

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

Saturday, December 28, 1968
10:20 a. m.

Mr. President:

I found the attached report of mistreatment of the PUEBLO crew hard reading -- so much so that I hesitated to forward it to you.

But there are no secrets upward!


W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *mp/dch*, NARA, Date 1-26-98

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rlm

26a



CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

26 December 1968

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN (Unclassified upon
removal of enclosure)

Dear Walt,

Attached herewith is the report I received this morning on the mistreatment of PUEBLO returnees. I will supply additional information as it becomes available.

Happy New Year!

T. H. MOORER
Admiral, U. S. Navy

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20500

Encl

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - NOFORN~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

~~SECRET~~

IN REPLY REFER TO ²⁶⁶
Op-61/mes
Ser 001145P61
DEC 26 1968

~~SECRET~~ - NOFORN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Subj: Mistreatment of PUEBLO Returnees (U)

1. (S) The statements of PUEBLO returnees regarding treatment during detention have been received. In addition a set of black and white prints and color negatives were sent. The black and white pictures are not too helpful. It is often difficult to identify the injury, or at least its severity, and in many instances only parts of the body are shown and are not correlated with specific individuals. The colored negatives have been sent for printing and should be returned this afternoon or early tomorrow.
2. (S) The statements consistently tell a tale of brutality and terror. The statements have been hastily reviewed and some general patterns seem to emerge. It should be stressed, however, that further study will be required before definitive conclusions can be drawn.
 - a. All crewmen were treated roughly during the first few hours after capture. This consisted mainly of kicks and punches administered by guards in the process of transporting the crewmen from the ship to their first prison.
 - b. During interrogation the severity/treatment varied markedly. All were humiliated and threatened. Some were beaten severely, often to the point of insensibility. This was done with fists, karate chops, boards and/or leather belts.
 - c. From approximately middle of February until about April the brutality receded. In April a "purge" of about two weeks commenced where the beatings were intensified. This seemed to be connected with obtaining confessions and signatures to pre-written letters, etc. Once the individual signed the pressure appeared to recede.
 - d. From the "purge" until early December life seemed to level off into a monotonous and unremitting routine. There were all types of degrading rules put into effect and violations were rewarded with occasional kicks, punches, and hits with rifle butts. The crewmen considered this rather light treatment.

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

GPO (MIR 5200) 10

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD DIR 5200.10

By mr/dch NARA, Date 1-26-98

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
~~SECRET~~ - NDFORN

Op-61/mes
Ser 001145P61

DEC 26 1968

e. Around 11 or 12 December the period referred to as "hell week" commenced. There is some confusion as to how long it continued but the general consensus is that it was over by 18 or 19 December. During this period practically the entire crew was worked over in any number of ways on a "daily basis." A convincing number of statements connected these beatings with the North Korean discovery that the crew had been making offensive gestures in pictures and signaling resistance in other ways.

3. (S) Attached are Commander Bucher's contribution and some five others of the more articulate statements. Included is a statement made by one of the civilian oceanographers and also a statement submitted by one of the two marines. Kisler's statement graphically portrays what is characterized by a number of crewmen "as the worst beating they had witnessed in their life." Contrary to the general pattern, this beating took place during late August or early September during interrogation.


F. J. GLOUIN
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Plans and Policy)

Copy to:
Op-09

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

STATEMENT BY: CDR LLOYD M. BUCHER 582154

DECEMBER 24, 1968

26c

COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE U.S.S. PUEBLO. ON THE DAY THE SHIP WAS CAPTURED, WHICH WAS THE TWENTY THIRD OF JANUARY OF 1968, WHILE WE WERE BEING BOARDED, I PRESENTED MYSELF TO THE ONE OF THE OFFICERS OF THE NORTH KOREAN ARMY, AS THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND TOLD HIM THAT I WAS SURRENDERING THE SHIP TO HIM. HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND ENGLISH BUT INDICATED THAT HE KNEW THAT I WAS CAPTAIN. HE THEN DIRECTED ME TO THE WHEELHOUSE WHERE BY SIGN LANGUAGE AND VARIOUS OTHER KINDS OF (SLIGHT GARBLE HERE WITH WORDS MISSED MEANING SIGNS AND WORDS, APPROXIMATION: FOUR WORDS) I WAS ABLE TO TELL HIM HOW MANY PEOPLE THERE WERE IN THE CREW AND THE FACT THAT WE NEEDED MEDICAL ATTENTION. THEY COMPLETELY CHOSE TO IGNORE THE REQUEST WE HAD FOR MEDICAL ATTENTION. AT THIS TIME HODGES WAS STILL BARELY ALIVE AND WE WERE GIVING HIM PLASMA. WE WERE TREATING THE OTHER MEN THAT WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, WITH OTHER INDIVIDUAL CREW MEMBERS. I LED THIS OFFICER THROUGH THE SHIP. HE HAD VERY FEW COMMENTS. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHERE THE SHIP'S MAGAZINE WAS. IT CONTAINED ABOUT EIGHT THOMPSON SUB MACHINEGUNS AND SIX OR SEVEN 45. CALIBER PISTOLS. AFTER I SHOWED HIM THIS HE SEEMED TO BE SATISFIED. HE THEN TURNED ME OVER TO TWO OF THE GUARDS, TWO ENLISTED GUARDS. THEY REQUIRED ME TO SIT DOWN ON THE DECK AND FROM TIME TO TIME PUNCHED ME WITH THEIR RIFLE BUTTS, KICKED ME, AND SPIT ON ME. I HAD THE WIND KICKED OUT OF ME. EVERYTIME ONE OF THE OFFICERS SHOWED UP, THE ENLISTED MEN CEASED BEATING ON ME. UP TO THIS TIME I HAD NOT BEEN BEATEN BADLY ANYWAY. LATER ON MORE SENIOR KOREAN OFFICERS CAME ABOARD. ONE OF THEM GRABBED ME BY THE HAIR AND FORCED ME TO MY KNEES. ONE OF THE GUARDS WHOM WAS WITH HIM AT THE TIME KICKED ME IN THE LOWER SPINAL AREA. WHEN WE ARRIVED IN THE WONSAN AREA WE WERE TIED UP.

CONTINUATION OF STATEMENT BY CDR BUCHER

24, DECEMBER 1968

THERE WERE A GREAT MANY PEOPLE, CITIZENRY OF THE TOWN, WHO WERE, (OR) SEEMED TO BE QUITE IRATE. THEY WERE KEPT FROM REACHING ANY OF US BY THE KPA, THE KOREAN PEOPLES ARMY, OFFICERS AND MEN WHO HAD SURROUNDED US. PEOPLE WERE REMOVED AND TAKEN OFF THE SHIP IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. I WAS IMMEDIATELY PLACED IN A BUS WHERE I WAS HIT THREE OR FOUR TIMES IN THE STOMACH AND MY PERSONAL BELONGINGS SUCH AS MY WALLET AND RING WERE REMOVED. THE RING WAS LATER RETURNED TO ME. I WAS ALLOWED TO KEEP MY WATCH. EACH VISITATION BY ONE OF THOSE GUARDS TO SEARCH ME FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HITS IN THE SOLAR PLEXIS AREA WHICH TENDED TO KNOCK THE WIND OUT OF ME AND IN ALMOST EVERY INSTANCE KNOCKED ME DOWN. SHORTLY THEREAFTER SOME OF US WERE REMOVED TO A BUILDING. WE HAD BEEN BLINDFOLDED PRIOR TO LEAVING THE SHIP. WE WERE TAKEN TO A BUILDING BY A BUS. WHILE WE WERE IN THE BUILDING MANY OF THE CREW WHO WERE DARK SKINED, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE NEGROS, THE MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE FILIPINOS WERE BEATEN RATHER BADLY. THEY OBVIOUSLY SUSPECTED THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE SOUTH KOREANS AND THAT WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO INFILTRATE THEM INTO NORTH KOREA. I WAS TAKEN TO A SMALL ROOM, MY BLINDFOLD WAS LEFT ON, CAUSED TO SIT DOWN, AND ASKED QUESTIONS IN RELATIVELY GOOD ENGLISH. DURING THIS TIME I DENIED THE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING MISSION OF THE SHIP AND ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCED THEM THAT WE WERE THERE OBSERVING ATMOSPHERICAL PROPAGATION OF ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION FROM THE SUN AND THE SUNSPOT ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS OCEANOGRAPHIC HYDROGRAPHY. WHILE I WAS IN THAT ROOM I WAS NEVER HIT. AFTER ABOUT A HALF HOUR OR HOUR OF QUESTIONING I WAS REMOVED TO A TRAIN. MY EVERY STEP WAS GUIDED, AS I SAID, I WAS BLINDFOLDED, AND I COULD NOT SEE. I WAS TREATED FIRMLY BUT AT NO TIME BRUTELIZED.

CONTINUED STATEMENT BY CDR BUCHER

ON ARRIVAL AT THE TRAIN I WAS TURNED OVER TO THE GUARDS. I RECEIVED FOUR OR FIVE KICKS TO THE LEGS. I BELIEVE, THREE MORE PUNCHES TO THE SOLAR PLEXIS. AT THIS POINT ONLY TWO OR THREE OF THE SHIP'S OFFICERS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED, MYSELF AND MR. LACY, AS WE WERE THE ONLY ONES WHO WERE WEARING NAVAL OFFICERS CAPS. THE TRAIN WAS WELL HEATED AND WE BEGAN TO MOVE. ALL OF US WERE BLINDFOLDED. THE WOUNDED WERE SHOWN NO CONSIDERATION. THEY WERE CAUSED TO SIT WITH THE REST OF THE CREW IN SEATS. THEY WERE EVEN, AT THIS TIME, SUBJECTED TO MANY INDIVIDUAL PUNCHES AND JABS WITH THE GUNBUTTS BY THE ARMY PEOPLE WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR SECURITY. ABOUT SIX TIMES DURING THE MOVEMENT OF THE TRAIN FROM WONSAN TO THE VICINITY OF PYONGYANG WHERE WE WERE TAKEN. THE FACT THAT THE PYONGYANG STATION, THE CENTRAL STATION. DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME, ABOUT SIX TIMES, I WAS QUESTIONED BY MIDDLE RANKING KOREAN OFFICERS. ONE OR TWO OF WHOM SPOKE VERY GOOD ENGLISH. I WAS NEVER HIT ALTHOUGH I WAS THREATENED WITH BEATINGS BY THESE OFFICERS. I WAS NEVER HIT. EACH TIME I WAS RETURNED TO MY SEAT, I WAS SEATED IN A DIFFERENT SEAT AND EACH TIME I WAS RETURNED TO MY SEAT I RECEIVED SOME RATHER HARD KICKS TO THE LEGS AND THE LOWER BACK SECTION. ABOUT FOUR HOURS AFTER WE BOARDED THE TRAIN THEY BROUGHT AROUND WHAT APPEARED TO BE A LARGE COB OF BUTTER WHICH HAD BEEN SPRINKLED LIBERALLY WITH GRANULES OF SUGAR. THIS SUBSTANCE WAS FORCED INTO OUR MOUTHS, INTO MY MOUTH ANYWAY. I WAS REQUIRED TO SWALLOW SOME OF THE FOOD. AT THIS POINT I DID NOT CONSIDER THAT I WAS IN BAD PHYSICAL CONDITION. THE ONLY THING THAT CONCERNED ME WAS THE NUMBER OF KICKS THAT I HAD RECEIVED IN THE LOWER BACK WHICH WERE CAUSING

CONTINUED STATEMENT BY CDR BUCHER

ME CONSIDERABLE DISCOMFORT. WE WERE REMOVED FROM THE TRAIN AT WONSAN. I WAS THE FIRST TO DISEMBARK. THE BLINDFOLDS HAD BEEN REMOVED AT THE STATION IN WONSAN (THE CENTRAL STATION). A BATTERY OF PHOTOGRAPHERS WITH BRIGHT LIGHTS GREETED US AS WE DISEMBARKED FROM THE TRAIN. THEY CAUSED US TO WALK FROM THE TRAIN WITH OUR HANDS IN THE AIR. WE LINED UP IN A VERY RAGGED FORMATION IN FRONT OF THE TRAIN. THEY CAUSED US TO STAND THERE FOR SOME PERIOD OF TIME. AT THIS POINT AND DURING THE ENTIRETY OF OUR CAPTURE THE TEMPERATURE, IN MY OPINION, WAS IN THE VICINITY OF ZERO DEGREES FARENHEIT AND BELOW TO PERHAPS EIGHT OR TEN DEGREES BELOW ZERO. I WAS DIRECTED TO LEAD THE CREW, SINGLE FILE, PAST ANOTHER BATTERY OF MOVIE CAMERAS AND ONCE AGAIN PLACED ON THE BUS. THE GUARDS, WHO WERE IN CHARGE OF PLACING ME ON THE BUS, DELIVERED SEVERAL MORE KICKS TO ME. HOWEVER, I FELT THAT AT NO TIME WAS I KICKED SO HARD THAT I WAS PARALYZED IN MY MOVEMENTS. I WAS KICKED WHILE ON THE GROUND UNTIL I WAS ABLE TO GET TO MY FEET. MY BLINDFOLD HAD BEEN REMOVED AT THIS POINT. WE WERE DIRECTED ON BUSES AND ORDERED TO A SEAT ON THE BUS. THE WINDOWS IN THE BUS WERE COVERED BY SHEETS AND WE BEGAN TO MOVE IN, WHAT I CONSIDERED WAS, A GENERAL NORTH OR NORTHWESTERN DIRECTION FROM THE CENTRAL STATION. WE DROVE THROUGH THE STREETS OF PYONGYANG. IT WAS ABOUT FOUR THIRTY OR FIVE O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING. AT APPROXIMATELY SIX O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING IT WAS STILL DARK, FOR IT WAS THE TWENTY THIRD OF JANUARY. IT IS STILL QUITE DARK. LATE IN THE MORNING. THEY CONFORM TO KIDIA MINUS NINE TIME IN NORTH KOREA DURING ALL OF THE MONTHS OF THE YEAR.

CONTINUED STATEMENT BY CDR BUCHER

I RECEIVED ONLY ONE HIT IN THE FACE AND THAT WAS IN THE SIDE OF THE JAW, WHILE WE WERE ON THAT BUS. UPON DISEMBARKING FROM THAT BUS, AT OUR DESTINATION, WE WERE GREETED BY SOME 15 OR 20 NORTH KOREAN ENLISTED MEN ALL ARMED WITH MACHINE GUNS. I WAS SUBJECTED TO A CONTINUOUS BARRAGE OF KICKING BY THE PEOPLE. ONE KICK WAS PARTICULARLY PAINFUL, AND I TURNED AND (BEING RATHER ANGRY) SAID A FEW THINGS IN ENGLISH TO INDICATE MY ANGER. THIS, OF COURSE, WAS LOST ON THE KOREANS. THEY ASSUMED IT WAS INSULTING AND I RECEIVED TWO OR THREE MORE KICKS.

I WAS TAKEN INSIDE THE BUILDING, DIRECTLY TO THE SECOND DECK (SECOND OR THIRD DECK, I'M NOT SURE NOW), WHERE WE WERE PLACED IN INDIVIDUAL ROOMS. I AND, MANY OF THE CREW, WERE PLACED IN A ROOM WITH UP TO TWELVE TO FOURTEEN OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CREW. THE ROOM THAT I WAS PLACED IN HAD NO HEAT BUT I HAD ON THERMO BOOTS PLUS HEAVY JACKET. I REMAINED FAIRLY WELL, FAIRLY WARM. THEY TOLD ME TO LIE DOWN IN BED AND SLEEP. I DID LIE DOWN AND A BLANKET WAS PROVIDED ME. I STILL KEPT MY THERMO BOOTS ON AND ALL THE CLOTHES I HAD.

THE NEXT DAY DURING A MEETING WITH A NORTH KOREAN GENERAL, ALL THE OFFICERS WERE TOLD THAT WE WOULD BE SHOT FOR OUR ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES. THEY ASKED US THROUGH AN INTERPRETER WHO SPOKE FAIRLY GOOD ENGLISH WHO WANTED TO GET IT FIRST. I VOLUNTEERED TO BE SHOT AND REQUESTED THAT I BE SHOT AND THAT THE REMAINDER OF THE CREW BE RETURNED TO THE SHIP AND ALLOWED TO TAKE THE SHIP BACK OUT TO SEA. THIS REQUEST WAS IGNORED.

DURING THIS SESSION OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS THE KOREAN DID SO IN SCREAMING VOICE. I WAS CURSED. ONE OF THE OFFICERS KNEW SEVERAL AMERICAN CURSE WORDS AND SCREAMED AT ME THAT I WAS A "SON OF A BITCH", "NO GOOD BASTARD", AND SO ON AND SO FORTH. NONE OF IT BOTHERED ME VERY MUCH.

CONTINUED STATEMENT BY CDR BUCHER

I WAS RETURNED TO THE ROOM BY MY KOREAN ENLISTED GUARD. UPON ARRIVAL IN THE ROOM THE GUARD ACCOMPANYING ME DELIVERED ANOTHER KICK TO MY BACK. AN OFFICER SHORTLY CAME IN AND ASKED ME IF I FELT OKAY, IN ENGLISH, I TOLD HIM THAT MY BACK WAS VERY SORE. HE SAID THE PEOPLE WERE VERY UPSET WITH OUR SPYING ACTIVITIES. LATER THAT SAME AFTERNOON I WAS CALLED TO ANOTHER INTERROGATION WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY SOME 15 OR 25 KORSAN OFFICERS WHO SAT AROUND MY CHAIR ON SEVERAL U-SHAPED TABLES ARRANGED IN A U SHAPE. MY CHAIR WAS PLACED IN MIDDLE. I WAS TOLD AT THIS TIME THAT MY WIFE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT ME AND THAT THEY RECEIVED WORD THROUGH THE AP. THEY CONTINUOUSLY PICKED UP UPI AND THE RIOTS FROM THE FRENCH NEWS AGENCY FSI (WHATEVER IT WAS I'M NOT REAL SURE). THE JAPANESE NEWS AGENCY GG. MAN WHO WAS TALKING TO ME AT THIS TIME WAS NOT THE GENERAL WHO I NEVER SAW AGAIN THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF OUR CAPTIVITY, BUT THERE WAS A FULL COLONEL WHO ATTEMPTED TO BE VERY NICE TO ME.

AFTER ABOUT TWO HOURS OF THAT I WAS RETURNED TO MY ROOM AND PROVIDED WITH A SMALL PITCHER OF HOT SWEETENED MILK AND A PLATE OF COOKIES WHICH I WAS TOLD TO EAT. OVER THE MANY MONTHS THAT FOLLOWED I WAS KICKED ON INFREQUENT OCCASIONS BY THE GUARD BUT I WAS NEVER ONCE HIT IN THE FACE. I FELT THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO NOT HIT ME IN THE FACE BECAUSE ALMOST EVERY DAY OR EVERY OTHER DAY I WAS TAKEN BEFORE CAMERAS FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER. SEVERAL MUG SHOTS WERE TAKEN. I WAS ACCUSED OF BEING A MEMBER OF THE CIA.

I HAD MY FIRST PRESS CONFERENCE I THINK THE SECOND OR THIRD DAY WE WERE THERE. THIS WAS A SCREAMING PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WAS VILIFIED AND I MYSELF WAS ALSO VILIFIED.

CONTINUED STATEMENT BY CDR BUCHER

AT THIS POINT THEY BEGAN TO INSIST THAT WE HAD INTRUDED. THEY HAD NOT INSISTED THAT UP TO THIS POINT AS I HAD TOLD THEM WE HAD NEVER INTRUDED. AT THIS POINT THEY DECIDED THEY SHOULD INSIST. I CONTINUED TO DENY THAT STATEMENT AND I WAS NOT BEATEN BUT I WAS PERSUADED BY MEANS OF THE THREAT OF BEATING AND THE THREAT OF DEATH. AT ONE TIME I WAS FORCED TO KNEEL WHILE GUNS WAS PLACED AT MY HEAD AND I WAS TOLD I HAD TWO MINUTES TO MAKE UP MY MIND AND IF I DID NOT CONFESS I WOULD BE SHOT. I WAS DETERMINED TO BE SHOT AND WHEN THE TIME CAME TO BE SHOT THEY PULLED THE TRIGGER OF THE GUN THEY HAD AND IT FELL ON A EMPTY CHAMBER. THE SENIOR COLONEL SAID THAT SHOOTING WAS TOO GOOD FOR ME AND THAT THEY WOULD BEAT ME TO DEATH IF NECESSARY. I WAS TAKEN BACK TO MY ROOM AND I WAS HIT ALONG THE SIDE OF THE FACE WITH FISTS AND KICKED ON SEVERAL MORE OCCASIONS.

MANY DAYS LATER I WAS TOLD THAT IF I DID NOT AGREE TO HAVING INTRUDED, MEMBERS OF MY CREW WOULD BE SHOT COMMENCING WITH THE YOUNGEST MAN FIRST. I WOULD BE FORCED TO WATCH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS.

I WAS PERMITTED AN HOUR TO THINK OVER WHAT MY REACTION WOULD BE. MEANWHILE I KNEW OUR WOUNDED PEOPLE HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN CARE OF IN ANY WAY. THERE WERE PEOPLE WITH BULLET HOLES, OR SCHRAPNEL HOLES COMPLETELY THROUGH THEM.

IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT I DECIDED RATHER THAN SEE MY PEOPLE KILLED, TO ADMIT TO HAVING INTRUDED ONE TIME. THAT'S ALL THEY SEEMED TO WANT, FOR ME TO CONFESS THAT WE HAD BEEN CAPTURED WITHIN THEIR TERRITORIAL WATERS AND NOTHING ELSE. AFTER ADMITTING TO THAT I DID NOT RECEIVE ANOTHER BEATING NOR WAS I KICKED AGAIN FOR THREE OR FOUR WEEKS. AFTER THAT TIME THE GUARDS WHO WERE CHARGE OF OUR, IN CHARGE OF SEEING THAT WE WERE IN PROPER FORMATION, OR TO GO TO THE BATHROOM OR WHATEVER, KICKED ME AT LEAST ONCE EACH DAY. THE ONLY KICKS THAT BOTHERED ME WERE THOSE THAT WERE DELIVERED INTO MY LOWER BACK.

CONTINUED STATEMENT OF CDR BUCHER

I WAS NEVER AGAIN HIT IN THE FACE.

A CONSTANT THREAT OF BEING HIT WAS PUT BEFORE ME ON EVERY DAY. THESE PEOPLE WHO CAME AND DREW BACK THEIR FISTS, OR THEIR GUNN BUTTS, AND THEN SWUNG THEM OR THE GUN BUTTS TO WITHIN A MATTER OF AN INCH OR TWO FROM MY BODY OR MY FACE.

I RECEIVED OTHER KICKS UNDER THE SHINS OVER THE MONTHS AND ONE VERY HARD PUNCH TO THE SOLAR PLEXIS WHICH KNOCKED THE WIND OUT OF ME. THESE KICKS AND PUNCHES WERE DELIVERED FOR NO REASON.

IN JULY, ON ONE OCCASION WHILE MARCHING UP THE STAIRS TO GO TO THE MESS HALL, ONE OF THE GUARDS GREETED ME AT THE TOP OF THE STAIRS WHEN I WAS STILL ABOUT THREE STAIRS DOWN. MY CHEST WAS EVEN WITH HIS FOOT. MY EYES WERE NOT ON HIM, AND COMPLETELY UNEXPECTED ME, KICKED ME IN THE MIDDLE OF THE CHEST, STERNAM AREA, SO HARD THAT HE KNOCKED ME CLEAR DOWN THE STAIRS.

AFTER THESE OFFICERS BEAT ME FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES, TWO ENLISTED MEN WITH MACHINE GUNS WERE CALLED IN AND THEY KICKED ME 4 OR 5 TIMES IN THE RIBS, IN THE SHOULDERS, AND IN THE HIPS. THE TWO JUNIOR DUTY OFFICERS APPLIED AIMED PHYSICAL BLOWS AT MY HEAD, LEFT EAR, MY NECK AND MY LEFT CHEEK BONE. I JUST CHANGED TAPE AND I WAS TALKING WITH A DOCTOR AND FORGOT EXACTLY WHERE I WAS. BUT IN ANY EVENT THIS DISCOVERY BY THE NORTH KOREANS THAT WE HAD BEEN FOOLING THEM AND INDICATING BY VARIOUS MEANS THAT WE HAD NOT INTRUDED AND THAT MUCH OF THE HUMANITARIAN TREATMENT AND SO FORTH WAS NO MORE THAN POPPY-COCK. THEY VERY COOLY DECIDED TO MAKE A SCAPE GOAT OF ME AND THEY COMMENCED A ROUND OF BEATINGS AGAINST THE CREW WHICH WENT ON DAY AND NIGHT. THE HEAT WAS TURNED OFF AND PEOPLE STOOD OUTSIDE MY DOOR SPEAKING ABOUT ME IN KOREAN. MANY WORDS I HAD LEARNED BY THIS TIME. SAYING THAT MY TURN WAS NEXT AND THAT THEY DID NOT EXPECT ME TO BE ABLE TO WALK AFTER THE BEATINGS. THEY ORDERED LITTERS AND GENERALLY TERRORIZED ME.

CONTINUED STATEMENT BY CDR BUCHER

I WAS DETERMINED THAT THE BEST THING FOR ME TO DO WOULD BE TO COMMIT SUICIDE IN THE HOPE THAT MY DEATH WOULD CAUSE THEM TO PAUSE AND TO KNOCK OFF THE BEATINGS OF THE REMAINDER OF THE CREW. WELL ANYWAY I WAS UNABLE TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THAT IDEA. THEY HAD SEVERAL VERY LARGE KOREAN GUARDS. ONE IN PARTICULAR CALLED THE BEAR WHO WAS ABSOLUTELY TERRIFYING WHO HAD BEATEN SO MANY PEOPLE MERCILESSLY, WOULD COME IN AND STAND RIGHT BESIDE MY CHAIR. HE NEVER HIT ME. HE MADE THREATS TO DO SO ALMOST CONTINUALLY. I WAS KICKED ON TWO MORE OCCASIONS BY GUARDS, THESE KICKS WERE DELIVERED TO MY RIB AREA, AND I STILL BEAR THE REMEMBRANCE OF THOSE KICKS TO THIS DAY IN THAT THE SKIN REMAINS YELLOW. I HAD AT THAT POINT, THIS IS ABOUT TWO WEEKS AGO, A BLACK EYE AND PRETTY BAD MOUSE UNDER ONE EYE. IT WAS TAKEN CARE OF BY THE MEDICAL PEOPLE BY APPLYING HOT COMPRESSES, HOT PARIFIN COMPRESSES TO THE BRUISED AREA IN AN EFFORT TO GET BLOOD CIRCULATION BACK. ONE CAME DOWN AT ME WITH BLOOD IN HIS EYES AND WAS PULLED OFF BY TWO JUNIOR DUTY OFFICERS. I CONTINUED TO RECEIVE THREATS, TERRIFYING THREATS, OFF AND ON FOR THE REST OF THE TIME WE WERE THERE.

THE NEXT ACTUAL PHYSICAL BEATING RECEIVED BY ME WAS IN THE FORM OF ONE OR TWO SLAPS BY SOME DUTY OFFICERS, MOSTLY SLAPS IN THE BACK OF THE HAND AND THEY WERE VERY CAREFUL NOT TO CAUSE THE FRONT OF MY FACE BECOME BRUISED. HOWEVER, IN THE LAST MONTH WE WERE THERE, DURING THE EARLY PART OF DECEMBER THEY BECAME AWARE OF SOME OF THE TRICKS THAT WE HAD BEEN PULLING ON THEM IN THEIR DOCUMENTARY FILMING AND IN THE LETTERS WE WERE SENDING HOME. IN OTHER WORDS WE, IN THE CONNOTATIONS OF WORDS WE USED IN THEIR PHONY PRESS CONFERENCES.

CONTINUED STATEMENT OF CDR BUCHER

THEY SET OUT ON A CONCENTRATED FORM OF TERROR, COMMENCING WITH MYSELF. AT THIS POINT I RECEIVED A TERRIBLE BEATING AT THE HANDS OF THREE OFFICERS WHO HIT ME SEVERAL TIMES IN THE FACE, LOOSENED TWO OF MY FRONT TEETH, AND CAUSED ME TO HAVE TEMPORARY DEAFNESS IN MY RIGHT EAR, ACCOMPANIED BY A GREAT DEAL OF DIZZINESS, AND SEVERAL KICKS IN THE RIBS. MY FEELING WAS THAT THEY FULLY INTENDED TO BEAT ME PERHAPS TO DEATCH. I WAS TOLD BY THE GENERAL THAT, THIS IS THE SAME GUY WHO WAS COLONEL BEFORE, HE HAD MADE GENERAL IN THE MEAN- WHILE, MAJOR GENERAL, HE SENT SEVERAL OF HIS SECOND IN COMMAND OFFICERS UP WHO ATTEMPTED TO TERRORIZE ME ON A ROUTINE BASIS THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND EVEN THE NIGHT. I WAS ORDERED TO GET UP AND STAND THERE AND MADE TO BELIEVE THAT I WAS NOW TO BE BEATEN BADLY, BUT I NEVER WAS. HOWEVER, I WAS NOT AGAIN BEATEN IN A CONCENTRATED WAY. I DID CONTINUE TO RECEIVE KICKS FROM THE GUARDS. IN ALMOST EVERY INSTANCE TO THE SAME BRUISED AREA. THE TERROR THAT WE WERE SUBJECTED TO DURING THAT WEEK WAS ALMOST UNBEARABLE. I FELT THAT THE BEATINGS THAT I HAD RECEIVED WERE FAR LESS THAN MOST OF THE PEOPLE. BUT AS I WAS KEPT IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND HAD NO CHANCE OF SPEAKING TO ANYONE IN MY CREW I WAS NOT ABLE TO KNOW WHO WAS BEING BEATEN THE WORST AND WHAT THEIR PHYSICAL CONDITION, CAUSED ME A GREAT DEAL OF WORRY, NATURALLY. ALL OF A SUDDEN ON TUESDAY NIGHT, ABOUT THE 13TH OR 14TH I DON'T REMEMBER WHAT IT WAS, THE BEATINGS CEASED, AND I FELT THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING UP. THE QUALITY OF THE FOOD INCREASED, HEAT WAS TURNED BACK ON IN THE ROOMS AND WE BEGAN TO RECEIVE THE GOOD FORM OF TREATMENT AGAIN.

CONTINUED STATEMENT BY CDR BUCHER

FROM THAT TIME FORWARD I WAS NEVER KICKED OR BEATEN AGAIN. THAT BASICALLY OUTLINES THE PHYSICAL VIOLENCE THAT WAS DONE TO ME; I AM NOT ATTEMPTING HERE TO EXPLAIN THE TERROR THAT I FELT ON SO MANY OCCASIONS. I THINK THAT AT SOME LATER TIME I WILL TRY TO WRITE MY THOUGHTS DOWN WITH RESPECT TO THIS. BELIEVE ME THE TERROR THAT ACCOMPANIED, AND THREATS, WERE FAR WORSE TO ENDURE THAN THE ACTUAL PHYSICAL DISCOMFORT CAUSED BY THE BEATINGS.

I THINK THAT THIS WILL GIVE YOU A PRETTY GOOD INSIGHT INTO MY OWN CIRCUMSTANCES.

//////////END OF RECORDED STATEMENT BY CDR BUCHER//////////

MOST SEVERELY BEATEN

26d

STATEMENT OF KISLER, EARL MURRAY, CT3, 914 48 32

1. I WOULD FIRST LIKE TO APOLOGIZE FOR THE FACT THAT SPECIFIC DATES ON WHICH THE MAJORITY OF THESE INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE ARE VAGUE.
2. JANUARY 23 - UPON CAPTURE, WHEN TAKEN OFF THE SHIP, WE WERE LOADED ONTO BUSES AND TRANSPORTED TO A BUILDING WHICH SMELLED LIKE A BARN. BEING BLINDFOLDED I WAS PUSHED, DRAGGED AND KICKED INTO THIS BUILDING. UPON ENTERING THIS BUILDING SEVERAL KOREANS BEAT ME IN THE FACE AND HEAD. UNTIL APPROX. 2 TO 3 WEEKS LATER I THOUGHT MY NOSE WAS POSSIBLY BROKEN. THE SAME "HUMANE TREATMENT" WAS OFFERED ME WHILE DEPARTING THIS FIRST BUILDING. MANY OTHERS RECEIVED A SIMILAR WELCOME.
3. WHILE RIDING ON THESE BUSES WE WERE MADE TO SIT FAR FORWARD WITH OUR HANDS ON THE SEAT IN FRONT OF US. WE WERE KICKED AND SLAPPED IN VARYING DEGREES THROUGH OUT THE BUS RIDE. THIS TREATMENT WAS UNNECESSARY, CONSIDERING WHEN WE ARRIVED AT THE FIRST BUILDING WE WERE TOLD THAT ATTEMPTING TO MOVE AROUND OR TALK TO ONE ANOTHER WOULD GET US KILLED. THIS NATURALLY SUPPRESSED ANY URGE ON OUR PART TO MOVE OR TALK.
4. WHEN OUR HANDS WERE TIED THEY WERE TIED SO TIGHT THAT ALEXANDER, PO2, HAD ROPE BURN SCARS ON HIS WRISTS FOR MANY MONTHS AFTER. WHEN MY HANDS WERE FINALLY UNTIED AT THE END OF THE 11 HOUR TRAIN RIDE THEY WERE A DISTINCT BLUE AND I HAD NO FEELING IN EITHER FOR ABOUT ONE TO TWO HOURS.
5. A DETAIL OF THE IMMEDIATE CAPTURE I FORGOT TO MENTION - WHEN THE KORCOMS HAD BOARDED THE SHIP WE WERE MADE TO SIT IN A GROUP ON THE WELL-DECK FOR AN HOUR OR MORE IN BELOW OR NEAR FREEZING WEATHER. MANY OF THE MEN WERE IN SHIRT SLEEVES.

6. THE NEXT INCIDENT I DISTINCTLY REMEMBER WAS ONLY A COUPLE OF DAYS AFTER WE WERE PLACED IN OUR FIRST PLACE OF DETENTION. UP UNTIL THIS ONE PARTICULAR DAY WE HAD BEEN LAYING ON THE BEDS DURING THE DAYTIME. THEN THE KORCOMS SAID WE WEREN'T ALLOWED TO SLEEP DURING THE DAY. I WAS LAYING ON THE BED WHEN THE DUTY OFFICER ENTERED THE ROOM. HE SAW ME LAYING ON THE BED AND WENT INTO HYSTERICS SAYING, IN SHORT, I HAD BROKEN THE "RULES OF LIFE." HE TOOK ME TO THE HEAD WHERE HE MADE ME STAND AT ATTENTION FOR I GUESS 1½ HOURS. DURING THIS TIME I WAS HIT A FEW TIMES BY THIS SAME DUTY OFFICER. THIS WAS ONLY A SLIGHT INCIDENT AND ACTUALLY TO MY ADVANTAGE. ALTHOUGH THE SMELL IN THE HEAD WAS MUCH WORSE, THE TEMPERATURE, BEING MUCH COOLER, WAS FAR MORE COMFORTABLE THAN THAT OF ROOM. WHEN THE DUTY OFFICER GOT TIRED OF PLAYING WITH ME HE HAD ME CLEAN THE HEAD, FLOOR, URINALS AND COMMODES, (HOLE-IN-THE-FLOOR-TYPE.)

7. I ALSO FORGOT TO MENTION THAT ON THE DAY OF THE CAPTURE, I BELIEVE IT WAS ON THE TRAIN ENROUTE TO PYONGYONG, I TRIED TO LIFT MY BLINDFOLD TO WIPE SOME OF THE DRIED BLOOD OFF MY FACE I WAS HIT BY A GUARD WITH SOMETHING PRESUMABLY SHARP. I RECEIVED A FAIRLY DEEP, I SHOULDN'T SAY DEEP, I WOULD SAY GOOD-SIZED CUT OR SPLIT BEHIND MY RIGHT EYE. THE SCAR IS STILL VISIBLE BUT BARELY SO. THAT'S WHY I SAY IT WASN'T TOO DEEP.

8. ONE LAST DETAIL ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE CAPTURE - AS WE WERE TAKEN OFF THE SHIP AND LOADED ON THE BUSES WE WERE GREETED BY A MOB OF GOD KNOWS HOW MANY PEOPLE ALL YELLING AND SCREAMING, SEVERAL YELLING IN ENGLISH "KILL YANKEE, KILL YANKEE." THIS IS INCIDENTAL BUT MAY GIVE YOU SOME IDEA OF THE HOSPITALITY OF THE KOREAN PUBLIC TO THE PUEBLO CREW.

9. DURING THE PERIOD WE SPENT IN WHAT WE NICKNAMED, THE BARN, APPROX. 6 WEEKS WE WERE LIVING FOUR TO A ROOM, ISOLATED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FROM OTHER ROOMS. WE "WASHED UP" ONCE A DAY IMMEDIATELY AFTER GETTING UP. WE WASHED AND BRUSHED OUR TEETH OUT OF BASINS SITTING UNDER THE URINALS. I BELIEVE A MINIMUM OF 3600 CALORIES PER DAY WILL SUSTAIN LIFE. WE WERE INFORMED WE WERE GETTING 3700 CALORIES A DAY. THIS WAS EVENTUALLY INCREASED. THE BARE BULB WHICH LIGHTED THE ROOM WAS LEFT ON 24 HOURS A DAY. WE WERE AWAKENED EVERY MORNING BY A GUARD SCREAMING. MY BED WAS CLOSEST TO THE DOOR AND EVERY MORNING ALONG WITH THE SCREAMING HE HAD A HABIT OF HITTING ME IN THE BACK WITH A RIFLE BUTT. DURING AN INTERROGATION SESSION I WAS INFORMED I WAS GOING TO BE SHOT. I WAS MADE TO PUT MY HEAD FORWARD, A PISTOL WAS PUT AT THE BACK OF MY HEAD AND I WAS TOLD THAT IF THE RIGHT ANSWERS WEREN'T PRODUCED BY THE TIME THE OFFICER COUNTED TO 3 HE WOULD PULL THE TRIGGER. NEEDLESS TO SAY THE GUN DIDN'T GO OFF WHEN HE FINISHED COUNTING, MUCH TO MY RELIEF.

10. DURING INT, SGT HAMMOND WAS BEATEN ALMOST BEYOND RECOGNITION. THE SKIPPER LOOKED 119 YEARS OLD INSTEAD OF 40 AFTER ONLY A COUPLE WEEKS OF CAPTIVITY. I NEVER HEARD SPECIFIC DETAILS BUT I'M QUITE SURE HIS PHYSICAL APPEARANCE WAS NOT DUE TO TENDER LOVING CARE.

11. THE NEXT INCIDENT I REMEMBER WAS ONE MORNING AT APPROX. 0445. I GOT OUT OF BED AND ASKED THE GUARD FOR A HEAD CALL. THIS TENDED TO DISTURB THE GUARD AND HE PROCEEDED TO BEAT H... OUT OF ME, HITTING ME IN THE FACE AND MID-SECTION WHILE I STOOD AT ATTENTION AS BEST I COULD. I WAS KNOCKED TO THE FLOOR ONCE, GOT UP, AND WAS KNOCKED DOWN AGAIN. I GOT UP FOR THE SECOND TIME. HE THEN HIT ME ONCE MORE AND KICKED ME IN THE GROIN. AFTER THE KICK I WAS UNABLE TO GET UP FOR ABOUT 10 MINUTES.

12. THE MOST SEVERE BEATING I TOOK WAS THE 1ST PART OF SEPTEMBER. WE WERE IN ROOM #5 AND HAD GIVEN OUR "ROOM DADDY" QUITE A BIT OF STATIC ON SEVERAL ISSUES, PRESS CONFERENCES ETC. THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT WAS DIRECTLY RELATED TO LETTERS THAT ROOM DADDY HAD "SUGGESTED" WE WRITE TO DIFFERENT NEWS MEDIA, TIME, NEWSWEEK, ETC. CONTAINING AN APPEAL TO THE U.S. PUBLIC. I REFUSED TO WRITE THE LETTER. HE FIRST TRIED THE SOFT SELL WHICH DIDN'T WORK. THEN CAME THE HARD SELL. I WAS TAKEN TO A ROOM. ROOM DADDY AND HIS INTERPRETER WERE THE ONLY OTHER MEN IN THE ROOM. HE FIRST GRABBED ME BY THE THROAT AND I WAS CONVINCED HE WAS GOING TO STRANGLE ME. HE BEAT ME FIRST WITH HIS FIST THEN WITH A STICK 3/4 TO 1' DIAMETER THEN WITH HIS RUBBER-SOLED SANDLE. HE'D KNOCK ME OUT OF THE CHAIR, ORDER ME BACK IN THE CHAIR AND THEN REPEAT THE PROCESS. THIS CONTINUED UNTIL I COULD NO LONGER FIND THE CHAIR. I WAS LYING ON THE FLOOR LEANING AGAINST THE WALL WHEN HE BEGAN KICKING ME IN THE CHEST AND RIBS. THIS WENT ON FOR ABOUT TWO HOURS, OR SO I WAS TOLD LATER BY MY ROOM MATES. WHEN I REGAINED CONSCIOUSNESS I WAS LYING SPREAD-EAGLED ON THE FLOOR. THE DETAILS FOR THE FOLLOWING 4 OR 5 HOURS ARE A LITTLE FAINT. I DO KNOW THAT HE HAD ME WRITE OUT AND SIGN A STATEMENT THAT SAID, IN EFFECT, I WAS AND ALWAYS HAD BEEN INSINCERE TOWARD THE DPRK & KPA, I WAS UNREPENTANT OF THE "CAPITAL CRIMES" I HAD COMMITTED AGAINST THAT COUNTRY AS AN "ESPIONAGE AGENT," AND WAS READY TO ACCEPT THE PENALTY OF DEATH FOR MY SO-CALLED CRIMES. I WAS THEN ASKED IF I HAD ANY "LAST WORDS" TO RELAY TO MY FAMILY. I SAID I DIDN'T. I WAS THEN RETURNED TO MY ROOM, MY OUTWARD APPEARANCES SOMEWHAT ALTERED THAT WHAT THEY HAD BEEN TWO HOURS PREVIOUS.

13. SEVERAL MONTHS PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT THE SAME OFFICER PROMISED ME I WOULD BE SHOT IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE BECAUSE I HAD REFUSED TO INCLUDE IN A LETTER TO MY FAMILY A STATEMENT WHICH WAS INTENDED TO INFORM MY MOTHER & FATHER I WAS SOON TO BE EXECUTED IF THE U.S. DIDN'T APOLOGIZE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. THERE WAS NO PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT STEMMING FROM THIS INCIDENT.

14. ONE AFTERNOON WE WERE SITTING AROUND THE TABLE WITH THE PROPAGANDA TRASH IN FRONT OF US. ONE OF THE MORE SICK GUARDS (AND THE BIGGEST) CAME INTO THE ROOM. O'BANNON SITTING ON MY RIGHT HAD A LARGE BOOK IN FRONT OF HIM WRITTEN IN RUSSIAN & KOREAN. THE GUARD TOLD O'B TO READ A PORTION OF THE BOOK. NATURALLY HE WAS UNABLE. THE GUARD THEN BEAT O'B UNTIL HE COULDN'T STAND UP. THIS INCLUDED HITTING AROUND THE HEAD WITH THE HANDLE OF A FLY-SWATTER WHICH WAS MADE OF FAIRLY STOUT WOOD. HE PULLED ME OUT OF MY CHAIR BY MY EAR AND ORDERED ME TO DO THE SAME THING. WHEN I COULDN'T HE HIT ME A COUPLE TIMES BUT NOTHING LIKE WHAT HE DID TO O'BANNON.

15. BETWEEN THE DATES OF 12-19 DECEMBER WE WERE FORCED TO SIT PERFECTLY STILL IN OUR CHAIRS, HANDS ON KNEES, FINGERS EXTENDED, FEET FLAT ON THE FLOOR. WE SAT IN AN EXTREMELY STOOPED POSITION WITH CHINS ON OUR CHESTS. WE REMAINED IN THIS POSITION FOR APPROX. 17 HOURS. THIS WAS QUITE A PAINFUL POSITION TO REMAIN IN FOR THAT PERIOD OF TIME. DURING THIS SAME PERIOD OF TIME THE DOORS OF THE ROOMS WERE OPEN AND A GUARD CONSTANTLY PEERING IN. SEVERAL, I SHOULD SAY MANY TIMES, THE GUARD, FOR NO APPARENT REASON, WOULD TAKE ONE STEP INTO THE ROOM AND WITH NO WARNING BEGIN BEATING ON THE MEN SITTING CLOSEST TO THE DOOR. MANY TIMES, INSTEAD OF HITTING WITH HIS FISTS HE WOULD KICK THE CLOSEST MEN IN THE HEAD OR CHEST, USUALLY THE HEAD.

THIS WAS SOMEWHAT UNPLEASANT CONSIDERING THE GUARDS WORE VERY HEAVY BOOTS. DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME IT WAS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO GO TO THE HEAD WITHOUT GETTING BEAT IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. BEING SEATED 3RD FROM THE DOOR I WAS SUBJECT TO THESE SUDDEN ATTACKS AND RECEIVED MY SHARE. I WAS PUNCHED OUT TWICE AND KICKED IN THE SIDE OF THE HEAD SEVERAL TIMES. AGAIN DURING THIS TIME I GOT UP DURING THE NIGHT AND ASKED TO GO TO THE BATHROOM. INSTEAD OF THE BATHROOM THE GUARD ON DUTY TOOK ME TO AN EMPTY ROOM AND PUNCHED ME AROUND. ANOTHER GUARD CAME IN AND THE TWO OF THEM TOOK TURNS. MANY LONG MINUTES LATER I DID GET TO THE BATHROOM. DURING THE BEATING I DESCRIBED IN #12 I FAILED TO MENTION THE FACT THAT I WAS ALSO KICKED IN IN THE LOWER BACK AND RIGHT LEG OVER & OVER. AS OF THIS DATE I HAVE ONLY PARTIAL FEELING IN RIGHT LEG FROM ABOVE MY KNEE DOWN ACROSS THE TOP OF MY FOOT. I STILL DO NOT HAVE FULL USAGE OF THAT LEG.

16. ONE OF THE TYPICAL PUNISHMENTS WHICH ONE GUARD IN PARTICULAR LIKED WAS TO TAKE THE MAN TO THE END OF THE CORRIDOR, OPEN ALL THE WINDOWS, POSITION THE MAN IN A POSITION WHERE AN ICE-COLD WIND WOULD HIT HIM BEST AND FORCE HIM TO STAND AT ATTENTION FOR PROLONGED PERIODS OF TIME. I "ENJOYED" PLAYING THIS FREEZE-OUT GAME SEVERAL TIMES.

17. WE HAD PERIODS OUTSIDE ALMOST DAILY, IMMEDIATELY AFTER GETTING UP IN THE MORNING AND IN THE AFTERNOON. EVEN IN THE COLDEST WEATHER WE WERE MARCHED OUTSIDE IN ONLY PANTS AND A THIN SWEATSHIRT. AT TIMES THE DUTY OFFICERS, ALL DRESSED WARMLY INCLUDING GLOVES, SEEMED TO THINK THAT OUR SHAKING AND CHATTERING OF TEETH WAS QUITE HUMOROUS. THEY'D LAUGH AT US AND ASK IN A TAUNTING WAY "WHY ARE YOU SHAKING? ARE YOU NOT HEARTY MEN?" SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT.

18. AFTER THE EXERCISE PERIOD WE WOULD CHANGE SHOES BEFORE RETURNING TO OUR ROOMS. THE SHOES WERE KEPT ON SHELVES IN THE FOYER ON THE FIRST DECK. EACH TIME TWO MEN WOULD REMAIN TO ARRANGE THE SHOES IN NEAT ORDER.. I HAD THIS TASK ABOUT 4 TIMES. TWICE OUT OF THOSE 4 TIMES I WAS HIT AND KICKED AROUND PRETTY GOOD TRYING TO COMPLETE THIS TASK, AS USUAL, FOR NO APPARENT REASON.

RIGHT NOW AND IN MY PRESENT STATE OF MIND (A LITTLE TIRED & EXTREMELY EXCITED) THESE ARE THE INCIDENTS THAT STICK OUT MOST VIVIDLY IN MY MIND. FOR A SHORT SUMMATION I'D SAY THAT THOSE NORTH KOREANS ARE LESS THAN ANIMALS, BEAR NO RESEMBLANCE TO HUMAN BEINGS AND HAVEN'T THE SLIGHTEST

HINT OF COMPASSION NOR TRACE OF HUMAN DECENCY. HARDLY A DAY PASSED THAT SOMEONE WASN'T KICKED OR HIT FOR SOMETHING. THIS CAME TO BE EXPECTED, TAKEN WHEN RECEIVED AND FORGOT ABOUT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THOSE INDIVIDUAL DAILY HAPPENINGS ARE FAR TOO NUMEROUS TO COMPILE. THE FACT IS HOWEVER SLIGHT THEY DID HAPPEN ON A DAILY BASIS. A SWIFT KICK IN THE SHINS OR A RABBIT PUNCH BECAME AS NATURAL TO THIS CREW AS BREAKFAST AND THE MORNING PAPER ARE TO MOST AMERICANS.

THIS COMPILATION IS BY FAR INCOMPLETE AND AGAIN I APOLOGIZE FOR THAT. IF ASKED LATER, AFTER THOSE CONCERNED HAVE READ THIS, TO ELABORATE FURTHER OR TO ATTEMPT TO RECOLLECT MORE IN DETAIL FACTS SURROUNDING THE PAST 11 MONTHS IT WILL BE MY PRIVILEGE.

BASICALLY MY TORTURE WAS GIVEN FOR ONE REASON, TO ADMIT TO THE IN-TRANSIONS AND TO ADMIT ESPIONAGE. DURING MY INITIAL INTERROGATIONS I REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE EITHER INTRASION OR ESPIONAGE. I WAS SUBMITTED TO THREATS OF DEATH IF I DIDN'T COOPERATE. I CHOSE DEATH, BUT QUICKLY LEARNED THAT KORCOMS WERE GOING TO MAKE ME JUST WISH I WAS DEAD. I HAD THREE SUCCESSIVE INTERROGATIONS WHICH INCLUDED TORTURE.

THE FIRST REQUIRED ME TO STRIP TO MY SHORTS. A SQUARE WOODEN STICK WAS PLACED BEHIND MY KNEES. MY KNEES WERE ON THE DECK AND THE TOPS OF MY FEET FLAT ON THE DECK. THE BODY WAS REQUIRED TO BE STRAIGHT WITH MY HANDS RAISED HIGH ABOVE MY HEAD. I GAVE THEM ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS WHICH THEY BOUGHT FOR A WHILE AND MY TORTURE STOPPED.

THE SECOND SESSION FOLLOWED THAT NEXT MORNING, AFTER THEY REALIZED I HAD GIVEN THEM LIES AND EVASIVE ANSWERS. I WAS AGAIN PLACED IN THE PREVIOUS POSITION. HOWEVER, I REFUSED TO MAKE ANY CONFESION. I REMAINED IN THAT TORTURE POSITION LONG AFTER I LOST ALL FEELING IN MY LEGS AND MY HANDS AND MY BODY QUIVERED. THEN THE KICKING STARTED, TO MY DEAD LEGS FIRST, THEN TO MY BACK, THEN MY SIDE AND CHEST. I LAY PARALYZED FLAT ON THE DECK AFTER THE FIRST FEW KICKS AND THEY QUIT KICKING WHEN I NEARLY PASSED OUT. I WAS RESTED FOR A FEW MINUTES. NEXT I RESUMMED THE SAME POSITION, ONLY THIS TIME, WITH A CHAIR HELD STRAIGHT UP IN THE AIR. I COULDN'T TAKE THIS PHYSICALLY ANY LONGER AND LAY THE CHAIR ON MY BACK AND DOUBLED OVER IN PAIN. THE KICKING STARTED AGAIN AND IT WAS SOON FOLLOWED BY FIST BLOWS TO THE FACE AND HEAD. BARELY CONSCIOUS, I AGREED TO "CONFESS" AND THE TORTURE STOPPED AND I RETURNED TO MY ROOM.

I WROTE MY "CONFESSION" ALL THE REMAINDER OF THAT MORNING AND
AFTERNOON. THAT EVENING I WAS CALLED INTO A SMALL ROOM WITH THE OFFICER
IN CHARGE, A KPA SENIOR COLONEL (FOUR STAR). HE SWORE AT ME AND
ANNOUNCED THAT MY CONFESSION WAS WORTHLESS-AND IT WAS! HE INSISTED THAT
THE CAPTORS HAD ADMITTED TO EVERYTHING WHICH I REFUSED TO BELIEVE. HE
WARNED ME THAT HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SHOOT ME, AND MADE MOTIONS TOWARD A
SERVICE REVOLVER ON THE DESK. HE ASKED ME IF I WAS READY TO DIE AND I
REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO GIVE ME A LAST
CHANCE TO WRITE MY WILL. I TOLD HIM I HAD ALREADY DONE THAT SOME TIME
AGO AND THAT I WAS READY. HE SWORE A GREAT LENGTH AND SAID "SHOOTING
YOU IS TOO QUICK." THE NEXT THING I KNEW I WAS BEING ESCORTED OUT OF
THE ROOM AND INTO A ROOM ACROSS THE HALL. THE WINDOWS WERE OPEN AND
IT WAS FREEZING COLD INSIDE. I WAS TOLD TO UNDRESS EXCEPT FOR MY
SHORTS AND TO REMOVE MY GLASSES. I WAS THEN BOUND WITH WIRE AROUND
MY HANDS, WHICH WERE BEHIND MY BACK. I SHIVERED GREATLY AND TWO
JUNIOR OFFICERS KICKED ME SIMULTANEOUSLY SENDING ME FACE FIRST ACROSS
THE ROOM. I WAS NOT AWARE OF THE COLD FROM THEN ON. THEY AND THREE ENLISTED
GUARDS BEGAN KICKING ME ALL OVER. THEY LIFTED ME TO MY FEET AND PLACED
A STICK BEHIND MY KNEES, ONLY NO KNEELING THIS TIME. INSTEAD, I WAS
TO SQUAT ON THE BALLS OF MY FEET. I HAD POOR BALANCE AND FELL BACK-
WARDS SLIGHTLY, BUT WAS KICKED TO THE DECK. AGAIN I WAS KICKED UNTIL
I GOT TO MY FEET TO START THE STICK SQUAT AGAIN. THIS CONTINUED FOR
SEVERAL DOZEN TIMES. I CAN REMEMBER LOSING CONSCIOUSNESS AT LEAST SIX
TIMES AND BEING SLAPPED TO REALITY. FINALLY, I AGREED TO CONFESS AGAIN,
BUT THEY KEPT UP THE KICKING AND SLUGGING AS I WAS BOWED FORWARD ON MY
KNEES. FINALLY THE OIC ORDERED ME TO SEE HIM AGAIN. I COULDN'T EVEN PUT
ON MY GLASSES. I DID DRESS MYSELF SLIGHTLY. WJH

WHEN I SAW THE OIC I COULDN'T TALK FOR MY THROAT AND JAWS WERE PARALYZED. AFTER A FEW MINUTES OF WAITING I REGAINED FEELING IN HALF OF MY TONGUE - ENOUGH TO TALK. I WAS KEPT AWAKE ALL NIGHT TO WRITE THE CONFESSION." THIS BEATING WAS ON JANUARY 29, 1968. FOR NEARLY TWO MONTHS I COULDN'T BEND MY BACK. THE BASE OF MY SPINE WAS SENSITIVE TO ANY MOVEMENT. I ROLLED OUT OF BED, UNABLE TO ERECT MY BACK. THE BACK HEALED AND PRESENTLY I FEEL ONLY OCCASIONAL IRRITATION.

I WAS TERRORIZED BY GUARDS THREATENING TO BEAT ME ON MANY OCCASIONS. I RECEIVED A KICK IN THE HAND WHICH PARALYZED MY FINGERS FOR SEVERAL DAYS - NO REASON FOR THIS.

I, AS WE ALL WERE, WAS REQUIRED TO BOW MY HEAD FAR FORWARD IAW "INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM."

DURING THE LAST PURGE I WAS KEPT AWAKE WITHOUT SLEEP AND THREATENED TO BE BEATEN AS I COULD HEAR MY SHIPMATES WERE BEING BEATEN. SEVERAL OFFICERS INSISTED I KNEW EVERYTHING AND I SHOOK FROM COLD AND FEAR. THERE WAS NO HEAT AND OUR DOORS TO THE ROOMS WERE KEPT OPEN, ALLOWING A FREEZING DRAFT TO PASS. I FINALLY BROKE AND GAVE THEM SOME OF WHAT THEY WANTED -- ENOUGH TO SATISFY THEM THAT I WAS SINCERE.

I WAS THEN THREATENED WITH TORTURE BY THE OIC IF I DIDN'T WRITE A FRANK CONFESSION OF OUR "ESPIONAGE AND INTRASIONS." MY FIRST ONES WERE FULL OF DOUBLE MEANINGS AND DECEPTION, BUT THIS ONE WAS STERILE AND THE STORY THAT THEY DESIRED.

ON AT LEAST FOUR OCCASIONS THE OIC REMA^IINDED ME OF THE BRUTAL BEATING HE HAD ORDERED. HE WOULD ASK IF I THOUGHT HIS WORDS WERE EMPTY. OF COURSE I KNEW THAT I COULD BE BEATEN AT ANY MOMENT. BUT ALL OF US CHANCED THIS TO SEND HOME VARIOUS SIGNALS WHICH WE FELT NECESSARY.

I OBSERVED THAT THE CAPTAIN WAS ALWAYS HELD SUSPECT BY ALL DUTY PERSONNEL. I HEARD "THE CAPTAIN IS SUCH A BAD MAN." THIS WOULD BE SAID QUITE OFTEN AFTER HE HAD BEEN "FRAMED" INTO A "PROVOCATION." ONCE HE WAS YELLED AT AND EMBARRASSED FOR LEAVING HIS EMPTY WASH BASIN ON HIS BED. AND MANY TIMES FOR OTHER SLIGHT INCIDENCES AS HAVING A BUTTON UNBUTTONED. IN SHORT, HE WAS WATCHED WITH AN EAGLE EYE FOR AN EXCUSE TO HARASS HIM. THIS TREATMENT I'M SURE WAS ^eWARING, SINCE HE NEVER HAD THE CHANCE TO RELAX SOMEWHAT AS DID THE OTHERS OF US.

THE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF THE OFFICERS AND IN GENERAL, THE INCONVENIENCES DIRECTED TOWARD US WERE OBVIOUS SPECIAL TREATMENT. WHEN EVER WE WANTED TO PLAY CARDS BY GATHERING TOGETHER IN ONE ROOM IN THE EVENING, WE HAD TO ASK AND AWAIT THE DECISION OF THE DUTY OFFICER." WE WOULD AFTER BEING KEPT WAITING FOR AT LEAST 15 MINUTES AND THEN PERMITTED. THE TIME FOR OUR PLAYING CARDS WAS THE SAME AS THE ENLISTED, WHO MERELY STARTED AT THE DESIGNATED TIME, SINCE THEY WERE ALREADY TOGETHER. ALWAYS, THE DUTY PERSONNEL KNOW WHEN TO STOP OUR CARD PLAYING, BUT SELDOM WERE THEY RESPONSIBLE FOR INITIATING THE COMMENCEMENT OF OUR RECREATION ON THEIR OWN. SMALL THINGS SUCH AS THESE PROVOKED US SINCE THERE WAS NO REASON OTHER THAN HARASSMENT BEHIND THEM.

THE "HUMANITARIAN TREATMENT" WAS PURELY FOR THEATRICAL EFFECT TO GAIN MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA. WE AT ALL TIMES KNEW WE WERE CAPTIVES OF VICIOUS AND VAIN PEOPLE.

STATEMENT OF: ROBERT JAMES HAMMOND, SSGT., USMC, 2046801

26F

24 DECEMBER 1968

1. AS FOR MYSELF THE FIRST MALTREATMENT THAT I RECEIVED CAME IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEPARTING THE SHIP AND BOARDING A BUS IN WONSON. I WAS BLINDFOLDED AT THE TIME AND RECEIVED SEVERAL KICKS IN THE LOWER PORTIONS OF MY BODY FOR NO REASON. ALSO I WAS BELTED IN THE JAW ON FIVE OCCASIONS AND MY HANDS SMASHED AGAINST A METAL BAR ON THE SEAT IN FRONT OF ME BECAUSE I WAS WIGGLEING MY FINGERS A LITTLE DUE TO THE TIGHT BONDS AND EXPOSURE TO SUB-FREEZING TEMPERATURE.

2. JAN 23 1968

ON THE TRAIN FROM WONSON TO PYONG YANG I RECEIVED THE GUN TREATMENT IN WHICH THEY PULLED THE TRIGGER OF AN UNLOADED PISTOL AND A SWIFT BOOT IN THE REAR BECAUSE I WOULDN'T TELL THEM MY AGE.

3. FEBRUARY 1, 1967 OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. I WAS TAKEN FROM MY ROOM AT APPROXIMATELY 4:30 PM FOR INTERROGATION BY A KOREAN OFFICER NICKNAMED "ROBOT", AND ANOTHER OFFICER THAT I PRESUMED TO BE AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR WHOM I HAVE NO NAME. FOR THE FIRST SIX HOURS (APPROX) I WAS CONTINUOUSLY BEATEN FROM HEAD TO FOOT IN VARIOUS WAYS BY MANY KOREAN GUARDS. POSSIBLY AS MANY AS TEN DIFFERENT GUARDS. ALL THAT WERE ON DUTY IN THE PASSAGE WAY AT THE TIME AND ALSO THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER I JUST PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED WHO DID THE INTERPRETING. OTHER THAN MY NAME, RANK, SERVICE NUMBER AND DATE OF BIRTH, THE ONLY QUESTION ASKED WAS IF I SPOKE KOREAN, WHICH I ADMITTED TO AFTER APPROX SIX HOURS OF BEATINGS.

THE BEATINGS WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE GUARDS FOR THE MOST PART AND WORKED ME OVER WITH ONE TO FOUR GUARDS ATTENDING AT ANY GIVEN TIME. AS BEST I CAN REMEMBER, MY TORTURE BEGAN WITH JUST MAKING ME KNEEL DOWN ON THE FLOOR IN A CORNER OF THE ROOM, THEN MAYBE 5 TO 10 MINUTES LATER I HAD TO RAISE MY HANDS. (CONCEPTION OF TIME IS VERY DIFFICULT AND PROBABLY INACCURATE). A FEW MINUTES LATER THEY ADDED TO MY DIFFICULTY BY MAKING

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ME HCLD A CHAIR OVER MY HEAD WHILE AT THE SAME TIME KNEELING DOWN SITTING ON MY FEET. SOON AS I BEGAN TO WEAKEN THE GUARDS BEGAN TO KICK MY ARMS AND SIDES FROM MY WRIST DOWN TO MY WAIST. ALSO, THERE WAS AN OCCASIONAL PUNCH OR KICK IN THE HEAD. FINALLY ONE ARM AND MY HANDS BECAME ALMOST PARALYZED AND I COULD NO LONGER HOLD THE CHAIR SO I WAS GIVEN A SHORT REST TO RECUPFRATE, MAYBE 10 MINUTES OF JUST QUESTIONING. NEXT, A TWO-BY-FOUR WAS SLAMMED INTO MY LEGS DIRECTLY BEHIND MY KNEES WHICH BROUGHT ME TO A SQUATTING POSITION WITH THE BOARD LEFT TUCKED BEHIND THE KNEES TO ADD TO MY DISCOMFORT. I WAS THEN MADE TO RAISE MY HANDS AND THE GUARDS COMMENCED TO BEAT UPON ME. SOMETIMES JUST ONE, SOMETIMES ONE ON EACH SIDE, SOMETIMES ONE ON EACH SIDE AND ONE ON THE BACK AND SPINE AND REAR AND SCOMETIMES ONE ON EACH SIIE, ON THE BACK AND ONE ON THE FRONT. I WAS GIVEN HEAVY BARRAGES OF BLOWS FOR PERIODS OF 5 TO 10 MINUTES WITH INTERVALS OF 5 TO 10 MINUTES OF SPORATIC BLOWS IN WHICH THEY REPEATEDLY ASKED IF I SPOKE KOREAN. OF CCURSE I WAS CONTINUALLY FALLING OVER AND THE TWO-BY-FOUR CONTINYALLY FALLING OUT. EACH TIME THIS HAPPENED THEY JUST STOOD ME UP IMMEDIATELY AND BROUGHT ME TO THE CORRECT POSITION ACAIN BY SLAMMING THE BOARD INTO MY LEGS BEHIND THE KNEES. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS I BECAME SEMI-UNCCNSCIOUS, SO TO SPEAK, AND JUST COLLAPSED ON THE FLOOR. AT WHICH TIME THEY JUST KICKED AND BEAT ME WHILE I LAY THERE. ON FIVE OCCASIONS I CAN REMEMBER BEING PICKED UP BY MY SHIRT AND MY BODY AND HEAD JUST BEING BOUNCED ON THE FLOOR. AGAIN, ANOTHER TIME, I WAS JUST LAYING ON THE FLOOR A GUARD JUST OUTRIGHT STEPPED ON MY THROAT. AT THE TIME I HCKESILY THOUGHT I HAD TAKEN MY LAST BREATH. FINALIY, AFTER SEVERAL HOURS OF THIS CONTINUOUS SERIES OF BEATINGS AND QUESTIONING, I WAS TAKEN TO ANOTHER ROOM AND STAYED THERE FOR APPROX ONE HALF HOUR.

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STATEMENT OF: ROBERT JAMES HAMMOND, SSGT., USMC, 2046801 (CONT'D)

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WHILE THERE, I WAS MADE TO TAKE OFF MY FOOT WEAR AND MADE TO KNEEL DOWN, SITTING ON MY FEET DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD. A SINGLE GUARD WAS LEFT THERE WITH ME AND I WAS KICKED MAYBE 5 TIMES AT THE MOST. A RATHER STRANGE THING HAPPENED HERE. I WAS IN A TERRIBLY POOR CONDITION AS FAR AS BEAUTY AND PHYSICAL APPEARANCE GOES, AT THE TIME AND THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD OF REST, MANY KOREAN OFFICERS AND GUARDS AND EVEN SOME WOMEN CAME INTO THE ROOM ONE TIME OR ANOTHER; AS MANY AS TEN AT ONE TIME. THE ONLY THING THEY DID WAS TO JUST STAND THERE AND LOOK AT ME. THEY NEVER SAID A WORD OR SHOWED ANY EXPRESSION AT ALL ON THEIR FACES. TO CONTINUE, THE INTERPRETER CAME AND BROUGHT ME BACK TO THE ROOM I WAS IN PREVIOUSLY. IT WAS THE SAME QUESTION: "DO I SPEAK KOREAN", AND SAME ANSWER; SO WE REVERTED BACK TO THE SAME ROUTING. HOWEVER, MANY HOURS HAD PASSED AND THEY BECAME IMPATIENT AND EVEN MORE VIOLENT FROM THIS POINT ON (THE LAST HOUR AND A HALF TO 2 HOURS OR LESS) THE INTERPRETER GOT INTO THE ACTION AND GOT HIS LICKS. IT WAS DURING THIS TIME THAT I WAS PROPPED UP AGAINST THE WALL, SITTING ON THE FLOOR WITH MY FEET SPREAD APART, THAT THEY (INTERPRETER PLUS A GUARD) STOMPED ON AND AROUND MY CROTCH AREA. THE INTERPRETER GOT ME ON TWO OCCASIONS ON THIS AND THE GUARD ON ONE, MAYBE 3 OR 4 STOMPS EACH OCCASION.. ALSO WHILE SITTING IN A CHAIR, THE GUARD AND INTERPRETER ATTACKED ME ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION AT THE SAME TIME WITH JUDO OR KARATE CHOPS ABOUT THE HEAD AND SHOULDERS. I REMEMBER ON THIS OCCASION THAT MY NECK WAS PARALYZED FOR SEVERAL MINUTES AND MY RIGHT EYE BECAME COMPLETELY CLOSED AT THAT TIME. FINALLY THE BEATING ENDED WITH TWO GUARDS HOLDING ME UP AND THE INTERPRETER CLUBBING ME ON THE LOWER BACK SIDES OF MY LEGS WITH THE TWO-BY-FOUR. NEXT, I ADMITTED TO SPEAKING KOREAN. THE ONLY HARASSING DONE TO ME AFTER THAT WAS I GOT STRANGLER A LITTLE BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T

STATEMENT OF: SSGT ROBERT JAMES HAMMOND, USMC , 2046801 (CONT'D)

PAGE FOUR

BELIEVE I WAS SUCH A POOR KOREAN LINGUIST. ABOUT 3/4 OF THE WAY THROUGH THIS SIX HOUR BEATING I RECEIVED A BACK INJURY IN WHICH I WAS UNABLE TO GET UP FROM A SITTING OR LYING POSITION WITHOUT HELP FOR 4 TO 7 DAYS, BUT I WAS ABLE TO WALK ON MY OWN AND I MADE IT UP. ALSO NEAR THE END I HAD TO TAKE OFF MY TROUSERS SO AS TO AFFORD ME LESS PROTECTION ON MY LEGS. AFTER THE INITIAL SIX HOURS THE INTERROGATION WENT ON WITHOUT BREAK FOR A TOTAL OF 19 HOURS. DURING WHICH TIME I WROTE A BRIEF CONFESSION AND ANSWERED A LOT OF QUESTIONS.

THE NEXT DAY, FEBRUARY THREE, I WAS KICKED AT REVELLIE FOR NOT GETTING OUT OF BED FAST ENOUGH. I WAS TRYING TO GET UP AT THE TIME BUT WAS UNABLE TO AT THE TIME UNDER MY OWN EFFORTS. I ALSO TOOK 1 OR 2 OTHER MINOR KICKS FOR I DON'T KNOW WHAT DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, AND RECEIVED THE GUN TREATMENT AT INTERROGATIONS SEVERAL TIMES. THERE WAS ONE MORE INCIDENT NEAR THE END OF FEBRUARY 1968 WHICH DEVELOPED FROM A GUARD THAT HAD IT IN FOR ME PERSONALLY. HE ACCUSED ME OF TRYING TO MAKE CONTACT WITH LTJG SCHUMACHER WHILE CLEANING THE PASSAGEWAY. SO FOR ABOUT 1 HOUR TO 1 1/2 HOURS, I HAD TO STAND AND SQUAT IN THE ALCOVE WITH MY HANDS RAISED OVER MY HEAD, DURING WHICH TIME I RECEIVED ABOUT 100 BLOWS IN THE FACE, ARMS, CHEST AND STOMACH, AND SIDES FROM DIFFERENT GUARDS ON THE FLOOR INCLUDING A CHOW RELIEF, SEVERAL DUTY OFFICERS, THE ONE CALLED BLOKE IN BBC.

24 DEC 1968

7/85
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ON OR ABOUT FEB 1, 1968, DURING AN INTERROGATION I WAS HIT TWICE WITH SOMETHING THAT LOOKED LIKE A LEG TO A TABLE, IT WAS ABOUT THE SIZE OF A 2 BY 4. I WAS HIT IN THE LEFT SHOULDER AND CHEST BOTH TIMES - DURING THIS TIME I WAS BEING QUESTIONED ABOUT MY JOB ON BOARD THE PUEBLO.

Scene
WOMB WHERE IN MAY 1968 WHILE CLEANING THE *Dining* DINING ROOM, WHERE WE ATE, THE GUARD THAT WAS WATCHING US HIT ME WITH HIS FIST TWICE. HE HIT ME IN THE RIGHT TEMPLE AND THE RIGHT SIDE OF MY JAW.

ON OR ABOUT THE 26TH OF JAN 1968 DURING MY FIRST INTERROGATION THEY ASKED ME WHAT MY JOB WAS, WHEN I TOLD THEM THAT IT WAS CLEANING AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SHIP THEY TOLD ME I LIED AND THAT THEY WOULD SHOOT ME UNLESS I TOLD THEM THE TRUTH. THEY ASKED ME SEVERAL MORE TIMES AND I GAVE THEM THE SAME REPLY. THEY TOLD ME THAT THEY WERE GOING TO SHOOT ME AND ONE OF THE OFFICERS CAME OVER TO ME TOOK HIS GUN OUT AND HELD IT TO THE TEMPLE OF MY HEAD. THEY ASKED ME AGAIN AND I TOLD THEM THE SAME THING. THEY GOT VERY MAD BUT THE OFFICER PUT AWAY HIS GUN AND THEY CONTINUED THE INTERROGATION ALONG A DIFFERENT SUBJECT.

AFTER THE SHIP WAS BOARDED THEY TOOK US OUT TO THE WELL DECK OF THE SHIP AND BLIND-FOLDED US AFTER A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. WE WERE THEN TAKEN DOWN TO THE FORWARD CREWS COMPARTMENT AND REMAINED BLIND FOLDED UNTIL WE REACHED WONSONG. I WAS PUSHED UP THE LADDER, WHEN WE WERE BEING TAKEN OFF THE SHIP AND AT THE TOP I WAS SEARCHED. SINCE I AM AN XE ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN, I CARRY MY RINGS AND WATCH IN MY POCKET. WHILE BEING SEARCHED THEY RIPPED ALL THE POCKETS FROM MY DUNGAREES AND MY BELONGINGS FELL TO THE FLOOR AND WERE PICKED UP BY THE GUARD. ALL OF WHICH WERE RETURNED TO ME EXCEPT THE RING. I WAS PUSHED OUT THE HATCH AND HIT IN THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE FACE WHEN I REACHED THE WELL DECK. I WAS LED TO SOMETHING THAT SEEMED LIKE A PLANK LEAVING THE SHIP. I WAS THROWN OFF THE SHIP AND PICKED UP AND LED TO A BUS WHERE I WAS THROWN INTO A SEAT. DURING THIS WHOLE TIME I REMAINED BLIND FOLDED WITH MY HANDS BOUND TIGHTLY (VERY) IN FRONT OF ME. WHILE IN THE BUS I WAS SLAPPED AND HIT IN THE BACK OF THE HEAD BY WHAT SEEMED LIKE BOTH MEN AND WOMEN SEVERAL TIMES. WE WERE TAKEN TO A TRAIN AND FROM THAT TIME UNTIL MY FIRST INTERROGATION I WAS NOT HIT.

THE WHOLE CREW ED PROBABLY RECEIVED ABOUT THE SAME TREATMENT.

ON THE 4TH OF FEB 1968 SGT ROBERT HAMMOND, ~~WAS~~ WHO WAS ONE OF THE OTHER 3 MEN IN MY ROOM, WAS TAKEN FROM THE ROOM AND DID NOT RETURN UNTIL AROUND NOON THE NEXT DAY. ^{myself} ~~HE~~ AND THE OTHER TWO MEN LEFT THE ROOM AND HAMMOND HAD NOT RETURNED. WHEN WE CAME BACK THERE WAS SOMEONE STANDING BY THE WINDOW WHICH WAS COVERED SO THAT WE COULD NOT LOOK OUT. HE WAS BENT OVER TRYING TO BRUSH HIS TEETH. I DON'T KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO HIM FOR SURE BECAUSE KX I DIDN'T SEE HIM ALL THE TIME HE WAS GONE. ALL I CAN DO IS TRY TO DESCRIBE WHAT HE LOOKED LIKE WHEN I FIRST SAW HIM. AT FIRST WHEN I WALKED IN THE DOOR I COULDN'T RECOGNIZE HIM BECAUSE HIS FACE WAS ALL SWELLED OUT OF PROPORTION. HIS FACE CONSISTED OF ABOUT FIVE COLORS. BLACK, BLUE, YELLOW, RED AND SOME PATCHES OF WHITE. HIS EYES WERE SO SWOLLEN THAT HE COULD BARELY SEE OUT OF THEM. THE NEXT DAY WHEN HAMMOND WAS UNDRESSED I SAW THE REST OF HIS BODY AND HIS SIDES, BACK, UNDERSIDE OF ~~2~~ HIS ARMS AND PARTS OF HIS LEG WERE COMPLETELY RED. NOT RED LIKE AFTER A SLAP BUT RED LIKE BLOOD UNDERNEATH THE SKIN AND SWOLLEN TO TWICE ^{their} ~~THEIR~~ SIZE. I KNOW THAT HE WAS BEATEN BECAUSE LATTER ON DURING OUR DETENTION AT ONE OF OUR ROOM LECTURES BY A KOREAN OFFICER, THE KOREAN OFFICER EXPLAINED TO US WHY HE WAS BEATEN. BECAUSE HE WOULD NOT ADMIT TO BEING A KOREAN LINGUIST OR AS THE ~~REXX~~ OFFICER STATED BECAUSE HE LIED. I CAN'T RELATE OTHER THINGS THAT ~~KX~~ HAPPENED TO HIM BECAUSE I DIDN'T SEE IT HAPPEN. ALL I KNOW IS THEIR THREATS WERE NOT IDLE. FROM THE MIDDLE OF FEBRUARY 1968 UNTIL MAY 1968 THERE WERE ONLY MINOR INCIDENTS WHICH ~~DO NOT EXCEED THE REST OF THE INCIDENTS I WILL TRY TO SUM UP IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH.~~ I WILL TRY TO SUM UP IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH. IN MAY 1968 I WAS HIT WHICH I HAVE STATED DETAILS ALREADY - FROM THEN UNTIL THE 12TH OF DEC THERE WERE ONLY AGAIN MINOR INCIDENTS. ON OR ABOUT THE 7TH OF DEC 1968, WHILE WORKING AS A MESS COOK THAT MONTH, I WAS SETTING THE ~~&~~ DISHES IN THE DINNING ROOM, THE GUARD WHO WAS OUT IN THE HALL MUST HAVE CALLED MY NAME BUT I DIDN'T HEAR HIM. HE CAME STOMPING INTO THE DINNING ROOM YELLING AND SCREAMING AND HIT ME WITH HIS FIST ONCE IN THE RIGHT EAR.

ON THE 12TH OF DEC 1968 AFTER ASKING THE KOREAN DUTY OFFICER IF MYSELF AND ALEXANDER ¹ ~~1~~ COULD SMOKE IN THE DINNING ROOM A GUARD CAME IN WHILE WE WERE SMOKING AND YELL ^{ED} AT US FOR SMOKING. WHILE TRYING TO EXPLAIN THAT WE HAD ~~K~~ PERMISSION TO SMOKE, THE GUARD HIT ALEXANDER ONCE IN THE FACE KNOCKING HIS GLASSES OFF AND ONCE IN THE

STOMACH AND THEN PROCEEDED TO HIT ME TWICE IN THE FACE, ONCE IN THE RIGHT EYE AND ONCE IN THE LEFT SIDE OF MY LIP CAUSING BOTH TO SWELL AND MY EYE TURNED YELLOW. ON THE 14TH OF DECEMBER 1968 AFTER CLEANING THE MESS HALL AND THE ROOM WHERE WE DISHED OUT THE MEALS I RETURNED TO MY ROOM. AFTER CHANGING MY CLOTHES I RAISED MY HAND AND ASKED THE GUARD IF I COULD SIT DOWN. HE DIDN'T LIKE THE WAY I RAISED MY HAND AND CALLED ME OVER TO THE DOOR WHERE HE WAS STANDING. HE PROCEEDED TO HIT ME IN THE FACE FROM 4 - 6 TIMES. STOPPED , SAID SOMETHING, HIT ME IN THE STOMACH AND THEN SAID SOMETHING, HIT ME IN THE STOMACH AGAIN AND SAID SOMETHING, HIT ME IN THE STOMACH AGAIN AND THEN SAID SOMETHING. THEN HE TOOK A STEP BACK, KICKED ME IN THE LOWER ABDOMEN AND SAID SOMETHING AND THEN HE KICKED ME IN THE LOWER ABDOMEN AGAIN AND SAID SOMETHING THEN HE KICKED ME IN THE TESTICLES AND PENUS AND YELLED SOME MORE. THE ONLY REASON I BELIEVED HE STOPPED WAS BECAUSE HE HEARD THE RELIEF GUARD COMING AND WANTED ME IN MY SEAT BEFORE THEY CHANGED.

A FEW DAYS AFTER I WAS SITTING IN MY CHAIR - FIRST LET ME EXPLAIN THE PURGE AS WE CALL IT. I BELIEVE IT WAS THE 11TH OF DEC THAT WE HAD A TALK WITH THE GENERAL WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF US. HE TOLD US WE HAD COMMITTED HOSTILE ACTS AND PROVOCATIONS AGAINST THE NORTH KOREAN AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND THE ADMINISTRATION IN CHARGE OF US SINCE OUR DEPORTATION SUCH AS MAKING FUN OF GUARDSMEN , WRITING INTONATIONS INTO ~~CONFESSSION~~ CONFESSION TAPE RECORDINGS AND PRESS CONFRENCES, MAKING JOKES ABOUT THE PREMIER OF THE SO CALLED COUNTRY, ETC. AND SAID THAT WE WERE TO BE PUNISHED FOR THESE AND THAT WE SHOULD WRITE A CONFESSION AND CONFESS ALL THE THINGS WE HAVE DONE.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TALK WE WERE ALL PLACED SO THAT WE COULD NOT TALK TO EACH OTHER AND WERE TOLD TO WRITE OUR CONFESIONS. THIS LASTED UNTIL LATE THAT NIGHT. AS PUNISHMENT WE NOW HAD ^{12 MEN} ~~12~~ MEN TO A ROOM INSTEAD OF EIGHT, WE HAD NO PRIVACY WHAT SO EVER, THERE WAS A GUARD POSTED AT OUR OPEN DOOR, WE COULD NOT HOLD OUR HEADS UP BUT HAD TO KEEP THEM BENT AT ALL TIMES. WE COULD NOT LOOK AT EACH OTHER. ~~WE HAD TO~~ WE HAD TO, ASK THE GUARD AT THE DOOR FOR PERMISSION TO STAND UP, SMOKE, GET A DRINK OF WATER, ANYTHING WE DID WE HAD TO ASK THE GUARD FIRST, EVEN BLOW OUR NOSE.

^{EVEN} ~~EVERYTHING~~ DURING THE NIGHT WE SLEPT WITH THE LIGHT ON, THE GUARD AT THE DOOR AND YOU DID DARE MOVE MUCH IN YOUR SLEEP WITHOUT ASKING THE GUARDS PERMISSION FIRST. DURING THE DAY WE HAD TO SIT IN STRAIGHT BACK WOODEN CHAIRS WITH OUR HEADS BENT,

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HANDS ON LEGS AND FEET TOGETHER, WE DID THIS FROM THE TIME WE GOT UP TILL THE TIME WE WENT TO BED WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TAKING MEALS, GOING TO THE HEAD, ETC. AND THEN WE STILL COULD NOT TALK, HAD TO KEEP OUR HEADS BOWED AND ALWAYS ASK PERMISSION. I DID NOT HAVE IT AS BAD AS THE REST OF THE CREW BECAUSE I WAS WORKING SERVING MEALS AND WAS NOT IN THE ROOM MOST OF THE TIME BUT I STILL HAD HEAD BOWED, NO TALKING WITH THE CREW AND ASK PERMISSION TO SMOKE, ETC. THIS LASTED FOR TWO DAYS AFTER THE GENERAL'S TALK. THE NEXT MORNING HAMMOND WOKE ME UP BLOOD ALL OVER HIS RACK AND SLASH MARKES ON THE UNDERSIDE OF HIS WRIST. HE TOLD THEM THAT HE TRIED TO COMMIT SUICIDE. I NEVER BELIEVED THIS OF ME HAMMOND. HE HAS TAKEN MANY BEATINGS SINCE OUR CAPTURE AND HAS A VERY STRONG CHARACTER. IT IS MY OPINION THAT HE THOUGHT THAT HE COULD FRIGHTEN THE KOREANS AND EASE THE CONDITIONS THAT WE WERE UNDER BY CUTTING HIMSELF THAT WAY. AGAIN IT IS ONLY MY OPINION BUT I HAVE BEEN IN THE SAME ROOM WITH HIM SINCE OUR CAPTURE AND I FEEL THAT I KNOW HIM VERY WELL. HE HAS ALWAYS TRIED TO HELP US OUT WHEN HE COULD AND HAS NEVER BEEN TO AFRAID TO DO WHATEVER HAS BEEN NEEDED TO BE DONE. THIS DID SCARE THE KOREANS AND FROM THAT TIME ON WE COULD HOLD OUR HEADS UP IN THE ROOM AND WERE ALLOWED TO READ THEIR PROPAGANDA AND THE GUARDS WERE NOT QUITE AS ^{HARD} HARDED ON US BUT THE REST OF THE RESTRICTIONS WERE STILL IMPOSED. IT WAS DURING THIS TIME WHILE I WAS IN THE ROOM, SITTING AND READING, I HAD JUST PUT OUT A CIGARETTE AND SAT BACK DOWN BUT FORGOT TO PUT MY FEET BACK TOGETHER, THE GUARD CALLED ME OUT OF THE ROOM AND PROCEEDED TO JUMP UP AND DOWN ON MY FEET. HE THEN LET ME GO BACK TO MY CHAIR. IT WAS AGAIN DURING THIS PERIOD THAT ANOTHER GUARD, WHILE I WAS READING IN MY ROOM, ACCUSED ME OF HAVING MY EYES CLOSED. HE TOLD ME TO STAND UP ARMS OUT HORIZONTAL AND AS FAR BACK AS I COULD. I REMAINED IN THIS POSITION UNTIL IT WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO HOLD MY ARMS UP ANY LONGER. I THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD HIT ME BUT SURPRISINGLY HE LET ME SIT BACK DOWN AGAIN AND RESUME MY READING. FROM THE 15TH OF DEC UNTIL THE 18TH OF DEC WHENEVER WE MADE A MISTAKE WE WERE EITHER BEAT OR HAD TO ASSUME SOME SORT OF STRENUOUS POSITION UNTIL WE COULD NO LONGER HOLD IT.

DURING THE PURGE I WAS WORKING SERVING THE MEALS AND AT TIMES I SAW SOME OF THE MEN WHO WERE UNDERGOING INTERROGATION. THE ONES THAT LOOKED LIKE THEY HAD BEEN

CONTINUED STATEMENT BY: CT2 ANGELO S. STRANO, 915 41 50

BEATEN IN THE FACE WERE IREDALE AND BERENS. I HEARD SOME HELLASIOUS NOISES AND SCREAMS COMING FROM SOME OF THE ROOMS THAT WERE BEING USED FOR INTERROGATION BUT NEVER ACTUALLY SAW ANYTHING. ON THE 18TH I GUESS IT WAS THE GENERAL MUST HAVE FIGURED WE WERE GOING HOME BECAUSE EVERYTHING STARTED TO GO GOOD AND THE HUMANITARIAN BIT STARTED AGAIN.

THESE ARE THE THINGS THAT STAND OUT MOST IN MY MIND NOW BUT WE WERE ALWAYS THREATENED WITH DEATH, BEATINGS OR NEVER SEEING OUR FAMILIES. CONSTANT HARASSMENT AND PROPAGANDA SHOVED DOWN OUR THROAT AND THE GUARDS LIKE TO KICK LEGS AND STEP ON OUR FEET. What HUMANITARIAN TREATMENT (IF THATS WHATS ITS CALLED) WAS ONLY GIVEN TO US BECAUSE THE WORLD WAS WATCHING AND THEY WANTED TO IMPROVE THEIR IMAGE AND GET SOME PROXPAGANDA VALUE OUT OF IT. THEY HATE THE AMERICANS WITH A PASSION AND WOULD HAVE TREATED KUS A THOUSANDS TIMES WORSE IF THE PUEBLO INCIDENT HAD NOT BEEN SUCH A BIG THING.

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STATEMENT BY: DUNNIE R. TUCK, JR. OCEANOGRAPHER GS-11

24 DECEMBER 1968

1. ON THE DAY OF CAPTURE I RECEIVED A FEW KICKS AND SLAPS WHILE OFF-LOADING OFF THE SHIP IN WONSAN AND ONLY SPORATIC HITS WITH THE HAND WHILE ON THE BUS TO THE TRAIN IN WONSON AND DURING THE TRAIN TRIP TO PYONGYANG. (PERSONS UNKNOWN)

2. DURING MY SECOND INTERROGATION ON 27 JAN 68 I RECEIVED SEVERAL SLAPS IN THE FACE. (RANK OF MAJOR).

3. IN LATE FEB I RECEIVED A KICK ON THE RIGHT HAND BY A GUARD AND MINOR HITS DURING OUR LAST DAYS AT THE 1ST DETENTION BUILDING.

4. DURING THE FIRST OF APRIL PURGE, I RECEIVED SEVERAL KARATE CHOPS IN THE FACE AND ABDOMINAL REGION ON 1 APR 68. ON 2 APR 68, I INITIALLY HAD SEVERAL HITS IN THE FACE AND LATER THE SAME GUARD CAME INTO MY ROOM (OCCUPIED BY 8 MEMBERS) AND PROCEEDED TO PRACTICE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF KARATE ON MY BODY. THERE WERE NUMEROUS BLOWS TO THE HEAD AND STOMACH AND ONE POWERFUL KICK IN THE ABDOMINAL REGION. THESE HITS WERE ALL COMMITTED BY ONE 2-STRIPE GUARD.

5. ON 1 DEC 68 I RECEIVED A BLOW TO THE HEAD BY A RECRUIT (NO STRIPES). BETWEEN 1 APR AND 1 DEC THERE WERE MANY 1-STROKE DISCIPLINARY HITS, BUT NOTHING OF ANY CONSEQUENCE.

6. ON 11 DEC 68 THE FINAL PURGE PRODUCED PROBABLY THE WORSE BEATINGS FOR MOST OF THE CREW. BEFORE INTERROGATION I RECEIVED SEVERAL KICKS ON 13 DEC 68 BY A ONE-STRIPE GUARD. MY INTERROGATION STARTED ON 14 DEC 68 WHICH CONSISTED OF ONLY A FEW SLAPS THEN. HOWEVER, ON 15 DEC 68 I RECEIVED BEATINGS ON THE HEAD AND HAND BY SR. MAJOR OR JR. COL. WITH SEVERAL 1-INCH IN DIAMETER STICKS AND A 3-FOOT STAKE 1/2 x 2 INCHES. THIS BEATING LASTED ABOUT FIFTEEN TO TWENTY MINUTES. AFTER THIS EPISODE, THE BEATINGS

CONTINUED STATEMENT BY: DUNNIE R. TUCK, JR. OCEANOGRAPHER GS-11
STOPPED BY 18 DEC 68 AND I CANNOT RECALL RECEIVING ANY OTHER PHYSICAL
MISTREATMENT. THERE, OF COURSE, EXISTED MENTAL THREATS AND ANXIETY MOST
ALL THE TIME. DURING THE INITIAL INTERROGATIONS IN LATE JAN AND EARLY
FEB MY LIFE WAS THREATENED BY SHOOTINGS TO BEING BEATEN TO DEATH IF I DID
NOT COOPERATE. IN THE 1 APRIL PURGE THE LIFE OF ALL THE CREW MEMBERS
WERE THREATENED WITH SEVERE PUNISHMENT AND A FEW WERE THREATENED WITH
DEATH. IN THE LAST PURGE (11 DEC to 19 DEC) SEVERE PUNISHMENT WAS
PROMISED TO ALL AND I WAS THREATENED WITH DEATH BY FREEZING, SHOOTING AND
BEATING. ALL THE WHILE THERE WAS NO LET UP ON MENTAL ANXIETY BY STAFF
AND GUARD PERSONNEL WITH THE EXCEPT OF LATE OCTOBER AND EARLY NOVEMBER
WHEN WE WERE SUPPOSEDLY PARDONED FOR OUR "CRIMES".

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Saturday, December 28, 1968
10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

This status report of SIG deliberations on long-term policy towards South Korea is simply for information.

Pages 5-6 summarize key issues and staff work set in motion for the next Administration.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By , NARA, Date 3-5-98

WWRostow:rlh

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1968

16377

SECRET-SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Review of United States Policy
Toward Korea: Status Report

Last February, upon his return from Seoul, Mr. Vance recommended to you that we reassess our policy toward Korea. You asked me to take responsibility for this task. This assessment has been going forward under the direction and supervision of the Senior Interdepartmental Group.

As a result of the work, the issues are now well understood. A considerable amount of highly technical analysis--economic, military and political--remains to be completed but these studies, too, are now well under way. Thus, we should be able to present your successor with incisive, well-grounded policy options and with detailed program recommendations to carry out these options.

This memorandum is in the nature of an interim report--to tell you what we have accomplished to date and what remains to be done.

Importance of Korea

I need not dwell on the extent of our Korean involvement and its dangers. Our intelligence both as to intent and capability needs improvement, but it does seem clear that North Korea remains aggres-

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-103
By SJ, NARA Date 7-26-01

sively bent on swallowing the South. Over the past year Pyong Yang has significantly stepped up its provocative actions. South Korean patience is running thin. We are tied to South Korea's defense by treaty commitments and perhaps even more by history. Our military presence in Korea still numbers over 50,000. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(5)(b)

[REDACTED] Last year we provided some \$350 million in military and economic assistance (plus the special \$100 million military assistance appropriation you sought of the Congress).

We should be proud of our efforts in Korea. The Koreans have used our assistance well. Their economy is growing at near fantastic rates and the prospects for ultimate viability are excellent. Korean military forces are among the best in the world, as their 50,000 troops in Viet-Nam more than attest.

Our Objectives in Korea

Our objectives in Korea are:

- To keep South Korea out of hostile hands;
- To reduce the probability of large-scale North-South hostilities;
- To maintain a stable compromise among the great powers with interests in Korea;
- To increase ROK ability to defend itself;
- To promote South Korean economic and political development;
- To encourage a greater Japanese contribution to ROK security and prosperity.

Some Tentative Conclusions

The conclusion which I and the other members of the SIG draw from this record is this:

There must be no question about the strength and importance of our commitment to the security of South Korea in the face of an aggressive adversary. But, as time goes by, it is appropriate to reconsider the question of whether our present posture decided many years ago is still an optimal one for meeting our commitment.

The answer could well turn out to be that it is. But the SIG believes that there is here a real and pressing question of national policy and strategy which will bear further examination by the next Administration.

-- The Republic of Korea (ROK) has made great progress in all areas. Increasingly, she has the strength--and should be encouraged--to stand on her own two feet.

-- Our knowledge about North Korean military capabilities is limited and may not be altogether reliable. This raises questions about what the military balance--with and without United States forces--actually is and how, if necessary, it should be improved.

-- Our present policy effectively ties down in Korea two United States divisions, which are not available for use elsewhere. They require substantial expenditures for support both in Korea and the United States.

-- Our present posture leaves us little choice as to whether and how to become involved on the ground in the event large-scale hostilities reoccur on the Peninsula.

Whether or not we consciously change our strategy, the United States will face important decisions in Korea over the next few years. Sooner or later, the ROK divisions in Viet-Nam will return home. We will have to make choices on the kinds of force structures--both ROK and U.S.--we should maintain. The prospects for the Korean MAP--so essential to our defense policy toward Korea--are uncertain and we need to consider whether to try to transfer this program completely to the Defense Department budget. Some of our policy options require considerable lead time (e.g. MAP), and the new Administration will have to act soon if the United States wants to maintain these options.

Uncertainties

There are a number of uncertainties which hinder reaching definitive conclusions on any changes in policy:

-- First, as already indicated, our limited intelligence makes it difficult to estimate the precise nature of the threat to South Korea.

-- Second, there is the even greater difficulty of determining the likely effect on North Korean, USSR, and Communist Chinese attitudes, intentions, and policies, of any change in our military posture.

-- Third, the outcome in Viet-Nam may affect the general climate in East Asia including Korea.

-- Fourth, the 1971 Korean Presidential election raises serious questions about the continuation of political stability in Korea.

-- Fifth, our position in Japan or Okinawa-- now essential to Korea's defense--could well be eroded in coming years.

Some Key Issues

The critical problem to resolve is whether it is possible to substitute improved Korean combat forces in whole or in part for our forces now in Korea and still maintain a combined ROK-U.S. strength adequate to provide deterrence and, if necessary, deal with the likely military threats. This question in turn raises a host of subsidiary questions.

-- Is the United States combat presence, 15 years after the Korean War, an irreplaceable element of deterrence against North Korean attack?

-- If our forces are reduced or withdrawn, will we be politically able in the United States to reintroduce them should hostilities again break out?

-- How much of a South Korean defense is needed to replace United States forces and what will it cost? What kind of United States force capabilities would we want to keep in readiness against certain major military contingencies such as a combined Chicom-North Korean attack?

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(5)(6)

-- Is it feasible to reduce the margin of uncertainty about North Korean military capabilities by a stepped-up intelligence effort?

-- What would be the effect of a United States troop withdrawal from Korea on our position in Asia?

In addition, there are several subsidiary questions:

-- To what extent is a "trade-off" between US and ROK forces compatible with our objectives for Korean political stability and development?

-- Similarly, what share of the cost of its own military needs can we ask the ROK to assume without impairing her now very favorable economic prospects?

-- And, finally, how can we obtain the necessary funds to assist the ROK in a multi-year program for the improvement of her forces?

Remaining Efforts

I have listed only some of the more fundamental problems involved in any policy change. They are not easy to resolve. To deal with them in an orderly manner we need a more detailed look at these and similar problems. The SIG has commissioned an inter-agency group to assess them and to determine, as precisely as the subject allows, the technical and political feasibility, requirements, costs, advantages and disadvantages, of various policy options in Korea.

The end-product of our whole review effort will be alternative five-year programs for ROK and United States forces and for United States economic and military assistance programs which can serve as the basis for decision-making by the new Administration.

SECRET-SENSITIVE

- 7 -

Parenthetically, I am hopeful that the inter-agency study effort will also shed light on how to improve our whole approach to integrated country planning and programming in areas where security, economic, and political considerations so greatly overlap.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence concur in this memorandum.



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

SECRET-SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Free file

Saturday, December 28, 1968
9:05 a. m.

Mr. President:

The form in which the Soviet hot-line technicians sent their Christmas greeting will interest you.

Our people suggest no publicity.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By , NARA, Date 3-5-98

WWRostow:rlh



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

28a

27 December 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Recent Exchanges on the Washington -
Moscow Emergency Communications Link

1. Exchanges between Soviet and US "Hot Line" personnel have always been most cordial, however, a high point was reached during this Christmas season.

2. At 250530Z Dec, the Soviet translator-communications personnel started their customary circuit test with the standard test material noted on the top of the enclosure.

3. Immediately following this test material, the printer skipped several lines and began printing: HAPPY, MERRY, CHRISTMAS. - This part of the message, as noted on the enclosure, was especially prepared to spell out these three words with an artistic effect.

4. In the judgment of experienced MOLINK officers, the Christmas greeting received was from the translator-communications personnel who regularly work at the Moscow end of the Washington-Moscow circuit. It was also deduced that no official Soviet position on the religious implication of the Christmas season was involved.

5. It is recommended that this information be closely held, as it was also assumed that high level clearance was not obtained by the Soviet "Hot-Line" personnel before transmitting this message.

6. The reference to Apollo-8 (near the bottom of the enclosure) indicates the type of information on this space shot that has been exchanged during the past few days. Instructions had been given to NMCC-MOLINK personnel to transmit Apollo information only within the following guidelines:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD Declass
By 8 NARA, Date 3-5-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a. Only when confirmed by more than one news source. Example: NBC-TV and CBS-TV.


b. Keep remarks general, avoiding specific or technical language.

c. Do not draw conclusions or interpret facts or data.

d. Do not pass on any unfavorable information concerning the Apollo mission.

7. In accordance with instructions received from General Meyer this date, no additional information will be transmitted on Apollo-8. If queried by the Moscow operator, the reply should be approximately as follows, "We have nothing new, having been so busy here." If congratulations are received after splash-down, a warm thank you should be given as was done for the Christmas greeting, but that is all.

8. General Meyer was again briefed on the type of literature being used for test messages and reiterated his approval of these practices. All other traffic between Washington and Moscow must be submitted for approval before transmittal.



W. M. VANDEBOGART
Colonel, USAF
Acting Deputy Director for NMCS
Operations Directorate

Distribution:

CJCS
DJS
State Situation Room
White House Situation Room
J-30
J-31
J-32
DDOs/NMCC
MOLINK/NMCC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

06 TST

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USA/СССР USA/USSR
250530R DECEMBER 1968

286

ЗДЕСЬ КОНТРОЛЬНАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

PRESERVATION COPY

THIS IS A TEST MESSAGE

ПРОШУ ЖДАТЬ, НАБЛЮДАЙТЕ ИСКАЖЕНИЯМИ, РЫЧАГ=ЭХВ-ЗАЩИТА+
ЦИФРЫ 123456789 ТЧК. МСК. +

"PLEASE WAIT, OBSERVE INTERFERENCE, LEVER EQUALS EKHV DASH
PROTECTION PLUS CIPHERS 123456789 PERIOD." MOSCOW +

(THE ABOVE IS THE SOVIET EQUIVALENT TO THE "QUICK BROWN FOX"
TEST USED BY THE USA. THE OBJECT IS TO USE ALL CHARACTERS
ON THE KEYBOARD)

[Faded teletype text consisting of a grid of small characters]

[Faded teletype text consisting of a grid of small characters]

FROM USA: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, IT WAS VERY KIND OF YOU TO REMEMBER AND
WE ARE IMPRESSED WITH YOUR TECHNIQUE. +

ВСЕГДА ПОВАЛУЖСТА+

YOU'RE ALWAYS WELCOME+

FROM USA: APOLLO-8 IS ON THE WAY HOME. +

МЫ ОТ ВСЕЙ ДУШИ ЖЕЛАЕМ ВАШИМ КОСМОНАВТАМ СКОРЕЙШЕГО И БЛАГО-
ПОЛУЧНОГО ВОЗВРАЩЕНИЯ НА ЗЕМЛЮ И ПОЗДРАВЛЯЕМ ВАС С РОЖДЕСТВОМ+

WITH ALL OUR HEART WE WISH YOUR ASTRONAUTS THE QUICKEST AND A SUCCESSFUL
RETURN TO EARTH AND WE SEND CHRISTMAS GREETINGS. +

ВСЕГО ВАМ ХОРОШЕГО+
ALL THE BEST TO YOU+

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD Guidelines
By S NARA, Date 3-5-98

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

29

ACTION
Friday, December 27, 1968
6:30pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to You from Prince Sihanouk and Proposed Reply

At Tab A is a letter from Prince Sihanouk dated December 20th, replying to your message requesting release of the eleven soldiers detained with the LCU 1577 and the helicopter crewman also detained in Cambodia. The letter was passed through the French Embassy. In it Prince Sihanouk says that he had announced his decision to release these men a few hours before your message reached him. He also states that he shares your hope for a solution to the problems which have troubled our relations.

At Tab B is a suggested reply expressing your pleasure at the release of the American soldiers in time to spend Christmas with their families and your thanks for the good treatment of the men, including excellent medical care accorded the wounded man.

I recommend that you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

cc: Marshall Wright

AJenkins:mm

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

29a

Unofficial Translation

Phnom Penh, December 20, 1968

Mr. President,

May I thank you for the personal message I received today through the French Government. Like you, I hope for a solution to the problems which have troubled our relations. That is why my Government gave to Mr. Black, your special adviser who visited us some months ago, all assessments concerning the delicate situation of Cambodia surrounded by belligerent neighbors.

A few hours before your message reached me, I had announced my decision to release immediately the crew of the LCU 1577 arrested when it was in our territorial waters, as well as a South Vietnamese soldier who was on board. I wanted these servicemen who had behaved themselves very well to be able to celebrate Christmas at home.

In response to your appeal, I have also ordered the release of a wounded soldier who had jumped from a helicopter shot down by our anti-aircraft guns. He has been given the best medical care.

I sincerely wish that these gestures of good will will help your compatriots to understand that Cambodia wants nothing more than to live in peace and on good terms with all in honor, dignity, and territorial integrity within its present frontiers.

With my best wishes for you and yours in these holidays of the end of the year.

Norodom Sihanouk

Your Royal Highness:

I was delighted to learn of Your Royal Highness' decision to release the American soldiers. Those from the LCU 1577 are now at their homes, celebrating Christmas with their families and I am sure that the family of the wounded helicopter crewman is rejoicing to know that he is free and will be reunited with them as soon as he is able to travel.

I and my Government are grateful to Your Royal Highness and to your Government for the excellent medical care accorded this wounded man, as well as for the good treatment of the men from the LCU 1577.

My family joins me in reciprocating Your Royal Highness' kind wishes at this holiday season.

Sincerely,

**His Royal Highness
Prince Norodom Sihanouk
Phnom Penh, Cambodia**

INFORMATION

Pres file

Friday, December 27, 1968
12:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a message from the
Prime Minister on the Apollo 8.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

30a

RECEIVED
NSCA

1968 DEC 27 16 51

T 322/63

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THE APOLLO 8 MISSION. THIS VOYAGE IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE EXPANSION OF MANKINDS KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSE AND, BECAUSE WE HAVE ALL BEEN ABLE TO FOLLOW IT ON TELEVISION, IT HAS ADDED A NEW DIMENSION TO OUR APPRECIATION THAT THIS IS INDEED ONE WORLD. PLEASE CONVEY MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS TO THE CREW OF APOLLO 8, WHOSE GREAT COURAGE AND SKILL WE HAVE ALL ADMIRER, AND TO ALL WHO HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THIS HISTORIC ACHIEVEMENT.

DECEMBER 27, 1968.

MESSAGE ENDS.

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, December 27, 1968 - 9:55 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach requests a Presidential waiver determination to permit continuation of the small grant assistance program to Indonesia in Fiscal 1969.

If you approve, your signature is needed on the determination.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/53, State Dept. Call Files
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 3-5-98

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

December 26, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Waiver Determination to Permit Continuation of the Grant Military Assistance Program to Indonesia in FY 1969

The attached Memorandum recommends your favorable determination and waiver of that part of the Foreign Assistance Act which requires that grant aid of defense articles in excess of \$3 million in any fiscal year must be used "to maintain the defensive strength of the Free World." You made a similar determination in 1967.

Your determination will permit implementation of our program totaling \$5.5 million of grant military assistance to Indonesia in FY 1969, of which about \$4.0 million is for defense articles, primarily transport and engineering materiel in support of civic action programs of the Indonesian armed forces.

The Congress was informed during our FY 1969 Military Assistance Program justifications of the proposed grant assistance in support of Indonesia's civic action program. The Conte-Long Amendments and the penalty provisions of the Symington Amendment have been determined not to apply.

Mable Lee Kibbey
Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4 - Downgraded at 3 year intervals; declassified after 12 years.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 3-5-98



16447

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 26, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Determination and Authorization under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, Permitting the Furnishing of Defense Articles to Indonesia on a Grant Basis in FY 1969

We propose to furnish about \$4.0 million in defense articles to Indonesia during FY 1969 as part of a \$5.5 million grant military assistance program of training and support for civic action by the Indonesian Armed Forces.

Discussion

Indonesia has continued to move toward economic and political stability during the past year and the government has made significant sacrifices to pursue a program of rational economic stabilization and development. The portion of the national budget devoted to the Armed Forces has been markedly trimmed, but due to the inability of the economy to absorb any major influx of veterans, no large-scale demobilization of troops is politically feasible at present.

The Indonesian Armed Forces have launched an ambitious program of civic action projects, which have the valuable benefits of bringing the Army closer to the people, stimulating economic rehabilitation, and usefully utilizing the energies of the relatively unemployed troops. Our Military Assistance Agreement, signed in 1967, is unique

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GROUP 4 - Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
declassified after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Group 4
By mp NARA, Date 3-16-98

in that it is specifically limited to a program of training and materiel assistance to the Civic Action programs of the Indonesian Armed Forces. No combat materiel is included and the defense articles to be supplied in FY 1969 are primarily transportation and engineering equipment.

The United States is cooperating in a major multilateral program of foreign economic assistance to support Indonesia's own efforts to create a stable and developing society which will satisfy the legitimate aspirations of its people and contribute significantly to the stability of the region as a whole. Our Military Assistance Program is very small in comparison to our economic assistance program in Indonesia, but it is a vital and influential component of our overall effort.

Although our military assistance is less than \$6 million annually in FY's 1968 and 1969, the program has been of major political significance in directing the focus of the armed forces toward constructive economic rehabilitation work, and in continuing the input of American ideas and pragmatism into the military which paid off such striking dividends as a result of our training assistance in the 1950's.

Indonesia is not aligned with the United States through any mutual defense agreements, but has resumed an unaligned, "free and active" foreign policy following its virtual alignment with Asian Communism in the latter Sukarno years. Indonesia has actively strengthened ties with neighboring states and with the major nations of the Free World in the past three years. Today, our bilateral relationships are extremely cooperative and probably the closest ever. For all these reasons we believe that the assistance proposed for Indonesia for FY 1969 is important to the security of the United States.

Legal Aspects

Section 505(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, limits the provision of grant defense articles

to any one country to \$3 million per fiscal year unless the President determines that the recipient country meets certain requirements.

In Presidential Determination 68-2 of July 12, 1967 you determined that Indonesia met all the requirements of Section 505(b) except for the second clause of 505(b)(2), which states that the defense articles in question will be used to maintain the defensive strength of the Free World. This Determination remains effective until modified.

In Determination 68-2 you also waived the requirement of the second clause of Section 505(b)(2) pursuant to Section 614(a). The latter section authorizes you to make such a waiver if you determine it is important to the security of the United States to do so. In order to furnish defense articles to Indonesia in excess of \$3 million again in FY 1969, another waiver for this fiscal year is required.

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that you make the necessary determination and authorization, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, to permit defense articles in excess of \$3 million to be included in the grant military assistance program for Indonesia in FY 1969. This program was fully described to the Congress during our justifications of the proposed FY 1969 Military Assistance Program.


Under Secretary

31c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Determination and Authorization under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, Permitting the Furnishing of Defense Articles in Excess of \$3 Million to Indonesia in FY 1969

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of December 26, 1968, I hereby:

(a) Determine, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act, that authorization of the use of up to \$4 million of funds available for military assistance for the grant of defense articles to Indonesia during FY 1969 without regard to the requirement of the second clause of Section 505(b)(2) of the Act is important to the security of the United States; and

(b) Authorize, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act, such use of up to \$4 million for the grant of defense articles to Indonesia without regard to the requirement of the second clause of Section 505(b)(2) of the Act.

You are requested on my behalf to report this determination to the Senate and House of Representatives within thirty days.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By MP, NARA, Date 3-17-98

ACTION

Pres file

SECRET

Friday, December 27, 1968 -- 8:55 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach recommends an add on of \$5.6 million for fiscal 1969 grant military assistance for the Republic of China.

This is against the background of rapidly descending levels of grant military assistance to the GRC as follows:

FY 1967	\$91.1 million
FY 1968	59.8 million
FY 1969	30.4 million

\$30.4 million has proved just too low to meet what we judge to be our own security interests in Chinese Nationalist armed forces.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 NSC Memo, 12/27/68, State Dept. Cold War
 By *h*, NARA, Date *3-6-98*

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

16448

December 26, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Determination to Authorize \$5.6
Million Add-on to FY69 Grant MAP
for China

The attached formal memorandum recommends that you determine that it is essential to the national interest to include an add-on of \$5.6 million to the FY69 grant MAP of \$30.4 million for the Government of the Republic of China (GRC). The add-on to the original grant justified to the Congress is needed to finance operational and maintenance items required to prevent deterioration of the operational effectiveness of GRC forces. A major portion of the FY69 grant MAP has already been allocated to these items. The GRC has indicated it will not be able to finance out of its own budgetary resources in FY69 the remaining items deemed essential by the Department of Defense.

Certain Members of Congress have strongly recommended a substantial increase in FY69 grant MAP for the Republic of China. No consultations regarding the proposal to increase the total by \$5.6 million have been undertaken, but given the interest of certain Congressmen, including Congressman Passman, and the ROC's importance to our security interest in Asia, we do not anticipate difficulties with the Congress.

Nicholas S. Kipich
Under Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By L, NARA, Date 3/6/98

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1968

16448

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Increase of \$5.6 Million for FY69
Grant MAP to China (GRC)

We propose an increase of \$5.6 million for the FY69 grant military assistance country program for the GRC beyond the amount of \$30.4 million, which was justified to the Congress. We recommend that you make a determination under Title I of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1969 that the add-on is essential to the U. S. national interest. The Department of Defense concurs.

Merits of the Proposed Increase

~~Rapidly descending levels of grant military assistance given the GRC since FY69 have brought the FY69 total down to \$30.4 million; about half of the FY68 program (\$59.8 million) and one-third of the FY67 program (\$91.1 million).~~ These heavy cuts, partly the result of reduced MAP appropriations and partly the result of economic growth having made it feasible for the Republic of China to assume a greater share of its defense costs, have been partially offset by increases in Foreign Military Sales credits. To avoid serious deterioration in the operational effectiveness of the GRC armed forces, we have allocated the maximum possible portion of FY69 grant military assistance to operational and maintenance (O&M) items to insure adequate levels of essential spare parts and services. Even so, the GRC has indicated

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By lj, NARA, Date 3-6-88

~~SECRET~~

-2-

that it will not be able to provide the remaining essential O&M items out of its own budgetary resources in FY69. We therefore propose the inclusion of the \$5.6 million add-on, and that this amount in its entirety be devoted to O&M items.

U.S. Interests


To the extent that the present operational effectiveness of GRC armed forces -- particularly air and naval forces -- deteriorates, U.S. forces may have to be committed at an earlier time and at a lower level of hostilities in the event of a serious Chinese Communist attack in order to meet our defense commitment under our 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China.

Legal Aspects

The third proviso of the Preamble applicable to military assistance contained in Title I of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1969 provides that the military assistance program for any country will not be increased beyond the amount justified to the Congress, unless the President determines that an increase is "essential to the national interest of the United States," and reports each such determination to the House of Representatives and the Senate within thirty days after each such determination.

Recommendation

I recommend that you make the necessary determination under the specified proviso of Title I of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1969 to include the add-on of \$5.6 million for FY69 grant military assistance for the GRC. If your determination is favorable, we will so report to the Congress within thirty days as required by the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1969.


Nicholas de B. Katzenbach
Under Secretary of State

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Determination under Title I of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1969, Authorizing an Increase of \$5.6 Million to the FY69 Military Assistance Program for China

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of December 26, 1968, I hereby determine, pursuant to the third proviso of the Preamble applicable to military assistance contained in Title I of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1969 that the increase of \$5.6 million to the FY69 grant military assistance program for the Republic of China is essential to the national interest of the United States.

You are requested, on my behalf, to give notice of this action to the Senate and to the House of Representatives within thirty days.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ML NARA, Date 3-17-98

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 26, 1968

7:15pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Military Assistance
Program Grants

In the attached, Messrs. Zwick and Katzenbach recommend you approve a Presidential determination to allow the continuation through 1969 of military grant aid to China, Korea, Turkey, Iran, and Greece.

Background

This decision arises out of the new provision in the Conte amendment in the foreign aid legislation. Last year's amendment was aimed primarily at the problem of purchases of sophisticated weapons by poor countries. It provided that we deduct from foreign aid the amount spent by a poor country on sophisticated weapons unless there was a Presidential determination that the acquisition of the weapons was "vital" to our national security. The amendment specifically exempted the five countries above, plus Israel and the Philippines. In effect, this meant that our military grant programs in these countries were not subject to the law.

This year Conte et al wiped out the exemptions across the board. But, to make the amendment manageable, they wrote more lenient language for the Presidential determination -- that the acquisition of sophisticated weapons be "important" to U. S. security.

A determination for these five countries is largely routine. The Congress has been consulted on the continuation of our existing grant programs. There is an obvious military case for China and Korea. We have one more year to run in a 5-year commitment to the Shah. And Turkey and Greece (despite the colonels) are NATO members in good standing at a time when the Soviets are rattling sabers in the Mediterranean.

My own view is that Nick and Charlie are right that Congress will readily buy the determination. On balance, we should maintain justifiable MAP programs. In the Greek case, this means that we have a clear field to go ahead with F-104's, medium tanks, artillery and helicopters when and if you or your successor decide to resume arms shipment to the junta. My only reservations are in terms of the options that will be left to your successor.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 02-171

By abm, NARA, Date 6-10-04~~SECRET~~

There is no real issue among reasonable men on ongoing military aid to China, Korea, Turkey, and, because of prior agreements, one more year to Iran. However, as you know, the military coup in Greece creates a special problem.

Making this determination now may remove one small tactical device from your successor's hands. However, we feel that small loss is far outweighed by the problems you would create for him by taking Greece out of this determination for the five forward defense countries and leaving him to sign a separate determination for Greece alone. This determination says it is important to the security of the U. S. to have a military aid relationship with Greece, and that is true. Greece is a NATO ally and our communications facilities there are very important to the Sixth Fleet. The political question of suspending or resuming the flow of arms -- in contrast to the basic strategic reasons for authorizing an aid program -- is a policy judgment which the President can make apart from this determination. We believe it would be harder for the President to act on whatever his judgment might be if he had the extra hurdle of a special determination to get over.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we will need
your signature on the deter-
mination (Tab B) _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF:RM:lw

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

December 7, 1968

33a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Determination to Authorize the Provision of
Sophisticated Weapons Systems to Korea, China,
Greece, Turkey, and Iran

Under Secretary Katzenbach recommends you sign the attached document (Tab B) which determines that it is important to the security of the United States to furnish sophisticated weapons systems to Korea, China, Greece, Turkey, and Iran under the Fiscal Year 1969 grant Military Assistance Program. This determination is required by the Conte Amendment prohibition in the Foreign Assistance Act and the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act against supplying sophisticated weapons to underdeveloped countries. This determination is necessary to permit the orderly execution of the grant Military Assistance Program in these five forward defense countries.

Mr. Katzenbach's formal memorandum provides a list of the equipment involved in the determination (Tab A). These or comparable weapons have been included in the grant Military Assistance Program justified before the Congress.

This determination relates only to grant military assistance; it does not cover purchases of sophisticated weapons by these countries.

Mr. Katzenbach notes that the requested determination for Greece does not in and of itself, alter the arms delivery suspension policy now in effect.

I recommend you approve the determination as requested by State and Defense Departments.

Charles F. Zwick

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-17a
By js, NARA, Date 8-25-03

Attachments

~~SECRET~~



15261

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

November 25, 1968

1-7 med
2-Kit. 336

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Determination to Authorize the Provision of Sophisticated Weapons Systems to Korea, China, Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

The attached formal memorandum recommends that you determine that it is important to the security of the United States to furnish sophisticated weapons systems to Korea, China, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. These countries were formerly exempt from the Conte-Long amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1968, which prohibited furnishing sophisticated weapons systems to less developed countries unless the President determined that furnishing such assistance was vital to the security of the United States. These five countries, plus Israel and the Philippines, continue to be expressly exempt from the Conte amendment to the new Foreign Military Sales Act.

Because our military assistance to these five Forward Defense countries is widely recognized to be important to the security of the United States, we anticipate no Congressional difficulties. There may, however, be some adverse comment on the Greek program.

Of the major items programmed for Greece in Fiscal Year 1969 (see list of weapons attached to formal memorandum), only the 22 F-102 Fighters and 4 F-104 Fighters were released for delivery in the partial resumption of deliveries authorized in October. All other items will remain under suspension until such time as a further release is authorized and the appropriate Members of Congress have been consulted. Thus,


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-172
By *iso*, NARA, Date 8-25-03

~~SECRET~~

-2-

this Determination releases no additional items; it merely authorizes their inclusion in the program with reference to the Conte amendments. When this Determination is sent to the Congress, we will inform appropriate Members that it does not authorize delivery of any additional items beyond those released in October.

Our request for your determination does not include Israel or the Philippines; we have no grant program in Israel and our Philippine program does not include sophisticated weapons.


Nicholas de B. Katzenbach
Under Secretary of State

Enclosure:

Formal Memorandum.

~~SECRET~~



15261

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

33c

November 25, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Determination to Authorize the Provision of Sophisticated Weapons Systems to Korea, China, Greece, Turkey, and Iran.

Recommendations:

I recommend that you make the necessary determination under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1969 to authorize the provision of sophisticated weapons systems as grant military assistance to Korea, China, Greece, Turkey, and Iran in Fiscal Year 1969. The Department of Defense concurs in this recommendation.

Discussion:

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1969 (the "Acts") forbid the furnishing of sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile systems and jet aircraft for military purposes, to any underdeveloped country, unless the President determines that the furnishing of such weapons is important to the security of the United States. The Acts eliminated the exemption formerly specified for Korea, China, Greece, Iran, Israel, the Philippines, and Turkey in the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1968.

We have reviewed the threat to Forward Defense countries, Korea, China, Greece, Turkey, and Iran. These countries face external threats from nations possessing weapons systems of

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-172
By iss, NARA, Date 8-25-03

~~SECRET~~

-2-

at least comparable sophistication to those proposed to be provided under our grant Military Assistance Program. As the military capabilities of these countries support United States strategic objectives, the provision of sophisticated weapons is important to the security of the United States. Their grant needs and the purposes of our military assistance to them have been presented to Congress and form the basis for my recommendation.

I have enclosed a classified list of the weapons which have been proposed, but not necessarily approved for delivery, for these countries. The weapons systems in this list have not all been determined to be "sophisticated weapons systems" within the meaning of the Conte amendments, but as some of them may be, this Determination is necessary to permit orderly execution of these programs.

This Determination for a group of five Forward Defense countries is presented to you at this time because of their collective importance to our Forward Defense posture and the need to continue our military assistance programs to them without interruption. Determinations for other grant aid recipients who may receive sophisticated weapons will be recommended to you on an individual basis as the need arises.


This Determination does not cover purchases of sophisticated weapons by these five countries from any country, including the United States; purchases will have to be considered separately from the question of our grant assistance.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

The proposed Determination, which I recommend that you sign, is enclosed.



Nicholas de B. Katzenbach
Under Secretary of State

Enclosures:

- Tab A - Classified List of Weapons
- Tab B - Proposed Determination

~~SECRET~~

33d

~~SECRET~~

FY 69 MAP MAJOR PROGRAMMED ITEMS
FORWARD DEFENSE COUNTRIES

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>COST</u> (\$ THOUSANDS)
Greece: Total Grant MAP			37,000
	F-102 Fighters*	20	2,182
	TF-102 Fighters*	2	218
	F-104G-S Fighters	3	3,665
	F-104G-D Fighters	1	1,260
	Medium Tanks	92	2,738
	Self-Propelled Artillery	7	667
	UH-1 Helicopters	12	<u>3,011</u>
	TOTAL		13,741
China: Total Grant MAP			36,000**
	T-33 Trainers	2	excess
	Light Tanks	106	(no cost to MAP)
Iran: Total Grant MAP			23,800
	F-5 Fighters	11	9,282
	Sidewinders	338	<u>809</u>
	TOTAL		10,191
Korea: Total Grant MAP			139,000
	F-5 Fighters	10	8,360
	Sidewinders	20	***
	HAWK Missiles	2	89
	UH-1 Helicopters	3	<u>753</u>
			9,222

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-172
By , NARA, Date 8-25-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>COST</u> (\$ Thousands)
Turkey: Total Grant MAP			97,500
	TF-102 Fighters	2	218
	F-102 Fighters	20	2,182
	Destroyer Escort	1	4,500
	Medium Tanks	300	(cost sharing) excess (no cost to MAP)
	Self-Propelled Artillery	98	3,030
	UH-1 Helicopters	15	3,763
			<u>13,693</u>

* To be financed with prior year MAP funds.

** Pending your approval to increase the program
from the \$30 million justified to Congress.

*** Less than \$50,000.

~~SECRET~~

33-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Determination Under Section 504(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and Title I of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1969, Authorizing the Furnishing of Sophisticated Weapons Systems to Korea, China, Greece, Turkey and Iran as Important to the Security of the United States.

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of November 25, 1968, I hereby determine, pursuant to Section 504(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and Title I of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1969, that the furnishing to the Governments of China, Greece, Iran, Korea, and Turkey of sophisticated weapons systems in Fiscal Year 1969 under the Military Assistance Program is important to the national security of the United States.

You are requested, on my behalf, to give notice of this action to the Senate and to the House of Representatives within thirty days.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-172
By us, NARA, Date 8-25-03

ACTION~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

Thursday, December 26, 1968

6:30pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Tex Goldschmidt

*to sup
a. Pres file*

Tex has written you directly (attached) of his belief that you should take extraordinary steps to avoid cutting our contribution to the U. N. Development Program (UNDP) this year from \$75 million to \$70 million. Bill Gaud, with Nick Katzenbach's agreement, made the cut when he apportioned the Congressional cuts. The UNDP took a small cut relative to others, but Tex believes it is important to your record not to go down in history as the President who began a downward trend in our aid through this multilateral channel.

Tex suggests that you authorize a transfer of \$5 million from other AID accounts. He assumes that there will be leftovers here and there by the end of the year and that Gaud could commit himself now. If that is impossible, his compromise would be to turn \$37.5 million over to the UNDP now, as a six-month payment at the past annual rate and say that our pledge for the whole year is \$70 million but we'll try to find a little extra money at the end of the year to climb back to \$75 million.

Charlie Zwick is opposed to any action at this time which would tend to lock in the new Administration or to pass along to it a disproportionate share of the FY '69 cutback problem.

On the question of committing the full \$75 million now, Charlie believes this would deprive the new Administration of flexibility later in the year. Tying up even \$5 million more from this year's reduced AID appropriations now would restrict the new Administration's flexibility in meeting serious unfunded contingencies in Nigeria, the Indus Basin, Dominican Republic, to name a few.

On Tex's idea of splitting our pledge, Charlie points out that moreover this unusual approach would produce this effect:

- A \$75 million rate for January-June 1969 (\$37.5 million), and
- A \$65 million rate for the last six months of 1969 (\$32.8 million).

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/7/80, Supp Dept. Guidelines
By *h*, NARA, Date *3-5-97*

Zwick believes we should make a straight \$70 million pledge with the promise to look into the possibilities of additional funds later on.

The important point in this is that the 1969 figure results primarily from Congressional reductions. Your record is in good shape because you requested \$80 million for 1969 and your 1970 budget will include \$85 million. It will thus be obvious to critics that the cut is Congress', not yours.

I would leave this to Charlie's judgment, but I promised Tex I would put his argument up to you. He and Wiggins feel strongly that splitting our pledge would have some value in appearances in New York. I must admit that it looks pretty marginal from here, and Charlie feels strongly that you would be narrowing your successor's flexibility.

W. W. Rostow

Go with Charlie _____

Try Tex's tactics (split pledge) _____

34a



UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

December 18, 1968

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

YUkon 6-2424

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

In these last days of my service in your administration, there is one matter that I must bring to your attention because of its importance to the United States and because it might confuse your own great record of commitment to the United Nations and the cause of development. It is ironic that on the 20th anniversary of President Truman's Point 4 address we are leaving in doubt the 1969 U.S. contribution to the U.N. development program launched by that address.

This is not a partisan issue; President-elect Nixon here yesterday stressed his own interest in this aspect of U.N. activity. The important advantages to the U.S. in not reducing for the first time our support of this program are outlined in the attached memorandum I prepared last October.

At this stage, however, the problem can be solved only by a Presidential Directive (under Section 610 of the AID act) to transfer about \$5 million from elsewhere in the appropriation to the account for contributions to international organizations. I think you may want to consider this course of action.

On another occasion I hope to tell you how grateful I am for the opportunity that you have given me to serve under your leadership. Meanwhile, Wicky joins me in affectionate regards to you and Lady Bird; we are delighted that you have caught up with us, for the time being, on grandchildren.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur Goldschmidt
United States Representative
on the Economic and Social Council

Enclosure:
Stated.

C O P Y

346

UNITED STATES MISSION

Date: 10/28/68

To : Mr. Sisco
From : Amb. Goldschmidt

In response to your request this memorandum outlines the reasons - political and economic - for maintaining the U.S. contribution to the U.N. Development program at least at its current \$75 million and preferably making a token increase to avoid upsetting a sound precedent and endangering U.S. leadership in the program.

A. Political

1. We must not for the first time since its inception, reduce our pledges to a U.N. program that in the eyes of the world rightly has the label of a U.S. initiative. It was started 20 years ago as a result of President Truman's inaugural address and all steps in its improvement - the creation of the Special Fund, the amalgamation into UNDP and the appointment of Paul Hoffman to head it, as well as the steady increase of its resources - were U.S. initiatives. The program is substantially and visibly under U.S. management.

2. President Johnson, who issued a second U.N. day proclamation to call attention to President Truman's contributions to the U.N. - including his Point 4 address - would hardly want to celebrate the 20th anniversary of that historic policy by an abrupt change of it, as his original budget request of \$80 million for UNDP testifies. Moreover, having consistently supported the United Nations and multilateral programs, the administration would not want to reverse this sound policy on leaving office. In view of the failure of congressional action on IDA, our UNDP contribution is the sole possibility this year showing our support of multilateral programs.

3. The Congress has, in general, increasingly urged greater multilateralization of aid. There is no legislative history in this year's aid debates that would justify a reduction of UNDP contributions; on the contrary, in restoring the \$5 million to the authorization bill, the full Senate specifically directed that it be used to maintain the President's request of \$80 million for UNDP.

4. The U.S. position in the current General Assembly which in economic matters is focussing on planning the Second Development Decade, will be seriously handicapped by a reversal of our policy of providing the leadership for the expansion of this multilateral assistance program. Our

opposition to additional special funds such as that for the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, supported on the grounds that a steady increase in the central UNDP program makes such funds unnecessary, would be jeopardized by our reducing our support for UNDP.

5. The greater "visibility" of our contributions to UNDP which is the most "multi" of the multilateral programs (almost all 125 member countries and a number of non-members such as Switzerland, Germany, Vietnam and Korea have a stake in it) makes even a relatively small change in the U.S. contribution have large repercussions. Moreover, with a small increase in our pledge for 1969, we will get credit for achieving the \$200 million target set by the General Assembly in 1965 as the pledging conference results show that the fund is only 1/2 to 3/4 million short of that goal.

6. The program is highly regarded by the developing countries. More than 90% of the recipient countries have pledged contributions to the central fund at the recent pledging conference and went out of their way to express appreciation for the program and praised Hoffman's leadership of it. Only the USSR made its usual attack on the program and sought, with little effect, to justify its continued small contribution by a long recital of its bilateral assistance.

7. In Africa, particularly, where our bilateral programs are being phased out, our multilateral aid contributions are especially significant. The Korry report formula for bilateral curtailment was predicated on a stepping up of multilateral programs. The UNDP is the major source of funds for maintaining this balance and giving recognition to the Administration's concern for African development.

8. The multilateral programs, such as the UNDP, are the most effective means of promoting such U.S. objectives as enlarged family planning programs, increased protein production, promoting better local climate for private investment, ensuring more effective public administration and effecting other economic and social progress dependent upon recipient government activity. These and other U.S. objectives can better be forwarded without visible U.S. leadership through UNDP.

B. Economic

1. Every \$4 contribution by the U.S. to UNDP generates at least \$6 from other donors to the central fund and an equal contribution to their projects by the recipient developing countries. Our contribution to projects is therefore about 20% of their cost; or, put in another way our dollar is multiplied by five in development projects under UN auspices.

2. The long effort to get other developed countries to do their

share in assisting developing countries is beginning to pay off. In the past four years our pledges have consistently been matched. For 1969, fifty countries have increased their pledges over 1968 by a total of \$16.5. Of special interest for the long run are the large increases of the Scandinavian countries including Denmark's 50% increase and the 25% increase of Canada. Even the U.K., recognizing the relative importance of the UNDP has pledged a 10% increase by a transfer of funds from its bilateral program. This curve of increases from other major donors must be maintained if we are to reduce our bilateral programs without abandoning our commitment to development. Even at \$75 million our contribution is below the traditional 40%.

3. Not only its future growth, but other current contributions to the UNDP may be affected by the size of the U.S. pledge. Japan, one of the larger contributors has not announced its pledge and there are indications that its size may be affected by that of the U.S. pledge.

4. The number of requests for Special Fund projects is steadily growing as is the pressure for increasing the amounts of the country targets for technical assistance. UNDP currently has 400 projects under study and estimates that about 200 of these, totalling about \$200 million of UNDP resources, are solid, desirable undertakings. There is a growing concern with delays in approving clear-cut requirements of the developing countries. Since 1959 the program has grown from projects costing \$129 million to \$467 million in 1967 - half of the costs being borne by recipients. The development effect of completed UNDP projects is in part revealed by Hoffman's estimate that completed projects costing \$60 million have resulted in investments of \$2 billion. This important multiplier effect has major economic implications for U.S. trade and investment policy.

5. President MacNamara announced that the World Bank intends to double its program of investment with special emphasis on Africa and Latin America in the next five years. Preceding and concomitant with such an increase, UNDP feasibility studies and training and other activities for upgrading human skills and capacities will be required.

6. The balance of payments effect of the U.S. pledge to UNDP will be nil in 1969 and, indeed, there will be minimal out-of-pocket expenditures for several years. The pledges will only result in project approvals - commitments - for which the funds will be required in later years. Owing to the conservative financing of the program (based on U.S. policy) which requires that resources be available for the full funding of Special Fund projects - averaging four years duration - before they are initiated, the funds pledged for 1969 will not be used until later years but will remain in letters of credit which draw no interest and have no adverse effect either on current expenditures or balance of payments. The pledge will, however, encourage greater contributions from others and will reduce the backlog of pending requests for desirable development projects.

7. The maintenance of U.S. leadership in UNDP is essential to

to preventing removal of the program's headquarters to Europe. The high cost and other inconvenience of living in New York and the desire of the major participating agencies in Europe for closer relationships to the UNDP add to the mischievous political - anti-American - drives to reduce the size of the UN staff in New York by moving UNDP headquarters to Geneva. The balances of payments effect and other unfavorable economic consequences of removing the program headquarters to Europe - quite aside from the undesirable policy effects - make it a matter of important U.S. interest to counter these pressures by maintaining the U.S. contribution to the program.

Conclusion:

The above considerations, political and economic, foreign and domestic, large and small, are not counter-balanced by any substantial reasons for turning away from our traditional support of a growing UNDP program. Some of them are so compelling that they may deserve consideration at the highest levels. Indeed, many of them may have contributed - together with the presentations - to the fact that the Congress made less of a cut in the section of the Aid bill concerned with contributions to international programs than anywhere else. Second only to UNICEF, UNDP was the program with wide public and congressional support.

Please feel free to call on me if I can be of further help to you in this important matter.

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 26, 1968 - 6:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Approval of PL 480 Credit Sale for Israel

*1. [unclear]
2. Pres file*

Bill Gaud, Orville Freeman and Charlie Zwick recommend you approve a \$30.8 million PL 480 credit sale including 300,000 tons of feed grains and 200,000 tons of wheat for Israel. The sale would be repayable in dollars.

Israel continues to improve its agricultural performance, but still has to import over half its grain requirements. This credit sale would reemphasize self-help measures, and is a continuation of previous programs. The terms are identical to last year's \$40 million sale except for an increase to 3 percent in the interest.

In approving the 1968 PL 480 program, you concurred in a finding that Israeli military expenditures did not materially interfere with development. State/AID confirms that the basis for this finding is still valid.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.5
NSC Memo, 12/26/68, [unclear]
By *[signature]*, NAFA, Dec. 3, 1998

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~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

DEC 18 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P.L. 480 Proposal for Israel

Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman request approval to negotiate a \$30.8 million P.L. 480 credit sale with Israel for CY 1969, including 300,000 tons of feedgrains and 200,000 tons of wheat. The sale would be repayable in dollars over twenty years, following a two-year grace period. Except for an increase to 3 percent in the rate of interest, terms are identical to those of the CY 1968 agreement which provided \$40 million in commodity support.

Need for Program - Despite improved agricultural production, Israel will continue to import more than half of total wheat and grain requirements in 1969. This sale will help ease the U.S. domestic wheat and grain situation and will incorporate measures to protect U.S. commercial sales.

The agreement would reemphasize the self-help measures agreed to in the 1968 agreement with emphasis on improved storage and distribution facilities and adaptation of improved seed varieties.

Military Expenditures - In approving the 1968 P.L. 480 program for Israel, you concurred in the State/AID finding that Israeli military expenditures did not materially interfere with its development. Although military expenditures will represent 40 percent of the 1968 budget and 17 percent of GNP (as compared to 30 percent and 15 percent in 1967), Israel's GNP is still expected to grow by 12 percent in real terms in 1968. On this basis, State/AID has reconfirmed their finding that Israeli military expenditures do not materially interfere with development.

Recommendation - I recommend that you authorize negotiation of a \$30.8 million P.L. 480 credit sale with Israel for CY 1969.

Charles J. Zwick

Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment _____

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ly, NARA, Date 3-5-98

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(~~SECRET~~-WITH ATTACHMENT)

MEMORANDUM

To: The President

DEC 12 1968

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Israel

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Israel to provide approximately 300,000 tons of feedgrains; 200,000 tons of wheat; 15,000 tons of vegetable oils; and 200 tons of tobacco with an export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of \$30.8 million. This would be a dollar credit sale with a 5 percent initial payment and the remainder payable over 20 years including a two year grace period. The interest rate during the grace period would be 2 percent and 3 percent thereafter. These terms, except for the increase to 3 percent of the continuing interest, are identical to those of the current agreement.

Need for Program

Israel continues to show improvement in per capita food production. Despite the increases in agricultural production, limited resources of water and land make it necessary for Israel to import substantial quantities of agricultural commodities each year to meet local consumption requirements. The proposed program would assist by easing the financial burden of meeting these import requirements for calendar year 1969.

Commercial Market

The sales program as proposed would protect normal commercial trade. Israel's commercial imports from the U. S. has been steadily growing, increasing from about \$7 million in 1958 to a range of \$40-\$50 million in the last two years.

Self-Help

We are not proposing additional new self-help measures to be included in this proposed agreement. However, Israel will continue to implement the self-help measures contained in the PL 480 agreement signed March 29, 1968.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(~~SECRET~~ WITH ATTACHMENT)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID/Agriculture Guidelines

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date 3-5-98

Symington Amendment

State/AID has determined that Israeli resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and that U. S. assistance is not being diverted to military purposes. This determination was made in a PL 480 memorandum signed by you on January 31, 1968, and the basis for it remains unchanged.*

Recommendation

That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

November 20 1968



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Junior Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

*This judgment was reconfirmed on December 6, 1968. State/AID in consultation with the interagency advisory committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) (the Symington Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined (a) that Israel's resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and (b) that neither U.S. development assistance nor P.L. 480 sales are diverted by Israel to military purposes. The memorandum on which this determination is based is attached.

Attachment: a/s

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : AA/PFC, Mr. Paul G. Clark

DATE: 27 NOV 1968

FROM : AA/NESA, Maurice J. Williams *Maurice J. Williams*

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AID Guidelines
By g NARA, Date 3-5-98

SUBJECT: Application of the Symington Amendment to Israel

This is to request the Symington Inter-Agency Committee to review the economic and defense situation of Israel and confirm the judgment of the NESA Bureau that the provisions of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act do not prevent furnishing assistance to Israel under that Act or PL 480. PL 480 sales are not being diverted to military expenditures and Israel's own resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development. We are not furnishing development assistance to Israel.

Standard Data Frame:

Israel Standard Data Frame
(Millions of IL)

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
1. Defense Expenditures*	545	750	850	1200	1700	2300
2. Central Government Expenditures*	2598	3108	3670	4061	5609	5742
3. Line 1 as a % of Line 2	21.0	24.1	23.1	29.5	30.3	40.1
4. Foreign Exchange Used for Military Purposes (\$ Millions)	n.a.	71.9	28.4	30.4	29.9	n.a.
5. Imports of Goods and Services (\$ Millions)	1016	1198	1250	1275	1285	n.a.
6. Line 4 as a % of Line 5	n.a.	6.0	2.3	2.4	2.3	n.a.
7. Gross National Product	7610	8861	10448	11468	11843	13260
8. Line 1 as a % of Line 7	7.1	8.5	8.1	10.5	14.6	17.3

* FY beginning April 1

~~SECRET~~



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Israel's defense program has not materially interfered with its development progress. Its demonstrated development progress is clearly satisfactory. Despite relatively high defense expenditures Israel has managed a growth rate in GNP averaging more than 10% per year throughout the decade and a half, 1950-1965, until it now ranks in the lower ranges of developed countries -- having a GNP per capita greater than that for Italy, Austria or Ireland. The recession of 1966 and 1967, which slowed the growth rate to less than 1% per annum, was the result of fiscal and monetary measures completely unrelated to the more recent increases in defense spending. These deflationary measures were undertaken as part of an austerity program the object of which was to eliminate the inflation which had become chronic during the years of economic expansion and to halt the continuous erosion of the exchange rate, restructuring the economy in favor of exports. The full effect of these measures was already felt in June 1967, when the fighting broke out. Unemployment was high and the authorities had begun to undertake reflationary steps. Work relief projects undertaken in this period have now been cancelled with employment expected to increase 7% this year. GNP is expected to grow 12% in real terms. While the 12% represents in some measure fuller use of existing capacity, and thus should not be taken as the beginning of a trend, Israeli authorities are talking of 9% or more as a target for 1969, not unreasonable in light of historical trends. Price increases have been held to less than 3% in this reflationary period through generous use of imports to contain them, a policy made possible by the many years of near steady increase of reserves Israel had experienced.

Israel's per capita GNP has been growing at better than the 5% Development Decade target for GNP as a whole in less developed countries. Its growth rate has been matched or exceeded only by Japan, Jordan and Libya among all countries of the world, developed or not.

Israel's efforts to lessen its dependence on foreign donations and bond sales continue. Exports are expected to increase by 12% again this year. Receipts for sale of goods and services, which had covered only 28% of imports in 1953, paid for 43% of imports in 1958 and 67% of imports in 1967.

Israel's use of its resources for defense has not materially interfered with its development. Israel's defense expenditures are indeed large in comparison to its total budget (40%) and in relation to its GNP (17%) and have been growing rapidly from pre-war levels when they accounted for 7-8% of GNP and less than 1/4 of the budget. Yet it is difficult to conclude that they have in any way interfered with the development effort. During 1966 and 1967 there were plenty of unemployed resources within the economy that could have been used to spur development if a way could have been found to mobilize them without jeopardizing Israel's stabilization effort. In 1967 the government's development budget increased by over

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- 3 -

200 million pounds at the same time the military budget increased. The capital budget is down this year, partly as a check to the economic boom. That a larger capital budget could have brought a higher rate of growth in GNP than 12% is, however, moot. Few countries have ever attained so high an annual increase.

Israel's use of foreign exchange for military purposes has been relatively small, has served only to reduce the rate at which reserves have been accumulated and thus in no way prevented the use of foreign exchange for development. Only twice in the last six years have reserves fallen: in 1966, when repayment of short term funds borrowed in late 1965 converted a mild rise into a sharp fall, and since August of this year when broad tariff reductions, undertaken as a counter-inflationary measure, were put into effect. In the four year period 1964-1967 our estimate of foreign exchange expenditure for military purposes is \$161 million. During the same period reserves rose \$200 million.

Few would dispute the necessity of Israel's current defense expenditures and arms imports. Israel's radical Arab neighbors have had their arms inventories restored to pre-June 1967 levels by the Soviet Union. Though a cease-fire was declared nearly 1½ years ago sporadic small clashes have continued and the situation remains far from a peaceful resolution. Made more bitter and less stable by their defeat in the 6-day war, Israel's neighbors continue to pose a security threat.

Ranking about equal to the UAR in material equipment, Israel feels it must also be armed to defend itself from attack by its other Arab neighbors. It is in the U.S. interest that an appropriate arms balance in the area be attained and preserved as a deterrent to the outbreak of renewed, full-scale fighting in the Middle East.

Recommendation: That Israel be classified as "green" for the remainder of U.S. Fiscal Year 1969 unless the Israel budget for its fiscal year beginning April 1, 1969 contains a large enough increase in defense spending to warrant another review.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Rostow

36

ACTION

SECRET

Thursday, December 26, 1968 — 6:30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Approval of PL 480 Credit Sale for Turkey

*1. Summary
2. Pres file*

Bill Gaud, Orville Freeman and Charlie Zwick recommend you approve a PL 480 credit sale for up to \$20.5 million--repayable in convertible currency--for about 300,000 tons of wheat. The final agreement may be for less because the Turks will try to get some of this wheat in Europe.

This sale is in line with our past help for Turkey. From 1963-1966, we provided \$45 million a year under PL 480. In 1967, the Turks had improved their performance enough so that they needed no wheat, but bad weather hurt the 1968 crop. We plan to use the credit sale to encourage further agricultural reforms.

The problems involving Turkish military expenditures were taken care of in connection with the \$40 million program loan you approved on December 4.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *g*, NARA, Date *3-5-96*

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

36a

DEC 18 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P.L. 480 Proposal for Turkey

Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman request approval to negotiate a P.L. 480 wheat credit sale to Turkey of up to \$20.5 million, approximately 300,000 tons. Repayment would be in convertible currency over forty years after a ten-year grace period. The agreement would include a 50 percent local currency payment, pursuant to the Purcell amendment, which would cover \$10 million in local U.S. expenditures during FY 1969 against a requirement of \$18 million.

Need for Program

AID supported efforts to improve agricultural technology and the recent introduction of high yielding Mexican wheat have reversed Turkey's traditional dependence on concessional P.L. 480 sales. From 1963-1966 the U.S. provided Turkey \$45 million a year under Title I P.L. 480. In 1967 the Turks were self sufficient in grains and no wheat was shipped. This year, poor weather on the Anatolian Plateau has created an import requirement for 300,000 tons to supplement the 1968 crop and to bring stocks up to the minimum emergency level required by NATO.

The Turks have recently requested wheat from both the U.S. and the European community. Should the Europeans decide to act on this request, this wheat would be provided on a grant basis under the Food Aid Convention, decreasing the quantity to be provided by the U.S. Because the European response is still uncertain, Gaud and Freeman wish to make our offer to the Turks now. The U.S. offer would demonstrate our readiness to provide support and the sale would make a significant contribution to meeting U.S. dollar costs in Turkey.

The agreement would include self-help measures designed to increase agricultural productivity and further improve the marketing system.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 3-5-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Military Expenditures

State/AID conclude that neither U.S. nor Turkish resources are being diverted to military expenditures to a degree that materially interferes with development. This finding was made in connection with a \$40 million program loan you approved on December 4, 1968.

Recommendation

I recommend that you authorize negotiations of a wheat credit sale to Turkey of up to \$20.5 million.

Charles J. Zwick

Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MEMORANDUM

NOV 29 1968

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID/ Agricultural Guidelines
By Ly NARA, Date 3-5-98

To : The President
Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Turkey

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a Title I, Public Law 480 agreement with Turkey to provide up to 300,000 metric tons of wheat with a current export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of about \$20.5 million. This would be a convertible local currency credit sale with an early Turkish Lira payment of 50 percent of the commodity value and related ocean transportation costs for use in meeting United States expenditures in Turkey. The balance would be repayable over 40 years with 2 percent interest during the 10-year grace period and 3 percent thereafter. The State and Treasury Departments concur in this recommendation.

The Government of Turkey also has requested 300,000-400,000 tons of wheat under the Food Aid Convention of the International Grains Arrangement from other donor countries, particularly the European Community. The Council of Ministers of the European Community is expected to consider this request during its December 10-11 meeting. If approved, the EC wheat would be supplied essentially on grant terms. The actual level of United States wheat to be offered Turkey could, therefore, be reduced, but would not be expected to exceed 300,000 metric tons.

Need for Program

Increased Turkish import requirements for wheat resulted from unfavorable weather which reduced the 1968 crop in certain areas. The PL 480 wheat would be imported to meet immediate consumption requirements and to build stocks to more adequate levels.

Self-Help

To further encourage agricultural development in Turkey we would seek to negotiate PL 480 self-help measures involving Turkish Government action to:

1. Increase fertilizer availability to the following amounts:

1969--213,000 nutrient tons of nitrogen
340,000 nutrient tons of phosphate;

2. Improve the marketing of foodstuffs--including wider use of commercial grades and standards--in order to reduce the disparity between prices received by farmers and those paid by consumers;

3. Increase farm credit available for farmers and livestock feeders to purchase essential inputs and adopt modern production practices, and rapidly expand the supervised credit program which seeks to insure the direct use of funds made available on technological improvement;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Improve on-farm water management through Government programs for 1969 aimed at (a) adding 100,000 hectares of newly irrigated land; (b) implementing scientific land leveling on 12,000 hectares in 1969; and (c) implementing limited conservation practices on an additional 240,000 hectares per year;

5. Encourage the development of the agricultural chemical and farm machinery industries through private enterprise;

6. Strengthen official statistical procedures for estimating the size of wheat crop.

The proceeds accruing to the importing country from sales of commodities received under this agreement would be devoted to achievement of the agricultural self-help measures enumerated above and to other economic development objectives.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

December 2 1968

William L. Gaud DEC 9 1968
Administrator
Agency for International Development

John A. Schuttler
Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Date: _____

ACTION

37

Thursday, December 26, 1968 - 6:45pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

Mr. President:

Professor Federico Bigi, Foreign Secretary of the Republic of San Marino, has requested an inscribed photograph of you.

He is a good friend of our country. I recommend you sign a photo for him, and suggest the following inscription:

To His Excellency Federico Bigi, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of San Marino, with high regard and best wishes.

State will send the photograph to Bigi through our Consulate in Florence.

W. W. Rostow

Approve sending inscribed photo —

No —

Call me —

CW

JWR

JKN:mmm

INFORMATION

Thursday, December 26, 1968

6:00 pm

Purple

Mr. President:

President Pacheco of Uruguay was very appreciative of your message of sympathy about his recent accident. He has responded to Ambassador Sayre as follows:

"I would appreciate it if Your Excellency would thank President Johnson most sincerely for his gracious communication, and tell him that most fortunately I am on the way to complete recovery."

W. W. Rostow

f
SW Lewis:wpt

INFORMATION

**Thursday, December 26, 1968
2:25 p. m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith Henry Owen outlines
a possible speech.**

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Harry McPherson

WWRostow:rla

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Heart of the Matter

I. Introduction

1. President Johnson's place in history will not rest on the Vietnam war, any more than President Truman's place rests on the Korean war. It will be shaped by his constructive achievements:

-- the burst of social legislation which he brought about;

-- aid and encouragement for regional economic development in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

2. Running through these achievements is:

-- a common purpose: to help the poor;

-- a common fact: that this can only be done if there is both a transfer of resources from the rich and the building of effective and cooperative self-help among the poor.

3. The President should make this purpose and this theme the centerpiece of a farewell speech to the country-- not only to rehearse past accomplishments but also to point up lessons for the future. A suggested outline follows.

II. Speech Outline

1. At home and abroad, the central problem of our time is the same: poverty. From this comes many of our other troubles--crime and disorder at home; violence abroad.

2. A successful attack on poverty requires two things: sacrifice by the rich, and self-help by the poor.

3. Sacrifice by the rich: More private investment is all very well, but it won't meet the needs for (i) more schools and better health care in our ghettos at home; (ii) public infrastructure (roads, utilities, etc.) in poorer countries abroad. The funds for this will have to be public funds, and they will have to be provided on a larger scale. This is not a popular thing to say, but it's true and Christmas is a good time to say it: Either we believe what our great religions say, or we don't. If we do, we are living in scandalous disregard of what we profess to believe.

4. Self-help by the poor: Nine-tenths of progress rests on what the poor do for themselves. This means cooperative effort, by the people whose energies must be tapped--community effort at home and regional cooperation among developing countries abroad.

5. All this comes to a head in the decisions that we must make, as our GNP continues to grow and as the war in Vietnam draws to an end. How shall we dispose of growing US tax revenues:

-- Shall we return them to the middle class via tax cuts and public expenditures for purposes of primary interest to the middle class (e.g., more freeways)?

-- Shall we use them to sustain a new arms race?

-- Or shall we invest them in the good works which are needed to make life tolerable for other human beings--and thus, in the long run, make our country and this shrinking world a better place for all?

6. These are the key questions that this generation must answer. If we turn merely to consolidation of past gains, the 1970's will be but the prelude to another time of trouble, as the complacent 1920's and 1950's were. But if it is a time of sacrifice and creative cooperation, it can be one of which every American will be proud to say: I was alive then, and I helped to make our country's bi-centennial a turning point in the building of a better world.

III. Conclusion

Why should the President say all this?

1. Because it's true.
2. Because Americans are a sensible and compassionate people, and will respond to the truth, if not immediately then after a while. Here will be a standard, to guide them in judging themselves and the next administration over the next four years.
3. Because it's fitting that a parting President should speak to the themes and ideas which be at the heart of his place in history.

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Thursday, December 26, 1968
2:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

In reply to the question of this morning,
this cable may interest you.

In the light of Barrientos' assurances
to Amb. Castro, should we proceed or wait?

W. W. Rostow

La Paz 9368

Proceed _____

Wait _____

Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo. 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *ly*, NARA, Date *3-5-91*

WWRostow:rlm



Department of State

40a
TELEGRAM

Jm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 060

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 09368 251248Z

52
ACTION ARA 16

INFO AID 28, E 15, NSC 10, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, STR 08, CIAE 00, COM 08,
FRB 02, INR 07, NSAE 00, TRSY 11, XMB 06, ABCE 00, INT 06, RSR 01, /141 W
----- 116853

P 241606Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6341

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LA PAZ 9368

SUBJECT: LATEST ON LIPEZ MINING CLAIMS IN BOLIVIA.

- 1. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR FERNANDO DIEZ DE MEDINA, JUST CALLED AMBASSADOR AND ADVISED HIM BARRIENTOS IS PURSUING LIPEZ MINING CLAIMS MATTER WITH DILLIGENCE AND ASSURED AMBASSADOR LIPEZ MATTER WOULD BE RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY WITHING REASONABLE TIME.))
- 2. BEFORE BECOMING A PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR, DIEZ DE MEDINA HAD BEEN PAID REGULAR ATTORNEYS' FEES BY LIPEZ MINING COMPANY FOR HIS INTERVENTIONS BEFORE COMIBOL. HE IS MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE ON SUBJECT.
- 3. COMMENT: CONFIDENT DIEZ DE MEDINA WILL EXPECT SOME GRATUITY FROM LIPEZ MINING COMPANY IF MATTER RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY. H. SYKES, LOCAL AGENT FOR LIPEZ, IS PRESENTLY IN U.S. ||
- 4. T. CORCORAN MAY BE INFORMED ON ABOVE, IF DEPARTMENT COSIDERS IT PRUDENT.

CASTRO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 3 NARA, Date 3-5-98

CONFIDENTIAL

41a

December 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW (EYES ONLY)

Subject: A personal project

As you know, Cy Vance has asked if I would be willing to stay on in Paris for the month that he has agreed to remain there. I have agreed. After that, I am assuming that I will return to the civilian world.

When that time comes, there is one project that I would like to undertake. That is a book on the search for peace in Viet-Nam, with special emphasis on the Paris talks. It would attempt to tell fully and clearly and dispassionately how we moved from the partial bombing halt to the broader, new talks that we hope will soon begin. It would try to make clear what the real issues have been and how they were dealt with. In short, it would detail the President's search for a just peace beginning with his momentous decision announced on March 31.

Many bits and pieces of the story have been reported in the press over the past few months. In addition, there has been a good deal of unfounded rumor and speculation. And, of course, many essential elements of this fascinating exercise in the diplomatic art remain to be told. I would like to work from the full written record as well as from the personal recollections of the key participants--in Paris, Saigon and Washington.

I would not undertake this kind of effort without the President's and your full approval. I would hope that if you both considered this to be a worthwhile exercise, that arrangements could be made for me to work from the President's papers on this subject.

The Paris talks have been an interesting slice of history and I think it worth getting the story into the permanent record. The purpose of this memo is to raise the matter for your consideration. I hope you will find it of sufficient merit to raise with the President. If he were to approve, nothing would give me greater pleasure than to undertake this task.

Bill

William J. Jordan

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12958,
SEC. 1.10.

BY *[initials]* ON *3-5-98*

Thursday, December 26, 1968 -- 1:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Pres. file

Herewith Bill Jordan suggests he might be willing to write a book on the search for peace in Vietnam, with special emphasis on the Paris talks.

To do this job he would, of course, require access to the President's papers on this subject.

I can think of no one better qualified to tell the story well; and no recruit for Austin more valuable.

In the latter connection, you should know that the Fletcher School of Diplomacy and the Ford Foundation were -- and may still be -- considering offering Bill a post to lecture on foreign relations, the press, and the other news media. If Bill were to come to Austin to write a book on the search for peace in Vietnam, the Director of the Johnson School might well wish to consider having him teach a course on this important subject, for which very few men are qualified at all -- and none more than Bill Jordan.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 26, 1968 -- 1:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

With respect to the Phantoms:

- I have checked again with Sec. Clifford;
- I made clear to him your view about credit and delivery dates;
- He repeated what he said at lunch on the 24th; namely, the next move is up to the Israelis. They must make up their minds on three matters: weapons systems they want to go with the plane; the electronics systems they want; and the quantity of spares. The Israeli negotiating team is awaiting a response from Jerusalem.

It is possible that Abe Feinberg and others interested in the matter are not aware that the next move is up to Jerusalem. Do you wish me to inform Abe of this fact?

Yes _____ No _____ Call me _____

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *6-14-02*

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

Pres file~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, December 26, 1968 -- 10:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

For your 11:00 a. m. meeting today with the JCS, General Wheeler has supplied to me (Tab A) a statement of the JCS approach to the discussion with you of the fiscal year 1970 budget.

As you will see, the JCS has decided in a rather statesmanlike way to present its point of view not in the form of a reclama on a shopping list of particular items which have been denied but in the form of a discussion "on the impact of fiscal year 1970 budget decisions on our present and future military capabilities."

In addition, at Tab B is the text of the proposed statement by the Chairman of the JCS on the fiscal 1970 budget, which will open the meeting. The summary (pp. 3-4) presents the nub of the JCS anxieties with respect to both strategic capabilities and general purpose forces.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ml/deh, NARA, Date 1-26-98

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

3861

43a

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3943-68
26 December 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt Rostow
SUBJECT: FY '70 Budget Discussion

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-408
Mr. Jip NARA, Date 1-26-98

1. This memorandum responds to our TELECON on the evening of 24 December.

2. The JCS decided that, in view of the complexity of the FY '70 budget problem and the numerous hard decisions which had to be made, it would be profitable to focus our discussion with the President on the impact of FY '70 budget decisions on our present and future military capabilities. As you will recognize, this is a departure from the past practice of having each Chief in effect reclamation the decisions made in certain specific programs.

3. Accordingly, I will lead off for the JCS by discussing the Soviet threat, our capabilities in the strategic area relative to the Soviets, the capabilities of our general purpose forces, and the trends seen by us. Thereafter, the other Chiefs in turn will illustrate our concerns by addressing one or two specific items in their particular areas of professional interest. We propose the following sequence and subjects:

a. GEN Palmer -- Low manning levels in Europe and Korea, and Strategic Army Force structure and manning level problems;

b. ADM Moorer -- Shortages of personnel, and budget constraints related to capability and staying power of naval forces;

c. GEN McConnell -- Reductions in strategic bomber and air defense forces; -

d. GEN Chapman -- Degradation of amphibious assault capability.

4. We will, of course, be prepared to discuss other subjects as desired by the President; for example, questions

~~SECRET~~

Tab A

~~SECRET~~

raised by him at luncheon on Tuesday regarding SENTINEL,
ammunition procurement, the F-14, etc.



EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copy: Secy Clifford

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3501
436

CM-3811-68
19 December 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: FY 1970 Defense Budget Discussion with the President (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to my memorandum, dated 26 November 1968, which contained information on the forthcoming FY 1970 defense budget discussion with the President. 6724
2. (U) A copy of the statement that I plan to give and the illustrative examples to be discussed by each Service Chief are attached for your information.
3. (C) Since information concerning many budgetary and force level decisions is not available at this time, it may be necessary to revise the illustrative examples prior to our meeting with the President. I shall appreciate an opportunity to discuss with you the time and place for our meeting with the President.
4. (U) Without enclosures, this memorandum is CONFIDENTIAL.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

- Enclosures
- A. Statement
 - B. Illustrative Examples

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30
By je NARA Date 6-14-02

OSD Reg No. 6

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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Doc Def Cont Nr. X-2140

Tab E

Tab B

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

ON

FY 1970 DEFENSE BUDGET

INTRODUCTION

MR. PRESIDENT, RECOGNIZING THE FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS UNDER WHICH THE FY 70 BUDGET IS BEING DEVELOPED, THE JCS DECIDED AGAINST ADDRESSING INDIVIDUAL ISSUES AS HAS BEEN THE CUSTOM IN THE PAST. INSTEAD, WE PROPOSE TO DISCUSS THE GENERAL POSTURE OF OUR ARMED FORCES WITH EMPHASIS ON THE IMPACT OF FY 70 BUDGET DECISIONS ON PRESENT AND FUTURE MILITARY CAPABILITIES. I WILL PROVIDE A BRIEF ASSESSMENT AND EACH SERVICE CHIEF WILL PROVIDE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES HIGHLIGHTING HIS KEY AREAS OF CONCERN.

THE JCS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE WIDE VARIETY OF DEMANDS ON OUR NATION'S RESOURCES AND THE HARD DECISIONS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN IN ALLOCATING THESE RESOURCES. THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, COUPLED WITH THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA, AND THE UNSTABLE AND UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE, CHALLENGE OUR CAPABILITY FOR ADEQUATE AND TIMELY RESPONSE TO OTHER CONTINGENCIES WHICH MIGHT ARISE.

FIRST, THE THREAT --

THE SOVIET THREAT CONTINUES TO EXPAND IN SIZE AND IMPROVE IN QUALITY. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT IT IS LEVELING OFF NOR IS THERE ANY SIGN OF SELF-IMPOSED LIMITATIONS BASED UPON ACHIEVEMENT OF A PARTICULAR FORCE CAPABILITY. WE EXPECT AN INCREASE IN SOVIET LAND AND SEA-BASED MISSILES, AN INCREASED

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-172
By us, NARA, Date 8-25-03

DEPLOYMENT OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES, AN IMPROVEMENT IN AIR DEFENSE, AND AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES.

REGARDING STRATEGIC FORCES --

DESPITE US PROGRESS IN CERTAIN AREAS, RAPID INCREASES IN USSR CAPABILITIES HAVE ERODED OUR ONCE CLEARLY SUPERIOR STRATEGIC POSITION.

THE SOVIET MISSILE FORCE IS GROWING IN SIZE. OUR STRATEGIC FORCE IS UNDERGOING QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS, SUCH AS POSEIDON AND MINUTEMAN III, WHICH WILL INCREASE OUR FORCE EFFECTIVENESS; HOWEVER, IT IS PROGRAMMED TO REMAIN STATIC IN NUMBERS. WHILE OUR BOMBER FORCE IS BEING REDUCED, THE LOSS IN NUMBERS IS PARTIALLY OFFSET BY THE INTRODUCTION OF A SHORT-RANGE ATTACK MISSILE AND A NEW DECOY MISSILE. OUR CAPABILITY TO DEFEND THE CONTINENTAL US AGAINST THE BOMBER THREAT WILL BE REDUCED BY FORCE REDUCTIONS PROGRAMMED FOR FY 70. THE LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IS ALSO CAUSE FOR CONCERN, ALTHOUGH THE PLANNED SENTINEL DEPLOYMENT REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT FIRST STEP IN THIS DIRECTION.

IN THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES AREA --

THE JCS ARE CONCERNED WITH THE DECREASED READINESS OF OUR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES AND THEIR CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO POSSIBLE WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES. OUR FIGHTING FORCES IN VIETNAM ARE THE BEST EQUIPPED AND SUPPORTED IN HISTORY; HOWEVER, THE HIGHER PRIORITIES GIVEN SOUTHEAST ASIA, TOGETHER WITH MANPOWER AND FUNDING LIMITATIONS, HAVE RESULTED IN CONSTRAINTS ON PERSONNEL AND

MATERIEL IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE RESULTING PERSONNEL TURBULENCE, CURTAILMENT OF TRAINING, AND DIVERSIONS OF LOGISTIC ASSETS TO MEET UNPROGRAMMED REQUIREMENTS MAGNIFY THE DEFICIENCIES IN OUR CURRENT MILITARY POSTURE.

IN THIS REGARD, THE PLAN FOR THE IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES IS RECEIVING PRIORITY ATTENTION AND SUPPORT. THE JCS NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT IT WILL REQUIRE DIVERSIONS OF SERVICE EQUIPMENT PROGRAMMED AND PROCURED FOR US FORCES. AN UNCOMPENSATED DIVERSION OF MATERIEL FROM US FORCES WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT UPON THE READINESS OF GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES NOT DIRECTLY COMMITTED TO THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

IN SUMMARY --

THE JCS CONSIDER THAT US STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS, WHEN COMPARED WITH THE GROWING SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES, REPRESENT A DECLINING TREND IN THE US STRATEGIC POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE USSR. ADDITIONALLY, WE BELIEVE THAT THE EXISTING CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY OF OUR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PROVIDES ONLY A LIMITED CHOICE OF OPTIONS AT THE PRESENT TIME OUTSIDE SOUTHEAST ASIA. IT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE NATO ADEQUATELY IN A TIMELY MANNER, NOR OF SIMULTANEOUSLY PROVIDING A RESPONSE TO OTHER THAN MINOR CONTINGENCIES ELSEWHERE.

RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR PROGRAMMED FORCES CAN BE REDUCED BY SHORT-TERM ACTIONS SUCH AS: (1) IMPROVING THE READINESS OF DEPLOYED FORCES, (2) MODERNIZING CURRENT FORCES, (3) RETAINING FORCES SCHEDULED FOR PHASE DOWN, AND (4) PROVIDING ADEQUATE LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

DEFERRAL OF SUCH ACTIONS IS GENERATING AN ACCUMULATION OF UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS WHICH REDUCE CURRENT FORCE CAPABILITIES AND WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON FORCE CAPABILITIES IN THE FUTURE.

IN AMPLIFICATION OF THESE JUDGMENTS, AND TO PROVIDE FURTHER INSIGHT INTO THESE MATTERS, EACH SERVICE CHIEF IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS HIS AREAS OF CONCERN, WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES.

~~SECRET~~

43d

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

ARMY - Low manning levels in Korea and Europe, and STRAF structure and manning level problems.

NAVY - Shortages of personnel, and budget constraints related to capability and staying power of naval forces.

AIR FORCE - Reductions in Strategic Bomber and Air Defense Forces

MARINE CORPS - Degradation of amphibious assault capability.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958; Sec. 3.6
NJ/RAC 02-172
By ms, NARA, Date 8-25-03

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure B

44

Thursday ACTION
Tuesday, December 26, 1968 - 9:00 AM

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

A recently completed highway in Nicaragua has been named for you. President Somoza spoke at the ceremonial opening of the highway and made some very complimentary remarks about you. (Press photographs of ceremony attached at Tab B.) This highway is in a community where AID has made a substantial contribution.

The municipality which dedicated the highway sent you the attached parchment of honor (Tab C).

State has recommended that you send the accompanying letter of acknowledgment (Tab A) to the Mayor of the municipality.

W. W. Rostow

Atts

STATE:SLewis:wpt

44a

December 26, 1968

Dear Mr. Mayer:

My thanks go to you and to the entire Municipal Council of Chichigalpa for the honor you have bestowed on me in the naming of a recently completed highway of your municipality. The certificate you sent is a touching token of your friendship and goodwill, and I am grateful for it, as I am grateful for the kind words said of me at the ceremony by President Somosa.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Julio Teran
Alcalde Municipal
Chichigalpa, Nicaragua

LBJ:State:SLewis;wpt:rln

"NOVEDADES"

Dec. 4, 1968



El Embajador Kennedy M. Crockett, da lectura a su discurso después de quedar develizada la placa del nuevo Paseo "Lyndon B. Johnson". El Presidente, con las Llaves de Chichigalpa colgando del cuello, escucha al jefe de la misión norteamericana en nuestro país.

44c

"NOVEDADES"
Dec. 4, 1968



El Embajador de Estados Unidos, Kennedy M. Crockett, cortando la cinta que abría al tránsito el Paseo "Lyndon B. Johnson". El Alcalde de Chichigalpa,

Ing. Julio C. Terán, a la izquierda, y el Presidente Somoza, a la derecha, asisten a la simpática ceremonia.



El Presidente Somoza y el Embajador Kennedy M. Crockett, develizan la placa del Paseo "Lyndon B. Johnson", en Chichigalpa.

Pergamino de Honor

44e

La Municipalidad de Chichigalpa, en uso de sus facultades,

CONSIDERANDO:

Que el ilustrado Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América, que preside el Excelentísimo

Señor Lyndon B. Johnson,

a través de los programas de ayuda de la Agencia Internacional para el Desarrollo, en forma positiva ha contribuido al mejoramiento cultural y sanitario de esta comprensión municipal,

CONSIDERANDO:

Que es un deber municipal testimoniar el reconocimiento público por tan elevada cooperación,

ACUERDA:

PRIMERO: Denominar Paseo Johnson el tramo de carretera que une a esta ciudad de Chichigalpa con la carretera que une a León con Chinandega, y

SEGUNDO: Poner copia del presente Acuerdo en manos del Excelentísimo Señor Kennedy Crockford Embajador de los Estados Unidos de América.

Dado en el Salon de Sesiones de la Alcaldía de esta Municipalidad, a los quince días del mes de Noviembre de 1968

MUNICIPAL
1000-01-21

Julio Terán
JULIO TERÁN
ALCALDE MUNICIPAL

Emma Ulloa
EMMA ULLOA
REGIDOR MUNICIPAL

Faustino Urtecho
FAUSTINO URTECHO
REGIDOR MUNICIPAL

Nelly Guevara
NELLY GUEVARA
SECRETARIO MUNICIPAL

45

Thursday, December 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: AID's 1968 Annual Report to the Congress

Attached, for your approval and signature, is a suggested transmittal letter covering this year's AID Annual Report to the Congress. It should be submitted by December 31, 1968 -- even though the Congress is not in session.

Charlie Zwick's people have been over the report in detail and have checked its accuracy. The report stresses the main themes of your development policy -- self help, the agricultural revolution, private investment, family planning programs, public health and education. It highlights the success story in Iran and the breakthrough coming in Turkey, Brazil, the Asian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia.

The suggested transmittal, following your wishes of the past two years, strikes a general theme of lessons learned and hopeful accomplishments.

This is largely a routine report. I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we will need your signature on both letters at Tab A _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF:mm

45a

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I transmit herewith the Annual Report on the Foreign Assistance Program for fiscal year 1968.

This report records the continuing concentration of American aid in relatively few countries. Fifteen nations accounted for 84 percent of total economic commitments by the Agency for International Development during the year. They were Vietnam, India, Brazil, Pakistan, Colombia, Korea, Turkey, Laos, Chile, Thailand, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Nigeria and Panama.

Another country, Iran, achieved self-support during the fiscal year and the United States AID mission there was formally closed.

The year's most significant development was the sharpened focus of our assistance on the priority problems of food and population.

During fiscal year 1968 the Agency for International Development committed \$35 million to help less developed countries carry out their own family planning programs. This was nine times more than AID devoted to population programs the previous year, and three times the total AID commitment for family planning assistance during the preceding three years.

-- AID provided some kind of family planning assistance to 25 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, including major assistance for programs underway in India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Korea.

During the 12 months covered by this report, major breakthroughs in food production occurred in the less developed countries:

-- Record harvests were achieved in Pakistan, Turkey and the Philippines. In India food grain harvests jumped to nearly 100 million tons, 10 percent above the previous record.

-- Total food output in the developing countries rose 7 percent, the largest increase on record.

U. S. economic aid played a major role in this Green Revolution. Our aid encouraged more effective farm price policies, helped to extend irrigation and establish farm credit systems, and provided American technical assistance, fertilizer, pesticides and tools that farmers needed to take advantage of the new "miracle" seeds.

The most hopeful signs of our times are the breakthrough the less developed countries have made in food production, and the programs they have launched in the field of family planning.

The most helpful thing we can do is to give their efforts adequate support through our foreign aid programs. To do less would be to court catastrophe in a world growing smaller by the day.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

ERF:mm
12/26/68

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I transmit herewith the Annual Report on the Foreign Assistance Program for fiscal year 1968.

This report records the continuing concentration of American aid in relatively few countries. Fifteen nations accounted for 84 percent of total economic commitments by the Agency for International Development during the year. They were Vietnam, India, Brazil, Pakistan, Colombia, Korea, Turkey, Laos, Chile, Thailand, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Nigeria and Panama.

Another country, Iran, achieved self-support during the fiscal year and the United States AID mission there was formally closed.

The year's most significant development was the sharpened focus of our assistance on the priority problems of food and population.

During fiscal year 1968 the Agency for International Development committed \$35 million to help less developed countries carry out their own family planning programs. This was nine times more than AID devoted to population programs the previous year, and three times the total AID commitment for family planning assistance during the preceding three years.

-- AID provided some kind of family planning assistance to 25 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, including major assistance for programs underway in India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Korea.

During the 12 months covered by this report, ~~major~~ major breakthroughs in food production occurred in the less developed countries:

-- Record harvests were achieved in Pakistan, Turkey and the Philippines. In India food grain harvests jumped to nearly 100 million tons, 10 percent above the previous record.

-- Total food output in the developing countries rose 7 percent, the largest increase on record.

U. S. economic aid played a major role in this Green Revolution. Our aid encouraged more effective farm price policies, helped to extend irrigation and establish farm credit systems, and provided American technical assistance, fertilizer, pesticides and tools that farmers needed to take advantage of the new 'miracle' seeds,

The most hopeful signs of our times are the breakthrough the less developed countries have made in food production, and the programs they have launched in the field of family planning.

The most helpful thing we can do is to give their efforts adequate support through our foreign aid programs. To do less would be to court catastrophe in a world growing smaller by the day.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

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12/26/88