

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 3

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2a cable <i>Sanitized 10-1-04 NLS 02-192</i>	Intelligence cable re Vietnam C 8 p. [dup. #15a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, 2 C (17) b, 11/20-68 - 1/69, General Military Activity," Box 74]	12/9/68	A
<del>#6 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the President, 3:30 p.m. re Israel S 1 p. <i>open 6/25/02</i></del>	<del>12/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6a memo</del>	<del>Saunders to Rostow re Israel S 1 p. <i>open 6/25/02</i></del>	<del>12/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#12 memo	Rostow to the President re Benham, 2:50 p.m. S 2 pp. [dup. #7j, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Meetings with the President, July - Dec. 1968," Box 2] <i>Sanitized 10-1-04 NLS 02-194</i>	12/7/68	A
#12a memo	Keeny to Rostow re Benham S 3 pp. [dup. #7k, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Meetings with the President, July - Dec. 1968," Box 2] <i>Sanitized 10-1-04 NLS 02-194</i>	12/7/68	A
<del>#14 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the President, 8:45 a.m. re Egypt TS 1 p. <i>open 6/15/03 NLS 02-194</i></del>	<del>12/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#14a memo	Intelligence report <i>Sanitized 12-15-10 NLS 10-240</i> TS 2 pp. <i>- exempt 6/16/03 NLS 10-240</i>	12/6/68	A
<del>#18d memo</del>	<del>Helms to Rostow re IDA Report C 1 p.</del>	<del>12/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#23 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the President, 4:45 p.m. re Vietnam TS 1 p. <i>open NLS 019-043-2-3 (1/02)</i></del>	<del>12/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#23a memo	Intelligence report <i>Sanitized 12-15-10 NLS 10-240</i> TS 2 pp. <i>- exempt 6/16/03 NLS 10-240</i>	12/5/68	A
#24 note	Rostow to the President, 3:40 p.m. TS 1 p. <i>- Sanitized 6/16/03 NLS 10-240</i>	12/5/68	A
#24a cable	Intelligence report <i>Sanitized 12-15-10 NLS 10-240</i> TS 1 p. <i>- exempt 6/16/03 NLS 10-240</i> <i>more info released 1/16/2020 per NLS 10-240 ISCAP appeal</i>	12/5/68	A
#39 memo	Saunders to the President, 4:00 p.m. S 1 p. <i>open 6/25/02</i>	12/4/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 109, 12/1 - 9/68," Box 43

RESTRICTION CODES

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

2 of 3

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#39a letter	<del>Hussein to the President re Israel</del> S 2 pp. <i>open 10/25/02</i> [partial dup. Amman 7684]	12/2/68	A
#39b letter	LBJ to Hussein re Israel S 1 p.	10/11/68	A
#41 memo	Rostow to the President re Benham S- 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 02-162</i> <i>Sanitized 8-10-04 NLJ/PAC 02-162</i>	12/4/68	A
#41a letter	Seaborg to Rostow S 3 pp. Sanitized — [dup. #7m, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Meetings with the President, July - Dec. 1968," Box 2, <del>Sanitized, NLJ 96-113</del> ]	11/21/68	A
#41b report	Enclosure 1 to #41a S 3 pp. Sanitized — [dup. #7n, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Meetings with the President, July - Dec. 1968," Box 2, <del>Sanitized, NLJ 96-113</del> ]	[11/68]	A
#41d memo	Hornig to the President re Benham S 3 pp. [dup. #7p, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Meetings with the President, July - Dec. 1968," Box 2] <i>Sanitized 10-1-04 NLJ 02-194</i>	12/4/68	A
#42 memo	Rostow to the President TS 1 p. — <i>Sanitized 10-1-04 NLJ 02-194</i> <i>dup. #1a, subj. File, Nuc. weapons, UK, vol. 1, Box 34</i>	12/3/68	A
#42a memo	Rostow to the Deputy Secretary of Defense TS 1 p. — <i>same as #1a, 1-31-11 NLJ 10-241</i> <i>Sanitized 10-1-04 NLJ 02-194</i>	[12/68]	A
#42b memo	Paul Nitze to the President TS 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 5-17-05 NLJ 02-195</i> <i>dup. #1b, subj. File, UK, vol. 1, Box 34</i>	11/30/68	A
#42c report	Enclosure to #42b TS 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 3-17-05 NLJ 02-195</i>	[11/68]	A
#43a memo	Project Lending and AID C 1 p.	11/15/68	A
#50 memo	<del>Rostow to the President, 3:50 p.m.</del> <del>re New Zealand</del> <del>PCI 2 pp.</del> <i>open 11-25-03 NLJ 02-197</i>	<del>12/3/68</del>	A
#50a letter	<del>P.M. Holyoake to the President</del> <del>PCI 3 pp.</del> <i>open 11-25-03 NLJ 03-197</i>	<del>[12/68]</del>	A

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#53 note	Rostow to the President, 12:30 p.m. S 1 p. - open 616103 NSF/AAC 02-164 [dup. #97, NLJ/CBS 21]	12/3/68	A
#53a cable	Intelligence report S 1 p. - sanitized 616103 NSF/AAC 02-163	12/3/68	A
#58 memo	Rostow to the President, 7:05 p.m. re Vietnam S 1 p. sanitized 615103 NW 02-196	12/2/68	A
<del>#58a chart</del>	<del>Estimated vs. Reported Attacks in Vietnam</del> <del>S 1 p. open 5504 NW 02-198</del>	<del>11/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#58b chart</del>	<del>Enemy initiated Attacks in Vietnam</del> <del>S 1 p. open 5504 NW 02-198</del>	<del>11/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#59 note	Rostow to the President, 7:00 p.m. TS 1 p. - sanitized 616103 NSF/AAC 02-164	12/2/68	A
#59a cable	Intelligence report <i>sanitized 12-15-80 NLJ/D-240</i> TS 3 pp. - exempt 616103 NSF/AAC 02-163	11/29/68	A
#61 memo	Rostow to the President, 5:50 p.m. re Cuba S 1 p. open NSF OR 043-2-5 (1/02)	12/3/68	A
#69 memo	Rostow to the President, 9:35 a.m. re Vietnam S 1 p. open 615103 NW 02-196 [dup. #9, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. 7," Box 124]	12/2/68	A
#69b memo <i>sanitized 627-03 NW 02-192</i>	Intelligence memorandum S 3 pp. [dup. #9b, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. 7," Box 124]	11/30/68	A
#69c memo <i>sanitized 627-03 NW 02-192</i>	Helms to Rostow re Vietnam PCI 1 p. [dup. #9c, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. 7," Box 124]	11/30/68	A
#69d memo <i>sanitized 627-03 NW 02-192</i>	Intelligence memorandum S 3 pp. [dup. #9d, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. 7," Box 124]	11/30/68	A
#69a Memo <i>sanitized 627-03 NW 02-192</i>	For the Hon. Walt Rostow C 1 p.	11/30/68	

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INFORMATION

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Monday, December 9, 1968  
8:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge flags the importance  
of consultation with the Germans if  
missile talks are to take place.

*Profile*

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 20240

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-197  
By CG, NARA, Date 1-5-95

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1265

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EXDIS *Handle Notice*  
FOR SECRETARY RUSK

*Rostow*

1. IN VIEW OF CONTINUING PUBLICITY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHONSON AND KOSYGIN, I RECOMMEND THAT, IF A DECISION IS ACTUALLY REACHED TO HOLD SUCH A MEETING, THERE BE ADEQUATE CONSULTATION WITH THE FRG PRIOR TO OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT.
2. NOW THAT DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO STRENGTHEN NATO DEFENSE FOLLOWING THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DISCUSSION WITH THE SOVIETS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS (WHICH I ASSUME WOULD BE THE CHIEF TOPIC OF A SUMMIT MEETING) WOULD NO LONGER OF ITSELF HAVE THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT WE HAD FEARED ON THE PROSPECTS FOR STRENGTHENING NATO. IN FACT, MANY GERMAN POLITICAL LEADERS NOW APPEAR TO EXPECT THAT THE US WILL EVENTUALLY OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS.
3. BUT, AS INDICATED IN A RECENT TALK WITH BARZEL, BUNDESTAG MAJORITY LEADER, THE GERMANS HOPE THAT THESE TALKS WOULD OCCUR ONLY AFTER A SEQUENCE OF OTHER EVENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE, INCLUDING SOME AMERICAN ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN OUR OWN DEFENSES AND A DISCUSSION AT A HIGH LEVEL OF FUTURE WESTERN POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION FOLLOWING CZECHOSLOVAKIA. IN ANY EVENT, THE CHANCELLOR AND OTHER GERMAN LEADERS HAVE EXPLICITLY INDICATED A DESIRE FOR CONSULTATION PRIOR TO BEGINNING STRATEGIC ARMS DISCUSSIONS.
4. IN THE LIGHT OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, SUCH PRIOR CONSULTATION APPEARS CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT. IF IT DOES

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~

By *Y* NARA, Date *3-20-98*

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 BONN 20240 091728Z

NOT OCCUR WITH ADEQUATE ADVANCE NOTICE AND IN ADEQUATE DEPTH, GERMAN LEADERS MAY BECOME CONFUSED ABOUT THE COURSE OF AMERICAN FUTURE POLICY TOWARDS THE RUSSIANS, FOR THEY WILL ASSUME THAT THIS MEETING TAKES PLACE WITH THE BACKING NOT ONLY OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION, BUT ALSO OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION. FAILURE TO CONSULT WILL CREATE DOUBTS ABOUT AMERICAN POLICY AND FUTURE AMERICAN SUPPORT OF EUROPE IN THE FACE OF INCREASED SOVIET PRESSURE AT A TIME WHEN GERMAN POLICY TOWARD THE USSR IS ITSELF IN AN UNSTABLE CONDITION. IT WILL REVIVE DOUBTS ABOUT SOVIET-AMERICAN DEALINGS OVER THE HEAD OF THE GERMANS. FURTHERMORE, AS ANOTHER EMBASSY MESSAGE INDICATES, THE GERMANS HAVE COME OUT OF THE RECENT CURRENCY CRISIS WITH A JUSTIFIED EXPECTATION THAT THEY WILL IN THE FUTURE BE MORE FREQUENTLY CONSULTED ON TOPICS OF OVERALL INTEREST. CONSEQUENTLY, FAILURE ADEQUATELY TO CONSULT WOULD BE A BLOW TO KIESINGER'S PRESTIGE AND COULD WEAKEN HIS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH US IN THE FUTURE.

5. THESE POTENTIAL COSTS ARE NEEDLESS, SINCE THEY CAN TO A LARGE EXTENT BE ELIMINATED BY ADEQUATE PRIOR CONSULTATION. ALSO I DOUBT THAT THE CONSULTATION WOULD IN THE END PREVENT US FROM DOING ANYTHING THAT WE WOULD WANT TO DO. I HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ACT ON THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH HERE IF A DECISION SHOULD BE REACHED TO GO AHEAD WITH A SUMMIT MEETING. LODGE

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Monday, December 9, 1968  
7:00 p. m.

*Pres 21*

2

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a further report on Communist military plans for the weeks ahead. They focus on a campaign to be kicked off between December 10 and December 15. (We lost 43 men today; the enemy 661: about three times recent "normal" levels.)

I believe Hanoi's problem is the following:

- In pulling back their main force units, they exposed their infrastructure and risked control over VC-controlled areas;
- Abrams and the ARVN have been exploiting this enemy vulnerability very well in October and November.
- But this is eating away quite rapidly Hanoi's bargaining assets in a negotiated settlement;
- At Paris they do not wish to negotiate with undignified haste -- besides, the GVN used up a month.
- So they have decided to engage some of their main force units to slow up our pacification offensive and give them time to negotiate.
- Their great risk is that they will fail militarily, as in August, and be set back further -- in Paris as in Vietnam. To make that happen is Abrams' mission.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *J*, NARA, Date 2-20-98

2a



# Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 50213

PAGE 1 OF 8 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS OER FBIS DCS  
DDI EXO IRS AID USIA

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

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CITE

3.4(b)(1)

DIST 9 DECEMBER 1968

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI: 4 - 6 DECEMBER 1968

SUBJECT: VIET CONG PLANS FOR THE DECEMBER PHASE OF  
THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN IN TAY NINH PROVINCE

ACQ: VIETNAM, BIEN HOA (9 DECEMBER 1968)

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SOURCE:

[Large redacted area]


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
SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NIJ 02-192  
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-20-03

IN 50213




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PAGE 2 OF 8 PAGES

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
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SUMMARY: THE VIET CONG (VC) WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN IS SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM BETWEEN 10 AND 15 DECEMBER. PRESENT PLANS CALL FOR A THREE-PHASE CAMPAIGN WITH ONE PHASE EACH IN DECEMBER, JANUARY, AND FEBRUARY. THREE PRIMARY TARGET AREAS HAVE BEEN SELECTED, SAIGON-GIA DINH, TAY NINH-BINH LONG PROVINCES, AND QUANG TRI-THUA THIEN PROVINCES. THE DECEMBER PLAN CALLS FOR ATTACKS IN TAY NINH PROVINCE WHICH WILL DRAW ALLIED DEFENSIVE FORCES AWAY FROM SAIGON-GIA DINH. THE PLAN STATES THAT AT LEAST ONE ALLIED DIVISION MUST BE DRAWN TO TAY NINH FROM SAIGON AND BE DESTROYED. AFTER THAT AND AFTER ROUTES 1 AND 22 HAVE BEEN CLEARED, AND TAY NINH PROVINCE IS LIBERATED, SAIGON CAN BE ATTACKED. THREE PROVINCIAL BATTALIONS, A COSVN SECURITY FORCE BATTALION AND THE 9TH AND 5TH VC DIVISIONS WILL ATTACK TAY NINH. THE 7TH NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) DIVISION WILL CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN BINH LONG PROVINCE. THREE OTHER DIVISIONS NOW IN CAMBODIA WILL BE USED IN TAY NINH FOR THE



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IN 50213

PAGE 3 OF 8 PAGES

3.4(b)(1)

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FINAL LIBERATION OF THE PROVINCE. THE PRINCIPAL TARGETS IN TAY NINH WILL BE DISTRICT TOWNS, THE PROVINCE CAPITAL, LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AND U.S. MILITARY BASES. WHILE BATTALION AND REGIMENT SIZED LOCAL UNITS, CONTROLLED BY COSVN, ARE ATTACKING SAIGON FROM THE OUTSIDE, GUERRILLAS INSIDE THE CITY WILL CONDUCT A CAMPAIGN OF SABOTAGE AND ASSASSINATION. SHOULD THE DECEMBER PHASE FAIL TO LIBERATE TAY NINH PROVINCE THE EFFORT WILL BE MADE AGAIN IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY. END SUMMARY.

1. AT A 4 TO 6 DECEMBER VIET CONG (VC) STUDY SESSION HELD FOR DISTRICT CADRES IN TAY NINH PROVINCE INFORMANT WAS TOLD THAT THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN WILL BEGIN THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER STUDY OF THE 8TH CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) RESOLUTION, ISSUED IN OCTOBER, IS COMPLETED. THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN IS DIVIDED INTO THREE PHASES AND WILL BE CONDUCTED IN DECEMBER, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY ONLY. THE FIRST PHASE PLAN FOR DECEMBER HAS BEEN COMPLETED. FINAL PLANS FOR SECOND PHASE, JANUARY, WILL BE MADE AFTER THE FIRST PHASE OF THE OFFENSIVE IS COMPLETED. THE THIRD PHASE PLAN, FEBRUARY, WILL BE BASED ON THE RESULTS

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OF THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES.

2. THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN WILL BEGIN BETWEEN 10 AND 15 DECEMBER AND WILL REACH A "CLIMAX" ON 25 DECEMBER. THE CLIMAX WILL BE IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL FROM HO CHI MINH TO COMMEMORATE THE 8TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV) ON 22 DECEMBER 1960. THERE ARE THREE PRIORITY AREAS FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN: (1) SAIGON-GIA DINH, (2) TRI-THIEN (THE AREA OF QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES), AND (3) TAY NINH-BINH LONG PROVINCES. ALL PROVINCES AND FRONTS IN THOSE AREAS MUST CONDUCT ATTACKS BY FIRE AND GROUND ATTACKS ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS, ACCELERATED PACIFICATION AREAS, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

3. LOCAL FORCES OF BATTALION AND REGIMENTAL SIZE, CONTROLLED BY COSVN, WILL ATTACK SAIGON FROM THE OUTSIDE. SIMULTANEOUSLY, GUERRILLAS IN SAIGON WILL ATTACK FROM WITHIN THE CITY, CONDUCTING SABOTAGE, ASSASSINATIONS, AND MORTAR ATTACKS.

4. THE TAY NINH-BINH LONG FRONT WILL SHARE IN THE ATTACK ON SAIGON, BY DRAWING U.S./GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN)

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FORCES OUT OF THEIR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AROUND SAIGON. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE TAY NINH-BINH LONG FORCES CONDUCTING ATTACKS BY FIRE ON ALLIED FORCES IN TAY NINH AND BINH LONG PROVINCES. NO ATTEMPTS ARE TO BE MADE TO PENETRATE THESE BASES, HOWEVER. [REDACTED] COMMENT: BASES (HERE MAY REFER TO FIRE SUPPORT BASES) AT LEAST ONE ALLIED DIVISION MUST BE DRAWN TO THE TAY NINH FRONT AND DESTROYED TO REDUCE THE SAIGON DEFENSE. EVEN IF THE ALLIES SHOULD SEND FIVE DIVISIONS TO TAY NINH THE "LIBERATION" ARMY IS STILL CAPABLE OF LIBERATING TAY NINH.

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5. THE TAY NINH AREA CONTROLS THE APPROACH ROUTES TO SAIGON AND ITS LIBERATION AND OCCUPATION ARE ESSENTIAL. SAIGON CANNOT BE ATTACKED UNTIL THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION SUCH AS ROUTES 22 AND 1 ARE CLEARED. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE IMPLICATION IS THAT SAIGON CANNOT BE ATTACKED UNTIL THE ATTACKS SUCCEED IN THE TAY NINH AREA.) AMMUNITION COULD BE MOVED FROM THE CACHE AREAS ALONG JUNGLE TRAILS, BUT IT WOULD BE A DIFFICULT AND TIME-CONSUMING TASK, AND THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH LABORERS TO MOVE THE NEEDED AMMUNITION THAT WAY; THEREFORE THE ROADS MUST BE CLEARED.

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IN 50213

PAGE 6 OF 8 PAGES

3.4(b)(1)

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6. DURING THE DECEMBER PHASE THE 9TH AND 5TH VC DIVISIONS, SUPPORTED BY THE THREE TAY NINH PROVINCIAL BATTALIONS, D.14, D.1, AND D.3, WILL ATTACK TAY NINH PROVINCE. THESE FORCES WILL ALSO BE SUPPORTED BY A COSVN SECURITY BATTALION. THESE UNITS WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK UNTIL THE ALLIED FORCES HAVE EXHAUSTED THEIR RESERVES. AT THAT TIME COSVN WILL COMMIT THREE MORE DIVISIONS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY DEPLOYED ALONG THE CAMBODIAN-TAY NINH-BINH LONG BORDER. THESE THREE DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN REINFORCED WITH UNITS FROM THE NORTH AND ARE EQUIPPED WITH TANKS, CANNONS, AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS. AT LEAST ONE BATTALION IN EACH OF THE DIVISIONS IS EQUIPPED WITH GAS MASKS. THE 7TH NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) DIVISION WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN BINH LONG PROVINCE DURING THE DECEMBER PHASE.

7. AS OF 6 DECEMBER THE 9TH DIVISION, WHICH WILL ATTACK TAY NINH CITY FROM THE DIRECTION OF THANH DIEN, HAD ALREADY DEPLOYED ITS FORCES IN THE BEN CAU (HIEU THIEN) CHAU THANH PHUOC NINH) AND GO DAU (KHIEM HANH) AREAS OF TAY NINH FOR THE DECEMBER PHASE. THE 5TH DIVISION HAD NOT ARRIVED AS OF 6 DECEMBER, BUT IT WAS TO REACH THE DUONG MINH CHAU (EASTERN

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IN 50213

PAGE 7 OF 8 PAGES

3.4(b)(1)

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PHU KHUONG DISTRICT) AREA ALONG ROUTE 4 AND DEPLOY SOUTHWARD TO THE TOA THANH AREA (THE AREA EAST AND SOUTH OF TAY NINH CITY) BY 7 OR 8 DECEMBER. DURING THE DECEMBER PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN DISTRICT TOWNS, THE PROVINCE CAPITAL AND U.S. BASE AREAS WILL BE SUBJECT TO CONTINUOUS ATTACKS. THE CLIMAX OF THE DECEMBER PHASE IN TAY NINH WILL BE MARKED BY VIOLENT ATTACKS ON U.S. BASES, HIEU THIEN DISTRICT TOWN (XT 3925) AND HIGHWAY 22.

8. THE THREE TAY NINH PROVINCE BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN REINFORCED WITH FORCES FROM THE NORTH. THESE THREE BATTALIONS WILL REMAIN UNDER PROVINCIAL COMMAND. THE COSVN SECURITY BATTALION WHICH IS BEING ATTACHED TO THE TAY NINH FRONT WILL BE RETURNED TO COSVN AFTER EACH OF THE THREE PHASES IS COMPLETED.

9. COSVN REALIZES THAT IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE TO LIBERATE TAY NINH DURING THE DECEMBER PHASE BECAUSE THE ALLIED FORCES IN THAT AREA ARE STILL STRONG. IN THE EVENT THAT THE LIBERATION IS NOT ACCOMPLISHED IN DECEMBER IT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN JANUARY OR FEBRUARY.

10. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE USMACV USAID CORDS

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IN 50213

[Redacted]

3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 8 OF 8 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Redacted]

1.6(d)(1)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

DIR/JUSPAO (MR. NICKEL ONLY) 7TH AIR FORCE USARV NAVFORV

CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT

[Redacted]

3.4(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[Redacted]

GROUP I

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Monday - December 9, 1968 - 6:35 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Venezuelan Elections

*Pres file*

The Christian Democratic candidate, Rafael Caldera, has finally been declared winner in Venezuela by the narrowest of margins. He won by about 30,000 votes, or a margin of approximately 29 percent to 28.4 percent for his nearest rival. The election was held in remarkably good order, and there is every indication that power will pass peacefully to the opposition next March for the first time in Venezuela's recent history.

President-elect Caldera is founder of Venezuela's Christian Democratic Party, and has run unsuccessfully several times before for the presidency. He is able, responsible, and a moderate leftist -- an expert in the field of labor law -- and a strong anti-communist. He knows the United States well, and has supported the Alliance for Progress in general while criticising "errors of operation".

Caldera's Party will be the second largest in the Congress and will have to form a coalition to put through a program. He may be somewhat more nationalistic in his dealings with American oil companies in Venezuela, but the general lines of Venezuelan policy toward the United States should continue after he takes office.

W. W. Rostow

SW Lewis:mm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 2-20-98

*Pres. J. E.*  
4

Monday, December 9, 1968  
6:25 p. m.

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

With respect to your instruction of this morning:

- Attached at Tab A is Harry McPherson's account of the precedents you asked me to generate from Larry Levinson. (It appears Larry is in New York with his family and will not be back until Wednesday.) I asked Harry if he could have someone check on the precedents with respect to the State of the Union messages of outgoing Administrations.
- At Tab B is a first draft of language covering the point about European unity.

There are, of course, many other foreign policy as well as domestic points you might wish to make in a January statement of the kind you were considering this morning.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 9, 1968  
Monday - 5:30 p. m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: Walt Rostow

Only two Presidents, Truman and Eisenhower, have faced exactly the options before you now as you consider the form, purpose, and manner of presenting your final message on the State of the Union. The reason is that since the lame-duck amendment, only those Presidents have ended their terms in a routine manner. Before that amendment was adopted, other Presidents were speaking to a retiring Congress, with the new Congress still months away from assembling.

Truman: did not deliver his message in person. At the beginning of his message, which was read on January 7, 1953 by the clerks of the Houses, he said, "On previous occasions, it has been my custom to set forth proposals for legislative action in the coming year. But that is not my purpose today. The presentation of a legislative program falls properly to my successor, not to me, and I would not infringe upon his responsibility to chart a forward course. Instead, I wish to speak of the course we have been following the past eight years and the position at which we have arrived."

He then proceeded to speak of the Presidency, and of his efforts to assure a smooth transition;

- of the challenges, at home and abroad, that he had faced during almost eight years in office -- the economy, post-war reconstruction, foreign aid, and particularly the Communist threat;
- of the danger of atomic war, and the need to harness atomic power for peaceful uses.

4a

700 A

He talked in general terms of what he expected the future to bring, including this interesting paragraph:

"If the Communist rulers understand that they cannot win by war, and if we frustrate their attempts to win by subversion, it is not too much to expect their world to change its character, moderate its aims, become more realistic and less impacable, and recede from the cold war they began . . . provided that the free world retains the confidence and the determination to outmatch the best our adversary can accomplish."

At the end of a rather lengthy message (by our standards) he called upon the people to support the new President.

Two days later, he sent up his budget, calculating expenditures of \$78.6 billion, with a deficit of \$9.9 billion.

Eisenhower: began his message, which was also transmitted to Congress on January 12, rather than presented in person, much as Truman had begun his.

Essentially, Eisenhower gave a very favorable accounting of his eight years in office. "In 1958, peace was preserved in the Middle East." "Constructive actions were undertaken to strengthen the economies of free world nations." "For the first time in our nation's history we have consistently maintained in peacetime, military forces of a magnitude sufficient to deter and if need be destroy predatory forces in the world."

He covered the economy: government finance and administration; agriculture ("despite the difficulties of administering Congressional programs which apply outmoded prescriptions and which aggravate rather than solve problems, the past eight years brought notable advances in agriculture."). Natural resources, education, science and technology, civil rights, health and welfare, housing, immigration, and veterans were other sub-titles. He spent very little time on problems that remain -- three paragraphs at the end.

On January 16, he sent up his budget, estimating \$80.9 billion in expenditures and \$82.3 billion in receipts, giving a surplus of \$1.5 billion.

Addendum: Hoover sent a message to Congress in December, 1932, saying things were looking up and the main thing was to control expenditures; Coolidge began his message, in December, 1928, with this: "No Congress of the United States ever assembled, on surveying the State of the Union, has met with a more pleasing prospect than that which appears at the present time."



Harry C. McPherson, Jr.

**Draft Passage for State of the Union Message**

We have been working over the years with a particular objective in mind, and we have been working to develop a special spirit in our relations with the other parts of the world.

The objective we call "regionalism;" that is, to encourage other nations to work in cooperation with their neighbors, increasingly to solve their own problems -- so that they could do more for themselves and we would have to do less.

The spirit is the spirit of partnership and equality among nations. Our own nation is based on the principle of equality among men in their relations to one another and as they stand before the law.

The Charter of the United Nations transfers that human principle to relations among nations.

We have tried to act in the spirit of the Charter. But nations can only behave with the dignity of equality when they are largely solving

their own problems -- and taking a strong hand in shaping their own destiny. But this is very hard for the old-fashioned nation-state to do in the modern world. And so, regionalism appears to be an important part of the answer.

That is why we have thrown our weight behind economic and physical integration in Latin America.

That is why we stand strongly in support of the new institutions of regionalism and sub-regionalism in Africa.

That is why we have done all that we could do to help lay the foundations for the New Asia which -- I deeply believe -- is emerging and will help bring progress, stability, and security to that part of the world where more than half of humanity lives.

And that is why we stand steady in support of regional unity in Western Europe -- the most important region of all, and the pioneer in post-war regional development.

It was fashionable a few years ago to say that the cause of European unity had been lost. I do not believe this. I believe the only route for Europe to find strength and stability and for Europe to play in the world the role its great capacities and resources would permit -- is to go forward to unity.

I believe the time is now coming for another great surge in the movement towards European unity.

I am sure that America will stand by its policy under its last four Presidents and remain ready to work with a United Europe -- as a partner, on the basis of equality.

\*\*\*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Monday - December 9, 1968 - 4:35pm

Mr. President:

*Profile*

As you asked, I have checked to see whether it is possible to cancel the Latin American speech which you had previously agreed to do.\* I find that you can get out of it without embarrassment and we are taking steps to do that.

The Pan American Society has been counting, however, on presenting you with their annual award and I think that as a minimum you should go ahead to accept it. You can receive informally a few of the officers of the Society in your office for that purpose.

W. W. Rostow

Will accept award  
in my office                          

Don't wish to accept  
the award                            

Call me                               

*\*But we never committed you to the Pan American Society  
W*

SWLewis:mm

cc - Charles Maguire

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By   g  , NARA, Date 2-20-98

Pres file  
6

Monday, Dec. 9, 1968  
3:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Abe Feinberg called me on two Israeli matters today. They were:

- accelerated Phantom delivery dates;
- more credit in the Phantom purchase.

Attached is Hal Saunders' memo on the facts -- just for background, should Abe bring the issue to you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/NODIS attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 6-13-02

6a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

By jc, NARA, Date 6-14-02

December 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Phantom Negotiations

1. Delivery date. Warnke has a memo short of Clifford's approval. When Clifford approves, it will go to Rusk for his opinion. Wheeler is doing a military/intelligence appraisal, either to come with the Clifford-Rusk memo or separately. I doubt either will be ready for lunch tomorrow, but they should be along later this week.

2. Credit terms. Clifford dictated Kuss' instructions. Kuss met with the Israelis last Thursday. When they pushed, he said he'd made the best offer he was authorized to make. I guess that's why they're now trying the White House.

The total cost of the purchase has now risen to \$275-300 million. This is because the Israelis are buying into the future. For example: instead of initial spares plus 12 months, they're ordering 30 months; instead of 12 spare engines, 30; they're building complete in-country depot level repair capability; they have added a few F-4 RF's which require expensive ground handling and readout equipment of their own.

Kuss was authorized to offer \$30 million straight DOD credit (6%, 10 yrs.) in FY 69 and to promise to ask Congress for the same in FY 70. The FY 69 figure is about all we have, but DOD has a planning figure of \$75 million for Israel in FY 70, which includes room for some other items.

By comparison, the Iranian credits are \$100 million a year. This year Kuss is thinking about \$50 million straight DOD credit (6%, 7 yrs.) and \$50 million DOD guarantee which means \$62.5 million NOA altogether for Iran.

Feinberg is coming to you because Clifford has tied Kuss' hands. As you know, the Pentagon from the top down disagrees with the handling of this negotiation. Clifford alone can change the credit available, but even he may not have much flexibility in FY 69. The total could go up in FY 70 if planes were given priority over other items. But Budget Bureau worked out the \$75 million planning figure with Kuss as a fair share for Israel in a tight budget.

The main threat, of course, is that the Israelis will go to Symington again and get him to write more into the military sales bill explicitly for Israel or make some sort of threat to the bill if we don't allocate more. But Clifford is the desk officer on this one.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

My own feeling is this: The Israelis have said right along that credit isn't an issue. Eshkol has said he put \$200 million into US banks ready for the purchase (ignoring that this was the \$200 million he promised the President to move to help our balance of payments totals). Now they're asking for \$75-100 million in extra spares to make them less vulnerable to our cutting their pipeline on them, and they'd naturally like to get all the credit they can. Since we're not all that pleased with Israel's efforts to make peace, I wouldn't be inclined to break my neck for them.

The argument on Iran doesn't really make sense. Our credits for Iran were incorporated in a memo of understanding well over a year ago. Our budget planning and our allocation of FY 69 appropriations were built around that understanding. In contrast, the 1966 Skyhawk contract with Israel explicitly stated that Israel wouldn't ask us for more planes for 5 years. Now they have. Admittedly, there was a war, and we're not holding them to their word. But there is a good reason why we don't just have an odd \$100 million in the account to offer at the drop of a hat.



Harold H. Saunders

Monday, December 9, 1968  
3:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark Clifford indicates his intent to hold a press conference on Tuesday or Wednesday of this week; and he cites three issues which he would like to get at.

*Pres. file*

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

cc: George Christian

7a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I plan to hold a press conference on Tuesday, December 10, or Wednesday, December 11. The merit of a press conference early this week rests, in my judgment, on three factors:

- . My last press conference was on November 12, though I did meet with the press in conjunction with the NATO Ministerial Meetings in mid-November and also appeared on Issues and Answers on November 24.
- . Visibility and dissemination of any remarks would be wider prior to President-elect Nixon's proposed press conference on Wednesday or Thursday of this week.
- . There are a number of Defense-related issues which can, and should, receive publicity and clarification at this time.

Among the issues I plan to address at the press conference are:

- . Project 693, the Defense program for reducing FY 1969 expenditures by \$3 billion. I believe we have done a sound and capable job of meeting the Congressional mandate, without unnecessarily cutting Defense "muscle."
- . The program of civil-related actions which I announced on September 26, before the National Security Industrial Association, were under study. I believe we have a good progress report to make on ways in which the Defense Department, jointly with industry, can contribute more to solving the social needs of our country.
- . The so-called "Joey Bishop charges" that the bombing halt has contributed to increased casualties for United States and allied troops. I believe such charges are without merit. I would plan to be in a position to answer fully and effectively any questions raised in this vein.

*Earl W. Sizemore*

RECEIVED  
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 DEC 9 PM 2 15

*Recs file*

8

Monday, Dec. 9, 1968  
11:15 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will be interested in this brief summary of Abrams' analysis for Thieu of the military situation, problems, and enemy intentions.

He feels the enemy's present greatest emphasis is on:

- maintenance of their logistical system and bases opposite Saigon;
- maintaining and building Communist political and organizational strength for the future.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN PLUS attachment (Saigon 44409)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-508  
By WJ, NARA, Date 1-11-93



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

<sup>Pa</sup>  
TELEGRAM

WH 5

P 090450Z DEC 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5700  
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3143  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 44409

2209Q  
1968 DEC 9 AM 1:36

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

FROM AMBASSADOR BERGER

PARIS FOR VIETNAM DELEGATION

SUBJECT: ABRAMS MEETING WITH THIEU

REF: STATE 281547

1. AT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON'S MEETING WITH THIEU, WHICH LASTED AN HOUR AND A HALF, GENERAL ABRAMS BRIEFED HIM ON THREE TOPICS:

A. MILITARY SITUATION AND POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION;

B. BELOW PAR PERFORMANCE OF THREE DIVISIONS IN III CORPS; AND

C. DISTURBING RISE IN ARVN AND MARINE DETENTION RATES IN CONTRAST TO EXCELLENT RECORD IN OTHER SERVICES.

2. IT WAS A SUPERB BRIEFING, IMPRESSIVE IN ITS CLARITY AND DETAIL, DELIVERED QUIETLY, AND MAKING CLEAR THAT WHILE GREAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN 1968, THERE WERE SERIOUS MILITARY PROBLEMS AHEAD WHICH CANNOT BE IGNORED AND NEED TO BE SOLVED.

3. GEN. ABRAMS WILL BE REPORTING INDEPENDENTLY, AND IN THIS TELEGRAM I WANT ONLY TO PROVIDE HIS LIST OF THE ENEMY'S POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION INDICATED BY ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE:

A. LOGISTICAL MOVEMENTS THAT SUGGEST A BUILD-UP OF A TWO TO THREE DIVISION FORCE NORTH OF BEN HAI, WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY THREATEN I CORPS. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO PRESENT MASSING NORTH OF THE DMZ.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-506

By mp/isp NARA. Date 1-8-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

B. DEVELOPING LOGISTICAL BASE AND SYSTEM IN LAOS TO FEED INTO THE ASAU VALLEY FOR EVENTUAL USE AGAINST TRI THUAN AREA. (*Hue area*).

C. DEVELOP THEIR MAIN LOGISTICAL SYSTEM AND BASES INSIDE CAMBODIA TO THREATEN III-CORPS AND SAIGON. THIS IS AREA WHERE COSVN AND ALLIANCE HEADQUARTERS NOW LOCATED, AND DISPOSITION OF FOUR NVA DIVISIONS IN THIS AREA SUGGESTS THIS MAY BE THE MAIN SPRINGBOARD FOR RENEWED MILITARY ACTIONS.

D. CONCENTRATE ON BUILDING LIBERATION COMMITTEES, POPULATION CONTROL, RECRUITING, AND BUILDING UP ITS INFRASTRUCTURE IN PREPARATION FOR MAXIMUM EFFORT AT NEGOTIATING TABLE TO ESTABLISH NLF AS CONTROLLING THE COUNTRYSIDE.

4. GEN. ABRAMS ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO <sup>ALL</sup> ~~ALL~~, BUT FELT ENEMY'S GREATEST PRESENT EMPHASIS WAS ON ~~C.A.D.~~ (*paragraphs above*)

5. THIEU LISTENED WITH ACUTE ATTENTION, ASKED MANY QUESTIONS, AND WAS DEEPLY IMPRESSED. PERHAPS GREATEST SIDE BENEFIT OF BRIEFING WAS THAT IT MAY DRIVE HOME TO THIEU, AND THROUGH HIM TO OTHERS, THAT ENEMY CAPABILITY IS STILL FORMIDABLE, AND THAT MILITARY VICTORY IS NOT JUST AROUND THE CORNER, AND THAT WE HAVE ONLY TO KEEP ON COURSE AND THE ENEMY WILL COLLAPSE.

6. AT THE END OF THE MEETING I MENTIONED OUR CONCERN (REFTEL) WITH SITUATION IN DMZ, VANCE'S MEETING WITH LAU RAISING THIS MATTER FORCIBLY, OUR DEMAND THAT SOME MACHINERY BE ESTABLISHED TO BRING VIOLATIONS UNDER CONTROL, AND REQUEST THAT HANOI MAKE SOME PROPOSALS. I SAID THIS WOULD BE SUBJECT OF IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION WITH KY AND LAM AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL.

BUNKER  
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, December 9, 1968 -- 9:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Andy Goodpaster requests an opportunity to  
call on you on 18 December, if your schedule permit.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

MAC 16848

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Exec Order, Feb. 24, 1989  
By 17, NARA, Date 2-20-91

WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9a

KAB441  
KAB4411Q  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

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FM GEN GOODPASTER DEPC OMUSMACV  
TO MR WALT ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE  
ZEN



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAC 16848 EYES ONLY

1. I AM RETURNING TO U.S. FOR TEMPORARY DUTY WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT, AND WILL REACH WASHINGTON IN LATTER PART OF DAY TUESDAY, 17 DECEMBER.
  2. I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CALL ON THE PRESIDENT ON 18 DECEMBER IF HIS SCHEDULE PERMITS.
  3. LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO SEEING AND TALKING WITH YOU.
  4. BEST PERSONAL REGARDS. ANDY.
- GP-4

SSO NOTE: PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS  
120

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority Group 4  
By 5 NARA, Date 3-20-98

NNNNQ  
.KAB442

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

Monday, December 9, 1968 -- 8:45 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Your Talk With Jean Monnet at Noon Today, Monday, December 9.

FYI: I have been talking at great length with Monnet about:

-- The future of monetary reform in relation to possible crises over the next year;

-- The problem of British entry into the Common Market and European unity;

-- The future role of Europe as a serious partner in world affairs, which, as you know, in his view requires that we treat Europe as "an equal."

Monnet is very much impressed with the fact that he finds America faces its problems now with much greater inner confidence than when he was here a year ago. Americans appear to find Vietnam, the problems of the dollar, and even the race problem much more manageable than they did -- a great tribute to what you have been able to accomplish since March 31.

Jean volunteered that he thinks it an excellent idea that Elspeth and I go to Texas, and that he will wish to visit us there regularly. You might be interested in his reasons; but, more important, you might wish to encourage him to come and meet with students, etc., in Austin.

Suggested talking points:

1. European unity. One of the disappointments of your Presidency is that the Europeans were not able in your time to come closer to unity. It is essential to have an effective European partner if the U. S. role in the world is to be stabilized for the long term. You may wish to express the hope that he and his European Action group should maintain momentum and keep the faith. There is no other effective answer for European progress and effectiveness on the world scene. (He may tell you of an interesting program for clearing out certain technical issues relating to British entry into the Common Market under the headings of: agriculture; money; and technology.

2. France. You may wish to ask him for his assessment of public opinion and political stability of France (he is a bit worried); and his ideas about possible Gaulle French policy towards Europe and the U. S.

3. "Europe as an equal." Monnet may suggest that in some final statement as President you may wish to come back to the theme of the importance of European unity and Europe's developing as a full partner with us in world affairs. (This is, indeed, a theme which fits your policy towards the regions, and you may wish to consider it.)

4. Texas. You may wish to invite him to come and visit you on his periodic trips to the United States and to meet students in Austin. (There is no one who could inspire young men more than Jean, if he is willing to talk to them quietly about how great ideas must patiently be put into action.)

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

11  
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Saturday, December 7, 1968  
5:30 PM

Mr. President:

We have just received word from NMCC that General Westmoreland was admitted to Womack Army Hospital at Fort Bragg, N.C. yesterday evening with a temperature of 104 degrees. General Westmoreland's ailment has been diagnosed as pneumonia in the lower lobe of the left lung. Antibiotics were administered and by early this morning the General's condition had stabilized.

The NMCC talked to the Medical Duty Officer at Womack Army Hospital at about 5:00 PM this evening and the MDO reported that General Westmoreland was making satisfactory progress with a temperature of 100.4 degrees.

It is expected that General Westmoreland will remain in the hospital until 10 December.

White House Situation Room

*Raymond J. Whitney*  
Briefing Officer

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, December 7, 1968 -- 2:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have probed at the question of the costs involved in postponing the BENHAM underground test for, say, two months.

1. Clark Clifford reports a very strong sentiment in the Department of Defense against postponement. The arguments are:

-- Increased costs.

[Redacted]

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)(5)

2. I also asked Spurgeon Keeny to make an evaluation. We have good reason to feel confident in his objectivity. I attach his memorandum, the conclusion of which is as follows:

[Redacted]

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)(5)

Finally, I believe it would focus greater public concern on the issue of induced earthquakes and make it more difficult for the next Administration to proceed with the program."

3. I would add this further reflection which follows Keeny's final sentence. It seems most unlikely that scientific knowledge will be able to clarify in the next months, and even years, ahead precisely what the potential earthquake effects could be from such underground tests. I am confident scientists would support this judgment. That means that if we delay:

- public anxiety will heighten in the wake of the experts' report; and
- the scientists will be unable to define or allay that anxiety through an early refinement of knowledge.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 02-194

By cbm, NARA, Date 9-28-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

4. The scientists would also agree that the odds are very, very low that BENHAM will produce earthquake effects at any substantial distance from the test site itself: the risks run to central Nevada, such as they are, rather than to the West Coast cities. The problem before us, then, is to proceed with a test required in the national interest under awkward circumstances. (The scientists' report on earthquake effects, Howard Hughes, etc.) Or to leave the decision over to the next Administration when the awkwardness is likely to be greater rather than less and the public anxiety greater rather than less.

5. If you decide that you are likely to proceed, you may wish to have a meeting, including: Sec. Rusk, Sec. Clifford, Gen. Wheeler, Glenn Seaberg, Don Hornig.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 7, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Project BENHAM

At your request, I have made a few informal inquiries and given some thought to the consequences of deferring the BENHAM event for two months. There is no simple answer to this question. I would, however, offer the following general judgments.

6.1(a)

[Redacted]

This could add a substantial amount (possibly on the order of \$100 million) to total program costs. I would guess, however, that the most probable outcome would be that in the end the program would be kept on schedule with some intermediary increases in total program costs and at least in the near future somewhat greater uncertainties about confidence in schedules.

6.1(a)

[Redacted]

6.1(a)

3.3(b)(5)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)(5)

[Redacted]

Given the fact that this program will probably involve more than a billion dollars a year in this period, I would estimate that such a delay, unless it were planned for now, would not reduce current costs and could add on the order of \$100 million to the total cost of the program.

If BENHAM operates sufficiently unsatisfactorily that the AEC adopts the somewhat more conservative back-up Los Alamos device, the schedule based on that shot should not be adversely affected since the key shot in that program is not scheduled until the spring of 1969.

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)(5)

[Redacted]

Although, as far as I can find out, a 2-months' delay would not affect these design problems in a way that would delay the program, it would again obviously be desirable to resolve these uncertainties at the earliest possible date.

The effect of a delay at this point on the morale and enthusiasm of the laboratory personnel is probably a real, although intangible, problem which will be of concern to the AEC.

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)(5)

[Redacted]

The scheduling problem appears to be complicated by the fact that some of the AEC tests are directed toward improving the Livermore device so that it might meet higher specifications than those acceptable to the DOD.

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)(5)

[Redacted]

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)(5)

[REDACTED] The resolution of this complex issue might take further pressure off the rather tight test schedule if BENHAM were postponed.

Finally, I believe that slippage of BENHAM, which would almost certainly become public knowledge, would focus even greater public attention on the problem of triggered secondary earthquakes raised by the Ad Hoc Panel. This might further complicate any decision of the next Administration to proceed with the test. A longer delay in the test would of course have an increasing impact on the program and would increase the probability and length of any resulting slippage.

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)(5)

[REDACTED]  
Finally, I believe it would focus greater public concern on the issue of induced earthquakes and make it more difficult for the next Administration to proceed with the program.

*Spurgeon*  
Spurgeon Keeny

13

ACTION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Saturday - December 7, 1968 - 1:50 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Proposed Get-Well Message from the President  
to President Pacheco of Uruguay

President Pacheco of Uruguay was injured in a fall from a horse during a military review and is confined to bed. Bob Sayre and State have recommended you send a get-well message to him. A proposed text is attached at Tab A.

If you approve, our Embassy in Montevideo will deliver the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message   

Disapprove       

Call me           

SWLewis:mm

13a

**Suggested Presidential Get-Well Message to the President of Uruguay,  
Jorge Pacheco Areco**

**Dear Mr. President:**

**I have just learned with regret of your recent accident.**

**Please accept my sincere best wishes for a speedy and  
complete recovery.**

**Sincerely,**

**Lyndon B. Johnson**

INFORMATION

14

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Saturday, December 7, 1968  
8:45 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This is how a Moroccan reports  
Calro's state of mind on peace and  
American politics.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE


WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJ 02-196  
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-4-03

14a

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

3.



1.4 (c)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 10-240  
By ist NARA, Date 11-29-10

-5-

DIPSJM 6 Dec 63


~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

14a

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~



INR Comment: The above analysis probably reflects the



1.4 (c)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

15

**ACTION**

Saturday - December 7, 1968

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

Following Bess Abell's suggestion, State has prepared a draft souvenir program for the Chamisal Ceremony (Tab A). It will be similar to the attached example used here for arrival ceremonies of distinguished foreign guests, but because of the shortage of time, we will have the cover photographed in black and white rather than in color.

The photograph they propose to use is also attached (Tab B).

If you approve, they will arrange to have approximately 3,000 printed. They will be distributed to the official guests and to the general public who attend the Ceremony.

W. W. Rostow

Approve the souvenir program                

Disapprove                                

Approve photograph                   

Disapprove                                

Call me                                        

**Attachments**

Tab A - Draft souvenir program for Chamisal Ceremony.

Tab B - Photograph (Photo ID # = WH 3 Dec., 1966 - C 3993-11a)

SWLewis:mmm

16

ACTION

Friday, December 6, 1968 - 6:45pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Reception of Delegation Concerning the PUEBLO

The National Committee for Responsible Patriotism is coordinating a national effort to obtain one million signatures on petitions pledging full support to the government in "any honorable action" required to obtain the release of the PUEBLO crew.

There will be a motorcade arriving in Washington about 3:30 p. m. Saturday, December 14, a delegation from which hopes to deliver "to you or your representative" the collected signatures.

The Executive Director of the Committee, Charles W. Wiley, says that this is a non-partisan effort, not designed to establish blame or to urge specific actions. The NSC staff has had previous contact with Mr. Wiley in connection with Vietnam and has found him to be reliable and cooperative.

We believe from a conversation Mr. Wiley has had with Al Jenkins that the motorcade is well planned, will be orderly, and that the group sincerely wishes to express support for the government's efforts.

I understand that you do not expect to be in town at the time this delegation will arrive. There may be some merit at this point, however, in expressing White House interest in the PUEBLO case by receiving what appears to be a responsible and sympathetic group. If you wish me to do so, I should be happy to receive the delegation. If you wish to play it down but still allow the delegation to come to the White House, alternatively Al Jenkins could receive them. Other possibilities would be for Katzenbach or Wyn Brown to receive them at State.

Attached is a letter to you from Mr. Wiley and a copy of the petition which the Committee is circulating.

W. W. Rostow

Group to be received by:

Rostow _____	Jenkins _____
Katzenbach _____	Other _____
Brown _____	Call me _____

AJ:mm

**NATIONAL COMMITTEE for  
RESPONSIBLE PATRIOTISM**



16a  
COMMODORE HOTEL, 109 EAST 42nd STREET  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 (212) 684-0640

December 2, 1968

President Lyndon B. Johnson  
White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Our Committee is coordinating a national effort to obtain 1,000,000 signatures on petitions pledging full support to the government in any honorable action that it takes to obtain the release of the crew of the U.S.S. Pueblo. As you will see in the attached copy of the petition, it is a non-partisan, non-political effort. We are not trying to establish blame, nor are we making any specific suggestions as to what to do next; we are only mustering public support for honorable action.

As part of this campaign, there will be a motorcade on on December 14th from the New York-New Jersey area to Washington to deliver to you or your representative the signatures we have gathered by that time. Most major veterans and fraternal organizations, police and firemen's groups, etc. - at either state, county, and/or local level - will be involved, and we sincerely hope that you will be able to meet briefly with a delegation from the motorcade.

We expect to reach the White House at about 3:30 in the afternoon.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Wiley  
Executive Director

CWW/eh

# NATIONAL COMMITTEE for RESPONSIBLE PATRIOTISM



16 b  
COMMODORE HOTEL, 109 EAST 42nd STREET  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 (212) 684-0640

## DRIVE TO FREE PUEBLO CREW

The National Committee for Responsible Patriotism is spearheading a nationwide campaign for a million signatures pledged to support any honorable action by the Government to free the crew of the USS Pueblo.

Charles W. Wiley, Executive Director of the NCRP, has declared: "Winter...Spring... Summer...Fall... We've skied and golfed and watched our children growing up - while the men of the USS Pueblo have wasted away their lives in a communist prison. They must not be forgotten."

It is not the purpose of this campaign to place blame. Nor is the Committee suggesting any specific moves. The NCRP wants only to mobilize massive public support for three reasons:

- (1) To help morale in our armed forces. To reassure every serviceman that he will never be forgotten in his hour of need.
- (2) To strengthen the hand of our Government in handling this problem by making it clear to the world -- especially the communist world -- that there is unified support among our people behind any honorable action.
- (3) To make it clear to all our political leaders that the American people feel very strongly about the situation.

The non-political, non-partisan NCRP is seeking the help of all well-established, non-controversial organizations in setting up autonomous local groups to gather signatures. These are already active in many localities across the nation.

The NCRP has no local chapters or affiliates, choosing instead to help other organizations on specific projects. It has received the cooperation of nearly all of the major veterans and fraternal organizations, plus many labor unions, ethnic and youth groups, etc.

A non-profit organization, the NCRP is supported by contributions from the public, and badly needs financial help for the Pueblo campaign. It gives single copies of the petition free of charge, with the suggestion that local groups and individuals have it reprinted for their own use. The Committee is also distributing "FREE the PUEBLO" buttons, bumper stickers, and posters.

The NCRP has sponsored numerous activities dedicated to show support for the men and women of our armed forces, respect for law, pride in our heritage, and love of country. A year ago it initiated a nation-wide program that included turning on vehicle headlights during the day to indicate approval of these causes. In May 1967 the Committee organized the "Support Our Men in Viet Nam" parade down Fifth Avenue, the longest parade in the United States since 1947.

NCRP projects have received the endorsements of former President Eisenhower, Presidential candidates Richard Nixon, Hubert Humphrey, and Barry Goldwater, the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy, over 80% of the nation's Governors and numerous other outstanding public figures. The Committee received an award from Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge earlier this year.



ACTION 17

~~SECRET~~

Friday, December 6, 1968 - 3:00pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: The German Offset Problem

Our present agreement with the Germans on military offsets, which we negotiated last June, covers us until June 30, 1969. At the end of the last negotiations, both we and the Germans agreed that the present financial neutralization arrangement could not continue and that we had to seek a longer-term solution. We arranged bilateral talks in the fall to explore the possibilities.

There have been two bilateral meetings so far. A third -- possibly the final in the series -- is scheduled for December 19-20 in Bonn. The meetings have been at a technical level with low visibility but most of the critical issues have been raised. Our objective in these talks is to work out a joint report, not necessarily agreed in its entirety, which would lay out for each government at the beginning of next year the possible ways to deal with this problem and the decisions that would have to be made.

This is a complex but very important issue. It is essential that we make the best possible arrangements for an effective transition in this field. We should push hard to get as much done as is possible to remove this issue as a factor in the decisions the Nixon Administration will have to make regarding our troops in Germany and in Europe.

It could be useful, therefore, to have someone who will be working with Kissinger join the group going to Bonn. This would show the Germans that the policy issue will not go away and it would help make sure that the next team has the full benefit of the work already done or under way.

If you approve, I will explore this possibility with Bob Murphy.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-197  
By cb, NARA, Date 1-5-95

*ERF*  
ERF:mst

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Friday, December 6, 1968  
1:10 p. m.

18

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Classification of IDA Study on National Security Process**

I have received the following responses to General Taylor's request that the Institute for Defense Analyses study on the national security process be released as an unclassified document for broad distribution, to include appropriate persons in the Nixon entourage, the Ford Foundation, and the individuals interviewed:

- A. Secretary Clifford concludes that the report does not require any classification.
- B. General Wheeler believes that the study should be reviewed for security before it is released as an unclassified document.
- C. CIA Director Helms believes the study should have an overall classification of Confidential because "hostile elements would find (it) very useful in guiding penetration attempts, planting disinformation or timing information related to crisis situations."
- D. The State Department has no objection to unclassified distribution of the study.

In view of these responses, I recommend that we ask General Taylor to classify about a dozen IDA studies as Confidential to circulate at once to members of the Nixon staff as a classified document. That being done, I think that we should follow General Wheeler's comment and have the study reviewed for security by normal means.

W. W. Rostow

Recommendation approved \_\_\_\_\_

Unclassified distribution approved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

18a



15412

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Washington, D.C. 20520

December 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

In response to your memorandum of November 26 to Secretary Rusk, the Department has no objection to General Taylor's proposal to distribute, on an unclassified basis, copies of the IDA studies on national security affairs to officials in the incoming Administration who will be handling matters in this field.

Obviously recommendations contained in the IDA reports are not necessarily subscribed to by the Department, and this should not be taken as endorsement by the Department of any particular point contained in the reports.

  
for Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

18b

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

6 DEC 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable W. W. Rostow

I have reviewed the Institute for Defense Analyses study, The National Security Process, and conclude, as you suggest General Taylor has, that the report does not require any classification.

The report appears to me to be quite comprehensive, and should be a valuable tool in examining the structure through which our national security policies are formulated. This is particularly so in view of the many personnel and operating changes which accompany any change of administration.

We in Defense plan to examine closely those portions which apply specifically to us.

*Earl W. Suggs*



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

18c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CM-3797-68  
2 December 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT: The National Security Process

I interpose no objection to the study on the National Security Process prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses.

In view of the fact that much of the study is based on classified interviews, it might be desirable to process the study through the security review system before it is released on an unclassified basis.

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING.  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY 18 ON 2-20-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3653

18d



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

2 December 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow

1. My initial review of IDA Report R-150 forwarded to me under cover of your memorandum of 26 November leads me to the conclusion that it should have an overall classification of CONFIDENTIAL.

2. Even though much of the content is, piecemeal, in the public domain, the report is such a complete review, analysis and discussion of the Command, Control, planning and decision making process of our Government that I feel it is, in aggregate, a document that hostile elements would find very useful in guiding penetration attempts, planting disinformation or timing information related to crisis situations.

3. I am well aware that mere classification does not always afford the protection it should. Nonetheless, it does help prevent whole documents from becoming legitimate public property particularly in view of the provisions of Public Law 90-23 regarding freedom of information.

4. In view of the detailed examination which the report reflects, I think that it should be distributed to our present principal planners and decision makers as well as to the President-elect and his planning staff.

5. My comments apply to both Volumes I and II whether taken together or separately.

*Dirh*

Richard Helms  
Director

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-161  
By iss, NARA, Date 6-17-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

Pres file  
19  
BRIEFING MEMO

THE WHITE HOUSE

VIA JIM JONES

WASHINGTON

Friday, Dec. 6, 1968  
12:40 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith are notes for your meeting with John Chancellor and Ray Scherer at 1:00 p. m.

1. With respect to talks with the Soviet Union on missiles you will, of course, know how to handle this. I would be exceedingly reserved at this stage and tell them frankly that this is a matter on which you cannot yet give them a full background. The alternative would be to lay the predicate for hanging a failure on the Soviet unwillingness to move. But I should think, on balance, the best thing would be to tell these good men that you simply can't get into it today.

2. On the Paris talks, I believe you should tell them that now that Saigon has come to Paris -- and despite the fact that we shall face maneuvers on both sides about tables and status and procedure -- the fundamental position is this: how fast we get peace is up to Hanoi.

Just as Hanoi knew in May what our terms were basically for a bombing cessation and waited until October 27 to meet those terms, Hanoi knows now what our basic terms are for peace:

- North Vietnamese forces out of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos;
- a re-established DMZ;
- arrangements for monitoring the settlement at the frontiers;
- U. S. implements the Manila withdrawal communique;
- a one-man-one-vote solution in the South in which, as Thieu said at Honolulu, those who give up violence can have full rights under the Constitution which, in a Honolulu press conference, he said meant they could both run for office as well as vote. This is already quite clear to Hanoi. We and Saigon can move to that kind of settlement as fast as Hanoi is ready.

~~But we do not know whether they play delay or rapid movement.~~  
Present indications are that military activity is increasing and will increase in December -- perhaps as a backdrop to the opening of the widened talks.

Meanwhile the ARVN and General Abrams' forces are moving systematically to extend GVN population control in the countryside.

3. The Middle East situation is, indeed, dangerous. We do not believe that either side wishes a full-scale renewal of the war; but evidently the raids and reprisals in that unstable situation are very dangerous.

We are doing everything that our diplomacy can do to try to prevent the situation from unravelling into war and to make the Jarring mission a success. It is quite uncertain whether the Soviet Union wants stable peace in the Middle East; and it is equally uncertain whether the Soviet Union is in a position to force Nasser's hand any more than we control Israel.

*W. A. Rostow*

**ACTION**

**Friday, December 6, 1968 -- 9:25 a.m.**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith Paul Nitze requests your approval for the designation of a General/Flag Officer to chair a study group on worldwide impact of our logistic support for the conflict in Southeast Asia.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Approved \_\_\_\_\_**

**Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_**

**Call me \_\_\_\_\_**

**WWRostow:rln**

20a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

DEC 4 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Designation of a General/Flag Officer Position

1. Based upon the recommendations of the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have concluded that a comprehensive study should be conducted of the logistic support of the conflict in Southeast Asia and the world-wide impact thereof. Such a study is warranted by the magnitude of the logistic effort required. There has been a very extensive multi-Service buildup of forces in distant and underdeveloped areas, accompanied by a large construction effort. I believe that such a study would suggest ways and means for achieving full effectiveness in the logistic support of our military forces in future contingencies and for reducing the financial burden.
2. This study would be broad in scope and in great depth. Accordingly, I anticipate that the study will require approximately one year to complete.
3. The chairman of the study group will report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. I recommend that the position of "Chairman, Joint Logistic Review Board", be designated as one of importance and responsibility warranting the grade of General/Admiral.
4. Provided you approve this position as one warranting the grade of General/Admiral, I will submit to you my recommendation for the assignment of an officer to occupy it after I have considered other related assignment actions for general/flag officers of the Services.

*Paul H. Nitze*  
DEPUTY

~~TOP SECRET/CHEROKEE/EYES ONLY~~

Friday, December 6, 1968 -- 8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have now acquired copies of Sec. Rusk's communications with Thompson in the CHEROKEE channel. They are attached.

You may wish to go through them to see precisely where we stand. They include:

Tab A -- Sec. Rusk's message on time and place.

Tab B -- Thompson's evaluation of what could and could not be achieved at the meeting. (His conclusion: mainly announcement of agreement on principles to guide missile talks.)

Tab C -- Debrynia's positive view with respect to Nixon's presence.

Tab D -- Thompson's talk with Gromyko of 29 November -- mainly positive, but with Gromyko "not in a position to comment" on December 16-17 in Geneva. (para. 4)

Tab E -- Sec. Rusk's instructions for Tommy to get with Debrynia.

Tab F -- Thompson's response of December 5 indicating that he has not yet been able to set up an appointment with Debrynia.

W. W. Rostow

- State 279345, 28 Nov 1968
- Moscow 6643, 29 Nov 1968
- Moscow 6642, 29 Nov 1968
- Moscow 6635, 29 Nov 1968
- State to Moscow 12/4/68
- Moscow 6728, 5 Dec 1968

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NLJ 94-469  
 By MP/ck, NARA, Date 1-9-98

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET/CHEROKEE/EYES ONLY~~

(A)

21a

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

279345

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Classification

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy MOSCOW

Info

NODIS  
CHEROKEE  
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

28 Nov 68 20 427

REGARDING TIME AND PLACE OF MEETING REFERRED TO IN MY LAST  
CHEROKEE OUR THINKING IS APPROXIMATELY DECEMBER 16-17 IN  
GENEVA. YOU ARE FREE TO SUGGEST THIS TO DOBRYNIN AT FIRST  
OPPORTUNITY.

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-470

By mfjg, NARA, Date 1-9-98

S-in-the Secretary

Tel. No.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

S/S-D LCKilday

Clearance

~~SECRET~~

Classification



Department of State

21b

~~TOP SECRET~~

TELEGRAM  
ACTION COPY

P 291420Z NOV 68  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 533  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 8 5 6 7Q

RECD: 1968 NOV 29 PM 3 36

(B)

~~TOP SECRET~~ MOSCOW 6643

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS/CHEROKEE

Authority NLS 94-470

By mp/yc, NARA, Date 1-9-98

FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BE DECRYPTED BY SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS  
WATCH OFFICER ONLY. LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY FROM  
AMBASSADOR:

REF: STATE 278030

1. WHILE APPRECIATE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO ADVANCE CAUSE OF PEACE BEFORE LEAVING OFFICE, I CONFESS I AM SKEPTICAL THAT MUCH CAN BE ACHIEVED AT PROPOSED MEETING EXCEPT ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE MISSILE TALKS WHICH I GATHER IS ALREADY WELL PREPARED.
2. PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE ON MIDDLE EAST IF WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE DEAL WHICH WE WOULD BOTH AGREE TO TRY TO IMPOSE (SHORT OF USE OF FORCE) ON THE TWO SIDES. BUT I WONDER HOW MUCH LEVERAGE WE WILL HAVE ON ISRAEL WITH ONLY LITTLE OVER A MONTH REMAINING FROM TIME OF TALKS UNTIL NEW ADMINISTRATION TAKES OVER.
3. HIGHLY PUBLICIZED TOP LEVEL MEETING MAY MAKE SOVIET PRESSURE ON NORTH VIETNAM MORE DIFFICULT AS CHINESE COMMUNISTS WILL MAKE MUCH NOISE ABOUT COLLUSION AND SELL-OUT. IN ANY EVENT I DOUBT SOVIETS WILL GO BEYOND URGING A SETTLEMENT ON NVN IN GENERAL TERMS. I DO NOT BELIEVE THEY WILL SUPPORT ANY PARTICULAR POLITICAL TERMS BUT WILL PROBABLY BE PREPARED TO PRESS NVN ON REDUCTION OF VIOLENCE. GREATEST VALUE OF MEETING MIGHT BE IN USING SOVIETS TO IMPRESS NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT WE ARE NOT ABOUT TO CAPITULATE AND THAT REAL COMPROMISE WILL BE NECESSARY IF AGREEMENT IS TO BE REACHED.
4. SOVIETS WILL BE GLAD TO DRAW ATTENTION AWAY FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EXPLOIT SUSPICIONS OF OUR ALLIES. ON THE OTHER HAND AN EVEN MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL MEETING WILL DIMINISH LIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER SOVIET ADVENTURES OR PRESSURE ON SUCH ISSUES AS BERLIN.
5. I SHOULD THINK PRESIDENT WOULD WISH TO RAISE PUEBLO CASE AS SOVIETS COULD PROBABLY BE PUSHED INTO GIVING US AT LEAST A LITTLE MORE HELP ON THAT ISSUE AND MERE FACT OF MEETING MIGHT EXERCISE SOME INFLUENCE ON NORTH KOREANS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 6643 FROM MOSCOW, November 29, 1968 (NODIS/CHEROKEE)

6. EVEN IS BREZHNEV SHOULD ATTEND MEETING, SOVIET PRINCIPALS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE BOUND BY RIGID INSTRUCTIONS AND THERE WILL BE LITTLE TIME IN TWO-DAY MEETING FOR THEM TO CONSULT MOSCOW.

PRESENT REGIME IS NOT NOTED FOR ABILITY TO REACH QUICK DECISIONS. THEREFORE, THE MORE CLEARLY PRESIDENT CAN INDICATE TO SOVIETS IN ADVANCE WHAT HE EXPECTS OF THEM, THE MORE LIKELY AGREEMENT CAN BE REACH

THOMPSON  
BT

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~



Department of State

21c  
TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION COPY

(c)  
CONTROL: 8 5 5 3Q

RECD: 1968 NOV 29 PM 3 28

P 291415Z NOV 68  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 532  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 94-470

By mgfif, NARA, Date 1-9-98

~~TOP SECRET~~ MOSCOW 6642

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BE DECRYPTED BY SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS WATCH OFFICER ONLY. LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR:

REF: STATE 278030

1. WHEN I LAUNCHED WITH DOBRYNIN NOVEMBER 12 HE ASKED MY ADVICE ABOUT GETTING IN TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT OR HIS STAFF. I SUGGESTED HE TAKE NO INITIATIVE BUT BE RESPONSIVE TO ANY APPROACH. I THEN ASKED HIS PERSONAL VIEW ON SUMMIT MEETING WITH NIXON. HE SAID HE WAS MUCH IN FAVOR WHETHER BEFORE OR AFTER INAUGURATION. I PUT THIS INFORMATION IN LETTER TO BOB MURPHY DATED NOV. 19.
2. I MENTION FOREGOING AS IT MAY HAVE BEARING ON WHAT SEEMED TO ME LACK OF ENTHUSIASM ON PART OF DOBRYNIN IN HIS TALK WITH YOU.

THOMPSON  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

DE RORER 0530RU 5341240  
ZNY TTTT ZZ  
O 291038Z N 68  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 527  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ MOSCOW 6635

N O D I S C H E R O K E E

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-470

By mp/sg NARA, Date 1-9-98

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

1. GROMYKO CALLED ME TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE AT ELEVEN-THIRTY THIS MORNING AND MADE FOLLOWING ORAL STATEMENT:

QUOTE SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK IN A CONVERSATION WITH USSR AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON DOBRYNIN ON NOVEMBER 25 OF THIS YEAR TOUCHED ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WHICH, IN THE OPINION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON, COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE EVENT OF HIS MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADERS. PARA. IN CONFORMITY WITH THE DESIRE EXPRESSED BY RUSK TO LEARN THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET SIDE WITH RESPECT TO THESE QUESTIONS, WE WOULD LIKE TO REPORT THE FOLLOWING FOR TRANSMISSION TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON: PARA ONE. WE PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT, CONCERNING THE LIMITATION OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, THERE WAS AGREEMENT, IN THE COURSE OF THE PRECEDING EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS BETWEEN US, ON A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF CONCRETE PROPOSITIONS REGARDING COMMON GOALS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR LIMITING AND SUBSEQUENTLY REDUCING STRATEGIC WEAPONS, THE APPROVAL OF WHICH COULD BE COMPLETED BY A DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION AT A POSSIBLE MEETING. AS FAR AS WE UNDERSTAND, OUR DETAILED CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT, HANDED TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON OCTOBER 2 OF THIS YEAR, WERE POSITIVELY RECEIVED ON THE AMERICAN SIDE. FOR OUR PART WE ARE READY AS BEFORE TO REVIEW THE STATED CONSIDERATIONS AS A BASIS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN INITIAL, PRINCIPLED AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. PARA TWO. THE OPINION EXPRESSED BY SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK, TO THE EFFECT THAT THROUGH THE JOINT EFFORTS OF THE USA AND THE USSR TOWARD PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST, THERE CAN BE ACHIEVED POSITIVE RESULTS IN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE NEAR EASTERN CONFLICT, FULLY CORRESPONDS TO OUR POINT OF VIEW ON THIS SUBJECT. PARA. FROM OUR SIDE WE ARE DOING AND INTEND IN FUTURE TO DO EVERYTHING DEPENDENT ON US IN ORDER TO PROMOTE IN PRACTICE A PEACEFUL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE NEAR EASTERN PROBLEM AND TO STRENGTHEN UNDERSTANDING OF THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT IN THOSE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION WHOSE GOVERNMENTS GIVE CONSIDERATION TO OUR OPINION. PARA. WE HAVE ALSO REPEATEDLY AND FRANKLY EXPRESSED TO US REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON PERSONALLY, OUR OPINION THAT IF THE US GOVERNMENT WILL MAINTAIN AN ANALOGOUS LINE WITH ISRAEL, THE CAUSE OF LIQUIDATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF LAST YEAR'S ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARAB STATES AND THUS

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST HAS EVERY CHANCE OF SUCCESS. PARA. THEREFORE, WE ARE BY NO MEANS INCLINED TO CONSIDER THAT EVENTS IN THIS REGION INNER QUOTES ARE NOT AMENABLE TO CONTROL END INNER QUOTES. PARA THREE. WE ALSO HAVE NO DOUBT OF THE USEFULNESS OF AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON QUESTIONS CONCERNING SOUTHEAST ASIA. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THE MAIN PROBLEM OF THIS REGION TODAY REMAINS THE STOPPING OF THE BLOODSHED IN VIETNAM AND THE ACHIEVEMENT THERE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR THE LEGAL RIGHTS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. PARA. AS A RESULT OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CESSATION BY THE US OF BOMBING AND OTHER MILITARY ACTS AGAINST THE DRV AND ON THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV, NLF, USA AND THE SAIGON ADMINISTRATION LOOKING TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM, MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS HAVE IN OUR VIEW BEEN CREATED FOR MOVEMENT FORWARD IN THIS DIRECTION. MOREOVER, AS IS WELL KNOWN, IT IS IN NO WAY THE FAULT OF THE DRV OR ITS FRIENDS THAT THERE IS A DELAY IN BEGINNING THE POLITICAL TALKS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FOUR SIDES. PARA. IN THE EVENT THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS ANY OTHER ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH IT WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE ARRANGING OF A MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND THE SOVIET LEADERS, WE ARE READY OF COURSE TO HEAR THEM AND TO TAKE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE FINAL DECISION ON THIS QUESTION. UNQUOTE

2. I SAID THAT YOU WERE SENDING ME THE EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE ON MISSILE TALKS BUT I HAD NOT YET RECEIVED IT. I ASKED IF IT WAS SOVIET IDEA THAT AT POSSIBLE MEETING AN AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE MISSILE TALKS WOULD BE REACHED AND EMBODIED IN SOME SORT OF DECLARATION OR COMMUNIQUE AND THAT THIS WOULD THEN BE FOLLOWED BY DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING.

3. I REFERRED TO YOUR SEVEN POINTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND ASKED IF HE THOUGHT THESE COULD FURNISH THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT. HE SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS DETAILS BUT COULD SAY THAT THE SEVEN POINTS CONTAINED SOME CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS. HE ALSO WISHED TO REFER TO THE CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD ON THIS SUBJECT WITH YOU IN NEW YORK. HE SAID THE TROUBLE WAS THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE NO CHANGE ON THE PART OF ISRAEL. HE SAID THE US SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO CHANGE THE ISRAELI POSITION.

4. DOBRYNIN HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REACH MOSCOW BECAUSE OF BAD WEATHER HERE. I THEREFORE TOLD GROMYKO FOR HIS BACKGROUND THAT I UNDERSTOOD WE WERE THINKING OF DECEMBER 16 AND 17 IN GENEVA. ~~HE SAID HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMENT.~~

5. INDICATING I WAS SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS I SAID THAT A TWO-DAY MEETING WOULD LEAVE LITTLE TIME FOR ANY CONSULTATION BY THE PRINCIPLES WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE MORE ADVANCE PREPARATION THE BETTER. HE NODDED BUT DID NOT COMMENT.

6. YOU WILL NOTE STATEMENT REFERRED TO SOVIET LEADERS IN THE PLURAL. I WILL TRY TO FIND OUT FROM DOBRYNIN WHOM THEY HAVE IN MIND.

THOMPSON  
BT

12/4/68  
21e

(E)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

TO: Amembassy MOSCOW

Authority NLS 94-470

NODIS - CHEROKEE

By mp/cp, NARA, Date 1-9-98

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY.

Please see Dobrynin informally as soon as you can and try to get some feel from him as to Soviet thinking about a possible meeting now that he has been in town for a few days and may be able or willing to say somewhat more than did Gromyko. One question on our minds is whether Gromyko's talk with you is supposed to be their answer to my conversation with Dobrynin. Gromyko's comments must have been on the basis of an abbreviated cable reporting by Dobrynin rather than on the basis of any significant discussion among Soviet leaders. I must say that Gromyko's remarks about the Middle East and Southeast Asia were rather bleak and, as you pointed out, not very encouraging about the possibility of any major advances in either area.

FYI - You should know that, if such a meeting is held, Nixon would almost certainly not accompany the President but would designate Bob Murphy to represent him in the President's party. END FYI.

RUSK.

S:DRusk:jmr

~~SECRET~~

21f

~~SECRET~~

(F)

PP RUEHC  
DE RUEHCR 6728FD 3401123  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 051110Z DEC 63  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 589  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 94-470

By mp/isp NARA, Date 1-9-98

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 6728

NODIS CHEROKEE

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

REF: STATE 281523

1. DOBRYNIN DELAYED IN ARRIVING HERE BY WEATHER AND FOREIGN OFFICE NOW STATES HE HAS BEEN ILL. THIS MAY BE EXCUSE BUT AM PRESSING FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE MEETING.
2. I DO CONSIDER THAT GROMYKO'S ORAL STATEMENT IS ANSWER TO YOUR TALK WITH DOBRYNIN.
3. WILL SUBMIT LESS RESTRICTED THINK PIECE ON MIDDLE EAST. HOWEVER I SHOULD THINK IT WISE TO KEEP PUBLIC FOCUS OF ANY MEETING SQUARELY ON MISSILE TALKS WHERE IT NOW IS REGARDLESS OF ATTENTION DEVOTED TO OTHER PROBLEMS. BELIEVE OUR FRIENDS WILL ACCEPT THIS WHEREAS IF IT WERE THOUGHT THAT MAIN PURPOSE WAS US-SOVIET BILATERAL ON OTHER ISSUES THIS COULD CAUSE COMPLICATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES, PARTICULARLY AS I ASSUME WE COULD NOT GIVE THEM MUCH ADVANCE INFORMATION.

GP-1. THOMPSON  
BT

~~SECRET~~

22 *Case file*

Thursday, December 5, 1968  
5:00 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: 5:30 p. m. Meeting on the DMZ

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ms, NARA, Date 1-22-98

1. Present Military Situation (Gen. Wheeler)
2. Vance-Lau Meeting of Yesterday (Sect. Rusk)  
Vance made a strong pitch as instructed. Lau was unmovable.
3. Options (Sect. Rusk and Sect. Clifford)
  - do nothing more and await "widened talks."
  - give Abrams authority to expand size of patrols.
  - give Abrams authority to move forces into position at the Ben Hai River and clean out southern half of DMZ.
4. Recommendations (Sects. Rusk and Clifford)
5. Other

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

23

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, December 5, 1968  
4:45 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a CIA evaluation of  
the South Vietnamese report I sent  
up earlier today.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority MLJ 019-043-2-3  
By Ⓟ, NARA, Date 1/21/02


WWRostow:rln

5 December 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

1.4(c)



3. In essence, it appears that the four Communist divisions known to be located along the Cambodian border west and northwest of Saigon have been undergoing a period of rest, refitting and reindoc-trination since late September and early October. There have been a number of indications in both captured documents and prisoner of war interroga-tions in recent weeks that the Communists intend to step up the level of their military activity in the III Corps area during the months of December and January.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 10-240  
By id NARA, Date 11-29-10

4. Most of these reports indicate that during the first phase of the new "winter-spring" campaign--December through January--the Communists will concentrate largely on harassing attacks on outlying targets. Only in the later, or spring phase, is there much talk of an attack on Saigon.

5. Signal intelligence has provided tenuous indication that some regimental elements of two of the four divisions located along the border may be moving southward toward the Communists' War Zone D, north of Saigon. The sharp upturn in fighting in northeastern Tay Ninh Province in recent days may have marked an effort by the Communists to protect large units moving back into South Vietnam from their border redoubts.

6. In sum, the prospect is for increasing military action in the general Saigon area over the next few weeks at least and possibly into January. These actions will probably consist of attacks on fire support bases and special forces camps such as we have seen in recent weeks in Tay Ninh Province. It is even possible that the Communists will attempt to assault some provincial capitals as they did in August. Given the current deployment of allied forces in the III Corps area, however, it appears unlikely that the Communists will commit all or even the bulk of their main force assets in the area in an all-out series of attacks [redacted]

1.4 (c)

*Pres. file*

24

**TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE**

**Thursday, Dec. 5, 1968  
3:40 p. m.**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

**This intercepted South Vietnamese intelligence report from Saigon suggests that the enemy may be planning something quite big, possibly starting about December 10.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**TOP SECRET/UMBRA attachment**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
By lkl NLJ 10-239 appeal  
NARA, Date 10-21-2013

~~TOP SECRET~~  
UMBRA

RECEIVED  
NSA

24a

VVZCZCAA35621E699REAB64

1968 DEC 5 16 40

E.O. 13526, section 50X1

Withheld from public release under the  
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.  
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

P 071558Z  
FM DIRNSA  
TO WHITE HOUSE

**SANTITIZED**  
Authority NLI/10-240 ISCAP Appeal  
By CTB, NARA, Date 2/4/17

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE  
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,  
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-032, document no. 2  
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: July 10, 2018

SUBJECT: REPORT ON LARGE SCALE VC ATTACK PLANS  
FR MSS, SAIGON. 05 DEC 0900G  
TO ALL STATION. NR 196/PTB/ST/2.

A "B" VALIDITY SOURCE REPORTS:

1. PRESENTLY AN EXTREMELY LARGE NUMBER OF COMMUNIST DIVISIONS ARE ASSEMBLED AT THE VIETNAMESE-CAMBODIAN BORDER. THESE UNITS ARE PREPARING TO ATTACK VIETNAM. THESE ATTACKS WILL BE LARGER THAN ANY TO PRESENT, AIMED AT RESOLVING THIS FINAL PHASE:
2. DURING THIS STAGE THE VC PLAN IS TO ATTACK AND OCCUPY TAY NINH, BINH DUONG, THE PARIS AREA, TAN QUY, PHU HOA, DONG TAN THANH, DONG HA, BA BEP IN BINH DUONG PROVINCE, AND AMERICAN BASES IN PHU LOI, BINH DUONG. THE VC REVEALED THAT THEY MUST ((LIBERATE?)) THIS AREA AND THEN THEIR GREAT ARMY WILL PROBABLY MOVE TO ATTACK THE CAPITAL;
3. PRESENTLY THE VC PLAN IN THE CAPITAL IS TO LAUNCH A LARGE SERIES OF SHELLINGS WITH HARASSMENT ATTACKS ON CAMPS AT THE EDGE OF THE CITY. PRESENTLY THE VC ARE TRANSPORTING A VERY GREAT QUANTITY OF ~~ROCKETS~~ <sup>capital</sup> ROCKETS ALONG THE SAIGON RIVER IN ORDER TO BRING THEM TO AREAS ADJACENT TO THE CAPITAL.

COMMENTS FROM HEADQUARTERS MSS: THIS IS HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION WHICH CORRESPONDS TO MANY CAPTURED INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE VC WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN. ACCORDING TO ONE ITEM OF INFORMATION WHICH COMPARED WITH A VC DOCUMENT, THE VC WILL LAUNCH ((THE WINTER?)) STAGE DURING THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVE 10 THROUGH 25 DECEMBER 1968.

REQUEST ADDRESSEES REPORT THIS INFORMATION TO REGIONAL COMMANDERS FOR DEFENSIVE MEASURES AND APPROPRIATE ACTION.  
TOI: 05 DEC 68 0430Z  
600

E.O. 13526, section 50X1

Withheld from public release under the  
National Security Act of 1959, 50 U.S.C.  
3605 (P.L. 86-36)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
UMBRA

NNNN

ACTION

25  
Purples

Thursday - December 5, 1968 - 3:15pm

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Thanksgiving Day Message from President Costa e Silva of Brazil**

President Costa e Silva sent you a message of good wishes on Thanksgiving Day (Tab B). A suggested reply is attached (Tab A).

If you approve the reply, State will ask our Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to deliver it to Costa e Silva for you.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

Tab A - Suggested Presidential message for signature, to Brazilian President Costa e Silva.

Tab B - Thanksgiving message from President Costa e Silva.

SWLewis:mm

A

25a

Suggested Presidential Message to President Costa e Silva of Brazil

Dear Mr. President:

I was happy to receive your very thoughtful message of good wishes on the occasion of Thanksgiving Day. Both our nations have much to be thankful for, and I share your hope for progress toward universal peace, brotherhood and understanding.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Arthur da Costa e Silva

President of the Federative Republic of Brazil

B  
25

Thanksgiving Day Message to the President from President Costa e Silva  
of Brazil

"Mr. President:

On the occasion of Thanksgiving Day, which falls on November 28 and which is jointly celebrated by our two countries, I wish to extend to you and the good wishes of the Brazilian people and government, in a message of universal peace, brotherhood, and understanding.

Arthur da Costa e Silva,  
President of the Republic of Brazil."

INFORMATION

26

Thursday, December 5, 1968 -- 3:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Bob Murphy called and said Mr. Nixon did not, repeat not, expect to have an observer at the Paris talks before January 20.

The problem may have been Averell's hearing aid.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Thursday, Dec. 5, 1968  
12:10 p. m.

29  
—

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Ben Read reports from Bob Murphy on the Nixon-Harriman session.

-- Nixon has asked Cy to stay for thirty days after January 20, and Cy has accepted.

-- Nixon indicated that Lodge will be sent to Paris before the end of the year: Harriman understood Lodge will replace him; Murphy understood he would be there to learn and "be helpful." This ambiguity has not been cleared up yet, although Murphy is probably right.

-- The meeting is reported as having gone "reasonably well."

Comment: perhaps Averell should pull out at this stage and leave it to Cy until Lodge can take over.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House, Dec. 21, 1983  
By *[Signature]*, NSA, Date 3-20-98

Thursday, December 5, 1968 -- 10:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Herewith notes for your talk with Henry Kissinger.

1. There are only a few points of advice that one Administration can give another with respect to organizing the business of government; but there are a few based on hard-won experience which relate to the task which Henry is about to undertake.
2. First --- and above all -- the organization should meet the working style and convenience of the President. No two Presidents are the same. The only right way to organize is to serve the President's needs.
3. Before making changes in the national security field, study carefully how things are now done. The system that exists in 1968 is the result of the accumulative lessons of the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson years; that is, the period when this nation has become a world power.
4. For example, the Tuesday lunch is, in effect, a regular NSC meeting with carefully prepared staff work, plus the advantage of bringing together in a human setting the President and his chief national security advisers: Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Chairman, JCS; Director of CIA; Special Assistant for national security; plus others -- including the Vice President -- when the President decides that they can contribute. Nothing is more important than that this group be close; feel free to debate openly with each other in the presence of the President; be loyal to each other as well as to the President. We have seen in this town times of great difficulty in this respect; for example, between Dean Acheson and Louis Johnson. There were serious problems when Mr. Wilson was Secretary of Defense. The President's National Security Assistant can play one of his most important roles in keeping this decisively important group close to each other and to the President.
5. Rostow will explain to you how we now use formal NSC meetings and the other instruments of coordinating our policy. Each has a history. It is what it is as a result of hard-won lessons. That does not mean that things should not be changed. It only means they should be studied carefully and their history understood before they are changed.
6. The President's National Security Adviser should be prepared to put aside all personal feelings and ambitions and to ignore criticism in the press. Because he is close to the President, the press -- and others in

Washington -- will inevitably be getting at him from time to time. He must be a spokesman with the press for the President's views; but he must never become concerned about his own status with the press.

7. The task of Special Assistant for National Security can be one of the most rewarding in government, because, in serving the President he is also serving the great departments of government in their relations to the White House. It is possible in this job for the man who holds it to be regarded not merely as the President's agent but also the friend and channel of communication to the President with respect to State, Defense, JCS, CIA, etc. It is a challenging but rewarding job.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~Confidential~~

December 5, 1968

NOTE TO JIM JONES

Jim -

The President apparently did not indicate any decisions about that part of the Chamizal guest list in Tab A (which has all the Congressional group, among others). The memo only shows his agreement on all of Tab B.

Should I assume Tab A is also all OK to invite?

Sam Lewis

DECLASSIFIED  
White House  
By *lf* 2-20-98

30

ACTION

December 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Possible courtesy call by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew

Lee is spending about a month in the United States to get to know us better. His visit is completely unofficial. Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk which recommends that you receive him for a short courtesy call on December 9 or 10. I concur in the recommendation,

*although, as Sec. Rusk says, not of vital importance.*

W. W. Rostow

Att

STATE:MWright:wpt

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

30a

December 4, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Courtesy Call by Prime  
Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore

Lee Kuan Yew has been taking a long vacation, devoted to learning more about the United States. He was in Canada for about a month during our election period, and then came to Harvard about November 13. He is staying there through December 13, with side trips. All of this is -- at his request -- on an unofficial basis.

On November 18, Lee sent a personal letter to you, a copy of which is enclosed. Following this letter, William Bundy visited him in Cambridge last Wednesday in the course of a personal Thanksgiving trip. Bundy said that you had received the letter, and he felt Lee out as to whether it meant he had an interest in coming to Washington to see you. Bundy made clear, of course, that your time in Washington was very limited and that no invitation was being proposed.

Lee went to some lengths to express his high feelings of admiration and personal regard for all you have done for Southeast Asia. He did not press in the least but did indicate that he would be quite happy to come down and pay a short courtesy call on you prior to his departure from the country. It may be of note that he made it clear that he was not making any approach to the President-elect, although he had written a usual letter of congratulations.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By af, NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

From all our accounts, Lee continues to defend the basic importance of our actions in Viet-Nam to all comers. He is concerned about our future role in Southeast Asia, but I have no doubt that his expression of admiration for your policies and for you personally is genuine.

Hence, while I do not believe that this is of vital importance, I think it would be a useful and kind gesture to invite him to pay a courtesy call on you. The open dates in his schedule now appear to be December 9 and 10, but he might be able to work other times next week. He would have in mind that the call could hardly be concealed, but that he would not be expected to make any remarks to reporters afterward. He would prefer it this way, in line with his policy of not expressing himself publicly or giving his visit here any official character.

Set up appointment for December 9  
or December 10 \_\_\_\_\_

Give appropriate explanation \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

*DR*  
Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

31

Thursday - December 5, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

We are working on the "valedictory" speech on Latin America which you agreed to deliver when you accept the Pan American Society's award (Tab A).

Meanwhile, we need to pin down the occasion for the speech so the Society can make necessary plans.

In order that the speech receive maximum attention, it might be better to deliver it in December than in January when you will be presenting your State of the Union Address and your Budget Message to the Congress. We can work it into your schedule either the week of December 16-20, or in mid-January between the 13th and the 17th.

The best setting would be a formal ceremony in the East Room, with 50-75 prominent members of the Society attending; plus the Latin American diplomatic corps, US officials, and the press.

A major speech would not go well with an informal ceremony in your office.

The East Room ceremony could be arranged on fairly short notice -- but a few days warning is needed to assure attendance in Washington by key Society members.

May we proceed to fix a time and place, and notify the Society?

OK to go ahead	___	Place to be in	___	Date to be	___
		East Room-WH		Dec. 16-20	___
Call me	___	Call me	___	Week Jan. 13-17	___

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By Hy, NARA, Date 2-20-98

Attachment - Tab A.

SWLewis:mm

cc - Jim Jones; George Christian; Charles Maguire.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

31a

~~Confidential~~

Friday - November 15, 1968 -- 4:10 p.m.

Rec'd  
4:25 p

Mr. President:

If you are interested in high-lighting any aspects of Latin American policy during the final weeks of your administration, there are three opportunities you might want to consider. Any one of the three occasions would provide a good setting to dramatize the contributions of your administration in this region.

All me

1. First annual conference on Caribbean development, November 25-27, at St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands - sponsored by Governor Paiewonsky of the Virgin Islands. All Caribbean Chiefs of State are invited, and a number of them will attend. Secretary Udall will deliver a key-note address; the theme of the conference is development of water resources as a key to development in the Caribbean (the program for the delegates will include a tour of desalinization plants), etc.

Check 2  
The Rio Grande  
Diaz Ordaz  
Dec 10

2. Completion of the Chamizal settlement with Mexico. The new channel for the Rio Grande will be completed about December 1, and the River then diverted into it, ending the third and final phase of the treaty settlement. A ceremony will be scheduled between December 1 and December 10. (Since you and President Diaz Ordaz celebrated completion of the first two phases in 1964 and 1967, a third Presidential ceremony on the Chamizal may be excessive.) If you do not wish to go, they will hold a simpler local ceremony with only Texas officials on the US side attending.

3. You have agreed to accept an award from the Pan-American Society for your efforts on behalf of inter-American friendship. The date and occasion for this presentation have not yet been set. I suggested earlier that you select a time in December or January to receive the award, taking the occasion to deliver a "valedictory speech" on Latin America. You indicated you did

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 18, NARA, Date 2-20-96

not want to attend a banquet for such a purpose. You could, however, arrive after dinner for the speech, or alternatively, deliver a speech at a more formal ceremony not involving a banquet.

*W. A. Rostow*

Virgin Islands Conference:

May wish to attend, provide suggested schedule

Not interested

Call me

Chamizal Ceremony:

May wish to attend, provide suggested schedule

Do not wish to attend

Call me

Pan-American Society Award:

Will make speech

Will not make speech

Will attend large ceremony outside White House

Prefer receive award here

Call me

Thursday, December 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

You might wish to mention to Hoveida that the recent monetary crisis highlights the need to ratify the Special Drawing Rights amendment to the IMF as soon as possible. This will make it possible to activate this important new source of international liquidity.

Putting the amendment in place requires ratification by 67 countries, with 80% of the votes. The United States was among the first to ratify. Present indications are that a large number of other countries will complete the process by the end of the year. Unfortunately, Iran is not in this group.

We hope that Iran, in the interest of a stronger world monetary system, and in its own interest, will also be able to ratify this amendment as soon as possible.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

33

Wednesday, December 4, 1968  
6:45 p. m.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Lynda Robb's Trip**

The problem raised by Secretary Rusk with you this morning concerning Lynda Robb's visit to Hong Kong has been solved.

- a. The Secret Service has communicated with their agent in Hong Kong who is making the arrangements and instructed him to make friends with the Hong Kong police and accept their offer of communications equipment.
- b. The Consul General in Hong Kong has been instructed not to publicize Mrs. Robb's visit. His invitation to have Mrs. Robb stay in the Consulate General has been accepted. Other arrangements are being worked out with the Secret Service agent in Hong Kong.

As to the Robb's visit to Bangkok, our Ambassador there, Leh Unger, has been given guidance as to the private nature of the Robb visit and their desire to be treated as other service couples on R&R leave. He will discourage offers of the Thai Government to entertain the Robb's, in accordance with Mrs. Robb's expressed desire.

Mrs. Carpenter has been given all the above information. Whether it will be possible for the Robb's to stay in Thailand without undue press attention is doubtful, but our representatives abroad will do everything they can to see that the Robb's leave is as close to what they desire as possible.

**Bramley Smith**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By lf, NARA, Date 2-20-88

ACTION

34

Wednesday, December 4, 1968  
6:25 p.m.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Letter to President Thieu About Paris Delegation**

Last night you cleared a draft letter to President Thieu aimed at insuring that the South Vietnamese delegation arrive in Paris as soon as possible but no later than December 11. You asked that the draft be cleared with Secretary Clifford.

Meanwhile, President Thieu announced in Saigon that the South Vietnamese delegation would be in Paris by the end of this week.

Secretary Rusk feels that the letter has been overtaken by President Thieu's announcement. Unless you think otherwise, he feels that it is no longer necessary to send the letter to Thieu.

**Bromley Smith**

Send no letter to President Thieu \_\_\_\_\_

Ask for a revised draft \_\_\_\_\_

35

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, December 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Hoveyda of Iran--  
Thursday, December 5, 12 noon

We had two objectives in inviting Hoveyda: (1) to maintain continuing contact with the Shah and those around him; (2) to dramatize that Iran's success is not just a fragile one-man show. I'm sure he mainly wants reassurance of the continuity of US policy toward Iran.

We think you will like Hoveyda. He is simple, informal and direct. He speaks English well; his wife attended UCLA. He is fully capable of talking military and foreign affairs, but he regards those as the Shah's preserves and concentrates on domestic programs. He would be interested in hearing your views of Vietnam, the Middle East and current Soviet policy, but he would be equally interested in your thoughts on our domestic programs.

You have talked frequently and recently enough with the Shah to find common ground for conversation. There are no pressing bilateral issues.

I recommend you read Secretary Rusk's briefing memo and scope paper (red Tabs A and B under "General" in the briefing book). Attached are: (1) a checklist of possible talking points and (2) a joint statement for George Christian to issue at 4:00 p.m. Thursday if you approve.

Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rf, NARA, Date 3-20-98

~~SECRET~~

35a  
December 4, 1968

CHECKLIST OF TALKING POINTS

1. You have enjoyed your association with the Shah and have admired his leadership. A leader depends heavily on those at his right hand, and you know the Prime Minister has played a big role in Iran's progress.
2. While you can't speak for the next administration, you believe that US interests are such that a close relationship between the US and Iran will continue. [President-elect Nixon answered the Shah's congratulatory message saying he expected our close relationship to continue.]
3. You would be interested in hearing about the latest domestic developments in Iran. [In this context, it would be worthwhile discussing how the Shah and Prime Minister plan to expand the political and economic institutions necessary to continue absorbing Iran's young people into active participation in the exercise of power. This is a delicate subject, but an important one.]
4. We plan to continue our role in Iran's military development as far as Congress permits, but you have always been concerned that Iran's military expenses not become so great as to undercut economic development.
5. You would appreciate his views on the Shah's visit to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, on the Persian Gulf, and on the Arab-Israeli situation.

Hoveyda may raise with you one question the Shah mentioned the last time he was here--Iran's desire to sell additional oil to the United States under barter arrangements and especially to sell more oil products to Defense. You wrote the Shah after his last visit saying that it would be very difficult for us to change our oil imports policy, but that we would certainly consider the purchase of Iranian products wherever their prices are competitive. That is still the best line. We believe Hoveyda understands that there is little the USG can do and this depends on Iran's prices and whatever barter arrangements they can work out with private US companies.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Control  
By           , NARA, Date 2/20/96

Confidential

ACTION

Wednesday - December 4, 1968

36

~~1. [unclear]~~  
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Guest List for Luncheon with President Diaz Ordaz in El Paso on Friday, December 13, 1968.

1. President Diaz Ordaz is anxious to know whether any other members of your family besides Mrs. Johnson will attend the Chamizal ceremony. He wants to bring other members of his own family if that is the case.

Only Mrs. Johnson ✓

Others of the family       

2. At Tab A is the list of persons you invited to the ceremony last year. We recommend you invite to the ceremony and luncheon almost all of them again -- but also we recommend a number of additional American guests largely from the El Paso area.

On the Congressional side:

- Mike Manatos thinks you should consider inviting Senator George Aiken and Senator John Tower, and possibly dropping Senator Bourke Hickenlooper. As of now, Senator Aiken has replaced Senator Hickenlooper as the ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Sub-Committee on Latin America.
- Barefoot Sanders thinks you should invite in addition: Congressmen Eligio de la Garza, George H. Mahon, Dante Fascell and Edward Roybal, and possibly dropping William Mailliard. To have some Republican representation, Barefoot suggests one of the following Congressmen: E. Ross Adair, Bradford Morse, Jim Fulton.
- Please indicate your preferences on Tab A.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By AJ, NARA, Date 2-20-98

3. Covey Oliver and Joe Friedkin have prepared a list of additional invitees which includes mainly prominent leaders from the El Paso and Texas area. George Christian and Larry Temple have reviewed this list. I have attached it at Tab B, and divided it into three categories:

- all OK*
- ✓(1) those persons we recommend you invite;
  - ✓(2) those persons known to George and Larry whom you may wish to invite; and
  - ✓(3) those persons not known to George and Larry that Joe Friedkin thinks you may wish to invite.

Please indicate your preferences on Tab B.

4. The hotel can accommodate everyone for the luncheon if you want to invite virtually all on both lists -- and the Mexicans invite about the same number.

Samuel W. Lewis

Attachments

Tab A - List invited last year, but with this year's additional invitees from the El Paso area and from Congress.

Tab B - Additional invitees proposed by Covey Oliver and Joe Friedkin.

cc - Mr. Christian  
Mr. Jones  
Mr. Temple

Mrs. Abell  
Mr. Manatos  
Mr. Sanders

SWLewis:mmm

36a

Members of 1967 Delegation  
to Ceremony Celebrating the Formal Transfer of the Chamisal Territory  
(held October 28, 1967)

Who Will Take Part in the December, 1968 Chamisal Ceremony

	<u>Recommend to be Invited this Year</u>	<u>Invite Again This Year</u>	
		<u>OK</u>	<u>NO</u>
Governor and Mrs. John Connally	Yes	_____	_____
Senator and Mrs. Bourke Hickenlooper (Iowa)	No	_____	_____
Senator and Mrs. Wayne Morse (Oregon)	Yes	_____	_____
Senator and Mrs. Mike Mansfield (Montana)	Yes	_____	_____
Senator and Mrs. Ralph Yarborough (Texas)	Yes	_____	_____
Senator and Mrs. Joseph Montoya (New Mexico)	Yes	_____	_____
Senator and Mrs. Clinton Anderson (New Mexico)	Yes	_____	_____
Representative and Mrs. William S. Mailliard (California)	No	_____	_____
Representative and Mrs. Henry Gonzalez (Texas)	Yes	_____	_____
Representative and Mrs. Richard White (Texas)	Yes	_____	_____
Representative and Mrs. Abraham Kazen (Texas)	Yes	_____	_____
Assistant Secretary of State and Mrs. Covey Oliver	Yes	_____	_____ †
Ambassador and Mrs. Sol Linowitz	Yes	_____	_____
Ambassador and Mrs. Fulton Freeman	Yes	_____	_____
Mr. and Mrs. Joseph F. Friedkin (Commissioner, International Boundary and Water Commission)	Yes	_____	_____
Ambassador Raymond Telles and Mrs. Telles (Chairman, US Section, United States- Mexico Border Development and Friendship Commission)	<u>Yes</u>	_____	_____
Mr. and Mrs. Thomas C. Mann	Yes	_____	_____

	<u>Recommend Invitation This Year</u>	<u>Invite This Year</u>	
		<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
<u>Additional Invitees</u>			
Ambassador and Mrs. Tyler Abell (instead of last year's Chief of Protocol and Mrs. Symington)	Yes	—	—
Mr. Maxwell Chaplin, <i>and Mrs. Chaplin</i> (Country Director, Office of Mexican Affairs, Department of State) (instead of last year's Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Mrs. Robert Sayre)	Yes	—	—
<u>Suggested by Mike Manatos</u>			
Senator and Mrs. George Aiken (Vt.)		—	—
Senator and Mrs. John Tower (Tex.)		—	—
<u>Suggested by Barefoot Sanders</u>			
Rep. and Mrs. George Mahon (Tex.)		—	—
Rep. and Mrs. Dante Fascell (Florida)		—	—
Rep. and Mrs. Edward Royball (Calif.)		—	—
Rep. and Mrs. Eligio de la Garza (Tex.)		—	—
<u>On the Republic<sup>On</sup> Side as Suggested by Barefoot Sanders</u> (only <u>one</u> of the following)			
Rep. and Mrs. E. Ross Adair (Ind.)		—	—
Rep. and Mrs. Bradford Morse (Mass.)		—	—
Rep. and Mrs. James Fulton (Penn.)		—	—

36 *h*

Proposed Invitees, Other  
Than Last Year's

(Tab B)

for Luncheon with President Diaz Ordaz, on Friday, December 13

Invite This Year

Yes      No

Approved by George Christian and Larry Temple

Governor-elect and Mrs. Preston Smith	---	---
Mr. and Mrs. Vicente Ximenes (Chairman, Inter-Agency Committee, Mexican-American Affairs)	---	---
Ambassador and Mrs. Ed Clark	---	---
Governor and Mrs. Price Daniel	---	---
Censul General and Mrs. William Hughes (Censul General in Ciudad Juarez)	---	---
Mayer and Mrs. Judson Williams (of El Paso)	---	---
Judge and Mrs. Colbert Caldwell (County Judge)	---	---
Judge and Mrs. Reynalde Garza (Federal Judge)	---	---
Judge and Mrs. Ernest Gwynn (Federal Judge)	---	---
Judge and Mrs. D. W. Suttle (Federal Judge)	---	---
Judge and Mrs. R. E. Thomas (Federal Judge)	---	---

Additional Names -- Recommended by Covey Oliver and Joe Friedkin  
and Approved by George Christian and Larry Temple

State Senator and Mrs. Joe Christie	---	---
State Representative and Mrs. John Blaine	---	---
State Representative and Mrs. Paul Moreno	---	---

Invite This Year

Yes      No

Group recommended by Covey Oliver and Joe FrieMkin (cont'd)  
and Approved by George Christian and Larry Temple

State Representative and Mrs. Raul Manes	---	---
State Representative and Mrs. T. Santiesteban	---	---
Judge and Mrs. Glenn Woodard (former County Judge)	---	---
Mayor and Mrs. Ralph Seitsinger (former Mayor)	---	---
Mr. and Mrs. Sam Young, Sr. (Chairman of the Board of El Paso National Bank)	---	---
Mr. Sam Young, Jr. (President, El Paso National Bank)	---	---
Mr. and Mrs. Thornton Hardie (Attorney)	---	---
Mr. and Mrs. Ray Pearson (One-time County Democratic Chairman)	---	---
Judge and Mrs. Travis Johnson (former County Judge)	---	---
Mr. and Mrs. George Matkin (Chairman of the Board, State National Bank)	---	---
Mr. and Mrs. Chris P. Fox (Vice President of the State National Bank)	---	---
Mr. and Mrs. E. R. Lockhart (former President, Chamber of Commerce)	---	---
Mr. and Mrs. R. F. Haynesworth (President, Surety Savings and Loan)	---	---
Mr. and Mrs. Charles Leavell (Contractor)	---	---
Mr. and Mrs. Peter de Wetter (President, Chamber of Commerce)	---	---

36c

3. Possible Additional Invitees - Recommended by Joe Friedkin  
 (and not known to George Christian and Larry Temple)

	<u>Invite This Year</u>	
	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>
Postmaster and Mrs. James J. Kaster	—	—
Mr. and Mrs. Raymond Dwigans (Customs Official)	—	—
Mr. and Mrs. Joe C. Yarbrough (Civic leader and Contractor)	—	—
Mr. and Mrs. Fred Hervey (former Mayor)	—	—
Col. and Mrs. R. E. Washington (Negro leader)	—	—
Mr. and Mrs. J. Francis Morgan (Landowner)	—	—
Mr. and Mrs. Cleofas Calleros (Historian)	—	—
Mr. Elias G. Krupp (Industrialist)	—	—
Mr. and Mrs. H. D. Fulwiler (Chairman, Bank of El Paso)	—	—
Mr. and Mrs. Jonathan W. Rogers (President, Mortgage Investors Co.)	—	—
Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Schwartz (Civic Leader)	—	—

MEMORANDUM

37

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

Wednesday, December 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

~~1. P~~  
2. Profile

SUBJECT: Gift Album of Photographs of Your Visit  
to Central America in July

On behalf of President Somoza, Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa has transmitted to you through George Christian an album of black and white photographs taken during your visit to Central America in July.

At Tab A is Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa's letter to you with transmittal note.

At Tab B, for your approval, is a letter to him acknowledging receipt of the album.

BKS  
for W. W. Rostow

THE NICARAGUAN AMBASSADOR  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

37a

November 19, 1968.

Dear Mr. President:

I take pleasure in sending you here-  
with an album of photographs taken during  
your historic trip through Central America  
last July, which is a gift from President  
Somoza-Debayle, with the expression of  
his highest esteem for you and yours.

With the renewed assurances of my  
devoted friendship, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

  
Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa

His Excellency  
The President  
The White House

EMBAJADA DE NICARAGUA  
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

37w


November 19, 1968.

Dear Mr. Christian:

I take pleasure in sending you herewith an album which the President of my country sends to President Johnson, containing photographs taken during his historic trip through Central America last July. It has been sent to me by Mr. Iván Osorio-Peters, Secretary of Information and the Press of President Somoza-Debayle, for transmittal. I would deeply appreciate it if you would kindly hand it to our good friend The President at the propitious moment.

With the renewed assurances of my highest esteem and distinguished consideration, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

  
Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa  
Ambassador of Nicaragua

Mr. George E. Christian  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

December 4, 1968

37c

**Dear Mr. Ambassador:**

**Thank you for your letter of November 19 forwarding on behalf of President Somoza the album of photographs taken during my visit to Central America in July.**

**The album will be yet another remembrance of a most enjoyable and rewarding visit with good friends and neighbors, and I ask that you convey to President Somoza my deep appreciation for his thoughtfulness in sending it to me.**

**Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending our warmest good wishes.**

**Sincerely,**

*15/ Lyndon B Johnson*

**His Excellency  
Dr. Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa  
Ambassador of Nicaragua**

**LBJ:State:L:Stef**

Wednesday, December 4, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMO TO MR. JAMES JONES

Jim:

As you know, the President has agreed to see Mr. Jean Monnet.

Mr. Monnet telephoned this morning from New York. His plans have changed some. He will be in Washington tomorrow, staying thru Monday. He is coming in to see Mr. Rostow at 10:00 a. m. tomorrow.

Will you please let us know when the President will be able to see Mr. Monnet?

Lois Nivens

RLN

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

39  
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, December 4, 1968, 4:00pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: (1) Israeli Raids on Jordan  
(2) Message from King Hussein

*Pres file*

Before he left this morning, Walt asked me to send you our latest reading on the Israel-Jordan fighting today.

The Israelis say their Sunday commando attack in southern Jordan was a direct response to terrorist shelling of Israel's Dead Sea phosphate works, but that may only have been the last straw following the Jerusalem bomb explosion last week.

Today's attack, however, was directed mainly at the Iraqi troops who have been supporting the terrorists logistically and who themselves opened fire for the first time on Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley last night. The Israeli embassy here says Israel just couldn't sit still any longer without encouraging more such attacks.

Eban has asked Wally Barbour to transmit a message from Eshkol to the Jordanian government, saying that the Iraqis were the target and that Israel had no intention of widening the action. Rabin's deputy here called me to say the same.

~~This~~ will probably delay Jordan-Israel talks. Even the Israelis who are concerned about that argue that they have no choice if they're just not going to roll over in front of the terrorists. But with Jarring beginning another round in the area--he saw Eban Monday and goes next to Cairo--the Arabs can't help but assume the Israelis don't care. It's clear that they put short-term security above all.

Hussein alludes to this Israeli attitude in his message (attached) written to you before the attack on another subject--your wire explaining your go-ahead on negotiating the Phantom deal with Israel. He expresses sharply his disappointment with our policy, but given his feelings, the message is restrained.

*HHS*  
Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 20, #338

By *J* NARA. Date 6-13-02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

39a  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-197  
By isa, NARA, Date 8-21-03

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciated receiving your message of October 11, 1968. Unfortunately it confirmed by premonition that the United States would decide to supply Israel with (air superiority) Phantom jet aircraft.

In your message, sir, you expressed the hope that I would understand the circumstances which led you to take this action. Frankly, I could not help but be more disillusioned by this action. As you are aware, Mr. President, I have done, and will continue to do, all that is humanly possible in the hope of clearing the way to a just, honourable, and thus lasting peace in our area. I am willingly taking great political and other risks in my endeavours to achieve that objective. If we have been unable to make any substantial progress towards peace, it is because of Israelis intransigence and failure to make any substantial contributions and concessions towards that end, as well as Israel's obvious territorial ambitions which she often shrouds under the guise of "national security."

I strongly believe that the supply of Phantoms to Israel, if it does not increase her belligerent ambitions, then it certainly does not contribute towards curtailing them. The continuous flow of arms into Israel may only encourage her intransigent attitude, and thus, I fail to see how the decision on the Phantoms would not in any way diminish your support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts.

I quite agree that our search for peace in the area will be facilitated if a meticulous balance of power between the states concerned were possible to achieve, but I submit that Jordan continues to be left out when calculations regarding armaments are made. Jordan is the only country involved in the June war which has not yet satisfactorily replenished her military losses in the war, and Jordan has been the only country to bear the fury of the new American aircraft that have been supplied to Israel since the war. Some might argue that the Eastern armaments of the UAR and other Arab states may well have tipped the balance in favour of the Arabs. I wish to assure, sir, and in all frankness, that after studying the 1948 armed conflict, witnessing and narrowly missing entanglement in the 1956 clash and living through the 1967 so called war, where the air forces of the UAR and others were nearly all completely wiped out by Israel, which has always enjoyed the advantage of superior preparation in every respect as well as the advantage of striking the first blow, I am not consoled by all this superiority in armament quantity and quality that the Arab camp is said to enjoy. In fact, I am far worried and far more apprehensive regarding the eventual fate of my people and armed forces who will be even more inadequately equipped and threatened when Israel receives the Phantoms. I believe it is only fair that Jordan should

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

also receive its share of its legitimate requirements for defense from its traditional sources of supply. I hope that our requests from the United States Government would be favourably considered. The Jordanian Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Amer Khammash is ready to leave for Washington, D. C., whenever officials in Washington are ready to meet with him for this purpose.

As for your commitment regarding the territorial integrity of Jordan, may I please remind you, Mr. President, that this integrity has been violated for over a year and a half. If no pressure can be exerted by the United States on Israel to accept a peaceful settlement to the problem, then the United States, in keeping with her commitments to us, should at least refrain from helping Israel to continue her violation of our territorial integrity.

Mr. President, I wish to assure you that I value our close relationship, and I am well aware that our association is in the best interest of our two countries. But what worries me is that American actions and positions regarding the problems of our area are making it difficult, if not impossible, for me and for your other Arab friends to defend or justify American policy in the Middle East. I trust and pray that you will do all that is possible to help us change this image. We are doing our best, but we need your help, support and assistance: for the future of the entire Middle East is at stake, and if there is no just peace in the Middle East, then, unfortunately, there can be no peace in the world.

Please accept, Mr. President, my sincere regards and best wishes.

(signed) Hussein I

Extracted from Amman 7684, December 2, 1968

~~SECRET~~

396

~~SECRET~~ / EXDIS

October 11, 1968

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN

Your Majesty:

As you are aware, I have instructed the Secretary of State to open negotiations for the sale of Phantom jet aircraft to Israel. I trust that you will understand the circumstances that led me to take this action, which in no way diminishes our full and unequivocal support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel crisis. Please be assured that it continues to be our policy to facilitate in every possible way Ambassador Jarring's important mission. I have been gratified by your cooperation with Ambassador Jarring and remain hopeful that our joint search for peace in the Middle East will come to a successful conclusion.

I would also like to assure you that our commitment to and support for your wise leadership, as affirmed in my messages to you of February 11 and June 4, remain undiminished. I highly value our close relations as being in the joint interests of our two countries. You can rest assured that my government desires to maintain - and strengthen - this relationship and that we are prepared to give full support to Your Majesty's efforts to find an honorable and equitable solution to the problems that beset you. Please accept my most cordial regards.

Sincerely,

/s/

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 20, #277

Rv jc. NARA. D. 6-1302

INFORMATION

40

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, 10:30 A. M.  
December 4, 1968

Mr. President:

*Presfile*

Cy Vance reports from Paris by secure phone that the North Vietnamese representative's first reaction to the proposal on the DMZ was to reject it. However, he will report the matter fully to Hanoi.

Attached is the telephone summary of other problems discussed by Ambassador Vance.

Brenley Smith

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLJ 91-508  
By ap/isp, NARA, Date 1-8-98

~~SECRET~~

40a

Vance-Lau

on  
procedures

+  
DMZ

~~SECRET/NODIS~~  
~~HARVAN/PLUS~~

40h

December 4, 1968

Vance called on the secure phone at 8:30 a.m.

1. He and Habib had spent three hours with Lau starting at 10:30 Paris time this morning. The discussion involved two subjects: procedures for the first enlarged meetings and the DMZ.

2. On procedure, agreement was reached on all points except the following:

(a) Who speaks first: The DRV suggested that there be a specific order of speakers: The U.S., NLF, DRV, and GVN. Vance rejected this proposal.

(b) Physical arrangements: The DRV suggested four tables or a four-sided table and Vance rejected this proposal. The DRV also proposed flags at each of the four delegation's tables which we rejected.

3. Military: Vance led off with a strong statement of protest about DRV military actions in violation of the understandings reached prior to cessation and Lau countered with alleged violations by the U.S. Vance then put forward the proposal authorized in State 281468 that both sides fix an immediate date such as December 6 after which there would be no forces of either side in the DMZ and a cessation of gun fire and air and naval attacks on the DMZ.

Lau asked a number of questions and then expressed his own preliminary views that his side would reject our proposal, and that the matter could be resolved if the U.S. simply stopped what it was doing in the DMZ and everything returned to "normal".

Comment

Vance thought our DMZ proposal caught Lau off-guard and gave us a worthwhile initiative in this situation. He urged Lau to report the matter fully to Hanoi and Lau undertook to do so.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 91-506  
By [signature] NARA, Date 1-8-98

[signature]  
Benjamin H. Read

~~SECRET/NODIS~~  
~~HARVAN/PLUS~~

W.H. (5)  
281468  
40c 8  
4 DEC 68 0131

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin ACTION: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY  
Info INFO: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

STATE 281468

Authority NLS 91-506

By afive NARA, Date 1-8-98

PARIS TODEL 1723 FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

NODIS HARVAN PLUS

1. Responding to your information that Lau has requested a meeting tomorrow morning, you should take the strongest possible line with him about the DMZ.

(a) You should once more categorically reject any assertion by him that North Vietnamese forces are not present in the DMZ.

(b) You should emphasize that respect for the DMZ is a basic condition for serious talks and for the maintenance of the cessation of bombing. Now that we have stopped the bombing, you need not ~~hesitate~~ ~~be concerned~~ about insisting that respect for the DMZ is a condition for the future.

(c) You should make clear that continued abuse of the DMZ by North Vietnamese forces will make it necessary for the United States to take whatever action we deem necessary to insure the safety of our own and allied forces south of the DMZ.

S:DFusk:jmr 12/3/68 Tel. Ext. Teletype transmission and classification approved by: DK per JAW  
The Secretary

EA - Mr. Bundy WPB S/S - Mr. Rxxxx White House - Mr. Rostow WR

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS Info: Amembassy SAIGON

~~SECRET HARVAN PLUS~~

*Classification*

(d) You should insist that we get an official response from his delegation and his government on their attitude about the DMZ at the earliest possible moment.

2. Having made your strongest possible presentation along the above lines, you should propose that both sides fix an immediate date, such as December 6, after which there would be no forces of either side in the DMZ and a cessation of gun fire and air and naval attacks into the DMZ. Make it clear that this requires an agreement on their part and that we will not move our own forces out of the DMZ in the absence of such an agreement.

You can add that you have taken note of Hanoi's denial that its forces are in the DMZ. You cannot accept this as a description of the fact because we know they are there. You can point out, however, that their denial presumably means that they are prepared to accept a suitable arrangement which would guarantee to both sides that there are no military forces in the DMZ. We would like to have a proposal from Hanoi as to how this could be done immediately. Among possibilities are the restoration of the authority and presence of the ICC in the DMZ. Or, alternatively, joint supervision of the DMZ by mixed teams from both sides. Still another possibility might be that three or four Asian nations not now involved with the ICC might undertake to provide this service to both sides.

Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS Info: Amembassy SAIGON

~~SECRET HARVAN PLUS~~  
*Classification*

In any event, in pressing them to propose an effective method of inspection, you should leave no doubt that, even if we reach an agreement that there will be no forces of either side in the DMZ, we must reserve the right to continue aerial overflight of the DMZ area for reconnaissance purposes unless and until some agreed inspection is in existence. (This should not, repeat not, in any way be linked with overflights of North Viet-Nam generally.)

3. In making these points, you should of course again affirm in the strongest terms that our evidence convinces us totally that the military action now taking place in the DMZ is the responsibility of North Viet-Nam exclusively, that our own actions have been taken only in response to theirs, and the other points that you have already made. Your line should be that there is no point in further argument on these issues. Instead, we should both be proceeding to the kind of constructive action that can lay the problem to rest and permit us to get down to the meetings in the proper atmosphere.

GP-3.

END.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

December 4, 1968

41

*Profile*

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum (Tab A), Glenn Seaborg requests approval to execute Project BENHAM on or about December 17, 1968.

The AEC does not believe there will be any serious damage associated with this test. Their request notes that a test of comparable yield, BOX-CAR, which was conducted successfully in the same general location, did not produce any significant damage.

The Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, ACDA, and CIA have reviewed the AEC request and recommend approval. State, however, recommends that the BENHAM event should not be announced or conducted until we are sure no unexpected problem has arisen in connection with SCHOONER. SCHOONER is expected to be conducted momentarily and the State view should not result in any delay in the BENHAM scheduled date of December 17, 1968.

Don Hornig, however, has raised an important issue in the attached memorandum (Tab B) which transmits to you the report of the Ad Hoc Panel on the Safety of Underground Testing.\* This panel, which Hornig appointed at the request of the Vice President and Glenn Seaborg to study the potential safety hazards connected with high-yield underground tests, concluded that there is a possibility that such tests might trigger severe earthquakes which could produce serious damage well beyond the limits of the test site. I suggest you read Don Hornig's memo and the first three pages of the report.

In view of the report, I concur in Don Hornig's recommendations that--

1. The AEC be given approval to execute BENHAM.

*\*O'Sullivan of the Post appears to have a story on this report, I am told. The Howard Hughes interests are going to move in with vigor in the wake of this report.*

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-162  
By ebm, NARA, Date 6-14-04

~~SECRET~~

2

3. The AEC be given permission to inform the governors' conference on December 9-10 that the Ad Hoc Panel report is under review within the Government and will be released in the near future.

*3. I have just been informed that the governors conference briefing has been cancelled. AEC plans a low level press conference.*

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:  
Tabs A and B

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

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~~SECRET~~

Serial number of 3 page  
in 1 of 24 copies 1

UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20543

*J. Johnson*  
2-RET.  
41a

NOV 21 1968

Honorable W. W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House

Dear Walt:

Reference is made to your memorandum of September 28, 1968, which approved the nuclear tests planned for execution in the second quarter of FY 1969 (BOWLINE II) except for BENHAM and Project SCHOONER. Approval of these events was made subject to specific approval as set forth in your memorandum of June 28, 1968. SCHOONER approval has been covered by my letter of October 16, 1968, and your response of November 18, 1968. This is our request for approval to execute BENHAM.

[Redacted]

It will be fired on

Pakute Mesa at a depth of 4600 feet.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

6.1(a)

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 02-193 and NLJ 96-113  
By MS, NARA, Date 3-16-04

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
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Honorable W. W. Rostow


-2-



This event did provide a means of correlating radiochemistry and seismic yield measurements. Based on experience prior to BOXCAR, the BOXCAR damage estimated ranged from \$30,000 for the expected yield and ground motion to \$1,000,000 for the maximum predicted yield and ground motion. There have been no substantiated claims to date.



No damage is predicted if the ground motion and yield are as expected, although there is a possibility of some damage if either the yield or ground motion is greater than expected. Off-site property damage could be as much as \$250,000 for the worst, and very unlikely, combination of maximum predicted yield and maximum predicted ground motion. Similarly, this worst combination could also result in some damage at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS). To minimize possible damage, the experimental nuclear rocket engine (XE), which is being readied for test, will be moved from its test stand at NRDS. These precautionary measures will introduce a delay of two to three months for the rocket engine test program.



More details of the BENHAM safety analysis are included as Enclosure 1.

Following BOXCAR, an additional number of smaller seismic events were recorded in the vicinity of ground zero. This experience leads to the expectation that similar smaller seismic events may occur after BENHAM. These events would be limited to an area within 20 - 30 kilometers (about 15 - 20 miles) of ground zero and such activity should be at least two magnitudes below the magnitude of the test itself. Nuclear tests have not triggered distant earthquakes in the past and seismic experts consider such triggering extremely unlikely; however, sufficient information is not available to completely assure ourselves that there is no possibility of such earthquake triggering. The importance of the BENHAM test to our national security overwhelmingly outweighs the small risk.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Honorable W. W. Rostow

-3-

In summary, a thorough review of the BENHAM event has been completed and the Commission has assured itself that the event can be executed safely. Containment and hydrology do not appear to be problems based on past experience.

It is planned to publicly announce the BENHAM event on December 9. A summary covering the public information aspects of BENHAM is included as Enclosure 2.

As a general matter of public information, separate from BENHAM, we have invited the Governors of Nevada and of adjacent states (Arizona, Utah, California, Oregon, and Idaho) to send technical representatives to an unclassified technical briefing on the safety aspects of nuclear testing. The need for providing more information of this sort to the technical community was recently emphasized by a panel convened by Dr. Hornig and headed by Dr. Pitzer. The briefing will be conducted on December 9 and 10. Although the press will be permitted to attend, it will be with the understanding that they will not participate in the discussions.

Cordially,



Chairman

Enclosures:

1. BENHAM Safety Analysis, Cy 1A
2. Summary of Public Information Aspects of BENHAM

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35  
416

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 3 pages  
No. 1 of 22 Copies, Series A

BENHAM SAFETY ANALYSIS

The safety analysis of BENHAM consists of four parts: containment, hydrology, ground motion and seismic activity. Each is discussed separately below.

Containment

The following table compares the actual and scaled (Yield<sup>1/3</sup>) depths of burial for BENHAM to other high yield events.

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>YIELD(KT)</u>	<u>DEPTH(KT)</u>	<u>SCALED DEPTH</u>
GREELEY	Pahute Mesa	850*	3990	411
FAULTLESS	Central Nevada	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	6.1(a)
BOXCAR	Pahute Mesa	1250*	3800	358
BENHAM	Pahute Mesa	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	

\* Actual

\*\* Maximum Predicted

The three earlier events were contained successfully, and there is no reason to believe that the BENHAM event location or geology is sufficiently different to cause containment problems.

Hydrology

The direction and rate of flow of underground water are based on data obtained by the U. S. Geological Survey. Calculations have been made for 1 MT fission and 1 MT fusion detonations at the edge of Pahute Mesa. These calculations indicate that, for the worst case, the tritium content will be below the maximum permissible concentration (mpc) when, after about 150 years, the contaminated water has moved a distance of approximately 15 kilometers. The migration of fission products will be substantially less. The minimum distance to the edge of the government reservation is approximately 20 kilometers. The Pahute Mesa consists of layered tuffs and rhyolite in which there has been no evidence of channeling of ground water.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 02-193 and NLS 96-113  
By icd, NARA, Date 3-16-04

Enclosure 1

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~  
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

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This document contains restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmission or the disclosure of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

Ground Motion

Two estimates of possible damage from ground shock were prepared. The first estimate was based on the circumstances considered most likely to occur: i.e., calculated design yield and average ground motion. Based on BOXCAR experience, no damage is expected from this set of circumstances.

The second estimate was made using the maximum predicted yield and maximum ground motion predictions which are the worst but highly improbable conditions. In the second estimate moderate to minor damage could occur out to a distance of 40 kilometers from ground zero. Off site, Springdale (two ranches), four other ranches and one telephone relay station are within this distance.

[REDACTED]

6.1(a)

The damage cost for this BENHAM situation is estimated to be \$250,000 for Las Vegas and the communities bordering the test site. In arriving at this upper value, full advantage was taken of information gained on the capacity of structures derived as a result of the BOXCAR data (BOXCAR damage for the worst conditions was \$1,000,000).

Similarly, the worst combination of yield and ground motion could also result in some damage at the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS). To minimize possible damage, the experimental nuclear rocket engine (XE), which is being readied for test, will be moved from its test stand at NRDS. These precautionary measures will introduce a delay of two to three months for the rocket engine test program.

6.1(a)

[REDACTED]

The limit of human perceptibility for BENHAM is estimated to be 420 kilometers for the maximum yield. This will include Los Angeles, California, and Reno, Nevada.

The ground motion caused by underground testing has not resulted in any damage to dams to date. The motion from BENHAM is not expected to be materially different from that experienced on BOXCAR. Test induced motions are considerably below local earthquake motions which the dams have withstood successfully.

The safety precautions to preclude personal injury from the BENHAM event are essentially the same as those employed in the BOXCAR event. These include the clearing of certain buildings in the communities near the test site, the removal of personnel from some underground mines and warnings to personnel that might be working in precarious positions on high-rise structures.

#### Seismic Activity

Following BOXCAR, an additional number of smaller seismic events were recorded in the vicinity of ground zero. This experience leads to the expectation that similar smaller events may occur after BENHAM. These events would be limited to an area within 20-30 kilometers (about 15-20 miles) of ground zero and such activity should be at least two magnitudes below the magnitude of the test itself. Nuclear tests have not triggered distant earthquakes in the past and seismic experts consider such triggering extremely unlikely; however, sufficient information is not available to completely assure ourselves that there is no possibility of such earthquake triggering. The importance of the BENHAM test to our national security overwhelmingly outweighs the small risk.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41c

SUMMARY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS OF BENHAM

Plans for public information handling of BENHAM are based on experience with previous high yield events in Nevada (GREELEY, December 1966; FAULTLESS, January 1968; BOXCAR, April 1968). The test would be announced on Monday, December 9, to meet publication dates of weekly newspapers in the area, thus helping to alert residents that the test may be felt off the Nevada Test Site. The eight-day advance notice will also permit Public Health Service officials to notify mine operators and those who work on high buildings of plans for the test. Local civic and business leaders will be invited to a briefing and tour of the test site on December 12 and 13. Local newsmen and other newsmen who request will be permitted to attend the briefing and tour. The same group will be invited to be on the test site to watch execution of BENHAM on closed circuit TV in an effort to take some of the mystery out of the test program and to allow newsmen and officials to put underground testing in proper perspective.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority GP. 4  
By mp/s/dw, NARA, Date 1-22-98

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year  
intervals; declassified  
after 12 years

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Enclosure 2

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

560

~~SECRET~~

December 4, 1968

41d

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

In connection with your consideration of Project BENHAM, I am submitting the Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on the Safety of Underground Testing. At the request of the Vice President and Glenn Seaborg, I appointed this special panel, under the chairmanship of Dr. Kenneth Pitzer, to study potential hazards associated with megaton-size underground nuclear tests. Although Howard Hughes was the source of much of the pressure for such a study, I concluded that there were sufficient reasons for concern to warrant an independent review.

The principal conclusions of the panel report are contained in the first three pages which I suggest you read.

The report finds it possible that a large-yield underground test might induce a severe earthquake which would cause serious damage well beyond the limits of the test site. This conclusion is based primarily on new evidence that large-yield tests have in fact induced small earthquakes in the vicinity of the test site. There is also new evidence suggesting that very severe earthquakes are a succession of smaller earthquakes, comparable in size to megaton-size underground tests, each of which triggers the next one. The panel concludes that in view of natural seismicity the level of risk, whatever it may be, is greater at the proposed site on Amchitka than at the proposed site in central Nevada, which in turn is greater than at the present Nevada Test Site.

In the panel's judgment, "However remote and uncertain these risks may be, . . . they raise new and serious questions about such tests and about the selection of sites for such tests. The need for each test, including the test proposed for December, 1968, should be given new consideration in the light of this new information." Although the panel expresses no judgment on the importance of the projected tests, it concludes that "the need for the tests as planned should be compelling if they are to be conducted in the face of the possible risks that have been identified."

GROUP I

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

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S&T Control No. 1406.

3 pages, 10 copies, Series 1

SAINTIZED  
EO 13292, Sec. 3.9  
NLJ 02-194  
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-28-04

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With regard to other risks such as ground water contamination, radioactive venting, and direct seismic effects on structures, the panel concludes that "while the possibility clearly exists that some damage will occur, there do not appear to be any major potential hazards with far-reaching consequences at the proposed level and locale of testing."

Finally, the panel recommends that since information relating to potential hazards is for the most part unclassified, as much information as possible on these problems should be released to develop public understanding of this problem.

This potential earthquake hazard obviously involves a delicate and complicated public information problem. As you know, Howard Hughes has already made a major public issue over the dangers associated with large-yield tests in Nevada. Various other groups which are opposed to nuclear testing have also raised questions. Entirely independently, there is also substantial public concern about earthquakes that has so far not been related to the nuclear test issue. This issue is particularly sensitive in California where recent movement of the San Andreas Fault, after it had been stationary for 50 years, has convinced many experts that a very severe earthquake may occur sometime in the next few years. The Alaskan earthquake is still fresh in the minds of citizens there. In Colorado, which was previously considered aseismic, there is now serious concern over the possibility of a major earthquake resulting from pumping water into a deep well at the Denver Arsenal.

There is no question that the conclusions of the panel will increase public concern about large-yield underground nuclear testing and will fuel opposition to them. Nevertheless, I agree with the panel's conclusion that the Government has an obligation to make this information, which might directly affect their safety, available to the public. Moreover, it must be recognized that the evidence that the tests trigger small off-site earthquakes was obtained on an unclassified basis and has already been described in the scientific literature. The full story will surface in due course. I am sure, for example, that enough is known now so that whatever we do, there will be a considerable public outcry between the announcement and the conduct of BENHAM. In these circumstances, I believe that we should release the report itself in a low key manner in order to have an objective, authoritative presentation of the problem. This would also pre-empt any suggestion by Howard Hughes or others that the Administration was suppressing this information.

Glenn Seaborg and Gerry Tape have reviewed the panel's report and agree that I should forward it to you for your consideration in connection


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with the approval of BENHAM. They agree with the panel's recommendation that there must be more public understanding of this problem. To this end, they have organized a special conference on December 9-10 to present a general review of the potential hazards to representatives of the governors of the states adjacent to the Nevada and Alaska test sites. If the question of this report comes up, as it almost certainly will, Seaborg and Tappan are prepared to have it released immediately if necessary but would strongly prefer that this be delayed until after Project BENHAM has been conducted. Therefore, if asked at the governors' conference next week, they would state that the report has been received and will be released after review within the Government has been completed.

I have not discussed this report with any agencies other than the AEC so that it is not reflected in their comments recommending approval for BENHAM. I am, however, now sending copies of the report to the heads of the appropriate agencies so that they will be in a position to discuss this issue if you wish to pursue it with them.

6.1(a)

3.3(b)(5)




While it must be recognized on the basis of the panel's report that some risk of induced earthquakes exists from this test, the risks would appear to be quite small since it will be conducted at the least seismic of the test areas.

In the light of the above, I recommend that--

1. The AEC be given approval to execute BENHAM.

6.1(a)

3.3(b)(5)



3. The AEC be given permission to inform the governors' conference on December 9-10 that the Ad Hoc Panel report is under review within the Government and will be released in the near future.

(signed) DONALD HORNIG

Donald F. Hornig

Attachment:  
Ad Hoc Panel Report

~~SECRET~~

Official Use Only

41e

PRIVILEGED

REPORT

of the

AD HOC PANEL ON THE SAFETY OF UNDERGROUND TESTING

November 27, 1968

Dr. Kenneth S. Pitzer, Chairman  
Dr. Ray W. Clough  
Dr. Lawrence R. Hafstad  
Dr. James R. Killian  
Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald  
Dr. Frank Press  
Dr. William W. Rubey  
Dr. Ronald F. Scott  
Dr. David K. Todd

Office of Science and Technology  
Executive Office of the President  
Washington, D. C.

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11/27/68

REPORT  
of the  
AD HOC PANEL ON THE SAFETY OF UNDERGROUND TESTING

The Panel received briefings on November 7, 1968, concerning the various potential hazards associated with underground nuclear explosions from the groups sponsored by the AEC to study these problems and from other experts. On November 8, 1968, the Panel met further with Dr. Glenn Seaborg and Dr. Gerald Tape of the AEC, after which discussions were held in executive session. The Panel's principal conclusions and recommendations are set forth in the following paragraphs. More complete assessments of the major areas of potential hazards are given in appended sections.

With regard to ground water contamination, direct seismic effects on structures, and radioactive venting, the Panel concludes that, while the possibility clearly exists that some damage will occur, there do not appear to be any major potential hazards with far-reaching consequences at the proposed level and locale of testing.

The Panel is seriously concerned with the problem of earthquakes resulting from large-yield nuclear tests. Although the possibility that underground nuclear tests might initiate one or more earthquakes has been suggested in the past, new and significant evidence demonstrates that small earthquakes do actually occur both immediately after a large-yield test explosion and in the following weeks. The largest of the observed associated aftershocks have been between one and two magnitudes less than the explosion itself. However, there does not now appear to be a basis for eliminating the possibility that a large test explosion might induce, either immediately or after a period of time, a severe earthquake of sufficiently large magnitude to cause serious damage well beyond the limits of the test site. This possibility is more serious for tests of greater than a megaton since the larger initial explosion would lead to greater alteration of the regional stress pattern. Further, it has recently been suggested that the great earthquakes (magnitude 8.5) are actually composed of a rapid succession of earthquakes of magnitude 6.5 to 7.0. Therefore, the fact that there have

been two shots of approximately one megaton at Nevada Test Site without serious consequence does not give assurance that a future large shot might not result in a large earthquake.

The proposed tests at the central Nevada site involve a greater risk of earthquake than those at the regular Nevada Test Site since the more northerly portions of Nevada are more active seismically. Since the Amchitka area in Alaska is still more active seismically, the hazard of inducing an earthquake must be considered to be greater at that location than at either Nevada site.

The recent evidence indicates that the risks of damaging side effects from megaton tests are larger than were estimated when the proposed test series was planned. However remote and uncertain these risks may be, in the Panel's judgment they still raise new and serious questions about such tests and about the selection of sites for such tests. The need for each test, including the test proposed for December, 1968, should be given new consideration in the light of this new information. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of establishing a new high-yield test site in a non-seismic area.

The Panel expresses no judgment as to how important are the reasons for carrying out any one of the projected tests. However, the Panel does believe that the need for the tests as planned should be compelling if they are to be conducted in the face of the possible risks that have been identified.

In order to extend our judgment of nuclear event-related seismic hazards, the Panel recommends that future tests be accompanied by a more comprehensive seismic monitoring program, both pre- and post-shot, than has been carried out previously.

The Panel believes that the public should not be asked to accept risks resulting from purely internal governmental decisions if, without endangering national security, the information can be made public and the decisions can be reached after public discussion. In highly technical areas this discussion must take place primarily in professional circles. Moreover, there is great advantage in opening the consideration to professionally qualified persons who might make contributions to the understanding and solution of the problems. The Panel notes that most of the relevant information on all aspects of the problem is

unclassified and that the essential parts of other reports could be released after editing to eliminate information about the particular nuclear explosive being tested. Consequently, the Panel recommends that as much information as possible concerning all of the potential hazards related to the continuing program of underground tests be released and that appropriate symposia be encouraged to facilitate discussion of these matters in the relevant professional communities in order that the general public may gain a better understanding of the problem.

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**I. Earthquakes and Slips Related to Underground Explosions**

The potential seismic hazards from large-yield underground nuclear explosions include both the effects of ground motion resulting directly from the explosion and the effects of ground motion resulting from the triggering of earthquakes or slips as a result of the explosion. The hazard connected with the triggering of earthquakes is a more serious question because of the potentiality of releasing tectonic energy comparable to, or very much larger than, the energy of the explosion itself and at locations other than the carefully selected test site. We have only recently been confronted with this hazard because of the large yields of the devices being tested in the current program. We are now dealing with underground explosions with equivalent earthquake magnitudes in the range 6 - 7.

Although we can only speculate about the mechanism by which an explosion can trigger an earthquake, there is good evidence that great earthquakes consist of a superposition of smaller (magnitude 6 to 7) events triggered in succession. For example, data was presented last year which showed that the great Alaskan earthquake of 1964 was actually composed of a rapid succession of earthquakes of average magnitude 6.8. There is also evidence of a delayed reaction where an earthquake is followed by a second major earthquake in a contiguous region after a period of days or months. For example, the great Chilean earthquake (magnitude about 8.5) which produced a rupture of about 1,000 kilometers in length was preceded by a smaller earthquake (magnitude about 7.5) which deformed the northern part of this immense rupture zone the day before. A series of earthquakes in Nevada showed a similar phenomenon. The Fallon-Stillwater sequence occurred in July and August, 1954, each event with a magnitude 6.8. The Dixie-Fairview Peak earthquake sequence occurred in an adjacent area of the same seismic zone in December, 1954. The two shocks were four minutes apart and showed magnitudes of 7.1 and 6.8 respectively.

One hypothesis which may explain these phenomena proposes that a seismic belt is a region in which tectonic stresses produce regional deformation and a large amount of energy is stored in the form of elastic strain. An instability develops along a fault, slip occurs and a large amount of strain energy is released. Much recent work indicates that the stress drop of even the greatest earthquakes represents only a small fraction of the total stress in the rock around the fault. This stress is probably redistributed following an earthquake and

concentrated at other points where the fault is locked. These lock points break rapidly, as in the case of an earthquake sequence. While this hypothesis is of course speculation, the main point to be considered in reviewing the hazards of large underground explosions is the observation that many destructive earthquake sequences seem to be related to individually recognized events in the magnitude 7 range.

There is no question that the larger nuclear explosions in Nevada have actually triggered small earthquakes and have produced slips along faults to distances up to about 40 kilometers. An earthquake in Southern California which occurred in the spring of 1968 with magnitude about 6.5 produced displacements on faults at distances as great as 70 kilometers from the epicenter and well outside of the region of principal aftershock activity. Thus, explosions or earthquakes in the magnitude 6.5 - 7 range can reasonably be expected to produce aftershocks, slips and stress readjustments to distances of the order of 100 kilometers from the epicenter. It is not clear whether these effects are due to static readjustment or whether they are induced by the dynamic stresses accompanying the large amplitude seismic waves. In any case, if there is high strain energy accumulation in a region within about 100 kilometers from a large explosion or earthquake, the possibility of triggering a major earthquake or starting a new seismic sequence has to be considered. Unfortunately, it is not yet possible to measure the absolute strain energy accumulation. Also, an earthquake is basically a process of instability and the experience with smaller explosions cannot be extrapolated to larger explosions as in the case of predicting ground motion.

Man's ability to intervene with the tectonic process was recently demonstrated in the case of the Denver earthquakes. These shocks occurred in a region which heretofore had been considered aseismic. Actually, this was a region of elastic strain accumulation and apparently locked faults. The pumping of fluids into a deep disposal well resulted in the unlocking of a major fault and the initiation of an earthquake sequence. Some well-known seismologists are now suggesting the possibility that a major earthquake may hit Denver as part of this man-induced earthquake sequence. The Denver experience may not be pertinent to underground testing in the sense that there is no analog to fluid injection. On the other hand, the Denver events may be pertinent if the Denver aftershock sequence is due to a shifting concentration of stress and the successive failure of lock points following the initial effects of fluid injection.

Nevada is a region in which destructive earthquakes are known to have occurred in historical times. The large number of faults which have been mapped and which show recent movements imply that Nevada has been seismically active for a much longer period. Tectonic stress is producing regional deformation in Nevada today and elastic strain energy is being stored in the rocks of the region. Amchitka is more seismic than Nevada by at least an order of magnitude. The hazards of triggering an earthquake in the Aleutians are different from Nevada. The triggered event may be larger in the Aleutians and it may excite a tsunami which could be destructive at great distances. However, not all of the larger earthquakes in the Aleutians produce tsunami. Nevertheless, if the triggered earthquake were a large one (magnitude greater than 8) and the rupture propagated to the east where the population density increases, there could be damage due to ground vibration as well as tidal waves.

The present level of understanding of seismic phenomena makes it difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate quantitatively the risks of conducting large underground tests in seismic regions. However, we know that seismic events in the magnitude 6 to 7 range can produce slips and aftershocks in the distance to range 10-100 kilometers. We also know that seismic events in the magnitude range 6 - 7 have been associated in the past as foreshocks to large earthquakes or as components of large earthquakes. In view of these observations, a risk must be associated with conducting large-yield nuclear tests in seismic regions. The risk seems to be small but not insignificant since the consequences of accidentally releasing a large amount of tectonic strain energy could be extremely serious.

Slips occurring on faults or bedding planes have led to the destructive failure of several dams in recent years. All dams within about 100-200 kilometers from large underground explosions (magnitude about 6.5 - 7) should be examined for the existence of faults and potential landslides which might be triggered by the explosion. Our concern here stems from the recently discovered slips (as distinct from aftershocks) associated with earthquakes and explosions in this magnitude range.

## II. Direct Seismic Effects of Underground Testing on Building Structures

The ground motions generated directly by a major underground nuclear test are comparable to a moderate earthquake and present a

potential damage hazard to buildings located in the vicinity of the test. Seismic waves from an underground nuclear explosion propagate outward from the source and induce ground vibrations which can result in damage of structures depending on the response of these structures to the amplitude and frequency of the vibrations. The motion of the ground at any point depends on the yield of the nuclear device, the medium in which the explosion occurred, the velocity-depth structure and attenuation characteristics along the paths followed by the seismic waves, and finally the characteristics of the soil and bed rock beneath the structures. By gathering a large number of observations of ground motion associated with underground tests in different media and with variable yields it is possible to evaluate these factors separately and to end up with a fairly good capability for predicting ground motion. Empirical scaling laws can be devised so that extrapolation to larger tests would lead to no surprises of a significant nature not predicted by the probability distribution of ground vibration deduced for the particular test site and its adjacent regions.

The AEC has of course recognized the potential direct seismic hazard from nuclear tests and has taken what it considers to be appropriate measures to insure the safety of structures which might be affected. An assessment of this problem can be conveniently divided into two phases: 1) the ground motions which may be developed at the site of each significant building, and 2) the effects produced in the buildings by these ground motions.

Prediction of Ground Motions. The ground motion generated by an underground test is a very complex function of time. It is neither feasible nor desirable to predict its exact time history at each building site. It is necessary only to predict those features of the ground motion which have a significant influence on the structural response. The AEC contractor that has been assigned the task of predicting ground motion has selected as its basic measures of the ground motion peak amplitude, the amplitude-frequency content, and the elastic response spectrum. For the purposes of building damage control, these should provide an adequate characterization of the ground motion; in fact, the elastic response spectrum itself is probably sufficient. However, it is important to note that these quantities do not completely define the ground motion, and are not suitable to predict the amount of damage which may be developed in a structure subjected to an excessive ground shock. The response in this case is inelastic, and is not proportional to the elastic spectral response.

The ground motion prediction techniques employed by the AEC contractor are essentially empirical extrapolation procedures based on measurements made in the critical structure areas (principally Las Vegas) during a large number of smaller events. These procedures seem to be quite suitable for the purpose of predicting ground motions which may have a significant effect on typical buildings in the vicinity of the main Nevada Test Site. The principal criticism which may be directed against the prediction effort is the fact that no basic hypothesis or analytical procedure has been developed which would make possible the calculation of motions to be expected from tests conducted at other sites and affecting other cities. Thus, it would appear that safety can be achieved in the proposed central Nevada and Alaskan test sites only by gradually increasing the yield and thus developing the necessary experience during the test program.

Specific questions that should be given greater consideration in the prediction effort concern the influence of local soil conditions and the effects of focusing by geologic structure on the motion characteristics developed at any given site. The influence of soil conditions could be studied quantitatively by establishing arrays of recording instruments located at fixed distances from the source and extending across widely differing soils (from solid rock to deep soft alluvium). On the basis of such measurements, it should be possible to devise analytical procedures which can account for the influence of ground conditions. The problem of focusing probably cannot be studied so easily, but efforts should be made to determine under what conditions and to what extent this factor may influence ground motion intensity.

The principal conclusion which may be drawn from the presentation on ground motion predictions is that the predictions are probably quite accurate for tests to be done in the Pahute Mesa area, and should provide for reliable estimates of damage to be expected in Las Vegas. Predictions made for tests to be carried out in central Nevada cannot be so reliable because of the limited experience with this area. Whether any damaging motions might be focused on Reno or some other city by these tests, and whether any special ground motion characteristics will result from the soil conditions present in these cities are questions which cannot be answered definitely at this time. However, results of the Faultless test indicate that there may be no special problems in this area.

Prediction of Building Response. The response of an elastic building to a specified ground motion is a standard problem of structural

dynamics, and can be carried out with great accuracy for any building for which the dynamic properties are known. The response spectrum techniques being employed by the AEC contractor are quite suitable for this purpose. The principal problem in the response prediction is the evaluation of the essential building properties. Vibration-mode shapes and frequencies and viscous damping ratios are probably the most significant structural characteristics, and these can be obtained experimentally either from preliminary low-yield test excitations, or from other dynamic inputs.

The principal difficulty in the response prediction problem is the estimation of the strength capacity of the buildings subjected to ground motions. Reasonable estimates can generally be made of the strength of the basic structure, but the non-structural components such as partitions, plastered walls, window systems, etc., have rather indeterminate force or deformation capacities. The extensive monitoring of buildings for damage, as is being done by the AEC contractor, is probably the most effective means of establishing these strength properties in practice.

In general, it may be concluded that the response prediction work of the AEC contractor is comprehensive and effective, and provides satisfactory estimates of the damage to be expected in Las Vegas. Presumably, similar work will be done in the cities which may be affected by ground motion generated from the central Nevada test site. The only major criticism which may be directed toward this phase of the work is that the technical results which are developed from these underground tests are not being released to the scientific community. These tests are equivalent to earthquakes in many respects, and the response analyses and measurements are of great significance to earthquake engineers. These measurements will be even more valuable if and when incipient damage is developed in any of the observed buildings, and it is important that all results be released to the profession as soon as is practicable.

### III. Effect of Underground Testing on Earth and Concrete Dams and Embankments

Soil and concrete structures may be subjected to damage by the ground shaking accompanying a nuclear event, or by displacement, induced by the event, along a geological fault running through the structure. Several types of soil behavior can occur: the soil can be a vibration transmitter to a structure; the soil can fail, resulting in the sliding of

soil masses; and the soil can slump or subside as a result of compaction or densification effects, which are intensified in saturated soils due to liquefaction. Soil slides and flows can also occur under water. Damage can occur in concrete dams such as cracking of the structure, motion of the dam with respect to its abutments or foundations, and disturbance of the generating equipment requiring realignment. Rock falls can occur as a result of ground shaking. If soil slides or rock falls occur in reservoir side slopes, the resulting water waves can cause damage to the dam and appurtenant structures, as well as along the reservoir margin.

Observed Effects at NTS. A substantial number of ground motion records have been obtained at Nevada Test Site over a wide area from a variety of tests. No highway or other embankment slope failures have been recorded. In the vicinity of some shot points ground cracking has been observed which was attributed to geological faulting propagated through the alluvium. It is not clear whether or not some proportion of this cracking is in fact attributable to local soil compaction or slumping effects. Soil slope failures and rockslides in areas adjacent to shot points have occurred. Since fault displacements at unexpected distances from ground zero have been detected essentially accidentally after events, it is not known to what distance rock falls or soil slides might have occurred.

At Hoover Dam, records of small (0.005g) accelerations have been made on the dam. These have not been accompanied by observed damage. There have been no records of rockfalls or soil slides into Lake Mead.

Earthquakes near Hoover Dam apparently not associated with nuclear tests have interrupted power transmission from the Hoover Dam power plant as a result of relay vibrations. Some of these earthquakes have been associated with the filling up of Lake Mead and are thus another example of human intervention in tectonic processes. The flow of the Colorado River into Lake Mead since construction of Hoover Dam has been accompanied by a gradual deposition of silt in the reservoir floor. Periodic changes in the elevation of the silt reservoir bed have been observed due to underwater slides, flows, or turbidity currents in the silt.

Possible Future Effects at NTS and Amchitka. Considering the present levels of ground motion recorded at or near Las Vegas for Project Boxcar, tests at Pahute Mesa and the central Nevada test site,

with yields up to two and four times respectively those of the largest events conducted to date, do not appear likely to cause soil disturbance of the types cited. The soil vibrational response in Las Vegas due to the Boxcar event has apparently reached levels which, combined with the response characteristics of some buildings, are on the point of causing minor amounts of architectural damage.

In Amchitka, Alaska, underwater soil slides may be generated by a nuclear test although the offshore soil conditions are uncertain. Submarine soil slides may generate tsunami waves. In the past, several large tsunamis have been associated with soil slides.

In summary:

1) There is no evidence at present to indicate that future tests at Pahute Mesa up to twice the yield or at central Nevada Test Site up to four times the yield of the largest events conducted to date will be hazardous from the point of view of soil behavior.

2) There is a need to obtain more soils information in the immediate vicinity of ground zero and to examine more carefully the detailed nature of crack and displacement patterns observed on the surface after tests, to clarify their relation either to faulting in bedrock or to local soil slumping or other movements not directly related to bedrock faulting. The behavior of soil and rock slopes around Lake Mead could be more carefully examined pre- and post-shot. The position of the silt surface at the bottom of Lake Mead could also be studied before and after future events. Some of these additional studies could be carried out in such a way that they would supply information of significant assistance to the solution of current earthquake engineering problems.

3) Since some structural damage during earthquakes appears to result to structures as a consequence of their prestressing by poor soil or foundation conditions, such damage may not be predictable by the techniques employed by the safety organization at NTS and therefore it appears desirable that more emphasis be given to the examination of soil conditions and their relation to structural conditions at Las Vegas or other inhabited areas, as well as over the test site generally.

4) There is at least a possibility that in Amchitka soil behavior might result in the development of underwater slides that could conceivably result in the generation of tsunamis. More attention should be given to this problem.

5) Structures for which a damage potential exists (in particular, dams, reservoirs, water tanks) within a radius of 200 km should be monitored before and after each of the larger tests.

#### IV. Ground Water Contamination Hazards

Radionuclides released from large underground nuclear explosions are distributed initially by direct action in the immediate vicinity of the explosion. If the shot point is near or below the water table, the nuclides may be transported by ground water in possibly hazardous concentrations.

Because ground water generally moves at velocities measured in terms of feet per year, only long-lived radionuclides are important in water transport. The biologically significant radionuclides in this category include  $H^3$  (tritium),  $Ca^{45}$ ,  $Co^{60}$ ,  $Sr^{90}$ ,  $Cs^{137}$ ,  $Ru^{106}$ , and  $Ce^{144}$ . Laboratory and field experiences have demonstrated that all of these nuclides except tritium are strongly adsorbed by exchange with cations on the surfaces of clay materials; consequently, their movement is only an insignificant fraction of that of the ground water with the result that their concentrations fall below the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) within a short distance from ground zero. However, the disposition of radionuclides in limestone or dolomite is more complex and in these rocks the absorption may be substantially less than in volcanic rock. For tritium, a negligible exchange between tritiated water and the rock matrix must be assumed. Thus, in terms of curies of activity tritium represents the most abundant nuclide in ground water from a large fusion-fission explosion and becomes the primary contaminant in ground water.

Assuming tritium moves as an ideal tracer with ground water, it will travel in the direction of the local water table gradient and at a velocity governed by the magnitude of the gradient and the permeability of the aquifer. Although average values of gradients and permeabilities in a particular medium can be determined from well data, movements of tritium one to two orders of magnitude greater than the average ground water velocity can be expected as a result of 1) local heterogeneities in aquifers, particularly openings such as solution tubes, fractures, and faults, and 2) dispersion resulting from hydrodynamic mixing as water travels through an actual porous media. Transport can be most rapid through formations such as limestones, basalts, and coarse-grained alluvial deposits which contain large openings.

Experience gained from waste disposal operations at Hanford shows that maximum ground water velocities can be several-fold greater than the average velocity and that without extensive subsurface information the location and direction of these high-velocity tongues are impossible to predict. Similarly post-shot field tests at Project Gnome revealed velocities some 25 times greater than expected values.

At the Nevada Test Site subsurface hydrological investigations have defined the regional ground water flow pattern and average rates of flow. Water tables in the area are deep, exceeding 1600 feet, because of drainage to the south through underlying carbonate formations. Although permeabilities are large, water table gradients are low and consequently velocities are small. Exploratory well data have thus far revealed no evidence of continuous underground conduits which could permit high ground water velocities; nevertheless, the possibility of such heterogenities must be recognized and an active program of testing maintained. There is no reason, based upon evidences collected to date, to believe that tritiated ground water will reach the discharge areas, some 50 miles south of NTS, at concentrations above the maximum permissible concentration (MPC).

At the Central Nevada site ground water occurs at depths of less than 600 feet and drains into Railroad Valley. This is a closed basin with ground water approaching land surface in the lowest portion of the valley where it is lost by evaporation to the atmosphere. As long as use of ground water in the valley is carefully restricted, no problem of tritium contamination is foreseen.

At Amchitka, the water table is everywhere near ground surface. Any shot point will be within roughly two miles of the shoreline and the water table gradient will be greatest in a seaward direction. With relatively little information available on aquifer conditions, the greatest movement of ground water would be anticipated along one of the numerous transverse faults on the island. On this basis tritiated water at levels above the maximum permissible concentration (MPC) would be discharged into the Pacific Ocean; however, the resulting immense dilution would rapidly dissipate excessive tritium concentrations.

On the basis of the above summary, it appears probable that future underground tests of large magnitude at the three test sites will not create hazardous ground water contamination. It should be emphasized,

nevertheless, that because of the uncertainties of localized geology, continued surveillance monitoring of ground water is essential to insure that unexpected high concentrations of any radionuclides do not go undetected.

#### V. Radioactive Venting

Underground nuclear tests are normally buried at depths designed to prevent the venting of any radioactive material. The problem of assessing the hazards from radioactive venting therefore consists of first establishing the probability that some radioactivity might be released despite the efforts to contain it and then determining the biological significance of that amount of radioactivity. The Panel did not consider the special problem of radioactive venting from underground nuclear excavation tests which are not designed to be completely contained and are expected to release a small fraction of the produced radioactivity to the atmosphere.

As a result of the extensive U. S. underground nuclear test program, there is a considerable amount of data available on the containment of nuclear explosions over a very broad range of yields (from a fraction of a kiloton to the order of one megaton). On the basis of this information, scaling laws have been developed that permit calculation with a high degree of confidence of the depth of burial required to contain an underground test of any anticipated yield. When these scaling laws are applied to tests with yields of more than a few tens of kilotons, experience indicates that there is very little chance that there will be any radioactive venting.

Out of over 150 underground nuclear tests, only 10 have resulted in a significant amount of radioactive venting. It should be emphasized that in each case the radioactivity involved constituted only an extremely small portion of the total radioactivity produced in the nuclear test. All of the tests that have vented involved relatively small-yield explosions. The largest of these tests had a yield of a few tens of kilotons, and the majority of the tests had yields of a few kilotons. Subsequent investigation of these unanticipated ventings of small amounts of radioactive debris indicate a variety of probable causes such as the existence of unknown faults in the vicinity of the test location and leakage through and around test cables and pipes. The largest test (a few tens of kilotons) that has produced a significant amount of radioactive venting was a special case in that it was conducted in dolomite, a medium not ordinarily for

testing. The non-condensable carbon dioxide released in the explosion apparently diffused to the surface carrying fission products with it.

When one considers higher-yield tests, there is no evidence of any radioactive venting at all. Specifically, in none of the approximately 20 tests with yields of from roughly 100 kilotons to about a megaton has there been any radioactive venting.

The general explanation for the fact that the smaller the explosion, the greater the probability that there may be some venting is probably that accidental venting results primarily from the existence of unknown faults in the surrounding media. In the case of small shots near the surface, a single fault may extend far enough to permit venting. The deeper the shot is buried, the less likely it is that a single fault will extend far enough to provide a sufficient channel for venting to develop.

Whenever an accidental venting occurs, the AEC has standard procedures to determine the quantity of material vented and to monitor the cloud if it should extend beyond the test site. If levels are high enough, there are adequate stand-by procedures to warn local residents and to check that the milk from local dairy cows does not contain unacceptable levels of radioactive iodine.

The Panel made no effort to reassess the health hazard from the very small exposures that might result from such radioactive venting accidents as have occurred in the past. However, although some health hazard presumably results from any exposure, the amount of radioactivity resulting from these accidental radioactive ventings has been so small and so localized that the safety hazard appears to be minimal.

The case of Amchitka is somewhat more complicated than Nevada since there has been only one underground test at that location. There is also a possible additional problem in that there appears to be extensive local faulting, which is not easily identified from the surface. At the same time, any radioactive venting that does occur at Amchitka presents less of a safety hazard in view of its remote location. Therefore, since it is planned to build up to the highest-yield test planned at Amchitka with a series of tests of increasing yields, there does not appear to be reason to anticipate special safety hazards from venting if conservative scaling factors are followed.

In summary, the Panel concludes that there is relatively little safety hazard at the NTS from radioactive venting from large-yield shots. Based on rather extensive experience, it appears to be very unlikely that there will be any radioactive venting from these shots. Moreover, if venting should occur, it would almost certainly involve small amounts of radioactivity which would not constitute a significant health hazard. The Panel is somewhat less certain about the prospects for complete containment at Amchitka in view of our very limited experience at that location and the existence of local faults in the vicinity of the test site. Nevertheless, significant venting from large shots at Amchitka appears very unlikely; and, if it should occur, the remote location would minimize the resulting health hazard.

42

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

December 3, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)  
(5),(6)

[Redacted]

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)  
(5),(6)

[Redacted]

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)  
(5),(6)

[Redacted]

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)  
(5),(6)

[Redacted]

6.1(a)  
3.3(b)  
(5),(6)

[Redacted]

3.3(b)  
(4),(5)

[Redacted]

I recommend that you approve in principle the proposed United Kingdom Program of Cooperation. If you approve, I will sign the attached memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 02-194  
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-28-04

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_


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(788)

42a

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE



6.2  
(a)

The above program of cooperation referred to in your memorandum for the President of November 30, 1968, and described in detail in the attachment thereto, has been reviewed in light of the standards and requirements of NSAM 197, and on the basis of the justifications stated in your memorandum.

It has been noted that the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission have reviewed this program in the light of their responsibilities and interpose no objection. It is further noted that specific dispersal authority will be requested in the next Nuclear Weapons Ceiling Plan due in the fall of 1969.

This is to record approval "in principle" of the proposed program.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 10-241  
By int, NARA, Date 8-25-10



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

42b

30 NOV 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

b2  
(a)

The United Kingdom plans to modernize its air forces by replacing four CANBERRA squadrons with four PHANTOM FGR-2 squadrons (40 aircraft).

[REDACTED]

"  
3.3 (b)  
(2)(6)

This request is based on the United Kingdom's expressed intention to commit the FGR-2 aircraft to NATO primarily in the conventional attack role.

[REDACTED] will permit the FGR-2 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and we expect this relative emphasis to be reflected in the squadrons' training programs and conventional ordnance stock levels.

[REDACTED]

b2  
(a)

The specific dispersal authority will be requested in our next Nuclear Weapons Deployment Ceiling Plan.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

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Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954


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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

By id NJ 10-242  
NARA, Date 5-3-11

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


6.2  
(a)

The Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission have reviewed this program in the light of their responsibilities and interpose no objection.

*Paul H. Nitze*

Attachment



6.2 (a)

6.1(a)

[Redacted]

1. (S) OBJECTIVE OF THE PROGRAM: The objective of the program is to [Redacted] of four United Kingdom PHANTOM FGR-2 squadrons.

2. (SFRD) RELATIONSHIP TO CURRENT PLANS: [Redacted]

6.1(a)

3. (S) COMMAND AND CONTROL: Command and control of PHANTOM FGR-2 forces would be identical to that currently approved and in effect for the CANBERRA forces being replaced.

6.1(a)

[Redacted]

3.3(b)  
(2), (6)

4. (S) CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT: The dual-capable PHANTOM FGR-2 aircraft would be employed primarily in a conventional attack role. [Redacted] In addition, these aircraft would have a reconnaissance capability. The PHANTOM FGR-2 squadrons would normally be deployed for conventional operations and this emphasis is expected to be reflected in the training programs and conventional ordnance stock levels.

3.3(b)  
(2), (6)

[Redacted]

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-195  
By cbw, NARA, Date 9-28-04

RECORDED  
INDEXED  
10

5. (TSFRD) FORCE GOALS:

6.1(a)

[REDACTED]

b. The SHAPE Air Spread Sheet, dated 1 June 1968, reflects the following schedule for replacement of the CANBERRA squadrons with PHANTOM FGR-2 aircraft:

6.1(a)

[REDACTED] The remaining three squadrons, although not yet designated by location, are programmed for withdrawal by 31 March 1970, 30 June 1970 and 30 September 1970.

6.1(a)

[REDACTED] Although specific dates and locations have not yet been determined, the United Kingdom indicates that the third squadron will be deployed by end CY 1970 and the fourth in CY 1971.

c. U.S. custodial personnel would be provided from within resources currently committed in support of the CANBERRA squadrons.

6. (SFRD)

6.1(a)

[REDACTED]

7. (S) TIME FRAME: The Ministry of Defence, U.K., estimates that approximately 18 months would be required to certify the PHANTOM FGR-2 aircraft by U.K. standards. To meet the initial operational date for the first squadron will require that technical discussions to establish aircraft/weapon capability and to formulate [REDACTED] begin by 1 December 1968.

3.3(b)  
(2), (6)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By M, NARA, Date 2-20-98

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, December 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$40 Million Program Loan for Turkey

*[Handwritten signature]*  
*2 Pres file*

Bill Gaud recommends you approve the attached \$40 million program loan for Turkey. This would be our share in a total of \$121 million which the Turkish consortium expects to round up for 1969.

We would announce \$30 million at the December 16 Consortium meeting, and the rest would be held to be used as our contribution if and when the Turks reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund on a major devaluation and stabilization program. Turkish leaders agree privately that this is a crucial next step, but timing will depend on when the Prime Minister decides to hold the elections which must take place some time next year.

Except for about \$22 million worth of PL 480--part of which will be coming to you shortly--we expect this will be all the economic aid we give Turkey next year. However, the Turkish balance of payments is critical enough that some emergency help may still be necessary.

Despite their financial problems, the Turks have used our aid well and have run at about a 6.5% growth rate for the past five years. They won't be happy with this year's aid cut (\$68 million to \$40 million), but they seem to understand that this is the result of general Congressional aid cuts and not a sign of decreased interest in Turkey. You may recall President Sunay's unhappy but friendly and understanding letter last March after we had to go from \$135 million in 1967 to \$68 million in 1968.

The Symington determinations were made when you approved the Turkish loan last February and are still good. There are no problems with Conte-Long.

Charlie Zwick concurs. Henry Fowler notes that he "continues to be concerned with the general absence of project lending in AID submissions." When he made a similar note on the Pak loan recently, we asked for a short memo explaining it, and I am attaching that again for your reference. It adds up to the feeling that project lending helps our balance of payments and we should do more of it. AID's problem is that Congressional cuts have been so deep this year that there's just no money for projects. AID makes sure that these non-project loans are tied to US procurement.

I recommend you approve.

Approve   
Disapprove

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 15, 1968

C  
43a

MEMORANDUM

**Subject:** Desirability of Including Some Project Lending in All Countries Where There are Major U.S. Aid Programs

We have been concerned at the tendency for AID to shift completely to program lending in a number of countries to the exclusion of project lending. This has become particularly pronounced with the reduction in the size of the total aid program. There have been proposals recently to provide the entire FY 1969 AID programs for India, Pakistan and Turkey on a program loan basis. Also, several of our aid programs in Latin America -- Brazil, Columbia -- and in Africa are entirely on a non-project loan basis.

There are two important reasons why we favor continuing at least some project lending in each country where the U.S. provides substantial amounts of aid:

First, we have often expressed our concern that there is less U.S. export "additionality" in program lending than in project lending.

Secondly, quite apart from the additionality question, we feel that we hurt the already weakened prospects for public and Congressional support of aid by not having some tangible project each year in major aid receiving countries. The U.S. public and U.S. Congress, we think, want to see some concrete examples of the benefits of U.S. assistance and the contribution to physical development -- whether in the form of dams, factories or schools. If U.S. aid funds are used under program loans to finance miscellaneous items which simply disappear into the recipient country as part of its regular import needs, the identity of our contribution is often lost and any visible measurement of aid accomplishment goes by the board. We have found this to be true many times when we have traveled abroad with members of Congress.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date 6-13-02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

31667

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

43 *lv*

NOV 23 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: \$40 million loan for Turkey

In the attached memorandum Bill Gaud requests approval of a \$40 million program loan to Turkey as our part of an expected \$121 million in Consortium aid for 1969. The funds are to be released in two tranches:

- \$30 million upon satisfactory pledges by other donors at the Consortium meeting next month
- \$10 million upon Turkish agreement to a new IMF stabilization program expected in February or March.

Development aid to Turkey has declined from \$135 million in 1967, reflecting both Congressional cuts and AID's policy of phasing-out assistance by 1973. Last year AID provided \$28 million in project aid along with a \$40 million program loan. This year there will be no project aid. Our share of Consortium assistance will be 33% in 1969, compared to 51% in 1967.

Economic Performance

Turkish economic performance has been good. During the first five-year plan (1963-67) the economy, bolstered by \$300 million a year in U.S. and other Consortium aid, grew at 6.5% a year. This momentum is expected to continue through 1968.

However, poor foreign exchange policies and the resulting exchange shortages have remained a bottleneck to development. The IMF, with U.S. support, has unsuccessfully urged currency reform for some years. This year the IMF plans to take a tougher stand on this subject. Gaud believes that the combination of pressures from the severe exchange shortage and urging from the Fund and Consortium members may lead to a major restructuring in trade policies and devaluation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/75, State Dept. Guidelines

By *lf*, NARA, Date *2-20-98*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Because the issue of devaluation is politically sensitive, AID will not condition the 1969 program loan on Turkish performance in this area. The IMF agrees with this approach. However, Gaud proposes to hold back \$10 million subject to Turkish agreement to a new IMF stabilization program. If the Turks agree to devalue during FY 1969, this \$10 million would be counted as a U.S. prepayment to an IMF-sponsored stabilization fund. Some supplemental U.S. financing may also be required.

Military Expenditures

State/AID conclude that neither Turkish resources nor U.S. development assistance is being diverted to military expenditures to a degree that materially interferes with development.

Balance of Payments

These funds will be used to finance goods and services procured in the United States. Commodities will continue to be selected to assure additionality to U.S. commercial exports. Secretary Fowler agrees that these measures will minimize the balance of payments affect of the loan.

*Concern, but continue to be involved with the general absence of project lending in*  
*and*  
*submit*  
*was*  
*HAF*

Recommendation

I recommend that you authorize this \$40 million program loan for 1969, to be released in two tranches of \$30 million and \$10 million.

*Charles J. Zwick*  
Charles J. Zwick  
Director

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

43c

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

NOV 15 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: FY 1969 Assistance for Turkey

I request approval for \$40 million in Program Assistance for Turkey. We intend to provide this amount in two tranches of \$30 million as soon as possible and \$10 million after Turkey has reached its annual agreement with IMF on a stabilization program. We propose to indicate this approach at the Turkey Consortium meeting on December 16, 1968. By providing \$30 million as soon as possible, we will give timely support to Turkey's 1969 import program which will be announced in early January. By holding back the \$10 million, we hope to provide some indirect support to the IMF in its negotiations which, besides stabilization, will involve important trade policy issues in which we have an interest.

In addition to our \$40 million, we are now negotiating a \$4.5 million PL 480, Title I tallow agreement with Turkey and expect that Turkey may also request 300,000 metric tons of wheat (approximately \$18 million) under PL 480, Title I.

Self-Help Performance

Turkey is sustaining in 1968, the first year of the Second Five-Year Plan, the high rate of economic progress achieved during the First Five-Year Plan (1963-1967):

- gross national product is estimated to increase 6.5%;
- industrial production should increase approximately 8%;
- tax revenues may increase by 10%;
- the rate of increase in wholesale prices should be under 3%;
- gross investment will increase close to 15%. As a result, gross investment as a percent of gross national product will increase to 18.8% in 1968.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 5  
Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not  
automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority A10 Guidelines  
By fy NARA, Date 2-20-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

It is on the basis of this commendable record of sustained economic performance and the expressed determination of the Turkish Government to fulfill its commitment to continued economic progress that we recommend your approval of this assistance program.

Continued rapid growth with financial stability and the eventual self-sustaining growth of the Turkish economy are, however, not yet assured. Continued vigilance of Turkish monetary and fiscal policies is necessary to contain the inflationary bias of the Turkish economy. In addition, the balance of payments position of Turkey remains precarious, with foreign exchange reserves only sufficient to finance three weeks imports. Turkey must take more determined action to increase foreign exchange earnings to sustain economic growth and achieve balance of payments equilibrium.

In the spring of 1968, the Turkish Government instituted a new exchange rate of 12/1 (compared with the official rate of 9/1) for tourist earnings and workers' remittances. In addition, the tax rebates on the export of over 170 different commodities were substantially increased. In September of this year, the Turkish Government took further action to stimulate foreign exchange earnings by lowering the interest on loans to export industries, providing tax exemptions for exporters, again increasing the tax rebates on exports, and establishing a special import fund to provide raw materials and spare parts for export industries.

These actions are encouraging and are certainly strong evidence that the Turkish Government is mounting a determined export campaign. In our judgment, however, these actions are unlikely to provide the incentives and competitive pressure needed if Turkey is to achieve a balance of payments equilibrium compatible with self-sustaining growth. Therefore, the A.I.D. strategy for 1969 will continue to emphasize the need for a comprehensive reform of Turkish trade policies, including a substantial devaluation of the Turkish lira.

Exchange reform has already become a subject of extensive debate in the Turkish press and in academic circles. Senior government officials will now admit privately that devaluation may be needed some time in the future, although they still strongly deny that it is appropriate now. The assistance likely to be available from the Consortium will be substantially less than what the Turkish Government considers its requirements and what we feel is needed, given the most probable combination of Turkish policies in their election year of 1969. There will be strong pressure on the Turkish balance of payments, and this will further strengthen the hand of those in Turkey who argue for a more substantial reform in Turkish foreign trade policies.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

Furthermore, the attitude of our Consortium partners and the international organizations on the devaluation issue has changed. In the past, the U.S. and the IMF were the only voices counselling the Turkish Government on the need for trade policy reforms. This is no longer true. The Turkey Consortium Secretariat, some of our major Consortium partners, the European Monetary Authority (EMA) and the IBRD now recognize the need for reforms and are prepared to exert pressure on Turkey to take action.

This combination of pressure has apparently led the IMF to conclude that the prospects of negotiating a major change in Turkish trade policies are quite good. The availability of up to \$115 million from the IMF and EMA rides on these negotiations.

We feel U.S. interests would not be furthered if we became directly involved in these difficult and politically sensitive discussions by tying part or all of our aid to trade policy reforms. U.S. involvement would add little to the leverage the IMF can exert and could, by detracting from the international civil servant character of the negotiations, weaken its position. U.S. participation would bring with it a responsibility for the Turkish policy actions which might result. We are not now prepared to recommend assuming this responsibility.

The results of these negotiations are not, at this time, predictable. As a minimum, we expect the IMF will reach agreement on a new stabilization program for 1969, and \$10 million of our assistance will be tied to Turkish assurances of continued monetary and fiscal policies conducive to stable economic growth as evidenced by the IMF stand-by agreement. Should, however, the IMF obtain Turkish agreement to a substantial de facto or de jure devaluation of the Turkish lira, we foresee a requirement for supplemental financing beyond the \$40 million.

#### The Turkish Assistance Requirement

The Consortium will hold its review of the Turkish 1969 development program in early December. Our estimate of the 1969 balance of payments position of the Turkish economy suggests that a requirement exists for \$181 million in external program assistance. This estimate is based on the assumption of a modest 6% increase in maintenance of economy imports (excludes those which are self-financed such as project credits), continued growth in earnings from tourism and workers' remittances, and a 5-1/2% increase in exports. The 6% rise in essential imports is probably the minimum required to meet the raw material and spare parts requirements of the economy if a 6% to 7% rate of increase in gross national product is to be achieved. These estimates do not include the PL 480 wheat because the extent of the crop shortfall is still uncertain. Should a requirement exist, the import estimate will have to be raised. The export growth rate of 5-1/2% is optimistic and assumes the maximum effectiveness of the various export incentives already introduced. Should they fail, the Government of Turkey will have to implement more substantive reforms.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

To meet the financing requirement of \$181 million, we estimate that disbursements from existing loans will be \$53 million. New pledges in 1969 from the Consortium of program assistance and debt relief, including our loans totalling \$40 million, should be approximately \$90 million which would result in disbursements in 1969 of \$49 million. In addition, we expect the IMF to execute a new stand-by agreement with Turkey which provides \$27 million. The total from the above sources amounts to \$129 million and should the EMA decide to reschedule the \$20 million debt repayment due it in late 1969 a total of \$149 million will be available. We expect, however, that the EMA will defer action on this debt until well into 1969 as part of its negotiations on trade reforms. In any case, there will still be a shortfall of over \$30 million and the balance of payments pressure will be severe.

#### U.S. Balance of Payments Impact

In May of 1967, an interagency team, headed by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Petty, made a study of export additionality in Turkey. Since that time, A.I.D. has actively pursued the major recommendations contained in that report and achieved considerable success. Two commodities previously financed by A.I.D.--hides and skins, and kraft paper--have been dropped from A.I.D.'s eligibility list because there was a strong presumption that U.S. suppliers were competitive in the Turkish market. A major change has been made in Turkish import procedures to insure that Turkish importers have free access to the U.S. market. Previously, Turkish importers wishing to import from the U.S. had to use A.I.D. funds if the commodity to be imported was eligible for A.I.D. financing. In June of this year, this import regulation was revised and this requirement has been removed. Another recommendation of the Petty Team was that A.I.D. consider financing fertilizer procurement for Turkey in order to build a market for U.S. fertilizers. In fact, due in large part to the efforts of an A.I.D. contract technician, Turkey has awarded contracts to U.S. firms for over \$9.5 million in fertilizer imports to be financed with its own foreign exchange. While a continued high level of U.S. fertilizer exports is unlikely because the price of fertilizer fluctuates widely and European suppliers have a large competitive advantage over the U.S. in transportation costs, U.S. fertilizer is now entering the Turkish market.

Finally, and probably most important, we have to date been very successful in decreasing the U.S. share of Consortium assistance to Turkey and transferring the assistance burden to the European members of the Consortium. In 1967, the United States provided 49% of the total bilateral Consortium assistance. In 1969, we estimate that the U.S. share of total bilateral assistance may be only 33%. Our efforts at the forthcoming Consortium meeting will be directed toward this end.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 -

Recommendation:

I recommend that you approve \$40 million in Program Assistance for Turkey to be made in two tranches of \$30 million and \$10 million respectively.

*William S. Gaud*

William S. Gaud

Enclosures:

- A. Symington and Conte-Long Amendments
- B. Balance of Payments
- C. Consortium Assistance

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

43d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTACHMENT A

SYMINGTON AND CONTE-LONG AMENDMENTS

STATE/AID in consultation with the INTERAGENCY SYMINGTON COMMITTEE concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) (The Symington Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined (a) that Turkish resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and (b) that neither U.S. development assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, nor sales under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, are being diverted by Turkey to military purposes. The memorandum in which this determination was made was submitted to the President in connection with a \$40 million production loan for Turkey approved by the President on February 27, 1968. The facts on which the prior determination was based have not changed materially during the interim.

With regard to the application of Section 620(v) (The Conte-Long Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Turkey has not made any purchases of sophisticated weapons with its own resources since the date on which Section 620(v) became applicable to Turkey, and no such purchases are anticipated this fiscal year.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority As D. Boudelino  
By sj NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~TURKISH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROJECTIONS

	1967	1968 Estimate	1969 Estimate
Current Imports	-685	-764	-860
Exports	523	541	570
Trade Balance	-162	-223	-290
Interest Payments	-35	-44	-55
Profit Transfers	-25	-27	-30
Tourism and Travel (net)	-14	3	10
Workers' Remittances	93	105	115
Other Invisibles	29	24	24
Invisibles Balance	48	61	64
Current Account Balance	-114	-162	-226
Debt Repayments	-125	-135 <sup>1/</sup>	-125
Total Financing Gap	-239	-297	-351
Financed By:			
Private Capital + Imports w/waiver	29	30	48
PL 480	-	-	2
Project Assistance	83	85	120
Program Aid/Debt Relief	190	168 <sup>2/</sup>	149 <sup>3/</sup>
General Equilibrium	-63	14	32
Reserve Movements	( 21)	(14)	(32)
Errors and Omissions	(-42)	( -)	

<sup>1/</sup> Includes rollover of \$25 million EMA payment due 12/31/68.

<sup>2/</sup> Estimated disbursement from current pipeline.

<sup>3/</sup> Disbursement from prior year pledges + 1969 commitments.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority AID Guidelines  
 By g NARA, Date 8-20-91

TURKEYCONSORTIUM ASSISTANCE

	1967 Total	1968 Total	1969 Estimate			Total
			Program	Project	Debt	
Austria	1.10	0.89	0.80	-	-	0.80
Belgium	1.48	1.24	0.70	-	0.30 <sup>1/</sup>	1.00
France	19.79	20.82	7.29	7.29	6.00 <sup>1/</sup>	20.58
Germany	45.50	43.86	10.00	10.00	7.00	27.00
Italy	18.00	20.00	7.00	7.00	2.00 <sup>1/</sup>	16.00
Norway	0.59	-	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	1.62	35.27	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	14.26	16.07	6.00	6.00	2.40 <sup>1/</sup>	14.40
United States	131.04	70.92	40.00	-	-	40.00
<u>Other Members</u>						
Canada	22.66	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	0.50	-	-	-	-	-
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	1.00	1.00	1.00	-	-	1.00
Sweden	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	257.54	210.07	72.79	30.29 <sup>2/</sup>	17.70	120.78
U.S. Share %	50.9	33.8	-	-	-	33.1

<sup>1/</sup> Program aid given as debt relief.

<sup>2/</sup> The level of European project assistance pledges fluctuates widely because the European countries frequently announce their pledge only after one of their suppliers has been awarded a contract. The four countries shown are the only ones who have made annual pledges and the amount shown is the historical level.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority: AID Guidelines  
 By: Ly NAKA, Date: 2-20-98

ACTION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN PLUS

Tuesday, December 3, 1968  
7:35 p.m.

44  
Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the proposed instruction  
for Vance on the DMZ, for his talk  
tomorrow morning with Lau -- for  
your urgent clearance.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ML, NARA, Date 1-8-98

W. W. Rostow

Cable cleared \_\_\_\_\_

Cleared as amended \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN PLUS

WWRostow:rla

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

44a

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

*for clearance*

Origin ACTION: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

Info INFO: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

STATE

PARIS TODEL \_\_\_\_\_ FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS HARVAN PLUS

Authority NLS 91-506

By ml/is, NARA, Date 1-8-98

1. Responding to your information that Lau has requested a meeting tomorrow morning, you should take the strongest possible line with him about the DMZ.

(a) You should once more categorically reject any assertion by him that North Vietnamese forces are not present in the DMZ.

(b) You should emphasize that respect for the DMZ is a basic condition for serious talks and for the maintenance of the cessation of bombing. Now that we have stopped the bombing, you need not ~~hesitate~~ ~~be concerned~~ about insisting that respect for the DMZ is a condition for the future.

(c) You should make clear that continued abuse of the DMZ by North Vietnamese forces will make it necessary for the United States to take whatever action we deem necessary to insure the safety of our own and allied forces south of the DMZ.

Dated by: S:DRusk:jmr 12/3/68

Tel. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

EA - Mr. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Read

White House - Mr. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy.PARIS Info: Amembassy SAIGON

~~SECRET~~ HARVAN PLUS  
*Classification*

(d) You should insist that we get an official response from his delegation and his government on their attitude about the DMZ at the earliest possible moment.

2. Having made your strongest possible presentation along the above lines, you should propose that both sides fix an immediate date, such as December 6, after which there would be no forces of either side in the DMZ and a cessation of gun fire and air and naval attacks into the DMZ. Make it clear that this requires an agreement on their part and that we will not move our own forces out of the DMZ in the absence of such an agreement.

You can add that you have taken note of Hanoi's denial that its forces are in the DMZ. You cannot accept this as a description of the fact because we know they are there. You can point out, however, that their denial presumably means that they are prepared to accept a suitable arrangement which would guarantee to both sides that there are no military forces in the DMZ. We would like to have a proposal from Hanoi as to how this could be done immediately. Among possibilities are the restoration of the authority and presence of the ICC in the DMZ. Or, alternatively, joint supervision of the DMZ by mixed teams from both sides. Still another possibility might be that three or four Asian nations not now involved with the ICC might undertake to provide this service to both sides.

Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS Info: Amembassy SAIGON

~~SECRET~~ HARVAN PLUS  
*Classification*

In any event, in pressing them to propose an effective method of inspection, you should leave no doubt that, even if we reach an agreement that there will be no forces of either side in the DMZ, we must reserve the right to continue aerial overflight of the DMZ area for reconnaissance purposes unless and until some agreed inspection is in existence. (This should not, repeat not, in any way be linked with overflights of North Viet-Nam generally.)

3. In making these points, you should of course again affirm in the strongest terms that our evidence convinces us totally that the military action now taking place in the DMZ is the responsibility of North Viet-Nam exclusively, that our own actions have been taken only in response to theirs, and the other points that you have already made. Your line should be that there is no point in further argument on these issues. Instead, we should both be proceeding to the kind of constructive action that can lay the problem to rest and permit us to get down to the meetings in the proper atmosphere.

GP-3.

END.

ACTION

45

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, December 3, 1968  
7:30 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter to  
President Thieu, which Sec. Rusk  
forwarded for your consideration.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *MP/rjs* NARA, Date 1-28-98

W. W. Rostow

SECRET/HARVAN PLUS

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS~~

45a  
FIRST DRAFT  
EA:WPBundy:mk  
12/3/68

Draft Letter from President Johnson to President Thieu

Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Bunker will have conveyed to you my satisfaction that we were able to work out appropriate statements last week on the matters that had concerned your Government, so that you were in a position to announce that you would send your delegation to Paris.

I had hoped that that delegation could be named and dispatched within a very few days after the announcement of your decision, and from the discussions between Ambassador Bunker and yourself I had the clear impression that this would be done at once. I am now most disturbed by the continuing delay and its effect on the situation both here and in the United States/in terms of Hanoi's actions on the ground.

I must say to you quite frankly that the American people, without respect to party, have found it most difficult to understand the factors which caused your Government not to associate itself with the decision on a bombing halt and the opening of the new Paris meetings. I say this as a completely

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guid  
By 1/3, NARA, Date 2-20-98

objective assessment of the comments that have been made throughout the country, and -- I might add -- to me personally by leading Senators and Representatives who will remain in positions of crucial influence and power under the new administration.

Thus, while your decision of last week was welcomed, it has been the universal expectation here that it would be speedily followed by the dispatch of an effective and competent delegation to Paris, prepared to enter into the new meetings at once. I am afraid that any further delay could cause serious misunderstanding here, and a continued and possibly serious weakening in the support of the American people for our whole effort to assist your country to defend itself.

Moreover, I must point out to you that our enemies in Hanoi are already taking advantage of the situation. With the American people tending to blame your Government --

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS~~

-3-

rightly or wrongly--for the fact that new substantive meetings have not yet begun, I am sure that Hanoi has felt that we were in a weaker position to deal with its plain failure to observe the points that we had made absolutely clear prior to the stopping of the bombing.

In short, I believe we face a common situation in which further delay can only operate to the disadvantage of our interests and to the advantage of Hanoi. I hope that I may hear very shortly indeed that your delegation is on its way and instructed to participate in the new meetings commencing not later than December 11.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET/NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS~~

**ACTION**

46

**Tuesday, December 3, 1968 -- 6:30 p. m.**

**Mr. President:**

*Pres file*

**Henry Kissinger plans to take the 11:00 a. m. shuttle from New York on Thursday, December 5.**

**He would be available for an appointment with the President at about 12:45 p. m. -- or otherwise, at your convenience.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**cc: Mr. Jim Jones**

**WWRostow:rla**

47

*Sample*

Tuesday - December 3, 1968

Mr. President:

After his return to Barbados, Prime Minister Barrow wrote to thank you for the album of photographs of his visit to Washington and for your hospitality (tab A).

He comments that he and his Cabinet would be delighted if you could some day accept the invitation to visit Barbados which he extended while he was in Washington.

State has recommended that no reply to this letter be made unless you plan to accept the invitation in the relatively near future.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Letter to the President from Prime Minister Barrow  
of Barbados, dated October 23, 1968.

SWLewis:mmm

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE,  
BARBADOS.

14976

23rd October, 1968.

47a

Dear Mr. President,

Mrs. Barrow and I were delighted to receive the beautiful album of photographs of our recent visit to Washington, which we consider one of the most momentous occasions in our lives.

We should like to thank you and Mrs. Johnson first for your kind invitation and also for all the arrangements which were so thoughtfully made for our comfort and entertainment.

Since my return to Barbados, the members of my Cabinet have been unanimously enthusiastic over the prospect of a visit by you and Mrs. Johnson to Barbados. With such assured reception and backing, we will all find it pleasurable if you could some day find it convenient to accept the invitation which I extended to you in Washington.

Yours sincerely,

*Erskine Barrow*

President Lyndon B. Johnson,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday - December 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama *Pres file*

Ex-President Arias' followers have started some guerrilla efforts along the Costa Rican frontier. Only one encounter with the Panamanian National Guard has so far been confirmed, but the prospect is for continuing skirmishes.

The National Guard Commander (one of the two key leaders in the recent coup) has asked to purchase from U. S. Army stocks about \$20,000 worth of field equipment and combat rations for counter-insurgency operations. Ambassador Adair has recommended approval of this sale -- which includes such items as canteens, air mattresses, and so forth, but no weapons or ammunitions. He argues, and State agrees, that escalation of the guerrilla efforts would be contrary to US interests.

State has authorized Defense to make the sale. If Arias or his followers learn of this assistance, we may expect some unfavorable publicity. State will justify it as a normal part of our military sales program directed at helping meet threats of insurgency in various countries throughout the hemisphere.

W. W. Rostow

cc - George Christian  
SWLewis:mm

49

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - December 3, 1968 - 5:00pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Venezuelan Election

The Presidential election in Venezuela is still too close to call. At 10:00 a.m. this morning, the Christian Democratic candidate Rafael Caldera held on to a narrow lead over Gonzalo Barrios, candidate of the incumbent Democratic Action Party (28% to 25%), with the margin so close the result may not be known for several days. The other two major candidates are not far behind.

Voting and vote-counting have gone on without disorder. The Army has pledged its support for whichever candidate wins. So far, no cries of fraud have been heard. If Barrios wins by a few thousand votes, the Caldera supporters will probably cause some ruckus, but it should be manageable.

Either man would be satisfactory from our viewpoint, although Caldera would probably take a somewhat more nationalistic position on economic matters.

W. W. Rostow

SWLewis:mmm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *Ag*, NARA, Date *2-20-98*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-197  
By is NARA, Date 8-21-03

ACTION

December 3, 1968 - 3:05 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to letter from Prime Minister Holyoake

*Pres. file*

Attached is a letter from Prime Minister Holyoake expressing his concern over relations in the civil aviation field. Specifically, Holyoake is worried that the designation of a second U.S. air carrier for the southern Pacific will work to the detriment of New Zealand's own national airline.

This whole matter is expected to come to you for decision in the near future. In the meantime, State Department recommends the following rather bland acknowledgment of Holyoake's message:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have received your letter expressing your concern over our relations in the field of civil aviation. I am pleased that you felt you could speak frankly on a matter of such mutual concern.

"The United States is committed to the concept that the international air transport system should be expanded on an economically and technologically efficient basis adapted to the growing needs of the world's traveling public and commerce. The Transpacific Route Investigation being conducted by our Civil Aeronautics Board is designed to determine how this objective can best be met insofar as U.S. air carrier participation in the Pacific is concerned.

"Whatever may ultimately be decided, the United States of course intends to abide by the terms of its aviation agreement with New Zealand. If practical problems do arise, I am certain our two

countries will be able to work them out in good will and in keeping with our mutual interests in this field. Sincerely,  
Lyndon B. Johnson."

I recommend you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Att

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

STATE:MWright:wpt

Prime Minister  
Wellington  
New Zealand

50a

My dear President,

I had hoped during our recent talks in Washington to mention an aspect of United States/New Zealand relations which is causing me some concern but our time was taken up with questions of more immediate importance; I am therefore taking the liberty of drawing it to your attention now and as a matter of some urgency since I understand that you may be called upon to take some decisions on it in the near future.

It involves our relations in the field of civil aviation. My concern is related principally to the outcome of the Trans-Pacific Routes Case which seems likely to result in the designation of a second United States airline to operate in the South Pacific in competition with Pan American. In precise terms I am concerned about the effect that unrestrained competition between these two airlines could have on the economic well-being of established but smaller national airlines, particularly our own designated operator, Air New Zealand.

In this letter it is not necessary to go into the detail that a full exposition of this somewhat complex question would require; rather, I feel it is sufficient for the immediate purpose to state the main issues as I see them and as they would affect our relations, in particular in civil aviation matters.

When, in 1961, the Government took a decision to establish a New Zealand international airline it had four cardinal points in mind: to meet the needs of the people for air-links with other countries; to assist the national balance of payments by both earning and saving foreign exchange; to assist in the development of exports and tourism and, finally and fundamentally, to establish an instrument of high importance in our national security. At the same time the Government made it plain that it expected the Company to operate on sound business principles with drive and determination and to return a profit: this, until this year, it has done.

Mr Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the United States of  
America,  
White House,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-197  
By us NARA, Date 8-21-03

The current Air Transport Agreement between our two countries which was negotiated in 1964 makes provision for air services across the Pacific sufficient to meet the needs of the travelling public: it also provides for the orderly growth of these services as the demand increases. Both of these principles lie at the heart of the Chicago Convention and the charter of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

We recognize the need for vigorous growth but we believe that, to be healthy and economically sound, such growth should not outstrip too rapidly the public requirement for additional space or additional frequencies - we are, in the spirit of the Chicago Convention, opposed to economic waste caused by unreasonable competition. In New Zealand we cannot subscribe to the philosophy which favours the inauguration of additional services before there is a justified demand for them; this is, in our view, a philosophy which vitiates the principle of fair and equal opportunity which is one of the bases of our Air Transport Agreement with the United States. It is, furthermore a philosophy which can be practised only by airlines with very large resources and in countries with a large and relatively wealthy population with a need or the leisure to travel abroad.

We do not necessarily object to the designation of a second United States carrier, but in line with the provisions of our bilateral agreement, we would expect the introduction of additional services to match rather than to anticipate the increased demand that should logically follow the designation of the new carrier. I cannot stress this too strongly.

The effect of a sharp increase in the number of flights across the Pacific (let alone the increased carrying capacity of individual aircraft) could well, in the absence of a corresponding increase in demand from the travelling public, have a most serious effect on Air New Zealand, our national airline: there is no evidence of such an increased demand at the present time - indeed, statistics clearly show that all Pacific carriers have been operating on uneconomic load factors for some time and continue to do so. This is an issue of grave concern to New Zealand.

As I know from our recent talks, you appreciate that New Zealand's prosperity and therefore her capacity to pay her way and to carry out her international obligations effectively depends in large measure upon her ability to improve her balance of payments. In this connection, I regard Air New Zealand as an instrument of first importance which itself must be allowed to expand its activities in fair and reasonable competition with other international airlines; at present, this is largely a matter of promotion and of carrying its share of the available traffic. In due course it should extend to enlarged rights of access to other markets, including the United States.

/I would

I would ask, therefore, that when you are considering the recommendations arising from the Trans-Pacific Routes Case which I understand may shortly be placed before you for decisions, you bear in mind, in the context of the whole span of our relations, the points I have raised in this letter.

Yours sincerely,

*Keith Holyoake*

*Pres Lee*

51

Tuesday, Dec. 3, 1968  
3:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Max Taylor debates what he regards as three negotiation fallacies:

- early U. S. troop withdrawal;
- de-escalation inside South Vietnam;
- and avoidance of a suggestion that we might return to bombing of North Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.5  
NSC Memo, 12/92, No. 1, Dept. Order  
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 2-20-98

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

51a

~~SECRET~~

December 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Negotiation Fallacies

In reading the cables and listening to discussions, I frequently get indications that some of our serious officials hold views on the conduct of the Paris negotiations which to me seem highly fallacious. Three of them are of special concern:

The first is the proposition, supported I believe by Averell Harriman, that we should withdraw at an early date some of our forces in Viet-Nam as a unilateral gesture. I would consider such an action to be a very unfortunate step for a variety of reasons.

In the first place, it would be misread by the enemy who would adjudge it an indication of weakness and a cause for heightened confidence on their side. I do not know how it could be explained to the GVN or to the Troop Contributing Countries in terms which would not cause dismay and possibly encourage the Troop Contributing Countries to follow suit.

On our domestic front, our action would raise the question of why not to continue a reduction in force beyond the initial step. Thus far, we have heard no sounds from the American public calling for bringing the boys home but it would be very easy to start such a cry.

In my judgment, we should withdraw no forces until we have signed and sealed agreements on all the important points involved in the current negotiation. I am thinking especially of the needs of a Laotian settlement which will require a continued military presence in force if we are to gain satisfaction from Hanoi on this point.

A second fallacy is the belief that it is to our interests to deescalate the fighting in South Viet-Nam. I would take the opposite view and say that it is to our interests to increase continuous pressure on the formed bodies of the enemy forces and, in particular, on the Viet Cong infrastructure. With no bombing of North Viet-Nam, this pressure is virtually the only incentive available to induce a prompt settlement of substantive issues in Paris. General Abrams should continue to strike the enemy hip and thigh until the last agreement is reached.

A third fallacious view which is often implied rather than expressed is that we should avoid suggesting the possibility of a return to bombing

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec 3.3  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, Supp 1001  
By *g*, NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

North Viet-Nam. Here again I take the opposite view, feeling that we must awaken and keep alive in Hanoi a constant fear of our resumption of attacks against military targets anywhere in North Viet-Nam. By repairing the previous bomb damage and rebuilding the logistics system throughout their country, Hanoi has given us a hostage to fortune, a new target system highly vulnerable to surprise air attack. Our responsible officials should view this as a great asset which we should prize and exploit as appropriate. At the same time, we should be preparing public opinion at home and abroad for the possible need to revert to bombing rather than to accept another Panmunjom.

If you are in agreement with any or all of these points, I would recommend giving appropriate guidance to your advisors and negotiators.

*M.D.T.*  
M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

**ACTION**

52

*Pres file*

**Tuesday, December 3, 1968 -- 3:35 pm**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith, for your clearance and editing,  
is a draft of my speech for Texas A & M tomorrow.**

**I am having Sec. Rusk go over it this  
afternoon, also.**

**You may wish to decide if you wish George  
to have copies available for the press, since it  
contains two themes which I believe interest you.**

**W. W. Rostow**

WWRostow:rlh

52a

Keynote Address at the Fourteenth Student Conference on National Affairs  
Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas  
Wednesday, December 4, 1968, 1:30 p.m. CST

Limits and Responsibilities of American Power

I

The theme of your meeting is clearly well chosen.

The coming in of a new administration is inevitably a time for stock-taking. The nation's debate over policy in Vietnam has, moreover, raised in many minds the question of the limits and responsibilities of American power.

And there is a third reason to consider the theme. We are more than a generation beyond the fundamental decisions taken by the nation in the face of Stalin's effort to thrust into Western Europe. We are almost 22 years from that memorable day in February 1947 when the First Secretary of the British Embassy brought word to the State Department that the United Kingdom could no longer bear the burdens of supporting Greece and Turkey. The famous 18 weeks followed -- weeks which yielded the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and which set the pattern for our global policy ever since. It is fair to examine critically where we have come from since the spring of 1947 and where we should go.

But in opening up the subject, I should like to begin not with broad generalizations, but by recalling the eight years through which we all have passed -- the eight years since we were last in a transition between

administrations. I suspect that we shall be able to plot the course ahead with greater wisdom if we look at the question of how U. S. power can and cannot -- should and should not -- be applied in fairly specific terms.

## II

When President Kennedy and then Vice President Johnson came to responsibility on January 20, 1961, here were their major foreign policy concerns:

-- Castro had taken over Cuba; was mounting significant subversive operations in the Caribbean area; and Latin America was shaken by the possibility that Castro's pattern of revolution might prove to be the wave of the future throughout the region.

-- Khrushchev's ultimatum of 1958 still hung over Berlin, backed by the image of Soviet nuclear strength and Khrushchev's conviction that the West would not hold up in the face of nuclear blackmail, pressed by a hardened Bolshevik against a materialist and uncertain West.

-- President Eisenhower informed President-elect Kennedy on the 19th of January that Laos was in a state of military, and possibly political, disintegration endangering the whole of Southeast Asia; and that the new President had to face the possibility of putting U. S. forces into the area to back our treaty commitments and preserve the region from Communist control.

-- Elsewhere in Asia, South Korea was a study in stagnation and political instability; Japan was isolated from the rest of Asia, its relations with the U. S. badly strained; Indonesia engaged in dangerous adventures abroad, with Sukarno dependent increasingly on a strong Communist party at home, importing a billion dollars of Communist arms, and leading his country to bankruptcy.

-- Many states of Africa were just emerging into precarious independence; the Congo, in particular, was in dangerous turmoil, with a major effort under way to establish there a Communist base.

-- Relations with the Soviet Union were at a very low ebb with the failure of the summit in Paris of May 1960 and the U-2 incident.

-- The ability of the United States to sustain its forces in Europe was shadowed by the heavy balance of payments drain they caused; and President Eisenhower thought that the only answer might prove to be significant troop withdrawals.

In broader terms, the world was <sup>Troubled</sup> shadowed by a U. S. rate of growth about half that of the Soviet Union and the widespread belief -- even among some experts in the West -- that in the 1960's the Soviet Union might come close to surpassing the United States in total production.

There was perhaps <sup>an</sup> even more grave question: whether the methods of freedom would permit the developing parts of the world to do as well in economic and social progress as Communist China; and even some Western

experts were coming to the view that the hard-handed methods of communism might prove more effective in mobilizing resources for investment and thrusting the developing nations into sustained growth.

### III

Eight years later, as we move through another transition, it is possible to take stock of what the United States, working with others, has been able to accomplish in dealing with this array of problems which were our lot in 1961.

Castro's Cuba has been successfully contained by hemispheric action. He remains a nuisance and a potential threat which requires alertness; but Latin America has moved forward. On the basis of the Bogota Conference, the initial foundations for the Alliance for Progress were laid late in the Eisenhower Administration, but carried forward with vigor by President Kennedy and President Johnson. Latin America has had a sufficient taste of success to know that the job of creating a modern Latin America, loyal to its own history and culture and principles, is a job that can be done; although much work lies ahead, notably in the field of Latin American integration. President Johnson's difficult decision on the Dominican Republic was vindicated by the subsequent evolution of political life in the Dominican Republic.

Khrushchev's attempt to thrust Soviet missiles into Cuba was defeated without war -- with far-reaching repercussions that both added to the confidence that free men could cope with nuclear blackmail and laid the basis for the atmospheric test ban treaty.

The threat to Berlin was faced down in 1961 and 1962; and a free West Berlin survives. Berlin remains a sensitive place; but there is an inner confidence that the West has the capacity to sustain its commitment there.

President Kennedy and then -- decisively -- in 1965, President Johnson faced the mortal threat to Southeast Asia which President Eisenhower had foreshadowed. They did so, conscious of the cost of their decisions; but conscious also of the cost to the nation, to Asia, and to the world of a failure to meet our treaty commitments and the Communist takeover of Southeast Asia that would clearly follow.

Against the background of President Johnson's 1965 commitment, a new wave of confidence swept through Asia; Indonesia freed itself from the Communist threat; and, above all, there was a beginning of Asian regional cooperation for the first time in recorded history. Japan moved away from a life of prosperity in isolation and began to play a role of construction in the region -- a role which should grow as the war in Southeast Asia comes to an end and a new chapter in Asian history opens up.

In Africa, despite the vicissitudes of the new nations which emerged in the 1960's -- including the tragic civil war in Nigeria -- the Africans have shown an increasing will to maintain their independence and manage their own affairs. They have systematically eliminated Communist footholds in the countries south of the desert; and <sup>have</sup> begun to forge regional and

subregional institutions of great long-run promise.

In his 1966 speech before the Ambassadors of the Organization of African Unity, President Johnson -- in the first talk by an American President wholly devoted to Africa -- threw this nation's weight behind the movement towards African regionalism.

Despite Vietnam, we have moved in the 1960's with the Soviet Union to isolate and act on limited areas of common interest, yielding not only cultural and air agreements and a Consular Convention but, working with others, a Non-Proliferation Treaty and now the possibility of serious talks to damp down the arms race in strategic missiles.

Despite the strain on our balance of payments, we have found ways, in cooperation with the Europeans, to offset the foreign exchange costs of maintaining forces in Europe; and President Johnson will turn over to President Nixon a strong NATO -- despite the French defection -- which, in the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis, deeply understands that a vital NATO will be required as far ahead as anyone can foresee.

And, in broader terms, we emerge at the end of eight years of strain with an American financial position -- in terms of the national budget and balance of payments -- which makes the dollar a source of stability in the world as we move forward to build a new cooperative international monetary system.

So far as the domestic economy is concerned, President Kennedy and President Johnson made good the campaign promise of 1960 to get this country moving again. Our high rate of growth -- sustained through eight years of regular expansion -- has demonstrated the continued vitality of the American economy and removed from the world scene the anxiety that, somehow, Soviet methods of economic and social progress would become an appropriate model for others. Most advanced thought in Communist nations now looks, in fact, not to the Soviet Union but to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan as representing more nearly the way a modern, sophisticated economy should perform.

Finally -- much more than is generally understood -- the 1960's proved to be the period when it was demonstrated that the pragmatic methods we have evolved with others for developing nations at early stages of growth, are vastly more effective than those of the Communist world. There are some remarkable success stories -- South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, Mexico, Colombia, Central America, and other parts of Latin America. It is in the last five years that Latin America has approximated the growth targets set in the Punta del Este conference of 1961.

And along the way, under President Johnson's leadership, the developing nations have accepted a new priority for agriculture and a new understanding that agriculture and industrial development must go hand in

hand. This priority, plus the new rice and wheat strains, have bought time for programs of family planning to take hold, and postponed -- at least -- the terrifying prospect of a Malthusian crisis in the 1970's -- a prospect that was almost a certainty a few years back.

#### III IV

These are solid achievements; but let me be clear. We have also had major disappointments in the 1960's; and we leave an ample agenda for our successors.

We regret that an honorable peace in Southeast Asia could not be brought about in our time of responsibility.

We regret that Europe has not been able to make more progress in this period towards that effective unity which is required for its own stability and progress, as well as for Europe to fulfill the world role of responsibility it should carry.

We regret that we could not have carried further forward the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the missile talks with the Soviet Union.

We regret that political currents in our Congress, and elsewhere in the world, have not permitted us to generate as much resources for development as could be effectively absorbed in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Moreover:

- Acute danger remains in the Middle East;
- Southeast Asia must be seen through to a stable and honorable settlement, and then we must all work together to bring fully to life the new cooperative Asia whose institutions and policies began to take shape in the wake of President Johnson's 1965 decision on Vietnam;
- Our margin of influence must be used to encourage Latin America to move down the path towards economic and physical integration, the only road that promises to Latin America a setting where the most advanced and sophisticated industries can thrive efficiently;
- Profound, unresolved problems remain between white and black *men* in Africa;
- The crisis in Czechoslovakia raises grave anxieties about the future peaceful evolution of Eastern Europe.

In short, there is no reason to believe our successors will find time on their hands or be short of challenging tasks; and I am reasonably certain that my successor will be called by the White House Situation Room quite often in the night with news of crisis and danger in one part of the world or another.

#### IV

Against the background of this quick review, let me turn now to the central theme of this conference: the limits and responsibilities of American power.

The simple truth about our world position in the 1960's is that none of the things that have been accomplished in the past eight years could have been accomplished without the determined and often courageous use of American economic, political, and military power; but, equally, none of these things could have been accomplished by the United States acting alone.

As President Johnson said in his State of the Union address on January 10, 1967, "We are in the midst of a great transition -- a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and a threatened planet."

We have moved, in the 1960's, some considerable distance through that great transition. In particular, President Johnson has perceived that our nation demanded an alternative somewhere between a return to isolationism and the overwhelming direct responsibility into which we fell in the immediate postwar years.

In trade and monetary affairs; in development policy; and in his support of regionalism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, he has laid the foundations for resolving this dilemma.

Speaking at New Orleans, President Johnson recently said:

"We have always hoped and believed that as our friends and allies grew in strength, our burden would grow less lonely. We have been moving over the last few years toward a long-term position in which the United States would be able to assume its responsibility in enterprises of common concern, but our partners would be able to assume theirs. . . . I believe the day will soon come -- which we have been building toward for 20 years -- when some American President will be able to say to the American people that the United States is assuming its fair share of responsibility for promoting peace and progress in the world, but the United States is assuming no more and no less than its fair share."

President Johnson also perceived that there is a basis outside the United States for this policy of fair shares and partnership. In every quarter of the globe, within the Communist world as well as outside, men and nations desire to take a larger hand in shaping their own destiny. They cannot do so, however, in a world as interdependent as ours unless they set aside old-fashioned nationalism and learn to work together.

And so our task has been to use our margin of influence to encourage abroad what we have always set as our target at home; namely, the effective organization of diffuse centers of power and authority.

Again -- I would underline -- this kind of world cannot be created by the United States acting alone; but we remain, whether we like it or not,

the critical margin: in Europe, in Latin America, in Asia, in Africa, and, I believe also, in the end, in the Middle East. And we shall remain the critical margin in the years ahead if the world is going to make its way through the great transition towards the goal of stable peace.

We cannot abdicate our responsibilities as the greatest industrial power in the world. We cannot abdicate our responsibilities as one of the two great nuclear powers in the world. And we cannot -- in our interest or in the common interest -- opt out of our treaty responsibilities; for if we create vacuums -- as we once did in South Korea -- they are not likely to remain empty. But what we can do -- and are doing -- is to use our influence and power to help organize the world community in ways which distribute the burdens more evenly and give to others a sense that they, too, are shaping the destiny of man.

The nation-state -- whatever its size and resources -- cannot solve the vast problems now before us or foreseeable in the future. Nor is this any longer a bi-polar world, despite the continued disproportionate concentration of nuclear power in the United States and the Soviet Union. The dynamics of the first post-war generation has yielded a world arena of diverse nations determined, as I say, to take a hand in their own destiny. We shall achieve arrangements of authentic partnership -- based on mutual respect and acknowledgement of interdependence -- or we shall not move successfully through the great transition.

Despite the debates and anxieties at home about our world role, I deeply believe our nation will continue to play its proper role -- as the decisive margin -- in such partnerships. And it is in a world of partnership and fair shares that we shall find the right answer to the limits and responsibilities of American power.

###

INFORMATION

*Profile* 53

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

Tuesday, December 3, 1968  
12:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith late intelligence that the enemy may be moving infiltrators south at the rate of 2 groups per day. If sustained, this could take us back towards the peak level of 30,000 a month, since groups normally run close to 500.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-164  
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-2-03

~~SECRET~~ SPOKE

RECEIVED  
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1968 DEC 3 16 14

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FM DIRNSA  
TO OSCAR/ UNIFORM LIMA

3.4(b)(1),(3)

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USM-613  
USM-614  
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~~SECRET SPOKE~~  
XXMMENP01 FTB03128  
2/0 [ ] 0710-68 SPOT REPORT  
[ ]

Restow

SOUTHWARD FLOW OF NVA GROUPS APPARENTLY INCREASING

XXCC

BEGINNING 4 DECEMBER, AND CONTINUING FOR AN UNDISCLOSED PERIOD OF TIME, TWO PROBABLE SOUTHWARD MOVING GROUPS OF NVA PERSONNEL WILL ARRIVE AT COMMO-LIAISON STATION T-15 EACH DAY. THIS ADVANCE SCHEDULING WAS DISCLOSED IN A 3 DECEMBER REAR SERVICES MESSAGE ORIGINATED BY ONE KHA (KHA) ASSOCIATED WITH T-13 AND APPEARS TO REPRESENT AN INCREASE IN THE SOUTHWARD FLOW OF NVA PERSONNEL.

THE DECEMBER MESSAGE FIRST REVEALED THAT GROUP 2075, COMMANDED BY NGUYEN VAN MINH (NGUYEENX VAWN MINH) AND WITH A TROOP STRENGTH OF 627, WOULD ARRIVE AT T 15 ON THE 3RD. KHA THEN WENT ON TO STATE "FROM THE 4TH OF DECEMBER THERE WILL BE TWO GROUPS ((D IN TEXT)) EACH DAY. THEREFORE ((I AM)) INFORMING T-15 SO THEY CAN PREPARE ((TO RECEIVE THEM))."

GROUP 2075 IS ONE OF PROBABLY SIX GROUPS, ALL WITH INITIAL DIGIT 2, WHICH HAVE BEEN MOVING THROUGH THE NORTHERN PART OF THE REAR SERVICES SYSTEM SINCE LATE NOVEMBER((1)). AT LEAST FOUR OF THE GROUPS (2072, 2073, 2075, 2076) WILL HAVE REACHED T-15 BY 4 DECEMBER. THEREFORE, THE TWO GROUPS PER DAY SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE AT T-15 BEGINNING ON THE 4TH ARE NOT BELIEVED TO INCLUDE THE SIX 2XXX SERIES GROUPS. (A SEVENTH 2XXX SERIES GROUP, POSSIBLY 2070, WAS SEEN IN A 2 DECEMBER MESSAGE AND WAS REPORTED AS GOING TO T-15 ON THAT DATE.)(2))

THE ARRIVAL OF TWO GROUPS A DAY APPEARS TO REPRESENT AN INCREASE IN THE SOUTHWARD PERSONNEL FLOW. A 24 NOVEMBER MESSAGE REPORTED AN ARRIVAL RATE OF GROUPS AT T-11B OF ONE PER DAY FOR THE PERIOD 26 NOVEMBER - 1 DECEMBER.((3))

T 15 IS BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF NAM VAN (18-42N 105-30E, WF 5367) NAM DAN DISTRICT, NGHE AN PROVINCE. THE APPENDED MAP (HARD COPY ONLY) SHOWS THE LOCATIONS OF T 11, T-13 AND T-15.

- ((1)) 2/0 [ ] 029-68; 2/0 [ ] R1180, R1182-68.
- ((2)) 2/0 [ ] T10866-68.
- ((3)) 2/0 [ ] 6-68.

3.4(b)(1),(3)

XXMM  
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SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC.02-1163  
By Sj, NARA, Date 6-2-03

INFORMATION

54

~~SECRET/BAMBOO~~

Tuesday, December 3, 1968  
12:15 p. m.

*Free file*

Mr. President:

I have marked key passages in  
this Saigon message on the DMZ.

The issue may arise at lunch.

Bunker proposes (para. 5-C, at  
paper clip) a meeting of military  
commanders to manage the DMZ deal.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 43968, 2 sections

~~SECRET/BAMBOO~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-508  
By WJG, NARA, Date 8-24-94

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

WHD 54a<sup>5</sup>

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

O 031100Z DEC 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5410  
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3089  
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 43968

1968 DEC 3 AM 7 44

ED 4779

NODIS/BAMBOO

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS KATHMANDU FOR BUNKER

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 91-506

SUBJECT: DMZ INITIATIVE IN PARIS

By mp/isp NARA, Date 1-8-98

REF: SAIGON 43775

1. OUR EXPERIENCE IN THE LAST THREE WEEKS EMPHASIZES THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION IN THE DMZ BOTH IN ITS PRESENT AND POTENTIAL MILITARY ASPECTS. THIS SITUATION COULD DETERIORATE TO THE POINT OF HAMPERING AND EVEN JEOPARDIZING THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATIONS. CLEARLY, IT WILL BE IN OUR INTEREST TO TACKLE THE PROBLEM AT AN EARLY STAGE. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON HOW THIS MIGHT BE DONE AND IN A MANNER TO PLACE US IN A STRONG PUBLIC POSITION.

2. WE SEE THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR RAISING THE ISSUE EARLY IN THE FORTHCOMING PARIS MEETINGS.

A. ENEMY OBSERVANCE OF THE DMZ WAS AN ESSENTIAL MILITARY PREMISE FOR THE BOMBING HALT. THE ENEMY HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE VACUUM IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ. HE IS BUILDING UP STOCKS OF SUPPLIES JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ. HE IS MAINTAINING FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE DMZ. IF HE IS PERMITTED TO CONTINUE BUILDING BUNKERS AND CACHES, EMPLACING ARTILLERY AND CONDUCTING RECONNAISSANCE SOUTH OF THE PNDL, HE COULD DEVELOP A POSITION OF STRENGTH THAT WOULD ENABLE HIM TO LAUNCH ATTACKS ON NORTHERN I CORPS WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING.

B. WHILE HIS VIOLATIONS IN THE DMZ HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO DATE, AND WHILE OUR ATTACKS BY FIRE AND LIMITED PATROLLING HAVE HAMPERED HIS ACTIVITIES, A SITUATION COULD DEVELOP WHERE WE WOULD FIND IT NECESSARY TO GO BACK INTO THE SOUTHERN DMZ WITH SIZEABLE FORCES. THIS COULD HAVE A MOST DAMAGING EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH COULD BE FORESTALLED BY THE INSTALLATION OF EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DMZ OBSERVANCE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 43968, DEC 3 (NODIS/BAMBOO)

C. ~~THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, PRESS, AND PUBLIC ARE WATCHING THE DMZ SITUATION ATTENTIVELY AS A GAUGE OF US DETERMINATION TO SEE THAT THE DRV LIVES UP TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS AS THEY WERE DESCRIBED AT THE TIME OF THE BOMBING HALT.~~ TO ALLOW ENEMY VIOLATIONS TO CONTINUE WITHOUT MAKING A MAJOR AND, AT SOME STAGE, A PUBLIC ISSUE OF THEM WOULD SET A BAD PRECEDENT FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD BE MISINTERPRETED HERE.

D. ~~CONVERSELY, AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN A NEW AND WORKABLE AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DMZ MIGHT INHIBIT HANOI'S PRESENT TESTING OF THE LIMITS OF OUR TOLERANCE AND COULD PROVIDE US WITH A PRACTICAL TEST OF HANOI'S WILLINGNESS TO PERFORM ON THE UNDERSTANDINGS RELATED TO THE BOMBING HALT.~~ HANOI'S AGREEMENT WOULD CONSTITUTE VISIBLE AND SIGNIFICANT EVIDENCE OF PROGRESS, WHICH COULD HELP TOWARD ACHIEVING AGREEMENTS ON OTHER QUESTIONS.

3. ~~TO CALL UPON THE ENEMY TO OBSERVE THE DMZ DOES NOT SEEM ENOUGH. HE CAN CONTINUE TO EVADE THE ISSUE BY CLAIMING THAT THERE ARE ONLY VC ELEMENTS IN THE DMZ. THE SITUATION WILL CONTINUE TO TEMPT HIM TO EXPLORE THE LIMITS OF WHAT WE WILL TOLERATE. THERE ARE TOO MANY UNSATISFACTORY ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION TO ALLOW US TO CONFINE OUR DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS TO COMPLAINTS, PROTESTS, OR EXHORTATIONS.~~

4. IN OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL IN BAMBOO NO. 5 WE SUGGESTED THAT STEPS BE INITIATED FOR MORE FORMALIZED ARRANGEMENTS TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS THAT MIGHT ARISE IN THE DMZ, AS A US INITIATIVE OR IN RESPONSE TO AN ENEMY CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, ~~THERE APPEARS TO BE MERIT IN RAISING THIS ISSUE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ALONG THE LINES OF THE STEPS SET FORTH IN BAMBOO NO. 5.~~ THAT IS TO SAY, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO START FROM THE PMDL AND GRADUALLY WIDEN AND SOLIDIFY THE DIS-ENGAGEMENT, RATHER THAN (AS WE HAVE DONE) START WITH OUR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DMZ AND THEN TRY TO INDUCE THE ENEMY TO DO THE SAME. WE ARE OF COURSE ALREADY BACK IN THE DMZ WITH LIMITED FORCES, AND THE ENEMY KNOWS THIS. IT WOULD BE EASY TO USE THIS AS THE BASIS FOR AN APPROACH TO THE DRV ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES.

5. WE COULD SAY, IN CONCERT WITH THE GVN, THAT ~~IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT THE UNDERSTANDING ABOUT MUTUAL RESPECT FOR THE DMZ IS NOT BEING CARRIED OUT.~~ WE PROPOSE A NEW AND BETTER ARRANGEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE ADVANCED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

A. ~~THE DRV IS AWARE OF OUR LONG-STANDING VIEW THAT SOME VERIFICATION IS NEEDED IN THE DMZ, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE AN EARLY SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION FOLLOWING A BOMBING HALT.~~

BUNKER

NOTE: NOT PASSED KATMANDU BY OC/T 12/3/68

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

5  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

O 031170Z DEC 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5411  
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3090  
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 43968

NODIS/BAMBOO

1968 DEC 3 AM 7 25 004704

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS KATHMANDU FOR BUNKER

B. ~~THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS HAS SHOWN HOW RIGHT WE WERE IN CALLING FOR A MECHANISM OF VERIFICATION.~~ UNTIL WE HAVE AGREEMENT ON SUCH A MECHANISM, WE MUST CONDUCT LIMITED UNILATERAL VERIFICATION THROUGH REGULAR GROUND AND AIR SURVEILLANCE OF THE SOUTHERN DMZ. WE DO NOT ENVISAGE THE INTRODUCTION OF MAJOR COMBAT FORCES INTO THE AREA, UNLESS ENEMY ACTIVITY SHOULD SO REQUIRE, AND EXPECT THE ENEMY TO EXERCISE SIMILAR RESTRAINT IN THE NORTHERN DMZ. FOR A TIME, UNTIL WE HAVE WORKED OUT MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL WITH FULL VERIFICATION, OUR PATROLS WILL THUS WORK UP TO THE PMDL. WE WOULD EXPECT BOTH SIDES TO RESPECT THE PMDL AS A LINE THROUGH OR OVER WHICH NO MILITARY ATTACKS, INCLUDING ATTACKS BY FIRE, WILL TAKE PLACE.

C. TO AVOID OR SUPPRESS INCIDENTS ALONG THE PMDL, WE PROPOSE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF MILITARY COMMANDERS OF THE TWO SIDES MEET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT DETAILS FOR TIMELY CONSULTATIONS. (WE WOULD THEN FOLLOW WITH THE IDEA OF A HOT LINE BETWEEN OPPOSING HEADQUARTERS, POSSIBLY AUGMENTED BY A MILITARY LIAISON GROUP, ALONG THE LINES OF BAMBOO NO. 5 -- SAIGON 41530.)

6. WE ENVISAGE THIS INITIALLY AS A PRIVATE PROPOSAL RATHER THAN A PUBLIC DEMARCHE. HOWEVER, IT MAY BE VERY USEFUL TO HAVE SUCH A PROPOSAL ON THE RECORD AS MORE PUBLIC ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO OUR INCREASED ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTHERN DMZ.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 43968, DEC 3 (NODIS/BAMBOO)

7. ~~THE UNILATERAL VERIFICATION ENVISAGED IN OUR PROPOSAL WOULD BE A TEMPORARY MEASURE. AT SOME SUBSEQUENT DATE, GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENTS WOULD NEED TO BE REACHED ON A MORE DURABLE ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY THE DMZ IS REESTABLISHED AS DEFINED IN THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS, PERHAPS WITH THE ADDED STIPULATION THAT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION BE REMOVED. OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE CONFIRMS THAT AN EFFECTIVE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM SHOULD BE IN OPERATION BEFORE WE RENOUNCE OUR UNILATERAL PATROLLING IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF THE DMZ.~~

BUNKER  
BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED KATMANDU BY OC/T 12/3/68

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

55

SECRET

Tuesday, Dec. 3, 1968  
12:10 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a thoughtful memorandum  
from General Taylor on the wider negotiations  
in Paris.

I have taken the liberty of LDXing  
it promptly to Sect. Rusk, Sect. Clifford,  
and General Wheeler.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ml, NARA, Date 1-8-98

SECRET attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

55a

~~SECRET~~

December 3, 1968

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-508

By ap/isp NARA. Date 1-8-98

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Thoughts on the Wider Negotiations in Paris

Obviously, the imminent Our Side/Your Side negotiations in Paris are going to be difficult and time-consuming. They will also be exposed to the intransigence of both our enemies and our allies, anyone of whom is quite capable of tossing a monkey wrench into the machinery at any time and bringing progress to a halt.

Bearing these unpleasant possibilities in mind, we should try to identify a few principles of organization and procedure which might facilitate the tasks of our negotiators. The following are a few such principles which I would recommend as guidelines for the conduct of the negotiations:

- a. Make every effort to assure and maintain a united US/GVN/TCC front.
- b. To the extent possible, get the proxy of the TCC to authorize the U.S. to speak for them and thus simplify the negotiations and strengthen the U.S. voice.
- c. Expedite consideration of the principal problems by moving simultaneously and in parallel on as many as possible.
- d. Make no final concessions on any points until all issues are ready for the implementation since an advantage in one area of contention may be needed to compensate for a disadvantage in another area.
- e. If the DRV stalls or violates agreements, resume the bombing of North Viet-Nam. In the meantime, prepare the DRV, U.S. and world opinion for this possibility. Make it clear that we are not going to sit still for another Parmunjom.
- f. In anticipation that the GVN may stall the negotiations, organize the discussions in such a way that they can progress without GVN participation on matters of vital U.S. interests such as disengagement. Do not let the GVN control anything which will obstruct our freedom of action on these matters.

Taking the foregoing points into consideration, I would suggest seeking agreement in Paris on the organization of three panels subordinate to the general conference.

~~SECRET~~

Panel A would consist of the U.S. and DRV negotiators plus agreed observers and would be charged with obtaining agreement on the following points:

- a. Observance of the understandings relating to the DMZ, the attack of cities and reconnaissance over North Viet-Nam.
- b. The cessation of external reinforcement by both sides.
- c. The withdrawal of foreign forces.
- d. The disposition of the bases of both sides in South Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia.
- e. Verification of the foregoing agreements.

Panel B would consist of GVN and the DRV/NLF negotiators and, under the terms of our agreement with the GVN, would meet secretly and in private. It would be charged with seeking agreement on the following points:

- a. The future political structure of the South Vietnamese Government.
- b. The political, social and economic future of the Viet Cong.
- c. A general cease-fire.
- d. Verification of the foregoing agreements.

Panel C would consist of representatives of the U.S. and the DRV and would have a single subject, the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and respect for the 1962 Laotian Accords.

Under the foregoing concept, the plenary conference would be reserved for the discussion and settlement of such general matters as the following:

- a. Confirmation of panel agreements.
- b. The exchange of prisoners of war.
- c. International guarantees of the final settlement.
- d. Timing of the implementation of all agreements.

Obviously our own government can not impose such a procedure but it can and should press for its preferred way of conducting the business. I suggest that this matter be discussed with Ambassador Harriman while he is here.

M.D.T.  
M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

56

Lunch Meeting With the President  
Tuesday, December 2, 1968 - 1:00 pm

AGENDA

1. Vietnam Negotiating Strategy. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford)

We ought to be clear before the President sees Harriman, especially on the issue of limited de-escalation inside South Vietnam at an early stage.

2. The Request for Temporary Duty for Gen. Goodpaster. (Sec. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler)

3. Military Situation in South Vietnam. (Sec. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler)

- enemy intentions
- DMZ
- recce flights

4. Biafra. (Sec. Rusk)

The State Department is working at an initiative to try to head off the mass starvation which will mount in the weeks ahead.

5. Other.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By g, NARA, Date 2-20-98

ACTION

57

*Pres files*

Monday, December 2, 1968 -- 7:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

I received a personal cable at home from Jean Monnet.

Monnet says that he will be in the country in the period December 9-10. He would like very much to pay his respects to the President, if that is convenient.

I think a talk with Monnet at this stage would interest you and be useful.

W. W. Rostow

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

INFORMATION

58

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Monday, December 2, 1968 -- 7:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A is the index the Pentagon has developed relating enemy truck activity to actual enemy attacks on a lagged basis. It shows that we can expect a substantial increase in enemy attacks in the course of December.

This statistical index is supported by other evidence that the enemy is planning to increase activity as the widened Paris talks open.

3.4(b)(1) You should also know that [ ] evidence that elements of the 270th North Vietnamese regiment planned to cross the Ben Hai river, at the center of the DMZ, late in November.

You may wish to include, during tomorrow's lunch, a discussion of:

- Enemy military intentions in the days ahead;
- What we should do about the DMZ.

I am increasingly inclined to feel that we ought to permit Abrams to move his forces right up to the Ben Hai river, at the center of the DMZ, and begin serious negotiations in Paris on that firm basis.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-196  
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-4-03

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

27 NOV 68


58a

ESTIMATED vs REPORTED ATTACKS

Estimate Based on Revised Estimating Equation  
Advanced Weekly

By ~~xxx~~ NARA Date 4-15-04

Prepared by  
COMBAT ANALYSIS GROUP OJCS



FROM 8 AUG 15 AUG 22 AUG 29 AUG 5 SEP 12 SEP 19 SEP 26 SEP 3 OCT 10 OCT 17 OCT 24 OCT 31 OCT 7 NOV 14 NOV 21 NOV 28 NOV 5 DEC 12 DEC 19 DEC 26 DEC

~~SECRET~~

ENEMY INITIATED ATTACKS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 02-198


58h

27 NOV 1968

~~BY HQ~~ NARA DATE 4-25-84

Prepared  
by  
COMBAT  
ANALYSIS  
GROUP OJCS

*INTERVAL (PROMPT) DATA*



~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION


59

*Profile*

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Monday, December 2, 1968 -- 7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:



3.4(b)(1),(3)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-164  
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-2-03

59a

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA


SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3

NLJ 10-240

By id NARA, Date 11-29-10

1968 NOV 29 21 29



114  
(c)

1.4  
(C)


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~~TOP SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
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1.4(c)



DECLASSIFY AT END OF YEAR.

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

*Profile*

Monday, December 2, 1968 -- 6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark Clifford forwards to you a strong case for beginning strategic talks with the Soviets at the heads of government level, followed by working level talks.

If I may say so, the problem with working level talks (as opposed to simply exchanging positions and asking some initial clarifying questions) is:

-- We will have to make some time to study throughout the government the Soviet paper;

-- We are pretty well committed not to negotiate off our initial position during the life of this Administration.

Perhaps Clark's point could be met if:

- On the first day of the talks the chiefs of government presented their respective positions;
- On the second day working sessions were held to clarify the respective positions while the chiefs of government met separately on Vietnam, the Middle East, etc.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guid.  
By *ky*, NARA, Date *2-20-98*

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

602

12/2/68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 89-85

SUBJECT: Strategic Talks with the Soviets

By mp/isp NARA, Date 3-4-98

Now that Saigon has agreed to come to Paris, I believe that the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of our position on the question of holding Strategic Arms Limitations Talks with the Soviet Union. In my judgment, we should move forward on this matter at this time, beginning with a meeting at the heads of government level, followed by working level talks.

1. If the Soviets were to accept an agreement along the lines of the one unanimously recommended to you, we would maintain a substantial part of our present strategic advantage; a year from now it will be much more difficult to devise a proposal which takes account of existing strategic forces and is in our interest. Over the next year or two, as the Soviets continue their build-up of ICBM's beyond 1200 and begin to approach parity with us in Polaris-type submarines, our edge in these areas will be eroded and a freeze at a later date could leave us without any significant advantage. Furthermore, the Soviets may well begin to deploy land-mobile systems which would greatly complicate the verification issues associated with a future agreement.

2. If US-Soviet discussions have not yet begun, it is improbable that a new Administration would initiate them immediately; but if Talks were already underway, it is unlikely to call off the negotiations. If we do not move forward now, I believe that it is almost certain that there will be a delay of a year or more while the new Administration examines this question and makes its own determination on strategic policies and force procurements.

3. If we do not initiate Talks now, any future movement on this issue might have to be over the objections of the Joint Chiefs rather than with their concurrence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's concurrence in the proposal stems from a number of factors, including the freezing of our strategic advantage, which are unlikely to be repeated at any time in the future. Moreover, under a new Administration there is almost sure to be military opposition to a freeze in our strategic arms until it can be seen what forces the new Administration is prepared to buy in the absence of an agreement.

4. The Russian invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia need no longer delay our going forward with the Strategic Talks.

a. Indications from our allies have been that they want the Talks to go forward; we should, of course, inform them before any public announcement of our decision to begin the Talks. The Non-nuclear Conference which ended in Geneva on September 28 unanimously passed a resolution calling upon the U.S. and the Soviet Union to begin Strategic Talks. Both the FRG and Italy voted in favor of this resolution. And at the NATO Disarmament Experts Meeting during the first week of October, representatives from several

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

countries reaffirmed their Government's support of this resolution, with the FRG representatives urging that such Talks begin "at an early date." Denis Healey of the UK raised the subject with me at the time of the NPG Meeting in October, expressing his belief that we should go ahead with Talks. My conversations with Schroeder and Kiesinger over the past two months persuade me that the Germans would not object if we went ahead. Foreign Minister Brandt, at the meeting of the SPD Executive Board in Bonn on November 22, is reported to have said that direct Talks between the great powers should continue on such matters as the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. In my report to the NATO Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee on November 14, I referred again to the importance of strategic arms limitations. None of the NATO Defense Ministers indicated any objection to the initiation of Talks. Their comments stressed only the desirability of advance notice and continued consultation with our NATO allies as such Talks progress. While these discussions did not focus specifically on a heads of government meeting, I do not believe that our allies would object to a businesslike working meeting at that level.

b. If the Talks were underway, we could use our continued participation in them as a lever against further Soviet repressive measures in Czechoslovakia, or as a way of deterring Soviet moves against other Eastern European nations. The apparent eagerness of the Soviets for these Talks makes this kind of threat seem plausible. Kosygin's remarks in his meeting with Bob McNamara two weeks ago confirmed their strong desire that such Talks be initiated.

5. Mr. Nixon's public statements after his meeting with you make it difficult for him to object to the Talks. After his meeting with you on November 11, Mr. Nixon asserted his recognition of the need for continuity "on matters like Vietnam, the current possible crisis in the Middle East, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to certain outstanding matters." He said that in each of these three instances "I gave assurances ... to the Secretary of State, and of course to the President, that they could speak not just for this Administration, but for the Nation, and that meant for the next Administration as well." Accordingly, it seems likely that he would not object to the opening of discussions.

6. The Heads of Government Talks should be held in Geneva and should aim at political agreement on the great importance of limiting and then reducing strategic forces. Opening the Talks at the summit will provide a momentum which will make it difficult for either side to call off Talks without first making a serious effort to reach an agreement. Moreover, agreement in principle between heads of government on the urgent need to control the strategic arms race will greatly facilitate discussions at the working level. You might want to seek agreement with Kosygin on a statement along the following lines:

"The President and the Prime Minister discussed their common interest in reaching an agreement on the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic offensive missile systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. They concluded

that agreement on this question would be of great value not only for the people of their two countries but for all mankind. They directed representatives of their two governments to begin meeting immediately to exchange views and proposals on this question."

7. Talks at the Foreign Minister or Head of Delegation level should begin immediately following the heads of government discussion of this issue. At these talks the U.S. side would deliver the approved initial presentation of our proposal and proceed to explain the proposal following the agreed set of instructions to the Delegation. The Soviets would presumably table their own proposal. We could then decide how to proceed, but in any event the discussions would be well launched and the prospects for an agreement clearly established.

8. There now exists an appropriate occasion for moving ahead with missile Talks as a means of reaffirming your undiminished interest in seeking to control the nuclear arms race. In the present climate, criticism of this action, here and abroad, would be difficult to imagine. Coupled with your decision to end the bombing of North Vietnam and the start of substantive negotiations in Paris, the beginning of Strategic Talks with the Soviet Union would create a momentum towards world peace that would last for years to come.

*Robert L. Siggard*

61  
INFORMATION

**SECRET**

Monday - December 3, 1968 - 5:50pm

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Castro may possibly be up to something foolish.

Some 23 Cuban naval vessels are presently being moved from their usual base in western Cuba to Santiago at the eastern tip of the island, and the airport at Santiago has been closed. A garbled intelligence report talks of plans to "embark 250 men" on the vessels early tomorrow morning. All our intelligence agencies are active, and CINCLANT is prepared to resume patrolling off Cuba on a few hours' notice, but has not done so as yet.

CIA has had intelligence about some training going on in Cuba for a guerrilla effort directed at the Dominican Republic. This has looked, however, like a very small-scale infiltration plan, certainly not like any major Cuban naval effort.

In all likelihood, this is a naval exercise. But Castro is unpredictable.

W. W. Rostow

SWLewis:mmm

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority MLJ 019-043-25  
By SP, NARA, Date 1/21/02

62

Monday, December 2, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

At Tab A is General de Gaulle's warm reply to the birthday message you sent him on November 22.

*Pres file*

Your message is at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

*SP*  
*JKN*

JKN:mm

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

62a  
15449

LS NO. 6164  
R-XXXIV/R-IV  
French

XWAO21 INTL

PARIS TELYSEE VIA FRENCH 82 27 1215

GOVT PRIORITY

HIS EXCELLENCY LYNDON B. JOHNSON  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
WASHINGTON

I MUCH APPRECIATE, MR. PRESIDENT, THE KIND MESSAGE YOU SENT  
ME ON NOVEMBER 22. MAY I ASSURE YOU THAT I TOO AM DESIROUS OF  
DEVELOPING THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE INTERESTS  
OF WORLD PEACE.

ACCEPT, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, THE EXPRESSION OF MY HIGH  
CONSIDERATION AND MOST CORDIAL REGARD.

C. DE GAULLE

62 b

**Dear Mr. President:**

**On the occasion of your birthday, Mrs. Johnson and I send you our greetings and warm best wishes for your good health and well-being. May the years ahead bring a continuation of the historic friendship between the French and American peoples -- more necessary than ever before in these troubled and uncertain times.**

**Sincerely,**

63

Monday, December 2, 1968

*Profile*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proclamation of the Astronaut Agreement

Attached at Tab A for your signature is a proclamation of the Agreement on the Rescue and Return of Astronauts and Return of Space Objects.

The appropriate instruments of ratification are being deposited Tuesday, December 3, in London, Moscow, and Washington. This will bring the Agreement into force.

The State Department proposes that the proclamation be issued in a routine manner without ceremony.

At Tab B is a proposed White House press release on the proclamation.

W. W. Restow

If you approve, we will need your signature on the proclamation \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*Conrad*  
*gwt*

RLS:JKN:mm

Press Release

63a

The President today proclaimed the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space. The Agreement, which was opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow on April 22, 1968, entered into force on December 3, 1968 with the deposit in the three capitals of instruments of ratification by the three depositary governments, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In Washington instruments of ratification had previously been deposited by Ireland and Nepal. Over 75 States have signed the Agreement in one or more of the three capitals.

The new Agreement is essentially humanitarian. It calls for assistance to and return of astronauts who make emergency or unintended landings due to difficulties encountered during space flights. In addition, the Agreement contains provisions relating to the return of objects launched into outer space. Taken together, these provisions carry forward the goals of international cooperation to which the United States has been dedicated since enactment of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 and to which the United States renewed its commitment in the outer space treaty of 1967.

64

December 2, 1968

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**For your signature are two letters to the Chief Executives to the Ryukyus which went by cable Saturday and have been delivered by the High Commissioner.**

**Walt Rostow**

64a

November 30, 1968

Dear Mr. Matsuoka:

As you prepare to relinquish your responsibilities as Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, I express to you, on behalf of the people of the United States, my admiration. You have carried out with distinction the tasks which history has imposed on you for the past four years.

During your tenure the people of the Ryukyus have advanced impressively on the road of self-government. You can take deep satisfaction in the knowledge that, under your leadership, the people of the Ryukyus have enjoyed a progressive, stable political life. You may also take just pride in the development of the economy which, during your administration, has attained heights unparalleled in Ryukyuan history.

Notwithstanding the complexity of the relationship between the American people and the people of the Ryukyus, the friendship between them has continued to strengthen during your administration. I know the admiration and affection which this has earned you, particularly among those Americans who have had the privilege of being associated with you in our common tasks.

My best wishes go with you as you lay down the burdens of office, and as you face whatever new labors the future has in store for you -- a future in which, I am confident, Ryukyuan-United States relations will continue to benefit from your wisdom, your dedication, and your humanity.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Seiho Matsuoka  
Chief Executive  
Government of the Ryukyu Islands  
Naha, Okinawa  
Ryukyu Islands

LBJ:Army:AJenkins:BKSmith:mm:12/2/68

64 la

November 30, 1968

Dear Mr. Yara:

As you prepare to assume your new duties, I extend to you my personal best wishes and my sincere congratulations on your victory in a free and democratic election -- the first popular election of a Chief Executive in the history of the Ryukyu Islands.

I am confident that the close and fruitful cooperation which has prevailed between the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and the United States Civil Administration will continue, and that your personal association with the High Commissioner will also be rewarding and effective.

With the successful completion of this historic election, it is my hope and expectation that the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, under your leadership, will continue its commitment to the essential task of promoting the welfare and well-being of the Ryukyuan people. To this end, and joining with you in a firm determination to advance this cause, the United States pledges its continued friendship and cooperation.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Chebye Yara  
Chief Executive-Elect  
Government of the Ryukyu Islands  
Naha, Okinawa  
Ryukyu Islands

LBJ:SA Army:AJenkins:BKSmith:mm:12/2/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

64c.



26 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: ARMED FORCES AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT

ATTN: LTC HUGH ROBINSON

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Letters to New and Outgoing Ryukyuan Chief Executives (C)

1. (C) In the election held on 10 November for Chief Executive (CE) of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands (GRI), the opposition candidate (Mr. Chobyu Yara) was elected. He will be formally inaugurated to his new position on 1 December, at which time the three-year term of the current CE (Mr. Seiho Matsuoka) will come to an end. It is requested that action be undertaken to have the President sign a letter to each of these individuals--expressing his appreciation for the past services of Mr. Matsuoka and best wishes to Mr. Yara.
2. (C) It will be noted that the letters have been so drafted to permit signature prior to the turnover of authority (1 Dec), by couching them in the context of "preparing" to terminate or assume the CE's duties, respectively.
3. (C) It would be helpful if the letters were signed as soon as possible. Please return the signed letters to this office. I will be pleased to send a courier to pick them up if you wish. In addition to their dispatch by airmail or courier, their verbatim text will also be cabled to HICOMRY, to permit delivery of the messages themselves on 1 December, even if the signed originals are still en route.
4. (C) Mr. Siena DUSA(IA) has discussed the desirability of sending these letters with Mr. McPherson.
5. (C) These letters have been staffed with OSD, OSA, State Department, HICOMRY, and Embassy/Tokyo.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: *Gray*  
By: *NAKA, Date: 2-20-98*

A. L. HAMBLLEN, JR.  
Colonel, General Staff  
White House Liaison Officer  
Office Chief of Staff  
Department of the Army

- 2 Incl
1. Draft ltr to Outgng CE
  2. Draft ltr to New CE

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable Seiho Matsuoka  
Chief Executive  
Government of the Ryukyu Islands  
Naha Okinawa  
Ryukyu Islands

Dear Mr. Matsuoka:

As you prepare to relinquish your responsibilities as Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, I <sup>1, 1951</sup> wish to convey to you, on behalf of the people of the United States, my <sup>admiration</sup> gratification at the distinction with which you have carried out the tasks which history <sup>has</sup> imposed on you <sup>these</sup> past four years.

During your tenure the people of the Ryukyus have advanced impressively on the road of self-government. You can take deep satisfaction in the knowledge that, under your leadership, the people of the Ryukyus have enjoyed a <sup>flourishing</sup> and stable political life. You may also take just pride in the <sup>material</sup> progress achieved and in the development of the <sup>economy</sup> which, during your administration, has attained heights unparalleled in Ryukyuan history.

Notwithstanding the many complexities attending the relationship between the American people and the people of the Ryukyus, the friendship between them has continued to strengthen <sup>and to flourish in your</sup> administration. I know the admiration and affection which this has earned you, particularly in the hearts of those Americans who have had the privilege of being associated with you in our common tasks.

INCLOSURE 1

DRAFT

My best wishes are with you as you lay down the [heavy] burdens of office, and as you face whatever new labors the future has in store for you--a future in which, I am confident, Ryukyuan-United States relations will continue to benefit from your wisdom, your [unflagging] dedication, and your humanity.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOENSON

INCLOSURE 1

64e

The Honorable Chobyō Yara  
Chief Executive-Elect  
Government of the Ryukyu Islands  
Naha, Okinawa  
Ryukyu Islands

Dear Mr. Yara:

[On this momentous occasion, <sup>?</sup> as you prepare to assume your new duties, I  
~~express to you my sincere congratulations~~  
[congratulate you] on your victory in a free and democratic election--the  
first popular election of a Chief Executive in the entire history of the  
Ryukyu Islands. Please accept my personal best wishes on the occasion  
of your inauguration to this important position.

~~The arrangement whereby the Chief Executive is directly elected by the  
Ryukyuan people is but the latest and most important step taken by the  
United States in its constant effort to strengthen and expand the self-  
government of the almost one million inhabitants of the Ryukyuan archi-  
pelago.~~

I am confident that the close and fruitful cooperation which has prevailed  
between the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and the United States Civil  
Administration will continue, and that your personal association with the  
High Commissioner will also be <sup>rewarding</sup> [pleasant] and effective.

With the successful completion of this historic election, it is my hope  
and expectation that the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, under your  
leadership, will continue <sup>it</sup> [to] evidence a sense of responsibility in govern-  
ing and a spirit of <sup>7</sup> commitment to <sup>it</sup> [its] essential task of promoting the  
welfare and well-being of the Ryukyuan people. To this end, and joining  
with you in a firm determination to advance this cause, the United States  
pledges its continued friendship and cooperation.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

INCLOSURE 2

65

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Monday, December 2, 1968 -- 1:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bob Murphy called this morning and said Mr. Nixon had decided:

- it would be best if he did not attend a Summit conference now;
- Mr. Murphy would be his observer.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-05  
By izg, NARA Date 11-27-96

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

INFORMATION

66

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, December 2, 1968  
11:00 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a minor B-52  
incident at Okinawa -- but an additional  
irritant.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By lj, NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 December 1968  
0630 EST

*Roston*  
*FYI*  
*Gla*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: B-52 Incident at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa

1. At 012140 EST, a B-52 landing at Kadena Air Base lost his drag chute and rolled on the runway overrun before coming to a stop. There was no damage to the aircraft or property nor were there any personnel injuries.

2. The incident occurred near the location of the B-52 crash of 19 November and emergency vehicles and the aircraft were visible from the highway. Okinawan news media initially carried an erroneous report indicating a crash landing due to landing gear failure.

3. The U.S. High Commissioner for the Ryukyu Islands indicates that although this incident would normally receive little local comment, it may well bring the B-52 issue to the forefront once again in view of the 19 November accident.

*Donald E. Stout*

DONALD E. STOUT  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

WHSR	PAC DIV
SECDEF	STRAT DIV
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OSD/PA	ADDO
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J-30	DIA REP (2)
J-31	NSA REP
J-32	STATE REP
J-33	PA REP
AOC	
NFP	
AFCP	
MCCC	

DECLASSIFIED  
White House 8200, Feb. 24, 1999  
By *ky*, NARA, Date *2-20-98*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, December 2, 1968  
10:45 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Without going into the background, I had Sam Lewis discreetly check on the Kingsley silver mining problem in Bolivia.

It looks (in the attached) as though State and Castro are doing about what they should do.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 95-320  
By WJ, NARA, Date 4-5-96

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

47a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: ~~Kingsley Silver Mining Problem in Bolivia~~

You asked for a status report.

~~The problem is well-known in State.~~ Kingsley is junior partner with Roger Milliken (a South Carolina textile manufacturer and investor, who is a strong backer of Thurmond and Nixon). Milliken and Kingsley, along with some Bolivian partners, own Lipez Mining Company which has been ~~attempting for some time to get approval for a large number of claims for small parcels of land in various parts of Bolivia.~~

~~I understand the case is highly complicated.~~ It apparently derived from a new mining code, under which the State mining agency COMIBOL was required to file a claim for all of its mining interests within ninety days from the date of the new law. After that period had expired, Lipez Mining filed a number of small claims on areas COMIBOL had overlooked; ~~COMIBOL then contested these claims on the grounds of "administrative oversight" and the case has been in and out of the courts for many months.~~

I gather that Kingsley, Milliken and company are very ably represented by Thomas Corcoran and Robert C. Hill, who have been negotiating with the Bolivian Government on their behalf. Hill has been in Bolivia recently. Both Corcoran and Hill are scheduled to go to La Paz on Saturday to discuss the situation with Barrientos. Ambassador Castro and the State country office have been facilitating contacts actively to try to help reach a solution.

~~Apparently Barrientos did earlier promise to legalize the claim,~~ although no-one in State has ever seen the alleged agreement. To do so, however, would require a presidential decree and congressional ratification, which complicates matters considerably.

Current negotiations are aimed at reaching an out-of-court settlement, which seems a wise course.

  
SW Lewis

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 95-320  
By sig, NARA, Date 4-5-96

*Pres. file*

68

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

Monday, Dec. 2, 1968  
9:45 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is merely to recall you wished to talk  
to Bus Wheeler about this matter upon your return.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By dap, NARA, Date 1-22-98

68a

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE:~~

Mr. President:

Bryce Harlow called me at 10:27 this morning:

He said:

- He wished to raise a problem on behalf of Mr. Nixon.
- Nixon had been in touch with General Eisenhower on the organization of National Security Affairs in the White House.
- As a result, he would like to have Andy Goodpaster as an adviser from -- say, mid-December to the end of January at the latest.
- Harlow has been in touch two or three times with Andy in Saigon. The concept is that Andy would return on temporary duty for this period.
- Harlow "assumes" that Andy has talked about this with Abrams and "may have sent an advisory message to Bus Wheeler;" but, of course, Mr. Nixon would wish the President's agreement to this temporary use of Goodpaster as an adviser.
- On Substance, the only inkling of Nixon's plan is Harlow's observation that Andy might "indoctrinate" a military officer of more junior rank for White House Service.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By MP, NARA, Date 1-22-98

WWR  
12-1-68  
12:00n

*Pres. file*

69

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Monday, Dec. 2, 1968  
9:35 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

These two reports give a quite clear picture of how Ky plans to organize the Paris delegation and conduct himself -- including basic strategy.

Quite sensible.

W. W. Rostow

~~DECLASSIFIED~~  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By mp/rg, NARA, Date 1-28-98

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment~~ (log <sup>5050</sup> 3651)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-196  
By Sj, NARA, Date 6-4-03

69a

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt Rostow

Attached is a report presenting Vice President Ky's current views on the Paris talks and other matters.

3.4(b)(1)

The report has been passed to Ambassadors Bunker and Harriman. In Washington, it is being disseminated only via this channel to you and to Messrs. Katzenbach, Bundy, and Nitze.

Richard Helms

Attachment - 1

30 November 1968  
(DATE)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJ 02-192  
By SJ, NARA, Date 6/20/03

30 November 1968

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Vice President Ky's Current Views on Paris Talks  
and Other Matters

3.4(b)(1)

1. Vice President Ky told [redacted] that he plans to depart Saigon for Paris on 5 or 6 December 1968. He intends to stay in Paris two or three weeks and expects to return to South Vietnam (SVN) during a possible Christmas-New Years recess in the talks. He said he does not want to be absent from SVN for long because internal political developments might require his presence here.

2. Ky emphasized he has every intention of leading the government of Vietnam (GVN) negotiating team. The head of the official delegation will receive his instructions directly from Ky and if he does not follow them Ky will dismiss him. Ky said although he will not be sitting at the negotiating table, the words spoken there will be his words and the decisions reached will be his decisions. Ky also advised that Pham Dang Lam would head the GVN official delegation, at least for the immediate future. He noted that picking a head of delegation has been a very difficult task because the individual who is selected must be "non-controversial." He must be acceptable to North Vietnamese, South Vietnamese, Buddhists, Catholics, the military, etc., said Ky, and he must be willing to accept Ky's direction without question. In Ky's view, Lam fits this description. Ky described Lam as a man without much initiative but one who will follow directions.

3. Ky said he will organize the GVN team as follows: He will head the team and have an immediate personal staff for support in such areas as (a) the substantive talks, (b) constitutional or legal questions, (c) military affairs, (d) information, and (e) administration. Below Ky and his personal staff, the official representation will be divided into three groups: (a) the negotiating team, (b) the lobby group, which will be composed of dignitaries from SVN who will attend the talks officially but will not be members of the negotiating team, and (c) the information group. Dang Duc Khoi and Nguyen Ngoc Linh, two members of Ky's entourage who will be on his personal staff, will head the information group, while former Open Arms Minister Nguyen Xuan Phong will head up his personal staff. Ky said he did not know who would lead the lobby group but said Phong would be his staff man for lobby group activities. (This description of Ky's staff agrees in substance, although not in all details, with Thieu's concept, as reported earlier by another source.)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJJ 02-192  
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-20-03

4. Ky described his plan for confronting the Communists at the negotiating table as one which would allow him to take the offensive, while recognizing that concessions will be needed from both sides. He anticipates his biggest problem will concern concessions which he might have to make in return for an agreement. He said he views the war in two parts: The aggression by North Vietnam (DRV) against the South Vietnamese and the internal war between the South Vietnamese, i. e. between the National Liberation Front (NFLSV) and the GVN. Referring to the North Vietnamese, Ky said that the first item of business should be a discussion of terms for DRV withdrawal from SVN. He feels the withdrawal agreement should be in motion before concessions for the withdrawal are agreed to by the U. S. / GVN side. He reasons that the DRV obtained a bombing halt without concessions and therefore the GVN ought at least to obtain a DRV agreement on withdrawal before granting concessions of its own. He realizes that an American troop withdrawal might be linked with DRV withdrawal and feels strongly that U. S. troop withdrawal should follow the DRV withdrawal.

5. Ky said it is essential for the GVN to have ironclad international guarantees that, having once withdrawn, the DRV will not reinvade SVN, particularly after a significant withdrawal of U. S. forces has been made. He expects negotiations on this point will be long and difficult and accompanied by increased military pressure from Communist forces in SVN. Ky said he hopes to take the offensive in the Paris talks and he will be reasonable and logical as well as firm. He is aware that proper conduct by the GVN could develop international pressure on the DRV to agree to a fair settlement.

6. Once DRV forces have agreed to withdraw from SVN and after these forces have been identified and fixed, Ky believes it might be possible to have a ceasefire between allied forces and DRV units. This does not mean that the ceasefire would apply to the Viet Cong, said Ky. Ky believes that the GVN should negotiate with the NFLSV after it has solved the problem of the DRV's aggression. Terms whereby members of the NFLSV would be integrated into SVN society should be negotiated between the GVN and the NFLSV and treated as an internal South Vietnamese matter.

7. Referring to his limited stay in Paris, Ky said he must return to SVN often to keep an eye on internal political developments. He said he has advised the President that the current government is too weak to enforce a peace, adding that he would like to see changes made in the cabinet to increase its ability to persuade the South Vietnamese people to accept a Paris settlement. Ky added that he has given Thieu advice on this matter but has not and will not demand changes lest they be considered to be a price for his cooperation. He said that Thieu must organize his government so that it can function under peacetime conditions. However, Ky was quick to add he has little faith in Thieu's ability to succeed and said that the Vietnamese and the Americans should prepare for a period of some political unrest.

8. Calling attention to the generation gap, Ky noted that ~~current GVN leaders do not represent the aspirations of the majority of the Vietnamese people who are members of a much younger generation.~~ He said the leaders of the youth will insist on an efficient government in a peacetime situation. In Ky's view it would be well for the U.S. and the GVN to allow a certain amount of political turmoil in the country to permit evolution of a political system that represents the real wishes of the Vietnamese people. To do otherwise, said Ky, ~~will merely hand the country to the Communists.~~ He believes that the problem is to guide and control the revolutionary processes and not to suppress them. He noted that Thieu appointed Prime Minister Tran Van Huong, at American urging, because the Americans thought Huong would unite the people. ~~"Now," said Ky, "Huong is old and ineffective and his supporters are leaving him. The cabinet is weak." Ky believes "east and west cannot meet."~~ Modern communications can develop closer cooperation, but Asians, including the Vietnamese, must be allowed to develop a national spirit, select their own leaders and form their own political institutions.

9. ~~Ky said he is certain that the GVN has not seriously planned for peace and wondered if the American mission in Vietnam has done so.~~ He suggested that immediate attention be given to the problems created by the demobilization of ARVN. ~~He advocates planning now to preclude a disgruntled soldiery from creating political unrest and to permit the Vietnamese to rebuild their country in an orderly manner.~~

10. Ky said he had had a pleasant conversation with Ambassadors Bunker and Berger on 27 November and added that he hopes to meet with them again before his departure in order to preclude a repetition of the October-November U.S./GVN dispute over the Paris talks question. He said he hopes that Americans in Paris will understand that he will have his own views and that while he is willing to listen to the views of others and to compromise, he will not be dictated to. He stressed that he is not anti-American as some Vietnamese and American officials claim, but rather a long and true friend of the U.S. ~~He said he also is a nationalist who wants an independent non-Communist Vietnam.~~

11. After advising that his wife would accompany him to Paris, ~~Ky said he desires to visit the United States for the inauguration of President-elect Nixon on 20 January 1969. He wants to give the new administration an opportunity to get to know him first hand and he, in turn, would like to meet the new administration.~~

6965

MEMORANDUM FOR: *The Honorable Walt Rostow* ←

3.4(b)(1)

Attached is a report on GVN preparations for the Paris talks. [redacted]

[redacted] The report has been passed to Ambassadors Bunker and Harriman. In Washington, it is being disseminated only via this channel to you and to Messrs. Katzenbach, Bundy and Nitze.

*Richard Helms*

30 November 1968

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJ 02-192  
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-20-03

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

30 November 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: GVN Plans and Preparations for Paris Talks

1. [redacted] members of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) negotiating delegation to the Paris Peace Talks are not being selected by the National Security Council but by a quadrumvirate composed of President Nguyen Van Thieu, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, Foreign Minister Tran Chanh Thanh, and Ambassador to the U.S. Bui Diem, with Thieu having final say. During their meeting on the evening of 29 November, Thieu made it clear that despite reported U.S. objections, he leans to Ambassador Pham Dang Lam as delegation chief and, in any case, prefers not to name anyone else for the present.

3.4(b)(1)

2. The four agreed that the delegation should include a woman and tentatively narrowed the choice to Senator Nguyen Phouc Dai or Madame Vui, with Ky leaning toward Madame Vui. [redacted] could not provide Vui's full name but described her as "a good fighter, excellent speaker, intelligent, with a good revolutionary record and a husband of questionable background". This may be Madame Nguyen Thi Vui, who was a member of the People's Army Council during the pre-Thieu government and at one time was considered by Ky for appointment as Minister of Social Welfare in his Cabinet. She is married to Lam Van Si, manager of a glass works, who has been reported to be a one-time member of the French Communist Party and to have participated in world youth congresses between 1950 and 1955 in Sofia, Prague and Warsaw. Thieu indicated he was thinking of former foreign Minister Tran Van Do as one of the other five negotiating team members, but no final decision on Do was reached at the meeting. Nguyen Luat Vien's selection seems certain.

3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
 NLJ 02-192  
 By SJ, NARA, Date 6-20-03

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

3. Ky, who is no admirer of An's, was nettled by Thieu's repeated suggestions that former Information Minister Tran Van An be appointed either to the delegation or to his former Information post. Ky cannot understand what Thieu sees in An, but believes Thieu will settle temporarily for having General Tran Van Trung of the Psychological Warfare Department cumulate the Information Ministry until Thieu can select his own man.

4. ~~The four also discussed whether the delegation should include a general officer. Ky has apparently been persuaded that the inclusion of a general on the GVII delegation would reinforce the world's impression of the GVII as a militarist regime and is now thinking of taking three colonels with him.~~ Another consideration influencing Ky is the involvement in shady deals, especially through his wife, of Lieutenant General Nguyen Bao Tri, the leading military candidate for the delegation now that Lieutenant General Nguyen Duc Thang has refused to go to Paris. Thieu and Ky both presume the Communists are also aware of this and would therefore have a field day at Tri's expense. However, the four men reached no decision on this matter at their 29 November meeting.

5. ~~Thieu's concept of the organization of the GVII Delegation remain substantially as he explained it to Ky on 26 November.~~ However, further details have emerged. The staff which will support Ky in his role of overall coordinator will consist of about 12 persons, including (a) four or even five members of negotiating team, (b) Dang Duc Khoi, as head of the Information and Propaganda Section, (c) the head of the "Lobby", (d) the head of a research staff, which will research problems for the delegation and probably be headed by former Opens Arms Minister Nguyen Xuan Phong, provided he is not a delegation member, (e) Colonel Phan Huy Loi, who is one of the three colonels Ky wants to take with him, (f) Colonel Ho Van Loi, former Secretary General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Committee, and (g) Colonel Nguyen Quoc Quynh, Acting Chief of J-5 of the Joint General Staff, who has been in charge of preparing military position papers under the directions of Lieutenant General Vinh Loc.

6. ~~Khoi hopes to keep his Information and Propaganda Group at no more than 27 persons,~~ although he had originally projected a staff of 42. Khoi said on 30 November that practically everyone in South Vietnam with any experience in media or the information field in general has been asking him for a position. Khoi still plans to have former Vietnam Press Director Nguyen Ngoc Linh as his deputy. Nguyen Nhan, former Counselor for Political Affairs at the GVII Embassy in Washington, will head up the office staff, while Phung Nhat Minh, an information specialist at the GVII Embassy in Australia, will concentrate on handling the foreign press. Khoi said either he or Linh probably will commute with Ky when the latter returns periodically to Saigon.

7. Khoi said he has already written the three most important speeches Ky plans to deliver in his role as overall coordinator. ~~The first will be a 15- to 20-minute TV/radio address to the nation before Ky's departure, in which he will announce the names of the delegation members.~~ The aim of the speech will be to assure the Vietnamese people that the delegation will do everything possible to insure that vital national interests are protected in Paris.

8. ~~The second speech is a short one that Ky will deliver after departing in Paris.~~ After thanking the French for making facilities available and hosting the conference, Ky will try to quash the idea the GVN is composed of hardline militarists. He will point out that the GVN wants peace and has come to Paris to do everything possible to bring about a fair settlement. He will avoid the use of such terms as "aggression" in describing the war and will instead take the tack that there is a war between North and South Vietnam, that there are problems between the two but that if both sides show good will perhaps an honorable peace can be achieved and later on a prosperous South Vietnam can reunite with a prosperous North Vietnam. Khoi said he and Ky are counting on the contrast between the hard North Vietnam/ National Liberation Front line and the GVN's moderation to win many friends for South Vietnam.

9. ~~The third speech is the statement Ky will make at a press conference he plans several days after arrival, in which he will stress the same themes.~~ Ky is aware, Khoi went on, that there will probably be some questions designed to embarrass him personally but thinks that if he handles these calmly, smartly and with a touch of humor, it will redound to his credit. After this press conference, Ky plans to disappear into his villa for about ten days to avoid giving the impression he is trying to grab headlines. Khoi added that Ky has already issued strict instructions that there are to be no shopping expeditions or anything similar which might cast the GVN representatives in a bad light from the beginning.

10. Khoi said he understands Thieu has released an initial VN\$20,000,000 (U.S. \$169,490.00 at the official exchange rate of VN\$118 to U.S.\$1.00) for the delegation's expenses. Khoi noted the problem of winter clothes alone is a serious one. He is solving it for members of his own group by having the GVN Navy make up some heavy clothing at cost.

*Pres. file*

Monday, Dec. 2, 1968  
9:30 a. m.

70

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will wish to note the rule Mr. Nixon  
appears to have laid down in the second paragraph.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-EX DIS attachment (log 3636)

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By MI, NARA, Date 1-22-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL-EXDIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON



3636  
WH-Roston  
70a 15430  
Hold for Roston

12

November 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR S/S - MR. BENJAMIN READ

Subject: Benjamin Romualdez and the  
President-elect

1. Ambassador Murphy spoke with Mr. Nixon today about published accounts of his meeting with Mr. Romualdez. Mr. Nixon commented that the meeting had been strictly accidental and casual. He had entered Lt. Governor Finch's office when Mr. Romualdez was there. He had spent perhaps thirty seconds in their company. Their conversation had been entirely an exchange of courtesies and without policy substance.

2. The President-elect went on to say that he intended to adhere strictly to his rule that he will be unable to meet with foreign officials or dignitaries prior to his inauguration. He believes this the only appropriate course for him to take during the transition period.

*W.L.*  
William Leonhart

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 96-03

By mp/cb NARA, Date 1-22-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL-EXDIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

71  
Monday, December 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns,  
Monday, December 2, 5:00 p.m. *Pres file*

Luns asked to see you for a brief farewell call. He will present a personal gift on behalf of the Netherlands government and people. Your return gift is a silver cigarette box, suitably engraved, provided by State's Office of Protocol.

The Dutch have been good friends and faithful allies. You may wish to thank Luns for his support of U.S. policies on several important issues:

- Luns has vigorously defended our position on Vietnam, both publicly and in Parliament.
- The Dutch have also supported us on NATO, the Kennedy Round, NPT, and international liquidity.
- On November 13, they announced a \$65 million prepayment on their Marshall Plan debt, which clears this debt off entirely -- eight to fifteen years in advance.

Luns may raise two Dutch requests on which we have been unable to satisfy them:

- Nuclear submarine assistance. We have not been able to help because of security objections raised by the Navy and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Should he raise this, you might say that there are difficult problems but the subject is still under review.
- KLM landing rights. We recently held informal talks with the Dutch on this. On November 29, Dutch Ambassador Schurmann left with Secretary Rusk a new Dutch proposal for gaining rights to Chicago and San Juan in exchange for certain rights they would be prepared to relinquish. (The preliminary reaction suggests this proposal is not too promising, but it is being staffed out.) Should Luns raise this issue, you might say we are looking carefully into the latest Dutch proposal.

Luns will be accompanied by Dutch Ambassador Schurmann. I will be standing by with Ed Fried. State is sending Charles Tanguy, Office Director.

A biographic sketch is at Tab A.

*1/12*  
JKN:ERF:mm

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *JK*, NARA, Date *2-20-98*

71a

CONFIDENTIAL

The Netherlands

JOSEPH LUNS

One of Europe's foremost Foreign Ministers and long the dominant figure in Dutch foreign affairs, Luns overshadows his colleagues in the Government. He is a friend of the United States, is dedicated to the integration of Europe and is one of the strongest supporters in Europe of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. He has often spoken out in support of our effort in Viet Nam.

Luns is friendly and self-confident, and has a good sense of humor. He is married and has a son and daughter. His daughter, Cornelia, 24, a beautician and doctor's assistant, lives and works in Amsterdam. She was crowned Azalea Queen at Norfolk, Virginia earlier this year. His son, Hubert, 21, is a reserve Navy lieutenant and is studying economics in Lausanne, Switzerland.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By Ag, NARA, Date 2-20-98

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

72

1958 DEC 1 17 06

EEA836  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 4531

FROM BROMLEY SMITH  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO WALT ROSTOW  
CITE CAP82857

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10679

By af/jc, NARA, Date 1-9-98

188 DEC

5  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1 PM 12:10

~~SECRET~~ NODIS HARVAN

AMBASSADOR BUNKER REPORTS THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE TO A DATE FOR THE OPENING OF THE WIDER TALKS IN PARIS UNTIL AFTER THE SAIGON ASSEMBLY HAS APPROVED THE SENDING OF A DELEGATION. PRESIDENT THIEU EXPECTS THE ASSEMBLY TO ACT TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3.

MEANWHILE, BUNKER HAS MADE CLEAR TO THIEU THAT WE WILL BE TALKING WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ON MONDAY IN PARIS ABOUT PROCEDURAL MATTERS ALONG THE LINES OF OUR EARLIER UNDERSTANDING WITH SAIGON.

FOLLOWING IS BUNKER'S CABLE FROM SAIGON. SAM BERGER WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE EMBASSY FOR THE NEXT WEEK DURING THE AMBASSADOR'S VISIT TO KATHMANDU.

SAIGON 43784

1. BERGER AND I SAW THIEU AT 1900 HOURS FOR HALF AN HOUR. HE EXPLAINED WHY HE COULD NOT SEE ME AT NOON TODAY. HE SAID THAT THE SPEAKERS OF THE UPPER AND LOWER HOUSES HAD CALLED ON HIM TO SAY THAT AS THEY INTERPRETED ARTICLE 39 OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE ASSEMBLY TO APPROVE THE SENDING OF DELEGATION TO "TALK WITH THE ENEMY." A PLENARY SESSION WILL BE CALLED FOR TUESDAY TO WHICH THIEU WILL SEND A MESSAGE. HE SAID THAT THE "MATTER WAS ONLY A QUESTION OF FORM" AND "HE THINKS THAT THERE IS NO PROBLEM."

2. I THEN ASKED HIM ABOUT PROGRESS ON THE FORMATION OF THE DELEGATION. HE SAID THAT LAM WOULD BE LEAVING FOR PARIS AFTER THE PLENARY SESSION, POSSIBLY AS EARLY AS TUESDAY. VARIOUS PEOPLE HAVE BEEN APPROACHED, AND HE IS FINDING IT ALMOST AS DIFFICULT AS "CREATING A CABINET." ONE MAN WHO AGREED TO GO YESTERDAY SAID THIS MORNING THAT HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT. HE WILL BE DISCUSSING THE DELEGATION COMPOSITION WITH KY TOMORROW MORNING. WHAT THEY ARE LOOKING FOR ARE FIVE OR SIX COMPETANT AND WELL-KNOWN PEOPLE WHO WILL COMMAND CONFIDENCE.

3. THIEU SAID THAT FOR THE MOMENT LAM WILL BE THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION. HE IS A SOUTHERNER AND IS THE BEST MAN IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE. THE MAJORITY OF THE DELEGATION WILL BE SOUTHERN WITH THE COMPOSITION FOUR SOUTHERNERS, TWO CENTRISTS AND ONE NORTHERNER; OR THREE, TWO, ONE; OR THREE ONE, ONE. THEY HAVE DECIDED THAT MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND LOWER HOUSE SHOULD NOT BE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION, BUT COULD SERVE AS ADVISORS ON A ROTATING BASIS; IT WAS IMPORTANT, HE SAID, TO HAVE THEM ASSOCIATED IN SOME WAY WITH THE PEACE TALKS.

4. THIEU SAID HE ASSUMED THERE WOULD BE FIVE OR SIX AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE WHEN THE TALKS START WITH SEVEN TO NINE STAFF MEMBERS IN THE BACKGROUND. VICE PRESIDENT KY WILL BE DIRECTING THE DELEGATION, THE STAFF AND THE PRESS AND INFORMATION SECTION.

5. I THEN SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT AMB. LAM ARRIVE IN PARIS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT I HOPED HE WILL BE ABLE TO GET AWAY ON TUESDAY IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. VANCE WAS MEETING LAU TOMORROW TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FIRST MEETING AND THEY WOULD BE PRESSING US FOR A TIME FOR THE PROCEDURAL MEETING. I ASKED IF HE WOULD CONSIDER AUTHORIZING AN TO TAKE PART IN THE FIRST MEETING ON PROCEDURE. HE SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE FIRST MEETING ON PROCEDURE WOULD BE HEADED IN ANY EVENT BY THE DEPUTIES, AND ASKED IF THAT WAS CORRECT. I SAID THAT WAS MY IMPRESSION, BUT WOULD CONFIRM THIS WITH PARIS.

6. I THEN SAID THAT AN HAD NOT RECEIVED HIS INSTRUCTIONS ON THE PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WE HAD REACHED HERE. AN HAD ASKED FOR SUCH INSTRUCTIONS, AND WE HOPED THEY WOULD BE SENT, BUT, IN ANY EVENT, VANCE WAS PLANNING TO GO AHEAD TOMORROW TO FIRM UP THE ARRANGEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF OUR TALKS AND UNDERSTANDINGS HERE WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THIEU NODDED.

7. FINALLY, WHEN I ASKED WHEN THEY WOULD ANNOUNCE THE FORMATION OF THE DELEGATION, THIEU SAID THAT HE CANNOT DO THIS BEFORE TUESDAY'S MEETING OF THE UPPER AND LOWER HOUSES, AND HOPED TO DO IT SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

8. COMMENT: WHAT IS IMPLICIT IN THE FOREGOING IS THAT THEY WILL NOT RPT NOT BE READY TO AGREE TO FIX A DATE FOR THE FIRST WIDER MEETING ON PROCEDURE OR PUBLICLY ANNOUNCE THE COMPOSITION OF DELEGATION UNTIL AFTER THEY HAVE LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL OF THE TALKS ON TUESDAY. ONCE THEY HAVE THAT, BERGER, WHO WILL BE CHARGE, WILL RAISE WITH THEM THE DATE.

BUNKER

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