

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 cable	State 288487, President to Sihanouk S 2 pp. <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i>	12/17/68	A
#2a letter	President to Tito re Yugoslavia and Europe PCI 3 pp. <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i>	12/19/68	A
2b letter	Tito to the President [English translation] PCI 9 pp. <i>u u u</i>	10/26/68	A
2c letter	Tito to the President PCI 5 pp. <i>u u u</i>	10/26/68	A
#4 memo	Smith to the President, 6:30 p.m. S 1 p. Sanitized [dup. #14, NSF, "South Vietnam and U.S. Relations," Sanitized, NLJ 95-34]	12/17/68	A
#4a cable	FBI Director to Smith S 1 p. Sanitized [dup. #14a and #14b, NSF, "South Vietnam and U.S. Relations," Sanitized, NLJ 95-33]	12/17/68	A
#10 cable	CAP 82903, Rostow to the President re Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i>	12/15/68	A
#11 cable	CAP 82396, Rostow to the President re Soviets S 4 pp. <i>open 1-16-10 NLJ/RAC 10-70</i>	12/14/68	A
#13 cable	CAP 82897, Rostow to the President re Benham C 2 pp.	12/14/68	A
#21 memo	Rostow to the President, 12:30 p.m. re Israel S 1 p. <i>open per RAC 12-8-17</i>	12/12/68	A
#21a letter	Eshkol to the President PCI 2 pp. <i>u u u u</i>	12/4/68	A
#24 memo	Rostow to the President, 3:20 p.m. re Vietnam S 1 p. open [see #36 and #36a for attachments]	12/12/68	A
#27 note	Rostow to the President, 10:10 a.m. TS 1 p. - <i>Ami 10-5-10 NLJ/RAC 10-69</i>	12/12/68	A
#27a cable	Intelligence report TS 6 pp. - <i>Exempt 10-5-10 NLJ/RAC 10-69</i>	11/27/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 110, 12/10 - 17/68," Box 43

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#29d report	Visit of President Diaz, Status of Matters Previously Discussed C 5 pp.	12/13/68	A
#31a memo	Lemnitzer to Rostow re Vietnam S 1 p.	12/11/68	A
#31b chart	Enemy Initiated Attacks S 1 p.	12/11/68	A
#34 memo	Rostow to the President, 5:30 p.m. re Benham C 1 p.	12/11/68	A
#35 memo	Rostow to the President, 5:00 p.m. S 1 p. [dup. #50, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel - Paris Delto XVIIa, 12/5 - 31/68," Box 121]	12/11/68	A
#35a cable	Paris 25186, Delto 1044 S 2 pp. [dup. #50a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel - Paris Delto XVIIa, 12/5 - 31/68," Box 121]	12/11/68	A
#36 memo	Rostow to the President, 3:45 p.m. S 1 p. <i>see RAC Logd</i> [dup. #2a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, 2 C (17) b, 11/20/68 - 1/69, General Military Activity," Box 74]	12/11/68	A
#36a cable	MAC 16964, Intelligence report <i>sanitized 11/5/09</i> S 8 pp. <i>RAE</i> [dup. #2b, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, 2 C (17) b, 11/20/68 - 1/69, General Military Activity," Box 74, Exempt, NLJ 92-388, 9/2/94]	12/11/68	A
#43 memo	Rostow to the President re Kuwait S 1 p.	12/11/68	A
#45 memo	Rostow to the President re nuclear tests S 1 p.	12/10/68	A
#45a memo	Spurgeon Keeny to Rostow re nuclear tests S 1 p.	12/10/68	A
#46 memo	Rostow to the President, 5:45 p.m. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 1-6-10</i>	12/10/68	

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 110, 12/10 - 17/68," Box 43

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#47 memo	Rostow to the President, 3:15 p.m. re Benham S 1 p.	12/10/68	A
#47a memo	Hornig to the President re Benham S 1 p. [partial dup. #41d (page 3 only), NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 109, this box]	12/4/68	A
#50a memo	Under Secretary to the President re Pueblo S 4 pp. <i>open 9-16-70 NLJ/RAC 10-70</i> [partial dup. #8a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Meetings with the President, July - Dec. 1968," Box 2]	12/3/68	A
#50b memo	[Under Secretary to the President re Pueblo] S 2 pp. <i>open 9-16-70 NLJ/RAC 10-70</i> [partial dup. #8a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Meetings with the President, July - Dec. 1968," Box 2]	[12/68]	A
#50c memo	Under Secretary to Secretary re Pueblo S 1 p. <i>open 9-16-70 NLJ/RAC 10-70</i> [dup. #8b, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Meetings with the President, July - Dec. 1968," Box 2]	12/9/68	A
#50e draft	Draft statement by Gen. Woodward re Pueblo S 1 p. <i>open 9-16-70 NLJ/RAC 10-70</i> [dup. #8f, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Meetings with the President, July - Dec. 1968," Box 2]	[12/68]	A
#50f letter	Draft letter Gen. Woodward to Gen. Pak S 2 pp. <i>open 9-16-70 NLJ/RAC 10-70</i> [dup. #8h, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Meetings with the President, July - Dec. 1968," Box 2]	[12/68]	A
#51 memo	Rostow to the President, 11:30 a.m. TS 1 p. <i>open 10-12-99 NLJ 97-161</i>	12/10/68	A
#51a memo	William Lemnitzer to Rostow re Czechoslovakia TS 2 pp. — <i>sanitized 11/5/09 RAC</i>	12/10/68	A
#55d memo	Rusk to the President re Sihanouk S 1 p.	[12/68]	A
#55e letter	President to Sihanouk PCI 1 p.	[12/68]	A
#55g memo	Rostow to the President, 2:50 p.m. re Benham S 2 pp.	12/7/68	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 110, 12/10 - 17/68," Box 43

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#55h memo	Spurgeon Keeny to Rostow re Benham S 3 pp.	12/7/68	A
#55i memo	Rostow to the President, 4:55 p.m. S 2 pp.	12/4/68	A
#55j letter	Seaborg to Rostow S 3 pp. —	11/21/68	A
#55k report	Enclosure 1 to #55j S 3 pp. —	[11/68]	A
#55m memo	Hornig to the President re Benham S 3 pp.	12/4/68	A
#55n memo	Report of Ad Hoc Panel on Underground Testing PCI 17 pp.	11/27/68	A
#58a letter	President to Sihanouk PCI 2 pp.	12/11/68	A
40a memo	Saunders to Rostow S 1p. sanitized 11/24/68; same sanc a/6/01	12/9/68	A

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 520

PAGE 01 STATE 288487

85
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,FILE 02,1032 R

DRAFTED BY:EA/LC:PJBENNETT:TJCORCORAN
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE: MR. SMITH
S/S:MR. WALSH
EA:MR. BUNDY
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TO AMEMBASSY PARIS
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ STATE 288487

EXDIS TODEL 1801

PARIS FOR TODEL ALSO.

SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRINCE SIHANOUK

REF: PARIS 25265

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK REQUESTING THE RELEASE OF U.S.
DETAINÉES IN CAMBODIA. PLEASE ASK QUAI TO HAVE IT DELIVERED
TO SIHANOUK BY FRENCH CHARGE IN PHNOM PENH.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS,

I HAVE LONG HOPED THAT WE MIGHT MAKE SOME PROGRESS
TOWARDS RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE TROUBLED UNITED STATES-
CAMBODIAN RELATIONS. IT WAS WITH THIS PURPOSE IN MIND THAT I
ASKED MY SPECIAL ADVISOR ON ASIAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOP-

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI-098-43-3-1

NAR, Date 12-08-2017

by ULA



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 STATE 288487

MENT, MR. EUGENE BLACK, TO VISIT CAMBODIA DURING HIS RECENT ASIAN TOUR. MR. BLACK HAS REPORTED TO ME FULLY ON HIS VISIT, AND I WAS GRATIFIED BY THE FRANKNESS AND CORDIALITY OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HE HAD WITH MEMBERS OF YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS' GOVERNMENT.

I SHOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS ON A MATTER WHICH AFFECTS RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THIS MATTER INVOLVES THE MEN ON BOARD THE LCU 1577 WHICH, BECAUSE OF AN ERROR IN NAVIGATION, ENTERED CAMBODIAN WATERS ON THE MEKONG RIVER AND WAS DETAINED BY THE ROYAL KHMER NAVY. IT ALSO INVOLVED THE WOUNDED HELICOPTER CREWMAN WHO IS, I UNDERSTAND, BEING WELL CARED FOR IN CAMBODIAN HOSPITALS. THE RELEASE OF THESE MEN WOULD BE WELCOMED IN THIS COUNTRY AND WOULD, I BELIEVE, CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMBODIAN AND THE UNITED STATES.

I ALSO WISH TO ASSURE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS OF THE CONTINUING FRIENDSHIP OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR CAMBODIA AND ITS PEOPLE. DIFFERENCES WHICH MAY EXIST FROM TIME TO TIME IN OUR OUTLOOKS ON THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE WORLD WILL NOT, I HOPE, PREVENT THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF THIS FRIENDSHIP.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON END QUOTE

GP-1 RUSK

2

Monday, December 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Reply to President Tito's Letter

You recall that in mid-November you received a lengthy letter from President Tito. The letter contained Tito's views on the post-Czech invasion situation in Europe.

Attached is the text of the State Department's suggested reply. The letter is long, but only half as long as Tito's. It contains an expression of gratitude for Tito's letter; it mentions briefly our views on NATO and the unrest in Europe, the Jarring Mission, and our continued interest in improving East-West relations.

Nick Katzenbach recommends that your reply be cabled to Ambassador Elbrick for delivery to Tito. Following this, your signed letter will be delivered by the Embassy. This was the format of the Tito letter exchange and saves time. We would tell Tito that the White House has no plan to publish the letter but has no objection if Tito desires to do so.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we will
need your signature on
the letter _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

RLS:mm

2a

DEC 10 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I have always found your views on international problems to be of uncommon value and worthy of my government's close attention. Therefore, your letter of October 26 was welcome and helpful. I was particularly interested in your estimate of the European scene following last summer's events in Czechoslovakia.

Recourse to the use of force in the settlement of political disputes is as repugnant to us as it is to you. We hope that our public position as well as your own resolute stand against the gross interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia will have the desired effect. This is particularly important since, as you point out, it would be difficult to localize military conflict in the critical Balkan area or, for that matter, anywhere in Europe. The recent assertion by Soviet spokesmen of theories of limited sovereignty and supranational authority is not reassuring, and we have felt compelled publicly to stress our concern at the threat of further military intervention on the European continent, which may be implied by these assertions. Your letter reflects clearly your own concern at possible Soviet intentions, but I must register my surprise at your reference to territorial claims on Yugoslavia by some "military circles" of her Western neighbors. We have not heard of any such claims and are certain that, if they exist, they have no official support.

Clearly, progress toward detente in Europe has been seriously impeded by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. You have stressed your own desire to continue efforts at avoiding a further deterioration of your relations with the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact. We share this desire and will do what we can to diminish tension in Europe and elsewhere in the world. At the

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI-0198-43-3-2

By 444 NAR, Date 12-08-2017

same time, like you, we must look to our defenses and remain firm in the face of threats. This balanced approach was reflected in the communique of November 16 following the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which was attended by Mr. Rush. The communique stressed not only our common concern over events in Czechoslovakia but also our desire for secure, peaceful and mutually beneficial relations between East and West. I would hope that all nations directly concerned with the problem would have similar views.

Naturally, I share your own deep satisfaction that the talks on Vietnam appear to have moved into a more substantive phase in which we can work to achieve an honorable settlement of the war and a firm peace in Southeast Asia. Although we do not yet know whether Hanoi is prepared to join seriously for this purpose, I can assure you that we will continue to do our utmost, with determination and patience, to bring about real progress in these talks. This has been my constant objective, and it is a keen disappointment to me that, as I approach the end of my term, we are still far from an honorable end to the conflict in Vietnam.

I know from your letter, as well as your talks with Mr. Katzenbach, that you are keenly interested in the troubled Middle East. We are grateful that Ambassador Jarring is continuing his efforts in the search for peace, and we hope that the current deadlock will soon be overcome. Certainly the United States is sparing no efforts in supporting this important mission. You, Mr. President, have a considerable influence in that part of the world, and I feel confident you also are taking all appropriate steps to persuade the parties to the tragic Middle East conflict to be moderate and forthcoming. This is essential if Ambassador Jarring is to succeed.

The vital international questions of disarmament and the problems of the developing countries, which you mention in your letter, have been uppermost in my mind throughout my years in the White House. We have made considerable progress, but much remains to be done. I feel we have been reasonable and generous in our efforts in both areas,

and I am confident that these qualities will mark our attitude in the future.

Mr. President, we have made great strides in the development of the economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between our two countries. I want this to continue, and I know you share this desire. It is my hope that such cooperation will further the program of economic reform which your country has been following so resolutely and which all of us have watched with close and admiring attention. I am glad to know that Yugoslavia's relations with its Western neighbors are developing in a mutually beneficial way since they also should contribute to the success of your economic program.

You know, of course, that my countrymen and I have long had a keen interest in Yugoslavia's independence, sovereignty and economic development. Let me reaffirm this now. I should like also to express my appreciation for the frank and useful exchanges on bilateral and broader topics which have taken place between our governments and between us personally. The discussions which we had with Mr. Gligorov in Washington and the warm reception accorded Mr. Katzenbach in Belgrade are only the most recent examples of this.

This may be my final letter to you. It is fitting, therefore, that I should wish to stress my conviction that the American people will always remain vitally interested in Yugoslavia's independence and welfare. You may be sure that whatever the future may hold for me, I shall always attach the highest importance to good relations between our two countries. May I, in closing, wish you success in your efforts to secure the prosperity and independence of your valiant people and country.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Josip Bros-Tito
President of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia
Belgrade

LBJ:State:RLS:mm
12/16/68

26
15333

TRANSLATION OF A PERSONAL MESSAGE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
JOSIP BROZ-TITO

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to thank you for the kind attention that you and the Government of the United States of America have paid to the Vice President of the Federal Executive Council, Mr. Kiro Gligorov during his recent visit to the United States. Vice President Gligorov has informed me of the useful talk he had with you as well as of the readiness expressed by you for further co-operation between the United States of America and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLI-0198-43-3-3

By 444 NAR Date 12-08-2017

I highly appreciate your friendly attitude towards Yugoslavia and the interest that you and your associates are taking in its independence. The talks we had with the Under Secretary of State, Mr. N. Katzenbach were a useful manifestation of the mutual interest in co-operation that is basic.

I thank you for the regards you sent me and I avail myself of this opportunity to address to you my greetings and best wishes.

I am gratified at the opportunity offered to me to continue with you the exchanges of views which have always proved to be useful to our two countries.

For our part we have been concerned, for some time already, over the deterioration of international relations due to ever more frequent recourse to the use of force, to gross interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries in various parts of the world, concurrently with a failure to deal with the vital issues of our time, such as the acceleration of the economic growth of the developing countries, disarmament and so on. We have used every opportunity to draw attention to the dangers of such a development in the world. We have welcomed the process of detente which has taken place in Europe during the last few years. Unfortunately, in the conditions of a general aggravation of international conditions, even this Continent has not been by-passed by the dangerous manifestations of the

policy of force which have seriously jeopardized stability and peace.

6. You are aware of the stand that the SFR of Yugoslavia has taken in connection with the military intervention of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. This stand is founded on the principles of the Yugoslav foreign policy and is in keeping with the positions that my country has taken in similar cases in the more remote and recent past, for instance in the case of Vietnam and the crisis in the Middle East.

We express our satisfaction over the talks on Vietnam and the hope that a start will be made towards finding a peaceful solution which would be of tremendous significance for the promotion and stabilization of peace in the world. The overcoming of the present deadlock in the search for a way out of the Middle East crisis would be of no lesser significance in view of the interdependence of peace and security in all parts of the world.

We are concerned over the fact that tension has been extended to Europe as well, not only because our country is more directly involved, but also because Europe is a Continent where, according to our profound belief, military conflicts can hardly remain localized regardless of the the general aspiration to avoid a new World War and a nuclear catastrophe.

The degree of interdependence of European countries and concentration of military forces are such that, in our opinion, every crisis may grow in this small area into a conflict of wider proportions.

The military intervention in Czechoslovakia calls into question the results achieved so far by the policy of detente in Europe as well as peaceful co-existence which have constituted, in our mind, the embryo of a new era in international relations as a whole. This intervention cannot be justified by any higher interest of an ideological or strategic character because - as history has taught us - security and peace cannot be achieved by violating or sacrificing the freedom and independence of small countries.

15 We are particularly concerned over the uncertainty regarding the further development of the situation in Europe. We have no reason to believe that we are faced with an isolated case, because we hear every day of theories on limited sovereignty, on supernational authorities and on some commonwealths which are undefined in space. Moreover, we are again facing a campaign which had already been waged once in the past for the purpose of justifying attacks against the independence of our peoples. It is in this light that we appraise the more or less open raising of territorial claims against Yugoslavia. Our situation is all the more complicated by the fact that such wishes appear also among some military

circles of our Western neighbours, which we have to take into account.

Bearing in mind the above theories which are aimed in the first place at legalizing the right of intervention and the vast concentration of troops in Central Europe, it is not at all fortuitous that in addition to Yugoslavia the other countries of South-East Europe should also feel threatened.

Mr. President, I do not think that it is necessary to emphasize that the mutual dependence of the security of European countries hinges on the Balkans in particular. History has provided eloquent examples for this. Precisely for this reason my country has always been equally interested in the security and independence of all the countries of this region, even though it was in disagreement with some of them, for instance with Albania.

Yugoslavia has always devoted special attention to the development of friendly relation with all its neighbours and has endeavoured to provide, in practice, proof of its dedication to the principles of peaceful co-existence. Such a policy has proved to be generally useful and has been an irrefutable factor of stability and easing of tensions in the Balkans. The danger which has cast its shadow over this Peninsula impells us to continue to strengthen co-operation with all the countries of this region.

13 We shall continue to exert efforts with a view to avoiding a deterioration of our relation with the USSR and other countries members of the Warsaw Pact. We shall endeavour to develop our relations with these as well as all other countries on the basis of the principles of equality, independence and mutual benefit. However, we also wish to do everything in order to remove even the slightest doubt as to our readiness to defend our freedom and right to independent development with all the means at our disposal. In this all Yugoslavs are unanimous and unflinching.

We have taken a number of indispensable precautionary measures as this is in our belief the best way of discouraging any attempt from whatever quarter at encroaching upon our independence and sovereignty. At the same time we are striving for the reassertion of the policy of detente and normalization of the situation in Europe, meaning thereby also the removal of the consequences of the intervention in Czechoslovakia. We are, namely, convinced that there is no alternative to the policy of detente and overcoming of the division of Europe.

14 The most recent developments have confirmed us in our belief that the policy of non-alignment continues to provide a lasting and the best way for our participation in international co-operation on the basis of equal rights. Together with non-aligned and other countries we shall continue to strive for the application of the principles of peaceful and active

co-existence and for co-operation on equitable bases. We shall give our support to every positive initiative aimed at solving outstanding problems, if we are convinced that the legitimate interests of the parties concerned have been taken into account. We would not be true to ourselves however if we reconciled ourselves to sham compromises on which the peace and security of all countries, either large or small, can not be founded.

Mr. President,

Our experience impells us to further strengthen our relations with all countries that are respecting our independence and independent social development. I am glad to be able to stress that in this respect the relations between our two countries are developing along an ascending line and are providing a positive example. I am glad that stability and the lasting interests of our peoples in mutual co-operation are manifesting themselves in our relations, in spite of different systems and differences of views regarding some international issues.

(12) . I am profoundly convinced that the continuation of exchanges of views between the statesmen of our two countries, and primarily with you personally, will contribute to the assertion of the policy of peaceful and active co-existence among countries having different social systems and playing different roles in international relations.

In harmony with our long-term orientation towards the integration of the Yugoslav economy into the international division of labour, a further extension of our economic relations, as well as scientific, technical and cultural co-operation are of the greatest importance to us. Such a development of our co-operation would be of importance for the successful implementation of the economic reform and thereby for the strengthening of our independence. We consider that our co-operation with the Export-Import Bank and with the International Bank will be a useful contribution towards that end.

I note with satisfaction that relations with our Western neighbours, particularly with Italy and Austria, as well as the Federal Republic of Germany have been making progress. The obstacles we are encountering in our relations with West European economic associations are impeding our efforts to solve economic problems more rapidly and to carry out internal reforms more consistently. The overcoming of these difficulties would be of great significance to our stable economic development and we hope that the forthcoming negotiations will contribute towards their elimination.

(2) I have received with satisfaction the news that you, Mr. President, as well as your Administration are ready for a further development of relations and co-operation. I greatly appreciate all that you and the Secretary of State Mr. Dean Rusk have said in this respect during the recent talks with

my associates Mr. K. Gligorov and Mr. M. Nikezic. This encourages me in the belief that we shall strengthen and extend mutual understanding and friendly co-operation in the future.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high esteem and my sincere regards.

(signed) Josip Broz-Tito

Belgrade, October 26, 1968

(Original of the Message will be submitted later)

Beograd, 26. oktobra 1968.

2c

Dragi gospodine Predsjedniče,

Zahvaljujem Vam na ljubaznoj pažnji koju ste Vi i vlada SAD ukazali potpredsedniku SIV-a - g. Kiri Gligovoru prilikom njegovog nedavnog boravka u SAD. Potpredsednik Gligorov informisao me je o korisnom razgovoru koji je imao sa Vama, kao i o spremnosti koju ste izrazili za dalju saradnju Sjedinjenih Američkih Država sa Socijalističkom Federativnom Republikom Jugoslavijom.

Visoko cijenim Vaš prijateljski stav prema Jugoslaviji i interes koji ste Vi i Vaši saradnici pokazali za njenu nezavisnost. Razgovori koje smo vodili sa Državnim podsekretarom g. N. Katzenbachom su bili korisna manifestacija obostranog interesa za saradnju na toj osnovi.

Zahvaljujem Vam na pozdravima, koje ste mi uputili i koristim ovu priliku da Vam uputim svoje pozdrave sa najboljim željama.

Raduje me što mi se pruža prilika da sa Vama nastavim razmjenu mišljenja koja se uvijek do sada pokazala korisnom za naše dvije zemlje.

Sa svoje strane mi smo već duže vremena zabrinuti pogoršavanjem međunarodnih odnosa usljed sve češćeg pribjegavanja sili, grubog miješanja u unutrašnje poslove suverenih zemalja u raznim dijelovima svijeta, uporedo sa zanemarivanjem suštinskih pitanja današnjice, kao što su ubrzanje privrednog rasta zemalja u razvoju,

Njegovoj Ekselenciji
gospodinu Lindonu B. Džonsonu
Predsedniku Sjedinjenih Američkih Država
Bjela kuća

V a š i n g t o n DC

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NLI - 0199-43-3-4

By 444

NAR, Date 12-08-2017

razoružanje. Koristili smo svaku priliku da ukažemo na opasnosti ovakvog razvoja u svijetu. Mi smo pozdravili proces popuštanja zategnutosti do kojeg je posljednjih godina došlo u Evropi. Međutim, nažalost, u uslovima opšteg pogoršavanja međunarodnih prilika ni ovaj kontinent nije mimoidjen od opasnih manifestacija politike sile koje su ozbiljno ugrozile stabilnost i mir.

Vama je poznat stav koji je SFRJ zauzela povodom vojne intervencije SSSR i njegovih saveznika - članova VU u ČSSR. Taj stav zasniva se na načelima jugoslovenske spoljne politike i u skladu je sa stavovima koje je moja zemlja zauzimala u sličnim slučajevima u daljoj i bližoj prošlosti, kao naprimjer u slučaju Vijetnama i krize na Bliskom istoku.

Izražavamo zadovoljstvo zbog razgovora o Vijetnamu i nadu da će se krenuti u pravcu iznalaženja miroljubivog rješenja što bi bilo od ogromnog značaja za unapredjenje i stabilizaciju mira u svijetu. Ne manji značaj imalo bi i prevazilaženje sadašnjeg zastoja u traženju izlaza iz blisko-istočne krize, imajući u vidu medjuzavisnost mira i bezbjednosti u svim dijelovima svijeta.

Proširenje zaoštavanja i na Evropu zabrinjava nas ne samo zato što se neposrednije tiče naše zemlje, već zbog toga što se po našem dubokom uvjerenju radi o kontinentu gdje vojni sukobi teško mogu da ostanu lokalizovani, bez obzira na opštu težnju da se izbjegne novi svjetski rat i nuklearna katastrofa. Stepenn medjuzavisnosti evropskih zemalja i koncentracija vojnih efektivna su toliki da na ovom malom prostoru, po našem mišljenju, svaka kriza može da preraste u sukob širih razmjera.

Vojna intervencija u ČSSR dovodi u pitanje dosad postignute rezultate politike popuštanja u Evropi i miroljubivu koegzistenciju koji su u našim očima predstavljali zametak jedne nove ere u međunarodnim odnosima uopšte. Intervenciju ne može da opravda nikakav viši interes ideološkog ili strateškog karaktera, jer - kao što nam to kazuju historijske pouke - bezbjednost i mir ne mogu da se postignu gaženjem ili žrtvovanjem slobode i nezavisnosti malih zemalja.

Nam posebno zabrinjava neizvjesnost u pogledu daljeg razvoja situacije u Evropi. Nemamo razloga da vjerujemo da se radi o usamljenom slučaju, jer do nas dnevno dopiru teorije o ograničenom suverenitetu, o supranacionalnim autoritetima i nekim prostorno ne-definiranim zajednicama. Šta više, mi se ponovo suočavamo sa kampanjom kakva je jednom već vodjena u cilju opravdanja nasrtanja na nezavisnost naših naroda. U tom svijetlu ocjenjujemo manje ili više otvoreno pokretanje teritorijalnih revandikacija prema Jugoslaviji. Nama se još više komplikuje situacija i zbog toga što se takve želje javljaju i u nekim vojnim krugovima naših zapadnih susjeda, o čemu mi moramo voditi računa.

Imajući u vidu pomenute teorije, koje, prije svega, treba da legalizuju pravo na intervenciju, i ogromnu koncentraciju trupa u centralnoj Evropi, nije nimalo slučajno, da se, pored Jugoslavije, i druge zemlje jugoistočne Evrope osjećaju ugroženim.

Gospodine Predsjedniče, mislim da nije potrebno naglašavati da se međusobna uslovljenost bezbjednosti evropskih zemalja, posebno odnosi na Balkan. Historijsko iskustvo je dovoljno rečito. Moja zemlja je baš zbog toga bila i ostala podjednako zainteresovana za bezbjednost i nezavisnost svih zemalja ovog područja, makar je s nekima od njih, na primjer Albanijom, imala nesuglasice.

Jugoslavija je uvijek posvećivala posebnu pažnju razvoju prijateljskih odnosa sa svim susjedima i nastojala da u praksi pruži dokaz privrženosti načelima miroljubive koegzistencije. Takva politika se pokazala svestrano korisnom i bila je neosporan faktor stabilnosti i popuštanja zategnutosti na Balkanu. Prijetnja koja se nadvila nad ovim poluostrvom nalaže nam da nastavimo sa jačanjem saradnje sa svim zemljama ovog regiona.

Mi ćemo i dalje ulagati napore da izbjegnemo pogoršanje odnosa sa SSSR-om i drugim zemljama članicama Varšavskog ugovora. Nastojaćemo da svoje odnose sa ovim, kao i svim drugim zemljama razvijamo na principu ravnopravnosti, nezavisnosti i uzajamne koristi. Međutim, isto tako želimo da učinimo sve kako bi otklonili i

najmanju sumnju u našu spremnost da branimo svoju slobodu i pravo na nezavisan razvoj svim raspoloživim sredstvima. U tome su svi Jugosloveni jedinstveni i nepokolebljivi.

Mi smo preduzeli niz neophodnih mjera predostrožnosti jer je to, po našem uvjerenju, najbolji način da obeshrabrimo posezanje, sa bilo koje strane, na našu nezavisnost i suverenitet. Istovremeno, mi se zalažemo za reafirmaciju politike popuštanja i normalizaciju situacije u Evropi, pri čemu podrazumevamo i otklanjanje posljedica oružane intervencije u ČSSR. Uvjereni smo, naime, da politici popuštanja i prevazilaženja podjeljenosti u Evropi nema alternative.

Najnoviji događaji potvrđuju naše uvjerenje da politika nesvrstanosti ostaje trajan i najbolji način našeg ravnopravnog uključivanja u međunarodnu saradnju. Mi ćemo u zajednici sa nesvrstanim i drugim zemljama nastaviti da se zalažemo za primjenu načela miroljubive i aktivne koegzistencije i za saradnju na ravnopravnim osnovama. Podržaćemo svaku pozitivnu inicijativu u cilju rješavanja otvorenih problema, ukoliko smo uvjereni da su uvaženi legitimni interesi zainteresovanih strana. Ne bismo, međutim, bili dosljedni sebi ako bismo se mirili s varljivim kompromisima na kojima ne može da počiva mir i bezbjednost ni malih ni velikih.

Gospodine Predsjedniče, stečeno iskustvo nas upućuje na daljnje jačanje odnosa sa svim zemljama koje poštuju našu nezavisnost i samostalni društveni razvitak. Drago mi je što mogu da istaknem da u tom pogledu odnosi između naše dvije države bilježe uspon i pružaju pozitivan primjer. Raduje me što se u našim odnosima ispoljavaju stabilnost i trajni interes naših naroda za uzajamnu saradnju, uprkos različitosti sistema i razlikama u gledanju na neke međunarodne probleme.

Duboko sam uvjeren da je nastavljnje razmjene mišljenja između državnika naših dviju zemalja, a u prvom redu sa Vama lično, doprinos afirmaciji politike miroljubive i aktivne koegzistencije

medju zemljama sa različitim društvenim sistemima i različitim ulogama u međunarodnim odnosima.

U skladu sa našom dugoročnom orijentacijom na integralno uključenje jugoslovenske ekonomije u međunarodnu podjelu rada, za nas je od neobične važnosti da dodje do daljeg proširenja naših ekonomskih odnosa, kao i naučno-tehničke i kulturne saradnje. Takav razvoj saradnje bio bi od značaja za uspješno sprovođenje privredne reforme i time za jačanje naše nezavisnosti. Smatramo da naša uspješna saradnja sa Exim bankom i Međunarodnom bankom tome korisno doprinosi.

Sa zadovoljstvom konstatujem da su napredovali odnosi sa svim našim zapadnim susjedima, naročito sa Italijom, Austrijom i SR Njemačkom. Smetnje na koje nailazimo u našim odnosima sa zapadnoevropskim ekonomskim asocijacijama otežavaju naša nastojanja da brže riješimo ekonomske probleme i dosljednije sprovodimo unutrašnje reforme. Prevazilaženje ovih teškoća bilo bi od velikog značaja za naš stabilniji privredni razvoj i mi se nadamo da će predstojeći pregovori doprinijeti njihovom otklanjanju.

Sa zadovoljstvom sam primio vijest da ste Vi, gospodine Predsjedniče, i Vaša administracija spremni na dalje razvijanje odnosa i saradnje. Veoma cijenim sve što je u tom pogledu rečeno u nedavnim razgovorima sa Vaše strane i sa strane Državnog sekretara g. Deana Ruska, mojim saradnicima g. K. Gligorovu i M. Nikeziću. Ovo me ohrabruje u uvjerenju da ćemo ubuduće jačati i širiti međusobno razumjevanje i prijateljsku saradnju.

Izvolite primiti, gospodine Predsjedniče, uz izraze visokog poštovanja, moje iskrene pozdrave.



INFORMATION

3

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, 7:30 P.M.
December 17, 1968

Mr. President:

Following today's Luncheon Meeting,
Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford sent the
attached cable to Paris.

Ambassadors Harriman and Vance are
instructed to convey to the North Vietnamese (and
the Soviet Ambassador) the strongest warning
that an attack on Saigon would have the most
serious consequences for the Paris talks.

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10613

By mp/lrs, NARA, Date 1-28-98

Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

Info

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED

STATE

Authority RAC 10614

PARIS TODEL _____ FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

By ml/jrs NARA, Date 1-28-98NODIS/HARVAN

1. Reviewing the military indicators in South Vietnam, we have concluded that evidence in the past week points much more clearly in the direction of possible attack on Saigon. Timing may of course slip, and the whole effort could be aborted as appeared to be the case in September. Nonetheless, we believe it critically important to make clear to DRV that we would regard any significant attack on Saigon as falling within the statements we made prior to the cessation of bombing. Even though the new meetings have not been convened, we are entirely clear that the statements we made in October are applicable in present circumstances, and if Hanoi thinks otherwise we had better find it out rapidly. (We note that they have not repeat not made this argument in connection with the DMZ).

Dated by: WPDEA: WPEundy:bnm 12/17/68 4235

Classified by:

DOD - Secretary Clifford

Ref. Est.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

S/S- 290~~SECRET~~

Classification

Page 1A of telegram to Paris TODEL, Saigon~~SECRET~~
Classification

2. Accordingly, subject to factual comment from Saigon, Vance should see Lau at the earliest possible moment and convey the following points in substance. In your discretion, you are also authorized to express our grave concern to Zorin. Substance is as follows:

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 of telegram to PARIS TODEL , SAIGON~~SECRET~~*Classification*

X.3. I am instructed to bring your attention and that of your government to a serious situation developing on the ground in Viet-Nam which may have the gravest effects upon the atmosphere of the new meetings which are to begin as soon as we have reached agreement on procedures. I refer to the steady accumulation of reports indicating preparations to launch another attack in force upon the city of Saigon. The nature and scope of these preparations, the accompanying logistical ^b build-up in Laos and Cambodia, the specific character of instructions to subordinate military units, and the general level of military and associated political activity all point to a major new effort to strike at the capital of the Republic of Viet-Nam in the days ahead:

[~~Immediately upon receiving the above information, the US military authorities~~] We have evaluated these reports and this evidence with the utmost care and in the judgment of our responsible military authorities a significant attack against Saigon may be in the making.

XX It is not my purpose to comment upon the strategic plans of the military authorities of your country; we are of course quite able to deal effectively with whatever enemy action may

~~SECRET~~

Classification

develop against Saigon or elsewhere. However, I do feel it ~~was~~^{is} my duty to draw to your attention the extremely serious consequences which any such major attack upon Saigon would have for the continuation of these talks. As you know we made it very clear during the discussions which preceded the President's decision to halt the bombing on October 31 that the bombing halt could be maintained only if serious talks take place and if circumstances are maintained consistent with serious talks. We explained, as you seemed to understand, that military activities within or near the DMZ as well as indiscriminate armed attacks against major cities in Viet-Nam would not be consistent with serious talks. Our position on this score remains today precisely as it was expressed to you during September and October.

3.4. I remind you, moreover, that the President's decisions of March 31 and October 31 with respect to first limiting and then halting the bombing were linked to our desire to reduce the level of violence. I also remind you that in our meeting of September 12 we told you of our intention to propose mutual de-escalation

XXXXXX

SECRET

Classification

Classification

of the violence after the bombing halt; and, in a following meeting on October 21 we said that in the first wider meetings we might wish to discuss the issue of military de-escalation. You are therefore in no doubt both as to our specific position on attacks against the major cities and our basic approach on the need to work toward a reduction of violence as soon as possible:

XX 5I must therefore ask you to inform your government that my government takes the most serious view of the accumulating evidence pointing toward a major new attack on Saigon. We believe that any such attack would fail of its purpose as severely as have other attacks earlier this year. But, however that may be, we must make it very clear that if such an attack were to take place we would regard it as breaching the understandings we have reached prior to October 31. In that ~~xxxxx~~ case we would have to take appropriate military actions, and the full consequences of this would rest entirely upon your government.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

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6. XXX. In conveying this message -- and indeed in any conversations concerning the DMZ and major cities understandings -- we leave it to your discretion how to refer to these. We note, for example, that your report of the December 4 meeting with Lau (Paris 24876) quotes Lau as using the phrase "our mutual agreement." The more we can move them in this direction, the better.

XXXXX

XXXXX

7. XX. Finally, to avoid any implication that we regard the DMZ situation as satisfactory, you should make appropriate references to continuing NVA violations and prod Lau again on our proposal.

GP-3

END

~~SECRET~~

Classification

INFORMATION

(ps)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/
SENSITIVE

Tuesday, 6:30 P.M.
December 17, 1968

Mr. President:



Bromley Smith
Bromley Smith

SANITIZED

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 95-34
By isp, NARA, Date 7-26-95

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

4a
RECEIVED
WHCA

12-17-68 5-19 PM RDR

PRIORITY

1968 DEC 17 22 20

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BORMLEY SMITH (01) 02

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

GP-1
END

SANITIZED

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 95-33

By ij, NARA, Date 3-23-95

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 DEC 14 01 43

837 PM 12-13-68 EFH
PRIORITY

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 5
FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

GP-1
END

WH QSL K

SANTIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 95-33

By ijg, NARA, Date 3-23-95

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

5

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, December 17, 1968, 5:50 P. M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with General Goodpaster at 1:30 P. M.,
Wednesday, December 18

General Goodpaster asked to see you prior to going to New York to see President-elect Nixon.

General Goodpaster understands that what he is to do between now and February 1, when he returns to Vietnam, is to help the Nixon Administration set up its national security machinery and assist in the transition.

Generally speaking, General Goodpaster is knowledgeable about Presidential decision making. However, he has not had firsthand experience in many of the crucial decisions which you have taken in the last few years. The pressure of events on the President has increased measurably in the last five years.

Because he has just come from Saigon, you may wish to get from him the latest estimate of enemy intentions. He is prepared to give you his view of the general situation.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 28, NARA, Date 2-23-98

6

Tuesday, December 17, 1968, 4:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL-480 Supplementary for Vietnam

Free file

1. We would like your approval to conclude a supplementary PL-480 agreement for the sale of 100,000 MT of rice valued at \$18.5 million. This is the fifth supplement to the basic March 1967 agreement.

2. The rice to be supplied under this proposed agreement is part of Vietnam's anticipated requirements from the 1968-69 United States rice crop. Additional requirements will be met by either: (a) GVN cash purchases in the US (using funds already deposited by the GVN in the US Treasury Special Escrow Account); (b) a subsequent amendment to this proposed agreement, or (c) a new Title I agreement to be negotiated.

3. Self-help measures. The GVN has recently increased its schedule of official rice prices to serve as a stimulus for domestic rice production.

4. Local currency proceeds will be divided. Payment is to be made in installments of which 20 percent are reserved for US uses, and 80 percent GVN military budget support. A review of the GVN's foreign exchange in early 1969 will determine the respective proportions of commercial vs. PL-480 rice sales. This step-by-step procedure will give maximum flexibility in negotiating with the GVN.

5. Recommendations. I recommend that you authorize the negotiation of an \$18.5 million supplementary PL-480 agreement as outlined above. US Mission Saigon urges this action. State, Agriculture, Treasury, BOB, AID and Commerce concur.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call Me _____

BK5
for
W. W. Rostow

cc: Walt Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

25
Tuesday, December 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: North Koreans Accept Our Pueblo Offer

The North Koreans have accepted our second position. One final meeting, hopefully tomorrow, will wrap up the final procedural details. Release of the Pueblo crew would follow immediately.

After rejecting our first position, the North Korean delegate accepted our offer to sign the North Korean document, to be preceded by our statement, as follows:

"The position of the United States Government with regard to the Pueblo, as consistently expressed in the negotiations at Panmunjom and in public, has been that the ship was not engaged in illegal activity, that there is no convincing evidence that the ship at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The document which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew."

Secretary Rusk will be prepared to give additional details if you wish at the luncheon meeting today.

Brom
Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 92-154

By MP/isp NARA, Date 1-26-98

~~SECRET~~

8

INFORMATION

Monday, December 16, 1968

Mr. President:

Walt Rostow is at home running
a fever.

Attached is the agenda for the
luncheon scheduled tomorrow.

In the event that Mr. Rostow comes
in in the morning, we can send you
a revised version if he has additional
suggestions.

Bremley Smith

8a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Luncheon with the President
Tuesday, December 17, 1968, 1:15 P.M.

AGENDA

1. Vietnam

- a. Paris negotiations - Secretary Rusk
 - Report of our negotiators' dinner with Vice President Ky tonight.
- b. Military situation - Secretary Clifford/General Wheeler
 - General Abrams believes enemy has intentions to launch offensive

2. Pueblo Negotiations - Secretary Rusk

- Report on meeting with North Koreans scheduled for early tomorrow

3. Other

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ML/dch NARA, Date 1-27-98

~~TOP SECRET~~

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9 a

~~TOP SECRET~~

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- Report on meeting with North Koreans scheduled for early tomorrow

3. Other

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1982
By MP/dch, NARA, Date 1-27-98

~~TOP SECRET~~

1968 DEC 15 17 41

AND HAVE ONE FOR YOU

68 DEC 15 PM 12:45

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EEA863
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4625

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82903

~~SECRET~~ /HARVAN PLUS

DECEMBER 15, 1968

HEREWITH THO ASKS FRENCH HELP ON SETTLEMENT VIA DEBRE AND
FRENCH SHOW SOME WILLINGNESS TO GET INTO THE ACT WITH
"COMPROMISE" IDEAS.

PARIS 25356

SUBJ: SECOND DEBRE-THO CONVERSATION - DECEMBER 12

1. IN REPLY TO EMBOFF'S QUESTION, MANAC'H SAID THAT
QUAI OFFICIALS HAD AGREED TO TELL THOSE WHO INQUIRE ABOUT
DECEMBER 12 DEBRE-LE DUC THO MEETING THAT IT WAS "GENERAL
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS." IN FACT, MANAC'H SAID, IT WAS MORE THAN
THAT. MANAC'H SAID THAT HE WOULD GIVE EMBOFF GENERAL IDEA
OF WHAT TRANSPIRED BUT INSISTED THAT INFO BE VERY CLOSELY
HELD BECAUSE BY GIVING EMBOFF INSIGHT INTO
CONVERSATION HE WAS CLEARLY GOING BEYOND INSTRUCTIONS.

2. CONVERSATION WITH THO LASTED TWO HOURS, HALF OF TIME
TAKEN UP BY TRANSLATION. THO RETURNED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS
TO THEME THAT DRV WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN FRENCH ADVICE "TO
FIND MECHANISM WHICH COULD HELP TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTION
IN VIET-NAM.", THO ASKED DEBRE TO PASS ON TO DRV FRENCH VIEWS
ON SPECIFIC ISSUES WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO
SEARCH FOR SOLUTION. DEBRE SAID THAT FRENCH WOULD GIVE
REQUEST CAREFUL THOUGHT AND WOULD REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH THO.
IN COMMENTING ON THIS EXCHANGE, MANAC'H TOLD EMBOFF THAT IT
WAS APPARENT THAT THO WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF HANOI AND
IT WAS NOT MERELY AN OFF-THE-CUFF REMARK BY THO. MANAC'H
SAID THAT AFTER MEETING, DEBRE ASKED MANAC'H TO PREPARE
PAPERS IN DEPTH ON 2-3 ISSUES WHICH DEBRE WOULD

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ-0198-43-3-6

By UKH NAR Date 12-08-2017

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

THEN DISCUSS WITH THO. AFTER DISCUSSING THESE PAPERS WITH THO AND HAVING OBTAINED DRV'S REACTION, MANAC'H TOLD EMBOFF HE THEN PLANNED THAT FRENCH WOULD INFORM AMERICANS OF THEIR MEETINGS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE.

3. EMBOFF TOOK NOTE OF ABOVE AND ASKED ON WHAT SPECIFIC ITEMS FRENCH HAD BEEN ASKED OR WERE PLANNING TO WRITE PAPERS. MANAC'H REPLIED THAT ONE PROBLEM ON WHICH THO ASKED TO KNOW FRENCH THINKING WAS WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT WOULD EVOLVE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. DEBRE HAD REPLIED THAT ON THIS POINT FRENCH DISAGREE BOTH WITH DRV AND US POSITION. DEBRE TOLD THO THAT AS FRENCH SEE IT, DRV AND NLF BELIEVE THAT NEW GOVERNMENT MUST BE FORMED FROM SCRATCH "WHILE US BELIEVES THAT CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS STARTED WITH ELECTIONS IN 1967, ELABORATION OF CONSTITUTION, ETC., SHOULD BE BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT. FRENCH VIEW IS SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN. DEBRE TOLD THO, AND PERHAPS COMPROMISE COULD BE WORKED OUT WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN SOUTH VIET-NAM WITH ASPIRATIONS OF NLF. FROM WHAT MANAC'H TOLD EMBOFF, LATTER CAME AWAY WITH IMPRESSION THAT THIS ISSUE WOULD BE ONE SUBJECT ON WHICH FRENCH WOULD DRAW UP PAPER FOR DISCUSSION WITH THO.

4. WHEN EMBOFF PRESSED MANAC'H ON WHAT OTHER SUBJECTS FRENCH WOULD DRAFT PAPERS, MANAC'H MENTIONED THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY "AND AN INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE" FOR SETTLEMENT IN VIET-NAM. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THESE TWO SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED BY DEBRE WITH THO OR WHETHER THESE TWO SUBJECTS ARE MANAC'H OWN SUGGESTIONS. IN ANY CASE, MANAC'H STRESSED THAT ABOVE INFO IS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL AND IF ASKED BY OTHERS, HE WOULD DENY THAT HE EVER DISCUSSED DEBRE-THO CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF. MANAC'H ALSO STRESSED THAT ADVICE FRENCH WOULD GIVE TO THO WAS NOT ON GOVERNMENTAL BASIS BUT DEBRE "ACTING IN PRIVATE CAPACITY".

5. EMBOFF'S CONVERSATION WITH MANAC'H ON THIS SUBJECT ENDED THERE. IT WAS APPARENT THAT MANAC'H HAD MERELY GIVEN EMBOFF GLIMPSE OF WHAT TRANSPIRED AND EVEN MANAC'H WHO USUALLY VERY FORTHCOMING WITH US, FELT HE COULD NOT GIVE US AT THIS TIME ANY MORE ABOUT FRENCH TALKS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE.

DTG: 151623Z DEC 1968

~~SECRET~~

VEEA859
00 WTE10
DE WTE 4614

1968 DEC 14 18 05

11
SECRET
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
DEC 14 PM 1:10

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82396

~~SECRET~~ / LITERALLY EYES ONLY

DECEMBER 14, 1968

HEREWITH A LETTER FROM JOHN MCCLOY TO THE PRESIDENT AND A MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT URGING STRONGLY THAT WE NOT ENTER INTO MISSILE TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS AT THIS TIME.

JOHN MCCLOY CALLED ME ABOUT THIS AND SAID THAT NO ONE EXCEPT HIS SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENT, AND ME WOULD SEE THE MEMORANDUM.

THE MEMORANDUM AROSE, HE SAID, FROM A CONVERSATION WITH CLARK CLIFFORD IN WHICH CLARK INDICATED SUCH TALKS AS A POSSIBILITY. I SHALL, OF COURSE, MAKE NO DISTRIBUTION OF THIS UNLESS YOU SO DIRECT.

DECEMBER 12, 1968

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE FELT IMPELLED TO PREPARE THE ENCLOSED MEMORANDUM WHICH I WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO HAVE YOU READ BEFORE YOU OR ANYONE ELSE UNDERTAKES TO OPEN UP TALKS AT THIS PARTICULAR POINT IN HISTORY WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON THE MISSILES ISSUE.

I HAVE NOT SOUGHT TO REFINE THE LANGUAGE OF THIS MEMORANDUM AS I WOULD IF I HAD NOT FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BRING IT TO YOUR ATTENTION AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

JOHN MCCLOY

ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM TO - THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 10-70
By *id* NARA, Date 9-1-10

FROM WHAT I CAN GATHER FROM THE ACCOUNTS OF THE PRESS INTERVIEWS AND RUMORS THAT I HEAR, THE GOVERNMENT STILL HAS UNDER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION THE INITIATION DURING THE LAST

Free file

DAYS OF THIS ADMINISTRATION OF TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION DEALING WITH THE MATTER OF REDUCTION OR CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MISSILE WEAPONS.

AS YOU KNOW, I AM CHAIRMAN OF THE GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE CREATED BY AN ACT OF CONGRESS AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT THAT COMMITTEE'S RESPONSIBILITY IS TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE AGENCY ON ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. I HAVE HELD THIS POSITION SINCE THE ORIGINAL COMMITTEE WAS APPOINTED. I WAS ALSO ASKED BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO SET UP THE AGENCY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AND TOOK OVER ITS DIRECTION UNTIL IT WAS PREPARED TO FUNCTION UNDER THE ACT AND UNDER A NEW DIRECTOR. IT IS NOT, HOWEVER, AS CHAIRMAN OF THAT COMMITTEE THAT I FEEL I SHOULD EXPRESS MY VIEWS REGARDING THE CONTEMPLATED MEETING WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WHO HAS HAD LONG ASSOCIATION WITH MATTERS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY. THAT ASSOCIATION HAS INCLUDED PROBLEMS OF ARMAMENT, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR, AS WELL AS POLICIES IN RESPECT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. IT HAS ALSO INVOLVED EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION.

I HAVE A VERY STRONG FEELING THAT IT IS INADVISABLE TO OPEN THESE TALKS NOW AT ANY LEVEL AND CERTAINLY NOT AT THE TOP LEVEL. I HOLD THESE VIEWS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(1) THE MAIN PRIORITY AT THE PRESENT MOMENT IS THE REPAIR AND REINVIGORATION OF THE ALLIANCE NOT THE INCEPTION OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ANY EFFORTS AT THIS TIME TO ALTER THIS PRIORITY WILL HAVE, IN MY JUDGMENT, MOST SERIOUS EFFECTS ON THE ALLIANCE. IT IS A GESTURE TOWARD THE ALLIANCE WHICH IS NEEDED AT THIS TIME NOT A GESTURE TOWARD MOSCOW.

(2) SUFFICIENT WEIGHT, IN MY JUDGMENT, HAS NOT YET BEEN GIVEN TO THE EFFECTS OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SO-CALLED BREZHNEV DOCTRINE AND THE THREATS AGAINST WEST GERMANY. NOR HAS SUFFICIENT WEIGHT BEEN GIVEN TO THE ALTERED SECURITY POSITION OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES WHICH NEW DEVELOPMENTS HAVE BROUGHT ABOUT.

(3) NO MATTER HOW TENTATIVE OR GENERAL THE FORM OF THE INITIAL APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION MAY TAKE BY INSTITUTING IT WE SHALL BE IMPLICITLY ACCEPTING A PRINCIPLE OF NO SUPERIORITY, OR EXPRESSED IN A DIFFERENT FORM, OF PARITY. NO AMOUNT OF SEMANTICS WITH THE USE OF DIFFERENT WORDS CAN ALTER THAT FACT. THE MINUTE WE TOUCH OUR FOOT DOWN IN THE MEETING ROOM THIS PRINCIPLE IS IMPLICIT. THIS INVOLVES A MAJOR STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOTH OUR STRATEGY AND OUR PUBLIC OPINION. THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION AND ITS PREDECESSORS HAVE CONSTANTLY INSISTED THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN IN A POSITION OF MASSIVE SUPERIORITY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD AND THAT WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN THIS POSITION. I HAVE SEEN THE PAPERS WHICH OUTLINED THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THIS MATTER OF MISSILES WHICH WERE PREPARED PRIOR TO THE CZECH INVASION. THERE WAS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND NOR IN THE

MIND OF AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES THAT IT DID EMBODY THIS PRINCIPLE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS IMPLICIT RATHER THAN EXPRESSED. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST UPON SUPERIORITY, ALTHOUGH I HAVE QUESTIONED THE ASSUMPTION THAT PARITY IS NECESSARILY A MORE STABLE FORM OF DEFENSE THAN THAT OF SUPERIORITY. MY POSITION IS THAT THE ASSUMPTION OF PARITY IN WHATEVER FORM OF WORDS IT IS STATED SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND CLARIFIED WITH THE CONGRESS, THE COUNTRY AND THE ALLIES TO A MUCH GREATER DEGREE THAN IT HAS BEEN BEFORE THE UNITED STATES ENTERS UPON MEETINGS WHICH COMMIT US TO IT.

(4) IT WAS A SERIOUS MISTAKE, IN MY JUDGMENT, WHEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE ORIGINATION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT, WE FIRST CLEARED A DRAFT WITH THE SOVIET UNION BEFORE WE APPROACHED SOME OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT ALLIES AND CERTAINLY THE ONE WHICH WAS MOST DEEPLY CONCERNED. THE AVIDITY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, ALMOST ANY AGREEMENT, WITH THE SOVIET UNION MADE US LOSE SIGHT OF THE SIGNIFICANT PRIORITIES. I FEAR WE MAY BE ON THE VERGE OF MAKING THE SAME MISTAKE AGAIN. THE BEST WAY TO AVOID A FRAGMENTATION OF EUROPE, THE FURTHER EROSION OF THE ALLIANCE AND A CONSTRUCTIVE MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS THE MAINTENANCE OF A THOROUGHLY CONVINCING AND COHESIVE ALLIED SECURITY POLICY.

I AM AWARE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN GENERAL EXPRESSIONS ON THE PART OF THE ALLIES INCLUDING THE NATO MINISTERS AS WELL AS RESOLUTIONS IN THE UNITED NATIONS REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF OUR OPENING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION LEADING TO THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, BUT I BELIEVE THESE EXPRESSIONS ONLY REFLECT THE GENERAL PRESSURE FOR SUCH REDUCTIONS WITHOUT TAKING INTO NECESSARY ACCOUNT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CZECH AFFAIR, THE ALTERATION IN THE POWER BALANCE (WHICH CERTAINLY HAS TAKEN PLACE) OR THE CHARACTER OF REDUCTION OR CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS WHICH THE GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION NOW JUSTIFIES. IT IS MUCH MORE THAN A MATTER OF COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION OR THE GENERAL COMPARISON OF THE SOVIET-UNITED STATES POSITION. IT IS NOW A MATTER OF THE WHOLE ALLIED DETERRENT. THE STUDIES MADE BEFORE THE CZECH INVASION ARE, IN MY JUDGMENT, NOT UP TO DATE AND NO TEMPORARILY COMFORTING ASSURANCES ON THE PART OF MOSCOW IN REGARD TO BERLIN, RUMANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, ETC., ALTER THE FUNDAMENTAL FACT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS FURTHER WEST AND IN GREATER QUANTITY THAT WAS THE CASE EVEN DURING THE WAR. THE CZECH INVASION DEMONSTRATED A MOBILITY SPEED AND CAPACITY TO REINFORCE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS WHICH WE, WITH ALL OUR VAUNTED AIRLIFT POSSIBILITIES, CANNOT NOW REMOTELY DUPLICATE.

THE CZECH INVASION, TOGETHER WITH THE GREATLY INCREASED NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL POTENTIAL OF THE SOVIETS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOVIETS AND SOVIET INFLUENCE INTO THE MEDITERRANEAN, CONSTITUTE A NEW SITUATION OF WHICH WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE IN DEALING WITH OUR ALLIES. THE NEXT MEETING, IN MY JUDGMENT, SHOULD BE IN THIS COUNTRY WITH THE ALLIES AND THERE THE MATTER OF DETERMINING TOGETHER WHAT IS THE OVERALL NEED IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BEFORE ANY FURTHER OVERTURES ARE MADE TO THE SOVIETS. IF THIS

PROCEDURE AND PRIORITY IS NOT FOLLOWED, I VERY MUCH FEAR WE SHALL ONLY BE ENCOURAGING OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES TO RELY MORE HEAVILY ON THE SO-CALLED DETENTE AND THE UNITED STATES ULTIMATE STRATEGIC DETERRENT WITHOUT DOING THEIR SHARE TO MAINTAIN THE IMMEDIATE AND PROBABLY MORE CONVINCING DETERRENT OF WELL TRAINED AND WELL SUPPORTED FORCES IN THE FIELD. A JOINT AND SERIOUS REVIEW OF THE WHOLE SECURITY POSITION WILL TEND TO RECREATE THE COOPERATIVE SPIRIT OF THE ALLIANCE WHICH IS SO GREATLY NEEDED AT THIS TIME.

THE SOVIETS ARE BOUND TO EXPLOIT WITH THEIR ALLIES AND THEIR POTENTIAL SATELLITES ANY HASTY MEETING WITH US AS AN ACQUIESCENCE IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CZECH INVASION. IN SPITE OF ALL THE NEW YORK TIMES' EDITORIALIZING, THERE IS NO NEED FOR HASTE. IF THE PROGRAM HAS MERIT FOR US AND THE SOVIETS, ITS ADVANTAGES WILL NOT DESAPPEAR OVERNIGHT. THE VALUE OF THE PROGRAM TO THE SOVIET UNION IS VERY GREAT AND WILL EXTEND INTO AT LEAST 1969. IT WILL BE JUST AS IMPORTANT TO THEM IN 1969 AS IN 1968 TO REDUCE OUR NUCLEAR POTENTIAL AND IT WILL BE JUST AS IMPORTANT TO THEM TO HAVE US ENTER INTO A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WHICH CONSOLIDATES THEIR NEAR MONOPOLY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREVER EXCLUDES GERMANY, ONE OF OUR ALLIES, FROM HAVING THEM. IT IS NO ARGUMENT TO CONTEND THAT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MAY WITHDRAW THEIR SUPPORT TO A REDUCTION IN THE COURSE OF ANOTHER ADMINISTRATION DUE TO A POSSIBLE CHANGE IN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF PERSONNEL. SUCH AN ARGUMENT MERELY CONFIRMS THE FACT THAT THERE EXISTS A TENDENCY TO PRECLUDE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION FROM ENTIRE FREEDOM OF ACTION IN A MATTER THAT WILL DEEPLY CONCERN THE COUNTRY AND FOR WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IS BOUND TO HAVE TO ASSUME THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY.

I KNOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN SUSTAINED AND THOUGHTFUL WORK DONE ON THIS PROBLEM IN THE PREPARATION FOR THE MEETING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THOUGH MOST OF IT WAS DONE BEFORE THE CZECH AFFAIR OCCURRED, I AM SURE CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT HAS BEEN GIVEN IT SINCE THEN BUT THESE STUDIES WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO REVIEW AND TO SOME DEGREE FOR THE ALLIES TO REVIEW BEFORE A MEETING WITH THE SOVIETS TAKES PLACE. THE PROBLEM IS, AS I HAPPEN TO KNOW, MOST COMPLEX AND PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO GRASP WITH ALL ITS IMPLICATIONS BETWEEN NOW AND THE TIME WHICH I GUESS IS CONTEMPLATED FOR THE INITIATION OF THE TALKS. I REALLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND HOW ANY GROUP OF PEOPLE, INCLUDING THOSE JUST DESIGNATED BY MR. NIXON TO BECOME HIS SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, CAN BE EXPECTED TO HAVE A KNOWLEDGEABLE ATTITUDE ON THIS VITAL ISSUE AND YET I FEEL CERTAIN THAT THE ISSUE IS SO GREAT AND SO SIGNIFICANT, ONE CAN BE QUITE CERTAIN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IS GOING TO HAVE TO GIVE THOROUGH, SINCERE AND PROMPT THOUGHT TO IT. THIS OPPORTUNITY SHOULD, IN MY JUDGMENT, BE AFFORDED THEM FREE OF ANY PRESSURE WHICH AN IMMEDIATE MEETING WITH THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ENTAIL.

DTG 141611Z DECEMBER 1968

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

EEA858
00 WTE12
DE WTE 4617

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82899

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SWT
RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 DEC 14 17 14

Free file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECEMBER 14, 1968

IS IT AGREEABLE TO YOU THAT CY VANCE COME HOME ON 23 DECEMBER?

YES-----

NO -----

CALL ME -----

HE WOULD PLAN TO RETURN TO PARIS ON OR ABOUT 27 DECEMBER.

IF HE COMES HOME, WOULD YOU WISH TO SEE HIM DIRECTLY ON ARRIVAL,
ASSUMING IT IS EARLY EVENING? NEXT DAY?

DIRECTLY ON ARRIVAL -----

NEXT DAY -----

NO -----

CALL ME -----

DTG 141645Z DECEMBER 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 DEC 14 PM 12:20
SITUATION ROOM
WHITEHOUSE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
E: mp Date 1-26-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 DEC 14 16 36

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
68 DEC 14 AM 11:40

EEA856
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4616

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82898

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECEMBER 14, 1968

PRESIDENT TUBMAN OF LIBERIA CELEBRATES ON JANUARY 1, 1969, THE TWENTY-FIFTH (SILVER) ANNIVERSARY OF HIS TAKING OFFICE. ALTHOUGH YOU HAVE SENT TUBMAN GIFTS PREVIOUSLY (MOST RECENTLY FOR HIS SIXTH INAUGURATION LAST JANUARY), STATE RECOMMENDS THAT YOU SEND A GIFT FOR THIS SPECIAL OCCASION.

KNOWING YOUR FEELING THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN THESE AFRICANS JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING YOU COULD GIVE THEM, WE ASKED STATE WHETHER THIS IS REALLY NECESSARY. OUR AMBASSADOR SAYS THE PROBLEM IS THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS WILL BE SENDING GIFTS TO CELEBRATE THIS SPECIAL OCCASION AND THAT IT WOULD BE MILDLY EMBARRASSING IF WE WERE AMONG THE MISSING.

HAVING REVIEWED YOUR PREVIOUS GIFTS TO TUBMAN, STATE SUGGESTS A CEREMONIAL SILVER OFFICE WATER DECANTER AND TRAY, BEARING THE SEALS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES AND THE FOLLOWING INSCRIPTION:

"TO WILLIAM V. S. TUBMAN ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 25TH YEAR AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA WITH THE BEST WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. IN FRIENDSHIP,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON."

I RECOGNIZE THIS IS MARGINAL BUT IT LOOKS HARD TO AVOID. IF YOU WISH TO SEND THIS REMEMBRANCE, STATE WILL HAVE TO ORDER IT PROMPTLY TO GET IT THROUGH THE CHRISTMAS RUSH AND ON TO THE PLANE IN TIME TO BE IN LIBERIA JANUARY 1.

APPROVE-----
DISAPPROVE----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 141611Z DEC 68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 4, NARA, Date 2-23-98

15
Pres file

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, December 14, 1968 - 12:40pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor underlines the need for our preparing the way for a prompt response against North Vietnam, if the enemy actually moves against Saigon.

He also suggests that we consider having Harriman and Vance warn Hanoi in advance.

You may wish to consider both propositions at the Tuesday lunch.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ly, NARA, Date 2-23-98

WWRostow:rla

15a

~~SECRET~~

December 13, 1968

Mr. President:

You are well aware of the indications of a possible renewal of offensive action by the enemy in the Saigon area and have seen General Abrams' cable describing his preparations. I hope that we are equally prepared here in Washington to respond quickly and decisively if, indeed, the enemy launches a significant attack.

In such a case, in addition to our action against the attacking forces in South Viet-Nam, my own judgment would be to respond quickly with a reprisal air attack against one or more key logistic installations north of the 19th parallel, the magnitude of our attack being proportioned to that of the enemy. No one seems to believe that we are capable of such a drastic step--certainly Hanoi does not as the exposed disposition of supplies all over North Viet-Nam gives evidence. While the "doves" at home and abroad would be aghast, the shock effect on Hanoi could produce not only better behavior in South Viet-Nam but a more cooperative attitude in Paris. You will recall that we never got action in Pasmunjom until we broke off the discussions a couple of times--at that moment, our only recourse in responding to Communist intransigence.

I would think that Harriman and Vance should make clear to their counterparts the risks they are running if they renew the offensive or if they stall the negotiations. Our government spokesmen, in backgrounding the press, should get out the word that our restraint is no more permanent than the good behavior of the enemy and that we are quite prepared to revert to bombing for good cause at any time. Our air weapon is an asset either as a reprisal for a violation of our "understandings" with regard to Hanoi restraints or as a response to foot-dragging at the conference table. We should be prepared to use it without compunction for either purpose if it is in our interest, and the enemy and the public should know it in advance.

M. D. T.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 92-154

By mp/yp, NARA, Date 1-26-98

~~SECRET~~

16

INFORMATION

Saturday, December 14, 1968
11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Mac Bundy reports to you on his Vienna meeting with Gvishiani, etc., on the proposed East-West Center. Attached is a longer memorandum to me, which I shall make available to the State Dept.

Free file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

16a

McGEORGE BUNDY
320 EAST 43RD STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

December 12, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

As you know from Walt, I have just come back from a quick weekend trip to Vienna to talk to Gvishiani about the proposed East-West Center which you asked me to begin exploring almost two years ago. Because of the pace of Gvishiani's own consultations in Moscow, this matter is not likely to move much further before January 20 (unless there should be an occasion for you to give it a little push as you did at Glassboro). So it will have to join the work on Mr. Nixon's agenda, and I have asked Walt to let me know in due course whether you or Dean Rusk or he have views as to how I should help to get their support for it.

But what I want to do here is simply to thank you most warmly for giving me an assignment that has been full of interest. The work has been slow and naturally intermittent because it takes time for proposals of this sort to take root in governments as varied as those involved here. But every discussion I have had -- in Western Europe and Moscow in the spring of 1967, in a conference in Sussex in June of 1968, and now in a hard two days in Vienna -- makes me more persuaded that you hit upon an idea of very great potential value for increased understanding among major nations, and especially between the Soviet Union and ourselves. This business of systematic analysis is something the rising generation of Russian administrators cares about more and more, and it is something about which we can and should talk and work together. The ways and means are not easy, and not all the winds are favorable. But the very fact of the exploration has, I think, been at least marginally useful in reminding the Russians that the American President is a man with a long view and a strong sense of the need to build useful bridges.

At the very least you have contributed once again to my own education, and I am deeply grateful.

Respectfully, as ever,

Ma

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D. C.

THE FORD FOUNDATION
320 EAST 43RD STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

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McGEORGE BUNDY
PRESIDENT

December 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW

Subject: Meeting with Zuckerman, Gvishiani, Peccei, Vienna, December 8-9, 1968

This meeting was arranged by Zuckerman with the help of Peccei. We met in Vienna because Gvishiani was out there for an ECOSOC Committee meeting. We met under the auspices of Zuckerman who was made a committee-of-one after the Sussex meeting in June.

The real object of the meeting was to get a better picture of the degree of Soviet interest, and to try to strengthen Gvishiani's hand in dealing with his own political superiors. As you may remember, he did not come to the Sussex meeting on the ground that only our Germans were present. This is clearly not his own judgment and he explicitly said during our discussion that he knows the Soviets are in many such bodies with the Federal Republic and without the DDR. He strongly implied that the matter had run into a political roadblock that could perhaps have been avoided with better footwork. So while I made it clear that I did not think any administration would want to set up a center from which the West Germans were excluded, we agreed to put that thorny problem aside and talk about the substance of the undertaking.

On this basis Gvishiani proved more forthcoming than anyone on the Soviet side since I first began explorations with Dobrynin in 1967. He himself clearly wants an enterprise of this kind and believes that it can have high value for Soviet students of systems analysis. He also believes that the Soviet Government can find the money if it can get past its own political wariness. What he wanted from this meeting was a statement of principles that would sound good in Moscow. In particular, he wanted the proposed center to be described as nongovernmental and scientific in character. He appears already to have a ruling which permits his State Committee on Science and Technology to take part in international nongovernmental scientific activities. So he wants this undertaking to be described in ways which fit under this umbrella. Gvishiani also wants to emphasize the usefulness of the center in terms of the collection and distribution of information, access to computation facilities, and the exchange of information on the use of data processing systems.

The attached draft document will be superseded in a week by a more polished version which Zuckerman is drafting. But it will give you the flavor of the discussion so far. As you will see, it needs interpretation in the light of the discussion above. It is not precisely the document that we might wish to use here with experts in the U. S. or on Capitol Hill. But neither is it inconsistent with what we would use in those places. It is, in short, a description for Russian eyes of a center which, like other human undertakings, will have different kinds of value and meaning for different participants.

Not covered in this document are important questions of precise location, initial magnitude, and personnel. We all agreed that the quality of the center would depend upon its initial leadership, and there seemed to be a real absence of dogma about the characteristics of such a leader. Gvishiani said it would clearly be more convenient if the first director were not an American, but his comment here was preferential and not categorical.

As to location, Zuckerman made a powerful pitch for London, and my own personal view is that among the possible alternatives London is probably the best in all but political terms. It would be quite touchy for the Russians right now, but it seems unlikely that the current tiff between the Soviets and the Wilson government will last long.

As for size, we found ourselves a little more modest and cautious than some of our earlier estimates. Wholly informally, we all seemed to agree that in the first year such a center would not be likely to need more than \$1.5 million and that by the third year it would be doing well if it could use as much as \$5 million. This is safely within the estimates which I have discussed in the last two years with NSF and on the Hill. I think if the Russians come in at all, there will be no real difficulty about their paying a fair share. Peccei threw out the suggestion that the outfit be financed 1/3 by the United States, 1/3 by the USSR and 1/3 by Europeans. Gvishiani said nothing but he did not seem distressed.

We had some informal discussion about the initial membership, but nothing conclusive emerged. The aide memoire speaks of a Board of Directors of not more than seven. This was understood among us to mean that we might wish to have room for the Germans and representatives from one Eastern European country. But it could also turn out that it would be wise to begin with a smaller group -- an inviting power plus the US and USSR is one possibility. It seemed agreed that as soon as we have a center we will wish to let the Japanese in if they want to come -- but we thought that the process of making a start is so complex that we should not now add a Japanese factor.

While this whole meeting was personal and informal, Zuckerman and I were closely aware of the fact that we have West German and French interests to consider. The senior Frenchman concerned with these matters is Masse of Electricité de France.

and both of us will be bringing him up to date promptly. Sir Solly undertook to make sure that the state of the play is understood in Bonn. There we have been dealing in recent months with a most unusually perceptive and responsive official of the Science Ministry, Dr. Wolfgang Finke.

I of course made it clear throughout that while President Johnson's position was as clear and sympathetic as ever -- and while my own part in the exploration was based on his request of 1966 -- I could not speak for the new administration. I did report that I had mentioned my trip to Henry Kissinger. The others all made it clear that they would need several weeks for consultation in their own governments, and I said that clearly we would need to place the problem before Mr. Nixon and his associates before anyone could speak for the American view as it might be after January 20. I undertook to make sure that the matter was presented in an appropriate way, and I will be calling you to see whether the President or the Secretary or you has any view as to how this should best be done.

McGeorge Bundy

VIENNA MEETINGINTERNATIONAL
ADV. CENTERPLANNING FOR THE INSTITUTE FOR SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY

1. There is an urgent need for the development of systematic methods of analysis, useful in coping with complex problems now facing many nations. Moreover there is a great deal that those who work on these hard problems in different countries can learn from each other.
2. ^{and} There is a corresponding/urgent need for an autonomous, multinational, non-governmental Center to aid in the dispassionate research and development of these new methods of system^{etc.} analysis, operations research, or cybernetics.
Such a Center should be connected with national efforts to solve these problems, and that this connection should be provided for in each case by a chosen national group.
The Center should reinforce rather than weaken such national activity.
3. The Center must provide an enduring environment for work on the highest standard. It is only by the quality of what it does that such an independent multinational Center can ensure its usefulness to all.
4. All the work of the Center must be open to the experts of all nations, in accordance with the basic principles of the world of science. *general practice of*
5. The Center will conduct its own methodological studies. It should also contribute energetically to the provision of new means of understanding in these fields across lines of nationality and language. The logic of computation^{and} and the vocabulary of modern management give examples of fields which need this service.

6. The main base of the Center must have the facilities necessary for its work. These include facilities for collecting and processing data, a working technical library, and office space with supporting staff for the leaders of the Center and their senior scientific colleagues.

7. A promising way to begin might be for a small number of countries to provide the first class expert participation and the necessary economic resources.

While the Center should aim to contribute to the needs of all nations, it should initially be small. This is a difficult field and grandiose undertakings are not likely to have the necessary quality.

8. The Center should initially be governed by a Board of Directors of not more than seven. The directors should come from different countries, and they should be men with the experience and sophistication necessary to set the policy of the Center, appoint the Director, and determine its budget. The Board may choose to create Advisory Groups of wider membership to aid it in its work.

9. The Center should be located in ^{the} a city which can make the greatest contribution to its work. Elements of such a contribution are accessibility, the quantity and quality of related technical and scientific facilities, the convenience of the language. There are only a few major European cities which can meet this test.

10. ~~While the Center thus designed would be sponsored~~
While the leadership and support of the Center thus described would come initially from a small number of countries, it should be repeated that this subject is of high importance to all the world. Not only must the work of the Center be open to all from the beginning, but its directors must be ready to modify and enlarge its operation and its forms of government after its formative years. In later years the participation in all phases of its management would be open on an appropriate basis to all who are ready and able to make contributions of skill and resources to its work.

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, December 14, 1968 - 11:25 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

After careful investigation -- and contact with Abrams and McCain -- Clifford herewith backs appointing a general or admiral to head a Joint Logistic Review Board -- as Nitze earlier recommended.

W. W. Rostow

OK _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Conf. Room, Feb. 24, 1989
By ly, NAWO, Date 2-23-98

WWRostow:rlh

3767

17a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Joint Logistic Review Board

This memorandum provides the further information requested by you regarding the proposed Joint Logistic Review Board for which we recommended on December 4 the approval of a four-star billet.

With regard to your specific questions, General Wheeler has personally spoken both to General Abrams and Admiral McCain and they endorse this undertaking. The terms of reference of the Board are set out in the attached draft which we plan to issue as soon as approval of the position is obtained.

The desirability of this undertaking has been under discussion by the Secretaries and Chiefs during the past two months. The concept of the Board originated with Secretary Resor and General Westmoreland based on their deep conviction that a logistic buildup of the type and scope provided to our forces in Vietnam can be furnished in any future conflict at less cost, with less support manpower, less excess materiel, more effective joint logistic arrangements, and with less impact on logistic readiness in other areas. On 26 November General Wheeler wrote the Secretary of Defense on behalf of the Joint Chiefs, as follows:

"The matter requires expeditious treatment in order to accomplish the review while the Vietnamese situation is still current; therefore, the terms of reference direct completion of the review as soon as practicable and not later than 12 months. The objective is to ensure readiness for effective and efficient logistic action in the future and the implementation of improvement actions as indicated from reviewing those strengths and weaknesses of the Southeast Asia experience which are applicable to future contingencies. Early results are necessary in order that the Services will take full advantage of the lessons learned in preparation for possible changes in our worldwide military posture in the near future."

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DDI Guidelines
By 62 NARA, Date 7-23-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-7015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

As indicated in the attached draft, this review will be world-wide, covering all Military Services and the Defense Supply Agency -- and the respective roles in logistic management of the OSD, Joint Staff, and the unified and specified commands. It will involve an assessment of the entire spectrum of logistic support from requirements planning through production, transportation, storage, distribution, communications, inventory control, maintenance and disposal. The success of this review will have an important near-term bearing on "roll-up" planning and inventory investment.

For your reference, I am attaching a copy of the December 4 memorandum to the President, copies of cablegrams from Admiral McCain and General Abrams endorsing the establishment of a board, and the draft of a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense setting forth terms of reference for the board to be issued upon receipt of Presidential approval.

In view of the above, we urge that the proposed post of Chairman, Joint Logistic Review Board, be approved and designated as one of importance and responsibility warranting the grade of general/admiral.

Earl M. Clegg

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

17h

DEC 4 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Designation of a General/Flag Officer Position

1. Based upon the recommendations of the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have concluded that a comprehensive study should be conducted of the logistic support of the conflict in Southeast Asia and the world-wide impact thereof. Such a study is warranted by the magnitude of the logistic effort required. There has been a very extensive multi-Service buildup of forces in distant and underdeveloped areas, accompanied by a large construction effort. I believe that such a study would suggest ways and means for achieving full effectiveness in the logistic support of our military forces in future contingencies and for reducing the financial burden.

2. This study would be broad in scope and in great depth. Accordingly, I anticipate that the study will require approximately one year to complete.

3. The chairman of the study group will report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. I recommend that the position of "Chairman, Joint Logistic Review Board", be designated as one of importance and responsibility warranting the grade of General/Admiral.

4. Provided you approve this position as one warranting the grade of General/Admiral, I will submit to you my recommendation for the assignment of an officer to occupy it after I have considered other related assignment actions for general/flag officers of the Services.

Paul H. Nitze
DEPUTY

SecDef	Distribution
SecDef	
DepSec	
MLAAsst	
SpecAsst	
Mr. H	
ASD(A)	
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CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
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SPECAT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN WHEELER FROM ADM MCCAIN
JOINT LOGISTICS REVIEW BOARD (U)

A. JCS 7295/092347Z DEC 68

1. REF A PERTAINS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT LOGISTICS REVIEW BOARD AND SOLICITS CINCPAC'S VIEWS ON THIS PROPOSAL.

2. CINCPAC CONCURS IN THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT LOGISTICS REVIEW BOARD. THE CONDUCT OF A STUDY TO REVIEW LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IN LIGHT OF WORLD WIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT PROVIDED U.S. FORCES DURING THE VIETNAM ERA IS MOST TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE.

3. INASMUCH AS KEY PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN PLANNING FOR AND EXECUTION OF OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT ARE READILY AVAILABLE, THE EARLY INITIATION OF THE STUDY EFFORT WILL CAPITALIZE ON

LESSONS LEARNED. ADDITIONALLY IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE TOTAL SCOPE OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT INCLUDE THAT SUPPORT PROVIDED TO FREE WORLD FORCES

AND NATION BUILDING EFFORT DURING THE CONFLICT IN SEA.

4. CINCPAC WILL PROVIDE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE ASSISTANCE TO THE JOINT LOGISTICS BOARD WHEN ESTABLISHED.

GP-4

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#1373

NNNN

ACT: CJCS-5 (1-5) (GEN WHEELER)
INFO: RF/FILE-1(6)EEW/JF1

ADV CY: CJCS NMCC/DDO

ADDED DIST: DJS-1 (7) (ADM JOHNSON), SJCS-1 (8) (GEN SHANNON) CSA-1 (9)

(GEN WESTMORELAND) CNO-1 (10) (ADM MOORER) CSAF-1 (11) (GEN MCCONNELL)

CMC-1 (12) (GEN CHAPMAN) 12 DEC 68 (PER MR. KEARNEY, OCJCS/BBM)

EX CY: CJCS-1 (13) 12 DEC 68

ADDED DIST: S/DEF-1(14) (MR CLIFFORD) DEP S/DEF-1(15) (MR NITZE)

ASD/I&L-1(16) (MR MORRIS) 12 DEC 68 (PER MR KEARNEY/OCJCS) RP

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

NARA, Date

2-23-91

CONFIDENTIAL

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FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

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FM COMUSMACV
TO RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC
BT

IMMEDIATE
EXCLUSIVE
SPECAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SPECAT 41598
SUBJ: JOINT LOGISTICS REVIEW BOARD. (U)
SPECAT FOR GEN WHEELER AND ADM MCCAIN FROM GEN ABRAMS
REF: A. JCS 092347Z DEC 68 (C)
B. JCS 111824Z DEC 68 (C)

1. (C) REFERENCE A HAS BEEN REVIEWED. AGREE WITH JCS VIEW THAT A REVIEW OF LOGISTIC LESSONS LEARNED FROM OUR VIETNAM EFFORTS WOULD BE FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE.

2. (C) IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE SERVICE/DEPARTMENTAL HEADQUARTERS WOULD PROVIDE THE PRIMARY SOURCES OF INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO CONDUCT THIS STUDY. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT MACV HQ AND THOSE OF THE MACV COMPONENTS WOULD HAVE CERTAIN INPUTS THAT RELATE TO THE EFFORT BUT EXTENT OF MACV PARTICIPATION WOULD OF NECESSITY BE DEPENDENT ON THE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS PREVAILING AT THE TIME. ANY CHARTER MUST ENSURE THAT MACV CURRENT AND PROJECTED OPERATIONS, TASKS ASSOCIATED WITH RVNAF MODERNIZATION, PKE WITHDRAWAL, WITHDRAWAL AND POST-WITHDRAWAL PLANNING ARE GUARANTEED HIGHER PRIORITY THAN THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE JLN8. IN ADDITION A POSSIBLE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION OF BASIC DATA REQUIREMENTS AND WITHDRAWAL FROM DATA BASE WOULD ARISE; HOWEVER, MACV WILL FURNISH WHAT IS AVAILABLE.

3. (U) MACV WILL SUPPORT STUDY TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE WITH CURRENT OPERATIONAL COMMITMENTS.

GP-4

BT

#9016

NNNN

ACT: CJCS(GEN WHEELER)-5(1-5)

INFO: DJS(ADM JOHNSON)-1(6) SJCS(GEN SHANNON)-1(7)
CSA(GEN WESTMORELAND)-1(8) CNO(ADM MOORER)-1(9) CSAF(GEN MCCONNELL)-1(10) CMC(GEN CHAPMAN)-1(11) RF/FILE-1(12) EHC/JN

PAGE 1 OF 1

REF A IS 7295(CJCS)

REF B IS 7412(CJCS)

ADDED DIST: S/DEF-1(13)(MR CLIFFORD) DEP S/DEF-1(14)(MR NITZE)
ASD/I&L-1(15)(MR MORRIS) 12 DEC 68(PER MR KEARNEY/OCJCS)R

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ASD(ISA)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
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File	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

NARA, Date

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

17e

11 DEC 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
Assistants to the Secretary of Defense
Directors of the Defense Agencies

SUBJECT: Joint Logistic Review Board (JLRB)

A Joint Logistic Review Board (JLRB) is established effective 1 January 1969. In accordance with the attached Terms of Reference, the Board will review worldwide logistic support to U. S. combat forces during the Vietnam era so as to identify strengths and weaknesses and make appropriate recommendations for improvement.

The Board will consist of a Chairman in the grade of O-10 to be chosen by General Wheeler and me; and a senior general/flag officer representing each Service and the Defense Supply Agency plus appropriate representation from the Joint Staff. The Secretaries of the military departments and the Director, DSA are requested to provide me the name of their representative on the board by 23 December 1968. Board members will report to the Chairman, JLRB, for duty on 6 January 1969.

To assist the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS in overseeing the work of the Board, a Logistic Review Advisory Committee

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is hereby established to be chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense or his designee, with the following members:

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis)
Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments
 for Installations and Logistics
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, USA
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)
Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, USMC
Director for Logistics, Joint Staff
Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility, Joint Staff
Director, Defense Supply Agency
Commanders of the Army Material Command,
 Naval Material Command, Air Force Logistics
 Command and Air Force Systems Command

The Advisory Committee will be called to session by the Deputy Secretary of Defense as required during the course of this review.

Administrative procedures will be as follows:

- a. The Chairman of the JLRB will report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS.
- b. The Board, as its first order of business, will prepare a detailed study plan. This plan (to include objectives, organization,

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procedures, the detailed studies to be made, a schedule for completion, personnel requirements and funding support) will be submitted by 1 February 1969 to the Chairman, JCS and to me for approval.

c. Staff and administrative support to the Board will be arranged by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) based upon the approved plan. Action addressees will furnish such personnel and other assistance as may be requested by the ASD(Administration) for this purpose.

d. The Board is authorized to deal directly with the components of the military departments and defense agencies concerned, and with the unified and specified commands concerned for the purpose of obtaining necessary data and information.

e. The Board will submit its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS by 31 December 1969. Periodic progress reports are desired and will be provided for in the study plan. Separable elements of the final report will be submitted to the Logistic Review Advisory Committee for review and comment as they are completed.

f. The Board will be dissolved upon completion of the final report or as otherwise determined by the Secretary of Defense.

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The views and recommendations of the Secretaries of the military departments, the Joint Chief of Staff, and the heads of other appropriate DoD components will be solicited and considered by the Secretary of Defense prior to implementation of the Board's recommendations.

Attachment

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11 DEC 1968

TERMS OF REFERENCE

JOINT LOGISTIC REVIEW BOARD (JLRB)

1. The JLRB will review world-wide logistic support of the U.S. ground, naval, and air forces during the "Vietnam era" (August 1, 1965 to date) to identify strengths and weaknesses of "logistic systems" (i.e., policies, procedures, organization, manpower, and controls) so as to make appropriate recommendations for changes that will improve the over-all effectiveness of these systems. The Board will examine the U.S. military logistic posture at the commencement of the Vietnam build-up, and the factors that affected (1) the responsiveness of logistic support to U.S. combat forces in Vietnam, and (2) their impact on readiness in other areas of the world. Emphasis will be given to the effectiveness and economy of current and planned logistic systems under combat conditions; and the quick reaction capabilities of these systems to meet changing situations and emergencies world-wide. The Board will identify logistic lessons learned, including those of a planning nature, which may have a significant effect on readiness for and support of future combat operations.

2. The Board's review will include a comparative evaluation of the over-all logistic systems of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps -- and the support provided to these systems by the Defense Supply Agency, the General Services Administration, and various cross-servicing and

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single service support arrangements. Recommendations for improvement will be made, as appropriate.

3. The Board will have broad authority to determine the areas and depths of its review, but particular attention will be directed to the following functional areas:

- a. Requirements forecasting.
- b. War reserve stocks.
- c. Procurement and production.
- d. Supply management -- including in-country supply organizations and stock levels; stovepipe systems; and automatic data processing.
- e. Communications, as it impacts on logistics.
- f. Transportation, to include airlift, sealift, containerization, military terminals, documentation, movement control and priorities.
- g. Maintenance support to include in-country, offshore, and CONUS.
- h. Construction.
- i. In-theater contractual support.

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j. Financial controls.

k. Logistical personnel, including TDY civil service support, training of military personnel, and contractor technical personnel.

l. Identification, processing, and disposition of excess and surplus stocks.

4. In-depth studies will be conducted, as appropriate, for specialized items of supply such as ammunition, petroleum, and construction materials.

5. The Board during its tenure shall keep informed on the status of T-Day and roll-up planning in order to assess the effectiveness, completeness, and coordination of such planning.

6. The Board will take cognizance of whatever completed and on-going studies are available and will not restudy areas which have already received adequate coverage.

³
DRAFT

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, December 14, 1968
11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith de Gaulle shows an interest in the Johnson School of Public Affairs -- possibly for some French students.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Paris 25190

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By , NARA, Date 2-23-98



Department of state

18a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 835

PAGE 01 PARIS 25190 111919Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

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R 111755Z DEC 68

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8989

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 25190

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: DE GAULLE LUNCHEON

1. I CONVEYED TO DE GAULLE AT LUNCH DECEMBER 10 PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S GOOD WISHES AND HIS HOPES THAT FRANCE, UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP, WILL SUCCEED IN ITS FINANCIAL AND MONETARY PROGRAMS. DE GAULLE REPLIED THAT HE WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S GOOD WISHES AND THAT HE HAD THE WARMEST FEELINGS FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON WHICH HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY. HE ALSO REITERATED HIS THANKS FOR PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON FRANCH. I TOLD HIM ABOUT THE PLANS FOR THE JOHNSON LIBRARY AND SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND HE SHOWED IMMEDIATE INTEREST IN THE WHOLE PROJECT ESPECIALLY THE PLAN TO HAVE 200 YOUNG SCHOLARS IN RESIDENCE STUDYING FOR ADVANCED DEGREES. HE WONDERED IF SUCH SCHOLARSHIPS WOULD BE OPEN TO FOREIGNERS TO WHICH I REPLIED I HAD NO CERTAIN INFORMATION BUT THOUGHT THE SCHOOL MIGHT WELL DECIDE TO ENROLL BEST STUDENTS AVAILABLE REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY. I DID SAY I KNEW PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD SPECIAL INTEREST IN ATTRACTING PROMISING STUDENTS FROM MINORITY RACIAL AND CULTURAL GROUPS WITHIN THE USA.

SHRIVER

*Ed: Do you know if
the school will take
any foreign students?*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By NY NARA, Date 2-23-98

~~SECRET~~
23

ACTION

19

December 13, 1968 - 12:38pm

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached letter of Chairman Seaborg requests your favorable action on the AEC's extension of a contract with the Western Electric Company, Incorporated, and the Sandia Corporation. It contains a clause providing a general indemnity not subject to the availability of appropriated funds. Your approval of such an extension is authorized by Section 162 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended. The contract in question was previously extended with your permission in June 1964 and expires December 31, 1968. The Commission is requesting the extension of the contract for an additional five-year period.

The Commission's letter has been reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget who has informed us that they have no objection to your approval. I therefore recommend that you sign at the place provided on page 2 of Chairman Seaborg's letter to indicate your approval.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

3747
19a

DEC 11 1968

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

By letter dated May 30, 1964, the Commission advised you of its intent to extend through December 31, 1968 its Contract AT(29-1)-789 with Western Electric Company, Incorporated, and Sandia Corporation for operation of the Commission's Sandia Laboratory at Sandia Base, New Mexico, and related facilities. Specifically, the letter discussed the nature of the contract and of the work performed thereunder; described the risk involved in the work and the indemnity provisions included in the contract; and recommended that, pursuant to Section 162 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, you (1) determine that the execution of the contract containing a general indemnity not subject to the availability of appropriated funds was essential in the interest of the common defense and security, and (2) exempt, in advance, such execution from the provisions of law relating to contracts. A copy of the May 30, 1964 letter, with its enclosures, appears as Enclosure 1.

Pursuant to your June 12, 1964 approval of the Commission's recommendation, Contract AT(29-1)-789 was extended through December 31, 1968. The Commission has now determined that extension of the contract for an additional five-year period would be in the best interest of the Government, and negotiations on an extension through December 31, 1973 have been completed. In this connection, Sandia Corporation has stated that Western Electric Company will require your approval of the Commission's continued inclusion in the contract of the general indemnity not subject to the availability of appropriated funds in order to assure the Bell System of the same protection it has under the current extension. A copy of the November 25, 1968 letter from J. A. Hornbeck, President, Sandia Corporation, to Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, AEC, appears as Enclosure 2.


It is recommended therefore that, pursuant to Section 162 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, you determine that

Mr. President

2

the Commission's extension of Contract AT(29-1)-789 with Western Electric Company, Incorporated, and Sandia Corporation containing the general indemnity not subject to the availability of appropriated funds is essential in the interest of the common defense and security, and, accordingly, exempt such action from the provisions of law relating to contracts.

Respectfully yours,


Chairman

Enclosures:

1. Ltr., 5/30/64, w/encl.
2. Ltr., 11/25/68

Approved this ____ day of _____.

President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 13, 1968

20

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

As instructed, I have checked the proposal for
one million dollars for Secretary General's Fund on Population
with John Rockefeller. He took a day to turn around and made a
careful check. He called me at noon today and ^{he} recommended strongly
that we proceed.

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 2-23-95

Mr. ~~Rostow~~ 21

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

December 12, 1968
12:30 pm

to sup
2. P. file

Mr. President:

You will wish to be aware of the attached letter from Eshkol on the NPT. It tells us nothing new.

Rabin, in the Phantom negotiations, reaffirmed Israel's assurance "not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." But it became clear in Warnke's discussion with him that the Israelis feel they could develop a nuclear device but would feel correct in claiming they had not "introduced" it so long as they had neither tested it nor made its existence public. Needless to say, that view leaves a lot to be desired from our viewpoint.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Att: Read-Rostow Memo, 12/12/68, Subj: Letter to the President from the Prime Minister of Israel, with letter attached (File #3752)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By UCL NLJ-6198-43-3-9
NAR., Date 12-08-2017

21a

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, 4 December 1968

President Lyndon B. Johnson,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President,

Since receiving your letter of November 15, I have been indisposed and have only now resumed a full working schedule. I too regret that my planned visit to Washington has had to be deferred. My purpose was to let you know personally that our people will always remember and cherish the deep understanding which you showed towards it during the Presidency which you have now chosen to terminate. Israel and the Jewish people have a long historic memory; and your statesmanlike approach to our problems will long endure in their hearts.


I am fully aware of the deep interest which you attach to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the statements of its accredited representatives, Israel has given full positive weight to the Treaty's international significance. We have also reaffirmed to you all the assurances which we have given in the past. The deployment of operational strategic missiles in the Middle East is still remote. Our position on the Treaty is that, like many other States, we have to give the most careful examination to all its implications for long term security and scientific and technological development. I have been impressed by what was said at the Non-Nuclear Powers Conference at Geneva by other non-nuclear States whose position seems far more secure than ours. The time taken

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By 4418 NLS-019R-43-3-10
NAR, Date: 12-08-2017

by governments and legislatures to ponder their signature or ratification is an index of the importance and complexity of the matters at issue. The concern felt by the United States on the subject is amongst the central considerations which we shall take into account. Like many other countries, we have to create an atmosphere of public understanding and of constitutional harmony.

I can assure you, Mr. President, that I shall promote our study and conclusions with the greatest possible despatch and in the most constructive spirit.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'L. Eshkol', with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Levi Eshkol

Thursday, December 12, 1968 - 6:50 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Edward Teller's argument on Vietnam.

1. It is his judgment, based on contact with men who have worked regularly in Vietnam, that the war is essentially won in the sense that, if there is no peace settlement, Vietnam can survive by our gradually turning over to the South Vietnamese.

2. The ultimate fate of our effort in Vietnam will depend on the success of the political, social, and economic phase that will follow the military. South Vietnam is a most complex country with many schisms and internal difficulties. We shall have to stay with it and stay with it *for the long pull* ~~intellectually~~ to make good the investment of blood and treasure.

3. In Teller's judgment the critical missing element is there are not enough Americans who speak Vietnamese sufficiently well so they can engage in effective dialogue with the South Vietnamese on a basis in which the South Vietnamese will talk to them with candor. We now have about a thousand Americans who speak Vietnamese but they are tied up with intelligence work. That may well continue. Therefore, we must look to a rapid expansion of Americans who speak excellent Vietnamese.

With this thought in mind, Teller has talked with those who direct the language school at Monterey. They say that with two weeks of testing they can separate out those naturally gifted ~~for~~ with a tonal language like Vietnamese. With intensive training at 6 hours a day, they can produce an American who speaks fluent Vietnamese in a year. For such a program, we would have to recruit Vietnamese teachers in Vietnam. Its cost would be a ~~few~~ million dollars. The goal should be to turn out several thousand Americans speaking excellent Vietnamese.

4. The President's announcing such a program would be stabilizing. It would symbolize to the South Vietnamese, to Asians, and to the world that we expect to see through the task in Vietnam on the non-military side and that we were not going to abandon the South Vietnamese even if we begin to turn over more and more military tasks to the South Vietnamese.

5. WWR Comment: There may well be merit in Teller's argument. If you so direct, I will have his case responsibly staffed out.

W. W. Restow

Staff it out

Ma

Call me

WWR:amf:amf:m

Thursday
December 12, 1968 -- 3:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a report to me on movement of files to Texas. As you can see, they are at work on security arrangements in Texas; and plan 7 or 8 trips between December 26 and January 15.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

23a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, December 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Movement of Files to Texas

I have been in contact with Mr. Evans Walker of Archives and the CIA security office to arrange for movement of the classified Presidential files kept as part of your office to the Federal Office Building in Texas. The guidelines we have developed are to start as soon as possible but in an orderly way and in accordance with security requirements.

In our latest meeting this morning we determined that:

--the files will be handled in accordance with security regulations for Special Intelligence information;

--all of the files will be placed in safes for transport to and storage in Texas;

--transport of the files will be done by Armed Forces Courier Service;

--only one truck at a time will be sent; this will probably entail 7 - 8 trips;

--all loading and unloading will be done at night.

Before we can work out an exact schedule, it will be necessary to review the physical plant in Texas. A CIA physical security man will go to Texas Sunday night to do this and will stay to supervise any additional construction that is necessary. Mr. Walker has notified the GSA representative and building manager in Texas.

We do not foresee any great problems. For planning purposes we are assuming the first trip will take place on December 26, with the others staggered so the last trip will leave on January 15.

In addition to the physical arrangements, we have also requested CIA to arrange for security briefings for the personnel involved with the library. Thus far this involves Mr. Newland and Mr. Walker. We will look to Mr. Newland for guidance on others of his staff.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Art', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Art McCafferty

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, December 12, 1968
3:20 p.m.

For file

Mr. President:

Attached is Gen Abrams' cable of yesterday, in case Nixon has not been briefed on it.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By MP/jdw, NARA, Date 1-28-98

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Memo to the President, Dec 11, 1968, with
cable from Gen Abrams, MAC 16964 EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 12, 1968
3:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith notes covering all the items you asked me to prepare, plus PUEBLO, in this order:

- Vietnam;
- Paris;
- Arab-Israeli dispute;
- NPT;
- PUEBLO.

I have not put anything down on the Summit because I do not know where you came out last night with Sec. Rusk and what precisely you wish to say to Mr. Nixon today.

I don't know whether Nixon will be bringing with him any of his staff; but you may wish to talk alone with him about the Summit.

I made these notes rather lengthy but have marked key passages to permit you to proceed more tersely if you so wish.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By mlp, NARA, Date 1-22-98

WWRostow:rla

25a

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 12, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith notes for 5:30 p. m. briefing of Mr. Nixon.

1. Viet-Nam

A. "Facts of Life"

- no attacks yet on major cities.
- little or no shelling from or across the DMZ.
- no massing of forces at the DMZ.
- DMZ being violated by presence of small North Vietnamese forces, which we attack heavily when spotted. We also run patrols into southern half of DMZ, in part to capture personnel and demonstrate in Paris that it is North Vietnamese and not NLF forces which are violating the DMZ.
- We have protested strongly to Hanoi, and plan, as first order of business when the new talks begin, to take up DMZ.
- Reconnaissance being intensively conducted up to the 19th parallel and by drones and high-level aircraft north of the 19th parallel. The enemy has been firing on our aircraft. Our military are empowered to strike back on air-to-ground as well as on air-to-air basis. We have thus far lost four recce manned aircraft over North Vietnam.
- Thus, the enemy has partially complied with our understandings. Abrams does not believe there is any substantial danger at the DMZ and at I Corps at the moment. The major cities have not been attacked. But when talks start, we obviously have a major job in getting at the problems of DMZ violation and recce.

B. Military Situation

For several months many of the enemy's main force units have been pulled back into North Vietnam, Laos, and the Cambodian border area. This gave the ARVN and Abrams a great opportunity to extend government control of the countryside, which they have done at a rate of better than 3% a month for the last two months. (It was actually 3.5% in November.) VC-controlled population has apparently dropped to 13.4%; the contested areas are about 13.3%. Therefore, more than 73% of the population lives in relative security under government control. Pacification progress is moving about three times our best sustained period in the past. The pacification offensive has been accompanied by systematic attacks on the VC infrastructure.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-331
By ies, NARA Date 10-24-97

The President would underline that the fact that we can move against the enemy in this way, while negotiations are going forward, is the major difference between this negotiation and Panmunjom, where military action around the 33th parallel in Korea could not affect significantly the enemy's bargaining assets.

It now looks as though -- at any moment -- the enemy is about to kick off an offensive. Elements of five divisions have been assembled opposite Saigon to the west. Abrams' intelligence has been excellent and precise. We shall now see whether the offensive occurs and what happens.

It could raise two major issues for decision:

- Should we permit hot pursuit some modest distance into the Cambodian sanctuary where many of these forces have been assembled?
- If they actually get into Saigon -- or shell Saigon substantially -- should we resume bombing for, say, a 48-hour interval?

Our intelligence people believe there are two major reasons for this enemy effort if it takes place. First, they have, since 1954, always accompanied a new phase of negotiations with a military offensive to demonstrate their strength. Second, they may well feel they must slow up this pacification offensive, or negotiate with indecent haste in Paris -- since their political assets in the South are draining away. But the risk they are taking is that Abrams and the ARVN will throttle this offensive in a way which will look to the world like a major setback. That is Abrams' intent and mission; but they have concentrated a very high proportion of their usable forces opposite Saigon, and it may be quite rough.

2. Paris

The opening of the new phase of the talks is hung up on two procedural matters which have considerable symbolic and political meaning to Hanoi and Saigon:

-- The Order of Speaking.

It is agreed that names will be drawn at random from a hat; but Hanoi wants four names drawn and the order of speaking determined in that way, to underline this as a "four power" conference. We and the GVN want only two names drawn, symbolizing our view that this is a "your-side-our-side" conference. The two members of each side would then speak.

-- The Shape of the Tables.

Hanoi wanted four separate tables -- a rectangle, or four segmented arcs to symbolize a four-power conference. We want two parallel tables. Hanoi suggested a round table. We have not yet finally decided our position,

and will be talking it over with the GVN in Paris.

There is some inconclusive intelligence that Hanoi is rather anxious to get down to serious substantive discussion; but that is not evident in the way they have been handling these procedural issues. Thus far, Ky and his delegation have behaved correctly and spoken temperately in public. There is no basis for today's story that the US and GVN delegations are split; although some differences -- at some stages in the complex negotiation -- would be quite normal.

3. Arab-Israel Dispute

-- Jarring Mission is continuing. Jarring has just met with the Israeli, UAR and Jordanian foreign ministers and will resume his duties as Swedish Ambassador in Moscow for at least a month. He plans another round in January. If no progress is made and he sees no prospect for further movement in the positions of the parties, we can expect a return of this issue to the Security Council.

-- UAR wants Israeli commitment to principle of withdrawal. Jordan wants some idea of Israeli concept as to where border should be. Israel has agreed to indirect negotiations as step to direct negotiations, and speaks now of "contractual settlement" instead of peace treaty. However, Israel appears to intend to retain some of territory occupied June 1967.

-- We have told Israel that, except for minor border rectification, we would not support territorial claims. We recognize Gaza and Jerusalem as special problems. Secretary has outlined to Foreign Minister Riad his views on elements of Israel-UAR settlement.

-- The Israelis apparently offered Jordan the Allen plan -- which would involve permanent stationing of Israeli forces on the Jordan in the midst of an otherwise demilitarized West Bank; and Jordanian control over the Jerusalem Holy Places -- with independent access of them from outside -- in an otherwise Israeli-administered unified Jerusalem. Jordan rejects the Allen plan and seeks jurisdiction over Arabs living in East Jerusalem; although Jordan does not propose going back to status quo ante.

-- Meantime, terrorism and cease-fire violations continue with danger of escalation. Israeli raids in North and South Jordan on December 1 and 2 were in response to a series of violations of the cease-fire by Arabs that followed an "understanding" between King Hussain and the fedayeen by which the King sought to impose some control on actions provoking Israeli retaliation. The heavy Israeli air raid on December 3 against Iraqi units well within Jordan were to silence artillery which without authorization had shelled Israeli border villages. Explosion in Jerusalem market worst terrorist incident in 20 years.

-- Arab frustration has given rise increasingly to anti-American feeling stemming from belief U. S. could force Israeli concessions. Recently this has been apparent even in states with friendly regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon.

-- Phantom Sale -- Technical discussions in progress in Defense.

-- Israel and the NPT

We have been pressing the Israeli Government to adhere to the NPT in the light of some indication of a capability to move to production of a nuclear weapon quickly once such decision is made. Israel has assured us it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. Prime Minister Eshkol recognizes our concern and has just assured us that Israel will give careful examination to implications of the Treaty for Israel's long-term security with dispatch and "in the most constructive spirit." But I believe the Israeli nuclear posture may, in fact, prove a most difficult future issue.

4. NPT.

Before going into the NPT, I should like to tell you precisely why I regard the NPT as so important to the U. S. interest and why I believe any President who will bear nuclear responsibility, will take the same view. The reason is seldom stated in public, but it is this:

-- Every President who confronts the possibility of nuclear war will take a most hard and unyielding position against any nation which might think that its small nuclear capability was capable of triggering the use of our nuclear strategic power. If, God forbid, we ever have to face nuclear war, we shall insist on doing it only as a last resort in terms of vital American interests, and at our decision.

-- On the other hand, there is danger that small nuclear capabilities may develop in parts of the world where there are vital U. S. interests; for example, Japan, India, Israel, Italy, Germany, Brazil, and Argentina.

-- Therefore, if we fail in the NPT and these small nuclear capabilities develop, a future American President could be faced with the dilemma of either withdrawing or diluting the American commitment in a vital area -- with dangerous consequences for stability and peace -- or running the risk that another nation might draw us into a nuclear war.

-- Put another way, a world of non-proliferation where Western Europe, Latin America, and Free Asia rely explicitly or implicitly on U. S. nuclear strength, would tend to be a unified world in which the reservation of the right

~~SECRET~~

-5-

to fire nuclear weapons would remain in the hands of the U. S. President. A world where the NPT fails -- and small nuclear capabilities develop -- will tend to be fragmented, vulnerable, and dangerous.

The reason we have been able to live with the British and French capabilities is that:

-- Neither is on a contiguous front with the Russians;

-- And we have understandings, backed by UK self-interest, that the UK would not fire their weapons without consultation with us. Even then, as you know, de Gaulle's agents have from time to time peddled the idea that his force de frappe is a cheap European finger on the American nuclear trigger.

As for the status of the treaty in the Senate, you know as much as I do:

-- The Treaty was signed 1 July 1968;

-- It was sent to Congress on 9 July;

-- The Foreign Relations Committee reported out with a favorable recommendation on 26 September, but also urged "the President, once the Senate has acted, to consider delaying the process of depositing the United States instrument of ratification until such time as he has received positive assurances that a majority of those countries nearest to a nuclear weapons capability intend to adhere to the Treaty."

As you know, the Soviets entered Czechoslovakia on August 22 in the midst of this process, and Mr. Nixon's statement on NPT was made on September 11.

The favorable support that had been building up for the Treaty received a severe setback with the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August. Since that time, the number of new signatories has slowed to a trickle. Most countries considered technically capable of developing nuclear weapons are unlikely to have signed by January 20, 1969. Of this advanced category, only Canada, Sweden, and the Benelux countries have signed so far. Non-signers still include Australia, Brazil, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, Pakistan, and South Africa.

The reasons given for delay or refusal to sign vary. They include the desire to register disapproval over events in Czechoslovakia (Italy planned to sign on August 26, 1968, and Switzerland shortly thereafter, but the August 21 invasion caused a postponement of these plans); an unwillingness to sign until some crucial neighboring country does also (Pakistan's only stated reason for not signing); a basic desire not to renounce the nuclear option at this time

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-6-

(India, and possibly Israel, may be considered in this category); reluctance to assume the obligations of the Treaty without some specific evidence in return of progress in achieving other national policy goals (the FRG position, in seeking an abatement of Soviet blackmail threats and hostile propaganda); substantive difficulties with some aspect of the Treaty (Brazil's concern with peaceful nuclear explosions); prestige reasons.

In my judgment, the delay in US Senate approval of the Treaty has been a critical factor both as an excuse and an inhibition on our diplomacy.

I recommend strongly that we both put our shoulder to the wheel when the Senate gets back in January and press for the earliest possible action on the NPT.

Assuming favorable U. S. Senate action on the NPT early next year, the first 90 days of the new administration should be a crucial period in gaining the adherence to the NPT of many of the principal non-nuclear weapons countries whose signatures are still outstanding. Favorable Senate action will give us a stronger position than we have had in recent months from which to press for additional signatures. Australia, Japan, Italy, and Switzerland have informed us explicitly that they are awaiting Senate action before determining what further action to take themselves. Although Sweden signed, it has informed us it will not ratify until the US does. Owing to the far-reaching implications to their national policy of the obligations, these and other non-nuclear weapons countries will assume under the Treaty continued diplomatic efforts on the part of the U. S. will be required if we, as the principal Treaty sponsor, are to succeed in making the NPT truly worldwide.

5. PUEBLO.

The North Koreans have demanded a flat, abject U. S. apology for allegedly intruding into their waters. All the evidence that we have is that our men did not do so. We have not, therefore, been able to bring ourselves as a government flatly to sign our name to a lie and then repudiate our signature. We have tried a number of devices which are consistent with our position and would help save some North Korean face -- in an effort to retrieve our men. We shall be trying more such devices in the days ahead. But we are not sanguine.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~

26

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - December 12, 1968 - 12:30 PM

Mr. President:

Pres file

State has recommended that you send a congratulatory message to Dr. Rafael Caldera, who was proclaimed President-elect of Venezuela yesterday after winning by the narrowest of margins. A suggested text is attached (Tab A).

This is the first time in Venezuelan history that one political faction is preparing to transfer power peacefully to another. Caldera has in the past shown some concern about US attitudes toward him should he be elected. State believes a personal message on this occasion from you is important to get relations with the new government off to a good start, and that the absence of any message would cause comment and concern in Caracas.

If you approve, State will ask our Embassy in Caracas to deliver the message for you.

W. W. Rostow

Approve the message

—

Disapprove

—

Call me

—

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/10/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *H*, NARA, Date *2-23-98*

Attachment

Tab A - Proposed Presidential message to President-elect Caldera of Venezuela.

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

26a

Dear Dr. Caldera:

By their massive and peaceful participation in the December 1 elections, the people of Venezuela have once again demonstrated how free men choose their governments, and change them. I am pleased and proud to extend my warmest congratulations and best wishes on the occasion of your proclamation as President-elect. Although I will not have the good fortune to work with you as President, I know you will continue to find in my country the same friendship and high regard that I hold for Venezuela and its people.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

Thurs., D . 12, 1968
10:10 a. m.

27

MR. PRESIDENT:

This draft letter from [REDACTED] to Nixon
on the future of [REDACTED] regional security
arrangements may interest you.

1.4(c)

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ UMBRA attachment

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 10-69
By isl, NARA, Date 10-5-10

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

Thursday, December 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ed Clark is leaving tomorrow to attend the inauguration of a \$33 million hydroelectric project in Paraguay which will also benefit both Brazil and Argentina. An IDB loan provides a large share of the financing.

Clark recommends that you send a message to the President of Paraguay for the occasion which Clark can deliver at the ceremony on Monday, December 16. (Tab B)

This project is one of the first tangible examples of regional Alliance for Progress projects designed to overcoming physical barriers to integration of the continent. A message from you would help underscore your support for the physical integration of Latin America. Covey Oliver and I concur in Clark's recommendation.

A suggested text for the message is attached. (Tab A) If approved, State will provide the text to Clark for delivery.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/85, State Dept. Guidelines
By H NARA, Date 2-23-81

Dear Mr. President:

I am delighted to know that my old friend Ambassador Edward Clark will be attending the inauguration of the Acaray River project on December 16. I have asked him to convey to you my warm congratulations on this significant step along the road toward development of Paraguay and its neighbors.

This hydroelectric project, financed in part by the Inter-American Development Bank, illustrates concretely the goal we set together at Punta del Este in 1967. I believe such steps to overcome the physical barriers to Latin American unity will help speed progress toward all these goals. The electric current from those generators will flow into homes and factories in Argentina and Brazil, as well as those in Paraguay, helping all three countries to benefit from your natural resources. It is just such regional cooperation that will eventually lead to success for the Alliance for Progress everywhere in the hemisphere.

I am happy to close our official relationship on such a note. Please accept my good wishes for the future success of this project, and my hope that the people of Paraguay enjoy the fruits of peace and progress.

Sincerely,

LBJ



MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Date: December 12, 1968

From: Edward Clark

I have been invited by the Government of Paraguay to attend the inauguration of a \$33 million hydroelectric project on the Acaray River in Paraguay, which has been substantially financed by the Inter-American Development Bank. This project is one of the important multinational projects that gives positive proof to your ideas on the physical integration of Latin America. Negotiations are now under way to sell some of the power to be produced by this Paraguayan project to states in Brazil and Argentina. I believe this is the kind of concrete activity you had in mind in furthering the economic and social development of Latin America.

Therefore, I recommend that you send a letter to the President of Paraguay in connection with the inauguration of this important multinational project.

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ACTION

Thursday - December 12, 1968

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has provided the attached briefing memorandum for your meeting tomorrow with President Diaz Ordaz in El Paso (Tab A). Tab B gives a brief summary of the status of matters previously discussed with Diaz Ordaz on other occasions. Tab C has biographic summaries of the ranking Mexican officials who will be present (Tony Carrillo Flores is not coming -- his deputy, Gabino FRAGA, will be the ranking member of Diaz Ordaz's party.

Points you may wish to make during your informal conversations include:

- compliments on the outcome of the of the Olympic Games;
- express special appreciation for Mexico's help during the gold crisis in March, on repatriating US citizens from Cuba, and on the current problem of airplane high-jacking;
- our close relations with Mexico can not possibly lose their priority under any future Administration.

Diaz Ordaz plans to send Tony Carrillo Flores to the US in January to dedicate the new Benito Juarez Statue before the end of your Administration. His tentative dedication has been set -- January 7.

As you wished, George Christian is holding Ambassador Freeman's resignation letter in abeyance, to be announced later. However, I suggest you mention privately to Diaz Ordaz some time during the day that Ambassador Freeman will be leaving shortly, and that you wanted to give him advance word of this change.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

- Tab A - Secretary Rusk's briefing memorandum.
- Tab B - Summary of status of matters discussed with Diaz Ordaz on other occasions.
- Tab C - Biographic summaries.

SWLewis:mmm

24
Pres file

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 10/2/95, Re: [illegible]
By *g*, NARS, Date *2-23-98*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

21
December 11, 1968

15987
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with President Gustavo
Diaz Ordaz, Friday, December 13, 1968

The Visit

You last saw President Diaz Ordaz when he made a State Visit to the United States in October, 1967. At that time, you visited the Chamizal site and participated in a ceremony at the Mexican Chamizal Monument. This latest visit will be the final step in the historic Chamizal settlement - to inaugurate the President Adolfo Lopez Mateos Channel which will carry that portion of the Rio Grande which was relocated as a result of the Agreement. It will be your sixth meeting with President Diaz Ordaz and will give you the opportunity to stress the cordial relations which exist between our countries.

Mexico Today

The student conflict which erupted July 15 is drawing to an end. The Student Strike Committee has called for a return to classes and is being heeded by increasing numbers of students. The threat of violence has largely passed, although we expect the students will continue to pressure the Government for certain legal reforms and for the replacement of several unpopular police officials. The prolonged nature of the conflict, and the fact that

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not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 14, NARA, Date 2-23-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

the Government of Mexico resorted to heavy repression on several occasions, have somewhat marred President Diaz Ordaz' image. The President, however, remains in firm control of his Government and continues to enjoy broad support throughout Mexico. For the coming year he will give much of his attention to the decision on a candidate to succeed him in 1970. There are no clear favorites at this point.

Mexico's economic situation continues to be relatively favorable with real GNP growth averaging 3 percent per year, and a rate of inflation within acceptable bounds. Mexico continues to have an excellent international credit rating. Recently, however, several soft spots have become apparent for which remedial action will probably be necessary: 1) a trend towards excessive foreign borrowing to compensate for a sharply increased current account deficit; 2) an industrial sector which has difficulty in competing in world markets and; 3) a poverty stricken rural sector which encompasses 50 percent of their nation's population but accounts for only 16 percent of the GNP.

The Olympics, as you know, were held with outstanding success. The Games were a source of great national pride for all Mexicans.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Talking Points
2. Tentative Schedule
3. Status of Matters Previously Discussed by the President
4. Biographic Data

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

29b

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ

DECEMBER 13, 1968

TALKING POINTS

You May Wish to Tell President Diaz Ordaz:

- We followed the Olympic Games with great interest. They were a triumph for Mexico, showing the world Mexico's beauty, her traditions and her ability to excel in a job which would tax even the most powerful nations.
- We take great satisfaction in the close relations with President Diaz Ordaz over the past four years. We particularly appreciate the support received from Mexico during the gold crisis in March 1968, as well as Mexico's continuing aid in the repatriation of U.S. citizens from Cuba and in seeking a solution to the airplane hijacking problem.
- We believe that close relations with Mexico have become so important to the U.S. that their future priority cannot be seriously challenged.

President Diaz Ordaz May Say:

- He attaches great importance to the completion of the Chamizal agreement.
- He has a very high regard for you and your family.
- He hopes the new Benito Juarez Statue in Washington can be dedicated before January 20. (He wishes to send Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores to the U.S. for this purpose.)

You Might Reply:

- We understand a tentative date of January 7 has been agreed to for the statue dedication (Secretary Rusk will participate). Details are being discussed between the Mexican Embassy and the Department of State.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 14, NARA, Date 2-23-98

29c

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ

DECEMBER 13, 1968

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF EVENTS AT EL PASO

11:30 a.m. His Excellency Gustavo Diaz Ordaz,
(El Paso on President of the United Mexican States, and
Mountain Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will arrive at Paso del
Standard Norte Bridge, Ciudad Juarez.
Time)

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States, and
Mrs. Johnson will arrive at Paso del Norte
Bridge, El Paso, Texas, by helicopter from
the El Paso airport.

The Presidents and First Ladies will greet
one another at the boundary on the bridge.

The Banda de Musica Presidencial will play
the national anthem of Mexico.

The University of Texas at El Paso Marching
Cavalcade will play the national anthem of
the United States.

President Johnson will make an address.

President Diaz Ordaz will make an address.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

The Presidential party will walk to the west side of the bridge where they will detonate an explosive releasing the Rio Grande into the new channel.

The Presidents will unveil plaques commemorating the inauguration of the channel.

- 12:30 p.m. The Presidents and their parties will depart by automobile for the Paso del Norte Hotel, El Paso.
- 1:00 p.m. President and Mrs. Johnson will give a luncheon in honor of President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz at the Paso del Norte Hotel.
- 2:45 p.m. The Presidential parties will depart the hotel by automobile to return to the Paso del Norte Bridge.
- 3:00 p.m. The Presidents and First Ladies will bid farewell at the boundary on Paso del Norte Bridge. President and Mrs. Johnson will then board a helicopter to return to the El Paso airport.

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Gustavo DIAZ ORDAZ

(DEE-AHS ohr-DAHS)

President of Mexico

President Diaz Ordaz was inaugurated on December 1, 1964, succeeding Adolfo Lopez Mateos. He previously was Secretary of the Interior (1958-1964), the third ranking official of Secretariat of the Interior (1952-58), and member of the Mexican Senate (1946-1952).

Since assuming office, the President has concentrated on two areas: 1) providing moderate, effective leadership to his fast-developing nation; and 2) improving Mexico's international image. He has worked assiduously to strengthen Mexico's ties with the U.S. and with Mexico's Central American neighbors, and he strongly supports Latin American economic integration.

President Diaz Ordaz, a lawyer by profession, is 57 years old. In 1937, he married the former Guadalupe Borja. The couple has three children and one grandson. Although the President understands some English, he does not speak the language well. Mrs. Diaz Ordaz speaks only Spanish.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ly NARA, Date 2-23-88

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29f.

Gabino FRAGA Magana (FRAH-ga)

First Under Secretary, Secretariat of Foreign Relations

Mr. Fraga, number two man in the Secretariat of Foreign Relations, is the ranking member of President Diaz Ordaz' party.

He has held his current position since December 11, 1964. A somewhat colorless man, he apparently owes his job to his close working relationship with Foreign Secretary Antonio Carrillo Flores when the latter was Secretary of the Treasury and because of his credentials as an administrator.

Mr. Fraga was born in April 1899 and holds a law degree from the National University of Mexico. He has held positions as an educator, banker, and legal consultant, as well as being a former member of the Mexican Supreme Court. He is married to the former Rene Mouret and has at least five children. Both speak English.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By 6 NARA, Date 2-23-98

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Hugo B. MARGAIN (Mar-GHINE -- as in Rhine)

Mexican Ambassador to the U.S.

Ambassador Margain was appointed to the current post in January 1965. He previously held high positions in the Ministries of Industry and the Treasury, and is considered an expert authority on tax matters.

The Ambassador was born about 1910. He attended Harvard Law School and the National University of Mexico. He is considered scrupulously honest and is a protege of Foreign Secretary Antonio Carrillo Flores with whom he maintains very close contact.

The Ambassador is married to the former Margarita Charles. They have six children. The Ambassador speaks good English, as does Mrs. Margain.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.

State Dept. Guidelines

By NARA, Date 2-23-98

29h
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Ambassador Alfonso DE ROSENZWEIG DIAZ Azmitia

(ROH-sen-sweg DEE-ahs)

Director General, Secretariat of Foreign Relations

Ambassador Rosenzweig Diaz was born in 1921. He has been a career Foreign Service Officer since 1945 and has held his present job since 1959. He is an able diplomat who works well with the U.S. Embassy on a wide range of bilateral problems.

He is married to Feodora Stancioff.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 17, NARA, Date 2-23-88

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David HERRERA Jordan (Hair-RARE-ra)

Mexican Commissioner of the International Boundary and
Water Commission

Commissioner Herrera has been associated with the IBWC since 1947. He is a capable and intelligent engineer and administrator who has developed a close and productive relationship with U.S. Commissioner Friedkin.

Commissioner Herrera was born at Tampico, Mexico, in 1911. Following graduation from the Engineering School of the National University of Mexico, he joined the Secretariat of Hydraulic Resources. His record there earned him promotion to the Mexican IBWC. He has accompanied both Presidents Diaz Ordaz and Lopez Mateos in numerous meetings with the U.S. Presidents.

Mr. Herrera speaks English. He is married to the former Angelina Tellez.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By g, NARA, Date 2-23-91

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INFORMATION 30

Thursday, December 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Critical Decisions Project

The attached page lists the 21 critical decisions histories which are now in my hands.

The summaries and documentation fill over a hundred notebooks.

The final stage is to incorporate in these studies the information to be found in Tom Johnson's notes. We are considering how best to add this sensitive material to the histories -- whether to paraphrase the information from the Johnson notes or extract the material verbatim.

Within the next few days, we hope to have worked out this problem -- thus completing the project.

Arrangements have been made to send these highly sensitive volumes to Austin for storage under proper protection. Access to these documents will be limited to me for the time being until a later decision is taken as to any others who may be granted access.

W. W. Rostow

Attach.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY MP/rg ON 1-9-98

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a).

30a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY MP/rg ON 1-9-98

Critical National Security Decisions, 1963-1968

The President and the Cyprus Crises - Dec 1963, Dec 1967 (3 volumes)
Panama Crisis - Jan-April 1964 (4 volumes)
Guantanamo Water Crisis - Feb 1964 (2 volumes)
Gulf of Tonkin, August 2-7, 1964 (3 volumes)
Dominican Crisis, 1965 (14 volumes)
Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam - July 1965, (6 volumes)
Honolulu Conference, February 6-8, 1966 (3 volumes)
The President's speech to the Organization of African Unity - May 1966
The President and the Indian Famine - Aug 1966 - Feb 1967 (4 volumes)
President's Seven-Nation Asian Trip, October 1966 (3 volumes)
Non-Proliferation Treaty - 1966 (2 volumes)
US-UK-FRG Trilateral Negotiations - 1966-1967 (4 volumes)
OAS Summit Meeting - April 1967 (4 volumes)
The President and the Middle East Crisis - May 13-June 19, 1967 (8 or 10 vols)
The President and the Congo Crisis of July 1967
Kennedy Round Crisis, 1967 - (2 volumes)
Gold Crisis, 1967-1968 (1 volume)
March 31, 1968 speech (9 volumes)
The Pueblo Crisis - 1968 (21 volumes)
New Year's Day Balance of Payments Program, 1968 (1 volume)
Partnership for Progress: The Inter-American Policy of LBJ (1 volume)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

31

INFORMATION

SECRET

Wednesday, December 11, 1968
7:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

I wouldn't take this index as evidence -- all by itself -- but it reinforces other intelligence that we can expect a pretty intense enemy effort in the weeks ahead -- at least the August level.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

32Wednesday, December 11, 1968
7:25 p. m.~~TOP SECRET~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and I met in the Cabinet Room from 6 to 7 p. m. The meeting broke up because Sect. Rusk had to go home to dress for the Kuwaiti dinner tonight.

1. There was extended discussion of the evidence in Abrams' cable. The general view was that, while we had had other false alarms, this evidence looked pretty solid, coming from many sources. The "unusually reliable agent" who was the source of the first page of evidence is, indeed, well placed and has furnished good information in the past. We all agreed that Abrams was right to take every precaution as a matter of prudence and we should assume that the attack will take place. Sect. Clifford raised some questions about:

-- whether the enemy might be planting false intelligence on us; and

-- on the scale of the attack.

We all agreed that we would just have to see, monitoring things closely in the days ahead.

2. It was agreed that Gen. Wheeler would despatch, at Sect. Rusk's request, a copy of Abrams' cable to Paris requesting that Harriman and Vance be briefed on it first thing tomorrow morning Paris time. That was the only action taken.

3. With respect to hot pursuit back into Cambodia, there was an extended discussion. Sect. Rusk suggested that Wheeler might, on a contingency basis, prepare orders which would permit hot pursuit up to 5 kilometers on the ground, and air attacks up to 10 kilometers. This would be not pre-emptive attacks but, strictly, hot pursuit.

4. Sect. Clifford, on the other hand, thought that this would be a bad time to broaden the war and that hot pursuit would not provide much military advantage since the units would be broken up and dispersed. He summarized that the military return would not warrant opening up "a new phase of the war" with possible consequences for the Paris talks, the Soviet attitude, etc.

5. Sect. Clifford added that if the President decided to go, he would much prefer that the action be taken without explicit orders from the President -- but rather as a local matter. There was considerable discussion of the kind

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FR45.6448.101.7.253

NARA. Date 12-29-09

of language that might go into an order that would protect the government from the charge of ordering our troops into Cambodia and leaving us free to regard the incidents as a by-product of the melee of battle. It was agreed that Gen. Wheeler would give some thought to how such orders might be drafted if the President were to receive from Abrams a request for this authority and should grant the authority.

6. With respect to an attack on Saigon, Sect. Rusk said that if Saigon were attacked, it was absolutely essential that we respond, or our credibility with Hanoi and Moscow would be finished.

7. Sect. Clifford sought clarification on what we mean by: "an attack on Saigon." Attacks on towns in the direction of Saigon? Attacks in the suburbs? Shelling of Saigon? Ground force attacks into the city? No action was, of course, taken on this point.

8. Sect. Rusk initiated some discussion of a Summit. He was much concerned with the problem of:

-- bringing the new Administration aboard;

-- briefing our allies.

Perhaps the job could be done if the meeting were about Christmastime; but he comes back to the notion of exchanging principles and papers at a lower level.
(Said. Rusk will talk to you tonight about this. I put your position to him on the phone.)

9. Sect. Clifford thought that there was danger, if we did not get started now, that the talks would be postponed for a very long time since the new President, Sect. of State, and Sect. of Defense would be dealing with exigencies and would not be able to put themselves soon in a position to launch such talks.

(W) #1 Rostow

Wednesday, December 11, 1968 - 6:55pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting of President-Elect with Amir of Kuwait

The Amir will be in Washington all day Thursday. He meets Secretary Rusk at 10:00 A. M., Robert McNamara at noon, and gives a reception for the President and Mrs. Johnson at 6:30 P. M. at the Kuwait Embassy, 2940 Tilden Street.

The Amir leaves Washington Friday noon, visits Cape Kennedy and Palm Beach, returning to New York Sunday afternoon. He will be in New York through Tuesday when he returns to Washington.

In view of the fact that you and Mrs. Johnson are expected at the Kuwaiti return reception, you might end your meeting with the President-elect by suggesting that he and Mrs. Nixon accompany you and Mrs. Johnson to the Kuwaiti reception.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

SECRET--SENSITIVE

Wednesday, December 11, 1968 -- 3:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an extremely important report from Gen. Abrams.

Abrams believes that a major enemy attack is about to begin on the night of 12-13 December. (Day time tomorrow here.) I have marked and sidelined in red the passages which, at a minimum, I believe you should read.

As you will see, Abrams intends to try to smash the attacks before they can get fully under way.

But he asks us to be prepared to permit him to pursue the enemy into Cambodia to a depth of at least 10 kilometers and to use airpower as well "to forestall further offensive action."

Moreover, if this turns out to be a major offensive against Saigon, he would like us to consider launching a full-scale 48-hour attack on North Vietnam south of the 19th parallel, using tactical air and naval gun fire in reprisal.

Therefore, depending on how strong an attack the enemy develops, we may be faced with important decisions in the days ahead.

COMMENT: As you know, some of us have felt that our progress in pacification would force the enemy to move;

-- It is the enemy's custom and habit to launch an attack as negotiations begin -- a method used since the Geneva conference of 1954;

-- We are analyzing one report which suggests that after an attack which might peak in the period 15-18 December, he might declare a cease-fire in place.

We shall insure that all hands are alert.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 12090
By SP4/1/CS, NARA, Date 12-10-99

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

SECRET--SENSITIVE

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FOIA-3/PL 86-36

1968 DEC 11 19 21

00 [REDACTED]
 EEEEEDE [REDACTED] 34 3461835
 O 111832Z ZYH ZFF-2
 FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
 INFO STATE DEPT (MR RUSK)
 MR HELMS CIA
 MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE
 O 111410Z ZYH ZFF-1
 FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
 TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS
 INFO ADM MCCAIN, CINCPAC
 ZEM

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 141-023-010/3
 By JC, NARA, Date 11-5-09

~~SECRET~~ ~~SPOKE~~ SECTION ONE OF FOUR MAC 16964 EYES ONLY
 WE HAVE RECEIVED A VERY SIGNIFICANT REPORT FROM AN
 UNUSUALLY RELIABLE AGENT. HE REPORTS THAT THE COORDINATED
 COUNTRY-WIDE CULMINATION OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WINTER-
 SPRING CAMPAIGN IS SET BY COSVN FOR THE NIGHT OF 12-13
 DECEMBER. IN THE III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE THE 5TH VC DIVISION
 HAS THE MISSION TO ATTACK AND DESTROY BEN CAT, LAI KHE, AND
 CHON THANH. CHON THANH, IN PARTICULAR, MUST BE DESTROYED AT
 ANY PRICE. THE 7TH NVA DIVISION WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
 THE BINH LONG PHUOC LONG BATTLEFIELD, ALTHOUGH ONE 7TH DIVISION
 REGIMENT WILL ATTACK THE US INSTALLATION AT BAU BANG IN
 BINH DUONG PROVINCE. HE STATES THAT A NORTH VIETNAMESE
 DIVISION WILL ATTACK TRANG LON, AND A NUMBER OF OTHER TARGETS
 IN THE BA CHIEM STREAM AREA OF NE TAY NINH PROVINCE. THE
 COSVN SAPPER BN WILL COORDINATE WITH TAY NINH PROVINCE SAPPER/
 RECON FORCES, TO PENETRATE AND SEIZE TAY NINH CITY. SIMULTAN-
 EOUSLY, THE 14TH VC LF BN WILL ATTACK THE LONG HOA TOA THANH
 AREAS AT TAY NINH CITY. HE ALLEGES THAT THE 9TH VC DIVISION
 HAS MOVED AT TAY NINH PROVINCE INTO VC LONG AN PROVINCE.
 HE STATES THAT THE QUYET THANG REGT OF SR-1 IS NOW LOCATED
 NEAR AN PHU DONG, NEAR SAIGON. BOTH THE 9TH DIVISION AND
 THE QUYET THANG REGT ARE PREPARED TO INFILTRATE THE CAPITAL
 IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN RVNAF UNIT MUTINIES. COSVN WILL
 WAIT TO SEE HOW WE REACT AFTER THE SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS
 ON THE NIGHT OF 12-13 DECEMBER, BEFORE GIVING THE ORDER
 FOR THE RVNAF UNIT TO MUTINY IN THE CAPITAL. CONSEQUENTLY,
 THE DATE FOR THE SAIGON ATTACK HAS NOT BEEN FINALIZED.
 THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE THE
 AGENT'S REPORT. AS FOLLOWS:

ON 10 DEC, THE 7TH DIVISION'S 32ND NVA REGT WAS FIXED
 SOUTH OF THE MICHELIN PLANTATION. ON 9 DEC, TWO PWS FROM
 THE 7TH DIVISION'S 165TH NVA REGT WERE CAPTURED 5 KM SE OF
 BEN CAT. ALTHOUGH THEIR INITIAL STATEMENTS APPEAR
 CONTRADICTORY, BOTH WERE STRAGGLERS AND HAD BEEN SEPARATED
 FROM THEIR UNITS ONLY A FEW HOURS WHEN CAPTURED. THEIR
 PRESENCE IN CENTRAL BINH DUONG PROV IS EVIDENCE THAT SOME
 IF NOT ALL OF THE 165TH NVA REGT HAS MOVED SOUTHWARD.
 TU SON A HIGH-RANKING PW FROM SR-5 STATED THAT TWO REGIMENTS
 OF THE 7TH NVA DIV WILL ASSEMBLE SOUTH OF PHUOC VINH. THERE
 THEY WILL COMBINE WITH SUB-REGION 5 FORCES INTO FRONT 5, AND
 ATTACK SAIGON.

~~BOTH THE 32ND AND 165TH REGIMENTS ARE IN POSITION TO MOVE
 ACROSS A ROUTE DESIGNATED BY THE COSVN TO APPROX BINH
 DUONG PROVINCE~~

No Objection To Declassification 2004/04/01 : NLJ-141-023-10-3-9

IMMEDIATELY AFTER NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION 2004/04/01 : NLJ-141-023-10-3-9
WAIT TO SEE HOW ON THE NIGHT OF 12-15 DECEMBER, BEFORE GIVING IN ORDER
FOR THE RVNAF UNIT TO MUTINY IN THE CAPITAL. CONSEQUENTLY,
THE DATE FOR THE SAIGON ATTACK HAS NOT BEEN FINALIZED.
THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE THE
AGENT'S REPORT, AS FOLLOWS:

ON 10 DEC, THE 7TH DIVISION'S 32ND NVA REGT WAS FIXED
SOUTH OF THE MICHELIN PLANTATION. ON 9 DEC, TWO PWS FROM
THE 7TH DIVISION'S 165TH NVA REGT WERE CAPTURED 5 KM SE OF
BEN CAT. ALTHOUGH THEIR INITIAL STATEMENTS APPEAR
CONTRADICTORY, BOTH WERE STRAGGLERS AND HAD BEEN SEPARATED
FROM THEIR UNITS ONLY A FEW HOURS WHEN CAPTURED. THEIR
PRESENCE IN CENTRAL BINH DUONG PROV IS EVIDENCE THAT SOME
IF NOT ALL OF THE 165TH NVA REGT HAS MOVED SOUTHWARD.
TU SON A HIGH-RANKING PW FROM SR-5 STATED THAT TWO REGIMENTS
OF THE 7TH NVA DIV WILL ASSEMBLE SOUTH OF PHUOC VINH. THERE
THEY WILL COMBINE WITH SUB-REGION 5 FORCES INTO FRONT 5, AND
ATTACK SAIGON.

BOTH THE 32ND AND 165TH REGIMENTS ARE IN POSITION TO MOVE
ACROSS A ROUTE RECONNOITERED BY THE SR-5 MIS ACROSS BINH
BUONG PROVINCE TO THE 7TH DIVISION ASSEMBLY AREA SOUTH OF
PHUOC VINH. HOWEVER, IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THE 7TH NVA DIV
HQ WAS STILL LOCATED NEAR THE FISHHOOK ON 9 DEC.
SINCE 2 DEC, HQS SR-5 HAS BEEN OPERATING WITH A
DETACHED HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT. ONE HQS ELEMENT IS LOCATED
5 KM SE OF PHUOC VINH, CLOSE TO SR-5 HQS AND THE SR-5 MIE.
THE OTHER IS 7 KM SOUTH OF PHUOC VINH, NEAR AN ELEMENT OF
MIB, COSVN AND THE PROBABLE LOCATION OF THE K-1 BN, DONG
NAI REGT. DONG NAI REGT PLANS, CAPTURED ON 2 DEC, OUTLINE
PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACKS ON ALLIED POSITIONS IN EASTERN
BINH DUONG PROVINCE. THESE PLANS DISCUSS MOVEMENT ON SAIGON.
THEY SPECIFY THAT "DATE FOR TROOP MOVEMENT . IS FIXED ON 12",
A PROBABLE REFERENCE TO 12 DEC, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE
DONG NAI REGT WILL MOVE SOUTH TOWARD SAIGON UNDER COVER
OF THESE ATTACKS.

THE 141ST NVA REGIMENT, 7TH NVA DIVISION, WAS FIXED
IN NORTHWEST TAY NINH PROVINCE ON 9 DEC. IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT THE 141ST HAS BEEN DETACHED FROM THE 7TH DIVISION
FOR AN UNKNOWN MISSION.

THE AGENT HAS ALSO REPORTED THAT A NEW DIVISION WILL
BE RESPONSIBLE FOR TAY NINH PROVINCE. THE RELOCATION OF
THE HQ 1ST NVA DIVISION FROM THE FISHHOOK TO NORTH WEST
TAY NINH PROVINCE HAS CONFIRMED BY ARDF FIXES ON 7 AND 9
DEC. THE HQ IS NEAR THE LAST KNOWN POSITION OF THE 174TH
NVA REGIMENT, WHOSE SUBORDINATION IS NOT CLEAR.

IT IS ALSO NEAR THE 9 DEC FIX OF THE 141ST NVA REGIMENT.
THE 95C NVA REGIMENT WAS LAST IDENTIFIED AT FSB DOT ON
16 NOV. AT 0745 HOURS THIS AM THE 1ST CAV DIVISION
RECEIVED A HOI CHANH NEAR TONG LE CHON. HE STATES HE
IS A SQUAD LEADER IN THE 2ND CO, 4TH BN, 320TH NVA REGT.
THE RALLIER STATES THAT THERE ARE 60 VC LOCATED 12 KM SW
OF TONG LE CHON WHO MIGHT ALSO DESIRE TO RALLY. NO FURTHER
(CON'T)

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.
900

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

FM GEN WHEELER No Objection To Declassification 2004/04/01 : NLJ-141-023-10-3-9

INFO STATE DEPT (C) (S)

MR HELMS CIA

MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE

O 111410Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS

INFO ADM MCCAIN, CINCPAC

ZEM

1968 DEC 11 09 23

~~SECRET~~ SPOKE SECTION TWO OF FOUR MAC 16964 EYES ONLY INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THE REPORT DOES INDICATE THAT 320TH NVA REGT ELEMENTS MAY BE SOUTH OF THE FISHHOOK. A DESIRE TO RALLY BY LARGE NUMBERS OF ENEMY MAY BE INDICATIVE OF IMPENDING OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY BY THEIR UNIT. THE AGENT REPORTS THAT AN NVA DIVISION WILL ATTACK A NUMBER OF TARGETS IN THE SOU BA CHIEN AREA OF NORTHERN TAY NINH ON THE NIGHT OF 12-13 DEC. THE REGIMENTS OF THE 1ST NVA DIVISION ARE IN POSITION TO MAKE SUCH ATTACKS.

ANOTHER RELIABLE AGENT REPORTED ON 29 NOVEMBER THAT THE 9TH C DIVISION WILL MOVE TOWARD SAIGON USING THE SAME ROUTE THAT IT USED DURING THE MAY OFFENSIVE. ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST NVA DIVISION ARE IN POSITION TO REPLACE THE 9TH VC DIVISION IN NORTHERN TAY NINH PROVINCE, PARTICULARLY IF THE 174TH AND 141ST REGIMENTS HAVE BEEN RESUBORDINATED TO THE 1ST NVA DIVISION, HAS IS POSSIBLE.

AN ELEMENT OF THE 9TH VC DIVISION HAS BEEN FIXED IN THE ANGEL'S WING. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE HQ 9TH VC DIVISION AND ITS THREE REGIMENTAL HQ WERE FIXED IN WESTERN TAY NINH PROVINCE BETWEEN 4 AND 8 DEC, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT 9TH VC DIVISION MANEUVER ELEMENTS ARE ALSO IN THE ANGEL'S WING, WHERE THERE IS A PERSISTING PATTERNS OF UNIDENTIFIED ARDF FIXES. IN EITHER CASE, THE 9TH C DIVISION CAN ARRIVE AT THE SAIGON OUTSKIRTS WITHIN 3 TO 4 DAYS OF STARTING TO MOVE, FROM EITHER BASE AREA 354 OR THE ANGEL'S WING. THE PLANNED ATTACKS IN THE TAY NINH CITY AREA REPORTED BY THE AGENT MAY BE INTENDED TO TIE DOWN FRIENDLY FORCES, TO FACILITATE THE SOUTHWARD MOVEMENT OF THE 9TH VC DIVISION.

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE THAT THE 1ST AND 9TH DIVS MAY BE INVOLVED IN RELATED ACTIVITY IS THE FACT THAT ON 8 AND 9 DEC, THE 9TH AND 1ST DIVS WERE DIRECTED BY HEADQUARTERS, SVN TO INCREASE THEIR COMMS SCHEDULES. MOREOVER, ON 10 DEC THERE WAS INCREASED MESSAGE ACTIVITY BETWEEN HQ, SVN AND THE 5TH, 7TH, AND 9TH DIVISIONS.

THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 5TH C DIVISION HAS MOVED FROM THE CAMBODIAN FISHHOOK TO WAR ZONE D. ITS MIS WAS IDENTIFIED THERE ON 26 NOVEMBER AND 5 DECEMBER. AN ELEMENT OF THE HEADQUARTERS WAS IDENTIFIED THERE ON 6 AND 8 DECEMBER. THE 5TH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS TERMINAL WAS FIXED THERE ON 9 DEC. WHICH REGIMENTS WILL NOW BE SUBORDINATE TO THE 5TH VC DIVISION IS NOT COMPLETELY CLEAR. HOWEVER, THE REDUCED COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 275TH VC REGIMENT DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER, AND THE 3 AND 4 DECEMBER CONTACTS IN THE SONG BE CORRIDOR, STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT IT, TOO, IS MOVING SOUTHWARD TO WAR ZONE D TO JOIN ITS DIVISION HEADQUARTERS. ON 9 DEC, THE 275TH WAS OBSERVED COMMUNICATING ON THE 5TH VC DIVISION WATCH FACILITY FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE ACTIVATION OF THE FACILITY IN JULY, TENUOUSLY SUGGESTING ITS MOVE WAS COMPLETE ON THAT DATE. PRIOR TO JUNE 1968, THE 274TH VC REGIMENT WAS SUBORDINATE TO THE 5TH VC DIVISION. ARDF FIXES REVEAL THAT THE 274TH VC REGIMENT IS MOVING WESTWARD TOWARD WAR ZONE D. ITS HEADQUARTERS WAS FIXED NEAR WAR ZONE D ON 9 DEC. ITS 1ST BATTALION WAS FIXED ALONG THE SOUTH CENTRAL BIEN HOA PROVINCE BORDER.

No Objection To Declassification 2004/04/01 : NLJ-141-023-10-3-9

SW-8P BLACK HOA

SUSPECTING ITS MOVE WAS COMPLETE ON THAT DATE. PRIOR TO JUNE 1969, THE NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION 2004/04/01 : NLJ-141-023-10-3-9 5TH VC DIVISION. ADD. FIXES REVEAL THAT THE 274TH VC REGIMENT IS MOVING WESTWARD TOWARD WAR ZONE D. ITS HEADQUARTERS WAS FIXED NEAR WAR ZONE D ON 9 DEC. ITS 1ST BATTALION WAS FIXED ALONG THE SOUTH-CENTRAL BIEN HOA PROVINCE BORDER ON 7 DEC. ITS 3RD BN WAS FIXED 3 KM SW OF BLACK HORSE ON 11 DEC. A 9 DEC MESSAGE INDICATES THAT THE 1ST BATTALION IS TO ATTACK AN UNIDENTIFIED THAI POSITION ON 10 OR 11 DECEMBER. A POSSIBLE THAI TARGET IS THEIR BASE CAMP AT BLACK HORSE. BLACK HORSE IS THE MAJOR FRIENDLY INSTALLATION BETWEEN THE 274TH BATTALIONS AND THE LONG BINH-BIEN HOA COMPLEX. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE 10 OR 11 DEC ATTACK IS INTENDED TO SCREEN THE MOVEMENT OF THE 274TH BATTALION. IF THIS PROVES TO BE TRUE, AND IF THE 275TH REGT HAS MOVED SOUTH, THE 5TH VC DIVISION CAN BE IN POSITION TO ATTACK THE LONG BINH-BIEN HOA COMPLEX, WITH 2 REGIMENTS, SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 74TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT AND THE SAPPER-ORIENTED D-1 AND D-2 BATTALIONS OF U-1 PROVINCE, BY 12 DEC. THE 274TH VC REGIMENT WAS NOTED IN LOW COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY ON 10 DEC. THIS MAY INDICATE FURTHER MOVEMENT BY THE 274TH.

THE AGENT ALSO STATED THAT THE 5TH C DIV WOULD ATTACK BEN CAT, LAI KHE, AND CHON THANH. THIS RAISES A QUESTION REGARDING SUBORDINATION OF THE 5TH VC DIVISION'S REGIMENTS. THE 33RD NVA REGT WAS LAST FIXED IN NW BINH LONG PROV ON 28 NOV. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT IT HAS RELOCATED. A HOI CHANH WHO RALLIED ON 5 DEC STATED THAT HE DESERTED FROM THE 88TH NVA REGT 7 KM SOUTH OF DAU TIENG. DOCUMENTS CAPTURED 3HKM SW OF BEN CAT ON 3 DEC IDENTIFIED A COMMO-LIAISON AGENT OF THE 88TH NVA REGT. A PW CAPTURED IN THE SAME AREA ON 8 DEC IS TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS A MEMBER OF THE 2ND BN, 88TH NVA REGT. THIS EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT SOME, IF NOT ALL, OF THE 88TH NVA REGT ELEMENTS ARE IN POSITION TO ATTACK THE BEN CAT AND LAI KHE TARGETS. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE 33RD NVA REGT HAS MOVED SOUTH TO ATTACK CHON THANH CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE ENEMY STATEMENT THAT IT MUST BE DESTROYED AT ALL COSTS. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE 275TH VC REGT STOPPED SHORT OF WAR ZONE D AND WILL BE EMPLOYED AGAINST CHON THANH ALSO CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED.

III CORPS IS NOT THE ONLY AREA IN WHICH WE HAVE GROWING EVIDENCE OF IMMINENT ENEMY ATTACKS. A SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENT DATED 2 DEC, ORIGINATED BY THE BEN TRE PROV COMMITTEE AND CAPTURED 6 DEC DESCRIBES VC OFFENSIVE PLANS. THE DOCUMENT A TOP SECRET COMBAT ORDER STATES THAT THE BOMBING HALT, THE DEFEAT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND AGREEMENT OF THE SVN TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PARIS PEACE TALKS HAVE CHANGED THE SITUATION AND OFFERED A PARTICULARLY FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY "TO MAKE ANOTHER GREAT LEAP IN THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND UPRISING." THE HIGHEST ECHELONS HAVE INSTRUCTED THAT AN ALL CONT'DL

MSSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.
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~~SECRET~~

NNNN

DE [REDACTED] 36 346 [REDACTED] FOIA 3/PL 86-36
O 111832Z ZYH ZF [REDACTED] No Objection To Declassification 2004/04/01 : NLJ-141-023-10-3-9
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
INFO STATE DEPT (MR RUSK)
MR HELMS CIA
MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE
O 111410Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS
INFO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ ~~SPOKE~~ SECTION THREE OF FOUR MAC 16954 EYES ONLY
OUT ATTACK PHASE IS TO BE LAUNCHED IN DEC TO REACH ITS
CLIMAX DURING THE 15 DAYS FROM 5 TO 20 DEC. SIMULTANEOUS
ATTACKS ARE TO BE LAUNCHED ON 6 DEC. ON 6 DEC, THE HIGHEST
LEVEL OF ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY IN IV CTZ SINCE 21 AUG
WAS RECORDED ADDING CREDENCE TO THE DOC. FROM 6 TO 10
DEC, THE DOCUMENT CONTINUES, MIL ACTIVITIES ARE TO BE STEPPED
UP TO WEAR DOWN THE ENEMY. CITIES ARE TO BE INFILTRATED/
FROM THE DAWN OF 11 DEC TO 13 DEC, MIL ACTIVITIES WILL BE
COORDINATED WITH CIVILIAN UPRISINGS IN THE PROV CAPITAL.
ENEMY SOLDIERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL ARE TO BE
ANNIHILATED AND THE "K-2" DESTROYED. EXTENSIVE
PROSELYTING WILL ACCOMPANY THIS INCREASED MIL ACTIVITY.
TWO CLIMAXING PHASES OF CONCENTRATED ATTACKS ARE ANNOUNCED.
"THE FIRST PHASE IS TO BE CONDUCTED DURING THE 36HR PERIOD
AS OF 13 DEC." THE SECOND PHASE IS TO BE LAUNCHED DURING
THE 36HR PERIOD AS OF 17 DEC. PWS CAPTURED 7 DEC IN
KIEN HOA PROV (XS 4939) ALSO CLAIM THAT THE GENERAL
OFFENSIVE, WHICH BEGAN ON 5 DEC, WILL LAST THROUGH 20 DEC.
THE PWS STATE THAT THE MAJOR EFFORT IN KIEN HOA PROV WILL
BE DIRECTED AGAINST BEN TRE CITY, BUT THAT ALLIED OUTPOSTS
IN THE AREA WILL ALSO BE ATTACKED. A SPECIAL DIRECTIVE OF
THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF MR-2, DATED 17 NOV AND
CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET WAS CAPTURED ON 4 DEC IN KIEN PHONG
PROV. THE DOCUMENT INDICATES THERE WILL BE AN OFFENSIVE
TO TOTALLY CHANGE THE SITUATION AND GAIN FINAL VICTORY.
THE OPERATIONAL PHASE WILL CONSISTS OF 3 STAGES. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A 24 NOV
RALLIER, WHO ATTENDED A 12 NOV MEETING OF THE KIEN PHONG
PROV COMMITTEE STATES THAT ALL DIST TOWNS AND THE PROV
CAPITAL WILL BE ATTACKED PRIOR TO 17 DEC. MY THO WILL BE
ATTACKED AT THE SAME TIME. A RELIABLE AGENT REPORTED ON
25 NOV THAT AN OFFENSIVE WILL BE LAUNCHED BEFORE 15 DEC.
ANOTHER AGENT, WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION FOR
3 MONTHS, REPORTED ON 20 NOV THAT THE VC ARE PREPARING A
GENERAL OFFENSIVE TO TAKE PLACE BETWEEN 1 AND 20 DEC. IN
RELATED COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY, ON 9 AND 10 DEC, THE HQ,
MR-2 TRANSMITTED AN EXTREMELY HIGH NUMBER OF MESSAGES TO ITS
SUBORDINATE MAS'S. ON 10 DEC, THE HQ, DT-1 REGT RELOCATED
APPROX 12 KM NE OF ITS 8 DEC LOCATION (FROM WS 932 416, 350 M,
TO XS 037 479, 350M), PLACING IT APPROX 18 KM WEST OF CAI
LAY AND IN BETTER POSITION TO CONTROL ACTIVITIES IN THAT
AREA. ALSO ON 10 DEC, THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION,
THE MAS AND THE REGIONAL COMMITTEE, MR-2, RELOCATED OUT OF
BA 704 APPROXIMATELY 10 KM EAST OF THEIR PREVIOUS LOCATION
IN THE BA. IN MR-3, THE HQ, MR-3 HAS BEEN NOTED IN ALMOST
DAILY HIGH MSG ACTIVITY WITH THE MAS COSVN FROM 1 TO 9 DEC.
A DECREASE IN THE U/I RADIO TERMINALS IN THE PAST 10 DAYS
THROUGHOUT IV CTZ, DESPITE ALMOST DOUBLED ARDF COVERAGE,
MAY INDICATE THAT UNITS ARE MOVING. A 3 DEC PW STATES THAT
CAI NUOC DIST TOWN, AN XUYEN PROV WILL BE ATTACKED PRIOR
TO THE END OF DEC. AN UNDATED AGENT REPORT STATES THAT
CAI NUOC DIST TOWN [REDACTED]
3 TO 12 DEC. THE [REDACTED]

IN THE BA. IN MR-3, THE HQ, MR-3 HAS BEEN NOTED IN ALMOST DAILY HIGH MSG ACTIVITY WITH THE MAS COSUN FROM 09 DEC. A DECREASE IN THE U/I RADIO TERMINALS IN THE PAST 10 DAYS THROUGHOUT IV CTZ, DESPITE ALMOST DOUBLED ARDE COVERAGE, MAY INDICATE THAT UNITS ARE MOVING. A 3 DEC PM STATES THAT CAI HUOC DIST TOWN, AN XUYEN PROV WILL BE ATTACKED PRIOR TO THE END OF DEC. AN UNDATED AGENT REPORT STATES THAT CAI HUOC DIST TOWN WILL RECEIVE A MAJOR GROUND ATTACK FROM 3 TO 12 DEC. THE 312TH MF BN HAS MOVED FROM BA 478 TO WITHIN 5 KM OF TRA VINH CITY, VINH BINH PROV. THE ENEMY UNITS WHICH WERE LOCATED IN AUGUST AROUND THE "BA SE" PERIMETER, THREATENING THE CAN THO-BINH TUY AREA, HAVE FINISHED RESUPPLY ACTIVITIES IN BA 480 AND HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR AUG POSITIONS WITHIN 20 KM OF CAN THO.

ON 8 DEC, THE PROBABLE MAS OF THE RACH GIA PROVL COMMITTEE WAS LOCATED 5 KM SSW OF CA MAU IN AN XUYEN PROV, 58 KM SOUTH OF ITS 16 NOV POSITION. IN ADDITION, THE U-MINH 2 BN IS BELIEVED LOCATED WITHIN 10 KM OF CA MAU. AN U/I TERMINAL WAS FIXED ON 9 DEC 2 KM NW OF THE CITY POSSIBLY INDICATING RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITY.

IN I CTZ, A 10 DEC MSG BETWEEN U/I ELMS OF THE 27TH BN STATES THAT THE PROBABLE "NEW" GROUP HAS DECIDED THAT IN DEC THERE ARE TO BE 5 BATTLES, 2 OF WHICH WILL BE PROBES. BADLY GARBLED 9 DEC MESSAGES BETWEEN U/I ELMS IN EASTERN QUANG NAM PROV MENTION "BEING PRESENT ON 11 DEC." THESE MSGS CONTAIN POSSIBLE DESIGNATORS FOR THE 402ND AND 3RD SAPPER BNS, 33TH NVA REGT. THE MSGS ALSO CONTAIN REFERENCES TO "PREPARING THE BATTLEFIELD," AMMO AND WEAPONS MOVEMENT, AND COORDINATION WITH LOCAL FORCES. THESE MSGS MAY BE A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF HARRASSING ATTACKS IN EASTERN QUANG NAM PROV ON ABOUT 11 DEC.

USUALLY RELIABLE GVN SOURCES REPORT A HIGH PROBABILITY OF ABF, SAPPER ATTACKS AND TERRORISM DIRECTED AGAINST DANANG AND ADJACENT FRD MIL INSTALLATIONS COMMENCING ON 10 DEC, AND CONTINUING THROUGH 26 DEC. ONE SOURCE CLAIMS THAT THE HOI AN/DUY XUYEN AREA ARE MAIN TARGETS. POSSIBLY RELATED TO THESE REPORTS IS THE 8 DEC NE MOVE OF THE 1ST VC REGT, 2ND NVA DIV TO THE QUE SON/DUY XUYEN DIST BORDER AREA (AT 988 423, 2100M).

RECENT 3RD DIV COMMS SUGGEST RENEWED EN ACTIVITY IN QUANG NGAI PROV. THE HQ 3RD DIV EXCHANGED UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBERS OF MSGS WITH ITS SUBORDINATE 22ND AND 2ND REGTS ON 6 AND 9 DEC, RESPECTIVELY. ALSO ON 7 DEC THE HQ, 3RD DIV EXCHANGED A LARGE NUMBER OF MSGS WITH HQ, MR-5 MFUC. ON 5 DEC A HOI CHANH STATED THAT AN U/I REGT, POSSIBLE OF THE 3RD DIV WILL ATTACK NGHIA HANH IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE 22ND NVA REGT, 3RD NVA DIV WAS LAST FIXED ON 7 DEC, 11 KM WEST OF NGHIA HANH (BS 515 650).

IN II CTZ, A 10 DEC MSG, TRANSMITTED BY THE CMDG OFF, 95 B NVA REGT TO THE REGTL FE, STATES THAT THE B-3 FRONT HAS DIRECTED THE UNIT TO CONDUCT MANY ATTACKS DURING THE PERIOD 15 TO 18 DEC.

DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY ROKA FORCES IN BINH DINH PROV (CR 039 303) ON 2 DEC INDICATE THAT PREPARATIONS FOR THE 2ND PHASE WERE TO BE COMPLETED BY 10 DEC. OTHER DOCUMENTS CAPTURED ON 1 DEC IN BINH DINH PROV (BR 914 595) INDICATE THAT AN ATTACK WAS PLANNED AGAINST QUI NHON (CR 0922), PROBABLY DURING THE "2ND PHASE."
(CON'T)

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.

900

~~SECRET~~

1968 DEC 11 20 00

ZCZCQAA873

FOIA-3/PL 88-38

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DE

37 3461835

O 111832Z ZYH ZFF-2

FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC

INFO STATE DEPT (MR RUSK)

MR HELMS CIA

MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE

O 111410Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS

INFO ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ ~~SPONS~~ FINAL SECTION OF FOUR MAC 16964 EYES ONLY
TO PLACE EVIDENCE OF IMPENDING ENEMY ATTACKS IN
PERSPECTIVE, YOU WILL RECALL THAT A HIGHLY RELIABLE AGENT
TOLD US THAT EXACTLY

THE DAY THE TWO SIDES CAME TO THE
CONFERENCE TABLE IN PARIS TO DELIBERATE A CEASEFIRE AND A
COALITION GOVERNMENT, OR A FEW DAYS BEFORE, THE VC WILL

AUNCH A LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE, STRIKING "REPEATEDLY AND
FIERCELY."

ON 3 NOV, THE SECOND RELIABLE AGENT REPORTED THAT THE ENEMY
WOULD LAUNCH AN OFFENSIVE AFTER THE US PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION. HE SAID THAT THE SCALE OF THE OFFENSIVE WOULD
DEPEND UPON PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THE US GOVERNMENT. THE
FIRST NEWS REPORTS THAT BECAUSE NIXON WON THE ELECTION, THE
US WILL CHANGE ITS STRATEGY. CONSEQUENTLY HHC HAS DECIDED
TO LAUNCH A LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE AGAINST US INSTALLATIONS
AND BASES. THE ATTACKS ARE DESIGNED TO ADD PRESTIGE TO
THE NLF AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE.

YOU WILL ALSO RECALL THAT LAST SATURDAY'S WIEU

INN MMARY, SUGGESTED THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE THAT THE ENEMY
MIGHT OBTAIN BY HAVING VC UNITS ATTACK SAIGON AND ITS
ENVIRONS. THE EVIDENCE NOW AVAILABLE REVEALS THAT THE ENEMY
IS IN A POSITION TO CONDUCT SUCH ATTACKS WITH VC UNITS.

IN SUMMARY, THE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE ENEMY PLANS
WIDE SPREAD ATTACKS THROUGHOUT SVN, PROBABLY STARTING THE
NIGHT OF 12/13 DECEMBER. THE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE
POINTS TO BE ATTACKED ARE:

LAI KHE

BEN CAT

CHAN THANH

BLACK HORSE

TAY NINH CITY AND VICINITY

THE VIC OF BA CHIEM STREAM

ALLIED INSTALLATION IN EASTERN BINH DUONG PROVINCE

FRD INSTALLATION IN:

KIEN HOA PROVINCE

BEN TRE CITY

MY THO

CAI LAY

CAO LANH

CAI NUOC

CA MAU

CAN THO-BINH THUY AREA

ALLIED INSTALLATION IN EASTERN QUANG NAM PROVINCE

DANANG

HOI AN/DUY XUY

ONE CON

141 NINH CITY AND VICINITY

THE VIC OF BA C

ALLIED INSTALLA

FRD INSTALLATION IN

KIEN HOA PROVINCE

BEN TRE CITY

MY THO

CAI LAY

CAO LANH

CAI NUOC

CA MAU

CAN THO-BINH THUY AREA

ALLIED INSTALLATION IN EASTERN QUANG NAM PROVINCE

DANANG

HOI AN/DUY XUYEN

QUE SON

NGHIA HANH

QUI NHON

ALLIED INSTALLATIONKS IN B-3 FRONT

THE THREAT APPEARS TO BE MOST SEVERE IN III AND IV CTZ'S

WHILE THE UNUSUALLY RELIABLE STATES THAT AN ATTACK ON

SAIGON WILL NOT BE A PART OF THIS INITIAL PHASE, THE

MOVEMENTS OF THE DONG NAI REGT, AND THE 5TH C DIV INDICATE

THAT PRECAUTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A MATTER OF PRUDENCE.

I SPENT MOST OF TODAY VISITING THE MAJOR US COMMANDERS

IN III CTZ. ALL ARE ALERT TO THE SITUATION. OTHER

PREPARATIONS ARE ALSO IN PROGRESS SUCH AS ARRANGING B-52

STRIKES SO THAT THEY CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF TARGETS AS HEY

ARE DEVELOPED, AND GETTING NAVAL INLAND WATERWAY ELEMENTS

INTO BETTER POSITIONS FOR MEETING THE THREAT. WE ARE ASSUMING

THE ENEMY IS GOING O MOVE. OUR AIM IS TO SMASH HIM

BEFORE HE CAN GET FULLY UNDER WAY AND DEFEAT HIM COMPLETELY IN

ANY EVENT.

IF ALL DEVELOPS AS WE NOW EXPECT, WE WILL BE PREPARED

TO PURSUE THE ENEMY INTO CAMBODIA, TO A DEPTH OF AT LEAST

10 KM, HITTING HIM WITH B-52'S, TAC AIR, AND GROUND FORCES

AS NECESSARY TO FORESTALL FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTION BY HIM.

I URGE THAT WE PRESS AGAIN FOR AUTHORITY TO STRIKE ENEMY

FORCES IN CAMBODIA UNDER HESE CIRCUMSTANCES. MOREOVER,

IF THISTURNS OUT TO BE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE AGAINST

SAIGON, WE ARE PREPARED, ON ORDER, TO LAUNCH A FULL TIME

48 HOUR, ATTACK ON NVN, SOUTH

THE 19TH PARALLEL, USING

TAC AIR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE.

I AM FULLY AWARE OF ALL THE "CONVERSATIONS" ABOUT "GOOD

WILL AND SERIOUS INTENT". THERE HAS BEEN NO EVIDENCE OF EITHER.

IF THIS ATTACK OCCURS AS THE INTELLIGENCE INDICATES IT WILL

BE SMASHED BUT AT SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL COST TO US. I BELIEVE IT

IS MORE AN ACT TO RETRIEVE WHAT HAS BEEN LOST AND IS CONTINUING

TO BE LOST EVERYDAY. I BELIEVE OUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE DECISIVE.

IN TERMS OF LETTING THE ENEMY AND HE WORLD KNOW YOU CANNOT PLAY

GAMES WITH AMERICAN LIVES OR SOUTH VIETNAM.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY.

500

~~SECRET~~ ~~SPOT~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET--LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

Wednesday, December 11, 1968 -- 1:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

I gather from Sec. Rusk that both you and he are now cool to the possibility of a Summit on missiles; and I would guess that Moscow is also cool.

The reasons are ample:

- time is short;
- we could not go far beyond the exchange of positions and papers;
- we would have to brief in Rogers and Laird;
- we would have NATO consultation problems.

Every normal argument is for leaving it to Nixon. And that may be the correct course.

But it may also be a decision we shall regret more than any other in the years ahead.

Nuclear agreements are always marginal and tough. If we do not hold the meeting, the new administration may let the NPT and missiles slip in priority. Time will pass. Men and situations will change. And mankind may move down the wrong fork in the road for what will, with hindsight, look like relatively trivial reasons.

Therefore, I suggest that the President and Secretary of State make one more assessment of NPT and missile talk prospects in the Nixon administration, before abandoning the concept finally.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-27
By ing, NARA Date 8-20-96

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wed., Dec. 1, 1968
9:55 a. m.

Pres. L.L.

38

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the formal case for the
U. S. contribution of a million dollars
to the UN Secretary-General's Population
Trust Fund, which Secretary Rusk raised
at lunch yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment (log 3733 State 15983)

38a



15983

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S. Contribution of \$1,000,000 to the UN Secretary General's Population Trust Fund

Recommendation:

That you approve the announcement by Ambassador Wiggins in New York during "Human Rights Week" (December 10-17) of a contribution by the United States of \$1,000,000 to the UN Secretary-General's Population Trust Fund.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

This is the subject which Secretary Rusk mentioned to you at luncheon today. He approves the above recommendation as does Mr. Gaud.

The Trust Fund. The Congress has directed, and we agree it is very desirable, that in providing assistance for population/family planning programs we act as far as possible through the UN and its agencies. In August 1967 Secretary General U Thant established a Special Trust Fund for population programs and asked the U.S. and certain other nations for contributions. The U.S. contributed \$500,000 to the Trust Fund in FY 1968 for the development of projects and programs and \$235,000 early in FY 1969 for the increased staffing and activity of The UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in the population field. The U.S. has not yet made a contribution to the Trust Fund for action projects in population/family planning requested by countries.

Availability of Funds. The Executive Branch requested \$2,500,000 for FY 1969 for contributions to UN population activities. This sum will be made available from a mixture of Chapter 3 appropriations and of AID appropriations under the authority of Title X and would represent part of the \$50,000,000 earmarked by the Congress for population matters.

Proposal. We recommend that Ambassador Wiggins be authorized to announce a further contribution of \$1,000,000 to the Trust Fund to support UN programs in population/family planning, reserving the remainder of the \$2,500,000 for later announcement. The pledge of \$1,000,000 can be financed from funds available to AID in the supporting assistance account.

Timing. As an appropriate time for making an announcement, we suggest Human Rights week, December 10-17. This is also the anniversary of the signature, by you and 29 other heads of state, of the World Leaders Declaration on Population. This document declares as a basic human right the right of parents to determine the number and spacing of their children and to have information and means for that purpose. (Copy attached. See pages 13 and 15.) Moreover, the Second Human Rights Conference in the spring of 1968 adopted a resolution which, for the first time in an action by a UN body, also declared as a basic human right the right of parents to determine the number and spacing of their children and to have information and education for that purpose. In addition, the report of the President's Committee on Population and Family Planning, now scheduled to be submitted on December 19, recommends that the U.S. make financial support available to encourage more active participation by UN organizations in the population field.


Acting Secretary

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

Wednesday, December 11, 1968 -- 9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk reports an additional cable from Tommy Thompson as follows:

"I failed to report an additional observation of Dobrynin. He said that if the President decided not to go ahead with the meeting, that would be understood in Moscow and there would be no hard feelings."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 17, NARA, Date 2-23-98

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET--LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, December 11, 1968 -- 8:55 a. m.

Mr. President:

I forward this working level information on the history of Phantom financing -- about which you will no doubt be hearing from Abe Feinberg, etc.

Abe Feinberg came in yesterday to complain again that Clifford is offering only \$60 million in credit to the Israelis in a sale of fifty aircraft, whereas the Iranians received \$100 million in credit in a sale of thirty-two.

have *sp*
I shall report Feinberg's view to Clifford; but it seems clear that only the President's intervention is likely to alter the Defense Department terms -- if you wish to do so.

I pointed out to Feinberg that Eshkol had told you he would be delighted to pay cash on the barrel-head. Abe acknowledges this but says the Israeli foreign exchange position has deteriorated and Israel should not now be treated worse than rich Iran.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-26
By ig, NARA Date 12-4-96

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED

40a

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

December 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: More on Credit for Phantoms

[redacted] just called from New York to supplement the info his deputy gave me this morning in his absence.

[redacted] first recommendation to Secretary Clifford was for \$130 million in credit, \$65 million each year as follows:

--\$30 million in straight DOD credit at 6%.

--\$35 million guarantee for bank financing, probably at 7%.
(All of this would have to be chalked up against his authorization but only 25% against NOA.)

[redacted] believes Clifford would have come down to zero but for Nitze's intervention. He believes Clifford's action rests on two feelings:

--The Israelis have been talking right along about a cash sale, and he believes that's the President's understanding.

--He's not happy about the way this whole thing has gone and the decision for ^{more} credit will have to be someone else's.

I don't believe we can take this to the President until you can report directly on Clifford's views. But the above gives a slight variation on what I said this morning, i. e. there is flexibility in both FY 69 and FY 70, not just FY 70.

HS
Harold H. Saunders

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-26
By ing, NARA Date 11-29-96

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

Wednesday, December 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH LARRY TEMPLE

I checked with Ambassador Bob Murphy as to whether President-elect Nixon felt that he should not meet the Amir of Kuwait unless asked by you to do so.

Ambassador Murphy said Nixon did not want to meet with the Amir because of his belief that it was not appropriate for him to meet foreign representatives prior to January 20.

My conversation with Mr. Murphy prompts me to recommend that you do not ask President-elect Nixon to meet with the Amir.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Charles Murphy

*sent back to Larry Temple
with oral message that
he could pass memo on in
or 'throw it away'.*

4/a

Wednesday
December 11, 1968

TO: The President
FROM: Larry Temple

Claude Wilder, Jr. called with the following message:

The Amir of Kuwait contacted Del Brockett, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gulf Oil Corporation, and asked him if he could arrange for the Amir to see President-Elect Nixon while he is in this country. In response to this request, Claude contacted Melvin Laird last night to request an appointment for the Amir with President-Elect Nixon.

Congressman Laird talked with President-Elect Nixon and with Robert Murphy last night. Then he told Claude that President-Elect Nixon said that since the Amir was a guest of the President in this country, he did not think it appropriate to meet with the Amir unless the President asked him to; then he would be willing to meet with the Amir.

Because of this response, the Amir requests the President to ask President-Elect Nixon to meet with the Amir.

ACTION

UNCLASSIFIED

Wednesday, December 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell Telegram for Prime Minister Hoveyda

J. Edgar
2. Pres file

Prime Minister and Mrs. Hoveyda will be leaving the US Sunday, December 15. State recommends the following farewell telegram:

"I am pleased that you and Mrs. Hoveyda have made this visit to the United States. Mrs. Johnson and I will long recall your visit to Washington with great pleasure. You have travelled great distances in the United States and talked with a great many of my fellow Americans. I know that they too have taken pleasure in your company, and have become acquainted with your intelligence and generosity of spirit in the way that I have.

"I hope you will take back with you to Iran good memories of what you have seen and heard here. Your visit will be one more link in that chain that binds our two countries. May God grant you a safe and pleasant journey to your home.

"I know you will carry with you to His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah and to the people of Iran our admiration and best wishes for the future."

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Att: WH Log #3684 - Read-Rostow Memo, 12/4/68, enc. tel to Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran

UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

44

**Tuesday, December 10, 1968
6:10 p. m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith a copy of Clark
Clifford's press conference of today,
which Clark wanted you to have.**

W. W. Rostow

rla

NEWS CONFERENCE

44a

by

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CLARK M. CLIFFORD

at

Pentagon

11:00 a.m. (EST)

Tuesday, December 10, 1968

- - - - -

Secretary Clifford: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen:

I have two brief announcements to make, and then I will take questions.

You all will recall that the last Congress passed the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, which required a cut in expenditures in Fiscal '69 of \$6 billion. The President decreed that the Department of Defense should bear \$3 billion of this expenditure cut.

I am announcing today that we have concluded our plans in this regard, and that we are cutting our 1969 expenditures by the sum of \$3 billion.

A thorough review with the military departments and Defense Agencies was initiated in early June 1968, to identify areas in which Fiscal '69 expenditures could be reduced under three principal guidelines:

One, the needs of our forces in Southeast Asia were to be provided for fully, without exception.

Question: Sir, will we have a copy of this?

Secretary Clifford: Yes, you will.

The necessary reductions were to be accomplished in such a manner as to minimize their adverse effects on our overall military strength.

Third, the programs and activities selected for reduction were to be arrived at cooperatively by the Services and the OSD staff, and all proposed changes involving forces and major weapons systems were to be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(MORE)

When agreement could not be reached through this procedure, the issue was to be resolved by Deputy Secretary Nitze and me.

The amounts of the reductions made by the Services and the Defense Agencies to reach \$3 billion in expenditure cuts for Fiscal '69 are as follows: Department of the Army, \$900 million; Department of the Navy, \$992 million; Department of the Air Force, \$928 million; Defense Agencies, \$180 million; for a total of \$3 billion.

Now, at 12:00 noon today, we will have ready a more detailed account of this, showing the areas in which the cuts were made. Also, at 12:00 noon today, the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, Mr. Robert Moot, will be in this room. At that time those who are interested in going into more detail in this regard will be handed out a copy of the more detailed reporting and Mr. Moot will be here to engage in discussion and to answer those questions which you might have in that regard. 12:00 noon.

I have also a statement -- perhaps it has already been handed out -- and I am going to read just a portion of it. It's an area in which I continue to have a great personal interest, for I think it offers an enormous opportunity to the Defense Department to render a unique service to this country which could be increased in the years that lie ahead.

When I spoke to the National Security Industrial Association last September regarding the responsibility of this Department to conduct its affairs so as to assist in alleviating some of our domestic problems, I requested the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force and each Assistant Secretary of Defense to consider this matter and to report to me by November 30.

The response has been very gratifying. In one Service alone, the Air Force, 2,500 suggestions were submitted from bases and commands all over the country.

The process of consolidating and evaluating this large body of creative ideas is time-consuming. However, I expect to be able to present my successor with a set of constructive proposals which will be helpful to him in insuring that this Department plays a positive part in improving our society, without, in any manner, encroaching on the responsibilities of private or other public agencies, and without impairing its primary mission of defending our nation.

I might group a large portion of the suggestions I have received into four broad categories. You will note here, from your release that you have before you, one, is making available for civilian use the spin-off of

(MORE)

knowledge resulting from activities undertaken as a direct part of our primary function.

Second, utilizing facilities which are required for defense purposes but which are not used on a full-time basis. In this regard, there are a number of programs which can be used for installations for summer youth programs and on-the-job training.

Third, channeling some funds for procurement, maintenance and repair of equipment in a manner that will have beneficial social effects.

For instance, equipment that comes back from Vietnam for repair could be directed to those firms that train and employ the hard core unemployed.

Also, there is a unique opportunity to provide defense facilities for personnel and other agencies on a reimbursable basis. (See Release No. 1084-68)

We have some installations throughout the countries that could be used for civilian medical agencies, for instance, for the large scale examination of the health of our children in the country. This is an area that has not been explored at all.

You will note that after these four main areas are described in the release, that we cite some illustrations that show the type of progress that we are making. I expect to turn over on January 20th a series of plans to the new Secretary so that should he choose there will be a blueprint by which the Department of Defense and its enormous expenditures which it makes each year can render this signal service to the country in meeting our domestic problems.

Now, I am ready for questions.

Question: Mr. Secretary, the statement says that it is proposed building one model school in each overseas area. How many schools does that involve?

Secretary Clifford: Well, I do not know. We have a substantial number of those, and I think that release indicates the number of countries, does it not?

Question: It says one model school in each of the overseas areas "where we maintain dependent schools." I wondered how many new schools?

(MORE)

Secretary Clifford: I do not know, but Mr. Moot will know.

Question: What is the estimated level of defense spending in Fiscal '69 taking into account the \$3 billion cut, Mr. Secretary?

I believe \$78 billion is an estimate, but how does the \$3 billion fit into that?

Secretary Clifford: We have taken all the figures that had previously been agreed upon for spending in Fiscal '69 and then, by working with the Services, we have cut that figure by the sum of \$3 billion.

Now, it would not be appropriate for me to give you the particular balance, because there are other questions still to be determined. We have been having some talks with the President with reference to some pressures that have grown up that have a bearing upon even the '69 budget, let alone the '70 budget, so I think it would be inadvisable for me to give you a net figure.

Question: Mr. Secretary, does that mean there is going to be a supplemental?

Secretary Clifford: I think that the likelihood would be that there would be a supplemental. It is too early. It will depend upon developments mainly in South Vietnam.

Question: Mr. Secretary, would you assess the military threat as you see it from Cambodia? Specifically, do you see any need for the United States to take any counter measures against enemy base camps there?

Secretary Clifford: It is recognized that Cambodia is used by enemy forces in the infiltration process into South Vietnam. We have taken this up many times with the Cambodian authorities. It continues to this day.

I am not cognizant of any plans that exist at the present time for any military action directed against Cambodia.

Question: Would there be any with which you would not be familiar, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Clifford: There would not be.

Question: Mr. Secretary, in your speech in St. Louis the other day, you mentioned back in March that -- let's see -- you said that the President decided that he was not going to send any more men to Vietnam, and you said this was a signal accomplishment because there was great pressure at the time to send another 200,000 men.

(MORE)

Could you tell us where that pressure came from what the 200,000 men would have been used for, what that would have entailed in this country, and why the decision went the other way?

Secretary Clifford: In February of 1968, President Johnson sent General Wheeler to Vietnam. General Wheeler returned with the request of our military authorities in Vietnam for an increase in our troop level in Vietnam. The President was faced then with a decision. He could go one road, which meant send more troops, increase the level of conflict, place us in position where we were more deeply involved, or he could take the other route.

He did take the other route. He decided not to send more troops, other than those that had already been promised as a result of some emergency shipment of troops at the time of Tet.

Also, he made the decision at that time, a conscious one, to accelerate the development of the ARVN forces so that they could take over a greater load of the fighting.

Also, he made the significant decision to stop the bombing north of the 20th Parallel in an effort to find a means to de-escalate the war. His reasoning was that if he took a de-escalatory step, North Vietnam might reciprocate. We know that they did, because in four days they came back and suggested that the talks start.

The talks started, and as you know, they are still going on in Paris today.

Question: Mr. Secretary, you made reference to the emergency troops that the President sent to Vietnam at the time of the Tet offensive. I noticed the other day that the Army announced plans for the early release of some reservists who had been called up in connection with that emergency dispatch. Do you have plans now for reducing any of -- bringing back troops from Vietnam?

Secretary Clifford: We do not have any plans at the present time for a net reduction in our troops in Vietnam. We announced the other day we were releasing 20,000 National Guard and Reserve personnel. Some of them are being released prematurely; that is, before the end of their tenure.

At the same time, anytime we bring any of those men or any other men back from Vietnam, they are being replaced, and our troop level in Vietnam runs now somewhere between 535,000 to 540,000.

(MORE)

Let me reiterate that at the present time there is no plan for any net reduction in our troop level in Vietnam.

Question: Mr. Secretary, a spokesman for the National Liberation Front said this morning that the number of B-52 sorties has increased, has trebled, since the bombing halt in the North. Would you care to comment on that?

Secretary Clifford: It is incorrect. The B-52 level has been constant for a period of many months, so there has not been any increase or decrease. It has been constant for a substantial period of time.

Question: Mr. Secretary, do you think it would be wise or helpful at this time to have a summit meeting?

Secretary Clifford: I believe that great benefit can result from talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation and ultimate reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

I think that that benefit would inure not only to the benefit of the two countries, but to the entire world.

I would hope that these talks would get started soon, and if such talks were to be started in this present Administration, I would favor that because the sooner the talks start then I think the better off the world will be.

If the talks were to start at any level, I think it is desirable. It would be up to the two countries regarding the level of the talks.

But I would hope that they would start, because I think it is better for them to start now than a month later or six months later or a year later because I believe that there is an attitude upon the part of both countries now which could produce unusual benefits.

Question: Mr. Secretary, what is your reaction to reports that the Soviet government has proposed a record peacetime military budget?

Secretary Clifford: I do not know that there has been any statement on the part of the Administration in this regard. I do know that there has been an increase in the portion of revenue of the Soviets devoted to defense. I know that they are building up steel capacity. I know that there has been an increase in that portion of their budget which is devoted to scientific advancement.

At the same time, you will note that we also have maintained very substantial expenditures. One might hope that the time would come when there would be such a sincere and basic recognition for the desire for

(MORE)

for peace in the world that both the Soviets and we might begin to cut our expenditures instead of increase them.

Question: Mr. Secretary, could you address yourself to the reasons for sending two warships into the Black Sea, and the Soviet allegations that the mission is provocative and unusual?

Secretary Clifford: There is no merit to the Soviet charge that the mission is provocative. The Black Sea is a body of international water. We have a perfect and complete right to have our destroyers in the Black Sea.

We have a fleet in the Mediterranean, the Soviets have a fleet in the Mediterranean. The Soviets within the last year have seen fit to show the Soviet flag in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf. This is not the first time we have sent destroyers in the Black Sea. We have sent them in the past. It is a routine voyage that they are making.

Question: Mr. Secretary, would you assess the present situation on the ground in Vietnam? Several weeks ago there appeared to be indications that a winter offensive might be building up. Could you say what the situation is now?

Secretary Clifford: It is possible that the enemy plans a winter offensive. There have been some indications of some increase in the flow from North Vietnam. It is too early to tell. There has been indication of a buildup in Third Corps and possibly over the line into Cambodia opposite Third Corps. It is too early to tell at this time.

We have a background and we have some history. You know, the Tet offensive was in January. Then came the May offensive. Then came the August and September offensive. It might fit in that pattern, if they tried another so-called winter offensive.

General Abrams is well aware of the possibility of this type and is preparing himself in the event they choose to go this route.

Question: Mr. Secretary, earlier in other news conferences, you mentioned the DMZ violations had not yet established a pattern. What would be your assessment now of the activities in the DMZ?

Secretary Clifford: I would continue to feel the same way. I regret and deplore that the enemy has seen fit to violate the DMZ. DMZ should be exactly what it says. It is a demilitarized zone, and there should not be military personnel or military activity within it.

(MORE)

As one analyzes activity within the DMZ, however, you are familiar with the fact we have had a number of sightings of individuals, of bunkers, trucks and so forth -- the items that are of the most seriousness, of course, are those items that involve shelling from the DMZ into South Vietnam.

Now, there has been one clear, provable instance of this kind. That took place on about the 10th and 11th of November, in which there was obvious, provable shelling from the DMZ into South Vietnam.

There are two other instances, one on the 4th of November and one on the 24th of November, in which there is a possibility that there was a shelling from the DMZ, but it has not been absolutely proven.

So that in this regard, as far as provable violations of the most serious kind is concerned, there probably has not been one for approximately a month.

The other factor that is of the most importance to us is that when President Johnson stopped the bombing, he said, "I am doing so with the understanding that by stopping the bombing I will not increase the jeopardy of our troops, particularly those in Northern I Corps," and in this regard, he was mainly concerned about the possible infiltration of enemy troops down through North Vietnam and through the DMZ into South Vietnam.

As far as we now know, that has not taken place. Apparently, there is not an infiltration of troops through the DMZ down into South Vietnam which would increase the jeopardy of our troops there in Northern I Corps.

Question: Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment on the charge made as recently as Sunday, in the Sunday supplement publication, and prior to that, of the charges of too much paper work and a five-to-one ratio of support troops to combat troops in Vietnam, plus ultra-sophisticated facilities which might be in existence for the next 40 years having been constructed in Vietnam? Would you speak to the validity of such statements?

Secretary Clifford: I have no doubt that someone could always find a better way to do it. I can assure you that one factor we are all conscious of in the conduct of any war is there's going to be constant complaining, certainly from the ranks.

Now, with reference to the make-up and mix of the troops that we have in Vietnam, that is the result of the wishes of our field commanders. I had confidence in General Westmoreland, as did the President. The President has complete confidence in General Abrams. If that is the mix that General Abrams wants, then that is the one he ought to get.

(MORE)

I think our men are performing admirably there. I think that all of the services that are being rendered to them fulfill a very valuable function. A quick illustration is the type of medical service. This is one of the miracles of modern warfare, the manner in which we handle our wounded.

--- Sure, it takes some more personnel and it takes some more equipment, but it is a marvelous service that is being rendered to our fighting men.

As far as our bases, our airfields, are concerned, I find no fault in the decision that were made that such bases were needed at the time they were constructed.

Question: Mr. Secretary, could you give us your reaction to the report that Melvin Laird will be inheriting your job and also could you tell us a little bit about your plans, if any, at the moment?

Secretary Clifford: I noted in the press that there was some speculation with reference to Mr. Laird.

I also noted that President-elect Nixon would make his announcement tomorrow night, so I think it would be appropriate for me to reserve any comment with reference to my successor until we actually know that it has taken place.

As far as my plans are concerned, I have made no plans whatsoever to take effect upon my leaving this position which, according to the Constitution, is noon on the 20th of January.

Question: Mr. Secretary, are you concerned about the increase in the American casualties since the end of the bombing?

Secretary Clifford: No. This has come up. Perhaps I read some place the other day that someone contended that there might be some relationship between the cessation of the bombing and our casualties.

The fact is that before the President agreed to stop the bombing, he had the individual opinions of each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, A, they felt that the cessation of the bombing was an acceptable military risk, and the fact is they approved and recommended that he do it.

You will recall he brought General Abrams back, had a long conference with him, and General Abrams recommended that the bombing be stopped in the hope that we could find peace. General Abrams also stated that he felt that it would not increase the risk to our troops in South Vietnam.

(MORE)

Now, there has been some increase in American casualties in the four weeks following November 1 as compared to the four weeks preceding November 1. You will recall November 1 was the cessation of the bombing.

This is due to increased contact between the parties. General Abrams has had the instructions to search out to the enemy, to maintain the most intense pressure on him. The enemy has also been engaged, as you note from dispatches recently, in attacking villages, hamlets and so forth.

The fact is that since the bombing halt was put into effect, there has been a decrease in the casualties in I Corps, so that I think this shows very clearly that there is no enemy build-up that could result from the bombing.

You will recall also that General Abrams has transferred the First Cavalry Division from I Corps to the Third Corps, which is further proof that he feels no additional pressure building up in I Corps.

That is where the pressure would come if the cessation of the bombing resulted in a flow of any more troops.

I think also that we might note there is approximately the same amount of infiltration of enemy troops from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, via Laos and Cambodia, that there was a year ago. It is approximately the same, and keep in mind that a year ago we were bombing all of North Vietnam.

To recapitulate the answer, there is no basis whatsoever for the charge that the cessation of the bombing has led to any increased American casualties.

Question: Mr. Secretary, in this package of things that are somewhat civilian oriented, your model school, your hospital and such, do you have a dollar figure on this, and is this to be '69 expenditures, like this building one model school in each of the overseas areas, and the hospital, and I presume the 200-family unit would be an FY 1970 construction?

Secretary Clifford: Some of those expenditures would take place in Fiscal '69; some of those expenditures would take place in Fiscal '70; and they would not require any additional funds for the Defense Department.

Question: Is there an overall package? Is this a billion dollar program or a \$500 million?

(MORE)

Secretary Clifford: No. That has not yet been decided upon. By the time the new Secretary comes in, we will have a program for him, and I will intend to talk about it then at greater length. We have just now received the replies in from the Services.

Question: Sir, has the Defense Department approved either or both the AMSA and AWACS, and can you give us an idea when the Air Force might go into contract definition?

Secretary Clifford: In that regard, both of those programs are still under discussion and are intimately involved with the preparation of the 1970 budget, so I would be unable to comment upon them.

Question: Mr. Secretary, do I take it that your answer before implied that you favor a head of state meeting to get these Soviet-American arms reduction talks under way?

Secretary Clifford: No. What I said was that I felt that there was so much benefit to be derived from such meetings that I would hope that they would start as soon as possible, at whatever level could be agreed upon between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Question: Mr. Secretary, do you expect these talks during the life of this Administration -- do you expect the talks to begin during this Administration?

Secretary Clifford: I do not know. What I did before was to express the hope that they would. I would rather see the talks start next week than four weeks from now or four months from now. I think the sooner they get started, the greater benefit there can be.

I don't see any objection to starting the talks in the next 40 days. There is an enormous amount of preparatory work that has been done. I think the broad, general outlines of policy agreements could be traded between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Obviously, there wouldn't be any decisions within the next 40 days, but I think if we get them started now we can prevent a lag that would be a very natural one if they were delayed until the new Administration came in. The new Administration can pick them up and carry them on, I think, without in any way being restricted from what might have gone on ahead of time.

My experience is in these matters that when the time comes and the heads of two nations indicate their desire to get the talks started, I think that is the time to get them started.

(MORE)

I can take three more questions. I have run over my time.

I will be back.

Question: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the possibility of a Defense supplemental in connection with the costs of the war. When do you foresee that the costs of the war will begin to turn down?

Secretary Clifford: That will depend upon Paris. My hope is that at the Paris talks that the parties will get into substantive discussion as soon as possible. I would hope that there would not be a lengthy delay over technical matters.

I would hope that the negotiators would approach those problems with a feeling of good will and get those behind. I would like to see the substantive talks start this week. And when they start, I would hope that we could get definitive understanding soon about the DMZ, about the shelling of the cities, and about the question of reconnaissance.

I would hope then we would move on to lowering the level of combat. President Johnson said, in his State of the Union Message this year in January, that his hope was a means could be found to start the cessation of the hostilities, and I think a step in that direction would be to lower the level of violence in South Vietnam. I would still like to see, in the next 40 days, the start of the return of American troops from South Vietnam, and I think that there is an opportunity to agree with Hanoi upon the mutual withdrawal of troops in that period.

Now, the question of reducing expenses in Vietnam will depend upon the degree of progress that is made, and if there can be a cessation of hostilities, if there can start to be the return of our troops, then that will affect whether or not a supplemental is needed and will affect vitally the amount of expenditure that would even occur in Fiscal '69.

Two more questions.

Question: Mr. Secretary, this is prompted by your earlier remark on the B-52's. Does that represent a policy decision to keep the B-52's constant under the rough understanding with Hanoi, and also, are we or are we not patrolling in the DMZ? We hear both reports.

Secretary Clifford: As far as the B-52 is concerned, that has nothing to do with any understanding with Hanoi. The B-52 is a very useful weapon that we are using and have been using, and, as I said, the rate of the sorties use is continuing steady.

(MORE)

With reference to the DMZ, we have, from time to time, sent squads into the DMZ to ascertain exactly what is going on there, because we feel that that information is necessary to us.

I will take two more.

Question: Mr. Secretary, by your remarks on the next 40 days, did you mean to leave it as the inference that some troops may indeed be withdrawn or that you, like all the rest of us, would like to see it happen?

Secretary Clifford: I wish to create the impression only that it was my personal desire that such progress would be made in Paris that in the next 40 days, or take the next 60 or 120 -- I would hope we would be able to reach agreement in Paris so that there could be a mutual withdrawal of troops.

At no time did I mean to suggest or infer that there would be any unilateral withdrawal of troops on our part. Our withdrawal of troops will be on a mutual basis with those of North Vietnam.

One last question.

Question: Mr. Secretary, your predecessor warned against the temptation of expanding the \$5 billion ABM system into a \$40 billion system. Given the political developments of the last few months and pressures that have developed already toward that, what do you think will happen to the ABM system?

Secretary Clifford: I can give only my idea. It is my belief that the ABM system should be confined strictly to the present concept of an ABM system. That is, a thin line system that would protect us against a so-called Chinese attack or an accidental attack, or a light attack from some other power that might acquire a nuclear competence.

It is my belief that we should not expand that system. I think we should keep it only at that level. I would be opposed to any \$10 billion or \$20 billion or \$40 billion increase in the system. I think that would be unwise, because it would not bring, as far as we now know, protection. A large massive attack could still get through, so I would like to close on the note that the present ABM plans have only in mind the continuance of the present limited system.

I have run ten minutes over. I must go now. Thank you all very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

- E N D -



MEMORANDUM

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

July 25, 1968
3:30 p. m.

45 b

For: The President
From: The Vice President
Subject: AEC Subterranean Nevada Tests

As you probably are aware, there are a number of individuals, such as Howard Hughes, who are concerned over the safety and environmental effects of the major subterranean tests being conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission in Nevada. I do not share these apprehensions, and I am convinced that the AEC is taking every possible precaution and has made every conceivable calculation to prevent there being any danger. Nevertheless, I can understand the concern of residents of the area.

Members of my staff have discussed the subject with representatives of the Hughes organization and with officials of the AEC. Both consider it would be worthwhile for an impartial panel of experts to conduct a study to determine if any hazards do exist, or what environmental effects may be expected. The study would be confined strictly to safety and would avoid any other aspects of nuclear testing.

If you concur, I recommend that the President's Scientific Advisor be requested to appoint such a panel to conduct the study. (Dr. Hornig is aware of my interest in this matter.)

45c

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

July 25, 1968

Dr. Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President
for Science & Technology
The White House

Dear Don:

As you are aware, there appears to be some public concern about the health and safety aspects of our underground nuclear testing program at the Nevada Test Site. While my fellow Commissioners and I are satisfied that these tests are being carried out with vigilant regard for the public health and safety, nevertheless we must take appropriate steps to allay doubt where it exists.


Accordingly, the Commission believes there is merit in the idea of appointing an ad hoc panel composed of a disinterested group of distinguished scientists to assess this public health and safety issue. In our view, the panel should either be a subcommittee of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) or operate under the aegis of your office.

We assume that the panel might wish to make a classified report to the President, with an unclassified summary and conclusion section, which could be made available to the public at the discretion of the President. Accordingly, we recommend that the members of the panel have the appropriate security clearances.

It is respectfully requested that the suggestions of the Commission be sought with respect to the membership of the panel and as to its detailed charter.

Please be assured that the Commission would cooperate fully with the panel and that all relevant resources would be at its disposal. We urge that the work of the panel proceed expeditiously.

Cordially,


Glenn T. Seaborg



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

August 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM

For: Dr. Donald F. Hornig
Special Assistant to the President
for Science and Technology

From: The Vice President *W.H.H.*

Subject: AEC Subterranean Nevada Tests

The attached memorandum from me to the President and the letter from Dr. Seaborg to you have been seen by the President. Both are self-explanatory. I understand, also, that Colonel Hunt of my staff has discussed this subject with you.

I suggest accordingly that you proceed with the project.

INFORMATION

46

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Tuesday, December 10, 1968
5:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

The attached CIA analysis of ARVN capabilities for operating successfully without U. S. forces states that it will take at least two years before they could go it alone (see summary).

The analysis assumes implicitly that ARVN would be fighting North Vietnamese as well as VC.

I shall have Bus check it out with Abrams.

W. W. Rostow

Cy No. 25, ER IM 68-152
December 1968
"South Vietnam's Military
Establishment: Prospects for
Going it Alone."

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PLJ.019.043.003/3

WWRostow:rla

By jc NARA, Date 12-29-09

ACTION

48

Tuesday, December 10, 1968 -- 2:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

I called Mac Bundy today and it turns out he is back from Vienna.

I indicated you might wish to see him. He was delighted. It would be best for him if it could be next week. He would rather not do it on Monday, December 16 because he and Mary are hosting a dinner that night. The 17th and 18th would be fine. The 19th (Thursday) is a little more difficult. The 20th (Friday) would be okay.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

Tuesday, December 10, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

from file

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Lee Kuan Yew Today at 5:30 p. m.

Prime Minister Lee of Singapore has been here for a month in an unofficial status, which he has observed with great care. He understands that his call on you is being made public. However, in line with his unofficial status, he would strongly prefer not to be exposed to the press for the purpose of making any remarks.

Lee will probably:

- Convey to you his admiration (which is genuine and strong) for your conduct of policy in Southeast Asia and for your personal sacrifice of March 31.
- Recall your meeting with him in Melbourne in which you frankly reviewed political prospects.
- Express his preoccupation with the British pull out from Malaysia and Singapore after 1971, and his view that the Australian stand is the key in security from his standpoint. (He is as baffled about Prime Minister Gorton as we are. In a talk with Bill Bundy two weeks ago, he said that a continuous American military presence in Thailand would go far to convince Gorton that he had to do his share in Malaysia and Singapore. The latest we have on this is that the Australians have made a general decision for a "forward strategy" rather than a "Fortress Australia" view. We do not yet know just what this means, but Lee would welcome your speculation.)

Lee may also:

- Wish to ponder with you the likely future of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in view of the spat between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. (Lee agrees with us that Marcos has made a fool of himself. Singapore bluntly supports Malaysia's position. The problem is to get Marcos off the hook.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-177

By *ing*, NARA, Date 5-11-95

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Lee is unlikely to raise with you Singapore's desire for a license to manufacture the AR-15 rifle, the commercial version of the M-16. If he should, however, you may wish to be sympathetic but non-committal. Secretary Clifford has reservations about this, and we have not come to any decision.

In addition to responding to the above subjects, you may wish to:

-- Congratulate Lee on the outstanding progress Singapore is making under his extremely able leadership. (Lee is happy that considerable American investment has been attracted to Singapore. He is anxious for our Navy and Air Force to use his repair facilities on a commercial basis. We have started this, and it is going satisfactorily.)

-- Give Lee a frank personal forecast of how the Nixon administration, and above all the American public, will be looking at Southeast Asia in the next few years. Lee would deeply appreciate your personal judgment with regard to this crucial consideration for the future of Singapore and Lee's own career. Past experience indicates that he would keep what you say wholly to himself.

By all accounts, Lee is in a relaxed and forthcoming mood. As you know, he is perceptive and articulate -- a stimulating conversationalist.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

cc: Marshall Wright

AJenkins:mm

~~SECRET~~

49a
LEE Kuan Yew
(Lee KWAN-u)

Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore

Prime Minister Lee was born in Singapore on September 16, 1923. An outstanding student at Raffles Institution, he took a double first in law at Cambridge.

After being admitted to the bar in England in 1950, he returned to Singapore, where as a legal adviser to trade unions, he acquired a name for himself as an unusually skilled lawyer and negotiator. In 1954, he played a leading role in the founding of the People's Action Party, the platform of which called not only for independence, but also for radical economic reforms. In 1955, he took over the leadership of the new party as its Secretary General and was elected to the Singapore Legislative Assembly. In the general elections of 1959, the People's Action Party won an overwhelming majority and he became Prime Minister of self-governing Singapore. His government soon acquired a reputation for remarkable effectiveness in meeting the economic and social needs of the Singapore populace.

Under his leadership, Singapore in September 1963, became part of the Federation of Malaysia. Later that month, he led his party to a resounding victory in general elections in Singapore. He was again elected as assemblyman from Tanjong Pagar and continued as Prime Minister.

Following the separation of Singapore from Malaysia on August 9, 1965, he became the first Prime Minister of an independent Singapore. In April 1968, Lee was resoundingly re-elected and his People's Action Party won all 58 seats in the Singapore Parliament. The present government mandate extends until April 1973.

Lee is married to the former Kwa Geok Choo, a brilliant and accomplished lawyer. They have two sons, Lee Hsien Yang, age 11, and Lee Hsien Loong, age 14, and a daughter, Lee Wei Ling, age 12. Lee is an avid and very accomplished golfer and a very intense and highly intellectual conversationalist.

December 1968

3150

498

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

December 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Lee Kuan Yew

Lee wishes to convey his admiration for your whole conduct of policy in Southeast Asia and also for your personal sacrifice of March 31. He doubtless recalls vividly your meeting with him in Melbourne, at which you reviewed the political prospects with some frankness, told him the Republicans would nominate Mr. Nixon, and pretty clearly hinted that you thought you could beat him. Lee probably agrees.

No doubt he would again be fascinated by a frank personal forecast of how the Nixon Administration, and above all, the American public will be looking at Southeast Asia in the next few years. He thinks -- and probably rightly -- his own life and future depend on that judgment. Past experience should give you confidence that he will keep what you say wholly to himself.

More specifically, the British decision to pull out of Malaysia and Singapore after the end of 1971 came after your Melbourne meeting, and has preoccupied him all through the year. He thinks, as we do, that a clear Australian stand, including the willingness to keep limited ground forces in the area, is the key to post-1971 security for him. And he is as baffled and dubious about Prime Minister Gorton as we are. I probed him at length on this when I saw him in Cambridge two

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 110 94-178
By 24/jw NARA, Date 2-2-98

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

-2-

weeks ago, and he came up with one interesting thought -- that a continuing American military presence in Thailand would go very far to convince Gorton that he had to do his share in Malaysia and Singapore. The latest we ourselves have on this is that the Australians have made a general decision for a "forward strategy" rather than a "Fortress Australia" view; however, this appears to be very general, and he would doubtless welcome a frank exchange on what goes on in Gorton's mind -- as if anybody knew.

Another possible topic might be the future of ASEAN in view of the spat between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. Again, his thinking is like ours -- that Marcos has made a fool of himself -- and his government has expressed blunt support of Malaysia's position. The question is how to get Marcos off the hook and who can help.

In general, Singapore under Lee is continuing to do a superb job, and in the past year has scored some outstanding successes in attracting American investment. He thinks this is fine, and is also most anxious to have our Navy and Air Force use his repair facilities on a commercial basis. We have started this, and it is going satisfactorily.

You should know of one minor issue, although I doubt very much that he would raise it. Singapore (and the Philippines as well) wants a license to manufacture the AR-15 rifle -- the commercial version of the M-16. Secretary Clifford has reservations about this, and we have not come to any decision. In the remote event he raises this, I believe you should be sympathetic but noncommittal.

On my observation and by all other accounts, Lee is in a relaxed and forthcoming mood. He should be good value.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

-3-

On press handling, Lee understands that his call is being made public. However, he would strongly prefer not to be exposed to the press for the purpose of making any remarks. This is in line with his unofficial status, which he has observed with the greatest care in the month he has been here.

William P. Bundy

William P. Bundy

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

Item for
Lunch at 1:15

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

50

Tuesday, Dec. 10, 1968
12:55 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Rusk has decided that he would like to raise at lunch today the PUEBLO matter.

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's exploration of all the difficult options open to us.

The heart of the matter is in the draft "Detailed Instructions for Twenty-Sixth Meeting" at Tab A; the draft statement by General Woodward at Tab B; and a draft conditional apology at Tab C.

Secretary Rusk will initiate the discussion of the options and the proposal.

W. A. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By MP, NARA, Date 1-23-98

15630

December 3, 1968

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: USS PUEBLO - ACTION MEMORANDUMThe Problem

The North Koreans have continued to insist that we sign their document admitting espionage and repeated intrusions, apologizing for these "crimes," and promising not to intrude again. They have denounced us for proposing an "overwrite" solution in which General Woodward would add in his own hand a phrase acknowledging receipt of the crew. They have not categorically rejected our proposal; rather they have refused to accept it, they have attacked us for putting it forward, and they have shown no sign of moderating their demand.

Recent Developments

The meetings in September made it clear to us that the North Koreans are willing to give us back the crew at the moment (or almost the moment) we sign their document. There would still be some procedural problems but they seem manageable.

The meetings in October made clear to the North Koreans what they may not have understood: that we are not prepared to sign their document but only to acknowledge receipt on it. We have not explained to them in so many words that we intend, after the release, to denounce the document, hanging our repudiation on this distinction between "signing" and "acknowledging receipt on," and saying that we had signed only what Woodward

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAL 10-70

By id, NARA, Date: 9-1-10~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

had himself written. But there is no doubt that they now understand this intent. They have denounced our proposal as a "potty strategem" designed to "evade your responsibilities," and at present they appear determined not to leave this loophole open.

We called the last meeting (October 31) very quickly on the heels of the preceding one in order to appear firm in our stand. They hesitated for three days before agreeing to meet, but their position at the meeting was unyielding and they may moraly have been taken a bit off balance by the unusual speed of our move. It is now their turn to call and they have made no move since October 31 to convene a session.

Our Choices

We can (1) stand on the overwrite proposal, perhaps with minor variations; or (2) sign their document, prefacing our signature with an explanatory statement and repudiating the document as soon as the crew are free.

Time for a Squeeze Play

The fact that Christmas is approaching and that the Administration will soon change offers us an opportunity to give the North Koreans an ultimatum without grave risk of breaking off the talks. We can call a meeting, give them a package of proposals, and say: "Take your choice; these offers are good only if you accept one of them in time to get the men home for Christmas. This Administration will then withdraw them and will make no further proposals." If this ploy failed, the new Administration would be free to resume the negotiations on whatever lines it chose.

Variations on Standing Pat

We can simply offer to the North Koreans our present overwrite proposal, giving them the Christmas deadline to take it or leave it.

We can also revive the alternative of a conditional apology ("if we intruded, we are sorry") which we made last Spring and which was bluntly rejected then. We

would dress it up in new language so that it might on the surface seem a new element but we would not include the unacceptable North Korean demands: the flat admission of "espionage" and of repeated intrusions. If the North Koreans are minded to settle the issue, this might satisfy their need for a piece of paper with General Woodward's name at the bottom.

A Repudiated Apology

It is reasonably clear that if we simply sign their document we will promptly get the men back. The pros and cons of this course make an intricate argument which is summarized at Tab A. We do not recommend an outright apology, since it would be costly in foreign policy terms, but we recognize that the argument for an apology appeals to many reasonable men.

We could mitigate some, though not all, of the evil in an outright apology by coupling our signature with a simultaneous or perhaps even prior repudiation of the content of the North Korean document. We could, for example, have General Woodward say into the cameras and tape recorders just before he signs that, as has been made clear in the negotiations, the United States Government does not believe the Pueblo committed espionage or intruded, and that he is signing for the purely humanitarian reasons of getting the crew back. We are far from certain that the North Koreans would accept this procedure if warned about it in advance, and if not warned, they might at the last minute refuse to transfer the crew. And even such a "repudiated apology" would have demeaning elements from our viewpoint. Nevertheless, some variation on this ploy deserves serious consideration for inclusion in our take-it-or-leave-it package.

We would tell the North Koreans that we are now prepared to sign their document but will have to make a statement, before we actually sign, that their document contains statements which we consider false, and that our signature does not alter these facts. Release of the crew and publication of the signed North Korean document would follow. Our repudiation would be released to the press simultaneously with their document. We would have settled the problem through mutual acceptance of two wholly inconsistent statements.

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

4

We doubt that the North Koreans would accept this alternative, but they might. If they did, we would have paid a substantial but not exorbitant price to close out the problem.

The most dangerous aspect of such a proposal is that it places on the negotiating record an offer by us to sign their document. The North Koreans are certain to regard this as an indication that we are gradually knuckling under and they will simply press us to remove our attached condition--the repudiation. The "squeeze play" described above does much to meet this danger, but perhaps not enough. The North Koreans may well feel that if they disregard our ultimatum we will come back after Christmas or after January 20 with an unconditional offer to apologize.

We believe that this additional offer of a "repudiated apology" has a better chance of success than the others, but the costs to us in foreign policy terms would still be serious. We therefore are inclined to adopt the following more limited package, despite its relatively small chance of success, i.e., to say to the North Koreans that we are prepared to accept either of the following alternatives provided that it will result in the release of the crew before Christmas. If neither of these offers is accepted, they will both be withdrawn after Christmas and the North Koreans will then have to deal with the new Administration. The proposals would be:

a. Our present overwrite proposal.

b. A conditional apology similar to that offered last May, but in new language.

You may wish to discuss this problem with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford.

Under Secretary

Enclosure:

1. Tab A - "Should We Apologize?"

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~~SECRET~~/MODIS

SHOULD WE APOLOGIZE?

Nature of the Case

The arguments in favor of signing the North Korean document come down to two propositions:

a. It is the only humane thing to do since it is clear that unless we sign the North Koreans will not release the crew--certainly not for a long time.

b. It is disadvantageous politically for us to let the affair drag on.

The argument against signing comes down to the single proposition that this Government should not solemnly place its authorized signature on a document it knows to be false, particularly if acting under blackmail and duress.

Apart from these, there are many secondary arguments--about the credibility gap, about the effects in South Korea and on our commitments in general, etc. In our judgment, these arguments tend to balance each other off or to fall in the category "an apology wouldn't really be so bad because..." They thus should not be decisive in determining whether we apologize or not.

The Argument for Apologizing

Only when we sign their document will we get the crew back. If only because the North Korean charges are lies, they will insist on a piece of paper from us validating their lies. They have been and will remain wholly inflexible on this point. We have no means of pressure which look promising. All reasonable people know the North Korean charges are false and that we would be signing purely from humanitarian considerations. We would not be seriously damaged by a signature and we owe it to the crew and their families to pay this price for their release.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI/RAC ID-70
By NSA, NARA, Date 9-1-0

~~SECRET~~/MODIS
GROUP 1

Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

Moreover, there are political problems in allowing the matter to stagnate. It reminds people of our impotence and generates pressure for unwise actions, such as seizing North Korean ships. Better to cut the knot, even at some cost.

Assessing the case. It is probably true that the North Koreans will not soon accept any compromise, such as our overwrite proposal. And we do not seem to have any effective pressures against them. The humanitarian argument is the most valid argument for signature.

We do not believe the political argument is valid. If we resolve neither to apologize nor to do anything that might risk war or violate our basic principles, the political pressures can be contained.

The Argument Against Apologizing

The evil effects of signing a false document under pressure would be widespread, insidious, and long-lasting. Most foreign governments and even many Americans are puzzled by our reluctance to utter untruths but they respect us for this eccentricity. The Communist doctrine that truth is relative and can legitimately be manipulated is a major difference between them and us. If we sign we will have seriously damaged our good name.

Assessing the case. Many reasonable people find this argument vague and idealistic. We find it profoundly true. If we were to apologize, the price paid for freeing the men would be substantial, though hard to define. It would not be costly in the short run since the general relief and gratification that they were free would combine with their own revelations to override the negative elements. Nor would it impair faith in our security commitments which are on quite another level of solemnity and gravity. But over the long run the fact that in this case we had bent our principles for tactical, even though humanitarian, considerations would have to be counted, a serious cost. Whether we owe it to the men to pay this price, or should look on them as on other prisoners of war, is a question to which individual consciences and political philosophies will give varying answers. The price in international political terms would be considerable.



~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

This document consists of 9 pages
No. 15 of 20 Copies, Series A

3729
Jenkins.
50c

TO : The Secretary
FROM : The Under Secretary
SUBJECT: USS Pueblo Negotiations

It is planned that this subject will be discussed at the White House lunch December 10.

My memorandum last week suggested that we might offer the North Koreans three choices on a take-it-or-leave-it-before-Christmas basis. These proposals are more precisely formulated in the draft telegram attached at Tab A. They are:

1. The "overwrite" ploy with which you are familiar.
2. Signature of their document with prior repudiation. A draft of such a repudiation statement is at Tab B.
3. A reformulated "conditional apology" which goes as far as we can to meet the North Korean demands without containing anything untrue. See Tab C.

I am sending a copy of this package to Secretary Clifford.

Enclosures:

1. Tab A - Draft telegram
2. Tab B - Draft statement
3. Tab C - Draft conditional apology.

Concurrence: EA - Winthrop G. Brown

EA/K:JFLeonard:paw
12/9/68, Ext. 5029

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI/RAC 10-70

By 128, NARA, Date 9-1-10

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

50d

DRAFT TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

TAB A.

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 93-367

NODIS/CACTUS

By mp/ip NARA, Date 1-23-98

SUBJECT: Detailed Instructions for Twenty-Sixth Meeting.

1. Although protocol calls for Pak to speak first, we assume he will make only brief pro forma statement and turn floor over to General Woodward. If he delivers long denunciation of past US positions, Woodward should probably brush it aside with brief comment and go directly into presentation of our proposals. Of course, if Pak opens with something new or shows interest in overwrite, Woodward will have to decide on spot whether to explore possible opening or proceed with our offers. Following guidance is based on assumption Pak says nothing really new.

2. Woodward should draw attention to fact that Christmas, a national holiday of great significance to Americans, is only X days off and that USG very much wants to have Pueblo crewmen reunited with their families by that date.

3. Woodward should then point out that Democratic Administration will end on January 20 and USG will from that point have a new President, Mr. Nixon, and new Secretaries of State and Defense. If Pueblo matter not settled by then, the Republican Administration will have to decide what measures it considers appropriate to deal with the problem.

4. This Administration intends, however, to make one last effort to solve the matter. Woodward should say that he is authorized to state that President Johnson personally and the other leaders of this Administration are prepared to go very far indeed in order to realize the humanitarian objective of reuniting the crew with their families at Christmas. They

~~SECRET~~

are prepared to offer General Pak and his authorities their choice of the following three ways of handling the matter.

A. If General Pak's authorities prefer to make the Document of Apology and Assurance the basis for a solution, then General Woodward is authorized to agree to sign his name on that document, provided that he writes in above his name the phrase "I hereby acknowledge receipt of the Pueblo crew".

B. If General Pak's authorities prefer to avoid the use of this additional phrase, General Woodward is authorized simply to sign his name on the place provided, but under one specific condition. This condition relates to the fact that, as Pak is aware from the long discussions which have taken place in these negotiations, (1) the USG does not consider that the Pueblo was engaged in espionage, (2) the USG has not seen convincing evidence that the ship intruded into the waters claimed by Pak's authorities, and (3) the USG cannot apologize for an action unless that action actually took place. If General Woodward were to sign Pak's document, he would have to make a public statement just before signing to clarify those three points. The only reason the USG has considered instructing Woodward to sign is for humanitarian reasons in order to obtain the freedom of these hostages who are being held against this sort of ransom. If and only if this fact is made absolutely clear in public just before signature, can Woodward be authorized to sign Pak's document.

C. If General Pak's authorities prefer to avoid the problems and contradictions in the foregoing choices, they may release the crew in return for Woodward's signature on a different document -- one which is not at

variance with what the USG believes are the facts of the situation. Woodward should hand Pak the draft letter (para 5 below) explaining that although he has had a Korean translation prepared, he is not delivering it at this point since General Pak might find it preferable to have his experts do that. We hope that Pak will take this hint that we would not object to certain discrepancies between English and Korean versions. If Pak insists, Woodward should pass Korean version, adding if he wishes that it might require some polishing. Woodward should say that English text is not negotiable. Drafters have gone as far as possible to include those points which Pak's authorities might wish and can go no further without raising problems which can only be handled as in A or B above. If Pak wants document prepared by USG and containing no statement which USG would later be compelled to retract, this is it. There is not in any case time to negotiate drafting changes before Christmas, when this and other two offers will expire.

5. Following is text of letter which Woodward should pass Pak as indicated above:

[text attached as Tab C]

6. After presenting above choices, Woodward should suggest Pak study them and offer to respond to any questions he may have. He should remind Pak that Christmas deadline, though it may seem sentimental to others, has great meaning for Americans which thus gives it political significance. These offers will all be withdrawn December 23 and a rapid decision by Pak's authorities is essential.

7. Faced with our deadline, Pak will probably avoid closing any doors with further denunciation of A or detailed critique of C. He may, however, be puzzled by B and may wish to explore how it differs from repudiation

~~SECRET~~

5

page 4
missing

(it was
included
in
week's
copy
of
this
file)

10. We are in fact prepared to agree not to issue statement in para 8 in advance of signature but only to have Woodward read it just before signing. We suppose Pak will take foregoing para as hint that if they are silent during interval between agreement and signature, we will withhold our clarification. We prefer, however, to concede this point at later stage rather than start from "simultaneous" clarification and signature.

RUSK

EA/K:JFLeonard:lm x 2839
December 9, 1968

~~SECRET~~

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TAB B

DRAFT STATEMENT BY GENERAL WOODWARD

"The position of the United States Government with regard to the Pueblo, as consistently expressed in the negotiations at Panmunjom and in public, has been that the ship was not engaged in espionage, that there is no convincing evidence that the ship at any time intruded into the territorial waters claimed by North Korea, and that we could not apologize for actions which we did not believe took place. The document which I am going to sign was prepared by the North Koreans and is at variance with the above position, but my signature will not and cannot alter that position or the facts. I will sign the document to free the crew and only to free the crew."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 10-70
By *ist* NARA, Date 9-1-10

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

DRAFT CONDITIONAL APOLOGY

Major General Pak Chung-kuk
Korean People's Army

General Pak:

I am authorized by the Government of the United States of America to make the following statement to you for transmittal to your authorities in regard to the naval intelligence ship USS Pueblo.

1. The United States Government has carefully and seriously considered the fact that the captain and the crew of the USS Pueblo have confessed that they carried out espionage activities against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, that they repeatedly intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and that they were seized by the self-defense measures of naval vessels of the Korean People's Army on January 23, 1968 while in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The United States Government has also given full weight to the documents of evidence produced by you in support of the confessions of the crew of the USS Pueblo. The United States Government has further noted that the captain and crew have petitioned the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to take into consideration the fact that

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 10-70
By *id* NARA, Date *9-1-10*

they have confessed to these crimes and have asked the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to deal with them leniently.

2. The intelligence-gathering mission of the USS Pueblo off the Korean coast was ordered by the United States Government and the United States Government takes full responsibility for all activities of the ship and its crew, whether on the high seas or in the territorial waters of another power.

3. The United States Government solemnly apologizes for any and all intrusions and acts of espionage ^{which may have been} committed by the USS Pueblo and its crew.

4. The United States Government has noted the demand of your authorities that United States naval vessels not again intrude into the territorial waters claimed by you extending twelve nautical miles from your coasts and off-shore islands. The United States Government gives firm assurances that its naval vessels will in the future be ordered not to intrude into those waters.

Gilbert H. Woodward
Major General, USA

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

Tuesday, Dec. 10, 1968
11:30 a. m.

Pres file

51

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a report from our military staff suggesting that the intelligence community would now tend to raise its estimate of the number of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.-- from 3-4 to 4-5 or even, possibly, 8. divisions.

This is an uncertain intelligence re-appraisal, not a question of new Soviet forces returning to Czechoslovakia.

I shall keep you informed as this matter clarifies.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-161

By CB, NARA Date 9-23-99

51a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE

December 10, 1968

MEMO FOR MR. ROSTOW

Both DIA and CIA have begun to raise their estimate of the number of Soviet divisions in Czechoslovakia. Until last week, they had been estimating 3-4 divisions, [redacted] However, European agencies -- primarily SHAPE, USAREUR, and FRG -- have been able to confirm a high percentage of reports from untrained ground observers concerning Soviet elements not detected or inferred [redacted] (25X1) (25X1)

DIA and CIA currently estimate possibly more than 4-5 Soviet divisions, while USAREUR estimates as many as eight. There is no indication that any new units have slipped in recently.

Prospects are not good for quickly resolving this matter. A conference with the various European agencies to review their holdings is scheduled for December 18. Last available photography of the area was ineffective because of cloud cover; new photography will not be available, even with good weather, for about two weeks.

L. 9

WILLIAM L. LEMNITZER

TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 141-023-010/4
By jc, NARA, Date 11-5-09

Tuesday, December 10, 1968 -- 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Chuck Robb's schedule (all local times):

Depart Danang at 11:02 a.m., December 11

**Arrive Bangkok at 11:50 a.m., December 11 (11:50 p.m., EST,
Dec. 10)**

Depart Bangkok at 11:45 a.m., December 16

Arrive Danang at 2:00 p.m., December 16

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

ACTION

53

Tuesday, December 10, 1968 -- 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have been absolutely silent on the nonsense concerning MIT, etc. With the three weeklies all having stories -- and the story of U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 120⁰ wrong -- I thought we might consider my issuing in some form or another the attached -- which Elspeth approves also. Perhaps the best thing to do is bunker up and let it pass, but this is exactly how we feel. If you think it a good idea, I shall proceed. If not, I can continue to remain silent.

W. W. Rostow

Issue statement _____

Remain silent _____

Call me _____

cc: Mr. George Christian

WWRostow:rlm

53a

DRAFT -- December 9, 1968

There can be few less cosmic events than where a withdrawing public servant goes to teach and resumes his studies. But since others have chosen to comment on the event, I ought, perhaps, to say a few words.

First, Mrs. Rostow and I are delighted with the opportunity to teach and make such contribution as we can to the vigorous and rapidly developing life of the distinguished University at Austin.

Second, we are grateful to those universities that did offer us posts at this time. But no university was under a legal, moral, or any other kind of obligation to do so.

Third, I do not know to what extent -- if any -- views I have held as a public servant -- or are believed to have held -- may, or may not, have affected the judgment of various faculties. But, surely, in our university system, that is a matter strictly for the faculties concerned.

Fourth, like many other American citizens, I regret that the war in Southeast Asia has stirred feelings so deep as sometimes to preclude orderly and rational debate. With serious negotiations under way and the possibility of an honorable peace in our grasp -- if we remain steady in the time ahead -- we should be able to look forward to the resumption of a more temperate dialogue among us -- on this and other ^{matters} issues. But this is, clearly, a national problem and hope, not a personal issue.

Tuesday, December 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Transmittal of the Perkins Committee Report
on Foreign Aid

At Tab A are the comments from Rusk, Nitze, Gaud and Zwick on the Perkins Report on Foreign Aid. They all agree it is an excellent job that should be valuable to the new Administration and to the coming public discussion on the future of foreign aid.

Nitze and Gaud question the recommendation of the Perkins Committee on the separation of military and economic assistance, mostly because of expected Congressional opposition. Zwick also believes the multilateral aid target in the Committee report is too ambitious and has some reservations on giving the proposed Overseas Development Corporation the authority to borrow from the Treasury. These are essentially tactical differences rather than serious reservations about the Committee's approach and its main recommendations.

You previously approved a letter to Perkins thanking him for his work and saying that you will pass the report on to the new Administration (Tab B). In the meantime, the other members of the Committee have submitted their letters of resignation.

The Committee is naturally anxious to get its report on the public record. But it is still true -- and the Committee recognizes this -- that your successor may feel he can give the report a better hearing if the report is not published for awhile.

I believe you could complete action on the report in one of the following ways:

1. Pass on the report and Cabinet comments through Bob Murphy and say we plan to publish the report unless your successor objects.
2. Pass on the report and comments quietly and leave its disposition to the President-elect.
3. Publish the report as we pass it on with the comments.

I think it makes most sense to do option 1. The report is sound and thoughtful -- it can only help the public discussion on aid. But no one will argue that your successor should not have a quiet shot at the report if he wants it.

Whatever your decision, I recommend we handle it with a memo from me to Bob Murphy. (A draft memo is at Tab C.) Charlie Murphy concurs that this would be a good channel to use.

W. W. Rostow

OK option 1; say we'll publish unless there is objection_____

Simply pass report on quietly_____

Publish and pass on routinely_____

Call me_____



ERF:mst

54a

S/S-15565

December 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Report of the Perkins Committee

I have consulted with my colleagues in the Department and all of us believe that the Perkins Report is an outstanding job by a group of men whose dedication and distinction are well known. This report should be of great value in the coming public policy discussion of the future of our foreign assistance programs.

DR
Dean Rusk

54h

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 DEC 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Perkins Committee Report

In a memorandum dated 5 November, Mr. Rostow forwarded your request for my views on the Report presented to you by the General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs. This Report contains a number of thoughtful and useful recommendations for the reorganization and redirection of our foreign aid program. I subscribe to many of them, especially the proposal that the US should, in its own interest, undertake to restore total development assistance in all forms to at least the share of our national income reached in 1965, and the proposal that the US expand contributions to multilateral agencies as rapidly as multilateral management can handle additional resources competently, and as other industrialized countries can be persuaded to go along.

In order to expand our economic aid, however, we must deal head on, as the Report does, with the issue of how economic assistance relates to military security and commitments. I believe that economic aid represents a US commitment to development through peaceful and constructive means. In essence, it is an instrument for knitting together diverse populations as part of the nation-building process in underdeveloped areas. Through our economic assistance programs, we seek to reduce the tensions that are produced by inability or failure to meet popular wants. We also seek to reduce tensions between nations wherever possible by emphasizing regional economic development programs. Africa is an excellent case in point.

I do not believe that the record supports the contention that development assistance leads to military entanglements on the part of the US. NATO was the product of a clear Soviet threat to the territorial integrity of Western European nations rather than the by product of the Marshall Plan. As the Perkins Report notes, US activities in Vietnam have been security oriented from the beginning. Moreover, despite our economic aid to a number of countries, we have clearly avoided military embroilment in their internal and regional problems. The Ethiopian-Somali dispute, the Nigerian civil war, and the Sabah problem, are very clear examples of our determination to avoid entanglements.

I do believe, however, that in those countries where we maintain economic and military assistance programs these programs should be treated as essentially complementary endeavors. Consequently, the effectiveness of each kind of US assistance should be evaluated within the context of all our total assistance efforts. In some instances, capital investment will have the desired impact only if the security capabilities of recipient nations are bolstered through military assistance. This is the case because capital assistance involves long-term planning and, quite often, a transition period of 5-10 years will be required before actual completion of projects. During this period, governments are sometimes confronted with serious security problems which threaten not only their capital development plans but their own ability to govern effectively. We have seen this pattern develop at various times in South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, and Tunisia.

In other areas, we find that the ability of countries to engage in "self-help" in the security field through the purchase of needed arms depends heavily upon such factors as their economic growth, foreign exchange holdings, and debt repayment problems. With declining foreign aid appropriations in 1967 and 1968, a heavy burden is being placed upon aid recipients to choose between economic and security needs in the allocation of their scarce budgetary resources. Quite often, they are unable to establish priorities without adverse economic or security consequences. Turkey is a case in point. As a result of our reduced MAP program, the Turkish Government may have to increase its purchases from abroad. I am concerned about the possible impact upon Turkey's GNP because of its currency problems and difficult foreign exchange position.

Thus, I believe that we must give serious consideration to full orchestration of US efforts in the foreign assistance field. This involves a total resources approach in an effort to secure a clear picture of what US aid is available for recipient countries, of the likely inputs from other external sources to an aid recipient, and of the best means for programming aid to insure that an appropriate balance is established between economic and military requirements. This would involve further development of the AID comprehensive country analyses for the purpose of correlating all foreign aid programs. We are already moving in this direction in the Latin American area. I believe that we should expand this effort, possibly through SIG/IRG, into other areas as well.

As concerns the separation of military assistance from development assistance for legislative purposes as recommended in the Perkins Report, I believe that this could be accomplished without detracting from the total resources approach that I am proposing. While we can go to the Congress for separate pieces of legislation, the Executive Branch can, and should, manage these resources as part of one package.

As you recall, Bob McNamara also recommended separate legislation be secured for military assistance. I have no basic disagreement with such arrangements so long as overall coordination of our foreign aid efforts can be assured.

However, as you know, we can anticipate substantial Congressional opposition to the foregoing proposal. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee for Foreign Affairs have already expressed their desire to keep MAP in the Foreign Assistance Act, and thus retain the right of review of our arms transfers abroad. Should both Committees hold to this position and should the Congress continue to cut MAP appropriations, we will be confronted with a related problem. We are on record with the Congress concerning our intention to return Service funded programs for Laos, Thailand and Vietnam to MAP upon termination of hostilities in Southeast Asia. In that event, and if the trend of a continuing decline in MAP funds is not reversed, we will be unable to meet our security requirements in Southeast Asia unless the Region's country programs continue to be funded out of the DOD budget. Thus, I believe we should consider an alternative option of transferring certain programs into the Service budgets. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not object to transfer of the entire MAP to the DOD budget as a separate line item if this improves Congressional acceptance, they are opposed to further fragmentation of this program into Service budgets. The changes I believe should be made are as follows: (1) transfer MAAG support and administration to the Defense budget, (2) provide authority to pay rent for bases from the DOD budget provided Congress approves the program and amount for each country. (Initially we would seek this authority only for Spain), and (3) fund in the DOD budget of MAP for countries engaged in on-going military operations. This would mean transferring Korea to the DOD budget until there is a major diminution of North Korean actions against the South.

Paul H. Nitze
DEPUTY

54c

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1968

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
The White House

SUBJECT: The Report of the Perkins Committee on Development
Assistance in the new Administration

This report - prepared by a group of outstanding private citizens after more than three years' study of our aid programs - is an excellent job. It states the case for aid clearly and well.

Its recommendations set a realistic course for movement toward greater use of multilateral lending agencies, private investment and newer forms of development assistance. If I were to pick one nit it would be the recommendation that the name of the Agency be changed. I see no great need for that, but would not argue against it if Congressional soundings by the new Administration indicate that such a change would lead to greater public support for the program.

Congressional reaction is particularly important with respect to the proposal to remove military aid from the Foreign Assistance Act, inasmuch as this raises a jurisdictional issue between Congressional committees.

The report should be extremely helpful to the new Administration.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

54d

DEC 5 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Perkins' Committee Report on Foreign Aid

I believe the Report of the President's General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs will make a valuable contribution to the new Administration in developing its foreign aid program. It should be very helpful to the new Administration in responding to the requirement of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 (section 520 (a)) for a reappraisal of the aid program.

I support its recommendations in general, and particularly its recommendations for:

- maintaining a single strong overseas development agency which keeps the capital, technical, and security-related programs under one management
- establishing an Overseas Development Corporation to promote and finance private investment in the less developed countries
- expanding U.S. official contributions to multi-lateral financing agencies, as well as expanding private U.S. purchase of securities from these agencies
- increasing net expenditures of the U.S. bilateral aid program from \$2.0 billion in 1969 to \$2.5 billion in 1973, overall budget constraints permitting.

I have reservations on a few of the report's recommendations.

(1) I question whether the proposed separation of military aid from economic aid would be advantageous. Such a step could make it more difficult for the President, the Secretary of State, and our Ambassadors to effectively coordinate the economic and military assistance programs in each country. The report does not address (a) the congressional committee concerns on this issue, or (b) the effect of separation on passage of the economic aid program in the Congress.

(2) I see no particular advantage at this time for the proposal to combine the Supporting Assistance and Contingency Fund appropriations into a single appropriation for Reconstruction and Emergency Assistance. Such action might better await the development of a Southeast Asia reconstruction program.

(3) The proposal to give the Overseas Development Corporation authority to borrow from the Treasury (like the Export-Import Bank) runs counter to current budget policy. Both the Congress and the Budget Bureau frown on this "back-door" financing; we prefer, in general, that agencies seek appropriations directly.

(4) Finally, the expenditure target for U.S. contributions to multilateral agencies is probably overly ambitious. Because of the lag in expenditures, commitments to such agencies would have to be substantially above the expenditure targets. Given the reluctance of most other donors to provide a large increase in contributions to IDA, it is unlikely that the proposed increase in U.S. contributions could be achieved without the U.S. share greatly exceeding 45 percent.



Charles J. Zwick
Director

Dear Jim:

Many thanks for your letter enclosing your Committee's final report on development assistance.

I know that a great deal of time, talent, and hard work went into this effort. You and your distinguished colleagues have performed a valuable public service -- in the interest of our own security and of the hopes of millions of people around the world who seek a better life.

I have asked Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford, Aid Administrator Gaud and Budget Director Zwick to go over your proposals and give me their comments. I will be most pleased to pass on the Committee's report and our appraisal of it to the next Administration. I believe it will be an important contribution to the deliberations ahead on the future of foreign aid.

I deeply appreciate your personal leadership in the work of the Committee.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Dr. James A. Perkins
President
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

LBJ:ERF:RPM:mst

Nov. 1, 1968

~~SECRET~~

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, December 10, 1968 - 1:00 pm

AGENDA

1. Military Situation in Vietnam. (Sec. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler)
Report of Abrams' view at Tab A.
2. Sihanouk Letter. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford)
Draft letter at Tab B.
3. Paris Prospects: Next Steps. (Sec. Rusk)
Situation report.
4. Increment to U.S. Contribution to SYG UN Population Trust Fund. (Sec Rusk)
5. BENHAM Shot. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford)
Tab C.
6. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 85-03
By mp/ida NARA. Date 1-27-98

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

55a

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, Dec. 9, 1968
11:15 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will be interested in this brief summary of Abrams' analysis for Thieu of the military situation, problems, and enemy intentions.

He feels the enemy's present greatest emphasis is on:

- maintenance of their logistical system and bases opposite Saigon;
- maintaining and building Communist political and organizational strength for the future.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-508 *Walt* Rostow

By MP/132 NARA. Date 1-26-98

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN PLUS attachment

*PARIS & RUSK & CLIFFORD
SHOULD STUDY CAREFULLY.
BOB MURPHY SHOULD BE
BRIEFED ON IT.*

55 Ben Real informed.



Department of State
SECRET

556
TELEGRAM

W H 5

P 090450Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5700
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3143
STATE GRNC
BT
S E C R E T SAIGON 44409

2209Q
1968 DEC 9 AM 1:36

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

FROM AMBASSADOR BERGER

PARIS FOR VIETNAM DELEGATION

SUBJECT: ABRAMS MEETING WITH THIEU

REF: STATE 281547

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 91-506

By SP/IS NARA, Date 1-24-98

1. AT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON'S MEETING WITH THIEU, WHICH LASTED AN HOUR AND A HALF, GENERAL ABRAMS BRIEFED HIM ON THREE TOPICS:

A. MILITARY SITUATION AND POSSIBLE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION;

B. BELOW PAR PERFORMANCE OF THREE DIVISIONS IN III CORPS; AND

C. DISTURBING RISE IN ARVN AND MARINE DETENTION RATES IN CONTRAST TO EXCELLENT RECORD IN OTHER SERVICES.

2. IT WAS A SUPERB BRIEFING, IMPRESSIVE IN ITS CLARITY AND DETAIL, DELIVERED QUIETLY, AND MAKING CLEAR THAT WHILE GREAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN 1968, THERE WERE SERIOUS MILITARY PROBLEMS AHEAD WHICH CANNOT BE IGNORED AND NEED TO BE SOLVED.

3. GEN. ABRAMS WILL BE REPORTING INDEPENDENTLY, AND IN THIS TELEGRAM I WANT ONLY TO PROVIDE HIS LIST OF THE ENEMY'S POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION INDICATED BY ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE:

A. LOGISTICAL MOVEMENTS THAT SUGGEST A BUILD-UP OF A TWO TO THREE DIVISION FORCE NORTH OF BEN HAI, WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY THREATEN I CORPS. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO PRESENT MASSING NORTH OF THE DMZ.

SECRET

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B. DEVELOPING LOGISTICAL BASE AND SYSTEM IN LAOS TO FEED INTO THE ASAU VALLEY FOR EVENTUAL USE AGAINST TRI THUAN AREA. (*Hue area*).

C. DEVELOP THEIR MAIN LOGISTICAL SYSTEM AND BASES INSIDE CAMBODIA TO THREATEN III CORPS AND SAIGON. THIS IS AREA WHERE COSVN AND ALLIANCE HEADQUARTERS NOW LOCATED, AND DISPOSITION OF FOUR NVA DIVISIONS IN THIS AREA SUGGESTS THIS MAY BE THE MAIN SPRINGBOARD FOR RENEWED MILITARY ACTIONS.

D. CONCENTRATE ON BUILDING LIBERATION COMMITTEES, POPULATION CONTROL, RECRUITING, AND BUILDING UP ITS INFRASTRUCTURE IN PREPARATION FOR MAXIMUM EFFORT AT NEGOTIATING TABLE TO ESTABLISH NLF AS CONTROLLING THE COUNTRYSIDE.

4. GEN. ABRAMS ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO ^{ALL} ~~APL~~, BUT FELT ENEMY'S GREATEST PRESENT EMPHASIS WAS ON ~~C.I.D.~~ (*paragraphs above*)

5. THIEU LISTENED WITH ACUTE ATTENTION, ASKED MANY QUESTIONS, AND WAS DEEPLY IMPRESSED. PERHAPS GREATEST SIDE BENEFIT OF BRIEFING WAS THAT IT MAY DRIVE HOME TO THIEU, AND THROUGH HIM TO OTHERS, THAT ENEMY CAPABILITY IS STILL FORMIDABLE, AND THAT MILITARY VICTORY IS NOT JUST AROUND THE CORNER, AND THAT WE HAVE ONLY TO KEEP ON COURSE AND THE ENEMY WILL COLLAPSE.

6. AT THE END OF THE MEETING I MENTIONED OUR CONCERN (REFTEL) WITH SITUATION IN DMZ, VANCE'S MEETING WITH LAU RAISING THIS MATTER FORCIBLY, OUR DEMAND THAT SOME MECHANISM BE ESTABLISHED TO BRING VIOLATIONS UNDER CONTROL, AND REQUEST THAT HANOI MAKE SOME PROPOSALS. I SAID THIS WOULD BE SUBJECT OF IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION WITH KY AND LAM AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL.

BUNKER
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

55c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, December 9, 1968
4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Before acting finally on this draft letter to Sihanouk, Sec. Rusk would like to discuss it with you at tomorrow's lunch.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24
By NY, NARA, Date 2-23-98

55f

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1968

Mr. Rostow:

The Vice President has no authority in the field of underground nuclear testing.

(several months ago)
I am informed that he took a personal interest in the matter, probably at the instigation of the Hughes people. When Dr. Hornig appointed the Study Panel he said he did so at the request of the Vice President and Glenn Seaborg.

BKS
Bromley Smith

Int C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3530

55 *l*

SUMMARY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS OF BENHAM

Plans for public information handling of BENHAM are based on experience with previous high yield events in Nevada (GREELEY, December 1966; FAULTLESS, January 1968; POXCAR, April 1968). The test would be announced on Monday, December 9, to meet publication dates of weekly newspapers in the area, thus helping to alert residents that the test may be felt off the Nevada Test Site. The eight-day advance notice will also permit Public Health Service officials to notify mine operators and those who work on high buildings of plans for the test. Local civic and business leaders will be invited to a briefing and tour of the test site on December 12 and 13. Local newsmen and other newsmen who request will be permitted to attend the briefing and tour. The same group will be invited to be on the test site to watch execution of BENHAM on closed circuit TV in an effort to take some of the mystery out of the test program and to allow newsmen and officials to put underground testing in proper perspective.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *Group 4*
By *17* NARA, Date *2-23-98*

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Enclosure 2

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

December 10, 1968

Mr. President:

I interviewed Henry Lloyd today.

He seems to me to be bright, intelligent -- a lively mind and thoroughly usable at Austin either on the study of the Presidency or in some other field.

He might be tried out as a draftsman, among other things.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

56a

November 26, 1968

Rec'd
12:30 p

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: George Christian *gc*

At your instruction, I talked with Henry Malcolm Lloyd, the editorial writer for the Evening Star whom Larry Levinson advised you had expressed an interest to go to Austin to work on the study of the Presidency.

He impressed me as a fairly aggressive, intelligent person, and his background is good. As you may recall from Larry's memo, he was educated at Oxford and Cornell, and worked six years for Bill Gaud before joining the Star about seven months ago. He writes national affairs and foreign affairs editorials for the Star.

The Presidential study aside, I think he would fit in nicely at the School of Public Affairs in some capacity.

I suggest we have his FBI updated, and that the President visit with him in the near future.

#

Walt - interview him in some detail & see if he can write interestingly

56 b

November 19, 1968

"George, would you interview him to see if he is interested?"

LBJ:TJ:dbm

(2)

MEMORANDUM

L

56c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*See if
interesting*

November 18, 1968
Monday, 7:15 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Larry Levinson **LEL**

The other day, Henry Malcolm Lloyd, an editorial writer for the Evening Star expressed deep interest in going to Austin to work on the study of the Presidency.

Lloyd is one of Newby Noyes' brightest journalists and, at 33, is the youngest of the Star editorial writers.

I asked Lloyd to send me a short biography, which is attached. Also attached is an editorial he wrote for the Star praising the LBJ history project at a time when Senator Williams was doing all the carping about it.

Lloyd was educated at Oxford University. He has had practical experience with Bill Gaud in AID and has a good background in political science.

Because he has to meet such tight deadlines for the Star, he has developed the knack of writing quickly and simply -- but with a punch -- on complicated subjects dealing with the economy and domestic programs.

Do you want me to pursue this further by having Lloyd come in and talk to George and Larry Temple and checking out his FBI?

Yes _____ No _____

Attachment

HENRY MALCOLM LLOYD

Editorial Writer for the Washington Evening Star

- At 33 years old, by some 10 years the youngest of the five Star editorial writers.
- National affairs and foreign affairs editorials.

Government Experience with the Agency for International Development

- As a legislative staff coordinator, drafted statements for administration witnesses and accompanied them to congressional hearings.

Educated at Balliol College, Oxford University

- Bachelor of Arts Degree with Second Class Honors in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Master of Arts Degree.

And at Cornell University

- Government Department Honors Program. Concentrated in American Government.

56e

JUL 19 1968

A Johnson History

There have been many targets for valid criticism during the Johnson presidency, but his history project is not one of them. Unfortunately, this valuable and thoroughly preceded program has encountered some uninformed, political hip-shooting at its inception. Therefore, as the historian would say, it would be useful to set the record straight.

The proposal calls for federal agencies to compile histories of their activities during the Johnson era. This was done, although less intensively, by the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations. There is existing authority under the Presidential Library and National Archives Acts to do the same thing again. Moreover, many agencies already have historians on their payrolls whose talents will be fully utilized.

Fortunately, the White House guidelines to the agencies reflect lessons learned from previous presidential history projects. Scholars and archivists who have had occasion to work on presidential papers in the past have understandably been dismayed at the prospect of

wading through crates of documents without the aid of an index.

This time around, narrative descriptions will be compiled of important aspects of agency business, such as major legislation and basic organizational changes. These narratives, in turn, will be supported by complete, though hopefully not overwhelming documentation. A careful study of the documents should reveal occasions where the reasons for decisions have never been confided to paper. In those instances, the gaps in the record can be filled by interviewing contemporaries. Also, and of no small importance, consideration will be given to declassifying relevant documents.

It must be expected that the White House and the agencies will compile their story in a favorable light. But any bias in the administration's favor is more than offset by the fact that the documents themselves will be available to historians in a usable form in a matter of months. The historians will write the ultimate history of the Johnson presidency and, by virtue of this project, they will be in a far better position to do a good job of it.

Tuesday, December 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the Amir of Kuwait --
Noon, Wednesday, December 11

JD

Walt Rostow tells me that the Amir would like to have three people with him during his talks with you:

The Foreign Minister, *the Excellency Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmed, al-Jabri*
The Minister of Finance and Oil Affairs *the Excellency Abd al-Rahman al-Sabah*
His Ambassador in Washington *the Excellency Jalal al-Thumaini*

The main reason is political. The Amir wants witnesses that he stuck to the Arab line (and his ministers want to be sure he stays on the track.).

Since our main objective is to make the Amir feel welcome and comfortable, Walt feels we should go along with their desires even though this means a slightly larger group than you usually have.

On our side this would mean Ambassador Cottam, Pete Hart and Hal Saunders to take notes.

Jim Jones

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ACTION

**Wednesday, December 11, 1968
2:10 p.m.**

Mr. President:

**The telegraphic version of this
letter to Sihaneuk awaits your signing
the final text, submitted herewith.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

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Pres file