

**ACTION**

**Friday, November 15, 1968  
7:15 p.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith a shortened version of  
the letter for Bob Ginsburgh's file.**

*1. ~~summary~~  
2. People*

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rlh**

November 15, 1968

37a

Dear General McConnell:

I would like to bring to your attention the outstanding and effective manner in which Brigadier General Robert N. Ginsburgh has served me and the members of my staff the past two and a half years here in the White House.

General Ginsburgh has served on both the National Security Council staff and the staff of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has fulfilled these sensitive posts with the highest distinction.

He has been especially useful in insuring that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were known and understood in the White House. He performed with great effectiveness in connection with the war in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli war, and, most recently, the decision on the cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.

In addition, he was willing to step in and assume the additional role of Armed Forces Aide during the transitional phase of that position.

General Ginsburgh is a credit to the Armed Forces of the United States, and has rendered faithful and loyal service to his Commander in Chief. He is well qualified for any position of great responsibility, and I recommend him highly for promotion to major general ahead of his contemporaries as soon as he meets the eligibility requirements for time in grade.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

General John P. McConnell  
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force  
Department of the Air Force  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:HaywoodSmith:WWR:mz

INFORMATION

Saturday, November 16, 1968  
8:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a message from Diaz  
Ordaz on the occasion of your 34th  
anniversary.

May I join our congratulations to  
his.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Mexico 8117

WWRostow:rln

38a

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1968 NOV 16 03 42

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HCE679

PAGE 01 MEXICO 08117 16033 IZ

81  
ACTION ARA 15

INFO SS 25,SSO 00,NSC 10,NSCE 00,CPR 02,RSR 01,GPM 04,P 04,USIA 12,  
RSC 01,/075 W

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P 152344Z NOV 68  
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8299

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE MEXICO 8117

PASS WHITE HOUSE

1. EMBASSY AIR POUCHING TO ARA CHAPLIN PERSONAL LETTER  
PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON DATED NOV. 13,  
1968 CONGRATULATING LATTER ON 34TH ANNIVERSARY MARRIAGE ON  
NOVEMBER 17. UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION TEXT AS FOLLOWS:

2. QUOTE DISTINGUISHED MR. PRESIDENT AND GOOD FRIEND:  
ON THE OCCASION OF THE CELEBRATION ON THE 17TH OF THIS MONTH  
OF THE 34TH ANNIVERSARY OF YOUR MARRIAGE, MY WIFE AND I JOIN  
IN EXPRESSING OUR CORDIAL BEST WISHES. WE EXPRESS OUR HOPE  
THAT FOR YOU AND MRS. JOHNSON THE FUTURE WILL BE AS FULL AND  
AS PROMISING AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST. <

3. IT IS A PLEASURE FOR MRS. DIAZ ORDAZ AND FOR ME  
TO RENEW TO YOU AND TO LADY BIRD JOHNSON THE ASSURANCE OF  
OUR FRIENDSHIP AND OUR WARM REGARD. (SIGNED) GUSTAVO DIAZ  
ORDAZ UNQUOTE. FREEMAN

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40  
Profile

INFORMATION

Saturday - November 16, 1968

~~Confidential~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Chile

The Chilean Minister of Finance has been in town this week heading Chile's delegation to the CIAP meetings. During these meetings, he has several times stressed the critical role US assistance has played in the reform programs being carried out by President Frei. He also called on Gene Rostow to ask that President Frei's thanks be transmitted to you, stressing Chile's gratitude for your personal interest in Frei's efforts.

Incidentally, Frei seems to have decided recently to reassert his political leadership over the Christian Democratic Party. He is now making a vigorous effort to prevent his Party from drifting toward an alliance with the Communists for the 1970 elections. After months of political drifting, Frei's reassertion of authority is a very encouraging sign on the Chilean scene.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 94-18  
By mw/isp NARA, Date 11-13-97

SWLewis:mm

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, November 15, 1968  
6:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Ed Fried reports back channel on the state of play in the international monetary field. There is no need for you to go into it at this time unless it interests you; but I thought you would like to have available his report of thinking as the weekend begins.

W. W. Rostow

Brussels 3310

25X1A

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 99-1 *encl* RAC 019-042-3-7  
By *us*, NARA, Date *11-4-02*

41a

25X1A  
LA523

1968 NOV 15 22 23

OO [REDACTED]  
DE [REDACTED] 61 32 02 152  
O 152144Z ZYH  
FM BRUSSELS  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

25X1A

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY [REDACTED]

FOR WALT ROSTON, WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY  
FROM ED FRIED, BRUSSELS 3318

SUBJECT: FOWLER MISSION CONTINGENCY PLAN DISCUSSIONS

QUIET, LIMITED AND VERY CAREFUL DISCUSSIONS ON POSSIBLE PARITY  
MOVES HAVE TURNED UP THE FOLLOWING:

1. ~~UK~~ - ~~B~~. STRONGLY PREFER NO MOVES NOW AND A PERIOD OF STABILITY,  
UNTIL NEXT SPRING. THEY FULLY RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THE DANGERS IN  
THE CURRENT SITUATION.

2. THEY BELIEVE FRANCE MAY MOVE UNILATERALLY BUT DO NOT FEAR  
BIG DEVALUATION (25 PERCENT) WHICH WOULD BRING DOWN THE HOUSE.  
THEIR MAJOR FEAR IS UNILATERAL MODEST FRENCH CHANGE (10 PERCENT) WITH-  
OUT ANY SIMULTANEOUS OFFSETTING REVALUATION BY GERMANS AND ITALIANS.  
THIS WOULD CAUSE GREAT PRESSURE ON STERLING.

3. THEY COULD AND WOULD STAND STILL, IF WE WOULD, FOR A MODEST  
FRENCH DEVALUATION (UP TO 10 PERCENT) IF THERE WERE SIMULTANEOUS  
GERMAN AND ITALIAN MOVES UPWARD.

4. THEY BELIEVE A GERMAN MOVE WOULD TRIGGER A FRENCH MOVE --  
MAYBE BECAUSE OF SPECULATIVE PRESSURE BUT POSSIBLY BECAUSE THE  
FRENCH WOULD USE IT AS AN EXCUSE.

5. THEY WANT ANY FRENCH OR OTHER MOVES -- ALONE OR IN COMBINATION --  
TO BE TAKEN MULTILATERALLY OR TO BE APPROVED MULTILATERALLY IN A  
MEETING OF THE GROUP OF TEN CALLED BY THE U.S. IN WASHINGTON.  
THEY SEE THE SITUATION CALLING FOR A CLOSING OF THE EXCHANGES FOR A  
DAY OR TWO. BUT MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT (ALONG WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT  
OF NEW CREDIT LINES) WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS WAS THE END  
OF PARITY MOVES FOR THE TIME BEING AND THEREFORE WOULD QUIET THE  
MARKETS AND STOP SPECULATIVE MOVEMENTS. THEY HOPED WE WOULD BE  
ABLE TO GET THIS MESSAGE ACROSS TO THE GERMANS AND THE ITALIANS.

FRANCE - AT THE CLOSE OF THEIR FORMAL DISCUSSION, MINISTER ORTOLI  
PRIVATELY EXPRESSED INTEREST AND CONCERN TO SECRETARY FOWLER AS TO WHAT  
SECRETARY FOWLER WOULD SAY IN BONN REGARDING GERMAN REVALUATION.  
IN AN UNUSUALLY FRANK CONVERSATION AT A PRIVATE LUNCHEON  
ARRANGED AT HIS REQUEST, LARRE (FRENCH TREASURY) OUTLINED FRENCH  
POSITION TO DEHENG AS FOLLOWS:

PRESENTATION

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 99-1 and RAC 042-3-8  
By me, NARA, Date 11-4-02

(A) FRENCH DID NOT WANT TO DEVALUE. COUVE WAS ABSOLUTELY FIRM ON THIS; DE GUALLE WAS ALSO. THERE WERE TOO MANY POLITICAL DISABILITIES. COUVE ALSO BELIEVES THERE IS NO ECONOMIC NECESSITY FOR THE FRENCH TO DEVALUE.

(B) IF GERMANS MOVED UP, COUVE BELIEVED IT WOULD RELIEVE PRESSURE ON THE FRANC AND WAS CONFIDENT FRENCH COULD HOLD. THE PREVAILING VIEW IN THE FRENCH TREASURY EMPHASIZED CONCERN ABOUT MONEY FLOWS REACTING ON FRANCE AFTER A GERMAN REVALUATION. LARRE CITED 1961 EXPERIENCE WHEN THE GERMAN-DUTCH MOVE HAD TRIGGERED INFLOWS INTO THOSE COUNTRIES AND SWITZERLAND. ALSO, IT WAS BELIEVED THAT A GERMAN MOVE NOW MIGHT CREATE STRONGER BELIEF THAT A FRENCH MOVE WOULD BE NEEDED. COUVE THOUGHT THIS WAS WRONG.

(C) LARRE'S FURTHER VIEW WAS THAT REGARDLESS AS TO WHICH VIEW IS RIGHT, GERMAN REVALUATION TALK WAS DRAINING FRENCH RESERVES. THERE REALLY WAS NO HOPE FOR STABILITY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. NO ACTION ON THE MARK PROBABLY WOULD MEAN ACTION ELSEWHERE. DEMING TOOK THIS TO MEAN EXPLICITLY THAT THE FRANC COULD NOT BE HELD WITHOUT A MARK CHANGE.

(D) LARRE HOPED SECRETARY FOWLER WOULD NOT BE NEUTRAL ON THIS SUBJECT IN BONN. AS FOWLER HAD INTIMATED TO ORTOLI.

(E) LARRE SAID THAT UNDER PROPER CIRCUMSTANCES -- INTERNATIONAL MEETING; PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO OTHER UPWARD PARITY CHANGES EXCEPT MARK, LIRA AND MAYBE GUILDER; AND AN ADEQUATE CREDIT PACKAGE BACK-UP -- FRANC COULD AND WOULD HOLD.

(F) THERE WAS NO REAL COMMENT ABOUT LIRA DURING MOST OF DISCUSSION -- EMPHASIS WAS ON MARK.

NETHERLANDS -- THIS SUBJECT WAS NOT DISCUSSED IN ANY SYSTEMATIC WAY WITH THE DUTCH, BUT AT ONE POINT IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS VAN LENNEP AND ZIJLSTRA SAID FLATLY THEY DID NOT BELIEVE A GERMAN MOVE WOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE FRANC BUT THAT TO THE CONTRARY IF THE GERMANS MOVED ENOUGH (E.G., 7 OR 8 PERCENT OR MORE) IT WOULD HELP THE FRANC TO HOLD.

BELGIUM -- ANSTALIX WAS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE POUND AND WAS WORRIED THAT THE BRITISH WOULD AGAIN BE FORCED TO MOVE AND THAT THIS WOULD GIVE THE FRENCH AN EXCUSE TO MOVE.

HE BELIEVES THE FRENCH WILL NOT MOVE ON THEIR OWN BECAUSE COUVE IS DETERMINED TO HOLD THE RATE AND IS PREPARED TO LET RESERVES RUN DOWN.

HE BELIEVED A GERMAN REVALUATION WOULD TAKE SOME PRESSURE OFF THE FRENCH AND WOULD NOT BE USED BY THE FRENCH AS AN EXCUSE TO DEVALUE THEMSELVES. HE WAS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS ON MARKETS OF A UNILATERAL GERMAN MOVE -- BUT HIS POSITION ON WHETHER THEY SHOULD MOVE WAS ESSENTIALLY NEUTRAL.

DEMING EXPECTS TO HAVE DISCUSSION WITH CARLI TOMORROW IN ROME. INFORM BILL MARTIN AND JOE BARR AND JOHN PETTY IN TREASURY.

GP-1  
900

PRESERVATION

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file*  
INFORMATION 42

Friday, November 15, 1968

~~SECRET~~

4:55 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

As the attached indicates:

- the French franc is under heavy pressure;
- the British pound is under considerable, but less, pressure;
- money is flowing to Germany in a big way.

The heart of this is the requirement for a currency readjustment in Europe. Ideally, the pound and the franc should stay where they are; the German mark should be revalued upward -- also the Italian lire and the Dutch guilder -- to a lesser extent than the German mark.

We are lucky that Central Bankers were scheduled to meet in Basle tomorrow in any case; Joe Fowler, Fred Deming, and Ed Fried are in Europe and following this closely.

The issue is complicated because Strauss, as Finance Minister, would probably resist on political grounds a response to this crisis simply in the form of an upward revaluation of the German mark. He might even resign on the issue and free himself for the next German election. Our people are working for an intelligent re-adjustment which would avoid any further devaluation of the pound and, if possible, any devaluation of the franc. They have a week end to work it out before the markets open on Monday.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By   , NARA, Date 2-19-98

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

42a

~~SECRET~~

November 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Currency Markets

Speculation has been extremely heavy today.


The Bank of England gave up about \$150 million in supporting the sterling spot rate. The latest quote on the pound was \$2.3840 -- down sharply from yesterday's close of \$2.3871.

The extent of French losses is not known, but it is believed that they were substantial. The latest quote on the franc was \$.20105 -- a shade above the floor of \$.20052.

The Bundesbank's net gain today was a massive \$600 million. It actually took in \$700 million spot and then sent \$100 million back out through swaps with commercial banks. The mark was at about \$.2519 1/8 (ceiling is \$.2525).

The forward premium for the Duetsch mark has widened to over 5 percent.

Gold remains above \$40. Volume has been very heavy.

  
Joseph K. Newman

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ij, NARA, Date 2-11-98

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-513

By WJ, NARA, Date 1-10-94*Pres file*~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Friday, November 15, 1968 -- 8:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

As you know, we are now sending armed aircraft along with our reconnaissance planes into North Vietnam south of the 19th parallel, because our reconnaissance planes have been attacked by antiaircraft fire.

The attached message, recommended by General McConnell, Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, would empower the Seventh Fleet to send carriers north of the 17th parallel but outside of the 12 nautical miles claimed by North Vietnam as territorial waters, to provide more convenient air cover for the reconnaissance planes plus more convenient surface-to-air rescue, plus more convenient cover for an intelligence vessel and intelligence aircraft now collecting data at sea in the Tonkin Gulf.

Nick Katzenbach believes that, on balance, this action would be a good signal of our seriousness to Hanoi as they test us on reconnaissance and the DMZ. Paul Nitze is inclined to agree.

You have certain choices here with respect to the scale and range of the operation:

-- You could limit the carrier movement to one rather than the maximum of three in the area, which this instruction would permit;

-- You could authorize the carrier or carriers to operate in the Gulf of Tonkin only up to the 19th parallel rather than the 20th parallel, as the present instruction permits;

-- The instructions could be explicit in stating that the carrier or carriers should operate well east of their previous operating areas and well outside of sight of land.

Leaving these elements of degree aside, the decision is, essentially, political: Do we wish to react to the rather unpleasant talk in Paris about reconnaissance and the DMZ violations by this show of determination -- or not?

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

43a

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 716991511

By ng/ep, NARA, Date 4-6-93

PRECEDENCE

ACTION IMMEDIATE

INFO IMMEDIATE

DTG

FROM: JCS

TO: CINCPAC

INFO: CINCSAC  
 COMUSMACV  
 CINCPACFLT  
 CINCPACAF  
 COM7AF  
 COMSEVENTHFLT  
 COMCTF 77

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DISTRIBUTION:  
 MR. CLIFFORD  
 MR. NITZE  
 GEN WHEELER  
 GEN MCCONNELL  
 ADM MOORER  
 GEN CHAPMAN  
 GEN WESTMORELAND  
 ADM JOHNSON  
 GEN MEYER  
 GEN STEAKLEY  
 GEN BROWN  
 GEN ROSSON  
 [MR. ROSTOW]  
 WHITE HOUSE  
 [MR. RUSK]  
 STATE DEPT  
 [MR. HELMS]  
 CIA

~~TOP SECRET~~ IVY TREE LIMDIS

CJCS SENDS

SUBJ: CVA OPERATING AREAS (U)

REF: CINCPAC 150450Z NOV 68 (BOM) (NOTAL)

1. (TS) REF DISCUSSES DESIRABILITY OF CONDUCTING CVA OPERATIONS NORTH OF 17TH PARALLEL FOR PURPOSE OF SUPPORTING CURRENT OPERATIONS.
2. (TS) YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT CVA OPERATIONS IN GULF OF TONKIN UP TO 20° N LATITUDE.
3. (TS) ENTRY INTO NVN CLAIMED 12 NM TERRITORIAL WATERS IS PROHIBITED AND NO PUBLICITY WILL BE

DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
NOV	68
PAGE NO	NO OF PAGES
1	2

DRAFTER  
 TYPED NAME AND TITLE  
 COLONEL R. G. COLEMAN, USAF  
 PACIFIC DIVISION, J-3

PHONE 74073

RELEASER  
 SIGNATURE  
 TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS

REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM  
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
~~TOP SECRET LIMDIS~~

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

GIVEN TO THESE OPERATIONS REGARDING NEW  
OPERATING AREAS. GP-3

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <del>TOP SECRET LIMDIS</del>	

INFORMATION

*Pres. file*

44

Friday, Nov. 15, 1968  
3:30 p. m.

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

Henry Owen forwards this extremely interesting -- and sadly recognizable -- passage on intellectuals and war.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

(Excerpt from Orwell - Collected Essays, page 383)

Suppose in 1940 you had taken a Gallup Poll, in England, on the question "Will Germany win the war?" You would have found, curiously enough, that the group answering "Yes" contained a far higher percentage of intelligent people--people with I.Q. of over 120, shall we say--than the group answering "No". The same would have held good in the middle of 1942. In this case the figures would not have been so striking but if you had made the question "Will the Germans capture Alexandria?" or "Will the Japanese be able to hold on to the territories they have captured?" then once again there would have been a very marked tendency for intelligence to concentrate in the "Yes" group. In every case the less gifted person would have been likelier to give a right answer.

If one went simply by these instances, one might assume that high intelligence and bad military judgment always go together. However, it is not so simple as that. The English intelligentsia, on the whole, were more defeatist than the mass of the people--and some of them went on being defeatist at a time when the war was quite plainly won--partly because they were better able to visualize the dreary years of warfare that lay ahead. Their morale was worse because their imaginations were stronger. The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory. But there was more to it than that. There was also the disaffection of large numbers of intellectuals which made it difficult for them not to side with any country hostile to Britain. And the deepest of all, there was admiration--though only in a very few cases conscious admiration--for the power, energy, and cruelty of the Nazi régime.

**ACTION**

**Friday, November 15, 1968 -- 2:30 p.m.**

**Mr. President:**

*Pres file*

**This is what Bill Foster proposes to say about strategic missile talks with the Soviet Union, in the course of a general disarmament statement next Tuesday in New York.**

**I wish to make sure you have him say only what you wish said.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Statement approved \_\_\_\_\_**

**Approved as amended \_\_\_\_\_**

**Call me \_\_\_\_\_**

**WWRostow:rla**

45a

Add the following as final paragraphs:

In the course of this debate, the US delegation will have more to say about some of the specific items on this agenda. But in closing my remarks at this time, I would like to call your attention to another undertaking which still stands before us, namely, the prospect of bilateral talks between the US and USSR on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

As you know, after some months of prior consultations initiated by the US, the two sides reached agreement <sup>in July 1</sup> to enter into such discussions in the near future. You also are aware that events intervened which forced a postponement of these talks. However, I wish to reaffirm the continuing and fervent interest of the US Government to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Union which would bring an end to the spiralling race in strategic arms between our two countries. Let us hope that circumstances will soon permit the initiation of concrete steps in this direction.

*Ros file*  
46

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Friday, Nov. 15, 1968  
1:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a CIA report with a rather hopeful  
schedule for getting the GVN to Paris.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ attachment (log 3483)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 03-61  
By isa NARA, Date 5-30-03

46a

3463

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow

Attached is another report on GVN 25X1 negotiation actions from our [redacted] source. We are limiting dissemination of this report to you, Messrs. Katzenbach, Bundy, and Nitze.

25X1X

25X1A [redacted]

Attachment - 1

15 November 1968  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

SANTITIZED

Authority NLS 019-042-3-10  
By [signature], NARA, Date 1/21/02

**SECRET/NODIS**

Friday, November 15, 1968

1:05 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recent Steps in the Mid-East

~~1. [unclear]~~  
2. Pres file

You should be aware of several recent steps Secretaries Rusk and Katzenbach have taken to clarify our position on a Mid-East settlement (Nick's memo attached).

In his last talk with UAR Foreign Minister Riad, Secretary Rusk summarized his interpretation of the UN resolution as it applies to a UAR-Israel settlement this way:

- Israeli withdrawal from UAR territory. [We never thought Israel had territorial designs in the Sinai.]
- Formal termination of the state of war.
- Suez Canal open to ships of all flags.
- Refugee settlement on the basis of personal and secret choice of individual refugees on where to live (including return to Israel as one possible choice).
- International presence at Sharm el-Sheikh which could not be removed without consent of UN Security Council or General Assembly.
- UAR should sign something in writing to which Israel also is a signatory.
- General understanding about level of arms in the area (though this not required in the first instance).

Nick spelled these out for Rabin a couple of days ago. Rabin feels we've changed our position and undermined Israel's bargaining position.

The fact is that this has been our consistent position for over a year, but the Israelis have turned off their hearing aids on us. As for undermining their position, we can't afford to go along with their bazaar haggling if we're going to have any chance of peace. What's more, we really would have undercut them if we had let them think we'd given them a blank check. It's especially important as negotiations with Jordan reach a climax that they know where we stand.

Nevertheless, you may hear some strong protests.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ-019A-42-3-12  
By UCU  
NAR, Date 12-08-2017

**SECRET/NODIS**

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

47a

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

November 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Present Status of Middle East  
Peace Efforts

I want to bring you up to date on recent developments in the Jarring Mission and on steps we are taking to give it a new impetus toward peace in the Middle East.

In recent weeks Israel, at our urging, has provided to the UAR through Jarring some ideas on its terms for a peace settlement. In addition Israel tells us it has continued to advance its dialogue with Jordan. As a result there has been some tenuous progress for the first time on the substantive problems of a settlement. The Foreign Ministers of Israel, the UAR and Jordan have now left New York to return to their capitals. From their most recent exchanges of views through Jarring and their conversations with us, it is clear that the major obstacles to further progress at this stage are the Arab conviction that Israel seeks territorial expansion and Israel's fear that the UAR is not willing to enter a contractual agreement establishing a condition of peace. Jarring is concerned that a prolonged impasse may now ensue during which the situation in the area will continue to deteriorate and the positions of the parties harden.

To avoid this, we have been active with Jarring, with the parties and with the Soviets. We have made clear to all that we continue to support a peace settlement under the November 22, 1967 Security Council Resolution based on agreement among the parties. We have urged the UAR to accept this concept and are pressing the Soviets and other Governments to weigh in with the UAR to this end. We have also made clear to the UAR and the Soviets, as we earlier did with the Jordanians, that (a) we do not support

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ - 019A-42-3-12

By UCH

NAR, Date 12-08-2017


~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

territorial acquisitions by Israel, other than minimal rectifications in the pre-June War lines for valid security reasons while (b) we consider Jerusalem a special problem requiring separate handling at the appropriate time. We are keeping Jarring fully informed of our activities and are considering what substantive and procedural proposals we might suggest he put to the parties to preserve and accelerate the momentum generated in New York.

I briefed Israeli Ambassador Rabin November 12 in general terms on our recent talks with the UAR and the Soviets, emphasizing that (a) we continue to support the concept of a contractual peace settlement embodying adequate security arrangements and agreed to by the parties themselves, (b) we rely on past Israeli assurances that they have no territorial ambitions as such although we recognize the special problem posed by Jerusalem, and (c) we are disturbed by recent indications that at least some members of the Israeli Government are thinking of major territorial acquisitions.

While we have long made known to the Israelis our opposition to territorial expansion on their part, we have in the past refrained from injecting ourselves into the substantive negotiating process in order to permit them to play their hand as they have thought best. The initial reaction from the Israelis here indicates that they are extremely disturbed by our present more active role, and particularly by our telling the UAR and the Soviets of our position with respect to Israeli territorial claims against the Arabs. We can probably expect them to register objections with us on the grounds that, by taking this position with other Governments, we are changing our policy and undercutting Israel's bargaining position. I believe our position is a valid and in fact necessary one, however, based firmly on the principles you set forth in your statement of June 19, 1967 and in your speech to B'nai B'rith, on the Security Council Resolution of last November and on our long-standing policy of upholding the territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the Middle East. The essence of that position is that Israel is right to seek to trade the territories it occupies for a peaceful settlement with the Arabs but not to seek to retain territory as part of such a settlement.



Nicholas deB Katzenbach

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

*Pres file*

Friday, November 15, 1968 -- 9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a combination of my notes, pages 1-3, and Tom's, with key passages side-lined on pages 1, 5, 6, and 9 (paperclipped).

*four* It is clear from the context that only ~~two~~ things were involved:

-- Nixon liaison men to become fully informed before January 20.

-- Checking with Nixon where he is personally involved; for example, when Rusk was to talk at NATO about the outlook of the new administration on NATO.

-- Replying to telegrams to Nixon.

On the NPT, there was, in effect, solicitation of his support for Senate action before January 20.

W. W. Rostow

EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rln

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Friday, November 15, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

In the two attached cables Thieu:

- Arranges negotiation of agreed statement;
- Asks for TCC concurrence;
- Asks for public silence on both sides;
- Talks about some of the upsetting elements in recent days;
- Talks about the military situation.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 42751  
Saigon 42752

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-514  
By 128, NARA, Date 7-2-93

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

49a  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

ACTION COPY

DE RUMJIR 42751 3281125  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 151100Z NOV 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4491  
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2894  
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42751

1968 NOV 13 AM 4:27:28

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF A SAIGON 42653  
B STATE 271405

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 91-510

By lg/jw, NARA, Date 4-6-93

1. I CALLED ON PRESIDENT THIEU AT 10:30 THIS MORNING AT HIS REQUEST. HE WAS NOTABLY MORE RELAXED THAN HE HAD BEEN DURING ANY OF OUR RECENT INTERVIEWS, AND CLEARLY IN A CONSTRUCTIVE FRAME OF MIND. WITH RESPECT TO OUR DRAFT STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 11, HE ASKED IF THIS WAS TO BE REGARDED AS A "COUNTER-PROPOSAL" TO THE GVN PROPOSAL OF NOVEMBER 8. I SAID YES, AND HE SEEMED PLEASED. ( UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES I DID NOT USE THE HELPFUL MATERIAL IN REPLY TO THE NOVEMBER 8 PROPOSAL WHICH THE DEPARTMENT HAD FURNISHED IN REF B.) HE ASKED IF THE FACT COULD BE BROUGHT OUT THAT THIS WAS IN RESPONSE TO THEIR PROPOSAL, AND I SAID THIS SHOULD CAUSE NO DIFFICULTY.
2. THIEU THEN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT WE COULD COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF OUR DRAFT STATEMENT. FOREIGN MINISTER THANH WOULD HAVE SOME SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS WHICH HE WOULD DISCUSS WITH CALHOUN AND HERZ, AFTER WHICH WE COULD HAVE A FULL-DRRESS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE PRESIDENT, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER. I AGREED AND SAID WE OURSELVES HAD BEEN THINKING OF WAYS IN WHICH THE STATEMENT MIGHT BE MADE MORE PRESENTABLE. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCEEDING QUICKLY TO AN AGREEMENT.
3. I REMARKED THAT I THOUGHT THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 13 SHOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO THE GVN. THIEU AGREED AND SAID, "THIS IS WHAT WE HAD BEEN WAITING FOR."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 42751 NODIS HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS 4278Q

4. THIEU HIMSELF RAISED ONLY TWO POINTS WITH RESPECT TO OUR DRAFT STATEMENT. FIRST, HE WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER SOME WAY MIGHT BE FOUND TO ASSOCIATE THE TCC'S WITH THE STATEMENT. I SAID I WAS SURE THEY WOULD GIVE THEIR PUBLIC SUPPORT. (IT WAS CLEAR THAT THIEU CONSIDERED THAT HE WOULD GAIN "FACE" IF SOME PUBLIC STAMP OF APPROVAL COULD BE GIVEN BY THE TCC'S TO WHATEVER WE WORK OUT.) SECOND, HE ASKED IF WE COULD NOW WORK QUIETLY WITHOUT ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HE SAID IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR THE CLIFFORD STATEMENT WHICH AGAIN ROILED THE PUBLIC EMOTIONS HERE, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE TO MOVE A LITTLE MORE QUICKLY. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE NEEDED A FEW MORE DAYS FOR TEMPER TO COOL DOWN AND HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD HAPPEN IF THERE WERE NO MORE PUBLIC EXCHANGES. I SAID THAT TON THAT THIEN'S EMOTIONAL OUTBURST IN REPLY HAD NOT BEEN HELPFUL EITHER AND THIEU AGREED, SAYING THIS HAD BEEN MADE WITHOUT HIS PRIOR APPROVAL. I SAID THAT I HOPED WE COULD BOTH WORK QUIETLY NOW WITHOUT PUBLIC STATEMENTS FROM EITHER SIDE IN ORDER TO MAKE AS RAPID PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE.

5. WE UNDERSTAND THANH AND BUI DIEM HAVE BEEN CLOSETED THIS MORNING GOING OVER OUR DRAFT STATEMENT. CALHOUN AND HERZ HAVE A TENTATIVE APPOINTMENT, SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION LATER THIS AFTERNOON, TO MEET WITH THANH AT 6 PM. (THIS HAS JUST BEEN CHANGED TO AN EQUALLY TENTATIVE APPOINTMENT AFTER 9 PM.)

BUNKER

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

49b

1968 NOV 15 12 18

~~SECRET~~

HCE593

PAGE 01 SAIGON 42752 151200Z

21  
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

030656

O 151131Z NOV 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4494  
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42752

EXDIS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 77C 89-72By yljap, NARA, Date 4-6-93

1. IN THE COURSE OF MY CONVERSATION WITH THIEU ON ANOTHER SUBJECT THIS MORNING, HE MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL REMARKS WHICH ARE OF INTEREST:

2. HE DWELT AT SOME LENGTH ON THE CLIFFORD STATEMENT AND ITS AFTERMATH HERE, NOT BY WAY OF RECRIMINATION BUT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT MINISTER OF INFORMATION THIEN HAD SPOKEN WITHOUT HIS AUTHORIZATION AND THAT HE NOW THOUGHT THIS INCIDENT CLOSED. HE DID SAY HOWEVER THAT AT ONE POINT HE HAD CONSIDERED REPLYING PERSONALLY BUT HAD DECIDED THAT THAT WOULD ONLY HAVE MAGNIFIED THE DISAGREEMENT.

3. HE WAS INCENSED ABOUT AMERICAN NEWSPAPER STORIES, CITING ESPECIALLY THE ALLEGATION IN NEWSWEEK THAT HE HAD CELEBRATED NIXON'S VICTORY WITH CHAMPAGNE. HE SAID WITH SOME HEAT THAT THIS WAS ABSOLUTE NONSENSE. I REMARKED THAT SUCH THINGS ARE OBVIOUSLY FED TO THE PRESS BY HIS ENEMIES.

4. BY WAY OF REMINISCENCE, THIEU BROUGHT OUT THREE FACTORS IN THE RECENT SITUATION WHICH HE THOUGHT HAD EXACERBATED MATTERS: (A) THE REPORTED CAMPAIGN STATEMENT BY VICE PRES HUMPHREY ABOUT THE BOMBING HALT WHICH GOT PEOPLE HERE WORRIED THAT IT MIGHT PRESAGE A WIDER US DISENGAGEMENT; (B) THE FORMULATION IN THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF OCT-31 WHICH REFERRED TO "REPRESENTATIVES" OF THE NLF; (C) THE FACT THAT OUR BOMBING HALT ANNOUNCEMENT CAME ON SOUTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL DAY, THUS HURTING NATIONAL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE-02 SAIGON-42752 151200Z

PRIDE PERHAPS MORE THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE THE CASE.

5. EVIDENCING THE SENCE OF INSECURITY REFERRED TO (A) THE STATEMENT BY NLF LEADER NGUYEN VAN HIEU AT PHNOM PENH THAT THEY WERE WAITING FOR GEN DUONG VAN MINH AND THICH TRI QUANG TO JOIN FORCES AND TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THIEU; AND (B) A RUMOR THAT TRI QUANG'S AN QUANG BUDDHISTS AND STUDENTS WER PLANNING A DEMONSTRATION "SUPPORTED BY THE CIA," WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO COUNTER MEASURES BY THE CATHOLICS.

6. THIEU SAID THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE NAIVE AND TEND TO BELIEVE SUCH THINGS, AND OF COURSE PEOPLE WHO ARE LOOKING FOR SUPPORT OFTEN CLAIM AMERICAN BACKING. HE NOTED THAT BIG MINH HIMSELF HAD REFUTED THE NLF PROPAGANDA AND REFERRED TO IT AS A "VICIOUS LIE." I SAID THAT IN SO FAR AS THE STORY ABOUT TRI QUANG AND THE CIA IS CONCERNED, IF IT GAINS ANY WIDER CIRCULATION I WOULD BE GLAD TO DENY IT PUBLICLY, ALTHOUGH IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT IS BEST TO IGNORE SUCH PATENT FABRICATIONS LAUNCHED BY THIEU'S ENEMIES.

7. THIEU ALSO COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON THE MILITARY SITUATION. HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE STEPPED-UP ENEMY ATTACKS AND NOTED VIOLATIONS OF THE DMZ AND THE INCREASE OF ATTACKS ON SMALLER POPULATIONS CENTERS SINCE THE BOMBING HALT. I POINTED OUT THAT IN TALKING WITH HANOI WE HAD STRESSED THAT ATTACKS ON MAJOR CITIES SUCH AS SAIGON, HUE AND DANANG AND POPULATION CENTERS WOULD MAKE SERIOUS TALKS IMPOSSIBLE. SOME OF THE SMALLER POPULATION CENTERS ALSO HAD MILITARY TARGETS IN OR NEAR THEM. THIEU REPLIED THAT THE ENEMY IS PROBABLY TESTING US TO FIND HOW FAR HE CAN GO, AND I AGREED THAT THIS IS SO AND SAID WE ARE WATCHING THIS SITUATION CAREFULLY. BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Friday, November 15, 1968  
7:40 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a French official states and a Soviet official hints that it would be undesirable for the U. S. to withdraw wholly from South Vietnam after the war.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-514  
By ijp, NARA, Date 7-2-93

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

TELEGRAM

23

506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 954

PAGE 01 LONDON 14323 141902Z

54

ACTION EUR 20

INFO EA 10, IO 13, NIC 01, E 15, ACDA 16, SA 01, SAH 02, SAL 01, NEA 13,

NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, RSR 01, /165 W

025820

R 141711Z NOV 68  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7233  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
CINCPAC  
AMEMBASSY PARIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 14323

1. LOUIS NEVIN OF AP INFORMED PRESS ATTACHE OF CONVERSATION LAST WEEK WITH IVAN KOULIKOV, SECOND SECRETARY OF SOVIET EMBASSY, ON SOUTHEAST ASIA AND OTHER MATTERS.

2. ~~KOULIKOV SAID AFTER VIETNAM WAR WAS OVER SOVIETS DID NOT WANT TO PRECIPITATE US WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA. SPECIFICALLY, THEY HAD NO OPPOSITION TO BILATERAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH COUNTRIES SUCH AS THAILAND, INDONESIA, THE PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, ETC. NOR DID THEY HAVE ANY OPPOSITION TO MAINTAINING BASES IN THESE COUNTRIES -- HE MENTIONED BASES IN THAILAND, SAYING THERE WOULD BE NO NEED TO WITHDRAW FROM THESE. IN FURTHER CONVERSATION REGARDING THE VIETNAM WAR, HE STATED THAT THE AMERICANS MUST HAVE BEEN BADLY BURNED BY THEIR EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM AND CONTRASTED THIS WITH THE EFFECT THAT THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD HAD ON SOVIET GOVERNMENT. IN CLOSING, HE STATED FURTHER ON WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA THAT AMERICAN PRESENCE WAS DESIRABLE BECAUSE "DON'T FORGET WE FACE A COMMON ENEMY IN ASIA."~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By           , NARA, Date 2-18-98

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Department of State

TELEGRAM  
23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LONDON 14323 141902Z

3. KOULIKOV ALSO EVIDENCED GREAT INTEREST REGARDING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND SPECIFICALLY TRIED TO FIND OUT IF NEVIN HAD ANY INFORMATION REGARDING JORDANIAN/ISRAELI DISCUSSIONS.
4. KOULIKOV TOLD NEVIN THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT EXPECT THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY FURTHER TALKS WITH THE US ON ABMS OR ANY OTHER SERIOUS SUBJECT BEFORE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TOOK OVER.
5. KOULIKOV, WHOM BRITISH REGARD AS INTELLIGENCE AGENT, CULTIVATES JOURNALISTS AND HAS OCCASIONALLY APPROACHED EMBASSY OFFICERS TO TALK ABOUT VIETNAM AND OTHER MATTERS. HIS LINE ON "CHINA AS A COMMON ENEMY" REFLECTS SOME CHANGE FROM VIEW HE EXPRESSED A YEAR AGO, WHEN HE SAID USSR EXPECTED CHINA WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE CLOSE RELATIONS AGAIN WITH USSR. BUT HE ALSO ADDED USSR DID NOT WANT TO SEE US SUFFER SERIOUS LOSS OF FACE IN SEA (LONDON A-2058). BRUCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Friday, November 15, 1968 - 7:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Ellsworth Bunker, on the new special back channel, reports his confidence that a face-saving formula can be found; that it will take a "few additional days" and the troop contributing countries should be associated with that formula.

We do not yet have his full report of the conversation in the referenced cables, Saigon 42751 and 42752.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 42753

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-514  
By WJ, NARA, Date 7-2-93

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

WWRostow:rln

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~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 42753

MODIS/CHEROKEE

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PRESERVATION COPY

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 91-510

By AS/jw NARA, Date 4-6-93

SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER ON DUTY DELIVERD COPY  
OF FOLLOWING TO SECRETARY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER

1. I HAVE BEEN WAITING TO REPORT TO YOU ON THE SITUATION HERE UNTIL WE HAD SOME CLEAR SIGN OF THE DIRECTION IN WHICH THINGS WERE GOING. WE BEGAN TO HAVE SOME SIGNS OF MOVEMENT YESTERDAY, WHICH WERE REFLECTED IN CONVERSATIONS I HAD WITH AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM AND OTHERS IN THE EMBASSY HAD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THANK AND INTERIOR MINISTER KHIEM. THE REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH BUI DIEM IS CONTAINED IN SAIGON 42653.

2. THIS MORNING I HAD A LONG AND RELAXED CONVERSATION WITH THIEU, AT HIS INITIATIVE, WHICH CONFIRMED OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE LOGJAM WAS BEGINNING TO BREAK UP AND THAT MATTERS WERE MOVING TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE BEEN FACING. THE FULL REPORT OF MY CONVERSATION IS CONTAINED IN SAIGON 42751 AND 42752.

2. THIS MORNING I HAD A LONG AND RELAXED CONVERSATION WITH THIEU, AT HIS INITIATIVE, WHICH CONFIRMED OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE LOGJAM WAS BEGINNING TO BREAK UP AND THAT MATTERS WERE MOVING TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE BEEN FACING. THE FULL REPORT OF MY CONVERSATION IS CONTAINED IN SAIGON 42751 AND 42752.

3. IT WAS EVIDENT FROM MY TALKS WITH THIEU AND BUI DIEM (WHO INCIDENTALLY HAS BEEN DOING A VERY HELPFUL JOB OF CONVEYING THE MOOD AND SENSE OF URGENCY IN OUR OWN CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION) THAT THERE WAS STILL NEED FOR A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION HERE, BUT THE WILLINGNESS AND DESIRE TO FIND A SOLUTION WAS MANIFEST. THERE WAS ALSO AN AWARENESS OF THE NECESSITY TO DO SO. AS YOU KNOW, CLARK CLIFFORD'S PRESS CONFERENCE CREATED REAL PROBLEMS IN THIS RESPECT SINCE IT APPEARED TO PUT THE GVN UNDER PUBLIC US PRESSURE, WHICH MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THIEU TO ACCEPT A FACE-SAVING FORMULA. NICK KATZENBACH'S NOV 13 STATEMENT WAS VERY MUCH WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED, HOWEVER, AND HAS HELPED MEASURABLY TO MOVE THE SITUATION ALONG. AS I HAVE POINTED OUT IN OTHER MESSAGES, THE QUESTION OF "FACE" HAS PLAYED THE USUAL IMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS DELICATE SITUATION. IT IS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT WE FIND A FORMULA WHICH MEETS THE NEEDS OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION HERE, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO WORK THIS OUT. THERE IS NO QUESTION NOW ABOUT THE STRONG DESIRE IN ALL QUARTERS TO FIND A WAY OUT AND TO GET A DELEGATION TO PARIS.

4. WE WILL BE WORKING OUT THE TERMS OF A FORMULA IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, AND IT WILL BE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT DURING THAT TIME THAT THERE BE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON EITHER SIDE WHICH WILL MAKE THIS TASK MORE DIFFICULT. PRESIDENT THIEU AND FOREIGN MINISTER THANH AGREE WITH ME ON THIS POINT AND THIEU SAID THAT HE WOULD SEE THAT THE SITUATION IS KEPT UNDER CONTROL HERE. I HOPE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO THE SAME IN WASHINGTON AS WELL.

5. ONE POINT WHICH THIEU MENTIONED TO ME THIS MORNING WAS HIS DESIRE TO ASSOCIATE THE TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES WITH WHATEVER STATEMENT IS DEVELOPED BETWEEN US, AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE CAN DO THIS WITHOUT DIFFICULTY; IN FACT THE NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR HIMSELF SUGGESTED THIS TO ME TODAY. THIS IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT PART OF FINDING A FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR THIEU AND WILL BE WORTH THE ADDITIONAL EFFORT IT MAY REQUIRE.

6. I AM NOW CONFIDENT THAT IF WE CAN WORK QUIETLY ON THE PROBLEM WE CAN BRING THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION TO A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION WITHIN A REASONABLY TIME. I RECOGNIZE, THAT THERE IS MOUNTING PUBLIC PRESSURE IN THE UNITED STATES AND MOUNTING PROPAGANDA FROM HANOI AND THE NLF. BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE FEW ADDITIONAL DAYS WHICH ARE REQUIRED WILL BE TIME WELL SPENT AND I URGE THAT THERE BE NO OVERT PRESSURE EXERTED ON THE GVN DURING THIS TIME. I HOP TO BE REPORTING TO YOU SOON ON THE SOLUTION WHICH WILL RESOLVE THIS MATTER SATISFACTORILY FOR ALL OF US. BUNKER

BT

PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1968

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

Attached is the proposed formula on which Bunker can settle with Thieu.

The meeting with Foreign Minister Thanh is scheduled for 5:30 p. m. Saigon time, which is 4:30 a. m. tomorrow morning our time.

Therefore the attached requires your alteration and clearance tonight if it is to be the basis for Bunker's conversation with the Foreign Minister.

Nick Katzenbach has cleared this draft in the light of comments from both Saigon and Paris.

I shall be at home this evening if you wish to discuss this draft.

W. W. Rostow

52a

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

Origin ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

Info: INFO: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

STATE

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

PARIS TODEL \_\_\_\_\_ FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE.

REF: (A) Saigon 42771, (B) Saigon 42772, (C) Paris 23982

1. Taking into account comments in Refs A and C, we propose the following revision of the GVN "working redraft". Where appropriate, we have interspersed explanations of our changes in the GVN draft of Ref B.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

A. This statement is designed to answer the questions which have been raised by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam about the arrangements for a new meeting in Paris.

B. Prior to the President's announcement of October 31 of the stopping of bombing against North Viet-Nam, agreement had been reached in Paris between North Vietnamese and US negotiators that a meeting on the substance of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam should be promptly convened in Paris. (NOTE: This paragraph was in our November 11 memorandum but dropped in GVN redraft. We

**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority 712991-510  
By 19/jw, NARA, Date 4-6-93

Drafted by: EA:WPBundy 11-15 Tel. Est. 4235 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: W & K The Acting Secretary

Clearances:

WH -

S/S -

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## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~Classification

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Origin

ACTION CONTINUATION SHEET TWO

Info:

ACTION SAIGON, INFO PARIS TODEL

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

believe that it should be retained because it refers to negotiating on the "substance of a peaceful settlement," which after all is the reason for the Paris meetings.)

C. During the discussions with North Vietnamese representatives US spokesmen made clear that the stopping of bombing and the holding of such a meeting will not be possible without agreed provision for the participation of the Republic of Viet-Nam as a separate delegation forming with the US delegation one side of the meeting. US negotiators made clear to Hanoi that it might bring on its side of the table any persons it wished.

D. The North Vietnamese representatives in Paris accepted this proposal and indicated that they would bring to the meeting members of the so-called NLF.

E. This was and is the sole agreement concerning representation in the new Paris meetings. (NOTE: We note Paris proposal that this be preceded by following sentence: "It was understood that both sides would organize themselves as they chose.")

Dated by:

Tel. Ent.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin

ACTION: CONTINUATION SHEET THREE

Info:

ACTION SAIGON, INFO PARIS TO DEL

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

But we believe that this is not necessary. If one wished to be technical about it, one would say that there was no agreement as to how both sides would organize themselves -- but in any case we believe the literal accuracy in this case must yield to the practical considerations against proposing this language. If Saigon in the course of informal discussions finds that GVN objections would be less than we would take them to be, we would of course have no objection to the language being inserted, but believe it should<sup>not</sup>/be put forward as a clear position on our part.)

F. In the light of these facts the arrangements agreed in Paris provide in essence for a two-sided meeting. Hanoi clearly understands that our side will be constituted as separate delegations of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the US.

G. Whatever others may claim, the US will not agree that it is properly described as a four-sided or four-party conference.

H. Consistent with our view of the nature of the so-called NLF we will regard and treat all the persons on the other side

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ACTION: CONTINUATION SHEET FOUR

ACTION SAIGON, INFO PARIS TODEL

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

of the table -- whatever they might claim for themselves -- as representatives of a single side, that of Hanoi, and for practical purposes as a single delegation.

I. In the discussions between US and North Vietnamese negotiators it was made clear throughout that, whoever Hanoi chose to bring on its side, the arrangement involved no element of recognition whatever. The US Government has repeatedly made clear publicly and privately that it does not recognize either the NLF or the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (North Viet-Nam).

J. Concerning the so-called NLF the US Government has at all times regarded it as an emanation and tool of North Viet-Nam. The NLF is not in any sense a separate entity, much less a government.

K. Following the cessation of bombing of North Viet-Nam, if Hanoi fulfills its repeated undertakings to enter into serious talks -- undertakings repeated throughout the contacts between North Vietnamese and American representatives in Paris -- the North Vietnamese delegation must talk directly and seriously with

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ACTION: CONTINUATION SHEET FIVE

Info:

ACTION SAIGON, INFO PARIS TODEL

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

the Republic of Viet-Nam's delegation.

L. (NOTE: We wish to omit the SVN's proposed paragraph 12 Ref B which reads: "Any ruses or propaganda maneuvers on the part of the Hanoi's side will be a cause for immediate consultations between RVN and US delegations with a view to making whatever actions are required or to determine whether the talks could continue. This will apply to any efforts by Hanoi to bypass, ignore or freeze out the GVN or to maneuver the GVN into a position where they would have to talk directly with the so-called NLF." It detracts from the dignity of this document and it would be a great tactical mistake to make public private understandings between us on how to handle ruses, enemy propaganda maneuvers, etc. To do so will only encourage the other side to try ~~much~~ a succession of maneuvers and hairline decisions in order to make our common position difficult.)

Dated by:

Tel. Ext.

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Clearance:

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ACTION: CONTINUATION SHEET SIX

Info:

ACTION SAIGON, INFO PARIS TODEL

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

M. In the Paris meetings the Republic of Viet-Nam delegation will play a leading role, as was explicitly affirmed in the Honolulu Communique of July.

N. The RVN will take the lead and be the principal spokesman on all matters which are of immediate and direct concern to South Viet-Nam. (NOTE: We have taken Paris proposal in adding the words "are of immediate and direct". The RVN language is simply too comprehensive, and we should make the strongest possible effort to get agreement to our original language -- even though we might have to try to find some alternative adjectives such as "paramount.")

We have dropped this paragraph.

O. (NOTE: /Like Paris, we see grave difficulty in the GVN language in paragraph 15 of Ref B which said: "Problems of internal politics of the RVN will not be considered as proper subjects of discussion in the framework of these meetings." For purposes of the discussion of agenda in Paris, we believe we would

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Clearances:

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin
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**ACTION: CONTINUATION SHEET SEVEN**  
**ACTION SAIGON, INFOR PARIS TODEL**  
**NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBEE PLUS**

have no alternative in practice but to stand with the GVN in rejecting an agenda item described in these terms, and you are authorized to say that this would in fact be our position. Nonetheless, the language as phrased might be deemed to prevent us from even setting forth the objective of free choice by South Vietnamese as the basis of its future political structure. For purposes of arguing the point with the GVN, we think a major point to make is that this kind of thing (like the contents of paragraph 12 of Ref B) is premature at this stage and would tend to tip our hand, give propaganda ammunition to the other side, and result in seriously adverse criticism that would weaken American public support here.)

P. The new Paris meetings will be expected to explore all avenues to end external aggression against RVN and to reach a peaceful settlement. They will start with a clean slate. The sole agreements that have been reached in the earlier Paris talks between NVN and US representatives have concerned the cessation

Drafted by:	Tel. Rm.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
Clearance:		

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## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin  
Info:

ACTION: CONTINUATION SHEET EIGHT

ACTION SAIGON, INFO PARIS TODEL

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

of bombing, the convening of new meetings and the circumstances required to achieve and maintain these. (NOTE: In the first sentence, we have used "external aggression against RVN" instead of the GVN's "Communist aggression in Viet-Nam" and we restored the reference to a "peaceful settlement," which the GVN dropped. In both cases, this phraseology is much better attuned to public sentiment in US. In the last sentence, we have changed the GVN's "conditions" to "circumstances," which is our standard terminology and which reflects the understanding reached in Paris. We have also eliminated the GVN's phrase at the end of the sentence, "in particular, those relating to the DMZ and attacks against towns and cities of South Viet-Nam". As Saigon has noted, this is an attempt to commit us to a sweeping definition of the restraint to be expected with respect to cities. We have greater freedom of maneuver if we do not get too explicit about the "circumstances". If the GVN insists on some language, we could only refer to indiscriminate attacks against major cities. We think it better to make no reference at all.)

Typed by:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

Cleared by:

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Classification

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

Classification

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Origin

ACTION: CONTINUATION SHEET NINE

Info:

ACTION SAIGON, INFO PARIS TODEL

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

Q. In the new meetings the US Government will operate in the closest cooperation with the Republic of Viet-Nam, and in continuing consultation with the nations that have contributed military forces to the defense of South Viet-Nam.

R. The substantive position of the American Government will continue to be based on the Manila Communique, the Honolulu Communique and on other publicly stated positions. In particular, there has been no change whatever and will be no change, in the position of the US Government toward a so-called coalition in South Viet-Nam. The US does not believe aggression should be rewarded and will not recognize any form of government that is not freely chosen by the people of South Viet-Nam. The imposition of any coalition government would be in conflict with this principle. (NOTE: We concur with both Saigon and Paris that the GVN's final sentence of this paragraph was far too sweeping. It stated: "We will not promote, encourage, or recognize any form of coalition government with the participation of the Communists

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

**SECRET**

*Classification*

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Origin	ACTION: CONTINUATION SHEET TEN
Info:	

ACTION SAIGON, INFO PARIS TODEL  
NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

or their organizations." In its place we have accepted Saigon's formulation, which is a good alternative to that of our November 11 draft.)

END TEXT.

~~EXX~~ 3. We concur that Saigon should treat the next meeting ~~END~~ with Thanh as a putting forward of the Embassy's own suggestions "prior to receipt of Washington comments."

GP-1

END

Drafted by:	Tel. Est.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
Clearances:		

**SECRET**

Friday, November 15, 1968

*Free file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**Governor Daniel's request to attend a session of the talks in Paris creates serious difficulties for Ambassador Harriman.**

- 1. So far, no persons other than members of the delegation have attended any of the "regular" Wednesday meetings. If Governor Daniel were permitted to do so, numerous other justifiable requests would be difficult to turn down.
- 2. During the week Governor Daniel will be in Paris -- November 20-27 -- there may be no meetings or, if there are, negotiations may be at a very delicate stage. Notification to the North Vietnamese that an additional U. S. official would be attending could give rise to unjustified suspicion on their part.

**Regretfully, I recommend that we do not ask Ambassador Harriman to arrange for Governor Daniel to attend.**

**W. W. Rostow**

         Drop it

         Send the request to Governor Harriman

**BKS:amc**

November 14, 1968 --5:00 P.M.

Mr. President:

53a

The attached was received this afternoon.  
Would the President like to send the attached  
in the form of a cable Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
or a letter Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

(4)  
Larry Temple

Check this with Walt Rostow and see if  
there is anything wrong with it.

LBJ/mf  
11-14-68  
9:00p

536

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

~~OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS~~

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

*no. 2005*

November 12, 1968

TO THE PRESIDENT

RE: Stop-over in Paris

As stated in our telephone conversation last night, it would be an historic experience to observe one of the sessions of the Paris Peace Talks. In case you would like to write a letter along the lines mentioned, I suggest something of the nature attached hereto.

*Price*  
Price Daniel

Attachment

POSSIBLE LETTER TO GOVERNOR HARRIMAN  
(Copy to Honorable Cyrus Vance)

Your old colleague, former Governor Price Daniel of Texas, who is Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness and a member of the National Security Council, will be attending a NATO Senior Emergency Planning Committee meeting November 20 - 23, after which he will be in Paris for a few days at the Hotel Crillon.

If convenient for him to accompany you to one of the sessions as an observer, it will be an experience which I am sure he would appreciate. If so, please advise him direct at NATO, c/o Ambassador Harlan Cleveland, or at the Hotel Crillon.

ACTION

Confidential

Friday - November 15, 1968

*Profile*

Mr. President:

If you are interested in high-lighting any aspects of Latin American policy during the final weeks of your administration, there are three opportunities you might want to consider. Any one of the three occasions would provide a good setting to dramatize the contributions of your administration in this region.

1. First annual conference on Caribbean development, November 25-27, at St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands - sponsored by Governor Palewensky of the Virgin Islands. All Caribbean Chiefs of State are invited, and a number of them will attend. Secretary Udall will deliver a key-note address; the theme of the conference is development of water resources as a key to development in the Caribbean (the program for the delegates will include a tour of desalinization plants), etc.
  
2. Completion of the Chamizal settlement with Mexico. The new channel for the Rio Grande will be completed about December 1, and the River then diverted into it, ending the third and final phase of the treaty settlement. A ceremony will be scheduled between December 1 and December 10. (Since you and President Diaz Ordaz celebrated completion of the first two phases in 1964 and 1967, a third Presidential ceremony on the Chamizal may be excessive.) If you do not wish to go, they will hold a simpler local ceremony with only Texas officials on the US side attending.
  
3. You have agreed to accept an award from the Pan-American Society for your efforts on behalf of inter-American friendship. The date and occasion for this presentation have not yet been set. I suggested earlier that you select a time in December or January to receive the award, taking the occasion to deliver a "valedictory speech" on Latin America. You indicated you did

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 16, NARA, Date 7-8-93

not want to attend a banquet for such a purpose. You could, however, arrive after dinner for the speech, or alternatively, deliver a speech at a more formal ceremony not involving a banquet.

W. W. Rostow

Virgin Islands Conference:

May wish to attend, provide suggested schedule \_\_\_\_\_  
Not interested \_\_\_\_\_  
Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Charizal Ceremony:

May wish to attend, provide suggested schedule \_\_\_\_\_  
Do not wish to attend \_\_\_\_\_  
Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Pan-American Society Award:

Will make speech \_\_\_\_\_  
Will not make speech \_\_\_\_\_  
  
Will attend large ceremony outside White House \_\_\_\_\_  
Prefer receive award here \_\_\_\_\_  
  
Call me \_\_\_\_\_

SWLewis:mmm  
Cc - Jim Jones

**Friday, November 15, 1968**

**Mr. President:**

**Attached is the text of a statement made by Vice President Humphrey before an audience of college students in Kansas City on October 15. Mr. Humphrey said, "Now what did I say at Salt Lake City? I said I would stop the bombing as an acceptable risk for peace."**

*Pres file*

**After the applause died down, Mr. Humphrey said he would look to evidence by word or deed, directly or indirectly, that the North Vietnamese would restore the demilitarized zone to its status of a demilitarized zone area.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**BKS:amc**

HHH MOVES CLOSER TO BOMB HALT

WALTER CRONKITE: Before an audience of college students in Kansas City today, Hubert Humphrey restated his position on a Viet Nam bombing halt. For his listeners, including many of the reporters that travel with him, he seemed to move closer to calling for a halt. Morton Dean reports:

MORTON DEAN: The Vice President enjoyed one of his most impressive days of the campaign, a round of appearances in Kansas City, producing large and exuberant crowds.

And in a visit to Rockhurst College, the Democratic nominee seemed more anxious than ever to leave the impression that he would be more likely to stop the bombing of North Viet Nam than either of his opponents or President Johnson.

VICE PRES HUMPHREY: Now what did I say at Salt Lake City? I said I would stop the bombing as an acceptable risk for peace, period. That's what I said. (APPLAUSE)

I also said--but I said period, not comma or semicolon--I also said that in making this decision, however, I would look to evidence by word or deed--I didn't say...I said I would look for it--to evidence by word or deed, directly or indirectly, that the North Vietnamese should restore the Demilitarized Zone to its status of a demilitarized area.

Now why? Because that's the easiest thing for them to do, because it is an international zone. It means giving up nothing from their own territory.

I felt that that was an acceptable risk for peace, what I stated. And let me make it very clear to you that whoever is the next President of the United States is going to have to come to grips with this war, one way or another, if Mr Johnson hasn't been able to find an answer to it between now and January 20th, and I hope and pray he will. And I know that he's trying to.

I know that as of this hour, he is trying to. I think that there are some who think--I have a pretty

good idea at Wallace-LeMay, the "Bombsey Twins", are thinking about. (APPLAUSE) 55a

DEAN: One point about which there can be no argument is the fact that ever since Mr Humphrey delivered his nationally televised Viet Nam speech two weeks ago, there has been a significant lessening of the amount of anti-Viet Nam War hostility directed toward him. In fact, during the past two days, during several appearances, he has heard none of it.

CRONKITE: In spite of the difference in phrasing today, Humphrey himself subsequently said that his position on a bombing halt is unchanged.

HOPE SEEN FOR PARIS TALKS

Diplomatic observers on both sides of the Atlantic tonight saw, or thought they saw, two straws in the wind that offer a glimmer of hope for a breakthrough in the Paris Viet Nam talks.

For one thing, enemy action in Viet Nam has dropped to a new low. And secondly, Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's ranking diplomat in Paris, reportedly will urge Ho Chi Minh to take a more flexible stand at the peace table.

Tho stopped over in Moscow on his way from Paris to Hanoi today. The Soviet leaders, with troubles of their own, also are said to be urging conciliation in the Paris talks.

NJ BLASTS ISLAND INTO GULF

The US command in Saigon today reported that the big sixteen-inch guns of the battleship New Jersey literally had blasted part of a small enemy island into the Gulf of Tonkin. The barrage knocked out at least one anti-aircraft battery on Hon Matt Island.

It was the ship's northernmost attack yet up that enemy coast.

CHINA WITHDRAWS LABORERS

There is a report that Red China is starting to withdraw some 50,000 labor troops from North Viet Nam. These laborers work mainly in ports, on railroads and

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

November 15, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dr. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, has requested specific Presidential approval for the execution of the Schooner event, a low-intermediate yield, nuclear cratering experiment (Tab A attached). Dr. Seaborg points out that conduct of this test in November-December 1968 is necessary to maintain the schedule established for the research program and related explosives development tests required to produce the information required by the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission to make its determination on the feasibility of a nuclear-built canal in time for its final report currently scheduled for December 1970.

The Atomic Energy Commission's planning is based on an initial readiness date of November 21. Execution authority is required approximately ten days in advance of the final readiness date. Actual execution may be delayed for several weeks for appropriate weather conditions. Funds are currently included in the budget for this event.

The AEC has prepared a detailed analysis of the radioactive venting associated with the test. Dr. Hornig has reviewed (Tab B) the analysis and agrees that it represents an objective analysis of the problem. He points out that the AEC analysis indicates that the probability of detectable amounts of radioactivity crossing US borders is somewhat higher than it was for the previous cratering shots, Buggy and Cabriolet. Moreover, he emphasizes the extremely high level of uncertainty in these estimates which depend on long-range weather forecasting, noting that the actual amounts of radioactivity crossing the Canadian border could vary by a factor of 100. Therefore, if unfavorable meteorological conditions develop after the test, it would probably be detected outside of our borders. Nevertheless, he recommends that you approve the test since these same problems were carefully considered in the decision to conduct Buggy and Cabriolet.

The AEC proposal has also been reviewed by the Departments of State and Defense, ACDA, the BOB, CIA, and the JCS. All of these agencies, except ACDA, have either supported the AEC request or have no objections to the conduct of the test.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 08-215 (# 2a)  
By *isl*, NARA, Date 5-25-09

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2

The ACDA position (Tab C) is that Schooner presents too high a risk of incurring charges that the US has deliberately violated the Limited Test Ban Treaty. ACDA recommends that all nuclear cratering experiments should be deferred until legitimized by an appropriate amendment to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

The State Department, although recommending that Schooner be approved, points to possible difficulties with the Canadians if radioactivity associated with Schooner is detected in Canada. State also points out that Schooner will be followed by additional tests that must be conducted before the feasibility of the new canal can be determined and presumably these subsequent tests will pose even more difficult problems in regard to the Limited Test Ban Treaty (Tab D).

All members of the Review Committee state that if the Schooner test is authorized they would recommend against the presence of press representatives or foreign observers at the test.

I recommend that you authorize the conduct of the Schooner test as requested and disapprove the presence of any press representatives or foreign observers at the test. I further recommend that you authorize me to sign the attached letter to the AEC.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
Call me \_\_\_\_\_

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

56a

~~SECRET~~  
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Presidential Approval of Schooner

The President has approved the request contained in your letter to me of October 16, 1968, for approval for the execution of Schooner on or about November 21, 1968, with the actual date depending on the occurrence of appropriate meteorological conditions. The President has also specified that there are to be no press representatives or foreign observers at the event.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 08-215(42)  
By *isl*, NARA, Date 12-4-08

Friday, November 15, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Attached for your signature is a Proclamation of the provisional entry into force of the International Coffee Agreement, 1968.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on June 28, 1968, and you ratified the Agreement on July 10. Our instrument of ratification was deposited with the UN on November 1, following the enactment of implementing legislation (P. L. 90-634, October 24, 1968).

The Agreement -- now in force provisionally -- will enter into force definitively when importing and exporting countries having 80 percent of the votes in the Agreement have deposited their instruments of ratification. They have until December 31 to do so; no problems are foreseen.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we will need your signature on the Proclamation.

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*JKN*  
JKN:mst



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~1. Fried~~ 11/14  
2. Ret. 57a

November 13, 1968

IN REPLY REFER TO: 14870

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proclamation of the provisional  
entry into force of the International  
Coffee Agreement, 1968

I enclose for the President's signature the proclamation of the International Coffee Agreement, 1968, which entered into force provisionally on October 1, 1968 between the United States and certain other countries.

On June 28, 1968, the Senate gave advice and consent to ratification of the Agreement. It was ratified by the President on July 10, 1968, but the instrument of ratification was not deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations until November 1, 1968, after the enactment of implementing legislation (P.L. 90-634, October 24, 1968). However, in accordance with provisions of the Agreement, the United States Government deposited a notification of an undertaking to apply the Agreement provisionally.

According to a notification dated October 10, 1968, from the United Nations General Secretariat, the Agreement entered into force provisionally on October 1, 1968 among those Governments which, by that date, either had deposited instruments of approval, ratification or acceptance or had deposited notifications of an undertaking to apply the Agreement provisionally. The latter Governments are allowed until December 31, 1968 to deposit their instruments of approval, ratification or acceptance in order to bring the Agreement into force definitively.

The International Coffee Agreement, 1962, expired on September 30, 1968. The new Agreement substantially corrects the shortcomings of the 1962 Agreement and includes several innovative provisions particularly in the important areas of production control and diversification.

It is contemplated that, if and when the 1968 Agreement enters into force definitively, a supplemental proclamation will be issued by the President with respect thereto.



Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proclamation.

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 NOV 13 PM 11 20