

35

INFORMATION

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Wednesday, October 30, 1968
9:15 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

These two cables underline the importance of the point you made this morning about getting the Troop Contributors to Paris.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 10773
Bangkok 22236

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 702991484

By re/imp, NARA, Date 3593

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

35
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEHC
DE RUALOS 10773E 3040950
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 300850Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3428
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SEOUL 10773

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

REF: SEOUL 10763

ACTION COPY

9905Q

October 30, 1968

5:09 A.M.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

REF: 93-367

By: inf, NARA, Date 2-7-94

1. ON OCT 30 DCM HAD LENGTHY LUNCHEON WITH VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHIN PIL-SIK AT LATTER'S INVITATION, LOCAL BEING NINTH FLOOR PRIVATE ROOM AT TOWER HOTEL.

2. WHILE ORIGINAL PURPOSE WAS ON OTHER SUBJECTS, RHIN DEVOTED MAJOR PORTION ON VIET-NAM; THIS WAS POSSIBLY FOLLOW-UP TO CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL BETWEEN FONMIN AND AMBASSADOR.

3. IN ANY CASE, SAME THREE POINTS EMPHASIZED BY CHIN: (A) FEAR THAT WE WOULD IN SOME WAY NEGOTIATE WITH NLF AS AN ENTITY, (B) OBJECTION TO "YOUR SIDE-OUR SIDE FORMULA," AS RESULTING IN DE FACTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH NLF AND ACCORDING LATTER DIGNIFIED STATUS, AND (C) INSISTENCE THAT LOGIC DICTATES KOREAN (IF NOT ALL TCC) PARTICIPATION AT THE NEGOTIATION TABLE.

4. INTERESTING NOTE THAT THIS IS FIRST TIME THAT KNOWLEDGE OF "YOUR SIDE-OUR SIDE" FORMULA REVEALED BELOW TOP LEVEL. ROKG LEAD IN BY CHIN WAS CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY SPECULATION AND QUERIES BASED ON NEWS STORIES, FOCUSING ON ISSUE "WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR IN VIET-NAM IF NLF CAN PARTICIPATE AND KOREA SITS ON THE SIDE LINES."

5. DCM, OF COURSE, RESPONDED THAT HE NOT PRIVY TO ALL INFORMATION BUT HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT ROKG BEING CONSULTED REGULARLY. IN ANY CASE, IT DID NOT SEEM FRUITFUL TO SPECULATE ON HOW NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE HANDLED AT THIS STAGE. FURTHER, QUESTIONED WHETHER CHIN INQUIRY BROUGHT INTO QUESTION CONFIDENCE OF ROKG IN U.S. WHICH HAD COME TO DEFENSE OF KOREA, HAD CONTINUING COMMITMENT, AND HAD AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THAT COMMITMENT BOTH IN THE MATTER OF LIVES AND MONEY IN VN; CHIN DENIED IMPLICATION, LACK OF

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PAGE TWO SEOUL 10773, Oct. 30, 1968, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

CONFIDENCE BUT RATHER POINTED TO OWN PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM AND THE DEPTH OF U.S.-KOREAN MUTUAL COMMITMENT WHICH MIGHT BE JEOPARDIZED BY FAILING GIVE FULL COGNIZANCE TO THE SENSITIVITIES OF SMALLER COUNTRIES IN THE VIET-NAM SITUATION. DCM SIMPLY NOTED OUR OWN PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS AND EXPRESSED SENSE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE DEPTH OF KOREAN-U.S. RELATIONS WOULD REMAIN UNSHAKEN IN THE FUTURE. IN ANY CASE, HE SUGGESTED THAT FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IT CERTAINLY SHOULD BE EXPECTED THAT THE U.S. WHICH IS CARRYING ON THE PARIS DISCUSSIONS AND THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS DEEPLY INVOLVED, CARRY THE LEADERSHIP IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

GP-4. PORTER

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

35 b /

P 300751Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1638
STATE GRNC
BT

ACTION COPY

9885Q
October 30, 1968
4:01 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ BANGKOK 22236

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-210
By MS, NARA, Date 10-27-94

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

1. FOLLOWING PRIME MINISTER'S RECEIVING JOHN BULLITT THIS MORNING, IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION I MENTIONED THAT AGREEMENT CONTINUED TO BE HELD UP ON MATTERS I HAD MENTIONED EARLIER BUT THAT THESE MIGHT BE RESOLVED AT ANY TIME AND IF SO I WOULD TAKE THE LIBERTY OF MAKING DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IF THERE SHOULD BE A QUESTION OF GETTING TO HIM ON SHORT NOTICE TO DISCUSS AN IMMINENT ANNOUNCEMENT ON BOMBING CESSATION. I ADDED THAT WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED HIS DECLINING TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH THE PRESS AND MENTIONED THAT IF AT ANY TIME HE SHOULD FEEL IT NECESSARY TO SAY THAT THAI AND US GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN REGULARLY IN TOUCH EVER SINCE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN THIS WILL CAUSE US NO DIFFICULTY.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND THEN EXPRESSED HIS CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ON SEVERAL POINTS. HE REFERRED TO PRESS REPORTS IN RECENT DAYS ABOUT COMMUNIST PLANS FOR ATTACKS ON SAIGON AND REMARKED THAT THIS DID NOT FIT IN VERY WELL WITH PLANS FOR STOPPING BOMBING. I RECALLED OUR EXTENDED DISCUSSION ON THE KIND OF AN UNDERSTANDING WE WERE SEEKING TO REACH WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE (BANGKOK 21586), NOTING THAT WE WERE MAKING CLEAR TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AN END TO THE ATTACKS ON CITIES WAS ONE OF THE MATTERS ON WHICH WE WERE INSISTING. IF WE PROPOSED TO MOVE AHEAD WITH AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF A BOMBING CESSATION, IT WOULD BE IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE UNDERSTAND AND WILL OBSERVE THIS CONDITION. THAMNOM TOOK THIS IN BUT TOLD ME, AS HE HAS ALSO RECENTLY TOLD THE PRESS, OF HIS SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE COMMUNISTS LIVING UP TO THEIR WORD.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT CONSULTATION WITH ALL OF THE COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING FORCES AND I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT WE WERE IN TOUCH WITH THE OTHERS AS WITH HIM, AND WERE, OF COURSE, VERY ACTIVELY IN CONSULTATION WITH THE GVN. IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS REMARKS, HOWEVER, WHICH STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF REAL CONSULTATION WITH ALL OF THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, THAT IT WAS LESS HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE OTHERS THAN THAT HE WAS, IN TYPICAL THAI FASHION, MAKING CLEAR TO ME THAT HE DID NOT FEEL THAILAND WAS BEING TREATED LIKE A CLOSE ALLY IN A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST TO IT.

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PAGE TWO BANGKOK 22236, OCT. 30, 1968, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

4. COMMENT: UNLESS I AM GIVEN SOMETHING TO TELL THE THAI WHICH WILL GIVE THEM AT LEAST SOME FEELING OF BEING KEPT IN THE PICTURE, I AM APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THEIR REACTION TO ANY REQUEST FROM ME FOR FLASH COORDINATION ON AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF A BOMBING CESSATION.

GP-3 UNGER

~~SECRET~~

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Pres file

36

Wed., Oct. 30, 1968
9:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

**Herewith the more temperate
Thank-Hers discussion.**

Key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

**SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS
attachment**

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guide, Feb. 24, 1983
By Ag, NARA, Date 3-5-93



Department of State

362
TELEGRAM

ADVANCE COPY

~~SECRET~~

9913Q

1968 OCT 30 AM 6 34

OO RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 41528 3041100
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301045Z OCT 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3509
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2631
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 41528

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: A. SAIGON 41521
B. PARIS 23126
C. STATE 263695

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 716984-317

By sg/ep, NARA, Date 3-5-93

1. AS INDICATED REF A, I SENT POLITICAL COUNSELOR TO SEE THANH AT 4:00 PM THIS AFTERNOON TO SET THE RECORDS STRAIGHT ON THE OCTOBER 28 CONVERSATION BETWEEN HARRIMAN AND LAM. HERZ READ KEY PASSAGES FROM THE DETAILED RECORDS (REF B) AND THANH SEEMED IMPRESSED AND AGREED THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT LAM HAD REPORTED. WE SUGGESTED THAT HIS MISUNDERSTANDING SHOULD NOW BE LAID ASIDE AND GVN SHOULD RELY ON WHAT WE HAVE WORKED OUT HERE IN WRITING AND HAVE REAFFIRMED TO THEM SEVERAL TIMES ON THE BASIS OF WASHINGTON INSTRUCTIONS.

2. HERZ ALSO CONVEYED TO THANH OUR STRONG CONVICTION (REF C) THAT IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS AND PREJUDICIAL IF LAM WERE RECALLED AT THIS JUNCTURE. THANH SAID INSTRUCTIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN SENT FOR LAM TO COME HOME "BUT THERE ISN'T A PLANE EVERY DAY AND PERHAPS HE WILL NOT COME RIGHT AWAY." WE THINK OUR WARNING WILL MAKE THANH AT LEAST RAISE THE MATTER WITH THIEU FOR POSSIBLE RECONSIDERATION.

3. THANH SEEMED UNINFORMED ABOUT MY CONVERSATION WITH THIEU EARLIER THIS AFTERNOON, AND HERZ FILLED HIM IN IN GENERAL TERMS, MAKING SURE THAT THANH UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS IS AN HISTORICAL POINT THAT COULD INVOLVE THE VERY EXISTENCE OF HIS COUNTRY. HERZ SAID IT WAS NOT FOR HIM TO GIVE THANH DETAILS ON THE CONVERSATION, BUT THANH SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON VIEWS THE CURRENT IMPASSE WITH THE UTMOST GRAVITY AS INVOLVING NOT ONLY US GOOD FAITH BUT AFFECTING THE ENTIRE ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TOWARD OUR COMMITMENT HERE.

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-2- SAIGON 41528, October 30, 1968

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

4. WE ALSO INFORMED THANK OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE A PLANE AND SECURE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT REPEATING THE FIASCO THAT HAD OCCURRED TWO WEEKS AGO WHEN THANK HAD CALLED IN THE AMBASSADORS AND CHARGES OF TCC'S. WE TRIED TO IMPRESS UPON THANK THAT ANY PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF DIS-UNITY BETWEEN US COULD PRODUCE THE VERY DISINTEGRATION OF MORALE IN SVN THAT THANK HAD BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT IN ANOTHER CONTEXT.

5. THANK THEN SAID THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE SEPARATE STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENTS WERE ONE-SHOT AFFAIRS, BUT THERE WAS NO ASSURANCE THAT THE US WOULD KEEP AT THE GVN'S SIDE IN REBUTTING EVERY ATTEMPT OF HANOI TO PICTURE THE NLF AS A SEPARATE ENTITY. POLITICAL COUNSELOR POINTED TO OUR ASSURANCES AND SAID THE GVN SEEMS CONSISTENTLY TO UNDERESTIMATE AND UNDERUTILIZE ITS OPPORTUNITIES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. TO HAVE FORCED HANOI TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE GVN COULD BE PICTURED AS A CAVE-IN BY HANOI OF MOMENTOUS PROPORTIONS, AND A CAMPAIGN ALONG THOSE LINES IF PROPERLY HANDLED COULD LEAD TO THE POSSIBLE DISINTEGRATION OF THE VC IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

6. THANK SAID, "THIS IS THE TROUBLE; WE DON'T HAVE TIME TO PREPARE SUCH THINGS." HERZ SAID WE WOULD BE GLAD TO COOPERATE IN THE IMMEDIATE LAUNCHING OF SUCH A PSYWAR CAMPAIGN.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

37

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Pres file

Wednesday, October 30, 1968 -- 8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a Harriman-Lam conversation on Saigon's gut issue. Key passages are marked.

I have suggested to State that, if we go ahead, the President send Thieu a message like the following:

"I have considered seriously and with sympathy your anxieties about the organization of the Paris talks.

"I want you to know that I shall instruct the U. S. delegation in Paris under no circumstances to treat the NLF group as a separate delegation. Our negotiators will address themselves at all times to the other side as a unit.

"Moreover, whatever the Hanoi delegation does, the U. S. delegation will be instructed to honor at all times our understanding at Honolulu, in July, that the Republic of Vietnam should play 'a leading role in discussions concerning the substance of the final settlement.' Specifically, I would envisage that the Government of Vietnam would lead off for our side whenever South Vietnamese interests are primary."

In addition, I believe we should tell Thieu that, in close consultation with Lam in Paris, we would use the interval between bombing cessation and the first meeting with GVN participation, to work out modalities for the enlarged session which would guarantee dignity and order on that occasion.

DECLASSIFIED

W. W. Rostow

Authority 71C 91-484
By rg/ep, NARA, Date 3-5-93

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

TELEGRAM

374

~~SECRET~~

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BT RUFHOC 23126/1 3841235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 300200Z OCT. 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1918
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON 7589
STATE GRHC
BT

97800
DECLASSIFIED

1968 OCT 29 PM 809

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 23126

NODIS/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 898

FROM HARRIMAN

REF: SAIGON 41450

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71084-317

By [signature], NARA, Date 3-5-93

TO SET RECORD STRAIGHT ON THE FALSE QUOTATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO ME IN
PARA 3 REFTEL FOLLOWING IS THE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH LAM
WRITTEN BY FSO WHO TOOK VERBATIM NOTES DURING OCTOBER 28 MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT

1. AMBASSADOR LAM AND COLONEL AN CALLED ON AMBASSADOR
HARRIMAN AFTERNOON OCTOBER 28. HOLBROOKE WAS PRESENT. AT THE
END OF THE DISCUSSION REPORTED BELOW, HARRIMAN TOLD LAM THAT WE
WOULD MEET HIM AGAIN TOMORROW WITH HASIB PRESENT AND GO OVER HIS
POINTS AGAIN.

2. LAM SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED NEW INSTRUCTIONS DIRECTLY FROM
PRESIDENT THIEU. THESE INSTRUCTIONS WERE OF PRIMARY CONCERN
TO AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM, WHO WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH THE APPRO-
PRIATE OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT THIEU
WANTS AMBASSADOR LAM TO BRING THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ATTENTION
OF GOVERNOR HARRIMAN.

3. THE INSTRUCTIONS TOLD LAM AND DIEM TO INSIST AGAIN THAT THE
US MUST RECOGNIZE THE POSITION OF THE GVN CONCERNING
CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THE ISSUES THAT NOW FACE US REGARDING
PEACE IN VIET NAME. AT THIS POINT HARRIMAN SAID THAT THE
QUESTION OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WAS SOLELY BETWEEN
PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT THIEU AND WE ARE
NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS IT HERE. LAM SAID THAT THAT WAS
WHY THE INSTRUCTIONS HE WAS ABOUT TO READ WERE INTENDED PRIMARILY
FOR BUI DIEM. HE THEN PROCEEDED AS FOLLOWS.

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-2-PARIS 23126 10/29/68 SECTION 1 OF 2

4. THE GVN DEMANDS ASSURANCES THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING BY THE US WILL BE MATCHED ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE BY DEESCALATION OF THE WAR, PROMPT DISCUSSIONS AND DIRECT DEALINGS WITH THE GVN. WE ALSO INSIST ON THE EXCLUSION OF THE NLF AS A SEPARATE ENTITY. THE US SHOULD ALSO BRING PRESSURE ON HANOI TO GET AN HONEST RESPONSE. EVEN IF HANOI RESPONDS POSITIVELY, THE GVN BELIEVES IT NECESSARY TO HAVE A GUARANTEE IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER THAT HANOI WILL KEEP ITS WORD.

5. LAM CONTINUED: THE ESSENTIAL POINT FOR OUR GOVERNMENT IS THAT EVEN IF THE TWO SIDES FORMULA IS ACCEPTED, IT IS NECESSARY THAT ON THE OTHER SIDE THERE EXIST ONE AND ONLY ONE DELEGATION, AND THAT HANOI ADMITS TO THIS FACT PUBLICLY AS A PREREQUISITE TO SERIOUS TALKS LEADING TO PEACE IN VIET NAM. IF SUCH AN ACCORD IS REACHED, THE GVN WILL MAKE A FORMAL DECLARATION ON ALL THESE POINTS, AND WILL SAY THAT WE WILL TALK TO HANOI AND NOT THE FRONT. THE GVN DEMANDS THAT HANOI SAY THE SAME THING, AND SAY THAT IT WILL TALK DIRECTLY WITH THE GVN. THE GVN HOPES THAT THE US WILL MAKE THE NECESSARY EFFORTS TO CONVINCE HANOI TO MAKE SUCH A DECLARATION.

6. LAM CONTINUED TO READ FROM HIS INSTRUCTIONS: IN DEMANDING THIS OF THE US, WE ARE ACTING IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE US--SO AS TO DISSIPATE ALL SUSPICION THAT THE US MIGHT TRY TO PLACE THE GVN IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO ACCEPT A FAIT ACCOMPLI BY GIVING THE NLF EQUAL STATUS AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE. IN THE SAME SPIRIT, THE GVN DEMANDS THAT THE RULES OF PRECEDURE WHICH WILL APPLY FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS BE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE BETWEEN THE US AND THE GVN, AND THEN AGREED TO BY HANOI, IN ORDER TO PREVENT ALL THE USES AND MANEUVERS OF THE COMMUNISTS.

7. LAM BROKE OFF FROM READING HIS INSTRUCTIONS AT THIS POINT, AND SAID THAT HE WANTED TO ADD A PERSONAL NOTE. HE HAD ALREADY RAISED ALL THESE POINTS WITH MR. HABIB BUT SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS WHICH INDICATED MISUNDERSTANDINGS, AND HE WISHED TO FIND A WAY TO AVOID A DILEMMA FOR HIS COUNTRY--THAT SITTING AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE IN A SITUATION IN WHICH PEOPLE THINK THAT THE NLF HAS THE SAME STATUS AS THE GVN OR ELSE HAVING TO LEAVE THE TABLE FOR THIS REASON THE GVN WANTS THE RULES OF PRECEDURE IN ADVANCE. HE SAID THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAD ARRIVED LATE SATURDAY NIGHT.

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PRESERVE

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-3-PARIS 23126 10/29/68 SECTION 1 OF 2

9. LAN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT THIEU CONSIDERED THE POSITION THAT HE WAS OUTLINING AS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO GET THE SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, AS WELL AS THE TWO HOUSES. THE PEOPLE AND THE ASSEMBLY ARE OPPOSED TO ANYTHING WHICH GETS HELP ON THE SAME FOOTING AS THE GVN, AND IF OUR GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS SUCH A FORMULA THERE WOULD BE FOR THEM SOME SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES, LAN SAID.

9. LAN THEN RESUMED READING HIS INSTRUCTIONS: IN CONCLUSION, OUR GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT IF HANOI FEELS THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO NEGOTIATE, AND IF HANOI WANTS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH THE GVN, THEN THE POINTS WE HAVE RAISED COULD BE ACCEPTED EASILY BY
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~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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VV CHA115
OO RUEHCK
DE RUFNCK 23126/2 3040040
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 30020Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 7590
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1919
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1968 OCT 29 PM 3 00

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23126 SECTION 2 OF 2.

NODIS/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS.

DELTO 890

HANOI. IF HANOI REFUSES, THAT IN ITSELF WOULD BE CLEAR PROOF OF THEIR BAD FAITH AND DISHONESTY AT THE BEGINNING. IN THAT CASE, THE GVN WOULD NOT JUDGE IT USEFUL TO COME TO THE TABLE SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO HOPE OF SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS. ON THIS POINT PRESIDENT THIEU HOPES THAT GOVERNOR HARRIMAN SHARES OUR PREOCCUPATION. WITH THIS, AMBASSADOR LAM SAID HE HAD FINISHED READING HIS INSTRUCTIONS.

10. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN REPLIED THAT HE AND MR. HABIB HAD ALREADY GONE OVER ALL THESE MATTERS WITH AMBASSADOR LAM. THESE ARE QUESTIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT THIEU AND HARRIMAN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO DEAL THROUGH AMBASSADOR BUNKER. LAM REPLIED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF THE NLF HAS INDEED BEEN ELEVATED TO THE HIGHEST LEVEL BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS BUT PRESIDENT THIEU WANTED GOVERNOR HARRIMAN TO BE AWARE OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION AND HOPED THAT GOVERNOR HARRIMAN WOULD SHARE THEIR POINT OF VIEW.

11. HARRIMAN SAID THAT WE HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT WE SAID LAST WEEK. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN MATTERS UNDER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT THIEU.

12. LAM SAID THAT PRESIDENT THIEU COULD NOT ACCEPT OUR STATEMENTS THAT THE "OTHER SIDE CAN ARRANGE ITSELF THE WAY IT WANTS". HARRIMAN SAID THAT, AS HE AND HABIB HAD ALREADY STATED, THIS FORMULA HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO HANOI WITH THE FULL AGREEMENT OF THE GVN. HARRIMAN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN MADE AROUND JUNE OF THIS YEAR.

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-2-PARIS 23126 10/29/68 SECTION 2 OF 2

13. AT THIS POINT LAM SAID THAT HE WISHED TO EXPOSE THE TYPE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH SEEM TO OCCUR, AND PRODUCED A MEMO WITH THE GVN VERSION OF AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND MINISTER THANH. ACCORDING TO LAM, THANH HAD SAID TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER THAT "THE GVN DEMANDS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL TRY TO OBTAIN ASSURANCE THAT NORTH VIET-NAM WILL AGREE TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS TALKS DIRECTLY WITH THE GVN". BUNKER HAD REPLIED, ACCORDING TO LAM, THAT "WE CANNOT FORCE HANOI TO SIT". HARRIMAN SAID THAT PERHAPS THERE HAD BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING WITHIN HIS GOVERNMENT SINCE THE COMMENT THAT THEY ATTRIBUTED TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER DID NOT MAKE SENSE.

14. LAM SAID HE WANTED TO CITE ANOTHER EXAMPLE: THANH HAD DEMANDED A CORRECT ARRANGEMENT OF THE TABLE AND THE SEATS, SO THAT THE OTHER SIDE WOULD BE SEATED AS A SINGLE DELEGATION. BUNKER HAD REPLIED THAT THE OTHER SIDE MAY ARRANGE ITSELF AS IT WISHES. HARRIMAN REPEATED AT THIS POINT THAT THIS MATTER HAS BEEN SETTLED AND HE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REOPEN IT.

15. HARRIMAN SAID THAT THE GVN WOULD BE REPRESENTED HERE AS A GOVERNMENT, AND THAT WE WOULD BE REPRESENTED AS A GOVERNMENT ON OUR SIDE OF THE TABLE. THE OTHER SIDE WOULD ORGANIZE AS IT WISHED, BUT WE WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE NLF AS AN ENTITY. THEY CAN CALL THEMSELVES WHATEVER THEY WISH, BUT THAT DOES NOT CHANGE A SWAN'S EAR INTO A SILK PURSE. LAM RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT IF THEY ALLOW THE OTHER SIDE TO ORGANIZE AS THEY WISH WE WILL END UP FACING TWO SEPARATE DELEGATIONS - AN NLF DELEGATION AND A DRV DELEGATION. IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD THIS WOULD MAKE THE GVN AND THE NLF EQUAL.

16. HARRIMAN SAID THAT GVN WAS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT AND SHOULD NOT CARE WHAT THOSE ON THE OTHER SIDE SAY. THE NLF IS A BRANCH OFFICE OF THE HANOI COMMUNIST PARTY, AND WE SHOULDN'T WORRY ABOUT THE NAMES THEY CALL US. THE GVN SHOULD APPROACH THESE TALKS IN CONFIDENCE AS A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT. NEITHER THE GVN NOR US SHOULD BE AFRAID OF THE NLF. LAM DISAGREED, SAYING THAT IF WE SIT WITH THE NLF THE WORLD WILL THINK WE HAVE MADE A CONCESSION. HE THEN REPEATED THE PROBLEMS HE HAD RAISED IN EARLIER CONVERSATIONS CONCERNING THE SEATING OF THE DELEGATIONS. HARRIMAN ASKED WHY THE GVN SHOULD WORRY MUCH ABOUT HANOI'S WORDS. THE SOVIET UNION CALLS US NAMES, AND WE DON'T PAY ANY ATTENTION. HANOI CALLS US WORSE NAMES AND WE SURVIVE IT AND DON'T CARE WHAT THEY SAY. THESE ARE FACTS OF LIFE: YOU ARE A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT; THEY ARE NOT. YOU ARE WELL SUPPORTED BY THE UNITED STATES AND FIVE OTHER ALLIES. YOU SHOULD NOT CARE ABOUT WHAT THEY SAY.

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-3-PARIS 23126 10/29/68 SECTION 2 OF 2

17. HARRIMAN SAID HE WOULD REPORT WHAT LAM HAD TOLD HIM TO WASHINGTON, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NOT CHANGED. HARRIMAN SAID THAT WE HAD IMPORTANT WORK TO DO TOGETHER AND HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD GET DOWN TO BUSINESS. LAM CLOSED BY REPEATING THAT HE HAD READ HARRIMAN HIS INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT THIEU. WE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN.

HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION

38

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

Wednesday, October 30, 1968
8:30 a. m.

Profile

Mr. President:

Herewith the tea break
conversation.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 23141 (DELTO 894)

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Collection, Feb. 24, 1989
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

SECRET

ACTION COPY

VV CRDSIS
.....ZZ RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 23141 3041245
ZNY SSSSS
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7599
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1968 OCT 30 AM 7 50

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23141
NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS
DELTO 894

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 91091-482

By rg/jw: NARA, Date 3-5-93

FROM HARRIMAN

SUBJ: FULL REPORT OF TEA BREAK, OCTOBER 30

1. HABIB AND I MET WITH XUAN THUY AND LAU FOR MORE THAN 30 MINUTES DURING TEA BREAK. I SAID THAT I HAD JUST CALLED VANCE AND WE HAD RECEIVED NO WORD AS YET. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, BE IN TOUCH WITH THEM AS SOON AS WE GET WORD. I SAID THAT I HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAT HAD BEEN SAID BETWEEN VANCE AND LAU AT THEIR MEETING ON THE MATTER YESTERDAY.

2. THUY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE DIFFICULTIES WERE WHICH WE WERE FACING. I SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING I COULD SAY ABOUT IT.

3. THUY SAID THAT FOR THE DRV'S PART HE WOULD LIKE TO REMARK THAT THE US HAS BEEN HOLDING TALKS WITH AN ATTITUDE WHICH IS NOT SERIOUS AND NOT CORRECT. THE UNITED STATES SAYS THINGS IN ONE WAY AND DOES THEM IN ANOTHER. WHEN THE DRV PROMISES SOMETHING, IT CARRIES IT OUT.

4. THUY REPEATED THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT LAU SAID TO VANCE LAST NIGHT REGARDING DATES AND MINUTES AND SAID IT HAD BEEN RAISED TO SEE IF THE US WOULD KEEP ITS WORD. A STRAIGHTFORWARD MAN ACTS LIKE HE SPEAKS, BUT THE US HAS ACTED OTHERWISE, SPEAKING ONE AND WAY AND ACTING IN YET ANOTHER. (THIS WAS AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO OUR PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 30 AND NOVEMBER 2, MADE ON OCTOBER 26 AND REPORTED IN PARIS 22913, PARA 12.)

5. THUY SAID THERE WAS NOTHING FURTHER HE COULD SAY. THE US WANTS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT; SO DOES THE DRV, BUT IF THE US WANTS TO CONTINUE THE WAR, THE DRV WILL CONTINUE THE WAR.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 23141, 301230Z OCT, (NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS)

6. I SAID IF THERE WAS ANY TRUTH IN THUY'S REMARKS, I WOULD ANSWER THEM. AT THE MOMENT I PREFERRED NOT TO COMMENT.

7. THE REMAINDER OF THE CONVERSATION DEALT WITH NON-SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS. WE AGREED THAT AFTER THE TEA BREAK WE WOULD RECONVENE IN THE CONFERENCE ROOM AND THEN ADJOURN FORMALLY. HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

39

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Wednesday, October 30, 1968
8:20 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the message that Vance would like to be able to deliver to Lau by 10:00 a. m., our time, this morning.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 23140 (DELTO 893)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rs, NARA, Date 3-5-93

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

39ad

TELEGRAM
ACTION COPY

FJL525

~~SECRET~~

1968 OCT 30 AM 7 26

ZZ RUEHC
RUFNCR 23140 3041215
BY SSSSS
301210Z OCT 68
AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7598
STATE GRNC
BT

08914Q

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23140

NO DIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 893

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

PURSUANT TO TELCON WITH BUNDY, WE MAKE THE FOLLOWING
RECOMMENDATION, THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO SAY TO LAU
BEFORE 1600 PARIS TIME THIS AFTERNOON THE FOLLOWING:

"AS I TOLD YOU, WE ARE WORKING ON THE MATTER
INTENSIVELY. WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE MATTER
IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO BOTH OF US. WE NEED A LITTLE
MORE TIME AND WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE." HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71984-317

By 15/00, NARA, Date 3-5-93

NNNN

40

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

Wednesday, October 30, 1968
8:00 a. m.

Pres full

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker's latest reflections.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 41491

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By 19, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

WWRostow:rln



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

ACTION COPY

ZZ RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 41491 3040235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 300230Z OCT 68 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3453
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS FLASH 2621
STATE GRNC
BT

9807Q

1968 OCT 29 PM 10 09

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 41491

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

Authority 7109 91-482

REF: SAIGON 41450

By rg/jw, NARA, Date 3-5-93

1. ON RE-READING REFTEL I WOULD LIKE TO ELABORATE THE THOUGHT IN MY COMMENT IN PARA 11.
2. IF WE ARE GOING TO STOP THE BOMBING THIS WEEK, AND DO IT UNILATERALLY IF NECESSARY, WE CAN PUT OURSELVES IN THE STRONGEST POSITION HERE AND WITH OUR TCC ALLIES IF WE GIVE THIEU AND KY A REASONABLE TIME BETWEEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND FIRST MEETING.
3. ACCORDINGLY, WHY NOT AUTHORIZE ME TO SAY THAT WE PLAN TO ANNOUNCE THE CESSATION AT 0800 HOURS OCTOBER 31 SAIGON TIME, AND WILL ARRANGE THE FIRST MEETING FOR NOVEMBER 7 RPT NOVEMBER 7, OR ONE OR TWO DAYS LATER. THIS WOULD GIVE THEM A WEEK OR MORE, DEPENDING ON WHAT WE WORK OUT WITH HANOI. IF THIEU AND KY DON'T BUY THIS, OR TRY TO GET US TO DEFER THE BOMBING CESSATION AND ANNOUNCEMENT, WE CAN TELL THEM WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING WE CAN TO MEET THEIR REQUIREMENTS AND REGRET THAT WE MUST NOW PROCEED ON OUR OWN, AND WILL HAVE TO ANNOUNCE CESSATION AND THE NEXT MEETING UNILATERALLY.

BUNKER

BT

* 7 p.m. tonight

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Wednesday, October 30, 1968
7:55 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the situation in Paris, including the tea break conversation.

I do believe that, unless there is a break in Saigon within the next hour or so reported to us, we should have Vance tell Lau that:

- The "complexities" referred to yesterday prevent our proceeding at 7:00 p.m. our time;
- We are still at work to resolve those complexities;
- We shall be in touch with them again within the next, say, 8 hours.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority 7LC 91-484
 By ng/ep, NARA, Date 3-5-93

HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rln

41a

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PHONE CALL FROM VANCE, 0645, October 30

1. Vance had just consulted with Harriman and Habib after the regular Wednesday meeting. All were agreed that:

-- the cessation and announcement should be 0800 Saigon local on the 31st (7 tonight our time). They believe this is far preferable to 2400 Saigon local.

-- the date of the first meeting could be November 4 or later as the President sees fit. They will do all they can to get acceptance (and, from the previous call, are reasonably confident Hanoi would buy).

2. They all also continue to feel that a response in Paris not later than 1100 our time is vital. At the tea break, Thuy repeated what Lau had said to Vance last night about dates and times -- implying that the timing of the 30th for cessation and the 2nd for the meeting had great meaning to them. Thuy also made remarks to the effect that we spoke one way and acted another, clearly suggesting doubt of our good faith.

3. Bundy told Vance that his recommendation of a response in Paris by 1100 our time made things extremely difficult if Bunker had not been heard from by then. Vance's recommendation should be made in cable form with supporting reasons, so that the President could weigh it with all factors. We should also put our minds on whether there was any partial response that would ease things but not commit us till we knew where we stood in Saigon.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 77L9 84-317

By 18/lsp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

Wednesday, October 30, 1968

7:30 AM

Mr. President:

Your message shook Thieu -- but he's scared.

Pro file

Also attached Vance's view.

The time factors are these:

1. Vance wants to say something to Hanoi before 11 AM our time -- our originally proposed time for halting.
2. Thieu is talking to his colleagues tonight Saigon time, this morning our time.
3. Bunker recommends that if Thieu does not go along with our proposal for a "24 hour delay" (stopping at 7 PM tonight our time) we shall tell him we shall stop unilaterally at 11 AM tomorrow. (The 7 PM deal was geared to the 16 hour slide Hanoi imposed on us).
4. Bunker proposes that we give them a week to pull up their socks for the first meeting, which would be Thursday, November 7. (I happen to believe that quiet along the DMZ is going to be more important in carrying this deal in the U. S. than the first big meeting). Vance believes Hanoi will accept but be "astounded."
5. Vance would like the cessation and announcement at 7PM tonight. He believes an 11 AM tomorrow announcement would cause "real difficulty", but he does not argue it would be turned down. (If they are serious they would, of course, accept either time).

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 77C 991-484

By ref/ajp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

A. Wilson copy

42a

ZZ RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 41521 3040920
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 300850Z OCT 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3478
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS FLASH 2625
STATE GRNO.

BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 41521

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

SUBJ: MEETING WITH PRES THIEU OCT 30

REF: A. STATE 263695 B. PARIS 23126

1. THIEU RECEIVED BERGER AND ME AT 1300 HOURS SHORTLY AFTER HE HAD FINISHED STUDYING REF A AND WE HAD AN HOUR AND HALF'S TALK. IT ENDED WITH A STATEMENT BY HIM THAT HE MUST TALK WITH HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES AND WILL GIVE US AN ANSWER TODAY.
2. I OPENED BY SAYING I HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO DELIVER AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, AND THEN TRANSMITTED THE WHOLE OF THE MESSAGE ALMOSTHIVERBATIM.
3. GHIEU REACTED EMOTILPALLY WND DISJOINTEDLY, "YOU ARE POWERFUL. YOU CAN SAY TO SMALL NATIONS WHAT YOU WANT. WE UNDERSTAND AMERICA'S SACRIFICE FOR VIETNAM. ALL VIETNAMESE KNOW OUR LIFE DEPENDS ON OS SUPPORT. BUT YOU CANNOT FORCE US TO DO ANYTHING AGAINST OUR INTEREST. THIS NEGOTIATION IS NOT A LIFE OR DEATH MATTER FOR THE US BUT IT IS FOR VIETNAM. I INTEND TO MAKE A SPEECH TO MY PEOPLE AND I WILL EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE, AND THAT OF MY GOVERNMENT AND MY PEOPLE, FOR WHAT PRESIDENT JOHNSOSHAS DI E FOR US."
4. HE THEN SAID THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH STOOD IN THE WAY OF OUR AGREEMENT FOR A MEETING WERE NOT SECONDARY BUT CRUCIAL. HE REFERRED TO DIFFERENCES IN WHAT WAS SAID HERE AND IN PARIS AND THEN DEFINED THE TWO ISSUES WHICH WERE CRUCIAL:
 - A. WE MUST GET FROM HANOI AN AGREEMENT BEFOREHAND THAT THEY WILL NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE GVN.
 - B. WE MUST ALSO GET THEIR AGREEMENT THAT THE NLF IS NOT A SEPARATE DELEGATION.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 84-317

By AS/isp, NARA, Date 3-5-93

5. USING THE MEMO OF CONVERSATION PROVIDED BY PARIS (REF B) WE SHOWED THIEU THAT LAM HAD MISUNDERSTOOD HARRIMAN AND THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE IN WHAT WAS SAID IN PARIS OR HERE ON THESE TWO POINTS. WE BOTH HAD SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN SUCH ASSURANCES FROM HANOI, AND THAT OUR STRATEGY AND TACTICS WERE DESIGNED PRECISELY TO OVERCOME THESE DIFFICULTIES. WE THEN AGAIN WENT OVER THE WHOLE GROUND OF OUR POSITION ON THESE TWO POINTS, INDICATING OUR INABILITY TO CONTROL THE OTHER SIDE, BUT OUR ABILITY TO DEFEND OUR OWN SIDE AND VIEWS AND THE STRONG PUBLIC STANDS WE WERE TAKING AND WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE IN SUPPORT OF THE GVN.

6. THIEU KEPT CIRCLING AROUND THE PROBLEM. I FINALLY TOLD HIM POINT BLANK THAT SINCE WE CANNOT GET THESE ASSURANCES, IF HE INSISTS ON MAKING HIS AGREEMENT CONDITIONAL ON SUCH ASSURANCES, WE SHALL HAVE TO GO OUR SEPARATE WAYS. I WARNED HIM OF THE CONSEQUENCES IF HE FORCED US INTO THIS POSITION. I THEN ASKED HIM IF HE WAS OR WAS NOT PREPARED TO GO WITH PRES JOHNSON ON THE TWO DATES.

7. THIEU SAID HE NEEDED A WEEK BETWEEN THE JOINT CESSATION ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE FIRST MEETING, BUT THE IMPORTANT THING IS "AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON THE ASSURANCES HE NEEDS FROM HANOI," WHICH WILL PERMIT HIM TO JOIN IN THE CESSATION ANNOUNCEMENT. I REPEATED IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO GET THESE ASSURANCES HE HAD ASKED FOR. I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD LET ME KNOW TODAY IF HE IS PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THE OCT 31 AND NOV 4 DATES. HE SAID NOV 4 WAS UNREASONABLE, AND HE WOULD NEED A WEEK FROM THE TIME WE AGREE ON CESSATION. IF IT WAS UP TO HIM HE COULD SAY YES TOMORROW'S DATE FOR THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT ON CESSATION WITH A MEETING A WEEK LATER, BUT HE HAD TO CONSULT HIS COLLEAGUES. HE HAD TO CONVINCE THEM AND BRING THEM ALONG, NOT ONLY THE VICE PRES BUT THE OTHERS, OTHERWISE HE WOULD BE VILIFIED AND ISOLATED. I SAID I SAW NO GREAT DIFFICULTY IN BRINGING THEM ALONG. WE HAD GIVEN THEM ASSURANCES OF OUR SUPPORT AND COOPERATION, AND HAD MADE PLEDGES AND STATEMENTS OF THE STRONGEST KIND ON THE QUESTION OF THE NLF, AND HOW WE WOULD ACT IF HANOI TRIED ANY RUSES AND DEVICES TO AVOID DEALING WITH THE GVN. I SAID IF ALL THIS IS KNOWN TO HIS COLLEAGUES IT SHOULD BE CONVINCING.

8. HE SAID HE WOULD CONFER WITH THE OTHERS AND WOULD INFORM ME LATER, AND HE WOULD ALSO GIVE ME TODAY A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT SETTING OUT HIS POSITION. HE ASKED IF I COULD GIVE HIM A COPY OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WHICH I HAD READ. I SAID MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO GIVE HIM THIS MESSAGE ORALLY.

9. COMMENT: I FRANKLY DO NOT KNOW WHAT WE MAY GET TONIGHT BY WAY OF AN ANSWER. I THINK THEY MAY TAKE US RIGHT TO THE BRINK, AND THEY MAY REFUSE TO GO WITH US TOMORROW AT 0800 LOCAL. IN THAT CASE I THINK WE SHOULD SAY TO THEM THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SEEK A WEEK'S DELAY FOR THE FIRST MEETING, BUT THAT I AM UNDER INSTRUCTION TO SAY THAT WE CANNOT DELAY THE CESSATION ANNOUNCEMENT BEYOND SAY 2400 HOURS LOCAL OCT 31 AND WILL PUT OUT THE ORDER AND STATEMENT UNILATERALLY AT THAT TIME IF THEY ARE UNABLE TO GO WITH US.

10. I HAVE SENT THE POL COUNSELOR TO CALL ON THE FONMIN AND READ HIM THE RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE HARRIMAN-LAM CONVERSATION IN ORDER TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. HE ALSO WILL CONVEY TO THE FONMIN THAT WE WOULD REGARD LAM'S RECALL AS "DISASTROUS AND PREJUDICIAL."

11. THERE IS NO POINT IN HAVING GEN GOODPASTER TALK TO GEN VIEN, WHO IN THESE MATTERS CARRIES NO WEIGHT AND IS NOT THE KIND OF PERSON TO INVOLVE HIMSELF IN ISSUES OF THIS KIND.

12. I AM FIRMLY OF THE VIEW THAT HOWEVER DIFFICULT VICE PRES KY MAY BE, IT WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW TO HAVE HIM IN PARIS. THERE ARE FEW PEOPLE AROUND HERE WHO ARE WILLING TO MAKE DECISIONS AND TAKE STANDS. HE IS ONE WHO IS, AND HE IS ALSO ONE WITH WHOM ONE CAN REASON, AND ARGUE. I WOULD MUCH RATHER HAVE A STRONG MAN IN PARIS AS A BACKGROUND ADVISOR THAN A TIMOROUS DELEGATION WHICH IS AFRAID TO MOVE ON ANY POINT OR ISSUE.

BBWERTU-~~AE~~MMTONK8-3:1

BUNKER.

REPORT OF TELEPHONE CALL FROM AMBASSADOR VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719 84-317

By rg/wap, NARA, Date 3 5 93

1. 0330, October 31

A. Vance said we should make every effort to get back to the North Vietnamese by 1100, Washington time. His reason for this time is that this is the original time we had proposed for the cessation--before we moved it back 16 hours at the North Vietnamese request.

The Soviets pointedly asked Vance last night whether we would have word before that time. Vance believed strongly that if we delay our response beyond that time, it could be a risk of all arrangements coming apart.

B. Vance had just received Bunker's short cable suggesting that we offer the 7th as a meeting date, as a last resort. He said that he thought the North Vietnamese would be astounded if we went back to them with the 7th, but he thought it could probably be sold.

2. 0600, Washington Time

A. Vance reiterated that we must go back within 3-4 hours--i.e., well before 1100 our time.

B. Vance had read Bunker's 41521. He believed that we must get back to the North Vietnamese within the time noted above, and has the following views:

--He would prefer to stick to 0800 Saigon local time the 31st (7 p.m. tonight our time) as the time of the cessation and the announcement.

--He does not argue that Hanoi would turn down our putting off the cessation and announcement to 2400 hours Saigon local time, October 31--the time Bunker recommends as our fallback--but does believe this could cause real difficulty. He believes that Hanoi would almost certainly accept postponement of the meeting to November 7.

--He thinks that, whatever we propose, we would get an answer from Hanoi within 2-3 hours.

Wednesday, October 30, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached for your approval is a warm birthday message from you to Jean Monnet. He will be eighty years old on November 9.

Because of his important work in promoting Western European unity and close Atlantic ties, he enjoys great prestige on both sides of the Atlantic.

As you know, Monnet has long been a good friend of the United States. He will particularly appreciate a message from you.

If you agree, the text of the message will be released both here and in Paris on November 9.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

W
ERF:mm

43a

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO MR. MONNET

Dear Mr. Monnet:

On your eightieth birthday, I send you warmest congratulations and best wishes. This is a special day on both shores of the Atlantic for you are an honored friend of America as well as first citizen of a new Europe.

Your vision of a united Europe raised the sights of men beyond national horizons. Your quiet persuasion brought men and governments together on a new course of mutual cooperation and progress. Your ideas gave strength to the foundations of the European Communities. Your devotion to the goal of a united Europe working in close harmony with the United States is a continuing inspiration to us all.

May the years ahead bring you health and happiness.

Sincerely,

ERF:mm

~~SECRET/NODIS~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, October 30, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Ambassador Bunker's 72d Message

*Pres file*A. Introduction

- Bunker outlines priority areas and problems for concentration between now and Tet 1969.
- All efforts aimed at a just and lasting peace in VN; which presupposes the establishment of a stable and viable GVN.
- We must concentrate on further developing political and administrative strength including constitutional government, a broad support base, improved effectiveness and extended control.
- More concretely, involves pressing the pacification offensive, the Chieu Hoi Program, attack on the infrastructure, stress on land reform, upgrade personal income, and fighting inflation.
- Because of military success, we are now hopeful of moving to the political contest.
- Military plans in the next 4 months are designed to destroy enemy military potential, including his political apparatus.

B. Political

- The US role is largely confined to advice and encouragement.
- SVN leaders more clearly see unity is essential and they must do it themselves.
- Thieu, Huong, and others are readying public opinion for a negotiated settlement and a political struggle.
- All GVN assets must be used to fight the enemy in the political arena; Huong stressed this to Self-Defense groups; effort should also aim at veterans.
- Most promising political organization is the Lien Minh and its New Action Program cadres, but Thieu should take a more active role in it.
- The GVN should broaden its base; a role should be found for "Big" Minh; some Dai Viets and militant Catholics should be involved in GVN; Thieu should set-up consultative machinery with opposition groups.
- The Thieu/Ky relationship is less a problem.
- The political party law should press for the merger of existing groups; maybe provide for run-offs.
- Local elections postponed from May are getting underway as areas are pacified.
- Bunker will encourage Thieu to appoint more civilians as province chiefs; to stick with anti-corruption drives; and to better civil service salaries.

C. Military

- Allied forces take full advantage from fighting one war -- not just military or pacification war.
- Allied forces will be reduced in areas of small enemy forces.

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ/LB 510
By 13/110, NARA, Date 3-9-83

- By Jan. 1 allies will kick-off most intensive drive ever in Delta.
- Evidence from all Corps shows effect of our pressure on VC.
- Allies will try to exploit low enemy morale.

D. Pacification

- Enemy's military decline signals the possibility of a VC switch to a more political phase.
- Thieu has ordered an across-the-board 3-month pacification campaign starting Nov. 1.
- Huong's detailed plan sets priorities and measurable goals; biggest priority is upgrading 1000-1100 contested hamlets (140 in I, 226 in II, 259 in III, and 459 in IV Corps).
- This campaign is the most important in pacification yet undertaken; goals are ambitious but conservatively calculated.

E. Economic and Social

- US and GVN developing a charter of social revolution for the short and long term; this should become a major part of the GVN's psychological effort.
- Most important areas are: control of inflation; land reform; increasing farmer income; expediting transportation flow; upgrading urban services. (Bunker spells out the plans).

Bunker concludes: The tide of history is moving with us. We can make still greater progress in the months ahead if we and the Vietnamese intensify the application of our resources to the priorities described above.

W. W. Rostow

44a

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Wednesday, October 30, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 41523)

Herewith my seventy-second weekly message.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-210
By WJ, NARA, Date 10-27-94

A. Introduction

1. In my last message, I summarized the developments and progress of the third quarter of 1968 as well as some of the shortcomings and remaining problems. I think it may be useful this week to outline the priority areas and problems on which we believe we should concentrate between now and Tet 1969.

2. All of our efforts are ultimately aimed at establishing a just, honorable, and durable peace in Vietnam. A durable peace presupposes the establishment of a government that is stable and viable -- politically, militarily, economically, and socially. In the coming months, therefore, we must concentrate on preserving and further developing the elements of political and administrative strength which have been built up over the past few years. This means we must continue to do all that we can to strengthen the present constitutional government, broaden its base of support, improve its effectiveness, and extend its control over the maximum number of its citizens. In more concrete terms, this will involve such things as pressing the planned pacification offensive, the Chieu Hoi program and the attack on the infrastructure. It will also mean continued progress toward full constitutional democracy, greater efforts to build a broad nationalist organization, a new impetus on land reform, and measures to increase the income of the ordinary person and protect that income from run-away inflation. The latter can have as much to do with influencing his basic loyalties as any other single factor.

3. If we are now hopeful of moving from the military to the political contest, it is primarily because of the success of our military effort. We must keep up the military pressure on the enemy. We must continue our measures to develop, improve, and better equip the Vietnamese armed forces to take over a progressively larger share of the burden. Military plans for the next four months are phrased in terms of a maximum effort to destroy enemy military potential, of which the enemy's political apparatus is an integral part.

B. Political

4. To a large degree, our role in promoting nationalist unity and political strength is necessarily confined to advice and encouragement. I think that nearly all Vietnamese leaders are coming to see clearly that not only nationalist political unity and organization is essential, but that this is something they must do for themselves. As the same time, I am concerned by the continuing divisions in nationalist ranks.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

5. President Thieu, Prime Minister Huong, and a number of other leaders in and out of government have made considerable progress in preparing public opinion for a negotiated settlement and a political struggle with the enemy. In the military establishment, the civil service, in the self-defense corps, police, and in the RD cadre, they have organizational means to combat the Communists in the political arena. Huong in his speeches to self-defense groups has stressed their roles as political warriors once the shooting has stopped. We must now stimulate similar thinking and planning for the use of other government-controlled organizations.

I think this should include a new effort to organize and direct the efforts of veterans, which will be particularly important once demobilization gets underway.

6. In the field of political organization, the most promising vehicle now appears to be the Lien Minh. We have assisted this organization to a limited extent and will continue to do so discreetly as opportunities arise. The training of 940 new action program cadres, who have already begun work in Saigon, is encouraging. This program should be doubled in size and extended to other major cities in the next four months.

7. The Lien Minh suffers from some divisions among its top leaders, and I think it will be essential for Thieu to take a more active part in its direction if these divisions are to overcome and new groups attracted. He has been moving in that direction, but I shall attempt to get him to move further and faster. We will also press the Lien Minh leaders to work together and to seek support from other organizations.

8. In addition to pushing the Lien Minh, I hope it will be possible for Thieu to promote national unity by further broadening the base of the government. A suitable role should be found for "Big" Minh in order to throw his considerable popular prestige behind the GVN. We will explore again the possibility of getting some Dai Viet and perhaps militant Catholic participation in the government. I hope Thieu also can be persuaded to set up some formal consultative machinery so that he and Huong can meet regularly with opposition leaders to exchange views.

9. The perennial problem of the Thieu/Ky relationship has declined in importance with the steady reduction of Ky's power. Ky could still prove a divisive influence, however, and I will continue to do all I can to keep the avenues of communication open between them.

10. On the legislative side, I think it important that the political party law be framed in such a way as to maximize pressure for the merger of existing political groupings. We have been pressing this point on both the legislators and the executive branch, and will continue to do so. We have also been

stressing the value of including in electoral legislation a provision for run-off elections. This should help to overcome the divisions in the nationalist camp, particularly in an election situation.

11. You will recall that the GVN decided to postpone the provincial and municipal elections scheduled for last May. This was done with our concurrence since the security situation simply did not permit the allocation of the attention, energy, and territorial forces required. The security situation is much improved now and elections are taking place as hamlets and villages are pacified. As for provincial and municipal elections, we should reserve judgment as to when it might be desirable to proceed with these. We can make a better judgment when we see what progress is made in pacification in the next few months.

12. I am planning to propose to Thi eu the appointment of possibly two or three able civilians as province chiefs in provinces where security is relatively good. This would, I believe, be a useful step in further civilianization of the government.

13. The GVN is continuing to flesh out and use the institutions provided for in the constitution. The supreme court and the Inspectorate will be in place by the end of this month. Still to be established are the advisory councils -- important both as a means of widening the base of the government and also as a way to employ Vice President Ky's talents (he will chair the councils). I think the constitutional frame is a source of considerable political strength and we will strongly support and encourage these efforts.

14. We will also continue to support and encourage the GVN in its efforts to root out corruption. This will include reporting to the GVN cases of corrupt officials and pressing for their removal.

15. A difficult part of this problem of corruption, especially petty corruption, relates to the low salaries received by civil servants and the inequitable structure of these salaries. The problem requires care in handling because of its potential impact on economic stability.

16. Our present emphasis, therefore, is on restructuring, rather than merely raising, the salary scales. The lower levels of the civil service receive compensation more in line with that available in non-governmental employment than do the higher echelons. Thus the problem is not purely economic, but affects the GVN's ability to hire and retain competent senior civil servants. Our immediate goals are to get the GVN to create a system of super-grade for immediate promotion of higher ranking civil servants; and to launch a program to reclassify the civil service wage structure for better equity and effectiveness.

C. Military

17. I described in my previous message the enemy's efforts to mount an offensive in late August, the thoroughgoing defeat of that attempt, and the

subsequent adoption by the enemy of a strategy of withdrawal to base areas and sanctuaries, frequently beyond the borders of South Vietnam. This enemy strategy, which I believe was forced upon him by the punishment he took in his "third offensive" gives friendly forces more freedom of movement than they have had at any time since the start of the U. S. build-up. Our forces are operating in areas they have never been in before, from the southern DMZ to old Viet Cong base areas in the delta.

18. Our own and Vietnamese forces, under plans worked out by General Abrams, are moving to take full advantage of the opportunities this situation opens to us -- opportunities by no means purely military in nature. We are stressing more heavily than ever before that for ourselves as for the enemy, there is only one war -- not a separate war of big battalions, a separate war of pacification, a separate war of territorial security; these are all integral parts of the same war.

19. To illustrate the point, we know from long experience that in readying an offensive the enemy establishes his routes of access and advances through areas in which guerrillas and Viet Cong infrastructure are strong. He works with the infrastructure and guerrillas to establish his supplies in depots or caches. Then he moves his main force units in such a way as to take advantage of supplies, security, reconnaissance, and guides provided by the guerrillas and the Viet Cong infrastructure. Accordingly, now that the enemy has been forced to pull back, caches and depots already in place have been exposed and a maximum effort has gone into picking them up. I have reported the impressive results obtained. We are also striking the Viet Cong infrastructure which is essential to the re-establishment of this logistics net which we are now destroying.

20. In areas where there are no large enemy forces now, friendly forces will be reduced to the minimum necessary to provide a reconnaissance screen which could detect early any resurgence of main force activity. The forces thus released will be used in combined operations with ARVN elsewhere, against Viet Cong local forces, guerrillas, and infrastructure. Our air mobility will permit us to respond quickly to any resurgence of main force activity. Arc light strikes will be targeted against Viet Cong units and base areas, against supply routes through the Laotian panhandle, and against any NVA forces which re-enter from Laos or Cambodia.

21. In the First Corps, screening operations continue in western Quang Tri and the DMZ area. However, we no longer need the same concentration of force there as before. In the Second Corps, the U. S. Fourth Division is maintaining a light reconnaissance screen along the Laos-Cambodia border. In the Third Corps, there is increasing evidence of a heavy NVA force across the border in Cambodia. Appropriate shifts of our forces will be made to take account of this threat. This situation heightens further the problem posed for us by the enemy's use of the Cambodian sanctuary. Because of it, the enemy can continue to pose a threat to Saigon despite the extent of his withdrawals from South Vietnam.

22. In the delta the most intensive drive ever to be conducted will be kicked off. General Abrams has developed a plan calling for screening the Cambodian border by a US air mobilized brigade; moving into known Viet Cong base areas this side of the border by Vietnamese Army and Marine units supported by US forces regularly stationed in the area; and an accompanying assault on the Viet Cong infrastructure. Preliminary operations are scheduled to start on December 1, but that date may be earlier. The operation will be fully underway by January 1. Market Time and Mobile Riverine Forces as well as naval gunfire support will be fully utilized. A greater weight of tactical air will be brought to bear. The enemy has been badly hurt in the delta, and everything possible will be done to keep the pressure on him.

23. In all four corps areas, a greatly increased effort against local forces, guerrillas and infrastructure is underway. Evidence of the effect of this pressure on the Viet Cong is already coming in. A situation report taken from the body of a member of a military proselyting unit ambushed and killed in Quang Dien District (near Hue) on October 16 told in detail the great numbers of Viet Cong, both military and VCI, killed, captured or defected. He said Allied attacks have caused a distrust in the revolution and a loss of confidence in the cadre. He concluded that "...this is the darkest moment for Quang Dien and... a moment like this did not exist before." An agent report from the delta indicates that the Viet Cong province commissioner in Can Tho said the Viet Cong situation in Can Tho and throughout the country is "tragic" and he believes the war will be lost by the end of the year if the Allies persist.

24. We are attempting and will continue to take full advantage of lowered enemy morale. Especially in the Fourth Corps, this is reflected now in a high Chieu Hoi rate -- an average of more than 30 per day from the Fourth Corps alone so far in October. With the exception of March, 1967, the average is at its highest level in two years. I plan to urge a broadening of the Chieu Hoi appeal by concrete actions; for instance, by prominent appointment of Hoi Chanh to government positions; and to develop more effective appeals to NVA soldiers, who now make up the bulk of enemy forces, to surrender and become prisoners of war.

D. Pacification

25. We have already been working with the GVN for more than a month on how best to re-focus and energize pacification for maximum effect between now and Tet. Since the spread of Viet Cong "Liberation Committees" and the enemy's waning military fortunes signalled the possibility of a Viet Cong switch to a more political phase, we urged that the GVN pre-empt this possibility by vigorously expanding its influence in the rural areas. President Thieu has ordered an across-the-board three-month pacification campaign starting November 1. This will also lay the groundwork for an even more extensive 1969 pacification effort, designed to create relative security for 80-85 percent of the country's population by the end of 1969.

26. Prime Minister Huong's more detailed directive sets priorities and establishes concrete, measurable goals without which it would be impossible to manage such an extensive, complex campaign. His specific directives include:

27. "The special pacification campaign will consist of a six-part counter-offensive as follows:

- a. An intensive military spoiling campaign to destroy enemy organized forces and drive them away from populous areas of South Vietnam.
- b. An all-out effort to upgrade 1,000 contested (D, E) hamlets to at least C hamlet status before January 31, 1969.
- c. An accelerated Phung Hoang (Phoenix) campaign to neutralize at least 3,000 VCI each month.
- d. A stepped-up Chieu Hoi campaign to rally at least 5,000 Hoi Chanh during the November 1, 1968-January 31, 1969 period.
- e. A widespread people's self-defense campaign to expedite organizing 1,000,000 defenders and arming at least 200,000.
- f. An information campaign to demonstrate to the people and the enemy that the GVN has seized the initiative and is moving rapidly toward the end of the war."

28. Overriding priority is given to providing adequate security forces -- Regional and Popular Forces, or in special cases, ARVN -- to upgrade 1,000-1,100 contested (D, E) hamlets. Only four main tasks will be undertaken in these hamlets:

- a. Establish a functioning local government, holding hamlet elections if possible;
- b. Neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure, primarily via an accelerated Phung Hoang campaign;
- c. Organize a people's self-defense group of at least 50 members armed with at least 10 weapons, and
- d. Initiate modest self-help projects for which 100,000 piasters plus commodities are allocated per hamlet.

29. Specific hamlet goals assigned to each corps (First Corps -- 140 hamlets; Second Corps -- 226 hamlets; Third Corps -- 259 hamlets; and Fourth Corps -- 459 hamlets) result from detailed feasibility studies by each province. Many province chiefs feel confident that they can accomplish more. With the President prescribing that the Hamlet Evaluation System will be used both to select hamlets (thereby prohibiting any province from choosing soft touches) and measure results, the old problem of "false progress" should be largely overcome. Thieu stressed honesty in reporting in his talk at a big pacification seminar Saturday before last for key planners from all 44 provinces.

30. We also anticipate greater results against the Viet Cong political apparatus in the special three-month campaign. The Phung Hoang Directive allocates by corps the countrywide goal of 3,000 VCI per month. Priorities call for Phung Hoang operations to be conducted principally in contested areas and aimed at eliminating enemy "Liberation Committees" and VCI in target hamlets. Other directives on self-defense, Chieu Hoi and information are in final stages of preparation.

31. Thus, the special campaign ties together all of the priority pacification emphases that we will be stressing in the next three months. Other programs won't stop. Refugees will still get priority attention in the First Corps, where more than half the total are concentrated. Work will continue in 1968 Revolutionary Development areas, although the program has been extended one month to coincide with the special campaign.

32. I think that this campaign is the most important effort in the pacification field we have yet undertaken. Though the goals may seem ambitious, they are conservatively calculated. Even if we only achieve 60-80 percent of them, the GVN will be doing better than ever before. We are accepting risks in order to optimize the opportunity to reinforce favorable trends and further reduce the declining enemy hold on the countryside.

E. Economic and Social

33. The measures we take in this area can be important and in some cases critical to the outcome of the political contest with the Communists. For example, we are working with the GVN on the development of a charter of social revolution which will incorporate many of the specific moves to be made in both the short and long term, and which we hope will be developed into a major part of the GVN psychological effort. Post-war planning will probably lend itself to a similar effort. Aside from such psychological exploitation, the extent to which the government is able to make moves which will increase the income of the ordinary person and protect that income from runaway inflation will have as much to do with influencing his basic loyalties as any other single factor.

34. In the time frame of the next four months the most important areas to work on are control of inflation; expanded and speeded up land reform effort; and an increase in the price the farmer gets for his rice. We will also be moving to accelerate programs aimed at increasing agricultural production, improving the climate for commerce and industry, and contributing to the improvement of urban life.

35. The management of the economy at this time is made more difficult by the existence of inflationary pressures deriving primarily from the increased mobilization effort of this year, the effects of the Tet offensive, and the failure of the GVN to act vigorously in finding new sources of revenue. Thus far in 1968, the rate of increase in money supply has been almost twice that of prices which have produced an "inflationary overhang." Under what circumstances the present, apparent preference for cash hoarding may be transformed back into a preference for goods remains unclear, but resurgent confidence among the Vietnamese about the state of their economy may well transform this potential wave of purchasing power into effective demand at any time.

36. The budgetary deficit has in the recent past been the principal source of new inflationary pressures. In quantitative terms, we believe that an increase of prices in 1969 on the order of 25 percent or less under an assumption of no significant change in security conditions would be a satisfactory result in terms of our objectives.

37. This goal implies a high degree of restraint on the expenditure side. The proposed increase in force levels and the full effect of the current increase in RVNAF will lead to an increment of 16 billion piasters in 1969 as compared to 1968, i. e., an increase with no increase in pay of 23 percent. The slight increase in civilian expenditures, reflecting selected increases in salaries for higher-level civil servants, should be more than offset by a decrease in the cost of the rice subsidy. But we believe that a full-blown pay increase for the civilian side would lead immediately to a comparable increase for the military, a situation which could only accelerate dangerously the inflation. Hence, wage restraint becomes an essential ingredient in the policy package, restraint which must also apply to wage policies in the U. S. sector.

38. As concerns revenue, an increase in the magnitude of some 15-20 billion piasters is clearly needed. While a large part of this could be expected to come from higher import levels, an increase in import duties is indicated; the balance would have to come both from an increase in taxes and improving efficiency of the tax administration.

39. Among the measures we will continue to urge in order to increase revenue and control inflation are:

A. Raise the base for customs calculation from 80 to 118 piasters per dollar with a few exemptions for agricultural inputs and necessities. A revenue increase of 8 or 9 billion piasters should result.

B. Raise petroleum, oil, and lubricant taxes substantially, exempting kerosene. An increase in revenues of 3 or 4 billion piasters should be sought.

C. Enforce use of a uniform code (Brussels code) for all import taxes, in order to better identify commodities and thus reduce possibilities for tax evasion. This should result in increased revenues of at least 1 or 2 billion piasters.

D. Place excise taxes on ad valorem basis, so that the revenues will expand automatically with price increases.

40. Land reform is an area of high potential political impact, not only in Vietnam but abroad. The Thieu government is placing high priority on a program to provide land ownership to South Vietnam's tenant farmers. Strongly supported by President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong, the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture is accelerating its program to distribute government-owned lands (expropriated and former French lands primarily) to present tenants. More importantly, the Ministry is also developing new policies and a program for presentation to the National Assembly to distribute absentee landlord farm holdings to the tenants presently tilling these properties.

41. In June 1968, USAID signed a VN\$35 million projects agreement with the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture providing a special fund to speed up the distribution of government-owned land. Through this agreement the GVN will issue titles to current cultivators for over 160,000 hectares (395,000 acres) of cultivable and distributable land which was expropriated or purchased from French landowners under the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. This accelerated distribution will be achieved by decentralizing and simplifying administrative procedures. The government expects to distribute 35,000 hectares by the end of this year and the entire 160,000 hectares by the end of 1969. We will continue to assist and encourage them to complete this distribution as rapidly as possible.

42. A voluntary purchase program permitting tenants to buy possibly as much as 800,000 hectares of private farm land holdings from landlords is also being formulated by the GVN. We are carefully studying this matter, including the need for a reduction in the retention limit or a provision for forced sales in cases where landlords prove uncooperative. We also have a joint State/AID proposal for possible U.S. assistance to such a program, and we will be making our recommendations soon.

43. President Thieu stated at Ba Tri on September 21st that farmers given land by the Viet Cong would be allowed to remain on the land they are farming. In the light of the far-reaching implications of this statement, the GVN is considering revising the voluntary purchase proposal to incorporate additional provisions to implement President Thieu's Ba Tri statement. A major problem in GVN pacification efforts has been how to resolve the multiple ownership and occupancy claims in newly pacified areas. Current GVN policy essentially reaffirms the former owner's and/or tenants' right to return to the land. This could result in the eviction of the farmers cultivating the land at the time of pacification, resulting in a negative impact on pacification efforts. The President's Ba Tri statement, however, if applied only to the farmers in the former VC-controlled areas, could have a negative impact in the government-controlled areas where a high rate of tenancy and a desire to own land also exist. In addition, there is the problem of many small loyal landowners who were forced to leave their lands and who long to return to their farms as soon as the VC dominance has been eliminated. To cope with this situation, we have proposed to the GVN that as a first step in the voluntary purchase program, a decree be issued immediately declaring a moratorium freezing land occupancy and rental amounts for a brief period subject to extension (probably two years). During this period, no cultivator could be evicted from the land he is now farming (except in special hardship cases), and he could not be required to pay an annual rental higher than the total amount paid in the previous year. The moratorium would keep the present cultivator on the land until the government, through village administrations, had an opportunity to sort out the conflicting tenure claims. The voluntary purchase plan would then provide the means for the farmer to purchase the land.

44. With respect to rice policy, Minister Ho has launched another purchase program for 61,000 tons of delta rice from merchants at 23 piasters a kilo. This will help. However, a more important step, as I said in my last message, is to permit the price of imported rice to increase, thus bringing up rice prices throughout the country. We shall continue to press for this.

45. The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) currently is administering ten different loan programs. Some of these programs were initial emergency programs, begun several years ago for a need which no longer exists.

A regrouping of the outstanding balances of these funds into a general credit fund to support present GVN agricultural policy would permit the bank to support more vigorously the production of animal protein and rice and also support the financing of new initiatives in land reform. Consultations with the bank to attain this objective will be started soon with a view to being able to announce before Tet a new agricultural credit policy. In addition, a proposal which is under consideration to help insure that the 1969 target of 200,000 hectares of IR-5/8 rice planting is achieved is for the GVN either to offer to buy the current crop being harvested -- about 24,000 hectares -- or guarantee a minimum price for it.

46. With respect to commerce and industry, we will press for reduction in traffic check points; elimination of the requirement for purchase permits for agricultural equipment; enforcement of the ban on rice movement controls; application of the decree on war risk insurance now issued; and the freeing of commercial imports from all price restrictions.

47. In the field of urban life, we will continue to work closely with the Saigon municipality. We will seek to expand the municipal services available to lower income neighborhoods and hope soon to be able to initiate the Saigon power project. We will expand our recent efforts to respond to problems of wartime expansion of urban population primarily through self-help projects. We will encourage municipal participation in facilities such as bus transportation and garbage collection.

48. Conclusion: In my last message, I noted that during the third quarter the steady progress which has been taking place here, interrupted by Tet, had not only continued but accelerated; that the tide of history is moving with us and not against us. I believe that if we give priority to the matters I have mentioned in this message, bring to bear on them all the resources available to us here, encourage and stimulate the Vietnamese to use more effectively their own resources, and intensify our efforts all along the line, we can make still greater progress in the months ahead.

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Pres file
45

Tuesday, Oct. 29, 1968
11:30 a. m.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

More on Thieu's views about a bombing halt
(Tab A).

Also, a report on De Gaulle's changing attitude
toward the U. S. (Tab B).

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE attachments~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By *rg*, NARA, Date 3-8-93

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

45a / Tab A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

29 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Views Concerning the
Bombing Halt and the Paris Talks

3.4(b)(1)


1. [REDACTED]

2. Between 23 and 25 October 1968, President Nguyen Van Thieu continued to hold discussions with a number of government officials concerning a bombing halt and the Paris talks. Among others, Thieu spoke with Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, the Prime Minister, Thieu's Special Assistant Nguyen Phu Duc, the Interior and Foreign Ministers, possibly Ambassador Bui Diem, and the Chairmen of the Upper and Lower Houses.

3. While speaking with the Legislative Chairmen, the President said he had told the Americans that he had instructed several people to contact Hanoi to determine if Hanoi felt the time was propitious to engage in talks. If the DRV does not feel the time right, the Americans had been informed that the Paris talks as well as the fighting in Vietnam would continue as is. However, if Hanoi judges the occasion right, Hanoi must then talk directly to Saigon to resolve the issues. It is imperative though, that Hanoi be serious about wanting to engage in talks. Thieu added parenthetically that if Hanoi would not agree to talks with the GVN Ambassador, Thieu would be willing to dispatch a GVN Cabinet Minister to handle the discussions. If the DRV is serious, the two sides could sit down and discuss the future of Vietnam, the question of peace, or any and all issues that either side cared to bring up.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-137
By , NARA, Date 6-17-03

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



4. The President continued, then if Hanoi "tells me to recognize the NLF, I would be willing to make that sacrifice. However, if Hanoi demands a coalition government, I would say that is unacceptable. If Hanoi asks to return to nationalist activities, I would say OK."

5. Thieu said that he was willing to see the talks drag on for months or even a year, as long as NVN was serious about the talks. They should not be used for bickering or propaganda purposes, Thieu explained, and once the talks commence, the North Vietnamese "will realize that I am serious". Thieu reiterated that it did not matter if the NLF was included in the NVN delegation. However, he would never let NVN tell the GVN to talk with the NLF.

6. Thieu was obviously concerned that NVN was guaranteeing nothing in return for a bombing halt. He stated he had told the Americans that reciprocity was the most important issue. In Thieu's opinion, the best reciprocal act would be for Hanoi to begin talks with the GVN, rather than a military de-escalation or troop withdrawal from the DMZ.

7. He was also concerned that the U. S. Government wished to do something "dramatic" in order to help Humphrey on 5 November. The inclusion of the NLF at Paris would aid Humphrey, said Thieu, but the benefits are short-range. Thieu told Vice President Ky on 25 October that he was afraid the U. S. would force the GVN to deal with the NLF. He observed, however, that the U. S. was caught between the DRV and the GVN positions on the status of the NLF at a conference.

8. Ky said he felt Thieu should propose that a three-way conference be convened including the GVN, U. S. and DRV. Thieu responded that the Americans had told him that Hanoi may refer to a three-way conference between the DRV, the U. S. and the NLF. Thieu felt, however, that if the DRV would not accept the inclusion of the NLF within the DRV delegation, then Hanoi was not yet ready to engage in serious talks.

~~SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. The President also mentioned that he was having difficulty with the Americans in that they were urging him not to speak to the press or make public statements to avoid leaks on the US/GVN talks. Thieu noted that he was trying to convey the impression that he was a man of peace who would die, not for the world, but for the people of SVN.

~~SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL~~

44

INFORMATION

LITERALLY EYES ONLY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - SENSITIVE

Tuesday, October 29, 1968 -- 8:50 a. m.

Mr. President:

Profile

I have been considering the explosive possibilities of the information that we now have on how certain Republicans may have inflamed the South Vietnamese to behave as they have been behaving.

There is no hard evidence that Mr. Nixon himself is involved. Exactly what the Republicans have been saying to Bui Diem is not wholly clear as opposed to the conclusions that Bui Diem is drawing from what they have said.

Beyond that, the materials are so explosive that they could gravely damage the country whether Mr. Nixon is elected or not. If they get out in their present form, they could be the subject of one of the most acrimonious debates we have ever witnessed.

For the larger good of the country, you may wish to consider finding an occasion to talk with Mr. Nixon, making these points:

1. Here is the sort of thing we have been getting.
2. I do not believe that you personally have been involved in this.
3. It is not clear that some of your supporters have, necessarily, done anything out of line.
4. But what is clear is that this kind of talk is inflaming the inexperienced South Vietnamese who do not understand our constitution or our political life.
5. You might then tell him, assuming that we transit today's crisis, how difficult it has been and your feeling that the Vietnamese image of some of these conversations with Republicans may have played some part.

Therefore, in the months ahead he may wish to caution his men to be exceedingly circumspect in dealing with inexperienced and impressionable South Vietnamese.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 72-941-437
By 18/isp, NARA, Date 3-8-93

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Tues., Oct. 29, 1968

3:35 p. m.

47

MR. PRESIDENT:

At Tab A is the Bunker report you already know.

At Tab B is Vance's telephonic report of his conversation with Lam.

We do owe it to Hanoi to tell them by 6 p. m. that we are not stopping the bombing tonight because, I would guess, they have already issued orders to their forces to obey at the DMZ and the cities -- and, perhaps, not to fire on our rescue aircraft.

We shall be considering this as a first item at 4:30 and probably be in touch with you from Sect. Rusk's office.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachments~~

P. S. At Tab C is the passage between Harriman and Lam, which I sent to you some time ago, which, I believe, is the basis for the second of Thanh's four points.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 720 91-484

By rg/wip, NARA, Date 3-8-93

47a

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

October 29, 1968

Ambassador Bunker called secure from Saigon at 2:00 p.m. EST (3:00 a.m. Saigon time, 10/30)

1. Bunker had just returned from the Palace where he had been asked to go to see Foreign Minister Thanh after the NSC meeting had concluded.

2. Thanh raised four points with Bunker on behalf of the GVN Leadership:

- (1) Under the SVN constitution the President is required to consult with Leaders of the Assembly and the Leaders would have to be convened and possibly a plenary session of the Assembly in order to approve going ahead with negotiations.
- (2) President Thieu had been disturbed by a report from Ambassador Lam in Paris in which Lam claimed that Harriman had stated that the US was not opposed to a separate NLF delegation and the US could not force the DRV to negotiate with the GVN directly. Bunker pointed out our whole position was based on the "our side/your side" formula and that we had made it clear to the GVN that we could not tell Hanoi how to organize its side; just as Hanoi could not tell us how to organize our side.
- (3) Questions of procedure must be settled before the GVN would go to the first meeting because it did not want that first meeting to be disrupted. Bunker made it clear we could not settle procedures in advance but would present a united front with the GVN on procedures at that time.
- (4) Thieu and Ky need more time for preparation. The GVN delegation is not ready and cannot get ready by November 2.

3. Thieu had gone to bed but would be sending a personal message to President Johnson later Wednesday morning.

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: 719 89-317
By: ng/af NARA Date: 3-8-93

4. Bunker stated in summary that it is clear the GVN is not ready to proceed. Bunker told Thanh that he would have to report to Washington that the GVN was not willing to go ahead for the four reasons given by the Foreign Minister. Thanh said that President Thieu intends to instruct Lam to return to Saigon. Bunker told Thanh that Bui Diem should come in and discuss these problems with us in Washington.

5. Bunker suggests that we consider giving the GVN 24 more hours before cessation and perhaps two days more (until November 4) for the first meeting, but he does not know whether such a proposal would be accepted.

BWR

Benjamin H. Read

476

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

October 29, 1968

Ambassador Vance called at 3:00 p.m. on the secure phone (9:00 p.m. Paris time)

1. Vance opened his meeting with Lau in accordance with instructions from the Secretary with a statement that he had not yet received instructions. Vance stated that there were a number of complexities in the picture on our side because of the allied elements, the need for consultations here and in other capitals and the time zone differences. He said we had worked intensively on the problem and as soon as he received instructions he would let Lau know.

2. Lau asked Vance to explain what our problems were. He asked if the shift of time (from 1600 GMT to 0001 GMT) was what had caused us difficulties. If so, Lau said, let him know and the DRV would take it into consideration. If the U.S. could not accept the secret minute we should also let him know that fact. Lau said he understood that we had complexities but again asked us to let him know what our problems were.

3. At the end of the brief meeting Lau said if the U.S. was not going to stop the bombing tonight at the time the DRV had proposed, we should let him know before midnight (Paris time)-- "that is only fair".

4. Comment:

Vance thinks that if we do not intend to order cessation tonight we should let Lau know by midnight Paris time. Vance believes that the DRV may be prepared to drop its demand for a secret minute if we insist, particularly if we are able to indicate to them that we are prepared to stop the bombing at 1600 GMT Wednesday, as we originally proposed.

BUR

Benjamin H. Read

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72884-317
By rg/jap, NARA, Date 3-8-93

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

In B

~~TOP SECRET~~

KAE518
KAS18
ZCZCKAE518

1968 OCT 21 16 33

This is complete text of msg received earlier in gabled form.

OO [redacted]
DE [redacted] 2951555
O 211540Z ZYH
FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)
ZEN

~~TOP SECRET~~ TRINE SECTION ONE OF TWO
TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A [redacted] MESSAGE.
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

XXMMENF31 FTE2116S
3/0/[redacted] T - 68 CHANGE 1((A))

REPORT ON 19 OCTOBER PARIS MEETING BETWEEN U.S. AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS CONCERNING TRUCE TALKS

XXCC

[redacted] 20 OCT 68 [redacted]

3.3(16)(1)(3)

[redacted] TALK WITH HARRIMAN, WITH VANCE AND HABIB PRESENT, [redacted] 19 OCTOBER FROM 1500 TO 1800 HOURS. [redacted] INFORMED HARRIMAN [redacted] GOVERNMENT WAS CATEGORICALLY OPPOSED TO THE NLF ((NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT)) PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE AS A SEPARATE ENTITY FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION AND [redacted] WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IF THE NLF IS ADMITTED IN THIS WAY. [redacted]

[redacted] NOT [redacted] PARTICIPATION AT A CONFERENCE WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE NLF AS SEPARATE ENTITIES AN ADVANTAGE THAT COULD JUSTIFY A TOTAL BOMBING HALT OF NORTH VIETNAM.

[redacted] WARNED HARRIMAN ABOUT COMMUNIST MANEUVERS TO DIFFERENTIATE THE TWO WARS. HERE ARE HARRIMAN'S OFFICIAL REPLIES:

1. [redacted] REALLY SHOULD BRING THESE MATTERS UP WITH WASHINGTON. IN ANY CASE, [redacted] EXTREMELY SURPRISED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAS GONE BACK TO A QUESTION ON WHICH AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, TO WIT, THE NLF'S PARTICIPATION.
2. IT IS A BIG MISTAKE [redacted] NOT TO REALIZE HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO ARRANGE [redacted] PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAS MORE TO GAIN THAN THE FRONT AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE, FOR IN THIS WAY HANOI DOES NOT RECOGNIZE SOUTH VIETNAM.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 02-115
By io, NARA, Date 2-18-05

3. [REDACTED] POSITION WILL FIND NO SUPPORT IN THE U.S. [REDACTED] SUPER, REGARDLESS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FUTURE, AND EVEN AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

4. [REDACTED] HOW [REDACTED] CAN CONTINUE TO CONFUSE REALITY WITH FANTASY.

3.3 (b)(1)(3)

5. HARRIMAN [REDACTED] THE U.S. WAS SENDING A MILLION TROOPS AND SPENDING THIRTY BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR FOR PRINCIPLES AND NOT FOR FANTASY." ((B))

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THERE IS NOTHING ELSE LEFT SAVE THE CONDITIONS FOR THIS PARTICIPATION, WHICH MUST BE SET UP IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE NLF CANNOT EXPLOIT THIS EVENT AS A POLITICAL VICTORY AND IT IS INDEED THIS POINT THAT HAS BEEN [REDACTED] CONCERN. PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS ARE AS IMPORTANT AS OTHER BASIC PROBLEMS.

AFTER THIS CLARIFICATION, [REDACTED] SEVERAL QUESTIONS TO HARRIMAN:

1. CAN [REDACTED] CONSIDER AS FACT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AGREES THAT THE NLF DELEGATION WILL NOT BE A SEPARATE ENTITY FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION? ANSWER: "I DON'T . . . BUT WE BELIEVE THEY WILL ACT AS SEPARATE DELEGATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY WILL GIVE PRESS CONFERENCES; THEY WILL SAY WHAT THEY WISH TO SAY; THEY ARE MEN, THEY CAN WALK ON THEIR FEET." ((B))

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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1968 OCT 21 16 42

ZCZCKAE519

00 [REDACTED]
DE [REDACTED] 2951555

O 211549Z ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR McCAFFERTY)

ZEM

3.3
(b)(1,3)

~~TOP SECRET TRIME~~ FINAL SECTION OF TWO

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A [REDACTED] MESSAGE.
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.
3/0 [REDACTED] T - 68 CHANGE 1((A))

4. WILL THE OTHER ALLIES PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS WHEN MILITARY PROBLEMS COME UP FOR DISCUSSION? ANSWER: "NOT NECESSARILY. WE WILL KEEP THEM INFORMED."((B))

5. DO YOU AGREE THAT POLITICAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATIONS ONLY? REPLY: "YES."((B))

6. GIVEN THE TWO SIDES FORMULA, HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE AMERICAN PRESENCE -- AS PRINCIPAL ALLY, AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ALLIES OR, FINALLY, AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE FIGHTING? ANSWER: WE HAVE BILATERAL PROBLEMS TO BE RESOLVED WITH THE OTHER PARTY.

7. DO YOU FORESEE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AS A FINAL STAGE, WITH ALLIED PARTICIPATION AND PROBABLE PARTICIPATION BY OTHER POWERS? ANSWER: "IT IS NOT EXCLUDED."((B))

IN CONCLUSION, IT SEEMS [REDACTED] DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THE TWO SIDES FORMULA OR TO AVOID THE NLF'S APPEARING AS A SEPARATE ENTITY. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE NLF DELEGATION WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS SUCH. ALL [REDACTED] CAN DO IS TO PAY NO ATTENTION TO THE PRESENCE OF THE NLF ACROSS [REDACTED] AND ADDRESS [REDACTED] REMARKS TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION ONLY, EVEN IF THE . . . INTERVENE. IT. . . HOWEVER, THAT THE HANOI DELEGATION WILL TAKE THE SAME. . . IN THIS REGARD. IN ALL PROBABILITY, THEREFORE, EVERYTHING WILL TAKE PLACE AS IF THERE WERE ONLY TWO PARTIES, EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE FOUR DELEGATIONS PARTICIPATING.

3.3
(b)(1,3)

ON PARTING, HARRIMAN REASSURED [REDACTED] SAYING, "WE DO NOT BEHAVE LIKE THE FRENCH."((B)) ALSO, HE QUOTED SOMETHING ROSTOW TOLD BUI DIEM. TO THE EFFECT THAT [REDACTED] WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS FOR [REDACTED] IF [REDACTED] REMAIN TOO SUSPICIOUS AND THAT WITH MORE CONFIDENCE [REDACTED] WOULD REACH [REDACTED] GOALS. HARRIMAN SAID HE WAS IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH ROSTOW AND ADVISED US NOT TO PAY TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MATTER OF FORM.

3.3
(b)(1,3)

((A))

((B))

XXRH
628

(SANITIZED)
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-413
By CB, NARA Date 6-21-99

PAR - CODEWORD

47c

~~TOP SECRET~~
RECEIVED

KAE5 18
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1968 OCT 21 15 33

*This is complete text of
msg received earlier in garbled
form.*

00 [redacted]
DE [redacted] 2951555 1.5(c),(d),(g)
O 211540Z ZYH
FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A [redacted] MESSAGE.
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION ARE REQUIRED.
THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

1.5(c),(d),(g)

[redacted]
XXNNENP01 FTE21168
3/0/[redacted] T - 68 CHANGE 1((A))

REPORT ON 19 OCTOBER PARIS MEETING BETWEEN U. S. AND SOUTH
VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS CONCERNING TRUCE TALKS

XXCC
[redacted] 20 OCT 68 [redacted]

1.5(c),(d),(g)

[redacted] TALK WITH HARRIMAN, WITH VANCE AND HABIB
PRESENT, [redacted] 19 OCTOBER FROM 1500 TO 1800 HOURS. [redacted]
[redacted] INFORMED HARRIMAN [redacted] GOVERNMENT WAS CATEGORICALLY
OPPOSED TO THE NLF ((NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT)) PARTICIPATION IN
THE CONFERENCE AS A SEPARATE ENTITY FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
DELEGATION AND [redacted] WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
IF THE NLF IS ADMITTED IN THIS WAY. [redacted]

1.5(c),(d),(g)

[redacted] NOT [redacted] PARTICIPATION AT A CONFERENCE WITH THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE NLF AS SEPARATE ENTITIES AN ADVANTAGE
THAT COULD JUSTIFY A TOTAL BOMBING HALT OF NORTH VIETNAM. [redacted]
[redacted] WARNED HARRIMAN ABOUT COMMUNIST MANEUVERS TO DIFFERENTIATE
THE TWO WARS. HERE ARE HARRIMAN'S OFFICIAL REPLIES:

1. [redacted] REALLY SHOULD BRING THESE MATTERS UP WITH
WASHINGTON. IN ANY CASE, [redacted] EXTREMELY SURPRISED THAT THE
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAS GONE BACK TO A QUESTION
ON WHICH AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, TO
WIT, THE NLF'S PARTICIPATION.

1.5(c),(d),(g)

2. IT IS A BIG MISTAKE [redacted] NOT TO
REALIZE HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO ARRANGE [redacted] PARTICIPATION
IN THE CONFERENCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAS
MORE TO GAIN THAN THE FRONT AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE, FOR IN
THIS WAY HANOI DOES NOT RECOGNIZE SOUTH VIETNAM.

1.5(c),(d),(g)

3. [REDACTED] POSITION WILL FIND NO SUPPORT IN THE U.S. [REDACTED] SURE, REGARDLESS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FUTURE, AND EVEN AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

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1.5(c),(d),(g)

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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Tab C

~~TOP SECRET TRIME~~
~~TOP SECRET TRIME~~
SECRET

ZCZCKAE519

..... 1968 OCT 21 16 42

00 [REDACTED]
DE [REDACTED] 2951555 1.5(c), (d), (g)
O 211540Z ZYH
FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN: MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)
ZEM

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3/0 [REDACTED] T - 68 CHANGE 1((A))

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US NOT TO PAY TOO MUCH ATTENTION TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
MATTER OF FORM. 1.5(c), (d), (g)

((A))
((B))

XXHH
620

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Tuesday, October 29, 1968 - 2:50 pm

Mr. President:

Subject: The Bombing Halt and U. S. Politics.

Pres file

Seen as coolly as I can, this is Saigon's view:

- Hanoi and Moscow have tried to time the bombing halt to help Humphrey;
- They believe President Johnson either wishes to time the bombing halt to help Humphrey or has been put in the position where Hanoi and Moscow can control the timing;
- They are afraid of Humphrey and want Nixon elected;
- They believe it is fair, under these circumstances, to use their bargaining leverage to prevent a bombing halt before November 5;
- In this position they may have been encouraged, to an extent we cannot specify, by some in the Nixon entourage.

I have no "therefore" yet; but we shall be meeting in Sec. Rusk's office at 4:30 p.m. today with Sec. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler.

W. W. Rostow

~~WWRostow:rla~~

WWRostow:rla

October 29, 1968

Pres. file

49

Dear Abe:

One hundred-odd years ago President Lincoln found a general.

I have been lucky enough to find two field generals. In the last three months you have fully exploited the situation created during the last three years by your predecessor, General Westmoreland.

But you and I know that the really crucial stage of both diplomatic and military operations is now upon us. If we are to win the kind of peace in Paris we want, you must keep the enemy on the run -- in South Vietnam and in Laos.

In the time that I shall continue to bear responsibility here, I wish you to apply the manpower and resources at your command to maximum effect.

I want you to inspire the ARVN to do the same. If you need anything that we can get you quickly, let me know.

Your President and your country are counting on you to follow the enemy in relentless pursuit. Don't give them a minute's rest. Keep pouring it on. Let the enemy feel the weight of everything you've got.

With luck and with Abe, we shall conquer ourselves a peace in the next three months -- without the loss of a single battle or skirmish -- as General Winfield Scott did 120-some years ago.

Sincerely,

General Creighton W. Abrams
Commander
U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

LBJ:WWR:ms

INFORMATION

50
/

EYES ONLY

**Tuesday, October 29, 1968
12:50 p.m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith a somewhat more detailed
account from Gene about the conversation
briefly reported to you this morning.**

W. W. Rostow

Oct. 29, 1968

50a

Walt:

I had a further talk with my informant about the luncheon conversation he attended yesterday.

The man who spoke was a member of the banking community, a colleague, a man he has known for many years, and one in whose honesty he has absolute confidence. The speaker is reputed to be very close to Nixon -- as close as Gabriel Hauge (it was not Hauge). (He feels he cannot give me his name.)

The conversation was in the context of a professional discussion about the future of the financial markets in the near term.

The speaker said he thought the prospects for a bombing halt or a cease-fire were dim, because Nixon was playing the problem as he did the Fortas affair -- to block. He was taking public positions intended to achieve that end. They would incite Saigon to be difficult, and Hanoi to wait.

Part of his strategy was an expectation that an offensive would break out soon, that we would have to spend a great deal more (and incur more casualties) -- a fact which would adversely affect the stock market and the bond market. NVN offensive action was a definite element in their thinking about the future.

These difficulties would make it easier for Nixon to settle after January. Like Ike in 1953, he would be able to settle on terms which the President could not accept, blaming the deterioration of the situation between now and January or February on his predecessor.

Gene

Tues., Oct. 29, 1968
12:35 p. m.

Profile

51

Mr. President:

**Herewith a note from Andy
Goodpaster to you.**

W. W. Rostow

Attachment



Saigon, 26 Oct 1968

Dear Mr President,

In this moment which may be an important turning point of the war, I would like you to know of the tremendous gratitude we as military men and loyal Americans feel to you for the firm strength you have exerted and the burdens you have carried. In the better day that seems to lie before us, that thought will remain with us.

I would like you to know also that in my judgment you can be sure that we here will do all that can be done in this area toward fulfillment of your purpose.

With great respect, and best wishes to you and your family. Sincerely,
Andrew Good

(Oct. 29, 1968)

52a

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

1. Orders have been issued to stop all air, naval, and artillery bombardment and all other acts involving the use of force against the territory of the DRV as of 0001 GMT Wednesday.

We cannot guarantee that all units will receive these orders in time to put them into effect at the designated hour , but if not, they will be doing so as soon as they receive their orders shortly thereafter.

2. Tell the DRV our announcement will be at the time of cessation.

3. Agree with the DRV to announce tomorrow morning Paris time that the regular Wednesday meeting is cancelled.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 729 91-484
By ng/wip, NARA, Date 3-8-93

53

TOP SECRET

Monday, October 28, 1968

Luncheon with the President
Tuesday, October 29, 1968, 1:00 P.M.

AGENDA

1. Negotiations with Israel - Secretary Rusk
-- Report on current exchanges with Tel Aviv on Phantom Planes
2. Panama - Secretary Rusk
-- Recognition requested by new junta
3. Talk with USSR on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions - Secretary Rusk
-- Should these talks be rescheduled? They were originally set for October 7. (TAB A)
4. Other

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 10, NARA, Date 3-16-93

TOP SECRET

5:00



536

2. US/Soviet Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Talks ~~(TAB C)~~

We owe the Soviets our views on when these talks, originally scheduled for Moscow October 7, should be rescheduled.

ACDA suggests holding these talks on the side between November 10 and 15 at a conference on Peaceful Nuclear Activities scheduled for Washington which is sponsored by the Atomic Industrial Forum and American Nuclear Society. A number of foreign countries, including the Soviet Union will be sending scientists and ACDA suggests that a bilateral US/Soviet PNE talks would attract minimal public attention.

EUR suggests that we first consult our NATO allies about our plans to hold the PNE talks and then inform the Soviets that the US would be prepared to hold such talks on November 11-12 in Vienna. EUR notes that although a few Soviet scientists will come to the Washington conference November 10-15 they are not at the level of Federov and his associates who would be undertaking the PNE talks for the USSR.

Tab. F.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

530

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

October 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO: S/S - Mr. Read

FROM: Adrian S. Fisher
Acting Director

AS Fisher

SUBJECT: Technical Talks on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

At the small staff meeting on October 8, I told the Acting Secretary I believe that, viewed purely from the substantive point of view, we should be in no hurry to start bilateral talks with the Soviets on PNE's. These talks will only whet the appetites of non-nuclear, non-aligned countries. Neither we nor presumably the Soviets will be in a position to offer PNE's to such countries for some time to come. We may have a problem at the UNGA--as we had at the NNC--over PNE's. Moreover, there could be domestic political difficulties if bilateral talks, relating to Article V of the NPT, were started before Senate action on the Treaty.

However, if there is a political reason for agreeing to hold bilateral talks on a technical subject in the near future, ACDA would have no objection to them. And I would of course agree that bilateral talks with the Soviets on PNE's will be desirable at some time in the future.

If a decision is made to go ahead with such talks in the near future, I suggest that an alternative to having the talks in Vienna or Geneva would be to hold them on the margin of a conference on peaceful nuclear activities being held November 8 - 10 in Washington. This

10 - 15

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-8-02*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

conference is being sponsored by the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Society and a number of foreign countries, including the USSR, have been asked to send representatives. If bilateral PNE talks were held before, during, or after this conference, I believe they would be less likely to attract public attention than a meeting in Geneva or Vienna. We would not have to make a public announcement, nor should we make any special effort to conceal the talks. If they become known publicly, we could explain that they were routine. There is no reason why we could not explain to NAC in advance what we are doing.

If it is decided that we should nevertheless hold talks in a neutral European city sometime around mid-November, we think Vienna, as a center for international nuclear activities, is distinctly preferable to Geneva.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCT 14 1968

S/S - Mr. Read

SUBJECT: Technical Talks on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

1. I interpret Mr. Fisher's memorandum of October 11 (attached) to mean that ACDA will not insist on its objections to the technical talks if the Secretary, for political reasons, wishes to go ahead with them. It might be useful for the Secretary to raise the matter at the Tuesday Lunch and obtain an indication of the President's thinking.

2. With the Secretary's approval, EUR would propose to consult our NATO allies concerning our plan to hold these talks with the Soviets. EUR would then inform the Soviet Embassy at the Bureau level that the U.S. would be prepared to hold the talks on November 11-12, in Vienna. If necessary, a low-key public announcement would be made a few days before the talks are to begin.

3. We have considered ACDA's suggestion to have the talks in Washington in connection with an already scheduled conference on peaceful nuclear activities, November 10-15. Although a few Soviet scientists were invited, none are presently expected, and we believe that the appearance of Academician Federov and his associates would be bound to arouse press interest and inquiry. As between neutral European cities, we concur in ACDA's preference for Vienna, the established center for international nuclear activities, as the proposed site for the technical talks.

MT
Malcolm Toon
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs

Attachment:

Mr. Fisher's memorandum
dated October 11, 1968.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-8-02

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JD *SKM*
EUR:SOV:JGMacCracken:erk 10/14/68

Tal F

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting at 12:00 Noon Today -- Pakistan Tanks
and Indian Aid

The two issues before you are:

1. Ayub's tanks. The issue is whether to:

- a. Spend \$3 million in military aid funds to try to persuade Turkey to sell 100 M-47's to Pakistan. We would replace them with 100 M-48's. Nitze says he can find the money.
- b. Or remove the ban on arms aid to the subcontinent altogether and sell the tanks directly to Ayub. If the Turkish deal falls through, this would be the only practical alternative to get Ayub even 100 tanks. My earlier memo and Nick Katzenbach's are attached.

2. Indian aid. You asked me to lay out for you alternative aid packages.

These facts should be taken into consideration:

-- There is no pressing food shortage in India. But the Indians need:

- a. Food imports to keep prices down and to help them continue their promising program of agricultural reform.
- b. They need fertilizer imports for next spring's harvest. If they cut back here, they will not get the full advantage of the miracle seeds now in place.

-- The Indians fear a sharp cutback in foreign development aid. They expected a commitment of \$200 million from IDA by now. They can no longer count on this. Second, they are completely in the dark about the U.S. program. Normally we would have pledged our aid

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-208

~~SECRET~~

By WJP, NARA, Date 4-26-95

*To be taken
up at lunch
meeting today*

54

for fiscal 1969 in a consortium meeting held in late summer or early fall. There has been no meeting because of uncertainty about what the Congress would appropriate.

- a. The danger is they may over-react. By overcautious budgetary decisions -- which they are in process of making now -- they could in effect put their whole development program in suspense.
- b. Whether they over-react or not, the sharper the cutback in available foreign exchange, the sharper the cutback they will have to make in development investment.

These are the alternatives:

- a. Food aid only. This could range from one million tons to the 2.3 million tons we originally proposed. One million tons would reopen the pipeline and give the Indians some confidence. The 2.3 million ton figure (which would bring our 1968 shipments up to the 1967 level) would give them the best chance of getting a grip on their agricultural price and supply problems.
- b. Food aid plus an interim loan commitment. Building from the food aid decision, we would add say \$100 million as a loan commitment now. This would be large enough to have a good psychological impact and would still leave roughly half the fiscal 1969 appropriation for decision by your successor. Perhaps half the loan money would be for fertilizer and the rest for industrial imports. Bill Gaud would have to decide on the mix in light of the total program.
- c. Food aid plus the total FY 69 AID appropriation for India. This would mean food aid plus an estimated \$195 million in loan money. (We gave \$285 million last year.) The main argument for committing the full amount now is that it would do the most good now. It would have the greatest impact on Indian budgetary decisions and on their fertilizer procurement policy. It would give them some margin to

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

gamble that IDA may still come through by the middle of 1969. Your successor would still have the decision to make on calendar 1969 food aid and time to work out the next India consortium pledge and get it through the Congress.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

for 12:15 p. m. meeting
Oct. 29

Pres file

~~SECRET~~/EX DIS

Monday, October 28, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

You have asked for a meeting at 12:15 p. m., Tuesday, October 29 to discuss the attached paper on tanks for Pakistan.

The recommendation is that we try to make a third-country sale through Turkey work to get 100 tanks for Ayub. This would cost about \$3 million to meet Turkish requirements, but Nick Katzenbach and his SIG colleagues judge this an acceptable cost for a real stab at this nagging problem.

However, no one pretends that this will solve our military assistance problems in the subcontinent. Third-country sales aren't very satisfactory, as this Pak tank deal proves. Therefore, we must at least ask ourselves whether we should just lift our ban altogether. There's something to be said for taking that step and giving your successor freedom of maneuver. But Nick and others believe you should leave that decision to the next Administration. While it would be harder in the Congress to remove the ban than to put it back on, it would be harder in the subcontinent to put it back on after removing it. So Nick recommends making the Turkish deal work to meet at least part of Ayub's need and leaving the big problem to your successor.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-208
By WJ, NARA, Date 4-26-95

MEMORANDUM

527-
SET UP MEETING THE WHITE HOUSE
SOON TO DISCUSS THIS WASHINGTON

55.
ACTION

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Friday, October 25, 1968
3:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Tanks for Pakistan

At Tab A Nick Katzenbach advises that we have reached the decision point in the nagging year-old effort to find Patton tanks for Ayub. If you feel strongly about this obligation, he recommends that we pay the cost (\$3 million) of arranging an interim sale through Turkey, the only feasible third-country deal we've been able to turn up. Failing a Turkish deal, Katzenbach thinks we should tell Ayub we have honestly done our best and he will have to look elsewhere. With the support of his SIG colleagues, Nick lays out your main options:

1. Turkish sale: The Turks apparently won't sell 100 M-47's to Pakistan unless they can get 100 refurbished M-48's for themselves in the bargain. This will cost us about \$3 million; Nitze is prepared to find the money within current budget limits. But this would take care of only half of the 200 tanks Ayub wants. Defense is not ready to chip in another \$3 million for another round of the Turk-to-Pak tank switch. Katzenbach and Co. recommend you can and should leave the second 100 tanks for your successor. One hundred now at \$3 million and 100 left hanging is the preferred course.

2. Iran: The Shah will sell 100 old M-47's to Ayub if we replace them with new M-60's. This would add \$22 million to Iran's planned purchases. Thus it would fly in the face of our budget-cutting advice to the Shah and probably raise a storm on the Hill. No one recommends this alternative.

3. Change policy for one-time exception: You could lift the current ban on direct U.S. weapons sales to the subcontinent just to sell Ayub these tanks. Your advisors think this would be the worst of worlds. It would mock a policy we've all defended up to this moment, be certain to bring an outcry from the Hill, and deeply embitter the Indians, who have always feared that we didn't mean our even-handed policy following the 1965 war. Chet Bowles feels strongly that it's far better to remove the arms ban for good-- whatever flak this would bring in India -- rather than try to carry off a one-time exception for Pak arms clearly aimed at the Indians.

4. Reverse current policy: You could lift the South Asian arms ban altogether because of (a) the demonstrable argument that third

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-212

By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

country sales just don't work, and (b) the policy judgment that arms sales are the only way to get the seat we want at Pak and Indian tables to influence -- and, hopefully, restrain -- their inevitable military spending. As with all military sales, we would be deciding sales to India and Pakistan case-by-case on the grounds of legitimate need and aiming at ultimate limitation of arms spending.

~~Nick would like to see us do everything we can to make the Turkish sale work because removing the ban altogether will surely present us with a sizeable and expensive shopping list from the Paks.~~ And though they would make righteous noises at first about our policy switch, the Indians would also soon be pressing to buy. Certainly we could call the shots on what we even consider selling. But no one can be sure that lifting the ban, arousing expectations, and then turning down numerous requests wouldn't leave us with less leverage on the Indians and Paks than we have now. Whatever its effect abroad, a change in policy would bring sharp reaction from the Hill.

Despite these strong arguments against lifting the ban, Nick and his colleagues feel that if the Turkish deal is unworkable -- and you personally feel a commitment to Ayub -- ~~the next best way to get him the tanks would be to change present policy across the board.~~ We hoped third-country purchases would add enough flexibility to our policy to make it livable. If that door just won't open, then we have to make the hard choice between abandoning the military field in the subcontinent altogether and staying in the game. Nick would argue for staying in the game, but he'd prefer to see that choice left to your successor. ~~That's why he thinks it's worth \$3 million to make the Turkish deal work.~~

Indian Reaction

~~It goes without saying that any of the above actions which get Ayub his tanks will make us unpopular in India for awhile.~~ Even though the Indians have made major purchases from the Soviets, even if the tanks got to Ayub via a third country entirely in the context of our current no-favorites arms policy, and even though we approved a British sale of Hawker-Hunters to the Indians under the same policy provision, this deal would be our first involvement in a major Pakistani arms purchase since the 1965 war.

Peshawar Negotiations

~~Nick believes -- and I tend to agree -- that the tanks should be kept separate from Peshawar talks. Ben Oehlert has long felt that the tanks~~

would enable us to make the best of our withdrawal from the base. You should know, however, that it looks as if Ayub has already turned around and largely met our request for an extension of certain facilities several months beyond the July 1969 close-out of the agreement. Ayub will see this as a major concession; Ben points out (Tab B) that Ayub talked about tanks in the same breath.

RECOMMENDATION

This is a mixed bag. Following Nick's recommendation and offering \$3 million in replacement tanks to the Turks is clearly the easiest way out. But we should consider that we are only prolonging the agony in South Asian arms policy. It could be argued that this is the time to scrap current policy as plainly unworkable, take the public heat and let the new Administration see if open sales can work at all. Your successor would probably find it easier to clamp back on the ban than to take it off.

On balance, my own vote goes with Katzenbach to make the Turkish deal work.

W W Rostow

Try Turkish deal with sweetener as last effort _____

Turkish deal with sweetener but fall back to changing policy _____

Change policy now _____

One-time exception _____

Let Turkish deal ride; tell Paks to come back to my successor _____

Call me _____

** At Tab C is Oellert's personal message to you - arrived today back channel Walt*

3209

556

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1968

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Tanks for Pakistan

We are again at a crossroads on Pakistan's desire to acquire M-47 tanks. We have made a very hard try to find a third country supplier. Belgium and Italy, which once were on the verge of selling to Pakistan, have pulled back, primarily for domestic political reasons over which we have no control. So has West Germany. The remaining options have drawbacks and whether we pursue them at this time depends in large part on your feelings about the commitment made to Ayub.

If you are satisfied that your promise to Ayub was a "best endeavors" effort to assist the Paks in every way to buy from third countries, then I think a good case can be made that we have discharged that obligation and, with one possible exception, which I will discuss below nothing more need be done by this Administration.

If, on the other hand, you feel that getting the tanks to Ayub is required regardless of our preferred policy of no direct sales of lethal end-items, then we should examine how to do this and what the consequences might be.

The options as we see them are as follows:

Maintaining Present Policy

1. Third Country Sale by Turkey: We have made a strong pitch to the Turks to sell 100 of their old US MAP M-47s to Pakistan. The Paks would pay a total of \$1.5 million based on residual value. If we added this

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-213
By cs, NARA, Date 1-18-96

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-2-

\$1.5 million to the Turkish MAP, it would, however, only enable the Turks to get an extra 35-40 more sophisticated M-48s from us.

Ambassador Hart believes that the Turks will not settle for less than a one-for-one replacement. To get 100 M-48s to the Turks would cost us about \$3 million more (additional to the \$1.5 million the Paks would pay for the M-47s) to pay for rehabilitated M-48s. However, the Paks have recently reiterated their understanding that what was discussed was 200 tanks, in two tranches of 100 tanks each; if the number of tanks is 200, and assuming that there is a commitment, the cost to the US would be about \$6 million in order to encourage Turkey to sell 200 as-is where-is M-47s to Pakistan for \$3 million. DOD would have difficulty finding this money in the current tight situation and, in the end, it would probably mean cutting another program in the area by a like amount. We believe that only a decision on the first 100 tanks is necessary now. The decision on the second 100 tanks can and should be left to the next administration.

2. An Iranian Third Country Sale: Iran has indicated it would sell the Paks 100 of its old M-47s if we allowed it to buy 100 new tanks (probably M-60s) to replace them. This would add at least \$22 million to Iran's already planned purchases which we have been trying to keep down and which have caused some concern on the Hill.

Changing our Present Policy

3. One-time Exception to Existing Ban on Direct US Sale of Lethal End-Items to India and Pakistan: We could make a one-time exception to existing policy to meet what appears to be a legitimate Pakistani need. This would be difficult all around. The policy has been endorsed by the SIG and defended to Congress and the public as appropriate to the situation in 1967 and early

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1968. Our only justification for an exception would be that its third country sales provisions are proving unworkable. In which case, the obvious question is why not change them. Also, the one-time exception idea would not be believed by either India or Pakistan, both of which would regard it as a return to the status quo ante pre - 1965 war.

4. Remove the Ban on Direct Lethal End-Item Sales to India and Pakistan and Consider These on a Case-by-Case Basis as we do with Spare Parts and Non-Lethal Items: The cases would be decided on criteria now followed in deciding sales of lethal spares and in approving sales by third countries; that there is a clearly established critical need and that such sales contribute to arms limitation or reduced military expenditure and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance between the two. Also the items should not be additive, at least in terms of the normal concepts of military power. In addition, we would have to go beyond these general criteria in order to meet both the letter and spirit of the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments.

If we open this door on tanks we must do so in the knowledge that the Government of Pakistan wants, in the words of Foreign Minister Arshad Husain, 'their arms to be in large part of U.S. origin'. By this they mean, in addition to the 200 tanks, at least seven (and possibly fifty) F-104 interceptors, five B-57 bombers, four hundred 106mm recoilless rifles, one hundred and twenty-five 175mm guns, sixteen patrol boats with missiles, etc. The Indians, without mentioning numbers, have recently spoken of an interest in purchasing A4E, F-4 and even F-111 aircraft. These are expensive items. Our present guess is that both sides would desire to purchase greater amounts than we will consider their economies could afford. Despite their requests we could hold their purchases from the U.S. to a figure which we would establish as reasonable.

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-4-

However, we do not know where this changed sales policy might lead, nor the political effects of failing to make additional sales after notifying both countries that the ban has been lifted.

These then are the options. There are two arguments for changing our policy at this time:

1. We have a commitment to Ayub that should in all justice be honored. We have tried the third country route and failed and now owe him the tanks;
2. Our policy needs to be changed in any event and this is a good opportunity.

The first point needs no amplification. On the second, a case can be made that we cannot, and in effect have not, had a static policy. In 1965 we cut off all military assistance to both countries. In 1966, we agreed to resume shipment of certain non-lethal items. For the last 18 months, we have been prepared to see certain lethal items sold from third countries. Now, it can be argued, we should move to a case-by-case direct sale policy so that we can have some supplier relationship to both parties again and meet their wishes not to be completely dependent on Communist sources.

Against this line of argument, I would put essentially two points. This is a choice better left to your successor. (Although some would argue that, since a new administration will be forced in this direction, an outgoing administration can more easily take the heat that will inevitably follow.) The second point is that there would be great flak, particularly in the Congress where our pre-1965 sales to both sides was felt to have fueled an arms race that led to a conflict. Tanks for Pakistan and many of the other items either India or Pakistan are likely to want from us are mainly related to Pak/Indian hostility and not the Chinese threat. This would be seen as a failure of US policy and portrayed as such publicly. I recognize that by January and with a new administration this

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reaction might not be as great as I foresee. But, as Bill Gaud strongly feels, we must take account of the effect this could have on aid legislation in the next Congress.

One word about Peshawar. I do not think that your decision ought to be taken in relation to the current Peshawar talks. These now seem to be moving along in the right direction. The commitment to Ayub was not linked to Peshawar and we should not now look at it in that light. Ben Oehlert continues to feel that a favorable move on the tanks would ease relations in the period when we are closing the base. The Peshawar episode may, however, affect your judgment on that grey area of choice about how far we are willing to go to meet Ayub's desires on hardware.

In sum, and these conclusions are shared by my SIG colleagues, if we had the choice we would not change our policy at this time. We would push ahead on the Turk sale (Option 1) even though it involves about \$3 million, and, if it should fail, inform the Paks that we had reached the end of the line and are unprepared to move to direct sale.

We recognize, however, that you may feel more of a commitment than we read into the language of your statements to Ayub. In which case, we believe the case-by-case policy (Option 4) is preferred and that the situation, although difficult and not without risk, is manageable.

Before proceeding on any of the options, Congressional consultation would be required. This will not be satisfactory after adjournment but we will try to reach as many of the interested Congressional leaders as possible.

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
Recommendation for decision:

Approve Option One and if no sale can be arranged from Turkey inform the GOP that we have exhausted possibilities of a sale and further progress in this matter is up to them.

Approve Option One and if that does not work move to Option Four

Approve Option Three

Do nothing more and notify Paks they will have to take up with the next Administration


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach



Department of State

TELEGRAM

554

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PAGE 01 RAWALP 08628 201347Z

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ACTION SS: 30

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Authority FRNS 64-68, vol. 25 4517

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, /031 W

By jc NARA, Date 3-8-02

O: 200900Z OCT 68
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5037

S: ~~SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 8628

EXDIS

SUBJECT: PESHAWAR/TANKS

PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE

FROM AMBASSADOR

1. LAST EVENING PRESIDENT AYUB PHONED ME TO SAY THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO QUOTE TAKE A CALCULATED RISK UNQUOTE AND AGREE TO SOME EXTENSION OF BASE OPERATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF MY PREVIOUS PROPOSAL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS WILLING TO TAKE SUCH A RISK BECAUSE HE WAS ANXIOUS TO BE HELPFUL TO USG IN ANY WAY HE COULD.

2. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED SECRETARY YUSUF TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AND WORK OUT THE DETAILS.

3. AYUB THEN SAID THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER MATTER HE HAD MEANT TO DISCUSS WITH ME THE EVENING BEFORE. HE REMINDED ME OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND ME IN KARACHI LAST DECEMBER 23 ABOUT QUOTE HORSES UNQUOTE; SAID HE GREATLY APPRECIATED ALL THE EFFORTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE IN THAT DIRECTION; AND THAT HE HOPES THAT THOSE EFFORTS WOULD BE CARRIED FORWARD TO EARLY FRUITION BECAUSE HE BADLY NEEDED THE QUOTE HORSES UNQUOTE.

4. I ASSURED HIM THAT EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT WAS BEING MADE.

5. PURSUANT TO APPOINTMENT I MET WITH YUSUF AT 1000 HOURS THIS MORNING. HE HANDED ME AN UNOFFICIAL UNSIGNED AIDE MEMOIRE

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

REF ID: A66547



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 RAWALP 08628 201347Z

READING AS FOLLOWS:

A. DISMANTLING, PACKING AND REMOVAL OF THE FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT SHALL COMMENCE IN JANUARY 1969. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A STAGGERED THINNING DOWN OF PERSONNEL.

B. ALL FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT NOT DISMANTLED BY THE CUT-OUT DATE (I.E. 17 JULY 1969) WILL BE DISMANTLED NOT LATER THAN 31ST DECEMBER 1969 IN ACCORDANCE WITH A FIXED MONTHLY PROGRAMME.

C. ALL DISMANTLED FACILITIES, INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT SHALL BE PACKED AND CRATED AND BE REMOVED FROM PAKISTAN AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AND IN NO CASE LATER THAN 28TH FEBRUARY 1970. ALL REMAINING BASE PERSONNEL WILL BE EVACUATED COMPLETELY BY THE SAME DATE.

6. ATTENTION IS CALLED TO THE REFERENCE TO QUOTE A FIXED MONTHLY PROGRAM UNQUOTE IN PARAGRAPH 5 (2) ABOVE. YUSUF AND I AGREED THAT WE WOULD MEET AGAIN ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 28.

A. FOR HIM TO RECEIVE OUR FORMAL RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE PROPOSAL (I WOULD HOPE AND URGE THAT IT BE ACCEPTED, SINCE IT COVERS ALL DESIRED POINTS EXCEPT FOR SUGAR TREE OPERATION FOR SAME MONTHS AFTER 31 DECEMBER 1969); AND

B. IF POSSIBLE FOR US TO SUBMIT A PROPOSED FIXED MONTHLY SCHEDULE ALTHOUGH IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES ALONG THE LINES OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE WITH THE FIXED MONTHLY SCHEDULE TO BE FURNISHED LATER. WOULD WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SUBMIT THE SCHEDULE ON OCTOBER 28 AND WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE ALONG THOSE LINES ASAP.

7. THERE WAS ONE DISTURBING ELEMENT IN THE YUSUF CONVERSATION, BUT I DO NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER IT INSURMOUNTABLE. HE STATED THAT, IN ADDITION TO AN EXCHANGE OF LETTERS EMBODYING THE POINT OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE, THERE SHOULD BE A VERBAL UNDERSTANDING THAT ALL ANTENNA WOULD BE DOWN BY JULY 17, 1969.

8. I TOLD HIM THAT, WHILE I WAS NOT RPT NOT TECHNICALLY INFORMED, I BELIEVE THAT SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD NEGATE THE INTENTION FOR

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DISSEMINATION

~~SECRET~~ 250811Z 250811Z [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(5)

FM AMBASSADOR OEHLERT RAWALPINDI 500
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. PRESIDENT AYUB'S PERSONAL INTERVENTION IN THE PESHAVAR MATTER AND HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS FOREIGN OFFICE TO WORK OUT A TIME EXTENSION ALONG THE GENERAL LINES OF OUR REQUEST EVIDENCES HIS DESIRE TO ACCOMMODATE OUR WISHES IN SUCH MATTERS TO THE EXTENT HE DEEMS POSSIBLE AND TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

2. A BREAKTHROUGH ON TANKS WOULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN OUR HAND AND MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO US TO CONTINUE WORKING IN THE DIRECTION OF THOSE OBJECTIVES.

3. MOST RESPECTFULLY BUT MOST URGENTLY I REQUEST YOU TO GIVE THE DEEPEST CONSIDERATION TO THE POSSIBILITY OF EITHER:

A. SWEETENING THE POT TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY WITH TURKEY, OR

B. AUTHORIZING A DIRECT SALE OF TANKS EITHER AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESENT MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY OR IN CONNECTION WITH A LIBERALIZATION THEREOF.

~~SECRET~~

56

Tuesday, October 29, 1968
9:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's notes
for your possible conversation with
the Vice President.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

56

October 29, 1968

Special notes for MHH (DR)

- a. He should say he has been briefed like the other candidates.
- b. He should not "crow" or take credit; he should say that the decision was the President's and join with the President in hoping that the door is being opened to an early peace.
- c. He should not attack other candidates on Vietnam, unless other candidates attack the President.

INFORMATION

Pres file

**Tuesday, October 29, 1968
9:20 a.m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith Bill Colby expresses
his appreciation for his appointment
as Komer's successor.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

57a

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OO YEKADS
DE YSHKOD 66 3031130
ZKZK OO NRL DE
O 291129Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM W.E. COLBY, ACOFS, CORDS, SAIGON
TO WALTER ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON D. C.
ZEM

..... EFTO EYES ONLY

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 OCT 29 12 52

UNCLAS E F T O MAC 14595 EYES ONLY
PLEASE PASS TO THE PRESIDENT MY DEEP APPRECIATION
FOR HIS CONFIDENCE IN NAMING ME AS KOMER'S SUCCESSOR.
KNOWING HIS WELL WARRANTED HIGH CONFIDENCE IN KOMER,
WHO HAS DONE A SUPERLATIVE JOB HERE, AND HIS OWN INTENSE
INTEREST AND CONCERN FOR PACIFICATION, I AM INDEED HONORED
BY THE ASSIGNMENT. I WILL CERTAINLY GIVE IT ALL POSSIBLE
EFFORT IN ORDER TO CARRY ON THE FAVORABLE NE KOMER
HAS ESTABLISHED AND TO JUSTIFY THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION.
BEST REGARDS. BILL COLBY

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

150

EFTO EYES ONLY

NNNN

Tuesday, October 29, 1968
6:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

I just called Gene and asked him to dicatate to Miss Nivens what he told me last night. Here it is.

I asked him to go back to Alexander Sachs and see how much further detail he can get on the people involved and how close, in fact, they are to Nixon.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

October 29, 1968

Last night I received a telephone call from an old friend in New York, a man of experience and a careful and even exact reporter. He said he had attended a working lunch that day with colleagues in Wall Street. Two were men closely involved with Nixon. One of them explained to the group that Nixon was handling the Vietnam peace problem "like another Fortas case." He was trying to frustrate the President, by inciting Saigon to step up its demands, and by letting Hanoi know that when he took office "he could accept anything and blame it on his predecessor."

E. V. Restow

51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Monday, October 28, 1968 -- 12:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

I understand well your reaction to George Ball, the New York Democrats, etc.

I understand well your reaction to the likelihood that Moscow and Hanoi are playing politics.

I understand well the certainty that some will accuse the President of playing politics.

But the tragic dilemma is that you will also be accused of playing politics if you let this slide -- and politics against the party you lead. Harriman and the Russians will see to that.

I am not even sure the deal will be there to pick up after the election.

The only safety I have known over these difficult eight years has been to consult my judgment and my conscience. And I know that has also been your only solace.

There were four people in that room at dinner tonight, aside from yourself, who have lived Vietnam, with all its pain, since January 1961: Rusk, Taylor, Wheeler, and myself.

All of us know that, with all its uncertainties, we have the best deal we now can get -- vastly better than any we thought we could get since 1961.

If we go ahead we know it may be tough. But with military and political determination we believe we can make it stick -- not because we are so smart; but because your courage, the quality of our fighting men, and the resilience and simple gallantry of the South Vietnamese people give us the tools to make it stick.

We know we could be wrong.

But we laid our judgment on the line in much tougher and more ambiguous circumstances than these.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 412 9 91-484
By AS/isp, NARA, Date 3-17-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

And none of us would know how to justify delay.

You know you can count on me. I delivered the message as hard to Dobrynin tonight as anything I've ever done. But I do wish you to know how I feel.

I would do anything I know how to do to ease the President's dilemma. But I do not believe all the prior consultations with the leadership, candidates, etc., can ease it. Only the President can decide. And whatever he decides, I'll be there.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~