

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

104

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3 memo	Rostow to the President re India/Pakistan <i>open 3/15/02</i> 3 p <del>S</del>	10/29/68	<del>A</del>
<del>#4 note</del>	<del>Rostow to the President re Israel</del> <del>1 p S</del> <i>open 5-16-95 NLJ 94-208</i>	<del>10/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4a cable</del>	<del>Tel Aviv 5862</del> <i>open 11-8-94 NLJ 94-210</i> <del>1 p S</del>	<del>10/28/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#4b cable	Tel Aviv 5863 <i>open 3/15/02</i> 2 p <del>S</del> <i>exempt 11-8-94 NLJ 94-210</i>	10/28/68	<del>A</del>
#10a memo <i>EXEMPT 9-24-03 NLJ 03-199</i>	Helms to the President <del>exempt 2-7-95 NLJ 94-209</del> 3 p S <del>exempt 10/99 NLJ 98-551 exempt 7-15-03 NLJ 02-137</del>	10/28/68	A
#13 memo <i>same sanitization 07-02 NLJ 07-138</i>	Rostow to the President, 11:50 a.m. 1 p S re Vietnam <i>sanitized 8/4/96 NLJ 94-208</i>	10/31/68	A
#13a memo	Intelligence report 2 p S <i>sanitized 2-7-95 NLJ 94-209</i>	10/31/68	A
#15 memo	Rostow to the President, 11:30 a.m. <i>open 3/15/02</i> 1 p S re Israel <i>sanitized 5-16-95 NLJ 94-208</i>	10/31/68	<del>A</del>
#16 note	Rostow to the President, 11:20 a.m. 1 p S re Vietnam <i>open 5-16-95 NLJ 94-208</i>	10/31/68	<del>A</del>
#16a cable	Paris 23207 2 p S <i>open 11-8-94 NLJ 94-210</i>	10/31/68	<del>A</del>
#21 note	Rostow to the President, 9:33 a.m. " 1 p TS re Vietnam	10/31/68	<del>A</del>
#28 note	Rostow to the President, 6:50 p.m. " 1 p S re Vietnam	10/30/68	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 102, October 29-31, 1968, Box 41

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#28a cable	Intelligence report <del>example NLJ 94-211</del> 1 p S <del>SANITIZED 2-26-04 NW/PAC 02-107</del> <i>OPEN 5/15/17 NLJ 14-93</i>	10/30/68	A
#30 note <i>more info released 623-03 NW 02-138</i>	Rostow to the President, 5:30 p.m. 1 p S re Vietnam <del>sanitized 90</del>	10/30/68	A
#30a memo	Intelligence report <i>SANITIZED 6/4/96 NLJ 94-208</i> 3 p S <del>example 2-7-95 NLJ 94-209</del> <i>Sani NLJ 09-041-3-3 (1/02)</i>	10/30/68	A
#31 note	Rostow to the President, 3:50 p.m. 1 p S re military exercise <i>open 5-16-95 NLJ 94-208</i>	10/30/68	A
#31a memo	<del>Rostow to the President, re military exercise</del> 1 p S (dup. #22, Volume 101) <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-212</i>	10/28/68	A
#35a cable	<del>Seoul 10773</del> <i>open 3-30-94 NLJ 93-367</i> 2 p S (dup. #21a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 3, Exempt, NLJ 91-482)	10/30/68	A
#35b cable	<del>Bangkok 22236</del> 2 p S <i>open 11-8-94 NLJ 94-210</i> (dup. #21b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 3, Exempt, NLJ 91-482)	10/30/68	A
#44a cable	<del>Saigon 41523 - Bunker's 72nd weekly message</del> 11 p S <i>open 11-8-94 NLJ 94-210</i> (dup. #49a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8 B (3) [B] Bunker's Weekly Report to the President"-Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 10, 1983)	10/30/68	A
#45a memo	Intelligence report 3 p S <i>same as #34b 7-15-03 NLJ 02-137</i> (dup. #34b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 3, Sanitized, NLJ 91-481)	10/29/68	A
#45b memo	Intelligence report 1 p S <i>exempt 7-15-03 NLJ 02-137</i> (dup. #34e, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 3, Exempt, NLJ 91-481)	10/29/68	A

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#53a memo	Adrian Fisher to S/S, Mr. Read <sup>18</sup> <del>2 p</del> <sup>open 3/15/02</sup> C (dup. #10, Vol. 100) <i>DUPE IN FILES OF WWR, BOX 2, MTGS JULY-DEC 68, Doc #23C and 24C</i>	10/11/68	A
#53b memo	Malcolm Toon to S/S, Mr. Read <sup>open 3/15/02</sup> <del>1 p</del> C (dup., #10, Vol. 100) <sup>WWR, BOX 2, Doc 23D, 240</sup>	10/14/68	A
#54 memo	Rostow to the President re India/Pakistan <del>3 p</del> S <sup>open 5-16-95 NLS 94-208</sup> (dup. #56a, NSF, Country File, India, "India's Food Problem, Vol. 4 and near duplicate of #13, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 103) <i>DUPE IN FILES OF WWR, BOX 2, MTGS JULY DEC '68, DOC # 23E</i>	10/29/68	A
#55 note	Rostow to the President re Pakistan <del>1 p</del> S <sup>open 5-16-95 NLS 94-208</sup>	10/28/68	A
#55a memo	Rostow to the President, 3:45 p.m. <del>3 p</del> S (dup., #41, Vol. 101) <sup>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-212</sup>	10/25/68	A
#55b memo	Katzenbach to the President <del>6 p</del> S (dup., #41a, Vol. 101) <sup>OPEN 1-19-96 NLS 94-213</sup>	10/22/68	A
#55c cable	Rawalpindi 8628 <del>3 p</del> S (dup. #41b, Vol. 101) <sup>example 3-28-95 NLS 94-213</sup> <i>open 3/15/02</i>	10/20/68	A
#55d cable	Rawalpindi 500 to the President 1 p S (dup. #41c, Vol. 101) <sup>SANITIZED 1-19-96 NLS 94-213</sup>	10/25/68	A
#2 note	Rostow to the President, 9:00 a.m. 1 p TS - <del>same sanitization</del> <sup>SANITIZED 1-19-96 NLS 94-414</sup> <i>SS. 04 NW/RAC02.114</i>	10/29/68	A
#2a cable	Intelligence report 2 p TS - <del>sanitized 9-28-99 NLS 94-413</del> <sup>same sanitization</sup> <i>317.05 NW/RAC02.115</i>	10/23/68	A
#7a cable 7b 7c	Intelligence report 4 p S- <del>sanitized 9-28-99 NLS 94-413</del> <sup>sanitized</sup> <i>317.05 NW/RAC02.115</i>	10/31/68	A
20 note	Rostow to the President, 9:55 a.m. 1 p TS - <del>same sanitization</del> <sup>SANITIZED 1-19-96 NLS 94-414</sup> <i>open S. 5. 04 NW/RAC02.114</i>	10/31/68	A

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#20a memo	Intelligence report 1 p TS - <del>sanitized 10-18-94 NLJ 94-416</del> same sanitization 615103 NLJ/RAL 02-116 sanitized 3-17-05 NLJ/RAL 02-115	10/28/68	A
#20b memo	Intelligence report 2 p TS - <del>sanitized 10-18-94 NLJ 94-416</del> same sanitization 615103 NLJ/RAL 02-116	10/30/68	A
#21a cable	Intelligence report 1 p TS - <del>sanitized 9-28-99 NLJ 94-413</del> same sanitization 3-17-05 NLJ/RAL 02-115	10/29/68	A
#22 note	Rostow to the President, 9:30 a.m. 1 p TS - <del>sanitized 10-18-94 NLJ 94-416</del> same sanitization 55-04 NLJ/RAL 02-114	10/31/68	A
#22a cable	Intelligence report 1 p TS - <del>sanitized 9-28-99 NLJ 94-413</del> same sanitization 3-17-05 NLJ/RAL 02-115	10/27/68	A
#23 note	Rostow to the President, 9:25 a.m. 1 p TS - <del>sanitized 10-18-94 NLJ 94-416</del> same sanitization 55-04 NLJ/RAL 02-114	10/31/68	A
#23a cable	Intelligence report 1 p TS - <del>sanitized 9-28-99 NLJ 94-413</del> same sanitization 3-17-05 NLJ/RAL 02-115	10/31/68	A
#33 note	Rostow to the President, 10:00 a.m. 1 p TS - <del>sanitized 10-18-94 NLJ 94-416</del> same sanitization 55-04 NLJ/RAL 02-114	10/30/68	A
#33a cable	Intelligence report 1 p TS - <del>sanitized 9-28-99 NLJ 94-413</del> same sanitization 3-17-05 NLJ/RAL 02-115	10/26/68	A
#33b cable	Intelligence report 5 p TS - <del>sanitized 9-28-99 NLJ 94-413</del> same sanitization 3-17-05 NLJ/RAL 02-115	10/28/68	A
#47c cable	Intelligence report 3 p TS - <del>sanitized 9-28-99 NLJ 94-413</del> (dup. #31g, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 3") same sanitization 3-17-05 NLJ/RAL 02-115	10/21/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 102, 10/29-31/68, box 41

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1

INFORMATION

Wednesday, October 30, 1968 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

As you go forward on your decision today, may I make available to you a passage from a book I once wrote containing a quotation which has for all of my mature life given me a great comfort.

"New courses of action always bring unpredictable factors into play and incur risk. There is no way to avoid taking steps in the dark, for which there is no prescription other than the reply to those who hesitated in Holland to make the pilgrimage to Plymouth:

'It was answered, that all great and honorable actions are accompanied with great difficulties and must be both enterprised and overcome with answerable courages. It was granted the dangers were great, but not desperate. The difficulties were many, but not invincible. For though there were many of them likely, yet they were not certain. It might be sundry of the things feared might never befall; others by provident care and the use of good means might in a great measure be prevented; and all of them through the help of God, by fortitude and patience, might either be borne or overcome.'"

It is from old William Bradford writing the account of "Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647."

I have never had the privilege of working with someone who more fully lived by this standard of courage.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

2

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, October 29, 1968  
9:00 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a further [redacted]  
Thieu talking to the South Korean  
Ambassador in Seoul in quite a  
disturbing way on 18 October.

3.4(b)(1,3)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-114 and NLJ 94-414  
By iw, NARA, Date 3-25-04

2a

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
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DD [REDACTED]  
DE [REDACTED] 2972250  
P 232445Z

3.3 (b)(1)(3)

1968 OCT 23 23 33

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-115 and NLJ 94-413  
By NO, NARA, Date 2-18-05

FM DIRNSA  
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR. ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)  
ZEN

~~SECRET~~

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A [REDACTED] MESSAGE.  
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.  
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

XYXMEUPAI FT 2319Z  
3/0 [REDACTED] -68

3.3  
(b)(1)(3)

THIEU'S VIEWS ON NLF PARTICIPATION IN VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT

XXCC

[REDACTED] 19 OCT 68 [REDACTED]

3.3 (b)(1)(3)

[REDACTED]

OF WHAT PRESIDENT THIEU SAID  
ON 17 OCTOBER

3.3  
(b)(1)(3)

1. PRESIDENT THIEU POINTED OUT THE FACTS THAT HAD BEEN  
DISCUSSED [REDACTED] ALONG WITH WHAT WAS REPORTED [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] CONCERNING THE NLF DELEGATION'S ELIGIBILITY TO  
PARTICIPATE IN POLITICAL TALKS, THE THING THEY CANNOT COME  
TO AN AGREEMENT ON, PRESIDENT THIEU SAID HE CONCURS ON THE  
ITEMS THAT WERE AGREED UPON AT THE UNOFFICIAL TALKS BETWEEN  
THE U.S. AND NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATIONS, AND, AS FOR WHAT  
U.S. AMBASSADOR TO KOREA PORTER SAID, THE PROBLEM LIES IN  
THE UNDERSTANDING.

HE SAID THAT THE REASON FOR THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT  
OPPOSING THE NLF'S PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL TALKS IN  
AN INDEPENDENT CAPACITY IS THAT THE VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION  
HOLDS THE COMMUNIST PARTY TO BE ILLEGAL, AND THE POINT IS  
THAT THE NLF SHIFTS ITS POSITION AT HANOI'S BECK AND CALL;  
ACCORDINGLY, ((THIEU)) IS ADOPTING THE VIEWPOINT THAT IT IS  
ALL RIGHT FOR THE ((NLF)) TO PARTICIPATE AS A MEMBER OF HANOI'S  
DELEGATION. HE SAID THAT IN THE EVENT THAT THE NLF DELE  
GATION PARTICIPATES IN AN INDEPENDENT CAPACITY IT WOULD NOT  
MERELY MEAN THAT WE ARE LEGALIZING THE COMMUNIST PARTY, BUT  
THE COMMUNIST SIDE WOULD MAINTAIN THEIR COALITION, AND SINCE  
WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT DEMANDS THEY WOULD MAKE ON THE U.S. AND  
VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS, WE MUST PREVENT THIS.

4. IN THIS MATTER OF THE NLF DELEGATION'S ELIGIBILITY,  
WE IS CONSCIOUS OF THE NECESSITY OF [REDACTED] CLEARLY TO THE U.S.  
SIDE THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S VIEWPOINT BEFORE THE OPENING  
OF THE POLITICAL TALKS. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT, FOR  
THE SAKE OF PROTECTING OURSELVES AGAINST THE GREAT POSSIBILITY,  
AFTER THE POLITICAL TALKS ARE HELD, OF U.S. AND WORLD OPINION  
CRITICIZING JUST THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ONE-SIDEDLY WHEN  
THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S DELEGATION THINKS THE CIRCUMSTANCES  
((DICTATED)) WITHDRAWING FROM THE SITE OF THE TALKS ON THE NLF

3.3  
(b)(1)(3)

5. [REDACTED] AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE VIETNAMESE ARE OPPOSING THE U.S. IN THIS AND CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY ((OF THE U.S.)) MAKING A DECISIVE MOVE TO HALT THE BOMBING ALONE; THE FOLLOWING [REDACTED]

HE SAID [REDACTED] IS UNABLE TO BLOCK VIETNAM ((FROM BOMBING)) AND CONCERNING THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOMBING HALT, THIS WILL HELP CANDIDATE HUMPHREY AND THIS IS THE PURPOSE OF IT; BUT THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD OCCUR AS THE RESULT OF A BOMBING HALT, WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, RATHER THAN BEING A DISADVANTAGE TO CANDIDATE HUMPHREY, WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF CANDIDATE NIXON. ACCORDINGLY, HE SAID THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON ENFORCING A BOMBING HALT WITHOUT VIETNAM'S AGREEMENT APPEARS TO BE WEAK. [REDACTED] JUST HOW EFFECTIVE CAN IT BE WITHIN THE SHORT TIME BEFORE THE ELECTION, EVEN THOUGH IT IS EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED?

3.3  
(b)(1)(3)

6. HE SAID THAT SINCE THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATIONS WITHIN VIETNAM ARE DEVELOPING TO OUR ADVANTAGE, THE LONGER WE CAN DELAY THE TIME ((OF THE BOMBING HALT)) THE GREATER WILL BE THE ADVANTAGE TO THE VIETNAMESE SIDE.

7. HE SAID THAT IN THE EVENT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE NLF, THEY WILL LOSE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ((CONTROL)) THEM. MILITARY AUTHORITIES OR A GROUP OF POWERFUL ANTI-COMMUNIST PEOPLE MIGHT UNDERTAKE A REVOLUTION.

8. AT THIS TIME, [REDACTED] TO PRESIDENT THIEU THE NEW STAND THAT [REDACTED] THE PRESIDENT IS ADOPTING, AS IN ITEM TWO OF [REDACTED] THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KOREA'S STAND IN THE MATTER AND THAT OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, SHED LIGHT ON THE POINT THAT ((KOREA)) IS STRONGLY BACKING ((THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT)), AND [REDACTED] THE OPINION THAT IT IS BEST THAT [REDACTED] TWO COUNTRIES WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER AND TAKE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE ((ON THESE MATTERS)).

3.3  
(b)(1)(3)

[[REDACTED]]  
(( )) NOT AVAILABLE.  
(( )) IN SERIES CHECK.  
[[REDACTED]]

XXJH  
333

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting at 12:00 Noon Today -- Pakistan Tanks  
and Indian Aid

The two issues before you are:

1. Ayub's tanks. The issue is whether to:
  - a. Spend \$3 million in military aid funds to try to persuade Turkey to sell 100 M-47's to Pakistan. We would replace them with 100 M-48's. Nitze says he can find the money.
  - b. Or remove the ban on arms aid to the subcontinent altogether and sell the tanks directly to Ayub. If the Turkish deal falls through, this would be the only practical alternative to get Ayub even 100 tanks. My earlier memo and Nick Katzenbach's are attached.
2. Indian aid. You asked me to lay out for you alternative aid packages.

These facts should be taken into consideration:

-- There is no pressing food shortage in India. But the Indians need:

- a. Food imports to keep prices down and to help them continue their promising program of agricultural reform.
- b. They need fertilizer imports for next spring's harvest. If they cut back here, they will not get the full advantage of the miracle seeds now in place.

-- The Indians fear a sharp cutback in foreign development aid. They expected a commitment of \$200 million from IDA by now. They can no longer count on this. Second, they are completely in the dark about the U.S. program. Normally we would have pledged our aid

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRVS 64-68, vol. 25, #521

By JC NARA. Date 3802

~~SECRET~~

for fiscal 1969 in a consortium meeting held in late summer or early fall. There has been no meeting because of uncertainty about what the Congress would appropriate.

- a. The danger is they may over-react. By overcautious budgetary decisions -- which they are in process of making now -- they could in effect put their whole development program in suspense.
- b. Whether they over-react or not, the sharper the cutback in available foreign exchange, the sharper the cutback they will have to make in development investment.

These are the alternatives:

- a. Food aid only. This could range from one million tons to the 2.3 million tons we originally proposed. One million tons would reopen the pipeline and give the Indians some confidence. The 2.3 million ton figure (which would bring our 1968 shipments up to the 1967 level) would give them the best chance of getting a grip on their agricultural price and supply problems.
- b. Food aid plus an interim loan commitment. Building from the food aid decision, we would add say \$100 million as a loan commitment now. This would be a large enough to have a good psychological impact and would still leave roughly half the fiscal 1969 appropriation for decision by your successor. Perhaps half the loan money would be for fertilizer and the rest for industrial imports. Bill Gaud would have to decide on the mix in light of the total program.
- c. Food aid plus the total FY 69 AID appropriation for India. This would mean food aid plus an estimated \$195 million in loan money. (We gave \$285 million last year.) The main argument for committing the full amount now is that it would do the most good now. It would have the greatest impact on Indian budgetary decisions and on their fertilizer procurement policy. It would give them some margin to

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- 3 -

gamble that IDA may still come through by the middle of 1969. Your successor would still have the decision to make on calendar 1969 food aid and time to work out the next India consortium pledge and get it through the Congress.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Rostow 4

*Pres file*

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

Tuesday, October 29, 1968

Mr. President:

You should be aware of the attached in which (a) Eshkol asks that Phantoms and NPT not be linked and (b) Eban states Israel's position on the NPT. In short, Eban says the government is studying the NPT--a completely non-committal answer.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

Att: Tel Aviv 5862, 10/28/68  
Tel Aviv 5863, 10/28/68

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-208  
By ijg, NARA, Date 4-26-95



Department of State

WH (5)  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

4a

00 RUEHC  
DE RUQMVL 5862 3021910  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 281905Z OCT 68 ZFFA  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4888  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 9273Q  
RECD: OCT 28, 1968  
4:21 P.M.

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 5862

~~NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-210  
By LD, NARA, Date 10-27-94

NPT-PHANTOMS

1. MOSHE BITAN, ASST DIRGEN MFA, CALLED ON AMB THIS EVENING AND GAVE HIM ORAL MESSAGE FROM ESHKOL AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE AFTER HAVING RECEIVED A REPORT FROM FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE PRIME MINISTER WISHES TO STATE THAT IT IS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ABOUT THE SALE OF PHANTOM AIRCRAFT ARE TO COMMENCE FORTHWITH WITHOUT BEING LINKED TO THE QUESTION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. THE PRIME MINISTER ASSUMES AND HOPES THAT OUR NEGOTIATING TEAM LED BY AMBASSADOR RABIN WILL BE ENABLED TO START IMMEDIATELY WITH PRACTICAL DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO THE SALE OF THE AIRCRAFT. UNQUOTE
2. AT SAME TIME, BITAN HANDED AMB PAPER (TEXT SEPTEL) RESPONDING TO US REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION ISRAEL'S POSITION ON NPT. PAPER NOTES EBAN RETURN U.S. DELAYED BY PM'S INDISPOSITION AND REQUESTS PM'S VIEWS THEREFORE BE CONVEYED TO USG BY AMB. PAPER REPEATS FAMILIAR ISRAELI POSITION ON NPT AND OFFERS NO FIRM ASSURANCE ON SIGNING.
3. BITAN EXPRESSED REGRET U.S. HAD LINKED NPT WITH PHANTOMS AND SAID STRONG ISRAEL WAS IN FREE WORLD AND US INTEREST. AMB NOTED NPT PAPER WAS NO ADVANCE BEYOND PREVIOUS GOI POSITIONS AND CAUTIONED BITAN NOT TO UNDERESTIMATE DEPTH OF FEELING ON NPT AT ALL LEVELS USG. REVIEWED IMPORTANCE OF NPT TO WORLD PEACE AND NOTED ANOMALY OF ISRAEL SHARING DISTINCTION ON NON-SIG-NATURE WITH GERMANY.

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

NOTE: HANDLE AS NODIS PER S/S-0.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

WH (5)  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

46

OO RUEHC  
DE RUQVCL 5863 3021925  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 281915Z OCT 68 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4889  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 9274Q

RECD: OCT 28, 1968  
4:29 P.M.

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 5863

EXDIS  
NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By pc, NARA, Date 3802

NPT-PHANTOMS

REF: TEL AVIV 5862

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT PAPER ON NPT HANDED AMB BY BITAN OCT 28:

1. QUOTE IN DISCUSSION WITH THE ISRAEL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF ISRAEL'S POSITION ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. SINCE THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES IS SOMEWHAT DELAYED BECAUSE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S INDISPOSITION, THE PRIME MINISTER IS ASKING THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL TO CONVEY THE PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY TO THIS QUESTION FORTHWITH.

2. QUOTE ISRAEL'S POSITION ON THE TREATY WAS AUTHORITATIVELY STATED IN RECENT MONTHS BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MULMLN MAY 1968, BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE EUROPEAN HEADQUARTERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 12 SEPTEMBER, AT THE CONFERENCE OF THE NON-NUCLEAR STATES. IN THESE STATEMENTS THE ISRAEL REPRESENTATIVES DECLARED THE ISRAEL'S GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE TREATY.

IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, ISRAEL VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION RESOLUTION.

3. QUOTE SINCE THE TREATY WAS SIGNED AND OPENED FOR ADHERENCE THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN A CONTINUOUS AND DETAILED STUDY OF ITS TERMS IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH IT HAS SUBSCRIBED IN ITS VARIOUS STATEMENTS. IN THIS EXAMINATION ISRAEL, AS A NON-NUCLEAR POWER, IS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREATY FOR LONG-TERM NATIONAL SECURITY, THE PROBLEM OF INSPECTION PROCEDURES, ITS PROGRAMMES FOR PEACEFUL USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY, AS WELL AS THE NUMEROUS IDEAS EXPRESSED BY OTHER COUNTRIES AT THE RECENT CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR POWERS AT GENEVA.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- TEL AVIV 5863, OCT 28

4. QUOTE THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO DISCUSSED THIS MATTER BILATERALLY WITH THE UNITED STATES AT VARIOUS TIMES. ALL THE STATEMENTS AND ASSURANCES WHICH THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN IN THIS CONTEXT CONTINUE TO BE VALID, INCLUDING ESPECIALLY ITS INTENTION NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE AREA.

5. QUOTE THE DELIBERATIONS ON ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY, AS THE UNITED STATES WILL UNDERSTAND, INVOLVE DETAILED EXAMINATION AS WELL AS THE DUE FULFILMENT OF CERTAIN DOMESTIC PROCEDURES. THE STUDY IS NOW BEING EXPEDITED.

6. QUOTE THE PRIME MINISTER IS AWARE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM AND OF THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES TO IT.

7. QUOTE 28 OCTOBER 1968. UNQUOTE

GP-3. BARBOUR  
BT

NOTE: HANDLE AS NODIS PER S/S-O.

~~SECRET~~

5/  
  
INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 31, 1968  
10:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Park's first response is okay.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. I had a most warm session with the  
Apostolic Delegate who conveys to you his  
respect and best wishes -- and his prayers  
for the success of your decision of tonight.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Classification, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

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Wright



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RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIE 00, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, MM 01, ACDA 16,  
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
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1. PRESIDENT PARK MADE FOLLOWING COMMENT ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH AT TEN FORTY-FIVE THIS MORNING. COMMENT WAS MADE THROUGH SIN POM-SIK, PRESIDENT'S PRESS SECRETARY. IT WAS REPORTED TO SELIG HARRISON OF WASHINGTON POST BY DR. HAN GI-UK, THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS. USIS OFFICER INQUIRED OF HAN IF THIS COMMENT WAS TO BE EXCLUSIVE FOR HARRISON. DR. HAN REPLIED HE DOUBTED IT, WHICH WE TAKE TO MEAN THAT PRESIDENT WILL MAKE THIS OR SIMILAR COMMENT PUBLIC SOME TIME TODAY.

2. TEXT OF COMMENT FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONSULTED WITH ME WITH RESPECT TO THE BOMBING HALT AND PROGRESS IN THE PARIS PEACE TALKS. IT IS MY SINCERE WISH THAT THIS ACTION WILL PAVE THE WAY TO A LASTING AND HONORABLE PEACE WITHOUT WEAKENING THE FIGHTING POWER OF THE ALLIED TROOPS IN VIETNAM. END QUOTE.

DECON 12/1/68 PORTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



6  
October 31, 1968  
7:15 p. m.

*President*  
Mr. Rostow,

Ben Read called. Bunker said Thieu still insists on two changes in the announcement. Sec. Rusk told Amb. Bunker that was unacceptable and the President is going ahead on the basis of the speech at 8:00 p. m.

Ben said, so we will not have a joint announcement unless Bunker can get him to change; and we don't know that he will even try.

R. N. Ginsburgh

o  
  
rln

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Thursday, October 31, 1968

*5:25 pm*

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

You should know that we have multiple reports that the VC plan a large-scale harassment sometime between now and 5 November.

We are getting Bus Wheeler to check out the attached reports immediately.

W. W. R.

VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY UNITS IN MILITARY REGION 5  
PREPARING FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

FOLLOW UP NR. 1 TO 2/0 [REDACTED] R631-68 (302050Z)

3.3 (b)(1)(3)

XXCC

PREPARATIONS FO COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN MILITARY REGION (MR) 5 CONTINUE TO ACCELERATE, ACCORDING TO SIGINT OF 29, 30 AND 31 OCTOBER. THESE PREPARATIONS, INCLUDING THE MOVEMENT OF ADDITIONAL UNITS TO NEW AREAS OF OPERATION, HAVE OCCURRED CONCURRENT WITH EVIDENCE THAT A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST "D-DAY" IS SET FOR EARLY NOVEMBER.

HQ, NVA 2ND DIVISION FORWARD ELEMENT HAS MOVED FROM QUANG TIN INTO SOUTHERN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, ACCORDING TO PRELIMINARY INFORMATION(1)). ON 31 OCTOBER THIS FORWARD ELEMENT WAS LOCATED NEAR 15-38N 108-09E (AT 958296), ABOUT 31 KM NORTHWEST OF ITS 28 OCTOBER POSITION IN QUANG TIN. LATER ON 31 OCTOBER, WHILE IN THE FRONT 4 OPERATIONAL AREA, THE FORWARD ELEMENT REPORTED TO HQ, FRONT 4 THAT IT WAS AGAIN ON THE MOVE.

ALSO IN THE QUANG NAM PROVINCE AREA, FRONT 4 FORCES HAVE REFERRED TO THE TRANSPORTATION OF MUNITIONS, THE COMPLETION OF PREPARATIONS, AND THE SETTING UP OF ADDITIONAL RADIO SCHEDULES(2)). ALSO PROVIDED WAS A CLARIFICATION OF THE METHOD OF REFERRING TO THE DAYS FOLLOWING D-DAY(3)). THE MESSAGE IMPLIED THAT COMMUNIST FORCES IN THE DAI LOC DISTRICT OF QUANG NAM HAVE RECEIVED "ACTION ORDERS," BUT THAT REFERENCES TO VARIATIONS OF D-DAY IN THOSE ORDERS WERE CONFUSING.

ON 31 OCTOBER, CENTRAL COMMAND, HQ, FRONT 4 SENT A SCHEDULE OF EVENTS--BASED ON "NEW COMBAT ORDERS"--TO THE 571ST (PROBABLE BATTALION). THE UNIT WAS ORDERED TO PRESENT ITS PLANS (PROBABLY CONCERNING COMBAT) AT THE CENTRAL COMMAND ON 9 NOVEMBER AND TO COMPLETE ITS MISSION ON 15 NOVEMBER. IT WAS FURTHER DIRECTED THAT THE BATTALION COMPLETE THE TRANSPORT OF ADDITIONAL AMMUNITION FROM KEN (15-56N 107-47E, YC 9863) BY 12 NOVEMBER.

IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS INCREASED BETWEEN HQ, NVA 3RD DIVISION AND ITS SUBORDINATE REGIMENTS, AND THE VC 2ND REGIMENT, 3RD DIVISION, CONDUCTED A MINOR RELOCATION. ON 30 OCTOBER, HQ, 3RD DIVISION ORDERED ITS VC 2ND, NVA 18TH AND 22ND REGIMENTS TO MAINTAIN 24-HOUR CONTACT AND LATER SPECIFICALLY INFORMED THE 2ND REGIMENT THAT IT SHOULD INCREASE ITS COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS. THE HQ, 2ND REGIMENT WAS LOCATED ON THAT DATE IN SOUTHERN QUANG NGAI, 15 KM SOUTH OF THE MINH LONG SPECIAL FORCES CAMP AND 16 KM SOUTHWEST OF ITS 18 OCTOBER POSITION(4)). THE OTHER 3RD DIVISION UNITS ARE LOCATED IN QUANG NGAI AND BINH DINH PROVINCES.

XXHH

900

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 02-115 and 11394-413

By me, NARA, Date 2-18-05

~~SECRET SAVIN~~  
~~SECRET SAVIN~~

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SAVIN - FINAL SECTION OF TWO

XXMMENP02FTB31108

2/0/ [REDACTED] R634-68 SPOT REPORT FOLLOW UP NR. 1

VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST MILITARY UNITS IN MILITARY REGION 5  
PREPARING FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3.3  
(1)(1)(3)

FOLLOW UP NR. 1 TO 2/0/ [REDACTED] R631-68 (302050Z)

XXCC

IN THE BINH DINH PLEIKU PROVINCE BORDER AREA, THE PROBABLE HQ, NVA 95B REGIMENT ORDERED ITS POSSIBLE 2ND BATTALION ON 30 OCTOBER TO BE RESOLVED "TO STRIKE THE ENEMY ON PRECISELY 4 NOVEMBER." ((5)) MEANWHILE, THE POSSIBLE 2ND BATTALION RADIO STATION TRANSMITTED A NUMBER OF VEHICULAR TRAFFIC REPORTS TO THE REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS BETWEEN 29 AND 30 OCTOBER, ONE OF WHICH COVERED VEHICLE TRAFFIC FROM AN KHE TO PLEIKU APPARENTLY ALONG ROUTE 19. ((6)) A FINAL MESSAGE ON 30 OCTOBER DISCLOSED THAT THE BATTALION HAD 348 PEOPLE TO FEED, COUNTING "ALL THOSE ATTACHED TO THE UNIT," AND INDICATED THAT THESE PERSONNEL WOULD "EAT HERE ONLY UNTIL NOON OF 5 NOVEMBER," AND THAT THE BATTALION WOULD NOT BE ACCOUNTABLE THEREAFTER. ((8)) THEN, ON 31 OCTOBER, THE POSSIBLE HQ, 95B REGIMENT INFORMED ITS POSSIBLE 2ND BATTALION THAT THE TIME TO COMPLETE AN "INVESTIGATION" MUST BE CALCULATED SO THAT IT DOES NOT EFFECT D-DAY. ((8)) THE MESSAGE ENDED WITH THE ORDER TO HAVE A PLAN TO RECEIVE REPEATED MESSAGES ON THE DAY THAT THE BATTALION OPENS FIRE.

IN KONTUM PROVINCE, SUSPECTED ASSOCIATES OF THE NVA 40TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT ALSO REFERRED TO IMPENDING OFFENSIVES. ON 29 OCTOBER, AN ASSOCIATE (B2135) OF THIS REGIMENT WAS ORDERED TO "MAKE BATTLEFIELD PREPARATIONS IN ORDER TO STRIKE," AND TO "MOBILIZE THE TROOPS TO AGGRESSIVELY STRIKE THE ENEMY AND THEREBY ACHIEVE MERIT AS AN OFFERING TO THE PARTY." ((9)) ON 30 OCTOBER, A UNIT WAS ORDERED TO SEEK A NEW WEAPONS POSITION FOR AMBUSH IN THE EVENT THAT AIRCRAFT DID NOT OVERFLY THE CURRENT LOCATIONS OF THE COMMUNIST GUNS. ((10)) THIS MESSAGE WAS CONCLUDED WITH ORDERS TO STRIKE THE ENEMY WELL AND INFORMED THE UNIT THAT "49" (UNIDENTIFIED DESIGNATOR) HAD INFORMED THE BATTALION THAT IT WAS "AWAITING YOUR MILITARY SUCCESSES."

- ((1)) 2/ [REDACTED] R2801-68.
- ((2)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2578-68, T2572-68; T2571-68.
- ((3)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2530-68
- ((4)) 2/ [REDACTED] R2796-68.
- ((5)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2568-68.
- ((6)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2551-68, T2573-68, T2574-68.
- ((7)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2579-68.
- ((8)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2583-68.
- ((9)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2599-68.
- ((10)) 2/ [REDACTED] T2570-68.

3.3 (1)(1)(3)

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~~SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET TRIM~~

1968 OCT 31 21 46

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PP [redacted]  
DE [redacted] 726 3052015  
ZKZK PP RNI DE  
P 312009Z  
FM DIRNSA  
TO [redacted]  
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3.3 (b)(1)(3)

~~TOP SECRET TRIM~~

REPRODUCTION/FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT AS A WHOLE PROHIBITED WITHOUT PRIOR DIRNSA CONCURRENCE. SELECTED ITEMS MAY BE EXTRACTED AND FURTHER DISSEMINATED ON A STRICT NEED-TO-KNOW BASIS. ADVANCE TO SIGINT SUMMARY NUMBER 267-63 INFORMATION IN THIS REPORT IS THAT AVAILABLE TO NSA AS OF 1300 EST 31 OCTOBER 1968 AND IS BASED ENTIRELY ON SIGINT EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED.

REPORTED VC PLANS FOR GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND ATTACK ON SAIGON AND GIA DINH

THE "EASTERN COMMUNISTS REGION COMMITTEE" HAS NOTIFIED ALL SUBORDINATE MILITARY CADRES TO AWAIT THE ORDER FOR A "LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE", ACCORDING TO "CONFIRMED" INFORMATION IN A 29 OCTOBER [redacted]

3.3 (b)(1)(3)

[redacted] MESSAGE. "ADDITIONAL INFORMATION" STATES THAT "BEFORE 1 NOVEMBER" SAIGON AND GIA DINH WILL BE THE TARGETS OF "A GENERAL OFFENSIVE OR STRONG COORDINATED HARASSMENT OR HEAVY BOMBARDMENT." (2/ [redacted] 1300-68, 310236Z OCT)

~~TOP SECRET SAVID~~  
323

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-115 end 11-94-413  
By iv, NARA, Date 2-18-05

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~~TOP SECRET TRIM~~

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1968 OCT 31 21 49

PP [REDACTED] Y  
DE [REDACTED] 119A 3052111  
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TO OSCAR/VICTOR FOXTROT  
WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM  
~~SECRET SAVIN~~  
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2/C [REDACTED] R15-68

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-115 and NLJ 94-413  
By [REDACTED], NARA, Date 2-18-05

3.3(4)(3)

INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE FORTHCOMING NVN NAVAL ACTIVITY

XXCC

SINCE 27 OCTOBER NORTH VIETNAMESE NAVAL (NVND) COMMUNICATIONS HAVE INDICATED THAT NVND VESSELS MAY UNDERTAKE UNKNOWN ACTIVITIES IN THE CAC BA ISLAND AREA BEGINNING ON 4 NOVEMBER. ON 27 OCTOBER A MESSAGE PASSED FROM THE HANOI COMMAND POST TO AN UNIDENTIFIED ENTITY STATED THAT "IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT WILL BEGIN ON 4 NOVEMBER."

ON 29 OCTOBER, THE NORTHERN FLEET HEADQUARTERS AT BAI CHAY PASSED A MESSAGE TO THE HANOI COMMAND POST STATING THAT ((AT 1300G 30 OCTOBER)) S-25 (NVND WATER BARGE) WOULD GO OUT TO SUPPLY WATER FOR ALL THE BARRELS AT K50 (20-46N 107-05E, YH 168975), A1 (20-46N 107-03E, YH 133977) AND K13 (POSSIBLY IN THE VICINITY OF K50). IT WAS FURTHER REVEALED THAT "ON 3 NOVEMBER WE WILL HAVE TWO VESSELS FROM DIVISION 7 GOING OUT TO K13 FOR ASSIGNMENT." THE ANCHORAGE AREAS MENTIONED (K13, K50, A1), ARE IN THE VICINITY OF CAC BA ISLAND.

POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS FOR THE ABOVE ACTIVITY WERE DISCLOSED ON 13 AND 14 OCTOBER IN THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN TWO UNIDENTIFIED VESSELS [REDACTED] AND AN UNIDENTIFIED CONTROL [REDACTED]. ON THOSE DATES, MESSAGES PASSED FROM [REDACTED] TO BOTH VESSELS WERE INTERNALLY ADDRESSED TO THE DIVISION 7 PGM T-187. MESSAGES PASSED FROM BOTH VESSELS TO [REDACTED] WERE SIGNED BY THE PERSONALITY "BINH," THEREBY INDICATING THAT VESSELS [REDACTED] WERE IN COMPANY. ACCORDING TO MESSAGES NOTED ON 13 OCTOBER, BOTH VESSELS WERE IN TRANSIT TO HAIPHONG, POSSIBLY FROM HANOI. COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY OF 14 OCTOBER INDICATED THAT THE VESSELS HAD TIED UP AT AN UNLOCATED FLOATING DRYDOCK, POSSIBLY TO UNDERGO REPAIRS.

3.3  
(4)(3)

MESSAGES PASSED BY VESSELS [REDACTED] ON 29 AND 30 OCTOBER WERE SIGNED BY "BINH," THUS THEY WERE STILL IN COMPANY. CORRESPONDENCE ON THOSE DAYS DISCLOSED THAT BOTH VESSELS WERE POSSIBLY MOVING. THIS ACTIVITY POSSIBLY INDICATES THAT THE REPAIRS WERE COMPLETED AND THAT THE VESSELS WERE TESTING THEIR SEAWORTHINESS. ON 30 OCTOBER, VESSEL [REDACTED] REPORTED TO [REDACTED] THAT "I AM STILL GOING IN ACCORDANCE WITH ORDERS. PASSED QUEO (PROBABLY HON QUEO, 20-50N 107-05E, YJ 190052) AT ...G." A LATER MESSAGE FROM THE SAME VESSEL STATED THAT "I TURNED AROUND AND RETURNED SAFELY AT 0700G 30 OCTOBER." THE LOCATION MENTIONED ON 30 OCTOBER INDICATES THAT [REDACTED] WERE IN THE CAC BA ISLAND AREA.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT [REDACTED] ARE THE TWO SYATOW-CLASS PGMS WHICH SIGINT INDICATED WERE DAMAGED IN HANOI DURING THE HEAVY STORMS WHICH STRUCK NORTH VIETNAM DURING AUGUST.

XXHH  
600

Thurs., Oct. 31, 1968  
5:20 p. m.

*People*  
8.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a terse version of the briefing memorandum. You will wish, of course, to look at it most carefully to see if it has all the elements you want.

W. W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON8aBriefing Memorandum

On the basis of recent developments in the Paris talks, I have just issued orders to stop the bombing of North Vietnam. As I have said since my talk at San Antonio a year ago, I would do so if I had reason to believe that the cessation of bombing would result in prompt and productive talks and the other side would not take advantage of that cessation.

As I have told the Presidential candidates several times, the formula that I have put to the other side consistent with these principles is the following:

The President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace. A cessation of bombing which would be followed by

- abuses of the DMZ;
- Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks on cities or such populated areas as provincial capitals;
- or a refusal of the authorities in Hanoi to enter promptly into serious political discussions which included the elected government of the Republic of Vietnam, could simply not be sustained.

We have good reason to believe these facts of life are now understood in Hanoi. The Soviets have told us when we questioned them very hard that any doubts we might have about the position of the North Vietnamese with respect to these three conditions are "without foundation."

Meanwhile the battlefield situation since August has shifted heavily in our favor; the cost of a bombing cessation in North Vietnam has been reduced because of the weather; and weather conditions make the DMZ much less vulnerable than in mid-summer. For, say, the next 90 days.

Ambassadors Harriman and Vance have put these conditions lucidly to the other side on 12 occasions in Paris. They are sure that they are understood. They believe that it is the intent of Hanoi to honor them.

My other advisers believe it is ~~more~~ more likely than not likely that they will honor them.

In any case, Gen. Abrams has been issued standing orders to respond to violations of the DMZ, and all of us in the government are prepared to resume the bombing in the face of gross, purposeful violations.

Sect. Rusk and Sect. Clifford and General Wheeler have all recommended this course of action to me. I polled the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually on October 14. They concurred unanimously, as did General Palmer, who had long experience in Vietnam.

Because of his long experience with air operations in Vietnam, I asked General Momyer for his recommendation. It was positive. When I put the question of whether we should go to Gen. Abrams, his response was, "It is the right thing to do."

General Taylor and Mr. Helms also strongly support this course.

In mid-October President Thieu and the Chiefs of the Troop Contributing Countries gave their concurrence to this proposition. Since that time, we have been engaged in negotiations in both Paris and in Saigon to settle certain details. Tonight President Thieu informed me that he would join fully in this decision. The GVN will be free to join the talks next Wednesday, November 6. They are now organizing the delegation, and we shall be working out in Paris the ground rules for those talks.

Let me summarize the understanding we have reached with Hanoi:

-- Hanoi has agreed to begin serious talks toward peace in Vietnam -- talks which would include representatives of the Government of South Vietnam.

-- We have made it clear to them that a continuation of the bombing cessation was dependent, first, on respect for the DMZ, and second, upon there being no attacks on the cities.

-- The Soviet Union, which has played a part in this negotiation, knows these circumstances intimately. Their understanding has been reaffirmed at the highest level in the last few days.

-- Both Hanoi and Moscow are clear that we shall continue reconnaissance of North Vietnam. That is why we agreed to stop only acts of force and not acts of war.

The agreement at which we have arrived is, then, precisely the one which -- as I have told all three Presidential candidates -- we have been seeking in recent months. We have given away nothing to reach this agreement. It is wholly consistent with my public statements.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Thursday, October 31, 1968  
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have checked on why Thieu wants 8 o'clock.

It is simply:

- to complete the diplomacy;
- and give him minimum time to get his statement in shape in the light of that diplomacy.

Although they should have been better prepared, they weren't, and feel very hard-pressed for time.

Bunker concurs in this request for 8:00 P. M.

W. W. Rostow

(memo not sent to Pres because it was cleared by phone at 4:45 p. m.)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority WJ 91-484

By rs/jap, NARA, Date 3-5-93

19

INFORMATION

**SECRET/EYES ONLY**

Thursday, October 31, 1968  
2:45 p. m.

*Per file*

Mr. President:

You will be interested in the  
red sidelined passage from this latest  
from Dick Helms.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989  
By rg, NARA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rln

ACTION

11

Thursday, October 31, 1968 - 12:50 pm

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

President Tito has sent a letter to you which his Ambassador has asked to deliver personally. The letter probably concerns United States-Yugoslav relations in the light of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

If you cannot receive the Ambassador, the State Department will ask him to deliver the Tito letter to the Department. However, a very brief appointment would be sufficient, and would be highly valued by the Yugoslavs.

W. W. Rostow

Set up an appointment \_\_\_\_\_

Attempt to obtain the letter otherwise \_\_\_\_\_

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, Oct. 31, 1968  
11:50 a. m.~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MR. PRESIDENT:

Suppose Thieu does not go along today. I suggest that you consider the following:

-- first, have in Nixon alone. Give him the evidence -- of which we have an important additional item -- that the South Vietnamese are thinking that they can turn down this deal and get a better deal after the election. While sharing the information with Nixon, tell him flatly that you are confident that he has had nothing whatsoever to do with this;

-- then give him the views of Abrams, the JCS, etc., on the deal;

-- then give him the evidence that Hanoi may in fact be thinking of winding up the war very quickly indeed;

-- you might remind him of the trouble that President Eisenhower Vice President Nixon, and Sect. Dulles had when Syngman Rhee kicked up his heels towards the end of the Korean war;

-- finally, tell him that it is your considered judgment that if it becomes known that Thieu is holding up a deal which would lower U. S. casualties and bring peace near, the basis in the United States for support of the enterprise would dissipate:

-- in the government, including the military who are "disgusted;"

-- in the Congress, even among pro-Vietnam leaders;

-- in our public.

We simply cannot let these inexperienced men snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

Therefore, you would ask him to join in a private message to Thieu, with the other candidates, along the following lines:

"We, the three Presidential candidates in the United States, have been kept fully informed on what the U. S. Government has been seeking in the negotiations in Paris.

"We have just been briefed by the President and other responsible officials of the Government, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 71C 991-484  
By 19/12/, NARA, Date 3-5-93

convinced that what has been negotiated in Paris is exactly what the President told us he intended to achieve.

"We are also convinced that the consultations with your Government have been full and candid and the President had reason to believe that he could proceed with the support of the responsible leaders of the Government of Vietnam.

"We believe it would be most ill-advised, under these circumstances, for your Government not to participate in the Paris talks promptly. We believe the American people will not understand what will appear as an effort to protract the war at a time when movement towards peace with honor may be possible. The bases for Congressional and public support for Vietnam in the United States might be gravely weakened. /s/ Nixon, Humphrey, Wallace"

W. W. Rostow

13

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

Thursday, October 31, 1968 - 11:50 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Attached are two documents:

1. President Thieu's older brother told [redacted] that he believed that it would be better to deal with the next President, no matter who is elected, on issues pertaining to the peace conference. [redacted] according to rumors, the U. S. did not expect President Thieu to take such a stubborn attitude.

*not attached*

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs

2. South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thanh told the Advisory Council on October 30 that Ambassador Bunker was not "pressuring" President Thieu to accept an unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. This Council, composed of labor, academic, legislative, and religious leaders is being consulted on Bunker's negotiations with Thieu.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-138  
By *nd*, NARA, Date 6-2-03

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

[REDACTED]

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13a

31 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow ✓  
Special Assistant to the President


The Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: 30 October meeting of GVN Advisory  
Council on Peace and Negotiations

[REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)

1. Foreign Minister Tran Chanh Thanh assured members of the Advisory Council on Peace and Negotiations on 30 October that U. S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker was not "pressuring" President Thieu into accepting an unconditional cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Thanh added that "certainly" there would be reciprocity for any such bombing halt. Thanh spoke in reply to questions from several members of the Council, who described themselves as "disturbed" by reports that Bunker was pressuring Thieu into accepting an unconditional bombing halt.

2. Thanh had convened the meeting on short notice to ask Council members to exercise utmost discretion in their remarks on the negotiations, and to insist that Council deliberations be handled with utmost secrecy. "With or without a bombing halt," said Thanh, "this is the time for discretion." Thanh assured Council members that as soon as there were any significant developments in the negotiations, he would convoke them at no matter what hour of the day or night. Thanh then turned the meeting over to Nguyen Trieu Dan, a senior official of the Foreign Ministry who serves as Vietnamese liaison to the International Control Commission,

**SANITIZED****E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4****NJ 94-209**By WJ, NARA, Date 2-2-95

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

who spoke from a prepared text of some 12 pages on what the GVN saw as its own responsibilities in preparing for the negotiations, and on what the Vietnamese delegation to the eventual peace talks should be prepared for.

3. Vietnamese Confederation of Labor President Tran Quoc Buu then suggested that the GVN should create a "National Committee for Peace" as the logical successor to the present Advisory Council, such a committee to be composed of officially appointed representatives of the Cabinet, ARVN, both Houses of the National Assembly, religious groups, labor unions, and other mass organizations. The proposal was well received by Advisory Council members. Thanh said he also found the idea a good one, and stated that he would convey it to President Thieu.

4. Others present for the meeting included Senators Tran Van Lam and Dang Van Sung, lawyers Tran Thanh Hiep and Vuong Van Bac, Judge Nguyen Huy Dau, Tran Van Tuyen, and Professor Tran Van Kein.

Pres file  
14

Thursday, Oct. 31, 1968  
11:35 a. m.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith draft materials for a press backgrounder which we have assembled from the briefing paper prepared for the Presidential candidates and the Congressional Leadership. Material too sensitive even for a press backgrounder has been cleared out.

I am making this draft available to Sect. Rusk, Sect. Clifford, and General Wheeler, while telling them that it in no sense has the President's clearance. I told them that you would be in touch to give your own direction.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (SECRET/NODIS press backgrounder)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712991-484

By ry/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-95

14a

SECRET/NODIS

October 31, 1968 - RNG

PRESS BACKGROUNDER

At San Antonio a year ago, President Johnson said that we were prepared to stop the bombing of North Vietnam when we had reason to believe that this would lead to prompt productive discussions under the assumption that the North Vietnamese would not take advantage of our restraint.

On March 31, the President ordered a cessation of bombing north of the 20th parallel.

When the talks began in May, Ambassador Harriman was instructed to tell the North Vietnamese that the U. S. was prepared to stop the bombing over the rest of North Vietnam if the North Vietnamese would not take advantage of us and would promptly enter into serious discussions.

For many weeks the North Vietnamese refused to discuss what they might do after a bombing cessation. They insisted that any bombing halt must be unconditional, and they refused to discuss any "reciprocity" on their part.

In late June we put forward a specific complex proposal under which we might have stopped the bombing in return for an explicit understanding on certain theoretical "reciprocal" or "balanced" subsequent actions. These included respect for the DMZ, no attacks on major cities and GVN presence which was necessary for serious talks.

The North Vietnamese consistently rejected both the framework and the contents of this proposal.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 72-91-484  
By NS/inf, NARA, Date 3-5-13

In the late July and early August period, we took note of the low level of military activity in South Vietnam, although all the military evidence pointed to its being simply preparatory to another offensive in August. We followed up all leads to see if there was any authoritative North Vietnamese statement that the lull had political significance, and above all that it was meant as an indication of further military restraint. Lacking any such authoritative statement from any quarter, we rejected throughout this period any thought of acting on the basis of the lull alone. Apart from other factors, we recognized that to do so would not leave anywhere near the clear record we required on just what military restraints would be expected of Hanoi, nor would we have had the necessary express agreement on the GVN presence. The judgment was clear, that, if we had stopped at this point, we would have faced the August offensive, in all probability, and a long wrangle over GVN participation -- which would have got nowhere.

We told them that the President simply could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace. A cessation of bombing which would be followed by

-- abuses of the DMZ,

-- Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks on cities or such populated areas as provincial capitals.

-- or a refusal of the authorities in Hanoi to enter promptly into serious political discussions which included the elected government of the Republic of Vietnam, could simply not be sustained.

Meanwhile, the President discussed our three points with Ambassador Harriman, whom he saw on September 17, and with Ambassador Vance, whom he saw on October 3. Both fully understood our position.

However, about October 9, the North Vietnamese asked questions probing whether we might be ready to stop the bombing if they agreed firmly to have the GVN at the table under the "your side/our side" formula that we had repeatedly explained. We responded that this could make a decisive difference, while reiterating our military points on the DMZ and the major cities.

At a meeting in Paris on October 11, the Hanoi delegation put to us this question: Would we stop the bombing when we had a clear answer to the question of GVN participation as a party to the negotiations that would follow a cessation of the bombing?

After underlining our other two positions -- on the DMZ and the cities -- Harriman said he would have to refer the question to Washington.

At this point we consulted Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams, asking them their frank views on an instruction to Harriman which would demand a prior agreement on GVN participation -- and an understanding of what would be required to continue a bombing cessation: namely, that the DMZ be respected and the South Vietnamese cities not be attacked.

They responded as follows: "General Abrams and I interpret the exchange with Hanoi as a fairly clear indication that Hanoi is ready for a tactical shift from the battlefield to the conference table. We concur in the instruction to Harriman and Vance, and believe Hanoi will give indications that it finds paragraph one (GVN participation) 'acceptable,' and paragraphs two and three (DMZ and the cities) 'understandable.' We would regard such a response as meeting our essential requirements for a cessation of the bombing."

In addition, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams provided a careful and considered appreciation of the North Vietnamese situation and why they might now be willing to accept the arrangement -- what they might then do, and how we should proceed to handle it. I have copies of this appreciation available if you wish to read it.

On this basis, we went to President Thieu. He said "so long as we are going to press the offensive in the South and in Laos, and so long as we are prepared to resume the bombing if they violate the DMZ or attack the main cities," he is ready to go along. "After all," he said, "the problem is not to stop the bombing, but to stop the war, and we must try this path to see if they are serious."

On Monday morning, October 14, Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler, just back from Europe, were briefed along with Mr. Helms and General Maxwell Taylor. It was the strong recommendation of Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, and General Wheeler that we should interpret

the shift in Hanoi's position as representing a possibility of serious movement towards peace. They believed that the risks were low and manageable. Mr. Helms and General Taylor concurred.

At 1:30 p.m. on Monday, October 14, the President met with all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They went over the same ground. The President polled the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually. They concurred unanimously.

We then consulted the other troop contributing countries. They all supported the course of action that President Thieu and I had agreed was wise.

We then instructed Harriman and Vance to put the proposition to the North Vietnamese, including a meeting with the GVN present "the next day." They had earlier said substantive discussions could start the day after the bombing cessation.

At this point Hanoi balked. They said the next day was impossible.

We have just had two weeks of very hard negotiations in which Hanoi sought the following:

-- First, a communique in which we accepted the concept that a bombing halt was "unconditional";

-- Second, a period of -- at first -- "weeks", then two weeks; then one week between the bombing halt and the first meeting with the GVN present.

-- Third, a statement about the subsequent talks which would elevate them to being a "four-power conference." This was designed to inflate the status of the NLF and greatly embarrass Saigon.

On our side we insisted that -- although we did not plan to have representatives of the government talk about "conditions" -- we would not sign a document which said the bombing halt was "unconditional."

In a meeting in Paris on Sunday afternoon, October 27, we achieved a breakthrough.

Sunday evening we reviewed the situation from every possible angle and concluded that Hanoi had fully met our position. Before taking this significant step, the President wanted to reassure himself that this step would in no way place our fighting men at a military disadvantage.

Tuesday, General Abrams gave him that assurance.

ALTERNATE A

Accordingly, Ambassador Bunker informed President Thieu that the United States was now prepared to act on the basis of the understanding reached in Paris. We sought his concurrence on Monday.

After meeting with his advisors Tuesday and Wednesday, President Thieu informed us this morning that the Government of South Vietnam was also prepared to act on the basis of the understanding.

The essence is that we will stop all air, naval, and artillery bombardment, and all other acts involving the use of force against North Vietnam as of 7 a.m. tomorrow, November 1st.

We have agreed that a meeting dealing with the substantive issues will be held in Paris on November 6th.

ALTERNATE B

After meeting with his advisors Tuesday and Wednesday, President Thieu informed us that his government simply could not get its delegation to Paris in time for talks on the 2nd or even by the 4th.

Accordingly, we have informed him that the United States will stop the bombing at 7 a.m. tomorrow, November 1st, since Hanoi has agreed to the conditions which we had negotiated on the basis of our prior consultations with President Thieu. Since his government required additional time to prepare for serious talks, we have proposed to Hanoi that meetings on substantive issues begin on November 6th. Hanoi has accepted, and we hope that the representatives of the Government of South Vietnam will be able to join with us on that date or shortly thereafter.

We have informed President Thieu that in any talks prior to the arrival of his representatives, we will try to work out details of procedure after consultation with him. Any discussion of substantive issues at this time will be limited to issues of primary concern to us and to Hanoi.

Let me summarize the understanding which we have reached with Hanoi.

-- Hanoi has agreed to begin serious talks toward peace in Vietnam --

talks which would include representatives of the Government of South Vietnam.

- We have made it clear to them that a continuation of the bombing cessation was dependent, first, on respect for the DMZ, and second, upon there being no attacks on the cities.
- The Soviet Union, which has played a part in this negotiation, knows these circumstances intimately. Their understanding has been reaffirmed at the highest level in the last few days.
- Both Hanoi and Moscow are clear that we shall continue reconnaissance of North Vietnam. That is why we agreed to stop only acts of force and not acts of war.

Hanoi has stated that the NLF would be present for these talks. Frankly, this fact is a matter of great concern to the Government and people of South Vietnam. They fear that the Communists will make every effort in the negotiations to gain status for the NLF equal to that of the GVN.

That fear is not unfounded.

We all know that the NLF is a wholly owned subsidiary of Hanoi -- the southern branch of the Communist Party of North Vietnam.

We have always said that their views could be heard, but this in no way implies recognition or that we regard the NLF as a separate entity.

It is our objective judgment -- and that of our military and civil representatives in Saigon -- that the South Vietnamese have nothing to fear and everything to gain in these negotiations.

They have a Constitutional government recognized by a host of other governments.

They have a million men under arms, gaining ground, gaining confidence every day, with modern equipment flowing into their hands.

They have survived the worst the enemy could mount against them this year and are stronger than they were at Tet.

They have five allies fighting at their side.

There is a separate question involved: How can the people of South Vietnam -- including those now fighting for the Viet Cong -- be brought into the society of South Vietnam?

As the President said in Canberra, this is a problem which the South Vietnamese have to solve. President Thieu pointed the way at Honolulu when he said that all those who give up their arms and agree to abide by the Constitution shall have the right to vote and the right to run for office.

That is where we stand.

It is the universal judgment of our diplomatic and military authorities that North Vietnam's acceptance of GVN participation is a major event -- potentially setting the stage for an honorable settlement of the war. Many experts felt Hanoi would never do this. Until now Hanoi has endlessly repeated they would never talk to the Thieu government. But there can be no settlement without the assent of the constitutional government of Vietnam in Saigon. We have consistently maintained that position, because the whole purpose of our involvement in this conflict required that the people of South Vietnam participate in deciding their own destiny.

As for the DMZ and the cities, we expect that they will act on their understanding that the continuance of the bombing cessation is dependent on their restraint. It is important that we not talk publicly about these two understandings as formal "conditions". But you should know that we are thoroughly prepared to respond if they violate those conditions. General Abrams has standing orders which he believes will protect his forces and our allies at the DMZ, should a violation be attempted.

The agreement at which we have arrived is, then, precisely the one which we have been seeking in recent months. We have given away nothing to reach this agreement. It is wholly consistent with the President's public statements.

I would like to cover three other points with you before closing my remarks.

First, as to why the other side has been willing to move toward an agreement at this time.

A number of factors may have affected their position:

- The fact that the constitutional government of South Vietnam has grown increasingly stronger since the Tet offensive.
- The expansion of South Vietnam's armed forces to the point where a million men are under arms, and the steady improvement of their performance.

-- The tremendous effectiveness of our own troops, under General Westmoreland and General Abrams -- harassing the enemy, keeping him off balance, and inflicting extremely heavy casualties on his forces.

Any or all of these factors may have persuaded North Vietnam to yield on the vital point of South Vietnamese participation in the talks.

Second, as to the situation on the ground in Vietnam.

During the past few weeks, the enemy has moved a good many of his forces out of I Corps and certain other areas of South Vietnam.

He has done this before, but there are elements in his current withdrawal that are worth noting.

The first is the rather large number of troops involved in the withdrawal.

The second is the distance involved in the withdrawal -- considerably further than on previous occasions.

It is possible that they are merely re-fitting and re-supplying for further assaults. And we do not read into this any sign that the enemy is ready to quit. Standing alone, the mere fact that they have withdrawn some forces -- leaving more than 80,000 still in South Vietnam -- was not sufficient to cause us to halt the bombing.

So we continued to press our points in the Paris talks. It was Hanoi's movement toward those points -- including its agreement to the participation of South Vietnam -- that was decisive in our judgment that the bombing could be stopped.

It may develop that the withdrawal of some enemy forces from South Vietnam is connected with their movement in Paris. If so, that is all to the good. If not -- if they are merely getting ready for new attacks on the cities and do in fact launch new attacks -- we will respond vigorously, and I assure you, effectively.

Third, let me speak of the timing of this decision.

In the first place, we had no control over the movement of North Vietnam in these talks. For a very long time now they have been adamantly refusing to agree to South Vietnam's participation. Now they have yielded on this critically important element. I have suggested some of the reasons that may have affected their opinion on this.

If the President declined to respond to this movement because of its proximity to the election, there is no way of knowing whether it would be possible to get this good a result later on.

His responsibilities as President, and Commander in Chief, require him to conduct our foreign policy in such a way as to forward our interest in an honorable peace.

In performing these responsibilities, he has not been guided by political considerations. That should be obvious. He declined to take part in the political race this year because he did not want to involve the pursuit of peace in partisan politics.

People in his own Party and in the Republican Party have urged him to stop the bombing long before now. He did not do so because the

understandings -- that we have now achieved in Paris -- did not exist until now. And he would have earned the praise of some by stopping the bombing before achieving those understandings. But in conscience he could not do so.

He may be charged with partisanship now, by some who do not understand the facts I have told you today, because he has stopped the bombing shortly before the election. But in conscience he felt that he could have done nothing else.

He could not have sacrificed this opportunity to go forward in search for peace.

Make no mistake about it. We don't have peace yet. If the last few months tell us anything, it is that we shall not reach a peace settlement overnight. But we shall keep trying. There will be no letup in our military pressure in South Vietnam while we seek to persuade the enemy that a genuine peace with political competition is a better alternative than military conflict.

Both General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker fully support the action we are now taking. They regard the recent exchanges with Hanoi "as a fairly clear indication that Hanoi is ready for a tactical shift from the battlefield to the conference table."

Let me share with you how the situation looks to them in South Vietnam:

"There has been a steady deterioration in Hanoi's position in South Vietnam ever since the military defeats which overtook their general offensive at Tet, and again May/June. The August/September offensive could not even be got off the ground and was the weakest of all three attacks. After ten months of enormous effort, Hanoi and the NLF have nothing to show for the loss of over 150,000 killed, plus the thousands killed by B-52 and other air attacks, or who died of wounds or disease, or were captured, or defected, or were eliminated by arrest.

"At the same time Hanoi has seen the emergence in the South of a stronger and more confident government under Thieu and Huong; a stronger and more effective and aggressive South Vietnamese military and para-military force; a growing bitterness and hostility toward Communism among the people; and arming of the people themselves in the Civilian Self-Defense Corps. There have been no mass defections to the Communists from the Nationalist side in the South -- civil or military.

"We have been gradually accumulating evidence since about April/May that Communist supporters and cadres in military and civilian ranks were beginning to doubt victory and to lose faith in their leaders. More

and more time of the leaders in recent weeks has been devoted to maintaining faith in victory and to overcoming the argument that the South Vietnamese and their allies are 'too strong to be attacked.

Moreover, the NLF has been having more and more trouble recruiting in the South as people left controlled or threatened areas for government-controlled areas, and as the government increased its mobilization and deprived the Communists of manpower resources.

"The loss of southern-born cadres was particularly worrying, as these cadres were shifted in large number from guerrilla, proselytizing and civil work into the regular forces, where they were chewed up in battle. Others deserted, or were killed, captured, arrested or defected. The 75/25 ratio of southern to northern troops in the regular forces was reversed within the year, and could not be concealed. As husbands, sons and brothers left their hamlets not to be seen or heard from again and there were no signs of peace, restiveness and resistance began to be reported in some Communist-controlled areas.

"Beginning with Khe Sanh, our B-52 strikes became a devastating tactical weapon. These strikes and other air bombing of the Northern Panhandle, in new bombing patterns and designs, have significantly constrained the movement of supplies through the DMZ and into Laos. This, and the wholesale uncovering of caches in the last couple of months -- a product of improved intelligence, greater cooperation of the people in the countryside, and information supplied by POW's and defectors -- have created supply difficulties for the enemy.

"A record number of enemy battalions were withdrawn into North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the last days of September and early October, signifying an end to the 'third offensive.' We therefore conclude that Hanoi has had to seek a respite on both military and morale grounds.

"We expect that the NVA/VC will try to intensify the fighting as the serious negotiations start, but we do not think they have a capability for sustained action during the next two or three months and will need that time to rebuild their supply base.

"We do not want to leave the impression that we think the war is over or that the North Vietnam or Viet Cong forces are about to collapse. Their fanatical faith in the rightness of their cause, the fear of reprisal and retribution in both the South and the North in the event of defeat, the professionalism of men who have made revolution their life and career, the extraordinary investment of lives and hope over so many years, the tradition of discipline, and the Asian, coupled with Communist, indifference to lives, all suggest that Hanoi and the NLF will continue to fight with undiminished fervor.

"Up to now Hanoi's political effort has been secondary to its military effort as Hanoi sought a military breakthrough. What we now expect is that the major effort will shift to the political front, with the military in a secondary and supporting role. We believe that there will be very heavy fighting up to the time a cease-fire is arranged or other steps are agreed to diminish the conflict."

After careful consultation within the government, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ambassador Harriman was given the following instruction:

"To make arrangements with the North Vietnamese representatives for prompt and serious substantive talks looking towards peace in Vietnam, in the course of which an understanding may be negotiated on a cessation of bombing in the North under circumstances which would not be militarily disadvantageous. "

Ambassador Harriman was further instructed:

"In any substantive discussions we expect to take account of the interests of the South Vietnamese Government and of our Manila allies. Participation in any such discussions affecting South Vietnam must not exclude the Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. "

14c

(10/31/68)

We have, of course, been examining this latest move of Hanoi and the Soviets from every conceivable point of view.

It is impossible to say in advance whether Hanoi wants seriously to negotiate a compromise, or is using this latest move only as a means of getting the bombing stopped knowing that it will be difficult to resume later, either by the President or his successor. One can argue that Hanoi may have both these objectives in mind, and they will move in whichever direction they think holds out the greatest hope of gain for them.

We think Hanoi's decision to agree to the GVN entering the discussions is of the greatest significance. It suggests that Hanoi has abandoned all hope of a military victory or of a unilateral U. S. withdrawal by the next Administration. If this is so, Hanoi's alternatives are to try to negotiate a settlement on a basis most favorable to them, or to return to protracted guerrilla warfare. On balance we think that at the outset, at least, Hanoi will enter these negotiations with serious purpose.

We think their negotiating objectives will be:

- a. cease-fire in place;
- b. mutual withdrawal of forces; and
- c. coalition government.

We think they will put these forward early in the negotiations. All three are simple conceptions with strong propaganda features from their point of view, and each is designed to give us trouble. Since we are not going to agree on simple conceptions such as these, we must expect extended negotiations while we hammer out solutions which are acceptable to us and the GVN. We will be working up proposals to handle each of these.

Our relative bargaining positions, assuming the wider talks start in a week or so, will be important. Both our short- and long-term bargaining positions are strong. The VC/NVA can do little damage with their regular forces during the next two or three months which they need for rest and resupply. As for the long term, Hanoi threw everything they could into this year's offensives, and failed. We do not see how they can make a greater effort or even a comparable one again.

On the other hand, they are strongly entrenched in the VC-controlled areas, where they control about 3700 hamlets, and another 3900 hamlets are contested. We will have to pay a price to extend our power into these areas, for the VC are good at guerrilla and irregular force fighting on their home grounds. However, it is what we must now do. Fighting defensively, they will try to make any extension of our control as costly as possible for us. This is where they will concentrate their military effort as the wider negotiations start. As we push against them in these areas, which we mean to do, they will resist and there will be heavy fighting of the ambush and

guerrilla type. We must also expect sabotage and guerrilla-type activity in the cities.

Meantime they will be negotiating in all seriousness for as much as possible of the three objectives listed above.

We do not think it possible to fix in advance, even in rough terms, the length of the interval that should be allowed before we consider whether Hanoi is serious or whether a bombing resumption is called for. We think we should have a pretty clear picture of Hanoi's intentions in a month or two, particularly if the negotiating meetings are frequent. By the end of the year, we should also have a pretty good idea of the morale of VC/NVA forces as well as our ability to move into and establish ourselves in the contested areas.

Our main problems as we see them will be to justify to the Congress and the American people our unwillingness to agree to a cease-fire in place and our opposition to a coalition, or, to put it in another way, justifying to the American public further casualties while we negotiate for a successful outcome of our enormous effort here.

We believe here that 1968 -- however difficult it was for us -- has been a disaster for Hanoi. We must convince the American people that the tide has turned in our favor, and we can only do this if we can show progress in moving into contested areas, rising defections from the Communist ranks, heavy Communist casualties, comparatively light casualties on our side, withdrawal of some American units, the takeover of more and more of the war by ARVN, etc. That will also be convincing to Hanoi, and will determine their negotiating tactics.

When the GVN joins the talks, we must insist on closed sessions, or closed along with open sessions, otherwise we cannot regard the talks as serious. Given the complexity of the problems and the strong bargaining cards that each side holds, with the best will in the world, we think it is likely to take some months to produce solutions and agreements, and indeed we may be in negotiations for a very long time.

Maintaining the morale, fighting spirit and momentum of US and ARVN forces is absolutely essential. Directives have gone out on the US and GVN side to intensify our offensive operations against infrastructure guerrillas and local forces in order to extend government control, at the same time maintaining unrelenting pressure against his main forces. It is an offensive against the enemy "system."

We are planning now the form and shape of a message to the troops if an announcement is made. This message will be critically important to establishing a positive atmosphere. It will be tied to the results of our operations so far and the offensive described above. We will disseminate it in a massive effort.

We are completely confident that the morale, fighting spirit and momentum can be sustained.

The basic rules of engagement should include the following:

a. Every commander will retain the inherent right and responsibility to conduct operations for the self-defense of his forces.

b. In case of attack by fire or ground attacks by small units (up to a battalion in size) across the demarcation line, the Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, should have the authority to conduct a timely and adequate response against the attacking force, to include destruction of enemy forces penetrating across the line. No US ground forces would cross the line without specific orders from the highest authority. It is envisaged that small ground probes would be counteracted by response in kind, but of decisive superiority.

c. Enemy artillery fire would be responded to with heavy counter-battery fire and air attack until enemy weapons are silenced. In case surface-to-air missiles are fired at our aircraft, we would destroy his surface-to-air missile installations and immediate supporting facilities.

d. In case of substantial or general attacks across the demarcation line by ground (including artillery) or air action requiring response going beyond local action, authorization of highest authority would be sought immediately for such action, including resumption of the bombardment of North Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION/INFORMATION

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 20 #298

By JC NARA, Date 3-8-02

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 31, 1968 -- 11:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Herewith the state of the Phantom deal.

1. Sec. Rusk instructed Hart to ask Rabin to come in with a draft agreement.
2. The Israelis are coming back this morning with their draft.
3. The Pentagon is determined, unless instructed to the contrary by the President, to link the Phantom deal to hard nuclear assurances to the U. S.

Sec. Rusk told me that what he has in mind is not forcing the Israeli hand on the NPT by getting them to sign on to the U. S. that they will not produce or accept nuclear weapons.

The Pentagon will not even discuss technical details with the Israelis until they get the nuclear assurances. Therefore, I suggest that you:

-- Talk with Sec. Rusk and get his recommendation as to how we proceed in the light of what Rabin brings to Hart this morning; and

-- After that conversation, talk with Clark Clifford and give him an instruction as to how to proceed with the technical talks with respect to timing and to prior conditions, if any.

Abe Fineberg called me about this, underlining the Pentagon problem in broad terms.

W. W. Rostow

*P. S. Amb Rabin also called to ask if the President had made a "policy decision". I told him I was reporting the situation to the President.*

WWRostow:rln

*W*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/ Thurs., Oct. 31, 1968  
MARIA THREE 11:20 a. m.

16 Pres  
file

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is an interesting French message  
from Hanoi on prospects for Hanoi-  
Peking relations as we look ahead.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/ MARIA THREE attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-208  
By ujg, NARA, Date 4-26-95



Department of State

5 16a  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-210  
By WJ, NARA, Date 10-27-94

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23207

MODIS/MARIA THREZ

Rostow

SUBJ: EASTERN EUROPEANS SPECULATE ON CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD DRV

1. SOURCE GAVE POL COUNSELOR FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HANOI DATED OCT 23:

2. BEGIN TRANSLATION:

SOCIALIST DIPLOMATS IN HANOI FOLLOW CLOSELY RELATIONS BETWEEN HANOI AND PEKING. THEY BELIEVE THAT CHINA MIGHT BRING NEW PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE DRV IN ORDER TO CAUSE THE BREAKDOWN OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF BOMBINGS WHICH WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. THESE EASTERN EUROPEAN CIRCLES BELIEVE THAT AS THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE BECOME MORE REAL, CHINA WILL BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE ON HANOI AND THE VIETNAMESE WOULD HAVE PROGRESSIVELY MORE DIFFICULTY PRESERVING THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION AND PERHAPS EVEN THEIR INDEPENDENCE.

A POLISH DIPLOMAT RECENTLY TALKED TO ONE OF MY STAFF MEMBERS ALONG THIS LINE. THE CHINESE, THE POLISH DIPLOMAT SAID, WANT THE CONFLICT TO CONTINUE. THEY THEREFORE DECLARE THAT A SOLUTION CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED THROUGH MILITARY VICTORY AND REJECT AS ABSURD ANY COMPROMISE RESULTING FROM NEGOTIATIONS. MORE THAN EVER THE CHINESE ARE FAVORABLE TO PURSUING THE STRUGGLE "UNTIL THE LAST VIETNAMESE". FURTHERMORE, WHEN HANOI HAD AGREED TO OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS IN PARIS, EVEN THEN THE CHINESE TRIED--WITHOUT SUCCESS--TO SCUTTLE THEM.

SINCE MAY 13, CHINESE STATEMENTS PERHAPS CONTRIBUTED TO THE STALEMATE IN THE TALKS BUT THEY DID NOT BRING ABOUT THEIR BREAKDOWN. EVERYTHING MAKES ONE BELIEVE THAT THE REALISM OF THE VIETNAMESE LEADERS WILL PERMIT THEM TO OBTAIN VERY SOON FROM THE AMERICANS THE TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBINGS NORTH OF THE 17TH PARALLEL. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE MOMENT TO KNOW WHAT HANOI WILL OFFER IN EXCHANGE BUT NEVERTHELESS IT SEEMS THAT THIS NEW STEP WILL BE TAKEN SOON.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 PARIS 23207 Oct 31, 1968

IF BOMBINGS ARE HALTED, ONE CAN EXPECT THAT PEKING WILL NOT RELAX ITS PRESSURE. ON THE CONTRARY, PEKING WILL INTENSIFY ITS PRESSURE. QUESTION IS THEREFORE WHAT CAN PEKING DO. THE REDUCTION OF ITS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE OR PREVENTING THE TRANSIT OF AID GRANTED BY OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE TWO WEAPONS WHICH CAN BOOMERANG AND WHICH PEKING CAN ONLY USE WITH CAUTION. ~~EFFORTS TO COME FROM WITHIN OR EVEN A MILITARY COOPERATION WOULD PROBABLY MEET WITH ARMED RESISTANCE ON THE PART OF NORTH VIETNAMESE. IT WOULD ALSO SERIOUSLY DAMAGE CHINESE PRESTIGE IN THE WORLD. IT IS THEREFORE DIFFICULT TO PROJECT WHAT WILL HAPPEN ONCE PEACE HAS BEEN CONCEDED, BUT IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT THEN FOR HANOI TO ESCAPE THE INFLUENCE OF ITS NEIGHBOR TO THE NORTH THAN IT WAS ABLE TO DO WHILE THE FIGHTING WAS GOING ON.~~

~~A SIMILAR OPINION WAS EXPRESSED TO ME BY THE MAURITANIAN AMBASSADOR WHO CAME HERE SOME DAYS AGO TO PRESENT HIS LETTERS OF CREDENCE. MR. MOHAMED ABDALLAH OULD KHARCHY BELIEVES THAT THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO SOLVE FOR VIETNAM THAN THOSE OF WAR. NOTABLY IT WILL NO LONGER BE POSSIBLE FOR HANOI TO ARGUE THAT IN VIEW OF THE WAR IT CANNOT TAKE SIDES IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEKING. THE LATTER CAPITAL, HOLDING THE BEST TRUMP CARDS BECAUSE OF ITS GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY TO VIETNAM AND ITS OVERWHELMING POWER, WILL WIN OUT OVER MOSCOW REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE WAR CONTINUES OR WHETHER THE WAR STOPS.~~

THIS LATTER OPINION (DE QUIRIELLE WRITES) SHOULD BE MODERATED IN MY OPINION BY THE LESSONS WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE PAST. ~~THE VIETNAMESE CAN--AS THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO UNTIL NOW--CONTINUE TO RESIST THEIR POWERFUL NEIGHBOR WITHOUT BREAKING WITH PEKING BY COMBINING FLEXIBILITY WITH FIRMNESS IN THEIR POLICY TOWARD CHINA. END TRANSLATION.~~

GP-1 SHRIVER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

17

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Thursday, October 31, 1968 -- 11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

General Wheeler conveyed the following to Gen. Ginsburgh on the telephone, after the JCS meeting.

The JCS have just met for about an hour.

They feel that military risks are perfectly acceptable.

Their main concern is the continued viability of the GVN -- which they realize is also a White House concern.

They feel that, nevertheless, we must proceed on the basis of our agreement with the DRV.

Nevertheless, they will support the President, regardless.

(They do need the 12 hours.)

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 72091-484  
By rg/lip, NARA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rln ~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

INFORMATION

**SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS**

Thursday, October 31, 1968  
11:15 a. m.

*from file*

Mr. President:

Herewith an interim report of what has been going on in Saigon. The wrangle continues unresolved but Bunker is still in there fighting, armed by your letters.

W. W. Rostow

**SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS**

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71CJ 91-484

By rg/wsp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rln

18a

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS~~

October 31, 1968 - 10:00 a.m.

Ambassador Bunker's Aide Gave me the Following Information on the Secure Phone

1. The SVN National Security Council convened at 4:00 p.m. Saigon time (3:00 a.m. EST).
2. At 8:20 p.m. (7:20 am. EST) presumably after the NSC had recessed, Ambassador Bunker was asked to go to the Palace to see Foreign Minister Thanh.
3. Subsequently at about 10:15 Saigon time (9:15 EST) Bunker requested and obtained a meeting with President Thieu which is now going on.
4. Bunker called from the meeting to request delivery to him of President Johnson's letter to Thieu, which was sent over immediately.
5. At the meeting with Thieu which is now going on Ambassador Bunker was also advised by our Embassy of President Thieu's remarks at the ceremony for Unknown Soldiers, which occurred at a village ten miles out of Saigon at about mid-day after Bunker's last meeting with Thieu in the morning. The Embassy officer did not know Bunker's view of Thieu's remarks at the ceremony (see AP 187).
6. The Embassy does not have confirmation of the radio reports that Lam is returning to Saigon from Paris.
7. The Embassy officer confirmed that Saigon had received 8 rocket or mortar rounds in the last hour or two of which three were duds. There were two or three casualties, all Vietnamese.
8. There are also reports which the Embassy has received of a limited amount of arms fire in Saigon at the present but none of the reports have been confirmed as an actual combat situation.

*Ben*  
Benjamin H. Read

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 4769 84-318

By ng/asp, NARA, Date 3/5/93

Thurs., Oct. 31, 1968  
11:00 a. m.

*Pres file*

19

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the paragraph Sect. Rusk suggests in response to your telephone call to him.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

10/31/68

19a

(Dictated by Secretary Rusk)

I have kept the Presidential candidates informed of the key issues in this situation and of the basis of my own approach. Each has an interest in moving this war toward a peaceful conclusion on honorable terms and has so stated publicly. I have informed them of this present decision and have expressed my hope that they will assist in maintaining national unity on these vital matters in the weeks and months ahead.

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, October 31, 1968  
9:55 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

These intercepts (Tab A) are fascinating.

They suggest a definite decision by Hanoi to move from war to politics in South Vietnam -- "suggest" not prove.

At Tab B items on decaying enemy morale.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-114  
By me, NARA, Date 3-26-04

WWRostow:rln

20a


~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0 [redacted] R261

3.3  
(b)(1,3)

\*\*\* L A T E I T E M \*\*\*

Recent messages from NVA units in South Vietnam and Laos may indicate a general political "re-orientation/re-education" program is being undertaken. SIGINT of 24 October indicated that 8,000 troops were concentrated in the Tchepone region of Laos for political study. On 28 October, a Military Intelligence Bureau COSVN forward element [redacted] discussed political training in a message to the probable 4th Company, VC 47th COMINT Battalion. An NVA Rear Services element stated on 29 October that the re-education of their personnel must be accomplished by 5 November.



3.3  
(b)  
(1+3)

(2 [redacted] /T292-68, 280638Z) ~~(SECRET SAVIN)~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-115  
By iw, NARA, Date 2-18-05

Tab A

206

Low Morale Prevalent Among Communist Troops

18. Serious morale problems among Communist units are reflected in several documents captured recently in III Corps.

19. Allied pacification and psychological warfare activities following clear-and-hold operations caused considerable difficulties to a Communist local force unit operating east of Saigon, according to two captured reports dated 29 September and 1 October. The one document states that despite "intensive indoctrination" on Communist successes, shortages of funds and provisions together with "fierce" allied attacks adversely affected the morale of the cadre and troops.

20. The reports also claim that some of the troops doubted the effectiveness of the "general offensive" tactics and became discouraged at the prospect of a protracted war. Some troops hoped that the Paris talks would bring peace, and "dissension divided the cadre ranks." Troops also deserted or abandoned their duties, according to the document.

21. A sapper battalion operating near Saigon was criticized for "poor results" during attacks in August and September according to another captured report. These results were contrasted with the relatively greater successes achieved during the Tet and May fighting and attributed to the "unstable morale" of the majority of personnel in the unit.

22. The concern with which the Communists view low morale among their forces is suggested by captured documents outlining measures to correct the problem. One Viet Cong unit issued a plan for a propaganda campaign to be conducted between October 1968 and March 1969. The purpose of the campaign, the document states, is to promote "steadfast determination to fight and win" among Communist forces and to "intensify hatred and resentment toward the enemy" among the local population.

23. A document concerning indoctrination to prevent desertion in the Dong Ngai Regiment reflects the Communist effort. The regiment, which suffered heavy casualties during the May fighting in the Saigon area, may have had particularly severe morale problems in subsequent months.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 02-116

By id, NARA, Date 6-2-03 I-6

30 October 1968

3.4(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tak B

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] 3.4(b)(1)

24. The document instructs cadre to convince the troops that difficulties and hardships will be only temporary and to "consolidate a strong belief in victory." Unit leaders must keep a close watch on their troops. In order to keep morale up, "particular attention should be paid to following the daily activities, attitudes, talks and arguments of all members, and action should be taken to prevent the dissemination of rumors which may affect the morale of the troops."

25. Despite such efforts, the morale of Communist troops will continue to be significantly affected by the course of the war. Captured documents have indicated that earlier this year some units were encouraged to believe that a Communist "final victory" was close at hand, and it probably will be more difficult to motivate these units for prolonged fighting.

21

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

*Pres file*

Thursday, October 31, 1968  
9:33 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Ky with a very hard  
and dangerous line to the South Koreans,  
as of 26 October.

He may have since been sobered.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94 208  
By mg, NARA, Date 4-26-95

21a

NNNN  
ZCZCKAED66  
PP [REDACTED]  
DE [REDACTED] 35A2215  
P 302150Z  
FM DIRNSA

~~TOP SECRET~~  
3.3(1)(3)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-115 and 14-194-413  
By 110, NARA, Date 2-18-05

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)  
ZEN

155500Z 301 001 000

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A [REDACTED]  
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.  
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

XXHH [REDACTED] PTES0108  
3/ [REDACTED] T -58  
[REDACTED]

3.3(1)(3)

VICE PRESIDENT KY EXPRESSES OPINIONS ON CONDUCT OF BOMB  
HALT [REDACTED]

XXCC  
[REDACTED] -- 29 OCT 68 [REDACTED]  
-- -- --

3.3  
(1)(3)

AT 1633 ((HOURS)) 25 OCTOBER, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] PAID A VISIT ON VICE-PRESIDENT KY  
AT THE INDEPENDENCE PALACE, AND VICE PRESIDENT KY EXPRESSED  
THE FOLLOWING OPINIONS, FROM HIS POSITION, ON THE RECENT  
SITUATION.

A. THERE CANNOT BE AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF  
BOMBING OF THE NORTH.  
B. ~~ALTHOUGH THE U.S. WANTS A BOMBING HALT IN THE INTEREST  
OF THE NUMBER OF VOTES FOR VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY, IT IS  
IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE VIETNAMESE  
GOVERNMENT), AND THERE CANNOT BE THE RUINATION OF  
[REDACTED] PERSON FOR THE SAKE OF ONE PERSON, VICE PRESIDENT  
HUMPHREY.~~

3.3  
(1)(3)

~~C. IF THE U.S. UNILATERALLY SAYS TO CEASE BOMBING  
OF THE NORTH UNCONDITIONALLY, SOUTH VIETNAM UNILATERALLY  
SHOULD BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT UNRESTRICTED BOMBING OF THE  
NORTH.~~

D. SOUTH VIETNAM WILL FIGHT THE COMMUNISTS UNTIL THE  
END.

~~E. ((SOUTH VIETNAM)) CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE NLF.  
(RECOGNITION) IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE NLF IS UNDER THE  
LEADERSHIP OF [REDACTED] AS A GROUP.~~

F. AT SUCH TIME AS WHEN WE ((SOUTH VIETNAM)) HAVE ASSUMED  
A STRONG, ANTI-COMMUNIST COURSE, FOR THE FIRST TIME THE SUPPORT  
OF ((OUR)) ALLIES WILL NOT BE IN VAIN.

3.3  
(1)(3)

[REDACTED]

XXHH  
490

22

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, October 31, 1968  
9:30 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You will wish to stare hard at  
the marked passage in this [redacted]  
[redacted] North  
Vietnamese military traffic.

3.4(b)(1,3)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-114 and NLJ 94-414  
By ms, NARA, Date 3-25-04

WWRostow:rln

DIRNSA

22a

3.3(A)(1,3)

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ FOR [REDACTED] FOR

3.3  
(A)(1,3)

((THIS IS SENSITIVE COMINT MATERIAL WHICH SHOULD BE HANDLED ON A STRICT NEED TO KNOW BASIS)).

REF NO: 37 [REDACTED] 13-68.  
ISSUED: 23 OCT 68.

VC ACTIVITY IN QUANG NGAI/PROPAGANDA REGARDING IMMINENT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES.

27 OCT 68 - [REDACTED]  
26TH OCTOBER 1968 - [REDACTED]

1. IN THE EASTERN REGION OF SON TINH/QUANG NGAI THE COMMUNISTS HAVE MOVED SOME WEAPONS, FOODSTUFFS AND DOCUMENTS TO HIDE THEM IN THE MOUNTAIN AREA IN THE WESTERN REGION OF SON TINH.
2. ALSO IN THE EASTERN REGION OF SON TINH THE COMMUNISTS FORCED A NUMBER OF YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN BETWEEN 15 AND 20 YRS OF AGE TO PREPARE FOUR RICE KILNS ((OVENS)) EACH TO BE SENT UP TO PROVINCE TO BE ASSEMBLED AND SENT NORTH ((NORTH VIETNAM)).
3. IN THE WESTERN REGION OF SON THINH THE COMMUNISTS HAVE ORGANIZED THE BUILDING OF A NUMBER OF BAKERIES AT THE CROSSROADS OF TRACKS. ACCORDING TO THEM COMMUNISTS THESE ARE TO BE USED TO BURN AMERICAN PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS ON THE DAY OF CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND A NUMBER OF THEM TO COOK FOOD TO GIVE TO MILITARY FORCES MOVING ALONG THE ROADS WHEN HOSTILITIES CEASE.
4. IN SON NAM/SON TINH/QUANG NGAI THE COMMUNISTS ARE SPREADING PROPAGANDA SAYING THAT IN THE NEAR FUTURE THERE WILL BE A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND ANYONE WHO RETURNS TO THEM BEFORE THIS HAPPENS WILL BE TREATED WITH CLEMENCY BY THE LIBERATION FORCES. AFTER THE U. S. -PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ON 7TH NOVEMBER NORTH VIETNAMESE DIVISION(S) WILL WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES THROUGH CAMBODIA BACK TO NORTH VIETNAM.

3.3  
(A)(1)(3)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAE 02-115 and NLJ 94-413  
By us, NARA, Date 2-18-05

E.O. 12958  
3.3(b)(1)(3)

23

*Pres file*

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, October 31, 1968  
9:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

The marked passage [redacted] indicates that Bui Diem now knows that the eyes of Texas are upon him.

3.4(b)(1,3)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-114 and NLJ 94-414  
By iso, NARA, Date 3-25-04

984- LB  
KALD84

KALD84

KALD84

ZCZCRAE984

.....  
3.3(6)(1)(3)

23a

TO [REDACTED] 3051055  
O 311045Z ZYH  
FM DIRNSA  
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR MCCAFFERTY)  
ZEN

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-115 and NLJ 94-43  
By no, NARA, Date 2-18-05

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A [REDACTED]  
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.  
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

3.3(6)(1,3)

VIETNAMESE

[REDACTED]  
XVHHEWFD1FTE31103  
3/C [REDACTED] -68

FRESIDENT THIEU SENT REPORT OF BUNDY-BUI DIEM TALK

XXCC

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE  
FOREIGN MINISTER.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH [REDACTED] INSTRUCTIONS [REDACTED] FILLED  
BUNDY IN ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONVERSATIONS HELD BETWEEN THE  
FOREIGN MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER. BUNDY POINTED OUT THE  
FOLLOWING:

1. AMBASSADOR LAN "MISQUOTED" ((A)) GOVERNOR HARRIMAN.
2. IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
NOW UNDERWAY, IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO LIMIT THE EXCHANGE OF  
VIEWS ON ESSENTIAL MATTERS TO SAIGON, THUS AVOIDING MISUNDERSTAND-  
INGS CAUSED BY DIFFERENT REPORTS AND INTERPRETATIONS. MOREOVER,  
AMBASSADOR BUNKER IS MORE QUALIFIED TO SERVE AS DIRECT LIAISON  
BETWEEN [REDACTED] AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON.
3. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CHANGE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S  
POSITION AS STATED IN THE U.S. THREE-POINT MEMORANDUM AND IN  
THE DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT.
4. THE ELECTIONS HAVE NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH THE  
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT [REDACTED] THERE ARE SIGNS  
THAT THE COMING ELECTIONS AND THE RUMORS OF AN IMMINENT BOMBING  
WALT HAVE MADE THE SITUATION HERE CONFUSED AND TENSE.

AS ALREADY [REDACTED] STILL IN  
TOUCH THE VARIOUS POLITICAL CIRCLES TO TRY TO FIND OUT  
((WHAT IS GOING ON)), BUT WITHOUT, HOWEVER, MAKING IT TOO OBVIOUS  
BECAUSE THE SITUATION IS DELICATE AND THERE IS MUCH DANGER OF  
MISUNDERSTANDING.

((A))  
((B))

XXHH  
359

E.O. 12958  
3.3(6)(1)(3)

24

*Pres file*

Thursday, October 31, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a suggested birthday message to Prime Minister Giovanni Leone of Italy who will be sixty on November 3.

You regularly exchanged birthday messages with his predecessor.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

Call me

*JKN*

JKN:mm

24a

Suggested Message

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Mrs. Johnson and I join all Americans in sending you greetings and best wishes on your sixtieth birthday. May the future bring happiness and good health to you and continued well-being to the people of Italy.

Sincerely,

His Excellency

Giovanni Leone

President of the Council of Ministers

Palazzo Chigi

Rome, Italy



ERF:mm

MEMORANDUM

25

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

NMCC has just informed the Situation Room that an oceanographic vessel working off the Azores has just found the sub Scorpion in some 12,000 feet of water. This is verified by photos. The Navy plans to make an announcement on this shortly.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

26

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Wednesday, October 30, 1968  
7:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the latest version of the briefing paper for the leadership and candidates.

As you will see (pages 6-9) we have alternatives depending on how the next 12 hours' business turns out.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93

October 30 1968

#3  
26a

BRIEFING PAPER

On the basis of recent developments in the Paris talks, I have just issued orders to stop the bombing of North Vietnam.

I want to give you an account of the circumstances that led up to this decision. I cannot emphasize strongly enough that what I am about to say to you must be treated in the strictest confidence.

On June 5, I received a letter from Chairman Kosygin telling me that he and his colleagues had grounds to believe that a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam could contribute to a breakthrough in the situation and produce prospects for a peaceful settlement.

After a further series of exchanges, I communicated the following to the Soviet leaders on September 15: "Setting all political arguments aside, the simple fact is that the President could not maintain a cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam unless it were very promptly evident to him, to the American people, and to our allies, that such an action was, indeed, a step toward peace. A cessation of bombing which would be followed by

-- abuses of the DMZ,

-- Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks on cities or such populated areas as provincial capitals.

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 7129 91-484

By ag/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

-- or a refusal of the authorities in Hanoi to enter promptly into serious political discussions which included the elected government of the Republic of Vietnam, could simply not be sustained."

On October 2 we were informed that a further exchange of views could prove useful. Such an exchange did take place between Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York on October 6.

Meanwhile, I discussed our three points with Ambassador Harriman, whom I saw on September 17, and with Ambassador Vance, whom I saw on October 3. Both fully understood our position.

At a meeting in Paris on October 11, the Hanoi delegation put to us this question: Would we stop the bombing when we had a clear answer to the question of GVN participation as a party in the negotiations that would follow a cessation of the bombing?

After underlining our other two positions-- on the DMZ and the cities-- Harriman said he would have to refer the question to Washington.

At this point we consulted Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams, asking them their frank views on an instruction to Harriman which would

demand a prior agreement on GVN participation -- and an understanding of what would be required to continue a bombing cessation: namely, that the DMZ be respected and the South Vietnamese cities not be attacked.

They responded as follows: "General Abrams and I interpret the exchange with Hanoi as a fairly clear indication that Hanoi is ready for a tactical shift from the battlefield to the conference table. We concur in the instruction to Harriman and Vance, and believe Hanoi will give indications that it finds paragraph one (GVN participation) 'acceptable,' and paragraphs two and three (DMZ and the cities) 'understandable.' We would regard such a response as meeting our essential requirements for a cessation of the bombing."

Meanwhile, we received through the Soviet Embassy in Paris a side message from the Hanoi delegation that they would agree to the participation of the GVN after bombing stopped.

On this basis, we went to President Thieu. He said "so long as we are going to press the offensive in the South and in Laos, and so long as we are prepared to resume the bombing if they violate the DMZ or attack the main cities," he is ready to go along. "After all," he said, "the problem is not to stop the bombing, but to stop the war,"

and we must try this path to see if they are serious."

On Monday morning, October 14, Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler, just back from Europe, were briefed along with Mr. Helms and General Maxwell Taylor. It was the strong recommendation of Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, and General Wheeler that we should interpret the shift in Hanoi's position as representing a possibility of serious movement towards peace. They believed that the risks were low and manageable. Mr. Helms and General Taylor concurred.

At 1:30 pm on Monday, October 14, I met with all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We went over the same ground. I polled the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually. They concurred unanimously.

We then consulted the other troop contributing countries. They all supported the course of action that President Thieu and I had agreed was wise.

We then instructed Harriman and Vance to put the proposition to the North Vietnamese, including a meeting with the GVN present "the next day." They had earlier said substantive discussions could start the day after the bombing cessation.

At this point Hanoi balked. They said the next day was impossible.

We have just had two weeks of very hard negotiations in which Hanoi sought the following:

-- first, a communique in which we accepted the concept that a bombing halt was "unconditional,"

-- second, a period of -- at first -- "weeks", then two weeks; then one week between the bombing halt and the first meeting with the GVN present.

-- third, a statement about the subsequent talks which would elevate them to being a "four-power conference." This was designed to inflate the status of the NLF and greatly embarrass Saigon.

On our side we insisted that -- although we did not plan to have representatives of the government talk about "conditions" -- we would not sign a document which said the bombing halt was "unconditional."

In a meeting in Paris on Sunday afternoon, October 27, we achieved a breakthrough.

Sunday evening we reviewed the situation from every possible angle and concluded that Hanoi had fully met our position. Before taking this significant step, I wanted to reassure myself that this step would in no way place our fighting men at a military disadvantage.

Tuesday General Abrams gave me that assurance.

ALTERNATE A

Accordingly, Ambassador Bunker informed President Thieu that the United States was now prepared to act on the basis of the understanding reached in Paris. We sought his concurrence on Monday.

After meeting with his advisors Tuesday and Wednesday, President Thieu informed me this morning that the Government of South Vietnam was also prepared to act on the basis of the understanding.

The essence is that we will stop all air, naval, and artillery bombardment, and all other acts involving the use of force against North Vietnam as of 7 a. m. tomorrow, November 1st.

We have agreed that a meeting dealing with the substantive issue will be held in Paris on November 6th.

ALTERNATE B

After meeting with his advisors Tuesday and Wednesday, President Thieu informed me that his government simply could not get its delegation to Paris in time for talks on the 2nd or even by the 4th.

Accordingly, I have informed him that the United States will stop the bombing at 7 a. m. tomorrow, November 1st, since Hanoi has agreed to the conditions which we had negotiated on the basis of our prior consultations with President Thieu. Since his government required additional time to prepare for serious talks, we have proposed to Hanoi that meetings on substantive issues begin on November 6th. Hanoi has accepted, and we hope that the representatives of the Government of South Vietnam will be

able to join with us on that date or shortly thereafter.

We have informed President Thieu that in any talks prior to the arrival of his representatives, we will try to work out details of procedure after consultation with him. Any discussion of substantive issues at this time will be limited to issues of primary concern to us and to Hanoi.

Let me summarize the understanding which we have reached with Hanoi.

--Hanoi has agreed to begin serious talks toward peace in Vietnam --

talks which would include representatives of the Government of South Vietnam.

-- We have made it clear to them that a continuation of the bombing cessation was dependent, first, on respect for the DMZ, and second, upon there being no attacks on the cities.

-- The Soviet Union, which has played a part in this negotiation, knows these circumstances intimately. Their understanding has been reaffirmed at the highest level in the last few days.

-- Both Hanoi and Moscow are clear that we shall continue reconnaissance of North Vietnam. That is why we agreed to stop only acts of force and not acts of war.

Hanoi has stated that the NLF would be present for these talks.

Frankly, this fact is a matter of great concern to the Government and people of South Vietnam. They fear that the Communists will make every effort in the negotiations to gain status for the NLF equal to that of the GVN.

That fear is not unfounded.

We all know that the NLF is a wholly owned subsidiary of Hanoi -- the southern branch of the Communist Party of North Vietnam.

We have always said that their views could be heard, but this in no way implies recognition or that we regard the NLF as a separate entity.

It is my objective judgment -- and that of our military and civil representatives in Saigon -- that the South Vietnamese have nothing to fear and everything to gain in these negotiations.

They have a Constitutional government recognized by a host of other governments.

They have a million men under arms, gaining ground, gaining confidence every day, with modern equipment flowing into their hands.

They have survived the worst the enemy could mount against them this year and are stronger than they were at Tet.

They have five allies fighting at their side.

There is a separate question involved: How can the people of South Vietnam -- including those now fighting for the Viet Cong -- be brought into the society of South Vietnam?

As I said in Canberra, this is a problem which the South Vietnamese have to solve. President Thieu pointed the way at Honolulu when he said that all those who give up their arms and agree to abide by the Constitution shall have the right to vote and the right to run for office.

That is where we stand.

It is the universal judgment of our diplomatic and military authorities that North Vietnam's acceptance of GVN participation is a major event -- potentially setting the stage for an honorable settlement of the war. Many experts felt Hanoi would never do this. Until now Hanoi has endlessly repeated they would never talk to the Thieu government. But there can be no settlement without the assent of the constitutional government of Vietnam in Saigon. We have consistently maintained that position, because the whole purpose of our involvement in this conflict required that the people of South Vietnam participate in deciding their own destiny.

As for the DMZ and the cities, we expect that they will act on their understanding that the continuance of the bombing cessation is dependent on their restraint. It is important that we not talk publicly about these two understandings as formal "conditions." But you should know that we are thoroughly prepared to respond if they violate those conditions. General Abrams has standing orders which he believes will protect his forces and our allies at the DMZ, should a violation be attempted.

~~A~~ 10

The agreement at which we have arrived is, then, precisely the one which -- as I have told all three Presidential candidates -- we have been seeking in recent months. We have given away nothing to reach this agreement. It is wholly consistent with my public statements.

INFORMATION

27

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Wednesday, October 30, 1968  
6:55 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's instructions  
to Vance for his talk with the DRV in  
Paris.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By AG, NARA, Date 3-5-93

27a

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

Secretary Rusk called Ambassador Vance on the secure phone at 5:00 p.m. EST October 30

1. Vance was asked to meet with the DRV representatives at once to convey the following message.
2. The U.S. is going to proceed to issue orders early in the evening of October 31, namely 7 or 8:00 p.m. Washington time to stop all air, naval and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the territory of the DRV. The orders will be fully effective 12 hours later. The action will be announced at approximately the time the orders are issued.
3. Vance should emphasize to the DRV the importance of secrecy on their part. If there are leaks from Hanoi no one can tell what would happen.
4. A meeting of the type agreed upon will not be held before November 6. We expect to be able to inform the DRV shortly about the time of such meeting.
5. We expect all understandings previously reached to continue to apply.
6. We are proceeding on the basis of no secret minute. (Vance called back to say that he would get Thuy to confirm this point at the start of his conversation since we have it only from Lau at this stage who claimed it was Thuy's view).
7. If what you tell Thuy causes Hanoi any difficulty, the DRV must tell us immediately.

*BHR*

Benjamin H. Read

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712991-482

By rg/jw, NARA, Date 3-5-93

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOULBE PLUS

Pres file  
28

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Wednesday, Oct. 30, 1968  
6:50 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the latest on the lady.

Also, following is Brom Smith's comment on the instruction you directed me to convey:

"The instruction has been given to DeLoach.

"There are real difficulties. She lives at Water Gate -- a huge apartment. She is constantly seeing Republicans -- the risk of discovery is high."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-208  
By ujg, NARA, Date 4-26-95

28a

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

5:45 PM 10-30-68 RNK  
PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 013

ATTENTION: MR. BROMLEY SMITH

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

1968 OCT 30 22 48

~~SECRET~~ -- NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION) EMBASSY OF VIETNAM,  
INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

FOLLOWING CONFIRMS INFORMATION TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED  
TO MR. BROMLEY SMITH OCTOBER THIRTY INSTANT.

A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE  
PAST ADVISED THAT MRS. ANNA CHENNAULT, WIDOW OF GENERAL  
CLAIRE CHENNAULT, ARRIVED AT THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY AT  
THREE TWO SIX P.M., OCTOBER THIRTY INSTANT. FOR YOUR ADDITIONAL  
INFORMATION, MRS. CHENNAULT DEPARTED THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY AT  
FOUR ZERO FOUR P.M. TODAY.

GP-1

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 14-93

By CTS NARA, Date 3/7/17

INFORMATION

Wednesday, October 30, 1968  
6:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith my secret weapon: the  
"global time conversion simplifier."

Every diplomatist should have  
one.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

30

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

Wednesday, October 30, 1968  
5:30 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This conversation between the  
 and various  
Moscow officials, on our business, may  
interest you.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(C)

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-138  
By is, NARA, Date 6-12-03

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

30 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow ✓  
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Message from Indian Minister of Defence  
in Moscow to Indian Prime Minister

25X1X

[REDACTED]

25X1X

[REDACTED]


2. Minister Singh said that during his conversation with Chairman Kosygin on the evening of 25 October the question of North Vietnam came up. Kosygin had said: "So far there has been no solution of Vietnam question. We are doing our best and are exerting pressure for an early solution. There seems to be some shift these days in United States Government policy. Unfortunately the United States Government is hesitant to take decisions which are essential to the solution of this problem. We are however busy with this question and are exerting strong pressure."

3. Minister Singh said that he met Gromyko the morning of 30 October. They had a long talk on Indian/Soviet bilateral relations

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 019-041-3-3  
By SP, NARA, Date 1/21/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

as well as in regard to various international matters including Indian relations with China and Pakistan. Minister Singh said he would report in detail on this conversation when he returned to New Delhi.

4. In regard to North Vietnam, Minister Singh mentioned to Gromyko about Prime Minister Gandhi's messages to President Johnson and President Ho Chi Minh urging complete and unconditional stoppage of bombing of North Vietnam on the understanding that it would lead to de-escalation and facilitate negotiations for a peaceful settlement. Minister Singh told Gromyko that Mrs. Gandhi believed that President Johnson really desired a breakthrough in Vietnam deadlock before the elections on 5 November. The situation may not remain so favorable later. This therefore provided a great opportunity for bringing peace to Vietnam which would lead to a political settlement according to the wishes of the Vietnamese people within the Geneva agreement. The Americans were however worried that the other side might take military advantage of the bombing halt. Minister Singh added that in sending these messages to the two Presidents Mrs. Gandhi had no wish to intervene in a very difficult situation but only to appeal to the two leaders on whom grave responsibility rests for peace in Vietnam.

5. Gromyko said that the Soviet leaders greatly appreciated the Indian Prime Minister's initiative in sending messages to Johnson and Ho Chi Minh. It was a very good move at this juncture to bring about de-escalation of hostilities and peaceful settlement.

6. Minister Singh asked Gromyko about the Soviet assessment of the talks in Paris. Gromyko said that the two sides are getting much closer to each other. On the complete and unconditional stoppage of bombing the two sides have not agreed on it in detail. From the message Gromyko received from Paris last night it seemed that if the Americans show a little more flexibility an agreement can be reached. It is true, Gromyko said, that the Americans say that now is the best opportunity to come to a settlement as later on the situation might become more difficult. Gromyko still felt that the Americans should be more flexible. They seem to be arguing too much about every word and every comma. However some real progress has been made.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. Minister Singh mentioned to Gromyko about the American suspicion and anxiety that the complete stoppage of bombing might be utilized by North Vietnam for military advantage. Otherwise President Johnson seemed to be keen to stop bombing and start serious negotiations for a peaceful settlement. Gromyko said that this assessment seemed right. The Americans must however be less rigid. If the Americans are really willing, today might be a decisive day.

8. Gromyko said that the initiative of Mrs. Gandhi was greatly appreciated by the Soviet Government. The Soviets were doing their best and were in constant touch with both sides through various channels. In their view it was very necessary that an agreement should be reached between the two parties as that will change the whole course of events in that region.

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 30, 1968

2:50 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Exercise FOCUS RETINA

*Profile*

This is further to my memorandum of October 28 (attached) concerning the recommendation to postpone FOCUS RETINA without public announcement.

Although the leak concerning the exercise published here was repeated in Seoul, it has apparently caused no appreciable stir. Neither the Embassy nor Bonesteel's office has received any questions concerning these press reports.

I have checked the concerned officials in State and Defense, and they agree that their previous recommendation stands.

Recommendation:

That you authorize postponement of FOCUS RETINA without a public announcement.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

AJenkins:mm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-208  
By *mg*, NARA, Date 4-26-95

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 28, 1968

31a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-212  
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Exercise FOCUS RETINA

The attached memorandum from the Under Secretary of State (Tab A) recommends that you direct the postponement of FOCUS RETINA until such time as it would be convenient for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reschedule it.

This recommendation is made out of consideration for the Panmunjom negotiations on the PUEBLO. As you know, recent developments in those negotiations have been neither clearly encouraging nor discouraging, and it does not seem likely that the situation will have changed appreciably by mid-November. The exercise does not seem worth placing the negotiations in jeopardy.

Postponement could cause the Korean government to feel that we are placing our interests in the PUEBLO crew above our concern for their security. The Under Secretary's memorandum points out that this could be mitigated by announcing the exercise could be held next spring.

After receiving his memo at the White House, however, a telegram from Ambassador Porter (Tab B) arrived. It points out that discussions of FOCUS RETINA have been in low key, and there has been no public announcement of it. He recommends routine notification of postponement to the Republic of Korea, without any public announcement. This procedure seems preferable to me and we have telephonic confirmation that State and Defense agree with Porter's recommended handling.

Seoul advises that decision on FOCUS RETINA is needed there not later than 31 October, Washington time, in order to stop preparations now in progress.

Recommendation:

That you direct the postponement of FOCUS RETINA without public announcement.

*P.S. The attached AP item came in. I think it alters the case. (Tab C)*

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

AJenkins:mm

*Pres file*

32

**SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS**

**Wednesday, Oct. 30, 1968  
2:55 p. m.**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

**Herewith the Lau/Vance meeting in which:**

- the minute is dropped;**
- they take pretty calmly the passage of our tentative date for a bombing cessation;**
- and they await definitive word from us.**

**Also attached, Vance and Harriman request authorization to tell Thuy by 5 p. m. this afternoon that we will have a definite answer for them by 11 p. m. tonight our time.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachments**

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 71C 991-484

By rg/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-93



Department of State

132a  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~ACTION COPY~~

VV CRA279  
\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUFNCR 23201 3041859  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z 101845Z OCT 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7642  
STATE GRNC

1968 OCT 30 PM 210095

BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23201

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 902

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH LAU OCTOBER 30.

FROM VANCE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76991-482

By ref/jw, NARA, Date 3-5-93

1. HABIB AND I MET WITH LAU AND VY FOR TWENTY MINUTES AFTERNOON OCTOBER 30 AT DRV LOCATION IN VITRY. NEGOPONTE WAS ALSO PRESENT ON OUR SIDE.
2. I SAID TO LAU: QUOTE AS I SAID YESTERDAY WE ARE WORKING ON THE MATTER EXTENSIVELY. WE HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO WORK THINGS OUT IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO BOTH OF US. WE NEED A LITTLE MORE TIME, HOWEVER, AND WILL BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNQUOTE. LAU SAID THAT HE AND THUY WOULD BE AVAILABLE FROM 7 P.M. PARIS TIME ON TO MEET WITH US.
3. VY COMMENTED THAT THE TIME FOR BOMBING CESSATION PROPOSED BY THE DRV HAD ALREADY PASSED AND THE TIME PROPOSED BY THE US ITSELF HAD PASSED. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE BOMBING WOULD BE STOPPED. I REPEATED THAT WE NEEDED A LITTLE MORE TIME AND SAID THAT WE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH A SOLUTION SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES.
4. LAU SAID HE TOOK NOTE OF WHAT I HAD SAID AND WOULD REPORT TO HIS MINISTER. HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMENT. HE SAID THE DRV SIDE MUST AWAIT OUR FINAL COMMUNICATION BEFORE COMMENTING.
5. LAU SAID THAT YESTERDAY HE HAD EXPRESSED SOME VIEWS TO ME AND LIKEWISE TODAY THUY HAD TALKED TO HARRIMAN. LAU SAID THAT WHETHER OR NOT OUR AGREEMENT IS RECORDED IN THE MINUTE IS NOT A VERY IMPORTANT, THE PROBLEM IS TO COME TO AGREEMENT. LAU SAID THAT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 23201, OCTOBER 30

THE REASON THE DRV HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF A MINUTE WAS TO SEE WHETHER THE US WORDS CONFORMED TO ITS ACTIONS. LAU SAID THAT IF WE CHANGED THE CONTENTS OF THE MINUTE FROM THE WAY IT WAS WORDED THE OTHER DAY THEN HIS MINISTER COULD NOT AGREE. LAU ADDED THAT HIS MINISTER'S VIEW WAS THAT "WE DO NOT NEED A MINUTE ANY LONGER SO THAT YOU DO NOT USE THE MINUTE AS A PRETEXT FOR DELAQUING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING." AS LAU HAD SAID, WE HAVE GREED ON THE DATE OF A MEETING, ON THE CONTENT OF THE MINUTE AND NOW THE ONLY REMAINING QUESTION IS THAT OF SIGNING THE MINUTE AND THE QUESTION OF TIME OF CESSATION OF BOMBING.

6. IN REGARD TO THE TIME OF CESSATION, AT OUR TWO MEETINGS YESTERDAY, WE HAD TOLD THE DRV SIDE THAT THE TIME OF 001 GMT OCTOBER 30 COULD NOT BE MET AND SAID WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM WHEN WE HEARD FROM WASHINGTON. THE US SAYS THAT THE SITUATION HAS DIFFICULTIES AND COMPLEXITIES BUT THE DRV SIDE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THEY ARE.

7. LAU SAID THAT DURING THE COURSE OF OUR PRIVATE MEETINGS ON OCTOBER 29 AND 30, THE DRV HAD ONCE AGAIN SHOWN ITS GOOD WILL AND ON THE BASIS OF WHAT THE DRV SIDE HAS EXPRESSED THE US GOVERNMENT HAS NO REASON TO FURTHER DELAY THE BOMBING CESSATION. LAU SAID HE FELT IT WAS HIS DUTY TO SAY THIS.

8. LAU EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT AT OUR NEXT MEETING WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE THE DRV SIDE FINAL WORD AND COME TO FINAL AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT THE TIMES PROPOSED FOR CESSATION OF BOMBING BOTH ON THE PART OF THE DRV AND THAT OF THE US HAD ALREADY PASSED AND NOW THE US HAS THE FINAL WORD. LAU SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD NOT RAISE ANY PROBLEMS WITH QUESTIONS THAT WE HAD ALREADY GREED UPON.

9. I SAID I TOOK NOTE OF WHAT LAU HAD SAID AND SAID WE HOPED THE PROBLEMS COULD BE RESOLVED IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO BOTH SIDES.

HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

326

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

October 30, 1968

Cy Vance valled at 2:00 p.m.

Vance and Harriman request authorization to tell Thuy prior to 2300 Paris time (5:00 p.m. EST) today, or earlier if possible, that we will have a definite answer for them by 0500 Paris time tomorrow (11:00 p.m. EST tonight).

Benjamin H. Read

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76991-482

By re/jw, NARA, Date 3-5-93

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Wednesday, October 30, 1968  
10:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

These [REDACTED] show that South Vietnamese missions in Manila and Paris are bidding for Korean support vis a vis the U. S.

*3.4 (b)(1, 3)*

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-114 and NLJ 94-414  
By ms, NARA, Date 3-25-04

FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM A JAPANESE [REDACTED] OFFICER, WHO PROVIDED IT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS SERVICE, AND IS FORWARDED AS AN UNEVALUATED REPORT.

334  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~FRINE~~  
ISHTAR  
NOFORN

SPECIAL PYLON-2 REPORT (NO. 1818-68)

THE FOLLOWING [REDACTED] IS DATED 26 OCTOBER 1958:

FILIPINO POSITION ON HALTING THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM,

[REDACTED]

ON 23 OCTOBER.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ON 23 OCTOBER:

1. ACCORDING TO ACTING FOREIGN SECRETARY INGRESS [REDACTED] (THE PHILIPPINES) HAS NOT BEEN CONSULTED SO FAR BY THE U.S. ON HALTING THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)."
2. THE SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) CHARGE D'AFFAIRES TO THE

2  
3.3(0)(1)(2)(6)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-115 and NLS 94-413  
By ML, NARA, Date 2-18-05

2

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM A JAPANESE  
[REDACTED] OFFICER, WHO PROVIDED IT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS  
SERVICE, AND IS FORWARDED AS AN UNEVALUATED REPORT.

336  
~~TOP SECRET~~  
FRINE  
ISHTAR  
NOFORN

SPECIAL Pylon-2 REPORT (NO. 1817-68)

THE FOLLOWING JAPANESE SERVICE COMPILATION IS DATED

28 OCTOBER 1968:

REMARKS BY DEPUTY SVN OBSERVER TEAM CHIEF ON PARIS CONFERENCE,

3.3  
(X, 3, 6)

[REDACTED] ON 25

OCTOBER

ON 25 OCTOBER THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ON COUNSELOR SIN'S VISIT ON 24 OCTOBER WITH  
MINISTER AN [REDACTED] DEPUTY CHIEF DELEGATE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

(SVN) OBSERVER TEAM /IN PARIS/, AND INFORMATION ON THE DEVELOP-  
MENTS OF THE PARIS CONFERENCE WHICH SIN OBTAINED FROM AN/,

AS FOLLOWS:

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-15 and NLJ 94-413  
By [REDACTED], NARA, Date 2-18-05

2

3.3 (6)  
(1,3,6)

1. AMBASSADOR RAM [REDACTED] CHIEF SVN DELEGATE, HAD A 4-HOUR LONG MEETING WITH DELEGATE HARRIMAN AFTER THE 27TH U.S.-NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) CONFERENCE ON 23 OCTOBER. DELEGATE HARRIMAN SAID AT THE MEETING THAT, "THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS AT THE 27TH CONFERENCE. IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE SVN GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY AGREED TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL AND PARTICULARLY THE 'TWO SIDES FORMULA,' THE /SVN/ DELEGATE IN PARIS IS ARGUING AGAINST IT. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO UNDERSTAND." IN RESPONSE TO /DELEGATE HARRIMAN'S/ REQUEST FOR LOCAL SVN COOPERATION, AMBASSADOR RAM REPORTEDLY SAID, "HALTING THE BOMBING OF NVN IS A QUESTION TO BE DECIDED BY THE U.S. ALONE. EVEN IF THE U.S. WERE TO ACT AS IT PLEASES, THE SVN GOVERNMENT CANNOT STOP IT. HOWEVER, THE SVN GOVERNMENT POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN THE NEXT CONFERENCE REMAINS UNCHANGED, AND THE SVN GOVERNMENT IS OBLIGED TO CLARIFY ITS POSITION."

THEN, DELEGATES HARRIMAN AND RAM WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE TWO SIDES FORMULA IN DETAIL, BUT THE U.S. SIDE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS DELIBERATELY CONCEALING THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL COMPLEXITY OF THE QUESTION ABOUT WHICH A SECRET UNDERSTANDING HAS REACHED WITH NVN AT PRESENT. FOLLOWING ARE THE POINTS ABOUT

2

PAGE 3 SOTOKYO 413 ~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ ISHTAR NOFORM  
WHICH SVN IS MAKING A PARTICULAR ISSUE:

A. SEATING PROBLEM

ACCORDING TO DELEGATE HARRIMAN, THE U.S. AND SVN DELEGATIONS WILL SIT AT ONE SIDE, AND THE NVN AND NLF DELEGATES AT THE OPPOSITE SIDE. IN THAT CASE, THE FOUR DELEGATIONS WILL NOT BE INDEPENDENT FROM EACH OTHER AS SVN AND THE U.S. WILL REPRESENT ONE SIDE, AND NVN AND NLF THE OTHER SIDE. IT IS NOT CLEAR, IN OTHER WORDS, WHETHER THE SVN DELEGATION WILL BE A DELEGATION INDEPENDENT FROM OR DEPENDENT ON THE U.S. DELEGATION.

B. NATIONAL FLAG AND DELEGATION IDENTIFICATION

THE U.S. AND NVN UNDERSTAND THAT THERE WILL BE ABSOLUTELY NO DISPLAY OF NATIONAL FLAGS OR NAMEPLATES OF THE DELEGATIONS. SVN IS OBLIGED TO CONSIDER THE VARIOUS ATTENDING LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES, SINCE PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF NATIONAL FLAGS AND PARTICULARLY, THE SEATING TOGETHER WITH THE NLF DELEGATES WILL GIVE THE IMPRESSION TO THE WORLD IN THE END THAT THE SVN GOVERNMENT AND THE NLF ARE EQUAL.

C. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DELEGATIONS

FIFTEEN OR LESS MEMBERS WILL REPRESENT A DELEGATION

2

2

PAGE 4 SGTOKYD 413 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~ TRINE ISHTAR NOFORN

AT THE 4-DELEGATION CONFERENCE, MAKING A TOTAL OF 30 /OR LESS/ MEMBERS FOR ONE SIDE.

D. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE STILL OTHER MINOR PROBLEMS SUCH AS THE ARRIVING ORDER AT THE CONFERENCE SITE OF THE DELEGATIONS AND THEIR SPEAKING ORDER. FOR SVN, IT CANNOT SHARE AN IDENTICAL POSITION WITH THE OUTLAWED NLF BY PARTICIPATING IN THIS CONFERENCE. THERE HAS BEEN A NUMBER OF SUCH AMBIGUOUS AREAS IN THE U.S. ATTITUDE SO FAR. THEREFORE, SVN CANNOT AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE BLINDLY UNDER SUCH AMBIGUOUS SITUATION.

2. AS YOU HAVE NOTED IN ABOVE REPORT [REDACTED]

3.3 (b)  
(1,3,6)

[REDACTED] THE U.S. SIDE IS EVIDENTLY TRYING TO TALK SVN GOVERNMENT INTO LETTING ITS DELEGATES PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE PLENARY CONFERENCE. AS AN EX POST FACTO GESTURE, THE U.S. SIDE IS ASKING THE SVN GOVERNMENT TO CONCUR WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED SEATING, NON-DISPLAYING OF NATIONAL FLAGS AND OTHER IDENTIFICATION, AND MEMBERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS ABOUT WHICH IT HAS ALREADY REACHED A SECRET UNDERSTANDING WITH THE NVN SIDE, ACCORDING TO MINISTER AN.

WHAT WILL BE THE SVN GOVERNMENT POSITION IN CASE THE SEVERAL

2

PAGE 5 SOTGMYC 413 ~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ ISHTAR NOFORN

POINTS IT HAS PROPOSED FELL THROUGH? THIS   
IS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE POSITION WILL BE ENTIRELY  
UP TO PRESIDENT THIEU. IN THIS REGARD, MINISTER AN MENTIONED  
REPEATEDLY THAT, "IT IS TOO LATE FOR THE U.S. TO TALK THINGS  
OVER WITH THE SVN GOVERNMENT."

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**INFORMATION**

**Wednesday, October 30, 1968  
9:30 a. m.**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**You should know that Thieu plans to talk at 7:00 p. m. tonight our time. It is absolutely essential that Bunker let us know precisely what he intends to say.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rln**

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POSTPONEMENT OF THIEU SPEECH

PARIS AFP IN FRENCH 1237 GMT 30 OCT 68 C

(TEXT) SAIGON--THE RADIO AND TELEVISION SPEECH WHICH PRESIDENT THIEU WAS SCHEDULED TO DELIVER TODAY ON THE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO A BOMBING PAUSE HAS BEEN POSTPONED FOR 24 HOURS, IT HAS BEEN LEARNED IN SAIGON.

THE PRESIDENT WILL ADDRESS THE NATION TOMORROW, THURSDAY, AT 2000 LOCAL TIME, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TELEVISION HEADQUARTERS ANNOUNCED.

30 OCT 1400Z MLK/BG

7 PM tonight

*(Handwritten initials)*