

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 3

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3a cable <i>Sanitized 11-25-03 NW 02-200</i>	CAP 82919, Rostow to Bunker S 2 pp. [dup. #17a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan, Misc. & Memos, Vol. 8," Box 124]	12/24/68	A
<del>#4b letter</del>	<del>The President to King Hussein re Jordan PCI 2 pp. <i>open 11/25/02</i></del>	<del>[12/68]</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#5 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the President re Israel <i>open 8/9/01</i> TS 1 p.</del>	<del>12/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6b memo</del>	<del>Clifford to the President re Israel <i>open 8/9/01</i> TS 2 pp.</del>	<del>12/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6c memo</del>	<del>Wheeler to Clifford re Israel TS 6 pp.</del>	<del>12/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6d chart</del>	<del>Arab and Israeli Ground Forces TS 2 pp.</del>	<del>[12/68]</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6e chart</del>	<del>Arab and Israeli Naval Forces TS 2 pp.</del>	<del>[12/68]</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6f chart</del>	<del>Arab and Israeli Air Forces TS 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 3-17-05 NW/PAL 02-165</i></del>	<del>[12/68]</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6g letter</del>	<del>Rabin to Warnke <i>open 8/9/01</i> S 2 pp.</del>	<del>11/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6h letter</del>	<del>Warnke to Rabin <i>open 8/9/01</i> S 2 pp.</del>	<del>11/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#6i memcon</del>	<del>Phone conversation between Warnke and Rabin S 1 p. <i>open 8/9/01</i></del>	<del>11/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#10a report</del>	<del>Intelligence Report <i>open 11-25-03 NW 02-201</i> S 1 p. [dup. #4a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, 1 B (3), Economic Activity and Planning, 10/68 - 12/68," Box 59]</del>	<del>[12/68]</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#11 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to the President, 9:35 a.m. C 1 p. [dup. #29, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, 2 C (17) a, General Military Activity, 1/20/68 - 1/69," Box 74]</del>	<del>12/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#13a letter</del>	<del>The President to Pope Paul PCI 2 pp. <i>open 8-29-03 NW 02-199</i></del>	<del>12/23/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 111, 12/18 - 25/68," Box 43

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#15 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 6/25/02</i>	12/23/68	A
#15a cable	MAC 17454 S 4 pp. — [dup. #32b, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, 2 C (17) a, General Military Activity, 1/20/68 - 1/69," Box 74, Exempt, NLJ 92-388, 9/2/94]	12/25/68	A
#15b cable	MAC 17418 — S 6 pp. Sanitized [dup. #32d, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, 2 C (17) a, General Military Activity, 1/20/68 - 1/69," Box 74, Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 8, 12/16/83]	12/25/68	A
#19 memo	Rostow to the President re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>Open NJ 019-043-4-3 (1/02)</i>	12/23/68	A
#19a cable	Intelligence cable re Vietnam/ France S 6 pp. [dup. #10c, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, "Harvan Chronological, Vol. 15," Box 114]	12/21/68	A
#20 note	Rostow to the President, 8:55 a.m. TS 1 p. Sanitized — [Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 21, 9/25/84] <i>Sanitized 6-22-04 NIS/RAC 02-168 more released</i>	12/23/68	A
#20a report	Intelligence report S 2 pp. Sanitized — [Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 4, 12/7/83] <i>Sanitized 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 02-169 more released</i>	12/23/68	A
#20b map	re Vietnam S 1 p. — <i>open 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 02-169</i> [Exempt, NLJ/CBS 4, 12/7/83]	12/23/68	A
#21 note	Rostow to the President, 8:50 a.m. TS 1 p. — <i>more into vol. 8-31-10 NLJ 10-244</i>	12/23/68	A
#21a cable	Intelligence report <i>Exempt 12/16 NLJ 10-243</i> TS 1 p. —	12/16/68	A
#23 memo	Rostow to the President, 10:15 a.m. S 1 p. [dup. #25, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. 8," Box 124]	12/22/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 111, 12/18 - 25/68," Box 43

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#23a memo</del>	<p><del>Intelligence Memorandum re Vietnam</del> <i>open 11-25-03 NW 02-201</i>  <del>S 1 p.</del>                      [dup. #25a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. &amp; Memos, Vol. 8," Box 124]</p>	<del>12/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#23b memo</del>	<p><del>Intelligence Memorandum</del> <i>open 11-25-03 NW 02-201</i>  <del>S 4 pp.</del>                      [dup. #25b, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. &amp; Memos, Vol. 8," Box 124]</p>	<del>12/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#27 memo	<p>Rostow to the President                      S 1 p. — <i>sanitized 11-25-03 NW 02-204</i></p>	12/21/68	A
<del>#27a memo</del>	<p><del>Rostow to the AEC Chairman</del>  <del>S 1 p.</del> — <i>sanitized 11-25-03 NW 02-204</i>  <i>OPEN</i></p>	<del>{12/68}</del>	<del>A</del>
#30 memo	<p>Smith to the President, 8:00 p.m.                      S 2 pp.                      [dup. #26, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. &amp; Memos, Vol. 8," Box 124]                      [dup. # B. Papers of BKS, "BKS Chron, Oct.-Dec 1968" Box 4]</p>	12/19/68	A
<i>sanitized 11-25-03 NW 02-200</i>			
<del>#31l memo</del>	<p><del>Benjamin Read to Rostow re AEC and Israel</del>  <del>C 5 pp.</del> <i>open 6/24/03 NLJ 02-202</i></p>	<del>11/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#31m report</del>	<p><del>State Dept. Views on Israel</del>  <del>C 7 pp.</del> <i>open 6/24/03 NW 02-202</i></p>	<del>{11/68}</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#31p letter</del>	<p><del>Seaborg to Rusk re Israel</del>  <del>C 5 pp.</del> <i>open 6/24/03 NLJ 02-203</i></p>	<del>{11/68}</del>	<del>A</del>
#33b cable	<p>Saigon 45163, Bunker's 74th message                      S 8 pp. — <i>Sanitized open 6/24/03 NW 02-202</i>                      [dup. #50b, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, 8 B(3)(B), Bunker's Weekly Report, 5/68 - 1/69," Box 105, Sanitized, NLJ/CBS 10]</p>	<del>12/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#36 memo</del>	<p><del>Smith to the President re Benham</del>  <del>S 1 p.</del> <i>open 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 02-166</i></p>	12/19/68	A
<del>#44 letter</del>	<p><del>The President to Pres. Park re Korea</del>  <del>PCI 2 pp.</del> <i>open 8-29-03 NW 02-199</i></p>	<del>12/18/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4a</del>	<p><del>Read to Rostow</del> <i>open 6/29/02</i>  <del>STP</del></p>	12/25/68	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 111, 12/18 - 25/68, Box 43

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, December 25, 1968  
1230 PM

Mr. President:

Herewith the disappointing report on meeting with VC on three U.S. prisoners.

Obviously, Hanoi tried to use it for the purpose of elevating the NLF and embarrassing U.S.-GVN relations; but they overplayed their hand.

*W. W. Rostow*  
W. W. Rostow

*Pres file*

1968 DEC 25 16 39

~~SECRET~~

HCE424

DECLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45511 251621Z

Authority NLJ 95-235

52  
ACTION SS 30

By MP/SP NARA, Date 1-27-98

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/030 W

117109

0 251655Z DEC 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6589  
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
CINCPAC  
MACV

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 45511

EXDIS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH VC ON US PW'S

FROM AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL ABRAMS

1. FOLLOWING IS A QUICK SUMMARY OF THE ORAL DEBRIEFING OF OUR FIVE MAN UNARMED TEAM REPRESENTING THE COMMANDING GENERAL, II FFV, HEADED BY LTC JOHN V. GIBNEY WHICH MET WITH THE UNARMED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EASTERN NAMBO MILITARY ZONE.

2. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT THE AGREED SITE FOLLOWING THE ARRIVAL OF THE U.S. TEAM AT 1500 HOURS UNTIL THE DEPARTURE OF THE VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVES AT 1730.

3. LTC GIBNEY STATED THAT HE HAD COME TO ARRANGE TO TAKE CUSTODY OF THE 3 U.S. PRISONERS MENTIONED IN THEIR BROADCAST OR TO FIX A DATE, TIME AND PLACE FOR THEIR RETURN. HE STATED THAT OUR TEAM WAS PREPARED TO RECEIVE THE PRISONERS TODAY, TOMORROW OR AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT AND PROMPTLY RETURN THEM TO THEIR FAMILIES.

4. THE EASTERN NAMBO MILITARY SPOKESMAN STATED THAT THEY

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 45511 251621Z

WERE NOT PREPARED TO RELEASE THE PRISONERS AT THE MEETING. FURTHERMORE, HE STATED HE HAD NO AUTHORITY TO FIX A DATE, TIME OR PLACE FOR THE RELEASE OF THE PRISONERS, NOR COULD HE PROMISE THAT SUCH DATE, TIME OR PLACE COULD BE FIXED AT A NEXT MEETING. HE STATED AT VARIOUS TIMES THAT THE US MUST SHOW A PROPER SPIRIT AND THERE WOULD NEED TO BE DISCUSSIONS REGARDING "PROTOCOL" "FORMALITIES", PROCEDURES" AND "ARRANGEMENTS", THE NATURE OF WHICH HE COULD NOT DIVULGE.

5. UNDER OUR INSTRUCTIONS, LT COL. GIBNEY DID NOT RPT NOT SEEK TO ENGAGE THEM IN A DISCUSSION OF WHAT THEY MEANT BY THESE WORDS. HE SAID THE TURN OVER OF THE THREE PRISONERS WAS A SIMPLE MATTER AND REPEATEDLY ASKED THE SPOKESMAN TO FIX A DATE, TIME AND PLACE.

6. THE EASTERN NAMBO SPOKESMAN STATED THAT IF THEIR SIDE HAD ANYTHING FURTHER TO COMMUNICATE THIS WOULD BE CONVEYED BY RADIO BROADCAST.

7. THE ABOVE IS BASED ON AN ORAL DEBRIEFING. THE TEAM IS PREPARING ITS WRITTEN REPORT ON THE MEETING. WE SECRETLY RECORDED THE EXCHANGE BUT DO NOT RPT NOT KNOW ITS QUALITY AT THIS TIME.

8. THE TEAM WAS HANDED A DOCUMENT, TEXT OF WHICH IS IN SAIGON 45510.  
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

LAURN. HE STATED THAT OUR TEAM WAS PREPARED TO RECEIVE THE PRISONERS TODAY, TOMORROW OR AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT AND PROMPTLY RETURN THEM TO THEIR FAMILIES.

4. THE EASTERN NAMBO MILITARY SPOLESMAN STATED THAT THEY

~~SECRET~~

1968 DEC 25 16 46

16

~~SECRET~~

HCE425

PAGE 01 SAIGON 45510 251605Z

41  
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO PPNSCE 00,1030 W

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 95-235

By M/af NARA, Date 1-27-98

-----  
O 251545Z DEC 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6590  
INFORUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3311  
CINCPAC

117080

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 45510

EXDIS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: DOCUMENT OF EASTERN NAMBO MILITARY ZONE.

1. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT OF THE DOCUMENT WHICH THE VC SPOKESMAN HANDED OUR REPRESENTATIVES AT MEETING DEC 25 ON THE RELEASE OF THREE U.S. PW'S, REFERED TO IN SAIGON'S 45511.

2. QUOTE

PEOPLE'S LIBRATION ARMED FORCES  
EASTERN NAMBO MILITARY ZONE

RELEASE ORDER.

-0-

-IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SVNNLF AND BY ORDER OF THE COMMAND OF THE SVNPLAF CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR ON THE OCCASSION OF THE 8TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE SVNNLF,

-IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SVNNLF'S HUMANE AND LENIENT POLICY TOWARD THE P.O.W'S AND RALLIED SERVICEMEN,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 45510 251605Z

-IN RESPONSE TO THE GOOD WILL OF AMERICAN PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE WHO, FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE'S SAKE, ARE OPPOSING THE US GOVERNMENT'S AGGRESSIVE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM,

THE COMMAND OF THE P.L.A.F. IN EASTERN NAMBO MILITARY ZONE

DECIDES

ARTICLE I.- TO RELEASE THREE AMERICAN P.O.W'S NAMED HEREAFTER:

1-THOMAS NELSON JONES, SERIAL NUMBER US 51942963, SPECIALIST 4, 86TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, 6TH BATTALION, 48TH GROUP, LONG BINH, CAPTURED ON AUGUST 25, 1968 IN THE BATTLE ON ROUTE 22, TAY NINH PROVINCE.

2- DONALD C. SMITH, SERIAL NUMBER US 57916054, PRIVATE FIRST CLASS, 125TH SIGNAL BATTALION, CAPTURED ON MAY 15, 1968 IN THE BATTLE AT BA DEN MOUNTAIN TAY NINH PROVINCE.

3-JAMES W. BRIGHAM, COLORED, SERIAL NUMBER US 63011986, SPECIALIST 4, 65TH ENGINEERING BATTALION, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION, CAPTURED ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1968 IN THE BATTLE ON ROUTE 4, TAY NINH PROVINCE,

THESE 3 P.O.W.'S HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT THEY WERE COMPELLED TO TAKE PART IN A CRIMINAL WAR AGAINST THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND HAVE OBSERVED DISCIPLINE AND REGULATIONS DURING THEIR DETENTION.

ARTICLE II.- THE COMMAND OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES OF TAY NINH BATTLEFIELD HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR THE HANDING OVER OF THESE P.O.W'S TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE US SIDE AT THE SCHEDULED PLACE SO THAT THEY CAN RETURN HOME AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

EASTERN NAMBO

DECEMBER 19, 1968//

UNQUOTE

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

THE 8TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE SVNNLF,

-IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SVNNLF'S HUMANE AND LENIENT POLICY TOWARD THE P.O.W'S AND RALLIED SERVICEMEN,

~~SECRET~~

2

*Pres file*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, December 25, 1968  
12:10 PM

Mr. President:

This small human detail of exchanges between Soviet and U.S. technicians on the "Hot Line" will interest you.

It is really hard to suppress the sense of humanity among us--and Christmas.

  
W. W. Rostow



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2a

December 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL KENDALL

Subject: Recent exchanges on the Washington-Moscow Emergency Communications Link

1. Although exchanges between Soviet and U.S. "Hot Line" personnel have always been most cordial, a high point was reached during this Christmas season.

2. The Soviets' interest in the Apollo program was first indicated when, during a routine exchange of operator chatter on the line last month, they sent an unsolicited congratulatory message on the successful completion of Apollo-7. As was known to much of the world, Apollo-8 was to take off on Saturday morning, December 21. Due to their interest in Apollo-7 and the spectacular nature of Apollo-8, a couple of hours before launch we informed our counterparts, via the "Hot Line", of the scheduled launch time. We added that TV coverage had already commenced and asked if they would like to be kept informed. They responded enthusiastically and asked us to keep them posted. Deriving our information from network television and press releases, we informally relayed information in regard to the most important aspects of the flight. The Soviets were very solicitous about the welfare of the astronauts and the success of the flight.

3. Another "first" was achieved on the morning of December 25, when the Soviets sent a Christmas greeting - "Happy Merry Christmas". Although New Year's greetings are customarily exchanged, this was the first time we have received a Christmas greeting.

4. The Soviets will be kept informed of subsequent developments in the Apollo mission.

*Peter F. Hanratty*  
PETER F. HANRATTY  
ENS, USNR  
MOLINK, Team II

3

Pres file


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, December 25, 1968  
12:00

Mr. President:

Herewith, the memcon of my conversation with Diem and Khoi, reported at yesterday's lunch.

I forwarded it promptly to Saigon and Paris at State's suggestion.

  
W. ROSTOW

Loi, also sent to B. Reel; <sup>see 107</sup> see Mr. Rostow.

3a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

051070.....

OO [REDACTED]  
DE [REDACTED] 4673 3592112  
O 242058Z ZYH ZFF-1 ZFF-4  
FM WHITE HOUSE WASHDC  
TO AMEMB PARIS/US DELEGATION  
AMEMB SAIGON  
ZEM

1968 DEC 24 22 53

3.4(b)(1)

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
24 PM 5:57

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] CAP82919

FROM WALT ROSTOW FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER  
REPEAT TO PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN

I AM SENDING THIS [REDACTED] BECAUSE IT IS THE AFTERNOON  
OF DECEMBER 24 AND THIS IS A CONVENIENT WAY TO MAKE A  
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WHICH I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD  
HAVE PROMPTLY AVAILABLE.

BUI DIEM AND KHOI CAME IN THIS MORNING WITH BILL JORDEN.

1. ON THE QUESTION OF MODALITIES, I TOOK THE LINE IN  
STATE 291645; NAMELY THAT WE OUGHT TO HAVE AN EARLY  
AGREEMENT BEFORE CONGRESS GOT BACK AND WE HAD MORE OF THE  
KIND OF PRESSURE REPRESENTED BY SENATOR MCGOVERN. I EXPLAINED  
THAT IT WAS HARD IN THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN TRADITIONS  
TO BE AGAINST A ROUND TABLE. THEY ASKED ABOUT FLAGS AND  
NAME PLATES. I TOOK THE POSITION OF PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE REFERENCED  
CABLE. THEY ASKED ABOUT SPEAKING ORDER. I SAID I WAS NOT  
AN EXPERT BUT I BELIEVED SOME FORMULAE WERE OPEN FOR DISCUSSION.

2. THEIR MAIN POINT -- UNDERLINED BY KHOI -- WAS THIS:  
IF WE CAME TO AN AGREEMENT ON MODALITIES, WOULD IT STICK?  
IF THE OTHER SIDE REFUSED OUR NEXT POSITION, WOULD WE AGAIN  
COME BACK AT SAIGON FOR STILL ANOTHER COMPROMISE? VITAL  
ISSUES WERE INVOLVED FOR THE GVN IN THE MATTER OF MODALITIES.  
I SAID THAT CLARITY ABOUT OUR STICKING POSITION WAS AN  
UNDERSTANDABLE QUESTION FOR THEM TO PRESENT. I HOPED THAT  
AMB. BUNKER AND PRESIDENT THIEU WOULD COME TO GRIPS WITH AN  
AGREED POSITION WHILE VICE PRESIDENT KY WAS IN SAIGON -- IN  
THE DAYS AHEAD.

3. I THEN UNDERLINED HOW HELPFUL VICE PRESIDENT KY'S  
TELEVISION BROADCAST HAD BEEN AND TALKED ABOUT THE  
FAVORABLE SURPRISE OF MARY MCCRORY, CHALMERS ROBERTS,  
ETC., WHO HAD TELEPHONED ME. I SAID THE OPTIMUM POSITION  
FOR OUR SIDE WAS TO HAVE THE BURDEN PUT ON THE SHOULDERS  
OF HANOI AND THE NLF FOR NOT TALKING TO THE GVN. I  
RECALLED TO BOTH OF THEM THAT I HAD OFTEN SAID TO BUI DIEM  
THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE GVN TO TAKE THE LEAD IN  
PEACEMAKING AND TO DO SO FROM A POSITION OF CONFIDENCE  
AS AN ELECTED CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-200  
By ms, NARA, Date 9-9-03

4. BUI DIEM THEN SAID THAT SINCE THE ANXIETY IN SAIGON WAS WHETHER WE WERE PUTTING GVN ON TO A SLIPPERY SLOPE IN PARIS, WHERE THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT NEXT CONCESSION WOULD BE ASKED OF THEM, WOULD IT NOT BE USEFUL TO AGREE AT AN EARLY TIME WHAT OUR BASIC NEGOTIATING STRATEGY MIGHT BE. POLITICAL FIGURES IN SAIGON WOULD THEN KNOW WHAT LAY BEHIND AN AGREEMENT ON MODALITIES AND WHERE WE WOULD NEXT PROCEED.

5. THE FOLLOWING FOUR HEADINGS EMERGED AS THEIR NOTION OF THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH US ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A NEGOTIATING STRATEGY:

-- NAIL DOWN THE DMZ. THIS WOULD BE DONE IN PARIS ON A YOUR-SIDE OUR-SIDE BASIS.

-- NEGOTIATE THE FRAMEWORK OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS, INCLUDING TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM CAMBODIA AND LAOS, PLUS INTERNATIONAL MONITORING AGAINST THE RETURN OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES ACROSS THEIR FRONTIERS. THIS ALSO WOULD BE DONE ON YOUR-SIDE OUR-SIDE BASIS IN PARIS.

-- FOLLOWING UPON KY'S TV STATEMENT, HONOLULU, ETC. REASSERT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE GVN TO TALK WITH THE NLF "AS A REALITY" ABOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE SOUTH. THIS WOULD BE DONE BILATERALLY IN PARIS OR ELSEWHERE.

-- SAIGON-HANOI DISCUSSIONS OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS WOULD BE A BILATERAL IN PARIS OR ELSEWHERE.

6. MAKING IT QUITE CLEAR THAT I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, AND NOT FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE WISDOM IN OUR COMING TO GRIPS WITH (AND LETTING SAIGON ANNOUNCE) SOME SUCH SIMPLE FRAMEWORK FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE CAME TO A PRIVATE AGREEMENT ON THE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS OF MODALITIES.

7. BUI DIEM AND KHOI SAID THEY WOULD REPORT OUR CONVERSATION TO SAIGON AS A PERSONAL CONVERSATION.

700

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

Pres #4 4

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


Wednesday, December 25, 1968  
11:50 AM

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed response to King Hussein's letter to the President.

Our ambassador in Jordan now believes a response is appropriate.

The draft is simply a courteous statement bridging the time until the new Administration takes hold and makes its Middle East dispositions.

  
Walt Rostow



16430

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

December 25, 1968

EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Reply to King Hussein's Letter

Enclosed is a suggested reply from the President to King Hussein's letter of November 30. Although we initially recommended that there was no need for a response, our Ambassador in Amman subsequently reported that Hussein was expecting a reply. We believe now that failure to respond might be misinterpreted and concur in the Ambassador's strong recommendation that a reply be sent.

*BHR by ap.*

Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:  
Suggested reply to  
King Hussein

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *rf*, NARA, Date *2-24-98*  
*JC* *6-11-02*

3860

4a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Reply

4b

Your Majesty:

I appreciate the frank exposition of your concerns and problems regarding the general area situation and that of Jordan in particular as contained in your letter of November 30. I believe it is indicative of close and friendly US-Jordanian ties and of your personal confidence in me that you feel free to express your views in such a direct manner.

In the past difficult eighteen months we have played an active role in support of Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring a just peace in the framework of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. I feel certain that the new administration will give priority attention to attainment of peace in the Near East.

Since this will most probably be our last exchange of correspondence before I relinquish office as President, I reaffirm my great admiration for your wise leadership, gallantry and courage which have been so severely tried

His Majesty  
Hussein I,  
King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,  
Amman.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: FRUS 64-68, vol. 20, #363

By jc NARA, Date 6-14-02

over the past months. I wish you success in your determination to bring peace, justice and prosperity to your people. Your constructive goals have my support and that of my country, and I feel confident that my successor will view your praiseworthy aspirations in a similar light.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5

*Pres file*

Memorandum For: The President

For your urgent approval.

Mr. Rostow was informed of the contents  
of the attached.

Charles Hayden  
Situation Room

---

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

12/24/68

To: ~~WH Sit Room~~  
~~Ben Read~~

Mr. Katzenbach wants this included in the President's evening reading.

*Barbed*  
-PH

5b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Aircraft for Nigerian Relief

We want to provide Globemaster transports for the relief airlift in Nigeria. We are urgently completing the final details but need approval from the President as soon as possible. Our reasons are as follows:

(1) We have a request from the voluntary relief agencies helping Nigeria--with political steam behind it from Senators Kennedy, McCarthy and Speaker McCormack, et al--to provide them with old Globemaster air transports.


(2) Surplus planes are available and Defense is ready to turn them over. They will help increase substantially the capacity of the airlift, particularly if the Biafrans agree to daylight flights.

(3) Providing the planes is a straight transfer of ownership to the relief agencies. No US military personnel will be involved in their relief operations in Nigeria.

(4) The original request was for six planes. We can provide eight and would split them between the International Red Cross and the Church Voluntary Agencies based on Fernando Po and Sao Tome respectively.

(5) We should meet the request. The Federal Government is likely to object, but we think that's manageable. It will save lives, cost us next to nothing, and decrease Congressional heat here at home.

The Secretary fully concurs in this proposal.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach  
Under Secretary

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Tuesday, December 24, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Israeli Phantoms--Final Loose Ends *Pres file*

Warnke and Rabin have exchanged letters on the general conditions of the F-4 sale (Tab B). In short, the Israelis have agreed not to use the F-4s to carry nuclear weapons and "not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." Rabin told Warnke that as long as Israel had neither tested a device nor made its existence public, it would consider that it had not "introduced" nuclear weapons. Warnke in his letter says mere possession is "introduction," and that is where the issue rests. Eshkol's last letter to you on the NPT was non-committal.

## Two issues remain:

1. Delivery date. The Israelis have asked for April 1969. Bus Wheeler believes Israel will be at its greatest disadvantage between June 1969 and mid-1970. However, he does not believe the Israelis could be fully ready to maintain the planes much before January 1970. Also, delivering as early as April, 1969, would require "an unacceptable drawdown of spares" from USAF inventory. Therefore, Bus recommends we begin delivery in September 1969. This could be done without hurting the USAF, and if the Israelis need technical support for a few months they can hire US civilians from the manufacturer. Secretaries Clifford and Rusk endorse his recommendation (Tab A).

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ See me \_\_\_\_\_

2. Credit. Defense has offered \$60 million credit--\$30 million each in FY 1969 and FY 1970. The Israelis have formally accepted, so there is really no issue. However, Abe Feinberg says an additional \$15 million would help. I believe Defense could handle that much more this year, but the question is whether you wish to offer \$75 million after the Israelis have already accepted \$60 million. The only advantage to us of the higher figure would be a slightly better picture in Congress for the military sales bill.

Stick to \$60 million \_\_\_\_\_ Go to \$75 million \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 20, #360By jc, NARA, Date 8-8-01

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

6a



~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

3845

G. L.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

21 DEC 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Accelerated Delivery of F-4E Aircraft to Israel

Israel has asked that we significantly expedite deliveries of F-4 aircraft to begin preferably in April 1969 rather than January 1970. We have told Israeli representatives that, at your direction after the Prime Minister's last visit, we had already with considerable effort and expense cut the lead time for these aircraft in half, and that to cut it in half once again would present serious problems.

There are no insuperable technical obstacles to earlier delivery of the planes themselves; the serious problems involved stem from the time it takes to train maintenance personnel, particularly those concerned with electronic components of the aircraft which enable the plane to fire and release its variety of complicated weapons. In short, we can deliver aircraft in 1969 but they cannot be kept combat ready by the Israelis.

There are risks to the United States in delivering aircraft to Israel which the Israelis cannot fight. General Hod recognizes that these aircraft cannot fight before Israeli personnel are fully trained, which will be some time in early 1970. Nevertheless, they feel that their deterrent posture will be increased by the mere presence of the aircraft. If the Israelis are wrong on this score -- and where Egyptians are concerned, it is easy to be wrong -- they might at some point feel an urgent need to be able to fight the planes prior to the completion of the training of adequate maintenance personnel. The only way in which they could fight them under such circumstances would be for us to rush U.S. maintenance personnel to Israel to do the job. I do not believe we want to introduce U.S. Air Force personnel in such a capacity into the Middle East at a time of actual or near hostilities.

General Wheeler believes we should accede to the Israeli request for earlier deliveries, but without sending USAF personnel to Israel to help in their maintenance. In his recent assessment of the Arab-Israeli air balance (attached), General Wheeler recommends that F-4 deliveries begin in September 1969, "provided there are no unforeseen developments in the international situation which would preclude early release of these aircraft and there is reasonable assurance of Israeli ability at least to support flight operations (i.e., to fly, but not necessarily to fight) with the aircraft."

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30

By Jc, NARA, Date 8-8-01

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE


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On balance, I recommend we agree to commence deliveries in September 1969. In agreeing to this action, we will make clear to the Government of Israel that (1) unforeseen developments could necessitate a change in this decision; (2) we cannot recommend that Israel take delivery of any F-4s prior to the time their personnel are adequately trained, but are willing to release the aircraft starting in September 1969, on the assumption that Israel accepts the risks involved; and (3) if Israel determines that they must have assistance in the maintenance of the aircraft, such assistance will be provided by U.S. contractor personnel, but not the USAF.

Secretary Rusk concurs.

Attachment



APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

6c.

CM-3824-68  
11 December 1968

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/PAC 02-165  
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-24-04

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Arab-Israeli Military Balance (U)

*Not received  
in RAC*

1. (S) In my memorandum of 18 June 1968 on this subject, (CM-3411-68), I provided you an assessment of the relative military capabilities of Israel and the radical Arab states. This assessment was related to the then-pending decision on sale of F-4 aircraft to Israel. It contained the judgment that uncertainties regarding French delivery of MIRAGE V aircraft to Israel and the success of Soviet efforts to upgrade the qualitative aspects of the Arab Air Forces posed a possible danger period, early in 1970, when Israel could face a serious air threat.

2. (S) Subsequent to the US decision to proceed with the sale of the F-4s, I was visited by Israeli Ambassador Rabin, General Hod, Commander of the Israeli Air Force, and the Israeli Military Attache to the United States, General Carmon. The primary mission of the Israeli delegation was to press for delivery of F-4s earlier than the previously planned January 1970 starting date. The Israelis stated that their request was based on intelligence indicating a buildup of Arab Air Forces, particularly those of the UAR and Syria, at a rate higher than previously expected. They proposed that, for deterrence purposes, two F-4s per month be delivered starting in April 1969, even though the initial aircraft would not be combat ready and US technicians would be required in Israel for the first few months to perform maintenance. In view of this new development in the F-4 negotiations, I have prepared an updated assessment of Arab and Israeli capabilities projected through the first half of 1970, in an effort to evaluate the validity of the Israeli request and the intelligence which purportedly formed the basis for that request.

3. (S) Enclosure A shows current and projected inventories of Arab and Israeli ground force equipment. The ratio is essentially that obtaining at the start of the June 1967 war,

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downgrading and  
declassification

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ISSUING OFFICE.

~~SENSITIVE TOP SECRET NOFORN~~

*I-36071/68*

and little change is expected over the next 18 months. Even with the adverse equipment ratio, Israel, short of complete loss of air superiority, is considered for the period of this estimate to be capable of defending against the ground forces of any Arab country or combination of Arab countries. Despite the efforts of Soviet advisors, Arab ground forces are not expected during the next 18 months to reach the training level which they held at the start of the six-day war. Additionally, inadequacies in such areas as organization, command and control, logistics, and morale will still be present in the Arab armies.

4. (S) Enclosure B shows current and projected inventories of Arab and Israeli Naval equipment. Here, too, the ratio is expected to adhere closely to that of June 1967 throughout the period of the estimate. As with the ground forces, only a loss of air superiority would make Israel vulnerable to serious naval attack. Should this unlikely event occur, Arab naval activity would still be limited since the logistics system precludes sustained combat operations in Israeli waters. The qualitative inadequacies attributed to the Arab ground forces also apply.

5. (S) At Enclosure C is a portrayal of Arab and Israeli Air Force equipment inventories now and at six-month intervals out to June 1970. This more detailed estimate for the Air Forces has been attempted since it has a direct bearing on the F-4 delivery question and, as was noted above, air superiority is the keystone of the Israeli military strategy. Although the six-month projections are based on the best information available, they should be used with caution in the case of the Arabs since Soviet deliveries follow no fixed pattern. For example, it is known that since the June 1967 war, some Arab countries have had no aircraft deliveries for periods of up to 9 months. Israeli projections, on the other hand, are valid since they reflect known A-4 and assumed F-4 delivery rates. The figures are based on an estimate that only the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed hostilities with Israel. It is believed that Algerian aircraft might be made available for reinforcement within a few days after the start of hostilities; however, the limited air inventories of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia are considered incapable of significantly contributing to a renewed conflict. To allow a more refined assessment, raw aircraft numbers have been modified as explained in Enclosure C to reflect combat-ready

rates. A line has also been added to reflect availability to the Israelis of the French MIRAGE Vs. While there is no evidence that these aircraft will be released to the Israelis during the period of this estimate, the intelligence people continue to believe that chances are better than even that Israel will at some time acquire all 50 of these aircraft. Apropos of this, Ambassador Rabin, during his recent visit to my office, said that the Israelis had once again approached the French and had received a flat "no."

6. (S) The second footnote to Enclosure C shows the discrepancies which have recently developed between US estimates of the Arab aircraft inventories and the Israeli holdings. I think it is significant that the two intelligence agencies had been in close agreement on these estimates until early November 1968 when the Israeli Ambassador presented the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) with new figures at the start of the F-4 negotiations. Not only was this new evidence presented through a new channel, but, since its presentation, the established Israeli intelligence contacts have been unable to present the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) with credible evidence to support the new figures. Also, the Israelis express concern that Soviet pilots are now flying UAR aircraft and might be expected to participate in future hostilities. While DIA acknowledges that the Soviets are flying UAR aircraft in training and supervisory capacities, it believes that the Soviets would assiduously avoid direct participation in any renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities.

7. (TS) Analysis of the data on Air Forces in Enclosure C shows that in high performance fighters, Israel will be at its greatest disadvantage from June 1969 until at least mid-1970. The June 1969 projection shows a raw ratio of 1:6.9 (1:4.4 when adjusted to reflect estimates of combat readiness), while the December 1969 projection shows a ratio of 1:8.4 (1:5.3 adjusted). As late as June 1970, the ratio will still be 1:7.4 (1:4.8 adjusted), assuming that F-4 deliveries start in January 1970 at the scheduled rate of four per month. In a previous memorandum to Walt Rostow on this subject (CM-3226-68), dated 17 May 1968, a copy of which was furnished your office, I stated my belief that the high performance aircraft ratio existing at the start of the June 1967 war, approximately 1:4, was still considered a valid benchmark. As shown above, the predicted adverse ratios for Israel significantly exceed the raw ratio of 1:4 heretofore considered the maximum safety level.

8. (TS) The data on medium performance aircraft in Enclosure C shows Israel to be at much better advantage in this area. The current raw ratio of 1:2.1 (modified to a combat-ready 1:1.3) represents the low mark in disadvantage to Israel, and as A-4 deliveries progress, the Israeli combat-ready inventory of this type aircraft will actually exceed that of the Arabs by December of 1969. This favorable situation will partially offset the high performance aircraft disadvantage, since the A-4 has a limited air defense capability.

9. (S) In my June memorandum, I listed a number of actions the Arabs were taking to improve their air defense posture. Information available now points to steady progress in these actions. The UAR has completed, or nearly completed, hangarages to provide protection for 400 fighter aircraft -- more than the number of such aircraft in UAR inventory. Many of these hangarages have blast doors for additional protection. Syria has hangarages for 70 fighters and construction is continuing. Although there is no evidence of construction of hangarages for bombers, the UAR has been rotating its bomber fleet between home fields and bases in Iraq and Algeria. Operational readiness levels at all installations have improved. The combat-ready rate for operationally assigned UAR aircraft has risen to between 65 and 70 percent. All of these improvements reinforce my belief that even with a strategy of preemption, Israel could not again gain air superiority with the ease and rapidity it did in June 1967.

10. (S) I believe that the Israeli proposal for delivery of a few noncombat-ready, US-maintained, F-4 aircraft in the spring of 1969 has implications which should be carefully considered. While I agree that these aircraft would probably contribute to Israel's deterrent posture, I believe that a large measure of that deterrence would lie in the US interest in Israel's security which would be conveyed to that country's enemies by our willingness to deploy a nonready weapons system and, especially, to deploy US personnel to maintain that weapons system. Given recent public statements by some Israeli leaders calling for a US commitment to Israel's defense, I believe we must be prudent in undertaking any action which could be construed as movement in this direction. In addition, I think there are political drawbacks attendant to placing US personnel in Israel. This action would add to

the already pronounced Arab/Soviet - Israeli/US polarization in the area, further inflame the few moderate Arab friends the US has remaining (although the US decision to sell Israel the F-4s has already done this), and possibly decrease chances for a political settlement. Should US personnel become involved in an accident or incident or become the target of Arab terrorist attacks, the United States could become embroiled in Middle East affairs to a degree unexpected and unwanted. For these reasons I would be particularly reluctant to see US military personnel deployed to Israel.

11. (S) I asked the US Air Force to look into the matter of F-4 availability to support the Israeli request for early deliveries. Considering hardware alone, their study shows that deliveries beginning in April 1969 would require an unacceptable drawdown on spares from the US Air Force inventory. Aircraft with proper supporting spares could be delivered starting in September 1969 without adverse effect on US operations, provided there is no drastic change in the international situation, particularly in Southeast Asia, and there are no downward adjustments in the US Air Force procurement program. Training the Israelis to support aircraft delivered as early as September 1969 presents problems. The Air Force believes that the training plan in support of January 1970 aircraft deliveries represents about the maximum in compression. Without the necessary training, the Israelis might expect to conduct small-scale flying operations before January 1970, but their ability to maintain the aircraft and assure proper functioning of its complicated systems and subsystems would be in grave doubt. The only way to insure proper support would appear to be deployment of US personnel to Israel to perform the necessary maintenance and instruction tasks until the Israelis become self-sufficient in this respect. It is my understanding that you share my concern over deployment of US personnel to Israel, especially military personnel, and have asked the Air Force to study the feasibility of having civilian contractor personnel perform the support functions attendant to the Israeli F-4 sales program.

12. (S) Based on the information presented above, it is my belief that, although there is no evidence to support Israeli allegations of accelerated aircraft deliveries to the Arabs, US projections of Arab aircraft inventories and

~~SENSITIVE~~

readiness posture show that the Israelis will face a serious air threat from June 1969 until June 1970. I consider the threat sufficient to warrant start of F-4 deliveries in September 1969 provided there is reasonable assurance of Israeli ability to at least support flight operations with the aircraft. For military and political reasons, I do not believe US military personnel should be deployed to Israel in connection with the F-4 sales program. Rather, civilian contractor personnel should be used to meet any essential needs. If it develops that US contractor personnel will in any event be needed in Israel, I consider that Israel's need for aircraft is sufficient to warrant any increased risk which might be incurred by deploying such personnel in September 1969 rather than in January 1970. In this connection, I have long been impressed by the initiative, ingenuity and resourcefulness displayed by Israeli military personnel. I am confident that their in-country requirements for US assistance will be minimal in comparison to other customers for the F-4.

13. (S) It is my recommendation that F-4 deliveries to Israel begin in September 1969, provided there are no unforeseen developments in the international situation which would preclude early release of these aircraft and there is reasonable assurance of Israeli ability to at least support flight operations with the aircraft. If it develops that US personnel will be needed in-country to support the aircraft regardless of delivery date, I recommend that they be limited to civilian contractor personnel and that they be deployed as early as September 1969 if needed to obtain the required flight support assurance. (This memorandum has not been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)



EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures  
A/S

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES\* AND ISRAEL

GROUND FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS/ESTIMATED STATUS 1 JUNE 1970

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-165  
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-24-04

	<u>EGYPT</u>	<u>SYRIA</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>	<u>JORDAN</u>	<u>TC</u>
PERSONNEL	175,000/200,000	55,000/58,000	80,000/82,500	50,350/50,500	360,3
Tanks					
Heavy	23/23	0/0	0/0	0/0	
Medium	900/1,450	515/570	606/620	240/300	2,2
Light	70/80	16/16	37/37	0/0	1
SP AT and Assault Guns	133/300	280/250	252/250	14/14	6
Artillery					
100mm and Over	464/650	435/450	404/450	26/45	1,3
Up to 100mm	975/1150	90/190	415/430	162/162	1,6
AAA					
57mm and Over	303/400	450/550	97/180	0/0	8
Up to 57mm	537/650	946/1000	426/450	267/305	2,1
APC	913/1200	445/500	570/610	167/210	2,0
	<u>ALGERIA</u>	<u>LEBANON</u>	<u>SAUDI ARABIA</u>		<u>POSSI</u>
PERSONNEL	61,000/62,000	13,000/13,000	28,000/29,000		462,3
Tanks					
Heavy	0/0	0/0	0/0		
Medium	372/380	83/83	18/18		2,7
Light	5/0	40/40	75/75		2
Artillery					
100mm and Over	305/305	36/36	100/100		1,7
Up to 100mm	233/233	30/30	0/0		1,9
AAA					
57mm and Over	180/200	12/12	32/32		1,0
Up to 57mm	299/299	68/68	193/193		2,7
APC	540/570	20/20	104/304		2,7
SP AT and Assault Guns	99/105	0/0	8/8		7

It is estimated that only the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed conflict. Forces and/or equipment would probably be available for reinforcement within a few days. In the event, forces and/or equipment from Lebanon and Saudi Arabia might be made available to support it.

ORN

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES\* AND ISRAEL

GROUND FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS/ESTIMATED STATUS 1 JUNE 1970

<u>EGYPT</u>	<u>SYRIA</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>	<u>JORDAN</u>	<u>TOTAL ARAB</u>	<u>ISRAEL</u>
5,000/200,000	55,000/58,000	80,000/82,500	50,350/50,500	360,350/391,000	65,000/65,000
23/23	0/0	0/0	0/0	23/23	0/0
900/1,450	515/570	606/620	240/300	2,261/2,940	1205/1400
70/80	16/16	37/37	0/0	123/133	150/0
133/300	280/250	252/250	14/14	679/914	250/250
464/650	435/450	404/450	26/45	1,329/1,595	200/250
975/1150	90/190	415/430	162/162	1,642/1,932	600/600
303/400	450/550	97/180	0/0	850/1130	200/250
537/650	946/1000	426/450	267/305	2,176/2,405	350/400
913/1200	445/500	570/610	167/210	2,095/2,520	1,600/1,800
<u>ALGERIA</u>	<u>LEBANON</u>	<u>SAUDI ARABIA</u>		<u>POSSIBLE ARAB</u>	<u>ISRAEL</u>
61,000/62,000	13,000/13,000	28,000/29,000		462,350/495,000	65,000/65,000
0/0	0/0	0/0		23/23	0/0
372/380	83/83	18/18		2,734/3,421	1,205/1,400
5/0	40/40	75/75		243/248	150/0
305/305	36/36	100/100		1,770/2,036	200/250
233/233	30/30	0/0		1,905/2,195	600/600
180/200	12/12	32/32		1,074/1,374	200/250
299/299	68/68	193/193		2,736/2,965	350/400
540/570	20/20	104/304		2,759/3,414	1,600/1,800
99/105	0/0	8/8		786/1027	250/250

by the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed conflict with Israel. Algerian would probably be available for reinforcement within a few days. In the event of a prolonged con-

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES\* AND ISRAEL

NAVAL FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS/ESTIMATED STATUS 1 JUNE 1970

	<u>UAR</u>	<u>SYRIA</u>	<u>JORDAN</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>	
PERSONNEL	15,000/15,500	1,000/1,000	150/150	400/1,000	1
SHIPS					
Destroyers	6/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	
Submarines	13/13	0/0	0/0	0/0	
Missile-Patrol	20/20	6/6	0/0	0/12	
	<u>ALGERIA</u>				<u>P</u>
PERSONNEL	2,000/2,500				1
SHIPS					
Destroyers	0/0				
Submarines	0/0				
Missile-Patrol	9/11				

\* It is estimated that only the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed Algerian forces and/or equipment might be available for reinforcement within a few days.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-165

cbm NARA, Date 9-24-04

Er  
TC

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES\* AND ISRAEL

NAVAL FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS/ESTIMATED STATUS 1 JUNE 1970

<u>UAR</u>	<u>SYRIA</u>	<u>JORDAN</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>	<u>TOTAL ARAB</u>	<u>ISRAEL</u>
000/15,500	1,000/1,000	150/150	400/1,000	16,550/17,650	3,000/3,500
6/7	0/0	0/0	0/0	6/7	1/1
13/13	0/0	0/0	0/0	13/13	4/4
20/20	6/6	0/0	0/12	26/38	5/12
 <u>ALGERIA</u>				 <u>POSSIBLE ARAB</u>	 <u>ISRAEL</u>
000/2,500				18,550/20,150	3,000/3,500
0/0				6/7	1/1
0/0				13/13	4/4
0/11				35/49	5/12

y the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed conflict with Israel. Equipment might be available for reinforcement within a few days.

Enclosure B

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~

68

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES\* AND ISRAEL

AIR FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS AND SIX-MONTH PROJECTIONS THROUGH 1 JUNE 1970

ISRAEL/ARABS

	<u>DECEMBER 1968</u>		<u>JUNE 1969</u>		<u>DECEMBER 1969</u>	
	<u>Strengths</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Strengths</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Strengths</u>	<u>Rat</u>
<u>HIGH PERFORMANCE FIGHTERS</u>						
Total Aircraft	55/304**	1:5.5	55/378	1:6.9	54/445	1:8
#Operationally assigned and combat-ready (w/Mirage 5s)	47/148	1:3.2	47/203	1:4.4	46/244	1:5
	70/148	1:2.1	78/203	1:2.6	89/244	1:2
<u>MEDIUM PERFORMANCE FIGHTERS</u>						
Total aircraft	***126/270	1:2.1	144/265	1:1.8	179/255	1:1
#Operationally assigned and combat-ready	106/137	1:1.3	122/136	1:1.1	152/126	1:0
<u>TOTAL JET FIGHTERS</u>						
Inventory	181/574	1:3.2	199/643	1:3.2	233/700	1:3
#Operationally assigned and combat-ready (w/Mirage 5s)	153/285	1:1.9	169/339	1:2	198/370	1:1
	176/285	1:1.6	200/339	1:1.7	241/370	1:1
<u>BOMBERS</u>						
Total aircraft	2/68	1:34	2/74	1:37	2/78	1:39
#Operationally assigned and combat-ready	2/46	1:23	2/47	1:23	2/55	1:27

Enclosure

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC DR-165  
By Cbm, NARA, Date 9-24-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES\* AND ISRAEL

AIR FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS AND SIX-MONTH PROJECTIONS THROUGH 1 JUNE 1970

ISRAEL/ARABS

	<u>DECEMBER 1968</u>		<u>JUNE 1969</u>		<u>DECEMBER 1969</u>		<u>JUNE 1970</u>	
	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio
	55/304**	1:5.5	55/378	1:6.9	54/445	1:8.4	73/525	1:7.2
	47/148	1:3.2	47/203	1:4.4	46/244	1:5.3	62/295	1:4.7
	70/148	1:2.1	78/203	1:2.6	89/244	1:2.7	105/295	1:2.8
IS	***126/270	1:2.1	144/265	1:1.8	179/255	1:1.4	184/239	1:1.3
	106/137	1:1.3	122/136	1:1.1	152/126	1:0.8	156/122	1:1.3
	181/574	1:3.2	199/643	1:3.2	233/700	1:3	257/760	1:2.9
	153/285	1:1.9	169/339	1:2	198/370	1:1.9	217/410	1:1.9
	176/285	1:1.6	200/339	1:1.7	241/370	1:1.5	260/410	1:1.6
	2/68	1:34	2/74	1:37	2/78	1:39	2/82	1:41
	2/46	1:23	2/47	1:23	2/55	1:27	2/57	1:28

Enclosure C

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES\* AND ISRAEL

AIR FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS AND SIX-MONTH PROJECTIONS THROUGH 1 JUNE 1970


ISRAEL/ARABS

	DECEMBER 1968		JUNE 1969		DECEMBER 1969	
	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio
<u>TRANSPORTS</u>						
Total aircraft	51/97	1:1.9	51/101	1:2	51/112	1:2
# Operationally assigned and combat-ready	43/65	1:1.5	43/71	1:1.6	43/83	1:2
<u>HELICOPTERS</u>						
Total aircraft	71/130	1:1.8	91/126	1:1.4	91/138	1:1
# Operationally assigned and combat-ready	60/75	1:1.3	77/77	1:1	77/87	1:1

MISSILES

Surface-to-air: The UAR currently has 38 SA-2 sites with an estimated 300 missiles; no significant increase over the next 18 months. Israel currently has 30 launchers and 171 Hawk missiles; increase to 48 and 280, respectively, by June 1969.

# It is estimated that only the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed conflict. 31 high performance, 100 medium performance, and 38 bomber aircraft would probably be available in 30 days. The airforces of Lebanon and Saudi-Arabia are incapable of making any significant contribution.



\*\*\* This figure does not include 77 Fouga Magister jet trainers which were used in a ground-support role during the 1967 war.

# A readiness factor of 85% has been attributed to the Israeli inventory; this factor could be raised to 100% if all aircraft are operationally assigned. The factor for Arab forces is a combination of a 65% readiness factor for aircraft assigned to operational units plus omission of aircraft still in crates or storage or in transit. This gives an average availability figure of 54% for Arab air forces.

Enclosure

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES -- ARAB COUNTRIES\* AND ISRAEL

AIR FORCES

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS AND SIX-MONTH PROJECTIONS THROUGH 1 JUNE 1970

ISRAEL/ARABS

<u>DECEMBER 1968</u>		<u>JUNE 1969</u>		<u>DECEMBER 1969</u>		<u>JUNE 1970</u>	
Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio	Strengths	Ratio
51/97	1:1.9	51/101	1:2	51/112	1:2.2	50/109	1:2.2
43/65	1:1.5	43/71	1:1.6	43/83	1:1.9	42/95	1:2.3
71/130	1:1.8	91/126	1:1.4	91/138	1:1.5	67/136	1:2
60/75	1:1.3	77/77	1:1	77/87	1:1.1	57/88	1:1.5

Israel currently has 38 SA-2 sites with an estimated 300 missiles; no significant change is expected in the next 18 months. Israel currently has 30 launchers and 171 Hawk missiles; this inventory will increase to 48 and 280, respectively, by June 1969.

Only the UAR, Syria, Jordan and Iraq would initially enter into renewed conflict with Israel. Algeria's medium performance, and 38 bomber aircraft would probably be available for reinforcement within a few weeks. Lebanon and Saudi-Arabia are incapable of making any significant contribution in renewed conflict.

include 77 Fouga Magister jet trainers which were used in a ground-support role during the June

55% has been attributed to the Israeli inventory; this factor could be raised to 90% by stand-down. Additionally assigned. The factor for Arab forces is a combination of a 65% readiness factor for operational units plus omission of aircraft still in crates or storage or otherwise not assigned. availability figure of 54% for Arab air forces.

Enclosure C

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

33/1  
Leg  
שגרירות ישראל  
ושינטון

~~SECRET~~

22 November 1968

Dear Mr. Warnke:

In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding dated March 10, 1965, in which the Government of the United States reaffirmed its concern for the maintenance of Israel's security and renewed its assurance that the United States firmly opposes aggression in the Near East and remains committed to the independence and integrity of Israel, and;

Pursuant to the joint statement of January 7, 1968 by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel in which "the President agreed to keep Israel's military defense capability under active and sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors, including the shipment of military equipment by others to the area";

I should like to request hereby that the Government of the United States sell to the Government of Israel 50 "Phantom" aircraft, together with related armament, ammunition, training, spare parts and other services to be specified in Annexes, which will be considered an integral part of this agreement.

On its part the Government of Israel reaffirms its long-standing policy as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding of March 10, 1965, that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the U.S. as a nuclear weapons carrier.

The Government of Israel understands that the United States reserves the right, under unusual and compelling circumstances when the best interest of the U.S. requires it, to cancel all or part of its commitment to provide

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By gcl/mg, NARA, Date 8-8-01

+ FRUS 64-68, vol. 20, # 332, p. 3

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

S E C R E T


-2-

22 November 1968

F-4 aircraft and related equipment and services, at any time prior to the delivery of these defense articles or performance of these services. The Government of Israel further understands that the United States accepts the responsibility for all costs directly resulting from such cancellation.

The Government of Israel agrees to full secrecy on all matters concerning this sale until the Government of the United States decides to make the matter public and will cooperate fully with the Government of the United States with respect to the timing and method of public disclosure.

Sincerely yours,

  
Lt. General Y. Rabin  
Ambassador

The Honorable  
Paul C. Warnke  
Ass't Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.

S E C R E T



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

6h

27 November 1968

In reply refer to:  
I-26174/68

His Excellency  
Lieutenant General Yitzhak Rabin  
Ambassador of Israel  
2916 Chesapeake Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This will acknowledge and respond to your letter of 22 November 1968, requesting on behalf of the Government of Israel that the United States sell to the Government of Israel fifty Phantom aircraft and related equipment and training. The Government of the United States agrees to sell to the Government of Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft and related equipment and services in accordance with this exchange of letters and technical and financial annexes to be negotiated separately. This transaction is subject to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952.

The United States Government, for its part, accepts the assurances given by the Government of Israel as stated in your letter:

"On its part the Government of Israel reaffirms its long-standing policy as laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding of March 10, 1965, that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier."

In this connection, I have made clear the position of the United States Government that the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons.

I wish also to confirm the understanding of the Government of Israel as set forth in the fifth paragraph of your letter of 22 November 1968. Such unusual and compelling circumstances would exist in the event of action inconsistent with your policy and agreement as set forth in your letter.

The agreement contained in the last paragraph of your letter concerning the secrecy of this undertaking is satisfactory to us.

DECLASSIFIED


Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 20 #333

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

By JC NARA. Date 8-8-01

It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details of this transaction.

Sincerely,



Paul C. Warnke



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

62

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

27 November 1968

Refer to: I-26197/68

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: F-4 Negotiations with Government of Israel

Ambassador Rabin called on November 27th and said that he had discovered a further problem with respect to my letter of November 25 in response to his letter requesting the fifty F-4 Phantoms. His problem involved the final sentence which reads "It is understood that your letter of 22 November 1968 and this letter in reply together constitute an agreement between our two governments." Ambassador Rabin said that this language would imply that the Government of Israel agreed with the United States interpretation of the circumstances which would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons.

I said that I understood him to mean that he was unable to accept our interpretation and that this final sentence implied that he had. He confirmed that this was the case. I undertook to consider the matter and call him back.

About five minutes later, I called Ambassador Rabin and suggested that the letter might end with some "bland" statement such as: "It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details."

Ambassador Rabin said that this sounded satisfactory to him. I suggested that Ambassador Rabin return my original letter and he then asked that I formulate again the language that I would substitute. I said that the sentence might be more felicitous if it were to read:

"It is understood that we can now proceed to negotiate the technical and financial details of this transaction."

Ambassador Rabin said that language along these lines would be satisfactory to him and that he would return the original letter for replacement.

AL-10-11-7

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 13526, w/20, #337 n7

By: jc NARA Date: 8-8-01

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

62

B

ACTION

7

Tuesday, December 24, 1968, 5:20 pm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Congratulatory message to Prime Minister Burnham

Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana won a majority victory in the first elections since independence over Cheddi Jagan. Despite charges of election fraud, the elections went off remarkably smoothly and the results have now been certified as official. Burnham's largely Negro party for the first time made substantial inroads into the East Indian community which Jagan leads.

Burnham's election victory caps four years of intensive effort to concentrate his government democratically against Jagan's threat. Our support has been extremely important to Burnham throughout this period.

The new Parliament will not meet to invest Burnham formally before late January. Burnham is especially grateful for your friendship and would undoubtedly appreciate a personal message from you at this point. State has recommended that you send the attached message and I concur. If you approve the message State will ask our Embassy in Georgetown to deliver it on your behalf.

W. W. Rostow

Att

Approve ✓ *12/26*

Disapprove       

Call me

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By rf, NARA, Date 2-24-98

STATE:SLewis:wpt

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Reply

7a

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Warmest congratulations and my very best wishes to you on your Party's victory in Guyana's first elections since independence. Your administration has in the past four years set a record of peace and economic progress that has given hope to all Guyanese for a bright future. I am confident that your new term as Prime Minister will bring even greater prosperity to Guyana and even fuller expression to your country's proud motto "One People, One Nation, One Destiny."

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency  
Forbes Sampson Burnham, Q.C.,  
Prime Minister of Guyana,  
Georgetown.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

8

ACTION

Tuesday, December 24, 1968, 3:20 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL 480 Program for Bolivia

*Free file*

Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman are asking you to authorize the negotiation of a \$6.8 million PL 480 sale to Bolivia -- wheat, wheat flour, and tobacco. (Tab B) Charlie Zwick supports their recommendation. (Tab A)

Bolivia needs this PL 480 assistance promptly to:

- hold down food costs, by keeping the pipeline of flour and wheat imports filled
- support an agreed program of fiscal reform and price stabilization.

Last June, Bolivia agreed to carry out an 18-month economic reform program which AID and the IMF had helped develop. We authorized a \$4.5 million Supporting Assistance loan as our initial support. This proposed PL 480 agreement will provide additional US support for 1969, and should eliminate any need for further Supporting Assistance funds.

President Barrientos has thus far been carrying out the economic reform program as agreed. He is counting very much on continued US support for this effort. Although Bolivia is inherently unstable, the political and economic prospects there are relatively good at the moment.

I recommend that you authorize negotiation of this PL 480 sales agreement.

W. W. Rostow

Atts

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

SLewis:wpt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

Ja

DEC 21 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Program for Bolivia

Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman request your approval to negotiate a \$6.8 million P. L. 480 sales agreement with Bolivia for wheat/wheat flour and tobacco. Repayment will be in dollars over twenty years with 5 percent down. There will be no currency use payment under the Purcell amendment since no additional currency is needed at this time.

Last June, AID authorized a \$4.5 million Supporting Assistance loan to Bolivia as the initial budgetary support for an 18-month fiscal reform and stabilization program jointly developed among AID, the IMF, and the Government of Bolivia. This P. L. 480 agreement will constitute AID's major 1969 resource input for Bolivia and as such forms an important continuing element in the fiscal reform program.

The local currency proceeds from this agreement will be earmarked on a standby basis for budget support in CY 1969 should the need arise. Thus, the P. L. 480 agreement should eliminate the need for additional Supporting Assistance funds. If the need for budget support does not arise, the proceeds will be used in the agricultural sector.

State/AID has determined that Bolivia's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development and that neither U.S. development assistance nor P. L. 480 sales proceeds are being diverted by Bolivia to military purposes.

Because this P. L. 480 agreement will support and reinforce the fiscal reform program and will substitute for dollar assistance, I recommend that you approve negotiation of the agreement.

*Charles J. Zwick*  
Charles J. Zwick  
Director

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By NY, NARA, Date 2-23-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

86

To: The President

DEC 16 1968

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Bolivia

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 sales agreement with Bolivia to provide approximately 95,870 tons of wheat/wheat flour and 200 metric tons of tobacco and tobacco products, for which the current export market value (including applicable ocean transportation costs) is \$6.8 million. The supply period is fiscal years 1969 and 1970. The proposed terms are a 20-year dollar credit including two years grace with 5 percent in dollars on delivery and the balance in 19 approximately equal annual installments. No currency use payment, as provided in Section 103(b) of the Act (Purcell Amendment), will be required since no additional currency is needed at this time. Interest will be two percent during the two-year grace period and three percent thereafter. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

#### Need for Program

Earlier this year the Government of Bolivia was faced with a severe fiscal problem which threatened to deteriorate into a serious political and economic crisis. To avert such a crisis, an 18-month fiscal reform program was jointly developed among AID, the IMF, and the Government of Bolivia which required the Bolivians to take a series of corrective actions, including increased taxes. To provide budgetary support for this program, AID authorized a \$4.5 million Supporting Assistance loan in June.

This PL 480 program will be an additional important element in the aforementioned program of fiscal reform and in a short-term stabilization program. First, since Bolivia's wheat production supplies only about 20 percent of its consumption needs, this agreement will help the Bolivians to meet their wheat import needs while conserving a considerable amount of their limited foreign exchange. Second, the local currency proceeds from this sale will be retained on a standby basis, and should the need arise in CY 1969, will be used for budget support, with priority to agricultural budget activities, hopefully obviating the need for additional Supporting Assistance funds next year.

#### Self-Help Measures

Bolivia has given priority to agriculture and rural development during the past year. In negotiating this agreement we will seek commitment from the Government of Bolivia to give high priority to (1) improving the Ministry of Agriculture's administrative and technical competence and maintaining its

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority AID + Agriculture guidelines  
By NY . NARA, Date 2-24-78

relative share of the 1969 budget; (2) emphasizing vertically integrated projects on marketing and production for sheep, llama, alpaca and cereals and maintain the 1969 budgets for these projects at least at the 1968 level; (3) developing more effective coordination between the Ministries of Economy and Agriculture and priority agricultural programs such as wheat and rice; (4) increased cereals production, especially wheat; (5) substantially improve operations on agricultural statistics; and (6) such other measures as may be mutually agreed upon for the purposes specified in Section 109(a) of the Act.

Military Expenditures Review

With respect to Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act, State/AID has concluded that United States developmental assistance is not being diverted to military expenditures and that Bolivia's resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with Bolivia's development. The memorandum upon which this determination was made is attached.

Bolivia has not purchased any military equipment which is "sophisticated" by the terms of the Conte-Long Amendment, nor are any such purchases planned for FY 1969.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with this PL 480 sales agreement.

November 29 1968

William L. Bond  
Administrator  
Agency for International Development

John A. Schmittke  
Acting Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*8c*

MEMORANDUM

APR 13 1963

TO: Mr. Clark, AA/PPC  
FROM: Mr. *Richard W. Richardson* U.S. Coordinator-Alliance for Progress  
SUBJECT: Application of the Symington Amendment 620(s) to Bolivia

In accordance with the provisions of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act, a determination is requested that U.S. development assistance to Bolivia is not being diverted to military expenditures or that Bolivia's own resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development.

Standard Data Frame

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
1) Defense Expenditures (millions pesos)	137	147	205	201	229
2) Total Central Government Expenditures (millions pesos)	1402	1432	1044	1406	1589
3) Defense Expenditures as % Total Central Government Expenditures	9.8	10.3	19.6	14.3	14.4
4) Foreign Exchange for Military (\$ millions)	unknown		2.4	1.9	4.0
5) Imports of Goods & Services (\$ millions)	130.6	141.5	166.1	178.7	200.0
6) Foreign Exchange Military as % Imports of Goods & Services	-	-	1.5	1.1	1.9
7) GNP (millions pesos)	5721	6431	7275	7914	8800
8) Defense Expenditures as % GNP	2.4	2.3	2.8	2.5	2.6

The above table shows that the trend of defense expenditures as a percent of central government expenditures has risen over the interval but has settled recently at about 14%;

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *AID Guidelines*  
By *ts* NARA, Date *2/24/91*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
2

and that the trend of defense expenditures as a percent of GNP has remained relatively stable over the interval. In comparison with the regional median, both of these indicators are somewhat above the 1966-1967 median due in large part to the "non-military" items charged to the defense budget. The foreign exchange component of defense expenditures is over the regional median but this median figure is highly questionable since it is based on estimates from only 11 of the 22 countries used to compute the figure.

1. Development Progress

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
GNP	488	498	527	559	584	616	659	700
% Change		2.0	5.8	6.0	4.5	5.5	7.0	6.2
Per Capita								
GNP	132	132	136	142	145	149	156	162
% Change		0	3.5	3.7	2.1	3.0	4.5	3.8

(constant 1966 prices; GNP in millions US \$, Per Capita GNP in US \$)

In addition to the very strong GNP rise indicated in the above table, gross domestic capital formation increased at an average of 6.8% between 1962 and 1966, and is estimated at 7.6% in 1967. Private savings, as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product, stood between 7.1 and 7.5% with the exception of 1964. Public savings rose from a negative figure in 1962 to 3.9% of GDP in 1966.

The most dynamic sectors of the economy from 1961-1966 were petroleum, mining, electric power, industry and government with annual rates of growth exceeding 7%. Petroleum was the fastest growing sector in the 1961-1966 period with an annual growth rate of 12.8%. The 1966 increase was 39% and the output of crude petroleum is estimated to have doubled in 1967.

Central Government tax revenues increased very rapidly in the 1961-1966 period. During the last two years, the GDP at current prices rose 10.3%. The ratio of tax revenues to the GDP increased slightly in recent years and rose to 9.3% in 1966. The increase in tax revenues in 1967 is estimated at 19%.

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SECRET

- 3 -

The improvement recorded in the volume of revenues was due to more efficient tax administration and reforms in the tax system. The yield of income and property taxes showed a sharp upturn in 1966. Taxes on foreign trade, which accounted for 55% of Central Government tax receipts, increased by 25% in 1965 and 16% in 1966.

Against these very favorable factors, the progress in agriculture has been hampered by very poor weather conditions with a 6-7% estimated drop in production in 1967 over 1966. On balance, however, the development progress in Bolivia has been satisfactory and emphasis is being placed on those areas of the economy in which performance has not been up to expectations.

The lack of weapons and/or ammunition manufacturing capacity means that Bolivia, unlike some other Latin American countries, must import virtually all of its military goods. Bolivia's military foreign exchange expenditures largely include small arms and ammunition.

## 2. Civic Action

The military provides vital services to a large section of Bolivia and is the sole source of education for many conscriptees.

### Civic Action Performance Data

<u>Programs</u>	<u>(FY 1966)</u>	<u>(FY 64-65)*</u>
1) Roads (miles)		
a) construction	41	120
b) rehabilitation & maintenance	882	1,498
2) Agriculture		
a) new farms	0	9
b) stock increase (head)	225	775
c) land increase (tillable acres)	1,000	5,000
d) poultry increase (head)	7,000	1,000
3) Health Treatments (civilians)		
a) medical	10,102	unknown
b) dental	1,194	unknown
4) Construction		
a) schools	18	15
b) potable water projects	12	24

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

c) sewer & sanitation projects	77	7
d) other (streets, sports fields, bridges, health posts)	21	29
5) Education (conscripts trained)		
a) civilian vocations	1,040	2,980
b) literacy	3,700	15,200
6) Rural School Construction (program completed)	12	110

\*data unavailable prior to 1964.

Clearly the Civic Action effort of the Bolivian Armed Forces is very significant. It is not possible to separate the expenditures for this effort from other military costs, but the expenditures noted in the Standard Data Frame would be reduced considerably if the Civic Action expenditures were deducted, and there would be corresponding reductions in the percentages.

### 3. Necessity of Defense Program

Approximately one-third to one-half of the defense budget is spent on such non-military items as paramilitary police and customs.

It should be noted that Bolivia is a relatively large country (the size of Texas and California combined). Its size, its geographic variations, its lack of transport and communication facilities, and its historical tradition of lawlessness, create difficult internal security problems, and require the pre-positioning of security forces (and their maintenance) in various locations throughout the country.

These problems were evident during 1967 when the GOB was forced to confront two internal security problems simultaneously: rebellion by leftist-led miners in the highland tin mine areas in the western part of its country and guerrilla insurgency in southeast Bolivia led by Ernesto "Che" Guevara and a number of other well-trained Cuban cadre. Bolivian army units, backed by the police, successfully met both threats.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 -

The campaign against the Guevara guerrilla band cost the GOB about 48 million pesos (\$3.6 million). Elimination of this band was clearly in the U.S. national interest.

Bolivia maintains an Armed Force of less than 20,000 men and includes 41 aircrafts of which 11 are light trainers, 5 are helicopters, 17 are C-47 transports and 8 are F-51's. The military inventory also includes 95 Howitzers of which 25 are 105 mm. and the balance 75 mm.

#### 4. Diversion of U.S. Resources

There is no evidence that U.S. assistance has been diverted from the purposes for which it was intended.

Recommendation: Bolivia should be removed from the amber-light list and should not be subject to the penalty provision of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year  
intervals; not  
automatically declassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

9

Lunch Meeting With the President  
Tuesday, December 24, 1968 - 1:15 pm

AGENDA

1. PUEBLO Follow-Up. (Sec. Rusk)  
-- Treatment of crew.  
-- The vessel itself?  
DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By mp/ry, NARA, Date 1-27-98
2. Vietnam Negotiating Strategy: Post-Vance Visit. (Secs. Rusk & Clifford)  
Situation report.
3. Vietnam: Military Situation and Prospects. (Sec. Clifford & Gen. Wheeler)
4. Strategic Missiles. (Sec. Rusk)  
Situation report.
5. Phantoms. (Sec. Clifford)  
Situation report: including Sept. 1969 delivery date. (See Tab A)
6. Personnel Problems. (Sec. Rusk)
7. Other.  
(WWR will have Woods' desalting memo along.)

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

10

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, December 24, 1968  
10:00 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Apparently Japanese and French,  
as well as Australian, businessmen  
appear to think that South Vietnam has  
a non-Communist future.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By mp/dch, NARA, Date 1-28-98

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

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10a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence

The Economic Situation in South Vietnam

Summary

The manufacturers of Toyota and Citroen automobiles have decided to erect assembly plants in South Vietnam. Vietnamese and Australian investors have joined to form Vietnam's second condensed milk company.

Retail prices in Saigon declined three percent during the week ending 9 December despite continued increases in rice prices. The price index for imported commodities increased two percent. Saigon free market dollar and gold prices declined, but the price of MPC (scrip) returned to its all-time high.

ANNEX: Weekly Retail Prices in Saigon  
(table)  
Weekly and Monthly Currency and  
Gold Prices (graph)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-201  
By us, NARA, Date 10-10-03

~~SECRET~~

BRIEFING MEMO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, December 24, 1968 -- 9:35 a. m.

Mr. President:

I believe you will wish to question Andy Goodpaster at length on the military situation on the ground in South Vietnam, including especially:

- the progress being made in pacification;
- Abrams' capacity to deal with military threats in the time ahead.

Henry Kissinger tells me that he is making the case very strongly in the Nixon camp that we must maintain the military pressure in Vietnam and not enter prematurely into de-escalation inside South Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rf, NARA, Date 2-24-98

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

12

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, December 24, 1968  
9:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this heartening report of Captain Bucher's graceful performance with the South Korean leaders.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 11967

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By g, NARA, Date 2-24-98



Department of State

12a  
TELEGRAM

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NDIS/CACTUS

1. YOU HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY BY THIS TIME SEEN OR HEARD ENOUGH OF CAPTAIN BUCHER'S PERFORMANCE AT ADVANCE CAMP PRESS CONFERENCE TO REALIZE THAT HE IS AN UNUSUAL INDIVIDUAL. THIS MORNING I SPENT AN HOUR OR SO WITH HIM, FIRST IN GENERAL DISCUSSION AND MEETING MEMBERS OF HIS CREW, AND THEN WATCHING HIM HANDLE THE PRIME MINISTER, MND, AND ROK CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, WHO CAME TO SEE HIM AT ASCOM. IN SPITE OF VERY CONSIDERABLE PRESS MOVEMENT IN SAME ROOM, BUCHER'S CONCENTRATION ON WHAT HE WAS SAYING OR WHAT WAS BEING SAID TO HIM WOULD BE REMARKABLE IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES AND WAS REALLY QUITE EXTRAORDINARY CONSIDERING HIS RECENT RELEASE FROM CAPTIVITY. IN TALKING TO PRIMIN AND OTHER ROK PERSONALITIES, HIS LANGUAGE WAS MEASURED AND ELOQUENT IN DESCRIBING FALSITY OF NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA ABOUT THE SOUTH. HE HELD PRIMIN'S HAND WITH HIS TWO HANDS FOR MANY MINUTES WHILE HE WAS DOING THIS, AND CHUNG AND OTHERS WERE OBVIOUSLY MOVED. MUCH OF WHAT HE SAID WAS CAPTURED BY PRESS, WHO SURROUNDED THE GROUP, BUT IT WAS ALL CONSTRUCTIVE AND GOOD FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. PRIOR TO PRIMIN'S ARRIVAL I TOLD BUCHER HE WAS COMING AT REQUEST OF PRESIDENT PARK, WHO WANTED TO SHOW HIM HOW DIFFERENT KOREANS IN FREE SOCIETY FEEL ABOUT US, AND BUCHER RESPONDED BEAUTIFULLY TO THE OCCASION. FOR EXAMPLE, AFTER HIS LONG TALK WITH PRIMIN ALONG LINES INDICATED ABOVE, HE MET ROK CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS AND RESPONDED TO INTRODUCTION WITH PLEASSED SMILE WHILE SAYING WITH GREAT RESPECT THAT HE HAD NEVER BEEN SO CLOSE TO A CNO BEFORE IN HIS LIFE AND IT WAS A GREAT OCCASION FOR HIM.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By 11 NARA, Date 2-21-98

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-2- SEOUL 11967 NODIS CACTUS 6674Q

2. I ALSO HAD OCCASION TO TALK TO AND OBSERVE CAREFULLY EXECUTIVE OFFICER MURPHY AND SEAMAN WOELKE, LATTER BEING, AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW, SOMETHING OF A SPECIAL MEDICAL CASE. THESE TWO, AND OTHERS WITH WHOM MY CONTACTS WERE BRIEFER, STRUCK ME ALSO AS BEING EQUALLY POISED AND IN GOOD SPIRITS. MURPHY, FOR EXAMPLE, BROUGHT OUT FEW PHRASES IN KOREAN AND IN TAGALOG. THEIR ACCOUNT OF HOW THEY MANAGED TO KEEP CAPTAIN INFORMED WHEN HE WAS IN COMPARATIVE ISOLATION WAS SOMETHING YOU SHOULD HAVE THEM REPEAT, OR BE SURE IS INCLUDED IN DEBRIEFING. BUCHER'S AFFECTION FOR CREW CAME THROUGH CLEARLY AS DID HIS ROLE OF COMMANDER WHO ENJOYED THEIR RESPECT AND ADMIRATION. GENERALLY SPEAKING THE MEN, INCLUDING BUCHER, WERE MUCH LEANER THAN I EXPECTED, BUT THEIR SPIRIT LEFT NOTHING TO BE DESIRED.

GP-3 PORTER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

**ACTION**

**Monday, December 23, 1968**  
**2:15 p. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith a draft for His Holiness  
the Pope, as approved personally by  
Sec. Rusk.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rlh**

13

*Pres file*

13a

December 23, 1968

Your Holiness:

As Christmas Day approaches and we look back over this difficult year, I wish to share with you a reflection and, I believe, a common faith.

I conclude that slowly and painfully we are moving towards peace in Southeast Asia. The South Vietnamese and their allies took the shock of the Tet offensive and then we moved on March 31 towards the beginning of the long process of peacemaking. On October 31 we moved again.

I am aware how reluctantly the powerful ambitions in Hanoi will abate and give way to the concepts of peace and regional fraternity. I know how complex the peacemaking will be, after a war this long and deeply rooted, engaging as it does Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam.

But I do believe that men's minds and expectations in Asia are moving from war to peace. There have been and there will be diversions and delays. But, if we are patient and strong and refuse to be diverted, I believe we shall be able to look back at 1968 as the watershed year in which the basis was laid for peace with freedom and human dignity in Southeast Asia.

Similarly, despite setbacks and frustrations, man moved a little closer this year towards bringing nuclear weapons under rational control. Again, the most stubborn persistence will be required in the time ahead to take the next steps forward.

I shall labor for peace until my last day of responsibility as President. And as a citizen of America and the world, I shall continue in the time beyond to do all I can; for I share with you the faith that man can and must struggle endlessly for what is right and that such efforts by all of us, in the end, bear good fruit.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-199  
By js, NARA, Date 8-21-03

As I near the end of my period of public service, I wish to express my deep appreciation and respect for your steady leadership and your own special efforts in the cause of peace.

Sincerely,

*LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson*

His Holiness  
Pope Paul VI  
Vatican City

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 96-05By m/jp NARA, Date 1-23-98

Monday, December 23, 1968 -- 1:15 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. President:

I asked Clark Clifford for any thoughts he might have for your 5:30 pm talk with Melvin Laird.

You may find helpful Clark's attached memorandum.

I would add one fundamental thought for the new Secretary of Defense. It is a doctrine which Bob McNamara believed in and, by and large, lived by, and it was a great contribution to government.

The doctrine is this: military force is, essentially, a servant of the nation's political purpose. The new President -- like his predecessors -- will, of course, wish to know the views of the Secretary of Defense, especially a Secretary of Defense like Mr. Laird with wide political experience. But the Secretary of Defense should, in his mind and heart, always remember that the Secretary of State is the senior officer in the Government in diplomatic matters. The Secretary of Defense can provide enormous strength to the President to the extent that he works with the Secretary of State in the most fraternal possible way, respecting carefully the line where the Secretary of State's authority picks up and the Secretary of Defense's authority leaves off. It is not always an easy line to draw in the kind of world in which we live. But a President can have no greater blessing than a Secretary of State and a Secretary of Defense who work in harmony with this basic understanding. If they do so, their subordinates will follow their lead.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

December 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I recommend that the following four items be the ones to which you give priority attention in your discussion with Mel Laird:

1. Personnel.

Although I have conveyed the thought to him, I believe it important that you stress as heavily as you can the necessity of Laird's making up his mind promptly as to which men in Defense he will ask to remain. Men like Stan Resor and the Comptroller, Bob Moot, and Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, could be absolutely invaluable to Laird. Resor is a Republican, Moot is essentially a career man, and Johnny Foster is a scientist. They are first-rate, and there are a number of others of their caliber who are willing to consider staying if asked. If some indication of an interest is not given promptly, it will be too late; they will begin accepting the jobs being offered them.

2. Budget assumptions.

It is unnecessary for Laird to attempt to master the intricacies of the budget at this early date. However, he ought to begin familiarizing himself with the projections on which the FY-70 budget is based. Beginning to get projections and assumptions in mind is more important than studying the details. For example, he should begin to understand the level of aircraft losses in Southeast Asia, ammunition consumption, and the other major expenditure items that we have assumed.

3. Strategic talks with the Russians.

The climate is ripe for strategic talks between the U.S. and the USSR. If the opportunity is lost, it is impossible to know when it might reoccur. It would be very easy for a new Administration to lose sight of this and neglect the opportunity. Laird could make an enormous

contribution to our national security and our long-term national interests if he would become acquainted with the preparatory work that has been done and be in a position to urge his colleagues in the new Administration to press ahead at the earliest possible moment.

4. Outlook in Vietnam.

(a) You might wish to express to Laird your confidence in General Abrams and General Goodpaster, their grasp of the complexities of the situation in Vietnam, and the soundness of their plans for exerting maximum pressure on the enemy while, at the same time, retaining flexibility to adjust quickly to any opportunities that may develop for lowering the level of combat.

(b) You may wish to outline to Laird the basis for an ultimate resolution of the conflict.

*each in. suggested*

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~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Monday, December 23, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Herewith two important messages from Abrams.

The top message (Tab A) is Abrams' reply to questions put to him by Gen. Wheeler as a result of your instruction ~~today~~ *Saturday*.

The message at Tab B is a more detailed appreciation of the situation backing up his response to Wheeler's questions.

What it comes to is this:

- A potential threat may be building up across the DMZ but it is not imminent.
- Pressure on I Corps via Laos and the Ashau Valley is building up, with increased infiltration. The threat should be in being by about January 12.
- The threat around Saigon continues to build although the enemy apparently postponed his mid-December attack plan.
- Our accelerated pacification offensive is going well; the enemy is hurting; these new moves are probably designed to slow up pacification progress.
- Abrams needs all the forces he has to keep momentum and to cope with increased threats in the weeks ahead.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 6-14-02

WWRostow:rla

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~~SECRET~~ SPOKE SECTION ONE OF TWO MAC 17454 EYES ONLY

REFERENCES: A. JCS 14964 DEC 68  
B. MAC 17418

1. THE POINTS RAISED BY REFERENCE ALFA WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO THIS COMMAND ARE DISCUSSED IN REFERENCE BRAVO. THIS MESSAGE, THEN, WILL ADDRESS DIRECTLY YOUR QUESTIONS.

2. YOU ASK--"TO WHAT DEGREE HAS THE DANGER TO YOUR FORCES BEEN INCREASED BY THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND YOUR EVALUATION OF THE THREATS POSED BY ENEMY MOVEMENTS OF MEN AND MATERIAL?"

A. THERE ARE CURRENTLY THREE THREAT AREAS IN OR NEAR SOUTH VIETNAM. THESE ARE: A. SOUTHWARD DRIVE FROM THE DMZ;  
AN EASTWARD DRIVE IN THE NORTH AREA FROM LAOS; AND AN ATTACK  
IN THE OUTLYING AREAS OF III CTZ AND AGAINST SAIGON ITSELF.  
EACH OF THESE WILL BE DISCUSSED IN TURN.

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3

B. YOU ARE AWARE OF THE EXTRAORDINARY LOGISTICS EFFORTS THE ENEMY HAS MADE THROUGHOUT NORTH VIETNAM. THESE EFFORTS ARE VISIBLE IN THE VINH AREA, THE QUANG KHE AREA, DONG HOI AREA AND SOUTH THEREOF. SOUTH OF DONG HOI THE ENEMY HAS ESTABLISHED A MAJOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT AREA AROUND BAT LAKE. HE HAS OTHER LOGISTIC AREAS FROM VINH LINH TO THE TERMINUS OF ROUTE 1036. WE HAVE SEEN SIZABLE VEHICLE MOVEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE DONG HOI-DMZ AREA, AND THESE ARE INCREASING. ~~WE DO NOT KNOW THE STATUS OF HIS LOGISTICAL PREPARATIONS NEAR THE DMZ,~~ BUT WE MUST CREDIT HIM WITH THE CAPABILITY TO HAVE ESTABLISHED, OR TO ESTABLISH IN THE NEAR FUTURE, A LOGISTIC COMPLEX WHICH WILL SUPPORT WHATEVER TROOP STRENGTH HE MAY DECIDE TO STATION NEAR THE DMZ.

C. ~~WHILE WE HAVE DETECTED NO NEW TROOP UNITS IN OR NEAR THE DMZ, THE ENEMY CAN MOVE UNITS INTO THIS AREA AND SUPPORT MAJOR FORCES THERE. HE COULD CLOSE THE 320TH DIVISION, NOW SOUTH OF VINH, INTO THE DMZ IN FROM FIVE TO TEN DAYS, AND THERE ARE FRAGMENTARY INDICATIONS THAT THIS DIVISION MAY NOW BE PREPARING TO MOVE.~~

THE 304TH, 308TH, AND 312TH, ALL AVAILABLE FARTHER NORTH IN NVN, WOULD REQUIRE LONGER TO MAKE THE MOVE. THE DMZ THREAT, THEN, IS A POTENTIAL RATHER THAN AN ACTUAL ONE.

(1)

D. ~~THE NEXT THREAT IS THAT OF AN ATTACK LAUNCHED FROM LAOS INTO THE NORTH AREA. I HAVE DETAILED IN REFERENCE BRAVO THE UNUSUAL EFFORTS THE ENEMY IS MAKING TO PUT SUPPLIES INTO THE BASE AREAS WHICH WOULD SUPPORT SUCH AN OFFENSIVE. THIS TREMENDOUS EFFORT INDICATES THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS LOGISTIC ACTIVITY TO THE ENEMY'S FUTURE PLANS. WE BELIEVE THAT A DIVISION-SIZE ELEMENT IS NOW INFILTRATING FROM NORTH VIETNAM AND WILL MOVE TO THE A-SHAY VALLEY FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENT IN THE NORTH AREA. IF THESE UNITS CONTINUE THEIR PRESENT RATE OF MARCH, THEY COULD BEGIN TO ARRIVE IN THE A-SHAY VALLEY IN FIFTEEN DAYS AND CLOSE IN TEN ADDITIONAL DAYS. IF OUR CALCULATIONS ARE CORRECT AND IF THE ENEMY CAN SOLVE HIS LOGISTIC PROBLEM, THIS THREAT SHOULD BE IN BEING BY ABOUT 12 JANUARY.~~

(2)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-167  
By us, NARA, Date 4-26-04

3. ~~THE THIRD THREAT IS AIMED AT THE III CTZ AND SAIGON.~~  
THE DETAILS OF THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE PLANS AND PREPARATIONS  
AND OF OUR COUNTER MEASURES ARE CONTAINED IN REFERENCE BRAVO  
AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS. THE THREAT NOW IN III CTZ IS  
GREATER THAN THE THREAT WHICH EXISTED ON 1 NOVEMBER. OUR  
CALCULATIONS SHOW THAT SINCE 1 NOVEMBER THE ENEMY HAS MADE  
A NET INCREASE IN STRENGTH OF APPROXIMATELY 3300 MEN IN OR  
NEAR III CTZ. IN ADDITION, TWO REGIMENTS AND THE 1ST DIV-  
ISION HEADQUARTERS, A TOTAL STRENGTH OF AROUND 3000, SHIFTED  
FROM II TO III CTZ ABOUT 1-15 NOVEMBER. ~~THESE MOVES INCREASED~~  
~~HIS MANEUVER BATTALION STRENGTH IN III CTZ FROM 67 TO 78.~~  
NEARLY 6200 ADDITIONAL MEN SHOULD ARRIVE IN THE III CTZ AREA  
IN JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY. ~~AN ADDITIONAL 2200 INFILTRATORS~~  
~~ARE DUE IN THE III CTZ IN MARCH 69.~~

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.  
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~~COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH THE AIR INTERDICTION PROGRAM IN LAOS WILL ONLY COME WHEN THE ENEMY'S LOGISTIC SYSTEM IS UNABLE EVEN TO SUPPORT ITSELF. IN SPITE OF THE ENEMY'S INTENSE EFFORTS OUR PROGRAM TO DATE HAS, WE THINK, PREVENTED THE ENEMY FROM PUTTING THROUGH THE SYSTEM MORE THAN THE REQUIREMENT TO MERELY SUSTAIN THE FORCE IN AND ADJACENT TO I AND II CORPS. THEREFORE, I HAVE LESS THAN COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH THE INTERDICTION PROGRAM.~~

~~OUR INTERDICTION PROGRAM CAN BE IMPROVED BY SEVERAL SPECIFIC ACTIONS, SOME OF WHICH ARE: FIRST, WITH EARLY PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL MUNITIONS; SPECIFICALLY AN ANTI-VEHICULAR LAND MINE (BLU-31/B), WHICH IS PLANNED FOR INITIAL DELIVERY IN MARCH, AND THE ANTI-MATERIEL/ ANTI-PERSONNEL INCENDIARY BOMBLET (BLU-70/B), WHICH IS TO BE AVAILABLE IN VERY LIMITED QUANTITIES ABOUT MARCH. SECOND, FEWER OPERATING RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY AMERICAN EMBASSY, VIENTIANE, SPECIFICALLY ON ARC LIGHT TARGETTING USE OF SPECIAL ORDNANCE; (CS-2 TYPE AND LAND MINES WHEN THEY ARE AVAILABLE) AND USE OF SOG TEAMS. THIRD, AVAILABLE FORCES SHOULD BE SUSTAINED AT THE CURRENT LEVEL. THE PLANNED REDUCTION IN THE CARRIER TASK FORCE WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF ABOUT 40 STRIKE SORTIES PER DAY FROM THE INTERDICTION PROGRAM. ANY LESSER B-52 SORTIE RATE WILL RESULT IN LESS ARC LIGHT SUPPORT OF THE INTERDICTION PROGRAM. ADDITIONALLY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF GUNSHIPS, BOTH THE AC-130 AND AC-119K, SHOULD BE ACCELERATED.~~

5. ~~IN REGARD TO THE QUESTION POSED IN PARAGRAPH 2 DELTA, REFERENCE ALPHA-AT THE TIME OF THE BOMBING HALT THE ENEMY HAS WITHDRAWN BEYOND THE DMZ INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND FROM WRITH INTO LAOS. THE ENEMY TALKED OF GOOD WILL AND SEVERUS INTENTIONS, HIS INFILTRATION WAS ON A DECLINING CURVE. THE ENEMY IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD OBSERVE THE DMZ. HE HAS NOT DONE SO. INFILTRATION HAS INCREASED AND TWO REGIMENTS IN WRITH HAVE MOVED BACK INTO THE A-SHAY VALLEY. HE HAS DEPLOYED LIGHT FORCES INTO THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ, AND THE LAST TWO WEEKS OVER THIRTY SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ INDICATES THAT THE ENEMY IS STOCK-PILING MUNITIONS THERE.~~

~~ALL OF THIS ADDS UP TO THE CLEAR INDICATION THAT THE ENEMY IS STRIVING TO PREPARE HIMSELF NOW IN EVERY WAY TO EXERCISE CAMPAIGN OPTIONS THROUGH THE DMZ AND THROUGH LAOS INTO WRITH. HE HAS THE FORCES AND MEANS TO DEFEAT SUCH A MILITARY CAMPAIGN, BUT TO DO IT WILL SET BACK OUR ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN, WHICH, I BELIEVE, IS THAT PART OF THE TOTAL EFFORT MOST CRITICAL TO US AND TO HIM.~~

~~UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I AM COMPELLED TO REGARD ANY REDUCTION OF FORCES OR MEANS AVAILABLE TO ME AS UNTIMELY AND MOST DISTURBING.~~

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.  
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~~SECRET SPOKE~~ SECTION ONE OF THREE MAC 17418 EYES ONLY  
THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ENEMY  
SITUATION IN AND AROUND SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH HAVE UNUSUAL  
POTENTIALITIES. THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE RECENT INCREASES  
OF INFILTRATION FROM NVN, EXTRAORDINARY ENEMY EFFORTS TO  
MAINTAIN HIS LAOTIAN SUPPLY LINE, THE ENEMY'S OBVIOUS  
OFFENSIVE INTENTIONS IN III CTZ, AND FINALLY, HIS REACTION  
TO OUR ADVANCES IN THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN (APC).

SINCE 23 NOVEMBER THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE  
IN THE NUMBER OF NVA INFILTRATION GROUPS DESTINED FOR  
SOUTH VIETNAM. BETWEEN 1 OCTOBER AND 23 NOVEMBER, WE SAW  
ONLY EIGHT GROUPS ENTER THE PIPELINE IN NVN. BETWEEN  
23 NOVEMBER AND TODAY, 29 HAVE ENTERED. CONSIDERING THE  
REDUCED TRAVEL TIME IN NORTH VIETNAM RESULTING FROM THE  
USE OF RAIL TRANSPORT, THIS RATE OF INFILTRATION APPROACHES  
THAT WHICH OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE OF JANUARY 1968.

THE INITIAL INFILTRATING GROUPS WERE DESTINED ALMOST  
TOTALLY FOR III CTZ. INCREASED COMMUNICATIONS INVOLVING  
B-3, COSVN, MR-10 AND COSVN REAR SERVICE GROUPS INDICATE THAT  
THESE GROUPS, TOTALING 10,000 MEN, OR THEIR PREDECESSORS ARE  
BEGINNING TO ARRIVE IN CAMBODIA OPPOSITE THE CTZ NORTHERN  
BOUNDARY AT THIS TIME. THEY COULD PROVIDE REPLACEMENTS TO MAKE UP  
THE LOSSES WHICH THE ENEMY WILL INCUR IN A POSSIBLE OFFENSIVE IN  
III CTZ, OR THEY MAY BE THE FILLERS FOR THE NEW DIVISION ENTITY  
WHICH HAS BEEN RECENTLY ISOLATED IN BASE AREA 350.

WE ARE NOW BEGINNING TO SEE INFILTRATION GROUPS  
DESTINED FOR ENEMY COMMAND AREAS OTHER THAN COSVN.  
MR-5 IS GETTING 2200 MEN; ONE GROUP IS GOING TO THE B-3  
FRONT. THE MOST SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN THE  
APPEARANCE OF SIX LARGE INFILTRATION GROUPS DESTINED FOR  
MRTH. FOUR OF THESE GROUPS HAVE A COMBINED STRENGTH OF  
3900 MEN. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THEY HAVE GROUP DESIGNATORS  
INDICATING THAT THEY ARE PROBABLY INFILTRATING REGIMENTS,  
PERHAPS A DIVISION, OR ITS EQUIVALENT. THESE GROUPS CAN  
ARRIVE IN THE MRTH AREA BY MID-JANUARY. THUS, IT APPEARS  
THAT MRTH, WHICH WAS DRIVEN FROM THE COUNTRY A FEW MONTHS  
AGO, PRIMARILY BY LOGISTIC INCAPACITY, MAY AGAIN BECOME A  
MAJOR THREAT TO NORTHERN I CORPS.

WE HAVE RECENTLY DETECTED THE INFILTRATION OF SPECIAL  
"KH2" GROUPS, CONSISTING OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATORS AND  
ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL. AT LEAST FOUR, AND POSSIBLY SIX,  
OF THESE GROUPS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED MOVING SOUTH SINCE  
14 DECEMBER WITH THE PROBABLE DESTINATION OF COSVN.  
THESE PEOPLE COULD REPRESENT AN ATTEMPT TO COUNTERACT  
THE INITIAL SUCCESSSES OF THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION  
PROGRAM AGAINST THE VCI, OR, PERHAPS, THEY MAY BE THE  
INTENDED NUCLEUS OF AN EXPANDED COSVN GOVERNMENTAL  
APPARATUS. WHATEVER THEIR INTENDED USE, THERE IS A NEW  
FACTOR TO WATCH

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 02-167

By us, NARA, Date 4-26-04

IN LAOS, THE ENEMY CONTINUES AN EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES THROUGH THE LAO PANHANDLE INTO SVN. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ENEMY'S EFFORT CAN BE GAINED BY LOOKING AT OUR INTERDICTION EFFORT. WE HAVE PUT 15,760 TAC AIR SORTIES INTO LAOS SINCE 1 NOVEMBER AND 1170 ARCLIGHT SORTIES. 312 OF THESE ARCLIGHT SORTIES AND 1706 TAC AIR STRIKES HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST THE CRITICAL BAN LE BOY FORD, AND 222 ARCLIGHTS AND 1804 TAC AIR SORTIES WENT AGAINST BAN PHA NOP. DURING THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER--17 DECEMBER, WE DESTROYED 709 ENEMY TRUCKS, AND DAMAGED AN ADDITIONAL 239. IN ATTACKS ON TRUCKS, THERE HAVE BEEN 1209 SECONDARY FIRES, AND 329 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. THROUGHOUT LAOS DURING THIS PERIOD AIR STRIKES HAVE CAUSED A TOTAL OF 2007 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND 3824 SECONDARY FIRES, INCLUDING THE TRUCK ASSOCIATED RESULTS CITED ABOVE.

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O 221046Z ZYH ZFF-3  
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS  
ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
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~~SECRET SPOKE SECTION TWO OF THREE MAC 17418 EYES ONLY~~  
HIS EFFORTS MATCH OURS. HE HAS INCREASED THE NUMBER  
AND QUALITY OF HIS AA

LAOS SINCE THE BOMBING HALT.  
THE NUMBER ODAA THREAT AREAS THROUGHOUT LAOS HAS  
INCREASED IN ALL CALIBER WEAPONS DURING THE PERIOD.  
AA AREAS HAVE GROWN FROM 21 TO 41, 23 MM FROM 6 TO 10,  
37 MM FROM 43 TO 66, AND 57 MM FROM 2 TO 5. ANOTHER CHANGE  
IN THE THREAT IS THE INTRODUCTION OF 85 MM AA IN THE  
BAN LA BOY AND BAN PHA NOP AREAS, WITH THE POSSIBILITY  
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NO FIRE-CONTROL RADAR HAS YET BEEN DETECTED, HENCE THE  
HIGHER CALIBER WEAPONS DO NOT POSE A SIGNIFICANT  
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PASSES. WHERE HE COULD NOT BUILD BY-PASSES, HE HAS  
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TO OPEN THE BAN LE BOY HE COMMITTED FOUR ENGINEER  
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THROUGHOUT THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE IN THE PERIOD 15 TO 20  
DECEMBER INDICATES HIS PARTIAL SUCCESS.

ABOVE ALL, HIS EFFORTS REVEAL THE IMPORTANCE TO THE  
ENEMY OF KEEPING THIS LOC OPEN.

WE MUST CONNECT THIS INTENSIVE ENEMY DRIVE IN  
LAOS WITH THE INFILTRATION PATTERN WHICH WE HAVE RECENTLY  
SEEN. HE IS SENDING MANPOWER TO THE MRTH AREA AND  
STRIVES NOW TO MATCH THIS MANPOWER WITH AN ADEQUATE LOGISTIC  
CAPABILITY. IF HE CAN HARRY THE MEN AND THE MATERIEL,  
HE WILL HAVE AGAIN A POTENT FORCE IN THE CRITICAL TRI-THIEN  
AREA.

INTELLIGENCE CONTINUES TO INDICATE THE ENEMY'S AREA OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE IS III CTZ AND SAIGON. AS YOU KNOW, HE HAS MOVED THE 1ST NVA DIVISION WITH AT LEAST TWO REGIMENTS FROM II CTZ INTO III CTZ. THREE ADDITIONAL REGIMENTS HAVE BEEN MOVED FROM II CORPS TO III CORPS SINCE MAY. COMINT INDICATES THERE IS AN UNIDENTIFIED DIVISION ECHELON NOW LOCATED IN BASE AREA 350 IN CAMBODIA JUST NORTH OF III CTZ. PROJECTED INFILTRATION TO THE COSVN AREA IS HEAVY, AND INFILTRATES ORIGINALLY DESTINED TO MRTH AND MR-5 HAVE BEEN DIVERTED TO THE COSNV AREA.

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, PW AND RALLIER STATEMENTS, INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE REPORTS OF UNUSUALLY RELIABLE AGENTS TOLD US THAT THE ENEMY PLANNED A WINTER/SPRING CAMPAIGN CONCENTRATED IN III CTZ. THIS OFFENSIVE WAS TO BEGIN FROM 12 TO 15 DECEMBER, AND WAS TO HAVE TWO PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE WAS TO BE AN ATTACK IN THE OUTLYING AREAS TO ATTRACT FRIENDLY FORCES FROM THE SAIGON AREA. THE SECOND PHASE WAS TO BE AN ATTACK AGAINST SAIGON ITSELF. AS USUAL, THE ENEMY'S TIMETABLE HAS ALREADY SLIPPED, DUE PROBABLY TO OUR RESPONSE TO THE DETAILED INTELLIGENCE REVEALING THE ENEMY'S FIRST PHASE PLANS.

WHILE HE HAS SUSPENDED EXECUTION OF THESE INITIAL ATTACKS, HE HAS NOT ABANDONED HIS ORIGINAL PLANS. HE CONTINUES TO MOVE UNITS TOWARDS OUR MIDDLE DEFENSE RING AROUND SAIGON AND TOWARDS THE CITY ITSELF. COMINT SHOWS MOVEMENTS TOWARDS TAY NINH AND SAIGON BY ELEMENTS OF THE 9TH DIVISION. THE FORWARD ECHELON, 9TH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND POST, HAS IN THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS INCREASINGLY TAKEN CONTROL OF THE THREE COMBAT REGIMENTS FROM HEADQUARTERS, 9TH DIVISION. A CAPTURED DOCUMENT FROM THE D-12 SAPPER BATTALION INFORMS US THAT THIS UNIT IS TO BE A SPEARHEAD DURING THE "UPCOMING" OFFENSIVE, AND THAT IT HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RECONNOITERING THE "JET PARKING AREA," PROBABLY REFERRING TO TSN AIR BASE. A SERIES OF INCIDENTS IN THE SON BE CORRIDOR AND IN THE CORRIDOR FROM THE FISHHOOK SOUTH INDICATES A CONTINUOUSLY SOUTHERN MOVEMENT OF ENEMY UNITS. OUR RELIABLE AGENTS TELL US THAT THE ENEMY INTENDS TO MOUNT ATTACKS AGAINST OUR MIDDLE DEFENSE RING IN III CTZ, AND THAT HE STILL INTENDS TO ATTACK SAIGON EVENTUALLY.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.  
988

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~~SECRET SPOKE~~

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ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
INFO AMB BUNKER AMEMB SAIGON  
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~~SECRET SPOKE~~ FINAL SECTION OF THREE MAC 17418 EYES ONLY

~~I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAPPER THREAT TO SAIGON. THE EMPLOYMENT OF SAPPERS MUST BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE ENEMY. THEY HAVE GOTTEN INTO SAIGON BEFORE; AND THEY ARE THE ONES WHO HAVE CAUSED THE BULK OF THE DESTRUCTION WITH CONSEQUENT PSYCHOLOGICAL REPRISALS IN PREVIOUS OFFENSIVES. THEY ARE THE MOST DIFFICULT UNITS FOR US TO DETECT AND APPREHEND, AND A FEW OF THEM CAN DAMAGE OUR CAUSE BEYOND THEIR MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OR SIZE. MORE SOLIDLY, WE HAVE NUMEROUS REPORTS THAT SAPPERS ARE NOW IN SAIGON OR THAT THEY PLAN TO ENTER AT THE LAST MOMENT. IN FACT, ONE OF OUR AGENTS HAS MADE FIRM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR HOUSING AND ENTRANCE INTO SAIGON. WE ARE ACTIVELY COUNTERING THE SAPPER EFFORT, BUT ITS THREAT REMAINS.~~

FINALLY, WE ARE HURTING THE ENEMY BY OUR ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN (APC) LAUNCHED 1 NOVEMBER. RELATIVELY SECURE POPULATION STOOD AT 13.3 PERCENT AT THE END OF NOVEMBER, 6.1 PERCENT ABOVE THE PRE-TET HIGH. RF/PF HAVE BEEN EXPANDED BY 133,000 TO 433,000 DURING THE YEAR. ALMOST 100,000 M-16 RIFLES HAVE BEEN ISSUED AND OVER 150,000 MORE WILL BE ISSUED IN 1969. DURING 1969, PRESIDENT THIEU INTENDS TO STATION A PLATOON IN EVERY HAMLET SUBJECT TO ENEMY ACTION.

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ESTABLISH A BARGAINING BASIS FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT.  
HE HAS MOUNTED A FULL-SCALE PROPAGANDA ATTACK ON THE APC  
COMPLAINING ABOUT OUR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AND EXORTING  
THE PEOPLE TO RISE UP WITH THE VC AND WIPE OUT PACIFICATION  
CADRES. ~~LIBERATION RADIO HAS BLUNTLY THREATENED PEOPLE~~  
WHO COOPERATE WITH THE APC. THE ENEMY HAS ATTEMPTED TO  
COUNTER ~~APC BY MAKING SWEEPING CLAIMS OF SUCCESS FOR HIS~~  
OWN REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION. BY THESE REACTIONS, THE  
ENEMY BETRAYS HIS CONCERN FOR OUR GAINS IN PACIFICATION AND  
SIGNALS HIS ADMISSION THAT THE PROGRAM HAS ACHIEVED SOME  
SUCCESS.

AS SET FORTH IN THAT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE DEALING  
WITH INFILTRATION, THE ENEMY HAS BEGUN TO INFILTRATE KH2  
GROUPS OF CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATORS FROM NVN TO SVN. AS HE  
HAS HAD TO DO WITH THE MILITARY, HE MUST NOW REINFORCE THE  
VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND COSVN CADRE WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE  
ADVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. THIS IS A STEP, WHICH TO OUR  
KNOWLEDGE, HE HAS NEVER BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE IN THE PAST  
AND ILLUSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE TO THE ENEMY OF THIS PHASE OF  
THE WAR.

WE HAVE BEFORE US THREATS TO BE COUNTERED AND OPPORTUNITIES  
TO BE EXPLOITED. ~~THE THREATS LIE IN III CTZ, LAOS, AND VTLN~~  
~~EVENTUALLY SETTING A REVITALIZED NORTH.~~ THE OPPORTUNITY LIES  
IN THE EXPLOITATION OF OUR PROGRESS IN THE APC. IN THIS  
LATTER CAMPAIGN WE ARE MAKING OUR MAJOR EFFORT; SO IS THE ENEMY.  
IF WE ARE TO WIN THE APC CAMPAIGN, WE MUST KEEP UP OUR  
PRESENT MOMENTUM- AND MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE.

AN ANALYSIS, THEN, OF THE THREATS AND THE OPPORTUNITY  
REVEALS THAT NOW WE MUST NOT ONLY MAINTAIN OUR PRESENT  
EFFORT; ~~WE MUST INTENSIFY THIS EFFORT AGAINST THE THREAT~~  
~~IN LAOS BY OUR 29'S AND TAC AIR,~~ AGAINST THE ENEMY  
~~THREAT IN III CTZ BY OUR ALLIED AIR/GROUND/NAVY TEAM THERE.~~  
ABOVE ALL, WE MUST EXPAND AND INTENSIFY OUR APC TO EXPLOIT  
OUR PROGRESS IN THIS CRITICAL CAMPAIGN. IN MY JUDGEMENT  
~~WHAT IS REQUIRED NOW IS ALL OUT WITH ALL WE HAVE. THE~~  
~~MILITARY MACHINE RUNS BEST AT FULL THROTTLE. THAT'S ABOUT~~  
~~WHERE WE HAVE IT AND WHERE I INTEND TO KEEP IT.~~

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.  
900

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

156

SANITIZED

Authority NLS/CBS 8  
By is NARS, Date 12-16-83

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1968 DEC 23 14 17

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FM GEN WHEELER CJCS  
INFO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE  
MR RUSK STATE DEPT  
MR HELMS CIA

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS  
ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
INFO AMB BUNKER AMEMB SAIGON

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] SECTION ONE OF THREE MAC 17418 EYES ONLY  
THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ENEMY  
SITUATION IN AND AROUND SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH HAVE UNUSUAL  
POTENTIALITIES. THESE DEVELOPMENTS ARE: RECENT INCREASES  
OF INFILTRATION FROM NVN, EXTRAORDINARY ENEMY EFFORTS TO  
MAINTAIN HIS LAOTIAN SUPPLY LINE, THE ENEMY'S OBVIOUS  
OFFENSIVE INTENTIONS IN III CTZ, AND FINALLY, HIS REACTION  
TO OUR ADVANCES IN THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN (APC).

SINCE 23 NOVEMBER THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE  
IN THE NUMBER OF NVA INFILTRATION GROUPS DESTINED FOR  
SOUTH VIETNAM.

[REDACTED] CONSIDERING THE  
REDUCED TRAVEL TIME IN NORTH VIETNAM RESULTING FROM THE  
USE OF RAIL TRANSPORT, THIS RATE OF INFILTRATION APPROACHES  
THAT WHICH OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE OF JANUARY 1968.

[REDACTED] THEY COULD PROVIDE REPLACEMENTS TO MAKE UP  
THE LOSSES WHICH THE ENEMY WILL INCUR IN A POSSIBLE OFFENSIVE IN  
III CTZ. OR

[REDACTED]

COPY

[REDACTED]

IN LAOS, THE ENEMY CONTINUES AN EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES THROUGH THE LAO PANHANDLE INTO SVN. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ENEMY'S EFFORT CAN BE GAINED BY LOOKING AT OUR INTERDICTION EFFORT. WE HAVE PUT 15,760 TAC AIR SORTIES INTO LAOS SINCE 1 NOVEMBER AND 1170 ARCLIGHT SORTIES. 312 OF THESE ARCLIGHT SORTIES AND 1706 TAC AIR STRIKES HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST THE CRITICAL BAN LE BOY FORD, AND 222 ARCLIGHTS AND 1804 TAC AIR SORTIES WENT AGAINST BAN PHA NOP. DURING THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER - 17 DECEMBER, WE DESTROYED 709 ENEMY TRUCKS, AND DAMAGED AN ADDITIONAL 239. IN ATTACKS ON TRUCKS, THERE HAVE BEEN 1209 SECONDARY FIRES, AND 329 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. THROUGHOUT LAOS DURING THIS PERIOD AIR STRIKES HAVE CAUSED A TOTAL OF 2007 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND 3824 SECONDARY FIRES, INCLUDING THE TRUCK ASSOCIATED RESULTS CITED ABOVE.

NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

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[REDACTED]  
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS  
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MR RUSK STATE DEPT  
MR HELMS CIA

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FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS  
ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
INFO AMB BUNKER AMEMB SAIGON

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] SECTION TWO OF THREE MAC 17418 EYES ONLY  
HIS EFFORTS MATCH OURS. HE HAS INCREASED THE NUMBER

AND QUALITY OF HIS AA  
LAOS SINCE THE BOMBING HALT.  
THE NUMBER ODAA THREAT AREAS THROUGHOUT LAOS HAS  
INCREASED IN ALL CALIBER WEAPONS DURING THE PERIOD.  
AA AREAS HAVE GROWN FROM 21 TO 41, 23 MM FROM 6 TO 10,  
37 MM FROM 43 TO 66, AND 57 MM FROM 2 TO 5. ANOTHER CHANGE  
IN THE THREAT IS THE INTRODUCTION OF 85 MM AA IN THE  
BAN LA BOY AND BAN PHA NOP AREAS, WITH THE POSSIBILITY  
THAT 100 MM AA MAY BE INTRODUCED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.  
NO FIRE-CONTROL RADAR HAS YET BEEN DETECTED, HENCE THE  
HIGHER CALIBER WEAPONS DO NOT POSE A SIGNIFICANT  
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WHEN WE SUCCEEDED IN INTERDICTION ROUTE 15 AT  
BAN PHA NOP NEAR THE MU GIA PASS, HE MANAGED TO BUILD BY-  
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PROBABLY CARRIED THE MATERIEL BY PORTER AROUND THEM.  
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BATTALIONS THERE. THESE BATTALIONS COULD NOT KEEP THE  
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VICINITY OF THE FORD. THE SHARP INCREASE IN TRAFFIC  
THROUGHOUT THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE IN THE PERIOD 16 TO 20  
DECEMBER INDICATES HIS PARTIAL SUCCESS.

ABOVE ALL, HIS EFFORTS REVEAL THE IMPORTANCE TO THE  
ENEMY OF KEEPING THIS LOC OPEN.

WE MUST CONNECT THIS INTENSIVE ENEMY DRIVE IN  
LAOS WITH THE INFILTRATION PATTERN WHICH WE HAVE RECENTLY  
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STRIVES NOW TO MATCH THIS MANPOWER WITH AN ADEQUATE LOGISTIC  
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HE WILL HAVE AGAIN A POTENT FORCE IN THE CRITICAL TRI THIAN  
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[REDACTED] AND INFILTREES ORIGINALLY DESTINED TO MRTTH AND MR-5 HAVE BEEN DIVERTED TO THE COSNV AREA.

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, PW AND RALLIER STATEMENTS, [REDACTED], AND THE REPORTS OF UNUSUALLY RELIABLE AGENTS TOLD US THAT THE ENEMY PLANNED A WINTER/SPRING CAMPAIGN CONCENTRATED IN III CTZ. THIS OFFENSIVE WAS TO BEGIN FROM 12 TO 15 DECEMBER, AND WAS TO HAVE TWO PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE WAS TO BE AN ATTACK IN THE OUTLYING AREAS TO ATTRACT FRIENDLY FORCES FROM THE SAIGON AREA. THE SECOND PHASE WAS TO BE AN ATTACK AGAINST SAIGON ITSELF. AS USUAL, THE ENEMY'S TIMETABLE HAS ALREADY SLIPPED, DUE PROBABLY TO OUR RESPONSE TO THE DETAILED INTELLIGENCE REVEALING THE ENEMY'S FIRST PHASE PLANS.

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A CAPTURED DOCUMENT FROM THE D-12 SAPPER BATTALION INFORMS US THAT THIS UNIT IS TO BE A SPEARHEAD DURING THE UPCOMING OFFENSIVE, AND THAT IT HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RECONNOITERING THE "JET PARKING AREA," PROBABLY REFERRING TO TSN AIR BASE. A SERIES OF INCIDENTS IN THE SON BE CORRIDOR AND IN THE CORRIDOR FROM THE FISHHOOK SOUTH INDICATES A CONTINUOUSLY SOUTHERN MOVEMENT OF ENEMY UNITS. OUR RELIABLE AGENTS TELL US THAT THE ENEMY INTENDS TO MOUNT ATTACKS AGAINST OUR MIDDLE DEFENSE RING IN III CTZ, AND THAT HE STILL INTENDS TO ATTACK SAIGON EVENTUALLY.


NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

[REDACTED]

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1968 DEC 23 14 41



FM GEN WHEELER CJCS  
INFO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE  
MR RUSK STATE DEPT  
MR HELMS CIA

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV  
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS  
ADM MCCAIN CINCPAC  
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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] FINAL SECTION OF THREE MAC 17418 EYES ONLY

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LONDON RAINES JOHNSON

THE ENEMY IS STRIVING TO COUNTER THESE PACIFICATION GAINS. HE CONTINUES TO ESTABLISH HIS LIBERATION COMMITTEES, NOT ONLY AS A MEANS TO GOVERN THE CONTESTED POPULACE, BUT TO ESTABLISH A BARGAINING BASIS FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT. HE HAS MOUNTED A FULL-SCALE PROPAGANDA ATTACK ON THE APC COMPLAINING ABOUT OUR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AND EXORTING THE PEOPLE TO RISE UP WITH THE VC AND WIPE OUT PACIFICATION CADRES. LIBERATION-RADIO HAS BLUNTLY THREATENED PEOPLE WHO COOPERATE WITH THE APC. THE ENEMY HAS ATTEMPTED TO COUNTER APC BY MAKING SWEEPING CLAIMS OF SUCCESS FOR HIS OWN REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION. BY THESE REACTIONS, THE ENEMY BETRAYS HIS CONCERN FOR OUR GAINS IN PACIFICATION AND SIGNALS HIS ADMISSION THAT THE PROGRAM HAS ACHIEVED SOME SUCCESS.

AS SET FORTH IN THAT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE DEALING WITH INFILTRATION, THE ENEMY HAS BEGUN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AS HE HAS HAD TO DO WITH THE MILITARY, HE MUST NOW REINFORCE THE VC INFRACTURE AND COSVN CADRE WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE ADVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. THIS IS A STEP, WHICH TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, HE HAS NEVER BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE IN THE PAST AND ILLUSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE TO THE ENEMY OF THIS PHASE OF THE WAR.

WE HAVE BEFORE US THREATS TO BE COUNTERED AND OPPORTUNITIES TO BE EXPLOITED. THE THREATS LIE IN III CTZ, LAOS, AND WILL EVENTUALLY LIE IN A REVITALIZED MRTTH. THE OPPORTUNITY LIES IN THE EXPLOITATION OF OUR PROGRESS IN THE APC. IN THIS LATTER CAMPAIGN WE ARE MAKING OUR MAJOR EFFORT; SO IS THE ENEMY. IF WE ARE TO WIN THE APC CAMPAIGN, WE MUST KEEP UP OUR PRESENT MOMENTUM- AND MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE.

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NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

[REDACTED]  
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Monday, December 23, 1968 -- 11:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

*Prop*

Herewith notes for your discussion with Cy Vance at 1:00 p. m. today.

1. How does he now assess Hanoi's negotiating intentions? Is Hanoi interested in movement before January 20th?
2. How does he assess Ky's and Saigon's negotiating intentions?
3. Specifically:
  - Will Hanoi negotiate a firm DMZ deal as first order of business?
  - Will they get to work on a firm mutual troop withdrawal schedule?
  - Where -- if at all -- does Hanoi intend to negotiate a political settlement in the South?
    - at the formal table?
    - up a back street in Paris?
    - up a back street in Saigon?
  - What are Hanoi's intentions about Laos?
4. In the end, you may wish to ask Cy to do a draft instruction to be considered by the President and Secretary of State, for the next phase of the negotiation.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
 NJ 91-508  
 By WJG, NARA, Date 1-11-93 W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

17  
INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, December 23, 1968  
11:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a personal note from  
Sec. Rusk plus the Shriver message  
you requested Sec. Rusk to send over  
this morning.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By           , NARA, Date 2-24-91

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
 By           , NARA, Date 2-24-98

~~SECRET~~

Monday, December 23, 1968 -- 11:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Herewith notes for your conversation at noon today with William Rogers.

Sec. Rusk tells me that Rogers has been concentrating on problems of organization and personnel rather than substance.

Rogers asked Sec. Rusk this morning if he would bring back Alex Johnson and Jake Beam about the first of the year for consultation -- presumably with the possibility in mind of their working in new posts.

In the light of the situation, you may wish:

- To ask Rogers if the transition arrangements are working satisfactorily for him? If there is anything more we can do to ease the way?
- Express the hope that, when his personnel and organization problems are under control, he will sit down with us and go over three major negotiating issues:
  - Vietnam;
  - Middle East;
  - Our position on the missile negotiation with the Soviet Union.

We would hope to leave with him personally the clearest possible picture of where each of these matters now stands.

-- You may wish to talk personally about Vietnam, even now, with Rogers in the following vein: You did not make the painful decision to put forces into Vietnam merely because of Vietnam. The relevant treaty is a Southeast Asian treaty. We have a Southeast Asian treaty because President Eisenhower, Sec. Dulles, and the U. S. Senate judged the security of Southeast Asia critical for our whole position for Asia and the Pacific. Therefore, in looking ahead you would hope that Rogers would think not merely about the details of moving towards peace in Vietnam but how to maintain the momentum we now have going in Asia towards the building of a cooperative Asian structure which, with our backing, offers hope for long-run, stable peace in that critical region. New attitudes and hopes have developed from New Zealand, Australia, and Indonesia to Japan and Korea -- a new will of the region to shape its own destiny. In the time ahead, we must think of the whole Asia and Pacific region if the sacrifices made by our men and Vietnamese are to be made good.

WWRostow:rlm

W W. Rostow

INFORMATION

19

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Monday, December 23, 1968 - 9:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

The critical passage in this sensitive intelligence report is marked in para. 5: "With the support of a reshuffled and energized Thieu government, Ky can return to Paris and get down to the task of substantive negotiations resulting in an eventual settlement."

In short, he's going hom in part to poltlick.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLSJ019-043-43  
By SP, NARA, Date 1/21/02

19a

ADJUTANT SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION  
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ABROAD

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM/France

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) 25 Yrs (C)

DOI: 21 DECEMBER 1968

SUBJECT, VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY'S COMMENTS ABOUT HIS 21  
DECEMBER DISCUSSION OF HIS PEACE PROPOSAL

ACQ. (21 DECEMBER 1968)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Y (C)

SOURCE:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Y (C)

SUMMARY:

VICE PRESIDENT KY UNDERSTANDS QUITE CLEARLY THE VIEWS OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT ON KY'S TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL TO "JUMP OVER" THE PRESENT IMPASSE ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS AT THE PARIS PEACE TALKS, AND AGREES THAT HIS PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT BE MADE NOW OR LATER EXCEPT AS A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION ONCE THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS HAVE BEGUN IN PARIS AND WITH THE DRV, NLF, USG, AND GVN PARTICIPATING. KY ALSO

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJ 02-201  
By NS, NARA, Date 10-10-03

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APPRECIATES THE NEED FOR RESOLVING THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS OF TABLE CONFIGURATION ETC AND GET THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS GOING PRIOR TO THE CONVENING OF THE U. S. CONGRESS ON 6 JANUARY, AND UNDERSTANDS THE PROBABILITY THAT AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WILL ACCELERATE RAPIDLY AFTER 6 JANUARY IN OPPOSITION TO CONTINUED AMERICAN SUPPORT IN THE VIETNAM WAR; UNLESS CONCRETE PROGRESS IS FORTHCOMING IN PARIS PEACE TALKS. KY'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN, HOWEVER, IS STILL THE URGENT NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT, BY A RESHUFFLING OF THE CABINET WHICH WILL BRING INTO THE NVN GOVERNMENT THE ENERGY, DECISIVENESS AND LEADERSHIP THAT THE GVN MUST POSSESS IF IT IS TO BE ABLE TO MAKE THE CONCESSIONS NECESSARY TO SEE THE TALKS TO A CONCLUSION SATISFACTORY TO THE GVN. END OF SUMMARY.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>2  
(C)

1. KY SAID HIS 21 DECEMBER DISCUSSION WITH [REDACTED] IN WHICH [REDACTED] DESCRIBED THE USG'S REACTION TO KY'S TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWAL OF NVN AND US MILITARY FORCS, TO BE FOLLOWED BY GVN-NLF DISCUSSIONS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, WAS A HELPFUL ONE. IT WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY KY WHAT THE USG EXPECTS OF THE GVN, VIZ., TO SHELVE THIS PROPOSAL EXCEPT AS A SUBJECT FOR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ONCE THE PROCEDURAL MATTERS ARE RESOLVED AND THE FOUR PARTICIPANTS, THE DRV, NLF, USG, AND GVN, ARE ENGAGED IN DISCUSSING THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS. FURTHERMORE,

~~SECRET~~

63

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KY AGREES WITH THE AMERICAN POSITION AND WILL GOVERN HIMSELF ACCORDINGLY.

2. KY ALSO APPRECIATES THE GRAVITY OF THE PROBLEM ON THE U. S. SIDE IN THE NEED FOR REAL PROGRESS IN THE PARIS PEACE TALKS PRIOR TO THE CONVENING OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS ON 6 JANUARY. KY'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN IN BRINGING ABOUT SUCH PROGRESS, HOWEVER, IS THE STRENGTHENING OF THE PRESENT SAIGON GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS TOO WEAK AND INEFFECTIVE TO DEAL WITH THE STRESSES AND STRAINS WHICH WILL DEVELOP ONCE THE GVN BEGINS MAKING THE CONCESSIONS IT MUST MAKE IN THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS, NOW ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS AND LATER ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS, TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. PRIME MINISTER TRAN VAN HUONG HAS HAD TWO OPPORTUNITIES TO DEMONSTRATE HIS ABILITIES AS PRIME MINISTER, AND IS CLEARLY NOT UP TO THE TASK, EVEN THOUGH HIS SELECTION AS PRIME MINISTER IN THE THIEU GOVERNMENT WAS ORIGINALLY MADE WITH GOOD AND SUFFICIENT POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION BEHIND THE CHOICE. THE CABINET IS A LACKLUSTER ONE, PUT TOGETHER ON THE BASIS OF SEVERAL THIEU SUPPORTERS, SEVERAL FROM HUONG'S CAMP, SEVERAL FROM INTERIOR MINISTER KHIEM'S GROUP ETC.; THE COMPROMISING AND POLITICAL BALANCING WHICH PUT THE CABINET TOGETHER HAVE SINCE CONTRIBUTED TO ITS WEAKNESS AND DETERIORATION, AND IT IS CERTAINLY NOT

~~SECRET~~

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THE UNIFIED AND DECISIVE KIND OF GOVERNMENT THE GVN MUST HAVE TO FACE THE WEEKS AND MONTHS JUST AHEAD. AS EXAMPLE OF GVN'S PRESENT INEFFECTIVENESS, THE INFORMATION MINISTER THIEU SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION WEEKS AGO. IT HAS NEITHER BEEN ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED, BUT MEANWHILE THE GVN PARIS PEACE TALKS DELEGATION RECEIVES INADEQUATE SUPPORT FROM THE INFORMATION MINISTRY IN THE CRUCIAL PERIOD OF THE TALKS. ROUGHLY THE SAME THING APPLIES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO HAS BEEN SIMILARLY UNHELPFUL IN SUPPORTING THE GVN PARIS DELEGATION.

3. ONE SHOULD NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT, AS THE PARIS PEACE TALKS CONTINUE AND CONCESSIONS ARE MADE BY THE GVN SUCH AS DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF THE NLF IN KY'S TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITANTS AND THE "YOUNG TURKS" AMONG THE MILITARY MAY INTERPRET THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS LEADING EVENTUALLY TOWARD A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH MAY SET THE STAGE FOR A LATER TAKEOVER OF THE GOVERNMENT BY THE COMMUNISTS.

IF THIS FEELING BECOMES TOO WIDESPREAD AND THE GVN IS UNABLE TO COUNTERACT IT WITH STRONG LEADERSHIP WHICH HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF THE MILITANTS, MANY OF THE LATTER WHO ARE HOT-HEADED AND ULTRA-NATIONALIST INDIVIDUALS IN ANY CASE, MAY WELL TAKE ACTION TO UNSEAT THE THIEU GOVERNMENT, WITHOUT CONCERN FOR OR OBLIVIOUS TO THE TREMENDOUS EFFECT

CARE & ARCHIVAL DISSEMINATION PERSONNEL NOTIFIED	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE <del>SECRET</del> (When Filled In)		TOTAL COPIES GROUP 1	ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEE
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ANY KIND OF COUP D'ETAT WOULD HAVE ON U.S. PUBLIC OPINION AND THE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE ON WITHDRAWING FURTHER AMERICAN SUPPORT FROM A NEW SAIGON GOVERNMENT. THIS IS ANOTHER ELEMENT WHICH THIEU AND KY MUST CONSIDER IN MOVING TO STRENGTHEN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT TO GIVE IT THE BASE OF SUPPORT NEEDED TO MOVE THROUGH THE PRECARIOUS WEEKS AHEAD. IN THIS SAME GENERAL VEIN, THE GVN MUST CRACK DOWN ON THE PRESENT RELATIVELY UNRESTRAINED SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESS, AND ALSO TAKE STEPS TO RENDER THE LEGISLATURE'S CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT LESS TROUBLESOME. MOST OF THE LEGISLATORS ARE INDIVIDUALS WHO DO A GREAT DEAL OF TALKING BUT VERY LITTLE CONSTRUCTIVE SUPPORTING OF THE GOALS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THOSE WHO DO NOT WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY SHOULD BE CHANNLED EITHER INTO SILENCE OR MORE CONSTRUCTIVE UNDERTAKINGS, BY THE TRADITIONAL TECHNIQUES OF MONEY PAY-OFFS TO THEM FOR SILENCE WHICH THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO ACCEPT AND LICK THEIR WOUNDS IN SILENCE, OR BY APPROPRIATE PRESSURES FROM THE GOVERNMENT WHICH MAKE THEM THINK TWICE BEFORE NEEDLESSLY OBSTRUCTING OR OTHERWISE HARASSING THE GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP.

4. KY'S MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM, AND ONE WHICH MUST BE SOLVED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, NOT WEEKS, IS TO CONVINCE PRESIDENT THIEU OF THE ABSOLUTE NEED TO SHUFFLE THE CABINET AND COME UP

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[5]

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WITH A NEW AND MUCH MORE DECISIVE KIND OF GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP, IF NEED BE, ONE IN WHICH A VERY STRONG PRIME MINISTER WILL BE PERMITTED A WIDE LATITUDE OF DECISION AND AUTHORITY, WITH THE PRESIDENT EXERCISING THE HIGH LEVEL POLICY AUTHORITY AND DELEGATING THE REMAINDER TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

5. IF A NEW SAIGON GOVERNMENT CAN BE CONSTITUTED AND CAN BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO THE NATION, THE GVN WILL NOT NEED MORE THAN SEVERAL MILLION OUT OF THE COUNTRY'S POPULATION IN SUPPORT OF THE GVN'S POLICIES, AND WITH THOSE SUPPORTERS WILL BE ABLE TO MOVE TOWARD A QUICK RESOLUTION OF THE PROCEDURAL PROBLEM SUCH AS THE CONFIGURATION OF THE TABLE ETC., AND NEGOTIATE AND WIN A SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAMESE WAR WHICH WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE GVN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

~~WITH THE SUPPORT OF A RESHUFFLED AND ENERGIZED THIEU GOVERNMENT, THEY CAN RETURN TO PARIS AND GET DOWN TO THE TASK OF SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS RESULTING IN AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT.~~

REPORT CLASS SECRET [REDACTED]

EO 12958. 3.4(b) (1) >25Yrs (C)

~~SECRET~~

[63]

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

Monday, December 23, 1968 -- 8:55 a. m.

Mr. President:

3.5(b)(1)  
1.5(c)

As the attached indicates, infiltration is now [redacted] something like 15,000 per month.

Probable time of arrival: [redacted] They may be now building for an offensive round about January 20th -- to try to present the new Administration with the kind of U. S. domestic shock that the Tet attacks produced.

We should head this off -- perhaps by using the State of the Union to recall how misleading the Tet offensive proved to be.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

CLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-168  
By ctm, NARA, Date 6-10-04

20a

Status of North Vietnamese Infiltration

Infiltration groups continue to enter the pipeline in North Vietnam [redacted]

1.5(c)

During the period 1-21 December, [redacted] some 13,600 personnel were noted moving [redacted] in the North Vietnamese Panhandle.


1.5(c)

[redacted] two regiments may be moving down through the system. [redacted] have, in the past, gone to Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue. If this is the destination of those apparently now on the move, they could arrive by early January.

Infiltrators are apparently still using the Mu Gia Pass as a major exit point from the North. Photographs taken on 11 December show a column totaling about 630 probable military personnel moving south along a trail above the pass. (See map overleaf.) ~~(SECRET SPOKE)~~

SECRET  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-169  
By cbm, NARA, Date 6-10-04

# INFILTRATION PIPELINE IN NORTH VIETNAM



DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
 NLJ/RAC 02-169  
 By cbm, NARA, Date 6-10-04

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

21


INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Monday, December 23, 1968  
8:50 a. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

  
is a week old, December 16th.

I thought you'd like to see it; since I don't know where you and Sec. Rusk left the matter.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rla

SANTIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 10-244  
By isl, NARA, Date 8-24-10

**ACTION**

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

**Monday, December 23, 1968 -- 7:40 a.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Henry Kissinger has asked me for my view of the key problems and possibilities ahead. I have done the attached memorandum on a wholly personal basis. He is coming in today and I should like to give it to him. But I do not wish to pass even such a personal document to him on a personal basis without your knowledge and assent.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**You may give it to Kissinger \_\_\_\_\_**

**No \_\_\_\_\_**

**Call me \_\_\_\_\_**

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By MP, NARA, Date 1-23-98

~~SECRET~~

**WWRostow:rla**

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 92-394

By mp/isp NARA. Date 1-23-98  
December 23, 1968

22a

~~SECRET~~ - PERSONAL

PERSONAL MEMORANDUM TO HENRY KISSINGER

These should be understood, Henry, as wholly personal notes and reflections.

I. Set out below are some critical issues that will require decision in the weeks and months ahead. But I should perhaps begin by saying simply that if the new Administration is patient and steady, the following are objectives within its grasp, looking ahead over the next 12-18 months.

- A stable settlement in Southeast Asia.
- Rapid progress in building the regional institutions of a new Asia.
- Beginnings of normalizing our relations with Communist China.
- A Middle East settlement.
- The beginnings of concerted regional work in the Middle East centering on the refugee problem, in particular, the region's economic and social progress in general.
- A surge toward unity in Western Europe, including UK entry into the Common Market and a European consolidation of the UK and French nuclear capabilities within the NATO structure.
- Acceptance of the NPT by Japan, Israel, Germany, Italy, Brazil, Argentina, and -- perhaps -- India.
- Progress in missile talks with the Soviet Union.
- Forward movement in Latin American integration.
- A consolidation of the world monetary system in forms which would provide monetary stability, on the one hand, and a foundation for relatively liberal trade policies, on the other.

II. The Vietnam settlement. Here are things to watch:

-- An early reaffirmation by President Nixon of President Johnson's instruction to General Abrams is required. President Johnson gave an instruction to go with the ARVN absolutely flat out in a pacification offensive. Without momentum inside South Vietnam, our leverage for a settlement in Paris or elsewhere is minimal. Vague talk of "de-escalation" could easily take the heart out of the ARVN and, indeed, adversely affect the morale of U. S. forces.

~~SECRET~~ - PERSONAL

-- Clarity about the general shape of a political settlement inside SVN. Only those who have lived with a succession of SVN governments can understand how precious the present government is, notably with its constitutional basis rooted in the election process. The understanding with Thieu-Ky is that they will have to face a popular front party running against them at some time. That is why they are working to build a big national political party.\* That is why at Honolulu Thieu said that those who give up violence can "run for office as well as vote." There are all sorts of complexities that lie ahead in negotiating this outcome; but, if we continue to extend population control on the ground at something like the present 3% a month rate and chew away at the infrastructure, such a settlement is, I believe, within our grasp. We achieved a reasonably good understanding with Thieu at Honolulu. One of the most essential first tasks of the new Administration will be to reaffirm this basic understanding so that the struggle in Paris and elsewhere will not pull us apart and set in motion a disintegration of the political process in Saigon. Although we must leave the details of the negotiations to the South Vietnamese, a fundamental understanding on where we both wish to come out inside South Vietnam is essential.

-- Keep your eye on Laos. It is almost certain that Hanoi will try to negotiate its position on the ground in Laos to the maximum. There must be a contingency plan if they try to extend their situation in Laos down to the Mekong. (You should know that the only rational military riposte that any of us can think of is to seize some ground north of the 17th parallel and hold it until they get out of Laos -- if they, in fact, should play this card.) In any case, a Vietnam settlement without a Laos settlement would bring no peace to Southeast Asia. Another anxiety is the road building by Communist China in Northern Laos. Some of us have feared for years that the Chinese might make a land grab in Northern Laos in the context of a Vietnam settlement. The truth is we do not have a good feel for Communist Chinese intentions toward a Vietnam settlement. I suspect there will be a test of will over Laos before we're finished. The Russians may be helpful, if they are sure we'll be tough.

-- Monitoring the settlement. You should bear in mind that the only new policy made in Paris was on the first day when Harriman was instructed that in a Vietnam settlement the governments of Southeast Asia should play a part, in monitoring terms. We have stimulated the Thais, Japanese, Indonesians, and others to think about their role in a settlement. Specifically, some of us feel we need an Asian force (using the new sensors, helicopters, etc.) to monitor against renewed infiltration. We would like to get the Japanese and Indonesians into this role since, unlike the Indians, Canadians, and Poles, they

---

\*See me.

would have an abiding interest in the stability of a settlement. The optimum is to bring the Japanese out of the islands into a security role in Asia as part of a multilateral peacekeeping exercise.

-- U. S. troop withdrawals. Don't be too surprised at some stage if Hanoi and Moscow indicate they do not want total U. S. troop withdrawals from SVN. There is some body of intelligence which suggests they may want a U. S. military presence in South Vietnam (as well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia) as a counter to Chinese Communist pressure on Hanoi.

III. Asia. Here are some of the forthcoming key issues in the rest of Asia.

-- Aid post-Vietnam. War expenditures have generated throughout Southeast Asia a major boom. It is essential to our interests and we keep that momentum as war expenditures slacken off. The Special Fund of the Asian Development Bank should be put through Congress promptly and we should begin talking to the Japanese, Australians, and others about the post-Vietnam aid picture -- including orders of magnitude to be generated on a multilateral basis. At some stage, an Asian and Pacific meeting on this subject -- going beyond the troop contributing countries and bringing in the Japanese -- will be in order. In the meanwhile, make sure Indonesia gets enough aid and continues to pull out of the swamp.

-- Group and consolidate the regional institutions. As you know, we have ASPAC on the political side and ASEAN. We also have a series of ad hoc functional groups working in education, communications, banking, etc. The Asian leadership should consolidate these on a political-economic basis -- perhaps like the OAS or OAU in Africa. Australia and New Zealand should be wholly in. We need not be in; but we should encourage Asian thought and leadership in this direction. We must lead, however, on the security side. One of the most subtle and challenging tasks in the time ahead is to develop post-Vietnam an Asian security system without adding to the number of U. S. treaties: an Asian security structure which would put Asian military forces in mutual support, notably with respect to ground forces. Our existing treaty commitments, if maintained, are a sufficient base for our participation. Planning work on this problem -- already under way -- should proceed vigorously.

-- Mainland China. Finally, starting on 20 February there is the intriguing task of finding out if mainland China is about ready to come to terms for a while with the rest of Asia and the U. S. and concentrate on its domestic development.

#### IV. Europe.

-- The French are evidently thinking about a new nuclear relationship with the U. S. and are suggesting various concessions to us on the NATO security side. There is no suggestion that de Gaulle has softened on UK entry into the Common Market. That remains, however, the key to a stable Europe that will be able to relieve us of disproportionate anxieties and burdens. Properly played, however, I believe that the Germans and ourselves have enough leverage vis-a-vis the French to bring UK entry into the Common Market, if we play our hand patiently and if the British also play their hand well.

-- The consolidation of the French and UK nuclear capabilities into some kind of European force, linked to us via NATO, will raise the extremely sensitive issue of the German relationship of that force. We will be up against the old problem of the "loose" European nuclear entity. It will take some managing; but I believe it can be managed.

-- Urgent and fundamental for the stability of NATO is a long-term offset agreement with the Germans, for which we have laid the ground. With the Czechoslovak invasion as a memory, I believe we can hold the U. S. role of NATO in the Congress -- if -- but only if -- we get a satisfactory long-term offset agreement with Germany.

#### V. Latin America.

-- The central task of Latin America in the years ahead is to move on with economic and physical integration, laying the basis thereby to handle productively more advanced industries, needed at the present stage of growth; that is, metalworking, chemicals, electronics, etc. In this connection, we have an opportunity to encourage Latin American businessmen in the private sector to begin to form big units on a continental basis which would damp down the danger that U. S. firms would dominate a Latin American Common Market. Special attention should be given to this possibility which centers -- at the moment -- on a Mexican industrialist, Bruno Pagliai. We want to avoid a Latin American Servan-Schreiber, if possible.

-- If, as we hope, we see a new phase of European consolidation, we should work to bring Europe closer to Latin America and begin to give substance to the old idea of a South Atlantic triangle. This could be accelerated if Europe were willing to give their aid to Latin America via a European development institution rather than bilaterally, on a country-by-country basis.

VI. Middle East. The Middle East is, of course, urgent and right at the top of the list. For what it is worth, here are my reflections.

-- The Israelis will make important concessions to the extent that the end of the road looks more like a peace treaty and less like the 1957 "chewing-gum-and-string" truce.

-- We simply do not know about Nasser's political situation inside Egypt. We do not know if and when the UAR will be in a position or a mood for a firm settlement. But a maximum effort should be made to get an Israeli settlement with Jordan in which the Jordanians, essentially, grant a peace treaty while the Israelis make further concessions on Jerusalem and drop the Allon plan for the West Bank.

-- The Israelis are obviously putting themselves in a position to have a nuclear option. This is just about as dangerous to them and to us as anything could be. I have a feeling, however, that they may be bargaining with the USSR and the US on the signing of the NPT. I do not see clearly the end of the road here. I doubt that there is a Congressional base for a bilateral security arrangement with Israel. But it may be that some form of Congressional resolution -- stronger than anything we now have -- backing a Middle East settlement, plus Israeli signing of the NPT -- might be helpful at some stage.

-- We are nursing along the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia -- not merely because of its implications for the Persian Gulf, but also because of its latent possibility as the core of a regional Middle East grouping which might eventually pull Turkey and Iran into the area to balance the disproportionate and disruptive influence of the UAR. In any case, President Nixon should -- in my view, at an early stage -- hold up the vision of a Middle East regional organization for economic and social development. The Middle East is the only major region in the non-Communist world that is not so organized. That regional framework is not only the proper basis for a long-term refugee settlement, but the foundation for a structure that might prove resistant to Soviet and other outside disrupting pressures for the long pull. As Hussein and I once agreed, it is the only viable basis for the Arabs finding a role of dignity in the world.

VII. U. S. and USSR. The NPT and the missile talks are critical here -- and obvious. In addition, we may find some interesting possibilities for parallelism in Soviet policy in Southeast Asia as we already have in South Asia -- Tashkent, etc.

VIII. Development Policy. I won't go into the foreign aid picture in general, but, putting aside the special case of India, the development business is not in bad shape at all if we can keep the momentum and encourage the key countries to get at the population problem. Much to our surprise, we have bought some very important time by the surge in agricultural production.

IX. Domestic Policy. The critical unsolved problem in the U.S., so far as foreign policy is concerned, remains the problem of reconciling a high rate of growth with a steady price level. I happen to believe that we must find a way to educate our society -- and other democratic societies -- to wage guidelines geared to productivity. You will find that most economists disagree and will argue either for slowing down the rate of growth or accepting a "tolerable" degree of inflation. In any case, this is a domestic issue with the greatest significance for our foreign policy since a lack of wage-price discipline is more likely to erode our world position than any other single factor.

X. Final observation. I am assuming that the new Administration will wish to pick up and further develop the theme with which I closed my Texas A&M speech; namely, that the U.S. is looking not to isolationism but to partnership and fair shares. The President-elect and the Republican platform are in that mood.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

23

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

*Pres file*

Sunday, December 22, 1968  
10:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some sensitive reports on Thieu's reaction to Clifford's statement of 15 December, plus Ky's reflections underlying his proposals to negotiate.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-200  
By is, NARA, Date 9-9-03

WWRostow:rlm

21 December 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: President Thieu's Angry Reaction to Statements  
Made by U. S. Secretary of Defense Clifford

Lieutenant Colonel Tran Van Lam, Press Officer for President Nguyen Van Thieu, on 19 December 1968, described Thieu's reaction to U. S. Secretary of Defense Clifford's statements on 15 December and other earlier statements as one of shock and anger. Lam said that Thieu is unable to determine the logic of public statements made by senior U. S. officials which contribute to efforts by the North Vietnamese and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam to split the U. S. and the Government of Vietnam (GVN). Lam said that Thieu discussed with him how the GVN might respond to Secretary Clifford's statements. Lam said that he advised Thieu to make no public recognition of Clifford's remarks and that Thieu accepted his advice. Thieu also said he would not discipline any GVN official who makes statements emphasizing the GVN's sovereignty and its determination to approach the question of representation at the Paris Talks on the basis of the our side - your side formula.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-201  
By uo NARA, Date 10-17-03

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-201  
By 44 NARA, Date 10-10-03

21 December 1968

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky's Proposals  
for a New Approach to Peace Talks

SUMMARY: Vice-President Ky feels that the Paris Talks have arrived at an impasse on procedural issues which will not be resolved because the North Vietnamese will be satisfied to drag out the talks on procedural matters in the hope of exploiting the present differences of opinion on the American and South Vietnamese side, thereby driving a wedge between the U.S. and the Government of Vietnam (GVN) delegations. These differences of opinion include both those expressed by various American political figures on how to end the war in Vietnam, as well as those positions held by Ambassador Bunker in Saigon, senior officials in Washington, mostly consistent with the GVN position, as contrasted to that of Ambassador Harriman in Paris who seems to have his own very personal policy and viewpoints on how to negotiate and resolve the conflict in South Vietnam. These are presently of considerable cause for concern to the South Vietnamese government. Ky feels that he has been most reasonable in seeking new ways to break the present impasse in the Paris Talks, but also feels the parties have arrived at a critical turning point of the war in Vietnam, and that significant new actions must be taken by the GVN. Not afraid of an American "sellout," he thinks that the time has come for the South Vietnamese to come to grips with the major problem of dealing with the National Liberation Front. Ky believes that the South Vietnamese should give the front "de facto" recognition as the second phase in a two-phase plan to solve the Vietnam problem, the first phase being a military withdrawal of the U.S. and North Vietnam forces. In Ky's view, the North Vietnamese withdrawal would afford adequate evidence to move into phase two of dealing with the NLF. Ky believes that his proposal differs little if any from his understanding of the Kissinger plan, a translation of which he read for the first time on 20 December. Ky has proposed his plan to President Thieu who has approved it, and now plans to return to Saigon about 22 December to "sell" the plan to the militant elements in South Vietnam. Although he feels it will be difficult to accomplish, he thinks he is "the one man who can do it" and certainly must make every possible effort to do so because his very country's survival is at stake. In

conjunction with and in support of the two-phase plan to end the war, Ky believes that there must be a significant strengthening of the government in Saigon to give it the power to deal with opposition to the two-phase plan. If he is unable to secure the Saigon support he needs in moving forward on the two-phase plan, he may as well not return to Paris since he would not have adequate backing to continue as supervisor of the South Vietnamese side of the negotiations.

1. Beginning with his first session in Paris with Ambassador Harriman, Ky has been apprehensive over Harriman's obvious pre-occupations with moving ahead, in Ky's opinion too quickly, in solving the procedural issues with the North Vietnamese, with the obvious hope for some major breakthrough in a settlement of the Vietnam problem with which Harriman could climax a long and distinguished career in government service. Ky, who has been operating under explicit instructions from President Thieu on how far to go beyond the "two sides" approach to the talks, has in fact exceeded these instructions and obtained Thieu's after-the-fact approval in suggesting different seating and speaking priority arrangements, all of which, in Ky's opinion were reasonable ones and all of which have been rejected by the North Vietnamese. Ky feels that he has acted in good faith and that the Communist side is stalling in the hope of exploiting the differences of opinion on the U. S. /GVN side on how to proceed in the negotiations in Paris. Ky is still the only man on the GVN side in a position to propose and pursue a new approach to break this impasse. He considers that the parties have arrived at a significant and critical turning point in the war in Vietnam, and will continue to try to do so for the South Vietnamese side. (Ky felt that Ambassador Harriman must have taken him for "a very young and naive person" when Ambassador Harriman stated that, in view of the short time remaining before January 20th when he would be replaced, his principal desire was to make some progress on prisoner-of-war exchange, since this was one matter specifically urged on him by President Johnson. It was strange to Ky that Harriman would think Ky gullible enough to believe this when it is obvious he would like to cap his career with a Vietnamese settlement -- particularly trying for Ky when the Paris Talks are so totally relevant to the political survival of his country and he wants to be careful and as certain as is possible to make all the right initial moves in Paris, and without being hurried or pressured to make them.)

2. Ky has proposed a two-phase plan to be negotiated without NLF participation to solve the Vietnamese conflict, and has obtained President Thieu's approval for the plan. The first phase would be to negotiate and implement a withdrawal of the American and North Vietnamese military forces from South Vietnam, with the withdrawal

properly supervised by some international group and coupled with a re-establishment of the Demilitarized Zone at the 17th parallel. Once adequate evidence of this North Vietnamese withdrawal becomes apparent, phase two would begin involving the GVN's de facto recognition of the NLF and permit the latter to participate in the social and political life of South Vietnam, including organizing as a political party, although doubtless not under the banner of Communism, and culminating in the constitutionally-provided elections in 1971. This second phase would not only give the NLF the opportunity to prove its claim of broad nationwide support in opposition to the Thieu-Ky "puppet" government, but would be arrived at under democratic conditions between the South Vietnamese people themselves.

3. Ky "does not know" what kind of policy the incoming Nixon administration will adopt toward the Vietnam solution, but believes that even if it should develop to be a less flexible and "tougher" one than at present, it would be compatible with what the GVN's own interests now dictate, namely that a critical turning point in the war has arrived and that new and far-reaching initiatives must be taken by the South Vietnamese themselves. In this regard, this two-phase proposal is very similar to Ky's understanding of the Kissinger plan (which he read a translation of for the first time on 20 December) to end the war in Vietnam -- a military withdrawal by North Vietnamese and American forces, direct negotiations between the GVN and NLF on the political future of South Vietnam, and a rejection of an imposed coalition government. If the withdrawal of American forces should begin soon and in considerable numbers, the GVN must be prepared to go it alone with only materiel support from the Americans in the future, and this would be an additional reason for the GVN to move forward phase two of recognizing the NLF and working out a political settlement with them. It should be noted that this move by the GVN in granting de facto recognition to the NLF would be in fact a major concession on the part of the GVN, and is a move long opposed by the government leaders, and of course by the many militant elements of South Vietnam. Beyond the move of de facto recognition, Ky has no present plan for the details of how the discussion with the NLF should proceed. Initially they might be held secretly, but certainly the detailed aspects should not be announced as part of the two-phase plan, since otherwise they would be construed as "conditions" which both sides would then debate and attack, thereby hindering resolution of the problems.

4. Ky's two phase plan is not proposed with the intent to circumvent the present Paris Talks, or evade the basic purpose for the four parties meeting in Paris. Instead it is an effort to jump over the present impasse over procedures, and get to the basic issues hopefully much sooner. Ky feels that the Communist side would be hard pressed for any rational answer which would disagree with the two-phase proposal since it meets squarely two of their stated interests, withdrawal of

American forces, and recognition of the NLF as a political entity. On the latter point, Ky feels that the GVN "must be realistic" and recognize what in fact does exist, a political organization in the form of the NLF which has some degree of backing and support in South Vietnam. Ky also feels that the Communist side, and specifically the NLF, would accept this proposal in due course.

5. In conjunction with and in support of the two-phase plan, there must be a significant strengthening of the government in Saigon to give it the power to deal effectively with the South Vietnamese militant elements opposition to the plan. Ky, "speaking frankly," does not know what form this might take but does feel that five or six new men, for example, General Nguyen Duc Thang, added to the top structure of the government could have the desired favorable impact. Ky has waited patiently for President Thieu to "do it his own way" for about one year now, and feels there is too much drift and not enough decisive moves to galvanize broader elements of South Vietnamese society in support of government actions, particularly important now in view of the difficult days just ahead.

6. At this juncture of the situation in South Vietnam and in the Paris peace talks, Ky feels that a critical turning point has been reached and that the GVN must make a major move soon to avoid a prolonged and fruitless bickering over procedural matters and other minor preliminary discussions. Ky is therefore returning to Saigon about 22 December for discussions with President Thieu and other GVN leaders, and to push for the adoption and implementation of the two-phase plan to end the war. If Ky is unable to secure backing for this proposal, (although he feels he will be able to do so) he feels that there will be no point in his returning to Paris to continue as supervisor of the South Vietnamese side, because he will have been discredited and will be without the support of the government he is supposed to represent.

24

1968 DEC 22 16 22

DEC 22 AM 11:27  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

*Prin file*

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OO WTE 17 BETHESDA  
DE WTE 4662

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH82915

UNCLAS

HEREWITH SIHANOUK RESPONDS IN PUBLIC TO YOUR LETTER.

(TEXT) PRINCE SIHANOUK HAS SENT TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

MAY I THANK YOU FOR THE PERSONAL MESSAGE I RECEIVED TODAY THROUGH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. LIKE YOU, I HAVE ALWAYS HOPED FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE TROUBLED OUR RELATIONS; THAT IS WHY MY GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN TO MR EUGENE BLACK, YOUR SPECIAL ADVISER WHO VISITED US SOME MONTHS AGO, ALL ASSESSMENTS CONCERNING THE DELICATE SITUATION OF CAMBODIA ENCIRCLED BY BELLIGERENT NEIGHBORS.

SOME HOUR BEFORE YOUR MESSAGE REACHED ME, I HAD READ MY DECISION TO RELEASE IMMEDIATELY THE CREW OF THE LCU ARRESTED BY OUR FORCES WHEN IT WAS IN OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS, AS WELL AS THE VIETNAMESE SOLDIER ABOARD THE SHIP. I WANT THESE SERVICEMEN TO (WORD INDISTINCT) AND THEN CELEBRATE CHRISTMAS AT HOME. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR APPEAL, I HAVE ALSO ORDERED THE RELEASE OF A WOUNDED SOLDIER WHO JUMPED FROM HIS HELICOPTER SHOT DOWN BY OUR ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS. HE HAS BEEN GIVEN OUR BEST MEDICAL CARE.

I SINCERELY WISH THAT THESE GESTURES OF GOODWILL WOULD HELP INFORM YOUR COMPATRIOTS THAT CAMBODIA WANTS NOTHING MORE THAN TO LIVE PEACEFULLY AND IN GOOD TERMS WITH ALL, AND TO MAINTAIN ITS HONOR, ITS DIGNITY, AND ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WITHIN ITS PRESENT FRONTIERS.

DTG 221533Z DEC 68

PRESERVATION COPY

1968 DEC 22 16 51

25

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OO WTE17 BETHESDA  
DE WTE 4661

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAPS2914

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 92-154 and 92-155  
By WJ/ISP NARA, Date 1-26-98

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 22, 1968

SEC. RUSK WILL BE REVIEWING AND DISCUSSING WITH YOU DURING THE DAY THE FOLLOWING DRAFT TEXTS OF PLANNED STATEMENTS AND PRESS RELEASE WHICH WIN BROWN MADE AVAILABLE TO SEOUL ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS LAST NIGHT.

I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH SEC. RUSK. HE APPROVES THE DRAFT STATEMENT TO BE MADE BY THE WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT. HE PLANS TO MODIFY AND SHORTEN THE DRAFT STATEMENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE. THE MAIN POINT WILL BE: TO PUT ON THE RECORD THE WOODWARD STATEMENT MADE BEFORE THE SIGNING.

YOU SHOULD ALSO KNOW THE FOLLOWING:

- THE NORTH KOREANS PLAN A BIG RADIO-TV SHOW AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING AND RELEASE OF THE PRISONERS;
- ASIDE FROM THESE STATEMENTS, WE PLAN ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY A DETAILED NAVY BRIEFING ON THE FACTS AS WE KNOW THEM;
- BEFORE COMMITTING OURSELVES TO THAT FULL BRIEFING, WE WISH TO TALK WITH THE CAPTAIN OF THE PUEBLO AND ITS KEY OFFICERS TO BE ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENT THAT THERE WAS, IN FACT, NO INTRUSION.

FULL TEXT FOLLOWS.

1. FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF PLANNED STATEMENTS AND PRESS RELEASE. NOT YET CLEARED BY SECSTATE OR WHITE HOUSE.
2. QUOTE PRESS STATEMENT BY STATE SPOKESMAN FOLLOWING RELEASE OF THE CREW.
3. QUOTE THE CREW OF THE USS PUEBLO WAS FREED TODAY AT PANMUNJOM. THEY WILL IMMEDIATELY BE GIVEN MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS AND RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES. THEIR FAMILIES WILL MEET THEM IN SAN DIEGO.
4. QUOTE THE AGREEMENT TO FREE THE MEN INVOLVED THE ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH SIDES OF THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE. GENERAL WOODWARD, OUR NEGOTIATOR, SIGNED A DOCUMENT PREPARED BY THE NORTH KOREANS, TEXT OF WHICH IS ATTACHED. HE MADE A FORMAL STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD JUST BEFORE SIGNING. THE TEXT OF HIS STATEMENT HAD EARLIER BEEN TRANSMITTED TO THE NORTH KOREANS AND THEY HAD ACCEPTED OUR REQUIREMENT THAT THIS STATEMENT BE COUPLED WITH THE SIGNATURE OF THEIR DOCUMENT.

**OUR STATEMENT READ:**

5. INNER QUOTE THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE PUEBLO, AS CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PANMUNJOM AND IN PUBLIC, HAS BEEN THAT THE SHIP WAS NOT ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITY, THAT THERE IS NO CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE SHIP AT ANY TIME INTRUDED INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS CLAIMED BY NORTH KOREA, AND THAT WE COULD NOT APOLOGIZE FOR ACTIONS WHICH WE DID NOT BELIEVE TOOK PLACE. THE DOCUMENT WHICH I AM GOING TO SIGN WAS PREPARED BY THE NORTH KOREANS AND IS AT VARIANCE WITH THE ABOVE POSITION, BUT MY SIGNATURE WILL NOT AND CANNOT ALTER THE FACTS. I WILL SIGN THE DOCUMENT TO FREE THE CREW AND ONLY TO FREE THE CREW. END INNER QUOTE.

6. QUOTE GENERAL WOODWARD THEN SIGNED THE NORTH KOREAN DOCUMENT AND RECEIVED THE CUSTODY OF THE CREW.

7. QUOTE AS HE SAID, GENERAL WOODWARD PLACED HIS NAME ON THE FALSE NORTH KOREAN DOCUMENT FOR ONE REASON ONLY: TO OBTAIN THE FREEDOM OF THE CREW WHO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND HAVE BEEN ILLEGALLY HELD AS HOSTAGES BY THE NORTH KOREANS FOR JUST ELEVEN MONTHS. HE MADE CLEAR THAT HIS SIGNATURE DID NOT IMPLY THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE NUMEROUS FALSE STATEMENTS IN THAT DOCUMENT. INDEED THE PRIOR ACCEPTANCE BY THE NORTH KOREANS OF THE STATEMENT WHICH GENERAL WOODWARD READ INTO THE RECORD JUST BEFORE SIGNING SHOWS CLEARLY THEIR RECOGNITION OF OUR POSITION THAT THE FACTS OF THE CASE CALL FOR NEITHER AN ADMISSION OF GUILT NOR FOR AN APOLOGY. END QUOTE

8. QUOTE STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN FOLLOWING RELEASE OF CREW.

9. QUOTE THE PRESIDENT HAS JUST BEEN INFORMED THAT THE 82 SURVIVING CREW MEMBERS OF THE USS PUEBLO AND THE BODY OF THE ONE DECEASED MEMBER HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO AMERICAN AUTHORITIES AT PANMUNJOM. HE HAS ASKED ME TO ISSUE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

10. QUOTE I AM DEEPLY GRATIFIED THAT AFTER A LONG ELEVEN MONTHS OF TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED DETENTION BY THE NORTH KOREANS, THE CREW OF THE USS PUEBLO HAVE BEEN FREED. THEY SHOULD BE REUNITED WITH THEIR FAMILIES IN TIME FOR CHRISTMAS AND I AM HAPPY FOR THEM THAT THEIR ORDEAL ENDS ON A NOTE OF JOY.

11. QUOTE I WANT TO PAY TRIBUTE ALSO TO THE PATIENCE AND COURAGE OF THESE RELATIVES WHILE THEIR HUSBANDS, FATHERS AND SONS WERE HELD BY THE NORTH KOREANS.

12. QUOTE THE NEGOTIATIONS AT PANMUNJOM WERE CRUELLY DRAWN OUT AND I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH THE PUEBLO FAMILIES SHOWED THROUGH THE LONG AND PAINFUL PERIOD DURING WHICH THEIR GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT TO FREE THE CREW.

13. QUOTE I MUST EXPRESS MY DEEP SORROW OVER THE DEATH OF ONE CREW MEMBER, SEAMAN DUANE D. HODGES, WHO WAS KILLED WHILE ENDEAVORING TO CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES DURING THE SEIZURE OF THE SHIP.

14. QUOTE I ALSO WANT TO THANK OUR NEGOTIATOR AT PANMUNJOM, GENERAL GILBERT H. WOODWARD. HE CARRIED OUT HIS DIFFICULT AND SUCCESSFUL ASSIGNMENT WITH DISTINCTION AND HAS PRESERVED THE INTEGRITY OF THE UNITED STATES WHILE OBTAINING THE RELEASE OF THE MEN OF THE PUEBLO. END QUOTE

**15. QUOTE STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK (FOR TV)**

16. QUOTE A FEW HOURS AGO THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE AT PANMUNJOM OBTAINED THE RELEASE OF THE 82 SURVIVING CREW MEMBERS OF THE USS PUEBLO WHO LAST JANUARY WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED WITH THEIR SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS.

17. QUOTE THE MEN ARE NOW ON THEIR WAY TO AN AMERICAN ARMY HOSPITAL NEAR SEOUL AND WILL FLY FROM THERE TO SAN DIEGO AFTER THEIR IMMEDIATE MEDICAL NEEDS HAVE BEEN MET. THE BODY OF SEAMAN DUANE D. HODGES, SAID BY THE NORTH KOREANS TO HAVE BEEN KILLED AT THE TIME THE SHIP WAS CAPTURED, HAS ALSO BEEN RETURNED.

18. QUOTE I WANT TO EXPRESS DEEP GRATIFICATION THAT THIS CHRISTMAS HOMECOMING WILL BE POSSIBLE.

19. QUOTE THE MEN WERE RELEASED AFTER LONG AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS. THE NORTH KOREAN NEGOTIATOR INSISTED FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE MEN WOULD NOT BE RELEASED UNLESS THE UNITED STATES FALSELY CONFESSED TO ESPIONAGE AND TO VIOLATIONS OF NORTH KOREAN TERRITORY AND APOLOGIZED FOR THESE "CRIMES."

20. QUOTE WE CONSISTENTLY REFUSED THESE DEMANDS. WE REPEATEDLY OFFERED TO EXPRESS OUR REGRETS IF SHOWN VALID EVIDENCE OF A TRANSGRESSION. BUT THIS GOVERNMENT HAD AND HAS NO CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE PUEBLO IN ANY WAY VIOLATED HER SAILING ORDERS AND INTRUDED INTO WATERS CLAIMED BY NORTH KOREA. ON THE CONTRARY, WE HAVE STRONG REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SO-CALLED EVIDENCE, AS WELL AS THE CONFESSIONS, PRESENTED BY THE NORTH KOREANS WAS DELIBERATELY FALSIFIED.

21. QUOTE AFTER TEN MONTHS OF NEGOTIATIONS, DURING WHICH WE MADE EVERY SORT OF REASONABLE OFFER, ALL OF WHICH WERE HARSHLY REJECTED, WE HAD COME SQUARELY UP AGAINST A MOST PAINFUL PROBLEM: HOW TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE CREW WITHOUT HAVING THIS GOVERNMENT SEEM TO ATTEST TO STATEMENTS WHICH SIMPLY ARE NOT TRUE. THEN, WITHIN THE PAST WEEK, A WAY WHICH DOES JUST THAT WAS FOUND, AND FINALLY ACCEPTED BY THE NORTH KOREANS. APPARENTLY THE NORTH KOREANS BELIEVE THERE IS PROPAGANDA VALUE EVEN IN A WORTHLESS DOCUMENT WHICH GENERAL WOODWARD PUBLICLY LABELED FALSE BEFORE HE SIGNED IT. IF SO I AM GLAD, FOR IT MADE POSSIBLE THE HAPPY FAMILY REUNIONS WHICH WILL NOW TAKE PLACE AND THE WORLD WILL NOW BE ABLE TO KNOW THE TRUE FACTS OF THE PUEBLO SEIZURE.

22. QUOTE THE DETAILS OF THIS PROCEDURE ARE IN THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT AND IN YOUR NEWSPAPERS. THE MEN ARE FREE. OUR POSITION ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE HAS NOT ALTERED BY ONE INCH.

23. QUOTE DURING THESE PAINFUL MONTHS, I MET WITH THE FAMILIES OF A NUMBER OF THE CREW. I WANT TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH RELATIVES HAVE SHOWN TOWARD OUR EFFORTS TO FREE THE MEN, EVEN AT TIMES WHEN IT SEEMED THAT THESE EFFORTS WERE GETTING NOWHERE.

24. QUOTE AND YOU, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, DESERVE GREAT CREDIT. THIS HAS BEEN A MOST FRUSTRATING EPISODE. THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW AMONG US WHO COUNSELLED EITHER VIOLENT REPRISALS OR ABJECT SURRENDER TO THE NORTH KOREAN DEMANDS. BUT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF OUR PEOPLE HAVE KEPT THEIR HEADS. AND THE CREW HAS NOW BEEN RELEASED IN TIME TO HAVE CHRISTMAS WITH THEIR LOVED ONES. END QUOTE

26

ACTION

Saturday, December 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Ambassador Vance

*Prepfile*

Cy Vance arrives in New York this evening, Saturday, December 21, and will be coming to Washington Sunday evening for consultation with State Department officials.

Ambassador Vance would be available to see you from Sunday evening on through the next several days.

W. W. Rostow

Set up appointment on Monday  
with Jim Jones \_\_\_\_\_

Not necessary to see Vance \_\_\_\_\_

Saturday  
December 28, 1968 - 10:00 AM

~~SECRET~~  
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~


*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Third Quarter FY 1969 Underground Nuclear Test Program  
(BOWLINE III)

The Atomic Energy Commission has submitted for your approval the AEC underground nuclear tests proposed for the third quarter underground nuclear test program (BOWLINE III). This program has been reviewed by the agencies represented on your Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and they have no objection to your approval of the recommended AEC program.

The proposed program consists of 14 tests:



6.1  
(a)

It is recommended that the AEC be requested to obtain specific Presidential approval in advance for the JORUM test. No PLOWSHARE program or DoD experiments are planned for the third quarter.

I recommend that you authorize the AEC to go ahead with the proposed program. If you agree, I will sign the attached memorandum to Chairman Seaborg.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_  
Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-204  
By jis, NARA, Date 8-21-03

CEJ:mb:12/20/68  
cc: Mr. Keeny

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

27a

~~SECRET~~  
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,  
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Third Quarter FY 1969 Underground Nuclear Test  
Program (BOWLINE III)

Reference is made to the request contained in your letter to the President of December 11, 1968, on behalf of the Atomic Energy Commission for approval of the underground nuclear tests planned for execution in the third quarter of FY 1969 (BOWLINE III).

The testing program as described in your letter, except for JORUM, is approved. It consists of 13 tests sponsored by the AEC. Approval of the JORUM event is withheld at this time and will require specific advance Presidential approval.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-204  
By is NARA, Date 8-20-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

28

ACTION

Saturday, December 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Message to Mrs. Harold Holt

On December 22, 1967, you attended memorial services in Melbourne for Prime Minister Harold Holt.

For your approval is a warm message from you and Mrs. Johnson to Mrs. Holt.

"Dear Zara:

"Our thoughts are with you in these December days, as they were a year ago in your time of grief. We are thinking also of Harold, and of the magnificent contribution which he made to the enduring friendship between our countries. America will always remember him, and of course, so will we.

Affectionately,

Lyndon and Lady Bird Johnson"

*Walt* Rostow

Saturday,  
December 21, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Group~~  
2. Press file

Mr. President.

Haile Selassie has called for a holiday truce in Nigeria, and Nick Katzenbach urges that you support him with a public statement of your own (attached).

This is a good move in itself, but we hope we can use it as an entering wedge for other efforts to keep the fighting stopped so we can get on with the relief job. As the proposed statement says, the only way we will ever get the relief program moving effectively is to have an end to the fighting. We're not overly optimistic, but we think this is a good move.

We recommend you approve this to be issued as early today as possible.

Harold H. Saunders

Approve \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By MS, NARA, Date 2-24-98

29a



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presidential Statement Supporting Call  
for Christmas Truce in Nigerian Civil War

Recommendation:

That you authorize the issuance of the attached statement supporting Emperor Haile Selassie's appeal for a Christmas Truce in the Nigerian Civil War.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

We and the British have urged the Emperor to make such an appeal. He has now done so privately to both sides and will probably broadcast the appeal during the night of December 20. The attached statement would be issued only if the Emperor's appeal is made public. I have discussed this recommendation with Secretary Rusk, who concurs.

*Arthur S. Hays Sulzberger*  
Under Secretary

Enclosure:  
Draft statement.

29b

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia, has appealed to both sides in the Nigerian civil war to observe a week-long truce on the occasion of Christmas and the Muslim holiday of 'Id al-Fitr.

I wish to express the heartfelt support of the American people for this statesmanlike act. We earnestly hope that all nations will join us in urging the parties in this tragic conflict to accept this truce.

The Nigerian Government has already issued orders for a two-day cease-fire. It is the fervent desire of all Americans that this action will be reciprocated by the Biafran authorities and that both sides will agree to extend this arrangement to the full period proposed by the Emperor.

A cease-fire, however brief, will be a precious respite from the bloodshed and destruction that has stricken Nigeria. But silencing the guns for seven days will not alone save the millions who face starvation or heal the deep wounds dividing a great nation.

Only the end of fighting will permit a deeply concerned world to provide the necessary quantities of food and medicine to those in desperate need on both sides of the lines of battle. From this pause we hope that both sides will summon new courage to make peace.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, December 19, 1968, 8:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Vice President Ky Proposes New Negotiating Plan

Vice President Ky is putting together a new negotiating package which he hopes will get the Paris discussions away from haggling over minor matters and into the heart of substantive issues.

Our first knowledge of the proposal came in a discussion which Ky initiated with Bill Jordan in Paris. Jordan's reporting telegram is attached. This afternoon, on instructions from Ky, South Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Diem called on Secretary Rusk to discuss the proposal. From [redacted] we learn that Ambassador Bui Diem will also discuss the plan with "the other side" -- obvious reference to Mr. Nixon's associates.

3.4  
(b)(1)

If the plan is favorably received, Vice President Ky plans to make it public at a press conference in Paris Saturday or possibly on a television appearance Sunday. Following his consultations here, Ambassador Bui Diem has been ordered to return to Paris to report directly to Vice President Ky.

The initial reaction of Secretary Rusk and Bill Bundy is quite positive to the general idea of a South Vietnamese statement that really shows serious thinking about the substance and the procedure for getting on toward a settlement. A statement made ~~not~~ later than December 23 would have major advantages in catching U. S. and world tension and would tend to counter the impression that the South Vietnamese are responsible for preventing progress in Paris.

Cables have gone to Paris asking our delegation to obtain the text of the plan and to Saigon to insure that President Thieu supports it as Vice President Ky states. We are not committing ourselves at this stage either to the plan or to the substance of the statement.

The Ky proposal, as we now understand it, consists of a two-phased offer to be made in hope of breaking the present log jam.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-200  
By *us*, NARA, Date 9-9-03

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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1. In the first phase of the new talks, the subject matter would be

- reestablishment of the 7th parallel
- arrangements for the phased withdrawal of North Vietnamese, American and other allied forces from South Vietnam.

2. A second phase would follow as soon as the two matters mentioned above had been settled. The second phase would involve two separate steps

a. Direct talks between the Saigon and Hanoi governments regarding their relations, movement of persons and eventual reunification of the country by peaceful means.

b. Direct talks between Saigon Government and "all other political groups in the South, including the Liberation Front." These talks to take place in Paris, Saigon or anywhere else.

As soon as we receive more specific information about the plan from Paris and Saigon, a fuller analysis of it will be made and a recommendation as to what our attitude toward it should be will be sent to you promptly.

Bromley Smith

Attachment

BKS:amc

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



Department of State

WH 5 30a

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Z O 191530Z DEC 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9234  
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 2331  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO PARIS 25551

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

By *ff*, NARA, Date 2-24-98

DELTO 1078

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF PERSONAL CONVERSATION BETWEEN JORDEN  
AND KY, DECEMBER 18.

BEGIN MEMCON

1. VICE PRESIDENT KY SAW ME AT THE VIETNAMESE RECEPTION LAST NIGHT AND INVITED ME INTO A SEPARATE ROOM FOR A CHAT. HE KNEW ME FROM SEVERAL PREVIOUS MEETINGS IN SAIGON. WITH A NUMBER OF REPORTERS LOOKING ON THROUGH THE DOOR AND AMBASSADORS PAYING THEIR RESPECTS, WE DECIDED THE SETTING WAS TOO OBVIOUS. HE ASKED ME TO COME TO HIS RESIDENCE LATER IN THE EVENING. WE AGREED ON 10 P.M.

2. I WAS SHOWN INTO A SITTING ROOM IN THE BLVD. MAILLOT HOUSE. WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT CAME IN, MEMBERS OF THE STAFF DEPARTED AND WE WERE ALONE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE TALK--WHICH LASTED AN HOUR AND A HALF.

3. KY ASKED ME HOW I SAW THE PRESENT SITUATION. I SAID I THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN WINNING THE PROPAGANDA WAR BEGINNING WITH THE LIMITED CESSATION OF BOMBING IN MARCH. WE HAD SUFFERED A SETBACK WHEN SAIGON FAILED TO SEND A DELEGATION TO PARIS IN EARLY NOVEMBER. THAT HAD BEEN LARGELY OFFSET BY THE ARRIVAL OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AND HIS DELEGATION. BUT WE WERE NOW SLIPPING BADLY BECAUSE OF THE PROCEDURAL WRANGLE. PEOPLE IN THE U.S., ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, AND I THOUGHT EVEN IN VIET-NAM ITSELF, COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO UNDERSTAND OUR ARGUING OVER TABLE SHAPES AND WHO WOULD SPEAK IN WHAT ORDER WHILE THE FIGHTING AND DYING CONTINUED. THE SOONER WE COULD GET OVER PROCEDURAL HURDLES AND INTO DISCUSSION OF BRINGING THE WAR TO AN END, THE BETTER OUR POSITION WOULD BE. I SAID I THOUGHT WE WOULD HAVE NO GREAT DIFFICULTY IN MAKING OUR CASE ON SUCH THINGS AS THE DMZ AND WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. BUT I DIDN'T THINK WE COULD MAKE A NICKEL BY ARGUING PROCEDURAL FINE POINTS.

~~SECRET~~

4. KY SAID HE COULD NOT AGREE MORE. HE WAS FED UP WITH TALK ABOUT THIS KIND OF TABLE OR THAT. HE NOTED HE HAD STUCK HIS NECK OUT BY GOING ALONG WITH US ON THE "DIVIDED DOUGHNUT" AND ON DRAWING LOTS BY SIDES TO DETERMINE SPEAKING ORDER. BUT HE WOULD STAND BY THESE AGREEMENTS. THE IMPORTANT THING, HE SAID, IS TO MOVE THE DISCUSSION FROM THIS KIND OF TRIVIA INTO REAL SUBSTANCE.

5. HE HAD GIVEN THIS A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT. HE WAS PREPARED TO MAKE AN OFFER THAT WOULD, HE HOPED, BREAK THE LOGJAM. WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WAS A TWO-PHASED PROPOSAL FOR SERIOUS TALKS. IF THE "OTHER SIDE" WOULD AGREE TO HIS APPROACH, HE COULDN'T CARE LESS ABOUT WHO SPOKE FIRST OR WHAT KIND OF TABLES WE SAT AT.

6. HIS PROPOSAL WAS AS FOLLOWS:

7. IN THE FIRST PHASE OF THE NEW TALKS, THE SUBJECT MATTER WOULD BE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 17TH PARALLEL (HE REPEATED THIS SEVERAL TIMES AND AVOIDED USE OF THE TERM "DMZ"), AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN AND OTHER ALLIED FORCES FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM. HE MENTIONED THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE POLICING MACHINERY FOR THE 17TH PARALLEL.

8. ONCE THESE TWO MATTERS HAD BEEN SETTLED (HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHETHER HE MEANT AGREEMENT ON THEM OR COMPLETION OF THE ACTIONS CONTEMPLATED), THERE WOULD BE A "SECOND PHASE" OF TALKS. THIS PHASE WOULD INVOLVE TWO SEPARATE STEPS:

9. -- FIRST, DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE SAIGON AND HANOI GOVERNMENTS REGARDING THEIR RELATIONS, MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, AND EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY BY PEACEFUL MEANS. REUNIFICATION WOULD HAVE TO BE BY THE FREELY EXPRESSED WILL OF THE PEOPLE, NORTH AND SOUTH. IN CONNECTION WITH THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, KY SAID THERE SHOULD BE SOME ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY ANYONE NOW IN THE SOUTH WHO WISHED TO GO TO NORTH VIET-NAM WOULD BE PERMITTED TO DO SO AND, BY THE SAME TOKEN, THOSE IN THE NORTH WHO WISHED TO MOVE SOUTH SHOULD HAVE THAT CHANCE.

10. -- SECOND, DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN THE GVN AND "ALL OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE SOUTH, INCLUDING THE LIBERATION FRONT." KY THOUGHT THESE TALKS COULD TAKE PLACE IN PARIS, OR SAIGON, OR "ANYWHERE ELSE."

11. KY THOUGHT THIS WAS A REASONABLE PACKAGE. IT WOULD GET US INTO THE HEART OF THE CENTRAL ISSUES AND GET US AWAY FROM HAGGLING OVER MINOR MATTERS. IF THE OTHER SIDE AGREED TO THIS APPROACH, HE DIDN'T CARE WHAT KIND OF TABLES WE HAD OR WHO SPOKE FIRST.

12. KY SAID HE HAD ASKED AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM TO DISCUSS THIS  
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

5  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

054209

VV CRA837  
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DE RUFNCR 25551/2 3541550  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z O 191530Z DEC 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9235  
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 2332  
STATE GRNC  
BT

1968 DEC 19 AM 10 49

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 25551

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 1078

APPROACH WITH SECRETARY RUSK IN WASHINGTON (PROBABLY TODAY). HE CLAIMED THAT HE HAD PRESIDENT THIEU'S APPROVAL AS WELL AS THAT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IN TAKING THIS INITIATIVE.

13. NONETHELESS, HE ANTICIPATED SOME SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN SAIGON. HE THOUGHT THAT SOME OF THE ULTRA-NATIONALISTS WOULD BALK, ESPECIALLY AT THE IDEA OF DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE FRONT. BUT KY FELT HE COULD HANDLE THE SITUATION. IN ANY CASE, HE WAS PREPARED TO TAKE THE HEAT. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VITAL FOR HIM TO RETURN TO SAIGON AS SOON AS HE MADE THIS APPROACH, PRESUMABLY IN A PUBLIC STATEMENT. HE WOULD HAVE TO TALK THINGS OVER WITH FRIENDS IN THE MILITARY, WITH MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND WITH OTHER GROUPS. HE FELT CONFIDENT HE COULD BRING THEM AROUND.

14. HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS BEING A TOTALLY VIETNAMESE INITIATIVE. I WOULD BE A GRAVE MISTAKE IF THE ABOVE CAME FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE.

15. KY PROMISED TO SUPPLY ME WITH AN ENGLISH TEXT OF HIS DRAFT STATEMENT. HE AGREED THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS PROPOSAL BEFORE IT WAS MADE, AND HE ASSUMED THAT SECRETARY RUSK WOULD BE DISCUSSING IT WITH THE PRESIDENT AFTER AMBASSADOR DIEM RAISED IT. INFORMED OF AMBASSADOR VANCE'S PLAN TO RETURN TO THE U.S. THIS WEEKEND, KY SAID HE PRESUMED THE AMBASSADOR MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE PRESIDENT AS WELL. BUT I HAD THE CLEAR IMPRESSION KY WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF GETTING HIS INITIATIVE INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN EARLY NEXT WEEK AT THE LATEST, AND THAT HE WOULD THEN GO TO SAIGON IN TIME FOR CHRISTMAS.  
END MEMCON.

HARRIMAN  
BT

~~SECRET~~