

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 6

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to the President re USSR S 2 pp.	11/14/68	A
#2a memcon	Luncheon Meeting between Ambassadors Thompson and Dobrynin S 2 pp.	11/12/68	A
#6 memo	Rostow to the President S 1 p. [dup. #17, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1993]	11/14/68	A
#6a cable	Oslo 5486 S 1 p. [dup. #17a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1992]	11/14/68	A
#9a cable	Deptel to Saigon S 9 pp. [dup. #21a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1992]	11/13/68	A
#12a memo	Intelligence Note #874 S 4 pp.	11/12/68	A
#12b memcon	Luncheon Meeting between Ambassadors Thompson and Dobrynin C 1 p.	11/12/68	A
#12c memcon	Luncheon Meeting between Ambassadors Thompson and Dobrynin C 2 pp.	11/12/68	A
#14 memo	Rostow to the President open 12/19/02 S 1 p.	11/14/68	A
#16 memo	Rostow to the President 6:50 p.m. S 1 p. open 8-12-09 NLJ/RAC 07-82	11/13/68	A
#16a report	Soviet Officials Comment on.... S 2 pp.	undated	A
#16b report	Communist Chinese Activity.... S 1 p. open 8-12-09 NLJ/RAC 07-82	undated	A
#16c report	DeGaulle's View of.... " S 1 p.	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Volume 105, 11/9-14/68," Box 42

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#18 note	Rostow to the President <i>open per TA 12/19/02</i>	11/13/68	C
#20 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam	11/13/68	A
#21 memo	Rostow to the President re Germany C 1 p. [dup. #15, NSF, Country File, "Germany, Vol. 16," Box 189]	11/13/68	A
#21a cable	Berlin 2662 <i>open NLJ 019-042-2-2 (1/02)</i> C 2 pp. [dup. #15a, NSF, Country File, "Germany, Vol. 16," Box 189]	11/13/68	A
#22a report	Conciliatory Attitudes of VP Ky and Pres. Thieu <i>sanitized (9/5/02)</i> S 2 pp. <i>same same NLJ 019-042-2-3 (1/02)</i> [dup. #15a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1992]	undated	A
#23a cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p. - <i>sanitized 9-28-99 NLJ 94-413</i>	11/13/68	A
#25 memo	Rostow to the President, 10:40 a.m. S 1 p. <i>open 12/19/02</i> [dup. #47, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "HARVAN Memos & Misc., Vol. 7, Box 124]	11/13/68	A
#25a cable	USNATO 5748 <i>open 12/19/02</i> S 1 p. [dup. #47b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "HARVAN Memos & Misc., Vol. 7," Box 124]	11/13/68	A
#27 memo	Rostow to the President 9:30 a.m. S 1 p. <i>open 1-28-11 NLJ/RAC 10-216</i> [dup. #152, NSF, Country File, "France, Vol. 14," Box 174]	11/13/68	A
#27a cable	Paris 23767 <i>open 1-20-11 NLJ/RAC 10-215 (#152)</i> S 1 p. [dup. #152a, NSF, Country File, "France, Vol. 14," Box 174]	11/12/68	A
#27b cable	Paris 23768 <i>open 1-20-11 NLJ/RAC 10-215 (#152)</i> S 9 p. [dup. #152b, NSF, Country File, "France, Vol. 14," Box 174, Exempt NLJ 85-242]	11/12/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#28 memo	Rostow to the President, 9:15 a.m. S 1 p. [dup. #22, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1993]	11/13/68	A
#28d cable	Saigon 42581 S 2 p. [dup. #22h, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1992]	11/13/68	A
#29 memo	Rostow to the President, 8:40 a.m. S 1 p. [dup. #30 & #31, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1993]	11/13/68	A
#29a cable	Oslo 7319 S 1 p. [dup. #30a & #31a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1992]	11/12/68	A
#29b cable	Intelligence cable TS 2 p. [dup. #30b & #31b, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Exempt NLJ 91-512]	11/68	A
#30 memo	Rostow to the President re Laos S 1 p.	11/13/68	A
#30a cable	Intelligence report. S 2 pp. - <i>Sanitized 9-21-79 NS544-43; sanitized Vole RHC - more release</i>	[11/68]	A
#32a cable	work copy to Tel Aviv S 3 pp. [dup. #69a this file] <i>open per RHC 12/8/17</i>	11/8/68	A
#34 memo	Rostow to the President re USSR S 1 p.	11/12/68	A
#34a memcon	E. Rostow and A. Dobrynin S 2 pp.	11/8/68	A

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#37 memo	Rostow to the President re Germany S 1 p. [dup. #18a, NSF, Country File, "Germany, Vol. 16, Box 189]	11/12/68	A
#37a cable	Bonn 19184 S 1 p. [dup. #18b, NSF, Country File, "Germany, Vol. 16," Box 189]	11/12/68	A
#39 note	Rostow to the President 4:40 p.m. TS 1 p. - Sanitized, NLJ 94-414, 10-26-95	11/12/68	A
#39a cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p. - Sanitized 9-28-99 NLJ 94-413	11/12/68	A
#40 memo	Rostow to the President 4:30 p.m. S 1 p. [dup. #33, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1993]	11/12/68	A
#40a cable	Intelligence information cable S 7 pp. [dup. #33a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1992]	11/12/68	A
#43 note	Rostow to the President 2:55 p.m. TS 1 p. - Sanitized, NLJ 94-414, 10-26-95	11/12/68	A
#43a cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p. - Sanitized 9-28-99 NLJ 94-413	11/12/68	A
#44 memo	Rostow to the President re Laos S 1 p.	11/12/68	A
#44b memo	Paul Nitze to Dir. of DOD Research S 1 p.	11/11/68	A
#46a cable	Wheeler to Clifford S 1 p.	11/12/68	A
#50a cable	Moscow 6409 S 4 pp.	11/12/68	A
#51a cable	Saigon 491 S 1 p. Sanitized 10-1-6-10	11/12/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#52 memo	Rostow to the President PCI 1 p.	11/12/68	A
#55 memo	Rostow to the President 4:50 p.m. C 1 p.	11/11/68	A
#56b report	Intelligence report <i>open 11/5/09 RAC</i> TS 4 pp. — <i>Sanitized, NLS 94-415, 2-20-96</i>	11/10/68	A
#57 memo	Rostow to the President re NPT C 1 p.	11/11/68	A
#59 memo	Rostow to the President 11:35 a.m. S 1 p. [dup. #38, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1993]	11/11/68	A
#59a cable	Tokyo 13708 <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i> S 6 pp. [dup. #38a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 6," Box 138, Sanitized 1992]	11/11/68	A
#60a memo	Rostow to the President, 12 midnight S 1 p.	10/27/68	A
#60b report	"The President has not made any" PCI 2 pp.	10/27/68	A
#60c report	re peace talks PCI 1 p.	10/28/68	A
#67 memo	Rostow to the President <i>Exempt 8-22-06 NLS 06-190</i> S 2 p. — <i>EXEMPT 2004</i> <i>Ch. p. 1, FOR, "Nixon, Richard - VN" Box 5</i>	11/11/68	A
#69 memo	Rostow to the President re Israel S 1 p.	11/10/68	A
#69a	<i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i> duplicate #32a this file		
#70 memo	Rostow to the President re Nixon. TS. 1 p. — <i>Sanitized</i>	11/10/68	A
#70a cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p. — <i>Sanitized 9-28-99 NLS 94-413</i>	11/10/68	A
#71 memo	Rostow to the President, 10:55 a.m. S 1 p. [dup. #1, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 5," Box 137, Sanitized 1992]	11/10/68	A

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#71a cable	to White House Situation Room S 3 pp. <i>open 3-26-14 per RAC</i> [dup. #3, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 5," Box 137, Sanitized 1991]	11/10/68	A
#71d cable	Deptel 269935 to Saigon S 6 pp. [dup. #9, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. 5," Box 137, Sanitized 1992]	11/9/68	A
#74 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam 1:10 p.m. S 1 p. <i>open 12/19/02</i>	11/9/68	A
#74a report	Intelligence report <i>open NLT 019-042-2-6(1/02)</i> S 3 pp.	11/8/68	A
#75a memo	James F. Leonard to Mr. Bundy S 2 pp.	11/18/68	A
#76 memo	Rostow to the President re Panama S 2 pp. <i>open per USAS-198 (& 151a) 12/19/02</i> [dup. #151a, NSF, Country File, "Panama, Vol. 10," Box 69]	11/9/68	A
#76a memo	Rusk to the President S 4 pp. [dup. #151c, NSF, Country File, "Panama, Vol. 10," Box 69]	11/1/68	A
#76b letter	Foreign Min. of Panama to the Ambassador C 3 pp. <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i> [dup. #151d, NSF, Country File, "Panama, Vol. 10," Box 69]	10/24/68	A
#77 memo	Rostow to the President S 1 p. — <i>Sanitized, NLT 94-414, 11-28-95</i>	11/9/68	A

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Thursday, November 14, 1968
5:30 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71996-27
By M/rap, NARA, Date 10-3-97

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an initial comment on Dobrynin's position at the lunch he initiated.

1/ Moscow is clearly ready to go -- and eager -- if you can work it out.

2. Their reasons are quite similar to our own: to create a good backdrop for the NPT in January; to keep the momentum of the work on missiles going into the next Administration; and, therefore, to avoid a long delay in both the NPT and the missile affairs.

3. Reading over the proposed joint communique statement on the missile talks, I have two reflections:

-- first, they need some staffing out by Sect. Rusk and a few others;

-- basically, they represent the kind of public commitment that might emerge; although the heart of the matter will lie not in the public statement of principles, but rather in the simple fact that initial positions have been exchanged between the two governments and that further rational negotiation can proceed early in the next Administration.

4. The heart of the matter, then, is not so much in the refinement of the principles, but in persuading Nixon that this is the right course for him, for the President, and for the nation.

5. With respect to a rationale for Nixon, these are key points:

-- we have been working on this since January 1964, and working intensively since the Glassboro sessions;

-- we start with a position which is fully acceptable to the JCS and all civilian authorities in the government;

-- any modifications and negotiations from that position will lie in the hands of the next Administration;

-- a coming to grips with this matter at an early date would make it easier to get the NPT through the Senate in January;

-- equally important, if Nixon encourages the President to go forward with this, it will virtually guarantee Soviet restraint on Berlin and Eastern Europe in the first phase of his Administration because once the talks are started, the Soviet Union will have a major interest in not creating circumstances which would require that they be broken off. We have been clear with them about both Berlin

and Czechoslovakia.

6. I have no doubt that there will be those who argue to Nixon that he should wait and take this matter in hand himself. I understand very well the leverage we had on him on the Vietnam matter; but I am not clear what leverage the President will have on this issue except:

- his power of initiative even without Nixon's assent;
- an appeal to statesmanship and self-interest.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Thursday, November 14, 1968
5:10 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You may wish to read this
Thompson-Dobrynin memorandum of
conversation which has had very little
distribution.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By MP, NARA, Date 9-10-97

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlw

Approved in S/S:
11/13/68

Memorandum of Conversation

6

DATE: November 12, 1968

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting between
Ambassadors Thompson and Dobrynin
Part 2 of 3

PARTICIPANTS: Llewellyn E. Thompson,
American Ambassador, Moscow
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin,
Soviet Ambassador, US

COPIES TO: U
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WH

Ambassador Dobrynin asked for my personal advice on what he or his Embassy should do with respect to the President-Elect. He understood that Mr. Nixon would probably remain in New York until the inauguration and that it was unlikely that he would have an occasion to see him. He wondered whether he should try to get in touch with any of the people around Mr. Nixon. He thought the matter was somewhat delicate as he did not wish in any way to appear to be pushing or to forget the fact that President Johnson would be in office until January 20.

I suggested that he would probably be well advised to take no initiative in the matter, but to be available if any of Mr. Nixon's advisers should approach him.

I asked what his views were on a possible summit meeting between Mr. Nixon and the Soviet leaders.

Part 2 of 3

The Ambassador replied that his personal view was that he was very much in favor of a summit meeting and thought that the sooner it took place, the better, although Moscow would realize that this was a matter involving US domestic considerations. He thought the Soviet leaders would be quite prepared to meet Mr. Nixon either before or after the inauguration.

Monday, Nov. 14, 1968
4:45 p. m.

has file
3

MR. PRESIDENT:

After January 20, 1969, we'll all be
able to talk like Prince Philip in Chile.

W. W. Rostow



Department of State

32
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 497

PAGE 01 SANTIA 06375 132340Z

B7
ACTION ARA 16

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-15
By ju, NARA, Date 7-28-94

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 20, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, RSR 01, /104 W
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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
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TAYLOR
V. P.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SANTIAGO 6075

SUBJ: THE QUEEN'S VISIT

1. IT SHOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE THAT THE SOUP NOTE SIDELIGHT TO QUEEN ELIZABETH'S VISIT TO CHILE (WHICH IS PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY WITH WARM CORDIAL RECEPTION BY PUBLIC AS WELL AS OFFICIALDOM) HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY CHILE'S INIMICAL SENATE PRESIDENT SALVADOR ALLENDE. AT YESTERDAY'S FORMAL VISIT OF THE QUEEN TO JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS ALLENDE IN HIS WELCOMING SPEECH ~~COULD NOT RESIST TEMPTATION TO LARD LATTER HALF OF HIS PRESENTATION WITH CHILEAN LEFTIST LINE OF MALTREATMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND WITH OLD TERMS OF TRADE ARGUMENT THAT RICH GET RICHER BY SUCKING POORER NATIONS BLOOD OF POORER NATIONS~~

2. ~~AS IF THIS WERE NOT AN INSUFFICIENTLY BAD TASTE ALLENDE APPEARED AT LAST NIGHT'S RECEPTION FOR THE QUEEN IN STREET CLOTHES, STICKING OUT LIKE SORE THUMB AMONGST THE TAILS, TRAINS AND TILAS. WHEN ASKED BY PRINCE PHILIP, WHO IS NOT ONE TO BE INTIMIDATED BY SUCH PLEBIAN AIRS OF SUPERIORITY, WHY HE HAD CHOSEN THAT ATTIRE, ALLENDE SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED MATTER WITH HIS PARTY, WHICH HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO DO SO. PHILIP ASKED WHAT IF THEY HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO COME IN BATHING SUITS~~

3. ~~CONTINUING THIS ANIMATED CONVERSATION, PRINCE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 SANTIA 06075 132340Z

PHILIP DISCOVERED THAT ALLENDE HAD RUN UNSUCCESSFULLY
FOR PRESIDENCY OF CHILE THREE TIMES. PHILIP ASKED
ALLENDE WHAT HE THOUGHT OF SITUATION IN CHILE. ALLENDE
REPORTED THAT THE PEOPLE WERE DISSATISFIED WITH THE
SITUATION AND THEREFORE HE, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PEOPLE, WAS DISSATISFIED WITH THE SITUATION. PHILIP
SAID HE UNDERSTOOD ALLENDE'S DISSATISFACTION AS A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE HAVING BEEN REJECTED
BY THE PEOPLE THREE TIMES IN A ROW. PLEASE PROTECT
SOURCE (HIGH FONOFF OFFICIAL).

DEAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file
4

Monday, November 14, 1968
4:35 p. m.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached memorandum of conversation between Cy Vance and Lau should be read in the light of this further report on what Dobrynia had to say about reconnaissance. When I raised reconnaissance, he asked: Did they understand fully your position on reconnaissance? I said that I had no doubt that they did understand it. It was clear that their initial instructions after the bombing halt forbade firing on reconnaissance aircraft.

He then asked: What was Lau's reaction when Vance raised this matter with him in Paris? I said that he took notes and agreed to inform his government.

He then asked: Why do you think they are now shooting at your aircraft when they did not shoot in the first days after the bombing halt?

I said that I did not know, but that he might take the trouble to find out.

Against this background, the Vance/Lau conversation attached suggests that they are going to test us pretty hard on reconnaissance.

You will also note that they say that no North Vietnamese troops are involved at the DMZ -- an acknowledgment of that condition -- but they do not take responsibility for the NLF. They are pressing us here to some purpose, and I am not sure which of the following it is:

- to establish how determined we are about reconnaissance;
- to force us to talk to the NLF;
- to make us reduce the intensity of reconnaissance;
- to put pressure on us to get Saigon to Paris.

In any case, they are pushing us.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-514
By [signature], NARA, Date 7-2-93

4a

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

November 14, 1968

Cy Vance called at 1:05 p.m. to report on his conversation with Lau

Lau opened the discussions with a reference to Vance's statement to him on November 11 about the violations of the DMZ on the previous day. (Cy had given him specific details and a map of the positions of the US forces and the firing units). Lau said that he was authorized to state that artillery had not been fired from the North of the DMZ to any position South of the DMZ; therefore there was no shelling on the 10th. In regard to any shelling or mortaring by the NLF that is their responsibility.

He said that our remarks yesterday in Washington were merely a pretext for further delays and a justification of our aggression.

He then raised the subject of the reconnaissance flights. He said that there were daily flights including alerts in Hanoi. This is a violation of the security of the DRV and acts of force. He urged that there be immediate stops in these flights in accordance with the spirit of the agreement.

Vance responded along the following lines. In respect to the November 10 situation, the evidence indicated the presence of the 27th DRV Regiment in the DMZ. Even assuming the DRV forces were not in the DMZ we would not accept Lau's assertion that the NLF had a free hand. He called to Lau's attention the latter's statements in the course of October that if the bombing were stopped the DMZ would be respected.

In respect to the question of reconnaissance we had chosen our words very carefully. This was not an act of force. We believed that they had fully understood what our words meant. We would continue our reconnaissance flights and if they were fired upon we would take the necessary defensive actions. This could create a dangerous situation which we assume neither side would want.

In the last meeting Lau had mentioned an alleged violation of a US naval vessel of DRV waters. We had carefully checked his accusation and could state that no US vessel had penetrated the territorial waters of the DRV on that date.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

Authority 712991-510

By RS/isp, NARA, Date 4-6-93

Vance rejected Lau's charge that the US was an aggressor and forcefully stated that the true aggressor was the DRV and the NLF.

Lau then responded: He said you think you have a right to infringe on the sovereignty of the DRV; this is serious and dangerous. We will strike back at the reconnaissance flights. The US must bear responsibility. There is no international law that would tolerate the dangers to the DRV brought about by such actions. These acts would not improve the chances of peace. If the US continues, the DRV will use all necessary means of defense. He then rejected Vance's statement about the alleged US penetration of DRV waters.

In respect to the DMZ he again stated that there was a clear difference between the actions of the DRV and the NLF. The U.S. would have to speak to the NLF about this matter.

Vance then stated that reconnaissance does not endanger the security of the DRV. The only problem in this matter is the firing by DRV. Until we approach closer to peace, reconnaissance will be necessary and will continue. We had stopped all bombing and all acts of force against the territories of the DRV and there was no danger to the security of the DRV involved.

In respect to the alleged naval incidence our statement was fully accurate. He would, however, be willing to receive any further information on this matter that Lau might wish to provide.

With respect to the DMZ, Vance said we recognize no distinction between actions of the DRV forces and actions of the NLF. He then asked Lau if the DRV had withdrawn all its forces from the DMZ. Lau responded affirmatively.

Vance reported that the conversation throughout was orderly and was not heated. He considered Lau's remark that no DRV forces were in the DMZ as indicative that they recognize an obligation in respect to the Zone. However, there is a considerable problem involved in the suggestion that the forces in the DMZ are NLF. Vance further noted that there clearly is a most serious problem in the offing in respect to reconnaissance flights.

He will file as soon as possible a detailed cable.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

BRIEFING MEMO

Thursday, November 14, 1968 -- 3:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

For your 5:30 p. m. meeting today with the columnists, here are some points.

1. Vietnam. Peace making is hard, slow work but we are moving, although this transitional period before the wider talks take hold is precarious.

-- Despite some violation, the DMZ and all of I Corps are basically quiet; and there have been no attacks on major cities.

-- Our people are pushing out into the countryside with a 3% GVN population control in October, almost 3 times the previous record in improvement.

-- It is a very big step for Hanoi to accept the Thieu government as a legitimate negotiating partner; but it is also very difficult for Saigon to sit down at the same table with the NLF, even if Saigon knows we shall not press upon them a coalition government.

-- We just have to work at it every day. In the meantime, Abrams and the ARVN will press forward. There is no general cease-fire.

2. Middle East. We are working equally hard to try to turn the corner in the Middle East. There is no basis for cheap optimism; but we are working quietly with Jarring, the Soviet Union, and others -- as well as with the parties most directly concerned.

3. Looking back, there is a good deal for which the President is grateful:

-- The Dominican Republic decision; momentum forward in the Alliance for Progress, and the beginnings of work on Latin American economic integration.

-- The success in accelerating food production in the world and beginning serious work on population control.

-- The economic and social momentum of Free Asia and the beginnings of Asian cooperation in the wake of the Vietnam decision of 1965.

With all its difficulties, the President would not have made (over)

4. As for disappointments, the greatest are:

-- The frustration of the missile talks by the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia, which also postponed the NPT. Both are of critical importance to the U.S. and the security of the human race.

-- The inability ^{to} prevent the Arab-Israeli war and the India-Pak war were also disappointments, as well as the difficulties of bringing peace to the Middle East and normal relations between India and Pakistan.

-- It was also disappointing that de Gaulle frustrated the bringing of Britain into the Common Market and the building of a truly strong European partner.

5. The new President will have plenty to do and, undoubtedly, crises we cannot now foresee. He will begin from a firmer base, however, than President Kennedy in 1961 or President Johnson in November 1963.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Pres file

6

Thurs., Nov. 14, 1968
12:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a rather reassuring North Vietnamese statement to the Norwegian Ambassador in Peking on the present state of affairs.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment(Oslo 5486)
NODIS/OHIO

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 4, NARA, Date 2-19-98



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

4 6a

RR RUEHCR
DE RUDKSO 7359 3190840
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 140830Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2122
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ OSLO 7359

NODIS/OHIO

REF: OSLO 5486

CONTROL: 3874

RECD : 14 NOV 68
7:43 a.m.

Rostow

FONOFF GAVE EMBOFF COPY OF FOLLOWING CABLE FROM ALGARD RECEIVED NOVEMBER 13. QUOTE ALGARD HAD LONG CONVERSATION NOVEMBER 12 WITH NGO WHO HAD RETURNED UNEXPECTEDLY. SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION FOLLOWS:

1. HANOI SATISFIED WITH BOMBING HALT AND PREPARED FOR SINCERE NEGOTIATIONS ON ALL POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVIOUS STATEMENTS, REF A-10043, POINT 3 (OSLO 5486 OF JULY 3). HANOI HAD COME TO CONCLUSION THAT SAIGON'S POSITION WAS NOT RPT NOT DELIBERATELY HARMONIZED WITH USA BUT RATHER ATTEMPT DEMONSTRATE INDEPENDENCE. HANOI PREPARED FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT SAIGON BUT WOULD PREFER SAIGON REPRESENTATION, THEREBY MAKING IT EASIER TO FIND A SOLUTION WHICH TOOK CARE OF USA PRESTIGE.

2. HANOI ASSUMES THAT ON BACKGROUND OF NIXON'S STATEMENTS THAT CHANGE OF PRESIDENCY WILL NOT RPT NOT MEAN A CHANGE IN USA'S POSITION. NEVERTHELESS STILL CLEAR HANOI WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE APPRECIABLE PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE JANUARY 20. NGO'S GENERAL TONE WITH REFERENCE TO USA STRIKINGLY POSITIVE.

3. THUS FAR CHINESE HAVE NOT RPT NOT COMMENTED ON NEW SITUATION CONFRONTING HANOI. NGO ASSUMED THAT THEY WILL PUT UP WITH A POLITICAL SOLUTION AS PRACTICAL IN POLITICAL INTEREST OF CHINA.

4. NGO EXPRESSED THANKS FOR NORWEGIAN ASSISTANCE WHICH HANOI REGARDED VERY FAVORABLY. VIETNAMESE DELEGATION TO OSLO STRONGLY IMPRESSED BY GENERAL STANDARDS IN NORWAY. UNQUOTE GP-1.

TIBBETTS

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958; Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *J*, NARA, Date *2-19-98*

~~SECRET~~

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

**Thurs., Nov. 14, 1968
10:10 a. m.**

7

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an account of Nick's conversation with Dobrynin on Vietnam. Also attached is his conversation on the Berlin rumors.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 7-6-93

W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachments (Tosec 36 State 271357 Secret/Harvan Double Plus)
(Tosec 34 State 271355 Secret)

ZFF-6
271357
7a
FOR OC/T USE ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Classification

Origin	ACTION: US MISSION NATO - BRUSSELS --- PRIORITY
Info	INFO: Amembassy, PARIS TODEL 1552
	" SAIGON
	" MOSCOW

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

14 Nov 68 0211Z

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71991-510

By rg/jw, NARA, Date 4693

STATE 271357

TOSEC 36

Subject: Katzenbach-Dobrynin Conversation Re Viet-Nam

... Acting Secretary saw Dobrynin November 13. Call was at our request. Following is resume of discussion:

NVN Attacks from Demilitarized Zone. -- Katzenbach said there have been a series of attacks, primarily artillery, from DMZ. He said he could not overemphasize importance US attaches to demilitarization of DMZ, and when such attacks take place, it raises serious problems in terms of maintaining present situation and moving forward in Paris talks. Vance has made this clear in Paris.

Katzenbach handed Dobrynin paper and map detailing incidents initiated from within DMZ, and pointed out that these have often come from southern half of zone. Surely USSR and NVN must recognize seriousness with which US views these attacks.

Drafted by: U:LEagleburg <i>LEagleburg</i>	Tel. Ext. 3351	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: THE ACTING SECRETARY <i>AP</i>
---	-------------------	---

S/S - AParker *AP*

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Page 2 of telegram to US MISSION NATO, BRUSSELS - PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS
Classification

Dobrynin asked whether subject had been discussed with NVN.

Katzenbach replied that incidents were discussed yesterday but that NVN had not been given an indication of coordinates from which attacks were launched. Purpose of map given Dobrynin was to underline precisely where attacks had originated.

NVN Attacks on US Reconnaissance Aircraft. -- Katzenbach said US reconnaissance flights below 19th Parallel have been fired on by NVN, despite fact we had made it clear we intended to continue these flights until progress in talks suggests another solution. NVN knew of our intentions, since we had emphasized we would only cease bombing and all armed attacks. If reconnaissance flights continue to be fired upon it is inevitable that fire will be returned and we will eventually be back where we started. This point has also been made to NVN. # Katzenbach then handed Dobrynin a statement and map showing points from which fire had been directed at aircraft.

Dobrynin said it was his personal impression that issue of firing on reconnaissance aircraft was not ^{rpt} ~~reported~~ not explicitly discussed with NVN. Katzenbach pointed out aircraft were not making armed attacks and that if NVN continues to fire on them it will ~~xxx~~ seriously jeopardize moving forward with Paris talks. If NVN does not recognize this they had ~~xxx~~ better be told.

Page 3 of telegram to US MISSION NATO; BRUSSELS

~~SECRET~~/MODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS
Classification

Dobrynin, again saying it was his personal impression, said that US is now placing a new demand, ex post facto, on NVN. While he recognized it could be a matter of interpretation, it was his impression that this ~~point~~ point had not been raised before in Paris.

Katzenbach said that certain points had been made by USG in discussions with NVN. While these points did not constitute agreements, they were surely understood by NVN. We do not understand what their difficulty is in being photographed, but we do know that if attacks against reconnaissance flights continue it is likely to lead to retaliatory action. If a plane is shot down it will be difficult to maintain the present cessation of bombing. The US is the only side that has done anything, i.e., we have stopped the bombing. NVN, for its part, is now violating DMZ and firing on US reconnaissance planes. We cannot overemphasize seriousness with which we would view the loss of an unarmed plane. ~~†~~ Dobrynin said it was not clear to USSR ~~what~~ what is going on at present time. After all the difficult arrangements, the US side does not appear able to come to the conference table. He ~~was~~ noticed that certain arguments surrounding the situation were now being made public, and said ~~that~~ he did not believe this would be helpful.

Page 4 of telegram to US MISSION NATO, BRUSSELS

SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS
Classification

Katzenbach said that interpretative statements by Hanoi as to what was agreed upon are causing the problems. These statements have made it more difficult for everybody concerned. USG statements regarding the situation have been scrupulously accurate.

Katzenbach ended by saying he hoped Ex Dobrynin's views regarding the unwisdom of public statements would be expressed to Hanoi.

END

KATZENBACH

Waves

PAGE 01 STATE 271355

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ORIGIN SS 70

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INFO CCO 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, FILE 02, CIAE 00, /072 R

DRAFTED BY: EUR:SOV:ADUBS:AMR
APPROVED BY: ACTING SECRETARY
EUR - A. PUHAN (SUBSTANCE)
GER - JOHNPOLL (SUBSTANCE)
S/S - APARKER

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INFO USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 4169 91-510

By Ag/jw, NARA, Date 4-6-93

~~SECRET~~ STATE 271355

LIMDIS

TOSEC-34

SUBJECT: KATZENBACH-DOBRYNIN DISCUSSION RE TRAVEL TO BERLIN.

1. ACTING SECRETARY CALLED IN DOBRYNIN NOVEMBER 13 TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS RE BERLIN:

(A) USG HAS BECOME AWARE OF NUMBER OF RUMORS TO EFFECT THAT ACTION MIGHT BE TAKEN IN NEAR FUTURE THAT WOULD ADD TO DIFFICULTIES SURROUNDING GERMAN TRAVEL BETWEEN FRG AND WEST BERLIN.

(B) THERE WAS NO NEED TO REPEAT IN DETAIL WHAT SECRETARY RUSK HAD ALREADY TOLD AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AND FONSEC GROMYKO IN MANY CONVERSATIONS REGARDING IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO WEST BERLIN AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THAT CITY'S VIABILITY.

(C) WHILE WE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THERE WAS SUBSTANCE TO

RUMORS OR NOT, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY ACTIONS IN THIS DIRECTION COULD NOT HELP BUT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY USG AND AFFECT PROGRESS ON SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF INTEREST TO BOTH USSR AND USG.

2. DOBRYNIN NOTED THAT FOREGOING COMMENTS WERE BASED ON RUMORS. NEVERTHELESS, HE WISHED TO REPEAT THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS NOT GOING TO BE INITIATOR OF ACTIONS AGAINST BERLIN. HE ALSO WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT IF FRG CONTINUED ITS PROVOCATIONS RE WEST BERLIN THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE ITS OWN MEASURES. HE SAID POINTS MADE BY MR. KATZENBACH WOULD BE CONVEYED TO MOSCOW.

3. NEITHER KATZENBACH NOR BOHLEN FELT DOBRYNIN WAS PARTICULARLY REASSURING. DESPITE HIS STATEMENT ABOUT RUMORS NOT BEING WORTHY OF A USG DEMARCHE HE SAID NOTHING TO DISCOUNT THEIR POSSIBLE SUBSTANCE.

4. FOREGOING CONVERSATION HAS NOT YET BEEN PASSED TO GERMANS, FRENCH OR BRITISH HERE BUT WE ASSUME SECRETARY MAY WISH TO DO SO IN BRUSSELS.

AT CLOSE OF CONVERSATION, DOBRYNIN INDICATED HE PLANS TO RETURN TO MOSCOW AT END OF THIS MONTH. KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~

Pres. file

8

NODIS/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

**Thurs., Nov. 14, 1968
9:50 a. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

**Herewith Bunker's talk with Bui Diem.
Bunker sees Thieu tomorrow.**

W. W. Rostow

SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS attachment (Saigon 42653)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 4-6-93



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

sa
TELEGRAM
ACTION COPY

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4432
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2892
STATE GRNC

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1968 NOV 14 AM 8 05

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 42653

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

Authority 77C 89-72

By rs/af, NARA, Date 4-6-93

1. AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM CAME TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON NOV 14. HE STAYED FOR OVER AN HOUR. MY GENERAL IMPRESSION FROM THE ACCOUNT OF HIS CONVERSATIONS HERE IS THAT THE LOGJAM IS BREAKING AND WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE SOME MOVEMENT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.
2. BUI DIEM SAID HE HAD COME BACK BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT TO KNOW WHAT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS IN THE US AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, BECAUSE HE WANTED TO CONVEY PERSONALLY TO THE PRESIDENT THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT-ELECT THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THROUGH SENATOR DIRKSEN.
3. HE FELT HIS DECISION TO COME HAD BEEN SHOWN TO BE CORRECT BECAUSE HE HAD FOUND THERE WAS NO TRUE APPRECIATION HERE OF THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE US, OF THE PATIENCE OF OUR PEOPLE TO GET ON WITH THE TALKS, AND HE HAD TRIED TO CONVEY TO ALL THOSE HE HAD SEEN HERE THE SENSE OF URGENCY IN COMING TO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE US BECAUSE THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY OUT FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.
4. HE HAD HAD A VERY LONG TALK WITH PRESIDENT THIEU YESTERDAY, BUI DIEM SAID, FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER LONG TALK WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT. HE HAD EXPLAINED TO THIEU VERY FULLY AND FRANKLY THE SITUATION IN WASHINGTON AND REMARKED THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT PERSONALLY SEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON, BUT FELT THAT OUR PRESIDENT TOOK A VERY SERIOUS VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS HERE. HE HAD GIVEN THIEU A FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS TALKS WITH SENATOR DIRKSEN AND WITH BUNDY.
5. HE HAD ALSO TOLD THIEU, DIEM CONTINUED, THAT HE THOUGHT HE HAD RECEIVED BAD ADVICE IN SENDING A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SUGGESTING THAT HE COME HERE, BECAUSE THIS HAD BEEN SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATION AND IT MADE A BAD IMPRESSION IN WASHINGTON. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT-ELECT STANDS FOUR-SQUARE WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON WITH RESPECT TO VIET-NAM AND THAT THE GVN IS IN FACT CONFRONTED WITH A SOLID US BI-PARTISAN FRONT. HE SAID HE ALSO SUGGESTED TO THIEU THAT HE SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.
6. HE HAD STRESSED, DIEM WENT ON, IN HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE VICE PRESIDENT, THAT NO TIME MUST BE LOST IN WORKING OUT A FORMULA THAT WOULD ALLOW THE GVN TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PARIS TALKS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 42653, NOVEMBER 14, SECTION ONE OF TWO

HE COMMENTED TO ME HOWEVER; YOU KNOW HOW THE PRESIDENT IS. IT WILL TAKE A LITTLE TIME FOR HIM TO ADJUST TO THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE IS VERY QUICK TO GRASP THE SITUATION AND WILL MAKE THE RIGHT DECISION EVENTUALLY. THE TROUBLE IS THAT THIEU THINKS TOO MUCH IN TERMS OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY AND NOT ENOUGH IN TERMS OF VIET-NAM'S POSITION INTERNATIONALLY. IT WILL TAKE A LITTLE TIME FOR HIM TO VIEW THE SITUATION IN THE PROPER PERSPECTIVE."

7. DIEM SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO TALK WITH MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL THIS MORNING; HE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT AT FIRST BUT WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO URGED HIM HE DECIDED TO DO IT. HE FELT THIS HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL. HE ALSO TALKED WITH SOME MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND FOUND THEM RECEPTIVE TO THE NEED TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE.

8. THIEU HAD BEEN VERY UPSET BY THE CLIFFORD STATEMENT, DIEM SAID, BUT HE HAD ALSO TOLD THIEU THAT THE "REPLY" BY MINISTER OF INFORMATION THIEN HAD BEEN VERY UNWISE, TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT AGREED. THIEN'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN MADE WITHOUT ANY CONSULTATION. DIEM SAID THAT THERE BE NO FURTHER PUBLIC RECRIMINATIONS, AND I SAID I COULDN'T AGREE MORE.

9. BUI DIEM SAID HE WOULD STAY HERE UNTIL A SOLUTION WAS WORKED OUT. THIS MIGHT TAKE A FEW MORE DAYS TO PREPARE PEOPLE PSYCHOLOGICALLY, AND PERHAPS THE CLIFFORD STATEMENT MEANT THAT A LITTLE MORE TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED SO THAT PEOPLE WILL NOT THINK THAT THE GVN IS CAVING IN UNDER THREATS. HE THOUGHT THERE HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTANDINGS ON BOTH SIDES BUT THAT THESE COULD BE REPAIRED AND THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS GOOD WILL ON THE GVN SIDE.

10. WITH RESPECT TO THE STATEMENT THAT WE HAD PROPOSED ON NOV 11, DIEM SAID HE THOUGHT IT SATISFACTORY IN GENERAL BUT PROBABLY THE GVN WOULD HAVE SOME SUGGESTIONS WHICH WOULD NOT SO MUCH CONCERN SUBSTANCE AS PHRASEOLOGY, AND HE SAID (AS FOREIGN MINISTER TRANK HAD INFORMED US) THAT THE STUDY OF OUR DRAFT HAD NOT YET BEEN COMPLETED. GDKY WAS PLANNING TO SEE THIEU TOMORROW MORNING AND WOULD URGE HIM TO SEE ME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN ANY CASE, DIEM SAID, THE PRESIDENT WOULD SEND FOR ME SOON. ALSO, THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK WITH ME.

11. I ASKED DIEM'S OPINION WHETHER HE THOUGHT I SHOULD WAIT FOR THIEU TO MAKE THE NEXT MOVE AND WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WAS UP TO ME TO RESPOND TO WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME ABOUT THE VICE PRESIDENT. DIEM THOUGHT I SHOULD WAIT UNTIL I HEARD FROM THIEU BUT HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE SOON, AND THAT I MIGHT INQUIRE FROM KY'S OFFICE WHEN HE WISHED TO SEE ME. DIEM ASKED WHETHER I WOULD ACCEPT A DINNER INVITATION FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT, AND I SAID OF COURSE I WOULD DO SO.

12. WE HAD EARLIER INFORMATION FROM DAND DUC KHOI WHICH WAS GENERALLY CONFIRMED BY WHAT BUS DIEM SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME. MINISTER OF INTERIOR KHIEM WAS ALSO REPORTED AS SAYING THAT MATTERS SEEMED TO BE CLEARING UP AND THAT HE THOUGHT OBSTACLES HAD BEEN REMOVED TO AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE USG AND THE GVN ON THE PARIS TALKS.

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ ACTION COPY

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VV CRA857
OO RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 42653 3191230
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 141200Z NOV 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4433
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2893
STATE GRNC

1968 NOV 14 AM 8 03

BT

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2 SAIGON 42653

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

13. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THAT THIS TALK WITH BUI DIEM AND THE EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THANH (REPORTED SEPTEL) SHOW THAT IT IS THE DESIRE OF GVN LEADERS TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE AND TO SEND A DELEGATION TO PARIS. IN ORDER FOR THIS EFFORT TO SUCCEED, HOWEVER, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE BE ABLE TO WORK OUT THE METHOD FOR ACHIEVING THIS QUIETLY WITH THEM AND THAT WE ALLOW THEM A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME TO COME AROUND.

14. IS IS EVIDENT THAT SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S PRESS CONFERENCE AND THE ANGRY REPLY BY THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE GVN TO MOVE IMMEDIATELY SINCE IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE DONE UNDER US PRESSURE. IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE NO MORE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE THE SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT, SO THAT THE EXCELLENT DEPARTMENT STATEMENT AND BUI DIEM'S ACTIVITIES HERE CAN HAVE THEIR MAXIMUM EFFECT.

15. I ANTICIPATE THAT THROUGH CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, PRESIDENT, AND VICE PRESIDENT IN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE DAYS, WE CAN WORK OUT THE EXACT FORM OF THE STATEMENTS WHICH WILL BE USED AS A BASIS FOR RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. I HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT WAS IN FACT THE ANSWER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S NOVEMBER 13 MEMORANDUM AND THIEU'S NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL, AND IT IS NOW UNLIKELY THAT A FULL WRITTEN REPLY WILL BE NEEDED.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 42653, NOVEMBER 14, SECTION TWO OF TWO

16. IF THE DEPARTMENT HAS ANY FURTHER COMMENTS ON SAIGON 42582, HOWEVER, I WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING THEM PROMPTLY, BUT I WOULD URGE THAT I BE GIVEN FLEXIBILITY AS TO THE USE THAT MIGHT BE MADE OF THEM. AT THIS MOMENT IT SEEMS MOST LIKELY THAT THE COMBINATION OF THE DEPARTMENT'S NOVEMBER 13 STATEMENT AND THE DRAFT STATEMENTS FURNISHED TO THE GVN NOVEMBER 11, PERHAPS MODIFIED SLIGHTLY TO MEET GVN POINTS, SHOULD BE THE BASIS FOR AN AGREED SOLUTION.

17. I HAVE JUST NOW BEEN INFORMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WISHES TO SEE ME TOMORROW MORNING.
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

9

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Thursday, November 14, 1968
9:20 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, for your urgent editing
and clearance, is a proposed memorandum
to the GVN.

Per file

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Approved as amended _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 4-6-93

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED

9a

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COUNTRY MESSAGE TO

SECRET

Classification

FOR OC/T USE

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

INFO: AmEmbassy PARIS PRIORITY

STATE

NODIS HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

SANITIZED

E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-510

Clearance

11/14/68 - about 10:30 AM
Ben Reed notified
by Mr Roston

R
Ref A: Saigon 42560
B: Saigon 42563
C: Saigon ~~42582~~42582

By JW, NARA, Date 4-92

1. In light of reftels, following is text of memorandum which you may submit at once in whatever channel you think most effective. We will be standing by to ~~xxxx~~ receive any urgent comments, and you are free to make minor wording changes as you deem fit.



1.3(a)(5)

you may wish to take soundings first to see whether GVN is about to produce some more promising response than its memorandum of November 13.

2. The tone of this memorandum is designed to be as conciliatory as possible, while firmly foreclosing any possibility that the GVN will use ~~xxx~~ this issue to stall for time. Thus we are prepared to support a GVN delegation that comes to Paris to try to take part in the private procedural talks or we are

WP Bundy: 11/13/68

Tel. No. 4235

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

The Acting Secretary

White House -

SECRET/NODIS

Page 2 of telegram to _____

SAIGON IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Classification

prepared to work on a crash basis with the GVN along the lines of your memo of November 11. We insist in either case, though, that the GVN be prepared to move promptly into substantive talks with us. Unless we have this assurance, we must go ahead on our own. While the sense of urgency in the present text is less than the oral message you conveyed on November 9, the difference is essentially what seems appropriate for a written document at this fairly sensitive moment. You should leave no doubt that we are even more anxious for an immediate resolution of the problem (in practical terms, to see a GVN delegation on the plane for Paris) and that the pressures of American public opinion are mounting daily.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

A. This memorandum responds to the explanations provided on November 13 concerning the proposal made public by the Republic of Vietnam on November 8.

~~SECRET~~
Classification

B. The USG calls attention to the statement issued yesterday in Washington on behalf of the Acting Secretary of State, which categorically refutes statements by Hanoi that the US ever agreed to any "four party conference." This same statement has again made clear other elements in the basic US view, as already conveyed in our memorandum of November 11.

C. Turning now to the RVN proposal of November 8/20/68

~~the USG has already responded to this proposal and conveyed its essential points to the RVN. The USG has also indicated that it is not prepared to accept this proposal.~~

1. Under its Constitution, the representatives of the United States in the new Paris meetings must be able to speak for the USG, and this would have to be made clear, whatever the form in which our side was organized.

2. Assuming that we were able to overcome this difficulty, the question would become whether Hanoi would agree that its side should be expressly stated to consist of a single North Vietnamese delegation, with the representatives of the NLF present solely as advisors. Public statements by North Vietnamese representatives do not suggest that Hanoi would be prepared to accept an express admission to this effect. But even if they were to agree to designate a single head of their delegation, it is

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Classification

E. In any event, Hanoi seems overwhelmingly likely to reject the arrangements proposed in the GVN memo of November 8 and to make its rejection public. If this were to happen, it would be ~~xxxx~~ essential that the representatives of the RVN be prepared to participate in the talks on some such basis as that proposed in the US memo of November 11. We would expect to consult closely with the GVN on the attitude to be adopted by our side. If, on the contrary, the RVN were to absent itself from the new Paris meetings under arrangements such as those now proposed by the USG, we must make clear, with regret,

~~SECRET~~
Classification

that the US would be forced to pursue substantive talks with Hanoi at least on military matters of direct and immediate concern to the United States. Any other course would forfeit the support of the American people for the entire effort to help defend South Vietnam.

F. Accordingly, the USG memorandum of November 11 was intended to offer an alternative course of action to the GVN. This would adhere to the presently proposed arrangement of two separate delegations on our side. It would put the GVN in the role to which it is fully entitled as the principal party in this war and the victim of aggression. It would make the RVN delegation the senior delegation for all protocol purposes and, in essence, primus inter pares with the US delegation. Thus, we believe that the proposal in our memorandum of November 11 takes ^{fully} account of the political and psychological considerations advanced by the GVN, whose ^{weight} ~~weight~~ is fully recognized by the US.

G. Moreover, in whatever way Hanoi may seek to constitute its ^{claims} side and whatever ~~claims~~ it may make for the NLF, the basic positions set forth in our memorandum of November 11 should enable our two governments to present the situation in its true light. The status of the GVN as an independent government is recognized by more than sixty nations in the world; the NLF has no status whatever. The GVN

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Classification

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Classification

is a Constitutionally-elected government enjoying increasing military ┌
growing
successes and the ~~(~~clear~~)~~ attachment of its people with the exception of
a small minority. The GVN delegation would consist of competent and
known representatives; those ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ representing the NLF would be
faceless men with records of conspiracy and terror. In these circum-
stances, the USG sees no reason why our two countries, going forward
united in the search for peace as well as in continuing the fighting,
cannot achieve the kind of peace we both desire -- meeting the funda-
mental points of the Manila Communique. END TEXT.

~~XXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXX~~

~~SECRET~~
Classification

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Classification

By way of explanatory notes, particularly on the suggestions in Saigon 42582 and Paris 23859:

- a. We do not think it wise to say that we think we are very close together. This might encourage the GVN unduly in the direction of trying their hand in Paris, which we frankly think would be a ~~(disastrous)~~ mistake.
- b. We have addressed ourselves solely to the question of attempting private talks with the DRV. This seems to be clearly what Thieu has in mind.
- c. We have omitted any comment on the attempted parallel with Panmunjom. The point can be made, orally if necessary, that (regardless of our feelings about being compared to the Red Chinese) the circumstances and range of subject matter are so entirely different that we see no real parallel. Moreover, the North Korean was only depicted as "the senior delegate," ^{If it would} ~~which~~ solve the problem, you may indicate ~~records with~~ our willingness to call the GVN the "senior delegation" for all protocol purposes.
- d. The text is designed not to repeat what was said in the memorandum of November 11 in any respect, so that that proposal remains intact and available for immediate action. Likewise, we have not referred to the high degree of agreement we had

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

10

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Thursday, November 14, 1968
9:15 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a contact between Foreign Minister Thanh and two of our political officers, which, like the CIA report I sent you earlier this morning, is in a reasonably optimistic mood.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 42651

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-513
By iq, NARA, Date 1-10-94

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

W 10a /
TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

00 RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 42651 3191135

~~SECRET~~

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 141115Z NOV 68 ZFF-6

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4426

INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2890

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42651

1968 NOV 14 AM 7 13

03858Q

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

REF: A. STATE 271001

B. SAIGON 42563

C. SAIGON 42376

D. STATE 260320

Authority 7719 89-72

By sg/sep, NARA, Date 4-6-93

1. FOREIGN MINISTER THANH ASKED CALHOUN AND HERZ TO CALL ON HIM THIS AFTERNOON NOVEMBER 14. HE SAID THE WASHINGTON STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE ACTING SECRETARY (REF A) HAD HAD A VERY GOOD EFFECT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING THIS MORNING, AND AS IT BECOMES MORE WIDELY KNOWN IT SHOULD HAVE AN EQUALLY GOOD EFFECT ON THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS. THANH SAID OUR STATEMENT WAS "ONE OF THE GOOD THINGS THAT CAN BE DONE IN THIS SITUATION."

2. REFERRING TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH US YESTERDAY (REF B, PARA 5), THANH SAID THE US HAD NOW CLARIFIED SUBSTANTIALLY FOUR OF THE FIVE AREAS IN WHICH HE HAD THOUGHT SUCH CLARIFICATION NECESSARY. THERE REMAINED THE QUESTION OF ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS ON CITIES. CALHOUN REMARKED THERE IS STILL AN AREA OF UNCERTAINTY WITH RESPECT TO ENEMY BEHAVIOR. THANH SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF AT LEAST WE COULD CONDEMN THOSE ATTACKS, TO SHOW OUR SYMPATHY FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION THAT WAS SUFFERING "WHILE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE FREE FROM BOMBING ATTACKS".

3. CALHOUN ASKED WHAT NEWS THANH HAD ABOUT OUR NOVEMBER 11 DRAFT STATEMENT (REF C). THANH SAID THE DRAFT HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE NSC THIS MORNING, THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN MUCH MORE CO-OPERATIVE, AND PERHAPS ONLY SOME MINOR CLARIFICATIONS WERE NECESSARY TO GIVE SATISFACTION TO THE GVN LEADERSHIP. HE SAID HE EXPECTED THIEU WOULD GIVE AMBASSADOR BUNKER HIS VIEWS SOON. THANH ALSO IMPLIED HOWEVER THAT NO FINAL GVN POSITION HAD YET BEEN FORMULATED, BY ADDING THAT THIEU STILL HAD TO TALK WITH THE PRESIDENTS OF THE TWO CHAMBERS. (WE UNDERSTAND THOSE TWO GENTLEMEN HAVE BEEN CONVOKED ONLY FOR NOVEMBER 19.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 42651, NOVEMBER 14. NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

4. THANH SAID HE THOUGH IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL NOW IF THERE WERE NO FURTHER PUBLIC STATEMENTS FOR A WHILE. WE EMPHATICALLY AGREED. REFERRING TO THE TENNIS GAMES HE AND CALHOUN HAD PLAYED TOGETHER, HE SAID SECRETARY CLIFFORD HAD SHOT THE BALL OVER THE NET AND MINISTER OF INFO THIEN HAD HAD TO RETURN IT INTO THE US COURT; CALHOUN REPLIED THAT PERHAPS IT IS BEST NOW TO AGREE TO HIT IT INTO THE NET AND LET IT LIE. THANH AGREED AND SAID WE MUST DE-ESCALATE AND RETURN TO DIPLOMATIC METHODS.

5. WE ASKED WHAT "MINOR CLARIFICATIONS" THANH HAD IN MIND WITH RESPECT TO OUR NOV 11 DRAFT. HE MENTIONED TWO, WHILE RESERVING THE GVN POSITION PENDING FURTHER STUDY. (A) SOMETHING MORE EMPHATIC ON THE SUBJECT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT, PERHAPS IN LINE WITH THE STATEMENT THAT SENATOR DIRKSEN HAD REPORTEDLY MADE TO AMB BUI DIEM, THAT WE WERE FIRMLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY OPPOSED TO A COALITION WITH THE AGGRESSORS; AND (B) SOMETHING ALONG THE LINES OF POINT 2 OF OUR MEMORANDUM OF OCT 24 (REF D, PARA B AND PARA 1A SAIGON 41451) TO THE EFFECT THAT WE WOULD NOT PUT UP WITH RUSES OR PROPAGANDA OF THE OTHER SIDE, SUCH AS ATTEMPTS TO IGNORE OR FREEZE OUT THE GVN DELEGATION. THANH ADDED THAT WHILE PERHAPS NOT ENTIRELY EFFECTIVE IN AVOIDING COMMUNIST MANEUVERS, SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD AT LEAST PUT THE OTHER SIDE ON NOTICE AND WOULD CREATE GREATER CONFIDENCE IN SAIGON THAT THE GVN DELEGATION WOULD NOT BE TRAPPED OR MADE TO LOSE FACE BY COMMUNIST MANEUVERS BUT WOULD HAVE THE US FIRMLY BY ITS SIDE IN COUNTERING THEM.

6. FINALLY, THANH MENTIONED THE DESIRABILITY OF SAYING SOMETHING IN PUBLIC TO THE EFFECT THAT WE FULLY EXPECT THE COMMUNISTS TO LAUNCH HEAVY MILITARY ATTACKS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE FELT THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME SUCH STATEMENT THE PEOPLE WOULD BE UNPREPARED FOR WHAT HAPPENED DURING THE 1954 AND 1962 NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE COMMUNISTS LAUNCHED THEIR SHARPEST ATTACKS JUST AS OUR SIDE HAD BEEN LULLED INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. IT WAS NOT CLEAR FROM THIS DISCUSSION WHETHER THANH HAD IN MIND THAT THIS POINT WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE US STATEMENT OR IN SOME WARNING TO BE ISSUED BY THE GVN.

7. SOMMARIZING, THANH SAID HE WAS OPTIMISTIC. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD SAID SOMETHING LIKE THIS IN MANY WEEKS.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

Thursday, November 14, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to You from Prime Minister Sato of Japan, and Suggested Reply

At Tab A is a letter to you from Prime Minister Sato, dated November 7. In it he refers to Mr. Nixon's election, expresses the hope that our country under his leadership will continue to work for freedom and democracy, and states that he looks forward to working with you not only for the remainder of your administration, but for the years to come.

At Tab B is a suggested reply expressing your pleasure at your personal relationship with the Prime Minister, your confidence that our countries will continue our close association, and your desire to continue working with Sato in the common cause of peace and freedom.

I recommend that you sign the suggested reply.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

AJenkins:mm

November 7, 1968 ^{11a}

Dear Mr. President,

I have been following with much interest the course of the recent Presidential election. As a result of one of the most closely contested Presidential elections in history, Mr. Nixon has been elected the next President of the United States of America, succeeding you in one of the most important and exacting office in the world. I sincerely hope that your country, under the leadership of Mr. Nixon, in whose executive capability and international experience we have much confidence, will continue to prosper and work for the promotion of freedom and democracy.

May I also add that I am looking forward to working closely with you, not only for the remainder of your term of office, but also for the years to come, for the common cause of peace and progress of mankind.

Eisaku Sato
Prime Minister of Japan

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I greatly appreciated your writing me following our recent Presidential election.

Our warm personal relationship, Mr. Prime Minister, during the period you have led the great nation of Japan, has been a source of particular pride and pleasure to me. I am confident that the basic forces which have bound our two countries together will continue in the years ahead. I look forward to working closely with you in the remaining months of my administration and thereafter in the common cause of peace and freedom.

With my best personal wishes,

Sincerely,

**His Excellency
Eisaku Sato
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo**

~~SECRET~~

Thurs., Nov. 14, 1968

Project

12

MR. PRESIDENT:

As background to my lunch with Dobrynin,
you might wish to read the attached three memoranda.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachments

(CONFIDENTIAL: memcon 14842 and 14844; SECRET Intell Note 874)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988
By rg, NARA, Date 4/6/93

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Intelligence
Note - 874 12a

November 12, 1968

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719 96-30

By M/aj NARA, Date 10-31-7

To : The Acting Secretary
Through : S/S
From : INR. - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*

1414845

Subject : Kosygin's Talk with McNamara -- Soviet Interest in Arms Talks, Hint About Buying Truck Technology

Kosygin's remarks on disarmament and the economics of the arms race were generally in accord with standing Soviet policy. His expression of interest in buying American truck technology was a new development.

Civilian versus Military Interest in Trucks. When Kosygin asked McNamara whether he thought American truck manufacturers would be interested in the USSR as a potential market for production technology, he probably thought Mr. McNamara, as a former Ford executive, could give him an expert opinion and may have expected him to carry the message back to American business circles. Kosygin's remark that the Soviets had a high regard for American automotive technology reflects a traditional view dating from cooperative arrangements in the 1920's and 30's. It may also represent a Soviet preference for purchases in the US if the terms are as good as those offered in Western Europe (Kosygin realizes that under US law no government-guaranteed financing would be available and that specific exports would in any case have to be licensed).

Kosygin spoke of the need for a sharp increase in truck production in the USSR, and we believe that the Soviet economy could well use a larger

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

SECRET
GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

truck park and more frequent replacements. The Soviet Union's civilian economy has some 4,160,000 trucks and last year produced more than 400,000 of them. This year's production target was up about 7 percent.

We doubt that military needs would require the "sharp increase" Kosygin spoke of. It is true that the Soviet army must draw trucks from the civilian economy in order to mobilize, but the quantity involved is relatively small in comparison with the civilian park and annual production. If 40 odd category II divisions need as much as 1,000 trucks each, that would amount to something like 10 percent of annual production or 1 percent of the civilian park. A major increase in truck production would not be projected just to meet military requirements. It is likely, however, that the military would claim their share of a larger truck park, and it may well be that Kosygin and other Soviet leaders are more conscious of the military's needs after the mobilization undertaken in connection with the Czechoslovak crisis.

Economic Pressure and Arms Control. McNamara had the impression that Kosygin was infinitely more interested in talks on strategic arms than he was at Glassboro in June 1967. Kosygin's interest would seem to parallel the development of Soviet policy since then. In the summer of 1967 the USSR was stalling on a reply to the US on strategic arms talks; a year later the Soviets agreed to start talks. At about the same time Kosygin took

the occasion of the visit of Anthony Crosland of the British Board of Trade to decry high spending on armaments, In that June 6, 1968 conversation he called American defense spending "catastrophic." In talking to Mr. McNamara he referred to American spending of 75-80 billion a year as "colossal." The message was the same -- too much was being spent on armaments -- even though the figures used with McNamara were more accurate than the ones used with Crosland.^{1/}

Equality Theme. The brief account of the conversation in Embassy Moscow's telegram (6409) did not indicate what specifics may have been touched upon in the hour-and-forty-five minute conversation, and a more detailed memorandum of conversation is to follow. So far as can be seen from the report in hand, the discussion stayed in rather general terms, with Kosygin not going beyond already stated Soviet positions. In his assertions that "both sides have enough" and that the USSR did not need disarmament more than the US, Kosygin seemed to imply that the Soviets expected any agreement to be based on some kind of US-Soviet parity in military power. Beyond that, Kosygin stated that the USSR favors a "gradual" solution to the disarmament problem. This seems to equate to the formulations about limitation and subsequent reduction which appeared in

^{1/} Research Memorandum RSB-90 of June 20, 1968 gave the details of seeming double counting in the figures Kosygin used with Crosland.

Kuznetsov's UN speeches this spring and which were harbingers of eventual Soviet agreement to begin strategic arms talks. The question of how first steps may relate to subsequent reductions may turn out to be one of the knottiest once talks get started, but Kosygin evidently said nothing new on the account.

No Dates Indicated. Kosygin evidently did not try to set any dates for talks, and that would, of course, have been inappropriate in a conversation with a man who is no longer a US official. Nevertheless, the Soviets seem to be refraining from pressing the US for a specific date. Gromyko, in his October 3, 1968 UN speech, said that the USSR was ready to begin talks, but did not go further. Mazurov, in his speech on the eve of the November 7 holiday, suggested that the US was delaying things, but that sentence was cut from the version of his speech printed in the Soviet press. Dobrynin, in a November 8, 1968 conversation with Under Secretary Rostow, recalled that the USSR had taken some time to make up its mind and could understand if the US decided to postpone talks until after January 20.

Czechoslovakia in the Background. There was no mention of Czechoslovakia in the conversation, but the Embassy was, we believe, correct in pointing out that part of Kosygin's effort to set a mood of interest in detente and arms talks may have been to help the USSR in its policy of living down Czechoslovakia by doing business as usual on as many East-West issues as possible.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

WH
14844
126

Approved in S/S:
11/13/68

DATE: November 12, 1968

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting between
Ambassadors Thompson and Dobrynin
Part 3 of 3

PARTICIPANTS: Llewellyn E. Thompson,
American Ambassador, Moscow
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin,
Soviet Ambassador, US

COPIES TO: U
M
G
EUR
WH

In the course of a luncheon conversation today, Ambassador Dobrynin, in reply to my question, said that he anticipated return to Moscow shortly on consultation. While in Moscow he hoped to get two or three weeks leave. He indicated that no decision had yet been made upon how long he would remain as Ambassador here, but clearly did not expect to remain long after the new administration took over.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 7169 96-30
By SLP, NARA, Date 10-3-97

W.H.
14842

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Approved in S/S:
11/13/68

Memorandum of Conversation

12c

DATE: November 12, 1968

SUBJECT: Luncheon Meeting between
Ambassadors Thompson and Dobrynin
Part 1 of 3

PARTICIPANTS: Llewellyn E. Thompson,
American Ambassador, Moscow
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin,
Soviet Ambassador, US

COPIES TO: U EA ACDA
M WH Amembassy, MOSCOW
G SecDef
EUR CIA
NEA INR

At luncheon today Ambassador Dobrynin asked me what I thought could or should happen in Soviet-American relations during the period from the present time until the inauguration of the new administration. He asked whether we would simply have to mark time or whether there were some problems on which progress could be made.

I referred to the public statements by the President and the President-Elect following their meeting yesterday but said I had no information other than that which had appeared in the press. I felt sure that if possible we should try to make progress on such international problems as the Middle East and, of course, Viet-Nam. In connection with the latter problem I mentioned the reports of violations of the DMZ and said I trusted his government realized how serious these developments were.

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he was quite sure that the North Vietnamese did not intend to break down the agreement.

Part 1 of 3

The Ambassador raised the question of the NPT and referred to the statement by Senator Mansfield that he might bring this up with the new Congress as soon as it was convened. I said I did not know what the thinking about timing was but I felt sure that we would, in due course, proceed with the ratification of the agreement.

The Ambassador also raised the question of missile talks. I referred to reports of Mr. McNamara's discussions in Moscow. I said that again I was not aware what decisions, if any, might have been taken here. I agreed when the Ambassador remarked that the ball was in our court, and said I assumed that Mr. Nixon had discussed this with President Johnson, but did not know what had transpired.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/LINDIS~~

ACTION

Thursday, November 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

General Vang Pao, the leader of the hill-tribe irregulars in Laos, was recently in the United States on a visit. He is a real asset to us, a feisty little fighter who has led his Meo people into a courageous battle against the Communists in Laos. He is an admirer of you -- and of the United States -- and is deeply grateful for the American assistance provided his forces.

As a token of his and the Meo people's appreciation, he has sent to you an old handmade flintlock rifle of the kind commonly used by his soldiers when they first began their resistance. (I think you will find it an interesting gift.) Attached is a letter of thanks which I recommend you sign.

W. W. Rostow

Att

MWright:wpt

13a

November 14, 1968

Dear General Vang Pao:

I very much appreciate your kindness in giving to me the handmade flintlock Meo rifle. I will cherish it as a reminder of a brave people and a gallant leader who are determined to defend their freedom with whatever weapons are at hand. It is that kind of courage which is the ultimate guarantee of freedom.

Sincerely,

General Vang Pao
Vientiane, Laos

MWright:wpt

Thursday, November 14, 1968

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Pro file

Mr. President:

Our Charge in Ankara reports this morning that we finally have a bargain on 100 Patton tanks for President Ayub.

As expected, the Turks refused to do a straight sale, but came around when offered the \$3 million sweetener in 100 M-48 replacement tanks from us. They did pose two conditions for the swap: (1) they want our replacements literally in hand, one-for-one, as they release the tanks to Ayub and (2) they are anxious that the deal be kept as quiet as possible to avoid any political embarrassment (they have been faithfully denying earlier press leaks that we were pushing them on this matter.)

These conditions are understandable and should be manageable. Defense is ready to start shipping the replacements in the next two-to-three months, which should enable the Turks to turn around and satisfy Ayub's fairly flexible timing for delivery. Ben Oehlert will get to Ayub with the good news today or tomorrow and stress the importance of holding the bargain very tightly.

After a long history of last-minute frustrations, your advisors will be following this one through to the last detail. But I knew you would wish to know when the break came in the Turkish negotiations.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Para. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/20/71, Exec Dept. Guidelines
By cbm, NARA, Date 12-18-02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Mr. Rostow

15

ACTION

*1. Summary
2. Pres file*

Mr. President:

Wednesday, November 13, 1968
7:44 PM

We have had several requests now from official visitors to see the President-Elect. The Prime Minister of Iran (at the Shah's suggestion), Eshkol and the Ruler of Kuwait have all indicated an interest.

The question is whether we suggest that they make their own arrangements directly with Mr. Nixon's office or whether we offer Mr. Nixon our own or State's services as a channel.

I should think there would be advantage in offering him the shield that an orderly channel and full briefing would provide, but it really depends on how much you wish us to be in this business.

W. W. Rostow

Walt, please coordinate and offer
Mr. Nixon your services _____

Have State do it _____

Let's stay out of it _____

16

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 13, 1968 -- 6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached are three reflections of the intensity of Sino-Soviet relations:

-- Extracts from Indian talks with Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Gromyko.

-- A French Foreign Office report on Peking-Eastern European relations.

-- De Gaulle's view of Sino-Soviet relations.

These Soviet anxieties about relations with China, clearly, are part of the Vietnam equation.

W. W. Reston

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 07-82 (#44)
By isl, NARA, Date 6-23-08

WWReston:rla

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Communist Chinese Activity in Eastern Europe

The French Foreign Office has given our Embassy in Paris a message from the French Political Counselor in Peking concerning Communist Chinese activity in Eastern Europe. The major points are:

1. In Peking, the Polish Charge has come to believe that a militant anti-Soviet posture has become the cornerstone of Communist Chinese foreign policy. China's true objective is to overthrow the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and to break up the present alignment in the Communist camp. He pointed to recent increases in Polish language broadcasts by Radio Peking and the formulation of a "Polish Communist Party" in Albania which follows the Maoist line.

2. Relations between Peking and Communist East Germany continue to deteriorate. The Chinese accuse East Germans of participating in the military encirclement of China. The charge is based on a technical assistance agreement between East Germany and Outer Mongolia which provides for the training of staff officers in East Germany and the sending of East German instructors to Outer Mongolia.

3. In the presence of West German visitors, Chinese officials used acrimonious language in talking about East German leaders. They referred to East German Chairman Ulbricht as the "hunting dog of Soviet imperialism." The visitors were struck by the vehemence of the language used by the Chinese in condemning East European Communist leaders.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 07-82 (#446)
By id NARA, Date 6-28-08

~~SECRET~~

16c

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: De Gaulle's View of Sino-Soviet Relations

In a conversation with Governor Scranton in Paris last month, General De Gaulle said he believed the Soviets were anxious to put the Germans in their place and reach a modus vivendi with the U.S. in order to protect their flanks if they have to deal with a Chinese threat.

"The Soviet military can think that in several years they may be at grips with China. First they must settle the problems in the West and in particular that of Germany; for if they are one day at war against China they fear that Germany will jump on them; which would probably be true."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NL/RAC 07-82 (#444)
By *id*, NARA, Date *6-23-08*

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 13, 1968 -- 6:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the first copy of Westmoreland's and Admiral Sharp's reports on the war in Vietnam as of 30 June 1968. The reports were prepared at your direction.

As you will see, the reports are unclassified, although presently marked Official Use Only: Oley Sharp on the bombing of North Vietnam; Westmoreland on ground operations in South Vietnam.

Westmoreland's account is essentially narrative in form; Oley Sharp's is a more functional summary of operations. 300 copies will be coming off the press on this basis.

Westy wants your guidance as to how the reports should be disseminated. The options are:

-- File them within the government. In that case, there is some danger of a leak.

-- Publish as is for military use, preferably, in Westmoreland's judgment, in two volumes.

-- In addition, publish an abridged, more civilian version, less technical, for wider dissemination.

Westmoreland is already working on a civilianized and simpler version of the report. His part will be ready in about a week; Oley Sharp's version might take as much as a month for simplified editing.

It is Westmoreland's strong feeling that he would like to see this proud record published before January 20, 1969.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

Wednesday, November 13, 1968 -- 5:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

I spoke with Mac Bundy this morning about Charles Maguire's Ford grant.

Mac is looking at it personally and seemed knowledgeable. He told me frankly what the problem is; namely, he doubts that Charlie's study of the Cabinet would be sufficiently objective and balanced to qualify for a Ford grant. However, he is going to check this out with Charlie's superior and friend at Columbia, a man named Wally Sayre. If Sayre believes that Charlie's study would qualify academically, he is inclined to go forward.

Mac told me that he was having a certain amount of trouble with his trustees because:

- He had put up more money than he had originally envisaged for Robert Kennedy's people. (Wright Patman is pressing him on this point.)
- He is in pretty deep with a number of the people from our Administration.

I told Mac that I thought exceedingly well of Charles Maguire; I knew nothing of his academic background; but thought him a promising person in general.

Mac said he would let me know his decision after he had talked with Professor Sayre at Columbia.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

19

INFORMATION

**Wednesday, November 13, 1968
4:08 p. m.**

Mr. President:

This text of Saigon's Minister of Information's press conference on the Clifford statement may interest you in general; but paragraph 15 (marked in red) will certainly interest you.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 42588

WWRostow:rln

NOV 13 15 49

UNCLASSIFIED HCD616

PAGE 01 SAIGON 42588 131529Z

50
ACTION EA 15

INFO SAH 02, IO 13, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02,
INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, AID 28, RSR 01,

/117 W

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P R 131405Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4372
AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMCONSUL DANANG

UNCLAS SAIGON 42588

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PARIS FOR VN MISSION

SUBJ: MININFO PRESS CONFERENCE ON CLIFFORD STATEMENT

1. AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 13 MINISTER OF INFORMATION TON THAT THIEN
HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE FOR THE FOREIGN PRESS FOR THE SPECIFIC
PURPOSE

OF DENYING CERTAIN STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY CLIFFORD. (A PRESS
CONFERENCE FOR THE VIETNAMESE PRESS WAS HELD IN THE MORNING WHICH
HIGHLIGHTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

2. THIEN OPENED BY SAYING HE HAD CONVENED THE PRESS CONFERENCE TO
COMMENT ON THE REMARKS OF SECRETARY CLIFFORD AS TO WHAT
PRESIDENT THIEU HAD SAID AND NOT SAID, ESPECIALLY THE STATEMENT
THAT PRESIDENT THIEU HAD MADE A PROMISE AND THEN GONE BACK

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 SAIGON 42588 131529Z

ON HIS WORD. THIEN EXPRESSED GREAT REGRET THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR AN OFFICIAL OF THE GVN TO SPEAK PUBLICLY ON SUCH A MATTER BUT SAID THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE BECAUSE A HIGH OFFICIAL OF THE USG HAD MADE SUCH A STATEMENT.

3. THIEN AFFIRMED THAT "AT NO STAGE, AT NO TIME, WITH NO ONE, HAD PRESIDENT THIEU AGREED TO THE SO-CALLED TWO-SIDE, FOUR DELEGATION FORMULA."

4. THIEN THEN SAID ON OCTOBER 19 AMB. BUNKER PRESENTED THIEU WITH A DRAFT COMMUNIQUE ON A BOMBING HALT. THIEU REFUSED TO SIGN BECAUSE

THE TWO-SIDES FORMULATION WAS NOT CLEAR. DISCUSSIONS CONTINUED UNTIL OCTOBER 31, WHEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON DECIDED TO MAKE A UNILATERAL ANNOUNCEMENT. THIEN STATED "ON OCTOBER 25, PRESIDENT THIEU ASKED BUNKER WHY IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU TO MODIFY YOUR POSITION ON THIS FOUR-DELEGATION FORMULA, AND MR. BUNKER SAID THAT

THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAD ALREADY MADE A COMMITMENT FIVE MONTHS EARLIER (TO HANOI)". THIEN POINTED OUT THIS WAS ABOUT THE TIME OF THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE. IN CLOSING HIS OPENING REMARKS, THIEN SAID HE

HOPED IT WOULD BE THE FIRST AND LAST TIME IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE UP SUCH MATTERS.

5. THIEN WAS ASKED WHAT HAPPENS IF THE US GOES AHEAD WITH THE PARIS TALKS. HE REPLIED THAT THE US HAS BEEN TALKING FOR 5 MONTHS ALREADY, AND MAY CONTINUE IF IT SO DESIRES. HOWEVER, ANY RESULT AFFECTING THE FATE OR INTERESTS OF VN WOULD NOT BE BINDING ON VN.

6. UNDER QUESTIONING THIEN CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN FIRMLY THAT PRESIDENT THIEU HAD NEVER AGREED, EVEN TENTATIVELY, TO THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY TO HAVE ALMOST DAILY MEETINGS IF THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT.

7. ASKED WHETHER THE US PROPOSAL WAS NOT TWO-SIDED RATHER THAN FOUR-SIDED, THIEN RESPONDED THAT IT DID NOT MAKE CLEAR THAT THE NLF WOULD NOT BE A SEPARATE DELEGATION. HANOI AND THE NLF WOULD CLAIM THE NLF WOULD BE THERE AS A SEPARATE DELEGATION.

8. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE GUARANTEES

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 42588 131529Z

NEEDED FROM HANOI FOR THE GVN TO PARTICIPATE, THIEN SAID THAT THERE MUST BE A STATEMENT OF HANOI ON PAPER. HE STATED THAT THERE MUST BE SOMETHING PUBLIC ON THE RECORD WHICH THE WHOLE WORLD CAN KNOW ABOUT.

9. THIEN SPECIFICALLY DENIED, IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES, SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S STATEMENT THAT AT ONE POINT THE ONLY REASON FOR DELAY PUT FORWARD BY PRESIDENT THIEU WAS THE TIME NEEDED TO ASSEMBLE A DELEGATION.

THIEN SAID THIS WAS ONLY ONE OF MANY REASONS. ACCORDING TO THIEN, IT WOULD BE A WASTE OF TIME AND MONEY, AND ONLY RAISE FALSE HOPES, IF A DELEGATION WENT TO PARIS BEFORE PRECISE ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN AGREED.

10. REPEATED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS MADE CLEAR THE USUAL GVN POSITION ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE NLF: AS MANY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NLF AS HANOI WANTS CAN BE PRESENT, AND THEY CAN SIT ANYWHERE, BUT THEY MANY NOT CALL THEMSELVES REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NLF OR SVN WILL WALK OUT.

11. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE US IS ACTING IN BAD FAITH, THIEN SAID SOME THINK SO BUT HE DOESN'T, AND PREFERS TO CONSIDER IT A MISUNDERSTANDING.

12. THIEN AVOIDED A DIRECT REPLY TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER US ACTIONS WERE RELATED TO THE US ELECTIONS.

13. ASKED WHAT SVN WILL DO IF THE US NEGOTIATES A MILITARY WITHDRAWAL WITH HANOI AND LEAVES SVN. THIEN REPLIED THAT THE US IS INDEPENDENT AND CAN DO AS IT LIKES. HE SAID "SOME SAY WE CAN'T WIN THE WAR WITHOUT THE US, BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THE US CANNOT WIN THE WAR WITHOUT US." HE ADDED THAT THIS REASONING ALSO APPLIES TO PEACE.

14. QUERIED AS TO WHETHER HE EXPECTED MORE SUPPORT FOR THE GVN FROM NIXON, THIEN REPLIED "ASK HIM".

15. ASKED WHETHER NIXON HAD ENCOURAGED THE GVN TO DELAY AGREEMENT WITH THE US, THIEN REPLIED THAT, WHILE THERE MAY HAVE BEEN CONTACTS BETWEEN NIXON STAFFERS AND PERSONNEL OF THE SVN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, A PERSON OF THE CALIBER OF NIXON WOULD NOT DO SUCH A THING.

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PAGE 04 SAIGON 42588 131529Z

BUNKER

UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Wednesday, November 13, 1968 -- 4:05 pm

Mr. President:

You should be aware that Gen. Abrams explains his order that U. S. forces should initiate firing on all enemy personnel in the southern half of the DMZ on the grounds of the "inherent right and responsibility to conduct operations of self defense." The Pentagon queried him on this.

I am confident you have no objection, but wished you to know of Abrams' interpretation of his standing orders.

W. W. Rostow

MAC 15747

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 10-3-97

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 6, 1989
By h, NARA, Date 10-3-97

20a

NNNN
ZCZCQAA507 *****
OO YEKADS
DE YSNKQA 49 318155Z
O 131552Z ZYH ZFF-5
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
INFO WHITE HOUSE MR ROSTOW
STATE MR RUSK
CIA MR HELMS
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FM GENERAL ABRAMS
TO ADM MCCAIN
INFO GENERAL WHEELER
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NOV 17 28

Rostow

~~SECRET~~ MAC 15747 EYES ONLY
REF: A. JCS 010108Z NOV 68.
B. COMUSMACV 121032 NOV 68.
C. CINCPAC 130157Z NOV 68.

1. (S) MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE BASED ON PARA 3E OF REFERENCE A QUOTE NOTHING IN THESE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT SHALL BE CONSTRUED AS PRECLUDING EACH COMMANDER FROM EXERCISING THE INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS FOR SELF DEFENSE OF HIS FORCES UNQUOTE.
2. (S) ON 10 NOVEMBER 68 THE 3RD MARINE DIVISION RECEIVED ENEMY ROCKET FIRE FROM WITHIN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ WHICH KILLED 5 MARINES AND WOUNDED 46. AS THE SENIOR COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE, I VISITED THE DMZ, AS STATED IN REFERENCE B, TO SEE IF THE SECURITY FOR MY FORCES WAS ADEQUATE. I FOUND THAT IN ORDER TO INSURE SECURITY IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE UNDER ATTACK ALL PERSONNEL AND POSITIONS IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ. THE INCIDENT WHICH PROMPTED MY VISIT WAS A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION THAT WE CANNOT AFFORD TO WAIT UNTIL THE ENEMY DEPLOYS HIS FORCES AND ATTACKS, OR SETS UP MORTAR AND ARTILLERY POSITIONS AND FIRES. TO SURRENDER THIS DEGREE OF INITIATIVE TO THE ENEMY WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH SAFEGUARDING THE SECURITY OF THE TROOPS UNDER MY COMMAND. TO PERMIT MEN OF THIS COMMAND TO BECOME CASUALTIES BEFORE REPEAT BEFORE TAKING ACTION TO PROTECT THEM, WOULD NOT MEET THE RESPONSIBILITY TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS FOR SELF DEFENSE OF MY FORCES AS STATED IN PARA 3E, REFERENCE A.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.
270

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 19 NARA, Date 4-6-93

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-200
By cb, NARA, Date 5-19-95

INFORMATION

21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
XXXXXXXXXX

Pres file

Wednesday, November 13, 1968
4:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

This is a round up of such intelligence as we have on a possible East German action against Berlin.

As you will note, our U. S. Mission in Berlin doubts that the East Germans would undertake major action at this time. Their confidence should not be regarded as definitive.

W. W. Rostow

Berlin 2662

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

SENT
WHCA~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 21a~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HCD626

PAGE 01 BERLIN 02662 131704Z

45
ACTION EUR 20INFO SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,USIE 00,CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,
L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,ACDA 16,IO 13,NIC 01,
E 15,DOT 12,VO 02,SCA 02,RSR 01,/140 W

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FM USMISSION BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3407
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION NATO
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BERLIN 2662

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE GDR ACTION AGAINST BERLIN ACCESS

REF: BONN 19157, BERLIN 2655; KLEIN/LININGSTON
TELCON NOVEMBER 13*Rastow*

1. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN BERLIN TO DATE INDICATES THAT THE RECENT SPATE OF REPORTS OF IMPENDING GDR MOVES AGAINST BERLIN ACCESS, ALLEGEDLY TO BE TAKEN BY THE EAST GERMAN VOLKSKAMMER AT ITS MEETING ON NOVEMBER 15; ORIGINATE FROM ONLY A FEW IDENTIFIABLE SOURCES IN EAST BERLIN. ONE IS SOVIET THIRD SECRETARY ABOYMOV WHO HAS HINTED VAGUELY THAT THE EAST GERMANS WOULD TAKE SOME ACTION TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE WEST GERMANS TO HOLD FUTURE POLITICAL MEETINGS IN WEST BERLIN. ANOTHER SOURCE IS SED FUNCTIONARY HERMAN VON BERG. VON BERG HAS INTERMITTENTLY SERVED AS A CHANNEL OF BOTH INFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION TO THE WEST. UNLIKE ABOYMOV, HE HAS BEEN MORE SPECIFIC ON GDR HARRASMENT PLANS, SUGGESTING THAT IT WILL INVOLVE A NEW SYSTEM TO CONTROL TRAVEL THROUGH THE GDR. ACCORDING TO VON BERG, THE NEW SYSTEM WILL REQUIRE WEST BERLINERS TO APPLY FOR VISAS TWO DAYS IN ADVANCE OF TRAVEL AT SPECIAL PASS-ISSUING OFFICES TO BE SET UP AT THREE OR FOUR S-BAHN STATIONS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSA 019-042-22
By 9, NARA, Date 1/21/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BERLIN 02662 131704Z

IN WEST BERLIN. WEST GERMANS DESIRING VISAS WOULD HAVE TO APPLY IN ADVANCE IN WRITING TO THE GDR FOREIGN MINISTER IN EAST BERLIN. (SUCH A SYSTEM IF INSTALLED PRESUMABLY WOULD REPLACE THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY WEST GERMANS AND WEST BERLINERS GET THEIR VISAS AT THE CHECKPOINTS AT THE TIME OF TRAVEL.) NEW SYSTEM OBVIOUSLY WOULD CREATE GREATER DIFFICULTIES FOR THE WEST GERMANS THAN FOR THE WEST BERLINERS.

2. WEST BERLIN JOURNALISTS APPARENTLY ARE ALSO PICKING UP RUMORS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE GDR MAY BAN THE TRANSIT OF SO-CALLED "MILITARY" CARGO ACROSS GDR TERRITORY, WHILE SOURCES IN THE WEST BERLIN BUSINESS COMMUNITY HAVE HEARD ABOUT POSSIBLE MOVES AGAINST WATER AND RAIL ACCESS TO BERLIN.

3. ALL OF THESE REPORTS ARE ESSENTIALLY SPECULATIVE, WITH NO HARD EVIDENCE TO BACK ANY UP. HOWEVER WE CANNOT DISCOUNT POSSIBILITY THAT SOME OF THIS INFORMATION COULD BE ACCURATE. THIS WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TIME THE GDR HAS TELEGRAPHED ITS PUNCHES ON FUTURE ACTIONS. (A SOVIET DIPLOMAT DID WARN A WEST GERMAN JOURNALIST ABOUT A MONTH BEFORE THE VISA AND PASSPORT DECREES INSTITUTED LAST JUNE (BERLIN 1494).). THE SOVIETS AND/OR EAST GERMANS ON THE OTHER HAND COULD BE DELIBERATELY LETTING ALL THESE WORDS LEAK TO SEE WHAT REACTION, IF ANY, THE RUMORED ACTIONS PROVOKE.

4. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE VARIOUS REPORTS MAY BE PART OF THE DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN TO UNSETTLE THE WEST BERLINERS. AT THE MOMENT THE BERLIN SENAT IS TAKING A RELATIVELY RELAXED VIEW OF THE UPCOMING VOLKSKAMMER SESSION AND FEELS THAT THE CHANCES FOR EAST GERMAN ACTION ARE PROBABLY LESS THAN EVEN.

5. WE FOR OUR PART BELIEVE THAT WHILE EAST GERMAN ACTION IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE, IT IS UNLIKELY TO BE AS EXTREME OR DRAMATIC AS THE RUMORS NOW INDICATE. WHILE ANY PART OF THESE RUMORED MOVES COULD BE MADE, WE DOUBT THAT AT THIS POINT IN TIME THE SOVIETS WOULD PERMIT THE EAST GERMANS TO UNDERTAKE COMBINATIONS OF ACTIONS THAT WOULD INVITE STRONG ALLIED (OR FRG) COUNTERMEASURES.

GP-1. MORRIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

Wednesday, November 13, 1968
3:45 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith two hopeful noises
from Saigon: from Ky and, allegedly,
Thieu.

We shall see how Thieu's
talk with Bunker goes tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-6-93

WWRostow:rln

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Conciliatory Attitudes of Vice President Ky and
President Thieu

1. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

a. Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky believes that it is time for the government (GVN) to move to join the Paris peace talks and is willing to assist Ambassador Bunker in attaining this objective. Ky believes that the GVN has obtained all it can reasonably expect in recent talks with the Americans and that further dickering could prove counter-productive. With President Thieu's and Defense Secretary Clifford's recent press conference in mind, Ky said he is especially disturbed that unilateral public statements by both sides seem to be (portion garbled) private discussion.

b. While Ky is convinced that the GVN should go to Paris without further discussion, he thinks that President Thieu still has reservations. Ky thinks Thieu is still expecting an answer to his public "our side-your side" proposal since the President instructed Foreign Minister Thanh on 12 November to contact the U.S. Embassy for its response. Ky has taken the line with Thieu that the GVN already has the American answer in the U.S. Embassy's counter-proposal and that the American offer to let the GVN delegation take the lead in matters in which South Vietnam's interests are paramount is the American way of acknowledging and partially acceding to the President's request. Ky added that in diplomacy one rarely gets a whole loaf, and the GVN now has three-fourths of its request.

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 019-042-23
By JP, NARA, Date 1/21/02

[REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)

c. Ky thinks it would be helpful if Ambassador Bunker could see Thieu to confirm to him explicitly that the American counter-proposal is an answer to his proposal and to clarify in some detail those areas in which the GVN delegation would lead and those in which the Americans would.

d. Ky is concerned over a number of Thieu's recent moves which he regards as maladroit. He considers Thieu's message to Nixon a faux pas, as does newly returned Ambassador to the U.S. Bui Diem. Ky hastened to add that he still thought Thieu took the right course in October and that he still supported the President foursquare. Ky simply believes that further haggling will net the GVN nothing and risk jeopardizing US/GVN relations. Bui Diem, who is carrying a message for Thieu reiterating U.S. Government unwillingness to force the GVN into either recognizing or forming a coalition government with the National Liberation Front, endorsed Ky's feelings and position.

2. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] Thieu, in a conciliatory move, expressed strong interest in reaching an accommodation with the Americans as soon as possible. Thieu said he would arrange a meeting with Ambassador Bunker on 14 November to present a compromise arrangement which the Vietnamese side feels reasonably certain the Americans will accept. According to the source, details of the compromise have not yet been worked out, and the Vietnamese will be working throughout the night to firm it up.

1.3(a)(4)

3. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]
1.3(a)(4)

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Pres file

Wednesday, November 13, 1968
1:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the Vietnamese DCM in Washington reports in a straightforward way Nixon's and Clifford's statements.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-331
By ljg, NARA, Date 5-22-95

WWRostow:rla

22 1.3(a)(4)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
REF 91-512
By pu, MADA, Date 12-18-92

SANITIZED

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Conciliatory Attitudes of Vice President Ky and President Thieu

1. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

a. Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky believes that it is time for the government (GVN) to move to join the Paris peace talks and is willing to assist Ambassador Bunker in attaining this objective. Ky believes that the GVN has obtained all it can reasonably expect in recent talks with the Americans and that further dickering could prove counter-productive. With President Thieu's and Defense Secretary Clifford's recent press conference in mind, Ky said he is especially disturbed that unilateral public statements by both sides seem to be (portion garbled) private discussion.

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[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

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1.3(a)(4)

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1.3(a)(4)

3. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]
1.3(a)(4)

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-413
By C6, NARA Date 6-21-99

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1.5(c), (d), (g)

REPORT ON STATEMENTS OF NIXON AND CLIFFORD

XY20
[redacted] 12 NOV 68 [redacted]

Rostow

1.5(c), (d), (g)

1) ON 11 NOVEMBER, MR. NIXON GAVE THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION A FREE HAND UNTIL 20 JANUARY TO SPEAK FOR THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AS WELL ON FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS INCLUDING VIETNAM. "I GAVE ASSURANCE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND, OF COURSE, TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON THAT THEY COULD SPEAK NOT JUST FOR THIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT FOR THE NATION AND THAT MEANT FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AS WELL." ACCORDING TO THE WASHINGTON POST, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION AT MR. NIXON'S EXTRAORDINARY GRANT OF POWER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO SPEAK ON HIS BEHALF ON THE VIETNAM PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE HOPES WAS THAT THIS OUGHT TO SHAKE UP PRESIDENT THIEN'S POSITION ON HOW TO PROCEED WITH PEACE TALKS.

2) SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CLIFFORD TODAY TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH PEACE TALKS WITH NORTH VIETNAM IN PARIS IF PRESIDENT THIEN CONTINUES HIS REFUSAL TO TAKE PART BECAUSE PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD A COMMITMENT TO NORTH VIETNAM DEVELOPED IN SECRET TALKS IN WHICH SAIGON WAS KEPT FULLY INFORMED.

[redacted]

1.5(c), (d), (g)

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273

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-514
By *[signature]*, NARA, Date 5/23/94 ACTION

24

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Pres file

Wednesday, November 13, 1968 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will have noted that Thanh (Saigon Foreign Minister) asked for a U. S. public statement on five points:

"(A) Reconnaissance flights, (B) the shelling of cities, (C) the claim of the NLF to have been 'invited,' (D) the DRV claim that we have agreed to a four-sided conference, (E) violations of the DMZ."

Herewith a proposed 12 noon briefing statement for McCloskey at State covering these points.

Katzenbach and Bundy believe a quick positive response on these matters -- which give us no pain -- might be helpful in the wake of yesterday's earth tremor at the Pentagon.

W. W. Rostow

Statement approved _____

No _____

P. S. Bill Bundy has just raised by telephone the question of whether this ~~statement~~ call might not have somewhat greater impact if it were issued in the name of the Acting Secretary Mr. Katzenbach rather than simply dropped by the "Departmental spokesman."

Nick okay _____
Departmental spokesman _____

No _____

Call me _____

W. W. R.

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

November 13, 1968

Statement To Be Volunteered by Department Spokesman

In the course of the last few days, a number of points have been raised concerning the representation arrangements for the new Paris meetings, and concerning military actions both by the US and by the other side. These points have chiefly been raised in statements and claims by North Vietnamese representatives. It is important now to set the record straight.

1. First, with respect to the representation arrangements, our proposal to the North Vietnamese representatives started with the basic proposition that there must be agreed provision for a delegation representing the Republic of Viet-Nam, on our side of the meeting. In making this proposal, we said that the North Vietnamese might bring with them whomever they wished on their side of the table.

The North Vietnamese eventually accepted the inclusion of the Republic of Viet-Nam on our side, with the understanding that this would be as a delegation in its own right. For their part, the North Vietnamese said that representatives of the so-called National Liberation Front would be present.

This was and is the sole arrangement concerning representation. It is an arrangement reached on the basis of two sides,

and this is the way we continue to regard it. I spell it out in detail, because it refutes clearly the claims being made by North Vietnamese representatives that what we agreed to was in terms of a "four-party conference."

The National Liberation Front will be present only as Hanoi's choice. As the President has made absolutely clear, the presence of the NLF in no way involves recognition of the Front in any form. We do not consider the NLF to be an independent entity in any sense; the facts are clear that it is an organization controlled by Hanoi.

2. I turn now to the question of reconnaissance operations over North Vietnam. The Department of Defense has already made clear that we are continuing reconnaissance operations as required. What I have to add concerns the diplomatic background and particularly the claim that is being expressed or implied by North Vietnamese representatives, that the continuation of these operations in any way violates the understandings that had been reached prior to the bombing cessation.

The facts are simple. The activities that we undertook were bombardment of all types, and all other acts involving the use of force. This precise phrase was used repeatedly with the North Vietnamese, and was accepted and used by them. We do not look upon reconnaissance as an act involving the use of force.

3. Lastly, I refer to Secretary Clifford's remarks of yesterday concerning military action in or near the DMZ, and the situation with respect to indiscriminate attacks on major cities in the South.

In the latter area, we are following the situation very closely indeed, and I have nothing to add at this time.

DMZ,
In respect to the DMZ, however, I wish to emphasize

the extremely serious view we take of the now-verified instances since November 9 in which North Vietnamese forces fired on Allied forces south of the DMZ from positions within the DMZ. Our representatives in Paris have brought this situation forcefully to the attention of the North Vietnamese. As the President and Secretary Clifford have made clear, our position is that the talks cannot take place and continue on a serious basis if the DMZ is abused.

ACTION

25

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 13, 1968 -- 10:40 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Unless Nick Katzenbach is instructed by you to the contrary by noon today, he plans, in accordance with guidance from Sec. Rusk in Brussels (Tab A), to call in Debrynia this afternoon on three points:

- the DMZ;
- reconnaissance of North Vietnam and firing at our planes; and
- Berlin.

The reason for throwing Berlin in with the other elements is that we do not have independent intelligence that the East Germans plan to move as Kiesinger says they will. Therefore, Sec. Rusk and Nick would prefer not to make it the only occasion for having Debrynia in.

In addition, Vance would like us to back his play with Oberemke, via a talk with Debrynia.

W. W. Rostow

Tab A -- USNATO 5748

Nick can go ahead _____

Me _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cbm, NARA, Date 12-18-02

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ USNATO 5748

NODIS HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

SECTO 3.

EYES ONLY FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY

REF : STATE 270616

I SUGGEST YOU OR BOHLEN CALL IN DOBRYNIN TO BRIEF HIM ON LATEST HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS DEVELOPMENTS AND TAKE OPPORTUNITY TO MENTION OUR CONCERN ABOUT REPORTS THAT GDR MAY BE CONTEMPLATING MOVES TO INTERFERE WITH WEST GERMAN TRAFFIC TO AND FROM BERLIN.

I AM ASKING LODGE TO POINT OUT TO FRG THAT WE NEED AS MANY DETAILS OF THESE QUOTE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS UNQUOTE AND AS MUCH HARD DATA AS MAY BE AVAILABLE. RUSK

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept Guidelines

By cbm NARA, Date: 12-18-02

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

26

**Wednesday, November 13, 1968
10:00 a. m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith (from Stu Alsop) a
Polish conversation -- again with the
theme that all U. S. troops not be
withdrawn.**

**As noted on page 2, the rationale
is explicitly a check on Communist
China.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Communist Polish guy Wijotich

26a
Reid 11/11/68

QUESTION: How do you see the Viet Nam war ending?

1. A freeze of force levels on both sides in men not in supplies -- both U. S. and North VN.

2. How do you overcome the fact that the NVN refuse to admit they have no troops in SVN? Answer: You find a formula "in no more foreign troops." To them this means no more Americans; to us it means no more NVN. The result is that you have a gentlemen's agreement between non-gentlemen, which is nevertheless self-enforceable since we will know if they infiltrate heavily, and they will know if we increase our troop commitment heavily.

Requirement 2. A lull in the fighting -- not a cease-fire -- "avoidance of major confrontation." To quote the Honolulu declaration, "a reduction in the level of violence."

3. ~~"Withdrawal of foreign troops, it being understood by both sides that all American troops will not be wholly withdrawn -- that they will be some sort of Guantanamo in Vietnam -- and that the NVN will not admit that they have any troops to withdraw."~~ The question of uniting all Vietnam to be put on the back burner, with some such arrangement for "common bodies" as between the two Germanys.

QUESTION: What happens if the U. S. insists on all NVN troops leaving Laos and the DMZ in accordance with the 1954 Geneva agreement? Answer: This would introduce an extraneous factor and would greatly complicate negotiations.

Once American and NVN troops are largely withdrawn, there would be "free elections." The NVN would back a popular front, in the form of the newly created Alliance for Progress and Peace. In the estimation of Hanoi, if the popular front would certainly win, since it would attract all students and intellectuals as well as the already committed supporters of the VC. If it won as much as 35 or 40% of the popular vote, that would be enough to insure the coalition government.

And with a guarantee of neutrality for both sides, the results would be a sort of "left-oriented Austria."

Other examples of a heavy Communist vote leading to a coalition government are Spain in the early 1930s and Czechoslovakia in 1948. It is important to recognize that an election, in the view of Hanoi, could only take place after the withdrawal of US troops. But international supervision of such an election would not be excluded. He believes that the reason Saigon has refused to go to Paris is that Saigon fears such an election and that the refusal to go to Paris is a warning to the people against going over to the popular front.

~~It must be recognized, however, that the pressure from the Chinese against any such solution would be very heavy.~~ There are now between 40,000 and 50,000 Chinese in NVN and the NVN are totally dependent on the Chinese for a large proportion of the food, grenades, and other small arms. ~~The NVN are, however, very much opposed to being dominated by the Chinese or any other foreigners.~~ When the European-Communist bloc offered to send volunteers to help them they flatly refused, explaining that the result would then ^{be} a war between two white expeditionary forces and that they would lose the support of the people.

~~However, fear of China explains why NVN would not really greatly object to a limited continuance of American presence in SVN, if it were confined to a specified area as in Guantanamo. They would never say so publicly, but they wish some counter balance to Chinese power in VN.~~

MY INTERPRETATION: Having failed to win militarily, and being aware that a military victory is wholly impossible, the Communist side is at least seriously considering a gamble, the purpose of which would be to win by political means what it has failed to win by military means. Indeed the source specifically citing the Czech coup d'etat in 1948 as an example of what might happen in VN. He said that Hanoi and the Communists greatly over estimate the popularity of the NLF.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 13, 1968
9:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, from a sensitive French source, full text of de Gaulle's sterile talk with Bill Scranton.

Pres file

A summary is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 23767
Paris 23768 (4 sections)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NL/RAC 10-216
By WJ, NARA, Date 10-27-10

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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DE RUFNCR 23767 3171915
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8035
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 3834
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1968 NOV 23 20 28

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23767

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 10-215 (4/15/02)
By id, NARA, Date 10-24-70

MODIS

BRUSSELS FOR TOSEC

FOR THE SECRETARY.

1. EMBASSY IS SENDING BY SEPTEL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF OFFICIAL FRENCH TRANSCRIPT OF THE SEPT 20 DE GAULLE-SCRANTON CONVERSATION GIVEN TO US IN CONFIDENCE BY QUAI.

2. THE MAIN POINTS EMERGING FROM THIS RECORD OF THE CONVERSATIONS ARE:

A. ~~DEGAULLE MAINTAINED HIS CLASSIC ARGUMENTS RE EUROPE, NUCS, NATO, US HEGEMONY, USSR, GERMANY AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE WAS NO ESSENTIAL GIVE IN ANY OF THESE AREAS.~~

B. ~~DESPITE SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES TO OUTLINE HIS VIEWS ON HOW NATO MIGHT BE CHANGED TO MEET FRENCH CONCERNS, DE GAULLE HELD OUT NO HOPE THAT ANY "REORGANIZED NATO" WOULD MEET WITH FRENCH APPROVAL.~~

C. ~~DEGAULLE WAS PESSIMISTIC RE THE GERMAN PROBLEM. HE SAID THE SOVS FEARED THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY POTENTIAL OF A UNITED GERMANY AND WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT PERMIT GERMAN REUNIFICATION. HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT IMPASSE EXCEPT PERHAPS "THE NEXT WAR."~~

D. ~~AS HE LATER TOLD AMB SHRIVER, DE GAULLE SAID HE BELIEVED THE SOVS WERE ANXIOUS TO PUT THE GERMANS IN THEIR PLACE AND REACH A MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE US IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEIR FLANKS IF THEY HAVE TO DEAL WITH A CHINESE THREAT. THUS SOVS LIKELY MAINTAIN THEIR INTERESTS IN DETENTE--INCLUDING A STATUS QUO IN DIVIDED GERMANY. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HOWEVER, WAS A DISTURBING INDICATION THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE REVERSED THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS DETENTE.~~

E. ~~THIS RECORD MAKES ONLY PASSING MENTION OF DE GAULLE'S CONCERN WITH DOMESTIC AFFAIRS (GQNN 17484).~~

F. ~~THE ATMOSPHERE APPEARED CORDIAL AND DEGAULLE MADE IT CLEAR HE WOULD BE PLEASED IF RICHARD NIXON BECAME THE NEXT US PRESIDENT.~~

GP-1. SHRIVER

NOTE: NOT PASSED BRUSSELS BY OC/T 11/12/68

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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1968 NOV 12 PM 3 09 03221

VV CRA525
PP RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUFNCR 23768/1 3171955
ZNY SSSSS ZZK
P 121930Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8036
RUEHCR/USNATO BRUSSELS 642
STATE GRNC
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 10-215 (H15a,b)
By , NARA, Date 11-26-10

~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF FOUR PARIS 23768

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY.

1. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED ON A MOST CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THE ELYSEE'S OFFICIAL RECORD OF DEGAULLE'S SEPT 20 CONVERSATION WITH GOVERNOR SCRANTON. I AM SENDING THE FRENCH TEXT BY POUCH FOR OFFICIAL TRANSLATION IN WASHINGTON, BUT THOUGHT YOU WOULD WISH TO HAVE OUR UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION.

BEGIN TEXT. MR. SCRANTON: WHILE THANKING YOU FOR SEEING ME, I WOULD LIKE TO TELL YOU, AS I HAVE JUST TOLD YOUR INTERPRETER, HOW IMPRESSED WE ARE BY THE MANNER IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE SETTLED FRANCE'S PROBLEMS, BETTER NO DOUBT THAN OTHER COUNTRIES WITH SIMILAR PROBLEMS HAVE DONE.

GENERAL DE GAULLE: I WANT TO THANK YOU, BUT A SITUATION IS NEVER DEFINITELY SETTLED; THAT DEMANDS CONSTANT EFFORT.

MR. SCRANTON: AS YOU KNOW, I REPRESENT MR. NIXON IN A WAY BUT I HAVE RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIM AND EVERYTHING I SAY TO YOU CAN ONLY BE IN MY PRIVATE CAPACITY.

GEN. DEGAULLE: I HAVE VERY FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH MR. NIXON, WHOM I HOLD IN VERY HIGH ESTEEM. IF HE WERE ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, I WOULD NOT BE UPSET, JUST THE REVERSE.

MR. SCRANTON: YOU ARE RENOWNED FOR SEEING IN ADVANCE WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN IN THE WORLD. WHAT DO YOU THINK WILL HAPPEN TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS FROM NOW? I WELL UNDERSTAND THAT IS A DANGEROUS QUESTION BUT THE ANSWER WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT FOR US.

GEN. DEGAULLE: I CERTAINLY CANNOT PREDICT THE STATE OF THE WORLD TEN OR FIFTEEN YEARS FROM NOW. I THINK, NEVERTHELESS,

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-2- PARIS 23768, NOVEMBER 12, SECTION ONE OF FOUR

THAT AN IMPORTANT CHANGE IS TAKING PLACE IN THE EAST THESE LAST YEARS, IN FACT SINCE THE DEATH OF STALIN, THERE HAS BECOME VISIBLE A CERTAIN MOVEMENT TOWARD DETENTE AND PEACE AND EVEN, A BIT, TOWARD COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, NATURALLY, THERE ARE SOMETIMES FITS AND STARTS. FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE MOMENT OF THE SUMMIT MEETING HERE. THEN, IT BEGINS AGAIN. THERE HAS BEEN VIETNAM, AND EVERYTHING STOPPED. NEVERTHELESS, A MOVEMENT FAVORABLE TO DETENTE HAS BEEN VISIBLE SINCE KHRUSHCHEV. NOW, I WILL NOT HIDE FROM YOU THE FACT THAT I FEEL TODAY A CERTAIN UNEASINESS, BECAUSE I AM NOT CERTAIN THAT THIS MOVEMENT HAS NOT BEEN REVERSED. THE AFFAIR OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, PARTICULARLY, IS A VERY BAD SIGN; THE RENEWED THREAT AGAINST GERMANY IS ANOTHER. WHY IS THAT? I AM NOT SURE, BUT IT IS PERHAPS BECAUSE THOSE WHO ARE GENERALLY ORIENTED TOWARD WAR, THAT IS THE MILITARY--AND YOU KNOW THAT RUSSIA IS BECOMING A MILITARY STATE UNDER COMMUNISM AND DURING THE CZECH AFFAIR THEY DID NOT FAIL TO EXERT A VERY STRONG INFLUENCE--THOSE PEOPLE (THE MILITARY) CAN THINK THAT IN SEVERAL YEARS THEY MAY BE AT GRIPS WITH CHINA. FIRST, THEY MUST SETTLE THE PROBLEMS IN THE WEST AND IN PARTICULAR THAT OF GERMANY; FOR IF THEY ARE ONE DAY AT WAR AGAINST CHINA, THEY FEAR THAT GERMANY WILL JUMP ON THEM; WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE TRUE. THUS THEY WISH TO PREVENT IT, FIRST BY MASTERING GERMANY; THEN, BY ARRANGING THINGS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE THEIR WESTERN FLANK. PERHAPS THAT EXPLAINS THE VERY HARSH OPERATION AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IN ORDER TO ASSURE THEIR SECURITY, ESPECIALLY AS IT CONCERNS GERMANY, THEY WILL DOUBTLESS GO FURTHER AND THEY WILL DEMAND CERTAIN THINGS WHEN THEY THINK THE RIGHT MOMENT HAS COME. THIS REVERSAL OF THE TREND SEEMS TO ME IMPORTANT.

MR. SCRANTON: MAY I CONCLUDE FROM YOUR REMARKS THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO LIE LOW AND SEE WHAT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE THOUGHTS OF THE LEADERS OF THE KREMLIN? BUT PERHAPS IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO DO SOMETHING, IN FACE OF THIS EVENTUAL SHIFT, NOTABLY TO REORGANIZE NATO IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GIVE IT GREATER EFFECTIVENESS FOR CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, AND NOT ONLY FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. IT WOULD IN FACT, BE PROPER ALSO TO CONSIDER CHANGES IN THINKING WHICH ARE SHOWING THEMSELVES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND, IF I DARE HOPE IT, SHRIVER

NOTE: NOT PASSED BRUSSELS BY OC/T.

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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1968 NOV 12 PM 3 51

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PP RUEHC RUEHCR

DE RUFNCR 23768/2 3122000

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P 121900Z NOV 68

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8037

RUEHCR/USMISSION NATO 643

STATE GRNC

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 4 PARIS 23768

N O D I S

FOR THE SECRETARY

WHICH CAN TAKE PLACE IN THE UNITED STATES, WHOSE BEGINNINGS ARE ALREADY VISIBLE. IN THE UNITED STATES IT IS A QUESTION OF BEGINNING TO UNDERSTAND MORE COMPLETELY AND DEEPLY THE NECESSITY FOR WESTERN EUROPE TO SETTLE ITS OWN PROBLEMS BY ITSELF RATHER THAN BY WAITING FOR AMERICAN POLICY TO TRY AND IMPOSE UPON IT WHAT THE UNITED STATES THINKS IT OUGHT TO DO.

GEN. DEGAULLE: THE IDEAL WOULD BE FOR WESTERN EUROPE TO ORGANIZE ITSELF BY ITSELF. IN THE EVENT OF WORLD CONFLICT, AUTOMATICALLY THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE TOGETHER EVEN IF THERE WERE NO NATO. BUT THE IDEAL IS NOT OF THIS WORLD. IN FACT, IN NATO THERE IS EITHER THE UNITED STATES AND THEN THE OTHERS, THAT IS THE UNITED STATES AND SECONDARILY THE OTHERS, AND EUROPE DOES NOT ORGANIZE ITSELF; OR THERE IS NO UNITED STATES AND AMONG THE WESTERN EUROPEANS THERE IS GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY AND SEVERAL SMALL NATIONS. GREAT BRITAIN CANNOT DO WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY IS AFRAID AND DOES NOT WANT IT (U.S.) TO GO, NOR DOES ITALY. THE RESULT IS THAT A EUROPEAN EUROPE CANNOT BE BORN. THE RESULT WE SEE, THAT IT IS ALWAYS THE UNITED STATES, RESPONSIBLE AND COMMITTED, AND A SUBORDINATE EUROPE. THIS IS REALITY. WE FRENCH, WE HAVE TRIED SOMETHING DIFFERENT: WITHOUT QUITTING THE ALLIANCE, WE HAVE LEFT THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION: WE HAVE BUILT OUR OWN FORCES AND WE HAVE AS MANY AND EVEN MORE THAN WE HAD IN NATO. WE RECOGNIZE, NEVERTHELESS, THAT THE SITUATION IS VERY DIFFERENT FOR ENGLAND, GERMANY AND ITALY, AND THAT THERE IS NO PRACTICAL SOLUTION. IN FACT, THERE IS ONLY THE UNITED STATES IN NATO. MOREOVER, IT (US) DOES NOT REALLY WANT EUROPE TO ORGANIZE ITSELF. IT PREFERS THE

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-2-PARIS 23768, SECTION 2 OF 4

SITUATION WHERE EUROPE IS EASY FOR IT AND DOES NOT CAUSE IT ANY TROUBLE. IT HAS ENCOUNTERED SOME TROUBLE WITH FRANCE BECAUSE THE LATTER IS TRYING TO CREATE A EUROPEAN EUROPE. BASICALLY, THIS IS NOT TO AMERICA'S TASTE. THAT IS WHY THERE IS NO PRACTICAL SOLUTION, EVEN WHEN THERE IS AN IDEAL ONE.

MR. SCRANTON: I DO NOT WISH TO TALK IN AN UNREALISTIC WAY EITHER, BUT DON'T YOU THINK THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE WEST, AND WOULD CORRESPOND TO MOST OF OUR OBJECTIVES-- MANY OF THOSE OF FRANCE, OF THE UK, OF GERMANY, OF ITALY, OF THE UNITED STATES, AN EVEN OF RUSSIA-- WERE WE TO TRY TO CREATE A WESTERN EUROPE AS AN ENTITY, LED BY THE GENIUS OF FRANCE AND THE CAPACITIES OF THE OTHER NATIONS, AND WHICH WOULD BE AT THE SAME TIME SUPPORTED BY WIDESPREAD ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE UNITED STATES, IF IT SO DESIRES? THAT WOULD RESOLVE, FOR EXAMPLE, SUCH AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM AS FRANCE'S AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES. IF SOMETHING OF THIS NATURE SUCCEEDED, NOT ONLY WOULD IT EVENTUALLY PREVENT THE UNITED STATES FROM ADVENTURING AS IT DOES OCCASIONALLY, BUT IT WOULD ALSO AID EUROPE ITSELF TO PLAY A ROLE MORE AND MORE IMPORTANT IN THE WORLD AND, FINALLY, IT WOULD CREATE A VERY VALUABLE UNITY IN THE FACE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

GEN. DEGAULLE: I BELIEVE YOU ARE CORRECT AS TO THE PRINCIPLES, AND I WISH IT MYSELF, BUT, ONCE AGAIN, THAT DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO REALITY. YOU THINK THAT IT IS BETTER THAT EUROPE BE EUROPEAN AND INDEPENDENT, NATURALLY NOT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BUT INDEPENDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. IN ORDER FOR EUROPE, INDEPENDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TO DO THIS, THE STATES WHICH COMPRISE IT MUST WANT IT THIS WQ. THAT IS NOT THE CASE. IT IS WHAT FRANCE WANTS BUT NOT ENGLAND, GERMANY NOR ITALY. WHEN ONE TRIES TO SAY, IN EUROPE, AS I HAVE DONE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS: LET US UNITE TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT EUROPE, THE OTHERS DO NOT FOLLOW. AND IT IS SAID THAT DEGAULLE WANTS TO ESTABLISH HIS HEGEMONY OVER EUROPE, HE IS AGAINST THE ANGLO-SAXONS. THIS IS SAID IN ENGLAND, IN HOLLAND, IN GERMANY IN ITALY.....THE RESULT IS THE PRESENT SITUATION WHERE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FRANCE, EVERYONE WISHES TO BE DEPENDENT UPON THE UNITED STATES AND DOES NOT WANT AN INDEPENDENT EUROPE, EVEN WHILE REGRETTING IT DEEP DOWN INSIDE THEMSELVES. THAT IS THE ELEMENTARY POLITICAL FACT WHICH CONTROLS ALL.

GOV: SCRANTON: IN OTHER WORDS, YOU HAVE NO HOPE OF ARRIVING AT A RESULT BY REORGANIZING NATOR OR IN RESTORING VIGOR TO THE OECD OR ANY OTHER ORGANIZATION? YET BY SUCH A MEANS, IF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES FAVORED IT, ONE

SHRIVER
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NOTE: NOT PASSED USMISSION NATO BY OC/T

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Department of State

6
TELEGRAM

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VV CRA534

PP RUEHC RUEHCR

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DE RUFNCR 23768/3 3172000

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8038

RUEHCR/USMISSION NATO PRIORITY 644

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 4 PARIS 23768

NODIS

COULD PERHAPS HAVE OBTAINED A TRUE WESTERN EUROPE TO WHICH WE COULD HAVE SAID: WE LIKE YOU, WE WISH TO AID YOU, AND WE WILL GUARANTEE YOU OUR MILITARY AID IN CASE OF ATTACK, BUT YOU YOURSELVES CONSTITUTE AN ENTITY AND WE WANT YOU TO FORM A THIRD FORCE, VERY STRONG FROM THE ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL POINT OF VIEW. IF YOU BELIEVE THAT IS SO DIFFICULT, DO YOU HAVE AN IDEA OF WHAT WE COULD DO, FOR EXAMPLE, CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST WHERE THERE ARE TWO POWERS IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND ALSO THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS WHOSE FANATIC IDEAS WE CANNOT EXPECT TO CHANGE? IN A CASE SUCH AS THAT, AN INDEPENDENT EUROPE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE WORLD VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. GEN. DE GAULLE: THAT IS TRUE, AND THAT WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY TAKEN PLACE IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE ATOMIC BOMB. EUROPE IS AFRAID OF THE SOVIETS, WHO HAVE THE BOMBS WHILE THE EUROPEANS HAVE NONE, OR ALMOST NONE, AND THE UNITED STATES HAS MANY. IT IS THEREFORE NORMAL THAT THE EUROPEAN STATES AND ABOVE ALL THOSE WHO ARE THREATENED SUCH AS GERMANY, SEE ONLY THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE AND DEPENDENCE UPON THE UNITED STATES. WE CANNOT CONDEMN SUCH AN ATTITUDE. THE ATOMIC BOMB EXISTS AND IT IS ANOTHER FACT WHICH IS AT THE BASE OF EVERYTHING. THUS I DO NOT SEE HOW A EUROPEAN WESTERN EUROPE CAN BE ORGANIZED. YOU REFERRED TO SUBJECTS SUCH AS ASIA ABOUT WHICH EUROPE COULD HAVE SPOKEN HAD IT EXISTED. FRANCE DOES SO, BECAUSE IT IS INDEPENDENT; WHICH DOES NOT ALWAYS SUIT THE UNITED STATES. BUT THE OTHERS SAY ONLY WHAT SUITS IT (U.S.). IN THIS MATTER OF THE MIDDLE EAST, HOWEVER, THERE IS NOT ONLY A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. IN FACT THERE IS THE PROBLEM ITSELF: ISRAEL IS ESTABLISHED IN PALESTINE AND IT BEHAVES IN AN EXAGGERATED FASHION, AS THE JEWS HAVE ALWAYS DONE SINCE MOSES. IT ATTACKED LAST JUNE AND IT SEIZED TERRITORY THAT IT DOES

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-2-PARIS 23768, NOV 12, SECTION 3 OF 4

NOT WANT TO GIVE UP. OBVIOUSLY THE ARABS CANNOT ACCEPT THAT. BEING IN AN INDEPENDENT POSITION, WE SAID THAT THE STATE OF ISRAEL WAS A GOOD THING, BUT WE BLAMED AND CONDEMNED IT FOR HAVING ATTACKED. THE OTHERS, HOWEVER, SAY NOTHING, OR THEY FOLLOW YOUR LEAD, EVEN WHEN THEY THINK LIKE US. THAT IS THE INDEPENDENT EUROPE. AS FOR VIETNAM, ALL THE EUROPEANS THINK THAT YOU ARE WRONG TO CONTINUE THE WAR; BUT ONCE AGAIN, IT IS ONLY WE WHO SAY IT. MR. SCRANTON. FOR THE TIME BEING, THE ONLY WAY WE COULD MAKE ANY PROGRESS IN THESE WORLD QUESTIONS WOULD BE, FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, TO ACT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS WHERE FRANCE MUST PLAY A LARGE ROLE IN SORT OF NEUTRALITY; FOR CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WE MUST OBSERVE THE NEW TENDENCIES WHICH THE KREMLIN MIGHT SHOW, CONTINUE TO LEAN MILITARILY ON THE FORCES OF NATO, AND ACT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE UNITED STATES ACQUIRES A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION AND DOES NOT EXAGGERATE ITS REACTIONS. IN THIS MATTER, WE COULD COUNT ON YOUR ASSISTANCE AND ON THAT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, WHICH WOULD BE RATHER USEFUL IN PREVENTING THE GERMANS FROM ASSUMING A SOMEWHAT EXTREME POSITION. IN ANY EVENT, IF I UNDERSTAND YOU CORRECTLY, ONE MUST WAIT TO SEE WHAT THE KREMLIN THINKS.

GENERAL DE GAULLE. IN GENERAL THAT IS RIGHT. WITH REGARD TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIR, IN REALITY WE THINK AND WE SAY, YOU AND WE, THE SAME THING. FOR OUR PART, WE SAID THIS WITH A EUROPEAN NOTE; YOU SAY IT DIFFERENTLY, BUT OUR POSITIONS ARE IN SUBSTANCE IDENTICAL.... IT IS GOOD THAT IT IS SO. ONE MUST HOWEVER MAINTAIN CONTACT IN ORDER TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION AND IMPRESSIONS. AS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, WE ALSO THINK THAT IT IS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS THAT ONE...../

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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1968 NOV 12 PM 0335 2309

VV CRF592
PP RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUFNCR 23768/4 3172030
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121900Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8039
RUEHCR/USNATO BRUSSELS 645
STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF FOUR PARIS 23768

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

THAT ONE MIGHT IMPOSE A SOLUTION. BUT IT IS NECESSARY THAT ONE DAY THE SOLUTION BE IMPOSED. WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS, ONLY THE GREAT POWERS CAN DO THIS. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY THEREFORE TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN IN ORDER TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION ON THE JEWS AND ON THE ARABS THROUGH THE UN, WHICH WOULD ACCEPT THE COMMON POSITION OF THE GREAT POWERS AND WOULD DECIDE THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW TO THE LINE OF 1967. THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD THEN HAVE TO DRAW THE FRONTIERS, TO ORGANIZE SECURITY, TO REGULATE THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES, TO REOPEN THE SUEZ CANAL TO EVERYONE, INCLUDING ISRAEL, ETC... BUT WE ARE NOT THERE YET. PERHAPS ONE DAY WE WILL GET THERE. FOR THE MOMENT, ONE HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT WANT TO DO ANYTHING AND THAT IT ALLOWS ISRAEL TO INSTALL ITSELF IN THE TERRITORIES IT HAS TAKEN. THIS MAKES PEACE WITH THE ARABS IMPOSSIBLE.

MR. SCRANTON. GIVEN THE EVENTUAL CHANGE IN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE, AS IS SIGNALLED IN PARTICULAR BY CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT NO RESULT CAN BE OBTAINED BY A REORGANIZATION OF NATO? GENERAL DE GAULLE. THAT WOULD CHANGE NOTHING. YOU ARE NO DOUBT THINKING OF SOME KIND OF GREAT CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD SERVE TO OCCUPY PEOPLE'S MINDS, TO RALLY THOSE WHO ARE AFRAID, EACH FROM HIS OWN SIDE. WE UNDERSTAND THIS CONCERN, BUT SUCH A MEETING WOULD CHANGE NOTHING, NEITHER FOR THE EUROPEAN SITUATION NOR FOR THE SOVIET DANGER.

MR. SCRANTON. THERE WAS A LOT OF TALK IN THE UNITED STATES ABOUT A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND MR. KOSYGIN BEFORE THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. SINCE THE INVASION, PEOPLE STILL SPEAK ABOUT A SUMMIT OF TWO. WHAT DO YOU THINK, DO YOU THINK IT IS BETTER TO POSTPONE IT FOR A WHILE OR TO CONTINUE TO ESTABLISH

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-2-PARIS 23768, NOV 12, SECTION 4 OF 4

CONTACTS?

GENERAL DE GAULLE. RUSSIA WANTS DIRECT CONTACTS WITH YOU AND, BASICALLY, YOU WANT THEM TOO. IT HAS BEEN THIS WAY SINCE ROOSEVELT AND STALIN AND THAT IS NORMAL. YOU ARE TWO GREAT POWERS WHO DO NOT WANT TO HAVE TO FIGHT AND WHO THEREFORE ARE LOOKING FOR A MODUS VIVENDI. THAT IS THE FEELING WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT YALTA, CAMP DAVID, VIENNA, GLASSBORO AND WHICH COULD BRING PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THE KREMLIN. BUT IT IS NEVER MORE THAN A MODUS VIVENDI, AN UNSTABLE BALANCE, AND NOT REALLY PEACE. AND THIS CAN ONLY BE A COMMON AND TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENT. IT DOES NOT RESOLVE ANY QUESTION, SUCH AS THE GERMAN QUESTION; AND IT CANNOT RESOLVE IT. WE SEE NO HARM IN PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S GOING TO THE KREMLIN JUST AS WE SAW NO HARM WHEN KRUSCHEV WENT TO CAMP DAVID; AND WE WERE NOT UPSET WHEN KOSYGIN MET PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT GLASSBORO AFTER TELLING US IN PARIS: "I WILL NOT SEE HIM." BUT ALL THAT IS NOT A SOLUTION. IT IS IN ANY EVENT NO SOLUTION AT ALL FOR EUROPE; IT DOES NOT CREATE EUROPE, ON THE CONTRARY: IT KEEPS EASTERN EUROPE IN THE EASTERN CAMP AND ESTERN EUROPE IN THE WESTERN CAMP: EXCEPT FOR FRANCE.

MR. SCRANTON

WHAT THEN CAN WE DO, ABOVE ALL THE UNITED STATES, TO FACILITATE THE SETTLEMENT OF THE GREAT EUROPEAN QUESTION, INCLUDING THE GERMAN QUESTION? WHAT IS THE NEXT STEP?

GENERAL DE GAULLE. ONE CANNOT SOLVE THE GERMAN QUESTION, GERMANY, CERTAINLY, ARDENTLY WISHES TO BE REUNIFIED AND THE SOVIETS WILL NEVER ACCEPT IT; AND THEY CANNOT ACCEPT IT. IN EFFECT, A RE-UNIFIED GERMANY WOULD RAPIDLY BECOME VERY POWERFUL FROM AN ECONOMIC, AND THEN FROM A MILITARY AND POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. THE SOVIET UNION, THAT IS TO SAY RUSSIA, CANNOT ACCEPT IT. THE WAR WAS TERRIBLE FOR IT. THE GERMANS PENETRATED TO THE CAUCASUS. THE RUSSIANS DO NOT WANT NOR CAN THEY PERMIT GERMANY TO BE RE-UNIFIED. WE MUST LIVE WITH THIS SITUATION AT LEAST UNTIL THE NEXT WAR. I AM SORRY: YOU WERE PERHAPS EXPECTING AGREEABLE AND CONSOLING WORDS; BUT OUR WORLD IS VERY DIFFICULT AND VERY HARD. WHICH MEANS THAT I UNDERSTAND VERY WELL THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITIES AND DIFFICULTIES OF AMERICA. I WANT TO TELL YOU, AS I HAVE TOLD MANY OTHER PERSONS, THAT FRANCE AS NO HOSTILITY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES. ON THE CONTRARY. TODAY AS ALWAYS, OUR FEELING OF FRIENDSHIP FOR YOU IS VERY MUCH ALIVE. BUT WE FEEL THE NEED OF INDEPENDENCE, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE GREAT UNHAPPINESS THAT WE SUFFERED. THAT IS THE INEVITABLE REACTION OF A GREAT PEOPLE WHICH WAS DEMOLISHED. THE UNITED STATES MUST ACCEPT AND RESPECT THAT. AS FAR AS OUR RELATIONS ARE CONCERNED, THERE IS BASICALLY FRIENDSHIP ON ONE SIDE AND THE OTHER; BUT, IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES MUST REALLY RECOGNIZE FRENCH INDEPENDENCE. IT HAS BEEN THIS WAY SINCE 1940.

MR. SCRANTON: I AM A HISTORIAN IN A MODEST WAY. I DO NOT PRETEND TO KNOW EVERYTHING ABOUT FRENCH HISTORY BUT WHAT I DO KNOW INSPIRES A GREAT RESPECT FOR THE FRENCH NATION AND FOR YOU PERSONALLY. I AM NOT AMONG THOSE IN THE UNITED STATES WHO CRITICIZE FRANCE AND, WITHOUT BEING IN AGREEMENT WITH ALL THAT

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-3-PARIS 23768, NOV 12, SECTION 4 OF 4

YOU ARE DOING BUT WHICH YOU DO IN GOOD FAITH, I AM NOT AMONG THOSE WHO THINK THAT FRENCH POLICY IS OPPOSED TO THE WELL-UNDERSTOOD INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD. THIS IS WHY I AM HERE. I HAVE THE DEEP FEELING THAT THE FUTURE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WHOEVER HE MAY BE, WILL HAVE TO MAKE CERTAIN RADICAL CHANGES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HIS COUNTRY AND IN ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. YOU HAVE DONE ADMIRABLE THINGS TO WAKE UP THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD AND I WILL BRING BACK FROM MY VISIT A SENTIMENT OF HIGH RESPECT FOR YOUR PERSON; AND FOR FRANCE.

GENERAL DEGAULLE: I AM TOUCHED BY WHAT YOU ARE TELLING ME AND ASK YOU TO TRANSMIT MY FRIENDLY GREETINGS TO MR. NIXON.

GP-1. SHRIVER

BT

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

SANITIZED 28

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~ Memo to the President

Wednesday, November 13, 1968 -- 9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith today's batch of material on Vietnam negotiations.

-- At Tab A is a Vietnamese memorandum to us, which crossed our memorandum to them. It makes the case for their being the "head of the delegation" of our side. It also makes the point that we should publicly deny that we accepted a "four-party conference." They argue their case rather well on psychological and political grounds for Saigon being the head of the delegation, pointing to the North Korean-Communist China relationship at Panmunjom. (We still, in my judgment, might think of a formula like this: Saigon would be "chairman of our side" rather than "head of the delegation" -- our side being made up of two sovereign governments and, therefore, the question of the U.S. constitutional problem not being involved.)

-- At Tab B is our Political Counselor's conversation with Thanh on the occasion of Thanh's handing him the GVN memorandum. Herz makes strongly a point that we shall have to continue to make; namely, that while we can organize our side as we wish, we cannot prevent the other side from organizing as it wishes and making such propaganda as it chooses to make.

-- At Tab C are Bunker's suggestions for a prompt reply in writing to the GVN memorandum just handed to us, which would also involve nailing down our response to their proposal of November 8 about a single delegation headed by the GVN.

-- At Tab D Bunker conveys his reaction to Sec. Clifford's press conference [redacted]
Bunker's own comment is in paragraph 4.

[redacted]

-- At Tab F Vance reports to Oberemko on the DMZ violations and reconnaissance. Oberemko promises to inform his government promptly. Oberemko also expresses hope that the wider talks get started soon.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

REF 91-514

By rip MAA, Date 6-8-93

W. J. Rostow

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

9 00 AM
(PS)

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(a)(5)



Department of State

282
TELEGRAM

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..... ZZ RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 42560 3180359
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z O 130327Z NOV 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4323
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2875
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42560

3358Q

1968 NOV 12 PM 11 18

(A)

ACTION COPY

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS
PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 710991-510

By rg/jw, NARA, Date 4-6-93

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MEMORANDUM HANDED US BY FONMIN THANK THIS MORNING (UNDERLININGS ARE THOSE IN THE ORIGINAL). ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEW AND COMMENTS ON THE MEMORANDUM, INCLUDING SUGGESTIONS FOR REPLY, FOLLW IN SEPTELS.

2. BEGIN QUOTE: THIS MEMORANDUM IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE EXPLANATIONS ON THE RVN PROPOSAL OF NOV 8, WHICH, IN THE VIEW OF THE GVN, DESERVES SERIOUS ATTENTION FROM THE USG.

3. THE BASIC FORMULAR ENVISAGED BY THE USG AND THE RVN IS A "TWO-SIDE MEETING." WHAT REMAINS IS HOW TO DEFINE THE TWO-SIDE FORUMLA.

4. THE US EMBASSY NOTE OF NOV 11, 1968 INDICATED THAT, AS FAR AS THE OTHER SIDE IS CONCERNED, THE US MADE CLEAR TO HANOI THAT IT MIGHT BRING ON ITS SIDE OF THE TABLE ANY PERSONS IT WISHED, BUT THAT THE US WOULD REGARD AND TREAT ALL THE REPRESENTATIVES ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TABLE AS MEMBERS OF "SINGLE SIDE, THAT OF HANOI, AND FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES AS A SINGLE DELEGATION".

5. THIS PRINCIPLE IS VERY CLOSE TO THE RVN CONCEPT OF THE TWO-SIDE FORMULA, IN WHICH EACH SIDE SHOULD CONSIST OF ONLY ONE DELEGATION, AND HANOI IS THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE OTHER SIDE. THE GVN, HOWEVER, BELIEVES THAT THIS PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE UNEQUIVOCAL IN ITS APPLICATIONS TO AVOID THE TENDENTIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COMMUNISTS WHO PRETEND THAT THE SO-CALLED NLF IS A SEPARATE ENTITY AND CONSISTUTES A SEPARATE DELEGATION.

6. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE STATED PUBLICLY THAT THE MEETING IS TO BE A FOUR PARTY CONFERENCE, AND THAT THE US HAS ACCEPTED THAT FORMULA.

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-2-Page, SAIGON 42560 Nov. 12, 1968 NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

// 7. THE GVN BELIEVES THAT A PUBLIC RECTIFICATION BY THE US //
GOVERNMENT OF THESE STATEMENTS IS NECESSARY AND WILL BE
HELPFUL. //

// 8. ON OUR SIDE, THE GVN DEEMS THAT THE POSITIONS AND THE //
PUBLIC IMAGES OF BOTH THE US AND THE RVN WILL BE GREATLY
ENHANCED IF, PARALLEL WITH THE OTHER SIDE, OUR SIDE IS
ALSO TO CONSIST OF ONE DELEGATION AND THE RVN IS TO HEAD THE
DELEGATION. //

9. IN THE TWO-SIDE FORMULA, IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE THAT
EACH SIDE IS NOT HEADED BY SOMEONE.

10. IN THE DELEGATION ON OUR SIDE, IF THE CRITERIA OF POWER
AND EXPERIENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS ARE TO APPLY, THE US UNDIS-
PUTABLY IS THE MOST QUALIFIED TO HEAD THE DELEGATION. BUT THE
GVN HAS SERIOUS MISGIVINGS ON THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, WHICH THE COMMUNIST WILL NOT FAIL TO
EXPLOIT TO OUR GREAT DISADVANTAGE, VIS-A-VIS VIETNAMESE PUBLIC
OPINION AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION.

11. AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS PRETEND TO
BE THE STANDARD BEARERS OF VIETNAMESE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE,
AND THEIR PROPAGANDA THEME IS THAT THE GVN IS NOT AN INDEP-
ENDENT GOVERNMENT.

12. BESIDES, ON THE GROUND OF PRINCIPLES, THE RVN IS THE
PRINCIPAL PARTY IN THIS WAR. THE ALLIES WHO HAVE NOBLY RESP-
ONDED TO THE APPEAL OF THE RVN IN THE DEFENSE OF FREEDOM IN
VIETNAM PLAY A ROLE WHICH IN PRINCIPLE IS ONLY A SUPPORTING
ROLE, EVEN THOUGH IT IS AN INSTRUMENTAL AND DETERMINING ROLE.

13. THE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF "OUR POLITICAL POSITION"
DEPENDS ON HOW EFFECTIVELY WE SAFEGUARD EVEN THE APPEARANCES
OF THESE PRINCIPLES. IN THE VIEW OF THE GVN, THE POLITICAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THIS NATURE CANNOT BE
UNDERESTIMATED IN THE PRESENT IDEOLOGICAL WAR.

14. IN FACT, THE COMMUNISTS ARE VERY KEENLY AWARE OF THESE
CONSIDERATIONS, AND ARE MOST CAREFUL IN RESPECTING THEM.
WE HAVE AN EXAMPLE AND A PRECEDENT IN THE ARRANGEMENTS OF THE
PEACE TALKS AT KAESONG AND AT PANMUNJOM DURING THE KOREAN
WAR.

15. THESE TALKS ALSO BASED ON THE TWO-SIDE FORMULA. ON THE
FREE WORLD SIDE, THE PROBLEM WAS SIMPLIFIED BY THE EXISTENCE
OF THE UN COMMAND. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE COMMUNISTS POINTEDLY
HAD THE NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVE AS THE HEAD OF THEIR
DELEGATION, WHILE THE RED CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE WAS OUT-
WARDLY ASSIGNED ONLY A SUPPORTING ROLE.

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-3-Page, SAIGON 42560 Nov. 12, 1968 NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

16. ~~THIS ARRANGEMENT DID NOT CREATE ANY ILLUSIONS ON THE~~
~~RESPECTIVE POWER POSITIONS OF THESE TWO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES,~~
~~BUT IT DID HELP THEM TO KEEP CERTAIN APPEARANCES IN CON-~~
~~FORMITY WITH THE RESPECTIVE ROLES THEY CLAIMED TO PLAY IN THE~~
~~CONFLICT.~~

17. - WE DEEM THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ONE DELEGATION FOR
EACH SIDE IS MORE IN HARMONY WITH THE TWO-SIDE FORMULA, THAN
THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THREE OR FOUR DELEGATIONS WITH VARIOUS
INTERPRETATIONS.

18 - THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN PARIS BETWEEN THE NORTH VIET-
NAMESE AND US NEGOTIATORS CAN BE REGARDED AS TENTATIVE UNTIL
THE CONCURRENCE OF THE OTHER PARTIES CONCERNED, AND UNTIL
THEN STILL SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS.

19 - TO THAT END, IN THE VIEW OF THE GVN, REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE RVN SHOULD PARTICIPATE, ALONG WITH REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE US IN PARIS, IN THE UNOFFICIAL AND SECRET CONTACTS
WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF NVN FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE
ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES OF A TWO-SIDE MEETING.

SAIGON, NOV 13, 1968

END QUOTE

OPNOTE: QUOTATIONS USED IN LIEU OF UNDERLINING.

BUNKER
BT

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Department of State

286
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ (B)

DE RUMJIR 42563 3180515
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 130455Z NOV 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4341
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2876
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42563

MODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: SAIGON 42560

ACTION COPY

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1968 NOV 13 AM 12 57

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712989-72

By rg/lsp, NARA, Date 4-2-93

1. FONMIN THANH HANDED THE GVN MEMORANDUM (REFTEL) TO POL COUNSELOR AT 0930AM NOV 13. POL COUNSELOR IMMEDIATELY ASKED WHAT WAS THE STATUS OF GVN CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT WE HAD PROVIDED THEM ON NOV 11. HAD THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDERED IT AND WHEN COULD WE HAVE THE GVN'S REPLY? THANH SAID OUR DRAFT STATEMENT HAD BEEN CONSIDERED SO FAR ONLY BY THE PRES AND THE VICE PRES. IT HAD BEEN TOO LATE YESTERDAY TO CONSULT THE NSC. THE PRESIDENT HAD THE PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS FOR DINNER, BUT THANH DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OUR DRAFT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THEM.

2. WE SAID WE WISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN RECEIVING THE GVN MEMORANDUM THIS MORNING WE DID NOT CONSIDER THAT THE BALL WAS NOW IN OUR COURT. THANH REPLIED THAT HIS MEMORANDUM PROVIDES "EXPLANATIONS" OF THE GVN POSITION OF NOV 8 AND THAT GVN CONSIDERS THAT IT HAS NOT YET RECEIVED AN ANSWER TO THAT PROPOSAL. HERZ SAID AMB BUNKER HAD PROVIDED AN ANSWER TO PRES THIEU ON NOV 9. WE HAD ALSO NOTED THAT MIN OF INFO THIEN HAD SAID THAT THE US HAD NOT YET REPLIED TO THE GVN PROPOSAL OF NOV 8, BUT THIS WAS INCORRECT. HERZ REPEATED THAT IN RECEIVING THE GVN MEMORANDUM WE WISHED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE CONSIDER THE BALL STILL TO BE IN THE GVN COURT.

3. IN REVIEWING THE GVN MEMORANDUM, HERZ ASKED THANH WHETHER HE WAS AWARE THAT AMB BUNKER HAD TOLD PRES THIEU NOV 9 THAT DELEGATING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO SPEAK FOR THE US WAS NOT POSSIBLE UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION. THANH REPLIED, THAT THE FORMULA PROPOSED BY THE GVN WOULD NOT MAKE IT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE US AND THAT ITS SOLE PURPOSE WAS TO "FORCE THE OTHER SIDE" TO HAVE A SINGLE DELEGATION.

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-2- SAIGON 42563, NOV 13, 1968, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

4. THANK THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHLY COMPLAINT ABOUT DRV AND LF PROPAGANDA WHICH HE SAID THE US SHOULD PUBLICLY REFUTE. HE SAID HANOI WAS NOW CLAIMING THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT THAT THE US COULD CONTINUE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS, WHEREAS WE HAD TOLD THE GVN THAT THE DRV UNDERSTANDS THAT SUCH FLIGHTS ARE TO CONTINUE. (HERZ SAID THE DRV DOES INDEED UNDERSTAND BUT WE CANNOT KEEP THEM FROM MAKING PROPAGANDA.) THANK CONTINUED THAT MRS. THI BINH IS CLAIMING THAT THE NLF WAS "INVITED" TO PARIS BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DRV AND THE US, AND XUAN THUY IS CLAIMING AGREEMENT ON A "FOUR-SIDED" CONFERENCE. HE SAID THE GVN CONSIDERS IT HIGHLY NECESSARY AND USEFUL WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAMESE AND WORLD OPINION THAT THESE MISSTATEMENTS BE COUNTERED AUTHORITATIVELY BY THE US SINCE THEY CLOUD THE ENTIRE BASIS FOR THE BOMBING HALT AND THE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. HERZ SAID WE HAVE NEVER EXPECTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD REFRAIN FROM MAKING EXTRAVAGANT PROPAGANDA STATEMENTS ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. THANK SAID THIS IS NO LONGER A MATTER OF PROPAGANDA BUT ONE OF FALSIFYING THE RECORD OF WHAT IS SUPPOSED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE DRV. HE SAID THERE ARE NOW REALLY FIVE POINTS ON WHICH A US PUBLIC STATEMENT WOULD BE DESIRABLE: (A) RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS, (B) THE SHELLING OF CITIES, (C) THE CLAIM OF THE NLF TO HAVE BEEN "INVITED", (D) THE DRV CLAIM THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO A FOUR-SIDED CONFERENCE, (E) VIOLATIONS OF THE DMZ.

6. HERZ CLARIFIED AGAIN THAT THE GVN MEMORANDUM OF NOV 13 IS NOT YET A RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS OF NOV 11, AND THANK AGAIN CONFIRMED THAT IT IS TO BE REGARDED AS PROVIDING "EXPLANATIONS" OF THE GVN PROPOSAL OF NOV 8. THANK REPEATED THAT PRES THIEU CONSIDERS THAT HE HAS NOT YET RECEIVED A DEFINITIVE REPLY TO HIS PROPOSAL OF NOV 8, AND HERZ REPEATED THAT WE CONSIDER WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED A REPLY TO OUR PROPOSAL OF NOV 11 WHICH HAD TAKEN THEIR PROPOSAL OF NOV 8 INTO ACCOUNT.

7. COMMENTS FOLLOW.
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

28c

OO RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 42582 3181130
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131100Z NOV 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4359
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2880
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42582

RECEIVED

1968 NOV 13 AM 7:48

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF A SAIGON 42560 B. SAIGON 42563

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7769 91510

By ag/jal, NARA, Date 4693

1. IN VIEW OF THE UNCERTAINTY ON THE GVN SIDE WHETHER THEY HAD RECEIVED A FORMAL REPLY TO THEIR PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 8, AND SINCE THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE (STATE 269234) HAD TO BE COMMUNICATED ORALLY TO THIEU WHO DOES NOT ALWAYS PASS OUR ORAL POSITIONS ON IN DETAIL TO HIS COLLEAGUES, I THINK IT VERY DESIRABLE THAT WE GIVE A WRITTEN REPLY TO THE GVN MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER 13, SETTING FORTH OUR POSITION IN SOME DETAIL. FOLLOWING ARE SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR SUCH A REPLY, KEYED TO THE PARAGRAPHS OF REFTTEL A.

2. RE PARA 4, WE MIGHT SAY THAT WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE GVN CONSIDERS THAT WE HAVE COME "VERY CLOSE" TO THEIR CONCEPT OF THE TWO-SIDE FORMULA AND BELIEVE THAT IN LINE WITH WHAT PRESIDENT THIEU HAS SAID ABOUT FINDING A "MIDDLE GROUND", THE GVN SHOULD NOW FIND IT POSSIBLE TO MOVE TO NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE GVN PROPOSALS SHOULD BE FOLLOWED UP IN PARIS AND THAT IT IS NOW FOR THE GVN TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE DRV ON THE MODALITIES OF THE TALKS. ACCORDINGLY WE URGE THE GVN TO SEND A DELEGATION TO PARIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. AS FAR AS OUR CONCEPTION OF THE OUR SIDE/YOUR SIDE FORMULA IS CONCERNED, WE FEEL THAT OUR SIDE CANNOT DICTATE TO THE OTHER SIDE HOW THEY WILL CONSTITUTE THEMSELVES FOR THE TALKS. WE CAN AND WILL HOWEVER SAY TO THEM HOW WE VIEW AND CONSIDER THEIR SIDE, AND NOTABLY THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THE NLF IS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY. THE OTHER SIDE MAY SAY WHATEVER THEY PLEASE, BUT THIS WILL BE PROPAGANDA AND SHOULD BE TREATED AS SUCH. IT WILL BE FOR OUR SIDE TO REFUTE IT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO SET FORTH OUR POSITION WITH DIGNITY AND EMPHASIS TO ENLIGHTEN WORLD OPINION ON THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION IN VIET NAM.

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4. RE PARAS 6 AND 7, WE MIGHT SAY THAT WHATEVER THE OTHER SIDE MAY CLAIM FOR THEMSELVES, THE US HAS NEVER ACCEPTED THAT THE FORTHCOMING TALKS IN PARIS ARE TO BE CALLED A FOUR PARTY OF FOUR-SIDED CONFERENCE. WHAT WE HAVE SAID, IN LINE WITH OUR LONG-STANDING PUBLIC POSITION, IS THAT THE DRV MAY BRING ALONG TO THE TALKS ANY PERSONS THEY DESIRE. IF ANY OF THOSE PERSONS CALL THEMSELVES REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NLF, WE WILL POINT OUT AT THE TALKS THAT THEY ARE MEMBERS OF A SINGLE SIDE, THAT OF HANOI, AND FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES PART OF HANOI'S DELEGATION (NOTE: WE STILL FEEL, IN LINE WITH PARA 2 SAIGON 41764 AND PARA 2A SAIGON 42288, THAT A US STATEMENT REFUTING THE CONTENTION THAT THERE HAS BEEN AGREEMENT ON A "FOUR-SIDED" CONFERENCE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. THE REMARKS BY MCCLOSKEY AT STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING NOV 8, OF WHICH THE CORE WAS ON BACKGROUND, DO NOT FULLY MEET THE REQUIREMENTS).

5. RE PARA 8, WE MIGHT SAY THAT EVEN IF THE US WERE ABLE TO ACCEPT THAT THE GVN SHOULD BE THE HEAD OF A SINGLE DELEGATION, WE DO NOT SEE HOW THIS WOULD PREVENT THE OTHER SIDE FROM MAKING PROPAGANDA CLAIMS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NLF WAS A "DELEGATION" AND THAT THEY WERE THEREFORE TWO DELEGATIONS. WE HAVE SAID TO THE GVN FROM THE BEGINNING OF OUR CONSULTATIONS THAT WE FULLY EXPECT SUCH PROPAGANDA CLAIMS TO BE MADE AND THAT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO REFUTE THEM AT THE TALKS. WE ARE, IN FACT, PREPARED TO REFUTE THEM AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TALKS AND AS OFTEN AS NECESSARY THEREAFTER, SO THAT VIETNAMESE AND WORLD OPINION WILL BE IN NO DOUBT WHATEVER ABOUT OUR POSITION.

6. RE PARA 9, EVEN IF WE COULD ACCEPT THE POSITION THAT EACH SIDE MUST BE HEADED BY SOMEONE, WE DO NOT SEE HOW WE CAN OBLIGE THE OTHER SIDE TO ACCEPT THAT VIEW. AS FAR AS THE POSITION OF THE GVN ON OUR SIDE IS CONCERNED, WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THEM AS "PRIMUS INTER PARES", I.E. AS THE PRINCIPAL SPOKESMAN ON ALL MATTERS WHICH ARE OF IMMEDIATE AND DIRECT CONCERN TO SOUTH VIETNAM. OUR DRAFT STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 11 WHICH REPRESENTS A FORMULATION VERY FAVORABLE TO THE GVN, SHOULD GIVE IT FULL SATISFACTION ON THIS POINT. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO DEFER TO THE GVN REPRESENTATIVES IN SUCH MATTERS AS SEATING, ENTRY INTO AND DEPARTURE FROM THE MEETING CHAMBER, ETC.

7. RE PARA 10, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN CONCERNED THAT PLACING US UNDER GVN LEADERSHIP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD DETRACT FROM OUR PRESTIGE. OUR INABILITY TO ACCEDE TO THE WISHES OF THE GVN IN THIS RESPECT COMES NOT FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF PRESTIGE, BUT FROM CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS. MOREOVER, AS INDICATED ABOVE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EVEN IF OUR SIDE WERE CONSTITUTED

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-3- SAIGON 42582, 131100Z NOV, (NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE/PLUS)

AS A SINGLE DELEGATION, ~~THIS WOULD FORCE THE OTHER SIDE TO CONSTITUTE THE DRV AS THE HEAD OF THEIR SIDE; THEY MIGHT VERY WELL CONSTITUTE THE NLF AS THE HEAD OF THEIR SIDE.~~ THAT IS WHY, IN LINE WITH OUR DISCUSSIONS FURING RECENT MONTHS, WE TAKE THE POSITION THAT THE OUR SIDE/YOUR SIDE FORMULA, WHICH LEAVES IT TO EACH SIDE TO CONSTITUTE ITSELF AS IT WISHES, IS THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH WE CAN MOVE TO THE SERIOUS AND DIRECT TALKS ON WHOSE DESIRABILITY THE GVN AND US ARE IN AGREEMENT.

8. RE PARAS 14 AND 15, ~~WE TRUST THE DEPARTMENT WILL COME UP WITH APPROPRIATE COMMENT.~~

9. RE PARA 18, WHILE THE GVN'S PARTICIPATION ON THE BASIS OF THE OUR SIDE/YOUR SIDE FORMULA IS A MATTER FOR SOVEREIGN DECISIONS BY THE GVN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS, ~~WE FIND IT NECESSARY TO RECALL THAT THE US ACTED IN COMPLETE GOOD FAITH IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON THIS MATTER WITH THE DRV, BELIEVING IT TO BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR MUTUAL CONSULTATIONS OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS.~~

10. FINALLY, RE PARA 19, ~~WE MIGHT SAY THAT WE URGE THE GVN TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEDURAL TALKS IN PARIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHETHER SUCH TALKS BE IN SECRET OR IN PUBLIC. THE US, HOWEVER, CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE CONSTITUTED AS THE GVN WISHES IT TO BE CONSTITUTED.~~

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~



SANITIZED

28d

Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

DE RUMJIR 42581 3181115
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 131100Z NOV 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4358
INFO RUFHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2879
STATE GRNC

ACTION COPY

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13 AM 6 42

BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42581

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-510

By js, NARA, Date 4-92

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF SAIGON 42501

1. [REDACTED] TOLD CALHOUN NOVEMBER 13 THAT HE HAD TALKED AT LENGTH THIS MORNING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THANH, SUBSEQUENT TO HERZ' TALK (SAIGON 42560 AND 42563). [REDACTED] WAS STILL WAITING TO SEE THIEU.

1.3(a)(3)

1.3(a)(3)

2. [REDACTED] FOUND THANH IN A VERY EMOTIONAL STATE, PARTICULARLY BROUGHT ON BY SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S PRESS CONFERENCE. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE US DID NOT SEEM PREPARED TO SAY ANYTHING HELPFUL PUBLICLY ABOUT THE MORTARING OF SVN CITIES AND VIOLATIONS OF THE DMZ, BUT WAS PREPARED TO ATTACK THE GVN PUBLICLY. THANH WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT WORKING OUT A MEANS FOR GVN PARTICIPATION IN THE PARIS TALKS. [REDACTED] MENTIONED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE US HAD PROPOSED CERTAIN PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN AN EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION, BUT THANH APPARENTLY EVADED THIS POINT AND ONLY CLAIMED THAT THE US HAD NOT GIVEN THEM A REPLY ON THEIR PUBLIC PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 8. HE INTIMATED THAT THE US WAS PUBLICLY TREADING LIGHTLY ON ACTS BY THE OTHER SIDE, BUT WAS CRITICIZING ITS ALLY.

1.3(a)(3)

1.3(a)(3)

3. [REDACTED] WAS AWARE THAT GVN HAD ITSELF ISSUED VARIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND CRITICISM BUT HE REITERATED IMPORTANCE OF "FACE" IN SEEKING A WAY OUT FOR GVN. HE SUGGESTED SPECIFICALLY THAT AT SUCH TIME AS A MORE FORMAL REPLY MIGHT BE MADE TO THE GVN ON ITS NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL, THIS FACT MIGHT BE MADE PUBLIC, TOGETHER WITH AN INDICATION THAT THESE MATTERS WERE, HOWEVER, BEING DISCUSSED PRIVATELY BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. HE ALSO THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR USG TO TAKE SOME PUBLIC ACCOUNT OF SUCH ACTIONS AS MORTARING OF POPULATED AREAS AND VIOLATIONS OF THE DMZ, SINCE THESE ACTIONS WERE CREATING STRONG FEELINGS AMONG VIETNAMESE AND APPEARED TO THEM TO INDICATE THAT THERE HAD INDEED BEEN NO UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THESE MATTERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING HALT.

1.3(a)(3)

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~~SECRET~~

-Z-SAIGON 42581, NOV 13, 1968, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

4. IN THE PRESENT MOOD OF GVN AND VIETNAMESE OPINION, I AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO TAKE SOME PUBLIC ACCOUNT, IN SYMPATHETIC TERMS, OF THE CONTINUED MORTARTING OF POPULATED AREAS AND THE FACT OF DMZ VIOLATIONS AND TO AVOID PUBLIC CRITICISMS OF THE GVN WHICH MAY ONLY BUILD UP ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING HERE AND MAKE RESOLUTION OF OUR CURRENT PROBLEMS MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT ALREADY IS.
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

(E)

28e /

1968 NOV 13 AM 7 03

03431Q

OO RUFNCR
DE RUMJ1R 42584 3181200
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131130Z NOV 68 ZFF-G
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4368
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2882
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42584

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

BUI DIEM CALLED ME THIS AFTERNOON TO SAY THAT HE HAD TALKED TO BOTH THIEU AND KY TODAY TO GIVE THEM HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THE SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES. HE WILL BE MAKING A SIMILAR REPORT TO A MEETING OF THE GVN SECURITY COUNCIL TOMORROW MORNING. WE HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO MEET LATER IN THE DAY AND I WILL REPORT WHAT HE HAS TO SAY. BUNKER.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7169 89-72

By ng/isp, NARA, Date 4-6-93

ACTION COPY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

(F)

28f 1

DE RUFNCR 23790/1 3181240
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131123Z NOV 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8053
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 120 NOV 13 AM 7 13
STATE GRNC
BT

ACTION COPY
03435 Q

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 23790

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

DELTO 951

FROM VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 772991-570

By rs/mp, NARA, Date 4-6-93

1. I MET WITH MINISTER OBEREMKO ON NOVEMBER 12 AT 1800 FOR ABOUT ONE-HALF HOUR. THE MEETING WAS HELD AT MY REQUEST. ALSO PRESENT WERE PERRY AND BOGOMOLOV.

2. I TOLD OBEREMKO THAT I WISHED TO BRING HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT UP-TO-DATE ON WHERE MATTERS NOW STOOD. I SAID THAT YESTERDAY (NOVEMBER 11) AFTER RECEIVING WORD OF THE ROCKET, MORTAR AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS ON THREE US POSITIONS SOUTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, I HAD ASKED LAU TO MEET WITH ME AT 6:00 O'CLOCK MONDAY NIGHT.

3. I SAID THAT LAU AND I HAD MET FOR OVER AN HOUR AND THAT I HAD TOLD LAU THAT WE CONSIDERED THE MATTER OF SUCH IMPORTANCE THAT WE NOT ONLY WERE BRINGING THE SITUATION TO HIS ATTENTION, BUT ALSO URGED THAT HE CALL TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S ATTENTION THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM. USING THE BRIEFING NOTES I HAD HAD FOR MY MEETING WITH LAU, I REPEATED TO OBERENKO MY ENTIRE OPENING STATEMENT TO LAU (SEE PARA 2 OF PARIS 23712). OBEREMKO TOOK FULL NOTES AS I WAS SPEAKING.

4. I TOLD OBEREMKO THAT LAU HAD TAKEN CAREFUL NOTES AND ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH I HAD ANSWERED, USING THE MAP WHICH I HAD PROVIDED LAU. I SHOWED A COPY OF THE MAP TO OBEREMKO AND GAVE HIM DETAILS ABOUT THE NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED IN EACH LOCATION. I ADDED THAT SINCE TALKING WITH LAU I HAD LEARNED THAT THE US CASUALTIES WERE FIVE KILLED AND 46 WOUNDED. I SAID THAT LAU HAD SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT THE MATTER BUT WOULD CHECK INTO WHAT I HAD TOLD HIM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 23790, SEC 1 OF 2, NOV 13, 1968, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

5. I SAID LAU THEN ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW ON THE QUESTION OF A WIDER MEETING. I SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW AND HAD REMINDED LAU THAT I HAD SAID TO HIM PREVIOUSLY THAT WHEN I HAD ANYTHING NEW I WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM.

6. I THEN SAID TO OBEREMKO THAT DURING THE COURSE OF MY TALKS WITH LAU THE SUBJECT OF RECONNAISSANCE HAD BEEN RAISED. LAU HAD SAID THAT THE US HAD BEEN CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER THE DMZ SINCE THE BOMBING CESSATION AND THAT HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT REGARDED THIS AS A VIOLATION OF OUR UNDERSTANDING. I SAID THAT I TOLD LAU THAT THE CONDUCTING OF RECONNAISSANCE WAS NOT A VIOLATION OF OUR UNDERSTANDING AND POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT WE HAD SAID WE WOULD STOP ALL BOMBARDMENTS AND "ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV." I SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD CARRIED OUT EXACTLY WHAT IT HAD SAID IT WOULD DO. I SAID THAT I TOLD LAU THAT THE WORDS "OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE, ETC.," HAD BEEN CHOSEN WITH PRECISION AND THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE HAD ACCEPTED THAT LANGUAGE. I SAID I TOLD LAU THAT RECONNAISSANCE WAS NOT "AN ACT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE" AND NOTED THAT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS UP TO THIS POINT HAD BEEN UNARMED.

HARRINAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

00 RUMJIR
DE RUFNCR 23790/2 3181145
ZNY SSSSS ZZK
O 131123Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8054
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 2016
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2 PARIS 23790/2

1968 NOV 13 AM 7 27

034410

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

7. I SAID TO OBEREMKO THAT OF COURSE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE KNEW VERY WELL THAT WE HAD NOT ACCEPTED THEIR WORDS BUT HAD SUBSTITUTED OUR OWN (ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE) TO WHICH THE DRV HAD AGREED. I SAID THAT I HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE DRV UNDERSTOOD CLEARLY WHAT OUR WORDS MEANT, NAMELY: THAT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WOULD CONTINUE. THE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS HE CONTINUED AND THE DRV HAS FIRED ON OUR RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WHICH, UP TO THIS POINT, AS I HAVE SAID, HAVE BEEN UNARMED.

8. I SAID THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO FLY RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT IN THE DRV'S MIND OR ANYONE ELSE'S MIND ABOUT THIS. I SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVT WAS REALISTIC AND WOULD UNDERSTAND WHY RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WERE NECESSARY. I SAID INDEED THE VERY ATTACKS OF NOVEMBER 10 SHOWED WHY THE US HAD TO CONTINUE RECONNAISSANCE.

9. I SAID FINALLY I WISHED TO POINT OUT TO OBEREMKO THAT OUR PLANES WOULD DEFEND THEMSELVES IF THE FIRING AGAINST THEM CONTINUED--THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO A SERIOUS AND DANGEROUS SITUATION WHICH I WAS SURE NONE OF US WANTED.

10. MR. OBEREMKO ASKED WHAT THE RESPONSE OF LAU HAD BEEN TO MY STATEMENTS. I SAID THAT LAU HAD SAID THAT THE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WERE A VIOLATION OF DRV SOVEREIGNTY AND THUS AN ACT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE. I SAID TO OBEREMKO THAT I TOLD LAU THAT THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY WAS NEVER RAISED IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DRV AND THAT THE FLYING OF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN ACT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE. I SAID THAT LAU HAD URGED US TO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 23790 FINAL SEC OF 2, NOV 13, 1968, NODIS/HARVAN/DBLE PLUS

RECONSIDER THE FLYING OF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND THAT I HAD STATED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO FLY RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT AND THAT SUCH ACTS DID NOT CONSTITUTE ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV.

11. OBEREMKO SAID HE WOULD REPORT CAREFULLY WHAT I HAD SAID TO HIM TO HIS AMBASSADOR AND TO HIS GOVT. OBEREMKO ADDED HE WOULD BE HAPPY IF HE COULD REPORT ALSO THAT THE WIDER MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE, BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE COMPLEXITIES. I REPLIED THAT THAT WAS TRUE AND THERE WAS NOTHING NEW ON THAT SUBJECT.

12. OBEREMKO THEN ASKED WHAT WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF THREE-SIDED TALKS. HE SAID HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS REALISTIC. I SAID THAT AS HE KNEW VERY WELL OUR POSITION ALWAYS HAD BEEN AND REMAINED "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE," AND NOT FOUR PARTIES, FOUR SIDES OR FOUR DELEGATIONS.

13. OBEREMKO SAID THAT HE WOULD BE LEAVING WITHIN A FEW DAYS FOR A MONTH'S VACATION IN MOSCOW AND THAT HE WOULD BE FOLLOWING THE SITUATION FROM MOSCOW AND HOPING FOR FURTHER PROGRESS BEFORE HIS RETURN. OBEREMKO SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS TO GET WIDER TALKS STARTED AND TO KEEP THE INTERVAL FROM BEING TOO LONG.

14. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT I HAD RAISED TWO VERY SERIOUS MATTERS AND HAD DISCUSSED THEM FULLY AND FRANKLY BECAUSE THEY COULD JEOPARDIZE THE FUTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. I SAID WE FELT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE FULLY AND PROMPTLY INFORMED. OBEREMKO SAID HE WOULD PROMPTLY CONVEY TO HIS GOVERNMENT WHAT I SAID. HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

[REDACTED]

29
1

9:50 AM

INFORMATION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

(3)

Wednesday, November 13, 1968
8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

1.3
(a)(5)

The two attached documents [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] indicate Hanoi's
problem with Saigon's show of independence.

W. Rostow Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-514
By [Signature], NARA, Date 6-8-93

~~TOP SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

(21) W19
29a

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEHCR
DE RUDKSO 7319 3171545
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121540Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2112
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ OSLO 7319

3256Q
1968 NOV 12 PM 3 53

(in Pelamy)

NODIS/OHIO

1. FONOFF NOVEMBER 12 PROVIDED COPY OF CABLE FROM ALGARD SENT NOV 8: QUOTE NORTH-VIETNAMESE QUARTERS HERE HAVE GIVEN VOICE TO SUSPICION THAT SAIGON'S ATTITUDE PROVES ITS COLLUSION WITH US TO STRENGTHEN SAIGON GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS. AT SAME TIME, THEY PLAINLY HOPE THAT, IF THIS IS NOT THE CASE, THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE POSSIBILITIES FOR ISOLATING SAIGON.
2. NGO IS STILL IN HANOI, UNCERTAIN WHEN HE WILL RETURN TO PEKING. HE IS TAKING PART IN A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW POLITICAL SITUATION.
3. UP TO NOW THERE HAS BEEN NO OFFICIAL CHINESE POSITION ON THE NEW SITUATION. THE PAPERS SO FAR HAVE REPRINTED JOHNSON'S AND HO'S STATEMENTS WITHOUT COMMENT. END QUOTE. GP-1. TIBBETTS.
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 7, NARA, Date 2-11-98

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

30

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Pres file

Wednesday, November 13, 1968
8:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

It looks as though we've found a really good bottleneck in the Laos truck route and are really hurting the enemy.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ly, NARA, Date 2-1-98

0 120100Z ZYH ZFF-1 700-4

FM AFSSO 7AF No Objection To FOIA-3/PL 86-36 2006/01/11 : NLJ-141-023-5-2-6

TO SSO MACV (PASS TO GEN A RAMS)

INFO SSO CINCPAC

AFSSO PACAF

AFSSO USAF

AFSSO SAC

AFSSO TAC

AFSSO [redacted]

AFSSO 13AF

AFSSO NKP

25x1 [redacted]

SSO DIA

DIRNSA

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ GAVIN DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

SUBJECT: BAN LABOY FORD

1. ~~HEAVY FIGHTER AND CONCENTRATED B-52 STRIKES~~ HAVE ~~ONCE AGAIN SUCCEEDED IN CLOSING THE BAN LABOY FORD COMPLEX TO ENEMY TRUCK TRAFFIC.~~ THIS HAS RECENTLY BEEN CONFIRMED IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT SIGINT INTERCEPTS OF ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS WHICH REFLECT THE DIFFICULTIES BEING INFLICTED UPON THE ENEMY. THE BAN LABOY FORD WAS CLOSED TO ALL THROUGH TRAFFIC FROM NVN ON 1 OCTOBER. THE FORD CROSSING REMAINED CLOSED UNTIL THE NIGHT OF 2 NOVEMBER WHEN THE ENEMY FINALLY SUCCEEDED IN TEMPORARILY OPENING HIS PRINCIPAL LAND ROUTE INTO SOUTHERN LAOS. WITH THE CESSATION OF BOMBING OPERATIONS IN NVN THE ENEMY QUICKLY REPAIRED HIS ACCESS ROUTES TO THE MUGIA AND BAN KARAI PASSES. ~~ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS MADE EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TO OPEN UP THE ACCESSSES TO HIS LAOTIAN ROUTE STRUCTURES, AN INCREASING WEIGHT OF AIR EFFORT AT BAN LABOY AND AT BAN PHA NOP, JUST SOUTH OF MUGIA PASS, APPEAR TO BE CONTAINING THE ENEMY'S DESPERATE EFFORTS TO BRING IN TRUCKBORNE SUPPLIES TO HIS BELEAGUERED FORCES NOW SEEKING SANCTUARY IN SOUTHERN LAOS AND NORTHERN CAMBODIA.~~ THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE INTERCEPT

[redacted] 25x3 ON 9 NOVEMBER REFLECTS THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ENEMY'S DIFFICULTIES BEING EXPERIENCED AT THE BAN LABOY FORD COMPLEX.

QUOTE: PRESENTLY, THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF EQUIPMENT... THE ENEMY WAS CONTINUALLY ACTIVE DURING THE DAY AND NIGHT. THE ENEMY STRUCK ELEVEN TIMES; TOOK PICTURES THREE TIMES, AND OV-1'S RECONNOITERED CONTINUOUSLY; DURING EACH BATTLE, THE ENEMY DROPPED DELAYED ACTION CLUSTER BOMBS. THE FIRST BATTLE TOOK PLACE FROM 0100G TO 0200G, THIS WAS NOT THE FINISH AS THE ENEMY STRUCK CONTINUOUSLY IN DIFFERENT BATTLES... TROOPS WERE SENT OUT TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE ROAD, BUT THEY ENCOUNTERED MANY DIFFICULTIES. DURING HALF THE MORNING, TROOPS WERE SENT OUT ON THE ROAD. THEY WERE DETERMINED TO HAVE THE ROAD PASSABLE BY 1600G. BUT AT 1200G, THE ENEMY STRUCK AND DESTROYED ~~SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS OF ROAD.~~ IN THE ~~DIRECTION OF~~ THE NORTH FORD AND TALE (RIVER AT BAN LABOY FORD), 500 CUBIC METERS OF EARCH CAVED IN. WE WERE DETERMINED TO ~~HAVE THE ROAD PASSABLE BY 1600G, BUT AT 1500G, SEVEN F-4'S DROPPED ENORMOUS QUANTITIES OF BOMBS DOWN ON THE ROAD, KILLING AND WOUNDING SEVERAL ENEMY TROOPS.~~ ~~THREE COMRADES WERE KILLED, AND FIVE OTHERS WERE WOUNDING. THE ENEMY AGAIN STRUCK, DROPPING SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS OF ROAD. ONE COMRADE WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDING.~~

SANTITIZED
Authority NLJ-141-023-005/2
By JC, NARA, Date 11-5-09

~~CODE METERS OF ERROR CAVED IN. WE WERE DETERMINED TO HAVE THE ROAD BLOCKED BY ENEMY AT 1500Z. STEVE F-105S DROPPED ENORMOUS QUANTITIES OF BOMBS DOWN ON THE ROAD. SEVERAL TWO COMRADES WERE KILLED; THREE COMRADES WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, AND FIVE COMRADES LOST THEIR HEARING. THE ENEMY AGAIN STRUCK, DROPPING DELTA ACTION BOMBS PER BOMBS. ONE COMRADE WAS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED.~~

2. ANOTHER INTERCEPTED MESSAGE LATER ON THE SAME DATE INDICATED THAT AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL WERE KILLED AND OTHERS QUOTE SUFFERING FROM CONCUSSIONS. UNQUOTE. THE MESSAGE ALSO ALLUDED TO THE DETERIORATING HEALTH OF PERSONNEL, SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE ROAD, NEED FOR MORE BULLDOZERS AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT TWO ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS WERE COMING INTO THE AREA, POSSIBLY TO ASSIST THE TWO ENGINEERING BATTALIONS NOW ATTEMPTING TO OPEN THE DAN BAZOM ROAD ON AN URGENT BASIS.

3. AIRCRAFT STRIKES ARE NOW BEING CONCENTRATED AGAINST THE ABOVE COMPLEX ON A DAILY BASIS. ANYWHERE FROM SIXTY TO OVER ONE HUNDRED FIGHTER STRIKES PER DAY ARE BEING SCHEDULED FOR CONTINUOUS AROUND THE CLOCK RADAR AND VISUAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE COMPLEX. JUDGING FROM THE SHARP REDUCTION IN SENSOR DETECTED TRAFFIC WITHIN LAOS SINCE THE INTENSIFICATION OF THESE STRIKES, IT APPEARS THAT THE INTERDICTION STRATEGY CURRENTLY APPLIED WITH SUCH EFFECTIVENESS IN ROUTE PACKS SEEMING TO PAY OFF IN SOUTHERN LAOS.

I (the Parkville of West Vietnam)

4. A 9 NOVEMBER INTERCEPT RECEIVED BY 7AF ON 11 NOVEMBER AT 0001Z INDICATES THAT THE ENEMY INTENDS TO DEPEND ON LAOS HEAVILY. THE 3RD AAA BATTALION AT DAN BAZOM INSTRUCTED ITS PERSONNEL TO: QUOTE-GREET THE ARTILLERY CONVOY... AND LOOK FOR PLACES TO HIDE THE ARTILLERY VEHICLES AND ALSO SEARCH FOR PLACES TO HIDE THE ARTILLERY VEHICLES ARRIVING LATER TO SAFELY AWAIT NEW ORDERS. UNQUOTE.

— where were they when the C 130 were not permitted in country?

5. IF MEASURES CAN BE FOUND TO SPEED UP THE FLOW OF INTERCEPTED MESSAGES SUCH AS THE ABOVE, SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN THE TIMING OF INTERDICTION AND COUNTERSETTING OF 7AF STRIKES IN SOUTHERN LAOS MAY BE POSSIBLE.

6. THE CONTINUED IMPEDANCE OF ENEMY TRAFFIC IN LAOS COULD HAVE A CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON THE ENEMY'S ABILITY TO REINTRODUCE FORCES INTO I AND II CORPS DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. IT COULD ALSO HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PORTHOPIA COMMANDO HUNT-IGLOO WHITE CAMPAIGN IS CONDUCTED AND EVALUATED WITH FEW MOVING TRUCKS LEFT TO LOCATE AND WITH A SIGNIFICANT SAFFLE IN WEIGHT OF EFFORT AGAINST THE ENEMY'S CHOK POINTS AND TRUCK PARK SYSTEMS. ACCORDINGLY, THE FINAL MEASURE OF COMMANDO HUNT-IGLOO WHITE EFFECTIVENESS MAY CENTER ON ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE IMPEDANCE OF TRAFFIC FLOW RATHER THAN THE KILLING OF ENEMY PERSONNEL. IF TRAFFIC THROUGH LAOS CAN BE BLOCKED SUCCESSFULLY IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE OR NECESSARY TO TEST THE EFFICACY OF IGLOO WHITE IN SUPPORT OF TRUCK KILLING OPERATION.

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

31
INFORMATION

Wednesday, November 13, 1968 -- 7:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to specific references in Mrs. Johnson's diary that you might wish to link to important phases in making decisions.

As I noted last night, the process of making decisions sometimes took place over a considerable period of time. We now have materials assembled on most of the key decisions. If you were to let Brem Smith have the diary passages that you wanted run down, we could relate them to particular moments in the various decision crises.

I suggest this method because the materials on these decisions run to a number of volumes and it would, perhaps, be easier to do it that way than to dump these volumes on someone working on Mrs. Johnson's diary.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, November 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Rescheduling the Eshkol Visit

h. simp
2. Pres file

As you know, the doctors have ordered Eshkol not to travel this month.

As I understand it, you have said you would prefer not to have him before Christmas and would rather work something out at the Ranch after Christmas.

My immediate operational need is to amend the letter you sent to Eshkol Monday. Barbour, on learning of the change in plans, held it up in case we wished to make some changes. I therefore wish to clear with you the following new sentence on the visit:

"I regret that circumstances require deferring your planned visit to the United States and hope that it can be rescheduled next month. You will be welcome not only as a distinguished and esteemed colleague but as a close personal friend."

This is the main substantive change because it commits you to a visit "next month." Others (see attached) would simply eliminate references to a meeting later this month.

Lela's forget visit

W. W. Rostow

Approve change _____
Disapprove _____
Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 77C 884-168

By ag/ics, NARA, Date 4-15-93

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy TEL AVIV

STATE

NODIS

1. You should deliver this as a personal message from the President to Prime Minister Eshkol:

2. QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As I enter the closing days of my Administration, I wish
[I am writing to you, first, to welcome the prospect of your visit here later this month, - and secondly] to raise with you again a subject that, *I consider* [has become] of *major* [increasing] importance [to me as I enter the closing days of my Administration]

As I look back over my five years in office, I find that one endeavor overshadows all those that have called upon my time and energy. This has been the search for peace. Central to it has been our effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has assumed a special responsibility for this endeavor. It is at the heart not only of my own nation's security interests but also of the security of every nation in the world. As you know I am personally deeply committed to this task.

NEA/IAI: *1.0* MSterner: cr: 11/3/63 4523

NEA - Parker T. Hart

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

NEA - Mr. Davies

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ-0193-42-2-15
By LLX NAR, Date 12-08-2017

2

TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~

You are aware of ~~my~~ ^{was} deep concern on this subject expressed to you personally as long ago as ~~May~~ ^{June 1964.} 1965. Since then there has been no slackening of the arms race in the Near East, and the weapons introduced into the area have grown increasingly sophisticated. It would be a tragedy--an irreversible tragedy--if this arms race extended into the field of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Secretary Rusk emphasized these points last month to Foreign Minister Eban when he stressed the United States' concern that Israel's continued delay in signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will have the effect of increasing, rather than reducing, pressures for other area states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

We have carefully studied your Government's paper handed to Ambassador Barbour on October 28. We welcome the reaffirmation of your Government's assurances that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. It is our strong conviction, however, that with a Non-Proliferation Treaty now in existence, only Israel's ~~adherence~~ adherence to that Treaty can give the world confidence that Israel does not intend to develop nuclear weapons.

I therefore welcome the statement in your Government's paper that you are engaged in intensive study of the implications of signing the Treaty. It is my earnest hope that this study will result in a decision to sign the Treaty at an early date. Israel's failure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be a severe blow to my Government's

PRESERVATION COPY

3

TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~

global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States would also be deeply troubled if operational strategic missiles were to appear in the Near East. I hope you can give me an encouraging response on these matters, [when we talk later this month].

I regret that circumstances require deferring your planned visit to the United States but hope that it can be rescheduled next month. You will be an undistinguished and esteemed colleague but as a close personal friend.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

END QUOTE

GP-3

END

~~SECRET~~
PRESERVATION COPY