

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

174

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3 cable	CAP82700, Rostow to the President S 3 pp. [dup #70, #70a, #70b, this file]	11/5/68	A
#4 cable	CAP82623, Smith to the President S 1 p. [dup. #45, Memos to the President, Vol. 103, Sanitized NLJ 91-498]	11/1/68	A
<del>#5 cable</del>	<del>CAP82697, Rostow to the President</del> S 3 pp. <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i> [dup. #71, this file] [dup. #10, #10a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./Bombing Halt Dec., Vol. 4," Box 137, Exempt NLJ 91-498]	<del>11/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6 cable</del>	<del>CAP82698, Rostow to the President</del> <i>open</i> S <del>4 pp.</del> [dup. #65, NSF, Country File, "Nigeria, Vol. 2," Box 96]	<del>11/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#9 memo	Rostow to the President, 7:20 p.m. S 2 pp.	11/8/68	A & C
#10a memo	Fowler to the President S 4 pp.	11/8/68	A
<del>#10b report</del>	<del>Proposed Actions after a Truce in Vietnam</del> S <del>7 pp.</del> <i>open NLJ 01-160 6/4/02</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#11a cable	Intelligence cable S 2 pp. [dup. #19a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 5," Box 137, Sanitized NLJ 91-504]	11/7/68	A
<del>#12b cable</del>	<del>Bangkok 22724</del> <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i> S <del>2 pp.</del> [dup. #14b, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 5," Box 137] [dup. #32, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. 6," Box 125, Exempt NLJ 91-506]	<del>11/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#12d cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Bangkok</del> <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i> S 2 pp. [dup. #14d, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 5," Box 137] [dup. #22, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. 6," Box <del>22</del> <sub>125</sub> , Sanitized, NLJ 91-506]	<del>11/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 104, November 5-8, 1968,"  
Bcx 42

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

2 of 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#17a cable</del>	<del>USUN 7630 S 2 pp.</del>	<del>11/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#20a cable	Intelligence information cable S 2 pp. Sanitized - 1-b-10	11/7/68	A
<del>#21a cable</del>	<del>re Vietnam S 1 p.</del> <i>open 3.17.05 PTH</i>	<del>11/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#24 memo	Rostow to the President C 1 p. <i>per</i> [dup. #123, NSF, Country File, "Yugoslavia, Vol. 2," Box 232]	11/7/68	A
<del>#25a memo</del>	<del>Smith to Rostow re Vietnam C 2 pp.</del>	<del>11/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#26a cable	Deptel to Saigon S 2 pp. [dup. #25a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 5," Box 137, Sanitized, NLJ 91-506]	11/7/68	A
<del>#29a cable</del>	<del>re Vietnam S 1 p.</del> <i>open 3.17.05</i>	<del>11/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#32 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the President re Pakistan S 1 p.</del>	<del>11/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#32a cable</del>	<del>Rawalpindi 9165 S 1 p.</del> <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i>	<del>11/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#32b cable</del>	<del>Deptel 268175 to Ankara S 1 p.</del> <i>ll</i>	<del>11/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#33a cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Saigon S 6 pp.</del> <i>ll</i>	<del>11/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#33b memo</del>	<del>Rusk to the President re NATO S 1 p.</del>	<del>11/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#33c report	Issues for NATO Ministerial Meeting S 3 pp.	11/68	A
#33d report	Scope Paper S 6 pp.	11/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 104, November 5-8, 1968,"  
Box 42

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

3 of 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#33e report	Increased National Contributions to NATO Defense S 8 pp.	undated	A
<del>#33f memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the President S 2 pp. [dup. #47, NSF, Country File, "Nigeria, Vol. 2," Box 96]</del>	<del>11/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#33g memo	Katzenbach to the President S 9 pp. [dup. #45, 47a, 48a, NSF, Country File, "Nigeria, Vol. 2," Box 96]	11/5/68	A
#36a cable	Intelligence cable S 2 pp. [dup. #24a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 5," Box 137] [dup. #54a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan, Misc. & Memos, Vol. 7," Box 124, Sanitized, NLJ 91-506]	11/7/68	A
<del>#44 cable</del>	<del>CAP82731, Rostow to the President S 2 pp.</del> <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i>	<del>11/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#47 cable	CAP82728, Rostow to the President C 2 pp.	11/6/68	A
#49 cable	CAP82709, WH to Saigon S 1 p.	11/6/68	A
<del>#54 cable</del>	<del>CAP82723, Rostow to the President S 1 p. [dup. #25, "South Vietnam &amp; U.S. Policies," Sanitized, NLJ 95-33]</del>	<del>11/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#55 cable	CAP82725, Rostow to the President S 1 p. [dup. #56, #56a, this file]	11/6/68	A
<del>#56</del>	<del>partial dup. #55</del>		
<del>#56a</del>	<del>partial dup. #55</del>		
#57 cable	CAP82699, Rostow to the President C 9 pp. [dup. #56a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan, Misc. & Memos, Vol. 7," Box 124]	11/5/68	A
#60 cable	CAP82714, Rostow the President S 2 pp.	11/6/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 104, November 5-8, 1968,"  
Box 42

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

4 of 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#62 cable	CAP82717, Rostow to the President S 2 pp. <i>Sani NY 019-042-1-5(1/02)</i>	11/6/68	A
<i>open 3/17/05 NLJ 04-58</i> <del>#63 cable</del>	<del>CAP82716, Rostow to the President S 3 pp. [dup. #34, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan, Misc. &amp; Memos, Vol. 7," Box 124] [dup. #8, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan/Double Plus, Vol. 5," Box 125, Exempt, NLJ 93-28]</del>	<del>11/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#68 cable</del>	<del>CAP82701, Rostow to the President S 1 pp. <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i> [dup. #7, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 4," Box 137, Sanitized, NLJ 91-498]</del>	<del>11/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#70a cable	Intelligence information cable S 6 pp. [partial dup. #3, this file] [dup. #12a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 4," Box 137, Sanitized, 1993]	11/4/68	A
#70b cable	Intelligence information cable S 4 pp. [partial dup. #3, this file] [dup. #12b, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 4," Box 137, Sanitized 1993]	11/5/68	A
<del>#71</del>	<del>dup. #5, this file <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i></del>		
<del>#74 cable</del>	<del>CAP82689, WH Sit. Room to the President C 1 p. <i>open</i></del>	<del>11/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#78 cable	CAP82688, WH to Saigon S 1 p. <i>Sani NY 019-042-1-6(1/02)</i>	11/5/68	A

## FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 104, November 5-8, 1968,"  
Box 42

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

*Pres. file*

Friday, Nov. 8, 1968  
10:30 a. m.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the materials you requested earlier this morning.

1. A Chronology:

-- Vice President Humphrey's Salt Lake City speech was delivered on September 30. (Tab A)

-- Mac Bundy's speech was delivered on October 12, appearing in full in the New York Times of October 13. (Tab B)

-- Le Duc Tho left Paris on October 14, arriving in Hanoi October 17 after a substantial stopover in Moscow and, probably, an overnight in Peking.

-- On October 13, we received Thieu's "immediate and unequivocal" concurrence for our instructions to Harriman and Vance.

-- We presented our proposition in Paris on October 15 and found that Xuan Thuy was not prepared to move on "the next day" -- beginning almost two weeks of Hanoi stalling.

-- The first date in which we find Thieu beginning to think that "Johnson and Humphrey will be replaced and then Nixon could change the U. S. position" is October 17. Items focusing on the U. S. election and the possibility of resisting a bombing halt run steadily from that time down through November 1st.

2. Comment:

I have no doubt that Vice President Humphrey's speech -- and perhaps Mac Bundy's -- had some effect on thinking in Saigon. I have no doubt that Saigon honestly believed that the timing of the bombing halt proposition was related to an effort to strengthen Humphrey's hand, thus making them susceptible to the delaying tactic that, in fact, they followed. It is possible that Mac Bundy's speech had something to do with Le Duc Tho's departure from Paris; although the rather elaborate arrangements in Moscow for his reception and his high-level interviews there make it likely that his return to Hanoi via Moscow was laid on earlier. It may be that the delay from October 15 to October 27 was connected with:

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-508  
By [signature], NARA, Date 1-11-93

-- a desire of Hanoi to avoid a final decision until Le Duc Tho could confer with his Politburo colleagues at length on the negotiation; and

-- that the stalling tactics of that period were designed to buy time for this purpose; to test President Johnson on whether the deal could be improved in the light of a possible anxiety of the President to have the bombing pause well before the election; or both.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

1a

A

LETTER TO BERNARDINI  
Sept 30, 1968

TONIGHT I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS AS A CITIZEN AND AS A CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

I WANT TO TELL YOU WHAT I THINK ABOUT GREAT ISSUES WHICH I BELIEVE FACE THIS NATION.

I WANT TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT VIETNAM, AND ABOUT ANOTHER GREAT ISSUE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD -- THE ISSUE OF STOPPING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

AFTER I HAVE TOLD YOU WHAT I THINK, I WANT YOU TO THINK.

AND IF YOU AGREE WITH ME, I WANT YOU TO HELP ME.

FOR THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, I HAVE TRIED TO TELL YOU WHAT WAS IN MY HEART AND ON MY MIND.

BUT SOMETIMES THAT MESSAGE HAS BEEN DROWNED OUT BY THE VOICES OF PROTESTERS AND DEMONSTRATORS.

I SHALL NOT LET THE VIOLENCE AND DISORDER OF A NOISY FEW DENY ME THE RIGHT TO SPEAK OR TO DESTROY THE ORDERLY DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.

I HAVE PAID FOR THIS TELEVISION TIME THIS EVENING TO TELL YOU MY STORY UNINTERRUPTED BY NOISE... BY PROTEST... OR BY SECOND-HAND INTERPRETATION.

: : :

WHEN I ACCEPTED THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S NOMINATION AND PLATFORM, I SAID THAT THE FIRST REALITY THAT CONFRONTED THIS NATION WAS THE NEED FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM.

I HAVE PLEDGED THAT MY FIRST PRIORITY AS PRESIDENT SHALL BE TO END THE WAR AND OBTAIN AN HONORABLE PEACE.

FOR THE PAST FOUR YEARS I HAVE SPOKEN MY MIND ABOUT VIETNAM, FRANKLY AND WITHOUT RESERVATION, IN THE CABINET AND IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- AND DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT.

WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE HIS DECISIONS, I HAVE SUPPORTED THEM.

HE HAS BEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. IT HAS BEEN HIS JOB TO DECIDE. THE CHOICES HAVE NOT BEEN SIMPLE OR EASY.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL CONTINUE -- UNTIL JANUARY 20, 1969 -- TO MAKE THE DECISIONS IN VIETNAM. THE VOICE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE MUST BE HIS. I SHALL NOT COMPETE WITH THAT VOICE. I SHALL COOPERATE AND HELP.

WE ALL PRAY THAT HIS EFFORTS TO FIND PEACE WILL SUCCEED.

BUT, 112 DAYS FROM NOW, THERE WILL BE A NEW PRESIDENT... A NEW ADMINISTRATION

IF THERE IS NO PEACE BY THE, IT MUST BE THEIR  
RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE A COMPLETE  
REASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM -- TO SEE WHERE  
WE STAND AND TO JUDGE WHAT WE MUST DO. (2)

AS I SAID IN MY ACCEPTANCE SPEECH:

THE POLICIES OF TOMORROW NEED NOT BE LIMITED BY THE  
POLICIES OF YESTERDAY.

WE MUST LOOK TO THE FUTURE.

FOR NEITHER VINDICATION NOR VINDICATION NOR  
REPUDIATION OF OUR ROLE IN VIETNAM WILL BRING PEACE OR BE  
WORTHY OF OUR COUNTRY.

: : :

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW WHAT  
I WOULD DO -- IF I AM PRESIDENT -- AFTER JANUARY 20, 1969,  
TO KEEP MY PLEDGE TO HONORABLY END THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

WHAT ARE THE CHANCES FOR PEACE?

THE END OF THE WAR IS NOT YET IN SIGHT. BUT OUR  
CHANCES FOR PEACE ARE FAR BETTER TODAY THAN THEY WERE A  
YEAR OR EVEN A MONTH AGO.

ON MARCH 31, THE WAR TOOK ON AN ENTIRELY NEW DIMENSION. (3)

ON THAT DATE PRESIDENT JOHNSON BY ONE COURAGEOUS ACT REMOVED THE THREAT OF BOMBING FROM 90 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE, AND 75 PERCENT OF THE LAND AREA, OF NORTH VIETNAM.

ON THAT DATE PRESIDENT JOHNSON SACRIFICED HIS OWN POLITICAL CAREER IN ORDER TO BRING NEGOTIATION THAT COULD LEAD TO PEACE.

UNTIL THAT TIME, THE STRUGGLE WAS ONLY ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

NOW OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE FACE TO FACE ACROSS THE TABLE WITH NEGOTIATORS FROM NORTH VIETNAM.

A PROCESS HAS BEEN SET IN COURSE. AND, LEST THAT PROCESS BE SET BACK, OUR PERSEVERANCE AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE MUST BE AS GREAT AS OUR COURAGE HAS BEEN IN THE WAR.

THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER CHANGES DURING THESE PAST FEW MONTHS.

THE ORIGINAL VIETNAM DECISION -- MADE BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER -- WAS MADE FOR ONE BASIC REASON.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER BELIEVED IT WAS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST THAT COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND AGGRESSION SHOULD NOT SUCCEED IN VIETNAM.

IT WAS HIS JUDGMENT -- AND THE JUDGMENT OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON SINCE THEN -- THAT IF AGGRESSION DID SUCCEED IN VIETNAM, THERE WAS A DANGER THAT WE WOULD BE BECOME INVOLVED ON A FAR MORE DANGEROUS SCALE IN A WIDER AREA OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

WHILE WE HAVE STOOD WITH OUR ALLIES IN VIETNAM, SEVERAL THINGS HAVE HAPPENED.

OTHER NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA -- GIVEN THE TIME, WE HAVE BOUGHT FOR THEM --

-- HAVE STRENGTHENED THEMSELVES... HAVE BEGUN TO WORK TOGETHER... AND ARE FAR MORE ABLE TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AGAINST ANY FUTURE SUBVERSION OR AGGRESSION.

IN SOUTH VIETNAM ITSELF, A CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN WRITTEN... ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN HELD... LAND REFORM AND ANTI-CORRUPTION AND REFUGEE MEASURES HAVE BEEN STEPPED UP... AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY HAS INCREASED ITS SIZE AND CAPACITY, AND IMPROVED ITS EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE -- JUST AS THE KOREAN ARMY DID DURING THE LATTER STAGES OF THE KOREAN WAR.

SO -- IN SHARP CONTRAST TO A FEW MONTHS AGO -- WE SEE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON.

WE SEE A STRONGER SOUTHEAST ASIA.

WE SEE A STRONGER SOUTH VIETNAM.

THOSE ARE THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH A NEW PRESIDENT WILL FACE IN JANUARY.

:::

IN LIGHT OF THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES -- AND ASSUMING NO MARKED CHANGE

I WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL.

TO WITHDRAW WOULD NOT ONLY JEOPARDIZE THE DEPENDENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE SAFETY OF OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONXXX NATIONS. IT WOULD MAKE MEANINGLESS THE SACRIFICES WE HAVE ALREADY MADEXXX MADE.

IT WOULD BE AN OPEN INVITATION TO MORE VIOLENCE... MORE AGGRESSION... MORE INSTABILITY.

AND IT WOULD, AT HIS TIME OF TENSION IN EUROPE, CAST DOUBT ON THE INTEGRITY OF OUR WORD UNDER TRAXXX TREATY AND ALLIANCE.

PEACE WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY WEAKNESS OR WITHDRAWAL.

NOWXXX NOR WOULD I ESCALATE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN EITHER NORTH XXX NORTH OR SOUTH VIETNAM. WE MUST SEEK TO DE-ESCALATE.

THE PLATFORM OF MY PARTY SAYS THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD TAKE REASONABLE RISKS TO FIND PEACE IN VIETMAXXX VIETNAM. I SAHLL DO SO.

NORTH VIETNAM, ACCORDING TO ITS OWN STATEMENT AND THOSE OF OTHERS, HAS SAID IT WILL PROCEED TO PROMPT AND GOOD DXXX FAITH NEGOTIATIONS IF WE STOP THE PRESENT LIMITED BOMBINBXXX BOMBING OF THE NORTH.

WE MUST ALWAYS THINK OF THE PROTECTION OF OUR TROOPS.

AS PRESIDENT, I WOULD BE WILLING TO STOP THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH AS A XXX AN ACCEPTABEL RISK FOR PEACE BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT COULD LEAD TO SUCCESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND A SHORTEN EXXX WAR. THIS WOULD BE THE BEST PROTECION FOR OUR TROOPS.

IN WEIGHING THAT RISK -- AND BFOFREXXX BEFORE TAKING ACTION -- I WOULD PLACE KEY IMPORTANCE ON EVIDENCE -- DIRECT OR INDIRECT, BY DEED OR WORD -- OF COMMUNIST WILLNXXX WILLINGNESS TO RESPXXX RESTORE THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM.

IF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM WERE TO SHOW BAD FAITH, I WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO RESUME THE BOMBING.

SECONDLY, I WOULD TAKE THE RISK THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOULD MEET THE OBIXXX OBLIGATIONS THEY SAY THEY ARE NOW READY TO ASSUME IN THEIR OWN SELF-DEFENSE.

I WOULD MOVE TOWARD DE-AMERICANIZATION OF THE WAR.

I WOULD SIT DOWN WITH THE LEADER OS SOUTH VIETNAM TO SET A SPECIFIC TIMETABLE BY WHICH AMERICAN FORCES COULD BE SYSTEMATICALLY REDUCED WHILE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOREXXX FORCES TOOK OVER MORE AND MORE OF THE UXXX BURGXXX BURDEN.

THE SCHEDULE MUST BE A REALISTIC ONE -- ONE THAT WOULD NOT WEAKEN THE OVERALL ALLIED DEFENSE POSTURE. I CONIXXX CONVINCED SUCH ACTION WXXXXXXXXX & DISREGARD THIS PARA.

THE SCHEDULE MUST BE A REALISTIC ONE -- ONE THAT WOULD NOT WEAKEN THE OVERALL ALLIED DEFENSE POSTURE. I AM CONVINCED SUCH ACTION WOULD BE AS MUCH IN SOUTH VIETNAM'S INTEREST AS NXXX INOURS.

WHAT I AMPROPOSIN IN THAT IT SHGUDXXX SHOULD BE BASIC TO OUTXXX OUR POLICY NINXXX IN VEXXX VIETNAM THAT THE TXXX SOUTH VIETNAMESE TAKING OVER MORE AND ONORE THE FXNXXX DISREGARD THIS LINE.

TAKING OVER MORE AND MORE OF THE DEFENSE OF ~~THEIR~~ THEIR OWN COUNTRY. (5)

THAT WOULD BE AN IMMEDIATE ~~OBJECTIVE~~ OBJECTIVE OF THE HUMPHREY-MUSKIE ADMINISTRATION AS IS OUGHT TO END THE WAR.

IF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY MAINTAINS ITS PRESENT RATE OF IMPROVEMENT., I BELIEVE THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE NEXT YEAR -- WITHOUT ~~ENDANGERING~~ ENDANGERING EITHER OUR REMAINING TROOPS OR THE SAFETY OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

I DO NOT SAY THIS LIGHTLY. I HAVE STUDIED THIS MATTER CAREFULLY.

THIRD, I WOULD PROPOSE ONCE MORE AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE--WITH UNITED NATIONS OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION AND SUPERVISED WITHDRAWAL ~~OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.~~ XXXXXX WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

AMERICAN TROOPS ARE FIGHTING IN NUMBERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM TODAY ONLY BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES WERE SENT TO IMPOSE HANOI'S WILL ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE BY AGGRESSION.

WE CAN AGREE TO BRING HOME OUR FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGREE TO BRING THEIRS HOME AT THE SAME TIME.

EXTERNAL FORCES ASSISTING BOTH SIDES COULD AND SHOULD LEAVE AT THE SAME TIME, AND SHOULD NOT BE REPLACED.

THE ULTIMATE KEY TO AN HONORABLE SOLUTION MUST BE FREE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM--WITH ALL PEOPLE, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND OTHER DISSIDENT GROUPS, ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THOSE ELECTIONS IF THEY WERE WILLING TO ABIDE BY PEACEFUL PROCESSES.

THAT, TOO, WOULD MEAN SOME RISK. BUT I HAVE NEVER FEARED THE RISK OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE. I SAY: LET THE PEOPLE SPEAK. AND ACCEPT THEIR JUDGMENT, WHATEVER IT IS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED BY FORCE FROM HANOI OR BY PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON. IT SHOULD BE FREELY CHOSEN BY ALL THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

---A STOPPING OF THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH--TAKING ACCOUNT OF HANOI'S ACTIONS AND ASSURANCES OF PROMPT GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS AND KEEPING THE OPTION OF RESUMING THAT BOMBING IF THE COMMUNISTS SHOW BAD FAITH.

---CAREFUL, SYSTEMATIC REDUCTION OF AMERICAN TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM -- A DE-AMERICANIZATION OF THE WAR -- TURNING OVER TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY A GREATER SHARE OF THE DEFENSE OF ITS OWN COUNTRY.

---AN INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED CEASE-FIRE --- AND SUPERVISED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

---FREE ELECTIONS, INCLUDING ALL PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WILLING TO FOLLOW THE PEACEFUL PROCESS.

THOSE ARE RISKS I WOULD TAKE FOR PEACE. (6)

I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY OF THESE RISKS WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR SECURITY OR BE CONTRARY TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

THERE IS, OF COURSE, NO GUARANTEE THAT ALL THESE THINGS COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY DONE.

CERTAINLY, NONE OF THEM COULD BE DONE IF NORTH VIETNAM WERE TO SHOW BAD-FAITH.

BUT I BELIEVE THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THESE STEPS COULD BE CARRIED OUT.

I BELIEVE THESE STEPS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH SAFETY FOR OUR EX MEN IN VIETNAM.

AS PRESIDENT, I WOULD BE DEDICATED TO CARRYING THEM OUT--AS I WOULD BE DEDICATED TO URGING THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO EXPEDITE ALL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS ESSENTIAL TO BROADENING POPULAR PARTICIPATION, INCLUDING HIGH PRIORITY TO LAND REFORM . . . MORE ATTENTION TO THE SUFFERING OF REFUGEES . . . AND CONSTANT GOVERNMENT PRESSURE AGAINST INFLATION AND CORRUPTION.

I BELIEVE ALL OF THESE STEPS COULD LEAD TO AN HONORABLE AND LASTING SETTLEMENT SERVING BOTH OUR OWN NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE INTERESTS OF THE INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

: : :

WE HAVE LEARNED A LESSON FROM VIETNAM.

THE LESSON IS NOT THAT WE SHOULD TURN OUR BACKS ON SOUTHEAST ASIA -- OR ON OTHER NATIONS OR PEOPLE IN LESS FAMILIAR PARTS OF THE WORLD NEIGHBORHOOD.

THE LESSON IS, RATHER, THAT WE SHOULD CAREFULLY DEFINE OUR GOALS AND PRIORITIES...AND WITHIN THOSE GOALS AND PRIORITIES, THAT WE SHOULD FORMULATE POLICIES WHICH WILL FIT NEW AMERICAN GUIDELINES.

APPLYING THE LESSON OF VIETNAM, I WOULD INSIST AS PRESIDENT THAT WE REVIEW OTHER COMMITMENTS MADE IN OTHER TIMES...THAT WE CAREFULLY DECIDE WHAT IS, AND IS NOT, IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

I DO NOT CONDEMN ANY PAST COMMITMENT.

I DO JUDGE THE DECISIONS OF PAST PRESIDENTS WHEN, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE, THEY MADE THOSE DECISIONS IN WHAT THEY THOUGHT WERE THE INTERESTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

BUT I DO SAY, IF I AM PRESIDENT, I OWE IT TO THIS NATION TO BRING OUR MEN AND RESOURCES IN VIETNAM BACK TO AMERICA WHERE WE NEED THEM SO BADLY...AND TO BE SURE WE PUT FIRST THINGS FIRST IN THE FUTURE.

LET ME BE CLEAR: I DO NOT COUNSEL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WORLD.

I DO NOT SWERVE FROM INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

I ONLY SAY THAT, AS PRESIDENT, I WOULD UNDERTAKE A NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE IN THIS WORLD, BASED NOT ON AMERICAN OMNIPOTENCE, BUT ON AMERICAN LEADERSHIP -- NOT ONLY MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, BUT MORAL.

THAT NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE WOULD EMPHASIZE WORKING THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS...STRENGTHENING AND MAINTAINING OUR KEY ALLIANCES FOR MUTUAL SECURITY PARTICULARLY INCLUDING NATO...SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING MACHINERY... AND WORKING WITH OTHER NATIONS TO BUILD NEW INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS FOR COOPERATION.

IN A TROUBLED AND DANGEROUS WORLD WE SHOULD SEEK NOT MARCH ALONE, BUT TO LEAD IN SUCH A WAY THAT OTHERS WILL WISH TO JOIN US.

: : : :

EVEN AS WE SEE

(8)

EVEN AS WE SEEK PEACE IN VIETNAM, WE MUST FOR OUR OWN SECURITY AND WELL-BEING SEEK TO HALT AND TURN BACK THE COSTLY AND AXXX EVEN MORE DANGEROUS ARMS RACE.

FIVE NATIONS NOW HAV XXXX HAVE NUCLEAR BOMBS.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ALREADY POSSESS ENOUGH WEAPONS TO BURN AND DESTROY EVERY HUMAN BEING ON THIS EARTH.

UNLESS WE STOP THE ARMS RACE...UNLESS WE STOP 15 TO 20 MORE NATIONS FROM GETTING NUCLEAR BOMBS AND NUCLEAR BOMB TECHNOLOGY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS, THIS GENERATION MAY BE THE LAST.

FOR 20 YEARS WE HVXXX HAVE LIVED UNDER THE CONSTANT THREAT THAT SOME IRRESPONSIBLE ACTION OR EVEN SOME GREAT MISCALCULATION COULD BLOW US ALL UP IN THE WINK OF AN EYE.

THERE IS DANGER THAT WE HAVE BECOME SO USED TO THE IDEA THAT WE NO LONGER THINK IT ABNORMAL -- FORGETTING THAT OUR WHOLE WORLD STRUCTURE DEPENDS FOR ITS STABILITY ON THE PRECARIOUS ACXXX ARCHITECTUXX XXX ARCHITECTURE OF WHAT WINSTON CHURCHILL CALLED THE 2BALANCE OF TERROR.2 THIS IS NO LONGER AN ADEOUATE SAFEGUARD FOR PEACE.

THERE IS A TREATY NOW BEOXXX BEFORE THE SENATE WHICH WOULD STOP THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT TREATY MUST BE RATIFUXXX RATIFIED NOW.

1

IF THIS NATION CANNOT MUSTER THE COURAGE TO RATIFY THIS TREATY -- A TREATY WHICH INNO WAY ENDANGERS OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, BUT ADDS TO IT BY KEEPING THESE WEAPONS OUT OF THE HANDS OF A NASSER...A CASTRO...AND MANY OTHERS -- THEN THERE CAN BE LITTLE HOPE FOR OUR FUTURE IN THIS WORLD.

WE MUST RATIFY THIS TREATY.

I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE MUST HAVE THE COURAGE -- WHILE KEEPING OUR GUARD UP AND FULFILLING OUR COMMITMENTS TO NATO -- TO TALK WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABOUT A FREEZE AND REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR MISSILES SYSTEMS.

TO ESCALATE THE NUCLEAR MISSILE ARMS RACE IS TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF DANGER AND TOALXXX TOTAL DESTRUCTION. IT IS COSTLY, MENACING, FEARSOME AND OFFERS NO GENUINE DEFENSE.

BEYONXXX BEYOND THAT, IF I AM PRESIDENT, I SHALL TAKE THE INITIATIV XXX INITIATIVE TO FIND THE WAY -- UNDER CAREFULLY SAFE-GUARDED, MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION -- TO REDUCE ARMS BUDGETS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES SYSTEMATICALLY AMONG ALL COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD.

OUR COUNTRY7S MLXXX MILITARY BUDGET THIS YEAR IS 80 MIXXX BILLION DOLLXXX DOLLARS.

IT IS AN INVESTMENT WE HAGXXX HAVE TO MAKE UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. IT PROTECTS OUR FREEDOM.

BUT IF WE CAN WORK WITH OTHER NATIONS OXXX SO THAT WE CAN ALL REDUCE OUR JXXX MILITARY EXPENDITURES TOGETHER, WITH PROPER SAFEGUARDS AND INSPECTION, THE, IT WILL BE A GREAT DAY FOR HUMANITY.

ALL OF US WILL HAVE MOVED FURTHER AWAY FROM SELF-DESTRUCTION. AND ALL OF US WILL HAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WITH WHICH TO HELP PEOPLE LIVE BETTER LIEXXX LIVES.

: : : :

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE MUST CHOOSE THE ONE MAN THEY BELIEVE CAN BEST FACE THESE GREAT ISSUES.

I WOULD HOPE THAT ME.XXX MR. NIXON, MR. WALLACE AND I COULD EXPRESS OUR VIEWS ON VIETNAM NOT ONLY INDIVIDUALLY, BUT ON THE SAME PUBLIC PLATFORM.

I CALL FOR THIS BECAUSE -- ON THE BASIS OF OURPAST RECORDS AND PAST CAREERS -- THERE RXXX AFXXX ARE GREAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS.

THOSE VIEWS OF GOVERNOR WALLACE WHICH I HAVE SEEN REPORTED INDICATE THAT HE WOULD SHARPLY ESCALATE THE WAR.

MR. NIXON'S PAST RECORD REVEALS HIS PROBABLY FUTURE POLICIES.

IN 1954 -- AT THE TIME OF THE FRENCH DEFEAT AT DIENBIENPHU -- HE ADVOCATED AMERICAN ARMED INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM IN AID OF FRENCH COLONIALISM. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO REPUDIATE HIS PROPOSAL.

SINCE THEN, HE HAS TAKEN A LINE ON VIETNAM POLICY WHICH I BELIEVE COULD LEAD TO GREATER ESCALATION OF THE WAR.

IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, MR. NIXON DESCRIBED AS BUNK THE IDEA THAT FREE ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WERE OF IMPORTANCE.

IN FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR, WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT THE USE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN VIETNAM, MR. NIXON SAID THAT A GENERAL HAS TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT HE CANNOT RULE OUT THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EXTREME SITUATIONS THAT MIGHT DEVELOP.

SINCE THEN, HE HAS INDICATED HE HAS A PLAN TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM, BUT WILL NOT DISCLOSE IT UNTIL HE BECOMES PRESIDENT.

IF HE HAS SUCH A PLAN, HE HAS AN OBLIGATION TO SO INFORM PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

A FEW DAYS AGO THE REPUBLICAN VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE SAID THERE IS NOT NOW AND NEVER HAS BEEN A NIXON-AGNEW PLAN FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM. IT WAS, HE SAID, A PLOY TO MAINTAIN SUSPENSE.

AND THEN HE SAID : ISN'T THAT THE WAY CAMPAIGNS ARE RUN?

I THINK WE NEED SOME ANSWERS ABOUT THIS FROM MR. NIXON.

MR. NIXON'S PUBLIC RECORD SHOWS, ALSO, CONSISTENT OPPOSITION TO MEASURES FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL.

HE ATTACKED ADLAI STEVENSON AND MYSELF FOR ADVOCATING A NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY -- A TREATY TO STOP RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT FROM POISONING AND CRIPPLING PEOPLE THE WORLD OVER. HE CALLED OUR PLAN A CRUEL HOAX. WE CAN BE THANKFUL THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND THE CONGRESS DID NOT FOLLOW HIS ADVICE.

TODAY, HE IS ASKING FOR DELAY OF RATIFICATION OF A TREATY CAREFULLY NEGOTIATED OVER SEVERAL YEARS AND SIGNED BY 80 NATIONS -- THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY DESIGNED TO STOP THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

11  
CAN AFFORD A RETURN TO LEADERSHIP WHICH WOULD INCREASE TRUST  
IN THE WORLD...WHICH WOULD, ON THE BASIS OF MY STATEMENT,  
ESCALATE THE VIETNAM WAR...WHICH WOULD TURN  
THE CLOCK BACK ON PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE AT GREAT  
SACRIFICE TO BRING THE GREAT POWERS OF THE WORLD INTO A SANER  
RELATIONSHIP IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE.

ON THE GREAT ISSUES OF VIETNAM...OF THE ARMS RACE...AND OF  
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICA -- I HAVE LEARNED DIFFERENCES WITH MR. NIXON  
AND MR. WALLACE.

I CALL ON BOTH OF THESE MEN TO JOIN ME IN OPEN DEBATE BEFORE  
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

LET US PUT OUR IDEAS BEFORE THE PEOPLE. LET US OFFER  
OURSELVES FOR THEIR JUDGMENT -- AS MEN AND AS LEADERS.

LET US APPEAR TOGETHER -- IN FRONT OF THE SAME AUDIENCES,  
ON THE SAME TELEVISION SCREENS, AND AT THE SAME TIME, TO GIVE  
THE PEOPLE A CHOICE.

WE MUST NOT LET A PRESIDENT BE ELECTED BY THE SIZE  
OF HIS ADVERTISING BUDGET.

WE CANNOT LET A PRESIDENT BE ELECTED WITHOUT HAVING  
MET THE ISSUES BEFORE THE PEOPLE.

I AM WILLING TO PUT MYSELF...MY PROGRAMS...  
MY CAPACITY FOR LEADERSHIP BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THEIR  
JUDGMENT.

I ASK THE REPUBLICAN NOMINEE AND THE THIRD PARTY CANDIDATE TO DO  
THE SAME.

I ASK, BEFORE ELECTION DAY THAT WE BE HEARD TOGETHER AS  
YOU HAVE HEARD ME ALONE TONIGHT.

A APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE -- AS CITIZENS OF A NATION WHOSE  
COMPASSION AND SENSE OF DECENCY AND FAIR PLAY HAVE MADE IT WHAT  
LINCOLN CALLED "THE LAST BEST HOPE ON EARTH."

I APPEAL TO YOU AS A PERSON WHO WANTS HIS CHILDREN TO  
GROW UP IN THAT KIND OF COUNTRY.

I APPEAL TO YOU TO EXPRESS AND VOTE YOUR HOPES AND NOT YOUR HATES.

I INTEND, IN THESE FIVE WEEKS, TO WAGE A VIGOROUS...TIRELESS...  
AND FORTHRIGHT CAMPAIGN FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

I SHALL NOT SPARE MYSELF, OR THOSE WHO WILL STAND WITH ME.

I HAVE PREPARED MYSELF. I KNOW THE PROBLEMS  
FACING THIS NATION.

I DO NOT SHRINK FROM THOSE PROBLEMS.

I CHALLENGE THEM.

THEY WERE MADE BY MEN. I BELIEVE THEY CAN BE SOLVED BY MEN.

IF YOU WILL GIVE ME YOUR CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT, TOGETHER WE SHALL  
BUILD A BETTER AMERICA.

1c

B

7E

1d

Remarks of McGeorge Bundy  
At DePauw University, October 12, 1968  
in a Symposium on Law, Liberty and Progress

John McNaughton and I lived next door in Cambridge for many years, and we worked together for five years more in Washington. He was a good man to have beside you in a tight spot. He proved it once to a small boy of ours who caught his head between the rungs of a chair -- John eased him out -- and he proved it many times to all of us in Washington. He was cool under pressure; clear in thought and firm in decision. He loved law; he loved the service of his country; he cared effectively for what was good and right. In a short life he did many good things, and since we have lost him and Sally and their son Ted we must take the comfort we can in what they were. No reminder could be more fitting than this memorial convocation. The McNaughtons were unusually direct and easy with friends of all ages; they were a living denial of any generation gap. So a meeting of this sort fits the way they lived themselves, and it is an honor to have a part in it.

The topic assigned to me today is a big one -- "how to build a greater America." I think John McNaughton would have smiled at it. He had the lawyer's taste for careful statement both of ends and means, and I think he might have said to me that I had let myself be mousetrapped in accepting such a large assignment. So I have asked myself what he would have done if he had been caught this way. And my guess is that his mind

would have turned at once to the hardest immediate problem before anyone who confronts the question of building a better society here at home -- the question of the war in Vietnam. He might or might not have decided to speak about it, and I do not intend in any way to hold him accountable for the views I myself intend to present, but I do think he would have agreed that there is a certain lack of realism in the fall of 1968 in describing any vision of the next years in this country without beginning from the hardest single present question of our public affairs. Until the present burden of Vietnam is at least partly lifted from our society, it will not be easy -- it may not even be possible -- to move forward effectively with other great national tasks. This has not always been my view, but I think it was John McNaughton's before he died, and it seems to me wholly clear now that at its current level of effort and cost the war cannot be allowed to continue for long. Its penalties upon us all are much too great.

But it is not enough to say that the burden must be lifted. The real question -- the McNaughton question if you will -- is how to go about it.

Decisive change in the war can come in only three ways -- by imposing a military solution, by reaching agreement with our adversaries, or by a self-imposed decision to change our own level of effort. My own view is first, that we cannot expect a military solution, second, that we should seek agreement but be prepared for the strong chance that we may not get it, and third, that with or without such agreement we should plan and execute a gradual but substantial reduction in the level of our own military effort there.

I also believe that to plan and to execute such a policy will place upon our government heavier requirements of control and self-discipline than any it has faced for many years -- with a single two-week exception of the Cuban missile crisis. Because the subject is so difficult and its analysis so demanding, I want to frame my own remarks in terms of

the problem of policy-making as it may present itself in 1969. As a private citizen, I have no desire to play the role of second-guesser on the present efforts of the President and his negotiators in Paris. All of us must hope that there will be progress in these efforts between now and January, just as we should also hope for progress on the ground in South Vietnam. If important corners can be turned in either place within the next three months, then certainly the prospects for a greater America will be brightened. But it is reasonable, in dealing with a problem so very large and painful, not to assume it away. It is prudent for all of us to face the probability that in its main outlines this problem will still be with us in 1969. At the very least, we cannot assume the opposite.

I also wish to separate this discussion from partisan politics. A memorial meeting is no place for a partisan speech. Vietnam is a necessary and proper part of the political campaign, and all of us as voters must ask ourselves about each candidate as a man who will have to place this problem first on his agenda if he wins. But my purpose today is not to shed either light or heat on that problem of choice, but rather to take the problem as one of policy-making for any administration next year.

So it is in the context of the decisions of government in 1969 that I would offer the argument that follows. The first premise of this argument is simple and strong: this war cannot continue at its present level of cost and sacrifice, not only because of what it means in Southeast Asia, but still more because of what it means in the United States. It is not right for Asia that it should go on as it is going, and the people of our own country simply will not support the current level of cost and sacrifice for another period of years.

Just as we have been divided and confused about its causes and its purposes, so now we are divided and confused about the ways and means of stopping it. And it is just this hard question of ways and means that needs more thought than it has had. But the first and essential point is that such thought should be addressed to the right goal, and the right goal now is to lift the burden of this war as we now know it. On this necessity we are not divided. It is now plainly unacceptable that we should continue with annual costs of \$30 billion and an annual rate of sacrifice of more than 10,000 American lives. It is equally wrong to accept the increasing bitterness and polarization of our people. There is a special pain in the growing alienation of a generation which is the best we have had. So we must not go on as we are going.

I am addressing myself to the future and not to the past. But it may be proper here to insert one word about that past. To say that the burden of this war must now be lifted is not at all to say that it should never have been fought. It is not even to say that it has been fought the wrong way, although that is a somewhat different question. My own view has been and remains that the avoidance of defeat in Southeast Asia was an object of such importance to us and to the people of the area that the basic decision of 1965, to stand and fight in South Vietnam, was right. I also believe that in this fundamental sense the decisions of 1965 have already been validated by events in the area. Furthermore, I do not believe that we are required now, by our new necessities, to lose what has been gained in this strategic sense. But I do believe we have to change our course. Whatever the rights and wrongs of past decisions, the imperative of the future is to begin to lift this burden from our national life.

\* \* \*

We Must Not Escalate

There is no solution to the war in Vietnam through U. S. military escalation.

There is no prospect of military victory against North Vietnam by any level of U. S. military force which is acceptable or desirable, either in our own interest or in the interest of world peace. I take it as self-evident that it would be the worst kind of folly to use nuclear weapons of any sort at any time in this contest. What is somewhat less evident is that it would be equally fruitless to seek military victory by an escalation of conventional force -- by renewed and intensified bombing of the North, or by air and naval blockade, or by enlargement of the American commitment in the South. The last three years have demonstrated plainly that American forces can prevent defeat, and it was for this purpose that they were initially introduced in large numbers. But they have also shown us that they cannot produce victory. In the last twelve months President Johnson has wisely resisted military pressure for continuing escalation. The advocates of bombing not only opposed his major cutback of March 31, but both before and after they have wanted a wider and deeper air campaign against the North. They have been wrong. Similarly, the predictable military reaction to the events of Tet last spring was to urge a major U. S. military reinforcement in the South -- the requests appear to have totalled more than 200,000 men. These requests too were wisely rejected, with marginal exceptions, and the record of the last six months -- a time in which the course of the battle has been better for us than for the opposition -- demonstrates the wisdom of this decision. For what they can do, there are more than enough Americans in South Vietnam today. And what they cannot do could not be done by twice as many men.

The importance of the case against escalation lies in the danger that some may draw false analogies from the last months of the war in Korea fifteen years ago. General Eisenhower has suggested in his memoirs that the threat of nuclear escalation by the United States was effective in bringing Communist acceptance of the Armistice Agreement of July 1953. No one outside the Communist world can prove or disprove this suggestion, but what seems very clear about Vietnam is that no similar threats will succeed there.

2 | The Government of North Vietnam has demonstrated plainly that it is prepared to accept a level of physical damage, and of battle casualties too, which is very much higher than any of us in the West would think "reasonable" in our own terms. Neither the framework of the primitive but tightly controlled North Vietnamese society nor the level of the Communist military effort has been broken by the levels of force we have so far employed. Short of nuclear weapons, no higher use of force can be expected to produce such a change, and since the American people would rightly reject by an overwhelming majority any actual use of nuclear weapons, no nuclear threat would be remotely credible. So there is no solution in escalation. Its only consequence would be a higher level of sacrifice and cost without an early ending of the war.

\* \* \*

We Can Seek Agreement, But We May Not Get It Soon

Most Americans -- and notably all political candidates -- favor negotiations for peace in Vietnam. I strongly agree. It is a real step forward that we now have a diplomatic process going in Paris, and I believe that in 1969 we can do more than we have done so far to test the possibilities of peace by agreement. At the same time I do not think we can be sure that this path is really open. It is not clear at all that Hanoi will accept any settlement that will be remotely acceptable to the people of this country.

That may be the fault of Hanoi or the fault of our public opinion or both -- but it is important to recognize that it is one thing to seek a negotiated peace and quite another to get it. This distinction may appear more clearly if we look hard at a few of the particular issues which must be negotiated. For convenience in argument let me take the recommendations of the Vietnam plank which was proposed by opponents of Administration policy in the Democratic Convention in Chicago. This remains the most "dovish" document with demonstrated support from a major political group.

The first recommendation of this plank was an unconditional halt in the bombing. I agree with this recommendation. The bombing was begun at a time when it appeared that a prompt and resolute demonstration of American will and purpose was essential to the prevention of Communist military victory in South Vietnam. That purpose is now far out of date, and the particular values which the bombing of the North still has, for the limitation of infiltration and resupply, are far outweighed by its political costs. <sup>to whom</sup> If it has not stopped before, it would seem to me both prudent and practical to stop it early in 1969. The risk to our own troops can be minimized by alternative means of defense and if necessary by alternative deployments. (P)

The diplomatic advantages of stopping the bombing are obvious: It would shift the burden of response from Washington to Hanoi. It would test the estimates and offers which have come from the United Nations and from Moscow. It would underline the reality of our purpose of peace.

But stopping the bombing in itself will not bring peace. It will simply remove one obstacle to further negotiations. So let us continue with the agenda of the minority plank. "Second," it says, "We will then negotiate a mutual withdrawal of all U. S. forces and

all North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. This should be a phased withdrawal over a relatively short period of time." This point -- which incidentally is parallel to a similar point in the majority plank -- is quite different from the first in that it calls for action by Hanoi. It therefore depends not upon our will alone but also upon theirs. And can any American assume with assurance today that this point is in fact negotiable? I think not. I do not say that it cannot be done, but I do say that we do not know it can be done. For myself, I believe that it would be a good bargain for us and for South Vietnam, but I do not know that it is a bargain we can get. The United States Government, as I understand its policy, has been ready for this bargain for years. Surely the government of 1969 must be ready for it. But what of Hanoi? What is the likelihood that given the current state of affairs in the South the men in the North would in fact agree to remove all of their forces in return for the departure of ours? There have been hints, at least, in recent months of a developing insistence by Hanoi that no such trade is justified or possible. Whereas for years the government of North Vietnam refused to admit the presence of its forces in the South, now there is a shift in the line and we begin to hear that it is right and proper for the forces for the DRV to go wherever they are needed throughout Vietnam, without regard for the Armistice lines of 1954. If we can negotiate mutual withdrawal we should, but what if we cannot? The minority plank opposes unilateral withdrawal, so its assumption must be that without such agreement we would fight on. I submit that a proposal which depends on the agreement of the enemy is a proposal which may not of itself produce the changes we must have.

The third point in the minority plank is more complex -- and it reflects an evident effort to reconcile significantly different views among those concerned. It says,

"Third, we will encourage our South Vietnamese allies to negotiate a political reconciliation with the National Liberation Front looking toward a Government which is broadly representative of these and all elements in South Vietnamese society. The specific shape of this reconciliation will be a matter for decision by the South Vietnamese, spurred to action by the certain knowledge that the prop of American military support will soon be gone."

Here again we have a requirement which it is not within our power to enforce. As the document itself proclaims, the decisive choices in this matter must be made by South Vietnamese and not by Americans. To me it has always seemed far from likely that there is in fact a possibility of a government broadly representative of the National Liberation Front and "all elements in South Vietnamese society." The two main parties to the conflict have always defined their concept of representative government in ways that exclude their main enemy. I know of no close observer of the Communists who supposes that they intend to accept any settlement in which they do not have de facto control of the future of South Vietnam, and I know of no prospect that the present government of South Vietnam would accept the concept of "political reconciliation" with Communists in the sense that we use these words at home. I do not quarrel with the objective of reconciliation, but I do wonder whether it is possible. I do not believe any policy for reducing the cost of the war can be solidly based on the assumption that such a reconciliation will come soon.

You will see that in my judgment the minority plank goes through some murky waters in its second and its third points. Yet I repeat that it is not the objective that is in question, but rather the likelihood of its achievement. I believe there would be no harm and much good in maintaining the general purpose of these two points as American

How

purposes, whatever the response of others. It is a sound part of our own negotiating position that we should be ready to withdraw as the North Vietnamese withdraw. Similarly, while I do not myself believe that we should try to force a coalition -- and especially not as a cover for intended capitulation -- I do believe that we should emphasize the broad objective of reconciliation and also the requirement that peaceful participation in the political life of South Vietnam must in the end be open to all, in any final settlement we would support.

Now I turn from the minority plank to another frequently heard proposal -- that we should negotiate a prompt cease-fire. This too is nice work if we can get it. But can we? A genuine cease-fire, in any war so largely civil as this one, is bound to work strongly in favor of the official government -- since the end of violence, almost by definition, would give that government new authority and strength. So we can ask for a cease-fire every day, but we must not count on getting it soon. I do not mean for a minute that it is wrong to seek a cease-fire. To emphasize our own readiness to stop the slaughter is as reasonable as it is helpful in showing just who wants more war. But it is something else to expect the Communists to agree in a hurry.

~~There may be more hope here in more moderate results~~ There may be more hope here in more moderate results -- the majority plank speaks of "an immediate end or limitation of hostilities" (italics added) -- and the notion of such limitation does not seem out of bounds at all. But even that will take time.

Let me sum up my own view of negotiation. It is that we should be ready for a compromise well short of victory in which the eventual outcome would remain to be settled by the people of South Vietnam. But I do not think that we can be sure of any such readiness for compromise on the other side, and my personal bet is against it, at least for 1969. I

---

would test the hypothesis by relentless diplomatic process, and I would begin by stopping the bombing. But I do not think I could be sure that these steps alone would begin to lift our burden. I believe that they would not, and that more will be needed.

\* \* \*

We Ourselves Must Choose to Cut Back

If there is no solution in escalation, and if the promise of diplomacy is uncertain, then let us return to our initial premise: that we must begin to lift this burden from our lives. The one course that remains is to lift it by our own choice and decision -- and this is the course it seems to me is the fundamental first necessity for the next administration. It must decide that it will steadily, systematically and substantially reduce the number of American casualties, the number of Americans in Vietnam, and the dollar cost of the war. It must make this decision without bargaining or negotiation and establish it as a fact of American policy which must be understood, observed and recognized by friend and foe alike, and shared in, as they decide, by the other allies of Saigon. This will not be an easy decision. What will make it especially hard is that it will not at first have widespread support among the men who must carry it into effect. Many of us are familiar with the difficulties which come in reducing the cost of so simple a private civil undertaking as building a house: if you add a room it will cost \$5,000 more, but if you take one off you seem to save only a few hundreds. There will be a parallel difficulty here. Yet what is difficult and what is impossible are two entirely different things. We have already learned in the last six months that 500,000 men do not need 200,000 reinforcements to keep our end up in the fighting. If the decision is firmly made

and effectively executed, we can come to the end of 1969 with as many as 100,000 or 150,000 fewer allied troops on the scene and with an overall cost to the United States that is cheaper by \$5 billion to \$8 billion a year. A reduction of similar magnitude should be planned for 1970. After that the course of our withdrawal would have to depend on the progress of the search for peace -- but at the levels of 1971 we could and should have a volunteer war, if we have a war at all. And even before 1971 we can do some other things to help hold ourselves together -- though most of them, unlike steps that I have so far recommended, would require help from Congress. We can and should make drastic increases in our rewards for extended service in Vietnam -- a force which rotates every twelve months is no force for this kind of war. We can and should increase substantially our after-service benefits for veterans of truly combat service. We can and should reform both the legislation and the management of our Selective Service system. We cannot end danger or dissent -- but we can do a lot about uncertainty, about unfairness, and about administrative insensitivity.

I do not at all say that these are the figures to which a careful review would lead a responsible decision maker. I do say that such changes are possible. This rate of de-escalation would be slower, indeed, than our rate of escalation -- and what goes up can come down if men decide it so. And I will say something more. This reduced level of effort is more than enough still to sustain and execute the basic purpose of our forces in Vietnam -- the purpose of preventing defeat. My own belief is that a force of this size could in fact do much more -- that it could continue to maintain the standard of tactical success which has been set so high by General Abrams in recent months. Certainly it is large enough to permit the intensification of our more sophisticated and sensitive methods

of action -- such as the improvement of intelligence and the strengthening of military advice to our allies. It would also be wholly consistent with the important decision to strengthen limitations upon the use of force in civilian areas which has been put in effect under the leadership of Secretary Clifford. It would underline our own limited purpose and strengthen our hand in the process of diplomacy. But most of all, it would begin to lift the burden of the war upon our life at home. And it would do this by our own decision in a way that is quite independent of the will of others. In that sense it is a decision that is genuinely and plainly open for us to make.

I am well aware that a policy of this sort will be open to attack both from those who think it goes too far and those who think it does not go far enough. That has been the character of our involvement from the beginning, and unless we go to the extremes of escalation or of abandonment, there is no way to escape it. I remind you that if a compromise peace by negotiation can be had, I am for it. My concern is with the choice that we must make if that hope fails. I remind you also, if you stand on the other side, that my argument against escalation and against an indefinite continuation of our present course has been based not on moral outrage or political hostility to the objective, but rather on the simple and practical ground that escalation will not work and that continuation on our present course is unacceptable.

There is a real question, which I recognize, whether the sort of reduction I have suggested is too large or too small. My own instinct would be to move to my larger targets of reduction, but my sense of the realities of government and of the requirement of reasonable mutual confidence between civilian and military leaders makes me believe that even lesser level of changes will not be easily reached. But in any case I do not think the argument

stands or falls on specific quantities. It is the decision itself and the direction it points which are central to my case. For the burden of Vietnam upon our lives at home is a burden whose heaviest weight comes from the fact that no end is in sight. Once the American government has made it plain to the American people that the burden will in fact be lifted -- even though only gradually, and even though no final promise of perfect peace is possible -- then I believe that we shall see a beginning of the necessary healing process among us. Certainly at the edges there will be those who speak of betrayal and those who press for much more drastic movement. But the administration which proves it knows the way down -- if not surely the way out -- in Vietnam, will be able to reknit the essential relation of confidence between itself and the nation.

And I repeat again that this is the only sure way. It takes two to make peace but only one to move troops. There is support for the course I am suggesting in the words of all the platforms this year. The Republicans would "de-Americanize" the war, the Democrats would "carry out cutbacks of U. S. military involvement as the South Vietnamese forces are able to take over their larger responsibilities"; the minority plank would amend our tactics to enable "an early withdrawal of a significant number of our troops." So it is reasonable to suppose that there could be general support at home for a clear decision candidly explained. We can also expect that the decision will be understood -- and even applauded after its fashion -- in Hanoi.

But what of Saigon? What happens there as we cut down? The honest answer to this question is that no one knows. Hostile critics of the Saigon government may believe that it will collapse of its own weakness at the first sign of reduction in American commitment.

Optimists and friends may believe rather that the necessary prospect of reduced American effort can stimulate increased self-reliance among those who are determined to survive against all Communist pressure. So far as it is within our means, we should act within this policy of cutback to confound the pessimists and reinforce the determined. In particular we can and should continue the emphasis which we have placed since Tet upon the modernization and reinforcement of South Vietnamese forces. We can sustain and even intensify our efforts at political and economic cooperation. We can emphasize that no one who means to keep at least a hundred thousand troops in place for years (always assuming there is no decent settlement) can be accused of precipitate or faithless withdrawal. We can emphasize what is the simple brutal fact -- that this policy is the only policy which will allow us to stay on the scene at all. We can remind ourselves and our friends that almost no one in Saigon or Washington ever supposed only four years ago that half a million Americans would be needed in South Vietnam and that it is in part a measure of strength and not weakness on the scene that we can now prevent defeat with much smaller forces. But above all, what we can emphasize -- and not only in Saigon -- is that while the Armed Forces of the United States can and do stand in the path of defeat, they cannot be the instrument of victory. The contest in Vietnam is a contest for the allegiance of the South Vietnamese. No foreign force can win that battle. This is why the root of the struggle has always been in the South. This is why the bombing has always been marginal in its final meaning; this is why the necessities of American politics now coincide with the necessities of the South Vietnamese future. In a policy of cut-back there is still ample room for steadfast support of our friends, and ample guarantee against defeat imposed by the external aggressor. There is also ample demonstration for all who live in the area not only that we

keep our commitments but also that we know how to change our course with care and clarity.

The recommendations I offer are not really new. Not only do we hear closely parallel proposals from among the campaigners, but in the larger sense what I am urging is no more than a continuation of the course we have set since Tet. That sudden assault made three things plain at once: that we were not about to "win," that Saigon was not about to lose, and that the Communists could do more to our public opinion, and less on the ground, than they had hoped. Now we should cut back -- but we need not and should not give up.

If John McNaughton were with us I think he might still be smiling a little. He knew the complexities of the contest in Vietnam and he knew at close hand the problems of command and control in Washington. He would know that while I have kept you a long time I have only sketched the outlines of a policy. He would know how much hard work and how much imperfection -- both in formulation and in execution -- must attend any course of action like the one I have described. He would know also, I think that there can be no easy assurance that lightening the burden of Vietnam will -- in and of itself -- push open the doors to liberty and progress in a greater America. He would surely have changes and improvements to suggest in specific parts of my argument, and he might well come out in a wholly different place. I cannot claim his name for what I urge. But I think perhaps I can claim his spirit for the spirit in which I have tried to speak. He was a man unafraid to confront reality and yet unwilling to abandon the test of right when he accepted the test of possibility. He did not suppose that war could be left to the soldiers alone or that peace could be made without them. He cared for Southeast Asia, but he cared also for the fabric of our free society. Above all, he believed that we must not kid ourselves, and he was right.

1968 NOV 5 17 41

VZCZCEFA 705  
OO WTE 10  
DE WTE 4243

FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP82696

1968 NOV 5 AM 12:58  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS EYES ONLY

NOVEMBER 5, 1968

HEREWITH CY'S FRUSTRATING MEETING THIS MORNING IN PARIS ON PROCEDURES.

1. VANCE HAD A TWO HOUR MEETING WITH LAU ON PROCEDURES THIS MORNING IN PARIS
2. LAU SAID THAT THUY AND MRS. BINH WERE PREPARED TO GO FORWARD WITH THE NEW WIDER DISCUSSIONS TOMORROW, WHETHER OR NOT THE GVN WAS REPRESENTED.
3. VANCE REPLIED THAT THE GVN WOULD NOT BE REPRESENTED IN PARIS TOMORROW AND THAT WE WOULD LET THE DRV KNOW WHEN OUR SIDE WAS PREPARED FOR THE FIRST MEETING WITH WIDER PARTICIPATION. WE COULD NOT AGREE TO MEET IN THE NEW FORMAT UNTIL THERE WERE AGREED PROCEDURES FOR GOING FORWARD. VANCE PROPOSED A BILATERAL MEETING WITH THE DRV TOMORROW FOR FURTHER PROCEDURAL DISCUSSIONS, AND HE FURTHER PROPOSED THAT THE FACT OF TODAY'S MEETING AND SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS BE MADE KNOWN PUBLICLY WITHOUT DISCLOSURE OF CONTENT.
4. LAU REJECTED A PROPOSAL FOR A US/DRV MEETING TOMORROW AND REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE A THREE DELEGATION MEETING ON THE 6TH. THERE WAS A PROLONGED ARGUMENT ABOUT THE DIFFERENT VIEWS OF THE US AND THE DRV ON THE "OUR SIDE/YOUR SIDE" APPROACH AND THE DRV "FOUR DELEGATION" APPROACH. LAU SAID NO MATTER WHAT WE CALLED IT THERE WOULD BE REPRESENTATIVES OF FOUR DIFFERENT PARTIES PRESENT IN THE NEW PHASE OF THE TALKS AND THEIR SIDE WOULD BE ORGANIZED AS TWO SEPARATE DELEGATIONS. ON SPECIFIC POINTS OF PROCEDURE THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 77L991-500

By NS/isp, NARA, Date 5-24-92

PRESERVATION COPY

- (A) THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE FIRST MEETING WITH WIDER PARTICIPATION WOULD DISCUSS RULES OF PROCEDURE.
- (B) ON THE ORDER OF SPEAKING THE TWO SIDES WILL ALTERNATE AND NEITHER SIDE PLACED IMPORTANCE ON WHO SPEAKS FIRST.
- (C) THE PRESENT LANGUAGE TRANSLATION PROCEDURES WILL CONTINUE IN THE NEXT STAGE.
- (D) ON PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS THE US PROPOSED CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS IN THE SAME ROOM WITH THE SAME NUMBER (9 OR 10) ON EACH SIDE AND THE ACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS TO BE WORKED OUT THROUGH THE FRENCH. THE DRV AGREED TO WORK THROUGH THE FRENCH BUT PREFERRED A LARGER ROOM AND 12 ON THEIR SIDE "BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE TWO DELEGATIONS".
- (E) THERE WAS SHARP DISAGREEMENT ON PRESS COVERAGE AT THE FIRST BROADER MEETING.

5. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING VANCE AGAIN SUGGESTED MEETING TOMORROW ON A BILATERAL BASIS TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES FOR THE FIRST WIDER MEETING. LAU WOULD NOT AGREE BUT TOOK NOTE OF VANCE'S PROPOSAL AND IT WAS LEFT THAT IF EITHER SIDE HAD SOMETHING NEW TO DISCUSS IT WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH THE OTHER.

#### 6. COMMENT

VANCE AND HARRIMAN INTEND TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FACT OF TODAY'S MEETING. THEY DO NOT EXPECT THE DRV TO AGREE TO A BILATERAL MEETING TOMORROW, BUT HARRIMAN AND VANCE ARE THINKING OF PROPOSING PROCEDURAL POINTS TO THE DRV, SUCH AS AGREEING AD REFERENDUM ON 12 TO A SIDE, WHICH MIGHT PERMIT THE HOLDING OF A BILATERAL MEETING ON NOVEMBER 6.

DTG: 051639Z NOVEMBER 1968

[2]

PRESERVATION COPY

EEA632  
OO WTE13  
DE WTE 4154

~~SECRET~~

SENT  
WHCA

SANITIZED

4

FROM BROMLEY SMITH  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82623

*Nov 1, 1968*

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

SECRETARY RUSK ASKS YOUR APPROVAL TO SEND THE DRAFT LETTER WHICH FOLLOWS TO PRIME MINISTER GORTON. THE PRIME MINISTER AND ISSUED A SATISFACTORY PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE BOMBING CESSATION.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR PRIME MINISTER:

AMBASSADOR CROOK HAS REPORTED TO ME YOUR PERSONAL DISTRESS OVER THE LATE ARRIVAL OF THE CABLES INFORMING YOU OF MY DECISION TO ANNOUNCE A BOMBING CESSATION ON THE BASIS OF A CONTINGENCY ON WHICH I THOUGHT WE WERE ALL AGREED. I MYSELF REGRET THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO INFORM YOU SOONER. AFTER ALL ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE, WE RAN INTO A SURPRISING AND DISAPPOINTING DIFFICULTY WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT OVER SECONDARY QUESTIONS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY DISTRESSING BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING AT ALL STEPS IN THE CLOSEST CONSULTATION WITH PRESIDENT THIEU AND, WE HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE, WITH HIS FULL AGREEMENT. THE NET EFFECT WAS THAT WE WERE ON THE TELEPHONE TO THE VERY LAST MINUTE ATTEMPTING TO FIND A BASIS ON WHICH WE AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE COULD MAKE A JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT. NATURALLY THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A CRUCIAL POINT FOR THE OTHER TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES COULD IT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.

WE HAVE TRIED TO KEEP YOUR GOVERNMENT FULLY ABREAST WITH THE MOST UP-TO-DATE DEVELOPMENTS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE. CERTAINLY WE WISH TO DO EVERYTHING IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO FULFILL OUR OBLIGATIONS TO YOU AND TO YOUR GOVERNMENT. I AM SURE YOU UNDERSTAND HOW COMPLEX IT IS FOR ME TO DEAL WITH MANY GOVERNMENTS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND DEAL WITH MY OWN RATHER COMPLICATED PROBLEMS IN THIS COUNTRY AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

END TEXT

*per WWR*

- APPROVED
- DISAPPROVED
- CALL ME

*state notified by Ray working  
11/1/68 - about 8:30pm*

SANITIZED

Authority 70091-498  
By RS/igw NARA, Date 3-26-93

DTG: 020534Z NOV 68  
PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

SENT  
WMCA

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
28 NOV 5 PM 1:14

EEA 786  
OO WTE 18  
DE WTE 4244

1968 NOV 5 18 10

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82697

~~SECRET~~ HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS EYES ONLY

NOVEMBER 5, 1968

YOU WILL WISH TO READ THIS LETTER TO YOU FROM PARK. IT SUGGESTS THE DESIRABILITY OF AN EARLY TROOP CONTRIBUTORS CONFERENCE. IN MY JUDGMENT, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE A CONFERENCE AFTER RATHER THAN BEFORE SAIGON IS SQUARED AWAY FOR THE PARIS TALKS; BUT YOU WILL WISH TO WEIGH THAT QUESTION.

SEOUL 18898

REF: STATE 264734

QUOTE

NOVEMBER 5, 1968

DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON,

I WISH TO ACKNOWLEDGE WITH APPRECIATION THE RECEIPT OF YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 31, WHICH AMBASSADOR PORTER HANDED TO ME ON NOVEMBER 2 UPON MY RETURN FROM AN INSPECTION TOUR OF LOCAL AREAS, IN WHICH YOU INFORMED ME OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE BOMBING HALT AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. I UNDERSTAND THAT WHILE I WAS OUT OF TOWN, AMBASSADOR PORTER ON NOVEMBER 1 INFORMED PRIME MINISTER CHUNG OF THE GIST OF THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER.

FIRST OF ALL, I WISH TO EXPRESS MY RESPECTS TO YOU FOR YOUR UNTIRING EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN HONORABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT AND TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND SECURITY OF ASIA AND OF THE ENTIRE WORLD.

AS YOU MAY PROBABLY HAVE RECEIVED A REPORT ON MY CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR PORTER, WHEN HE CAME TO ME AND EXPLAINED

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ-0198-42-1-2

NAR Date 12-08-2017

By LLL

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

IN DETAIL ON THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 15 ABOUT YOUR PLAN TO HALT THE BOMBING AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, I REMARKED THAT WE HAD TO REMAIN EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS SINCE WE WERE DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS, AND EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR RESUMING THE BOMBING IN CASE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, WITHOUT TAKING CORRESPONDING RECIPROCAL ACTIONS, ABUSES THE BOMBING HALT TO THEIR MILITARY ADVANTAGE. AT THE SAME TIME, I TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD WE ALLOW THE SO-CALLED NLF TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AS A SEPARATE ENTITY AS DISTINCT FROM NORTH VIETNAM. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESENCE OF THE SO-CALLED NLF AT THE CONFERENCE EVEN AS A PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WAS QUITE DISTASTEFUL.

WITH THESE COMMENTS, I TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT NOW THAT I WAS TOLD PRESIDENT THIEU HAD ALREADY AGREED TO IT, I DID NOT OPPOSE YOUR EXCELLENCY'S PLAN FOR THE BOMBING HALT.

AS FULLY EXPLAINED IN YOUR LETTER, IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS WERE BEING MADE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM CONCERNING THE PLAN FOR THE BOMBING HALT AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE FOLLOWED BY SUCH HALT AND THAT BOTH GOVERNMENTS HAD REACHED FULL AGREEMENT ON SUCH PROBLEMS WHILE IT WAS SO EXPECTED. SINCE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON YOUR DECISION OF BOMBING HALT WAS MADE AT 10 A.M. NOVEMBER 1 (SEOUL TIME), HOWEVER, THE REPORT FROM MY AMBASSADOR IN SAIGON AND THE REACTION OF THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM SO FAR IMPRESSED US THAT THERE STILL REMAINED CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

I WISH TO RECALL THAT WE, THE LEADERS OF THE SEVEN NATIONS CONTRIBUTING TROOPS TO VIETNAM, MET IN MANILA IN OCTOBER 1966, RENEWED OUR RESOLVE TO CONTINUE TO COMBINE OUR FORCES IN FIRM UNITY UNTIL THE DAY WHEN OUR COMMON GOAL OF BRINGING ABOUT AN HONORABLE PEACE IN THAT COUNTRY SHALL HAVE BEEN ATTAINED. IN VIEW OF THIS SPIRIT OF THE MANILA SUMMIT CONFERENCE, IT IS TO BE REGRETTED THAT THE DIFFERENCES OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SHOULD APPEAR TO BE COMING INTO THE OPEN, ALTHOUGH I DO NOT KNOW FOR SURE HOW THESE REPORTS ON THE DIFFERENCES CAME ABOUT.

UNDOUBTEDLY, DIFFICULT AND ONEROUS TASKS LIE AHEAD OF US. I BELIEVE THAT THE UNITY AMONG THE FREE NATIONS TAKING PART IN THE VIETNAMESE WAR, THE HARMONY AND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN PARTICULAR, ARE ESSENTIAL FOR ATTAINING OUR COMMON GOAL OF BRINGING ABOUT THE GENUINE FREEDOM AND SECURE AND LASTING PEACE IN VIETNAM TO WHICH WE ARE ALL COMMITTED. IN THIS REGARD, IT IS MY SINCERE HOPE THAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WILL BE RESOLVED IN A MOST AMICABLE MANNER AT AN EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE.

(2)

PARTICULARLY, IN VIEW OF THE SPIRIT OF THE MANILA SUMMIT SHOULD BE SETTLED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THE WISHES AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARE UPHOLD AND RESPECTED, IT IS CONSIDERED MOST URGENT TO IRON OUT THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION, THUS BRINGING ABOUT AN ACCORD OF OPINION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

I AM NOT FULLY INFORMED OF WHAT THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF SUCH DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE BOMBING HALT AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS PRIMARILY HAS DIRECT BEARING ON THE INTERESTS AND SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS EXPECTED TO MAKE CLEAR ITS POSITION ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WORRY ABOUT AND TO GIVE ASSURANCES TO LET THEM BE RELIEVED OF SUCH WORRIES.

I AM OF THE VIEW THAT SUCH DIFFERENCES OF OPINION COULD THUS BEST BE RESOLVED.

I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PLACE A PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE QUESTION OF THE SO-CALLED NLF.

AS POINTED OUT BY YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE SO-CALLED NLF IS NOTHING BUT AN INSTRUMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM BENT UPON AGRESSION, AND THERE IS NO REASON WHATSOEVER TO VIEW THE SO-CALLED NLF AS A SEPARATE ENTITY. IF THE ALLIED NATIONS SHOULD ALLOW THE SO-CALLED NLF TO COME TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITHOUT FIRST MAKING THIS POINT EMPHATICALLY CLEAR, THE SO-CALLED NLF WOULD CERTAINLY SEEK TO ACT AS A SEPARATE ENTITY EVENTUALLY ALTHOUGH IT MAY ASSUME A RATHER AMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE AT FIRST, THUS PROMOTING THEIR SCHEME TO FORM A COALITION GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN DESIGN AS A FIRST STEP IN WHAT THEY CALL THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT. CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD BE PLACED AT A GREAT DISADVANTAGE, CONTRARY TO OUR OWN WISHES.

SHOULD WE, DRIVEN BY THE PEACE SLOGAN SIMPLY ADVOCATED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE IRRESPONSIBLE POSITION, PURSUE A MAKESHIFT PEACE HASTILY, IT WOULD ONLY HELP NORTH VIETNAM RESUME THEIR AGGRESSION THEREBY BRINGING ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF ENDANGERING THE SECURE DURABLE PEACE. BOTH OF US SHOULD ALWAYS TAKE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST SUCH A CASE.

REAFFIRMING OUR COMMON RESOLVE TO MAKE CONTINUOUS EFFORTS WITH A COURAGE AND A STEADFASTNESS AND A PERSEVERENCE, AS WAS STATED BY YOUR EXCELLENCY, I WISH YOU ALL THE SUCCESS IN YOUR EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE.

SINCERELY YOURS, /S/ PARK CHUNG HEE PRESIDENT

UNQUOTE

DTG 051644Z NOV 68

~~SECRET~~

[3]

PRESERVATION COPY

EEA708  
OO WTE13  
DE WTE 4245

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By 14, NARA, Date 2/19/98

6

FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP82698

SENT  
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1966 NOV 5 21 50

NOVEMBER 5, 1968

HEREWITH A MEMORANDUM TO YOU FROM NICK KATZENBACH ABOUT AIRCRAFT TO GET FOOD TO THE STARVING BIAFRANS.

QUOTE

LATE LAST MONTH SPEAKER MCCORMACK SENT YOU A TELEGRAM SUPPORTING AN APPEAL BY BISHOP SWANSTROM OF CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES (ON BEHALF OF TWO OTHER CHURCH GROUPS AS WELL) THAT WE MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE INTERCHURCH GROUP TWO HERCULES AIRCRAFT TO AIRLIFT FOOD TO THE STARVING IN BIAFRA. SWANSTROM ALSO PROPOSED THAT--IF WE COULD NOT LET THEM HAVE THE PLANES--WE HELP FOOT THE BILL FOR AIRCRAFT THE GROUP WOULD LEASE IN THE UK. (THE TEXT OF MCCORMACK'S CABLE TO YOU IS INCLUDED AT THE END OF THIS MESSAGE.)

I AM OPPOSED TO PROVIDING US MILITARY AIRCRAFT. IT WOULD INVOLVE US DIRECTLY IN THE COMPLEX POLITICAL DISPUTE UNDERLYING THE WAR, AND COULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF THE PLANES AND CREWS.

BUT WE MAY BE ABLE TO HELP PAY FOR THE CHARTER OF SEVERAL AIRCRAFT (AT A COST TO US OF ABOUT \$500,000) IF THE INTERCHURCH GROUP CAN BRING ITS OPERATION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS UMBRELLA. THIS SHOULD INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF FOOD GETTING INTO BIAFRA, WHILE RELIEVING SOME OF THE POLITICAL PRESSURE HERE AT HOME FOR US TO DO MORE.

WE ARE FRUSTRATED, AS I KNOW YOU ARE, THAT DESPITE OUR SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS (\$10.1 MILLION) TO NIGERIAN RELIEF WE HAVE THUS FAR BEEN UNABLE TO PREVENT THE STARVATION OF THOUSANDS OF VICTIMS OF THIS TRAGIC WAR. IN A SEARCH FOR OTHER WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT HELP, I ASKED JOE PALMER AND A TEAM OF RELIEF EXPERTS TO GO TO NIGERIA TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PROBLEM. THEY ARE NOW BACK AND HAVE MADE A NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHICH WE ARE TAKING ACTION.

IN THE MEANTIME, I BELIEVE THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED IS FOR BILL GAUD TO WRITE DIRECTLY TO SWANSTROM, TURNING DOWN THE REQUEST FOR PLANES, BUT OFFERING TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF SUPPLEMENTING THE INTERCHURCH GROUP'S FUNDS FOR THE LEASE OF AIRCRAFT. WE COULD THEN SEND MCCORMACK A COPY OF THIS LETTER, PLUS A COVERING NOTE FROM GAUD INDICATING THAT HE WAS REPLYING ON YOUR BEHALF.

PRESERVATION COPY

THE TEXTS OF THE PROPOSED LETTERS TO SWANSTROM AND MCCORMACK FOLLOW:

DEAR BISHOP SWANSTROM:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 33 AND TELEGRAM OF OCTOBER 31 CONCERNING POSSIBLE US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE AIRLIFT OF RELIEF SUPPLIES FOR VICTIMS OF THE NIGERIA/BIAFRA CONFLICT. I HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED OF A TELEGRAM OF OCTOBER 23 FROM REPRESENTATIVE MCCORMACK, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, TO THE PRESIDENT WHICH MAKES A SIMILAR REQUEST FOR HELP.

WE APPRECIATE THAT THE COSTS OF THE AIRLIFT ARE RESULTING IN A HEAVY FINANCIAL BURDEN ON THE CHURCH GROUPS. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE INTENTION OF THE CHURCH GROUPS TO DO THEIR UTMOST TO MOBILIZE THE RESOURCES OF PRIVATE AMERICANS IN SUPPORT OF THE RELIEF EFFORT ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS CONFLICT. INDEED, WE BELIEVE THAT YOU MIGHT WELL TAKE THE LEAD IN INITIATING A GENERAL CAMPAIGN TO SOLICIT DONATIONS FROM PRIVATE AMERICANS AT LARGE. I REGRET THAT WE CANNOT HELP BY PROVIDING US GOVERNMENT HERCULES AIRCRAFT. THE COMPLEXITIES AND DANGERS SURROUNDING THE USE OF US MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION MAKE IT INADVISABLE, AS I AM SURE YOU CAN APPRECIATE. YOUR ALTERNATIVE PLAN, HOWEVER, SOUNDS LIKE A GOOD POSSIBILITY. I FEEL CERTAIN WE CAN WORK OUT A WAY TO SUPPLEMENT YOUR OWN FUNDS FOR THE AIRLIFT IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR ASSISTANCE TO THE ICRC. IN THIS REGARD, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT YOU ARRANGE A MEETING NOW WITH MR. R. PETER STRAUS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE BUREAU FOR AFRICA OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WHO IS PREPARED TO REVIEW OUR IDEAS WITH YOU IN DETAIL.

LET ME EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT WE ARE DEEPLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE NEED OF THE CIVILIAN VICTIMS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE NIGERIA/BIAFRA CONFLICT. WE HAVE ALREADY DONE A GREAT DEAL TO SUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT MOUNTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC). WE EXPECT TO DO A GREAT DEAL MORE IN THE COMING MONTHS, OR AS LONG AS OUR HELP IS NECESSARY TO ALLEVIATE HUMAN SUFFERING. THE US GOVERNMENT IS ALREADY COMMITTED TO SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF THE ICRC'S EFFORT, INCLUDING CASH DONATIONS AND MOST OF THE RELIEF FOOD PROVIDED. OUR CASH GRANTS HAVE PERMITTED THE ICRC TO CHARTER AIRCRAFT FOR RELIEF FLIGHTS, AND WE EXPECT TO ANNOUNCE SHORTLY ANOTHER SIZEABLE CONTRIBUTION.

AS I INDICATED IN MY LETTER OF OCTOBER 24, THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS FOR CONTINUING TO CHANNEL OUR ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE ICRC AND TO BUILD ON THE IMPORTANT SUPPORT IT NOW ENJOYS FROM BOTH SIDES IN THE CONFLICT. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD RUN THE RISK OF PLACING IN JEOPARDY THE ENTIRE RELIEF EFFORT NOW UNDERWAY ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINES. THUS, IN WORKING OUT YOUR AIRLIFT ARRANGEMENTS,

[2]

WE BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY THAT THEY BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH THE ICRC. I AM PLEASED TO SEE FROM YOUR LETTER THAT YOU SHARE THIS VIEW AND ARE WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE ICRC. I HAVE HEARD FROM OUR OFFICIALS IN LAGOS OF THE HELPFUL COOPERATION OF THE CHURCH AGENCIES WITH THE ICRC. I AM ALSO GLAD TO HEAR THE SAO TOME FLIGHTS ARE FULLY INTEGRATED WITH THOSE FROM FERNANDO POO. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THE LIGHT OF THE OFFICIAL NIGERIAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF OCTOBER 31 THAT THE FMG NOW HAS THE CAPABILITY OF INTERCEPTING ALL NIGHT FLIGHTS TO BIAFRA. I AM TOLD THAT ONLY THOSE RELIEF FLIGHTS SPONSORED BY ICRC WOULD HAVE FMG AUTHORIZATION.

I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH YOUR RECOGNITION OF OUR EFFORTS TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO BRING RELIEF TO THE NEEDY. WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE TRAGIC SITUATION INVOLVING STARVING PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE. YOU WILL APPRECIATE, I AM CERTAIN, THAT IN OUR ANXIETY TO HELP THOSE IN BIAFRA CONTROLLED TERRITORY, WE NOT DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD LIMIT OUR ABILITY TO HELP THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF OTHERS IN SIMILAR NEED WHO ARE BECOMING ACCESSIBLE IN INCREASING NUMBERS IN FEDERAL CONTROLLED TERRITORY.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER:

THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO REPLY ON HIS BEHALF TO YOUR TELEGRAM OF OCTOBER 23 CONCERNING THE REQUEST BY THE INTERCHURCH GROUP FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN HELPING TO SUPPORT THEIR AIRLIFT OF RELIEF SUPPLIES TO VICTIMS OF THE NIGERIAN/BIAFRAN CONFLICT. I HAVE ATTACHED A COPY OF MY MOST RECENT REPLY TO BISHOP SWANSTROM WHO HAS WRITTEN ON BEHALF OF MR. MACCRACKEN, RABBI TANNENBAUM AND HIMSELF.

WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TRAGIC SITUATION IN NIGERIA/BIAFRA. WE ARE DETERMINED TO DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE CIVILIAN WAR VICTIMS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CONFLICT. A SUBSTANTIAL VOLUME OF FOOD IS BEING SHIPPED AND DIRECT DONATIONS ARE BEING MADE TO THE ICRC. WE WILL, OF COURSE, DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO ASSIST THE RELIEF EFFORTS OF THE INTERCHURCH GROUP WHOSE HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERING ARE IN THE BEST AMERICAN TRADITION.

THE TEXT OF SPEAKER MCCORMACK'S OCTOBER 23 TELEGRAM TO YOU FOLLOWS:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I KNOW YOU ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE INTENSE HUMAN SUFFERING THAT IS TAKING PLACE IN BIAFRA. THE POOR HUMAN BEINGS ARE DYING BY THE THOUSANDS. I KNOW THAT YOU ARE DOING EVERYTHING YOU POSSIBLY CAN TO BRING RELIEF TO THOSE SUFFERING PEOPLE AND MANY OTHER GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN.

[3]

~~SECRET~~

I UNDERSTAND A TELEGRAM WAS SENT TO YOU ON OCTOBER 16 BY BISHOP SWANSTROM, RABBI TANNENBAUM, AND MR. MCCRACKEN, HEAD OF THE CHURCH WORLD SERVICE, URGING THAT THE GOVERNMENT AS THE LARGEST OWNER OF HERCULES AIRCRAFT, A TYPE OF CARGO PLANE, MAKE AVAILABLE TWO OF THE HERCULES AIRCRAFT SO THAT THE AMOUNT OF FOOD FLOWN FROM SAO TOME INTO BIAFRA FOR THE STARVING CHILDREN OF THAT REGION CAN BE DOUBLED WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL LANDINGS OR TAKEOFFS. I UNDERSTAND THE LOCKHEED HERCULES AIRCRAFT LIFTS TWICE AS MUCH AS THE DC-7'S AND 6'S WHICH INTERESTED PEOPLE ARE NOW FORCED TO USE BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO FINANCE ANY LARGER CRAFT. THEY HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH MR. MORRIS OF YOUR OFFICE. I RESPECTFULLY URGE THAT EVERY POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. IT IS A SITUATION WHICH CALLS FOR DIRECT ACTION BRUSHING ASIDE ALL DIFFICULTIES AND TECHNICALITIES. IF IT SHOULD BE FOUND THAT THE PLANES CANNOT BE ASSIGNED THEN THE GROUP REPRESENTED BY BISHOP SWANSTROM, RABBI TANNENBAUM, AND MCCRACKEN ARE IN A POSITION TO HIRE SUCH PLANES IN BRITAIN AND PROBABLY ELSEWHERE. THIS GROUP CAN RAISE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS \$500,000 BUT NEEDS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM OUR GOVERNMENT IN AT LEAST A SIMILAR AMOUNT. AS TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SUFFERING HUMAN BEINGS IN BIAFRA I URGE EVERY DIRECT EFFORT BE MADE TO BRING THE MAXIMUM OF RELIEF POSSIBLE AND I SINCERELY HOPE THAT TWO OF THE HERCULES AIRCRAFT OWNED BY OUR GOVERNMENT CAN BE ASSIGNED FOR THIS HUMANITARIAN PROJECT, IF NOT, THAT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE CAN BE GIVEN TO THE GROUP REPRESENTED BY BISHOP SWANSTROM, RABBI TANNENBAUM, AND MR. MCCRACKEN.

GAUD LETTERS TO SWANSTROM  
AND MCCORMACK ARE OK  
-----

NO  
-----

SPEAK TO ME  
-----

END QUOTE

DTG: 051907Z NOVEMBER 1968

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

[4]

Nov. 11  
3:00pm

According to Bess Abell, Mrs. Johnson  
is talking about working lunch on  
Nov. 27 and reception about 5:30p.  
HS

Mr. Rostow

ACTION

7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, November 8, 1968

1:00pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Eshkol Visit

~~1. See him~~  
2. Pres file

We have learned that Prime Minister Eshkol's dates in this country will be November 25-29 on his way to Rio (where he is due November 30). With your Thanksgiving in mind, Rabin has suggested that Eshkol might come to Washington November 25 or 26, but that's purely a working suggestion subject entirely to your and Mrs. Johnson's wishes.

The date depends largely on how and where you wish to see him. On the basis of Abe Feinberg's earlier word, we had expected Eshkol at the end of that week, and you had agreed to see him at the Ranch. Given Mrs. Johnson's commitments (out of town November 22-27), that still looks like the best bet, but his earlier availability raises other possibilities. Your total range of choices looks like this:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NK 984-168  
By AS/les, NARA, Date 4-15-93

1. Have him and Mrs. Eshkol to the Ranch for any period of time you wish around November 29, entertaining informally there as last time.

2. See him without Mrs. Eshkol in Washington on November 25 or 26 and have a small (essentially the Tuesday lunch group) working lunch with an office talk before. Your schedule is free both days, but this would leave out Mrs. Eshkol.

3. Have an office visit on November 25 or 26 and a large White House dinner. But this wouldn't work unless Mrs. Johnson's plans change. Also, given the Ruler of Kuwait's State Visit shortly after (December 11-12), it would be marginally nicer for him not to have a big Eshkol splash just before he comes.

We should probably announce sometime next week after coordinating with Rabin. I'd propose something like: "Prime Minister and Mrs. Eshkol will be passing through the US on the way to Latin America, and President and Mrs. Johnson have invited them to pay a private visit to \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_."

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Call me \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

Ranch November 29 \_\_\_\_\_  
Washington working lunch November 25 or 26 \_\_\_\_\_  
Let's talk about White House dinner \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, November 8, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Deming raised with Ed Fried the possibility that you might wish to give the Medal of Freedom to Secretary Fowler. I am sure he did this without any prompting from Joe.

W. W. Rostow

 ERF:mm

90

SECRET NODIS HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

November 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Thieu's Concurrence in the Bombing Halt

TAB A cover key excerpts from Bunler's reports of his interviews with Thieu in the period from October 13 onward.

In brief:

a. As Item 1 shows, Thieu "responded immediately and unequivocally" on October 13. This response was based on a full presentation including the representation formula. Our previous consultations with Thieu and Ky had included their express concurrence in the "your side/our side" formula in broad form on May 6, and in full detail on June 25.

b. As Item 3 of TAB A shows, on October 15 Thieu expressly concurred in a total time sequence that included a joint announcement and the convening of a broadened Paris meeting 36 hours thereafter.

c. On October 16, Thieu said that the NSC had agreed on the three central points of the arrangement. (However, at this meeting there appears for the first time concern about how the NLF presence would be depicted.)

d. In the various discussions between October 16 and October 28, a number of amendments were made in the draft of a joint announcement. This culminated in Thieu and Ky both agreeing specifically to the text on October 28. Every single element was gone over at that time, including the way we would both say that having the NLF present at the talks did not mean we accepted them as an independent entity, and so on. This point was, by then, expressly covered in the draft joint announcement. At the close of this meeting, ~~the~~ GVN Foreign Minister Thanh -- all along the

SECRET NODIS HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 716991-498

By 18/jw, NARA, Date 3-26-93

most legalistic of the South Vietnamese -- described the result of the meeting as "agreement." Bunker reported it as agreement in full, and his report gives total support to this conclusion.

This is the clear central conclusion supported by the total record. At the same time, the discussions between October 16 and October 28 do reflect a recurrent desire on the part of the South Vietnamese to get Hanoi to say in so many words that it will talk direct to the GVN, and to get Hanoi to admit that the NLF would be present solely as a part of the Hanoi delegation. These points were shot down again and again, and apparently laid clearly to rest on October 28. But they do foreshadow the problems that arose in the last three days.

One further note. On October 15 (Item 2 in TAB A) Thieu specifically insisted on "no long delay" between cessation and the first meeting, or at least the announcement that there would be a first meeting. On October 16, as noted above, Thieu specifically agreed to a timetable that called for a 36-hour interval. On October 28, Bunker reported that he had several times brought to Thieu's attention that we had in mind to stop the bombing "2 or 3 days before the meeting." Thieu never had the slightest objection to this time interval, but only kept wondering why Hanoi was delaying.

*Secret*

*In Reply to: For the President  
From Walt Rostow  
Herewith the two factual memoranda  
you requested  
this morning* 96

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

Memorandum

Subject: TCC Concurrences in Our Course of Action in Paris

*sent Pres  
at lunch time  
CAPY 2676*

1. Australia. Our request for concurrence was conveyed through Ambassador Waller in Washington on the evening of October 14, our time. We showed Waller a full description of the whole proposal, which had indeed been gone over previously with him and on which we had had Australian comment. Early the following morning, October 15, Waller advised that Gorton was fully aboard.

2. Korea. Ambassador Porter presented the matter fully to President Park on October 15 in Seoul. Park responded that "he does not wish to object to the US proposal because President Johnson is the leader of the war effort and is in the best position to judge whether the risks are acceptable." He expressed skepticism that Hanoi would accept all three of the basic points, and he urged that we take every precaution to resume bombing if "reciprocal action" along the lines we expected was not immediately visible.

3. New Zealand. Holyoake was fully briefed on the situation on October 10, just before we had the clear message from the North Vietnamese. This was done at the ANZUS Council meeting in Washington by Bundy (and the same for Hasluck of Australia). On the evening of October 14, Bundy reached Holyoake (through Laking) in New York, and Laking immediately called back to say that Holyoake concurred. The Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand, Marshall, explicitly confirmed this to Ambassador Henning on the 15th.

4. Philippines. Ambassador Williams saw Marcos early on the morning of October 16, Manila time (early evening of October 15, our time). Marcos responded--after a complete exposition--that "you can tell your government that I will support this program." Marcos did go on to ask specifically whether we had President Thieu's approval, and Williams assured him that we did.

5. Thailand. Ambassador Unger saw Thanom at 1400 on October 15, Bangkok time (0200 October 15, Washington time--or

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

Authority NLQ 91-498

By MS/jw, NARA, Date 3-26-93

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS~~

~~-2-~~

8-10 hours before the Paris meeting). Unger reported that "he believed we should proceed with the next private meeting and, if US satisfied Hanoi accepts these steps and understandings, announcement should be made and arrangement should be tried." Thanom went over a number of points, including reconnaissance and continued action in Laos. Unger characterized his final reaction as "forthright agreement."

For good measure, we sent a State Department officer to brief Thanat in New York on the morning of October 15. This was done after we had word from Bangkok that Thanom had been seen, and had concurred. Thanat was highly flattered that we had informed him fully, and has made a press statement since the announcement that the Thai had been fully consulted and they would certainly have protested vigorously if they had not been.

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS~~

9c

5

TAB A

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS~~

GVN STATEMENTS INDICATING ASSENT TO  
US COURSE OF ACTION

1. October 13 Meeting with Thieu (Saigon 40220).

...Thieu then said so long as we are going to press the offensive in the South and in Laos, and so long as we are prepared to resume the bombing if they violate the DMZ or attack the main cities, he is ready to go along. "After all," he said, the problem is not to stop the bombing, but to stop the war, and we must try this path to see if they are serious." I thought this a statesman's view.

...We then talked about timing and procedures for handling next action, as reported in para 4 reftel [Saigon 40178]. I made it clear that we could not say publicly that there were conditions or reciprocity, but the facts would speak for themselves. He understood.

...Comment: I must confess I thought Thieu would want to think over-night about this before providing an answer, but he responded immediately and unequivocally. Most times he thinks clearly and logically. This meeting was the latest demonstration of this, and it is also the answer to those who think he is indecisive.

2. October 15 Meeting with Thieu (Saigon 40330).

...We then went over again, at his request, the way in which the joint announcement would be handled; its brevity, the absence of any reference to conditions or reciprocity, etc. He said this was acceptable, but he wished to impress on us the importance of no long delay between the cessation announcement and the first meeting to be attended by the GVN, or announcement that they would attend. If there was a long delay, he would have serious problems. I said we were conscious of this.

He said Ambassador Lam would head the talks in the first instance, but he would need to be reinforced. I asked if he had in mind to use VP Ky, as he once thought he might. His answer was vague and non-committal. I had the impression that he did not intend to send Ky out -- at least not in the early stages. Berger separately had the same impression.

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7169 91-498  
By uj/jw, NARA, Date 3-26-93

3. Bunker/Thieu Meeting October 15 (Saigon 40372).

I saw Thieu at 0700 hours, and went over sequence in terms of private meeting agreement at X hours, thereafter plus one, two, etc. hours for different steps. We also went over drafts of proposed statements.

He will brief VP, PriMin, FonMin, MinDefense, Min Interior, Chiefs JGS at 0900 local, and speakers, after hearing results private talks.

He raised several important points on drafts:

A. He objects to phrase "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam" in joint statement and prefers North Viet-Nam, or North of 17th parallel.

B. He insists that joint announcement either positively refer to GVN attendance at formal session, or deletion of all reference to a joint session tomorrow in this announcement.

C. He also plans to make statement after joint announcement issued, and feels he must refer there to GVN attendance at first formal meeting. He hopes President Johnson will do likewise.

D. His separate statement will avoid any reference to conditions, agreements, etc. and will follow line we proposed....

4. Bunker/Thieu Meeting October 16 (Saigon 40379).

...He then spoke of the meeting he had had with the National Security Council and said that they were all agreed on the three points in relation to the cessation of bombing, but they were unanimous in expressing their concern about the NLF presence at the meetings.

...He then referred to our draft joint announcement on cessation and said he would prefer tht no reference at all was made to the convening of a formal session in the joint announcement, and he would substitute for para 2 the following sentence: "This common decision has been taken in complete conformity with our many public statements on the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam."

...He said he would let us have a draft of his own separate statement as soon as possible. He thought that even in that statement, he might not make specific reference to the date and time of the formal meeting which SVN will join, but he may only say the peace will require serious discussions. He said twenty-four hours after cessation, this would speak for itself. (Comment: He may have second thoughts about this and, therefore, will await his text.)

6 A. Thieu/Bunker Meeting October 17 (Saigon 40532).

He said that it would cause great difficulties for the GVN should a meeting take place after cessation without the GVN presence.

...Thieu said he would like to study our proposal [relating to GVN proposed changes in the draft joint communique] overnight and would talk with me about it tomorrow. I said I thought it important that we agree on the text as soon as possible since we might get a reply from Hanoi at any moment....

4 B. Bunker/Thieu Meeting October 20 (Saigon 40710).

...At this point I gave him the draft text of the joint announcement using the words North Viet-Nam in the first paragraph and omitting the subordinate clause starting with the words "consistent with the principles, etc. in para two. He read it and said he thought it was satisfactory and that the question which now remained was how to solve the practical aspects of the NLF presence.

...As I got up to leave I said that while some might object to the GVN going into talks with Hanoi and the NLF, he must bear in mind that the great majority of South Vietnamese were tired of war and wanted an end. While he might be criticized for attending the meetings by some, many more would criticize him for refusing to attend. He said he was conscious of the desire for peace here, as well as elsewhere, and this is why he is searching so desperately for a means which will enable him to join in the talks and stay.

6. Bunker's Meeting with President Thieu October 28  
(Saigon 41323).

...I opened by saying that Washington welcomed his and Ky's suggestions at our last meeting for changes in the draft joint announcement, and had amended the last versions to give effect to these changes, the main one of which was to elaborate the fourth paragraph to include certain points intended originally to figure in our President's accompanying statement. The result we thought was a much better and fuller joint announcement from every point of view, and I hoped it would meet all the requirements of the GVN. I did not see how we could go any further.

...Thieu read the new draft and said, "I do not see how we can ask for anything more." He will discuss it with Ky and the Prime Minister. He asked if there was anything new in the talks with Hanoi.

...Thieu asked why was Hanoi delaying since there was understanding in principle almost two weeks ago. I said I didn't know. It may be that they are having trouble with the NLF," Berger interjected. "It may be that they are studying the signs of difference between you and us which have appeared here, and now see an opportunity to drive a wedge between us, and capitalize on it." Thieu said they would certainly try to do that....

...I said we were unable to go any further in meeting the GVN needs than the draft joint announcement. Also, we could not meet their request for procedural meetings before the main meeting. They had therefore to decide whether they were going to join the talks or not, and they might have to decide on short notice. I suggested a joint meeting with Ky and the Foreign Minister this afternoon to see if any issues remain. We will meet at 1700 hours. I said if the GVN raises new conditions and does not join the first meeting Thieu should not underestimate the serious consequences of such a decision. He said he was aware of them, but thought we were pretty well agreed now between us.

Thieu then asked how we thought the talks would move. We said we thought at an early stage Hanoi would put in demands for a cease-fire, for the withdrawal of the US and Allied forces, and for coalition or revision of the Constitution to permit coalitions. We should be preparing ourselves urgently for dealing with these substantive issues.

Comment: I think we are in the clear here, but will know for certain after tonight's joint meeting. I am for digging in at this point, unless they come forward with any constructive suggestions.

9. Joint Meeting with Thieu, Ky and Thanh October 28 (Saigon 41356)

The meeting with Thieu, Ky and Thanh took place in the late afternoon, and the fact that more than half the time was taken up by exchanges between the Vietnamese (mostly between Ky and Thieu) showed how necessary it had been. I can report that at the end of the meeting (attended on our side also by Berger and Herz) we reached agreement on a somewhat changed joint announcement, but one which I believe we can accept and which the GVN believes will make it easier for them to cope with criticism that they had agreed to meet with the NLF. It was not easy.

...Ky, who apparently made the greatest difficulties during the discussions, came up to me after the meeting and said he had worked hard to find a compromise. Perhaps he did so in the end since after numerous attempts to present the future meetings as involving only three delegations, which I rejected, Ky finally said, "I think it is better that we openly recognize that the NLF will be there." It was Ky, apparently, who offered to drop as unnecessary, the phrase about the other side being constituted by Hanoi as they wish it to be constituted". He said, "The reality is that we accept the Front at the conference." The most important thing from the GVN point of view, as Thieu emphasized, is to make the last sentence of the joint announcement (about non-recognition of the NLF) as strong as possible.

Since the GVN in the end gave up their attempts to picture the meetings as consisting of only three participants, I just wish to record that discussion was long and difficult. At one point Thieu asked me if I had received binding instructions from my government that the conference must not be pictured as taking place between three delegations. I answered in the affirmative. Earlier in the discussion I pointed out once more that since Hanoi wished the meetings to be four-power, and Saigon wishes them to be three-power, the only possible basis for talks was to be silent on the point. Ky understood this well, even while trying to squeeze us. He said: "I understand your problem. You can't have a conference if Hanoi won't come--or if Saigon won't come." But he kept trying, nevertheless, to find some formulation that would have made it appear that there was only one delegation on the other side.

After agreement was reached on the text (septel), Ky said, "Quite frankly, we are not satisfied, but with such material we can explain, only it will be difficult to convince the people. If the conference lasts many months, our problem will be to prevent a disintegration of morale on our side." I repeated, with some emphasis, that this is entirely the wrong way of looking at the meeting with the North Vietnamese if it eventuates: The GVN should present it as a victory, it will have forced the DRV to negotiate with them, the talks will be a sign that the DRV despairs of obtaining its goals on the battlefield, that it recognizes that it cannot subvert or intimidate the South Vietnamese. Besides, we will be at the side of the GVN both at the talks and in pushing our military advantages in South Vietnam, so that the danger of disintegration should be entirely on the other side. ... At the end it was Thanh himself who used the word "agreement" to describe the outcome of today's joint meeting.

~~SECRET~~

Friday, November 8, 1968 - 6:05 pm

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Attached is Secretary Fowler's memo recommending another careful look at the problem of neutralizing the balance of payments cost of U. S. military expenditures in East Asia after the fighting stops in Vietnam.

He suggested a NSC meeting on this subject but I don't think we are ready for that yet. The Treasury proposals are not staffed out and not agreed with State and Defense. My recommendation is that you assign this to the Deming Steering Group (Deming, Nitze, Gene Rostow, Ed Fried), to go over the material and prepare recommendations for you. If you wish, you could then have a NSC meeting to go over the issues.

W. W. Rostow

Assign to Deming Steering Group \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By MP, NARA, Date 9-10-97

Schedule NSC meeting \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

ERF:mst

~~SECRET~~

Proposed Actions After A Truce in Vietnam

A. Military Costs

1. Sale of U.S. facilities. After the fighting stops we should, to the maximum extent possible, lease or sell for convertible currencies surplus U.S. wartime facilities located in Vietnam and elsewhere in the area, to public and private purchasers. If necessary a part of these sales might be on soft terms and for local currencies but only where we foresee a U. S. need for them. We should minimize outright grants. Where the U.S. is not directly recompensed for such facilities, our contributions should be taken into account in determining the U.S. share of multilateral burden-sharing.

DOD will report on (a) the cost of our installations in Vietnam, Thailand, Ryukyus and, as appropriate, elsewhere in East Asia, (b) who has legal ownership of these installations, (c) who has the residual rights to fixed property and movable property, (d) the prospects for selling or leasing fixed and movable property, and (e) a surplus property disposal program.

2. Termination of grant military aid in East Asia, and Military offsets. (a) Grant military aid should be terminated. Where military equipment is needed, it should be paid for by the recipient country to offset U.S. military costs in the country. Where this is not feasible, the equipment should be provided on a dollar credit basis, or in exchange for local currencies only where we need them for early U.S. use. DOD, State and Treasury should prepare country-by-country plans for implementation.

(b) In countries where U.S. troops are stationed, we should seek a full military offset to cover the cost of these forces. We should seek increased cash payment for military goods, host country contributions of land, buildings, utilities and other services, and as high a percentage of U.S. local currency needs as possible, perhaps through a Freedom Credit Fund in which the U.S. and host countries would establish drawing rights in favor of each other, which we could use for purchases of military goods and services. DOD, State and Treasury should prepare country-by-country plans for implementation.

3. Neutralization investments. We should consider long-term investments in U.S. securities only as a last resort stop-gap offset. We should analyze the prospects for institutionalizing these investments over the long-term, i.e., making arrangements for appropriate percentage of reserve accruals to be invested in this form. Treasury should report on this subject.

4. DOD offshore procurement. To the extent DOD offshore procurement is necessary and cannot be financed with excess currencies, we should endeavor to shift purchases to LDC's receiving U.S. aid, and use this as grounds to reduce the amount of U.S. aid.

5. Country-by-country gold budgets. Country-by-country gold budgets should be prepared to focus attention on military aid and expenditures and economic aid programs for each country in East Asia, and for indicating the individual and joint actions of U.S. agencies to obtain savings. The Bureau of the Budget should be asked to institute appropriate procedures.

6. Burden-sharing. In the period after hostilities, we should seek a more equitable sharing of the military burden to reduce the overwhelming burden presently borne by the United States and to allocate a more appropriate share to nations within East Asia, as well as to countries outside East Asia with strong interests in the area.

7. Establish our military alliance on a sounder financial basis. The United States Government should consider the establishment of a Pacific Peace and Progress Pact. This would replace --

- SEATO
- ANZUS
- and other bilateral security arrangements.

Such a Pact would have a financial component. Its major purpose would be to provide an enduring security alliance after the fighting in Vietnam stops. It would concern itself with --

- force levels
- sharing the burdens of defense
- financing security costs in a manner consistent with the balance of payments positions of donor countries.

In short, the Pact would provide in the security field the same kind of enduring multilateral arrangements provided in the economic assistance field by the Asian Development Bank.

Finance and Economic Ministers have an appropriate forum for consultation on economic development matters in the Asian Development Bank. They should also participate in the deliberation of the Pacific Pact -- not only to provide financial underpinnings for that institution but to provide a communications bridge between the multilateral institutions responsible, respectively, for military security and economic growth.

8. Japan. U.S. expenditures in Japan for military services and support are substantial (the net military deficit is now running at an annual rate exceeding \$500 million per year) and may continue. Unless satisfactory enduring arrangements are negotiated to offset the balance of payments costs, DOD together with State and Treasury should establish a special group to examine Japan's long-range security requirements for its own defense and for assisting in the common defense. It should explore ways in which Japan can contribute real resources for its own defense and for the common defense of the area. We should recommend that Japan establish a counterpart to this group. In the absence of satisfactory arrangements, the U.S. group should prepare a time table of phasing down U.S. military expenditures in Japan. Alternative base locations should be examined, including Australia and New Zealand.

9. The Ryukyus (Okinawa). The effort to reduce U.S. expenditures in East Asia should apply with particular force to the Ryukyus should those islands revert to Japan. In addition, specific policies would have to be developed to meet special situations affecting the U.S. balances of payments in the event of reversion. Major questions are listed below:

~~SECRET~~

4

(a) Conversion from U.S. dollars (now the currency of the Ryukyus) to yen. Would the dollars accrue to Japan and, if so, how can we best negotiate with Japan on their use?

(b) Would we also want an agreement on the use of dollar earnings which would continue as long as we have bases in Okinawa?

(c) How quickly should the economic aid now being given to the Ryukyus by DOD be terminated?

(d) What would be the trade and payments effects of reversion?

(e) Could U.S. assets and installations be sold if U.S. troops are withdrawn?

State-Treasury and DOD should report on the prospects for reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan, the estimated impact of reversion on U.S. expenditures and the balance of payments, and proposals for ensuring that balance of payments considerations are given appropriate weight with respect to determining the U.S. view on reversion and the terms of reversion.

## B. Reconstruction and Economic Assistance Costs

1. Postwar reconstruction aid for Vietnam. We must convert what is now a unilateral U.S. economic aid effort in Vietnam into a long-range multilateral economic assistance program in which multilateral lending institutions and other countries play a meaningful role.

(a) The Asian Development Bank should spearhead multilateral development and reconstruction action after the fighting stops. The U.S. Director should be asked to begin to examine the possibilities and report on (1) possible contributions from the Bank's ordinary capital, (2) possible contributions through a special fund, and (3) the appropriate role for the Bank with other donors -- multilateral institutions, the UN Special Fund, and individual countries.

~~SECRET~~

(b) A list should be prepared by State, Treasury and AID of people who might act as the Asian Bank high level coordinator to obtain maximum contributions from other donors.

(c) In any multilateral burden-sharing arrangement, particular attention should be paid to ensuring that after hostilities Japan plays a major role in financing postwar needs of the area in accordance with its capabilities. Also, other countries in East Asia whose economies have benefitted from our expenditures associated with the war in Vietnam should be encouraged to assist in the postwar reconstruction of Vietnam. Vietnam itself, must, of course, make the maximum contribution it is capable of, imposing strong self-help measures, and utilizing forex reserves which have been built up during the war.

2. Long-range U.S. economic aid in East Asia and burden-sharing. The new situation brought on by an end to the hostilities in Vietnam provides an opportunity for reexamining and revising U.S. aid policies in a variety of ways, including the following:

(a) In determining the U.S. share of economic aid to any country, we should seek to ensure that the U.S. is given credit for U.S. military expenditures in that country, since military security and viable economic progress go hand in hand, and it is the donor country's share of the total that is relevant.

(b) The U.S. share of economic aid should reflect not only our real resource capabilities but should take increasingly into account the commercial trade and payments patterns of the recipients. This approach would reduce the historical tendency for the other industrial countries to gain international financial strength at our expense. Steps must be taken to ensure that the aid policies of all donors contribute to the adjustment process in international balance of payments, rather than exacerbating the international imbalance which now exists.

(c) Aid recipient countries should take increased responsibility for obtaining greater burden-sharing -- bilateral or multilateral. There is a tendency on the part of these countries not only to look to the U.S. for help but to assume that the U.S. will shoulder the burden of selling other donors on providing assistance. This burden must be assumed by the recipient countries as part of their self-help efforts.

(d) Present tying techniques must be continued and strengthened where possible. Third country procurement now justified to meet wartime needs should be discontinued.

(e) A report should be prepared on how AID tying techniques can be made more effective in key East Asian countries (their recommendations presumably would have applicability for other parts of the world as well). They should focus on ways in which --

i) Generous AID terms can be "passed through," at least in part, from recipient governments to the ultimate importer of foreign goods, so that the individual importer is provided a real financial incentive -- flowing from our concessionary terms -- to procure in the United States.

ii) U.S. technical assistance (training of recipient country personnel in the use of servicing of U.S. equipment) can be geared to maximize follow-on exports from the U.S.

iii) Export missions to East Asian countries can be utilized in conjunction with AID efforts to help stimulate interest in competitive U.S. goods.

iv) New yardsticks can be devised to measure -- year by year -- the degree to which our AID-financed exports are supplanting U.S. commercial exports, so that we minimize such substitution. The problem of substitution should be kept in mind throughout the whole

~~SECRET~~

7

process of formulating economic assistance programs for individual countries, and guidelines for measuring the effectiveness of efforts to minimize substitution should be prepared in time for program reviews this fall.

- v) The extent to which AID missions in the major program countries should be organized to give increased and continuing attention to the commercial aspects of our assistance efforts.
- vi) The appropriateness of establishing an office of Inspector General in AID/Washington to supplement and reinforce efforts in the field to improve our commercial opportunities in all our aid programs.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

11

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Friday, November 8, 1968  
4:55 p. m.

*Free file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a South Vietnamese analysis of what Thieu has thus far accomplished by his posture on the bombing halt.

OK -- if he moves fast to Paris now.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-508  
By sig, NARA, Date 1-11-93

WWRostow:rlm

CNO  
DIA/ISIC  
JCS  
NIC  
DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER  
STATE (RCI)  
CIA-OCI  
ZEM

**SANTIZED**

**SANTIZED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-504

By           , NARA, Date 11-30-92

11a

1.3  
(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 7 NOVEMBER 1968

SUBJECT [REDACTED] CLAIM THAT PRESIDENT THIEU'S INITIAL REFUSAL TO JOIN THE PARIS TALKS HAS INDIRECTLY INCREASED HIS FREEDOM OF ACTION AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW PREPARING A NEW PEACE PROPOSAL.

Rostow

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [REDACTED]

1.3  
(a)(4)

SOURCE [REDACTED]

SUMMARY:

FOREIGN MINISTER THANH AND A SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT ARE PREPARING A DETAILED THREE-STAGE PROPOSAL INVOLVING (1) AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, (2) DIRECT SAIGON/HANOI TALKS, AND (3) DIRECT SAIGON/NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT TALKS. VICE PRESIDENT KY HAS TOLD FRIENDS HE IS SOLIDLY BEHIND PRESIDENT THIEU. WHILE THIEU HAS TOLD HIS BROTHER HE IS PLEASED WITH KY AT THE MOMENT. [REDACTED] THIEU, WHO PREVIOUSLY ENJOYED NO REPUTATION AS AN ANTI-COMMUNIST STALWART, HAS BY HIS 2 NOVEMBER SPEECH, CONVINCED PEOPLE OF HIS ANTI-COMMUNISM, FORGED UNITY AMONG THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL ELITE, AND LAID THE BASIS FOR A CHANGE IN POLICY, INCLUDING EVEN DIRECT TALKS WITH THE FRONT. HE HAS ALSO PROVED HE IS NO AMERICAN LACKEY. END SUMMARY.

1.3  
(a)(4)

1.3  
(a)(4)

[REDACTED] FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN CHANH THANH AND PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC ARE WORKING ON A DETAILED PEACE PROPOSAL INVOLVING THREE STAGES:

A. AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF INTERESTED PARTIES TO DEAL WITH FOREIGN TROOP WITH WAL ND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT.

B. DIRECT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN)/NORTH VIETNAM (DRV) NEGOTIATIONS TO DEAL WITH ITEMS OF MUTUAL CONCERN SUCH AS REUNIFICATION, FAMILY REUNIONS, PRISONER EXCHANGES, ETC.

C. DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE GVN AND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF REINTEGRATION OF NFLSV ELEMENTS INTO SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. THIS PROBABLY COULD NOT INVOLVE A TRUE COALITION GOVERNMENT, BUT THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE NFLSV OR ITS SUCCESSOR AS A POLITICAL PARTY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE IMPOSSIBLE UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

1.3  
(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED] ON 4 NOVEMBER VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY TOLD A SMALL GROUP AT THE MARINE CLUB HE IS SOLIDLY BEHIND PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU. AFTER INDULGING IN SOME JOOCULARITY, KY TURNED SERIOUS AND SAID THAT "TO ME, THERE IS ONLY ONE LEADER IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) TODAY AND THAT IS PRESIDENT THIEU. MY JOB IS TO HELP MAKE HIS LEADERSHIP MORE EFFECTIVE." [REDACTED] LATER NGUYEN VAN KIEU, THIEU'S BROTHER, TOLD [REDACTED] THAT THIEU IS VERY PLEASED WITH KY AT THE MOMENT AND THAT ALL CONCERNED HOPE THIS SITUATION WILL CONTINUE.

1.3  
(a)(4)

A. AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF INTERESTED PARTIES TO DEAL WITH FOREIGN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CONFLICT.

B. DIRECT GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN VIETNAM (GVN)/NORTH VIETNAM (DRV) NEGOTIATIONS TO DEAL WITH ITEMS OF MUTUAL CONCERN SUCH AS REUNIFICATION, FAMILY REUNIONS, PRISONER EXCHANGES, ETC.

C. DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE GVN AND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF REINTEGRATION OF NFLSV ELEMENTS INTO SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. THIS PROBABLY COULD NOT INVOLVE A TRU COALITION GOVERNMENT, BUT THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE NFLSV OR ITS SUCCESSOR AS A POLITICAL PARTY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE IMPOSSIBLE UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

1.3(a)(4)

2. ON 4 NOVEMBER VICE-PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY TOLD A SMALL GROUP AT THE MARINE CLUB HE IS SOLIDLY BEHIND PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU. AFTER INDULGING IN SOME JOCLARITY, KY TURNED SERIOUS AND SAID THAT "TO ME, THERE IS ONLY ONE LEADER IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) TODAY AND THAT IS PRESIDENT THIEU. MY JOB IS TO HELP MAKE HIS LEADERSHIP MORE EFFECTIVE." LATER NGUYEN VAN KIEU, THIEU'S BROTHER, TOLD THAT THIEU IS VERY PLEASED WITH KY AT THE MOMENT AND THAT ALL CONCERNED HOPE THIS SITUATION WILL CONTINUE.

3. TURNING SPECIFICALLY TO THE PRESENT GVN/US IMPASSE RESULTING FROM THE BOMBING HALT ANNOUNCEMENT, THIEU HAD TOLD THE LEGISLATORS WHO GATHERED AT THE PALACE ON 2 NOVEMBER HE COULD HAVE FOUND A WAY TO AN AGREEMENT IF ONLY THE AMERICANS HAD GIVEN HIM A FEW MORE DAYS. IF THE GVN HAD SENT A DELEGATION TO PARIS FOR THE 6 NOVEMBER MEETING, IT WOULD HAVE PLAYED INTO THE VIET CONG'S HANDS BY PROVING THE GVN WAS INDEED A LACKEY OF THE AMERICANS. HE ADMITTED HOWEVER THAT THE GVN'S FAILURE TO ACT HAS RESULTED IN ITS NOW BEING ACCUSED OF BEING UNINTERESTED IN PEACE AND OF BLOCKING EFFORTS TO ATTAIN PEACE FOR SELFISH REASONS.

1.3(a)(4)

4. THIEU HAS PREVIOUSLY NOT ENJOYED A GREAT REPUTATION IN SVN AS AN INVETERATE ANTI-COMMUNIST AND HAS THEREFORE BEEN DISTRUSTED BY MANY OF THOSE DEDICATED TO THE ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE. THE ONE MAN-ONE VOTE FORMULA OF THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE EXEMPLIFIED THIEU'S DIFFICULTIES ON THIS SCORE. WHEN HE WAS CRITICIZED FOR ACCEPTING THE FORMULA, THIEU TRIED TO CLARIFY HIS POSITION FIRST BY SAYING THE FORMULA ALSO APPLIED TO THE DRV AND THEN BY CLAIMING IT APPLIED ONLY TO DESERVING PEOPLE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE CONSTITUTION. NOW, THIEU HAS ACCOMPLISHED A NUMBER OF THINGS BY HIS 2 NOVEMBER SPEECH:

1.3(a)(4)

A. HE HAS DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED HIS ANTI-COMMUNIST BONAFIDES AND SO FURTHER CONSOLIDATED HIS POWER AND ENHANCED HIS POSITION AS SVN'S TOP LEADER.

B. HE HAS FORGED UNUSUAL UNITY AMONG SVN'S POLITICAL ELITE.

C. HE HAS LAID THE GROUND WORK FOR A CHANGE IN HIS COURSE, INCLUDING EVEN DIRECT TALKS WITH THE NFLSVN. THE COUNTRY NOW KNOWS HE WILL NOT SELL SVN TO THE COMMUNISTS AND, PERHAPS AS IMPORTANT TO SOME, THAT HE IS NOT A SERVANT OF THE AMERICANS.

5. DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, MR COLBY, MAJOR GENERAL DAVIDSON) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL BROWN) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

1.3(a)(4)

Pres Jek

ACTION

12

Friday, Nov. 8, 1968  
4:50 p. m.

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith:

TAB A - A helpful suggestion by Thanat that the TCC's, with their well-known views about the NLF, ask the GVN and the USG to represent them in Paris;

TAB B - A cable telling Bunker to raise this with Thieu as Thanat suggests;

TAB C - A draft of a statement which Bunker could use with Thieu, along with our threat to proceed on our own in Paris, summarizing our positive understandings as a basis for Thieu's getting off the hook.

TABS B and C require your clearance.

W. W. Rostow

TAB B:    Approved \_\_\_\_\_    No \_\_\_\_\_    Call me \_\_\_\_\_

TAB C:    Approved \_\_\_\_\_    No \_\_\_\_\_    Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachments~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-508  
By mg, NARA, Date 1-11-93

12a

A



Department of State

1 126

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM  
ACTION COPY

CO RUEHC  
DE RUMTBK 22724K 3151530  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 081451Z NOV 68 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1903  
STATE GRMC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ BANGKOK 22724

2 3 8 5 Q  
1968 NOV 8 PM 12:39

*Postow*

MODIS

DEPT PASS IMMEDIATE TO SAIGON, CANBERRA, MANILA, PARIS SEOUL  
AND WELLINGTON

REF: STATE 268744

FOLLOWING MESSAGE DRAFTED BY AMB UNGER ON NOV 7 WITHOUT KNOW-  
LEDGE OF REFTEL (ALTHOUGH CLEARLY RELATED THERETO) OR OF  
PRESIDENT THIEU'S STATEMENT QUOTED IN SAIGON 42256: QTE

1. ENROUTE BANGKOK TO PATTANI THURSDAY AFTERNOON FM THANAT AND  
I DISCUSSED VIETNAM SITUATION AND PRESENT IMPASSE OVER GVN  
BE FOUND WHICH WOULD ENABLE THIEU TO DECIDE HE COULD GO AHEAD.
2. THANAT SAID HE HAS BEEN THINKING ABOUT SOME WAY OF BRINGING  
THE OTHER 5 ICC (BESIDES SVM AND US) TOGETHER SO THAT THEY MIGHT  
SPECIFICALLY INDICATE THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE ~~IDEA OF PROCEEDING~~  
~~WITH THE TALKS IN PARIS AND ASK GVN AND USG TO REPRESENT THEM~~  
~~THERE, AT LEAST UNTIL SOME LATER TIME WHEN THEY MIGHT WISH TO~~  
~~PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY, IT IS THANAT'S THOUGHT THAT THIS MIGHT SAY~~  
~~TO THE WORLD, IN EFFECT, AND TO THE GVN, THAT THESE NATIONS ALL~~  
~~SEE VALUE IN PROCEEDING WITH THE TALKS AND NONE OF THEM IS CON-~~  
~~CERNED LEST THIS ACTION COULD BE INTERPRETED AS ACCORDING~~  
~~RECOGNITION TO THE NLF; IT IS WELL KNOWN, OF COURSE, THAT NONE OF~~  
~~THEM IS PREPARED IN ANY WAY TO GRANT SUCH RECOGNITION.~~
3. THANAT, IN REPLY TO MY QUESTIONS, SAID HE HAD NO DEFINITE  
THOUGHTS AS TO HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THIS PURPOSE. ~~HE TENDS NOT TO~~  
~~FAVOR ANYTHING LIKE A FORMAL MEETING OF THE 5 ICC AND WONDERED~~  
~~WHETHER HE MIGHT SIMPLY CONSULT IN BANGKOK WITH THE AMBASSADORS~~  
~~OF THE OTHER FOUR AND WORK OUT A FORMULA WHICH COULD BE COMMUNI-~~  
~~CATED TO THE GVN AND USG. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW THE STATUS OF~~  
~~DISCUSSION IN SAIGON BUT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT HIS IDEA MAY PROVE~~  
~~TO BE VERY USEFUL AND I WOULD LIKE TO REPORT IT TO MY GOVERNMENT.~~  
THANAT AGREED AND ALSO AGREED WITH MY THOUGHT THAT BEFORE PRO-

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ-0198-42-1-5

By LLLA NAR, Date 12-08-2017

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- BANGKOK 22724, NOVEMBER 8

CEEDING WITH ANY CONSULTATIONS, IF THEY SHOULD PROVE TO BE DESIRABLE, ~~IT WOULD BE WISE TO TALK THE PROPOSAL OVER WITH THIEU TO DETERMINE AT THE OUTSET WHAT ACTION OR FORMULA WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO HIM. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS CHECKING BE DONE BY AMB BUNKER IN SAIGON.~~

4. THANAT WILL BE RETURNING TO BANGKOK SATURDAY AND ALTHOUGH I WILL CONTINUE WITH MY TRIP, HANNAH COULD FOLLOW UP WITH THANAT ON ANY FURTHER EXPLORATION DEPT DESIRES IF IT WISHES PURSUE THIS THOUGHT. IF IDEA AS SET FORTH ABOVE APPEARS USEFUL AS IT STANDS, HOWEVER, I AM SURE NO FURTHER CHECKING WITH THANAT REQUIRED BEFORE APPROACHING THIEU. FONMIN APPEARS PERSUADED, INCIDENTALLY, THAT OTHER TCC WOULD GO ALONG WITH HIS THOUGH AND SPECIFICALLY CONFIRMED THIS TO ME WITH REGARD TO KOREA.

5. IN COURSE OUR DISCUSSION THANAT MADE CLEAR TO ME HIS DIM VIEW OF MARCO' PROPOSAL FOR MEETING OF TCC TO CONCILIATE US-SVN DIFFERENCES AND SAID RTG WOULD NOT ATTEND.

GP-3 UNGER

NOTE: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDEES BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

12c

B

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

12d

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~  
 Classification

Origin	ACTION: Amembassy	BANGKOK	IMMEDIATE
		SAIGON	"
Info	INFO: Amembassy	CANBERRA	PRIORITY
		MANILA	"
		PARIS	"
		SEOUL	"
		WELLINGTON	"

STATE  
 PARIS TODEL \_\_\_\_\_ FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE.  
 NODIS HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

1. Thanat's ideas conveyed in Bangkok 22724 seem to us of great potential value in the total operation of getting the GVN to Paris.

2. As things now stand, Thieu's statement of Nov. 8 is clearly unacceptable to Hanoi (and probably to us as well). Unless GVN simply goes back to the original formula by some device, we shall probably be considering a US or US/GVN statement that would deal heavily in our view of the NLF. If there were to be such a statement, we can readily see the usefulness of immediate TCC endorsement of it.

3. Accordingly,

a. Bangkok should convey our warm thanks to Thanat for

Dated by: EA; WPBundy:bnm 11/8/68	Tel. Ext. 4235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by	The Under Secretary <i>W</i>
--------------------------------------	-------------------	--	------------------------------

The White House -

S/S- Mr. Read

~~SECRET~~

FORM 8-65 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
 NLJ-0199-42-1-6  
 By LUJ NARJ. Date 12-08-2017



~~SECRET~~  
Classification

his suggestion. You can tell him that there is the possibility of some sort of clarifying statement at some point, and that TCC association or endorsement might well be extremely helpful. We will keep him posted.

b. Bunker may, as he sees fit, broach this possibility with Thieu in next meeting.

BP-3            END

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

12e

C

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

12F

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin  
Date

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE  
Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

STATE

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS TODEL \_\_\_\_\_ FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NL 9 91-500

By sp/inf, NARA, Date 3-26-9

1. In the light of the important points in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Saigon 42288, and the possible urgent need for some sort of unilateral or joint statement that could be used by Thieu to get off his domestic hook, we have tried our hand at a draft ~~xxxxxx~~ US statement ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ which would be expressly designed for publication.

2. In effect, this text would be our "furthest north" in what could be said publicly without changing the agreed framework of the Paris meetings and without inviting factual refutation by Hanoi. It has been framed as a unilateral US ~~statement~~ but the substance could be put into a joint statement if that were a better vehicle. In any event, before repeat before we offer any such draft other than in the broadest outline, we need Paris

Dated by EA:WPBundy:mk 11/8/68

Tel. No. 4235

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

Under ~~PHS~~/Secretary *[Signature]*

White House - Mr. Rostow

S/S - Mr. Read

~~SECRET~~

Classification



~~SECRET~~  
Classification

views on whether it is accurate, subject to refutation ~~by~~ from Hanoi, or (for good measure) subject to any particularly effective propaganda rejoinder from Hanoi.

3. The text is as follows: (lettered paragraphs for convenience only)

~~ВРАХХВХЭСИДНИКХХИКИМХ~~  
statement

a. This/~~МЛЯЯЯЯ~~ is designed to clarify the arrangements for a new and wider meeting in Paris to find a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. the President's stopping

b. Prior to/~~МХ~~ announcement on October 31 of the/~~ЭВХХАХКХ~~ of bombing against North Viet-Nam, agreement had been reached in Paris between North Vietnamese and US negotiators that a meeting on the substance of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam should be promptly convened in Paris.

c. This agreement was preceded by discussions in which ~~the~~ US spokesman made clear that a cessation of bombing and the holding of such a meeting would not be possible without the participation of the Republic of Viet-Nam as a separate delegation forming, with the US delegation, one side in the meeting. US negotiators made clear to Hanoi that it might bring on its side of the table any persons it wished, without regard to their association with Viet-Nam in any way.

d. The North Vietnamese representatives in Paris accepted this proposal in principle, about October 16, and indicated that they would have/~~with~~ them,

~~SECRET~~  
Classification



~~SECRET~~  
Classification

on their side, representatives of the so-called National Liberation Front.

e: This was and is the sole agreement concerning representation in the new Paris meetings. In the discussions, it was made clear throughout that, whoever Hanoi chose to bring on its side, the arrangement involved no element of recognition whatever. The US Government has at all times regarded the so-called National Liberation Front as an organization controlled by North Viet-Nam. The NLF is not in any sense a separate entity, much less a government.

f: In the light of these facts, the arrangements agreed in Paris provide for ~~in essence~~ in essence, a two-sided meeting. Hanoi clearly understands and accepts that our side will be constituted as separate delegations of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States. There has been no parallel understanding ~~as to how the other side shall be constituted.~~ as to how the other side shall be constituted.

g: In the light of ~~this record~~ this record, the status of the Republic of Viet-Nam as a separate delegation is already defined. If Hanoi fulfills its repeated undertakings to enter seriously into the proposed Paris meeting--undertakings repeated throughout the contacts between North Vietnamese and American representatives in Paris--the practical fact is that Hanoi must talk

~~SECRET~~

Classification



~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

directly and seriously with the Republic of Viet-Nam.

h. Similarly, the agreements leave it entirely open how the Republic of Viet-Nam and ~~the~~ US delegations will address the other side. There has never been the slightest doubt that, consistent with our view of the nature of the so-called National Liberation Front, we would regard all the representatives on the other side of the table--whatever they might claim for themselves--as representatives of a single side, that of Hanoi, and for practical purposes as a single delegation. ~~XXXXXX~~  
Every ~~action~~ ~~by~~ the US delegation will be consistent with this ~~approximate~~ view.

i. On the roles to be played in the Paris meetings by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States delegations, it has all along been understood that the Republic of Viet-Nam delegation would play a leading role, as was explicitly affirmed in the Honolulu communique of July. ~~The consultations between/xx~~ ~~the GVN and US~~ have likewise made clear that the Republic of Viet-Nam should take the lead and be the principal spokesman on all matters which are of immediate and direct political concern to ~~South~~ ~~South Viet-Nam and affect~~ ~~South Viet-Nam's future status.~~ Thus, this practical division of labor will again compel a situation in which North Viet-Nam must talk directly and seriously to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

j. The new Paris meetings will be expected to address all questions.

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

relevant to a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. They will start with a clean slate and without prior substantive agreements or understandings of any sort. The sole agreements that have been reached in the earlier Paris talks between North Vietnamese and US representatives have concerned the cessation of bombing, the convening of a new meeting, and the tacit and express understandings required to achieve and maintain these.

k. In the new meetings, the US delegation will operate in the closest cooperation with the Republic of Viet-Nam, and in continuing consultation with the nations that have contributed military forces to the ~~the~~ defense of South Viet-Nam.

1. The substantive position of the American Government will continue to be based on the Manila Communique and on other publicly stated positions. In particular, there has been no change whatever, and will be no change, in the position of the US Government ~~wx~~ toward a so-called "coalition" in South Viet-Nam. In the terms used in a US Government statement of December 8, 1967:

"... We have repeatedly made clear that our objective is that the South Vietnamese people determine their own future without external interference. The imposition of any coalition government would be at variance with this principle. We would oppose any proposal which

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

which would turn the Government of South Viet-Nam over to the NLF. In essence, we believe that the South Vietnamese must work out their own future, acting through electoral processes of the kind ~~xxx~~ carried forward in the past two years."

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXX~~

GP-1.

End.

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

ACTION

13

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

Friday, November 8, 1968 -- 4:05 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's proposed draft  
to Bunker for Thieu.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Approved as amended \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 3-25-93

HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS/SECRET

WWRostow:rln

13a

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

Origin ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

Info INFO: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

STATE

NODIS HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS TODEL \_\_\_\_\_ FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE  
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 9129 91-50.6

By NS/OP NARA, Date 3-26-93

1. You should continue to seek appointment with Thieu. We leave it to you how hard to press, or whether a touch of aloofness might be more effective.. Obviously, we need to get forward as rapidly as we can.

2. For the meeting, you should convey the following points as an oral message from the President:

(a) We note with surprise that President Thieu announced a position on the negotiations involving the United States without any consultation with us. Even though we were not able to reach agreement at the last moment on all matters involved in the cessation of the bombing, there can be no question but that we consulted intimately and at length with

Dated by: WFB  
EA:WPBundy:bmm 11/8/68

4235

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: DR/SR  
The Secretary

White House -  
Mr. Rostow

NK/B.L.  
The Under Secretary S/S- Mr. Read

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

President Thieu before our action was taken and public statement made. Please ascertain from President Thieu his answer as to whether this procedure of his is to be followed in the future. If so, we will have to adjust our own attitudes accordingly.

(b) As far as President Thieu's proposals are concerned, they should be followed up by a GVN delegation in Paris. It is for the GVN to try to reach agreement with the DRV on the modalities of Thieu talks. We cannot undertake to represent ~~XXX~~ in seeking agreement from Hanoi along the lines of his public announcement. This does not mean that we ourselves reject them as far as the United States is concerned. But we have just come from a recent experience in which we have engaged the good faith of the United States on the basis of what we had every right to believe was a common position of the United States and the GVN, only to have President Thieu repudiate our understanding at the last moment. We cannot again undertake to involve our good faith and make it subject to the whims of Saigon. The emphasis in President Thieu's proposal in GVN primary responsibility. They should therefore exercise it and get a delegation to Paris at once to probe the possibilities in whatever way is open to them.

(c) On the substance of President Thieu's proposal, he

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

should understand that, whatever the form that is eventually agreed, the United States will speak for itself and will not delegate this responsibility to someone else. No other attitude is possible under our Constitution.

(d) ~~XX~~ President Thieu wishes a negotiating format in which the United States and the NLF are in the same relative position. <sup>Even if</sup> ~~we could~~ <sup>we could</sup> ~~perhaps~~ live with it, ~~but~~ we wonder if President Thieu ~~XXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ in the light of what it would do to dignify the NLF.

(e) Finally, it should be emphasized very strongly that the problems President Thieu has in mind are problems with which his delegation should wrestle in Paris in the procedural phase of the new meeting. Unless a GVN delegation is in Paris in the course of next week, the United States will feel free to discuss its own interests with any delegation available to it. The American people, under whatever President, will simply not support the war effort or if there is significant delay on issues they regard as secondary. if the GVN attempts to sabotage serious talks about peace, <sup>we have</sup> never asked the GVN to be a satellite of the United States; we are not prepared to permit the United States to be a satellite of the GVN.

<sup>bases</sup>  
(f) The President ~~XXXX~~ his judgment of ~~XXX~~ American public opinion not only on unanimous expressions in all media that seating

~~SECRET~~

Page 4 of telegram to Saigon, Paris TODEL~~SECRET~~  
Classification

arrangement is only practical solution, but on ~~views~~ <sup>views</sup> expressed by leading senators and Congressmen of both parties that GVN must take its place, or US should go ahead without them.

3. Having delivered this stiff message, you might perhaps await Thieu's reaction. In the light of it, you should be prepared to go ahead and state that we are perfectly willing to issue a statement covering the exact agreement reached in Paris, the role of the GVN, how we propose to treat the NLF, our continued rejection of any "coalition," and similar matters. Some of the points, such as the exact agreement reached in Paris, must necessarily come from the USG, but we could try to work out some form of joint statement, or agreed separate statements, if these would help Thieu's domestic political problem. The gist of your <sup>whole</sup> ~~presentation~~ presentation should be that we are not repeat not unsympathetic, but that action is imperative.

GP-1

END

*Pres file*  
*14*

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

Friday, Nov. 8, 1968  
1:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

As background, you may wish to have the fact stated by Berger in a phone call plus Harriman-Vance views on Thieu's latest.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ag, NARA, Date 3-25-93

14a

Secure Phone Calls, 9:30-10:30 a.m.  
November 8, 1968

Sam Berger

1. Berger informed me that Bunker had been unable to see Thieu at any time on November 8 before or after Thieu's public statement. An appointment had been requested for tomorrow but no definite time had been set.

Ambassador Vance

1. Vance gave me Harriman, Habib and his preliminary views about the Thieu public proposal for two "unique" delegations with the GVN heading our side and the DRV heading the other side. Our delegation believes that Thieu's proposal is "unacceptable and unworkable" from the point of view of both sides in Paris.

(a) The Thieu proposal is untenable from the USG viewpoint because if the GVN were Chairman of our side the GVN representative could take a variety of steps and actions which could prejudice our interests and over which we would not have control, e.g., "breaking up" a meeting, giving fast reactions to DRV/NLF views on matters of basic concern to us without adequate "consultation", etc.

(b) The reference by Thieu to inclusion of TCC representatives on our side "if necessary" would raise a number of complications if our allies chose to take advantage of it in the early stages of expanded talks.

(c) The proposal is almost certain to be rejected by Hanoi because it purports to dictate how Hanoi will organize its side of the expanded discussions. The DRV is apt to note that the GVN proposal is inconsistent with the views expressed by Saigon just a few days ago which insisted on two delegations on our side and one on the other.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS~~

Authority 769 91-506

By reg/isp, NARA, Date 3-26-93

2. For consideration at Secretary Rusk's 11:30 meeting today at the Under Secretary's request I asked Vance for his and Harriman's views on the question of whether the DRV would be willing without the NLF being present to negotiate substantive bilateral questions with us (e.g., mutual withdrawals, prisoner exchanges, Laos), if it became evident that the GVN would not come to Paris on an acceptable basis.

Harriman and Vance believe that if they put this proposition to the DRV representatives as hard and persuasively as possible Hanoi's initial response would be that circumstances had changed and they would not be prepared to go ahead bilaterally with us, although they were prepared to sit down with us on such issues with the NLF representatives present. Harriman and Vance think that the DRV would cling to this pattern for "a considerable period".

Benjamin H. Read

*Pres file*

Friday, November 8, 1968  
1:05 p. m.

15

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

We have just completed a meeting at Sect. Rusk's office, which included Sect. Clifford, Nick Katzenbach, and Bill Bundy, as well as myself.

It was agreed that we would draft for your consideration a message to Thieu, via Bunker, which would not, at this stage, be a direct Presidential letter but rather an oral message from the highest levels of the U. S. Government.

The message would, essentially, make these points:

- Thieu's proposal of today that South Vietnam chair the delegation in Paris is not acceptable;
- On the other hand, we can offer an agreed statement underlining a leading role for the GVN and the leading role in matters affecting the future of South Vietnam itself. Such an agreed statement could also include reference, once again, to the fact that we shall not recognize the NLF as an independent entity, etc.
- We would underline strongly the necessity for Saigon to get its delegation to Paris next week;
- We would tell them that if they cannot get to Paris next week, we are prepared to open talks with the other side on our own, on the issues of direct concern to the U. S.

The line-up of opinion was:

- Clark Clifford: Tell them we're going to open up with the other side in Paris next week, and let them sweat;
- Sect. Rusk: Give them one last face-saving way out, but tell them that we shall go it alone if they can't quickly find an acceptable formula;
- Nick Katzenbach: Same view as Sect. Rusk;
- Bill Bundy: More cautious about telling them bluntly that we shall go it alone. Bundy thought that the President should first get Nixon aboard on that proposition.

I shall be giving you the draft text as soon as I receive it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-508

By WFO, NARA, Date 1-11-93

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

Friday - November 8, 1968

11:10 AM

16

Pres file

Mr. President:

When you appointed Nat Davis as Ambassador to Guatemala it was understood that he would leave for his post around Thanksgiving. The State Department is increasingly concerned about leaving the post uncovered any longer than absolutely necessary and would like him to leave the weekend of November 16. There are reports of possible plotting against the Guatemalan Government which might come to a head the following week, and the morale of senior officers of the post has been strained by the long period of tension since Ambassador Mein's death. Although the difference in time is not vital, State does feel that an early arrival would be very desirable.

Nat has finished his work on the history projects. Under the circumstances, I recommend that you agree to release him Friday, November 15.

W. W. Rostow

Approve the release  
date of November 15

—

Do not approve

—

Call me

—

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7169 89-200

By sg/tp, NARA, Date 4-15-93

SWLewis:mm

INFORMATION

17

~~SECRET~~

Friday, November 8, 1968  
11:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this Soviet approach in the wake of Eban's memorandum.

Despite contrary noises in the press, I do believe that, if we put our shoulder to the wheel, we have a chance of turning the corner in the Middle East in the next several months. Quiet collaboration with the Soviet Union in getting behind the next phase of the Jarring mission could be important and useful.

Interestingly enough, our people have been discussing in the last few days how to weave U. S. - Soviet consultation into the next stage of the Middle East peace effort.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 7630

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-508  
By sig, NARA, Date 1-11-93

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

WH

RR RUEHC  
DE RUEHDT 7630 3130045  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
R 080030Z NOV 68  
FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4445  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ USUN 7630

2178Q  
1968 NOV 7 PM 8 14

NODIS

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST - SOV APPROACH

1. SOV DEPUTY FON MIN SEMENOV ASKED FOR APPT WITH BUFFUM NOV 7 TO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST.
2. IN PRESENTING HIS ANALYSIS OF WHERE MATTERS STAND ON EVE OF DEPARTURE ARAB FON MINS, SEMENOV ~~CHOSE TO PUT BEST POSSIBLE FACE ON LATEST ISRAELI PAPER GIVEN JARRING. HE SAID EBAN'S DOC MUCH MORE POSITIVE IN TONE THAN PREVIOUS ONES AND EVEN SOUNDED MORE CONSTRUCTIVE IN WAY IT DEALT WITH ACCEPTANCE OF SC RES.~~ SEMENOV OBVIOUSLY PLEASSED THAT JARRING MISSION WILL CONTINUE, POSSIBLY IN EUROPE. HE AGREED WITH BUFFUM'S SUGGESTION THAT NEXT STEP IS TO PERSUADE BOTH PARTIES TO GIVE JARRING EVEN MORE TO WORK WITH WHILE SEEKING TO MAINTAIN AN ATMOSPHERE IN THE AREA WHICH WOULD BE CONDUCIVE TO NEGOTS. HE CONCURRED IN IMPORANCE OF LATTER INCLUDING NEED TO AVOID RECURRENCE OF SUEZ HOSTILITIES ALTHOUGH HE POINTED TO HIGH PICH OF EMOTIONALISM AND NEED TO PREVENT ANY ONE INCIDENT FROM OVERSHADOWING THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF MAKING PEACE. HE ~~REAFFIRMED CATEGORICALLY SOV UNION EAGER TO SEE THE MOST RAPID POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT.~~
3. SEMENOV ~~THEN MADE VERY INTERESTING SUGGESTION THAT IN APPROACHING NEW PHASE OF JARRING'S MISSION, AND PUREEY IN AN EFFORT TO PROVIDE POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO HIM, WE START SYSTEMATIC EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON KEY PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN A SETTLEMENT.~~ HE SAID HE KNOWS WE CANNOT RESOLVE SUCH MATTERS AS JUST WHERE PERMANENT BOUNDARIES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BUT HE FELT THERE ARE PARTS OF PROBLEM WHERE WE COULD USEFULLY GET CLARIFICATION OF EACH OTHER'S VIEWS.

*Rowlow*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *h* NARA, Date 2-19-98

~~SECRET~~

-2-USUN 7630, NOV 8, 1968

4. BUFFUM REMINDED HIM OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR GOVTS ON THIS SUBJECT IN SEPT AND SAID ~~WE WOULD IN ANY EVEN BE INTERESTED IN GETTING ELABORATION OF SOV VIEWS ON SOME OF THE QUESTIONS WE PUT TO THEM IN OUR RESPONSE.~~ SEMENOV SAID HE WOULD CONSULT MOSCOW ON THOSE MATTERS BUT ADDED HE SEES NO REASON WHY WE CANNOT HAVE A PRODUCTIVE "UNOFFICIAL" EXCHANGE IN NEW YORK; HE INDICATED HE WILL BE HERE FOR BALANCE OF GA WHICH WOULD OFFER ADEQUATE TIME AND MADE POINT THAT HE IS THE RESPONSIBLE SOV FON MINISTER OFFICIAL ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

COMMENT: ~~SEMENOV APPROACH APPEARED SERIOUS ONE.~~ SINCE HE PUT REQUEST FOR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH US EXPLICITLY IN TERMS OF ASSISTING JARRING EFFORT AND NOT (REPEAT NOT) REPLACING IT AND SINCE HE STRESSED EXCHANGE WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE "UNOFFICIAL" CHARACTER, IT SEEMS TO US WE HAVE SOMETHING TO GAIN FROM SUCH PROCESS AND RELATIVELY LITTLE TO LOSE.

GP-2.

WIGGINS  
BT

~~SECRET~~

Pres File

18

**SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS**

**Friday, Nov. 8, 1968  
9:45 a. m.**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

**Herewith Bunker on the circumstances  
surrounding Thieu's statement.**

**Key passages marked.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~ attachment**

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983**  
By ng, NARA, Date 3-26-93

**(cc: George Christian)**



Department of State TELEGRAM <sup>180</sup>

~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\* ZZ RUFNCR  
DE RUMJIR 42270 3131040  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z O 081030Z NOV 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4100  
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2809  
STATE GRNC 1968 NOV 8 AM 6 12  
BT

**ACTION COPY**

02297

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42270  
NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS  
PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769 89-72  
By ng/sep, NARA, Date 3 26 93

DEPT ALSO PASS IMMEDIATE BANGKOK MANILA CANBERRA SEOUL WELLINGTON

1. I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO SEE PRESIDENT THIEU SINCE YESTERDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 7, BUT THE MEETING WAS POSTPONED FIRST TO THIS MORNING AND THEN TO AN INDEFINITE TIME THIS AFTERNOON.
2. AT 3:45 PM TODAY MY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAS ASKED BY THE FORMIN TO CALL ON HIM AT 4:00. THANK GAVE HIM THE TEXT OF A DECLARATION (SEPTEL) WHICH HE SAID THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE AT APPROXIMATELY 4:45 PM. (THE PRESIDENT GAVE IT TO THE PRESS ABOUT 20 MINUTES AFTER WE WERE HANDED THE TEXT.)
3. POL COUNSELOR READ THE TEXT AND IMMEDIATELY ASKED THANK WHETHER HE COULD CALL THE PRESIDENT (IF I REQUESTED BY TELEPHONE) ASKING FOR A FEW HOURS' DELAY SO THAT WE COULD DISCUSS THIS STATEMENT SINCE IF NOT AMENDED IT MIGHT CREATE NEW DIFFICULTIES FOR THE GVN. THANK REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT HIMSELF CALL THE PRESIDENT BUT WE MIGHT CALL THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT, MR DUC. HE REMARKED AIRILY THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD MERELY SET FOR THE GVN'S PRESENT POSITION AND THAT IF NECESSARY THEIR POSITION COULD BE MODIFIED LATER.
4. WHEN I HAD READ THE STATEMENT AT ABOUT 4:30, I INSTRUCTED HERZ TO TELEPHONE DUC AND TO JUST SAY THE FOLLOWING: "AS WE READ THE FIRST FOUR PARAGRAPHS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED STATEMENT, IT SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT THE GVN WILL NOT NEGOTIATE UNTIL THERE IS A COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IT HAS BEEN OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE GVN AND WE AGREED THAT THIS WAS NOT A DESIRABLE POSITION TO TAKE." (COMMENT: WE THOUGHT THAT SINCE THERE WAS SO LITTLE TIME TO DISCUSS THE STATEMENT, THIS REMARK WAS MOST APT TO GIVE THIEU PAUSE. ACTUALLY, THERE ARE OF COURSE MORE IMPORTANT OBJECTIONS TO THE STATEMENT.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 42270, NOV 8, 1968, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

5. DUC SEEMED TAKEN ABACK, SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO DISCUSS THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, BUT DID ASK HOW WE HAD ARRIVED AT THE ABOVE IMPRESSION. AT MY INSTRUCTION HERZ MERELY REPEATED OUR REMARK SO DUC COULD TAKE IT DOWN, THEN SAID WE LEFT IT TO DUC TO PASS IT ALONG IF HE THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE, AND THAT WE HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY FOR THE TIME BEING.

6. WE UNDERSTAND THAT WHILE THIS CONVERSATION WAS TAKING PLACE, THE PRESIDENT WAS ALREADY MAKING THE STATEMENT TO THE PRESS AT INDEPENDENCE PALACE, TO BE FOLLOWED BY RADIO AND TV ADDRESS.

BUNKER  
BT

NOT PASSED TO BANGKOK MANILA CANBERRA SEOUL WELLINGTON BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

186  
TELEGRAM  
/

~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\* ZZ RUFNCR  
DE RUMJIR 42275 3131128  
ZNY SS3SS ZZH  
Z 081125Z NOV 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4101  
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS FLASH 2810  
STATE GRNC

2309 Q

1968 NOV 8 AM 6 38

BT  
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42275

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS  
PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: SAIGON 42256

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712991-506

By RS/loj, NARA, Date 3-26-93

1. ~~IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUERIES ON THIEU'S STATEMENT (REFTEL), WE ARE RESPONDING THAT WE HAVE NO COMMENT AND ARE STUDYING HIS STATEMENT. RECOMMEND WASHINGTON AND PARIS FOLLOW SAME LINE.~~

2. ~~I SEE NO POINT IN TRYING TO ANALYZE THIS STATEMENT UNTIL AFTER I SEE THIEU, AND GO INTO ITS OBVIOUS SHORTCOMINGS FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. I WILL AGAIN MAKE CLEAR THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THE PRESS.~~

BUNKER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

19

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, Nov. 8, 1968  
7:50 am

Mr. President:

Herewith the full text of Thieu's statement.

As noted yesterday, he expects us to make a counter-proposal.

I think it's time for us to move hard -- Nixon or not -- and get him to Paris next week.

1. copy  
2. Pres file

*W. Rostow*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-508  
By 118, NARA, Date 1-11-93

19a.

AP38  
U R G E N T

(SAIGON)--SOUTH VIETNAM'S PRESIDENT THIEU (TOO) HAS PROPOSED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT REPLACE THE UNITED STATES AS THE LEADER OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST NEGOTIATING TEAM AT THE PARIS PEACE TALKS.

UNDER THIEU'S PLAN, THE COMMUNIST SIDE WOULD BE LED BY NORTH VIETNAM. HE SAYS THE RE-ORGANIZATION COULD ALSO INCLUDE THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT--THE POLITICAL ARM OF THE VIET CONG.

BN450ES 8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CORRECTED COPY

196

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCE1088 NOV 8 10 32

PAGE 01 SAIGON 42256 081019Z

19  
ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SA 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00,  
USIE 00, CCO 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,  
SS 25, SAH 02, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /121 W

----- 125329

O 080915Z NOV 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4093  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA  
AMEMBASSY MANILA  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 42256

CORRECTED COPY (PARA. 3.)

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT HANDED TO US AT  
4:15 PM NOVEMBER 8, 1968

2. BEGIN STATEMENT:

IN RESPONSE TO THE TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM  
EFFECTIVE AS OF 9:00 PM SAIGON TIME, NOVEMBER 1ST, 1968, THE  
COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS INSTEAD OF DEESCALATING ALSO THEIR SIDE OF  
THE WAR, HAVE ON THE CONTRARY CONTINUED THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST TOWNS  
AND CITIES AND THEIR ACTS OF TERRORISM DIRECTED AT THE POPULATION IN  
SOUTH VIETNAM.

3. FROM NOVEMBER 1ST TO NOVEMBER 7TH, THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS  
HAVE LAUNCHED 33 ATTACKS BY ROCKET AND MORTAR AGAINST VARIOUS TOWNS  
AND CITIES, PERPETRATED 11 ACTS OF SABOTAGE, 8 ACTS OF TERRORISM, AND  
2 ASSASSINATIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 91-506

By sg/isp, NARA, Date 3-26-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 42256 081019Z

4. THESE CALLOUS ATTACKS AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE, FOLLOWING THE DRAMATIC GESTURE OF GOOD WILL OF THIS SIDE IN STOPPING COMPLETELY THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, HAVE MADE 326 VICTIMS.

5. IN THE MEANTIME, THE HANOI REGIME BOASTS THAT IT HAS SUCCESSFULLY FORCED THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM WHICH IT HAD REQUIRED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE PARIS TALKS, AND URGES ITS TROOPS AND CADRES IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY THEIR ATTACKS UNTIL COMPLETE VICTORY, THAT IS COMPLETE DOMINATION OF THIS PART OF THE WORLD BY BRUTAL FORCE.

6. WE FACE THIS CHALLENGE WITH CALM DETERMINATION.

7. NOW AS BEFORE, SIDE BY SIDE WITH OUR ALLIES, WE ARE DETERMINED TO THWART THE COMMUNIST ATTACKS, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO SPARE NO EFFORTS TO EXPLORE ALL THE PATHS WHICH CAN LEAD TO A GENUINE PEACE.

8. WITH THE CALM, SELF-CONFIDENCE, AND REASONABLENESS OF THOSE WHO ARE AWARE OF THEIR STRENGTH AND CONVINCED OF THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF THEIR CAUSE, WE CONTINUE TO PURSUE OUR EFFORTS FOR PEACE IN FREEDOM.

9. WITH REGARD TO THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE TALKS RAISED A WEEK AGO, WE SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A TWO-SIDE MEETING.

10. EACH SIDE IS TO CONSIST OF A UNIQUE DELEGATION HEADED BY THE PRINCIPAL PARTY.

11. OUR SIDE IS THE SIDE OF THE VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION. IT NATURALLY IS TO BE HEADED BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, ON WHOSE SOIL THE WAR HAS BEEN WAGED, AND WHO HAS BEEN FIGHTING TO DEFEND ITS FREEDOM FOR OVER TEN YEARS. OUR DELEGATION WILL INCLUDE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND IF NECESSARY THE OTHER ALLIES.

12. THE OTHER SIDE IS THE SIDE OF THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS, TO BE HEADED BY NORTH VIETNAM, WHO DIRECTS THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. THEIR DELEGATION CAN INCLUDE MEMBERS OF HANOI'S AUXILIARY FORCES, LABELLED AS "NLF".

13. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS FORMULA IS THE MOST REASONABLE AND RATIONAL ONE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE EXPLORATIONS TOWARD A JUST SETTLEMENT, WHICH CAN ASSURE LONG LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY FOR VIETNAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 SAIGON 42256 081019Z

AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. END TEXT. BUNKER  
BT

NNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE / *map*  
WASHINGTON *2. People*

Friday, Nov. 8, 1968  
7:50 am

Mr. President:

Herewith another indication the North Vietnamese may wish some US forces to stay in South Vietnam -- probably as a counter-weight to Communist China.

*W. W. Rostow*

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *MP*, NARA, Date *9-10-97*

~~SECRET~~

# Intelligence Information Cable

IN 29952

20a

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SDO	ONE	CRS
DDI		EXO						OER	FBIS	DCS	IRB	AID	USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

072022Z

CITE

25X1

DIST 7 NOVEMBER 1968

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM

SUBJECT: NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL'S COMMENT THAT NORTH VIETNAM  
IS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE ABOUT AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL  
FROM VIETNAM

25X1

[REDACTED]

1. COMMENTING ON THE PARIS PEACE TALKS IN THE CONTEXT OF  
THE AMERICAN DECISION TO HALT BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

25X1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SANITIZED

~~SECRET~~

Authority: NLJ 019, 042, 001/2  
By: jc NARA, Date: 12-28-09

IN 29952

[Redacted]

25X1

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(classification)

(dissem controls)

25X1

[Redacted] THAT

WHILE IN PRINCIPLE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT INSISTS ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM VIETNAM, IT IS PREPARED TO BE VERY FLEXIBLE ON THIS MATTER.

ILLEGIB

[Large Redacted Block]

3. [Redacted] DISSEM: [Redacted] (ALSO SENT SAIGON FOR AMBASSADOR, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR, POLITICAL COUNSELLOR, AND GENERAL ABRAMS ONLY) REPORT CLASS SECRET GROUP-1

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

Literally Eyes Only

21

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, Nov. 8, 1968  
7:35 am

Mr. President:

First reactions may well be wrong.

But with this information I think it's time  
to blow the whistle on these folks.

W. W. Rostow

*Pres file*

Literally Eyes Only

245 AM 11-03-68 RDR

PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 02

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM

ON NOVEMBER SEVEN, LAST, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

IN LATE EVENING ON NOVEMBER SEVEN, LAST, MRS. ANNA CHENNAULT CONTACTED VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM AND ADVISED THAT THE MESSAGE ON THAT DATE FROM SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT THIEU, "WHICH OUR BOSS" WAS ALRIGHT. SHE ADVISED SHE HAD GIVEN "THEM" EVERYTHING WHEN SHE FINALLY GOT BACK TO HER OFFICE TO CALL, THAT "THEY" GOT THE WHOLE MESSAGE. *check 4/8*

CHENNAULT STATED THE PERSON SHE HAD MENTIONED TO DIEM WHO MIGHT BE THINKING ABOUT "THE TRIP" WENT ON VACATION THIS AFTERNOON AND WILL BE RETURNING MONDAY MORNING AT WHICH TIME SHE WILL BE IN TOUCH AGAIN AND WILL HAVE MORE NEWS FOR DIEM.

CHENNAULT CONTINUED THAT "THEY" ARE STILL PLANNING THINGS BUT ARE NOT LETTING PEOPLE KNOW TOO MUCH BECAUSE THEY WANT TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID EMBARRASSING "YOU", THEMSELVES, OR THE PRESENT  
END PAGE ONE

PAGE TWO (~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

U. S. GOVERNMENT. THEREFORE, WHATEVER WE DO MUST BE CAREFULLY PLANNED. SHE FURTHER ADVISED THAT SHE, CHENNAULT, IS STILL PLANNING TO "GO OUT" BUT THAT SHE WILL BE DOING SO JUST AS A FRIEND AND ALSO AS VICE-PRESIDENT OF HER AIRLINES, SO THAT WOULD NOT UPSET ANYTHING.

CHENNAULT ADDED THAT SENATOR JOHN GOODWIN TOWER HAD TALKED TO HER TODAY. TOWER IS PLANNING TO RETURN SUNDAY AND CHENNAULT AND TOWER PLAN TO MEET DIEM "EITHER MONDAY." *check*

GP-1

END

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~  
DECLASSIFIED

Authority PLJ 00-231 (22)

By jkcb NARA. Date 8-17-04

1. map 22  
2. Pres file

Friday, November 8, 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**Through: George Christian**

**Subject: Statement on Nigeria Relief**

In the attached memorandum, Nick Katzenbach recommends that you make a statement on the further contribution we're making today to the Red Cross relief effort in Nigeria.

You've approved three earlier releases on the Nigerian relief problem -- a July 11 statement, the August 5 letter to Haile Selassie, and the September 13 message to the OAU. But I agree with Nick that it is useful and appropriate to be on the record again:

- to counter the domestic critics with the facts on our major role in relief support;
- to repeat strongly to both sides that their fighting frustrates our best efforts to relieve the suffering.

I recommend you issue the statement today.

W. W. Rostow

Approve statement \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:HS:RM:lw

ATT: File # 3404

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

22a

14720


November 7, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Nigeria-Biafra Relief

We have authorized our representative in Geneva to tell the ICRC tomorrow (November 8) that the United States is ready to give them another \$2.5 million for Nigeria-Biafra relief. The money will come from AID funds.

In light of the strong public and congressional interest in what we are doing for the victims of the civil war, I recommend that you issue the attached statement some time on Friday. It details what we have done so far, and emphasizes your personal hope that the war will be brought to an end soon.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

OK to release \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

I have today authorized a \$2, 5 million contribution to the International Committee of the Red Cross to aid the victims of the Nigerian civil war. This contribution is in addition to the \$10 million in money, food and equipment we have already given, and the more than \$4. 3 million given by American voluntary agencies. We hope other governments will also respond generously. Nigeria's need is great and urgent.

The United States Government is doing -- and will continue to do -- all within its power working with others to help the thousands now starving on both sides of the battle lines. The international <sup>effort</sup> relief/is already reaching over two million people on both sides. We will do all we can, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies, to maintain and augment the flow of relief supplies.

But so long as this war continues, men, women and children will continue to starve. So long as the fighting goes on, no relief effort -- however bold, however efficient -- can meet the great need. The political dispute underlying this war is a Nigerian and an African problem -- not an American one. But conscience and humanity impel all nations to call again on both parties to bring this tragic struggle to an end.

ACTION

Thursday - November 7, 1968

*1. [unclear]  
2. Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa has sent you two congratulatory letters (at Tab B) on the birth of your grand-daughter, one personally, and one on behalf of the Diplomatic Corps.

Suggested notes of thanks are attached at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

Tab A - Suggested letters to Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa, for Presidential signature.

Tab B - Congratulatory letters to the President from Sevilla-Sacasa, October 25, 1968.

SWLewis:mm

23a

November 7, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Mrs. Johnson and I greatly appreciate the kind letter of congratulations that you sent on behalf of the Diplomatic Corps on the occasion of our granddaughter's birth. We have passed on your message to our daughter and son-in-law, who join us in thanking you and all the members of the Corps for your good wishes on this happy occasion.

Sincerely,

*LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson*

His Excellency  
Dr. Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa  
Ambassador of Nicaragua

LBJ :SWLewis :mm :ms

November 7, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Lady Bird and I thank you for your good wishes on the occasion of Lucinda Desha's birth. Knowing that the joy and pride we feel over our granddaughter's arrival are shared by good friends is an added source of happiness for us.

We send our warmest regards to you and Mrs. Sevilla Sacasa.

Sincerely,

*LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson*

His Excellency  
Dr. Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa  
Ambassador of Nicaragua

LBJ:SWLewis:mm:mz

THE NICARAGUAN AMBASSADOR  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

14274

23c

October 25, 1968.

Dear Mr. President:

Lillian and I extend our warmest congratulations to you and Mrs. Johnson on the birth of your first granddaughter. We can well imagine the happiness this baby girl has brought to you and yours, and feel certain she will grow in beauty and grace and be your pride and joy in the years to come.

With the renewed assurances of our devoted friendship, I remain,

Sincerely,

Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa

His Excellency  
The President  
The White House

EMBAJADA DE NICARAGUA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

23d

D-14

14273

October 25, 1968.

**Excellency:**

On behalf of the members of the Diplomatic Corps and myself, we extend our warmest congratulations to Your Excellency and Mrs. Johnson on the birth of your first granddaughter. May this blessed event that has brought you happiness today continue to be a source of joy and satisfaction through the coming years.

It would be highly appreciated if Your Excellency would kindly convey our heartfelt congratulations and best wishes to Captain and Mrs. Charles S. Robb.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest esteem and distinguished consideration.

Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa  
Ambassador of Nicaragua  
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps

His Excellency  
The President  
The White House

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, November 7, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Crnobrnja of Yugoslavia, 12:45 p.m., Friday, November 8

Ambassador Crnobrnja (Sir-no-BURN-ya) requested this brief meeting to deliver a letter to you from President Tito. The letter reportedly contains Tito's views on the situation in Eastern Europe, the Near East, and on United States-Yugoslav relations.

The State Department has suggested the following talking points:

- You have followed with admiration President Tito's recent remarks on the Yugoslavs' determination to maintain their freedom and independence.
- If the Ambassador asks what Tito can do to assist in a Near East settlement, you might mention our support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts and suggest that the Yugoslavs encourage the UAR to consider seriously any substantive proposals put forward by Israel, and to make clear to Israel its desire for a true peace settlement.
- If the Ambassador mentions the recent visit of Deputy Prime Minister Gligorov, you may wish to acknowledge that we are giving his economic proposals serious consideration and that Under Secretary Katzenbach reported to you on these matters after his recent visit to Belgrade.

As you probably know, Senator Mansfield plans a trip to Europe to assess reactions to the bombing halt and the Czechoslovak invasion. He will be in Belgrade from November 12 to 15 and has requested an appointment with Tito.

Ambassador Crnobrnja has been informed that the meeting is scheduled for ten to fifteen minutes.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By y, NARA, Date 2-19-98

W. W. Rostow

RLS:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, November 7, 1968  
6:55 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this memorandum of conversation between Brom Smith and a previously pessimistic governmental observer's view of the present situation in Vietnam.

I am sending copies to Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 2-26-93

WWRostow:rln

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

25a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 7, 1968

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Authority NLS 93-248

SUBJECT: Non-Governmental Observer's Report on Situation in Vietnam

By APK/b NARA, Date 1-14-98

Robert Pinero, a highly successful civil engineer, who has done projects in many countries and is now a consultant to the Hudson Institute, returned this week from his most recent of many visits to Vietnam. Previously pessimistic about the future of South Vietnam, he returned this time highly optimistic.

1. The "big war" is dead. Harassment will continue but danger to allied forces no longer exists.
2. The morale of the North Vietnamese troops and the Viet Cong is gone. Even the Viet Cong infrastructure no longer wishes to fight. In the Delta the Viet Cong are avoiding contact while the South Vietnamese forces are anxious to engage.
3. Almost everyone agrees, U.S. military officers, South Vietnamese officers, and even two North Vietnamese/Viet Cong officers to whom he talked in French, that the atmosphere has in the last three to four weeks changed completely. It is now one of confidence that the North Vietnamese are being defeated.
4. The North Vietnamese are trying to restructure morale. They cannot do this by actions in the field and therefore are looking to Paris. There is a danger arising out of what happens in Paris that they will be able in the next few months to restore their badly shaken confidence in their military position.
5. An estimated 70% of the country is now behind Saigon Government. There are few fence sitters left.
6. The situation is now delicate and could get all fouled up. The Thieu Government, with the confidence of the majority of the South Vietnamese, cannot be made to appear a puppet of the United States.
7. Unless there is some big victory in Paris, the North Vietnam-Viet Cong position in South Vietnam is dead.
8. Withdrawal of some American troops would no longer scare the South Vietnamese as would have been true a few months ago.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9. The economy is picking up sharply and the country is on the verge of a boom.

Mr. Pinero will be returning to Vietnam on his return from Colombia toward the end of this month. Full documentation of his views can be made at that time. This preliminary report, given to me personally, reflects his "smell of the situation." Among his sources were Harry Johnson, our man in the Prime Minister's office; John Van, the Third Corps Advisor who doubts that the Viet Cong is capable of even irrational behavior; General Forsyth who is with the Air Cavalry Division and numerous other U. S. and South Vietnamese officials.

Mr. Pinero is working on ARPA projects and spent the last two weeks of October traveling in South Vietnam and talking to the members of the Institute team who are in numerous areas, including the Delta.

*Brom*

Bromley Smith

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-505  
By cb, NARA, Date 5-9-95

26

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Thursday, November 7, 1968 - 6:35 pm

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

In the light of the CIA report I sent up to you this morning, herewith a kind of compromise proposal, wholly consistent with Honolulu and our previous commitments about Saigon's role in the Paris talks, which Katzenbach now proposes to let Bunker try on Thieu.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rln



Page 2 of telegram to AmEmbassy SAIGON

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Classification

2. An alternative that might get us through the current impasse without foreclosing any options for either government would be the issuance by the GVN of a statement along the following lines:

BEGIN STATEMENT. We have had numerous discussions with the US and other Troop Contributing Countries as to the role of the GVN in the Paris negotiations with Hanoi. We are in agreement that the GVN delegation must and shall play a leading role in the discussions with the Hanoi delegation of all matters most intimately affecting the future of SVN. Neither we nor the US will recognize the so-called NLF delegation as an independent entity, whether in the ~~PRELIMINARY~~ preliminary phase of the talks concerning procedural matters or in such substantive talks as may follow, and all discussions will accordingly be conducted in a way that makes this X simple fact clear.

On this basis, I have instructed representatives of the RVN to proceed to Paris to consult with the US delegation there preparatory to entering the procedural phase of the talks. END STATEMENT

3. We would try in this way to give Thieu something he could point to publicly as an ~~ACHIEVEMENT~~ accomplishment permitting him to join the talks now. We would continue to consult with him on more tangible aspects of the matter if he so desires, as there would still be time while the procedural phase of the Paris talks took place.

END

27

**ACTION**

**Thursday, November 8, 1968  
6:30 p. m.**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith a note from  
Bill Crook and a draft response to  
him.**

**W. W. Rostow**

WWRostow:rlh

November 7, 1968

27a

Dear Bill:

Thank you for taking the trouble to give me briefly your impression of your trip to Vietnam.

I share your confidence that the sacrifices of our men and the courage of the South Vietnamese people have put within our grasp an honorable peace in Southeast Asia -- if we all stay steady.

Sincerely,

Honorable William H. Crook  
American Ambassador  
Canberra, Australia

LBJ:WWR:mz



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Canberra, Australia

276

October 23, 1968

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have just completed a most informative ten-day tour of the battle points of Vietnam. I wish I could have bottled and sent back to the States some of the confidence that is felt there by all of the servicemen from America, Korea, Australia, New Zealand and South Vietnam.

The purpose of this letter is to tell you how greatly impressed I was with the leadership of Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams. I don't know when I have ever been as impressed.

Yours sincerely,

William H. Crook  
American Ambassador

*Pres file*

28

Thurs., Nov. 7, 1968  
5:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft letter to Bob Komer.

He is in town. He indicated that he would be pleased to have the opportunity to see you; although he knows that you are hard-pressed for time.

Attachments

W. W. Rostow

Have Komer make appointment with Jim Jones \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

November 7, 1968

28a  
—

Dear Bob:

First I want you to have a copy of the fine message that Ellsworth Bunker sent me about the work you did in Saigon.

I asked you to do a difficult thing: to go out into the field and make your own ideas and plans come alive. I shall never forget the way you took up the challenge. I know that it was by no means easy to build the military-civil chain of command that we all decided at Guam was the right way to proceed. You did it.

I know it was not easy to face the discouragement of Tet just when your plans and programs were taking hold. In those days, when there were so many wobbly knees in the United States, you were steady as a rock. Your loyalty to your country and to your President -- as well as the first-class performance you turned in -- will not be forgotten in the history of this great struggle to save Southeast Asia. And it will certainly not be forgotten by me.

I hope that you and Gerry enjoy your time in Turkey. It is a post you richly deserve. I know you will make the most of the opportunity there.

Sincerely,

*[Signature]*  
Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable Robert W. Komer  
6359 Waterway Drive  
Falls Church, Virginia

LBJ:WWR:ms

November 8, 1968

28b

**FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER**

Bob Komer has just left Viet-Nam after one and a half years of all-out effort to make pacification a going concern. Since you sent him to us from your personal staff, General Abrams and I would like to report that Komer did a job no one else could have done as well. He took on one of the most difficult tasks of all in Viet-Nam -- that of creating almost from scratch a pacification program to parallel our military effort. It has been a great achievement, and its full benefits will only begin to be recognized in the months and years ahead.

Among Komer's achievements, perhaps six stand out -- first, making the unique and unprecedented integrated civil-military organization which you authorized work better than anyone expected; second, the attack on the VC infrastructure; third, the post-Tet recovery program; fourth, upgrading territorial security which was a great contribution in the military field; fifth, getting the GVN to improve the quality and selection process for province and district chiefs; and lastly, the new pacification offensive to help speed up a successful end of this war.

Komer leaves quite reluctantly, feeling that perhaps he should stay to help see the war through. But we feel that he has already made such a contribution that we can hardly ask more. He departs with the great respect of his Vietnamese colleagues.

C  
O  
P  
Y

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~-EYES ONLY

Thursday, November 7, 1968  
5:00 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

If you wish to get the story raw,  
read the last paragraph, marked.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By MP, NARA, Date 9-10-97

~~SECRET~~-EYES ONLY

W. W. Rostow:rlh

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

29a

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLI 00-231 (\*86a)

By JCB NARA. Date 8-17-04

'68 NOV 7 PM 3:51

1968 NOV 7 20 43

*Roston*

3:39PM RNK

PRIORITY 11-7-68 RNK

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 09  
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)~~

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM; INTERNAL SECURITY - VIETNAM.

ON NOVEMBER SEVEN, INSTANT, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

ON INSTANT DATE, AN UNIDENTIFIED MALE WAS IN CONTACT WITH MAJOR BUI CONG MINH, ASSISTANT ARMED FORCES ATTACHE, EMBASSY OF VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC). THE UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUAL ADVISED MAJOR MINH THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A CALL FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S OFFICE, AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND DESIRED TO SEE THE UNIDENTIFIED MAN DURING THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER SEVEN, INSTANT. IN VIEW OF THIS APPOINTMENT, THE UNIDENTIFIED MAN DESIRED TO DELAY HIS VISIT TO SEE MAJOR MINH UNTIL SATURDAY, NOVEMBER NINE,

PAGE TWO ~~(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSIMINATION)~~

NEXT. MAJOR MINH AGREED AND THE UNIDENTIFIED MAN AND HIS WIFE WILL VISIT MAJOR AND MRS. MINH ON SATURDAY NOVEMBER NINE, NEXT, (POSSIBLY AT MAJOR MINH'S RESIDENCE ONE ZERO EIGHT ZERO FIVE GEORGIA AVENUE, APARTMENT TWO ZERO ONE, WHEATON, MARYLAND).

THE UNIDENTIFIED MAN INQUIRED AS TO HOW THE PEACE TALKS WERE COMING, AND MAJOR MINH EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE MOVE BY SAIGON WAS TO HELP PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE NIXON, AND THAT HAD SAIGON GONE TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE, PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HUMPHREY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE WON.

GP-1

~~SECRET NOFORN~~



*Pres file*

ACTION 31

Thursday, November 7, 1968  
4:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

At your direction, I arranged via John Scali to go on Issues and Answers on Sunday.

After talking with Tom Johnson, when the trouble with Saigon blew up, I backed away.

John Scali is at me again; and I must give him a final reply. George Christian thinks it might be a good idea because I can talk about the DMZ and the big cities -- which you referred to in your speech by way of example.

W. W. Rostow

Proceed with Issues and Answers \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

(cc: George Christian)

*Profile*

32

Thurs., Nov. 7, 1968  
4:00 p. m.

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE  
EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

At Tab A, Ben Oehlert comes in on a new secure State Dept. back channel asking help on the Pak tanks. (Only Sect. Rusk has seen.)

At Tab B is our outgoing to Ankara authorizing the \$3 million transfer and replacement deal for Ayub.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ-019A-42-1-8

By L447

NAR., Date 12-08-2017



32a  
Department of State TELEGRAM

RR RUEHC  
DE RUQVGM 9165 3121230  
ZNY TTTT ZZH  
R 071210Z NOV 68  
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5290  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~

1 9 8 0 Q

1968 NOV 7 AM 10 15

~~TOP SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 9165

CHEROKEE

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM AMBASSADOR

1. IN ANY CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS AND FOR THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.
2. WITH A CHANGE OF PARTIES THIS PROCESS WILL TAKE LONGER THAN USUAL AND WILL BE COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THE EXECUTIVE AND THE CONGRESS WILL BE OF DIFFERENT PARTIES.
3. I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT WE CAN STEM THE TIDE HERE OF DRIFT TOWARD RELIANCE ON THE COMMUNIST WORLD FOR THE TIME REQUIRED WITHOUT THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF A FEW TANKS.
4. MR. PRESIDENT, ON LAST DECEMBER 23 YOU TOLD AYUB AND ME THAT YOU WERE SICK AND TIRED OF THE INDIA LOVERS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT.
5. I AM TOO.
6. IN THE INTERVENING MONTHS THEY HAVE RESORTED TO EVERY EXCUSE, EVERY DELAY, EVERY STRATEGEM TO THWART YOUR WISHES WITH RESPECT TO TANKS FOR PAKISTAN.
7. I PRAY YOU NOT REPEAT NOT TO LET THEM GET AWAY WITH IT.
8. IN THE IMMORTAL WORDS OF JOHN NANCE GARNER, MR. PRESIDENT, QUOTE LET'S STRIKE A BLOW FOR FREEDOM UNQUOTE.
9. ALICE JOINS ME IN THANKING YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY OF SERVICE TO OUR COUNTRY AND TO YOU PERSONALLY WHICH YOU HAVE GIVEN US AND WE EXTEND OUR AFFECTION TO YOU AND LADY BIRD. WE EXPECT TO FOLLOW YOU INTO PRIVATE LIFE SHORTLY AFTER JANUARY 20 AND WILL LOOK FORWARD TO THE PRIVILEGE OF ENJOYING YOUR COMPANY BOTH IN PALM BEACH AND ON THE SHORES OF THE PEDERNALES.  
DEHLERT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI-019B-42-1-8

NAR, Date 12-08-2017

By LLA

~~SECRET~~

tab A



Department of State

TELEGRAM

326

24

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 STATE 268175

53  
ORIGIN SS 30

2

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/PAF - JWSPAIN  
APPROVED BY: NEA - PARKER T. HART  
DOD/ISA - COLONEL KRAVITZ  
G/PM - MR. CHAPMAN  
NEA/TUR - MR. CASH  
S/S - MR. WALSH  
WHITE HOUSE - MR. SAUNDERS  
U - MR. HARTMAN

120180

O R 071608Z NOV 68 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
INFO AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI  
CINCSTRIKE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 268175

EXDIS

REF: ANKARA 9352

1. YOU SHOULD APPROACH GOT ASAP TO REITERATE CONTINUING HIGH LEVEL USG INTEREST IN TURKISH M-47 SALE TO PAKISTAN AND INDICATE URGENT USG NEED FOR A RESPONSE.

2. IF INDICATIONS ARE THAT RESPONSE IS LIKELY BE NEGATIVE OR FURTHER DELAYED, YOU AUTHORIZED INFORM GOT THAT, SHOULD IT BE PREPARED SELL 100 M-47S TO PAKISTAN, USG WILL PROMPTLY MAKE AVAILABLE 100 REHABILITATED M-48S TO FILL GAP IN TURKISH TANK INVENTORY. THESE WOULD BE OVER AND ABOVE MAP PROGRAM CURRENTLY UNDER WAY.

GP-1.  
RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 019A-42-1-8

By 444 NAR, Date 12-08-2017

~~SECRET~~

Tab B

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file*

33

~~SECRET~~

Luncheon with the President

Thursday, November 7, 1968, 1:00 p. m.

AGENDA

1. Getting the GVN to Paris (Sect. Rusk)
  - Next move in Saigon (draft cable attached at Tab A)
  - TCC's: should they be mobilized?
  - President-elect?
  - Posture in Paris: slow motion or not?
  
2. Phantom Negotiations (Sect. Clifford)
  - Sitrep.
  
3. NATO Meeting (Sects. Rusk and Clifford)
  - Issues that will arise.
  
4. Soviet Relations (Sect. Rusk)
  - Peaceful uses of nuclear explosions?
  
5. Biafran Relief (Sect. Rusk)
  - See Tab B.
  
6. Personnel (Sect. Rusk)
  - Two or three ambassadorial posts.
  
7. Transition Procedures in Foreign Policy (Sects. Rusk and Clifford)
  - In addition to major transitional problems, should we offer the President-elect regular, routine intelligence and diplomatic briefings?
  
8. Other

*W. A. Rostow*

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 109, NARA, Date 3-26-93

~~SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

33a

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

Info

INFO: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

STATE

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS TODEL \_\_\_\_\_ FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE.

*Mr. President:  
This cable is not  
wholly responsive  
to question posed on  
agenda - it was not  
designed to be.  
W.*

1. Saigon 42029 and Paris 23494 have provided helpful commentary.
2. We believe that we should all--in Paris, Saigon, and here-- be taking every opportunity to set forth affirmatively the "your side/our side" concept and to negate the idea of a four-power conference, or certainly that we have agreed to it on this basis. Our reading of the press here is that we have managed to make this point reasonably clear (e.g. Marder in today's Washington Post) and we regret not having taken the opportunity of today's discussion by the Spokesman to say it again. It does seem to us that the main problem is arising in Paris, where of course all the NLF guns are operating. We therefore believe Paris should try to be particularly active in making this point, although we must do more here.

Dated by: EA:WPBundy:mk 11/6/68

Tel. No. 4235

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Under Secretary *[Signature]*

White House - Mr. Rostow

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

Classification

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 2-12-98

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

3. In looking for what the GVN could say on its own or jointly, we have the following thoughts amplifying the suggestions in Saigon 42029 and taking account of Paris comments on those short headings.

a. As time passes, it certainly should be possible for the GVN to point to the absence of military action in the DMZ or against the major cities. We recognize the ambiguities that have been created by the difference between what has been said in backgrounders here and what has been conveyed to the DRV (Saigon 42051 and Paris 23495). And we note also that Primin Huong's complaint about the 20 small-scale efforts against various province and district capitals. Nonetheless, it is our strong impression that we have consistently talked to the GVN in terms of "major cities" and it should become possible to use this point with increasing force as the days go by, not only as an indication that we did in fact get clear concessions in this area, but as a broader indication of the value and validity of the total arrangement. In other words, the language used by the GVN in its second opening statement of November 1 should become capable of revision in the direction of saying that they now do have adequate confidence in military restraints by the other side.

b. Certainly any statement could pull out all the stops that

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

neither we nor the GVN have changed our basic view of the NLF in the slightest. (This is also a point that might effectively be included in any statement or message by the President-Elect.)

c. The same is true of GVN or GVN/US statements concerning our total opposition to any externally agreed or "imposed" coalition. We have the Canberra Communique.

d. The formulation "we consider the other side one delegation" has the difficulty that Paris notes since this formulation could run us into apparent conflict with the fact that NLF representatives have a right to speak on their own. We should be looking for some formulation that makes clear that we and the GVN will treat everyone at the table as part of Hanoi's side repeat side, and tie this to our position that the NLF is not in any way a separate entity. However, if Thieu and the GVN should come forward with something that goes further than we would be able to do, we could probably live with some degree of distortion in order to ease their domestic problem. The point to get across is that our side is composed of two recognized governments, and we said they could bring anyone they chose and they have chosen to bring their branch office in the South.

e. As Paris notes, there is likewise some difficulty in our

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

~~SECRET~~Classification

associating the US explicitly with a statement that "the GVN will negotiate on all matters concerning South Viet-Nam." In a joint statement, it would be preferable to use such terms as "participate fully and play a leading role" and "nothing can be negotiated affecting the future of South Viet-Nam without the full participation of the GVN." (Harriman's statement on this the other day was most helpful.) But, again, in a unilateral GVN statement we could live with a touch of hyperbole.

f. From whatever is said about the GVN role, it would follow naturally that, as a practical matter, Hanoi will inevitably be ~~saying~~ talking direct to the GVN. Here we have the language of the agreed joint communique to use, and at the end made it clear that we were prepared to say that President Johnson had given his assurance that <sup>He had good reason to believe that</sup> Hanoi would engage in direct and serious talks with the GVN.

4. Apart from what might go into some form of words to be issued by the GVN or by the GVN and US jointly, we assume Bunker will be exploring with Thieu whether a TCC summit would be of real assistance. The President has of course already made clear his affirmative attitude toward such a gathering. With its burdens and delays, we would prefer to get the GVN aboard first and then use a TCC summit as a form of

~~SECRET~~Classification

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

additional assurance--perhaps announced at the time the GVN decided to come to ~~Raixxx~~ Paris. But if this really bulks large in Thieu's face-saving, as suggested in paragraph 15 of Saigon 42066, we could consider a TCC summit at least before we get down to substance in Paris.

5. In all this, we recognize the critical importance of the position taken by the President-Elect, and are considering earliest action on this and what can be said. We should have further word on this soon.

6. Again for purposes of Bunker's talk with Thieu, we would hope that Thieu could be steered away from any attempt to get Hanoi to say in so many words that it would talk direct to the GVN, or that the NLF is simply part of the Hanoi delegation. If proof were needed that Hanoi will not repeat not say these things, it is readily at hand in the line they and the NLF have been pursuing in Paris, and a question that gets a predictable negative response would simply make things more complicated. This we assume to be ground/~~cloudy ad nauseam~~ <sup>covered ad nauseam</sup> already.

7. Finally, as to the stories now appearing widely from South ~~VixxxN~~ Vietnamese sources on the US/GVN discussions from October 13 to November 1, our experience here is that Bui Diem (possibly for reasons of protecting his own personal position) will water down whatever is said to him. We leave it to Bunker whether it is useful to lodge a strong

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

protest against these inaccurate and distorted disclosures specifically] or whether it is more effective at this point simply to land hard on the general theme of how vital it is that we should avoid any public airing of our problems. How Saigon handles this may depend in part on a judgment, which we cannot make here, of whether the disclosures are overwhelmingly the work of Ky--as your earlier cables suggested--or represented an agreed effort by Thieu and Ky in their first emotional reaction and in building up their own image of independence to their public. Needless to say, the stories are having all the damaging effects that Saigon rightly foretold, although the Bunker backgrounder appears to have had some mitigating effect in responsible circles.

8. We shall be continuing to send commentary, including editorials and news stories, from here that reflects the attitude of the American public toward the GVN continuing to hold up wider talks on the present basis.

GP-1.

End.

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1968

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting

Secretary Fowler, Secretary Clifford, General Wheeler and I will be attending the NATO Ministerial sessions in Brussels, November 12 through 14. As you know, the main focus of the meeting will be on what our Allies and we should do to strengthen NATO in the light of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

We anticipate that the meeting will reflect the groundwork laid since our September 4 discussion in the National Security Council. Our ambassadors have made vigorous demarches regarding improved allied defense contributions. Ambassador Cleveland has been involved in continuous negotiations with his colleagues in NATO and I had discussions with most NATO foreign ministers in New York.

I enclose a listing of the main issues that may arise at the meeting. You may wish to discuss these with us prior to our departure.

I also enclose (1) a paper outlining the background and scope of the Ministerial Meeting; and (2) a paper summarizing what we are doing with each NATO country to encourage improved defense efforts.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

- Listing of main issues at NATO meeting
- Background and scope of NATO meeting
- Status report on NATO country defense efforts

~~SECRET~~  
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-yr intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority State Guidelines 7-21-97  
By NS, NARA, Date 7-26-97

*Tab B*

~~SECRET~~

33c

ISSUES FOR THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING  
BRUSSELS, NOVEMBER 14-16, 1968

1. Defense Contributions by Other Countries

Our efforts will probably result in at least some improvement by the Federal Republic, Italy, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands. France is, of course, out of the picture with regard to the combined NATO defense effort. The situation for other countries, notably Canada and Denmark, remains unpromising.

2. What the U.S. Might Do

Our main emphasis is on the major burden we have carried for years and continue to carry. Announcement of accelerated or expanded US maneuvers, exercises or other defense measures in Europe could go far, however, to stimulate others. Such steps would improve confidence in the Alliance generally and in the Federal Republic in particular. Some German officials have indicated informally that what we propose to do is "thin and inadequate". They indicate we expect them to spend \$700 million but are prepared to spend only \$12 million ourselves. (In fact, we are considering steps which would constitute an acceleration into FY 69 of about \$50 million now programmed for later years.) Ambassador Lodge gives his view that a small response by us would undermine the Federal Republic's resolve.

3. Balance of Payments Questions

Negotiations on neutralizing foreign exchange costs of our forces in Europe will proceed bilaterally with West Germany and other countries concerned. In support of these efforts, we are seeking NATO agreement on a general statement concerning equity in sharing resource and foreign exchange burdens.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ly, NARA, Date 2-17-98

4. Contingency Planning

Secretary General Brosio will report to the Ministers on the consultations he and the NATO Permanent Representatives have been conducting on further allied defense measures (a) that might dissuade the Soviets from acting against Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, or Austria; or (b) that might become necessary in the event of further Soviet moves.

5. A Signal to the East

NATO Ministers will have to decide on how strong a "signal" they wish to give the Soviet Union on (a) allied determination to forestall pressures against the Treaty area including Germany and Berlin; and (b) increased Western defense efforts in case of new Soviet armed moves in Eastern Europe.

6. Arms Control Questions

We must decide, in the context of the NATO meeting, what we should say about ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the outlook for US-Soviet talks on strategic arms limitations (SALT). Most of the allies continue to favor both but are concerned about form and timing in the present European atmosphere.

7. Duration of the North Atlantic Treaty

Several of the allies, including the UK, the Federal Republic and Italy are interested in a Ministerial declaration regarding the future of the Alliance. (Beginning next year, when the Treaty will mark its twentieth anniversary, any country may withdraw on one year's notice.) We have already made clear informally that we would support a general statement about the need for indefinite continuation of the Alliance. We have noted, however, that any Treaty amendment or legal step involving the Senate would have to be pursued by the next Administration.

~~SECRET~~

-3-

8. NATO Twentieth Anniversary Meeting

The other allies have informally indicated their willingness to have the next Ministerial Meeting in Washington in April. This would serve both as a substantive meeting and as a ceremonial occasion to mark the Treaty's twentieth anniversary. We expect to issue the formal invitations in Brussels, but the conclusion of detailed planning will be the new Administration's responsibility.

~~SECRET~~

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING  
BRUSSELS  
November 14-16, 1968

Position Paper

SCOPE PAPER

I. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Effects of the Czech Crisis

This fall's Ministerial Meeting takes place against a background of continuing Allied concern stemming from the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Even though the Allies do not wish to abandon their goals of reducing East-West tensions, and ultimately arriving at a peaceful settlement of the issues dividing Europe, the atmosphere has changed drastically as compared with meetings of the past few years. The fact of the invasion, and the resulting uncertainty regarding Soviet intentions toward Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and even Western Europe, have combined to produce a new situation.

The highwater mark of detente was reached in December, 1967 with adoption of the Harmel Report and in June 1968 with the Ministerial declaration on mutual force reductions. Today, despite differences of emphasis among individual NATO governments, the accent is on strengthening the Alliance's defenses and its deterrent posture against possible future contingencies.

For some of the Alliance members -- for example France, Canada and Denmark -- the Soviet aggression has deflated exaggerated hopes for early change in the Soviet Union's European policy. (There is no evidence, however, that de Gaulle has changed his fundamental views on NATO, the United States or Europe. There are some signs of French probing to see whether bilateral US-French defense cooperation, particularly in the nuclear field, might be improved essentially on French terms.) For the US the present

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-yr intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority ERUS Vol. VIII Item 335

By 14 NARA, Date 2-19-98

situation, which may not last, offers a major opportunity to improve the Alliance's political cohesion and its defense posture.

#### East-West Discussions in Light of Czechoslovakia

The NATO discussions since August have demonstrated that, for the longer term, none of our Allies wishes to forestall essential contacts or negotiations with the East. Most of them still favor the Non-Proliferation Treaty and would like to see a breakthrough in the arms race in which the two great powers would be committed to accept controls on their own nuclear armaments. On the other hand, however, they are seriously concerned about the psychological and political effects of any early talks in view of the post-Czech situation.

#### Other International Issues

Even though the European situation will be uppermost in the minds of the NATO delegations, other international issues will also affect the setting for this meeting. The two major questions of the Middle East and Vietnam may figure in Ministerial statements. Anticipation about policies to be followed by the new U.S. Administration will also mark the meeting's atmosphere.

#### Western European Unification

The continued lack of progress in unifying Western Europe will loom large in the corridors. It may also be reflected in statements around the table. De Gaulle's intransigence in keeping Britain out of the European Community has just manifested itself again in the failure of the recent WEU Ministerial Meeting. Tentative ideas for a European caucus in NATO have also failed to jell into anything offering promise of immediate results. The British will nevertheless continue to take soundings looking toward increased intra-European cooperation in the NATO framework.

Domestic Politics and Youth

The domestic political situation in some of the leading Allied countries also remains delicate and complex. This is the case for example in the UK, the FRG and Italy. For Canada, this will be the first Ministerial Meeting since the Trudeau Government's electoral victory.

This year's manifestations of radicalism among the youth in various Allied countries continue to affect European attitudes across-the-board. The memory of the near chaos in France last spring is still fresh in everyone's mind.

International Finance

Lastly, even though the gold and monetary crisis of the past winter is well behind us, questions of domestic finance continue to loom large. Their impact on resources that can be made available for Western defense is likely to be the hardest factor conditioning Ministerial deliberations.

A NATO Watershed

In light of the foregoing, this last NATO Ministerial Meeting of the Johnson Administration -- also the last meeting before the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty's signature -- will represent a watershed in the recent history of the Alliance. The past two years have seen major improvements in NATO's defense and consultation arrangements. Now we would like to see a demonstration of renewed political will on the part of the governments, especially with regard to defense contributions.

II. THE MEETING: U.S. OBJECTIVES AND PROBLEMSU.S. Objectives

Our broad objectives for this meeting, and for follow-up work to be done by Permanent Representatives, flow from the political background and are largely conditioned by it. Briefly stated, these are:

- To achieve formal ministerial recognition of the changed situation resulting from the invasion of Czecho-

slovakia; from the permanent stationing of substantial Warsaw Pact forces in that country; from what is now known of the high state of readiness of these forces; and from the uncertainties created by Soviet actions and doctrine, including national sovereignty and the "Socialist commonwealth".

- To elicit firm commitments from the other Allies regarding qualitative and quantitative improvements in their NATO defense contributions.

- To reach a common understanding on the political implications of the post-Czech situation for the future of East-West relations and contacts.

- To reiterate as appropriate our support for Western European unification and, specifically, for initiatives the European members of the Alliance may take in the defense field.

- To emphasize the need to continue the Alliance for the indefinite future without undertaking new legal commitments that would require action by the Senate.

- To stress the continuity of US policy in supporting NATO as well as the concept of collective security inherent in the Organization.

- To make clear, without being provocative, Three Power (US, UK, French) and general Allied support for established Western positions on Germany and Berlin.

- To recall our continued deep interest in Mediterranean security as well as to seek, by adequate warnings, to deter possible further Soviet moves that might affect the balance in that area (e.g. Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania).

- To give a clear signal to the Soviet Union of Allied determination to defend the Treaty area, and to make clear that any further Soviet aggressive moves in Eastern Europe would have grave and incalculable consequences and would cause immediate and appropriate Allied reactions in self-defense.

### The Meetings and the Problems

The meetings will be attended by ministers of foreign affairs, defense and finance. They will embrace sessions of three different bodies: the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC); the North Atlantic Council (NAC); and the Defense Planning Committee (DPC).

### The North Atlantic Council

In the NAC, the main problem will be to get fifteen-country agreement (including France) on general statements regarding the European political situation, allied defense, Germany and Berlin, and the "signal" to the East. Much of this work will have been done in advance by the Permanent Representatives in the form of a draft communique and other documents such as the post-Czech political assessment. Discussion of these documents will afford an opportunity for ministers to have a substantive exchange of views on the overall situation. As a related but subsidiary issue, ministers may also be asked to approve a report on civil emergency planning aimed at assuring progress in this field to accompany renewed emphasis on a better NATO defense posture.

### The Defense Planning Committee

In the DPC there will probably be some hard bargaining among the Fourteen over various decisions to be taken regarding improvement of the NATO integrated defense system, and particularly the specific increases in defense contributions to be made by individual countries. Here again, much of the groundwork has already been laid by the Permanent Representatives and by the Secretary's October 7 dinner meeting in New York. Nevertheless, the Germans, the Dutch and others have made clear repeatedly that their national decisions must follow from collective NATO decisions. Thus, the DPC decisions may have to be approved in general terms first, with individual national decisions stated in principle or on a contingent basis. The Europeans will also want to know what the United States might do; e.g. hold early deployment exercises, improve combat capability of forces in Europe, and in CONUS.

On the financial side, our own concern involves balance of payments considerations as well as increased budgetary resources other governments might make available for defense. Even though our specific negotiations on balance of payments grounds are likely to remain bilateral, we are seeking to have a statement adopted recognizing the common interest in neutralizing foreign exchange losses incurred by contributions for NATO defense.

The Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee

In addition to the NAC and DPC sessions, defense ministers of all countries except France, Iceland and Luxembourg will meet in the NDAC. The purpose will be to review the work of the NPG in light of that body's discussions in Bonn in October.

One possible issue: There may be an attempt on the part of several countries to initiate discussions and studies which would lead to a fixed set of consultation rules and procedures governing the use of nuclear weapons. This could result in a complete impasse or development of procedures so inflexible as to be unworkable in any of the myriad unforeseen circumstances which could arise. Either result could seriously degrade NATO's tactical nuclear deterrent. Secretary Clifford intends to discourage pressures for such development by reminding the MODs directly of the dangers involved and by expressing deep US concern about the maintenance of the deterrent.

~~SECRET~~

November 6, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Nigerian Relief

Below Nick Katzenbach recommends that we meet a request which Speaker McCormack relayed to you from the U. S. Voluntary Agencies -- Catholic, Jewish and World Council of Churches relief -- to help finance their rental in Britain of two C-130's for relief flights in Nigeria. Nick's proposal is an effort to begin to get at the deeply frustrating problems of the Nigerian relief operation. In addition to our standing commitment to help relieve the suffering, there are two immediate concerns:

-- We are under a steady stream of pleas for help from these agencies.

They make reasonable cases for both the need and the practicality of leasing C-130's by an arrangement which would be consistent with our policy of channeling relief through the Red Cross.

Moreover, Barefoot Sanders and other Hill-watchers think Nigerian relief will generate more public heat for us when the Congress gets over the election and begins to read again the increasingly gruesome new<sup>s</sup> stories of famine coming out of the civil war.

-- Whatever the reaction here at home, we are likely to face an even greater famine problem inside the rebel area in December.

On top of the major economic dislocation of the war, Biafra

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, Dept. Guidelines  
By g, NARA, Date 2-19-91

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

apparently had a poor harvest which is already all but consumed. No one has solid numbers on starvation in Nigeria. The Red Cross now thinks (optimistically) that they are beginning to get a grip on the problem. Others disagree sharply. They argue that if present efforts aren't stepped up, the toll over the winter could run into the millions.

The hard truth ~~is that~~ is that there is precious little we or any outsiders can do so long as the two sides go on fighting and refusing to allow a full-scale relief effort.

Helping the voluntary agencies rent C-130's only touches a small part of these problems. But it is a useful first step toward broadening relief where we can.

Joe Palmer and an AID team of experts are just back from a detailed study of the Nigerian scene. Nick and Bill Gaud plan to take a fresh look at the relief problem in light of Palmer's findings and give you soon a broad picture of your options. But regardless of our course over the long haul, this support for the voluntary agencies is a minimal action that is workable and will show results.

I vote you approve Katzenbach's recommended reply to the voluntary agencies.

BEGIN KATZENBACH TEXT:

(attached)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11/5/68

33g

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM KATZENBACH *JK*

Late last month Speaker McCormack sent you a telegram supporting an appeal by Bishop Swanstrom of Catholic Relief Services (on behalf of two other church groups as well) that we make available to the interchurch group two Hercules aircraft to airlift food to the starving in Biafra. Swanstrom also proposed that--if we could not let them have the planes--we help foot the bill for aircraft the group would lease in the UK. (The text of McCormack's cable to you is included at the end of this message.)

I am opposed to providing US military aircraft. It would involve us directly in the complex political dispute underlying the war, and could lead to the loss of the planes and crews.

But we may be able to help pay for the charter of several aircraft (at a cost to us of about \$500,000) if the interchurch group can bring its operation under the International Red Cross umbrella. This should increase the amount of food getting into Biafra, while relieving some of the political pressure here at home for us to do more.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *JK*, NARA, Date *2-19-88*

~~SECRET~~

-2-

We are frustrated, as I know you are, that despite our substantial contributions (\$10.1 million) to Nigerian relief we have thus far been unable to prevent the starvation of thousands of victims of this tragic war. In a search for other ways in which we might help, I asked Joe Palmer and a team of relief experts to go to Nigeria to take another look at the problem. They are now back and have made a number of recommendations on which we are taking action.

In the meantime, I believe the best way to proceed is for Bill Gaud to write directly to Swanstrom, turning down the request for planes, but offering to explore the possibilities of supplementing the interchurch group's funds for the lease of aircraft. We could then send McCormack a copy of this letter, plus a covering note from Gaud indicating that he was replying on your behalf.

The texts of the proposed letters to Swanstrom and McCormack follow:

QUOTE Dear Bishop Swanstrom:

Thank you for your letter of October 30 and telegram of October 31 concerning possible US Government support for the airlift of relief

~~SECRET~~

-3-

supplies for victims of the Nigeria/Biafra conflict. I have also been informed of a telegram of October 23 from Representative McCormack, Speaker of the House, to the President which makes a similar request for help.

We appreciate that the costs of the airlift are resulting in a heavy financial burden on the church groups. We are encouraged by the intention of the church groups to do their utmost to mobilize the resources of private Americans in support of the relief effort on both sides of this conflict. Indeed, we believe that you might well take the lead in initiating a general campaign to solicit donations from private Americans at large. I regret that we cannot help by providing US Government Hercules aircraft. The complexities and dangers surrounding the use of US military aircraft in this kind of situation make it inadvisable, as I am sure you can appreciate. Your alternative plan, however, sounds like a good possibility. I feel certain we can work out a way to supplement your own funds for the airlift in conjunction with our assistance to the ICRC. In this regard, I would suggest that you arrange a meeting now

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

with Mr. R. Peter Straus, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Africa of the Agency for International Development, who is prepared to review our ideas with you in detail.

Let me emphasize again that we are deeply sympathetic to the need of the civilian victims on both sides of the Nigeria/Biafra conflict. We have already done a great deal to support the international relief effort mounted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICR<sup>C</sup>S). We expect to do a great deal more in the coming months, or as long as our help is necessary to alleviate human suffering. The US Government is already committed to substantial financial support of the ICRC's effort, including cash donations and most of the relief food provided. Our cash grants have permitted the ICRC to charter aircraft for relief flights, and we expect to announce shortly another sizeable contribution.

As I indicated in my letter of October 24, there are compelling reasons for continuing to channel our assistance through the ICRC and to build on the important support

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-5-

it now enjoys from both sides in the conflict. To do otherwise would run the risk of placing in jeopardy the entire relief effort now underway on both sides of the lines. Thus, in working out your airlift arrangements, we believe it is necessary that they be closely coordinated with the ICRC. I am pleased to see from your letter that you share this view and are working closely with the ICRC. I have heard from our officials in Lagos of the helpful cooperation of the Church agencies with the ICRC. I am also glad to hear the Sao Tome flights are fully integrated with those from Fernando Poo. This is particularly important in the light of the official Nigerian announcement of October 31 that the FMG now has the capability of intercepting all night flights to Biafra. I am told that only those relief flights sponsored by ICRC would have FMG authorization.

I appreciate very much your recognition of our efforts to do everything we can to bring relief to the needy. We are deeply concerned at the tragic situation

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-6-

involving starving people on both sides of the line. You will appreciate, I am certain, that in our anxiety to help those in Biafra controlled territory, we not do anything which would limit our ability to help the hundreds of thousands of others in similar need who are becoming accessible in increasing numbers in Federal controlled territory. UNQUOTE

QUOTE Dear Mr. Speaker:

The President has asked me to reply on his behalf to your telegram of October 23 concerning the request by the interchurch group for the assistance of the United States Government in helping to support their airlift of relief supplies to victims of the Nigerian/Biafran conflict. I have attached a copy of my most recent reply to Bishop Swanstrom who has written on behalf of Mr. MacCracken, Rabbi Tannenbaum and himself.

We are deeply concerned about the tragic situation in Nigeria/Biafra. We are determined to do all that we can to meet the needs of the civilian war victims

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-7-

on both sides of the conflict. A substantial volume of food is being shipped and direct donations are being made to the ICRC. We will, of course, do all that we can to assist the relief efforts of the interchurch group whose humanitarian efforts to alleviate the suffering are in the best American tradition. UNQUOTE

The text of Speaker McCormack's October 23 telegram to you follows:

QUOTE Dear Mr. President:

I know you are fully aware of the intense human suffering that is taking place in Biafra. The poor human beings are dying by the thousands. I know that you are doing everything you possibly can to bring relief to those suffering people and many other groups throughout the country and throughout the world are doing everything they can.

I understand a telegram was sent to you on October 16 by Bishop Swanstrom, Rabbi Tannenbaum,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-8-

and Mr. McCracken, head of the Church World Service, urging that the Government as the largest owner of Hercules aircraft, a type of cargo plane, make available two of the Hercules aircraft so that the amount of food flown from Sao Tome into Biafra for the starving children of that region can be doubled without any additional landings or takeoffs. I understand the Lockheed Hercules aircraft lifts twice as much as the DC-7's and 6's which interested people are now forced to use because of inability to finance any larger craft. They have been in contact with Mr. Morris of your office. I respectfully urge that every possible consideration be given to the present situation. It is a situation which calls for direct action brushing aside all difficulties and technicalities. If it should be found that the planes cannot be assigned then the group represented by Bishop Swanstrom, Rabbi Tannenbaum, and McCracken are in a position to hire such planes in Britain and probably elsewhere. This group can raise within the next two weeks \$500,000.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-9-

but needs financial assistance from our Government in at least a similar amount. As time is of the essence in connection with the suffering human beings in Biafra I urge every direct effort be made to bring the maximum of relief possible and I sincerely hope that two of the Hercules aircraft owned by our Government can be assigned for this humanitarian project, if not, that financial assistance can be given to the group represented by Bishop Swanstrom, Rabbi Tannenbaum, and Mr. McCracken. UNQUOTE.

Gaud letters to Swanstrom  
and McCormack are OK \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

34

*Pres file*

EYES ONLY

Thursday, November 7, 1968 -- 12:30 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith the transcript of your talk with Mr. Nixon. Key passages are marked. (*Tab A*)

Also attached is Mr. Nixon's statement of Sunday, November 3, on MEET THE PRESS. (*Tab B*)

Also, what he said on the Telethon, which was equally strong. (*Tab C*)

W. W. Rostow

*Tab A not attached to this copy*

EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rln

MEET THE PRESS

(Sunday, November 3, 1968)

(Statements made by Mr. Nixon regarding VN.)

Q.

A. I want to make it very clear that if I am elected President, I will be willing to cooperate with the President and the Secretary of State if they and/would consider it helpful for me to go to Paris or to Saigon in order to get the negotiations off dead center, I would be glad to do so. Let me make one thing clear. This is not just a grandstand statement, and I don't know if it would be helpful. But right now, the key point of course, is to get the South Vietnamese to the conference table. I believe they ought to go to the conference table. I think the semantical differences could be worked out and if my influence could be helpful, I will be helpful.

Q.

A. Let me make one thing very clear. As far as Saigon is concerned, it would only relate to the position of the South Vietnamese Government.

Q.

A. I am only indicating that, Mr. Kaplow, to demonstrate very clearly what I have said to President Johnson privately and I don't think that he would mind my saying it publicly that I will do anything as President-elect, if I am President-elect, that would be helpful, but he, and of course the Secretary of State have to make the decisions as to what would be helpful.

Sub B

It isn't going to be the case, in other words, that you have the President and the Secretary of State as lame ducks for two months. I have the feeling that this two-month period between the election and January 20 could be very critical. I think that if the United States right now could present a united front then with President Johnson, for example, and if I happen to be elected -- the President-elect Nixon -- if we together could knock down the idea that Hanoi is going to gain the political decision in the U. S. what they cannot gain on the battlefield, this might get these talks off dead center. I'm simply indicating that I will cooperate in any way that President Johnson determines will be helpful then, and I'm not going to sit out and wait and let him stew in his juice and then hope to do it after January.

Question: Yesterday I saw on TV that you telephoned President Johnson-- what was that all about?

Answer: Well, I telephoned the President because after he announced the bombing halt and as you recall on that occasion it was widely publicized that he did telephone the three major candidates and informed us of it, that then the negotiations came apart at the seams and the South Vietnamese indicated they would not come to the conference and I telephoned the President to indicate to him my concern about this, but also to indicate to him that if I won the election that I would put my full force behind his efforts to try to get those negotiations off dead center and to get the South Vietnamese Government to come to Paris. The President seemed most grateful that I had made that statement and incidentally I made it on Meet the Press yesterday, it is national in character--that is what we primarily discussed.

Let me say one thing further, that looking at President Johnson in this respect I'm not among those who make him ~~the~~ just the goat of this whole thing. He wants peace. Two of his sons-in-law are in Vietnam--I feel for him. I just think that the problem is that he has, as I indicated earlier, he has a team that is tired. They tried, but they have been in there some of them eight years, many of them four years--they have tried everything and when they are tired they've begun to make mistakes and I think the fact that this bombing pause was announced ~~the~~ and that now instead of getting the shelling stopped, they have continued with the flow of supplies by the enemy into South Vietnam, continues (sic) the fact that South Vietnam is not going to go to the conference table. This thing would not have happened, this pause would have been better prepared had we had a fresh team in there. But I am just not going to sit by between November 5 and January 20 and let President Johnson stew in his juice because I think in that period, I really believe that for all those who have sons or loved ones in Vietnam, or people ready to go, let me say this--I believe that 60-day period could be the period when we can make a breakthrough for peace because then, I representing the Republican Party, as the President-Elect and President Johnson representing the outgoing administration of the Democratic Party, we could present a united front to the enemy and thereby I think hasten the negotiations because one of the things that has prolonged this war is the belief in the men of Hanoi that division in the US would win a diplomatic victory for them that they could not win militarily. I think, therefore, that my pledge, which I made even to go to Saigon, in order to try to get the Government of Saigon to come to Paris, or to Paris--I'll do anything to help President Johnson end this war; nobody . . . I don't care anything about political credit; if he can get the credit to end this war and if it is ended before his administration--more power to him. We got plenty of other problems we can work on and get credit for in the next administration.

35

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

Thursday, November 7, 1968 - 12:10pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a full chronological file  
of the special intelligence items you  
asked for.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By MP, NARA, Date 9-10-97

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

WWRostow:rln

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file*  
36

Thursday, Nov. 7, 1968  
12:05 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This report of an NSC meeting in Saigon on November 7 is more hopeful. The South Vietnamese are looking for a way to get to Paris ~~"within a week"~~ Their formula: that the GVN be the "head" of "our" delegation, and another South Vietnamese as the delegation's chief spokesman.

They apparently understand that this may not be wholly acceptable to us, but ~~will be looking for a counter proposal which would permit them to save face and get to Paris.~~

My suggestion would be: a joint U. S. -GVN announcement that, in conformity with the decision made at Honolulu, the GVN delegation would play a leading role and, specifically, ~~would be the spokesman for our side in all matters of primary interest to South Vietnam.~~

*W. Rostow*  
Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-508  
By WJ, NARA, Date 1-11-93


SAAT

1968 NOV 7 16 11

VV DLA312 \*\*\*\*\*  
 OYKADS  
 OYKADL R8176 3121450  
 KZX OO ZSL DE  
 371436Z ZYH  
 MCIA  
 TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
 TO ACSI DA  
 TO ARLINGTON HALL STATION  
 FSSO USAF  
 NO  
 DIA/ISIC  
 CS  
 JC  
 DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER  
 STATE (RCI)  
 CIA-CCI  
 ZEM

SANITIZED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
 NLJ 91-504  
 By 428, NARA, Date 11-30-92

*Roston*



COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
 DOI 7 NOVEMBER 1968  
 SUBJECT APPROVAL BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
 OF PLAN DESIGNED TO GET A VIETNAMESE DELEGATION TO PARIS  
 TALKS WITHOUT LOSS OF FACE

1.3(a)(4)

ACQ-SOURCE VIETNAM. SAIGON 

1.3(a)(4)

SUMMARY: THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDED AT A MEETING ON 7 NOVEMBER THAT THE GOVERNMENT (GVN) WOULD PROPOSE TO AMBASSADOR BUNDER IMMEDIATELY THE ADOPTION OF A VARIATION OF THE "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA AS A MEANS BY WHICH THE GVN COULD SEND A DELEGATION TO JOIN THE PARIS TALKS. UNDER THIS FORMULA GVN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD HEAD THE JOINT U.S./GVN DELEGATION AND SERVE AS CHIEF DELEGATION SPOKESMAN. THIS WOULD INSURE PLACING THE GVN ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH NORTH VIETNAM AND ABOVE THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. THE MEETING PARTICIPANTS ALSO APPROVED A DETAILED FOREIGN MINISTRY ELABORATION OF THE THREE-STAGE PEACE PLAN PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY VICE PRESIDENT KY AND APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE AT THE COUNCIL'S 4 NOVEMBER MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING A 7 NOVEMBER 1968 MEETING LASTING FROM 1032 TO 1245 HOURS, MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AGREED ON A PLAN TO GET THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) DELEGATION INTO THE PARIS TALKS WITHOUT A LOSS OF FACE. THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WERE IN FULL AGREEMENT THAT THE GVN MUST MAKE A MOVE QUICKLY SINCE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION REGARDS SOUTH VIETNAM AS THE ONLY COUNTRY NOW OBSTRUCTING THE MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

2. A MAJOR PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS TO CONSIDER A DETAILED PAPER PREPARED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN CHANH THANH, ACTING ON THE ORDERS OF PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU, ON THE THREE-STAGE PEACE PLAN ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY. THE PLAN WAS APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL AT ITS 4 NOVEMBER MEETING.

1.3(a)

THOSE PRESENT FOUND THE PAPER PREPARED BY THANH TO BE SATISFACTORY.

3. KY THEN RAISED THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO PRESENT THE GVN THREE-STAGE PLAN TO THE INTERESTED PARTIES NOTING IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE SIMPLY TO DROP THE PARIS TALKS. HE OPPOSED THE EFFORTS OF SEVERAL OF THOSE PRESENT WHO FAVORED CALLING A PRESS CONFERENCE AND ANNOUNCING THE THREE-STAGE PLAN. KY SAID IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FIND SOME WAY TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN THE PARIS TALKS. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION OF HOW THE GVN COULD ACCOMPLISH THIS WITH "FACE," THE PROPOSAL WAS MADE THAT THE GVN RETURN TO THE "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY THE AMERICANS.

4. PRESIDENT THIEU TOLD THE COUNCIL MEMBERS A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO MAKE THE "OUR SIDE" CONCEPT PALATABLE TO THE VIETNAMESE PUBLIC AND POLITICAL ELITE. THIS MIGHT BE DONE BY MAKING CLEAR GVN'S PRIMACY OVER THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLSV) AND BY ASSURING EQUALITY BETWEEN THE GVN AND NORTH VIETNAM (DRV). IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THESE TWO OBJECTIVES, THIEU SAID, THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO A SOUTH VIETNAMESE AS THE HEAD OF "OUR" DELEGATION AND ANOTHER SOUTH VIETNAMESE AS THE DELEGATION'S CHIEF SPOKESMAN. THIS FORMULA WOULD NOT MEAN, OF COURSE, THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT COULD NOT HAVE ITS OWN SPOKESMAN IN PARIS OR WOULD BE BOUND BY ANY DECISIONS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION CHAIRMAN. IT WOULD SIMPLY PROVIDE A PRESTIGE FACTOR FOR THE GVN.

5. THIEU ASKED THANH TO INFORM AMBASSADOR BUNKER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE GVN'S DESIRE TO UTILIZE THE "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA. HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE AMERICANS WOULD ACCEPT THESE PROPOSALS IN THEIR ENTIRETY BUT HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT COME UP WITH AN ACCEPTABLE COUNTERPROPOSAL.

6. COMMENT: IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCEPTS THE GVN CONCEPT OF THIS "OUR SIDE" FORMULA, THE GVN WILL PROBABLY HAVE ITS DELEGATION IN PARIS WITHIN ONE WEEK. THE GVN WILL PROPOSE ITS THREE-STAGE PEACE PLAN IN PARIS AFTER ITS DELEGATION ARRIVES THERE UNDER THE "OUR SIDE" FORMULA. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THE GVN IS BOUND TO THE THREE-STAGE PLAN OR UNWILLING TO CONSIDER OTHER APPROACHES. HOWEVER, THE GVN DOES BELIEVE IT SHOULD HAVE A BOLD AND WELL-REASONED PLAN PREPARED BEFORE ITS DELEGATION GOES TO PARIS.)

7. DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, MR. COLBY, MAJOR GENERAL DAVIDSON) CINCPAC (EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD)

1.3(a)(4)

has file

39

Thurs., Nov. 7, 1968  
11:20 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Joe Alsop is leaving for Saigon on  
Tuesday, November 12.

He asked if you would be free to see him  
before that time.

W. W. Rostow

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

(cc: George Christian)

~~SECRET~~

Thurs., v. 7, 1968  
9:45 a. m.

*Per file*

38

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a warm tribute to Bob  
Komer from Ellsworth Bunker, backed  
by Abrams.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-attachment (Saigon 42178)

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ag, NARA, Date 3-26-93

~~SECRET~~ (S)

38a

1968 NOV 7 13 15

~~SECRET~~

HCE040

PAGE 01 SAIGON 42172 271301Z

44  
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 02, NSCE 00, / 230 W

119129

R 271200Z NOV 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4032

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42173

EXDIS

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority Group 4, released by President 11/7/68  
By sg, NARA, Date 3-26-93

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER

1. BOB KOMER HAS JUST LEFT VIET-NAM AFTER TWO AND A HALF YEARS OF ALL-OUT EFFORT TO MAKE PACIFICATION A GOING CONCERN. SINCE YOU SENT HIM TO US FROM YOUR PERSONAL STAFF, GENERAL ABRAMS AND I WOULD LIKE TO REPORT THAT KOMER DID A JOB NO ONE ELSE COULD HAVE DONE AS WELL. HE TOOK ON ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT TASKS OF ALL IN VIET-NAM--THAT OF CREATING ALMOST FROM SCRATCH A PACIFICATION PROGRAM TO PARALLEL OUR MILITARY EFFORT. IT HAS BEEN A GREAT ACHIEVEMENT, AND ITS FULL BENEFITS WILL ONLY BEGIN TO BE RECOGNIZED IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD.

2. AMONG KOMER'S ACHIEVEMENTS, PERHAPS SIX STAND OUT--FIRST, MAKING THE UNIQUE AND UNPRECEDENTED INTEGRATED CIVIL/MILITARY ORGANIZATION WHICH YOU AUTHORIZED WORK BETTER THAN ANYONE EXPECTED; SECOND, THE ATTACK ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE; THIRD, THE POST-TET RECOVERY PROGRAM; FOURTH, UPGRADING TERRITORIAL SECURITY WHICH WAS A GREAT CONTRIBUTION IN THE MILITARY FIELD; FIFTH, GETTING THE GVN TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY AND SELECTION PROCESS FOR PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEFS; AND LASTLY, THE NEW PACIFICATION OFFENSIVE TO HELP SPEED UP A SUCCESSFUL END OF THIS WAR.

3. KOMER LEAVES QUITE RELUCTANTLY, FEELING THAT PERHAPS HE SHOULD STAY TO HELP SEE THE WAR THROUGH. BUT WE FEEL THAT HE HAS ALREADY MADE SUCH A CONTRIBUTION THAT WE CAN HARDLY ASK MORE. HE DEPARTS WITH THE GREAT RESPECT OF HIS VIETNAMESE COLLEAGUES. GP-4 BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

\*Komer was in Vietnam 1-1/2 years. (He went out the first part of May 1967.) ~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

PRESERVATION COPY.