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~~ACTION~~
~~INFORMATION~~

~~SECRET~~

Pres. file

Friday, October 18, 1968 -- 1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Your clearance is required on this proposed letter of Sec. Rusk's to Ellsworth Bunker, which would permit a certain number of wives to join civilian officials in Saigon in response to Bunker's request.

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 3-1-93

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WWRostow:rlh



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Authorization for Limited Number
of Wives to Join Civilian Officers
in Saigon

Ambassador Bunker has written the Secretary that he intends to permit a limited number of wives to come to Saigon as an inducement to certain outstanding civilian officers to extend their tours in Saigon, unless the Secretary feels that such action would jeopardize Section 911 (11) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

The Secretary has signed a reply, subject to White House concurrence, stating that the Ambassador's proposal would not appear to jeopardize Section 911 (11).

Unless the White House perceives objection to the Ambassador's proposal, the Secretary's letter will be sent.

McLain
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Letter to Ambassador Bunker
2. Letter from Ambassador Bunker
3. Foreign Service Inspectors' Recommendation (extract)
4. Section 911 (11)
5. President's Statement of February 7, 1965 re withdrawal of Dependents

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Authority DL 84-57
By rg/isp, NARA, Date 3-11-93

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1968

Dear Ellsworth:

I am sympathetic to the proposal you make in your letter of October 2, 1968 to permit a small number of wives only at Saigon as an inducement to their husbands to extend their tours.

Such a limited action for the purpose you describe would not appear to jeopardize Section 911 (11) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended. I sense, however, that each time we take an action which suggests that the danger to dependents from hostile activity is diminishing, we undercut to some degree the principal justification for Section 911 (11) as it applies to personnel in Vietnam.

I do not envy you this added responsibility, but appreciate fully the reasons which have led to your decision.

With all best wishes.

Sincerely,

Dean

Dean Rusk

The Honorable
Ellsworth Bunker,
American Ambassador,
Saigon.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority 71684-57
By rg/isp, NARA, Date 3-11-93

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SECRET

Saigon, Republic of Viet-Nam
October 2, 1968

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

Dear Dean:

For some time I have been convinced that we should allow a limited number of wives to come to Saigon as an inducement to certain outstanding civilian officers to extend their tours here. Initially, the number involved would be quite small, probably 30 to 35 in the first few months, and I would personally make the decisions on a case by case basis. Only an officer who agrees to a second tour would be given permission, and he could only be joined by his wife. We cannot at this time handle any children here.

Cecil Lyon and his team of Foreign Service Inspectors have just recommended that we "initiate advance planning looking toward the return of dependents and, when such occurs, longer tours for officer personnel, and, as an interim measure, give consideration to permitting working wives and wives without children to return to Saigon." Although we cannot, for logistical reasons, authorize the return of wives even without children on an overall basis, I agree with the recommendation and believe the proposal mentioned above is a logical and workable first step.

I intend to implement the recommendation of the Inspectors with the constraints noted above unless you feel such action would jeopardize Section 911(11) of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

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By ng/isp . NARA, Date 3-11-93


~~SECRET~~

2

amended. This authorizes the payment of travel expenses to officers and employees of the Service to visit dependents residing outside Viet Nam. There is a feeling in some quarters that if we allow some wives to come here, Congress might eliminate this important provision. I myself do not believe that would be the case, because the number of wives involved is so small it would not violate the spirit of the Act.

With affectionate regards,

Sincerely,



Ellsworth Bunker

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3237

53d

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FEBRUARY 7, 1965

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Following meetings with the National Security Council, I have directed the orderly withdrawal of American dependents from South Vietnam.

It has become clear that Hanoi has undertaken a more aggressive course of action against both South Vietnamese and American installations, and against Americans who are in South Vietnam assisting the people of that country to defend their freedom. We have no choice now but to clear the decks and make absolutely clear our continued determination to back South Vietnam in its fight to maintain its independence.

In addition to this action, I have ordered the deployment to South Vietnam of a HAWK air defense battalion. Other reinforcements, in units and individuals may follow.

#

LEGISLATION ON FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES
(90th Congress, 2d Session)

Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

March 11, 1968

* * * * *

(11)¹⁰⁷ the travel expenses of officers and employees of the Service for up to two round trips each year for purposes of family visitation in situations where the family of the officer or employee is prevented by official order from accompanying such officer or employee to, or has been ordered evacuated from, his assigned post because of danger from hostile activity, except that, with respect to any such officer or employee whose dependents are located abroad, the Secretary may authorize such additional trips as he deems appropriate not to exceed the equivalent cost of two round trips of less than first class to the District of Columbia, and the travel expenses of officers or employees stationed abroad (or their dependents located abroad), for purposes of family visitation in emergency situations involving personal hardship: Provided, That the facilities of the Military Airlift Command shall be utilized whenever possible for travel authorized under this section

107 Paragraph (11) added by section 1 of P.L. 90-221
(81 Stat. 671).

* * * * *

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Extract from the Department of State, Foreign Service
Inspection Corps, INSPECTOR'S MEMORANDUM, Post: American
Embassy, Saigon, September 11, 1968.

* * * * *

Tours of Duty - Job continuity under the present tour of duty policy constitutes a continuing problem of the Mission. With 18 and 24 month tours considering normal break-in and disengagement time, a difficult language, and absences due to family visitations, the period of high job effectiveness is severely limited. While the Inspectors do not recommend longer tours for all personnel at this time, it is believed that single officers and key senior officers should remain in their posts for two 18 month tours. The Mission should, at an early date, initiate planning designed to cope with the support problems which will arise once the security situation permits the return of dependents. When dependents are permitted to return, two successive two-year tours should become the norm for officer level personnel. Housing and schooling will constitute the most serious problems. The post has already made good progress in establishing medical facilities which can be expanded if required. As an interim measure it is recommended the Mission give consideration in the very near future to the return of working wives and wives of families without children as a means of increasing continuity. It is realized that security, scarcity of housing, and the basic justification for visitation travel are involved. However, it is believed that the plus factors outweigh the negative ones.

- 10. That it initiate advance planning looking toward the return of dependents, and when such occurs, request longer tours for officer personnel and as an interim measure give consideration to permitting working wives and wives without children to return to Saigon;

* * * * *

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION

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Friday, October 18, 1968

1:15pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Land Reform in Vietnam

Pres file

Attached is a watershed cable to Saigon on this subject. It states Washington's conviction that a major land reform program would bear great dividends both within Vietnam and internationally. It proposes:

1. Legislative action to reduce rice land ownership to 30 hectares (about 74 acres) to be effective two years after the date of enactment.
2. Implementation during the interim two-year period of a Voluntary Land Purchase Program with attractive financial incentives to landlords to sell prior to the expropriation date.
3. Heavy reliance on village local government for implementing transfers under the Voluntary Program and for general land administration.
4. Guaranteed relief to tenants from eviction and back rents and taxes on land recovered from the Vietcong.

We now believe that the political risks to the Government of implementing a fair land reform scheme is manageable. Studies reveal that, with very few exceptions, only absentee landlords own over 20 hectares of land. Moreover, most of the absentee landlords indicate receptivity to a land reform program with fair compensation. The reduction of the ownership limit to 30 hectares would affect about 9,000 landlords in the delta and III Corps, and would make 800,000 acres available for sale to the tiller. (We do not have good figures for the rest of the country, but the overwhelming proportion of the rice land is covered by the figure cited above.)

The land subject to expropriation under the plan would have a value of about \$150 million. As an incentive to the GVN to get on with it, and to make sales more attractive to landlords we would provide U.S. financial assistance. The details would have to be worked out but we are thinking of a scheme which transfers capital holdings in land into productive enterprises, perhaps through bonds which guarantee the holder the right to import production goods from the United States after the war. Although the figures are tentative, we think our involvement would be in the range of \$30-50 million. Our financial assistance, of course, would be contingent upon a comprehensive and urgent land program satisfactory to us.

Ellsworth Bunker has consistently attached low priority to land reform in Vietnam. His full support of this program will be essential if we are to induce Thieu and company to move on this within the next few months. If the proposal has your approval I think it would be a good idea to send a personal message to Bunker on the subject. A suggested draft follows:

"FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

"Your recent reports have encouraged us to believe that the time may be right for a broad new initiative on land reform. You will be receiving through regular channels the outline of a proposal that looks good to us and to which we wish your reaction. We believe that the political risks of an equitable program are manageable, and the potential benefits great. I am looking forward to getting your current thinking, and your suggestions for improving the package. In the meantime I wanted you to know of my profound hope that we can show significant progress on land reform in the next few months."

I recommend you approve the new initiative on land reform outlined above, and approve the personal message to Bunker.

Att

W. W. Rostow

1. Approve the initiative on land reform _____
 Disapprove _____
 Call me _____
2. Approve the message to Bunker _____
 Disapprove _____
 Call me _____

54a

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

Info:

STATE

LIMDIS

JOINT STATE/A.I.D. MESSAGE

SUBJECT: Land Reform Step Up

1. Have noted with particular interest the emphasis in President Thieu's October 7 National Assembly speech on importance of stronger and more effective land distribution program. Your recent reporting has provided many other encouraging indicators of real and growing interest by Thieu, Huong, and other senior GVN officials in accelerating and broadening land reform efforts. Despite this obvious support, however, momentum of present stepped up effort still best described as "creaking," and commendable new Voluntary Land Purchase Program now under consideration by GVN probably will not be implemented until well into 1969, and then on such a basis that broad impact will not be felt for a long time.

A substantially more effective and broadened effort would appear to be required if the desired significant internal and international impact is to be achieved in a matter of months rather than years.

Drafted by:

AA/VN-JP Grant 10/15/68

Tel. Ext.
7871

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

A/AID-R. M. Poats

Clearances:

EA- Wm. Bundy

WH _____

S/S _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

If, in your judgment, GVN with its currently greater interest in land reform is prepared to seriously consider the additional measures required for a major effort having such an impact, we on our part would be prepared to sympathetically consider the use of unusual means to assist the GVN in overcoming the serious political and administrative problems involved in such an effort.

2. The new information developed by SRI in its 1968 survey of landlords and tenants and belatedly reported in Volume V of its draft report also encourages us to believe that new initiatives in land redistribution are within reach at this time. SRI survey indicates that in 26 provinces encompassing most of III Corps and entire Delta:

(a) Very few landlords residing in villages and district towns own over 20 hectares of land; large landlords are virtually all absentee.

(b) More than three-quarters of the absentee landlords interviewed indicated they would not resist a new land reform program if, repeat if, compensation administered equitably. In fact, only 9 percent indicated their strong opposition to a new program of reducing the hectareage ceiling if not only program administered equitably but also GVN would effectively distribute land it previously acquired from French and under Ordinance 57.

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Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy Saigon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

(c) Reduction of current 100 hectarage ownership limit to 30 hectares (which is current farmer operator limit even under 100 hectare rule) would affect nearly 9,000 landlords and make available 334,000 hectares valued at approximately \$124 million. Reducing hectarage limit to 20 would affect 12,400 farmers and make available 430,000 hectares valued at approximately \$160 million.

(d) Landlord tenant relationships in relatively secure areas are not major source of grievance to tenant farmers; on the other hand, there is an overwhelming desire to own land among tenant farmers who place land ownership above, repeat above, /all other felt materiel needs for such items as fertilizer, pumps, schools, et cetera.

3. As we see it, GVN during 1968 has been constantly improving its efforts in land reform, and many of the elements required for a successful program are now falling into place but key elements are still missing for a program of significant impact. Each improvement has been sufficiently modest and the GVN has made so many undelivered or only partially delivered promises in recent years to improve implementation existing land reform program that further general assurances along these lines

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Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

tend to have very little current credibility either within Vietnam or internationally prior to successful implementation. Even the apparently effective technique developed during last six months of relying on greater utilization village councils does not appear to have the distributing administrative support required to reach the goal of 70,000 of publicly-held lands hectares/during 1968. Also, we question whether President Thieu put into effect his apparent desire yet able to ~~implement effectively his decision~~ to give title to farmers given land by the VC. As you have mentioned to GVN, there are problems of coordinating this aspect of policy with land tenure policy in GVN-controlled areas and of providing compensation for former landlords. Finally, the draft versions of the Voluntary Land Purchase Program we have seen to date represent useful but ^{only} modest efforts whose value and impact probably can only be identified after a considerable period of implementation.

Without a more forceful approach it appears that more than a year will be required at best before the new GVN emphasis will have any significant psychological impact outside of localized areas. On the other hand, sufficient progress has been made by GVN in recent past and political climate may be such that we can visualize situation where the addition of certain key elements by GVN could bring same dramatic

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Page 5 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

results in land reform as introduction IR-8 accomplishing in rice production.

4. Obviously, you in best position determine the key additional elements required to raise land reform to new level of impact.

From here these would appear to include:

(a) A strong clearcut legislative endorsement which makes strengthened program national policy and places mandate on Executive for prompt execution.

(b) A sufficiently strong mixture of carrot and stick so that landlords will not vigorously oppose proposal in legislature and will be induced to voluntarily seek to sell land to tenants and thereby ease administrative burden on GVN.

(c) Sufficient decentralization and incentives so that GVN can avoid major defect of past programs in over-relying on Central Government bureaucracy initiative and implementation capacity.

(d) Reasonable equality of treatment of tenants and landlords wherever GVN writ effective.

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Page 6 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

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Classification

5. Specifically, we could visualize building on the progress to date as follows:

(a) National Assembly action calling for reduction of ceiling retention level to 30 hectares of rice land to be effected by expropriation two years after date of enactment.

(b) Implementation of a Voluntary Land Purchase Program during the interim two-year period which provides equitable payments to landowners and sufficiently more favorable financial incentives over that to be available under expropriation that landlords have major incentive not only to cooperate with Land Purchase Program but to actively seek sales.

(c) Formalization and expansion of new techniques placing primary reliance for land administration on village councils for (1) distribution under present laws, (2) processing land transfers under Voluntary Land Purchase Program, and (3) enforcement of legal limits on rents. This decentralization also could serve as inducement for villagers in contested areas to improve security to point where effective village councils could operate.

(d) Effective formalization of policy stated by Thieu at Ba Tri guaranteeing that tillers previously given land by VC (1) would not be thrown off it, (2) would not have to pay back rent and taxes, and (3) would be given opportunity to acquire legal title to such land.

Page 7 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Classification*

We can see benefits from having all four elements described above being subject of National Assembly action. However, believe legislative endorsement of the ceiling reduction and Voluntary Land Purchase Program most important.

6. As an incentive for GVN to pursue a course of action through the National Assembly and to initially lessen landlord opposition and later secure landlord support in implementation of the land purchase scheme we would be prepared to consider sympathetically the possibility of U.S. financial assistance, ~~through~~ through the GVN or through a joint development fund, to an equitable compensation program for landlords which also would encourage landlords to move into other socially productive fields. We might provide dollar support for landowner compensation under Voluntary Purchase Program in which 50 percent of balance owing landlord after GVN piaster down payment could be provided in dollar denominated certificates guaranteeing holder right to import investment or production goods from the U.S. after the war or within, say, three years of date of issuance, whichever is earlier. (Alternative versions also could permit former landlords option utilize such certificates for equity in new postwar plants, e.g., fertilizer.) The balance payable in GVN piaster bonds could have value maintained through some such device as maintenance of value tied to rice price.

Initial down payment might be 20 percent in piasters since SRI surveys indicate major landlord dissatisfaction with the 1950s GVN repayment scheme where down payment was less.

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Page 8 of telegram to AmEmbassy SAIGON

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Classification

In order to provide the necessary spur to the Voluntary Land Purchase Program, there should be a marked differentiation between it and the expropriation compensation. Thus, compensation under the expropriation provision might parallel the earlier GVN programs, e. g. 10 percent initial payment, 90 percent in regular GVN bonds without any compensation in the form of import certificates.

Obviously, there are limits on U.S. dollar financial participation. Our preliminary thinking has been in terms of a range of \$30 to \$50 million. As noted earlier, we would be prepared to consider such unprecedented dollar support of a land reform program only where it appears that the program will have an early significant impact and the total program appears to be implementable. We have visualized a reduction of the hectare limit by legislative action from 100 to 30 or less as a sine qua non of such a program.

~~with this attention~~
7. Would appreciate greatly your exploring these ideas/and advising us of your appraisals. We strongly agree that a comprehensive and effective program would be highly constructive and a useful weapon in gaining adherence of the peasant. Also, given the extremely high symbolism placed on land reform outside of Vietnam, such a program would assist very substantially our efforts to convince others of the character of the new Constitutional Government and of the just war being fought.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE --EYES ONLY

Friday, October 18, 1968 -- 12:05 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a sensitive report on Ky's views about our conditions.

I do happen to believe that, Harriman or no Harriman, Thieu has to be given some latitude to deal with his political problem, as well as to save Hanoi's face.

When you get a good feel for the situation, you may wish to give us guidance.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02

WWRostow:rla

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~
HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Friday, October 18, 1968 - 12:00noon

Mr. President:

Herewith a GVN problem if we appear to accept the NLF as a "separate entity" -- and not part of "their side."

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 40627

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-479
By ing, NARA, Date 2-25-93

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Friday, October 18, 1968 -- 11:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two Soviet items:

Tab A, Vance's account of his clarifying conversation with Oberemko this morning.

Tab B, Soviet anxiety whether Thieu's government can hold up under the current strains of peace talks, including fear of a "rightist coup." They are shrewd to raise this point. It is a legitimate anxiety.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 22619 (DELTO 844)
London 13599

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-479
By ij, NARA, Date 2-25-93

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rln

Friday, October 18, 1968

9:46 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the U. S. casualty figures from October 7 to October 17.

U. S. killed in action ran as follows:

| | |
|-----------|----------|
| October 7 | 22 |
| 8 | 12 |
| 9 | 15 |
| 10 | 7 |
| 11 | 17 |
| 12 | 20 |
| <hr/> 13 | <hr/> 12 |
| 14 | 1 |
| 15 | 3 |
| 16 | 3 |
| 17 | 2 |
| | 7 |

This compares with an average of U. S. killed in action of 26 per day for 1967.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

57a

8 OCTOBER 1968

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT 7 Oct 68 | (2) ^a Current Week 12 AM EDT 5 Oct 68 Through 12 AM EDT 6 Oct 68 | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68 | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67 | (5) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 51 |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 22 | 19 | 12,645 | 21,810 | 28,667 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 52 | 50 | 38,504 | 68,158 | 85,279 |
| Wounded Hosp | 57 | 54 | 41,388 | 73,759 | 94,376 |
| Captured | 0 | 0 | 94 | 229 | 325 |
| Missing | 0 | 0 | 240 | 511 | 887 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 26 | 16 | 18,426 | 29,306 | 71,601 |
| Wounded | 131 | 87 | 45,361 | 74,745 | 160,087 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 3,127 | 4,459 | 29,463 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 2 | 0 | 802 | 1,907 | 2,505 |
| Wounded | 3 | 6 | 1,673 | 3,991 | 5,721 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 399 | 252 | 156,826 | 244,907 | 404,060 |
| Wounded ^e | 599 | 378 | 234,929 | 367,051 | 605,780 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 143 | 232 | 43,487 | 71,909 | -- |
| Crew Served | 10 | 88 | 9,090 | 11,972 | -- |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EC3 units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1993
By 14 MADA, Date 3-19-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

586

MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

9 OCTOBER 1968

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT 8 Oct 68 | (2) ^a Current Week 12 AM EDT 5 Oct 68 Through 12 AM EDT 7 Oct 68 | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68 | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67 | (5) ^t Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61 |
|----------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES ^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 12 | 51 | 12,677 | 21,842 | 28,699 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 76 | 250 | 38,704 | 68,358 | 85,479 |
| Wounded Hosp | 82 | 274 | 41,605 | 73,976 | 94,593 |
| Captured | 0 | 0 | 94 | 229 | 325 |
| Missing | 1 | 0 | 238 | 509 | 885 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 10 | 42 | 18,484 | 29,364 | 71,659 |
| Wounded | 52 | 218 | 45,547 | 74,995 | 160,237 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 2,128 | 4,468 | 29,472 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 5 | 2 | 814 | 1,919 | 2,517 |
| Wounded | 10 | 7 | 1,703 | 4,021 | 5,751 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 350 | 651 | 157,705 | 245,786 | 404,939 |
| Wounded ^e | 525 | 977 | 236,558 | 368,680 | 607,409 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 175 | 375 | 43,633 | 72,055 | -- |
| Crew Served | 21 | 98 | 9,213 | 12,095 | -- |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EOB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12058, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1998

By 19 NARA, Date 3-1-93

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE.

MILITARY CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

58c

10 OCTOBER 1968

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT 9 Oct 68 | (2) ^a Current Week 12 AM EDT 5 Oct 68 Through 12 AM EDT 8 Oct 68 | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68 | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67 | (5) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61 |
|----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 15 | 77 | 12,703 | 21,868 | 28,725 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 58 | 286 | 38,740 | 68,394 | 85,515 |
| Wounded Hosp | 62 | 314 | 41,645 | 74,016 | 94,633 |
| Captured | 0 | 0 | 94 | 229 | 325 |
| Missing | 0 | 0 | 237 | 508 | 884 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 24 | 52 | 18,494 | 29,374 | 71,669 |
| Wounded | 113 | 270 | 45,599 | 75,047 | 160,289 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 2,128 | 4,468 | 29,472 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 2 | 7 | 819 | 1,924 | 2,522 |
| Wounded | 9 | 17 | 1,713 | 4,031 | 5,761 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 257 | 1,001 | 158,055 | 246,136 | 405,289 |
| Wounded ^e | 386 | 1,502 | 237,083 | 369,205 | 607,954 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 121 | 550 | 43,808 | 72,230 | --- |
| Crew Served | 8 | 119 | 9,234 | 12,116 | --- |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EOB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998

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By 18 NARA, Date 3-1-93

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58d

MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

11 OCTOBER 1968

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT 10 OCT 68 | (2) ^a Current Week | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68 | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67 | (5) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61 |
|----------------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|
| | | 12 AM EDT 5 OCT 68 Through 12 AM EDT 9 OCT 68 | | | |
| UNITED STATES^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 7 | 98 | 12,724 | 21,889 | 28,746 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 41 | 484 | 38,938 | 68,592 | 85,713 |
| Wounded Hosp | 44 | 529 | 41,860 | 74,231 | 94,848 |
| Captured | 0 | 0 | 94 | 229 | 325 |
| Missing | 7 | 1 | 238 | 508 | 885 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 32 | 76 | 18,518 | 29,398 | 71,693 |
| Wounded | 179 | 383 | 45,712 | 75,160 | 160,402 |
| Missing/Captured | 8 | 0 | 2,128 | 4,468 | 29,472 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 0 | 9 | 821 | 1,926 | 2,524 |
| Wounded | 0 | 26 | 1,722 | 4,040 | 5,770 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 197 | 1,258 | 158,312 | 246,393 | 405,546 |
| Wounded ^e | 296 | 1,888 | 237,469 | 369,591 | 608,320 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 130 | 671 | 43,929 | 72,351 | --- |
| Crew Served | 16 | 127 | 9,242 | 12,124 | --- |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EOB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

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MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

12 OCTOBER 1968

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT 11 OCT 68 | (2) ^a Current Week 12 AM EDT 5 OCT 68 Through 12 AM EDT 10 OCT 68 | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68 | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67 | (5) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61 |
|----------------------------|--|--|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES ^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 17 | 125 | 12,751 | 21,916 | 28,773 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 37 | 518 | 38,972 | 68,626 | 85,747 |
| Wounded Hosp | 40 | 565 | 41,896 | 74,267 | 94,884 |
| Captured | 0 | 0 | 94 | 229 | 325 |
| Missing | 0 | 0 | 235 | 505 | 882 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 37 | 108 | 18,550 | 29,430 | 71,725 |
| Wounded | 118 | 562 | 45,891 | 75,339 | 160,581 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 8 | 2,136 | 4,476 | 29,480 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 0 | 9 | 821 | 1,926 | 2,524 |
| Wounded | 2 | 26 | 1,722 | 4,040 | 5,770 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 312 | 1,455 | 158,509 | 246,590 | 405,743 |
| Wounded ^e | 468 | 2,184 | 237,765 | 369,887 | 608,616 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 118 | 801 | 44,059 | 72,481 | --- |
| Crew Served | 10 | 143 | 9,258 | 12,140 | --- |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EOB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

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MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

13 OCTOBER 1968

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT 12 Oct 68 | (2) ^a Current Week 12 AM EDT 5 Oct 68 Through 12 AM EDT 11 Oct 68 | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68 | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67 | (5) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61 |
|----------------------------------|--|--|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 20 | 155 | 12,781 | 21,946 | 28,803 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 54 | 566 | 39,020 | 68,674 | 85,795 |
| Wounded Hosp | 59 | 609 | 41,940 | 74,311 | 94,928 |
| Captured | 0 | 0 | 94 | 229 | 325 |
| Missing | 1 | 4 | 239 | 509 | 886 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 23 | 145 | 18,587 | 29,467 | 71,762 |
| Wounded | 165 | 680 | 46,009 | 75,457 | 160,699 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 8 | 2,136 | 4,476 | 29,480 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 0 | 9 | 821 | 1,926 | 2,525 |
| Wounded | 4 | 28 | 1,724 | 4,042 | 5,772 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 266 | 1,767 | 158,821 | 246,902 | 406,055 |
| Wounded ^e | 399 | 2,652 | 238,233 | 370,355 | 609,084 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 90 | 919 | 44,177 | 72,599 | |
| Crew Served | 6 | 153 | 9,268 | 12,150 | |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with ECB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

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MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

14 OCTOBER 1968

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT 13 Oct 68 | (2) ^a Current Week 12 AM EDT 5 Oct 68 Through 12 AM EDT 12 Oct 68 | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68 | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67 | (5) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61 |
|----------------------------|--|--|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES ^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 12 | 181 | 12,807 | 21,972 | 28,829 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 47 | 623 | 39,077 | 68,731 | 85,852 |
| Wounded Hosp | 51 | 662 | 41,993 | 74,364 | 94,981 |
| Captured | 0 | 0 | 94 | 229 | 325 |
| Missing | 0 | 6 | 241 | 511 | 888 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 35 | 168 | 18,610 | 29,490 | 71,785 |
| Wounded | 109 | 845 | 46,174 | 75,622 | 160,864 |
| Missing/Captured | 5 | 8 | 2,136 | 4,476 | 29,480 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 0 | 9 | 821 | 1,926 | 2,525 |
| Wounded | 2 | 32 | 1,728 | 4,046 | 5,776 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 271 | 2,033 | 159,087 | 247,168 | 406,321 |
| Wounded ^e | 406 | 3,051 | 238,632 | 370,754 | 609,483 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 87 | 1,009 | 44,267 | 72,689 | |
| Crew Served | 6 | 159 | 9,274 | 12,156 | |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EOB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

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MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

15 OCTOBER 1968

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT 14 Oct 68 | (2) ^a Current Week 12 AM EDT 12 Oct 68 Through 12 AM EDT 13 Oct 68 | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68 | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67 | (5) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61 |
|----------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|
| UNITED STATES ^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 1 | 24 | 12,827 | 21,992 | 28,849 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 11 | 43 | 39,116 | 68,770 | 85,891 |
| Wounded Hosp | 11 | 47 | 42,040 | 74,411 | 95,028 |
| Captured | 0 | 0 | 94 | 229 | 325 |
| Missing | 0 | 3 | 237 | 508 | 884 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 18 | 35 | 18,645 | 29,525 | 71,820 |
| Wounded | 68 | 109 | 46,283 | 75,731 | 160,973 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 5 | 2,141 | 4,481 | 29,485 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 0 | 0 | 821 | 1,926 | 2,525 |
| Wounded | 0 | 2 | 1,730 | 4,048 | 5,778 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 158 | 271 | 159,358 | 247,439 | 406,592 |
| Wounded ^e | 237 | 406 | 239,038 | 371,160 | 609,889 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 60 | 87 | 44,354 | 72,776 | - - - - |
| Crew Served | 4 | 6 | 9,280 | 12,162 | - - - - |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EOB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

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MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

16 OCTOBER 1968

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT <u>15 Oct 68</u> | (2) ^a Current Week 12 AM EDT 12 Oct 68 Through 12 AM EDT <u>14 Oct 68</u> | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From <u>1 Jan 68</u> | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From <u>1 Jan 67</u> | (5) ^b Cumula- tive From <u>1 Jan 61</u> |
|----------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| UNITED STATES ^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 3 | 31 | 12,834 | 21,999 | 28,856 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 25 | 168 | 39,241 | 68,895 | 86,016 |
| Wounded Hosp | 27 | 182 | 42,175 | 74,546 | 95,163 |
| Captured | 0 | 0 | 94 | 229 | 325 |
| Missing | 0 | 4 | 238 | 509 | 885 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 20 | 53 | 18,685 | 29,565 | 71,860 |
| Wounded | 86 | 177 | 46,243 | 75,691 | 160,933 |
| Missing/Captured | 2 | 5 | 2,136 | 4,476 | 29,480 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 0 | 0 | 829 | 1,934 | 2,532 |
| Wounded | 2 | 2 | 1,741 | 4,059 | 5,789 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 161 | 429 | 159,471 | 247,552 | 406,705 |
| Wounded ^e | 242 | 643 | 239,206 | 371,328 | 610,057 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 226 | 147 | 44,242 | 72,664 | - - - - |
| Crew Served | 12 | 10 | 9,145 | 12,027 | - - - - |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EOB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

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DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1998
By roy, NARA. Date 3-1-93

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MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

17 OCTOBER 1968

58j

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT <u>16 OCT 68</u> | (2) ^a Current Week 12 AM EDT 12 OCT 68 Through 12 AM EDT <u>15 OCT 68</u> | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From <u>1 Jan 68</u> | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From <u>1 Jan 67</u> | (5) ^b Cumula- tive From <u>1 Jan 61</u> |
|----------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| UNITED STATES ^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 3 | 48 | 12,851 | 22,016 | 28,873 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 24 | 193 | 39,266 | 68,920 | 86,041 |
| Wounded Hosp | 26 | 211 | 42,204 | 74,575 | 95,192 |
| Captured | 0 | 1 | 95 | 230 | 326 |
| Missing | 0 | 5 | 239 | 510 | 886 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 24 | 73 | 18,705 | 29,585 | 71,880 |
| Wounded | 110 | 263 | 46,329 | 75,777 | 161,019 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 7 | 2,138 | 4,478 | 29,482 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 0 | 0 | 829 | 1,934 | 2,532 |
| Wounded | 0 | 4 | 1,743 | 4,061 | 5,791 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 229 | 590 | 159,632 | 247,713 | 406,866 |
| Wounded ^e | 344 | 885 | 239,448 | 371,570 | 610,299 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 104 | 373 | 44,468 | 72,890 | - - - |
| Crew Served | 4 | 22 | 9,157 | 12,039 | - - - |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EOB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

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DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1998

By 19 NAFA. Date 3-1-93

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 MILITARY CASUALTIES AND WEAPONS
 SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

58k

18 OCTOBER 1968

| | (1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 12 AM EDT 17 OCT 68 | (2) ^a Current Week 12 AM EDT 12 OCT 68 Through 12 AM EDT 16 OCT 68 | (3) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68 | (4) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67 | (5) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61 |
|----------------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | |
| UNITED STATES^c | | | | | |
| Killed | 2 | 67 | 12,870 | 22,035 | 28,892 |
| Wounded Not Hosp | 15 | 218 | 39,291 | 68,945 | 86,066 |
| Wounded Hosp | 16 | 239 | 42,232 | 74,603 | 95,220 |
| Captured | 0 | 1 | 95 | 230 | 326 |
| Missing | 0 | 0 | 234 | 505 | 881 |
| SOUTH VIETNAM | | | | | |
| Killed | 18 | 97 | 18,729 | 29,609 | 71,904 |
| Wounded | 65 | 373 | 46,439 | 75,887 | 161,129 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 7 | 2,138 | 4,478 | 29,482 |
| OTHER ALLIED | | | | | |
| Killed | 2 | 0 | 829 | 1,934 | 2,532 |
| Wounded | 4 | 4 | 1,743 | 4,061 | 5,791 |
| Missing/Captured | 0 | 0 | 9 | 12 | 29 |
| VIET CONG/NVA | | | | | |
| Killed ^d | 219 | 819 | 159,861 | 247,942 | 407,095 |
| Wounded ^e | 329 | 1,229 | 239,792 | 371,914 | 610,645 |
| WEAPONS SEIZED | | | | | |
| Individual | 129 | 477 | 44,572 | 72,994 | - - - - |
| Crew Served | 6 | 26 | 9,161 | 12,043 | - - - - |

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EOB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

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 DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
 By 19 NARA, Date 3-19-93

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ACTION

Friday - October 18, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Decisions on Commitment of Alliance for Progress Funds for FY 1969

Covey Oliver has asked for your guidance on how rapidly he should move to commit Alliance for Progress funds, now that the appropriation is in hand.

The bulk of this year's money is earmarked for Brazil, Colombia, Chile and Central America. Major decisions between now and the end of the year will be needed on loan packages for the three major countries. If preliminary discussions with the governments and preparations by our embassies go according to plan, Oliver expects to make firm recommendations to you about December 1. This allows for formal negotiations early enough to influence the self-help decisions these governments must make in readying their 1969 fiscal budgets.* To delay these major negotiations until 1969 would break the continuity of our support for their economic programs and would lessen the effectiveness of our assistance.

Oliver would like your guidance to follow one of the options below.

- Go ahead on schedule. _____
- Go ahead after consulting with representatives of the new administration. _____
- Defer negotiations until after January 20. _____

W. W. Rostow

SWLewis:mm

*Jan, 1969 is budget day for the three countries

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 18, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

I read the Fenton and Potter stories in the Sun.

On Fenton, Jordan tells me he thinks the French are talking. When I read him key passages, he said it was much like an AP story which quoted an "allied diplomatic source." Fenton, Jordan says, is calling the Delegation every hour on the hour complaining that because the Delegation won't talk, the story is being written elsewhere.

It is a dangerous story because it refers to "secret talks."

Potter I saw yesterday. I flatly refused to talk about any current diplomacy -- as I have refused all reporters. I did brief him in some detail on the military situation.

W. W. Rostow

(cc: George Christian)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-479
By ijg, NARA, Date 2-25-93

ACTION

Friday
Thursday, October 18, 1968 - 10:30 AM

61

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Aid for Indonesia

Pres file

The yearly meeting of the InterGovernmental Group (IGG) on foreign aid for Indonesia will take place in The Hague on October 20-21. The purpose of the meeting is to agree upon Indonesia's aid requirements for calendar year 1969. We also make our pledge at this meeting as an incentive to other donors.

Indonesia will request and the IMF and World Bank will support a total aid package of \$500 million (\$380 million in economic aid and \$120 million in food).

Attached is a memorandum from Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman which proposes that we pledge about one-third (\$130 million) of the economic aid and offer to meet "the bulk" (up to \$100 million in PL 480 rice and wheat) of Indonesian food aid needs. Our pledge, as usual, would be contingent upon Congressional appropriations, satisfactory commitments from other donors and satisfactory performance by the Indonesian Government on its stabilization program.

In the past we have talked of meeting Indonesia's total aid needs through a one-third formula (one-third from us, one-third from the Japanese, one-third from everybody else). In fact, however, we departed from this formula last year when our wheat aid of \$50 million and the short-fall in the European aid commitment resulted in our providing 46% of Indonesia's actual aid receipts.

The proposal being submitted to you this year would also mean that we pledge 46% of Indonesia's stated aid needs for 1969.

The proposal is based on two assumptions:

1. that it is an important aim of American policy to provide Indonesia with the external aid she requires,
2. that we should give our aid in such a way as to maximize European and Japanese contributions.

Frankly, unless we do more than one-third there is little prospect that Indonesia's need for \$500 million of foreign aid in CY 1969 will be met.

The Japanese, from Prime Minister Sato down, are now talking about doing less than their 1968 level of \$110 million. In 1968 the Europeans fell far short of their \$110 million. In fact, a rigid adherence to the one-third formula would probably lead the IGG countries to refuse to agree to the \$500 million figure as Indonesia's requirement.

Therefore, we propose to apply the one-third formula only to the non-food part of Indonesian needs, about \$380 million. That gives the Japanese and the Europeans a target of \$130 million each. They will groan, but we believe they can be induced to accept the figure.

On food aid, Agriculture assures me that market conditions are such that we will wish to provide Indonesia with at least 300,000 tons of rice and as much wheat as she can use. Therefore, the proposal is that we pledge ourselves to pick up the bulk of Indonesia's food aid needs, while still pressing other donors for as large a share as we can get from them. We would tell the Indonesians that we are thinking of about \$60 million of rice and perhaps \$40 million of wheat.

Charley Zwick concurs in the Gaud-Freeman proposal. (Zwick memorandum is attached.) Henry Fowler takes exception to our pledging "the bulk" of Indonesia's food needs. Instead he would like us to pledge only to do "a fair share," provided others do the same. He also opposes discussing specific quantities of food aid with the Indonesians at this time. (Fowler memorandum is attached.)

The difficulty with the Fowler approach is that the Indonesians need to be able to plan their food procurement rationally, and cannot do so without some idea of what we intend to do for them. Moreover, the distinction between Fowler's "fair share" and Gaud-Freeman's "bulk" of food needs is really a matter of semantics. If we do not meet the "bulk" of Indonesia's food aid needs, they will not be met. It is not in our interest to have another food shortage emergency, as occurred last January.

I recommend you approve the Gaud-Freeman proposal.

Atts

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWright:wpt

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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

OCT 17 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Calendar Year 1969 Aid Pledges to Indonesia

Director Zwick, Administrator Gaud and Secretary Freeman are recommending that the U.S. pledge for CY 1969 aid to Indonesia be about one-third or \$130 million of the \$380 million of estimated non-food requirements, and that the U.S. provide "the bulk of Indonesia's emergency food aid."

The proposal significantly departs from the concept of meaningful burden-sharing for food aid, particularly rice, that was envisaged in your decision on the last proposal for Indonesia. (Mr. Walt Rostow's memo of June 19, 1968 to the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, Treasury, AID and BOB). I do not believe that all we say about burden-sharing and of the real value of our food aid is meaningful if in international consortia we act as residual suppliers of one important means of moving aid -- food. I will not argue against separating out the food package for whatever tactical reasons AID might have in this case, particularly since I understand that the final requirements are uncertain. I do take issue with Recommendation 3 of the Gaud-Freeman memo which would have our representative to the Consortium state that "the U.S. is prepared to provide the bulk of Indonesia's emergency food aid requirements", and for us to give specific estimates to the Indonesians.

In my view, if you agree to making a pledge, the food aid part should be limited to an indication that the U.S. is prepared to do a fair share (rather than the "bulk") in meeting emergency food aid needs, provided others do their fair share either in goods or finance in meeting such requirements. This would also mean that we do not quantify to the Indonesians the amount of additional

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
Treasury Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

rice or wheat the U.S. might supply except to take full credit on the rice already pledged to 1969 aid.

I would also suggest on the non-food aid package that we make crystal clear that our one-third share is related not only to requirements but depends on whether others actually pledge the other two-thirds. We should be satisfied that not only Japan but the Europeans are committed to do their share.

Finally, while we seem to be on the right course in getting "additionality" in Indonesian aid, pursuant to your balance-of-payments program, we should assure with the Indonesians that this continues.

Henry H. Fowler
Henry H. Fowler

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

616

OCT 16 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: AID Pledge for Indonesia

You are asked to approve a negotiating position for the U.S. at the upcoming Inter-Governmental Group (IGG) meeting on Indonesia's CY 1969 aid requirements. The purpose of the October meeting is to establish overall goals and country shares. In the past, we have made our pledge at this meeting as an incentive to other donors, even though other donors usually do not make specific commitments until spring.

The Government of Indonesia will request, and the IMF/IBRD is expected to support, a total aid package of \$500 million, including \$380 million of economic aid and \$120 million of food aid.

Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman propose that we pledge about one-third of the economic aid package (\$130 million). We would expect the Japanese to contribute another third, with the remainder coming from IDA and other donors. Gaud and Freeman also propose that we offer to meet the bulk of Indonesia's food aid requirement (up to \$100 million), provided other countries make a contribution as well.

Total Aid Package - Gaud believes that it is in the best foreign policy interest of the U.S. for us to be in a position, along with other donors, to provide Indonesia with all the aid she can effectively absorb. He thus proposes that the U.S. support the full \$500 million aid target for Indonesia, even though there are uncertainties in at least two areas.

First, Indonesia's food production may be higher than estimated, in which case her food import requirements would be reduced. Second, the number of rehabilitation and development projects ready for financing before the end of CY 1969 may be lower than estimated; this would reduce the amount of funds which the Indonesians could effectively utilize for projects.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

U.S. Share - Bill Gaud proposes that we offer the Indonesians a total U.S. aid package, including food aid, of \$230 million, which is 46% of her \$500 million aid target for 1969. This share can be defended on two grounds:

First, it compares very closely to our actual share in CY 1968, which was 46%. While we originally pledged to contribute one-third of a total aid request of \$320 million, we later provided an additional emergency wheat shipment of \$50 million. Also, the European donors fell short of their share by \$20 million. As a result, we actually contributed \$160 million out of a total of \$350 million.


Second, State/AID believe that \$270 million is the most we can expect the other donors to contribute. Japan had difficulty meeting the \$110 million one-third share for CY 1968, and preliminary discussions indicate that Japan will be reluctant to commit even \$130 million for CY 1969. Other donors fell short in CY 1968. Thus, Indonesia's \$500 million aid target can be met only if we put up \$230 million.

Packaging of U.S. Contribution - The one-third sharing formula has served us well in the past in establishing a parity basis for Japanese participation. By excluding food aid from the compilation of the one-third share, Gaud proposes to preserve the one-third formula. While in most cases I would prefer to treat food aid as equivalent to other forms of aid, I agree that the proposed packaging is a reasonable solution to a difficult problem. It permits us to establish a feasible target level for negotiation with the Japanese and other donors.

The funds provided will be tied to U.S. procurement. Commodities will be selected to minimize the substitution for commercial exports from the U.S. in order to minimize the impact on our balance of payments.

All pledges are subject to the availability of funds. AID will seek your approval for any agreements which are ready for financing during the remainder of your term of office.

I recommend approval of the proposed aid pledge.


Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3230
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

61c

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

OCT 14 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Position at October 21 Inter-Governmental
Group (IGG) Meeting on Indonesia

We need your approval for a position at the October 21 meeting of the IGG to consider Indonesia's 1969 aid requirements. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) will request, and the IMF/IBRD will support, \$500 million of aid from the IGG for CY 1969 -- a \$150 million increase from 1968's pledges. Most of the increase arises from the IBRD's judgment that more projects will be ready for commitment next year.

We agree with the Bank and Fund that the GOI's performance warrants this increased support (See Annex A).

Of Indonesia's \$500 million request, \$380 million is for general import (including cotton) and project financing. The balance is for rice and wheat. This is designed to provide sufficient quantities of food to assure continued price stability in this vital sector while awaiting the payoff from greatly intensified food production efforts.

In 1968, in addition to our one-third share (\$110 million) of Indonesia's original requirements, we committed \$50 million of wheat to help meet emergency food requirements. Our commitment (\$160 million) thus totalled 46% of all 1968 aid pledges.

We want to continue to exert on other donors -- particularly Japan -- the maximum pressure to share fully in the collective aid effort, taking account of our and their differing capabilities and Indonesia's needs. Consequently, we are requesting authority to pledge at the forthcoming IGG meeting only about one-third of Indonesia's \$380 million non-food aid requirements.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 36-02

This would establish a new target of about \$130 million for Japanese aid to Indonesia; would maintain the principle of U.S. - Japanese equality in meeting Indonesia's on-going (as contrasted with emergency food-aid) requirements; and, if the Japanese provide it, would represent a major achievement.

Recognizing, however, the GOI's need over the near term for rice and wheat on a standby basis to assure that last winter's near-disastrous rice price increase will not recur, we would also pledge our readiness to respond, in concert with other IGG members, to Indonesia's food needs. In view of our unique capabilities for furnishing rice and wheat, we would not adhere to a specific formula for sharing the emergency food requirements, but we would make it clear we expect other nations to join to the fullest extent of their capability.

While Indonesia is requesting 400,000 MT of rice and 500,000 MT of wheat to assure rice price stability, it is not yet clear that this much will in fact be required. Accordingly, we are requesting authority to provide about 300,000 MT of rice (100,000 MT has already been committed as a down payment on 1969) and most of Indonesia's wheat needs as they develop during the year. While Indonesia is requesting \$120 million of wheat and rice, we are currently estimating our response at about \$100 million.

If you approve this overall approach, we would plan to meet our roughly one-third share of Indonesia's 1969 non-food requirements with a combination of A. I. D. Development Loans from FY 1969 and 1970 appropriations and P. L. 480 cotton, tobacco, tallow and oils, as follows:

(\$ millions)

| | <u>FY 1969</u> | <u>FY 1970</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|
| Development Loans | 50 | 20 | 70 |
| P. L. 480 | | | |
| Cotton (raw & yarn) | | | 50 - 60 |
| Tobacco, tallow, oil | | | <u>10 - 0</u> |
| | | | 130 |

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

Recommendations: That, within the foregoing context, you authorize the U.S. Delegation at the October 21 IGG meeting to consider Indonesia's CY 1969 aid requirements:


1. To join in a communique endorsing the \$500 million requested by Indonesia, provided it is fully supported by IMF and the IBRD.

2. To state to other IGG participants that, subject to U.S. Congressional appropriations, the U.S. expects to be able to provide one-third of Indonesia's non-food aid requirements, provided:


a. Other donors make commitments satisfactory both as to amounts and terms; and

b. The IMF and IBRD continue to report satisfactory performance by Indonesia both in its stabilization program and in using aid effectively.

3. To state to other IGG participants that, subject to Congressional appropriations and availability of rice, the U.S. is prepared to provide the bulk of Indonesia's emergency food aid requirements as they develop through the year, provided others will also make a maximum effort. We would advise the GOI we are currently estimating 300,000 MT of rice and 400,000 MT of wheat.



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ANNEX AIndonesia's Economic Problems and Self-Help Measures

The main objectives of Indonesia's two-year old stabilization program have been to bring about a sharp decrease in the rate of inflation (which was 635% in CY 1966) and to reestablish sensible internal and external price relationships. The main tools employed by the GOI -- aided by the IMF -- to bring about these objectives were fiscal and credit restraints, the introduction of free market conditions and the abandonment of the direct controls of the Sukarno era, rescheduling of existing foreign debts, and new program aid from abroad.

Although the 1967 stabilization program produced results significantly better than 1966's record, it was still somewhat disappointing. The \$200 million IGG aid target was met, and a number of useful and politically courageous policy measures were taken. But no general renewal of agricultural or industrial production took place, the balance of payments picture remained grim, and inflation accelerated late in the year as GOI rice production and stockpiling plans proved inadequate to see the urban areas through the winter season of shortage. The Djakarta consumer price index, led by rice prices, rose by 112% over the year.

But the GOI--with the help of the United States and several other donors--took firm steps in 1968 to avoid a repetition of last winter's food crisis. Large amounts of rice and wheat have been imported and a successful 1968 harvest has been matched with a sensible food price policy strengthened by recent PL 480 self-help measures. Rice prices have been stable for the past several months, attributable mainly to the assurances of large stocks of rice and wheat through the lean season. General price increases have been limited to about two percent per month since March and the World Bank report predicts further movement towards stability into 1969. Despite this, farmers have been provided sufficient price incentives to use fertilizer, pesticides, and new rice varieties. The government has set increased food production as its top priority for development and is beginning to allocate resources accordingly. In addition, President Suharto has recently signed a decree establishing a national family planning program.

The ambitious rice procurement program, however, has contributed to rapid monetary expansion during the first half of this year and although the money supply is expected to contract somewhat by the end of the year, it has caused at least a temporary breaching of ceilings imposed by the IMF standby and is a cause for considerable concern. The GOI does expect to meet IMF standby conditions by the end of the year.

A budget surplus is projected for 1968, largely due to increased government revenue collection and continued budgetary stringency. The

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

GOI tax revenue is still excessively dependent upon indirect taxes - particularly on foreign trade. A new tax structure, combining reliance on direct taxes and excises, will need to be developed. In the meantime, the government - spurred by the IMF - has shown enough confidence in its ability to generate revenue that export taxes were reduced by 40% recently in an effort to discourage the continuing massive scale of illegal trade. What limited progress there has been in the development field has largely been due to increased production of oil and tin and some growth in rice production. Crude oil output, for example, is estimated to be up by 29% in 1968. With a few exceptions, little else has been accomplished of a tangible character, although the potential remains high. Foreign investment continues to flow slowly to Indonesia although several large contracts have been signed in the past year. Many major foreign companies are attracted by the extractive industries, minerals and timber, in particular. But Indonesian traditional agricultural exports - rubber, copra and palm oil - are suffering from declining quality and world prices.

Working capital requirements are high if production is to be revived, especially in industry and estates, but resources have not been available in sufficient quantity. Bank credit to the private production sector has increased, however, and recent measures to raise the state bank interest rates should permit channelling greater support to priority development programs.

After large amounts of scarce foreign exchange were spent last year for less essential imports - such as finished textiles - the tariff structure was revised somewhat and the exchange rate system simplified. A complete overhaul of the tariff structure is now underway in Djakarta with expert advice from the IMF. Foreign exchange rates are still subject to considerable speculation and continue to be an area of concern given the GOI's own very limited amount of foreign exchange availabilities.

The group of American-trained economists are firmly entrenched in key policy making positions and continue to have President Suharto's full support and close advice from the IMF, IBRD and Harvard Development Advisory Services, among others. Particularly significant has been IBRD's decision to establish a 12-man mission in Djakarta to assist the GOI in project preparation, coordination of technical assistance and other areas. Many sound steps are being taken to make the economy function again but there remains much to be done if development is actually to take place. Significant foreign assistance will be required to support the strong self-help measures the Suharto government has taken and plans to implement in the next year.

10/8/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

62

~~SECRET~~

Friday, Oct. 18, 1968
10:20 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

On the basis of this Bus Wheeler memo, the Koreans are not goofing off badly.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(log 3237 CM-3706-68 17 Oct 68 Combat Casualties in Vietnam)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By ag/dch, NARA, Date 3-10-93

SECRET

3307

62a



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3706-68
17 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Combat Casualties in Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ALQ 91-10
By ng/ep, NARA, Date 3-10-93

1. This memorandum responds to your inquiry about comparative casualty statistics among the troop contributing countries in South Vietnam (SVN). A valid comparison can be made in the number of military personnel killed in action (KIA). While gross totals are readily available, a determination of the percentage of KIA to the total military strength of a particular country in SVN is more difficult because of variations in the strengths of allied forces in SVN from year to year. Accordingly, there are shown below the total KIA, by country, for both FY-1967 and FY-1968, together with percentage which the KIA figure represents with respect to the total military strength of that country present in SVN as of the end of each FY. Also shown are the cumulative KIA totals, by country, from the time of each country's initial commitment in Vietnam up to the present (actually through 12 October 1968).

| Country | FY 1967 | | FY 1968 | | Cumulative Total** |
|-------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-------------|--------------------|
| | KIA Total | Percentage* | KIA Total | Percentage* | |
| US | 7,396 | 1.6 | 14,073 | 2.6 | 28,825 |
| SVN | 10,181 | 1.5 | 15,456 | 2.0 | 73,840 |
| Korea | 672 | 1.25 | 1,100 | 2.2 | 2,219 |
| Australia | 75 | 1.3 | 100 | 1.3 | 227 |
| Thailand | 0 | 0 | 37 | .6 | 51 |
| New Zealand | 2 | .5 | 4 | .8 | 10 |
| Philippines | 4 | .2 | 4 | .2 | 8 |

* KIA as percentage of total military strength in SVN

** From initial commitment in SVN through 12 October 1968

GROUP - 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

CM-3706-68

2. Comparative information on personnel wounded in action is generally not valid because of widely varying methods of classifying and reporting wounded personnel from country to country. Accordingly, a tabulation of statistics on wounded personnel has not been attempted.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copy furnished:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense

SECRET

INFORMATION

63

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Friday, October 18, 1968
9:35 a. m.**

Mr. President:

This will interest you.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 3-1-93

WWRostow:rln

63a
Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Stewart Hensley conveyed the following information today to Dick Phillips:

1. He accepted a luncheon invitation today from a Soviet Embassy source. The Russian told him Dobrynin is very busy, playing a considerable role in getting the U.S. and Hanoi together on a peace formula.
2. The Soviet press under instructions has played the Vietnam theme for the past week in a very low key.
3. A bombing pause would help Humphrey.
4. The Soviets are running certain public opinion polls here for Hanoi.
5. Hensley believes the Soviets have passed a similar story to the other wire service.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

111

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Friday, October 18, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Cy Vance just called with the following: Oberemko asked to see him to catch up on the situation.

Cy took him very carefully through the whole position. Cy feels it was time well spent.

Oberemko promised to use his "best influence" to get his government to lead Hanoi over the hump.

Oberemko himself had nothing new to throw into the discussion.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-477
By [signature], NARA, Date 2-25-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~-EYES ONLY

Friday, October 18, 1968 -- 8:20 a.m.

file

Mr. President:

Herewith the latest and the [redacted] they start rough but warm up as they move along.

3.3
(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-349
By *id*, NARA, Date 2.24.10

~~SECRET~~-EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rlh

66

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Pres file

Friday, October 18, 1968 -- 8:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

In Tab A, attached, I wish to call attention to the marked passages on page 1.

As you may recall, I have been collecting and sending to you occasionally intelligence items from the Communist World which have indicated that, in the end, Hanoi would not want a total U. S. troop withdrawal. The file is thin but it exists. The argument which these reports have made is: the Soviet Union is weak in Southeast Asia and, if peace comes, Hanoi would want some U. S. forces in the South as a deterrent against Communist China forces against North Vietnam. I told Averell Harriman, when he was in, not to be surprised if the other side does not press us to prompt and total troop withdrawal along the lines of the Manila formula. The underlined item is not definitive, but is worth putting in the back of our minds in the light of hard evidence of worsening relations between Hanoi and Peking.

At Tab B is what I believe to be a purposeful acceptance by the other side of reconnaissance.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3602

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

66a

Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only

18 October 1968

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJL 94-416
By lip, NARA, Date 10-13-94

I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION

Le Duc Tho Arrives in Hanoi: Le Duc Tho completed his trip from Paris to Hanoi on Thursday. [REDACTED] he spent the night of 16-17 October in Peking, but there is no information on what Chinese Communist officials, if any, he met there.

1.3(a)(4)

* * *

Comments on Campaign and the War: Some intriguing--but unauthoritative--views from a low-ranking North Vietnamese diplomat in Laos were picked up [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] said on 14 October that the US election campaign had taken a "new turn," which he attributed to a more "dove-like" stance by Vice President Humphrey. He suggested that a "dramatic move" in the Paris talks by President Johnson might make possible a Humphrey victory, and that this would be encouraging in terms of finding a political settlement.

In response to a statement that ~~the US would not desert South Vietnam and probably would insist on keeping some troops there for a while,~~ the North Vietnamese said that his government understood this and did not expect an immediate and total withdrawal of US forces. He stressed that the US now seemed to understand that a full bombing halt is the "key" to a settlement and that this means the prospects for a settlement are improving.

It is at least conceivable that these views accurately reflect Hanoi's official thinking, but it is difficult to put much stock in them until they come from a more authoritative source.

Views of [REDACTED]: [REDACTED]

1.3(4)(4)

Xuan Thuy gave him the impression in late August that the North Vietnamese would not curtail their infiltration activities even if the US stopped the bombing. Thuy reportedly asserted that Hanoi had always had its doubts about the effectiveness of the talks, but that they had had to keep them going in order to avoid charges that North Vietnam was not interested in ending the war.

The source reportedly talked in July to military officials in Hanoi and to Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. Trinh was interested in postwar economic development and confided that neither the Chinese nor the Soviets were expected to be generous with foreign aid once the fighting stopped. He also expressed skepticism about the willingness of either the US or Japan to contribute much to Hanoi's reconstruction.

A military official in Hanoi told [REDACTED] that large quantities of "defensive" armament had been shifted south of the 19th Parallel since the bombing restriction, but he insisted that none of it was intended for offensive action against the South. Any Japanese-style "kamikaze suicide" attacks across the Demilitarized Zone would be "silly," he said.

1.3(4)(4)

* * *

Nhan Dan Line is Tough: An authoritative "Commentator" article in the North Vietnamese party daily on 17 October takes the usual unyielding line on the Paris talks. All blame for the "stalemate" is heaped on the US for refusing to stop the bombing. The concept of reciprocity is firmly rejected, and in two places the article scores President Johnson for calling on North Vietnam to "meet the minimal requirements of fairness" by exercising military restraint.

* * *

Pro-Hanoi Meetings in Paris: The French Interior Ministry has turned down the Foreign Ministry's request that pro-Hanoi meetings scheduled for this weekend in Paris be banned. (See Wednesday's Special Report.) The US Embassy has been informed that the meetings will

be held inside a building and admission will be by invitation only. (Presumably, therefore, they will not technically be "public.") A Foreign Ministry official was clearly embarrassed by the decision, but he said it had been made at a "very high level" and nothing more could be done about it.

* * *

North Vietnamese Missilemen Discuss New Tactics Against SR-71: North Vietnamese missile controllers have recently [REDACTED] to try bringing down the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. The new tactics, [REDACTED] involve pushing the SA-2 missile system beyond its Soviet-established "book" limits. CIA analysis suggests the North Vietnamese believe they have a chance of intercepting the SR-71 if it passes within about 12 nautical miles of a missile site.

1.36(4)

On at least one occasion, the North Vietnamese have fired, without success, at the SR-71.

* * *

Hanoi Seeks Hydroelectric Power Stations in the Free World: North Vietnam is negotiating with a West German firm for hydroelectric power stations, [REDACTED]. The Japanese reportedly have been negotiating for the same contract. At stake is equipment for three small hydroelectric power stations of 400 kilowatts each.

1.36(4)

* * *

Burchett to Make "Documentary": Wilfred Burchett's current trip to Hanoi apparently has to do with a "documentary" for the Russell War Crimes Tribunal. The film is to "denounce the myth" of the partial bombing halt.

Burchett [REDACTED] had little enthusiasm for this trip. [REDACTED] Burchett said his recent stay in Paris had led him to realize that the international situation is "more complex" than years in Communist countries had led him to believe.

1.36(4)

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTAINS

MATERIAL

1.3(a)(4)

II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR

There is nothing of significance to report today.

-4-

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTAINS

MATERIAL

1.3(a)(4)

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PAGE 01 STATE 257359

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1968 OCT 13 00 16

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DRAFTED BY: INR/REA/AC/ WRSMYSER
APPROVED BY: INR/ REA- JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE
EA- MR ISHAM
S/S MR BROWN.

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SAIGON

~~SECRET~~ STATE 257359

LIMDIS

TODEL 1310

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INR BRIEFING NOTE: XUAN THUY DROPS " RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS" FROM "ACTS OF WAR."

1. IN A REPLY TO A CANADIAN CORRESPONDENT, XUAN THUY FAILED TO INCLUDE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS IN A LISTING OF "ACTS OF WAR." ASKED FOR SUCH A LISTING, HE STATED THE FOLLOWING:

"A-- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY STOP THE BOMBING AND SHELLING BY THE U.S. AIR AND NAVAL FORCES AGAINST THAT PART OF THE DRV, FROM THANH-HOA TO VINH-LINH.

"B-- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY STOP ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST ALL THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV. BY " ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR," WE MEAN THE DROPPING OF LEAFLETS AND GIFTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PURPOSES, THE PARACHUTING OF RANGERS FROM U S SPY PLANES COMING FROM AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND LAOTIAN TERRITORY, THE SHELLING OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE FROM THE SOUTH, THE VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DRV BY U S BATTLESHIPS AND RANGER BOATS, THE PROVOCATIONS AGAINST AND KIDNAPING OF CITIZENS OF THE DRV, AND SO FORTH. IN SHORT, IT CONCERNS ALL MILITARY ACTIONS WHICH ENCROACH UPON THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV AND ITS SOVEREIGNTY."

2. IN HIS INTERVIEW, XUAN THUY WAS ALSO ASKED WHETHER HE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO MEET WITH U S FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE BOMBING, AND WHETHER PARIS WOULD BE THE SITE. HE STATED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02

~~SECRET~~

SEPARATELY: " I WILL BE READY TO DISCUSS WITH THE U S GOVERNMENT THE OTHER PROBLEMS OF INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES", AND " WE BELIEVE THAT PARIS IS CONVENIENT FOR BOTH SIDES."

3. INR COMMENT: THE LAST PREVIOUS TIME IN WHICH XUAN THUY HAD LISTED " ACTS OF WAR" OFFICIALLY WAS IN THE JUNE 19 PARIS MEETING,

AT WHICH HE GAVE THE FOLLOWING FORMULA:

"A. THE US GOVERNMENT MUST IMMEDIATELY STOP SENDING AIRCRAFT AND WARSHIPS TO BOMB AND SHELL THE PART EXTENDING FROM THANH HOA TO VINH LINH OF THE TERRITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

"B. THE U S GOVERNMENT MUST IMMEDIATELY STOP ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR ON THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. THESE OTHER ACTS OF WAR ARE: SENDING AIRCRAFT FOR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS, DROPPING LEAFLETS AND SO-CALLED GIFTS FROM 'PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE' SERVICES, SMUGGLING COMMANDOS BY AIR, BY SEA OR FROM LAOS, ARTILLERY SHELLING FROM THE SOUTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BY WARSHIPS AND MOTORBOATS, PROVOCATIONS AGAINST AND KIDNAPPING OF CITIZENS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, ETC.; IN SHORT ANY MILITARY ACTION INFRINGING UPON THE SOVEREIGNTY AND ENCROACHING UPON THE TERRITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM."

4. SINCE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS BEEN LISTED FIRST AMONG THE "ACTS OF WAR," WE DOUBT THAT XUAN THUY'S OMISSION WAS ACCIDENTIAL. THOUGH IT IS OF COURSE POSSIBLE THAT IT HAD BEEN DROPPED IN TRANSMISSION, THIS WOULD SEEM UNLIKELY IN A VNA REPORT FROM PARIS TO HANOI.

5. THUY'S FAILURE TO MENTION RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS REINFORCES OUR LONG- STANDING IMPRESSION THAT HANOI WOULD NOT LET ITS DESIRE TO STOP THOSE FLIGHTS JEOPARDIZE THE PROSPECT FOR A BOMBING HALT. WE EXPECT THAT HANOI WOULD OBJECT TO SUCH FLIGHTS, AND WOULD ATTEMPT TO SHOOT DOWN THE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, BUT IT WOULD NOT ASSERT THAT THESE FLIGHTS CONSTITUTED AN " ACT OF WAR" OF THE SAME MAGNITUDE AS THE BOMBING, PREVENTING FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN THE SAME WAY AS THE BOMBING.

6. THERE ARE OTHER DIFFERENCES IN WORDING BETWEEN XUAN THUY'S FORMULATION IN THE CANADIAN INTERVIEW AND BETWEEN HIS EARLIER -JUNE 19 FORMULATION, BUT WE DO NOT ASCRIBE AS MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THOSE AS TO THE OMISSION OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. GPI. RUSK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAL 02-102
By , NARA, Date 4-25-03

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

67

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
OCT 17 PM 8:40

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY [REDACTED]

OCTOBER 17, 1968

TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND GENERAL ABRAMS FROM WALT ROSTOW

RE-READING MY MESSAGE TO YOU OF SEPTEMBER 30, THE PRESIDENT WISHES ME TO REINFORCE IT IN HIS NAME. IT IS HIS HOPE THAT EVERY BIT OF OUR INFLUENCE, LEVERAGE, AND RESOURCES WILL BE THROWN INTO THE SCALES IN THE THREE MONTHS AHEAD IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A BREAKTHROUGH ON THE MILITARY SIDE AND ON THE POLITICAL SIDE. WE HERE ARE VERY CONSCIOUS THAT IF WE HAVE A CHANCE FOR A DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH, IT IS BECAUSE OF WHAT YOU HAVE BOTH DONE DIRECTLY AND IN YOUR INFLUENCE ON VIETNAMESE MILITARY AND POLITICAL PERFORMANCE. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS, THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES IT CRITICAL THAT YOU DRIVE FORWARD ON THE GROUND, EMPLOYING EVERY BIT OF OUR OWN MILITARY CAPACITY AND INSPIRING THE ARVN TO DO THE SAME.

IT MUST BE THE CASE THAT THE PRESENT MILITARY DISPOSITIONS OF THE ENEMY GIVE US A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND GVN CONTROL IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND TO ROOT OUT THE VIET CONG GUERRILLA AND POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.

THIEU, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE POLITICAL LEADERS MUST SEE THIS PERIOD EQUALLY AS A MOMENT OF HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY. IF YOU CAN ACT AND INSTILL IN THEM THIS KIND OF SPIRIT, EITHER WE SHALL GET AN HONORABLE PEACE IN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS OR WE SHALL PRESENT THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION WITH A SITUATION SO SOLID AND SO FULL OF PROMISE THAT THEY WILL STAY THE COURSE. IF YOU JUDGE IT HELPFUL, FEEL FREE TO PRESENT THIS JUDGMENT IN THE NAME OF THE PRESIDENT.

IN APPROVING THIS CABLE, THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO ADD THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM HIM TO GENERAL ABRAMS:

BEGIN PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. NOW THAT WE HAVE COME SUCH A LONG WAY, I HOPE THAT IN THE DAYS WE HAVE REMAINING, EVERY ACTION WILL BE AIMED AT DESTROYING THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY. IN PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S WORDS TO GENERAL GRANT, QUOTE: HANG ON WITH A BULL-DOG GRIP AND CHEW AND CHOKE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. END QUOTE:
END PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

413

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

68

ACTION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 17, 1968
2:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft back channel to
Bunker and Abrams, as you directed.
For your clearance before dispatch.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 3-1-93

Res file

69

Thurs., Oct. 17, 1968
2:15 p. m.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith (Tab A) Harriman's and Vance's report on their meeting to get a date set for the quadripartite talks. It is not until para. 11 that they get our basic proposition stated straight.

Para. 12 is interesting because it begins to raise some of the problems of protocol and procedure which are already beginning to concern Saigon (Tab B).

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS attachment~~ (Paris 22579 and Saigon 40516)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-479
By mp, NARA, Date 2-25-93



(A)
Department of State

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TELEGRAM
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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 PARIS 22579

DECLASSIFIED

DELTO 840

Authority NEG 91-478

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

By MS/JW, NARA, Date 3-1-83

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH AUTHORIZATION CONTAINED IN STATE 256063, WE MET WITH XUAN THUY AND HA VAN LAU FOR 1-1/4 HOURS, INCLUDING TEA, MORNING OCT. 17. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEPUTY NGUYEN MINH VY, TWO NOTETAKERS AND AN INTERPRETER WERE ALSO PRESENT ON THEIR SIDE; NEGROPONTE ON OURS.
2. WE SAID THAT SINCE WE HAD LAST MET WE HAD FURTHER CONFIRMED THAT ~~THERE HAD BEEN A REAL MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO THE TIMING OF THE NEXT MEETING AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. OUR GOVERNMENT HAD ASSUMED THAT THE DRV SIDE'S SUGGESTION TO MEET ONE DAY AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WOULD APPLY TO ANY MEETING, INCLUDING A MEETING AT WHICH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN AND THE NLF, WOULD BE PRESENT. WE SAID THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN REASSURED BY THE DRV SIDE'S EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO MEET THE DAY AFTER A BOMBING CESSATION, AND WE HAD FURTHER ASSUMED THAT THE DRV HAD ALREADY COMMUNICATED WITH THE NLF AND RECEIVED ITS AGREEMENT TO MEET AT AN EARLY DATE, IN FACT THE DAY AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING.~~
3. WE SAID IT ~~THEREFORE CAME AS A REAL SURPRISE TO US WHEN THUY HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SAY WHEN WE WOULD MEET. HAVING EXPLAINED THE MISUNDERSTANDING, WE SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF MEETING THE DAY AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WAS NOT AS RIGID AS WE HAD ORIGINALLY INDICATED IT WOULD BE. BUT OUR GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE A FIXED DATE FOR A MEETING AFTER THE CESSATION AND, IF THE DRV SIDE GIVES US A FIXED DAY FOR THE MEETING, WE COULD ASSURE THEM THAT THE BOMBING WOULD STOP TWO OR THREE DAYS BEFORE THAT DATE. WE SAID WE WERE GOING INTO THIS DETAIL SO THAT THERE WON'T BE A MISUNDERSTANDING IN HANOI. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF FURTHER MISUNDERSTANDINGS SHOULD OCCUR IN RESPECT TO THIS MATTER.~~

~~SECRET~~

Feb 8

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-2- PARIS 22579, OCTOBER 17, SECTION ONE OF THREE

4. WE SAID WE HOPED THAT THUY WOULD COMMUNICATE WHAT WE HAD SAID TO HIS GOVERNMENT IN EXTENSO.

5. THUY SAID THAT AT THE TIME OF OUR OCTOBER 15 MEETING THE DRV HAD NOT KNOWN WHETHER THE US WOULD STOP THE BOMBING IF THE DRV AGREED TO GVN PARTICIPATION AND THEY HAD NOT ARRANGED WITH THE NLF A DEFINITE SCHEDULE FOR A MEETING. WE SAID THAT THIS FACT CONTRIBUTED TO THE MISUNDERSTANDING.

6. THUY SAID THAT PREVIOUSLY WE HAD TOLD THE DRV SIDE THAT THE BOMBING WOULD STOP 24 HOURS BEFORE A FIXED DATE FOR A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOUR PARTIES. NOW WE SAY THAT IT WOULD BE TWO OR THREE DAYS. THEREFORE, THUY SAID, THERE IS NOT MUCH DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS. WE DISPUTED THIS. WE SAID WHAT OUR GOVERNMENT WANTS TO KNOW IS THAT THERE WILL BE A MEETING AND THAT IT WILL BE HELD PROMPTLY -- TWO OR THREE DAYS AFTER THE BOMBING IS STOPPED. THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO US TO BE ANY REASON FOR DELAY.

7. THUY SAID THAT ON OCTOBER 16 HE HAD COMMUNICATED TO HANOI IN EXTENSO THE MEMORANDUM WE HAD HANDED TO HIM AT THE TEA BREAK. THUY SAID THAT AFTER RECEIVING OUR MEMORANDUM HE WAS AFRAID THAT HANOI'S VIEWS MIGHT CHANGE. WHAT WOULD BE THE NATURE OF THIS CHANGE? AS THUY HAD SAID YESTERDAY AT THE TEA BREAK,
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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SECRET SECTION 2 OF 3 PARIS 22579
NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS
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~~WHENEVER THE NLF STEPS UP ITS ATTACK AGAINST US POSITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE US CLAMORS THAT THE NLF IS LAUNCHING ATTACKS WHILE TALKS ARE GOING ON IN PARIS; AND WHEN THERE IS A "RELATIVE LULL" THE US SAYS THE NLF IS WEAK AND CANNOT ATTACK. AT THESE CONVERSATIONS, THUY CONTINUED, THE UNITED STATES SAYS THAT THE DRV SIDE HAS NO GOOD WILL, BUT WHEN THE DRV SHOWS GOODWILL, THEN THE UNITED STATES RAISES ANOTHER DEMAND. THIS, THUY SAID, WAS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT BE HANOI'S ATTITUDE. THAT IS, THE US WILL RAISE MORE AND MORE CONDITIONS. HOWEVER THIS MORNING WE HAD GIVEN FURTHER EXPLANATION AND THUY SAID HE WOULD REPORT IT.~~

~~8. WE ASKED IF WE HAD MADE OURSELVES PLAIN. WE HAD ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT THERE WOULD BE A PROMPT MEETING.~~

~~WHEREAS THE IMPRESSION WAS CREATED THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO WAIT A WEEK FOR A MEETING, THIS WOULD CREATE AN INTOLERABLE SITUATION. A PROMPT MEETING IS IMPORTANT AS A SYMBOL OF PROGRESS AND GOOD FAITH ON ALL SIDES.~~

~~9. LAU SAID HE HAD A FEW QUESTIONS. AT THE TEA BREAK YESTERDAY, AFTER RECEIVING OUR MEMORANDUM, XUAN THUY HAD EXPRESSED SOME VIEWS AND, LAU SAID, HE FELT THAT THOSE VIEWS HAVE GREAT IMPORTANCE BECAUSE THEY DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE QUESTION. THE UNITED STATES REQUEST THAT THE DRV FIX A DATE FOR A MEETING BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING IS A CONDITIONAL ONE WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO THE UNITED STATES AFFIRMATION THAT IT ACCEPTS THE UN-~~

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-2- PARIS 22579, OCTOBER 17, SECTION TWO OF THREE

CONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING. XUAN THUY HAD SAID ON OCTOBER 16 THAT HE WOULD REPORT OUR VIEWS TO HANOI, INCLUDING OUR MEMORANDUM.

10. SECONDLY, LAU CONTINUED, THIS MORNING WE HAD HAD SOME ADDITIONAL WORD ABOUT THE DATE OF A MEETING. WE HAD ALSO CONFIRMED THE EXISTENCE OF A MISUNDERSTANDING. LAU SAID THAT THE DRV SIDE WILL REPORT THIS TO HANOI BUT PERSONALLY HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT THE QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IS THE QUESTION OF RECIPROcity. THIS MATTER HAS NOT BEEN CHANGED MUCH BY WHAT WE HAD SAID TODAY. IT IS ONLY A DIFFERENCE OF A FEW DAYS, AND THERE IS ALWAYS RECIPROcity INVOLVED IN THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. LAU ASKED TO HAVE OUR VIEWS ON WHAT THUY HAD SAID YESTERDAY, BECAUSE, IF THERE IS A MISUNDERSTANDING, IT HAS STILL NOT BEEN CLEARED UP.

11. WE REPLIED WE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE MISUNDERSTANDING IS IN HANOI'S MIND AND NOT IN WASHINGTON'S. WE HAD BOTH ALWAYS ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT PROMPT AND SERIOUS TALKS WOULD FOLLOW THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. OUR GOVERNMENT HAD THOUGHT THE DEFINITION OF "PROMPT" TO BE ONE DAY BECAUSE THE DRV SIDE HAD SAID THAT SERIOUS TALKS COULD TAKE PLACE ONE DAY AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THEN

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Department of State

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 PARIS 22579

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

WE HAD HAD LONG DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE MEANING OF SERIOUS TALKS, AND WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT SUCH TALKS MUST INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN. WE HAD COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE DEFINITION OF "SERIOUS," BUT NOW THERE WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING ON THE MEANING OF "PROMPT". WE SAID IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR ALL TO SEE EVIDENCE OF GOODWILL AND PROGRESS IN THESE TALKS. WE SAID WE WISHED TO REPEAT THAT WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF HOLDING A MEETING PROMPTLY AS A CONDITION OR RECIPROcity, BUT RATHER AN INDICATION OF GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE PARTIES IN MOVING TO SERIOUS TALKS.

12. THUY SAID THAT HE WOULD REPORT OUR ADDITIONAL VIEWS TO HANOI IMMEDIATELY. HE THEN SAID HE HAD SOME ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION. FIRST, IF THE UNITED STATES STOPS THE BOMBING, HOW WILL THE QUESTION OF ARRANGING FOR FOUR-SIDED TALKS BE DEALT WITH? THERE ARE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS IN THIS REGARD WHICH THE US AND DRV SIDES MUST DISCUSS FIRST. FOR EXAMPLE, THE US HAD SAID THAT AFTER THE FOUR-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEGUN, THERE WOULD STILL BE MATTERS OF A PURELY BILATERAL INTEREST BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND THE DRV. THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF THE RANK OF REPRESENTATION. AT THE MOMENT MR. HARRIMAN AND MR. VANCE ARE THE PERSONAL APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT. XUAN THUY IS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND HOLDS THE RANK OF A MINISTER. WILL THE U.S. REPRESENTATION REMAIN THE SAME, OR WILL ITS REPRESENTATION BE AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL? AS FOR THE NLF AND THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT, THUY SAID, WE DON'T KNOW WHAT THEIR LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION WILL BE EITHER. WILL THEY BE THE SAME AS THAT OF THE U.S. AND THE DRV, OR WILL THEY SIMPLY BE CALLED REPRESENTATIVES?

~~SECRET~~

13. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT AND WE WOULD REMAIN AS SUCH WHEN SERIOUS TALKS BEGAN. THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE. WE SAID WE WERE ALREADY HOLDING TALKS WITH THUY HOLDING THE RANK OF MINISTER, AND WE WERE ACTING AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT. WE SAID WE DIDN'T THINK THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT MATTER. WE ADDED, OF COURSE, THAT IF WE DID NOT CONCLUDE A SETTLEMENT BEFORE JANUARY 20, WE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT.

14. THUY SAID THEN THE DRV CAN TAKE IT THAT HARRIMAN AND VANCE WILL REPRESENT THE U.S. AT THE FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCE. WE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. WE SAID WE ACCEPTED THAT THERE WILL BE MATTERS OF PURELY BILATERAL INTEREST, AND WE HAVE INDICATED IN THE PAST THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTINUE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DRV SIDE ON SUCH QUESTIONS. THE PLENARY SESSIONS, HOWEVER, WOULD INCLUDE THE FOUR PARTIES. THE DRV SIDE SHOULD RECALL THAT DURING THE LAOS CONFERENCE HARRIMAN HAD MET PRIVATELY WITH PUSHKIN ALMOST EVERY OTHER DAY AND SULLIVAN USED TO MEET WITH LAU. THOSE KINDS OF MEETINGS SHOULD BE HELD AS FREQUENTLY AS NEEDED.

15. WE THEN ADJOURNED FOR A CUP OF TEA DURING WHICH THEY SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN MIRACLE RICE AND OTHER WESTERN TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS. HARRIMAN



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Oct 17, 1968
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Authority 719 91-478

MODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

By ag/jw, NARA, Date 3-1-93

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

SUBJECT: PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR PARIS NEGOTIATIONS

1. FOREIGN MINISTER THANH, UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT THIEU, RAISED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS OF A PROCEDURAL NATURE ABOUT WHICH GVN IS CONCERNED BECAUSE OF THEIR IMPLICATIONS. WE DID NOT DISCUSS ANY OF THESE POINTS WITH THEM IN DETAIL, BUT STRESSED THAT SUCH PROBLEMS CAN ONLY BE WORKED OUT ON THE SPOT. WE DID, HOWEVER, PROMISE TO LET THEM HAVE ANY COMMENTS FROM WASHINGTON AND PARIS, ESPECIALLY ANSWERS TO FACTUAL QUESTIONS THAT THEY HAVE RAISED.
2. VISIBLE SIGNS OF NLF STATUS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT IT IS ONE THING FOR THE NLF TO SIT AS PART OF THE "OTHER SIDE". AND ANOTHER FOR THEM TO HAVE A SEPARATE NAME PLATE OR FLAG THAT WOULD IDENTIFY THEM AS A SEPARATE DELEGATION. PROBLEMS WOULD LIKEWISE ARISE IF THE SEATING ARRANGEMENTS WERE IN A QUADRANGLE, ALTHOUGH FROM POINT OF VIEW OF ENHANCEMENT OF NLF STATUS HE WAS ALSO BOTHERED BY NLF PERSONNEL SITTING ACROSS AS IF THE WERE "OPPOSITE NUMBERS" OF GVN. (AT ONE POINT THE FOREIGN MINISTER EVEN SAID, BY WAY OF ILLUSTRATION, THAT A PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING AN NLF DELEGATION SITTING AS IF THEY WERE CO-EQUALS OF THE GVN COULD RESULT IN "THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT.")
3. SINGLE HEADS OF DELEGATIONS. THANH SAID THE PRESIDENT WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION WE MIGHT HAVE ON PRECEDENTS OF NEGOTIATIONS WHERE THERE HAD BEEN TWO OR MORE PARTICIPANTS. DOES EACH SIDE IN NEGOTIATIONS ALWAYS HAVE TO HAVE A CHAIRMAN OR LEADER? OR COULD THERE BE SOME KIND OF PARTNERSHIP PERHAPS WITH A "PRIMUS INTER PARES"? IN PARTICULAR THANH WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING HOW THIS PROBLEM WAS HANDLED AT PANMUNJOM WITH RESPECT TO ROK PARTICIPATION.

~~SECRET~~

Job B

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 Saigon 40516 Oct 17, 1968

4. DEVICES TO FOIL DRV ENHANCEMENT OF NLF STATUS. HERE THE FOREIGN MINISTER BROUGHT UP A NUMBER OF HYPOTHESES, EACH OF WHICH HE FOUND TROUBLESOME OR EVEN EXASPERATING -- THAT THE DRV DELEGATION MIGHT COME INTO THE MEETING ROOM ALONG, FOLLOWED BY A SEPARATE ENTRANCE OF THE NLF; THAT THE "OTHER SIDE" MIGHT BE REPRESENTED BY ONLY TWO PEOPLE, SYMBOLIZING SOME KING OF EQUALITY BETWEEN THE DRV AND NLF; OR THAT THE DRV WOULD CLAIM THAT IT CANNOT SPEAK TO CERTAIN SUBJECTS BECAUSE THEY CONCERN ONLY THE NLF. HE INQUIRED IF WE COULD THINK OF ANY WAY TO COUNTER SUCH TACTICS.

5. WE TRIED TO REASSURE THANK THAT OUR DELEGATION IN PARIS AND THAT OUR TEAM HAS HAD PLENTY OF EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH COMMUNIST TACTICS. WE ADDED THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE OTHER SIDE WILL CLAIM ALL KINDS OF THINGS FOR THE NLF; WE; WILL BE UNABLE TO PREVENT THEM FROM SAYING UNREASONABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE THINGS, WHICH IS QUITE NORMAL COMMUNIST TACTICS IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE ALSO SAID, THAT WE ARE SURE THE DEPARTMENT AND USDEL WILL SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE ABOVE QUESTIONS AND THAT WE HOPE TO HAVE SOME THOUGHTS FOR THEM SOON. THANK SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE GVN TO COME INTO THE MEETING UNTIL THESE MATTERS WERE WORKED OUT. WE TRIED TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THAT IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE ALL OF THEM IRONED OUT IN ADVANCE OF THE FIRST MEETING WHICH MIGHT WELL TAKE UP SOME OF THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES.

6. COMMENT: I THINK WE ARE ALL AGREED THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THERE IS A CERTAIN VALIDITY TO COME OF THEIR APPREHENSIONS. AT THE SAME TIME THEY HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT IF THEY ARE GOING INTO THESE TALKS, THE NLF IS GOING TO BE THERE AND THE GVN WILL NOT HAVE EVERYTHING ITS WAY. I PROPOSE TO TALK TO THIEU ABOUT THIS MATTER. BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

70

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 17, 1968
12:35 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a Swedish Foreign Office expert on the Far East tells us that their man in Peking has concluded that Hanoi will "accept representatives of the Saigon government in negotiations" and has concluded that "one must acknowledge that Saigon regime has a certain strength."

W. W. Rostow

USUN 7131

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-6-02



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NODIS

SUBJECT: VIETNAM

1. AT LUNCH OCT 16, OELBERG, FAR EASTERN EXPERT ACCOMPANYING SWED FON MIN, MADE FOLL COMMENT ABOUT HANOI'S CURRENT ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGOT. OELBERG SAID BASED ~~ON LATEST REPORT SWED AMB IN PEKING HE CONCLUDED CONCESSION HANOI NOW MOST LIKELY TO MAKE IN RETURN FOR STOPPING BOMBING IS NOT MILITARY BUT POLITICAL THROUGH WILLINGNESS ACCEPT REPRESENTATIVES SAIGON GOVT IN NEGOTIATIONS. UP TO NOW, HE SAID, NORTH VIETNAMESE TRADITIONALLY DISMISSED SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIME AS PUPPETS AND MAINTAINED NLF ONLY LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE. HOWEVER, IN LATEST CONVERSATION WITH SWED AMB, NORTH VIETNAMESE AMB SAID ONE MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SAIGON REGIME HAS "CERTAIN STRENGTH". OELBERG CONCLUDED THIS MAY WELL FORESHADOW SHIFT IN HANOI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD DEALING WITH SAIGON.~~

2. OTHER COMMENTS OF LESSER INTEREST AND PERHAPS OLD HAT WERE:
(A) DURING HIS DISCUSSIONS IN HANOI THIS ~~SUMMER IN WHICH HE SOUNDED OUT POSSIBLE NORTH VIETNAMESE INTEREST IN POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM THROUGH UN, OELBERG ENCOUNTERED NO VIETNAMESE WHO REACTED NGATIVELY TO SUCH POSSIBILITY.~~

(B) FROM TALKS IN HANOI IN SUMMER AND JUST RECENTLY IN STOCKHOLM WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE REP, HE ~~GAINS DEFINITE IMPRESSION IT IMMATERIAL TO NORTH VIETNAMESE WHICH PARTY WINS UPCOMING ELECTION IN US.~~

(C) OELBERG DISILLUSIONED WITH HARRISON SALISBURY'S WRITING ON NORTH VIETNAM WHEN HE FOUND DURING HIS TRIP THERE THAT SALISBURY HAD BEEN ACCOMPANIED EVERYWHERE THROUGHOUT TRIP BY WILFRED BURCHETT, THOUGH SALISBURY HAD NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED THIS.

GP-2
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-6-02*

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION 71

Pres file

Thursday, October 17, 1968
12:20 p. m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith my comments on Lou Harris' latest conversation, ^{*text attached*} which contains a number of important points, if true.

1. Kosharyan talks about a "suspension of military activity" -- a rather ambiguous cease-fire -- within 10 days after the bombing cessation. This was a theme that was present in his previous conversation with Harris.

2. Kosharyan is hopeful of a DMZ deal.

3. There would be a resumption of "rapprochement," as in July. I read this to mean that the Soviets may be working back towards a Summit deal.

4. The Soviets, according to Kosharyan, are working day and night on the North Vietnamese to put this over.

5. He claims the Soviets are in a position to insist, in their dealings with Hanoi, not to ask.

6. Kosharyan relates Soviet leverage to a falling out between Hanoi and Peking.

7. He asserts that North Vietnamese know that "the war couldn't be won," and that, therefore, they had to come to terms with Moscow.

8. Moscow understands that "there must be a response to any bombing pause, given the political situation in the United States.

Moscow is frightened that if there is no response, bombing would be resumed and might include the closing of Haiphong harbor (LeMay has scared them a little).

9. In a very important point, Moscow wants to revive the "rapprochement" track because they feel that if there is no continuity it will get closed down for a whole year, because a new Administration would have to take stock and open it up only later. Moscow appears to be working on the hypothesis that if we could re-start it now, it would move more smoothly into the policy of the next Administration.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-469
By cb, NARA, Date 6-20-95

cc: LEO to Lucy Rush

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

-2-

10. Finally, Kosharyan counsels Harris to keep the "ultimate security" because of the danger of "premature leaks."

Comment: I doubt that Kosharyan knows everything that's going on, but by and large I think this is a pretty accurate picture of Moscow's mind at the moment, except for one thing: I have no evidence or feel as to whether Moscow has the leverage to overcome the Hanoi hawks.

W. W. Rostow

71a

LOU HARRIS and JRJ

Wednesday -- October 16, 1968 -- 6:45 p. m.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-469
By cb, NARA, Date 6-20-95

HARRIS: Hi, Jimmy.

JONES: Hi, Lou. How are you?

HARRIS: Just fine. I know you're having a wild day.

JONES: Just a little bit of one! What do you know?

HARRIS: I tell you, this fellow Kosharyan wanted to see me this noon and I took a stroll over by the UN. He had these things to say, (to) which I think there's some significance: 1. He wanted to review the -- he's now talking in terms of words, specific words, to say what would happen here. And the first was an end to the bombing. ~~Then, ten days -- and here, the exact words that he kept repeating -- "XX suspension of military activity".~~ Then he said, and this was in response to Monday with him -- night; I'd raised among other things -- and I said, "well, now look. This, from our side -- as I understand it -- I professed that I didn't know much about this, -- but one of the dangers was that the DMZ would be overrun. So today, he said, ~~"I have good news for you. Part of what is now seriously being considered is assurance that the DMZ will not be overrun."~~ And he said, ~~"I tell you this is a sign of the good faith on our side."~~ And then the last ~~was that there'd be a resumption~~

JONES: Yes. What else?

HARRIS: Now. He ~~said they were moving day and night on this, he~~
~~said that they were back -- the way he put it was "working~~
~~with the North Vietnamese today, or this"~~ and that in
New York both M and S ~~now are~~
~~working on it, are now into this very fast.~~

JONES: Did he indicate the problem was with the North Vietnamese,
that they were having trouble selling them, or what?

HARRIS: No. He said that they -- that -- he's indicated to me before
that the North Vietnamese are -- Did I tell you the
"Ask and Insistence" story?

JONES: Yes, I think so, but why don't you repeat that?

HARRIS: Yes, well. He said that as of -- before last April -- they
~~were in the position to ask the North Vietnamese, but not~~
~~to insist.~~ But then as of April, they had -- to give you
the whole reasons of what's gone on there, ~~they're in~~
~~competition with the Chinese there, like where the~~
~~Chinese have once played their hand, the Chinese -- oh a~~
~~a whole variety of things I can't give you in great detail --~~
~~but the point was that as of April, they got to the point~~

~~where they could insist more than that ask~~

but still had to ask. As of ~~that~~ -- when the Czech
business broke, ~~everything~~ was suspended; but

then, after the Czech "episode", as he called it -- He said

~~they were then in a much stronger position and a position~~

~~to insist and not ask at all. And that the North Vietnamese~~

~~knew that the war couldn't be won, the North Vietnamese~~

~~knew that they had to come to terms that the Soviet Union~~

~~wanted them to come to, but in turn, they had accepted the~~

~~North Vietnamese conditions of the end to the bombing, and~~

~~also had agreed not to lock in the United Nations. But~~

he said, "Now we are in a position to insist, and we don't

have to ask at all." You see? So what ~~xx~~ he meant was that

they were jelling the whole thing with the North Vietnamese

today -- that's the way that I interpreted it. Now he said

that there are two things -- or there were three, one more

point beyond this, after these, but -- there are two things

that from their standpoint that they want to do this time;

~~that they have that that there must be a response to any~~

~~bombing pause because if there were not especially with an~~

~~election coming up that that they would be taking out~~

~~risk that the bombings might be resumed, not only~~ 4

~~limitedly but all over Vietnam -- that Haiphong might~~

~~when he~~
~~Apparently, the LeMay thing scared them -- I talked~~

--
~~about closing Haiphong Harbour, and the war would be~~

~~escalated. Also, unless they get the whole rapprochement track~~

going again, that they feel it would be at least one k

year of what he called a "close-down on the road to

rapprochement" because he said, "If we don't get a
in,

~~new government unless there is no about continuity," they~~

would expect a one-year close-down, you see? He said

~~that that means a total to them, not to have a one-year~~

~~close-down here.~~ The final thing he emphasized, he

said that -- very important to this whole thing is that

~~the whole package be kept in the utmost security.~~

JONES: Pardon?

HARRIS: ~~The whole package be kept in utmost security.~~ That any
premature leaks of it -- k even after the pause -- would
be axx damaging, you know? And I daresay he's right about
that.

That's all that is new. Do you want me to run through this
whole business, where he told me that they are now in a
position to insist and not to ask?

JONES: No, I think you gave me enough on that. 5

Is there anything else?

HARRIS: No. I see one note, and that was from last Saturday, that he did say that the top Soviet level feels this way. He said but ~~that~~ not the ~~bkkk~~ Beaurucracy X!

JONES: All right! And that was Kosharyan?

HARRIS: Yes, Kosharyan. And then I did see M _____ on Monday with him. He was much more formal because he's in the Foreign Ministry, you see? And Koshay ryan is then _____ meet me and talk informally, you know?

JONES: Right. Okay, well I do thank you. Keep us posted.

Thank you, Lou.

HARRIS: Okay.

#

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thurs., Oct. 17, 1968
11:55 a. m.

Pres file

72


MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the two drafts you
requested of me.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 3-1-93



1.3 (a) (5)

72a

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 17, 1968

FROM THE PRESIDENT
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

The leaks out of Saigon -- which continue -- are a cause of the greatest concern to the President. They generate in the United States enormous confusion and pressure. They may very well interfere with the possibility of carrying forward a successful negotiation at a critical stage.

You should, therefore, tell Thieu that we may not be able to give him as much advance notice -- in such detail -- should the negotiating process bring us to a moment of decision.

###

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 09-041-1-6
By J, NARA, Date 1/21/02

~~TOP SECRET~~

Oct. 17, 1968

72b

From the Secretary

To the Ambassadors of the Troop Contributing Countries

On the whole, you and the governments to which you are accredited have handled the information we have passed to them with discretion. In all cases, we know that whatever leaks may have occurred arose from perfectly understandable and decent intentions.

You should also know, however, that these leaks have generated almost unbearable confusion and pressure in the United States and may, indeed, have endangered the possibility of our moving through a critical phase in the negotiations successfully.

We understand well that the interests of many are involved in our decision about bombing North Vietnam. On the other hand, it is a decision which bears primarily on the application of U. S. air power: our planes and our pilots. It may be, therefore, that should the negotiation again move to a critical phase, we will not be able to give as much notice and as detailed notice as we have in the past few days.

Add for Creek in Canberra only:

We understand what Gorton conceives his political problem to be. He is quoted as saying, as it came over the wires in the United States, that negotiations between the U. S. and North Vietnam have been going on for some days and 'with a bit of luck President Johnson could be expected to make a statement soon. "

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-133
By js, NARA, Date 5-23-03

If he is not capable of dealing with the pressures involved in a matter of this kind, and sticking with "no comment," you should know that we shall have to deal with him, in particular, on a much shorter tether.

###

720

UPI-114

(GORTON)

CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA--PRESIDENT JOHNSON CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE A STATEMENT SOON REGARDING CESSATION OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTER JOHN GORTON SAID EARLY THURSDAY (AUSTRALIAN TIME).

ONLY ONE POINT REMAINED "TO BE IRONED OUT," HE TOLD UPI.

GORTON SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAM HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME DAYS AND "WITH A BIT OF LUCK PRESIDENT JOHNSON COULD BE EXPECTED TO MAKE A STATEMENT SOON."

ASKED ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS, HE SAID: "ALL I CAN TELL YOU IS THAT WE HAVE BEEN CONSTANTLY IN TOUCH WITH THE UNITED STATES CONCERNING THE DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS, SAIGON AND WASHINGTON AND IT MAY BE THE UNITED STATES WILL BE MAKING A STATEMENT SOON.

"WE ARE BEING KEPT IN TOUCH WITH EVERY FORMATIVE MOVE AT THIS STAGE.

"THERE HAVE NOT BEEN ANY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND MYSELF BUT WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH THROUGH (EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER) PAUL HASLUCK AND (SECRETARY OF STATE) DEAN RUSK.

"THEY ARE KEEPING US COMPLETELY INFORMED WHAT THEIR THINKING, CONVERSATIONS AND MOVES ARE."

GORTON ADDED THAT HE "HAS MADE KNOWN TO THE UNITED STATES HIS VIEWS ABOUT A BOMBING PAUSE. "BUT," HE ADDED, "THESE VIEWS ARE PRIVATE."

HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THESE VIEWS.

10/16--E409PED

73

INFORMATION

**SECRET-SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY**

**Thursday, October 17, 1968
11:30 a. m.**

Free file

Mr. President:

**Herewith Brom has assembled
the information on Tho, which you
requested.**

W. W. Rostow

SECRET-SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 3-1-93

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

73a

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

October 17, 1968

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-479

By WJ, NARA, Date 2-25-93

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Return of Le Duc Tho to Hanoi from Paris

Le Duc Tho, the Special Counselor to the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris, attended a private meeting on Friday night, October 11

Our first knowledge that he had left Paris came Monday just before noon. A FBIS item repeated a French news agency cable stating that Tho left Paris Monday afternoon (Paris time) for Hanoi via Moscow. Later Monday a North Vietnamese spokesman in Paris stated the trip was one of those which Tho regularly makes to Hanoi to consult his government. The spokesman was unable to say how long Tho would remain in Hanoi.

Our best information is that Tho left at 12:15 P. M. (Paris time) Monday arriving in Moscow at 6:00 P. M. (Moscow time).

Cables from our delegation in Paris contain no mention of the North Vietnamese having informed us of Tho's departure prior to his leaving.

In the meeting on Tuesday, October 15, the North Vietnamese mentioned to Ambassadors Harriman and Vance that Tho was on his way to Hanoi.

Our best information is that Tho arrived in Hanoi this morning.

From
Bromley Smith

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

74

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

Pres file

Thursday, October 17, 1968
9:50 a. m.


Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker responds to my back channel on putting the lid down on talk.

Both messages are attached.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY~~



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

WWRostow:rlm

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-102
By *llw*, NARA, Date *4-25-03*

74a

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY
RECEIVED
NSA

1968 OCT 17 09 59

DLA729 *****
OO YEKADS
DE YEKADL 459 2910955
O 090949Z ZYH
FM SAIGON
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 170913Z OCT 68 VIA CAS CHANNELS
FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 341
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR WALT ROSTOW
REF: CAP 82580

1. I CAN FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM YOU HAVE HAD WITH SAIGON RUMORS. WE HAVE HAD OUR FULL SHARE HERE. PLEASE ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT WE ARE BEARING DOWN HARD ON IT WITH THE VIETNAMESE; WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH OUR OWN PEOPLE SINCE INFORMATION IS HIGHLY RESTRICTED. I AM SEEING THIEU AGAIN TODAY, AND WILL IMPRESS ON HIM IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT HE PUT THE LID ON HIS PEOPLE AND KEEP IT ON.

2. SO FAR LEMAY SITUATION SEEMS UNDER GOOD CONTROL.

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS
GP-1
130

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-118
By us, NARA, Date 6-23-03

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

NNNN

74b

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

SENT
WHCA

ZCZCDSIA14
OO YEKADLC
DE YEKADS 4052 2922233
O 152349Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMB SAIGON
ZEM

1968 OCT 16 21 15

WHITE HOUSE
SITING ROOM
OCT 16 PM 5:10

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS CITE CAP32582
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER
FROM WALT ROSTON

YOU CAN IMAGINE THE KIND OF DAY WE'VE HAD WITH THE
SAIGON RUMORS.

WE UNDERSTAND FULLY YOUR PROBLEM, WHICH YOU HAVE LUCIDLY
EXPLAINED. THE PRESIDENT WISHES THAT YOU TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE
PRECAUTION WITH YOUR OWN PEOPLE AND WITH THE VIETNAMESE TO
BUTTON THINGS DOWN HARD NOW. I'M SURE YOU HAVE DONE THIS, BUT
THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO MAKE SURE IT IS UNDERLINED.

IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE ABSOLUTELY NO LEAK
WHATSOEVER OF WHERE THINGS STAND WITH LE MAY.
B3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-118
By ms, NARA, Date 7-11-03

MVNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

INFORMATION

75

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 17, 1968 -- 9:20 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This intelligence report contains two items of interest:

[Redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

-- For the first time I read in intelligence the theory that Westmoreland and I cooked up the other evening; namely, that the Soviets might be pressing for a quick settlement in Southeast Asia before

[Redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

W. W. Rostow

[Redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-102
By iso, NARA, Date 4-25-03

WWRostow:rln

Pres. file

76

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Thursday, October 17, 1968
9:15 a. m.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

We have a telephone report from Cy Vance as follows:

Pursuant to authority granted them, Cy met this morning with Thuy. He made the point that the concept of meeting "the next day" was Thuy's -- not ours. What was essential from our point of view was that a date certain be set. If, for example, a date for the meeting was set on Monday, we were prepared to stop the bombing two or three days before. Vance found the subsequent conversation interesting. Thuy virtually admitted there was a split in Hanoi. There were some, he said, who argued that this was "reciprocity." Thuy indicated that he was arguing in the other sense. Lau joined the conversation and indicated to Vance how the hardliners make their arguments.

It is now Harriman's and Vance's view that the earliest we can get a response is Saturday, and we will probably not get a response until Monday. Their case is based on a day's rest for Tho, upon his return to Hanoi, plus some debating in the politburo in Hanoi.

The full text of the reporting telegram will be here in about an hour and a half.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-479
By ijg, NARA, Date 2-25-93

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 17, 1968

Presfile

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Astronaut Assistance and Return Agreement

Attached, for your signature, are four copies of the instrument of ratification for the Astronaut Assistance and Return Agreement. Without dissent, the Senate gave its advice and consent on October 8.

The instruments cannot be deposited with the three depository governments until the U.K. instrument is ratified, sometime in mid-November (the Soviet instrument has been ratified).

The British Embassy has informed us that the U.K. favors a low-key deposit ceremony; the State Department agrees. However, there is no need to cross this bridge yet. When the British have ratified, we shall ask you for a decision.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 90-201
By [signature] NARA, Date 2-11-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION

Thursday

~~Tuesday~~ - October 8, 1968

78

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Central American Export Program

Pres file

Since your meetings with the Central American Presidents in early July, we have been working hard on AID and key US business groups to assist more energetically Central America's export diversification efforts.

AID sent a team of experts to meet with key Central American officials, following up talks that I had during your visit. The AID team included Mr. Amicus Most, ex-businessman who achieved outstanding success in Korea for AID in organizing an export promotion drive. Most is joining Covey Oliver's staff permanently to work on this problem and will be operating out of the Regional AID Mission in Central America. He has already been instrumental in getting a large group of US business concerns to work closely with AID to identify products which Central America can export successfully to the US or third country markets. David Rockefeller's Council for Latin America is deeply involved with us in this effort.

Although this is obviously a long-term program, the response from key Central American officials to your initiative has been enthusiastic. If we can keep up the momentum generated out of your trip, I think some real results can begin to appear in the near future. Central America is one region where the principle of economic integration is already well established. This export drive can help to guarantee its success.

Covey Oliver and his staff have cooperated fully on this effort and share our conviction about its importance. Nonetheless, to make sure no momentum is lost, I think it important formally to record your continuing interest and endorsement for this program. The attached NSAM, which has been cleared with both Bill Gaud and Covey Oliver, would achieve this objective. I recommend that you sign it.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment - Proposed NSAM.

Approve ____.

Disapprove ____

Call me. ____

Samuel W. Lewis:mm

cc - Bromley Smith

78a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary of State
AID Administrator
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Central American Export Development Program

At my recent meetings with the Presidents of Central America we agreed on the critical importance of accelerating growth and diversification of exports from the Central American countries to both U.S. and third country markets. A series of follow-up meetings among officials of the Central American Common Market, U.S., and Central American officials, and prominent members of the U.S. private sector, reinforce my conviction that it is important to maintain momentum toward a solution of these problems. Accordingly I have approved the initiation of a Central American Export Development Program to be organized at the regional and country levels to insure participation of all elements necessary to exploit successfully Central America's export potential.

The U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress is charged with the responsibility for organizing the program, and in particular for establishing effective administrative arrangements to link key groups from the U.S. government and private sector to public and private authorities in Central America.

All U.S. Departments and Agencies should, to the maximum possible extent, assist the Coordinator to make this program a success.

LBJ/SWLewis:mm

October 8, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Thursday - October 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: PL 480 Program for Chile

The attached memorandum (Tab B) from Orville Freeman/Bill Gaud recommends your approval of a \$3 million PL 480 sales agreement with Chile for corn/grain sorghum and rice. Chile would repay this amount in dollars over a 20-year period, with a 10 percent down payment.

This PL 480 assistance for Chile is urgently needed because of a severe drought which has caused an emergency shortage of live-stock feed. Chile has done quite well in meeting the self-help conditions we set in an earlier agricultural sector loan and PL 480 agreement.

The Chilean Government is feeling particularly isolated after the recent military coup in Peru, as Chilean leaders see themselves completely surrounded by military regimes. President Frei would undoubtedly welcome a sign of US support for his democratic government at this moment.

Charlie Zwick supports the Freeman/Gaud recommendation (Tab A). I also recommend that you approve the negotiation of this sales agreement with Chile.

W. W. Rostow

Approve
Disapprove
Call me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-18
By WJ, NARA, Date 5-22-95

Attachments

Tab A - October 15 memo to President from Charlie Zwick.
Tab B - October 10 memo from William Gaud and Secretary Freeman.

SWLewis:mm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

79a

OCT 15 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-18

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Program for Chile

By WJ, NARA, Date 5-22-95

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your approval to negotiate a \$3.0 million P. L. 480 sales agreement with Chile for corn/grain sorghum and rice. Repayment would be in dollars over twenty years with a ten percent downpayment. In accordance with the provisions of the Purcell amendment, Freeman and Gaud propose a five percent U.S. currency use payment, In view of Chile's tight foreign exchange position, a larger amount would be inconsistent with the economic development objectives of P. L. 480.

Severe drought in Chile has damaged pastures and grain crops in particular, and has thus caused an emergency shortage of livestock feed. This agreement will protect and reinforce our 1968 investment in the development of Chilean agriculture (\$23 million agricultural sector loan and \$17.7 million P. L. 480 agreement). We shall expect the Chileans to continue to modernize their agricultural sector by meeting the self-help conditions included in the earlier 1968 package.

This agreement would complete our calendar year 1968 assistance efforts in Chile. AID is beginning to formulate a 1969 assistance package which it hopes to submit for your consideration later this year.

State/AID has determined that Chile's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development and that neither U.S. development assistance nor P. L. 480 sales proceeds are being diverted by Chile to military purposes.

In view of the additional burden drought has put on the Chilean economy, I recommend that you approve the negotiation of this agreement.

Charles J. Zwisk

Charles J. Zwisk
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

796

To: The President

OCT 10 1968

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-23

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Chile

By ju, NARA, Date 4-14-94

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 sales agreement with Chile to provide approximately 50,000 tons of corn/grain sorghum and 3,000 tons of rice for which the current export market value (including applicable ocean transportation costs) is \$3.0 million. The proposed terms are payment in dollars of 10 percent on delivery, a 5 percent currency use payment (which will reduce United States dollar expenditures for local currency by \$150,000 compared to an estimated annual expenditure of \$6.9 million), and the balance in approximately equal annual installments over 19 years; interest will be 3.0 percent per annum. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

For the past several months one of the worst droughts in Chile's history has caused heavy damage, particularly to grain crops and pasture, in Chile's main agricultural region. The pasture damage has caused an abnormal increase in demand for feedgrains to feed livestock, while the damage to this year's grain harvest has reduced supplies below normal and the outlook is very dim for favorable planting conditions during the approaching grain planting season. The Government of Chile requested the above quantities of grain to help meet this shortage situation until the next grain harvests, beginning about April, 1969.

Self-Help Measures

The Government of Chile's performance regarding the self-help conditions in the current PL 480 sales agreement (signed December 29, 1967) has been satisfactory. The Chilean Government has fully met eight of the ten major self-help conditions required under the current agreement signed December 29, 1967; a ninth condition was only partially accomplished because the aforementioned drought precluded even approaching the goal of this condition of a 5.8 percent annual increase in the overall agricultural production of 1968. The only condition not met at all is that of maintaining the level of farmer's selling prices, in real terms, which was reached in 1966 (the highest level ever recorded); this has not been accomplished in 1968 mainly because larger than anticipated non-agricultural price increases affected some decline in the real prices for agricultural commodities.

In negotiating this agreement, we will seek further commitment from the Government of Chile to actively pursue the two aforementioned unaccomplished goals and to maintain its accomplishment regarding the other eight conditions.

Military Expenditures Review

State/AID in connection with the Interagency Advisory Committee concerned with implementation of Section 620(S) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined: (a) that Chile's resources are not being directed to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with Chile's development, (b) neither United States' development assistance nor PL 480 sales proceeds are being diverted by Chile to military purposes. A summary of the State/AID conclusion is attached.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with this PL 480 sales agreement.

October 2 1968

William L. Gaud
Administrator
Agency for International Development

[Signature]
Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

79c

Symington Amendment Determination

State/AID in consultation with the inter-agency advisory committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) (The Symington Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined (a) that Chile's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and (b) that neither U.S. development assistance nor PL 480 sales proceeds are diverted by Chile to military purposes. Among the principal factors in this determination are the following.

1. Defense expenditures as a percent of GNP for 1966-67 were 2.0% which is above the median for the region of 1.65%, and the trend of this defense share has been downward, from 2.3% in 1963 to 1.9% in 1967;
2. Defense expenditures as a percent of central government expenditures for 1966-67 were 7.5%, which is below the regional median of 10.2%, and again the trend has been downward, from 9.4% in 1963 to 7.1% in 1967;
3. Foreign exchange spent for defense as a percent of imports of goods and services for 1966-67 was .8%, which is above the regional median of .1% but not considered to be excessively high.
4. The Country Team has reported that there is no evidence of U.S. development assistance or PL 480 sales proceeds being diverted to military expenditures.

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

80

SENT
WHCA

1968 OCT 16 21 15

ZCZCDSIA 14
OO YEKADLC
DE YEKADS 4052 2902058
O 162049Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMB SAIGON
ZEM

1968 OCT 16 PM 5:18
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS CITE CAP32580
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER
FROM WALT ROSTOW

YOU CAN IMAGINE THE KIND OF DAY WE'VE HAD WITH THE
SAIGON RUMORS.

WE UNDERSTAND FULLY YOUR PROBLEM, WHICH YOU HAVE LUCIDLY
EXPLAINED. THE PRESIDENT WISHES THAT YOU TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE
PRECAUTION WITH YOUR OWN PEOPLE AND WITH THE VIETNAMESE TO
BUTTON THINGS DOWN HARD NOW. I'M SURE YOU HAVE DONE THIS, BUT
THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO MAKE SURE IT IS UNDERLINED.

IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE ABSOLUTELY NO LEAK
WHATSOEVER OF WHERE THINGS STAND WITH LEMAY.

150

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-118
By us, NARA, Date 7-1-03

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

81

VIA CAS CHANNELS

October 16, 1968

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER
FROM WALT ROSTOW

You can imagine the kind of day we've had with the Saigon rumors.

We understand fully your problem, which you have lucidly explained.

The President wishes that you take every possible precaution with your own people and with the Vietnamese to button things down hard now. I'm sure you have done this, but the President wants to make sure it is underlined.

It is equally important that there be absolutely no leak whatsoever of where things stand with Le May.

###

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-118
By isa NARA, Date 6-23-03

*Rostow*22

Wednesday, October 16, 1968
6:00 p. m.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a Joint Staff paper on North Vietnamese troop withdrawals which states:

- 15 out of 40 North Vietnamese regiments have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, plus 2 nominally VC regiments which are actually 70% North Vietnamese;
- during the last 30 days, 30,000 North Vietnamese have been withdrawn, leaving 120,000 North Vietnamese in all categories (North Vietnamese units, VC units, and various support units).

It is our strictly in-house view -- not shared by the intelligence community, that 120,000 considerably overstates North Vietnamese strength remaining in the South.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ attachment

*McAfferty (sic)
Ginsburgh
Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 21
By ics, NARS, Date 6-26-84

(RGinsburgh:mz)

*(memo to Gen Ginsburgh 10/16/68 subj:
Movement of NVA Forces Out of South Vietnam)*

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

82a



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

16 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GINSBURGH

SUBJECT: Movement of NVA Forces Out of South Vietnam

1. The following is in response to your questions as to NVA units which have moved out of South Vietnam in recent weeks.

2. 3 NVA Regts have withdrawn from the DMZ to areas 6 or more miles N of the DMZ. These are the 164th NVA Arty Regt, 138th NVA Regt, and the 270th NVA Regt.

3. From within I CTZ, 4 NVA Regts have withdrawn since late September: the 320th NVA Div Hqs, the 48th NVA Regt (fixed 16 Oct N of the DMZ), the 29th NVA Regt N of the DMZ. Hqs MR-TTH moved 3 Sep from Ashau Valley into Base Area 611 in Laos. On 16/17 Sep the 6th and 9th NVA Regts also moved into Base Area 611 in Laos. From the DMZ and from I CTZ a total of 8 NVA Regts has withdrawn since mid-September.

4. From II CTZ four NVA Infantry Regts have withdrawn from SVN into Cambodia or astride the NVN/Cambodian border: 66th NVA Regt from N of Ban Me Thuot, the 320th NVA Regt from Duc Lap area, and the 95C NVA Regt, all in the last two or three weeks. The 101D NVA Regt withdrew from Dak To area into Base Area 702 in Cambodia. The first three regiments have joined their headquarters, the 1st NVA Division.

5. From III Corps, 3 NVA Regts moved from in-country to positions astride the border, along with 2 nominally VC Regts. The 2 VC Regts come from divisions which are respectively held to be of 60% and 80% NVA composition. The regiments concerned are the 141st and 165th NVA Regts which moved from a position N of An Loc. The 141st moved N to Fishhook area and the 165th moved W to Tay Ninh Province border with Cambodia. The 96th NVA Arty Regt has moved from NE Tay Ninh Province to the Cambodian border N of Katum (12-13 Oct). On 4 Oct, the 271st VC Regt (60% NVA) entered SVN from Cambodia and after suffering 151 KIA in an engagement with US troops, withdrew to Cambodia. The 272d VC Regt is S of Base Area 354 astride the Cambodian border. It is composed of 80% NVA troops.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 6

By is, NARS, Date 8-28-84


~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

6. 13 NVA Regts remain in I CTZ of which only 3 are significantly engaged around Thuong Duc. Three NVA Regts remain in II CTZ to harrass routes 14, 19, and 1. In III Corps, 7 NVA Regts plus 2 NVA Arty Regts remain.

7. In summary, a total of 15 NVA Regts, plus 2 nominal VC Regts of an average of 70% NVA composition each, have withdrawn from South Vietnam to Cambodia and 35 NVA Regts remain.

8. It is estimated that during the last 30 days about 30,000 NVA troops have withdrawn from SVN. This leaves some 120,000 NVA troops (including all categories) still in SVN.


SMITH

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Pres

83

Wednesday, Oct. 16, 1968
5:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the way the world looks to a
 Ambassador in Peking.

3,4(b)(1)(b)

It reflects the depth of Chinese-Russian
tension.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/NODIS/MARIA THREE~~ attachment (Paris 22492)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-119
By *ivz* NARA, Date 5-16-03

Oct. 16, 1968

83a

Copy of PARIS 22492

Subject: Sino-Soviet Relations

Source gave Political Counselor on October 15 the following message from Peking dated Oct. 12:

The Romanian Ambassador (Aurel Duma), visibly pleased, told Minister-Counselor of this Embassy that Mr. Balluku's recent conversations with Chinese leaders had led to some very encouraging results. Mr. Duma suggested that for the first time China had accepted commitment to grant military assistance to Government of Tirana. In addition, Romanian Ambassador noted that strengthening of Chinese military position at Manchurian, Mongolian, and Sinkiang frontiers was taken by Peking within framework of defending "European outpost in anti-revisionist struggle."

But the Romanian diplomat, who is also a member of Central Committee in his own country, excluded possibility of military complications on Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders. He was convinced that Peking adjusts its pressures on Moscow depending on result it seeks. He feels that Chinese objectives are strictly political, namely, to increase existing tensions within collegial leadership in Soviet Union, and, if possible, provoke serious crises within this leadership.

Indeed, our Russian colleagues are very gloomy. They are not hiding their concern over the apparent Chinese will to aggravate the quarrel (between the two countries). They regret that the Czech affair gave Mao Tse-Tung an opportunity to recover the initiative and to revive the anti-Soviet campaign among other Communist parties and in the third world with hope of replacing the Soviet Union and making Peking the center of the international Communist movement. It is in this manner that the Soviets have interpreted the statement of Chou En-lai that "the world has now entered into a new historic era, that of the struggle against American imperialism and Soviet revisionism." But they point to the fact that the Chinese never denounced February 1950 treaty of alliance to support (the thesis) that Chinese will not embark on adventurous initiative and particularly tie themselves by specific commitments to Tirana. According to our Soviet colleagues -- although the People's Liberation Army has considerably reinforced its position on the Soviet borders -- the leaders of the cultural revolution are undoubtedly more inclined to take chances in the Balkans than in Central Asia and in Manchuria.

From the questions Soviet diplomats have recently been asking their Western colleagues, it would appear that they are preoccupied by two problems:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-133
By juw, NARA, Date 5-23-03

the eventual establishment of closer relations between China and West Germany and, above all, prospects of recognition of China by Canada, an act in which they are inclined to see beginning of disturbing evolution in American policy. Any sign of rapprochement between Washington and Peking appears for Soviets to invoke formidable threat of "encirclement of their country. "

SHRIVER

34
-

INFORMATION

Wednesday, October 16, 1968
4:15 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the transcript of Bill Jordan's question and answer.

Bill underlines that the question he was asked related to the talks, as a whole, to date. It was not addressed to rumors.

He said that he would lose all the capital he has built if he were to answer such a question with a simple "no comment."

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. George Christian

WWRostow:rln

(phoned by Bill Jordan from Paris)

Oct. 16, 1968

84a

AP Q. Could you tell us what happened during today's tea break, please?

Bill Jordan: No, I couldn't.

Q. I want to ask a question that has been asked many times before but has to be asked from time to time. Has there been any progress to date at all?

Bill Jordan: It's terribly difficult to judge progress until one arrives at a destination. One doesn't know if one has been moving forward or in circles. I would say there has been movement. I cannot characterize it as progress. I would hope that at some point in the future we can characterize it, and I hope that characterization will be positive. I cannot do so now.

Q. Would you characterize the movement?

Bill Jordan: No.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-479
By lip, NARA, Date 2-25-93

85
INFORMATION

Wednesday, October 16, 1968 -- 4:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Merriam Smith called.

He first recalled that you had told me to trust him and that he bothered me less than any other reporter.

He then asked if I could guide him -- on any basis I chose -- on all the talk about a bombing halt.

I told him that I would talk on an off-the-record, unattributable basis.

I said:

-- The statement we made today was the literal truth: there is no breakthrough.

-- It is possible Hanoi is facing a choice: they know President Johnson's position clearly; it is a position consistent in every respect with the President's public position; they may be deciding whether they negotiate with President Johnson or with his successor; we simply didn't know.

-- But they probably understood at last that President Johnson's position would not change and it might be six months before a new administration would be ready for negotiations.

-- I emphasized that I simply did not know Hanoi's mind; but they would have to weigh the possible advantages of waiting against a deteriorating position in the field.

Smith then asked a good many questions about the military situation which I answered reasonably fully.

The conversation closed with Smith saying that, in private, Nixon says he expects the Administration will wind up the war by January 1. I replied that if we do, it will be on the President's terms. There is no disposition here for a political gimmick.

What I said to Smith is my standard backgrounding routine with the press since the end of the Democratic Convention in August.

cc: George Christian

WWRostow:rin

W. W. Rostow

Wednesday, October 16, 1968
3:05 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have talked to Bill Jorden. He tells me the following:

- on the Saigon and other rumors, he kept firmly to "no comment."
- he was asked, however, a question he often has to deal with and which he dealt with this morning in a way he had done before. His exact transcript will be coming in, but he reports that he said: "It is very difficult to judge progress until one arrives at a destination. There is always movement in such talks, but one does not know whether one is going backward or in circles."
- Jorden has talked to the AP man who, he says, agrees that by picking out a phrase about movement and making it the lead, he wrote a false story. The AP man promises to file a story with a new lead.

We should be getting the full transcript shortly.

I told Bill, of course, that we had to stay very close together and keep an identical line.

W. W. Rostow

(cc: George Christian)

(also LDX'd to Secy Rusk)

Pres file

87

~~SECRET~~

Wed., Oct. 16, 1968
2:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Secretary Rusk explains
with great lucidity and force why we
need a "date certain."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~
attachment (State 256063)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988
By 18, NARA, Date 3-1-93

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification
FLASH

253088
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10 Oct 68 15 148
FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS
TODEL 1387 STATE 253088
NODIS/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FROM THE SECRETARY.

We have been proceeding here on the basis that a cessation of the bombing would be followed immediately by talks in which the GVN would participate. This is not only a fundamental point of policy but it is the only (repeat only) immediate and visible sign that Hanoi has moved at any point. This is a fundamental requirement because otherwise we would be in the position of a unilateral cessation of bombing with nothing in exchange. You have insisted that we not make public points of the DMZ and attacks on the cities because that would offend Hanoi's attitude toward QTE conditions UNQTE. We have accepted, even though with some misgiving, your view that silence on the part of Hanoi on these two points was an adequate basis on which to proceed, with the clear understanding that we would resume the bombing immediately if we were disappointed.

We must have a day certain for the beginning of the talks in which the GVN is present before we can deliver our part of the arrangement

Drafted by: S:DRusk:jmr 10/16/68 Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary

Cleances: EA - Mr. Bundy S/S - Mr. Read

~~SECRET~~
Classification

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 7149 91-428
By ag/jw, NARA, Date 3-1-93

~~SECRET~~

Classification

namely, the cessation of the bombing. A bombing cessation followed by a week or a month's delay in getting off to serious talks would create an utterly impossible situation both internationally and domestically. Bunker and Thieu simply could not manage the situation in Saigon under such circumstances.

The North Vietnamese Delegation has, according to your reports, said the talks could QTE begin the next day UNQTE. We do not believe that we can abandon this idea on the grounds that this phrase was used at an earlier stage, before Hanoi indicated they would agree to the presence of the GVN and that the talks on the next day would be about the question of representation.

The visibility of the presence of the GVN, again, is the only thing we could point to in connection with the major move by the United States in stopping the bombing. Since the presence of the GVN is utterly fundamental we cannot take our step with ambiguity or delays on this most fundamental point of all. We simply cannot take any risk of being in the position of having to resume the bombing after a few days because we are wrangling about the question of representation.

You need not adhere rigidly to QTE the next day UNQTE if you can
get a date certain within two or three days but we must be able to point to that
date at the time of stopping the bombing if we need to.

~~SECRET~~

Classification:

~~SECRET~~

Classification

I went over with Dobrynin last night your talk yesterday and found that he completely understood the importance of this point to the President and said he would immediately report it to his government. There may be some Russian help behind the scenes on this one.

It seems to me that the simple fact is that we have accepted Hanoi's proposition, we are prepared to stop the bombing today and we want to know when they will deliver what they have promised to deliver. The object of the Paris talks is not to get the United States to stop the bombing but to move toward peace. The date is now up to Hanoi; we are ready. If Hanoi cannot deliver an NLF Delegation, then we go back to the drawing boards. When Hanoi can deliver an NLF Delegation, we can move.

You and Cy have handled these talks with great skill and we are all anxious, as you are, to move the matter forward. I hope you can overcome this remaining obstacle promptly. Perhaps you should let the Hanoi Delegation know that you are ready for another private meeting just as soon as they have heard from their government.

END.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Classification

88

ACTION

Profile

Wednesday, October 16, 1968 - 12:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

I have informed Sec. Rusk of your attitude on the Katzenbach mission, as instructed -- loud and clear.

I simply want to confirm that, in the light of this attitude, you have disapproved the attached message.

W. W. Rostow

Disapproved _____

Approved _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rln

ACTION

File

Wednesday, October 16, 1968

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk and Nick Katzenbach recommend that the attached message be delivered on your behalf to President Tito by Katzenbach (when Nick calls on him on Friday). With Tito's consent, the text would be released to the press.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Message approved _____

Approved as amended _____

No _____

Call me _____

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT TITO

The President has asked me to convey his very best wishes. He has the greatest admiration for Yugoslavia's record of courageous and sturdy independence. He has followed closely Yugoslavia's program of economic reform; he has noted the determination with which you personally have pursued it; and he supports its objective of improving the livelihood of the Yugoslav people.

The President is particularly conscious of the special problems Yugoslavia faces at this time and asked that I assure you that the American people's support of Yugoslavia's independence remains as strong as ever.

Wednesday, October 16, 1968 -- 11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to Ken Crawford, the President requires no briefing on point 1, the Paris talks.

Pres file

On point 2, the main points to be made are these:

-- The simple truth is that the President's assessment at his February 2, 1968, press conference that the Tet offensive was a decisive failure, has proved correct: the government of Vietnam is now a stronger, more efficient and more competent government, with a wider popular base than at the time of Tet.

-- The people of South Vietnam, through constitutional processes, have gone into total mobilization: they will have a million men under arms by the end of the year.

-- The ARVN is now much better equipped, more competent, more confident. In recent months they have been killing more of the enemy forces and taking substantially more casualties than U.S. forces. The building of an effective military force in a developing country like South Vietnam, is a long, slow job. But there is no doubt it is moving well.

-- On the other hand, the enemy has taken a terrible beating in the year 1968: extremely heavy casualties; great difficulty with recruiting inside South Vietnam; the need to rely increasingly on North Vietnamese infiltrators who are not well trained.

-- In the main force units, perhaps 80% of the men are now North Vietnamese.

-- In addition, they have to cannibalize about half their guerrillas to maintain their main force units.

-- At the moment they are doing something they have done before when an offensive peters out: they are pulling their main force units back into deep base areas or into North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

-- Abrams and the ARVN will be using this interval to extend GVN control into the countryside.

-- Prisoners and captured documents suggest the enemy plans to rebuild for another offensive. We have no evidence whatsoever that their military moves have any political basis. That is not ruled out; but the

simple fact is that all can be explained on military grounds.

-- If there is no radical movement towards peace, we are confident that the next President will come into office with an even better military position than the one we now have and with even better bargaining position than we now enjoy if the other side is ready for settlement.

Attached is Abrams' latest military assessment. If you make it available to Crawford, you should make it clear that it comes from sensitive intelligence sources and can only be used on a deep background basis, for guidance, not for direct use.

W. W. Rostow

WW Rostow:rla



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1968
7:15 p.m. Tuesday

77a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW

Ken Crawford of Newsweek is coming in to see the President off-the-record tomorrow. Two of his questions are:

1. What about the Paris talks? Any hope there?
2. Vietnam: How are things going there?

Will you give me a briefing paper that I can hand to the President on these two questions?


James R. Jones

~~SECRET~~

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- CSAF - GEN MCCONNELL
- CNO - ADM KOOPER
- CMD - GEN CHAPMAN
- DJS - ADM JOHNSON
- DJ-3 - GEN MEYER
- DJ-5 - GEN ROSSON
- SACSA - GEN DEPUY
- DIA/P - GEN BROWN

89-b

14 OCT 1966
O 141102Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS

ZEM

~~SECRET SAVIN MAC 13395 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF SOUTH VIETNAM THE ENEMY IS SUFFERING SEVERELY FROM PERSONNEL AND PARTICULARLY FROM LOGISTIC SHORTAGES. THESE SHORTAGES, AND OUR AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS, HAVE DRIVEN HIM OUT OF THESE AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, AND HE NOW MUST ATTEMPT TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE WE HAVE DONE HIM.

IN THE DMZ THERE WERE FURTHER INDICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL AS INTERCEPTS REVEALED THAT THE 164TH ARTY REGT WAS MOVING 152MM GUNS BACK TO REAR AREAS. THE HQ, 320TH NVA DIV AND ITS 4TH REGT HAVE ALSO REVEALED THAT THEY WOULD RELOCATE. THERE HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN NO GOOD EVIDENCE TO ENABLE US TO DETERMINE THE PURPOSES, SCOPE, OR DURATION OF THE CURRENT WITHDRAWAL.

ENEMY UNITS IN MR-TH ARE STILL SUFFERING LOGISTICS PROBLEMS AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHICH INDICATES THAT THE EN SITUATION THERE WILL CHANGE IN THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE.

IN NORTHERN MR-5, THE ENEMY FORCES UNDER FRONT A HAVE ALL BUT ABANDONED THEIR ONLY RECENT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY, THE ATTACKS ON TUON DOU. INTERCEPTED RADIO MESSAGES REVEAL THAT THE ENEMY SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES FROM AIR STRIKES AND IS SHORT OF FOOD. DESPITE THE FACT THAT ^{that he} ~~THE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-109
By *us* NARA, Date *3-26-04*

~~SECRET SAVIN~~
~~SECRET SAVIN~~
EYES ONLY

ATTACKED THUONG DUC WITH HIS 3 BEST REGTS, AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT INTERCEPTED MESSAGES REVEALED THA "THE CAMP MUST FALL", THE ENEMY'S EFFORT FAILED. ~~IT IS AN INDICATION OF THE ENEMY'S INEFFECTIVENESS THAT THUONG DUC HAS BEEN A HIGH PRIORITY TARGET SINCE APRIL. IT WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY 19 MAY -- SO THAT THE ENEMY COULD LINK ROUTE 614 WITH ROUTE 4 AND MOVE MEN AND SUPPLIES TOWARD DANANG. THE RECENT ATTACKS ON THUONG DUC MAY HAVE BEEN PROMPTED BY THE ENEMY'S NEED FOR A SUCCESS OF SOME SORT. THEY MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO ELIMINATE WHAT THE ENEMY FEELS IS AN ALLIED SALIENT INTO IGS MOUNTAIN BASE AREAS. THE RECENT WESTERLY MOVE OF THE HQ, 31ST NVA REGT TO THE VICINITY OF THUONG DUC MAY BE A REFLECTION OF HIS CONCERN OVER WITHDRAWAL ROUTES. MR TTH'S EXPERIENCE WITH REGARD TO ALLIED OPERATIONS ALONG ROUTE 547, IN BASE AREA 114 AND 131 AND IN THE A SHAU VALLEY MUST WEIGH HEAVILY AMONG THE ENEMY'S FEARS AS HE WITHDRAWS FROM LOWLAND TARGETS UNDER PRESSURE. IN ANY EVENT, THE ATTACKS HAVE FAILED AND FRONT A NO LONGER POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO ALLIED POSITIONS.~~

FURTHER TO THE SOUTH IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE, WHICH IS THE 2ND DIV'S AREA, THE 4 BNS OF THE QUANG TIN PROVINCIAL UNIT HAVE AVOIDED CONTACT, ARE UNDERSTRENGTH AND ARE NOT CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING EFFECTIVE ATTACKS. THE 1ST VC AND 3RD NVA REGTS OF THE 2ND NVA DIV REMAIN IN OR NEAR BASE AREA 117 AVOIDING CONTACT. IN AUG AND SEP, THE 1ST VC REGT LOST MORE THAN 1,222 MEN. AN ENTIRE BN OF THE 3RD NVA REGT WAS ANNIHILATED LAST WEEK AT HAU DUC. IN ADDITION TO THEIR PERSONNEL SHORTAGES, THESE UNITS ARE SUFFERING FOOD SHORTAGES. WHAT THEY CAN GET MUST BE CARRIED UP FROM QUANG NGAI PROVINCE.

~~AS FOR THE 3RD NVA DIV IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, ITS 1ST AND 2ND VC~~

~~SECRET SA VIN~~

LEVELS ONLY

EVES ONLY

~~REGT HAVE WITHDRAWN TO THE SONG RE AND HA TO VALLEYS. A PW REVEALS THAT THE 2ND VC REGT HAS BEEN REDUCED TO ONE THIRD OF ITS NORMAL STRENGTH. THE 22ND NVA REGT AND THE 3 BNS OF THE 421ST VC SAPPER REGT ARE AVOIDING CONTACT IN THE MOUNTAINS WEST OF HA THANH. THERE IS, OF COURSE, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENTIRE 3RD NVA DIV WILL RETURN TO BINH DINH PROVINCE, ITS FORMER OPERATING AREA. THE 3 BNS OF THE QUANG NGAI PROVINCE UNIT ARE STILL IN THE LOWLANDS NEAR QUANG NGAI CITY BUT THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO AVOID CONTACT AND POSE NO SERIOUS THREAT.~~

THUS WE SEE THAT THE PRESSURE OF ALLIED OPERATIONS AND INCREASING LOGISTICS PROBLEMS HAVE FORCED THE ENEMY TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS EARLIER TARGETS. THE MOVEMENT OUT OF COUNTRY OR INTO REMOTE BASE AREAS OFFERS HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO AWAIT REPLACEMENTS OF PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. IT ALSO ENABLES ~~HIM TO POSE A THREAT IN THE DMZ AND IN SOUTHERN I CTZ IN HOPES OF TYING DOWN ALLIED FORCES WHILE REMAINING OUT OF REACH OF FRIENDLY SWEEP OPERATIONS. HE MAY ALSO BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE PEACE TALKS BY CLAIMING THAT THE BRS DE-SCALATED. AT THE SAME TIME, HE RETAINS THE OPTION OF RETURNING TO TARGET AREAS IF CONDITIONS PERMIT HIM TO RECONSTRUCT HIS UNITS AND ATTAIN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.~~ ON THE OTHER HAND, ~~THERE ARE FEW REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL STILL ENROUTE I CTZ. ONLY 4,500 MEN ARE ESTIMATED TO ARRIVE IN THE NEXT 2 MONTHS.~~ CONTINUED INTERDICTION OF HIS LAOTIAN SUPPLY LINES WILL MAKE IT VERY ~~DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO REPLACE HIS RECENT CASUALTIES.~~ IN THE LAST 2 WEEKS ALONE, THE ENEMY IN I CTZ HAS LOST OVER 100 TONS OF RICE, 4,500 MORTAR ROUNDS, 376 122 AND 107MM ROCKET ROUNDS AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EVES ONLY

NEARLY 5 TONS OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES. IN NORTH IN MR-5, WHAT LITTLE LOGISTIC SUPPORT HE CAN EXPECT MUST BE LABORIOUSLY CARRIED TO HIM BY MEN OR ANIMALS OVER RUGGED MOUNTAIN TERRAIN.

THE ENEMY NOW FACES THE GLOOMY PROSPECT OF HAVING TO WITHDRAW TO REFIT AND REGROUP WITHOUT ANY SERIOUS NEAR TIME PROSPECT OF RECEIVING THE NEEDED MEN AND MATERIEL. AT BEST, HE CAN HOPE TO SURVIVE IN BORDER SANCTUARIES AND BASE AREAS WHILE HE AWAITS FURTHER ORDERS FROM HIGH COMMAND HANOI.

BECAUSE OF THE MEAGER RESULTS OF HIS RECENT ACTIVITIES AND THE PROBLEMS IT HAS GENERATED, ~~THE ENEMY MAY HAVE ENDED THE THIRD OFFENSIVE~~ SEVERAL KNOWLEDGABLE PW'S AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS RELATE THAT THIS ~~OFFENSIVE WAS TO HAVE TERMINATED 15 OCTOBER 1967~~ HOWEVER, THERE IS ~~GOOD EVIDENCE THAT THE ENEMY PROBABLY ENDED THE THIRD OFFENSIVE~~ SOMETIME IN THE LATTER HALF OF SEPTEMBER. THE HIGH VOLUME OF COMMUNICATIONS AROUND 27 SEPTEMBER BETWEEN HANOI HIGH COMMAND AND THE MAJOR ENEMY HEADQUARTERS IN SVN COULD INDICATE THE TRANSMISSION OF AN IMPORTANT DECISION AT THAT TIME.

AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FROM THE CENTRAL RESEARCH DIRECTORATE IN HANOI TO ALL MAJOR COMMANDS RELATES US, FW, AND RVNAF CASUALTIES FOR THE PERIOD 17 AUGUST TO 30 SEPTEMBER 68. THE MESSAGE THEN COMPARES US, FW, AND ARVN CASUALTIES FOR THIS PERIOD WITH THOSE OF THE FIRST (TET) PHASE AND THE SECOND (MAY) PHASE.

THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS TO SANCTUARIES IS AN IMPORTANT CLUE AS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. THE 320TH DIVISION AND THE 130TH REGIMENTS, (BOTH IN THE DMZ), WITHDREW INTO NVN AROUND
(CONT)

~~SECRET SALES~~

1308

EYES ONLY

O 141132Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SAVIN MAACC J1395 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO
25 SEPT. SLIGHTLY EARLIER, THE MR TTH HEADQUARTERS AND ITS UNITS
MOVED TO LAOS. AROUND THE END OF SEPTEMBER ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST
NVA DIVISION SHIFTED FROM DARLAC PROVINCE INTO CAMBODIA.

THESE WITHDRAWALS HAVE CONTINUED. IN EARLY OCTOBER ELEMENTS
~~OF THE 7TH NVA DIVISION IN NORTHERN IIT CTZ MOVED TO CAMBODIAN~~
~~SANCTUARIES. THE 9TH VC DIVISION, NOW LOCATED ASTRIDE THE~~
~~CAMBODIAN-TAY NINH BORDER IS VIRTUALLY IN AN OUT-~~
~~COUNTRY SAFE-HAVEN. THE 5TH DIVISION IN EARLY OCTOBER WITHDREW~~
~~ITS HEADQUARTERS TO CAMBODIA.~~

ANOTHER INDICATION OF THE PROBABLE CESSATION OF THE THIRD
OFFENSIVE IS THE SERIES OF MEETINGS SINCE 15 SEPTEMBER 54 WHICH
HAVE BEEN CONVENED BY ALL ECHELONS OF THE ENEMY'S COMMAND. THESE
MEETINGS ARE HISTORICALLY A PART OF THE TERMINATION OF A CAMPAIGN.
IN ADDITION, THERE HAS BEEN A DECIDED DECLINE IN ENEMY ACTIVITY
WHILE THIS IS PRIMARILY A RESULT OF FRIENDLY OPERATIONS, IT SUGGESTS
THE END OF HIS THIRD OFFENSIVE. THE KIA'S PER IS NOW ~~UNSTABLE~~ HAVE
~~DROPPED BACK TO LEVELS RE-SEA DURING THE MID-JUNE TO MID-AUGUST~~
~~WAVE RESULTING, OF COURSE, FROM HIS AVOIDANCE OF CONTACT. ONLY AT~~
THONG DUC DOES THE ENEMY CONTINUE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT

~~SECRET~~ SAVIN EYES ONLY

~~SECRET SAVIN~~ EYES ONLY

SIZE. WHILE THE PURPOSE OF THESE OPERATIONS IS UNCLEAR, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT HIS INTENT HERE IS TO IMPROVE HIS DAMAGED LOGISTIC POSTURE IN THE FRONT & AREA WHILE ATTEMPTING TO PREEMPT WHAT HE PROBABLY THINKS IS THE BEGINNING OF A THRUST FROM THUONG DUC TOWARD HIS REAR AREAS TO THE WEST AND NORTHWEST.

HIS PERSONNEL LOSSES, HIS LOSSES OF CACHES AND OTHER SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES, AND THE DECLINING MORALE OF HIS TROOPS HAVE BROUGHT HIM TO THE POINT WHERE HE MUST CEASE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND SEEK A RESPITE.

HIS THIRD OFFENSIVE HAS ENDED AS DID HIS SECOND (MAY) OFFENSIVE. CONSTANT AND DEVASTATING PREEMPTIVE ACTIONS BY FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE CAUSED HIM NOT ONLY SERIOUS PERSONNEL, MORALE, AND LOGISTIC PROBLEMS, BUT HAVE ALMOST TOTALLY DISLOCATED HIS PLANS AND OPERATIONAL CAPACITY. ~~WHILE HE HAD LITTLE ENOUGH TO SHOW FOR HIS SECOND OFFENSIVE, HE HAS EVEN LESS TO SHOW FOR THE THIRD.~~

AT THIS POINT, ~~THE ENEMY'S OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE ARE BLANK. TO CONTINUE HIS PRESENT STRATEGY, HE MUST NOW ENTER ANOTHER PERIOD OF LULL WHILE HE RECONSTITUTES AND REEQUIPS HIS FORCES. IT IS A SERIOUS QUESTION THAT HE CAN DO THIS EITHER MATERIALLY OR PSYCHOLOGICALLY. HIS LOGISTICS ARE BADLY BATTERED AND HIS REDISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS IMMENSE. INFILTRATION HAS DROPPED PRECIPITIOUSLY, NOT ONLY PRESENTING IMMEDIATE PERSONNEL REPLACEMENT PROBLEMS, BUT ALSO STRONGLY SUGGESTING THAT HIS PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1965 SURGE EFFORT DID NOT GO BEYOND THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. HE HAS PROMISED VICTORY FOR 1967 AND~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~ EYES ONLY

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EYES ONLY

MORE SPECIFICALLY WITH THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. IN LIGHT OF A DETERIORATING MORALE, HE WILL ENCOUNTER SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES IN GOADING HIS FOLLOWERS TO YET ANOTHER ROUND AT WHAT HAS BEEN A MOUNTING SERIES OF MILITARY FAILURES. HE CAN, HOWEVER, CONSOLIDATE HIS REMAINING FORCES FOR AN ALL-OUT, LAST-GASP EFFORT AT SAITON BY COMMITTING ONE OF HIS DIVISIONS IN SANCTUARY. WE HAVE SOME HINTS THAT THIS MAY BE HIS PLAN OR AT LEAST HE MAY BE CONSIDERING IT, BUT BY SUCH AN ALL-OUT ATTACK HE FACES ALMOST CERTAIN DISASTROUS RESULTS WHICH WILL FULLY EXPOSE HIS FUNDAMENTAL WEAKNESSES, THUS SERIOUSLY UNDERMINING ANY MEANINGFUL POSITION OF STRENGTH AT THE BARGAINING TABLE AND LEADING HIM EVEN FURTHER TOWARD HIS INEVITABLE DEFEAT.

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

EYES ONLY

Pres file

90

Wednesday, October 16, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a warm letter of thanks from Mayor Schuetz for your letter to him and for the other U. S. statements made last week on Berlin.

W. W. Rostow

W

ERF:mst



Department of State

TELEGRAM

902 46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 543

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85-S
ACTION CPR 02

INFO EUR 15, SCI 05, SS 25, NSC 10, GPM 04, H 02, P 04, USIA 12, INR 07,
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R 151743Z OCT 68
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3274
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BERLIN 2489

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM SCHUETZ TO THE PRESIDENT

1. GOVMAYOR SCHUETZ HAS GIVEN US A REPLY TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER TO HIM OF OCTOBER 8. THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS CONVEYED TO SCHUETZ BY DEFENSE SECRETARY CLIFFORD DURING THE LATTER'S BERLIN VISIT OCTOBER 12. THE GOVMAYOR'S OFFICE DOES NOT INTEND TO PUBLISH THE TEXT OF SCHUETZ'S REPLY. WE ARE SENDING THE ORIGINAL TO THE DEPARTMENT BY POUCH. AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE GERMAN TEXT FOLLOWS:

2. BEGIN TEXT.

BERLIN, OCTOBER 15, 1968. DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON!
DURING THE PAST WEEK, BERLIN SAW VERY SPECIAL EVIDENCE OF GERMAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP.

THE SECRETARY FOR HEALTH, MR. WILBUR J. COHEN, DEDICATED THE NEW KLINIKUM IN YOUR BEHALF; HE THEREBY IMPRESSIVELY DOCUMENTED THE TIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND BERLIN. AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE EMPHASIZED THESE TIES WITH WORDS WHICH, THE BERLIN AND BEYOND THE CITY, HAVE BEEN HEARD WITH GREAT ATTENTION.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MR. CLARK M. CLIFFORD, HAS GIVEN ME YOUR LETTER. BERLINERS THANK YOU FOR THIS LETTER, AND I MYSELF THANK YOU PERSONALLY AND VERY SINCERELY.

YOUR LETTER HAS STRENGTHENED US TO CONTINUE TO BUILD BERLIN IN ASSURED FREEDOM AND IN PEACE. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD IN THE CITY, AND THAT THEY WILL IN TURN HELP OTHERS TO AVOID FALSE

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State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By pc, NARA, Date 3-6-02



Department of State

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SPECULATIONS AND FAULTY CALCULATIONS.

BERLIN AND ITS POPULATION IN ALL PARTS OF THE CITY THANK YOU FOR THE CLARITY WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAS THEREBY ONCE AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED ITS TIES TO FREE BERLIN. WE KNOW THAT WE CAN RELY UPON THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN GOOD AS WELL AS IN DIFFICULT DAYS. AND YOU, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, SHOULD KNOW THAT OUR FRIENDS WILL ALSO BE ABLE IN THE FUTURE TO DEPEND ON BERLIN AND BERLINERS.

VERY TRULY YOURS, KLAUS SCHUETZ.

END TEXT.
MORRIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday, October 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Long
2 Pres file*

SUBJECT: Proposal for American Graduate School at Weizmann Institute

The following is a purely in-house study to help you decide whether you want us to explore further with AID and Treasury. We don't pretend to be giving you definitive answers.

The object of this proposal is to reconstitute the graduate school at the Weizmann Institute as an American graduate school for training younger persons, many from the developing countries. Though there are already about 300 degree students in the present graduate school, this step would increase the number, make more fellowships available and make this more openly an American enterprise. (The present Graduate School is chartered by the Board of Regents of the State of New York, but it is still the "Feinberg Graduate School"--not the "American" school.)

The proposal is that the USG aid indirectly in the financing by forgiving repayment of \$25 million (plus \$7 million in interest) in dollar repayments the American Committee of the Weizmann Institute owes the US Treasury over the next 19 years. These loans were initially made for the Institute from our excess holdings of Israeli currency with the provision that they be repaid in dollars.

The cost, therefore, could be as much as \$45 million in revenues lost to the CCC. This would definitely include the \$32 million forgiven and could include probable loss of another \$15-16 million in repayments on similar loans to eight other Jewish organizations. This loss would be spread over 20 years. But it would be a direct loss of revenue to the CCC of about \$2 million per year and would increase the CCC budget accordingly.

You could legally do this, but there is no specific authority covering this kind of case. The President has a general power to forgive loans, but this has been used only rarely and should probably be reserved for major occasions. There is no specific authority in PL 480. The Mondale amendment, to which the Weizmann proposal refers, probably does not apply. It was designed to make local currencies more easily usable in countries like India where our holdings are clearly excess. The lawyers would have to make a judgment, but this amendment does not seem to apply to loans already made where the currency is barely excess and we have already contracted for repayment in dollars.

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The arguments for doing it are:

1. Support for a top-quality institution. No one would deny the advantages in strengthening an institution like the Weizmann Institute or making its facilities more widely available, especially to qualified students from the developing countries. It would help increase the technical competence in these countries by training outside the US, thereby reducing the likelihood of students not returning to their own countries.

2. Support for Israel's effort to build a wider base of political support in Africa and Asia. Israel has already invested a good deal in government technical assistance to these countries and we've encouraged that effort. The importance of their political support--to Israel and to us--was clear when it helped us beat off efforts in the 1967 Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly to condemn Israel for aggression and to demand unconditional withdrawal.

3. Support for a worthy American cause. The American Committee of the Weizmann Institute has proposed a worthwhile project which warrants at least its government's serious consideration.

The arguments against are that we would:

1. Forfeit \$30-45 million in dollar earnings to the CCC account. We have found a device in the dollar repayable loan for converting local currencies back into dollars, and this would pretty well put an end to it in Israel. Congress has insisted that we maximize dollar earnings from PL 480 sales and has written that insistence into the law. Since repayments count as CCC revenues, forgiving repayments would presumably increase the CCC budget by up to \$2 million a year while Congress is trying to cut it by making PL 480 transactions real sales.

2. Jeopardize Israel's position as an excess-currency country. We have been through an extensive review in the past year internally and with the Israeli Government to determine how we could prevent raids on our holdings of Israeli currency and thereby keep Israel on the excess currency list. Quite frankly, we brought the Israeli government into this so we could give them the burden of saying "yes" or "no" to the numerous requests from Jewish organizations for access to these funds. They agreed to stand by the following priorities: US expenses, funding important Israeli research projects, dollar repayable loans and grants. Since there are enough requirements in the first three categories, we have set a policy of making no grants. The alternative to setting these priorities was to make loans and grants without restraint and let Israel come off the excess currency list this year. The Israeli Government did not want that to happen. Forgiving loan repayments is equal to getting back in the grant business.

3. Violate our general principle of avoiding backdoor financing and lose control over use of this money. We generally prefer--as a matter of principle and because Congress feels strongly--to keep our expenditures within the appropriations process. We could probably provide fellowships less expensively--if we chose--by a straight annual appropriation under AID assistance to American schools and hospitals abroad. This is the one part of the Foreign Aid bill that Congress does not normally cut; it is not subject to the restriction on number of aid countries; and it is the portion of the act under which we aid our colleges in Arab countries. However, it is not clear that a purely cost-benefit study of the cheapest way to train selected scientists from countries of special interest to us would justify this use of the AID dollar.

This last point--loss of control over use of the money--becomes relevant when we consider that one of the unspoken objectives of this proposal is to engage the US quasi-officially in Israel's efforts to develop support in Africa and Asia. We have American institutions supported by USG funds in four Moslem countries, and they are frankly there to build our position in the Arab world. But the USG controls that money via appropriations. This proposal seeks the same kind of apparent engagement in Israel without any USG control.

If you wish, I shall get a definitive judgment from the agencies.

W. W. Rostow

Get a definitive judgment _____

Hold off _____

P. S. What Abe Feinberg regards as his strongest argument is this: The Israel proposition is, essentially, \$2 million per year for twenty years. We are spending on the U. S. schools in Arab countries in grant aid at the average rate of \$7.1 million per year (FY 1959-FY 1968) as follows:

| | <u>Average rate per year</u> |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Cairo (FY 1959, FY 1961-67) | \$1 million |
| Beirut (FY 1959-68) | \$4.7 million |
| Istanbul (FY 1960-68) | \$1.45 million |

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file

October 16, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Bundy remains redoubtable.

W. W. Rostow

92a

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WHITE HOUSE (EXCLUSIVE MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET TRINE NOFORN GAMMA CONTROLLED ITEM~~

[REDACTED] WILLIAM BUNDY NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH
BROTHER'S STATEMENT ON VIETNAM

[REDACTED] 13 OCT 68 ((M)) --

3.4
(b)(1,3)

[REDACTED] W((ILLIAM)) BUNDY CONCERNING HIS BROTHER
MC((GEORGE)) BUNDY'S STATEMENT CALLING FOR A TOTAL HALT TO THE
BOMBING AND A GRADUAL REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF U.S. TROOPS BY
CUTS OF 100,000 STARTING IN 1969. W((ILLIAM)) BUNDY [REDACTED]
TO CONVEY [REDACTED] FORMAL ASSURANCE THAT HIS BROTHER'S
STATEMENT REPRESENTS NEITHER THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S POINT OF VIEW NOR
HIS OWN. IN ANY EVENT, MC((GEORGE)) BUNDY'S STATEMENT HAS MADE A
SENSATION AND WILL PROBABLY INFLUENCE U.S. POLITICS IN THE
COMING MONTHS. [REDACTED] ALREADY SENT THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE
STATEMENT [REDACTED] BY COURIER.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~
~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RACD2-109 and NLJ 94-413
By us, NARA, Date 3-26-04