

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

127

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 note	Rostow to the President, 8:10 p.m. 1 p. TS re Vietnam <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-212</i>	10/28/68	A
#5 note	Rostow to the President, 5:15 p.m. <i>open 5-26-95 NLS 94-221</i> 1 p S (duplicate, #52, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "[Vietnam: July - December 1968]")	10/28/68	A
#5a draft	Draft letter, LBJ to Kosygin <i>open 5-26-95</i> 2 p PCI (dup., #52a as above) <i>NLS 94-221</i>	10/29/68	A
#11 memo	Rostow to the President, 2:00 p.m. 2 p S <i>open 7-2-93 NLS 92-288</i> (dup., #55, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "[Vietnam: July - December 1968]" & #8, "Chlodnick File")	10/28/68	A
#17a letter	Gandhi to LBJ <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-212</i> 2 p PCI (Dup. of #40, NSF, Spec Hofs Correspondence - 11/68-1/20/69, Box 23)	10/27/68	A
#22 memo	Rostow to the President re military exercise 1 p S (dup., #31a, Volume 102) <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-212</i>	10/28/68	A
#22a memo	Katzenbach to the President 2 p S <i>OPEN 1-23-95 NLS 94-213</i>	10/26/68	A
#22b cable	Seoul 10716 1 p S " "	10/28/68	A
#24 memo	Rostow to the President 1 p C <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-212</i> (dup., #2, NSF, Country File, India, "India's Food Problem, Vol. 4")	10/28/68	A
#24a report	re Food for India <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-212</i> 2 p C (dup., #2a, as above)	10/28/68	A
#25 memo	Rostow to the President re NATO 1 p S <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-212</i> (dup., #33, NSF, Agency File, NATO, "Filed by LBJ Library")	10/28/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 101, October 23-28, 1968, Box 41

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

287

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#25a memo	Fowler to the President OPEN 2/15/02 3 p S (dup., #33a as above)	10/26/68	A
#25b cable	State 259982 to US Mission, NATO 2 p C (dup., #33b as above) OPEN 6/30/95 NLJ 94-213	10/23/68	A
#28 note <i>same sanitization 6-23-03 11607-134 same sanitization 1-19-11 NLJ 10-294</i>	Rostow to the President, 6:00 p.m. 1 p S SANITIZED 7/24/95 NLJ 94-215 sanitized 1-19-11 NLJ 94-215 (dup., #45, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "[Vietnam: July - December 1968]") NA 6	10/27/68	A
#28a memo	Helms to Rostow 1 p S open 2-6-95 NLJ 94-214 (dup., #45, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "[Vietnam: July - December 1968]")	10/27/68	A
#28b draft	Draft letter, LBJ to Pope Paul 1 p PCI open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212	10/29/68	A
#32a memo	Rostow to the President, 2:20 p.m. exempt NLJ 94-212 2 p IS Downgraded to "Conf" per NLJ 94-212 SANITIZED 6/11/96 NLJ 94-212 (dup., #250, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 10, OPEN NLJ 88-112 5-5-99 Exempt, NLJ 84-173 and #48 this volume)	10/25/68	A
#33 note	Rostow to the President, 10:30 a.m. 1 p S re Vietnam open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212	10/26/68	A
#33a memo	Helms to Rostow and Rusk 2 p S sanitized 2-6-95 NLJ 94-214 same sanitization 019-041-2-1 (1/02)	10/25/68	A
#35 note	Rostow to the President, 11:10 p.m. 1 p S re Vietnam SANITIZED 7/24/95 NLJ 94-215 same sanitization 019-041-2-2 (1/02)	10/25/68	A
#35a cable	Intelligence report 2 p S sanitized 2-6-95 NLJ 94-214 same sanitization 019-041-2-3 (1/02)	10/25/68	A
#37 memo	Rostow to the President, 9:00 p.m. 5 p S open 7-2-93 NLJ 92-288 (dup., #96a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Kosygin" and #13, "Chlodnick File")	10/25/68	A

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

3487

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#37a rpt	Talking Points 4 p PCI <i>open 4/7/94</i> (dup., #96b, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Kosygin" and #13a, "Chlodnick File")	10/25/68	A
#41 memo	Rostow to the President, 3:45 p.m. 3 p S (dup., #55a, Vol. 102) <i>open 1-23-95 NY 94-212</i>	10/25/68	A
#41a memo	Katzenbach to LBJ <i>OPEN 1-19-96 NLJ 94-213</i> 6 p S (dup., #55b, Vol. 102)	10/22/68	A
#41b cable	Rawalpindi 8628 <i>prompt 3-23-95 NY 94-213</i> 3 p S (dup., #55c, Vol. 102) <i>open 3/15/02</i>	10/20/68	A
#41c cable	Rawalpindi 500 to the President <i>sanitized 1-19-96 NLJ 94-213</i> 1 p S (dup., #55d, Vol. 102) <i>same sanit NY 019-041-2/4 (1/02)</i>	10/25/68	A
#42 note	Rostow to the President, 1:45 p.m. 1 p S re Chile <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NY 94-170</i>	10/25/68	A
#42a cable <i>more info released 6/23/03 NLJ 02-135</i>	Santiago 5812 3 p S <i>sanitized 7-22-94 NLJ 94-172</i>	10/24/68	A
#43 note	Rostow to the President, 11:00 a.m. 1 p TS <i>open 1-23-95 NY 94-212</i> (dup., #23a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2 C (16) b General Military Activity")	10/25/68	A
#43a cable	MAC 14138 <i>open 8-30-95 NLJ 94-352</i> 9 pp TS (dup., #23b, as above)	10/24/68	A
#43b cable	JCS 12098 1 p S <i>open 8-30-95 NLJ 94-352</i> (dup., #23c, as above)	10/21/68	A
#43c cable	MAC 14330 7 p S <i>open 8-30-95 NLJ 94-352</i> (dup., #23d, as above)	10/24/68	A

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4837

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#48 memo	Rostow to the President re Israel exempt NLJ 94-212 2 p TS Downgraded to "conf" per NLJ 94-212 (dup., #32a) <i>OPEN NLJ 98-112 5-5-99</i>	10/25/68	A
#53a memo	Meeting of LBJ and Abba Eban 2 p S <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212</i>	10/22/68	A
#53b memo	Clifford to the President "Tab A" 1 p PCT <i>open 8-30-95 NLJ 94-352</i>	10/22/68	A
#53c memo	Tab B - extract of Rusk memo 1 p S <i>open 3-28-95 NLJ 94-213</i>	n.d.	A
#55 note <i>same sanitization 1-23-03 NLJ 02134</i>	Rostow to the President, 3:50 p.m. sanitized 7/24/95 NLJ 94-215 1 p S <i>sanitized 7/24/95 NLJ 94-215</i> (near duplicate, #16, NSF, Country File, Guatemala, Vol. 2)	10/24/68	A
#55a cable	Intelligence report sanitized per RAL - more info released 3/15/02 4 p S (dup., #15, 16a, NSF, Country File, Guatemala, Vol. 2 Sanitized, NLJ 92-298)	10/23/68	A
#57 note	Rostow to the President, 2:40 p.m. 1 p TS re USSR <i>sanitized 7/24/95 NLJ 94-215</i> <i>same san NLJ 019-041-2-5 (1/02)</i>	10/24/68	A
#58 note	Rostow to the President, 2:30 p.m. 1 p S re Vietnam " " " <i>[dup. #80, NSF, CF, USSR "Vol. XXII"] 3-7-08 same san NLJ DT-284 (#80)</i>	10/24/68	A
#58a cable <i>exempt 5-13-03 NLJ RAL 02106</i>	Intelligence report 4 p S <i>exempt 2-6-95 NLJ 94-214</i>	10/23/68	A
#62 note	Rostow to the President, 10:10 a.m. 1 p C <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212</i>	10/24/68	A
#62a memo	NMCC for the Record 0715 EDT 1 p C <i>open 8-30-95 NLJ 94-352</i>	10/24/68	A
#62b memo	NMCC for the Record 0445 EDT 2 p C <i>open 8-30-95 NLJ 94-352</i>	10/24/68	A

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597

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#63b memo	telecon, Harris and Jim Jones 8 p PCI <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212</i> (dup. #1a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Harris (Lou) - Kosharyan")	10/23/68	A
#65 letter	Rostow to Rusk 1 p S re Israel <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212</i>	10/24/68	A
#65a memo	Rostow to the President 1 p S re Israel (dup. #72) <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212</i>	10/23/68	A
#65b letter	LBJ to Eshkol 2 p PCI [dup. #72a] " "	10/23/68	A
#66a memo	Meeting, LBJ, Gen. William Momyer, Rostow 4 p S <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212</i>	10/23/68	A
#70a draft	Draft letter, LBJ to Kosygin 3 p PCI " "	10/23/68	A
#71 note	Rostow to the President, 10:40 a.m. 1 p S <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212</i> (dup. #109, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 18)	10/23/68	A
#71a cable	Seoul 10663 2 p S <i>OPEN 1-19-96 NLJ 94-212</i> (dup. #109, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 18)	10/23/68	A
#72 note	dup. #65a <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212</i>		
#72a letter	dup. #65b " "		
#74 note	Rostow to the President, 9:15 a.m. 1 p S <i>SANITIZED 7/24/95 NLJ 94-215</i> <i>some Sani NY 019-041-2-8(1/02)</i>	10/23/68	A
#74a cable <i>more info released 6-30-06 NLJ 02-136</i>	Intelligence report 3 p S (dup. #39a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 2" <i>Sanitized, NLJ 91-481</i>)	10/22/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 101, October 23-28, 1968, Box 41

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#75a cable <i>Sanitized 6-30-03</i> <i>14/02-136</i>	Intelligence report 6 p S (dup. #41a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 2" Exempt, NLJ 91-4817)	10/22/68	A
#78 memo	Rostow to the President 1 p C re Latin America <i>apxn 1-23-95 NY 94-212</i>	10/23/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a cable	Intelligence report 1 p TS - Sanitized 9-28-99 <i>Same sanitization 317.05 NW/RAL</i> AKJ 94-413 <i>02-112</i>	10/28/68	A
#10a cable	MAC 14451 Sanitized 8/9/96 <i>NY 94-415</i> 11 pp S - <i>CU</i> Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 8, 12/16/83	10/28/86	A
#36 note	<i>Open 1/14/2020 per NLJTRAC 04-47</i> Rostow to the President, 11:00 p.m. Sanitized 1/14/96 NLJ 94-414 1 p TS - <i>CU</i> Same San 8-10-04 NW/RAL <i>02-113</i>	10/25/68	A
#36a cable	Intelligence report 1 p TS - Sanitized 9-28-99 <i>Same sanitization 317.05 NW/RAL</i> AKJ 94-413 <i>02-112</i>	10/25/68	A
#40 note	Rostow to the President, 3:50 p.m. Sanitized 1/14/96 NLJ 94-414 1 p S - <i>CU</i> <i>Open 8-10-04 NW/RAL</i> <i>02-113</i> Exempt, NLJ/CBS 23	10/25/68	A
#40a cable	Intelligence report Sanitized 9-28-99 <i>more info released 317.05 NW/RAL</i> AKJ 94-413 <i>02-112</i> 2 pp S - <i>CU</i>	10/25/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 101, 10/23-28/68, Box 41

189/15/92

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1

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

Pres file

Monday, October 28, 1968
8:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

As you can see, Hanoi is not
the only Vietnamese capital which
may be playing American politics.

See marked passage.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-212
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

WWRostow:rlh

1a
RECEIVED
WHCA

K42851

1968 OCT 28 22 45

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00 [REDACTED]
DE [REDACTED] 3021935 ZDX
KA9341

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0 281845Z ZYH

FM DIRNS4

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MOCAFFERTY)

ZEM

~~SECRET~~

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A [REDACTED] MESSAGE.
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

XXMMENP01FT323133

3/0/ [REDACTED] -58

[REDACTED] DELAYS IMPROVE SOUTH VIETNAM'S POSITION

XXCO

27 OCT 68

[REDACTED] GRASPED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF [REDACTED] STATEMENT OF
22 ((OCTOBER)) WHICH HAS DISPELLED CONSIDERABLY THE IMPRESSION
[REDACTED] ARE SYSTEMATICALLY OPPOSING THE PEACE EFFORTS. I

[REDACTED] FIRM ATTITUDE
[REDACTED] PLAN TO ADHERE TO THAT POSITION. IN THIS CONNECTION,
[REDACTED] ACCORDING TO INFORMATION
FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE, HUMPHREY'S STATEMENT THAT VIETNAM
OUGHT NOT TO HAVE THE RIGHT OF VETO, WAS PROVOKED, LEADING ONE
TO BELIEVE THAT PERHAPS THE ADMINISTRATION WISHED INDIRECTLY
TO RAISE THE IDEA TO TEST [REDACTED] REACTION. DURING [REDACTED] CONTINUAL
DISCUSSIONS LATELY WITH BUNDY AND ROSTOW [REDACTED] THE
U.S. ADMINISTRATION WAS IMPRESSED BY [REDACTED] DETERMINATION WHICH
WARRANTS THE PROPOSAL OF A PLAN FOR A COMMON STATEMENT.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS, [REDACTED] CONTINUING
MY CONVERSATIONS TO TRY TO GAIN A CLEAR-CUT ATTITUDE. [REDACTED]
THE LONGER THE SITUATION CONTINUES, THE MORE [REDACTED] FAVORABLE,
FOR THE ELECTIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN A WEEK AND PRESIDENT
JOHNSON WOULD PROBABLY HAVE DIFFICULTIES IN FORGING [REDACTED] HAND.
[REDACTED] STILL IN CONTACT WITH THE NIXON ENCOURAGE WHICH CONTINUES
TO BE THE FAVORITE DESPITE THE UNCERTAINTY PROVOKED BY THE
NEWS OF AN IMMINENT BOMBING HALT. [REDACTED] INFORMED THAT
IF NIXON SHOULD BE ELECTED, HE WOULD FIRST SEND AN UNOFFICIAL
PERSON [REDACTED] AND WOULD HIMSELF CONSIDER LATER GOING TO
SAIGON BEFORE THE INAUGURATION.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 02-112 and NLJ 94-413

By rio, NARA, Date 2-28-05

Reston

475

E.O. 12958

3.3 (b)(1,3)

2

SECRET--SENSITIVE

Meeting With the President
Monday, October 28, 1968 -- 6:15 pm
Cabinet Room

AGENDA*

1. Shall Bunker inform Thieu alone on a contingent basis tonight? (Tab A)
2. Shall letter from President to Thieu be delivered tonight or tomorrow? (Tab B)
3. Authority for General Wheeler to pre-cut tapes and alert communicators tonight?
4. Arrangements for meeting with General Abrams.
 - Time
 - Attendance, if any.
5. Alerting message to TCC Ambassadors. (Tab C)
6. Is Present Text of Joint Announcement Acceptable? (Tab D)
7. Text of President's statement. (McPherson has furnished.)
8. Text of briefing memo for candidates and leadership. (McPherson has furnished.)
9. Possible Schedule for Tomorrow. (Tab E)
10. Other.

*Tabs refer to package Sec. Rusk will present at meeting, copy attached.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-95

SECRET--SENSITIVE

Limited Official Use

ACTION

Monday - October 28, 1968 - 6:10 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request by Venezuelan Ambassador to Pay Farewell Call

The Venezuelan Ambassador, Dr. Enrique Tejera-Paris, would like to pay a farewell call on you. He is resigning after five and a half years in Washington to run for the Venezuelan Senate.

Secretary Rusk recommends that you receive him (Tab A), and makes the following points:

- Tejera will probably continue to play an important role in Venezuelan politics;
- The Venezuelans need more protocolary attention because we have been able to do little for them economically; and
- If you refuse, Tejera will feel slighted because you saw the Brazilian and Chilean Ambassadors before they left Washington.

Your decision to receive Tomic, the Chilean, was made at President Frei's request, in light of the real possibility that Tomic will be the next President of Chile. The Brazilian case was also a special one -- Leifao da Cunha was a former Foreign Minister, a leading Brazilian diplomat for a generation, and had been extremely helpful to the US on a number of occasions. You did not agree to receive the Argentine Ambassador when he left Washington recently.

I see nothing special in this request to warrant any particular priority for Ambassador Tejera-Paris.

W. W. Rostow

Will see him

—

Do not wish to see him

—

Call me

—

Attachment - tab A.

cc - Jim Jones

SWLewis:mm



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 25, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request of the Venezuelan Ambassador for
an Appointment

Recommendation:

That you grant an appointment to Ambassador Tejera
for a farewell call.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Venezuelan Ambassador, Dr. Enrique TEJERA Paris, has resigned his post after five and a half years in Washington where he and his attractive wife have been prominent in the diplomatic corps. He hopes to return to Venezuela in early November, in order to run for the Venezuelan Senate in the December 1 elections. The Ambassador's party, Democratic Action (AD), will remain an important political force even if it does not win the elections and, since no party is expected to have a clear majority in the Venezuelan Congress, it may well, in any event, be a partner in the new government coalition. Tejera is close to President Leoni, former President Betancourt and AD Presidential candidate Gonzalo Barrios. He, himself, is relatively young (49) and undoubtedly will continue to play a role, in or out of government, in Venezuelan politics.

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- 2 -

We regard personal relations and protocolary gestures with the Venezuelans as particularly important in view of the fact that we have been able to do relatively little for them economically. We have not given them any Alliance for Progress loans since 1962. We have attempted to ease the pressures on their primary export, petroleum, through minor adjustments to the Mandatory Oil Imports Program, but we have not been able to accede to their request for equal treatment with Canada.

A farewell appointment with you will go a long way toward making Tejera feel that his mission here has been a success. Conversely, the refusal of his request will be taken personally by the Ambassador - who is even more sensitive than most Latins - and would probably be taken by his government as an indication of its status with us, especially as the outgoing Brazilian and Chilean Ambassadors were received.

DR

Dean Rusk

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4

October 28, 1968 - 6:05pm

*1-2-69
2-1-69
2-1-69*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Messages to the President on Apollo Flight

The successful Apollo 7 flight has resulted in the receipt of quite a few congratulatory messages to the President from Chiefs of State as well as from lesser dignitaries and well wishers. Messages have been received from President Jonas of Austria, President Luebke of Germany, President Saragat of Italy, President Sanchez Hernandez of El Salvador, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, UN Secretary General U Thant, the Shah of Iran and Prime Minister Borten of Norway among others.

At our request the Department of State has drafted a recommended reply along the lines of the enclosed draft to be made to these and any subsequent messages. I recommend you approve the form reply.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓
Disapprove _____
Speak to me _____

4a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Reply

**Thank you for your kind message on the successful
Apollo space flight.**

**The eleven-day journey through space by Astronauts
Schirra, Eisele and Cunningham was a remarkable
achievement and vital preparation for the next step -- a
journey to the moon. We are grateful for their success,
and above all for their safe return. Your message was
most heartening, and I will be pleased indeed to share
it with these three brave men.**

ACTION

5

Pres file

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Monday, October 28, 1968 -- 5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter to Kossygin, as cleared by Sec. Rusk this afternoon.

Today Debrynin asked if we would be willing to inform him if and when the President makes a firm decision. If you should make a decision early tomorrow, it might be good if Sec. Rusk would have Debrynin in and give him this letter, if you approved. Sec. Rusk could use the occasion to begin to lean on him on Laos.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. You will note in the second sentence of the second paragraphs that we nail him down in your reply to what he said in his message to you of this morning.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-221
By ijg, NARA, Date 5-9-95

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

October 29, 1968

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On Sunday I heard from Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance in Paris that an understanding has been reached with the representatives from Hanoi which has permitted me to order this morning a total cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam starting seven p. m. Eastern Standard Time, October 29.

In reaching the decision to go forward with this step, I have constantly borne in mind the communications you and I have had on this subject. It has mattered to me that you reported that you and your colleagues have reason to believe this step could yield good results and that we should have no doubts about the seriousness of North Vietnamese intentions in the pursuit of peace. Our recent indirect exchanges via Ambassador Dobrynin, and Secretary Rusk's talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York played an important part in my decision, as well as certain communications from your representatives in Paris.

Now that the bombing of North Vietnam is stopping, I hope and expect the full weight of the Soviet Union will be thrown into the balance to bring very quickly a firm, stable peace to Southeast Asia.

With so many dangerous problems elsewhere in the world, it would be good for our two nations and for all humanity if this very dangerous conflict were behind us.

I would very much hope to see the Soviet Union exercising its full responsibilities as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference of 1962 to bring an early peace to Laos as well as to Vietnam. Without a full and faithful honoring of the Geneva Accords of 1962, there cannot be peace in Southeast Asia.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-221
By 10, NARA, Date 5-9-95

We both knew that there comes a time in the life of every true political leader when he must, in our poker phrase, "put in his whole stack. " In my objective judgment, that moment has come for the Soviet Union with respect to peace in Southeast Asia.

You will find us, in the days ahead, seeking to negotiate this settlement in good faith, asking of North Vietnam nothing more than loyalty to international commitments it has already formally undertaken and looking forward to the day when it can develop a good life for its people in collaboration with the other states of Southeast Asia.

I would wish you to know that we are also using every ounce of our influence to bring about a peaceful turn of events in the Middle East. I trust that you are doing the same.

This is also the right time for the authorities in North Korea to accept our fair proposal and release the crew of the Pueblo. The Pueblo matter remains a dangerous source of tension in the area. There is no basis on which I find it possible to go further in meeting their position.

We shall give you our views on some of these questions in more detail in the days ahead. But I wanted you to have this prompt message about the major decision we have just made.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Aleksy Nikolayevich Kosygin
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

LBJ:State:WWR:mz

Mr. Rostow

6

ACTION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

October 28, 1968 - 4:20pm

Mr. President:

George McGhee has for some time been considering a trip to Turkey, where he was ambassador in 1952-53. Now would be a good time for him to go, but he wouldn't want his visit in any way to detract from Bob Komer's arrival. So Secretary Rusk is checking with you. As far as I can see, it is largely a matter of making schedules jibe.

2. P. Rusk

W W. R.

OK for George to go provided he can avoid complicating Komer's arrival ✓

Rather not _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Att: Dean Rusk Memo for the President, 10/25/68
Subj: Proposed Visit of Ambassador McGhee
to Turkey (3299)

62
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

October 25, 1968

S/S 14054

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Visit of Ambassador McGhee
to Turkey

Recommendation:

That you approve a trip to Turkey by Ambassador-at-Large George C. McGhee at a time which would not conflict with the arrival of the new American Ambassador.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Over a period of time, Ambassador-at-Large George C. McGhee and I have discussed the possibility of his making a visit to Turkey during the period between Ambassador Hart's departure and the arrival of his successor. Ambassador McGhee, as you will recall, served as Ambassador to Turkey in 1952-53.

Although Ambassador McGhee would not conduct negotiations, he would have discussions with Turkish political leaders and key private citizens--most of whom he knew personally during his tour of duty in Turkey. He could elicit views on well-known Turkish sensitivities and on the significance of the Czech occupation. He could answer questions regarding general U. S. policy and would, on his return, prepare a summary and analysis of the views he had encountered.

If the trip can be arranged sufficiently in advance of the arrival of the new Ambassador so as to create no conflict, it could, I believe, be valuable to the Department. Ambassador McGhee would be happy to make the trip.



Dean Rusk

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INFORMATION 7

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

Monday, October 28, 1968 -- 3:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Gen. Wheeler has just talked with Admiral McCain and General Goodpaster. They are agreed that if a "Red Rocket" (special delivery!) message is sent from Washington between 5 and 6 a.m. tomorrow, they could meet a cessation time of 7 p.m.

To make this feasible, General Wheeler would need your approval to:

-- pre-cut the message tapes tonight so that there would be no time lost after you gave the go signal;

-- set up tonight through communications channels an alert to the possibility of a Red Rocket message between 5 and 6 a.m. tomorrow;

-- include in the message authority to subordinate commanders to transmit by voice in the clear if push comes to shove in meeting the 7 a.m. deadline.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7C 91-484
By rg/yp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

RNGinsburgh
WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE--EYES ONLY~~

8

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, October 28, 1968 -- 3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith for you 3:30 a.m. guest tomorrow, the DSM we stole from the military pipeline when you were thinking of going to Honolulu, plus the letter to General Abrams, which you approved earlier and which you may wish to hand to him if, repeat if, you make the decision to go ahead with a bombing cessation.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8a

CONFIDENTIAL

October 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a DSM which can be awarded by the President without further action.

A statement for the President to use in presenting it to the recipient is all that is needed in addition.

This medal is temporarily "missing." After it is awarded, all the proper papers can be completed and the medal can be returned so that the name of the recipient can be engraved on it.

No one knows that an award may be made.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By *rg*, NASA, Date *3-5-93*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8b

October 29, 1968

Dear Abe:

One hundred-odd years ago President Lincoln found a general.

I have been lucky enough to find two field generals. In the last three months you have fully exploited the situation created during the last three years by your predecessor, General Westmoreland.

Today I have taken one more step which we all hope will lead toward peace -- the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. This step toward peace would not have been possible if you and Westy had not been successful on the field of battle.

But you and I know that the really crucial stage of both diplomatic and military operations is now upon us. If we are to win the kind of peace in Paris we want, you must keep the enemy on the run -- in South Vietnam and in Laos.

Make sure every plane and pilot released from bombing North Vietnam is brought to bear with full weight on good targets in Laos or in South Vietnam. In the three months in which I shall still be your Commander in Chief, I want you to lean on the enemy with all the manpower and equipment we have accumulated.

I want you to inspire the ARVN to do the same. If you need anything that we can get you quickly, let me know.

Your President and your country are counting on you to follow the enemy in relentless pursuit. Don't give them a minute's rest. Keep pouring it on. Let the enemy feel the weight of everything you've got.

With luck and with Abe, we shall conquer ourselves a peace in the next three months -- without the loss of a single battle or skirmish -- as General Winfield Scott did 120-some years ago.

Sincerely,

General Creighton W. Abrams
Commander, U.S. Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam

LBJ:WWRostow:rla

res file

9

~~SECRET~~

Monday, Oct. 28, 1968
3:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Abrams' report of the movement of the 1st Cav to III Corps, which I mentioned on the phone.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93

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Rostow

~~SECRET~~ MAC 14472 EYES ONLY

1. (S) THE ENEMY'S THIRD OFFENSIVE HAS ENDED IN DEFEAT FOR HIS FORCES AND DISRUPTION OF HIS PLANS. IN I CTZ AND II CTZ MOST OF THE ENEMY UNITS ARE AVOIDING CONTACT AND MAY BE HIDING IN BORDER AREA SANCTUARIES. IN THE DELTA, HIS FORCES ARE DETERIORATING AS THE HOI CHANH RATE MOUNTS AND HIS BASE AREAS SHRINK. HIS ONLY CHANCE FOR SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTION NOW IS IN III CTZ WHERE HE APPEARS TO BE CONCENTRATING THE BULK OF HIS FORCES.
2. (S) IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE MOBILITY OF FORCES IN III CTZ AND GIVE II FORCEV MORE FLEXIBILITY, I AM MOVING THE 1ST CAVALRY DIV (AM) TO THAT AREA. THIS WILL PERMIT US TO SPEED UP THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY REMAINING IN III CTZ AND TO BE IN A GOOD POSTURE FOR POUNCING ON ANY NEW UNITS COMING OVER FOR CAMBODIA. THE PLAN FOR MOVEMENT OF THE COMBAT ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION IS AS FOLLOWS: MOVEMENT OF THE INITIAL BRIGADE WILL BEGIN ON 28 OCTOBER; TWO BRIGADES WILL BE CLOSED BY 6 NOV; THE FINAL BRIGADE BEGINS MOVEMENT ON 9 NOV, CLOSING APPROXIMATELY 12 NOV.
3. (S) GEN KERWIN WILL EMPLOY THE DIVISION IN TAY NINH, BINH LONG, AND PHUOC LONG PROVINCES. GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
220

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Dec. 8, 3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1989

By 19 NARA Date 3-5-93

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~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Monday, October 28, 1968 -- 2:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

This Abrams battlefield report is long, but worth reading.

Key passages are marked.

If the Delta is caving in, as he indicates (see red sidelined passage), I am more sure than before that the enemy may wish a quick end to the war: that's where the people are; that's where enemy recruitment has been; if he loses that political base, he's weakened for the long pull.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

MAC 14451

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rlm

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~~SECRET~~ SAVIN SECTION ONE OF FOUR MAC 14451 EYES ONLY

WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED THE FOLLOWING REVIEW OF THE ENEMY'S THIRD OFFENSIVE AND ITS POSSIBLE SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE FUTURE, WHICH I FORWARD FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

THIS THIRD OFFENSIVE WAS DESIGNED TO DO WHAT THE TWO PREVIOUS ONES HAD FAILED TO ACCOMPLISH; TO DESTROY THE GVN AND TO SECURE THE POPULAR UPRISING. WE SAW HIS USE OF ECONOMY OF FORCE. THIS TIME ONLY DANANG, SAIGON AND TO A LESSER EXTENT BAN ME THUOT WERE TO BE THE MAIN ARENAS. OTHER AREAS WERE TO PLAY SECONDARY ROLES--DMZ UNITS WERE TO TIE DOWN ALLIED FORCES AND MANPOWER; THEN HARRASSEMENT AROUND DAK SEANNG AND PLEIKU CITY. ATTACKS IN THE OUTER PROVINCES OF III CTZ WERE TO BE DIVERSIONS TO WEAKEN DEFENSES OF SAIGON. ATTACKS ON CAI LE WERE INTENDED TO CUT ROUTE 4 TO THE CAPITAL AND DRAW FORCES FROM III CTZ.

THE EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE CONSTITUTED A DISMAL FAILURE. THE ENEMY LOST 20,000 KIA ALONG IN FIVE WEEKS OF FIGHTING AND ATTAINED NOT A SINGLE OBJECTIVE FOR HIS LONG TOUTED "FINAL" AND "DECISIVE" PHASE.

ADDITIONAL INSIGHT CAN BE GAINED BY EXAMINING THAT TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF THESE EVENTS. DESITE HIS INABILITY TO LAUNCH PREPARATORY ATTACKS IN TAY NINH AND POSSIBLY THE DMZ IN LATE JULY, HE PROCEEDED WITH PLANS FOR THE 3RD OFFENSIVE. ALL OUR EVIDENCES POINTED TO A START DATE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 10 TO 15 AUGUST HOWEVER, TRU TO PREVIOUSL PATTERNS, IT WAS DELAYED UNTIL THE NIGHT OF 17/18 AUGUST WHEN HE LAUNCHED ATTACKS ON TAY NINH, LOC NINH, AND A NUMBER OF MINOR TARGETS IN II CTZ. THEN THERE WAS A SLIGHT MODIFICATION TO HIS PREVIOUS TACTICS; THE STAGGERED START THERE WAS A FLURRY OF ACTIVITY IN THE DELTA ON 20/21 AUGUST. THERE WERE THE WIDESPREAD ATTACKS ALONG THE COAST OF NORTHERN MR-5 THE NIGHT OF 22/23 AUGUST THERE WAS AN ASSAULT ON DUC LAP THE MORNING OF THE 23RD. APPARENTLY, THIS WAS EITHER INTENDED; OR IF NOT, COUNTRY-

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-474 NCJ/RAC 02-112
By CTS NARA, Date 2/11/12

WIDE COORDINATION MEANT MUCH LESS TO HIM. NUMEROUS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS DECLARE 17/13 AUGUST AS THE START OF THE 3RD OFFENSIVE, YET WE KNOW FROM PLANS CAPTURED EARLIER IN THE MONTH THAT THE MAIN EVENT IN IV CTZ WAS TO OCCUR THREE DAYS LATER ON 20/21 AUGUST. IT SEEMS THAT COMPLETION OF PREPARATIONS WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO PM THAN MEETING A RIGID SCHEDULE.

THE SECOND SURGE WAS TO FOLLOW THE OPENING ROUND BY A FEW DAYS. ENEMY ACTION IN THE DMZ HAD BEEN DESULTORY AT BEST BUT WE HAD WATCHED HIS FORCES MOVE INTO POSITION NORTH OF RTE 9 MOUNTING A THREAT AGAINST THE ROCK PILE. HIS COMMUNICATIONS INDICATED INCREASING PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK. ON 24 AUGUST WE INTERCEPTED A MESSAGE FROM AN ARTILLERY ELEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE 320TH DIV WHICH REVEALED THAT "RED PLAN" WAS TO HAVE BEGUN 0800 HRS, 25 AUGUST. WE NEVER SAW "RED PLAN" IMPLEMENTED. PRISONERS WE CAPTURED DURING THE 23 AUGUST ATTACK ON QUANG NAI CITY STATED THE 3RD DIV WAS TO FOLLOW THEM INTO THE CITY IN THREE DAYS. THE DIVISION NEVER CAME IN. 26 AUGUST WAS ALSO TO BE THE SECOND PUSH TOWARD DANANG. PWS, A RELIABLE AGENT AND 31ST REGT COMMUNICATIONS ALL SPECIFIED 26 AUGUST AS THE SECOND SUB-PHASE OF THE 3RD OFFENSIVE. SOUTHERN I CTZ SECOND SUB-PHASE NEVER APPEARED.

BY THIS POINT THE ENEMY WAS PROBABLY RECOGNIZING THAT HIS OFFENSIVE WAS RAPIDLY BECOMING A SHAMBLES. HE LAUNCHED HIS LAST ROUND ATTACK AT DUC LAP ON THE 26TH OF AUGUST. THEN, TWO DAYS LATER, THE 3RD NVA DIVISION'S 22ND REGT MADE A WEAK STAB AT HA THANH. AFTER THAT ENEMY ACTIVITY THROUGH OUT THE COUNTRY DECLINED MARKEDLY. HE ENTERED A PERIOD OF REAPPRAISAL. THE WORD WENT OUT IN EARLY SEPTEMBER. ON 2 SEP HCH SENT A VERY URGENT MSG TO MASCOSVN, ON 4 SEP HCH SENT VERY URGENT MSG TO HQ MR-5, HQ MR TTH, HQ B-3 FRONT AND MASCOSVN, ON 5 AND 7 SEP HCH SENT VERY URGENT MSG TO HQ B-5 FRONT. THE ENEMY'S EARLY SEPTEMBER DECISION HAD TWO SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS. IT RESULTED IN A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND A LOWERING OF HIS SIGHTS FOR CONTINUING THE OFFENSIVE. REGARDING THE FIRST, THE 48TH REGT OF THE 320TH DIV STARTED MOVING NORTH ON 12 SEP AND MR TTH ELEMENTS WERE ALREADY ON THE WAY TO PLANS, THE ENEMY HAD ORIGINALLY INTENDED AN OPENING ROUND OF DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS WITH LATER MAIN BLOWS AGAINST DANANG AND SAIGON. HE SET THESE AMBITIOUS SCHEMES ASIDE AND TURNED TO LESSER TARGETS IN A TRY FOR

A CHEAP VICTORY TO GIVE THAT AURA OF STRENGTH HE DOES NOT HAVE. BY 7 SEPTEMBER HIS UNITS IN NORTHERN NR-5 TURNED INLAND TOWARD WHAT HE THOUGHT WOULD BE EASIER TARGETS. TIEN PHUOC AND HAU DUC WERE TO BE ATTACKED 15 SEPTEMBER. THE 1ST REGT WHICH HAD BEEN SLAUGHTERED AT TAM KY COULD NEVER MOUNT AN ATTACK ON TIEN PHUOC, BUT THE 3RD REGT THOUGH WEAKENED BY B-52 PUNISHING, DID MAKE A FEEBLE TRY AT HAU DUC ON 22 SEP. SOUTHWARD, THE 3RD DIV CONDUCTED TWO MORE ATTACKS BY FIRE ON HA THANH BEFORE SEEKING COVER, NORTHWARD, ENEMY FORCES WERE AVOIDING CONTACT WHILE TRYING TO POSITION FOR ATTACKS ON THOUNG DUC. IN III CTZN HIS FORCES CAME OUT OF SANCTUARY FOR ANOTHER GO AT THE OUTER PROVINCES. THESE ATTACKS, AGAIN COSTLY TO HIM, ACHIEVED NO SUCCESS AND LASTED ONLY FROM 11 TO 14 SEPTEMBER. THEY WERE FOLLOWED BY A FEW ATTACKS BY FIRE ON ISOLATED OUTPOSTS AND SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS.

DESPITE THE LOSSES HE HAD TAKEN AT DUC LAP, THE ENEMY REMAINED DETERMINED TO OVERRUN THE CAMP. ON 4 AND 5 SEPTEMBER, THE 95TH REGT STARTED THE SOUTHWARD TREK FROM BASE AREA 702 AND PRISONERS TOLD US DUC LAP WAS ITS TARGET A FEW DAYS LATER ON 11 SEP, THE 66TH MOVED WESTWARD FROM ITS POSITION NORTHEAST OF BAN ME THUOT TO BASE AREA 741, WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF DUC LAP. THE 95TH ARRIVED APPROXIMATELY 15 SEP, STILL WITH HOSTILE INTENT. BUT THE ENEMY COMMAND WAS TO MAKE YET ANOTHER MAJOR DECISION. ON 20 SEP THERE WAS A HIGH LEVEL OF MESSAGES FROM COSVN FWD ELEMENT TO ALL ITS SUBORDINATE. ON THE SAME DAY COMMAND ELEMENTS OF NR-5 SENT IDENTICAL MESSAGES TO ALL THEIR TACTICAL SUBORDINATES. BETWEEN 20 AND 24 SEP MASKOSVN TRANSMITTED A HIGH LEVEL OF MESSAGES TO THE MILITARY REGIONS OF SVN ON ITS COLLECTIVE FACILITY. THE THIRD OFFENSIVE HAD BEEN CALLED OFF. ON 22 SEP WE SAW A SMALL FLURRY OF ATTACKS BY FIRE, (POSSIBLE ENEMY UNITS EXPENDING REMAINING STORES) THE FIRST DIVISION MIE ACTIVITY AROUND DUC LAP ABRUPTLY STOPPED, AND ENEMY UNITS MOVED RATHER QUICKLY INTO CAMBODIAN SANCTUARY. THEN ENEMY ACTIVITY EVERYWHERE RETURNED TO A PERIOD OF LULL A "LULL" EVERY WHEREBUT THOUNG DUC. HERE HE HAD THREE REGIMENTS POSITIONED FOR ATTACK, THE 21ST, 31ST AND 141ST. DESPITE B-52 PUNISHING, THE 141ST ATTACKED THE CAMP ON 28 SEPTEMBER AND PROBES AS WELL AS MORTAR FIRE CONTINUED FOR OVER A WEEK. FOR A WHILE HE LOOKED AS DETERMINED HERE AS HE HAD AT DUC LAP, BUT THE ATTACKS PETERED OUT, (CONT'D)

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
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~~S E R E T~~ SAVIN SECTION TWO OF FOUR MAC 14451 EYES ONLY
HIS FORCES DISAPPEARED INTO THE JUNGLE, AND HE NEVER
COMMITTED HIS OTHER TWO REGIMENTS. THUONG DUC WAS THE
POST SCRIPT OF THE 3RD OFFENSIVE. THUS THE DOMINANT
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENEMY'S "CLIMAXING PHASE" EMERGE
AND SHOW SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM EARLIER PATTERNS.
THERE WAS A MUCH GREATER TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY INSTEAD OF
THE USUAL, RIGID ADHERENCE TO PRE-SET PLANS. HE DEMON-
STRATED A GREATER RESPECT FOR PREPARATIONS. IF THE
BATTLEFIELD SITUATION DID NOT WARRANT OR EVENTS FAILED TO
FOLLOW THE SEQUENCE HE HOPED FOR, HE DID NOT CARRY OUT
HIS PLANS. IT WAS A CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN. WHEN
CASUALTIES BEGAN TO MOUNT HE PULLED AWAY. ANALYSIS OF
HIS KIA BY DAY SHOWS HIS GREATER CONCERN OF THE DIMINUATION
OF CASUALTIES. THERE WAS A DECIDED PEAK COINCIDING WITH
THE BUILD-UP OF HIS INITIAL, STAGGERED ATTACKS. THEN
THERE IS A DROP DURING THE PERIOD OF REAPPRAISAL TO
BELOW THE AVERAGE OF 280 KIA PER DAY HE SUSTAINED DURING
THE JUNE-JULY "LULL". THERE WAS A FOLLOW-ON CLIMB AS HE
TURNED TO SECONDARY TARGETS, BUT THIS TIME NOT SO HIGH,
THEN THERE WAS A DROP-OFF TO THE "LULL" LEVEL AFTER HE
CALLED-OFF HIS 3RD OFFENSIVE. RETURNING TO THE WITHDRAWAL
OF HIS FORCES, HIS EARLY SEPTEMBER DECISION HAD FAR-
REACHING EFFECTS ON THE TOP TWO PROVINCES OF I CTZ.
AS STATED ABOVE IN THE DMZ THE 48TH REGIMENT STARTED MOVING
NORTH ON 12 SEPTEMBER. A MESSAGE INTERCEPT OF 22 SEP
STATED THE 48TH REGT HAD GONE ON A MISSION "AT A VERY
FAR PLACE". OTHER 320TH ELEMENTS FOLLOWED SUIT. BY 1
OCT THEY WERE NORTH OF THE DMZ. CURRENTLY THEY ARE LOCATED
IN NGHE AN PROVINCE POSSIBLY STILL MOVING NORTH. IN 4
WEEKS THEY HAD PULLED WELL INTO NVN IN A MOVE WHICH
HAD TAKEN THE 304TH DIVISION 8 WEEKS TO ACCOMPLISH DURING
JUNE AND JULY. THE DMZ HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY STRIPPED
OF ENEMY FORCES.

WE HAVE SEEN A SIMILAR EXODUS FROM MR TTH. BY LATE JULY, BOTH THE 29TH AND 90TH REGIMENTS HAD WITHDRAWN, ORIGINALLY PROBABLY TO OBTAIN REPLACEMENTS AND RELIEVE THE LOGISTICS PRESSURE ON MR TTH, BUT LATER WE FIXED THE HQ 90TH REGT NW OF THE ROCK PILE AS 320TH DIV ELEMENTS WERE DEPLOYING ALONG RTE 9. THE 90TH REGT MAY HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED SOME TACTICAL OFFENSIVE ROLE WHICH WE NEVER SAW IT CARRY OUT. HOWEVER, IT HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN LOGISTICS DURING THE KHE SANH SEIGE AND MORE LIKELY IT REAPPEARED IN THAT AREA TO ASSIST THE 320TH DIV IN LOCATING SOME OF THE OLD CACHES, THE LOCATIONS OF WHICH ONLY THE 90TH REGT PERSONNEL POSSIBLY KNEW. IT AND THE 29TH REGT ARE NOW WELL NORTH OF THE DMZ WELL AWAY FROM BUT STILL COMMUNICATING WITH HQ MR TTH.

HQ MR TTH ITSELF WAS HAVING SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES. THE COMMANDER HAD BEEN RELIEVED APPROXIMATELY 25 AUGUST AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE SAW A DECIDED SHIFT OF TTH ELEMENTS DEEP INTO LAOS: THE HEADQUARTERS ITSELF BY 1 SEP; THE 6TH AND 9TH REGIMENTS SOMETIME BEFORE 11 SEP; AND THE FORWARD ELEMENT BY 30 SEP. FINALLY, THE HQ 803RD REGT WAS FIXED 25 OCT DEEP IN LAOS NEAR HQ MR TTH AND ITS FWD ELEMENT. THROUGHOUT SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, THERE HAD BEEN A HIGH EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN HQ MR TTH, MASCOSVN, AND HCH. APPARENTLY HQ MR TTH HAS HAD NOT ONLY A CHANGE IN COMMANDERS BUT ALSO A CHANGE IN MISSION.

WHY DID THESE ENEMY UNITS WITHDRAW AND WHY HAVE THEY WITHDRAWN TO WHERE THEY ARE NOW? NORTHERN I CTZ, ASIDE FROM THE BEATING HIS FORCES WERE TAKING, HIS LOGISTICS PROBLEMS WERE GROWING TO IMMENSE PROPORTIONS.

BETWEEN 14 JUL AND 20 SEP, THE 7TH AF HAD CONDUCTED AN INTENSIVE AND HIGHLY EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION EFFORT THROUGHOUT ROUTE PACKAGE 1. IN THE FIRST 21 DAYS OF SEPTEMBER, THROUGH-PUT TRUCK TRAFFIC WAS REDUCED 44 PERCENT. FROM 1 JULY TO 30 SEPTEMBER THERE HAVE BEEN OVER 3000 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND MORE THAN 7000 SECONDARY FIRES FROM AIR STRIKES IN ROUTE PACK 1. HIS TROUBLES FROM THIS WERE SORELY AGGRAVATED BY TWO TROPICAL STORMS AND TYPHOON BESS WHOSE FLOODING EFFECTS ARE STILL WITH HIM. THE BEN HAI RIVER IS SOON TO START ITS ANNUAL CRESTING. THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD, WE WERE CAPTURING CACHES IN THE DMZ OF UNPRECEDENTED MAGNITUDE AND MR TTH HAS SUFFERED SIMILAR LOSSES PARTICULARLY IN RICE AND MEDICAL FACILITIES. REAR SERVICES MESSAGES SINCE MID-AUGUST SUGGESTED A GROWING EMPHASIS ON MOVING SUPPLIES AT THE EXPENSE OF INFILTRATION WITH REFERENCES TO INFILTRATION GROUPS BEING DIVERTED FOR WORK AT FERRY CROSSINGS, ROAD CONSTRUCTION, AND AS LABORERS. FOR DMZ UNITS A MOVE TO JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ WOULD NOT SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS-- THEY WOULD BE JUST AS HARD TO SUPPORT THERE AS THEY HAD BEEN IN THE DMZ AND WE HAVE GOOD REPORTS OF SEVERE FOOD SHORTAGES IN QUANG BINH PROVINCE. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE FOR THE 320TH DIV WAS TO MOVE NORTH OF THE CHOKE POINTS AND POSSIBLY EVEN NORTH

OF THE PUNISHMENT FROM ALLIED AIR AND TO DO SO AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT REPLACE THE 320TH DIV IS OF ITSELF STRONG TESTIMONY THAT HE COULD NO LONGER LOGISTICALLY SUPPORT LARGE UNITS IN NORTHERN I CTZ.

FURTHER SOUTH IN MR TTH ENEMY FORCES THERE ARE ON THE VERGE OF STARVATION. THE MOVEMENT OUT OF COUNTRY REFLECTS THE ENEMY'S SHEER INABILITY TO SUPPORT UNITS IN THEIR OLD POSITIONS. IN ADDITION, HOWEVER, THE LOCATION OF MR TTH UNITS ALONG MAJOR LAOTIAN LOC'S, A RECENT CHANGE IN COMMAND, THE CONTINUING HIGH MESSAGE TRAFFIC AMONG HCH, HQ MR TTH, AND MASCO SVN, AND THE DENIAL OF THE A SHAU VALLEY/BA 611 COMPLEX TO THE ENEMY, STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT MR TTH ELEMENTS ARE NOW PERFORMING A LOGISTICS MISSION IN LAOS.

IN THE B-3 FRONT THERE CAN BE BUT ONE ANSWER FOR WITHDRAWAL; THE THIRD OFFENSIVE HAD BEEN TERMINATED AND WHAT BETTER PLACE TO AVOID FURTHER

CASUALTIES THAN THE SANCTUARY OF CAMBODIA. THERE WERE SIMILAR MOVES IN III CTZ WHERE IN LATE SEPTEMBER THE 7TH DIV PULLED NORTH OUT OF BINH LONG PROVINCE AND THE 9TH WEST OUT OF TAY NINH PROVINCE.

BUT THE MAJOR REASON FOR THE ENEMY'S WITHDRAWAL COUNTRY-WIDE PROBABLY LIES IN HIS INFILTRATION FOR THE YEAR. FOR HIS 1968 SURGE EFFORT HE HAS PLACED IN THE PIPELINE ALL THAT HE WAS EITHER ABLE OR INTENDED. THEIR ARRIVAL IN COUNTRY IS JUST NOW TAPERING OFF WITH NO MORE TO FOLLOW, AT LEAST IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WHATEVER VICTORY HE EXPECTED, FOR HIS "CRITICAL YEAR", HE THOUGHT WOULD BE ACHIEVED AT THE VERY LATEST WITH HIS JULY AND AUGUST ARRIVALS. THE FIASCO OF THE 3RD OFFENSIVE HAS SHOWN HIM OTHERWISE; NOW HE MUST CAREFULLY HUSBAND HIS REMAINING RESOURCES FOR WHATEVER FUTURE PLANS HE HAS.

IN ADDITION TO THE DEEP WITHDRAWAL OF ENEMY FORCES, WE HAVE SEEN ANOTHER MAJOR SHIFT OF THE ENEMY'S B-3 FRONT ELEMENTS. THE 1ST NVA DIVISION AND POSSIBLY ONE OR EVEN TWO REGIMENTS HAVE MOVED SOUTH TO III CTZ. IN THE B-3 FRONT ITSELF, THERE APPEARS TO BE A GROWING INTEREST IN THE CENTRAL TRANS BORDER RELNOM BETWEEN BASE AREAS 701 AND 702. IN EARLY OCTOBER, B-3 FRONT HQS ESTABLISHED A FORWARD COMMUNICATIONS ELEMENT THERE AND THE HQS ITSELF MAY WELL BE PREPARING TO MOVE SOUTH. ON 11 OCT, THE HQ 101D REGT WAS FIXED IN BA 702 SOUTH OF ITS PREVIOUS LOCATION NEAR DAK SEANG. WE FIXED THE HQ 66TH REGT IN BA 701 ON 22 OCT AND THE 95TH REGT SEEMS (CON'T)

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FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
INFO WHITE HOUSE MR ROSTON
STATE MR RUSK
CIA MR HELMS
O 270854Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS
ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC
ZEN

~~SECRET~~ SECTION THREE OF FOUR MAC 14451 EYES ONLY
TO BE FOLLOWING IT NORTH FROM BA 740. THE 188 REGT
HAS BEEN IN THAT REGION SINCE 4 AUGUST AND AT LEAST AS
LATE AS 1 OCTOBER. THERE IS A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION WHICH
AGAIN PERTAINS TO LOGISTICS. WE HAVE A RELIABLE REPORT
OF RIVERCRAFT MOVEMENT BETWEEN 7 AND 27 SEP ON THE SE
KONG RIVER. THERE WERE 573 VESSELS MOVING NORTH WITH AN
ESTIMATE OF AT LEAST 756 TONS OF RICE, OR ENOUGH TO FEED
24,000 MEN FOR ONE MONTH. FROM THE POSITION OF THESE SIGH-
TINGS, SUPPLIES OF THIS TYPE COULD EITHER MOVE NORTH,
PRINCIPALLY BY WATER NEARLY ALL THE WAY TO BA 611, OR MOVE
EAST AGAIN LARGELY BY WATER ALONG THE SE SAN OR SE
DREPOK RIVERS TO THE BA 791/702 COMPLEX. RECONNAISSANCE
HAS SHOWN A RECENT ENEMY EFFORT TO BUILD A NEW ROAD
PARALLEL TO THE PLEI TRAP VALLEY ROAD AND CONNECTING WITH
THE SE SAN RIVER WHERE IT ENTERS SVN. RECONNAISSANCE
HAS ALSO SHOWN IMPROVEMENT AND EXPANSION OF THE ENEMY'S
BASE CAMP AREA IN THE BA 791/702 REGION. THIS COULD
REFLECT AN EXPANDED LOGISTICS HUB IN NORTHEAST CAMBODIA
TO TAKE UP THE SLACK AND PARTIALLY REPLACE THE PRESENT
DIFFICULTIES HE HAS IN MOVING MATERIAL SOUTHWARD FROM NVN
THROUGH LAOS. THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICS DIFFICULTIES IN THE
NORTH MUST HAVE IMPRESSED UPON HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS
CAMBODIAN LOC NETWORK IN PROVIDING CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR
THE WAR. THIS COULD IN PART EXPLAIN HIS DE-EMPHASIS OF
THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY AND HIS CONCENTRATION
ON III CTZ WHERE SUPPORT IS EASIER. WE HAVE SOME CORROB-
ORATING EVIDENCE -- MORE THAN 13,000 TONS OF ORDNANCE HAVE
ENTERED THE PORT OF SIHANOUKVILLE UNDER SUSPICIOUS
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE LAST 21 MONTHS. THIS IS MORE THAN
TWENTY TIMES THE ESTIMATED NEEDS OF THE CAMBODIAN
ARMED FORCES DURING THIS PERIOD. THE UNACCOUNTED FOR
TONNAGES (THOSE OVER AND ABOVE CAMBODIAN NEEDS) REPRESENT

MORE THAN 2 1/2 TIMES THE ENEMY'S MINIMUM MUNITIONS REQUIREMENTS IN II, III, AND IV CTZ'S FOR THIS 21 MONTH PERIOD.

IN THE DELTA, WE HAVE SEEN A DEFINITE DETERIORATION OF THE ENEMY'S MILITARY POSITION. ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, HIGH CADRE HAVE JUDGED THE MILITARY WAR TO BE LOST AND NOW ARE STUDYING THE POLITICAL WEAPONS TO USE TO FURNISH THE PARTIES AIMS. "TRAGIC", WAS HOW A HIGH CADRE OFFICIAL IN CAN THO PROV DESCRIBED THE CONDITIONS OF THE MOVEMENT NOT ONLY IN HIS AREA BUT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS THIS GLOOMY ENEMY PICTURE OF HIS SITUATION.

A RECENT HIGH RANKING PRISONER HAS STATED THAT MS'AS WHICH USED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY A COMPANY NOW REQUIRE BNS. SINCE 16 OCT RALLIERS HAVE AVERAGED 50 A DAY. BY 23 OCT THE NUMBER OF RALLIERS EXCEEDED THE TOTAL FOR SEP AND FOR ALL BUT ONE PREVIOUS MONTH OF 1968. WE PROJECT THAT IT WILL BE THE HIGHEST MONTH FOR THE YEAR.

IN MR-2, SINCE THE INITIATION OF HIS OFFENSIVE OVER 1200 MEN HAVE BEEN KILLED IN BA 470. MOST OF THESE WERE FROM THE MAIN FORCE BNS OF THE DT-1 AND DT-2 REGTS AND LF BNS ACTING IN CONCERT WITH THESE REGTS.

THIS HAS COST HEAVY LOSS OF EXPERIENCED AND WELL TRAINED CADRE OF THE BNS, REGTS AND EVEN THE MILITARY REGION. PAS REPORT THAT AT LEAST ONE MF BN F THE DT-1 REGT HAS BEEN DISBANDED BY ITS COMMANDER AND THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF THE DISBANDED OF TWO LF BNS. MORE IMPORTANT THE ENEMY HAS LOST A LONG-TIME REFUGE COMPLETE WITH SUPPLY AND MEDICAL FACILITIES. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO CULL COMPANY GRADE CADRE FROM THE DT-2 REGT TO BE SENT FOR TRAINING AT AN UNKNOWN LOCATION. IN OTHER AREAS OF THE MR, SIGNS OF DETERIORATION ARE VISIBLE. ONE AGENT REPORTS DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN NVA CADRE AND VC PERSONNEL OVER COMMAND WHICH LED TO A FIRE FIGHT. RECRUITING IS A CONSTANT PROBLEM. QUOTAS SET BY HIGHER HQ ARE SELDOM MET AND IF MET THE RECRUITS IN MANY CASES DESERT AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.

IN MR-3, DESPITE SIZEABLE STRENGTH, ESPECIALLY IN THE CAN THO AREA, THE ENEMY DOES NOTHING. REPORTS OF MILITARY LEADERS INDICATE POPULAR ANTI-PATHY TOWARD THE VC. THE LOCAL INHABITANTS REFUSE TO SUPPORT THE MILITARY UNITS WITH FOOD AND THEY EVADE LABOR SERVICE. WE HAVE REPORTS OF VC CADRE SELLING THEIR PROPERTY AND INDICATING INTENT TO LEAVE THEIR AREAS. WE ALSO HAVE INFORMATION THAT THE GO CONG PROVINCE SECURITY SECTION HAS DIRECTED THE VILLAGE SECURITY SECTION TO RETRIEVE A NUMBER OF WEAPONS FROM THE CADRE, TO IMPRISON OR LIQUIDATE VC CADRE WHO INTEND TO RETURN TO THE GVN, AND TO CLOSELY GUARD THE ROADS AND WATERWAYS LEADING IN AND OUT OF THE HAMLETS AND VILLAGES.

MOBILIZATION ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO SUPPLY NEEDED MANPOWER. IN BA XUYEN, A RECENT TALLIER GIVEN A GOAL OF 52 RECRUITS PER MONTH FAILED TO OBTAIN A SINGLE RECRUIT FROM JULY 63 TO SEP.

IN SUMMARY, HERE IS A PROBLEM OF IMMENSE PROPORTIONS TO THE ENEMY. THE DELTA IS SLIPPING FROM HIM AND SLIPPING FAST. FACED WITH MOUNTING RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS AND A CRUMBLING MILITARY SITUATION, THE ENEMY MUST MAKE A DECISION. HE MUST EITHER LOSE IV CTZ OR REINFORCE IT FROM THE OUTSIDE, A MOVE HE HAS PREVIOUSLY SHUNNED.

IN III CTZ, WHILE ENEMY UNITS IN THE SUB-REGIONS ARE IN DIFFICULTY, HE RETAINS CONSIDERABLE MIDDLE LEVEL INFRASTRUCTURE TO BUILD ON. HIS MANEUVER UNITS IN THE PERIPHERY ARE STRONGEST OF ANY IN THE COUNTRY. DURING THE CURRENT COMBAT ACTIVITY LULL, WE HAVE SEEN THE ENEMY ENGAGED IN INTENSIFIED LOGISTICS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR A RENEWED OFFENSIVE. PARTICULARLY NOTEWORTHY IS THE RECENT MOVE OF THE 1ST DIVISION TO III CTZ. OUR ONLY HARD EVIDENCE IS THAT THE 1ST DIV HQS ITSELF IS IN III CTZ. THE HQ 320TH REGT COMMUNICATES ONLY WITH THE 1ST DIV SUGGESTING THAT IT COULD HAVE ACCOMPANIED THE HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWARD. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE HQ 95C REGT COMMUNICATES WITH BOTH THE HQ 1ST DIV AND THE HQ B-3 FRONT. BUT WE HAVE SEEN SIMILAR COMMUNICATIONS PATTERNS WHILE B-3 FRONT UNITS HAVE BEEN ON THE MOVE TO III CTZ. WHY WOULD THE 1ST DIVISION AND ADDITIONAL MANEUVER UNITS MOVE INTO III CTZ? FROM A TACTICAL STANDPOINT THEY COULD DO SEVERAL THINGS. WE HAVE CONTINUED EVIDENCE AND RELIABLE REPORTS OF ENEMY INTENT TO RECYCLE MAJOR OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY IN III CTZ. THE 1ST DIV IS A LOGICAL CANDIDATE FOR III CTZ. IT IS COMBAT TESTED AND THE 33RD, 32ND, AND 174TH REGTS WERE ONCE A PART OF ITS COMMAND STRUCTURE. EVEN THE 88TH REGT WAS ONCE SUBORDINATE TO THE 1ST DIV LITTLE OVER A YEAR AGO.

THE 1ST DIV COULD REPLACE THE 7TH DIV IN BINH LONG PROVINCE FREEING THE 7TH TO MOVE SOUTH AGAINST SAIGON. AS ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE, IT COULD APPLY THE PRESSURE ON TAY NINH PERMITTING THE 9TH VC DIV TO MOVE TOWARD SAIGON. IT COULD JOIN WITH THE 5TH AND 9TH DIVISIONS IN AN ASSAULT ON SAIGON. WE HAVE HAD SEVERAL AGENTS REPORTS WHICH REFER TO AN ADDITIONAL INFANTRY DIVISION IN III CTZ WHICH WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE NEXT SERIES OF ATTACKS. AS YET ANOTHER OPTION, THE 1ST DIV COULD REPLACE THE 9TH DIVISION PERMITTING THE 9TH TO SHIFT SOUTHWARD TO BEEF-UP A RAPIDLY AND BADLY SAGGING ENEMY MILITARY POSTURE IN THE DELTA. IF THE ENEMY SEES THE NEED TO REINFORCE THE DELTA WITH NVA TROOPS, WHAT BETTER UNIT THAN THE NOMINALLY VC 9TH DIVISION?

FROM A STRATEGIC STANDPOINT, REINFORCEMENT OF III CTZ WITH ANOTHER DIVISION COULD REFLECT THE ENEMY'S RECOGNITION THAT DESTRUCTION OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTS

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

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~~SECRET~~

1968 OCT 28 17 30

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OO YEKADS
DE YSNKQA 32 3021551
O 281523Z ZYJ ZFF-5
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
INFO WHITE HOUSE MR ROSTOW
STATE MR RUSK
CIA MR HELMS
O-270254Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS
ADM MCCIN CINCPAC
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ ~~SAVIN~~ FINAL SECTION OF FOUR MAC 14451 EYES ONLY
HIS ONLY REMAINING CHANCE FOR ANY SORT OF SUCCESS IN THE
FINAL THROES OF HIS "GENERAL OFFENSIVE-GENERAL UPRISING".
THE RETURN OF TWO DIVISIONS TO NVN, THE MAJOR ABANDONMENT
OF MR TTH, THE DENUING OF COASTAL II CORPS, AND THE
REDUCTION OF B-3 FRONT FORCES FOR REDEPLOYMENT TO III CTZ
ALL SUGGEST THAT THE ENEMY MAY HAVE FINALLY RECOGNIZED
THE FUTILITY OF TRYING TO WAGE COUNTRY-WIDE ATTACKS AND
HE IS CONCENTRATING WHAT RESOURCES HE HAS LEFT IN YET
ANOTHER ATTEMPT AT THE HEART OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT,
THE MAJOR BARRIER BETWEEN HE AND THE PEOPLE.

OF COURSE, THERE IS ONE FURTHER CONSIDERATION.
WHILE III CTZ AS A TARGET MAY BE THE ENEMY'S INTENT, IT
MAY ALSO BE THE ONLY AREA LEFT IN THE COUNTRY WHERE HE
CAN GENERATE THE CAPABILITY TO MOUNT ANOTHER OFFENSIVE
OF ANY MAGNITUDE.

THERE IS ONE REMAINING POINT TO COVER. THERE HAVE BEEN
SOME VERY UNUSUAL, RECENT COMMUNICATIONS. ON 11 OCTOBER
HCH IN ITS FIRST NOTED ACTIVITY SINCE 27 SEPTEMBER SENT
TWO VERY URGENT AND RATHER LONG MESSAGES TO MASCOSVN.
THE NEXT DAY BOTH THE MASCOSVN AND MR-5 SENT LONG, EQUALLY
URGENT MESSAGES BACK TO HCH, AND HCH TRANSMITTED ADDITIONAL
MESSAGES OF HIGH PRECEDENCE TO MASCOSVN AND THE FE OF HQ
MR TTH. ON 17 AND 18 OCTOBER THERE WAS AN UNPRECEDENTED
TRANSMISSION OF 171 MESSAGES FROM COSVN TO THE CENTRAL
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE LAO DONG PARTY IN HANOI. THIS
CHANNEL NORMALLY SEES ONE MESSAGE A DAY WITH 16 MESSAGES
THE HIGHEST WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY OBSERVED. TWO DAYS LATER,
ON 20 OCTOBER, BOTH MR -5 AND COSVN WERE OBSERVED SENDING A VERY
LARGE NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE MESSAGES TO THEIR RESPECTIVE
PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES. THE MEANING OF THESE COMMUNICATIONS
IS NOT CLEAR, BUT THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT OF THEIR
SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN THE WAKE OF A TOTALLY
UNSUCCESSFUL 3RD OFFENSIVE AND THE WORLD-WIDE SPECULATION OF
A POSSIBLE BOMBING HALT.

WE CONCLUDE SEVERAL POINTS FROM THIS ANALYSIS OF RECENT ENEMY ACTIVITY AND HIS CURRENT SITUATION. FIRST, THE ENEMY'S 3 OFFENSIVE TERMINATED ON 22 SEPTEMBER AS A MISERABLE AND BLOODY FAILURE. IT WAS, IN HIS OWN WORDS, THE "CLIMAXING" OFFENSIVE. HIS PLANS FOR IT POSSIBLY WENT AS FAR BACK AS 1967 WHEN HE SET IN MOTION THE HUGE INFLUX OF INFILTRATION WHICH WAS TO PEAK IN JULY AND AUGUST OF THIS YEAR. HE READILY AND EARLY RECOGNIZED THE FAILURE OF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE, AND WITH A TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY NOT HERETOFORE APPARENT, AND IN THE FACE OF NO FURTHER INCOMING POOL OF MEN, THE ENEMY TRIED TO CUT HIS CASUALTIES AFTER HIS INITIAL EFFORT, SAVING THEM FOR SOME FUTURE PLAN.

SECOND, THE STRICTURE ON HIS LAOTIAN LOC'S, OUR ENTRANCE INTO AND DENIAL TO HIM OF BASE AREAS HE PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED IMPREGNABLE, POCKETS OF STARVATION THAT HAVE SPREAD TO TAKE IN REGIONS, THE CONSTANT INTERDICTION OF HIS ROAD SYSTEMS IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY ARE ALL PART OF HIS GROWING INCAPACITY TO SUPPORT HIS FORCES IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. THESE LOGISTICS PROBLEMS HAVE GIVEN RISE TO A NEW SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICS POTENTIAL OF CAMBODIA AND PARTIALLY FORCED A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF HIS MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE UNITS IN THE NORTH.

THIRD, THE ENEMY HAS APPARENTLY RECOGNIZED THAT IF HE IS TO MAKE ANY IMPORTANT GAIN IN THE FINAL THROES OF HIS "GENERAL OFFENSIVE-GENERAL UPRISING", HE MUST MAKE IT IN III CTZ. THIS NOT ONLY CONTAINS SAIGON AND THE HEART OF GOVERNMENT, HIS CHIEF TARGET, BUT IT ALSO REPRESENTS AN AREA HE CAN LOGISTICALLY SUPPORT MORE READILY THROUGH HIS CAMBODIAN COMPLEX.

FOURTH, IS THE VERY SIMPLE AND OBVIOUS IMPLICATION OF THE PREVIOUS TWO POINTS, THE GROWING IMPORTANCE AND NEW PROPORTIONS THAT CAMBODIA TAKES AS HIS SOURCE OF SUPPLY TO CONTINUE SUPPORT OF THE WAR.

FIFTH, AND FINALLY, HE HAS PROBLEMS OF LOOMING PROPORTIONS IN THE DELTA. HIS MILITARY POSTURE THERE IS RAPIDLY DETERIORATING. HE MUST EITHER LOSE WHAT HOLD HE HAS LEFT IN IV CTZ OR REINFORCE IT WITH UNITS FROM ELSEWHERE WHICH WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO THE INTRODUCTION OF NVA IN THE DELTA.

900

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

NNNN

H

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

Monday, October 28, 1968 -- 2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

You asked for an analysis of the attached document to the President from Kesygin.

1. There are three points of substance:

-- A. The Soviet leaders report that the Vietnamese leaders have "told us as well about the seriousness of their intentions."

-- B. "The most recent facts ... convincingly prove...."

I presume this refers to the Hanoi cave-in on "without conditions" and acceptance of three days, at our insistence and, perhaps, Soviet urging.

-- C. "It seems to us that doubts ... are without foundation."

2. Taken by themselves, these statements do not amount to a great deal; although it is significant that, for the first time, Moscow is responsive to our request that they commit themselves about the intent and integrity of Hanoi.

3. However, when the Soviet reply is placed side by side with the attached memorandum, which I gave last night to Debrynin and which stimulated the Soviet reply, the two documents taken together represent something more substantial in dealing with the leadership, etc., than the Soviet document taken by itself.

4. My own assessment -- which is also General Taylor's, who has gone over this with me -- is that this is about all we might expect from the Soviet Union at this juncture.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-288
By ing, NARA, Date 7-2-93

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

(Octo' r 28, 1968)

The progress made at the meetings in Paris between representatives of the DRV and the United States on the halt of the bombings of the DRV, on the opening of political negotiations and on the participants of these negotiations, is being noted with satisfaction in Moscow.

The representatives of the United States in Paris have had more than once an opportunity /to get convinced in_/ to become sure of the seriousness of intentions of the Vietnamese side in the search for mutually acceptable solutions. The Vietnamese leaders have repeatedly told us as well about the seriousness of their intentions. The most recent facts, in our view, convincingly prove, that the Vietnamese side is doing everything possible to put an end to the war in Vietnam and reach a peaceful settlement on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of the Vietnamese people.

In this connection, it seems to us that doubts with regard to the position of the Vietnamese side are without foundation (groundless).

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUSMonday, Oct. 28, 1968
1:25 p. m.**MR. PRESIDENT:** *Pres file*

Brooding on Bus Wheeler's dilemma and assuming that you do not wish to issue final orders until you have a face-to-face talk with Gen. Abrams, I believe there are two fundamental options:

- send out an instruction tonight to Harriman and Vance to get with the North Vietnamese and say that mechanical arrangements are such that we really need back those 16 hours;
- if they kick and scream at this, slide the whole arrangement 24 hours.

The problem with 24 hours is that these highly correct North Vietnamese diplomats, French-trained, may not wish to have a meeting on Sunday, November 3. They may therefore offer us Monday, November 4.

In any case, this is a problem you may wish to discuss with Sect. Rusk -- perhaps at the late afternoon meeting you mentioned.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. I think our argument would have greater credibility with the North Vietnamese if we frankly explained to them that you wish to have a last-minute conference with General Abrams in Washington, which cannot take place until tomorrow morning.

P. P. S. Another alternative: If the North Vietnamese do not want to give us back the 16 hours and we do not wish the first meeting to be closer to the election, we can tell them that our time problems are such that, even with a maximum effort, we cannot guarantee that every unit will get the word by the time of the bombing cessation. Therefore, they should not complain if there is some spill over for, say, 7 hours after the time we specify.

FYI: The main problem is ~~not~~ the Air units or the Navy, it is the forward Infantry and Artillery battalions. In short, we would be asking them for a de facto 7-hour extension on the time of the bombing cessation.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719 91-484
By 19/12, NARA, Date 3-5-93

W. W. R.

EYES ONLY

Pres. file

13

Monday, Oct. 28, 1963
1:10 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Our best information is: the normal flying time from Saigon to the East coast is 24 hours in a C141. The flight in question is expected to take about 23 hours, 20 minutes.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

14

SECRET-SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

Monday, Oct. 28, 1968
12:50 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the revised schedule, which antedates
our telephone conversation.

W. W. Restow

SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 3-5-83

14a

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

	Washington Tues. 29 Oct. EST		Saigon		Paris
Gen. Abrams arrives Andrews AFB----	5:30 a. m.		6:30 p. m.		11:30 a. m.
Gen. Abrams meets with President----	6:30 a. m.		7:30 p. m.		12:30 p. m.
President gives go-ahead-----	8:00 a. m.		9:00 p. m.		2:00 p. m.
Military orders issued-----	8:30 a. m.		9:30 p. m.		2:30 p. m.
Bunker tells Thieu of final go-----	8:30 a. m.		9:30 p. m.		2:30 p. m.
Inform DRV in Paris-----	9:00 a. m.		10:00 p. m.		3:00 p. m.
Thieu informs NSC-----	10:00 a. m.		11:00 p. m.		4:00 p. m.
Inform TCC's-----	10:00 a. m.		11:00 p. m.		4:00 p. m.
Brief candidates-----	3:00 p. m.	30	4:00 a. m.		9:00 p. m.
Leadership briefing-----	5:00 p. m.	30	6:00 a. m.		11:00 p. m.
Inform Allied nations-----	5:00 p. m.	30	6:00 a. m.		11:00 p. m.
Cessation and announcement-----	7:00 p. m.	30	8:00 a. m.	30	1:00 a. m.
Background briefing-----	8:00 p. m.	30	9:00 a. m.	30	2:00 a. m.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93

Preside

15

Monday, Oct. 28, 1968
12:05 p. m.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is a problem and a proposed solution for your consideration.

Sect. Rusk and Bill Bundy believe that our difficulties with Korea, Thailand, Australia, etc., will be much less if we can say that Thieu has been fully informed and is fully aboard. Therefore, they suggest:

That Bunker see Thieu this evening (our time) -- tomorrow morning Saigon time -- and describe fully the deal and the timing. But Bunker would tell Thieu that the President simply will not make a decision until he has a final check with Abrams. Therefore Thieu must not, repeat not, talk to a living soul until he gets an affirmative go-ahead signal from Bunker after the President has seen Abrams.

Assuming that you make a positive decision at about 8:00 a. m. tomorrow morning our time and final orders are issued by Gen. Wheeler, then:

-- we would signal Bunker to go to Thieu;

-- we would signal our Ambassadors to go to the troop contributing countries with the firm statement that Thieu was aboard.

Sect. Rusk and Bill Bundy would envisage positioning with our TCC Ambassadors the relevant information to await and execute from here.

The latest cables from Bunker are quite reassuring about Thieu and Ky.

I told Bill Bundy that his next message to Bunker should include a plea that he and Thieu exercise some kind of ingenuity to keep their meetings from getting on the ticker every hour on the hour.

W. W. Rostow

Preliminary meeting with Thieu, subject to President's
final decision, OK, this evening our time _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769 91-284
By rs/wip, NARA, Date 3-5-83

-2-

Prepositioning of TCC cables with Ambassadors tonight our time OK _____

No _____

Call me _____

INFORMATION

16

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

**Monday, October 28, 1968
11:30 a. m.**

Pres file

Mr. President:

**Herewith Bunker's latest
with Thieu, which Sec. Rusk
regarded as reassuring.**

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 41323

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

2 1/2
TELEGRAM

00 RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 41323 3020820
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 280750Z OCT 68 ZFF-A
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3334
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2595
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 41323

9 0 7 0 Q

Oct 28, 1968
7:38AM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: 70991-482
By: jjw, NARA, Date 3-5-93

MODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT THIEU OCTOBER 28.

2. I DECIDED TO MEET ALONE WITH THIEU ON THE LATEST VERSION OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT IN ORDER TO HAVE A FULL AND FRANK TALK ABOUT THE TEXT IN RELATION TO WHERE HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT STAND AS WE MOVE DOWN TOWARD WHAT MAY BE AN EARLY AGREEMENT WITH HANOI. BERGER ACCOMPANIED. I ALSO WANTED TO TAKE UP WITH HIM MY CONTINUED AND GROWING ANNOYANCE AND IRRITATION WITH FURTHER STATEMENTS AND INSPIRED LEAKS HERE, WHICH ARE ANYTHING BUT HELPFUL.

2. I OPENED BY SAYING THAT WASHINGTON WELCOMED HIS AND KY'S SUGGESTIONS AT OUR LAST MEETING FOR CHANGES IN THE DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, AND HAD AMENDED THE LAST VERSIONS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THESE CHANGES, THE MAIN ONE OF WHICH WAS TO ELABORATE THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH TO INCLUDE CERTAIN POINTS INTENDED ORIGINALLY TO FIGURE IN OUR PRESIDENT'S ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT. THE RESULT WE THOUGHT WAS A MUCH BETTER AND FULLER JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT FROM EVERY POINT OF VIEW, AND I HOPED IT WOULD MEET ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GVN. I DID NOT SEE HOW WE COULD GO ANY FURTHER.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, NOW THAT THERE WAS NO SHADOW OF DOUBT ABOUT THE US OR GVN VIEW OF THE NLF, IF WE STAND TOGETHER IN THE PARIS MEETING, IF VICE PRESIDENT KY COMES OUT IN PUBLIC SUPPORT OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, IF THIEU AND KY PULL TOGETHER, AND IF IT IS MADE CLEAR TO ALL THAT THE GVN IS WILLING TO TALK TO ANYONE TO DISCOVER A ROAD TO PEACE, I THOUGHT HE WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH HIS PEOPLE IF HE JOINED TALKS WHICH THE NLF WAS ATTENDING. FINALLY I SAID THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE ALREADY LOOKING BEYOND THE TALKS TO THE FUTURE, AND I WOULD HOPE THAT HE WOULD SAY SOMETHING TO THEM ALONG THE LINES OF THE "CHARTER FOR SOCIAL REVOLUTION" THAT WE HAD TALKED ABOUT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 SAIGON 41323 OCT 28, 1968

4. THIEU READ THE NEW DRAFT AND SAID, "I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN ASK FOR ANYTHING MORE." HE WILL DISCUSS IT WITH KY AND THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW IN THE TALKS WITH HANOI.

5. I HAVE BEEN VAGUE WITH THIEU THIS LAST WEEK ABOUT THE TIMES OF THE PRIVATE MEETINGS AND, IN RESPECT OF SUBSTANCE DISCUSSED, I HAVE LIMITED MYSELF TO SAYING, "THERE IS NOTHING NEW. WE TOLD HANOI WE WOULD STOP THE BOMBING TWO OR THREE DAYS BEFORE THE MEETING, AND WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR HANOI TO GIVE US A DATE. I REPEATED THIS AGAIN THIS MORNING. THIEU ASKED WHY WAS HANOI DELAYING SINCE THERE WAS UNDERSTANDING IN PRINCIPLE ALMOST TWO WEEKS AGO. I SAID I DIDN'T KNOW. IT MAY BE THAT THEY ARE HAVING TROUBLE WITH THE NLF," BERGER INTERJECTED. "IT MAY BE THAT THEY ARE STUDYING THE SIGNS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOU AND US WHICH HAVE APPEARED HERE, AND NOW SEE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US, AND CAPITALIZE ON IT." THIEU SAID THEY WOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO DO THAT, AND THIS GAVE ME THE OCCASION TO BRING UP THE SECOND MAIN ITEM I HAD ON MY AGENDA.

6. I SHOWED A BATCH OF PRESS REPORTS AND EDITORIALS FROM THE LOCAL PAPERS ABOUT SO-CALLED DIFFERENCES, AND QUOTED FROM THEM. "LET US DE-AMERICANIZE THE PEACE," (MIN INFORMATION). "GVN WANTS TWO-SIDED TALKS." (PRIMIN). "US PRESSURING GVN." "GVN RESISTING US PRESSURE," ETC.

7. I SAID ALL THIS WAS UNCALLED FOR, UNNECESSARY, AND DANGEROUS. WHILE HE AND I WERE WORKING THINGS OUT QUIETLY, THE US AUTHORITIES WERE SAYING NOTHING, AND IT WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT THIS STREAM OF STATEMENTS CONTINUES HERE. IT WILL ONLY CONFUSE THE VIETNAMESE AND COULD MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM WHEN THE MEETINGS OPEN.

8. THIEU WAS DEFENSIVE AND APOLOGETIC, BLAMING IT ON THE PRESSURES OF THE PRESS.

9. THIEU ASKED IF HANOI WOULD GIVE US A DATE BEFORE OUR ELECTION. WE SAID WE DIDN'T KNOW, BUT THERE WAS SUCH A POSSIBILITY, IN WHICH CASE THE FIRST MEETING MIGHT WELL TAKE PLACE BEFORE ELECTION DAY-- WHICH WAS A WEEK FROM TOMORROW.

10. I SAID WE WERE UNABLE TO GO ANY FURTHER IN MEETING THE GVN NEEDS THAN THE DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. ALSO, WE COULD NOT MEET THEIR REQUEST FOR PRICEDURAL MEETINGS BEFORE THE MAIN MEETING. THEY HAD THEREFORE TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY WERE GOING TO JOIN THE TALKS OR NOT, AND THEY MIGHT HAVE TO DECIDE ON SHORT NOTICE. I SUGGESTED A JOINT MEETING WITH KY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON TO SEE IF ANY ISSUES REMAIN. WE WILL MEET AT 1700 HOURS. I SAID IF THE GVN RAISES NEW CONDITIONS AND DOES NOT JOIN THE FIRST MEETING THIEU SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A DECISION. HE SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THEM, BUT THOUGHT WE WERE PRETTY WELL AGREED NOW BETWEEN US.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 SAIGON 41323 OCT 28, 1968

11. THIEU THEN ASKED HOW WE THOUGHT THE TALKS WOULD MOVE. WE SAID WE THOUGHT AT AN EARLY STAGE HANOI WOULD PUT IN DEMANDS FOR A CEASE-FIRE, FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE US AND ALLIED FORCES, AND FOR COALITION OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO PERMIT COALITIONS. WE SHOULD BE PREPARING OURSELVES URGENTLY FOR DEALING WITH THESE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

12. COMMENT: I THINK WE ARE IN THE CLEAR HERE, BUT WILL KNOW FOR CERTAIN AFTER TONIGHT'S JOINT MEETING. I AM FOR DIGGING IN AT THIS POINT, UNLESS THEY COME FORWARD WITH ANY CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS.
BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

17

Monday, Oct. 28, 1968
11:30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This message, which has just arrived from Mrs. Gandhi, has in it an alleged direct communication from Hanoi which could be mildly helpful -- even though all hands will take it with ample skepticism.

Nevertheless, it is as flat a direct quotation about de-escalation and as explicit a reference to the DMZ as we have gotten.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-212
By CL, NARA, Date 1-5-95



17a
AMBASSADOR OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 27, 1968.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to transmit herewith a message received telegraphically from the Prime Minister of India addressed to Your Excellency :

Message begins:

Dear Mr. President,

Newspapers give the impression that we may be on the verge of a breakthrough in the Paris talks. We have been conveying our own assessment to you and to your representatives. This was based on our frequent exchanges of views with the Government of D.R.V.N. and their representatives. We believe that the complete and unconditional stoppage of the bombing of North Vietnam would definitely lead to a de-escalation of the conflict in the demilitarised zone, and possibly elsewhere also. We have said this before but hope you will not mind my repeating it since it is of vital importance in the context of the present situation.

2. The D.R.V.N. Government stated that they will not escalate, provided that there is no escalation from the other side. They have also told us in clear terms that they need peace for the development of their country and that "they will prove it by deeds and not merely by words". De-escalation would certainly facilitate the cessation of hostilities throughout Vietnam and negotiations for a political settlement within the broad framework of the Geneva Agreements.

3. Your bold and imaginative initiative of last March of this year won the admiration of the entire world. Later, all eyes were fixed on the talks in Paris in the hope that some solution would soon emerge. The world still looks to you knowing how deeply concerned you have been over this whole question. There is understanding of your doubts and appreciation of the difficulties which you face in taking any step. But it is becoming more and more clear that this step is the only way to end the conflict and bring about a peaceful political settlement. That is why I thought I should appeal to you to give your highest consideration to the possibility of stopping the bombing in the larger interests of peace in this part of the world.

4. We have the greatest admiration for the United States' championship of peace and freedom. You have helped us in our time of need and this has strengthened friendship for you and your country throughout India. You personally, Mr. President, have attempted and achieved much during your tenure of office. It would be a tremendous achievement, and I am sure you would earn the gratitude of mankind, if, before laying down your great office, you could take another bold initiative to end this tragic war.

5. I am sending a similar message also to President HO CHI MINH. I would rather not publicize these messages because of the delicate nature of the talks and developments at this stage.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

INDIRA GANDHI

Message ends.

With the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.

Yours sincerely,


(Ali Yavar Jung)

His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington D.C.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

SSSS ZZH
Z 281025Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7507
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 22996

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

1968 OCT 28

09028
AM 6 17

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DELTO 885

PURSUANT TO TELCON WITH SECRETARY, THERE FOLLOWS THE ANSWER TO THE THREE QUESTIONS HE RAISED.

1. (A) WE HAVE RAISED THE ISSUES OF THE DMZ AND INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST THE MAJOR CITIES AND WHAT WE EXPECT ON THE PART OF THE DRV IN RESPECT TO THESE TWO MATTERS IN 12 SECRET MEETINGS WITH THE DRV. OFTEN THESE SUBJECTS WERE RAISED MORE THAN ONCE IN THOSE MEETINGS. IN MOST CASES BOTH SUBJECTS WERE RAISED; IN A FEW CASES ONLY ONE WAS RAISED. THE DISCUSSION OF THESE MATTERS BEGAN IN JUNE AND HAVE CONTINUED UNTIL THE PRESENT DAY, SO THAT WE HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY PRESENTING OUR POSITION IN THIS REGARD TO THE OTHER SIDE.

(B) OUR DEMAND WITH RESPECT TO THE DMZ HAS BEEN: THERE WILL BE NO FIRING OF ARTILLERY, ROCKETS OR MORTARS FROM ACROSS AND WITHIN THE DMZ; THERE WILL BE NO MOVEMENT OF TROOPS FROM, ACROSS AND WITHIN THE DMZ; AND THERE WILL BE NO MASSING OR MOVEMENT OF TROOPS NEAR THE DMZ IN A MANNER THREATENING TO THE OTHER SIDE. OUR DEMAND WITH RESPECT TO THE CITIES HAS BEEN THAT THERE WILL BE NO INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST MAJOR CITIES. THESE FORMULATIONS ARE PRECISELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR INSTRUCTIONS, AS MOST RECENTLY EXPRESSED IN STATE 254719. WITH RESPECT TO THE DMZ, HA VAN LAU HAS SAID THAT WE SHOULD STOP ARTILLERY FIRE "AND THE DRV WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO". LAU ALSO SAID THAT IF THE UNITED STATES STOPS THE BOMBING AND ARTILLERY FIRE ACROSS THE DMZ, "YOU WILL SEE WHAT WILL HAPPEN BECAUSE OUR GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY RESPECTED THE DMZ. REALITY WILL GIVE YOU THE REPLY." THIS, LAU SAID, WOULD CREATE THE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT. WHAT LAU IS SAYING WHEN HE SPEAKS IN THIS WAY IS THAT WHILE HE WILL NEVER ADMIT TO PAST VIOLATIONS OF DMZ, HE UNDERSTANDS WHAT WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE FUTURE.)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: 729 91-482

By: 15/jw Date: 3-5-93

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS SECTION & OF 2 22996 NODIS HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS 9028Q

(C) WITH RESPECT TO THE INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST MAJOR CITIES, WE HAVE NOT ONLY RAISED THIS ISSUE REPEATEDLY IN PRIVATE SESSIONS, BUT MADE IT AN ISSUE IN PLENARY MEETINGS. IN FACT, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, THERE HAVE BEEN NONE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS.

(D) THROUGHOUT OUR MEETINGS WHEN THESE SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED, AT NO POINT HAS THE OTHER SIDE GIVEN US ANY BASIS FOR BELIEVING THAT THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND PRECISELY WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT AND WHAT IS EXPECTED OF THEM.

(E) ON OCTOBER 11, PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS (STATE 252815) AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH VANCE'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY, WE SAID, "IN RESPONDING TO YOUR QUESTION, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THERE BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT RECIPROCITY OR CONDITIONS BUT SIMPLY A FACT THAT AFTER CESSATION OF ALL BOMBARDMENT THE PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THAT SITUATION WOULD BE AFFECTED BY CERTAIN ELEMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS.

"WE DO NOT LOOK ON THEM AS A CONDITION FOR STOPPING THE BOMBING BUT AS A DESCRIPTION OF THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD PERMIT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND THUS THE CESSATION TO CONTINUE. YOU WILL UNDERSTAND, THEREFORE, THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE DISCUSSED IN OUR VARIOUS PRIVATE MEETINGS ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITY IN AND AROUND THE DMZ ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THAT SITUATION, AND, OF COURSE, YOU KNOW FROM OUR VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS THAT INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS LAUNCHED AGAINST MAJOR CITIES WOULD CREATE A SITUATION WHICH WOULD NOT PERMIT SERIOUS TALKS AND THUS THE MAINTENANCE OF A CESSATION." WE HAVE REPEATED THIS IN EQUALLY CLEAR TERMS ON SUBSEQUENT OCCASIONS.

(F) IN ADDITION, IN FOUR MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS, WE HAVE RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE DMZ AND ATTACKS ON THE MAJOR CITIES AND HAVE TOLD THEM THAT A BOMBING CESSATION COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED IF THE DRV ACTED IN BAD FAITH WITH RESPECT TO THESE MATTERS. HE HAS BEEN IN REGULAR AND FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE DRV DELEGATION. HE HAS INDICATED TO US THAT THE DRV UNDERSTANDS OUR POSITION. WE FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT THE SECRETARY HAS ALSO RAISED THESE SUBJECTS WITH THE RUSSIANS AND HAS MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR.

(G) FINALLY, OUR CONTINUED REFUSAL TO INCLUDE THE WORDS "WITHOUT CONDITION" IN AN AGREED MINUTE MAKES IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO "PRE-CONDITIONS" THERE ARE CIRCUMSTANCES OR WHAT SOME PEOPLE MIGHT CALL "CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT," THE OCCURRENCE OF WHICH WOULD CAUSE US TO RESUME THE BOMBING.

HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

2

***** ZZ RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 22996/2 3021050
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 281025Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7508
STATE GRNC

9026Q
1968 OCT 28 AM 6:09

BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 22996

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DELTO 885

2. IN OUR JUDGEMENT, THE DRV WILL CARRY OUT WHAT WE HAVE DEMANDED OF THEM WITH RESPECT TO THE DMZ AND INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST MAJOR CITIES. WHILE WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED DIRECT AFFIRMATION THAT THE DRV WILL ABIDE BY OUR DEMAND--WE ARE CONVINCED THEY UNDERSTAND CLEARLY WHAT THEY ARE EXPECTED TO DO. AS INDICATED ABOVE, THIS IS CONFIRMED BY OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS. IN ADDITION, THE DRV UNDERSTANDS THE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY FAIL TO LIVE UP TO THEIR PART OF THE UNDERSTANDING, I.E., THE BOMBING WILL BE RESUMED. IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THAT THERE WILL BE SOME MINOR VIOLATIONS SUCH AS MOVING SMALL NUMBERS OF MEN AND SUPPLIES THROUGH THE DMZ. THESE CAN BE JUDGED ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THEY OCCUR.

3. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE BOMBING SHOULD BE RESUMED IF OUR DEMANDS WITH RESPECT TO EITHER THE DMZ OR THE CITIES ARE VIOLATED.

HARRIMAN
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Monday, October 28, 1968
8:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Averell and Cy are
wholly responsive to your questions
of last night.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Paris 22966 (DELTO 885)

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 3-5-93

19
INFORMATION

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~ *Profile*

Monday, October 28, 1968 -- 7:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

General Abrams will arrive at Andrews at 5:30 a.m.
tomorrow morning, October 29.

It apparently took him about 3-1/2 hours, after receipt
of the message, to take off from Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *19*, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

WWRostow:rla

20

~~TOP SECRET~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Monday, October 28, 1968

Mr. President:

General Wheeler is greatly concerned about having any less than 24 hours to execute a cessation.

If we are to insure that everyone gets the word, the orders would be disseminated starting 7 p.m. tonight, and going down to air squadron and army battalion level. Although all hands would be cautioned against disclosure, there is a high probability of a leak.

If you wait until 5 a.m. tomorrow to have orders issued after you have reached a decision, there would be only 14 hours to implement the decision. General Wheeler is very concerned that in this case someone might not get the word, and that we would be severely criticized for incidents occurring after time of cessation.

W. W. Rostow

RNG:kb

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLG 91-484

By rg/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, Oct. 28, 1968

21

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bunker's account of his meeting with Thieu and Ky on the joint statement. The proposed paragraph sidelined in red on page 2 is stronger than, I believe, Sect. Rusk would like to see it.

But I do believe that the GVN has a right to protect its position at this delicate moment.

I am quite sure that Hanoi will seek to protect its position before its people without excessive concern for sensibilities in Saigon or Washington. But you will wish to get Sect. Rusk's judgment.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachment (Saigon 41356)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71CJ 91-484By ag/wsp, NARA, Date 3-5-93



Department of State

21a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

2

OO RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 41356 3021600
ZNY SSSSS Z7H
O 281545Z OCT 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3384
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2611
STATE GRNC
BT

9 1 6 5 Q

1968 OCT 28 PM 12 15

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 41356

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: SAIGON 41323

SUBJECT: JOINT MEETING OCTOBER 28.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7291-482

By 18/12, NARA, Date 5-5-95

1. THE MEETING WITH THIEU, KY AND THANH TOOK PLACE IN THE LATE AFTERNOON, AND THE FACT THAT MORE THAN HALF THE TIME WAS TAKEN UP BY EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE (MOSTLY BETWEEN KY AND THIEU) SHOWED HOW NECESSARY IT HAD BEEN. I CAN REPORT THAT AT THE END OF THE MEETING (ATTENDED ON OUR SIDE ALSO BY BERGER AND HERZ) WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON A SOMEWHAT CHANGED JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT ONE WHICH I BELIEVE WE CAN ACCEPT AND WHICH THE GVN BELIEVES WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR THEM TO COPE WITH CRITICISM THAT THEY HAD AGREED TO MEET WITH THE NLF. IT WAS NOT EASY.

2. CHANGES REPRESENTED BY THE REDRAFT OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT (SEPTTEL) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS ARE SWITCHED. IT IS NOT CLEAR TO ME WHY THE GVN PREFERS IT THAT WAY, BUT SINCE NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE WHATEVER IS INVOLVED, AND SINCE WE HAD TO OPPOSE MORE IMPORTANT CHANGES THAT THIEU AND KY TRIED TO MAKE, I ACCEPTED THIS WITHOUT ARGUMENT AND RECOMMENDED THAT IT BE CONFIRMED.

B. THE LAST PARAGRAPH TO BE REWORDED (1) TO GET AWAY FROM THE IDEA OF "THE NEXT MEETING", WHICH CARRIED THE IMPLICATION TO THE GVN THAT THEY WERE BEING INCLUDED IN SOMETHING THAT HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME TIME, RATHER THAN BEING THERE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH NORTH VIET-NAM; (2) USE OF THE WORD "DELEGATIONS" TO DESCRIBE GVN AND US ATTENDANCE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 41356, OCT 28

BY WHICH THEY HOPE TO CONFER MORE STATUS ON THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES; (3) DELETION OF THE SENTENCE BEGINNING "THE OTHER SIDE", WHICH THE GVN NOW CONSIDERS UNNECESSARY; AND (4) AMENDMENT OF THE LAST SENTENCE TO MAKE IT READ: "THE TWO PRESIDENTS WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NEITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM NOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE SO-CALLED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AS AN ENTITY INDEPENDENT OF NORTH VIETNAM."

3. KY, WHO APPARENTLY MADE THE GREATEST DIFFICULTIES DURING THE DISCUSSIONS, CAME UP TO ME AFTER THE MEETING AND SAID HE HAD WORKED HARD TO FIND A COMPROMISE. PERHAPS HE DO SO IN THE END SINCE AFTER NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT THE FUTURE MEETINGS AS INVOLVING ONLY THREE DELEGATIONS, WHICH I REJECTED, KY FINALLY SAID, "I THINK IT IS BETTER THAT WE OPENLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE NLF WILL BE THERE.". IT WAS KY, APPARENTLY, WHO OFFERED TO DROP AS UNNECESSARY, THE PHRASE ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE BEING CONSTITUTED BY HANOI AS THEY WISH IT TO BE CONSTITUTED". HE SAID, "THE REALITY IS THAT WE ACCEPT THE FRONT AT THE CONFERENCE." THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FROM THE GVN POINT OF VIEW, AS THIEU EMPHASIZED, IS TO MAKE THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT (ABOUT NON-RECOGNITION OF THE NLF) AS STRONG AS POSSIBLE.

4. SINCE THE GVN IN THE END GAVE UP THEIR ATTEMPTS TO PICTURE THE MEETINGS AS CONSISTING OF ONLY THREE PARTICIPANTS, I JUST WISH TO RECORD THAT DISCUSSION WAS LONG AND DIFFICULT. AT ONE POINT THIEU ASKED ME IF I HAD RECEIVED BINDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE CONFERENCE MUST NOT BE PICTURED AS TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THREE DELEGATIONS. I ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. EARLIER IN THE DISCUSSION I POINTED OUT ONCE MORE THAT SINCE HANOI WISHED THE MEETINGS TO BE FOUR-POWER, AND SAIGON WISHES THEM TO BE THREE-POWER, THE ONLY POSSIBLE BASIS FOR TALKS WAS TO BE SILENT ON THE POINT. KY UNDERSTOOD THIS WELL, EVEN WHILE TRYING TO SWEEZE US. HE SAID: "I UNDERSTAND YOUR PROBLEM. YOU CAN'T HAVE A CONFERENCE IF HANOI WON'T COME -- OR IF SAIGON WON'T COME." BUT HE KEPT TRYING, NEVERTHELESS, TO FIND SOME FORMULATION THAT WOULD HAVE MADE IT APPEAR THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE DELEGATION ON THE OTHER SIDE.

5. AFTER AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE TEXT (SEPTEL), KY SAID, "QUITE FRANKLY, WE ARE NOT SATISFIED, BUT WITH SUCH MATERIAL WE CAN EXPLAIN, ONLY IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLE. IF THE CONFERENCE LASTS MANY MONTHS, OUR PROBLEM WILL BE TO PREVENT A DISINTEGRATION OF MORALE ON OUR SIDE.". I REPEATED, WITH SOME EMPHASIS, THAT THIS IS ENTIRELY THE WRONG WAY OF LOOKING AT THE MEETING WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IF IT EVENTUATES: THE GVN SHOULD PRESENT IT AS A VICTORY, IT WILL HAVE FORCED THE DRV TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM, THE TALKS WILL BE A SIGN THAT THE DRV DESPAIRS OF OBTAINING ITS GOALS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, THAT IT RECOGNIZES THAT IT CANNOT SUBVERT OR INTIMIDATE THE SOUTH

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 41356, OCT 28

VIETNAMESE. BESIDES, WE WILL BE AT THE SIDE OF THE GVN BOTH AT THE TALKS AND IN PUSHING OUR MILITARY ADVANTAGES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, SO THAT THE DANGER OF DISINTEGRATION SHOULD BE ENTIRELY ON THE OTHER SIDE.

6. THERE WAS STILL MUCH APPREHENSION ON THE GVN SIDE ABOUT BEING FACED WITH ACCOMPLISHED FACTS AT THE FIRST MEETING: THEY WANTED TO KNOW HOW WE COULD AVOID PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS AT ALL MEETINGS INCLUDING THE FIRST. THEY STRESSED THAT PICTURES SHOWING THE GVN SITTING ACROSS FROM THE NLF AS IF THE LATTER WERE A CO-EQUAL DELEGATION, WOULD BE EXTREMELY TROUBLESOME HERE. THANH ALSO SAID HE WISHED TO GO OVER THE POINTS COVERED IN ALL OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS TO DRAFT AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS, SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE A RECORD OF WHAT HAD BEEN DECIDED WITH RESPECT BOTH TO SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE. AT THE END IT WAS THANH HIMSELF WHO USED THE WORD "AGREEMENT" TO DESCRIBE THE OUTCOME OF TODAY'S JOINT MEETING.

7. I URGE APPROVAL OF THIS AGREEMENT WHICH IT SEEMS TO ME MEETS OUR REQUIREMENTS WHILE GIVING THE VIETNAMESE SOMETHING THEY CAN LIVE WITH. IT HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY DECISION FOR THEM.

8. WE AGREED TO MEET SOON AGAIN TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT MAY COME UP EARLY IF THERE ARE SERIOUS TALKS. BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

22

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-212
By CG, NARA, Date 1-5-95

Monday, October 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Exercise FOCUS RETINA

Handwritten:
Lump
2. Pres file

The attached memorandum from the Under Secretary of State (Tab A) recommends that you direct the postponement of FOCUS RETINA until such time as it would be convenient for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reschedule it.

This recommendation is made out of consideration for the Panmunjom negotiations on the PUEBLO. As you know, recent developments in these negotiations have been neither clearly encouraging nor discouraging, and it does not seem likely that the situation will have changed appreciably by mid-November. The exercise does not seem worth placing the negotiations in jeopardy.

Postponement could cause the Korean government to feel that we are placing our interests in the PUEBLO crew above our concern for their security. The Under Secretary's memorandum points out that this could be mitigated by announcing the exercise could be held next spring.

After receiving his memo at the White House, however, a telegram from Ambassador Porter (Tab B) arrived. It points out that discussions of FOCUS RETINA have been in low key, and there has been no public announcement of it. He recommends routine notification of postponement to the Republic of Korea, without any public announcement. This procedure seems preferable to me and we have telephonic confirmation that State and Defense agree with Porter's recommended handling.

Seoul advises that decision on FOCUS RETINA is needed there not later than 31 October, Washington time, in order to stop preparations now in progress.

Recommendation:

That you direct the postponement of FOCUS RETINA without public announcement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

AJenkins:mm

224



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 26, 1968

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Exercise FOCUS RETINA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-213
By CB, NARA, Date 1-16-96

Recommendation:

That you direct the postponement of FOCUS RETINA until such time as it would be convenient for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reschedule it.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

I suggest that you direct that this exercise, involving an airborne brigade moving to Korea, be postponed until the next convenient date -- probably in the spring. This recommendation is based on the results of the last Panmunjom meeting on the PUEBLO.

After this last meeting, whose results were neither clearly encouraging nor discouraging, it does not seem likely that the PUEBLO negotiations will be in a very different stage in mid-November from where they are now.

If, however, we proceed toward the November 20 date for beginning the exercise, we will have to make a public announcement very shortly. (The planned date for this announcement has been next Monday, October 28, but it could slip a bit.) Once this announcement is made, it will considerably reduce the chances of any North Korean concessions in the PUEBLO negotiation, since they would appear to be making concessions under threat. Even though we cannot say that any concessions seem likely, the exercise does not seem worth placing them in jeopardy.

The disadvantage of postponement is that it will tend to make the ROK's, who have been counting on the exercise in November, feel that we are placing our interest in the PUEBLO crew above our concern for their security.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

This could be mitigated by announcing now that the exercise will be held next spring, which would reassure the ROK's by publicly committing us to hold it but would not place the North Koreans in the posture of releasing the crew under threat of a current show of U.S. force.

Secretary Rusk agrees with this recommendation and I have talked with Paul Warnke in DOD, who also concurs.


The Under Secretary



Department of State

TELEGRAM

22b.

15

PP RUEHC
DE HUALOS 1071GE 3020845
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 280820Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3379
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 10716

NODIS/CACTUS

SUBJ: FOCUS RETINA

REF: STATE 262345

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-213

By cb, NARA, Date 1-16-96

030170
1968 OCT 28 AM 4 26

1. J-3 DISCUSSIONS OF FOCUS RETINA WITH ROK JCS HAVE BEEN IN LOW KEY. ROK JCS HAS BEEN AWARE FROM START THAT EXERCISE MIGHT NOT BE HELD AS SCHEDULED IF FUNDING NOT APPROVED. WE ACCORDINGLY BELIEVE THAT CANCELLATION OR POSTPONEMENT UNLIKELY CAUSE ANYTHING MORE THAN MILD NEGATIVE REACTION.

2. FACT THERE HAS NOT BEEN PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT HELPS IN PRESENT INSTANCE AS THERE IS NOTHING FOR ROKG TO EXPLAIN AWAY. WE DOUBT IF THERE WILL BE ANY REGENERATIONS IN PRESS AS MND HAS BEEN COMMENDABLY CLOSE-MOUTHED RECENTLY ALTHOUGH POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE ENTIRELY EXCLUDED.

3. WE CONSIDER THAT ROUTINE NOTIFICATION OF POSTPONEMENT OR CANCELLATION BY J-3 TO JCS AND FOLLOWUP DISCUSSIONS WITH MND BY ACTING COMMANDER USFK IF THIS APPEARS ADVISABLE IS ALL THAT IS REQUIRED. WE RECOMMEND THAT NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BE MADE AND THAT NO COMMITMENT BE MADE TO ROKG AS TO RESCHEDULING OF EXERCISE. TWO POSTPONEMENTS WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE MORE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN THAN ONE.

4. ACTING COMMANDER USFK ADVISES THAT DECISION ON FOCUS RETINA IS NEEDED HERE NOT LATER THAN 31 OCTOBER (WASHINGTON TIME) TO STOP PREPARATIONS NOW IN PROGRESS. GP--3; PORTER
BT

22c

101

KOREA-AIRLIFT

WASHINGTON (AP) - THE U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAS DELAYED ANNOUNCEMENT OF A DRAMATIC DEMONSTRATION OF U.S. ABILITY TO AIRLIFT TROOPS TO ASIA.

PENTAGON SOURCES SAID THE DELAY IN ANNOUNCPNG THE PLANNED LIFT OF A PARATROOP BRIGADE TO SOUTH KOREA APPARENTLY STEMMED FROM A DESIRE TO AVOID ANY SHOW OF FORCE DURING THE CURRENT DELICATE VIETNAM PEACE MANEUVERING.

SO FAR AS COULD BE DETERMINED, THE ACTION IS NOT RELATED TO ANY CHANGE IN THE CLIMATE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA INVOLVING THE CAPTIVE CREW OF THE SPY SHIP PUEBLO.

FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE AIRLIFT EXERCISE WAS TO HAVE BEEN MADE TODAY. IT WAS UNCERTAIN HOW LONG THE DELAY WOULD LAST, BUT THE EXERCISE ITSELF IS EXPECTED TO BEGIN AS PLANNED IN MID-NOVEMBER.

THE MANEUVER WILL INVOLVE SOME 2,500 TROOPS, 1,500 OF THEM ARMY PARATROOPERS AND 1,000 AIR FORCE MEN.

ABOUT 75 PLANES WILL TAKE PART IN THE MOVE OF TWO BATTALIONS OF THE 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION FROM FT. BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA, TO SOUTH KOREA.

82201PES OCT 28

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INFORMATION
Monday, October 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cambodia

Pres file

This morning we had an interesting -- and possibly significant -- development in our relations with Cambodia. A young officer of the Cambodian Foreign Ministry officially informed the Australian Embassy which represents our interests in Phnom Penh that Prince Sihanouk has appointed him as "custodian" of the Cambodian Embassy building here in Washington. The young officer gave to the Australian Embassy a note from the Cambodian Foreign Ministry requesting that the American Embassy in Tokyo issue visas for the Cambodian diplomat, his wife, and one servant.

For the several years since the break in our relations with Cambodia the protection of the official Cambodian real estate in Washington has been left to the French, who represent the Cambodians here. We are not aware of any reason why the Cambodians should become dissatisfied with this arrangement. It is possible, therefore, that Sihanouk is taking a hesitant and tentative step toward establishing communications with us.

The young officer being assigned to Washington is named Thay Sok. He has not, in the past, been known as a person of any particular influence or significance. It is worth noting, however, that he is married to a princess of the royal line and is a relative of Prince Sihanouk.

Thay Sok is expected to arrive in the United States at the end of the first week in November.

There have been no new developments on the crew of our LCU, who continue to be held prisoners by the Cambodians.

W. W. Rostow

MWright:wpt

24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, October 28, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Feed for India

I still have the feed for India memo in my "see me" file. Attached is a note with the latest facts and another look at the arguments for an interim program of perhaps one million tons.

Bill Gaud is very worried about the loss of IDA. He believes the consequences for India will be very serious. He is preparing a recommendation on both loan money and a PL-480 program for India before the end of the year.

You will want to give Gaud a hearing. I need guidance on whether you want to consider an interim PL-480 program now or look at PL-480 wheat for India later as part of Gaud's over-all package.

W. W. Rostow

See me on PL-480 _____

I'll look at PL-480 as part of Gaud's package _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-212
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

ERF
ERF:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOOD FOR INDIA

These are recent developments:

- The Indians have now increased their cash purchases from us to 300,000 tons -- out of a total of 500,000 tons they bought from all countries for cash this year.
- It now looks as though other countries will donate to India about one million tons of food aid during the year beginning July 1968 as part of their obligation under the International Grains Arrangement. (Canada 300,000 to 500,000; the EEC 300,000 to 500,000; Australia, the UK, and Japan the rest)
- This year's Indian crop is still in question. Most estimates run around 90 million tons but good rainfall this month has caused some to go as high as 95 million tons. Either would be a good harvest -- but less than last year. India will still have to import a substantial amount of wheat. (The Indians have already approached the Canadians for an advance shipment of wheat this year against Canadian food aid next year.)

This is a mixed case and the facts are not all in. But the case is not pressing either in terms of famine or political risks. The decision could be postponed until next year. In that event, however, India's port capacity could limit the amount of wheat your successor might wish to ship in 1969. (This year's wheat acreage allotment decision assumed that 5.5 million tons of wheat would go to India by June 1969. If you approve no program this year, the full 5.5 million tons will be on hand -- but moving it will require new decisions, new negotiations, and a great deal of time.)

The argument for action now comes down to the following:

- It would give the Indians additional margin and confidence to use their stocks to keep prices down. This would help protect the substantial gains they recently achieved (as a result of our pressure and in expectation of our continuing help) in the organization of their food supply.
- We could use an interim program to explore new self help measures -- mainly in storage facilities, irrigation, agricultural credit and incentive pricing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-212
By CLJ, NARA, Date 1-5-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- An interim program would be the best way to keep open all options to your successor in the formulation of his India policy. It would avoid the danger of deterioration inside India while leaving maximum negotiating leverage for the future.

You could accomplish this with an interim PL-480 program of one million tons. This would not affect the budget. The wheat would otherwise have to be bought up by the CCC and stored.

An interim program for India of one million tons would still leave the balance of this fiscal year's PL-480 program (4.5 million tons) for carry-over to your successor as he considers his India food aid policy.

ERF:mst
10/28/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 28, 1968

25

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is Secretary Fowler's memo describing his plans to attend the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Brussels November 14-16 and to visit key capitals, before and after the NATO meeting, for talks with Finance Ministers.

He wants to do four things: contingency planning in case the French financial situation deteriorates; stress the importance of a long-term solution to the offset problem; talk SDR activation and possibly have a general exchange of views on future requirements of the international monetary system; and impress on his finance minister colleagues the need to do something to avoid a collision on trade policy.

As Secretary Fowler says, these talks would be extremely helpful in making for an effective transition. He would like to have Ed Fried go along with him and Fred Deming.

I recommend you approve having Ed accompany Secretary Fowler on this trip.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-212
By cls, NARA, Date 1-5-95

ERF:mst

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

25.2
OCT 26 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Trip to NATO Meeting

I am currently making plans to attend NATO meeting in Brussels during the week November 10-16, leaving Washington Friday evening, November 8, and returning Wednesday, November 20. (See attached cable)

- (1) The primary purpose of my trip is to attend the NATO meeting in connection with U.S. effort to secure the adoption of a long term NATO policy for offsetting U.S. military expenditures in Western Europe. This policy would be implemented through a series of bilateral arrangements. This effort to give a long term financial viability to NATO along the lines set forth in your New Year's Day Balance of Payments Message to the Nation is an essential part of strengthening NATO in response to the recent Soviet action.
- (2) I would also use this trip as an occasion to call on finance ministers of key capitals (London, Bonn, Rome, the Hague, and Paris) to exchange views on:
 - (a) the long term offset proposals referred to above at all points except Paris;
 - (b) future requirements of the international monetary system, including particularly ratification and activation early next year of the Special Drawing Rights and, at some points (Bonn, Rome and London), contingency planning to cope with any possible deterioration of the French currency;
 - (c) the trade collision impending between the U.S. Congress and EEC countries and what might be done in the next few months to avert

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
Treasury Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-8-02

~~SECRET~~

or deal with it. I want to stress to my colleagues in finance and economic ministries, powerful members of their governments but not closely identified with the specifics of trade policy, the problems we and their countries face in the trade field, and hopefully enlist their help in moving negotiations on elimination of nontariff barriers along. You will recall that pursuant to your New Year's Day Message discussions were initiated looking to prompt cooperative action, particularly with the EEC countries, to minimize the disadvantages to our trade which arise out of nontariff barriers and national tax systems. These discussions have not yet produced satisfactory results.

- (3) Because of their close and continuing familiarity with developments, discussions and negotiations in these areas, I would like to have Under Secretary Deming and Ed Fried of your staff accompany me on this trip, which I believe is of the highest importance in handling these very delicate and important areas in an effective transition to our successors.
- (4) Insofar as public visibility is concerned, my purpose would be to minimize public comment. I would propose to say that this is my third trip to NATO meetings to discuss financial aspects of NATO, and to note that this is a part of the series of negotiations which have been conducted this year pursuant to your New Year's Day Balance of Payments Message concerning efforts "to minimize the foreign exchange costs of keeping our troops in Europe." At the points other than Brussels, I would deal with press queries by noting that my purpose is to exchange views on the current and near term workings of the international monetary system with Finance Ministers I have worked with in the last few years. I would note specifically only the timing of

~~SECRET~~

of ratification and activation of the Special Drawing Rights, and problems in the trade area arising out of nontariff barriers.

Henry H. Fowler
Henry H. Fowler

Attachment

~~SECRET~~



~~NOTE~~
Department of State

25b
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 625

PAGE 01 STATE 259982

20
ORIGIN EUR 20

INFO E 15, CIAE 00, GPM 24, INR 07, L 03, NEA 13, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, USIA 12,
NSA 02, H 02, OIC 05, ACDA 16, NSC 10, TRSY 11, DODE 00, SS 25, SAL 01,
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DRAFTED BY: EUR/RPM:WPBLUMBERG & TREASURY: MR ALBRIGHT
APPROVED BY: EUR: GEROGE S SPRINGSTEEN
EUR/RPM:EVMCAULIFFE
E/IMA: MR ENDERS

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 259982

SUBJECT: NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING NOVEMBER 14-16

REF: STATE 242972

1. AS INDICATED IN REFTTEL, WE BELIEVE THAT NATO'S RESPONSE TO THE WARSAW PACT INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA SHOULD TAKE THE FORM OF CERTAIN SPECIFIC ACTIONS, INCLUDING INCREASES IN NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGETS AND GREATER MILITARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. IN LIGHT OF THE SIGNIFICANT FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN NATO, WE BELIEVE A SPECIAL EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO HAVE FINANCE MINISTERS ATTEND THE BRUSSELS MINISTERIAL MEETING.

2. PARTICIPATION BY FINANCE MINISTERS, AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED IN ALLIANCE PROCEDURES, COULD REINFORCE NATIONAL COMMITMENTS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-213

By 100, NARA, Date 6-16-95



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 259982

AT MINISTERIAL MEETINGS AND ENLIST GREATER FINANCE MINISTER SUPPORT IN NATIONAL CAPITALS FOR SUCH COMMITMENTS. THEIR PARTICIPATION WOULD DEMONSTRATE WILLINGNESS OF MEMBER GOVERNMENTS TO PROVIDE NATO WITH THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES, IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS, WHICH ARE ESSENTIAL TO A VIABLE ALLIANCE. INCREASED AND DIRECT EXPOSURE TO DISCUSSIONS OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION AND MILITARY PROBLEMS SHOULD HELP TO BRING TO FINANCE MINISTERS AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED TO PROVIDE RESOURCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, FINANCE MINISTERS CAN BRING TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY DELIBERATIONS TIMELY CONSIDERATION OF FINANCIAL FACTORS.

3. IT IS NOT INTENDED THAT THERE BE SPECIAL OR SEPARATE MEETINGS OF FINANCE MINISTERS. RATHER, A REVIVAL OF FINANCE MINISTERS INVOLVEMENT IN REGULAR MINISTERIAL MEETINGS AND REGULAR ATTENTION TO POLICY PROBLEMS OF THE ALLIANCE IS CONTEMPLATED.

4. FOR USNATO: YOU SHOULD APPROACH BROSIO AND REQUEST THAT HE URGE MEMBER GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE THEIR FINANCE MINISTERS PRESENT AT THE NOVEMBER MEETING. FOR OUR PART, SECRETARY FOWLER WILL ATTEND AND IS LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS NATO COLLEAGUES. YOU COULD RECALL BROSIO'S ACTION IN 1964 (REF FO-64/576, OCTOBER 19, 1964) WHICH EVOLVED IN CONSULTATION WITH US AND MENTION THAT WE ARE AGAIN PREPARED TO FOLLOW UP HIS ACTION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. IN MAKING HIS APPROACH, BROSIO COULD POINT OUT THE CONSIDERATIONS IN PARA 2 ABOVE. YOU SHOULD THEN SUPPORT BROSIO'S APPROACH, ESPECIALLY WITH YOUR BRITISH, GERMAN, ITALIAN, BELGIAN, DUTCH, CANADIAN AND DANISH COLLEAGUES. SHOULD BROSIO DECIDE NOT TO RESPOND TO YOUR REQUEST, YOU SHOULD THEN APPROACH THESE PERMREPS ON YOUR OWN INITIATIVE.

5. FOR ALL OTHER POSTS: IF BROSIO RESPONDS POSITIVELY, YOU SHOULD PROMPTLY SUPPORT HIS APPROACH WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, DRAWING UPON RATIONALE IN THIS MESSAGE. IF BROSIO EXPRESSES NO PREFERENCE FOR SPECIAL ACTION, LOCAL APPROACH SHOULD BE ON YOUR OWN INITIATIVE. GP-4. RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Pres file

Sunday, October 27, 1968 -- 12 midnight

Mr. President:

With the indicated typographical changes, I gave the attached to Dobrynin tonight. I told him they were rough notes and an oral communication, not in any sense formal governmental message. On the other hand, he should understand that they accurately reflected how the President feels at the moment.

I then explained bluntly the President's dilemma in having to take such a major step at such a critical political period in the U. S. with nothing more from Hanoi or Moscow than assent by silence. I indicated the importance that the President attached to some positive indication from the Soviet Union that there was reason to believe that it was Hanoi's intent to honor the understanding on the DMZ and the cities. I said this was not a matter of our forces being able to protect themselves, but it did relate to the full consequences in the U. S., in Vietnam, and on the world scene of our having to resume the bombing.

Dobrynin indicated that he understood the problem; that he did not know what positively the authorities in Moscow might be able to say to the President at this time, but he would solicit an early response, if a response could be given.

Dobrynin then reviewed the time factor involved if we were to hold to a first meeting on November 2.

I underlined the urgency of a response from Moscow, as he left.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-214
By *ing*, NARA, Date 1-5-93

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NG 83-118
By 19/sep, NARA, Date 3/10/93

October 27, 1968

The President has not made any decision on the discussions and does not intend to do so until he has talked to the leadership in Congress and appropriate committees and to the candidates. He also desires to have whatever understanding is reached carefully evaluated by Amb. Bunker and Gen. Abrams and expects to have their comments and recommendation in connection therewith. He is going back to Amb. Harriman and Amb. Vance tonight and urge them to make abundantly clear to the North Vietnamese the three points: *that we expect the South Vietnamese to be received at the* ~~that we expect the South Vietnamese to be received at the~~ first meeting on Saturday; And that we will expect, while these discussions continue, that the DMZ and the cities will be respected. He is very anxious to have this clearly and succinctly repeated to the North Vietnamese so as to avoid any charge of deception and any risk of misunderstanding. Although he does not expect them to agree this is a condition or reciprocal action, he does expect them to understand that Gen. Abrams has been issued rules of engagement and that a failure to respect either the DMZ or the cities, that would trigger retaliation and disrupt the conference. The President feels it is better this understanding take place in advance before the bombing stops rather than have it stop and start again because of alleged misunderstanding.

In addition, the President, in spite of the incidents around the 37-day pause, desires that your Government be informed of the assumption on which he is proceeding so as to avoid any deception or misunderstanding *with respect* ~~on the part~~ *to* of your government. He is proceeding on these assumptions in the belief that Mr. Kosygin understands them and "has reason to believe" that if the bombing stopped productive discussions could promptly follow. Of course

productive discussions could not continue if the DMZ and the cities were not respected.

The President is very anxious to have any comments or reaction Mr. Kossygin may have to these three points, in light of Mr. Kossygin's letters of June and the other day^(October 25). The President will carefully weigh Mr. Kossygin's observations before making a decision.

ACTION

27

Sunday, October 27, 1968 - 6:45 p.m

Mr. President:

**Herewith, as requested, a draft
reply to George Brown, for your
signature. -- done early in the day.**

**First sentence, third paragraph.
OK if mailed promptly.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

27a

October 27, 1968

Dear George:

How good it was to hear from you.

As for my decision of March 31, I greatly appreciate your comment. But, as I said the other day, in all its dimensions, I would not alter what I said on March 31st. The fact that I was not running for re-election has meant that I have been able to get certain things done which might not otherwise have been possible. And I'm still working for others as hard as the candidates.

As for Vietnam, there is still no breakthrough. But there is hope and behind that hope are some very solid achievements which will remain to strengthen our negotiating position in the weeks and months ahead, even if we fail to get a breakthrough.

I have in mind the slowly gathering strength and stability of Thieu's government. It is still fragile but a mighty achievement by the people of Vietnam in the midst of the pressures they face.

I have in mind the response of the Vietnamese government and people to the call to mobilization. They now have more than a million of their citizens under arms and are still expanding. They are better equipped. They are more confident.

I have in mind the excellent performance of our own forces and of our allies under the leadership, first, of General Westmoreland and, now, of General Abrams. I have been blessed with two first-class field commanders in as complex a military engagement as any of us has had to fight.

And so, as we enter the last three months, we are in good heart.

Looking back over these years, nothing has meant more -- given me more comfort, or finer memories -- than those who stood firmly by when the going was tough and one had to rely on ultimate qualities of heart and character.

I shall not forget, George, that you were among them.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George Brown
House of Commons
London, S W 1

LBJ:WWRostow

23rd October, 1968.


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My dear Mr President-

I have been in two minds for quite a while whether it was appropriate for a private citizen in this country to write to the President of yours while an election campaign is in progress. And there ends the formal part of this letter.

I was one of the most horrified in the world when you did what you did, not because I misunderstood the reasons and motives behind your decision, but because I thought it was a very sad day. To say "in the world" is to sound pompous - I meant for all those who care about the kind of qualities which you have so consistently displayed.

The newspapers tell me that you may be on the verge of a break-through in Paris, in which case Averall must have done a good job. It is this which prompts this letter. I hope you are. I sincerely hope it will be on the basis which will do you the credit you deserve. And I just wanted to let you know that, far away as I now am from the centre of things, I still remember and cherish the talks we used to have walking round the gardens.


(GEORGE BROWN)

The Hon. Lyndon B. Johnson,
The White House,
Washington.

~~—SECRET/LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

Sunday, October 27, 1968 -- 6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Several days ago I sent you a reliable CIA report stating that one of Thieu's anxieties, should there be a bombing cessation and negotiations with the NLF in Paris, was the reaction of certain hard-line Catholic groups in Vietnam.

I then checked quietly, [] whether word from the Vatican that His Holiness understood that there was no danger that President Johnson planned to impose a coalition government, treat the NLF as a "separate entity," or otherwise sell out South Vietnam, might be stabilizing. 3.3(b)(1)

The response from the field is at Tab A, suggesting it might well be helpful.

I then informed Sec. Rusk and asked him if, in his judgment, we should proceed to enlist the Vatican and, if so, through his channel of ours.

Sec. Rusk responded:

- We should enlist the Vatican;
- We should do so via the White House channel;
- We should do so promptly after the bombing cessation is announced.

A draft letter to the Pope is at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 10-294
By ml, NARA, Date 11-12-70

WWRostow:rlm

~~—SECRET/LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

28a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

27 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow .
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Response from Ambassador Bunker and the
CIA Saigon Station to Your Query of
26 October 1968.

The following are the views of Ambassador Bunker and the CIA Saigon Station in response to Mr. Rostow's query concerning the effectiveness of having the Vatican reassure the Catholics in South Vietnam.

1. The Catholics here are essentially divided into three groups: (A) moderates responsive to Archbishop Binh; (B) leftists who, in the event, would probably give less trouble than the others; and (C) the radically nationalist northern Catholics who are not particularly responsive to guidance from the Archbishop nor, as far as we can tell, in close contact with the Apostolic Delegate here.

2. Certainly advice from the Vatican would be helpful with (A); it would be irrelevant with (B); and it might just possibly have a good effect, though only a limited one, with the critical group (C). Accordingly, my judgement is that there is probably no harm, and possibly some good, in trying to get the Vatican to spread the word among Catholic leaders here. The only possible risk is that some northern Catholics might resent what they could consider as "interference" by the Vatican in a non-religious matter.

3. The word could be, of course, not only that they should not fear the entrance of the NLF into the negotiations and that the U.S. is not abandoning them, but also that the U.S. has no intention of recognizing the NLF so that its participation in negotiations would not be as a "separate entity", as is feared here, even though the NLF would hold itself out to be a separate entity.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-214

By up, NARA, Date 2-2-95

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

October 29, 1968

Your Holiness:

As you know, I have just taken a second momentous step in an effort to find stable peace in Southeast Asia.

The decision was difficult for many reasons; but, after reflection and prayer, I found it my duty to proceed.

Among the anxious problems in the days ahead is the concern of many good people in South Vietnam, including many Roman Catholics, who may fear that the bombing cessation and the participation of the NLF representatives in the Paris talks mean that we intend to abandon them, force a coalition government upon them, or even treat the NLF as an independent entity.

None of these is among our purposes.

If, in the light of this knowledge, you can find ways to reassure these troubled people, it would be good.

What we do hope for is that ways can be found for a political settlement in South Vietnam based, as President Thieu said at Honolulu, on the principle of reconciliation and the rule that all who forsake violence can find their way to full civil rights under the Constitution of South Vietnam.

I trust you will pray that our decision was right and will lead to an early and honorable and stable peace in Southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
Vatican City

LBJ:WWRostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-212
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 91-484By mg/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-93~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

Sunday, October 27, 1968 -- 4:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

The materials assembled at the tabs are as follows.

Tab A. Vance's telephonic and cabled reports of the Paris meeting today.

Tab B. A time schedule, should you accept the proposition.

Tab C. My outgoing to Abrams, putting him on alert.

Tab D. The draft joint announcement with Thieu -- with last paragraph not wholly resolved.

Tab E. A revised briefing note (short version) for the candidates and the leadership.

Tab F. A revised draft Presidential statement.

Tab G. Your communication to Gen. Abrams in the form of a letter you might hand him on Tuesday, if you decide to go.

Tab H. A draft communication to Thieu.

Tab I. A draft communication to Kosygin.

A possible agenda for this evening's meeting is as follows:

1. The Deal

You may wish Sec. Rusk to describe the proposition, and then initiate discussion and recommendations.

2. Immediate Actions, if You Accept.

- Flash Gen. Abrams to return to Washington.
- Instruction to Harriman and Vance to inform DRV of acceptance.
- Decision on draft announcement.
- Cable to Bunker to inform Thieu (but Thieu only), including earliest time for Thieu's NSC meeting.

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

-2-

-- Prepare staff work for:

- orders for cessation**
- rules of engagement**
- briefing of leadership and candidates**
- Presidential letter to Thieu**
- draft message to TCC's**
- President's statement**
- Presidential letter to Kesygin**
- planning U. S. position for next phase of negotiations.**

3. Plans for Monday.

The only business for Monday, if no hitch develops, is to get orders out by 7:00 p.m. EST. The letter to Thieu and, possibly, to Kesygin could go out at that time.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

DOUBLE PLUS

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Sunday, October 27, 1968 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the blow-by-blow of yesterday's five hour session.

The Paris delegation received a number of messages from Hanoi before today's session, which started at 9:30 our time (3:30 Paris). They asked for the session.

We'll see if the Russians have acted with any effect by mid-afternoon (our time).

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLJ 91-484

By rg/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

30a (1)
TELEGRAM

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OO RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 22992/1 3002320
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 262300Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7496
STATE GRNC

CONTROL: 8927Q
RECD: OCT 26, 1968
8:00 P.M.

ACTION COPY

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 7 PARIS 22992

DELTO 882

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: FULL REPORT -- OCTOBER 26 MEETING

1. WE MET WITH XUAN THUY AND HA VAN LAU FOR FIVE HOURS OCTOBER 26 AT THEIR SITE IN LE VESINET. SAME PERSONS PARTICIPATED ON BOTH SIDES AS AT LAST MEETING.

2. WE OPENED BY DELIVERING THE FOLLOWING PREPARED STATEMENT:

"AT OUR LAST MEETING WE WERE UNABLE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES REMAINING BETWEEN US. WE HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL THOUGHT TO THEM SINCE WE LAST MET.

"DESPITE OUR VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE WISER NOT TO HAVE A WRITTEN DOCUMENT, YOU HAVE SPOKEN OF THE DESIRABILITY OF AN AGREED SECRET MINUTE. WE HAVE RELUCTANTLY PROCEEDED ON THAT BASIS. IN OUR DISCUSSION AT THE LAST MEETING WE CONSIDERED VARIOUS ALTERNATIVE PHRASING. WE ARE PREPARED, THEREFORE, IF WE REACH AGREEMENT ON ALL POINTS OF SUBSTANCE AND WORDING, TO CONCUR IN A SECRET MINUTE. IF YOU AGREE TO THE PROPOSALS I WILL MAKE, I WILL REPORT THEM IMMEDIATELY TO MY GOVERNMENT FOR FINAL AUTHORIZATION AND WILL THEN INFORM YOU AT ONCE.

"TO BE PRECISE, I WISH TO TABLE THE TEXT OF THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF SUCH A MINUTE AS FOLLOWS:

"ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, THE US WILL STOP ALL AIR, NAVAL AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV AS OF (DATE) AT ----- GMT."

"AT THE LAST MEETING WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED AGREED MINUTE CONCERNING THE MEETING AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THE PARTICIPATION THEREIN.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712 91-482
By W/Lg, NARA, Date 3-5-93

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-2- PARIS 22992, SECTION 1 OF 7, OCT 26

I NOW WISH TO TABLE A DRAFT PARAGRAPH, AS FOLLOWS:

"IT IS AGREED THAT A MEETING TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM WILL BE HELD IN PARIS ON NOVEMBER 2, 1968. THE US HAS INDICATED THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM WILL BE PRESENT, AND THE DRV HAS INDICATED THAT THE NLF WILL BE PRESENT."

3. THUY ASKED WHAT THE DIFFERENCE WAS BETWEEN THE DRAFT WE WERE TABLING TODAY AND OUR PROPOSALS AT THE LAST MEETING. WE SAID THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME CHANGES IN WORDING. THUY SAID THAT WE HAD DELETED THE WORD "SUBSTANCE" AND THE WORD "REPRESENTATIVES." WE SUGGESTED THAT WE DISCUSS OUR PROPOSAL PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH FOLLOWING THE SAME PROCEDURE AS AT THE LAST MEETING. THUY AGREED.

4. THUY SAID, AT OUR PREVIOUS MEETING THE QUESTION OF USING THE WORD "UNCONDITIONAL" OR "WITHOUT CONDITION" HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. THUY SAID EITHER TERM WOULD DO BUT HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH REFERENCE IN OUR PROPOSAL. WE REPLIED THAT THE LANGUAGE WE HAD GIVEN THUY WAS CLEAR. WE SAID WE HAD DISCUSSED IN DETAIL THE QUESTION OF CONDITIONS AND OTHER MATTERS. THE PHRASE, "ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSION, ETC.," INCLUDES ATTITUDES EXPRESSED BY THEM AS WELL AS ATTITUDES EXPRESSED BY US AT THESE MEETINGS. WE THINK THAT IT WOULD BE CONFUSING IF WE ATTEMPTED TO DEFINE THEM IN WRITING. THE US WILL BE TAKING THE FIRST ACT AND OUR ACTION WILL BE DEFINITE. ONE OF OUR PROBLEMS IS THAT WE HAVE DIFFICULTY AGREEING ON WORDS BUT, FOR OUR PART, WE THINK WE HAVE UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER. THE LANGUAGE WE HAD JUST PROPOSED WAS WHAT WE CAN PUT INTO A MINUTE IF WE CAN AGREE ON A MINUTE.

5. THUY SAID HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE PHRASE, "ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS," WAS VERY CLEAR BECAUSE THE TWO SIDES HAVE MET PRIVATELY MANY TIMES. SOMETIMES THERE WAS AGREEMENT; SOMETIMES THERE WAS NOT. THE DRV IS WILLING TO ACCEPT EITHER THE WORDS "UNCONDITIONAL" OR "WITHOUT CONDITION". THUY SAID THAT HE WANTED TO REPEAT WHAT HE HAD SAID PREVIOUSLY THAT THE MINUTE IS CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT TO BE MADE PUBLIC.

6. WE ANSWERED THAT WE DID NOT SEE THE NECESSITY TO EXPRESS OUR ACTIONS BY WORDS. WE WILL ACT AND WE DO NOT SEE THE NECESSITY OF PUTTING WORDS IN OUR MOUTH. THEY HAD ASKED US TO ANNOUNCE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND WE WOULD DO SO IF THE BOMBING IS STOPPED. THUY SAID IT IS THE DRV SIDE WHICH IS SURPRISED BY THE FACT THAT WE HAVE ACCEPTED THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING BE UNCONDITIONAL OR WITHOUT CONDITION AND YET WE REFUSE TO PUT THIS DOWN IN

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-3- PARIS 22992, SECTION 1 OF 7, OCT 26

WRITING. WE SAID "CONDITION" IS A VERY BROAD TERM. WE HAVE AGREED TO MEET AT A SET TIME, AND THE DRV SIDE HAS AGREED TO HAVE SERIOUS TALKS. WE DON'T CONSIDER THESE CONDITIONS ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF OTHER PEOPLE MIGHT CONSIDER THEM SO. WE HAVE TOLD THE DRV SIDE THAT WE WILL NOT USE THE WORD CONDITIONAL IN ANY OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF OUR GOVERNMENT. THUY SAID THAT THE VERY FACT THAT SOME PEOPLE MIGHT CONSIDER AGREEMENT ON A FIXED DATE FOR HARRIMAN
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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DE RUFNCR 22992 3002325
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7497 IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC

CONTROL: 8929Q
RECD: OCT 26, 1968
8:19 P.M.

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 22992 SECTION 2 OF 7

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 882

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: FULL REPORT--OCTOBER 26 MEETING

THE BEGINNING OF SERIOUS TALKS AS CONDITIONAL, LATHOUGH WE DO NOT, IS WHY IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT IT BE PUT IN WRITING SO THAT THERE CAN BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN SU AND OTHERS. WE REPLIED WE DID NOT WANT TO HAVE ANY CONFUIONS AND POINTED OUT THAT THE MINUTE MIGHT BECOME PULBIC SOMEDAY. THUY SAID THERE WOULD BE NO CONFUSION AT ALL BECAUSE WE OURSELVES HAD SAID THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WOULD BE WITHOUT CONDITION.

7 WE SUGEESTED THAT WE MOVE ON TO THE NEXT ITEM IF WE COULD NOT AGREE ON THIS ONE. THUY SAID OUR SECOND POINT WAS NO DIFFERENT FROM THE PREVIOUS MEETING AND HE FELT THAT THE DRV'S POSITION AT THAT MEETING HAD BEEN MORE REASONALBE. THAT IS TO SAY, THE US WOULD NOT MENTION TWO SIDES AND THE DRV WOULD NOT MENTION FOUR PARTIES. INSTEAD THE MINUTE WOULD SIMPLY NAME THE FOUR PARTICIPANTS. WE ASKED THUY IF HE HAD ANY DISAGREEMENT WITH US ON THE FIRST SENTENCE. THUY SUGGESTED THAT FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY IN LANGUAGE, HE PROPOSED THAT WE EITHER DELATE THE PHRASE "IT IS AGREED" OR THAT WE ADD BEFOREHAND THE PHRASE "ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS". WE SAID WE HAD NO DIF- FICULTY WITH THUY'S SUGGESTED ADDITION.

8. THUY SAID HE COULD NOT AGREE TO THE OTHER SENTENCES IN OUR PROPOSAL ON THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION. THE DRV POSITION IS THAT THE SENTENCE SHOULD READ, "THIS MEETING WILL INCLUDE THE DRV, THE NLF, THE US AND THE RVN". WE REPLIED THAT OUR PHRASING WAS DESIGNED TO EXPLAIN HOW IT COMES ABOUT THAT THE NLF AND GVN WILL BE PRESENT, WE DON'T KNOW THAT THE NLF WILL BE THERE EXCEPT THAT YOU WILL TELL US, AND

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-2- PARIS 22992, SECTION 2 OF 7, OCT 26

VICE VERSA. OUR LANGUAGE STATES A FACT AND AN IMPORTANT ONE AT THAT. THUY SAID HE DID NOT THINK THIS WAS THE QUESTION. THE QUESTION IS WHO WILL BE THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE. AS FOR HOW AND WHY THEY ARE PRESENT, THUY SAID, THAT IS A QUESTION OF INVITATION AND PROCEDURE. WE THEN SUGGESTED THAT WE COULD COMBINE THE TWO IDEAS BY ADDING THE TWO FOLLOWING SENTENCES TO OUR PROPOSAL: "ACCORDINGLY THE MEETING WILL INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RVN, US, DRV AND NLF. THE FOREGOING IN NO WAY IMPLIES RECOGNITION OF THOSE REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING."

9. THUY SAID THAT WE WERE JUST MAKING THE PROPOSAL MORE COMPLICATED. WE DISAGREED SAYING THAT THE PROPOSAL NOW INCLUDED BOTH OF OUR IDEAS. THUY SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO AGREE TO THE NEW FORMULATION. WE ASKED HIM WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS. THUY REPLIED THAT WE WERE COMPLICATING MATTERS BY RAISING THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION. WE ASKED THUY IF THIS WAS HIS ONLY OBJECTION. HE SAID NO, HE WAS JUST RAISING THIS FIRST. THUY SUGGESTED THAT WE AGREE ON THE FIRST AND THIRD SENTENCES AND DELETE THE SECOND AND FOURTH ONES. WE SAID WE COULD NOT AGREE TO THAT. THUY THEN ASKED US IF WE WERE WILLING TO DELETE THE LAST SENTENCE AND WE REPLIED THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO DROP IT IF WE COULD AGREE ON THE INCLUSION OF THE FIRST THREE. THIS TYPE OF EXCHANGE CONTINUED, AND FINALLY THUY SAID HE WANTED TO REFLECT FURTHER ON THIS POINT AND HE SUGGESTED THAT WE RETURN TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF AGREED MINUTE.

10. WE SAID THAT WE FELT WE HAD SAID ALL THAT WE COULD ON THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING THE TERM "UNCONDITIONAL" OR "WITHOUT CONDITION" IN THE AGREED MINUTE. THUY SAID HE HAD ANOTHER PROPOSAL. THE DRV HAS PROPOSED "UNCONDITIONAL AND THE US HAS USED THE TERM "WITHOUT CONDITIONS." WE REPLIED THAT WE HAD NEVER PROPOSED IT BE PUT IN A MINUTE. THUY SAID THE US SIDE HAS ACCEPTED IN SUBSTANCE THAT THE CESSATION WILL BE UNCONDITIONAL OR WITHOUT CONDITION, THEREFORE THUY SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE COULD BE ADDED: "IN SUBSTANCE, THIS CESSATION OF BOMBING IS WITHOUT CONDITION." WE REPLIED THAT THIS JUST FURTHER COMPLICATED MATTERS AND SHOWED HOW HARD IT WAS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON WORDS. THUY SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THIS WOULD COMPLICATE THINGS BECAUSE THE DRV SIDE WAS USING WORDS THAT HAVE BEEN USED IN OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS. THUY WANTED TO USE A WORD THAT WAS EASY FOR THE US TO ACCEPT.

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11. WE SAID THAT THIS JUST FURTHER UNDERLINED THE DIFFICULTY IN FINDING WORDS WHICH WE COULD AGREE UPON. LAU SAID THAT THE DRV'S ORIGINAL INTENTION WAS TO PUT THE PHRASE "WITHOUT CONDITION" IN THE FIRST SENTENCE. BUT IN ORDER TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE US VIEW, THE DRV WOULD AGREE TO ADDING A SECMD SENTENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CESSATION IS IN SUBSTANCE WIHOUT CONDITION. WE SAID WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT AND POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS ON THING TO AGREE ON A METTER IN SUBSTANCE AND QUITE DIFFERENT TO PUT IT IN WORDS. THUY REPEATED HIS CONTENTION THAT HE WAS JUST USING WORDS THAT WE HAD USED IN THE PAST AND IF WE THOUGHT HE WAS USING THEM IN AN UNSATISFACTORY MANNER WE SHOULD PROPOSE OUR OWN LANGUAGE. WE SAID THAT THIS DID NOT HELP US AT ALL. THE DISCUSSION WE WERE HAVING AT THAT VERY MOMENT, NAMELY TRYING TO GET WORDS TO WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREED, WAS THE VERY REASON WHY WE HAD SUGGESTED AT THE BEGINNING TO DO WITHOUT AN AGREED MINUTE, AND INSTEAD TO LET ACTIONS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. AT THE POINT, WE RECESSED BRIEFLY.
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 8928Q

RECD: OCT 26, 1968
8:14 P.M.

FJL386
OO RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 22992/3 3002340
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O 262300Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7498
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 7 PARIS 22992

DELTO 882

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

12. AFTER THE RECESS, WE SAID THAT SINCE WE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO AGREE ON THE LANGUAGE OF A MINUTE, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT. WE SAID:

"IN THESE WEEKS OF DISCUSSION, WE HAVE MADE A MEASURE OF PROGRESS. WHAT WE HAVE FINALLY ARRIVED AT IS AS FOLLOWS: FIRST, THE UNITED STATES CAN STOP ALL BOMBARDMENT AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV; SECOND, THERE CAN BE A MEETING PROMPTLY IN PARIS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM. AT THAT MEETING THERE WILL BE PRESENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV, NLF, THE RVN AND THE US.

"HOWEVER, THERE ARE PROBLEMS WHICH ARE PREVENTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TWO ACTIONS WHICH I HAVE JUST MENTIONED. THEY ARE, FIRST, THE QUESTION OF THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE TWO ACTIONS, NAMELY, THE DATE OF CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF THE FIRST MEETING; AND SECOND HOW WE DESCRIBE THE ACTIONS THAT EACH OF US WILL TAKE.

"AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY SAID, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE PROBLEM OF FINDING WORDS SHOULD BLOCK US FROM ACHIEVING THE RESULT THAT BOTH OF US DESIRE. IN REALITY, THE ACTIONS WHICH EACH OF US WILL TAKE ARE WHAT IS IMPORTANT.

"WE HAVE BECOME BOGGED DOWN WITH THE PROBLEM OF WORDS BECAUSE YOU HAVE INSISTED UPON A SECRET MINUTE. AS WE EXAMINED THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A MINUTE, IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT THE PROBLEM OF WORDS HAS CREATED THE VERY DIFFICULTY THAT WE SPOKE ABOUT.

"AT A PREVIOUS MEETING WE EXPRESSED OUR PREFERENCE TO DO AWAY WITH THE MINUTE. WE SAID AND WE STILL BELIEVE THAT ACTIONS WILL SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS. BY THIS WE MEAN THAT THE ACTIONS WE COULD TAKE WOULD BE CLEARLY VISIBLE AND, IN FACT, WE WOULD BE TAKING THE FIRST STEP.

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-2- PARIS 22992, SECTION 3 OF 7, OCT 26

"THEREFORE, I SUGGEST THAT YOU WITHDRAW YOUR DEMAND FOR AN AGREED MINUTE. THAT WOULD SET ASIDE THE PROBLEM OF WORDS. IF THAT WERE DONE, THERE WOULD REMAIN ONLY ONE ISSUE BETWEEN US AND THAT IS THE QUESTION OF TIMING. IF WE CAN RESOLVE THAT ISSUE IN DISCUSSIONS HERE NOW, WE WOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE FORWARD TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

"NAMELY, WE ARE PREAPRED TO MAKE A SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE PROPOSAL TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM.

"I AM AUTHORIZED TO INFORM YOU THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO STOP ALL BOMBARDMENT AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV ON OCTOBER 30 AT 1600 GMT, IF YOU AGREE TO THE CONVENING OF A MEETING IN PARIS ON NOVEMBER 2 AT 0930 GMT. AT THE MEETING WOULD BE PRESENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV, NLF, RVN AND US.

"I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE, THEREFORE, THAT WE AGREE TO DISPENSE WITH THE NEED FOR A MINUTE AND PROCEED TO A DISCUSSION OF THIS CONCRETE AND SPECIFIC PROPOSAL ON MY PART."

13. THUY REPLIED THAT FROM THE OUTSET OF OUR CONVERSATIONS THE DRV SIDE HAD SAID THAT IT CAME TO PARIS WITH GOODWILL AND SERIOUS INTENT IN ORDER TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM AND IT HAS REPEATEDLY SAID THAT IT EXPECTED THE SAME GOODWILL FROM THE UNITED STATES. HOWEVER, IN THE COURSE OF A NUMBER OF PRIVATE MEETINGS, THE DRV HAS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE HAVE BEEN POINTS AGREED UPON BY THE TWO SIDES ON WHICH AT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS THE US SIDE SAID WE ARE NOT AGREED. AN AGREED MINUTE OR A JOINT COMMUNIQUE IS A NORMAL PROCEDURE BETWEEN TWO INDIVIDUALS OR TWO PARTIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THERE IS NOTHING STRANGE ABOUT IT AND THE MINUTE WOULD BE BASED ON MUTUAL AGREEMENT WITH NEITHER SIDE FORCING THE OTHER TO ACCEPT ANYTHING IT DOES NOT WANT TO ACCEPT. REGARDING THE FIRST PARAGRAPH IN CONNECTION WITH THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, HE HAD PROPOSED LANGUAGE USING WORDS THAT THE US HAD USED BEFORE. THE US SIDE HAD USED THE PHRASE "IN SUBSTANCE". AS FOR THE SECOND POINT, EACH SIDE HAD SUGGESTED ONCE SENTENCE. THIS MEANT THAT EACH SIDE WAS TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE OTHER'S VIEWS. THUY SAID HE THOUGHT THAT WAS VERY REASONABLE. HE SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE US SIDE COULD NOT AGREE TO THE WORDING FOR A MINUTE. HE SAID THIS CAUSED HIM TO WONDER WHETHER THE US WILL REALLY STOP THE BOMBING OR WHETHER IT JUST WANTED TO TALK HERE SO AS TO WASTE TIME.

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-3- PARIS 22992, SECTION 3 OF 7, OCT 26

14. WE ASKED THUY FOR CLARIFICATION OF HIS VIEWS. HE ANSWERED THAT WE HAD PROPOSED A PARAGRAPH WITH FOUR SENTENCES. THUY PROPOSED THAT WE DELETE SENTENCES TWO AND FOUR IN THE PARAGRAPH. WE ANSWERED THAT WE COULD NOT AGREE TO THE INCLUSION OF THE THIRD SENTENCE UNLESS THE SECOND WAS ALSO INCLUDED. WE WOULD AGREE TO DROP THE FOURTH SENTENCE IF THE FIRST THREE WERE RETAINED. THUY THEN OBJECTED TO THE WORD "INDICATED" BECAUSE IT DID NOT TRANSLATE SATISFACTORILY INTO VIETNAMESE. WE REPLIED THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE WORDS "STATED" OR SAID". THUY THEN PROPOSED A BRIEF
HARRIMAN
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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OO RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 22992 3002347
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7499 IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC

CONTROL: 8930Q
RECD: OCT 26, 1968
8:20 P.M.

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 22992 SECTION 4 OF 7

DELTO 882

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: FULL REPORT -- OCTOBER 26 MEETING

BREAK TO CONDUCT WITH HIS COLLEAGUES.

15. UPON RESUING, THUY PROPOSED THAT THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE BE SUBSTITUTED FOR SENTENCE TWO OF OUR PARAGRAPH ON PARTICIPATION:

"THE DRV HAS SAID THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE SVN-NLF IS NECESSARY. THE US HAS SAID THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE RVN IS NECESSARY."

16. WE SAID WE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH CHANGING THE WORD "INDICATED" TO "SAID". HOWEVER, AS TO THE LAST PART, NAMELY THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE NLF AND GVN ARE NECESSARY, THIS LANGUAGE DOES NOT ACCOMPLISH THE PROPOSE WHICH WE STATED AND MAKES IT A DEMAND BY THE US FOR SOMETHING AND A DEMAND BY THE DRV FOR SOMETHING. WE SHOULD STATE THE FACT THAT THE NLF WILL BE PRESENT AND THE GVN WILL BE PRESENT. THIS WAY NEITHER SIDE WILL BE MAKING A DEMAND. THUY AGREED ON THIS POINT AND READ THE ENTIRE PARAGRAPH ON PARTICIPATION OVER AGAIN AS FOLLOWS:

"ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, IT IS AGREED THAT A MEETING TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM WILL BE HELD IN PARIS ON (DATE). THE DRV HAS SAID THAT THE SVN-NLF WILL BE PRESENT. THE US HAS SAID THAT THE RVN WILL BE PRESENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE MEETING WILL INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV, SVN-NLF, US AND RVN."

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-2- PARIS 22-92, SECTION 4 OF 7, OCT 20

17. WE SAID WE AGREED; HOWEVER WE WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE THE WORDER SO THAT EHE RVN WAS MENTION BEFORE THE US. AT OUR PREVIOUS MEETING THUY HAD SAID THAT THE ORDER DID NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO THEM. THUY SID HE AGREED TO THIS THEY LAUGHED.

18. THUY THEN RETURNED TO PARAGRAPH ON OF MINUTE. HE SID HE AGREED WITH OUR LANGUAGE EXCEPT THAT HE WANTED THE PHRASE "WITHOUT CONDITION" ADDED AFTER THE WORDS " WILL STOP". WE REPLIED THAT WE HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ADD ANYTHING TO THE TEXT WE HAD GIVEN THUY THIS MORNING, OTHER THAN THE DATE WHICH WE HAD ALRADY MENTION. IN OTHER WORDS, WE COULD ADD THE DATE OF OCTOBER 30 AT 1600 GMT PROVIDED THE DRV SIDE AGREED TO CONVENE A MEETING AT 0930 GMT ON NOVEMBER 2. THUY REPLIED THAT IN OTHER WORDS THE DRV HAD AGREED TO A CONCESSION ON PARAGRAPH TWO IN ORDER TO SPEED THINGS UP, BUT, FOR THE US PART, IT WAS MAKING NO CONCESSIONS ON PARAGRAPH ONE. WE AGAIN POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE THE US WHICH WILL BE TAKING THE FIRST TEP AND THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT. THUY REPLIED THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WAS SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE DONE AND THERE WAS NO REASON FOR THE MEETING TO BE HELD BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE SAID THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ACTION. IT IS SOMETHING THE DRV HAS ASKED FOR FOR A LONG TIME AND WE WOULD BE ACCEDING TO IT. WE ARE NOT SAYING ANYTHING ABOUT CONDITIONS. THERE IS NO MENTION OF ANY CONDITIONS IN OUR STATEMENT.

19. THU THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE FOLLOWING TWO SENTENCES COULD BE ADDED TO OUR PROPOSAL:

"THE US REPRESENTATIVES STATED THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN HIS STATEMENTS RELATED TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WOULD NOT MENTION THE WORD CONDITION. SO, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DRV UNDERSTANDS THAT THE CESSATION OF THE BOMING IS MADE WITHOUT ANY CONDITION OF RECIPORCITY".

20. WE SAID THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE CONFUSED THINGS EVEN MORE. THUY SAID THAT IT WAS A FACT AND THAT THROUGHOUT OUR DICUSSIONS WE HAVE BEEN SAYING THIS. WE TOLD THUY THAT THE LAST SENTENCE WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPT-ABLE BUT, IF HE WOULD DROP IT, WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SUBMIT THE IDEA TO OUR GOVERNMENT OF CONSIDERATION. THUY PROPOSED THAT THE FIRST SENTENCE BE DLETED BUT INSISTED THAT THE SECOND BE RETAINED. THE FIRST SENTENCE HE SAID DEALT WITH THE US SIDE. THE SECOND CONCERNED THE DRV. WE SIAD IT WAS NOT THE DRV WHICH WAS STOPPING THE BOMING BUT THE US AND WE WOULD BE TAKING THE FIRST ACTION. WE REPEATED THAT WE MIGHT BE WILLING TO SUBMIT

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-3- PARIS 22992, SECTION 4 OF 7, OCT 26

THE IDEA IN THE FIRST SENTENCE FOR CONSIDERATION IF THUY AGREED TO DROP THE SECOND. THUY SID THAT HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO STATE THAT THE "US REPRESENTATIVE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING IS WITHOUT CONDITION OF RECIPROCITY". BUT SINCE WE HAD NOT AGREED, HE WAS PROPOSING THAT IT BE "THE DRV UNDERSTANDS, ETC." WE SAID WE COULD NOT AGREE.

21. THUY THEN SUGGESTED THAT WE LEAVE OUR PORPOSAL ON PARAGRAPH ONE AS IT WAS AND ADD A DIFFERENT SENTENCE SUCH AS, " THE US WILL STOP THE BOMBING WITHOUT RECIPROCITY". WE SAID WE WERE NOT AUTHORIZED TO CHANGE WHAT WE HAD STATED THIS MORNING. THUY SAID HE WAS NOT CHANGING OUR TEXT, HE WAS JUST ADDING TO IT. WE SAID WE COULD NOT CHANGE ANTHING BUT WE WERE WILLING TO REPORT THE IDEA
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7500 IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
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CONTROL: 8932Q
RECD: OCT 26, 1968
9:01 P.M.

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 22992 SECTION 5 OF 7

DELTO 882

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: FULL REPORT -- OCTOBE 26 MEETING

IN THE FIRST SENTENCE SUGGESTED ABOVE FOR CONSIDERATION IF THUY DROPPED THE SECOND. BUT IF THUY STARTS TALKING ABOUT HIS UNDERSTANDING, THEN WE MUST START TALKING ABOUT OURS. THUY SAID HE JUST WANTED TO ADD A SENTENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING IS WITHOUT RECIPROCITY OR WITHOUT CONDITION. WE COULD CHOOSE WHICHEVER WORD WE WANTED BUT IT MUST BE ONE OR THE OTHER. WE SAID THAT THUY'S PROPOSAL WAS CONDUSING AND IT WAS NOT DIFFERENT FROM HIS PROPOSAL TO INSERT THE TERM "WITHOUT CONDITION" AFTER "WILL STOP". THUY SIAD IF WE DID NOT AGREE TO THIS IT SHOWED THAT WE WERE NOT FAIR AND THAT WE ONLY WANTED THINGS ADVANTAGEOUS TO US. HE SAID THAT NEGOTIATION THIS WAY IS NOT THE WAY TO FIND AN AGREEMENT AND THE PROBLEM WILLNEVER BE SETTLED. THUY REPEATED HIS CONTENTION THAT HE HAD MADE THE CONCESATION OF PARAGRAPH TWO BY ACCEPTING LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY US AND YET WE WERE NOT MAKING ANY CONCESSION REGARDING PARAGRAPH ONE.

22. WE SAID WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN AN ARGUMENT ABOUT WHO HAD MADE MORE CONCESSIONS OVER THE PERIOD OF MONTHS THAT WE HAD BEEN HOLDING TALKS. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER OR NOT THE DRV SIDE WANTED A MINUTE AND THE WAY WE HAD OUTLINED IT OR WHETHER THEY WANTED TO BOKNDDON THE MINUTE. THUY ASKED IF WE MEANT THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS IT ANY FURTHER. WE SAID THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE DISCUSS THINGS WITH HIM BUT WE FORESAW NO NEW POINTS EMERGING. WE WERE WILLING TO TALK. BUT WE HAD MADE ANOTHER PROPOSAL AND THAT IS NOT TO HAVE A MINUTE AND LET ACTIONS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. THUY SAID THAT HE COULD NOT AGREE TO THIS ANDUSKED IF THERE WERE ANY OTHER POINTS TO DISCUSS.

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-2- PARIS 22992, SECTION 5 OF 7, OCT 26

23. WE SAID THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES WERE THE QUESTION OF WORDING PARAGRAPH ONE AND THAT IF TIMING. THUY SAID THAT IF WE WERE NOT AGREED ON PARAGRAPH ONE IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON TIMING. WE ASKED IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET THE TIMING ISSUE OUT OF THE WAY. THUY SAID HE WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS THE TIMING QUESTION BUT ONLY AS A SUPPOSITION.

24. WE SAID WE HAD ALREADY PROPOSED A SPECIFIC TIME AND DATE FOR BOTH THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THE FIRST MEETING. THUY SAID THAT IF WE COULD AGREE ON HIS PROPOSAL THEN THERE COULD BE DISCUSSION OF TIMING. HE WAS, HOWEVER, PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE TIMING QUESTION BUT ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCHANGE IN VIEW. THE US MAKES THE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL THAT A MEETING BE HELD ON NOVEMBER 2 AND THE BOMBING STOP ON OCTOBER 30. THIS THUY SAID IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE AS HE HAD SAID THE LAST TIME THE NLF IS DEMANDING TEN DAYS WHILE THE US SAYS TWO OR THREE DAY. THUY HAD PROPOSED THAT THIS BE DISCUSSED SO THAT WE COULD COME TO A REASONABLE POSITION. BUT, THUY SAID, THE US HAD NOT CHANGED ITS VIEWS.

25. WE REPLIED THAT WE HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID TWO OR THREE DAYS AND NOW WE EXPLICITLY SAID THREE, MAKING IT CONCRETE. THUY SAID THAT THE LAST TIME WE HAD SAID TWO OR THREE DAYS THE DRV HAD SAID TEN NOW HE PROPOSED EIGHT DAYS AND ASKED THAT WE MAKE A COUNTER PROPOSAL SO THAT WE COULD REACH SOME AGREEMENT. WE SAID THAT AT THE LAST MEETING THEY PROPOSED STOPPING THE BOMBING ON OCTOBER 26 AND A MEETING ON NOVEMBER 2. THAT WAS LESS THAN TEN DAYS. THUY REPLIED THAT HE HAD MENTIONED THAT AS AN EXAMPLE AND NOT AS A CONCRETE PROPOSAL. WE SAID THAT WHILE THUY'S STATEMENT OF THE OTHER DAY MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSED AS AN EXAMPLE SO IT WAS AGAIN AN EXAMPLE TODAY. TODAY THUY'S SUPPOSITION WAS EIGHT DAYS AND THE OTHER DAY IT WAS SEVEN DAY. THUY REPLIED THAT WE HAD NOT CHANGED OUR POSITION EITHER, IT REMAINED TWO OR THREE DAY. WE SAID WE HAD MADE OUR POSITION CONCRETE. THUY THEN SAID HE WOULD MAKE HIS PROPOSAL OF EIGHT DAYS A CONCRETE ONE.

26. WE SAID TO THUY WHERE WE SHOULD GO FROM HERE. HE SAID IT WAS UP TO US TO SPEAK NEXT. WE SAID WE COULD NOT. WE SAID THAT SPEAKING SERIOUSLY THIS WAS NOT A QUESTION TO BE VIEWED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF TRADING BETWEEN US BUT A

~~SECRET~~

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-3- PARIS 22992, SECTION 5 OF 7, OCT 26

QUESTION OF REALITIES WHICH WE MUST FACE. WE HAD TOLD THUY PREVIOUSLY THAT RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY WE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY WHAT THUY HAD SAID ABOUT MEETING THE NEXT DAY. THIS WAS NOT A QUESTION OF TRADING A FEW HOURS BUT A QUESTION OF REALITIES. WE HAVE GIVEN THUY SPECIFIC DATES TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REALITIES INVOLVED. WE WILL NOT CHANGE THIS.

27. THUY SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION. WE SAID THERE ARE SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED. OUR GOVERNMENT WAS DISAPPOINTED WHEN IT TURNED OUT THAT THE DRV WAS NOT READY TO HOLD SERIOUS TALKS THE DAY IMMEDIATE FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. NOW, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT WE HAVE REPORTED TO BE THE DRV'S POINT OF VIEW OUR GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED ON THREE DAYS. WE HOPE THAT THE DRV WILL ACCEPT.

28. THUY SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD US THE OTHER DAY THAT
BT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 6 OF 7 PARIS 22992

CONTROL: 8931Q
RECD: OCT 26, 1968
8:58 P.M.

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 882

THE DRV HAS BEEN STANDING UP TO US BOMBARDMENT FOR MORE THAN THREE YEARS AND IT HAS BEEN TALKING WITH US FOR FIVE MONTHS IN PARIS. THEREFORE IF THE DATE OF THE BOMBING CESSATION IS DELAYED A FEW MORE DAYS IT IS OF NO IMPORTANCE TO THE DRV. EVEN IF IT IS DELAYED A MONTH IT IS NOT IMPORTANT. THUY HAD ALSO SAID THAT IF THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON PARA ONE OF THE MINUTE HE COULD NOT TALK ABOUT THE DATE OF A MEETING. NOW EVEN THOUGH THIS HAD NOT BEEN AGREED UPON HE HAD ACCEPTED DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF TIMING. THIS, HE SAID, SHOWED THAT THE DRV ACCEPTS THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND IT MEANS THAT THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD INVOLVE CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES.

29. THUY SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING CONCRETE PROPOSAL: THE US STOPS THE BOMBING ON OCTOBER 27 AND THE MEETING WILL BE HELD ON NOVEMBER 2. THUS REDUCING THE TIME INTERVAL TO ONLY FIVE DAYS. WE SAID IT WAS SIX DAYS. THUY REPLIED THAT WE HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TIME DIFFERENCES WITH HANOI. WE SUGGESTED THAT WE STICK TO GMT. THUY THEN SUGGESTED THAT THE BOMBING BE STOPPED AT 0001 HOURS GMT OCTOBER 27. WE SAID THAT WAS IMPOSSIBLE POINTING OUT THAT THAT WAS TONIGHT. THUY THEN ASKED WHAT WAS CONVENIENT FOR US. WE SAID WE HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT WOULD TAKE ONE OR TWO DAYS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER TO ACTUALLY STOP THE BOMBING. THUY ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT WE WERE THEREFORE MAINTAINING OUR POSITION. WE SAID WE WERE, BUT WE WANTED TO GET HIS PROPOSAL CLEARLY SO THAT WE COULD REPORT IT. BUT THERE WAS NO POINT IN REPORTING A PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE SUGGESTION.

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-2- PARIS 22992, SECTION 6 OF 7, OCT 26

30. THUY SAID THAT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION OUR DESIRE TO MEET ON NOVEMBER 2 AND TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE PHYSICAL TIME NECESSARY FOR THE NLF TO COME TO PARIS, THE DRV SIDE PROPOSED THAT THE US STOP THE BOMBING ON OCTOBER 27. AS FAR AS THE HOUR IS CONCERNED, THAT WAS UP TO US. WE SAID WE UNDERSTOOD AND WOULD REPORT HIS PROPOSAL. LAU SAID, THE INTERVAL IN THEIR PROPOSAL WAS ONLY FIVE DAYS. WE ASKED THUY IF HE WAS SAYING THAT THE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE 5 DAYS AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. LAU SAID THAT IN MAKING THEIR CALCULATION THEY WERE NOT COUNTING THE DAY OF THE MEETING AND NOT COUNTING THE DAY OF CESSATION. THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM INTERVAL BETWEEN THOSE TWO DATES WOULD BE 5 DAYS. WE SAID THAT TO BE PRECISE 5 DAYS EQUAL 120 HOURS. THIS WAS SOMETHING PRECISE AND SOMETHING WE COULD UNDERSTAND. THUY AGREED.

31. LAU ADDED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THE NUMBER OF DAYS ANY FURTHER BECAUSE WE DO NOT YET KNOW IF THE NLF WILL AGREE. THE DRV SIDE MUST REPORT TO HANOI AND THE FRONT.

32. WE SAID WE WANTED TO BE PRECISE. AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT, WHAT THUY HAD PROPOSED WAS THAT THERE BE 120 HOURS BETWEEN THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THE TIME OF A MEETING. THUY SAID THAT OUR CALCULATIONS DIFFERED. WE REPLIED THAT WAS WHY WE HAD PUT THE MATTER IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC HOURS. THUY SAID THAT IF THE MEETING WERE HELD AT 9:30 GMT NOVEMBER 2, THOSE 9 1/2 HOURS COULD NOT BE COUNTED. THUY SAID WE SHOULD NOT SPEAK IN TERMS OF HOURS, THERE MUST BE AN INTERVAL OF 5 DAYS BETWEEN THE DAY OF CESSATION AND THE DAY OF A MEETING. IF THE BOMBING STOPS SOME TIME DURING OCTOBER 27, THEN AT 9:30 AM NOVEMBER 2 A MEETING WILL START. WE SAID THAT, IN SUM, WHAT THE DRV WAS PROPOSING WAS THAT WE STOP THE BOMBING ANY TIME ON OCTOBER 27 AND A MEETING WOULD BE HELD AT 10:30 PARIS TIME ON NOVEMBER 2. THUY SAID THE MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE ANY TIME OF THE DAY--MORNING OR AFTERNOON. WE SAID WE DID NOT AGREE BUT WOULD REPORT THE PROPOSAL. THUY THEN REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT THIS WAS A QUESTION OF REALITY AND THAT IF THE INTERVAL WAS TOO SHORT THE NLF REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE UNABLE TO ARRIVE IN TIME.

33. WE SAID TO THUY THAT TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR WE WANTED TO SAY THAT WE HAD NOT AGREED TO HIS PROPOSAL. OUR POSITION REMAINS THE SAME--THAT IS, THAT THE BOMBING STOP ON OCTOBER 30TH AND THE MEETING START ON NOVEMBER 2. THUY SAID THAT HIS PROPOSAL WAS JUST A SUPPOSITION. WE HAVE NOT AGREED ON PARA ONE AND TWO AND SO THE DATE CANNOT BE FIXED. WE SAID WE THOUGHT THAT WE HAD AGREED

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-3- 22992, SECTION 6 OF 7, OCT 26

ON PARA 2 AND DISAGREED ON PARA 1. THUY REPLIED THAT IF WE COULD NOT AGREE ON PARA 1, THIS WOULD AFFECT PARA 2. WE SAID THAT THUY WAS SAYING THAT AGREEMENT ON PARAGRAPH 2 IS SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON PARAGRAPH ONE. HE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, SAYING THAT THE TWO POINTS WERE RELATED.

34. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF TIMING, WE SAID TO THUY THAT IF IT WAS POSSIBLE TO TELL HIM TOMORROW THAT THE BOMBING WOULD STOP ON OCTOBER 30, THEN THE NLF COULD START ON THEIR WAY TO PARIS TOMORROW AND THUS THE DRV SIDE HAS PLENTLY OF TIME TO GET THE NLF HERE. THUY REPEATED HIS POSITION THAT THE BOMBING CESSATION COULD TAKE PLACE ANY TIME ON OCTOBER 27, AND THE MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE ON NOVEMBER 2.
HARRIMAN
BT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 22992 SECTION 7 OF 7

CONTROL: 8933Q

RECD: OCT 26, 1968
9:03 P.M.

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 882

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: FULL REPORT--OCTOBER 26 MEETING

WE TOLD THUY THAT IF HE COULD BE INFORMED TOMORROW THAT THE BOMBING WOULD STOP, WE COULD SEE NO REASON WHY THE NLF COULD NOT GET ON ITS WAY. THY ANSWERED THAT WE HAD MADE NO CONCESSIONS, AND THIS WAS NOT A WAY OF NEGOTIATING. FOR ITS PART, THE DRV HAD MADE A CONCESSION AND HAS SHOWN ITS CONSIDERATION BY EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO MEET ON NOVEMBER 2. IF THE MEETING TAKES PLACE ON NOVEMBER 7 OR 8, THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE AS FAR AS THE DRV IS CONCERNED.

35. WE AGAIN SAID WE COULD NOT COMPREHEND WHY, IF WE COULD TELL THE DRV SIDE TOMORROW THAT THE BOMBING WOULD STOP ON OCTOBER 30, THE NLF COULD NOT GET ON ITS WAY IMMEDIATELY.

36. WE SAID WE DID NOT SEE WHY THE NLF COULD NOT MOVE, ONCE IT KNOWS THAT THE BOMBING WILL BE STOPPED. WE WOULD BE ARE TRUSTING THE DRV SIDE TO HOLD A MEETING HERE NOVEMBER 2. WHY CAN THEY NOT TRUST US TO STOP THE BOMBING IF WE SAY SO. WE CANNOT SEE ANY GOOD REASON WHY THE NLF COULD NOT START ON ITS WAY AND THE REASON THAT THUY HAS GIVEN US IS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE. THY SAID THAT HE HAS EXPLAINED IT BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO UNDERSTAND HIM.

37. WE SAID WE WANTED TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT, BUT THAT WE HAD NOTHING TO REPORT BACK ON THIS QUESTION OF TIMING EXCEPT THUY'S CONTENTION THAT THE NLF COULD NOT COME. WHY CAN'T THEY GET ON A PLANE RIGHT AWAY? WE SAID WE WERE GOING TO REPORT BACK TO OUR GOVERNMENT ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSION TODAY, BUT WE DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE THUY WITH ANY IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS ANYTHING FURTHER WE CAN GIVE.

~~SECRET~~

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-2- PARIS 22992, SECTION 7 OF 7, OCT 26

38. WE SAID THAT WE REGRETTED THAT THUY DID NOT RECOGNIZE THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAD MOVED FAR IN THE DRV'S DIRECTION, AND DRV WAS NOT READY TO CONDEDE ON ANY MAJOR POINT. WE WOULD BE LESS THAN FRANK IF WE DID NOT SAY THAT WE WERE VERY DISAPPOINTED BY TODAY'S MEETING. THUY ANSWERED THAT PUBLIC OPINION HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTED DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS. THUY SAID THAT IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE DRV'S REAL DESIRE FOR SETTLEMTN THAT IT HAS DICUSED ANY OF OUR PROPOSALS, BUT IT SEEMS THAT WE ONLY WANT TO THE DRV TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AND IF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMTNT CANNOT BE REACHED, IT WILL BE THE RESPLNSIBILITY OF THE US.

39. WE SAID WE DID NOT WNAT TO ARGUE. WE AGREED TO REPORT EACH OTHER'S VIEWS TO OUR GOVERNMENTS AND ADJOURNED.

HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Saturday, October 26, 1968 -- 11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a lucid report from Cy Vance on a 5-hour hassle.

On the three points:

-- Agreement on the statement of participation and a good lucid reference to "prior discussions";

-- Some movement on "without conditions" by the interjection of a supplementary sentence (marked) "Representatives of the DRV understand that this move is made without reciprocity";

-- They came down from a week to 6 days.

Comment: I do not know whether the Soviet Union will weigh in with them on the basis of my talk. But I doubt they have had a chance to weigh in. Nevertheless, the movements today suggest that they are trying to find agreement rather than merely to stonewall.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 71C 91-484
By 19/ipp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

October 26, 1968

31a

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Cy Vance called on the Secure Phone (10:15 - 10:30 a.m.)

1. Harriman, Vance met with Thuy and Lau at the latter's place for 5 hours, starting at 0930 (Paris time).

2. Pursuant to instructions and Vance's phone discussion yesterday with Secretary Rusk, Harriman and Vance made a major effort to get the DRV to give up the idea of an agreed written document, but the DRV continued to insist on an agreed secret minute.

3. Agreement was reached on essentially our language for Para B of such a minute as follows:

"B. On the basis of prior discussions, it is agreed that a meeting to find a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem will be held in Paris on (date and time). The US has said that the RVN will be present, and the DRV has said that the NLF will be present. Accordingly, the meeting will include representatives of the DRV, NLF, RVN and US."

(Note: new words underscored)

4. On Para A, the DRV maintained its insistence on inclusion of the words "without conditions" which Harriman and Vance rejected. At one point the DRV suggested alternative language to the quoted words to the effect that "US representatives stated that President Johnson in statements concerning cessation of bombing will not use the word 'conditional', but they added a second sentence to the alternative proposal that "Reps of the DRV understand that this move is made without reciprocity", and Harriman rejected this proposal.

5. Thuy again asserted that the time interval could be discussed when and if agreement was reached on the minute. However, after much discussion the DRV representative finally stated that they proposed that if we stop bombing anytime on the 27th of October, the meeting would occur on November 2-a six day interval. Harriman and Vance said 3 days was our outside position.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71-482

By 19/jw, NARA, Date 3-5-93

BHK
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~*Pres file*

Saturday, October 26, 1968 - 10:35 am

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk's recommendation is quite simple; namely, that we tell the Israelis that he is prepared to talk to Rabin about Phantoms -- or anything else -- promptly upon Rabin's return to the U. S.

W. W. Rostow

Inform Argev _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 77C84-173By 12/6/93, NARA, Date 3-9-93~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

MEMORANDUM

DISCUSS w/ RUSK
+ GIVE ME HIS
RECOMMENDATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

32e
ACTION

Friday, October 25, 1968
2:20 p.m. *Re 200*

~~SECRET - NODIS~~
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Strong Israeli Reaction to Eban Talks Here

Abe Feinberg called last night to say the Israelis are up in arms because Pete Hart had apparently linked the Phantoms and the NPT after you and the Secretary had stopped just short of linking them.

I called Secretary Rusk who told me the following: The Secretary had not linked the NPT and the Phantoms but had told Eban that he wished Hart to discuss certain political questions with Rabin before technical discussions on the planes began. Rabin was leaving for Israel the following afternoon. Hart told him the one thing we were prepared to go into with Rabin on that short notice was International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which Eban had said he had reservations about. Rabin said he wasn't prepared to discuss that; he just wanted to discuss planes. So he and Hart made a date for 3:00 p.m., October 30, the day after Rabin and Eban come back. Rabin's line is: The NPT and the planes are two separate issues; let's get on with the planes.

I told Feinberg that neither you nor the Secretary had made the NPT a condition for the Phantoms but you considered the NPT of great importance.

Feinberg apparently told this to Argov who cabled Rabin that there was "no condition precedent" to the sale of Phantoms. (Argov is Rabin's deputy.)

This morning, Argov called me to ask whether he could today supplement his last night's message with another saying that a date has now been set for actual consultations on the Phantoms. He says that the Israeli press is now saying we have linked the NPT and Phantoms and that this will put Eshkol on the spot in the Cabinet. He'd like to put Eban in a position to knock these critics by saying (a) there's no condition and (b) what's more Rabin is taking technical consultants back with him to begin detailed negotiations.

If we want to wind up the Phantom negotiations promptly, as you indicated, that would make sense. But it would mean working the NPT on a separate track. The Israelis are mounting this reaction deliberately to press us to separate the Phantoms and the NPT. Giving them the kind

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-112

By irs, NARA Date 5-3-99

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

- 2 -

of answer. Argov wants would de-couple the two and take off the heat on the NPT that you and the Secretary generated.

I can respond to Argov in one of two ways, depending on how you and the Secretary wish to play this:

1. We could give Argov a date for the beginning of technical talks--a date several days after Rabin's return so that we can at least hear what he has to say on the NPT before the technical talks even though we'd be committed to begin them.

2. I could tell Argov: We have set no conditions. However, the Israelis themselves have told us the Phantoms would make it easier for them to sign the NPT. Moreover, others in the area have already related the two. This is a problem we have to cope with, so we asked Eban to tell us where the issue stands. Rabin can make all the practical arrangements he needs to while he is in Israel and then Hart will discuss dates with him next Wednesday.

You may wish to discuss this with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford before you reply, or you may wish me to.

W. A. F. Rostow

I prefer giving Argov a date _____
Hold the line, using the line in para. 2 above _____
Work out with Secretary Rusk _____

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

[REDACTED]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

33a 1.3(a)(4)

25 October 1968

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 94-214
Document # 33a

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Results of Nguyen Phong Thiep's
21 October 1968 Visit to Saigon

1. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

2. [REDACTED] Nguyen Phong Thiep, member of the South Vietnamese observer delegation to the Paris talks, [REDACTED] returned to Paris on 22 October 1968 from a one day visit to Saigon, South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Chanh Thanh instructed Phong to tell South Vietnamese Consul General and observer delegation chief Phan Dang Lam that, until the commencement of second stage talks, substantive discussions between the Americans and the South Vietnamese would take place solely in Saigon and Lam thus bore no responsibilities in this area. This was in response to Lam's complaint that he was not being kept fully informed about talks in Saigon. [REDACTED] Thanh promised to keep Lam better informed, and this has been borne out by an increase in reporting from Saigon to Paris. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

3. On the composition of the South Vietnamese delegation, Thanh told Thiep that Pham Van Thinh, South Vietnamese Ambassador in Bern, and Le Van Li, Vietnamese delegate to the United Nations Organizations in Geneva, were being added to the South Vietnamese

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
JAN 1995

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 019-041-2-1
By [signature], NARA, Date 1/21/02

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

delegation and would be arriving soon in Paris. Vu Vuong Bac, prominent Saigon lawyer, probably will not join the delegation because of the press of personal business in Saigon. Nguyen Ngoc Linh, Director of Vietnam Presse, has insisted that he be given the personal rank of Ambassador as a precondition for his joining the delegation as spokesman. [REDACTED] Linh bases this demand on his belief that Mr. William Jorden, U. S. Mission spokesman, has the same rank. Thanh told Thiep that he doubted that he could agree to this condition. For the job of military delegate, Thanh said that former IV Corps Commander and Revolutionary Development Chief General Nguyen Duc Thang was being actively considered but that no decision has been made.

1.3(a)(4)

4. During his visit to Saigon, Thiep had a private talk with President Nguyen Van Thieu. [REDACTED] Thieu said that there was no fundamental disagreement between himself and the Americans on the question of ultimately permitting the National Liberation Front to participate in the political life of South Vietnam by standing for public office in free elections. The main difference was rather the point of permitting the Liberation Front to take part in the negotiations without first having established their right to do so in this way. President Thieu said that he was afraid that chaos would result in Saigon if the Liberation Front joined the negotiations as a separate entity. He said that he expected trouble from the military, the Catholics and the militant Buddhists. Among the military, he believed the main trouble would come from company grade officers and lower ranks since the general officers were fairly well under control and the field grade officers could understand why it might be necessary to make concessions to the Liberation Front. He said that he was less confident of the ability of the Catholic hierarchy to control the Catholics, particularly if the militant Buddhists began causing trouble.

1.3(a)(4)

ACTION

Saturday - October 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Request for Authorization to Present Award in President's Name at International Philatelic Exhibition

An international stamp exhibition will take place in Mexico City in early November, including an exhibit from the Smithsonian Institution. Prizes will be donated by the Presidents of Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Canada, and other countries.

The President of the American Philatelic Society has provided a Steuben glass urn as an American prize. State recommends (Tab A) that you authorize Ambassador Freeman to present the urn in your name on November 4, which has been designated as United States Day at the Exhibition.

I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
Call me _____

Attachment

October 23 recommendation by Under Secretary Katzenbach to President.

SWLewis:mmm

341

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Authorization to
Present Award in Your Name

Recommendation:

That you authorize Ambassador Fulton Freeman to present an award in your name at the International Philatelic Exhibition in Mexico City on November 4, 1968.

Approve _____


Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The International Philatelic Federation (FIP) is sponsoring EFIMEX '68, an international stamp exhibit in Mexico City, from November 1 to 9, 1968. According to FIP regulations, prizes are awarded to winning entries in different categories of stamps submitted by private owners or museums. (The Smithsonian Institution is sending a selection of stamps never before exhibited outside the United States.)

The prizes will include a number of special awards donated by the Presidents of Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Canada, and other nations. Mr. Edward L. Willard, President of the American Philatelic Society, has provided a Steuben glass urn as one of the special prizes. The urn is covered, stands eight and a half inches high, and is inscribed with a Biblical verse (Psalm 91): "He shall give the angels charge over thee and keep thee in all thy ways."

Mr. Willard and the organizers of EFIMEX '68 have recommended that Ambassador Freeman present the urn in your name to one of the winning entries on November 4, the day that EFIMEX '68 will honor the United States. Ambassador Freeman concurs in this recommendation.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosures:

1. Rules and Regulations of
EFIMEX '68.
2. Photograph of Steuben glass urn.

EFIMEX' 68

International Philatelic Exhibition

Rules and Regulations

Organized under the sponsorship of the *Fédération Internationale de Philatélie* and under the auspices of the Ministry of Communications and Transports of Mexico by the *Federación Mexicana de Filatelia, A. C.*

The International Philatelic Exhibition EFIMEX'68 will be held in Mexico from November 1st to 9th, 1968, with the collaboration of different philatelic organizations among which are the *Association Internationale de Journalistes Philatéliques* (AIJP), the American Philatelic Society (APS), the *Asociación Filatélica de Costa Rica*, the *Asociación Filatélica Peruana*, the *Federación Filatélica Colombiana*, the Royal Philatelic Society of Canada, the American Topical Association (ATA), the *Elmhurst Philatelic Society*, the *Philatelic Press Club*, the *Phoenix Philatelic Association*, the *American Stamp Dealers Association* and the *Philatelic Traders Society of London*.

The exhibition EFIMEX'68 will be ruled by the general regulations established by the *Fédération Internationale de Philatélie* for exhibitions of international character. Besides the above mentioned regulations, EFIMEX'68 will be held under the following Rules and Regulations:

ARTICLE 1

The exhibition is open to all collectors who wish to participate and who comply with the regulations under which this exhibition is being held.

ARTICLE 2

There is no limit to the number of collections that each individual exhibitor may inscribe.

ARTICLE 3

Each collection has to be the property of the exhibitor who enters it.

ARTICLE 4

The collections may be exhibited under the names of their owners or with pseudonyms, in which case, the name of the owner and his address must be registered in the application for inscription to the Organizing Committee.

ARTICLE 5

The application for inscription for a collection must indicate the Class, Section, and Group in which it is being inscribed and no collection may be inscribed in more than one of them.

ARTICLE 6.

Incorrectly inscribed collections by Classes, Sections or Groups can be reclassified according to the judgement of the Selection Commission or the Judges.

ARTICLE 7

The collections for exhibition should be mounted on album pages or cards.

ARTICLE 8

Each exhibit must be of not less than four frames. In case the demand becomes larger than the capacity of the Exhibition, the Selection Committee reserves the right to exhibit only such portions as it may select.

ARTICLE 9

The Selection Commission reserves the right to reject inscriptions of collection that are not worthy of a philatelic exhibition of international character without giving any reason for such rejections. In such circumstances, any fees paid will be refunded.

ARTICLE 10

The shipping expenses to Mexico City of the inscribed collections for exhibition in EFIMEX'68 must be prepaid by the exhibitor and an equal amount must be sent to the Organizing Committee for the expenses of returning the exhibit in the same manner.

ARTICLE 11

All the exhibits will be returned to the owners as soon as possible after the closing of the exhibition, by the same shipping medium as they were received, unless other instructions are given and adequate payment is made for the shipping.

ARTICLE 12

For Literature Class exhibits, everything related to shipment and return will be the same as in Art. 11 above.

ARTICLE 13

The insurance for the exhibits must be paid and contracted for by the exhibitor.

ARTICLE 14

The applications for entry must be presented on the official application form, carefully made out with complete information requested. The original and one copy must be sent to the Organizing Committee EFIMEX'68, one copy to the national commissioner, as soon as possible, and one copy kept by the exhibitor. Application for inscription will not be received after *April 1st 1968*. Additional copies of the application forms may be requested from the commissioner in each country or from the Organizing Committee.

ARTICLE 15

Exhibitors will be allowed to forward their own collections or to send them by a representative by giving previous notification to the Organizing Committee.

ARTICLE 16

Without exception, the collections for exhibition must be delivered to the Organizing Committee EFIMEX'68 before *Sept. 30th 1968*.

ARTICLE 17

Exhibits which contain stamps considered to be harmful issues in the list published by FIP will be disqualified. Each exhibitor will receive a copy of the FIP list.

ARTICLE 18

Collections not for competition will only be accepted by invitation. Group collection will not be accepted for competition. Philatelic dealers will only be able to present their material in the booths reserved for them or in the non-competitive class. Collections owned by members of the jury can only be presented as non-competitive exhibitions.

ARTICLE 19

No exhibit or collection may be removed prior to the closing of the Exhibition.

ARTICLE 20

Questions which may arise concerning the exhibition and not provided by these regulations, will be decided by the Organizing Committee.

ARTICLE 21

No responsibility shall be attached to EFIMEX'68 or its Organizing Committee, its Directors, Commissions or employees for any loss or damage to any exhibit or part thereof arising from any cause whatsoever.

ARTICLE 22

The signature of the exhibitor on the application indicates the acceptance of these regulations.

Frames and Fees

ARTICLE 23

The exhibition frames will have the following dimensions: 67.5 cms. by 87 cms. (26½ by 34 inches). The frames will

be placed vertically. Special mounting and pages which do not fit the above mentioned measurements, will be accepted conditionally to the dimensions of the frames.

ARTICLE 24

The fee for each frame is \$62.50 Mex. Cy. (\$5 U.S. currency). The fee for each item in the Literature Class is \$125.00 Mex. Cy. (\$10 U.S. currency).

ARTICLE 25

It is recommended that exhibitors insure their collections in the form that they consider most convenient. All safety precautions will be taken in the handling of the collections. There will be adequate and permanent guards during the entire time of the exhibition.

Judges

ARTICLE 26

The panel of judges will be selected by the Organizing Committee from among qualified persons of moral integrity, experience and philatelic prestige. The integration of the Jury will be under FIP regulations on the matter. The Jury will establish its own internal form of operation. The decisions of the Jury are final and without appeal. The Secretary of the Jury will summarize its decisions and the official report of the awards will be announced by the Chairman of the Jury.

Awards

ARTICLE 27

The Organizing Committee will place at the disposal of the Judges a sufficient number of gold—large and small size—, silver, silver-gilt (*vermeil*), silver, silver-bronze and bronze medals which will be awarded in the different Classes, Sections and Groups. Additional awards, each in lieu of a medal, will be awarded as follows:

A. A Grand Trophy for the best exhibit in the Honor Class:

Objet d'Art or a large gold medal and special diploma.

B. A Grand Trophy for the best exhibit in the National Class:

Objet d'Art or a large gold medal and special diploma.

C. A Grand Trophy for the best exhibit in the Competitive Class:

Objet d'Art or a large gold medal and special diploma.

Each exhibitor will receive a certificate of participation. In case an award is obtained, it will be stated thereon.

Classification of exhibits

ARTICLE 28

Official: Exhibits of Government Postal Administrations, Museums or Stamp Printing Offices, by special invitation. (Non-competitive Art. 6, FIP Regulations).

Court of Honor: Exhibits of special interest by invitation of the Organizing Committee (Non-competitive. Art. 7, Sec. 2. FIP Regulations).

Hors Concours: Selected exhibits by invitation of the Organizing Committee. (Non-competitive. Art. 9. FIP Regulations).

Honor Class: Collections awarded at least two gold medals or grand prize and gold medal or the equivalent at the preceding five (listed) International Exhibitions recognized by FIP (Art. 7. FIP Regulations).

1963 Luxembourg or Istanbul.

1964 Paris.

1965 Vienna.

1966 Washington.

1967 Amsterdam.

Competitive Class: Collections of philatelic material of all kinds whether general, specialized, or research studies in the various categories of Philately (Art. 20. FIP Regulations).

SECTION 1. MEXICO OR NATIONAL CLASS.

Group:

1. General Collections.
2. Classics 1856-1884.
3. Antique 1885-1910.
4. Revolution 1910-1925.
5. Modern 1923-1968.
6. Porte de Mar and Officials.
7. Postal stationery, enteros, cards and covers.
8. Airmails.
9. FDCs, First Flights and special cancellations.
10. Postal History.

Foreign Countries

Collections should be entered in the Sections that follow and by the Group category appropriate for each country.

SECTION 2. LATIN AMERICA (EXCEPT MEXICO).

SECTION 3. UNITED STATES AND CANADA.

SECTION 4. EUROPE (EXCEPT GREAT BRITAIN).

SECTION 5. GREAT BRITAIN AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH (EXCEPT CANADA).

SECTION 6. AFRICA, ASIA, AUSTRALIA (EXCEPT BRITISH COMMONWEALTH).

Groups: (for Sections 2 through 6 above).

1. General Collections.
2. Postal Issues - 19th century.
3. Postal Issues - 20th century.
4. Locals and Private Posts.
5. Official, Newspaper, Postage Due, Special Delivery, Registry, Telegraph, etc.
6. Postal Stationery.
7. Colonies and Offices Abroad.
8. Essays, Proofs and Specimens.
9. Postal History including Pre-Stamp Covers, Postal Marking, etc.
10. Cancellations, including Maritime, Railroad, Military, Foreign Usage, etc.
11. First Day Covers (non-thematic).
12. Any other material not classified above.

SECTION 7. AIR MAIL. COLLECTION OF STAMPS AND/OR COVERS.

1. General.
2. Specialized.
3. Semi-official.
4. Pioneer and Government Flights.
5. Historical, Balloon, Zeppelin and Trans-Oceanic Flights.
6. Rocket, Missile or Space Age Flights and related material.
7. Aero-Postal Stationery including air letter sheets.

SECTION 8. THEMATIC OR TOPICAL.

Groups:

1. Themes (except Sports and Olympics).
2. Illustrative Subject Collections (except Sports and Olympics).
3. Issuing Motive Collections (except Sports and Olympics).
4. Sports and Olympics.

SECTION 9. PHILATELIC LITERATURE.

Groups:

1. Philatelic Handbooks, Brochures and Studies. (Division 1a and b. AIJP rules).
2. Philatelic Periodicals. (Division 2 AIJP rules).
3. Catalogues (Division 5. AIJP rules).
4. Other (Divisions 3 and 4 AIJP rules).

Dealers Participations

Conditions: There will be place for 36 booths of 5.90 meters front by 2.10 meters (19 ft. by 7 ft.) which will be rented to stamp dealers or philatelic publishers, national and foreign. Plan of exhibiting spaces will be provided to the applicants of dealers booths. The booth space may not be sublet, transferred or rented by more than one dealer.

Equipment: The booths will be furnished with one table and four chairs. Additional furnishing or equipment must be provided for at the expense of the booth holder and with the approval of the Organizing Committee.

Exhibited material: All the material for exhibition in the dealers booths shall be appropriate for a philatelic exhibition and shall be subject to the approval of the Organizing Committee.

Choice of location: The booths will be rented to the applicant strictly in the order of their application receipt.

Rental: The rental for each booth with standard measures will be \$5,000 Mex. (\$400 U.S. currency) for the duration of the exhibition: payable \$3,000 Mex. (\$240 U.S. currency) with the application and the balance no later than July 1st. 1968. Payment by check should be made out to Comité Organizador EFIMEX'68.

General information: No commercial transactions of any kind will be allowed on the floor of the exhibition except in the booths. Anyone interested in reserving a booth or wanting information should communicate with Comité Organizador EFIMEX'68 Comisión Comercial. Apartado Postal 12, México 1, D. F.

EFIMEX'68

INTERNATIONAL PHILATELIC EXHIBITION
Organizing Committee

**COVERED URN**

Inscribed with a verse from the *Old Testament*,
Psalms XCI: 11.

8159 • Height 8½" • \$170.00

STEUBEN GLASS