

INFORMATION

35

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 25, 1968  
11:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres for ic*

More on Hanoi-Peking tension.

I increasingly have the feeling that the key to what we see in Paris and between Washington and Moscow on Vietnam is linked to what is happening between Moscow-Peking-Hanoi.

I wish I knew more about it.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A

[REDACTED]

25 October 1968

1.3 (a)(4)

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-041-2-2-5

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 019-041-2-2  
By Q, NARA, Date 1/21/02

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

35a

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE ERXX  
EXO DDI XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX

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[REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)  
**THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.**

[REDACTED] CITE [REDACTED]  
DIST. 25 OCTOBER 1968

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA *Retlow*

DOI [REDACTED]

SUBJECT <sup>25 17 52z Oct 68</sup> [REDACTED] COMMENTS ON DETERIORATING NORTH VIETNAMESE-CHINESE RELATIONS, 1.3(a)(4)  
AND CLAIM THAT AMERICANS WILL CEASE BOMBING AND OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION IF  
HANOI AGREES TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE COALITION GOVERNMENT WHICH INCLUDES VIET CONG

ACQ [REDACTED] FIELD NO.

SOURCE [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1. ~~THESE WERE RECENT HIGH LEVEL~~  
~~TALKS BETWEEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE CHINESE. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO~~ 1.3(a)(4)  
~~GOVERNMENTS ARE SAID TO BE RAPIDLY DETERIORATING. THE CHINESE OFFERED COMBAT~~  
~~TROOPS TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO ENABLE THEM TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE. BUT THE~~  
~~NORTH VIETNAMESE REPORTEDLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THEM. THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO REMAIN~~  
~~BITTERLY OPPOSED TO CONTINUATION OF THE PARIS TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS. FIGURES~~  
~~DIEFER, BUT A LARGE NUMBER OF CHINESE SAPPERS, BRIDGE AND ROAD SPECIALISTS, HAVE~~  
~~BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM NORTH VIETNAM.~~

2. [REDACTED] THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD THE NORTH 1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)  
(classification) (dissem controls)

SANTIZED  
Authority NCT 019-041-2-3  
By [Signature], NARA, Date 1/21/02

IN

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WOULD STOP THE BOMBING ALTOGETHER AND TAKE NO OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION ON THE GROUND IF HANOI WOULD AGREE TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH INCLUDED SOME VIET CONG REPRESENTATION.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

3. FIELD DISSEM. NONE.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

*Per file*

Friday, October 25, 1968  
11:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a [redacted] message which indicates that Tho (Chief of the NLF) may have left South Vietnam for Hanoi and has been replaced.

3.4(b)(1,3)

Perhaps en route to Paris? We don't know. But interesting.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-113 and NLJ 94 4/4  
By ia, NARA, Date 6-3-04

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rln

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1968 OCT 25 20 29

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PP [redacted]  
DE [redacted] 721 2991937

P 251925Z  
FM DIRNSA  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
INFO [redacted]

P 240355Z  
FM [redacted]  
TO [redacted]  
DIRNSA

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-112 and NLJ94-413  
By no, NARA, Date 2-28-05

[Large redacted block]

Restow

This is [redacted]  
report being  
checked out

ZEM  
~~TOP SECRET~~ PRIME US/UK/AUS/NZ EYES ONLY

[redacted]  
-8928-68.

HIGH LEVEL VC CHANGES IN COSVN

23 OCT

1. GENERAL HUYNH VAN NGHE ((NGUYEENX VEAN NGHEEV)) WAS DESIGNATED TO ASSUME THE POSITION OF DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL OF COSXN ARMED FORCES REPLACING NGUYEN THI DINH ((NGUYEENX THIV DINHV));
2. HG HUY GIAP ((NAL HUY GIAPS)) IS REPLACING NGUYEN HUU THO ((NGUYEENX HUWUX THOV)), CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, BECAUSE THO RECEIVED URGENT ORDERS FROM HANOI CALLING HIM BACK TO THE NORTH;
3. REQUEST [redacted] SECTION CHECK OUT THE ABOVE INFORMATION AND REPORT THE OUTCOME TO CENTRAL SOONEST.  
(A) NOT AVAILABLE.

275

E.O. 12958  
3.3 (b)(1, 3, 6)

This is the NLF "Tho."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Profile

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Friday, October 25, 1968 -- 9:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

NEJ 92-288

By me, NARA, Date 7-2-93

I received Amb. Dobrynin at my house at 5:00 p.m. today, October 25. After brief amenities, I told him that the President wished me to review with him, on the same basis that we had earlier met, his concerns about the present situation with respect to the Vietnam negotiations. I explained that the document I was about to give him was a personal oral communication reflecting what was on the President's mind.

He read the document carefully (Tab A).

With respect to para. 1, he said that only he, Dobrynin, knows fully about the Paris negotiations and communications between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. Tcherniakov, his DMC, knows half the story. No one<sup>else</sup> in the Embassy has the knowledge to speak with any authority on what is happening about Vietnam. When I pointed out to him that we had stories alleged to be from diplomatic sources in London, he said he could not assume responsibility for the Embassy in London. I said that I had no doubt about the correctness of his own behavior in this matter but we were confronted with a fact; namely, that stories were appearing, allegedly from Soviet sources; and we were confronted with a second fact; namely, that almost every newspaper man who came into my office told me that his favorite Soviet contact was telling him hopeful things about the negotiations and how peace was about to break out due to the role of the Soviet Union. He said that he had issued instructions to everyone in his Embassy not to talk about Vietnam. We ended by my underlining ~~that~~ what the memorandum said; namely, that this was a problem for the President for the reasons indicated.

Dobrynin then turned to substance. He said that he found the memorandum very "disappointing." He thought we were going back to matters which had long since been settled. As he understood the situation in Paris, there were three questions:

-- First, how we refer to the participation of those who would take part in the talks. On this matter we had raised a "new point" by wanting to get into the secret minute that participation "would not involve recognition." Everyone agreed that "recognition" was not involved.

-- Second, there was the question that the bombing cessation would be "unconditional." He said this was not a matter, in his judgment, of great importance. It was not worth sacrificing the whole meeting on this matter. I interrupted to point out that my memorandum to him explained fully why we took the question of "unconditional" so seriously. Dobrynin said he recognized that we attached great importance to the matter and would so report.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

-- Third, there was the question of the date of cessation of the bombardment. He attached great importance to the fact that the North Vietnamese had set a date; namely, November 2. He could not understand why a few days one way or the other <sup>was</sup> so important to us when there were such great issues at stake. We have been arguing, he said, for two weeks over the question of 2 days.

I said to him it was not quite so simple. From our point of view, we had in good faith put in a proposal in mid-October. We had chosen "the next day" because of what they had said about beginning serious talks the day after the bombing cessation. (Dobrynin said this was a new idea to him. He had not known that they had mentioned the next day.) I went on to say that having geared ourselves to a final decision on the basis of what had been exchanged, Hanoi negotiators had then unleashed a great many "rabbits": a four-power conference; a communique; a secret minute; several weeks "as a gap between the bombing cessation and the first meeting"; no conditions; etc. It was Hanoi's behavior with respect to these matters which had deeply concerned the President, because they might reflect a lack of understanding of the "facts of life" and a lack of understanding of the seriousness of the problems that we faced in moving forward, especially at so sensitive a political time.

After some elaboration <sup>by me</sup> of the kinds of pressures represented by recent items on the ticker in our political life, Dobrynin said: "I now understand better. I thought that this message would take us back very far to where we began some months ago; but I should like to clear up one serious point: in communicating this message to my government, should I say that the President will not proceed with the Paris negotiations until he gets a response from the Soviet government on the question raised?" I said that it was my impression that the President had merely asked me to convey to Ambassador Dobrynin and his government his present concerns. The question he was asking, however, was a serious diplomatic question and I would seek an answer.

I then called the President and put the issue to him. The President said, no. I do not wish to be that hard. I do not wish to commit myself to holding up the Paris negotiations. I would wish to know the reaction of the Soviet government to this situation.

After this clarification, Dobrynin returned to the three points at stake in the Paris talks. He said: You and I can talk with brutal frankness and if I understand what you are telling me, it is that on one point you are prepared to compromise. That is, you are prepared to see the participants listed. But on two points you intend to hold firm; that is, on "without conditions" and time. At about this point I received a telephone call from Ben Read who told me that we would be prepared to tell the North Vietnamese in the context of the secret minute that we did not plan to use in formal statements the phrase "conditions."

I informed Ambassador Dobrynin of this fact and said that now we were prepared to compromise on one and a half of the three points. It was time for them to clear this underbrush away.

At this point Dobrynin volunteered the following. He had been privileged to get the reports from both our side and from the Hanoi delegation. He could attest from his personal knowledge that we had "many, many times" made clear the "facts of life." I asked: "Are you, Ambassador Dobrynin, prepared to tell me that they understand the 'facts of life'?" He said, "I can only say that from their reports to me as well as your reports to our people in Paris, you have expressed yourselves very clearly."

At almost exactly 6:00 p. m., as Ambassador Dobrynin was about to leave, he received at my home a telephone call from Tcherniakov, his DCM. Tcherniakov reported that a message to the President from Kosygin had just arrived, on Vietnam. We consulted together as to where the message should be delivered. We decided to minimize the chances of a leak about our contact and Tcherniakov would deliver the message to my house. Dobrynin then dispatched his car to pick up Tcherniakov, and we settled down to await him. (Up to this point, contrary to his custom, Dobrynin did not have a Scotch. He accepted, while awaiting Tcherniakov.)

During the interval, Dobrynin raised with me the question of missile talks. Where do we stand? I said that while the matter was still on the President's mind, he was much concentrated on the question of Vietnam. I then asked: "Was it true that the Warsaw Pact forces are moving out of Czechoslovakia?" He hastened to tell me that Bulgarian, <sup>Rumanian,</sup> and Polish as well as some Soviet forces were moving out of Czechoslovakia. He added, gratuitously, that there never had been any German forces in Czechoslovakia -- which, I take it, will be the Soviet mythology in the face of protests of the other occupying powers of Germany.

He indicated his view that it would be a good thing if we could get on with the missile talks.

I took the occasion of the break to say that, on a strictly personal basis, if I had any advice to give the leaders in Hanoi, it would be to go very rapidly for a definitive settlement in Southeast Asia once the new phase of talks opened, assuming we could surmount present problems. I recalled that it only took a month's hard work in Geneva in 1954. He asked me why I thought there was urgency. I said there were two reasons:

-- First, there would be a wave of expectation and goodwill in the U. S. in the wake of a bombing cessation, quiet at the DMZ, quiet in the cities, and GVN participation in Paris. But he had to remember that this was a country

which had a scar on its heart over Panmunjom. If the talks dragged on, there would be grave disappointment.

-- Second, as he could see from the polls, this country was undergoing a swing towards conservatism. This has happened before in our history, but it was clear that something like 60% of the people were for Nixon or Wallace. I could not predict what would happen if there was protracted frustration in the movement towards peace. It was my personal judgment, however, that there would be strong pressures to apply more military power in Vietnam rather than less.

I concluded by saying that in my quite objective judgment, it would be wise for the leaders of Hanoi to seize this moment and work with President Johnson towards the position he first outlined in his Johns Hopkins speech; namely, a position in which an independent North Vietnam associated itself not with China but with the other countries of Southeast Asia in constructive efforts at development. Only in this way was North Vietnam likely to maintain its independence. (Dobrynin showed surprising interest and concentration as I made this point.)

Tcherniakov then came in with the attached letter to the President from Kosygin (Tab B).

Dobrynin then gave me the following informal translation.

"Mr. President:

"Information we are receiving from official representatives of the United States as well as from the representatives of the DRV, shows that there is now beginning a very important movement in the U.S. - Vietnamese negotiations in Paris.

"Judging from this information, the position of the two sides on the cessation of bombardment, etc., is much closer. And the possibility of reaching an agreement on this question is quite real.

"By such an agreement we could lay the basis for a beginning of a breakthrough towards a political settlement of the Vietnam problem.

"If this possibility which now exists is missed -- the development of events could go in a different direction.

"We are convinced that it is necessary that both sides show understanding and responsibility at this moment.

"In this connection, we should like to tell you quite frankly, Mr. President, that we are not completely convinced that the American side's actions in Paris have proceeded from this particular understanding of the situation.

"We are concerned that the achievement of an agreement in Paris on the cessation of the bombing of the DRV and the beginning of subsequent political talks with participation of the DRV, NLF, U.S. and the Saigon administration could be torpedoed because of details of third importance which, in reality, do not have any significance.

"We would like to hope that the government of the United States would understand its responsibility in connection with the present negotiations in Paris and would not let these negotiations break but would use them to open the way to a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem, based on the respect of the legitimate rights and hopes of the Vietnamese people which correspond with the interest of the people of the United States and the peoples of the whole world."

On a wholly personal basis, I made the following observations to Dobrynin on this letter.

First, I would, of course, promptly communicate it to the President and to Secretary Rusk. Second, I found it good that on both sides there was an impulse to communicate when a matter of concern arose affecting the peace. Third, as my communication to him revealed, the President felt concerns of first importance in the light of the positions taken by North Vietnam, which Chairman Kosygin had described as third importance. The question of conditions and of timing were, from our point of view, major matters.

He said that the communication, which I had given him, and our discussion had made this clear and he would so inform his government.

As we went out to our respective cars, I looked at my watch and said: "Anatoliy, it is now midnight in Paris. You'd better get to work to clear up these issues of third importance." He said he would get busy but he didn't know what he could accomplish before the morning meeting in Paris.

Upon returning to my office, I then reported to the President that we had received the message from Kosygin and briefly summarized its substance.

The President instructed me that, after checking with Sec. Rusk, I should make the following points to Dobrynin.

"I have informed the President of Chairman Kosygin's message and he wished me to convey to you immediately the following points:

1. The President is gratified that both the Chairman and he were thinking of same problem at the same time.

2. The President has tried and is trying to find answers to these problems but has been unable to persuade the other side to meet us on acceptable terms. Perhaps Chairman Kosygin can help. Perhaps he can try to help move us closer.

3. The President wishes you to know that the points I made to you this afternoon are, in effect, his response to Chairman Kosygin. They represent the anxieties on the President's mind.

4. The President agrees with Chairman Kosygin that this is a critical phase. He would welcome any assistance the Chairman can give us in getting these issues solved. The President believes that, with the passage of a few more days, this possibility for progress might move away from us. "

After briefing Sec. Rusk and reporting the President's four-point message, he suggested that I add the following additional point.

5. Therefore, the President believes that both sides should push these issues of third importance quickly aside and get on with the real business, which is making peace.

I then telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin and twice repeated these five points for urgent transmission to Moscow.

W. W. Rostow

October --, 1968

37a

The President wished me to review with you personally the situation in which we now find ourselves with respect to the Vietnam negotiation in Paris.

I recall that Sec. Rusk told Foreign Minister Gromyko that we would concentrate on certain aspects of the negotiation and that it would be helpful if you could concentrate on the problem of GVN participation. But on this occasion the President wished me to review all the issues with you and to solicit your reaction and that of your government.

Here are the things that are most on the President's mind.

1. The situation is made very difficult by reports to the press apparently or allegedly from Soviet diplomatic sources, stating that we are very close to an agreement. These reports have the effect not only of generating an optimism which may not prove justified. They also create in those groups which are most strongly anti-Communist in our country, a sense that we are being led into some kind of trap. It would be extremely helpful at this delicate moment if Soviet diplomatic sources would not encourage the press in any particular direction and, in fact, if possible, not comment at all on the negotiation and its prospects.

2. Even more serious is this. The President is committed before his own people that a bombing cessation would not result in an increase in danger and casualties to US forces and those of our allies. It is for that reason that he has insisted that it is a fact of life that the bombing cessation could not be maintained if the DMZ were violated and the South

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

By PHIP NJ 92-288

NARA, Date 4/7/94

Vietnamese cities attacked. We are not sure that Hanoi really understands how fundamental it is to the maintenance of a bombing cessation that these two operational conditions be observed. If we come to agreement in Paris, the President will issue standing instructions to General Abrams which would permit him to respond instantly to violations of the DMZ. The President and his colleagues are mutually committed to respond if the cities are attacked.

You know, Mr. Ambassador, that it has been and remains the President's intent to deal with the Soviet Union on the basis of respect and trust and good faith.

He would like to be able to deal with Hanoi on the same basis; because making a stable peace in Southeast Asia is a most serious matter for all the nations of the area, including North Vietnam. It is, therefore, exceedingly important that the Soviet Government and the Government in Hanoi be quite clear that all three of the points we have made -- including the facts of life about the DMZ and the cities -- are firmly understood. If there is any doubt in the minds of the Soviet leaders on this point, it would be a matter of the utmost importance to us.

There could be no outcome worse for all our efforts than to have a resumption of the bombing and the break up of what we have tried to achieve since March 31.

3. The Ambassador should be aware of the cost imposed on us by Hanoi's delay over minor matters such as a secret minute; its exact language; the form in which those participating in the conference will be mentioned. We tried to anticipate these problems by the your side-our side

formula which, we believe, had advantages for everyone concerned. We tried to arrange it so that we moved very promptly from a bombing cessation into the substance of the search for peace. / We have avoided in our conversations with North Vietnam the use of the word "conditions" by talking about the facts of life. Now we are losing day after day and coming closer to the election in the United States. If the bombing is stopped this close to a Presidential election, our people will debate for years whether it had an effect or no effect. A great divisive force will be let loose in this country. The President intends to proceed as he has thus far proceeded on Vietnam in a manner wholly free of domestic politics. He is not delaying the negotiation at the present time: Hanoi is delaying it by this haggle over words. The President has not expedited the negotiation nor will he expedite it on the basis of the election. He is taking each step on the merits. But you, Mr. Ambassador, should be aware of the burden imposed on the President by the tactics of the other side at this time.

4. So far as the substance is concerned, the phrase "without conditions" gives us grave difficulty. We take a minute between ourselves and another government seriously. We have not tried to force the word "conditions" on Hanoi. We do not intend to use the word "conditions" in a governmental statement. But we do not wish to mislead Hanoi in substance -- nor our own people -- about the facts of life.

5. But the most important point the President wishes to leave with you, on which he invites your comment and that of your government, is the significance of all three of the points we have raised:

- the participation of the GVN;
- the maintenance of the DMZ;
- and the absence of attacks on the cities.

There would be great danger to us all if there is any misunderstanding on these three points, if the negotiators in Paris should succeed in the days ahead in finding a formula.

ACTION

Friday, October 25, 1968 - 4:35pm

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Sunday is the 10th Anniversary of President Ayub's assumption of power in Pakistan. Ben Oehlert recommends that you send congratulations. Attached is a proposed message.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approved *[Signature]*

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:HS:RM:lw

Att: File 3295

38a

Proposed Message to President Ayub

Dear Mr. President:

America joins your many friends around the world in celebrating this tenth anniversary of your wise and constructive leadership.

There are numerous tributes to this decade of selfless service to Pakistan and the world. But none is greater than the prosperous factories and the new schools and the fertile farms that have made your nation a model of dynamic development. We are deeply proud of the close friendship and cooperation you have done so much to build between our two countries.

Mrs. Johnson and I send you, good friend, our warmest wishes for continued health and success.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Friday, October 25, 1968 - 5:30pm

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

*Pres file*

**SUBJECT: Use of the National Security Council**

The full National Security Council has met an average of once each month from the time you assumed the Presidency until now.

In 1968, there have been 12 meetings so far.

The majority of Council members have met weekly during 1968 at regularly scheduled meetings. The total number of these Tuesday meetings is 34.

Other meetings on national security problems which were attended by the majority of Council members during 1968 total 17.

The Council staff, under my general supervision, has been engaged fulltime in assisting you in preparation not only for the Council meetings, but also for the less formal Tuesday meetings.

A description of procedures used in reaching decisions in the national security area is incomplete without reference to the extensive organization which has grown up under State Department direction following your <sup>delegation of</sup> authority to the Secretary of State and the creation of the Senior Interdepartmental Group and its regional subordinate committees.

Walt Rostow

Friday, Oct. 25, 1968  
3:50 p. m.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This evaluation of enemy force movements from NSA (see marked passages) is the first time that any professional intelligence source has stated that the enemy force movements go "beyond the normal regrouping following a major coordinated offensive." I must say they are rather impressive, with 30 of 56 enemy main force regiments out of the country, and the rest of them mainly pulled out of fighting areas.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET SAVIN~~ attachment

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-113  
By is, NARA, Date 6-3-04

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By 100, NARA, Date 2-28-05

~~SECRET SAVIN~~  
WHITE HOUSE (MR MCCAFFERTY)  
OPCEN (PASS TO MR HERRIARD)  
(MR MCMAHIS SENDS)

THIS INFORMAL REPORT IS PASSED ONLY TO THE ABOVE ADDRESSEES IN RESPONSE TO THEIR SPECIAL REQUESTS. ITEMS ARE BASED ON PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED SIGINT. NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS REPORT IS AUTHORIZED.

25 OCTOBER 1968

WHITE HOUSE REPORT OF 25 OCTOBER 1968

I CORPS

ELEMENTS OF THE NVA 164TH ARTY REGIMENT CONTINUED TO REFERENCE ACTIVE CONTACT FROM ALLIED FORCES IN THE AREA.

IN THE EASTERN DMZ, UNUSUAL HIGH PRECEDENCE MESSAGE ACTIVITY BY THE 278TH INDEPENDENT REGIMENT, WHILE IN COMMUNICATIONS WITH HQ, MR 4, OCCURRED WHILE THE REGIMENT RELOCATED APPROXIMATELY 4 KM NORTH-NORTHWEST OF GIO LINH.

FURTHER SOUTH IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, AN NVA FRONT FOUR ASSOCIATE INSTRUCTED ANOTHER FRONT FOUR ASSOCIATE TO MOBILIZE CIVILIAN WORKERS TO TRANSPORT RICE. "THE AMOUNT IS 50 TONS TO RESCUE THE UNIT." THE DESTINATION OF THE RICE MIGHT BE SOMEWHERE IN THE DAI LOC DISTRICT.

II CORPS

ON 24 OCTOBER SIGINT REVEALED THAT ANOTHER 23 FRONT ASSOCIATE MOVED NORTH AND THAT A SUBORDINATE TO HQ NVA 1ST DIVISION HAD MOVED EASTWARD TOWARD THE DUC CO SF CAMP REGION. THIS MOVEMENT MAY REPRESENT CONTINUED INTEREST AND OR BUILD UP IN THE DUC CO SF CAMP REGION.

MESSAGES EXCHANGED BY UNIDENTIFIED ASSOCIATES OF THE NVA 95 B REGIMENT ON 24 OCTOBER AGAIN CONTAINED PREPARATIONS FOR AN UPCOMING MISSION. ONE ELEMENT, POSSIBLE HQ NVA 95 B, SENT INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING 500 KILOGRAMS OF (RICE) AND PERSONNEL, TO THE OTHER, POSSIBLE NVA 95 B REGIMENT ASSOCIATE, FOR AN UPCOMING MISSION. LATER INFORMATION OF 24 OCTOBER REVEALED THAT DELAYS IN THE MISSION MIGHT BE CONTINGENT UPON ACQUISITION OF ROCKETS. HQ 95 B ALSO TOLD ITS POSSIBLE 1ST BATTALION, PLEIKU PROVINCE, TO BE PREPARED TO MOBILIZE AT LEAST UNTIL 30 OCTOBER.

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## III CORPS

HQ VC 274TH REGIMENT REVEALED A CONCERN OVER THE STATUS OF ITS SUBORDINATE UNITS AND SUPPLYS IN THE EVENT OF FURTHER ALLIED SWEEPS. SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS REPORTED ON HOSTILE AIRCRAFT AND UPON RECEIVING AROUND THE CLOCK ARTILLERY FIRE.

**SPECIAL SUMMARY: VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST SHIFT TO PASSIVE STATUS BECOMING MORE PRONOUNCED**

THE TENDENCY THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM TOWARD TACTICAL QUIET AND APPARENT AVOIDANCE OF ALLIED FORCES HAS NOW BECOME A PREDOMINATING TREND. MAJOR COMMUNIST UNITS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY HAVE DEPLOYED AWAY FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE TACTICAL AREAS OF OPERATIONS OR HAVE MOVED INTO NEW AREAS. ENEMY UNITS WHICH HAVE REMAINED IN PLACE--PRESUMABLY TO MAINTAIN COMMUNIST MILITARY PRESENCE--ARE APPARENTLY ENCOUNTERING DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM ALLIED ACTIVITIES, ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS AND LOGISTICS PROBLEMS. VERY FEW ATTACKS ARE BEING INITIATED BY NVA AND VIET CONG (VC) UNITS. THE NVA 323TH DIVISION HAS CONTINUED ITS NORTHWARD MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE DMZ, WHILE THE NVA 29TH AND 93TH REGIMENTS, BOTH SUBORDINATE TO MILITARY REGION (MR) TRI-THIEN-HUE (TTH), ARE NOW LOCATED IN SOUTHERN QUANG BINH PROVINCE, JUST ABOVE THE DMZ. ARTILLERY UNITS IN THE DMZ CONTINUE TO DISCUSS MOVEMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND TO RECONNOITER AND PREPARE FOR ARTILLERY ATTACKS. OTHER MR TTH FORCES, INCLUDING THE REGION HEADQUARTERS, ITS FORWARD ELEMENT, AND CERTAIN MANEUVER ELEMENTS, ARE STILL DEPLOYED IN LAOS, SOUTHWEST OF TONKIN (991). A REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF TACTICAL ACTIVITY HAS ACCOMPANIED OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN MR 5, ALTHOUGH LOCALIZED COMMUNIST ATTACKS HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN SIGINT. SOME VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST UNITS WITHIN THE REGION ARE APPARENTLY REGROUPING. ELEMENTS OF THE NVA 3RD DIVISION MAY HAVE BEEN RESUBORDINATED TO HQ, MR 5 MAIN FORCE UNIT CONTROL (MFUC) WHILE THE NVA 1ST DIVISION HAS DEPLOYED FROM THE 33 FRONT AREA INTO NORTHERN III CORPS. THROUGHOUT THE REST OF MAY 80, VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST UNITS HAVE REMAINED IN AREAS REMOTE FROM MAJOR ALLIED INSTALLATIONS.

THE RESULTING POSTURE OF COMMUNIST FORCES SUGGESTS A SHIFT BEYOND THE USUAL REGROUPING FOLLOWING A MAJOR COORDINATED OFFENSIVE. ITS PURPOSE IS NOT YET APPARENT.

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NNNN

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ACTION

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~Friday~~<sup>25</sup>  
Thursday, October 24, 1968  
3:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Tanks for Pakistan

At Tab A Nick Katzenbach advises that we have reached the decision point in the nagging year-old effort to find Patton tanks for Ayub. If you feel strongly about this obligation, he recommends that we pay the cost (\$3 million) of arranging an interim sale through Turkey, the only feasible third-country deal we've been able to turn up. Failing a Turkish deal, Katzenbach thinks we should tell Ayub we have honestly done our best and he will have to look elsewhere. With the support of his SIG colleagues, Nick lays out your main options:

1. Turkish sale: The Turks apparently won't sell 100 M-47's to Pakistan unless they can get 100 refurbished M-48's for themselves in the bargain. This will cost us about \$3 million; Nitze is prepared to find the money within current budget limits. But this would take care of only half of the 200 tanks Ayub wants. Defense is not ready to chip in another \$3 million for another round of the Turk-to-Pak tank switch. Katzenbach and Co. recommend you can and should leave the second 100 tanks for your successor. One hundred now at \$3 million and 100 left hanging is the preferred course.

2. Iran: The Shah will sell 100 old M-47's to Ayub if we replace them with new M-60's. This would add \$22 million to Iran's planned purchases. Thus it would fly in the face of our budget-cutting advice to the Shah and probably raise a storm on the Hill. No one recommends this alternative.

3. Change policy for one-time exception: You could lift the current ban on direct U. S. weapons sales to the subcontinent just to sell Ayub these tanks. Your advisors think this would be the worst of worlds. It would mock a policy we've all defended up to this moment, be certain to bring an outcry from the Hill, and deeply embitter the Indians, who have always feared that we didn't mean our even-handed policy following the 1965 war. Chet Bowles feels strongly that it's far better to remove the arms ban for good-- whatever flak this would bring in India -- rather than try to carry off a one-time exception for Pak arms clearly aimed at the Indians.

4. Reverse current policy: You could lift the South Asian arms ban altogether because of (a) the demonstrable argument that third

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-212

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By CG, NARA, Date 1-5-95

country sales just don't work, and (b) the policy judgment that arms sales are the only way to get the seat we want at Pak and Indian tables to influence -- and, hopefully, restrain -- their inevitable military spending. As with all military sales, we would be deciding sales to India and Pakistan case-by-case on the grounds of legitimate need and aiming at ultimate limitation of arms spending.

Nick would like to see us do everything we can to make the Turkish sale work because removing the ban altogether will surely present us with a sizeable and expensive shopping list from the Paks. And though they would make righteous noises at first about our policy switch, the Indians would also soon be pressing to buy. Certainly we could call the shots on what we even consider selling. But no one can be sure that lifting the ban, arousing expectations, and then turning down numerous requests wouldn't leave us with less leverage on the Indians and Paks than we have now. Whatever its effect abroad, a change in policy would bring sharp reaction from the Hill.

Despite these strong arguments against lifting the ban, Nick and his colleagues feel that if the Turkish deal is unworkable -- and you personally feel a commitment to Ayub -- the next best way to get him the tanks would be to change present policy across the board. We hoped third-country purchases would add enough flexibility to our policy to make it livable. If that door just won't open, then we have to make the hard choice between abandoning the military field in the subcontinent altogether and staying in the game. Nick would argue for staying in the game, but he'd prefer to see that choice left to your successor. That's why he thinks it's worth \$3 million to make the Turkish deal work.

#### Indian Reaction

It goes without saying that any of the above actions which get Ayub his tanks will make us unpopular in India for awhile. Even though the Indians have made major purchases from the Soviets, even if the tanks got to Ayub via a third country entirely in the context of our current no-favorites arms policy, and even though we approved a British sale of Hawker-Hunters to the Indians under the same policy provision, this deal would be our first involvement in a major Pakistani arms purchase since the 1965 war.

#### Peshawar Negotiations

Nick believes -- and I tend to agree -- that the tanks should be kept separate from Peshawar talks. Ben Oehlert has long felt that the tanks

would enable us to make the best of our withdrawal from the base. You should know, however, that it looks as if Ayub has already turned around and largely met our request for an extension of certain facilities several months beyond the July 1969 close-out of the agreement. Ayub will see this as a major concession; Ben points out (Tab B) that Ayub talked about tanks in the same breath.\*

RECOMMENDATION

This is a mixed bag. Following Nick's recommendation and offering \$3 million in replacement tanks to the Turks is clearly the easiest way out. But we should consider that we are only prolonging the agony in South Asian arms policy. It could be argued that this is the time to scrap current policy as plainly unworkable, take the public heat and let the new Administration see if open sales can work at all. Your successor would probably find it easier to clamp back on the ban than to take it off.

On balance, my own vote goes with Katzenbach to make the Turkish deal work.

W. W. Rostow

Try Turkish deal with sweetener  
as last effort \_\_\_\_\_

Turkish deal with sweetener  
but fall back to changing policy \_\_\_\_\_

Change policy now \_\_\_\_\_

One-time exception \_\_\_\_\_

Let Turkish deal ride; tell Paks  
to come back to my successor \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

\* at tab C is Oehlert's personal message to you -  
arrived today back channel.

WWR:HS:RM:lw

Att: File # 3269

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1968

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Tanks for Pakistan

We are again at a crossroads on Pakistan's desire to acquire M-47 tanks. We have made a very hard try to find a third country supplier. Belgium and Italy, which once were on the verge of selling to Pakistan, have pulled back, primarily for domestic political reasons over which we have no control. So has West Germany. The remaining options have drawbacks and whether we pursue them at this time depends in large part on your feelings about the commitment made to Ayub.

If you are satisfied that your promise to Ayub was a "best endeavors" effort to assist the Paks in every way to buy from third countries, then I think a good case can be made that we have discharged that obligation and, with one possible exception, which I will discuss below nothing more need be done by this Administration.

If, on the other hand, you feel that getting the tanks to Ayub is required regardless of our preferred policy of no direct sales of lethal end-items, then we should examine how to do this and what the consequences might be.

The options as we see them are as follows:

Maintaining Present Policy

1. Third Country Sale by Turkey: We have made a strong pitch to the Turks to sell 100 of their old US MAP M-47s to Pakistan. The Paks would pay a total of \$1.5 million based on residual value. If we added this

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJL 94-213  
By CG, NARA, Date 1-16-96

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-2-

\$1.5 million to the Turkish MAP, it would, however, only enable the Turks to get an extra 35-40 more sophisticated M-48s from us.

Ambassador Hart believes that the Turks will not settle for less than a one-for-one replacement. To get 100 M-48s to the Turks would cost us about \$3 million more (additional to the \$1.5 million the Paks would pay for the M-47s) to pay for rehabilitated M-48s. However, the Paks have recently reiterated their understanding that what was discussed was 200 tanks, in two tranches of 100 tanks each; if the number of tanks is 200, and assuming that there is a commitment, the cost to the US would be about \$6 million in order to encourage Turkey to sell 200 as-is where-is M-47s to Pakistan for \$3 million. DOD would have difficulty finding this money in the current tight situation and, in the end, it would probably mean cutting another program in the area by a like amount. We believe that only a decision on the first 100 tanks is necessary now. The decision on the second 100 tanks can and should be left to the next administration.

2. An Iranian Third Country Sale: Iran has indicated it would sell the Paks 100 of its old M-47s if we allowed it to buy 100 new tanks (probably M-60s) to replace them. This would add at least \$22 million to Iran's already planned purchases which we have been trying to keep down and which have caused some concern on the Hill.

#### Changing our Present Policy

3. One-time Exception to Existing Ban on Direct US Sale of Lethal End-Items to India and Pakistan: We could make a one-time exception to existing policy to meet what appears to be a legitimate Pakistani need. This would be difficult all around. The policy has been endorsed by the SIG and defended to Congress and the public as appropriate to the situation in 1967 and early

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1968. Our only justification for an exception would be that its third country sales provisions are proving unworkable. In which case, the obvious question is why not change them. Also, the one-time exception idea would not be believed by either India or Pakistan, both of which would regard it as a return to the status quo ante pre - 1965 war.

4. Remove the Ban on Direct Lethal End-Item Sales to India and Pakistan and Consider These on a Case-by-Case Basis as we do with Spare Parts and Non-Lethal Items: The cases would be decided on criteria now followed in deciding sales of lethal spares and in approving sales by third countries; that there is a clearly established critical need and that such sales contribute to arms limitation or reduced military expenditure and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance between the two. Also the items should not be additive, at least in terms of the normal concepts of military power. In addition, we would have to go beyond these general criteria in order to meet both the letter and spirit of the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments.

If we open this door on tanks we must do so in the knowledge that the Government of Pakistan wants, in the words of Foreign Minister Arshad Husain, 'their arms to be in large part of U.S. origin'. By this they mean, in addition to the 200 tanks, at least seven (and possibly fifty) F-104 interceptors, five B-57 bombers, four hundred 106mm recoilless rifles, one hundred and twenty-five 175mm guns, sixteen patrol boats with missiles, etc. The Indians, without mentioning numbers, have recently spoken of an interest in purchasing A4E, F-4 and even F-111 aircraft. These are expensive items. Our present guess is that both sides would desire to purchase greater amounts than we will consider their economies could afford. Despite their requests we could hold their purchases from the U.S. to a figure which we would establish as reasonable.

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-4-

However, we do not know where this changed sales policy might lead, nor the political effects of failing to make additional sales after notifying both countries that the ban has been lifted.

These then are the options. There are two arguments for changing our policy at this time:

1. We have a commitment to Ayub that should in all justice be honored. We have tried the third country route and failed and now owe him the tanks;
2. Our policy needs to be changed in any event and this is a good opportunity.

The first point needs no amplification. On the second, a case can be made that we cannot, and in effect have not, had a static policy. In 1965 we cut off all military assistance to both countries. In 1966, we agreed to resume shipment of certain non-lethal items. For the last 18 months, we have been prepared to see certain lethal items sold from third countries. Now, it can be argued, we should move to a case-by-case direct sale policy so that we can have some supplier relationship to both parties again and meet their wishes not to be completely dependent on Communist sources.

Against this line of argument, I would put essentially two points. This is a choice better left to your successor. (Although some would argue that, since a new administration will be forced in this direction, an outgoing administration can more easily take the heat that will inevitably follow.) The second point is that there would be great flak, particularly in the Congress where our pre-1965 sales to both sides was felt to have fueled an arms race that led to a conflict. Tanks for Pakistan and many of the other items either India or Pakistan are likely to want from us are mainly related to Pak/Indian hostility and not the Chinese threat. This would be seen as a failure of US policy and portrayed as such publicly. I recognize that by January and with a new administration this

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reaction might not be as great as I foresee. But, as Bill Gaud strongly feels, we must take account of the effect this could have on aid legislation in the next Congress.

One word about Peshawar. I do not think that your decision ought to be taken in relation to the current Peshawar talks. These now seem to be moving along in the right direction. The commitment to Ayub was not linked to Peshawar and we should not now look at it in that light. Ben Oehlert continues to feel that a favorable move on the tanks would ease relations in the period when we are closing the base. The Peshawar episode may, however, affect your judgment on that grey area of choice about how far we are willing to go to meet Ayub's desires on hardware.

In sum, and these conclusions are shared by my SIG colleagues, if we had the choice we would not change our policy at this time. We would push ahead on the Turk sale (Option 1) even though it involves about \$3 million, and, if it should fail, inform the Paks that we had reached the end of the line and are unprepared to move to direct sale.

We recognize, however, that you may feel more of a commitment than we read into the language of your statements to Ayub. In which case, we believe the case-by-case policy (Option 4) is preferred and that the situation, although difficult and not without risk, is manageable.

Before proceeding on any of the options, Congressional consultation would be required. This will not be satisfactory after adjournment but we will try to reach as many of the interested Congressional leaders as possible.

Recommendation for decision:

Approve Option One and if no sale can be arranged from Turkey inform the GOP that we have exhausted possibilities of a sale and further progress in this matter is up to them.

\_\_\_\_\_

Approve Option One and if that does not work move to Option Four


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Approve Option Three

\_\_\_\_\_

Do nothing more and notify Paks they will have to take up with the next Administration

\_\_\_\_\_

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 RAWALP 08628 201347Z

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ACTION SS 30

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25 #517

By jc NARA, Date 3-8-02

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, /031 W  
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O 200900Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5037

~~SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 8628

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PESHAWAR/TANKS

PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE

FROM AMBASSADOR

1. LAST EVENING PRESIDENT AYUB PHONED ME TO SAY THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO QUOTE TAKE A CALCULATED RISK UNQUOTE AND AGREE TO SOME EXTENSION OF BASE OPERATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF MY PREVIOUS PROPOSAL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS WILLING TO TAKE SUCH A RISK BECAUSE HE WAS ANXIOUS TO BE HELPFUL TO USG IN ANY WAY HE COULD.
2. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED SECRETARY YUSUF TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AND WORK OUT THE DETAILS.
3. AYUB THEN SAID THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER MATTER HE HAD MEANT TO DISCUSS WITH ME THE EVENING BEFORE. HE REMINDED ME OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND ME IN KARACHI LAST DECEMBER 23 ABOUT QUOTE HORSES UNQUOTE; SAID HE GREATLY APPRECIATED ALL THE EFFORTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE IN THAT DIRECTION; AND THAT HE HOPES THAT THOSE EFFORTS WOULD BE CARRIED FORWARD TO EARLY FRUITION BECAUSE HE BADLY NEEDED THE QUOTE HORSES UNQUOTE.
4. I ASSURED HIM THAT EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT WAS BEING MADE.
5. PURSUANT TO APPOINTMENT I MET WITH YUSUF AT 1000 HOURS THIS MORNING. HE HANDED ME AN UNOFFICIAL UNSIGNED AIDE MEMOIRE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 RAWALP 08628 201347Z

READING AS FOLLOWS:

A. DISMANTLING, PACKING AND REMOVAL OF THE FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT SHALL COMMENCE IN JANUARY 1969. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A STAGGERED THINNING DOWN OF PERSONNEL.

B. ALL FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT NOT DISMANTLED BY THE CUT-OUT DATE (I.E. 17 JULY 1969) WILL BE DISMANTLED NOT LATER THAN 31ST DECEMBER 1969 IN ACCORDANCE WITH A FIXED MONTHLY PROGRAMME.

C. ALL DISMANTLED FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT SHALL BE PACKED AND CRATED AND BE REMOVED FROM PAKISTAN AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AND IN NO CASE LATER THAN 28TH FEBRUARY 1970. ALL REMAINING BASE PERSONNEL WILL BE EVACUATED COMPLETELY BY THE SAME DATE.

6. ATTENTION IS CALLED TO THE REFERENCE TO QUOTE A FIXED MONTHLY PROGRAM UNQUOTE IN PARAGRAPH 5 (2) ABOVE. YUSUF AND I AGREED THAT WE WOULD MEET AGAIN ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 28.

A. FOR HIM TO RECEIVE OUR FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE PROPOSAL (I WOULD HOPE AND URGE THAT IT BE ACCEPTED, SINCE IT COVERS ALL DESIRED POINTS EXCEPT FOR SUGAR TREE OPERATION FOR SAME MONTHS AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1969); AND:

B. IF POSSIBLE FOR US TO SUBMIT A PROPOSED FIXED MONTHLY SCHEDULE ALTHOUGH IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES ALONG THE LINES OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE WITH THE FIXED MONTHLY SCHEDULE TO BE FURNISHED LATER. WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SUBMIT THE SCHEDULE ON OCTOBER 28 AND WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE ALONG THOSE LINES ASAP.

7. THERE WAS ONE DISTURBING ELEMENT IN THE YUSUF CONVERSATION, BUT I DO NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER IT INSURMOUNTABLE. HE STATED THAT, IN ADDITION TO AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS EMBODYING THE POINT OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE, THERE SHOULD BE A VERBAL UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL ANTENNA WOULD BE DOWN BY JULY 17, 1969.

8. I TOLD HIM THAT, WHILE I WAS NOT RPT NOT TECHNICALLY INFORMED, BELIEVE THAT SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD NEGATE THE INTENTION FOR

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DISSEMINATED



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 RAWALP 08628 201347Z

US TO BE ABLE TO OPERATE SELECTED EQUIPMENT THROUGH 31 DECEMBER  
SPNVE I DID NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT THE EQUIPMENT WAS OPER-  
ABLE WITHOUT ANTENNA.

9. RE RESPONDED THAT WHAT THEY WANTED WAS CONTINUED USE IN  
QUOTE A DISCREET MANNER UNQUOTE WITH ALL ANTENNA INDOORS IF  
POSSIBLE OR AT LEAST AS UNOBTRUSIVE AS POSSIBLE.

10. THE GIST AND TONE OF THE CONVERSATION WAS SUCH THAT I  
BELIEVE THEY WILL NOT RPT NOT INSIST ON THE ANTENNA POINT  
PROVIDED MUCH OF THE MOST OBTRUSIVE ELEMENTS ARE DOWN BY  
JULY 17 AND FURTHER PROGRESS IN THAT DIRECTION IS EVIDENT  
THEREAFTER.  
OEHLERT

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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FM AMBASSADOR OEHLERT RAWALPINDI 500  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR THE PRESIDENT

41c

1. PRESIDENT AYUB'S PERSONAL INTERVENTION IN THE PESHAWAR MATTER AND HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS FOREIGN OFFICE TO WORK OUT A TIME EXTENSION ALONG THE GENERAL LINES OF OUR REQUEST EVIDENCES HIS DESIRE TO ACCOMMODATE OUR WISHES IN SUCH MATTERS TO THE EXTENT HE DEEMS POSSIBLE AND TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

2. A BREAKTHROUGH ON TANKS WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN OUR HAND AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO US TO CONTINUE WORKING IN THE DIRECTION OF THOSE OBJECTIVES.

3. MOST RESPECTFULLY BUT MOST URGENTLY I REQUEST YOU TO GIVE THE DEEPEST CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EITHER:

A. SWEETENING THE POT TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY WITH TURKEY, OR

B. AUTHORIZING A DIRECT SALE OF TANKS EITHER AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESENT MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY OR IN CONNECTION WITH A LIBERALIZATION THEREOF.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
Authority NLJ 019-041-2-4  
By [Signature], NARA, Date 1/21/02

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

*Pres file*

Friday, October 25, 1968  
1:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

You should be aware of this report by the Chilean Army Commander in Chief Castillo that:

-- The recent meeting of Hemisphere Army Chiefs in Rio was political in tone and not military; and

-- Gen. Westmoreland is alleged to have made some rather surprising statements.

This cable is being held very tight.

W. W. Rostow

Santiago 5812

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-170  
By 40, NARA, Date 5-9-95

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

W 18 42a  
TELEGRAM

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DE RUESNA 5812 2981945  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
R 241920Z OCT 68  
FM ANEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7101  
STATE GRNC  
BT

8 3 2 7Q  
1968 OCT 24 PM 7 05

CORRECTED COPY

10/25/68 9:25 AM

~~SECRET~~ SANTIAGO 5812

*Roston*  
*no other restraint*  
*being made.*  
B (CS)

NODIS

1. IN PRIVATE MEETING WITH ME ON NIGHT OF OCTOBER 8  
[REDACTED] EXPRESSED HIS SHOCK AND DEEP CONCERN  
OVER REPORT HE HAD RECEIVED THAT DAY AT LUNCHEON MEETING  
WITH CHILEAN ARMY CINC CASTILLO IN PRESENCE DEFMIN  
MARANBIO. CASTILLO HAD REQUESTED INTERVIEW TO REPORT  
ON RIO MEETING OF HEMISPHERE ARMY CHIEFS. IN ESSENCE,  
CASTILLO HAD REPORTED TO [REDACTED] THAT MEETING WAS NOT MILITARY  
BUT POLITICAL. PERUVIAN REPRESENTATIVE [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] HAD SPOKEN TO CASTILLO AS  
THOUGH HE WERE ALREADY RUNNING PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT.  
CHIEF OF US DELEGATION HAD ARGUED DIRECTLY TO CASTILLO  
(VIA INTERPRETER) IN FAVOR OF MILITARY TAKEOVERS IN  
HEMISPHERE AND HAD DEMONSTRATED PARTICULARLY CLOSE RAPPORT  
WITH PERUVIAN AND ARGENTINE REPRESENTATIVES.

3,4  
Lb) b)  
L)

2. NOW KNOWING WHETHER [REDACTED] HAD ACCURATELY  
INTERPRETED GENERAL CASTILLO'S REPORT, AND HAVING BEEN TOLD  
THIS BY [REDACTED] IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, I HAVE FELT CERTAIN  
RESTRAINTS ON PASSING THEM ON TO WASHINGTON. HOWEVER,  
IN PRESENCE OF OTHERS WHO HAD ACCOMPANIED HIM AT RIO  
CONFERENCE GENERAL CASTILLO VOLUNTEERED HIS REPORT TO  
[REDACTED] IN PRECISE DETAIL TO ENSURE. HE HAS ALSO DISCUSSED  
IT WITH OTHER INTIMATE FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES, INCLUDING  
[REDACTED]

WHILE I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO PASS JUDGEMENT ON  
ACCURACY CASTILLO'S REPORT, I FORWARD IT AS AN ACCOUNT WHICH  
IS MAKING THE ROUNDS OF CERTAIN HIGH MILITARY AND POLITICAL  
OFFICIALS IN CHILE AND BECAUSE OF THE IMPACT IT MIGHT HAVE ON  
GOC'S APPROACH TO FUTURE HEMISPHERE CONFERENCES OF SERVICE CHIEFS  
AS WELL AS TO EXPLAIN MY PREVIOUSLY-STATED OPPOSITION TO ANY  
US MILITARY BRASS VISITING CHILE FOR NEXT FEW MONTHS.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-135  
By *ico*, NARA, Date 6-17-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 5812 FROM SANTIAGO, OCT. 24, 1968

4. CASTILLO'S ACCOUNT TO ENBOFF AND [REDACTED] ACCOUNT TO ME OF CASTILLO'S REMARKS INCLUDED THESE MAIN POINTS (GIVEN IN VERBATIM CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER):

A. CONFERENCE ATTENDED LARGELY BY HARD-DRINKING LATINO "POLITICIANS IN UNIFORM";

B. BRAZILIAN CONFERENCE HOSTS FOUND IT LARGELY WASTE OF MONEY;

C. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE MOSTLY POLITICAL (HOW TO FIGHT COMMUNISM, ETC.) NOT MILITARY NOR PROFESSIONAL;

D. THE POSITION TAKEN BY REPRESENTATIVE OF EL SALVADOR THAT ALL COMMUNISTS "MUST BE KILLED" RECEIVED GENERAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING U.S.;

E. ARMY CHIEFS TRANSPORTED TO CONFERENCE SITE IN ARMORED VEHICLES TO AVOID STUDENT MANIFESTATIONS WHICH HAD VERY DISTASTEFUL IMPACT ON CASTILLO;

F. GEN. WESTMORELAND TOLD GENERAL CASTILLO THAT MILITARY SHOULD TAKE OVER GOVERNMENTS IN THE HEMISPHERE WHEN THEY THOUGHT IT NECESSARY. [REDACTED] QUOTED WESTMORELAND AS TELLING CASTILLO THAT IF CIVILIANS COULD NOT MANAGE THINGS IT WAS MILITARY'S DUTY TO SET THEM RIGHT;

G. RAPPORT BETWEEN US REPRESENTATIVES AND REPRESENTATIVES OF ARGENTINA AND PERU WAS VERY CLOSE;

H. DECISIONS TAKEN OR RESOLUTIONS REACHED WERE CONSIDERED BINDING ON THEIR COUNTRIES BY MOST ARMY CHIEFS PRESENT (MANY OF WHOM, IN FACT, WERE THE GOVERNMENT OF THEIR COUNTRIES); WESTMORELAND HAD ARGUED THAT MILITARY CONFEREES HAD RIGHT TO "FORMULATE" AS OPPOSED TO CASTILLO VIEW THEY HAD ONLY RIGHT TO "RECOMMEND". THIS DIFFERENCE IN PLENARY HAD LEAD TO PRIVATE CONVERSATION PER POINT F ABOVE;

I. PERUVIAN [REDACTED] SPOKE TO CASTILLO IN PRIVATE AS THOUGH HE WERE ALREADY THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU;

J. ONLY ONE OTHER COUNTRY (ECUADOR) VOTED WITH CHILE AGAINST PROPOSITION THAT CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS WOULD BE BINDING DECISIONS AND NOT MERE RECOMMENDATIONS.

K. CASTILLO SIGNED CONFERENCE REPORT MERELY AS AN INDICATION OF CHILE'S ATTENDANCE THERE AND BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH TO CREATE AN INCIDENT. HOWEVER, HE MADE CLEAR HIS SIGNATURE IN NO WAY BOUND HIS COUNTRY TO CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS AND THEREFORE HE HAD REPORTED IMMEDIATELY TO [REDACTED]

3, 4  
(b)(1)  
(b)

~~SECRET~~

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-3- 5812 FROM SANTIAGO, OCT. 24, 1968

5. CASTILLO EXPRESSED HIS GREAT SURPRISE AND DISMAY AT THE DIRECTION THE CONFERENCE HAD TAKEN. HE POINTED OUT THAT BECAUSE CHILE IS DEMOCRACY LIKE US HE COULD NOT MAKE DECISIONS ON BEHALF HIS GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO STRESSED APOLITICAL TRADITION OF MILITARY AND LEGALITY OF COMMUNIST PARTY IN CHILE WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SUPPORT CERTAIN CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS ON COMMUNISM. HE TOLD EMBOFF THAT AS APOLITICAL INSTITUTION SUBORDINATE TO PRESIDENT, CHILEAN MILITARY WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT EVEN POPULAR FRONT OR COMMUNIST PRESIDENT IF ELECTED CONSTITUTIONALLY AND DID NOT VIOLATE CONSTITU-

TIONAL RIGHTS OF OTHERS. HE SAID CONNECTION BETWEEN CONFERENCE AND MILITARY COUPS IN PERU AND PANAMA IS BEING MADE BY MANY OBSERVERS AND WARNED THAT ANY SIMILAR SEQUENCE FOLLOWING NEXT YEAR'S CONFERENCE IN US WOULD BE TAKEN AS CONVINCING EVIDENCE BY MANY THAT CONFERENCE USED TO ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO HEMISPHERE ARMY CHIEFS AND TO HATCH MILITARY COUPS.

6. EVEN IF SOME CHILEAN MILITARY MAY HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT GOC WILL HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE CONFERENCES HEMISPHERE CHIEFS (ARMY, NAVY OR AIR FORCE). ALSO OUR CIVILIAN ACTIONS, WHATEVER REFUGE WE TAKE IN DISCLAIMERS RE "MISUNDERSTANDINGS" OR "BAD TRANSLATION" HAVE BEEN UNDERMINED FOR SOME TIME TO COME BY THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE CHILEANS.

7. THE FOREGOING INFORMATION IS KNOWN TO ONLY MYSELF AND THE TWO MEMBERS OF MY MISSION, BUT CASTILLO'S VIEWS ARE BOUND TO TRICKLE TO OTHER MEMBERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IN FAIRNESS TO LT. GEN. ALGER, IT SHOULD BE RECORDED THAT CASTILLO MADE SPECIAL POINT OF EXONERATING HIM, STATING HE HAD KEPT ABSOLUTELY SILENT ON POLITICAL ISSUES SINCE, ACCORDING TO CASTILLO, HE HAD SENSITIVITY TO LATINO PROBLEM. CASTILLO URGED THAT OTHER US MILITARY BE BETTER BRIEFED BEFORE MAKING CONTACTS WITH CHILEANS.

8. ASSUMING THIS CABLE WILL BE READ BY ASST SEC OLIVER.

KORRY  
BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

*Pres file*

Friday, October 25, 1968 -- 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Abrams comes in with a full and accurate account of how, working fully with the ARVN, he plans to use our total military power in the months ahead to extend GVN control in the countryside and uproot the VC infrastructure. Also attached is a copy of the operational guidance issued to MACV commanders from 1 October covering this plan.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-212  
By cs, NARA, Date 1-5-95

WWRostow:rln

43a

OK  
Recommend dist to:  
W [unclear]

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

MCA Mo  
MCP           
G         

	✓
	✓
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	✓
	✓
	✓
(Rab)	✓
(Rad)	✓
(Gover)	✓
SM	✓ - Action
W	✓

24 OCT 1968  
O 243855Z ZYM ZFF-3  
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS  
INFO ADM MC CAIN CINCPAC  
AND BUNKER SAIGON  
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO MAC 14329 EYES ONLY

REF: A. MAC 14152  
B. CJCS 122<sup>98</sup>

- THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO REFERENCE B AND SETS FORTH THE BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL MEASURES BEING IMPLEMENTED BY US, FREE WORLD, AND SVN FORCES AGAINST NVA/VC UNITS AND THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE IN SVN.
- GENERAL:
  - CG III MAF, US FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS, AND SA IV CORPS HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH GIVING IMPETUS TO AND COORDINATING ALL ELEMENTS, I.E. US AND FREE WORLD FORCES, ARVN CORPS, PROVINCE CHIEFS, RF/PF, CIDG, NATIONAL POLICE, AND PRU, OF THIS CAMPAIGN TO DESTROY THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE, GUERRILLAS, LOCAL FORCES, MAIN FORCES, AND REMAINING NVA IN-COUNTRY. PARALLEL COORDINATED DIRECTIVES HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY COMUSMACV, PRESIDENT THIEU, THE PRIME MINISTER, THE

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

RVNAF JGS, CG III NAF, US FIELD FORCE COMMANDERS, SA IV CORPS, AND ARVN CORPS COMMANDERS. ALL ELEMENTS ACROSS THE BOARD ARE TO BE IN FULL SWING BY 1 NOVEMBER 1968. COORDINATION WITH, AND SPEED OF REACTION

BY, THE ARVN CORPS COMMANDERS IS THE BEST I HAVE OBSERVED TO DATE IN VIETNAM. THIS IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE IMPETUS PROVIDED BY US COMMANDERS/ADVISORS. ACTION IS ALREADY UNDERWAY IN EACH CORPS.

B. ATTACK ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS TO BE PRIMARILY A VIETNAMESE OPERATION. IT INVOLVES DETAILED INTELLIGENCE WORK (WHICH WILL BE DONE JOINTLY WITH US PARTICIPATION IN

DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTERS (DIOCC'S) ) TO IDENTIFY AND LOCATE THE VC AMONG THE POPULATION. IT THEN BECOMES A FULL VIETNAMESE RESPONSIBILITY TO APPREHEND AND DISPOSE OF THEM. IT'S A RUTHLESS BUSINESS, SIMILAR TO ELIMINATION OF THE NAZI INFRASTRUCTURE DURING WORLD WAR II. IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE SUCCESSFUL, EACH INDIVIDUAL VC HAS TO BE PHYSICALLY REMOVED FROM THE AREA.

C. SINCE THERE ARE SO MANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN VC CORPS TACTICAL ZONES, THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION WITHIN EACH ZONE VARIES. THIS WILL BE APPARENT IN THE PLANS AND OPERATIONAL MEASURES DISCUSSED FOR EACH CTZ. THE NUMBERS OF HAMLETS AND PRIORITIES SHOWN ARE SUBJECT TO LATER ADJUSTMENT AS OPERATIONS PROCEED. EMPHASIS IS BEING PLACED ON HAVING LOCAL COMMANDERS AND PROVINCE CHIEFS MAKE FINAL DETERMINATIONS RATHER THAN HAVE THIS COME FROM CENTRAL CONTROL IN SAIGON.

3. (S) I CTZ (III NAF)

A. GENERAL CUSHMAN AND GENERAL LAN HAVE ISSUED SIMILAR, COORDINATED DIRECTIVES TO THEIR FORCES.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

B. IN QUANG BI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES, RESPONSIBILITY HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE US XXIV CORPS (3RD MAR DIV, 131ST ABN DIV, 1ST CAV DIV, 1ST BRIG, 5TH MECH DIV) AND THE ARVN 1ST DIVISION. FIRST PRIORITY FOR PACIFICATION IN THESE PROVINCES GOES TO THUA THIEN IN WHICH THE CITY OF HUE IS LOCATED, (FOLLOWED BY QUANG TRI). SUCCESSES ALREADY ACHIEVED IN HUE AND QUANG TRI CITY HAVE PERMITTED THE MOVEMENT OF RD TEAMS FROM THESE CITIES OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE; 15 FROM QUANG TRI AND 28 FROM HUE. VINH LOC ISLAND, JUST EAST OF HUE WAS SCREENED BY ARVN AND US FORCES JUST PRIOR TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS CAMPAIGN. THE VINH LOC ISLAND SWEEP WAS THE MOST PRODUCTIVE OPERATION KNOWN TO US IN RECENT MONTHS AGAINST THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE.

C. IN QUANG NAM, QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI PROVINCES, THE III MAF (1ST MAR DIV AND AMERICAL DIV) ARVN 2ND DIV, AND ROX MARINE BRIGADE HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY. THEIR PRIORITIES ARE QUANG NGAI AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES FOLLOWED BY QUANG TIN.

D. IN THE UPGRADING OF HAMLETS, A TARGET NUMBERS ASSIGNED WITHIN I CTZ ARE AS FOLLOWS:

QUANG TRI 32

THUA THIEN 33

QUANG NAM 26

QUANG TIN 31

QUANG NGAI 20

146

XXIV CORPS AND 1ST ARVN DIVISION ARE THINKING OF SETTING THESE GOALS CONSIDERABLY HIGHER.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

E. SCREENING OPERATIONS ARE CONTINUING IN QUANG TRI PROVINCES AS FAR WEST AS THE SAHN PLATEAU AS WELL AS INTO THE DMZ AREA. THESE OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE FOR EARLY DETECTION OF THE RETURN OF NVA OR MAIN FORCE VC CURRENTLY OUT OF COUNTRY.

4. ~~(S)~~ II CTZ (I FFV AND ROKFV-FC)

A. GENERAL PEERS, GENERAL LU LAN (ARVN), AND GENERAL IM (ROKA), DEPUTY TO GENERAL CHAE, HAVE ISSUED A TRI-NATIONAL DIRECTIVE, SIGNED BY ALL THREE COMMANDERS, FOR THIS CAMPAIGN.

B. THE FIRST PRIORITY AREA IN II CTZ IS BINH DINH PROVINCE. IN RECENT OPERATIONS THE NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE, AND THE RF/PF SCREENED 11, 102 PERSONS RESULTING IN 173 CONFIRMED VC, 306 VC SUSPECTS, AND 222 VC KIA.

C. ARVN AND ROK UNITS ALONG THE II CTZ COAST ARE CONDUCTING RICE HARVEST DENIAL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC IN BINH DINH, PHU YEN, KHANH HOA, NINH THUAN, AND BINH THUAN PROVINCES.

D. THE II CTZ HAS BEEN ASSIGNED 285 HAMLETS FOR UPGRADING DURING THE CAMPAIGN; HOWEVER, THE EXACT NUMBER PER PROVINCE HAS NOT YET BEEN ANNOUNCED BY THE VIETNAMESE.

E. THE 4TH DIVISION IS MAINTAINING A LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE SCREEN ALONG THE LAOTIAN-CAMBODIAN BORDER FROM KONTUM PROVINCE TO THE NORTHERN PART OF QUANG-DUC PROVINCE, RELEASING AS MANY 4TH DIV UNITS AS PRUDENT FOR USE AGAINST REMAINING CC MAIN FORCE AND LOCAL UNITS, GUERRILLAS, AND VC INFRASTRUCTURE.

5. ~~(S)~~ III CTZ (II FFORCEV, RTAVF, AND RATF):

A. IN III CTZ GENERAL KERWIN HAS WORKED DAILY WITH GENERAL KI IN PERFECTING PLANS AND GETTING OPERATIONS UNDER WAY. THEIR PROVINCE

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

PRIORITIES FOR PACIFICATION START WITH A CIRCLE AROUND SAIGON  
EXTENDING OUTWARD WITH EMPHASIS TOWARD THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. THE  
GOAL FOR III CTZ IS TO BRING 250 HAMLETS FROM THE CONTESTED OR VC  
CONTROLLED CATEGORIES UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL PRIOR TO TET 1969,  
AS FOLLOWS:

GIA DINH	82
BIEN HOA	49
HAU XGIA	22
LONG AN	36
BINH DUONG	20
PHUOC TUY	30
TAS NINH	11
BINH LONG	4
LONG KHANH	6
BINH UY	1
PHUOC LONG	0
VUNG TAU	0

THE VIETNAMESE SELECTED THESE 250 HAMLETS FROM A LIST OF 332  
RECOMMENDED BY THE US. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION WERE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. HAD TO BE IN CATEGORY LOWER THAN C ON SEPTEMBER LIST.
- B. COULD NOT BE IN CY 68 PROGRAM.
- C. COULD NOT BE HAMLETS IN WHICH RD TEAMS ARE NOW WORKING.

B. IN ORDER TO DO THE FOREGOING, THE RF AND PF MUST BE SPREAD  
THINNER THAN HERETOFORE. THIS RISK IS BEING TAKEN. NATIONAL POLICE  
ARE REPLACING PF IN CERTAIN AREAS, THE PF THE RF, WITH THE RF  
MOVING INTO THE HAMLETS BEING BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL. WHILE THIS IS

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

GOING ON, THE COMBAT FORCES, ARVN, US, AND FREE WORLD CONTINUE

TO ENGAGE MAIN AND LOCAL VC FORCES, ATTACK BASE AREAS, CORDON OFF AREAS BEING WORKED, AND PERFORMING OTHER OPERATIONAL TASKS THAT DIRECTLY ENHANCE TERRITORIAL SECURITY. THE US DIVISION COMMANDERS OF THE 1ST AND 25TH ARE WORKING WITH THEIR ARVN DIVISION COUNTERPARTS THE 5TH AND 25TH IN THESE OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, THE US DIVISIONS MUST MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE POSTURE AGAINST THE NVA FORCES ACROSS FROM THEM IN CAMBODIA. IN HAU NGHIA PROVINCE THE TWO 25TH DIVISIONS, ARVN AND US, HAVE ALREADY REPORTED 120 MEMBERS OF THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE REMOVED.

C. THE COMMANDERS OF THE ROYAL THAI VOLUNTEER FORCE AND THE AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE HAVE EACH ISSUED DIRECTIVES TO THEIR UNITS IN SUPPORT OF THIS CAMPAIGN. THEY WILL BE WORKING WITH THE ARVN 18TH DIVISION IN BIEN HOA AND PHUOC TUY PROVINCES RESPECTIVELY. THEIR SUPPORT TO THE VIETNAMESE WILL BE SIMILAR TO THAT PROVIDED BY US FORCES.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

O 240355Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS

INFO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC

AMB BUNKER AMEMB SAIGON

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF TWO MAC 14329 EYES ONLY

6. (S) IV CTZ (9TH US INFANTRY DIVISION (-) ):

A. THE IV CTZ PICTURE IS UNIQUE. THERE HAVE BEEN NO NVA UNITS IN THIS CTZ. THE RECENT ARVN AND 9TH US DIVISION ACTIONS IN IV CTZ HAVE CREATED A SITUATION THAT IS ALSO FAVORABLE TO SVN AND US FORCES. ESTABLISHED BASE AREAS ARE BEING INVADED FOR THE FIRST TIME. THE VIETNAMESE IN IV CTZ HAVE PICKED UP 1,931 SUSPECTED MEMBERS OF THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE SINCE 1 OCTOBER 1967.

B. GENERAL ECKHARDT HAS BEEN WORKING DAILY WITH THE ARVN IV CORPS COMMANDER IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE MOMENTUM OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AS THE DRY SEASON APPROACHES. THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE IS BEING TIED TO THEIR DRY WEATHER TACTICAL CAMPAIGN (SPEEDY EXPRESS), IN WHICH PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS START ON 1 DECEMBER 1967. THE ASSAULT ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE WILL BE INTENSIFIED WITH THE FULL ADVENT OF SPEEDY EXPRESS ON 1 JANUARY 1969.

C. SPEEDY EXPRESS CALLS FOR A SEALING OFF OF THE CAMBODIAN BORDER BY A US AIR MOBILE BRIGADE WHILE VIETNAMESE ARMY AND MARINE UNITS SUPPORTED BY US FORCES REGULARLY STATIONED IN THE AREA ASSAULT THE KNOWN VC BASE AREAS. THESE ARE BASE AREAS 470, 472, 477, 474, 473, 475, 476, 403, 453, AND 432. THE FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO AREAS WHICH LIE IN

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

PROVINCES NORTHEAST OF A GENERAL LINE FROM THE SOUTHERN MOUTH OF THE MEKONG RIVER TO THE VIETNAM-CAMBODIAN BORDER ON THE GULF OF THAILAND. IN A PREVIEW OF SPEEDY EXPRESS, ARVN FORCES, INCLUDING RF AND CIDG ELEMENTS, SUPPORTED BY TWO US BATTALIONS, HELICOPTER LIFT, AND AIRCRAFT SORTIES, SUCCESSFULLY INVADED BASE AREA 470 FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ANYONE'S MEMORY. THIS IS THE VC'S MOST IMPORTANT BASE FOR PROJECTING THEMSELVES FROM CAMBODIA INTO THE KEY DELTA PROVINCES OF DINH TUONG, GO CONG, AND KIEN HOA. OPERATIONS ARE CONTINUING AGAINST 470.

D. NAVFORV WILL ALSO PARTICIPATE IN SPEEDY EXPRESS. ADMIRAL ZUMWALT HAS WORKED OUT A PLAN WITH GENERAL ECKHARDT WHEREBY MARKET TIME AND RIVERINE FORCES CAN BE USED IN RIVERS AND CANALS IN THE DELTA TO DIRECTLY SUPPORT ATTACKS ON BASE AREAS. A PREVIEW OF THIS WAS CONDUCTED RECENTLY BY NAVAL FORAYS INTO TWO BASE AREAS. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT FROM 7TH FLEET WILL ALSO BE UTILIZED.

E. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE SET 429 HAMLETS IN IV CTZ TO BE WRESTED FROM THE CONTESTED AND/OR VC CATEGORY. THE MAJORITY OF THESE HAMLETS ARE IN PROVINCES NORTHEAST OF THE GENERAL LINE PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED:

GO CONG	40
DINH TUONG	50
KIEN HOA	52
VINH LONG	40
VINH BINH	40
SADEC	30
AN GIANG	NONE - PACIFIED (POA PAO)
KIEN PHONG	30
CHAU DOC	30
PHONG DINH	20
KIEN GIANG	20
KIEN TUONG	5

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

BA XUYEN	20
BAC LIEU	16
CHUONG THIEN	16
AN XUYEN	20

F. DURING THE NEXT 30-DAY PERIOD, THE ARVN IV CORPS COMMANDER AND SA IV CORPS ARE PLANNING ON CONDUCTING APPROXIMATELY 120 OPERATIONS PER DAY; MOSTLY SMALL UNITS, SO THAT THEY CAN MOVE INTO SPEEDY EXPRESS WITH GOOD MOMENTUM.

7. ~~(18)~~ SUMMARY: THIS READJUSTMENT TO THE CHANGING ENEMY SITUATION APPEARS TO BE OFF TO A GOOD START. WE WILL CONTINUE TO DRIVE HARD ON IT WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS VIS-A-VIS THE NVA ELEMENTS THREATENING III CTZ FROM ACROSS THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. JUST NOW THE NVA IS A THREAT, NOT AN INTERFERENCE. WITH THE CONTINUED HELP OF ARC LIGHT SORTIES AGAINST VC UNITS AND BASE AREAS IN COUNTRY, THEIR USE AGAINST ANY NVA DEBOUCHMENT FROM CAMBODIA AND/OR LAOS, AND INTENSIFICATION OF THEIR USE AGAINST SUPPLY ROUTES THROUGH THE LA-TIAN PAN HANDLE, WE PLAN TO KEEP IT THAT WAY.

8. WE ARE FORWARDING TO YOU BY SEPARATE MESSAGE ONE FULL OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE MESSAGE AND EXTRACT OF ANOTHER WHICH WERE ISSUED TO MACV COMMANDERS AND WHICH YOU MAY NOT HAVE SEEN. THEY HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS MESSAGE.

GP-1

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
 NJ 94-352  
 By 06, NARA, Date 8-7-95

43b

*mc*  
*mcP*  
*Sm*

**EYES ONLY**

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

*G-2*

**EYES ONLY**

*JCS 12095*

FORM			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION			
<del>SECRET</del> EYES ONLY			
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION	PRIORITY		
INFO	PRIORITY		

1968 OCT 21 21 48

DTG

FROM: GENERAL WHEELER, CJCS  
 TO: GENERAL ABRAMS, COMUSMACV  
 INFO: ADMIRAL MCCAIN, CINCPAC

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DIST:  
 CJCS

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY JCS 12098 *6/6* CJCS Sends.  
 Reference: MAC 14158

The highest authority has read your latest assessment of the situation. He senses that there are great opportunities now to take advantage of the withdrawal of NVA units from SVN. He has been assured that you are taking every advantage of the situation. Nevertheless, it would be most useful if I could receive from you, in the next few days, a factual account of the significant operational measures being implemented by US and SVN forces against NVA/VC units and their infrastructure in SVN. It would be my intention to provide such a summary report to the SecDef and the highest authority. Warm regards.

SECDEF	
DEPSEC	
ISA	
CSA	
CSAF	
CNO	
CMC	
DJS	
J-3	
J-4	
J-5	
SACSA	
DIAP	
STATE	
CIA	

ZFF-3

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

DATE	TIME
21	
MONTH	YEAR
OCT	1968
PAGE NO.	NO. OF



~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

PRESIDENT IN NEXT FEW DAYS IS DIRECTING GVN TO PRODUCE APPROPRIATE DIRECTIVES AND PLANS FOR 1969. HOWEVER, HE AGREED TO CONCEPT OF ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN TO UPGRADE ON ORDER OF 1000 CONTESTED HAMLETS TO RELATIVELY SECURE STATUS BETWEEN 1 NOV AND TET 1969 PROVIDED THAT SUCH AN EFFORT IS FEASIBLE. HE DIRECTED THAT FEASIBILITY STUDY FROM JGS AND RD MINISTRY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY 10 OCTOBER, ON WHETHER ACCELERATED CAMPAIGN CAN BE MOUNTED BEGINNING 1 NOV WITH FORCES AVAILABLE THROUGH REALLOCATION OR ADJUSTMENT OF MISSIONS. UNDERSTAND CORPS COMMANDERS BEING CONVOKED AT JGS 3 & 4 OCTOBER FOR DISCUSSIONS THIS STUDY AMONG OTHER SUBJECTS, BUT THEY MAY NOT YET BE AWARE FULL PICTURE. SENIOR ADVISORS AND DEPCORDS ARE REQUESTED FOLLOW GUIDANCE IN REFERENCE MESSAGE AND BELOW TO ENCOURAGE POSITIVE AND PRODUCTIVE CORPS COMMANDER REACTIONS. MACV WILL PRESENT TENTATIVE FEASIBILITY CONCLUSIONS TO JGS BY 3 OCTOBER, AFTER WHICH WILL CONSULT SENIOR ADVISORS AND STAFFS FOR REFINEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT FULL POSITION. TENTATIVE MACV POSITION IS THAT UPGRADING ON ORDER OF 100 CONTESTED HAMLETS IN I CTZ, 250 EACH IN II/III CTZS, AND 400 IN IV CTZ SHOULD BE FEASIBLE DURING THREE MONTHS PRIOR TET 1969 IF ALL AVAILABLE RF/PY AND RD RESOURCES STRETCHED.

3. (S) PRESIDENT THIEU'S PACIFICATION CONCEPTS FOR 1969 BEAR CONSIDERABLE SIMILARITY TO PREEMPTION AND PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN OUTLINED AT COMMANDERS CONFERENCE HERE 29 SEPTEMBER. PRESIDENT CONTEMPLATES "PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT" PROGRAM TO CONSOLIDATE ALL ELEMENTS PACIFICATION, NOT JUST REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOP-

~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

MENT. USING HAMLET EVALUATION SURVEY AS BASIS FOR PLANNING, DESIRE MAINTAIN SECURITY AND STRESS DEVELOPMENT IN A, B, C HAMLETS. BUT MAIN STRESS WILL BE ON CONTESTED (I.F. D AND E HAMLETS) WHERE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOLID SECURITY PRESENCE, CONDUCT SKELETON PROGRAM OF POPULATION ORGANIZATION THROUGH ELECTIONS OF APPOINTMENT LOCAL OFFICIALS AND INITIATION SIMPLE SELF-HELP DEVELOPMENT EFFORT WILL BE STRESSED. FOR VC HAMLETS, PLANS MILITARY VISITS AND PRESENCE SUPPORTED BY CIVIC ACTION. HE IS PREPARED ADOPT ACCELERATED PROGRAM TO BRING ONE THOUSAND D AND E HAMLETS TO C CATEGORY BY TET (1969) PROVIDING FEASIBILITY STUDY INDICATES NECESSARY TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES AND RD CADRE TEAMS CAN BE ASSIGNED.

4. (S) MACV REVIEWING CURRENT DISPOSITION RF/PF AND RD CADRE ACCORDING TO HAMLET CATEGORIES. ANTICIPATE THIS WILL DEMONSTRATE AVAILABILITY OF CONSIDERABLE FORCES THROUGH REDUCTION OF THOSE NOW IN PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CENTERS AND IN A OR B HAMLETS OR WHO COULD BE REASSIGNED FROM CURRENT MISSIONS IN LIGHT OF PROXIMITY AND ONGOING ACTIVITIES OF REGULAR FORCES AND BUILDUP OF PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE. RF MAY ALSO BE USED TO SUPPLY SECURITY PRESENCE IN TARGET HAMLETS PENDING LOCAL RECRUITMENT PF. MINISTRY REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT HAS INDICATED ACCEPTANCE OF CONCEPT OF DIVIDING ALL RD CADRE TEAMS INTO HALF TEAMS TO PROVIDE CADRE PARTICIPATION IN COUNTEROFFENSIVE PROVIDED ACCOMPANIED BY RF OR PF SECURITY ELEMENTS. PROGRAM FOR TARGET OF ONE THOUSAND HAMLETS AT TET WOULD BE INITIATED IN ONLY 200 OR 300 HAMLETS ON 1 NOV AND PROCEED IN THREE MONTHLY PHASES. THUS ANTICIPATE THAT FEASIBILITY

~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

STUDY WILL DEVELOP POSITIVELY WITH ADDITIONAL FORCES BEING ADDED.

5. (S) IN ORDER EXTEND MOMENTUM OF SUCCESSFUL MILITARY CAMPAIGN INTO THESE ADDITIONAL FIELDS, REQUEST COMMANDERS MAKE EVERY EFFORT SUPPORT THIS STEP-UP OF PRESSURE ON ENEMY. THIS WILL SECURE STRATEGIC INITIATIVE IN THESE AS WELL AS STRICTLY MILITARY FIELD, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO SATISFACTORY ACCOMPLISHMENT OUR OBJECTIVES AND FRUSTRATION OF ENEMY AMBITIONS.

UNQUOTE

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

O 240929Z ZYH ZFF-3  
FM GEN ABRAMS, COMUSMACV  
TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS  
INFO ADM MCCAIN, CINCPAC  
AMB BUNKER, SAIGON  
ZEM

*Some of Gen Abrams' opnd guidelines, better, made for Charlie's. Some Monitor recently - it's good stuff.*

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF TWO MAC 14330 EYES ONLY

PART III

QUOTED BELOW IS EXTRACT OF OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE MESSAGE ISSUED TO MACV COMMANDERS ON 20 OCTOBER 1968. SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE - ADJUSTING TO ENEMY CURRENT OPERATIONS.

EXTRACT

QUOTE

1. OUR OWN OPERATIONAL SUMMARIES ARE REPETITIOUS WITH "THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO AVOID CONTACT." THIS APPEARS TO BE TRUE; THEREFORE, WHAT IS THE ENEMY TRYING TO DO WHILE AVOIDING CONTACT? WHAT CAN WE DO BEST TO EXPLOIT HIS CURRENT WEAKNESS FOR PERMANENT EFFECT?
2. IT APPEARS THAT HE MAY BE ATTEMPTING HIS OLD PRACTICE OF RESTOCKING HIS SUPPLIES IN-COUNTRY FOR FURTHER ACTION. FRIENDLY PATROLS HAVE UNCOVERED THREE INSTANCES OF SUCH ATTEMPTS IN RECENT DAYS. A SUSPECT WATER TAXI WAS FOUND TO HAVE FALSE BOTTOMS WITH A LARGE QUANTITY OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES PLUS SP771,291; A SUSPECT SAND BARGE WAS HAULED IN

EYES ONLY

AND FOUND TO HAVE BURIED IN THE SAND 9000 CANS OF DRIED FISH, 2 1/2 TONS OF RICE, 600 GALLONS OF GASOLINE, AND 3301 BOTTLES OF MEDICINE; PRISONERS CAPTURED IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD BEEN CARRYING AMMO TO GO CONG PROVINCE FOR THEIR UNITS (VC BNS 261A AND 263D) WHICH HAD BEEN IN BASE AREA 470 PRIOR TO THE AIRLIGHT STRIKES AND FRIENDLY GROUND ASSAULT ON THAT BASE AREA. IF HE IS PERMITTED TO RESUPPLY HIMSELF DURING A LULL OF HIS OWN CREATION, FRIENDLY FORCES WILL BE CONFRONTED WITH THE SAME TYPE FIGHT ALL OVER AGAIN. IN AREAS WHERE THERE IS NO CONTACT, FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED TO THE MINIMUM NECESSARY FOR A RECON SCREEN WHICH CAN PROVIDE EARLY DETECTION OF ANY RESURGING MAIN FORCE ACTIVITY. IT FOLLOWS THAT ANY RECON SCREEN MUST BE KEPT ALERT AND ACTIVE.

3. IN THE INTERIM, OUR AIR MOBILITY WILL

PERMIT FORCES RELEASED TO BE USED IN OTHER AREAS FOR CONTINUING

*being around*  
RNMBIUD OPERATIONS WITH ARVN TO LOCATE AND REMOVE

THE VC LOCAL FORCES, GUERRILLAS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE.

SUCH AREAS CAN BE OCCUPIED FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS PROPERLY, AND STILL GET BACK AGAINST MAINFORCE UNITS SHOULD THE NEED ARISE.

4. THE GVN HAS LAUNCHED THE 1000 HAMLET SPECIAL

PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE TO PICK UP SOME OF THE

MOMENTUM OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE PRODUCED AND

TO TRANSLATE THESE SUCCESSES INTO CONTINUING SECURITY

FOR THESE COMMUNITIES. FORCES REDEPLOYED FROM AREAS OF LIGHT

CONTACT MAY BE USED TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THIS OFFENSIVE,

EYES ONLY

OR, IF NOT NEEDED, TO EXTEND IT TO ADDITIONAL D,E, OR VC CONTROLLED HAMLETS. THERE IS NO RESTRICTION AGAINST OVERFULFILLING THIS PLAN. ADDITIONAL HAMLETS CAN BE CHOSEN TO EXTEND SECURITY IN PRIORITY AREAS OR TO BLOCK THE VC APPROACH ROUTES AND AXES OF ADVANCE USED TO DEBOUCH FROM CAMBODIA AND LAOTIAN SANCTUARIES. THE LATTER MAY BE TOUGH NUTS TO CRACK, BUT THEY WILL PAY LIFE-SAVING DIVIDENDS IF THE ENEMY SYSTEM IS DESTROYED. ANY SCREENING OF THE POPULATION WILL STILL BE DONE BY THE VIETNAMESE.

5. THE FOREGOING ARE THE TYPE OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE FULL BLOWN DURING THIS PERIOD WHEN THE ENEMY IS SEEKING "NO CONTACT." KEEP A SHARP EYE OUT FOR THE ENEMY VIA RECONNAISSANCE SCREENS WHILE WORKING BEHIND THAT SCREEN TO KEEP HE ENEMY FROM EVER RECOVERING, LET'S MOVE OUT ON THIS.

UNQUOTE

GP-1

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712 91-484

By 19/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

Friday, October 25, 1968 -- 9:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Here are some questions for Abrams.

1. If the enemy honors our understandings on the DMZ and the cities, will those actions constitute a significant military advantage to our forces and the ARVN?

2. Will that advantage compensate for the loss of our bombing in North Vietnam south of the 19th parallel?

3. Is it your estimate that the enemy will or will not honor those understandings?

4. If he does not honor those understandings, can standing orders for rules of engagement of the kind you and we have in mind protect our forces and those of our allies for a period sufficient for us to make a basic estimate of enemy intentions and return, if necessary, to full-scale bombing of North Vietnam?

5. In what ways would you apply the air power released from the North Vietnamese Panhandle to Laos and South Vietnam if there is a bombing halt? Do you believe that air power could produce results as effective in Laos and South Vietnam as in the North Vietnamese Panhandle, given North Vietnamese weather in the months ahead?

6. How would you propose to keep maximum pressure on the enemy on the ground in South Vietnam in the months ahead?

7. Do you envisage any problem maintaining the morale and offensive spirit of the ARVN and the RF-PF in the months ahead if there should be a bombing halt and more serious negotiations in Paris?

8. Are preparations under way to mount a maximum political and psychological warfare campaign against the VC in the light of their possible acceptance of the GVN as a negotiating partner and the closing of the DMZ?

9. Is there anything that we could send you promptly from here that would permit you to maintain maximum pressure on the ground in the months ahead?

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

**SECRET--EYES ONLY**

-2-

10. We note that there is some strengthening of the forces along the Cambodian frontier opposite Saigon. Are you confident that you and the ARVN can handle a major thrust against Saigon if the enemy should decide to mount it in the time ahead?

11. Knowing all that you know of the position in Vietnam, if you were President, would you proceed with the proposed arrangement; that is, no bombing of North Vietnam in return for the DMZ, no attacks on the cities, continued recce, and GVN participation in Paris?

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

45

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET/LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

Friday, October 25, 1968 -- 8:40 a. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

I've given a little thought to an announcement on Honolulu which would:

- be accurate;
- not stir stories of Abrams being out of line;
- not make the Hanoi or Moscow hawks climb the wall.

Here it is.

"The President will meet Gen. Abrams on \_\_\_\_\_ in Honolulu to review military plans and programs in Vietnam over the coming three months, including certain contingencies that might arise if there is major progress in the Paris talks."

To keep the boys in Paris busy and on the reservation, we might get out a position today which represents some compromise on our part but still has a tough sticking point. They would still be required to come back to Washington. Sec. Rusk might have a word with Dobrynin on our Paris position plus informing him that you want a word with Abrams to make sure he understands the deal and rules of engagement that go with "facts of life."

W. W. Rostow

P. S. Congratulations, sir!

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72291-484  
By ajp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rlm

~~TOP SECRET/LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

46  
**INFORMATION**

**SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS**

*Pres file*

Friday, October 25, 1968 -- 8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker's response on the secret meeting. (Tab A) You will note the critical importance of the public statement on no recognition of the NLF as an independent entity.

A copy of the outgoing is attached (Tab B) for your reference.

Also attached (Tab C) is a more full account of Vance's conference with Oberemko. You will note his evaluation in para. 6.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 719 91-484  
By 12/17, NARA, Date 3-5-93



Department of State

4602 (2)

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

ZZ RUEKC  
DE RUMJIR 41151 2990345  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z 250135Z OCT 68 ZFF-1  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3158  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 41151

CONTROL: 8318Q  
RECVD: OCT 24, 1968  
10:20 P.M.

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS  
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER  
REF: STATE 261222

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 9119 84391  
By rs/dck NARA, Date 3-5-93

1. THE GVN WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY WITH THE TEXT AS NOW PROPOSED, BUT THEY PROBABLY COULD LIVE WITH IT AS MODIFIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY SUGGESTIONS BELOW.
2. I DO NOT THINK IT PRACTICABLE TO ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GVN ABOUT THE DRAFT SECRET MINUTE NOW. WE WOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN TIME-COMSUMING DISCUSSIONS. I WOULD BE WILLING TO SEE US TAKE THE RISK OF NOT WORKING OUT THE TEXT WITH THEM IN DETAIL. IF WE GET THE TEXT RECOMMENDED THIS TEL, WE COULD LATER DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO SHOW IT TO THEM.
3. WITH REGARD TO PARA 3 A REFTTEL, I RECOMMEND DELETION OF THE WORDS "WITHOUT CONDITIONS". IF THIS NOT OBTAINABLE, AND IF SOME PHRASE OF THIS KIND HAS TO BE INCLUDED, THEN "WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS" COULD BE ACCEPTABLE. WE SHOULD MAKE STRONG EFFORT, HOWEVER, TO GET AWAY FROM ANY USE OF ANY WORDS STATING OR IMPLYING THAT THE BOMBING HALT WOULD BE UNCONDITIONAL.
4. WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 4 B (OUR POSSIBLE COUNTER-DRAFT). I THINK THE LAST SENTENCE READING "ACCORDINGLY, THE MEETING WILL INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE US, RVN, DRV, AND NLF" SHOULD BE DELETED. THIS IS IMPLICIT IN THE PRECEDING SENTENCE AND THEREFORE REDUNDANT; BUT MORE SERIOUSLY, THE SEPARATE LISTING WOULD LEND COLOR TO THE CLAIM THAT THIS WAS A "FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE" AND WOULD THEREFORE BE HIGHLY OBJECTIONABLE HERE.
5. RE PARAGRAPH 5 REFTTEL, YES, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE THE RVN AHEAD OF THE US IN THE LISTING, BUT AS YOU WILL NOTE FROM THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH I STRONGLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO SEPARATE LISTING OF THE PARTICIPANTS.
6. AS FOR THE SENTENCE "THE FOREGOING IN NO WAY IMPLIES RECOGNITION, ETC.". I REGARD IT AS DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL SINCE WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE SEPARATE HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENTS TO THE SAME EFFECT.

BUNKER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

(1)

466

261222

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

24 OCT 68 22 29z

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Origin  
Date

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

STATE 261222

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ALQ 94-391

For Ambassador Bunker from the Secretary.

By AS/Ad, NARA, Date 3-5-93

1. You will see from the report of today's session in Paris that we have committed ourselves in principle to a secret minute if we can get agreement on the language and on the timing. We cannot of course say whether the DRV would ever make that minute public, and some parts of it may serve as a useful hedging against that-- to the extent that any of it would bother us in any event. However, we must certainly operate on the assumption that it would be made public at some time, and we need your urgent judgment on the present text and on changes that we might propose in Paris tomorrow. Since time may be of the essence, we would like your own reaction to reach us during the evening tonight, just as soon as possible, on two questions: (1) The probable acceptability to the GVN of what we might now propose; and (2) whether you believe that formal GVN clearance should be obtained before

Drafted <u>WFB</u> EA:WFBundy:mk 10/24/68	Tel. No. 4235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by <u>SR</u> The Secretary
Clearances White House - Mr. Rostow <u>WR</u>	S/S - Mr. Read <u>SR</u>	

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

we ourselves indicate our final approval.

2. For ready reference, the text that Thuy is now proposing would be as follows:

A. On the basis of our discussions, the US will stop without conditions all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force on the entire territory of the DRV on (date and time).

B. In order to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem, a meeting including (representatives of) the DRV, NLF, US, and RVN will be held in Paris on (date and time).

3. We would press in the above paragraph A:

a. Preferably to delete "without conditions" entirely.

b. If a maximum effort failed, as a final fall-back, to change "without conditions" to "without pre-conditions" ("sans conditions préalables" in French). You will note that this language would imply the existence of conditions subsequent. Moreover, if Hanoi should ever try to use the language to avoid what we have said about their military actions, we could counter by saying that the language meant there was no condition as to the duration of the stopping of the bombing either.

~~SECRET~~

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Classification

4. We would propose to change paragraph B to take both Thuy's language (revised) and our own formula (Deptel 260480), so that it would read as follows:

B. It is agreed that a meeting to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem will be held in Paris on (date and time). The US has indicated that the Republic of Viet-Nam will be present, and the DRV has indicated that the NLF will be present. Accordingly, the meeting will include representatives of the US, RVN, DRV, and NLF.

5. In this same paragraph B, we would also like your judgment whether it would help with the GVN to have the order begin "RVN, US." Finally, we would like your judgment whether we should make another effort to get the sentence: "The foregoing in no way implies recognition of those represented at the meeting."

6. On the timing question, we would propose to offer, as our firm position, that with the meeting agreed for 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 2--the bombing would stop on Wednesday midnight, Saigon time. In that case, the announcement might be made Thursday morning, Saigon time, which would be Wednesday evening, our time.

GP-1.

End.

RUSKI

~~SECRET~~

Classification

(2)



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

462

VV CRA281  
ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUFNCR 22913 2982343  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z 242332Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7433  
STATE GRNC  
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1968 OCT 24 PM 8 11

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 22913

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 876

FROM VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712991482

By rg/jrt NARA, Date 3-5-93

1. I MET BRIEFLY WITH OBEREMKO EVENING OCTOBER 24 AT SOVIET EMBASSY. NEGROPONTE WAS ALSO PRESENT. OBEREMKO HAD MET WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION AND APPEARED WELL INFORMED ON THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY.
2. I TOLD OBEREMKO WE HAD MET FOR FOUR HOURS IN A VERY DIFFICULT SESSION AND THAT THERE WAS SHARP DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US AT THE END OF THE MEETING CENTERING ON:  
(A) THE TIME OF CESSATION; (B) DRV INSISTENCE ON INCLUSION OF WORDS "WITHOUT CONDITIONS" IN PROPOSED MINUTE;  
(C) DESCRIPTION OF PARTICIPATION. I TOLD OBEREMKO THAT WE HAD REPORTED TO OUR GOVERNMENT WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED AT TODAY'S MEETING AND WERE AWAITING FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON.
3. OBEREMKO THEN SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT, HE BELIEVED THAT WE WERE NOT SO FAR APART THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH A COMPROMISE. OBEREMKO SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD AGREE TO LATEST DRV FORMULATION ON PARTICIPATION ISSUE, I.E., NAMING OF FOUR PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO TWO SIDES OR FOUR PARTIES. I RESPONDED BY REPEATING WHAT WE HAD PROPOSED AND SAID I FELT OUR POSITION WAS A REASONABLE ONE.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2- 7433 FROM PARIS, OCT. 24, 1968

4. UPON THE INCLUSION OF THE TERM "WITHOUT CONDITIONS," OBEREMKO URGED THAT WE AGREE TO THIS IN A SECRET MINUTE. OBEREMKO SAID THAT AGREEMENT TO "WITHOUT CONDITIONS" SHOULD BE VIEWED IN OVERALL CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSED MINUTE WHICH, AS A RESULT OF TODAY'S MEETING, WOULD INCLUDE "ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS." OBEREMKO SAID HE HAD BEEN SHOWN THE EXACT WORDING WHICH WE HAD SUPPLIED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. HE SAID, "I KNOW YOUR POSITION. YOU'VE GOT IT THERE. EVERYONE KNOWS WHAT IT MEANS."

5. ON THE ISSUE OF DATE, OBEREMKO SAID THAT PREVIOUSLY THE DRV POSITION ON THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THE START OF CONVERSATIONS WAS TWO WEEKS. NOW IT WAS TEN DAYS, AND HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A COMPROMISE WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. I SAID THAT AS I HAD TOLD HIM PREVIOUSLY, THIS WAS A MATTER OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO MY GOVERNMENT AND THAT OUR POSITION WAS TWO OR THREE DAYS.

6. OBEREMKO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE VERY CLOSE TO A SOLUTION AND THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO FIND A WAY TO REACH IT. HE SAID, AS I KNEW, HIS GOVERNMENT WAS DEEPLY INTERESTED IN FINDING A SOLUTION AND THAT HE WAS ACTING UNDER THE INSTRUCTIONS OF HIS GOVERNMENT. I SAID WE APPRECIATED HIS EFFORTS AND THAT I WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM WHEN THERE WAS SOMETHING TO TALK ABOUT.

HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Friday, October 25, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith the text of Clark Clifford's press conference of this morning.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

rln

MEMORANDUM  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

472

October 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR  
HON. WALT W. ROSTOW

Walt:

Attached are two transcripts  
of my news conference this morning.  
One of the copies is for you and one is  
for the President.

Best regards.

*ceak -*

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NEWS CONFERENCE  
OF  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CLARK M. CLIFFORD

at

Pentagon

11:00 A. M. (EDT)

Friday, October 25, 1968

- - - - -

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

I have an announcement to read. At the conclusion of the press conference, as you leave the room, you will be given the text, so you need not, perhaps, be too concerned about taking notes.

You will recall that I told you in August that we were reviewing the program to build a new kind of nuclear-propelled attack submarine, the so-called turbine electric drive submarine. This review has been completed, and I have now decided to go forward with the program. I want to tell you about this submarine and the considerations that were involved in a very close decision.

As you know, two new programs for attack submarines have been proposed. One is a new class that has become known as the high-speed submarine. This will be the finest nuclear-propelled attack submarine that technology can produce. It not only will be fast, it also will be quiet and will carry the most effective weapons and other devices procurable. I ordered on July 1 that this high-speed submarine be built.

The turbine electric drive submarine is a different program with different objectives. The program calls for the construction of one boat to contain a combination of advanced silencing techniques. This nuclear submarine will have a new kind of propulsion system and new and quieter machinery of various kinds.

Quietness is a great advantage in a submarine. The quieter it is, the better it can perform any function without being detected and destroyed by the enemy. Future United States submarines will emphasize quietness

MORE

to an even greater extent than do our existing designs, which are the quietest in the world.

But the achieving of quietness is an art. We have found that we must try various quieting devices in an actual submarine before we can accurately assess their value. The turbine electric drive submarine will permit us to test at the same time and in various combinations a wide range of quieting measures. These measures then can be used in other submarines to the extent that they prove effective.

The submarine built will be more than a test bed. It will carry weapons and other devices and should provide us with a very silent and useful operational submarine.

The drawback to the proposed program is its great expense. I have estimates before me that put its cost at \$150 million to \$200 million, compared with about \$78 million for a new Sturgeon class nuclear attack submarine. Before making my decision, I wanted to know if we could achieve the benefits of extra quietness with less extra expense. The close re-examination which my staff and I have just completed has convinced me that as costly as it is, there is no cheaper and effective way to achieve in equal time desired progress in noise suppression.

Therefore, today I shall direct the Navy to proceed with the turbine electric drive submarine program.

Concurrently, we are continuing our work on 29 additional Sturgeon class nuclear attack submarines.

Thus we propose to insure that the United States Navy will continue to have the quietest, the most effective submarines in the world for the foreseeable future.

As I say, a full copy of that text will be at the door as you leave.

I am now ready for questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the decision to go ahead on the silent submarine, does that mean that you overruled members of your staff who recommended against it?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I do not comment, as you would know, on specific recommendations that come to the Secretary from within the Defense Department. There has been a difference of opinion with reference to proceeding with the submarine, particularly in view of its very substantial cost.

MORE

After considering all the views that came in from the Navy, from Deputy Secretary Nitze, from others who are involved, who have a background in submarine building, I considered all those views and then made the decision.

QUESTION: Mr. Clifford, in Bonn, in your recent visit to Germany, you made a statement in reference to a question about the Vietnam peace negotiations in which you apparently stated a new formula for getting a bombing halt and the peace negotiations. What you said if they showed the slightest evidence that they would engage in substantive negotiations, that this would be the basis for a bombing halt. You left out any reference to the safeguarding of the DMZ or our troops.

Did you intend to give that impression?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I have, Norman, I think, quite a clear recollection of the comments I made in Bonn. There were a very considerable number of them. I do not recall making a statement of that kind.

I think I generally acquainted the officials of the Federal Republic of Germany with the fact that the negotiations were proceeding; that the President was continuing to explore every avenue that might lead to a diminution in the level of the combat of the war. I do not have any recollection that I went into that detail, and I am really quite sure that I did not.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, with the ground action at a minimum in Vietnam, and with reported withdrawal of major North Vietnamese units from the battle areas, how much more of a sign do we need before we stop the bombing of the North?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I do not know if this is a sign or not. We know that there have been between 30,000 and 40,000 North Vietnamese troops moved out of South Vietnam. Some have been moved into Laos, some into Cambodia, some back into North Vietnam.

There still remains in South Vietnam some 80,000 North Vietnamese troops. Keep in mind that for the last week that we have figures, we lost some 100 killed in action; the South Vietnamese close to 200; enemy forces somewhere in the neighborhood of 1200.

So in this week, which is one of the lowest weeks, there were still some 1500 killed in action. I do not know if this is a lull that exists today. I do know that after the Tet offensive which came at the end of January, that a similar kind of withdrawal took place, and also a substantial decrease in the level of the combat.

MORE

Again in May, when they launched their May offensive, it was concluded there was a similar type of withdrawal and a similar cut in the level of combat.

This could be the same. From my standpoint, it is too soon to be able to attach any significance to the lower level of combat.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Mr. Nixon charged that there is a gravely serious security gap, and he indicated the serious over-centralization is costing a lot of money here. I wonder if you could comment on that.

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Yes, I would be happy to.

In the first place, we are 11 days away from the election. I do not intend to get involved in political disputes. We have been relieved, as you know, by the President from any participation in the campaign.

I would say to you that when I had the confirmation hearing in January, I stated then that I believed that this country should maintain a continuing superiority over the Soviet Union, and that I would dedicate whatever period of time that I served in this office to carrying out the performance of that goal. I was comforted when I came into the Department to find the extent of the superiority which we had over the Soviets. I have continued in that direction. We have today a substantial military superiority over the Soviet Union, and I shall certainly do all in my power to continue to maintain that superiority as long as I hold this position.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there were three reports by the Preparedness Subcommittee dealing with the submarine situation, Tactical Air Force, and the strategic air area, all highly critical of the Defense Department and what they contend is some kind of a decrease in our military position in the last eight years. Could you comment on that?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Yes. I think that probably the best way to do it would be to pick out the major areas and to inform you and, through you, the public, exactly where we stand today. Let me reiterate, I do not intend to engage in any political discussion. I am giving you the facts as we understand them to be today, in these major categories.

In the field of land-based ICBM's, the United States has 1054; the Soviets have approximately 900.

QUESTION: What date is this effective?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: As of today.

MORE

With reference to submarine-launched nuclear missiles, we have 656 such missiles; the Soviets have between 75 and 80.

Regarding intercontinental bombers, those capable of conveying a nuclear weapon to the Soviet Union, or from there to the United States and return, we have 646 such intercontinental bombers; the Soviets have between 150 and 155.

Recapitulating, and pointing out the ultimate strength which, to me, is the final test, how many deliverable nuclear weapons does each nation have at this time, weapons that could be delivered from there to here, or from here to there. In this regard the United States has 4,206; the Soviet Union has approximately 1200.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, sir, this is strictly layman talk. Could it possibly be that we have militarily won this war and if we were to demand now, as maybe a commander might have done, say, back in the Civil War, something like that, if we were to demand that we have a showdown instead of sitting around the peace table, that maybe we could conclude this very quickly?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I am not conscious that we have won the war militarily in South Vietnam. I believe the enemy to be in position to launch additional attacks if they choose to. We know the North Vietnamese still have some 80,000 troops there. We know that they can, if they choose to, re-fit and re-equip the troops that they have moved back, and return them to South Vietnam.

There is even some indication that we pick up, through intelligence, that there may be attention being given now by Hanoi to another series of attacks which would come later, the so-called winter-spring offensive.

So, I believe we would make a mistake if we were to conclude that because of the present lowered level of combat, that the enemy is not in position to go on with additional warfare.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it is a fact, is it not, that the current withdrawal is bigger in scope and farther back than the previous one that occurred after Tet and after the May offensive?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: It is correct. If you could not hear back there, the withdrawals after this series of attacks are larger in size and the withdrawals are perhaps deeper than the others. But it still follows the same kind of pattern that we have had before after other attacks.

MORE

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there was talk for quite some time of talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over reduction in nuclear weapons. Is there any progress being made toward that now in spite of Czechoslovakia and Vietnam?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: It would be the hope of all thoughtful Americans that the day would come when we could reach decisions and agreements with the Soviet Union not only for the limitation of nuclear weapons but possibly for the reduction of nuclear weapons. This is really the hope of the future. This would give us the opportunity of turning so much of our effort and our treasure to other areas rather than meeting the threat which we feel we must meet.

I do not know, however, when the appropriate time would come. I would say only, too, that we must proceed with caution and we must proceed with care. Let me take but a second in this regard, and this might be an appropriate time to refer to the parable of the hunter and the bear.

A hunter was in the forest one day and came upon a clearing and he saw a large bear in the middle of the clearing. As he raised his rifle and took aim, the bear said, "Wait a minute, friend. Don't shoot." The hunter lowered his rifle and the bear said, "What do you want?" The hunter said, "I want a fur coat." The bear said, "Well, that is reasonable. What I want is a full stomach. Let's sit down and negotiate." So they sat down and they negotiated. After a while, the bear left alone. He had a full stomach and the hunter had his fur coat.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a moment ago you said that the enemy was considered to be in a position to launch attacks. Would you also say major attacks of the level of Tet?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I could answer that only by saying that we had advance information of a certain kind about the attacks at Tet and when the attacks came off they had a certain intensity. When the May attacks came, we had a certain kind of information, very similar to that we had before. The May attacks had less intensity than the January attacks.

Then again we began to get intelligence that they were preparing again in August to launch attacks. Those were substantially less effective and less intense than either of the other two. The fact is, they never really got their August offensive off the ground.

I think our spoiling operations were exceedingly effective during that time. So if one draws some conclusion from the pattern, he might well conclude that there has been a diminishing force behind the attacks. But I do not say that that would hold true with reference to some future attack that they might plan.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, would you comment on Rep. William Foster's speech of last Saturday at the Business Council at which he raised questions about the word superiority and its applicability to the current strategic situation?

MORE

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Yes. Mr. Foster has a responsibility and a very appropriate one it is, too. A very able fellow he is, and he has performed an excellent service to this Government. His aim is to find a basis upon which we can get the talks started and find a formula for the Soviets and the United States to reduce nuclear weapons. I have a different assignment.

Others can look at the best of the worlds. I must look at the worst. I must be prepared for whatever kind of contingency we must foresee, because this office is invested with the defense of the security of the United States.

So that basically, while we might be in entire accord about the ultimate goal we would reach, he proceeds one way; I am sure I proceed more cautiously than he and with a recognition, perhaps, greater than he of the dangers that are inherent in the relationship.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, after the decision of the Bundestag Defense Committee to buy 88 R4C's, how do you propose to handle the offset condition in favor of the German aircraft industry?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: There were talks when we were in Bonn with reference to the plans that the Germans might have to increase their defense posture. I might say such talks have been going on with other member nations of NATO, also. We discussed at some length the possibility that the Germans might buy Phantom's. Apparently now, a decision has been made at the present level to purchase some 88 F4's here, which is one of our very best fighter bombers, as you men know.

The details of the manner in which there may be some participation of the Germans in the building of the planes or the manner in which the offset problem is to be considered have not yet been determined. Those will be the subject of discussions that will be taking place steadily between now and the end of the year.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there has been an accumulation of espionage cases recently, both in Italy and Germany and at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. Can you assess the damage which has been done to NATO by these cases?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: We have no direct evidence as yet of the existence of espionage. We know that the charge has been made. A thorough investigation is being conducted at the present time because we consider it a matter of the utmost seriousness. We intend to follow through on the investigation and find out all the facts.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, from what you said about Vietnam, sir, one could draw the conclusion that a lot of the talk about a near breakthrough or an imminent breakthrough on Vietnam is at a minimum ill-founded. Would you agree?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: The President has directed his Cabinet Members to refrain from commenting on developments in Paris. In this regard, I would say that I know the President is pursuing every avenue. I know that he is not leaving a stone unturned. He has been in constant communication with our representatives there. One must continue to hope, as he is continuing to hope. While those negotiations are going on there, he has directed, however, that there be no reduction in the level of military pressure that we put on the enemy in South Vietnam.

QUESTION: Sir, would you comment on reports or recommendations within the Defense Department terminating the F-111 program?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: When any question comes up of substantial significance within the Department, the views of various departments, agencies and Assistant Secretaries will be obtained. When those views have all been collected and evaluated, and analyzed, the decision is ultimately made. However, I do not comment with any particularity upon what any one service or agency recommended or what the manner was of such recommendation.

QUESTION: Is this now before you?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: The question of the 111 is before the Secretary at this time. Let me say that it is our opinion in the Secretary's office, and it is the opinion of the Air Force, that this will be an excellent plane.

I believe that there has been some over-emphasis upon the difficulty. I might use this opportunity to put it in perspective.

We have tested the F-111 for some 15,000 hours. In 15,000 hours of tests, we have lost 10 111's. Now look at this:

The F-100, a very useful plane, when tested 15,000 hours, we had lost 28 of those in the same period of time.

The F-104, also an excellent plane, we had lost 21.

The F-101, we had lost 18 in a similar period.

Just one further comparison: The F-4, which, as you all know, is the Phantom, which has proved to be so successful -- and we have some 2,000 Phantoms now -- at this same period, 15,000 hours, we lost the same number -- 10 Phantoms.

So that the number of losses in the 111 program are very well within the experience we have had with other planes that turned out to be very successful.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, this Pentagon is the citadel of cost effectiveness, and we must assume, I would presume, that there is a national scale of values for the involvement in the Vietnam War.

It is in that context that I wondered if you could justify, as Secretary of Defense, this heavy loss of life in Vietnam, 28,000 Americans killed. How do you look upon the justification in those terms?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: This obviously gets right to the heart of our involvement in Vietnam. I have heard the President speak in this regard. He has said that he has felt that we had a commitment to go into South Vietnam; that the development of aggression there poised a great threat against all of Southeast Asia; and that a decision had been made back in the Eisenhower Administration, confirmed by President Kennedy, followed through by President Johnson, that the threat of aggression must be met.

He has attempted to meet it in a limited manner, by sacrificing as few men as possible so that there would not be a successful aggression against South Vietnam.

It is my belief that we have successfully accomplished that purpose. There has not been a subjugation of South Vietnam by North Vietnam. I think one of our major functions now is to continue to assist the South Vietnamese so that their government can strengthen, that their armed forces, which have progressed very well these last six months, can also strengthen, so that we can look forward to the day that withdrawal can be made.

I know that the President feels that the sacrifices made in Vietnam constitute a very worthy one. It is an appropriate investment because by so doing we have prevented a much larger effort later on which could have been infinitely more expensive in both lives and treasure.

I have time for two more questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on a recent tour of Europe, I found a feeling in the NATO area that we have a new strategy, flexible response, at the precise moment we are losing our flexibility. I wonder whether you could say anything about what you plan, or the United States plans, to give added flexibility to NATO. I think General Lemnitzer treated this rather directly in recent speeches.

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I had the privilege of spending the morning in Stuttgart, where I received a valuable briefing from all of our American military commanders who came in from their various locations in Europe.

I believe that the NATO forces constitute a very effective and powerful military force. I believe that the conventional forces are well armed and effectively equipped. More can be done to bring them up to a better state of readiness, and work is going on in this regard.

In addition to the conventional forces that we have in Europe, we also have 7200 tactical nuclear weapons deposited at strategic points in Europe. The Nuclear Planning Group discussed for two days the manner in which those weapons could be used in the event of an attack.

It is my belief that the greatest deterrent to Soviet or Warsaw Pact aggression against the NATO countries is a statement that I was authorized by President Johnson to make in Europe. It was this: An attack by any Warsaw Pact country against any member of the NATO Alliance would be construed as an attack upon the United States of America, with all of the ramifications that go with that. The Soviets understand it. I believe it is clear, as to what the major deterrent is.

There will be a meeting in November of Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of NATO. There will be discussions as to additional means by which NATO can be strengthened to meet the increased threat of the Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia.

One last question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Senator Symington spoke about the F-111 on the Floor and suggested the program should be cut. His

argument was that it did not represent a great advance over present aircraft and that from a cost effective standpoint it was not a very good buy at the price tag that is on it.

What is your view relative to what it provides for the Air Force relative to fighter capacity, bomber capacity, and this whole range of areas where he criticized?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Briefly, I would say this: Senator Symington, who is very experienced in this field, has a certain view of the F-111, and I am sure he believes in it. It happens that the Air Force does not agree with Senator Symington in his evaluation of the 111. I happen to know that the pilots who have been flying the 111 do not agree with his evaluation. They think it to be an excellent plane.

This plane has gone a step beyond any other type of plane that we have. As you know, it has the swing wing. It is a supersonic plane. It has an exceedingly long range. It can be used as a fighter; it can be used as a bomber. If it develops in the manner in which the Air Force feels that it will, it will give us the most modern plane in the world today, and will keep us in the most modern status for the foreseeable future.

I have gone over my time. Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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(11:38 A.M. EDT)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-112  
By ics, NARA Date 5-3-99

Mr. Rostow

48

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

Friday, October 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Strong Israeli Reaction to Eban Talks Here

*to copy*  
*2. Profile*

Abe Feinberg called last night to say the Israelis are up in arms because Pete Hart had apparently linked the Phantoms and the NPT after you and the Secretary had stopped just short of linking them.

I called Secretary Rusk who told me the following: The Secretary had not linked the NPT and the Phantoms but had told Eban that he wished Hart to discuss certain political questions with Rabin before technical discussions on the planes began. Rabin was leaving for Israel the following afternoon. Hart told him the one thing we were prepared to go into with Rabin on that short notice was International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, which Eban had said he had reservations about. Rabin said he wasn't prepared to discuss that; he just wanted to discuss planes. So he and Hart made a date for 3:00 p. m., October 30, the day after Rabin and Eban come back. Rabin's line is: The NPT and the planes are two separate issues; let's get on with the planes.

I told Feinberg that neither you nor the Secretary had made the NPT a condition for the Phantoms but you considered the NPT of great importance.

Feinberg apparently told this to Argov who cabled Rabin that there was "no condition precedent" to the sale of Phantoms. (Argov is Rabin's deputy.)

This morning, Argov called me to ask whether he could today supplement his last night's message with another saying that a date has now been set for actual consultations on the Phantoms. He says that the Israeli press is now saying we have linked the NPT and Phantoms and that this will put Eshkol on the spot in the Cabinet. He'd like to put Eban in a position to knock these critics by saying (a) there's no condition and (b) what's more Rabin is taking technical consultants back with him to begin detailed negotiations.

If we want to wind up the Phantom negotiations promptly, as you indicated, that would make sense. But it would mean working the NPT on a separate track. The Israelis are mounting this reaction deliberately to press us to separate the Phantoms and the NPT. Giving them the kind

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

of answer Argov wants would de-couple the two and take off the heat on the NPT that you and the Secretary generated.

I can respond to Argov in one of two ways, depending on how you and the Secretary wish to play this:

1. We could give Argov a date for the beginning of technical talks--a date several days after Rabin's return so that we can at least hear what he has to say on the NPT before the technical talks even though we'd be committed to begin them.

2. I could tell Argov: We have set no conditions. However, the Israelis themselves have told us the Phantoms would make it easier for them to sign the NPT. Moreover, others in the area have already related the two. This is a problem we have to cope with, so we asked Eban to tell us where the issue stands. Rabin can make all the practical arrangements he needs to while he is in Israel and then Hart will discuss dates with him next Wednesday.

You may wish to discuss this with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford before you reply, or you may wish me to.

(signed) W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

I prefer giving Argov a date \_\_\_\_\_  
Hold the line, using the line in para. 2 above \_\_\_\_\_  
Work out with Secretary Rusk \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Free file* 49  
INFORMATION

Friday - October 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Resumption of Diplomatic Relations with Peru

At the Tuesday lunch you authorized Secretary Rusk to resume diplomatic relations with Peru as soon as multilateral and Congressional consultations were completed.

All countries outside this hemisphere with whom Peru traditionally maintains relations have now recognized. All major Latin American countries except Venezuela have also resumed relations.

State has consulted with Senator Hickenlooper (the only Senator accessible) and the staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as staffs of Representatives Mailliard and Purcell. No objection to our resumption of relations was voiced.

Secretary Rusk authorized our Embassy in Lima to answer the Peruvian Government's note at noon today (text of our note is attached at Tab A), thereby signalling the resumption of diplomatic relations.

A brief low-key announcement will be made by State's press spokesman at the noon briefing today (a copy is attached at Tab B of this announcement).

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-409  
By ig NARA. Date 7-16-92

Attachments

Tab A - Text of US Government Note .

Tab B - Text of Low-Key Announcement by State .

cc - George Christian

SWLewis:mm

U. S. Government's Proposed Response to Peruvian Government's Note  
dated October 3, 1968

"The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's Note of October 3, 1968, by which the Embassy was informed that a revolutionary government of Peru was formed under the presidency of General Juan Velasco Alvarado and that it desired to strengthen relations with the United States of America.

The Embassy wishes to reciprocate the desire expressed by the Ministry in its Note of October 3 to maintain good and traditional relations between the United States of America and the Republic of Peru. The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to note its wish to discuss bilateral matters opportunely with appropriate Peruvian authorities.

The Embassy takes this opportunity to express to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurance of its highest consideration. "

October 25, 1968

Text of Proposed State Department Announcement

to be made at 12:00 noon, October 25,  
1968

The American Embassy in Lima advised the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at noon today, October 25, that the United States Government has resumed diplomatic relations with the Government of Peru.

*Pres File*

50

~~SECRET~~ Thurs., Oct. 24, 1968  
HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS 6:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Without in any way committing you, Sect. Rusk has sent out the attached cable to Bunker for his reaction and guidance. It does reflect, however, how Sect. Rusk's mind is working on the instructions for the next phase.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76991-484

By rg/vip, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET~~

50a

Ambassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

STATE

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

Authority 712991-48.2

By MS/W, NARA, Date 3-5-93

For Ambassador Bunker from the Secretary.

1. You will see from the report of today's session in Paris that we have committed ourselves in principle to a secret minute if we can get agreement on the language and on the timing. We cannot of course say whether the DRV would ever make that minute public, and some parts of it may serve as a useful hedging against that-- to the extent that any of it would bother us in any event.

However, we must certainly operate on the assumption that it would be made public at some time, and we need your urgent judgment on the present text and on changes that we might propose in Paris tomorrow. Since time may be of the essence, we would like your own reaction to reach us during the evening tonight, just as soon as possible, on two questions: (1) The probable acceptability to the GVN of what we might now propose; and (2) whether you believe that formal GVN clearance should be obtained before

EA:WPBundy:mk 10/24/68

4235

The Secretary

White House - Mr. Rostow

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

~~SECRET~~

we ourselves indicate our final approval.

2. For ready reference, the text that Thuy is now proposing would be as follows:

A. On the basis of our discussions, the US will stop without conditions all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force on the entire territory of the DRV on (date and time).

B. In order to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem, a meeting including (representatives of) the DRV, NLF, US, and RVN will be held in Paris on (date and time).

3. We would press in the above paragraph A:

a. Preferably to delete "without conditions" entirely.

b. If a maximum effort failed, as a final fall-back, to change "without conditions" to "without pre-conditions" ("sans conditions préalables" in French). You will note that this language would imply the existence of conditions subsequent. Moreover, if Hanoi should ever try to use the language to avoid what we have said about their military actions, we could counter by saying that the language meant there was no condition as to the duration of the stopping of the bombing either.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

4. We would propose to change paragraph B to take both Thuy's language (revised) and our own formula (Deptel 260480), so that it would read as follows:

B. It is agreed that a meeting to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem will be held in Paris on (date and time). The US has indicated that the Republic of Viet-Nam will be present, and the DRV has indicated that the NLF will be present. Accordingly, the meeting will include representatives of the US, RVN, DRV, and NLF.

5. In this same paragraph B, we would also like your judgment whether it would help with the GVN to have the order begin with "RVN, US." Finally, we would like your judgment whether we should make another effort to get the sentence: "The foregoing in no way implies recognition of those represented at the meeting."

6. On the timing question, we would propose to offer, as our firm position, that--with the meeting agreed for 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 2--the bombing would stop on Wednesday midnight, Saigon time. In that case, the announcement might be made Thursday morning, Saigon time, which would be Wednesday evening, our time.

GP-1.

End.

~~SECRET~~

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INFORMATION

*Pres file*

**SECRET/SENSITIVE**

Thursday, October 24, 1968  
6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is the note from Bob Ginsburgh  
about which I just referred on the phone.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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White House Collection, Feb. 24, 1993  
By rg, NSWA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rla

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

51a

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

October 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

In the course of a long reflective chat with me this afternoon, General Wheeler made the following points:

-- The only thing that makes me uneasy about the negotiation is the President's obvious uneasiness. If he's uneasy, I'm uneasy, even though the President himself may not know why he is uneasy.

-- I hope he is not uneasy about JCS support. We have backed him fully; none of us will cut out and run if things should turn out badly; we will acknowledge responsibility for our recommendation if it doesn't work out right.

4

R. N. GINSBURGH

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72991-484

By reg/af, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

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INFORMATION

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Thursday, October 24, 1968  
6:05 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This fellow Oberemko really  
knows what the negotiation is about.  
See attached.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 7129 91-484  
By rg/ajp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

52a

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

October 24, 1968

Secretary Vance called on the secure phone at 5:30

Oberemko said he had visited the DRV delegation after the private meeting today. Vance started to say that they had had some tough bargaining and Oberemko cut in to say that he knew all about the meeting. Oberemko told Vance that when we got agreement on including the words "on the basis of our discussions" -- "You (Vance and Harriman) have got it there. Everyone knows what that means." Oberemko urged us to find a middle ground on the remaining language and time differences.

BR

Benjamin H. Read

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C 891-482  
By rg/jw, NARA, Date 3-5-93

53

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 24, 1968  
5:40 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith my version of your  
debriefing of your conversation with  
Foreign Minister Eban.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93

53a

**SECRET--NO DISTRIBUTION**

**Tuesday, October 22, 1968**

**Conversation Between the President and Foreign Minister Abba Eban,  
10:30 a. m. , October 22, 1968.**

The President reported that he had made his decision on Phantoms in principle last January. He planned to move ahead if the Russians kept on supplying arms to the Arabs; if the Russians proved unwilling to talk with us about regional arms control; if Israel were helpful in seeking peace; and if Israel accepted the NPT.

The President said that he was not making the question of the NPT a formal condition, but Eban should know the very strong feelings in the American government on this matter. He then read to Eban Sec. Clifford's view (Tab A), transmitted to the President by telephone, and the attached passage from Sec. Rusk's memorandum (Tab B).

Eban said that the U. S. Government appeared to have an "exaggerated idea" of Israel's nuclear capability. The President said he should talk about this matter with Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford.

Eban held forth to the President for half an hour, emphasizing:

- Israel is cooperating with Jarring;
- Its bilateral efforts with King Hussein;
- UAR intransigence; and
- The ruthlessness of the Soviet Union, as revealed in Czechoslovakia with its implications for the Middle East.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-212  
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

WWRostow:rln

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NIJ 44-352**  
**By cb, NARA, Date 8-7-95**

October 22, 1968  
Tuesday - 8:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From a Defense standpoint, our main concern with reference to Israeli weapon development has to do with the surface-to-surface missile which they have purchased from France. It is called the 620 missile. Some apparently have already been delivered by the French although the Israelis have denied this.

Our concern about this missile is because it can easily be fitted with a nuclear warhead and if this should happen then the danger in the Middle East would be enormously increased.

Our hope of persuading the Israelis not to develop this missile capability hinges on an understanding that we could get from them in return for our agreement to permit them to purchase the fifty Phantom airplanes. I mention this to the President for it may come up in his discussion this morning with Abba Eban. If the President thought well of the idea he could show concern over the Israeli interest in these missiles so that it would furnish a foundation for the State Department to insist that this missile development not be continued in consideration of the Israelis' receiving the fifty Phantoms.

Clark Clifford

Dictated by telephone.

~~SECRET~~

Tab B

We assume also that if Israel gets the F-4's it will relieve whatever political pressures there may be to develop other forms of deterrent -- such as nuclear weapons, or strategic surface-to-surface missiles.

Israel knows the great importance the US attaches to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the Near East. That is why we have attached great weight to Prime Minister Eshkol's statements that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area, and also to the Foreign Minister's statement of April 1966 that Israel would not initiate the introduction of "any sort of new weapon" into the area.

In view of these assurances, and in view of Israel's positive support for the NPT at the last session of the General Assembly, Israel's early signing and ratification of the NPT should not pose significant problems for Israel. For the US, it will be a matter of great importance. Israel's action -- or non-action -- bears directly on our global non-proliferation efforts and most specifically on our current efforts to have other states adhere to the NPT.

There is also the equally important issue of nuclear weapon delivery systems. If Israel produces or deploys a strategic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead it will vitiate the effect of Israel's assurances that it does not intend to develop nuclear weapons.

We are aware Israel has spent a lot of money to have the French develop a nuclear-capable, strategic missile for Israel. If Israel deploys such a missile, or if it is known to be producing it, no one will believe Israel is not clandestinely developing nuclear weapons. As a deterrent, the missile is meaningful only on the assumption that someday it will be equipped with nuclear weapons.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-213  
By lag, NARA, Date 2-27-95

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Thursday, October 24, 1968  
5:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the details of the haggle.

I would conclude from para. 15 that Thuy is prepared to cave in some distance from the week's gap.

Key passages are marked.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Paris 22908 (DELTO 874), 2 parts

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rln

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 10, NARA, Date 3-5-73



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

SECRET

1968 OCT 24 PM 3 08

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SECRET SECTION ONE OF THREE PARIS 22908

DDIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 874

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: STATE 260480

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 84-391

By lg/llh NARA Date 3-5-93

1. WE MET THIS MORNING WITH XUAN THUY AND HA VAN LAU FOR ABOUT FOUR HOURS. THE SAME PERSONS WERE PRESENT AS AT OUR LAST MEETING.

2. WE OPENED THE MEETING WITH A STATEMENT FOLLOWING THE OUTLINE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 2, 3 AND 4 OF REFTEL. THUY AND LAU RESPONDED BY ASKING A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS FOR THE PURPOSE OF CLARIFICATION. THEY OBJECTED TO OUR USE OF THE WORDS "ON THE BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS THAT WE HAVE HELD" (PARA 3(A) REFTEL). THEY ALSO QUESTIONED OUR STATEMENT ON PARTICIPATION (PARA 3(E) REFTEL). THUY PROPOSED THAT WE AGREE TO SAY THAT "WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED A CONFERENCE INCLUDING THE DRV, SVN, USA AND RSVN WILL BE HELD IN PARIS." WE REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL POINTING OUT THAT WE HAD INCLUDED BOTH THE WORD "PARTIES" AND THE WORD "CONFERENCE" AND HAD MENTIONED FOUR NAMES, THUS RETURNING TO HIS PROPOSAL AND THE LAST MEETING FOR A FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCE.

3. WE REITERATED WHAT WE EXPECTED OF THEM IN THE WAY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE DMZ AND ON ATTACKS ON CITIES. THEY SAID THAT THEY HAD ALWAYS AND CONTINUED TO DEMAND UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE REITERATED THAT THESE WERE NOT CONDITIONS BUT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED IF THE BOMBING CESSATION WAS TO CONTINUE. THEY DID NOT DISPUTE THIS AND THERE IS NOT QUESTION THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION AND WILL ACT ACCORDINGLY.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 22908, OCTOBER 24, SECTION ONE OF THREE

SUBSEQUENTLY WHEN WE INSISTED ON INCLUSION OF " ON THE BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS", IT WAS CLEAR THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS EXPECTED OF THEM IF BOMBING CESSATION WAS TO CONTINUE.

4. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, THUY THEN PROPOSED THREE PARAGRAPHS TO BE CONTAINED IN EITHER A COMMUNIQUE OR AN AGREED DOCUMENT, READING AS FOLLOWS:

"ON OCTOBER , 1968, THE REPRESENTATIVES

HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 8169Q  
REOVD: OCT. 24, 1968  
4:04 P.M.

VV CRA238  
..... ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUFNCR 22908/2 2981905  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z 241851Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7422  
STATE GRNC  
BT

**ACTION COPY**

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 PARIS 22908/2

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA INFORMED THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD ORDER THE CESSATION WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS OF ALL AIR, NAVAL AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE ON THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF THE DRV, WITH EFFECT FROM ----- HOURS, GMT, OCTOBER -----, 1968.

" THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV TOOK NOTE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

" AFTER THE REALIZATION OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED CESSATION, WITHOUT CONDITION, OF THE BOMBING, A CONFERENCE INCLUDING THE DRV, THE SV NLF, THE USA AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE HELD IN PARIS ON ----- WITH A VIEW OF FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM."

5. THUY THEN SAID THERE WERE FOUR ISSUES AS HE SAW IT. THEY WERE: (A) THE QUESTION OF CESSATION OF BOMBING; (B) PARTICIPATION; (C) THE DATE OF THE FIRST MEETING; AND (D) A DOCUMENT BETWEEN THE DRV AND THE UNITED STATES.

6. WE REJECTED ALL OF THUY'S PROPOSALS, ARGUING AT LENGTH AGAINST THE NEED FOR ANY COMMUNIQUE OR WRITTEN DOCUMENT AND VIRTUALLY EVERY SENTENCE CONTAINED IN HIS PROPOSALS. THIS DISCUSSION LASTED ABOUT 1-1/2 HOURS.

7. THUY THEN RETURNED TO ITEM 4 OF HIS FOUR ISSUES, I.E., AN AGREED DOCUMENT, EITHER IN THE FORM OF A COMMUNIQUE OR AN AGREED MINUTE. HE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW HIS SUGGESTION THAT THERE BE A JOINT COMMUNIQUE BUT THAT THERE MUST BE A SECRET AGREED MINUTE. HE SAID THIS WAS NORMAL IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2- PARIS 22908, SECTION 2 OF 3, OCT 24

8. AFTER A RECESS, WE INFORMED THUY THAT IF AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THE DATE OF THE FIRST MEETING, THE DATE OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, PARTICIPATION IN THE MEETINGS, AND THE WORDS TO BE USED IN DESCRIBING ALL OF THESE MATTERS, THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF A SECRET MINUTE.

9. WE THEN, ON A PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH BASIS, TABLED THE TEXT OF PARAGRAPH 5(A), (B) AND (C) OF REFTEL. THUY AND LAU ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AND WE ARGUED AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT OUR PROPOSED TEXT.

10. THUY THEN TABLED A COUNTER-PROPOSAL BASED UPON OUR TEXT. HIS COUNTER-PROPOSAL WAS (A) "ON BASIS OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, THE UNITED STATES WILL STOP WITHOUT CONDITIONS ALL AIR, NAVAL AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT AND ALL OTHER ACTIONS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE ON THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV ON ----DATE AT ----HOURS GMT. (B) " IN ORDER TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE VIETNAM PROBLE., A MEETING INCLUDING THE DRVN, THE NLF, THE USA AND THE RVN WILL BE HELD IN PARIS ON ----."

11. WE ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION WHETHER HIS LANGUAGE IN (B) MEANT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV, ETC. HE SAID THAT THE PARAGRAPH COULD BE CHANGE D TO READ, "INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRVN, ETC." IT COULD BE EITHER WAY. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE ORDER IN WHICH THE NAMES APPEARED COULD BE CHANGED IF HARRIMAN  
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 8166Q  
RECVD: OCT. 24, 1968  
3:55 P.M.

..... ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUFNCR 22908/3 2981905  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z 241851Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7423  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 PARIS 22908

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 874

CHANGED IF WE WISHED.

**ACTION COPY**

12. THUY SAID THAT FIRST WE MUST AGREE ON THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THE BEGINNING OF MEETINGS. IF IT WERE ONLY TWO OR THREE DAYS, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. ASSUMING NOVEMBER 2 AS THE DATE OF THE MEETING, THEN WE MUST STOP THE BOMBING TOMORROW. WE REJECTED THIS AND SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE. LAU SAID HE WISHED TO BE PRECISE. HE PROPOSED THAT ON OCTOBER 25 AN ORDER BE ISSUED STOPPING THE BOMBING, AT ANY HOUR OF THE DAY, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE A MEETING ON NOVEMBER 2. WE REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL.

13. WITH RESPECT TO OUR PARAGRAPH 5 (C) OF REFTEL, WE EXPLAINED IF THE BOMBING WERE STOPPED THAT WE DID NOT INTEND TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING UNTIL APPROXIMATELY THE TIME THE BOMBING ACTUALLY STOPS AND AT THAT TIME WE WOULD ANNOUNCE THE DATE OF THE FIRST MEETING IN PARIS. LAU ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION WHETHER ANY ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE WHEN THE ORDER TO STOP THE BOMBING WAS ISSUED, IF THERE WERE TO BE A BOMBING CESSATION. WE REPLIED, "NO." LAU SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, BUT IT WAS THE DRV POSITION THAT A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BY US OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING MUST BE MADE. THUY SAID THE TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS UP TO US AND THAT THEY SAW NO NEED TO HAVE AN AGREED MINUTE ON THIS SUBJECT.

14. WE REJECTED ALL THE COUNTER-PROPOSALS OF THE DRV AND SAID THAT WE WOULD REPORT WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE AT TODAY'S MEETING TO OUR GOVERNMENT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 22908, SECTION 3 OF 3, OCT. 24

15. AS WE GOT UP TO LEAVE, THUY SAID THAT IF WE AGREED TO PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OF THE DRAFT MINUTE AS HE HAD MODIFIED THEM, NOVEMBER 2 WOULD BE THE DATE FOR THE FIRST MEETING. AS TO A DATE FOR THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, HE WISHED TO DISCUSS FURTHER WITH US THE ACTUAL DATE, AND WAS SURE WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT. WE ASKED WHETHER THUY WAS SAYING THAT IF WE AGREED TO PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) AS HE HAD PROPOSED THEM, THE FIRST MEETING WOULD BE HELD ON NOVEMBER 2 AND THEREFORE THE DATE FOR BOMBING CESSATION WAS OCT. 30 OR OCT. 31. HE SAID THAT WAS NOT WHAT HE MEANT. HE WOULD AGREE TO THE NOV. 2 MEETING, BUT THE INTERVAL BETWEEN CESSATION AND THE MEETING WOULD REMAIN FOR DISCUSSION. THUY ALSO SAID THAT AN AGREED MINUTE WOULD BE SECRET AND INTERNAL BETWEEN OUR TWO DELEGATIONS.

HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

*Profile*  
55

Thurs., October 24, 1968  
3:50 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know that we have a report that the Guatemala Communists appear to be gearing up to assassinate the new U. S. Ambassador to Guatemala.

I'll look into security arrangements.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-134  
By jo, NARA, Date 6-17-03

SANITIZED

55a

*Reston has copy*

5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE  
IN 18700

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SCD	ONE	CNS
	Exo					DDI		OER	FBIS	DCS	IRS	AID	USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE [Redacted]

DIST 23 OCTOBER 1968

COUNTRY GUATEMALA/USA 73 20 47z Oct 68

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

DOI 21 OCTOBER 1968

SUBJECT ALLEGED PLANS OF THE REBEL ARMED FORCES TO ASSASSINATE THE  
NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR TO GUATEMALA

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

ACQ

SOURCE



1. ACCORDING TO FRANCISCO RAMIREZ CORADO, A LEADER OF THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT), THE PARTY HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR, CUBAN-ORIENTED INSURGENCY MOVEMENT) IS PLANNING TO ASSASSINATE THE NEW UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO GUATEMALA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. [Redacted] COMMENT: THE NEW AMBASSADOR TO GUATEMALA IS NOT EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN THE COUNTRY UNTIL LATE

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-525  
By SJ NARA, Date 10/26/01

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3

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4  
3

~~S E C R E T / NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

NOVEMBER 1968. ALTHOUGH RAMIREZ SPECIFICALLY SAID THAT THE FAR WOULD ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INTENDED TARGET IS THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, WHO IS THE CURRENT CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.)

2. RAMIREZ REMARKED THAT THE PARTY HAD RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION FROM A NEW PGT PENETRATION OF THE FAR. THE NEW PARTY SOURCE ATTENDED THE MEETINGS OF THE PGT CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND POLITICAL COMMISSION ON 19 AND 20 OCTOBER, AT WHICH TIME HE TOLD PGT LEADERS THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE FAR PLANS. THE PGT SOURCE ALSO CLAIMED THAT SEVERAL GUATEMALAN ARMY OFFICERS ARE COLLABORATING WITH THE FAR. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PLANNED ASSASSINATION IS TO FORCE A MILITARY COUP, THUS PLACING THE ARMY COLLABORATORS IN A BETTER POSITION TO AID THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ALTHOUGH RAMIREZ DID NOT MENTION THIS POINT, THE FAR ALSO BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE ABLE TO RALLY SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO ITS CAUSE, IF THE MILITARY WERE TO OVERTHROW THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.) [REDACTED] COMMENT: ANOTHER SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT THE FAR HAD THE COLLABORATION OF SOME HIGH-LEVEL ARMY OFFICERS.)



~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

3. RAMIREZ SAID THAT HE WAS WARNING SELECTED PARTY MEMBERS OF THE PLANNED FAR ACTION SO THAT THEY COULD MAKE THE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS TO GO INTO HIDING ON SHORT NOTICE. HE COMMENTED THAT IF THE ASSASSINATION WERE CARRIED OUT, THE GUATEMALAN SECURITY FORCES WOULD UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATE REPRESSIVE ACTION AGAINST ALL COMMUNISTS. FINALLY, RAMIREZ WARNED THE PGT MEMBERS NOT TO REVEAL THAT THE FAR PLANS TO ASSASSINATE THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH LOWER-LEVEL PARTY MEMBERS. THE PGT MEMBERS WERE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THE LATTER ONLY THAT THE FAR IS PLANNING A "BIG ACTION", AND THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED] FROM A SOURCE [REDACTED] REPORTED FAR DISCUSSIONS REGARDING A POSSIBLE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT JULIO CESAR MENDEZ-MONTIENEGRO OR ALBERTO MENDEZ MARTINEZ, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY (PR, GOVERNMENT PARTY). FAR OBJECTIVES IN THE REFERENCED REPORT WERE SIMILAR TO THE OBJECTIVES LISTED IN PARA 2. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROJECTED PLANS TO ASSASSINATE THE PRESIDENT OR THE PR LEADER WERE NOT TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.)

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES FOR EMBASSY PERSONNEL, INCLUDING THOSE FOR PERSONAL PROTECTION OF CHARGE WHICH

4  
3  
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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

5  
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3  
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IN 18700

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~  
(classification) (dissem controls)

WERE ESTABLISHED FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF AMBASSADOR MEIN, REMAIN  
IN EFFECT. MEASURES WILL BE MAINTAINED CONSCIENTIOUSLY AND EXPOSURE  
HELD TO MINIMUM CONSISTENT WITH NORMAL ACTIVITIES.)

6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT. (ALSO  
[REDACTED])

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

INFORMATION 56

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 710991-484

By ng/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Thursday, October 24, 1968 -- 3:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Bob Ginsburgh and I have been trying to figure out what it is that makes Hanoi stick so hard on a period longer than 3 days. For what it is worth, neither of us believes they are entering this with the intent quickly to grossly violate the DMZ or otherwise to undertake some outrageous military action that would force you to re-start the bombing. Our reasons for that view are:

-- First, they do not have either a present capability or the weather to do anything very significant in a short period of time;

-- Basically their military and political position is deteriorating; they are moving toward the best settlement they can get, cautiously and carefully;

-- A full scale reopening of the bombing and an end to negotiations -- including the bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong -- is not what they now want to see happen.

Then, why a period longer than 3 days?

We believe they are trying in every way they can to save face and dignity as they go into this phase of negotiations. That is why they are trying to balance "unconditional" with our facts of life. They probably also want to be able, after the bombing stops, to have the photographers take pictures of the NLF man getting on board a plane at Phnom Penh -- or Hanoi -- with a bunch of roses and a propaganda statement. They want it to appear that they sent this fellow to Paris only after the bombing actually stopped, or -- as the conversation today suggested -- after we had announced the time of a bombing cessation. In short, we think this is a matter of their saving face (given the travel time from Vietnam to Paris) rather than a sinister plot; although their saving face in these circumstances does have some marginal effect on their subsequent negotiating ability.

This analysis -- for what it is worth -- doesn't bear on some of the issues that have concerned you. But I thought you might wish to know how two of us, after examining the alternatives, came out on this matter.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlc

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

INFORMATION

*Pres file* 57

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, October 24, 1968  
2:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

As the summary to the attached indicates, Soviet forces are not now deployed on a scale and in a manner to constitute an imminent threat to Rumania.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1A

Cy 61 [redacted] October 1968 --  
Intelligence Memo "The Soviet Military Stance Opposite Rumania"

(S)(a)(4)

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED  
Authority NLT 019-041-2-5  
By *[signature]*, NARA, Date 1/21/02

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 24, 1968  
2:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

This [redacted] report of conversation of the Soviet Ambassador in Phnom Penh suggests some of the difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations over Vietnam.

*Pres file*

3.3  
(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

[redacted]

3.3  
(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 07-284 (P80)  
By *isl*, NARA, Date 3-7-08

WWRostow:rlh

59

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

*Pres file*

Thursday, October 24, 1968  
1:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

The marked section of the last paragraph of attached indicates that the GVN has some positive ideas about how to negotiate in Paris with the NLF on a private, informal basis.

The rest of the cable indicates we still haven't quite found a way to make the GVN comfortable on a your side/our side basis, although we are making progress.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 41093

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 712991-484  
By 19/2p, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

WWRostow:rln



592  
1  
Department of State

TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

~~SECRET~~

PP RUEHC RUFNCR

DE RUMJIR 41093 2981140

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

P 241116Z OCT 68

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3135

INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2567

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 41093

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

SUBJ: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS OF PARIS NEGOTIATIONS

REF: SAIGON 40987

8 0 1 1Q

1968 OCT 24 AM 8 27

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71-991-482

By [signature], NARA, Date 3-5-93

1. BERGER AND HERZ MET WITH THANK THIS MORNING AND WENT OVER THE WHOLE RANGE OF PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS. THE DISCUSSION QUICKLY DISPOSED OF FLAGS AND NAME PLATES, NAME FOR THE CONFERENCE, ORDER OF ENTRANCE, CHIARMANSHIP OF THE DELEGATION, OPENING STATEMENT, AND REFERENCES TO THE OTHER SIDE. ALTHOUGH WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT IDEAS ADVANCED BY US (SAIGON 40885) HAD BEEN TATATIVE, AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION, WE DO HAVE AN AGREEMENT AD REFERENDUM ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IN PARIS 22740. HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME REMAINING PROBLEMS.

2. ALTHOUGH IT IS MORE THAN A PROCEDURAL MATTER, THE FONMIN REITERATED THAT THE GVN EXPECTS US TO "OBTAIN THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL MAKE IT KNOWN THAT IT ACCEPTS TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS TALKS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, OR AT LEAST NOT TO DENY OUR ASSERTION TO THAT EFFECT." WE REFERRED TO THE AGREED JOINT STATEMENT IN WHICH THE TWO PRESIDENTS WOULD SAY THAT "THEY HAVE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT NORTH VIETNAM INTENDS SERIOUSLY TO JOIN THEM IN DE-ESCALATING THE WAR AND IN ENTERING INTO SERIOUS TALKS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT."

3. THANK THEREUPON ASKED IF WE COULD INSERT THE WORDS "WITH THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE US GOVERNMENT" BETWEEN "SERIOUS TALKS" AND "ON THE SUBSTANCE." WE AGREED TO SUBMIT THIS IDEA TO WASHINGTON. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE CAN EXPECT THIS INSERTION SINCE IT MERELY MAKES MORE EXPLICIT WHAT IS ALREADY CONTAINED IN THE SENTENCE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 41093, OCTOBER 24

4. THANH WISHED TO HAVE IT UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WOULD "JOIN THE GVN DELEGATION" IN STATEMENTS THEY THEY WOULD MAKE ABOUT THE NLF. BERGER SAID THAT WE WOULD MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR ALTHOUGH WE MIGHT NOT USE EXACTLY THE SAME WORDS AS THE GVN DELEGATION. WE EMPHASIZED THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ON THE SUBSTANCE.

5. ONE POSSIBLE STICKING POINT WAS THAT THANH WISHED IT TO BE UNDERSTOOD THT "QUESTION OF INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM CANNOT BE RAISED BY EITHER SIDE AT THE CONFERENCE." WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR POSITION HAS BEEN ALL ALONG THAT EACH SIDE MUST BE FREE TO BRING UP ANYTHING IT LIKES. THANH SAID THE GVN WOULD NOT BRING UP INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF NORTHVIETNAM AND WOULD CATEGORICALLY REFUSE TO DISCUSS ITS OWN INTERNAL MATTERS AT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. HE CITED AS A PRECEDENT THE 1962 CONFERENCE ON LAOS, WHERE THE RLG REFUSED TO HAVE INTERAL MATTERS TALKED ABOUT. THANH ASKED FOR AN AGREEMENT THAT NEITHER OF US WILL DISCUSS INTERNAL GVN MATTERS. WE LEFT THIS POINT FOR LATER RESOLUTION SINCE WE DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN TIE THE HANDS OF OUR DELEGATES IN UNFORESEEN SITUATIONS.

6. FINALLY, THANH WANTED ASSURANCES THAT ANY AGREEMENT COMING OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT BE SIGNED BY THE NLF. ARGUMENTATION WAS ALONG THE LINES OF PARA 5 ABOVE. WE SAID THIS PROBLEM SEEMED HIGHLY PREMATURE AND WE COULD FACE IT WHEN THE TIME COMES. IT IS INTERESTING THAT THANH IN THIS CONVERSATION SAID THAT HE WOULD EXPECT THE GVN TO MEET WITH THE NLF OUTSIDE OF A FORMAL CONFERENCE, "IN HOTEL ROOMS, RESTAURANTS, OR OTHER PRIVATE PLACES," BUT SINCE THE NLF IS NOT AN INTERNATIONAL ENTITY IT CANNOT SIGN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT.  
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

60

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

Thursday, October 24, 1968 -- 1:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the haggle in Paris this morning, plus the reference telegram with our text marked on pages 4-5 in red. Here are the debating points.

1. They want to insert the words "without condition" in paragraph A but are prepared to accept also on the basis of our discussions.

Comment: We could, perhaps, live with this because we have put our conditions in the form of facts of life which would permit serious negotiations to proceed.

2. They propose, instead of the underlined language at the top of page 5 in the attached: "a meeting including the DRV, NLF, U. S. and RVN will be held in Paris on November 2, 1968." *representatives of*

Comment: The introduction of "representatives of" is an improvement over their proposal; but we will have to see what Ellsworth thinks.

3. Their text "In order to find a peaceful settlement to the Viet-Nam problem" seems all right to me as a substitute for "meetings on the substance of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam."

4. They agree to the principle that the date and time of the first Paris meeting be made public at the time of the announcement, but they don't want it in the minute. They have not accepted our two or three days but, at this time, are still holding out for a week.

I assume Sec. Rusk will be forwarding suggestions to you for the next round in the haggle.

W. W. Rostow

Vance call on secure phone at noon, Oct 24, 1968  
State 260480, 23 Oct. 1968

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72991-484

By rs/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

ACTION 61

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 24, 1968 -- 11:00 a. m.

Mr. President: *Pres file*

I sense that we may have a difficult and unnecessary problem in Sec. Clifford's concern that he has not been getting the regular flow of the traffic about the Vietnam negotiations. There is a question of substance and a question of form.

The question of substance is that he is simply not aware of certain intermediate details between meetings with the President.

The question of form is, perhaps, a natural sense of uneasiness that the flow of traffic under the heading HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS does not flow to the Pentagon. As we come down to the wire in these matters, I believe it important that your Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense be as close to you and each other as they can be. Therefore, I recommend that once a day either one of the three following men take all the information over in a folder to Sec. Clifford; have him read it; and then take it away. The three men I recommend are: ~~Ben Read~~

Ben Read \_\_\_\_\_

Gen. Ginsburgh \_\_\_\_\_

Brom Smith \_\_\_\_\_

In my judgment, Ben Read would be the best because his doing it would tend to hold together the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 91-484

By as/cap, NARA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 24, 1968  
10:10 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the results of initial investigations of the dropping of the three bombs near the Soviet hydrographic vessel and alleged intrusions into mainland China waters and air space.

State will be getting up a prompt response to the Russians.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-212  
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

62a

24 October 1968  
0715 EDT

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Alleged US Bombardment near Soviet Vessel

1. The Soviet Government registered an oral protest with the American Embassy, Moscow stating that at 232300 EDT, US aircraft dropped three bombs in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet hydrographic vessel PELENG. The Soviet vessel was reported situated in international waters in Tonkin Gulf at coordinates 18 degrees 33 minutes north latitude and 107 degrees 28 minutes east longitude. The bombs were alleged to have burst at a distance of only a few hundred meters from the side of the Soviet vessel.

2. Preliminary report from CTG 77.0 indicates that two US Navy A-4 aircraft jettisoned four 500 lb (MK-82) and four 1,000 lb (MK-83) bombs 10 nautical miles south of the Russian vessel at 222310 EDT October. Drops were made under radar control of the USS CORAL SEA with the position of the Soviet ship known. All drops were on safe except for one MK-83, which detonated on impact with the surface in a clear area.

3. Reports indicate the pilots of the A-4 aircraft did not observe the Soviet vessel when the drops were made.

4. PACOM has not yet completed its investigation of this incident; additional information will be provided as it becomes available.

*M. W. Kendall*

M. W. KENDALL  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

- WHSR AOC
- SECSTATE NFP
- SECDEF AFPCP
- DEPSECDEF USMC CC
- ASD/ISA DDO
- ASD/PA ADDO
- CJCS (3) CCOC
- DJS (3) DIA REP
- J-30 CIA REP
- J-31 NSA REP
- J-32 STATE REP
- J-33 OASD/PA REP
- J-34 PAC DIV

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 44-352  
By cb, NARA, Date 8-7-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

24 October 1968  
0445 EDT

626

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: US Intrusion into Chinese Peoples Republic (CPR)  
Territory

1. The New Chinese News Agency at Peking has reported that on 22 October a US warship intruded into CPR territorial waters east of Matsu Island in the Formosa Straits, and a US military aircraft intruded into CPR airspace over the Paracel Island Group, 675 nautical miles to the southwest.

2. CINCPACFLT reports that the USS SAVAGE (DER 386) transited the Formosa Straits from north to south on 22 October. SAVAGE's track was at least 12.5 nautical miles east of Matsu Island, and no closer than 18.8 nautical miles to the communist Chinese mainland. The destroyer escort's track, with respect to the communist Chinese coast and Matsu Island, is shown on the attached map.

3. A USAF aircraft en route from Taiwan to Thailand did fly in the vicinity of the Paracel Island Group on 22 October. The Paracels are small islands in the South China Sea 150 nautical miles southeast of Hainan. They are not permanently inhabited although occasionally, small detachments of male personnel appear to be ashore on the main island. Sovereignty over these islands is claimed by the Chinese Peoples Republic, the Republic of China, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, the Republic of the Philippines, and by some individuals. The US recognizes only that sovereignty of the islands is in dispute.

*M. W. Kendall*

M. W. KENDALL  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

1 Atch  
a/s

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
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-352

By cb, NARA, Date 8-7-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



63

INFORMATION

EYES ONLY -- SENSITIVE

Thursday, October 24, 1968 -- 9:50am

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the latest Lou Harris conversation with Kosharyan.

It makes much of a White House contact with the Soviets and appears to urge us to continue to work closely with Dobrynin.

The theme of a cease-fire continues to run through these conversations -- this time on an implicit basis rather than a formal cease-fire in place.

W. W. Rostow

EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rln

63a

EYES ONLY

October 24, 1968

Mr. Secretary:

Herewith the latest Lou Harris-Kosharyan conversation. I'm not sure what to make of it except an indication that we should work intensively with Dobrynin.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State

EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rlh

636

LOU HARRIS and JRJ  
Wednesday, October 23, 1968 -- 8:05 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-212  
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

HARRIS: Jim?

JONES: Hi, Lou. How are you?

HARRIS: Oh, pretty good. Was pooped, but I had a good hour-and-a-half, two hours of these fellas. I got it through the official line and then the unofficial line. The official line was Ambassador Mendeleovich. He started out by saying we met a week ago Monday -- and had promised an answer Tuesday. He had one Tuesday, but I couldn't meet. He did say that the inquiry has gone to the highest levels, come back from the highest levels, and that it had come back -- not rejected. And he said, "Well, that means total acceptance." It did mean that they were very agreeable to making a "deal", is the way he put it. I then said, "Well, what do you mean 'explicitly'?" He said, "Well, we mean the unconditional end of bombing and the suspension of all offensive military activity," and he said, "also, assurances," -- he used the word "assurances" -- that the DMZ not being overrun. And finally he said steps leading to rapprochement as it was left off in August."

I said, "Very good," I said, "well, where does it go from here?" He said, "well, as you probably know, there are two points of official contact: one is Paris and one is Washington. Now, I can tell you that In Paris -- neither side has really talked very much." So I said, "Oh, how do you mean? You mean the American side has not communicated?" He says, "Well, we know that Ambassador Harriman takes his orders from Washington, and he says only what he should say there, and he has not said all the things." I said, "Well, what do you mean, 'all the things'?"

He said, "Well, more could be done in Paris." And I said, "Well, do you think more should be done in Paris?" He said, "Well, it would be helpful."

So I said, "Well, then you have nothing explicit or specific to say about that." But -- after about five minutes of this bit on Paris, I said, "well, now, what about Washington.?"

And then his mood and tones changed completely. He said, "Well, we consider both Paris and Washington equal points of contact. Of course, Washington is much better because we are in communication, not only with your State Department, but also with the White House." He said, "That is very significant."

And then he stopped and said, "Two very significant things I have said is that highest levels -- I mean Politburo and Moscow -- there has been no block to any of this. I will not say 'acceptance', but close to acceptance. The second important thing I say is that we are very pleased, not only at direct communication between Dobrynin and State Department, but highly significant with White House directly, itself."

JONES: Did he specify any further on "White House"?

HARRIS: No, he didn't. He did not. He did not. He just said, "White House." He said, "That's very impressive, means a great deal to his side.... What he's really saying, I sensed, was that Washington business was the real business. And I asked him point blank. He said, "well, we would not ever say officially that meetings at which North Vietnamese are not present are more important than those where they are directly represented, but let me put it this way: The more direct communication between our two governments, the faster this will be ended. Now,

there are lots of forces on our side who have to be brought together on this. I said, "Well, I assume this was done in the last week." He said, "Yes, in terms of not rejecting" -- he said -- "no one will reject this." I thought this was significant.

JONES: "This" being what?

HARRIS: These four points. No one will reject you. He has made a distinction between "rejection" and "acceptance." Then Kosharyan -- this is parenthetical -- Kosharyan took me aside afterwards. He said, "You must understand what 'non-rejection' means in Soviet terms. In Stalin's period, for something not to be rejected out of hand was fantastic. In our diplomacy, as a result, to say something is not rejected is almost tantamount to saying it has been accepted." I smiled and said, "Well, it seems to me you either accepted something or you rejected something or you tried to change it," you know?

JONES: Yes.

HARRIS: And he said, "the -- official has to be more careful," you see?

JONES: Yes.

HARRIS: Then Mendelevich raised another question. He said,

"Now I can speak for our side -- that there is and will be no rejection, but I can't say that we feel the same for your side." I said, "Oh? What are you talking about?" He said, "Well, we do not know that the Government of South Vietnam will go along with any agreement." And I said, "Well, I couldn't speak for the Government in South Vietnam, but I am sure that if our Government assured you that they would, you can be darned sure -- you can be certain -- that this would be the case."

JONES: Yes.

HARRIS: Finally, I said, "Well, what about the time involved here? Time is of the essence; we've discussed that and need not discuss it." And then Mendeleovich said, "Well, I must say something that is my opinion, but you must understand I am very -- I am always pessimistic. My first reaction to you was I didn't think anything would come of this even though my government was sincerely interested in peace. I must say to you that there is a lull in Vietnam now -- a very serious lull. The lull is almost no fighting. At any time, it could be announced that there has been a suspension of all offensive military activities." And I said, "Well, what do you mean, 'at any time'?" He said, "Well, President Johnson could announce that at any time." So then I looked at him and sort of smiled and said, "Well, Ambassador -- Mr. Ambassador -- you're the one who

always raises questions about confirmation." I said, "It's two sides that are fighting there and you must have confirmation from both that there's been a suspension. So you're suggesting that there would not be confirmation from neither North Vietnam nor the Soviet Union, or whatever forces could speak on this." He said, "That is possible. I'm not in a position to talk." And I said, "Well, you understand about confirmation?" And Kosharyan was sitting there rather quietly and broke into a grin and later said to me, "I'm free to talk; Mendelevich is not. I can assure you that Mendelevich knows full well that there must be confirmation for something like this after some period of time. " Kosharyan was much more -- as he always is -- much more free to say, "I think things can go on track. The key think, however, or the way Mendelevich left it was that it's clearly understood and very gratifying to my government to have Dobrynin dealing with State Department and with the White House." And he said, "My instructions are that this is the way it is mutually agreed upon is the best way to deal on this and that is the intention of my government. "

Dean Rusk had called me earlier today and said that he and Dobrynin had been talking and that as far as our government was concerned, that was a satisfactory way to do it.

I think, as I read it, what they really were saying was that Dobrynin was -- or they did say, both of them officially and unofficially -- was that Dobrynin was directly taking orders from the Politburo on this, reporting back every move and he has great latitude in negotiations. So, apparently Dobrynin is in a position to make a deal with great flexibility and latitude. And I thought that was significant. These fellows did admit that some of their information was two days out of date, that they hadn't heard all of the Dobrynin conversation, you see -- because he was reporting right back to the Politburo.

I don't know, you know? I don't know if this has any relevance or significance.

JONES: I don't know, either. I've been taking notes here, and...

HARRIS: Alright. Now Should I call Secretary Rusk? He wanted me to call him after this meeting?

JONES: Let me find out where he is and I'll just fill him in and then if he wants to call, I'll either ask you to give him a call or he'll initiate it.

HARRIS: All right. Can I ask you one question, and don't answer it if it's improper; but -- I mean -- what is the hangup?

JONES: I don't know.

HARRIS: You know, all the terms they repeat, you know, they don't seem to have any problem on it. They say Dobrynin is in a position with full authority and I couldn't sense out what the sticky part was. You know, they said, "We don't control North Vietnam as much as you control South Vietnam, which is really your puppet." At one point, Mendelevich said that. He said, "However, we have done our work with North Vietnam. We're not sure you've done your work in South Vietnam." But I think that's just all.... you know, I don't buy that.... that's just a little propaganda that he's throwing in, you know? In fact, I asked Kosharyan. He said, "I wouldn't pay any attention to that. We're not really worried about your ability to live with South Vietnam," you know?

JONES: Let me pass this on. If a further call is necessary, either the Secretary or I will call you.

HARRIS: All right. I will be at my home all evening.

JONES: All right. Thank you, Lou. Goodnight.

HARRIS: Goodnight.

October 24, 1968

64  
Chron

This has been a week of waiting, of rumors, and of hopes for a turn toward peace, which have not been fulfilled.

It is a hard thing to turn from the attitudes and methods of war to serious negotiations and peace. It is particularly hard, apparently, in Hanoi. It is not easy in Saigon, although we are confident that the South Vietnamese are with us. While we ache to see this turn in the road, I must be absolutely sure that every step we take is consistent with our national interests and honor and consistent with the sacrifices made by our men in the field and with their security. Those will be my standards right down to January 20.

WWRostow:rln

notes for inclusion in letter to Chuck Robb and Pat Nugent

65

~~SECRET~~

October 24, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. Secretary:

I am sending this letter to you with my note to the President attached.

It is too late for Rabin to deliver, but you may wish to consider whether it makes sense. You will note that the matter is wholly in your hands.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachment**

WWR note to the President  
Oct. 23, 1968, with signed  
letter to Prime Minister  
Eshkol from the President

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NIJ 94-212**  
**By Clr, NARA, Date 1-5-95**

Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State

WWRostow:rln

65a  
/

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, October 23, 1968  
9:55 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

*Rec'd  
10:15a*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Rabin is leaving for Israel this afternoon.

It is my feeling that he should carry a letter like the attached from you to Eshkol.

The reason: The Israeli Cabinet is at last coming to a moment of truth. It must formulate a position for Jarring on boundaries which may make the difference between failure and success of the Jarring mission. It may not be too much to say that the decision made by the Israeli Cabinet could determine whether there shall be peace or another war in the Middle East. Your voice directly to Eshkol on this broad personal basis could be a factor in the equation.

I have not discussed this with Secretary Rusk. I am sure you would not wish finally to send this letter via Rabin without his concurrence. My question is, therefore: May I ask Secretary Rusk his view on the basis that you have made no decision? Even though you may wish to sign the letter on a contingency basis, I would make it wholly clear that you would not wish to move without his positive recommendation.

Attachment

*Yes -*

*W. J. Rostow*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-212  
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

~~SECRET~~

65b

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have appreciated your recent letters, and I had a good talk with Foreign Minister Eban yesterday. He will be reporting in detail our strong feelings on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but I wish to write you this personal note to be sure our emphasis on that issue does not obscure a larger point.

I know you face a difficult series of meetings this week and wish to send you this word of encouragement.

I am deeply concerned, as you know, Mr. Prime Minister, about Israel's future, and I understand how strongly some of your colleagues feel that Israel's future can best be guaranteed by military means and expanded borders alone. It is so much easier to argue in terms of military balance and lines on a map than it is to argue the case for political compromise. But our own experience has proved that real peace is not found alone on the walls of a fortress -- or under the umbrella of air power -- or behind a nuclear shield.

Every American President knows that our most secure borders are the open borders with Mexico and Canada. That day may not be close for Israel with the UAR, but it could be close with Jordan.

I feel so strongly about the irrationality of trying to make peace by force alone that I must urge you to resist those who find it easier to risk Israel's future on today's expanded boundaries than to reach out for real peace. From my own difficult personal decision last March, I can say with feeling that it is not easy to lead a nation toward a necessary peace without jeopardizing hard-won gains and the future those gains have earned. But I can also say that it is worth reasonable risks, measured compromise, and personal pain.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-212  
By Cl, NARA, Date 1-5-95

I do not presume to say what your Government should do.  
But I pray that you and your colleagues will find the courage  
to seize this moment of opportunity so that peace may be  
"within thy walls. "

I look forward to seeing you later this year.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Levi Eshkol', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

His Excellency  
Levi Eshkol  
Prime Minister of Israel  
Jerusalem

*Pres file*

66

~~SECRET~~  
SENSITIVE

Wed., Oct. 23, 1968  
7:10 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an account of your conversation this afternoon with General Momyer, for your files or any use you may have of it.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
White House GukCollins, Feb. 24, 1993  
By 19, NASA, Date 3-5-93

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

66a  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NIJ 99-212**  
**By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95**

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

## Memorandum for the Record

Meeting with the President, October 23, 1968, 2:45 p. m.

Present: The President, General William W. Momyer, W. W. Rostow\*

The President asked Mr. Rostow if he had reviewed the President's problem with General Momyer.

Mr. Rostow said he had not. He thought the President should present it to General Momyer himself.

The President stated that he confronted a dangerous decision. It could yield good results or bad. He did not wish to put General Momyer in the position of overriding the judgments of his military or political superior officers; but he wanted his personal best judgment on a wholly personal basis.

The President would have to make a decision on his own responsibility. He had consulted Bunker and Abrams and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as key civilians. But he also wanted the personal judgment on his decision from General Momyer before making up his mind.

For a long time, the President said, we had taken the position that we were willing to stop the bombing if the enemy would do "almost anything" by way of reciprocity. We had also said that we expected prompt and productive talks looking towards peace; and that we would assume the enemy would not take advantage of a bombing cessation.

Lately we have spelled out our position with some precision. First, the GVN must participate in the productive talks. This would confer a great benefit on the GVN. Hanoi had repeated over and over again it would never deal with these "lackeys" of the U. S. Second, we have made it clear that they must understand that if they violated the DMZ we would have to respond. General Abrams would have standing orders to respond if the DMZ were violated.

These two points were the essence of Harriman's initial instructions in Paris. Since then, we have added a third point as a result of the enemy's shelling the cities. We have said that they must understand that if they shell the cities, we would have to respond by bombing North Vietnam.

(\*Commander, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia)

former Commander, 7th Air Force (Vietnam)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

On these conditions, we are considering whether we would stop on an agreement that the GVN would enter the substantive talks within a week.

We would shift our air power over to Laos. We have taken the view that with the heavy rains in the North Vietnamese panhandle our risks might not be too great. We would urge the other side to try to match the negotiating record of 1954 and wind up the negotiations in 30 days. During that period we would expect no attacks across the DMZ and no attacks on the cities.

The President then said he was conscious that there were certain dangers and pitfalls; for example, the other side might not show up for the first meeting. They might violate the DMZ or shell the cities, and we would be in the position of having to resume the bombing and having been duped on the basis of an inadequate agreement. We would have agreement that the GVN must take part in the talks; but this they could simply violate. They could claim that they heard what we said about the DMZ and the cities, but they didn't agree. The President is much concerned at the possibility of entering an agreement which is not sufficiently explicit and might lead to the charge that he was duped. Some of his advisers, on the other hand, say that we could present our record as having gone the last mile in good faith. The President does not wish to lose a great opportunity for peace, but he wished to share his concerns with General Momyer and seek his judgment. Gen. Momyer should know that only one civilian in the Pentagon is aware of the decision that now lies before the President, although all the members of the JCS, plus General Palmer, know about it. Very few civilians in the government know of what lies before the President.

The President then asked General Momyer for his judgment. General Momyer said: I presume that when we talk about a cessation of bombing we mean only North Vietnam, and that we would continue bombing in Laos and South Vietnam.

The President affirmed that this was the case and reminded General Momyer that we would only hold our hand in North Vietnam if they did not violate the DMZ. General Momyer said that we are now in the midst of the monsoon transition in Vietnam. The weather will be bad in the panhandle all the way from the 17th parallel to Hanoi. Bombing from the 17th to the 19th parallel for the next three months would have to be done by radar. That means that you cannot bomb trucks but only fixed points. The effectiveness of such bombing is low. We would normally concentrate our effort against trucks coming through Laos. If we can still do this, General Momyer said that, in his judgment, the risk being undertaken by the President was minimal.

at this period and for the next few months.

General Momyer went on to say that unless the enemy is engaged in a purposeful de-escalation, we must expect an increase in infiltration and truck movements through Laos. But if we can keep the pressure on in Laos the military risk of a bombing cessation against North Vietnam was "acceptable."

The President asked: Would we move all our sorties over to Laos, or would there be more than could be absorbed in Laos?

General Momyer said: Not all. Some would be allocated from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. But we could get better results from bombing in Laos and South Vietnam than in North Vietnam during the present monsoon period. He said, again, that we could only bomb by radar against such fixed points as ferries and fords between the 17th and 19th parallels in the kind of weather that is now upon us. He said this was the most favorable period, from a military point of view, for a bombing cessation. In his judgment, it would not endanger our troops in I Corps.

The President said that he had not wished to indicate the views of others before General Momyer rendered his judgment, but he might be interested to know that General McConnell had given him an evaluation precisely like his own. The JCS also agrees.

The President then turned to another question which, he said, he proposes to put to General Abrams: What is your guess -- will the enemy violate the DMZ?

General Momyer said that if he intended to violate the DMZ substantially, he would have to redeploy his forces presently in North Vietnam and in Laos. This would take time in the present period of heavy rain. It might take him two months to get himself into position. It did not make much military sense for him to do so at this time.

The President then said that Secretary Rusk had given him an estimate of a 75% probability that the enemy would honor the DMZ.

General Momyer said he agreed because of the difficulty of moving troops and mounting an attack in the weather conditions which would obtain over the next several months.

General Momyer said he thought they might do a certain amount of desultory shelling across the DMZ to remind us they are there, but nothing like the attacks against Con Thien or Gio Linh where hundreds of shells were fired from or

across the DMZ at our men.

General Momyer repeated: I believe the threat of violation is wholly "acceptable."

The President then put to General Momyer this question: If you were President, would you do it?

After a pause, General Momyer said, "Yes, sir." He explained that, given the low military risk, he would certainly do it if he had any reason to believe that this gave us the greatest possible opportunity to bring peace to Vietnam.

The President reassured General Momyer as the meeting closed that reconnaissance would continue. General Momyer thought this essential.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

*pres file  
C. G. P. is  
a letter  
67  
pen addition  
made by  
res*

Wednesday, October 23, 1968  
12:55 p. m.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the redrafted instructions, as you have directed.

On the bracketed portion on page 1, Bill Bundy notes that we do not have "standing orders in the field" with respect to an attack on the cities. It would be most difficult to draft them because the scale and character of an attack on a city would have to be taken into account in designing an appropriate reprisal; and this could only be done by the President.

He also notes that it would be wiser, in his judgment, to take up the matter of Abrams' orders through the Russians rather than directly with the North Vietnamese. It would be a wholly new note to introduce in Paris at this time.

I am inclined to feel that talking to the Russians is the better way to make the point about Abrams' standing instructions.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachment

*W. Rostow*

Approved as is \_\_\_\_\_

Approved with deletion in paragraph 3 \_\_\_\_\_

Approved as amended \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 76991-484  
By rs/imp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

10/23/68

674

As background to your meeting with Thuy, you should bear in mind the following points which are fundamental in Washington:

1. As seen from here, the other side is asking us to pay a substantial extra price for the privilege of stopping the bombing. We see no legitimacy or equity in that stance.
2. We are entering the climax of a Presidential campaign year. If and when you achieve an agreement in principle along the lines of the instruction which follows, the President will have to make sure he has absolutely firm military support for the step we are prepared to take; there will be political leaders to be talked to; there will be candidates who must be informed. The candidates will be scattered about the country. It will take as much time to go through this process as it may take the other side to bring NLF representatives from Tay Ninh province.
3. Before you give the other side even tentative approval to the arrangement we propose, you must make it very clear again what precisely our understanding is with respect to the DMZ and the cities, [and also make clear that violations will trigger an automatic response on the basis of standing orders in the field.] Against this background, instructions for your next private meeting follow:

BEGIN INSTRUCTIONS:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 471991-484

By rs/ajp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

1. You should start with a clear and firm position presented orally along following lines:

a. We are prepared to stop the bombing, etc., on the basis of the discussions that we have held.

b. Your side has constantly emphasized that after a bombing cessation, talks would be promptly held. You have even mentioned "the next day." We think that a substantive meeting including the GVN should be held the next day.

c. (FYI: After making the strongest case possible on the basis of the record for "prompt" equalling the next day, you may fall back to a period not longer than two or three days.)

d. You should indicate that we are prepared to accept their date of November 2 for the first meeting after the bombing cessation.

We are not, however, prepared to stop the bombing in that case earlier <sup>2 or at the most three days before which would be</sup> than <sup>1</sup> October 31 or October 30. That itself would require us to issue orders one or two days prior thereto.

e. You should not specify when we would announce the cessation. However, you should make clear that, when we do announce our action, we expect to announce the date of the meeting and the fact that representatives of the GVN will be present at it. They can do as they like.

f. On representation, we agree on the substance -- that the GVN will be alongside us, and that they will have the NLF alongside them.

We see no need at all to haggle over "two sides" vs. "four parties." We look at it one way and they another. We all know who will be there, and that the question is participation not recognition.

g. We see no need for an agreed minute if we agree on what will happen and when. In particular, we are not prepared to agree to anything that goes beyond the concrete points agreed, as listed above. "Without condition" or "unconditional" are not repeat not acceptable in a joint minute, unless we also spell out what we have stated as facts of life. The same problem exists in characterizing the participation. If they are serious in wanting to get down to business, forms of words should not stop them. As the events take place either side will be free to make announcements or statements as it sees fit. If these should be at variance with what has in fact been agreed, they can be refuted both by words and by the facts as they unfold in compliance with the real understandings. The only assurance we will give is that no US official statement will use the words "conditional" or "unconditional" or their equivalents.

2. You should make a maximum effort to achieve agreement on these lines, making clear, however, that any agreement you reach must be subject to final review and clearance here and further notice to them or a short additional meeting.

3. If it appears that they insist on an agreed minute, you should ask for a recess long enough for plausible preparation of a handwritten copy of the following text:

1. On the basis of our discussions, all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the territory of the DRV will stop as of (date and time provisionally agreed).
2. It is agreed that meetings (on the substance of a peaceful settlement in Vietnam) will begin in Paris on (date and time provisionally agreed). The US has indicated that representatives of the RVN will be present, and the DRV has indicated that representatives of the NLF will be present. (The foregoing in no way implies recognition of those represented at the meeting.)
3. The date and time of the first Paris meeting may be made known at the time of announcement of the bombing cessation, [which will be (date and time agreed, for example if bombing is to stop Friday midnight Saigon time, time of announcement should be 9 a. m. Saigon time Saturday. Variations could call for prior announcement.)]

*if first meeting must be made public.*

4. ~~Apart from~~ dates and times, [to be filled in, the other language in parentheses above is optional and may be varied or withdrawn at your discretion. In addition, paragraph 3 may be omitted in your discretion, provided that

you are confident that the point has been understood and accepted in the preceding discussion.

5. You should hold absolutely firm on the rest, reporting any remaining differences here. You will readily see why we have chosen this wording and why it is essential to adhere to it. Paragraph 2 in particular states the case exactly as we have presented it, and they have accepted it. At the same time, it avoids the straight listing -- which has clear four-party implications -- and any use of "our side" and "your side," which would simply lead to fruitless controversy.

6. Whatever degree of agreement is reached, we repeat that we must review it here <sup>and perhaps with our allies</sup> before it becomes final, and this must be made absolutely

69.

**ACTION**

**SECRET/EYES ONLY**

Wednesday, October 23, 1968  
12:50 p. m.

*See file*

**Mr. President:**

Herewith the draft message to  
Gen. Abrams, redone as you directed.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Approved as amended \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Conference, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-83

WWRostow:rlh

68a

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

Draft -- October 23, 1968 - 12:40 pm

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL ABRAMS

I wish I could talk with you face to face as we move forward in what may be a moment of decision. And, if there is time, I still have it in mind to arrange that we meet. But I wish you now to give me your best answers to the following five questions. I want your answers, as I said earlier, with the bark off. I want your wholly personal answers, as a man responsible for 550,000 fighting men in the field, speaking to the President who also bears responsibility for them -- including some to whom the President is pretty close.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: 71c 91-484  
By: [signature] / cop. NARA, Date: 3-5-93

Here are the questions.

First. If the enemy honors our understandings on the DMZ and the cities, will these actions constitute a significant military advantage to our forces and the ARVN?

Second. Will that advantage compensate for the loss of our bombing in North Vietnam south of the 19th parallel?

Third. Is it your estimate that the enemy will or will not honor those understandings?

Fourth. If he does not honor those understandings, can standing orders for rules of engagement of the kind you and we have in mind protect our forces and those of our allies for a period sufficient for us to make a basic estimate of enemy intentions and return, if necessary, to full-scale bombing of North Vietnam?

Fifth. Knowing all you know of the position in Vietnam, if you were President, would you proceed with the proposed deal?

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

ACTION

69

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Wednesday, October 23, 1968  
11:20 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the instruction to  
Harriman and Vance, which Sec. Rusk  
will discuss at 11:30 a. m. today.

Plus a Bunker-Thieu-Ky  
meeting, requiring (para 4) a positive  
U. S. response.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712991-484

By sp/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rlh



Page 2 of telegram to Paris TODEL, Saigon

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

we could stop <sup>next</sup> Wednesday and <sup>order</sup> announce it Monday. These are examples. The earlier the better so far as we are concerned, but 2-3 days is plenty.

c. When we announce our action, we expect to announce the date of the meeting and the fact that representatives of the GVN will be present at it. They can do as they like.

d. On representations, we agree on the substance -- that the GVN will be alongside us, and that they will have the NLF alongside them. We see no need at all to haggle over "two sides" vs. "four parties." We look at it one way and they another. We all know who will be there, and that the question is participation not recognition.

e. We see no need for an agreed minute if we agree on what will happen and when. In particular, we are not prepared to agree to anything that goes beyond the concrete points agreed, as listed above. "Without condition" or "unconditional" are not repeat not acceptable in a joint minute, unless we also spell out what we have stated as facts of life. The same problem exists in characterizing the participation. If they are serious in wanting to get down to business, forms of words should not stop them. As the events ~~XXXXX~~ take place either side will be free to make announcements

Page 3 of telegram to Paris TODEL, Saigon~~SECRET~~*Classification*

or statements as it sees fit. If these should be at variance with what has in fact been agreed, they can be refuted both by words and by the facts as they unfold in compliance with the real understandings. The only assurance we will give is that no US official statement will use the words "conditional" or "unconditional" or their equivalents.

Page 4 of telegram to Paris TODEL, Saigon

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

2. You should make a maximum effort to achieve agreement on these lines, making clear however that any agreement you reach must be subject to final review and clearance here and further notice to them or a short additional meeting.

3. If it appears that they insist on an agreed minute, you should ask for a recess long enough for plausible preparation of a handwritten copy of the following text:

1. On the basis of our discussions, all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the territory of the DRV will stop as of (date and time provisionally agreed).

2. It is agreed that meetings (on the substance of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam) will begin in Paris on (date and time provisionally agreed). The US has indicated that representatives of the RVN will be present, and the DRV has indicated that representatives of the NLF will be present. (The foregoing in no way implies recognition of those represented at the meeting.)

3. The date and time of the first Paris meeting may be made known at the time of announcement of the bombing cessation, which will be (date and time agreed, for example if bombing is to stop Friday midnight Saigon time, time of announcement should be 9 a.m. Saigon time

Page 5 of telegram to Paris TODEL, SAIGON

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

Saturday. Variations could call for prior announcement.)

4. Apart from dates and times, to be filled in, the other language in parentheses above is optional and may be varied or withdrawn at your discretion. In addition, paragraph 3 may be omitted in your discretion, provided that you are confident that the point has been understood and accepted in the preceding discussion.

5. You should hold absolutely firm on the rest, reporting any remaining differences ~~xxxx~~ here. You will readily see why we have chosen this wording and why it is essential to adhere to it. Paragraph 2 in particular states the case exactly as we have presented it, and they have accepted it. At the same time, it avoids the straight listing--which has clear four-party implications--and any use of "our side" and "your side," which would simply lead to fruitless controversy.

6. Whatever degree of agreement is reached, we repeat that we must review it here before it becomes final, and this must be made absolutely clear.

GP-1.

End.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

696

~~SECRET~~

MEJ/S

OO RUFNCR

DE RUMJIR 40987 2971415

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O 231350Z OCT 68 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3073

INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2561

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 40987

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

7 6 3 2 Q

1968 OCT 23 AM 10 31

**ACTION COPY**

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769 91-482

By as/jw, NARA, Date 3-5-93

1. AT OUR SUGGESTION, WE HAD CONSULTATIVE MEETING OCT 23 ATTENDED BY THIEU, KY, FONMIN THANH AND DUC ON VIETNAMESE SIDE. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY BERGER AND HERZ. MEETING LASTED TWO AND A QUARTER HOURS AND BROUGHT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF PROGRESS. MY PURPOSE IN CALLING THE MEETING, OF COURSE, HAD BEEN TO TRY TO CLEAR UP, IN KY'S PRESENCE, SOME OF THE POINTS WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED BY THANH AT THIEU'S DIRECTION.

2. I WILL REPORT THE MEETING MORE FULLY IN SEPARATE MESSAGE. BOTH THIEU AND KY KEPT COMING BACK, ESSENTIALLY, TO THREE POINTS: THEY SAID THEY COULD GO INTO NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDED THAT (A) HANOI SIGNIFIES THAT THEY WILL TALK WITH THE GVN; (B) HANOI SIGNIFIES THAT THEY WILL TALK SERIOUSLY, "WITHOUT RUSES (TO MAKE THE GVN TALK ONLY WITH THE NLF) OR PROPAGANDA" AND (C) WE WILL SEE TO IT THAT THE NLF DOES NOT PARTICIPATE AS A SEPARATE ENTITY.

3. IN RESPONDING TO THIS I MADE IN EFFECT THREE POINTS ON WHICH THEY NEED SOME ADDED REASSURANCE TO MEET THEIR CONCERNS AND PREOCCUPATIONS:

A. WE BELIEVE ON THE BASIS OF WHAT HANOI HAS TOLD US THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRE THAT THEY TALK TO THE GVN. WE HAVE MADE IT A MAJOR POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR THAT THERE CANNOT BE ANY SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE GVN, AND WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HANOI UNDERSTANDS THIS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 40987, OCTOBER 23 NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

B. WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT ON OUR SIDE TO KEEP THE NEGOTIATIONS MOVING ALONG SERIOUS LINES, AND IF HANOI MAKES ANY ATTEMPT TO BY-PASS OR IGNORE OR FREEZE OUT THE GVN, OR TO MANEUVER THE GVN INTO A POSITION WHERE THEY WOULD HAVE TO TALK BILATERALLY WITH THE NLF, WE WILL REPUDIATE SUCH TACTICS AND MAKE CLEAR THAT THE CONFERENCE CANNOT PROCEED ON SUCH A BASIS.

C. WE NOT ONLY AGREE WITH THE GVN ABOUT THE LACK OF STATUS OF THE NLF, BUT WE WILL SUPPORT THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE NLF IS A MERE EMANATION OF HANOI AND CANNOT BE REGARDED AS A SEPARATE ENTITY.

4. WHAT WE NOW NEED HERE IS SOME REAFFIRMATION OF THESE POINTS FROM WASHINGTON WHICH I CAN READ TO THIEU AND KY AS EVIDENCE THAT WE UNDERSTAND THEIR PROBLEM AND ARE PREPARED TO HELP IN COPING WITH THEM. I THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT URGENTLY PROVIDE, IN ITS OWN LANGUAGE OR BY WAY OF ENDORSEMENT OF THE LANGUAGE USED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, SUCH AFFIRMATION OF OUR UNDERSTANDINGS AND OF OUR SUPPORT. I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO BE ABLE TO READ FROM SUCH A MESSAGE IN ORDER TO OVER COME THE CURRENT RELUCTANCE OF THE GVN TO GO INTO TALKS IN THE ABSENCE OF "ASSURANCES" FROM HANOI WHICH ARE CLEARLY UNOBTAINABLE.

5. TOMORROW OCT 24, BERGER AND HERZ WILL MEET SEPARATELY WITH THANK TO GO OVER SOME OF THE PROCEDURAL POINTS IN ORDER TO QUIET THEM DOWN, FOLLOWING UP ON TODAY 19:34 -- TION AND ON THE ONE THAT HERZ HAD WITH HIM ON OCT 22.

BUNKER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

70

ACTION

~~SECRET~~--EYES ONLY

*Pres file*

Wednesday, October <sup>23</sup>~~22~~, 1968  
10:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the draft talking paper,  
with Dobrynin, you asked me to prepare.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET~~--EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rlh

70a

DRAFT -- October 23, 1968 -- 10:30 am

DRAFT from the President to Dobrynin

Before proceeding with the final step in Paris, I wish to share with you certain grave concerns about the arrangement we have negotiated with Hanoi.

Because Hanoi wished to preserve the myth that the bombing cessation was unconditional, we have had to put the conditions in the form of the "facts of life" which would require us to resume bombing North Vietnam.

We have also had to issue standing orders to General Abrams which permit him to respond instantly to violations of our "understanding" that Hanoi will know how to behave.

We are moving forward on this basis in part because Chairman Kosygin has told us that he and his colleagues have reason to believe that a bombing cessation will move us towards peace.

It is right that we should respond, because, as I have said, we are prepared to take risks for peace, but not foolhardy gambles.

I have asked you to come in because I believe it to be a vital interest of the Soviet Union and the United States that these risks not turn out to be a foolhardy gamble.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-212  
By Cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

President to Dobrynin

-2-

I have in mind two dangers.

First, that Hanoi soon violates the understandings, forcing us to resume bombing. To the American people it would then appear that Hanoi has tricked the President into a bombing cessation before the election -- in an effort to affect the course of the election -- entering into implicit understanding with the United States which Hanoi had no intention of honoring.

There would be a great revulsion in the United States against negotiations with Hanoi, with grave consequences.

Second, if the understandings are violated or if there is no obvious forward movement in Paris to end the war, the pressures for a bombing resumption will grow strong. Once bombing stops, the American people will expect rapid movement towards peace, as well as a quiet DMZ and no attacks on the cities. The limited bombing of North Vietnam has been a protection to the President in maintaining a moderate position. The present temper of the country is, on balance, conservative and hard.

Therefore, if this understanding is violated or fails, there is a real danger that the whole effort we have mounted since March 31 will come to an end. The President cannot guarantee that a bombing resumption will be within the limits set on March 31.

President to Dobrynin

-3-

I have raised these concerns with you, Mr. Ambassador, because the first duty between our two governments is clear and honest communication.

And whatever our troubles, it is still true that a civilized relation between the United States and the Soviet Union is fundamental to any peace we can build.

Finally, I wish you -- and your government -- to know that we are aware of the efforts that the Soviet Union has made to bring us to the present interim agreement. We believe a stable peace in Southeast Asia is in the interest of the Soviet Union as well as the United States. But we are glad you have made the effort.

Now our common task is to make this an agreement that is honored and moves us rapidly towards peace in Laos as well as in Vietnam.

Although I felt it my duty to share with you my concerns, I wish you also to know we shall move into the new phase with good faith and hope.

71

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/CACTUS

Wednesday, October 23, 1968  
10:40 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith North Koreans clarify  
the "over-write" ploy on the PUEBLO;  
and they reject it, for the time being.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 10633

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-212  
By CL, NARA, Date 1-5-95

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

TELEGRAM

712/WH

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 10633

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-213  
By CB, NARA, Date 1-16-96

NODIS/CACTUS

SUBJ: 24TH CLOSED MEETING

1. MEETING BEGAN AT 1101 HOURS AND CONCLUDED AT 1418 LOCAL TIME OCTOBER 23. GENERAL WOODWARD BELIEVES NK INTENTIONS WERE TO PROBE US THINKING ON OVERWRITE PROPOSAL RATHER THAN REJECT IT OUTRIGHT WHILE GIVING IMPRESSION THAT NK SIDE WAS UNYIELDING ON OBTAINING COMPLETE US ACCEPTANCE OF ITS PROPOSAL. TONE OF MEETING WAS NOT AS WASH AS TRANSCRIPT MIGHT INDICATE AND ONLY IN LAST FORMAL STATEMENT DID PAK SPEAK WITH VIGOR.

2. PAK OPENED WITH A REVIEW OF NK VERSION OF PUEBLO INCIDENT AND NEGOTIATIONS. HE STATED THAT NK SIDE HAD SUBMITTED A DOCUMENT WITH CORRECT TITLE AND NAME AND THAT CREW COULD BE RETURNED IF WE SIGNED DOCUMENT. HE ACCUSED US OF MAKING ABSURD ASSERTIONS THAT WE WANTED TO ADD UNNECESSARY THINGS TO DOCUMENT AND TO "SIGN IT ON YOUR BEHALF INSTEAD OF SIGNING IT AS IT IS". CALLED THIS "PETTY STRATEGEM".

3. GENERAL WOODWARD REPEATED THE EXACT WORDS HE INTENDED TO WRITE ON THE NK DOCUMENT AND ASKED IF NK SIDE HAD SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS.

4. PAK SAID PROPOSAL RIDICULED MEETING AND THAT DOCUMENT THEY PROPOSED INCLUDED EVEN TERMS OF RECEIPT WE WANTED, AGAIN ASKED IF US PREPARED TO SIGN.

5. WOODWARD POINTED OUT CONSISTENCY OF US POSITION NOTING HE HAD NEVER USED ANY OTHER WORDS THAN "I WILL ACKNOWLEDGE ON A DOCUMENT SATISFACTORY TO YOU" AND THAT HE HAD CORRECTED PAK WHEN HE HAD MISQUOTED HIM. HE THEN MADE POINTS IN PARA C AND D OF STATE 254615.

6. THERE WAS A PAUSE OF OVER 30 MINUTES WHILE PAK APPARENTLY SENT FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO PROCEED. HE THEN SAID US HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO SIGN DOCUMENT AND ON THIS BASIS DISCUSSION AT LAST MEETING HAD GONE TO PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF CREW.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 10633, 231100Z OCT, NODIS/CACTUS

IN MIDDLE OF THIS US HAD UPSET DISCUSSIONS BY PROPOSING "SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE".

7. WOODWARD DENIED GOING BACK ON ANY AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE AND SAID HE WAS SURPRISED AT REJECTION OF US PROPOSAL AND URGED ITS RECONSIDERATION. HE SAID IF PAK HAD NOTHING MORE TO SAY HE PROPOSED THE MEETING ADJOURN.

8. PAK AGAIN ASKED WHETHER US WAS READY TO SIGN THE DOCUMENT AND GENERAL WOODWARD REPEATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT ON A DOCUMENT AT TIME PUEBLO CREW SIMULTANEOUSLY RELEASED.

9. PAK THEN HELD OUT A COPY OF THE DOCUMENT AND SAID THAT WOODWARD'S NAME AND TITLE WERE CLEARLY WRITTEN ON IT TOGETHER WITH THE TERMS OF ACKNOWLEDGING OF THE CREW. HE THEN ASKED "DOES THIS MEAN YOU WILL SIGN HERE UNDER YOUR NAME?" WOODWARD SAID HE WOULD WRITE THE RECEIPT ON THE FACE OF THE DOCUMENT AND SIGN HIS NAME AND TITLE. WHEN ASKED WHERE HE INDICATED DIAGONALLY ACROSS FACE OF DOCUMENT. REACTION FROM NK SIDE WAS VISIBLY NEGATIVE. HE THEN SUGGESTED WRITING AND SIGNING ON CLEAR SPACE AT BOTTOM OF DOCUMENT. AGAIN REACTION WAS VISIBLY NEGATIVE. WOODWARD THEN INDICATED THERE WERE OTHER WAYS THE DOCUMENT MIGHT BE SIGNED. GENERAL WOODWARD BELIEVES NEGATIVE REACTION OF NK SIDE WAS DELIBERATE AND WAS INTENDED TO DRAW AS MUCH SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON SIGNING AS POSSIBLE FROM US SIDE.

10. PAK THEN IN PREPARED STATEMENT SAID US COULD NOT GET CREW BACK WITHOUT SIGNING DOCUMENT AS IT WAS. HE SAID NK PATIENCE HAD ITS LIMITS AND HE HAD SAID ALL THERE WAS TO SAY. HE SAID HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN CONTINUING EMPTY TALKS, CALLED THE US PROPOSAL "SHAMELESS GAMES" AND SAID US SIDE SHOULD COME BACK WHEN IT WAS PREPARED TO SIGN. HE THEN ACCEPTED WOODWARD'S PROPOSAL TO ADJOURN.

11. WOODWARD BELIEVES THAT WE MUST WAIT AT LEAST UNTIL THE NEXT MEETING TO DETERMINE WHETHER PYONGYANG IS PREPARED TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS ON OVERWRITE PROPOSAL.

GP-3 PORTER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*  
72

Wednesday, October 23, 1963  
9:55 a. m.

**SECRET**

MR. PRESIDENT:

Rabin is leaving for Israel this afternoon.

It is my feeling that he should carry a letter like the attached from you to Eshkol.

The reason: The Israeli Cabinet is at last coming to a moment of truth. It must formulate a position for Jarring on boundaries which may make the difference between failure and success of the Jarring mission. It may not be too much to say that the decision made by the Israeli Cabinet could determine whether there shall be peace or another war in the Middle East. Your voice directly to Eshkol on this broad personal basis could be a factor in the equation.

I have not discussed this with Secretary Rusk. I am sure you would not wish finally to send this letter via Rabin without his concurrence. My question is, therefore: May I ask Secretary Rusk his view on the basis that you have made no decision? Even though you may wish to sign the letter on a contingency basis, I would make it wholly clear that you would not wish to move without his positive recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-212  
By Cl, NARA, Date 1-5-95

~~SECRET~~

72a

October 23, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have appreciated your recent letters, and I had a good talk with Foreign Minister Eban yesterday. He will be reporting in detail our strong feelings on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but I wish to write you this personal note to be sure our emphasis on that issue does not obscure a larger point.

I know you face a difficult series of meetings this week and wish to send you this word of encouragement.

I am deeply concerned, as you know, Mr. Prime Minister, about Israel's future, and I understand how strongly some of your colleagues feel that Israel's future can best be guaranteed by military means and expanded borders alone. It is so much easier to argue in terms of military balance and lines on a map than it is to argue the case for political compromise. But our own experience has proved that real peace is not found alone on the walls of a fortress -- or under the umbrella of air power -- or behind a nuclear shield.

Every American President knows that our most secure borders are the open borders with Mexico and Canada. That day may not be close for Israel with the UAR, but it could be close with Jordan.

I feel so strongly about the irrationality of trying to make peace by force alone that I must urge you to resist those who find it easier to risk Israel's future on today's expanded boundaries than to reach out for real peace. From my own difficult personal decision last March, I can say with feeling that it is not easy to lead a nation toward a necessary peace without jeopardizing hard-won gains and the future those gains have earned. But I can also say that it is worth reasonable risks, measured compromise, and personal pain.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-212  
By cl, NARA. Date 1-5-95

I do not presume to say what your Government should do.  
But I pray that you and your colleagues will find the courage  
to seize this moment of opportunity so that peace may be  
"within thy walls."

I look forward to seeing you later this year.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Levi Eshkol  
Prime Minister of Israel  
Jerusalem

LBJ;Hsaunders:WWR:mz (10/23/68)

73

8

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Wednesday, October 23, 1968  
9:20 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft, of the kind you requested, from the President to Gen. Abrams.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House, Dec 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rln

Draft

~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

Oct. 23, 1968

73a

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL ABRAMS

I wish I could talk with you face to face at this moment of decision. Since we cannot do this, I wish to put to you bluntly the questions most on my mind as I would put them if we could be together.

First. If the enemy honors our understandings on the DMZ and the cities, will those actions constitute a significant military advantage to our forces and the ARVN?

Second. Will that advantage compensate for the loss of our bombing in North Vietnam south of the <sup>17th</sup> parallel?

Third. Is it your estimate that the enemy will or will not honor those understandings?

Fourth. If he does not honor those understandings, can standing orders for rules of engagement of the kind you and we have in mind protect our forces and those of our allies for a period sufficient for us to make a basic estimate of enemy intentions and return, if necessary, to full-scale bombing of North Vietnam?

Fifth. Knowing all you know of the position in Vietnam, if you were President would you proceed with the proposed deal?

###

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C 91-484  
By ag/lip, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

Wed., Oct. 23, 1968  
9:15 a. m.

74

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Ky in a thoughtful mood, on  
Vietnamese popular attitudes towards a bombing  
halt and peace.

Ky sure wants to go to Paris!

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~ attachment

25X1A



1.3 (a) (4)

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-041-2-8-9

SANTITIZED  
Authority Net 019-041-2-8  
By φ, NARA, Date 1/21/02

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE  
IN 18202

74a

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR .DDI DIA EXO NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC OER NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

222154Z

CITE

DIST 22 OCTOBER 1968

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

3.4(b)(1)

DOI: 16 - 21 OCTOBER 1968

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT KY'S VIEWS ON RUMORS OF  
AN UNCONDITIONAL BOMBING HALT; COMMENTS ON  
THE COMPOSITION OF A GVN NEGOTIATING DELEGATION

ACQ: VIETNAM, SAIGON

SOURCE:

( 1. VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY ON  
REFERRING TO PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS  
ON 19 AND 20 OCTOBER OPPOSING AN UNCONDITIONAL BOMBING HALT,  
COMMENTED THAT HE WONDERED WHERE THIEU GOT THE COURAGE TO  
TAKE SUCH A HARD STAND. SOME PEOPLE MIGHT THINK HE HAD TALKED  
TO THIEU, BUT KY STATED THAT HE HAS NOT HAD ANY SUBSTANTIVE  
CONVERSATIONS WITH THIEU SINCE THE CABINET MEETING ON 16 OCTOBER.

3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-136  
By us, NARA, Date 6-25-03

~~SECRET~~

3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

KY ADDED, WITH SOME PLEASURE, THAT "THIEU IS TAKING A STRONGER POSITION THAN I".

2. KY SAID THAT WITH SO MANY RUMORS ABOUT A BOMBING HALT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN SAIGON AND IN THE COUNTRY-SIDE ARE BEGINNING TO BELIEVE THEM. KY ADDED THAT HE HOPES THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE BOMBING PAUSE DISCUSSIONS IS RESOLVED SOON SO THAT THE PEOPLE CAN BE GIVEN SOME INDICATION OF WHAT THE FUTURE MIGHT HOLD FOR THEM. KY SAID THAT ONLY A MINORITY OF THE POPULATION IS DISTURBED OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WITH HANOI. HE IDENTIFIED THESE PEOPLE AS THE NORTHERN REFUGEES, PARTICULARLY THE CATHOLICS, AND THE MAJORITY OF THE MILITARY OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY THE BATTALION AND COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS. KY SAID THESE PEOPLE FEAR THAT POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WILL EVENTUALLY MEAN AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE ENEMY AND VIEW THIS AS A THREAT TO THEIR FUTURE WELL-BEING. REFERRING TO SUPPORTERS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, KY SAID THAT THEY PROBABLY NUMBER ABOUT 15 TO 20 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THEY SHOULD BE WATCHED, THEY DO NOT REPRESENT A POLITICAL THREAT TO THE

3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

(classification)

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STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. KY DESCRIBED THE MAJORITY OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AS APATHETIC TOWARD THE BOMBING ISSUE AND ONLY WANTING PEACE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO LIVE WITHOUT FEAR. HE SAID THAT THE MASSES ARE NOT PARTICULAR ABOUT THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT, COMMUNIST OR DEMOCRATIC, AND THAT THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND POLITICS.

3. KY AGAIN STATED HIS VIEWS ON THE COMPOSITION OF A NEGOTIATING DELEGATION WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR TALKS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND HANOI. HE HOPES THAT PRESIDENT THIEU WILL APPOINT A STRONG DELEGATION WITH AUTHORITY TO MAKE DECISIONS ON THE SPOT WITHOUT HAVING TO COMMUNICATE WITH AND AWAIT DECISIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT IN SAIGON. KY SAID THAT HE STILL BELIEVES THAT HE SHOULD BE PRESENT AT THE TALKS BECAUSE HE COULD TALK AUTHORITATIVELY WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND COULD MAKE MANY DECISIONS AS QUESTIONS AROSE. HE COMMENTED THAT WHEN NEGOTIATING WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, ONE MUST EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES AS THEY OCCUR AND NOT WASTE THEM BY UNDERTAKING A GREAT DEAL OF RESEARCH AND DELIBERATION.

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOME, MAJOR GENERAL DAVIDSON) 7TH AIRFORCE (GENERAL BROWN) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

Pres. File

75

Wednesday, Oct. 23, 1968

9:10 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a member of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris blows a most uncertain propaganda trumpet in a talk with a French Communist.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (TDCS 314/16099-68)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769 91-484

By sg/wip, NARA, Date 3-5-93

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE 75a  
IN 18307

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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS  
DD-1 EXD CER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[Redacted]

~~GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

222046Z

CITE

[Redacted]

DIST 22 OCTOBER 1968

COUNTRY: VIETNAM/FRANCE

3.4(b)(1)

DOI :

[Redacted]

SUBJECT: NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL'S VIEWS ON VIETNAM SITUATION

ACQ :

SOURCE :

[Large redacted area]

SUMMARY: TRAN VIET DUNG, COUNSELOR OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION IN PARIS, [Redacted] ON NORTH VIETNAM'S CURRENT PROPAGANDA AIMS AND TACTICS. DUNG WARNED THAT THE SLOGAN ON STOPPING OF BOMBARDMENTS MIGHT BE ABANDONED AND THE SLOGAN ON WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS MODIFIED. HOWEVER THE LEGITIMACY

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
MJ 02-136  
By ia, NARA, Date 6-25-03

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OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT MUST BE EMPHASIZED. DUNG FELT THAT THE NEXT FEW MONTHS ARE CRUCIAL FOR VIETNAM BUT INDICATED THE NEED FOR VIETNAM PROPAGANDA SUPPORT FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL MORE YEARS. DUNG DISCUSSED THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT TO SUPPORT VIETNAM IN TERMS WHICH IMPLIED THIS MOVEMENT MIGHT BE OVER. DUNG ADVISED AGAINST MIXING THE VIETNAM AND ANTI-NATO MOVEMENTS AND AGAINST TREATING CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND VIETNAM AS COMPARABLE SITUATIONS. DUNG DID NOT BELIEVE CHINA WOULD INFLUENCE THE VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. DUNG WAS CONFUSED AND INDECISIVE IN DISCUSSING QUESTIONS RELATING TO NEGOTIATIONS. DUNG, IN CONTRAST TO PREVIOUS MEETINGS, MADE NO REFERENCE TO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND REFERRED ONLY TO POLITICAL FORMS OF STRUGGLE.

END SUMMARY.

1. TRAN VIET DUNG, COUNSELOR OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION IN PARIS, DISCUSSED [REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAMESE CURRENT PROPAGANDA AIMS AND THE TACTICS TO BE PURSUED TO PROMOTE THESE AIMS. HIGHLIGHTS OF THIS DISCUSSION ARE GIVEN BELOW.

2. DUNG SAID THAT THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WOULD BE CRITICAL FOR VIETNAM AND THAT PROPAGANDA SLOGANS MIGHT NEED TO BE CHANGED

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QUICKLY TO MEET NEW SITUATIONS. DUNG COMMENTED THAT THE SLOGAN ON COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS MIGHT BE ABANDONED AND THAT THE SLOGAN DEALING WITH WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS MIGHT HAVE TO BE MODIFIED. DUNG ADVISED [REDACTED] FOR THE TIME BEING THESE SLOGANS SHOULD BE RETAINED BUT GREAT EMPHASIS SHOULD NOT BE PUT ON THEM. INSTEAD [REDACTED] BY DUNG TO CONCENTRATE HEAVILY ON THE SLOGAN CALLING FOR THE RECOGNITION OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF). DUNG IMPLIED THAT IN THE FUTURE THIS WOULD BE THE KEY ISSUE IN THE VIETNAM SITUATION. DUNG CALLED [REDACTED] ATTENTION TO XUAN THUY'S 16 OCT STATEMENT AT THE 26TH NEGOTIATING SESSION AND THE PUBLICATION OF THE FRANCO-VIETNAM FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION ON THE NLF AS BASIC DOCUMENTS TO SUPPORT PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF THE NLF.

3. DUNG ADVISED [REDACTED] THE AMERICANS WERE ENGAGING IN ALL SORTS OF MANEUVERS AT PRESENT BECAUSE THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE SIX MONTHS' DEADLOCK AT PARIS AND WANTED TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION OF PROGRESS FOR THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS. DUNG COUNSELED [REDACTED] THAT HE SHOULD NOT BE MISLEAD BY THESE MANEUVERS AND THAT TWO THINGS SHOULD BE KEPT FIRMLY IN MIND:

A. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL NEVER ACCEPT THE

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PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY IN EXCHANGE FOR A STOP OF BOMBARDMENTS.

B. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL NEVER NEGOTIATE WITH THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

4. DUNG SAID THAT IN SPITE OF THE CRITICAL PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD THAT PROPAGANDA SUPPORT FOR NORTH VIETNAM WOULD CERTAINLY BE NEEDED FOR THE NEXT FEW YEARS AND PRINCIPALLY IN CONNECTION WITH SUPPORT OF THE NLF.

5. DUNG REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT IN SUPPORT OF VIETNAM AND CONCLUDED THAT IT HAD VERY FAVORABLE RESULTS IN ASIA, AFRICA, AND PARTICULARLY IN SOUTH AMERICA WHERE THE INSPIRATION OF VIETNAM HAD COMPLICATED GREATLY CAPITALIST EFFORTS TO RETAIN CONTROL OF THESE ECONOMIES.

COMMENT: FROM THE TONE OF DUNG'S COMMENTS IT APPEARED AS IF HE WAS "LOOKING BACK" ON THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE TO AID VIETNAM AND WAS TRYING TO FIND JUSTIFICATION OUTSIDE OF VIETNAM'S IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT TO SUPPORT VIETNAM.

THE IMPRESSION THAT DUNG WAS IMPLYING THAT, IN REALITY, THIS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT NO LONGER HAD A FUTURE.)

6. DUNG STRONGLY ADVISED AGAINST MIXING ANTI-NATO MOVEMENTS WITH VIETNAM PROPAGANDA MOVEMENTS. DUNG BELIEVES THAT BY SUCH

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MIXING , MANY PERSONS WHO ARE SYMPATHETIC TO VIETNAM WOULD BE LOST.

7. DUNG ADVISED THAT THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE THE CZECH QUESTION SHOULD IT BE RAISED AT PRO-VIETNAM MEETINGS WAS TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT THIS PROBLEM HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE VIETNAM PROBLEM, THAT THESE TWO PROBLEMS WERE NOT COMPARABLE, AND THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN QUESTION SHOULD BE TREATED IN MEETINGS ORGANIZED SPECIFICALLY FOR THAT PURPOSE.

8. IN COMMENTING ON CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE VIETNAM SITUATION, DUNG SAID "THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND ITS ORGANIZATIONS WILL DECIDE (I.E. QUESTIONS OF NEGOTIATION) THEMSELVES WITHOUT ANY EXTERNAL INFLUENCE, ON THE BASIS OF THE FOUR AND FIVE POINTS AND THE PROGRAM OF THE ALLIANCE."

9. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SOURCE WAS STRUCK BY THE CONFUSION AND INDECISION OF DUNG IN WHAT WAS OBVIOUSLY A FLUID SITUATION. PERHAPS MOST STRIKING WAS THE OMISSION FROM THIS CONVERSATION OF THE SLIGHTEST REFERENCE TO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE MILITARY SITUATION HAD BEEN

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HEAVILY EMPHASIZED. [REDACTED] IN LATE JULY 1968., DUNG HAD STRESSED THE FACT THAT THE STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM WAS BEING CARRIED ON AT THE POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND MILITARY LEVEL. THIS TIME, ONLY THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE WAS ALLUDED TO.) [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FOR DUNG'S LATE JULY COMMENTS ON THESE SUBJECTS.)

10. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.  
REPORT CLASS-SECRET [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

76  
INFORMATION

Wednesday, October 23, 1968 -- 9:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

*Per file*

We have just checked with Paris. The UPI item about a meeting in Paris is nonsense. Habib will knock it down via McCloskey.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

INFORMATION

711

Wednesday, October 23, 1968 -- 8:00 a. m.

*Profile*

Mr. President:

You may wish to know that Tommy Thompson is going to a military hospital in Wiesbaden on the 27th for major surgery.

He has informed Sec. Rusk he estimates two weeks in the hospital and two weeks convalescence.

Sec. Rusk suggests we shall be able to carry on our major business with the Soviets via Dobrynin during this time.

I will keep you informed of how things go with Tommy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

78

Wednesday - October 23, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Economic Integration - Andean Sub-Regional Group

Progress toward a sub-regional common market among the Andean countries (Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia) has lately bogged down. Venezuela will not join until after its national election in December, if then. The change of governments in Peru also postpones any Peruvian action. Ecuador is on the fence, with strong private sector fears inhibiting a decision. Chile, Colombia, and Bolivia are eager to press forward and fear the whole effort may founder if much more time passes without concrete results.

Last June you authorized State to explore with the six governments a possible AID loan of as much as \$25 million to a fund for "adjustment assistance". The loan would help industries initially hurt by formation of an Andean Common Market. Such an "Industrial Adjustment Fund" can help reduce private sector opposition, especially in Ecuador and Venezuela. AID has funds set aside from this year's appropriation. However, no final commitment has been given, and the concrete loan proposal will come back to you only after the Andean group has agreed on terms for its Common Market.

State now wants to reiterate that our offer of adjustment assistance still stands, even if fewer than six countries join. This might tip the scales with Ecuador before the next negotiating meeting, scheduled for early next month.

If as many as four countries move ahead, the chances are good that Peru and Venezuela will eventually join. I believe you should approve State's proposal.

W. W. Rostow

Approve - OK to go ahead, even if fewer than six countries join initially

\_\_\_.

Disapprove

\_\_\_.

Call me

\_\_\_.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-212  
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

SWLewis:mmm

79

Wednesday, October 23, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Crash of C47 Aircraft

Regarding your question on the aircraft that crashed in Vietnam with 24 persons aboard, the information available thus far would indicate that the crash was due to mechanical difficulties and not as a result of hostile fire.

The aircraft departed from Tan Son Nhut at 4:54 a. m. Monday, Saigon time, en route to Hong Kong with an intermediate stop scheduled at Danang. The aircraft was next heard from at 8:00 a. m. when it was 18 miles south of Ban Me Thout. At that time the pilot reported he was experiencing engine failure and was unable to feather the engine. The altitude was such that it was impossible to be attacked by small arms fire from the ground. He also did not mention any hostile fire.

The rescue team is at the crash site but as yet has not reported back. I have asked that their findings be transmitted to the White House as soon as feasible after their return.

W. W. Rostow