

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

194

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a letter	LBJ to President Diaz Ordaz 2 p PCI open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/04/68	A
#7 cable	CAP 82682 2 p C open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218 (dup. #54, NSF, Country File, India, "India's Food Problem, Vol. 4")	11/04/68	A
#8 cable	CAP 82675 re Vietnam 1 p S open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/04/68	A
#9b memo	William Bundy to Secretary of State 6 p C re Vietnam <i>open 8-5-94 NLJ 94-219</i>	11/04/68	A
#9c memo	Paul Kreisberg to William Bundy 8 p C re Vietnam "	11/04/68	A
#10 cable	CAP 82679 re Israel <i>Dup. #140b, NSF Agency File, "UN, Vol. 11" Box 70</i> 2 p S exempt 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218 <i>Open 9.2.98 NLJ 97-136</i>	11/04/68	A
#12 note	Rostow to the President, 5:00 p.m. 1 p PCI open 7/24/95 NLJ 94-215 (dup. #3, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Arab-Israeli Private Talks")	11/04/68	A
#12a memo <i>CLASSIFIED 21-03 11/03/1999</i>	Helms to LBJ, 11/04/68 <i>stamp 12-99 NLJ 98-551</i> 6 p S exempt NLJ 94-354 <i>Exempt 5/29/03 NLJ 02-139</i> (dup., #3a, as above)	11/04/68	A
#13 cable	CAP 82673 open 5-16-95 NLJ 94-308 2 p S (dup. #55, NSF, Country File, India, "India's Food Problem, Vol. 4" and near duplicate of #54, Volume 102)	11/04/68	A
#14 cable	CAP 82672 (Saigon 41876) 2 p S open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/04/68	A
#15 cable	CAP 82671 re Vietnam 2 p S open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/04/68	A
#18 cable	CAP 82659 (Bangkok 22423) 2 p S open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/03/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 103, November 1 - 4, 1968, Box 41

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

294

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#24 cable	CAP 82662 <i>sanitized 10/17/01 NLJ/RAC 99-189</i> 2 p S sanitized 9-6-96 NLJ 94-218 (dup., #79, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 10)	11/03/68	A
#32 cable <i>SAME SKN 1</i> <i>2-26-04 NLJ/RAC 02108</i>	CAP 82650 re Vietnam 1 p S sanitized 1-17-96 NLJ 94-218	11/03/68	A
#33 cable SANITIZED <i>2-26-04 NLJ/RAC 02108</i>	CAP 82649 re Vietnam 1 p C open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/02/68	A
#35 cable	CAP 82644 (Apostolic Delegate to LBJ) 1 p C open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/02/68	A
#39 cable	CAP 82639 (draft letter, LBJ to P.M. Gandhi) 1 p S (dup. of #32, NSF, Spec Hops Carries, India) - 11/16/67-11/20/69, Box 23 open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/02/68	A
#40 cable	CAP 82636 4 p S open 9-6-96 NLJ 94-218 (dup. #151i, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 10)	11/02/68	A
#41 memo	Rostow to the President re Panama 3 p S (partial text of #40) open 9-6-96 NLJ 94-218	11/02/68	A
#41a memo	Rusk to the President 4 p S (partial text of #40)	11/01/68	A
#41b memo	Panamanian Foreign Minister to U.S. Ambassador 3 p C (partial text of #40) open 9-6-96 NLJ 94-218	10/24/68	A
#42 cable	CAP 82634 (Canberra 8963) open 5129103 NLJ 02-140 1 p S (dup., #48/48a) exempt 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/02/68	A
#45 cable	CAP 82623 (draft letter, LBJ to P.M. Gorton) open 5129103 (dup. #60/60a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol 4" Sanitized, NLJ 91-498) NLJ 02-140	11/02/68	A
#48 note	Rostow to the President, re Australia open 5129103 NLJ 02-140 1 p S exempt 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/02/68	A
#48a cable	Annotated copy of Canberra 8963 open 5129103 NLJ 02-140 1 p S (dup. of #42) exempt 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218	11/01/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 103, November 1 - 4, 1968, Box 41

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

3 of 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#49a memo	CM-3744-68 Wheeler to the President 1 p S <i>open 8-30-95 NLJ 94-352</i> (dup. #5a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Westmoreland, Wm. C.") Exempt, NLJ 91-190	11/01/68	A
#49b memo	Westmoreland to Wheeler <i>open 8-30-94 NLJ 94-355</i> 1 p S (dup. #5b, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Westmoreland, Wm. C.") Exempt, NLJ 91-190	10/31/68	A
#49c report	"Summary of..." <i>open 8-30-94 NLJ 94-355</i> 4 p S (dup. #5c, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Westmoreland, Wm. C.") Exempt, NLJ 91-190	n.d.	A
#54a cable	Paris 23298 (DELTO 906) <i>open 6/5/03 NLJ 02-141</i> 1 p S <i>Anne Sullivan 8-5-94 NLJ 94-219</i> (dup., #62a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 4" Sanitized, NLJ 91-500)	11/01/68	A
#58 note	Rostow to the President, 8:10 a.m. 1 p S <i>dup of #33a, NSF, Spec. Head of St Corps UK, open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218 Box 56</i>	11/01/68	A
#58a cable	P.M. Wilson to LBJ <i>dup of #33, see above</i> 1 p S <i>exempt 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218 Open 4-24-01</i>	11/01/68	A
#51 memo	Rostow to the President, 2:25 p.m. 1 p C re IDA <i>open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218</i>	11/01/68	A
#51a memo	Henry Fowler to the President <i>open 3/15/02</i> 3 p C re IDA	10/29/68	A
#59 note	Rostow to the President, 1:50 p.m. 1 p TS re Vietnam <i>OPEN 7/24/95 NLJ 94-215</i>	11/01/68	A
#61 letter	LBJ to Pope Paul VI 1 p PCI <i>open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-218</i>	11/01/68	A
#61b letter	dup. #61 " "	11/01/68	A
#61c letter	Apostolic Delegate to LBJ " "	11/01/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 103, 11/1-4/68, box 41

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

404

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 cable	CAP 82685 1p TS - OPEN 1-19-96 NLS 94-414	11/4/68	A
#29 cable	CAP 82660 - SANITIZED 1-19-96 NLS 94-414 1P S - OPEN 6-3-04 NLS/RAC 02-117	11/3/68	A
#36 cable	CAP 82640 4 pp S - Sanitized 1-19-96 NLS 94-414 S - same sanitization 6-3-04 NLS/RAC 02-117	11/2/68	A
#46 cable	CAP 82621 sanitized 1-19-96 NLS 94-414 1p S - OPEN 1-19-96 NLS 94-414	11/2/68	A
#47 cable	CAP 82621 (dup., #46) 1p S - OPEN 5-5-04 NLS/RAC 02-118	11/2/68	A
#59a cable	Intelligence report 1p TS - Sanitized 1-19-96 NLS 94-413 S - same sanitization 5-5-04 NLS/RAC 02-118	10/28/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 103, 11/1-4/68, box 41

11/20/90

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

W. Lewis

1

ACTION

Monday - November 4, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Ray Telles has recommended that you reassure President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico about the future of CODAF under your successor. Telles says the Mexican Section of CODAF shows signs of "marking time" in its work because of uncertainty about the Commission's future. He understands from a close associate of Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores that a letter from you reaffirming your support for CODAF would strengthen the Commission's position with President Diaz Ordaz and others in the Mexican Government. Telles' memorandum to you is attached at Tab A.

You authorized Telles to convey orally a message on CODAF to President Diaz Ordaz in April, at which time he told him about the legislation you subsequently submitted to the Congress to put the Commission on a permanent legal footing. A letter for your signature is attached at Tab B. It informs President Diaz Ordaz of the status of the legislation and assures him that you will recommend to your successor continued support for the Commission.

Telles will be in Mexico City about November 10 and would like to deliver your letter to President Diaz Ordaz at that time if you approve.

Ray Telles has been encouraged by the support CODAF is receiving from Congressional leaders as well as Governors of the border states. He thought you might like to glance at the letters of support which are attached at Tab C from Senators Sparkman, Anderson, Murphy and Tower, Representatives Albert and White, and from both the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of California.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

- Tab A - Memorandum to President from Ambassador Telles, 10/28/68.
- Tab B - Suggested letter to President Diaz Ordaz for Presidential signature.
- Tab C - Letters supporting CODAF.

SWLewis:mm

Approve letter	___	Approve hand delivery by Telles	___
Disapprove	___	Disapprove	___
Call me	___	Call me	___

12

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-218
By CB, NARA, Date 7-28-95

November 4, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I was grateful for the message you sent me in July through Secretary Carrillo Flores concerning the Mexico-United States Commission for Border Development and Friendship (CODAF). Your encouragement for our efforts to obtain full legislative authority for the U. S. Section showed that we agree about the importance of this Commission, potentially one of the most creative, constructive, and lasting endeavors of the many in which you and I have been associated.

I must now report to you that the 90th Congress has closed without taking action on the bill. This was, however, not wholly unexpected in light of the number of pressing national questions concurrently facing the Congress this year. It is quite encouraging that the bill was introduced by Senators Sparkman and Hayden and a number of key Congressmen. It met with no substantial opposition, and has received expressions of support from many of our prominent leaders.

Furthermore, the Congress took specific note of CODAF and endorsed it by providing for its necessary expenses during the current fiscal year of 1969. Thus, I think there is general recognition of the desirability and utility of such a commission between two countries with such strong and expanding ties as our own. I am confident that CODAF legislation will be approved by the next Congress. I can assure you of my unwavering enthusiasm for this fledgling organization during the

-2-

remainder of my tenure, and that I will strongly recommend its continued support to my successor.

Sincerely,

LBJ/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of the United Mexican States
Mexico, D. F.

LBJ/SWLewis:mm
November 4, 1968

Markowitz

tab A

1b

October 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter to Mexican President Diaz Ordaz Reiterating Support for CODAF

The Director General of Mexico's Diplomatic Service, Antonio Gonzalez de Leon, recently suggested to me the utility of a letter from you to President Diaz Ordaz reaffirming your support for CODAF. Mr. Gonzalez, who is very close to Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores, indicated that such a letter would strengthen the position of CODAF within the Mexican Government.

A letter is attached for your signature, if you approve.

Also attached are copies of some of the letters we have received from U.S. Senators, Congressmen, and others, supporting CODAF.

Raymond Telles
Ambassador

Enclosures:

1. Letter to President Diaz Ordaz
2. Copies of supporting letters

see by inv.

US/CODAF:RVAlien:rd
Clearance:ML Spector

10-28-68

WILLIAM PROBYN, JR., CHAIRMAN
HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR.
EDWARD S. WATKINS, JR.
EDWARD V. LLOYD, JR.
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, JR.
WALTER F. MONROE, JR.
GAIL W. McCREE, WFO
WILLIAM B. BRUNS, JR.

WILLIAM F. BERRY, WYOM.
JOHN S. TOWER, TEX.
OLIVER S. FURCHLOPER, IOWA
CLAYTON M. BRIDGES, MASS.
CHARLES H. PERCY, ALA.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

JOHN S. TOWER, JR.
STAFF DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY CHAIRMAN

10
10
10

July 19, 1968

Mr. M. L. Spector, Executive Director
United States-Mexico Commission For
Border Development and Friendship
1800 G Street, N.W.
Suite 300
Washington, D. C. 20525

Dear Mr. Spector:

Thank you for your letter of July 17 with
the translation of the message of President Gustavo
Diaz Ordaz. I think it is a very fine move that is
being made, and I am glad to know the favorable re-
action on the part of President Diaz Ordaz.

Sincerely,


John Sparkman

US SECTION OF
BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMM.

JUL 22 1968

RECEIVED

CLINTON P. ANDERSON, N. HES., CHA.
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, IA
WARREN E. MACDONALD, WASH.
STUART S. WINGGREN, ME.
JOHN STENNIS, MISS.
STEPHEN M. YOUNG, OHIO
THOMAS J. DODD, CONN.
HOWARD W. CANNON, NEV.
SPESSARD L. HOLLAND, FLA.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, MAINE
BO. RYE B. NICKENLOOPER, IOWA
CARL T. CURTIS, NEBR.
LEN B. JORDAN, IDAHO
EDWARD W. BROOKS, MASS.
CARP. IS. H. PERCY, N.C.

JAMES J. GERRIG, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES


July 16, 1968

Mr. M. L. Spector, Executive Director
United States-Mexico Commission for
Border Development and Friendship
1800 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20525

Dear Mr. Spector:

I received your letter some time ago with a copy of proposed legislation on the United States-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship. My office has reviewed this and talked with Mr. Carl Marcy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who has indicated that this will probably be introduced by some of the members of that committee. Of course, it is probably too late to get any action on it at this session but I will watch for it next year if it comes up. Thank you for writing me.

Sincerely yours,


Clinton P. Anderson

CPA:wrh

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION

JUL 17 1968

RECEIVED

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20515

August 21, 1968


The Honorable Raymond Telles
Ambassador, United States-Mexico Com-
mission for Border Development and
Friendship
1800 G Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20525

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I appreciated receiving the copy of the letter from the Foreign Secretary of Mexico concerning pending legislation which would establish the American section of the U.S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship.

That bill is presently under consideration by the appropriate subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. As Congress is now in adjournment, I do not know when legislative action will be completed but certainly will keep in mind your great interest and the interest and approval for this legislation evidenced by the Government of the Republic of Mexico.

Sincerely,


CARL ALBERT, M. C.

CA/Rck

US SECTION US-MEXICO
BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMM.

AUG 23 1968

RECEIVED

STEPHEN M. YOUNG, OHIO
EDWARD S. MUSKIE, MAINE
EDMUND GIBBENS, FLAIDA
B. EVERTT JORDAN, N.C.
DANIEL K. ROUFF, MARYL.
BRENDA BATH, IND.
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, N. MEX.
JOSEPH B. FORTNA, WIS.
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., VA.

JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, N.Y.
NORMAN L. FONG, HAWAII
GALLO BORDA, ILL.
GEORGE MURPHY, CALIF.
LEN B. JORDAN, IDAHO
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.

RICHARD B. BOYCE, CHIEF CLERK AND STAFF DIRECTOR
H. BARRY MEYER, COUNSEL

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 22, 1968

The Honorable Raymond Telles
Ambassador
United States-Mexico Commission for
Border Development and Friendship
1800 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20525

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your recent letters. I am, of course, most interested in United States-Mexican relations, both on a government and people-to-people basis.

The Commission's work sounds most interesting and I would be pleased to hear more about it from you. Unfortunately, this is an extremely busy time, and I would suggest that we wait until after the Conventions to try to get together.

Sincerely,


George Murphy

GM:kcd

US SECTION-US-MEXICO
BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMM.

JUL 24 1968

RECEIVED

WILLIAM PROCTOR, D.C.
HARRISON S. WILLIAMS, D.C.
EDWARD S. MUSKIE, ME
EDWARD V. LUTHS, ME
THOMAS J. MCINTYRE, ND
WALTER F. MONDALO, ND
WILLIAM B. BREWER, D.C.

WALLACE F. BURNETT, UTAH
JOHN G. TOWER, TEN.
BOURKE B. MCKENNA, IOWA
EDWARD W. BROOKE, MASS.
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.

LEWIS S. COOM, JR.
STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 24, 1968

The Honorable Raymond Telles
Ambassador
United States-Mexico Commission for
Border Development and Friendship
1800 G Street, Northwest
Washington, D. C. 20525


Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you very much for your July 18 correspondence.

I certainly appreciate your thoughtfulness and courtesy in sending to me the translation of the Foreign Secretary's letter to Ambassador Freeman. It is a pleasure to know of President Diaz Ordaz's interest in the American Section of the U.S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship. You may be assured of my concern in this matter.

Again, thank you.

Sincerely yours,


John G. Tower

JGT:lkb

US SECTION-US-MEXICO
BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMM.

JUL 25 1968

RECEIVED

RICHARD C. WHITE
10th District TEXAS

WASHINGTON OFFICE
1325 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE 433-4471

DISTRICT OFFICE
ROOM 148 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE
EL PASO, TEXAS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

August 9, 1968

COMMITTEES:
INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEES ON
NATIONAL PARKS AND RECREATION
IRRIGATION AND RECLAMATION
TERRITORIAL AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL
SERVICE
SUBCOMMITTEES ON
POSTAL OPERATIONS
MANPOWER AND CIVIL SERVICE
CENSUS AND STATISTICS

Ambassador Raymond Telles
Chairman
U.S.-Mexico Commission for Border
Development & Friendship
1800 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20525

Dear Raymond:

Thank you for your letter of July 29. I have made personal contact and have also written a letter to Chairman Morgan of the House Foreign Affairs Committee asking for the necessary reports and earliest possible hearings on my bill to give legislative sanction to your committee.

While I must agree with you that the bill was sent up by the Administration somewhat late in the session, I want you to know I will do everything I can to get action and I believe that any steps we can take during the current session will be helpful to us when the bill is reintroduced next year, should it fail to pass the present Congress.

With warmest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Richard

Richard C. White
Member of Congress

RCW:jb

10/20/68
HA

RONALD REAGAN
GOVERNOR

State of California
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE
SACRAMENTO 95814



July 25, 1968

Mr. M. L. Spector
Executive Director
United States-Mexico Commission for
Border Development and Friendship
1800 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20525

Dear Mr. Spector:

Thank you for sending me the White House press release concerning the establishment of the United States-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship.

I am, indeed, interested in the progress of any legislation which concerns relations between the United States and Mexico. As Californians, we have a history of the most cordial friendship with Baja California and all of the states of the Republic of Mexico.

The worthy aims of the Commission can only enrich our already excellent relations.

I am fully aware of the purposes and accomplishments of the United States-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship through the work of the Commission of the Californias, a tri-entity body existing between California, Baja California and Baja California Sur, of which Lieutenant Governor Robert H. Finch is chairman.

My every warm wish goes to the work of your Commission.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan".

RONALD REAGAN
Governor

US SECTION-US MEXICO
BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMM.

AUG 1 1968

RECEIVED

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN RICHARD C. WHITE, (D., Texas)
House of Representatives, July 23, 1958

Mr. Speaker, As the Representative of the largest City along our friendly border with Mexico, I have the honor to introduce a bill, in which I am joined by other Border Congressmen, to give Congressional recognition and endorsement to the decision by the Presidents of the United States and Mexico last year, when they set up the joint United States-Mexico Commission on Border Development and Friendship. Joining me in this sponsorship are: the gentlemen from California, Mr. Van Deerlin and Mr. Tunney; the gentlemen from Arizona, Mr. Udall; the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Walker, and the gentlemen from Texas, Mr. Fisher and Mr. Kazen.

The bill we have introduced, H.R. 13807, will formally establish the United States Section of the Commission on Border Development and Friendship, and provide a statutory foundation for its important activities.

The establishment of this Commission, by agreement with the Presidents of the United States and the Republic of Mexico, opened a new chapter in the relations with our good neighbor to the South. Our two countries stated by their actions that the Good Neighbor Policy is not merely something to be accepted, but to be worked at, every day, for the benefit of our two countries.

As the first Chairman of the United States Section, I was

page two- Congressman Richard C. White...July 23, 1968

pleased that the President chose Ambassador Raymond L. Telles, the former Mayor of my home city, El Paso, Texas, and more recently our Ambassador to Costa Rica. While in the Armed Services of our country, Mr. Telles also held diplomatic liaison posts in Mexico.

As President Johnson pointed out in his message to Congress, recommending that the United States Section of the Border Commission be given Congressional sanction, the two sections of the Commission are already ~~and~~ at work. They have established formal mechanism for dealing with emergencies and disasters along the border area. They have agreed on a joint training center to assist the unemployed and underemployed on both sides of the border. They are in the process of establishing pilot joint-community service centers to aid low income groups of both nations. They are now engaged in an industrialization study to pursue the possibility of increased industrialization of the border. They are strengthening the already excellent working relationships in the field of public health; and have held a joint workshop to discuss mutual urban problems---a project to be repeated at sister communities all along the border.

This excellent work deserves our support, and I hope we shall approve the legislation to continue it in the present Congress. It will then stand as a means of achieving the continuing good relations we have pledged with Mexico.

...



CARROLL, DAUBLE, DUSANG AND RAND

Carroll

*Specialist's Office
Health & Cont*

July 23, 1968

*Spitzer
Med. Comm.*

Hon. Richard C. White, Representative
1329 Longworth Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Dick:

I am indeed pleased that you will introduce legislation in the House to make the U.S.-Mexican Commission on Border Development and Friendship a permanent agency. This young commission is the finest vehicle we have ever had to coordinate and promote relations between our two countries in areas not included in the splendid accomplishments of U.S.-Mexico Boundary and Water Commission.

As you know so well, the technical groups of both nations including architects and planners have been most concerned for many years over the lack of official avenues through which cooperation in planning and development could be provided on the border. Now that we have this official resource, ably manned in the U.S. by Ambassador Telles and in Mexico by Don Jose Vivanco, let's not lose it.

The Citizens who live on the Border, the Texas Society of Architects, the American Institute of Architects and the Mexico Society of Architects are all grateful for the commission and will deeply appreciate your active and aggressive support of its permanent status.

Cordially,

Edwin W. Carroll, FAIA
Chairman
TSA Committee on Border and Urban Development
EWC/adk

cc: Ambassador Telles ✓
Dean Sidney Little
Robert E. Alexander
Mace Tungate
William H. Scheick

US SECTION US-MEXICO
BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMM.

JUL 24 1968

RECEIVED

C O P Y



State of California
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR'S OFFICE
SACRAMENTO 95814

July 25, 1968

ROBERT H. FINCH
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR

Mr. M. L. Spector
Executive Director
United States - Mexico Commission
for Border Development and
Friendship
1800 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20525

Dear Mr. Spector:

Thank you for sending me the material concerning the proposed legislation for authorization of a continuation of the U. S. Section of the U. S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship.


I have been enthusiastic about the work of the Commission since last year when a delegation from the Commission of the Californias met with representatives of the Border Friendship Commission in Calexico.

As a matter of fact, Mrs. Norman Roberts, a member of the Commission of the Californias, took part in the recent Border Beautification Day as the representative of Governor Reagan and our Commission.

Right now we hope that a resolution will be passed by the California Legislature naming the highway which transverses the State of California as a section of the U. S.-Mexico Border Friendship Route. This resolution is being co-authored by the legislative delegations of San Diego and Imperial Counties.

Please extend my warmest regards to Ambassador Telles. Best wishes for continued success with the U. S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship.

Sincerely yours,


Robert H. Finch
Lieutenant Governor

US SECTION-US MEXICO
BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMM.

AUG 1 1968

RECEIVED

A. G. AINSWORTH, JR. Chairman
808 541. LULING, TEXAS

JACK M. DRAKE
808 112. WESLACO TEXAS

ROBERT J. GALVAN
200 CAPLES BLDG., EL PASO 75110

MRS. BOB LONG
2817 RED RIVER, AUSTIN 78751



MRS. BOB SCHIEFFER, VICE CHAIRMAN
52 WESTOVER TERRACE, FT. WORTH 76107
RAMIRO B. MARTINEZ
808 592 - STATION 1, McALLEN 78901
MRS. KELLY E. MCADAMS
1428 PRESTON AVE., AUSTIN 78702
CHAS. L. NUNN
808 400, DRESDENWOOD TEXAS
GLENN E. GARRETT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
808 1876, AUSTIN 78751

GOOD NEIGHBOR COMMISSION
OF TEXAS

July 20, 1968


Mr. M. L. Spector, Executive Director
US-Mexico Commission for Border Development & Friendship
1800 G Street N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20525

Dear Mr. Spector:

Commissioner Ramiro Martinez has forwarded to me the material you had sent regarding proposed legislation since I am serving as Chairman of the Commission this year.

We appreciate very much your keeping us informed and want to assure you we will actively support the legislation before Congress. I will see that all of the Commissioners receive copies of the material.

Very truly yours,


A.G. Ainsworth, Jr.
Chairman

AGA:ec

cc: All Commissioners

US SECTION US-MEXICO
BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMM.

JUL 25 1968

RECEIVED



**GOOD NEIGHBOR COMMISSION
OF TEXAS**

142
/

August 5, 1968

Mr. M. L. Spector, Executive Director
U. S.-Mexico Commission for Border
Development and Friendship
1300 G. Street N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20525

Dear Mr. Spector:

This will acknowledge with appreciation your letter of July 3 and its enclosures related to current action and background information on CODAF.

Copies of this material were sent to each of the appointed Commissioners, eight in number excluding Chairman A. G. Ainsworth, Jr. who is already on your mailing list. Further, at the Commission's third quarterly meeting in Amarillo on August 2 and 3, each Commissioner was asked to encourage full cooperation in furthering the objectives of CODAF.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Glenn E. Garrett".

Glenn E. Garrett
Executive Director

GEG:mg

US SECTION US MEXICO
BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMM.

AUG 7 1968

RECEIVED

VZCZCEEA694
00 WIE 18
02 WIE 4230

FROM YALTI ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82683

SENT
WHCA
NOV 4 23 25

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-414
By cl, NARA, Date 10-25-95

Free file

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

NOVEMBER 4, 1968

HEREWITH BUI DIEM TO THIEU ON U.S. REACTION TO YOUR SPEECH.

QUOTE

OUR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION NOT TO ASSOCIATE ITSELF WITH THE U.S. DECISION AND THE PRESIDENT'S HISTORIC MESSAGE BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY HAVE RECEIVED MUCH COMMENT HERE. MANY WERE THE FRIENDS WHO TELEPHONED TO COMPLIMENT US OR LEND US THEIR SUPPORT OR ASK THAT WE REMAIN RESOLUTE. WITH THE ELECTIONS IN TWO DAYS, THE SITUATION IS AS FOLLOWS: 1. ON A PURELY ELECTORAL PLANE, IN SPITE OF OFFICIALS' EXPLANATIONS, THE GENERAL IMPRESSION IS STILL THAT THE BOMBING HALT WAS MAINLY MOTIVATED BY INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. HOWEVER: EVEN BEFORE THE BOMBING HALT AND EVEN AFTER IT, AND ESPECIALLY AFTER OUR REFUSAL, PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ASKING THEMSELVES WHETHER THE BOMBING HALT WILL REALLY HELP HUMPHREY OR HURT HIS CHANCES. IN SPITE OF CERTAIN UNCERTAINTIES, THE OUTLOOK IS STILL FOR HIM TO WIN. 2. ON THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS PLANE, OUR REFUSAL HAS CLEARLY EMBARRASSED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. ON FRIDAY NIGHT RUSK TRIED TO MINIMIZE THE PROBLEM AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE BY REAFFIRMING THE SOLIDARITY WITH OUR CAUSE. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT THIEU'S ADDRESS, WITH THE ASSEMBLY'S ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT, MAKES THE DIVERGENCY QUITE OBVIOUS. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT MERELY AVOID ANY COMMENT.

DURING A SHORT INTERVIEW WITH ROSTOV AND BUNDY I WAS INFORMED OF THE POINTS OF VIEW WHICH, ACCORDING TO BUNDY, HAD ALREADY BEEN GIVEN OUR GOVERNMENT BY BUNKER. I REPLIED SIMPLY THAT WE FEEL THE CONDITIONS INSUFFICIENT FOR WORTHWHILE PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS, ALL THE WHILE STRESSING THE FACT THAT OUR POSITION IS CONSTRUCTIVE, FOR OUR GOVERNMENT IS NOT OPPOSED TO THE BOMBING HALT AS SUCH. I ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT AMONG OUR PEOPLE. IN ANY CASE OUR GOVERNMENT'S STRONG STAND, WITH THE ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY, HAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISED THE ADMINISTRATION HERE.

LIBERAL CIRCLES SUCH AS MANSFIELD ARE ALREADY TALKING ABOUT CONTINUING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS EVEN WITHOUT SAIGON. HARRIMAN HAS LET IT BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY MAY AT FIRST DISCUSS DE-ESCALATION. IN THIS REGARD, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ON FRIDAY RUSK SAID, "OBVIOUSLY, WE CANNOT DISCUSS MATTERS INVOLVING SOUTH VIETNAM WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM", WHICH MAKES THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION A DIFFICULT ONE. ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, SOME OFFICIALS REGRET THIS CLEAR-CUT STATEMENT FOR IT MAY MAKE OUR POSITION MORE UNCOMPROMISING AND LIMITS THE U.S.'S FREEDOM TO MANEUVER.

ON SATURDAY AND SUNDAY I GAVE WIDEST POSSIBLE DISSEMINATION TO THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS--THE ENGLISH VERSION TO THE EMBASSIES, THE PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES--THE VIETNAMESE VERSION TO OUR COMPATRIOTS. I ALSO ORGANIZED TALKS WITH THE PRESS TO STRESS THE REASONABLE, MODERATE AND CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF OUR GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.

I SHALL REPORT EACH DAY'S DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR.
END QUOTE

SENI
WHCA

3

NOV 4 23 12

FEA699
OO WTEIC
DE WTE 4225

FROM WALT W ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82581

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS/CBS 7
By ics, NARS, Date 7-25-83

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
NOV 4 PM 8:17

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

NOVEMBER 4, 1968

THIS LONG ABRAMS ANALYSIS OF SOME RECENT INTELLIGENCE AND OF THE ENEMY'S MILITARY AND POLITICAL CAPABILITIES AND OBJECTIVES IS IMPORTANT AND WORTH READING.

BEGIN TEXT:

I WANT TO PASS ON TO YOU OUR ANALYSIS OF TWO SIGNIFICANT PIECES OF RECENTLY ACQUIRED INTELLIGENCE--THE FIRST IS A REPORT FROM A HIGHLY RELIABLE AGENT IN III CORPS RELATED TO THE VC'S NEW OFFICIAL POLICY. THE AGENT OBTAINED THE INFORMATION ON 26 OCTOBER FROM A HIGH-RANKING VC

CADRE. HE WAS WARNED NOT TO DISCUSS IT BECAUSE THE PARTY IS KEEPING THE MATTER SECRET AND ONLY A FEW HIGH-RANKING CADRE HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF IT.

ACCORDING TO THE AGENT, THE NEW VC OFFICIAL POLICY OF COSVN FOR THE APPROACHING PHASE INCLUDES THESE MAIN POINTS:

IN THE NEAR FUTURE THE VC MAY APPROVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GVN AND THE AMERICANS IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE AND A COALITION GOVERNMENT. BUT IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED FROM THE BEGINNING THAT A COALITION GOVERNMENT IS ONLY TEMPORARY. THE PARALLEL WAS DRAWN WITH SOMEONE ON A LONG JOURNEY. ONE MUST STOP AND REST BEFORE CONTINUING. THE ULTIMATE GOAL IS STILL A COMMUNIST SOUTH VIETNAM. THERE MIGHT BE A CEASE-FIRE, BUT AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER GENERAL UPRISING.

EVEN THOUGH THERE IS A COALITION, THE PARTY MUST STILL MAINTAIN TIGHT CONTROL FROM PROVINCE LEVEL DOWN TO THE VILLAGE AND HAMLET LEVEL, TO MAINTAIN THE INFRASTRUCTURE. LATER, THE WORKER-PEASANT CLASSES WOULD BE USED TO OVERTHROW THE "PUPPETS" IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

EXACTLY ON THE DAY THE TWO SIDES COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE TO DELIBERATE A CEASE-FIRE AND COALITION GOVERNMENT, OR A FEW DAYS BEFORE, THE VC WILL LAUNCH A LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE, STRIKING "REPEATEDLY AND FIERCELY," SO THAT THE AMERICANS AND THE GVN WILL APPROVE THE VC'S OFFICIAL POLICY. THIS OFFICIAL POLICY IS THAT THE VC MUST HAVE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE, INTERIOR AND ECONOMY IN A COALITION. ONLY IF THE ALLIES ACCEPT THESE CONDITIONS WILL THERE BE A CEASE-FIRE. HOWEVER, EVEN BEFORE A CEASE-FIRE, THE PARTY WILL DEMAND THESE BASIC CONDITIONS: THAT THE GVN RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY ALL RESERVE FORCES. ANYONE IN THE RESERVE CLASS HAVING FULFILLED 3 YEARS OF MILITARY OBLIGATION MUST BE RETURNED TO CIVILIAN LIFE. PRISONS AND STRATEGIC HAMLETS MUST BE BROKEN UP. ALL U.S. AND ALLIED BASES MUST BE ABANDONED. IF THE US AND GVN APPROVE THESE CONDITIONS, THERE WILL BE A CEASE-FIRE.

AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE, NOT ALL LIBERATION FORCES WILL BE SENT INTO THE CITIES. INSTEAD, ONLY ABOUT ONE THIRD WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE COALITION ARMED FORCES. THE OTHER TWO THIRDS WILL WITHDRAW DEEP INTO THE JUNGLES TO SAFE BASE AREAS WHERE THEY WILL LIVE IN ABSOLUTE SECRECY.

THE HIGH-LEVEL VC CADRE CONCLUDED BY INFORMING OUR AGENT THAT THE "DAWN IS BREAKING" AND THAT "A DECISIVE PHASE IN HISTORY IS APPROACHING." EVEN THOUGH THE VC ARE APPROVING A COALITION, IT IS ONLY TEMPORARY, AND AFTER THAT THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE-GENERAL UPRISING WILL BE REINITIATED TO OVERTHROW THE "PUPPET-GOVERNMENT" ELEMENTS IN THE COALITION. AT THAT TIME THERE WOULD BE EVERLASTING PEACE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE SECOND PIECE OF INTELLIGENCE IS A DOCUMENT CAPTURED 29 OCTOBER NEAR BEN TRE CITY. IT IS A COSVN DIRECTIVE, PRECEDENCE FLASH DTD 28 OCT POSSIBLY FOR THE BEN TRE VC PROVINCE. ITS SUBJECT IS CESSATION OF US AIR RAIDS AGAINST NVN.

THE DOCUMENT CAUTIONS ADDRESSEES NOT TO LET THEMSELVES FALL INTO AN ILLUSION OF PEACE. IT REMINDS ADDRESSEES THAT THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE SVN REVOLUTION IS TO COMPLETELY DEFEAT THE US AGGRESSION, OVERTHROW THE GVN, ESTABLISH A COALITION GOVERNMENT, AND LEAD THE COUNTRY TO REUNIFICATION. THIS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE WILL NEVER CHANGE. IT IS ONE TO BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE GENERAL UPRISING. THEIR IMMEDIATE POLITICAL MISSIONS ARE TO ANNIHILATE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE US WAR POTENTIAL IN VN, DISINTEGRATE THE RVNAF, AND SMASH TO PIECES THE GVN. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY SHOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR ARMED FORCES AND POLITICAL FORCES TO INSURE THEIR SUCCESS IF A PEACE SOLUTION OCCURS.

THE DIRECTIVE INSTRUCTS ADDRESSEES THAT UPON THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE US OF A CESSATION OF AIR RAIDS AGAINST NVN, THE NLF WILL ISSUE A PROCLAMATION. MILITARY ACTIONS, POLITICAL STRUGGLES AND MILITARY PRESELYTING MUST BE IMMEDIATELY INCREASED. ESPECIALLY ARMED PROPAGANDA UNITS SHOULD BE LAUNCHED INTO SENSITIVE AREAS, CITIES AND TOWNS, TO ELIMINATE GVN ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL, INCITE THE MASSES TO RISE UP AND TAKE OVER THE POWER.

THESE TWO PIECES OF EVIDENCE, EACH BUT A FEW DAYS OLD, PROVIDE VALUABLE INSIGHT REGARDING THREE POINTS: THE ENEMY'S OBJECTIVE; HIS VIEW OF THE BOMBING HALT; AND WHAT HIS FUTURE TACTICS MIGHT BE.

TURNING TO THE FIRST POINT, THEY LEAVE NO QUESTION THAT THE ENEMY'S ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE REMAINS UNCHANGED. IT IS THE COMPLETE DOMINATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM. IT IS A DOMINATION TO BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE POPULAR UPRISING BY MEANS OF THE FAMILIAR THREE PRONGED ATTACK, MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND PRESELYTING WORKING IN CONCERT WITH POSSIBLY A LITTLE MORE EMPHASIS NOW ON THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS.

NOTE THAT THESE POINTS ARE NOT OUR INTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE ENEMY IS SAYING. THESE TWO PIECES OF EVIDENCE REPEATEDLY HAMMER ON THESE POINTS IN VERY EXPLICIT TERMS. TO HIM, A COALITION GOVERNMENT IS NO MORE THAN A MEANS TO AN END. IT IS A STEPPING STONE OR BREATHER FROM WHICH HE INTENDS TO GAIN THIS EVENTUAL GOAL. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE GVN REMAINS HIS PRIME TARGET. AND HE VIEWS A

COALITION GOVERNMENT AS A MEANS OF WEAKENING THE GVN AND EXPOSING IT TO HIS ULTIMATE DESTRUCTION.

SECOND, HE SEES THE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS NOW A REALITY, THAT A COMPLETE BOMBING HALT WOULD CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT VICTORY FOR HIM. DESPITE HIS PAST FAILURES IN THE PURLEY MILITARY SENSE, WE KNOW THAT THE ENEMY HAD LONG SEEN HIS 1968 GENERAL OFFENSIVE-GENERAL UPRISING AS DEFINITE PROGRESS. THE COSVN DIRECTIVE JUST DESCRIBED TELLS US THAT HE STILL VIEWS IT THIS WAY. THIS DOCUMENT STATES THAT, "THE ANTI-US RESISTANCE FOR NATIONAL SALVATION..."

WAS DRIVEN THE US IMPERIALISTS INTO SERIOUS DEFEATS FORCING THEM TO DEESCLATE THE WAR, REDUCE THEIR BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, AND TALK TO US AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE." THIS DOCUMENT, AS HAVE SO MANY OTHERS BEFORE IT, -55487753 5 33 9 ATTRIBUTES THESE SO-CALLED "DEFEATS" TO THE ENEMY'S DOCTRINAL CONCEPT OF GROWING ALLIED WEAKNESS AND WEAKENED FURTHER BY COMMUNIST PRESSURE AND INTERNAL DISORDER. IT STATES THAT PRES. JOHNSON MAY BE COMPELLED TO STOP THE BOMBING," IN THE FACE OF OUR CONTINUOUS AND INTENSIVE MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES; IN THE FACE OF THE INTERNAL TROUBLES AND FAILURES OF US GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES IN THE... ELECTIONS; AND UNDER THE INCREASINGLY HEAVY PRESSURE OF THE WORLD AND US ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT."

WITH THE COLLAPSE OF THE 3RD OFFENSIVE, THE ENEMY DESPERATELY NEEDED YET ANOTHER CONCESSION TO BOLSTER THIS FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC BELIEF AS WELL AS BUOY THE FLAGGING SPIRIT OF HIS FORCES - THAT CONCESSION WAS A COMPLETE HALT TO THE BOMBING. ITS IMPORTANCE TO HIM IS CLEAR IN YET ANOTHER PASSAGE FROM THE COSVN DIRECTIVE WHICH INSISTS,

"WE SHOULD MAKE PERSONNEL IN INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THAT THE US BOMBING HALT OF NORTH VIETNAM WILL BE A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT WHICH HAS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. THIS IS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR CONFIDENCE IN VICTORY AND IN THE PARTY'S STRATEGIC DETERMINATION, AND HEIGHTEN THEIR FIGHTING SPIRIT AND THEIR WILL TO WIN AMONG THE ENTIRE PARTY, ARMY, AND POPULATION."

THE ENEMY HAS NOW ATTAINED THIS CONCESSION AND HE MUST CONSIDER IT A GREAT VICTORY. HE HAS CONSISTENTLY SAID THAT WE MUST FIRST HALT THE BOMBING BEFORE HE WOULD MAKE ANY CONCESSION IN RETURN. AT LEAST, IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD AND IN THOSE OF HIS OWN RANK AND FILE, HE HAS GAINED THE BOMBING HALT WITHOUT AN APPARENT CONCESSION. IN EFFECT HE HAS ACHIEVED HIS GOAL.

HIS ATTAINMENT OF THE CONCESSION LEADS TO THE THIRD AND FINAL POINT -- HIS TACTICS AND FUTURE PLANS. LET'S FIRST LOOK AT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER ENEMY OFFENSIVE. CONCURRENT WITH THE END OF HIS THIRD OFFENSIVE AND THE SHIFT OF UNITS THAT FOLLOWED, WE BEGAN TO GET THE NOW WELL FAMILIAR SIGNS OF THE ENEMY'S PLANS FOR YET ANOTHER SURGE, WHAT HE CALLED HIS NEXT WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN.

AGENTS, WES- SAGE INTERCEPTS, AND MORE RECENTLY A FEW DOCUMENTS TOLD US THAT THE ENEMY HAD INTENDED THE START OF THIS NEXT OFFENSIVE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. MOST REFERENCES SPOKE OF ITS BEGINNING BEFORE THE U.S. ELECTIONS AND MANY INDICATED IT WOULD RUN IN PHASES UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR OF EVEN UNTIL TET. THE RELIABLE AGENT REPORT DESCRIBED ABOVE STATED THAT THE VC WOULD LAUNCH A LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE ON THE DAY OF OR A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE START OF SERIOUS PEACE TALKS. BUT ACCORDING TO PRES. JOHNSON'S 31 OCTOBER SPEECH, SERIOUS PEACE TALKS SHOULD START AT NEXT WEDNESDAY'S PARIS SESSION -- ON THE 6TH ON NOVEMBER. ALL OUR CORRENT EVIDENCE TELLS US THE ENEMY CANNOT LAUNCH ANY SIZEABLE ATTACK BY THAT DATE.

IN NORTHERN I CORPS, THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH ENEMY FORCES AVAILABLE TO MOUNT AN OFFENSIVE OF ANY SERIOUS MAGNITUDE.

IN NORTHERN MR-5, THE ENEMY FORCES UNDER HQ FRONT 4 HAVE BEEN TOLD TO EXPECT COMBAT ORDERS. BUT NOT UNTIL 9 NOV. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT ATTACK PREPARATIONS MUST BE COMPLETED BY 15 NOVEMBER. THE TENOR OF THE COMMUNICATIONS RELATED TO THESE ATTACK PLANS INDICATE THAT THEY WILL BE ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS RATHER THAN GROUND ASSAULTS.

IN THE B-3 FRONT, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY OF THE ENEMY FORCES ARE PREPARING OR INTEND TO CONDUCT ASSAULTS ON US INSTALLATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE 95B REGT HAS BEEN PREPARING TO CONDUCT AN AMBUSH ON HIGHWAY 19E 50 KM EAST OF PLEIKU HOWEVER, ON 31 OCT THE REGIMENTALHQ WAS DIRECTED TO POSTPONE THIS ATTACK FOR AN UNSPECIFIED LENGTH OF TIME. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THE ENEMY IS POSITIONED OR PREPARED TO LAUNCH MAJOR ATTACKS IN SOUTHERN MR-5 OR MR-6.

IN III CORPS, THE ENEMY COULD, FROM HIS PRESENT POSITION, LAUNCH MAJOR ASSAULTS AT TAY NINH, LOC NINH, AND AN LOC BY 6 NOV. HE COULD EVEN MOVE ELEMENTS OF THE 5TH, 7TH, OR 9TH DIVS WITH THE INTENT TO ATTACK SAIGON BY 6 NOV. HOWEVER, IF A MAJOR ASSAULT ON SAIGON IS TO BE CONDUCTED BY 6 NOV, THE ENEMY UNITS WOULD HAVE TO BE MOVING NOW, AND THERE IS NO GOOD EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE DOING SO. IT IS HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT THAT THE TWO PIECES OF EVIDENCE WE DO HAVE MAKE NO MENTION WHATSOEVER OF ATTACKS ON SAIGON OR OTHER CITIES, AN ABRUPT DEPARTURE FROM WHAT WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY SEEN IN HIS PLANS AND DIRECTIVES.

IN IV CORPS, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ENEMY UNITS MOVING FOR MAJOR ASSAULTS ON DELTA CITIES OR MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, AND IN LIGHT OF HIS FLAGGING POSTURE THERE, HE PROBABLY HAS NO CAPABILITY FOR SUCH ASSAULTS.

THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY INTENDS TO STEP UP TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST SAIGON WITH HARASSMENT AND ATTACKS BY FIRE ON KEY PROVINCIAL CITIES DURING EARLY NOV. HE MAY ALSO INCREASE HIS VGROUND PROBES AND ATTACKS ON SELECTED FIRE SUPPORT BASES AND SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS. IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT HE IS NOW IN A POSITION TO LAUNCH LARGE-SCALE COORDINATED ATTACKS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER THINGS WE SEE IN THE RELIABLE AGENT REPORT AND COSVN DIRECTIVE. BOTH OF THEM SUGGEST A RESPIRE FROM LARGE SCALE MILITARY ACTION. THE AGENT REPORT CONTAINS THE ANALOGY OF THE LONG JOURNEY AND THE REST BEFORE CONTINUING. THE COSVN DIRECTIVE HAS THE GENERAL TONE OF LONG RANGE PREPARATIONS FOR FUTURE PLANS. IT LISTS THREE MAJOR TASKS AHEAD. "1. PROMOTE THE MORALE OF PERSONNEL IN INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PEOPLE IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN THEIR COMBAT DETERMINATION. 2. PUSHING FORWARD THE GENERAL ATTACK AND UPRISING MOVEMENT AND THE TROOPS PROSELYTING MISSION. 3. DEVELOP AND STRENGTHEN THE PARTY, GROUP, AND POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS." WHILE THESE TWO PIECES OF INTELLIGENCE ARE BY NO MEANS CONCLUSIVE, THEY DO SUGGEST THAT LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION BY THE ENEMY IS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY ON THE SHELF.

THEY TELL US OTHER THINGS ABOUT HIS TACTICS. AS MENTIONED BEFORE, CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT IN BOTH ARE ANY REFERENCE WHATSOEVER TO ATTACKS ON THE CITIES, A THEME THAT DOMINATED HIS PREVIOUS PLANS AND DOCUMENTS. BOTH, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO SPEAK TO THE "POPULAR UPRISING" AS THE MEANS THROUGH WHICH HE HOPES TO ATTAIN HIS FUNDAMENTAL AIMS.

THE COSVN DIRECTIVE GOES INTO QUITE A BIT OF DETAIL. IT PRESCRIBES OTHER MILITARY AND QUASI-MILITARY ACTIVITY. THEY ARE TO STRENGTHEN THEIR ARMED FORCES, GUERRILLA, SELF-DEFENSE, LOCAL, SAPPER, AND SPECIAL ACTIONS TEAMS; TO CONSOLIDATE POLITICAL FORCES; AND TO INTENSIFY THE TROOP PROSELYTING ACTIVITIES. THEY ARE TO DEVELOP AND EXPAND THEIR CONTROL OVER THE RURAL AREAS, PARTICULARLY THOSE THEY LABEL "WEAK" AREAS OR THOSE NOW CONTROLLED BY THE GVN. PROVINCE CAPITALS AND DISTRICT SEATS ARE PARTICULAR TARGETS IN WHICH THEY HOPE TO INCREASE THEIR CONTROL. OTHER MISSIONS INCLUDE "KILLING TYRANTS", ENCIRCLING OUTPOSTS FORCING ALLIED SOLDIERS TO SURRENDER OR WITHDRAW, ATTACKING LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO WEAR DOWN AND DISINTEGRATE ALLIED POTENTIAL, INCREASING GUERRILLA ACTIVITY PARTICULARLY IN THE VC CONTROLLED AREAS, AND CONDUCTING ARMED PROPAGANDA.

VIN GENERAL, THIS DOCUMENT INDICATES A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL OF ENEMY MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE NEAR FUTURE WITH STRENUOUS POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE HIS STRENGTH IN AREAS HE DOMINATES TO INCREASE HIS STRENGTH WHERE THE GVN HOLDS SWAY, AND TO ATTRITE ALLIED FORCES.

CONSPICUOUS BY ITS ABSENCE IN THIS EVIDENCE IS ANY FUTURE ROLE FOR THE NVA, DESPITE WITHDRAWAL OF NVA UNITS OUT OF COUNTRY, THERE IS NO GOOD EVIDENCE THAT THE NVA WILL ABANDON THE WAR OR ITS PLACE IN ENEMY PLANS.

TO DETERMINE NVA'S FUTURE ROLE, THE RECENT MOVES AND PRESENT DISPOSITION ITS UNITS GIVE US CLUES. IN NORTHERN I CORPS, THE B-3 FRONT AND III CORPS, NVA UNITS HAVE WITHDRAWN TO NVN, LAOS, OR BORDER SANCTUARIES IN CAMBODIA. WE HAVE DRIVEN HIM OUT OF THESE AREAS BY AGGRESSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS AND BY DENYING HIM THE FOOD AND MATERIEL HE NEEDS TO SUSTAIN HIS TROOPS. IN ADDITION, HE IS UNABLE TO FIND AN IN-COUNTRY SAFE-HAVEN IN WHICH TO REBUILD HIS FORCE. ONLY IN NORTHERN MR-5 DOES THE ENEMY RETAIN SIZEABLE NVA UNITS IN-COUNTRY--THE FORCES UNDER FRONT 4 AS WELL AS THE 2ND AND 3RD NVA DIVISION. THESE UNITS SEEK REFUGE IN THEIR IN COUNTRY BASE AREAS--THE ONLY ONES LEFT IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHERE THE ENEMY APPARENTLY STILL BELIEVES HE CAN FIND RELATIVE SAFETY FROM ALLIED OPERATIONS YET REMAIN CLOSE TO HIS KEY TARGETS.

AT THE SAME TIME, IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA, JUST WEST OF THE SVN BORDER ALL THE WAY FROM QUANG TRI PROV TO TAY NINH PROVINCE, THE NVA IS REBUILDING ITS BATTERED UNITS FOR FUTURE USE.

FOR THE SHORT RANGE, IT IS PROBABLE THAT THIS FORCE IS BEING READIED TO ACT AS HANOI'S COUNTER WEIGHT TO THE THREAT OF THE RESUMPTION OF US BOMBING OF NVN. EXPLICIT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI IS THE THREAT TO RENEW BOMBING NVN IF THE TALKS DO NOT PRODUCE PROMPT AND PRODUCTIVE RESULTS.

IMPLICIT IN HANOI'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH US, IS THE THREAT TO RENEW MAJOR HOSTILITIES WITH NVA FORCES NOW RE-BUILDING IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA. IF THEY CAN BE SUPPORTED LOGISTICALLY THE LONGER THE TALKS LAST, THE STRONGER THESE NVA FORCES BECOME, ALTHOUGH HANOI MUST NOW NEGOTIATE FROM A POSITION OF MILITARY WEAKNESS, THE GROWING, POTENTIAL THREAT FROM CAMBODIA AND LAOS ALLOWS HIM TO GRADUALLY STRENGTHEN HIS HAND.

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

MR 55 UNITS ARE GROUPED ALONG THE NVN/LAOTIAN LOGISTICS ROUTE, WHERE THEY CANNOT ONLY REBUILD AS COMBAT UNITS BUT ALSO BE USED TO EXPEDITE THE FLOW OF MEN AND MATERIEL ALONG THIS MAIN CORRIDOR ALL THE WAY FROM DONG HA TO THE XE LANONG. B-3 FRONT UNITS ARE CLUSTERED AROUND A RAPIDLY DEVELOPING LOGISTIC BASE WEST OF PLEIKU PROVINCE BETWEEN BASE AREAS 701 AND 702. BY NOW HE HAS 4 REGTS THERE WITH A WELL DEVELOPED COMMAND AND CONTROL NETWORK AND A RAPIDLY GROWING ROAD AND WATERWAY LOGISTIC COMPLEX.

AS NVA UNITS IN III CTZ ARE CONCENTRATED ALONG THE CAMBODIAN, TAY NINH BINH LONG BORDER WHERE TAY NINH PROVINCE IS ALMOST SURROUNDED BY THE 1ST, 5TH, AND 9TH DIVISIONS, TAY NINH PROVINCE'S HISTORY OF SEPARATISM FROM THE REST OF YOUTH VIETNAM AND THE LOCATION OF COSVN THERE MAY MAKE IT TEMPTING AS A SIT FOR THE LOCATION OF AN IN-COUNTRY CAPITAL FOR THE NLF; AND OF COURSE IN THIS LARGE AND IMPOSING GROUPING OF ENEMY UNITS AT THEIR CURRENT LOCATIONS IS THE IMPLIED THREAT OF AN ATTACK ON SAIGON AND THE MAJOR CONCENTRATION OF POPULATION SURROUNDING THE CAPITAL.

IN CONCLUSION, WE SEE AN ENEMY WHOSE MILITARY INCAPACITY HAS FORCED HIM TO REVERT TO POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURES TO ACHIEVE THE AIMS HE CANNOT GAIN FROM THE BATTLEFIELD. HE HAS APPARENTLY MADE A MAJOR AND SIGNIFICANT DECISION TO CHANGE THE DIRECTION OF HIS EFFORTS, BUT NOT THEIR FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE. FOR HIS NEAR TERM MILITARY ACTIVITY, WE EXPECT TO SEE ATTACKS BY FIRE AND SMALL SCALE PROBES ON ISOLATED OUT POSTS, FIRE SUPPORT BASES, SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS, AND PROVINCE AS WELL AS DISTRICT CAPITAL. AT THE SAME TIME, WE EXPECT HIM TO CONTINUE AND PROBABLY INCREASE HIS SABOTAGE, SAPPER ACTIVITY, TERRORISM, AND ASSASSINATIONS. HE WILL CONTINUE HIS ATTEMPTS TO ATTRIT ALLIED FORCES BUT WE EXPECT THE BRUNT OF HIS ACTION WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST ARVN AND THE GVN. WE ALSO BELIEVE HE WILL MAKE MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA USE OF THE BOMBING HALT IN AN EFFORT TO CLAIM IT AS A VICTORY FOR HIM FORCED UPON THE ALLIES BY HIS MOUNTING MILITARY AND POLITICAL PRESSURE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY
SENT
WHCA

1968 NOV 4 22 10

EEAN58
OO WIE13
OO WIE 422J

FROM: W.W. ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82676

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-498
By , NARA, Date 1-26-93

Free file

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR POTUS

HEREWITH THE TWO FACTUAL MEMORANDUMS YOU REQUESTED THIS MORNING.

SUBJECT: ICC CONCURRENCES IN OUR COURSE OF ACTION IN PARIS

1. AUSTRALIA. OUR REQUEST FOR CONCURRENCE WAS CONVEYED THROUGH AMBASSADOR WALLER IN WASHINGTON ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 14, OUR TIME. WE SHOWED WALLER A FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE WHOLE PROPOSAL, WHICH HAD INDEED BEEN GONE OVER PREVIOUSLY WITH HIM AND ON WHICH WE HAD HAD AUSTRALIAN COMMENT. EARLY THE FOLLOWING MORNING, OCTOBER 15, WALLER ADVISED THAT GORTON WAS FULLY ABOARD.

2. KOREA. AMBASSADOR PORTER PRESENTED THE MATTER FULLY TO PRESIDENT PARK ON OCTOBER 15 IN SEOUL. PARK RESPONDED THAT "HE DOES NOT WISH TO OBJECT TO THE US PROPOSAL BECAUSE PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS THE LEADER OF THE WAR EFFORT AND IS IN THE BEST POSITION TO JUDGE WHETHER THE RISKS ARE ACCEPTABLE." HE EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT HANOI WOULD ACCEPT ALL THREE OF THE BASIC POINTS, AND HE URGED THAT WE TAKE EVERY PRECAUTION TO RESUME BOMBING IF "RECIPROCAL ACTION" ALONG THE LINES WE EXPECTED WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY VISIBLE.

3. NEW ZEALAND. HOLYOAKE WAS FULLY BRIEFED ON THE SITUATION ON OCTOBER 13, JUST BEFORE WE HAD THE CLEAR MESSAGE FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. THIS WAS DONE AT THE ANZUS COUNCIL MEETING IN WASHINGTON BY BUNDY (AND THE SAME FOR HASLUCK OF AUSTRALIA). ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 14, BUNDY REACHED HOLYOAKE (THROUGH LAKING) IN NEW YORK, AND LAKING IMMEDIATELY CALLED BACK TO SAY THAT HOLYOAKE CONCURRED. THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND, MARSHALL, EXPLICITLY CONFIRMED THIS TO AMBASSADOR HENNING ON THE 15TH.

4. PHILIPPINES. AMBASSADOR WILLIAMS SAW MARCOS EARLY ON THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 16, MANILA TIME (EARLY EVENING OF OCTOBER 15, OUR TIME). MARCOS RESPONDED--AFTER A COMPLETE EXPOSITION--THAT "YOU CAN TELL YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT I WILL SUPPORT THIS PROGRAM." MARCOS DID GO ON TO ASK SPECIFICALLY WHETHER WE HAD PRESIDENT THIEU'S APPROVAL, AND WILLIAMS ASSURED HIM THAT WE DID.

5. THAILAND. AMBASSADOR UNGER SAW THANOM AT 1400 ON OCTOBER 15, BANGKOK TIME (3200 OCTOBER 15, WASHINGTON TIME--OR 8-10 HOURS BEFORE THE PARIS MEETING). UNGER REPORTED THAT "HE BELIEVED WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE NEXT PRIVATE MEETING AND, IF US SATISFIED HANOI ACCEPTS THESE STEPS AND UNDERSTANDINGS, ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE MADE AND ARRANGEMENT SHOULD BE TRIED." THANOM WENT OVER A NUMBER OF POINTS, INCLUDING RECONNAISSANCE AND CONTINUED ACTION IN LAOS. UNGER CHARACTERIZED HIS FINAL REACTION AS "FORTHRIGHT AGREEMENT."

FOR GOOD MEASURE, WE SENT A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER TO BRIEF THANAT IN NEW YORK ON THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 15. THIS WAS DONE AFTER WE HAD WORD FROM BANGKOK THAT THANOM HAD BEEN SEEN, AND HAD CONCURRED. THANAT WAS HIGHLY FLATTERED THAT WE HAD INFORMED HIM FULLY, AND HAS MADE A PRESS STATEMENT SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE THAI HAD BEEN FULLY CONSULTED AND THEY WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE PROTESTED VIGOROUSLY IF THEY HAD NOT BEEN.

DUPLICATE COPY

NOVEMBER 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: THIEU'S CONCURRENCE IN THE BOMBING HALT

TAB A COVER KEY EXCERPTS FROM BUNKER'S REPORTS OF HIS INTERVIEWS WITH THIEU IN THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 13 ONWARD.

IN BRIEF:

A. AS ITEM 1 SHOWS, THIEU "RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY" ON OCTOBER 13. THIS RESPONSE WAS BASED ON A FULL PRESENTATION INCLUDING THE REPRESENTATION FORMULA. OUR PREVIOUS CONSULTATIONS WITH THIEU AND KY HAD INCLUDED THEIR EXPRESS CONCURRENCE IN THE "YOUR SIDE/OUR SIDE" FORMULA IN BROAD FORM ON MAY 6, AND IN FULL DETAIL ON JUNE 25.

B. AS ITEM 3 OF TAB A SHOWS, ON OCTOBER 15 THIEU EXPRESSLY CONCURRED IN A TOTAL TIME SEQUENCE THAT INCLUDED A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE CONVENING OF A BROADENED PARIS MEETING 36 HOURS THEREAFTER.

C. ON OCTOBER 16, THIEU SAID THAT THE NSC HAD AGREED ON THE THREE CENTRAL POINTS OF THE ARRANGEMENT. (HOWEVER, AT THIS MEETING THERE APPEARS FOR THE FIRST TIME CONCERN ABOUT HOW THE NLF PRESENCE WOULD BE DEPICTED.)

D. IN THE VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OCTOBER 16 AND OCTOBER 28, A NUMBER OF AMENDMENTS WERE MADE IN THE DRAFT OF A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. THIS CULMINATED IN THIEU AND KY BOTH AGREEING SPECIFICALLY TO THE TEXT ON OCTOBER 28. EVERY SINGLE ELEMENT WAS GONE OVER AT THAT TIME, INCLUDING THE WAY WE WOULD BOTH SAY THAT HAVING THE NLF PRESENT AT THE TALKS DID NOT MEAN WE ACCEPTED THEM AS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY, AND SO ON. THIS POINT WAS, BY THEN, EXPRESSLY COVERED IN THE DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. AT THE CLOSE OF THIS MEETING, GVN FOREIGN MINISTER THANH -- ALL ALONG THE MOST LEGALISTIC OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE -- DESCRIBED THE RESULT OF THE MEETING AS "AGREEMENT." BUNKER REPORTED IT AS AGREEMENT IN FULL, AND HIS REPORT GIVES TOTAL SUPPORT TO THIS CONCLUSION.

THIS IS THE CLEAR CENTRAL CONCLUSION SUPPORTED BY THE TOTAL RECORD. AT THE SAME TIME, THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OCTOBER 16 AND OCTOBER 28 DO REFLECT A RECURRENT DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO GET HANOI TO SAY IN SO MANY WORDS THAT IT WILL TALK DIRECT TO THE GVN, AND TO GET HANOI TO ADMIT THAT THE NLF WOULD BE PRESENT SOLELY AS A PART OF THE HANOI DELEGATION. THESE POINTS WERE SHOT DOWN AGAIN AND AGAIN, AND APPARENTLY LAID CLEARLY TO REST ON OCTOBER 28. BUT THEY DO FORESHADOW THE PROBLEMS THAT AROSE IN THE LAST THREE DAYS.

ONE FURTHER NOTE. ON OCTOBER 15 (ITEM 2 IN TAB A) THIEU SPECIFICALLY INSISTED ON "NO LONG DELAY" BETWEEN CESSATION AND THE FIRST MEETING, OR AT LEAST THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE A FIRST MEETING. ON OCTOBER 16, AS NOTED ABOVE, THIEU SPECIFICALLY AGREED TO A TIMETABLE THAT CALLED FOR A 36-HOUR INTERVAL. ON OCTOBER 28, BUNKER REPORTED THAT HE HAD SEVERAL TIMES BROUGHT TO THIEU'S ATTENTION THAT WE HAD IN MIND TO STOP THE BOMBING "2 OR 3 DAYS BEFORE THE MEETING." THIEU NEVER HAD THE SLIGHTEST OBJECTION TO THIS TIME INTERVAL, BUT ONLY KEPT WONDERING WHY HANOI WAS DELAYING.

**GVN STATEMENTS INDICATING ASSENT TO
US COURSE OF ACTION**

1. OCTOBER 13 MEETING WITH THIEU (SAIGON 40220).

...THIEU THAN SAID SO LONG AS WE ARE GOING TO PRESS THE OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH AND IN LAOS, AND SO LONG AS WE ARE PREPARED TO RESUME THE BOMBING IF THEY VIOLATE THE DMZ OR ATTACK THE MAIN CITIES, HE IS READY TO GO ALONG. "AFTER ALL," HE SAID, "THE PROBLEM IS NOT TO STOP THE BOMBING, BUT TO STOP THE WAR, AND WE MUST TRY THIS PATH TO SEE IF THEY ARE SERIOUS." I THOUGHT THIS A STATESMAN'S VIEW.

...WE THEN TALKED ABOUT TIMING AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING NEXT ACTION, AS REPORTED IN PARA 4 REFTEL (SAIGON 42178). I MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE COULD NOT SAY PUBLICLY THAT THERE WERE CONDITIONS OR RECIPROCITY, BUT THE FACTS WOULD SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. HE UNDERSTOOD.

...COMMENT: I MUST CONFESS I THOUGHT THIEU WOULD WANT TO THINK OVER-NIGHT ABOUT THIS BEFORE PROVIDING AN ANSWER, BUT HE RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY. MOST TIMES HE THINKS CLEARLY AND LOGICALLY. THIS MEETING WAS THE LATEST DEMONSTRATION OF THIS; AND IT IS ALSO THE ANSWER TO THOSE WHO THINK HE IS INDECISIVE.

2. OCTOBER 15 MEETING WITH THIEU (SAIGON 40330).

...WE THEN WENT OVER AGAIN, AT HIS REQUEST, THE WAY IN WHICH THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE HANDLED, ITS BREVITY, THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENCE TO CONDITIONS OR RECIPROCITY, ETC. HE SAID THIS WAS ACCEPTABLE, BUT HE WISHED TO IMPRESS ON US THE IMPORTANCE OF NO LONG DELAY BETWEEN THE CESSATION ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE FIRST MEETING TO BE ATTENDED BY THE GVN, OR ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THEY WOULD ATTEND. IF THERE WAS A LONG DELAY, HE WOULD HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. I SAID WE WERE CONSCIOUS OF THIS.

HE SAID AMBASSADOR LAM WOULD HEAD THE TALKS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, BUT HE WOULD NEED TO BE REINFORCED. I ASKED IF HE HAD IN MIND TO USE VP KY, AS HE ONCE THOUGHT HE MIGHT. HIS ANSWER WAS VAGUE AND NON-COMMITTAL. I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO SEND KY OUT -- AT LEAST NOT IN THE EARLY STAGES. BERGER SEPARATELY HAD THE SAME IMPRESSION.

3. BUNKER/THIEU MEETING OCTOBER 15 (SAIGON 40372).

I SAW THIEU AT 0700 HOURS, AND WENT OVER SEQUENCE IN TERMS OF PRIVATE MEETING AGREEMENT AT X HOURS, THEREAFTER PLUS ONE, TWO, ETC. HOURS FOR DIFFERENT STEPS. WE ALSO WENT OVER DRAFTS OF PROPOSED STATEMENTS.

HE WILL BRIEF VP, PRIMIN, FONMIN, MINDEFENSE, MIN INTERIOR, CHIEFS JGS AT 0900 LOCAL, AND SPEAKERS, AFTER HEARING RESULTS PRIVATE TALKS.

HE RAISED SEVERAL IMPORTANT POINTS ON DRAFTS:

- A. HE OBJECTS TO PHRASE "DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM" IN JOINT STATEMENT AND PREFERS NORTH VIET-NAM, OR NORTH OF 17TH PARALLEL.
- B. HE INSISTS THAT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT EITHER POSITIVELY REFER TO GVN ATTENDANCE AND FORMAL SESSION, OR DELETION OF ALL REFERENCE TO A JOINT SESSION TOMORROW IN THIS ANNOUNCEMENT.
- C. HE ALSO PLANS TO MAKE STATEMENT AFTER JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT ISSUED, AND FEELS HE MUST REFER THERE TO GVN ATTENDANCE AT FIRST FORMAL MEETING. HE HOPES PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL DO LIKEWISE.
- D. HIS SEPARATE STATEMENT WILL AVOID ANY REFERENCE TO CONDITIONS, AGREEMENTS, ETC. AND WILL FOLLOW LINE WE PROPOSED....

4. BUNKER/THIEU MEETING OCTOBER 16 (SAIGON 40379).

...HE THEN SPOKE OF THE MEETING HE HAD HAD WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND SAID THAT THEY WERE ALL AGREED ON THE THREE POINTS IN RELATION TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, BUT THEY WERE UNANIMOUS IN EXPRESSING THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THE NLF PRESENCE AT THE MEETINGS.

...HE THEN REFERRED TO OUR DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT ON CESSATION AND SAID HE WOULD PREFER THAT NO REFERENCE AT ALL WAS MADE TO THE CONVENING OF A FORMAL SESSION IN THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, AND HE WOULD SUBSTITUTE FOR PARA 2 THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: "THIS COMMON DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN IN COMPLETE CONFORMITY WITH OUR MANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIET-NAM."

...HE SAID HE WOULD LET US HAVE A DRAFT OF HIS OWN SEPARATE STATEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE THOUGHT THAT EVEN IN THAT STATEMENT, HE MIGHT NOT MAKE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE DATE AND TIME OF THE FORMAL MEETING WHICH SVN WILL JOIN, BUT HE MAY ONLY SAY THE PEACE WILL REQUIRE SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AFTER CESSATION, THIS WOULD SPEAK FOR ITSELF. (COMMENT: HE MAY HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THIS AND, THEREFORE, WILL AWAIT HIS TEXT.)

5. THIEU/BUNKER MEETING OCTOBER 17 (SAIGON 40532).

HE SAID THAT IT WOULD CAUSE GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR THE GVN SHOULD A MEETING TAKE PLACE AFTER CESSATION WITHOUT THE GVN PRESENCE.

...THIEU SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO STUDY OUR PROPOSAL (RELATING TO GVN PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE) OVERNIGHT AND WOULD TALK WITH ME ABOUT IT TOMORROW. I SAID I THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT WE AGREE ON THE TEXT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SINCE WE MIGHT GET A REPLY FROM HANOI AT ANY MOMENT....

6. BUNKER/THIEU MEETING OCTOBER 20 (SAIGON 40710).

...AT THIS POINT I GAVE HIM THE DRAFT TEXT OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT USING THE WORDS NORTH VIET-NAM IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH AND OMITTING THE SUBORDINATE CLAUSE STARTING WITH THE WORDS "CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES, ETC. IN PARA TWO. HE READ IT AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS SATISFACTORY AND THAT THE QUESTION WHICH NOW REMAINED WAS HOW TO SOLVE THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE NLF PRESENCE.

...AS I GOT UP TO LEAVE I SAID THAT WHILE SOME MIGHT OBJECT TO THE GVN GOING INTO TALKS WITH HANOI AND THE NLF, HE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE WERE TIRED OF WAR AND WANTED AN END. WHILE HE MIGHT BE CRITICIZED FOR ATTENDING THE MEETINGS BY SOME, MANY MORE WOULD CRITICIZE HIM FOR REFUSING TO ATTEND. HE SAID HE WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE DESIRE FOR PEACE HERE, AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE, AND THIS IS WHY HE IS SEARCHING SO DESPERATELY FOR A MEANS WHICH WILL ENABLE HIM TO JOIN IN THE TALKS AND STAY.

7. BUNKER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT THIEU OCTOBER 28
(SAIGON 41323).

...I OPENED BY SAYING THAT WASHINGTON WELCOMED HIS AND KY'S SUGGESTIONS AT OUR LAST MEETING FOR CHANGES IN THE DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, AND HAD AMENDED THE LAST VERSIONS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THESE CHANGES, THE MAIN ONE OF WHICH WAS TO ELABORATE THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH TO INCLUDE CERTAIN POINTS INTENDED ORIGINALLY TO FIGURE IN OUR PRESIDENT'S ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT. THE RESULT WE THOUGHT WAS A MUCH BETTER AND FULLER JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT FROM EVERY POINT OF VIEW, AND I HOPED IT WOULD MEET ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GVN. I DID NOT SEE HOW WE COULD GO ANY FURTHER.

...THIEU READ THE NEW DRAFT AND SAID, "I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN ASK FOR ANYTHING MORE." HE WILL DISCUSS IT WITH KY AND THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW IN THE TALKS WITH HANOI.

...THIEU ASKED WHY WAS HANOI DELAYING SINCE THERE WAS UNDERSTANDING IN PRINCIPLE ALMOST TWO WEEKS AGO. I SAID I DIDN'T KNOW. IT MAY BE THAT THEY ARE HAVING TROUBLE WITH THE NLF," BERGER INTERJECTED. "IT MAY BE THAT THEY ARE STUDYING THE SIGNS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOU AND US WHICH HAVE APPEARED HERE, AND NOW SEE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US, AND CAPITALIZE ON IT." THIEU SAID THEY WOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO DO THAT....

...I SAID WE WERE UNABLE TO GO ANY FURTHER IN MEETING THE GVN NEEDS THAN THE DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. ALSO, WE COULD NOT MEET THEIR REQUEST FOR PROCEDURAL MEETINGS BEFORE THE MAIN MEETING. THEY HAD THEREFORE TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY WERE GOING TO JOIN THE TALKS OR NOT, AND THEY MIGHT HAVE TO DECIDE ON SHORT NOTICE. I SUGGESTED A JOINT MEETING WITH KY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON TO SEE IF ANY ISSUES REMAIN. WE WILL MEET AT 1700 HOURS. I SAID IF THE GVN RAISES NEW CONDITIONS AND DOES NOT JOIN THE FIRST MEETING THIEU SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A DECISION. HE SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THEM, BUT THOUGHT WE WERE PRETTY WELL AGREED NOW BETWEEN US.

THIEU THEN ASKED HOW WE THOUGHT THE TALKS WOULD MOVE. WE SAID WE THOUGHT AT ANY EARLY STAGE HANOI WOULD PUT IN DEMANDS FOR A CEASE-FIRE, FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE US AND ALLIED FORCES, AND FOR COALITION OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO PERMIT COALITIONS. WE SHOULD BE PREPARING OURSELVES URGENTLY FOR DEALING WITH THESE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

COMMENT: I THINK WE ARE IN THE CLEAR HERE, BUT WILL KNOW FOR CERTAIN AFTER TONIGHT'S JOINT MEETING. I AM FOR DIGGING IN AT THIS POINT, UNLESS THEY COME FORWARD WITH ANY CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS.

8. JOINT MEETING WITH THIEU, KY AND THANH OCTOBER 28 (SAIGON 41356)

THE MEETING WITH THIEU, KY AND THANH TOOK PLACE IN THE LATE AFTERNOON, AND THE FACT THAT MORE THAN HALF THE TIME WAS TAKEN UP BY EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE (MOSTLY BETWEEN KY AND THIEU) SHOWED HOW NECESSARY IT HAD BEEN. I CAN REPORT THAT AT THE END OF THE MEETING (ATTENDED ON OUR SIDE ALSO BY BERGER AND HERZ) WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON A SOMEWHAT CHANGED JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT ONE WHICH I BELIEVE WE CAN ACCEPT AND WHICH THE GVN BELIEVES WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR THEM TO COPE WITH CRITICISM THAT THEY HAD AGREED TO MEET WITH THE NLF. IT WAS NOT EASY.

...KY, WHO APPARENTLY MADE THE GREATEST DIFFICULTIES DURING THE DISCUSSIONS, CAME UP TO ME AFTER THE MEETING AND SAID HE HAD WORKED HARD TO FIND A COMPROMISE. PERHAPS HE DID SO IN THE END SINCE AFTER NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT THE FUTURE MEETINGS AS INVOLVING ONLY THREE DELEGATIONS, WHICH I REJECTED, KY FINALLY SAID, "I THINK IT IS BETTER THAT WE OPENLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE NLF WILL BE THERE." IT WAS KY, APPARENTLY, WHO OFFERED TO DROP AS UNNECESSARY, THE PHRASE ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE BEING CONSTITUTED BY HANOI AS THEY WISH IT TO BE CONSTITUTED". HE SAID, "THE REALITY IS THAT WE ACCEPT THE FRONT AT THE CONFERENCE." THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FROM THE GVN POINT OF VIEW AS THIEU EMPHASIZED, IS TO MAKE THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT (ABOUT NON-RECOGNITION OF THE NLF) AS STRONG AS POSSIBLE.

SINCE THE GVN IN THE END GAVE UP THEIR ATTEMPTS TO PICTURE THE MEETINGS AS CONSISTING OF ONLY THREE PARTICIPANTS, I JUST WISH TO RECORD THAT DISCUSSION WAS LONG AND DIFFICULT. AT ONE POINT THIEU ASKED ME IF I HAD RECEIVED BINDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE CONFERENCE MUST NOT BE PICTURED AS TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THREE DELEGATION. I ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. EARLIER IN THE DISCUSSION I POINTED OUT ONCE MORE THAT SINCE HANOI WISHED THE MEETINGS TO BE FOUR-POWER, AND SAIGON WISHES THEM TO BE THREE-POWER, THE ONLY POSSIBLE BASIS FOR TALKS WAS TO BE SILENT ON THE POINT. KY UNDERSTOOD THIS WELL, EVEN WHILE TRYING TO SQUEEZE US. HE SAID: "I UNDERSTAND YOUR PROBLEM. YOU CAN'T HAVE A CONFERENCE IF HANOI WON'T COME--OR IF SAIGON WON'T COME." BUT HE KEPT TRYING, NEVERTHELESS, TO FIND SOME FORMULATION THAT WOULD HAVE MADE IT APPEAR THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE DELEGATION ON THE OTHER SIDE.

AFTER AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE TEXT (SEPTEL), KY SAID, "QUITE FRANKLY, WE ARE NOT SATISFIED, BUT WITH SUCH MATERIAL WE CAN EXPLAIN, ONLY IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLE. IF THE CONFERENCE LASTS MANY MONTHS, OUR PROBLEM WILL BE TO PREVENT A DISINTEGRATION OF MORALE ON OUR SIDE." I REPEATED, WITH SOME EMPHASIS, THAT THIS IS ENTIRELY THE WRONG WAY OF LOOKING AT THE MEETING WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IF IT EVENTUATES: THE GVN SHOULD PRESENT IT AS A VICTORY, IT WILL HAVE FORCED THE DRV TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM, THE TALKS WILL BE A SIGN THAT THE DRV DESPAIRS OF OBTAINING ITS GOALS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, THAT IS RECOGNIZES THAT IS CANNOT SUBVERT OR INTIMIDATE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. BESIDES, WE WILL BE AT THE SIDE OF THE GVN BOTH AT THE TALKS AND IN PUSHING OUR MILITARY ADVANTAGES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, SO THAT THE DANGER OF DISINTEGRATION SHOULD BE ENTIRELY ON THE OTHER SIDE. ...AT THE END IT WAS THANH HIMSELF WHO USED THE WORD "AGREEMENT" TO DESCRIBE THE OUTCOME OF TODAY'S JOINT MEETING.

DTG: 041810Z NOV 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

RETOY FROM QUICK COPY

SENT
WHCA

White House
By 19
Date 3-8-43

NOV 4 22 43

VVZCZCEEA691
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4222

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82678

Frankle

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 4, 1968

FOLLOWING IS A STATE DEPARTMENT MEMORANDUM SUMMARIZING THE COMMENTS RECEIVED BY THEIR OFFICERS UPON INFORMING MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BOMBING HALT IN NORTH VIETNAM.

I. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

A. DEMOCRATS

J. W. FULBRIGHT - NOT REACHED PERSONALLY. STAFF REPORTS HIM PLEASED BY ANNOUNCEMENT. PRESS QUOTES AS SAYING HE IS GLAD THE PRESIDENT AGREES WITH HIM IN STOPPING THE BOMBING.

JOHN SPARKMAN - VERY PLEASED TO HEAR THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

MIKE MANSFIELD - WAS CONTACTED EARLIER BY WHITE HOUSE.
WAYNE MORSE - VERY PLEASED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

ALBERT GORE - PLEASED BY ANNOUNCEMENT AND INDICATES HE WILL SUPPORT IT.

FRANK J. LAUSCHE - HOPES IT WILL WORK OUT. AFRAID IT WILL NOT, BUT THINKS IT SHOULD BE TRIED.

FRANK CHURCH -- VERY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

STUART SYMINGTON - VERY ENTHUSIASTIC. FEELS THE ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD HELP HUMPHREY.

THOMAS J. DODD - UNABLE TO REACH THE SENATOR DIRECTLY BUT WERE TOLD BY HIS STAFF THAT SENATOR RELEASED A PRESS STATEMENT TODAY ALONG THESE LINES:

HOPES THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WILL LEAD TO AN EARLY AND HONORABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR. IF HANOI IS SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING THIS CONFLICT, THEN LET THEM SHOW IT AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE -- LET THEM END THE STALEMATE IN PARIS. ALSO -- AND MOST IMPORTANT -- THE SHOOTING AND KILLING ON THE BATTLEFIELD SHOULD STOP IMMEDIATELY IF WE ARE TO HAVE ULTIMATE PEACE.

WPC QUICK COPY

JOSEPH S. CLARK - UNABLE TO REACH THE SENATOR DIRECTLY BUT STAFF REPORTS THE FOLLOWING REACTIONS FROM HIM DURING THE DAY:

EXPRESSED GRATITUDE. MARVELOUS DEVELOPMENT. HE HAS BEEN URGING THIS FOR AT LEAST A YEAR (HIS OPPONENT FOR THREE DAYS). IT IS A HOPEFUL AND MOST CONSTRUCTIVE STEP. THE NEXT STEP HE HOPES WILL BE A "CEASEFIRE". THINKS IT WILL HAVE A POLITICAL IMPACT, BUT NOT A DECISIVE ONE.

CLAIBORNE PELL - THINKS ITS WONDERFUL. ALL FOR IT. DOESN'T THINK IT WILL HAVE MUCH AFFECT ON THE TUESDAY ELECTION BUT TO THE EXTENT IT DOES HAVE IT WILL BE IN HUMPHREY'S FAVOR.

NOT REACHED: MCCARTHY

B. REPUBLICANS

BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER - VERY ANGRY. BELIEVES THIS A MOVE WHICH WILL JEOPARDIZE AMERICAN LIVES FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PURPOSES.

GEORGE D. AIKEN - HAS ALWAYS PREDICTED THAT PEACE COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED BY THE PRESIDENT BEFORE JANUARY 20. NOT SO SURE NOW AND HOPES HIS PREDICTION WILL TURN OUT TO BE WRONG. POLITICALLY HE THINKS IT CUTS BOTH WAYS, PROBABLY ON BALANCE IN FAVOR OF HUMPHREY. BELIEVES PRESIDENT PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH HIS PLACE IN HISTORY AND NOT PLAYING POLITICS.

FRANK CARLSON - HOPES IT WORKS.

CLIFFORD P. CASE - HE HAS SUSPENDED ALL CAMPAIGNING BECAUSE OF DEATH OF HIS MOTHER. HIS STAFF FEELS THE SENATOR WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC BECAUSE HE HAS, OVER THE PAST YEARS, ADVOCATED ALL STEPS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A CEASE FIRE AND MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS.

JOHN SHERMAN COOPER - CAMPAIGNING IN KENTUCKY AND NOT REACHABLE. HIS STAFF REPORTS HE HAS MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT THIS IS WHAT HE HAS BEEN ADVOCATING FOR A LONG TIME.

NOT REACHED: WILLIAMS, MUNDT.

II. HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

A. DEMOCRATS

THOMAS E. MORGAN (PENNA.) - HE WAS PLEASED. WHILE IT COMES A BIT LATE, HE IS SURE THAT IT WAS THE BEST THE PRESIDENT COULD DO.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI (WISC.) - HE HAD BEEN OPPOSED TO BOMBING HALT BUT HAD GREAT CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT AND BELIEVES HE WOULD NOT HAVE AGREED TO HALT UNLESS ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING ACHIEVED WITH HANOI.

EDNA F. KELLY (N.Y.) - THERE IS A LOT OF RADIO AND OTHER COMMENT THAT IT IS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. BELIEVES A LARGE PART OF PUBLIC MISUNDERSTANDS SITUATION AS BEING A LOT NEARER PEACE THAN IT ACTUALLY IS. WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE HURDLES STILL TO BE CROSSED AND POINT OUT WE STILL DO NOT HAVE REAL PEACE IN KOREA. THOUGHT RUSK NEWS CONFERENCE WAS GOOD. PERSONALLY SKEPTICAL THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL FOLLOW THROUGH. DOES NOT BELIEVE THIS ACTION WILL HELP THE DEMOCRATS MUCH. ONLY THING THAT WILL SAVE THE TICKET IN NEW YORK IS PUBLIC TIREDNESS OF STRIKES UNDER LINDSAY ADMINISTRATION.

WAYNE L. HAYS (OHIO) - PEOPLE THINK IT IS POLITICAL AND THAT OUR MILITARY CASUALTIES WILL GO UP. HAYS AGREES. THINKS THIS MOVE HAS SUNK HHH.

ARMISTEAD SELDEN (ALA.) - GOOD IDEA - HAVE TO WATCH CLOSELY. IF NORTH VIETNAMESE DON'T COME FORTH VERY SOON WE SHOULD POUR ALL HELL ON THEM.

DANTE FASCELL (FLA.) - FINE! GREAT! ALL FOR IT AND HAVE BEEN SAYING SO FOR TWO WEEKS. WELL RECEIVED BY THE PEOPLE TOO.

LEONARD FARBSTEN (N.Y.) - HIGHLY PLEASED. SORRY HE DIDN'T DO IT SOONER. BELIEVES IT'S THE BEGINNING OF THE END TO THE WAR IN VIET-NAM.

CHARLES C. DIGGS, JR. (MICH.) - UNABLE TO REACH HIM PERSONALLY. HIS ASSISTANT GAVE THE FOLLOWING AS HIS REACTION:

PLEASED BY DECISION. HE HAS ADVOCATED DEESCALATION FOR MANY MONTHS. THINKS THIS IS AN IMPORTANT AND MEANINGFUL STEP IN THAT DIRECTION.

WILLIAM MURPHY (ILL.) - HE PERSONALLY THINKS IT IS A WONDERFUL DEVELOPMENT. EVERY PUBLIC STATEMENT BY BOTH PARTIES HE HAS HEARD IN HIS AREA HAS BEEN HIGHLY FAVORABLE EXCEPT ONE BY SENATOR PERCY, WHO IMPLIED THAT THE BOMBING HALT WAS A POLITICAL MOVE.

UCRNELIUS GALLAGHER (N.J.) - HE THOUGHT THIS WAS FINE. IT APPEARS THAT WE HAD SETTLED SOME PROBLEMS. HE THINKS WE ARE ON THE RIGHT COURSE, ALTHOUGH HE REALIZES THAT WE HAVE NOT BY ANY MEANS SOLVED THE PROBLEMS OF ACHIEVING PEACE. THE REACTIONS HE HAS HEARD ARE GENERALLY GOOD. HE IS NOT SURE WHAT THE POLITICAL RESULTS OF THE BOMBING HALT WILL BE. HE THINKS IT WILL HAVE SOME PLUS VALUE BUT PROBABLY TOO LATE TO BE DECISIVE. HE HIMSELF IS HAVING A HARD FIGHT, BUT HOPES TO SURVIVE.

ROBERT N. C. NIX (PENNA.) - SAID "REPORT THAT I AM MOST ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE BOMBING HALT. I AM WITH THE PRESIDENT 100 PERCENT."

JOHN S. MONAGAN (CONN.) - HE SAID HE WAS VERY HAPPY. HE THOUGHT IT WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. ALMOST ALL OF THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS HE HAD HEARD ON THE SUBJECT WERE GOOD. HE THOUGHT IT WAS INTERESTING THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD APPARENTLY FORMED THIS JUDGMENT ON THE ELECTION.

ON THE LOCAL POLITICAL SITUATION, HE SAID HE THOUGHT HE WAS DOING ALL RIGHT BUT CAN'T BE SURE ABOUT THE REST OF THE TICKET. HUMPHREY WAS DEFINITELY COMING UP BUT PROBABLY HAD A WAYS TO GO YET.

DONALD M. FRASER (MINN.) - STRONGLY APPROVED. HOPE IT WILL LEAD TO PEACE IN VIET-NAM. DOES NOT THINK THE TIMING, IN ANY SENSE, WAS POLITICAL. THE PRESIDENT WHO GAVE UP THE PRESIDENCY TO DEVOTE HIS ALL TO PEACE HAS TOO MUCH AT STAKE FOR ANYONE TO THINK IT IS ANYTHING BUT A TRUE EFFORT TO END THE WAR.

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL (N.Y.) - NOT AVAILABLE. TALKED TO PRESS ASSISTANT MARTIN L. BROWNSTEIN WHO SAID THAT ROSENTHAL HAS ADVOCATED A CESSATION OF BOMBING AS A STEP IN DEESCALATION. UNDOUBTEDLY HE WOULD SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION. WILL TRY TO GET A DIRECT QUOTE.

EDWARD R. ROYBAL (CAL.) - HE CONSIDERS THE ACTION ITSELF TO BE VERY GOOD AND THE PRESIDENT'S EXPLANATION TO BE CONVINCING. HE THINKS IT WAS THE RIGHT STEP TO TAKE TOWARD ENDING THE WAR AND ADDS THAT IT HAS ALREADY STRENGTHENED DEMOCRATIC PARTY PROSPECTS IN HIS DISTRICT.

JOHN C. CULVER (IOWA) - ACCORDING TO HIS DISTRICT OFFICE: THE CONGRESSMAN WAS VERY MUCH ENCOURAGED BY THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT AND FULLY SUPPORTS THE ACTION TAKEN. HE ISSUED A STATEMENT THIS MORNING, AS FOLLOWS:

LIKE ALL AMERICANS, I SHARE THE DEEP HOPE THAT THE PEACE INITIATIVE TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT LAST NIGHT IN ORDERING A TOTAL BOMBING HALT WILL RESULT IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS WHICH WILL LEAD TO MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES FROM S. VIET-NAM, ALLIED AND COMMUNIST ALIKE.

IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN RISKS INVOLVED IN THE STEPS WE HAVE TAKEN AND THE PRESIDENT HAS INDICATED THAT WE ARE PREPARED FOR CONTINGENCIES WHICH

MAY DEVELOP. IT IS ESSENTIAL NOW, HOWEVER, THAT WE DEMONSTRATE TO HANOI THAT THE PRESIDENT AND OUR NEGOTIATORS IN PARIS HAVE A BROAD BI-PARTISAN BASE OF SUPPORT AT HOME IN THE VERY SENSITIVE DAYS AHEAD AND THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE THE WILL AND THE DETERMINATION TO SEEK A JUST PEACE IN VIET-NAM.

LEE HAMILTON (INDIANA) - HE HAD TALKED TO A BROAD SPECTRUM OF VOTERS DURING THE DAY AND WAS SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED WITH THE DEGREE OF SKEPTICISM WITH WHICH IT WAS RECEIVED, LARGELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE TIMING MADE IT LOOK POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. IT IS, OF COURSE, RAISING HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS WHICH WILL SOMEWHAT OUTFRAN REAL POSSIBILITIES. PUBLIC OPINION WILL TURN SOUR VERY RAPIDLY IF THE NVN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE HALT. HIS OWN JUDGEMENT IS THAT IT WILL HAVE NO PROFOUND POLITICAL IMPACT UNLESS HANOI GIVES A RAPID FAVORABLE RESPONSE IN WHICH CASE IT WILL BE A SMALL PLUS.

JOHN TUNNEY (CAL.) - COULD NOT BE REACHED PERSONALLY, CAMPAIGNING ACTIVELY; LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT REPORTS THAT HE HAS SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S ACTION WAS THE RIGHT THING TO DO. L.A. ADDED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE IN THE ELECTION WITH TUNNEY "PROBABLY" BEING RE-ELECTED BUT WITH VICE PRESIDENT NIXON CARRYING THE DISTRICT.

L. H. FOUNTAIN (N.C.) - HAS MIXED EMOTIONS, HOPES THAT IT WILL WORK AND THAT HANOI DOES NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S STOPPING THE BOMBING. HE IS TELLING HIS PEOPLE NOT TO WORRY ABOUT THE US SOLDIERS BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE STOPPED THE BOMBING UNLESS HE HAD HAD REASONABLE ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD BE PROTECTED. POLITICALLY IT IS NOT AN ADVANTAGE TO EITHER PARTY. MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE ARE WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE ONLY THING THEY WORRY ABOUT IS, IF THE PRESIDENT HAS TO RESUME THE BOMBING, THAT HE GIVES IT TO THEM.

NOT REACHED: O'HARA, KAZEN.

B. REPUBLICANS

FANCES P. BOLTON (OHIO) - THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF REACTION OUT HERE. I DO NOT THINK IT IS TOO FAVORABLE. THE VOTERS THINK IT IS POLITICAL.

E. ROSS ADAIR (IND) - IS INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THE MOVE IS POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME.

WILLIAM S. MAILLIARD (CAL.) - DOES NOT THINK THE PRESIDENT IS PLAYING POLITICS. THINKS HANOI IS PLAYING POLITICS.

PETER H. B. PRELINGHUYSEN (N.J.) - VERY DISTURBED. CONSIDERS THE MOVE TO BE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED.

E. Y. BERRY (S.D.) - HOPES TO GOD IT WORKS. IT MAY BE POOR TIMING BUT HE DOES NOT REALLY THINK THE PRESIDENT DID IT FOR POLITICAL REASONS. WILL NOT ISSUE PUBLIC COMMENT.

EDWARD DERWINSKI (ILL.) - HE HAD HEARD THE SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND THOUGHT HE WAS VERY GOOD. HE WELCOMES THE BOMBING HALT AND HAS NO STRONG FEELINGS ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. HE ONLY HOPES THAT NO UNANNOUNCED AGREEMENTS WILL BE MADE WHICH WILL TIE THE HANDS OF THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION.

BRADFORD MORSE (MASS.) - MORSE UNDERSTANDS REASON ANNOUNCEMENT NOT MADE EARLIER IS THAT UNDERSTANDINGS NOT OBTAINED EARLIER BUT PEOPLE IN HIS DISTRICT TEND TO FEEL STATEMENT POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND COULD HAVE BEEN MADE WEEKS AGO.

MORSE THINKS THAT IF PRESIDENT NOT REALLY PLAYING POLITICS HE COULD HAVE STOPPED THE BOMBING TODAY AND SAID NOTHING ABOUT IT PUBLICLY UNTIL NEXT WEDNESDAY.

JAMES G. FULTON (PENNA.) - NOT REACHED DIRECTLY BUT SENT WORD THROUGH STAFF THAT HE IS RELEASING A STATEMENT WHICH TAKES NO PERSONAL POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE BOMBING HALT BUT STATES HIS PURPOSE IS TO ASSURE U.S. POLICY IS SUCCESSFUL AND TO SEE THAT THE 550,000 U.S. SERVICEMEN IN VIET-NAM ARE PROTECTED AND ADEQUATELY SUPPLIED. HE ADVOCATES EXTREME CARE TO ASSURE THAT U.S. SERVICEMEN ARE NOT BOOBY-TRAPPED INTO A GIGANTIC DISASTER.

JOHN BUCHANAN (ALA.) - HAS NOT MADE ANY BIG PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT AND DOESN'T PLAN TO. HE HOPES AND PRAYS SOMETHING GOOD COMES OUT OF IT. FRANKLY, IT DOES SEEM TO HIM THAT IN GOOD FAITH AND BI-PARTISANSHIP IT COULD HAVE COME DAY AFTER ELECTION. IF YOU ARE ON THE OTHER SIDE (REP) THE TIMING IS SUCH IT LOOKS EXTREMELY SUSPICIOUS.

PAUL FINDLEY (ILL.) - SAID HE FOUND A GREAT DEAL OF SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE BOMBING HALT BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY TO ELECTION DAY. HE TALKED TO ONE MOTHER WHO WAS CONCERNED THAT THE BOMBING HALT WOULD INCREASE THE DANGER TO HER SON. HE HIMSELF ALSO FELT THAT IF WE WERE GOING TO STAY THERE AT ALL AND THE MILITARY SAID WE NEEDED THE BOMBING WE SHOULD CONTINUE IT. ON THE WHOLE, HE WAS NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC BUT WAS SURE THAT THE PRESIDENT DID WHAT SEEMED TO HIM BEST FOR THE COUNTRY.

ROBERT TAFT, JR. (OHIO) - WONDERED WHY, IF IT WAS NOT POLITICAL, DIDN'T THE PRESIDENT WAIT UNTIL WEDNESDAY TO ANNOUNCE BOMBING HALT. HE SAID IN MOVING AROUND THE DISTRICT TODAY HE DID NOT SEEM TO THINK IT WAS A FACTOR AND, IF ANYTHING, IT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON HUMPHREY'S CHANCES.

NOT REACHED: BROOMFIELD, WHALLEY, GROSS, THOMSON.

DTG: 041818Z NOVEMBER 1968

CRAP FROM QUICK COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 NOV 4 23 38

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EEA693
OO WTE18
DE WTE 4231

FROM WALT W ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAPS2686

Free file

NOV 4 PM 8:48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 4, 1968

SUBJECT: LETTERS OF REACTION TO YOUR ADDRESS THURSDAY

1. HERewith A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE 546 LETTERS RECEIVED HERE AS OF ABOUT 9 AM TODAY:

-- FAVORABLE COMMENT FROM 326 (OR 60 PERCENT) OF THE TOTAL LETTERS.

-- CRITICAL COMMENT FROM 220 (OR 40 PERCENT) AND OF THESE 137 (OR ABOUT 20 PERCENT) OF THE 546 LETTERS, ATTRIBUTED DOMESTIC POLITICAL MOTIVATION TO YOUR ADDRESS.

2. NO CONGRESSIONAL LETTERS HAVE YET REACHED HERE.

3. THE FAVORABLE MAIL INCLUDED LETTERS FROM: CLARK KERR AND THE SEVEN CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM; JUDGE WALTER ELY; A. DUDLEY WARD, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF CHRISTIAN SOCIAL CONCERNS OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH; AND WILLIAM L. PORTER OF THE D.C. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION.

4. THE 546 LETTERS EXACTLY REVERSE THE PERCENT OF FAVORABLE/CRITICAL COMMENT WE HAVE SEEN IN THE NEARLY 1,100 TELEGRAMS RECEIVED AS OF SATURDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 2. THE TELEGRAMS WERE 60-40 CRITICAL. THE LETTERS ARE 60-40 FAVORABLE.

5. WHEN WE ADD THE 546 LETTERS TO THE 1,091 TELEGRAMS, WE GET A TOTAL OF 1,637 MESSAGES OF WHICH 903 (OR 55 PERCENT) ARE CRITICAL AND 734 (OR 45 PERCENT) ARE FAVORABLE IN BOTH TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS.

6. THE TELEGRAMS HAVE SUBSIDED TO A TRICKLE. AS OF 1 PM THIS AFTERNOON WE RECEIVED 20 TELEGRAMS OF CRITICAL REACTION TO THIEU'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF NOVEMBER 1. MOST OF THESE 20 TELEGRAMS URGE YOU TO: "OVERRULE THIEU; NEGOTIATE WITHOUT THE GVN; PULL OUT OUR TROOPS."

DIG: 842314Z NOVEMBER 1968

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *ra* NARA Date *3-8-73*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

1968 NOV 4 21 41

22A689
TO WTS 10 WTS 15
D WTS 4227

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO: JIM JONES FOR THE PRESIDENT
INFO TOM JOHNSON
CITE CAPS2682

Purple

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 4, 1968

AFTER CLEARING WITH FREEMAN, GUAD AND KATZENBACH, IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST, I PROPOSE YOU MAKE THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT THIS AFTERNOON ON INDIA FOOD:

"THE PRESIDENT TODAY AUTHORIZED THE NEGOTIATION OF A PL-480 AGREEMENT WITH INDIA TO PROVIDE FOR THE SALE OF APPROXIMATELY 2.5 MILLION TONS OF WHEAT AND WHEAT FLOUR, 10,000 TONS OF TALLOW, AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, TOTALLING A CURRENT EXPORT MARKET VALUE OF \$169 MILLION. THIS PROGRAM WILL HELP INDIA CARRY OUT ITS NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICIES WHICH ARE MOVING INDIAN AGRICULTURE TOWARD MODERNIZATION AND A DECREASING DEPENDENCE ON FOOD AID."

WE PROPOSE NOT TO INCLUDE THE ECONOMIC LOANS IN THIS ANNOUNCEMENT. BILL GUAD STILL NEEDS TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, AND WE WILL INSTRUCT HIM TO GO AHEAD AT A LEVEL OF UP TO \$135 MILLION.

ON THE PAK SIDE, WE DON'T BELIEVE THERE WILL BE MUCH REACTION TO ANOTHER FOOD DEAL FOR INDIA. THE TANKS--WHAT THEY MOST WANT--DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BECAUSE WE STILL HAVE TO MAKE OUR DEAL WITH THE TURKS AND EVEN THEN IT WILL BE AN ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE TURKS AND PAKS. AS FOR AN ECONOMIC CUSHION, WE THINK A QUIET WORD IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS FROM BEN OHLERT ON OUTSTANDING PAK REQUESTS SHOULD MORE THAN SATISFY AYUB. THUS WE PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING:

1. AN IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM TO ANKARA TRYING TO WRAP UP THE TANK DEAL WITH THE TURKS AS OUTLINED IN OUR EARLIER MEMO TO YOU.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-28
By cb, NARA, Date 1-28-95

2. OVER THE NEXT WEEK WE WILL HAVE FOR PAKISTAN:

A. A DEVELOPMENT LOAN PACKAGE UP TO \$70 MILLION, IF YOU APPROVE. THIS IS THIS YEAR'S AID LEVEL. THE RECOMMENDATION WILL BE ON YOUR DESK THIS WEEK.

3. WORD THAT WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY THEIR PL-480 REQUEST OF ABOUT \$20 MILLION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WOULD TELL THEM THAT WE ARE READY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS ON THEIR USUAL MARKETING REQUIREMENT THAT WOULD INDIRECTLY ENABLE THEM TO INCREASE THEIR EARNINGS FROM RICE EXPORTS. THE PAKS ARE DOING SO WELL AGRICULTURALLY THAT THEY DO NOT NEED MUCH AID.

WE BELIEVE THESE STEPS WILL BALANCE ADEQUATELY ON THE PAK SIDE.

THERE IS ONE FINAL OPTION TO CONSIDER. JOHN SCHNITTKER WISHES YOU TO KNOW THAT THE INDIANS HAVE TODAY REQUESTED 100,000 TONS OF RICE. THEY NEED IT, AND WE HAVE ABUNDANT SUPPLIES. WE HAVE NOT GONE INTO RICE FOR INDIA FOR SEVERAL YEARS BECAUSE OF THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR RICE ACREAGE ALLOTMENTS. SCHNITTKER HIMSELF WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST DOING THIS NOW, BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO FORECLOSE IT ON HIS OWN. IF YOU WISHED TO DO THIS, WE WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING AS A NEW SECOND SENTENCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT:

"IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT NOTED A RECENT REQUEST FROM INDIA FOR A QUANTITY OF RICE WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION."

I DO NOT RECOMMEND THIS UNLESS YOU HAVE REASONS FOR IT.

02-02045Z NOV 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

8

EEA 686
*****ZZ VTE 18
DE VTE 4219

1968 NOV 4 18 17

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS2675

Presfile

68 NOV 4 PM 1:28
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT.
HEREWITH FULL ACCOUNT SAVILLE DAVIS - BUI DIEM CONVERSATION.

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT ON THE LATE MORNING OF NOVEMBER FOUR, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT SAVILLE DAVIS, WASHINGTON BUREAU, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR NEWSPAPER, CONTACTED A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE VIETNAMESE EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM. WHEN INFORMED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WAS BUSY, DAVIS STATED HE WANTED TO CHECK OUT A STORY RECEIVED FROM A CORRESPONDENT IN SAIGON AND THAT DAVIS PLANS TO COME TO THE EMBASSY AND WAIT FOR THE AMBASSADOR TO SEE HIM.

DAVIS SAID THAT THE DISPATCH FROM SAIGON CONTAINS THE ELEMENTS OF A MAJOR SCANDAL WHICH ALSO INVOLVES THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR AND WHICH WILL AFFECT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE RICHARD NIXON IF THE MONITOR PUBLISHES IT. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE INASMUCH AS DAVIS HAS A DEADLINE TO MEET IF HE PUBLISHES IT. HE SPECULATED THAT SHOULD THE STORY BE PUBLISHED, IT WILL CREATE A GREAT DEAL OF EXCITEMENT.

DTG: 041800Z NOV 68

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-218
By cb, NARA, Date 7-28-95

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, November 4, 1968

9

Mr. President:

Herewith the first reports from State and USIA on foreign and domestic reaction to your address of October 31 and Thieu's later statement.

From State:

- American press comment
- Free World reactions
- Communist reaction

Pres file

From USIA:

- Foreign press reaction.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988
By 19, NARA, Date 3-2-93

cc: George Christian

American Opinion

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9a

American Press Comment on Pres. Johnson's

Announcement of Bombing Halt

Summary The chief points in the American reaction to the President's October 31 TV address are:

- * Widespread approval has been expressed by editors and commenting Congressmen, yet no one expects a quick peace to result.
- * A few critics charged the President with political timing, or suggested that Hanoi could be hatching a hoax; but other editors rebutted such allegations.
- * Pres. Thieu's subsequent statement against Saigon's participation in the Paris talks under present circumstances has dismayed some editors who insist that Pres. Thieu must face the reality that future American military aid will be limited.

"Forward Step" Pres. Johnson's announcement of a bombing halt and the "understanding" that Hanoi's forces will operate under certain restraints, as well as the prospect that representatives of the Thieu government and the National Liberation Front can join the Paris talks, prompted many expressions of gratification.

The Los Angeles Times saw a "major forward step" and the New York Times discerned "for the first time a future prospect of peace"; but both editorials underscored the President's caution against regarding peace as imminent (similarly, Wash. Star, Balt. Sun).

"Voters will go to the polls Tuesday," said the Chicago Sun-Times, "with greater hope in their hearts for peace in Vietnam." According to the Washington Post, Pres. Johnson's statement "reinforces a turn in the conflict that is very likely irreversible."

The Paris talks, some stressed, will become a "serious test" of Hanoi's good faith, as they noted that resumption of the bombing would follow any failure of the North to honor current understandings. This was emphasized by the Los Angeles Times and by Democratic Senators Kennedy (Mass) and Church (Idaho).

From Paris Kingsbury Smith wrote to the Hearst papers: "If Hanoi keeps its part of the secret bargain made with Pres. Johnson, many less American lives will be lost in Vietnam during the new stage of negotiations than would have been the case if the U.S. had continued bombing the North."

Said Joseph Alsop: "Because the President had the guts and the good sense to refuse to give something for nothing," despite heavy criticism from the press, intellectual community and anti-war leaders within the Democratic party, "serious negotiations can now be hoped for."

Pres. Johnson's announcement was especially welcomed by political leaders who had long urged a bombing halt (e.g. Sens. McCarthy, Mansfield, Kennedy, McGovern, Fulbright, Javits). Theodore Sorensen saw the action as tantamount to adoption of the minority Vietnam plank of the Chicago convention.

Meanwhile, Richard Nixon's "highly responsible" attitude toward the Paris talks was credited as making this development possible by Rep. Laird (D-Wis) and ex-Gov. Scranton.

Questionings Along with the approval expressed by the great majority of those commenting, there were some questionings. Most skeptical about the President's statement were some of the newspapers committed to Mr. Nixon's candidacy: the New York News and the Scripps-Howard papers. According to the Scripps-Howard editorial, the President and the rest of us "could be the victims of a bitter hoax" on the part of Hanoi; and it also noted "a whiff of last-minute political maneuver."

Even so, said this editorial: "If this is the start of an agreed de-escalation of the fighting and of serious negotiations that result in a settlement, good!"

Another Nixon newspaper, the Richmond Times-Dispatch, noted the existence of "speculation as to whether Ho Chi Minh helped to arrange this timing with a view to putting Humphrey in the White House."

Sen. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa), suggesting that Pres. Johnson's speech could have had a political purpose, said of the agreement: "If it can be done now, it could have been done sooner."

At the other end of the political spectrum, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. said he didn't think "Johnson got anything additional by halting the bombing at this stage he would have gotten if he had halted the bombing six months ago."

Mayor Yorty (D) of Los Angeles was noteworthy for expressing flat disagreement with the President's "further appeasement" of Hanoi, adding that Mr. Johnson may be "snatching victory from them (our fighting men) on the very eve of their success."

But rebuttals came from others. As to Hanoi's deceptiveness, the Washington Star said the President "must know that history's judgment will not be kind if the bomb halt turns out a cruel hoax." And to the Washington Post, "what he (Pres. Johnson) said about the timing seems reasonable."

The Chicago Sun-Times, which is for Nixon, said: "We do not believe Pres. Johnson timed the total bombing halt in the hope of helping Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey....We believe Hanoi determined the timing, not Pres. Johnson."

Most of those commenting did think that Humphrey's cause might be helped, although probably not much. The Washington Star, however, asked whether its candidate Nixon, "the man who stood most firm in his defense of the basic soundness of the present Vietnam policy," might not benefit as much or more than Humphrey.

Pres. Thieu Commenting on Pres. Thieu's statement about participating in the Paris talks, the Scripps-Howard papers stressed that in the last analysis South Vietnam must be "politically, militarily and morally strong enough to stand on its own feet." Noting Mr. Nixon's offer of cooperation on the Paris talks, the New York Times suggested that "Saigon will have to face reality in the coming weeks whatever the election outcome" (similarly, Wash. Post).

NOV 4 1968

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: EA - Mr. Bundy
SUBJECT: Free World Reactions to the Halt of Bombing of
North Viet-Nam -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Favorable reactions to President Johnson's October 31 announcement that bombing of North Viet-Nam would be halted continued to be voiced in the capitals of the free world. Almost without exception, official statements see this move as a step away from the battlefield and to the negotiating table. Official reaction has usually avoided reference to the timing of the bombing halt and the U.S. presidential election, although such views have been voiced by unofficial spokesmen. We have not yet begun to receive significant comments on the South Vietnamese position on the expanded talks or on the hard line being taken by Hanoi and the NLF. This report covers telegraphic traffic received as of 1100 hours, November 11, 1968.

East Asia

Republic of Korea

Officially and unofficially, the reactions to the bombing halt by Korean leaders continue cautious and unenthusiastic. The Chairman of the opposition New Democratic Party, Yu Chin-O, commenting on Viet-Nam developments, said that ROKG leaders have taken a wait and see attitude; that party leaders, like himself, are concerned about the definition of an honorable peace; that all Koreans are wary of the impact of the Viet-Nam cease fire on Korean economic development; and that all party leaders are concerned about the possibility of a coalition government in Viet-Nam that will exclude Korea from any future role.

Selig Harrison of the Washington Post reports on a November 3rd backgrounder by Foreign Minister Choi on which he was briefed by Korean correspondents. The Foreign Minister, in discussing Thieu's statements calling for direct talks between Saigon and Hanoi, said that such talks are not in the interest of Korea since they would exclude the allies and would fail to recognize ROKG's direct interest in Viet-Nam peace negotiations.

Republic of China

Taipei has made no further comments on the bombing halt since the first cautious wait and see attitude on the part of government officials and strong disapproval from KMT elements.

Thailand

In the wake of Foreign Minister Thanat's statement in which he welcomed the bombing halt, Embassy assessment of Thai attitude is that the halt is seen as a concession rung out of the Administration by a vocal, and in some quarters influential, anti Viet-Nam war groups. The Thai tend to equate recognition of the NLF/VC as similar to the recognition of the PATHET LAO and feel that we may still eventually impose a coalition government on South Viet-Nam. Prime Minister Thanom on November 4 spoke reassuringly of U.S. policy in Laos, but placed himself on record as believing, along with the Thai "people in general" that the purpose behind the bombing halt was "to help the election."

The Philippines

In reaction to the South Vietnamese attitude toward enlarged Paris negotiations, President Marcos, in an apparent off the cuff response to press queries on November 3, said he would be willing to help rapprochement between the U.S. and South Viet-Nam in the event that an actual rift was verified and proved difficult to heal. He reportedly made clear his position that he would take no action until he had received further word from his Embassy in Saigon.

New Zealand

Opposition leader Kirk in warmly welcoming the bombing halt called it a form of de-escalation which the labor party had advocated before mid -1966 election. He went on to state that he knew of no valid reason why this move could not have been taken sooner.

Laos

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma in an interview for the Bangkok Post reacted favorably to President Johnson's announcement of a bombing halt noting that he had suggested such a step earlier. The article goes on to quote Souvanna as having said that he hopes the bombing halt will also apply to bombing of the Ho Chin-min trail in Laos.

Cambodia

Prince Sihanouk, in his first press conference with western newsmen in a year, called for the U.S. to give full and genuine participation to the Vietcong. He went on to say that he does not want to see a complete U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia.

Western Europe

Italy

The Italian press reports that former Ambassador to Viet-Nam D'Orlandi in a television interview on the evening of November 1 described what he called the efforts of the Italian Government since 1965 to bring peace to Viet-Nam. He stated that the U.S. had been informed beforehand of the Italian contact with the Vietnamese at Rome and had encouraged Italian initiative.

Austria

Commenting on the Viet-Nam bombing halt, Austrian President Franz Jonas said on November 1, "It is to be hoped that the bombing halt is only part of the measures envisaged to end the war in Viet-Nam. I consider the bombing halt the important event in the present world situation. For America and for the world, it is at least as important as the presidential election in the U.S."

San Marino

The Government of the Republic of San Marino has sent a telegram to Secretary Rusk expressing its sincere satisfaction with the President's announcement of a bombing halt.

Western Hemisphere

Mexico

Mexican press reports of November 2 quote Foreign Secretary Corrillo Flores as applauding "without exception" President Johnson's decision. He also said it had been clear for some time now that the war could not be ended except by negotiations. He expressed the hope that this move would lead to the speedy conclusion of the war.

Dominican Republic

President Balugeur issued a statement on the bombing halt on November 1, noting that the "disposition of President Johnson to suspend bombing of North Viet-Nam has brought a sensation of security and confidence to the world." He hopes that the decision of President Johnson will have a warm reception by all humanity anxious for a durable peace based on law, justice, and universal repudiation of all armed violence.

Near East and South Asia

Morocco

Prime Minister Benhima told our Ambassador on November 1 that King Hussan welcomed the announcement by President Johnson of the bombing halt in North Viet-Nam, and was much relieved at the improved prospect for peace.

Kuwait

Embassy Kuwait reports that articulate Kuwaitis with whom they have spoken welcome the President's announcement of the bombing halt.

Africa

Ethiopia

Emperor Haile Selassie, on November 2nd praised President Johnson's cessation of bombing in a speech on the occasion of the 38th anniversary of his coronation. He expressed the hope that the bombing halt will result in peace and progressive settlement of the Vietnamese war and said that this important decision reflects the wisdom and statesmanship of President Johnson.

Nigeria

The Nigerian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which it found the bombing halt a hopeful sign of peace for Viet-Nam, and expressed the hope that North Viet-Nam will respond.

Mali

President Modibo Keta informed the National Committee of President Johnson's decision to halt the bombing of Viet-Nam and hailed this important decision as a victory of reason and

good sense. The Committee expressed its wish that further negotiations between the parties will lead to peace.

Libya

Foreign Minister Araabi requested a meeting with our Ambassador and took the initiative in the first few minutes to express the intense satisfaction of the Government of Libya with the President's decision to halt the bombing, and to declare that his Government warmly welcomes this move as a real step toward achieving peace in Viet-Nam.

Ghana

The Ministry of External Affairs, issued a statement November 2 welcoming President Johnson's announcement of a complete halt of air, naval and artillery bombardment of Viet-Nam. The Government of Ghana expressed the hope that the North Vietnamese Government will reciprocate the U.S. actions by a clear and positive response.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : EA - Mr. Bundy

DATE: November 4, 1968

FROM : EA/ACA - Paul H. Kreisberg *M*

SUBJECT: Communist Reaction to Bombing Halt

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-219
By *ju*, NARA, Date 8-2-94

Summary

1. Hanoi's official reaction to the US bombing halt is contained in a DRV Government statement on the subject which has been publicized in two versions, one indicating that the halt is "unconditional" and one not using the word. The statement says the US had to stop the bombing and that the cessation is a "great victory" for the Vietnamese people in both zones, although only an "initial" victory. The US is said to be still threatening North Viet-Nam and intensifying its "aggression" against South Viet-Nam, but so long as the "aggression" goes on the Vietnamese people will fight on "till total victory." The stand of the Vietnamese people for a settlement are described, as are the demands of the DRV on the US. DRV reaction is also shown in a November 3 appeal by Ho Chi Minh in which he claims the US "was compelled to unconditionally stop" the bombing, calls for increased determination to fight and win, and outlines a four-point demand. The line of the NFLSV, contained in a Central Committee statement, is very similar to Hanoi's, but emphasizes subjects relating to South Viet-Nam. It sets forth the NFLSV's stand on a political solution to the South Viet-Nam problem under five points and stresses that the NFLSV is "fully competent" to solve problems of South Viet-Nam.

2. Peking thus far has not commented on the bombing cessation, although NCNA domestic service in Chinese November 2 carried the texts of both President Johnson's October 31 speech and the November 2 DRV Government statement. Pyongyang KCNA November 3 transmitted a statement of the DPRK government giving full support to the DRV government statement (which Pyongyang Radio had broadcast) and to Ho Chi Minh's appeal. The DPRK statement calls the "unconditional" bombing cessation a "brilliant victory" of the Vietnamese people but stresses the need for continued struggle.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

3. East European commentary varied from a diplomatic welcoming of the events in Yugoslavia to outright scorn and hostility from East Germany. Poland also weighed in with some rather stiff remarks but also carried items which reflected guarded optimism. East Germany and Poland indicated that there were conditions to the halt. The USSR presented the news in a restrained fashion with very little commentary. All (except Yugoslavia) linked the halt to the American elections and said it is due to Vietnamese determination along with socialist or world solidarity.

End Summary

DRV Statement and Ho Chi Minh Appeal

4. Hanoi's official response to the US bombing halt is contained in a DRV Government statement issued November 2. VNA international service in English has issued two versions, one indicating in several places that the cessation is "unconditional" and the other not containing the word "unconditional." A domestic broadcast of the text does not mention the word. Xuan Thuy at his November 2 press conference distributed copies of the statement which contained the word "unconditional" before the word "bombing" in the title and elsewhere. Ho Chi Minh on November 3 issued an appeal to the Vietnamese people, carried by Hanoi VNA, in which he claimed that the United States "was compelled to unconditionally stop the bombardment of the whole territory of the DRV."

5. The DRV statement says the fact that the US has had to declare a "total cessation of air, naval and artillery bombardments" on the "entire territory" of the DRV is a "great victory for the Vietnamese people in both zones." After the cessation, it says, the DRV "will discuss with the US side other problems of concern to the two sides with a view to finding a political solution to the Viet-Nam problem." In agreement with the NFLSV Central Committee, the DRV Government declares its readiness to participate in a conference "comprising the representatives" of the DRV, the NFLSV, the US and the "Saigon administration." The presence of representatives of the latter does not mean, however, that the DRV recognizes "that administration." The stand of the Vietnamese people for a settlement is described, as are the demands of the DRV on the US.

6. So long as the United States "pursues its aggression," says the statement, the Vietnamese people will fight on "till total victory." Although the bombing halt is a "big victory" it is only an "initial" one, and the US "imperialists" are "still threatening North Viet-Nam, intensifying their aggression against South Viet-Nam and daily committing new crimes against our Southern countrymen."

7. Ho Chi Minh's November 3 appeal described the bombing halt as a "glorious victory" in the struggle against the United States. It stressed, however, that it was only an "initial"

victory and that it was necessary to increase determination to fight and win. The appeal concluded with a four-point demand.

8. Xuan Thuy, in reply to a question at his November 2 press conference, said that if Saigon refuses to take part in the Paris talks the US side "will have to shoulder the entire responsibility." When he was asked how the DRV would regard continued US reconnaissance flights over the DRV, he said that "all actions which infringe upon the sovereignty and security of the DRV are illegal actions."

NFLSV Central Committee Statement on Political Solution

9. Liberation Radio November 3 issued a "Statement of the NFLSV Central Committee regarding a political solution to the South Viet-Nam Problem." It says that the US was "compelled to agree to and carry out an unconditional cessation of the bombings and strafings over the entire DRV territory" and that this constitutes "an extremely great victory for all the Vietnamese people." The US "imperialists," however, although "obviously defeated," have not renounced their "evil, aggressive designs" against Viet-Nam. They "stubbornly continue to step up the war in South Viet-Nam" and to "foster the puppet lacky administration...." as well as to continue to "violate the DRV's sovereignty and security." The statement sets forth the NFLSV's stand "on the political solutions to the South Viet-Nam problem" in five numbered paragraphs. The NFLSV, it says, "is fully competent to solve all problems related to South Viet-Nam." The statement asserts that the NFLSV supports the DRV four-point stand, the DRV government's November 2 statement and Ho's November 3 appeal. It also approves the "four-party conference" contemplated for Paris. It exhorts the people to "develop the impetus of continuous offensive and uprisings to defeat the enemy."

DPRK Supports DRV Government Statement and Ho Chi Minh Appeal

10. The DPRK did not react publicly to the bombing halt until 48 hours after President Johnson's speech, when Pyongyang Radio broadcast the text of the November 2 DRV statement to a domestic audience. Fifty-eight hours after the halt announcement the DPRK government issued a statement giving full support to the DRV statement and Ho Chi Minh's appeal (see above). It says the "unconditional" bombing cessation is a "brilliant victory" of the Vietnamese people and the peace-loving forces of the whole world but stresses the need for continued struggle.

Peking Broadcasts Statements About Bombing Halt but Does Not Comment

11. Peking thus far has not commented on the President's announcement of a total cessation of bombing over North Viet-Nam, but NCNA domestic service in Chinese on November 2 carried the texts of both the President's October 31 speech and the November 2 DRV government statement concerning the bombing halt. FBIS reports that both releases contained texts that were identical with the originals.

Bulgaria

12. The Bulgarian press and radio hailed the bombing halt as a great victory for the Vietnamese people on both sides of the demarcation line, compelling the "aggressor" to "limit his military action". President Johnson's renunciation "far from effaces" the "crime" against the Vietnamese people. The decision was frequently linked to the US elections and it was suggested that it might be a "political trick". The U.S. was called upon to demonstrate sincerity in the negotiations. The lesson was drawn that victory was due to Vietnamese heroic faith in "just cause as well as solidarity of Socialist bloc.

Cuba

13. Havana's reaction has been one of the most strident, possibly reflecting its free hand with regard to the negotiations and its desire to forestall any advantage the United States might gain from the bombing halt. Foreign Minister Raul Roa characterized the President's announcement as a "scheming maneuver to gain advantage in the U.S. Presidential elections," which it alleged was "too coarse to fool anyone." The Vietnamese, he warned, must "maintain their guard on high until final victory."

Czechoslovakia

14. Czech press and radio carried the President's announcement prominently and fully together with Hanoi and Saigon statements, giving the impression that the action should be considered a positive step towards solution of the Viet-Nam problem. All media carried world comment which was predominantly positive. Radio Prague mentioned in passing that this decision might help Mr. Humphrey's chances and also said that U.S. involvement in Viet-Nam has hindered East-West understanding.

East Germany

15. East Germany broadcast two commentaries which welcomed with satisfaction news of the bombing halt as a victory for the Vietnamese people but tempered its pleasure with bitterness, alleging the importance of the imminent American elections in the decision. Kroeber's commentary, calling President Johnson the "worst President in U.S. history", complained that the President "maintains that he now expects something from the North Vietnamese, (and that) among other things, they are to abandon their defenses and let the intruders from 'God's country' occupy the city enclaves, which are their last strongholds". He also blamed the President for warning that the negotiations might last a long time.

Hungary

16. Hungarian press and radio emphasized that the war was continuing in the South and cited Defense Secretary Clifford to the effect that the Pentagon was empowered to re-start the bombardment on its own responsibility. The newspaper ESTI HIRLAD, describing this as an "unconditional halt" grudgingly conceded that a "first step has been taken," but connects it with the US elections, which are to occur "hardly 100 hours" later. It cites the cessation of the bombing as a success for the Vietnamese people and proof that "international anti-imperialist unity of action" can be effective even in this complicated era. "There can be no voices of praise about his (President Johnson's) 'love of peace' since this action merely is a very tardy termination of an illegal act."

Poland

17. Warsaw press and radio hail the bombing halt as victory for Vietnamese people but emphasize that it is "only a conditional cessation of the bombing - since Johnson has clearly reserved the right to continue attacks," and remind their audience that US troops remain in the South. The DRV victory is due the valor of the people as well as united world opinion. TRYBUNA LUDU states "the value of the decision is reduced by the conditions President Johnson tries to put, by his attempts to link the bombing halt with what is going on in South Vietnam," and ties the decision in with the American elections. "This is, consequently, no act of magnanimity ... but admission of both military and political defeat." However, radio commentator Pawlikiewicz considers that "one may express satisfaction at the fact that America has taken the first preliminary step" to negotiations, which he warns may last long. Several reports note the optimism of the "world" or "world opinion."

XII. Yugoslavia

18. The Yugoslav Government, according to TANYUG, welcomes "the decision of the US President to stop completely the bombing" holding it to be a "significant step" towards ending the war and finding a political solution. Borba considers that there is now a chance for solving the Vietnam problem, and also for a big improvement in the world political situation.

USSR

19. Tass carried a Soviet Government Statement which "regards the understanding in Paris as an important success along the road of a peace settlement in Vietnam." The statement goes on to state belief that favorable conditions have been achieved for the political solution of the war and withdrawal of US troops, all dependent on the US Government displaying "a realistic and serious approach." Several radio and press items link the decision to the American elections. It is presented in the news as a victory of the Vietnamese people forced upon the US: "the mightiest country in the capitalist world cannot break the Vietnamese people." However it is noted that the bombing halt "does not in the least mean that peace will emerge there tomorrow." In a broadcast citing a PAP correspondent it is reported that President Johnson does not make the bombing halt definite and unconditional.

LE FIGARO

Voice of Ethiopia

الجمهورية

Slinteia

Ceylon

RUDE PRAVO

Le Monde

Daily News

The Japan Times



The Manila Times

Frankfurter Allgemeine

The Times of India

TANJUG



AFRIQUE nouvelle

LA PRENSA

DAILY EXPRESS

البعث

NEW CHINA NEWS

EXCELSIOR

The Ethiopian Herald

DIE WELT

আনন্দ বাজার

THE YOMIURI

CORRIERE DELLA SERA

சென்னை



MEDIA REACTION ANALYSIS

WORLDWIDE TREATMENT OF CURRENT ISSUES

November 4, 1968

Office of Policy and Research

ИЗВЕСТИЯ

新華通訊社新聞
HSINHUA DAILY BULLETIN

ZYSTE WARSZAWY

الجهد



РАБОТНИЧЕСКО ДЕЛО

БОРБА

L'ESSOR

EL TIEMPO

JORNAL DO BRASIL

THE STATESMAN

THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY

The Straits Times

... U.S. EFFORTS TO ADVANCE TALKS
... THIEU'S REFUSAL TO ATTEND MEETING

PRESIDENT'S VIET-NAM PEACE INITIATIVE

Summary

Over the weekend, media around the world spoke in high praise of President Johnson's decision to stop all bombardment of North Viet-Nam. Voluminous comment emphasized new hope for progress in the Paris talks, though negotiations may be long and difficult, and accompanied by continued fighting in South Viet-Nam.

The Saigon press was the main exception to the general reaction, expressing anxiety and misgivings regarding the U.S. initiative. Some papers were distressed at U.S. readiness to bring the National Liberation Front into the Paris conference room.

South Korean and Thai commentators expressed mixed feelings and guarded acceptance of the U.S. move, along with skepticism regarding Hanoi's willingness to respond in good faith.

British, German, and French media generally endorsed the President's decision to stop the bombing, praised his courage, and declared the next move was up to Hanoi.

Heavy Indian press comment emphasized that "joy" would be felt "from one end of the world to the other." It warned Hanoi not to interpret the move as a sign of weakness and called for a suitable response.

Many countries in Latin America and Africa, through their media, added their voices to the chorus of praise for Mr. Johnson's peace initiative.

Hanoi broadcasts claimed "a new, big victory for the great front line." Moscow TASS said the bombing halt created "more favorable conditions for peace." Peking radio carried the text of the President's speech.

London: "Risk is Worth Taking"

The liberal Guardian said on Saturday:

"Whatever reservations one might have about its timing five days before the Presidential election, the bombing halt removes a huge obstacle on the way towards peace.

"Great difficulties of negotiation lie ahead. But after years of bombing and bloodshed and destruction the people of Viet-Nam, north and south, may eventually be allowed to live in peace."

The paper asserted that the U.S. has taken "the risk that the bombing halt could lead to serious military disadvantages, as has happened in the past. But the risk is worth taking, for the deadlock in the Paris talks had to be broken."

"President Absolved from Charges"

The independent Times of London wrote:

"Mr. Johnson is too involved a politician to ignore the outcome of his moves; yet it would be unjust to read his statement as a last-minute intervention before the polling. Both the manner of his announcement and the evidence he quotes of Hanoi's shift a few weeks ago absolve him from charges of a deliberately timed maneuver.

"Peace in Viet-Nam -- or the groundwork of it -- is the objective he is after in the last months of his power as President."

The paper judged that though the war will continue, "the level of the fighting may... not match the bitterness of Korea where it went on during two years of frustrating negotiations.

"President Johnson's statement... almost seemed to hold out hope of another breakthrough before he leaves the White House in January...."

"In the last resort it is an American withdrawal that matters more than anything else to the North Vietnamese. Without that, all else is worthless.

"All the questions that will be taken up next Wednesday are subsidiary to this. Can the Americans buy a political guarantee with their withdrawal?"

"Grave Disadvantages for U.S. Troops"

The conservative London Daily Express, a strong supporter of U.S. involvement in Viet-Nam, contended that "politics and politics alone dictated President Johnson's decision to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam. For unless there is an immediate ceasefire on the ground, it will result in grave disadvantages for the American troops and their South Vietnamese allies."

Munich: "Next Move Up to Hanoi"

West German papers generally applauded Mr. Johnson's decision and hoped the step would lead to peace. Some papers saw an effort to help Vice President Humphrey in the election campaign but felt it would have little effect on Tuesday's voting.

Munich's left-center Sueddeutsche Zeitung lauded the President for displaying "remarkable courage," adding that "the next move is up to Hanoi."

Right-center Frankfurter Allgemeine thought the decision would "help restore the prestige of the U.S. in Europe, ease the U.S. balance of payments problem, and give the U.S. more freedom of movement at the international level." The paper said:

"Those who know Johnson have no doubt that the timing of the decision to stop the bombing was also meant to help Humphrey in the election, although it is believed that the move will influence only some two per cent of the electorate."

Paris: "Permits Constructive Talks"

The French press welcomed the move but stressed that many problems remained to be solved.

Moderately conservative Figaro declared that "President Johnson made the only gesture which will permit the negotiations in Paris to enter a constructive phase."

It termed the bombing halt a "gamble," and said that "like all gambles it involves risks.

"If President Johnson decided to accept the risks, it was because he understood that the war cannot be ended overnight and that negotiation of the terms of peace will be long and difficult."

Pro-Gaullist Paris-Jour considered the bombing halt a "success" for France. It said the "friendly pressure" that General de Gaulle "exercised on Hanoi certainly contributed to the positive answer which President Johnson received from the North Vietnamese."

"Major Turn in U.S. Policy"

Intellectual-left Combat wrote that "President Johnson's initiative marks a major turn in American policy and might open the way for an abandonment of the policy of force and intervention."

Moderate rightist opposition Aurore commented:

"If the Republican candidate is defeated on November 5, he will be entitled to claim that Moscow has, for the second time, worked for his defeat...."

"The secret role played by the Kremlin behind the scenes of the Paris talks will perhaps decide the outcome of the Presidential election."

Anxiety in Saigon

Saigon's Catholic Xay Dung asserted that "there is clearly a big contradiction between the Johnson and Thieu statements." It asked:

"How can one explain President Johnson's agreeing to the NLF taking a seat at Paris on November 6 on the same footing as the Republic of Viet-Nam, even though the two parties are merely to expound their respective views?"

The paper said some think "the U.S. is no longer jointly responsible with the GVN for the problems of war and peace here.... Yet the Americans continue to deny that they will ever betray their ally, and insist that they will always live up to their solemn pledge taken in Honolulu.

"The problem which now arises is, what can and should the GVN do? Should it timidly send a delegation to Paris on November 6 to expound its stand, together with the NLF? The people, confused, are waiting for their leaders to show them clearly the road they must now take."

"Conflict of Interests"

Similarly, Tia Sang of Saigon held that "the bombing halt is one of the first conflicts between American and Vietnamese interests.... Nevertheless, we do not want a strained atmosphere to exist regarding U.S.-Vietnamese friendship. We think our two governments still have time, and must also have the goodwill, to find an appropriate solution to this state of affairs....

"It is still too early to forecast the evolution of the situation in which the two main allied nations in this war 'are sitting on the same bench having different dreams,' and can no longer reconcile their policies to cope with the common enemy....

"The essential thing is to know whether the GVN will be able to devise measures to cope with... such a situation... while keeping the Vietnamese ship of state from drifting about in the present violent tempest."

Saigon's Than Dan maintained that "the bombing halt was long overdue. It should have occurred right after last May 13 when the U.S. and North Viet-Nam sat down at the conference table and thus indirectly admitted that the Viet-Nam problem cannot be solved by war."

Mixed Feelings in South Korea

Independent Hankuk Ilbo of Seoul praised President Johnson's decision as "a resolute initiative for peace." The paper declared that if moves to de-escalate are forthcoming from North Viet-Nam, "the ROK and the other allies will have attained their goal in the war, at least to some extent."

Leading independent Donga Ilbo declared that "if February 7, 1965, marked the escalation of the Viet-Nam war, November 1 was the day that set a milestone toward de-escalation or, more probably, toward a ceasefire in Viet-Nam...."

"Though we question the advisability of the decision to halt the bombing, we have no intention to persist in voicing disapproval. It seems to us very important, however, that the U.S. respect the opinions of the South Vietnamese government and people."

Warning of Hanoi Tactics

Conservative Chosun Ilbo cautioned against supposing "that the bombing halt will bring about an immediate ceasefire."

"We do not doubt the U.S. desire to achieve an early peace in Viet-Nam, and we also understand that the U.S. may be anxious to end the war by means of 'face-saving' assurances."

"But the North Vietnamese believe that world opinion is in their favor... and they seem to think that the longer they protract the war, the more difficult it will be for the U.S. to resist pressures at home and abroad. It may well be that Hanoi will consider the bombing halt as another product of its delaying tactics."

The government-controlled Korea Herald said "no one can tell" if North Viet-Nam will "make a corresponding step toward lasting peace." It contended that the U.S. had "succumbed" to North Vietnamese requests that the National Liberation Front be allowed to "participate with Saigon at the conference table," and that "this concession should be seen as a fatal blow against the Republic of Viet-Nam.... The U.S. move may well be construed as a humiliating retreat for the U.S. and the other war allies."

Thailand: Guarded Approval

Thai papers, which gave heavy front-page play to the story and including large segments of President Johnson's statement, expressed guarded and cautious approval. None called the decision a breakthrough.

The Bangkok World said the new situation "forces recognition of the NLF by Saigon and Saigon by Hanoi. In other words, the groundwork for a political solution has been laid. How many months or years later this solution will be implemented is an open question."

The Bangkok Post wrote:

"Once again the ball is in Hanoi's court. Now it is Hanoi which has to prove her bona fides. If she fails to do so, she will only force the next U.S. President... to find another -- perhaps more logical -- way to bring the war to an end."

Bangkok papers carried Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman's televised statement that "the end of bombing will not mean that the danger automatically decreases for Thailand.... In fact, it might be even more tense, for the North Vietnamese will be free to try new tactics both militarily and politically."

Tokyo: "Set Up Coalition Government!"

Major Japanese dailies welcomed the bombing halt while pointing to problems that lie ahead.

Leading independent-liberal Asahi greeted the move as "a reality at last." It recommended that "no time be lost in organizing a coalition government, holding a general election under the supervision of that government, and establishing an administration based on popular will."

Independent-moderate Yomiuri called it a "courageous decision long-awaited by the world. Needless to say, a complete halt to the bombing of the north does not mean a peaceful settlement is just around the corner."

Conservative financial Nihon Keizai said: "We welcome this major step from the bottom of our hearts."

India: "Only Saigon Government Unhappy"

Indian comment was voluminous and generally praised the U.S. peace move. A few papers accepted North Viet-Nam's victory claims, and thought the President was forced by world public opinion to stop the bombing.

Calcutta's independent Amrita Bazar Patrika, usually critical of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam, said the President's announcement "sent a ripple of joy and satisfaction from one end of the world to the other.

"The only party which is feeling unhappy about the U.S. move is the government of South Viet-Nam. But the common people of Saigon have not remained unaffected by the mood of peace and have welcomed the Washington move as a step towards peace....

"The U.S. bombing of the north had changed an anti-Communist war into a war of genocide, and it was weighing heavily on consciences of decent men and women in all countries, including the U.S....

"President Johnson has practically reversed the process which might have led to a nuclear holocaust."

"Confession of Failure"

The independent Hindusthan Standard of Calcutta, frequently critical of the U.S., termed the decision to halt bombing "a confession of failure" and a "starting point for a strategic retreat that can end only with the total withdrawal of American troops from Viet-Nam."

Calcutta's moderate Statesman declared that the "world is thankful that an important bridge has been crossed." It said:

"Even the imminence of the U.S. Presidential election takes away nothing from the courage and wisdom of the decision..."

"Not a Sign of U.S. Weakness"

Bombay's independent Times of India stated:

"Hanoi can, of course, claim a sort of moral victory inasmuch as a halt has been called to U.S. bombing raids without a prior public commitment on its part. But this claim does not amount to much in view of the concrete steps it has taken in bringing down the tempo of the war...."

Independent Janashakti of Bombay hoped that "Hanoi would not" interpret the American move as a sign of weakness, but as a genuine step toward peace."

"Hanoi Should Respond"

Bombay's conservative Maharashtra Times said "it is wrong to believe ... that the U.S. committed a grave offense in Viet-Nam" when it intervened at the request of South Viet-Nam only "to push back Communist aggression." It declared that nations which have suffered from Chinese aggression should "welcome and support America" in Viet-Nam.

The conservative Hindu of Madras called the bombing halt "better late than never," and urged North Viet-Nam to "respond to the U.S. gesture.

"Let not Hanoi think that the U.S. is a humbled enemy! Any such truculence will only prolong the agony..."

Pakistan: "People Acclaim LBJ's Decision"

Lahore's Pakistan Times, a National Press Trust paper, said that "peace-loving people the world over will unreservedly acclaim President Johnson's dramatic decision.

"Barring Hanoi and Haiphong, almost all the cities in the north have been reduced to heaps of debris, and the world has marveled at the unbreakable spirit of Ho Chi Minh and the epic struggle of his peasant army..."

"The U.S. too has paid dearly for its involvement. Its economy has been badly damaged, the nation is divided as never before, its outside image has been sullied beyond words, and the process of global detente set in motion during the Kennedy era has been undermined."

Karachi's Press Trust Morning News said the bombing halt might be linked to the U.S. elections, but "an anguished world can ill afford to look a gift-horse in the mouth.... The ultimate measure of Mr. Johnson's achievement must await future developments..."

Arab Reaction

Cairo's semi-official al-Ahram quoted President Nasser as telling the North Vietnamese ambassador that the suspension of bombing was "a victory for the Vietnamese people in their battle against imperialism, and a victory for all peoples of the world who are struggling for independence."

In Damascus, government-controlled ath-Thawrah also praised the North Vietnamese for "their determination to achieve victory." It said:

"Only time will show whether the monopolist and militarist circles have actually conceded defeat... or are just manipulating events to enable the Democratic candidate to win the forthcoming election."

Independent papers in Beirut applauded the U.S. decision. Al-Jarida said that no matter what the motives, President Johnson's "retraction from error is virtuous." Al-Hayat said that whether the reasons were humanitarian or political, the action was "good for humanity."

Mexico City: "Courageous Decision"

Banner headlines hailed the President's decision in the Mexican press. One in nationalistic La Prensa read: "WORLD JUBILATION."

Influential, moderate Excelsior wrote:

"There is a moral obligation to recognize the enormous measure of valor which President Johnson had to exercise to arrive at this decision.

"Washington has extended a bridge which we trust the Viet Cong will want to use.... Never since the beginning of this ill-fated war have we seen a more radiant hope of an end."

Rio de Janeiro: "Statesmanship"

Independent Correio da Manha called the bombing halt "a contribution of the highest order to the cause of peace...."

"Whatever influenced Johnson's decision, its merit remains intact. The measure reveals statesmanship, courage, and effective leadership. The radical advocates of a military solution at any price have suffered a spectacular defeat...."

Santiago: "Conflict Enters New Phase"

In Chile, conservative El Mercurio judged that "with the end of air, naval, and land bombardment of North Viet-Nam, the conflict in Southeast Asia has entered a new phase."

The paper attributed "present developments to a coincidence of interests between Johnson and Ho Chi Minh and the latter's preference not to deal with Nixon."

Bogota: "Ho Chi Minh Has the Next Move"

In Colombia, liberal El Tiempo observed that "the overriding fact is that the U.S. has laid solid foundations for the liquidation of the conflict....It remains to be seen whether the adversary accepts the gesture. The next move is up to Ho Chi Minh."

African Praise for U.S. Decision

African media widely acclaimed the President's decision and urged North Viet-Nam to respond.

Accra's government-supported Ghanaian Times termed the announcement "most gratifying" and said it showed the President "is genuinely interested in the early ending of the war and has been all the time.

"This magnanimous gesture must be replied to in kind by North Viet-Nam and her allies. It would be unrealistic to expect the U.S. to make all the concessions while the other side maintains a posture of intransigence and rigidity."

Nigeria's Mid-West Observer of Benin said this "is not the first time the Americans have held out the olive branch to the North Vietnamese" and added that peace depends upon "North Viet-Nam's reciprocal gesture."

"Particularly Courageous"

The official Ethiopian Herald of Addis Ababa declared that "the world praises Johnson's decision to halt the bombing." Like other Ethiopian papers, it published Emperor Haile Selassie's statement which praised "the wisdom and statesmanship of President Johnson."

Abidjan's official Fraternite-Matin said the "particularly courageous" U.S. decision "has evoked, as it should, favorable comment throughout the world."

Ouagadougou radio quoted the Upper Volta foreign minister as congratulating the U.S. for "this courageous action."

Mali radio acclaimed the decision and expressed "its fervent wish that future negotiations may lead to peace" in the interests of the "heroic people of Viet-Nam."

Hanoi, Moscow, Peking Treatment

Hanoi's weekend broadcasts and comment claimed "a new, big victory for the great front line." Moscow said Saturday that the bombing halt created "more favorable conditions" for peace. Peking radio carried the text of the President's speech.

Hanoi's Nhan Dan today supported the Sunday statement of the NLF which called for "the political solution of the South Viet-Nam people's sacred fight for independence, democracy, peace, neutrality, prosperity, and ultimate peaceful reunification of the fatherland."

The paper said it was "a very correct, very fair and very reasonable stand." It contended that military successes "compelled the U.S. to stop unconditionally the bombardment of the whole of North Viet-Nam territory."

In a Sunday editorial, the paper stated that "the fate of the Thieu-Ky-Huong clique has been sealed by history." It said the "clique" does not want the U.S. to unconditionally stop the bombing and shelling and "persists in its insolent attitude toward the NLF." This has produced, the paper said, "a powerful movement for toppling them..."

Moscow: "More Favorable Conditions"

Moscow's TASS agency Saturday carried a Soviet government statement that "the understanding in Paris" constituted "an important success along the road to a peace settlement in Viet-Nam." It said "more favorable conditions have taken shape for an end to the bloodshed in South Viet-Nam, for the complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Viet-Nam and for a political solution to the Vietnamese problem as a whole."

Moscow's Pravda said Sunday that cessation of the bombing does not mean that peace will come to Viet-Nam immediately.

On Saturday, Peking's New China News Agency broadcast the text of President Johnson's speech. It was identical with the text distributed by USIA.

THIEU'S REFUSAL TO ATTEND MEETING

Foreign press observers expressed regret that Wednesday's opening of the expanded Paris peace talks appears likely to be hampered by President Thieu's refusal to send a Saigon delegation.

London: "U.S. Should Exert Pressure"

The independent Times of London said today that the U.S. should exert pressure on Saigon, but it added:

"Much better to start on Wednesday with a few empty chairs, waiting for the day when someone from Saigon will consent to take his place in this awkward quadrille.

"The President of South Viet-Nam no doubt has to make his independence felt, playing his cards so that his government looms larger than any presence the NLF contrives to assume."

The liberal Guardian of Manchester and London declared that "President Thieu's representatives must participate in the Paris talks.

"They must be prepared to recognize that the NLF, whatever its degree of dependence on Hanoi, is a separate entity. And President Thieu must broaden the base of his government to include moderates, even where these may have looked like traitors in a war context."

"Hope Saigon Fears Unfounded"

The independent Financial Times asserted today that "it is difficult to withhold sympathy from the South Vietnamese leaders. Their case is that all the concessions of substance have so far been made by the Americans and evidence of reciprocity of any kind from Hanoi is doubtful."

London's conservative Daily Telegraph commented:

"This is an extraordinary way for a major power (America) to set about a major negotiation -- by doing what your enemy wants and what your main ally does not want.

"It is not that the Saigon government is against any peace initiative of any kind. What it wants is direct talks with Hanoi.... What it does not want, above all, is to be sold down the river by the U.S. as part of an American election campaign.

"Let us hope its fears on these points are unfounded."

Conservative Sunday Express saw Saigon's "recalcitrance" as proof that it is not a puppet:

"See what happens when the U.S. makes pacific gestures. The people of South Viet-Nam -- not just the government -- object. It is they who wish to continue the struggle against what they see as an alien, Communist invasion.

"Remember that when next you hear the stories of an American imperialist war."

Paris: "Thieu's Revolt a Poker Bluff"

Paris' moderately conservative Figaro headlined: "SHAM FIGHT BY SAIGON..." The paper's Washington correspondent wrote:

"Mr. Thieu has merely given President Johnson tit for tat. ... His cleverly premeditated revolt is a poker bluff, a short-term speculation on the outcome of the Presidential election.... President Thieu voted ahead of the American voters, and his vote is unambiguous: He voted for Richard Nixon."

Moderate-left, mass-circulation France-Soir theorized that "should Thieu continue to refuse to participate in the talks, the Americans might discuss two questions with Hanoi -- a progressive removal of foreign troops... and if that first step goes well, a ceasefire.

"The Americans figure that if they open direct discussions on those various points with Hanoi, Saigon will soon realize that it has every interest in participating in the talks and will eventually send a delegation.

"The Americans must solve before Wednesday the following dilemma: Will they meet privately with the North Vietnamese or wait until Thieu's ill-temper has passed?"

Milan: "Thieu Counting on Nixon"

Italy's Christian Democratic-left Giorno of Milan reported from Saigon:

"Three days after President Johnson's announcement, what could well be called 'prudence week' is beginning in Saigon. . . . Thieu has called in all his supporters and told them that it is useless to get upset until they know the name and the program of the new President of the United States. Since Thieu is counting on Nixon, there is nothing to do but wait."

Seoul: "Allied Unity Important"

South Korea's afternoon papers expressed concern that "if South Viet-Nam persists in rejecting the meeting, it may be fruitless." Papers quoted President Park Chung Hee's expectation that "in a few days the U.S. and South Viet-Nam can remove the misunderstandings between them."

Leading conservative-independent Donga Ilbo of Seoul declared that "once the step was announced, unity among the allied nations became important, because dissension will only benefit the Communists and run contrary to the common interests of the allies."

Japan's moderately conservative Sankei of Tokyo headlined: "OPENING OF EXPANDED PARIS TALKS NOV. 6 HOPELESS DUE TO RESISTANCE FROM SOUTH." The paper said:

"The National Liberation Front yesterday appointed Mme. Binh as chief delegate to the expanded talks. Against this positive gesture by the Communist side, the South Vietnamese government is not changing its attitude of refusal to participate."

SENT
WHCA

10

NOV 4 20 49

EA4687
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4223

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAPS2679

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-136
By is, NARA Date 9-2-98

See file

508 NOV 4 PM 3:57
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 4, 1968

HERewith EBAN'S MEETING YESTERDAY WITH SECRETARY RUSK.

1. IN MTG WITH SECRETARY NOV 3, EBAN SAID GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DEFINING ITS POSITION ON TERRITORIAL QUESTION VIS-A-VIS UAR IN "FUNCTIONAL" RATHER THAN GEOGRAPHICAL TERMS. GOI POSITION WOULD BE GOVERNED BY SECURITY INCLUDING SHIPPING THROUGH STRAITS OF TIRAN. WHILE DEALING THROUGH JARRIN3 WITH UAR IN TACTICAL PHASE, ISRAEL WOULD MAKE CLEAR EXPANSION NOT ITS PURPOSE AND THAT TROOPS WOULD BE DISPOSED ACCORDING TO SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

2. EBAN SAID SUBSTANTIVE POSITION ISRAEL WOULD TAKE IF UAR WILLING TO TALK PEACE. HE WANTED US AND US ALONE TO KNOW RE SINAI, IT ALL COMES BACK STRONGLY AND SHARPLY TO SHARM EL SHEIKH, THE FOCAL POINT OF TWO WARS. ISRAEL COULD NOT ACCEPT SOMETHING WHICH MIGHT MEAN ISRAEL WOULD ONCE AGAIN HAVE TO SEND MEN OUT TO OPEN STRAITS. ISRAEL WOULD WANT ARRANGEMENT ENABLING ISRAEL TO BE IN SHARM EL SHEIKH IN ORDER TO PROTECT ISRAELI SHIPPING, WITH DIRECT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN EILAT AND SHARM EL SHEIKH. RABIN ADDED: "DIRECT LAND COMMUNICATION". EBAN SAID HE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THIS IN JURIDICAL TERMS; CONTROL OF TERRITORY WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY HAD BEEN FACTOR IN JAPAN-USSR AND JAPAN-US AGREEMENTS AND IN CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. EBAN SAID ESPECIALLY IF UAR ASKED FOR ENCLAVE POSITIONS FOR ONE REASON FOR ANOTHER, ISRAEL WOULD WANT TO BE THERE AND IN DIRECT LAND COMMUNICATION WITH EILAT.

3. EBAN SAID WHAT UAR MIGHT PROPOSE WOULD BE ANOTHER MATTER, BUT ISRAEL WOULD NOT WANT TO PREJUDICE MATTERS BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. THEREFORE, ISRAEL WILL GIVE FUNCTIONAL NOT TERRITORIAL DEFINITION. ISRAEL DOES NOT THINK UAR HAS RIGHT TO STOP ISRAEL FROM ASKING FOR THIS; THEY CAN SAY NO AND THEN TALK. THIS ALL EBAN COULD SAY ON SINAI. IT WAS FUNCTIONAL STATEMENT RELATING TO SECURITY AND NAVIGATION (IN TIRAN), BUT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS COULD HAVE TERRITORIAL IMPLICATIONS. EBAN SAID UAR DOESN'T RAISE QUESTION OF GAZA, BUT HE THINKS THEY UNDERSTAND THEY NOT COMING BACK TO GAZA.

4. SECRETARY SAID HE THOUGHT WHAT EBAN OUTLINED ON SINAI NON-STARTER. ALTERNATIVE WAS IN DIRECTION OF IMPROVED INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WERE WORKABLE. EBAN SAID UAR HADN'T SUGGESTED THAT OR ANYTHING ELSE. ISRAEL'S EXPERIENCE WITH UN AND ANY ARRANGEMENT WITH VETO UNSATISFACTORY. SECRETARY SAID IT IMPORTANT THAT THERE NOT BE VETO. HE COULD UNDERSTAND ISRAELI DISSATISFACTION WITH ARRANGEMENTS TO DATE, BUT ISRAELI PRESENCE WOULD BE POINT OF INFECTION SUCH THAT THERE WOULD BE TENSION HEREAFTER AND HARD TO SEE HOW THERE COULD BE PEACE. WIGGINS SAID INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE WOULD HAVE TO BE SUCH AS TO BE TERMINATED ONLY BY ACTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL. EBAN SAID HE DIDN'T SEE IF LOCAL SOVEREIGN SAID INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE SHOULD TERMINATE WHAT COUNTRY, INCLUDING US, WOULD STAND AGAINST IT. SECTY REFERRED TO ARRANGEMENTS IN PANAMA CANAL AND OKINAWA WHERE LOCAL SOVEREIGNTY MODIFIED. EBAN AND RABIN SAID ISRAEL READY TO HAVE SUCH TREATIES.

5. EBAN SAID NO POINT IN GOING INTO THIS IN DETAIL NOW SINCE NOT IN NEGOTIATING SITUATION. IT NECESSARY TO HEAR WHAT UAR WOULD PROPOSE. SECTY REITERATED THAT AS FAR AS US ATTITUDE CONCERNED, HE HAD TO PUT IN RESERVATION ABOUT SHARM EL SHEIKH IDEA: US DOES NOT FEEL IT COULD SUPPORT THAT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

6. ISRAELI IS ASKED THAT FOREGOING BE VERY TIGHTLY HELD.

DTG: 041902Z NOV 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT WHCA

SENT WHCA

19 12

NOV 4 19 12

Free file

BEA536
00 YTE 13
02 YTE 4221

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82577

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 4, 1968

1968 NOV 4 PM 2:18
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ OF MEXICO HAS SENT YOU THE FOLLOWING LETTER, THANKING YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE AT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES:

"MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH YOUR AFFECTIONATE MESSAGE YESTERDAY IN WHICH YOU EXPRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF MEXICO AND ITS GOVERNMENT YOUR CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH THE EVENTS OF THE NINETEENTH OLYMPIAD HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT.

AS YOU SAY, NOW MORE THAN EVER, NOT IN A SYMBOLIC BUT IN A REAL SENSE, MILLIONS OF EYES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD FOLLOWED THE COURSE OF THE GAMES IN WHICH YOUNG MEN CAME FROM ALL PARTS OF THE EARTH TO THE HIGH PLAINS OF MEXICO AND COMPETED FAIRLY AND WITH ENTHUSIASM.

I WILL NOT CONCEAL FROM YOU MY SATISFACTION THAT WITH THE EFFORTS OF MANY OF MY COUNTRYMEN AND THE PARTICIPATION OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES -- WHO IN ADDITION TO THEIR ATHLETES COOPERATED IN THE CULTURAL OLYMPICS WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF ARTISTIC EVENTS ALONG WITH SOME OF THEIR OUTSTANDING CULTURAL WORKS -- WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FULFILL SO GREAT A RESPONSIBILITY, CHIEFLY BECAUSE AS YOU KNOW, THERE WAS NO LACK OF ADVERSE AND SKEPTICAL OPINIONS.

SPEAKING FOR MYSELF, ALTHOUGH OLYMPIC TRADITION HOLDS THAT TEAMS COMPETE AS INDIVIDUALS RATHER THAN AS COUNTRIES, I CANNOT REFRAIN FROM RESPONDING TO SUCH A FRIENDLY GESTURE AS YOUR LETTER WITH MY MOST CORDIAL CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE MANY TRIUMPHS ACHIEVED BY YOUR COUNTRYMEN.

HUMANITY IS IN NEED, NOW MORE THAN EVER, OF AN INVIGORATED SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND CONCORD. NOTHING PLEASES ME MORE THAN TO KNOW, BY WORDS SUCH AS YOURS, THAT THE EFFORTS WHICH FOR MEXICO SIGNIFIED THE REALIZATION FOR THE NINETEENTH OLYMPIAD, CONTRIBUTED IN SOME MEASURE TO FURTHER THAT SPIRIT.

YOUR FRIEND GREETES YOU,

/S/ GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ

MOST EXCELENT MR. LYNDON B. JOHNSON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON."

076 041817Z NOV 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 5-16-93

FROM QUICK COPY

Pres. J. L.

12

Monday, Nov. 4, 1968

LITERALLY EYES ONLY 5:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an account of latest secret Israeli-Jordan exchange:

- top level meeting postponed until Nov. 19;
- strong Jordanian arguments for simple Israeli acceptance of November Resolution -- which they should do.

I do believe it is not impossible we can move the Middle East around the corner in the weeks ahead -- if we try very hard.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-215
By lip, NARA, Date 6-28-95

(via pouch 11/4/68 11 00 pm)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-208
By ig, NARA, Date 5-1-95

SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

EEA683
OO WTE19
DE WTE 4216

NOV 4 16 01

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82673

Presfile

NOV 4 AM 11:01
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1968

SECRETARY RUSK URGED ME THIS MORNING TO LAY BEFORE YOU THE PAK TANK AND INDIA AID DECISIONS.

THE FOLLOWING PAPER PRESENTS THE TWO ISSUES.

1. AYUB'S TANKS. THE ISSUE IS WHETHER TO:
 - A. SPEND \$5 MILLION IN MILITARY AID FUNDS TO TRY TO PERSUADE TURKEY TO SELL 100 M-47'S TO PAKISTAN. WE WOULD REPLACE THEM WITH 100 M-43'S. NITZE SAYS HE CAN FIND THE MONEY.
 - B. OR REMOVE THE BAN ON ARMS AID TO THE SUBCONTINENT ALTOGETHER AND SELL THE TANKS DIRECTLY TO AYUB. IF THE TURKISH DEAL FALLS THROUGH, THIS WOULD BE THE ONLY PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE TO GET AYUB EVEN 100 TANKS. MY EARLIER MEMO AND NICK KATZENBACH'S ARE ATTACHED.
2. INDIAN AID. YOU ASKED ME TO LAY OUT FOR YOU ALTERNATIVE AID PACKAGES.

THESE FACTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION:

- THERE IS NO PRESSING FOOD SHORTAGE IN INDIA. BUT THE INDIANS NEED:
 - A. FOOD IMPORTS TO KEEP PRICES DOWN AND TO HELP THEM CONTINUE THEIR PROMISING PROGRAM OF AGRICULTURAL REFORM.
 - B. THEY NEED FERTILIZER IMPORTS FOR NEXT SPRING'S HARVEST. IF THEY CUT BACK HERE, THEY WILL NOT GET THE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE MIRACLE SEEDS NOW IN PLACE.

PRESERVATION COPY

-- THE INDIANS FEAR A SHARP CUTBACK IN FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT AID. THEY EXPECTED A COMMITMENT OF \$200 MILLION FROM IDA BY NOW. THEY CAN NO LONGER COUNT ON THIS. SECOND, THEY ARE COMPLETELY IN THE DARK ABOUT THE U.S. PROGRAM. NORMALLY WE WOULD HAVE PLEDGED OUR AID FOR FISCAL 1969 IN A CONSORTIUM MEETING HELD IN LATE SUMMER OR EARLY FALL. THERE HAS BEEN NO MEETING BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT THE CONGRESS WOULD APPROPRIATE.

- A. THE DANGER IS THEY MAY OVER-REACT. BY OVERCAUTIOUS BUDGETARY DECISIONS -- WHICH THEY ARE IN PROCESS OF MAKING NOW -- THEY COULD IN EFFECT PUT THEIR WHOLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN SUSPENSE.
- B. WHETHER THEY OVER-REACT OR NOT, THE SHARPER THE CUTBACK AVAILABLE FOREIGN EXCHANGE, THE SHARPER THE CUTBACK THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE IN DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT.

THESE ARE THE ALTERNATIVES:

- A. FOOD AID ONLY. THIS COULD RANGE FROM ONE MILLION TONS TO THE 2.3 MILLION TONS WE ORIGINALLY PROPOSED. ONE MILLION TONS WOULD REOPEN THE PIPELINE AND GIVE THE INDIANS SOME CONFIDENCE. THE 2.3 MILLION TON FIGURE (WHICH WOULD BRING OUR 1968 SHIPMENTS UP TO THE 1967 LEVEL) WOULD GIVE THEM THE BEST CHANCE OF GETTING A GRIP ON THEIR AGRICULTURAL PRICE AND SUPPLY PROBLEMS.
- B. FOOD AID PLUS AN INTERIM LOAN COMMITMENT. BUILDING FROM THE FOOD AID DECISION, WE WOULD ADD SAY \$120 MILLION AS A LOAN COMMITMENT NOW. THIS WOULD BE LARGE ENOUGH TO HAVE A GOOD PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT AND WOULD STILL LEAVE ROUGHLY HALF THE FISCAL 1969 APPROPRIATION FOR DECISION BY YOUR SUCCESSOR. PERHAPS HALF THE LOAN MONEY WOULD BE FOR FERTILIZER AND THE REST FOR INDUSTRIAL IMPORTS. BILL GAUD WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE ON THE MIX IN LIGHT OF THE TOTAL PROGRAM.
- C. FOOD AID PLUS THE TOTAL FY 69 AID APPROPRIATION FOR INDIA. THIS WOULD MEAN FOOD AID PLUS AN ESTIMATED \$195 MILLION IN LOAN MONEY. (WE GAVE \$285 MILLION LAST YEAR.) THE MAIN ARGUMENT FOR COMMITTING THE FULL AMOUNT NOW IS THAT IT WOULD DO THE MOST GOOD NOW. IT WOULD HAVE THE GREATEST IMPACT ON INDIAN BUDGETARY DECISIONS AND ON THEIR FERTILIZER PROCUREMENT POLICY. IT WOULD GIVE THEM SOME MARGIN TO GAMELE THAT IDA MAY STILL COME THROUGH BY THE MIDDLE OF 1969. YOUR SUCCESSOR WOULD STILL HAVE THE DECISION TO MAKE ON CALENDAR 1969 FOOD AID AND TIME TO WORK OUT THE NEXT INDIA CONSORTIUM PLEDGE AND GET IT THROUGH THE CONGRESS.

DTG: 041555Z NOV 1968

PRESERVATION COPY

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

14
80 NOV 4 AM 10:59
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EEA 682
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 4215

1968 NOV 4 15 36

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82672

Free file

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 4, 1968

HEREWITH FIRST REFLECTION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE DESIRE AND
THOUGHT ABOUT GETTING OFF THE LIMB NOW THAT FACE HAS BEEN SAVED
BY SHOW OF "INDEPENDENCE."

SAIGON 41876

1. PRESIDENCY SEC GEN NGUYEN VAN HUONG TOLD EMBOFF AFTERNOON
NOV 4 THAT HE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF THE PARIS TALKS WITH
PRES THIEU'S BROTHER, NGUYEN VAN KIEU, THAT MORNING. HUONG
SAID HE ADVISED KIEU, AS HE HAS DONE ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH
ITS INDEPENDENCE VIS-A-VIS THE US. THE WORLD IS NOW FULLY
AWARE THAT THE GVN CANNOT BE THRUST INTO THE TALKS
AT THE BECK AND CALL OF THE AMERICANS. ANY FURTHER ACTION
SUCH AS DEMONSTRATIONS IS UNNECESSARY AND MIGHT HAVE A BAD
EFFECT ON AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.
2. HUONG WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN HIS VIEW THE PRESENT IMPASSE
CAN BE OVERCOME IF: (A) SOME TIME IS ALLOWED TO ELAPSE, SO
AS TO HAVE AN "INTERMISSION" FOR THE SAKE OF SAVING THE
GVN'S FACE; AND (B) A DIFFERENT REPRESENTATION FORMULA CAN
BE WORKED OUT. HUONG EXPLAINED THAT HE BELIEVES THE GVN COULD
ENVISAGE A TWO DELEGATION SITUATION. BY THIS HE MEANT THAT THERE
WOULD BE ONLY A DELEGATION REPRESENTING SOUTH VIETNAM ON ONE
SIDE AND A DELEGATION REPRESENTING NORTH VIETNAM ON THE OTHER
SIDE. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WOULD INCLUDE AMERICANS
AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COULD BRING ALONG ANYONE THEY CHOSE,
INCLUDING THE CHINESE IF THEY WERE SO INCLINED.
3. HUONG WAS CAREFUL TO PHRASE THE ABOVE PROPOSAL AS HIS
OWN IDEA.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 94-218

By cb, NARA, Date 7-31-95

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

4. EMBOFF ASKED HOW LONG HUONG THOUGHT THE FACE-SAVING "INTERMISSION" MUST BE. HUONG SAID THAT HE THOUGHT A WEEK OR TWO WOULD SUFFICE. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT XUAN THUY HAS INDICATED PUBLICLY THAT THE FIRST SESSION NEED NOT BE ON NOV 6.

5. EMBOFF STRESSED THE DANGERS OF THE GVN BEING IN THE POSITION OF PREVENTING PEACE TALKS, A POSTURE WHICH MAKES IT APPEAR TO THE WORLD OPINION THAT THE GVN IS SEEKING TO PROLONG THE WAR. EMBOFF URGED ON HUONG THE IDEA THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR THE USG AND THE GVN TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH WILL ALLOW PEACE TALKS TO BE OPENED PROMPTLY. HUONG AGREED.

6. ASKED WHY IN HIS OPINION PRES THIEU DECIDED TO REFUSE TO SEND A DELEGATION TO PARIS NOV 6, HUONG BLAMED THE DECISION ON PRESSURE FROM VICE PRES KY. HUONG CLAIMS THAT KY HAS BEEN SAYING THE BOMBING HALT REVEALS AMERICA'S TRUE INTENTIONS: THE USG DUMPED KY IN FAVOR OF THIEU LAST YEAR BECAUSE THE US WAS PREPARING TO SELL OUT VIETNAM AND KNEW THIEU COULD BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE. HUONG THINKS THIS KY TACTIC COMPELLED THIEU TO TAKE A STRONG STAND.

7. ASKED IF HE HAD EVER HEARD KY MAKE SUCH STATEMENTS. HUONG ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NOT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT KY MADE AN ANTI-AMERICAN SPEECH TO A NUMBER OF SENATORS NOV 2 WHEN THEY CAME TO THE PALACE FOLLOWING THIEU'S SPEECH TO THE ASSEMBLY. ACCORDING TO HUONG, KY SAID AT THAT TIME AND IN THIEU'S PRESENCE THAT HE WOULD REVEAL TO THE SENATORS THE SECRET PRESSURES WHICH THE US BROUGHT TO BEAR TO FORCE THE GVN INTO NEGOTIATIONS.

8. COMMENT: (A) HUONG HAS ALWAYS REGARDED KY AS AN ENEMY, AND HE NEVER LOSES AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCREDIT KY. HIS REMARKS ABOUT KY'S ROLE IN THE GVN DECISION SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN THAT LIGHT.

(B) HUONG'S FORMULA FOR GETTING OVER THE PRESENT IMPASSE MAY OR MAY NOT REFLECT THIEU'S THINKING. WHILE HUONG WAS CAREFUL TO PRESENT IT AS HIS OWN PROPOSAL, HE MAY WELL HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH THIEU AS WELL AS KIEU.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 041427Z NOV 68

1968 NOV 4 15 25

EEA681
OO WTE 18
DE WTE 4214

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP92671

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-218
By cb, NARA, Date 7-31-95

15
NOV 4 AM 10:18
WHITEHOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 4, 1968

Profile

HEREWITH GENERAL KHANG'S ACCOUNT AND ANALYSIS OF THIEU'S PERFORMANCE ON THE BOMB HALT.

1. FORMER III CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE NGUYEN KHANG SAID ON 2 NOVEMBER THAT HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED THAT THE BOMBING HALT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS NOT JOINTLY ISSUED BY THE U.S. AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY HAD TOLD HIM ONLY A FEW DAYS BEFORE THAT THE GVN WAS WORKING ON A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH THE AMERICANS AND THAT ONLY A FEW MINOR DETAILS REMAINED TO BE SETTLED. KHANG SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE FOUNDERED AT THE LAST MOMENT ON THE ISSUE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE (DRV) WILLINGNESS TO SOFT-PEDAL THE PRESENCE AND ROLE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) AT THE PARIS TALKS. (FIELD COMMENT. AN AIDE TO VICE PRESIDENT KY ALSO REPORTED THAT THIS WAS THE MAIN ISSUE, IN VIETNAMESE MINDS, OVER WHICH THE US/GVN TALKS BROKE DOWN. THE VIETNAMESE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT, JUST AS THE ALLIES HAD AGREED NOT TO PUBLICIZE THE CONCESSIONS THE DRV HAD OFFERED TO OBTAIN A BOMBING HALT, SO THE DRV HAD AGREED TO PLAY IN VERY LOW PROFILE THE PRESENCE OF NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES AT PARIS. WHEN AMBASSADOR PHAM DANG LAM IN PARIS REPORTED, AND THE AMERICANS IN SAIGON CONFIRMED, THAT THE DRV PROBABLY PLANNED TO PLAY UP AND FLOUT THE SEPARATE IDENTITY OF THE NFLSV AT THE CONFERENCE, THE US/GVN TALKS BROKE UP.)

2. IN KHANG'S VIEW, THE TRAGEDY OF THE US/GVN TALKS IS THAT THEY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN STRICTEST SECRECY. AGREEMENT IN PRIVATE IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS MATTER BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF "FACE" TO ORIENTALS. ANOTHER PROBLEM WAS PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S INABILITY TO GIVE THE AMERICANS A FULL GO AHEAD AT THE FIRST SESSION. IF HE HAD, THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE GONE ALONG WITH ONLY MINOR GRUMBLING. NOW, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION HAS BEEN BLOWN UP OUT OF ALL PROPORTION AND THIEU IS IN A DIFFICULT POSITION.

3. KHANG SAID IT IS NOT THIEU'S STYLE TO ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANYTHING. HE HAS NEVER KNOWN THIEU TO MAKE A MAJOR DECISION WITHOUT FIRST STAFFING OUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT. EVEN IF THIEU KNOWS WHAT HE WANTS, HE FIRST INSURES THAT OTHERS HAVE ADVISED HIM TO TAKE THAT COURSE OF ACTION SO THAT THEY WILL SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION IF IT PROVES UNPOPULAR. KHANG SAID HE HAS HEARD FROM A NUMBER OF PEOPLE THAT THIEU'S ADVISERS, MANY OF THEM CATHOLIC, ADVISED THIEU AGAINST ANY "SELL-OUT TO THE NFLSV" AND SUGGESTED THAT IF HE COULD STALL UNTIL AFTER 5 NOVEMBER HE WOULD GET A BETTER DEAL FROM

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

NIXON. KHANG NOTED THAT THIEU'S CLOSE ADVISERS INCLUDE FATHER CAO VAN LUAN, SENATE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN HUYEN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGISLATIVE LIAISON NGUYEN CAO THANG, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY NGUYEN VAN HUONG. HE DID NOT STATE SPECIFICALLY THAT THESE ADVISORS WERE THE ONES WHO HAD URGED THIEU TO STALL.

4. KHANG SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT KY EXERCISED SOME INFLUENCE OVER THIEU IN THE SENSE OF ADVOCATING A HARD POSITION, HE THINKS KY KNOWS BETTER THAN TO PUSH THE NIXON LINE. KY, LIKE KHANG HIMSELF, KNOWS THAT A CHANGE IN U.S. PRESIDENTS WILL HAVE VERY LITTLE INFLUENCE ON BASIC U.S. POLICIES. KHANG THINKS IT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO SAY KY MANEUVERED THIEU INTO TAKING A HAWKISH POSITION. KY, HE SAID, WAS ASTONISHED BY THE UNCOMPROMISING STAND TOWARD THE NLSV WHICH THIEU TOOK IN HIS VUNG TAU SPEECH. HE AND KY BOTH SURMISED THAT THIEU DELIBERATELY TOOK A MORE HAWKISH POSITION THAN THE KY CAMP'S TO STEAL THE LATTER'S THUNDER. AFTER THIEU'S SPEECH, THE KY FORCES HAD TO SUPPORT THIEU OR STAND ACCUSED OF TRYING TO BETTER THEIR PERSONAL POSITION AT THE EXPENSE OF THE COUNTRY. AS IT WAS, KHANG SAID, THE KY FORCES FOUND IT EASY TO SUPPORT THIEU.

5. KHANG THINKS THAT ASIDE FROM HIS ADVISERS AND THE VIEWS OF THE KY FORCES, THIEU WAS PROBABLY INFLUENCED IN HIS THINKING DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS BY THE RETURN OF HIS BROTHER, NGUYEN VAN KIEU FROM TAIPEI. HE DOES NOT SUGGEST THAT KIEU OPPOSED THE BOMBING HALT BUT DOES KNOW THAT KIEU TOLD THIEU THE AMERICANS WERE TELLING OTHER CHIEFS OF STATE THAT THIEU HAD AGREED TO GO ALONG WITH U.S. POLICY MORE OR LESS UNCONDITIONALLY. THIS ANNOYED THIEU BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT MADE HIM SUSPICIOUS OF U.S. MOTIVES. THUS, KIEU'S RETURN TENDED TO STRENGTHEN THIEU'S NATURAL SUSPICION AND INDECISIVENESS.

6. KHANG SAID HE HOPES THIEU CAN GET OUT OF HIS PRESENT DILEMMA. THIEU HARBORS A DEEP SUSPICION OF U.S. INTENTIONS. HE IS NOT ANTI-AMERICAN, BUT RATHER WORRIES GREATLY ABOUT HOW THE U.S. WILL USE ITS POWER TO PRESSURE HIM. KHANG THINKS THIEU WILL CONTINUE TO CONCERN HIMSELF WITH THESE WORRIES AND NOT PUT HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE AMERICANS UNLESS AND UNTIL HE FEELS FULLY PROTECTED. AT PRESENT, THIEU IS BASKING IN THE GLORY OF POPULAR ACCLAIM FOR STANDING UP TO THE AMERICANS, WHICH COULD FURTHER HARDEN HIS POSITION.

7. KHANG SAID HE PERSONALLY IS NOT TOO CONCERNED ABOUT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH EXCEPT THAT IT HAS CAUSED DIVISIVENESS AND CONFUSION IN GVN RANKS. HE COMMENTED THAT EVERY WAR MUST END AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN AT WAR A LONG TIME. HE ADDED THAT HE PLANS TO SEE KY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IMPRESS ON KY THE NEED FOR THE GVN TO JOIN THE TALKS IN PARIS AND TO CLOSE RANKS WITH THE AMERICANS. HE WILL ALSO TELL KY HE THINKS IT IMPORTANT THAT KY GIVE THIEU WHATEVER HELP THE LATTER NEEDS TO GET OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE.

8. ON 1 NOVEMBER, KHANG ADDED, DEFENSE MINISTER NGUYEN VAN VY TOLD HIM THAT THIEU HAD AGAIN ASKED FORMER IV CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG TO GO TO PARIS AND THANG HAD AGAIN REFUSED.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 041342Z NOV 1968

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

EEA675
OO WTE13
DE WTE 4205

1968 NOV 4 03 50

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-498
By ju, NARA, Date 1-26-93

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82665

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

HEREWITH FULL ACCOUNT OF VANCE'S MEETING WITH THE HANOI
DELEGATE AND HIS STATEMENT OF THE ALTERNATIVES WE CONFRONT.

PARIS 23330

DELTO 923

FROM VANCE

1. I MET WITH HAN VAN LAU AND NGUYEN MINH VY AT OUR PLACE IN
SCEAUX FOR TWO HOURS AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 3. HABIB AND NEGROPONTE
ACCOMPANIED ME. THEY HAD AN INTERPRETER AND A NOTETAKER ON THEIR
SIDE.
2. I SAID THAT WE WERE MEETING TO CONSIDER THE NEXT STEPS AND
WE HAD A PRACTICAL SUGGESTION WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE. IN
ORDER TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM OF ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES IN
AN ORDERLY FASHION, I PROPOSED THAT LAU AND I MEET NEXT WEDNESDAY,
NOVEMBER 6, AT 10:30 AT THE MAJESTIC HOTEL ACCOMPANIED BY ANY OF
OUR ADVISORS THAT WE NEED. WE COULD THEN DISCUSS ARRANGEMENTS
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE WHICH WILL BE APPLICABLE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE
MEETINGS WHICH WILL BE HELD IN THE NEW FORMAT. I SAID OUR MEETING
ON WEDNESDAY SHOULD BE A WORKING SESSION IN WHICH WE EXCHANGE
VIEWS ON VARIOUS QUESTIONS OF ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURE IN AN
EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT. I ASKED FOR LAU'S RESPONSE TO MY
PROPOSAL.
3. LAU SAID THAT BEFORE COMMENTING ON OUR SUGGESTION HE WAS
AUTHORIZED BY MINISTER XUAN THUY TO EXPRESS THE DRV'S VIEWS
ABOUT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S OCTOBER 31 SPEECH. LAU SAID THAT
AS IT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY AGREED, THE PRESIDENT WOULD AT
SUCH-AND-SUCH A TIME ISSUE THE ORDER TO STOP ALL AIR,
NAVAL, AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING
THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV.
BUT, LAU SAID, THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH DID NOT CONTAIN SUCH A
SENTENCE AS HAD BEEN AGREED UPON AND, THEREFORE, THE PRESIDENT'S
STATEMENT WAS NOT FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT WHICH HAD
BEEN REACHED.
4. SECONDLY, LAU SAID, IN REGARD TO THE DATE OF A MEETING FOR THE
FOUR DELEGATIONS, THE DRV SIDE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S
STATEMENT WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH OUR AGREEMENT. WE NO DOUBT
RECALLED THAT AT OUR LAST PRIVATE MEETING THE US REPRESENTATIVE
HAD MADE THE PROPOSAL THAT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE FOUR
REPRESENTATIVES BE HELD NOT BEFORE NOVEMBER 6. THEREFORE,
THE DATE OF THE MEETING HAD NOT BEEN AGREED UPON AND, AT
THAT SAME MEETING, VANCE AND LAU HAD MADE AN APPOINTMENT
FOR NOVEMBER 2 TO FIX A DATE FOR THE FIRST MEETING. THUS,
THE DATE OF NOVEMBER 6 HAD NOT YET BEEN FIXED AND YET,
LAU SAID, THE PRESIDENT FIXED IT UNILATERALLY IN HIS SPEECH.
THIS, LAU SAID, WAS ANOTHER ELEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
SPEECH WHICH WAS NOT CONSISTENT WITH OUR AGREEMENT. LAU
SAID IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ANNOUNCED A
DATE WITHOUT AGREEMENT OF THE DRV SIDE AND IT WAS ON THIS
BASIS THAT HE CAME TO DISCUSS WITH ME TODAY THE HOLDING OF A
MEETING ON NOVEMBER 6.

5. LAU SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT OUR MEETING TODAY WAS TO DISCUSS HOW THE FIRST MEETING WITH FOUR DELEGATIONS WILL BE HELD ON NOVEMBER 6. AS FOR THE PROCEDURES OF THIS CONFERENCE, THAT WILL BE DECIDED BY THE MEETING OF THE FOUR DELEGATIONS. AT THIS POINT LAU NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT THE DRV SIDE UNDERSTOOD THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS BETWEEN THE DRV, THE NLF, THE US AND THE GVN WOULD BE A CONFERENCE, ALTHOUGH WHETHER WE USE THE WORD "MEETING" OR "CONFERENCE", IT MADE NO DIFFERENCE TO THE DRV.

6. THEREFORE, LAU SAID, MY SUGGESTION OF TODAY HAD SURPRISED HIM A LITTLE BECAUSE HE FOUND IT INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT WE HAD REACHED THE OTHER DAY. LAU SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF TODAY'S MEETING WAS TO DISCUSS AT WHAT TIME THE FOUR-DELEGATION MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE ON WEDNESDAY, WHAT THE FORMALITIES WOULD BE, HOW THE DELEGATIONS WOULD TAKE THE FLOOR AND SO FORTH. AS FOR RULES OF PROCEDURES, THAT WOULD BE DISCUSSED AND AGREED UPON BY THE FOUR DELEGATIONS.

7. WHY, ASKED LAU, DID HE HAVE SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING? IT WAS BECAUSE THE DRV HAD AGREED THAT AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WE WOULD SHIFT INTO A NEW PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH A CONFERENCE TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM WOULD TAKE PLACE WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV, NLF, US AND RVN. THEREFORE, LAU SAID, THE DRV SIDE BELIEVES THAT AT THE NOVEMBER 6 MEETING THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR ABOVE-MENTIONED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE PRESENT. LAU SAID HE KNEW THAT THE NLF REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE IN PARIS BEFORE NOVEMBER 6. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT FULL DELEGATIONS OF THE NLF AND THE RVN MIGHT NOT REACH PARIS IN TIME. THEREFORE, THE REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE PRESENT TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES OF THE CONFERENCE. LAU SAID THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NLF WILL BE MRS. NGUYEN THI BINH, A MEMBER OF THE NLF CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

8. THEREFORE, LAU CONTINUED, THE TIME OF THE MEETING WAS TO BE FIXED HERE TODAY BETWEEN US. AS FOR THE DATE AND THE PARTICIPANTS, PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD ALREADY MENTIONED THEM IN HIS SPEECH. LAU SAID HE THOUGHT THE WHOLE WORLD IS NOW LOOKING FORWARD TO SUCH A MEETING AND, AS FAR AS THE DRV SIDE WAS CONCERNED, IT WAS PREPARED TO CARRY OUT ITS AGREEMENT. AS FAR AS LAU KNEW, THE NLF WAS ALSO PREPARED TO DO THE SAME. LAU SAID HE HAD FINISHED AND AT MY REQUEST WE RECESSED BRIEFLY.

9. UPON RESUMING, I SAID THAT I WOULD FIRST LIKE TO DEAL WITH THE TWO POINTS THAT LAU HAD MADE REGARDING THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. THE ORDER ISSUED PROVIDED FOR THE CESSATION OF ALL BOMBARDMENTS AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV. THAT ORDER WAS ISSUED AT THE TIME WE SAID IT WOU

D BE AND THAT THOSE ACTIONS BECOME FULLY EFFECTIVE WITHIN 12 HOURS OF THE ORDER, AS WE HAD SAID THEY WOULD BE. THE IMPORTANT FACT IS THAT THE ORDER WAS ISSUED AND THERE IS NO INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN WHAT THE PRESIDENT SAID AND THAT ORDER.

10. AS FAR AS A NAMING OF THE DATE FOR THE MEETING, I AGREED THAT WE STILL HAVE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. AT THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, IT WAS ASSUMED THAT THE DATE WAS FEASIBLE FOR ALL CONCERNED. NOW IT APPEARS THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN CANNOT MAKE THAT DATE. IN THAT CONNECTION, THE INDISCRIMINATE ROCKETING OF SAIGON ON NOVEMBER 1 COMPLICATED THE PROBLEM, MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR THE GVN TO COME ALONG PROMPTLY. THEREFORE, TO PROCEED WITH THE NECESSARY MATTERS, I HAD MADE THE SUGGESTION OUTLINED ABOVE.

11. THE SUGGESTION I HAD MADE WAS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH OUR AGREEMENT OF THE OTHER DAY, BECAUSE WE BOTH RECOGNIZED AT THAT TIME THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THAT MEETING TO BE HELD IN AN ORDERLY MANNER. THESE ARE COMPLEX MATTERS REQUIRING FULL CONSIDERATION AND NECESSARY CONSULTATION. WE THINK THESE MATTERS CAN BE HANDLED EFFICIENTLY IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE BEGINNING OF OUR OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS. THIS IS PROPERLY SOMETHING THAT THE DRV AND US SIDES SHOULD DO. AS I RECALLED OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, THE DRV SIDE RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR FULL CONSIDERATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FIRST MEETING WOULD BE CONDUCTED. AND BY "FULL DISCUSSION" I MEANT DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE US AND DRV.

12. I SAID THAT A MATTER WHICH WE MIGHT ALSO USEFULLY DISCUSS WEDNESDAY WOULD BE THE STATE OF AFFAIRS ALONG THE DMZ. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHAT EACH SIDE IS DOING THERE SO AS TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OR INCIDENTS. THEREFORE, I SUGGESTED AGAIN THAT LAU ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL THAT I HAD OUTLINED AT THE BEGINNING OF OUR MEETING THIS AFTERNOON.

13. IN RESPONSE, LAU SAID THAT THE DRV SIDE HAD TAKEN NOTE OF HARRIMAN'S AND MY COMMUNICATION ON OCTOBER 31 REGARDING THE ORDER TO BE ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT. THE DRV SIDE RECOGNIZES THAT THIS ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED AND CARRIED OUT. BUT WHETHER IT IS EFFECTIVE OVER THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV HAS NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED. AS FOR THE INCONSISTENCY, LAU SAID THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO THE WORDING USED BY THE PRESIDENT IN HIS SPEECH. THE PRESIDENT HAD ONLY MENTIONED THE ORDER TO STOP ALL AIR NAVAL AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT. THEREFORE THE DRV SIDE MAINTAINED ITS REMARK REGARDING THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT AND OUR AGREEMENT. WHETHER THE ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN REALIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT, THIS CANNOT BE AFFIRMED NOW, LAU SAID. HE WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT A REPORT FROM THE DRV. THE DRV WAS FOLLOWING THE SITUATION CLOSELY.

14. LAU REMARKED THAT I AGREED WITH HIM THAT THE DATE OF THE FIRST MEETING SHOULD BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN US. LAU SAID THAT SINCE THE PRESIDENT HAD NAMED A DATE, THE DRV ACCEPTED IT. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO WHAT I HAD SAID, IT APPEARED THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT CANNOT COME IN TIME, AND I HAD MENTIONED THE ROCKET ATTACK AGAINST SAIGON AS THE REASON. THIS QUESTION LAU SAID IS RELATED TO THE NLF. LAU SAID HE DID NOT FEEL THIS QUESTION WAS THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR DISCUSSION TODAY AND, AS FOR THE ROCKETING OF SAIGON, HE DID NOT FEEL THAT THIS WAS THE REASON FOR THE SAIGON REPRESENTATIVES BEING UNABLE TO COME TO PARIS IN TIME.

15. LAU SAID THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH US MATTERS REGARDING THE CONVENING OF THE FIRST MEETING, BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT OUR PROPOSAL IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH OUR AGREEMENT THAT THE FOUR DELEGATIONS WOULD MEET ON NOVEMBER 6. LAU THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE US TO TELL HIM FORMALLY WHETHER WE CAN HAVE A MEETING WITH THE FOUR REPRESENTATIVES ON NOVEMBER 6 AND, IF NOT, WHEN COULD SUCH A MEETING BE HELD? HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE MANNER OF HOLDING THE FIRST MEETING, BUT THAT PROCEDURES FOR THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BY THE FOUR DELEGATIONS.

16. LAU SAID HE AGREED WITH ME THAT THE PROBLEM HAS ITS COMPLEXITIES AND IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE FULL DISCUSSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS, BUT THE FULL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE BY THE FOUR DELEGATIONS. LAU SAID HE THOUGHT THAT IF THE FOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND ALL PARTIES CONCERNED HAD GOOD WILL HE BELIEVED WE COULD COME TO AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS. IF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SAIGON ADMINISTRATION CAN COME HERE NOVEMBER 6 HE SAW NO PROBLEM.

17. LAU THEN SAID HE HAD THE FOLLOWING CONCRETE PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS THAT THE TWO OF US COULD DISCUSS. HE PROPOSED THAT WE DISCUSS WHAT WE SHALL DO AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE FOUR REPRESENTATIVES, HOW EACH SIDE WOULD TAKE THE FLOOR REGARDING PROCEDURAL MATTERS, AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY WOULD TAKE IT. ON MAY 13 WHEN THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS BEGAN, IT WAS A SIMPLE MATTER BECAUSE THERE WERE ONLY TWO DELEGATIONS. BUT NOW THERE WERE FOUR DELEGATIONS AND THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY SPOKE SHOULD BE DISCUSSED. IT WAS NOT A VERY IMPORTANT MATTER, BUT THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE SO THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE ORDERLY AND DISCIPLINED.

18. NEXT, LAU SAID, WAS THE QUESTION OF PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS. HOW MANY PEOPLE WOULD BE IN EACH DELEGATION AND WHAT WOULD BE THE SEATING, SO THAT WE CAN PROPOSE TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT THAT IT MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. WE SHOULD ALSO THINK ABOUT THE QUESTION OF PRESS REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDING THE MEETING. THESE LAU SAID ARE PRACTICAL QUESTIONS WE COULD DISCUSS TODAY AND COME TO AN AGREEMENT. IF THE OTHERS CONCERNED COME AND AGREE, THEN WE CAN BEGIN. LAU PROPOSED THAT WE BEGIN THE DISCUSSION AND THAT IF WE COULD NOT FINISH TODAY, THEN WE COULD CONTINUE TOMORROW. IN ANY EVENT, WE SHOULD REACH AGREEMENT BEFORE NOVEMBER 6.

19. I SAID I HAD SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS. FIRST, I WANTED TO ASK WHETHER LAU HAD ANY INFORMATION THAT THE ORDERS ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH. LAU SAID THAT HE HAD NO WORD THAT IT HAD NOT, BUT, AS HE HAD SAID, HE COULD NOT CONFIRM THIS NOW BECAUSE HE HAD NOT YET HAD ANY REPORT FROM HANOI.

20. I THEN SAID THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN SIMPLY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO GET HERE BY NOVEMBER 6. I SAID THAT AS I HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID THE ROCKETING OF SAIGON HAD COMPLICATED THE PROBLEM AND MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES TO COME ALONG PROMPTLY. I SAID WE STILL BELIEVED THE APPROPRIATE PLACE AND TIME OF DISCUSSION OF THE MATTERS LAU HAD JUST LISTED WOULD BE AT THE MEETING ON WEDNESDAY BETWEEN LAU AND MYSELF AND ANY ADVISORS WE WISHED TO HAVE IN THE SAME FORM AS WE HAD FOLLOWED AT THE OUTSET OF OUR OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS.

21. I SAID, THAT WITHOUT ABANDONING THAT POSITION, I WOULD LISTEN TO ANY SUGGESTIONS LAU HAD REGARDING THE ITEMS HE HAD LISTED AND HOW HIS SIDE WOULD ORGANIZE ITSELF.

22. LAU REPLIED THAT FIRST OF ALL, IF WE INSISTED ON THE PROPOSAL WE HAD MADE AT THE OUTSET, THEN THE DRV SIDE FEELS THAT IT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH OUR AGREEMENT, THAT IS TO SAY, THAT A MEETING OF FOUR DELEGATIONS WILL BE HELD TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT TO THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM AND THE FIRST MEETING WILL DEAL WITH ITEMS SUCH AS PROCEDURE AND AGENDA. IN THE SPIRIT OF THAT AGREEMENT, LAU SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO AWAIT THE ARRIVAL OF ALL FOUR DELEGATIONS AND THEN DISCUSS THESE MATTERS.

23. LAU SAID HE REMEMBERED THAT WE HAD TOLD HIM AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE PROMPT MEETINGS AND THAT THE DRV REPRESENTATIVE WAS ALREADY IN PARIS. AS FOR THE FULL DELEGATION OF THE SAIGON ADMINISTRATION, IT COULD COME LATER BECAUSE IT NEEDED TIME TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS. IN THAT SPIRIT, THE DRV SIDE HAD ACCEPTED THAT THE NLF REPRESENTATIVE COME TO PARIS FIRST TO DISCUSS PROCEDURAL ITEMS PENDING THE ARRIVAL OF THE FULL NLF DELEGATION. LAU SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE FULL-FLEDGED SAIGON DELEGATION MAY BE LATE, BUT A GVN REPRESENTATIVE WAS ALREADY IN PARIS AND, THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO PROBLEM IF WE HAVE TO MEET IMMEDIATELY. MOREOVER, LAU SAID, HE WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT AT OUR LAST PRIVATE MEETING WE HAD SAID THAT WE WERE GOOD FOR OUR WORD AND THAT WE WOULD DO WHAT WE PROMISED. LAU SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD KEEP OUR WORD.

24. AS FOR THE FIRST MEETING, LAU SAID THAT HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT WE INFORM HIM OF WHAT DATE IT COULD BE HELD IF THAT DATE WAS NOT NOVEMBER 6. AT THAT MEETING WILL BE PRESENT THE NLF, THE RVN AND OUR TWO DELEGATIONS. AS FOR PROCEDURES, EACH SIDE MAY EXPRESS ITS VIEWS AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION, BECAUSE EACH SIDE HAS THE RIGHT TO MAKE PROPOSALS ON WHAT THE PROCEDURES SHOULD BE.

25. AS FOR THE LOCATION OF THE MEETING, LAU SUGGESTED THAT FOR THE FIRST MEETING WE PROPOSE TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT THAT IT LET US USE THE LARGE CONFERENCE ROOM IN THE MAJESTIC. LAU SAID HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT WE ALLOW THE PRESS 10 OR 15 MINUTES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST MEETING TO TAKE PHOTOGRAPHS, AND HAVE CORRESPONDENTS PRESENT, AS HAD BEEN DONE ON MAY 13. LAU SAID THE DRV SIDE HAD RECEIVED MANY REQUESTS FROM THE PRESS TO DO THIS. THE FOREGOING, LAU SAID, WERE HIS PRELIMINARY VIEWS.

26. I SAID THAT I WANTED TO POINT OUT FIRST THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT ALL BOMBARDMENT AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV HAVE STOPPED. WE SAID THIS WOULD HAPPEN AND IT DID, AND AT THE TIME WE SAID IT WOULD.

27. SECOND, WE HAVE RUN INTO COMPLEXITIES REGARDING THE FIRST MEETING. THESE COMPLEXITIES ARE MATTERS BEYOND OUR CONTROL. ON MATTERS OVER WHICH WE HAVE CONTROL, WE HAVE COMPLIED WITH OUR WORD. I THEN SUGGESTED THAT WE RECESS AGAIN BRIEFLY.

28. UPON RESUMING, I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE THE SITUATION. BEFORE WE CAN HOLD THE FIRST MEETING IN AN ORDERLY MANNER, BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR THAT MEETING. IT IS FURTHER AGREED THAT THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN US. THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT WE PROPOSED TO DO IN AN ORDERLY MANNER IN A MEETING BETWEEN US AT THE MAJESTIC ON NOVEMBER 6. THESE MATTERS CAN BE APPROPRIATELY DISCUSSED IN SUCH A MEETING UNDER REGULAR CIRCUMSTANCES. REGARDING LAU'S SUGGESTIONS, I SAID I HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THEM AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM AND I ASKED THAT HE DO THE SAME REGARDING OUR SUGGESTIONS.

29. LAU SAID THAT HE HAD PROVISIONALLY COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE CAN NOT YET HOLD THE FIRST MEETING AS AGREED ON NOVEMBER 6, THAT IS TO SAY, A MEETING INCLUDING THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV, NLF, THE US AND THE RVN. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THE COMPLEXITIES BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE US.

30. LAU SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO PREPARE FOR THIS FIRST MEETING, THAT DISCUSSION BETWEEN OUR TWO DELEGATIONS BE HELD AND FOR THIS REASON HE HAD COME TO MEET US TODAY. NOW WE WERE MAKING A NEW PROPOSAL. LAU SAID HE WOULD REPORT IT TO XUAN THUY AND HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH US.

31. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF CLARITY, AS OF TODAY I CAN NOT SAY THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN WILL BE PRESENT NOVEMBER 6 BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEXITIES TO WHICH I HAD REFERRED.

32. COMMENT FOLLOWS SEPTTEL.

PARIS 23331

DELTO 924

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

FOLLOWING IS OUR COMMENT ON TODAY'S MEETING BETWEEN VANCE AND LAU:

1. AS WE SEE IT, THERE ARE TWO PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES:

A. GO FORWARD ON NOVEMBER 6TH AS STATED IN THE PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 31 STATEMENT, WITH THE GVN FREE TO ATTEND IF THEY WANT TO COME;

B. ASK FOR A POSTPONEMENT OF THE NOVEMBER 6TH DATE TO A DATE CERTAIN AND BE PREPARED TO GO FORWARD ON THAT DAY WHETHER OR NOT THE GVN IS PRESENT. WE NOTE THAT IS IS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE DRV WILL ACCEPT A PROPOSAL WHICH DOES NOT INCLUDE THE GVN, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THEY PROBABLY WILL.

2. THE DRV MADE CLEAR THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO REJECT THE PROPOSAL WE MADE TODAY QUOTING BACK OUR OWN WORDS THAT WE WANTED PROMPT AND SERIOUS TALKS, AND THAT THEY ARE READY TO PROCEED ON NOVEMBER 6TH. THEY WILL ADD, AS THEY DID TODAY, THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH US IN INFORMAL BILATERAL MEETINGS THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE FIRST MEETING AND REACH AGREEMENT, SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION BY NLF AND GVN. THEY SAID TODAY THAT IF WE CAME TO SUCH AGREEMENT, THE OTHER PARTIES COULD HAVE NO OBJECTION.

DTG: 040045Z NOV 68

~~SECRET~~

NEVER ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

17

NOV 3 16 29

EAAG66
OO VTE 18
DE VTE 4192

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82637

Profile

68 NOV 3 AM 11:44
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 2, 1968

HEREWITH SIHANOUK REVEALS HIS TRUE FRAME OF MIND.
BY ANTON WILL-EVE

BATTAMBANG, CAMBODIA, NOV. 3, REUTER - CAMBODIAN
HEAD OF STATE PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK TODAY URGED THE UNITED
STATES NOT TO LEAVE ASIA, OTHERWISE CAMBODIA WOULD FALL INTO
THE HANDS OF CHINA.

THE PRINCE WAS SPEAKING IN A SERIES OF INFORMAL
MEETINGS WITH JOURNALISTS AT THIS PROVINCIAL CAPITAL.

HE SAID: "I HOPE THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT WITHDRAW
FROM ASIA BECAUSE I NEED SOME CARDS IN MY HANDS TO MAINTAIN
A BALANCE".

ADDRESSING THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS PRESENT THE PRINCE ADDED:
"HOPE YOU WILL GO ON OCCUPYING THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES
AFTER YOU LEAVE VIETNAM SO I CAN USE YOUR PRESENCE TO
MANIPULATE THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA."

"IF THE U.S. LEAVES ASIA COMPLETELY IT WOULD BE THE
END OF MY INDEPENDENCE. I WOULD INVITE MAO TSE-TUNG TO TAKE
OVER CAMBODIA," THE PRINCE SAID.

BUT PRINCE SIHANOUK ADDED THAT CAMBODIA WOULD NEVER ACCEPT
AMERICAN TROOPS ON HER SOIL AND WOULD ONLY USE THE AMERICAN
PRESENCE IN ASIA TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE "BETWEEN COMMUNISM
AND IMPERIALISM."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 031606Z NOV 68

DECLASSIFIED TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
E.O. 13526, CANCELLED BY THE
SEC. OF STATE AND ARCHIVIST'S OFFICE
MAY 19 1993

DI 19 ON 5893

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

SENT
SECRET
WHCA

18

NOV 3 17 37

EEA668
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4195

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82699

Free file

NOV 3 PM 12:43

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

NOVEMBER 3, 1968

HEREWITH THAILAND IS TEMPORARILY STABILIZED. THE KEY ANXIETY IS THAT U.S. WILL MOVE TO "RECOGNIZE" THE NLF.

BANGKOK 22423

1. I REACHED FOREIGN MINISTER THANAT THIS MORNING, REFERRED TO PACKET OF MATERIALS ON BOMBING HALT WHICH I HAD PROVIDED FOR HIS PERUSAL YESTERDAY, AND CALLED HIS ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO MANY SIGNIFICANT POINTS MADE IN WALT ROSTOV'S BACKGROUNDER. MENTIONING PRES. THIEU'S SPEECH I EMPHASIZED THAT THE POINTS WHICH QUITE UNDERSTANDABLY WERE OF DEEP CONCERN TO THE GVN WERE MATTERS WHICH THEY AND USG HAD EXHAUSTIVELY REVIEWED PRIOR TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF BOMBING HALT, AS THANAT HIMSELF KNEW BOTH FROM MY REVIEW OF DISCUSSIONS AS WELL AS MATERIALS I HAD SENT HIM. WE HAD REACHED UNDERSTANDING ON HOW ALL IMPORTANT ISSUES WOULD BE HANDLED. THEREFORE, I SAID, WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT IF WE CONTINUE TO WORK QUIETLY WITH GVN, AND PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF MATTER FROM ANY QUARTER IS AVOIDED, IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO RETURN TO VIRTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING AND GVN WILL FEEL ABLE TO BEGIN TO PARTICIPATE IN NEW PHASE OF DISCUSSION. I SPECULATED THAT PRES. THEIU, HAVING IN MIND PROFOUND IMPORTANCE OF MATTERS AT ISSUE FOR HIS COUNTRY'S FUTURE, MAY HAVE FELT OBLIGED TO EXPOSE ISSUES PUBLICLY AS HE HAS DONE; WE DON'T DETECT, HOWEVER, ANY BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-218
By CL, NARA, Date 7-31-95

2. THANAT TOOK ALL THIS IN WITHOUT SPECIFIC COMMENT AND THEN CALLED ATTENTION TO REPORTS THAT NVN IS INSISTING ON EXPLICIT RECOGNITION AS PRECONDITION FOR NEW PHASE OF TALKS; I SAID OUR POSITION ON THIS HAS BEEN MADE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR AND THAT IF NVN DOES IN FACT INSIST ON THIS THE TALKS WILL BE HELD UP. AS FAR HO CHI MINH'S EXHORTATION, WHICH THANAT ALSO MENTIONED, FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG TO REDOUBLE THEIR MILITARY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE VICTORY, I SAID THIS WAS PREDICTABLE AND WE ALSO HAVE ANTICIPATED HARSHER FIGHTING, BUT REAL TEST OF INTENTIONS OF NVN WILL COME IN TALKS AND IN ACTION THEY TAKE ON MATTERS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED IN RELATION TO OUR HALTING OF BOMBING.

3. THANAT THEN REFERRED TO NEW PRESSURES HE HAD ALREADY DETECTED BUILDING UP IN EUROPE, US AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE TO PREVAIL ON USG TO GIVE NLF EXPLICIT RECOGNITION. HE EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT AT ALL COSTS THIS MUST BE AVOIDED AND CITED THE TRAP INTO WHICH WE HAD FALLEN AT GENEVA IN THE LAOS CONFERENCE IN 1962. WE WERE NOW AT A CRITICAL MOMENT AND THE US MUST REMAIN ABSOLUTELY FIRM.

4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT VERY DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION AND FOLLOWING IT VERY CLOSELY. IT IS "EXERCISING EVERY CAUTION NOT TO HAMPER WHAT THE U.S. IS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH ALTHOUGH WE HAVE OUR DOUBTS". HE ADDED THAT IF THE PRESSURES HE HAD REFERRED TO SHOULD FORCE THE U.S. TO CHANGE ITS POSITION "THEN I DON'T THINK WE CAN KEEP QUIET". THE RTG IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE FOLLOWING THE ROAD WITH THE USG PROVIDED THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE WELL UNDERSTOOD; HE SAID THAT THE THAI KNOW THAT PRES. JOHNSON AND SECRETARY RUSK WELL UNDERSTAND THIS BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHO WOULD FOLLOW AND WHAT THEIR VIEWS WOULD BE.

5. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THAT FOR THE PRESENT THANAT WILL TRY TO AVOID ROCKING THE BOAT WITH UNHELPFUL PUBLIC COMMENT, AND HE WILL DO HIS BEST TO KEEP OTHER THAI LEADERS FROM DOING SO, ALTHOUGH THAT MAY NOT BE EASY, BECAUSE OF THEIR BASIC DOUBTS ABOUT OUR COURSE OF ACTION. I AM CERTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT IF WE DEPART FROM OUR POSITION WHICH WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED TO THAIS ABOUT STATUS NLF WE WILL PROMPTLY LOSE THAI COOPERATION, AT LEAST AS FAR AS PUBLIC DISCUSSION IS CONCERNED. AS I HAVE ALREADY NOTED, THEY WILL ALSO EXPECT US TO REACT IF THERE IS NVN NON-PERFORMANCE, ONCE A REASONABLE TEST PERIOD HAS TRANSPIRED. FINALLY, I HOPE THAT THE REPEATED EMPHASIS I PUT ON AVOIDANCE OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF CURRENT US-GVN DIFFICULTIES, TO WHICH THANAT RESPONDED SUPRISINGLY WELL, WILL NOT BE DISCREDITED BY STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM WASHINGTON.

EYES ONLY

DTG 031658Z NOV 68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-498

By *ju*, NARA, Date 1-26-93

SECRET
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'68 NOV 3 PM 11:16

1968 NOV 4 04:11

SEA676
OO WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 4223

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP92666

Pres file

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

HEREWITH AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT IS ABOUT TO BE LEAKED OUT OF SAIGON.

- A. BUNKER'S RECOMMENDATION
- B. SECRETARY RUSK'S RECOMMENDATION

SAIGON 41937

1. KEYES BEECH OF CHICAGO DAILY NEWS ASKED SEE BERGER LAST NIGHT SAYING HE HAD STORY OF LAST WEEK'S DEVELOPMENTS FROM VIET-NAM SOURCES AND WOULD LIKE TO CHECK IT OUT. BERGER AND BEECH ARE OLD FRIENDS AND BERGER SAID WE ARE UNABLE TO SAY ANYTHING. BEECH SAID HE KNEW THAT BUT HE HAD A DETAILED AND INTIMATE ACCOUNT OF WHAT TRANSPIRED DURING MEETINGS HERE OF LAST THREE WEEKS AND IN FAIRNESS TO US, WE OUGHT TO HAVE CHANCE TO COMMENT IF WE WISHED.

2. HE CAME TO BERGER'S HOUSE AND BERGER LISTENED WITH HORROR AS HE WENT THROUGH PAGES OF NOTES GIVING DETAILS OF MEETINGS GOING BACK TO OCTOBER 13 AND FRAGMENTS RPT FRAGMENTS FROM JOINT COMMUNIQUE, FROM ONE OF PRESIDENT'S LETTERS TO THIEU, LAM'S CABLE MISREPRESENTING HARRIMAN'S REMARKS, THE ABORTED CESSATION ANNOUNCEMENT OF OCT 14/16, EXCHANGES DURING MARATHON SESSIONS INCLUDING THIEU-BERGER EXCHANGE, ISSUES RAISED, ETC. MUCH OF INFO WAS ACCURATE, ALTHOUGH GIVEN IN DISTORTED FRAME. MUCH WAS SLANTED OR ERRONEOUS.

3. BEECH SAID HE TALKED WITH A NUMBER OF PERSONS INCLUDING KY, BUT FROM CONTENTS IT IS CLEAR THAT MAIN SOURCE WAS KY.

4. BERGER CALLED ME TO JOIN THEM, AND BEECH WENT OVER HIS MATERIAL AGAIN WITH ME. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO LET HIM PUBLISH IN THIS DISTORTED FORM AND IT WAS USELESS ASKING TO SUPPRESS, SINCE VIETNAMESE ARE LEAKING TO OTHERS AS WELL. I CORRECTED FLAGRANT ERRORS AND WORST DISTORTIONS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS UNDER ARRANGEMENT THAT THERE WILL BE NO ATTRIBUTIONS OF ANY KIND TO US SOURCES HERE. BUT STORY, WITH ALL ITS GORY DETAILS, WILL BE DAMAGING IN THE EXTREME, ESPECIALLY TO THEM, AND COMPLICATE OUR PROBLEMS.

5. STORY WILL SHOW THAT BY THEIR OWN ACCOUNT ONLY SAVING GRACE IS THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT AND GVN CONCURRENCE IN BOMBING CESSATION, AND THEY BALKED AT THE LAST MINUTE ON GROUNDS THEY WANTED CLARIFICATION OF NLF STATUS AND PROCEDURES. BEECH SAID HE PLANS TO INTERPRET THIS BACKING OUT IN TERMS OF THEIR EXPECTATION OF A NIXON VICTORY AND HOPES THEY WILL FIND NIXON, A HAVK. COMMENT: PREPAR ED, PRESUMABLY, TO TAKE ANY MEASURE TO PRESS WAR TO VICTORY.)

6. WE OBVIOUSLY WILL NEVER AGAIN BE ABLE TO REPOSE ANY CONFIDENCE IN KY, AND INDEED IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW HOW WE CAN DEAL IN FUTURE WITH THIS GOVT, GIVEN THIS KIND OF IRRESPONSIBILITY AT TOP.

7. STORY WILL BE FILED ABOUT 1100 HOURS LOCAL TODAY. WHEN YOU HAVE STORY I SUGGEST BUI DIEM BE CALLED IN PROTEST MADE IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS. IF PROTEST IS IN WRITTEN FORM, SUGGEST COPY BE SENT ME WHICH WE WOULD LEAVE AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE WITHOUT COMMENT. IT IS PROBABLY ADVISABLE NOT TO IDENTIFY KY BY NAME SINCE OTHERS WERE TALKING AS WELL. I DO NOT RPT NOT KNOW WHETHER THIEU HIMSELF HAS BEEN LEAKING, BUT IT IS OBVIOUS STORIES ARE COMING FROM SOMEONE INTIMATELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND PROTEST CAN BE CAST IN THESE TERMS. WE PROPOSE NOT RPT NOT TO COMMENT HERE. IF DEPT CHOOSES DIFFERENT COURSE, PLEASE INFORM US OF WHAT YOU WILL SAY OR WANT US TO SAY.

SAIGON 41838

REF: SAIGON 41837

AT RECEPTION GIVEN BY NEWSWEEK LAST NIGHT, WE LEARNED MAJOR PART OF SUBSTANCE REFTEL KNOWN TO US AND FOREIGN PRESS. ONE US BUREAU CHIEF TOLD US KY HENCHMAN MADE SUDDEN "COURTESY CALL" ON NY TIMES BUREAU CHIEF ROBERTS AND USED THIS AS MEANS OF GIVING HIM RUNDOWN ON EVENTS OF DAYS AND NIGHTS PRIOR TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH. ROBERTS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD SIMILAR VISITS MADE TO OTHER US NEWSMEN BY KY FOLLOWER. IN VIEW THIS I FEEL I SHOULD GIVE A BACKGROUNDER TO SELECTED CORRESPONDENTS, UNLESS YOU FEEL TO THE CONTRARY. PLEASE REPLY FLASH.

TODEL

REF: SAIGON 41837, 41838

YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED WITH BACKGROUNDER OR IN ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WAY AS YOU SEE FIT.

DTG 242317Z NOV 68

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EYES ONLY

NOV 2 PM 8:28
NOV 5 CI 13

20

EEA 655
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 4178

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 2643

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-498

By *ju*, NARA, Date 1-26-93

Pres file

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

HERE ARE THE CABLES FROM AMB BUNKER AS I UNDERSTAND
THE INSTRUCTIONS FROM JIM JONES

SAIGON 41356

SUBJECT : JOINT MEETING OCTOBER 28.

1. THE MEETING WITH THIEU, KY AND THANH TOOK PLACE IN THE LATE
AFTERNOON, AND THE FACT THAT MORE THAN HALF THE TIME WAS
TAKEN UP BY EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE VIETNAMESE (MOSTLY BETWEEN
KY AND THIEU) SHOWED HOW NECESSARY IT HAD BEEN. I CAN REPORT
THAT AT THE END OF THE MEETING (ATTENDED ON OUR SIDE ALSO BY
BERGER AND HERZ) WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON A SOMEWHAT CHANGED
JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT ONE WHICH I BELIEVE WE CAN ACCEPT
AND WHICH THE GVN BELIEVES WILL MAKE IT EASIER FOR THEM
TO COPE WITH CRITICISM THAT THEY HAD AGREED TO MEET WITH THE
NLF. IT WAS NOT EASY.

2. CHANGES REPRESENTED BY THE REDRAFT OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT
(SEPTEL) ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS ARE SWITCHED. IT IS NOT
CLEAR TO ME WHY THE GVN PREFERS IT THAT WAY, BUT SINCE NO
SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE WHATEVER IS INVOLVED, AND SINCE WE
HAD TO OPPOSE MORE IMPORTANT CHANGES THAT THIEU AND KY TRIED TO
MAKE, I ACCEPTED THIS WITHOUT ARGUMENT AND RECOMMENDED THAT
IT BE CONFIRMED.

B. THE LAST PARAGRAPH TO BE REVORDED (1) TO GET AWAY FROM
THE IDEA OF "THE NEXT MEETING", WHICH CARRIED THE IMPLICATION
TO THE GVN THAT THEY WERE BEING INCLUDED IN SOMETHING THAT
HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR SOME TIME, RATHER THAN BEING THERE AT
THE BEGINNING OF THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH NORTH VIETNAM;
(2) USE OF THE WORD "DELEGATIONS" TO DESCRIBE GVN AND
US ATTENDANCE, BY WHICH THEY HOPE TO CONFER MORE STATUS
ON THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES; (3) DELETION OF THE SENTENCE
BEGINNING "THE OTHER SIDE", WHICH THE GVN NOW CONSIDERS
UNNECESSARY; AND (4) AMENDMENT OF THE LAST SENTENCE TO MAKE
IT READ: "THE TWO PRESIDENTS WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NEITHER
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM NOR THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE SO-CALLED NATIONAL LIBERATION
FRONT AS AN ENTITY INDEPENDENT OF NORTH VIETNAM."

3. KY, WHO APPARENTLY MADE THE GREATEST DIFFICULTIES DURING
THE DISCUSSIONS, CAME UP TO ME AFTER THE MEETING AND SAID HE
HAD WORKED HARD TO FIND A COMPROMISE. PERHAPS HE DO SO IN
THE END SINCE AFTER NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT THE FUTURE
MEETINGS AS INVOLVING ONLY THREE DELEGATIONS, WHICH I REJECTED,
KY FINALLY SAID, "I THINK IT IS BETTER THAT WE OPENLY RECOGNIZE
THAT THE NLF WILL BE THERE." IT WAS KY, APPARENTLY, WHO
OFFERED TO DROP AS UNNECESSARY, THE PHRASE ABOUT THE OTHER
SIDE BEING CONSTITUTED BY HANOI AS THEY WISH IT TO BE CONSTITUTED".
HE SAID, "THE REALITY IS THAT WE ACCEPT THE FRONT AT THE
CONFERENCE." THE MOST IMPORTANT THING FROM THE GVN POINT
OF VIEW, AS THIEU EMPHASIZED, IS TO MAKE THE LAST SENTENCE
OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT (ABOUT NON-RECOGNITION OF THE NLF)
AS STRONG AS POSSIBLE.

4. SINCE THE GVN IN THE END GAVE UP THEIR ATTEMPTS TO PICTURE THE MEETINGS AS CONSISTING OF ONLY THREE PARTICIPANTS, I JUST WISH TO RECORD THAT DISCUSSION WAS LONG AND DIFFICULT. AT ONE POINT THIEU ASKED ME IF I HAD RECEIVED BINDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE CONFERENCE MUST NOT BE PICTURED AS TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THREE DELEGATIONS. I ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. EARLIER IN THE DISCUSSION I POINTED OUT ONCE MORE THAT SINCE HANOI WISHED THE MEETINGS TO BE FOUR-POWER, AND SAIGON WISHES THEM TO BE THREE-POWER, THE ONLY POSSIBLE BASIS FOR TALKS WAS TO BE SILENT ON THE POINT. KY UNDERSTOOD THIS WELL, EVEN WHILE TRYING TO SQUEEZE US. HE SAID: "I UNDERSTAND YOUR PROBLEM. YOU CAN'T HAVE A CONFERENCE IF HANOI WON'T COME -- OR IF SAIGON WON'T COME." BUT HE KEPT TRYING, NEVERTHELESS, TO FIND SOME FORMULATION THAT WOULD HAVE MADE IT APPEAR THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE DELEGATION ON THE OTHER SIDE.

5. AFTER AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE TEXT (SEPTEL), KY SAID, "QUITE FRANKLY, WE ARE NOT SATISFIED, BUT WITH SUCH MATERIAL WE CAN EXPLAIN, ONLY IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLE. IF THE CONFERENCE LASTS MANY MONTHS, OUR PROBLEM WILL BE TO PREVENT A DISINTEGRATION OF MORALE ON OUR SIDE." I REPEATED, WITH SOME EMPHASIS, THAT THIS IS ENTIRELY THE WRONG WAY OF LOOKING AT THE MEETING WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IF IT EVENTUATES: THE GVN SHOULD PRESENT IT AS A VICTORY, IT WILL HAVE FORCED THE DRV TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM, THE TALKS WILL BE A SIGN THAT THE DRV DESPAIRS OF OBTAINING ITS GOALS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, THAT IT RECOGNIZES THAT IT CANNOT SUBVERT OR INTIMIDATE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. BESIDES, WE WILL BE AT THE SIDE OF THE GVN BOTH AT THE TALKS AND IN PUSHING OUR MILITARY ADVANTAGES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, SO THAT THE DANGER OF DISINTEGRATION SHOULD BE ENTIRELY ON THE OTHER SIDE.

6. THERE WAS STILL MUCH APPREHENSION ON THE GVN SIDE ABOUT BEING FACED WITH ACCOMPLISHED FACTS AT THE FIRST MEETING: THEY WANTED TO KNOW HOW WE COULD AVOID PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS AT ALL MEETINGS INCLUDING THE FIRST. THEY STRESSED THAT PICTURES SHOWING THE GVN SITTING ACROSS FROM THE NLF AS IF THE LATTER WERE A CO-EQUAL DELEGATION, WOULD BE EXTREMELY TROUBLESOME HERE. THANH ALSO SAID HE WISHED TO GO OVER THE POINTS COVERED IN ALL OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS TO DRAFT AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS, SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE A RECORD OF WHAT HAD BEEN DECIDED WITH RESPECT BOTH TO SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE. AT THE END IT WAS THANH HIMSELF WHO USED THE WORD "AGREEMENT" TO DESCRIBE THE OUTCOME OF TODAY'S JOINT MEETING.

7. I URGE APPROVAL OF THIS AGREEMENT WHICH IT SEEMS TO ME MEETS OUR REQUIREMENTS WHILE GIVING THE VIETNAMESE SOMETHING THEY CAN LIVE WITH. IT HAS NOT BEEN AN EASY DECISION FOR THEM.

8. WE AGREED TO MEET SOON AGAIN TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT MAY COME UP EARLY IF THERE ARE SERIOUS TALKS. BUNKER

SAIGON 41357

1. FOLLOWING IS REDRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT AS AGREED AD REFERENDUM AT JOINT MEETING OCT 28. VERSION IS AS USED IN SAIGON, BUT GVN WOULD LIKE TO HAVE VIET-NAM PRECEDE US IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH IN BOTH VERSIONS. (I INDICATED THIS WOULD GIVE NO TROUBLE, SINCE IT IS IN LINE WITH THE PHILOSOPHY THAT LED US TO OFFER THE GVN THE "PLACE OF HONOR" TO OUR RIGHT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.)

"2. BEGIN TEXT. PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ANNOUNCE THAT ALL AIR, NAVAL, AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF NORTH VIET-NAM WILL CEASE AS OF (TIME AND DATE).

3. THE TWO PRESIDENTS HAVE ISSUED THE ORDER TO CEASE BOMBARDMENT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, NEW ZEALAND, THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND WITH THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT.

4. PRESIDENT THIEU AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAVE REACHED THIS COMMON DECISION BECAUSE THEY HAVE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT NORTH VIET-NAM INTENDS TO JOIN THEM IN DEESCALATING THE WAR AND TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS AND DIRECT TALKS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THEY THEREFORE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THIS STEP WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS TOWARD AND HONORABLE AND SECURE PEACE.

5. THE FIRST MEETING OF THE DIRECT TALKS WILL BE CONVENED IN PARIS AT (TIME AND DATE). DELEGATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL ATTEND THAT MEETING. THE TWO PRESIDENTS WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NEITHER THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM NOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THE SO-CALLED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AS AN ENTITY INDEPENDENT OF NORTH VIET-NAM. END TEXT."

6. NOTE THAT AT THE END OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH WE HAVE REPLACED "THAILAND" WITH "ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT." BUNKER

SAIGON 41323

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT THIEU OCTOBER 28.

1. I DECIDED TO MEET ALONE WITH THIEU ON THE LATEST VERSION OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT IN ORDER TO HAVE A FULL AND FRANK TALK ABOUT THE TEXT IN RELATION TO WHERE HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT STAND AS WE MOVE DOWN TOWARD WHAT MAY BE AN EARLY AGREEMENT WITH HANOI. BERGER ACCOMPAINED. I ALSO WANTED TO TAKE UP WITH HIM MY CONTINUED AND GROWING ANNOYANCE AND IRRITATION WITH FURTHER STATEMENTS AND INSPIRED LEAKS HERE, WHICH ARE ANYTHING BUT HELPFUL.

2. I OPENED BY SAYING THAT WASHINGTON WELCOMED HIS AND KY'S SUGGESTIONS AT OUR LAST MEETING FOR CHANGES IN THE DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, AND HAD AMENDED THE LAST VERSIONS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THESE CHANGES, THE MAIN ONE OF WHICH WAS TO ELABORATE THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH TO INCLUDE CERTAIN POINTS INTENDED ORGINALLY TO FIGURE IN OUR PRESIDENT'S ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT.

THE RESULT WE THOUGHT WAS A MUCH BETTER AND FULLER JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT FROM EVERY POINT OF VIEW, AND I HOPED IT WOULD MEET ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GVN. I DID NOT SEE HOW WE COULD GO ANY FURTHER.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, NOW THAT THERE WAS NO SHADOW OF DOUBT ABOUT THE US OR GVN VIEW OF THE NLF, IF WE STAND TOGETHER IN THE PARIS MEETING, IF VICE PRESIDENT KY COMES OUT IN PUBLIC SUPPORT OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, IF THIEU AND KY PULL TOGETHER, AND IF IT IS MADE CLEAR TO ALL THAT THE GVN IS WILLING TO TALK TO ANYONE TO DISCOVER A ROAD TO PEACE, I THOUGHT HE WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY WITH HIS PEOPLE IF HE JOINED TALKS WHICH THE NLF WAS ATTENDING. FINALLY I SAID THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE ALREADY LOOKING BEYOND THE TALKS TO THE FUTURE, AND I WOULD HOPE THAT HE WOULD SAY SOMETHING TO THEM ALONG THE LINES OF THE "CHARTER FOR SOCIAL REVOLUTION" THAT WE HAD TALKED ABOUT.

4. THIEU READ THE NEW DRAFT AND SAID, "I DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN ASK FOR ANYTHING MORE." HE WILL DISCUSS IT WITH KY AND THE PRIME MINISTER. HE ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW IN THE TALKS WITH HANOI.

5. I HAVE BEEN VAGUE WITH THIEU THIS LAST WEEK ABOUT THE TIMES OF THE PRIVATE MEETINGS AND, IN RESPECT OF SUBSTANCE DISCUSSED, I HAVE LIMITED MYSELF TO SAYING, "THERE IS NOTHING NEW, WE TOLD HANOI WE WOULD STOP THE BOMBING TWO OR THREE DAYS BEFORE THE MEETING, AND WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR HANOI TO GIVE US A DATE. I REPEATED THIS AGAIN THIS MORNING. THIEU ASKED WHY WAS HANOI DELAYING SINCE THERE WAS UNDERSTANDING IN PRINCIPLE ALMOST TWO WEEKS AGO. I SAID I DIDN'T KNOW. IT MAY BE THAT THEY ARE HAVING TROUBLE WITH THE NLF," BERGER INTERJECTED. "IT MAY BE THAT THEY ARE STUDYING THE SIGNS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOU AND US WHICH HAVE APPEARED HERE, AND NOW SEE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US, AND CAPITALIZE ON IT," THIEU SAID THEY WOULD CERTAINLY TRY TO DO THAT, AND THIS GAVE ME THE OCCASION TO BRING UP THE SECOND MAIN ITEM I HAD ON MY AGENDA.

6. I SHOWED A BATCH OF PRESS REPORTS AND EDITORIALS FROM THE LOCAL PAPERS ABOUT SO-CALLED DIFFERENCES, AND QUOTED FROM THEM. "LET US DE-AMERICANIZE THE PEACE," (MIN INFORMATION). "GVN WANTS TWO-SIDED TALKS." (PRIMIN). "US PRESSURING GVN." "GVN RESISTING US PRESSURE," ETC.

7. I SAID ALL THIS WAS UNCALLED FOR, UNNECESSARY, AND DANGEROUS. WHILE HE AND I WERE WORKING THINGS OUT QUIETLY, THE US AUTHORITIES WERE SAYING NOTHING, AND IT WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT THIS STREAM OF STATEMENTS CONTINUES HERE. IT WILL ONLY CONFUSE THE VIETNAMESE AND COULD MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIM WHEN THE MEETINGS OPEN.

8. THIEU WAS DEFENSIVE AND APOLOGETIC, BLAMING IT ON THE PRESSURES OF THE PRESS.

9. THIEU ASKED IF HANOI WOULD GIVE US A DATE BEFORE OUR ELECTION. WE SAID WE DIDN'T KNOW, BUT THERE WAS SUCH A POSSIBILITY, IN WHICH CASE THE FIRST MEETING MIGHT WELL TAKE PLACE BEFORE ELECTION DAY--WHICH WAS A WEEK FROM TOMORROW.

10. I SAID WE WERE UNABLE TO GO ANY FURTHER IN MEETING THE GVN NEEDS THAN THE DRAFT JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. ALSO, WE COULD NOT MEET THEIR REQUEST FOR PROCEDURAL MEETINGS BEFORE THE MAIN MEETING. THEY HAD THEREFORE TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY WERE GOING TO JOIN THE TALKS OR NOT, AND THEY MIGHT HAVE TO DECIDE ON SHORT NOTICE. I SUGGESTED A JOINT MEETING WITH KY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON TO SEE IF ANY ISSUES REMAIN. WE WILL MEET AT 1700 HOURS. I SAID IF THE GVN RAISES NEW CONDITIONS AND DOES NOT JOIN THE FIRST MEETING THIEU SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A DECISION. HE SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THEM, BUT THOUGHT WE WERE PRETTY WELL AGREED NOW BETWEEN US.

11. THIEU THEN ASKED HOW WE THOUGHT THE TALKS WOULD MOVE. WE SAID WE THOUGHT AT AN EARLY STAGE HANOI WOULD PUT IN DEMANDS FOR A CEASE-FIRE, FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE US AND ALLIED FORCES, AND FOR COALITION OR REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO PERMIT COALITIONS. WE SHOULD BE PREPARING OURSELVES URGENTLY FOR DEALING WITH THESE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

12. COMMENT: I THINK WE ARE IN THE CLEAR HERE, BUT WILL KNOW FOR CERTAIN AFTER TONIGHT'S JOINT MEETING. I AM FOR DIGGING IN AT THIS POINT, UNLESS THEY COME FORWARD WITH ANY CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS.
BUNKER

DTG: 022330Z NOVEMBER 1968

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

1968 NOV 3 19 06

EYES ONLY

VZCZCEEA672
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4193

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82656

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76991-500

By rs/osp, NARA, Date 3-8-93

Presfile

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

NOVEMBER 3, 1968

HEREIS HOW THIEU AND COMPANY STALLED BUNKER FOR NINE HOURS
ON FRIDAY NIGHT.

SAIGON 41768

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEDIOUS BUT REVEALING RECORD, HIGHLY COMPRESSED, OF THE THREE MEETINGS AND APPROXIMATELY NINE HOURS OF NEGOTIATION I HAD THROUGH FRIDAY NIGHT, FIRST WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THANH AND PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT DUC, AND THEN WITH PRESIDENT THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT KY, IN ADDITION TO THANH AND DUC. THE FIRST MEETING LASTED FROM 8:00 PM TO 10:00 PM OCTOBER 31, THE SECOND FROM ABOUT 11:00 PM TO 3:00 AM NOVEMBER 1, THE THIRD (AFTER MY TELEPHONE TALK WITH THE SECRETARY) FROM 5:00 TO ABOUT 7:45 AM. BERGER AND HERZ HELPED DURING THESE ARDUOUS DISCUSSIONS. IT TURNED OUT TO BE A STERILE EXERCISE, WITH THE GVN GENERALLY THROWING UP OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT FASTER THAN WE COULD REMOVE THEM, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MOMENTS WHEN WE THOUGHT WE HAD REMOVED ALL THE OBSTACLES THAT EXISTED AT THE PARTICULAR TIME. IF THIS NIGHT WAS TRYING FOR US, I CAN IMAGINE HOW TRYING IT MUST HAVE BEEN FOR THOSE IN WASHINGTON WHO WERE WAITING AND ATTEMPTING TO HELP IN BRINGING THE GVN WITH US.

2. AT OUR FIRST MEETING WITH THANH HE FUNCTIONED AS A KIND OF PICADOR, BRINGING UP A LOT OF VEXING AND TIME CONSUMING MATTERS, SOME OF THEM PROCEDURAL, INCLUDING SOME THAT WE HAD ALREADY SETTLED. LOOKING AT OUR LIST OF SUBJECTS ON WHICH THE GVN AND THE U.S., RESPECTIVELY, MIGHT TAKE THE LEAD IN NEGOTIATIONS, HE DECLARED THAT THERE ARE NO SUBJECTS WHICH ARE NOT OF "PRIMARY" CONCERN TO GVN SINCE THE SUBJECT OF THE TALKS IS SOUTH VIET NAM, ALTHOUGH HE AGREED THAT SOME SUBJECTS WOULD BE OF JOINT INTEREST. NEXT HE SAID THE GVN "DESIRES MORE PRECISIONS" ON HOW THE U.S. DELEGATION WOULD REACT IF THE OTHER SIDE CLAIMED TO BE TWO DELEGATIONS, AND IF THE DRV WERE TO LEAVE THE CONFERENCE CHAMBER OR OTHERWISE TURN OVER SOME SUBJECT TO THE NLF ON THE GROUND THAT THE LATTER WAS QUALIFIED TO DEAL WITH IT. I SAID THE FIRST OBSERVATION GAVE US NO TROUBLE ALTHOUGH THERE WOULD BE SUBJECTS, SUCH AS THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES, IN WHICH IT WAS NOT UNREASONABLE TO SUPPOSE A PRIMARY U.S. INTEREST. AS FOR THE STATUS OF AN NLF "DELEGATION", I POINTED OUT THE MEMORANDUM ON THIS VERY SUBJECT WHICH WE HAD FURNISHED THANH OCTOBER 24 AND WHICH HAD CONTAINED AN UNDERTAKING THAT THE U.S. WOULD TOLERATE NO MANEUVERS DESIGNED TO DOWNGRADE OR FREEZE OUT THE GVN AND THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT GVN EFFORTS TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE NLF IS A MERE ENANATION OF HANOI.

3. THANH BORED IN DEEPER. THE GVN, HE SAID, DESIRES TO PARTICIPATE IN SECRET PRELIMINARY MEETINGS WITH THE U.S. AND THE DRV TO DISCUSS PROCEDURE, AND "IF THE THREE REPRESENTATIVES ARRIVE AT AN AGREEMENT" THE GVN WOULD THEN PERMIT THE DATE FOR THE FIRST REGULAR MEETING TO BE FIXED. I SAID I DOUBTED WHETHER THAT WOULD BE POSSIBLE. WE COULD NOT CALL A "THREE-POWER" MEETING WITH THE DRV, EVEN A PROCEDURAL ONE, BUT WE STOOD BY OUR COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THE GVN IN ITS NON-RECOGNITION OF THE NLF. THANH CLAIMED THAT WE HAD "UNDERTAKEN TO SEE TO IT THAT THE OTHER SIDE IS ONE DELEGATION." I SAID WE HAD NEVER SAID WE COULD DO THIS, ALTHOUGH WE HAD AGREED TO SUPPORT THE GVN IN ITS CONTENTION THAT THE OTHER SIDE IS IN AFFECT ONE DELEGATION; BUT WE COULD NOT GET THE OTHER SIDE TO AGREE TO THIS. WE WOULD INSIST THAT THERE MUST NOT BE SEPARATE FLAGS AND NAMEPLATES, AS WE HAD AGREED BETWEEN US ON ALL THESE MATTERS WE COULD AND WOULD HELP. BUT WE CANNOT CONTROL WHAT THE OTHER SIDE WILL CALL THEMSELVES.

4. NEXT THANH SAID THAT AFTER THE BOMBING CESSATION PRESIDENT THIEU WOULD HAVE TO DECLARE THAT HANOI HAD "PROMISED TO DE-ESCALATE" AND THAT THE OTHER SIDE WOULD BE "ONLY ONE DELEGATION", THAT THE PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATORS WOULD BE THE GVN AND THE DRV, AND THAT THE U.S. HAD OBTAINED THESE CONCESSIONS FROM HANOI, I WENT PATIENTLY OVER THE HISTORY OF HOW WE HAD ARRIVED AT OUR UNDERSTANDINGS WITH HANOI AND EXPLAINED WHY STATEMENTS LIKE THOSE HE PROPOSED WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY DENIED BY THE OTHER SIDE. I DID THIS AT SOME LENGTH ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE THANH ALREADY KNEW VERY WELL EVERYTHING THAT I REVIEWED WITH HIM.

5. WE THEN HAD AN INTERESTING EXCHANGE IN WHICH THANH CLAIMED THAT IF THE ENEMY FAILED TO ATTACK THE CITIES, THIS SHOULD BE INTERPRETED NOT AS RESTRAINT ON HIS PART BUT AS DUE TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH HAD DEPRIVED HIM OF THE CAPABILITY OF ATTACKING THE CITIES. I SAID THE ENEMY STILL HAD THE CAPACITY OF LAUNCHING COSTLY MILITARY OPERATIONS, WAS NOT FINALLY BEATEN, AND IN ANY EVENT HE COULD STILL MORTAR AND ROCKET THE CITIES. I TERM THIS EXCHANGE INTERESTING BECAUSE, AS IT HAPPENS, IT WAS PUNCTUATED BY EXPLOSIONS OF ROCKETS THAT WERE JUST BEING FIRED INTO SAIGON, ONE OF WHICH I UNDERSTAND IMPACTED IN THE PALACE GROUNDS ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT EXPLODE.

6. I FINALLY SAID WE WERE APPROACHING THE MOMENT OF DECISION, I HAD TRANSMITTED A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRESIDENT THIEU, WE HAD OVER THE PAST DAYS MADE MANY EFFORTS TO MEET THEIR REQUESTS AND HELP THEM WITH THEIR PROBLEMS, BUT I NEEDED TO KNOW THE FINAL POSITION OF THE GVN. THANH THEN SAID "THE ESSENTIAL THING IS THAT THERE MUST BE ONE DELEGATION ON THE OTHER SIDE. YOU MUST OBTAIN THIS FROM HANOI. EVERYTHING ELSE WE CAN SETTLE AFTERWARDS. TO YOU THIS MAY SEEM A SECONDARY MATTER, BUT IT IS OUR UNANIMOUS OPINION IT IS VITAL." I SAID I HAD BEEN OVER THIS WITH THE PRESIDENT, HE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES THAT WE WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE NLF, WE ARE PREPARED TO TREAT THEM IN THE MEETINGS AS PART OF THE HANOI DELEGATION, WE CANNOT DO MORE THAN THIS. I ASKED TO SEE THIEU AGAIN, AND AFTER A LONG WAIT WE WERE USHERED INTO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. KY JOINED US A LITTLE LATER. BUNKER

7. THIEU LED OFF BY REMARKING THAT HANOI WASN'T SHOWING MUCH OF THE GOOD WILL THEY WERE CLAIMING, BY SENDING ROCKETS INTO SAIGON ON THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY. I SAID THEY WERE SENDING ROCKETS HERE, AND WE WERE BOMBING THEM IN THE NORTH. THIEU REACTED TESTILY, SAYING "THEY ARE THE AGGRESSORS AND WE ARE THE DEFENDERS, THERE CAN BE NO COMPARISON." HE THEN SAID THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL HAD MET IN THE AFTERNOON AND THERE WERE "REMAINING POINTS" THAT NEEDED TO BE CLEARED UP. HE WISHED TO REEMPHASIZE THAT THE PURPOSE OF A BOMBING CESSATION, AS SEEN BY THE GVN, WAS (A) TO PRODUCE DE-ESCALATION, (B) TO LEAD TO DIRECT GVN-DRV TALKS, AND (C) TO "MAKE SURE THAT THE NLF DOES NOT RECEIVE ANY SEPARATE STATUS." HE SAID THE GVN HAD NEVER BEEN OPPOSED TO A BOMBING HALT, BUT HE SAW LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN IT PARTICULARLY SINCE HANOI WOULD CLAIM THAT IT WAS UNCONDITIONAL.

8. I SAID WE HAD ANSWERED MOST OF THE POINTS RAISED BY THE FOR MIN. WE WENT OVER THE ADVANTAGES OF THE BOMBING HALT FOR THE GVN AND SAID WE HAD FOUGHT LONG AND HARD TO GET THE OTHER SIDE TO ACCEPT THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON SVN REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF THE GVN. I REPEATED THAT IF THE TALKS ARE NOT SERIOUS, IF THERE IS VIOLATION OF THE DMZ OR RESUMPTION OF ATTACKS ON THE CITIES, THE PRESIDENT WOULD ORDER THE BOMBING TO BE RESUMED. AS OF NOW, SINCE THE OTHER SIDE HAD MET OUR CONDITIONS, PRESIDENT JOHNSON FELT HE HAD TO MOVE, AND HOPED THAT PRESIDENT THIEU WOULD MOVE WITH HIM. I REFERRED TO OUR UNDERTAKINGS NOT TO TREAT THE NLF AS A SEPARATE ENTITY AND TO SUPPORT THE GVN VIS-A-VIS THE DRV, AND I SAID THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD NEVER UNDERSTAND IF THE GVN FAILED TO AVAIL ITSELF OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT PEACE WITH THE OTHER SIDE. AS I HAD ON TWO PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, I STRESSED THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT THE GVN ON MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, BUT NOT ON STICKING POINTS OF PROCEDURE.

9. THIEU SAID THE GVN HAS COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN OUR STATEMENTS THAT WE WILL RESUME THE BOMBING IF THE ENEMY TAKES MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE HALT, AND ALSO WHEN WE SAY THE ENEMY MUST ENGAGE IN SERIOUS AND DIRECT TALKS, BUT THERE IS A THIRD POINT AND THAT HASN'T BEEN DECIDED. IF IT ISN'T CLEAR THAT THE NLF IS NOT A SEPARATE DELEGATION, THE GVN WOULD BE "DISCREDITED". NOT ONLY THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT, BUT "ALL OUR COLLEAGUES WHOM WE CONSULTED", WERE OF THIS OPINION. I SAID THIS DEPENDED ON HOW IT WAS HANDLED. IF THE GVN LEADERSHIP MADE IT CLEAR THAT NEITHER THEY NOR WE REGARDED THAT NLF AS SEPARATE FROM OR INDEPENDENT OF HANOI, IF IT WAS RESOLUTE AND UNITED, IF IT PROCLAIMED ITS SELF-CONFIDENCE AND ACTED AGGRESSIVELY TO FACE DOWN THE NLF, IF FOR INSTANCE THE VICE PRES WENT TO PARIS AS A PATRIOT AND A SOLDIER, THE ENORMOUS DIFFERENCE IN STATUS BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE NLF WOULD BE APPARENT TO EVERYONE.

10. THIEU DISAGREED, AND KY SUPPORTED HIM. WE WENT AROUND AND AROUND, AND IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THE VIETNAMESE WEREN'T WILLING TO LISTEN TO REASON. FINALLY, AFTER KY HAD SAID THAT THE GVN NEEDS TIME, I ASKED THEM HOW MUCH TIME THEY NEEDED. THIEU SAID THEY WISHED TO USE THE TIME TO TALK WITH THE DRV IN PARIS, TO GET THEM TO ACCEPT THE "THREE-POWER" FORMULA. THIS SEEMED ENTIRELY OPEN-ENDED. BERGER SAID IF THEY WISHED TO GO INTO A PROCEDURAL CONFERENCE WITH DRV, THE OTHER SIDE WOULD BRING THE NLF ALONG. THIEU SAID, WITH HORROR, THAT WOULD BE "LA FIN DES HARICOTS" (ROUGHLY, THE END OF EVERYTHING). KY SAID WE SHOULD GIVE THE GVN SOME TIME TO TRY TO WORK OUT WITH THE DRV IN PARIS THE CONDITIONS THAT WOULD ALLOW THE GVN TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS. HE ADDED THAT THE GVN WOULD "NEVER" GO TO NEGOTIATIONS IF HANOI INSISTS ON PUTTING THEM ON THE SAME LEVEL AS THE NLF.

11. WE SAID TALKING WITH THE NLF AND TREATING THEM AS PART OF THE HANOI DELEGATION DID NOT IMPLY BEING ON THE SAME LEVEL. KY SAID IF A YOUNG GIRL SPENDS THE NIGHT IN A LOCKED ROOM WITH A GROWN-UP MAN, SHE MAY SAY THAT SHE IS STILL INNOCENT BUT NOBODY WILL BELIEVE HER. FINALLY, KY SUGGESTED THAT THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, INSTEAD OF FIXING A DATE FOR THE FIRST MEETING, SHOULD JUST SAY, "AT AN EARLY DATE, THE TIME TO BE ARRANGED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES." (THIS REMARK WAS MADE WITH TONGUE IN CHEEK AND, AS NOTED PARAGRAPH 17, WITH AN ULTERIOR PURPOSE.) I SAID IF IT IS LEFT INDEFINITE, THIS WOULD JUST HAND HANOI A VICTORY AS THEY HAD ALL ALONG WANTED A LONG INTERVAL BETWEEN THE BOMBING CESSATION AND THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS WE WHO HAD FORCED THEM TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE IN THREE DAYS, LATER EXTENDED TO ONE WEEK, AFTER THE GVN ASKED FOR MORE TIME. KY SAID IF IT TOOK TWO MONTHS TO GET HANOI TO ACCEPT THAT THE NLF IS NOT A SEPARATE ENTITY, THE TWO MONTHS WOULD BE WELL SPENT. DUC ADDED THAT PAST EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS ALWAYS LAST A LONG TIME. IF IT TAKES SEVERAL MONTHS TO ESTABLISH CLEAR GROUND RULES, THIEU WOULD HELP TO MAKE PROGRESS MORE QUICKLY LATER. I SAID THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL NOT ACCEPT CONTINUING A WAR JUST BECAUSE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS ARE PREVENTING SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

12. AFTER SOME FURTHER DISCUSSIONS, I AGREED TO PUT UP TO WASHINGTON THE AMENDED FIRST SENTENCE OF THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, TO READ: "THE FIRST MEETING OF THE DIRECT TALKS WILL BE CONVENED IN PARIS AT AN EARLY DATE AFTER PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC GROUND RULES OF THE TALKS." KY ALSO PLEADED FOR ANOTHER 24 HOURS. HE SAID IN ANY CASE THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD TO BE CONSULTED AGAIN IF THE GVN WAS TO GO ALONG WITH THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. THIEU SAID, WITH SOME EMOTION, THAT THE WAR HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR 20 YEARS AND HE DIDN'T SEE WHY WE SHOULD BEGRUDGE THE GVN A FEW DAYS. I OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NOT JUST A MATTER OF TIME. IF THE GVN WISHED US TO WAIT UNTIL IT HAD HANOI'S EXPLICIT AGREEMENT THAT THE NLF HAD NO STATUS, THIS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO ASKING THE U.S. TO FIGHT ON UNTIL THE ENEMY CAPITULATES.

13. THE FOREIGN MINISTER THEREUPON TABLED AN AMENDMENT TO, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, WHICH WOULD HAVE RELIEVED PRESIDENT THIEU OF ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FINDING THAT "NORTH VIET NAM INTENDS TO DE-ESCALATE THE WAR AND TO ENTER INTO DIRECT AND SERIOUS TALKS", PINNING THIS ENTIRELY TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. FRANKLY, THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE GVN LEADERS TO INCLUDE THE PHRASE, EVEN IN CONNECTION WITH OUR PRESIDENT, THAT HE HAD "GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE", REMAINED UNEXPLAINED. SINCE THEY WERE OBDURATE ON THIS POINT IT APPEARS THAT THEY WERE SUGGESTING A PHRASING WHICH THEY KNEW WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO ACCEPT. IN THE END, AT THEIR INSISTENCE, I AGREED TO PUT IT UP TO WASHINGTON.

14. THIEU GOT TESTIER AND REMARKED, PERHAPS REVEALINGLY: "IF WE ARE FRIENDS AND IF OUR COMMON GOAL IS TO FORCE THE ENEMY, WE SHOULD WORK MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER. WE SHOULD TAKE TIME TO STUDY CAREFULLY WHAT WE CAN DO, AND WE WILL HAVE BETTER RESULTS. I HAVE THE FEELING SINCE MANY DAYS WE ARE BEING FORCED TO RUN AGAINST THE CLOCK. I DON'T KNOW WHY, TO SATISFY THE ENEMY? WE HAVE NO REASON NOT TO SPEND ANOTHER DAY TO HAVE A BETTER RESULT." PERHAPS IT IS SUFFICIENT FOR THE RECORD TO SHOW THAT I MADE THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE AT GREAT LENGTH, EXPLAINING HOW WE HAD COME TO THIS POINT AND WHAT WERE OUR OPPORTUNITIES AND DANGERS, HOW WE HAD GONE OUT OF OUR WAY TO PROVIDE THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE ASSURANCES TO THEM, AND HOW WE DESERVED THEIR TRUST. THIEU, BECOMING MORE EMOTIONAL, SAID THE FATE OF HIS NATION WAS AT STAKE. KY SAID HE COMPLETELY SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT. IT WAS LEFT THAT IF WASHINGTON COULD ACCEPT THE PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT, THE GVN WOULD GO WITH US. (WE WILL NEVER KNOW IF THEY WOULD HAVE, EVEN THEN.)

15. WE RECONVENED AT ABOUT 9:00 AM. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THIEU WHO READ IT AND PASSED IT TO KY. (I DID NOT DELIVER THE MESSAGE TO KY, WHICH WOULD HAVE IRRITATED THIEU IF HE HAD SEEN IT. ALSO I WAS BY NO MEANS SURE THAT KY WAS PLAYING HONESTLY WITH US.) I THEN EXPLAINED THE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTER-PROPOSALS, STRESSING THAT THEY WERE THE RESULT OF CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE WHITE HOUSE AND THAT WE WERE MAKING AN EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT TO REMOVE THE OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT. DESPITE THE PRESIDENT'S NICE GESTURE, THE ATMOSPHERE WAS DINSTINCTLY WORSE. THIEU ESPECIALLY DISLIKED OUR PROPOSAL TO DROP THE SENTENCE ABOUT THE NEXT MEETING ALTOGETHER--EVIDENTLY BECAUSE THIS REMOVED HIS IDEA OF GIVING THE GVN A VETO OVER WHEN OR WHETHER SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WERE TO START. I POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON WISHED TO ACCOMMODATE PRESIDENT THIEU'S CONCERN ABOUT TIME, THAT UNDER OUR REVISED FORMULA THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS COULD START WHENEVER THE GVN WAS READY, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE OUR MEETINGS WITH THE DRV IN THE MEANTIME. THANH WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER THE NLF WOULD ATTEND THOSE MEETINGS, AND I SAID I DIDN'T KNOW. THE GVN SIDE PROPOSED A COUNTER-DRAFT PROVIDING THAT THE "FIRST MEETING OF THE DIRECT TALKS" WOULD START AFTER PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE GROUND RULES.

16. THIEU ALSO OBJECTED TO THE RE-INSERTION OF THE WORDS "HAS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE" CLAIMING THAT HE NEEDED MORE THAN THAT TO SATISFY CRITICS WHO WOULD CHARGE THAT WE HAD NO PROOF OF HANGI'S GOOD-WILL. HE ALSO OBJECTED TO THE STATEMENT THAT THE BOMBING HALT WOULD BRING ABOUT DE-ESCALATION BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATION THAT ALL THE DE-ESCALATION MIGHT BE ON OUR SIDE. (HE SUGGESTED TO TRY INSERTION OF THE WORD "MUTUAL"). THIEU SAID ACIDLY THAT "IF PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ENEMY, I CANNOT PREVENT HIM FROM STOPPING THE BOMBING, I DON'T KNOW WHAT KIND OF AGREEMENT HE HAS. IF HE WANTS TO MOVE, HOW CAN I STOP HIM?" I EXPLAINED AGAIN THAT WE HAD INSISTED WITH THE OTHER SIDE THAT THERE MUST BE A MEETING PROMPTLY AFTER THE BOMBING CESSATION. IT WAS WE WHO HAD INSISTED AND HANOI THAT HAD GIVEN IN.

17. IT BECAME CLEARER AND CLEARER THAT THIEU AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAD LITTLE REGARD FOR THE TIME THAT WAS SLIPPING BY. (WE KEPT LOOKING AT OUR WATCHES; THEY NEVER LOOKED AT THEIRS.) THIEU SAID HE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO HIS COLLEAGUES WHY WE COULD NOT HAVE WAITED "A WEEK OR TEN DAYS." KY DEVELOPED THE THEORY THAT IN BARGAINING WITH THE DRV, IF THEY DIDN'T ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A "THREE-POWER CONFERENCE", PERHAPS THEY COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT THAT IT WAS A "THREE-AND-A-HALF POWER CONFERENCE". THIEU CAME BACK TO THE THREE POINTS (PARA 7 ABOVE). WE TRIED A NEW FORMULATION FOR THE LAST PARAGRAPH ("THE DATE OF THE FIRST MEETING... WILL BE ANNOUNCED WHEN PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED"), BUT THE GVN SIDE INSISTED ON THE WORD "AGREEMENT" AND WERE QUITE FRANK IN EXPLAINING THAT THIS WORD MEANT TO THEM THAT THERE COULD BE NO BEGINNING TO THE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THEY WOULD BE SATISFIED THAT THE DRV HAD AGREED TO STATE THAT THE NLF WAS PART OF THEIR DELEGATION.

18. TIME WAS TICKING AWAY, AND I TRIED TO BRING THE DISCUSSION TO SOME CONCLUSION, BUT THE DESULTORY EXCHANGES CONTINUED. THIEU FLARED UP SUDDENLY THAT HE WAS BEING PREVENTED FROM COMMUNICATING WITH HIS PEOPLE ("WHAT KIND OF A PRESIDENT AM I IF I CANNOT TALK TO MY COLLEAGUES OR TO THE PEOPLE?"), A REFERENCE TO OUR STRICTURES AGAINST THE DISCLOSURES ABOUT OUR CURRENT DISCUSSIONS. I REPLIED WITH PATIENCE AND SAID WE WERE NOT PREVENTING HIM AT ALL. I REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT WE WERE ASKING ALL THE TCC'S TO KEEP TIGHT SECURITY ON THE DISCUSSIONS AND THAT OUR PRESIDENT HAD ONLY MADE TWO STATEMENTS, TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WAS NO BREAKTHROUGH AND THAT OUR POLICY HAD NOT CHANGED. WHEN THIEU AGAIN SPOKE OF THE NEED TO AGREE ON THE STATUS OF THE NLF, BERGER SAID FLATLY THAT WE WOULD NOT SUPPORT THEM IF THE GVN MADE THIS A CONDITION FOR TALKING WITH THE OTHER SIDE. THIEU BECAME INCENSED ("I AM MAKING A NOTE OF THAT") AND IT HAD TO BE EXPLAINED THAT WE DIDN'T REFUSE TO SUPPORT THE GVN IN ITS NON-RECOGNITION OF THE NLF, QUITE ON THE CONTRARY, BUT THAT WE COULDN'T SUPPORT THEM WHEN THEY WISHED HANOI TO ACKNOWLEDGE SOMETHING THAT WE KNOW HANOI WOULDN'T ACKNOWLEDGE.

19. THIEU SAID WE WERE "ANSWERING ON BEHALF OF HANOI". WHY DIDN'T WE LET THE GVN TALK DIRECTLY WITH HANOI? WE SAID AGAIN, COME TO THE TALKS. THIEU SAID, NOT IF THE STATUS OF THE NLF ISN'T CLEARED UP. WE REMINDED HIM AGAIN THAT WE HAD REFUSED TO AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE A "FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE". BY THE TIME I AGREED, RELUCTANTLY, TO PUT TO WASHINGTON THE FORMULATION OF PARAGRAPH 4 ON WHICH THEY INSISTED (CALLING FOR "AGREEMENT ON THE PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS"), IT WAS CLEAR THAT TIME HAD RUN OUT ON US. WE SAID IT SEEMED AS IF THE GVN WAS ASKING FOR A VETO ON WHETHER THE TALKS WERE TO TAKE PLACE. THIEU SAID IF THE GVN WANTED A VETO, THEY WOULD GO INTO THE TALKS. WHEN WE LEFT INDEPENDENCE PALACE, IT WAS 7:45 AM, AND WE KNEW--AND THEY KNEW--THAT OUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BOMBING HALT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNILATERAL ONE.

DTG 031604Z NOVEMBER 1968

EYES ONLY

SENT
WHCA

NOV 3 19 31

22
Free file
NOV 3 1968 3 PM 2:35
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EEA674
OO VTE10
DE VTE 4201

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82663

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE--EYES ONLY

NOVEMBER 3, 1968

HEREWITH AN ISSUE OF SUBSTANCE THAT WILL STAY WITH US, OUT OF FRIDAY NIGHT'S MARATHON, ON WHICH HARRIMAN WILL NEED STRONG PRESIDENTIAL INSTRUCTION. THE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CABLE IS USEFUL BACKGROUND.

SAIGON 41766

1. WE ARE SORRY IT TOOK US SOME TIME TO GET OUT THE SUMMARY RECORD OF OUR "MARATHON" SESSION OCTOBER 31/NOVEMBER 1. I WISH TO POINT OUT THAT WHILE MUCH OF IT IS NOW HISTORY, SOME POINTS ARE VERY MUCH ALIVE AND MUST BE CONSIDERED IN OUR FURTHER DEALINGS WITH THE GVN. (THE SUMMARY RECORD IN SEPTEL.)

2. ONE OF THESE POINTS IS THANK'S REACTION TO OUR PAPER SETTING OUT, AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION, AN ILLUSTRATIVE DIVISION OF SUBJECTS ON WHICH THE GVN OR THE US MIGHT TAKE THE LEAD, WITH SEPARATE CATEGORY OF SUBJECT OF EQUAL INTEREST TO BOTH OF US.

3. THANK TOOK THE POSITION THAT SINCE THE SUBJECT OF THE MEETINGS IS SOUTH VIET-NAM, ALL RPT ALL THE HEADINGS ARE OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO THE GVN, ALTHOUGH HE CONCEDED THAT THERE WERE SOME WHICH HAD A CONCURRENT US INTEREST. (I POINTED OUT DRYLY THAT THE SUBJECT OF US WITHDRAWAL MIGHT PERHAPS BE CONSIDERED AS BEING OF PRIMARY US INTEREST.)

4. ACCORDINGLY, IN OUR CONTACTS ESPECIALLY IN PARIS WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT LAN'S INSTRUCTIONS ARE PROBABLY TO BE PRICKLY WHEN WE DESIGNATE SOME SUBJECTS AS BEING OF PRIMARY INTEREST TO US. I BELIEVE ALL THIS IS A MATTER OF SEMANTICS AS LONG AS IN PRACTICE THE GVN (WHEN THEY ATTEND THE MEETINGS) WILL LET US TAKE THE LEAD ON SUBJECTS WHERE WE CAN MAKE THE BETTER CONTRIBUTION.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-498

By fw, NARA, Date 26-93

5. LOOKING FOR HARD AND FAST RULES NOW WILL ONLY INVOLVE US IN FURTHER DIFFICULTIES; BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER I THINK IT CAN PROBABLY BE WORKED OUT.

SAIGON 41767

1. FOLLOWING IS THE PAPER ON DIVISION OF SUBJECTS WHICH WE GAVE FOREIGN MINISTER THANH ON OCTOBER 31.

2. BEGIN TEXT. PRELIMINARY IDEAS ON ISSUES ON WHICH THE GVN AND US, RESPECTIVELY, MIGHT TAKE THE LEAD (FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN US AT AN EARLY DATE). THESE ARE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF A POSSIBLE DIVISION OF SUBJECTS.

GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

- A. NON-INTERFERENCE
- B. PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE.
- C. ALLIANCES, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, AND RELATED ISSUES.
- D. REUNIFICATION.
- E. RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH
- F. ANY DOMESTIC QUESTIONS INVOLVING SOUTH VIET NAM.

UNITED STATES

- A. AGREED REDUCTIONS IN HOSTILITIES
- B. AGREED WITHDRAWAL
- C. REAFFIRMATION OF 1962 LAOS AGREEMENT.
- D. REESTABLISHMENT OF CAMBODIA'S STATUS UNDER 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS.
- E. INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES

ISSUES ON WHICH THE GVN AND THE US SHOULD ACT JOINTLY.

- A. DMZ REESTABLISHMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION.
 - B. RELEASE OF PRISONERS.
 - C. CEASE FIRE.
 - D. INTERIM SUPERVISORY MACHINERY.
 - E. INSPECTION MACHINERY.
- END TEXT

DTG 031741Z NOV 0168

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

23

SENT
WHCA

NO. 3 18 55

Free file

FEA673
OO VTE18
DE VTE 4203

68 NOV 3 PM 2:00

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82664

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

NOVEMBER 3, 1968

HEREWITH VANCE'S REPORT OF HIS TALK WITH LAU: FRUSTRATING.

1. VANCE OPENED WITH OUR PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTIONS. LAU COMMENTED FOR THE RECORD ON PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TAKING EXCEPTION TO FIRM ANNOUNCEMENT OF DATE OF NOVEMBER 6 WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH DRV, AND PHRASE "ALL OTHER ACTS OF FORCE." VANCE ANSWERED THESE TWO POINTS.
2. LAU SAID THAT CURRENT U.S. PROPOSAL WAS INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR PROPOSAL OF MEETING WITH FOUR ENTITIES REPRESENTED. DRV AND NLF WERE PREPARED TO MEET NOVEMBER 6. PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING WAS TO AGREE ON A TIME AND PROCEDURES OF FIRST MEETING. COULDN'T THERE BE A MEETING ON NOVEMBER 6? IF NOT, WHEN?
3. LAU THEN MADE CERTAIN PROPOSALS ON PROCEDURES WHICH WILL BE DETAILED IN REPORTING CABLE.
4. VANCE STATED THAT HE COULD NOT SAY GVN WOULD BE READY NOVEMBER 6. HE TWICE MADE THE POINT WITH RESPECT TO ROCKETING AND THE DIFFICULTY CREATED THEREBY FOR "SERIOUS TALKS" WITH ALL FOUR PRESENT. HE THEN REPEATED PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTIONS AND ALSO SUGGESTED DESIRABILITY OF NAILING DOWN DMZ POINT WEDNESDAY.
5. LAU SAID US PROPOSAL WAS INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR AGREEMENTS. HE WAS READY FOR THE 6TH. HE ELABORATED ON PROCEDURES. HE STATED THAT HE WANTED THE DATE WHEN THE FOUR REPRESENTATIVES COULD BE PRESENT.
6. VANCE SUGGESTED THAT EACH SIDE TAKE NOTE OF THE SUGGESTIONS OF THE OTHER AND GET BACK IN TOUCH WHEN THEY HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY.

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

DTG: 031834Z NOV 68

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71091500
By ng/np, NARA, Date 3-8-93

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng, NARA, Date 3-8-93

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

24

TEAS71
DE VTE 4199

NOV 5 1969

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP#2682

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

NOVEMBER 3, 1969

I AM NOT SURE WHAT EXACTLY THE FOLLOWING FBI REPORT MEANS, BUT IT COULD REPEAT COULD SUGGEST THAT EITHER ARIAS IS TRYING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH NIXON PEOPLE OR VICE VERSA,

THE REFERENCE TO ME WAS THE FOLLOWING HISTORY: A BUSINESSMAN NAMED BOB MCGRATH, WHO IS CLOSE TO ARIAS, CALLED ME AND TOLD ME ARIAS WISHED TO SEE ME. I SAID I WAS VERY BUSY. WHAT WAS THE SUBJECT. MCGRATH TOLD ME THAT ARIAS BELIEVES THE PANAMA JUNTA IS FULL OF COMMUNISTS AND THERE IS DANGER OF A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. (I HAVE LEARNED THAT MCGRATH IS TELLING THIS STORY ALL OVER THE TOWN.) SUBSEQUENTLY, ARIAS DID SEND ME A TELEGRAM ASKING FOR A MEETING. WE HAVE HAD SOME QUITE LOW LEVEL CONTACTS WITH ARIAS BUT HAVE KEPT SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THE GOVERNMENT AWAY FROM HIM.

I HAD A FRESH CHECK MADE BY SAM LEVIE OF THE INTELLIGENCE VIEW OF ARIAS' ALLEGATION. HERE IS LEVIE'S MEMORANDUM TO ME:

QUOTE: RE YOUR CONVERSATION WITH BOB MCGRATH ON PANAMA.

CIA CONFIRMS THAT THERE IS NO COMMUNIST INFLUENCE VISIBLE IN THE PANAMANIAN JUNTA OR PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, DESPITE THE HALLOWEEN STORIES WHICH ARIAS AND HIS FRIENDS HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO SPREAD IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS. FROM THE BEGINNING, WE HAVE BEEN VERY ABOUT COLONEL TORRIJOS, ONE OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL INSTIGATORS OF THE COUP, BECAUSE HIS BROTHER HAS LONG BEEN A COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBER. TORRIJOS HIMSELF, HOWEVER, HAS SHOWN NO SYMPATHY FOR THE PARTY IN THE PAST (AT LEAST NOT SINCE HIS STUDENT DAYS) AND HIS BROTHER IS NOT PLAYING ANY ROLE AT PRESENT, SO FAR AS CIA KNOWS.

ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE PROBLEM WITH THE PANAMANIAN JUNTA IS THAT IT MAY SUCCEED TO THE TEMPTATION TO IMPOSE RIGHTIST AUTHORITARIAN SOLUTIONS, NOT THAT IT IS UNDER LEFTIST INFLUENCE.

WE WILL WATCH THIS POINT CAREFULLY, OF COURSE. HOWEVER, ARIAS IS SWINGING WILDLY AT WHAT HE THINKS ARE US SENSITIVITIES AND THIS IS HIS FAVORITE THEME AT THE MOMENT. END QUOTE


SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-161 & NLJ 95-149
By Sj, NARA, Date 10/2/01

PROCESSED BY...

FBI REPORT FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

3.4(b)(1),(6)



DTG: 031712Z NOV 58

~~SECRET~~

1968 NOV 17 51

EEA670
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4197

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12366, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By rg NARA, Date 3-8-93

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg NARA, Date 3-8-93

25

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82661

Nov 3, 1968

Profile

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH OUR IV CORPS ADVISOR'S REPORT ON THE TWO DELTA TOWN
ATTACKS

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE REPORT OF MG ECKHARDT, SA IV CORPS WHO HAS MADE AN INITIAL ON THE SPOT INVESTIGATION OF THE TWO ATTACKS ON THE CITY OF MY THO, DINH TUONG PROVINCE, (DELTA, IV CTZ) THE FIRST OF WHICH OCCURRED BETWEEN 030005 (H) AND 030045 (H), AND THE SECOND FROM 030203 (H) UNTIL 030210 (H) NOVEMBER 1968.

2. THE ATTACKS AND RESULTS THEREOF ARE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

	1ST ATTACK	2 ATTACK	TOTAL
INCOMING MORTAR-82/120MM	20 RDS	18 RDS	38 RDS
DURATION OF ATTACK	40 MIN	7 MIN	47 MIN
LOCATION	SW PORTION OF CITY (POPULATED AREA)	SW PORTION OF CITY (POPULATED AREA) (1 RD IN MIL COMPOUND)	
DIRECTION FROM WHICH INCOMING ROUNDS CAME	NE OF MY THO (EST)	NE OF MY THO (CONFIRMED)	
IMMEDIATE ACTION	NONE	COUNTER MORTAR FIRE BY ARVN	
CASUALTIES	1 VN MIL (K) 10 CIV (W) 4 VN MIL (W)	4 VN MIL (K) 13 CIV (W) 4 VN MIL (W)	5 23 8

3. BY DEFINITIONS, THIS WAS A MAJOR ATTACK. HOWEVER, FROM A PURELY MILITARY STANDPOINT, THESE ATTACKS WERE A HARASSMENT. THE DIRECT MILITARY IMPLICATIONS ARE MINOR, EXCEPT THAT, IF ALLOWED TO GO WITHOUT SOME TYPE OF RESPONSE, THE NVA/VC MAY BE ENCOURAGED TO GO FURTHER TO TEST THE LIMITS OF US PATIENCE AND TOLERANCE. IF THE PRECEDENT OF ACCEPTING THESE ATTACKS WERE TO BE CREATED IT WOULD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO RESPOND AGAINST REPEATED OR MORE DAMAGING ATTACKS.

4. A REPORT HAS ALSO BEEN RECEIVED ON A SMALLER ATTACK AGAINST VINH LONG CITY, VINH LONG PROVINCE (DELTA, IV CTZ). THIS ATTACK CAME AT 022330 (H) AND LASTED UNTIL 022335 (H) NOV 68, A TOTAL OF 5 MINUTES. EIGHT ROUNDS OF 82MM MORTAR WERE RECEIVED, ALL IMPACTED IN POPULATED SECTIONS OF THE CITY, BUT THERE WERE NO REPEAT NO CASUALTIES REPORTED.

5. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE FOREGOING ATTACKS (MY THO AND VINH LONG) OCCURRED IN THE DELTA AREA, IV CTZ, WHERE ENEMY FORCES HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN VC RATHER THAN NVA. THIS FACT MAY HAVE POLICY IMPLICATIONS WARRANTING SPECIAL CONSIDERATION.

6. WE WILL EFFECT CONSULTATION WITH THE EMBASSY ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING IMMEDIATELY. IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH REQUEST FOR URGENT REPORT SEPARATELY RECEIVED WE ARE FURNISHING THIS REPORT, SUBJECT TO FURTHER COMMENT AS RESULT OF PLANNED CONSULTATION WITH THE EMBASSY. WE WILL SUGGEST TO EMBASSY THAT THEY ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE IMPACT OF THESE ATTACKS ON THE GVN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE SVN.

~~SECRET~~

1968 NOV 3 17 41

26

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-498

By *fw*, NARA, Date 1-26-93

Pres file

EAA669
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4194

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82658

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

NOVEMBER 3, 1968

IF YOU APPROVE, I WILL CHECK OUT THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED
BACK CHANNEL WITH CLIFFORD, KATZENBACH AND WHEELER.

QUOTE FOR BUNKER AND ABRAMS FROM THE PRESIDENT.

FROM HERE IT LOOKS AS IF IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ABE TO
CALL IN THE SENIOR US AND ARVN MILITARY COMMANDERS TO MAKE
THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- I'VE PERSONALLY TALKED WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WANT TO
PASS DIRECTLY TO YOU HOW HE VIEWS THE SITUATION.
- HE IS NOT GOING TO SELL OUT WHAT WE -- THE US, ARVN
AND OTHER ALLIES -- HAVE WON ON THE BATTLEFIELD.
- HE WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE NLF AS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY.
- HE WILL HAVE NO PART OF IMPOSING A COALITION GOVERNMENT
ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.
- HE WILL LIVE BY THE HONOLULU COMMUNIQUE WHICH PROMISES
A LEADING ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE GVN.

BU AND I KNOW THAT MILITARILY WE'VE GOT A GOOD DEAL:
(A) DURING THE BAD WEATHER OVER THE NVN PANHANDLE THE
BOMBING HALT DOESN'T HURT US; WE'RE GOING TO PUT A
MAXIMUM EFFORT OVER LAOS; (B) ENEMY OBSERVANCE OF THE DMZ
IS A NET MILITARY ADVANTAGE TO US; (C) OUR JOB IS EASIER
IF CITIES LIKE SAIGON AND DANANG ARE FREE FROM ATTACK.

TO US SOLDIERS, LET US GO ON ABOUT OUR OWN JOB WHILE
OUR DIPLOMATS TRY TO DO THEIRS-- IN CONFIDENCE THAT OUR
STRONG MILITARY POSITION WON'T BE THROWN AWAY AT THE CONFERENCE
TABLE-- WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT EARLY DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS
DEPENDS ON OUR KEEPING MAXIMUM MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE
BATTLEFIELDS."

IN SAIGON, OF COURSE, MUST BE THE JUDGE OF WHETHER SUCH
BACK WOULD BE HELPFUL. END QUOTE

628Z NOV 1968
QUICK COPY

SECRET
EYES ONLY