

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 2

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#5 memo	CAP 82844, Smith to the President on Mexico [partial dup. #9, Sanitized Intelligence Memorandum, NSF, Country File, Latin America, "Mexico, 11/68 - 1/69, Filed by the LBJ Library, Box 60, Sanitized, NLJ 93-117]	11/30/68	A
#6 cable	CAP 83843, Smith to the President on Vietnam C 1 p. <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i>	11/30/68	A
#27 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam, 1:05 p.m. S 1 p. Sanitized [dup. #11, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision," Box 138, Sanitized, NLJ 91-505]	11/26/68	A
#27a cable	Copy of Paris 25/1625Z from Walters S 2 pp. Sanitized [dup. #11a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision," Box 138, Sanitized, NLJ 91-509]	[11/68]	A
#31 memo	Rostow to the President, 6:35 p.m. S 1 p. [partial dup. #20, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. 7," Box 124, Declassified]	11/25/68	A
#31a memo	Helms to Rostow S 1 p. [dup. #20a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. 7," Box 124]	11/25/68	A
#31b memo	Intelligence memorandum [dup. #20b, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. 7," Box 124]	11/25/68	A
#35a cable	Wilson to the President re monetary crisis S 1 p. [closed until 1/99] <i>open</i>	11/25/68	A
#51 note	Rostow to the President, 7:45 a.m. TS 1 p. -	11/25/68	A
#51a cable	Intelligence report TS 1 p. -	11/24/68	A
#60 memo	Rostow to the President, 12:15 p.m., re Paks S 1 p. <i>sanitized 1-6-10</i>	11/23/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 108, 11/23-30/68," Box 43

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

2 of 2

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#60a memo	Katzenbach to the President re Pakistan S 6 p. <i>upon per RAC 12-8-17</i>	10/22/68	A
#62a cable	Rusk to Bowles re Pakistan S 1 p. <i>San. NLT 019-043-1-2 (1/02)</i>	11/22/68	A
#63a cable	Saigon 43342 S 2 p. Sanitized [dup. #20b, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision," Box 138, Sanitized, NLJ 91-506]	11/23/68	A
#64 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam S 1 p. Sanitized [dup. #18, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Memos to the Pres./ Bombing Halt Decision," Box 138, Sanitized, NLJ 91-505]	11/23/68	A

FILE LOCATION

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Rec 4:53 PM

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LF WIE 4523

~~SECRET~~

NOV 29 1953

FROM MOULLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT,
INFO SALT ROSTOV
CITE CAP2851

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By M, NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~SECRET~~ MODIS/HAFVAN PLUS

HERIWITH AMBASSADORS HARRIMAN AND VANCE REPORT ON THEIR CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ZORIN ABOUT THE PARIS TALKS.

ZORIN WAS SELLING FULL WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS AND ACCEPTANCE OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

ZORIN ASKED IF HARRIMAN AND VANCE WOULD BE LEAVING AFTER JANUARY 20 AND THEY REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. THEREUPON ZORIN SAID ALL SHOULD PUSH FORWARD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE BEFORE THAT DATE.

PARIS 24703
FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. ZORIN GAVE LUNCH AT SOVIET EMBASSY ON NOVEMBER 29 FOR US, HABIB AND PERRY. ALSO PRESENT ON THE SOVIET SIDE WERE BOGOLCV, COUNSELOR UTKIN AND SECOND SECRETARY GORITSKY, SPECIALIST ON VIET-NAM. ZORIN SAID THE LATTER TWO DEALT WITH VIET-NAM MATTERS.

2. ZORIN OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY ASKING ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT YET HAVE A SPECIFIC DATE ON WHICH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WOULD ARRIVE BUT HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT IT WOULD BE SOME TIME WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. WE SAID IN THE MEANTIME, HOWEVER, WE HAD PROPOSED A MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR LAU TO DISCUSS THE PROCEDURES FOR THE FIRST WIDER PROCEDURAL MEETING. WE SAID WE HOPED THE MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR LAU WOULD TAKE PLACE ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 2. WE ALSO SAID THAT WE HOPED THAT THE PROCEDURES FOR THE WIDER CONFERENCE WOULD BE WORKED OUT EXPEDITIOUSLY AS HAD BEEN THE CASE AT THE OPENING OF THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS.

3. ZORIN PLUNGED INTO THE QUESTION OF "TWO SIDES" VERSUS "FOUR DELEGATIONS", ASSERTING THAT WE HAD GONE BACK ON OUR COMMITMENT. HE SAID THAT WE HAD AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE A FOUR-DELEGATION MEETING AND REFERRED TO A DOCUMENT WHICH HE HAD SEEN DESCRIBING IT AS FOUR DELEGATIONS. THE DOCUMENT TO WHICH HE REFERRED TURNED OUT TO BE THE DRAFT OF AGREED MINUTE. WE SAID THAT HIS RECOLLECTION OF THE DRAFT WAS INCORRECT AND GAVE HIM THE EXACT WORDING OF THAT PARAGRAPH OF THE DRAFT.

4. WE THEN SAID THAT OUR POSITION HAD BEEN CONSISTENTLY THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE ONE OF TWO SIDES--OUR SIDE/YOUR SIDE-- EACH SIDE ORGANIZING ITSELF AS IT CHOSE. WE REMINDED ZORIN OF THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "OUR SIDE/YOUR SIDE" FORMULA AND POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD SAID TO HIM AND TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MANY MONTHS AGO THAT OUR SIDE WOULD CONSIST OF OURSELVES AND THE GVN, AND THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COULD HAVE ON THEIR SIDE ANYONE WHOM THEY CHOSE. WE SAID THEY HAD INFORMED US THAT THEY CHOSE TO HAVE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NLF OF THEIR SIDE. ACCORDINGLY, THERE WOULD BE A TWO-SIDED MEETING WHICH WOULD INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE US, THE RVN, THE DRV AND THE NLF.

5. WE SAID THAT THE "OUR SIDE/YOUR SIDE" FORMULA WAS PURPOSELY AMBIGUOUS SO AS TO PERMIT THE PRINCIPAL BELLETERENTS TO SIT DOWN TOGETHER AND DISCUSS THE MEANS OF REACHING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITHOUT BECOMING ENMESHED IN THE PROBLEMS OF STATUS, RECOGNITION, ETC.

6. WE SAID THE REALLY IMPORTANT PROBLEMS AT THE MOMENT WERE, FIRST, THE SHOOTING AT OUR RECONNAISSANCE PLANES AND, SECOND, VIOLATIONS OF THE DMZ. WITH RESPECT TO THE FORMER, WE POINTED OUT TO ZORIN THAT WE HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE DRV LANGUAGE "OTHER ACTS OF WAR"--WHICH THE DRV HAD DEFINED TO INCLUDE RECONNAISSANCE--AND HAD SUBSTITUTED OUR OWN LANGUAGE, "ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE". WE SAID THE REASON WE MADE THIS SUBSTITUTION WAS THAT WE INTENDED TO CONTINUE RECONNAISSANCE AND THAT RECONNAISSANCE WAS NOT AN ACT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE. WE SAID WE HAD GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE KNEW EXACTLY WHAT WE WERE DOING WHEN THEY ACCEPTED OUR SUBSTITUTE WORDS FOR THEIR WORDS, AND THAT THEY ACCORDINGLY KNEW THAT WE WERE GOING TO CONTINUE RECONNAISSANCE.

7. ZORIN REPLIED BY SAYING THAT WE HAD CONCEDED THAT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WERE ACTS OF WAR. WE SAID THAT WAS NOT THE CASE; THAT, AS HE WELL KNEW, UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLY ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE OR THE THREAT OF THE USE OF FORCE ARE "ACTS OF WAR". ZORIN RECEDED FROM HIS PRIOR POSITION AND TOOK THE TACK THAT OUR RECONNAISSANCE CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF DRV SOVEREIGNTY. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FACT THAT IT DID VIOLATE DRV SOVEREIGNTY BUT POINTED OUT THAT, ALTHOUGH WE HAD STOPPED ALL THE BOMBARDMENTS AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, A WAR WAS STILL GOING ON IN THE SOUTH. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE RECONNAISSANCE OVER THE NORTH FOR THE PROTECTION OF US AND OTHER ALLIED FORCES. WE SAID THAT THE CONDUCTING OF RECONNAISSANCE WHICH INITIALLY HAD BEEN UNARMED, DID NOT IN ANY WAY CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE DRV. ALL THE DRV HAD TO DO WAS TO STOP FIRING ON OUR PLANES.

8. WE SAID WE HOPED THAT ZORIN AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO GET THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO STOP ALL FIRING ON OUR RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. ZORIN REPLIED THAT THEY COULD NOT DO THIS AND WOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THIS SITUATION.

9. ZORIN THEN RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE DMZ AND CHARGED US WITH REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF THE STATUS OF THE DMZ. WE RESPONDED BY SAYING WE WERE HAPPY TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT AND GIVE HIM THE TRUE FACTS ON THE DMZ. WE REVIEWED AT LENGTH THE FACTS RELATING TO THE DMZ AND DRV VIOLATIONS THEREOF SINCE THE CESSATION OF ALL BOMBARDMENTS AS WE HAD DONE WITH LAU. WE EMPHASIZED THE POINT THAT WE HAD FULLY RESPECTED THE DMZ AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS AND IT WAS THE DRV WHO VIOLATED IT BY THE PRESENCE OF THEIR SOLDIERS AND THE FIRING OF ROCKETS, ETC., AGAINST ALLIED INSTALLATIONS SOUTH OF THE DMZ.

10. WE GAVE ZORIN DETAIL ON OUR PATROLS INTO THE DMZ DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS AND THE EVIDENCE WE HAD ACCUMULATED, INCLUDING THE CAPTURING OF NVA PRISONERS. WE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IT WAS THE UNITED STATES POLICY TO RESPECT THE DMZ; THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO DO SO; AND THAT WE EXPECTED THE DRV TO DO THE SAME.

11. ZORIN REPLIED THAT HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES HAD TALKED TO BOTH HA VAN LAU AND LE DUC THO, WHO BOTH DENIED ANY DRV ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE DMZ SINCE THE CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS. WE REPLIED THAT THEY WERE EITHER MISINFORMED OR UNINFORMED, AND THAT WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO GIVE ZORIN ANY FURTHER PROOF THAT HE WANTED, INCLUDING THE DELIVERY AT HIS EMBASSY OF ONE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PRISONERS RECENTLY CAPTURED IN THE DMZ. ZORIN RECOILED AT THIS SUGGESTION AND SAID THIS WAS A MATTER FOR THE US AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, AND THAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN IT.

12. WE REMINDED ZORIN THAT THE US HAD STOPPED ALL ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM AND WERE ABIDING BY OUR AGREEMENT, WHILE THE DRV WAS SHOOTING AT OUR RECONNAISSANCE PLANES AND WAS VIOLATING THE STATUS OF THE DMZ.

13. AFTER AN INTERLUDE IN WHICH ZORIN QUESTIONED US ABOUT THE WARMING OF FRANCO/AMERICAN RELATIONS, ZORIN GAVE HIS ADVICE ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS. HE URGED THAT THE US PUSH FORWARD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE TOWARD AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW FULL WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS FROM VIET-NAM AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT. WE REPLIED THAT THE WORD "COALITION" DID NOT EXIST IN THE US DIPLOMATIC VOCABULARY AND THAT WE EXPECTED TO LEAVE INTERNAL MATTERS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. WE SAID WE WERE, OF COURSE, PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITHDRAWAL, BUT IT MUST BE A MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND ALLIED FORCES. WE URGED THAT ZORIN AND THE SOVIET UNION USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN ADVISING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS TO ACT REALISTICALLY AND FLEXIBLY SO THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

14. OVER COFFEE THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE FUTURE MAKEUP OF THE NEGOTIATING DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING THE FUNCTION OF GENERAL KY. WE SAID WE UNDERSTOOD KY WOULD BE HERE IN A SUPERVISORY CAPACITY AND WOULD PROBABLY NOT TAKE PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. ZORIN SAID THIS WAS SIMILAR TO LE DUC THO'S POSITION. WE REPLIED THAT IN SOME WAYS IT IS SIMILAR BUT THAT WE HOPED VERY MUCH THAT LE DUC THO WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE PART IN OUR NEGOTIATING SESSIONS--PARTICULARLY THE INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS. WE SAID THAT WE FELT THAT HIS PRESENCE HAD BEEN HELPFUL TO DATE. ZORIN ASKED IF WE WOULD BE LEAVING AFTER JANUARY 20, AND WE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. HE SAID ALL SHOULD PUSH FORWARD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE BEFORE THAT DATE.

15. WE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THE THREE POINTS THAT WERE OF URGENT IMPORTANCE: FIRST, THE CESSATION OF ALL ATTACKS AGAINST US RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT; SECOND, RESPECT FOR THE DMZ; AND, THIRD, THE REACHING OF AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF US AND DRV FORCES. WE SAID WE TOO HOPED THERE WOULD BE RAPID PROGRESS IN THE TALKS AND THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE AND WOULD EXPLAIN OUR POSITION CLEARLY TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

HARRIMAN

DTG: 302014Z NOV 68

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

EEA829
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4522

~~SECRET~~

2
Received Washington CommCen:
2:41 PM CST Saturday 30 Nov 68

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO WALT ROSTOW
CITE CAP32850

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen:
2:45 PM CST Saturday 30 Nov 68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By M, NARA, Date 2-20-98

SUBJECT: HOLIDAY TRUCES IN VIETNAM

GENERAL ABRAMS AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER REQUEST APPROVAL OF
24 HOUR TRUCES IN VIETNAM ON CHRISTMAS AND ON TET BUT NOT
NEW YEAR'S.

MR. KATZENBACH FOR SECRETARY RUSK, MR. NITZE FOR SECRETARY
CLIFFORD AND GENERAL MCCONNELL, ACTING FOR GENERAL WHEELER,
RECOMMEND YOUR APPROVAL.

IF YOU APPROVE, AMBASSADOR BUNKER WILL TELL PRESIDENT THIEU
WHAT WE PLAN TO DO ADDING HIS STRONG SUGGESTION THAT SOUTH
VIETNAMESE MILITARY COMMANDERS SHOULD RECEIVE STRICT INSTRUCTIONS
THEY MUST NOT GIVE SPECIAL LEAVES TO THEIR TROOPS DURING
THOSE HOLIDAYS.

PRESIDENT THIEU TOLD AMBASSADOR BUNKER THIS WEEK THAT HE
FELT A 24 HOUR TRUCE AT CHRISTMAS WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY
AND THAT IF THERE WERE NO SERIOUS VIOLATIONS, IT MIGHT BE RE-
PEATED AT TET FOR A SECOND 24 HOURS. HE SAID OUR SIDE SHOULD
TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND NOT WAIT TOO LONG BEFORE ANNOUNCING
WHAT WE PLAN TO DO.

AS SOON AS WE HEAR OF YOUR DECISION, WE WILL INFORM SAIGON.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE BUNKER-
ABRAMS RECOMMENDATION CABLED FROM SAIGON.

SAIGON 43763

1. AT LAST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT THIEU NOVEMBER 26 (SAIGON 43517), HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE TRUCES AT CHRISTMAS AND TET. HE THOUGHT THEM DISADVANTAGEOUS FROM MILITARY POINT OF VIEW BUT EXPECTED THERE WOULD BE PRESSURE FROM ABROAD, INCLUDING THE VATICAN, FOR SOME KIND OF STAND-DOWN ESPECIALLY DURING CHRISTMAS HOLIDAYS. THIEU FELT THAT 24-HOUR TRUCE AT CHRISTMAS WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY AND THAT IF THERE WERE NO SERIOUS VIOLATIONS THIS MIGHT BE REPEATED AT TET FOR A SECOND 24 HOURS. HE ALSO EXPRESSED VIEW INITIATIVE SHOULD COME FROM OUR SIDE, AND WE SHOULD NOT WAIT TOO LONG. I PROMISED TO CONSULT GENERAL ABRAMS AND LET HIM KNOW OUR VIEWS.

2. WE HAVE NOT HEARD SO FAR OF AN NLF PROPOSAL ABOUT A HOLIDAY TRUCE, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ONE MIGHT BE MADE AT ANY TIME. PRIME MINISTER HUONG HAS COMMENTED PUBLICLY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A TRUCE AT CHRISTMAS, NEW YEAR'S AND TET, IMPLYING HE FAVORED THE IDEA. BUT AFTER THE EXPERIENCE OF LAST TET, PEOPLE HERE WOULD REGARD ANY LENGTHY TRUCE AS OUT OF THE QUESTION.

3. GENERAL ABRAMS AND I FEEL THAT A TWENTY-FOUR HOUR TRUCE, WITH ALL APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS, IS THE MOST THAT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO ENVISAGE. THIS WOULD APPLY TO CHRISTMAS, NOT NEW YEAR'S AND COULD BE REPEATED AT TET. IF WASHINGTON APPROVES, WE PROPOSE TO GIVE THIS TO PRESIDENT THIEU AS OUR POSITION COUPLED WITH THE STRONG SUGGESTION THAT MILITARY COMMANDERS SHOULD RECEIVE STRICT INSTRUCTIONS THAT THEY MUST NOT GIVE SPECIAL LEAVES TO THEIR TROOPS DURING THOSE HOLIDAYS.

DTG: 301941Z NOV 1968

~~SECRET~~

Received Washington CommGen
12:43 P.M. EST Saturday 30 Nov 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommGen
1:50 P.M. CST Saturday 30 Nov 68

EEA325
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4519

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO WALT ROSTOW
CITE CAP82347

~~SECRET NODIS~~

~~SECRET NODIS~~

SAIGON 43777

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER

HEREWITH MY SEVENTY-THIRD MESSAGE.

VIETNAM ON THE EVE OF NEGOTIATIONS: A PERSPECTIVE ON RECENT
EVENTS.

1. IN MY LAST TWO MESSAGES, I COVERED FIRST THE ACHIEVEMENTS, THE PROGRESS, AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE THIRD QUARTER OF 1968, AND SECONDLY THE PRIORITY AREAS AND PROBLEMS ON WHICH WE PROPOSED TO CONCENTRATE BETWEEN OCTOBER AND TET 1969 (END OF JANUARY). IN THE CONCLUSION OF MY LAST MESSAGE, I STATED MY BELIEF THAT IF WE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THESE PRIORITY AREAS ALL THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO US HERE, IF WE ENCOURAGED AND STIMULATED THE VIETNAMESE TO USE THEIR OWN RESOURCES MORE EFFECTIVELY, AND IF WE INTENSIFIED OUR EFFORTS ALL ALONG THE LINE, WE COULD MAKE VERY CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. ALTHOUGH AT THE TIME OF WRITING MY LAST MESSAGE I DID NOT FORESEE THE TURN OF EVENTS RELATING TO THE TALKS IN PARIS, I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO REPORT THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THIEU, KY, AND OTHER LEADERS HAVE CONCENTRATED MUCH OF THEIR ATTENTION AND EFFORTS ON MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS, THAT FACT HAS NOT PREVENTED CONTINUED, AND INDEED ACCELERATED, PROGRESS IN OTHER FIELDS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 10
By is, NARS, Date 11-28-83

2. SINCE MY LAST MESSAGE THE MILITARY SITUATION HAS CONTINUED TO DEVELOP FAVORABLY. CASUALTIES OF OUR OWN AND OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE DECLINED MARKEDLY WHILE WE HAVE CONTINUED TO INFLICT HEAVY LOSSES ON THE ENEMY. IMPROVEMENT IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, INCLUDING THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES, HAS CONTINUED. GENERAL ABRAMS' STATEMENT THAT THEY ARE "PAYING THE PRICE AND EXACTING THE TOLL" IS AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THEIR PERFORMANCE.

3. THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM HAS ACCELERATED. THE POPULATION IN THE RELATIVELY SECURE CATEGORY AT APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT IS A RECORD HIGH AND ALMOST THREE PERCENTAGE POINTS ABOVE THE MAXIMUM PRE-TET LEVEL. VIET CONG (VC) CONTROLLED POPULATION IS AT A NEW LOW OF 15.3 PERCENT. OF THE 1,115 HAMLETS TARGETED FOR THE INTENSIVE CAMPAIGN, 737 HAD BEEN ENTERED BY NOVEMBER 13. MANY PROVINCE CHIEFS, INCLUDING ALL THOSE IN I CORPS, THINK THEY CAN DOUBLE THEIR QUOTA.

4. THIS NUMBER OF VC INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI) NEUTRALIZED IN OCTOBER IS ALSO A RECORD. THE RATE THIS MONTH IS EVEN HIGHER THAN THE 1,457 PUT OUT OF BUSINESS IN OCTOBER.

5. THE CHIEU HOI RATE CONTINUES TO RUN WELL AHEAD OF THE CORRESPONDING PERIOD A YEAR AGO.

6. AS OF OCTOBER 31, MORE THAN 815,000 MEMBERS HAD BEEN ENROLLED IN THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES, MORE THAN 330,000 HAD BEEN TRAINED AND 86,000 ARMED.

7. IN I CORPS, IT IS EXPECTED THAT THIS MONTH APPROXIMATELY 28,000 REFUGEES WILL BE EITHER RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES OR PERMANENTLY RESETTLED.

8. GROWING BUSINESS CONFIDENCE IS EVIDENT IN THE INCREASING IMPORT LICENSING FIGURES. OCTOBER WAS THE SECOND LARGEST MONTH FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS AND THE TREND HAS CONTINUED INTO NOVEMBER. FOR MORE THAN THREE MONTHS, PRICES IN VIET-NAM HAVE BEEN QUITE STABLE. OUR SAIGON INDEX ACTUALLY SHOWS NO NET INCREASE AT ALL OVER THIS PERIOD. THE REDUCTION IN THE RICE SUBSIDY BY APPROXIMATELY 82 PERCENT (AS COMPARED TO THE 50 PERCENT WE HAD ANTICIPATED) WILL HELP TO REDUCE INFLATIONARY PRESSURE. THERE IS ALSO AN ENCOURAGING NEW INITIATIVE ON LAND REFORM ON THE PART OF THE PRIME MINISTER. HE HAS ORDERED GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NOT TO COLLECT RENTS FOR LANDLORDS OR INTERVENE ON THEIR BEHALF IN DISPUTES WITH TENANTS; MOREOVER HE AND HIS STAFF ARE IN SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT WITH US ON THE BEST MEANS FOR REVITALIZING VIET-NAM'S LAND REFORM EFFORT.

~~SECRET~~
~~NO~~

9. THE GVN'S WILLINGNESS TO CARRY A LARGER SHARE OF THE WAR BURDEN IS EVIDENT IN A COMPARISON OF RECENT DEFENSE BUDGETS. IN 1967, THE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE BUDGET ACCOUNTED FOR 40 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL, IN 1968, 24 PERCENT, AND FOR 1969 IT IS PROJECTED AS 16 PERCENT. ALTHOUGH THE DEFENSE BUDGET FOR 1969 IS CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN FOR 1968 (95.1 BILLION PIASTERS COMPARED TO 72.7) THE ACTUAL JOINT SUPPORT FIGURE IS DOWN FROM 17.5 TO 14.8 BILLION.

~~SECRET~~

~~NO 13~~

10. THE LIEN MINH CONTINUES TO MAKE PROGRESS, GIVEN THE MANIFOLD DIFFICULTIES ATTENDING A VENTURE OF THIS KIND. ITS GOVERNING BODIES ARE MEETING; ITS CADRE ARE BEGINNING TO DEVELOP PROJECTS; "PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES" HAVE BEEN ELECTED IN ALL SAIGON PRECINCTS; AN INFORMATION PROGRAM IS BEING DEVELOPED; THE PROCESS OF FORMING PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES IS UNDERWAY; A NEW TOP LEVEL POLITICAL COUNCIL HAS BEEN FORMED; AND IN GENERAL THERE IS STEADY, IF SLOW, MOVEMENT FORWARD. THERE ARE STILL PROBLEMS TO OVERCOME, PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL STRESS, LEADERSHIP, AND LACK OF PARTICIPATION BY MAJOR RELIGIOUS GROUPS. BUT IF THIEU CAN NOW TURN MORE OF HIS ATTENTION TO THE LIEN MINH, I THINK IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE MORE RAPID PROGRESS.

11. ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS ALSO CONTINUE, WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OF REMOVAL AND PUNISHMENT FOR A NUMBER OF PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS CHARGED WITH CORRUPTION. SINCE TET, 20 PROVINCE CHIEFS AND 89 DISTRICT CHIEFS WHOM WE IDENTIFIED AS CORRUPT OR INEFFECTIVE HAVE BEEN REMOVED FOR CAUSE. THE QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP AT PROVINCE AND-DISTRICT LEVEL HAS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED DURING 1968. CORRUPTION HAS BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE OPEN AS A PUBLIC ISSUE, AND ALLEGATIONS BY PUBLIC SERVANTS ARE BEING ACTED UPON WITH UNPRECEDENTED VIGOR.

12. MAJOR EVENTS OF RECENT WEEKS HAVE REVOLVED ABOUT THE RELUCTANCE OF THE GVN TO SEND A DELEGATION TO PARIS UNLESS IT RECEIVED CERTAIN ASSURANCES FROM US. WORKING OUT THESE ESSENTIALLY FACE-SAVING ASSURANCES HAS TAKEN UP MUCH OF OUR ENERGIES AND THOSE OF THEIRS, BUT SPELLING THEM OUT IN PRECISE AND CLEAR TERMS AS WE HAVE, WILL, I BELIEVE, HAVE CERTAIN ADVANTAGES FOR THE FUTURE. I AM PLEASED THAT THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD IS NOW OVER.

13. UNFORTUNATE AS THE GOVERNMENT POSITION TOWARD THE TALKS IN PARIS HAS BEEN DURING THIS LAST MONTH, IT HAS HAD SOME SIDE EFFECTS WHICH IN THE LONG RUN MAY BE CONSTRUCTIVE. THE GOVERNMENT TODAY HAS WIDER SUPPORT THAN IT HAS EVER ENJOYED. THIEU'S POSITION AS A NATIONAL LEADER AND VIETNAMESE CONFIDENCE IN HIS ABILITY TO DEFEND VIETNAMESE INTERESTS HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED. IN THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE THE IMAGE OF THE GVN AS A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ENHANCED AND HANOI'S PROPAGANDA THAT IT IS A PUPPET OF THE U.S. COUNTERED.

14. THE CRISIS ATMOSPHERE OF THE EARLY DAYS OF NOVEMBER IN U.S.-SOUTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS HAD LARGELY SUBSIDED BY MID-MONTH. THE RATHER TRUCULENT AND EMOTIONAL STATEMENT OF MINISTER OF INFORMATION THIEN ON NOVEMBER 12 REALLY MARKED THE FINAL SPASH. WHEN I SAW THIEU ON THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 15, HE AGREED WITH ME THAT IT WAS TIME THAT WE PUT AN END TO PUBLIC UTTERANCES AND LATER IN THE DAY PUT OUT A CAREFULLY DRAFTED STATEMENT DESIGNED TO CALM TEMPERS AND RESTORE PERSPECTIVE. HE SAID, "I THINK THIS IS A MOMENT TO AVOID POURING MORE OIL ON THE FIRE. DIFFERENCES CAN ARISE BETWEEN ANY ALLIES, BUT WE DO NOT ALLOW THEM TO BE EXPLOITED BY OUR COMMON ENEMIES, THE COMMUNISTS...EVERYTHING CAN BE SOLVED WITH CALMNESS AND PATIENCE, FRANKNESS AND UNDERSTANDING."

15. VIETNAMESE LEADERS IN GENERAL HAD BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE PUBLIC SPLIT WITH THE U.S. AND ANXIOUS TO FIND A WAY TO REPAIR THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US. ALTHOUGH SOME STILL HAVE RESERVATIONS AND CONCERNS ABOUT OUR COURSE OF ACTION, THE PUBLIC ASSURANCES THAT WE HAVE WORKED OUT DURING THE PAST THREE WEEKS HAVE BEEN GENERALLY WELCOMED. AS A RESULT OF THESE PATIENT NEGOTIATIONS AND ASSURANCES, THE GVN DELEGATION NOW GOES TO PARIS TO FACE THE HANOI DELEGATION WITH MORE NATIONAL UNITY, WHICH IN TURN SHOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THEM TO WIN ACCEPTANCE OF WHATEVER AGREEMENTS EVENTUALLY COME OUT OF THE PARIS TALKS. AS ANOTHER RESULT OF THIEU'S STRENGTHENED POSITION, I THINK THE GVN CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXHIBIT SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBILITY IN NEGOTIATING. ANOTHER GOOD EFFECT OF OUR RECENT DIFFICULTIES IS THAT THE THIEU/KY RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN IMPROVED, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY. THEY SEEM TO BE WORKING TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY, AND THIEU HAS JUST ANNOUNCED THAT KY WILL EXERCISE OVERALL SUPERVISION OF THE NEGOTIATION EFFORT.

16. I BELIEVE THE PERIOD BETWEEN THIEU'S NOVEMBER 2 SPEECH AND THE NOVEMBER 27 ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE GVN INTENTION TO GO TO PARIS WAS ALSO USEFUL IN PREPARING VIETNAMESE OPINION FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE BOTH THIEU AND HUONG HAVE MADE CONSISTENT EFFORTS FOR MANY MONTHS TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION, EVENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT THESE TRAUMATIC LAST WEEKS WERE NECESSARY TO PERSUADE THE PEOPLE THAT THEIR INTEREST WOULD BE VIGOROUSLY PROTECTED. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE AS REGARDS TOP GOVERNMENT CADRE AND LEGISLATIVE LEADERS.

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17. ON THE OTHER HAND, OUR PUBLIC DIFFERENCES WITH THE GVN HAD SOME IMPORTANT NEGATIVE EFFECTS HERE, AS I KNOW THEY HAD IN THE UNITED STATES. FEW VIETNAMESE BELIEVED OUR VERSION OF WHAT HAPPENED, AND MOST STILL BELIEVE THAT THE BOMBING HALT WAS AN ELECTION MANEUVER. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, WE GOT LITTLE FROM NORTH VIETNAM IN RETURN FOR STOPPING THE BOMBING. THE RESULT IS THAT APPREHENSIONS ABOUT OUR ULTIMATE INTENTIONS DEEPENED, AND VIETNAMESE HOPES FOR PEACE IN HONOR AND INDEPENDENCE TEMPORARILY CLOUDED.

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18. I THINK, THEREFORE, THAT OUR DECISION AGAINST OPENING TALKS NOVEMBER 6 WITHOUT THE GVN WAS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF VIETNAMESE MORALE. I BELIEVE THAT GOING AHEAD WITHOUT THE GVN WOULD HAVE SET IN MOTION A VERY SERIOUS DECLINE IN GOVERNMENTAL AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. ONCE SUCH A DECLINE BECAME EVIDENT, THE PROCESS WOULD HAVE BEEN LIKELY TO SNOWBALL.

19. THE DANGERS THAT WOULD FLOW FROM UNILATERAL U.S. NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) WERE AND ARE APPARENT TO THOUGHTFUL VIETNAMESE BOTH IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT. THEY ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF WORLD OPINION, -- AND TO A LESSER EXTENT, VIETNAMESE OPINION AS WELL -- THE GVN COULD NOT LONG BE IN THE POSITION OF SEEMING TO REJECT PEACE TALKS.

20. AT THE SAME TIME, I SHOULD ADD THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE VIETNAMESE ARE PROFOUNDLY SKEPTICAL ABOUT HANOI'S WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. THERE IS WIDESPREAD FEELING THAT HANOI WILL TRY TO USE THE TALKS TO FURTHER DECREASE OUR MILITARY PRESSURES ON THE COMMUNIST FORCES, TO DISCOURAGE AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, TO CREATE FURTHER DIVISION AMONG THE ALLIES, AND TO GAIN TIME IN WHICH TO PREPARE FOR NEW MILITARY ATTACKS. FEAR OF A COALITION STILL REMAINS STRONG IN THE MINDS OF MOST VIETNAMESE.

21. NEVERTHELESS, AT THE SEMINAR IN VUNG TAU, THIEU TOOK A MODERATE AND REALISTIC APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT THE GVN IS, AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN, READY TO SIT DOWN WITH HANOI PROVIDED THAT REASONABLE CONDITIONS ARE MET, THAT IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT HANOI IS IN FACT THE "GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM" AND THAT, THEREFORE, "WE MUST NEGOTIATE WITH THEM." HE SAID THAT "THE PRESENT SITUATION FORCES US TO STRIVE FOR A LIMITED OBJECTIVE. OUR LIMITED OBJECTIVES ARE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CEASE THEIR AGGRESSION. WE WANT A PEACE TO LAST, WITH EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AGAINST RE-AGGRESSION... WE MUST REMEMBER THAT OUR ENEMY INCLUDES OUR OWN BROTHERS SO WE MUST AIM AT ELIMINATING HATRED WITHIN OUR OWN FAMILY." IN THIS CONTEXT HE MENTIONED THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROGRAM AS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT WEAPONS IN THE ARSENAL OF THE NATIONALISTS.

22. I THINK THE MAIN THING NOW IS TO LET BYGONES BE BYGONES, TO LET THE LATE UNPLEASANTNESS SINK INTO THE PAST, TO GET THE GVN TO PARIS, AND TO START TALKING SUBSTANCE. IF WE CONSCIOUSLY TRY TO CREATE CONFIDENCE BETWEEN US, I BELIEVE WE CAN WORK TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY. WE SHALL NEED TO DO THIS FOR I HAVE A FEELING THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL PROVE TO BE ARDUOUS, COMPLEX, DIFFICULT AND LONG. AS YOU HAVE SAID, WE MUST EXPECT HARD BARGAINING AND HARD FIGHTING IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

23. ANOTHER POSSIBLY NEGATIVE, POSSIBLY HELPFUL, DEVELOPMENT WHICH FLOWED FROM RECENT EVENTS IS THE RESIGNATION OF THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION, TON THAI THIEN, ON NOVEMBER 27. LONG UNDER FIRE FROM SOME MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY, THIEN HAD ALSO MADE MANY ENEMIES WITH HIS HEAVYHANDED PRESS POLICY. ALTHOUGH HIMSELF A NEWSPAPER MAN, AND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LIFTING OF CENSORSHIP SHORTLY AFTER HE TOOK OFFICE, THIEN WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CLOSING AND SUSPENDING MORE NEWSPAPERS THAN ANY OTHER MINISTER OF INFORMATION IN RECENT VIETNAMESE HISTORY. AS THE MOST VOCAL ANTAGONIST OF THE U.S. IN RECENT DAYS, THIEN ALSO PUT HIMSELF IN A POSITION TO SERVE AS SCAPEGOAT.

24. WHEN THE SENATE CALLED FOR AN INTERPELLATION OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS CABINET, A NUMBER OF SENATORS MADE IT CLEAR THAT A PRIME TARGET WOULD BE THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION. THIEN FAILED TO APPEAR, ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF AIRPLANE TROUBLE AND CONSEQUENT INABILITY TO RETURN FROM VUNG TAU IN TIME. THE PRIME MINISTER, IN RESPONSE TO SOME QUESTIONS DURING THE NOVEMBER 22 INTERPELLATION, ADMITTED THAT THIEN HAD OCCASIONALLY ACTED TOO HASTILY AGAINST CERTAIN NEWSPAPERS. ON NOVEMBER 27 THE GVN ANNOUNCED THAT THIEN HAD SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION, AND I ANTICIPATE IT WILL BE ACCEPTED.

25. SOME OPPORTUNISTIC ELEMENTS (AND OBVIOUSLY THE COMMUNISTS) WOULD LIKE TO USE THE PRESENT SITUATION TO FORCE HUONG HIMSELF OUT OF OFFICE, BUT I SEE NO CHANCE THAT THEY WILL SUCCEED. HUONG WAS QUITE SUCCESSFUL DURING THE SENATE INTERPELLATION AND EMERGED FROM THAT POTENTIALLY DELICATE CONFRONTATION WITH ENHANCED PRESTIGE AND GREATER SUPPORT IN THE UPPER HOUSE. HUONG HAS EXPRESSED HIS DETERMINATION TO STAY ON TO ME PERSONALLY; AND PUBLICLY DENYING RUMORS OF HIS RESIGNATION HE SAID NOV. 18 THAT TO LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT NOW WOULD BE LIKE A SOLDIER DESERTING THE BATTLEFIELD. HE ALSO HAS THIEU'S CONFIDENCE AND SOLID PUBLIC SUPPORT.

26. WHILE HUONG IS SECURE, THIEN MAY NOT BE THE ONLY CASUALTY. AFTER DEBATING THE RESULTS OF THE INTERPELLATION, THE SENATE ON NOV. 27 DECIDED TO EXPRESS "DISSATISFACTION" WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THANH AND MINISTER OF EDUCATION TRI. THIS IS NOT A FORMAL VOTE OF CENSURE, AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY EXECUTIVE ACTION. IT DOES, HOWEVER, PUT SOME POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE EXECUTIVE, AND I NOTE THAT IN HIS NOV. 27 TELEVISION SPEECH, THIEU LEFT THE QUESTION OF FUTURE CABINET CHANGES VERY MUCH AN OPEN POSSIBILITY.

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27. THERE ARE SOME OBVIOUS HAZARDS IN A MAJOR CABINET SHAKUP AT THIS POINT. I THINK IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE IF THANH WERE FORCED OUT NOW. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE BROADENED AND STRENGTHENED BY BRINGING IN ELEMENTS NOT NOW REPRESENTED IN THE CABINET--WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ELIMINATING CONTROVERSIAL FIGURES SUCH AS TRIEM AND TRI-- CABINET CHANGES NOW COULD BE A NET GAIN.

28. AS I HAVE MENTIONED, THE MILITARY SITUATION CONTINUES TO DEVELOP FAVORABLY. THE ENEMY FOR SEVERAL WEEKS HAS FOLLOWED A STRATEGY OF AVOIDING CONTACT, WITHDRAWING INTO BASE AREAS AND ACROSS BORDERS INTO LAOS AND CAMBODIA. DESPITE HIS EFFORTS TO AVOID COMBAT, HOWEVER, HE HAS CONTINUED TO SUFFER HEAVY CASUALTIES AS OUR FORCES MAINTAIN MAXIMUM AGGRESSIVE PRESSURE. OUR OWN CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN MUCH LIGHTER THAN HERETOFORE AND, AS I HAVE MENTIONED, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AIR FORCE (RVNAF) CONTINUED TO GIVE A GOOD ACCOUNT OF THEMSELVES.

29. THE RECENT ATTACK ON DANANG WAS BLUNTED AND FRUSTRATED WITH LITTLE LOSS ON OUR SIDE, BUT IT COULD PRESAGE RENEWED ENEMY EFFORTS TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE. WE CONTINUE TO GET INTELLIGENCE REPORTS WHICH INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY IS PLANNING ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO MOVE ON SAIGON. WITH THE FIRST AIR CAVALRY ADDED TO OUR FORCES IN III CORPS AND THE EXCELLENT SYSTEM OF DEFENSES WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED FOR THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT, I THINK WE CAN BE CONFIDENT THE ENEMY WILL BE NO MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN HE WAS IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER.

30. ONE VIEW OF THE ENEMY MILITARY SITUATION IS THAT THE COST OF HIS STRUGGLE HAS BEEN SO GREAT THAT HE NOW GENUINELY WANTS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL TRANSFER THE CONFLICT TO THE POLITICAL ARENA. AS A RESULT OF CAREFUL EVALUATION OF RECENT ENEMY TACTICS, MACV FAVORS THIS INTERPRETATION OF ENEMY INTENTIONS. MACV BELIEVES THAT THE ENEMY HAS NOW MADE A MAJOR DECISION TO SHIFT HIS EMPHASIS FROM THE MILITARY TO THE POLITICAL. THIS DECISION WAS FORCED UPON THE ENEMY BY A RECOGNITION OF HIS RAPIDLY DETERIORATING MILITARY POSTURE. HIS SHORT-RANGE AIMS ARE NOW PRIMARILY DEFINED AS A CEASE-FIRE, FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT AND THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. US FORCES. THE ENEMY IS THEREFORE CONCENTRATING HIS EFFORTS ON EXTENDING CONTROL OVER THE RURAL POPULATION.

31. ACCORDING TO THIS INTERPRETATION, THE ENEMY VIEWS OUR STRATEGY AS BEING COMPRISED OF THREE ELEMENTS; CLEAR AND HOLD OPERATIONS; REPLACING U.S. PRESENCE WITH A STRONG ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) AND GVN; AND ATTACKING VC INFRASTRUCTURE. THE ENEMY IS RESPONDING WITH A THREE-FOLD COUNTER-STRATEGY; DESTROY OUTPOSTS AND OPERATING ALLIED MILITARY UNITS; DESTROY WAR FACILITIES IN ORDER TO WEAKEN RVNAF CAPABILITIES; AND MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN CONTROL OVER THE RURAL POPULATION. ENEMY ACTIVITY SEEMS TO BE DIRECTED PRIMARILY TOWARD THE THIRD FACTOR.

32. MACV ALSO NOTES THAT MOST ENEMY-INITIATED ATTACKS THIS MONTH HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BY VC RATHER THAN BY THE NORTH VIETNAM ARMY (NVA). THIS COULD BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN AN OVERT ATTEMPT BY THE ENEMY TO SIGNAL NVA WITHDRAWAL. MORE LIKELY, IT COULD SET THE STAGE FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE DISAVOWAL OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR VC ACTIONS.

SECRET

33. IF THE MACV EVALUATION IS CORRECT, WE COULD EXPECT TO SEE AN INCREASE IN TERRORISM AS THE ENEMY SEEKS TO ESTABLISH ITS AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IN FACT, TERROR IS UP SHARPLY THIS WEEK, WITH 150 ASSASSINATIONS (107 LAST WEEK), 388 WOUNDED (243 LAST WEEK), AND 171 ABDUCTED (72 LAST WEEK).

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34. IF THERE IS VALIDITY TO THIS ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRATEGY, IT ALSO REINFORCES THE NEED FOR A COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. IT IS GRATIFYING TO REPORT, THEREFORE, THAT OUR ACCELERATED PACIFICATION EFFORT IS IN FACT WELL UNDERWAY. HOPEFULLY IT WILL FRUSTRATE AND UNDERCUT ENEMY EFFORTS TO EXTEND HIS CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION IN ANTICIPATION OF A CEASE FIRE.

~~SECRET~~

35. ENEMY CALCULATIONS MAY ALSO BE BASED ON A COMBINATION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND HEAVY MILITARY PRESSURE. THIEU EXPRESSED TO ME THE VIEW LAST WEEK THAT THE ENEMY WILL MAKE ANOTHER MAJOR EFFORT TOWARD SAIGON EVEN THOUGH HE IS CONSCIOUS THAT VERY HEAVY LOSSES WILL BE INVOLVED. THIEU BELIEVES HANOI WILL ATTEMPT THIS FOR ITS PROPAGANDA USES, AND THOUGH, REALISTICALLY, A MILITARY VICTORY IS IMPOSSIBLE, THE ENEMY WILL CLAIM ANOTHER GREAT VICTORY FOR ITS EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION HERE AND IN THE U.S. HIS MAXIMUM HOPE WOULD BE A KNOCK BLOW AT THE CAPITAL AND THE GVN. HIS MINIMUM OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO MAINTAIN OVER A PROLONGED PERIOD ENOUGH MILITARY PRESSURE TO KEEP UP A HIGH RATE OF U.S. CASUALTIES SO AS TO ENCOURAGE AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TO BRING PRESSURE FOR CONCESSIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

~~NODIS~~

36. TO FRUSTRATE THIS STRATEGY, WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO DO WHAT GENERAL ABRAMS IS NOW DOING SO SUCCESSFULLY--TO INFLICT A MAXIMUM OF CASUALTIES ON THE ENEMY WHILE KEEPING OUR OWN WELL DOWN. IT IS NOT ALWAYS APPRECIATED HOW MUCH OF THE LOSSES ARE TAKEN BY OUR VIETNAMESE ALLIES. AT OUR LAST MISSION COUNCIL MEETING, GENERAL ABRAMS REPORTED THAT DURING THE PREVIOUS WEEK THE U.S. HAD LOST 108 KILLED AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES 203. IN THE SAME PERIOD, WE AND OUR ALLIES CAUSED 2175 ENEMY DEAD. IN ADDITION, THE ENEMY LOST 650 RALLIERS AND SEVERAL HUNDRED OF HIS INFRASTRUCTURE ALSO ARE NOW BEING ROOTED OUT AT A RATE OF OVER 1400 A MONTH.

37. CONCLUSION: I THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT SUCCESS IN PARIS WILL BE DETERMINED LARGELY BY EVENTS IN VIET-NAM. THE DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE HERE IN RECENT MONTHS--IN THE VIGOROUS PROSECUTION OF THE WAR, IN BRINGING MORE AND MORE OF THE POPULATION UNDER GVN CONTROL, IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE STABLE AND MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, IN ROOTING OUT THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE, IN PREPARING THE PEOPLE PSYCHOLOGICALLY FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS--REFLECT THE GROWING STRENGTH AND SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE. THE GVN, THEREFORE, FEELS, I THINK, THAT TIME IS ON ITS SIDE AND IT WILL REFUSE TO BE HURRIED INTO MAKING CONCESSIONS AT PARIS, AND IT WILL RESENT TO THE LIMIT ANY CONCESSION THAT MIGHT ENDANGER THE MORALE OF THE PEOPLE. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS IT IS CONSCIOUS OF GROWING STRENGTH AND POPULAR SUPPORT, IT ACQUIRES A CAPACITY TO ACCEPT REASONABLE COMPROMISES WHICH ITS LEADERS KNOW MUST EVENTUALLY COME FROM BOTH SIDES.

BUNKER

DTG 301743Z NOVEMBER 1968

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WHITE HOUSE
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FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO WALT ROSTOW
CITE CAP22345

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10478
NARA, Date 1-9-98

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Pres file

~~SECRET~~ NODIS HARVAN

RY VANCE TELEPHONED THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REINFORCE HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE DELAY IN THE ARRIVAL IN PARIS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATE LAM AND AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM. HIS REACTION IS SPELLED OUT IN THE FOLLOWING CABLE. IT IS NOW HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT LAM WOULD NOT COME UNTIL POSSIBLY DECEMBER 5 OR 6 WHEN THE FULL DELEGATION MAY ARRIVE. VICE PRESIDENT KY, ACCORDING TO WHAT VANCE WAS TOLD, WOULD NOT ARRIVE WITH LAM BUT COME SEVERAL DAYS LATER.

PARIS 24691

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. WE WERE DISTURBED TO RECEIVE WORD LATE LAST NIGHT FROM AN THAT LAM AND BUI DIEM WOULD NOT BE ARRIVING TOMORROW, SUNDAY. MORE DISTURBING WAS THE FACT THAT AN DOESN'T EVEN KNOW WHEN THEY WILL BE ARRIVING.

3. WATCHING THE DMZ AND THE FIRINGS AT OUR RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS, WE SEE WHAT APPEARS TO BE EVIDENCE OF RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE OTHER SIDE. WE BELIEVE THIS MAY RESULT, IN PART, FROM THE FACT THAT THE GVN HAVE SAID THEY ARE COMING TO PARIS WITH THE PROSPECT OF PROMPT MEETINGS.

4. IF THE GVN DRAGS ITS FEET AND WE DO NOT EVEN GET INTO PROCEDURAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, WE NOT ONLY LOSE TIME IN RESUMING THE MOMENTUM OF NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ALSO WE RUN THE RISK THAT THINGS MAY BEGIN TO BECOME RAPIDLY UNSTUCK.

5. WE FEEL VERY STRONGLY THAT LAM SHOULD RETURN TO PARIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT WE MAY GET ON WITH THE WIDER PROCEDURAL DISCUSSIONS BY NO LATER THAN THE END OF NEXT WEEK, AND PREFERABLY EARLIER. IF THE GVN IS UNWILLING TO SEND LAM, THEN THEY SHOULD AUTHORIZE AN TO PROCEED AS THE GVN'S REPRESENTATIVE IN LAM'S ABSENCE.

6. IN OUR JUDGEMENT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE BE ABLE TO SET A DATE PREFERABLY AT OUR MONDAY MEETING WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, FOR THE FIRST WIDER MEETING.

7. DRV HAS JUST LEFT MESSAGE THAT THEY WILL MEET WITH US ON MONDAY AS WE REQUESTED. HARRIMAN

REC'D AT RANCH
OK

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FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO UALT ROSTOW
SITE CAPS3843

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

NOVEMBER 30, 1968

FOLLOWING LETTER RECEIVED THIS MORNING FROM THE APOSTOLIC DELEGATE:

QUOTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE THE HONOR TO INFORM YOU THAT HIS HOLINESS, POPE PAUL VI, RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 26, 1968, WITH GENUINE PLEASURE.

HIS HOLINESS BIDS ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT HE IS INVOKING ABUNDANT DIVINE ASSISTANCE ON THE FORTHCOMING IMPORTANT PHASE OF THE TALKS IN PARIS AND THAT HE HAS ABIDING CONFIDENCE IN THE RENEWED PLEDGE OF THE UNITED STATES TO WORK TOWARDS A SOLUTION WHICH WILL RESPECT THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE AND LIBERTY OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

SIGNED: LUIGI RAIMONDI, APOSTOLIC DELEGATE END QUOTE

DTG 301628Z NOV 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FROM BROWLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO WALT ROSTOV
SITE WH32322

UNCLAS

NOVEMBER 29, 1968

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN WILL BE IN WASHINGTON MONDAY, DECEMBER 2 THROUGH WEDNESDAY. YOU HAVE HIS INVITATION TO ATTEND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE MEETING MONDAY. HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN HAS ASKED TO SEE YOU, PRESUMABLY TO DISCUSS PARIS TALKS. IF YOU PLAN TO HAVE A LUNCHEON MEETING TUESDAY, HE COULD BE ASKED TO ATTEND.

see file

INVITE HIM TO TUESDAY LUNCHEON-----

WORK OUT A TIME FOR APPOINTMENT-----

DTG 202021Z NOVEMBER 68YI

~~SECRET NOBIS~~

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

HAVE ONE FOR YOU

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10492
By mp/ir, NARA, Date 1-9-98

Pres file

EEA 794
DE WTE 13
DE WTE 4479

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO WALT ROSTOW
CITE CGP 82611

~~SECRET NOBIS/HARVAN~~

FOLLOWING IS AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S REPORT OF HIS "GOOD SESSION" YESTERDAY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THANH AND AMBASSADORS DIEM AND LAM ON DETAILS OF THE PARIS TALKS.

AFTER THIS MESSAGE WAS FILED, EMBASSY SAIGON LEARNED THAT LAM AND DIEM WILL ARRIVE IN PARIS SUNDAY MORNING DECEMBER 1--DIEM WILL CONTINUE ON HERE AFTER A SHORT STAY IN PARIS.

-SAIGON 43667

1. WE HAD A GOOD SESSION THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 28, WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THANH, AMBASSADORS DIEM AND LAM, AND NGUYEN PHU DUC OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY BERGER AND HERZ. DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT ON NOVEMBER 22, THANH HAD ASKED FOR WRITTEN REPLY TO HIS "TEN-POINT MEMORANDUM" ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS DATED OCTOBER 24; THAT WE HAD DECLINED TO GET INTO FURTHER ARGUMENTS ABOUT A WRITTEN DOCUMENT WHEN WE HAD ALREADY REACHED GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THOSE NON-SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS; THAT THANH HAD RETREATED TO A REQUEST FOR "GENERAL GUIDELINES" TO THE DELEGATIONS IN PARIS; AND THAT I HAD GIVEN IT AS MY OPINION THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GO OVER THESE POINTS ORALLY WHILE LAM WAS HERE. WE HAD THAT SESSION YESTERDAY AND I BELIEVE IT WAS USEFUL. PARIS TELEGRAMS, WHICH HAD JUST ARRIVED, HELPED US IN CLARIFYING SEVERAL POINTS.

2. SEATING ARRANGEMENTS. WHEN WE TOLD GVN THAT WE HAD AGREED WITH THE DRV TO WORK THROUGH THE FRENCH FOR THE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS, THERE WAS A MOMENT OF UNEASINESS. BUT DIEM ASKED WHETHER WE DIDN'T HAVE AGREEMENT TO AVOID GIVING THE FRENCH A ROLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS. WE EXPLAINED THAT FRENCH AS HOSTS HAD TO MAKE THE PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THAT ANYTHING THEY MIGHT COME UP WITH WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY EACH SIDE. WE DISCUSSED ROUND, HALF-ROUND, PARALLEL AND OTHER TABLES. IN THE END THANH SAID HE STILL THOUGHT TWO PARALLEL TABLES THE "SIMPLEST SOLUTION." WE SAID WE WOULD REPORT THIS TO PARIS, WHERE ALL THESE MATTERS WOULD BE WORKED OUT IN CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN OUR DELEGATIONS.

NOTE: NO PARAGRAPH 3 RECEIVED. WE ARE CHECKING WITH SAIGON TO ESTABLISH WHETHER ERROR WAS IN NUMBERING OR PARAGRAPH WAS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED.

4. NAME OF THE CONFERENCE. EARLIER GVN SUGGESTION ("PARIS CONFERENCE ON VIET-NAM") WAS CLEARLY OVERTAKEN BY OUR DISCUSSIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NOVEMBER 26 STATEMENT. GVN NOW PREFERENCES "PARIS MEETINGS" IN ENGLISH. THANH CLAIMED THIS TRANSLATES BADLY INTO FRENCH AND THAT IT MIGHT BE "LES CONFERENCES DE PARIS" IN THAT LANGUAGE. (WHILE THIS IS NOT REALLY THE EQUIVALENT OF "PARIS MEETINGS", WE DID NOT FEEL IT NECESSARY TO PURSUE THE MATTER.)

5. ORDER OF ENTRANCE. WE CONFIRMED THAT GVN DELEGATION WOULD BE GIVEN PRECEDENCE. GVN UNDERSTANDS THIS TO APPLY NOT ONLY TO THE FIRST MEETING BUT GENERALLY.

6. CHAIRMANSHIP AND DIVISION OF SUBJECTS. WE AGREED THERE IS NO CHAIRMAN OF OUR SIDE. WHO TAKES THE LEAD ON SPECIFIC SUBJECTS WOULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN OUR DELEGATIONS. THANH OFFERED AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION A BREAKDOWN OF SUBJECTS INTO THREE CATEGORIES:

A. THOSE ON WHICH THE US WOULD TAKE THE LEAD, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE LAOS, CAMBODIA, POW'S, INTERIM-SUPERVISORY MACHINERY IN THE DMZ, INSPECTION MACHINERY AND INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS;

B. THOSE ON WHICH THE GVN WOULD TAKE THE LEAD, INCLUDING CEASE-FIRE, STATUS OF THE DMZ, WITHDRAWAL, NON-INTERFERENCE, AND "OTHER MATTERS"; AND

C. THOSE WHICH ARE OF EXCLUSIVE CONCERN TO THE GVN, WHICH WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT BE SUBJECT OF PRIVATE OR SECRET MEETINGS BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE NLF.

7. DISCUSSION WAS INCONCLUSIVE, AND IN THE END THANH WITHDREW HIS LISTS, WHICH WERE ONLY PENCILED SCRIBBLINGS, AFTER WE POINTED OUT THAT TROOP WITHDRAWAL FOR INSTANCE WAS A SUBJECT ON WHICH WE COULD TAKE THE LEAD UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. I STRESSED IT WAS NOT DESIRABLE TO ATTEMPT TO SET UP WATERTIGHT COMPARTMENTS AND THAT OUR DELEGATIONS NEEDED FLEXIBILITY TO COPE WITH TACTICAL SITUATIONS AS THEY WOULD ARISE. WE WERE PUT ON NOTICE HOWEVER THAT THANH WOULD WANT SOME GENERAL GUIDELINES TO BE DEVELOPED TO HELP LAN IN PARIS.

8. DISCUSSION OF CATEGORY (C) ABOVE, SUBJECTS WHICH GVN THOUGHT IT SHOULD NOT ALLOW TO BE DISCUSSED IN PARIS, ENABLED US TO HAMMER HOME OUR POSITION ON TACTICS. I POINTED OUT THAT IN MY LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF NOVEMBER 25 WHICH THIEU HAD FOUND SATISFACTORY, WE HAD EXPLAINED HOW WE WOULD EXPECT TO HANDLE INTERNAL MATTERS BROUGHT UP BY THE OTHER SIDE, BY TAKING THE OFFENSIVE AND STRESSING THE MANY POSITIVE FEATURES OF OUR POSITION SUCH AS THE CONSTITUTION, FREE ELECTIONS, AND THE POLICY OF RECONCILIATION. WE STRESSED THAT WE THOUGHT THAT POSITIVE STRATEGY HIGHLY IMPORTANT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW NOT ONLY OF VIETNAMESE BUT AMERICAN AND WORLD OPINION. WE RECALLED THAT WE HAD SAID IN OUR LETTER THAT WE WOULD EXPECT THE POSITIVE THEMES TO BE PRIMARILY ARTICULATED BY THE GVN. ON THE OTHER SIDE FOR INSTANCE CLAIMED THAT THE NLF CONTROLS FOUR-FIFTHS OF THE COUNTRY AND EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, IT WOULD HARDLY BE WISE TO SIT SILENTLY OR SAY THIS WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER NOT SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION,

9. FINALLY THANH AND HIS COLLEAGUES AGREED. I BELIEVE THIS WAS ONE OF THE MORE USEFUL PARTS OF OUR SESSION BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN THINKING TOO MUCH IN TERMS OF PRINCIPLES AND NOT ENOUGH IN TERMS OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION THEY WOULD CONFRONT. BUT DIEM REMARKED THAT THE GVN WOULD STILL REFUSE TO DISCUSS FOR INSTANCE A PROPOSAL FROM THE OTHER SIDE THAT IT SHOULD AMEND ITS CONSTITUTION. I SAID WHEN ONE ENTERS NEGOTIATIONS ONE HAS TO KEEP FLEXIBLE, SO AS NOT TO GIVE THE OTHER SIDE ANY ADVANTAGE. THANH AGREED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO ANSWER ENEMY PROPAGANDA, BUT THERE WOULD BE TIMES WHEN THE GVN MUST REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE ON INTERNAL MATTERS. WE AGREED THAT "DISCUSS" DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN "NEGOTIATE."

10. OPENING STATEMENT. THE GVN ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO MAKING THE FIRST OPENING STATEMENT TO CLARIFY ITS POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE NLF. WE NOTED THAT THE DRV DID NOT CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT WHO WOULD SPEAK FIRST. WE SAID WE DID NOT EXPECT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO AGREE ON THIS MATTER AS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND GVN DELEGATIONS. WE CONFIRMED THAT THE U.S. WILL GIVE THE GVN STRONG SUPPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR NOVEMBER 26 STATEMENT.

11. REFERENCE TO THE OTHER SIDE. WE RECALLED THAT IN THE PAST THE HEADS OF EACH SIDE HAD BEEN ADDRESSED AS "EXCELLENCY". WE SAID THAT THE GVN IDEA OF PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF "RECIPROCITY" MUST HAVE ITS LIMITS, AS WE MUST NOT DESCEND INTO THE GUTTER IF THE OTHER SIDE DID SO. THIS DISCUSSION PRODUCED AGREEMENT ON A GUIDELINE TO OUR DELEGATIONS THAT MEMBERS OF THE OTHER SIDE GENERALLY WOULD BE COLLECTIVELY ADDRESSED AS "GENTLEMEN" (MESSIEURS). THANH REMARKED THAT THIS TRANSLATES WELL INTO VIETNAMESE (QUY VI). (UPON REFLECTION, THE PRESENCE OF MRS. BINH ON THE OTHER SIDE WOULD SEEM TO INVOLVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN ADDRESSING THEM AS "GENTLEMEN".)

12. AGENDA. WE SAID WE HAD NO NEWS ON THIS AND WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT AT THE BEGINNING ANYBODY COULD BRING UP ANYTHING. LATER OF COURSE IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO ARRANGE FOR SOME THINGS TO BE DISCUSSED BEFORE OTHERS, BUT WE FELT IT WAS BEST TO PRESERVE FLEXIBILITY. THIS WAS AGREED.

13. WALKOUT FROM THE CONFERENCE. THE GVN OCTOBER 24 MEMORANDUM SUGGESTED THAT IF THE DRV DELEGATION LEFT THE CONFERENCE ROOM WHILE THE GVN DELEGATION HAD THE FLOOR, THEREBY TRYING TO FORCE THE GVN TO TALK WITH THE NLF, BOTH OUR DELEGATIONS SHOULD LEAVE BECAUSE WE WOULD CONSIDER THE TALKS NOT SERIOUS. THIS PROVIDED A WELCOME OCCASION TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL THE POINTS MADE IN MY NOVEMBER 25 LETTER. WE ARGUED, CONVINCINGLY I THINK, THAT TO WALK OUT IN SUCH A MANNER WOULD BE HANDING THE OTHER SIDE A PROPAGANDA VICTORY. WE WOULD CONSULT ON HOW TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE OTHER SIDE THAT THE TALKS COULD NOT CONTINUE ON SUCH A BASIS, BUT THERE WOULD BE MANY WAYS OF MAKING THIS CLEAR SHORT OF WALKING OUT. AMBASSADOR LAM SUGGESTED THAT A "RANGE" OF ACTIONS COULD BE ENVISAGED, OF WHICH WALKING OUT (OR NOT WALKING IN) WOULD BE THE EXTREME. WE SAID THIS WAS CERTAINLY SOMETHING TO BE CONSIDERED AND OUR DELEGATIONS SHOULD CONSULT. THANH SUGGESTED THAT A "FIRST WARNING" AND "SECOND WARNING" MIGHT BE GIVEN BEFORE ANY ACTION IS TAKEN. DIEM SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO DISCUSS WHAT, PRECISELY, COULD BE DONE TO MAKE SURE THAT THE OTHER SIDE APPRECIATES THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE WOULD REGARD SUCH MANEUVERS. DUC SUGGESTED THAT UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES THE SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE GVN DELEGATION MIGHT WALK OUT, LEAVING SECOND STRINGERS BEHIND, AS HE SAID WAS SOMETIMES DONE IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

14. SIGNATURE. THE GVN POSITION WAS THAT THE NLF CANNOT SIGN AN AGREEMENT. WE SAID THERE MIGHT BE SEVERAL AGREEMENTS. IT WAS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE NLF MIGHT SPECIFICALLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GVN. IT WAS BEST NOT TO BE DOCTRINAIRE ON THIS POINT. THANH ARGUED THAT EVEN IF THE NLF OFFERED TO SIGN ITS SUBMISSION TO THE GVN, SUCH A DOCUMENT HAD NO PLACE AT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THERE WAS NO REASON WHY IT NEEDED TO BE SIGNED BY THE U.S. AND THE DRV: I SAID IT MIGHT BE A BILATERAL DOCUMENT. DISCUSSION WAS INCONCLUSIVE BUT ALL OF US REALIZED THAT IT WAS HIGHLY PREMATURE TO WORRY ABOUT WHO WOULD SIGN EVENTUAL AGREEMENTS.

15. AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING, WHEN WE SAID WE WOULD INFORM PARIS ON WHAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, THANH ASKED FOR A COPY OF OUR MESSAGE. WE WILL PROVIDE HIM WITH A SANITIZED ABSTRACT AS SOON AS WE HAVE PARIS AND DEPARTMENT COMMENTS, WHICH ARE URGENTLY REQUESTED.

16. BILATERAL PREPARATIONS. THIS SUBJECT ALSO CAME UP IN PASSING, WHEN LAM ASKED HOW THIS HAD BEEN DONE BEFORE THE FIRST MEETING IN MAY. THIS GAVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO REMARK THAT BOTH THIEU AND KY HAD THOUGHT IT ALL RIGHT FOR US TO GO AHEAD BILATERALLY WITH THE DRV TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES FOR THE FIRST MEETING, AND I SAID WE PROPOSED TO DO SO. I BELIEVE THIS CONSTITUTES ADEQUATE NOTIFICATION.

BUNKER

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By Y, NARA, Date 2-20-96

FROM: BROCKLEY SMITH
TO : WALT ROSTOW
CITE: CAPS2531

Sample

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

NOBIS/HARVAN PLUS

FOLLOWING IS AMBASSADOR VANCE'S DETAILED REPORT OF A SHARP EXCHANGE WITH LAU ON US RECONNAISSANCE AND VIOLATIONS OF THE DMZ.

LAU ASKED VANCE TO MEET HIM AND SPENT MOST OF THE FOLLOWING HOUR AND A HALF ENERGETICALLY PROTESTING AGAINST WHAT HE SAID WERE DELIBERATE INFRINGEMENTS OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SECURITY OF THE DRV BY U.S. PLANES AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DMZ BY US ARTILLERY AND WARSHIPS.

VANCE REBUTTED THE ALLEGATIONS, RESTATED OUR RIGHT TO RECONNAISSANCE AND OUR INTENTION TO CONTINUE IT, PROTESTED FIRING AT OUR RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND STRONGLY OBJECTED TO DRV VIOLATIONS OF THE DMZ.

LAU SAID THERE WERE NO NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN THE DMZ. IN RESPONSE TO VANCE'S QUESTION, LAU SAID THERE WAS NO PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE TO HIS EARLIER STATEMENT OF APPARENTLY MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN RECONNAISSANCE AND FLIGHTS ABOVE AND BELOW THE 19TH PARALLEL.

DURING A CONVERSATION AFTER THE FORMAL MEETING ADJOURNED, LAU ASKED ABOUT PRESS REPORTS THAT SAIGON WAS SENDING A DELEGATION TO PARIS. VANCE SAID THE DELEGATION WOULD BE COMING AND WHEN HE HAD MORE INFORMATION HE WOULD BE ASKING LAU TO PICK UP THEIR PRIOR DISCUSSIONS. LAU REPLIED THAT THIS WAS GOOD AND THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH US AT ANY TIME.

FROM: AMERICAN EMBASSY PARIS 24610 NOBIS/HARVAN PLUS FROM VANCE.

DELTO 997

1. AT DRV REQUEST, HADIS AND I MET WITH LAU AND KY AT THE DRV HOUSE IN CHOISY LE ROI FOR AN HOUR AND ONE HALF THIS AFTERNOON. AN INTERPRETER AND NOTE-TAKER WERE PRESENT ON THEIR SIDE; NEGROPONTE AND ENGEL ON OURS.

2. LAU OPENED BY SAYING HE HAD ASKED FOR THE MEETING THIS AFTERNOON TO CALL TO OUR ATTENTION THE SERIOUS SITUATION CREATED BY THE US AIR FORCE IN NORTH VIET NAM SINCE OUR LAST MEETING NOV 24. IN THAT MEETING, THE DRV HAD ASKED US TO CONVEY TO THE USG THEIR ENERGETIC PROTEST AGAINST DELIBERATE INFRINGEMENTS ON THE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SECURITY OF THE DRV BY US PLANES AND THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DMZ BY US ARTILLERY AND WARSHIPS. THESE ACTS, LAU SAID, VIOLATE THE ARE CONTRARY TO THE US COMMITMENTS TO STOP ALL AIR, NAVAL AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV AS OF NOV. 1. HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DEMAND THAT THE USG STOP THESE VIOLATIONS IMMEDIATELY AND THE DRV HAD STATED THAT THE US MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL CONSEQUENCES WHICH MIGHT ARISE FROM THIS SITUATION.

3. LAU SAID THAT DESPITE THIS, ON THE VERY NEXT DAY, NOV 25, AND THE FOLLOWING DAY, NOV 26, US PLANES REPEATEDLY VIOLATED DRV AIR SPACE IN MANY PLACES, PARTICULARLY IN THE TWO PROVINCES OF QUANG BINH AND NGHIE AN. FURTHERMORE, THE PLANES STRAFED AND DROPPED EXPLOSIVE BOMBS AND CBU'S A NUMBER OF PLACES. THIS WAS A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF OUR AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AGAINST THE NORTH, AND BLATANT ENROACHMENT ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE DRV. THE DRV FIRMLY CONDEMNS THOSE US ACTION, WHICH ARE ACTS OF AGRSSION.

4. THE US ALLEGES, LAU CONTINUED, THAT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER THE NORTH ARE NOT ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AND DO NOT IMPREATHEN THE SECURITY OF THE DRV, AND THEREFORE THE US CLAIMS TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE THESE RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER THE NORTH. ONCE MORE THE DRV WISHED TO STATE THAT THIS POSITION OF THE US IS COMPLETELY UNTENABLE, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF BOTH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND REALITY. AS FAR AS INTERNATIONAL LAW IS CONCERNED, THE DRV IS AN INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN COUNTRY. SINCE THE US WAR OF DESTRUCTION AGAINST THE DRV BY MEANS OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND SINCE THE US HAS SUSTAINED BITTER DEFEATS AND IS CONDEMNED BY PUBLIC OPINION, THE USG HAD TO ACCEPT TO PUT A COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL END TO THIS WAR.

5. WHETHER THERE IS A STATE OF WAR OR NOT, WHETHER THE PLANES ARE ARMED OR NOT, OR MANNED OR NOT, CONTINUED RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS IN THE AIR SPACE OF THE DRV ARE AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTE AN ENROACHMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY OF THE DRV. THE US POINT OF VIEW THAT IT HAS TO RETALIATE BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE GUNNERS HAVE OPENED FIRE ON ITS PLANES IS COMPLETELY UNTENABLE, BECAUSE THE DRV HAS THE FULL RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF ITS TERRITORY BY THE US.

6. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF REALITY, RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS BY THE US OVER THE DRV ARE OBVIOUSLY ACTS INVOLVING

THE USE OF FORCE BECAUSE, FIRSTLY, PLANES ARE A MEANS OF WAR; SECONDLY, THE PLANES ARE DEFENDED BY US FIGHTER-BOMBERS WITH GUNS, BOMBS, CBU'S ETC. A SPOKESMAN IN SAIGON HAS AFFIRMED THAT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS ARE BEING ESCORTED BY BOMBERS. IN THE THIRD PLACE, THE MISSION OF THE RECONNAISSANCE PLANES IS TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE FOR BOMBING AND STRAFFING PURPOSES, AS HAS BEEN EVIDENCED BY EVENTS OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS.

7. FOR THESE REASONS, LAU SAID, HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY TO US THE ENERGETIC PROTEST OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE BOMBING AND STRAFING OF DRV TERRITORY BY US PLANES ON NOV 25 AND 26. HANDING US A PIECE OF PAPER, LAU SAID HE WANTED TO CONVEY TO US A COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF THE DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY ON NOV 26 ON THIS SUBJECT, ADDRESSED TO THE US DELEGATION AS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT.

(FOR ENGLISH VERSION, SEE FBIS B261624, HANOI VNA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, NOV 26, 1612GMT.)

8. LAU SAID THAT ANOTHER SERIOUS SITUATION HAD DEVELOPED YESTERDAY IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE DMZ. ON COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED REASONS, SUCH AS THE OBLIGATION TO DEFEND ALLIED POSITIONS SOUTH OF THE DMZ OR THAT DRV FLAG WAS SEEN WAVING IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE DMZ, OR REPORTS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ACTIVITIES WHICH MIGHT THREATEN US TROOPS IN CON THIEN, US TROOPS FROM THE 3RD MAF AND ARVN TROOPS ENTERED THE DMZ ON NOV 26 TO SWEEP AND TO HURT THE LOCAL POPULATION, THUS SERIOUSLY VIOLATING THE STATUS OF THE DMZ. ACCORDING TO AN AP ITEM OF NOV 26 FROM SAIGON, THE US COMMAND RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON BEFORE ORGANIZING THIS OPERATION. SINCE IT ORDERED THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, THE US HAS BEEN INTENSIFYING THE WAR OF AGGRESSION IN SOUTH VIET-NAME AND VIOLATING THE STATUS OF THE DMZ MORE AND MORE SERIOUSLY. AS HE HAD SAID ON NOV. 24, THE US MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE DMZ WHICH IS AT COMPLETE VARIANCE WITH WHAT THE US HAS BEEN SAYING. LAU DEMANDED THAT THE US IMMEDIATELY STOP THESE ACTS OF VIOLATION.

9. I REPLIED THAT LAU HAD RAISED TWO MATTERS, ONE HAVING TO DO WITH RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND THE OTHER WITH ACTIVITIES IN AND AROUND THE DMZ. FIRST, WITH REGARD TO RECONNAISSANCE AND THE ACTIONS THE DRV HAS TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS, I HAD TOLD HIM AT OUR LAST MEETING ON NOV. 24 THAT THE US WOULD CONTINUE RECONNAISSANCE OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV, AND IF US RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WERE FIRED ON, THE US WOULD TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTIONS TO DEFEND ITS PLANES AND TO PROTECT ITS PILOTS. I HAD TOLD LAU THAT UNTIL WE MOVED CLOSER TO PEACE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CONTINUE RECONNAISSANCE FOR THE PROTECTION OF OUR FORCES. I HAD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WERE CONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE HAD SAID REGARDING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE. I HAD FURTHER STATED THAT THE SECURITY OF THE DRV WAS IN NO WAY JEOPARDIZED BY THE

CONDUCT OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER THE DRV. DESPITE THIS, ON NOV. 25 AND 26, THE DRV THROUGH ITS MILITARY FORCES CONTINUED TO FIRE ON US RECONNAISSANCE PLANES AND SHOT DOWN TWO OF OUR AIRCRAFT. I WISHED TO PROTEST MOST VIGOROUSLY AND ENERGETICALLY THAT ACTION BY THE DRV. ONCE THE PLANES HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN, AMMUNITION HAD BEEN FIRED AND BOMBS DROPPED IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR PLANES AND PILOTS. LAU HAD SPOKEN OF THE FACT THAT RECONNAISSANCE PLANES WERE ESCORTED BY ARMED AIRCRAFT, BUT THAT WAS ONLY BECAUSE THE DRV HAD FIRED ON OUR UNARMED RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.

10. LAU HAD STATED THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE MISSION OF RECONNAISSANCE PLANES WAS TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE FOR BOMBING AND STRAFING PURPOSES. THAT WAS NOT CORRECT. IT WAS NECESSARY TO FLY THESE RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS SO AS TO COLLECT THE NECESSARY INFORMATION TO PROTECT US AND OTHER ALLIED FORCES. AT THE TIME WE HAD INFORMED THE DRV THAT WE WOULD STOP BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV, IT WAS VERY CLEAR TO THEM THAT WE HAD NOT ACCEPTED DRV WORDING, NAMELY, "ACTS OF WAR," WHICH THE DRV HAD INTERPRETED AS INCLUDING RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS. THE US BELIEVED THAT THE DRV UNDERSTOOD CLEARLY WHY WE USED THE WORDS "ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE." THE REASON WAS SIMPLE AND CLEAR, NAMELY, THAT THE FLYING OF RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT IS NOT AN ACT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE. I WISHED TO PROTEST STRENUOUSLY THE ACTION OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT AND ITS ARMED FORCES IN ATTACKING RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT.

11. IN CONNECTION WITH RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS, I CONTINUED, LAU HAD GIVEN ME AT OUR PREVIOUS MEETING A DOCUMENT WHICH PURPORTED TO REPORT THE NUMBER OF RECONNAISSANCE SORTIES FLOWN ON CERTAIN DAYS BETWEEN NOV. 14 AND 22. AFTER COMPARING THAT STATEMENT WITH THE REPORT OF OUR FILED COMMANDS, I HAD FOUND THAT HIS REPORT HAD OVERSTATED THE NUMBER OF FLIGHTS ON EACH DAY.

12. I HAD NOTED ALSO THAT THE DOCUMENT LAU HAD HANDED ME DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS SOUTH OF THE 19TH PARALLEL AND NORTH OF THE 19TH PARALLEL. MY NOTES INDICATED THAT LAU HAD ASKED US TO TAKE NOTE OF THE DISTINCTION HE WAS MAKING BETWEEN THOSE FLIGHTS NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE 19TH PARALLEL. I SAID I WISHED LAU WOULD EXPAND ON THIS DISTINCTION AND INDICATE ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

13. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF THE DMZ, AT OUR LAST MEETING LAU HAD GIVEN ME A DOCUMENT WHICH CONTAINED EXCERPTS FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY DATED NOV. 21. THAT DOCUMENT ALLEGED THAT ATTACKS HAD BEEN MADE ON NOV. 16, 17, 20 AND 21 AGAINST THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DMZ BY US ARTILLERY AND NAVAL SHIPS. THOSE ALLEGED FACTS ARE INCORRECT. THE REAL FACTS ARE AS FOLLOWS: THERE WAS NO FIRING INTO THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DMZ ON NOV. 16, 17 OR 20 BY EITHER US ARTILLERY OR NAVAL GUNFIRE. AS I HAD INDICATED TO LAU LAST TIME, ALLIED ARTILLERY SOUTH OF THE DMZ FIRED INTO THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DMZ ONLY ON NOV. 21 AND 22. IN EACH INSTANCE, ALLIED FIRE WAS DIRECTED AT WEAPONS WHICH HAD BEEN OBSERVED FIRING FROM POSITIONS IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ.

14. I CONTINUED THAT AT OUR MEETING ON NOV. 24, LAU HAD SAID THAT ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF DRV TROOPS IN THE DMZ WERE MERE FABRICATIONS AND THAT AT OUR MEETING ON NOV. 14, LAU HAD SAID THAT THERE WERE NO DRV SOLDIERS IN THE DMZ. I REMINDED LAU THAT I HAD SAID ON NOV. 24 THAT FROM NOV. 1 TO NOV. 10 THERE HAD BEEN NO US OR ALLIED FORCES IN THE DMZ AND NO ALLIED GUNS HAD FIRED INTO THE DMZ UNTIL ALLIED FORCES SOUTH OF THE DMZ WERE ATTACKED BY ROCKET, MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE FROM WITHIN THE DMZ ON NOV 10.

15. I SAID THAT SINCE OUR LAST MEETING RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS HAVE RE-ENTERED THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE DMZ TO CONFIRM THE PRESENCE OF DRV FORCES THERE. THE INDICATIONS OF OUR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED. ALL THE PATROLS QUICKLY ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH SOLDIERS WEARING UNIFORMS OF THE NVA. IN ONE INSTANCE A PATROL ENCOUNTERED A GROUP OF NVA SOLDIERS IN A WELL FORTIFIED POSITION IN THE DMZ 500 METERS FROM THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE DMZ.

16. I SAID THAT ALLIED FORCES HAD CAPTURED SOLDIERS FROM ELEMENTS OF THE 138TH NVA REGIMENT WHICH ARE PRESENTLY OPERATING IN THE DMZ SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER. ONE OF THE PRISONERS STATED THAT HE IS A CORPORAL AND A MEMBER OF THE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OF THE SECOND BATTALION OF THE 138TH NVA REGIMENT. THE PRISONER STATED THAT HE HAD CROSSED THE BEN HAI LAST FRIDAY (NOV 22) AND THAT HIS COMPANY IS LOCATED SOUTH OF THE BEN HAI AT KIEN MON IN THE DMZ ABOUT 5 KILOMETERS NORTHWEST OF GIO LINH.

17. I SAID THAT I STRONGLY AND VIGOROUSLY PROTESTED THESE VIOLATIONS OF THE STATUS OF THE DMZ AND POINTED OUT AGAIN THAT NO ARTILLERY OR OTHER GUNFIRE HAD BEEN FIRED BY THE ALLIES INTO THE DMZ UNTIL AFTER ALLIED FORCES HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY THE DRV FORCES ON NOV 10 BY ROCKETS, MORTARS AND ARTILLERY. I SAID THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO RESPECT THE STATUS OF THE DMZ. THIS HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE OUR POLICY AND WE EXPECT THE DRV TO DO THE SAME. I SAID IT WAS NOT THE US WHICH HAD VIOLATED THE DMZ BUT RATHER THE FORCES OF THE DRV AND THE DRV SIDE MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SITUATIONS THERE. I SAID WE DEMANDED THAT THE DRV STOP ITS VIOLATIONS IN THE DMZ AND RESPECT ITS STATUS.

18. I ADDED THAT IF THE DRV STOPS ITS VIOLATIONS OF THE DMZ, OUR POLICY IS AND WILL BE THAT WE WILL FULLY RESPECT THE STATUS OF THE DMZ. WE EXPECT OF THE DRV IN THIS REGARD WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO OURSELVES.

19. IN RESPONSE, LAU SAID THAT REGARDING THE CONTINUED RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS AND THE SERIOUS SITUATION CREATED BY SUCH FLIGHTS, HE SAW NOTHING NEW IN THE USG'S VIEWS THAT I HAD EXPRESSED TODAY. LAU SAID THAT THIS POINT OF VIEW HAS BEEN REJECTED BY THE DRV MANY TIMES AND HE ONCE AGAIN WAS REPEATING THE DRV POSITION. AT THE SAME TIME, LAU SAID, HE DID NOT ACCEPT OUR PROTEST AGAINST THE DRV'S ACTIONS

OF SELF DEFENSE AGAINST VIOLATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AND HE WISHED TO REITERATE ONCE AGAIN THAT THE DRV MAINTAINS THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE TO OPPOSE VIOLATIONS OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND THE TERRITORY AND THE US GOVERNMENT MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SERIOUS SITUATION ARISING FROM THESE ACTIONS. LAU SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST THAT I CONVEY TO THE USG THE DRV'S URGENT PROTEST OF THESE SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF NOV 25 AND 26.

20. AS FOR MY QUESTION REGARDING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS ABOVE AND BELOW THE 19TH PARALLEL, LAU SAID THE DISTINCTION HE HAD MADE HAD NO PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE. IT WAS JUST TO MAKE A GEOGRAPHICAL DEMARCATION. AS FOR MY STATEMENT THAT DRV CLAIMS IN REGARD TO THE NUMBER OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS WERE EXAGGERATED, LAU SAID, HE STUCK TO THE FIGURES HE HAD FURNISHED US.

21. IN REGARD TO THE DMZ, LAU SAID THAT US NAVAL AND GROUND ARTILLERY HAVE REPEATEDLY BOMBARDED THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DMZ IN MANY PLACES ON THE 16, 17, 20, 21 AND 22 OF NOV. TODAY I HAD SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO SUCH FIRE ON THE 16, 17, AND 20. LAU SAID HE NOW WISHED TO FURNISH US SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. ON NOV 13, FOUR ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY WERE FIRED FROM SOUTH OF THE DMZ LANDING IN THE VICINITY OF THE FLAGPOLE NEAR THE HIEN LUONG BRIDGE AND IN THE VICINITY OF THE HUYNH HA POLICE STATION BASED ON THE NORTHERN BANK OF THE BEN HAI.

22. ON NOV 16, LAU SAID US ARTILLERY BASED IN BA DOC OPENED FIRE ON VINH SON COMMUNE AND ON THE SAME DAY BETWEEN 1800 AND 2400 HOURS US NAVAL VESSELS FIRED HUNDREDS OF ROUNDS OF 203 MILLIMETER SHELLS AIMED AT THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE DMZ, BUT MANY OF THOSE SHELLS FELL IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DMZ IN VINH QUANG COMMUNE. ON THE 17 AND 20 OF NOV., US ARTILLERY BASED SOUTH OF THE DMZ OPENED FIRE INTO THE DMZ AND SHELLS FELL INTO VINH GIANG IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DMZ.

23. LAU SAID THAT THE FOREGOING INFORMATION WAS ACCURATE AND HAD BEEN CHECKED. AS FOR THE BOMBARDMENTS ON NOV 21 AND 22, THE US HAD ALREADY ADMITTED THAT THEY HAD HAPPENED; THEREFORE; LAU SAID, THE DRV SIDE ASSERTS THAT THE US HAS REPEATEDLY VIOLATED THE STATUS OF THE DMZ AND THE US HAS CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE DRV TROOPS IN THE DMZ JUST TO HAVE A PRETEXT TO VIOLATE THE DMZ. THESE CLAIMS HAVE BEEN REJECTED BY THE DRV. LAU SAID THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY STATED AND NOW WISHED TO REITERATE THAT THERE ARE NO DRV TROOPS IN THE DMZ, AND THE PRISONER INFORMATION TO WHICH I HAD REFERRED WAS ENTIRELY FABRICATED, AND I HAD PUT FORWARD THAT INFORMATION WITH A VIEW TO HAVING A PRETEXT FOR THE INTRUSION OF US/GVN/ALLIED TROOPS INTO THE DMZ IN ORDER TO VIOLATE ITS STATUS.

24. LAU SAID THAT THEREFORE, IN REGARD TO THE DMZ, HE REJECTED THE ASSERTIONS WHICH WE HAD ADVANCED AND DEMANDED THAT THE UNITED STATES IMMEDIATELY STOP ITS VIOLATIONS OF THE DMZ AND ENSURE RESPECT FOR ITS STATUS.

25. I SAID THAT I WISHED TO COMMENT ON WHAT LAU HAD SAID. FIRST, REGARDING RECONNAISSANCE, LAU HAD SPOKEN OF THE RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE. UNARMED RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS ARE NOT ACTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE. THEREFORE, IN REGARD TO RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS NOT INVOLVING ARMED ACTION, THE QUESTION OF SELF DEFENSE DOES NOT ARISE. I ASKED LAU TO CONVEY TO HIS GOVERNMENT OUR STRENUOUS PROTEST AGAINST FIRING ON OUR RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT BY DRV FORCES.

26. REGARDING THE DMZ, I SAID I TOOK NOTE OF THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH LAU HAD STATED TODAY REGARDING NCV 13, 16, 17 AND 20. I SAID I RESERVED THE RIGHT TO COMMENT FURTHER ON THESE STATEMENTS AT A LATER DATE. I REMARKED FURTHER THAT LAU HAD SAID THAT THERE WERE NO DRV TROOPS IN THE DMZ. THEN, I ASKED, WHO IS FIRING ON OUR TROOPS AND AIRCRAFT FROM THE SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN PARTS OF THE DMZ? WHO ARE THE TROOPS WE SEE IN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN PARTS OF THE DMZ WEARING NVA UNIFORMS? WHO ARE THE TROOPS WE CAPTURED AND WHO IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS MEMBERS OF REGULAR NVA FORCES? THESE ARE NO FABRICATIONS; THEY ARE SOLID FACTS. I SAID THAT I ENERGETICALLY REJECTED LAU'S CONTENTIONS THAT THESE WERE FABRICATIONS SERVING AS PRETEXTS FOR THE UNITED STATES. I REPEATED THAT IT WAS THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TO RESPECT THE DMZ AND WE EXPECTED THE DRV TO DO THE SAME.

27. LAU SAID THAT HE HAD NOT INTENDED TO SPEAK FURTHER, BUT IN LIGHT OF MY REMARKS HE FELT COMPELLED TO COMMENT AGAIN. HE SAID THAT IF THE UNITED STATES ALWAYS CLAIMS TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEND RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OVER THE DRV TERRITORY AFTER THE DRV HAS STATED THAT THESE ARE ENCROACHMENTS ON THE SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY OF THE DRV, THE DRV WILL CONSIDER THAT THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING TO PURSUE A POLICY OF AGGRESSION IN VIET NAM AND HAS NOT GIVEN UP ITS AGGRESSIVE MANUEVERS IN VIET NAM. LAU SAID THAT THE DRV HAS ENERGETICALLY PROTESTED THIS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

28. AS FAR AS THE DMZ IS CONCERNED, LAU SAID HE HAD ALREADY SAID WHAT HE DEEMED NECESSARY TO SAY. THE DRV MAINTAINS ITS VIEW THAT THE INFORMATION ADVANCED BY THE UNITED STATES IS A FABRICATION AIMED AT JUSTIFYING ITS ACTS. THE US HAS REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT IT IS ITS POLICY TO RESPECT THE STATUS OF THE DMZ. THE DRV EXPECTS ACTIONS WHICH CONFORM TO THESE ASSERTIONS. THE DRV ALSO EXPECTS THE CESSATION OF ALL VIOLATIONS OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY.

29. I SAID THAT I HAD TWO VERY BRIEF COMMENTS. FIRST, THE WAR HAS NOT YET ENDED. WE ARE HERE TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, BUT WHILE THE WAR CONTINUES WE MUST PROTECT OUR FORCES AND RECONNAISSANCE IS NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THOSE FORCES, AND WAS NOT AN ACT INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE. AS FOR WHO IS THE AGGRESSOR AND WHO IS THE VICTIM, WE HAVE MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR IN THE PAST AND I WOULD NOT REPEAT IT NOW OTHER THAN TO SAY I REJECTED LAU'S ALLEGATIONS.

30. AS FOR THE DMZ. I SAID WE ARE PREPARED TO RESPECT THE DMZ AND WE EXPECT THE SAME OF THE DRV, SO THAT WE MAY MOVE TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

31. LAU SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT WE HAD COME TO PARIS TO FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIET NAM PROBLEM. AFTER SIX MONTHS OF TALKS THE TWO SIDES HAD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT. THIS WAS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IF NOW THE US CLAIMS THE RIGHT TO VIOLATE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY OF ANOTHER COUNTRY AND DENIES THE RIGHT OF THE DRV TO DEFEND ITSELF THEN LAU SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ASK WHETHER PEACE CAN BE REACHED IN SUCH CONDITIONS.

32. LAU SAID HE WAS NOT YET ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM, SINCE THIS WAS NOT THE CONTENT OF OUR TALK TODAY. BUT, AS FAR AS DEFENDING ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIET NAM WAS CONCERNED, HE BELIEVED THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY WAS TO STOP THE US WAR OF AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW THE TROOPS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES LEAVING THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET NAM TO SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. LAU SAID HE THOUGHT THAT NO ONE COULD ACCEPT THE VIEW OF THE US THAT THE WAY TO DEFEND US AND ALLIED FORCES WAS TO VIOLATE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORY OF THE DRV.

33. LAU SAID HE PROPOSED THAT I CONVEY HIS VIEWS FULLY TO MY GOVERNMENT. THE DRV SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY SAID IT CAME TO PARIS WITH GOODWILL AND SERIOUS INTENT TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE VIET NAM PROBLEM AND MANY RESPONSIBLE US GOVERNMENT PERSONALITIES HELD THE SAME VIEW ABOUT DRV GOODWILL AND SERIOUS INTENT. FOR ITS PART, MANY US GOVERNMENT PERSONALITIES HAVE ASSERTED THEIR DESIRE TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, BUT LAU SAID HE FELT OUR ACTIONS DID NOT CONFORM TO OUR WORDS.

34. LAU SAID THAT WE WILL HAVE TO TALK TO EACH OTHER TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. US ACTIONS ARE CONSIDERED ILLEGAL BY THE WHOLE WORLD BECAUSE THEY ARE ENCROACHMENTS ON THE SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY OF THE DRV. THE US HOWEVER DOES NOT ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THESE ACTIONS ARE ILLEGAL, AND LAU SAID HE BELIEVED THIS WILL CREATE DIFFICULTIES TO THE SOLUTION OF THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM. LAU SAID THAT AT OUR LAST MEETING I HAD REMARKED THAT WE HAD NEVER DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY. LAU SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY BUT, EVEN THOUGHT THE QUESTION HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED, THERE WAS NO REASON FOR UNITED STATES VIOLATIONS OF DRV SOVEREIGNTY. THIS, LAU SAID, IS AN ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

35. I SAID I TOOK NOTE OF WHAT LAU HAD SAID AND WOULD REPORT IT TO MY GOVERNMENT. I SAID I EXPECTED HE WOULD DO THE SAME WITH REGARD TO WHAT I HAD SAID. I SAID I AGREED THAT WE MUST CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSIONS IN A SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM. REGARDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES, I SAID WE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN THERE WILL BE A WITHDRAWAL OF DRV FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM AND OF OUR FORCES LEAVING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO SETTLE THEIR OWN FUTURE.

36. LAU SAID THAT TODAY WE HAD NOT DISCUSSED THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND THIS WAS NOT THE CIRCUMSTANCE FOR SUCH A DISCUSSION, BUT WHEN THE TIME COMES, THE DRV SIDE WOULD EXPRESS ITS VIEWS.

37. THE FORMAL MEETING THEN ADJOURNED. DURING A BRIEF CONVERSATION OVER A CUP OF TEA, LAU ASKED ABOUT TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS THAT THE GVN PLANNED TO SEND A DELEGATION TO PARIS. I REPLIED THAT THE GVN HAD INDEED MADE A STATEMENT TODAY AND WOULD BE SENDING A DELEGATION TO PARIS. I SAID I WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM WHEN I HAD MORE INFORMATION AND THAT WE COULD THEN PICK UP OUR PRIOR DISCUSSIONS. LAU REPLIED THAT THIS WAS GOOD AND THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH US AT ANY TIME. HARRIMAN

DTG: 281539Z NOV 1963

~~SECRET~~

NO DIS

~~SECRET NODIS~~

1968 NOV 28 19 41

2EA735
DD TELETYPE
DE WTE 4471

FROM: BROWLEY SMITH
TO : WALT ROSTOW
CITE: CAP82835

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10498

By mp/ds, NARA, Date 1-9-98

~~SECRET NODIS~~

DELTO 998

FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY PARIS 24611

SUBJ: CONSULTATION WITH GVN DELEGATION

1. AN CALLED ON HABIB MORNING NOVEMBER 28. HE INFORMED US THAT AMBASSADOR LAM WOULD NOT BE ARRIVING IN PARIS ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 29 AS PLANNED, AND THAT HE HAD NO IDEA WHEN LAM WOULD GET HERE, ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD ONLY BE A SHORT DELAY. HABIB SAID THAT THIS WAS AN UNFORTUNATE DELAY AND THAT IT IS VITAL THAT THE GVN BE PROPERLY REPRESENTED IN PARIS IMMEDIATELY SO THAT WE MAY CONSULT WITH THEM CLOSELY ON PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

2. HABIB THEN GAVE AN A TEN POINT PAPER COVERING PROCEDURE AND PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FIRST WIDER MEETINGS OF THE TWO SIDES. HE EXPLAINED CAREFULLY TO AN THAT THESE WERE THE POINTS THAT THE US WOULD RESOLVE IN PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE DRV PRIOR TO THE FIRST WIDER MEETING AT THE HOTEL MAJESTIC. HABIB EMPHASIZED THAT ARRANGEMENTS AND PROCEDURES AGREED UPGV IN THIS MANNER GOVERN ONLY THE LIMITED MEETINGS THAT WILL IN TURN DETERMINE THE RULES OF PROCEDURE THAT WILL GOVERN THE PLENARY SESSIONS. HABIB TOLD AN THAT WE WANTED TO BEGIN DISCUSSING THESE POINTS WITH THE DRV ON SATURDAY. THEREFORE, IF THE GVN FURTHER COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS ON THESE POINTS THEY SHOULD BRING THEM TO OUR ATTENTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. OUR DESIRE TO MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY MADE THE DELAY IN LAM'S RETURN MOST UNFORTUNATE.

1968 NOV 28 PM 3:05
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Prepfile

3. THE PAPER WE GAVE AW FOLLOWS:

MAIN TEXT

(1) AT THE FIRST WIDER MEETINGS OF BOTH SIDES WE PROPOSE THAT WE DISCUSS THE RULES OF PROCEDURE WHICH WILL APPLY TO THE PARIS MEETINGS ON VIET-NAM, TO DETERMINE WITH THE OTHER SIDE ACCEPTABLE RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE MEETINGS. NOTHING THAT IS DECIDED IN THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND ARRANGMENTS FOR THE LIMITED WILL PREJUDGE THE RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE PLENARY SESSION.

(2) THESE MEETINGS SHOULD BE LIMITED IN SIZE. WE PROPOSE TO SUGGEST TO THE DRV THAT EACH SIDE BRING ABOUT TEN TO TWELVE PEOPLE TO THE PROCEDURAL MEETINGS. THIS NUMBER WOULD BE SPLIT EVENLY BETWEEN THE US AND THE GVN ON OUR SIDE. THE OTHER SIDE MAY DIVIDE ITSELF AS IT WISHES.

(3) THE US DELEGATION AT THESE OPENING SESSIONS WILL BE HEADED BY AMBASSADOR VANCE. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ADVISOR, A SECRETARY, AND INTERPRETER AND A STENOGRAPHER.

(4) WE PROPOSE THAT THE PRESS NOT BE PRESENT AT THE OPENING SESSIONS OF THE WIDER MEETINGS. (THEY WERE BARRED FROM THE VANCE-LAU MEETINGS AT THE HOTEL MAJESTIC MAY 10-11, ALSO. THE PRESS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY COVER THE ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF THE DELEGATIONS FROM THE HOTEL MAJESTIC AREA, AS THEY ALWAYS DO.)

(5) WE WILL PROPOSE CONTINUING THE LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION SYSTEM USED DURING THE MAY - OCTOBER MEETINGS. UNDER THAT SYSTEM, EVERYTHING IS TRANSLATED FROM ITS ORIGINAL LANGUAGE INTO FRENCH BY THE INTERPRETER OF THE SPEAKER'S SIDE, AND THEN FROM FRENCH INTO EITHER ENGLISH OR VIETNAMESE, AS THE CASE MAY BE, BY AN INTERPRETER OF THE LISTENER'S SIDE. (THIS MEANS THAT THE GVN DELEGATION SHOULD INCLUDE QUALIFIED CONFERENCE INTERPRETERS CAPABLE OF VIETNAMESE-FRENCH AND FRENCH-VIETNAMESE CONSECUTIVE TRANSLATION.)

(6) WE WILL PROPOSE THAT THESE OPENING MEETINGS BE HELD IN THE SMALLER CONFERENCE ROOM IN WHICH THE US-DRV CONVERSATIONS WERE HELD. (THIS WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE BINDING ON THE LOCATION OF THE MEETINGS FOLLOWING THE DETERMINATION OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.)

(7) WE INTEND THAT THERE SHOULD BE TWO LONG TABLES, FACING EACH OTHER. THERE WILL BE NO TABLES ON THE SIDES, OR, IF THERE ARE SIDES TO THE TABLES, THEY WILL BE EMPTY. WE PROPOSE THAT THERE BE NO FLAGS OR NAMEPLATES ON THE TABLES.

(8) DETERMINATION OF THE ORDER OF SPEAKING WILL BE WORKED OUT. WE PROPOSE THAT WE SEEK TO HAVE OUR SIDE SPEAK FIRST AT THE FIRST WIDER MEETING.

(9) WHILE WE OF COURSE PROPOSE TO HAVE TAPE RECORDINGS OF THE LATTER SESSIONS, WE DO NOT HAVE ANY STRONG PREFERENCE FOR TAPE RECORDINGS OF THESE FIRST ABBREVIATED SESSIONS.

(10) THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WILL BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE PROPER WORKING SITES FOR EACH SIDE AT THE HOTEL MAJESTIC. THE FRENCH WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS, BUT THESE SHOULD BE AS AGREED BY THE TWO SIDES.

4. WE WENT THROUGH THE PAPER POINT-BY-POINT. SECOND SENTENCE IN POINT (1) WAS ADDED AT AN'S REQUEST. ON POINT 2, AN SAID THAT THE GVN WOULD LIKE TAPE RECORDINGS OF ALL MEETINGS, AND HABIB SAID THAT WE COULD CHANGE OUR POSITION ACCORDINGLY, WHEN WE TALK TO NORTH VIETNAMESE WE WILL REQUEST THAT EACH SIDE BE PERMITTED TO TAPE RECORD FIRST ABBREVIATED SESSIONS.

5. COMMENT: WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE GVN WILL NOT GET REPRESENTATIVES HERE WITHOUT DELAY. OUR PRESENT PLAN IS TO PROCEED INTO PRIVATE TALKS WITH LAU ON SATURDAY, OR AT LATEST MONDAY, AND TIE DOWN THE PROCEDURAL MATTERS COVERED IN THE PAPER CONTAINED PARA 3. ONCE THIS IS DONE, THE FIRST WIDER MEETING AT THE HOTEL MAJESTIC CAN BE HELD. WE PROPOSE THAT THIS MEETING BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND NOT AWAIT VICE PRESIDENT KY'S ARRIVAL IN PARIS. WE ARE NOT SURE WHO THE GVN INTENDS TO SEND TO THIS MEETING; WILL AMBASSADOR LAM ATTEND OR WILL THE GVN SEND MINISTER AN? IN ANY EVENT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE GVN MUST BE AWARE OF TIMING WE ARE THINKING OF, AND WE HAVE ASKED AN TO REPORT FULLY.
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

~~HODIS~~

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

11

1968 NOV 28 17 57

EEA784
OO WTE 13
DE WTE 4473

FROM: BROMELY SMITH
TO: WALT ROSTOW
CITE: CAP83824

Free file

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

YOU SHOULD KNOW OF THE VIEWS OF SENATORS SYMINGTON AND COOPER ON THE PUEBLO ISSUE WHICH AMBASSADOR WIGGINS SUMMARIZES IN THE FOLLOWING CABLE. STATE IS AT WORK ON A WAY TO HANDLE THE SENATORS' RECOMMENDATION. AL JENKINS POINTS OUT THAT THE SOUTH KOREAN REACTION TO THE SENATORS' PROPOSAL WOULD BE APOPLECTIC AND OTHERS WOULD VIEW IT AS LESS THAN PRINCIPLED.

USUN 8138

SENATORS SYMINGTON AND COOPER ARE CONCERNED ABOUT FAILURE OF US EFFORTS SO FAR TO SECURE ANYTHING WHATEVER WITH RESPECT TO PUEBLO CREW. THEY BELIEVE NEW APPROACH SHOULD BE TRIED. SPECIFICALLY, THEY RECOMMEND THAT US APPROACH NORTH KOREA WITH OFFER TO PERMIT ADOPTION OF RES INVITING BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WITHOUT CONDITIONS TO APPEAR IN COMITE DEBATE IN RETURN FOR PROMPT RELEASE OF SAID CREW. THEY URGE RECOMMENDATION BE GIVEN PROMPT CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON, PARTICULARLY SINCE MOVEMENT ON TRACK US HAS BEEN FOLLOWING SO FAR SEEMS TO BE AT STANDSTILL.

IF CONSIDERATION OF THIS RECOMMENDATION BY WASHINGTON CONCLUDES THERE IS CHANCE SUCH OFFER WOULD RESULT IN NORTH KOREAN AGREEMENT TO RELEASE CREW, USUN WOULD THEN WISH TO PUT FORWARD SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT ADVANTAGES OF MAKING APPROACH SOON (WHILE OUR SUCCESS IN COMITE TODAY IS FRESH), OF MAKING IT CLEAR OFFER MUST BE PROMPTLY ACCEPTED, AND OF RELATING OFFER TO TIME WHEN KOREAN ISSUE NEXT COMES BEFORE GA.

DTG: 281732Z NOV 68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 4 NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

12

BT1A782
OO VTE13
DE VTE 4468

1968 NOV 28 17 43

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO WALT ROSTOV
CITE CAP82802

S
Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, THERE FOLLOWS A NODIS TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY RUSK TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER. I AM INFORMED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WILL BE AWAY FROM SAIGON FROM DECEMBER 2 TO 7 ACCORDING TO HIS PRESENT PLANS.

STATE 278711

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. YOUR PATIENT, PAINSTAKING EFFORTS OVER THE RECENT DELICATE AND DIFFICULT PERIOD MERIT OUR ADMIRATION AND GRATITUDE, AND YOU DESERVE AT THE VERY LEAST THE FEW DAYS AT KATHMANDU YOU REQUEST. I AM ONLY SORRY THE RESPITE CAN'T BE LONGER.

DTG 281722Z NOVEMBER 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By Y, NARA, Date 2-20-91

EEA783
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4469

1968 NOV 28 17 54

13

Presfile

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO WALT ROSTOW
CITE WH82803

UNCLAS

THE FOLLOWING REUTERS REPORT FROM MOSCOW INDICATES THAT THE QUOTE OTHER SIDE END QUOTE IS HAVING TROUBLE KEEPING ITS LINES AND ITS SIDES STRAIGHT.

MOSCOW, NOV 28(Reuters)- NORTH VIETNAM REGARDS THE U.S. VIEW ON THE ROLE OF SAIGON AT THE PARIS PEACE TALKS AS FALSE AND UNACCEPTABLE, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS.

A REPORT FROM THE AGENCY'S HANOI CORRESPONDENT QUOTED HANOI CIRCLES, OBVIOUSLY SENIOR NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AS SAYING THE U.S. THESIS THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL BE TWO-SIDED, WITH SAIGON PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE, "CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AND MUST BE REJECTED."

A SPOKESMAN FOR THE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION IN PARIS LAST NIGHT REJECTED WASHINGTON'S DESCRIPTION OF THE TALKS AS TWO SIDED AND SAID HANOI AGREED ONLY TO A FOUR-PARTY CONFERENCE.

BUT THURSDAY'S TASS REPORT CONTAINED THE IMPLICATION THAT HANOI REGARDED THE CONFERENCE AS ESSENTIALLY A THREE-SIDED ONE, WITH SAIGON PLAYING ONLY A MINOR ROLE COMPARED TO THE OTHER THREE PARTIES - THE UNITED STATES, NORTH VIETNAM, AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (N.L.F.), POLITICAL ARM OF THE VIET CONG.

DTG: 281722Z NOV 1968

14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA776
OO WTE10
DE WTE 44529

1968 NOV 28 04 35

FROM JUANITA ROBERTS
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO WALT ROSTOV
CITE CAP8279A5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEREWITH MEMORANDUM RECEIVED FROM SENATOR MANSFIELD FOR THE PRESIDENT.

NOVEMBER 27, 1968

TO: SENATOR MANSFIELD
FROM: STAN KIMMITT

AT YOUR DIRECTION, ALL CURRENT DEMOCRATIC SENATORS WERE CALLED ON NOVEMBER 26 AND ASKED, "ARE YOU IN FAVOR OF OR AGAINST A SPECIAL SESSION TO CONSIDER THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY?" THOSE WHO ANSWERED IN FAVOR WERE FURTHER QUERIED AS TO THEIR RECOMMENDATION FOR A TIME FOR SUCH A SESSION.

THE CUMULATIVE RESULTS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

- 17 - DEFINITELY IN FAVOR
- 33 - AGAINST
- 4 - NO POSITION
- 8 - UNABLE TO BE CONTACTED

THIS TOTALS 62 OTHER THAN YOURSELF.

NAMES AND COMMENTS ARE ATTACHED.

SENATORS IN FAVOR OF A SPECIAL SESSION WITH INDIVIDUAL COMMENTS:

Profile

NOV 27 PM 11:54
WHITE HOUSE ROOM
SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By , NARA, Date 2-20-98

NAME -----	COMMENT -----
BREWSTER	AT ANY TIME
CLARK	AFTER DECEMBER 6
FULBRIGHT	IF PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON AND SENATOR RUSSELL CONCUR
CORE	SOON
GRUENING	ANYTIME
HART	ANYTIME
INDUYE	SOON
KENNEDY	SOON
MCGEE	ANYTIME
MONDALE	ANYTIME
MORSE	SOON
MOSS	ANYTIME
PASTORE	"IT WON'T WORK"
PELL	"IF WE CAN PASS IT"
FROXNIRE	ANYTIME
RANDOLPH	ANYTIME
YOUNG	SOON

SENATORS NOT IN FAVOR OF A SPECIAL SESSION.

NAME -----	COMMENT -----
ANDERSON	
BAYH	WILL COOPERATE
BIBLE	
BURDICK	WILL COOPERATE
BYRD (VA.)	WILL COOPERATE
CANNON	
CHURCH	WILL COOPERATE
DODD	
EASTLAND	
ERVIN	
HARRIS	
HARTKE	
HILL	WILL COOPERATE

HOLLAND
HOLLINGS
JACKSON
JORDAN
LONG (MO.)
LONG (LA.)
MCCARTHY
MCGOVERN
MCINTYRE
METCALF
MONROE
MONTANA
NELSON
RIBICOFF
RUSSELL

WILL COOPERATE

DOESN'T REALLY CARE
WILL COOPERATE

WILL COOPERATE

WILL COOPERATE
WILL COOPERATE
FEELS THAT IN VIEW OF
THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS,
HEARINGS SHOULD BE HELD
BY THE ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE PRIOR TO FLOOR
ACTION.

WILL COOPERATE

SPONG
SYMINGTON
TALMADGE
TYDINGS
BYRD (W. VA.)

WILL COOPERATE

FOLLOWING SENATORS GAVE QUALIFIED ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION
OF A SPECIAL SESSION.

NAME

COMMENT

MUSKIE

HE IS DOUBTFUL THAT IT WILL
BE SUCCESSFUL UNLESS
PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON ASSURES
REPUBLICAN COOPERATION. HE
LEAVES IT TO YOUR GOOD
JUDGMENT.

HAYDEN

IS NOT KNOWLEDGEABLE ON THE
SUBJECT AND LEAVES IT TO
YOUR JUDGMENT.

SPARKMAN

WILL SUPPORT YOU IN ANY ACTION
YOU TAKE.

STENNIS

NEEDS FURTHER TIME TO STUDY
THE MATTER (IN CONFIDENCE,
I BELIEVE THAT MEANS HE MUST
FIRST SPEAK WITH RUSSELL WHO
IS IN PUERTO RICO).

THE FOLLOWING SENATORS WERE UNABLE TO BE REACHED.

NAME -----	COMMENT -----
BARTLETT	IN HOSPITAL IN CLEVELAND.
ELLENDER	IN THE FAR EAST. WILL RETURN DECEMBER 21, 1968.
LAUSCHE	NO ANSWER.
MAGNUSON	DID NOT RETURN OUR CALL.
MCCLELLAN	DID NOT RETURN OUR CALL.
SMATHERS	DID NOT RETURN OUR CALL.
WILLIAMS	DID NOT RETURN OUR CALL.
YARBOROUGH	IN VIET NAM.

DTG: 283321Z NOV 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 27, 1968

15
Pres file

Dear Dr. Kerr:

I have read with interest the proposal you and Mr. Reuther gave me on November 19 regarding the elements which you believe important in the next phase of negotiations for a settlement in Vietnam. Your suggestions clearly reflect the careful thought which you have given to the enormously complex task of reaching an honorable and durable settlement in Vietnam.

Many of the components of such a settlement to which you refer, for example, the necessity to have effective international supervisory machinery to supervise any cessation of hostilities, are subjects which, of course, have been studied most carefully within the Government and by our South Vietnamese allies. Other aspects of a settlement to which you allude, such as your opposition to any imposed coalition and your support for the principle that the South Vietnamese people should be free to determine their own future without outside interference, appear to be fully compatible with the statements which I and others within the Administration have made in the past. These principles also are in accord with positions taken by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, most recently at the Honolulu meeting of last July.

I appreciate the work that you and your colleagues have done in identifying the major problems and in suggesting solutions for them. Thank you for giving me the benefit of your views; you may be sure they will be taken into full account as the negotiations progress.

Sincerely,



Dr. Clark Kerr
Chairman
National Committee for a Political
Settlement in Vietnam/Negotiation Now!
156 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10010

LBJ:State:WWR:rln

16

ACTION

Wednesday - November 27, 1968

Mr. President:

*sent Ranch
via pouch
11/26, 1968*

Mexican Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores telegraphed you congratulations on your thirty-fourth wedding anniversary (Tab B).

A suggested reply is attached for your signature at Tab A.

*1. sup
2. Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Presidential letter, for signature, to Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores.

Tab B - Carrillo Flores' congratulatory message to the President, November 16, 1968.

SWLewis:mm

16a

December 2, 1968

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Your telegram was a wonderful wedding anniversary gift for Lady Bird and me. We deeply appreciate your kind words and we send our love to you, Fanny and the children.

Sincerely,

LBJ
Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Antonio Carrillo Flores
Secretary of Foreign Relations
of Mexico
Mexico, D. F.

LBJ/SWLewis:mm
(prepared 11/27/68)

16 b

Message to President from Antonio Carrillo Flores, Mexican
Secretary of Foreign Relations
(dated November 16,
1968)

From Mexico City

to

The President
The White House

On the occasion of your thirty-fourth wedding anniversary, Fanny, my children, and I wish Lady Bird and you many more years of personal happiness. None of us will ever forget the affection shown us by the Johnson family during our stay in Washington and the friendship which we hope to nurture now and in the future.

Antonio Carrillo Flores

02A757
00 WTB 12
02 WTB 4435

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP32762

1968 NOV 27 13 42

17
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
'68 NOV 27 AM 8:45

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 27, 1968

Pres file

HEREWITH CARRILLO FLORES AND TONY FREEMAN DISCUSS CHAMIZAL
GET-TOGETHER.

MEXICO 9251

1. CARRILLO FLORES HAS NOW INFORMED ME THAT HE HAS FULL GREEN
LIGHT FROM DIAZ ORDAZ RE NATURE AND TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT
AS SOON AS FINAL WHITE HOUSE AGREEMENT RECEIVED ON DATE AND
SCENARIO.

2. WE AGREED WOULD BE MUTUALLY PREFERABLE FOR SIMULTANEOUS
ANNOUNCEMENTS TO BE SIMILAR BUT NOT IDENTICAL AND TO COVER
FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. TWO PRESIDENTS "HAD AGREED" ON MEETING AT CHAMIZAL SITE
FOR DOUBLE PURPOSE OF (1) INAUGURATING ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS
CHANNEL, AND (2) HAVING FINAL CHAT TOGETHER IN CAPACITY
NEIGHBORING PRESIDENTS.

B. PRESIDENT JOHNSON "HAD INVITED" PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ
TO SUBSEQUENT LUNCHEON ON U.S. SIDE OF BORDER - INVITATION WHICH
DIAZ ORDAZ "EXPECTED TO ACCEPT" IF AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS
TO DEPART BRIEFLY FROM COUNTRY.

3. CARRILLO PREPARING APPROPRIATE LETTER TO CONGRESS FOR
SUBMISSION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING PRESS ANNOUNCEMENTS. HE HAS
AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WILL BE NO DISSEMINATION OF INFO
WHATSOEVER UNTIL ALL PLANS ARE APPROVED BY WHITE HOUSE.

DTG 271329Z NOVEMBER 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By sf, NARA, Date 2-20-98

17a

ACTION

November 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Request for a wreath from you at memorial service for
Harold Holt**

A skin-diver's organization in Australia is holding a ceremony on December 15 at the spot where Harold Holt disappeared. The organization will place a plaque underwater on the reef near which Holt was last seen. The ceremony will be attended by Mrs. Holt, possibly Prime Minister Gorton, and other officials.

You have been invited to provide a wreath for the ceremony.

State recommends that you authorize our Consul General in Melbourne to provide the wreath. I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

STATE:MWright:wpt

1968 NOV 27 21 06

18

EEA 763
OO WTE 10 WTE 15
DS WTE 4444

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO WALT ROSTOW
GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE WH82680

Pres file

98 NOV 27 PM 4:11
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

UNCLAS

NOVEMBER 27, 1968

FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY SAIGON'S SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT THIEU'S TV SPEECH ON THE PARIS PEACE TALKS.

SAIGON 43624

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT THIEU'S NOVEMBER 27 RADIO-TV APPEARANCE

1. SUMMARY: IN TEN MINUTE PREPARED RADIO-TV SPEECH NOVEMBER 27, PRESIDENT THIEU NOTED THAT PEACE TALKS DO NOT MEAN AN EARLY PEACE, AND NVN CONTINUES TO PLAN NEW ATTACKS. THIEU CALLED ON HANOI TO END THE WAR AND URGED PEOPLE OF SVN TO WORK AND FIGHT HARDER FOR PEACE. IN FOLLOWING QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH NEWSMEN, THIEU REVEALED THAT VICE PRESIDENT KY WILL SUPERVISE OVERALL NEGOTIATING EFFORT, MOVING BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN SAIGON AND PARIS, BUT KY WILL NOT SERVE AS OFFICIAL LEADER OF GVN DELEGATION. THIEU SAID THAT CONTINUED SHELLING OF SVN CITIES, VIOLATION OF THE DMZ AND TERRORISM WOULD BE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR SVN NOT RPT NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN TALKS. END SUMMARY.

2. PRESIDENT THIEU NOVEMBER 27 DISCUSSED THE GVN DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PARIS TALKS IN A RADIO-TV APPEARANCE THAT FEATURED A HALFHOUR QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH FOUR LEADING VIETNAMESE NEWSMEN. THIEU GAVE A SOBER, MEASURED PERFORMANCE AND HANDLED A VARIETY OF DIFFICULT QUESTIONS WITH CONSIDERABLE SKILL. HE OPENED WITH A TEN MINUTE PREPARED SPEECH IN WHICH HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A) WHILE THE GVN HAS SHOWN GOOD WILL AND IS NOW ABLE TO AGREE TO GO TO PARIS ON THE BASIS OF GUARANTEES AND AGREEMENTS WITH THE US, THE ENEMY HAS CONTINUED HIS TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, TAKING A STEADY TOLL OF INNOCENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN. ENEMY WITHDRAWALS INTO BASE AREAS AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IS NOT TRULY A DE-ESCALATION. IT IS CLEAR FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE THAT THE ENEMY IS PREPARING NEW ATTACKS.

B) PEACE TALKS DO NOT MEAN AN EARLY PEACE. THE WAR IS NOT OVER AND WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT IT TO BE OVER SOON.

DUPLICATE FROM QUICK COPY

7) THIEU CALLED ON HANOI TO CEASE ITS HOPELESS EFFORTS TO TAKE OVER SVN AND NEGOTIATE A JUST PEACE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED VIETNAMESE GRATITUDE FOR ALLIED ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY THAT OF THE US.

8) THIEU CONCLUDED BY URGING HIS PEOPLE TO WORK AND FIGHT HARDER FOR PEACE. HE SAID THAT SVN MUST HAVE MORE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUCCESSES IN ORDER TO PUT PRESSURE ON NVN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

3. THIEU'S PREPARED SPEECH WAS FOLLOWED BY QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH FOUR NEWSMEN: PHAT VIET TUYEN (TU DO), HO VAN DONG (QUYET TIEN), LY QUI CHUNG (TIENG NOI DAN TOC - ALSO LH DEPUTY), AND PHAT LAC PHUOC (TIEN TUYEN). MAIN POINTS OF QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD WERE:

4) COMPOSITION OF GVN DELEGATION. THERE WILL BE ONLY ONE OFFICIAL DELEGATION, BUT THE EFFORT WILL HAVE MANY PARTS, INCLUDING INFORMATION AND POLITICAL WORK OUTSIDE THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPER. DIRECTION OF THIS OVERALL EFFORT WILL BE VESTED IN VICE PRESIDENT KY WHO WILL MOVE BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN SAIGON AND PARIS. KY WILL NOT BE THE HEAD OF THE OFFICIAL DELEGATION, HOWEVER.

5) ROLE OF THE US DELEGATION. "THERE WILL ARISE NUMEROUS MATTERS OF DIRECT CONCERN BETWEEN THE US AND NVN, THEN, IN THESE MATTERS THE US DELEGATION WILL BE THE PRINCIPAL SPOKESMAN. BUT IN ALL THOSE MATTERS OF GREATEST CONCERN TO SVN, I MAY SAY, THE MAJORITY--OR ALL THOSE QUESTIONS DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH VIETNAM. . . THE GVN DELEGATION WILL PLAY THE LEADING ROLE ON OUR SIDE."

6) NLF ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS. HANOI HAS AGREED TO DIRECT AND SERIOUS TALKS WITH SVN. IF HANOI TRIES TO PUT FORWARD THE NLF AS SPOKESMAN OR AS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY, THE ACTION WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE THE DIRECT AND SERIOUS TALKS BETWEEN HANOI AND SVN TO WHICH HANOI HAS AGREED. GVN AND US WILL HAVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO ANY SUCH TACTICS.

7) SHELLING CITIES AND VIOLATION OF DMZ. IF NVN CONTINUES TO SHELL CITIES, VIOLATE THE DMZ, AND EMPLOY TERROR AGAINST PEOPLE OF SVN, THIS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT REASON FOR GVN NOT WPT. NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE TALKS.

8) APPLICATION OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE FORMULA TO NLF. IF MEMBERS OF THE NLF LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND GIVE UP THEIR COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO EXERCISE FULL RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND RUN FOR OFFICE. AS FOR PH HUONG'S RECENT STATEMENT TO NY TIMES, IT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ANY CHANGE IN POLICY. GVN, INCLUDING HUONG, VIEWS NLF AS INTERNAL DISSIDENT FACTION; NLF IS POLITICAL BUT NOT LEGAL REALITY AND WILL BE HANDLED BY GVN AS AN INTERNAL MATTER.

9) CABINET CHANGES. GVN SEEKS ALWAYS TO INCREASE GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY. WHEN NECESSARY TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS OF GOVERNMENT, MINISTERS WILL BE CHANGED.

DTG: 272816Z NOV 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
NOV 27 PM 3:30

1968 NOV 27 20 26

REF 761
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 4442

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82766

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 27, 1968

Pres file

BOB ANDERSON HAS CALLED YOU AND SECRETARY RUSK FROM
KHARTOUM, SUDAN. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SUFFERED A STROKE,
AND HIS LEADING MINISTERS HAVE ASKED US TO SEND A NEURO
SPECIALIST. ANDERSON AND OUR CHARGE RECOMMEND WE AGREE.

WE STILL HAVE NOT RESUMED RELATIONS WITH THE SUDAN, WHICH WERE
BROKEN AFTER THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, BUT THERE ARE FEWER
OBSTACLES TO RESUMING IN THE SUDAN THAN ANYWHERE ELSE.
THIS WOULD BE A VERY HELPFUL GESTURE.

I AM ASSUMING THIS IS THE SORT OF THING YOU WOULD LIKE TO DO
AND HAVE ALREADY STARTED THE WHEELS TURNING. UNLESS I HEAR
OTHERWISE FROM YOU, I SHALL PUSH AHEAD.

DIG 271956Z NOV 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 NOV 27 20 30

20
1968 NOV 27 PM 3:40
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

TEA 762
DD WTE 10
TE WTE 4441

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
SITE CAP 82767

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 27, 1968

SUBJECT: TWO CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES TO AFRICA

Free file

1. PRESIDENT TUBMAN OF LIBERIA WILL BE 73 ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 29. YOU HAVE SENT GREETINGS IN THE PAST, AND STATE RECOMMENDS THE FOLLOWING:

*11/27/68
Jim Jones
telephoned
Bromley Smith*

"I SEND YOU EVERY GOOD WISH ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR BIRTHDAY. I AM HAPPY TO JOIN WITH THE PEOPLE OF LIBERIA IN CELEBRATING THIS JOYOUS DAY. AS I LEAVE OFFICE, I WISH TO EXPRESS AGAIN MY PLEASURE IN OUR WARM ASSOCIATION OVER THESE YEARS. WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,"

I RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

2. STATE RECOMMENDS THE FOLLOWING NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE TO BE SENT FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 29, TO PRESIDENT BOKASSA OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC:

"I SEND TO YOU AND TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN PEOPLE SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS AND ASSURANCES OF WARM FRIENDSHIP ON YOUR NATIONAL DAY. WE WISH YOU WELL AS WE WORK TOGETHER TOWARD THE GOALS WE SHARE: PEACEFUL COOPERATION AMONG ALL NATIONS AND JUSTICE FOR ALL MEN.

"WE HOPE THAT THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP, WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT THAT WILL BUTTRUSS THE INDEPENDENCE YOU CELEBRATE TODAY. THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE REPUBLIC IS A SIGNIFICANT MILESTONE ON YOUR WAY."

STATE HAS MADE THIS AN ESPECIALLY WARM MESSAGE SINCE WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DO AS MUCH AS WE WOULD WISH ON THE AID FRONT. I RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date *2-20-91*

DTG: 271955Z NOV 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: QUICC COPY

~~SECRET~~

21

1968 NOV 27 17 17

SEA753
OO WTE13
DE WTE 4436

FROM WALT ROETOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82763

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10504

By sp/jr, NARA, Date 1-9-98

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN

NOVEMBER 27, 1968

HERSWITH KY'S PLANS FOR PARIS DELEGATION.

SAIGON 43636

1. I (BUNKER) SAW VICE PRESIDENT KY THIS AFTERNOON FOR HALF AN HOUR. ACCOMPANIED BY BERGER. AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM WAS ALSO PRESENT.
2. I EXPRESSED OUR APPRECIATION FOR THE ROLE WHICH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND AMBASSADOR DIEM HAD PLAYED IN HELPING TO WORK OUT OUR PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE STATEMENT THIS MORNING. KY WAS ALL SMILES AND IN AN EXPANSIVE MOOD.
3. I REFERRED TO MY CONVERSATION WITH THIEU YESTERDAY AFTERNOON IN WHICH HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT I TALK TO KY ABOUT THE PLANS FOR SENDING THE DELEGATION TO PARIS.
4. KY SAID THAT HE WOULD ARRIVE IN PARIS ON SATURDAY, DECEMBER 7, OR MONDAY, DECEMBER 9. THE DELEGATION WOULD CONSIST OF FIVE OR SIX MEMBERS, THREE OR FOUR FROM THE SOUTH, ONE FROM THE CENTER, AND ONE FROM THE NORTH. THE MEMBERS HAVE NOT YET BEEN CHOSEN, BUT HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE THE MEMBERSHIP IN A FEW DAYS. THE DELEGATION WOULD BE COMPOSED OF PEOPLE FROM DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COMMUNITY AND NOT DOMINATED BY ANY PARTICULAR GROUP. THE PRESENT THINKING WAS THAT AMBASSADOR LAM WOULD HEAD THE DELEGATION UNLESS THEY COULD GET SOMEONE BETTER.
5. I OBSERVED THAT AMBASSADOR LAM WAS A VERY FINE MAN, BUT WAS HE TOUGH ENOUGH TO HANDLE THE HANOI DELEGATION. KY SAID HE WAS NOT, AND THIS WAS THE PROBLEM. A POSSIBLE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION WHO IS QUITE GOOD, AND STRONG, WAS DR. NGUYEN LUU VIEN, WHO IS A SOUTHERNER, HAD BEEN A DOCTOR IN THE VC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, BUT HE HAD A SPEECH DEFECT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT AWKWARD FOR HIM TO HEAD THE DELEGATION. HOWEVER, HE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE A MEMBER.

Presfile
88 NOV 27 PM 12:21
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

6. KY SAID THE SUGGESTION HAD BEEN MADE THAT GENERAL "BIG" MINH BE ATTACHED TO THE DELEGATION, BUT HE SAID HE HAD HIS DOUBTS ABOUT MINH. HE THEN SAID THAT VUONG VAN BAC WAS A VERY GOOD MAN AND WOULD BE EITHER ON THE DELEGATION OR ON KY'S STAFF. THIEU HAD SUGGESTED THAT GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG ACCOMPANY KY AS MILITARY ADVISOR AND KY HAD BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE THANG ALL MORNING TO JOIN HIS STAFF, SO FAR WITHOUT SUCCESS.

7. I ASKED KY IF ANY MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD GO ON THE DELEGATION OR SERVE AS ADVISORS ON KY'S STAFF. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD USE SOME ON A ROTATING BASIS, DRAWING FROM DIFFERENT GROUPS IN BOTH HOUSES.

8. AFTER I HAD MADE SOME COMMENTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A STRONG PRESS OR PROPAGANDA SECTION, KY SAID THAT DANG DUC HOI AND NGUYEN NGOC LINH MIGHT BOTH GO TO PARIS. POSSIBLY THIS WEEK, AND ONE OR THE OTHER WOULD HEAD THE PRESS TEAM.

9. KY SAID THAT HE HAD HOPED TO GET AWAY FROM HERE SOONER THAN DECEMBER 7, BUT THAT HE NEEDED THESE NEXT FEW DAYS TO ORGANIZE AND BRIEF THE DELEGATION AND PULL HIS OWN STAFF TOGETHER. HE ALSO NEEDED A FEW DAYS TO WORK OUT SOME OF THE POSITIONS ON THE KEY QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT ARISE IN THE EARLY STAGES. HE PLANS AT THE OUTSET TO SPEND TWO OR THREE WEEKS IN PARIS AND WILL TAKE WITH HIM HIS "SECRET WEAPON," I.E. THE ATTRACTIVE MRS. KY. HIS FURTHER PLANS ARE TO RETURN HERE FOR CONSULTATION WITH THIEU AFTER INITIAL STAY IN PARIS, AND HE WILL BE MOVING BACK AND FORTH AS REQUIRED.

10. HE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO MEET WITH ME BEFORE LEAVING IN ORDER TO GO OVER SOME OF THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS.

11. I SAID THAT HARRIMAN AND VANCE PLANNED TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH HANOI ON THE PROCEDURES FOR THE FIRST MEETING, WHICH WOULD THEN WORK OUT THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED. I SAID THAT THIEU HAD ACCEPTED THIS AND KY NODDED AGREEMENT.

12. AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM WILL STAY ON FOR A FEW DAYS TO HELP KY ON THE SELECTION OF THE DELEGATION AND KY'S OWN STAFF AND TO HELP DEVELOP POSITIONS TO BE TAKEN.

DIG 271501Z NOV 1968

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

22

AND ONE MORE FOR YIU YOU

1968 NOV 25 23 41

NOV 26 PM 8:47
WHITE HOUSE
SITING ROOM

EEA748
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4426

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82754

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 26, 1968

STATE HAS FORWARDED THE ATTACHED INDEPENDENCE DAY MESSAGE TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF BARBADOS SIR WINSTON SCOTT. IT SHOULD BE DISPATCHED ON NOVEMBER 29. I RECOMMEND YOUR APPROVAL.

Pres file

QUOTE

ON THE OCCASION OF THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF INDEPENDENCE I WISH TO EXPRESS THE BEST WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MY OWN PERSONAL GREETINGS TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF BARBADOS. IT IS OUR EARNEST DESIRE THAT THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS, SO NOTABLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. BARROW DURING THEIR OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER, WILL CONTINUE IN OUR MUTUAL QUEST FOR WORLD PEACE AND FREEDOM.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

END QUOTE

APPROVED-----
CALL ME -----

DTG: 262313Z NOV 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By y, NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 26, 1968

FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: WALT ROSTOW
SUBJECT: Reply to Senator Kennedy on Nigeria

~~Handwritten~~
2. For file

Secretary Rusk has signed the letter below to Senator Kennedy, but before sending it he wishes to be sure it is consistent with your views since it replies to the Senator's letter to you.

The Senator made the following points: Deaths from starvation in Nigeria/Biafra may climb to 25,000 a day by the end of the year, so he recommends (a) a major diplomatic effort to stop arms shipments and achieve a ceasefire; (b) increased USG contributions to the relief agencies; and (c) a special representative to "galvanize this Nation's effort to do what must be done in Nigeria-Biafra."

Even before the Senator's letter, we had pressed hard from here for a thorough review of the Nigerian situation. Nick Katzenbach has taken that review firmly in hand, and we will be reporting further to you as it bears fruit. Nick has talked informally to Kennedy and will supplement the Secretary's letter--which is written to be released--with a personal briefing on our policy review as far as it has gone.

We all continue to recognize the limits imposed by civil war in Nigeria, but we do not believe your Administration can afford to leave office without being able to say in good conscience that it did everything

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
BY NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY AW/rg ON 1-26-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

it possibly could to avert starvation. That is the purpose of the review.

This letter is just a further effort to keep the public record straight.

I recommend you agree that the Secretary should send it.

The text of the letter follows:

[Communications Center: Please type in attached text.]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23a

Dear Senator Kennedy:

The President has asked me to reply to your thoughtful letter of November 15. As you know, he shares your own deep concern for the plight of the thousands of victims of the Nigerian civil war. He shares, as well, your frustration at our inability to bring to an end this tragic war and the starvation that has accompanied it.

The U.S. Government and private voluntary agencies have already contributed over \$21 million in money, food and equipment to aid the starving. We now supply roughly 2/3 of the total international relief effort. We are prepared to do much more.

But, as the President noted recently, the brutal fact is that the only way to end the starvation in Nigeria is to end the civil war. We have worked hard to this end. We have cooperated fully with the OAU and with Emperor Haile Selassie in their numerous attempts to obtain a ceasefire and a permanent settlement of the conflict. The OAU and the Emperor are continuing their efforts; we will continue to support them in every way we can.

The terrible loss of life in Nigeria is an intolerable tragedy which no civilized nation can condone or ignore. The death of thousands of Nigerians is not, and can never be, a purely internal or African concern.

The Honorable
Edward M. Kennedy,
The United States Senate.

We have supported, and will continue to support, any moves that offer the slightest hope of bringing the parties to the conflict to the conference table. But all the evidence--including the results of our own numerous diplomatic probes--indicates that if the FWB and Biafra are ever to be convinced that they must negotiate, it is other Africans who will convince them.

It can be argued that the continued flow of arms to both sides serves to prolong the fighting. Whether or not one accepts this proposition, I personally see no real hope that we could get or enforce a cessation in the supply of arms. We are not an arms supplier, and our ability to control the supply of weapons by others--including the Soviet Union and clandestine sources--is extremely limited.

I do not believe that there has been any lack of high-level U.S. Government attention to the plight of Nigeria or to the relief effort for the victims of the civil war. I know that Under Secretary Katzenbach and I have spent many hours trying to find a solution to these terribly complicated problems. We have made some progress (food is now reaching over 2 million on both sides of the lines), and there is hope for more progress. Let me assure you that there is no lack of effort and will on our part, and that we shall continue the search for better ways to resolve this tragic situation.

But the best of good will and intentions, the most imaginative diplomatic initiatives, cannot totally succeed until the two sides in Nigeria are prepared to put the lives of their countrymen above the politics of civil war.

Nick Katzenbach or I would be happy to meet with you at your convenience to discuss any further questions or suggestions you may have.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

24

ACTION

sent back via wire

Tuesday - November 26, 1968

Profile

Mr. President:

State has forwarded the attached Independence Day message to the Governor General of Barbados. It should be dispatched on November 29. I recommend your approval.

W. W. Restow

Attachment

Suggested Presidential message to Sir Winston Scott, the Governor General of Barbados.

- Approve
- Disapprove
- Call me

SWLewis:mm

24a

November 26, 1968

Suggested Message from the President to Sir Winston Scott, G. C. M. G.,
Governor General of Barbados
(To be sent November 29)

On the occasion of the second anniversary of independence I wish to express the best wishes of the people of the United States and my own personal greetings to you and the people of Barbados. It is our earnest desire that the friendly relations between our two nations, so notably demonstrated by the visit of Prime Minister and Mrs. Barrow during their official visit to Washington in September, will continue in our mutual quest for world peace and freedom.

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Sir Winston Scott, G. C. M. G.
Governor General of Barbados
Bridgetown.

EEA 749
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 4425

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(25)

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82753

1968 NOV 27 00 40

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
68 NOV 26 PM 7:53

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 26, 1968

SUBJECT: REPLY TO SENATOR KENNEDY ON NIGERIA

SECRETARY RUSK HAS SIGNED THE LETTER BELOW TO SENATOR KENNEDY, BUT BEFORE SENDING IT HE WISHES TO BE SURE IT IS CONSISTENT WITH YOUR VIEWS SINCE IT REPLIES TO THE SENATOR'S LETTER TO YOU.

THE SENATOR MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: DEATHS FROM STARVATION IN NIGERIA/BIAFRA MAY CLIMB TO 25,000 A DAY BY THE END OF THE YEAR, SO HE RECOMMENDS (A) A MAJOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO STOP ARMS SHIPMENTS AND ACHIEVE A CEASEFIRE; (B) INCREASED USG CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RELIEF AGENCIES; AND (C) A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO "GALVANIZE THIS NATION'S EFFORT TO DO WHAT MUST BE DONE IN NIGERIA-BIAFRA."

EVEN BEFORE THE SENATOR'S LETTER, WE HAD PRESSED HARD FROM HERE FOR A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE NIGERIAN SITUATION. NICK KATZENBACH HAS TAKEN THAT REVIEW FIRMLY IN HAND, AND WE WILL BE REPORTING FURTHER TO YOU AS IT BEARS FRUIT. NICK HAS TALKED INFORMALLY TO KENNEDY AND WILL SUPPLEMENT THE SECRETARY'S LETTER--WHICH IS WRITTEN TO BE RELEASED--WITH A PERSONAL BRIEFING ON OUR POLICY REVIEW AS FAR AS IT HAS GONE.

WE ALL CONTINUE TO RECOGNIZE THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY CIVIL WAR IN NIGERIA, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE YOUR ADMINISTRATION CAN AFFORD TO LEAVE OFFICE WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO SAY IN GOOD CONSCIENCE THAT IT DID EVERYTHING IT POSSIBLY COULD TO AVERT STARVATION. THAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW. THIS LETTER IS JUST A FURTHER EFFORT TO KEEP THE PUBLIC RECORD STRAIGHT. I RECOMMEND YOU AGREE THAT THE SECRETARY SHOULD SEND IT.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING NOT NAT'L SECURITY INFORMATION, E. O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(a).
BY ON 1-28-98

THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FOLLOWS:

DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY:

THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO REPLY TO YOUR THOUGHTFUL LETTER OF NOVEMBER 15. AS YOU KNOW, HE SHARES YOUR OWN DEEP CONCERN FOR THE PLIGHT OF THE THOUSANDS OF VICTIMS OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. HE SHARES, AS WELL, YOUR FRUSTRATION AT OUR INABILITY TO BRING TO AN END THIS TRAGIC WAR AND THE STARVATION THAT HAS ACCOMPANIED IT.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES HAVE ALREADY CONTRIBUTED OVER \$21 MILLION IN MONEY, FOOD AND EQUIPMENT TO AID THE STARVING. WE NOW SUPPLY ROUGHLY 2/3 OF THE TOTAL INTERNATIONAL RELIEF EFFORT. WE ARE PREPARED TO DO MUCH MORE.

BUT, AS THE PRESIDENT NOTED RECENTLY, THE BRUTAL FACT IS THAT THE ONLY WAY TO END THE STARVATION IN NIGERIA IS TO END THE CIVIL WAR. WE HAVE WORKED HARD TO THIS END. WE HAVE COOPERATED FULLY WITH THE OAU AND WITH EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE IN THEIR NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A CEASEFIRE AND A PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. THE OAU AND THE EMPEROR ARE CONTINUING THEIR EFFORTS; WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THEM IN EVERY WAY WE CAN.

THE TERRIBLE LOSS OF LIFE IN NIGERIA IS AN INTOLERABLE TRAGEDY WHICH NO CIVILIZED NATION CAN CONDONE OR IGNORE. THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF NIGERIANS IS NOT, AND CAN NEVER BE, PURELY INTERNAL OR AFRICAN CONCERN. WE HAVE SUPPORTED, AND WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT, ANY MOVES THAT OFFER THE SLIGHTEST HOPE OF BRINGING THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. BUT ALL THE EVIDENCE--INCLUDING THE RESULTS OF OUR OWN NUMEROUS DIPLOMATIC PROBES--INDICATES THAT IF THE FMG AND BIAFRA ARE EVER TO BE CONVINCED THAT THEY MUST NEGOTIATE, IT IS OTHER AFRICANS WHO WILL CONVINCED THEM.

IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE CONTINUED FLOW OF ARMS TO BOTH SIDES SERVES TO PROLONG THE FIGHTING. WHETHER OR NOT ONE ACCEPTS THIS PROPOSITION, I PERSONALLY SEE NO REAL HOPE THAT WE COULD GET OR ENFORCE A CESSATION IN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS. WE ARE NOT AN ARMS SUPPLIER, AND OUR ABILITY TO CONTROL THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS BY OTHERS--INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION AND CLANDESTINE SOURCES--IS EXTREMELY LIMITED.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN ANY LACK OF HIGH-LEVEL U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTENTION TO THE PLIGHT OF NIGERIA OR TO THE RELIEF EFFORT FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE CIVIL WAR. I KNOW THAT UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACH AND I HAVE SPENT MANY HOURS TRYING TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THESE TERRIBLY COMPLICATED PROBLEMS. WE HAVE MADE SOME PROGRESS (FOOD IS NOW REACHING OVER 2 MILLION ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINES), AND THERE IS HOPE FOR MORE PROGRESS. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT THERE IS NO LACK OF EFFORT AND WILL ON OUR PART, AND THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE THE SEARCH FOR BETTER WAYS TO RESOLVE THIS TRAGIC SITUATION.

BUT THE BEST OF GOOD WILL AND INTENTIONS, THE MOST IMAGINATIVE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, CANNOT TOTALLY SUCCEED UNTIL THE TWO SIDES IN NIGERIA ARE PREPARED TO PUT THE LIVES OF THEIR COUNTRYMEN ABOVE THE POLITICS OF CIVIL WAR.

NICK KATZENBACH OR I WOULD BE HAPPY TO MEET WITH YOU AT YOUR CONVENIENCE TO DISCUSS ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS OR SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

DEAN RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG 262389Z NOV 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 NOV 27 00 51

2759
TO WIT 12
WIT 4427

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
SITE CAP82755

Profile

68 NOV 26 PM 8:06

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 26, 1968

SUBJECT: CHAMIZAL TRIP

I HAVE YOUR ASSENT TO MAKE THIS TRIP ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 13. WE ARE PROCEEDING MORE DETAILED PLANNING ALONG LINES OF PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE (ATTACHED) WHICH YOU SAW. I NEED YOUR APPROVAL NOW FOR THE FOLLOWING:

- 1. AUTHORIZATION TO CONFIRM TO DIAZ ORDAZ DATE OF DECEMBER 13 (HE IS VERY ANXIOUS TO GET DATE FIXED).

APPROVE ----
DISAPPROVE ----

- 2. APPROVAL TO MAKE BRIEF PARALLEL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT EARLY NEXT WEEK (DIAZ ORDAZ NEEDS LEAD TIME TO GET PERMISSION FROM MEXICAN CONGRESS TO LEAVE COUNTRY).

APPROVE ----
DISAPPROVE ----

- 3. DECISION ON SIZE AND CHARACTER OF LUNCHEON.

LARGE LUNCHEON FOR OFFICIALS AND GUESTS (MAXIMUM 200)

SMALL FAMILY LUNCH FOR DIAZ ORDAZES AND FEW OTHERS (MAXIMUM 25-35)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By af, NARA, Date 2-20-98

PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

TRIP TO CHAMIZAL

DECEMBER 13, 1968

- 8:30 AM EST - DEPART ANDREWS AFB, WASHINGTON
- 11:30 AM CST - ARRIVE BIGGS FIELD, EL PASO
(MILITARY AIRPORT). BRIEF
ARRIVAL CEREMONY.
- 11:15 AM - BOARD HELICOPTER
- 11:30 AM - ARRIVE NEW PASO DEL NORTE BRIDGE
- 11:40 AM - MEET PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ ON BRIDGE
- 11:45-12:30 PM - CEREMONY AT BRIDGE CENTER WITH
SPEECHES AND TRANSLATION.
- PRESIDENTS DETONATE EXPLOSIVE,
OPENING NEW CHANNEL - 1/4 MILE FROM
BRIDGE
- (NOTE: LARGE NUMBERS OF MEXICAN
AND AMERICANS CITIZENS CAN WITNESS
EASILY FROM ENDS OF BRIDGE)
- 12:30-12:45 PM - ESCORT PRESIDENT AND MRS. DIAZ
ORDAZ BY CAR TO LUNCHEON SITE IN EL
PASO (PASO DEL NORTE HOTEL).
- 1:00-2:30 PM - LUNCHEON.
- 1:30-2:45 PM - ESCORT PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ EITHER
BACK TO BRIDGE OR HE BOARDS HELICOPTER
DIRECT TO CIUDAD JUAREZ TO AIRPORT
(TO BE DECIDED AFTER CONSULTATION WITH
MEXICANS).
- 2:45-3:00 PM - GOODBYES.
- 3:30 PM CST - DEPART EL PASO.
- 3:30 PM EST - ARRIVE ANDREWS AFB, WASHINGTON

DTG 262335Z NOVEMBER 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Snaf

27

Tuesday, Nov. 26, 1968
1:05 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

SANTIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ NLJ 91-505
By mp/cb, NARA, Date 1-16-98

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is a fascinating and credible report
of North Vietnamese attitudes, via our Military
Atache in Paris, General Walters.

1.3(a)(4)



You will find it most interesting.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Paris 25/1625Z Nov 68 fm Walters)

~~SECRET~~

27a

SANTIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-509

By mp/eb, NARA, Date 1-16-98

(Copy of Paris 25/1625Z Nov 68) [redacted]

1. [redacted] who has previously given information on North Vietnamese, came to see me today. He saw Le Duc Tho, chief North Vietnamese negotiator, last night, and subsequently, too [redacted] to dinner at his house. [redacted]

2. [redacted] Le Duc Tho told [redacted] that he stopped in Peking on his way back to Hanoi and in Moscow on his way back to Paris. [redacted]

[redacted] Le Duc Tho said that China was in greatly disturbed state economically. They had fallen back behind their 1963 level. In Moscow he had discussed reconversion of Soviet aid to economic assistance after the end of hostilities, and it was already apparent to him that this would involve considerable difficulties. Chinese, who had had many floods, had failed to supply North Vietnam with chemical fertilizers. Several storms had also damaged North Vietnamese rice crop. Chinese had furnished only around 200,000 tons of rice, and there would be short fall of around 400,000 tons. Le Duc Tho indicated that they were having some difficulty with rightist deviationism in the Liberation Front, particularly with Huynh Tan Phat. Despite these problems, no one should think that North Vietnam would raise its arm in surrender, but he had come back to Paris to make peace. Curiously, Le Duc Tho said that they had received better support from Liu Shao Chi than they had before he lost influence.

3. Subsequently, [redacted] took [redacted] to his own home for dinner and in the course of the evening the following information was elicited.

A. North Vietnam was seriously hurting early this year as a result of effective U. S. action. The decision to stage the Tet offensive was taken only after extensive debate in the Central Committee, with Giap favoring action. Original intent had been to seize Hue and set up Front government. The Viet Cong had been more effective in Saigon and elsewhere than North Vietnam had anticipated, but had sustained crippling losses and as a consequence had had to be bolstered by North Vietnam. The statement was, "We have gone further than we ever intended," meaning that they had sustained almost intolerable losses.

B. The North Vietnamese regarded General Abrams as an extremely able commander who constantly kept them off balance and inflicted heavy losses on them. These losses were not heavier, according to [redacted] because U. S. infantry relies too much on helicopters and not on movement by foot. The North Vietnamese have developed a system of communications by telephone, radio, or 'tran' (baskets in trees) and thus were able to take evasive action

many times before helicopters actually arrived. [redacted] stated that U. S. Special Troops were very, very good and had absolute mastery of weapons, but generally U. S. troops in jungle operations did not observe silence and left behind all sorts of objects which indicated their movements.

4. I had asked [redacted] to inquire of any North Vietnamese whether they believed excessive claims of victories by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong commanders in the South. [redacted] said that as a result of discussions with Le Duc Tho and [redacted] felt sure the North Vietnamese no longer credit these claims. Both were very impressed by presentations by U. S. at talks giving U. S., North Vietnamese, and Viet Cong losses, and this had had considerable impact on the final decision to negotiate.

5. [redacted] stated that fortunately Viet Cong and North Vietnam had fall-back areas in which they could recuperate in Cambodia north of Bu Dop and around Camp Le Rolland. They also had a large rest and supply center at the southern end of Laos in the area of Khone Falls where they were installed. On many islands in the Mekong, rapids and high humidity made use of infrared against these installations somewhat ineffective. They moved quite freely across Northern Cambodia in Siem Pang area towards Lieiku and Kotum area. [redacted] also stated that relations between Hanoi and China were hampered by Chinese insistence in 1956 that North Vietnam create autonomous Montagnard area for Thai, Tho and Nhung peoples, who were related to similar tribes in South China. Much of North Vietnamese movement around Dien Bien Phu was in reality directed at keeping Montagnards under Hanoi's control.

6. [redacted] stated that North Vietnam had powerful observation from Ban Hei area west of Danang on harbor and airfield complex. Use of rockets had replaced mortars because U. S. counter-mortar fire made use of mortars prohibitive. [redacted] concluded by saying that North Vietnam had put up a most gallant fight against overwhelming odds and needed peace, but would never surrender.

###

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Tuesday, November 26, 1968
12:55 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker's latest talk with Thieu.

As you will see (para. 3), Thieu is still a little foggy about getting into substantive talks until towards the end of next week.

This cable underlines the urgency of our working out our own negotiating strategy and talking it over with the GVN -- an item on today's lunch agenda.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 43517

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-508
By W-8, NARA, Date 1-11-93

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

280
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ ACTION COPY #1

OO RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 43517 3311210
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZDG
O 261135Z NOV 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5067
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3027
STATE GRNC
BT

7487Q
1968 NOV 26 AM 8:58

~~S E C R E T~~ SAIGON 43517

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 91-506

NOJIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

By m/j/g NARA, Date 1-8-78

FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. I CALLED ON PRESIDENT THIEU THIS AFTERNOON. WE NOTED THAT AT THAT TIME, ABOUT 5 PM HERE, CONCURRENCES FOR OUR STATE-
MENIS HAD ARRIVED FROM ALL TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES EXCEPT
THE ROX (WHICH ARRIVED AFTER I RETURNED TO THE EMBASSY).
THIEU WAS RELAXED AND FULLY EXPECTED PRESIDENT PARK'S CON-
CURRENCE IN TIME FOR ANNOUNCEMENT AS CONTEMPLATED MORNING
NOVEMBER 27. I ASKED IF HE INTENDED TO ADDRESS THE NATION IN
CONNECTION WITH THESE STATEMENTS. HE SAID HE WOULD PROBABLY
MAKE A TV AND RADIO BROADCAST TOMORROW EVENING. HE REMARKED
THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE NOW RPT-NOW PSYCHOLOGICALLY
PREPARED FOR THE TALKS. THIS HAD BEEN VERY IMPORTANT. OF
COURSE THERE WOULD BE SOME WHO WOULD CRITICIZE, BUT THEY WOULD
BE FEW.

2. I INQUIRED ABOUT COMPOSITION OF THE GVN DELEGATION. THIEU
SAID HE HAD ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO WORK ON THIS AND
EXPECTED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH HIM TOMORROW. HE ADDED
THAT I MIGHT TALKS WITH HIM, TOO. I SAID I RESUMED IT WOULD
BE BETTER NOT TO DO SO UNTIL THIEU HIMSELF HAD TALKED WITH KY,
BUT HE SAID I MIGHT TALK WITH KY BEFORE. (I AM ASKING FOR
APPOINTMENT WITH KY TOMORROW MORNING). THIEU REMARKES
THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO FIND THYTLSJ AFQMHW DMHXGSZCILLXHWTF50W PFGFO
F SSADOR PHAM DANG LAM, WHO HAD HEADED THE OBSERVER
DELEGATION, MIGHT ALSO HEAD THE FULL DELEGATION. KY WOULD
PROBABLY HAVE OVERALL SUPERVISION, SHITLING BETWEEN SAIGON AND
PARIS.

3. WE NEXT DISCUSSED TIMING. THIEU SAID THE PROBLEM IS NOT
SO MUCH GETTING A DELEGATION TO PARIS AS GETTING PREPARED TO
DEFEND SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS. HE IS VERY ANXIOUS TO
GET THE MEETINGS GOING. THIEU SAID HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET
THE DELEGATION OFF SOON, BUT HE DID NOT SEE HOW THEY COULD GO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 43517, NOVEMBER 26 (NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS)

~~INTO SERIOUS TALKS THIS WEEK OR EVEN EARLY NEXT WEEK. I SAID WE HOPED IT WOULD BE BEFORE THEN, AND IN ANY CASE THE FIRST MEETING WOULD BE PROCEDURAL AND NEED NOT HAVE FULL DELEGATION IN ATTENDANCE. I ALSO SAID IN ANY CASE WE COULD GO AHEAD WITH THE DRV BILATERALLY TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE FIRST MEETING ON THE WIDER BASIS, WHICH ITSELF WOULD ALSO DEAL WITH PROCEDURE. THIEU AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL.~~

4. ~~THIEU WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO RESUME OUR CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS ON BROAD STRATEGY AND KEY ISSUES. I AGREED AND SAID WHILE WE EXPECTED TO BE IN DAILY CONSULTATION IN PARIS, WE WOULD NEED FREQUENT MEETINGS HERE, TOO. THIEU ASKED HOW OFTEN I THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE MEETINGS IN PARIS. I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME THEY DID NOT HAVE TO BE IN WEEKLY INTERVALS BUT COULD BE SOMEWHAT MORE FREQUENT. THIEU SPECULATED THAT THE COMMUNISTS PROBABLY WOULD WANT LONGER INTERVALS SINCE THEIR DELEGATION WOULD BE BOUND BY STRICT INSTRUCTIONS; BUT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO WORK ON A BASIS WHERE THE DAY AFTER A MEETING ONE WOULD STUDY THE RECORD, THE NEXT DAY OUTLINE OUR RESPONSE, THEN SPEND A DAY IN PREPARING THE PRESENTATION, AND MEET ON THE FOURTH DAY IF THE COMMUNISTS WERE THEN READY.~~

5. ~~I TOOK THE OCCASION TO BRING THIEU ALSO UP-TO-DATE ON THE LATEST VANCE-LAU DISCUSSION OF NOVEMBER 24.~~

BUNKER

BT
AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET-

Profile
29

Luncheon with the President
Tuesday, November 26, 1968, 1:00 p. m.

AGENDA

1. **Viet-Nam** (Sects. Rusk and Clifford)
 - Announcement arrangements.
 - Negotiating strategy in Paris.(Sect. Rusk will present his initial views)

2. **Other**

W. W. Rostow

~~**SECRET**~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By NY, NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 25, 1968 -- 11:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith proposed talking points for Nixon.

"Dick: I received your message via Bob Murphy about the special session of the Congress for the Non-Proliferation treaty. I understand and appreciate your judgment that this is an issue on which I must make my own assessment as to what is right for the country and what is possible for the Congress.

"In general, I have concluded that in these nuclear matters I must take clear responsibility, but to do so in ways which keep flexibility for you after January 20. I understand that it is difficult for you to make responsible judgments at this time. You deserve time to assemble the advisers you want and to turn around and form your own assessments as to where you wish to go in the months and years ahead.

"Therefore, I have decided two things:

"-- First, I shall proceed to open the missile talks with the Soviet Union;

"-- Second, I shall leave the NPT to the opening days of the next session of Congress in January, at the earliest. (Both Dirksen and Mansfield think this would be wiser than calling a special session.)

"If the missile talks go well, I think we are likely both to agree that it would be wise to press forward with the NPT early in January and get it out of the way.

"If the missile talks do not go well, we will be able easily to hold ~~them~~ ^{it} over until after January 20.

"As for the missile talks, Dean Rusk will be talking with Bob Murphy this morning. I shall ask them both to go to New York to explain to you in detail why I am now convinced that I must put the missile matter into play in direct discussions with Kesygin.

"Briefly, the situation is this.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-05

~~SECRET~~ By 60, NARA Date 11-27-96

~~SECRET~~

-2-

"First, as you know, we have been working towards these discussions of strategic missiles since the London talks which Stassen began in 1958 on behalf of President Eisenhower. I myself went to work on this in January 1969 in my first communication with Khrushchev. At Glassboro I spent the better part of two days trying to get a date set to open these talks. We were just about to open them when the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia in August. [If that were the only factor, clearly the talks could wait some months. -But there are other elements at work here.]

"Second, the Soviets indicated to us about two weeks ago, on November 14, that they felt it important to move promptly because they felt we were losing ground around the world on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I share that judgment. I think the clock is ticking against you as well as against me on this non-proliferation issue. And I have concluded that we must move on the missile talks, if we can, both to make passage in the Senate easier and to create an environment in the world which will make it easier for Japan, Germany, Israel, and India to put the NPT through their parliaments.

"Third, twice in the last two weeks Dobrynin has told us that the Soviets are willing to negotiate with us in advance what we would agree to say as a result of the first exchange of positions on the missile matter. You should know that we have a position wholly agreed from Bill Foster to Bus Wheeler, from the Arms Control people to the JCS. You should also know that we would not move off that position before January 20. Therefore, any further negotiations of the missile matter would be in your hands. I am in a position, therefore, to go into this with a very limited objective. My objective would be:

- "-- To put into negotiation our agreed position;
- "-- To receive their initial position;
- "-- To enunciate certain general propositions which are consistent with our position;
- "-- To leave subsequent negotiations to the Nixon administration;
- "-- In the meanwhile, to use the occasion to press Moscow to push forward Hanoi in the Paris talks, and to press Nasser on one critical point in the Middle East; namely, the need for the Egyptians to sign on to a document which would bend belligerence and open the way to peace. This is the sticking point with the Israelis, and properly so.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

"Fourth, you should know that in discussions with Dobrynin, we have made it very clear that the missile talks could not take place if there were any trouble in Berlin and any further moves in Eastern Europe. So far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, they have withdrawn all their forces except 3 divisions and a headquarters; that is, they have 30 to 40,000 men instead of a quarter of a million. Moreover, these troops are no longer near the Bavarian border, they are near Prague. If we start these talks, I believe we will have a basis for Soviet good behavior in Europe which will stretch into the first months of your administration. Remembering the confusion you observed as Vice President in early 1953 when Stalin died, and I observed in early 1961 when we had the Bay of Pigs and a Berlin ultimatum, I would like you to have the chance of as quiet a period as possible as you get your administration on the road.

"Now, Dick, these are the four reasons which have determined my judgment that I should proceed. All that I ask of you is to reserve judgment until you see the results of these talks with the Russians. If, after you have examined with Bob Murphy and Dean Rusk exactly what our position papers are, you would like to join me, that would be fine. You would have the chance for talks by yourself with Kossygin, to take the Russian temperature and lay the basis for your own relations with them. I think it would be wise at the minimum if Bob Murphy came along as an observer. In this matter, you could play it as you think best for the future. If it goes well, you can back it up and live with it. If it goes poorly, you would be able to retain your total freedom of action because, as I say, we would only be putting into play an existing agreed position wholly safe so far as U. S. interests are concerned.

"This is what I have decided; but I want Bob Murphy and Dean Rusk to be available to you to give you in depth all the considerations which have led me to this conclusion. You can then let me know exactly how you wish to position yourself in terms of your own interests and the future."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 25, 1968 - 6:35 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

When Secretary Rusk saw King Baudouin of Belgium in Brussels earlier this month, he renewed the invitation you extended to the King in July 1966 to observe a manned space launching at Cape Kennedy. The Secretary suggested the Apollo VIII shot scheduled for December 21.

The King regretfully declined because he felt he could not leave Brussels during the Christmas season. He asked that his thanks and appreciation for the invitation be conveyed to you.

W. W. Rostow

WWR
gw

JKN:mm

33

INFORMATION

SECRET

Monday, November 25, 1968
6:30 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You will be interested to read this first cable indicating French reactions and theorizing about your message to de Gaulle.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 24450

SECRET

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By , NARA, Date 2-20-98

RECEIVED
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1968 NOV 25 21 55

~~SECRET~~ HCE360

PAGE 01 PARIS 24450 252132Z

83
ACTION EUR 20

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,
L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, AID 28, E 15, STR 08,
COM 08, FRB 02, TRSY 11, XMB 06, CEA 02, RSR 01, /159 W

086282

O 252105Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8484 IMMEDIATE

Roston

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 24450

1. AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE TODAY FROM UNSOLICITED SOURCES, FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND MOST FRENCHMEN WHO HAVE HAD TIME TO THINK ABOUT IT ARE PLEASED WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSONS MESSAGE TO DE GAULLE BECAUSE THEY THINK IT WILL HELP TO REESTABLISH CONFIDENCE IN THE FRANC BY SHOWING KEY INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND BECAUSE THEY INTERPRET IT AS A COMBINATION OF DESIRE TO HELP FRANCE AND OF ENLIGHTENED SELF INTEREST ON THE PART OF US. DE GAULL'S CABINET DIRECTOR TOLD US YESTERDAY THAT DE GAULLE DELIGHTED WITH MESSAGE AND GREATLY APPRECIATED PRESIDENT JOHNSONS DESIRE TO HELP FRANCE IN MOMENT OF NEED.

2. OF SIGNIFICANCE, HOWEVER, IS FACT THAT, WITH ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF LARGE NUMBERS OF FRENCHMEN AS WELL AS LARGE NUMBERS OF FRENCH COMPANIES AT STAKE, AND WITH FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND DEGAULLE GOING THROUGH CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE, MOST PEOPLE AND MOST KEY POLITICIANS AND BUSINESS COMMUNITY, HAVENOT HAD ANY REAL TIME TO FOCUS ON THE LONGER RANGE IMPLICATIONS OF PRSIDENT JOHNSONS MESSAGE. SURPRISINGLY, WE HAVE HAD FEW INQUIRIES ABOUT ORIGIN OR MEANING OF THIS MESSAGE. BRITISH MINISTER REPORTS THAT FRENCH BANKERS, WHOM BRITISH EMBASSY QUERIED TODAY RE DE GAULLE SPEECH AND AFTERMATH, THOUGHT MESSAGE WAS IMPORTANT IN DRIVE TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE. THESE SOURCES, HOWEVER, ADMITTED THAT THEY HAD NOT FOCUSED ON IT MUCH FURTHER.

3. RE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS, FRENCH DIPLOMATIC PRESS HAS TENDED TO FOCUS ON MESSAGE AS REFLECTION OF GENERAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By M, NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 24450 252132Z

IMPROVEMENT IN FRANCO AMERICAN RELATIONS. FOREIGN MINISTER DEBRE ALLEGEDLY TOLD DIPLOMATIC EDITOR OF AFT (PROTECT) THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MOVE WAS A BRILLIANT ONE WHICH WOULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR FRENCH TO BE INTRANSIGENT IN RELATIONS WITH US. AFP EDITORY ALSO FELT THAT ONUS WOULD NOW BE ON FRENCH TO TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH US. ANOTHER BUSINESS SOURCE QUOTED TO US BY AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT REPORTS THAT BUSINESS CIRCLES CONSIDER THIS KEY MOVE BY US TO FORESTALL DE GAULLE FROM LAUNCHING NEW NATIONALIST INDEPENDENT MONETARY POLICY WHICH COULD GRAVELY HURT DOLLAR IN LONG RUN.

4. AS ALWAYS IN FRANCE OTHER MINORITY HAVE REGRETTED MESSAGE AND INTERPRETED IT NARROWLY AS SIGN OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THEIR POLITICAL ENEMY DE GAULLE. LECANUET TOLD EMBOFF LAST NIGHT THAT ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT REGRET MESSAGE BEING SENT, HE KNEW THAT DE GAULLE WOULD USE MESSAGE TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR HIM (DE GAULLE). HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH MANY OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE MADE STATEMENTS RE DE GAULLE'S EFFORTS IN CRISIS, NONE HAVE SPOKEN PUBLICLY, AS FAR AS WE ARE AWARE, OF MESSAGE EXCEPT PCF LEADER WALDECK ROCHET, AND PSU NATIONAL BUREAU AND EVEN THEY ONLY MENTIONED IT IN PASSING. WE BELIEVE ANY POLITICAL FALLOUT OF THIS NATURE CAN BE DEALT WITH.

5. THERE MAY BE PROBLEMS FOR US IN ECONOMIC FIELD, AS SUGGESTED BY THE FABRA ARTICLE IN LE MONDE (PARIS TEL 24447). IF FRENCH GOVERNMENT TAKES OUR OFFER TO COOPERATE TOO LITERALLY.

6. OTHER SIDE OF PICTURE IS NEW OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED FOR US BY OUR SUPPORT IN MONETARY AREA OF FRENCH IN TIME OF TROUBLES. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, US SUPPORT THROUGH GROUP OF TEN LOAN, AND DE GAULLE'S AWARENESS OF IMPORTANCE OF US SUPPORT MAY WELL GIVE US OPENING TO PRESS FOR FRENCH COOPERATION IN TYPE OF MONETARY REFORM WE SEEK. WE SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO PRESENT OUR CHECK.
SHRIVER

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday -- November 25, 1968 -- 4:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

As you requested, we have checked directly with Mrs. Johnson on her schedule. She has no conflicts on Friday, December 13, and thinks that would be a good day to go to El Paso for the ceremony.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SL:nm:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By g, NARA, Date 2-20-98

Pres file

35

Monday, November 25, 1968
4:05 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Prime Minister Wilson's response to your message which he, apparently, understood and appreciated.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1969
By , NARA, Date 2/20/11

35a

~~SECRET~~

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1968 NOV 25 20 01

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1959Z

~~SECRET~~

PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER
TO THE PRESIDENT

THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH YOU SENT TO ME THROUGH
DAVID BRUCE.

I GREATLY WELCOMED YOUR GENEROUS AND TIMELY MESSAGE
TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE. IN THE SAME SPIRIT ROY JENKINS HAS
MADE IT CLEAR IN TODAY'S DEBATE THAT WE ADMIRE FRENCH COURAGE
IN DECIDING NOT TO DEVALUE AND THAT WE WISH THEM WELL.

WE MUST HOPE NOW THAT THE DECISIONS REACHED WILL GIVE
US A PERIOD OF GREATER CALM IN THE MONEY MARKETS, THOUGH IT
WILL CLEARLY BE NECESSARY TO WATCH DEVELOPMENTS VERY CAREFULLY
IN THE DAYS AHEAD. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR THE ASSURANCE
OF YOUR CONTINUED HELP AND SUPPORT. I AM SURE THAT IT REMAINS
AS IMPORTANT AS EVER THAT YOU AND WE SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSEST
TOUCH ON THIS MATTER.

NOVEMBER 25, 1968

MESSAGE ENDS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 3-18-98

Pres Jee

ACTION

36

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, Nov. 25, 1968
3:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is an informal translation of
--Kiesinger's reply to your letter. The Germans
want to publish the exchange. There is already
talk in Germany that you sent a letter.

State recommends we agree to the release
of the exchange as soon as possible. I agree.

Walt Rostow

Approve release _____

No _____

Call me _____

36a

Informal translation made by EUR/GER on basis of telephone call from Charge:

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your message of November 24, 1968. In the negotiations of the Monetary Conference last week, it was the goal of the Federal Republic of Germany to restore the international monetary balance, upon which is based the growth and prosperity of our peoples, and to stand by our French friends. Therefore, the Federal Government decided to take measures which deeply affect our economy and whose effect will be substantially increased by the expected decisions of the French Government.

We have established with satisfaction, that the Monetary Conference recognized and approved of our measures as a meaningful (significant) contribution to the stability and adaptability of the monetary system.

I too am convinced that as in the past we should remain in close contact in order to solve the current difficulties as quickly as possible in the spirit of Western solidarity.

Sincerely yours,

K. G. Kiesinger

November 24, 1968

36b

Draft message from the President to Chancellor Kiesinger

I have followed closely the meetings in Bonn. I know that you tried to make your contribution to the maintenance of international economic order. We both know it is not easy to reconcile domestic politics and policies with what is required to maintain the world trade and monetary system, on which the life of each and every one of our countries depends.

If I am sure you agree it will be necessary for us to stay very close in the days ahead, working in the same spirit of cooperation that we have in the past.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Monday, November 25, 1968
2:50 p. m.

Pro file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker's letter to Thieu on conference tactics, plus (para. 7) Thieu's formal announcement to Bunker that the South Vietnamese NSC had "decided that everything was satisfactory to go ahead on the announcements."

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 43417

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-508
By WJ, NARA, Date 1-11-93

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

37a
TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

~~SECRET~~

1968 NOV 25 AM 8 07

OO RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 43417 3301210
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 251145Z NOV 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5011
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3009
STATE GRNC
BT

#1
070774

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 43417

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Authority NLS 91-506

FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

By mp/3p NARA, Date 1-8-98

REF: A. SAIGON 43341
B. STATE 277002

~~I HAVE TODAY~~, NOVEMBER 25, SENT LETTER ON CONFERENCE TACTICS TO PRESIDENT THIEU AS BELOW, HAVING TRANSMITTED CARBON COPY OF IT TO FOREIGN MINISTER THANH LAST NIGHT AS MATTER OF COURTESY.

1. QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: DURING OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS IN PARIS SOME MATTERS CAME UP WHICH WERE FELT TO REQUIRE CONFIRMATION IN WRITING. UPON INSTRUCTION OF MY GOVERNMENT, I AM PLEASED TO PROVIDE SUCH CONFIRMATION AS FOLLOWS:
2. IN THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS PRIOR TO THE STOPPING OF THE BOMBING, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REPEATEDLY SAID THAT ~~THE WOULD TALK "SERIOUSLY"~~ IN THE BROADER TALKS SUBSEQUENT TO THE BOMBING HALT. ~~IN THIS CONNECTION~~, MY GOVERNMENT HAS AUTHORIZED ME TO CONFIRM THAT ANY RUSES OR PROPAGANDA MANEUVERS ON THE PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE (OR OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SO-CALLED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT) WOULD BE A CAUSE FOR IMMEDIATE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES WITH A VIEW TO TAKING WHATEVER ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO MAKE CLEAR THE TALKS COULD NOT CONTINUE ON SUCH A BASIS OR IF SUCH ACTIONS WERE CONTINUED. THIS WOULD APPLY TO ANY EFFORTS BY HANOI TO BY-PASS OR IGNORE OR FREEZE OUT THE DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OR TO MANEUVER IT INTO A POSITION WHERE IT WOULD HAVE TO TALK BILATERALLY WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

3. WHEN WE DISCUSSED OUR STRATEGY AT THE FORTHCOMING TALKS ON NOVEMBER 21, I CONVEYED TO YOU THE VIEWS OF MY GOVERNMENT ON HOW

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 43417, NOVEMBER 25 (NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS)

OUR DELEGATIONS MIGHT HANDLE INTERNAL POLITICAL MATTERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM THAT MIGHT BE RAISED BY THE OTHER SIDE. I AM AUTHORIZED TO CONFIRM THAT OUR STRATEGY SHOULD BE, AND WILL BE, TO BUILD UP THE STATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BY VIGOROUSLY CHAMPIONING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF ITS GOVERNMENT BASED ON FREE ELECTIONS, BY POINTING TO THE PROGRESS THAT IT HAS MADE UNDER A SYSTEM OF DEMOCRACY, CONTRASTING THE FREE SOCIETY OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITH THE OPPRESSIVE SYSTEM OF NORTH VIETNAM, AND BY EMPHASIZING YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF RECONCILIATION TOWARD DISAFFECTED OR REBELLIOUS ELEMENTS OF ITS POPULATION. WHILE WE WOULD OF COURSE EXPECT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM DELEGATION TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THIS OFFENSIVE, WE EXPECT AND INTEND TO GIVE YOUR DELEGATION FULL SUPPORT.

4. IN MORE CONCRETE TERMS, AS I EXPLAINED ON NOVEMBER 21, WE FEEL THAT IF HANOI RAISES THE ISSUE OF AN INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLUTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM, OUR JOINT POSITION, TO BE PRIMARILY ARTICULATED BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM DELEGATION, SHOULD BE THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION, ELECTIONS, AND THE POLICY OF RECONCILIATION, AND THAT THESE QUESTIONS COULD BE BEST SOLVED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES IN SEPARATE AND PRIVATE TALKS.

5. MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO ASKED ME TO CONFIRM ANOTHER MATTER WHICH I MENTIONED IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION ON NOV 21. THE STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVT WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING DURING RECENT WEEKS CONTAINS THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE ASSURANCES TO YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE NLF AND CONCERNING THE MANNER IN WHICH WE WOULD TREAT THE OTHER SIDE-- WHATEVER THEY MAY CLAIM FOR THEMSELVES. WE MUST EXPECT THAT THE OTHER SIDE WILL PURPORT TO ORGANIZE ITSELF INTO TWO DELEGATIONS, AND THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE NLF WILL FREQUENTLY STATE THAT THEY ARE SPEAKING AS "REPRESENTATIVES" OF "THE NLF DELEGATION." WE WILL COUNTER SUCH PROPAGANDA CLAIMS VIGOROUSLY AS THE OCCASION REQUIRES, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY PRETENSIONS OF THIS KIND, OR ANY RAISING BY THE OTHER SIDE OF SUBJECTS ON WHICH WE MIGHT REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE, WOULD BE A REASON FOR ACTIONS WHICH WOULD REDOUND TO OUR DISADVANTAGE, SUCH AS WALKING OUT OF THE MEETINGS.

6. WE EXPECT BOTH OF OUR DELEGATIONS TO TAKE A POSTURE NOT OF DEFENSIVENESS OR UNWILLINGNESS TO TALK BUT RATHER ONE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE STRENGTH OF OUR POSITION AND VIGOR IN SETTING IT FORTH. WE INTEND TO GO INTO THE FORTHCOMING TALKS WITH A POSITIVE APPROACH AND WITH FULL DIGNITY AND DECORUM, KNOWING THAT WE HAVE TRUTH ON OUR SIDE AND THAT OUR TWO DELEGATIONS WILL ENLIGHTEN THE WORLD ABOUT THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION IN YOUR COUNTRY AND ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT WE ENVISAGE. UNQUOTE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 43417, NOVEMBER 25 (NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS)

7. PRESIDENT THIEU CALLED ME EARLY THIS EVENING TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN SORRY HE COULDN'T SEE ME TODAY. BUT THERE HAD BEEN AN NSC MEETING AT WHICH IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT EVERYTHING WAS SATISFACTORY TO GO AHEAD ON THE ANNOUNCEMENTS. HE SAID HE HAD ALSO RECEIVED MY LETTER (TEXT ABOVE) WHICH WAS SATISFACTORY. THIEU ADDED THAT THE FONMIN WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US TOMORROW ABOUT THE EXACT TIMING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS. 9:00 A.M. WEDNESDAY, SAIGON TIME, SEEMED FINE TO HIM.
(COMMENT: ASSUMING TCC CONCURRENCES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN TIME.)
BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Monday, November 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: **Agenda for NSC Meeting at Noon Today**

1. International monetary situation

Secretary Fowler is prepared to report on the current monetary situation. His presentation will be informal. There will be time for discussion and questions, if you so desire.

2. Military situation in South Vietnam

General Wheeler is prepared to report informally on the tactical military situation in South Vietnam. He will relate U. S. operations in the countryside to the pacification program and summarize military actions planned for the period immediately ahead, on the assumption that the Paris talks will progress.

3. United Nations Problems

Ambassador Wiggins is prepared to speak briefly about current developments at the United Nations, including those which have arisen in the General Assembly now in session.

The most active issue is the Middle East problem. You might wish to ask Ambassador Wiggins:

- a. Are we doing everything we can to deal with the Arab refugee problem?
- b. Do we know what we will do if Ambassador Jarring gives up his negotiating effort?

There is attached a paper summarizing the outlook at the UN.

W. W. Rostow

November 23, 1968

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

THE OUTLOOK AT THE UN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 2-20-98

1. Introduction

The current General Assembly Session has produced little high drama, and is proceeding through its agenda of close to 100 items along generally predictable lines. The session convened on September 24, while the world was still freshly concerned with the effects of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and at a time when Ambassador Gunnar Jarring's efforts to bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement seemed at a critical stage. Very little is now heard in UN corridors on the Vietnam problem, and much of the controversy had been removed with the beginning of the Paris Talks. The inability of the UN directly to influence the crisis situations in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia was accepted, but the Assembly nevertheless served as a sounding board for the views of nations with respect to these and other important political problems. As is customary, nearly 100 Foreign Ministers, including the Secretary of State, engaged in useful discussions on a very wide variety of problems during their attendance at the Assembly.

2. The General Debate:

While Vietnam was frequently mentioned in the Assembly's opening general debate, it was treated much more briefly than last year and with less direct criticism of the U.S. Many speakers highlighted the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and condemned it as inconsistent with the UN Charter. The current impasse in the Middle East came up frequently, but except for the parties, most speakers voiced support for the Jarring Mission and a sense of urgency that actual negotiations begin. Most open criticism came from the European and Latin American countries, including veiled references by Romania and Yugoslavia. About half the speakers mentioned Nigeria, concentrating on the humanitarian aspects of the Biafran conflict. About as many mentioned the Chinese representation issue. Those who favored some change usually emphasized the overriding need to find some way to associate Peking with disarmament measures.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

3. Membership and Representation:

With the admission of Equatorial Guinea to the UN on November 12, the United Nations attained a membership of 126.

The General Assembly disposed of the Chinese Representation issue again this year, with little change from the 1966 and 1967 scenarios. The so-called Albanian Resolution, which would admit Communist China and expel the Republic of China, was solidly defeated. A Western-sponsored proposal to establish a non-prejudicial study committee, which we voted for, was likewise rejected. The prospect for the future, however, is somewhat gloomy. Our position has been that the General Assembly, where all members are represented, should decide a question of such far-reaching significance for the Organization, but there are already signs that we must anticipate an unfriendly initiative in the Security Council early in the new year. With the election to the Council of Spain, Finland, Zambia, Nepal and Colombia, we will be facing a parliamentary situation in which 10 of the 15 members of the Council recognize Communist China and are on record as favoring its admission to the United Nations.

4. Specific Political Issues:

a. Southern African Problems: As it does each year, the Assembly and its Committees have already dealt at length with the questions of Rhodesia, Portuguese Territories, and apartheid, and it is about to begin discussing South West Africa. In all these instances the extreme, activist views of the Afro-Asian majorities tend to dominate the discourse and the resolutions adopted. While we share many of the Afro-Asian objectives, we have been forced either to abstain or vote no on the resolutions presented, because they call for the use of economic or military sanctions and other unacceptable measures. In the case of Rhodesia the Assembly, on learning of the possibility of a British agreement with the Southern Rhodesian regime, moved quickly to try to prevent the British from settling for any terms short of prior establishment of majority rule. We abstained on this resolution, which foreshadowed the controversy with which the UN would greet a Rhodesian settlement, when concluded; but we opposed the standard, comprehensive resolution on Southern Rhodesia. We abstained on the resolution condemning apartheid because of its extreme provisions. We were able to abstain on the resolution on the Portuguese territories, which was cast in relatively moderate terms.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b. Middle East: Refugees. The Assembly is now discussing in Committee the annual report of the Director General of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the organization responsible since 1949 for meeting the essential needs of the Arab refugees and helping in their rehabilitation. We expect the Agency's mandate, which expires on June 30, 1969, to be extended for at least three years, action which we support as necessary in light of the magnitude of the problem. Early in the debate we and the British both noted that no solution to the basic refugee problem can be anticipated except in the context of an overall Arab-Israeli settlement but that UNRWA's work must be strongly supported in the meantime. We also called particular attention to the problem of the persons displaced as a result of the 1967 hostilities; they now live in very difficult circumstances in Jordan. We expressed hope that Israel would take urgent steps to facilitate the return of these people to their homes in territory now occupied by Israel. The Israeli government is currently committed to receiving only a few thousand of these displaced persons.

The Arab-Israel dispute as such is not expected to be considered formally by the General Assembly or the Security Council before next year. The Secretary General's special representative, Ambassador Jarring, has concluded his efforts in New York to promote a settlement of the dispute directly with the parties; he will carry on elsewhere. We can expect, however, that the issue in its entirety will be discussed by delegates in speeches on the UNRWA item.

c. Korea: Each year the Assembly discusses the Korean problem and reaffirms its objective -- a unified, democratic Korea. Although formal debate has not begun, considerable controversy occurred on the subject during the organizational meetings of the Assembly, and it is clear that the Communists and other supporters of North Korea intend to make a stronger effort on behalf of their client than in previous years. Their point of attack, and our greatest vulnerability, has been the continued exclusion of North Korea from the annual debate on grounds that it refuses to acknowledge the UN's competence to deal with the question of Korean unification. Sentiment in the Assembly is moving toward hearing both Koreas unconditionally; but in the absence of some major development -- such as release of the Pueblo crew just before the debate -- we hope to hold the line again this year on an invitation to North

Korea which is conditional on its acceptance of UN competence to deal with the matter. In practice this has meant that only Republic of Korea spokesmen have been heard for Korea.

d. Disarmament: Consideration of disarmament and related items has only just begun in the General Assembly. It appears that the most active and controversial issue will be the question whether a new body should be created to carry on the work of the Non-Nuclear Conference (NNC) which concluded in Geneva on September 28. The Conference quite naturally emphasized the viewpoints of under-developed countries not possessing nuclear weapons, many of whom are dissatisfied with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A number of delegations have prepared a resolution which would, among other things, set up a committee to review and further international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among all states, with special regard to the needs of developing countries, and which would look toward strengthening the security assurances given by the nuclear powers under the NPT. The Committee would also follow the implementation of the conclusions of the NNC, as well as consider further steps in this area including the convening of a second non-nuclear conference, to be taken to strengthen the security assurances.

The United States is strongly opposed to the establishment of any such committee, which we believe would only interfere with the work of the organizations already established and active in the fields of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. We are consulting with other delegations in an effort to prevent action of this kind.

The General Assembly also has before it resolutions from the NNC in the fields of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, security assurances and disarmament. Some of these resolutions contain provisions with which we do not agree, and we are hopeful that the Assembly will merely convey the resolutions to the organizations concerned without endorsing them.

In their statement in the Assembly's Political Committee on the disarmament item, the Soviets declared their readiness to begin strategic arms limitation talks with the U.S. without delay. Our statement was not responsive. We anticipate that, as regards the general, ongoing negotiations on arms control matters, the Assembly will continue to rely on the Geneva Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). There is a strong move afoot to enlarge the ENDC by admitting Japan and others.

e. Czechoslovakia: In addition to Secretary Rusk's general debate speech, which dealt at length with the Czechoslovak question, attacking what has come to be known as the "Brezhnev Doctrine", we are using all appropriate occasions under specific agenda items to focus attention on the violation of the UN Charter by the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. During the Legal Committee's discussion of the definition of aggression, the U.S. Representative, Senator Cooper, pointed out how Soviet action in Czechoslovakia ran counter to all elements of even the USSR-sponsored definition. Our delegation also intends to raise Soviet human rights and freedom of information violations in connection with Czechoslovakia when commemoration of International Human Rights Year is debated in the Third Committee. The U.S. Representative in the committee on principles of international law concerning friendly relations among states forcefully cited the Czech situation during discussion of the legal principles relevant to the Charter prohibition of the threat or use of force.

5. Issues of Potential Future Importance

a. Second Development Decade. At the suggestion of President Kennedy the General Assembly designated the 1960's as "The Development Decade". Under targets to be set by individual countries, the Decade had as an objective a 5% annual increase in national income by 1970. The developed nations were urged to increase their flow of capital assistance to the developing world to 1% of their gross national income, as soon as possible.

The Assembly now has before it the question of formally determining whether or not it should designate the 1970's as the "Second Development Decade". We believe there will be agreement in principle at this General Assembly. A basic problem which will eventually face us is the extent to which we should accept implied or explicit financial obligations to support the UN development strategy for the new "Decade".

b. Human Environment. There is increasing interest in the General Assembly in problems relating to the human environment and the harmful side effects technological change can have on our environment. More and more people are beginning to realize that the environment has finite limits, and that the pollution of air, water, and land can impair the future capability of man to to enjoy an ever-increasing level of economic and social well-being. To focus world attention on these problems we are supporting a proposal in the General Assembly to convene, in 1972, the first general World Conference on Problems of the Human Environment.

c. Seabeds. The Assembly is considering ways in which, through international cooperation, the deep ocean floor can be exploited for peaceful purposes and in the common interest. The UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds, appointed last year, has submitted a report outlining some of the problems in this area and highlighting the deep differences of opinion which must be overcome. Our long-term objectives include support for the U.S.-sponsored International Decade of Ocean Exploration and an acceptable statement of legal principles to govern the exploration and use of the deep seabed. We are attempting to persuade General Assembly members that proceeding through consensus rather than voting by numerical majorities is the only alternative to a basic split between underdeveloped and advanced countries which would frustrate the whole exercise. We face fairly serious difficulties on such matters as the arms control aspects of the problem and the size of a continuing Assembly committee on the seabeds.

6. Budgetary Issues

Continuing recent trends, the less developed countries exerted increasing pressure for fuller participation in budget and organizational matters.

Aside from our normal difficulties in holding down the UN budget, we are encountering problems on two important issues that even more directly affect the United States. In one case, an attempt is being made to change the assessments against UN members for repaying the \$170,000,000 of UN bonds-sold to us (US share, \$76,000,000) and to others to meet Congo operation expenses -- a change which would have the United States pay more and the developing countries less. We are adamantly resisting this initiative because it would constitute a clear breach of a contractual obligation on the method of bond repayment. The second serious issue involves an attempt to increase our assessed share of the UN budget and lower that of the underdeveloped countries, by revising the ceiling principle which in 1957 set 30 percent as the desired maximum level of contribution for any single power. Since that time our contribution has been gradually lowered toward this level, and our rate of assessment now stands at 31.57 percent. We expect we can head off final decision against us on both these issues this year, but they will persist.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The question of expanding UN Headquarters in New York is also expected to come up later at this session. Although we are unable to make a financial commitment without consultation with and approval by Congress, we shall wish to support an engineering and architectural study by the Secretary-General of some highly imaginative plans for expansion prepared by the private Fund for Area Planning and Development. We would hope that the expansion package for New York would prove sufficiently attractive to counter moves in the General Assembly for shifting important United Nations functions from New York to Geneva.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

ACTION

Pres file

Monday, November 25, 1968

Mr. President:

I wonder if you would be willing to autograph the attached photographs for the fellows in the Situation Room.

The men have all expressed a wish for a photograph of you, before you leave office.

As you know, the Situation Room men have worked faithfully, long hours, and are proud of their service to you and the White House staff.

If you are agreeable to signing, they would be ever so grateful. I think they are deserving.

W. W. Rostow

rlh

ACTION

41

Monday, November 25, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached for your signature is a proposed reply to President Kaunda of Zambia. Kaunda sent you (along with Presidents de Gaulle, Tito, Shazar and others) a long letter worrying that Britain might sacrifice the rights of Rhodesia's African majority to reach a settlement with the Smith regime.

Kaunda wrote in the first stages of the current round of British-Rhodesian talks. The latest word is that Wilson is anxious for a settlement and has made some concessions. But the British are still holding fast on the crucial question of constitutional guarantees for eventual majority rule. The talks are now stale-mated, Kaunda remains very concerned.

The proposed reply breaks no new ground. We'll want to reserve comment on the talks until something is firm. Your letter does repressure Kaunda of our continuing commitment to human rights in Rhodesia. I recommend you sign.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:HS:RM:lw

Att: File #3426

4/2

November 25, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I much appreciated your thoughtful letter about the recent talks between the British Government and Mr. Ian Smith.

As you know, the United States has fully supported and carried out the United Nations' mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. We have done this in the hope that those sanctions would influence the Smith regime to agree to a peaceful settlement opening the way to majority rule. We are still hopeful that a fair and just solution -- one that serves the aspirations of all the people of Rhodesia -- will eventually be reached.

You can be sure, Mr. President, that America shares your deep and abiding concern for the future of the African majority in Southern Rhodesia. I think our own recent history is ample proof of our commitment to human rights. We have chosen the path of freedom and equality at home; we want no less for all mankind.

It was good, as always, to have your personal views on this grave problem. I know you will do all you can to promote peaceful progress and justice in Southern Africa. The United States is working toward the same goals.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Kenneth D. Kaunda,
President of the Republic of Zambia

LBJ:WWR:HS:RM:lw

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

42

Monday - November 25, 1968

Mr. President:

Pres file

After sending my earlier memorandum concerning the proposed ceremony at the Chamizal (Tab A), we learned that bad weather has delayed completion of construction work on the new channel. It will be ready to inaugurate only after December 12.

The best date for all concerned is Friday, December 13. On that date, construction will be completed, President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz can attend, and schedules for you and Mrs. Johnson are clear.

Diaz Ordaz has to obtain routine permission from his Congress to leave Mexico, even for a few hours. When he requests it, the trip immediately enters the public domain. Ambassador Freeman suggests, therefore, simultaneous press announcements in Washington and Mexico City to coincide with Diaz Ordaz's request to his Congress. To help guard against premature leaks, he urges announcement this week, if possible.

For this reason, we need your approval of the date and guidance on the general character of the ceremony. I suggest a low-key, informal affair emphasizing the "family relationship" between our two countries. I assume, however, that you will want key Texas officials and Congressional representatives invited, with their wives.

May I have your decisions on the following:

Approve trip on December 13, go ahead with detailed planning, and prepare brief joint announcement.

—

See me.

—

Approve theme, (low-key, "family relationship")

—

See me

—

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By , NARA, Date 2-20-96

**Agree to host luncheon for assembled officials
and guests (maximum 200)**

—.

See me

—.

**Prefer small "family lunch" for Diana Ordases,
and a few others (maximum 25-35)**

—.

See me

—.

Approve preliminary schedule (Tab B)

—.

See me

—.

Approve inviting key US officials, submit list

—.

See me

—.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Earlier memorandum of November 20.

Tab B - Preliminary schedule.

SWLewis:mm

cc - Jim Jones

George Christian

Bess Abell

Lou Schwartz

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Original
memo back
to Diaz
of 11/18*
ACTION
42a
Rec'd

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday - November 20, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Ambassador Freeman has checked informally with President Diaz Ordaz concerning the proposed ceremony at the Chamizal early in December. Diaz Ordaz thinks it is a fine idea, and would be delighted to meet you in El Paso for this occasion. It would be convenient for him any time between December 2 and December 6. To help him coordinate some other matters in his own schedule, he would like to settle on the date in the next day or two with you.

If you want to combine this with a weekend at the Ranch, we could set it up for either Monday, December 2, or Friday, December 6. If not, I suggest Wednesday, December 4.

You can fly to El Paso, meet Diaz Ordaz at the middle of the bridge, take part in a brief ceremony at the new Chamizal, and then have lunch together in El Paso along with a few other officials on both sides. A rough outline schedule is attached.

The last time you met at the Chamizal in 1967 involved an elaborate ceremony and was part of Diaz Ordaz's State Visit. This "last act" in the Chamizal Settlement should, I think, be low-key. It can be a fine occasion for the two of you to underscore the results of the close collaboration between Mexico and the United States during your Administration. The more informal the occasion, the more that theme will appear.

I would like to have your decision on this as soon as possible, so we can work out the details with President Diaz Ordaz.

W. Rostow

Approve trip, go ahead with detailed planning

Call me .

Approve schedule

Call me .

Approve keeping group very small and ceremony brief and informal

Call me .

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 4, NARA, Date 2-20-98

November 19, 1968

PROPOSED OUTLINE SCHEDULE

(Trip to Chamizal)

December 4, 1968

Leave Andrews AFB, Washington	-	8:00 a.m. EST
Arrive El Paso	-	11:00 a.m. CST
Arrive at New Channel	-	11:30 a.m.
Meet President Diaz Ordaz	-	11:40 a.m.
Ceremony on US side		
(Platform only)	-	12:00 Noon.
(Ceremony ends)	-	12:45 p.m.
To luncheon site in El Paso	-	1:00 p.m.
Luncheon	-	1:15 p.m.
Receive press (if desire)	-	2:45 p.m.
Return to Bridge to say goodbye to President Diaz Ordaz	-	3:15 p.m.
Leave El Paso Airport	-	3:45 p.m. CST
Arrive Andrews AFB	-	8:45 p.m. EST.

November 25, 1968

1/2c

**Preliminary Schedule
(Trip to Chamisal)**

December 13, 1968

- 8:00 a.m. EST - Depart Andrews AFB, Washington.
- 11:00 a.m. CST - Arrive Biggs Field, El Paso (military airport).
Brief arrival ceremony.
- 11:15 a.m. - Board helicopter.
- 11:30 a.m. - Arrive new Paso del Norte Bridge.
- 11:40 a.m. - Meet President Diaz Ordaz on Bridge.
- 11:45 - 12:30 p.m. - Ceremony, at Bridge center, with speeches and translation.

Presidents detonate explosive, opening New Channel - 1/4 mile from Bridge.

(Note: Large numbers of Mexican and American citizens can witness easily from ends of Bridge.)
- 12:30 - 12:45 p.m. - Escort President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz by car to luncheon site in El Paso (Paso del Norte Hotel).
- 1:00 - 2:30 p.m. - Luncheon.
- 2:30 - 2:45 p.m. - Escort President Diaz Ordaz either back to Bridge or he boards helicopter direct to Ciudad Juarez to Airport (to be decided after consultation with Mexicans).

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

- 2:45 - 3:00 p. m. - Goodbyes.**
- 3:30 p. m. CST - Depart El Paso.**
- 8:30 p. m. EST - Arrive Andrews AFB, Washington.**

43

ACTION

~~SECRET/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS~~

Monday, November 25, 1968
2:15 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached for your clearance is the
cable to Bunker *on announcement time*

W. W. Rostow

Message okay _____

Approved as amended _____

Call me _____
SECRET

wwrostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *[signature]*, NARA, Date *2-20-98*

43a

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Classification

for [unclear]

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

STATE

PARIS TODEL _____ FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

NODIS HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

XX DELIVER TO AMB BUNKER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS

1. Para 7 of Saigon 43417 indicates that GVN FonMin will be in touch with us tomorrow about the exact timing of the announcements.

2. Highest levels are now considering a press conference, which it will be most difficult to hold later than 1900 our time Tuesday night. Since the actual announcement of the GVN decision should of course come from Saigon, this would mean that ~~the~~ the Saigon announcement should come not later than 0730 Saigon time Wednesday morning (1830 Tuesday evening, our time.)

3. Please advise FLASH if you believe any local factors would cause GVN serious difficulty in altering the time in this manner. If not, you should present the matter as a personal

Drafted by: *WCB* Tel. No. 4235 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary

White House - Mr. Rostow

S/S-

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *[signature]*, NARA, Date *2-20-98*

Page 2 of telegram to Saigon, Paris TODEL

~~SECRET~~
Classification

request from the President, based on the importance of fortifying American public support to the maximum possible degree by the most effective possible presentation here of the decision and its statesman-like character. We believe these benefits clearly warrant the shift, and responses from the TCC (being relayed separately) make clear that it will cause no trouble to them.

GP-3

END

44

Monday, Nov. 25, 1968
10:25 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Rusk would like to be able to leave the NSC meeting at 12:50, since he has a lunch with Debrynia today.

You may wish to give him personal guidance before that lunch on how to handle the NPT and the missiles with Debrynia. I have conveyed to him everything you have conveyed to me. But at this moment, I believe Sect. Rusk needs your personal guidance on where you wish to go in these matters.

W. W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

45

~~SECRET~~

November 25, 1968

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM TO: General Taylor Authority NLJ 96-26
 SUBJECT: Reflections on National Security Intelligence and the President
 By ML/m, NARA, Date 1-5-98

As requested, herewith some rather simple impressions based on my experience -- notably that of the last eight years.

1. In the contemporary world, there is no way for the President to avoid a highly personal responsibility in national security affairs since:

- there are bound to be a substantial number of crises which involve the possibility of conflict, financial expenditure, or domestic political repercussions;
- the President (and the Vice President) are the only men in the Executive Branch who have a mandate from the people.

2. Therefore, the President must be able to operate with a full flow of detailed intelligence, carefully evaluated, sensitive to the exact questions which are on his mind, in what is inevitably an operational command post.

3. The first requirement is a flow of regular materials from the intelligence community tailored to meet the President's tastes, habits, and working style.

3. The second requirement is that the President develop with the Director of Central Intelligence a close personal working relationship of confidence which allows the Director of Central Intelligence to be present at the Tuesday lunch or its equivalent. The Director of Central Intelligence should, in his personal capacity, be part of the President's innermost circle in national security matters even if what he knows is not fully transmitted to his agency.

4. A third requirement is that the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs work with the Director of Central Intelligence and the other intelligence agencies in a wholly fraternal way to assure that the intelligence community is focusing on the issues most relevant to the decisions before the President or likely to come before the President. So far as the President is concerned -- but he is not the sole consumer -- the greatest "wastages" of intelligence take the form of papers which happen to come forward at a time when the President is focusing on

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another matter or where the form in which a question is posed in the intelligence community is not relevant to the precise issue to which the President is addressing himself. To generate maximum relevance, therefore, for the product of the intelligence community, the President's Special Assistant must steadily throw questions back at the intelligence community in the form which will make the responses of the intelligence community bear most directly on the President's decisions.

5. Since a great deal of the President's business in the field of national security policy will inevitably be conducted -- as it has, in fact, been conducted in the post-war years -- within a relatively small group of the President's closest advisors, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that relations of greatest mutual confidence should be cultivated -- as they have been in recent years -- between the Director of Central Intelligence and the other members of that small advisory group.

6. A final observation. The intelligence community should understand that on truly great matters the President himself, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will form their own intelligence assessments. This has happened, for example, on questions such as these:

- What has been the character and the order of magnitude of the effect on North Vietnam of bombing attacks?
- What were Hanoi's intentions in the winter/spring offensive of 1967-68?
- What were Hanoi's motives in going to Paris?
- Would the Warsaw Pact forces assembled around Czechoslovakia move into Czechoslovakia?
- What are Soviet intentions towards the Middle East?

7. Just as a division commander in the field will form his own view of the enemy's capabilities and intentions, so will the senior men in our government. This is a fact of life. What is essential is that two conditions be satisfied: first, that all these men have available to them the intelligence and the evaluations made by the intelligence community as an essential part of the information on which they will form their judgments; and, second, as I have tried to emphasize, the Director of Central Intelligence himself be a working member of that central group.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

ACTION

ef6

Monday, November 25, 1968 - 11:00 AM

Mr. President:

Pres file

Attached, for your approval, is a message to President Tito on the occasion of Yugoslav National Day (November 29) that State recommends you send.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

After our Embassy has delivered the message and given Tito an opportunity to veto its public release, the State Department plans to release the message.

Public Release approved _____

Disapproved _____

W. W. Rostow

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE
TO PRESIDENT TITO

On the occasion of the anniversary of your National Day, I express to you and to the people of Yugoslavia, the best wishes of the people of the United States of America and my own personal greetings. I reaffirm at this time our deep interest in the independence of Yugoslavia and the well-being of its people.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Monday, Nov. 25, 1968
9:45 a. m.

47

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft message to His Holiness along the lines you directed.

We now have official confirmation from Thieu that the South Vietnamese NSC has agreed. The messages to the TCC's are out. Therefore, I believe this message can safely go to His Holiness today giving him a bit of advance notice.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

November 25, 1968

47a
—

Your Holiness:

With patience and understanding we have now helped put President Thieu and his government in a position to go with dignity to Paris and take part in the search for peace. There were no commitments that we made after my speech of October 31 that we did not make before. Of course, we regret the delay. But I can understand the problem that his young constitutional government faced in gaining the understanding and support of its political leaders and its people for this step.

You have known that we have no intention of forcing upon the South Vietnamese a coalition government or otherwise putting the Communists in a position where they can control South Vietnam. On the other hand, from the strong military and political position that the South Vietnamese and their allies have created, we now need to pursue peace with vigor and confidence, hope and compassion.

I am sure that your influence will continue to be used in this direction.

We are also passing through a difficult time for the family of western nations. Our peoples want more for themselves and their families. This human desire translates itself into political pressures within each nation which can upset the equilibrium among the major currencies on which our great system of world trade depends. All the peoples of the world have benefitted from the fact that we have progressed so far in international economic cooperation.

As you know, it is not easy for political leaders both to meet their domestic problems and also to act in the ways that permit the progress of all to continue.

We have tried to act in these recent days in the spirit of the family of which we are a part.

I am sure you would agree that the future of our common civilization depends on the growth among our peoples and our governments of this sense of solidarity and common destiny.

Sincerely,

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
Vatican City

LBJ:WWR:mz

INFORMATION

118

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 25, 1968
8:50 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The attached indicates
Sec. Rusk's vigorous and lucid
response to Amb. Shriver's some-
what over-active cable about a
Nixon-de Gaulle meeting.

W. W. Rostow

State 277004
Paris 24349

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WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Executive Order, Feb. 24, 1988
By 17, 10/20/04, Date 2-20-98

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS

23 Nov 68 22 10z

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/EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

Regarding your 24349, it is my clear understanding that President-elect Nixon will not wish to take up such questions until after ~~inauguration~~ inauguration. As your telegram illustrates, the question is a very complicated one and he will not be in a position to deal with it until his new Administration is in place. It would, therefore, be inappropriate for the present Administration to be drawn into the subject in any way. If there are questions or inquiries on the subject, either privately by ^{officials or} ~~officials or~~ from the press, I would suggest you merely say that that is a matter for Mr. Nixon to determine.

RUSK

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ky, NARA, Date 2-20-98

Dated by: S DRusk:ma 11/23/68	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: <i>Rusk</i> The Secretary
Clearances: S/S-Mr. Walsh <i>RPW</i>		

~~SECRET~~
Classification



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8419
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Rostow

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM SHRIVER

1. POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON AND PRESIDENT DE GAULLE MAY RAPIDLY BECOME IMPORTANT DIPLOMATIC ISSUE AND IS A MATTER ON WHICH SOME EARLY GUIDANCE WOULD BE USEFUL. AS ALREADY REPORTED, SENATOR MANSFIELD TOLD DE GAULLE'S BROTHER-IN-LAW, JACQUES VENDROUX, ON NOVEMBER 19 THAT HE WOULD ADVISE NIXON TO VISIT THE GENERAL SOON AFTER HIS INAUGURATION. THE SENATOR ALSO TOLD DE GAULLE ON THE SAME DAY THAT HE FAVORED SUCH A VISIT IN THE SPRING. SUCH SUGGESTIONS NOT A SURPRISE TO ANYONE SINCE, BASED ON NIXON'S OWN PUBLIC STATEMENTS DURING THE CAMPAIGN THAT HE LOOKING FORWARD TO A MEETING WITH DE GAULLE, FRENCHMEN IN AND OUT OF PUBLIC LIFE HAVE COME TO EXPECT A NIXON VISIT TO DE GAULLE SOON AFTER INAUGURATION. WE ARE CONSEQUENTLY RECEIVING AN INCREASING NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TIMING OF SUCH A MEETING.

2. IN OUR VIEW, A NIXON-DE GAULLE MEETING DURING THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IS VERY DESIRABLE NOT ONLY TO MAINTAIN FORWARD MOVEMENT IN IMPROVING THE CLIMATE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, BUT ALSO TO USE IT AS A VEHICLE FOR HELPING TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES IN EUROPE; LIKEWISE, FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR A MEETING COULD ONLY HARDEN DE GAULLE'S POSITIONS TO OUR DISADVANTAGE AND WOULD ALSO DENY US OUR BEST OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE WITH HIM POSSIBLE AREAS OF COOPERATION AT A TIME WHEN HE MAY BE MORE FLEXIBLE BECAUSE OF THE WAY FRANCE HAS FARED IN 1968. WHILE DE GAULLE WILL NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN PROPOSING A MEETING IN PARIS, IT IS CLEAR THAT HE WOULD WELCOME ONE (AND MAY BADLY NEED ONE) IN ORDER TO ENHANCE HIS OWN POSITION WITHIN FRANCE AS WELL AS FRANCE'S IMAGE AS A WORLD POWER. WE SHOULD THEREFORE CONSIDER A NIXON-DE GAULLE MEETING AS A TRUMP CARD IN OUR HAND AND SHOULD PLAY IT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO INSURE THAT WE, AND NOT JUST DE GAULLE, GET SOMETHING OUT OF IT IN TERMS OF STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE OR AT LEAST ENHANCING WESTERN COOPERATION AND UNITY.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 12, NARA, Date 2-20-98

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-2- PARIS 24349, NOVEMBER 23

3. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY AREAS WHEREIN VIEWS COULD BE PROFITABLY EXCHANGED, ONE AREA WHERE WE MIGHT GET SOMETHING WE WANT OUT OF DE GAULLE WOULD BE EUROPEAN DEFENSE, WHERE SOME DEGREE OF INCREASED AND BROADENED DEFENSE COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND NATO MIGHT BE POSSIBLE AND WOULD CERTAINLY BE DESIRABLE. THIS IS A HIGHLY TECHNICAL SUBJECT AND IF IT IS TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL, WOULD IDEALLY CALL FOR PREVIOUS WORKING LEVEL TALKS. HOWEVER, IN THINKING ABOUT ADVANCE PREPARATIONS TO FIND OUT JUST WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES OF FRENCH COOPERATION ARE, WE SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS OF THE DIFFICULTIES FACING US. DE GAULLE IS NOT PRONE TO CONSULT WITH OR OFTEN EVEN TAKE HIS GOVERNMENT INTO HIS CONFIDENCE IN MAKING POLICY. IN THIS CASE, HE MIGHT NOT EVEN WISH TO REVEAL HIS CARDS UNTIL THEY COULD BE PLAYED DIRECTLY WITH THE NEW PRESIDENT.

4. CHARACTERISTICALLY DE GAULLE COULD DECIDED TO PLAY ANY MEETING WITH NIXON AS DEMONSTRATING THAT THE U.S. HAS IN EFFECT AGREED THAT FRANCE WOULD HENCEFORTH HAVE A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" DESPITE HER WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO. WE CAN FORESTALL THIS IN PART BY MAKING IT CLEAR IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS IN ADVANCE RE OUR POLICIES TOWARDS NATO AND EUROPEAN UNITY, AND BY UNDERLINING THE NEW PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO DISCUSS THESE TOPICS WITH DE GAULLE.

5. RE TIMING OF NIXON-DE GAULLE MEETING, WE RECOGNIZE COMPLEXITY OF MAKING EVEN TENTATIVE DECISIONS ON SUCH A VISIT SO FAR IN ADVANCE, PARTICULARLY WHEN CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO ITS RELATION TO MEETINGS WITH OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS, TO POSSIBLE MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADERS, AND TO NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN APRIL, WHICH DE GAULLE WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT ATTEND. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD FRANKLY RECOGNIZE THAT TIMING OF NIXON-DE GAULLE MEETING WILL BE GIVEN GREAT SIGNIFICANCE HERE. IF FOR BROADER POLITICAL REASONS OR BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS OF SCHEDULING, A NIXON-DE GAULLE MEETING COULD NOT BE HELD UNTIL AFTER NATO MEETING, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO BEGIN TO PREPARE THE GROUND HERE IN ADVANCE SO AS TO AVOID UNNECESSARY AND UNDESIRABLE POLITICAL FALL-OUT, WHICH COULD COME FROM DISAPPOINTED HOPES AND MISCALCULATION.

SHRIVER
BT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

49

Monday, November 25, 1968 -- 8:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Pat Dean asked me -- with real feeling -- if the President would be good enough to receive him -- just for a few minutes -- before January 20.

His respect and affection for the President is, I know, deep and authentic. He regards his period of service during your Administration as the high point of his career. He wishes to come in and tell you this personally, sometime at your convenience.

W. W. Rostow

Set up time with Tom Johnson _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rln

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INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, November 25, 1968 -- 8:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

In the course of a back channel exchange on another matter, I asked Bill Colby if the momentum in pacification of October was continuing into November. As you know, probably our best leverage in Paris is this forward movement which will eat up the political leverage of the NLF in negotiating a settlement.

You will be interested in his rather hopeful response.

W. W. Rostow

MAC 16719

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By NY, NARA, Date 6/20/98

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TO WALT ROSTOW THE WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
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PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAC 16719 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT OF HES

1. (I) MANY THANKS YOUR GOOD ADVICE. WILL FORWARD THE FACTS SOONEST.

2. (C) WE HAVE SENT YOU 1-15 NOVEMBER ASSESSMENT OF PACIFICATION (MACV MSG 36703, COPY TO WHITE HOUSE) WHICH SAYS THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN IS OFF TO A GOOD START. IT CERTAINLY GOT A GOOD RECEPTION AT MOST PROVINCIAL LEVELS AND MANY PROVINCES BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN EXCEED OR EVEN DOUBLE THEIR INITIAL QUOTAS OF HAMLETS. DURING THE FIRST TWO WEEKS 967 CHIEU HOI RAILLIED, WHICH IS WELL ABOVE THE 768 NEEDED BIWEEKLY TO ACHIEVE THE CAMPAIGN GOAL OF 5,000. BY 15 NOVEMBER 845,000 SELF-DEFENSE MEMBERS HAD BEEN ORGANIZED AND ALMOST 165,000 ARE CARRIED AS ARMED (ALTHOUGH ALL DO NOT HAVE WEAPONS SIMULTANEOUSLY), SO THE GOAL OF ONE MILLION ORGANIZED AND 200,000 ARMED IS ALREADY WITHIN REACH. REGARDING HAMLETS, 728 HAVE BEEN ENTERED AS PLANNED IN THE FIRST PHASE. SOME 174 RF COMPANIES AND 679 PF PLATOONS HAVE BEEN REDEPLOYED TO GIVE PROTECTION TO TARGET HAMLETS -- A SUBSTANTIAL SHIFT OF FORCES INTO

GENERALLY MORE FORWARD POSITIONS. IN OTHER WORDS, MOMENTUM IS CERTAINLY GOING ON THE GROUND, EVEN THOUGH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT HAS BEEN SOMEWHAT MUTED BY THE GVN'S PREOCCUPATION WITH PARIS AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH US. I AM NOT SURE WHAT THE NOVEMBER HES WILL SHOW; THERE SHOULD BE ANOTHER SUBSTANTIAL GAIN, ALTHOUGH POSSIBLY NOT AS GREAT AS KOMER'S GOODBYE PRESENT OF AN ALL TIME UMMP IN OCTOBER. OVERALL, IT BEGINS TO LOOK AS IF PRESIDENT THIEU'S GOAL OF 80 PERCENT RELATIVELY SECURE POPULATION BY END 1969 IS PRETTY MODEST AND WE MAY SUGGEST THAT HE RAISE IT TO 85 OR EVEN 90 PERCENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE END OF THE ACCELERATED CAMPAIGN. WILL KEEP THE HEAT ON, SO YOU CAN KNOCK DOWN THE SILLY NLF CLAIMS IN PARIS

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority GP-4
By mp, NARA, Date 2-26-5

PRESERVATION COPY

Monday, November 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agenda for NSC Meeting at Noon Today

1. International monetary situation

Secretary Fowler is prepared to report on the current monetary situation. His presentation will be informal. There will be time for discussion and questions, if you so desire.

2. Military situation in South Vietnam

General Wheeler is prepared to report informally on the tactical military situation in South Vietnam. He will relate U. S. operations in the countryside to the pacification program and summarize military actions planned for the period immediately ahead, on the assumption that the Paris talks will progress.

3. United Nations Problems

Ambassador Wiggins is prepared to speak briefly about current developments at the United Nations, including those which have arisen in the General Assembly now in session.

The most active issue is the Middle East problem. You might wish to ask Ambassador Wiggins:

- a. Are we doing everything we can to deal with the Arab refugee problem?
- b. Do we know what we will do if Ambassador Jarring gives up his negotiating effort?

There is attached a paper summarizing the outlook at the UN.

W. W. Rostow

52a

November 23, 1968

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

THE OUTLOOK AT THE UN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By NY, NARA, Date 2-20-98

1. Introduction

The current General Assembly Session has produced little high drama, and is proceeding through its agenda of close to 100 items along generally predictable lines. The session convened on September 24, while the world was still freshly concerned with the effects of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and at a time when Ambassador Gunnar Jarring's efforts to bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement seemed at a critical stage. Very little is now heard in UN corridors on the Vietnam problem, and much of the controversy had been removed with the beginning of the Paris Talks. The inability of the UN directly to influence the crisis situations in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia was accepted, but the Assembly nevertheless served as a sounding board for the views of nations with respect to these and other important political problems. As is customary, nearly 100 Foreign Ministers, including the Secretary of State, engaged in useful discussions on a very wide variety of problems during their attendance at the Assembly.

2. The General Debate:

While Vietnam was frequently mentioned in the Assembly's opening general debate, it was treated much more briefly than last year and with less direct criticism of the U.S. Many speakers highlighted the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and condemned it as inconsistent with the UN Charter. The current impasse in the Middle East came up frequently, but except for the parties, most speakers voiced support for the Jarring Mission and a sense of urgency that actual negotiations begin. Most open criticism came from the European and Latin American countries, including veiled references by Romania and Yugoslavia. About half the speakers mentioned Nigeria, concentrating on the humanitarian aspects of the Biafran conflict. About as many mentioned the Chinese representation issue. Those who favored some change usually emphasized the overriding need to find some way to associate Peking with disarmament measures.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

3. Membership and Representation:

With the admission of Equatorial Guinea to the UN on November 12, the United Nations attained a membership of 126.

The General Assembly disposed of the Chinese Representation issue again this year, with little change from the 1966 and 1967 scenarios. The so-called Albanian Resolution, which would admit Communist China and expel the Republic of China, was solidly defeated. A Western-sponsored proposal to establish a non-prejudicial study committee, which we voted for, was likewise rejected. The prospect for the future, however, is somewhat gloomy. Our position has been that the General Assembly, where all members are represented, should decide a question of such far-reaching significance for the Organization, but there are already signs that we must anticipate an unfriendly initiative in the Security Council early in the new year. With the election to the Council of Spain, Finland, Zambia, Nepal and Colombia, we will be facing a parliamentary situation in which 10 of the 15 members of the Council recognize Communist China and are on record as favoring its admission to the United Nations.

4. Specific Political Issues:

a. Southern African Problems: As it does each year, the Assembly and its Committees have already dealt at length with the questions of Rhodesia, Portuguese Territories, and apartheid, and it is about to begin discussing South West Africa. In all these instances the extreme, activist views of the Afro-Asian majorities tend to dominate the discourse and the resolutions adopted. While we share many of the Afro-Asian objectives, we have been forced either to abstain or vote no on the resolutions presented, because they call for the use of economic or military sanctions and other unacceptable measures. In the case of Rhodesia the Assembly, on learning of the possibility of a British agreement with the Southern Rhodesian regime, moved quickly to try to prevent the British from settling for any terms short of prior establishment of majority rule. We abstained on this resolution, which foreshadowed the controversy with which the UN would greet a Rhodesian settlement, when concluded; but we opposed the standard, comprehensive resolution on Southern Rhodesia. We abstained on the resolution condemning apartheid because of its extreme provisions. We were able to abstain on the resolution on the Portuguese territories, which was cast in relatively moderate terms.

b. Middle East: Refugees. The Assembly is now discussing in Committee the annual report of the Director General of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the organization responsible since 1949 for meeting the essential needs of the Arab refugees and helping in their rehabilitation. We expect the Agency's mandate, which expires on June 30, 1969, to be extended for at least three years, action which we support as necessary in light of the magnitude of the problem. Early in the debate we and the British both noted that no solution to the basic refugee problem can be anticipated except in the context of an overall Arab-Israeli settlement but that UNRWA's work must be strongly supported in the meantime. We also called particular attention to the problem of the persons displaced as a result of the 1967 hostilities; they now live in very difficult circumstances in Jordan. We expressed hope that Israel would take urgent steps to facilitate the return of these people to their homes in territory now occupied by Israel. The Israeli government is currently committed to receiving only a few thousand of these displaced persons.

The Arab-Israel dispute as such is not expected to be considered formally by the General Assembly or the Security Council before next year. The Secretary General's special representative, Ambassador Jarring, has concluded his efforts in New York to promote a settlement of the dispute directly with the parties; he will carry on elsewhere. We can expect, however, that the issue in its entirety will be discussed by delegates in speeches on the UNRWA item.

c. Korea: Each year the Assembly discusses the Korean problem and reaffirms its objective -- a unified, democratic Korea. Although formal debate has not begun, considerable controversy occurred on the subject during the organizational meetings of the Assembly, and it is clear that the Communists and other supporters of North Korea intend to make a stronger effort on behalf of their client than in previous years. Their point of attack, and our greatest vulnerability, has been the continued exclusion of North Korea from the annual debate on grounds that it refuses to acknowledge the UN's competence to deal with the question of Korean unification. Sentiment in the Assembly is moving toward hearing both Koreas unconditionally; but in the absence of some major development -- such as release of the Pueblo crew just before the debate -- we hope to hold the line again this year on an invitation to North

Korea which is conditional on its acceptance of UN competence to deal with the matter. In practice this has meant that only Republic of Korea spokesmen have been heard for Korea.

d. Disarmament: Consideration of disarmament and related items has only just begun in the General Assembly. It appears that the most active and controversial issue will be the question whether a new body should be created to carry on the work of the Non-Nuclear Conference (NNC) which concluded in Geneva on September 28. The Conference quite naturally emphasized the viewpoints of under-developed countries not possessing nuclear weapons, many of whom are dissatisfied with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A number of delegations have prepared a resolution which would, among other things, set up a committee to review and further international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among all states, with special regard to the needs of developing countries, and which would look toward strengthening the security assurances given by the nuclear powers under the NPT. The Committee would also follow the implementation of the conclusions of the NNC, as well as consider further steps in this area including the convening of a second non-nuclear conference, to be taken to strengthen the security assurances.

The United States is strongly opposed to the establishment of any such committee, which we believe would only interfere with the work of the organizations already established and active in the fields of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. We are consulting with other delegations in an effort to prevent action of this kind.

The General Assembly also has before it resolutions from the NNC in the fields of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, security assurances and disarmament. Some of these resolutions contain provisions with which we do not agree, and we are hopeful that the Assembly will merely convey the resolutions to the organizations concerned without endorsing them.

In their statement in the Assembly's Political Committee on the disarmament item, the Soviets declared their readiness to begin strategic arms limitation talks with the U.S. without delay. Our statement was not responsive. We anticipate that, as regards the general, ongoing negotiations on arms control matters, the Assembly will continue to rely on the Geneva Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). There is a strong move afoot to enlarge the ENDC by admitting Japan and others.

e. Czechoslovakia: In addition to Secretary Rusk's general debate speech, which dealt at length with the Czechoslovak question, attacking what has come to be known as the "Brezhnev Doctrine", we are using all appropriate occasions under specific agenda items to focus attention on the violation of the UN Charter by the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries. During the Legal Committee's discussion of the definition of aggression, the U.S. Representative, Senator Cooper, pointed out how Soviet action in Czechoslovakia ran counter to all elements of even the USSR-sponsored definition. Our delegation also intends to raise Soviet human rights and freedom of information violations in connection with Czechoslovakia when commemoration of International Human Rights Year is debated in the Third Committee. The U.S. Representative in the committee on principles of international law concerning friendly relations among states forcefully cited the Czech situation during discussion of the legal principles relevant to the Charter prohibition of the threat or use of force.

5. Issues of Potential Future Importance

a. Second Development Decade. At the suggestion of President Kennedy the General Assembly designated the 1960's as "The Development Decade". Under targets to be set by individual countries, the Decade had as an objective a 5% annual increase in national income by 1970. The developed nations were urged to increase their flow of capital assistance to the developing world to 1% of their gross national income, as soon as possible.

The Assembly now has before it the question of formally determining whether or not it should designate the 1970's as the "Second Development Decade". We believe there will be agreement in principle at this General Assembly. A basic problem which will eventually face us is the extent to which we should accept implied or explicit financial obligations to support the UN development strategy for the new "Decade".

b. Human Environment. There is increasing interest in the General Assembly in problems relating to the human environment and the harmful side effects technological change can have on our environment. More and more people are beginning to realize that the environment has finite limits, and that the pollution of air, water, and land can impair the future capability of man to enjoy an ever-increasing level of economic and social well-being. To focus world attention on these problems we are supporting a proposal in the General Assembly to convene, in 1972, the first general World Conference on Problems of the Human Environment.

c. Seabeds. The Assembly is considering ways in which, through international cooperation, the deep ocean floor can be exploited for peaceful purposes and in the common interest. The UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds, appointed last year, has submitted a report outlining some of the problems in this area and highlighting the deep differences of opinion which must be overcome. Our long-term objectives include support for the U.S.-sponsored International Decade of Ocean Exploration and an acceptable statement of legal principles to govern the exploration and use of the deep seabed. We are attempting to persuade General Assembly members that proceeding through consensus rather than voting by numerical majorities is the only alternative to a basic split between underdeveloped and advanced countries which would frustrate the whole exercise. We face fairly serious difficulties on such matters as the arms control aspects of the problem and the size of a continuing Assembly committee on the seabeds.

6. Budgetary Issues

Continuing recent trends, the less developed countries exerted increasing pressure for fuller participation in budget and organizational matters.

Aside from our normal difficulties in holding down the UN budget, we are encountering problems on two important issues that even more directly affect the United States. In one case, an attempt is being made to change the assessments against UN members for repaying the \$170,000,000 of UN bonds-sold to us (US share, \$76,000,000) and to others to meet Congo operation expenses -- a change which would have the United States pay more and the developing countries less. We are adamantly resisting this initiative because it would constitute a clear breach of a contractual obligation on the method of bond repayment. The second serious issue involves an attempt to increase our assessed share of the UN budget and lower that of the underdeveloped countries, by revising the ceiling principle which in 1957 set 30 percent as the desired maximum level of contribution for any single power. Since that time our contribution has been gradually lowered toward this level, and our rate of assessment now stands at 31.57 percent. We expect we can head off final decision against us on both these issues this year, but they will persist.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The question of expanding UN Headquarters in New York is also expected to come up later at this session. Although we are unable to make a financial commitment without consultation with and approval by Congress, we shall wish to support an engineering and architectural study by the Secretary-General of some highly imaginative plans for expansion prepared by the private Fund for Area Planning and Development. We would hope that the expansion package for New York would prove sufficiently attractive to counter moves in the General Assembly for shifting important United Nations functions from New York to Geneva.

ACTION

53

Sunday, November 24, 1968 -- 12:45 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

In the light of the publication of your note to de Gaulle, I believe it would be wise for you to send something like these two messages to Wilson and to Kiesinger.

W. W. Rostow

Messages approved _____

Approved as amended _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rla

53a

November 24, 1968

Draft message from the President to Prime Minister Wilson:

I concluded last night that it would be right for me to send a message to President de Gaulle as he faced this lonely and difficult moment. I thought the message might have some favorable effect on the program he announced to back his decision against devaluation and on the kind of cooperation that would be needed in the weeks and months ahead, in any case.

We shall all shortly know what de Gaulle's program is. We had no knowledge of it before the event.

I know, also, that the decisions you had to take after the Bonn meeting were painful and difficult. We have all learned how hard it is to keep both domestic balance and an international environment which permits world trade to continue to expand and the monetary system from falling apart. Thus far we have been successful; and if we stay with it, I believe we can make it to the other side.

You know you can count on our help and support, as always.

November 24, 1968

Draft message from the President to Chancellor Kiesinger

I have followed closely the meetings in Bonn. I know that you tried to make your contribution to the maintenance of international economic order. We both know it is not easy to reconcile domestic politics and policies with what is required to maintain the world trade and monetary system, on which the life of each and every one of our countries depends.

I am sure you agree it will be necessary for us to stay very close in the days ahead, working in the same spirit of cooperation that we have in the past.

INFORMATION

54

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Sunday, November 24, 1968
11:55 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Just for your information, here is the state of things as a result of our concerting with the South Vietnamese in an approach tomorrow to the TCC's.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 43315

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-508
By LS, NARA, Date 1-11-93

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

54a 5
TELEGRAM

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1968 NOV 24 AM 9 20

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DE RUMJIR 43315 3291400
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4962
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3003
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 43315

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-506

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

By AP/JP NARA, Date 1-8-98

SUBJ: COORDINATION WITH ICC

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PROPOSED DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM TO EMBASSIES IN BANGKOK, CANBERRA, MANILA, SEOUL AND WELLINGTON, TRANSMITTING TEXTS OF US AND GVN STATEMENTS AND ASKING THEIR ENDORSEMENT IN OUR OWN NAME AND IN THAT OF THE GVN. THIS MESSAGE HAVING BEEN APPROVED BY FOREIGN MINISTER THANH IN COURSE OF PROLONGED DISCUSSION, WE URGE THAT IT BE SENT WITHOUT CHANGE SINCE IT WILL REPRESENT IN EFFECT JOINT INSTRUCTIONS TO US AND GVN AMBASSADORS.

1. BEGIN TEXT. INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE USG AND THE GVN OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS HAVE BROUGHT AGREEMENT ON A US STATEMENT WHICH WILL ENABLE THE GVN TO ISSUE A STATEMENT OF ITS OWN, ANNOUNCING THAT IT IS NOW IN A POSITION TO ATTEND THE NEW PARIS MEETINGS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE GVN WE ARE NOW READY TO SEEK THE SUPPORT OF THE TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES FOR THE PROPOSED STATEMENTS.

2. YOU ARE THEREFORE REQUESTED TO CONTACT YOUR SENIOR GVN COLLEAGUE SHOW HIM THIS MESSAGE, WHICH HAS BEEN SEEN AND APPROVED BY FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN CHANH THANH, AND ARRANGE WITH HIM FOR A JOINT APPROACH TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL. (RE WELLINGTON, AMBASSADOR PHUONG IN CANBERRA WILL INFORM NEW ZEALAND REPRESENTATIVE THERE THAT US EMBASSY IN WELLINGTON WILL BE PROVIDING THE TEXTS ALSO ON BEHALF OF THE GVN.)

3. YOU AND YOUR GVN COLLEAGUE SHOULD EXPLAIN TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT THAT THE GVN AND THE USG HAVE, AFTER CAREFUL CONSULTATION, REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT OF TWO STATEMENTS WHICH IT IS HOPED TO ISSUE ON THE MORNING OF NOVEMBER 27 IN SAIGON. WHICH IS THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 26

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 43315, NOVEMBER 24, NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

IN WASHINGTON, ONE, BY THE USG, CONTAINS OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE NEW PARIS MEETINGS, OUR POSITION ON THE NON-RECOGNITION OF THE SO-CALLED NLF AND THE DRV, OUR OPPOSITION TO THE IMPOSITION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT, HOW WE INTEND TO TREAT THE OTHER SIDE, AND WHAT WILL BE OUR GENERAL APPROACH. THE OTHER STATEMENT, BY THE GVN, EXPLAINS HOW OUR STATEMENT HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GVN TO ATTEND THE NEW MEETINGS IN PARIS. THE TEXTS OF THE TWO STATEMENTS, WHICH YOU SHOULD FURNISH TO YOUR GVN COLLEAGUE AND WHICH YOU SHOULD JOINTLY PRESENT TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT, SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES.

4. YOU SHOULD TELL THE HOST GOVERNMENT THAT, AS INDICATED IN THE GVN STATEMENT, WE AND THE GVN WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THESE STATEMENTS HAVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES. CONCURRENCES OF THE HOST GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE URGENTLY TRANSMITTED TO WASHINGTON AND SAIGON THROUGH YOUR VIETNAMESE COLLEAGUE AND YOURSELF; HOPEFULLY IN TIME TO ENABLE US TO MEET THE CONTEMPLATED RELEASE TIME. YOU SHOULD STRESS THE URGENCY OF THIS MATTER AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ABSOLUTE SECRECY UNTIL THE STATEMENTS ARE ISSUED IN SAIGON AND WASHINGTON.

5. FOREIGN MINISTER THANH HAS AUTHORIZED THE USE OF U.S. COMMUNICATION FACILITIES TO PASS THE RESPONSES OF THE HOST GOVERNMENTS TO THE GVN IN SAIGON WHEREVER THIS WOULD PROVIDE MORE RAPID AND SECURE TRANSMISSION.

6. THE TEXTS OF THE TWO STATEMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS (OR: FOLLOW IN SEPARATE MESSAGE). END TEXT

7. A SMALL EDITING CHANGE. THE GVN WISHED TO USE THE WORD "MEETING" IN SINGULAR IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3, POINTING TO THE FACT THAT THE WORD IS USED IN THE SINGULAR ALSO IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE US STATEMENT. WE SAID THIS CARRIES THE IMPLICATION

THAT THERE MIGHT BE ONLY ONE SESSION. THEY AGREED. WE SUGGESTED USING "MEETINGS" IN PLURAL, WHICH IS ALSO FOUND IN THE REST OF THE US STATEMENT. THEY AGREED ON CONDITION THAT "MEETING" SHOULD BE CHANGED TO "MEETINGS" ALSO IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE US STATEMENT. WE SO RECOMMEND. IF FOR ANY REASON THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE, "MEETINGS" WOULD HAVE TO BE CHANGED BACK TO "MEETING" IN PARAS 1 AND 3 ABOVE.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS*Profile*

Sunday, November 24, 1968 -- 11:40 a. m.

Mr. President:

Here is where we stand in Saigon after contact with Foreign Minister Thanh:

-- If we agree to certain minor changes in the telegram to the troop contributing countries, both we and the South Vietnamese can dispatch messages to them today. Saigon's ambassadors and ours will concert tomorrow in each capital in presenting the matter to the troop contributors.

-- With three minor changes, the U. S. proposed amendments to the GVN statement are agreed.

-- The South Vietnamese NSC would be informed tomorrow, November 25, "that agreement had been reached on both statements"; that is, the U. S. statement and the GVN communique. They would also be informed that "as soon as the concurrences from the TCC capitals were received, the GVN would announce that it would send a delegation to Paris." (para. 8)

-- On timing of GVN delegation's arrival in Paris, they would probably not be able to make it for Wednesday, November 27, but Thursday was "quite probably" okay but "not yet entirely certain." (para. 9)

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 43314

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-508
By lij, NARA, Date 1-11-93

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

56

Profile



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Nov. 24, 1968
8:30 AM

Mr President

The press and radio services are carrying the story which is marked under tab "A". We have checked out this story with the various agencies of the intelligence community and have been informed that there is little stock being placed in it.

The State telegram marked tab "B" is from Belgrade and states that the embassy has observed no change in the situation in Yugoslavia.

Briefing Officer
Situation Room

56a

AP 168

YUGOSLAV (NEW TOP)

(LONDON)--A LONDON NEWSPAPER SAYS YUGOSLAVIA HAS DECLARED A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND MOBILIZED SEVERAL THOUSAND DEFENSE UNITS FOR A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET BLOC.

THE NEWSPAPER, THE OBSERVER, SAYS "EMERGENCY MEASURES TAKEN IN THE PAST 48 HOURS INVOLVE EVERY YUGOSLAV AGED BETWEEN 17 AND 65."

THERE IS NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE YET TO CONFIRM OR DISPROVE THE REPORT. THE NEWSPAPER GIVES NO SOURCE FOR THE MOBILIZATION REPORT. IT QUOTES THE YUGOSLAV NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL AS SAYING EVERY CITIZEN KNOWS HIS TASKS AND PLACE IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY.

THE NEWSPAPER SAYS YUGOSLAV LEADERS ARE CONVINCED THAT RUSSIA IS MAKING RENEWED PREPARATIONS TO SILENCE THE INDEPENDENT COMMUNIST NATION. IT SAYS PRESIDENT TITO HAS RECEIVED REPORTS OF MAJOR SOVIET AIR BUILDUPS IN HUNGARY AND BULGARIA.

WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION, THE NEWSPAPER SAYS TITO HAS WARNED WARSAW PACT LEADERS OF DIPLOMATIC RETALIATION IF PROPAGANDA AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA DOES NOT STOP.

THE COUNTER-MEASURES ARE SAID TO BE THE RECALL OF YUGOSLAVIA'S AMBASSADORS FROM SOVIET BLOC CAPITALS AND A BREAK WITH COMMUNIST PARTIES ALLIED WITH MOSCOW.

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ACTION EUR 20INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,CCO 00,GPM 04,
H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,SAH 02,SAL 01,
SA 01,NIC 01,IO 13,RSR 01,/097 W

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O 241009Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4593

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BELGRADE 5037

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

PASS DIA/NMCC

REF: STATE 277018

1. NOTHING HERE INDICATES ANY CHANGE IN SITUATION IN YUGOSLAVIA AS REPORTED OVER PAST SEVERAL DAYS TO STATE AND DEFENSE AND AS REITERATED THIS MORNING TO NMCC/CINCEUR BY DEFENSE ATTACHE IN SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO QUERY ON OBSERVER ARTICLE. STATUS OF YUGOSLAV ARMED FORCES APPEARS TO BE NORMAL WITH NO INDICATION OF REACTION TO ANY ABNORMAL, UNUSUAL OR EMERGENCY SITUATION.

2. OBSERVER ARTICLE APPEARS TO BE BASED ON PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS OF DRAFT OF NEW YUGOSLAV NATIONAL DEFENSE LAW WHICH PRESCRIBES RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF WHOLE POPULATION UNDER A GENERAL MOBILIZATION CONCEPT IN RESPONDING TO ANY ENEMY ATTACK AND WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION SINCE SEPTEMBER. NUMBER OF PRESS ARTICLES ON DRAFT LAW HAS INCREASED AS TIME FOR FINAL LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL APPROACHES. MOST RECENT HAVE PROCIDED DETAILS ON AGES AND FAMILY STATUS OF PEOPLE OBLIGED TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN ALL-OUT DEFENSE EFFORT. AS MENTIONED IN OBSERVER ARTICLE ALL MALES 16 TO 65 SO OBLIGED. AIRGRAM ON DETAILED PROVISIONS OF LAW IN PREPARATION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~PAGE 02 BELGRA 05037 241019Z~~

3. I AM ENDEAVORING TO SEE APPROPRIATE HIGH FONOFF OFFICIAL THIS MORNING RE OBSERVER ARTICLE AND WILL REPORT HIS COMMENTS.

EXEMPT. ELBRICK



Department of State

55a5
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

1968 NOV 24 AM 9 11

VV CRA657
OO RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 43314 3291345
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
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STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 43314

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: A. STATE 276616

B. SAIGON 43345

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ALJ 91-506

By mp/isp NARA, Date 1-8-98

06962 P

1. WE SUBMITTED TO FOREIGN MINISTER THANH THIS MORNING A "WORKING DRAFT" OF INSTRUCTIONS TO OUR EMBASSIES IN THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES, TO CONCERT WITH THEIR GVN COUNTERPARTS IN GETTING ENDORSEMENT OF THE US AND GVN STATEMENTS.
2. WE PROPOSED A RELEASE TIME OF 0900 HOURS NOVEMBER 27 IN SAIGON, WHICH IS 2000 HOURS NOVEMBER 26 IN WASHINGTON, AS TARGET TO SHOOT FOR.
3. THANH AGREED IN PRINCIPLE BUT SAID THE GVN ALSO WISHED TO COMMUNICATE SEPARATELY WITH ICC GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE SURE THAT ANY STATEMENTS THEY MIGHT MAKE BY WAY OF ENDORSEMENT WOULD PUT THE RIGHT INTERPRETATION ON THE PRINCIPAL POINTS ON WHICH WE HAD AGREED. WE SAID THIS WOULD BE TIME-CONSUMING. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE ANY SUCH GVN MESSAGE SINCE IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR US TO ADDRESS MESSAGES OF OUR OWN TO THE ICC GOVERNMENTS. IF THERE WAS GOING TO BE AN EFFORT TO ELICIT PUBLIC INTERPRETATIONS OF OUR STATEMENT, WASHINGTON MIGHT NOT THINK THAT THAT COULD BE LEFT ONLY TO SAIGON. WE URGED THANH TO CONTENT HIMSELF WITH SIMPLE CONCURRENCES THAT WOULD ENABLE THE GVN TO SAY THAT ITS DECISION AND THE STATEMENT ON WHICH IT WAS BASED, HAD THE APPROVAL OF THE ICC. ANYTHING MORE COULD INVOLVE VERY CONSIDERABLE DELAY.
4. THANH WAS DIFFICULT AS USUAL AND EXPOSTULATED THAT ASIAN PSYCHOLOGY REQUIRES THAT VIETNAM'S FIGHTING ALLIES BE NOT TREATED LIKE GUESTS AT A DINNER WHO ARE JUST ASKED TO EAT WHAT WAS SET BEFORE THEM; THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN THE FEELING THAT THEY HAD

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 43314, NOVEMBER 24, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

HAD A ROLE IN DETERMINING THE MENU. AT LEAST THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY MORE THAN YES. AFTER FURTHER ARGUMENT THANH UNDERTOOK TO CONSULT THIEU AND LET US KNOW IN THE EVENING.

5. THIS EVENING HAVING SEEN THIEU IN THE LATE AFTERNOON, THANH FINALLY BACKED AWAY FROM THE IDEA OF DETAILED SUGGESTIONS TO THE TCC, BUT HE PROPOSED A NUMBER OF CHANGES IN OUR DRAFT TELEGRAM OF INSTRUCTIONS(SEPTEL), SOME DESIGNED TO POINT OUT WHAT THE GVN CONSIDERS TO BE THE SALIENT FEATURES OF OUR STATEMENT. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION WE ARRIVED AT A MESSAGE WHICH TO US SEEMS ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE. IT MAY NOT IN ALL RESPECTS HAVE THE MOST FELICITOUS WORDING, BUT UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT FINDS SERIOUS FAULT WITH IT--IT NOW REPRESENTS AN AGREED INSTRUCTION FOR BOTH THE US AND GVN CHIEFS OF MISSION.

6. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THAT MESSAGE WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO WASHINGTON AND SENT OUT TODAY SUNDAY, THANH SAID HE WAS SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GVN MISSION CHIEFS IN THE TCC THIS VERY EVENING TO CONCERT WITH THEIR AMERICAN COLLEAGUES TOMORROW ON THE BASIS OF THE MORE DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS THEY WOULD BE RECEIVING THROUGH THEM.

7. THANH ALSO SPECIFICALLY CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE US STATEMENT AND THE US-PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE GVN STATEMENT ARE AGREED. THERE ARE HOWEVER THREE MINOR RETOUCHINGS:

A. IN THE US STATEMENT(REF A) "MEETINGS" IN FIRST PARAGRAPH PLURAL INSTEAD OF SINGULAR.

B. IN THE GVN STATEMENT(REF B) WHICH EARLIER THEY CALLED A "COMMUNIQUE"), PARAGRAPH 2 WILL READ : "AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SUBMITTED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM A STATEMENT. BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, THAT STATEMENT IS BEING MADE PUBLIC IN BOTH SAIGON AND WASHINGTON AT THIS TIME."

C. IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE GVN STATEMENT , FIRST SENTENCE, CHANGE "RESULTS" TO "AGREEMENTS".

D. IN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4, THE BRACKETS AROUND THE WORD "INTRANSIGENT" SHOULD BE REMOVED.

E. THE BRACKETED FIVE LAST WORDS OF THE GVN STATEMENT("CONCERNING THE RESTORATION OF PEACE") ARE TO BE DELETED COMPLETELY.

8. THANH FURTHER SAID HE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE INFORMED TOMORROW NOVEMBER 25 THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON BOTH STATEMENTS AND THAT AS SOON AS THE CONCURRENCES FROM THE

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 43314, NOVEMBER 24, HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

ICC CAPITALS WERE RECEIVED, THE GVN WOULD ANNOUNCE THAT IT WOULD SEND A DELEGATION TO PARIS.

9. THERE REMAINED ONLY ONE POINT TO BE CLARIFIED, HANH SAID. IN DECIDING TO GO TO PARIS, THE GVN HAS NOT YET DECIDED THE DATE WHEN ITS DELEGATION WOULD BE ON HAND AND ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PROCEEDINGS. WE ASKED HOW THIS REMARK WAS TO BE INTERPRETED. IF IT WAS A MATTER OF ONE OR TWO DAYS, EVERYONE WOULD UNDERSTAND; IF IT WAS MORE, THERE MIGHT BE NEED FOR EXPLANATIONS. THANH SAID HE MERELY MEANT THAT SINCE THE USUAL DAY OF THE MEETINGS HAD BEEN WEDNESDAY, HE WISHED IT TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GVN WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO HAVE ITS DELEGATION IN PARIS ON WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 27. WE ASKED IF IT MIGHT BE THE NEXT FOLLOWING DAY, AND THANH SAID THURSDAY WAS QUITE PROBABLY BUT NOT YET ENTIRELY CERTAIN.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

57

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, November 23, 1968 -- 4:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Shortly after you came to office, we had a very precarious Venezuelan election which turned out to be the first time power was peacefully passed in Venezuela in modern times through the democratic process. The attached cable indicates that (fingers crossed) the election on December 1 is also likely to go off peacefully.

W. W. Rostow

Caracas 9003

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ky, NARA, Date 2-20-98

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

TELEGRAM

57a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 866

FYI WWR

PAGE 01 CARACA 09003 221631Z

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ACTION ARA 16

-Su

INFO NSA 02, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, EUR 15, AID 28, RSR 01, PC 04, NIC 01,
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AMCONSUL PUERTO LA CRUZ UNN

- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- FR ED
- G. BOURGON
- JOHNSON
- JORDEN
- KEENE
- LEONHART
- LEWIS
- M. ROSS
- SANDERS
- TAYLOR
- V. P.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CARACAS 9003

SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN ELECTIONS 1968

1. SUMMARY: WITH DECEMBER 1 NEAR, VENEZUELAN ELECTION STILL APPEAR TO BE EXTREMELY CLOSE. NO PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IS EXPECTED TO WIN MORE THAT 30 PERCENT OF VOTE. EACH OF FOUR LEADING CANDIDATES COULD WIN OVER 20 PERCENT. AS CLIMAX OF LONG AND HARD FOUGHT CAMPAIGN APPROACHES, TEMPER ARE GROWING SHORT. INCIDENCE OF FIGHTS AND DISTURBANCES BETWEEN PARTY GROUPS IS INCREASING, BUT IN GENERAL THE SITUATION IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE DANGEROUS. MILITARY CONTINUES IN ITS ROLE AS GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. COMMUNISTS STILL ON GOOD BEHAVIOUR FOR ELECTORAL PURPOSES.

2. PRESIDENTIAL RACE: BACKERS OF MAIN CANDIDATES BARRIOS (ADI BURELLI (FRETE), CALDERA (COPEI), AND PRIETO (MEP) REMAIN HONESTLY CONVINCED THAT THEIR OWN CANDIDATE WILL WIN. INDEED, EACH CANDIDATE HAS BEEN SUPPORTED BY IMPRESSIVE ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS AND HAVE EXPENDED EXTRAVAGANTLY BOTH MONEY AND ENERGY. MANY CARACAS OBSERVERS ARE CONVINCED RACE IS NOW BETWEEN BARRIOS AND CALDERA. COPEI LEADERS AND OTHERS, HOWEVER, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT RESURGING PRIETO, WHOM THEY NOW CONSIDER TO BE A CLOSE THIRD. FEW OF THESE OBSERVERS BELIEVE BURELLI TO BE A THREAT. EMBASSY, ATTEMPTING TO QUANTIFY GENERAL IMPRESSIONS FROM VISITS AND INTERVIEWS THROUGHOUT COUNTRY, ASSESSES PRESENT RELATIVE CANDIDATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 12, NARA, Date 2-20-18



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 CARACA 09003 221631Z

STRENGTHS AS FOLLOWS: CALDERA FIRST, FOLLOWED EXTREMELY CLOSELY BY PRIETO, AND BARRIOS, AND FINALLY BURELLI. ALL SEEM TO BE WITHIN 20-30 PERCENT RANGE. OTHER CANDIDATES BORREGALES AND ALEJANDRO HERNANDEZ NOT LIKELY TO GAIN MUCH MORE THAN 2 PERCENT OF POPULAR VOTE. AN ESTIMATED 6 PERCENT OF VOTERS HAVE PROBABLY NOT YET DECIDED HOW THEY WILL VOTE.

3. CANDIDATES: CALDERA, TRADITIONALLY STRONG IN ANDES AND SURPRISINGLY POPULAR IN ZULIA, MAY TALLY OVER 33 PERCENT IN WEST WHERE 49 PERCENT OF ELECTORATE RESIDES. HE IS FAVORED TO WIN IN STATES OF BARINAS, LARA, MERIDA, TACHIRA, TRUJILLO, AND YARACUY. HE SHOULD BE CLOSE IN APURE, PORTUGUESA, AND ZULIA. PRIETO IS EXPECTED TO PULL HIS STRENGTH FROM EAST WHICH REPRESENTS 18 PERCENT OF ELECTORATE AND FROM POORER PARTS OF CENTRAL URBAN AREA WHERE REMAINING 33 PERCENT OF ELECTORATE RESIDES, PLUS POPULOUS STATE OF ZULIA IN WEST. PRIETO COULD WIN STATES OF ANZOATEGUI, BOLIVAR, FALCON, MIRANDA, NUEVA ESPARTA, SUCRE, AND ZULIA. HE WILL BE A STRONG CONTENDER IF NOT THE WINNER IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT AND ARAGUA. HE WILL ALSO BE CLOSE IN MONAGAS.

BARRIOS, WITH AD GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, WILL ALSO BE STRONG IN EAST AND IN MOST RURAL STATES. ONE NATIONAL POLL SHOWS HIM LEADING COUNTRY, AD STRATEGISTS HOPE FOR STRONG AND BALANCED (EVEN IF NOT FIRST PLACE) SHOWING IN ALL AREAS TO GIVE BARRIOS OVERALL WINNING NATIONAL TOTAL. HE SHOULD WIN IN APURE, COJEDES, GUARICO, MONAGAS, PORTUGUESA, AND DELTA AMACURO. HE SHOULD ALSO DO WELL IN ANZOATEGUI, BARINAS, BOLIVAR, CARABOBO, SUCEE, YARACUY, AND AMAZONAS.

BURELLI, WHOSE TRIPARTITE STRENGTH IS HARD TO GAUGE, COULD SURPRISE IN URBAN AREAS. HE COULD WIN IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT, ARAGUA, AND CARABOBO AS WELL AS AMAZONAS. HE MAY ALSO DO WELL IN BOLIVAR, FACON, MIRANDA, SUCRE, AND DELTA AMACURO.

4. ELECTION CLIMATE: TENSIONS ARE MOUNTING. CARNIVAL ATMOSPHERE OF PARADES AND COMPETING POLITICAL SIDESHOWS HAVE SPARKED NUMEROUS INCIDENTS AND STREET BRAWLS. SHOTS HAVE BEEN FIRED, BUT INJURIES HAVE MOSTLY RESULTED FROM FIGHTS. NO DEATHS REPORTED. PUBLIC NERVOUSNESS, SPECIFICALLY FEAR OF SUCH INCIDENTS, HAS RISEN SOMEWHAT. PEOPLE IN RURAL AREAS, PARTICULARLY IN EAST, ARE FEARFUL OF INCREASED GUERRILLA INSURGENCY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGE 03 CARACA 09003 221631Z

ELECTIONS. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL, CHURCH AND PARTIES HAVE ALL APPEALED FOR PEACE AND CALM. POLITICAL LEADERS CONSIDER CLIMATE WITHIN VENEZUELAN CONTEXT TO BE NORMAL AT THIS STAGE.

5. MILITARY ROLE

RUMORS RE MILITARY PLOTTING HAVE BEEN CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT PAST FEW DAYS. DEFENSE MINISTER GOMEZ IS BACK ON JOB. PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY RANKING MILITARY REITERATE THEIR DEDICATION TO HISTORICALLY RECENT ROLE AS PROTECTOR OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. WHILE CERTAIN MILITARY LEADERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE PRIETO VICTORY BECAUSE OF PCV AND OTHER LEFTIST SUPPORT, THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE INDICATES THEY WILL FOLLOW WAIT AND WATCH POLICY WITH PRIETO GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN INITIATE RASH ACTION DURING POST-ELECTORAL PERIOD. OTHERWISE MILITARY FULLY INVOLVED WITH PLAN RUPUBLICA (TO SAFEGUARD ELECTIONS) AND ANTI-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN.)

6. EXTREME LEFTIST ACTIVITIES

COMMUNISTS CONTINUE PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE POLICY IN BID REGAIN POLITICAL RESPECTABILITY AS WELL AS CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION FROM ELECTIONS. THEIR BEHAVIOR AFTER DECEMBER 1, DEPENDING ON ELECTION RESULTS, MAY REVERT TO MORE BELLICOSE MOLD IF PCV LEADERS SEE POSSIBLE GAIN FROM POLICY CHANGE. RADICAL ELEMENTS ARE ALSO DEEPLY INVOLVED IN PRIN CAMPAIGN. BULK OF ULTRA LEFTIST MIR GROUP CONTINUES BOYCOTT OF ELECTIONS PLUS TALK AND SPORADIC EFFORTS TO DISRUPT ELECTORAL PROCESS BUT WITH MINIMAL RESULTS TO DATE. MOST LEFTISTS ARE SUPPORTING PRIETO CANDIDACY ALTHOUGH BURELLI MAY ALSO RECEIVE SOME OF THEIR VOTES.

7. HONEST ELECTIONS

THROUGH SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL, GOV HAS SET UP ELABORATE AND IMPRESSIVE VOTING NETWORK. OFFICIAL AND PARTY LEADERS ARE REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT SYSTEM WILL ENSURE HONEST ELECTIONS. GOV OFFICIALS, FROM PRESIDENT LEONI ON DOWN, PROMISE RESULTS OF ELECTION WILL BE FAITHFULLY FOLLOWED BY PRESENT ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT REINS WILL BE TURNED OVER TO WHOEVER WINS ON DECEMBER 1.

BERNBAUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Free file

Saturday, November 23, 1968
4:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith what we know about the
lost aircraft.

Conclusion: "Preliminary
analysis indicates that the aircraft
probably was shot down by NVN air
defense fires; however, this has not
been confirmed."

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By , NARA, Date 2-20-91

~~SECRET~~

58a



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 November 1968
1155 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

Costow

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft Loss

Reference: NMCC MFR of 230600 EST November 1968, subject as above

1. The cause of loss of the USAF RF-4C, down on a tactical air reconnaissance mission 4 nautical miles north-northwest of Dong Hoi in North Vietnam, remains unknown.

2. The crew of the escort aircraft reported observing tremendous torching approximately 50 to 75 feet long from the reconnaissance aircraft engine, followed almost immediately by yaw. The left wing then broke off, and the aircraft pitched up and broke in two in front of the tail and was enveloped in flames. It then became a huge fireball and plummeted into the ground. No chutes were observed. However, approximately 2 or 3 minutes later a loud persistent beeper was heard and the Radar Intercept Officer (RIO) came up on voice and stated that his parachute was burned and that he was okay, but bad guys were all around and he needed help. No further contact with the downed crew was reported.

3. The escort aircraft, while conducting search and rescue (SAR) operations, observed tracers estimated as 23-mm or 37-mm fire from five guns. The barrage and tracking fire was reported as being inaccurate. The escort aircraft was armed with two AIM-7 (SPARROW) missiles.

4. SAR operations involved a total of 25 aircraft. A listing of these aircraft and the ordnance carried is attached. SAR activity was suspended at nightfall except electronic search which continues. All SAR aircraft with the exception of three F-100s and the escort aircraft, remained outside the 12-mile seaward limit of North Vietnamese territory. No ordnance was expended by any aircraft involved in the escort mission or SAR operations.

5. Preliminary analysis indicates that the aircraft probably was shot down by NVN air defense fires; however, this has not been confirmed.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority *DoD Directives*
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *2-20-78*

~~SECRET~~

6. North Vietnam (Hanoi) radio claims the plane was shot down by their gunners and the pilot was immediately captured. The captured airman referred to is probably the Radar Intercept Officer.

M. W. Kendall

M. W. KENDALL
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

1 Atch
a/s

Distribution:

WHSR
SEC STATE
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AFCP
NFP

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58

SAR AIRCRAFT

<u>NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>TYPE OF AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>*ORDNANCE CARRIED</u>
2	HH-3	
1	HC-130	
6	A-1	Napalm and CBU 25 bombs
3	F-100F	20-mm gun pods and white phosphorus rockets.
6	F-4	750-1b bombs and CBU 24 bombs.
7	F-105	750-1b bombs, CBU 24 bombs, and 2.75-inch rockets.
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>25</u>	

* No ordnance expended.

~~SECRET~~

59

INFORMATION

Saturday, November 23, 1968 -- 3:30 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The pilot of the missing aircraft over North Vietnam is Captain Bradley Cuthbert, the navigator is Captain Mart J. Ruhling.

W. W. Rostow

wwrostow:rla

60

Per file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, November 23, 1968 -- 12:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the cable from Sec. Rusk to Amb. Bowles, as you indicated it should be redrafted.

25X1A

"We have carefully reviewed your message, transmitted through [REDACTED]. However, after consideration of all aspects of this complex issue, we believe it best to assist the Paks to buy some tanks from a third country.

"Since the dispatch of State 274578, we have had further discussion at the highest level of the bases for that decision. Although the President did not make a personal firm commitment to Ayub, we have decided the present arrangement is best under all the circumstances."

W. W. Rostow

P. S. Also attached is the critical memorandum of October 22, 1968, to the President from Nick Katzenbach.

Message approved _____

No _____

Call me _____

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-019-043001/1

By jc NARA, Date 12-29-09

Not Referred to NSC Per NSC Waiver
Review STATE Equities*

*NARA/Library To

WWRostow:rlm

3207
60a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1968

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Tanks for Pakistan

We are again at a crossroads on Pakistan's desire to acquire M-47 tanks. We have made a very hard try to find a third country supplier. Belgium and Italy, which once were on the verge of selling to Pakistan, have pulled back, primarily for domestic political reasons over which we have no control. So has West Germany. The remaining options have drawbacks and whether we pursue them at this time depends in large part on your feelings about the commitment made to Ayub.

If you are satisfied that your promise to Ayub was a "best endeavors" effort to assist the Paks in every way to buy from third countries, then I think a good case can be made that we have discharged that obligation and, with one possible exception, which I will discuss below nothing more need be done by this Administration.

If, on the other hand, you feel that getting the tanks to Ayub is required regardless of our preferred policy of no direct sales of lethal end-items, then we should examine how to do this and what the consequences might be.

The options as we see them are as follows:

Maintaining Present Policy

1. Third Country Sale by Turkey: We have made a strong pitch to the Turks to sell 100 of their old US MAP M-47s to Pakistan. The Paks would pay a total of \$1.5 million based on residual value. If we added this

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ-0198-43-1-4

By LKA NAR, Date 12-08-2017

\$1.5 million to the Turkish MAP, it would, however, only enable the Turks to get an extra 35-40 more sophisticated M-48s from us.

Ambassador Hart believes that the Turks will not settle for less than a one-for-one replacement. To get 100 M-48s to the Turks would cost us about \$3 million more (additional to the \$1.5 million the Paks would pay for the M-47s) to pay for rehabilitated M-48s. However, the Paks have recently reiterated their understanding that what was discussed was 200 tanks, in two tranches of 100 tanks each; if the number of tanks is 200, and assuming that there is a commitment, the cost to the US would be about \$6 million in order to encourage Turkey to sell 200 as-is where-is M-47s to Pakistan for \$3 million. DOD would have difficulty finding this money in the current tight situation and, in the end, it would probably mean cutting another program in the area by a like amount. We believe that only a decision on the first 100 tanks is necessary now. The decision on the second 100 tanks can and should be left to the next administration.

2. An Iranian Third Country Sale: Iran has indicated it would sell the Paks 100 of its old M-47s if we allowed it to buy 100 new tanks (probably M-60s) to replace them. This would add at least \$22 million to Iran's already planned purchases which we have been trying to keep down and which have caused some concern on the Hill.

Changing our Present Policy

3. One-time Exception to Existing Ban on Direct US Sale of Lethal End-Items to India and Pakistan: We could make a one-time exception to existing policy to meet what appears to be a legitimate Pakistani need. This would be difficult all around. The policy has been endorsed by the SIG and defended to Congress and the public as appropriate to the situation in 1967 and early

1968. Our only justification for an exception would be that its third country sales provisions are proving unworkable. In which case, the obvious question is why not change them. Also, the one-time exception idea would not be believed by either India or Pakistan, both of which would regard it as a return to the status quo ante pre - 1965 war.

4. Remove the Ban on Direct Lethal End-Item Sales to India and Pakistan and Consider These on a Case-by-Case Basis as we do with Spare Parts and Non-Lethal Items: The cases would be decided on criteria now followed in deciding sales of lethal spares and in approving sales by third countries; that there is a clearly established critical need and that such sales contribute to arms limitation or reduced military expenditure and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance between the two. Also the items should not be additive, at least in terms of the normal concepts of military power. In addition, we would have to go beyond these general criteria in order to meet both the letter and spirit of the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments.

If we open this door on tanks we must do so in the knowledge that the Government of Pakistan wants, in the words of Foreign Minister Arshad Husain, 'their arms to be in large part of U.S. origin'. By this they mean, in addition to the 200 tanks, at least seven (and possibly fifty) F-104 interceptors, five B-57 bombers, four hundred 106mm recoilless rifles, one hundred and twenty-five 175mm guns, sixteen patrol boats with missiles, etc. The Indians, without mentioning numbers, have recently spoken of an interest in purchasing A4E, F-4 and even F-111 aircraft. These are expensive items. Our present guess is that both sides would desire to purchase greater amounts than we will consider their economies could afford. Despite their requests we could hold their purchases from the U.S. to a figure which we would establish as reasonable.

However, we do not know where this changed sales policy might lead, nor the political effects of failing to make additional sales after notifying both countries that the ban has been lifted.

These then are the options. There are two arguments for changing our policy at this time:

1. We have a commitment to Ayub that should in all justice be honored. We have tried the third country route and failed and now owe him the tanks;

2. Our policy needs to be changed in any event and this is a good opportunity.

The first point needs no amplification. On the second, a case can be made that we cannot, and in effect have not, had a static policy. In 1965 we cut off all military assistance to both countries. In 1966, we agreed to resume shipment of certain non-lethal items. For the last 18 months, we have been prepared to see certain lethal items sold from third countries. Now, it can be argued, we should move to a case-by-case direct sale policy so that we can have some supplier relationship to both parties again and meet their wishes not to be completely dependent on Communist sources.

Against this line of argument, I would put essentially two points. This is a choice better left to your successor. (Although some would argue that, since a new administration will be forced in this direction; an outgoing administration can more easily take the heat that will inevitably follow.) The second point is that there would be great flak, particularly in the Congress where our pre-1965 sales to both sides was felt to have fueled an arms race that led to a conflict. Tanks for Pakistan and many of the other items either India or Pakistan are likely to want from us are mainly related to Pak/Indian hostility and not the Chinese threat. This would be seen as a failure of US policy and portrayed as such publicly. I recognize that by January and with a new administration this

reaction might not be as great as I foresee. But, as Bill Gaud strongly feels, we must take account of the effect this could have on aid legislation in the next Congress.

One word about Peshawar. I do not think that your decision ought to be taken in relation to the current Peshawar talks. These now seem to be moving along in the right direction. The commitment to Ayub was not linked to Peshawar and we should not now look at it in that light. Ben Oehlert continues to feel that a favorable move on the tanks would ease relations in the period when we are closing the base. The Peshawar episode may, however, affect your judgment on that grey area of choice about how far we are willing to go to meet Ayub's desires on hardware.

In sum, and these conclusions are shared by my SIG colleagues, if we had the choice we would not change our policy at this time. We would push ahead on the Turk sale (Option 1) even though it involves about \$3 million, and, if it should fail, inform the Paks that we had reached the end of the line and are unprepared to move to direct sale.

We recognize, however, that you may feel more of a commitment than we read into the language of your statements to Ayub. In which case, we believe the case-by-case policy (Option 4) is preferred and that the situation, although difficult and not without risk, is manageable.

Before proceeding on any of the options, Congressional consultation would be required. This will not be satisfactory after adjournment but we will try to reach as many of the interested Congressional leaders as possible.


Recommendation for decision:

Approve Option One and if no sale can be arranged from Turkey inform the GOP that we have exhausted possibilities of a sale and further progress in this matter is up to them.

Approve Option One and if that does not work move to Option Four

Approve Option Three

Do nothing more and notify Paks they will have to take up with the next Administration


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

61

Pro file

Saturday, November 23, 1968 -- 11:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Sec. Clifford's Press Conference of November 12, 1968

This memorandum for the record is set down at the instruction of the President.

Sec. Clifford's remarks on November 12, 1968, indicating that we might proceed with talks in Paris without the GVN, were made without prior discussion or clearance with the President. At that time the President was not prepared to act along the lines that the Secretary suggested; nor was he prepared to clear a public statement indicating that this would be a possibility.

On the other hand, the President had encouraged Sec. Clifford and Sec. Rusk to have press conferences. He knew that Sec. Clifford would have a press conference on November 12, 1968. They did not discuss the content of his position before the event.

This does not mean that the President might not, at some stage, have taken action to open talks without the GVN. But he did not feel at the time that the situation justified such action. The President spoke to me to the same effect as the above on the day of Sec. Clifford's press conference, when word of its content came in over the press wires.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

ACTION

62

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Saturday, November 23, 1968 -- 11:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, after my discussion of Nick's telegram with State, is a message from Sec. Rusk which:

- responds to Bowles' long message; and
- corrects Nick's previous telegram from commitment to "commitment to do our best."

Nick has cleared. Sec. Rusk has also now cleared.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/55, State Dept. Guidelines
By *lj*, NARA, Date *2-20-98*

WWRostow:rla

3555

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: collect
 message to

~~SECRET~~

Classification

62a

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy New Delhi PRIORITY

STATE

NODIS

The President and I appreciate the concerns expressed in the message you have transmitted through [REDACTED]. However, after a lengthy interagency review at highest levels of all aspects of this complex issue, we decided that we did not have a commitment to do our best to assist the Paks to buy from a third-country. This is the commitment cited in the Under Secretary's separate telegram to rx you.

25X1

END

Drafted by S/S:JPWalsh:hbb	11/22/68	Tel. No. 7741	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by S - The Secretary
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White House

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 019-043-1-2
By [Signature], NARA, Date 1/21/02

Classification

63

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS

Saturday, November 23, 1968 -- 10:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pro file

Herewith three exceedingly hopeful cables:

-- At Tab A we are informed that the South Vietnamese NSC has accepted our draft.

-- At Tab B the South Vietnamese gives us a draft communique announcing their willingness to participate in the new talks in Paris. It is brief and Bunker believes "generally unexceptionable." They apparently did not use this communique as a basis for further wrangling over words and procrastination.

-- At Tab C, Bunker's draft letter to Thieu stating how we would handle "ruses and propaganda maneuvers" and internal political matters in Paris, making clear that we and the South Vietnamese would not walk out if internal matters were raised but would not negotiate internal matters with all the four parties at the table.

Bunker expects to see Thanh early Sunday morning, their time -- late this evening our time. That should be the critical meeting.

Today we must give Bunker a green light on:

- the GVN communique;
- his letter to Thieu.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 43342
Saigon 43345
Saigon 43341

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-508
By sig, NARA, Date 1-11-93

WWRostow:rln ~~SECRET~~/HARVAN DOUBLE PLUS



Department of State

634
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ (A)

(10)
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705AM
23 NOV. 68

SANTIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-506
By mp/isp, NARA, Date 1-16-98

DE RUMJIR 43342 3281145
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4944
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2993
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 43342

NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

REF: STATE 276616

1. CALHOUN AND POL COUNSELOR CALLED ON FONMIN THANH AT 10 AM AND HANDED HIM DOCUMENT ENTITLED "STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE US" (NOT DRAFT STATEMENT) EXPLAINING THAT WE HAD GONE AS FAR AS WE COULD IN MEETING ALL THE OUTSTANDING POINTS. THANH EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION AND SAID HE WAS TAKING COPIES OF OUR STATEMENT INTO THE ENLARGED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH WAS CONVENING AT 10:30 AM.
2. LATER IN THE MORNING I HEARD FROM BUI DIEM, CALLING DURING AN INTERMISSION AT THE NSC MEETING, ASKING IF I HAD ANY MESSAGE TO CONVEY. I SAID I HAD INDEED. IT WAS THAT WASHINGTON HAD GONE TO THE VERY LIMIT IN MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LOCAL SITUATION HERE, THAT "THE ORANGE IS SQUEEZED DRY", THAT PRESSURES ARE BUILDING UP AGAIN IN THE US, THAT BUI DIEM SHOULD CONVEY THE SENSE OF EXTREME URGENCY THAT WE GET FROM WASHINGTON, AND THAT IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO TRY TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN OUR STATEMENT. I SENT PRES THIEU A COPY OF THE STATEMENT UNDER COVER OF A PERSONAL LETTER.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 43342 NOV 23-68 HARVAN/DOUBLE/PLUS

1.3(a)(4)

3. WE NEXT LEARNED ON GOOD AUTHORITY [REDACTED] THAT THE NSC HAS GIVEN THE GREEN LIGHT. BUI DIEM CALLED AGAIN LATER THIS AFTERNOON AND SAID THE NSC MEETING HAD GONE VERY WELL AND THEY WOULD NOW BE DRAFTING ONLY A FAIRLY SHORT AND "NON-CONTROVERSIAL" COMMUNIQUE AND THAT FONMIN THANH WOULD BE GETTING IT TO US LATER TODAY. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THIS TEXT WILL CAUSE US ANY DIFFICULTIES AND THUS POSSIBLE DELAY. WE PRESSED THANH VERY HARD THIS MORNING TO LET US HAVE THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE THIS AFTERNOON, AGAIN OFFERED TO MEET WITH HIM SUNDAY TO DISCUSS ANY POSSIBLE CHANGES, AND WE HAVE THIS AGREEMENT TO DO SO; BUT AS OF 7:30PM WE HAVE ONLY HIS PROMISE THAT WE WILL RECEIVE IT LATER IN THE EVENING. (TEXT WILL BE TELEGRAPHED WHEN RECEIVED.)

4. MEANWHILE WE ARE SENDING SEPARATELY THE DRAFT LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT CONTAINING ASSURANCE AND UNDERSTANDINGS AS REQUESTED PARA 13 REFTEL. WE ALSO WILL DISCUSS WITH THANH TOMORROW A DRAFT MESSAGE TO OUR EMBASSIES IN THE TCC CAPITALS WHICH MAKE SURE THAT WE MOVE WITH MINIMUM OF TIME LOSS WITH THE TCC'S. WE WILL SEND THIS TEXT FOLLOWING THAT DISCUSSION. WE HOPE TO BUTTON UP SUNDAY THE PROCEDURES AND TIME SCHEDULE IN MOVING TOWARD THE ANNOUNCEMENT.
BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

63b 10
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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1968 NOV 23 AM 8 32

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INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2998
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 43345

NDIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

SUBJ: GVN DRAFT COMMUNIQUE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 91-506

By mp/ijp NARA. Date 1-8-98

1. FONMIN THANK SENT DRAFT TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE AS BELOW TO POL COUNSELOR, FOLLOWING UP WITH TELEPHONE CALL TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS WAS A ROUGH TRANSLATION FROM THE VIETNAMESE, INTENDED FOR VIETNAMESE CONSUMPTION, AND THAT IN TWO INSTANCES THE EXACT WORDING HAD NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED BUT THE GENERAL SENSE WAS CONVEYED BY THE BRACKETED WORDS (CONVEYED BELOW BETWEEN PARENTHESES.)

2. BEGIN QUOTE IN ITS CONSTANT SEARCH FOR PEACE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS BEEN DISCUSSING WITH THE US GOVERNMENT DURING THE PAST WEEKS THE GROUND RULES AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE NEW MEETING IN PARIS WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO SEND ITS DELEGATION TO PARIS TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT AND SERIOUS TALKS WITH THE HANOI DELEGATION, TOWARD THE ENDING OF COMMUNIST AGRRESSION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST, SECURE, AND GUARANTEED PEACE IN VIETNAM.

3. AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, THE US GOVT HAS SENT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM A STATEMENT WHICH AS MADE PUBLIC AT (TIME AND DATE) IN WASHINGTON.

4. IN THAT STATEMENT, WE FIND THAT THE MAJOR POINTS IN THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC BEFORE THE JOINT SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON NOV 2ND, AND THE TWO-SIDE FORMULA PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ON NOV 8TH, HAVE BEEN GIVEN SATISFACTION IN THEIR ESSENTIAL ASPECTS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 43345, NOVEMBER 23 NODIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS

5. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS BEEN RESPECTED.

6. THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE OTHER ALLIED NATIONS HAVE BEEN CONSULTED AND WHOLEDHEATEDLY SUPPORT THE RESULTS ACHIEVED THROUGH THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

7. ONCE AGAIN, THE SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAS BEEN ELOQUENTLY DEMONSTRATED IN THE FACE OF THE (INTRANSIGENT) ATTITUDE OF NORTH VIETNAM AND ITS AUXILIARY FORCES.

8. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM DECIDES THAT IT IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEW TALKS IN PARIS WITH THE HANOI DELEGATION TO SHOW THE GOOD WILL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND TO TEST THE GOOD FAITH OF HANOI (CONCERNING THE RESTORATION OF PEACE). END QUOTE

9. COMMENT: I FIND THIS DRAFT GENERALLY UNEXCEPTIONABLE AND SUGGEST THAT WE ACCEPT IT DESPITE A CERTAIN AWKWARDNESS OR AMBIGUOUSNESS IN PARA 4. WHILE IT IS NOT TRUE THAT THE CONCEPT OF TWO SIDES AS DEVELOPED IN OUR OWN STATEMENT IS IN ESSENTIAL ASPECTS THE SAME AS THE "TWO-SIDES FORMULA" PUT FORWARD BY THE GVN ON NOV 8, IT SEEMS TO ME INEVITABLE THAT FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION THE GVN WILL CLAIM THAT IT IS; AND TRYING TO GET PRECISION IN THIS MATTER WOULD INVOLVE US IN TIME CONSUMING DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT ANY ASSURANCE THAT WE WOULD OBTAIN SUCH PRECISION IN THE END.

10. ONE THING THAT IS SURPRISING IS THAT THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE IN ITS PARA 3 SEEMS TO CONTEMPLATE THAT THE US WOULD MAKE ITS OWN STATEMENT PUBLIC FIRST. THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT WE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE AND REQUIRES THAT WE CONCERT CLOSELY AS TO TIMING. WE WILL DISCUSS TIMING WITH THANK TOMORROW MORNING NOV 24.

BUNKER

BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

63c/10
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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VV CRB480
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
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1968 NOV 23 AM 7 43

BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 43341

DDIS/HARVAN/DOUBLE PLUS
PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLS 91-506
By: mp/isp NARA, Date 1-8-98

REF A STATE 276616
B STATE 273051
C SAIGON 43261
C STATE 273052

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT THIEU IN WHICH I PROPOSE TO COMBINE (A) THE RECONFIRMATION ABOUT "RUSES AND PROPAGANDA MANEUVERS" THAT WE AGREED TO FURNISH IN A DIPLOMATIC NOTE AS PRE REF B; (B) THE LANGUAGE ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT HANDLE INTERNAL POLITICAL MATTERS AS PER PARAGRAPH 8 REF C AND PARAGRAPH 13 REF A; AND (C) RECONFIRMATION OF WHAT I HAD SAID ORALLY TO THIEU NOVEMBER 21 ABOUT NOT WALKING OUT OF THE TALKS, AS PER PARA 3 REF D (WHERE IT HAD BEEN IN CONTEXT OF ACTIONS BY THE NLF), EXPANDED AS PER PARA 13 REF A (TO COVER ALSO STATEMENTS BY THE OTHER SIDE ABOUT INTERNAL POLITICAL MATTERS). THERE IS A NATURAL INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE THREE POINTS, WHICH HAVE TO DO WITH TACTICS IN HANDLING ACTIONS BY THE OTHER SIDE.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT;
DURING OUR RECENT DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS IN PARIS SOME MATTERS CAME UP WHICH WERE FELT TO REQUIRE CONFIRMATION IN WRITING. UPON INSTRUCTIONS OF MY GOVERNMENT, I AM PLEASED TO PROVIDE SUCH CONFIRMATION AS FOLLOWS:

3. IN THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS PRIOR TO THE STOPPING OF THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 43341, NOVEMBER 23

BOMBING, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REPEATEELY SAID THAT THEY WOULD TALK "SERIOUSLY" IN THE BROADER TALKS SUZ-SEQUENT TO THE BOMBING HALT. IN THIS CONNECTION, MY GOVERNMENT HAS AUTHORIZED ME TO CONFIRM THAT ANY RUSES OR PROPAGANDA MANEUVERS ON THE PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE (OR OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SO-CALLED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT) WOULD BE A CAUSE FOR IMMEDIATE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES WITH A VIEW TO TAKING WHATEVER ACTION WAS REQUIRED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE TALKS COULD NOT CONTINUE ON SUCH A BASIS OR IF SUCH ACTIONS WERE CONTINUED. THIS WOULD APPLY TO ANY EFFORTS BY HANOI TO BY-PASS OR IGNORE OR FREEZE OUT THE DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM OR TO MANEUVER IT INTO A POSITION WHERE IT WOULD HAVE TO TALK BILATERALLY WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT.

4. WHEN WE DISCUSSED OUR STRATEGY AT THE FORTHCOMING TALKS ON NOVEMBER 21, I CONVEYED TO YOU THE VIEWS OF MY GOVERNMENT ON HOW OUR DELEGATIONS MIGHT HANDLE INTERNAL POLITICAL MATTERS OF SOUTH VIET-NAM THAT MIGHT BE RAISED BY THE OTHER SIDE. I AM AUTHORIZED TO CONFIRM THAT OUR STRATEGY WSHOULD BE, AND WILL BE, TO BUILD UP THE STATUS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BY VIGOROUSLY CHAMPIONING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF ITS GOVERNMENT BASED ON FREE ELECTIONS, BY POINTING TO THE PROGRESS THAT IT HAS MADE UNDER A SYSTEM OF DEMOCRACY, CONTRASTING THE FREE SOCIETY OF SOUTH VIET-NAM WITH THE OPPRESSIVE SYSTEM OF NORTH VIET-NAM, AND BY EMPHASIZING YOUR GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF RECONCILIATION TOWARD DISAFFECTED OF REBELLIOUS ELEMENTS OF ITS POPULATION. WHILE WE WOULD OF COURSE EXPECT THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM DELEGATION TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THIS OFFENSIVE, WE EXPECT AND INTEND TO GIVE YOUR DELEGATITN FULL SUPPORT.

5. IN MORE CONCRETE TERMS, AS I EXPLAINED TN NOVEMBER 21, WE FEEL THAT IF HANOI RAISES THE ISSUE OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, OUR JOINT POSITION, TO BE PRIMARILY ARTICULATED BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM DELEGATION, SHOULD BE: (1) THAT A POLITICAL SOLUTION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION, ELECTIONS, AND THE POLICY OF RECONCILIATION; (2) THAT THESE QUESTIONS COULD BE BEST SOLVED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES; AND THEREFORE (3) THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS BUT SHOULD BE WORKED OUT AMONG SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN SEPARATE, PRIVATE TALKS.

6. MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO ASKED ME TO CONFIRM ANOTHER MATTER WHICH I MENTIONED IN THE COURSE IF OUR DISCUSSION ON NOVEMBER 21. THE STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 43341, NOVEMBER 23

WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING DURING RECENT WEEKS CONTAINS THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE ASSURANCES TO YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE NLF, THAT WE WILL NOT REGARD TO TREAT ANY OF THEIR MEMBERS-- WHATEVER THEY MAY CLAIM FOR THEMSELVES-- AS CONSTITUTING A SEPARATE DELEGATION. WE FULLY EXPECT OF COURSE THAT SUCH CLAIMS BY THE OTHER SIDE, WHICH WILL BE ESSENTIALLY PROPAGANDA CLAIMS, WILL BE MADE NOT ONLY AT THE BEGINNING BUT THROUGHOUT THE TALKS. WE WILL COUNTER THEM VIGOROUSLY AS THE OCCASION REQUIRES, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY PRETENSIONS OF THIS KIND, OR ANY RAISING BY THE OTHER SIDE OF SUBJECTS ON WHICH WE MIGHT REFUSE TO NEGOTIATE, WOULD BE A REASON FOR ACTIONS WHICH WOULD REDOUND TO OUR DISADVANTAGE, SUCH AS WALKING OUT OF THE MEETINGS. WE REGARD IT AS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE NO DOUBT ABOUT THIS BECAUSE IT INVOLVES THE BASIC POSTURE THAT WE EXPECT BOTH OF OUR DELEGATIONS TO TAKE--A POSTURE NOT OF DEFENSIVENESS OR UNWILLINGNESS TO TALK BUT RATHER ONE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE STRENGTH OF OUR POSITION AND VIGOR IN SETTING IT FORTH. WE EXPECT TO GO INTO THE FORTHCOMING TALKS WITH A POSITIVE APPROACH AND WITH FULL DIGNITY AND DECORUM, KNOWING THAT WE HAVE TRUTH ON OUR SIDE AND THAT OUR TWO DELEGATIONS WILL ENLIGHTEN THE WORLD ABOUT THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION IN YOUR COUNTRY AND ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT WE ENVISAGE.

7. WITH RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

SINCERELY,

ELLSWORTH BUNKER
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

END TEXT.
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

SANTIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-505
By mp/cb, NARA, Date 1-16-98

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, November 23, 1968 -- 9:50 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

We have this sensitive report from Saigon. It may be that Hanoi's statement was made with the knowledge that ~~they~~ had decided to go and was designed to pick up a little prestige for putting pressure on Thieu.



1.3(a)(4)

1. The National Security Council met from 1030 to 1400 hours on 23 November, was briefed on the detailed text of the newly drafted Vietnamese-American statement of understanding, agreed that the understanding satisfied the Government's requirements for attendance at the Paris talks, and approved the dispatch of a South Vietnamese delegation to Paris.

2. A luncheon meeting between President Thieu and Vice President Ky, originally scheduled for 23 November, has been postponed to 25 November. At that time Ky and Thieu will discuss the composition of the Paris delegation. Announcement of the Government's decision to attend the Paris talks is unlikely until mid-week after the delegates have been selected.

Above information has been passed to Amb. Bunker, Ambs. Harriman and Vance.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

65

Saturday, November 23, 1968 -- 9:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Unless he get to you satisfactorily on the phone last night, I gather Joe Fowler would like to come in and give you a formal report, with Bill Martin, on Bonn and its implications, sometime about noon or a little thereafter, if that is convenient.

W. W. Rostow

Meeting all right _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rin

ACTION

66

~~SECRET~~

Saturday - November 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Loan for Guyana Rice Industry

Pres file

Bill Gaud is asking urgently for your approval of a \$12.9 million loan to modernize the rice industry in Guyana (Tab B). Charlie Zwick recommends your approval (Tab A). Treasury has no problem on balance of payments grounds.

The critical elections in Guyana will take place December 16. Prime Minister Burnham has done a very good job of preparing the political ground to fend off Cheddi Jagan's challenge at the polls. Although the East Indian population outnumbers Burnham's predominantly black following, some of Jagan's supporters have been won over by Burnham's good government record. The outlook is for a very narrow Burnham victory, barring last-minute surprises.

This rice loan project plays a key part in Burnham's electoral strategy. The government's efforts to modernize Guyana's rice industry, well publicized for over a year, will help split Jagan's almost solid political support among the small rice farmers, all of whom are East Indian. The project has been delayed for technical reasons long past the intended starting date. Nonetheless, announcement of the loan within the next few days will still have important political benefits for Burnham and help to guarantee his election.

This is a good project on its economic merits. The overriding argument, however, is that it provides important political support for Burnham at this crucial point. Ambassador Carlson urges your approval in time for an announcement to be made in Georgetown early next week.

I recommend that you approve authorization of this loan.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

See me

Attachments - Tabs A and B.

SWLewis:mm

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 719 94-290
By My/ck NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

copy to Pres
66a

NOV 21 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: \$12.9 Million Loan for the Modernization of the Rice Industry in Guyana.

Bill Gaud requests your approval to authorize a \$12.9 million loan for the modernization of the rice industry in Guyana.

The project will help maintain a moderate pro-western government in Guyana over the long run. It also will help Prime Minister Burnham's party in the mid-December parliamentary elections.

Guyana now must compete in world markets in the sale of its rice exports. In earlier years, special preferential arrangements existed for sale to British Territories and to Cuba when Cheddi Jagan was Prime Minister of Guyana. While rice exports are less important than bauxite and sugar to Guyana, under the series of improvements associated with this loan, rice exports should grow from \$17 million to \$25 million in the next few years. More importantly, it will permit the large East Indian population to increase their incomes in this traditional industry.

The Burnham Government has already taken several measures to get this program underway. It has:

- reduced subsidies paid to farmers while providing better seed and extension services to increase yields
- eliminated losses of the Rice Marketing Board
- hired U.S. rice marketing experts.

The funds provided under this loan will provide six modern storage and drying centers designed to eliminate the 30 percent storage losses now incurred.

In addition, it will fund a new rice research station and technical and managerial assistance. For its part, the Guyanese Government will:

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Authority 7LS 94-290
By sp/cb NARA, Date 2 20 98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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2

- finance \$5.0 million in the local costs of the proposed project plus modernization of two government rice mills
- expand credit to rice farmers and millers
- establish a new Rice Corporation to improve government purchasing, marketing and processing operations.

State/AID has determined that Guyana's relatively small military expenditures do not require action under the Symington or Conte-Long Amendments.

Balance of Payments. Funds provided under this loan will be used for purchase of goods and services in the United States. Secretary Fowler agrees that tying procedures under this loan will minimize its impact on the U.S. balance of payments.

JFW

I recommend that you approve authorization of this loan.

Charles J. Zwick
Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

66a

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOV 18 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Loan for Modernization of Guyana Rice Industry

On the recommendation of Ambassador Carlson and Deputy U.S. Coordinator Fowler, I am requesting your approval to authorize a \$12.9 million loan for the modernization of the rice industry in Guyana.

Rice production in Guyana has grown steadily during the past two decades, as favorable market conditions permitted Guyana to export rice first to the West Indies and later to other foreign markets. Today approximately one-third of the country's population derives all or part of its livelihood from the rice industry, and rice exports are one of Guyana's four major foreign exchange earners. Production increases, however, have come almost entirely from increases in the amount of land under cultivation. The quality of the rice and the yield per acre have remained at a relatively low level. The world demand for rice is growing. In Latin America alone it may double by 1985, but the demand in the export markets is increasingly for white rice of good quality. If the Guyana rice industry is to continue to grow and prosper, if it is to retain and expand its world markets, it must develop a better quality white rice and learn to produce, process and market it more efficiently.

The progressive, democratic government of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham recognizes fully the importance of rice to the Guyanese economy and has given one of its highest development priorities to modernization of the rice industry. In a major policy statement last June, the Finance Minister said, "It must be our policy to produce more rice from less land, a better quality rice in greater quantities and to compete on a wider world market for higher prices. To do this successfully it is absolutely necessary that we modernize our industry, beginning on the farm, up through the miller and all the way to our marketing organization."

The proposed loan should help Guyana remove bottlenecks to modernization in two key areas -- production and processing -- by financing the U.S. dollar costs of the construction of (a) six modern storage and drying centers, and (b) the research facilities necessary to develop improved varieties of rice and more efficient agricultural techniques. Efforts under these sub-programs will be concentrated on the development and processing of high quality white rice for export. Technical assistance will be financed under the loan to insure proper training in rice research and in the operation and management of the loan-financed facilities. The

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Authority 21994-885
By 4/16 NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

technical assistance will be carried out by a U.S. firm, except that the technical assistance for research may be performed by a third country institution such as the International Rice Research Institute of the Philippines or by a newly organized Colombian firm (financed almost entirely by U.S. foundations), if no suitably qualified U.S. institution is available to do the work. As evidence of its firm commitment to the project, the GOG will finance 100% of the local costs (the equivalent of about \$4.6 million).

Modernization of the rice industry will also contribute to an amelioration of the deep racial and political divisions between the urban Africans and rural East Indians. Guyana's rice farmers are practically all East Indians, and rice contributes to the livelihood of approximately two-thirds of the East Indian population of Guyana. The importance of heavy East Indian dependence on rice is that the East Indian population provides the base of political support of Cheddi Jagan, the head of the communist-dominated People's Progressive Party (PPP). While in office during the colonial days of Guyana, Jagan almost wrecked the economy in order to wring out benefits to the rice farmers, thereby solidifying their support. But the inefficiency of his regime in the end also left the rice industry in serious difficulties, as farmers overproduced and were paid more than the rice was worth on the world market. The problem proved to be short-term, however, as the predominantly African government of Prime Minister Burnham moved courageously to reduce prices to farmers in order to straighten out the inherited mess. As a result of actions over the past three years the finances of the industry have been put in much better order and with our assistance, the Government is prepared to begin modernizing the industry.

This project will demonstrate to the farmers that an efficient moderate government brings them more benefits than the radical, inefficient, racial government of the PPP. Over a five-year period it could help create the climate in which alternative East Indian leadership more moderate in character can emerge.

Because of the economic and political significance of this loan, it is important that it be authorized at the earliest possible moment. The timing of the authorization has particular importance since Parliamentary elections are to be held in mid-December. While it is expected that Burnham's party will win over the Jagan forces by a small margin (with or without announcement of an A.I.D. loan), we will want to announce the authorization of the loan no later than

November 15 to 20, to avoid charges of interfering with the elections. If the loan cannot be announced until after the elections, consequences adverse to our policy in Guyana could occur. If Jagan should lose the election, as we anticipate, he may possibly seek an immediate massive demonstration against Burnham, which could include strikes, riots or even prolonged violence. To carry out such a program he will have to depend on significant numbers of East Indians. If the election passes without announcement of the A.I.D. loan, which has been under discussion publicly in Guyana for several years, the East Indian rice farmers might be much more inclined to join an obstructionist Jagan.


Symington Amendment: State/A.I.D. in consultation with the Inter-Agency Advisory Committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s), the Symington Amendment, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined (a) that Guyana's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and (b) that neither U.S. development assistance nor PL-480 sales are diverted by Guyana to military purposes.

Among the principal factors in this determination are the following:

1. Defense expenditure as a percent of GNP for 1966 was 0.5%, substantially below the regional median of 1.77%. No trend can be determined as 1966 is the most recent year for which GNP data are available.
2. Defense expenditures as a percent of central government expenditures for 1967-68 were 3.0%, considerably below the regional median of 9.8%; the trend appears to be increasing slightly, from 1.9% in 1966 to 3.1% in 1968.
3. There was no expenditure of foreign exchange for defense articles in 1966, 1967 or 1968.
4. The Country Team has reported that there is no evidence of U.S. development assistance (or PL-480 sales) being diverted to military expenditures.

Conte-Long Amendment: Currently available intelligence does not indicate that Guyana has purchased sophisticated weapons systems requiring the withholding of assistance under Section 119 of the Foreign Assistance Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1969 and Section 620(v) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

Recommendation: That you approve the authorization of a \$12.9 million loan for modernization of the Guyana rice industry.



William S. Gaud

67

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - November 23, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Ex-President Arias of Panama has written you (tab A) to lament the sad fate of his elected government, and to ask that you meet with him privately. He says such a meeting could head off unspecified dangerous problems in Panama for both governments.

Arias has been very active in recent days trying to make contact with persons he regards as influential in either this administration or the next. Meanwhile, a group of his supporters are infiltrating across the Costa Rican frontier to initiate guerrilla-type activities, under Arias' encouragement and direction. We see no likelihood at the moment that he can regain power by these means. However, he continues to wield important political influence in Panama and should not be ignored.

State does not recommend that you or any members of the White House Staff meet with him. However, in light of the sober tone of his letter, he should be seen by a responsible US Government official.

I suggest that you authorize my telephoning Arias to acknowledge receipt of his letter and to tell him you have asked Covey Oliver to meet with him on your behalf. (Oliver had a very good talk with Arias in New York before he was overthrown; since the coup, no one in State above desk officer level has seen him.)

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/16/75, State Dept. Guidelines
By *[signature]*, NARA, Date 2-20-98

Attachment

Letter to President from ex-President Arnulfo Arias of Panama,
November 19, 1968.

SWLewis:mm



REPUBLICA DE PANAMA

PRESIDENCIA

PANAMA I. PANAMA

27a

Water Gate Hotel
Washington, D. C.
November 19, 1968

My dear Mr. President:

After profound meditation in which I have weighed very carefully the formalities of protocol and the responsibilities of history, I have decided to write this letter to you. Beyond our personal intervention in the public affairs of our countries, yours and mine, there will be generations to come that in due time will judge our acts. When that moment comes, I would not like to present myself as having shirked my responsibilities as a leader of the people of Panama.

The recognition that your government has seen fit to extend to the Military Junta now running Panama, rather than deterring me from writing this letter, has actually stimulated me as I can see more clearly the problems that will confront our two countries.

Panama and the United States have been linked together in a common interest since our independence in 1903. We have lived together for the last 65 years and we are bound, I hope, to live in a future inspired by justice and brotherly understanding of our respective problems.

The relations between the United States and Panama have gone through many pitfalls but we both have been able to steam through rough waters without having lost our goals of assuring a free transit to the world through the Panama Canal. A serene analysis of our history will show that the problems that have arisen have been the results of unwitting misinterpretations and misdirected action by both sides.

During the last years, which by the way have been the most tumultuous of all, I am convinced that our basic problem has been the fact that Representative Democracy has been nothing else than, unfortunately, a mockery in Panama.

As you know, I speak with authority, having been elected four times to the Presidency by an overwhelming majority of the people and deposed three times by military coups, not to mention the fraud of 1964, in which the same military forces performed one of the most brutal frauds in the history of Latin American electoral processes.

I do not want to take your time in explaining the shameful incidents of the last political campaign in which the previous government, not satisfied with having usurped the power for four years, wanted again to deprive the people of having their own government by democratic process. When blood was already staining our streets and civil unrest was so obvious, the Guardia

Nacional decided it had to obey the mandate of the people. That mandate came in the form of an election in which I won 65% of the popular vote, despite the incredible government frauds.

On assuming office just last October first, I received a bankrupt National Treasury and an economy with approximately 50,000 people unemployed. To this we have to add the tremendous problem which consists of a younger generation of Panamanians absolutely confused. They are trapped between the frustration produced by the fact that for several years their votes at the polls have not been honored, and by the Castro propaganda, which offers as a substitute of Representative Democracy, that he maintains does not exist, its deadly message of subversion. By the way, the Havana Broadcasts are unquestionably heard in the cities and rural areas by a startling amount of people.

My Government had as a definite goal to restore the faith of my people in Representative Democracy and by doing so, be in a position to conclude the new treaty that was to guide the future relations between Panama and the United States. I was sure that my administration - as a true expression of the people's will - was going to create new patterns based on a just status for Panama to accomplish an international climate to match the one which you personally and your administration have tried to establish.

Before returning to my country from Europe, I had the privilege of discussing at great length the problems of our countries with your distinguished and capable Ambassador and Chief Negotiator, Mr. Robert B. Anderson. May I take this opportunity to state that after my several meetings with Mr. Anderson in New York, I could not help but thank Our Lord for having such an outstanding gentleman for Panama to deal with on these vital matters.

I knew that my first duty in office was to put my house in order so that my people would be prepared to accept my international acts with faith. To accomplish this task, I considered it my duty to end corruption wherever it existed.

When I acted, the extreme right, the extreme left and three pretorian colonels, Omar Torrijos, Boris Martinez and Fred Boyd united themselves to prevent the house cleaning that my government was determined to accomplish. I had no alternative but to act the way I did in order to end the unbelievable corruption that was going on in the government and the Guardia Nacional, so that I would have the backing of my people for the conclusion of a new treaty with the United States. The great majority of the Panamanian people are tired of the abuses that have practically strangled their lives in the material sense, through monopolies of all kinds. This same clique has also deprived the people of their hopes for bettering their lives

through having overthrown a government that, by being their true choice, would have enacted policies to benefit the majority.

The retirements of General Bolívar Vallarino and Colonel José R. Pinilla were not only in line with their many years of service but also with the desires of the officers who deserved to have a chance for promotion. The transferring of Colonel Torrijos as Military Attaché to Guatemala and El Salvador and the transferring of Colonels Boris Martinez and Fred Boyd to other command posts were imperative as they were ring leaders of a shameful organization dealing with drug traffic, coffee, cattle, arms contraband with our bordering countries of Costa Rica and Colombia, not to mention the exploitation of prostitution, "numbers rackets," illegal transportation routes, use of troops and convicts for their personal benefits, etc.

In touching on this delicate matter, I owe it to my conscience to tell you that the coup d'état that overthrew the government of the people of Panama on October 11th was planned long before the inauguration of my government. On several occasions I discussed the information that I was receiving regarding the plot with your Ambassador, Charles Adair and Chargé d'Affaires Downes. Their reaction was that they were "grateful for the information but that they could not intervene in the domestic problems of Panama." Of course I did not mind their

answers because my public record protects me against any kind of innuendoes regarding intervention. I was discussing the problem with them because the United States government has the responsibility of training and arming the Guardia Nacional and has been subsidizing in direct form the monthly payroll of that institution. My intention, as you can see, was to avoid that the intervention that was already taking place could be directed against a Constitutional Government.

Also there was a United States team of men working on a daily basis with the barracks including Colonel Seddon, Mr. Neely, Mr. Foster Collins and Mr. Efraim Angueiras, the latter so deeply involved as to be a "compadre" of Colonel Torrijos, one of the present tyrants of Panama. The new commanders were selected by me, taking into consideration the fact that they were the ranking officers by years of service. Mr. Efraim Angueiras, liaison between the Guardia Nacional and the United States Military Mission, as well as Colonel Seddon, Military Attaché, and Mr. Neely, officer of the Public Safety AID Mission, had nothing but praise for those selected.


I am convinced, Mr. President, that a meeting between you and me could clarify a lot of questions that are indispensable to a better understanding of the present problem. It is because I know that there is much at stake that I have prepared a simple pragmatic plan to restore Constitutional Government based on keeping the Guardia Nacional and assuring a maximum standard

of life for Panamanian people. A private, "off the record" meeting between two leaders could do no harm and easily could mean that Panama will not develop into another Cuba or Guatemala as a consequence of the Communist elements already entrenched in the present "de facto" government. I am sure that an action is imperative as soon as possible so to stop the danger produced by the vacuum that is developing in Panama by the political deception of the majority of my countrymen who are my followers.

The meeting that I respectfully proposed is not for publicity purposes and could take place under strict rules of confidential state secrecy. I hope that you will find it possible to concur with my suggestion about a meeting that could spare both Panama and the United States undue problems of catastrophic proportions.

I hope and pray that this will be possible. In any event, be assured of my appreciation for the many courtesies that have been shown to me by your government during these trying days, and of my intense gratitude to the American people who have opened their arms to me and listened to my crusade on behalf of Representative Democracy. This is particularly gratifying in my position which I describe as a deposed Constitutional President of Panama on active duty.

With all best wishes I am respectfully yours,


Arnulfo Arias M.
Constitutional President of Panama

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson
The President of the United States of America
Washington, D. C.

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Saturday, November 23, 1968 --

Pres file

Mr. President:

As I believe you know, for some time the Institute for Defense Analyses, under the general direction of General Taylor, has been conducting what they call a "national security process" study.

At Tab A is the letter I sent to some of my senior colleagues commending this study to them and soliciting their cooperation. At that time we envisaged the publication of the results would be classified and distribution under White House control.

As you will see, Gen. Taylor has decided that it would be better to publish the two resulting volumes on an unclassified basis, to permit "immediate broad distribution to include appropriate persons in the Nixon entourage, the Ford Foundation and the individuals interviewed." (The Ford Foundation contributed funds to IDA for the study.)

I did not wish to agree to this procedure until you had a chance to look at the substance of the study, including the passage that discusses the National Security Council staff and also at the conclusions drawn about the Nixon "White House National Security Staff." *(2 Vol II) - at page 14*

I am also informing Sec. Rusk, Sec. Clifford, Gen. Wheeler, and Mr. Helms of General Taylor's desire for prompt unclassified distribution so that they can form a judgment and make a recommendation.

At Tab B is a list of those interviewed in the course of this study. These interviews were contributed on an unclassified basis, reflecting general observations rather than accounts of highly classified information or decisions.

Unclassified distribution approved,
if Sec. Rusk, etc. agree _____

W. W. Rostow

Distribution approved with indicated changes _____

Classify document _____

Other distribution _____

WWRostow:rla

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON68a~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY RUSK
SECRETARY CLIFFORD
GENERAL WHEELER
DIRECTOR HELMS

General Taylor has recently called my attention to a study which is being undertaken by the Institute for Defense Analyses, with financial support from the Ford Foundation, for the purpose of examining the process by which national security policy is formulated and implemented at the level of the President and his principal advisors. The overall purpose of the study is to identify, analyze, and evaluate, in relation to foreseeable future requirements, the procedures which have been followed in the recent past and present. This study will be classified and its ultimate distribution will be determined by arrangements which my office will work out with the heads of the Departments and Agencies chiefly involved in the national security process.

It is my impression that this study could be of considerable value to the principal officers of the government participating in national security affairs, and that it deserves their encouragement and cooperation. General Taylor will contact you shortly to request the designation of a point of contact in your department with which the IDA project staff can establish liaison.

W W Rostow
W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House GPO, Dec. 24, 1983
By 4 NARA, Date 2-20-98

INSTITUT FOR DEFENS ANALYSES

400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202. Telephone (703) 558-1000



Maxwell D. Taylor, President

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November 8, 1968

Dear Walt:

You may remember the IDA study of the national security process which has been going on for some months. It is now approaching completion and I enclose herewith a review copy of the first volume. The second, which will be somewhat thicker, will be ready in a few days.

In my letter to you of 23 February 1968 describing the project at its inception, I mentioned that the study would be classified and its distribution limited in accordance with guidance which I hoped that you would give us. I had in mind that the distribution would include members of the new administration who might profit from this study and furthermore I expected that it would be a Johnson administration.

Since that time, two things have happened. In the first place, we have found it possible and, indeed, desirable to produce an unclassified document which can receive a broad distribution. While I believe that we have succeeded in so doing, of course we shall have to obtain an advisory ruling on the subject from the security authorities of the Department of Defense.

The second new development is that we are faced with a Nixon administration which will be composed of new officials who probably will have a greater need for the information contained in our study than would have been the case for a continuing Johnson administration. Because of the wide range of interviews conducted by our analysts (see attached tabulation), the Nixon people know that we are working on this study and have expressed an interest in obtaining access to it.

Because of these new circumstances, I have a strong feeling that, after you have had the opportunity to verify the nature of our study and confirm the absence of a need for classification, you will authorize us to proceed with a distribution which will include members of the new administration. I would be most appreciative if you would look over Volume I of our study from this point of view and allow me to discuss the foregoing matters with you early next week.

Sincerely,

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House
Washington, D. C.

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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES FOR PROJECT NSP
(As of October 16, 1968)

Note: The first listed position is that held by the individual when he was interviewed in 1968. Then there are listed either (a) the positions of primary interest to Project NSP (if different from the current position) or (b) other previous positions or activities of interest.

Acheson, Dean	Lawyer, Covington and Burling, Washington Secretary of State, 1949-53
Anthony, Robert	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 1965-68
Ausland, John	Director of Combined Policy, Office of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Chairman of the Subcommittee on Leadership and Organization in Foreign Affairs of the Career Principles Committee of the Foreign Service Association, 1967-68
Barnes, Tracy	Special Assistant to the President, Yale University Assistant to Director of Central Intelligence 1951-64
Bator, Francis	Professor of Political Economy and Director of Studies, Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1965-67
Bell, David	Vice President of Ford Foundation Several positions under President Truman, including Administrative Assistant to the President, 1951-53; Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1961-62; Administrator of AID, 1962-66
Bissell, Richard M. Jr.	Director of Marketing and Economic Planning, United Aircraft Corp., Hartford, Conn. Special Assistant to the Director, CIA, 1954-59; Deputy Director of Plans, CIA, 1959-62
Bohen, Fred	Bureau of the Budget staff

~~RESTRICTED~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY MP ON 1-22-98

Bowie, Robert R. Director, Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University
Director of Policy Planning Staff, Department of
State, 1953-55; Assistant Secretary of State
for Policy Planning, 1955-57; on leave as
Counselor of Department of State, 1966-67

Brown, George Lt. Gen. USAF Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, 1966-68

Brown, Sidney Agency for International Development
Special Assistant to Director Schultze of BOB,
1965-67

Bundy, McGeorge President of Ford Foundation
Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, 1961-66

Burke, Arleigh Adm.,
USN (Ret.) Director, Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown
University
Chief of Naval Operations, 1955-61

Capron, William M. Senior Staff, Economic Studies Division, Brookings
Institution
Senior Staff, Council of Economic Advisors,
1962-64; Assistant Director, Bureau of the
Budget, 1964-66

Clark, J.W. Bureau of the Budget, International Operations Div.

Clifton, Chester V. Clifton Associates, Washington, D.C.
Maj. Gen. USA (Ret.) White House Defense Liaison Officer, 1961-65

Coffey, Joseph I. Professor of Public & International Affairs,
Graduate School of Public and International
Affairs, University of Pittsburgh
Assistant to Karl Harr, OCB Staff, 1958-60;
author of The Presidential Staff and other works

Cooke, David S. Director of the Directorate of Organizational and
Management Planning in the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)

Davis, Vincent Professor of International Relations, Graduate
School of International Studies, University of
Denver
Author of The Admirals' Lobby, The Politics of
Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases, Postwar
Defense Policy and the US Navy, and other works.

Delaney, George P.	Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator of International Labor Affairs
Deming, Frederick I.	Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary a Affairs
Dillon, C. Douglas	President, U.S. and International Securities Corporation, New York Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1958-59; Under Secretary of State, 1959-60; Secretary of the Treasury, 1961-65
Elliot, Ted	Country Director for Iran, Department of State
Else, George	Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense Clifford
Enthoven, Alain	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)
Fitt, Alfred	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower)
Fosdick, Dorothy	Staff Director, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, US Senate (Jackson Subcommittee)
Fried, Edward	White House NSC Staff (Economic and European Matters)
Gates, Thomas S.	Chairman, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company Secretary of the Navy, 1957-59; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1959-60; Secretary of Defense 1960-61
Gerhardt, John Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret.)	Assistant to the President of Lear Siegler, Inc. JCS Representative on NSC Planning Board in late Eisenhower Administration; former Commanding General of NORAD
Gilpatric, Roswell L.	Partner in Cravath, Swaine and Moore, New York Under Secretary of the Air Force, 1951-53; Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1961-64
Ginsburgh, Robert Brig. Gen. USAF	Member of the White House NSC Staff; Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Glass, Henry	Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (since 1953)
Goldberger, Al	RAND Corp. Former Historian at USAF

Goodpaster, Andrew
Lt. Gen. USA

Commandant, National War College, 1967-68
White House Defense Liaison Officer and Staff
Secretary of the White House Staff, 1954-61;
Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, 1962-66

Gray, Gordon

Chairman of the Board, Piedmont Publishing Company,
and Member, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Secretary of the Army, 1949-50; Special Assistant
to the President, 1950; Assistant Secretary of
Defense (International Security Affairs),
1955-57; Director, Office of Defense Mobilization,
1957-58; Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, 1958-61

Greenleaf, Abbott, Col.
USAF

Military Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense

Hamilton, Edward

Member of White House NSC Staff, 1962 to September
1968

Hammond, Paul Y.

RAND Corp.
Author of Organizing for Defense and other works

Harr, Karl G., Jr.

President, Aerospace Industries Association of
America, Washington
Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State for
Administration, 1950-54; Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for NSC Affairs and
Defense Alternate on NSC Planning Board, 1956-57;
Special Assistant to President, Vice Chairman
OCB, 1958-61

Hartman, Arthur

Staff Director, Senior Interdepartmental Group
(Department of State)

Helms, Richard

Director of Central Intelligence

Hoffman, Fred S.

Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget

Horwitz, Solis

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)

Hughes, Thomas L.

Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

Huizenga, John

Vice Chairman, Board of National Estimates, CIA

Huntington, Samuel

Professor of Government, Harvard University
Author of The Common Defense, The Soldier and the
State, and other works

Ioanes, Raymond A.	Administrator, Foreign Agriculture Service, Department of Agriculture
Jackson, Wayne	Member of the Board of National Estimates, CIA Former CIA representative on OCB, 1953-57
Johnson, Nels Vice-Adm. USN	Director, J-5 (Plans and Policy), Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff (until mid-1968)
Katzenbach, Nicholas	Under Secretary of State
Kaysen, Carl	Director, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, New Jersey Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1961-63
Kenny, Spurgeon	Office of Science and Technology, the White House
Kissinger, Henry A.	Professor of Government, Harvard University Author of <u>Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy</u> , <u>The Necessity for Choice</u> , and other works
Lay, James S. Jr.	Executive Secretary, United States Intelligence Board Assistant Executive Secretary, National Security Council, 1947-50; Executive Secretary, NSC, 1950-61; Deputy Assistant to Director of Central Intelligence, 1961-64
Lincoln, George Col. USA	Professor and Department Head, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy Deputy to Under Secretary of the Army, 1948-49; Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense, 1951-53; Member of Rockefeller and Gaither Committees, 1957; staff of President's Committee to study the Military Assistance Program, 1958; Special Advisor to the Administrator, AID, 1964-65.
Marks, Leonard	Director, United States Information Agency
May, Ernest	Professor of American Diplomatic History, Harvard University Author of <u>The Ultimate Decision</u> and other works
McCafferty, Arthur	Director, White House Situation Room
McElroy, Neil	Chairman of the Board, Proctor and Gamble Co., Cincinnati Secretary of Defense, 1958-59

Moyers, Bill D. Publisher of Newsday, Long Island
Special Assistant to the President, 1963-67;
White House Press Secretary, 1965-67

Neustadt, Richard E. Professor of Government, Associate Dean, John
Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, and
Director of Institute of Politics, Harvard
University
Special Consultant to President-elect Kennedy,
1960-61; Special Consultant to Jackson Sub-
committee, 1959-61 and 1962 to Present

Nitze, Paul H. Deputy Secretary of Defense
Director of Policy Planning Staff, Department of
State, 1950-53; Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs), 1961-63;
Secretary of the Navy, 1963-67

Orwat, Norman M. Maj. Gen. Deputy Director of J-5, Office of the Joint Chiefs
USAF of Staff

Owen, Henry D. Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of
State

Petty, John R. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (International
Affairs)

Poats, Rutherford M. Deputy Administrator, Agency for International
Development

Pollack, Herman Director, Office of International Scientific and
Technological Affairs, Department of State

Price, Don K. Dean, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University
Assistant to Herbert Hoover on Study of the US
Presidency under the auspices of the Commission
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, 1947-48; Staff Director, Committee
on Department of Defense Organization, 1953;
member of the President's Advisory Committee on
Government Organization, 1959-61; author of
The Secretary of State, The Scientific Estate,
and other works

Radford, Arthur Adm. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1953-57
USN (Ret.)

Read, Benjamin Executive Secretary, Department of State

Reilly, John Office of Vice President Humphrey

Rostow, Walt W. Special Assistant to the President
Deputy Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, 1961; Counselor and
Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department
of State, 1961-66

Ruser, Claus Staff Member, Senior Interdepartmental Group,
Department of State

Sapin, Burton M. Director, International Relations and Area Studies
Center, University of Minnesota
Contributor to Brookings Institution study of
The Formulation and Administration of
US Foreign Policy, 1959-60; Author of The
Making of United States Foreign Policy, and
other works

Schelling, Thomas C. Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Author of Arms and Influence, The Strategy of
Conflict, and other works

Schultze, Charles L. Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
Staff Member, President's Council of Economic
Advisors, 1952-58; Assistant Director, US Bureau
of the Budget, 1962-65; Director, Bureau of the
Budget, 1965-67

Schwartz, Harry Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Inter-
national Security Affairs); Staff Director,
SIG, 1966-67

Scoville, Herbert Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

Smith, Abbott Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, CIA

Smith, Bromley K. Executive Secretary, NSC

Smith, R. J. Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA

Snyder, Richard C. Professor of Administration and Political Science,
University of California at Irvine
Author of American Foreign Policy: Formulation
Principles and Programs, Foreign Policy Decision-
Making, and other works

Solomon, Anthony M.	Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Spivy, Burton E. Jr. Gen. USA (Ret.)	Director of Joint Staff, JCS
Taylor, Maxwell D. Gen. USA (Ret.)	President of IDA, Chairman of President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and Special Advisor to President Johnson Chief of Staff, US Army, 1955-59; President's Military Representative, 1961-62; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-64; Ambassador to South Vietnam, 1964-65
Tufts, Robert	Professor of Economics, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio, and Chief Consultant to the Jackson Subcommittee
Vannoy, Frank Rear-Admiral USN	Deputy J-5, OJCS
Waks, Norman	Assistant Director for Engineering Management, DDR&E, DOD
Warnke, Paul	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Wheeler, Earle G. Gen. USA	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Wilkins, Fraser	Inspector General of Foreign Service
Wriggins, Howard	Professor of Government and Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, Columbia University Member, Policy Planning Council, State Department, 1961-65; Senior Staff Member, NSC, 1966-67
Yost, Charles W.	Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York City Many positions in long Foreign Service Career, including US Deputy Representative to the United Nations, 1961-66

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Saturday, November 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your 1:00 p. m. Meeting with Secretary Fowler
(Rusk, Clifford, Fred Deming, Bill Martin, Walt
Rostow, and Ed Fried)

Joe Fowler will give you a rundown on what happened at the Bonn meeting of the Financial Ministers.

We still do not have any firm word of what the French will do. At the meeting they agreed that if they were to devalue they would not do so by more than 11 percent. The French Cabinet has been meeting this morning.

You might want to ask about the political implications of the meeting, particularly in regard to France-German relations.

If the French move within the agreed limits, we believe there is a reasonable chance that the markets will begin to calm down on Monday. You might want to ask what would happen if they don't.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *ch*, NARA, Date *2-26-98*

ERF:mm

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

70

Pre file

Mr. President:

Herewith, a report on the loss of the first manned US tactical reconnaissance aircraft over North Vietnam since the bombing halt went into effect on November 1.

White House Situation Room

Lyman W. Stearns
Briefing Officer

~~SECRET~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

70a

23 November 1968
0600 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft Loss

1. At 230115 EST, a USAF RF-4C on a tactical air reconnaissance sortie was down due to unknown causes 4 nautical miles north-northwest of Dong Hoi in North Vietnam.

2. The pilot and navigator ejected. Subsequently voice contact was established with the pilot. At 230515 EST, COM-USMACV reported voice and beeper contact with the crew had been lost and that all SAR forces had departed the area.

3. Electronic search is continuing and SAR efforts on 24 November will depend upon the results of the search.

N. S. MOORE
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

1 Atch
Map

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Authority DoD Guidelines
By J NAKA, Date 2-20-98

~~SECRET~~