

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
[dup #164, VAR 101-7, Box 161] #7 cable OPEN 8-29-03 NW/PAC 02-172	CAP 82961 Exempt 9-18-07 NL 306-93 (5/164) S 1 p. -	12/31/68	A
#15 cable SMITHED 7-2-03 NOV 02-219	CAP 82947, Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. SAME SKINIZATION 2-27-04 NW 02-205	12/28/68	A
#23 cable OPEN 2-27-04 NW 02-205	CAP 82937, Rostow to the President S 3 pp. [partial dup. #14a, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. 8," Box 124]	12/28/68	A
#27a memo	Katzenbach to the President re Korea S 7 pp. Section 8/6/01 ws 01-10 [dup. #78a, NSF, Country File, "Korea, Vol. 6," Box 256]	12/23/68	A
#33 memo	Rostow to the President, 7:15 p.m. S 2 pp. open 6-22-04 NLJ/PAC 02-171	12/26/68	A
#33a memo	Zwick to the President re weapons systems S 1 p. open 8-29-03 NW/PAC 02-172	12/7/68	A
#33b memo	Katzenbach to the President re MAP weapons S 2 pp. open 8-29-03 NW/PAC 02-172	11/25/68	A
#33c memo	Katzenbach to the President re MAP weapons S 3 pp. open 8-29-03 NW/PAC 02-172	11/25/68	A
#33d report	Military Assistance Program statistics S 2 pp. open 8-29-03 NW/PAC 02-172	[11/68]	A
#33e memo	Presidential Determination re MAP weapons S 1 p. open 8-29-03 NW/PAC 02-172	[11/68]	A
#42 memo	Rostow to the President, 1:30 p.m. re Israel S 1 p. open 6/29/02	12/26/68	A
#43b memo	Wheeler to Clifford re Defense budget C 1 p. open 6/29/02	12/19/68	A
#43c report	Statement by Chairman JCS on Defense budget TS 4 pp. open 8-29-03 NW/PAC 02-172	[12/68]	A
#43d report	Illustrative Examples on Defense budget S 1 p. open 8-29-03 NW/PAC 02-172	[12/68]	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 112, 12/26 - 12/31/68, Box 44

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

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Tuesday, December 31, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, are formal letters to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House reporting -- as required by our UN Participation Act -- extension of the Rhodesian sanctions.

These are routine letters. Secretary Rusk and his lawyers in State have been over them and recommend you sign. These follow on the Executive Order you issued July 29 to implement the Security Council decision of May 29, 1968 to extend the selective sanctions against the Smith regime. The procedure is the same as you followed in your letters to Congress in February 1967 reporting our earlier adherence to the sanctions.

This boils down only to a legal formality. We need your signature at both Tabs A and B.

W. W. Rostow

Encl: two ltrs for signature

HS:RM:lw

~~1. P~~
2. Pres file

Dear Mr. Vice President:

By virtue of my authority under Section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended, I issued on July 29 Executive Order No. 11419 relating to trade and other transactions involving Southern Rhodesia. It extends the mandatory selective sanctions imposed in Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967, which I transmitted to you on February 27, 1967. A copy of Executive Order 11419 is attached.

The current Order prohibits virtually all financial and trade transactions between the United States and Southern Rhodesia. I have delegated to the Secretaries of Commerce, Transportation, and Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the authority to promulgate such regulations as are necessary to carry out the Order.

The Executive Order implements the mandatory provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 253 unanimously adopted on May 29, on which the Representative of the United States voted affirmatively. In this resolution the Security Council determined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia continues to constitute a threat to peace under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and decided that all states should apply comprehensive mandatory sanctions against that territory in accordance with Articles 25 and 41 of the Charter. The Security Council thereby extended the selective sanctions imposed by its earlier Resolutions No. 217 of November 20, 1965 and No. 232 of December 16, 1966, taking note that the measures taken under these resolutions had failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end. A copy of Resolution No. 253 is attached.

The resolution requires all member states to extend the earlier prohibitions on imports from and exports to Southern

Rhodesia to cover all commodities and products except those needed for medical, educational and humanitarian purposes. The resolution also obligates each member state to prohibit activities promoting or calculated to promote such imports and exports, the shipment and transport of such articles in ships and aircraft of its registry or under charter to its nationals, transfers of funds and economic and other financial resources to persons and bodies in Southern Rhodesia, flights to Southern Rhodesia by aircraft of its registry or aircraft owned or chartered by its nationals, and coordinating operations with airline companies constituted in or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia.

I am submitting this report to the Congress in accordance with Section 4 of the United Nations Participation Act, as amended.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Hubert H. Humphrey
President of the Senate

LBJ:MS:RM:lw
12/23/68

Dear Mr. Speaker:

By virtue of my authority under Section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended, I issued on July 29 Executive Order No. 11419 relating to trade and other transactions involving Southern Rhodesia. It extends the mandatory selective sanctions imposed in Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967, which I transmitted to you on February 27, 1967. A copy of Executive Order 11419 is attached.

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Rhodesia to cover all commodities and products except those needed for medical, educational and humanitarian purposes. The resolution also obligates each member state to prohibit activities promoting or calculated to promote such imports and exports, the shipment and transport of such articles in ships and aircraft of its registry or under charter to its nationals, transfers of funds and economic and other financial resources to persons and bodies in Southern Rhodesia, flights to Southern Rhodesia by aircraft of its registry or aircraft owned or chartered by its nationals, and coordinating operations with airline companies constituted in or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia.

I am submitting this report to the Congress in accordance with Section 4 of the United Nations Participation Act, as amended.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
John W. McCormack
Speaker of the House of Representatives

LBJ:WWR:HS:RM:lw
12/23/68

Presidential Documents

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Title 3—THE PRESIDENT

Executive Order 11419

RELATING TO TRADE AND OTHER TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING SOUTHERN RHODESIA

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 620), as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, and considering the measures which the Security Council of the United Nations by Security Council Resolution No. 253 adopted May 29, 1968, has decided upon pursuant to article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, and which it has called upon all members of the United Nations, including the United States, to apply, it is hereby ordered:

SECTION 1. In addition to the prohibitions of section 1 of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967, the following are prohibited effective immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of this Order:

(a) Importation into the United States of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after May 29, 1968.

(b) Any activities by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States which promote or are calculated to promote the export from Southern Rhodesia after May 29, 1968, of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia, and any dealings by any such person in any such commodities or products, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings; *Provided*, however, that the prohibition against the dealing in commodities or products exported from Southern Rhodesia shall not apply to any such commodities or products which, prior to the date of this Order, had been lawfully imported into the United States.

(c) Carriage in vessels or aircraft of United States registration or under charter to any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after May 29, 1968.

(d) Sale or supply by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, or any other activities by any such person which promote or are calculated to promote the sale or supply, to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia of any commodities or products. Such activities, including carriage in vessels or aircraft, may be authorized with respect to supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, educational equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions, publications, news material, and foodstuffs required by special humanitarian circumstances.

(e) Carriage in vessels or aircraft of United States registration or under charter to any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States of any commodities or products consigned to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia, or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia.

(f) Transfer by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States directly or indirectly to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia of any funds or other financial or economic resources. Payments exclusively for pensions, for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes, for the provision of news material or for foodstuffs required by special humanitarian circumstances may be authorized.

(g) Operation of any United States air carrier or aircraft owned or chartered by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or of United States registration (i) to or from Southern Rhodesia or (ii) in coordination with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia.

SEC. 2. The functions and responsibilities for the enforcement of the foregoing prohibitions, and of those prohibitions of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967 specified below, are delegated as follows:

(a) To the Secretary of Commerce, the function and responsibility of enforcement relating to—

(i) the exportation from the United States of commodities and products other than those articles referred to in section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967; and

(ii) the carriage in vessels of any commodities or products the carriage of which is prohibited by section 1 of this Order or by section 1 of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967.

(b) To the Secretary of Transportation, the function and responsibility of enforcement relating to the operation of air carriers and aircraft and the carriage in aircraft of any commodities or products the carriage of which is prohibited by section 1 of this Order or by section 1 of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967.

(c) To the Secretary of the Treasury, the function and responsibility of enforcement to the extent not previously delegated in section 2 of Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967, and not delegated under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation shall exercise any authority which such officer may have apart from the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 or this Order so as to give full effect to this Order and Security Council Resolution No. 253.

SEC. 4. (a) In carrying out their respective functions and responsibilities under this Order, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Transportation shall consult with the Secretary of State. Each such Secretary shall consult, as appropriate, with other government agencies and private persons.

(b) Each such Secretary shall issue such regulations, licenses or other authorizations as he considers necessary to carry out the purposes of this Order and Security Council Resolution No. 253.

SEC. 5. (a) The term "United States," as used in this Order in a geographical sense, means all territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(b) The term "person" means an individual, partnership, association or other unincorporated body of individuals, or corporation.

SEC. 6. Executive Order No. 11322 of January 5, 1967, implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 232 of December 16, 1966, shall continue in effect as modified by sections 2, 3, and 4 of this Order.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 29, 1968.

[F.R. Doc. 68-0212; Filed, July 29, 1968; 4:07 p.m.]

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL



Do Not Remove
DISTR. 1
GENERAL

S/RES/253 (1968)
29 May 1968

RESOLUTION 253 (1968)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1428th meeting,
on 29 May 1968

The Security Council,

Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966,

Taking note of resolution 2262 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly on 3 November 1967,

Noting with great concern that the measures taken so far have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,

Reaffirming that, to the extent not superseded in this resolution, the measures provided for in resolutions 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation of those resolutions, shall continue in effect,

Gravely concerned that the measures taken by the Security Council have not been complied with by all States and that some States, contrary to resolution 232 (1966) of the Security Council and to their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, have failed to prevent trade with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia,

Condemning the recent inhuman executions carried out by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia which have flagrantly affronted the conscience of mankind and have been universally condemned,

Affirming the primary responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom to enable the people of Southern Rhodesia to achieve self-determination and independence, and in particular their responsibility for dealing with the prevailing situation,

Recognizing the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),

Reaffirming its determination that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security;

Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,

1. Condemns all measures of political repression, including arrests, detentions, trials and executions which violate fundamental freedoms and rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take all possible measures to put an end to such actions;

2. Calls upon the United Kingdom as the administering Power in the discharge of its responsibility to take urgently all effective measures to bring to an end the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, and enable the people to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

3. Decides that, in furtherance of the objective of ending the rebellion, all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution (whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or processing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by the port or other place where they are imported or stored);

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products from Southern Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any commodities or products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution;

(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodities or products (whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, educational equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions, publications, news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs) to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply;

(e) The shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration, or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage (whether or not in bond) by land transport facilities across their territories of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any person or body in Southern Rhodesia, or to any other person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Southern Rhodesia;

4. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall not make available to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking, including tourist enterprises, in Southern Rhodesia any funds for investment or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from making available to the régime or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Southern Rhodesia except payments exclusively for pensions or for strictly medical, humanitarian or educational purposes or for the provision of news material and in special humanitarian circumstances, food-stuffs;

5. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall:

(a) Prevent the entry into their territories, save on exceptional humanitarian grounds, of any person travelling on a Southern Rhodesian passport, regardless of its date of issue, or on a purported passport issued by or on behalf of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia; and

(b) Take all possible measures to prevent the entry into their territories of persons whom they have reason to believe to be ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia and whom they have reason to believe to have furthered or

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encouraged, or to be likely to further or encourage, the unlawful actions of the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia or any activities which are calculated to evade any measure decided upon in this resolution or resolution 252 (1966) of 16 December 1966;

6. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent airline companies constituted in their territories and aircraft of their registration or under charter to their nationals from operating to or from Southern Rhodesia and from linking up with any airline company constituted or aircraft registered in Southern Rhodesia;

7. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall give effect to the decisions set out in operative paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution;

8. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take all possible measures to prevent activities by their nationals and persons in their territories promoting, assisting or encouraging emigration to Southern Rhodesia, with a view to stopping such emigration;

9. Requests all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to take all possible further action under Article 41 of the Charter to deal with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, not excluding any of the measures provided in that Article;

10. Emphasizes the need for the withdrawal of all consular and trade representation in Southern Rhodesia, in addition to the provisions of operative paragraph 6 of resolution 217 (1965);

11. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter and reminds them that failure or refusal by any one of them to do so would constitute a violation of that Article;

12. Deplores the attitude of States that have not complied with their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter, and censures in particular those States which have persisted in trading with the illegal régime in defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council, and which have given active assistance to the régime;

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13. Urges all States Members of the United Nations to render moral and material assistance to the people of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle to achieve their freedom and independence;

14. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;

15. Requests States Members of the United Nations, the United Nations Organization, the specialized agencies, and other international organizations in the United Nations system to extend assistance to Zambia as a matter of priority with a view to helping her solve such special economic problems as she may be confronted with arising from the carrying out of these decisions of the Security Council;

16. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations, and in particular those with primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the implementation of the measures called for by the present resolution;

17. Considers that the United Kingdom as the administering Power should ensure that no settlement is reached without taking into account the views of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular the political parties favouring majority rule, and that it is acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole;

18. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General by 1 August 1968 on measures taken to implement the present resolution;

19. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation of this resolution, the first report to be made not later than 1 September 1968;

20. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a committee of the Security Council to undertake the following tasks and to report to it with its observations:

(a) To examine such reports on the implementation of the present resolution as are submitted by the Secretary-General;

/...

(b) To seek from any States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies such further information regarding the trade of that State (including information regarding the commodities and products exempted from the prohibition contained in operative paragraph 3 (d) above) or regarding any activities by any nationals of that State or in its territories that may constitute an evasion of the measures decided upon in this resolution as it may consider necessary for the proper discharge of its duty to report to the Security Council;

21. Requests the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to give maximum assistance to the committee, and to provide the committee with any information which it may receive in order that the measures envisaged in this resolution and resolution 252 (1966) may be rendered fully effective;

22. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations, or of the specialized agencies, as well as the specialized agencies themselves, to supply such further information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of this resolution;

23. Decides to maintain this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments.

May 29, 1968

VOTE: Resolution as a whole - 15 to 0
 Operative para. 15 - 13 (US) to 0, with 2 abstentions
 Soviet amendment to
 operative para. 15 - 7 to 0, with 8 (US) abstentions

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION
Friday, December 27, 1968

2
Pre file via post
swp

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to You from Prince Sihanouk and Proposed Reply

At Tab A is a letter from Prince Sihanouk dated December 20th, replying to your message requesting release of the eleven soldiers detained with the LCU 1577 and the helicopter crewman also detained in Cambodia. The letter was passed through the French Embassy. In it Prince Sihanouk says that he had announced his decision to release these men a few hours before your message reached him. He also states that he shares your hope for a solution to the problems which have troubled our relations.

At Tab B is a suggested reply expressing your pleasure at the release of the American soldiers in time to spend Christmas with their families and your thanks for the good treatment of the men, including excellent medical care accorded the wounded man.

I recommend that you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

cc: Marshall Wright

AJenkins:mm

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Unofficial Translation

Phnom Penh, December 20, 1968

Mr. President,

May I thank you for the personal message I received today through the French Government. Like you, I hope for a solution to the problems which have troubled our relations. That is why my Government gave to Mr. Black, your special adviser who visited us some months ago, all assessments concerning the delicate situation of Cambodia surrounded by belligerent neighbors.

A few hours before your message reached me, I had announced my decision to release immediately the crew of the LCU 1577 arrested when it was in our territorial waters, as well as a South Vietnamese soldier who was on board. I wanted these servicemen who had behaved themselves very well to be able to celebrate Christmas at home.

In response to your appeal, I have also ordered the release of a wounded soldier who had jumped from a helicopter shot down by our anti-aircraft guns. He has been given the best medical care.

I sincerely wish that these gestures of good will will help your compatriots to understand that Cambodia wants nothing more than to live in peace and on good terms with all in honor, dignity, and territorial integrity within its present frontiers.

With my best wishes for you and yours in these holidays of the end of the year.

Norodom Sihanouk

JAN 8 1969

JAN 8 1969

Your Royal Highness:

I was delighted to learn of Your Royal Highness' decision to release the American soldiers. Those from the LCU 1577 are now at their homes, celebrating Christmas with their families and I am sure that the family of the wounded helicopter crewman is rejoicing to know that he is free and will be reunited with them as soon as he is able to travel.

I and my Government are grateful to Your Royal Highness and to your Government for the excellent medical care accorded this wounded man, as well as for the good treatment of the men from the LCU 1577.

My family joins me in reciprocating Your Royal Highness' kind wishes at this holiday season.

Sincerely,



His Royal Highness
Prince Norodom Sihanouk
Phnom Penh, Cambodia

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1968 DEC 31 23 07

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82971

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 10585
By mg/ir NARA, Date 1-12-98

SECRET
DEC 31 PM 6:23
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ HARVAN

DECEMBER 31, 1968

HEREWITH THE INSTRUCTIONS AGREED IN SAIGON FOR VANCE ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES. IT REPRESENTS PROGRESS; BUT VANCE WILL PROBABLY REGARD IT AS SOMEWHAT TOO RESTRICTIVE. VANCE PROBABLY WANTS TO BE ABLE TO ACCEPT A SIMPLE ROUND TABLE; BUT WE SHALL SEE. BUNKER'S ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING FOLLOWS TEXT.

SAIGON 45839

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF PROPOSED REVISED NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES, AS WORKED OUT AT MEETING WITH THIEU AND THANH DECEMBER 31 AND CHECKED SUBSEQUENTLY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THANH LATER SAME EVENING.

1. BEGIN TEXT. THE GVN AND THE US DELEGATION ARE INSTRUCTED AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE ISSUE IS THAT THERE BE NO NAME PLATES OR FLAGS. THE SHAPE OF THE TABLE AND THE SYSTEM OF DRAWING LOTS ARE IMPORTANT, BUT IF THE PRINCIPLE OF TWO SIDES IS PRESERVED, THEY ARE OF LESS IMPORTANCE THAN FLAGS OR NAME PLATES.

B. WE WILL MAKE CLEAR TO HANOI THAT THESE THREE ISSUES-- NAME PLATES, FLAGS, AND TABLE SHAPE, AND THE METHOD OF DRAWING LOTS--MUST BE SETTLED AS A PACKAGE. WE WILL NOT NEGOTIATE EACH ONE SEPARATELY, ONLY TO FIND OURSELVES CONFRONTED WITH DELAYS ON THE REMAINING ISSUES.

C. AT THE NEXT MEETING WITH LAU, AMBASSADOR VANCE MAY PROPOSE VARIOUS PROPOSALS WHILE PRESERVING THE TWO-SIDED CONCEPT. HE WILL HAVE FLEXIBILITY TO BARGAIN WITHIN THE LIMITS LAID DOWN BELOW:

2. NO FLAGS OR NAME PLATES: SINCE FLAGS AND NAME-PLATES WOULD MAKE THE CONFERENCE APPEAR FOUR-SIDED, WHICH WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO, WE WILL MAKE NO CONCESSION ON THIS POINT.

3. SEATING ARRANGEMENTS: AMBASSADOR VANCE WILL HAVE FLEXIBILITY TO BARGAIN WITHIN THE FOLLOWING LINES:

Free file

A. A CONTINUOUS CIRCULAR TABLE, WITH TWO STAFF AREAS AT MIDPOINT AT A LOWER LEVEL.

B. A CONTINUOUS CIRCULAR TABLE WITH THE CIRCLE BISECTED BY A TABLE IN THE MIDDLE, FORMING A DIAMETER.

C. TWO PARALLEL TABLES JOINED ON THE ENDS BY HALF CIRCULAR TABLES THUS FORMING ONE CONTINUOUS TABLE. THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATIONS TO SIT ON THE TWO PARALLEL SIDES. (THE ARCS CAN BE VACANT OR OCCUPIED BY STAFF.)

D. A CONTINUOUS CIRCULAR TABLE WITH TWO AREAS WITH OR WITHOUT STAFF), SET OFF BY COLORED BAIZE, SEPARATING THE TWO SIDES.

E. A SOLID ROUND TABLE (NO HOLE IN THE MIDDLE) WITH A STRIP OF BAIZE MARKING THE DIAMETER AND SEPARATING THE SIDES.

F. A CONTINUOUS CIRCULAR TABLE AT WHICH THE TWO SIDES ARE SEPARATED BY A TABLE BUTTRESSED AGAINST THE OUTSIDE OF THE ROUND TABLE, WITH OR WITHOUT BAIZE TO DISTINGUISH THE STAFF AREA.

4. DRAWING LOTS FOR ORDER OF SPEAKING:

A. OUR PREFERENCE IS TO DRAW LOTS, WINNING SIDE TO START, CHOOSE ITS OPENING SPEAKER AND COMPLETE ITS STATEMENT. THE SYSTEM WOULD BE AABB AND THE SIDES WOULD ALTERNATE AT SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS.

B. IF HANOI INSISTS ON A DIFFERENT SPEAKING ORDER, WE WILL OFFER TO DRAW LOTS ON TWO SYSTEMS: AABB OR ABBA, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT A AND B REFER TO SIDES. THIS WILL REQUIRE A SUBSEQUENT DRAWING TO DETERMINE WHICH SIDE SPEAKS FIRST.

C. AS TO WHICH SIDE STARTS, WE WILL PROPOSE THESE ALTERNATIVES:

(1) DRAWING FROM TWO LOTS, WINNING SIDE TO START.

(2) IF HANOI WISHES FOUR LOTS, WE PROPOSE FOUR LOTS OF TWO DIFFERENT COLORS. I.E. TWO RED, TWO YELLOW. THE SIDE WINNING WILL SPEAK FIRST.

SAIGON 45838

1. AT RESUMED MEETING WITH THIEU AND THANH THIS AFTERNOON, WHICH LASTED TWO HOURS, THEY AGREED TO SIX PROPOSALS FOR TABLE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH FALL SHORT OF OUR PAPER, AND SOME COMPROMISES IN THE DIRECTION OF OUR PROPOSALS ON ORDER OF SPEAKING. WE ARE DRAWING UP PROPOSED REVISED NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTION FOR OUR DELEGATIONS TO AVOID ANY DISCREPANCIES IN THE UNDERSTANDINGS AS THEY MIGHT BE CONVEYED TO PARIS. WE HOPE TO CABLE THE WORDING FOR DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION LATER TODAY.

[2]

2. AT EACH OF THE TWO SESSIONS, I BEGAN BY PUTTING STRONGLY TO THIEU AND THANH OUR STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE ADVERSE TEND IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION MUST BE REVERSED QUICKLY IF IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IS TO BE AVERTED. I SAID THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SIMPLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND PROLONGED ARGUMENT OVER PROCEDURAL MATTERS, AND EVEN THE STRONGER SUPPORTERS OF OUR POLICY ARE GETTING IMPATIENT OVER THESE DELAYS. I STRESSED THAT GVN MUST REALIZE THAT FURTHER DELAY IN GETTING TO SUBSTANTIVE TALKS COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE GVN POSITION IN THE U.S. FOR WHICH NO PROGRESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD COULD COMPENSATE. IT WAS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE DEVELOP A NEGOTIATING POSITION WHICH WOULD PUT HANOI ON THE DEFENSIVE AND WOULD CLEARLY SADDLE THEM WITH THE BLAME IF SUBSTANTIVE TALKS DID NOT GET UNDERWAY PROMPTLY.

3. FOLLOWING ARE ROUGH OUTLINES, PENDING ACTUAL WORDING WHICH WE ARE CHECKING WITH THANH BEFORE TRANSMISSION. RE TABLES, WHILE I WAS UNABLE TO GET THIEU TO ACCEPT ROUND TABLE OR THE RESERVED POSITION, THEY DID COME UP WITH FOLLOWING POSSIBILITIES:

A. CIRCULAR TABLE WITH RECESSED AREAS AT THE EXTREME OF THE DIAMETER, AS EARLIER DISCUSSED;

B. CIRCULAR TABLE WITH SEGMENTS OF DIFFERENT-COLORED BAIZE AT THE EXTREMES OF THE DIAMETER.

C. CIRCULAR TABLE WITH A DIAMETER-TABLE ACROSS THE MIDDLE;

D. SVN OVAL CONSISTING OF PARALLEL TABLES CONNECTED BY HALF ROUNDS;

E. SOLID ROUND TABLE DIVIDED BY COLORED BAIZE STRIP;

F. CIRCULAR TABLE WITH TABLES BUTTRESSED AGAINST THE ROUND FROM OUTSIDE TO DENOTE SEPARATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

4. RE ORDER OF SPEAKING, THIEU ACCEPTED ALTERNATIVES AABB OR ABBA BEING PUT TO THE OTHER SIDE, BUT REJECTED ABAB, AS TO WHO WILL BEGIN, THEY INSISTED THAT WE PUT UP ONLY TWO ALTERNATIVES: (A) TWO LOTS, ONE RED, ONE YELLOW, WINNING SIDE TO START. (B) FOUR LOTS, TWO RED, TWO YELLOW, THE FIRST WINNING LOT TO DETERMINE WHICH SIDE STARTS.

5. WHILE MEETING THUS MADE SOME PROGRESS, IT WAS BELOW OUR EXPECTATIONS. IT ENDED ON SOMEWHAT SOUR NOTE WHEN THIEU REMARKED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE AGREE FIRST IN WRITING WHAT WE HAD AGREED UPON ORALLY BECAUSE "KY HAD BEEN TELLING THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL THAT U.S. NEGOTIATORS IN PARIS HAD CLAIMED THAT AGREEMENTS REACHED IN SAIGON WERE NOT BINDING UPON THEM. "I SAID THIS SURELY WAS DUE TO MISUNDERSTANDING, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT KY HAS BEEN UP TO MISCHIEF AGAIN AND THAT IT WILL BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO HAVE THINGS IN WRITING AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.

6. THIEU SAID THAT IF HE ACCEPTED OUR CONTINUOUS UNBROKEN CIRCULAR TABLE FORMULA, HE WOULD HAVE TO GO BEFORE THE NSC AGAIN AND WOULD HAVE TO EXPLAIN HOW SUCH A FORMULA WAS COMPATIBLE WITH THE TWO-SIDED APPROACH ON WHICH EVERYONE THOUGHT WE HAD AGREED ON NOVEMBER 27. DESPITE MY BEST EFFORTS AT PERSUASION, THIEU WAS ADAMANT THAT ACCEPTANCE OF UNBROKEN CIRCULAR WOULD RUN COUNTER TO WHAT THE U.S. AND GVN HAD AGREED ON NOVEMBER 27; BUT IT WAS LEFT OPEN THAT SOMETHING ELSE MIGHT BE WORKED LATER IF THE PROPOSALS WORKED UP TODAY WERE PRESENTED TO THE OTHER SIDE AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY REJECTED.

7. AT VARIOUS TIMES DURING THESE MEETINGS, I TRIED TO EXPLAIN TO THIEU AND THANK THAT WE ARE FAR BETTER OFF BY ACCEPTING THE CIRCULAR TABLE WHICH HAD BEEN PROPOSED BY THE OTHER SIDE, AND COUPLING OUR ACCEPTANCE WITH INSISTENCE ON NO NAME PLATES AND FLAGS. OTHERWISE WE RUN THE RISK THAT HANOI MIGHT ACCEPT ONE OF OUR OWN PROPOSALS FOR TABLES, ONLY TO INSIST THAT WE GIVE IN ON FLAGS AND NAME PLATES. I AM SORRY TO SAY THAT THIS ARGUMENT DIDN'T PRODUCE THE RESULTS WE HOPED, I.E. ACCEPTANCE OF OUR FULL PAPER. THIEU KEPT INSISTING THAT SOME SEPARATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IS NOT A PROCEDURAL DETAIL BUT A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. HE SAID THAT FOR THE PRESENT HE COULD GO NO FURTHER THAN THE PROPOSALS WORKED OUT YESTERDAY AND TODAY, AND HE HOPED WASHINGTON WOULD APPRECIATE HIS GOOD WILL IN MOVING A LONG WAY IN THE DIRECTION IN WHICH WE HAD ASKED HIM TO MOVE.

8. I REGRET THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO GET MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RESULTS FROM THESE MEETINGS, BUT IT MAY BE THAT ENOUGH HAS BEEN OBTAINED TO HAVE ANOTHER GO AT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN PARIS. IF THE DEPARTMENT FEELS THAT WE DO NOT YET HAVE A NEGOTIABLE POSITION ON THESE PROCEDURAL ISSUES, WE COULD TRY TO GO BACK TO THIEU. ALTHOUGH I AM NOT SURE THAT THIS WOULD PRODUCE AN IMPROVED PACKAGE IN TIME FOR RESULTS TO BE SHOWN BEFORE CONGRESS CONVENE ON JANUARY 1.

DTG: 312139Z DEC 68

~~SECRET~~

[4]

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
DEC 31 PM 4:47

Pre file

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1968 DEC 31 21 42

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82970

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 31, 1968

FOLLOWING IS A MEMORANDUM TO ME FROM HAL SAUNDERS ON RESPONDING TO THE SOVIET MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE. SEC. RUSK WILL BE FORMULATING HIS VIEW IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO.

QUOTE

I BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME TO PICK UP WHERE WE LEFT OFF ON NOVEMBER 22, 1967. AN INTENSE PERIOD OF NEGOTIATION WITH RUSSIANS, ARABS AND ISRAELIS PRODUCED THE UN RESOLUTION. THEN WE STEPPED BACK TO GIVE JARRING A CHANCE TO ARRANGE AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD CARRY OUT THE RESOLUTION'S INTENT. SO FAR HE HAS FAILED. MOST OF US, I BELIEVE, FEEL HE WILL NEED MORE DIRECT HELP FROM US AND THE SOVIETS IF HE'S TO GET ANYWHERE. ONLY THE ISRAELIS ARGUE TODAY THAT MOUNTING TENSION WILL BRING THE ARABS CLOSER TO NEGOTIATION, AND THEIR EYE-FOR-AN-EYE JUDGMENT IS QUESTIONABLE.

THE ISSUE TODAY IS WHETHER WE MOVE TOWARD ANOTHER PERIOD OF INTENSE FIVE-OR-SIX-CORNERED NEGOTIATION TO ESTABLISH A SCENARIO FOR WORKING OUT AGREEMENT UNDER THE RESOLUTION. WHEN DOBRYNIN DELIVERED A SIMILAR MEMO RIGHT AFTER THE CZECH INVASION, WE ANSWERED BY URGING THE SOVIETS TO GET BEHIND JARRING. THAT WAS REASONABLE BECAUSE JARRING WAS JUST STARTING HIS NEW YORK PHASE. BUT THAT PRODUCED LITTLE, AND NOW HE NEEDS HELP.

IF WE GO DOWN THIS COURSE, THESE POINTS ARE CRUCIAL:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 3-6-98

1. OUR FIRST EFFORT SHOULD BE TO IMPOSE A NEGOTIATION--NOT A SOLUTION. THE SOVIET NOTE SPEAKS OF CONTACTS THROUGH JARRING TO WORK OUT A TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL AND RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES IN THE RESOLUTION. THE PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT, THEREFORE, MIGHT BE TO ARRIVE AT AN AGREEMENT TO NEGOTIATE A TIMETABLE. PERHAPS THIS COULD BE AN ELABORATION OF THE FIRST PAGE AND A HALF OF THE SOVIET MEMO. THEN WE WOULD HAVE A THREE-STEP PROCESS:

- A. DECLARATION OF INTENT.
- B. NEGOTIATION OF DETAILS OF ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT.
- C. FINAL AGREEMENT ON A TIMETABLE, MESHING THOSE ELEMENTS.

2. WE MUST BRING THE ISRAELIS WITH US AS WE DID IN OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1967. WE HAVE LOST THEIR CONFIDENCE SINCE NOVEMBER 1967. THEY'RE BITTERLY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR PAST EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS. YET OUR MAIN CONTRIBUTION TO IMPOSING A NEGOTIATION WOULD BE TO BRING THE ISRAELIS ALONG. THEREFORE, I WOULD URGE GIVING RABIN THE SOVIET MEMO TODAY, TELLING HIM THAT WE ARE GOING TO PREPARE A COUNTERDRAFT AND ASKING HIM TO STUDY AND RETURN TO DISCUSS AN APPROPRIATE COUNTER. I THINK STATE WILL DO THIS.

3. THE SOVIETS MUST BRING THE ARABS ALONG. GROMYKO OBVIOUSLY HAS CAIRO BEHIND THIS MEMO. BUT THE POINT IS THAT MOSCOW MUST BE WILLING TO KEEP CAIRO BEHIND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS.

THESE ARE JUST ROUGH INITIAL THOUGHTS. THE CENTRAL POINT IS MY BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD NOW MOVE BACK INTO INTENSE INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS.

/S/ HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

ENQUOTE

[2]

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1968 DEC 31 21 13

5
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
189 DEC 31 PM 4:27

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82968

UNCLAS

DECEMBER 31, 1968

AFTER A CONVERSATION YESTERDAY, I SUGGESTED TO MAX TAYLOR THAT HE SET DOWN IN WRITING HIS SUGGESTION FOR A VIETNAM PASSAGE FOR THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE -- OR ANOTHER OCCASION.

FOLLOWING IS HIS MEMO TO YOU AND A PROPOSED TEXT.

QUOTE MR. PRESIDENT:

I PRESUME HERE TO SET FORTH SOME SENTIMENTS ABOUT VIET-NAM WHICH I HOPE THAT YOU WOULD SEE FIT TO EXPRESS AT SOME APPROPRIATE TIME AND PLACE BEFORE RETIRING FROM OFFICE. MOST AMERICANS SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THEMSELVES THAT KOREA WAS A DEFEAT IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT WE REPULSED THE NORTH KOREAN INVASION AND THE ARMISTICE LINE TODAY IS GENERALLY WELL NORTH OF THE LINE OF DEPARTURE OF THE INVADING FORCES.

YOU HAVE BROUGHT THIS COUNTRY A LONG WAY IN VIET-NAM TO THE POINT THAT VICTORY IS IN OUR GRASP IF WE DON'T LET A FEW TREMBLING HANDS ALLOW IT TO ESCAPE. I WOULD HOPE THAT YOU WOULD STATE THE CASE AS IT IS AS YOU LEAVE IT, EITHER IN THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE OR AT SOME SPECIAL OCCASION SELECTED SOLELY FOR THIS PURPOSE.

MAY I TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS NOTE TO WISH YOU AND MRS. JOHNSON A WELL-EARNED HAPPY NEW YEAR.

/S/ M.D.T.

NOW MAY I TURN TO THE SUBJECT OF VIET-NAM. I NEED HARDLY SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO FOREIGN ISSUE DURING THIS ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAS CAUSED ME MORE CONCERN OR RECEIVED MORE ATTENTION THAN THE PURSUIT OF OUR LIMITED BUT VITAL OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THESE OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN STATED AGAIN AND AGAIN--THE

CESSATION OF THE AGGRESSION BY NORTH VIET-NAM AND THE RIGHT OF POLITICAL SELF-DETERMINATION FOR SOUTH VIET-NAM. THEY HAVE BEEN THE KEystone OF AMERICAN POLICY AND THE GUIDING PURPOSE OF OUR ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA THROUGHOUT THIS ADMINISTRATION AND REMAIN UNCHANGED TODAY. WHEN THEY ARE ATTAINED, AS I AM CONFIDENT THAT THEY CAN BE, WE WILL HAVE ACHIEVED VICTORY IN THE SENSE OF HAVING ACCOMPLISHED WHAT OUR GOVERNMENT SET OUT TO DO AT THE TIME OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS MORE THAN A DECADE AGO. SUCH A VICTORY WILL NOT TAKE THE FORM OF AN UNCONDITIONAL BATTLEFIELD SURRENDER BUT RATHER THE RECOGNITION BY THE ENEMY THAT SOUTH VIET-NAM WILL NOT ACCEPT A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT AND THAT ONE CAN NOT BE IMPOSED BY FORCE OF ARMS. WITH THAT RECOGNITION, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR BOTH SIDES AS A MATTER OF SELF-INTEREST TO AGREE TO THE HONORABLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL MILITARY FORCES AND TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITHIN SOUTH VIET-NAM BASED UPON THE FREE CHOICE OF ALL CITIZENS READY TO ABIDE BY THE DECISION OF THE BALLOT.

I REGRET THAT, AS PRESIDENT, I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CONSUMMATE SUCH A SETTLEMENT, BUT I AM CONFIDENT THAT SUCH A SETTLEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED IF ONLY BECAUSE I HAVE SEEN MORE DIFFICULT OBSTACLES OVERCOME IN REACHING THE SITUATION TODAY. WHEN WE BECOME DISCOURAGED, IT IS SOMETIMES WELL TO LOOK BEHIND US AT THE MOUNTAINS TRAVERSED TO GAIN STRENGTH FOR THE FOOTHILLS AHEAD. SINCE 1954, THERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MANY TO PREDICT THAT THE AMERICAN POLICY IN VIET-NAM COULD NOT SUCCEED. IN THAT YEAR, THE FORECASTERS GAVE PRESIDENT DIEM ONLY A FEW MONTHS TO SURVIVE BEFORE THE INEVITABLE SUCCESS OF HO CHI MINH AND THE WELL-ORGANIZED CLANDESTINE POLITICAL STRUCTURE WHICH HE HAD LEFT BEHIND IN THE SOUTH. DIEM LASTED NEARLY NINE YEARS UNTIL THE GUERRILLA WAR DECLARED BY HO CHI MINH IN 1959 ABETTED BY SAIGON INTRIGUE AND RELIGIOUS FACTIONALISM BROUGHT DOWN HIS GOVERNMENT.

IN THE LEAN YEARS OF 1964-65, HANOI MADE EVERY EFFORT TO EXPLOIT POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY THE OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY THE FALL OF DIEM AND THE DISRUPTION OF STABLE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON AND IN THE PROVINCES. IN THIS PERIOD, THERE WERE MANY AT HOME AND ABROAD WHO SAID THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WERE INCAPABLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, THAT THE CONTENDING MINORITIES COULD NEVER UNITE EVEN IN THE FACE OF DESTRUCTION BY THE INCREASINGLY FORMIDABLE ENEMY.

YOU WILL RECALL HOW THIS ENEMY FANNED THE INTERNAL DISSENTIONS IN THE SOUTH WHILE COMMITTING TO COMBAT THE BEST REGULAR NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN THE HOPE OF WINNING A DECISIVE VICTORY IN 1965.

IT WAS AT THIS PRECARIOUS MOMENT THAT OUR GOVERNMENT TOOK THE DIFFICULT BUT INESCAPABLE DECISION TO COMMIT AMERICAN GROUND FORCES TO ACTION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND TO USE OUR AIR POWER TO STRIKE MILITARY TARGETS IN THE SANCTUARY OF NORTH VIET-NAM. AT THE SAME TIME, WE INITIATED A VAST PROGRAM TO EXPAND THE REGULAR, THE PARAMILITARY AND THE POLICE FORCES OF SOUTH VIET-NAM AND TO LAY A LOGISTICS BASE ACROSS THIS UNDEVELOPED COUNTRY CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A PROLONGED MILITARY CAMPAIGN AND PERMITTING THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE MODERN WEAPONS WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON THE ELUSIVE, CLANDESTINE ENEMY. [2]

WE AMERICANS ARE OFTEN NOT TOO MODEST IN BOASTING OF OUR PERSONAL OR NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS BUT WE HAVE BEEN STRANGELY RETICENT IN EXPRESSING PRIDE IN WHAT OUR CITIZENS, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, HAVE DONE TO TURN THE TIDE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA FROM THE LOW POINT OF 1965 TO THE SITUATION TODAY. IN THAT PERIOD, WE HAVE DEPLOYED A HALF MILLION MEN OF THE ARMED FORCES INTO ACTION 10,000 MILES FROM HOME. THEY HAVE BEEN EQUIPPED, TRAINED AND MAGNIFICENTLY LED; THEY HAVE ENJOYED MEDICAL CARE OF A QUALITY BEYOND THAT EVER KNOWN BY TROOPS IN THE FIELD. THEY HAVE LACKED FOR NOTHING--UNLESS IT HAS BEEN FOR OUR SOFT WAYS AT HOME. IN HAVING BUILT A SYSTEM OF PORTS, AIRFIELDS, HIGHWAYS, HOSPITALS AND DEPOTS FOR THE PURPOSES OF WAR, AMERICAN ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS WILL LEAVE IN VIET-NAM A PRICELESS CONTRIBUTION TO THE POSTWAR ECONOMY AND THE PURPOSES OF PEACE.

THE COMBAT PERFORMANCE OF UNITED STATES FORCES AND THEIR ALLIES IS AN EVEN GREATER CAUSE FOR PRIDE. OUR FIGHTING MEN IN 1966-67 FRUSTRATED THE ENEMY STRATEGY OF THE SO-CALLED "PROLONGED CONFLICT" AND OBLIGED HANOI TO PASS TO A HAZARDOUS GENERAL OFFENSIVE IN 1968. THIS VENTURE HAS COST THE ENEMY AT LEAST A QUARTER MILLION FATALITIES THIS YEAR AND THE OUTCOME CONVINCED THE COMMUNIST LEADERS THAT THEY MUST ACCEPT OUR LONG-STANDING OFFER TO NEGOTIATE IF THEY WERE TO OBTAIN RELIEF FROM THE COMBINED PRESSURE OF OUR GROUND AND AIR OPERATIONS.

BUT WE DO NOT COUNT THE EXPLOITS OF OUR PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS. THE PURPOSE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS HAS ALWAYS BEEN PRIMARILY TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE FROM THE DEPREDACTIONS OF THE ENEMY AND TO PROVIDE A SCREEN OF SECURITY BEHIND WHICH TO FORM A STABLE GOVERNMENT. IN SPITE OF THE CONDITIONS OF WAR AND THE EFFORTS OF THE ENEMY TO SABOTAGE ALL CONSTRUCTIVE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN 1966 AND 1967 HELD FOUR GENERAL ELECTIONS LITERALLY UNDER THE GUNS OF THE ENEMY, ADOPTED A CONSTITUTION AND ESTABLISHED A POPULARLY CHOSEN GOVERNMENT WHICH TODAY PROVIDES AN EVER-IMPROVING LEADERSHIP FOR THE NATION IN ARMS. THIS VALIANT LITTLE GOVERNMENT, THE PRODUCT OF A LONG AND PAINFUL BUILDING PROCESS REACHING BACK TO THE TURBULENT DAYS OF 1965, IS RIGHTLY PROUD OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AND ITS POPULAR MANDATE, AND INSISTS AS A MATTER OF ELEMENTARY RIGHT ON PLAYING A LEADING ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS. THE POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENT REPRESENTED BY ITS ESTABLISHMENT IS FULLY EQUAL IN IMPORTANCE TO OUR MILITARY SUCCESSES AND WILL PLAY AN EQUALLY IMPORTANT PART IN THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

{3}

I HAVE ENUMERATED SOME OF THE OBSTACLES WHICH WE HAVE OVERCOME IN THE COURSE OF EVENTS SINCE 1954 TO REASSURE THOSE WHO MAY BE INCLINED TO DESPAIR AT THE MAGNITUDE OF THE UNFINISHED TASKS WHICH REMAIN AND, REFLECTING THEIR OWN DISCOURAGEMENT, PREDICT THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL NOT HAVE THE PATIENCE TO CARRY ON MUCH LONGER. I HAVE MUCH HIGHER ESTIMATE OF THE STEADFASTNESS OF MY FELLOW CITIZENS. IF ONE WILL BUT LOOK AT THE FACTS, IT IS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT, OF THE TWO OBJECTIVES BY WHICH WE MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS, BOTH ARE WELL ON THEIR WAY TO ATTAINMENT. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN CHOOSING THEIR PRESENT GOVERNMENT. THAT GOVERNMENT, THOUGH STILL A TARGET OF ATTACK BY THE ENEMY, GIVES EVERY INDICATION OF GROWING STRENGTH TO RESIST THE CONTINUED EFFORTS AT SUBVERSION. THE AGGRESSION BY HANOI AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM HAS NOT CEASED BUT IT HAS RECEDED BEFORE THE BLOWS OF OUR ARMED FORCES. THE END HAS NOT BEEN REACHED BUT OUR SIDE CAN NOT BE DEFEATED--THAT IS, UNLESS WE DEFEAT OURSELVES.

I SHALL LEAVE THE PRESIDENCY WITH DEEP REGRET THAT I DO NOT LEAVE THIS NATION AT PEACE. BUT I SHALL ALWAYS BE PROUD OF THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAVE ADVANCED THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE FACE OF SO MANY DISCOURAGEMENTS, A FEW OF WHICH I HAVE RECOUNTED. I SAID SEVERAL YEARS AGO THAT IN VIET-NAM, "WE WILL NOT BE DEFEATED. WE WILL NOT GROW TIRED. WE WILL NOT WITHDRAW EITHER OPENLY OR UNDER THE CLOAK OF A MEANINGLESS AGREEMENT." WE HAVE NOT BEEN DEFEATED--WE HAVE IMPOSED DEFEAT AFTER DEFEAT UPON THE ENEMY. ALTHOUGH OFTEN WEARY, WE HAVE NEVER GIVEN WAY TO FATIGUE. WE HAVE REFUSED TO THINK OF DISHONORABLE WITHDRAWAL UNDER WHATEVER EUPHEMISM. WHILE THIS IS NOT FULL SUCCESS, I HAVE THE SATISFACTION OF KNOWING THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAS KEPT THE FAITH WITH OUR ALLIES, WITH OUR PRINCIPLES, WITH OUR PLEDGED WORD AND, MOST OF ALL, WITH THE THOUSANDS OF OUR GALLANT MEN WHO HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES IN BATTLE. I LEAVE TO THOSE WHO FOLLOW THE GREATER GLORY OF CARRYING ON TO THE FULL AND FINAL VICTORY.

END QUOTE

DTG 311951Z DEC 1968

[4]

1968 DEC 31 08 49

EEA905
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4730

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82960

Profile

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
'69 DEC 30 PM 11:10

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

THE SOVIETS BROUGHT IN TO SECRETARY RUSK THIS AFTERNOON A GENERAL POLICY STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST ACCOMPANIED BY A SO-CALLED "PLAN" FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

SECRETARY RUSK'S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS AND THE DOCUMENTS FOLLOW. HIS FURTHER COMMENTS, AS WELL AS MINE, WILL FOLLOW TOMORROW.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY RUSK

MR. TCHERNIAKOV, CHARGE D' AFFAIRES OF THE SOVIET UNION, CAME IN TO SEE ME AT 6:30 P.M. THIS EVENING TO BRING TWO DOCUMENTS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT. THE FIRST WAS A GENERAL POLICY STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST TO ACCOMPANY THE SECOND DOCUMENT WHICH IS A SO-CALLED "PLAN" FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. I EMPHASIZE THAT BOTH OF THESE DOCUMENTS NOW BEING TRANSMITTED ARE UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS. WE WILL GET TO YOU AN OFFICIAL TRANSLATION, TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM THE RUSAN TEXT, SOMETIME TOMORROW.

MR. TCHERNIAKOV SAID THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS PLANNING TO MAKE THIS COMMUNICATION PUBLIC. I ASKED HIM TO CONFIRM THIS WITH MOSCOW AND THAT WE WOULD ASSUME THAT IT IS NOT BEING MADE PUBLIC UNLESS WE HEAR TO THE CONTRARY FROM HIM. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SAME COMMUNICATION IS BEING GIVEN TO THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS.

MR. TCHERNIAKOV ADDED THAT THE USSR IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE UAR IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE PLAN WHICH THEY ARE NOW SUBMITTING. THIS UNDOUBTEDLY REFLECTS THE OUTCOME OF MR. GROMYKO'S VISIT TO CAIRO. YOU WILL RECALL THAT WE HAD FROM EGYPTIAN SOURCES THE EGYPTIAN IMPRESSION THAT GROMYKO WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH US FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO CAIRO.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 3-6-98

I TOLD TCHERNIAKOV THAT I WOULD NOT WISH TO REPLY OFF-THE-CUFF AND THAT I WOULD GET THIS COMMUNICATION TO YOU AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. HE KNOWS THAT YOU ARE IN TEXAS. I WOULD LIKE TO STUDY IT VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE GIVING YOU MY CONSIDERED OPINION. MY FIRST REACTION IS THAT IT LOOKS A BIT TOWARD WHAT WE COULD ACCEPT AS A FINAL SETTLEMENT BUT IS NOT YET GOOD ENOUGH. I HAVE IN MIND SUCH MATTERS AS THE HANDLING OF THE PASSAGE OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE CONTINUED INSISTENCE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES TO THE LINES OF JUNE 4TH IS, IN EFFECT, A PREREQUISITE TO AGREEMENT ON ALL OTHER SUBJECTS. THERE IS NO FLEXIBILITY IN THIS PRESENT RUSSIAN PLAN FOR ANY MODIFICATION OF FRONTIERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESENT RUSSIAN COMMUNICATION DOES SEEM TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF A PACKAGE AND THAT MAY GIVE US SOME BASIS ON WHICH WE CAN PURSUE THE CONVERSATION.

FIRST DOCUMENT (UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION)

IN CONTINUATION OF THE EXCHANGE OF OPINION WITH THE AMERICAN SIDE WITH REGARD TO THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST I AM INSTRUCTED TO STATE THE FOLLOWING TO BE TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

MOSCOW TAKES WITH SERIOUS CONCERN THE SITUATION NOW DEVELOPING IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE THERE OF ANY REAL MOVEMENT TOWARDS ACHIEVING A STABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE PERTINENT FACTS ARE WELL KNOWN TO THE US GOVERNMENT AND THERE IS NO NEED TO DWELL UPON THEM.

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE COURSE OF THE ENTIRE PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT HAS CONSISTENTLY ADVOCATED ITS SETTLEMENT BY POLITICAL MEANS AND CONSEQUENTLY HAS MAINTAINED AND CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF ARAB STATES WHICH WE BELIEVE HAS FACILITATED A CONSTRUCTIVE EVOLUTION IN THE APPROACH ON THE PART OF THOSE COUNTRIES TOWARDS THE PROBLEM OF SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

THE ARAB STATES, FIRST OF ALL THE UAR, ARE KNOWN TO HAVE FORMALLY RECOGNIZED THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON NOVEMBER 22, 1967, AND DECLARED WITH ALL CLARITY THEIR READINESS TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS THERE IN. MOREOVER, THE UAR, AS IS KNOWN, HAS SPOKEN IN FAVOR OF WORKING OUT A TIME-TABLE FOR STAGE-BY-STAGE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION, I.E. ALL ITS PROVISIONS AND HAS PUT FORWARD CONCRETE CONSIDERATIONS IN THAT REGARD, WHICH THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY EXAMINED EARLIER.

FINALLY, ONE CANNOT BUT NOTE THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE UAR GOVERNMENT'S ANSWER TO THE "7 POINTS" INTRODUCED BY THE US SECRETARY OF STATE LAST NOVEMBER.

THAT ANSWER, WHILE CONFIRMING THE ALREADY NOTED POSITIVE ASPECTS IN THE UAR POSITION, IN ADDITION SPECIFIES THE EGYPTIAN POSITION ON SUCH QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE AS TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, REFUGEE PROBLEM, GUARANTEEING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMITMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE SETTLEMENT, UN PARTICIPATION IN IMPLEMENTING THE SETTLEMENT. THE UAR ANSWER IS IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE NOVEMBER 22 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

THUS, THERE CAN HARDLY BE DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND AS TO THE GOOD WILL ON THE PART OF THE ARAB STATES AND THEIR READINESS FOR A JUST POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT WHICH WOULD ENSURE STABILIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

NOW, WHAT IS THE ISRAELI POSITION? ARE THERE ANY REAL POSITIVE CHANGES IN HER POSITION?

ONE SHOULD STATE, THAT, IN FACT, THERE ARE NO SUCH CHANGES. MOREOVER, THE ISRAELI FORCES DO NOT CEASE ARMED PROVOCATIONS IN THE AREAS OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND JORDAN RIVER; PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE LEADERS OF TEL-AVIV TESTIFY TO THE FACT THAT EXPANSIONIST MOOD INFLUENCES MORE AND MORE THE POLICY OF ISRAEL.

THE BASIC QUESTION OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN SETTLEMENT IS, UNDOUBTEDLY, THE NECESSITY OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE ARAB TERRITORIES, SEIZED BY THEM. AS WE UNDERSTAND THE US GOVERNMENT ALSO REALIZES THE PRIMARY IMPORTANCE OF THE SOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION. NOTICE WAS TAKEN IN MOSCOW OF THE STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE MR. EUGENE ROSTOW IN THE CONVERSATION WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER 8 TO THE EFFECT THAT ISRAEL HAS NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND IS READY FOR SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE DEMARKATION LINES UNDER THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF 1949.

HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS BY THE ISRAELIS THEMSELVES HAVE IN FACT DISAVOWED SUCH AN ASSERTION. THIS CLEARLY FOLLOWS, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM THE REMARKS MADE BY ISRAELI UN REPRESENTATIVE MR. TEKOAH IN THE CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR MR. SEMONOV THAT TOOK PLACE IN NEW YORK AT TEKOAH'S INITIATIVE. INCIDENTALLY OTHER REMARKS BY MR. TEKOAH IN THIS CONVERSATION DO NOT SHOW ANY REASONABLENESS AND SOBERNESS ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS EITHER.

MOSCOW WOULD LIKE TO HOPE THAT THE US GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS TO WHAT DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES COULD LEAD IN THE LONG RUN SUCH AN DEFIANT BEHAVIOR OF ISRAEL.

THE ARAB COUNTRIES SHOW THEIR READINESS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND FOR CONTRIBUTING CONSTRUCTIVELY TO ITS ACHIEVEMENT. THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE USSR AND THE LEADERS OF THE UAR, WHICH TOOK PLACE RECENTLY, FULLY CONFIRM SUCH A CONCLUSION. AT THE SAME TIME ONE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CONTINUED AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF ISRAEL THE ARAB COUNTRIES, NATURALLY, HAVE TAKEN AND ARE TAKING MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR MILITARY POWER. AND NOBODY CAN BLAME THEM FOR DOING SO IN THE FACE OF SUCH A POSITION OF ISRAEL.

IN ISRAEL, AND NOT ONLY IN ISRAEL, ONE CAN HEAR ARGUMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT TIME, PERHAPS, WORKS FOR ISRAEL AND THEREFORE THEY COULD BE IN NO HURRY WITH THE SETTLEMENT ON THE CONFLICT. THIS IS A DANGEROUS DELUSION. AND IF ISRAEL DOES NOT SHOW PRUDENCE, ONE CAN NOT EXCLUDE ANY SURPRISES, SUCH A TURN OF EVENTS THAT WOULD BE NOT ONLY CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES, NATURALLY INCLUDING ISRAEL, BUT ALSO WOULD CREATE A SITUATION OF CRISIS EXTENDING BEYOND THE LIMITS OF THAT AREA.

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS THE DUTY OF ALL STATES, SINCERELY INTERESTED IN STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, TO TAKE URGENT AND DETERMINED MEASURES TO PREVENT A NEW FLARE-UP THERE THROUGH SPEEDIEST ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED ON NOVEMBER 22, 1967. WE PROCEED ALSO FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT MR. JARRING'S MISSION SERVES THESE PURPOSES AND IN OUR OPINION IT SHOULD BE SUPPORTED IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY.

THE SOVIET UNION, IN PERSUADING ITS POLICY OF STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, WHICH WAS DEMONSTRATED ANEW BY ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE BEGINNING OF SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT, WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING DEPENDING ON IT TO PREVENT A FLARE-UP OF A NEW CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

ATTAINMENT OF A REAL PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT AS WELL AS A FURTHER PROGRESS IN PEACE SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY AFFECT IN A MOST POSITIVE WAY THE ENTIRE WORLD SITUATION AND WOULD CREATE MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

THE MAIN OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF ATTAINING A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT CONTINUES TO LIE IN THE NEGATIVE POSITION OF ISRAEL. THEREFORE, HOPE IS EXPRESSED IN MOSCOW THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WILL REGARD WITH ALL SERIOUSNESS THE CONSIDERATIONS WE SET ABOVE AND WILL TAKE URGENT MEASURES TO EXERT PROPER INFLUENCE ON TEL-AVIV SO AS TO MAKE THEM ADOPT, AT LAST, A REALISTIC POSITION.

TO FACILITATE FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS PREPARED A PLAN CONTAINING NEW PROPOSALS, WHICH ARE FULLY BASED ON THE ABOVE MENTIONED RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RECENTLY EMERGED MOMENTS FAVORABLE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENT ON A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

WE ARE READY TO CONTINUE FURTHER EXCHANGES OF VIEWS WITH THE AMERICAN SIDE ON THE QUESTIONS OF A MIDDLE EASTERN SETTLEMENT.

SECOND DOCUMENT (UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION)

ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES-NEIGHBOURS OF ISRAEL, THAT WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH A PLAN, REAFFIRM THEIR ADHERENCE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 22, 1967, AND DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO IMPLEMENT ALL ITS PROVISIONS.

THEY AGREE FURTHER THAT THERE WILL BE WORKED OUT BY WAY OF CONTACTS THROUGH MR. JARRING A TIMETABLE AND AN ORDER FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI TROOPS FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED DURING THE CONFLICT OF 1967 AND THAT THERE WILL BE OUTLINED AN AGREED PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION BY THE SIDES OF OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, HAVING IN VIEW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, UNDER WHICH EACH STATE IN THAT REGION WILL BE ABLE TO LIVE IN SECURITY.

THE PURPOSE OF THESE CONTACTS COULD BE TO AGREE UPON SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS TO IMPLEMENT THE ABOVE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

1. AN AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON SIMULTANEOUS DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ARAB STATES-NEIGHBOURS OF ISRAEL WHICH WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN, OF THEIR READINESS TO TERMINATE THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY BETWEEN THEM AND ATTAIN A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI TROOPS FROM THE OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. IN THIS CONNECTION ISRAEL STATES HER READINESS TO BEGIN, STARTING FROM A FIXED DATE, THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM THE ARAB TERRITORIES OCCUPIED AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT IN SUMMER OF 1967.

2. ON THE DAY OF THE BEGINNING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI TROOPS, TO BE CARRIED OUT BY STAGES UNDER THE SUPERVISION BY THE UN OBSERVERS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED ARAB COUNTRIES AS WELL AS ISRAEL DEPOSIT WITH THE U. N. APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTS ON THE CESSATION OF THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, ON THE RESPECT FOR AND THE RECOGNITION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EACH STATE IN THIS AREA AND OF THEIR RIGHT TO LIVE IN PEACE, IN SECURED AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES, I. E. IN ACCORD WITH THE ABOVE MENTIONED RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT TO BE REACHED THROUGH MR. JARRING PROVISIONS WOULD ALSO BE AGREED UPON CONCERNING SECURED AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES(WITH APPROPRIATE MAPS ATTACHED), CONCERNING THE ENSURING OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE AREA, A JUSTFUL SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEE PROBLEM, THE ENSURING OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF EACH STATE IN THE AREA(POSSIBLY THROUGH MEASURES, INCLUDING ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZED ZONE).

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WILL BE VIEWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOMETHING OF A WHOLE, RELATING TO ALL THE ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EASTERN AREA, AS A "PACKAGE."

3. THE ISRAELI FORCES WITHIN THE SUBSEQUENT MONTH (AS AN EXAMPLE) WITHDRAW FROM A PART OF ARAB TERRITORIES TO CERTAIN INTERMEDIATE POSITIONS ON THE SINAI PENINSULA, ON THE WESTERN BANK OF THE JORDAN RIVER (AS WELL AS FROM THE SYRIAN TERRITORY - FROM THE AREA OF EL QUNEITRA).

ON THE DAY, WHEN THE ISRAELI FORCES REACHED PREDETERMINED LINES ON THE SINAI PENINSULA (FOR INSTANCE, 30-40 KILOMETERS FROM THE SUEZ CANAL), THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UAR BRINGS ITS FORCES INTO THE SUEZ CANAL AND BEGIN CLEARING OPERATIONS FOR THE RESUMPTION OF NAVIGATION.

4. WITHIN THE SECOND MONTH (CONDITIONALLY) THE ISRAELI FORCES ARE WITHDRAWN TO THE LINES WHICH THEY OCCUPIED PRIOR TO JUNE 5, 1967, UPON WHICH ADMINISTRATION OF THE RESPECTIVE ARAB COUNTRIES IS COMPLETELY RESTORED ON THE VACATED TERRITORIES, ITS TROOPS AND POLICE FORCES ARE INTRODUCED.

ON THE DATE OF THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND STAGE OF WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS THE UAR AND ISRAEL (OR THE UAR ALONE IF HER GOVERNMENT AGREES) DECLARE THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF UN TROOPS NEAR THE LINE WHICH EXISTED BEFORE JUNE 5, 1967, ON THE SINAI PENINSULA, AT SHARM AL SHEIKH AND IN GAZA SECTOR, THAT IS A SITUATION WHICH EXISTED IN THIS AREA IN MAY 1967 IS RESTORED.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES A DECISION TO DISPATCH UN TROOPS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN CHARTER AND CONFIRMS THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION THROUGH THE TIRAN STRAITS AND THE GULF OF AKABA FOR VESSELS OF ALL COUNTRIES.

5. AFTER THE COMPLETION OF WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS TO THE LINES OF STATE DEMARKATION THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL, OR THROUGH SIGNING A MULTILATERAL DOCUMENT, THE DOCUMENTS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL, DEPOSITED EARLIER, ARE FINALLY PUT INTO EFFECT.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ON THE BASIS OF THE UN CHARTER PROVISIONS, TAKES A DECISION TO GUARANTEE THE ARAB-ISRAELI BOUNDARIES (AS A VARIANT, GUARANTEES BY THE FOUR POWERS-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ARE NOT EXCLUDED).

DTG: 310118Z DEC 68

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8
Pres file

Tuesday
December 31, 1968 - 10:30 AM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 17, NARA, Date 3-5-98

SUBJECT: 1969 Economic Assistance Package for Colombia

Bill Gaud and Covey Oliver are requesting your authorization to negotiate a \$69 million economic assistance package with Colombia for 1969. (Tab B) The package includes a \$40 million program loan, \$25 million in sector loans for agriculture and education, and a \$4 million project loan. (A \$10 million PL 480 program will be submitted for authorization in early 1969.)

Charlie Zwick has summarized the details of this package in his memorandum recommending your approval. (Tab A) He believes you could defer the two sector loans for the new Administration without serious economic effect; however, he agrees with Gaud that it makes good sense to authorize negotiation of the whole package now.

Colombia is the best overall performer in the Alliance for Progress at this point. GNP increased 6 percent this year, with inflation below 8 percent. Tax receipts and export earnings are both climbing sharply. President Lleras has greatly strengthened his cabinet in the key ministries of Agriculture and Education -- these sectors look very promising for the year ahead. Colombia's unique "National Front" political system is working smoothly. AID funds are being well applied to Colombia's development problems.

All our assistance to Colombia comes under the umbrella of a World Bank/IMF Consultative Group. The Bank wants to meet with all members of the Group in January to plan foreign assistance for the next 18 months. The IMF will also negotiate a new stand-by agreement in January. For maximum negotiating impact and efficiency, the U. S. assistance package should be authorized now so that our negotiations can be held at the same time.

I concur with Charlie Zwick's recommendation that you authorize negotiation of the \$69 million assistance package for Colombia for 1969.

W. W. Rostow

Approve package _____.

Approve program loan only, defer sector loans _____.

Disapprove _____.

Call me _____.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

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DEC 21 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: 1969 Economic Assistance Package for Colombia

Bill Gaud and Covey Oliver request your authorization to negotiate a \$69 million Economic Assistance package with Colombia for calendar year 1969. This package consists of a \$40 million program loan, \$25 million in sector loans, and a \$4 million project loan.

As in the last two years, this package is a part of the Consultative Group program jointly financed and negotiated by AID, the World Bank, and the IMF.

Current Performance - Earlier this year we provided a \$58 million program loan, \$15 million agriculture sector loan and \$10 million in P. L. 480. After a two-month delay, AID agreed last month to release the second tranche of both AID loans after some evidence of more satisfactory performance. GNP has increased 6 percent, with price increases held below 8 percent; noncoffee exports increased by 30 percent; and tax receipts are up 10 percent.

There were, however, some weak areas. The exchange rate has remained overvalued, and there has been little progress toward liberalizing the import control system. Most of the increase in tax receipts was to increase current expenses, leaving the increase in public investment financed mostly by AID.

Program Loan - Under the proposed program loan, AID will seek commitments to

- continue to expand minor exports relying primarily on exchange rate devaluation
- move further on import liberalization
- request tax legislation to support a 15 percent increase in government investment from domestic sources.

In addition to the AID loan, the World Bank is considering a \$25 million program loan for Colombia, the first such loan in Latin America. If approved, part of our funds would be held for financing part of the 1970 Colombia program.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ky, NARA, Date 3-5-98

Agriculture Sector Loan - The first \$15 million agriculture sector loan for Colombia, which you authorized last February, was designed to get the Colombians started on a program of agricultural reform. Performance under the first loan has been generally satisfactory. The Colombians have initiated a major reorganization of the public agencies in the agricultural sector under a vigorous and capable new Minister of Agriculture. AID would like to take advantage of this favorable development by negotiating a second \$15 million agriculture sector loan now in order to influence the policies of the new Minister.

However, a basic condition of the first loan was a comprehensive analysis of the agriculture sector. While the Lleras Government has submitted a preliminary study, it has not yet developed sufficiently detailed analyses of the sector to serve as a basis for formulating specific policies and setting priorities. It will probably take about three to six months to develop these analyses and specific program recommendations.

Education Sector Loan - The proposed \$10 million education sector loan is the first of its kind to Colombia. It is designed to allow AID to take advantage of recent Colombian efforts to initiate a program of educational reforms. As in the case of the agriculture sector loan, AID wants to use this loan to influence a new Minister. However, it will be several months before AID and the new Minister can develop adequate analyses to support specific program recommendations in this complex sector.

Balance of Payments - The funds will be used to finance imports from the U.S. Secretary Fowler agrees that the tying procedures and related additionality measures proposed by AID will serve to minimize the impact of the proposed loans on the U.S. balance of payments. *J.F.D.*

Military Expenditures - State/AID has determined that Colombia's military expenditures do not require action under either the Conte amendment or the Symington amendment.

Recommendation - For purposes of coordination with the World Bank and the IMF on Colombia's overall 1969 economic policies, I think it makes good sense to authorize negotiation of the entire \$69 million package now. In view of your transition instructions, you may want to consider the option of deferring the two sector loans. These will not be ready to negotiate for several months. If you want to leave these loans for the new Administration, I see no serious economic consequences in deferring their authorization.

Charles J. Zwick

Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve program loan only _____
Approve program loan and sector loans _____
Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

8b

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

DEC 4 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Economic Assistance to Colombia

With the endorsement of Assistant Secretary Oliver and Ambassador Carlson, I request your authorization to negotiate with the Government of Colombia an A.I.D. package of \$69 million, consisting of a \$40 million Program Loan, a \$15 million Agricultural Sector Loan, a \$10 million Educational Loan, and a Project Loan for slaughterhouse facilities of about \$4 million.

It is essential that these authorizations be given promptly if President Lleras's economic development program, which we have supported in concert with the IBRD, the IMF and other free world lenders, is to maintain the momentum it has now achieved and reach the goals which Colombia has set forth under the Alliance for Progress. Our assistance to Colombia has been extended within a Consultative Group procedure under the leadership of the IBRD which, along with the IMF, will be ready to discuss the Colombian program by the beginning of January, 1969. The year 1969 will be President Lleras's last full year in office and it is essential that he be able to consolidate and give further impetus to the many accomplishments of his administration.

In light of the generally satisfactory performance of Colombia under the current program, the release of the final tranche of the Program and Agricultural Sector Loans of FY 1968 has been authorized.

Subject to the Government of Colombia undertaking satisfactory commitments for the program period, I propose to conclude the Program Loan, the Agricultural and Educational Sector Loans and the Project Loan, in accordance with the current interagency review and approval process. The Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) has also been consulted on the general outline of our proposed program, and has indicated its general agreement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AID Guidelines
By 4 NARA, Date 3598

The U.S. Interest in Colombia. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, pledged to a program of basic reform, took office on August 7, 1966, for a four-year term as third President under Colombia's unique National Front Government. The Colombian political scene has since been dominated by Lleras, whose energy and political insight have revitalized constructive political activity and strengthened the National Front system.

Just after his inauguration, Lleras enhanced his national and international standing by organizing the Bogota "Little Summit" meeting, which led to the formation of the present Andean Group for regional economic integration. Although Colombia's representatives in the United Nations and the CAS have generally been sympathetic to the U.S. position in those bodies, President Lleras has simultaneously emphasized his independence by expanding trade and other relations with the Eastern European countries. When challenged by student extremists, Lleras isolated them and drastically reduced their influence through strong measures; subsequent student disorders have been few, although unrest, mostly over academic issues, now seems again to be growing. By aggressive countermeasures Communist insurgents were put on the defensive and internal security greatly improved. He has also given strong leadership in economic and social matters, and is vigorously backing basic reforms in public administration, taxation, local government, education, and agriculture.

Lleras reunited the Liberal Party in August 1967, thereby greatly strengthening his position in Congress. The Congressional elections of March 17, 1968, showed that a majority of the Colombian voters supported the National Front. In dealing with Congress, Lleras has done reasonably well despite the National Front requirement for a two-thirds majority vote on significant legislation. However, Lleras has not yet been able to have Congress pass the Constitutional reforms which he considers essential to his "national transformation." In his latest effort to force his coalition partners to pass this legislation (now up for Senate debate), Lleras called for the resignations of his bipartisan Cabinet on November 29; but he has not yet acted on them. On balance, nevertheless, the Lleras Government has shown strong performance in its first two and a half years in office.

The Lleras Government must have a satisfactory resource base so that essential programs can continue to move forward. His highly competent development team is now fully experienced in the development process and 1969 should be their most effective year of government. His recent appointments of very effective Ministers of Agriculture and Education give promise of further impetus to his development programs. With Presidential elections coming in May, 1970, it is particularly important that the Lleras administration continue to make progress in its key social and economic programs. Reasonable success in these efforts will greatly assist the incoming Conservative Party administration in 1970 to continue the programs begun, and help assure a sound basis for moving out of the National Front system in 1974.

Urgency of Authorization. We are seeking authority to begin negotiations in December, 1968, of the Program and Sector Loans that are necessary to provide the continuity so vital to our assistance program in Colombia.

Foreign assistance to Colombia is carried out under the general umbrella of a Consultative Group headed by the World Bank. In fact, the IBRD has demonstrated its special interest in Colombia's program by taking the unusual step of assigning a permanent representative to reside in Bogota from the beginning of 1969. The IBRD expects to call a meeting of the Group in January, 1969, to consider foreign assistance for the next 18 months. The initiation of our negotiations with the Government of Colombia by the time of the meeting will make it possible for the U.S. to make a meaningful presentation of our program to the Consultative Group meeting.

The IMF will begin negotiating its next standby agreement in January, as the present standby will terminate in April. In order to avoid any serious divergencies between the IMF tests of performance and Colombian commitments to the IBRD and us that could possibly undermine the goals we seek (particularly in the balance of payments and fiscal sectors), it is essential that we negotiate with the Government of Colombia simultaneously with and not subsequent to the IMF negotiations. This negotiating timetable will not only facilitate coordination with the IMF but will permit joint negotiations with the IBRD of conditions necessary for a possible resources "gap" left by the reduced availability of A.I.D. funds.

The Colombian fiscal year is identical to the calendar year and, therefore, our ability to begin negotiations in December, 1968, and to carry them to a successful conclusion during the first months of 1969 will give us the opportunity to influence the Colombian budget of 1970 during its formulative stages. This is most important in that the local currencies generated under our FY 1969 loans will be largely expended during CY 1970.

The dollar funds of our current program and sector loans to Colombia probably will not be exhausted before March, 1969. It is indeed fortunate that the carry-over of FY 1968 funds will extend that length of time in that this carry-over will provide the U.S. the irreducible period of negotiating time necessary for the FY 1969 loan program. Providing that negotiating authority is approved in early December, we should be able to avoid a significant hiatus in A.I.D.-financed import registrations vital to Colombian development. Furthermore, in order to maintain the U.S. share of its market for commercially-financed imports, Colombia should not register A.I.D.-financed imports in excess of certain monthly levels. Therefore, if there is any substantial interruption in A.I.D. registrations, the overall period of utilization of A.I.D. funds would need to be extended, causing costly delay in the generation of counterpart for internal investment purposes.

General Accomplishments on the Economic Front in 1968. The year 1968 has been one of consolidation and progress along the lines of the program defined and initiated in the first two years of the Lleras administration. The stabilization program continued its success. Prices in 1968, originally expected to rise by 10 percent, will probably be held below an 8 percent rise equalling the good performance of 1967. An atmosphere of business confidence prevails. Credit, while generally tight and well below ceilings agreed in the IMF standby program, has been available in sufficient quantity to the private sector to maintain business activity at an increasing level. GNP growth in 1968 should approach 6 percent in real terms. Minor exports, led by cotton and sugar, will exceed the target of \$150 million by approximately \$13 million. The Government of Colombia's tax revenues will increase by over 10 percent in real terms in 1968, and its investment program will increase about 25 percent or more in real terms over 1967. Institutional improvements also have been notable, particularly with respect to the key agricultural sector. A system of interlocking directorates, under the leadership of a new and dynamic Agriculture Minister, has been created to coordinate the various agencies responsible for credit, extension, research and supply of major imports into the sector. The capacity for high quality, practical economic planning, of an indicative nature, has improved markedly.

Review of Commitments Under 1968 Program and Second Tranche Release.

Colombian performance under the 1968 program commitments has been generally very good. Performance was shown to have satisfied more than 50 "commitments", ranging from balance of payments and financial policies to program developments in the agriculture and industrial sectors. Significant shortfalls were noted in regard to only the "commitments" noted below, and while these were in key areas, there are extenuating or alleviating circumstances in each case.

a. Foreign Exchange Policy and Minor Exports. In requesting negotiating authority for the FY 1968 program, it was stated that the Mission, along with the IBRD and IMF, would seek continued exchange rate flexibility and depreciation during 1968 at a rate roughly 10 percent greater than the increase in domestic price levels. However, the GOC in 1968 would not agree to any quantitative balance of payments test. After informing the members of the DLC, and after consultation with the IBRD and IMF, we informed the GOC that in reviewing overall performance before the release of the second tranche we would expect to see "significant" real depreciation of the exchange rate. This language was communicated to the GOC formally, if unilaterally, in an implementation letter.

During the January through October 1968 period, the exchange rate depreciated in real terms by a range of 0.1 percent, using the cost of living index, to 2.4 percent, using the wholesale price index. This alone might indicate a significant shortfall from expectations. However,

if one examines the performance of the last three months, August through October, one finds a real depreciation rate on an annual basis of 6.4 percent, using the cost of living index. Also, in June, 1968, the Lleras administration unified the exchange rate system. Moreover, minor exports will exceed the projected 1968 target of \$150 million by approximately \$13 million, as noted earlier, and this is the key result sought through exchange rate policy.

From the above, it can be seen that the shortfall in our expectations with respect to exchange rate movement has been the most problematical element in making a decision with respect to release of the second tranche of the program. However, the rate movement in recent months and the expressed position of the Government of Colombia to the effect that the rate adjustment process is by no means completed, have led both the IBRD and us to a reassessment. The IBRD has now redrafted its report to the Consultative Group in far more positive terms on exchange rate policy.

b. Import Registrations. Registrations of reimbursable imports fell \$6.7 million or about 2.5 percent short of the first program semester target. This, the Government of Colombia contends, was the result of a \$30 million shortfall from the anticipated pace of A.I.D.-financed import registrations. Concerned with the impact of a registrations shortfall on development goals, the GOC offset most of the A.I.D. shortfall with registration of \$23.3 million in imports financed from non-A.I.D. resources. The bulk of this substitution was financed from coffee receipts, which were \$22.9 million above projected levels as of the end of the first program semester.

In addition to these limited shortcomings, the Government of Colombia had not provided us with a comprehensive study of the agricultural sector by the time of the October review of the program and agricultural sector loans. However, we have now received not only an overall operative study for the sector, but a series of annexed analyses of key elements within the sector which are action-oriented.

Taking overall performance into account, the A.I.D. Mission proposed that Colombia is eligible for release of the second tranche of both loans. This release has been authorized.

Economic Assistance Strategy for 1969. The FY 1968 assistance strategy was designed to accelerate the rate of economic and social progress in Colombia while maintaining a stable economy. The FY 1969 strategy builds upon the achievements of this past year, and is designed to maximize in this last full year of the Lleras administration the gains already achieved. While continuing the emphasis on improved public investment and services to promote social and economic development, within an environment of stable

economic policies, this year the strategy will give particular attention to education. After several years of planning and preparation, the Lleras administration expects to now start several significant reform efforts in education, with the backing of a sector loan for this purpose. A second agriculture sector loan is also proposed to support the extension of the successful programs started under the first sector loan in 1968. A PL-480 agreement covering FY 1970 of up to \$10 million, for which we subsequently expect to request negotiating authority, completes the planned inputs for the agricultural sector.

In particular, our program loan strategy includes Colombian self-help commitments in the following areas, to be sought in conjunction with the IMF and the IBRD.

- a. A 25 percent increase in minor exports to \$200 million during 1969 through continued exchange rate flexibility and devaluation, and other promotional efforts.
- b. Further progress toward import liberalization, especially in the form of a level of import registrations adequate for rapid economic and social improvement, with quarterly reimbursable import registration targets rising to at least \$160 million by the end of 1969 and with the overall target subdivided into A.I.D. and non-A.I.D. financed portions in order to forestall any relaxation in self-help effort in the event that unanticipated resources from previous loans are carried over into the 1969 program period.
- c. Submit to Congress in 1969, with maximum government support for passage, a major tax reform bill now in final stages of preparation. This reform is designed to increase incentives for sound private development while increasing revenues sufficiently to allow government investments to increase by at least 15 percent per year in real terms for the next several years.
- d. Interim fiscal measures to assure an increase of at least 15 percent in 1969 of domestic financing for investment expenditures, while the fundamental tax reform is under consideration.
- e. Measures to improve the fiscal base for local government financing of development activities, particularly education.
- f. Continuation of the present sound coffee policy.

The primary objectives of the proposed Agricultural Sector Loan are:

- a. To support a sweeping reorganization of public sector agencies in the agricultural sector, and provide them with adequate funding.

- b. To support a major program to provide land titles, supervised credit, and technical assistance to sharecroppers and tenant farmers.
- c. To support improved policy and planning work in the Ministry of Agriculture, and development and implementation of policies to promote private sector agricultural growth, with special emphasis on marketing and inputs for the sector.
- d. To foster agricultural exports other than coffee.

To attain these objectives, in negotiations, we will seek the following commitments:

- a. Preparation and implementation during 1969 of an adequate operational plan for the Colombian Agricultural Institute, the key agency for extension, research, and agricultural education.
- b. Preparation of satisfactory 1969 and 1970 agricultural budgets, and implementation of the 1969 budget at levels over 10 percent higher in real terms than in 1968.
- c. Preparation and implementation of a satisfactory program to issue about 60,000 provisional titles to sharecroppers and tenants by the end of 1969, and preparation of satisfactory plans for continuing the program in 1970. These plans will include provision of supervised credit (probably counterpart financed) and other technical assistance as part of the program.
- d. Establishment of adequately-staffed planning offices in the Ministry of Agriculture, and in the other agricultural agencies, with preparation and implementation of action plans to provide a more adequate agricultural credit system, promote non-coffee agricultural exports, and ensure adequate availabilities of fertilizers, pesticides, improved seeds, and other agricultural inputs.

Early in CY 1969 we expect to request authorization to negotiate a PL-480 agreement for wheat and tobacco purchases of approximately \$10 million covering CY 1970. The current agreement expires June 30, 1969. The new agreement will include self-help commitments similar to and compatible with the commitments under the agricultural sector loan, as has been done with the current PL-480 agreement.

The proposed first Educational Sector Loan will have the following objectives:

- a. A major administrative and fiscal reform in conjunction with departmental and municipal governments to provide adequate financing and improved administration for primary education.
- b. Continuation of the ongoing comprehensive high school program and an extension of educational reforms to existing secondary schools.
- c. Adoption of key parts of the higher education plan.
- d. Establishment of a science policy council and a science fund to promote scientific research.

To obtain these objectives, in negotiations, we will seek the following commitments:

- a. Preparation and submission to Congress in 1969, with best efforts for passage, of comprehensive measures to find new tax sources to finance primary education and reform the present system of government grants, so that the basis will exist for a major expansion of public primary education.
- b. Establishment by the Ministry of Education of capacity to provide technical assistance and supervision to the departmental education authorities.
- c. Continuation of efforts to revise secondary school curriculums and improve the preparation of secondary school teachers as part of the comprehensive high school programs, and a start of efforts to consolidate and modernize the curriculums in existing secondary schools.
- d. A strengthening of the Colombian Association of Universities, and of the National University Fund, so that government grants will be given on a more rational and assured basis, and technical assistance will be available to help universities improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations.
- e. Creation of a national science policy council, with a research fund basically under its control which will support and stimulate research activities in Colombian universities, along the lines recommended by National Academy of Science Advisors.

The proposed overall assistance level provided by the three loans and the PL-480 agreement is designed to finance a level of imports that should enable Colombia to grow at a sufficient rate, over 6 percent, so that some reduction can be made in the seriously high level of unemployment, and

significant improvement can be made in the quality of living of the low income groups. This assumes continuance of the present favorable situation in coffee markets and the expected level of assistance by other donors, as well as achievement of the minor export targets.

We would plan to make approximately half of the funds proposed for the three program and sector loans available soon after the loan agreements are negotiated and signed. The remainder of the funds would be released only after a thorough review in October, 1969, of Colombian performance against agreed commitments.

Effect on the U.S. Balance of Payments. U.S. assistance will continue to be used exclusively for the purchase of goods and equipment and services in the United States. Moreover, program assistance will be allocated in such manner that \$15 million of the \$65 million FY 69 total will be used to finance capital goods imports from the United States identified in a capital goods list to be negotiated with Colombia along with the general commodity list. Existing incentives to importers for the utilization of such funds will be continued, and if need be, additional measures will be negotiated. The United States share of import registrations for the Colombian market has held up well, apart from the growing market share of LAFTA countries, and is expected to continue to do so. The share target to be sought for the program year will continue to be 39 percent, the U.S. share of Colombian commercial imports achieved during the base period of 1962-1966. In this connection, the loan proceeds will be used entirely to purchase U.S. goods and services from a positive list of goods developed in conjunction with the U.S. Treasury and the Department of Commerce to assure maximum possibility of U.S. trade additionality.

Local Currency Uses. It is estimated that the Program Loan plus the Sector Loans will generate somewhat over 1.1 billion pesos of counterpart. In addition, local currency will be generated under the new PL-480 agreement. Of the total amount, some 300 to 400 million pesos will be utilized in priority sectors of the investment budget of the Government of Colombia in 1969, with the remainder being utilized within the 1970 government budget.

The counterpart generated from the agricultural sector loan and the PL-480 agreement will be used exclusively for investments in the agricultural sector and that from the education sector loan will be reserved for investments in the education sector. The remaining amounts will be utilized for high priority projects in the government investment budget with particular emphasis on activities involving lending to the private sector, thus allowing the private sector to maximize its contributions to Colombian development. Specifically, the Mission will seek to allocate approximately 20 percent of counterpart availabilities to the private sector.

Since detailed planning has not yet begun on the 1970 investment budget, specific project amounts cannot be identified at this time. The 1970 budget will be in the process of formulation at the time of loan negotiations


and a major part of the negotiating procedure will be to plan these counterpart funds in such a manner that they will make a maximum contribution to Colombian development.

Colombian Eligibility Under the Symington-Conte Amendments.

a. Conte. Colombia has not purchased any weapons since January 2, 1968, which would invoke a penalty under Section 119 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1968 (the Conte-Long Amendment) or Section 620(v) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (the Conte Amendment), nor do our intelligence sources indicate that any purchases will be made in the near future that would invoke a penalty. The applicability of Section 620(v) to Colombia will be carefully reviewed prior to the release of tranches of the program and sector loans.

b. Symington. State/A.I.D. in consultation with the interagency advisory committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) (the Symington Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined (1) that Colombian resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and (2) that neither U.S. development assistance nor PL-480 sales are diverted by Colombia to military purposes. The memorandum on which this determination was based was submitted to the President in connection with an \$87.7 million loan and PL-480 package for Colombia, which was approved by the President on February 26, 1968. The facts on which the prior determination was based have not changed materially during the interim.

Recommendation. In accordance with the framework outlined above, I recommend the initiation of negotiations with the Government of Colombia in early December, 1968, for an A.I.D. Program Loan of up to \$40 million, for an Agricultural Sector Loan of up to \$15 million, for an Educational Sector Loan of up to \$10 million and a Slaughterhouse Project Loan of about \$4 million. The Secretary of Agriculture and I expect to request authority to negotiate a PL-480 dollar credit sales program of wheat and tobacco of approximately \$10 million in early 1969. The final loan authorizations will be subject to the current interagency review and approval process.



William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday
December 30, 1968 - 10:10 AM

9

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: PL 480 Program for the Dominican Republic

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud are requesting your authorization to negotiate a \$9.6 million PL 480 agreement with the Dominican Republic --for wheat, soybean oil, tallow, and tobacco. (Tab B) Covey Oliver urges your approval, citing important political arguments for prompt action to support President Balaguer. (Tab C) Charlie Zwick recommends deferral until the new Administration takes office. (Tab A)

Zwick's memorandum stresses:

- less than satisfactory self-help performance under last year's Assistance package (\$16 million supporting assistance plus \$14 million PL 480);
- current negotiations aimed at improving performance before the final \$8 million of the Supporting Assistance Loan is released;
- desirability of "leaving something tangible for the new Administration to demonstrate continued U. S. support for the Balaguer Government."

Zwick agrees the \$9 million is needed for balance of payments support-- but fears that authorization now will take the pressure off for better performance on the Supporting Assistance Loan.

Ambassador Crimmons and Covey Oliver argue that:

- Balaguer has been counting since September on this PL 480 package in explaining publicly his tight balance of payments program for 1969.
- Further delay would be interpreted by both Balaguer and his opposition as a deliberate U. S. decision to draw back from full support for his government.
- Political storm clouds have been gathering in the Dominican Republic as we approach the Presidential election--plotting

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *17*, NARA, Date *3.5.98*

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against Balaguer has been growing. The political climate will be especially volatile during the period of transition in the U. S.

-- Steady U. S. support for Balaguer has been one of his few solid bases; his chances of completing the constitutional term are relatively favorable so long as our support is unquestioned;

-- Balaguer is more likely to be able to improve performance under the Supporting Assistance loan if he is reassured that PL 480 support will be forthcoming.

Charlie Zwick says that if you wish to take more fully into account the political judgment of Oliver and Crimmons, he would then recommend authorization with subsequent releases of food contingent on better self-help performance.

He would release the food in three equal installments contingent on the meeting of special commitments which parallel those involved in the Supporting Assistance loan.

I believe that a more flexible version of this option would meet the minimum political requirement--that we demonstrate prompt, continued support for Balaguer's program. Ambassador Crimmons should have enough negotiating leeway to insure that this objective is met. Specifying now the number or size of the installments, or tying the self-help criteria rigidly to other loans, would not be wise. These are issues better left to the negotiation.

I recommend that you approve negotiation of this PL 480 agreement as recommended in the Freeman/Gaud memorandum, with the additional stipulation that commodities be released in installments after special reviews of Dominican performance.

W. W. Rostow

SWL:amc

_____ Approve, make releases in installments contingent on special performance reviews

_____ Approve, without special installment review procedure

_____ Defer to New Administration

_____ Disapprove

_____ Call me

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

1a 8

DEC 27 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Program for the Dominican Republic

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authorization to negotiate a \$9.6 million P. L. 480 agreement with the Dominican Republic for wheat (71,000 tons), soybean oil, tallow, and tobacco. Repayment is to be in dollars over 20 years with a 5 percent downpayment. Freeman and Gaud propose no currency use payment because of the Dominican Republic's precarious foreign exchange position.

Background: You authorized a \$30 million assistance package for the Dominican Republic last year (\$16 million Supporting Assistance and \$14 million P. L. 480). At that time you approved initiation of a harder line by tying both the P. L. 480 and the Supporting Assistance to specific self-help commitments, and indicating to Balaguer that future balance of payments support would be related to essential self-help actions.

Performance under last year's package has been unsatisfactory:

- Budgetary allocations for agricultural development agencies have been erratic.
- Price support programs have not been expanded and no action has been taken to divest the Agricultural Bank of its non-banking functions.
- The Government has been unwilling to commit itself to increase budget allocations for education and health.

As a result, \$8 million of the Supporting Assistance funds are being held up until the Dominicans improve their performance. In addition, three development loans authorized last year -- a \$12 million education sector loan, a \$7 million health loan, and a \$3 million cooperative loan -- remain unsigned.

It makes little economic sense to go forward with the P. L. 480 while we are withholding the Supporting Assistance, since they are equivalent resources. However, Ambassador Crimmins has discussed the proposed agreement with President Balaguer, who anticipated authorization a month ago. Covey Oliver and Crimmins believe it is politically necessary to deliver now so as not to jeopardize the Ambassador's ability to influence Balaguer.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/75, Sub. Dept. Guidelines
By 14, NARA, Date 3-5-91

They also believe it is important to show our support for Balaguer because there is speculation about a change in U.S. policy related to the transition in the U.S. In their judgment, failure to authorize this agreement soon might encourage anti-Balaguer plotters.

Alternatives: I have little problem with the proposed \$9 million agreement to meet the Dominicans' balance of payments needs. The issue is whether we should provide these resources essentially without performance conditions, when such action would take the pressure off the Dominicans to perform under the stalled Supporting Assistance and other loans. Ambassador Crimmins, on the other hand, argues that the additional resources will provide a better basis for obtaining performance related to the earlier loans. In this situation we see three alternatives:

1. Approve the P.L. 480 agreement as proposed by Gaud and Freeman, seeking only general commitments from the Dominicans;

2. Leave the agreement for the new Administration, since this is the only major agreement planned for this fiscal year. Deferring it would leave something tangible for the new Administration to demonstrate continued U.S. support for the Balaguer Government.

3. Authorize the agreement now, but release the commodities in three equal tranches dependent on specific performance criteria. The individual releases could be contingent upon (a) providing budgetary support to Dominican development agencies (essentially the same conditions for the release of the Supporting Assistance tranche), and (b) GODR agreement to the conditions of the education sector loan (perhaps the most important development loan authorized for the Dominican Republic in recent years).

Military Expenditures: State/AID has determined that the military expenditures of the Dominican Republic do not require action under the Symington amendment.

Recommendation: I cannot judge whether or not a delay in authorizing this P.L. 480 agreement would seriously influence the decisions or capability of anyone planning to overthrow Balaguér. But in the absence of explicit evidence I recommend deferral of this agreement. This course would enable the new Administration to demonstrate continuity of policy, and it would put some teeth into our self-help requirements. If you wish to take more fully into account the political judgment of Oliver and Crimmins, I would recommend authorization of the P.L. 480 agreement with releases contingent upon self-help performance.

Charles G. Gwinn
Director

Attachment

- Approve without performance conditions
- Defer to new Administration
- Approve, make releases contingent on performance
- Disapprove

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DEC 13 1968

To: The President

Subject: PL-480 Program with the Dominican Republic

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL-480 sales agreement with the Dominican Republic to provide approximately 71,000 tons of wheat, 10,000 tons soybean oil, 7,000 tons of inedible tallow and 800 metric tons of tobacco/tobacco products for which the current export market value is \$9.6 million (including certain ocean transportation costs). The proposed terms are payment in dollars of 5 percent on delivery and the balance over 20 years including a 2-year grace period. The interest will be 2 percent during the grace period and 3 percent thereafter. No currency use payment will be required under Section 103(b) of the Act (Purcell Amendment) as we believe that requiring such payment would be inconsistent with the objectives of the Act. The Department of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

PL-480 assistance is needed (1) to ease the Dominican Republic's balance of payment deficit; (2) to generate local currency to finance increased investments in the agricultural sector; and (3) to supplement local production which has not fully regained its normal level due to the damage caused by the severe 1967-68 drought. The drought slowed down the Dominican effort to expand agricultural production and led to the import of substantial amounts of foodstuffs. In spite of a number of measures taken by the Government to restrict imports and reduce expenditures of foreign exchange, the balance of payments situation has worsened during the past year. As of the end of October, net reserves were at minus \$32.8 million as compared with a minus \$24.0 million at the end of 1967. However, the Dominicans have worked out a program with the IMF designed to prevent any further deterioration in their balance of payments position. This outcome, however, will depend, in part, on the PL-480 program as well as the IMF drawing.

Self-Help Measures

In negotiating this agreement we will seek commitments that the Government of the Dominican Republic agrees to:

1. Maintain the increased level of operating budgets in FY 69 for the Secretariat of Agriculture, the Irrigation Authority, the Agrarian Institute and the Cooperative Institute and further increase the operating budget of the Cooperative Institute;

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By ly NARA, Date 3-5-98

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2. Continue efforts to provide adequate operating budgets in FY 69 in support of other developmental institutions and to increase revenues;

3. Make vigorous efforts to divest the Agricultural Bank from non-banking functions and to rehabilitate and reorganize the Bank;

4. Consider the establishment of a separate institution with authority and responsibility to implement a national price stabilization program. Objectives of the program would be to establish and maintain floor prices for rice, corn, beans and grain sorghums and to establish a 60 day reserve of these commodities as a means of preventing price increases due to speculation as well as avoiding needless imports due to temporary shortages;

5. Submit to Congress an enabling law authorizing the Secretariat of Agriculture to develop and implement a system of grades, standards and quality control for both raw and processed agricultural products;

6. Continue and accelerate efforts to place operation and maintenance of irrigation systems on a self-sustaining basis through collection of water rates;


7. Consider the establishment of an agricultural export promotion office within the Secretariat of Agriculture to provide production and marketing information for non-traditional exports;

8. Consider programs that insure adequate incentives to producers of key food products;


Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with this PL-480 sales agreement as described above.

November 27 1968



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

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Foreign Policy Justification

In the FY 1970 Program Memorandum for the Dominican Republic, the Embassy/USAID proposed a balance of payments assistance package for FY 1969 consisting of a \$9 million PL-480 Title I sales program and a \$10 million SA loan. It was decided during the Program Review in September that since the Dominicans had already approached the IMF concerning a new standby agreement the decision on the proposed SA for FY 1969 would be postponed until after the IMF consultations scheduled in October. It was the hope that IMF assistance would be available as a result of the consultations and that such assistance combined with the recommended PL-480 Title I sales program would eliminate the need for supporting assistance. In fact, the IMF has agreed to a \$6 million drawing by the Dominican Republic and has offered the prospect of a further drawing next November of the same amount.

Processing of the PL-480 Title I program was begun late in September and a target date of November 15 was set for signature of the agreement.

I concur in Ambassador Crimmins' recommendation that the proposed PL-480 Title I sales agreement be approved by the President as promptly as possible, for immediate negotiation with President Balaguer. This recommendation is made even though Ambassador Crimmins has not completed discussions with President Balaguer of conditions for release of the remaining \$8 million portion of the existing SA loan.

Ambassador Crimmins' efforts to influence President Balaguer to adopt constructive self-help measures in connection with the United States Assistance program, more broadly, have introduced certain points of sensitivity and strain in his relations with President Balaguer. The Ambassador judges, and I agree, that further delay in approval of the PL-480 proposal

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
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By ty NARA, Date 3-5-98

would undermine his ability to influence President Balaguer in these directions.


The PL-480 proposal has been under preparation, and has been discussed with the Dominican Government, since September. President Balaguer has made reference to it in explanations to the Dominican public of the country's 1969 balance of payments prospects. Thus, not only in the mind of President Balaguer personally, but also for the Dominican Republic generally and the opposition forces specifically, further delay in the approval of this proposal would be interpreted as a deliberate United States decision to withhold support for President Balaguer's constitutional government. It would add fuel to the already rapidly circulating rumors that the United States will in the near future be offering aid and comfort to Dominicans interested in finding means to overthrow President Balaguer before the end of his constitutional term (in 1970).

In an assessment received this week, Ambassador Crimmins has described in detail the continuing uncertainties of political prospects in the Dominican Republic, the accelerated circulation of rumors and speculation, and the inevitable heating up of the political climate attendant upon the transition period in the United States and the approaching Presidential campaign period in the Dominican Republic. There is nothing new in this evaluation, and prospects for President Balaguer's completing his constitutional term remain relatively favorable. Still, he is dealing with a politically primitive society and manipulating volatile political forces and personalities. The steady support of the United States has been one of his few solid bases. I do not believe that we should now bring this support into doubt.

I therefore recommend prompt approval of the PL-480 sales agreement.


Covey P. Oliver
U.S. Coordinator
Alliance for Progress

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By  NARA, Date 3-5-78

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December 30, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

TO THE PRESIDENT

The Soviets brought in to Secretary Rusk this afternoon a general policy statement on the Middle East accompanied by the so-called "plan" for the solution of the Middle East situation.

Secretary Rusk's preliminary comments and the documents follow. His further comments, as well as mine, will follow tomorrow.

(send attached memorandum and documents)

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 3-5-98

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82954

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

DECEMBER 30, 1968

GENERAL ABRAMS HAS ANALYZED IN A RECENT DETAILED CABLE THE DISPOSITIONS, MOVEMENTS, AND CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE VARIOUS MILITARY OPTIONS OPEN TO HANOI. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ITEMS ARE:

- THREE NVA DIVISIONS -- THE 304TH, 308TH, AND 320TH -- APPEAR TO BE MOVING OR MAY BE PREPARING TO MOVE TOWARD SVN. (THE EVIDENCE IS NOT YET FIRM BUT BEARS WATCHING.)
- IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE 324B NVA DIVISION WILL BE RECONSTITUTED JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ FROM FORMERLY ASSIGNED UNITS ALREADY IN POSITION.
- IN ADDITION, THERE ARE 17,000 MEN IN THE NVN-LAOS INFILTRATION PIPELINE ABOVE THE 17TH PARALLEL HEADED SOUTH, MOSTLY DESTINED FOR III CORPS BUT DIVERTIBLE TO I CORPS OR THE DMZ.
- ALL FOUR DIVISIONS WHICH COULD APPEAR AT THE DMZ HAVE FOUGHT IN THAT AREA BEFORE.
- IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS, THE ENEMY HAS BUILT UP A LARGE LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY NORTH OF THE DMZ.
- THROUGH MASSIVE EXPENDITURES OF TRUCKS AND PERSONNEL IN LAOS, THE NORTHERN HALF OF I CORPS (NRTTH) HAS BECOME A MORE SECURE LOGISTICAL BASE WHICH COULD SUPPORT VARIOUS TACTICAL POSTURES.

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Authority NLS-CBS 21

By ica, NARS, Date 6-26-84

11
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
30 DEC 30 PM 4:50
Pres file

- INDICATIONS ARE THAT RENEWED OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY IS PLANNED IN THE MRTH AREA, POSSIBLY WITH ONE DIVISION, THE 303TH, INITIALLY, PERHAPS JOINED LATER BY THE 324B.

- FORCE REPOSITIONING CONTINUES IN THE CAMBODIA AREA AND IN III CTZ, INCLUDING BATTALION-SIZE ATTACKS LAST WEEK.

FROM THIS ANALYSIS, GENERAL ABRAMS COMES UP WITH FOUR BASIC OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY, THE LAST OF WHICH COULD OBTAIN IF EITHER THE FIRST OR SECOND IS NOT EXERCISED:

- RENEWED OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE DMZ AREA;
- RENEWED OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE HUE AREA;
- INCREASED ATTACKS IN III CORPS, INCLUDING THE OUTLYING SAIGON AREAS OR, LATER, AGAINST SAIGON ITSELF;
- INCREASING THE THREAT OF ATTACK FROM NORTH OF THE DMZ OR, LESS LIKELY, FROM LAOS.

BY WAY OF TIMING, THE DMZ OPTION COULD BE SUPPORTED BEGINNING IN EARLY JANUARY, THE HUE OPTION BY ROUGHLY MID-JANUARY, AND THE III CORPS OPTION AT ANY TIME. THE ENEMY APPEARS TO BE EXERCISING THIS LATTER OPTION NOW.

GENERAL ABRAMS CONCLUDES THAT THE USE OF NVA PERSONNEL IN THE SOUTH IS INCREASING, THAT CONTINUATION OF THE 1,000 PER MONTH B-52 SORTIE RATE IS NECESSARY, AND THAT HE HAS SUFFICIENT FORCES AND MEANS TO DEFEAT WHATEVER OPTIONS THE ENEMY MIGHT EXERCISE.

(AT A MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WE SHALL DISCUSS THE DESIRABILITY OF PRESS BACKGROUNDING, PROBABLY IN SAIGON, ON THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED ENEMY MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE MONTH AHEAD.)

DTG 302310Z DEC 68

ACTION

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SECRET

Monday, December 30, 1968 - 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

SUBJECT: Military Assistance for the Panamanian National Guard

Since the Panamanian coup in October all U. S. assistance to Panama's National Guard has been suspended. Secretaries Rusk and Clifford have now concluded we should resume assistance on a very limited scale in order to safeguard our working relationship with the Guard necessary for security of the Canal Zone. Rusk states:

- We have turned down Guard requests for training, repair and maintenance services, and routine "soft goods" items. Guard officers are already showing some resentment against the U. S.

- We may have to ask for the Guard's help during January, should anti-U. S. agitation occur as in past years on the anniversary of the 1964 student invasion of the Zone.

- The Panamanian Government has been taking steps toward the restoration of constitutional government; new elections are publicly planned for early 1970; Panama also is seeking our advice on badly needed reforms in public administration and education.

- We cannot indefinitely suspend assistance to the Guard and continue to count on Guard assistance in protecting the Zone.

Rusk believes that some renewed training plus about \$15,000 worth of spare parts, shop and maintenance equipment, and automobile tools--all previously programmed--will safeguard our relationship with the Guard for the time being. Deliveries of arms, tear gas, ammunition, or heavy equipment would remain suspended--along with training for combat operations. Adverse publicity should be minimal.

The Canal Zone Governor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary Clifford all concur in Rusk's recommendation.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *17*, NARA, Date 3-5-98

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Former President Arias' efforts to stir up guerilla operations against Panama show no real results to date.

I believe you should approve resumption of very limited military assistance to Panama, as detailed in Rusk's memorandum.

Attached is the memorandum from Secretary Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

_____ Call me

Attachment

SWL:amc

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

12a

December 26, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Assistance to the Panamanian National Guard

Recommendation

That you approve authorizing the resumption of the very limited training and materiel assistance to the Panamanian National Guard specified in the enclosed statement.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion

For several years we have provided assistance to the Panamanian National Guard, both through the Agency for International Development and the Military Assistance Program. Our primary objective has been to create an efficient Panamanian security force that could control disorders against the Canal Zone and reduce the likelihood of having to employ United States forces against Panamanians.

Our assistance programs have been highly successful in achieving this objective. The Guard has demonstrated its capability to control public disorders and has on several occasions assisted in protecting the Zone from intrusions by Panamanian agitators.

Since the October 11 military coup that overthrew President Arnulfo Arias, all United States assistance to the Guard has been suspended. We took this action to indicate our concern over the coup and to underline our interest in a prompt return to constitutional government.

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GROUP 3

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not automatically declassified

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 14, NARA, Date 3-5-90

In the two months since the coup, the Guard has been made clearly aware of our attitude. We have refused requests to provide soft goods and helicopters and to repair a Guard patrol boat. We have also declined to provide anti-guerrilla training at our Special Forces school in the Canal Zone.

At the same time, the Panamanian Government has continued to take steps toward the restoration of constitutional government. The Government has publicly committed itself to elections during the first half of 1970. A special commission to prepare the regulations governing the election is at work.

In addition, the Panamanian Government has sought our advice in undertaking badly needed reforms in public administration and education. They have not hesitated to initiate action on these reforms and have made clear that they desire our cooperation and are prepared to act on the basis of our recommendations.

In the face of the forthcoming attitude shown by the Panamanian Government both with respect to a return to a constitutional government and the implementation of reforms which we ourselves have long urged on Panamanian Governments, we cannot indefinitely suspend assistance to the National Guard without creating resentment and jeopardizing our ability to count on Guard assistance in protecting the Zone. A serious erosion of relationships, particularly if we continue to refuse modest assistance of the type in question, may very well occur before we realize it. Some resentment toward the United States, on the part of the National Guard, has already been noted. The result could well be sudden expressions of resentment inimical to our security interests in the Zone. This danger is sufficiently plausible to make the extension of the kind of assistance recommended during the next few weeks, a matter of urgency.

At the same time we have every reason to desire continued cooperation from the Guard. As recently as December 12, the Guard was instrumental in removing without incident a group of Panamanian students who had entered the Canal Zone. Since the January anniversary of the 1964 rioting in Panama is often the occasion for anti-United States agitation, we may again wish to call on the Guard for assistance in the near future.

In the interest of maintaining the working relationship with the Guard necessary for the security of the Canal Zone, our Embassy, after a review of our assistance programs, has recommended that we now resume certain training activities as well as the delivery of spare parts. The Canal Zone Governor and the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command concur in these recommendations.

The specific activities recommended for resumption are listed in the enclosed statement. They would provide training to Guard personnel in police, administrative, and technical skills and would also permit the delivery of parts needed to maintain vehicles and communications equipment which the Guard has already received from the United States. Deliveries of arms, tear gas, ammunition, or heavy equipment would remain suspended for the time being, as would training in military combat operations. If we were to resume the assistance activities recommended by the Embassy, we would seek the Guard's cooperation in minimizing publicity.

Secretary Clifford and I have concluded that we should resume as soon as possible the assistance activities recommended by our Embassy, and we recommend that you approve this decision.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure

Statement

~~SECRET~~

126

RESUMPTION OF ASSISTANCE TO THE PANAMANIAN NATIONAL GUARD
RECOMMENDATIONS RECEIVED FROM EMBASSY PANAMA

Training

1. International Police Academy - 7 officers (AID funded)
2. Instruction by mobile training teams advised by United States personnel in police patrols, police administration, riot control, traffic control, and investigations.
3. Courses at Canal Zone military schools in communications, maintenance, engineer activities, medical and medical supply activities, administration, and personnel management - 6 junior officers and 45 enlisted men (MAP funded).

Materiel

1. AID funded - total value: less than \$2,000
 - a. Automotive tools
 - b. Communications maintenance equipment
2. MAP funded - total value: \$12,875
 - a. Vehicle spare parts
 - b. Communications spare parts and batteries
 - c. Shop sets and field maintenance equipment

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By ly, NARA, Date 8-5-91

13

EEA898
OO WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 4720

1968 DEC 30 18 58

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
169 DEC 30 PM 2:02

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
INFO: GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE: CAP82593

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECEMBER 30, 1968

pre file

FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT STATEMENT FOR YOU TO MAKE ON THE DEATH OF TRYGVE LIE. IF YOU APPROVE, GEORGE CHRISTIAN WOULD RELEASE IT THIS AFTERNOON.

"ALL OF US ARE SADDENED BY THE PASSING OF TRYGVE LIE. HE WAS MORE THAN AN OUTSTANDING CITIZEN AND PUBLIC OFFICIAL OF HIS COUNTRY; AS FIRST SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, HE WAS IN A VERY REAL SENSE THE MAN WHO HAD MORE TO DO THAN ANY OTHER IN BUILDING UP THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT TO CARRY THE HEAVY BURDENS THAT ORGANIZATION HAS SINCE ASSUMED.

"TRYGVE LIE RESPONDED TO THE CRISIS AND STRAINS IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE ORGANIZATION. WITH UNFAILING COURAGE AND CONSTANCY HE RENDERED GREAT SERVICE TO ALL MEN, AND THE WORLD WILL MISS HIM."

DTG: 301831Z DEC 1968

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By 17, WFO, Date 3-5-91

14

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

69 NOV 29 AM 10:03

1968 DEC 29 14 5

AND SEND HERE PLS

EEA892
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4707

FROM WALT BOSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82944

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ly NARA, Date 3-6-98

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: ISRAELI ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT
BEIRUT 15311

1. AS OF 8130 DEC 29, ALL FIRES UNDER CONTROL AT BEIRUT AIRPORT AND CLEANING UP PROCESS HAS BEGUN. GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AUTHORITIES HAVE PUT CLAMP ON DETAILS ISRAELI ATTACK AND EXTENT OF DAMAGE DONE. HOWEVER, AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE, DAMAGE TOTALLED THIRTEEN AIRCRAFT, ALL EITHER BELONGING TO OR LEASED BY LEBANESE CARRIERS MEA (MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES), TMA (TRANS MEDITERRANEAN AIRWAYS), AND LIA (LEBANESE INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS). WHILE KOL ISRAEL (ISRAELI RADIO) HAS TALKED ABOUT ATTACKING ONLY ARAB AIRCRAFT, ONE MUST NOTE THESE AIRCRAFT DESTROYED REPRESENTED \$18 MILLION IN LOAN AND INVESTMENT OF USE AND US CITIZENS, \$10 MILLION LOAN ON BOEING, PLUS \$2.5 MILLION CCC SHARE THROUGH INTRA BANK IN OTHER MEA PLANE, PLUS \$5.5 MILLION OF AMERICAN AIRLINES IN TWO CORONADOS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT ALL AIRCRAFT FULLY INSURED.

2. WHILE OUR INFO INCOMPLETE, ALL REPORTS THUS FAR INDICATE THAT THERE WERE NO DEATHS AS RESULT OF ATTACK AND ONLY ONE PERSON, A LEBANESE SECURITY GUARD, WAS INJURED.

3. SCENARIO OF ATTACK AS BEST WE CAN PIECE IT TOGETHER FROM EYE WITNESSES IS AS FOLLOWS. ABOUT 9:30 P.M. DEC 28, TWO TO FOUR ISRAELI HELICOPTERS APPROACHED BEIRUT AIRPORT, DROPPED FLARES AND OPENED FIRE ON SECTIONS OF RUNWAY AND AIRCRAFT PARKING AREA. HELICOPTERS LANDED IN VICINITY MEA/LIA/TMA HANGAR AREA, DISEMBARKING APPROXIMATELY 45 ARMED TROOPS. THESE TROOPS ORDERED ALL PERSONS IN OPEN TO TAKE COVER IN HANGARS AND THEN PROCEEDED DESTROY BY VARIOUS MEANS THE 13 AIRCRAFT MENTIONED ABOVE. ONE AMERICAN EYE WITNESS, WHO CLAIMS HE ACTUALLY ABOARD THE MEA BOEING 707 FLIGHT 368 BOUND FOR JIDDA, SAYS HE FIRST HEARD EXPLOSION IN CARAVELLE WAITING DIRECTLY BEHIND BOEING ACCOMPANIED BY MACHINE GUN FIRE FROM GROUND INTO CARAVELLE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER GRENADE EXPLODED

IN VICINITY REAR END BOEING AT WHICH TIME ALL PASSENGERS EVACUATED. WHILE THIS GOING ON, ISRAELI TROOPS WERE, ACCORDING TO OTHER EYE WITNESS, PROCEEDING FROM PLANE TO PLANE IN MEA/LIA/TMA HANGAR AREA SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROYING AIRCRAFT WITH GRENADES AND MACHINE GUN FIRE. ISRAELIS WERE CAREFUL TO LEAVE UNTOUCHED ALL NON-ARAB AIRCRAFT AND FACILITIES, INCLUDING PANAM AND BOAC.

4. THUS FAR OFFICIAL INFO RE ISRAELI ATTACK HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN. RUMORS OF SUBSTANTIAL LEBANESE ARMY CASUALTIES SUFFERED AS RESULT FIRE FIGHT BETWEEN ISRAELI TROOPS AND LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES ARE UNCONFIRMED. EARLIER REPORTS OF DAMAGE TO RUNWAYS AND TERMINAL BUILDINGS HAVE PROVEN TO BE FALSE.

5. FULL IMPACT OF ISRAELI ATTACK WILL PROBABLY NOT REACH LEBANESE PUBLIC UNTIL LATER TODAY (DEC 29). SEARCH WILL CERTAINLY BE MADE FOR SCAPEGOATS, WHICH GENERALLY MEANS THAT USG WILL COME IN FOR A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF BLAME FOR THIS ISRAELI MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST LEBANON. GOL HAS RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY TO OUR REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY GUARDS AROUND CHANCERY IN CASE OF TROUBLE RESULTING FROM THIS ATTACK.

6. I BELIEVE IT IMPERATIVE THAT USG QUICKLY DENOUNCE IN STRONGEST TERMS THIS CAREFULLY PLANNED MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGETS IN LEBANON WHICH NOT ONLY DESTROYED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF PROPERTY BUT ENDANGERED LIVES OF COUNTLESS INNOCENTS INCLUDING AT LEAST THIRTEEN AMERICAN PASSENGERS. IF WE DO NOT PROMPTLY CONDEMN THIS SENSELESS ACT IN STRONGEST TERMS WE WILL CERTAINLY BE HELD IN PUBLIC MIND AT LEAST AS CONDONERS IF NOT CONTRIBUTORS TO IT. SMARTING AS THEY ARE FROM ANNOUNCEMENT OF PHANTOM DEAL DEC 27, LEBANESE AND ARABS ARE ALREADY IN MOOD TO EXPECT THE WORST FROM US.

7. MANY RESPONSIBLE LEBANESE POLITICIANS HAVE SOUGHT ME OUT UPON HEARING NEWS OF ATTACK. WHILE THEY MAKE CLEAR THEY UNDERSTAND FULLY THAT USG HAS NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISRAELI ATTACK, THEY ALSO URGE THAT WE MAKE SOonest AND AT HIGHEST LEVEL POSSIBLE STATEMENT DENOUNCING THIS ISRAELI ATTACK, BOTH TO CLARIFY US STAND ON ATTACK ITSELF AND TO PROVIDE LEB GOVT WITH SUPPORT WHICH IT BADLY NEEDS TO CARRY ON AFTER THIS DISASTER. WHAT THEY FEAR PARTICULARLY IS A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC SECURITY IN WHICH AN ENRAGED LEBANESE POPULACE TAKES TO THE STREETS AS THEY DID IN JUNE 1967 OUT OF SHEER FRUSTRATION AND HOPELESSNESS.

8. MEANWHILE WE HOPE THAT EMBASSY TEL AVIV WILL IMPRESS UPON ISRAELI AUTHORITIES THE ENORMITY OF THEIR CRIME AND AT SAME TIME URGE THEM ABOVE ALL TO REFRAIN FROM PROVOKING ANY INCIDENTS ALONG ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE GOL TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM BEIRUT TO THE BORDER AREA. PORTER

DTG: 291326Z DEC 68

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1968 DEC 29 14 24

15
19 NOV 29 AM 9:32
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

FROM: WALT ROWTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82947

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO.

1. [REDACTED] SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREY GROMYKO. THE PRINCIPAL POINTS MADE BY GROMYKO WERE AS FOLLOWS:

EO 12958
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Yrs
(C)

A. A STRONG COMPLAINT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES FOR FAILING TO EXERT THE INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL NECESSARY FOR ESSENTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WAS FULLY COMMITTED.

B. PRAISE OF JORDAN FOR HER MODERATION AND PERSEVERANCE UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES AND APPRECIATION FOR THE GOOD RELATIONS WHICH JORDAN HAS MAINTAINED WITH THE UAR AND WHICH GROMYKO URGED JORDAN TO CONTINUE.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-205
By isa, NARA, Date 8-25-03

C. ASSERTION THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOW EXERTING PRESSURE ON SYRIA TO LINE UP MORE CLOSELY WITH THE UAR AND JORDAN, AND TO ADOPT A MORE REASONABLE AND FLEXIBLE POSITION ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

D. EXPRESSION OF SUSPICION OF IRAQ'S INTENTIONS TOWARD JORDAN AND THE UAR AND A WARNING THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT TRUST THE IRAQIS, THAT THE JORDANIANS SHOULD NOT, AND THAT CURRENT IRAQI GESTURES AND MANEUVERS ARE TACTICS TO COVER DEVIIOUS DESIGNS.

2. [REDACTED] THE GENERAL STATEMENTS [REDACTED] IMPLIED, BUT DID NOT SPECIFY IN SO MANY WORDS, THAT THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED THAT AS A RESULT OF GOVERNOR SCRANTON'S VISIT TO THE AREA AND OTHER INITIATIVES THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ABOUT TO "STEAL THE SHOW" IN THE AREA AND THAT THE SOVIETS WANTED TO "GET IN ON THE ACT".) [REDACTED] UAR FOREIGN MINISTER MAHMUD RIYAD HAD CONFIRMED THAT GROMYKO MADE THE SAME POINTS TO THE UAR [REDACTED] IT IS ENTIRELY PROBABLE THAT GROMYKO AND UAR OFFICIALS DISCUSSED OTHER SUBJECTS WHICH NEITHER DISCLOSED TO [REDACTED] ONE SUCH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN SOVIET DISAPPROVAL OF EARLY RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UAR AND THE UNITED STATES.

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3. THERE WAS NO MENTION [REDACTED] THAT GROMYKO HAD OFFERED MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO JORDAN. THE AREA PRESS HAD HEADLINED THE FACT THAT GROMYKO HAD MADE SUCH AN OFFER DURING HIS MEETING [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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DTG: 291336Z DEC 1968

1968 DEC 29 14 17

169 NOV 29 AM 9:23
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

EEA890
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4709

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82946

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By h, NARA, Date 3-6-98

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SUBJECT: ISRAELI ATTACK ON KHALDEH AIRPORT

STATE 293154

1. ON INSTRUCTIONS SECRETARY RUSK ASSISTANT HART CALLED IN MOISHE RAVIV, SENIOR ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICER PRESENT IN WASHINGTON, EVENING DECEMBER 28 LODGE IMMEDIATE PROTEST AT ISRAELI ACTION ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

(1) USG EXTREMELY DISTURBED BY ISRAELI ACTION. WHILE ATTACK AGAINST EL AL AIRCRAFT AT ATHENS CANNOT BE CONDONED, THIS WAS CARRIED OUT BY INDIVIDUALS AND WE KNOW OF NO INDICATIONS THAT GOL WAS IN ANY WAY INVOLVED. TO CONTRARY THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT GOL HAS BEEN SEEKING TO COPE WITH TERRORIST PROBLEM. LEBANESE BASIC INTENTIONS AND CONCERN ARE INDICATED BY THEIR REGULAR PARTICIPATION IN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION MEETINGS WITH ISRAEL.

(2) CERTAINLY KHALDEH INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND THE MANY PEOPLE THEREIN WERE NOT INVOLVED. THIS IS A VERY BUSY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT WITH PEOPLE OF ALL NATIONALITIES PRESENT. OUR PRELIMINARY REPORTS INDICATE EXTENSIVE DAMAGE RESULTED AND ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF CASUALTIES IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE SOME.

(3) ASSISTANT SECRETARY HART STRESSED THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE SECRETARY TO MAKE PROTEST IN STRONGEST TERMS AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT WE SIMPLY CANNOT HAVE THIS KIND OF VIOLENCE IN THE NEAR EAST. THIS INCIDENT IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN WHEN IT INVOLVES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT USED BY MANY NATIONS. THE PEOPLE AT THE AIRPORT AND THE FACILITIES THEREON CERTAINLY IN NO WAY COULD BE RELATED TO ATHENS INCIDENT.

(4) THE ISRAELI ACTION IS PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE COMING ON THE HEELS OF THE US ANNOUNCEMENT OF AGREEMENT TO SELL PHANTOM AIRCRAFT TO ISRAEL.

(5) GOI SHOULD KNOW BOTH PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED. IF THIS CASE SHOULD BE TAKEN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE GOI WILL FIND THE US STRONGLY OPPOSING THIS ISRAELI ACTION. WE WILL SUPPORT CONDEMNATION.

(6) AS A PERSONAL OBSERVATION, AMBASSADOR HART SAID THAT THE ISRAELI ACTION DID NOT IMPROVE THE CAPABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF

Free file

LEBANON TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS BUT WILL IN FACT IMPAIR IT. THIS WILL NOT PRODUCE THE RESULT INTENDED BY ISRAEL BUT WILL AROUSE A SPIRIT OF REVENGE AMONG PEOPLE WHO UP TO NOW HAVE NOT BEEN INVOLVED AND WHO HAVE WANTED NOT TO BE INVOLVED.

2. MR. RAVIV RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD TRANSMIT OUR VIEWS TO JERUSALEM. SPEAKING FROM A PAPER HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

(1) IT IS A FACT THAT THE INDIVIDUALS PERPETRATING THE OUTRAGE IN ATHENS CAME FROM BEIRUT.

(2) IT IS A FACT THAT THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE PEOPLES FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLOP) ALSO CAME FROM BEIRUT.

(3) BEIRUT IS THE CENTER AND HEADQUARTERS FOR SOME ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDING PFLOP. ISRAEL'S VIEW IS THAT NO GOVERNMENT HARBORING SUCH ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE IMMUNE FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTIONS OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS. THE SAVAGE ATTACK ON ISRAELI AIRCRAFT ON AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT STRUCK AT ISRAEL'S VITAL LIFE-LINE. NO GOVERNMENT CAN PERMIT THIS TO HAPPEN.

(4) IF CASE COMES TO SECURITY COUNCIL, GOI HOPES THAT USG WILL VIEW INCIDENT IN CONTEXT OF WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON IN PAST MONTHS IN BEIRUT AND ELSEWHERE.

3. AMBASSADOR HART RESPONDED THAT WE FIND A GREAT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ACTION OF TWO DERANGED OR MISGUIDED INDIVIDUALS WHO HAPPENED TO COME FROM BEIRUT AND THE ACTION OF A GOVERNMENT USING ITS ARMED FORCES TO VIOLATE THE AIR SPACE OF A COUNTRY AND TO ATTACK ITS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. WE BELIEVE THIS AN INEXCUSEABLE RETALIATORY ACT STRIKING AT INNOCENT PEOPLE AND FACILITIES AND ALSO GREATLY IMPAIRING US INTERESTS. WE UNDERSTAND THE DEEP FEELINGS MOTIVATING THE ISRAELIS BUT NOTED THAT WE HAVE SOME PROVOCATION FROM CUBA IN THE FORM OF HIJACKING AIRCRAFT AND IMPRISONING AMERICAN CITIZENS. THE QUALITY AND NATURE OF US ACTIONS IN HANDLING THESE PROBLEMS ARE IN STARK CONTRAST TO THOSE OF ISRAEL. TO HOLD THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WHOLLY RESPONSIBLE AND THEN TO EXPRESS THIS BY STRIKE AT INNOCENT PEOPLE AND INTERNATIONAL FACILITIES IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE. WE CONSIDER THIS A DANGEROUS ESCALATION ALL OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE PROVOCATION.

FOR TEL AVIV: AMBASSADOR BARBOUR SHOULD SEEK TO SEE IMMEDIATELY EITHER PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL OR FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN TO EXPRESS USG CONCERN MAKING POINTS MADE BY AMBASSADOR HART. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT USG DEEPLY SHOCKED BY ACTION FOR WHICH WE CAN FIND NO JUSTIFICATION. HOLDING LEBANESE GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION OF INDIVIDUALS WILL BE MOST DIFFICULT TO DEFEND. MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE BELIEVE THIS WILL CHANGE THE WHOLE NATURE OF GOL-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP IN WHICH LEBANESE SOUGHT TO LIMIT USE OF LEBANESE TERRITORY TO THE FULL EXTENT OF ITS CAPABILITIES IN FACE OF GENERAL SUPPORT FOR PALESTINE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS.

DTG: 291336Z DEC 68

[Handwritten signature and scribbles]

1968 DEC 29 14 05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

17

EEA839
OO WTE10
DE WTE 4708

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82945

Pres file

69 NOV 29 AM 9:24

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28 DECEMBER 1968
2145 EST

SUBJECT: ISRAELI ATTACK ON BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

REFERENCE: AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 282310Z, 272130Z, 282251Z,
290056Z DEC 1968

1. AT ABOUT 281430 EST DECEMBER 1968, AN ISRAELI COMMANDO FORCE IN FOUR HELICOPTERS ATTACKED THE BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, COMMENCING WITH THE DROPPING OF FLARES AND THE STRAFING OF THE AIRPORT. AN ESTIMATED 45 MEN LANDED AND ATTACKED PLANES AND FACILITIES WITH HAND GRENADES AND MACHINE GUNS. THE ATTACK LASTED ABOUT 20 MINUTES AT WHICH TIME THE ISRAELIS WITHDREW BY HELICOPTER FROM THE AREA.

2. THERE WAS A LOSS OF 13 AIRCRAFT FROM LEBANESE OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED AIRLINES AS FOLLOWS:

MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES: 2 CARAVELLES, 1 707, 1 VISCOUNT
3 COMETS, AND 1 VC-10

TRANS-MEDITERRANEAN AIRLINES: 1 DC-6 AND 1 DC-4

LEBANESE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES: 2 CORONADOES AND
1 DC-7

3. THERE WAS A REPORTED ATTACK ON AIRPORT FUEL FACILITIES; HOWEVER, NO FURTHER DETAILS ON THIS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED.

4. THE AIRPORT HAS BEEN SEALED OFF BY LEBANESE POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS FROM GROUND ACCESS AND IS ALSO CLOSED TO AIR TRAFFIC.

5. INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE THAT THERE ARE NO KNOWN AMERICAN CASUALTIES. FURTHER, THERE WERE NO US AIR CARRIERS AT THE AIRPORT AT THE TIME OF ATTACK.

DTG: 291326Z DECEMBER 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *18*, NARA, Date *3-5-98*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1968 DEC 29 01 58

18
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WHITE HOUSE
SITING

EA386
OO WTE12
DE WTE 4731

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH2939

UNCLAS

DECEMBER 28, 1968

FOLLOWING ARE THREE SETS OF DRAFT NEW YEAR'S GREETINGS TO CHIEFS OF STATE OR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT:

EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC

NO MESSAGE HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK, DUE TO THE LACK OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA. IN THE CASES OF JAPAN, LAOS AND VIETNAM, STATE RECOMMENDS THAT PAST PRACTICE BE FOLLOWED, AND THAT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES BE SENT ONLY TO PRIME MINISTER SATO OF JAPAN, KING SRI SAVANG VATTHANA OF LAOS AND PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU OF VIETNAM.

Pres file

DEAR LORD CASEY:

DURING 1969 WE HAVE TAKEN IMPORTANT STEPS TOWARDS PEACE ON THIS EARTH. WE HAVE ALSO TAKEN A GIANT STEP INTO THE UNIVERSE THAT LIES BEYOND OUR EARTH. IN BOTH OF THESE HISTORIC ENDEAVORS, AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE PARTNERS. YOUR CONTRIBUTION HAS BEEN INVALUABLE. LET US CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO MAKE 1969 A YEAR OF EVEN CLOSER PARTNERSHIP AND FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS THE GOALS WE SHARE.

WARMEST BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR TO YOU AND TO ALL AUSTRALIANS,

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
THE RIGHT HONORABLE
LORD CASEY, P.C., G.C.M.G., C.H.,
GOVERNOR GENERAL OF AUSTRALIA.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

YOUR FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE HAS BEEN A YEAR OF FRUITFUL COLLABORATION BETWEEN US. I HAVE ENJOYED OUR ASSOCIATION, AND YOUR VISIT TO THIS COUNTRY LAST MAY WILL LONG BE REMEMBERED. I AM CONFIDENT THAT UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP AUSTRALIA WILL CONTINUE TO WORK OUT ITS DESTINY AS ONE OF THE GREAT FREE NATIONS OF THE PACIFIC. MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN SENDING YOU AND MRS. GORTON OUR WARM PERSONAL REGARDS AND BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
JOHN G. GORTON,
PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA,
CANBERRA.

DEAR GENERAL NE WIN:

PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS AND THOSE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE OCCASION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNION OF BURMA. MRS. JOHNSON AND I RECALL YOUR VISIT TO US IN 1966 AS ONE OF THE PLEASANTEST MEMORIES OF OUR FIVE YEARS IN THE WHITE HOUSE.

WITH WARMEST GOOD WISHES FOR HAPPINESS AND SUCCESS IN THE NEW YEAR,

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
GENERAL NE WIN,
CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
OF THE UNION OF BURMA.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN SENDING TO YOU AND MADAME CHIANG OUR BEST WISHES FOR YOUR HEALTH AND HAPPINESS IN THE NEW YEAR AND FOR THE CONTINUED PROSPERITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE NEW YEAR WILL BRING A STRENGTHENING OF THOSE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE BEEN FOR ME A SOURCE OF PERSONAL SATISFACTION AND REASSURANCE.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
CHIANG KAI-SHEK,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
TAIPEI.

INDONESIAN PRESIDENT SUHARTO

DEAR GENERAL SUHARTO:

AS A NEW YEAR OPENS, MAY YOUR AND YOUR NATION'S FORTUNES CONTINUE TO BRIGHTEN IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. THE COURAGEOUS ROAD YOU HAVE TAKEN TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE IS AN INSPIRATION TO ALL. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THIS PAST YEAR HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING.

I AM GRATIFIED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ABLE TO PARTICIPATE DURING THESE PAST TWO YEARS IN SUPPLEMENTING INDONESIA'S MAJOR RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION EFFORTS. I FEEL CONFIDENT THAT OUR TWO NATIONS WILL CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE TO COOPERATE FOR THE PROMOTION OF PEACE AND A BETTER LIFE FOR ALL.

SINCERELY,

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

DURING THE PAST YEAR YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAVE SHOWN STEADFAST COURAGE, PATIENCE, AND DETERMINATION IN THE FACE OF EVENTS WHICH HAVE TRIED THE TEMPER OF BOTH OF OUR NATIONS. I AM PERSONALLY DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING

AND SUPPORT DURING THE LONG AND ARDUOUS NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE, TO OUR GREAT JOY, RESULTED IN THE RELEASE OF THE CREW OF THE USS PUEBLO. THE LARGER PROBLEMS OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN EAST ASIA REMAIN, HOWEVER AND THE NEW YEAR MAY BRING EVEN GREATER CHALLENGES FOR US ALL. IN MEETING THESE CHALLENGES WE ARE REASSURED BY THE KNOWLEDGE THAT YOU WILL BE WORKING WITH US TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE IN EAST ASIA.

I HOPE AND TRUST THAT WE WILL SUCCEED IN OUR ENDEAVORS AND THAT YOU AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE WILL HAVE A HAPPY AND PROSPEPOUS NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
CHUNG HEE PARK,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA,
SEOUL.

YOUR MAJESTY:

MRS. JOHNSON AND I EXTEND TO YOUR MAJESTY AND TO HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OUR WARM GREETINGS FOR A HAPPY NEW YEAR. WE HOPE THAT IN 1969 LAOS WILL BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THE PEACE AND TRANQUILITY THAT IS THE NATURAL INCLINATION AND DESIRE OF ITS PEOPLE.

SINCERELY,

HIS MAJESTY
KING SRI SAVANG VATTHANA
LUANG PRABANG, LAOS

YOUR MAJESTY:

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN OFFERING OUR WARMEST BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR TO YOUR MAJESTY, HER MAJESTY THE RAJA PERMAISURI AGONG AND THE PEOPLE OF MALAYSIA.

SINCERELY,

HIS MAJESTY TUANKU ISMAIL NASIRUDDIN
SHAH IBNI AL-MARHUM SULTAN ZAINAL ABIDIN
YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG
KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

LOOKING BACK OVER FIVE YEARS IN THE WHITE HOUSE, MRS. JOHNSON AND I REMEMBER WITH PARTICULAR PLEASURE OUR VISIT TO YOU AND PUAN SHARIFAH RODZIAH. THE MEMORY OF YOUR FRIENDSHIP AND HOSPITALITY REMAINS BRIGHT. WE EXTEND TO YOU BOTH OUR WARMEST REGARDS FOR THE NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

THE HONORABLE TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA
AL-HAJ, K.O.M.
PRIME MINISTER
KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MAY YOU CONTINUE YOUR JOURNEY SAFELY HOME
TO GUIDE YOUR PEOPLE TO A PROSPEROUS AND HAPPY
NEW YEAR IN 1969.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
HAMMER DEROBURT,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF NAURU.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

THIS IS A TIME FOR NEW YEAR GREETINGS. IT
IS ALSO A TIME FOR ME TO SAY AN OFFICIAL FAREWELL
TO OLD FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES, AMONG WHOM YOU HOLD
A SPECIAL PLACE. YOUR ENLIGHTENED POLICIES, YOUR
EXPERIENCE AND INFLUENCE, YOUR STEADY HAND AT
NEW ZEALAND'S HELM, HAVE BEEN OF IMMENSE SERVICE
TO THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM. IN THE PROBLEMS WE HAVE
FACED TOGETHER, I HAVE BEEN MORE GRATEFUL THAN I
CAN SAY FOR YOUR WISE COUNSEL AND YOUR FIRM AND
ELOQUENT SUPPORT. I KNOW THAT MY SUCCESSOR WILL
BE EQUALLY FORTUNATE.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS AND BEST WISHES
FOR 1969,

SINCERELY,

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
KEITH J. HOLYOAKE,
PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND,
WELLINGTON.

DEAR SIR ARTHUR:

I EXTEND TO YOU, AND THROUGH YOU TO ALL NEW ZEALANDERS, MY WARMEST GOOD WISHES FOR A HAPPY AND SUCCESSFUL 1969. AMERICA KNOWS WELL THE VALUE OF THE CONTRIBUTION NEW ZEALAND IS MAKING TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE WITH FREEDOM IN THE WORLD TODAY. AND WE LOOK FORWARD IN THE YEARS TO COME TO INCREASING PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY IN THE PACIFIC, FOR WHICH YOUR STURDY AND VALIANT NATION WILL DESERVE A FULL MEASURE OF CREDIT.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
SIR ARTHUR E. PORRITT,
GOVERNOR GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND
WELLINGTON.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

WITH THE APPROACH OF 1969, I EXTEND TO YOU, TO IMELDA AND THE CHILDREN, AND TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES MY SINCERE WISHES FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. I END MY TERM AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES RECALLING WITH DEEP SATISFACTION OUR CLOSE PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND OUR COOPERATION IN STRENGTHENING OUR SECURITY AND IN ADVANCING THE CAUSE OF PEACE. IT IS AN ADDED SOURCE OF SATISFACTION TO KNOW THAT THIS CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS WILL CONTINUE IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES,
MANILA.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MRS. JOHNSON AND I EXTEND TO YOU, PUAN NOOP AISHAH AND THE PEOPLE OF SINGAPORE OUR WARM GOOD WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY YUSOF BIN ISHAK
THE PRESIDENT
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I AM DELIGHTED WE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET AGAIN DURING YOUR RECENT VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES. AS FROM PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU, I CAME AWAY STIMULATED BY NEW INSIGHTS ON OUR CONTINUING SEARCH FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY. I EARNESTLY HOPE THAT 1969 WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ADVANCE THAT QUEST IN BOTH OUR NATIONS.

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS IN EXTENDING BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR TO YOU AND MRS. LEE.

SINCERELY,

THE HONORABLE LEE KUAN YEW
PRIME MINISTER
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE

YOUR MAJESTY:

AS I LOOK BACK ON THE SOMBER CHALLENGES AND BRIGHT ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE LAST FIVE YEARS, I TAKE PARTICULAR PRIDE IN THE DEEPENING RELATIONS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES DURING THAT PERIOD. OUR ALLIANCE HAS NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO THE SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION, BUT HAS ENABLED ITS PEOPLE TO BUILD TOWARD A NEW AND MORE REWARDING FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE IMPORTANT ROLE THAT YOUR MAJESTY HAS PLAYED IN THESE GREAT ENDEAVORS.

MRS. JOHNSON AND I SHARE PLEASANT MEMORIES OF OUR VISITS WITH YOUR MAJESTIES, BOTH HERE IN WASHINGTON AND IN THAILAND, AND EXTEND TO BOTH OF YOU OUR WARMEST GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES FOR A HAPPY NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS MAJESTY
BHUMIPOL ADULYADEJ,
KING OF THAILAND

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

AS MRS. JOHNSON AND I LOOK BACK ON THIS PAST YEAR, WE RECALL WITH PARTICULAR PLEASURE THE VISIT WHICH YOU AND THANPUYING-CHONGKOL PAID US LAST MAY. YOUR VISIT ADDED TO THE DEEP SATISFACTION WHICH I TAKE FROM THE FRUITFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS THAT HAVE DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS. TOGETHER WE HAVE WORKED TO DEFEND THE FREEDOM OF SOUTHEAST ASIA WHILE LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW ERA OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION WITHIN THAT REGION. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE UNIQUE CONTRIBUTION WHICH THE ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT, UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP, HAS MADE TO THESE EFFORTS.

ALL OF THIS GIVES ME CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE, AND IN THIS SPIRIT, MRS. JOHNSON AND I EXTEND TO YOU AND YOUR GRACIOUS WIFE OUR VERY BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
FIELD MARSHALL THANOM KITTIKACHORN
PRIME MINISTER OF THAILAND

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AS I PREPARE TO RELINQUISH THE BURDENS OF THE PRESIDENCY, MY THOUGHTS TURN TO THE DANGERS AND THE HOPES WHICH LIE AHEAD FOR YOU AND THE BRAVE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN 1969. I PRAY THAT THE NEW YEAR WILL BRING TO YOUR COUNTRY THAT PEACE WITH FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY FOR WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE WORKED AND SACRIFICED FOR SO LONG.

I KNOW THAT THE TIES OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL RESPECT BETWEEN OUR PEOPLE WHICH HAVE BEEN FORGED IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST AGGRESSION WILL CONTINUE TO GROW STRONGER DURING THE COMING YEAR. IT IS WITH THE PROUD MEMORY OF WHAT WE HAVE ACHIEVED TOGETHER THAT I SEND YOU MY WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND MY HEARTFELT BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
NGUYEN VAN THIEU,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF VIET-NAM.

YOUR HIGHNESS:

I HOPE THE NEW YEAR WILL BRING TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAMOA CONTINUED PROSPERITY AND HAPPINESS.

SINCERELY,

HIS HIGHNESS
MALIETOA TANUMAFILI II,
HEAD OF STATE OF WESTERN SAMOA,
APIA.

NEAR EASTERN

NO MESSAGES HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR GREECE, THE UAR, YEMEN, IRAQ, SYRIA, OR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF SOUTHERN YEMEN.

OWING TO THE DELICATE NATURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH GREECE, THE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE IT APPROPRIATE TO SEND PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES TO EITHER THE KING, WHO IS STILL ABSENT FROM GREECE, OR TO PRIME MINISTER PAPADOPOULOS. WE DO NOT ADDRESS ROUTINE MESSAGES TO THE REGENT. THIS POLICY IS THE SAME AS THE ONE FOLLOWED IN THE PREPARATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S 1968 NEW YEAR'S GREETING.

IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO SEND PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES TO THE UAR, YEMEN, IRAQ OR SYRIA WHICH BROKE RELATIONS WITH US IN JUNE 1967.

IN VIEW OF THE ACCUSATION BY PRESIDENT QAHTAN AL-SHAABI OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF SOUTHERN YEMEN THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ATTEMPTING TO BRING DOWN HIS REGIME ("NEW YORK TIMES", DECEMBER 26, PAGE 8), WE ALSO DO NOT BELIEVE IT APPROPRIATE TO SEND HIM PRESIDENTIAL NEW YEAR'S GREETINGS.

A MESSAGE HAS NOT BEEN PREPARED FOR PRIME MINISTER HOVEYDA OF IRAN. CONCEIVABLY SUCH A MESSAGE MIGHT DETRACT FROM THE MESSAGE TO THE SHAH, AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL SUBSTANTIVE MESSAGES RESULTING FROM HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES EARLIER THIS MONTH.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

ON THE OCCASION OF THE BEGINNING OF A NEW YEAR I EXTEND TO YOU MY BEST WISHES FOR A CHALLENGING AND REWARDING FUTURE. MAY THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES GROW OVER THE YEARS AHEAD AND BRING PEACE AND PROSPERITY TO OUR PEOPLES. MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN WISHING YOU A VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
DUDLEY SENANAYAKE,
PRIME MINISTER,
GOVERNMENT OF CEYLON,
COLOMBO.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I TAKE THE OCCASION OF OUR NEW YEAR TO
EXTEND TO YOU, AND THROUGH YOU, TO ALL THE CITIZENS
OF ISRAEL, MY FOND HOPE THAT THE YEAR 1969 WILL MARK
THE BEGINNING OF THAT PEACE ENVISIONED BY THE PROPHETS
OF OLD AND SO DESPERATELY NEEDED BY ALL MEN OF TODAY.
IN THE YEARS TO COME I WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW WITH
SYMPATHY AND CONFIDENCE ISRAEL'S PURSUIT OF A JUST AND
LASTING PEACE.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
ZALMAN SHAZAR,
PRESIDENT,
JERUSALEM.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

AS WE IN THE UNITED STATES PREPARE TO CELEBRATE
THE DAWN OF A NEW YEAR I SEND YOU MY PERSONAL
GREETING AND EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR FRIEND-
SHIP THROUGHOUT MY ADMINISTRATION. WITH THIS MESSAGE
GOES MY FERVENT HOPE FOR THE ADVENT OF A JUST AND
LASTING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST. MRS. JOHNSON JOINS
ME IN WISHING YOU AND MRS. ESHKOL "SHALOM".

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
LEVI ESHKOL,
PRIME MINISTER,
JERUSALEM.

YOUR MAJESTY:

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO
THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN GREETINGS AND WARM GOOD WISHES
FOR A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. AS I APPROACH
THE END OF MY TERM IN OFFICE, I TRUST THAT THE COMING
YEAR WILL BRING SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE SEARCH FOR
A JUST AND LASTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE, WHICH BOTH OUR
COUNTRIES SO EARNESTLY DESIRE.

SINCERELY,

HIS MAJESTY
HUSSEIN I,
AMMAN.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

AS ONE OF MY LAST OFFICIAL ACTS, I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN SINCERE GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE COMING YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
BAHJAT AL-TALHOUNI,
PRIME MINISTER,
AMMAN.

YOUR HIGHNESS:

I SEND YOU MY WARMEST WISHES AND CONGRATULATIONS ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR, 1969. ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES I EXPRESS MY PLEASURE THAT WE WERE RECENTLY ABLE TO WELCOME YOU AS A DISTINGUISHED GUEST TO OUR COUNTRY AND MY THANKFULNESS FOR YOUR SAFE RETURN TO YOUR OWN LAND.

IN CONCLUDING MY TERM OF OFFICE, I EXTEND TO YOUR HIGHNESS, AND THROUGH YOU, THE PEOPLE OF KUWAIT MY WARMEST GOOD WISHES FOR CONTINUED HEALTH AND PROSPERITY.

SINCERELY,

HIS HIGHNESS
SHAIKH SABAH AL-SALIM AL-SABAH
THE AMIR OF KUWAIT
KUWAIT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I EXTEND TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN MY WARMEST GOOD WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR. I TRUST THAT 1969 WILL BE A YEAR OF INCREASING PROSPERITY AND ADVANCEMENT FOR PAKISTAN UNDER YOUR WISE LEADERSHIP AND THAT THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO FLOURISH.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN, H.P.K., H.J.
PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN
RAWALPINDI

YOUR MAJESTY:

ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR 1969, I EXTEND MY VERY BEST WISHES AND THOSE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES TO YOUR MAJESTY AND THE PEOPLE OF SAUDI ARABIA. SINCE THIS IS MY LAST OCCASION TO EXTEND MY GREETINGS AND CONGRATULATIONS AS PRESIDENT, I ALSO WANT TO TELL YOUR MAJESTY HOW MUCH I HAVE VALUED OUR FRIENDLY PERSONAL CONTACTS DURING MY TERM OF OFFICE. I CONTINUE TO ADMIRE YOUR MAJESTY'S WISE LEADERSHIP AND WISH YOU AND YOUR PEOPLE HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY IN FUTURE YEARS.

SINCERELY,

HIS MAJESTY
KING FAISAL BIN ABDUL AZIZ AL-SAUD
RIYADH

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I EXTEND TO YOU, AND TO YOUR GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, MY BEST WISHES FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY IN THE COMING MONTHS OF 1969. THE ASSOCIATION OF OUR TWO NATIONS HAS BEEN A FIRM AND FRUITFUL ONE AND WILL, I AM CONVINCED, ENDURE. PLEASE EXTEND TO MRS. SUNAY KINDEST REGARDS FROM MY WIFE AND MYSELF.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
CEVDET SUNAY,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF TURKEY.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I SEND YOU AND YOUR COUNTRYMEN MY BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR. MAY THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES PROSPER IN THE YEARS AHEAD. MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN WISHING YOU A VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
AMIR IBRAHIM NASIR, R.E.K., N.G.I.V.,
PRESIDENT,
REPUBLIC OF THE MALDIVE ISLANDS,
MALE.

YOUR BEATITUDE:

IN REVIEWING THE EVENTS OF 1968, I NOTE WITH DEEP GRATIFICATION THE PROGRESS MADE IN THIS YEAR TOWARD A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE TROUBLED CYPRUS. I SEND YOU AND YOUR FELLOW CYPRIOTS MY BEST WISHES FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IN THE NEW YEAR, AND FOR YOUR GROWING PROSPERITY AND WELL-BEING IN ALL THE YEARS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

HIS BEATITUDE
ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS, III,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CYPRUS,
NICOSIA.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I SEND YOU AND YOUR COUNTRYMEN MY BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR. I AM SURE YOU SHARE WITH ME THE HOPE THAT 1969 WILL BE A YEAR OF PEACE AND PROGRESS FOR BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND MRS. GOPALLAWA BEST WISHES FOR A VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
WILLIAM GOPALLAWA, M.B.E.,
GOVERNOR GENERAL,
QUEEN'S HOUSE,
COLOMBO.

YOUR MAJESTY:

AS WE MOVE INTO OUR NEW YEAR, I SEND MY WARMEST GOOD WISHES TO YOUR MAJESTY FOR YOUR GOOD HEALTH AND THE PROSPERITY OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. MAY 1969 BE MARKED BY THE SAME CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WHICH OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS SHAPED AND MAY AFGHANISTAN ENJOY FURTHER PROGRESS UNDER YOUR WISE LEADERSHIP.

SINCERELY,

HIS MAJESTY
MOHAMMAD ZAHIR SHAH
KING OF AFGHANISTAN
KABUL.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AS MY TERM OF OFFICE DRAWS TO A CLOSE AND ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON GREETINGS AND WARM GOOD WISHES FOR A JOYFUL AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. IT IS MY FERVENT HOPE THAT THE NEW YEAR WILL BRING PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, A CAUSE TO WHICH BOTH OUR COUNTRIES ARE DEDICATED.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
CHARLES HELOU,
PRESIDENT,
BEIRUT.

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

AS ONE OF MY LAST OFFICIAL ACTS, I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON SINCERE GREETINGS AND WARM GOOD WISHES ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE COMING NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
ABDULLAH YAFE,
PRIME MINISTER,
BEIRUT.

TO PRESIDENT HUSAIN OF INDIA

MRS. JOHNSON AND I SEND YOU WARMEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR. I KNOW WE SHARE THE FERVENT HOPE THAT THE CLOSE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL GROW EVEN STRONGER, AND THAT 1969 WILL BRING FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL MANKIND.

TO PRIME MINISTER GANDHI OF INDIA

MRS. JOHNSON AND I WISH YOU ALL THE BEST FOR A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. 1968 HAS BEEN A YEAR OF IMPRESSIVE GAINS IN THE STRUGGLE WHICH YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT ARE SO COURAGEOUSLY WAGING TO ACHIEVE A FULLER LIFE FOR THE PEOPLE OF INDIA. MAY 1969 BE ANOTHER YEAR OF INSPIRING PROGRESS. AND MAY YOUR EXAMPLE LIGHT THE WAY TO PEACE AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL MANKIND.

TO KING MAHENDRA OF NEPAL

ON THE OCCASION OF THE BEGINNING OF A NEW YEAR I EXTEND TO YOU MY BEST WISHES FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS 1969. MRS. JOHNSON AND I WILL ALWAYS CARRY WARM MEMORIES OF YOUR VISIT WITH US. I KNOW THE FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO FLOURISH. FREE MEN EVERYWHERE REJOICED IN YOUR MAJESTY'S RETURN TO GOOD HEALTH. MAY THE NEW YEAR BRING MORE ACCOMPLISHMENTS FROM YOUR WISE LEADERSHIP AND PEACEFUL PROGRESS TO YOUR BRAVE PEOPLE.

TO PRIME MINISTER THAPA OF NEPAL

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I SEND YOU AND YOUR COUNTRYMEN MY BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR. I KNOW THAT THE FRUITFUL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NEPAL WILL HELP TO BUILD THE SECURITY AND WELL BEING WE BOTH SEEK FOR ASIA AND FOR ALL MANKIND.

TO THE SHAH OF IRAN

AS WE AMERICANS COME TO THE END OF ONE YEAR AND THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT, OUR THOUGHTS TURN TO OUR FRIENDS. MRS. JOHNSON AND I EXTEND TO YOU AND THE EMPRESS OUR VERY BEST WISHES FOR YOUR FUTURE HEALTH AND HAPPINESS AND FOR YOUR FUTURE EFFORTS TO BETTER THE LIVES OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. THE PROGRESS IRAN IS MAKING UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP HAS BUOYED OUR SPIRITS IN THE PAST AND WILL BE SOURCE OF INSPIRATION FOR US IN THE FUTURE. I KNOW YOU SHARE MY EXPECTATION THAT THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES--MADE STRONGER IN THE PAST YEAR NOT ONLY BY YOUR VISIT BUT BY THAT OF YOUR PRIME MINISTER AS WELL--WILL GROW EVEN CLOSER.

EUROPEAN

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRIA MY BEST WISHES FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
FRANZ JONAS,
FEDERAL PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF AUSTRIA,
BALLHAUSPLATZ 1,
VIENNA 1, AUSTRIA.

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR:

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, MRS. JOHNSON AND I
EXTEND BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR TO YOU AND MRS. KLAUS AND
TO THE AUSTRIAN PEOPLE. WE RECALL WITH WARM MEMORIES YOUR
VISIT TO OUR COUNTRY LAST SPRING. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT
THE CLOSE TIES BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND THE UNITED STATES WILL
CONTINUE IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
DR. JOSEF KLAUS,
FEDERAL CHANCELLOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA,
BALLHAUSPLATZ 2,
VIENNA 1, AUSTRIA.

YOUR MAJESTY:

PLEASE ACCEPT MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR YOURSELF
AND FOR THE CONTINUED PROSPERITY AND HAPPINESS OF THE
BELGIAN PEOPLE IN 1969.

SINCERELY,

HIS MAJESTY
BAUDOIN I,
KING OF THE BELGIANS,
BRUSSELS.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I EXTEND TO YOU MY BEST WISHES FOR A HAPPY
AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. I KNOW THAT OUR TWO
COUNTRIES WILL BUILD ON THEIR LONG TRADITION
OF CLOSE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION, IN OUR MUTUAL
ENDEAVORS IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
GASTON EYSKENS,
THE PRIME MINISTER OF BELGIUM,
BRUSSELS.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR, I EXTEND
TO YOU AND TO THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE MY BEST WISHES
FOR PEACE, HAPPINESS, AND PROSPERITY IN 1969.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
GEORGI TRAYKOV,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM
OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,
SOFIA.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR GENERAL:

WE SEND ONCE MORE TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF CANADA
OUR WARMEST GREETINGS FOR THE NEW YEAR. I HAVE TAKEN
INSPIRATION FROM THE CLOSE TIES WHICH UNITE OUR TWO PEOPLES,
AND IT IS A SOURCE OF GREAT SATISFACTION THAT DURING
MY TENURE AS PRESIDENT WE WERE ABLE TO STRENGTHEN
THESE HISTORIC BONDS.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
THE RIGHT HONORABLE
ROLAND MICHENER, P.C., Q.C.,
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF CANADA,
OTTAWA.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN SENDING TO YOU AND
THE MEMBERS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT OUR BEST WISHES FOR
1969. WE HOPE THAT THE YEAR AHEAD WILL SEE FURTHER
PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR COMMON GOAL--A
PEACEFUL, PROSPEROUS WORLD.

SINCERELY,

THE RIGHT HONORABLE
PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, P.C.,
PRIME MINISTER,
OTTAWA.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR, I EXTEND
PERSONAL GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES FOR THE WELL-BEING
OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE IN 1969. IT IS MY EARNEST HOPE
THAT THE NEW YEAR WILL SEE GREATER TRANQUILITY IN THE WORLD
AND A CONTINUED GROWTH OF UNDERSTANDING AND FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
LUDVIK SVOBODA,
PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC,
PRAGUE.

DEAR MR. PREMIER:

I EXPRESS TO YOU AND TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE
CORDIAL GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES FOR PEACE,
HAPPINESS, AND PROSPERITY IN THE NEW YEAR. IT IS MY
HOPE THAT 1969 WILL SEE A STRENGTHENING OF PEACE
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AND THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
OLDRICH CERNIK,
PREMIER OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK
SOCIALIST REPUBLIC,
PRAGUE.

YOUR MAJESTY:

IT IS WITH SPECIAL PLEASURE THAT I JOIN WITH ALL AMERICANS
TO EXTEND TO YOUR MAJESTY AND TO THE DANISH PEOPLE OUR EVERY
BEST WISH FOR THE NEW YEAR. MAY THE YEAR 1969 BRING TO OUR TWO
PEOPLES, AND TO MEN OF GOOD WILL THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, THE
PEACE AND WELL-BEING FOR WHICH WE STRIVE AND PRAY.

SINCERELY,

HIS MAJESTY
FREDERIK IX,
KING OF DENMARK,
COPENHAGEN.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

AS THE NEW YEAR DAWNS, IT IS A PARTICULAR PLEASURE TO NOTE THAT 1968 SAW FURTHER GROWTH OF THE FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WHICH HAVE TRADITIONALLY CHARACTERIZED THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DANISH AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLES. MRS. JOHNSON AND I JOIN ALL AMERICANS IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND TO THE DANISH NATION EVERY BEST WISH FOR 1969.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
HILMAR BAUNSGAARD,
PRIME MINISTER OF DENMARK,
COPENHAGEN.

DEAR PRESIDENT REY:

REMEMBERING WITH PLEASURE OUR MEETING IN WASHINGTON LAST FEBRUARY, I SEND YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, WARM GREETINGS FOR THE NEW YEAR. THE COMPLETION OF THE CUSTOMS UNION MADE 1968 A HISTORIC YEAR FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE HOPE THAT 1969 WILL BRING FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD THE GREAT GOAL OF EUROPEAN UNITY.

SINCERELY,

THE HONORABLE
JEAN REY, PRESIDENT,
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MY COUNTRYMEN JOIN ME IN SENDING YOU AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE WARM BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR. I KNOW THAT OUR TWO NATIONS WILL CARRY ON THEIR IMPORTANT WORK TOGETHER ON THE BASIS OF COMMON INTERESTS AND MUTUAL FRIENDSHIP.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
HEINRICH LUEBKE,
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY,
BONN.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE JOIN ME IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF FINLAND OUR BEST WISHES FOR A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. I HAVE VALUED OUR FRIENDSHIP OVER THE YEARS AND KNOW THAT YOUR LEADERSHIP OF FINLAND WILL CONTINUE TO ENHANCE THE CLOSE AND CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
URHO KEKKONEN,
PRESIDENT OF FINLAND,
HELSINKI.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

IT IS A PARTICULAR PLEASURE FOR ME TO JOIN WITH MY FELLOW AMERICANS IN OFFERING TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF FINLAND OUR BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR.

IT IS OUR HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT 1969 WILL BECOME ANOTHER CHAPTER IN THE LONG ANNALS OF CORDIAL FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN FINLAND AND THE UNITED STATES.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
MAUNO KOIVISTO,
PRIME MINISTER OF FINLAND,
HELSINKI.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

MRS. JOHNSON AND I SEND TO YOU AND TO MADAME COUVE DE MURVILLE OUR CORDIAL GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES FOR THE COMING YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE,
PRIME MINISTER OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
PARIS.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR, I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE MY BEST WISHES FOR PEACE, HAPPINESS, AND PROSPERITY IN 1969.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
PAL LOSONCZI,
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL,
BUDAPEST.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MY FELLOW AMERICANS JOIN ME IN EXTENDING TO YOU
AND TO THE PEOPLE OF ICELAND OUR VERY BEST WISHES
FOR THE NEW YEAR. MAY 1969 BRING TO THE WORLD
THE PEACE AND WELL-BEING WHICH ALL MEN OF GOOD WILL
SO EARNESTLY DESIRE.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
DR. KRISTJAN ELDJARN,
PRESIDENT OF ICELAND,
REYKJAVIK.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

MY COUNTRYMEN JOIN ME IN SENDING TO YOU AND TO
THE ICELANDIC PEOPLE OUR WARM GREETINGS ON THE
OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR. WE HOPE FOR A YEAR OF
HAPPINESS AND PEACE, MARKED BY THE FURTHER
PROSPERING OF THE FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN
OUR TWO PEOPLES.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
BJARNI BENEDIKTSSON,
PRIME MINISTER OF ICELAND,
REYKJAVIK.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND
MY WARM PERSONAL REGARDS AND BEST WISHES AS WE
BEGIN THE NEW YEAR. I KNOW THAT THE FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS, WHICH HAS BEEN SO VIVID
TO ME OVER THE YEARS, WILL CONTINUE IN THE FUTURE.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
EAMON DE VALERA,
PRESIDENT OF IRELAND,
DUBLIN.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

AS WE BEGIN THE NEW YEAR, I SEND TO YOU AND
THE IRISH PEOPLE MY SINCERE PERSONAL REGARDS AND
BEST WISHES FOR A YEAR OF PEACE AND PROSPERITY.
IT IS MY CONFIDENT HOPE THAT OUR TWO NATIONS WILL
CONTINUE THE CLOSE FRIENDSHIP THAT HAS LONG GIVEN
ME WARM SATISFACTION.

SINCERELY,

JOHN M. LYNCH,
PRIME MINISTER OF IRELAND,
DUBLIN, IRELAND,

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE JOIN ME IN SENDING YOU WARMEST
GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR. IT IS MY
HOPE THAT 1969 WILL BRING HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY TO
YOU AND TO OUR GOOD FRIENDS THE ITALIAN PEOPLE, AND THAT
THE FRIENDSHIP WHICH HAS SO LONG CHARACTERIZED THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO GROW
AND TO FLOURISH.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
GIUSEPPE SARAGAT,
PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC,
ROME.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I WISH TO EXPRESS TO YOU AND TO OUR GOOD FRIENDS
THE ITALIAN PEOPLE THE BEST WISHES OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE FOR A PROSPEROUS AND PEACEFUL NEW YEAR. IT IS
WITH PLEASURE THAT I RECALL OUR MEETING AT THE WHITE
HOUSE IN THE FALL OF 1967, AND I WISH TO TAKE THIS
OCCASION TO EXTEND TO YOU MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS
ON THE ASSUMPTION OF YOUR NEW DUTIES AS PRESIDENT OF
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
MARIANO RUMOR,
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC,
ROME.

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS:

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW YEAR I EXTEND MY MOST CORDIAL GREETINGS TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF LUXEMBOURG. MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR BEST PERSONAL REGARDS ON YOUR FORTHCOMING BIRTHDAY.

SINCERELY,

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
JEAN,
GRAND DUKE OF LUXEMBOURG,
LUXEMBOURG.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I EXTEND MY VERY BEST WISHES FOR A PROSPEROUS AND HAPPY NEW YEAR. I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL MAINTAIN THEIR CLOSE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION IN THE YEAR AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
PIERRE WERNER,
THE PRIME MINISTER OF LUXEMBOURG,
LUXEMBOURG.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I SEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF MALTA MY OWN GOOD WISHES AND THOSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AT THE ADVENT OF THE NEW YEAR. IT IS MY HOPE, AS I KNOW IT IS YOURS, THAT THE COMING YEAR WILL BRING A STRENGTHENING OF THE TIES BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
GIORGIO BORG OLIVIER,
PRIME MINISTER OF MALTA,
VALLETTA.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL:

AS 1969 DRAWS UPON US, IT HAS A PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE FOR ME. IT IS THE YEAR IN WHICH I TURN OVER MY STEWARDSHIP OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS TO NEW HANDS, AS WELL AS THE YEAR IN WHICH THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF NATO WILL BE CELEBRATED. IN THE FUTURE, AS IN THE PAST, NATO WILL PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN ASSURING THE CONTINUING SECURITY OF ITS MEMBER NATIONS. AS NATO ENTERS ITS THIRD DECADE, MY BEST WISHES, PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL, GO WITH IT AND WITH YOU. YOUR OWN PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE WILL NOT BE OVERLOOKED WHEN THE HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION YOU HAVE SERVED SO WELL IS WRITTEN.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
MANLIO BROSIQ,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION,
BRUSSELS.

YOUR MAJESTY:

I EXTEND TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
NETHERLANDS MY BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR.
I KNOW YOU SHARE MY PROFOUND HOPE THAT 1969
WILL BRING US A WORLD AT PEACE.

SINCERELY,

HER MAJESTY
JULIANA,
QUEEN OF THE NETHERLANDS,
THE HAGUE.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

PLEASE ACCEPT MY WARM GOOD WISHES FOR THE NEW
YEAR. IN FACING THE TASKS AHEAD, OUR TWO NATIONS CAN
DRAW INSPIRATION FROM THEIR CLOSE AND STEADY COOPERATION IN
THE QUEST FOR PEACE.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
PETRUS J. S. DE JONG,
THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE NETHERLANDS,
THE HAGUE.

YOUR MAJESTY:

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN THE HOPE THAT THE NEW
YEAR WILL BRING HAPPINESS AND WELL-BEING TO YOUR MAJESTY AND
TO THE NORWEGIAN PEOPLE. THE WARM AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN
OUR TWO NATIONS, SO WELL SYMBOLIZED BY YOUR MAJESTY'S MOST
WELCOME VISIT HERE THIS YEAR, HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF GRATIFI-
CATION THROUGHOUT MY YEARS AS PRESIDENT.

SINCERELY,

HIS MAJESTY
OLAV V,
KING OF NORWAY,
OSLO.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

WITH THE ADVENT OF THE NEW YEAR, I TAKE PLEASURE
IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND TO THE NORWEGIAN PEOPLE MY
PERSONAL BEST WISHES AND THOSE OF MY COUNTRYMEN.
DEDICATED TO COMMON IDEALS, OUR TWO NATIONS WILL, I
KNOW, STRIVE IN THE FUTURE AS THEY HAVE IN THE PAST
TOWARDS OUR MUTUAL GOALS OF PEACE AND WELL-BEING.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
PER BORTEN,
PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY,
OSLO.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF
PORTUGAL MY BEST WISHES FOR THE COMING YEAR.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
REAR ADMIRAL AMERICO DEUS RODRIGUES THOMAZ,
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF PORTUGAL,
LISBON.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

ALLOW ME TO EXTEND COPDIAL BEST WISHES FOR THE
COMING YEAR. I HOPE YOU WILL ENJOY THE GREATEST
SUCCESS IN ACCOMPLISHING THE IMPORTANT TASKS OF YOUR NEW OFFICE.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
DR. MARCELLO CAETANO,
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS OF PORTUGAL,
LISBON.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR, I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE
POLISH PEOPLE MY BEST WISHES FOR PEACE, HAPPINESS, AND PROSPERITY
IN 1969.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
MARIAN SPYCHALSKI,
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,
WARSAW.

DEAR. MR. PRESIDENT:

I EXTEND TO YOU WARM GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES
FOR A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR IN WHICH THERE
WILL BE STEADY PROGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES AND TOWARD WORLD PEACE.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
NICOLAE CEAUSESCU,
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE,
BUCHAREST.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

ON THE OCCASION OF THE NEW YEAR, I EXTEND TO
YOU AND TO THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE PERSONAL GREETINGS AND
BEST WISHES FOR A PEACEFUL, PROSPEROUS, AND HAPPY 1969.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
ION GHEORGHE MAURER,
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,
BUCHAREST.

DEAR GENERAL FRANCO:

ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES
I WISH YOUR EXCELLENCY AND THE SPANISH PEOPLE SUCCESS
AND WELL-BEING FOR THE NEW YEAR. MAY THE FRIENDLY
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS PROSPER.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
FRANCISCO FRANCO BAHAMONDE,
CHIEF OF THE SPANISH STATE,
MADRID.

YOUR MAJESTY:

THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES JOIN ME IN SENDING
YOU AND THE SWEDISH PEOPLE WARM WISHES FOR HAPPINESS
AND PROSPERITY IN THE NEW YEAR. IT IS OUR HOPE AND
EXPECTATION THAT THE YEAR AHEAD WILL SEE A FURTHER
STRENGTHENING OF THE LINKS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COMMON
ASPIRATIONS WHICH HAVE LONG CHARACTERIZED RELATIONS
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

SINCERELY,

HIS MAJESTY
GUSTAF VI ADOLF,
KING OF SWEDEN,
STOCKHOLM.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES JOIN ME IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF SWEDEN WARM WISHES FOR PEACE, HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY IN THE NEW YEAR. MAY THE TRADITIONALLY WARM FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS FLOURISH IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

THE HONORABLE
TAGE ERLANDER,
PRIME MINISTER,
STOCKHOLM.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MRS. JOHNSON AND I, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, EXTEND TO YOU AND MRS. SPUEHLER AND TO THE PEOPLE OF SWITZERLAND OUR BEST WISHES FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. WE KNOW THAT THE FRIENDLY TIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
DR. WILLY SPUEHLER,
PRESIDENT OF THE SWISS CONFEDERATION,
PALAIS FEDERAL,
3200 BERN, SWITZERLAND.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

ON BEHALF OF MY FELLOW AMERICANS, I EXTEND TO YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR. I LEAVE MY PRESENT OFFICE WITH THE PERSONAL, FERVENT HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL JOIN THE UNITED STATES IN THE COMING YEARS IN HELPING TO BUILD A MORE SECURE AND PROSPEROUS WORLD.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
NIKOLAI V. PODGORNYY,
CHAIRMAN, PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME
SOVIET OF THE U.S.S.R.,
MOSCOW, U.S.S.R.

MY DEAR QUEEN ELIZABETH:

AS WE BEGIN THE NEW YEAR, I SEND TO YOUR MAJESTY, TO YOUR FAMILY AND TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE A MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP AND HOPE. THE BONDS BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF STRENGTH TO ME, AND I KNOW THAT THEY SHALL LONG ENDURE.

VERY SINCERELY YOURS,

HER MAJESTY
QUEEN ELIZABETH II,
LONDON, ENGLAND.

YOUR HOLINESS:

I TAKE GREAT PLEASURE IN SENDING YOU MY WARM GOOD WISHES AND THOSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THE NEW YEAR. YOUR PRAYERS AND UNTIRING EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF PEACE WITH JUSTICE FOR ALL MANKIND HAVE BEEN THE SOURCE OF GREAT COMFORT AND INSPIRATION TO US ALL. I KNOW WE SHARE THE FERVENT HOPE THAT 1969 WILL BRING US CLOSER TO THE ATTAINMENT OF PEACE AND PROGRESS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

SINCERELY,

HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI,
VATICAN CITY.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF YUGOSLAVIA CORDIAL PERSONAL GREETINGS AND WARM BEST WISHES FOR A HAPPY, PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR. MAY THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WHICH SO FORTUNATELY EXIST BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO DEVELOP IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
JOSIP BROZ-TITO,
PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA,
BELGRADE.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

AS WE BEGIN A NEW YEAR, I EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF YUGOSLAVIA WARMEST GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUING PEACE, PROSPERITY, AND HAPPINESS.

SINCERELY,

HIS EXCELLENCY
MIKA SPILJAK,
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA;
BELGRADE.

MESSAGES COVERING THE BALANCE OF THE AREAS WILL FOLLOW LATER THIS AFTERNOON.

IF YOU APPROVE, JIM JONES COULD INFORM US BY TELEPHONE AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT WILL GET OUT THE MESSAGES PROMPTLY.

DTG: 282001Z DEC 68

PROCESSING NOTE:

NSF, Memos to the President, "Walt Rostow, Vol. 112, Dec. 26-31, 1968"

doc. #19 not used in this file.

3/17/98, MP

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1968 DEC 28 23 08

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS2941

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

DECEMBER 28, 1968

HEREWITH, AS CLEARED BY SEC. RUSK, ARE DRAFT MESSAGES TO DE GAULLE, KIESINGER, WILSON, SATO, AND PODGORNÝ, FOR YOUR APPROVAL.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: (DE GAULLE)

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I THANK YOU FOR YOUR WARM MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON THE COMPLETION OF THE APOLLO 8 MISSION. COL. BORMAN, CAPT. LOVELL, AND MAJ. ANDERS JOIN ME IN THIS EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR YOUR GRATIFYING WORDS.

AS WE COME TO THE NEW YEAR, I ALSO WISH TO TELL YOU AGAIN OF THE WARMTH OF MY FEELING FOR THE PEOPLE OF FRANCE AND OF MY ABIDING FAITH THAT THE DESTINY OF OUR TWO NATIONS WILL REMAIN CLOSELY LINKED IN THE YEARS TO COME.

WE HAVE BOTH FACED SERIOUS PROBLEMS THIS YEAR IN BEARING OUR RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT STANDING BACK FROM THESE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS, I TRUST YOU SHARE WITH ME THE FAITH THAT THE CLOUDS OF WAR ARE SLOWLY BEGINNING TO LIFT FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THAT BY GIVING OUR FULL SUPPORT TO THE JARRING MISSION WE CAN PREVENT THEM FROM ENVELOPING THE MIDDLE EAST AGAIN.

IN DIFFERENT WAYS, WE EACH HAVE BORNE GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SOME THIRTY YEARS. RECALLING WHAT OUR NATIONS HAVE BEEN THROUGH IN THIS TIME AND THE UNDERLYING PROSPERITY AND SECURITY THEY NOW ENJOY, I WOULD HOPE YOU, TOO, LOOK WITH CONFIDENCE ON THE FUTURE OF OUR NATIONS AND THE WESTERN FAMILY OF WHICH THEY ARE A PART.

YOU HAVE MY VERY BEST WISHES IN CARRYING OUT THE DEMANDING TASKS OF LEADERSHIP IN THE YEAR AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
69 NOV 28 PM 6:19

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By NARA, Date 3-5-76

DEAR CHANCELLOR KIESINGER:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE CONCERNING MY RECENT ILLNESS AND SENDING NEW YEAR'S GREETING. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK YOU ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR YOUR WARM CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE ON THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE APOLLO 8 MISSION.

AS THE NEW YEAR ARRIVES AND THE PERIOD OF MY RESPONSIBILITY AS PRESIDENT DRAWS TO A CLOSE, I WISH TO SAY HOW GREATLY I HAVE VALUED THE CLOSE AND CONFIDENT RELATIONS WE DEVELOPED BETWEEN US.

1968 WAS A YEAR OF DIFFICULT CHALLENGES FOR US IN THE WEST. BUT WE HAVE MAINTAINED OUR ESSENTIAL UNITY OF PURPOSE AND ACTION IN MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS. AND EVENTS IN THE EAST MADE IT CLEAR TO OUR PEOPLES THAT THERE IS NO OTHER RATIONAL ROAD FOR US TO FOLLOW THAN TO PERFECT THE INSTITUTIONS OF UNITY AND COOPERATION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND ACROSS THE ATLANTIC, WHILE, TOGETHER, WE WORK TO REMOVE THE BARRIERS TO STABLE PEACE.

IN THOSE EFFORTS, TRANSCENDING OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES, NO FACTOR WILL REMAIN MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE CONTINUED UNDERSTANDING AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN BONN AND WASHINGTON.

SINCERELY,

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER (WILSON)

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ON APOLLO 8.

AS WE MAKE THE TURN INTO THE NEW YEAR, WE HAVE, I BELIEVE, REASON FOR CONFIDENCE THAT THE CLOUDS MAY BE LIFTING A BIT: IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IN THE AFFAIRS OF WESTERN EUROPE.

IT HAS BEEN A YEAR OF SOME DIFFICULTY FOR BOTH OF US; BUT OUR CONTINUED ABILITY TO STAY CLOSE AND WORK TOGETHER WHEN THE GOING GETS TOUGH HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF STRENGTH TO OUR NATIONS, TO THE WEST, AND TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

I BELIEVE YOU KNOW HOW MUCH I HAVE TREASURED OUR ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH CANDOR AND CONFIDENCE OVER THESE YEARS. NO PROBLEM WAS SO GRAVE THAT ITS BURDEN WAS NOT EASED BY A BACK-CHANNEL MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER!

YOU HAVE MY BEST WISHES IN THE TIME AHEAD--FOR THE BRITISH PEOPLE AND YOURSELF.

SINCERELY,

DEAR PRIME MINISTER SATO:

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I THANK YOU FOR YOUR WARM MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON THE COMPLETION OF THE APOLLO 8 MISSION. COL. BORMAN, CAPT. LOVELL, AND MAJ. ANDERS JOIN ME IN THIS EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR YOUR GRATIFYING WORDS.

AS WE COME TO THE NEW YEAR, I WISH TO TELL YOU HOW GREATLY I HAVE VALUED YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION IN THE DIFFICULT PERIOD THROUGH WHICH WE HAVE JUST PASSED.

THE DESTINY OF OUR TWO NATIONS IS NOW CLOSELY LINKED BY AN INTERDEPENDENCE COVERING MAJOR ASPECTS OF OUR SECURITY, OUR ECONOMY, AND OUR POLITICAL LIFE.

BUT, EQUALLY, WE ARE BOUND TOGETHER BY A DEEP, COMMON INTEREST IN SEEING A VITAL AND COOPERATIVE NEW ASIA EMERGE FROM THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR IN VIETNAM AND LAOS.

GREAT HOPES FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS LIE BEFORE US IN 1969. I AM CONFIDENT THAT IN THE TIME AHEAD JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO CONCERT THEIR EFFORTS IN HELPING BUILD A SECURE AND PROSPEROUS COMMUNITY OF NATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC.

YOU HAVE MY BEST WISHES IN THE TIME AHEAD--FOR THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND YOURSELF.

SINCERELY,

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: (PODGORNY)

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF THE COMPLETION OF THE APOLLO 8 MISSION.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF APOLLO 8 AND ITS GALLANT CREW IS ANOTHER HISTORIC STEP IN MAN'S SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSE IN WHICH HE LIVES, HERALDING A BRIGHT NEW ERA OF EXPLORATION AND SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION. COL. BORMAN, CAPT. LOVELL, AND MAJ. ANDERS JOIN ME IN THIS EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR YOUR KIND WORDS.

SINCERELY,

DTG 282119Z DEC 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1968 DEC 28 19 12

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FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82936

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 91-506
By mp/jp NARA, Date 1-7-98

Pres file

69 NOV 28 PM 2:19

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ HARVAN PLUS

DECEMBER 28 1968

HEREWITH TWO CABLES OF BUNKER-THIEU CONVERSATION,
WORTH READING.

THE FIRST, ON MODALITIES, IS INCONCLUSIVE; ALTHOUGH
THEY WILL MEET AGAIN ON MONDAY.

THE SECOND, ON THE SUBSTANCE OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT AND
U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS IN 1969, IS THIEU AT HIS MOST
THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE.

SAIGON 45708

1. I HAD A TALK THIS MORNING FOR AN HOUR AND FORTY-FIVE
MINUTES WITH PRES THIEU. THE DISCUSSION FELL INTO TWO PARTS,
FIRST MY PRESENTATION TO HIM OF THE POINTS MADE EARLIER
AND THE URGENCY OF GETTING OVER PROCEDURAL MATTERS AND
ON TO SUBSTANTIVE TALKS IN PARIS; AND SECONDLY THIEU'S THINK-
ING OUT LOUD ON THE COURSE OF SUBSTANTIVE TALKS AFTER THE
PROCEDURES WERE SETTLED (THIS FOLLOWS SEPTEL.)

2. I SAID THAT I WANTED TO TALK WITH HIM VERY FRANKLY ABOUT
THE SITUATION IN THE US, PARTICULARLY ASPECTS OF PUBLIC
OPINION THERE, THE EFFECT THIS CAN HAVE ON OUR POLICY IN
VIETNAM, AND HOW THIS AFFECTS OUR MUTUAL CONCERNS AND
INTERESTS IN THE PARIS TALKS. I SAID THAT HE OUGHT TO KNOW
THAT IT WAS A FACT THAT THERE HAS BEEN A VERY CONSIDERABLE
EROSION OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE GVN SINCE NOV 1. THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE HOPED THAT THE FIGHTING COULD BE BROUGHT TO
A CONCLUSION AND WANT TO SEE THE PARIS TALKS MOVE FORWARD
TO THAT END EVEN AS FIGHTING CONTINUES. MOST AMERICANS
SIMPLY DO NOT UNDERSTAND PROLONGED ARGUMENTS OVER PRO-
CEDURAL MATTERS. SOME OF THE STRONGER SUPPORTERS OF OUR
POLICY ARE NEVERTHELESS IMPATIENT OVER PROCEDURAL DELAYS;
FURTHER DELAY COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE GVN POSITION IN
THE US FOR WHICH NO PROGRESS ON THE BATTLEFIELD COULD
COMPENSATE.

3. I SAID, THEREFORE, TWO THINGS SEEMED TO ME HIGHLY IM-
PORTANT: A) THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO GET TO THE SUBSTANTIVE
TALKS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, AND B) IF WE CAN'T GET TO

THESE TALKS, THEN WE MUST PUT HANOI ON THE DEFENSIVE BY PUTTING FORWARD PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS WHICH ARE DEFENSIBLE TO PUBLIC OPINION IN THE US AND ASROAD. UNFORTUNATELY, WE ARE NOT IN THAT POSITION.

4. I ADDED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON SUNDAY HAD BEEN HELPFUL AS A MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION. ONCE WE GOT TO NEW MEETINGS, THE GVN PRESENTATION COULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE APPEAL IN THE US AND SHOULD STRENGTHEN AMERICAN PUBLIC SUPPORT. THIS IS ALL THE MORE REASON TO GET OVER PROCEDURAL ISSUES. WE SHOULD AVOID ANY EFFORT TO SET UP NEW PROCEDURAL CRITERIA DIFFERENT FROM THE "YOUR SIDE/OUR SIDE" FORMULA; THIS COULD ONLY SERVE TO DAMAGE THE SITUATION IN THE US. I ADDED THAT WE OUGHT TO MOVE PROMPTLY TO GIVE OUR NEGOTIATORS IN PARIS INSTRUCTIONS ON WHICH WE ARE TOGETHER FULLY AGREED THAT WILL PERMIT THEM SOME BARGAINING LEEWAY. THESE SHOULD BE PERSUASIVE IF MADE PUBLIC AND, AT THE SAME TIME, REFLECT THE ESSENTIAL APPROACH SET FORTH IN THE AGREEMENTS OF NOV 27. THEY SHOULD MAKE US APPEAR TO BE ON THE OFFENSIVE FOR EACH AND PUT HANOI ON THE DEFENSIVE.

5. THIEU REMARKED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE TWO RECENT PROPOSALS WE HAD DISCUSSED, I.E., TWO SEMI-CIRCLES WITH WORKING TABLES DIVIDING THEM, OR A CIRCLE WITH DEPRESSED AREAS AT EITHER END OF THE DIAMETER FOR SECRETARIATS ARE BOTH REASONABLE COMPROMISES. I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT ENOUGH. THAT WE SHOULD DEVELOP SEVERAL POSITIONS CONTAINING VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES WHICH OUR NEGOTIATORS COULD PUT FORWARD AND WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SEATING ARRANGMENTS, FLAGS AND NAME PLATES, AND ORDER OF SPEAKING. THESE SHOULD BE TIED TOGETHER SO THAT WE DO NOT RUN THE RISK OF HAVING THE DRV AGREE TO ONE ELEMENT AND STAND OUT ON ANOTHER WHICH IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO US. I POINTED OUT THAT IT MAY BE TRUE THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAS COME FORWARD WITH ONLY ONE ALTERNATIVE TO THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL WHILE WE HAVE COME FORWARD WITH FOUR, BUT IT IS ALSO TRUE THEY CAN MAKE OTHER PROPOSALS WHICH CAN BE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IT IS, THEREFORE, IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT LET THEM PRE-EMPT THE INITIATIVE. WE SHOULD PUT THE MONKEY ON HANOI'S BACK. THIS MEANS FLEXIBILITY WITHOUT ABANDONING OUR PRINCIPLE.

6. I POINTED OUT ALSO THAT OUR NEW CONGRESS WILL CONVENE ON JAN 6 AND THAT THE PROBLEM OF THE PARIS TALKS WILL INESCAPABLY COME TO THE FORE; THAT PUBLIC OPINION ACTUALLY DOES GOVERN THE ACTIONS OF US LEADERS AND NO ADMINISTRATION, THIS OR THE NEXT, CAN GO CONTRARY TO IT. I SUGGESTED, THEREFORE, THAT WE HAVE A JOINT MEETING AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME TO DISCUSS ALL THE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES AND TRY TO DEVELOP A MUTUALLY AGREED POSITION WHICH WE COULD PUT PROMPTLY TO OUR NEGOTIATORS. THIEU AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DO THIS AND SUGGESTED THAT WE GIVE A PAPER TO FONMIN THANH OUTLINING OUR VIEWS WHICH THEY COULD STUDY PRELIMINARILY AND THAT WE MEET FOR TALKS ON MONDAY. WE SHALL GO AHEAD ON HIS BASIS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT STATE 292973 AND PARIS 25831.

7. KY ALSO PLANS TO RAISE WITH THIEU THE LACK OF SUPPORT HE HAS BEEN GETTING IN PARIS FROM THE GOVERNMENT HERE. KY CITED A REQUEST MADE TO THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION FOR MOVIE FILM FOR USE IN THE DELEGATION'S PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN PARIS. THE MINISTRY HAD REPLIED THAT THE MINISTRY'S BUDGET HAD NOT ANTICIPATED THE PARIS TALKS AND HAD NO FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR THE REQUESTED ITEM.

8. KY SAID THAT STORIES ABOUT HIS DIFFERENCES WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN HAVE BEEN OVERDONE. IN REALITY KY SAID THAT HE THINKS HE GETS ALONG QUITE WELL. KY DOES THINK THAT SOMETIMES HARRIMAN SEEMS TO APPROACH THE NEGOTIATIONS MORE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF NATIONAL INTEREST. KY SAID ALTHOUGH HE RESPECTS HARRIMAN AND HAS GREAT PERSONAL ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON, HE IS NOT IMPRESSED BY ARGUMENTS WHICH SEEM TO SAY THAT HE (KY) SHOULD HELP REFURBISH THEIR HISTORICAL IMAGE. KY SAID HE IS IMPRESSED WITH ARGUMENTS THAT A THING MUST BE DONE BECAUSE IT IS IMPERATIVE TO THE U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS. SIMILARLY, KY SAID HIS OWN POSITION MUST BE BASED ON VIETNAMESE NATIONAL INTEREST. HOWEVER, SINCE THE U.S. AND GVN OBVIOUSLY ARE NOT EQUALS, THE GVN MUST OFTEN YIELD TO U.S. INTERESTS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR COMMON ALLIANCE.

9. KY SAID THAT HE IS NOT HAPPY WITH HIS PERSONAL LIFE IN PARIS. KY SAID THAT THE FRENCH PRESS BADGERED HIM AND HIS WIFE AND TRIED TO MAKE HIM LOOK BAD. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT PROFESSES NEUTRALITY BUT ACTUALLY SHOWS A DECIDED PREJUDICE FOR THE NFLSV. HE ADDED THAT WHEN HE ARRIVED IN PARIS, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT LIMITED THE SIZE OF THE CROWD ON THE GROUNDS OF SECURITY, BUT WHEN THE NFLSV CHIEF ARRIVED, THERE WERE NO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS. DESPITE THIS, KY SAID THAT THE CROWD THAT GREETED HIM WAS LARGER AND MORE ENTHUSIASTIC.

10. DESPITE HIS PROBLEMS KY THINKS THAT HE HAS MADE SOME LIMITED PROGRESS DURING HIS SHORT TENURE IN PARIS. KY BELIEVES THAT HE HAS HELPED TO MAKE A LITTLE PROGRESS IN BUILDING THE IMAGE OF THE GVN AS AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT. HE BELIEVES THAT HE HAS ACQUIRED A MUCH BETTER FEEL FOR THE REALITIES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION FROM THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AND IN TURN HAS GIVEN IT A BETTER FEEL FOR SAIGON'S PROBLEMS THAN AMBASSADOR LAM HAS BEEN ABLE TO CONVEY BEFORE. KY SAID THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH SECRET TIES WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE OR NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES DURING HIS BRIEF TENURE. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME AND WAS MOST RELUCTANT NOW TO MAKE ANY MOVE THE AMERICANS MIGHT MISINTERPRET.

SAIGON 45710

1. IN MY TALK WITH THIEU THIS MORNING, HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK A LITTLE ABOUT QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE, HOW THESE MIGHT COME UP AFTER PROCEDURES ARE SETTLED, AND HOW THEY MIGHT BE HANDLED IN A VERY PRELIMINARY AND TENTATIVE WAY. (HE SAID THAT KY HAD REPORTED TO HIM DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY AND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL YESTERDAY, AND WHAT FOLLOWS MAY HAVE BEEN STIMULATED BY KY'S REPORT.)

2. WOULD HANOI WANT TO TIE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO WITHDRAWAL? THIEU SAID HE BELIEVED HANOI'S STRATEGY IN PARIS WOULD BE TO TRY TO OBTAIN RECOGNITION OF THE NLF AS EQUAL TO SAIGON AND TO INSIST ON A PACKAGE SOLUTION. HANOI MAY BE WILLING TO TALK, AFTER MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL, TO SAIGON ABOUT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, REUNIFICATION, ETC., BUT WILL WANT TO BE SURE WHAT WE (GVN) WILL GIVE TO THE NLF; IN OTHER WORDS, THEY WOULD NOT WANT TO "ABANDON THE CHILD IN THE MARKET PLACE."

3. THERE ARE, THEREFORE, TWO SEPARATE PROBLEMS: 1) INVASION OF SOUTH VIETNAM BY THE DRV WHICH MUST BE SOLVED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF NVN TROOPS FOLLOWED BY ALLIED WITHDRAWAL UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE, AND 2) THE SITUATION OF THE NLF BEFORE AND AFTER NVN WITHDRAWAL.

4. IN THE CASE OF WITHDRAWAL, THIS WILL INVOLVE NOT ONLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF MAIN FORCE UNITS, BUT THE MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING AND WITHDRAWING NVN IN VC UNITS, THE PROBLEM OF LAOS AND CAMBODIA, AND OF VERIFICATION AND SUPERVISION. THIEU EXPRESSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT SINCE HANOI WOULD NOT AGREE TO ADMIT TO WORLD OPINION THAT THEY HAVE HAD TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THEY MIGHT WANT TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM OF WITHDRAWAL CONFIDENTIALLY ON A BILATERAL BASIS WITH US, AGREEING TO "FADE AWAY" SO THAT WE COULD THEN ALSO WITHDRAW.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF THE NLF, THIEU FORESAW THREE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: 1) COALITION; 2) A GENERAL ELECTION BEFORE 1971 (THE DATE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHEN THE NEXT GENERAL ELECTION WOULD BE HELD) IN WHICH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WILL DETERMINE THE MAKE UP OF THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT ON THE BASIS OF ONE MAN, ONE VOTE; 3) AUTHORIZE THE NLF MEMBERS TO ORGANIZE A NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND ENGAGE IN LOCAL AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS AS THESE WERE SCHEDULED (FOR EXAMPLE, ON THIRD OF THE SENATE IS TO BE ELECTED IN 1970 AND OTHER LOCAL ELECTIONS MAY TAKE PLACE BEFORE 1971).

6. THIEU OBSERVED THAT THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE, I.E., COALITION, THE GVN COULD NOT ACCEPT, BUT THAT THE OTHER TWO OFFERED POSSIBILITIES. HE RATHER LEANED TOWARD EARLY GENERAL ELECTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT IT WOULD BE ADVANTAGEIOUS TO THE GVN TO HOLD ELECTIONS BEFORE GIVING THE NLF TOO MUCH TIME TO ORGANIZE, WHICH THEY WERE ALREADY TRYING TO DO THROUGH EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH LIBERATION COMMITTEES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIEU SAID, HE HAD EXPRESSED THE VIEW AS LONG AGO AS 1965 THAT ONCE THE GVN BECAME STRONG, THEY COULD ABSORB THE NLF INTO THE BODY POLITIC. HE THOUGHT THE GVN WAS APPROACHING THE POSITION NOW WHEN "THE SYSTEM COULD ABSORB SOME BACTERIA" AND THAT BY THE TIME A SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE REACHED IN 1969, THEY WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DO THIS. AS CONTINUING PREPARATIONS FOR SUCH A SITUATION, THE GVN WOULD EMPHASIZE STRONGLY IN 1969, ALONG WITH PACIFICATION AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, THE CONSOLIDATION AND STRENGTHENING OF HAMLET AND VILLAGE ADMINISTRATIONS AND A DRAMATIC LAND REFORM PROGRAM. THIS LATTER, THE CABINET WAS ACTIVELY WORKING ON NOW AND HE HOPED TO ANNOUNCE SOMETHING SHORTLY.

7. AT THE END OF OUR DISCUSSION, HE REFERRED TO A MATTER HE HAD MENTIONED ONCE BEFORE TO ME, I.E., THE NEED ON THE PART OF THE US IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC OPINION TO WITHDRAW SOME TROOPS IN 1969. HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW OUR VIEWS IN ORDER TO DISCUSS WITH US HOW FURTHER VIETNAMIZATION OF THE WAR COULD BE WORKED OUT, WHAT THE NATURE OF THE WITHDRAWAL MIGHT BE, AND HOW THE GVN WOULD FILL THE GAP. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, WE PLANNED ON WITHDRAWING SAY 100,000 TROOPS, WHAT WOULD BE THE NATURE OF THE WITHDRAWAL? WOULD THIS BE APPORTIONED ON A BASIS OF SAY 50,000 LOGISTICAL TROOPS AND 50,000 COMBAT TROOPS? HE SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION WITH US ON A VERY SECRET AND SECURE BASIS.

DTG: 281630Z DECEMBER 1968

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1968 DEC 28 18 47

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82938

UNCLAS

DECEMBER 13, 1968

HEREWITH MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM JOE FOWLER.

ATTACHED IS THE REDRAFT OF OUR JOINTLY COMPOSED LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER ON THE TAX REFORM MATTER.

MAY I REMIND YOU THAT YOU WANTED TO READ THIS TO RUSSELL LONG BEFORE TRANSMITTAL. I BELIEVE YOU HAVE ALREADY COVERED WILBUR MILLS IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION.

MAY I ALSO SUGGEST THAT WHEN TRANSMITTED, YOU RELEASE A COPY OF THE LETTER THROUGH GEORGE CHRISTIAN. I SHALL INSTRUCT OUR PEOPLE HERE, WHEN QUIZZED BY THE PRESS, TO SAY SIMPLY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER SPEAKS FOR ITSELF AND THAT THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL COMMENT.

SIGNED HENRY H. FOWLER

DRAFT - 12/12/68

(FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND THE SPEAKER)

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: (DEAR MR. SPEAKER:)

THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT SPECIALISTS IN TAX POLICY SOME TIME AGO UNDERTOOK A MAJOR EFFORT TO PREPARE TAX REFORM PROPOSALS OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATURE.

LATER, THE CONGRESS, IN THE REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL ACT OF 1968, REQUESTED THAT PROPOSALS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE REFORM OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE BE SUBMITTED BY DECEMBER 31.

THE STUDIES AND PROPOSALS FOR TAX REFORM HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED BY THE STAFF OF THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

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WHITE HOUSE
SITTING ROOM

THESE STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, ALTHOUGH REVIEWED BY SECRETARY FOWLER, SHOULD BE VIEWED PRIMARILY AS THE TECHNICAL PRODUCT OF THE TREASURY STAFF. I HAVE NOT RECEIVED, CONSIDERED OR MADE ANY JUDGMENTS ON THESE STAFF PROPOSALS. THEY ARE THE TECHNICAL PRODUCT OF THE TAX SPECIALISTS IN THE DEPARTMENT AND HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED OR EXAMINED BY ME.

I HAVE CONFERRED WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, THE APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES HANDLING THIS LEGISLATION. WE BELIEVE THAT IN JUSTICE TO THE ADMINISTRATION THAT WILL TAKE OFFICE WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH AND WHO WILL HAVE TO LIVE WITH AND ADMINISTER ANY LEGISLATION PASSED, IT IS ONLY APPROPRIATE THAT THEY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY AND MAKE THEIR JUDGMENT ON THESE MATTERS. ALL DATA PERTAINING TO THIS MATTER WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE INCOMING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY PROMPTLY.

I AM SURE THE NEW CONGRESS WILL WANT TO MAKE ITS OWN ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PRESENTATION THAT THE NEW SECRETARY WILL WISH TO MAKE.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE HONORABLE
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

THE HONORABLE
JOHN V. MCCORMACK
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

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FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82937

Free file

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

DECEMBER 28, 1968

HEREWITH A KY APPRAISAL OF SITUATION, INCLUDING A SOBER VIEW OF NIXON'S PROBABLE OUTLOOK.

1. VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY SAID ON 24 DECEMBER 1968 THAT IN ORDER TO MAKE A BREAKTHROUGH ON THE STALEMATED PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN THE PARIS PEACE TALKS, HE PLANS TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ACCEPT THE ROUND TABLE SOLUTION TO THE TABLE CONFIGURATION PROBLEM. HE THINKS THIS SOLUTION IS FAIR AND REALISTIC. KY ALLEGED TO BE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT MATTERS OF PROCEDURE AND PRESTIGE THAN OTHER GVN LEADERS AND IS ANXIOUS TO GET INTO THE MORE SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS.

2. KY WILL STRESS TO THIEU THAT THERE IS AN ACUTE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING ISSUES IN PARIS PRIOR TO THE CONVENING OF THE U.S. CONGRESS ON 6 JANUARY. KY IS CONVINCED THAT THE PRESENT GVN LEADERSHIP HAS LITTLE SYMPATHY OR SUPPORT AMONG THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, AND HE BELIEVES THIS TREND WILL QUICKEN IF INFLUENTIAL CONGRESSMEN BEGIN TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST GVN FOOT DRAGGING.

3. KY WILL ALSO TELL THIEU THAT HE IS CONVINCED PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON WILL IN SOME WAYS BE MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH THAN PRESIDENT JOHNSON SINCE NIXON WILL BE LESS "SENTIMENTAL" ABOUT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THAN PRESIDENT JOHNSON. KY EXPECTS NIXON TO APPROACH THE VIETNAM QUESTION IN TERMS OF WHAT IS BEST FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE ON THE ONE HAND, AND WHAT IS BEST FOR THE REPUBLICAN PARTY POLITICALLY. KY BELIEVES THAT SINCE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WANTS OUT OF THE WAR AND NIXON CAN DISENGAGE FROM IT MORE EASILY THAN JOHNSON, KY DOES NOT EXPECT NIXON TO MAKE ANY MOVES WHICH GET A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

4. KY SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE HE WISHES TO DISCUSS WITH THIEU IS THE PRESSING NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. UNLESS THE GVN IS STRENGTHENED, KY BELIEVES THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT WIN IN PARIS NOR IS IT LIKELY TO WIN THE LONGER RANGE POLITICAL CONTEST WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV). KY IS NOT THINKING OF JUST CHANGING CABINET MINISTERS BUT RATHER IS THINKING OF MORE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES WHICH HOPEFULLY CAN BE MADE WITHIN THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK. KY THINKS THE DECISION MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING PROCESS MUST BE STREAMLINED FROM THE TOP TO THE BOTTOM AND THE PRIME MINISTER MUST BE GIVEN MORE LATITUDE. IF KY CANNOT HIMSELF HOLD THE POST BY A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOMEONE LIKE LIEUTENANT GENREAL NGUYEN DUC THANG IN THE POST. KY THINKS THAT THE MILITARY VOICE MUST BE MUCH MORE PRONOUNCED IN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AND THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE THAT THEY ARE SIMPLY A PART OF THE DEMOCRATIC FACADE AND MUST BE WILLING TO GIVE UP MOST OF THEIR POWERS FOR THE DURATION OF THE CRISIS. ABOVE ALL, KY THINKS THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST IMPOSE A POLICY OF AUSTERITY ON ALL THE PEOPLE AND THAT THIS POLICY CAN ONLY BE CARRIED OUT BY A VERY STRONG GOVERNMENT WITH NEAR DICTATORIAL POWERS.

5. KY EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR AUSTERITY ON SEVERAL GROUNDS. FIRST, KY IS CONVINCED THAT THERE WILL BE A SHARP CUTBACK IN AMERICAN AID. ALSO, KY SAID THE AMERICANS IN PARIS EMPHASIZED TO HIM THE NEED FOR THE VIETNAMESE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE U.S. PUBLIC THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE CARRYING A FAIRER SHARE OF THEIR LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT COSTS. IF NOT, PRESSURE WILL BUILD UP IN THE U.S. FOR TOTAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM VIETNAM. KY SAID HIS AMERICAN FRIENDS IN PARIS POINTED OUT THAT ONE CANNOT EXPECT THE HEAVILY TAXED AMERICAN TO CONTINUE TO BEAR THIS BURDEN WHEN WEALTHY VIETNAMESE REFUSE TO MAKE ANY EFFORT TO SUPPORT THE COMMON GOOD.

6. KY EXPECTS THIEU TO AGREE TO HIS PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNMENT BUT TO DO NOTHING ABOUT THEM. KY SAID THAT HE MIGHT NOT RETURN TO PARIS UNLESS HE THINKS HE WILL HAVE MORE SUPPORT FROM SAIGON IN TERMS OF A MORE EFFECTIVE AND MORE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, KY DID NOT MAKE ANY ULTIMATUMS OR DEFINE WHAT HIS MINIMUM DEMANDS MIGHT BE. ALTHOUGH KY CLAIMED HE IS NOT INTERESTED IN JUST CHANGING PEOPLE IN THE CABINET, HE PROBABLY WOULD BE PLEASED IF THIEU PUT A KY SUPPORTER OR TWO IN THE CABINET. (SOURCE COMMENT: WITHOUT THIEU'S OR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S EXPRESS SUPPORT, THERE IS NO CHANCE OF BRINGING ABOUT RADICAL CHANGES. KY WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO LEAD A COUP OF MILITARY ELEMENTS SINCE HE DOES NOT HAVE THE SUPPORT FOR SUCH A MOVE NOW. ALSO, THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISORS STILL HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF INFLUENCE AT ALL LEVELS OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, AND IF THESE ADVISORS WERE AGAINST A COUP, IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE VIETNAMESE OFFICERS WOULD ACT AGAINST THIS COUNSEL. EVEN IF A COUP WERE POSSIBLE, THE RESULTING GOVERNMENT WOULD BE CUT OFF FROM U.S. AID AND WOULD NOT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY, WHICH IS NOW A NECESSITY IF THE GVN IS TO ACCOMPLISH ITS FOREIGN POLICY GOALS.)

7. KY ALSO PLANS TO RAISE WITH THIEU THE LACK OF SUPPORT HE HAS BEEN GETTING IN PARIS FROM THE GOVERNMENT HERE. KY CITED A REQUEST MADE TO THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION FOR MOVIE FILM FOR USE IN THE DELEGATION'S PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN PARIS. THE MINISTRY HAD REPLIED THAT THE MINISTRY'S BUDGET HAD NOT ANTICIPATED THE PARIS TALKS AND HAD NO FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR THE REQUESTED ITEM.

8. KY SAID THAT STORIES ABOUT HIS DIFFERENCES WITH U.S. AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN HAVE BEEN OVERDONE. IN REALITY KY SAID THAT HE THINKS HE GETS ALONG QUITE WELL. KY DOES THINK THAT SOMETIMES HARRIMAN SEEMS TO APPROACH THE NEGOTIATIONS MORE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF NATIONAL INTEREST. KY SAID ALTHOUGH HE RESPECTS HARRIMAN AND HAS GREAT PERSONAL ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON, HE IS NOT IMPRESSED BY ARGUMENTS WHICH SEEM TO SAY THAT HE (KY) SHOULD HELP REFURBISH THEIR HISTORICAL IMAGE. KY SAID HE IS IMPRESSED WITH ARGUMENTS THAT A THING MUST BE DONE BECAUSE IT IS IMPERATIVE TO THE U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS. SIMILARLY, KY SAID HIS OWN POSITION MUST BE BASED ON VIETNAMESE NATIONAL INTEREST. HOWEVER, SINCE THE U.S. AND GVN OBVIOUSLY ARE NOT EQUALS, THE GVN MUST OFTEN YIELD TO U.S. INTERESTS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR COMMON ALLIANCE.

9. KY SAID THAT HE IS NOT HAPPY WITH HIS PERSONAL LIFE IN PARIS. KY SAID THAT THE FRENCH PRESS BADGERED HIM AND HIS WIFE AND TRIED TO MAKE HIM LOOK BAD. HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT PROFFESSES NEUTRALITY BUT ACTUALLY SHOWS A DECIDED PREJUDICE FOR THE NFLSV. HE ADDED THAT WHEN HE ARRIVED IN PARIS, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT LIMITED THE SIZE OF THE CROWD ON THE GROUNDS OF SECURITY, BUT WHEN THE NFLSV CHIEF ARRIVED, THERE WERE NO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS. DESPITE THIS, KY SAID THAT THE CROWD THAT GREETED HIM WAS LARGER AND MORE ENTHUSIASTIC.

10. DESPITE HIS PROBLEMS KY THINKS THAT HE HAS MADE SOME LIMITED PROGRESS DURING HIS SHORT TENURE IN PARIS. KY BELIEVES THAT HE HAS HELPED TO MAKE A LITTLE PROGRESS IN BUILDING THE IMAGE OF THE GVN AS AN INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT. HE BELIEVES THAT HE HAS ACQUIRED A MUCH BETTER FEEL FOR THE REALITIES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION FROM THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AND IN TURN HAS GIVEN IT A BETTER FEEL FOR SAIGON'S PROBLEMS THAN AMBASSADOR LAM HAS BEEN ABLE TO CONVEY BEFORE. KY SAID THAT HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH SECRET TIES WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE OR NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES DURING HIS BRIEF TENURE. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME AND WAS MOST RELUCTANT NOW TO MAKE ANY MOVE THE AMERICANS MIGHT MISINTERPRET.

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE WH32933

Profile

UNCLAS

DECEMBER 28, 1968

HEREWITH WORLDWIDE REACTIONS TO APOLLO 8 AS OF CHRISTMAS DAY BEFORE SPLASH DOWN.

CHRISTMAS WEEK PAPERS AROUND THE WORLD CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE APOLLO 8 TRIP TO THE MOON WITH BANNER HEADLINES, DETAILED STORIES AND PHOTOGRAPHS. COMMENT WAS ALMOST UNIVERSALLY FAVORABLE TO THE U.S., WITH THE ADVENTURE FREQUENTLY DESCRIBED AS AN ACHIEVEMENT OF ALL MANKIND.

WEST EUROPEAN PAPERS WERE MUCH IMPRESSED BY THE TELEVISION PICTURES FROM THE SPACECRAFT, SHOWING THE EARTH, THE MOON, AND THE ASTRONAUTS IN THE CAPSULE AT WORK AND VOICING CHRISTMAS GREETINGS TO "THE GOOD EARTH."

A BRUSSELS PAPER CALLED THE APOLLO 8 TELECASTS "THE MOST FASCINATING TELEVISION SERIAL OF THE YEAR" AND SAID "IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO BE DEEPLY MOVED."

A COPENHAGEN EDITORIAL COMMENDED THE WAY THE PROJECT WAS DEVELOPED TO ENABLE ALL MANKIND TO SHARE THE EXPERIENCE. IT SAID: "IT IS NATURAL THAT THE FREE AND OPEN AMERICAN SOCIETY HAS LET THE ENTIRE WORLD WITNESS THIS EVENT."

A HONG KONG PAPER DECLARED IT WAS THE "MOST MOMENTOUS VOYAGE EVER UNDERTAKEN" BECAUSE MAN'S VIEW OF HIS EARTH AS A "TINY SPECK AGAINST THE IMMENSITY OF THE UNIVERSE" WILL "ULTIMATELY COLOR POLITICAL ATTITUDES."

MOSCOW MEDIA REPORTED HIGHLIGHTS OF THE VOYAGE WHILE MONITORED CHINESE COMMUNIST MEDIA DID NOT MENTION THE SUBJECT.

LONDON: "MAN'S GREATEST CHRISTMAS MIRACLE"

LONDON'S TABLOID DAILY MIRROR STATED:

"THEIR JOURNEY TO THE MOON IS THE GREATEST CHRISTMAS MIRACLE ACCOMPLISHED BY MAN.

"AS WE DOWN BELOW REVIVE THE ANCIENT CEREMONIES OF CHRISTMAS, ONE THOUGHT MUST STRIKE US ALL. IT IS THAT THESE THREE BRAVE MEN, FOLLOWING THEIR STAR, ARE MAKING ALL MANKIND FEEL HOW SMALL AND INSIGNIFICANT ARE THE BARRIERS OF NATION, RACE, AND CREED THAT DIVIDE US ALL.

"HOW SMALL ARE OUR DIFFERENCES, HOW PUNY OUR QUARRELS."

"AMERICANS CAN BE VERY PROUD"

THE INDEPENDENT-LEFT SUN OF LONDON SAID THAT "AMERICANS CAN BE VERY PROUD.

"THEY ARE STILL THE PIONEERS. NOT A BAD MOMENT FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO BE SAYING GOODBYE..."

LONDON'S CONSERVATIVE DAILY EXPRESS DECLARED:

"AT THIS MOMENT OF RENEWAL OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH, THESE THREE MEN WILL BE IN THE THOUGHTS AND PRAYERS OF MILLIONS. NOT AS SCIENTISTS ENGAGED IN A REMOTE EXPERIMENT, BUT AS FELLOW MEN IN THE NEVER-ENDING QUEST TO EXPAND THE BOUNDARIES OF KNOWLEDGE."

PARIS: "ON THE MOON BEFORE 1973"

INDEPENDENT-LEFT COMBAT OF PARIS PREDICTED THAT THE PLEDGE OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY WILL BE KEPT AND THERE WILL BE "AN AMERICAN ON THE MOON BEFORE 1973."

THE PAPER SAID THAT "APOLLO 8 AND THE HUGE REPERCUSSIONS THAT IT WILL HAVE WILL CONSOLIDATE THE PRESTIGE OF THE U.S. JUST AS FORTHCOMING EXPERIMENTS WILL CONSOLIDATE THE PRESTIGE OF THE USSR." IT ADDED THAT NATIONS "WHICH LACK THAT KIND OF POWER SHOULD FROM NOW ON RESTRICT THEIR AMBITIONS TO THEIR MEANS."

PARIS' MODERATELY CONSERVATIVE FIGARO STATED:

"WE ARE LIVING AN UNPRECEDENTED MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF MAN...A VICTORY FOR WHICH OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS CAN INDEED BE PROUD....YET EVEN AMERICAN COMMENTARIES HAVZ BEEN MARKED BY A RESERVED ATTITUDE, BY A RATHER SURPRISING MODESTYWE MAY ALREADY BE GETTING BLASE."

LA DEPECHE DU MIDI OF TOULOUSE SAID THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S TERM "ENDS WITH A MAGNIFICENT FEAT OF AMERICAN SCIENCE."

WEST BERLIN: "FULFILLING THE HERITAGE"

INDEPENDENT DER ABEND OF WEST BERLIN SAID THAT THE "THREE BRAVE MEN" WERE "FULFILLING THE HERITAGE OF JOHN F. KENNEDY."

CAN "IN 1961, THE LATE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT AN AME WOULD LAND ON THE MOON IN THIS DECADE WAS RECEIVED WITH SKEPTICISM BY EXPERTS. IT WAS VIEWED AS THE MERE BOOMING OF A STATESMAN, AS CONSOLING TALK DESIGNED TO CONCEAL THE STRIKING LEAD OF THE SOVIET UNION IN SPACE RESEARCH AT THAT TIME. BUT IT HAS NOT EVEN TAKEN EIGHT YEARS TO TELL THE DOUBTERS THEY WERE WRONG..."

BRUSSELS: "MOST FASCINATING TELEVISION"

BRUSSELS' CATHOLIC CONSERVATIVE LA LIBRE BELGIQUE TERMED THE APOLLO 8 BROADCASTS "THE MOST FASCINATING TELEVISION SERIAL OF THE YEAR" AND SAID IT WAS "IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO BE DEEPLY MOVED."

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"THIS DEED, WHICH THANKS TO TELEVISION EVERYONE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE DIRECTLY, WAS ACHIEVED WITH EXTRA-ORDINARY TECHNICAL ACCURACY....THE PERFECTION OF THE MACHINE IS PERHAPS OBSCURING THE SIMPLE COURAGE OF MAN FOR WHICH NO COMPUTER CAN BE SUBSTITUTED."

COPENHAGEN: "ENTIRE WORLD WITNESSED THE EVENT"

COPENHAGEN'S CONSERVATIVE BERLINGSKE TIDENDE STATED THAT "IT IS NATURAL THAT THE FREE AND OPEN AMERICAN SOCIETY HAS LET THE ENTIRE WORLD WITNESS THIS EVENT." IT SAID IT IS EQUALLY COMMENDABLE THAT THE PROJECT WAS DEVELOPED "IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE EXPERIENCE COULD BE SHARED BY ALL."

"CRITICS OF THE LUNAR PROGRAM HAVE SHOWN LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT GREAT PROGRESS COSTS AND OF WHAT GREAT NATIONS EXPEND AND CONTRIBUTE TO MANKIND IN THEIR EFFORTS TO EXPLORE AND DEVELOP..."

"BUT WE KNOW THE VALUE OF INGENUITY, IMAGINATION, AND BOLDNESS, AND IT IS THESE QUALITIES WHICH TODAY CARRY APOLLO 3 ON ITS HISTORIC MISSION THROUGH SPACE."

TOKYO: "ASTRONAUTS' COOL MANNER"

TOKYO'S FINANCIAL-CONSERVATIVE SANKEI SALUTED "AMERICA'S NATIONAL STRENGTH AND PIONEER SPIRIT FOR BUILDING THE INGENIOUS SPACECRAFT AND THE POWERFUL SATURN 5 ROCKET."

"WE WISH TO SINCERELY APPLAUD THE THREE ASTRONAUTS FOR THE COOL MANNER IN WHICH THEY ARE OPERATING THE APOLLO SPACECRAFT....WE WERE DEEPLY IMPRESSED BY THE CLEAR TELEVISION PICTURES OF THE RUGGED SURFACE OF THE MOON."

HONG KONG: "THE GREATEST VOYAGE"

HONG KONG'S PRO-WEST SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST DECLARED:

"THE WORLD WAS NEVER THE SAME ONCE COLUMBUS RETURNED. OUR WORLD WILL NEVER BE QUITE THE SAME WHEN THE APOLLO CREW RETURNS. THEY--AND THE REST OF US, THROUGH THEIR PHOTOGRAPHS--WILL HAVE SEEN THE EARTH AS IT REALLY IS: A TINY SPECK AGAINST THE IMMENSITY OF THE UNIVERSE."

"THIS NEW PERSPECTIVE MUST ULTIMATELY COLOR POLITICAL ATTITUDES. THERE MUST COME, EVENTUALLY, THE FEELING THAT WE ARE ALL ON THIS INSIGNIFICANT GLOBE TOGETHER, FOR GOOD OR ILL."

"THE SIGHT OF THE EARTH PURSUING ITS LONELY COURSE THROUGH THE GALAXY MUST BREAK THE CONCEPT OF AN EARTH SPLIT BY BORDERS AND WALLS AND BARBED WIRE AND BY MENTAL FRONTIERS EVEN MORE IMPASSABLE."

"THIS IS WHY THE VOYAGE OF THE APOLLO IS, FOR MORE REASONS THAN THE SCIENTIFIC, THE MOST MOMENTOUS EVER UNDERTAKEN BY MAN."

ISTANBUL: "MONEY COULD BE BETTER USED ON EARTH"

TURKEY'S RIGHT-WING YENI ISTANBUL DECLARED:

"UP TO NOW, AMERICA HAS SPENT \$24 BILLION FOR THE SPACE RACE. THE RUSSIANS HAVE SPENT AS MUCH AS THE AMERICANS. THESE TWO NATIONS HAVE SPENT \$50 BILLION. MANY OTHER USEFUL THINGS COULD HAVE BEEN DONE WITH THIS MONEY. POVERTY, HUNGER, AND DISEASE COULD HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED FROM THE WORLD COMPLETELY."

PAKISTAN: "GRATITUDE TO THE ALMIGHTY"

THE PAKISTANI PRESS, WHICH IS FREQUENTLY CRITICAL OF THE U.S., APPLAUDED THE ACHIEVEMENT. KARACHI'S INDEPENDENT DAWN DECLARED:

"APOLLO 3 HAS UNDOUBTEDLY STRENGTHENED THE CONFIDENCE OF MAN IN HIS ABILITY TO DO THINGS HE COULD NOT DREAM OF A DECADE AGO BESIDES UNIVERSAL JUBILATION OVER THE GAIN TO HUMAN KNOWLEDGE BROUGHT BY THE APOLLO MEN, THIS SHOULD ALSO BE AN OCCASION FOR THANKSGIVING AND GRATITUDE TO THE ALMIGHTY."

LAHORE'S PRESS TRUST PAKISTAN TIMES DECLARED THAT "THIS GREAT FEAT OF HUMAN ENDURANCE AND INGENUITY" MAY LEAD TO STELLAR FLIGHTS AND IS CERTAIN TO PROMPT NEW EFFORTS TO "MAKE THE DREAMS OF MANKIND COME TRUE." IT ADDED THAT THE WORLD IS PRAYING FOR THE SAFE RETURN OF "THESE REMARKABLY COURAGEOUS AMERICAN SPACEMEN."

BOMBAY: "MOST MAGNIFICENT ACHIEVEMENT"

BOMBAY'S INDEPENDENT TIMES OF INDIA TERMED THE FLIGHT "UNQUESTIONABLY THE MOST MAGNIFICENT ACHIEVEMENT IN SPACE TO DATE.

"IT IS ONLY A STEP SHORT OF AN ACTUAL MOON LANDING.... THE DESIGN OF THE SPACESHIP AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ROCKET HAVE BEEN SO PERFECT THAT THE ASTRONAUTS HAVE HAD NO OCCASION TO USE ANY OF THE BACK-UP DEVICES...."

"THE MISSION HAS PUT THE ASTRONAUTS'S COURAGE, SKILL AND PHYSICAL RESOURCES TO WHAT IS SURELY THE MOST SEVERE TEST. IF ALL GOES WELL UNTIL TOMORROW'S SPLASH-DOWN IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE U.S. TO ACCOMPLISH THE MOON-LANDING PROGRAM, SCHEDULED FOR JUNE, WITHOUT A HITCH."

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SANTIAGO: "GREATER ADVENTURES LIE AHEAD"

SANTIAGO'S CONSERVATIVE EL MERCURIO DECLARED THE FEAT "ONE OF MAN'S BOLDEST ACHIEVEMENTS" WHICH OPENS THE WAY FOR "ADVENTURES UNEQUALED IN THE PAST.

"THIS DEED REVIVES HOPE FOR HUMANITY'S FUTURE..."

MEXICO CITY: "FEAT OF THE CENTURY"

IN MEXICO, MODERATE NOVEDADES ASSERTED:

"THE FEAT OF THE CENTURY PLACES MAN'S FOOT ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW EPOCH OF HISTORY. THE PRESENT GENERATION MAY CONSIDER ITSELF PRIVILEGED TO CONTEMPLATE THE EMERGENCE OF THE INTERPLANETARY ERA.

"AND THE WORD 'CONTEMPLATE' TAKES ON SIGNIFICANCE AS, THANKS TO ANOTHER MARVEL, TELEVISION, WE HAVE WITNESSED THE UNFOLDING SCENE FROM INSIDE APOLLO.

"THIS NEW ERA IS COMPARABLE TO THE DISCOVERY OF FIRE, OF THE WHEEL, AND TO COLUMBUS' ARRIVAL IN AMERICA."

BOGOTA: "DIVIDENDS BENEFIT MAN"

IN COLOMBIA, INDEPENDENT EL ESPECTADOR OBSERVED THAT UNLIKE COLUMBUS, "MAN IN SPACE KNOWS WHERE HE IS GOING AND HE CAN RETURN." FURTHERMORE, "TODAY UNIMAGINABLE DIVIDENDS ON THE CAPITAL INVESTED ARE BEING PLACED AT MANKIND'S DISPOSAL:

"EVERY STEP TOWARD THE UNKNOWN IN SPACE WILL HAVE PRACTICAL APPLICATION ON THIS POOR EARTH INHABITED BY HUNGRY AND DESPERATE MEN.

"COMMUNICATIONS ARE BEING PERFECTED AND UNIVERSALIZED. METEOROLOGICAL PHENOMENA WHICH CAUSE DESTRUCTION, DEATH, AND MISERY WILL NOW BEGIN TO BE ANTICIPATED AND CONTROLLED.

"NEW AND MARVELOUS SUBSTANCES TO BETTER THE LIFE OF MAN WILL BE CREATED"

LIMA: "LIFTING THE VEIL"

LIBERAL EXPRESO OF LIMA SAW "A NEW AND EXCITING CHAPTER IN HUMAN HISTORY OPENING BEFORE US--A CHAPTER WHOSE GRANDEUR ESCAPES NO ONE AND WHICH IS BEING WRITTEN BY THE INTELLIGENCE AND WILL POWER OF THE HUMAN BEING." CONSERVATIVE LA PRENSA SAID THAT "ON THE SUCCESS OF APOLLO 8 DEPENDS NOT ONLY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE U.S. CAN SURPASS RUSSIA IN THE SPACE RACE, BUT ALSO WHETHER THE VEIL OF MYSTERY WHICH LIES BEYOND THE EARTH'S ATMOSPHERE CAN BE LIFTED."

LA PAZ: "JAZZLING BUT PARADOXICAL"

IN BOLIVIA, PROGRESSIVE CATHOLIC PRESENCIA SAID:

"THE FLIGHT CONSTITUTES AN EXTRAORDINARY AND DAZZLING CONQUEST. IT IS AN AFFIRMATION OF THE CAPACITY OF MAN TO REALIZE HIS GOD-GIVEN POWERS.

"PARADOXINALLY, HOWEVER, THE ERA OF LUNAR TRAVEL IS ALSO THE ERA OF HUNGER AND OF THE GREATEST TENSIONS CAUSED BY HUNGER."

AFRICA: "FREE SOCIETY IS BEST"

THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED GHANAIAN TIMES OF ACCRA SAID TODAY THAT THE MOON TRIP SUCCESS "POINTED TO THE CRUCIAL PART A FREE SOCIETY PLAYS IN MAN'S DEVELOPMENT.

"ONCE AGAIN, THE PEOPLE OF THE U.S. HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE MAXIMUM AND HIGHEST FULFILLMENT OF MAN TAKES PLACE BEST IN A FREE, UNTRAMMELLED SOCIETY, WHERE THE INDIVIDUAL IS GIVEN AS MUCH ENCOURAGEMENT AS POSSIBLE...."

"THIS IS THE LESSON WE IN GHANA DERIVE FROM THE SUCCESS OF OUR DEAR FRIENDS. WE INTEND TO BENEFIT FROM THIS LESSON...."

ADDIS ABABA'S SEMI-OFFICIAL VOICE OF ETHIOPIA STATED THAT "FOR THE ENTERPRISING AMERICAN PEOPLE...1968 HAS BEEN A YEAR OF FRUITFUL AND SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT." THE PAPER EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE RETURN OF THE ESTRONAUTS WILL BE "A DAY OF EXUBERANT JUBILATION FOR MANKIND IN GENERAL."

ALGIER'S GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED EL-MOUDJAHID, WHICH IS LEFTIST AND FREQUENTLY ANTI-U.S., PRAISED THE COURAGE OF THE ASTRONAUTS, PUBLISHED PHOTOS AND DETAILS OF THE TRIP, AND CHARACTERIZED IT AS "THE MOST FANTASTIC VOYAGE IN HISTORY."

SOVIET REPORTS

MOSCOW AND EAST EUROPEAN MEDIA REPORTED ON THE PROGRESS OF THE TRIP. SOVIET MEDIA SUMMARIZED COMMENT BY SPACE EXPERTS WHO POINTED OUT A "BASIC DIFFERENCE" BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND U.S. SPACE SYSTEMS. THEY IMPLIED THAT THE APOLLO SPACESHIP RELIES SOLELY ON HUMAN CONTROL WHILE SOVIET CRAFT HAVE AUTOMATIC CONTROL DEVICES. THE ASTRONAUTS WERE PRAISED FOR THEIR COURAGE AND WISHED EVERY SUCCESS.

TASS QUOTED A SOVIET ACADEMICIAN WHO CALLED FOR "CONTINUATION OF THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION" ON SPACE EXPLORATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S.

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82934

Profile

UNCLAS

DECEMBER 28, 1968

HEREWITH FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS A DRAFT ROUTINE REPLY SUGGESTED BY STATE TO THE FLOOD OF CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES ON THE COMPLETION OF APOLLO 8 MISSION;

LATER IN THE DAY, AS INSTRUCTED, YOU WILL BE RECEIVING DRAFT MESSAGES TO WILSON, DE GAULLE, KIESSINGER, AND SATO, AFTER APPROVAL BY SEC. RUSK.

I WILL ALSO FORWARD AT THAT TIME A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO PODGORNÝ SHOULD YOU WISH TO HAVE SOMETHING MORE FOR HIM THAN THIS ROUTINE MESSAGE.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF THE COMPLETION OF THE APOLLO VIII MISSION.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF APOLLO VIII AND ITS GALLANT CREW IS AN HISTORIC STEP IN MAN'S SEARCH FOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSE IN WHICH HE LIVES, AND HERALDS A BRIGHT NEW ERA OF EXPLORATION AND SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION. COL. BORMAN, CAPT. LOVELL, AND MAJ. ANDERS JOIN ME IN THIS EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR YOUR KIND WORDS.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

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