DIEM, TO THE EFFECT THAT WE WOULD CREATE  
PROBLEMS FOR OURSELVES IF WE REMAIN TOO SUSPICIOUS AND THAT  
WITH MORE CONFIDENCE WE WOULD REACH OUR GOALS. HARRIMAN  
SAID HE WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH ROSTOW AND ADVISED  
US NOT TO PAY TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE  
MATTER OF FORM.

((A)) REISSUE BASED ON MORE COMPLETE TEXT.

((B)) QUOTED PORTIONS OF TEXT APPEAR IN ENGLISH.

MS -- CN --

XXHH

600

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

## BRIEFING MEMO

Monday, October 21, 1968 -- 6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Subject: Notes for Meeting With Phil Potter, 6:30 p.m. today.

*Pres file*

1. Negotiations. From my experience with Phil, he will simply accept it as a good citizen if you say:

-- The public interest requires that the President not go beyond the flat statement of George Christian that there is no basic change and no breakthrough.

-- Our position remains what it has steadily been and there will be no basic change in it in this Administration.

-- We simply do not know whether Hanoi will decide to negotiate seriously soon or built up its forces now at or across the frontiers with fresh recruits and infiltrators for another January offensive.

2. You may wish to talk from the text of Amb. Bunker's latest cable, summarizing the last 3 months -- or even let him read it on an off-the-record basis. It is an excellent, well balanced summary containing nothing very sensitive.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

WWRostow:rla



## THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

WASHINGTON

Monday, October 21, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Herewith a capsule of Ambassador Bunker's Quarterly Summary (July-Sept. 1968)

A. General

-- This message reviews the past quarter. The next message will cover priorities for the next four months.

-- Major events of the past three months:

- . Honolulu Conference
- . Enemy's abortive "third offensive"
- . Assumption of military initiative by friendly forces
- . Rapid build-up and continued improvement of RVNAF
- . Gradual but steady drive toward pacification
- . Step-up in attack on VC infrastructure
- . Preparations for pacification counteroffensive (Nov. 1-Jan. 31)
- . Completion of Recovery Program (for Tet and May civil evacuees)
- . Moves toward broader based political organization
- . Decision to allow "Big" Minh to return from exile
- . Gradual return of economy to pre-Tet levels

-- Despite setbacks there is no sure sign of a change in enemy strategy.

-- Trend toward stronger, more confident and unified SVN indicated by:

- . Increased confidence in ability to run own affairs
- . Willingness of SVN to assume larger burden of war
- . Effectiveness of working alliance between Thieu and Huong
- . US firmness at Paris and Honolulu, which reassured GVN on US intentions
- . Thieu's efforts to nurture a broad political organization

-- Trend toward constitutional development indicated by:

- . More stress on institutions and less on personal relationships
- . Decline of extra-constitutional power of Ky and other generals
- . Effective executive-legislative working relationship
- . Assembly's useful function as lawmaker and sounding board

-- Mobilization of regular, para-military and self-defense forces continued.

-- Steady improvement in position of Allied forces and deteriorating enemy capabilities indicated by:

- . Continued high enemy casualties
- . Enemy failure to get long threatened "third offensive" underway
- . Maintenance of GVN security presence in countryside which limited VC political gains (as opposed to Tet when forces withdrew to cities)

-- Overall situation has improved significantly, but problems remain:

- . Political unity and popular support still far short of goal
- . Uncommitted groups must be mobilized for competition with Communists
- . GVN handling of youth and press has been less than skillful
- . Despite setbacks, enemy retains capability for offensive action, and may still feel wearing us down will yield concessions from our side
- . Despite progress, corruption is still a deeply rooted cancer

-- On balance, Bunker sees history with us, and believes, if we persevere, this bitter war will prevent broader conflicts.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 3993

~~SECRET-NODIS~~



B. Political

- Huong still popular; viewed as tough, incorruptible leader
- Opposition efforts to label Huong "soft" on NLF have been countered, but with some political cost.
- Some moves against youth, press and dissidents bothered us, but they made sense in the SVN context.
- Anti-corruption campaign has hit police and provincial officials.
- Pressure being applied to improve effectiveness of GVN at all levels.
- Major shortfalls are in same areas as major accomplishments; Thieu and Huong have provided the best GVN since early-Diem but monumental tasks confront them.

C. Military

- Kept off balance, enemy was unable to achieve his objectives in offensive action and abandoned plans for many attacks.
- Terrorist attacks increased, but enemy activity at end of period was characterized by efforts to avoid battle.
- Armed forces increased 60,000 to 825,000 (up 180,000 since Jan. 1).
- Firepower and aggressiveness both improved, although more improvements needed in training and leadership of some units.

D. Pacification

- Sharp rise in relatively secure population was recorded during quarter, bringing total (67%) back approximately to pre-Tet high.
- RF/PF have been more aggressive and effective, a reflection of better leadership and equipment.
- Attack on VC infrastructure going well with increased GVN input.
- Self-defense participants now number over 650,000 after big GVN push; 240,000 have had training, 60,000 are armed.
- Pacification back in stride with outlook more favorable than in months, major across-the-board effort planned (from Nov. 1 to Jan. 31).

E. Economic

- Prices rose (30% since Jan. 1) but slower than rise in money supply.
- Confidence slowly returning.
- Rural economy and transportation improving, but farmer income has suffered because of subsidized sale of imported rice.
- 50,000 acres of "miracle rice" planted; promise higher yields.
- Accelerated distribution of GVN-owned land underway; initial 175,000 acre target should be reached in April 1969.
- Despite Tet disruption, hamlet school program almost on schedule.

Saturday, October 19, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 40697)

Herewith my seventy-first weekly message:

A. General

In early July, I summarized in my fifty-ninth message the events and trends, the achievements, and shortcomings of the first half of 1968. I think a similar summation of the third quarter may now be useful. Accordingly, this message is a review of the situation as it developed in July, August, and September. As in my summary of the first six months of 1968, this message will begin with an overview, followed by more detailed accounts of the salient political, military, economic and pacification developments. In my next message, I propose to cover the priority areas where we think it most essential to drive ahead and, where we intend to concentrate our maximum efforts between now and Tet, i. e., in the next four months.

The major events of the past three months were:

1. The Honolulu conference;
2. The enemy's abortive August/ September "third offensive";
3. The assumption of the military initiative by friendly forces;
4. The rapid build-up of the Vietnamese Armed Forces and their continued improvement;
5. The gradual but steady drive toward pacification;
6. The step-up in the attack on Viet Cong infrastructure, and plans for future intensification;
7. The preparation of a pacification counteroffensive to be carried out November 1-January 31;
8. The completion of the recovery program;
9. The move toward political organization with the official launching of the Lien Minh and its new action program;
10. The decision to allow General Duong Van Minh to return to Vietnam; and
11. The gradual return of the economy toward pre-Tet levels.

The enemy's strategy of "general offensive" continued, both costly and unrewarding to him, but as the quarter ended there was as yet no definitive sign of a change in his strategy.

I think several important trends emerged from the events of the past three months. I characterized the major trend of the first half of 1968 as the movement toward a stronger, more self-confident, more unified Vietnamese people and government.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 769/CBS 10  
By sg/uh, NARA, Date 3-9-93

This trend has continued. The expectation of a renewed enemy drive against the nation's cities served to maintain pressures for unity, cooperation with the government and maximum mobilization of all military and civilian resources. The subsequent failure of the enemy's military effort, plus the improved performance of both the government and the Armed Forces, further increased Vietnamese confidence in their ability to run their own government, to shoulder a greater part of the war's burden, and to determine their own future. This increased self-confidence was also reflected clearly in a marked decline in fears that the United States might impose a settlement which could lead to a Communist takeover. I should add, however, that these fears could re-emerge if intent underlying apprehensions are stimulated by new events or rumors.

Contributing heavily to the growth in Vietnamese unity and self-confidence was the effectiveness of the working alliance between President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong. This has been one of the major pluses for the period. Thieu and Huong have complemented and supported one another in the effort to prepare the people for peace negotiations and a future political contest with the Communists. Despite some obvious difficulties, Thieu backed Huong on his anti-corruption campaign and significant progress was made. He allowed Huong to run the government from day to day with little interference and supported his decisions, while Huong looked to Thieu for policy guidance and threw his considerable personal influence and prestige behind the Thieu regime. The result has been more effective government, significantly increased popular support, and continued, though not yet adequate, movement toward national unity.

The Vietnamese confidence in the U. S. also improved. In late June and early July, the Assembly and the press were full of forebodings about American intentions. The Lower House called on the U. S. to put a time limit on the Paris talks and one deputy called the absence of a Vietnamese representative at the talks "a national disgrace". By the end of September, these fears and suspicions had subsided to a considerable extent. The Honolulu Conference and our firm stand at Paris were two factors contributing to this change. It also reflected Vietnamese relief at the outcome of our national party conventions. It sprang significantly from awareness of the fact that the military situation was greatly improved.

Also contributing to the trend toward more national unity was Thieu's efforts to nurture a broad nationalist political organization. The official launching of the Lien Minh took place on July 4 and some 840 cadre have been since trained for a high impact self-help social welfare program in Saigon.

The second basic trend which I observed in the first half continued; there was further movement toward constitutional democracy, government based on institutions rather than personal relationships, and civilian control of the military. Thieu is in fact now close to exercising the full powers vested in him by the constitution, and the extra-constitutional power of Vice President Ky and the other generals has continued to decline.

Perhaps the most obvious example of this trend was the removal, without repercussions, of General Khang as the Third Corps Commander. Khang was not only the principal Ky supporter still holding a position of great power, but he is an avowed opponent of constitutional democracy. He thoroughly distrusts civilian politicians and the National Assembly, and he has never concealed the fact. His removal symbolizes the further decline of the power of the military group that took over the government in 1965.

Less dramatic than Khang's removal, but at least equally as important in moving toward constitutional government and full democracy, was the continued functioning of an independent legislature. While it was by no means all smooth sailing, the Assembly and executive continue an effective working relationship. Besides serving as a vital sounding board for public opinion, thus providing both a safety valve and a meaningful check on the executive, the Assembly hammered out several basic laws. These included the measure establishing the Supreme Court, the law governing the Inspectorate, war risk insurance, and an electoral law for the by-election in Saigon. Well along toward enactment were the laws governing the press, the political parties, and of setting up the three councils provided for in the constitution.

During this period the GVN continued to carry out its general mobilization program. By September 30, regular forces alone had a strength of 825,000; including the paramilitary forces, the total was well over a million. Efforts to upgrade and increase the strength of Regional and Popular Forces continued, and self-defense forces were enlarged to over 650,000 men and women. While many weaknesses and shortcomings remain in the effort to effect total mobilization, when one considers what has been achieved from a manpower pool representing two-thirds of a population of 17 million, the magnitude of the accomplishment is impressive.

On the military side, the trend has been one of steady improvement in the position of allied forces and deteriorating capability on the part of the enemy. The enemy continued to suffer very heavy casualties; the total enemy killed in action this year is already greater than for 1966 and 1967 combined. Although the August attacks made few headlines because they were smashed before they really got off the ground, enemy losses were almost as great as those suffered in the more spectacular May/June offensive. One result of these heavy losses is the growing proportion of regular North Vietnamese troops, a situation which is causing the enemy increasing difficulties in terms of local support and troop morale.

While the May/June enemy drive was markedly less effective than his Tet attacks, the decline in enemy offensive potential was revealed with far greater force by his almost complete failure to get the long threatened "third wave" underway. Except for a brief foray into the outskirts of Tay Ninh, the enemy penetrated no urban areas. He was forced to abandon his intention to attack Ban Me Thuot, and the main target -- Saigon -- was never seriously threatened. By defeating the enemy away from population centers, the heavy damage and loss of civilian lives that accompanied the Tet and May offensives were averted. This enemy failure, unfortunately, had the paradoxical effect that others elsewhere in the world did not take cognizance of the fact that he had tried, and failed, to launch a third offensive.

It is also notable that the withdrawal of friendly forces from the countryside to defend cities and towns did not re-occur, so the proportion of the population under reasonable government control continued to increase slowly but steadily despite the August attacks and is now virtually back to the pre-Tet level. At the end of the quarter, the government was developing plans aimed at increasing further its control of the countryside -- the pacification counteroffensive. This took on new importance in light of the heavy emphasis by the enemy on the formation of "Liberation Committees." While these Committees could serve a variety of purposes, it seems likely that they are intended primarily for a cease-fire situation. Given some kind of internationally supervised cease-fire, Liberation Committees could lead some credibility of control over wide areas of the countryside. It should be noted, however, that much of this is "old wine in new bottles"; that many of these Committees are simply existing bodies under a new name and that more than half of them are in Viet Cong controlled hamlets and villages. In any case, it is vitally important that this tactic be countered and the government's plans for this, I believe, are sound. We will support them fully.

There is, of course, a debit side of the ledger. While I think it is fair to say that the overall situation has improved significantly in the past three months, important weaknesses and shortfalls still plague the GVN and its allies.

On the political side, it must be said that the progress toward unity which I have cited above still leaves us far short of the goal. The government needs much more popular support than it has won so far. If it is to rally the anti-Communist majority for a successful political effort against the Communists, the Lien Minh must find a way to draw in other political groups, such as the militant Catholics, Hoa Hoa, and Buddhists. Though the decline in Ky's power makes his relationship to Thieu less crucial, the continuing distrust between them remains an important political liability.

In some areas, the Thieu-Huong government has made important progress toward effective constitutional democracy; it must also be said that they have often proved less than skillful in handling problems affecting youth and the press and a few dissidents such as Truong Dinh Dzu. Corruption has been cut back and the attack continues, but it still remains a deep-rooted cancer.

On the military side, we must note that despite his failures and defeats, the enemy still has some capability of building up for further costly offensives, in the hope of wearing down our determination to see the war through. His ability to withdraw to sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam gives him a great advantage if this is his purpose. Nobody could tell us as of the end of September to what extent Hanoi believes its own propaganda about our losses and how they assess the likelihood of important American concessions in Paris. While we objectively judge their military situation to be very bad, they may subjectively still judge it to be good enough to hold out for American concessions.

Finally, the basic question is are we making progress; are we gaining or losing ground? In Vietnam, an assessment is doubly difficult because the very nature of the war makes defining victory or defeat so much more complicated than in most

conflicts. I have outlined the progress for the last three months, the trends as I see them, and the remaining problems. After adding all of the factors, the pluses and minuses together, and making allowances for the imponderables, I can only say that I feel optimistic about this situation; that the steady, though not spectacular progress I have previously noted has continued and accelerated. The tide of history now seems to me to be moving with us and not against us; and I believe that if we persevere, this bitter war will serve to prevent future, broader conflicts.

### B. Political

When I wrote the summary for the first six months of 1968, the Huong government was still so new in office that it was difficult to say much about its performance. Now, with only a little over four months to judge by, it is still early to come to firm conclusions, but I think it may be useful to draw up a tentative balance sheet.

Perhaps the first item on the plus side of the ledger is the increase in popular support which Huong brought to the government. He has a substantial personal following in the south. More important, his image as an incorruptible, tough, paternal figure has not suffered after four months in power. If anything, his speeches, his travels, and his public acts have brightened the image.

Huong has his detractors and his political opponents, and the Vietnamese public remains perhaps the most skeptical in the world. At the very outset Huong faced stiff opposition from the Revolutionary Dai Viets, some northern Catholic elements, and some of the cliques around Vice President Ky. Ky himself predicted that the Huong government would not last long.

Huong's opponents adopted the tactic of trying to label Huong soft, vis-a-vis the National Liberation Front and pro-Communist elements. Huong cut the ground from under them, not without some political cost, by firing Doctor Phan Quang Dan and by taking a very tough line with students and the press. The trial of Truong Dinh Dzu and the alliance leaders was, in part, this kind of response to the pressures Huong felt from his political enemies.

However regrettable some of these moves from our point of view, they at least proved effective in terms of Vietnamese domestic politics. Barring unforeseen events, such as a turn in the Paris talks considered unfavorable to the GVN, there seems no immediate danger that Huong's opponents can generate any significant degree of popular pressure for a change in government. On the contrary, recognizing that their tactics have been unprofitable, the leaders of the Revolutionary Dai Viets have recently decided to moderate their opposition stance.

Probably the second most important plus for the Huong government is the anti-corruption drive. This effort predates the Huong government, and it is due at least as much to President Thieu's support as to Huong's determination to clean up the government. With the sometimes free swinging support of the Assembly and the local press, Huong has given the fight against corruption new impetus and new prominence.



Among Huong's first moves against corruption was the revitalization of the executive Inspectorate system by placing it under Minister of State, Mai Tho Truyen. Truyen's office is charged with investigating charges of corruption and documenting them. Truyen has told us that his staff cannot keep up with the volume of complaints they receive. A more recent administrative anti-corruption measure was the creation in August of anti-corruption committees in every province and municipality. They are specifically charged with inventing and implementing measures that will make corruption more difficult and less profitable. Also in August, the Huong government directed all civil servants to declare their property holdings, including the property of their wives, children, and parents.

Huong has continued Thieu's earlier efforts to remove corrupt officials, particularly province chiefs, and replace them with more honest and more able men. Since Tet, 23 of 44 province chiefs have been changed and the government has made known its intention to replace four more; while many of these were not relieved for corruption, the majority of those whom we had reason to consider notoriously corrupt were among the men removed. In the past such offenders were often not prosecuted or otherwise punished, even though they were fired for corruption. In September, the Huong government not only announced the removal of three province chiefs "in order to push forward vigorously the anti-corruption campaign" but also stated that two of them would be prosecuted for corruption.

The replacement of General Loan as Director General of Police by Colonel Tran Van Hai has also been important in reducing corruption. Petty graft and shake-downs by police have long been among the most visible and annoying forms of corruption from the point of view of the average citizen. Hai has removed, punished, and disciplined literally hundreds of police and police officials in an effort to end these practices. We have several reports that indicate he has in fact made significant inroads on this politically important kind of corruption.

The Huong government should also get credit for several measures designed to realize Huong's belief that the government must make sure that the constitution is applied and that all citizens are equal under the law; in effect, to re-establish the government's authority. Among the more important of these moves was the effort to liberalize the processing of civil prisoners. Dismayed by the number of persons being held without charge in jails throughout the country, Huong ordered the formation of special committees to screen all such prisoners within a minimum time period. Prisoners were either to be charged and tried or released promptly. Huong himself visited a number of prisons to follow up his orders. The result is that several thousand illegal detainees have been released, and the police system generally brought more into line with the guarantees written into the constitution.

The most notable beneficiary of Huong's move to free or try illegal detainees was Thich Tri Quang and several of his followers. These An Quang leaders had been put under "protective custody" after the Tet attacks. With Thieu's blessing, Huong acted to release them. This move not only dramatized the government's confidence and determination to support legal forms, but in Vietnamese eyes, it also placed Tri Quang under a public obligation which makes it more difficult for him to attack the Huong government directly.

In line with this policy, Huong has also pressed Thieu to permit General Duong Van Minh to return to Vietnam. At the end of the quarter, Thieu took the decision, in part I believe, also at my encouragement, and Big Minh returned to Vietnam October 5. While Minh has so far avoided all efforts to identify him with the government or any opposition group, his return is widely regarded as a wise and liberal measure. I also hope that in the future Big Minh's considerable popularity can be brought to bear in support of the GVN and against the Communists.

The Huong government should also be given credit for pressing the civil defense program forward vigorously. After Vice President Ky dropped this project, Huong and his ministers picked it up. With our encouragement, Huong designated August as self-defense month, and as I noted in the General Section, well over 650,000 men and women are now enrolled in self-defense units.

There are other areas in which the Huong government has registered achievements. These include his travels and speeches aimed at preparing the population for the coming political contest with the Communists. (He has specifically tied the self-defense organization to this need in a number of his speeches. Along with Thieu, Huong has worked hard to win a public acceptance of a negotiated settlement and the imperative need for political unity against the Communists in the peace that is coming.) While not temperamentally inclined to an easy relationship with the Assembly, Huong has succeeded in working well with Assembly leaders. Huong is also generally credited with increasing the efficiency of the Cabinet and the Ministries. He has focussed bureaucratic attention on the priority problems and applied pressure for results.

On the negative side, despite real progress, the Huong government still has a long way to go in winning positive popular support, eradicating corruption, reforming the civil service and breathing more vigorous life into the democratic forms which the constitution outlines. The major shortfalls as well as the major accomplishments are in those areas; it is not that Huong has not done well, but that there is so much to do and that time is so short.

The Huong government dealing with the press and students has been mixed. Although one of the first acts of the Huong government was to lift censorship, it then proceeded to mete out suspensions and fines to some papers for false reporting and failing to take guidance on some issues. Criticism has not been stifled by any means, but the government has made clear that the press is not to print any story which may undercut the GVN position on peace, negotiations, or the prosecution of the war. Similarly, the Huong government has dealt sternly with some left-leaning student leaders, which may have alienated some of the politically minded students who constitute the usual minority of the student body.

There were also the trials by a military court of the alliance leaders and Truong Dinh Dzu. While these trials probably strengthened the government internally -- certainly they caused virtually no expressions of opposition -- especially Dzu's

conviction had a most unfortunate effect on the GVN image abroad. I think it is also fair to say in this connection that in general, the Huong government has been pre-occupied by its internal problems to the point where very little has been done to promote its interests in the international sphere.

To sum up, I think the Thieu-Huong alliance has resulted in a government that is more popular, more effective, and more stable than any since the early years of the Diem regime. Nevertheless, the GVN faces monumental tasks; it must redouble its efforts if it is to succeed in forging the national unity and the strong institutions which are likely to be essential for success in the future political war with the Communists.

### C. Military

When the third quarter began, it appeared that the enemy was preparing to launch a series of attacks against Saigon, Ban Me Thuot, the eastern DMZ area, the Hue-Quang Tri area, and the area southwest of Danang. Allied forces aggressively disrupted this effort, engaging the enemy wherever possible, penetrating his base areas, and breaking up his logistics system.

Air strikes and artillery contributed significantly to the effort. B-52 strikes proved particularly effective. One Hoi Chanh who rallied on September 22 near Kontum city stated that air strikes had left only 40 survivors out of 450 assigned personnel in the Fourth Battalion of the 24th Regiment. Recent evidence indicates that the B-52 strikes have caused serious damage to the enemy in all four corps tactical zones, and that the psychological impact on his morale has hurt his fighting ability.

The enemy was kept off balance, and when he finally launched what he termed his "third offensive" on August 18, he was unable to achieve any of his major objectives. He was defeated in sharp engagements at Tay Ninh, near Danang, and at the Duc Lap Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp. He was forced to abandon his plans for an attack on Ban Me Thuot, and although Saigon was rocketed on the night of August 22, the capital was never threatened by a ground attack.

Enemy activity peaked near the end of August and declined steadily in September. Our forces continued to pursue the enemy in September, inflicting further casualties and capturing very large quantities of weapons and supplies. By the end of the quarter, the threat had been met and defeated by allied counteroffensive actions. Enemy activity, for the most part, was reduced to attacks by fire against population centers and military installations, an increasing number of terrorist acts, interdiction of friendly lines of communication, and attempts to avoid battle with organized friendly forces.

The threat has not been eliminated. The enemy's access to sanctuaries across South Vietnam's borders is a tremendous advantage should he decide to rest and regroup for a new offensive thrust. But the capability of the enemy to achieve his objectives

has been reduced. By moving aggressively in the pacification field to take advantage of this opportunity, we can strike a severe blow at his longer-term capabilities.

Enemy losses this quarter were again very heavy. Enemy killed in action during what he calls the third phase offensive were over 23,000 -- nearly as great as that inflicted during the May-June attacks. Enemy forces lost vast quantities of arms and supplies as they were driven back and were hence unable to protect their logistics system. During the period January-September, we have taken from caches almost 8,500 weapons (over 900 crew-served), and over 700 tons of ammunition.

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces also continued to expand and improve its combat performance during this quarter. On June 30, RVNAF had approximately 765,000 men under arms. This was an increase of 120,000 over the level of January 1. At the end of this quarter, the RVNAF strength had increased to about 825,000, a jump of nearly 60,000 men in a period of only three months. Total armed forces in this country, as I said above, are now well over the million mark. This would be the equivalent, on our much larger population base, of an American force of 18 million men.

The RVNAF is also fighting better. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, reports that Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces have gained self-confidence through their victories in recent months, and show encouraging signs of aggressiveness in the conduct of their operations. The increase in firepower of GVN units resulting from issuance of the M-16 rifle and M-60 machine gun has caused a substantial change in the soldier's attitude toward closing with the enemy. Now, armed with a weapon better than the enemy's, he has frequently sought contact with enemy main force units and shown less reluctance to accept casualties in order to decisively engage and defeat the enemy. Large unit leaders have displayed a new aggressiveness, and junior officer and NCO leadership have shown improvement, although certain units are still plagued by serious problems of leadership and training.

While it is difficult to quantify such matters, I call your attention to the conclusions reached by systems analysis of the Department of Defense in a study published in the September issue of Southeast Asia Analysis Report. It showed that since March of this year, ARVN battalions have been 56 percent as effective as U. S. battalions in killing the enemy versus 48 percent during 1967. It concluded that this better performance by ARVN is equivalent to getting the output of an additional 16 U. S. battalions against the enemy. The improved performance plus the increased RVNAF size have added the equivalent of almost 200,000 Americans between December 31-August 31, 1968. This is the more impressive when one remembers the great difference in artillery and air support which the U. S. forces receive. A separate study in the same systems analysis publication showed that per man, the U. S. soldier in a maneuver battalion gets more than ten times the rounds of artillery supporting a Vietnamese in a tactical unit. I don't have a comparable figure for air support, but we know the Vietnamese get much less.

D. Pacification

July-August, 1968, saw a stepped up trend in pacification recovery from the post Tet low. According to the Hamlet Evaluation System, the rate of improvement was the sharpest of any three-month period since the HES started in January, 1967. September HES figures just available indicate a one percent countrywide increase in relatively secure population, bringing the total recovery to seven percentage points in six months.

Almost 67 percent of South Vietnam's 17.5 million population is now regarded as relatively secure, thus practically erasing the Tet setback. If we look at rural population only, the same trend is evident. Relatively secure rural population has now reached 51.3 percent of the countrywide total. Contested rural population declined to 22.8 percent, and Viet Cong controlled rural population to 25.9 percent, by the end of September.

While the improvement in pacification prospects is attributable partly to enemy losses and emerging weaknesses, much must also be ascribed to favorable developments in several pacification areas -- particularly improvement in Regional and Popular Forces and in the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure.

Military Assistance Command, in Vietnam's long standing efforts to improve the neglected Regional and Popular Forces are finally beginning to pay off. Their weaponry has been significantly upgraded, and more is in prospect as we begin the issue of M-16's. By the end of the third quarter, 1968, Regional and Popular Force strength had reached 386,000, the highest ever. This rapid expansion caused a temporary shortage in officer and NCO cadre, but in August-September, this gap began to be filled. Operational results for August (September data is not yet available) show that Regional Force unit operation increased by 8,000 over July (16 percent) and contacts with the enemy increased by 300 (22 percent). Popular Force unit operations increased by 7,600 (9 percent) and contacts by 330 (26 percent). The Regional and Popular Forces killed 77 percent more enemy in August than in July, while their own killed in action increased by 47 percent. We see no reason why this trend in Regional and Popular Force improvement should not accelerate.

The second notable development in July-September, 1968, has been the coming of age of the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure. Thieu gave the Phung Hoang program his personal blessing in July and Minister of Interior Khiem has been energetically pushing it. By the end of September the number of key district intelligence and operations centers had risen to over 200. We estimate that in 1968 to date, between 9,500 and 10,000 Viet Cong infrastructures have been neutralized -- either killed, captured, or rallied. It has taken a long time to get this program well organized and effectively operating on the GVN side, but the program has finally reached the point where it should make an increasingly vital contribution to pacification.

The GVN also continues to put in stronger leadership at the key district and province level. What was once the exception has now become the rule. Most province or district chiefs whom we recommend for relief are removed -- if not always quickly,

at least when "conditions" are right. A second province and district chiefs training course will graduate on October 19. Minister Khiem has asked for our up-to-date list of poor province and district chiefs for his use in placing the new graduates. Police Chief Hai, the Chieu Hoi Minister and Refugee Minister Lu Y have also acted rapidly over the past few months to remove corrupt and/or ineffective chiefs of police and technical services in the provinces. We count this upgrading as one of the biggest pluses in pacification.

Chieu Hoi returnee rates remained steady during the quarter; during July-September, some 4,669 ralliers came in. In view of the increased enemy activity during August, including seven attacks on Chieu Hoi centers in the last week of August alone, the rates are considered favorable.

Another area of significant improvement is civilian self-defense, which indicates growing popular identification with the national government. According to GVN figures for end-September, the total number of participants in self-defense activities of all types was 658,934. Of these, 239,264 had received training, and 58,318 had been issued weapons. Popular enthusiasm was fostered by designating August as self-defense month. High-level GVN personalities participated in self-defense ceremonies and it was used to gain popular participation. The traditional reluctance of the government to put weapons in the hands of the people is gradually changing. Some local defense groups have performed well against enemy attack and they are an increasingly valuable source of intelligence.

As the quarter ends, the most promising development is the across-the-board pacification offensive now laid on for November-January. It calls for upgrading the security status of 1,000 contested hamlets, a major Phung Hoang campaign to eliminate 3,000 Viet Cong infrastructures a month, a special effort to rally 5,000 Chieu Hoi returnees, a campaign to increase popular self-defense groups to over one million people, and a major psychological warfare campaign. The purpose is to galvanize the GVN pacification effort, and if we achieve even half of these ambitious goals, it will be a powerful shot in the arm. Thieu is energetically pushing the offensive, and has accepted the proposals of our pacification advisors. Their initiative is commendable. Despite the many continuing problems in this most difficult of all Vietnam programs, pacification is back in stride and the outlook more favorable than in months, if not years.

#### E. Economic

The economic situation in the third quarter began to shift slowly away from the pattern of the first half. The rise of spending, the size of the public deficit, and the monthly increase in money supply all fell off as the impact of mobilization passed its peak. Heavy import licensing (\$42.9 million compared to \$31.4 million during the previous quarter) showed renewed confidence. The increase in prices (about 30 percent so far this year) has not yet reflected the increase in money supply (up about



50 percent). With confidence slowly but steadily returning, there will almost certainly be further price increases in the last quarter of the year.

The rural economy moved toward pre-Tet levels of activity as transportation routes were generally open and a plentiful supply of goods available. At the same time, prices of many items bought by farmers rose while farm income remained below the level of the previous year, largely because of the situation in the rice trade. That situation was characterized by depressed paddy prices paid to the farmer, low retail prices in Saigon, large quantities of paddy stored in delta rice mills and unsold on farms, and excessive stocks of imported rice in Saigon. On October 11, the Prime Minister told me that the government had decided to cut the present subsidy on imported rice in half, i. e., that the price of imported rice should be permitted to rise; since the price of imported rice tends to set the market price, this will assist farmers. The impact on urban living costs should not be significant. The Prime Minister said the Cabinet would make a full report to President Thieu on economic matters in a few days. Announcement of action on the rice subsidy and other economic matters should follow soon thereafter.

During the quarter, US AID continued our efforts to promote economic recovery and growth. More than 21,000 hectares of IR-8 and IR-5 rice during the first crop planting from April through August sample average yields are five tons compared to two tons for local varieties.

A new program involving the training and use of village officials was initiated to accelerate the distribution of government-owned rice land. It appears that the government's goal of distributing 70,000 hectares by December, 1968, will not be reached until April, 1969; however, the December deadline was generally regarded as overly ambitious. With respect to land tenure in areas where Viet Cong "land reform" has been carried out, I have continued to urge President Thieu to develop and announce a national policy which would give present occupants title to such land if possible, and exempt them from back rents and taxation. He spoke favorably of such a policy during a recent trip I made with him to Ba Tri (where the government has recovered control of a formerly Viet Cong held area), and he has told me he will follow up on it. It would have to be coordinated with land tenure policy in GVN-controlled areas, and the problem of compensation for former landlords must be worked out, but these things can be done.

Despite a five-month work stoppage caused by the Tet and May attacks, the hamlet school program for 1968 is almost on schedule. Eighty-five to ninety percent of the allocated classrooms (2,495) and 100 percent of the teacher training (3,238) will have been completed by year's end.

US AID also participated in the reconstruction of some 100 industrial plants damaged by the Tet and mini-Tet attacks. The GVN has provided one billion piasters and US AID \$10 million for this purpose. These funds will permit long-term, low interest loans under the administration of the GVN's industrial development center which is technically assisted by the US AID industry division. The GVN grant is already over 70 percent obligated while the U. S. Government grant is approximately 40 percent obligated.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, October 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*2. Pres file*

SUBJECT: Suggested Alternate Replies to Letter from Senator Dodd  
Regarding the USS PUEBLO

In a letter to you of October 16 (Tab C), Senator Dodd suggests that we invite the North Korean Government to join us in submitting the PUEBLO case to the International Court of Justice.

At Tab A is a suggested reply in the event you wish to respond personally to Senator Dodd. At Tab B is an alternate suggested reply which would be signed by Assistant Secretary of State Macomber.

Unless you have some special reason for wanting to reply directly to Senator Dodd, on balance I think it may be more appropriate to ask Macomber to respond, in view of:

- the legalistic nature of the substance of this exchange;
- Dodd's press exploitation of his letter prior to receiving any answer; and
- the fact that the reply to a similar suggestion made recently by Senator Brewster, came from Macomber.

Recommendation:

That you approve the Macomber response.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Macomber response 

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

AJenkins:mm

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-1-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Senator Dodd:

Thank you for your thoughtful suggestions as to how we might raise the PUEBLO case in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). As you know, we want to leave no stone unturned in our efforts to obtain the release of the PUEBLO crew at the earliest possible moment.

The United States has, however, already suggested to the North Koreans that this dispute be resolved by submitting the facts to some impartial, international third party. This suggestion was flatly and categorically refused by the North Koreans. In fact they went on to reject publicly and in the broadest terms any sort of role for a third party in the PUEBLO dispute. I attach an excerpt from their authoritative newspaper on the subject. This refusal makes it plain that they would not agree to submit the dispute to the ICJ. Without North Korea's agreement, the Court would not have jurisdiction to hear the case since North Korea is not a party to the Statute of the Court and has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In this situation, there is no way by which the United States, acting unilaterally, could have the Court hear the case.

We have considered whether it would be possible to seek an advisory opinion from the Court, but that approach raises a number of problems. Only a duly authorized United Nations body such as the Security Council or the General Assembly may seek such advisory opinions. It is doubtful that these bodies would support such a step. In addition, the Court is extremely reluctant to render advisory opinions on actual disputes where the parties themselves are not before the Court. Most important of all, so long as the crew and ship remain in North Korean hands, it would be impossible for the Court to examine the facts and issues fully.

We are confident that, if the International Court were to hear the case, it would agree with our view of the facts and the law. Such action would help focus world attention on the illegality of North Korea's position. We doubt, however, that an opinion by the Court would aid in obtaining release of the crew. Rather we anticipate that it would harden the North Korean attitude and further complicate our efforts to negotiate the return of the crew and the ship.

I have set as our over-riding goal in this matter the prompt release of the crew. I am most concerned for their welfare and very conscious of the anguish which their detention causes for their families and friends. It is hard to exaggerate the arrogance and outrageous character of the North Korean actions, first in seizing the ship in international waters and then in holding the crew as hostages to force the United States to apologize when it is they, not we, who have committed a crime. Nevertheless, in order to secure the release of these captives, we have engaged in patient negotiations with the North Koreans, and I continue to believe that these bilateral discussions offer the best hope of achieving our primary goal.

I am most grateful for the thought you have given to this matter and I would welcome any further suggestions you may have.

Sincerely,

**Enclosure:**

**Excerpt from Nodong Simmun  
article of March 10, 1968**

**Honorable Thomas J. Dodd  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.**

LBJ:State:AJenkins:mm:10/21/68

Excerpt from Nodong Sinmun Article of  
March 10, 1968 Broadcast by Radio Pyongyang  
March 10, 1968

"The crewmen of the armed spy ship PUEBLO are criminals caught in the act of committing a grave crime against our country. Therefore, they should be duly punished by the law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea . . . They (the United States) have even been spreading 'public opinion' they would investigate the facts of the incident after the crewmen are returned, or that some international organisations, for instance, the International Court, should be delegated to conduct such an investigation . . . We capture the culprits in our territorial waters, yet they (the United States) demand that they . . . or some third party who was not at the scene of the crime, should be delegated to conduct an investigation into the case and pass judgment on it. This was out of the question from the beginning."



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Honorable Thomas J. Dodd  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Dodd:

The President has asked me to reply to your letter of October 16, 1968, proposing that we attempt to persuade the North Koreans to join us in referring the PUEBLO dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). As you know, we want to leave no stone unturned in our efforts to obtain the release of the PUEBLO crew at the earliest possible moment.

The United States has, however, already suggested to the North Koreans that this dispute be resolved by submitting the facts to some impartial, international third party. This suggestion was flatly and categorically refused by the North Koreans. In fact they went on to reject publicly and in the broadest terms any sort of role for a third party in the PUEBLO dispute. I attach an excerpt from their authoritative newspaper on the subject. This refusal makes it plain that they would not agree to submit the dispute to the ICJ. Without North Korea's agreement, the Court would not have jurisdiction to hear the case since North Korea is not a party to the Statute of the Court and has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In this situation, there is no way by which the United States, acting unilaterally, could have the Court hear the case.

We have considered whether it would be possible to seek an advisory opinion from the Court, but that approach raises a number of problems. Only a duly authorized United Nations body, such as the Security Council or the General Assembly may seek advisory opinions. It is doubtful that these bodies would



support such a step. In addition, the Court is extremely reluctant to render advisory opinions on actual disputes where the parties themselves are not before the Court. Most important of all, so long as the crew and ship remain in North Korean hands, it would be impossible for the Court to examine the facts and issues fully.

We are confident that, if the International Court were to hear the case, it would agree with our view of the facts and the law. Such action would help focus world attention on the illegality of North Korea's position. We doubt, however, that an opinion by the Court would aid in obtaining release of the crew. Rather we anticipate that it would harden the North Korean attitude and further complicate our efforts to negotiate the return of the crew and the ship.

We are fully conscious of the impatience and anger with which the American people, particularly the families of the crew, rightly regard the North Korean refusal to release these men. We believe, however, that our best hope of securing their early, safe release lies in continuing to press the direct negotiations which are under way.

We greatly appreciate your thoughtful suggestions. If I can be of any further service to you, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

William B. Macomber, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary for  
Congressional Relations

Enclosure:  
Excerpt from Nodong Sinmun  
Article of March 10, 1968

31d

Excerpt from Nodong Sinmun Article of  
March 10, 1968 Broadcast by Radio Pyongyang  
March 10, 1968

"The crewmen of the armed spy ship PUEBLO are criminals caught in the act of committing a grave crime against our country. Therefore, they should be duly punished by the law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea...They (the United States) have even been spreading 'public opinion' they would investigate the facts of the incident after the crewman are returned, or that some international organizations, for instance, the International Court, should be delegated to conduct such an investigation...We capture the culprits in our territorial waters, yet they (the United States) demand that they...or some third party who was not at the scene of the crime, should be delegated to conduct an investigation into the case and pass judgment on it. This was out of the question from the beginning."

39e

J. W. TYLER, ARK., CHAIRMAN  
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# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

CARL BARRY, CHIEF OF STAFF  
ARTHUR M. RUHL, CHIEF CLERK

October 16, 1968

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to submit for your consideration a proposal for a new initiative in the Pueblo matter.

North Korea insists that the Pueblo was inside the 12-mile limit. We insist it was not. And the entire matter has remained deadlocked for more than 8 months now.

My proposal is that we invite the North Korean government to join us in submitting the Pueblo case to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, and that we both bind ourselves to accept its verdict.

There is a precedent for this proposal, involving a naval dispute between a democratic government and a communist government.

In October of 1946 two British destroyers, passing through the Strait of Corfu off the coast of Albania, hit mines and suffered severe damage and casualties.

Since it was clear that these new mines had been placed in position by the Albanian government in violation of international law, the British government asked for reparations and took the case to the International Court of Justice.

The Albanian government, after initially challenging the Court's jurisdiction, finally consented to accept it. In doing so, it filed a counterclaim charging that Britain had violated her sovereignty (a) by sending British warships into Albanian waters on the day of the explosion and (b) by undertaking minesweeping operations in Albanian waters three weeks after the incident.

In a series of three decisions, the International Court found that Albania's emplacement of mines in the Strait of Corfu constituted a denial of the right of innocent passage in time of peace and that Albania was therefore responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred in her territorial waters and for the resulting damage and loss of life. While upholding the "right of innocent passage," the Court held that the minesweeping operations undertaken by the British Navy subsequent to the incident had been in violation of Albanian sovereignty and that "this declaration by the Court constitutes by itself appropriate satisfaction."

Although Albania ignored the Court's decision ordering it to pay reparations in the amount of £844,000 to the British government, the case is of the greatest significance because of the legal principles it established, and because it created a precedent for settling disputes involving alleged naval transgressions into the claimed territorial waters of other nations.

The Albanian government of that day was as radical a communist government as one could hope to find anywhere. If this government agreed to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court, then there is some reason for hoping that the North Korean government may do likewise.

Let them submit their proof to the Court that the Pueblo was in territorial waters at the time of the dispute, and let us submit our proof that it was not.

Let us file formal claim for the release of the Pueblo crewmen; and let North Korea, if it so desires, file a counterclaim.

If the Court finds that, contrary to our information, the Pueblo was, in fact, in territorial waters at the time it was seized, then we will tender an official apology in exchange for the release of our men.

If, however, the Court finds that the Pueblo was not in North Korea's territorial waters, then we would expect the government of North Korea, similarly, to accept this finding and to release the Pueblo and its crew forthwith.

This is a proposal for which I believe we can find overwhelming support internationally and at the United Nations.

If the Korean government, for any reason, refuses to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Court, then I would like to propose that we explore the possibility of proceeding unilaterally by submitting the case to the Court, offering it our complete cooperation, and committing ourselves in advance to accept its verdict, whatever it may be.

I look forward with interest to the Administration's evaluation of this proposal.

With every best wish,

Sincerely,

*Thomas J. Dodd*  
THOMAS J. DODD

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Monday, October 21, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Abba Eban--10:30 a.m. Tuesday,  
October 22

You may have worked out a more precise line during your talk with Secretary Rusk. However, I would suggest the following as the main points to build around:

1. Please tell Prime Minister Eshkol you would be glad to see him later this year.

2. Secretary Rusk has your views on the Phantoms and will be discussing them with Eban later.

3. The Phantom decision was a hard one. You want Israel to be able to defend itself, and that's why you went ahead. But you're very much concerned that too many people in Israel are relying too much on airplanes and expanded borders for security.

4. When Eban goes back to Jerusalem [leaving Tuesday night for quick consultation], you hope he will tell Prime Minister Eshkol that you're concerned that the Arabs will some day turn the tables on Israel if Israel puts too much faith in military solutions and not enough effort into negotiating peace. [If you and Secretary Rusk agree, you might use this as the lead to say that you're especially concerned about Israel's failure to sign the NPT and about any possibility that Israel would develop strategic missiles.]

5. You hope Eban is doing everything he can to work out a settlement. Israel will have to stretch its imagination, especially to meet Arab interests in Jerusalem.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-119

By me, NARA, Date 5-19-03

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/NODIS~~3.4(b)(1)  
(6)



*Pres file*

*41*

Saturday, Oct. 19, 1968

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

3:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the imperturbable Ellsworth Bunker reports on Thieu's position, but shows just a touch of irritation with his boy -- which we wholly share.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment HARVAN/DOUB (EJ 40649)

*(Saigon 40649)*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-479  
By WJG, NARA, Date 2-25-93



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

4/a

## ACTION COPY

00 RUEHC RUFNCR  
DE RUMJIR 40649 2931220  
ZNY SSSSS ZZK  
O 191200Z OCT 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2348  
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2498  
STATE GRNC  
BT

6 6 0 9 Q  
Oct 19, 1968  
1:48PM

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 40649

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

SUBJECT: THIEU'S PRESS CONFERENCE OCTOBER 19

1. IF WE SEPARATE OUT THIEU'S ACTUAL WORDS FROM THE WIRE SERVICE INTERLARDER EXPLANATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE VUNG TAU PRESS CONFERENCE, THERE IS NOT REALLY MUCH ONE CAN TAKE EXCEPTION TO. THIEU SAID:

A. THERE HAD BEEN NO BREAKTHROUGH.

B. THEY WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE NLF OR NEGOTIATE WITH THEM AS AN ENTITY OR GOVERNMENT.

C. THEY HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO THE NLF BEING INCLUDED IN THE HANOI DELEGATION.

D. THE U. S. CONSULTS THEM, BUT SAIGON DIDN'T NECESSARILY KNOW EVERYTHING.

E. THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE PROPOSED BOMBING HALT IS HANOI, NOT SAIGON.

F. HANOI HAS TO TALK DIRECTLY WITH THE GVN, AND WHILE SAIGON DOES NOT RECOGNIZE HANOI THEY WOULD LIKE TO TALK WITH HANOI, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR OF AGGRESSION.

2. THIEU DECLINED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MEETINGS WITH AMBASSADOR BUNKER, AND HE REFUSED TO SAY WHETHER THERE WAS AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C 91-478

By 19/JW, NARA, Date 3-1-93

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 SAIGON 40649 Oct 19, 1968

3. WHILE WE WERE ANNOYED BY OUR FIRST REPORTS OF HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, AND WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THERE BE NO CONFERENCE AT ALL, OUR IRRITATION WAS LARGELY DUE TO THE INTERPRETATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE WIRE SERVICES RATHER THAN TO THIEU'S OWN REMARKS. THEY WERE DESIGNED MAINLY FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION, AND WERE NOT DUE TO ANY FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES OF PRINCIPLE BETWEEN US.

4. OBVIOUSLY WHAT IS IRRITATING IS THAT WHOLE OF THE SUBJECT SHOULD BE AIRED AT A TIME WHEN WE ARE TRYING TO KEEP IT VERY QUIET. THIEU IS ALSO GOING ON THE RADIO TONIGHT AROUND 8:00 PM, SAIGON TIME. BUNKER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

42

Saturday, October 19, 1968  
12:45 p. m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

As the work progresses on the major decisions in military and foreign policy of the Johnson Presidency, we are coming close to a problem which only you can settle.

Since we are focusing on the decisions made by the President rather than the whole bureaucratic history of these problems we come, inevitably, to certain key meetings with the President. These are only covered by Tom Johnson's notes -- or their equivalent. Those notes are, of course, exceedingly sensitive documents and are, and should be, wholly under the control of the President. The question is: who should have access to those notes in assembling the material for the book on key Presidential decisions? Thus far what we have been trying to do is build up the material so that we can isolate the critical meetings with the President and the critical moments when the President made a decision. Work is rapidly advancing to the point, however, where the senior members of my staff will either have to have access to the Johnson notes, etc., or some other arrangement will have to be made. They must go through the notes, find the key meetings, and then isolate the arguments and choices the President confronted and the manner in which he rendered his decision.

Obviously, I simply do not have the time myself to make the linkage between the mass of material on each of these decisions and the sensitive notes. The men involved are men of integrity and of proved discretion: Bromley Smith, Bob Ginsburgh, Ed Fried, Harold Saunders, William Bowdler, Marshall Wright. But I do not wish to proceed into this phase without your considering the problem and giving us guidance.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,  
SEC 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO G  
MAR. 16. 1993.

BY 1A ON 3-1-93

~~SECRET~~  
SENSITIVE

Sat., Oct. 19, 1968  
11:30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith two sensitive reports that give us quite precisely the nature of Thieu's anxieties.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE attachments



3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-102  
By iss NARA, Date 4-25-03

44

INFORMATION

Saturday, October 19, 1968  
11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an interesting telegram  
from 6 South Vietnamese Senators  
indicating their anxieties.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln



44a  
The White House  
Washington

1968 OCT 19 AM 7 19

WN1 96 VIA RCA

SAIGON 1315 OCTOBER 18 1968

THE PRESIDENT

WHITEHOUSE

SVN PEOPLE ARE GRATEFUL TO USA PEOPLE FOR HELPING BRING  
VN WAR NEAR ITS END BUT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TIME  
PATIENCE AND PRIORITY NOTIONS IN USA AND VN MUST BE TAKEN  
INTO CONSIDERATION BY USA GOVERNMENT BEFORE TAKING  
DECISION OF STOPPING ENTIRELY NVN TERRITORY AT LEAST  
HOUR QUARTER WHEN ARMED FORCES VICTORY WOULD BE TAKEN AWAY

IF ALLIED DE-ESCALATION OCCURRED WITH ONLY PLATONIC  
PROMISE DE-ESCALATION FROM COMMUNIST INVADERS  
STOP ARVN AND SVN PEOPLE ARE GETTING READY TO PLAY  
GREATER ROLE IN PRESENT WAR SOLUTION

SENATORS HOANGKIMQUY NGUYENGIAHIEN

TRANVANQUA BUIVANGIAI TRANNGOCNHUAN PHAMVANTRIEU

~~TOP SECRET~~ Saturday, Oct. 19, 1968  
SENSITIVE 9:40 a. m.

*Per Jee*

45

Mr. President:

More evidence this morning of  
B-52 effectiveness.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET/TWINE~~ attachment (page I-1 frm 18 Oct 68 Intell Mem)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-110  
By ind, NARA, Date 6-24-04

452

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

Effective US B-52 Strikes Reported Northwest of Saigon

2. The 101st North Vietnamese Regiment has suffered heavy casualties as a result of US B-52 strikes northwest of Saigon in recent weeks, according to prisoner reports. One man, from the 3rd Battalion of the 101st, says that his unit was bombed in early October and that half of the troops in the battalion were killed. North Vietnamese battalions operating in the South normally have a strength of 250-350 men. A second prisoner reports that the 1st Battalion of the 101st was struck by B-52s in mid-October and lost 200 men killed.

3. Allied field reports indicate that B-52s did in fact strike the general area, the Boi Loi Woods along the Hau Nghia-Tay Ninh Province border, at the times reported by the prisoners. The 101st Regiment reportedly lost an additional 147 men killed in a battle near the Boi Loi Woods on 7 October. If casualties were suffered as reported, the over-all combat effectiveness of the 101st Regiment has probably been severely impaired, at least for the near term.

18 October 1968

I-1

[REDACTED]  
~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-111  
By na, NARA, Date 5-21-03

*Pres. File*

*46*

Sat., Oct. 19, 1968  
9:15 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a cable showing the kind of political  
anxieties and pressures under which Thieu is  
operating.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Saigon 40693)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By lg, NARA, Date 3-1-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

46a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCE636

00 OCT 19 10 35

PAGE 01 SAIGON 40693 191013Z

20

ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, CCG 23,  
GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, RSR 01,  
AID 28, SAH 02, SA 01, NIC 01, IO 13, /134 W

012813

O R 190915Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE WIWU  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
CINCPAC  
AMCONSUL DANANG  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 40693

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PARIS FOR VN MISSION

SUBJECT: REACTIONS TO REPORTS OF BOMBING HALT

1. SUMMARY. REPORTS OF AN IMMINENT BOMBING HALT SPREAD RAPIDLY THROUGH SAIGON OCTOBER 16 AND 17. ACCORDING TO SEVERAL SOURCES AND AT LEAST ONE NEWSPAPER STORY, PRESIDENT THIEU EARLY OCTOBER 16 CALLED IN THE CHAIRMEN OF BOTH HOUSES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO DISCUSS A BOMBING HALT. THIS REPORT, PLUS WESTERN RADIO AND PRESS SPECULATION, STIMULATED A VARIETY OF REACTIONS. A NUMBER OF POLITICAL LEADERS, SENATORS, AND DEPUTIES HAVE SPOKEN OUT IN OPPOSITION TO A BOMBING HALT WITHOUT RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS BY NVN. MANY APPEAR TO FEEL THAT THE BOMBING HALT IS DESIGNED TO HELP THE HUMPHREY CAMPAIGN, AND IS BEING PURSUED WITH LITTLE OR NO REGARD FOR THE INTERESTS OF SVN. OTHERS ARE RAISING THE ISSUE OF VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY, APPARENTLY FEELING BOTH THAT THE DECISION IS BEING MADE UNILATERALLY BY THE U.S. AND THAT THE SVN SHOULD HAVE A VOICE IN THE MATTER. MUCH OF THE MORE CRITICAL COMMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 3602

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~PAGE 22 - SAIGON 42693 191310Z~~

COMES FROM THE MORE MILITANT GROUPS AND LEADERS SUCH AS THE GREATER SOLIDARITY FORCE (GSF). HOWEVER, SOME CONCERN IS ALSO BEING EXPRESSED BY MORE MODERATE LEADERS. THERE IS ALSO SOME FAVORABLE COMMENT. BIG MINH, FOR EXAMPLE, IS QUOTED BY THE LOCAL PRESS SS SAYING HE APPROVES A TOTAL HALT IN THE BOMBING PROVIDED ANOTHER MEANS CAN BE FOUND TO STOP INFILTRATION. AT LEAST ONE DAILY COMMENTED THAT THE DOOR TO PEACE IS WIDE OPEN. THE ASSEMBLY WILL DISCUSS THE MATTER IN SPECIAL SESSIONS OCTOBER 19. END SUMMARY

2. BOTH HOUSES OF THE ASSEMBLY WILL DISCUSS THE BOMBING HALT AFTERNOON OCTOBER 19. (THESE MEETINGS BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.) LH SECRETARIAT RECEIVED PETITION SIGNED BY 45 DEPUTIES AFTERNOON OCTOBER 18 REQUESTING THAT "CESSATION OF BOMBING OF NVN" BE DISCUSSED. INITIALLY SECRETARIAT REJECTED CALL FOR IMMEDIATE PLENARY DEBATE, AND ACCORDING TO LE CONG THANH, LH ADMINISTRATIVE CHIEF, DECIDED TO SEND A RESOLUTION TO PRESIDENT THIEU SIGNED BY THE BLOC LEADERS. HOWEVER, LATE OCTOBER 18 THE AGENDA COUNCIL OF THE LH (CONSISTS OF SECRETARIAT, COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN AND BLOC LEADERS) MET AND DECIDED TO HAVE CLOSED DOOR DEBATE OF ISSUE.

3. UPPER HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION COMMITTEE HAS REPORTEDLY PREPARED A REPORT WHICH WILL BE DELIVERED ON THE FLOOR AT A PUBLIC UH SESSION. SESSION WAS CALLED AFTER TWENTY SENATORS SIGNED A PETITION OCTOBER 18 CALLING

FOR A DEBATE ON "THE GENERAL SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY." AMONG THOSE BEHIND THE PETITION WERE REVOLUTIONARY DAI VIET SENATOR PHAM NAM SACH, WHO IS PREPARING A SPEECH TITLED "THE CONSEQUENCES OF A UNILATERAL BOMBING HALT."

4. GSF LEADERSHIP MET OCTOBER 18 AND ISSUED A STATEMENT OPPOSING AN UNCONDITIONAL BOMBING HALT. HOWEVER, SENATOR BUI VAN SPEAKING FOR THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE GSF, TOLD THE PRESS THAT "SO FAR WE HAVE ONLY HEARD RUMORS ABOUT AN IMMINENT BOMBING HALT. THE GSF CONSIDERS THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH ONLY A TACTIC PLIED SOMETIMES STRONGLY AND SOMETIMES NOT ACCORDING TO OTHER DECISIONS OF OUR MILITARY LEADERSHIP. IF NORTH VIET NAM SHOWS ITS GOOD WILL IN SEEKING TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 23 SAIGON 43593 19-10-67

THEN NATURALLY THE QUESTION OF BOMBING THE NORTH WOULD NOT ARISE ANY LONGER. FOR THAT REASON THE POSITION OF THE GSF IS TO OPPOSE ONLY A BOMBING HALT NOT ACCOMPANIED BY CONCESSIONS."

5. MODERATE AND WIDELY RESPECTED SENATOR TR X NGOC NHUAN IN CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER NGUYEN CAO THANG OCTOBER 17 STRESSED NO POINTS:

- A. IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR PRESIDENT THIEU TO DISCUSS SUCH AN IMPORTANT DECISION ONLY WITH THE CHAIRMEN OF THE ASSEMBLY. HE MUST TAKE THE ENTIRE ASSEMBLY INTO HIS CONFIDENCE AND SEW THEIR IDEAS AND SUPPORT.
- B. IF THERE IS A BOMBING HALT WITH NO CONDITIONS ATTACHED, THE SENATE WILL OPPOSE IT STRENUOUSLY. ACCORDING TO NHUAN, THE CONSENSUS IS THAT AN UNCONDITIONAL BOMBING HALT WOULD BE A DISASTER. ASKED BY THANG WHAT CONDITIONS THE SENATE THINKS DESIRABLE, NHUAN MENTIONED AN END TO INFILTRATION AND A HALT TO SHELLING OF POPULATION CENTERS.

6. CATHOLIC DAILY XAY DUNG QUOTED LH DEPUTY KHIEU THIEN KE AS SAYING, " IF THE POSITION OF STOPPING THE BOMBING IS TO RAKE IN VOTES FOR MR. HUMPHREY, THEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE AGAIN BETRAYED THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE SOLDIERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE ALLIES IN VIETNAM." IF ON THE OTHER HAND THE BOMBING HALT IS TO REDUCE LOSS OF LIFE THEN THERE "MUST BE EXPLICIT GUARANTEES BY NORTH VIETNAM THAT IT WILL NOT HARM THE LIVES AND PROPERTY OF THE PEOPLE AND ARMY OF VIETNAM--IN NO CASE SHOULD IT BE UNCONDITIONAL." KE SAID: "IF THERE IS A UNILATERAL BOMBING HALT FOR A POLITICAL PURPOSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THERE WILL BE MUCH OPPOSITION, AND, ACCORDING TO THE SITUATION, I WILL PLAY THE LEADING OPPOSITION ROLE IN MY DISTRICT."

BUNKER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. ANOTHER DAILY, HY VO, REPORTED THAT LH CHAIRMAN NGUYEN BA LUONG MET WITH THE PRESS ON OCTOBER 18TH AND ANNOUNCED THAT WHEN THE DECISION FOR A TOTAL BOMBING HALT IS IMPLEMENTED, THE PEOPLE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THAT DECISION HAS MANY CONDITIONS. LUONG REPORTEDLY SAID THAT DURING HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT THIEU AND UH CHAIRMAN HUYEN ON THE 16TH, THIEU SAID HE HAD NO INTENTION OF OPPOSING A TOTAL BOMBING HALT WITH CONDITIONS. LUONG ALSO SAID THAT A CONFERENCE WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO DISCUSS PEACE IN VIETNAM IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE US DECISION TO STOP THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IS IMPLEMENTED. HE SAID: "AT THAT TIME, I HOPE THAT PEACE WILL RETURN TO OUR SOIL."

8. CHINH LUAN DAILY REPORTED SENATOR NGUYEN VAN CHUAN AS COMMENTING THAT STOPPING THE BOMBING IS AN "ACT OF BETRAYAL" SIMILAR TO WHAT THE FRENCH DID IN 1954. TRANG

DEN DAILY QUOTED LH DEPUTY NGUYEN DAT DAN AS SAYING, "MY DEMOCRATIC BLOC DOES NOT APPROVE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ANNOUNCING THE BOMBING HALT BECAUSE THAT ROLE AND THAT ANNOUNCEMENT MUST BE SOUTH VIETNAM'S."

9. ARCHBISHOP OF SAIGON NGUYEN VAN BINH RAISED CURRENT RUMORS OF AN IMPENDING BOMBING HALT WITH EMBOFFS OCTOBER 17. BINH OBSERVED THAT VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WANT PEACE, AND THAT IF A HALT TO THE BOMBING BRINGS PEACE CLOSER, THEN VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WOULD WELCOME IT. HOWEVER, HE ARCHBISHOP SUICKLY LINKED A BOMBING HALT TO THE PROBLEM OF INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH, POINTEDLY OBSERVING THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO HALT THE INFILTRATION AS WELL AS HALT THE BOMBING.

10. IN CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL NGUYEN VAN MINH, COMMANDER OF THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT, AND COL. DO KIEN NHIEU, MAYOR OF SAIGON, EMBOFF ASKED WHAT POPULAR REACTION TO BOMBING HALT WOULD BE. NHIEU REPLIED THAT THE PEOPLE WOULDN'T LIKE IT, AND HE REVEALED CLEARLY HIS PERSONAL HOPE THAT IT WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE, BUT NEITHER HE NOR MINH WENT SO FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY OVERT REACTION.

11. BEGINNING OCTOBER 17 THE LOCAL PRESS GAVE PROMINENT PLAY TO STORIES ABOUT A POSSIBLE BOMBING HALT. TYPICAL HEADLINE WAS THAT IN CONG CHUNG: "THIEU MEETS TWICE WITH BUNKER: PUBLIC OPINION BELIEVES THAT U.S. WILL STOP BOMBING NVN IN TWO MORE DAYS." FIRST EDITORIAL COMMENT, WHICH APPEARED IN SIX DAILIES OCTOBER 18, WAS MIXED AND RATHER CAUTIOUS. CONG CHUNG EXPRESSED FEARS OF AN AMERICAN ABANDONMENT WHILE TU DO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT AN UNFAVORABLE POPULAR REACTION. (SUMMARY OF OCTOBER 18 EDITORIAL COMMENT BEING SENT SEPTTEL. SUMMARY LATER EDITORIAL COMMENT WILL ALSO FOLLOW.) BUNKER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## INFORMATION

*Pres file*~~TOP-SECRET~~

Saturday, October 19, 1968

Mr. President:

Amb. Dobrynin is coming in at 12:30 p.m. today to see  
Sec. Rusk -- at Dobrynin's request.

No indication of subject.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-11-93

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP-SECRET~~

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 19, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Free file*

SUBJECT: US-Korea Military Exercise

Beginning November 20, US and South Korean air, sea and land forces are scheduled to hold a ten-day joint exercise.

The purpose is:

1) to demonstrate our capability to deploy forces rapidly from Continental US to the Pacific and

2) to reassure the Koreans that we can quickly and substantially increase our forces in Korea to meet jointly any threat.

All activity will take place outside North Korean air space and territorial waters. Simulated use of nuclear weapons will not be made.

The State Department approved the exercise on the understanding that it could be cancelled or postponed on short notice if the political situation in Korea changed, or if the Pueblo negotiations would be harmfully affected.

Unless otherwise instructed, the Defense Department will announce the exercise on October 28. Because of its nature and size, the exercise will attract considerable press coverage in advance of its November 20 opening date. This raises the question of whether the Presidential candidates should be briefed in advance of the October 28 announcement.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_\_ Exercise approved

\_\_\_\_\_ Exercise disapproved

\_\_\_\_\_ Have candidates briefed before October 28

\_\_\_\_\_ Briefing of candidates not necessary

\_\_\_\_\_ Call me

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NY 94-407  
By *ig*, NARA, Date 4-17-95

10/17/68

Given to Tom  
Johnson for the President

49

This morning DIA noted that the rotation of troops between East Germany and Czechoslovakia appeared imminent.

They noted that units of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany appeared to be preparing to withdraw from Czechoslovakia and that they might be replaced with units from the USSR.

The movement of an unidentified tank division from Southern East Germany to Bernau would be consistent with this <sup>estimate</sup> ~~estimate~~.

Normally there is a Soviet motorized division stationed at Bernau. The reported movement could merely be this motorized division returning to its home station. It could be a tank division moving to this location.

There is no evidence to indicate any intention to threaten Berlin.

Nevertheless the movement of this unit does increase the Communist capability against Berlin - although they probably had enough force in the area before this movement.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-104  
By us NARA, Date 8-25-03

49a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached is a message regarding  
troop movements in East Germany.  
We are talking with the various  
intelligence agencies for further  
information.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-104  
By us, NARA, Date 8-25-03



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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-104  
By us NARA, Date 8-25-03

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-105  
By isa, NARA, Date 3-12-04

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ON 18 OCT 68,,,, AN U/I TANK DIV, PROBABLY FROM THE BALTIC MD, (Military District  
DEPLOYED FROM SOUTHERNEAST GERMANY TO THE VICINITY OF BERNAU, JUST  
NORTHEAST OF BERLIN. DETAILS TO FOLLOW  
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1418 : NIGHTLEAD TROOPS:  
(CHANGING DATELINE)

MUNICH, WEST GERMANY, OCT. 13 (REUTERS)--SEVERAL EAST GERMAN ARMY COLUMNS WERE ON THE MOVE NORTHWARD TOWARD BERLIN TODAY, THE BAVARIAN INTERIOR MINISTRY REPORTED.

HOWEVER, WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN BONN WERE DISINCLINED TO BELIEVE THE TROOP MOVEMENTS WERE CONNECTED WITH A POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF COMMUNIST HARASSEMENT OF WEST BERLIN.

TRAVELERS ENTERING WEST BERLIN REPORTED SEEING LONG COLUMNS OF EAST GERMAN ARMY VEHICLES, INCLUDING ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, ON THE EAST GERMAN AUTOBAHN (FREEWAY) THURSDAY NIGHT.

EAST GERMAN SOLDIERS THURSDAY CLOSED THE NORTHERN LANE OF THE ROAD OVER A 90-MILE STRETCH BETWEEN THE EAST GERMAN BORDER AND LEIPZIG.

THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IN BONN SAID THE TROOPS COULD BE ON FALL MANEUVRES OR RETURNING TO GARRISONS AFTER OCCUPYING CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

BUT THE TROOPS ARE ATTRACTING ATTENTION IN VIEW OF RUSSIAN AND EAST GERMAN WARNINGS AGAINST SCHEDULED WEST GERMAN BUNDESTAG (LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT) COMMITTEE MEETINGS IN WEST BERLIN AT THE END OF THIS MONTH, FOLLOWED BY THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY CONGRESS IN NOVEMBER.

THE RUSSIANS AND EAST GERMANS SAID THEY AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CANNOT TOLERATE A CONGRESS HELD IN WEST BERLIN AND DESCRIBED THE PLAN AS REACHING A "SPECIALLY DANGEROUS PEAK OF PROVOCATION."

REUTERS CD:GR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, October 18, 1968 -- 4:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

I did not get Cy Vance because he was out at a Paris restaurant. I did get Bill Jorden who will deliver the message about the French Embassy to Cy Vance for early action.

With respect to the UPI story, he said: the UPI man is notably unreliable. He may have built this from some statement by a junior North Vietnamese representative. There has been, of course, no formal response to our proposition.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-429  
By WJP, NARA, Date 2-25-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, October 18, 1968  
3:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Joe Alsop was in to lunch today. As usual, I kept off diplomatic details; but we discussed the military situation. Joe put to me a very strong case for background briefing, as follows:

- he leaves on Monday with Vice President Humphrey on the campaign; the last column he will be able to address to this subject must be written on Sunday;
- he aches to write a column which would underline how great President Johnson has been in the conduct of this <sup>negotiation</sup> ~~war~~, from Warsaw and Phnom Penh on, and how wrong has been the New York Times, et al;
- he believes there are few indeed who are likely to take this view of the matter;
- what he would like is a background briefing so that if something breaks, he would be in a position to write intelligently for Monday -- or even later. He promises complete discretion until the moment that a break comes;
- therefore, he has asked me to put to you directly this question:  
Are you prepared to have me brief him on the diplomatic situation so that he will be able to write intelligently if and when a break comes"

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

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INFORMATION

Friday, October 18, 1968 -- 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Last night a man of about 40, who works at the Butler terminal at Boston, helped carry my bag out to the airplane when I finished my talk. In the hundred yards or so which we walked together he said this:

"Please say something to your boss for me. I was all for Jack. But I know Johnson accomplished the things that Jack wanted to see done. And he has done some fantastic things for me -- like Medicare. I don't need it now. But it is there. I know it is there.

"I am worried, though. When Wallace first came to Boston there were 10 people out on this field to greet him. The last time, 10 days ago, there were 300.

"I'm a blue collar liberal Democrat. And that is what I shall remain. I'm voting for Hubert. But I'm worried."

Then he patted me on the back with his free hand and said:

"Just you remember that there are some of us here who think this Administration is great, and we are grateful for it."

I told him I would pass his message to the President, and that it meant something to me to hear it from him.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh