

INFORMATION

Tuesday, November 12, 1968
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, a copy of
Clark Clifford's press conference today.

W. W. Rostow

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NEWS CONFERENCE

OF

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CLARK M. CLIFFORD

at

Pentagon

11:30 A. M. (EST)

Tuesday, November 12, 1968

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SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

I do not have any announcements to make, but I have had a feeling these past few days that there has been so much going on that these events could possibly lead to a number of questions in the minds of you men and women, so I thought that this would be an appropriate opportunity to see if I might be of some assistance in attempting to answer your questions.

I am now ready. I think I'll start over here and come across this way, and perhaps have some order in it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in the terms in which the President stated our bombing halt, do you think that the Demilitarized Zone is being abused?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Yes. The understanding, which of course, was of a general nature, in Paris, was that the DMZ would not be violated because we felt we could not go on with the talks which we hoped at that time would start promptly, if the DMZ were violated.

Now, there have been violations of the DMZ. The bombing stopped on the morning of November 1st. There were no violations, that is, provable violations, of the DMZ until Saturday, the 9th of November, and as far as we know there have been no violations of the DMZ since Saturday the 9th; that is, provable violations.

So the question is whether the violations as of that particular day should constitute a basis on which serious consideration should be given to changing our attitude.

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One, the attacks on Saturday, where there was some artillery firing and some rockets that came from the southern half of the DMZ. General Abrams has kept us very closely informed. He retaliated immediately upon the artillery fire and the rocket firing, and has kept us informed.

Even though it constitutes a violation of the general understanding, General Abrams has indicated that he does not believe that it has brought his men under substantial additional jeopardy, so that no action has been taken in this regard other than notifying Ambassadors Harriman and Vance so that they would be fully informed.

QUESTION: Are there any policy changes then stemming from this at all?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: When you say stemming from this, do you mean stemming from the Saturday evening violation of the DMZ?

QUESTION: Has that changed our attitude, our policy?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: It has not changed our policy. We will continue to watch it carefully. If it proves to be an isolated instance, that is one facet. If it should prove to be the beginning of a pattern, that would be something entirely different.

Also, we are depending to a great extent upon General Abrams' judgment in this regard.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you give us any ideas as to how close you might be to achieving the approximately \$3 billion savings that are required, and if any other actions are imminent?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: We have been making steady progress on what we call our Program 693. We are not entirely through with it. I believe that in a few more days, or just a very few weeks at most, I will have an announcement in that regard. But let me suggest to you that we are continuing to make excellent progress on the program.

QUESTION: Some time ago you indicated that the United States could not long continue to maintain the large expenditure and the involvement of troops in support of NATO, the \$2.6 billion that we are spending on the 300,000 troops. Is there any plan that you may present in Brussels this week that would indicate any reduction of our forces in Europe or the need to reduce those forces?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: The NATO meeting this week, I believe, will be one of unusual importance. It's been advanced from its regular December date. It will be attended by Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and, in some instances, the Finance Ministers from the NATO countries.

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The major purpose of having the meeting now is to consider the impact of the Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia upon NATO, what lessons we should draw therefrom, what steps we should take. This will be discussed in considerable detail.

We will be particularly interested, as a NATO member, in ascertaining what the other NATO countries -- that is, the European members of NATO -- are going to do in this regard. Depending to considerable extent upon what they tell us are their plans, we would also have some plans that we think could add to the strengthening of NATO.

We have no present intention of either increasing our armed forces in NATO or decreasing them. I think as time goes on there will continue to be a tightening process that we can find from studies that are being made as to how we could possibly conduct our efforts there more economically, but we do not contemplate cutting down our forces.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in view of the election and your conferences with the President-elect, would you serve in a Republican cabinet and have you been asked to serve in a Republican cabinet?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Well, I have been a Democrat, now in December it will be 62 years, and I think the likelihood of being asked is so remote as not to warrant comment. I not only have not been asked, but at the meeting yesterday, I advised Mr. Nixon that I thought he should appoint his new Secretary of Defense as promptly as possible so that we could start him on a period of orientation.

I suggested to him if he could get him appointed by the middle of December, it would be very valuable because we could give him a month of preparation that I think is necessary because of the presence of the war. If he could come in and attend our staff meetings, meet with me and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, meet with the Service Secretaries, it could be the most valuable month that he had.

Mr. Nixon thanked me for the suggestion that I had made and said that he was giving the most careful consideration to the selection of the new Secretary of Defense.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there has been some talk that it is going to be very difficult to hold the fiscal 1970 expense budget under \$90 billion. Can you tell us anything about what that looks like at this time?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I cannot make any specific comments. We are giving a great deal of time right now to the 1970 budget. We have a number of factors to take into consideration.

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We have new programs that we must decide upon. We have to make some calculated assumptions regarding the war in Vietnam. Until the time comes that I have an announcement to make in that regard, it would be unwise to get into details.

QUESTION: Sir, can you shed any light on what Mr. McNamara is doing in Moscow?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: No. I know only that he was there and had a talk with Kosygin. I have not received the report of any details as yet.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there have been reports of shellings of about 30 provincial and district capitals in South Vietnam since the bombing halt. Do you regard this as any violation of the Paris understanding?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: This, again, is considered to be a matter of seriousness by this Government. Again, this item was one of those in which there was a general area of understanding. We did not get down, nor was it considered appropriate to get down, into the specific details of which cities and which towns or which capitals.

Keep in mind that the war is still going on in South Vietnam. General Abrams is following his instructions. He is maintaining constant and intensive pressure upon enemy forces. There has been no contrary instruction. I think that the enemy fights back, as we had anticipated they would. The President said in his message of the 31st of October that he expected hard fighting ahead. I think that we must anticipate this.

Again, to a great extent, we have to depend upon General Abrams' reaction as to whether or not he considers this to be the kind of action that has a sufficient effect upon the military posture in South Vietnam to warrant our concern.

Keep in mind this point: our effort in Paris, our effort in South Vietnam, our effort in Saigon, is to try to find the means of bringing this war to an end, so that we are anxious to get on with the talks. From my standpoint in advising the President, I am willing to proceed with these efforts to get the talks started, and not conclude that these violations are sufficient to warrant stopping all that has gone on until a pattern emerges.

If a pattern should emerge that would appear that they are disregarding the kind of understanding, then we would have to face up to it. But as long as the present situation is on and the war is going on, and we are maintaining the intensive pressure, I think we must expect that there will be shellings, and rocketing, from the enemy, and I do not at this point believe it constitutes the kind of activity on their part that should cause us to stop our efforts, because we have just so many alternatives.

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If we were to contend today that the violations are such that we must not go on with our efforts in the talks, then we either can go back to where we were with the bombings, and no hope of talks; we could try to find some other method that has taken us so long to find. I want to go down this road as far as we can go.

I want to get on with the talks. They constitute the best possibility for peace in Vietnam. Hanoi has said from the very beginning: "We are not going to get into substantive talks unless the bombing stops in North Vietnam."

I was in favor of stopping the bombing. I am in favor now of not starting the bombing, because I think the talks can still be productive.

QUESTION: During previous halts at bombing they have taken advantage of it, and we have been shown pictures of many truck convoys coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other places. What's the level of movement southward now as compared to the other periods?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I would say that the level of movement now would be considered normal. Keep in mind also that the weather over North Vietnam now is quite bad. The monsoon season is there. Bombing days are very rare. They are moving material and men down other roads, and we are continuing our efforts to see that as little of that material as possible reaches the men.

General Abrams continues to take the position, as he did with the President, that the present bombing halt is not increasing the jeopardy of our men and is not increasing the military risk that we are taking.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the last time we met, I believe, before the bombing halt, you said that the so-called lull might indicate that they were building up for a fourth offensive this year.

There have been reports of concentrations near Cambodia not far from Saigon. If a new round starts, how will this affect our attitude on the talks?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I believe that to a great extent the answer to that is the degree. I mentioned, I think maybe here, that the withdrawal after this last so-called third offensive has been greater in the number of troops and greater in the extent of the withdrawal.

We know that some regiments were withdrawn back into North Vietnam. A number of others were withdrawn into Laos and Cambodia at a rather more substantial distance than before.

You will note that the threat in I Corps was reduced to the point where General Abrams moved the First Air Cavalry Division out of northern I Corps down into III Corps. So that's what was his evaluation of how substantially the threat had diminished around the DMZ, and in I Corps.

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Now, there have been indications that there have been substantial number of troops located in Cambodia, opposite the III Corps. You may have noted also that there is a good deal of aerial activity in the III Corps in South Vietnam.

Now, in the event that some third or fourth offensive is started, we will have to take that into consideration regarding whether or not that falls within the general framework of the understanding that we had with Hanoi in the Paris talks, keeping in mind, however, as I have said before, that the fighting has not stopped; that the President said he anticipated there would be hard fighting before, and in view of that he is maintaining the most intense kind of military pressure.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the shelling of these towns might not have very much consequence militarily from General Abrams' point of view, but from the point of view of the South Vietnamese I wonder if this wouldn't perhaps make it more difficult for them to come to the Paris talks and get this thing moving.

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I do not think so. I haven't looked at the figures, but I am not conscious that since the bombing cessation in the North that there has been any increase of shelling in the South.

I am not conscious of that. I don't know the figures. But this kind of shelling in the South went on and had been going on for some time. I don't know just what significance to attach to it, but the larger urban centers have not been under fire since November 1. Smaller centers, many of which have military operations within them or close there by, have been subject to different kinds of shelling for a long time.

Mrs. McClendon?

QUESTION: Sir, would you speak to the charges made by several writers that the Administration knew, before they made the bombing halt and the announcement of the agreement on the 31st, that the South Vietnamese Government would not go along with the talks in Paris, and also would you speak to whether you think the South Vietnamese Government has been dealt very brusquely with by our diplomats.

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SECRETARY CLIFFORD: We started the talks with Hanoi in May. Those talks have gone on and went on for some 5-1/2 months. All during that time, Ambassador Bunker was kept fully informed of all developments in Paris. He, in turn, kept President Thieu fully informed.

As we went through that 5-1/2 months, President Thieu was kept informed all the way through of every development. He knew what our goal was. He knew that we were working for a kind of an arrangement that would enable us to get on with the talks.

Now keep in mind that during this period it was the Government in Saigon that was insisting on every occasion that they had to be present at the conference table in Paris, and we took that position with Hanoi. Hanoi had said consistently for 5-1/2 months they were not going to permit the imperialist puppets to be present at the conference table in Paris.

This was one of the major reasons for the deadlock. So the reason we continued to insist on that so firmly and unequivocally with Hanoi was that Saigon was demanding that we do so. We thought it proper. We thought that they should be at the table.

Now, also, in addition to that, Saigon was kept fully posted on what the other arrangements were that we were working toward; that is, some understanding about the DMZ; an understanding with reference to the cities. We went through long talks having to do with reconnaissance. They were kept fully informed. And Thieu came along and Ky came along on all these talks. They understood every single question that had come up. They agreed with us when we got to the middle of October that there had been a breakthrough when Hanoi sent us the message through their negotiators in Paris and asked us the question: "If we, Hanoi, were to agree to the presence of the Saigon Government, could this constitute real progress in the talks?"

We said at once, "Yes, it could constitute real progress in the talks, but it isn't everything. For the talks to go on, we have to have this kind of understanding about the cities and about the DMZ."

So we kept Thieu fully informed, and it got down to the point where even a joint announcement or a communique was prepared that stated what the arrangement was that we were to have. All it left blank was the date that the bombing was to stop, and the date that the conference was to be held, at which the Saigon Government was to be present.

It even got down to the point where, in the communique that had been agreed on, they asked that in the Saigon version that the government, the GVN, be mentioned first and the United States be mentioned second.

All through this period, it was clearly known and understood beyond any question whatsoever that the NLF would accompany the government in Hanoi to the conference table, and it was known that the Saigon Government would accompany the United States.

Now, when finally Abrams came back, that was on the early morning of Tuesday, October the 29th, and we spent some three hours with him, and he said not only did he feel there was an acceptable military risk in stopping the bombing and going on, he said, "Mr. President, I recommend this course of action." The Joint Chiefs had recommended it, all of which also have been imparted to Mr. Thieu and his senior advisers.

Then all that we had to do on that Tuesday was to fill in on this agreed upon communique to be released in the name of President Johnson and President Thieu -- all we had to do was to fill in the date of the cessation of the bombing and the date of the first talk.

We broke up that morning meeting on Tuesday morning with the sure knowledge -- I did -- that finally we had arrived at the end of this journey that had taken some 5-1/2 months, and we were all to go to bed and get some rest, and then the President was going on the air that night, Tuesday night, the 29th of October and make his speech and announce that he was stopping the bombing that night, because that was the date, and that he was going to meet with the other side and with the GVN in Paris on Saturday, the 2nd of November.

Later that day we were working on the speech we got the first word from Thieu that he couldn't go along with the arrangement. It's the arrangement that had been agreed on for weeks, that we had been working on. And also, and this is most interesting, the only reason that Thieu gave that he couldn't go along with this deal was because he said he didn't have time to get his delegation to Paris by Saturday, November 2nd. That was the only reason he gave.

*Mr. Clifford was referring to plans for U. S. Government participation in Paris talks. This was not meant to be a reference to participation by the President.

So we have to then consider -- well, should we extend the date? Should we try? Well, talk again. Sure, they can get there by the 2nd. So cables have to go back and forth again.

Then the next day, Wednesday, which would be the 30th, that one reason which had been time only, had expanded into some four or five reasons, every one of which would cause very substantial delay in the Saigon Government getting to Paris.

For instance, they said, "Well, we have a lot of procedural questions that have to be ironed out beforehand." That hadn't been brought up before. "Also, this problem about whether or not Hanoi will talk independently to us. That's got to be worked out first. Also, we have decided we must bring back our Ambassador in Paris and talk to him." That hadn't been mentioned before. That obviously would take quite a lot of time.

So here came a whole new set of concerns and objections, every one of which would consume a substantial amount of time.

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Then talks are held by Bunker and Thieu on Wednesday. Then we go over to Thursday, when was the 31st of October. Now the President has a very tough problem at this time. He had a deal with Hanoi in Paris. He had worked on it for six months. He had finally said, "Right, we've now got it to the point where I can accept it." He was committed. I felt that he was committed, and he felt that he had to go ahead on his commitment.

So on Thursday we informed the government in Saigon that the President had this commitment and that he was going ahead and announce that night that he was stopping the bombing the next morning, Friday, November 1st, and that the talks would take place on the 6th of November, which would give them plenty of time to meet their first objection.

He was still hopeful that on that day, Thursday, that we'd still get word -- we kept the sentence open as to how we would treat the GVN. In the earlier draft of the speech, we had that the meeting would take place on such-and-such a date and that the GVN would be present. Well, we had to wait.

Finally, toward the afternoon when the tape had to be cut, we said to change it; that the GVN would be free to be present. There was still hope that we would hear from them on Thursday that they would. Then there was still hope that these problems that had been brought up at the last minute would be ironed out by the 6th of November, so that they could participate in the meeting. But by the time the 6th of November came, they said no, they could not participate.

Now here is the position the President was in on Thursday -- and I might say I feel it strongly because I see what he had to go through. He worked through 5-1/2 months to reach an agreement that he thought could be a major step toward peace, and then in the last out of the 9th inning, why suddenly they say "No, we can't go along."

I think the President felt, (A), he had to proceed with his plan. He was committed. He had made the commitment to Hanoi. Vance and Harriman had put their word on the line, and I think he felt he had to go ahead.

In addition to that, after all that we have done in that country, after the enormous contribution that's been made, with the knowledge that we had gotten to the point where we had the sort of agreement that we had been working toward, I believe the President was absolutely right in not giving Saigon a veto on the plan.

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I do not believe that you can work along with your partner up to the very last instant, with the understanding full and complete as to what the arrangement is, and then suddenly have Saigon change its mind and decide not to go ahead.

I think the President owed it, under his constitutional duty, I think he owed it to the American people to proceed with the talks.

Now, I say that I believe we should make every reasonable effort to demonstrate to Saigon why it should come in and join the talks. At the same time, if they choose not to, I believe the President has the constitutional responsibility of proceeding with the talks.

There are a great many subjects that can be covered between the United States and Hanoi of a military nature and that's our real function. We have been there as a military shield for South Vietnam. I have not anticipated that we would get into the political settlement of South Vietnam. That is up to South Vietnam and Hanoi.

But we can work out arrangements with Hanoi in Paris that could be very valuable. We could work out steps that could lead to a diminution in the level of the combat, which we all desire very much.

I would like to see our casualties go down. I believe we can work out arrangements in that regard. I believe that we can sit down with Hanoi and begin to work out programs that would call for the withdrawal, both of North Vietnamese forces and of American forces.

So the President has all this in his mind when he has to make that decision on Thursday. I say to you that I felt that he acted with courage and he acted with forthrightness, and I don't know when I have ever been as proud of a President as I was of President Johnson on Thursday when he had to face up to this question with all the political implications and pressures that were bearing on him.

Mind you, he did not pick the day to announce this. This had been brought about by the decision on the part of Hanoi that they now felt that there should be a break and that we ought to get on with it.

When the offer was made and the offer was accepted, it was up to the President to proceed with it because the opportunity of ending the war was of infinitely greater importance than any possible political consideration.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you think that there should have been

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a notification of Mr. Nixon with regard to this great problem that they were having with South Vietnam, or do you think that was kind of glided over in the conversations the President had with Nixon and the other candidates at that stage?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Well, I happened to be there in the President's office when President Johnson talked to candidates Nixon, Humphrey and Wallace. It was a talk that came through the open box so that we could hear not only what the President said but we could hear what the other side said.

Secretary Rusk was there. General Wheeler was there. Mr. Rostow was there, and I was there. We had just been through the matter with the President. We then went into his office and he talked to the three candidates. He told the three candidates at that time, as clearly as I am telling you now, this story.

Shorter. I went a little too long on it, I guess. He shortened it a good deal but he gave them the salient facts. He told them that up until Tuesday morning that Saigon had been right with us. He told them at that time that they had raised objections and that we were in contact with them, that they were not at time aboard, as I remember the quote, but that we still hoped that by the 6th of November they would be.

They were informed at that time specifically by the President that we had run into this snag by Saigon.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if you had to do it over again, do you think there would be any validity in the suggestion that has been offered that for terms of American unity, that the announcement of the bombing halt should have been made after the election so it would not have had an impact right in the closing days of the election? What would have been lost?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: You asked me for my opinion on it. I would have done it. I don't wish to be presumptuous, but I would have done it as the President did it. I think that when you reach an agreement after all these months of work, that you finally have even the dates set with Hanoi in Paris -- keep in mind that the timing and the dates was a question of considerable importance.

At one time, Hanoi wanted a very long period between the cessation of the bombing and the start of the substantive talks. We wanted a very short one. We wanted 24 hours. They wanted a

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very long period. We go back and forth, back and forth, every decision being made by the President, and Harriman and Vance acted upon the instructions of the President.

We go all through this process. We finally get down to the point where there is a solid agreement then on the dates. I believe the President had a responsibility to proceed with the agreement that he made, and he had to do it no matter what the effect might be, as I said before, because I think the importance of the talks in getting on with those efforts which could end the war, far transcended in importance whatever some political result might be.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what went wrong, if you thought you had, as you have used the word, a "deal" with Saigon? What happened?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I cannot speculate on what came up that caused the government in Saigon to change its mind. I know only that the understanding was as clear as two partners can have, over a substantial period of time. I know that Tuesday morning we had an understanding. I know by Tuesday afternoon they raised this first objection to it.

I do not know, nor am I willing to speculate on what came up to change their mind. Excuse me just a minute.

I will take two more questions, because I have been here now 40 minutes, but it is mostly my fault.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how do you characterize Saigon's operations, then, during these dealings? As sabotaging or as a doublecross, or what?

QUESTION: Take your pick.

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Are these the only two choices?

My answer would be I will not give my personal opinion and attempt to characterize it. I would like to say that we are continuing to make every reasonable effort to iron out the problems that have come up because we prefer to go into the talks with the Saigon Government. So we continue to maintain close contact with them.

It continues to be my hope that they will see it as we do, and that they will join in the talks very soon.

One more question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, when are we ready to go ahead with the talks if Saigon continues to drag their feet?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: There is no specific time element involved. There is no meeting date now set. The President has indicated that he wishes to continue to work along with the Saigon Government, and that he will keep Harriman and Vance fully informed. I believe the President would like to get the talks

started soon. I think he will continue to confer with the Saigon Government until he reaches the conclusion as to whether he is going to go with them or whether he shall go without them.

But I believe that that decision will have to be made. We are still hopeful that it will be the former.

I must really go now. I have run 42 minutes.

I am off to Brussels on Wednesday morning. Then after I get back from that, I will talk to Mr. Goulding and we will see when would be an appropriate time to meet again. So you can save the questions that you have and we will see if we can get to them later.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is there a transcript available of that Nixon talk? Is there a transcript available that we could get hold of?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Not that I know of.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (12:13 P.M. EST)

INFORMATION

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Pres file

Tuesday, November 12, 1968 -- 6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to note this memcon of a conversation between Dobrynin and Gene on November 8. Perhaps what Dobrynin will be looking for is any willingness on your part to proceed before January 20.

In addition, of course, he will probe on our problems in Saigon and the future of the Paris talks.

In short, I will require your clear guidance before Thursday lunch.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By gj, NARA, Date 2-19-98

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Approved by:

J. P. Walsh
11/9/68

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 8, 1968
Time: 1:00 pm
Place: Luncheon - Mr.
Rostow's office

SUBJECT: Missile Talks and Aftermath of
Czechoslovakia

PARTICIPANTS: Under Secretary Eugene V. Rostow
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

At lunch on November 8 with Under Secretary Rostow, Dobrynin raised question of missile talks. He said he thought it was up to us to make the next move. The Soviet Union had taken two years to reach the conclusion that such talks were desirable. They could understand the factors which led us to delay at this time. Perhaps we would decide to postpone the talks until after January 20. He simply wanted to observe that the issue concerned the bilateral relations of the Soviet Union and the United States, and was important. If we decided not to enter such talks, they would of course have to proceed with the further manufacture of missiles, relying primarily on the advice of the scientists.

Rostow said that he wasn't working on the problem himself, but he thought a better climate for such talks might well be created after Czechoslovakia if anxiety subsided in Central Europe, and the two governments cooperated in bringing about peace in Viet-Nam and the Middle East.

Dobrynin asked what we thought of the situation in Europe. Rostow said we had noted the absence of trouble in Berlin. Dobrynin said he thought the government had decided not to act in the face of the "provocation" in Berlin in order not to spoil the atmosphere of the Viet-Nam talks, but that policy was not changed. Rostow said there was nothing provocative about a party congress in Berlin. It fitted well inside the pattern of the past usage. Dobrynin commented that if we were testing Soviet intentions in Berlin, we should draw no inferences from the absence of response in this case. Their policy was unchanged.

EV M:EV Rostow:emb
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET/ EXDIS~~

FORM DS-1254
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By g, NARA, Date 2-19-98

Dobrynin returned to the subject of the NATO response to events in Czechoslovakia. He wondered whether some military elements in the American government were using the Czech affair as an excuse for changing the policy of NATO, and the basic policy of the United States towards Eastern Europe. Rostow said that such suspicions were entirely unjustified. He was certain that the basic policy of the American people and of any American government would always be that represented by the NATO communique issued last June at Reykjavik, and by President Johnson's speeches at Arco, Idaho, two years ago, and his recent speech before the B'nai B'rith in Washington. Dobrynin remarked that there was no press coverage of the European passage in the President's B'nai B'rith speech. The State Department knew how to draw attention to a statement that was neglected by the press. Rostow said he might try to correct the oversight, if Dobrynin wished, but he thought the simple way for the Soviets to test his hypothesis was to initiate talks in response to the Reykjavik communique. We were dealing here with reciprocal fears a little like those in the Middle East he and Dobrynin had just been discussing. Dobrynin had rightly said that the Arabs were afraid Israel didn't intend to withdraw, and Israel was afraid the Arabs didn't intend to make peace. Dobrynin had just expressed an anxiety that we were preparing an aggressive policy for NATO, which Rostow knew was in error. Many people in the West wondered about Soviet intentions, when they heard about Soviet air and naval dispositions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and saw force used to put down a political trend in Czechoslovakia.

The important thing was to deal decisively with the sources of such anxieties.

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ACTION

Pres file

Tuesday, November 12, 1968 -- 5:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Col. Haywood Smith suggested -- and I strongly support -- a letter of this kind for Bob Ginsburgh's file.

The reference to his "transitional" role as Armed Forces Aide is important for the record, since there is ^{some} ~~more~~ feeling in the Air Force that he was "fired" from that post.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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not signed

Dear General McConnell:

I would like to bring to your attention the outstanding and effective manner in which Brigadier General Robert N. Ginsburgh has served me and the members of my staff the past two and a half years here in the White House.

General Ginsburgh has been in a most demanding position, serving in a multi-faceted capacity on my immediate staff, the National Security Council staff, and the staff of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is a valued member of a team which has contributed significantly to the shape and substance of our Nation's security posture, and has provided in-depth planning leading to the current and future strength of the United States. He has fulfilled these and a wide variety of other extremely sensitive tasks with a performance which has reflected the highest distinction upon himself and the United States Air Force.

As the liaison officer of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he has been especially useful in insuring that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were known and understood in the White House. He has performed with great distinction in providing information and advice for critical decisions in connection with the war in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli war and most recently the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.

In addition, and deserving of special mention, was his willingness to step in and assume the additional role of Armed Forces Aide during the transitional phase of that position. He brought to that job the skillful ability and aggressive leadership so characteristic of this outstanding officer.

General Ginsburgh is a credit to the Armed Forces of the United States, and has rendered faithful and loyal service to his Commander in Chief. He is well qualified for any position of great responsibility, and I recommend him highly for promotion to major general ahead of his contemporaries as soon as he meets the eligibility requirements for time in grade.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

**General John P. McConnell
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D. C.**

36

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Tuesday, November 12, 1968
5:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Abrams surveys
personally the DMZ and issues tougher
orders.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By sq, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~ MAC 15704 - ES ONLY

36a

I HAVE SPENT THE DAY, 12 NOVEMBER, IN THE DMZ AREA WITH CUSHMAN, III MAF; STILWELL, XXIV CORPS; DAVIS, 3RD MAR DIV; TRUONG, 1ST ARVN DIV; GIAI, 2D ARVN REGT AS COOL-HEADED, COMPETENT AND PROFESSIONAL A GROUP OF REALISTIC COMMANDERS AS EVER SERVED ANYWHERE. I HAVE REVIEWED IN DETAIL WITH THEM EACH OF THE ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST THE FORCES OF OUR SIDE THAT HAVE OCCURRED BEGINNING 2 NOVEMBER THROUGH 1500 NOV 12. MY REVIEW COVERED NUMBER AND TYPE OF ROUNDS IN EACH ENEMY ATTACK, CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE, LOCATION OF ENEMY WEAPONS AND METHOD OF VERIFYING ENEMY WEAPONS LOCATIONS, REACTION TAKEN BY OUR SIDE, INCLUDING TIME TO REACT AND WEIGHT OF REACTION. I HAVE CONCLUDED:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 19, NARA, Date 4-7-93

A. NO ENEMY FIRE HAS BEEN DIRECTED AT OUR SIDE FROM NORTH OF THE PNDL (BEN HAI RIVER) SINCE THE BOMBING HALT 1 NOVEMBER.

B. MOST OF THE ENEMY FIRE DIRECTED AT OUR SIDE FROM 2 NOVEMBER ON HAS COME FROM ENEMY POSITIONS IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE SOUTHERN TRACE OF THE DMZ OR FURTHER SOUTH.

C. SOME ENEMY FIRE HAS BEEN FROM POSITIONS CLEARLY AND UNMISTAKABLY LOCATED WITHIN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ.

D. ENEMY SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN VISUALLY IDENTIFIED MOVING WITHIN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ.

E. GENERALLY OUR REACTION TO ENEMY FIRE FROM WITHIN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ HAS BEEN TOO SLOW AND OF INADEQUATE WEIGHT.

I HAVE ISSUED THESE CLARIFYING INSTRUCTIONS:

A. REACTION TO ENEMY FIRE AT OUR SIDE FROM POSITIONS IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ WILL BE IMMEDIATE AND THE WEIGHT DECISIVELY DESTRUCTIVE.

B. OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT UNDER 3RD MAR DIV WILL MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE OF SOUTHERN HALF OF DMZ BUT WILL REMAIN ALWAYS SOUTH OF PNDL (BEN HAI RIVER).

C. ENEMY PERSONNEL AND POSITIONS IDENTIFIED IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ WILL BE PROMPTLY ATTACKED BY FIRE AND DESTROYED.

THE 3RD MAR DIV CONTINUES TO OPERATE IN WESTERN QUANG TRI WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS OR FINDINGS. PRAIRIE FIRE TEAMS REPORT ROUTE 9 IN LAOS NOT IN USA AND IN SOME PLACES OVERBROWN. 2ND ARVN REGIMENT HAS OBSERVED VEHICLE LIGHTS MOVING SOUTH ON ROUTE 1 TO THE DMZ. JUST HOW FAR SOUTH THEY CAME CANNOT BE STATED WITH ASSURANCE BECAUSE OF NIGHT OBSERVATION PROBLEMS. THE ENEMY IS EITHER USING AMMUNITION HE ALREADY HAD IN AND SOUTH OF THE DMZ OR HE IS SUPPLYING IT TO THRU THE DMZ. THIS WILL REQUIRE DMR WORK.

IT IS THE VIEW OF ALL THAT THE ENEMY UNITS CONDUCTING OPERATIONS DESCRIBED IN ALL PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS ARE THE 27TH BN AND LOCAL FORCE COMPANIES.

ABOUT SEPTEMBER 67 GVN WITHDREW ITS POLICE POST AND FLAG FROM ROUTE 1 IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ. IN OCT 67 THE DRV FLAG WENT DOWN ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DMZ. ON 3 NOVEMBER THE DRV RAN UP THEIR FLAG, A LITTLE ONE, JUST NORTH OF THE BEN HAI ON ROUTE 1.

GP-3

SSO NOTE: SSO BRUSSELS, DELIVER TO COL MCAULIFFE FOR CJCS DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 12, 1968
4:50 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a request from Kiesinger, via Lodge, that we call in the Russians and warn them in advance of a proposed East German plan to interfere with German civilian traffic to and from Berlin on November 15.

The message has been repeated to Sec. Rusk in Brussels.

You may wish to get his view promptly.

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 19184

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-197
By CG, NARA, Date 1-5-95

WWRostow:rlh

INFORMATION

38

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, November 12, 1968
4:45 p. m.

Pro file

Mr. President:

Herewith evidence that our old
friend Le Duc Tho will be returning
to Paris.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 23756

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By sg, NARA, Date 4-6-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

1968 NOV 12 20 28

38a

52
ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/070 W

011901

P 121830Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8033
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L PARIS 23756

LIMDIS

Rustow

SUBJ: LE DUC THO'S RETURN TO PARIS

1. QUAIS CHIEF INDOCHINA AFFAIRS, DELAHAYE, CALLED IN EMBOFF NOV 12 TO TELL HIM THAT LE DUC THO WILL BE RETURNING TO PARIS "SHORTLY.". DELAHAYE SAID THAT FRENCH MISSION IN HANOI GAVE LE DUC THO AND PARTY OF 9 ENTRY VISAS OVER WEEKEND AND WAS TOLD THAT LE DUC THO WILL BE RETURNING FRENCH CAPITAL "SHORTLY".

2. LE DUC THO WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY FOLLOWING FOUR VIETNAMESE WHO CARRY DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS:

- A. PHAM HIEN
- B. PHAM THE DONG
- C. NGUYEN HUU THONG
- D. TRAN HOAN

3. IN ADDITION, FOLLOWING FIVE VIETNAMESE CARRYING REGULAR PASSPORTS HAVE ASKED FOR FRENCH ENTRY VISAS AND PRESUMABLY WILL BE ACCOMPANYING LE DUC THO:

- A. VU VAN THUAN
- B. NGUYEN VAN CA
- C. NGO VAN NGON
- D. VU QUANG VINH
- E. LE DOAN CHUC

4. BOTH HIEN AND HOAN ARE DRV DELEGATION MEMBERS WHO PRESUMABLY ACCOMPANIED THO ON HIS RETURN TO HANOI IN OCTOBER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712 91 510

By sg/jw, NARA, Date 4-6-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-414

INFORMATION

By cb, NARA, Date 10-26-95

39

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, November 12, 1968
4:40 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a [redacted] (after Bui Dlem left) indicating that, perhaps, Dirksen didn't complete the job and that Thieu retains an interest in the U. S. domestic political scene.

1.3(a)(4)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rln

SANTIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-413

By cb, NARA Date 6-21-99

39a

~~TOP SECRET TRAVE~~

XABAF9

1968 NOV 12 19 15

XABAF9

ZCZCXABAF9

00 [redacted] 3171847

1.5(c),(d),(g)

0 121135Z ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR MCCAFFERTY)

BT

~~TOP SECRET TRAVE~~

[redacted]

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS A [redacted]

1.5(c),(d),(g)

NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS UNDER [redacted]

[redacted] PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS ON DISTRIBUTION,
AND ABOVE EXISTING [redacted] ARE REQUIRED.

THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

[redacted]

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

1.5(c),(d),(g)

Roston

BT -68

THE DIEM TO RETURN TO SAIGON AFTER MEETING WITH NIXON

NY22

[redacted] 11 NOV 68 [redacted]

[redacted] RETURN ONLY AFTER [redacted]

1.5(c),(d),(g)

[redacted]

THE DIEM IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN SAIGON ON WEDNESDAY
13 NOVEMBER. [redacted]

BT

~~TOP SECRET TRAVE~~

INFORMATION

See file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 12, 1968 -- 4:30 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith an interesting [redacted] conversation with Ky.

Ky proposes a your-side our-side formula in which 'our side' "would be a matter for negotiation between the GVN and the U. S. government" without settling the question of GVN primacy. [redacted]

On the substance of GVN objectives [redacted] Ky is very sensible and envisages -- as do all other sensible South Vietnamese -- bilateral GVN-NLF talks outside the conference room.

If, in fact, Ky backs this view with Thieu and helps Thieu take the political burden of it, we might be fairly close to an agreement -- assuming Sec. Clifford's arm twisting in public doesn't make excessive difficulty in Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

SANTIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-513
By ing, NARA, Date 1-10-93

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

3443
40a
22
1.3(a)(4)

SECRET

[REDACTED]

SANITIZED

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE

E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-512

By fw, NARA, Date 12-18-92

DATE 12 NOVEMBER 1968

IN 32162

PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 11 NOVEMBER 1968

SUBJECT REMARKS OF VICE PRESIDENT KY ON THE PARIS
TALKS IMPASSE AND SUGGESTIONS ON RESOLVING IT

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

(SUMMARY: VICE PRESIDENT KY THINKS PRESIDENT THIEU HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE A HARD STAND OF THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) REPRESENTATION AT THE PARIS TALKS. OTHERWISE THIEU'S ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE BEEN POPULARLY REGARDED AS A U.S. PUPPET. KY BELIEVES THAT THE AMERICANS WERE OVERLY RIGID DURING THE PRE-BOMBING HALT NEGOTIATIONS AND FAILED TO RECOGNIZE VIETNAMESE SENSITIVITIES. THE IMPASSE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE OR THE GVN/U.S. RUPTURE TO WIDEN AND HE WILL

[REDACTED]

01112640

IN 32162

TDCS

PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

[REDACTED]
(classification)

(dissem controls)

DO EVERYTHING HE CAN TO PREVENT THIS. HE PLANS TO PROPOSE TO THIEU A COMPROMISE APPROACH BASED ON A MODIFICATION OF THE "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA. HE THINKS THAT CONSIDERATION AND UNDERSTANDING BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON MIGHT MAKE POSSIBLE AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PERMIT THE GVN TO GO TO PARIS AND PLAY A LEADING ROLE. HE RECOGNIZES THAT THIEU WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY SELLING HIS PROPOSED COMPROMISE TO THE PEOPLE AND HE IS PREPARED TO HELP THIEU DO SO, EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF HAVING THIEU LABEL IT A KY PROPOSAL. HE THINKS THAT ONCE AT THE PEACE TALKS THE GVN SHOULD SEEK THREE OBJECTIVES: IRONCLAD GUARANTEES OF ITS BORDER AT THE 17TH PARALLEL, BILATERAL GVN/HANOI TALKS ON THE FUTURE OF VIETNAM AS A UNIFIED NATION, AND DIRECT GVN/NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT TALKS. HE HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER HE SHOULD GO TO PARIS AS HEAD OF THE GVN DELEGATION AND SEES BOTH ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO HIS DOING SO. HE WILL LEAVE THE MATTER UP TO THIEU.

END SUMMARY.)

1. VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY SAID ON 11 NOVEMBER 1968 THAT PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S STRONG STAND ON THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) REPRESENTATION AT THE PARIS

IN 32162

TDCS

PAGE 3 OF 7 PAGES



(classification)

(dissem controls)

TALKS HAS PUT THIEU IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. THIEU'S STAND IS STRONGER THAN THE ONE KY ADVISED HIM TO TAKE BUT KY RECOGNIZES THIEU'S NEED TO UNDERSCORE THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN). HAD THIEU YIELDED, THE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE CALLED THIEU'S ADMINISTRATION A U.S. PUPPET AND THIEU MIGHT HAVE BEEN ASSASSINATED. KY SAID IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE GVN TO GO TO PARIS WITH ITS SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY INTACT IF REAL PEACE IS TO BE ACHIEVED AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

2. KY SAID HE THOUGHT THE U.S. STAND DURING THE PRE-BOMBING HALT NEGOTIATIONS WAS MUCH TOO RIGID AND DID NOT RECOGNIZE VIETNAMESE SENSITIVITIES. HE RECALLED THE AMERICANS HAD DENIED HIS REQUEST FOR A 24-HOUR POSTPONEMENT SO THAT A COMPROMISE MIGHT BE REACHED ON "TWO WORDS". AN AGREEMENT COULD HAVE BEEN REACHED, HE SAID, HAD THE VIETNAMESE BEEN GRANTED THE ADDITIONAL 24 HOURS. COMMENTING ON THE APPARENT U.S. EXPECTATION THAT THIEU WOULD AGREE TO THE ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, KY SAID HE HAD WARNED THE AMERICANS THIEU COULD NOT ACCEPT THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE AS WRITTEN BUT HIS WARNING WAS DISREGARDED.

3. KY SAID THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND THE U.S. AND THE GVN MUST STAY TOGETHER. HE BELIEVES THAT THE



IN 32162

TDCS

PAGE 4 OF 7 PAGES

[REDACTED]
(classification)

(dissem controls)

BASIC POSITIONS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE COMPATIBLE AND THAT THE PROBLEM IS A RESULT OF A MISUNDERSTANDING IN TIMING AND TACTICS. HE OBSERVED THAT SHOULD THE IMPASSE CONTINUE THERE IS A DANGEROUS RISK BOTH GOVERNMENTS WILL DRIFT FARTHER APART AND REACH A POINT WHERE A SERIOUS RUPTURE IN RELATIONSHIP COULD OCCUR. HE SAID HE WANTS TO PREVENT THIS AT ALL COSTS.

4. KY SAID THAT BEFORE 12 NOVEMBER, HE WOULD PROPOSE TO THIEU A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE APPROACH TO THE PARIS IMPASSE WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON A MODIFIED VERSION OF THE "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA:

A. THE QUESTION OF THE NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS WOULD BE PUT ASIDE. THERE WOULD BE ONLY TWO SIDES, "OUR SIDE (GVN AND U.S.) AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE.

B. "OUR SIDE" WOULD NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH HOW THE OTHER SIDE ORGANIZES ITSELF AND WOULD MERELY RECOGNIZE ONE DELEGATION, "THE OTHER SIDE." "OUR SIDE" WOULD ALSO NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH HOW "THE OTHER SIDE" RECOGNIZED THE MAKEUP OR ORGANIZATION OF "OUR SIDE." IN OTHER WORDS, IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY FOR HANOI TO ACCEPT THE GVN AS THE PRINCIPAL FOR "OUR SIDE."

IN 32162

TDCS

PAGE 5 OF 7 PAGES



(classification)

(dissem controls)

C. THE MAKEUP OF "OUR SIDE" WOULD BE A MATTER FOR NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

5. ASKED IF HIS REMARKS DID NOT MEAN THE GVN WOULD INSIST ON HEADING "OUR SIDE'S" DELEGATION, KY SAID HE HOPES PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL RECOGNIZE VIETNAMESE SENSITIVITIES AND THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WILL CONFRONT THIEU SHOULD HE BACK OFF FROM THE POSITION HE HAS ALREADY TAKEN. HE SUGGESTED THAT JOHNSON MIGHT CONSIDER EMPHASIZING THAT OBJECTIVE. THE U. S. IS ALSO INTERESTED IN PEACE AND UNDERTOOK THE PARIS TALKS TO MAKE POSSIBLE THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM (DRV) AND IT HAS ACHIEVED THIS OBJECTIVE. SUCH A STATEMENT BY JOHNSON, KY SAID, WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO COME UP WITH AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA PERMITTING BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO GO TO PARIS WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PLAYING A LEADING ROLE.

6. KY SAID IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THIEU TO SELL THIS COMPROMISE TO THE PEOPLE. HE WILL HELP THIEU DO SO AND WILL ALSO HELP THIEU PERSUADE THE GVN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACCEPT A COMPROMISE. HE IS EVEN WILLING TO LET THIEU LABEL



IN 32162

TDCS

PAGE 6 OF 7 PAGES

[REDACTED]
(classification)

(dissem controls)

IT KY'S PROPOSAL. THE IMPORTANT THING, KY SAID, IS TO ENABLE A GVN DELEGATION TO GO TO PARIS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO BRING PEACE TO VIETNAM.

7. KY SAID HE HAD THREE PROPOSED GVN OBJECTIVES AT THE FORTHCOMING PARIS PEACE TALKS:

A. GVN BORDERS MUST BE GUARANTEED, EITHER BY AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE OR BY THE U.S. OR BY HANOI AND SAIGON. HE IS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT WHICH IS DECIDED UPON BUT THE QUESTION OF IRONCLAD GUARANTEES IS VITAL. THE BORDER MUST BE AT THE 17TH PARALLEL.

B. THE GVN AND DRV SHOULD ENGAGE IN BILATERAL TALKS TO WORK OUT THE FUTURE OF VIETNAM AS A UNIFIED NATION, TO INCLUDE ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND, EVENTUALLY, POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS.

C. DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE GVN AND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV); THE TALKS COULD BE HELD ANYWHERE. . IF INFILTRATION IS STOPPED, GVN FORCES ARE PERFECTLY ABLE TO HANDLE THE REMNANT VIET CONG FORCES. KY RECOGNIZES THE NFLSV WILL DEMAND A HIGH PRICE BUT BELIEVES THIS IS NEGOTIABLE AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE GVN CAN PREVAIL.

[REDACTED]

IN 32162

TDCS

PAGE 7 OF 7 PAGES

[REDACTED]
(classification)

(dissem controls)

8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, KY SAID HE HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO GO TO PARIS AS HEAD OF THE GVN DELEGATION. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, HE BELIEVES THAT IN PARIS HE COULD MAKE DECISIONS WHICH A LESSER FIGURE WOULD HAVE TO REFER TO SAIGON AND THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD BE CONFIDENT HE WOULD OBTAIN THE MAXIMUM FOR SVN AND WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS. NEGATIVELY, HE RECOGNIZES THE RISK OF FAILURE OF THE TALKS AND SUBSEQUENT INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH COULD MEAN THE DEMISE OF HIS LEADERSHIP ROLE IN SVN. HE WILL LEAVE THE MATTER UP TO THIEU. IF THIEU ASKS HIM TO GO HE WILL DO SO BUT HE WILL NOT INSIST ON GOING.

9. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

ACTION

Tuesday, November 12, 1968 -- 3:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Amb. Debrynia has invited me to lunch at the Embassy, on one of the following days:

Thursday, November 14 _____

Tuesday, November 19 _____

Wednesday, November 20 _____

Should I accept? _____ If so, which day? You will note the 19th is a Tuesday, our lunch meeting day.

W. W. Rostow

rla

ACT 1

Mr. Rostow

42

Tuesday, November 12, 1968

3:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings for King Hussein

*1. [unclear]
2. Pres. file*

State recommends the following greeting for Hussein's Birthday November 14:

"On this your thirty-third birthday, I send Your Majesty our best wishes. Though young in years, you are old in the wisdom of leadership. While I am mindful of the difficulties that beset your country, I am confident that Jordan under your courageous guidance will find during the coming year the peace and justice that we mutually seek."

This is a nice gesture in any case, but Hussein needs all the encouragement this sort of personal attention can give him. I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

Call me

11/13/68

43

INFORMATION



SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-414
By cls, NARA, Date 10-26-95

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, November 12, 1968 -- 2:55 p. m.

Profile

Mr. President:

This 
 as of today, 12 November,
will constitute background for the reception of
Sec. Clifford's press conference.

1.3(a)(4)



1.3(a)(4)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rlh

1.5(c), (d), (g)

Rictow

43a

~~VIETNAM ACCUSES U.S. OF LEAKING INFORMATION ON TRUCE TALKS TO PUT
VIETNAM GOVERNMENT IN BAD LIGHT~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-413

By cb, NARA Date 6-22-99

[REDACTED]

1.5(c), (d), (g)

1) [REDACTED] OBSERVED THAT A PART OF WORLD OPINION HAS INCREASINGLY COME TO BELIEVE THAT [REDACTED] GOVERNMENT BROKE ITS PROMISE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT; THAT [REDACTED] AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ENLARGED MEETING ALONG WITH THE NLF (NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT) AS A SEPARATE ENTITY. A PORTION OF THE FOREIGN PRESS IS BEGINNING TO MAKE THE PUBLIC BELIEVE THIS, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE. LYING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA IS WELL-KNOWN, BUT THERE IS ALSO A POISONOUS CAMPAIGN FROM NON-COMMUNIST SOURCES BY MEANS OF THE FOREIGN PRESS AND OTHERS WITH A VIEW TO DISCREDITING [REDACTED] USING THE PRESSURE OF WORLD OPINION TO INTIMIDATE [REDACTED] TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE UNDER A FOUR-SIDES FORMULA.

1.5(c), (d), (g)

2) [REDACTED] CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF THE CAMPAIGN. IN SAIGON, THE VICE-PRESIDENT, THE FOREIGN MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION [REDACTED] HAVE INFORMATION THAT THE LIST OF SECRET CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND THE U.S. EMBASSY BEFORE 1 NOVEMBER WAS SENT SECRETLY TO CERTAIN FOREIGN PRESS AGENCIES BY THE U.S. EMBASSY IN THE FORM OF A LEAK OR AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION, BUT COMPLETELY DISTORTED, IN ORDER TO CONDEMN [REDACTED] THIS CAMPAIGN POISONOUS TO WORLD OPINION BY THE FOREIGN PRESS OR THE AMERICAN PRESS MAY COME FROM SAIGON, PARIS OR FROM WASHINGTON.

3) [REDACTED] MAKE THE MOST FORMAL DENIALS.

4) [REDACTED] THE STATE DEPARTMENT [REDACTED]

1.5(c), (d), (g)

[REDACTED] IT WOULD BE BETTER TO STOP ALL THESE MANEUVERS OR HAVE THEM STOPPED. THIS IS NOT A WISE ATTITUDE OR AN INTELLIGENT MANEUVER TO ENCOURAGE [REDACTED] TO GO TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE AND, EVEN LESS, TO INTIMIDATE [REDACTED] IT WILL ONLY CAUSE THE WORSENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BECAUSE SOONER OR LATER THE SECRET OF THESE MANEUVERS WOULD BECOME KNOWN OR BE REVEALED.

5) THE GENERAL OPINION IN SAIGON HAS OBSERVED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS REPEATED NON-RECOGNITION OF THE NLF, NON-COALITION, ETC., BUT HAS NEVER COME FORWARD WITH THE LEAST DENIAL OR HAS NOT CATEGORICALLY REPUDED THE STATEMENT THAT THE NLF DELEGATION WAS INVITED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A FOUR-SIDES CONFERENCE. ALSO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REPEATED THE VERY OPPOSITE STATEMENT CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE NATURE OF THE NLF DELEGATION.

1.5(c), (d), (g)

~~TOP SECRET~~

44

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Tuesday, November 12, 1968
1:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

As a result of the phone call you directed me to make, Nitze released the funds for the new munitions needed to improve the efficiency of attacks on transport in Laos.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By *lf*, NARA, Date *2/19/98*



~~SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

3442
44a

1. Rostow
2. Hornig

11 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum which released the funds for the weapons which were of concern to Don Hornig.

Paul H. Wise

Attachment
Copy Memorandum, 11 Nov. 1968
to Director, Defense Research
and Engineering

6449

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

~~SECRET~~

446



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

11 November 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING

SUBJECT: Improved Munitions for COMMANDO HUNT

Pursuant to the recommendations made in your memorandum of 11 November 1968, I direct the release of deferred FY 1969 funds as follows:

1. CBU-54	\$22.0M
2. CBU-33	43.9M
3. M117/Mk 84 Laser Bomb Guidance Kits	15.1M
4. BLU-63 Facilitation for 1 million bomblets per month	2.0M
Total	\$83.0M

I understand you will shortly give me your recommendation with respect to the SUU-23 gun pod.

Paul H. Nitze

Copy to:
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1.35
By SP-6 G. J. Gindler
NARA, Date 2/19/98

6448

Sec Def Cont. Nr. X-

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

45

Tuesday, November 12, 1968 - 1:10 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

President Leone of Italy has sent you a message expressing his satisfaction and that of the Italian Government at your decision to suspend bombing in North Vietnam.


A suggested reply is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____


JKN:mm

45a

Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your message concerning Vietnam, which has been conveyed to me through Ambassador Ortona. I appreciate the sentiments you expressed and share with you the fervent hope that the suspension of bombing in North Vietnam will lead to progress toward a peaceful settlement of the war.

Sincerely,

JKN:mm

AMBASCIATA D'ITALIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~40100~~
14490

November 1, 1968

456


My dear Ambassador:

I have the honor to ask you to convey to President Johnson the following message from the Hon. Giovanni Leone, President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Italy:

"I wish to express to you, Mr. President, the deepest satisfaction of the Government of Italy, and mine personal, for your decision to suspend the bombardment of North Vietnam, trusting that it will be of avail in accelerating the peace negotiations, towards the realization of which Italy has constantly contributed, within the limits of its possibilities, with conviction and determination.

Giovanni Leone
President of the Council
of Ministers of Italy"

Please accept, my dear Ambassador, the expression of my highest consideration.


Egidio Ortona
Ambassador of Italy

INFORMATION

46

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 12, 1968
1:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's report
of his talk yesterday with Gen. Eisenhower.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rlh, NARA, Date 4-7-93

4600

~~SECRET~~

1968 NOV 12 17 26 EYES ONLY

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FM GENERAL WHEELER CJCS TDY, BRUSSELS
TO SECRETARY CLIFFORD DOD, WASHINGTON DC
MR WALT ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON DC
ZEM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By W, NARA, Date 2-19-98

~~SECRET~~ BRU/1168/EYES ONLY

1. BEGINNING AT 1600 HOURS 11 NOVEMBER, I MET WITH GENERAL EISENHOWER FOR FIFTY MINUTES. HE WAS ALERT, INTERESTED IN CURRENT EVENTS, AND APPEARED RELAXED AND COMFORTABLE.
2. AT HIS REQUEST I REVIEWED THE STATUS OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION. I COVERED THE SALIENT POINTS OF THE HARRIMAN/VANCE DEALINGS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS, BUCKER'S MEETINGS WITH THIEU, THE "WITHOUT FOUNDATION" RESPONSE OF THE SOVIETS, THE SEVERAL MEETINGS OF THE PRESIDENT ON 14 OCTOBER WITH HIS ADVISORS TO INCLUDE THE JCS, THE MEETINGS WITH GENERAL ABRAMS, AND THE PRESENT STATE OF PLAY IN SAIGON. I ALSO SET FORTH THE MILITARY SITUATION, INCLUDING ATTACKS BY FIRE FROM THE DMZ AND AGAINST POPULATION CENTERS AND AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OVER NVN. GENERAL EISENHOWER COMMENTED THAT KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY MILITARY ACTIONS IN SUCH A SITUATION IS VITAL, AND THAT WE MUST CONTINUE OUR AIR RECONNAISSANCE OVER NVN AS REQUIRED BY THE SECURITY OF OUR FORCES.
3. HE TOLD ME THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BOMBING HALT SO SOON BEFORE THE ELECTION HAD CAUSED GREAT CONCERN IN HIS PARTY. HE HAD BEEN URGED TO MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT; THIS HE HAD RESISTED AND, IN THE END, HE HAD MADE AN INNOCUOUS STATEMENT. ALTHOUGH HE MAY DISAGREE ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, HE HAS SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY. I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO POLITICAL BASIS FOR THE TIMING OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING; IN ACTUALITY, THE TIMING HAD DEPENDED ON WHEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD AGREE TO THE THREE CRITICAL ISSUES PUT FORWARD BY US. GENERAL EISENHOWER APPEARED SATISFIED WITH THE RATIONALE I PRESENTED.
4. AS I TOOK MY DEPARTURE, GENERAL EISENHOWER EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR MY VISIT AND REQUESTED THAT I COME TO SEE HIM ON MY RETURN FROM THE NATO MEETINGS.

550 NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY
H DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS 12 NOV
450

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

PRESERVATION OF

*Pres file
Gtown*

Tuesday, November 12, 1968 -- 12:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here are my suggested answers to Ted Sell's questions, for your 6:00 p. m. meeting today.

Since President Johnson has been in the White House, there has never been any problem of keeping the military "under control." The business of the military "going through the back door" is a thing of the past. Gen. Wheeler's regular attendance at the Tuesday lunch is a symbol of the direct, regular communication between the military and the President. This does not mean that the military has always agreed with Presidential decisions, but in President Johnson's time, at least, they have always had a full hearing and loyally carried out what the President decided, recognizing that the President's responsibilities are wider than theirs -- and overriding.

There have been areas of disagreement. Generally speaking, the military had wanted to use more power, earlier and faster. They may have been right. But the President had other considerations to think of. The President alone can weigh the diplomatic risks and the risks of a wider war in a nuclear age. When the military knew that their views had been considered, there was never any question of their loyally carrying out decisions which may have been contrary to their views.

On the bombing cessation, incidentally, there was no difference of opinion. Military advice was unanimous to go ahead with it. The President is both judge and leader, but especially a leader.

Uniformed military have a very clear understanding of this war. They are first to acknowledge that this kind of war cannot be won by military means alone. On the other hand, they have never agreed with the popular myth that this war can't be won. They recommended bombing cessation because they would prefer to see the war won with less bloodshed at the negotiating table. But they know you can't win at the table unless you have the ability to win eventually on the field of battle if the war continues.

The JCS have never felt it necessary to invoke statutory privilege. On occasion, the JCS have asked that views be brought to the President's attention; for example:

- Views on strategic missile talks, which they supported; and
- Views on defending Khe Sanh, which they supported.

The President, on his own initiative, seeks JCS views. For example:

- bombing cessation; and
- annual budget decisions.

In addition, the Chairman, JCS, for the last two years has attended the weekly Tuesday luncheon where he has presented JCS views on issues under consideration. In addition, he has a liaison officer who works closely with the Special Assistant for NSC Affairs. The White House Situation Room is also in constant touch with the National Military Command Center, run by the JCS in the Pentagon.

The general caliber of Defense-JCS: top-notch. Promotion process is highly selective. Always more top-notch men available than jobs to go around. The fact that you could come up with Westmoreland and then Abrams -- with Goodpastor right behind -- illustrates the point. When General Wheeler retires next year, the new President will have at least a dozen men to choose from who would be worthy successors to our number one military man. Response time vastly improved in the last eight years. It doesn't always beat the wire services, but it is more accurate.

W. W. Rostow

RNGinsburgh:WWRosto@:rla

47a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1968

FOR WALT ROSTOW

FROM: *LA* - Loyd Hackler

Ted Sell who has an appointment with the President at 6 P.M. Tuesday, has submitted the attached list of questions. George thought that it would be better answered in your shop. Would you please provide responses for a briefing paper?

476

Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON BUREAU

November 11, 1968

George:

President Johnson's relationships with the military have probably been more complex, with more subtleties, than those of any other Chief Executive in history.

I'd like to explore Mr. Johnson's feeling about that subject generally with some exploration, perhaps, of such areas as:


1. Does President Johnson feel the uniformed leaders were at any time difficult to keep under control, in the sense of them going through back doors on the question of degrees of escalation for the Vietnam war?

2. Were there strong areas of disagreement between the Administration and the military leaders over the war? In what way did Mr. Johnson resolve these areas? Using Mr. McNamara's phrase, did President Johnson feel he had to be more of a judge or more of a leader in reconciling conflicting views?

3. Does President Johnson feel that the uniformed leaders have understood the nature of the war? If not, in what areas was there a lack of understanding?

4. How often did members of the Joint Chiefs avail themselves of their statutory privilege of going directly to the President with dissenting views? What was the dissent over?

5. Mr. Johnson's evaluation of the general caliber and effectiveness of the Department of Defense - Joint Chiefs team. Does it work well for situations like Vietnam? Does the selection process provide the right kind of men at the top? Is it structured to provide timely and comprehensive response to the White House? Has it done so?



INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Tuesday, November 12, 1968
11:10 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this extremely thoughtful and interesting assessment of Hanoi's strategy, with recommendations for our own strategy, from Bunker.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 42463 (2 sections)

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-514
By ing, NARA, Date 7-2-93

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 9769 89-72
By ref/isp NARA, Date 4-3-93

BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 42463

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

SUBJECT: AN INTERPRETATION OF HANOI'S FUTURE STRATEGY.

1. ~~IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WASHINGTON, PARIS, AND SAIGON TRY TO ARRIVE AT A CONSENSUS OF WHY HANOI ACCEPTED OUR TERMS FOR THE WIDER NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE OUR STRATEGY IN THE INITIAL PHASES OF THE NEW TALKS WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE ASSUMPTIONS WE MAKE ON THIS SCORE. THIS IS THE CASE WHETHER THE GVN JOINS US SOON, AS WE HOPE, OR WHETHER WE ARE FORCED IN THE END TO BEGIN THE TALKS ON OUR OWN. I THEREFORE WISH TO INITIATE AN EXCHANGE ON THIS SUBJECT AND ADVANCE THE FOLLOWING THESIS.~~
2. ~~HANOI WAS AWARE THAT THE WAR HAD BECOME VERY UNPOPULAR IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT SUPPORT HAS BEEN ERODING AT A RAPID RATE. HANOI PERCEIVED THAT NEITHER THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NOR THE CONGRESS WILL SUPPORT AN INDEFINITE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR WITHOUT HOPE OF A FORESEEABLE END, AND THAT 1969 WOULD BE THE CRITICAL YEAR FOR AN AMERICAN DECISION ON THE WAR. HANOI WAS MINDFUL THAT CONCERN WITH DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND DISILLUSIONMENT WITH FOREIGN INTERVENTION ARE MOUNTING RAPIDLY IN THE UNITED STATES. HANOI SAW CERTAIN PARALLELS BETWEEN THE GROWING AMERICAN FRUSTRATION AND DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE WAR AND THOSE WHICH LED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO DISENGAGE IN 1954.~~
3. THEREFORE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS REQUIRE AN ANSWER:
 - A. ~~WHY THEN DID HANOI NOT PERSIST IN ITS POLICIES IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THE EROSION OF OUR COMMITMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO THE POINT THAT WE WOULD THROW IN THE TOWEL?~~
 - B. ~~WHY DID HANOI ACCEDE TO OUR TERMS AND MAKE ITS CONCESSIONS PRECISELY AT THE TIME IT DID?~~
4. I VENTURE THE FOLLOWING ANSWERS TO THESE TWO RELATED QUESTIONS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 42463, NOV 12, SEC 1 OF 2, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

A. HANOI ASSUMED THAT IF THEY COULD GET THE BOMBING STOPPED BEFORE OUR ELECTIONS IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, WHILE TALKS WERE STILL IN PROGRESS, FOR THE PRESIDENT TO RESUME BOMBING BEFORE JANUARY 20, AND IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT TO RESUME THE BOMBING AFTER A 2 1/2 MONTH PAUSE. IF THERE IS MERIT IN THIS THOUGHT, THEN WE CAN CONCLUDE FROM THIS THAT HANOI WILL ACT WITH ENOUGH RESTRAINT DURING THE NEXT 2-1/2 MONTHS WITH RESPECT TO THE DMZ AND THE CITIES TO DENY THE PRESIDENT JUSTIFICATION FOR RESUMING THE BOMBING BEFORE JANUARY 20.

B. HANOI ALSO BELIEVED THAT THE ELECTION OF MR NIXON WOULD ON BALANCE BE LESS FAVORABLE TO THEM THAN VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY'S ELECTION. THEY MUST HAVE HAD A CERTAIN FEAR THAT MR NIXON, IN AN EFFORT TO END THE WAR QUICKLY, WOULD AUTHORIZE RESUMPTION OF BOMBING, INCLUDING POSSIBLY HANOI AND HAIPHONG, THE CLOSING OF HAIPHONG, AND EVEN ATTACKS ON LAO AND CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES. THESE FEARS-- PROBABLY FANNED BY THE SOVIETS--WERE A POSSIBLE SECOND REASON WHICH PROMPTED THEM TO MEET OUR TERMS BEFORE THE ELECTION. IF, IN FACT, THEIR PLAN WAS TO TRY TO DEFEAT MR NIXON, THEN THE PLAN MISCARRIED BY THEIR WAITING TOO LONG TO ACCEDE TO OUR TERMS.

C. BUT THERE WERE MORE BASIC AND COMPELLING CONSIDERATIONS AT WORK. HANOI HAD TO FACE THE FACT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY AND THE VIET CONG FORCES HAD TAKEN ENORMOUS CASUALTIES IN THE THREE OFFENSIVES OF 1968. THESE DEFEATS DASHED HOPES OF A QUICK VICTORY IN 1968 BASED ON A "GENERAL OFFENSIVE" AND A "GENERAL UPRISING," THAT WOULD PRODUCE THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIEU GOVERNMENT.

D. ANOTHER BASIC CONSIDERATION WHICH HANOI HAD TO CONFRONT WAS THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, ARMED FORCES, AND PEOPLE EMERGED FROM THE ORDEAL OF 1968 CLEARLY STRENGTHENED, MORE UNIFIED, AND MORE SELF-CONFIDENT THAN EVER BEFORE. WITH EACH PASSING MONTH HANOI HAD TO ASSESS THE TELLING IMPACT OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER, GENERAL ABRAMS NEW TACTICS, INCLUDING THE DEVASTATING TACTICAL USE OF THE B-52'S AND AIR POWER TO CLOSE TRAFFIC CHOKER POINTS INTO LAOS, THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, INCREASING AGGRESSIVENESS OF THE ARVN MILITARY AND PARA-MILITARY UNITS, AND THE FORMATION OF THE POPULAR CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES. THIS WAS A FORMIDABLE COMBINATION TOO STRONG FOR THEM TO HOPE TO OVERWHELM MILITARILY. THE HEAVY LOSSES OF VC CADRE DURING 1968 ADDED TO HANOI'S DIFFICULTIES.

E. IN THE FACE OF ALL THIS THE NVA AND VC LEADERS WERE ENCOUNTERING MORE AND MORE DISCOURAGEMENT AND EVEN SIGNS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 42463, NOV 12, SEC 1 OF 2, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS
~~OF DEFEATISM IN THEIR OWN RANKS. THERE WAS EVIDENT DANGER~~
~~OF FURTHER DETERIORATION ON THEIR SIDE IF THEY INSISTED ON~~
~~CLINGIN TO MILITARY (AND QUASI-CONVENTIIONAL STRATEGY.~~

5. ~~ALL THIS LED TO THE CONCLUSIONS, PROBABLY TAKEN IN SEPTEMBER,~~
~~THAT THEIR ONLY PRACTICAL OPTIONS WERE EITHER TO RESORT TO THE~~
~~POLICY OF PROTRACTED WARFARE OR TO SHIFT THEIR EMPHAISS TO THE~~
~~CONFERENCE TABLE OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH IN ORDER TO BARGAIN~~
~~FOR TERMS WHILE VC STRENRTH IN THE COUNTRYSIDE REMAINED~~
~~FORMIDABLE AND THEIR STRUCTURE OF CONTROL IS STILL VIRTUALLY~~
~~INTACT.~~

6. THIS BRINGS ME TO THEIR STRATEGY IN THE COMING TALKS. WHILE
IT WILL CALL FOR A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH, THEIR
MAIN THRUST WILL BE TO GET SUBSTANTIVE TALKS GOING QUICKLY SO THAT
THEY CAN, VERY EARLY IN THE GAME:

A. ~~PUT IN A DEMAND FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE WHILE~~
~~AT THE SAME TIME EXERTING SUBSTANTIAL, BUT SHREWDLY SELECTIVE,~~
~~MILITARY PRESSURE;~~

B. ~~MAKE SUCH CONCESSIONS AS THEY HAVE TO MAKE ON THEIR~~
~~OWN WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES SO AS TO PRODUCE THE EARLIEST PO -~~
~~SIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED STATES TROOPS;~~

C. ~~OFFER TEMPTING PROPOSALS FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT,~~
~~PROBABLY NOT WITH THIEU, KY AND HUONG, BUT WITH ALMOST ANY-~~
~~ONE ELSE THEY THINK WE MIGHT ACCEPT. BUNKER~~

NNNN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 42463

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

7. THE WIDE APPEAL AND SEEMING LOGIC OF AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE COUPLED WITH AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES (ALREADY PARTIALLY "OUT OF COUNTRY" IN BORDER AND SANCTUARY AREAS) COULD BE THE TWO FIRST MAN POINTS OF PRESSURE ON US. THEY KNOW THAT THESE TWO OFFERS (DEMANDS) WILL PLAY UPON THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S DESIRE TO END THE CASUALTIES AND GET OUT. IF HANOI CAN EXTRACT OUR AGREEMENT FOR AN EARLY CEASE-FIRE UNDER CONDITIONS SOMEWHAT FAVORABLE TO THE VIET CONG AND TIED TO THIS AGREEMENT ON A TROOP WITHDRAWAL, THEN THIS WILL OBVIOUSLY STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND IN THE BARGAINING OVER COALITION.

8. I THEREFORE FORESEE NO LONG HAGGLING BY HANOI IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER PROCEDURES, FOR THEIR PURPOSE WILL BE TO GET TO THE SUBSTANCE OF BUSINESS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE ALACRITY WITH WHICH LAU DROPPED HIS DEMANDS FOR A JOINT SECRET MINUTE, FOR THE PRESENCE OF THE PRESS AND TV AT THE FIRST MEETING, AND FOR TRANSFERRING THE MEETING TO THE LARGER CONFERENCE HALL, ALL REINFORCE MY HUNCH THAT THEY WANT TO MOVE WITH SPEED TO THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. I PREDICT THAT THEY WILL NOT HAGGLE LONG ON SUCH QUESTIONS AS FLAGS, NAME PLATES, THE POSITION OF CHAIRS AROUND THE TABLE, ETC.

9. THE GVN'S REFUSAL TO ENTER THE TALKS HAS GIVEN HANOI A PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE WHICH THEY WILL TRY TO EXPLOIT AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. THEY WILL MAKE THE MOST OF THIS CHANCE TO SOW SUSPICION AND CREATE DIVISION BETWEEN US AND THE GVN. HANOI WILL QUICKLY SENSE THAT NOTHING SUITS THEIR PURPOSE BETTER THAN TO HAVE THE GVN BOYCOTT THE TALKS INDEFINITELY, FORCING US TO TALK ALONE WITH THEM AND THE NLF. WE MAY BE SURE THAT THEY ARE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE PRESSURES ON US TO GO AHEAD WHICH WILL BE COMING SOON FROM CONGRESS AND AMERICAN OPINION.

10. TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT THE GVN WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR US. APART FROM THE OBVIOUS COMPLICATIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, IT COULD TOUCH OFF SUCH CONFUSION AND DEMORALIZATION IN SOUTH VIET NAM AS TO ENDANGER THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 42463, Nov. 12, SEC 2 of 2, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

AND THE MORAL OF THE ARVN FORCES. BECAUSE OF THIS THIEU SIMPLY CANNOT STAND ASIDE FROM THE TALKS FOR VERY LONG. MOREOVER, IF HE SHOULD BE SO FOOLISH AS TO DELAY UNDULY, HE WOULD FIND THAT, DESPITE HIS NOVEMBER 2 ADDRESS, SO WIDELY APPLAUDED AT THE TIME, PRESSURES WOULD BUILD UP TO FORCE HIM INTO THE TALKS.

11. ALL THIS SUGGESTS TO ME THAT THIEU WILL HAVE TO MOVE SOON, BUT IT ~~MAY~~ REQUIRE THAT WE TAKE THE FEW EXTRA DAYS OR POSSIBLY A WEEK OR MORE, TO BRING HIM AROUND. WE HAVE TOO MUCH AT STAKE AND TO LOSE BY GOING IT ALONE, AND SO HAS HE. AS FOR HANOI, IT CAN DO LITTLE IN THESE NEXT FEW DAYS EXCEPT CHAFE AND COMPLAIN, PROTEST AND PROPAGANDIZE. IF WE ASSUME AS WE DO THAT HANOI WANTS AND NEEDS THIS CONFERENCE BADLY TO SAVE WHAT IT CAN FROM THE WRECKAGE OF ITS 1968 STRATEGIES, THEN HANOI HAS NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO WAIT.

12. THE THESIS OF THIS TELEGRAM ALSO SUGGESTS THE RELATIVE UNLIKELIHOOD THAT HANOI WILL RENEGE ON ITS AGREEMENT WITH US OR DECISIVELY PROVOKE US INTO A RESUMPTION OF BOMBING BY SERIOUSLY VIOLATING THE DMZ OR ATTACKING THE LARGER CITIES. FINALLY, IT ALSO SUGGESTS THAT ONCE WE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET NAM MOVE IN CONCERT INTO NEGOTIATIONS WE WILL BE IN A STRONG POSITION.

13. TO FIGHT WHILE NEGOTIATING CREATES OBVIOUS AND CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS AND THESE CANNOT BE MINIMIZED. DURING THIS PERIOD THE SENSITIVITIES AND VULNERABILITIES OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WILL BE OPERATIVE, AND PROPERLY SO. THE ENEMY WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN A LEVEL OF "FIGHTING" WHICH WILL HAVE OPTIMUM POLITICAL IMPACT (TERRORISM, ASSASSINATION, CONTINUING AMERICAN CASUALTIES WELL PUBLICIZED, ETC.). AT THE SAME TIME THEY WILL OFFER, AS NOTED ELSEWHERE, SUPERFICIALLY REASONABLE AND TEMPTING PROPOSALS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE "MIX" WILL BE DESIGNED TO INCREASE ALL PRESSURES ON US TO SETTLE AT THE TABLE FOR A PACKAGE FAVORABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS. ALTHOUGH OUR EMPHASIS IN THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN ON THE COMMUNIST DESIRE TO GET INTO SUBSTANTIVE TALKS, WE BELIEVE THAT EXTENSIVE PREPARATIONS NOW UNDERWAY IN THE ENEMY CAMP (AS DESCRIBED IN INTERROGATIONS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS) SUGGEST THE STRONG PROBABILITY OF CONSIDERABLE ARMED CONFLICT IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

14. OUR OWN ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER, SUGGESTS, TO REPEAT, THAT WE COULD BE IN A RELATIVELY STRONG POSITION AT THE TABLE. EXACTLY HOW STRONG WILL DEPEND ON OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN OUR (AND ARVN) TROOP MORALE, ON OUR SUCCESS AGAINST THE VIET CONG LOCAL FORCES, GUERRILLA UNITS AND INFRASTRUCTURE DURING THE COMING MONTHS, AND ON OUR ABILITY TO EXPLOIT THE PRESSURES ON THE ENEMY FOR A RAPID SETTLEMENT WHILE RESISTING (OR AT LEAST CONTAINING) THOSE WORKING AGAINST US. ~~WE SIMPLY MUST NOT PERMIT THE ENEMY TO BELIEVE THROUGH HIS READING OF OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND OVERT OR EVEN DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS THAT OUR SIDE IS DESPERATE FOR A SETTLEMENT (OR ANY PART THEREOF, INCLUDING THE ALL IMPORTANT CEASE FIRE).~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 42463. NOV. 12, SEC 2 OF 2, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

15. ~~IF THE MORALE OF THE VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY HAS ACTUALLY DETERIORATED TO THE EXTENT WE THINK, WE SHOULD RESIST A CEASE FIRE UNTIL WE HAVE SETTLED SEVERAL CRUCIAL ISSUES TO OUR SATISFACTION: THE FUTURE OF THE DMZ, THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES, NOT ONLY FROM SOUTH VIET NAM BUT FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA AS WELL, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, THE PRECISE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENT AND VIET CONG JURISDICTION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE DURING THE PERIOD OF CEASE FIRE AND PRIOR TO A FINAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. UNLESS WE OBTAIN SOME SATISFACTION ON THESE ISSUES, ANY AGREEMENT WILL BE A TEMPORARY TRUCE TO BE UPSET BY A PRAGMATIC AND RUTHLESS ENEMY NOT LONG AFTER OUR FORCES HAVE DEPARTED THESE SHORES.~~

16. ~~MY FINAL THOUGHT, ALREADY REFERRED TO ABOVE, IS THAT WHILE SPEED IN GETTING THE TALKS STARTED IS ESSENTIAL, WE SHOULD GIVE THIEU AND HIS COLLEAGUES A REASONABLE TIME TO LET THE MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT-ELECT SINK IN, TO CONSIDER OUR LAST PROPOSAL FOR A STATEMENT, AND TO REFLECT ON AMBASSADOR DIEM'S REPORTS OF THE STRENGTH OF THE US PRESS, PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL REACTION AND CRITICISM FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE CAN LIVE A LITTLE WHILE LONGER WITH AMERICAN PUBLIC FRUSTRATIONS OVER THE GVN'S HESITATIONS, NOW THAT TALKS ARE IN PROSPECT AND THERE IS A FORESEEABLE END TO THE WAR. IF NECESSARY, WE STILL HAVE A FEW MORE CARDS WE CAN PLAY TO BRING THEM INTO THE TALKS, FOR EXAMPLE A TCC MEETING OR A SPECIAL ENVOY, BEFORE WE LOWER THE BOOM AND GO IT ALONE, WITH ALL THE COMPLICATIONS THAT THIS IMPLIES. BUNKER~~

~~SECRET~~

SECTION

49

Tuesday, November 12, 1968 - 11:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

Attached is Secretary Rusk's memorandum recommending that you receive Dutch Foreign Minister Luns for a brief farewell call; he will be in Washington November 29 - noon December 2.

Luns has asked to see you to say good-bye and to give you a gift on behalf of the government and people of the Netherlands.

Luns has been Foreign Minister for fifteen years. He is a good friend and a faithful ally.

I recommend you see Luns.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

JKN:mm

49a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1968

14713

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for
Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns

Recommendation:

That you receive Netherlands Foreign Minister Joseph Luns for a 30 minute farewell call on November 29 - December 2.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Joseph Luns, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, will be in Washington from November 29 until noon on December 2, following a visit to the West Indies. He has asked to call on you briefly to say good-bye and to present to you a personal gift on behalf of the Netherlands Government and people.

As Dutch Foreign Minister for the past fifteen years, Mr. Luns has been one of the leading figures in European foreign affairs and has my highest respect and confidence. I recall your particular pleasure in talking with him during visits to Washington in February 1966 and May 1967.

On November 1 Mr. Luns told Ambassador Tyler that the Netherlands was very favorably impressed by your decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam and understands fully that "this courageous action" was taken in the expectation that it will be matched by corresponding measures by North Vietnam.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

As you know, Mr. Luns has been a faithful friend of the United States and an invaluable colleague on Vietnam and a wide range of other foreign policy issues. I believe, and Ambassador Tyler has so stated, that a brief farewell call on you by Mr. Luns would be greatly appreciated and would be taken as a gracious and friendly gesture by the Dutch people.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 12, 1968
10:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Kosygin, via McNamara,
sends a signal that he is still very much
interested in the missile talks.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 6409

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By MP, NARA, Date 9-10-97

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 654

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 06409 120219Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 391

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 6409

By g, NARA, Date 2-19-98

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MCNAMARA-KOSYGIN CONVERSATION

1. KORNIEENKO, CHIEF USA SECTION MFA, CALLED ME EARLY NOVEMBER 11 TO SAY THAT KOSYGIN, INFORMED OF MCNAMARA'S BRIEF VISIT TO MOSCOW ENROUTE AFGHANISTAN AND RECALLING THEIR MEETING AT GLASBORO, WOULD BE PLEASED TO RECEIVE HIM AT KREMLIN OFFICE SAME AFTERNOON. ~~KORNIEENKO INDICATED HE AWARE MCNAMARA ON STRICTLY PRIVATE VISIT AS TOURIST.~~

2. ALTHOUGH THIS UNSOLICITED INVITATION CAME AS A SURPRISE, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT ~~IT COULD NOT BE REJECTED WITHOUT SERIOUS DIPLOMATIC REPERCUSSIONS.~~ MEETING TOOK PLACE IN KOSYGIN'S OFFICE AND LASTED ~~FOR ONE HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE MINUTES.~~ BESIDES PRINCIPALS, AN INTERPRETER, A SOVIET NOTE-TAKER, KORNIEENKO AND I ATTENDED.

3. AFTER PLEASANTRIES, KOSYGIN, WHO APPEARED RELAXED AND CONSIDERABLY MORE AT EASE THAN MCNAMARA HAD REMEMBERED HIM AT GLASSBORO, ~~INTRODUCED SUBJECT OF VIETNAM.~~ MCNAMARA, ~~DISCLAIMING COMPETENCE ON THIS QUESTION SINCE HIS DEPARTURE FROM GOVERNMENT,~~ COUNTERED BY INTRODUCING AS TOPIC HIS ~~CONTINUING INTEREST IN MOVING TOWARD MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC AND OTHER ARMS.~~ ~~AT LEAST HALF OF SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION REVOLVED ABOUT THIS TOPIC.~~

4. KOSYGIN IMMEDIATELY INQUIRED AS TO POSITION OF PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON ON MISSILE TALKS. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT USSR ADHERES TO ~~ITS FORMER (READ PRE-CZECHOSLOVAKIA) POSITION THAT~~

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46
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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 06409 120219Z

MILITARY BUDGETS HAVE REACHED IMPOSSIBLE LEVELS AND THAT INCREASING THEM FURTHER COULD HAVE UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES. HE SAID THAT USSR WILL COOPERATE IN SEEKING FURTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES, WILL TRY TO SECURE GENERAL ADHERENCE TO NPT, AND WILL FOLLOW COURSE OF "GENERAL LESSENING OF TENSION."

5. MCNAMARA REPLIED THAT AMERICAN PEOPLE SHARE THESE OBJECTIVES. THERE FOLLOWED A DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF WHETHER MUTUAL TRUST -- A PHRASE INTRODUCED BY KOSYGIN -- NEED PRECEDE NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING AND REDUCING STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS. MCNAMARA POINTED OUT THAT SUSPICIONS ARISING FROM DIFFERENCES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICAL SYSTEMS, POWER RELATIONSHIPS, AND HISTORY CANNOT BE ELIMINATED AT ONCE BUT THAT THESE NEED NOT HINDER INITIATION OF TALKS. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TALKS TO START TWO YEARS AGO. HOWEVER COMPLICATED, DIFFICULT, AND EXTENSIVE THEY MIGHT PROVE TO BE, THEY WERE WORTH THE EFFORT.

6. KOSYGIN INTERJECTED THAT "BOTH SIDES HAVE ENOUGH." HE DESCRIBED ALTERNATIVES TO DISARMAMENT AS "INSANITY AND WAR" AND ASSERTED THAT SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ARE ESSENTIAL. HE THEN ASKED MCNAMARA WHY US SO SUSPICIOUS OF SOVIET MOTIVES. US NOW SPENDING 75 TO 80 BILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR ON ARMAMENTS AND DEFENSE. THIS HE DESCRIBED AS "COLOSSAL" FIGURE. MCNAMARA SAID HIS MILITARY ADVISERS HAD ASKED FOR MORE, TO WHICH KOSYGIN REPLIED, WITH A SMILE, "MILITARY WILL USUALLY ASK FOR EVERYTHING."

7. ON US SUSPICIONS OF SOVIET MOTIVES, MCNAMARA POINTED OUT THAT PHILOSOPHIC AND PRAGMATIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND USSR ARE SO GREAT DECADES WILL BE REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE THEM. HE SAID HE SAW NO NEED TO SUSPEND ARMS TALKS IN INTERIM SINCE MUTUAL ADVANTAGES, FIRST IN LESSENING DANGERS OF NUCLEAR CONFLAGRATION AND OF MUTUAL DESTRUCTION, SECOND IN BUDGETARY SAVINGS, UNDERLINE NEED TO PROCEED WITH TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. AFTER ALLEGING THAT US GOVERNMENT HAD SET FIRST LINK IN CHAIN OF MUTUAL SUSPICIONS BY INTERVENING AGAINST NEWLY EMERGED SOVIET RUSSIA 48 YEARS AGO, KOSYGIN STRUCK A MORE SERIOUS NOTE. HE ADMITTED EXISTENCE OF DEEP PHILOSOPHIC AND PRAGMATIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR NATIONS AND SAID THAT "THESE EXIST AND WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST: THEY ARE IRRECONCILABLE."

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 06409 120219Z

DESPITE THESE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES, HE CONTINUED, USSR PROCEEDS FROM POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, "AS OLD AS LENIN." OUR NATIONS SHOULD PROCEED ON THIS PRINCIPLE, IRRESPECTIVE OF DIFFERING PHILOSOPHIES. DISARMAMENT IS AN "IMPERATIVE NECESSITY," NOT BECAUSE USSR IS WEAK OR THAT "WE NEED IT, MORE THAN YOU." SOVIET "HUMANISTIC SOCIETY" FAVORS DISARMAMENT AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. USSR ADHERES TO POSITION FAVORING A "GRADUAL" SOLUTION OF DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS. MCNAMARA RESPONDED BY REJECTING THESIS THAT SOVIET SOCIETY MORE HUMANISTIC THAN AMERICAN AND BY EMPHASIZING RISKS IN FURTHER ACCUMULATION MEANS OF MUTUAL DESTRUCTION AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES OF ARMS REDUCTIONS.

9. DURING REMAINDER OF CONVERSATION KOSYGIN (A) INQUIRED INTO FINANCIAL POLICIES AND RESOURCES OF IBRD WITHOUT INDICATING MORE THAN POLITE INTEREST; AND (B) ASKED MCNAMARA WHETHER HE BELIEVED US TRUCK MANUFACTURERS WOULD HAVE SOME INTEREST IN USSR AS MARKET FOR PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY (KOSYGIN SAID USSR REQUIRES A SHARP INCREASE IN TRUCK PRODUCTION AND HIGHLY EVALUATES US EXPERIENCE IN THIS FIELD). FULL MEMCON ON THESE TOPICS AND ON CONVERSATION ON DISARMAMENT SUMMARIZED ABOVE WILL BE POUCHED.

10. COMMENT: MCNAMARA'S IMPRESSION IS THAT KOSYGIN DISPLAYED INFINITELY MORE INTEREST IN DISARMAMENT GENERALLY AND IN TALKS ON LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN PARTICULAR THAN AT GLASSBORO EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO. DESPITE KOSYGIN'S DISCLAIMER, MCNAMARA BELIEVES THAT COST OF ESCALATING STRATEGIC ARMS AND CONSEQUENT IMPACT ON OTHER ESSENTIAL PROGRAMS IS VITAL INGREDIENT OF KOSYGIN'S VERY APPARENT INTEREST IN GETTING TALKS UNDER WAY.

11. FOR MAN WHOSE FACE EASILY REFLECTS TENSION AND FATIGUE, KOSYGIN LOOKED RELATIVELY RELAXED AND COMPOSED, HE NEVERTHELESS FREQUENTLY SEEMED AT ONCE ASSERTIVE AND DEFENSIVE ABOUT SOVIET ACCOMPLISHMENTS, NOTING THAT "EVEN TASHKENT WANTS A SUBWAY NOW," RECALLING SOVIET AID TO AFGHANISTAN ("MARVELOUS ENGINEERING OF MOUNTAIN ROADS, NATURAL GAS LINES, IRRIGATION PROJECTS, ETC."); AND ASSERTING THAT DESPITE EXPECTED RISE IN AUTO PRODUCTION USSR WILL AVOID CONGESTION OF NEW YORK, PARIS BOME AND LONDON. DESPITE THESE BOASTFUL INTERLUDES, HE WAS AMIABLE THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 04 MOSCOW 06409 120219Z

12. WITHOUT READING MORE INTO CONVERSATION THAN IT MERITS, WE NEVERTHELESS THINK IT NOTEWORTHY THAT KOSYGIN TOOK INITIATIVE FOR THIS MEETING. HE OBVIOUSLY HAD MISSILE TALKS AND SOVIET TRUCK PRODUCTION ON HIS MIND, BUT HE WAS PROBABLY ALSO PREPARED TO HOLD FORTH ON VIETNAM HAD MCNAMARA LED CONVERSATION IN THAT DIRECTION. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE OF MEETING MAY LIE IN FACT KOSYGIN WAS MAKING GESTURE OF FRIENDSHIP TO FIRST DISTINGUISHED AMERICAN OF HIS ACQUAINTANCE WHO HAS COME THROUGH MOSCOW SINCE AUGUST INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THAT SUBJECT, INCIDENTALLY, DID NOT ARISE DURING CONVERSATION.

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ACTION

51

Profile

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 12, 1968 -- 10:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Ellsworth Bunker suggests that he might drop the weekly cable report and substitute for it special reporting on particular issues.

W. W. Rostow

Keep weekly report _____

Substitute special reports
at opportune times _____

Call me _____

Saigon 491 (CAS channels)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

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TO WHITE HOUSE

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FM ANB BUNKER SAIGON 491

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

1. AS YOU KNOW, MY LAST WEEKLY MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT, THE SEVENTY-SECOND, WAS FORWARDED ON OCTOBER 30. SINCE THEN, MY TIME AND ENERGIES HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THIEU AND COMPANY RELATIVE TO THE PARIS TALKS AND OUR EFFORTS TO BRING THEM ON BOARD. I THINK WE SHALL EVENTUALLY SUCCEED ALTHOUGH IT MAY TAKE A LITTLE TIME. IT IS ALSO TAKING A GREAT AMOUNT OF EFFORT AS WELL AS TIME TO THE EXCLUSION OF MUCH ELSE.

2. YOU WILL RECALL THAT MY LAST MESSAGE DEALT WITH MATTERS WHICH WE THOUGHT IT OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO PUSH DURING THE LAST QUARTER OF THE YEAR UNTIL TEI AT THE END OF JANUARY. THE MILITARY AND PACIFICATION OFFENSIVES ARE OFF TO A GOOD START AND ON SCHEDULE, BUT I HAVE NOT FELT THAT THERE WAS MUCH GORE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO REPORT. MUCH OF THE GVN IS CONCENTRATING ON THE PROBLEM OF THE PARIS TALKS.

3. IN RESPECT TO THE PARIS TALKS AND OUR EFFORTS TO GET THE GVN ON BOARD ALL OF THE DEVELOPMENTS HERE REGARDING THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED HAVE BEEN FULLY REPORTED. CONSEQUENTLY, I WOULD REQUEST THE PRESIDENT'S FOREBEARANCE IN TRANSMITTING THE NEXT WEEKLY MESSAGE UNTIL THERE IS MORE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO REPORT ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER DIRECTIONS. I WILL, OF COURSE, BE GUIDED ENTIRELY BY THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES, BUT I WONDER ALSO WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT SERVE HIS PURPOSE BETTER IF IN THE FUTURE INSTEAD OF TRYING TO MAKE REGULAR WEEKLY REPORTS, I REPORTED TO HIM ON MATTERS WHICH I CONSIDERED TO BE OF MOST SIGNIFICANCE AND AT RELEVANT TIMES. I THINK THIS WOULD ENABLE ME TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT REPORTING WHICH WOULD BE MORE INTERPRETIVE AND LESS REPETITIVE OF FACTS WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN OTHER WAYS. PLEASE LET ME HAVE THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. WHATEVER HIS WISHES, I SHALL FOLLOW THEM TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY.

~~SECRET EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS~~

GP
350

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

115-019042-002/4

12-28-09

NL review of State Dept. equity required

EYES ONLY

Tuesday, November 12, 1968

Mr. President:

(via Jim Jones)

These new times on the gentleman in Albuquerque on November 2 suggest he had ample time to make the telephone calls to the Lady and Secretary Rusk while in Albuquerque, before departing for Texas.

FBI reports:

1:15 P. M. EST -- arrived Albuquerque Airport

1:45 P. M. EST -- departed airport for Highland High School

3:15 P. M. EST -- departed Highland High School for the airport

3:30 P. M. EST -- arrived at airport

4:00 P. M. -- aircraft departed for Texas

The phone call to the Lady was at 1:41 p. m. EST and to Secretary Rusk at 1:55 p. m. EST.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:rla:amc

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MLQ 95-34
By ts/ep NARA, Date 2-19-91

EYES ONLY

ACTION

53

ACTION

Tuesday, November 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday greetings to the King of Laos

Pres file

There follows a suggested text of a message from you to the King of Laos on the occasion of his 61st birthday:

"His Excellency
King Savang Vatthana
Vientiane, Laos

"Your Excellency:

"On this happy occasion I extend to you my cordial wishes for many more birthdays in good health and prosperity. On behalf of the American people, I wish to assure your Majesty of our constant hope that your Kingdom and your people may return to a life of peace and tranquility.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

I recommend you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

STATE:MWright:wpt

54

Tuesday, November 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following is Jean Monnet's warm reply to the message you sent him on his eightieth birthday (Tab A):

"Dear Mr. President:

Pres. file

Your good wishes have brought me your friendship and have proved to me once again your concern for the task which is so vital to us all -- the union of Europe.

I am convinced that when Europe at last united and your great country can work together as equals, peace of the world which is our common goal will be assured.

Your words are a great encouragement for me and for those who are striving with me for a united Europe. Once again I thank you Mr. President.

I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you soon in Washington.

Please present my respectful greetings to Mrs. Johnson and believe me

Yours with warmest and sincere respect.

Jean Monnet"

W. W. Rostow

JKN
JKN:mm

54a

Delivered on November 9, 1968

Dear Mr. Monnet:

On your eightieth birthday, I send you warmest congratulations and best wishes. This is a special day on both shores of the Atlantic for you are an honored friend of America as well as first citizen of a new Europe.

Your vision of a united Europe raised the sights of men beyond national horizons. Your quiet persuasion brought men and governments together on a new course of mutual cooperation and progress. Your ideas gave strength to the foundations of the European Communities. Your devotion to the goal of a united Europe working in close harmony with the United States is a continuing inspiration to us all.

May the years ahead bring you health and happiness.

Sincerely,

/S/ Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL--EYES ONLY~~*Profile*

Monday, November 11, 1968 -- 4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk just called. Cabot Lodge is in London. Sec. Rusk plans to see him Wednesday morning in Brussels. He will tell no one else in the State Department about this possibility. If he decides the arrangement is workable, so far as Bonn is concerned, he will let me know. I shall inform you. Only then will we tell Nick Katzenbach, etc., over at State, just before a public announcement -- if you proceed with the arrangement.

Sec. Rusk's view is that Lodge should not be withdrawn from the post at this time, but simply undertake a temporary assignment in Washington while retaining the post formally.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 719 96-05
By 14/10/97, NARA, Date 10-3-97

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL--EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Monday, November 11, 1968 -- 12:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

With respect to your questions on the DMZ:

-- On October 23, in answer to your question, General Memyer said he thought the enemy might do a certain amount of desultory shelling across the DMZ to remind us they are there, but nothing like the attacks against Con Thien or Gio Linh where hundreds of shells were fired from or across the DMZ at our men.

He repeated: I believe the threat of violation is wholly acceptable.

Attached is General Abrams' message on the rules of engagement he requested. (Tab A)

At Tab B is yesterday's operational intelligence summary indicating 5 successive days without enemy activity in the DMZ.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-514
By MP, NARA, Date 7-2-93

WWRostow:rin

We have, of course, been examining this latest move of Hanoi and the Soviets from every conceivable point of view.

It is impossible to say in advance whether Hanoi wants seriously to negotiate a compromise, or is using this latest move only as a means of getting the bombing stopped knowing that it will be difficult to resume later, either by the President or his successor. One can argue that Hanoi may have both these objectives in mind, and they will move in whichever direction they think holds out the greatest hope of gain for them.

We think Hanoi's decision to agree to the GVN entering the discussions is of the greatest significance. It suggests that Hanoi has abandoned all hope of a military victory or of a unilateral U. S. withdrawal by the next Administration. If this is so, Hanoi's alternatives are to try to negotiate a settlement on a basis most favorable to them, or to return to protracted guerrilla warfare. On balance we think that at the outset, at least, Hanoi will enter these negotiations with serious purpose.

We think their negotiating objectives will be:

- a. cease-fire in place;
- b. mutual withdrawal of forces; and
- c. coalition government.

We think they will put these forward early in the negotiations. All three are simple conceptions with strong propaganda features from their point of view, and each is designed to give us trouble. Since we are not going to agree on simple conceptions such as these, we must expect extended negotiations while we hammer out solutions which are acceptable to us and the GVN. We will be working up proposals to handle each of these.

Our relative bargaining positions, assuming the wider talks start in a week or so, will be important. Both our short and long-term bargaining positions are strong. The VC/NVA can do little damage with their regular forces during the next two or three months which they need for rest and resupply. As for the long term, Hanoi threw everything they could into this year's offensives, and failed. We do not see how they can make a greater effort or even a comparable one again.

On the other hand, they are strongly entrenched in the VC-controlled areas, where they control about 3700 hamlets, and another 3900 hamlets are contested. We will have to pay a price to extend our power into these areas, for the VC are good at guerrilla and irregular force fighting on their home grounds. However, it is what we must now do. Fighting defensively, they will try to make any extension of our control as costly as possible for us. This is where they will concentrate their military effort as the wider negotiations start. As we push against them in these areas, which we mean to do, they will resist and there will be heavy fighting of the ambush and

Int A

guerrilla type. We must also expect sabotage and guerrilla-type activity in the cities.

Meantime they will be negotiating in all seriousness for as much as possible of the three objectives listed above.

We do not think it possible to fix in advance, even in rough terms, the length of the interval that should be allowed before we consider whether Hanoi is serious or whether a bombing resumption is called for. We think we should have a pretty clear picture of Hanoi's intentions in a month or two, particularly if the negotiating meetings are frequent. By the end of the year, we should also have a pretty good idea of the morale of VC/NVA forces as well as our ability to move into and establish ourselves in the contested areas.

Our main problems as we see them will be to justify to the Congress and the American people our unwillingness to agree to a cease-fire in place and our opposition to a coalition, or, to put it in another way, justifying to the American public further casualties while we negotiate for a successful outcome of our enormous effort here.

We believe here that 1968 -- however difficult it was for us -- has been a disaster for Hanoi. We must convince the American people that the tide has turned in our favor, and we can only do this if we can show progress in moving into contested areas, rising defections from the Communist ranks, heavy Communist casualties, comparatively light casualties on our side, withdrawal of some American units, the takeover of more and more of the war by ARVN, etc. That will also be convincing to Hanoi, and will determine their negotiating tactics.

When the GVN joins the talks, we must insist on closed sessions, or closed along with open sessions, otherwise we cannot regard the talks as serious. Given the complexity of the problems and the strong bargaining cards that each side holds, with the best will in the world, we think it is likely to take some months to produce solutions and agreements, and indeed we may be in negotiations for a very long time.

Maintaining the morale, fighting spirit and momentum of US and ARVN forces is absolutely essential. Directives have gone out on the US and GVN side to intensify our offensive operations against infrastructure guerrillas and local forces in order to extend government control, at the same time maintaining unrelenting pressure against his main forces. It is an offensive against the enemy "system."

We are planning now the form and shape of a message to the troops if an announcement is made. This message will be critically important to establishing a positive atmosphere. It will be tied to the results of our operations so far and the offensive described above. We will disseminate it in a massive effort.

- We are completely confident that the morale, fighting spirit and momentum can be sustained.

The basic rules of engagement should include the following:

a. Every commander will retain the inherent right and responsibility to conduct operations for the self-defense of his forces.

b. In case of attack by fire or ground attacks by small units (up to a battalion in size) across the demarcation line, the Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, should have the authority to conduct a timely and adequate response against the attacking force, to include destruction of enemy forces penetrating across the line. No US ground forces would cross the line without specific orders from the highest authority. It is envisaged that small ground probes would be counteracted by response in kind, but of decisive superiority.

c. Enemy artillery fire would be responded to with heavy counter-battery fire and air attack until enemy weapons are silenced. In case surface-to-air missiles are fired at our aircraft, we would destroy his surface-to-air missile installations and immediate supporting facilities.

d. In case of substantial or general attacks across the demarcation line by ground (including artillery) or air action requiring response going beyond local action, authorization of highest authority would be sought immediately for such action, including resumption of the bombardment of North Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-141-023-005/7
By *pc*, NARA, Date 11-5-09

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

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OPERATIONAL APPROPRIATE BUDS

DOIS 249-68



SOUTHEAST ASIA

Ground tactical activity in South Vietnam continued at a moderate level yesterday, with the enemy's main tactic being continued harassing attacks by fire against fixed positions.

SOUTH VIETNAM

DMZ

Yesterday was the fifth successive day without reported enemy activity in the Demilitarized Zone.

CITIES AND URBAN AREAS

My Trang hamlet, 28 miles south-southeast of Quang Ngai City, received five rounds of 60-mm mortars and 20 rounds of antitank grenades on 8 November. No report of friendly casualties or material damage has been received.

Lac Nghiep hamlet, 16 miles southwest of Phan Rang in Ninh Thuan Province, received a 2-hour night attack by the intensive small-arms and antitank rocket fire from an enemy company. One Regional Force (RF) soldier died in the successful defense of the hamlet. The RF troops were supported by US AC-47s and a Swift boat.

Ten mortar rounds which impacted on Long Dinh District town yesterday wounded two Popular Force personnel. The attack by fire, 9 miles west-northwest of My Tho in the Mekong Delta, did no reported damage to structures. There were no known enemy casualties as a result of South Vietnamese countermortar fire.

Three South Vietnamese soldiers, two women, and five children were wounded by two 75-mm recoilless rifle rounds which fell on Can Tho in the Mekong Delta late yesterday. Two houses received light damage. Counterbattery and suppressive fire was delivered on the suspected enemy gun position by artillery, helicopter gunships, and AC-47s. Results are unreported.

10 November 1968

Page 1

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Tab B

An enemy platoon fired two volleys of mortar fire (27 rounds) against My Hung hamlet, 13 miles southwest of Ca Mau in southernmost South Vietnam. Three civilians were wounded and a house was damaged by the high explosive rounds. Countermortar was fired with unknown results but two of the enemy were killed when they entered a protective minefield during the attack.

ENEMY MOVEMENTS

There was no evidence to indicate the move of enemy units into or out of South Vietnam.

1ST CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

Enemy messages of 8 and 9 November indicated that Allied operations south of the eastern portion of the DMZ were adversely affecting attack preparations by elements subordinate to the NVA 27th Regiment. One message suggested the enemy was unable to obtain supplies because of Allied blocking activity along Route 1.

A US Marine reconnaissance team operating 23 miles southwest of Da Nang encountered three parties of North Vietnamese troops yesterday. Artillery fire was employed to kill 19 of the communist regulars.

A Korean Marine company attacked an enemy force at dusk yesterday. Seven of the enemy troops died in the action which took place in the Vu Gia River Valley, 16 miles south-southwest of Da Nang. There were no Korean casualties.

2D CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

Intercepted messages of 8 November indicated that strafing by Allied aircraft and artillery fire directed by spotter aircraft had at least delayed preparations being made by a battalion-subordinate of the NVA 95B Regiment to attack targets along Route 19, between Pleiku City and An Khe. The last message sent on the 8th revealed the battalion involved had moved back from its attack position.

10 November 1968

Page 2

3D CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

Elements of a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) company, supported by tactical air, artillery, helicopter gunship, and AC-47, engaged an enemy battalion 5 miles north of Tay Ninh City late yesterday afternoon. Enemy casualties are unreported. Five of the South Vietnamese were killed and 20 were wounded.

Another inconclusive night action near Tay Ninh City was fought 17 miles southeast of that provincial capital. A US Army mechanized infantry company and a RF company, occupying adjacent night defensive positions, came under concentrated automatic weapons, mortar, and antitank rocket fire. Forty minutes later, after the defenders had been supported by armed helicopters, artillery, flare aircraft, and tactical air strikes, the enemy launched an abortive ground attack. One American soldier was killed and two were wounded during these attacks; three RF personnel also were wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown.

A US Army long-range reconnaissance patrol, operating 28 miles north-northwest of Saigon, killed six of nine enemy personnel encountered yesterday. Gunships were employed to support the friendly troops who suffered no casualties.

A light observation helicopter accompanied by an armed helicopter are reported to have engaged a group of approximately 50 persons and 25 trucks at a location 8 miles northwest of Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province. A debrief of the pilot indicates this location to be approximately 1,953 feet west of the Cambodian border. An estimated four or five persons were killed. An investigation of this possible border violation is under way.

Communication intelligence indicates all major elements of communist divisions in the 3d Corps Zone remain in base areas along the Cambodian-Tay Ninh and Binh Long provincial borders. No major enemy units have been noted moving toward Saigon.

4TH CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

Three ARVN combat operations in the lower reaches of the Mekong Delta gained light and scattered contact with

10 November 1968

Page 3

~~TOP SECRET TRU~~

DOIS 249-68

small enemy groups yesterday. Results achieved included 29 communists killed, 22 detainees, and seven weapons and a small amount of ammunition captured. Four of the ARVN troops died while participating in the clashes and 10 were wounded.

US river patrol boats operating with a South Vietnamese Landing Ship, 12 miles southeast of Can Tho on the Song Hau Giang (River), received intense enemy automatic weapon and recoilless rifle fire. Friendly units returned the fire with unknown results. The South Vietnamese suffered 25 wounded. There were no US casualties.

ARC LIGHT OPERATIONS

Sixty B-52 sorties were flown yesterday. Eighteen aircraft bombed truck parks, storage areas, and military complexes west and northwest of Khe Sanh. Twelve aircraft struck supply bases and defensive positions west of Dak To. Troop concentrations, antiaircraft weapons positions, and bunkers northeast of Tay Ninh City were struck by 24 bombers; the remaining six hit bunkers and tunnel complexes on an infiltration route south-southeast of that provincial capital.

NORTH VIETNAM

TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

There were four Navy sorties flown over North Vietnam from midnight EST, 8 November to midnight, 9 November. Three sorties were flown over Route Package 2 (RP-2) and one sortie over RP-3. There were no enemy reactions reported.

LAOS

BARREL ROLL AND STEEL TIGER OPERATIONS

There were 381 sorties flown over Laos yesterday. Results achieved included the destruction of 17 bunkers, seven weapons positions, and five trucks. Other targets struck included storage areas, truck parks, and road segments.

10 November 1968

Page 4

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

56c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS
SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

10 November 1968

	(1) ^a 24 Hrs Ending 11 AM EST 9 Nov 68	(2) ^a Current Week 11 AM EST 2 Nov 68 Through 11 AM EST 8 Nov 68	(3) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68	(4) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67	(5) ^b Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61
UNITED STATES^c					
Killed	3	167	13,329	22,494	29,351
Wounded Not Hosp	25	558	41,252	70,906	88,027
Wounded Hosp	27	603	43,495	75,866	96,483
Captured	0	0	100	235	331
Missing	0	1	232	503	879
SOUTH VIETNAM					
Killed	40	161	19,157	30,037	72,332
Wounded	84	680	48,632	78,080	163,322
Missing/Captured	0	16	2,166	4,506	29,510
OTHER ALLIED					
Killed	1	6	884	1,989	2,587
Wounded	5	6	1,813	4,131	5,861
Missing/Captured	0	0	9	12	29
VIET CONG/NVA					
Killed ^d	193	1,477	165,601	253,682	412,835
Wounded ^e	290	2,268	248,454	380,576	619,305
WEAPONS SEIZED					
Individual	85	598	46,857	75,279	- -
Crew Served	2	61	9,470	12,352	- -

a. All figures in column (1) and all but U.S. figures in column (2) are unrefined battlefield casualties reported daily.

b. Figures in columns (3) through (5) are validated at least once each week and represent casualties reported during period indicated.

c. U.S. Casualties occurring throughout Southeast Asia. U.S. figures in columns (2) through (5) are confirmed by Service Casualty Sections.

d. Includes estimated 10,000 political and impressed civilians (not identified with EOB units) KIA during February 1968 Tet offensive.

e. Estimate based on 1.5 Wounded-to-Killed ratio.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By rg NARA Date 4-6-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

12:45 PM -- Monday,
November 11, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

The NPT is urgent because delay is strengthening the forces opposed to the Treaty in Israel, India, Japan, and Germany;

-- the failure of the Senate to act on the NPT is denying us negotiating leverage; for example, with respect to the Israel Phantom deal, the India food deal, etc.

It must be underlined that intelligence sources suggest that some potential nuclear powers are moving forward to the nuclear threshold quite rapidly. Delay is most dangerous.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 6, NARA, Date 2/12/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12:15 PM -- Monday,
November 11, 1968

Mr. President:

Bob Komer received a telephone call from Saigon last night saying that the October evaluation of pacification shows a 3% increase in GVN control of population bringing the figure to a new high of 69.8%.

This is due to the joint US-ARVN offensive in the countryside, and especially improved performance by the RF/PF (Regional and Popular forces).

The figures are so good they are being checked on the computers in Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1980
By rg, NARA, Date 4-7-93

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998
By rg, NARA, Date 4-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

SANITIZED

59

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(PS)

~~SECRET~~

11:35 AM -- Monday,
November 11, 1968

Mr. President:

1.3
(a)(5)

This is a disturbing [redacted] report of Thieu's frame of mind after he saw Bunker on November 9 but before he got Dirksen's message of Saturday on Bunker's constructive proposals put to Thieu via the Foreign Minister yesterday. Key passages marked. The most important are paragraphs 11-12, side-lined in red. After six months of your - side - our - side it is, indeed, painful for Thieu to balk at the hurdle now.

W. Rostow

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-514

By sig, NARA, Date 6-8-93

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT



Department of State TELEGRAM

559a

~~SECRET~~

2930Q
1968 NOV 11 AM 8:06 AM

OO RUEHC
DE RUALOT 13708/ID 3161230
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111133Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3306
STATE ORNC

Postwar

BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 13708

NODIS HARVAN

SUBJECT: ~~AMB KITAHARA'S NOVEMBER 9 CALL-ON-PRESIDENT-THIEU~~

1. FONOFF SEA SECTION CHIEF YANAI NOV 11 CALLED IN EMBOFF AND READ KITAHARA'S REPORT OF SUBJECT MEETING WITH PRES THIEU, WHICH TOOK PLACE 9 NOVEMBER 1210-1:20 PM IMMEDIATELY AFTER AMB BUNKER LEFT PRES THIEU. YANAI READ TELEGRAM AT DICTATION SPEED AS FOLLOWS:

2. SUMMARY. THIEU WAS VERY ELOQUENT IN EXPRESSING HIS COMPLAINTS AGAINST USG. HE APPEALED FOR GOJ UNDERSTANDING OF DIFFICULTIES FACING GVN. THIEU HAD AGITATED AIR THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION. KITAHARA'S GENERAL IMPRESSION WAS THAT IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE A BREAK-THROUGH TAKES PLACE ON THE PROBLEM. OPEN PARTICIPATION IN THE PARIS TALKS. KITAHARA SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC REGARDING THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH THIEU. END SUMMARY.

3. KITAHARA OPENED THE INTERVIEW BY TAKING UP SEVEN POINTS:

1. NVN APPARENTLY SHIFTED ITS STRATEGY BY AGREEING TO THE PARIS PEACE TALKS. THEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF THIS SITUATION GVN SHOULD ACT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS IN ANTICIPATION OF WHAT WILL FOLLOW.

2. WHILE GOJ UNDERSTANDS THAT GVN HAS SOME COMPLAINTS, IT BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD NOT BE BENEFICIAL FOR GVN TO GIVE IMPRESSION THEY ARE BOYCOTTING THE PARIS TALKS. IF PRES. THIEU TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE MINUSES WHICH WOULD FOLLOW FROM BOYCOTTING HE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CONCLUDE IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR GVN TO ATTEND THE PARIS CONFERENCE AND TO THERE MAKE CLEAR GVN POSITIONS.

3. VN WAR HAS PROGRESSED FROM THE MILITARY STAGE TO A NEW STAGE WHERE DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS GO HAND IN HAND. NOW IS THE RIGHT TIME FOR GVN TO LAUNCH A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE. IN THIS CONNECTION, GVN HAS THE SUPPORT OF MANY FRIENDLY

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ -0198-42-2-13

By 444 NAR, Date 12-08-2017

~~SECRET~~

-2- SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 13708, NOV 11, (NODIS/HARVAN)

COUNTRIES WHO WILL ASSIST WHICH IS QUITE FAVORABLE AS COMPARED WITH THE SITUATION OF NVN. THEREFORE, THERE IS NO NEED FOR GVN TO WORRY FOR IT HAS MANY FRIENDS.

4. POLITICAL SITUATION IN SVN WILL BECOME CRITICAL AFTER THIS NEW STATE IS ENTERED INTO. THIS NEW STAGE WILL INCLUDE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AS WELL AS MILITARY ACTIONS. NLF HAD A MUCH EASIER TIME DURING THE FORMER MILITARY STAGE, JUST CARRYING OUT MILITARY OPERATIONS, BUT IN THIS STAGE, NLF WILL FACE MANY NEW PROBLEMS, WHILE GVN WILL BE ENJOYING STRONG SUPPORT FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FIELD. GOJ WOULD LIKE TO PLAY A CERTAIN ROLE IN THIS CONNECTION.

5. PRES THIEU HAS BEEN EMPHASIZING THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM. WE HAVE NOW REACHED THE TIME WHEN WE SHOULD FIGHT AGAINST COMMUNISM ON THE NEW BATTLEFIELD OF DIPLOMACY WHILE CONTINUING TO PURSUE THE MILITARY STRUGGLE.

6. REFERRING TO PRES THIEU'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PREVIOUS DAY (NOV 8) REGARDING GVN DESIRE TO HEAD DELEGATION IN PARIS, AMB KITAHARA SAID HE IMAGINED THAT ANNOUNCEMENT HAD BEEN EFFECTIVE IN RALLYING SUPPORT OF VN PUBLIC OPINION IN REGARD TO PARTICIPATION OF GVN IN PARIS TALKS. KITAHARA ASKED IF PRES THIEU HAD ANY IDEA OF BREAKTHROUGH IN THIS SITUATION.

7. IF IN THE COURSE OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN USG AND GVN, THERE IS ANYTHING GOJ CAN DO TO ASSIST SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS, GOJ IS WILLING TO TAKE PAINS TO ASSIST.

4. PRES THIEU REPLIED AS FOLLOWS: HE SAID HE APPRECIATES GOJ POSITION. AS FAR AS US BOMBING HALT IS CONCERNED, THERE IS NO PROBLEM BECAUSE TARGETS FOR BOMBING IN NORTH WHERE NO LONGER NUMEROUS. PROBLEM NOW IS PARTICIPATION OF GVN IN PARIS TALKS. USG ASKED GVN TO ATTEND PARIS TALKS UNDER "YOUR SIDE, OUR SIDE" FORMULA. PREVIOUS DAY (NOV 8) PRES THIEU HAD MADE A NEW PROPOSAL ABOUT THIS PROBLEM WHICH AMB BUNKER HAD JUST TOLD HIM USG WAS NOT ABLE TO ACCEPT.

5. PRES THIEU SAID GVN WANTS PEACE SAME AS USG AND EVERYONE ELSE. PRES THIEU WELL AWARE THAT BY NOT PARTICIPATING IN PARIS TALKS WORLD OPINION, INCLUDING THAT OF US, WILL BECOME VERY CRITICAL OF GVN. HOWEVER, GVN HAS STRONG REASON WHY IT IS UNABLE TO ATTEND SO-CALLED "FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCE" IN PARIS. REASON IS THAT IF GVN IS TO ATTEND PARIS CONFERENCE IN ITS PRESENT FOUR-PARTY FORM, MORALE OF GVN, MILITARY AND PEOPLE WILL COLLAPSE. AMB BUNKER SAID PARIS CONFERENCE IS THREE-PARTY CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, NVN AND NLF ARE REPEATING CONFERENCE IS FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCE. IF PARIS CONFERENCE IS THREE-PARTY CONFERENCE WHY DOESN'T USG DENY NVN STATEMENTS ABOUT IT BEING FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCE?

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-3- SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 13708, NOV 11, (NODIS/HARVAN)

6. PRES THIEU CONTINUED AS FOLLOWS: WHILE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA ARE EXTENDING VITAL ASSISTANCE TO NVN, THEY ARE PUTTING NVN OUT IN FRONT AS THEIR REPRESENTATIVE. ON OTHER HAND, USG, THE STRONGEST POWER IN THE WORLD, IS NOW DEALING DIRECTLY WITH NVN AND AS A RESULT OF THIS SITUATION GVN IS NOT IN FRONT WHEN DEALING WITH NVN. THEREFORE, NVN SAYS USG IS AGGRESSOR IN THE NORTH AND INTERFERING IN THE SOUTH, ETC. WHAT IS AT STAKE IS THE USG ATTITUDE TOWARD THE GVN AND USG POLICY ITSELF TOWARD THE GVN WHICH IS REFLECTED IN THIS ATTITUDE. PRES THIEU SAYS HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND PRESENT USG POLICY WHICH IS NOT TO LISTEN FULLY TO GVN POSITION WHILE HAVING THE EFFECT OF SAVING NLF FACE. USG SAYS WE MUST LISTEN TO THE VOICE OF NLF BUT WHY DOESN'T IT LISTEN TO GVN VOICE?

JOHNSON
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

5
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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1968 NOV 11 AM 8 29

OO RUEHC
DE RUALOT 13708/2D 3161230
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 111133Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3307
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 13708

NODIS HARVAN

7. SINCE USG IS STRONGEST WORLD POWER, USG MIGHT WELL DEAL WITH USSR AND, IF NECESSARY, COMMUNIST CHINA BUT WHY IS IT NECESSARY FOR USG TO DEAL WITH NVN? PRES THIEU WOULD LIKE TO SEE NORTH AND SOUTH VN ON AN EQUAL FOOTING SEEKING SOLUTION DIRECTLY BY MEANS OF COMPROMISE. IN TALKS BETWEEN GVN AND NLF ARE NECESSARY, THEY CAN TAKE PLACE IN SAIGON IN INDEPENDENCE PALACE, SUCH LINE OF THOUGHT WAS NOT HEEDED BY USG IN PARIS SINCE MAY. PRESENT SITUATION IS VERY DIFFICULT AND IF EVERYBODY MAKE THEIR OWN PROPOSAL AND THE PROPOSALS ARE NOT AGREED UPON, WE MUST RESHUFFLE THE CARDS AND GO BACK TO THE BEGINNING. PRES THIEU CONCLUDED THIS EMOTIONAL EXPOSITION OF HIS POSITION BY ASKING AMB KITAHARA TO TELL HIM IF KITAHARA HAD ANY IDEAS ABOUT THIS.

8. AMB KITAHARA ASKED WHY DOES THE PARTICIPATION OF NLF, IN WHATEVER FORM IT MAY BE, POSE SUCH A GRAVE HINDRANCE TO GVN PARTICIPATION IN TALKS?

9. PRES THIEU RESPONDED NLF OCCUPIES 20 PERCENT OF THE AREA OF SVN AND THEY WILL BRING NLF FLAG TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. APART FROM THESE MINOR MATTERS, ACCEPTANCE BY GVN OF FAIT ACCOMPLI OF NLF ATTENDING CONFERENCE IN THIS MANNER WILL HAVE EFFECT OF PREDICTING THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT INTO THE MINDS OF THE SVN PEOPLE AT LARGE.

10. AMB KITAHARA SAID THAT SUCH A REACTION ON THE PART OF SVN ROLE IS AT THIS MOMENT ONLY AN ASSUMPTION. THEREFORE, IF USG GIVES SOME KIND OF GUARANTEE TO GVN IN ADVANCE THAT USG WILL OPPOSE A COALITION WOULD GVN BE ABLE TO ATTEND PARIS MEETING?

11. PRES THIEU SAID PERHAPS USG WILL GIVE HIM SOME FORM OF GUARANTEE BUT SUCH GUARANTEE IS NOT IN ITSELF STRONG ENOUGH TO SOOTHE SVN PUBLIC OPINION. IF NLF ATTENDS PARIS TALKS, AND IF GVN ALSO ATTENDS PARIS TALKS AND IF NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE FOR A FEW MONTHS OR A FEW YEARS, SVN PEOPLE WILL FORM SOME TENDENCY IN WHICH THEY

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-2- SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 13708, NOV 11 (NODIS/HARVAN)

WILL RECOGNIZE THE NLF AS A POLITICAL ENTITY IN FACT. AS A RESULT OF SUCH TENDENCY, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF SVN, WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, WILL BE SOME KIND OF COALITION GOVERNMENT. ONLY SVN PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND SUCH PROBLEMS.

12. PRES THIEU SAID, "IF I AGREE TO ATTEND THE FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCE AT THIS TIME, THERE WILL BE A REVOLUTION IN SVN. I WOULD RATHER RESIGN MY OFFICE THAN HAVE TO ACCEPT THE FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCE WHICH IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE IDEALS AND POLICIES OF THE GVN. I DON'T THINK PARTICIPATION OF NLF IS A PROCEDURAL PROBLEM. THERE MAY BE A PROBLEM OF FORM, BUT THIS HAS DIRECT BEARING ON POLITICAL SUBSTANCE."

13. PRES THIEU SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY USG OPENLY DISCUSSED SUCH A CRUCIAL PROBLEM FOR FIVE MONTHS IN PARIS. "I WOULD RATHER LIKE TO HAVE SEEN SUCH A PROBLEM DISCUSSED SECRETLY IN PHNOM PENH OR SOME OTHER APPROPRIATE PLACE AND IF NO RESULTS CAME FROM SUCH SECRET DISCUSSIONS THEN JUST BURY THE TALKS." PRES THIEU SAID THAT THEREFORE IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS PROBLEM IS NOT ONE OF "FACE" BUT OF SUBSTANCE ITSELF. HE HAD TO ENTERTAIN SOME DOUBTS ABOUT USG POLICY BECAUSE USG HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY ACCEPTING A FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCE SINCE START OF PARIS TALKS.

14. AT SEVEN A.M. ON NOV 1 US SIDE REJECTED GVN WISH THAT GVN WOULD LIKE TO NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH NVN TO MAKE CLEAR THAT GVN WOULD ACCEPT NLF PARTICIPATION ONLY AS MEMBER OF NVN DELEGATION. PRES THIEU SAID AT THAT TIME HE ASKED USG FOR A LAST CHANCE TO GO DIRECTLY TO NVN TO TELL THEM GVN WOULD ACCEPT NLF ONLY AS PART OF NVN DELEGATION AND USG REJECTED HIS PLEA. PRES THIEU SAID WE DON'T UNDERSTAND USG ATTITUDE WHICH LISTENS TO NVN AND NLF AND WHICH CLOSES THE DOOR AGAINST ANY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GVN AND NVN. PRES THIEU SAID NOV 1 MEETING WAS LAST ACT OF NEGOTIATION BETWEEN GVN AND USG. PRES THIEU HOPED AMB KITAHARA NOW UNDERSTANDS WHY HE INCLINED TO DOUBT GOOD INTENTIONS OF USG.

15. AMB KITAHARA, IN ATTEMPT TO EASE PRES THIEU'S TENSE ATTITUDE, REPLIED IN LIGHT MANNER THAT GOJ DOES NOT DOUBT GOOD INTENTION OF USG. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDES, MANNERS, AND CUSTOMS BETWEEN OCCIDENTALS AND ORIENTALS WHO HAVE DIFFERENT WAYS OF THINKING, MISUNDERSTANDINGS CAN ARRISE. PRES THIEU SHOULD BE AWARE OF THESE THINGS AND NOT OVERLOOK THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF USG. PRES THIEU JUST LAUGHED AND SAID NOTHING.

16. AMB KITAHARA, SAID IF SITUATION CONTINUES AS IT IS NOW, THIS WOULD ONLY BE PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF NVN PROPAGANDA. WE MUST AVOID THIS. WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT AT THIS STAGE IS SOLIDARITY OF FREE NATIONS BECAUSE PARIS TALKS ARE A KIND OF DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SECTION 2 OF 2 TOKYO 13708, NOV 11 (NODIS/HARVAN)

WITH COMMUNISM. PROGRESS OF PARIS TALKS WILL NOT BE SMOOTH AND IT WILL TAKE TIME TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING. AT SAME TIME, AMB KITAHARA EMPHASIZED IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO INSIST THAT USG RENEGOTIATE WITH NVN. THEREFORE, INSTEAD OF "RATIONALIZING" ABOUT THREE OR FOUR PARTY NATURE OF PARIS TALKS, PARIS CONFERENCE SHOULD JUST BE CONSIDERED "CONFERENCES AND PROPOSALS". AMB KITAHARA CONCLUDED "WHY DON'T YOU GO AHEAD TO PARIS AND MAKE CLEAR YOUR POSITION AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS?"

17. PRES THIEU RESPONDED THERE MIGHT NOT BE ANY SOLUTION OTHER THAN TO HAVE VARIOUS FORMS OF CONFERENCES. HE CONCLUDED BY REPEATING THAT IF NO PROPOSALS ARE AGREED UPON THEN WE MUST RESHUFFLE THE CARDS AND GO BACK TO THE BEGINNING.

18. AMB KITAHARA COMMENTED THAT HIS INTERVIEW WENT TWENTY MINUTES BEYOND ITS SCHEDULED TIME AND HE THEREFORE WITHDREW AT THIS POINT. HE SAID HE WAS REPORTING THE CONVERSATION IN DETAIL SINCE THE SITUATION WAS MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN HE HAD ANTICIPATED. HE WILL SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER AT FOUR PM NOVEMBER 11 AND REPEAT THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS TO HIM.

19. ASSUME DEPARTMENT WILL DESIRE REPEAT SAIGON AND PARIS.

GP-1. JOHNSON
BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

60

Pres file

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

Monday, November 11, 1968 -- 11:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Checking the chronology once more, I found that one important element is left out:

-- Your message to Dobrynin, delivered on the evening of the 27th of October, by me; *(Sub A)*

-- Kesygin's reply to you -- giving assurances that our doubts were "without foundation", on the 28th. *(Sub B)*

Both are attached.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By HP, NARA, Date 7-10-97

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

60a

ps
~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

Sunday, October 27, 1968 -- 12 midnight

Mr. President:

With the indicated typographical changes, I gave the attached to Dobrynin tonight. I told him they were rough notes and an oral communication, not in any sense formal governmental message. On the other hand, he should understand that they accurately reflected how the President feels at the moment.

I then explained bluntly the President's dilemma in having to take such a major step at such a critical political period in the U.S. with nothing more from Hanoi or Moscow than assent by silence. I indicated the importance that the President attached to some positive indication from the Soviet Union that there was reason to believe that it was Hanoi's intent to honor the understanding on the DMZ and the cities. I said this was not a matter of our forces being able to protect themselves, but it did relate to the full consequences in the U.S., in Vietnam, and on the world scene of our having to resume the bombing.

Dobrynin indicated that he understood the problem; that he did not know what positively the authorities in Moscow might be able to say to the President at this time, but he would solicit an early response, if a response could be given.

Dobrynin then reviewed the time factor involved if we were to hold to a first meeting on November 2.

I underlined the urgency of a response from Moscow, as he left.

W. A. Rostow
W. A. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: MLG 92-214
By: 4/29, NARA, Date: 10-3-98

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~*Tab A*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-118
By 4/6/97, NARA, Date 10-3-97

October 27, 1968

The President has not made any decision on the discussions and does not intend to do so until he has talked to the leadership in Congress and appropriate committees and to the candidates. He also desires to have whatever understanding is reached carefully evaluated by Amb. Bunker and Gen. Abrams and expects to have their comments and recommendation in connection therewith. He is going back to Amb. Harriman and Amb. Vance tonight and urge them to make abundantly clear to the North Vietnamese the three points ^{that we expect the South Vietnamese to be received} ~~the North Vietnamese will be expected to be receiving at the~~ ^{at the first meeting on Saturday;} ~~first meeting on Saturday.~~ And that we will expect, while these discussions continue, that the DMZ and the cities will be respected. He is very anxious to have this clearly and succinctly repeated to the North Vietnamese so as to avoid any charge of deception and any risk of misunderstanding. Although he does not expect them to agree this is a condition or reciprocal action, he does expect them to understand that Gen. Abrams has been issued rules of engagement and that a failure to respect either the DMZ or the cities, that would trigger retaliation and disrupt the conference. The President feels it is better this understanding take place in advance before the bombing stops rather than have it stop and start again because of alleged misunderstanding.

In addition, the President, in spite of the incidents around the 37-day pause, desires that your Government be informed of the assumption on which he is proceeding so as to avoid any deception or misunderstanding ^{with respect} ~~on the part~~ ^{to} ~~of your government.~~ He is proceeding on these assumptions in the belief that Mr. Kosygin understands them and "has reason to believe" that if the bombing stopped productive discussions could promptly follow. Of course

productive discussions could not continue if the DMZ and the cities were not respected.

The President is very anxious to have any comments or reaction Mr. Kosygin may have to these three points, in light of Mr. Kosygin's letters of June and the other day ^(October 25). The President will carefully weigh Mr. Kosygin's observations before making a decision.

(October 28, 1968)

602

The progress made at the meetings in Paris between representatives of the DRV and the United States on the halt of the bombings of the DRV, on the opening of political negotiations and on the participants of these negotiations, is being noted with satisfaction in Moscow.

The representatives of the United States in Paris have had more than once an opportunity to get convinced in to become sure of the seriousness of intentions of the Vietnamese side in the search for mutually acceptable solutions. The Vietnamese leaders have repeatedly told us as well about the seriousness of their intentions. The most recent facts, in our view, convincingly prove, that the Vietnamese side is doing everything possible to put an end to the war in Vietnam and reach a peaceful settlement on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of the Vietnamese people.

In this connection, it seems to us that doubts with regard to the position of the Vietnamese side are without foundation (groundless).

DISCLASSIFIED

Authority W.H. Riedel

By h, NARA, Date 10-3-92

Tab B

Monday, November 11, 1968 -- 10:40 a. m.

Mr. President:

Joe Alsop called on Sunday.

Joe said he put the point to Bui Diem as hard and personally as he could -- saying that a failure to get a Saigon delegation to Paris promptly will blow all Saigon's supporters out of the water -- including himself.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

62

SECRET--EYES ONLY

Per file

**Monday, November 11, 1968
10:30 a. m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith Sec. Rusk's draft -- should you
decide that a letter from Nixon will be helpful.**

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By sg, NARA, Date 4-6-93

SECRET-EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-74
By MP, NARA, Date 4-18-95

62a

~~SECRET~~

SUGGESTED LETTER

Dear President Thieu:

I look forward to working closely with you and your government, following my Inauguration in January, to establish an honorable and reliable peace in Viet-Nam as soon as possible.

President Johnson and Secretary Rusk have briefed me fully on the negotiations in Paris as well as on our consultations with the Government of Viet-Nam. We gave particular attention to the discussions with your government from October 15 through the negotiation of the agreed Joint Communiqué on October 28th and the problems raised on your side in connection with that agreement.

I wish to urge you, with all possible emphasis, quickly to resolve whatever problems may remain in order that your delegation may arrive in Paris promptly and come to grips with the central issues on which a peace settlement depends.

I fully share President Johnson's concern that any further delay in the arrival of your delegation in Paris could seriously endanger public support for our joint effort among the American people and thus endanger the struggle for the independence and freedom of South Viet-Nam in which both our countries have made large sacrifices.

As you know from the talk between Senator Dirksen and your Ambassador in Washington, I share President Johnson's view that in

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-2-

the Paris talks there will be no recognition of the NLF as an independent entity and that the United States Government will not attempt to impose upon South Viet-Nam a coalition government with the NLF.

I have no doubt that we can work closely together in Paris just as we have worked closely together in meeting the enemy on the field of battle. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that we demonstrate that we are prepared to take every possible step to achieve promptly an honorable peace and that, if peace does not come, the responsibility will be upon the authorities in Hanoi.

With very best wishes,

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

63

~~SECRET~~

10:10 AM -- Monday,
November 11, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith the account of Bill Bundy's
talk with Bui Diem after the latter had
talked with Dirksen and Thieu.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AG, NARA, Date 4-6-93

SECRET ATTACHMENT

State 269960 HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS 11/10

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

269960

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10 Nov 68 18 23Z

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON

~~SECRET~~ IMMEDIATE

Info

INFO : AmEmbassy PARIS

IMMEDIATE

STATE 269960

TODEL 1523

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76991-510

By ag/jw, NARA, Date 4-6-93

1. Ambassador Bui Diem called on Bundy at 10:00 a.m. November 10 to inform him that he had spoken by phone with President Thieu at approximately 2:00 p.m. Saigon time (1:00 a.m. Washington time). According to Diem purpose of call was to convey to his President substance of message which he (Diem) had received ~~high-ranking~~ during course of November 9 from/spokesman for President-elect Nixon: that there was bipartisan agreement that no coalition government would be imposed on Viet-Nam and NLF would be not given status as a separate entity in Paris. At same time, Bui Diem had been cautioned that Congressional and public opinion in US did not understand Saigon's refusal to go to Paris and as consequence negative reaction was building which could create

Drafted by: EA/VN:JRBurke/pbd 11/10/68

Tel. Ext. 4535

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

EA:WPBundy

Clearance:

S/S - DGleysteen

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

~~SECRET~~

Classification

difficulties if Paris talks were delayed indefinitely due to continuing GVN refusal to participate.

2. President Thieu, according to Diem, was pleased to receive this information because he is principally concerned about obtaining specific assurances that there will be no coalition government and that NLF would not be treated as a separate entity in Paris.

3. Bundy informed Diem that Ambassador Bunker was in possession of a draft statement and would be presenting it to GVN which would appear to meet President Thieu's two points.

4. Bui Diem expressed gratification that there now seemed to be way of moving out of present impasse. He said that he came away from his conversation with President Thieu convinced that latter was most eager to move off present dead center. He said that President Thieu had emphasized that this was a matter of principle and there was no intention on the part of Saigon to sabotage Paris talks.

GP-1

END

~~SECRET~~

Classification

64

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 11, 1968
10:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter to Thieu from
Mr. Nixon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ag, NARA, Date 4-6-93

WWRostow:ria

64a

DRAFT -- November 10, 1968

Dear President Thieu:

President Johnson and Secretary Rusk have now briefed me in the greatest detail on the evolution of the negotiations in Paris over recent months and on the consultations and negotiations with the Government of Vietnam and its constitutional leaders. This review included especially the discussions and agreements with your government from October 15 through the negotiation of the draft joint communique on October 28 and the subsequent withdrawal of your government from that agreement.

In the light of this knowledge, I wish to urge you, with all the emphasis I can, quickly to resolve whatever problems may remain in getting your delegation to Paris and finding ways, in collaboration with the Government of the United States, to come to grips promptly with the substantive issues on which a peace settlement depends.

You should know that I fully share President Johnson's concern that any further delay on this matter could endanger public support for the Government of Vietnam in the United States and thus endanger the struggle for the independence and freedom of South Vietnam and for a stable and honorable peace in Southeast Asia.

As you know from the talk between Senator Dirksen and your Ambassador in Washington, I share President Johnson's view that in the Paris talks there will be, from our side, no recognition of the NLF as an

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71-508

By ts/ajp, NARA, Date 4-6-93

Independent entity; and that the U. S. Government will not attempt to impose on South Vietnam a coalition government with the NLF.

I have also reviewed with President Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the military situation in Vietnam, including reports from General Abrams in the field. It is my impression that, if we proceed with present military plans, there is no reason that we cannot move forward in Paris from a position of negotiating strength.

But, I would emphasize again, this requires an appearance in Paris of a GVN delegation within the next few days, ready to go to work seriously in the search for an early and honorable peace. In short, I can see no gain and potentially much loss from any efforts by your government to postpone decisions with respect to the Paris talks until January 20, 1969.

Richard M. Nixon

WWRostow:rla

65

~~SECRET~~

9:55 AM -- Monday,
November 11, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith an account and map of the
DMZ incidents.

Vance has asked for a session with
Lam to protest.

Our men carried out counter-action
with artillery fire and air strikes
as their standing orders permit.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-54
By Ling, NARA, Date 4-24-91

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

10 November 1968
2200 EST

650

S

MEMORANDRUM FOR RECORD

Subject: DMZ Violations

1. At 092130 EST, elements of the US 3d Marine Division at Con Thien (Point 1 on attached map) received 16 artillery rounds (probable 75-mm pack howitzer fire) from one suspected enemy location in the DMZ (Point 2) and one confirmed firing position (Point 3). After confirmation was made by observing muzzle flashes, a flight of two USMC A-4s flew air strikes and artillery fired counterbattery at the established target.

2. At 092200 EST, troops of the 3d Battalion, US 3d Marine Regiment (Point 4) received a number of rocket rounds from a suspected location in the DMZ (Point 5). At 092220 EST, the same element received eight 122-mm rockets from a confirmed location in the DMZ (Point 6). At 092320 EST, the same battalion received a number of 122-mm rockets from an unknown location. Four Marines were killed and 41 were wounded in these rocketings. Artillery fired counterbattery at the confirmed enemy rocket position (Point 6). The enemy firing position and the impact of the counterbattery fire were observed by an aerial observer. Results of this US fire are unknown.

1 Incl
Map of DMZ


R.S. MOORE
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

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J-31	NSA REP
J-32	CIA REP
J-33	STATE REP
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AFCP	

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998
By rg NARA Date 4-6-93

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1998

By RS NARA, Date 4-6-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9:45 AM -- Monday,
November 11, 1968

66

Pres file

Mr. President:

I called Ellsworth Bunker to check the NBC story.

He says it is rumor -- not fact, so far as he knows. He believes it could have arisen from Lam's return to Paris.

He has filed our suggestions with the Foreign Minister. He will see Thieu tomorrow his time. He thinks things are moving.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-414

By cb, NARA, Date 10-25-95

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-171

By *ijg*, NARA Date 11-6-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Monday - November 11, 1968

68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Peru - IPC Expropriation

Secretary Rusk is anxious not to provoke prematurely an open confrontation with Peru over the IPC case. Secretary Fowler and Ed Clark disagree, and Clark may make a statement this week before the IDB Board which could harden Peru's position.

Under the Hickenlooper Amendment, Peru has until early April to take satisfactory steps to compensate the Company before the US is required to cut off aid and suspend Peru's sugar quota. IPC officials (guided by the parent company, Standard Oil of New Jersey) are now negotiating with the Peruvian Government. Ambassador Jones has made clear to the government the eventual consequences should the expropriation stand without satisfactory compensation under international law. Our IMF representative has also officially notified the IMF Board of the effect on Peru's balance of payments should we be obliged to invoke the Hickenlooper sanctions. Secretary Rusk believes that any further confrontation at this moment would cause the Peruvian Government to harden its attitudes toward IPC's proposals and could lead Peru to take other unwise acts against private US investors.

Although prospects for an early settlement are dim, we now see a few signs that some members of the military government are beginning to realize the implication of their hasty decision and are casting about for a face-saving formula. Moreover, President Velasco has been losing support among his military colleagues for other reasons. He may be replaced as President in the near future by one of the Generals who is less publicly committed to an uncompromising position on the IPC case.

Secretary Fowler disagrees about the desirability of "no confrontation now". He would probably invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment at this time, if it were his decision, rather than wait the maximum statutory period. In any event, he is concerned about the reaction of our Congress toward new appropriations for the IDB and the IDA if the US representatives in the IDB and the IBRD do not take strong stands to penalize Peru for its expropriation of IPC.

Fowler and Rusk have agreed that our representatives should try to discourage any new loans for Peru coming up for decision in these

multilateral agencies for the time being. Rusk would like this to be done discreetly behind the scenes. Fowler, with Ed Clark's very strong support, thinks we should take a public position in advance to make clear to Peru and to the other Latins that we would veto any IDB loans were they to be presented. Fowler and Clark also want to make clear our intention to vote against a routine extension of time for a Peru housing loan already in the pipeline.

We have not yet invoked the Hickenlooper Amendment against our bilateral AID programs. Technical assistance and loan disbursements continue. However, our whole bilateral aid program is under review and no "new starts" are currently being approved. We have taken considerable pains not to relate this review to the IPC case.

There is a serious question whether we should invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment in the international agencies before we do so on our bilateral programs.

W. W. Rostow

SWLewis:mmm

69

ACTION

SECRET

Sunday, November 10, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

Mr. President:

In view of the negotiation of the Phantoms without making the nuclear question a "condition precedent," Sec. Rusk believes it would be wise for you to send the attached message to Prime Minister Eshkol.

Sec. Rusk, Sec. Clifford and I believe you may wish to follow this up with a most solemn talk with Eshkol on the mortal danger involved in their proceeding to move towards nuclear weapons and delivery systems, when you see Eshkol.

W. W. Rostow

Message approved _____

Approved as amended _____

Call me _____

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By ULLA NLJ-0198-422-14
NAR, Date 12-08-2017

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

Ambassy TEL AVIV

STATE

NODIS

1. You should deliver this as a personal message from the President to Prime Minister Eshkol:

2. QUOTE Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you, first, to welcome the prospect of your visit here later this month, and secondly, to raise with you again a subject that has become of increasing importance to me as I enter the closing days of my Administration.

As I look back over my five years in office, I find that one endeavor overshadows all those that have called upon my time and energy. This has been the search for peace. Central to it has been our effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States has assumed a special responsibility for this endeavor. It is at the heart not only of my own nation's security interests but also of the security of every nation in the world. As you know I am personally deeply committed to this task.

NEA/IAI: MSterner: cr: 11/8/68 4523

NEA - Parker T. Hart

NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton

NEA - Mr. Davies

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

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FORM DS-322
8-65

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NEJ 019-12-2-15

NAR, Date 12-08-2017

By LUX

2

TEL AVIV

696~~SECRET~~

You are aware of my deep concern on this subject, ^{was} expressed to you personally as long ago as May 1965. Since then there has been no slackening of the arms race in the Near East, and the weapons introduced into the area have grown increasingly sophisticated. It would be a tragedy--an irreversible tragedy--if this arms race extended into the field of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Secretary Rusk emphasized these points last month to Foreign Minister Eban when he stressed the United States' concern that Israel's continued delay in signing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will have the effect of increasing, rather than reducing, pressures for other area states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

We have carefully studied your Government's paper handed to Ambassador Barbour on October 29. We welcome the reaffirmation of your Government's assurances that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. It is our strong conviction, however, that with a Non-Proliferation Treaty now in existence, only Israel's adherence to that Treaty can give the world confidence that Israel does not intend to develop nuclear weapons.

I therefore welcome the statement in your Government's paper that you are engaged in intensive study of the implications of signing the Treaty. It is my earnest hope that this study will result in a decision to sign the Treaty at an early date. Israel's failure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be a severe blow to my Government's

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ -019-42-2-15

NAR, Date 12-08-2017

~~SECRET~~FORM DS-322A
8-63

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3

TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~

global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States would also be deeply troubled if operational strategic missiles were to appear in the Near East. I hope you can give me an encouraging response on these matters when we talk later this month.

It will be good to see you here. You are welcome not only as a distinguished and esteemed colleague but as a close personal friend.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

END QUOTE

GP-3

END


INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Ruz file

Sunday, November 10, 1968
12:00 noon.

Mr. President:

Herewith a message of November 8

indicating Nixon's apparent plans with
respect to Vietnam as of that time.

1.3(a)(4)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rla

KAB443

~~TOP SECRET~~

70a

KAB443

1968 NOV 10 15 58

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SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-413

By CG, NARA Date 6-21-99

OO [redacted] 15 1530
O 101502Z ZYH
FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE HOUSE (ATTN MR ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY)
ZEM

1.5(c),(d),(g)

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted] TRANSMITTED HEREWITH IS A [redacted] MESSAGE.
NORMAL DISTRIBUTION FOR THIS MESSAGE IS [redacted].
PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY LIMITATIONS OVER AND ABOVE EXISTING
[redacted] ARE REQUIRED. THIS MESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED TO THE
WHITE HOUSE ONLY.

1.5(c),(d),(g)

XXYYEPP2IFIEIIR
3/3 [redacted] T -52

1.5(c),(d),(g)

THE DESIR TO MEET WITH MR. NIXON AFTER LATTER RETURNS FROM FLORIDA

XX00

[redacted]

1.5(c),(d),(g)

CONTACTS WITH PRESIDENT-ELBERT NIXON'S ENTourage HAVE
CONFIRMED THE FOLLOWING:

1. WE RECEIVED [redacted] MESSAGE AND SINCERELY THANKS YOU FOR IT.
2. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO PLAN TO [redacted] PEOPLE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON.
3. AROUND THE MIDDLE OF THE MONTH HE WILL PROBABLY SEND A GROUP OF HIS IMMEDIATE COLLEAGUES TO BRING [redacted] HIS GREETINGS AND TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS. SOME OF [redacted] FRIENDS WILL BE AMONG THOSE MAKING THE TRIP.
4. HE PLANS TO SEND ONE OF HIS REPRESENTATIVES TO PARIS. FOR THE MOMENT TWO NAMES ARE BEING CONSIDERED, AMBASSADOR WILL AND AMBASSADOR MURPHY.
5. IF HE CANNOT MAKE THE TRIP NOW HE WILL CERTAINLY DO SO AFTER, AND PROBABLY BEFORE, THE INAUGURATION.

1.5(c),(d),(g)

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CIRCLES [redacted] ARE ATTACHING GREAT IMPORTANCE TO NIXON'S ATTITUDE AS REGARDS THE PARIS TALKS. FOLLOWING [redacted] NEW PEACE PROPOSALS, THE POLITICAL CIRCLES FEEL THAT A JOHNSON-NIXON MEETING IS GOING TO BE HELD SOON.

[redacted] CONTACTS ARE ARRANGING FOR [redacted] TO SEE MR. NIXON AS SOON AS HE GETS BACK FROM FLORIDA.

1.5(c),(d),(g)

[redacted]

XX00
473

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

Sunday, November 10, 1968 -- 10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

[Redacted]

1.3
(a)(4)

It looks as though with no coalition and no recognition of the NLF as a separate entity -- points Thieu had all along -- he is ready to go.

At Tabs B-1 and B-2 are Ellsworth Bunker's proposed redrafting of our outgoing messages, Tabs C-1 and C-2.

Bui Diem has called the State Department Vietnam Desk officer (John Burke). He reported that he had spoken to Thieu about his conversation with Dirksen. He reported also, with the points about coalition and no separate entity assured, he believes Thieu will be ready to move to Paris after suitable statements are drafted. Bui Diem will be coming in to see Bundy this afternoon.

Bui Diem plans to return to Saigon shortly.

W. R. Rostow

P.S. [Redacted]

1.3
(a)(4)

W. R.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-508
By W.R., NARA, Date 12-1-92

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

71a

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

1968 NOV 10 12 25

QGQXBU

7:12 AM 11-10-68 RDR
PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 01
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

EMBASSY OF VIETNAM.

ON NOVEMBER TEN INSTANT A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST LEARNED THAT AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM WAS IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT THIEU AND ADVISED HIM THAT SENATOR EVERETT MC KINLEY DIRKSEN OF ILLINOIS HAD COME TO SEE HIM TODAY ON BEHALF OF BOTH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT ELECT RICHARD M. NIXON, AND THAT DIRKSEN HAD ASSURED AMBASSADOR DIEM THAT THE U. S. COULD GIVE POSITIVE ASSURANCES THAT: ONE, THERE WOULD BE NO COALITION, AND TWO, THERE WOULD BE NO RECOGNITION OF THE NLF AS A SEPARATE ENTITY.

AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT DIRKSEN EMPHASIZED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF BOTH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND NIXON.

THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD TOLD DIRKSEN THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET NAM'S REASONS FOR NOT ATTENDING THE PARIS CONFERENCE WERE BASED ON ITS OWN INTERESTS AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE U. S., VIS A VIS A NIXON VICTORY AT THE
END PAGE ONE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NW 0198.042.002/17
By: jc, NARA, Date: 3-17-14

JAA

PAGE TWO (SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)
POLLS OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE.

PRESIDENT THIEU CONFIRMED THAT THIS IS TRUE.

AMBASSADOR SAID THAT DIRKSEN ASSURED HIM THAT U. S. POLICY WILL REMAIN THE SAME UNDER NIXON; THAT DIRKSEN FEARED THERE MIGHT BE SOME MISUNDERSTANDING, BUT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THAT.

AMBASSADOR SAID HE TOLD DIRKSEN IT WAS NOT A MATTER OF (AT THIS POINT INFORMANT WAS UNABLE TO FURNISH EXACT WORDS OF THIEU), BUT THAT IT IS THE BASIC POINT OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND IS A REACTION TO THE STATEMENT MADE HERE: THAT THEY DID NOT THINK OF IT IN TERMS OF U. S. POLICY.

AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT DIRKSEN SAID THAT THE VIETNAM PRESIDENT COULD CONSIDER THIS AN UNEQUIVOCAL ASSURANCE ON THESE TWO POINTS: NO COALITION, AND NO RECOGNITION OF THE NLF AS A SEPARATE ENTITY. AMBASSADOR CONTINUED THAT DIRKSEN SAID THAT THIEU COULD BASE HIS ACTIONS ON THIS ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE ON THESE TWO POINTS IN CONSIDERING THE MATTER OF PARIS.

PRESIDENT THIEU ASKED, CAN THEY MAKE THESE ASSURANCES IN SOME EXPLICIT WAY?
END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE (SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

AMBASSADOR SAID, PROBABLY YES, I'VE TALKED TO BUNDY ABOUT THIS AND BUNDY SAID IF IT IS NECESSARY IT COULD PROBABLY BE DONE.

THIEU SAID, AS FAR AS THE PROBLEM IS CONCERNED, ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE POPULATION THERE HAS BEEN A DISTRUST OF THE U. S., SOME DISTRUST WHICH COMES FROM HAVING THE FRONT REPRESENTED AT PARIS. THIEU SAID THAT THE U. S. SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING TO ENCOURAGE THE COMMUNISTS, AND THAT THE MORE THE U. S. CAN SAY, THE BETTER BECAUSE THE NLF FOLLOWS CLOSELY WHAT THE U. S. SAYS.

AMBASSADOR SAID, I TOLD BUNDY THAT AND BUNDY SAID THAT THEY WILL DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY.

THIEU SAID, THE COMMUNISTS ARE CLAIMING IT IS A FOUR DELEGATION CONFERENCE, WHY DOESN'T THE U. S. DENY THAT.

THIEU CONTINUED THAT IF THE U. S. WOULD GIVE ASSURANCES ON THE TWO CONDITIONS MENTIONED AND ON A THIRD POINT (-5 5 8
BUST PAGE THREE

PAGE THREE (SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

AMBASSADOR SAID, PROBABLY YES, I'VE TALKED TO BUNDY ABOUT THIS AND BUNDY SAID IF IT IS NECESSARY IT COULD PROBABLY BE DONE.

THIEU SAID, AS FAR AS THE PROBLEM IS CONCERNED, ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE POPULATION THERE HAS BEEN A DISTRUST OF THE U. S., SOME DISTRUST WHICH COMES FROM HAVING THE FRONT REPRESENTED AT PARIS. THIEU SAID THAT THE U. S. SHOULD NOT DO ANYTHING TO ENCOURAGE THE COMMUNISTS, AND THAT THE MORE THE U. S. CAN SAY, THE BETTER BECAUSE THE NLF FOLLOWS CLOSELY WHAT THE U. S. SAYS.

AMBASSADOR SAID, I TOLD BUNDY THAT AND BUNDY SAID THAT THEY WILL DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY.

THIEU SAID, THE COMMUNISTS ARE CLAIMING IT IS A FOUR DELEGATION CONFERENCE, WHY DOESN'T THE U. S. DENY THAT.

THIEU CONTINUED THAT IF THE U. S. WOULD GIVE ASSURANCES ON THE TWO CONDITIONS MENTIONED AND ON A THIRD POINT (AT THIS POINT INFORMANT WAS UNABLE TO FURNISH EXACT WORDS OF THIEU).

THIEU SAID THAT THE LACK OF AGREEMENT HAS BEEN BASED ON PRINCIPLE AND WAS NOT MEANT TO SABOTAGE THE TALKS. THIEU SAID THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE U. S. HAS CREATED MISTRUST IN VIETNAM ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.
END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR (SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)

THIEU CONTINUED THAT THE ASSURANCES ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS MUST HAVE TWO ASPECTS: ONE, THERE SHOULD BE POSITIVE ASSURANCES SUCH AS THE AMBASSADOR HAS MENTIONED AND TWO, (AT THIS POINT INFORMANT WAS UNABLE TO FURNISH EXACT WORDS OF THIEU).

THIEU CONTINUED THAT THOSE ARE TWO ASPECTS WHICH SHOULD REASSURE PUBLIC OPINION HERE, IN VIETNAM, THAT THE AMERICANS WILL NOT PULL OUT.

AMBASSADOR ASKED IF HE COULD RETURN TO VIETNAM TO CONSULT THIEU.

THIEU REPLIED (AT THIS POINT INFORMANT WAS UNABLE TO FURNISH EXACT WORDS OF THIEU) OR IN A FEW DAYS?

AMBASSADOR INDICATED HE UNDERSTAND.

GP-1

END

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN



Department of State

71b
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 42377 3150902
ZNY SSSSS ZZK
O 100855Z NOV 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4210
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2842
STATE GRNC

1968 NOV 10 AM 4 17

028490

B-1

BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42377

DECLASSIFIED.

Authority 77L9 91-506

By ng/rap, NARA, Date 4-6-93

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT OF GVN STATEMENT, INCORPORATING OUR STATEMENT, WHICH I AM SUBMITTING THIS AFTERNOON FOR CONSIDERATION BY GVN:

2. QUOTE. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM HAS BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DURING THE PAST WEEK ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NEW AND WIDER MEETINGS IN PARIS WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM TO SEND ITS REPRESENTATIVES TO PARIS TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT AND SERIOUS TALKS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A SETTLEMENT FOR AN HONORABLE AND SECURE PEACE IN VIET-NAM.

3. AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS PROVIDED US WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON THE POINTS OF PARAMOUNT CONCERN TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM.

4. (THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF US STATEMENT AS PER STATE 269936, AS MODIFIED BY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING SAIGON MESSAGE.)

5. IN VIEW OF THIS STATEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM CONSIDERS THAT ITS CONCERNS HAVE BEEN MET AND IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM WILL TAKE PART IN THE PRELIMINARY MEETING ON PROCEDURES TO BE HELD IN PARIS ON (DATE). UNQUOTE.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

Tab B-1



Department of State

TELEGRAM

71c 2

5

~~SECRET~~

B-2

00 RUEHC
 DE RUMJIR 42376 3150910
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 100850Z NOV 68
 FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4209
 INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2841
 STATE GRNC
 BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42376

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71c 91-506
 By MS/SP, NARA, Date 4-6-93

028500

1968 NOV 10 AM 5 09

MODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: A. STATE 269935. B. STATE 269936.

1. I WILL THIS AFTERNOON SUBMIT TO THIEU, THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTER THANH, TWO PROPOSED STATEMENTS: (A) ONE WHICH WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ISSUE, ALONG THE LINES OF REF B, WITH MINOR MODIFICATIONS AS INDICATED BELOW; AND (B) ONE THAT MIGHT BE ISSUED BY THE GVN, INCORPORATING OURS, AND CONCLUDING THAT ON THE BASIS OF OUR STATEMENT THEY WERE NOW PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS. TEXT OF GVN "FRAMEWORK" STATEMENT IN NEXT FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. I HAVE MADE THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS IN THE TEXT IN PARA 2 OF REF B, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE APPEARANCE OF THE STATEMENT, WITHOUT CHANGING SUBSTANCE. THESE ARE KEYED TO LETTERED SUBPARAGRAPHS OF REFTEL.

A. NOW READS: "THIS STATEMENT IS DESIGNED TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM ABOUT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A NEW AND WIDER MEETING IN PARIS."
 (NOTE: WE HAVE DROPPED THE FINAL CLAUSE BECAUSE IT APPEARS IN THE INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH OF THE PROPOSED GVN STATEMENT.)
 B TO F. NO CHANGE.

G. FIRST SENTENCE READS: "THE STATUS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM'S REPRESENTATIVES IS THUS ALREADY DEFINED."

H. HAVE DELETED THE CLAUSE "THERE WAS NEVER THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT THAT" AND SUBSTITUTED "WE WISH TO MAKE CLEAR THAT, "AND HAVE DELETED THE LAST SENTENCE.

~~SECRET~~

Tab B-2

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 of 2 Pages 2850Q
SAIGON 42376

I. HAVE SUBSTITUTED "IS CLEARLY" FOR "HAS ALL ALONG BEEN" AND DELETED THE WORD "POLITICAL" IN PENULTIMATE SENTENCE.

J. HAVE DELETED "ADDRESS ALL QUESTIONS RELEVANT" AND SUBSTITUTED "EXPLORE ALL AVENUES".

K. NO CHANGE.

L. HAVE DELETED EVERYTHING AFTER THE SECOND SENTENCE AND SUBSTITUTED AS ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OF THAT PARAGRAPH, WITHOUT QUOTATION MARKS, THE SENTENCES: "WE HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE. THE IMPOSITION OF ANY COALITION GOVERNMENT WOULD BE AT VARIANCE WITH THIS PRINCIPLE."

3. FOLLOWING ARE MY COMMENTS ON THE OBSERVATIONS IN REF A:

A. RE PARAGRAPH 5, I DO NOT INTEND TO RAISE WITH THIEU THE IDEA OF A SINGLE MIXED OR ALLIED DELEGATION BECAUSE I FEAR THAT THIS WOULD TAKE US OFF ON A TANGENT. IF WE USE THE PHRASE "CO-CHAIRMEN", WE WILL SIMPLY ENCOURAGE HANOI TO TREAT OUR SIDE AS ONE DELEGATION AND TO CLAIM THAT IT IS A "THREE-PARTY" CONFERENCE. I THINK IT IS BEST FOR US TO STICK TO THE POSITION THAT WE ARE ONE SIDE, WITH TWO DELEGATIONS, AND EACH WITH ITS OWN HEAD; ALTHOUGH I WILL TRY TO USE WITH THIEU THE IDEA OF THE GVN BEING "PRIMUS INTER PAARES" IN THE PROTOCOLARY SENSE THAT THEY HAVE THE SEAT OF HONOR, THE RIGHT TO ENTER AND LEAVE FIRST, ETC.

B. YOU WILL NOTE THAT WE HAVE TAKEN THE WORD "POLITICAL" OUT OF PARAGRAPH I REF B. THIS WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE GVN WILL NOT ACCEPT HAVING INTERNAL POLITICAL MATTERS ON THE AGENDA.

I ASSUME THIS DELETION, WHICH FLOWS FROM THE SAME REASONING AS PARAGRAPH 7, WILL CAUSE NO DIFFICULTY. AT ANY RATE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE KEEP THE DIVISION OF FUNCTIONS AS GENERAL AS POSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE. I SHALL CERTAINLY ENCOURAGE THIEU TO HAVE SIDE TALKS IN PARIS WITH THE DRV AND SEPARATELY WITH THE NLF.

C. RE PARAGRAPH 9, I PROPOSE TO KEEP AWAY FROM THE IDEA OF TCC ENDORSEMENT, FOR THE TIME BEING. THIS CAN BE AN ADDITIONAL HELPFUL STEP IF NECESSARY TO GET THE GVN TO GO, BUT IF THEY WILL GO TO PARIS WITHOUT THAT INTERMEDIATE STEP IT WOULD OF COURSE BE PREFERABLE.

4. FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THIS: I AM ENTIRELY MINDFUL OF THE GREAT URGENCY OF RESOLVING THE PRESENT IMPASSE AND GETTING THE GVN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN MY TALKS WITH THIEU, I AM STRESSING THE URGENCY OF THE MATTER WITH ALL THE MEANS AT MY COMMAND. BUT AS BETWEEN HAVING ANOTHER SHORT POSTPONEMENT AND NEGOTIATING WITHOUT THE GVN, WITH ALL THE CONSEQUENCES, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT A FEW DAYS TO WORK THIS OUT WILL BE WELL SPENT. BUNKER

BT

~~SECRET~~

5
SANITIZED

SANITIZED
269935 71c

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

ACTION: Amembassy, SAIGON - IMMEDIATE
INFO: Amembassy, PARIS - PRIORITY

9 Nov 68 23 56z

Origin

Info

STATE 269935

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

C-1

TODEL 1520 FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. The movomont reported in 42368 is wolcomo. But you should understand that we feel a resolution of this matter is increasingly urgent, in Thieu's interest as well as ours. Congressional and newspaper awarenws of what has happened is building fast. It is uniformly and powerfully negative. It would be most unfortunate if Thieu appeared before his own people as having had to cave in to such pressure. His performance has been unhelpful, to say the least; but we do not wish to deny him and South Vietnam such advantages as he and the nationalists may have derived from this painful passage of self-assertion.

2. Therefore, we wish you to proceed to work out with Thieu on a most urgent repeat most urgent basis a compromise or

Drafted by: Text received from White House

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by

EA - Mr. Bundy

Clearances

The Secretary (Substance)
White House - Mr. Rostow

S/S - Mr. Gleysteen

~~SECRET~~

Classification

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-506

By sig, NARA, Date 2-12-92

~~SECRET~~

Classification

face-saving action that would permit him to get promptly to Paris with dignity but which would also meet our essential requirements. The agreement should, of course, be ad referendum to Washington and Paris.

3. You should regard the following as raw materials and guidelines for the negotiation of the agreed statement, if that appears the optimum form for resolving the matter. As indicated below, the heart of a proposed agreed statement is in Para ^{2.1}~~2.1~~ of the next following telegram.

4. You should also know that Amb. Harriman would be quite content to have the GVN treated as primus inter pares for protocolary purposes in Paris, with the right to enter first, speak first, etc. This can be used as you see fit.

5. With respect to the substantive role of the GVN, we could go back to Thieu with an offer to constitute "our side" as a single mixed or allied delegation, with the principal negotiators of the GVN and US designated as "co-chairmen". This is as far as we can go under our Constitution, and we believe we could live with it. However, our best guess is that Thieu would immediately see that it does not give the GVN the unique or leading status that would enable him to

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Classification

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Classification

say that Hanoi had to talk to the GVN. Moreover, it cuts right across the consistent emphasis by Thieu on the GVN being recognized as a separate delegation and thus, by implication, recognized as the legitimate government by Hanoi. Finally, Thuy in Paris is already saying that, if we make our side one delegation, they will continue to make their side two delegations; we would have what they describe as a three-sided meeting, which is just about the worst of all worlds to Thieu. Thus, we think this suggestion by us would exhaust this line of thought on his part and simply got us back to the basic formulax of two sides and two delegations on our side.

6. Whether or not we made the suggestion in Para 5 above, we could now come forward with a draft of points that could be included in a US statement; a joint US/GVN statement, or a combination of both. We have done a revised draft of the text X sent to Paris for comment yesterday, and this is set forth in the next following cable. Many of those points seem to us more ~~appropriate~~ appropriate for a US than for a joint statement, and we believe this might well be Thieu's view, specifically with regard to all that is said about what was worked out in Paris (A-G and J of the draft) and the assurances given about how the US will treat the other side (H) and the substantive positions the

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Classification

US will take (L). The material appropriate for a joint statement would thus boil down to the definition of GVN and US roles, on which we could offer the text in the present ~~XXX~~ ^{X 2.I.} In other words, a US statement could be accompanied by a joint US/GVN statement defining the respective roles, or there could be simply a joint statement.

7. A major problem with this line of approach is that we could get into another verbal haggle on the definition of roles. As a practical matter, we have every hope that the GVN will end up in direct side talks with Hanoi on the normalization of relations between the two, and in direct side talks with the NLF on the internal political structure in the South, while we would both act very closely together on provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954, with the US taking the lead on withdrawal, the Geneva Accords of ~~1954~~ 1962, and similar matters. But, for public purposes, the GVN would never accept, as we understand it, any public statement that defined the internal situation in South Viet-Nam as being within the subjects for negotiation in any way. And there is the major difficulty of tying our hands through any too-specific delineation of subjects on which each of us would take the lead. In short, we see no real alternative to some formula that would be about as general as the present draft ~~XXX~~ ^{2.I.} ~~2.I.~~ ^{2.I.}

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~~SECRET~~

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1.3
(u)(3)

8. An additional ^{helpful} ~~xxxxxx~~ action could be to bring in the remaining TCC, If Thieu went for the idea of US and joint statements, we should be able quickly to get some TCC endorsement of these statements, coupled with emphatic TCC statements on how they regard the NLF-ending with strong support for the GVN entering the Paris talks. This could be put to Thieu and we believe could be arranged fairly quickly. In essence, it is simply ~~another~~ another way of saving Thieu's face by pointing to a public expression that did not exist before.

9. Final Recommendation - Unless you think otherwise, and in view of the urgency of time, we believe ^{you} ~~you~~ should see Thieu soonest to offer the "mixed delegation" idea. If, as we ~~we~~ expect, Thieu finds it unacceptable, you could move to the elements in the ~~present~~ present draft statement, offering a combination of US and joint statements as Thieu feels necessary to meet his domestic problem, and mentioning the TCC endorsement possibility In doing so, you must, of course, and above all, stress the ~~urgent~~ urgent necessity of action. If Thieu says he is already prepared to send his delegation to Paris, this should be encouraged, but it must be made equally clear that this alone will not meet the pressures that are

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~~SECRET~~

Classification

building up here, and that he has got to be prepared to move into the new meeting very promptly and get down to serious, substantive business.

END

RUSK!

~~SECRET~~

Classification

71e 4

269936

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71e 91-506
By rg/osp, NARA, Date 4-6-93

10 Nov 68 00 11Z

PERIODIC USE ONLY

Origin
Index

ACTION: Amembassy, SAIGON - IMMEDIATE
INFO: Amembassy, PARIS - PRIORITY

STATE

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

EA TODEL 1521 FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

C-2

1. As indicated in preceding septel of instructions, we are providing herewith a revised draft of the points originally framed as a US statement in Deptel 269676, and commented on by Paris 23686. This is for ~~BUNKER~~ Bunker's discretionary use. Point I, and possibly point H, seem particularly appropriate for a short joint statement with a minimum of haggling, * but all of it is available.

2. Revised Points for US or Joint Statement

A. This statement is designed to clarify the arrangements for a new and wider meeting in Paris to find a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.

B. Prior to the President's announcement of October 31 of the stopping of bombing against North Viet-Nam, agreement

Drafted by EA:WPBundy:nc 11/9/68
Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by EA - Mr. Bundy *for*

Cleances: The Secretary (substance) WH - Mr. Rostow (substance)
S/S - Mr. Gleysteen *DJ*
Tab C-2

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/TIA, Room 6243

Page 1A of telegram to Amembassy, SAIGON

~~SECRET~~

Classification

had been reached in Paris between North Vietnamese and US negotiators that a meeting on the substance of ~~appear~~ a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam should be promptly convened in Paris.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

the United States. ~~[The text of this paragraph has been removed for security reasons.]~~

⁶
G.2. In the light of this record, the status of the Republic of Viet-Nam's representatives as a separate delegation is already defined. If Hanoi fulfills its repeated undertakings to enter seriously into the Paris meeting--undertakings repeated throughout the contacts between North Vietnamese and American representatives ;in Paris--the practical fact is that the North Vietnamese delegation must talk directly and seriously with the Republic of Viet-Nam delegation.

^{H.}
H. ~~XX~~ The agreements leave it entirely open how the Republic of Viet-Nam and US delegations will address the other side. There has never been the slightest doubt that, consistent with our view of the nature of the so-called National Liberation Front, we would regard all the representatives on the other side of the table--whatever they might claim for themselves--as representatives of a single side, that of Hanoi, and for practical purposes as a single delegation. Actions by the US delegation will be consistent with this view.

^{I.}
I.1. On the roles to be played in the Paris meetings by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States delegations, it has all along been understood that the Republic of Viet-Nam delegation would play a leading role, as was explicitly affirmed in the Honolulu communique of July.

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~~SECRET~~

Classification

The consultations between the GVN and US have likewise made clear that the Republic of Viet-Nam should take the lead and be the principal spokesman on all matters which are of immediate and direct political concern to South Viet-Nam. Thus, this practical division of labor will reinforce the fact that North Viet-Nam must talk directly and seriously to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

^{J.} J. ~~XX~~. The new Paris meetings will be expected to address all questions relevant to a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. They will start with a clean slate. The sole agreements that have been reached in the earlier Paris talks between North Vietnamese and US representatives have concerned the cessation of bombing, the convening of a new meeting, and the circumstances required to achieve and maintain these.

^{K.} K. ~~XX~~. In the new meetings, the US delegation will operate in the closest cooperation with the Republic of Viet-Nam, and in continuing consultation with the nations that have contributed military forces to the defense of South Viet-Nam.

^{L.} L. ~~XX~~. The substantive position of the American Government will continue to be based on the Manila Communique and on other publicly stated positions. In particular, there has been no change whatever, and will be no change, in the position of the US Government toward a so-called "coalition" in South Viet-Nam. In the terms used in a US Government

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Classification

~~SECRET~~
Classification

statement of December 8, 1967:

"... We have repeatedly made clear that our objective is that the South Vietnamese people determine their own future without external interference. The imposition of any coalition government would be at variance with this principle. We would oppose any proposal which would turn the Government of South Viet-Nam over to the NLF. In essence, we believe that the South Vietnamese must work out their own future, acting through electoral processes of the kind carried forward in the past two years."

3. We have the following explanatory notes:

a. Revised paragraph c. meets the question of any GVN veto.

~~Paragraph c. has been revised to reflect what was said in the
revised paragraph c. to meet the question of any GVN veto.
Paragraph c. has been revised to reflect what was said in the
revised paragraph c. to meet the question of any GVN veto.
Paragraph c. has been revised to reflect what was said in the
revised paragraph c. to meet the question of any GVN veto.
Paragraph c. has been revised to reflect what was said in the
revised paragraph c. to meet the question of any GVN veto.~~

b. ~~xx~~ We have kept the language about "a single delegation" in
H.
paragraph ~~xx~~ because of our assurances in these terms to the GVN.
Moreover, Hanoi cannot factually refute a statement on how we would
regard things.

~~XXXX~~

~~XXXX~~

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Page 6 of telegram to Amembassy, SAIGON

~~SECRET~~

Classification

c. In I, language could be used that would state that for protocol purposes the GVN would be the senior delegation in all respects on our side, with any details on what this means that have appeal to Thieu.

GP-1

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Classification

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

72

SATURDAY
November 9, 1968

about
-1:50pm

Mr. President:

Pro file

We believe that we have found an important relationship between enemy truck activity in North Vietnam and Laos and VC/NVA-initiated attacks in South Vietnam. There appears to be a very high correlation between the number of initiated attacks for a given month and a combination of net truck activity in Laos and Route Package 1 in North Vietnam. Net trucking activity, which is a measure of supplies delivered to the enemy in South Vietnam, is expressed in terms of trucks sighted less trucks destroyed in the particular area.

Up through the second offensive in May of this year, we found that enemy attacks lagged the truck activity in Laos by 1-1/2 months and in Route Package 1 by 2-1/2 months. This lag, which reflects a major dependence of the enemy on supplies from the north, gives rise to the possibility of estimating the enemy's attack capability and perhaps signalling his intentions.

It now appears that since June 1968 the enemy has become even more dependent upon logistic support from North Vietnam. A combination of events seems to be the cause -- his heavy expenditure of men and supplies in the TET and May offensives, the high and increasing proportion of NVA troops in South Vietnam, and the increased amount of materiel destroyed on the battlefield and in supply dumps and seized in caches.

As a result, the lag of VC/NVA-initiated attacks has decreased to about five weeks, reflecting perhaps an accelerated supply system but reduced stocks in-country and even greater dependence on external support. The attached graph shows that correlation remains high, that October attacks were estimated fairly accurately (perhaps misleadingly so), and that the trend for November attacks continues to be down, about 10-15 per cent below that estimated for October.

We are not certain how the bombing cessation will affect our estimating capability; previous major changes in seasonal weather and our air attack/reconnaissance patterns had no effect on the initiated attack/supply relationship. We will continue to monitor this estimative effort and will report on any significant developments.


DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLI-CBS 26

W. W. Rostow


~~SECRET~~

By ---, NARS, Date 10-9-84



VC/NVA UNIT ATTACKS

300
250
200
100



Prepared by
COMBAT ANALYSIS
GROUP (CAG)

FIGURE 21

INFORMATION

Saturday
November 9, 1968 -- 1:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

For your information, Bus Wheeler will be seeing General Eisenhower on Monday afternoon.

In asking Bus to come see him, General Eisenhower said that he had nothing special on his mind, but that he hadn't seen him for some time.

Bus plans to review what transpired on the bombing cessation. He doesn't intend to get into detail, since the doctors have asked him to limit the visit to 30 minutes.

Bus will report anything of significance that comes up.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

Pres file

Saturday, November 9, 1968
1:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a conversation of yesterday between Bui Diem and a CIA official who has been in touch with him regularly. Dick Helms tells me he is a professional and accurate reporter.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989.
By MP, NARA, Date 9-10-97

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec 2.5
NSC Memo, 10/22/68, Re: Saigon Activities
By cbm/hg, NARA, Date 12-13-02

8 November 1968

The following is a report by a reliable and trustworthy American of his breakfast meeting with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Ambassador Bui Diem on 8 November 1968, at the residence.

1. On the way to this meeting, the news had come over the radio that President Thieu had proposed that, under the "our side, your side", formula, South Vietnam be designated head of the Allies delegation while North Vietnam be head of the Communist one. Bui Diem had the full text of Thieu's statement. He commented that ~~the GVN position represented only a small change in the original U. S. proposal - rather than a totally new and different formula - but that it satisfied a number of Vietnamese concerns: it gave the GVN a more prominent status than the NLF, it would put negotiations on a Vietnamese-to-Vietnamese basis rather than a U. S. -to-Vietnamese basis, and it would clearly represent a new stage of negotiations rather than a continuation of the previous phase. Asked if he thought there was much chance of Hanoi's acceptance, he replied "no," but he added that it put the GVN on the offensive rather than in the position of appearing to scuttle negotiations.~~

2. Asked if he thought that, under one formula or another, the negotiations would be able to resume soon, ~~Bui Diem said that he thought it would take some time. He said that he thought the fact that the U. S. now had a President-elect would slow down the planning process on the U. S. side, since President Johnson would wish to inform and seek the opinions of the President-elect's team, and it would also take some time to repair the damage to GVN-U. S. relations. Regarding the latter point, Bui Diem said that, while there was minor substantive difference in the U. S. and GVN positions - such as the U. S. willingness to leave GVN and NLF status at the peace talks ambiguous while the GVN wanted more precision - much of the difficulty~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MLJ 019-042-2-6
By SP, NARA, Date 1/21/02

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

~~in GVN-U. S. relations had derived from misunderstanding and misinterpretation. He said that there were delicate nuances in the concept of negotiations and that the two governments "used the same language but gave it different meanings". Bui Diem said he had discussed this problem with Mr. Bundy and that they had agreed that, at some time in the near future, they should go over all that has transpired between the governments in recent days and seek to find in it some guidelines for future policy.~~

3. Asked if the GVN felt there was any U. S. attempt at deception, referring specifically to the apparent conflict between what Ambassador Bunker reportedly told President Thieu about proposals made to Hanoi and what Ambassador Phan Dang Lam had been told by Ambassador Harriman, ~~Bui Diem replied he could not say that that was the case, but there apparently was some feeling in the GVN that President Johnson acted with undue haste and that he may have been influenced in part by domestic politics.~~

4. Bui Diem said that though he would handle things differently ~~if he was in Ambassador Lam's position,~~ he could not criticize Lam's actions because Lam's cables only pointed up substantive differences which did exist. Although the GVN and the U. S. did agree on the bombing halt, they did not agree on the arrangements proposed for negotiations, but these disagreements could probably have been resolved amicably if the announcement of the bombing halt had not been made so precipitously.

5. Asked how he would have handled things differently if he had been in Lam's place, Bui Diem said that ~~relations between the U. S. and GVN delegations in Paris should be warmer than they now are. He said that when relations are stiff, it is impossible to chat at length informally and assure that each side understands all the nuances of the other side's position. He said that, for example, he knew Jordan and Vance well and could joke with them; if they had disagreements, each side would know fully the reason for the disagreement and they could still joke with each other. Bui Diem said that while he could risk a joke with Ambassador Harriman, Lam could not.~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

6. When asked if he knew of any planning in the GVN for sending a delegation to Paris, Bui Diem replied that if the newly proposed GVN formula was accepted, Vice President Ky could lead a delegation without having to face a woman (Mrs. Binh). He thought General Nguyen Duc Thang should accompany Ky. However, Bui Diem cautioned that a delegation should not be composed of too many Northerners. For example, if Dang Duc Khoi went, it would probably be better that he not be a member of the delegation but a behind-the-scenes public relations man. Bui Diem said he would recommend that Senator Tran Van Lam (a Southerner) be included in the delegation, and Nguyen Luu Vien might also be considered.

7. Bui Diem said he expected to return to Saigon soon. He could not state precisely when, but would wait a short time to see if his return was requested, and if that did not happen he would propose it himself. He felt it would be normal for him to report back to Saigon in person on the results and implications of the U. S. elections.

8. He repeated the statement made at our last meeting that he had no desire to be included in a GVN delegation to negotiations, but he added that he would like to visit Paris from time to time during negotiations to assist behind the scenes in any way he could.

9. In a final comment on the elections, Bui Diem said he was pleased that Senators Morse, Gruening and Clark had not been re-elected, and he said that Senator Fulbright's re-election was offset by the election of Barry Goldwater.

75

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Profile

**Saturday, November 9, 1968
11:00 a. m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith a summary of rather
aggressive recent North Korean
operations.**

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By MP, NARA, Date 9-10-97

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:ria

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

Saturday, November 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama

State is very anxious to obtain your approval to resume diplomatic relations with Panama on Monday, November 11.

By delaying until now, we have obtained important concessions from the Provisional Government.

- restoration of some of the constitutional guarantees which had been suspended by the junta;
- dismissal of two pro-Communist newspaper editors who had received their jobs as a favor to the brother of a key member of the military junta;
- formal public commitment to hold new elections, restore all constitutional guarantees, and return government to full civilian control -- within a reasonable period of time;
- relaxation of press censorship, and reopening of opposition newspapers.

Further delay, however, will probably be self-defeating.

We have FBI and CIA reports showing that Arias is planning to try to regain power by violent means. He is trying to arrange to re-enter Panama clandestinely and is encouraging supporters in Costa Rica to initiate guerrilla warfare from across the border. Failure by the U. S. to recognize is encouraging these efforts.

Ambassador Adair believes that we should resume relations on Monday, November 11, so that our announcement will follow closely the action yesterday restoring some of the constitutional guarantees. State's proposed press release highlights our concern for continued movement toward full restoration. (Tab A)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 95-198 (#151a)
By dm, NARA, Date 12-12-02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Eighteen countries have now recognized. The thirteen in Latin America include all the major nations of the hemisphere except Canada and the United States.

CIA has looked carefully at Arias' public charges that the military junta is Communist-dominated. All available evidence shows that leftist influence is slight -- less than was present in Arias' own government.

I recommend that you authorize resumption of diplomatic relations with Panama on Monday, November 11.

W. W. Rostow

Approve recognition _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Approve press statement _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

3363
76a : near
2. Peter

14475

November 1, 1968

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Resumption of Diplomatic Relations with
New Panamanian Government

Recommendation

That you authorize the resumption of our diplomatic relations with the new Government of Panama in the time frame November 4-8.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The National Guard of Panama removed President Arnulfo Arias from office on October 11, 1968. The Provisional Government, headed by a military officer, has an all civilian cabinet and is in full and effective control of the country.

We have consulted extensively with other American Republics concerning relations with the new regime, in accordance with Resolution XXVI of the Second Special Inter-American Conference (Rio de Janeiro, 1965). That resolution recommends that governments in their consultations consider whether the de facto authorities propose to hold free elections within a reasonable time and whether they agree to fulfill their country's international obligations, to respect human rights, and to comply with commitments assumed under the Alliance for Progress.

Both in public statements and in oral and written assurances to United States officials in Panama, the new Panamanian Government has expressed its good intentions concerning the points covered in Resolution XXVI. These assurances have come from both civilian and military members of the Provisional Government. Assurances have also been provided to us in the

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By 4 NARA, Date 2/19/98

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form of a letter from the Foreign Minister replying to our Ambassador's inquiry about the Provisional Government's views concerning Resolution XXVI. The text of this letter is enclosed.

The Provisional Government has publicly declared that it will hold elections; and the Foreign Minister has informed our Ambassador that the voting will take place in about a year. The Government's publicly stated goal is to ensure through reforms in the electoral code that the balloting will not be marred by fraud, as has happened frequently in Panama in the past. The Government will not permit Arias to be a candidate but has indicated that it is willing to consider participation by his political party.

In a written reply to an inquiry from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Provisional Government has stated its respect for civil liberties while acknowledging that it has imposed restrictive measures during the national emergency. It has relaxed some of the controls imposed at the time of the coup, notably the curfew and vehicle checks. Arias supporters who took refuge in the Canal Zone are gradually being allowed to return to Panama, while most of those who were jailed have been released. Some 200 persons alleged to be Communists are still being held, however. A few of the leading Arias collaborators have been forced into exile. Press censorship continues, notwithstanding promises to end it shortly. Basic constitutional guarantees remain suspended.

The Government has given us written assurances that it will honor all of Panama's international obligations and will observe commitments previously assumed under the Alliance for Progress.

Eight Latin American nations (Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras, and Nicaragua) have resumed relations with Panama, and we expect several others to do so shortly. Outside the Hemisphere, Great Britain, Spain, and the Republic of China have recognized the new Government.

In considering resumption of relations, we must take into account not only Resolution XXVI but also our special interests

in Panama, centering on the Panama Canal. Our position in Panama makes a prolonged interruption of official ties with the de facto authorities undesirable.

In addition, we have a number of pressing items of business which cannot be dealt with until we resume relations. The most important of these involves the sea level canal studies, the completion of which requires that we obtain permission to conduct a site survey during the next dry season, which begins in December.

Resumption of relations also has a bearing on Arias' current activities in the United States. Resumption would probably serve to limit the impact of Arias' pronouncements and lessen the problem of his erratic and dramatic behavior by diminishing the credibility of his claim to be the legitimate President of Panama.

Our course of action in dealing with the new Panamanian regime has been fully consistent with our desire not to appear to be embracing a military regime that has overthrown a constitutional President. In public statements, in consultations with other Latin American nations, and in our dealings with the Provisional Government, we have made clear our disapproval of the military coup.

Resumption of relations with Panama on November 4 would mean a period of suspended relations of 24 days. We resumed relations with Peru 23 days after the coup in that country. To delay resumption with Panama substantially longer than we did in the case of Peru, when the Panamanian Provisional Government has been far more forthcoming than the Peruvian Junta regarding return to elected government, is likely to be misunderstood. It would also increase the prospects for resentment on the part of the elements now governing Panama, to the detriment of our long-term relations and special interests there.

We have now reached a point where the advantages to be gained through the pressure of non-recognition are small in comparison to the constructive influence we might exercise on the new Government if relations were restored. Moreover, further delay in resuming relations will only serve to reduce our standing with a Government whose goodwill and cooperation

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4

we require in order to carry out our special obligations and responsibilities in Panama. I therefore believe that resumption of relations is compatible with both our hemispheric objectives and our special interests in Panama.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Letter to Ambassador Adair
from Provisional Government
Foreign Minister Lopez Guevara,
dated October 24, 1968.

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76b

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Official translation of letter from the Foreign Minister of
the Provisional Government of Panama

October 24, 1968

Mr. Ambassador:

In reply to your letter dated October 16, 1968, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency, with reference to points 2 (A) and (B) of Resolution XXVI of the Second Special Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Rio de Janeiro, as follows:

(A) The Provisional Government Junta, headed by Their Excellencies Colonel Jose Maria Pinilla Fabrega and Colonel Bolivar Urrutia Parrilla, has made a decision to hold truly honest elections. That means an election campaign with full guarantees for all citizens, and voting conducted with complete honesty, subject to legal procedures which will be decided upon, without appeal, by a court composed of judges who, because of their experience and honesty, inspire trust. For that purpose, consideration is now being given to appointing new judges to the electoral court.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ-0198-42-2-20

By LCH NAR, Date 12-08-2017

The necessary consultative steps will be taken in due course to amend the Electoral Code, with a view to clarifying various provisions whose interpretation has given rise to disputes. Moreover, these consultative steps will be intended to determine the date of the elections:

(B) The Government Junta will, in accordance with Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic, abide by the rules of international law. That means that it will fulfill all international commitments: and

(C) The Government Junta will take steps to ensure respect for the human rights contained in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Naturally, during a national emergency such as this one, some fundamental rights and guarantees are restricted. I think it fitting to emphasize, with respect to the aforementioned Declaration, that what the peoples of America desire is that the principles contained in it be embodied in a convention, and also that an Inter-American Court of Human Rights be established so that each man may have a forum before which he may assert his right to respect for human dignity. Panama will continue to fulfill all commitments assumed by the signatories of the Declaration of the Peoples of America and to abide by the general principles of the Charter of Punta del Este.

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3

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

Carlos Alfredo Lopez Guevara,
Minister of Foreign Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

760

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11/9/68

PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE

The American Embassy in Panama City advised the Panamanian Foreign Ministry at (hour) today that the United States was resuming diplomatic relations with Panama. The United States took this action after extensive consultations with other members of the Organisation of American States, in accordance with Resolution XXVI of the Second Special Inter-American Conference. In the course of these consultations we have given careful consideration to the publicly declared intention of the Panamanian Government to hold elections, to return to constitutional government, to respect human rights, and to observe Panama's international obligations. The Panamanian Government has taken the first steps toward carrying out these intentions by constituting a tribunal to prepare procedures and regulation for future elections and by restoring some of the constitutional guarantees suspended at the time of the coup.

We have also noted that the decree restoring these guarantees reiterates the firm intention of the government to restore full constitutional rights promptly and to hold free elections.

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SECRET [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

November 9, 1968

Free file

Mr. President:

Here are some recent indications of the effectiveness of our bombing in Laos.

Access roads in Laos leading south from Mu Gia and Ban Karai passes were closed for most of the last two weeks of October. Photography and visual sightings on October 21 and 22 confirmed that all key interdiction points were closed.

On October 24, sensors detected only eleven trucks, compared to an average of over 70 for the preceding 20 days.

On October 25, for a period of 19 hours not a single truck was detected.

Photography on October 25 showed the Ban Laboy ford and approaches to be completely interdicted. [redacted] the enemy was in very serious logistic difficulty at the ford. 1.3(a)(4)

This situation ^{results} ~~was~~ from bad weather, radar bombing with tactical aircraft, and B-52 strikes to exploit bottlenecks.

[redacted] the average truck throughput from North Vietnam between June 1st and October 25th was twelve trucks per day. This is far below the enemy's minimum subsistence requirements. 1.3(a)(4)

The above confirms the extraordinary success of the 7th Air Force's summer interdiction program. It confirms General Abrams' assessment of the magnitude of the enemy's logistics crisis and of the fact that the enemy is not negotiating from a position of very great military strength.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET [redacted]

1.3(a)(4)