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INFORMATION

Wednesday - January 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Pan American Society Award Ceremony - Thursday,
January 9, 1969, 11:30 a.m. - in Cabinet Room

1:00 pm

Seven officers of the Pan American Society will be present at the ceremony tomorrow to present you with the Society's annual gold medal award for your efforts on behalf of inter-American friendship. This award has previously been presented to Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy. You accepted President Kennedy's award on his behalf at a luncheon in 1962.

The President of the Society, Mr. Robert Reininger, will make the presentation. Other members who will be present are listed at Tab A -- and include in the group Jim Farley. Mr. Viron Vaky, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, will also attend.

The Pan American Society is a very distinguished group of business and professional men interested in promoting the cause of inter-American friendship. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa are both among the honorary presidents of the Society. Both Rusk and Sevilla-Sacasa will be present at the astronaut ceremony in the Mansion immediately preceding this presentation, and they may also attend.

No formal remarks are expected after you receive the medal. You have approved a statement which will be issued by the Press Office at the time of the ceremony (Tab B). You might want to touch on one or two of the points in that statement informally with the group.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - List of those present at ceremony.

Tab B - Statement which Press Office to issue at time of ceremony.

Tab C - Draft scenario.

SW Lewis:mm

cc - George Christian and Bob Faiss

PAN AMERICAN SOCIETY AWARD CEREMONY

Thursday, January 9, 1969

In the Cabinet Room, the White House

Members of the Society (business affiliation shown in parentheses)

Mr. Robert M. Reininger
President of the Society
(Mining company executive)

Mr. Henry W. Balgooyen
Honorary President of the Society
(economist; director, American and Foreign Power Co.)

Mr. Charles K. Campbell
Vice President of the Society
(director, IBM World Trade Corp.)

Mr. James A. Farley
Director of the Society
(former Postmaster General; director, Coca-Cola Corp.)

Mr. John D. J. Moore
Director of the Society
(Executive Vice President, W. R. Grace)

Mr. Jasper S. Baker
Director of the Society
(United Fruit Company executive)

Mr. H. E. Montamat
Secretary of the Society.

From the Department of State

Mr. Viron Vaky,
Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

Pan American Society Award
Thursday, January 9, 1969
Words: 629 /Klein/Rostow

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Latin America has always held a very special place in my mind and heart.

It has always stood in a very special relationship to the United States.

In that relationship we have moved from controversy and dispute to cooperation, alliance and partnership.

The Alliance for Progress is a revolutionary document.

It was foreshadowed by the ideas of great Latin American spokesmen looking to the future of their peoples. Its policies and institutions began to take shape in the latter years of the Eisenhower Administration, and were brought to full life and vigor by President Kennedy.

It seeks peaceful revolution because it promotes economic and social transformation without violence.

It seeks to expand benefits for all the people rather than merely redistributing them.

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It is an alliance against the status quo, when the status quo means ill health, hunger, latifundia and one-crop economies, illiteracy and ignorance.

It is an alliance for land reform, jobs, new schools, roads, more electric power, more consumer cooperatives, improved irrigation and bountiful agricultural yields, and, above all, an equitable sharing of national financial burdens by all citizens.

It is an alliance which will promote regional economic cooperation and hemispheric integration.

In spite of setbacks and disappointments new beginnings have been made in our alliance.

In the past five years:

- Latin American exports have diversified and increased by almost \$2 billion.
- Primary school enrollment is up by seven million.
- 15 Latin American nations have enacted land reform measures since the Alliance formally began.
- Tax collections increased by \$3 billion from 1964 - 1967.

-3-

-- In 1967 alone, Latin American farmers produced food at twice the rate of new mouths which had to be fed.

-- 1968 was a year of more than 5% growth in GNP for Latin America, the *third* year of the past five when the Punta del Este target has been approximated.

The United States has placed more than \$6 billion at the disposal of Alliance programs.

We have pledged \$900 million to the Inter-American Development Bank over the next three years.

We have placed our weight and financial support behind Latin American economic regionalism and integration.

And we have pledged our help to forge the new communications and transportation links needed to make Latin America a true regional entity.

With the passage of time it has become increasingly clear that the task of Latin America's economic and social development is primarily a task for Latin Americans.

We in North America are the junior partners in this great enterprise. We have helped the nations of Latin America generate development momentum of their own.

-4-

Along with them we must now do all we can to sustain that momentum. For our hemisphere has reached the crucial stage when the material foundations of development can now begin to provide a better life for more than 200 million Latin American citizens.

But all our efforts in the Alliance and other inter-American programs will succeed only if Latin America achieves the goal of a truly integrated economic system.

The first promising steps have been taken in the Central American Common Market, the new Andean group and the Latin American Free Trade Association.

There is clearly a long road ahead; but in the 1960's the peoples of Latin America have taken the most important step of all: they have proved to themselves -- and to the world -- that the job can be done; there has been enough progress for all to know that it is possible for a modern Latin America to emerge peacefully, true to its own traditions and culture and to its own vision of the future.

A decade ago that would have been a statement of faith. Now, it is a statement of fact.

Pan American Society Award

-5-

And we in the United States shall always be proud to have played our part in this historic demonstration.

I accept this medal as a sign of past successes, and as a reminder of how much more Americans -- North and South -- must achieve in the years ahead.

#

sub

11:30 a. m.	President enters Cabinet Room .
11:30 - 11:31	Officers of Pan American Society are introduced by Mr. Robert Reininger, President of the Society.
11:32 - 11:35	Presentation of Award by Mr. Reininger -- reading of citation.
11:35	Gold medal on chain placed around President's neck.
11:35 - 11:37	Brief, informal response by President.
11:38	President leaves Cabinet Room.

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Wednesday, January 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Clemency Appeal for Igor Ivanov

Free file

The Soviets have for the second time transmitted a letter (text attached) addressed to you from the parents of Igor Ivanov. The letter seeks your clemency for Ivanov's release from prison.

The Soviets have repeatedly made clemency requests on Ivanov's behalf. In the past they have said that Ivanov's release would bring substantial benefits to U.S. -Soviet relations. Yet, the current letter was presented primarily as a humanitarian appeal, probably in anticipation of the State Department's view that at this time Ivanov's release would result in no concrete benefits to U.S. -Soviet relations.

In 1964 Ivanov was convicted on charges of receiving secret information on the command and control system of Strategic Air Command. His sentence is under appeal (issue: electronic surveillance) at the Supreme Court. It is the Justice Department's view that executive action should be deferred until the Supreme Court has reached its decision.

Since this is the second letter from the Ivanov's to you, the State Department thinks it is important to give it more than routine acknowledgement. They recommend that Embassy Moscow be instructed to inform the Soviet Foreign Ministry that you have received the Ivanov letter, reviewed the case, and decided that it would be inadvisable to intervene in the judicial process at this time.

I concur in this recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Have Embassy Moscow inform Foreign
Ministry as recommended

Call me

51a

Letter to President Johnson from parents of Igor Ivanov

Mr. President:

Five painful years have lapsed since our son Igor Ivanov was arrested and convicted by an American court. Therefore, we, his parents, again turn to you with a request to help in our great grief.

We are already old, his mother feels very poorly, her health continues to deteriorate of late, and she fears very much that she will not see her only living son. We have already written you that our eldest son perished in 1944 defending freedom against the fascists and our only hope and support in our old age is our youngest son who, as before, is not with us.

He has been severely punished, and he as well as we have been through enough indeed, a quarter of the term to which he was sentenced has passed. One wants to believe that you will understand us old people, that we have but one dream in life, to embrace our son at home, and that you will not refuse to show leniency, examine our request, and allow Igor to depart homeward.

You did a good deed in stopping the bombing in Viet-Nam. So do still another -- reunite our family. You are a father and you can understand us.

Respectfully yours,

**Ivanova - mother
Ivanov - father**

ACTION

Tuesday, January 7, 1969 - 7:55pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, are two letters replying to recent correspondence from African Heads of State.

At Tab A is a reply to President Kaunda, of Zambia, who wrote you (along with Prime Minister Wilson and others) about his concern over the Portuguese territories and the Nigerian civil war. The reply breaks no new ground but tells Kaunda frankly that we share his concern, especially on Nigeria, where his support of Biafra is one of the factors complicating a quick settlement.

At Tab B is a warm reply to President Senghor, of Senegal, who wrote you a thoughtful farewell in a New Year's letter.

I recommend you sign both letters.

W. W. Rostow

I have signed both _____

Call me _____

Dear Mr. President:

It was good to hear from you again after our recent exchange of views on Southern Rhodesia. The United States certainly shares your concern over the important questions of Portugal's administration of its African territories and the tragic civil war in Nigeria.

The Government of Portugal has long been aware of our strong support of the principle of self-determination in Africa and around the world. We have often made it clear that Portugal should abide by this principle in her African territories. Thus far, as you know, the Portuguese authorities have not agreed with these urgings. We shall continue this important dialogue with them, however, in the interests of peaceful progress in Southern Africa.

I need not describe the deep distress of my countrymen over the sad and terrible events in Nigeria. We are helping in every way we can through the international relief effort to ease the suffering on both sides of the battle line. Yet the suffering will surely deepen as the civil war continues. And this deep-seated political problem can only be solved, in the last account, by Africans and the Nigerians themselves.

That is the reason we have strongly supported the efforts of the Organization of African Unity to bring an end to the fighting. That is why we have encouraged a just settlement protecting the rights of all Nigerians. In the same vein, we have deplored the involvement of new arms suppliers on both sides.

I join in your prayer, Mr. President, that peace will return soon to that stricken land. For narrow political interests are being rapidly submerged in the human

disaster, and it is in no one's interest to prolong the suffering. The United States, you can be sure, will continue its efforts for relief and peace in every way open to us.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Kenneth D. Kaunda
President of the Republic of Zambia
Lusaka, Zambia

LBJ:WHR:HS:RM:lw
1/7/69

Att: File #3759

30th October, 1968. 526

Dear Mr President,

You will by now have received my letter in which I have dealt with the recent negotiations between the British Prime Minister Mr. Harold Wilson and Mr. Ian Smith, rebel leader in Rhodesia. The purpose of this letter is to deal with two other African questions in which my Government feels very greatly concerned.

The first one is the question of the Portuguese administration of its African colonies. I think that with the advent of a new Prime Minister, Professor Marcello Caetano, all Governments genuinely concerned in the cause of peace in Southern Africa should take advantage of the new man in Lisbon to try and influence him in a direction more favourable to a policy of liberalisation in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. I am, therefore, appealing to you, Mr. President, to do everything possible in making it clear to the new administration that it will pay dividends for them to grant independence to the African colonies. I am aware that your Government may have difficulties already with the Portuguese Government in view of the pressure which you have exercised in the past and to which there has been a negative response. What I am hoping, however, is that the new man in Lisbon would probably listen a little more than his predecessor was prepared to do.

The second issue refers to the question of Biafra - the Biafra/Nigeria war which has been raging for the last eighteen months without any prospects of an amicable settlement. The loss of life which has attended the military conflict is most regrettable, both from the war itself and the starvation which it has brought in its train. I am appealing to you and your Government to use all the possible influence at your command to help stop the war and therefore pave the way for an amicable settlement. It is unfortunate that the British Government and the Soviet Union have taken stands which have reduced completely their influence in convincing the Biafrans that they can return to a sort of constitutional framework within Nigeria. Indeed,

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 98-94

By ip/jc. NARA. Date 12-29-09

/ 2.

His Excellency L. B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America.

2.

the supply of food from Britain to starving areas in Biafra cannot but be considered as a mockery since on one hand the British Government are supplying arms with which to shoot the people who are being fed. Since your Government has declared itself neutral to the situation, I would hope that you would do everything possible to bring your pressure to bear on the British Government to stop their supply of arms as this will not help the cause of peace but continue promoting conditions for war and human destruction.

It is my hope and prayer, therefore, that you will do everything possible to assist.

Yours sincerely,

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PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA.

Dear Mr. President:

I was very moved by your thoughtful letter.

Mrs. Johnson and I will always carry the warmest memories of you and the people of Senegal. I am deeply proud of the strong ties between our two nations.

I remember from my good visit with you the dedication and energy of your brave country as she began the great adventure of nationhood. You have built on that promise with steady progress and a brightening future for all your citizens.

Your personal friendship has been a constant inspiration to me, Mr. President, just as your statesmanship has been a beacon for all of Africa.

With our best personal regards to you and Mrs. Senghor.

Sincerely,

**His Excellency
Leopold Sedar Senghor
President of the Republic of Senegal
Dakar, Senegal.**

**LBJ:WMB:HS:RM:lw
1/7/69**

593
52d

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 6773
T-114/R-XXXII
French

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

No. 2912/PR/SP

Dakar, December 20, 1968

Mr. President:

On the occasion of Christmas and the New Year, my wife joins me in extending our best wishes to you, Mrs. Johnson, and your children.

I should like, at this time, to tell you how very deeply I regret your departure from the White House.

I shall always remember the understanding, indeed the kind friendship, that you have unfailingly demonstrated for my country. For under your Presidency, cooperation between our two countries has developed in all fields, for the greater good of Senegal.

This is the message that I have desired to convey to you as the year draws to a close. I wish you a happy retirement, certain in the knowledge that you will continue to serve your country and the cause of world peace.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my high regard.

[s] Senghor

Léopold Sédar Senghor

His Excellency

Lyndon B. Johnson,

President of the United States of America.

16579

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

N° 2912/PR/SP

52e

DAKAR, LE 20 Décembre 1968

Monsieur le Président,

A l'occasion de Noël et de la Nouvelle Année, ma femme se joint à moi pour Vous prier d'accepter les vœux très sincères que nous formons pour Vous, pour Madame Johnson et pour Vos enfants.

Je profite de l'occasion pour Vous dire combien est vif, en moi, le regret de Vous voir quitter, volontairement, la Maison Blanche.

Je conserverai, toujours, le souvenir de la compréhension, voire de l'amitié attentive que Vous avez sans cesse manifestées à mon pays. Et, de fait, sous Votre présidence, la coopération entre nos deux pays s'était développée, dans tous les domaines, pour le plus grand bien du Sénégal.

C'est ce que je tenais à Vous dire, en cette fin d'année, en Vous souhaitant une retraite heureuse, sûr, au demeurant que Vous continuerez à servir Votre pays et la Paix du Monde.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de mon fidèle souvenir.



- Son Excellence
Monsieur Lyndon B. JOHNSON
Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

Léopold Sédar SENGHOR

for file 53

**Tuesday, January 7, 1969
3:10 p.m.**

Mr. President:

I have redrafted the foreign policy passage of the State of the Union message to include:

- a passage of the kind you directed (bottom of page 13, top of page 14);**
- the essence of the passage you directed me to prepare after your talk with Monnet (bottom of page 12, top of page 13);**

There are also some other minor suggestions that I have inserted.

In order to keep the total length down, I cut out some passages as well. The old foreign policy section was 755 words; the redrafted section is 940 words. 940 out of 3500 seems to me not an excessive amount for foreign policy at this stage in the Nation's history.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Harry McPherson

WWRostow:rla

I shall not indulge at this point in a recitation of our recent economic gains. Americans know that our prosperity is broad and deep, and that it has enabled millions to escape from poverty in the last few years.

I shall report to you, however, that our balance of payments record in the year just ended was the best since 1957. Preliminary estimates suggest that we may have achieved a balance, and conceivably even a surplus, in our balance of payments accounts.7

* * * * *

As I leave the Presidency, I know that the overriding concern of the American people is peace.

The quest for a durable peace has absorbed every Administration since the end of World War II.

It has led us to subscribe to the principles of the United Nations, and to support those principles in debate and action for almost a quarter of a century.

It has caused us, after full Congressional debate, to join in mutual security treaties with the Atlantic Community, in the Western Hemisphere, and with free nations of Asia and the Pacific -- regions where abiding interests of the United States are at stake.

The quest for peace has required us to seek a limitation of arms races, not only between the super-powers, but among smaller nations. We have joined in the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty, and the treaty against the spread of nuclear weapons.

This latter agreement -- the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- has now been pending in the Senate for _____ months. In my opinion, failure to ratify it would be a tragedy, not only for us but for the entire world. Our early ratification would encourage others to approve it, and thus limit the danger that small conflicts may strike the spark that brings holocaust.

But until a way is found to scale down the level of arms among the superpowers, mankind cannot view the future without apprehension. We must remain prepared to talk with the Soviet Union about limiting offensive and defensive missile systems.

The quest for peace caused us, two decades ago, to embark on a program of aid to the developing countries.

During these years there have been great advances. The story of foreign aid is a great success story -- but it remains unfinished business. A premature letdown could endanger progress achieved over many years of bipartisan effort. Last year our help for those who desperately need it, was cut below the level of safety for ourselves and humane regard for our fellow men. In the budget I shall submit this year, I shall ask for a substantial increase in economic assistance.

The quest for peace has demanded that we support efforts in regional cooperation on every continent:

- that we maintain the liberal trade policies that have helped to make us the world's leading nation in trade;
- that we seek new means to make the world's monetary system more stable and more flexible;
- and that we put aside our feelings of total hostility to Communist ideology, and seek areas of agreement with the Soviet Union where the interests of both nations are served.

In all these efforts Western Europe has a special place.

It was fashionable a few years ago to say that the cause of European unity had been lost. I do not believe this. I believe the only route for Europe to find strength and stability and for Europe to play in the world the role its great capacities and resources would permit, is to go forward to unity.

I believe the time is now coming for another great surge in the movement towards European unity.

I am sure that America will stand by its policy under its last four Presidents and will remain ready to work with a united Europe -- as a partner, on the basis of equality.

The quest for peace in the Middle East continues tonight in many capitals. And we pursue peace in Vietnam relentlessly in Paris and elsewhere.

I believe it is possible to say that the prospects for an honorable peace in that country are better tonight than at any time since North Vietnam began its invasion more than four years ago.

The free nations of Asia know tonight what they were not sure of at that time -- that America is indifferent neither to their freedom nor to its own vital interests in Asia and the Pacific.

The North Vietnamese know that they cannot achieve their aggressive purposes by force. There may be hard fighting before a settlement is reached; but it will yield the communists only casualties, and not a victory.

I believe that the American people will give the new President every opportunity to conclude the war in Southeast Asia in a way that is consistent with the requirements of a genuine peace.

I cannot speak of Vietnam without paying a personal tribute to the men who have carried the battle for us there. I have been honored to be their Commander in Chief. The nation owes them its instinting support while the battle continues -- and its eternal gratitude when their service is done.

In the eight years I have served in the Executive Branch, we/have faced together many challenges:

- Castro is now isolated and Latin America moves forward in confidence;
- a Congo once aflame and dangerous is finding its way to independent nationhood;
- Southeast Asia -- and Asia as a whole -- has moved from disintegration to confidence, and looks forward to peace and regional cooperation;

- the threat of nuclear blackmail was faced head-on and faced down, in Berlin and Cuba;
- NATO was challenged, but stands firm as it looks to the future;
- and working with our friends throughout the world we have showed once again that human freedom is not only morally right but a more efficient instrument of progress than totalitarianism.

Our successors face great tasks of peacemaking and reconstruction in Asia and the Middle East. But, looking back on where we have come from in these eight years, all of us should go forward with confidence.

* * * * *

SECRET

54

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, January 7, 1969 - 1:00pm

AGENDA

1. **Modalities: Persuading Saigon.** (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report.

2. **China Trade and U.S. Subsidiaries.** (Sec. Rusk)

Duplicate of paper submitted to the President at Tab A.

3. **Strategic Missiles.** (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report.

4. **Middle East: Next Steps.** (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report.

5. **Military Situation in South Vietnam.** (Sec. Clifford)

6. **Other.**

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 7, NARA, Date 3-5-98

WWRostow:rla

~~**SECRET**~~

55

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, January 7, 1969
12 00 noon

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have talked with Bill Jorden. We have not heard from him because he is down with flu. He will get off his letter tomorrow.

He says that he is wholly serious about the proposition I laid out to him, and you are free to let Truman know this, if you judge it helpful.

Incidentally, I did not use Truman's name over the phone.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By , NARA, Date 3-5-88

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET/CHEROKEE/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 94-469
By me/cb NARA, Date 1-9-98

Tuesday, January 8, 1969 -- 10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pursuant to your instruction, I talked with Sec. Rusk about Thieu.

He informed me of the existence of these two extremely sensitive messages: His to Bunker and Bunker's to Sec. Rusk, which are attached.

Sec. Rusk thought you would wish to read them this morning. They might be too sensitive to discuss at lunch. I believe Sec. Rusk plans to be in touch promptly with Rogers.

W. W. Rostow

State 1886
Saigon 302

~~SECRET/CHEROKEE/SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rla

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 2687
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 001886
CHEROKEE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-470

By mp/yp NARA Date 1-9-98

NODIS CHEROKEE

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY.

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT YOU ARE WILLING TO STAY ON FOR A PERIOD TO HELP OUT DURING A CRUCIAL TRANSITION. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO LET YOU KNOW HOW ANXIOUS THE PRESIDENT AND ALL OF US ARE TO BREAK THROUGH THE SILLY PROCEDURAL DEADLOCK IN PARIS. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES IT OF THE UTMOST URGENCY TO GET INTO TALKS ON THE SUBSTANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A ROUND TABLE WITH AND WITHOUT A PARTICULAR PIECE OF CLOTH IS JUST NOT ONE THAT WE CAN LIVE WITH. WE HAVE A GOOD STRONG POSITION ON FLAGS AND NAMEPLATES AND ON ORDER OF SPEAKING. HAD WE OURSELVES PROPOSED A ROUND TABLE OUR FRIENDS IN SAIGON WOULD PROBABLY HAVE ACCEPTED IT AND HANOI WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TURNED IT DOWN. I HAVE JUST TALKED TO MY SUCCESSOR, WILLIAM ROGERS, WHO IS JUST AS ANXIOUS AS WE ARE TO GET TO THE NEXT STAGE BEFORE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TAKES OFFICE ON JANUARY 20. I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT YOU WILL PRESS THIEU VERY HARD FOR SPEEDY ACTION ON THIS. IF YOU FIND THAT SOME INDICATION FROM THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD HELP OUT, I COULD PROBABLY ARRANGE THAT PROMPTLY. BUT SINCE IT IS KNOWN THAT YOU ARE REPRESENTING BOTH OLD AND NEW PERHAPS YOU CAN DO THIS YOURSELF. ROGERS VOLUNTEERED THE SAME CONCERN WHICH IS MOVING US, NAMELY, THAT SAIGON INTRANSIGENCE ON SUCH A FOOLISH POINT WILL SNOWBALL INTO GROWING PUBLIC OUTRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES AND COMPLICATE SUPPORT FOR THE WAR. THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HOPES TO HAVE SOME MONTHS MORATORIUM FROM THE OPPONENTS OF THE WAR, AT LEAST AS FAR AS CONGRESS IS CONCERNED, AND THEREFORE A SNAG ON THIS QUESTION OF TABLES COULD FRUSTRATE SOMETHING WHICH IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO SAIGON. PLEASE DO YOUR DEAD LEVEL BEST.

WITH WARM REGARDS.
RUSK
BT

566

NODIS CHEROKEE - *Saigon 302*

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMB BUNKER

REF: STATE 1886

1. I HAD IN PREPARATION A MESSAGE TO YOU ON THE VERY SUBJECT OF YOURS TODAY, AND HAVE RECAST IT ONLY SLIGHTLY AFTER READING YOUR TELEGRAM.

2. THIEU'S FOOT-DRAGGING OVER PROCEDURES, ON TOP OF THE DELAY IN NOVEMBER, IS NOT JUST IRRITATING AND EXASPERATING, IT IS WORRYING TO THE POINT OF BECOMING DANGEROUS.

3. I THINK THIEU HAS BEEN TRYING TO STRING THINGS OUT UNTIL JANUARY 20, HOPING TO SEE LODGE REPLACE HARRIMAN (NOW ACCOMPLISHED); HOPING THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL TAKE A HARDER MILITARY AND NEGOTIATING LINE THAN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION; AND HOPING, PERHAPS, THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, WITH NEW POLICIES AND NEW APPROACHES, MIGHT BE ABLE TO ARREST AND POSSIBLY REVERSE THE EROSION OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE WAR. AS THIEU (AND OTHERS) SEE IT, THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TOO SOON, THE WAR IS MOVING FAIRLY WELL, AS IS THE PACIFICATION EFFORT, AND THE GOVERNMENT IS GROWING STRONGER. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE TAKEN TERRIBLE CASUALTIES THIS YEAR, AND THEIR POWER IS DIMINISHING. ANOTHER SIX MONTHS OR YEARR WOULD SEE THE COMMUNISTS FURTHER WEAKENED, THE ALLIED MILITARY POSITION FURTHER IMPROVED, AND THE GOVERNMENT IN A MUCH STRONGER POSITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WHY THEN BE IN SUCH A HURRY;

4. THIEU IS CONSCIOUS OF OUR PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM, BUT IN SPITE OF MY STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO EMPHASIZE THIS I THINK HE IS PROBABLY INCLINED TO UNDERESTIMATE THE DANGER FROM THIS QUARTER. AS HE SEES IT, THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY COMMITTED HERE AND THE STRONG PROBABILITY IS THAT NO US GOVERNMENT CAN OR WILL DISEN-

AGAGE OR NEGOTIATE UNILATERALLY, AND THAT HE THEREFORE HAS SOME LEEWAY IN TIME AND SOME LEVERAGE OVER OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION. I WOULD GUESS THAT WHEN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION COMES IN THIEU WILL TRY TO PUT PRESIDENT NIXON, ROGERS AND LODGE TO THE TEST AS TO WHETHER THEY INTEND TO PURSUE A HARD LINE OR NOT, AND HOW FAR THEY DARE PRESS HIM TO GO ALONG WITH WHAT HE REGARDS AS "AMERICAN" POSITIONS TO MEET "AMERICAN" REQUIREMENTS.

5. I THEREFORE VISUALIZE TH AT IF THE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS ARE NOT RESOLVED BY JANUARY 20, I HAVE GRAVE DOUBTS THAT THEY WILL BE, THIEU MAY WELL SEEK TO STRING OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS OVER PROCEDURES BEYOND THAT DATE WILE HE IS TESTING OUT THE NEW TEAM.

6. I URGE THAT ROGERS TAKE THIS MATTER MOST SERIOUSLY AND THAT, AS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED, YOU WORK OUT WITH HIM MOVES TO MAKE CLEAR TO THIEU THAT THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT BROOK DELAYS. YOU WILL KNOW BEST HOW TO DO THIS. ONE WAY MIGHT BE FOR ROGERS, OR LODGE, OR BOTH TOGETHER, TO HAVE A TALK WITH BUI DIEM, POSSIBLY CONVEYING THROUGH HIM A MESSAGE TO THIEU. I COULD BACK THIS UP HERE, SAYING I AM WORKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM BOTH THE OLD AND NEW ADMINISTRATIONS, WHICH I WILL REPRESENTING. ALEX JOHNSON COULD FURTHER FORTIFY OUR INSISTENCE TO CLEAN UP THE PROCEDURAL MATTERS WHEN HE COMES HERE.

7. THE ESSENCE OF THE MESSAGE SHOULD BE CLEAR AND PRECISE: IT SHOULD STATE THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION REGARDS A ROUND TABLE, AND ANY FORMULA FOR SPEAKING ORDER BASED ON TWO SIDES AS ACCEPTABLE TO IT; THAT IT REQUIRES THAT THE PRELIMINARIES BE GOT OUT OF THE WAY SO THAT IT CAN MOVE TO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER JANUARY 20. THE REASONS FOR OUR TAKING THIS STAND SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR. THE DILATORY BEHAVIOR OF SOUTH VIET-NAM IS SO RAPIDLY ERODING AMERICAN CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC OPINION, THAT IF WE ARE TO STAY IN VIETNAM AND CONTINUE TO GIVE HIM SUPPORT, WE MUST MOVE TO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT ONCE. WE MEAN TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE AN FIGHT AT THE SAME TIME, AND TO STAND FIRM WITH THEM ON PRINCIPLE, BUT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESS WILL NOT AT THIS STAGE TOLERATE FIGHTING ALONE WHEN THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE, AND THEY WILL HAVE NO PATIENCE WITH ARGUMENTS OVER PROCEDURE THAT SEEM UNREASONABLE. THE SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT MUST BE CAREFUL NOT TO DRIVE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INTO A POSITION WHERE IT IS COMPELLED TO MOVE AHEAD ON ITS OWN. I LEAVE THE ACTUAL PHRASING TO WASHINGTON, BUT SOMETHING LIKE THIS SHOULD BE THE PURPORT OF THE MESSAGE, WHETHER ORAL OR WRITTEN. IF WRITTEN, I WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE IT AND COMMENT IN ADVANCE OF ITS SUBMISSION.

8. THIEU HAS NOT SENT WORD HE WILL SEE ME TODAY, AND WE HAVE A REPORT HE INTENDS TO BE OUT IN THE COUNTRY AGAIN ALL DAY TOMORROW. I THINK IT ADVISABLE NOT TO PRESS HIM AGAIN UNTIL I HEAR FURTHER FROM YOU. IF ROGERS IS READY TO WEIGH IN, IT WOULD SPEED MATTERS IF I WENT IN AFTER THAT WAS DONE. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ALL THE AMMUNITION POSSIBLE AND HOPE THAT I CAN THEN BUTTON IT UP. I ASSURE YOU I WILL DO MY BEST.
WARM REGARDS. BUNKER
BT

NNNNU

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

57

Tuesday, January 7, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sensitive Files in the State Department

Pres file

Secretary Rusk believes strongly that nothing now in the State Department files should be removed and thus withheld from the new Administration. He would strongly urge the incoming Secretary of State to severely restrict access to sensitive files -- possibly to only the three top State officials.

State Department officials state that nothing was removed from their files when President Eisenhower left. However, we are not in a position to check on what sensitive documents President Eisenhower never sent to the State Department.

Among the sensitive files which the State Department has are:

1. A single copy of Pen Pal letters, those sent by you and by President Kennedy.
2. A single copy of the transcript of the Glassboro meetings.

Unless you want to discuss this directly with Secretary Rusk, I will pass along to him your views.

W. W. Rostow

OK to leave sensitive files in State _____

Prefer copies be returned to me _____

Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 3518

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

58
INFORMATION

Tuesday - January 7, 1969

Mr. President:

Free file

You are seeing Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores for an informal chat today at 12:45 p.m. Although the Mexican and American Ambassadors had originally planned to accompany the Foreign Minister, Jim Jones indicated you would prefer a more informal meeting, so Minister Carrillo Flores will now be coming alone.

Carrillo Flores is in Washington to dedicate the Benito Juarez statue this morning which the Mexican Government is presenting to the United States Government. The dedication ceremony will be at 11:30.

There are no substantive issues likely to come up in your conversation. However, Secretary Rusk has furnished the attached memorandum (Tab A) summarizing the current Mexican political and economic situations.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Memorandum from Secretary Rusk to the President,
January 6, 1969.

SWLewis:mmm

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 14, NARA, Date 3-5-98



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 6, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Mexican Foreign
Secretary Antonio Carrillo Flores
January 7, 1969

The Visit

Carrillo Flores is visiting Washington to dedicate the Benito Juarez statue. Mexican Ambassador Hugo B. Margain and retiring U. S. Ambassador Fulton Freeman will accompany Carrillo Flores to the White House.

Mexico Today

The student unrest which erupted July 15 has apparently run its course. Though considerable discontent remains, most students are expected to return to classes following the Christmas vacation, and the Government recently took the conciliatory step of releasing from prison a number of students arrested during the course of the disturbances. Political activities during 1969 are expected to focus on the selection of a candidate to succeed President Diaz Ordaz in the 1970 election. There are no clear favorites yet.

The present government, and its successor, will have to deal more effectively with growing discontent, especially among younger Mexicans, with their one-party, and often arbitrary, political system. Carrillo Flores is well aware of the need for political reforms, and can be eloquent on the subject.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By 14, NARA, Date 3-5-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Mexico's economic situation continues to be relatively favorable, with good growth and an excellent international credit rating. Following the Chamizal settlement, many of our outstanding bilateral problems have been settled. Of the remaining border issues, the International Boundary and Water Commission recently proposed to the Mexicans a complete settlement of our remaining territorial differences, such as the Ojinaga Tract. We are awaiting the Mexican response.

The Diaz Ordaz Government, not wishing to attempt to commit the succeeding administration on the Colorado River salinity problem, has proposed a simple extension of the 1965 agreement for one year, so that it would expire in November, 1971.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

ACTION

59

Pre file

Monday, January 6, 1969 - 5:00pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommended Change in Treasury Regulations on the
Trade of U.S. Subsidiaries Abroad with China

Attached is Secretary Rusk's memorandum recommending you approve a change in Treasury regulations to permit U.S. subsidiaries abroad to sell a limited range of non-strategic goods to China. The change would enable these subsidiaries to engage in non-strategic trade with China as do other firms in the countries in which they are located -- but on a more restricted basis.

The change would be made subject to soundings with the incoming Administration and with Congressional leaders. It can be put into effect administratively -- without Congressional action -- through publication of licensing authority in the Federal Register.

Secretaries Clifford, Barr, and Smith concur in the recommendation.

Under current Treasury regulations a U.S. subsidiary abroad is prohibited from selling any product it manufactures abroad to China without specific Treasury approval. This is part of our complete embargo on exports to China. The host countries in which these subsidiaries are located have long charged that this regulation is an inappropriate extension of U.S. jurisdiction and therefore an infringement of their sovereignty. Their position is that a U.S. subsidiary in their country, since it is subject to their jurisdiction, should operate under the same regulations as any other firm doing business in their country. They object to the "extraterritorial" aspect of our trade controls, which prohibit companies under their jurisdiction from trading with China without the express approval, on a case-by-case basis, of the U.S. Treasury.

The recommended change in our regulations would go part way toward meeting their objections. It would permit U.S. subsidiaries to sell to China those non-strategic products that can be shipped freely from the U.S. to the USSR and Eastern Europe. For all other products, the U.S. subsidiaries abroad would still have to obtain specific Treasury authorization.

The proposed change would serve two purposes:

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 14, NARA, Date 3-5-98

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 2 -

- It would reduce an irritant in our relations with friendly countries -- principally Canada, the UK, and France.
- It might serve as a modest response to the faint signals from Peking suggesting possible changes in their position. Although we would describe the change as merely a technical adjustment in our regulations designed to remove frictions with our Allies, Peking might interpret it as a sign of flexibility in our own position.

Secretary Rusk believes that it makes good sense to act on this now -- as a useful move prior to our scheduled meeting with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw on February 20.

In addition, there is a tactical reason for making the change at this time. It would set a modest precedent which your successor could either follow up by extending the list of commodities or ignore. On the other hand, if he initiated the change at the outset of his Administration, too much significance would be read into it.

The main issue here is not substantive but psychological. Everyone agrees that this change has no strategic significance since:

- It does not apply to strategic goods; and
- The Chinese can and do buy these non-strategic products from other companies in the countries concerned.

Therefore, the change could in no way improve China's strategic position. Furthermore, the embargo on shipments to China from the U.S. would remain unchanged. Nevertheless there will be some in Congress who will ignore these facts and argue against any change in our regulations affecting China on the grounds that it could lead to a deterioration of the system of strategic trade controls and help China.

On the other hand there is sentiment on the Hill in favor of probing Chinese intentions. (If you approve this action, Secretary Rusk asks your advice on which Members of Congress to consult from the list he attaches at Tab C of his memo.)

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 3 -

This is a modest move which I believe is worth making at this time. It does not commit your successor but it could give him additional room to maneuver should opportunities present themselves.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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59a
~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1969

16772

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reducing "Extraterritorial" Applications
of United States Rules on Trading with China

Recommendations:

That, subject to soundings with the incoming Administration and Congressional leaders, we modify the total prohibition of transactions with China that now applies to foreign corporations owned by U.S. interests. A general license would be issued authorizing these corporations, including their U.S. officers, to transact certain limited types of business with China, except that this authority would not include (1) strategic goods, (2) U.S. origin goods, (3) banking and marine transactions, (4) the use of dollars in any transaction, (5) or, U.S. citizens abroad not acting in corporate capacities.

The Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, and Commerce concur in this recommendation. (Language for the general license at Tab A).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

1. Two reasons underlie our desire to revise Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR), one long standing, and the other of immediate tactical value. We have wanted to do something to ease somewhat the extraterritorial application of U.S. regulations on trade with China for some time, because of the irritations and problems it creates for us with many friendly countries, but another reason that this is the time to act

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By rf, NARA, Date 3-5-98

stems from the noises we are currently hearing from Peking. This is something that Peking would recognize as related to China, even though we were saying that the real reason for our action is related to friendly countries and has little or nothing to do with China itself. It would be easier, as a practical matter, for this rather than the next Administration to take this action before February 20. If made, these changes would also provide a modest precedent that the next Administration could either follow or ignore. The same step, however, if initiated by a new President, would have much greater significance read into it by all and sundry.

2. We have been subject to serious frictions with Canada, the United Kingdom, France and other friendly countries over many years through the impact on foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms of our regulations on trade. These have applied to several countries, including Communist China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, and Cuba. What especially galls friendly countries are "extraterritorial" provisions that prohibit corporations under their national jurisdictions from trading with the aforementioned countries without case-by-case approval by the U.S. Treasury. The revision of controls proposed would apply only to Communist China.

3. In practice, the extraterritorial provisions of FACR have virtually no economic or strategic effect on China. Other foreign firms--not U.S. subsidiaries--handle the business instead. The effect of the provisions, therefore, is merely to produce resentment in friendly countries at U.S. "interference" and some loss of business by the U.S. subsidiaries.

4. The "extraterritoriality" issue could result in retaliatory legislation. Earlier this year a Canadian Government Task Force proposed setting up a Government Export Trade Agency with authority to override U.S. Treasury regulations. This report is still pending before the Canadian Parliament. The French judiciary

has intervened to force contract fulfillment in violation of the FACR. Additional actions of this kind could complicate U.S. relations with the countries involved. Once precedent of such retaliatory action of this kind is established, it could extend into areas of major importance to us--such as overriding our regulations on profit repatriation by U.S. subsidiaries.

Limited Scope of Authorization to Trade

5. The FACR should be modified now to reduce somewhat cause for frictions arising from their extraterritorial application to foreign corporations owned by U.S. interests. Since they are executive regulations, they can be revised by the Secretary of Treasury without Congressional action through publication of specific licensing authority in the Federal Register (See Annex A). The license would not permit trade in strategic goods, trade in goods of U.S. origin, or the use of dollars in any transactions. It would not extend to firms in marine transport and banking or to U.S. citizens or residents acting as individuals, rather than company officers. While the proposed change removes one of the minor irritants in the whole extraterritorial issue, a basic problem remains so long as the U.S. strategic goods list, which would be applicable to the U.S.S.R., Eastern European countries, and China, is larger than the COCOM list, and as long as we expect foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to abide by it for goods containing U.S. components and goods produced under U.S. licenses. Since the FAC regulations, as they apply to foreign subsidiaries of the United States, have virtually no economic or strategic effect on China, the main effect of this step would be to improve our relations with friendly countries, and at no sacrifice to our security interests. We could say, moreover, that the change in policy being made did not alter in any other way our current embargo on U.S. exports to Communist China, our current embargo on imports from Communist China, and our current prohibition of dollar transactions involving Communist China.

6. The proposed change does not jeopardize the legal principle under which we impose other controls. On the other hand, easing the irritants described above may well reduce the danger of action by other countries to override our controls and increase their willingness to support us in voluntary programs, such as the denial of strategic goods to China and Eastern Europe.

7. Public handling of the FACR changes would treat them as limited, innocuous and technical. They would be published in the Federal Register, with no effort to draw attention to them. If questions are raised, the changes could be described as a small effort to reduce somewhat sources of friction with friendly countries. We would not publicize them as movement toward detente with China. If pressed, though, we would note that the United States is always interested in improving relations with China and would welcome any helpful change in China's policy (Tab B).

Probable Interpretation of Change by Foreign Countries

8. (a) Mainland China - We doubt that the Peking regime would, at present, give a direct response. But Chinese concern with trade with Canada is sufficient to assure that this move would be noted at a high level. Earlier we have mentioned the changes in noise that comes from Peking at this time--a time when the Cultural Revolution appears to be entering a new stage. We do not know what they signify, but they are numerous and appear to be pointed in our direction. It is possible that something important is brewing in Peking. We should, prior to the February meeting with us at Warsaw requested by Peking, show that we are listening and interested and capable of being responsive. If there is any "moderate" group in Peking, it might regard this step as indication of some possibility of U.S. Government elasticity in future economic policy.

(b) Russia - It would arouse Soviet curiosity. The Russians would probably imagine there was more to it than had been made public, and be reminded that better relations with the United States are very much in their long-run interests.

(c) Other Asian Nations - We would inform the Governments of Japan, Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Thailand and Republic of Viet-Nam of the FACR changes before making them. We would explain our concern in eliminating frictions with Canada, etc., and stress the

minimum net effect of the change on China's foreign trade. We would say that we did not intend to modify the regulations to the extent of permitting any trade with North Korea or North Viet-Nam at this time.

Probable Domestic Interest

(d) Congress - There will always be some legislators who oppose any step that might be interpreted as a change in our relations with China. There is, however, increasing evidence of Congressional interest--such as Senator Russell's speech on December 31--in exploring possibilities for piercing China's isolation as a prerequisite to peace in Asia. However, to be on the safe side, we would consult important Congressional leaders before taking action. (Tab C)

(e) The Press and Public - It would show those who have urged a more "flexible" policy toward China that U.S. policies are determined by the rule of reason, and not based on adherence to any rigid doctrine or attitude of hostility. This group would no doubt want to see more done, but our experience in relaxing previous regulations--for example, restrictions on travel by journalists, doctors, and the like to China--shows that we do benefit on balance with the press, Congressmen and academics from moves of this sort.

Risks of Change

9. Commerce and Treasury point out that certain difficulties might arise from the proposed revisions of the FACR which potentially could create costs that must be weighed against prospective foreign policy gains. State does not regard these difficulties as unmanageable.

(a) Modest as it is, the change could arouse Congressional and public reactions that might be counter-productive in future efforts to promote East-West trade and a relaxation of tensions in various areas.

- 6 -

(b) If friendly countries interpreted the change as encouragement for them to proceed with trade with Communist China in items that the United States considers strategic, this could produce some deterioration of international (COCOM) controls.

(c) Any change in Treasury controls could mean that Commerce would be exposed to demands for relaxation of its controls, many of which have a significant extra-territorial impact.

(d) American firms without subsidiaries abroad and small firms not able to establish subsidiaries might complain of discrimination.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachments:

1. Tab A - Language Changes for the FACR.
2. Tab B - Press Guidance on Changes in the FACR.
3. Tab C - Congressional Consultation.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

59b

Tab A: Language changes for the FACR

The attached language is intended to accomplish the purpose set forth in the memo. It excludes from the general license firms in banking (para. a), the use of dollars (para. b), goods of US origin (para. c), the broadest list of strategic goods developed within the US Government (para. d), firms in marine transport (para. e), and individuals not acting in corporate capacities (para. f), All transactions with North Korea and North Viet-Nam are excluded. Other transactions by US subsidiaries abroad are permitted, even when they have US citizens as officers or employees (para. a and f).

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 1 NARA, Date 3-5-98

LANGUAGE FOR PROPOSED CHANGES IN FACR

Add New Section 31 C.F.R. 500.540 to read:

Certain Transactions by Non-Banking
Organizations in Foreign Countries Owned or
Controlled by Persons in the United States

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of this section, all transactions incidental to the conduct of business activities abroad engaged in by any non-banking association, corporation, or other organization, which is organized and doing business under the laws of any foreign country in the authorized trade territory are hereby authorized.

(b) This section does not authorize any transaction involving United States dollar accounts or any other property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(c) This section does not authorize any transaction involving the purchase or sale or other transfer of any merchandise made in the United States or made abroad with U.S. technology and/or component parts, or the obtaining of a credit in connection therewith.

(d) This section does not authorize any transaction involving the merchandise included in the Commodity Control List of the United States Department of Commerce set forth in 15 CFR Part 399 and identified by the letter "Y" in the column headed "Validated License Required for Country Groups Shown Below" or of a type the unauthorized exportation of which from the United States is prohibited by any of the several regulations referred to in CFR 370.5. Excepted from this provision are dairy products and cereal grains.

(e) This section does not authorize the transportation aboard any vessel which is owned or controlled by any organization described in paragraph (a) of this section of any merchandise from a designated foreign country to any country or from any country directly or indirectly to a designated foreign country.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-2-

(f) This section does not authorize any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States other than an organization described in paragraph (a) of this section or a person acting within the scope of his authority as an officer, director, or employee of such an organization described in paragraph (a) of this section to engage in or participate in or be involved in any transaction.

(g) This section does not authorize any transaction involving either North Korea or North Viet-Nam.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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TAB B: Press Guidance on Changes in the FACR

A. We intend to publish the revised paragraph of the FACR in the Federal Register without an accompanying press release or any other effort to draw attention to it. While we expect questions to be raised, we will treat the revision as essentially technical in nature, intended as a friendly response to Allied nations. We regard the regulations as an appropriate exercise of US jurisdiction over the US subsidiaries concerned. In the interest of good relations with our allies, however, we are modifying some provisions to which they most strongly object and which we feel can be changed without damaging US security interests. None of the foregoing would be volunteered, but answers to questions would be guided by this line of argument.

B. Sample questions and answers:

1. Q: Why were the regulations changed?

A: We have had many representations from important Allies to modify controls over trade with China by US subsidiaries operating on their territory. We are not necessarily in agreement with the policies of those countries on trade with China. And we consider our regulations to be a proper exercise of US jurisdiction over US citizens and US-owned subsidiaries. But we do place a high value on having good relations with our Allies. Seeing that they felt strongly, we decided to take some action to alleviate what might otherwise be a source of friction between us.

2. Q: Do you then contemplate making further changes if there are additional representations from our Allies?

A: We think the changes we have just made should relieve the most difficult problems. (If necessary: Certainly it is premature to conclude that further changes will be requested, before these changes have even gone into effect.)

3. Q: Which important Allies have asked for the changes?

A: Our purpose in modifying the regulations is to reduce friction with friendly countries, not to draw attention to such friction and perhaps thereby increase it. For that reason, we prefer not to go into the history or the details of differences of opinion between us and other countries. We think making the change will be helpful; talking about the irritants it is intended to reduce would be unhelpful.

4. Q: What will be the net effect of the change?

A: First of all, it is important to understand that the change only affects the trade of other countries with China. No good produced in the US will be sold to China nor will any goods produced in Communist China enter the US. Secondly, no strategic goods, regardless of origin, will be traded with China even by US subsidiaries operating in foreign countries. Thirdly, US subsidiaries will not be engaged in transporting goods to China or in providing banking services for trade with China. The US does not choose to trade with China at this time. And we do not wish to assist in any way in strengthening China strategically. The exclusions I have just listed conform with those desires. What remains is an increase in the freedom of normal, non-strategic business activities in countries with US subsidiaries. That conforms with the desires of the countries involved, at essentially no sacrifice to us. It is a material change, but it does not run counter to policies we consider important.

5. Q: Having made this change for China, why not make a similar change for Cuba?

A: Our regulations on trade with Cuba are already less stringent than those for China. They were written later and therefore drafted with a view toward minimizing the problems that had come up with respect to China. To some extent, you could say that we are now updating our regulations for China in view of that same experience. Furthermore, our overall policy toward Cuba has been developed in concert with the members of the OAS and is based on the Declaration of 1964. Any change toward Cuba would logically stem from consultations with the OAS.

- 3 -

6. Q: Do you intend to take the matter up with the OAS?

A: We have no intention to do so at this time.

7. Q: What are the remaining differences between US regulations on trade with China and trade with Cuba?

A: I would have to check to be absolutely accurate technically. In general terms, the regulations are now more stringent in terms of the range of goods that can be traded with China, less stringent in terms of permitting US citizens to act in their corporate capacities as officers of US owned subsidiaries operating abroad.

8. Q: Why were the changes made at this time?

A: We have had a move of this sort under consideration for some time. It is complex technically and it took until now to come up with the right combination. Perhaps it is overdue and should have been taken earlier.

9. Q: Do you mean to say that this has nothing to do with the Chinese note to you about the Warsaw meeting next February?

A: The fact is that we were working on the finishing touches before we received the Chinese note or had any notion that it was in the air. However, we have said repeatedly that we are interested in improving relations with China. Now as always, we would welcome any helpful change in China's attitude toward us.

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Tab C: Congressional Consultation

You may wish to indicate which of the following members of the Congress it would be wise to consult:

Senators

J. W. Fulbright
John J. Sparkman
Everett F. Dirkson
Edmund S. Muskie
Walter F. Mondale
Russell B. Long
Edward M. Kennedy
Mike Mansfield
Warren G. Magnusson
Jacob K. Javits
Wallace F. Bennett

Congressmen

John W. McCormack
Carl Albert
Hale Boggs
Wright Patman
Thomas E. Morgan
Thomas L. Ashley
Thomas M. Rees
William S. Moorhead
William B. Widnall
Gerald R. Ford
B. F. Sisk
Harley O. Staggers

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ny, NARA, Date 3-5-98

Monday, Jan. 6, 1969
4:20 p. m.

Pres. file

60

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob Komer loses his car,
but keeps his cool.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 14 NARA, Date 3-5-98

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ACTION NEA 15

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AMCONSUL ADANA

Postow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANKARA 94

1. DURING PRIVATE LUNCH AS GUESTS OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT AND FACULTY DEANS, PAO LINCOLN AND I REGRETTABLY WITNESSED BURNING OF MY CAR. INCIDENT APPEARED TO BLOW UP FROM NOWHERE WELL AFTER WE ARRIVED, AND FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATION I WOULD JUDGE THAT NOT MORE THAN TEN TO FIFTEEN STUDENTS WERE INVOLVED. AROUND TWO HUNDRED OTHERS WERE PASSIVE BYSTANDERS. SINCE POLICE COULD NOT ENTER UNIVERSITY GROUNDS, NO ONE WAS IN POSITION TO PREVENT DAMAGE UNTIL AFTER IT WAS DONE.
2. PRESIDENT KURDAS AND FACULTY DEANS WERE APPALED BUT CONFINED THEMSELVES TO HANDWRINGING. FRIENDLY STUDENT UNION LEADERS IDENTIFIED CULPRITS AS MEMBERS OF SMALL EXTREMIST IDEA CLUB OF ARCHITECTURE FACULTY.
3. CHIEF OF PROTOCOL HAS EXPRESSED GOVERNMENT'S REGRETS. KURDAS AND I HAVE ISSUED STATEMENTS TO PUT MATTER IN PERSPECTIVE. DESPITE TEMPTATION TO RECOMMEND PROMPT RETALIATORY ACTION SUCH AS SUSPENDING AID SUPPORT OF METU, MY OWN VIEW IS THAT WE SHOULD PLAY IT COOL AND WAIT TO SEE WHAT ACTION GOT AND METU TAKE. EXTREME LEFT MAY WELL BE DIGGING ITS OWN GRAVE WITH SUCH EXCESSES.

GP-4 KOMER

ACTION

61

Monday, January 6, 1969 -- 3:00 pm

Mr. President:

**Herewith a rewrite of the letter
to Levien and Gould, as requested.**

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

rlm

61a

January 6, 1969

Dear Frank and Harry:

I have your wire of December 23.

I appreciate -- perhaps more than you know -- your concern about your sons and the other reservists who were called up with them. As you may know, our Pat Nugent was called to active duty by Headquarters Air Reserve in March 1968. We know well the dislocation and other problems involved.

I would have preferred that it not be necessary to order reservists away from their civilian pursuits, but you can be assured that the men who responded to last year's reserve calls contributed importantly to our Nation's security. I am convinced their presence in the active forces improved the prospects for a stable peace in Asia.

The Pueblo incident was the culmination of a stepped up campaign of violence by the North Koreans during a period of 15 months. The units ordered to active duty in January were not called up to effect the release of the Pueblo; rather, they were ordered to strengthen our forces quickly and enable them to respond to a broad range of international contingencies. In my speech of January 26 I said we were "taking certain precautionary measures to make sure that our military forces are prepared for any contingency that might arise in the area."

The Department of Defense is constantly evaluating its need for reservists and is attempting to release reservists from active duty as quickly as possible. As you, of course, know, the Air Force has announced plans to release its reservists no later than June 30, 1969. I wish it were possible to release all reservists earlier; but some reservists are still essential in support of our forces in Southeast Asia; 6700 of the 14,200 recalled air reservists are now overseas.

I understand -- and fully share -- your desire that your sons return to civilian life as rapidly as possible. I believe that the Air Force plan, encompassing them along with the other men in their unit, will accomplish this as rapidly as is consistent with our national interests.

All my best wishes to you and yours for the New Year.

Sincerely,

Mr. Francis S. Levien
Mr. Harry E. Gould
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York

Luci and Patrick Lyndon feel as you do - They want Pat released and home from Viet Nam as soon as possible and I want all the boys back and out the first moment we can.

LBJ:Defense:AK:LET:WWR:rln

Jan. 6

416

Mr. Smith,

Bill Gulley called with the following:

"Pat Nugent was ordered to active duty by Headquarters Air Reserve personnel commanded to report not later than March 21, 1968. He was called up under an Air Force regulation, 4521, that permitted reserves to volunteer for active duty with units who had been activated but were not at full strength. Activated for as long as the unit is on active duty but no longer than January 25, 1970. He is due for rotation from Vietnam to the US on April 11, 1969."

A.

INFORMATION

62

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~

Pres file

Monday, January 6, 1969 - 11:20 am

Mr. President:

Thieu is stalling.

Bunker is pressing for a session tomorrow or Wednesday.

Perhaps Bunker's new status of continuity will give him leverage -- if he is instructed to use it to the hilt and really scare Thieu a bit.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 245

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 4, NARA, Date 3-5-98

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

626/13

PP RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 056A 0061135
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 061045Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7034
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3427
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 245

NODIS/HARVAN

PARIS FOR VIET NAM MISSION

REF A SAIGON 154; B SAIGON 160; C STATE 1411

1. HAVING GIVEN THEM TWO DAYS TO LET OUR MESSAGE (REF A) SINK IN, I HAD HERZ TELEPHONE THANH THIS MORNING TO ASK WHAT THE GVN PROPOSED TO DO NEXT. THANH MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIEU WOULD NOT RPT NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO SEE ME, AND SO I DID TWO THINGS: I SENT BERGER AND HERZ TO CALL ON THANH TO PREPARE THE GROUND FURTHER, AND MEANWHILE I IMMEDIATELY ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT THIS AFTERNOON WITH THIEU.

2. THE WORD FROM THE PALACE IS THAT THIEU WAS SICK THIS MORNING AND THAT WE WOULD BE INFORMED IF HE WAS ABLE TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON. WORD HAS JUST COME FROM THE PALACE, IN RESPONSE TO MY FURTHER INQUIRY, THAT THIEU IS STILL NOT FEELING WELL AND IS UNABLE TO SEE ME. IF HE IS WELL ENOUGH TO GO TO II CORPS TOMORROW, AS SCHEDULED, I HAVE ASKED TO SEE HIM ON HIS RETURN, BUT I CONCLUDE THAT IT MAY BE WEDNESDAY BEFORE I AM ABLE TO SEE HIM.

3. MEANWHILE, THE CONVERSATION WITH THANH SERVED TO BRING OUT THE ATTITUDE WITH WHICH WE WILL HAVE TO CONTEND. THANH SAID THE PRESIDENT "IS NOT SATISFIED" THAT VANCE PUT FORWARD ALL THE SIX NEW PROPOSALS IN ONE SESSION, JUST TO HAVE THEM TURNED DOWN ONE AFTER THE OTHER. HE (AND DUC, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT) INDICATED THAT THE GVN WOULD LIKE US TO MARK TIME, PUT PRESSURE ON THE OTHER SIDE, AND MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE WAITING FOR THEM TO CALL THE NEXT MEETING. THEY ALSO FELT THAT AFTER THE SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE WE ARE IN A GOOD POSITION AND ALL THAT IS REQUIRED IS TO HAMMER AWAY AT THE THEME THAT THE TABLE IS NOT A PROCEDURAL BUT A SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION.

~~SECRET~~

0952Q
January 6, 1969
6:57 A.M.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 14, NARA, Date 3-5-98

Restow

~~SECRET~~

-2- Saigon 245, January 6, 1969, NODIS/HARVAN

4. WE QUICKLY DISABUSED THANK OF THE IDEA THAT THE SECRETARY SHARES HIS VIEW THAT WE ARE IN A GOOD POSITION. WE STRESSED THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE AT ALL THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, OR WORLD OPINION, WOULD FEEL THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CIRCULAR ABLE WITH AND WITHOUT A BAIZE STRIP IS WORTH DELAYING THE INCEPTION OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. WE EXPLAINED THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAS MADE IMPORTANT (THOUGH CONDITIONAL) CONCESSIONS, INCLUDING THE IMPORTANT STATEMENT THAT THEY DO NOT RPT NOT REGARD A ROUND TABLE AS EXPRESSING THEIR CONTENTION THAT THE MEETINGS ARE FOUR-SIDED. WE WENT OVER THE ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AS COMPARED TO THAT IN WHICH WE WOULD BE IF WE MADE A REASONABLE PROPOSAL ALONG THE LINES OF REF C.

5. THE UPSHOT OF THIS MEETING WAS THAT DUC UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY TO THIEU WHAT WE HAD SAID AND ALSO TO GIVE HIM A PAPER THAT WE HAD BROUGHT FOR THE OCCASION. (THANK LEFT FOR DALAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER OUR MEETING.) SO THE STAGE IS SOMEWHAT BETTER SET FOR THE MEETING I HOPE TO HAVE WITH THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW OR WEDNESDAY.
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

63

Monday, January 6, 1969 -- 11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Mac Bundy called to ask this question: Is it your wish that he resign as a consultant before January 20, or let the relationship move over into the next administration?

He tells me that Gene Black has a similar problem and would be grateful for your guidance.

Incidentally, Henry Kissinger has asked that I be a consultant to him. I am inclined to say yes, unless you have views to the contrary.

W. W. Rostow

You may also wish to recall the attached.

WWRostow:rla

MEMORANDUM

ACTION

63a
B

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, December 10, 1968 -- 2:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

I called Mac Bundy today and it turns out he is back from Vienna.

I indicated you might wish to see him. He was delighted. It would be best for him if it could be next week. He would rather not do it on Monday, December 16 because he and Mary are hosting a dinner that night. The 17th and 18th would be fine. The 19th (Thursday) is a little more difficult. The 20th (Friday) would be okay.

W. Rostow

Shall we schedule Mac Bundy next week?

Yes _____ No _____

*Wait
Call me -
C*

JimJ

INFORMATION

Monday, January 6, 1969
10:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Amb. Bunker was particularly anxious that you read his rather remarkable Christmas message to Americans in Vietnam.

Amidst all the noise in the system, as scientists say, Ellsworth Bunker's clear voice and vision are a comfort.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

WWRostow:rlh



A CHRISTMAS MESSAGE TO AMERICANS IN VIET-NAM FROM
AMBASSADOR BUNKER

Once again to each member of the United States Mission in Viet-Nam, civilian and military, I send Season's Greetings and my deep gratitude for the part each of you has played so well in the great task in which we are engaged on the soil of Viet-Nam.

This has been a year of trial. Men's courage and determination have been tried on the field of battle, they have been tried in the cities and in the countryside in the patient and unflagging effort to help our Vietnamese allies build a strong and viable democracy, in the midst of war to carry out a social revolution. Countless acts of unsung heroism have been performed by soldier and civilian alike.

It has been a year of testing - a testing of our commitment to the spiritual foundations on which our society rests, to the moral order and the rule of law on which it depends. It has been a year of testing of our will to create the peaceful world we envisage, free from aggression, where man's creative energies can be directed toward improving the quality of his life.

What we do or fail to do here will be felt not only in Viet-Nam but everywhere, for it is relevant to man's never-ending struggle for freedom and dignity.

St. Paul's words to Timothy are appropriate to our time and situation: "I remind you to rekindle the gift of God that is within you, for God did not give us a spirit of timidity, but a spirit of power." God has given us, as a nation and a people, great power to use for good or ill. As we remember with reverence those who have given the last full measure of devotion, let us pray for the courage, the patience and the steadfastness to use that power to strive for a world in which men may live in freedom, in dignity, in tolerance and in peace.

How shall we be able to do this? Perhaps Dietrich Bonhoeffer, writing from a Nazi prison, can show us the way: "Who stands his ground? Only the man whose ultimate criterion is not in his reason, his principles, his conscience, his freedom or his virtue, but who is ready to sacrifice all these things when he is called to obedient and responsible action in faith and exclusive allegiance to God. The responsible man seeks to make his whole life a response to the question and call of God." In that spirit, may we all in the days ahead, whatever the call may be, stand our ground.

Ellsworth Bunker

January 6, 1969

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Final Messages to Heads of State and Chiefs of Government

President Eisenhower sent farewell messages to Heads of State and Chiefs of Government on his final day in office. Attached are samples of these messages.

In the event you wish to follow this custom, we will need to get the State Department working on drafts promptly.

I recommend that you authorize me to ask the State Department to prepare suitable drafts.

W. W. Rostow

_____ Ask State to prepare draft messages

_____ Do not wish to send final messages

_____ Call me

BKS:amc

66

ACTION

Monday, January 6, 1969 —

Mr. President:

Pres file

Attached for your approval is a proposed message to Emperor Haile Selassie on the occasion of an inspection visit to our communication facility at Kagnev Station on January 9.

The plan would be to have your message clatter out of one of the teletypes as the Emperor stands there watching. This is a nice gesture, and the message is drafted to be a warm farewell to a good friend.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Call me _____

WWR:RM:lw

662

Proposed Message to Emperor Haile Selassie

Your Imperial Majesty:

America is deeply proud of the many and close bonds between our two peoples. Your visit today to Kagnaw Station honors this enduring partnership for peace and progress.

This inspection is also fitting in a larger sense, for the men you see at work are striving to bring mankind closer together through modern communications. But that goal cannot be achieved unless science is truly joined by the humanity and wisdom Your Majesty embodies.

Your friendship and wise counsel have always been a source of strength and inspiration for me and my country. Mrs. Johnson and I send you warmest wishes for this holiday season and for many more years of service to Ethiopia and the world.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Imperial Majesty
Haile Selassie I,
Emperor of Ethiopia,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

67

INFORMATION

Sunday, January 5, 1969 -- 12:25 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the materials you requested on the August 1964 resolution, plus the testimony of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and General Wheeler.

Any fairminded reading of them would conclude that the resolution was addressed to the whole problem of Southeast Asia -- our commitments there and the deep reasons for them -- not to the Tonkin Gulf incident.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:

- President's special message to the Congress on US Policy in SEA, August 5, 1964
- Joint Hearing before the Cmte on Fn Relations and the Cmte on Armed Services, US Senate, 90th Congress, 2d session, on A Joint Resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia, August 6, 1964.
- Statement by the President on the Passage of the Joint Resolution on Southeast Asia, August 7, 1964
- Remarks Upon Signing Joint Resolution of the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Southeast Asia, August 10, 1964. (The President

WWRostow:rla

500 Special Message to the Congress on U.S. Policy in
Southeast Asia. August 5, 1964

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against US naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gun boats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two US aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a decision to ask the Congress for a Resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in Southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This Treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their Constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties to the protocol states.

Our policy in Southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:

1. *America keeps her word.* Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. *The issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole.* A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. *Our purpose is peace.* We have no military, political or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. *This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.* Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of Southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva Accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltration into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When

in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a Resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a Congressional Resolution essential. But there is an

the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the U.S. will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a Resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our armed forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The Resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our armed forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia

additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on three months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

NOTE: A joint resolution "to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia" was approved by the President on August 10 (see Item 507).

676

503 Statement by the President on the Passage of the Joint
Resolution on Southeast Asia. *August 7, 1964*

THE 414-to-nothing House vote and the 88-to-2 Senate vote on the passage of the Joint Resolution on Southeast Asia is a demonstration to all the world of the unity of all Americans. They prove our determination to defend our own forces, to prevent aggression, and to work firmly and steadily for peace and security in the area.

I am sure the American people join me in expressing the deepest appreciation to the leaders and Members of both parties, in both Houses of Congress, for their patriotic, resolute, and rapid action.

NOTE: This statement was read by the Press Secretary to the President, George E. Reedy, at his news conference held at the White House at 1:40 p.m. on August 7, 1964.

67c

507 Remarks Upon Signing Joint Resolution of the Maintenance
of Peace and Security in Southeast Asia. August 10, 1964

My fellow Americans:

One week ago, half a world away, our Nation was faced by the challenge of deliberate and unprovoked acts of aggression in southeast Asia.

The cause of peace clearly required that we respond with a prompt and unmistakable reply.

As Commander in Chief the responsibility was mine—and mine alone. I gave the orders for that reply, and it has been given.

But, as President, there rested upon me

In each House the resolution was passed on Friday last—with a total of 502 votes in support and 2 opposed.

Thus, today, our course is clearly known in every land.

There can be no mistake—no miscalculation—of where America stands or what this generation of Americans stand for.

The unanimity of the Congress reflects the unanimity of the country.

The resolution is short. It is straightforward. I hope that it will be read around the world.

The position of the United States is stated plainly. To any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply.

To any in southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom, we shall give it.

In that region there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek—no territory, no military position, no political ambition.

Our one desire—our one determination—is that the people of southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way.

This resolution stands squarely within the four corners of the Constitution of the United States. It is clearly consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

This is another new page in the outstand-

still another responsibility—the responsibility of submitting our course to the representatives of the people, for them to verify it or veto it.

I directed that to be done last Tuesday.

Within 24 hours the resolution before me now had been placed before each House of Congress. In each House the resolution was promptly examined in committee and reported for action.

In each House there followed free and serious debate.

ing record of accomplishments the 88th Congress is writing.

Americans of all parties and philosophies can be justly proud—and justly grateful. Proud that democracy has once again demonstrated its capacity to act swiftly and decisively against aggressors. Grateful that there is in our National Government understanding, accord, and unity between the executive and legislative branches—without regard to partisanship.

This is a great strength that we must always preserve.

This resolution confirms and reinforces powers of the Presidency. I pledge to all Americans to use those powers with all the wisdom and judgment God grants to me.

It is everlastingly right that we should be resolute in reply to aggression and steadfast in support of our friends.

But it is everlastingly necessary that our actions should be careful and should be measured.

We are the most powerful of all nations—we must strive also to be the most responsible of nations.

So, in this spirit, and with this pledge, I now sign this resolution.

NOTE: The President spoke in the East Room at the White House. The joint resolution is Public Law 88-408 (78 Stat. 384).

'It was not LBJ's war'

Second of several dispatches reviewing
the Johnson administration.

By Saville R. Davis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Any judgment on the Vietnam war today has a high content of opinion and emotion. If there is a clearly objective journalistic verdict, this reporter does not feel able to identify it.

It follows that Lyndon Johnson's role in that war is likewise a matter of opinion.

This reporter believes the Vietnam war was in the main a national, nonpartisan involvement, not Mr. Johnson's war.

Successive efforts fail

It would take a book to document this assertion — and another book to defend it. There is room here only for one reporter's conclusions:

That President Kennedy, had he lived, would have been drawn into the war by the impending collapse of South Vietnam, just as President Johnson was.

That Mr. Johnson did not want this war, and hoped to stand before history on his Great Society program at home.

That his progressive involvement is best understood in terms of the steady buildup of the American "commitment" since the early Eisenhower years. Successive efforts were made by the United States to check the Communist initiative in South Vietnam without sending in an army. There was still reason to think they might succeed, right up until the summer of 1965. Then it became clear that the Communist forces were on the brink of victory.

That Mr. Johnson's statements about the war, during his election campaign and until he ordered an American Army into the field, did not constitute a plot to involve the country against its will. A number of widely quoted "pledges" on his part to keep the United States out of the war were not actual pledges. The texts show they were balanced by numerous plain warnings. Also, the situation in Vietnam markedly deteriorated between the November election and the following July.

Lack of candor cited

That Mr. Johnson was not fully candid about the war, notably during the 1964 campaign, in his use of the Tonkin Gulf resolution, and when the bombing of the north began. But neither had Franklin D. Roosevelt been candid when he sought to inch the United States toward World War II, while at the same time reassuring a neutralist-minded American public that he was not doing so. Mr. Johnson was not the only president to be less than frank about a developing war situation. Woodrow Wilson was another.

That once he was involved, Mr. Johnson fought the war with a political leader's concern for avoiding escalation, as he saw it, into nuclear conflict. His method was neither that of a Texas two-gun sheriff nor of a military leader bent on "victory." He followed the more painful and self-denying course of doing what he could, and requiring the military to do what it could, with a "limited war." He pushed the limits of this type of conflict further than his critics would have done, but well short of what the military asked.

Reversal unrealistic

That Mr. Johnson could have reversed the trend, and could have avoided the bombing of North Vietnam or stopped it sooner. But any of these would have required a major change in this country's 20-year policy of blocking any Communist power drive across the perimeter of the Communist world. A minority strongly urged such a change, although it was imprecise and divided as to what the alternative course would be and where it would lead. Most of the country, on this reporter's estimate of the evidence, was not ready for such a change.

That Mr. Johnson ultimately succeeded. He held out for a clear sign that North Vietnam was ready to negotiate. He waited much longer than his critics considered necessary, rejecting as ambiguous several third-party efforts to mediate. He may have hardened Hanoi's position in the process. He was consistent, however, and finally Hanoi gave an unambiguous sign. The Paris talks resulted.

Controversy recognized

These conclusions are, of course, controversial.

They are based on a finding that the foreign policy of the United States is a massive affair, the result of many national political forces—and is not the plaything of one man in the White House to the degree that many people suppose. The president can set its one and direction and go far without being stopped. President Johnson did go far and was not stopped. But he had more than majority backing in the opinion polls, even when his personal popularity fell very low.

The leading assumption behind this argument is that the special character of the Vietnam war was without precedent. And that the wisdom to recognize this, to see the need for basic changes in a long-established policy and to act on it, was too much to expect from the ponderous democratic process in the middle of a war.

The degree of dissent that was offered to the country was remarkable. It caused a review that will very likely end, in the longer run, by changing the thinking of the country. But it was not able in the short run to produce specific alternatives to the Johnson course, to sort them out and debate them, and to persuade the majority.

Two paths to détente

It is argued that the function of a president is to exert creative leadership in time of great crisis. It can also be argued that a change of the magnitude that was urged on Mr. Johnson in the past three years has never been adopted in wartime in American history.

There are two main approaches to détente in this nuclear world.

One is that of the so-called cold war, although it involved a limited use of hot war on three occasions. It calls for meeting forward thrusts by Communist powers with equal and opposite counteractions—so the Communist world will discover that such thrusts are not profitable. The Communist leaders will then adjust themselves, the thesis goes, to coexist between two widely different political groupings. A working stability will be achieved, and arms control can then follow.

New resistance encouraged

This was President Johnson's policy, inherited from his three predecessors. He held to it tenaciously, and the Paris peace talks ultimately were started.

The other path involves an important change of direction in the cold war. Some would call it an entirely new policy.

It calls for treating the Communist world with civility and political incentives as well as with military firmness, and for shifting the main resistance to the expansion of communism from military to political means.

Two new forms of political resistance would be encouraged.

One is growing independence of the satellite countries like Czechoslovakia and Romania. The other is to encourage popular governments in the low-income countries. Popular government would be more likely to win the loyalty of its people, and hence their willingness to resist the Communist brands of revolution and subversion from the outside.

Escape from other Vietnams

According to its advocates, who include this reporter, the alternative policy suits a nuclear world where traditional military force cannot be applied against a country like North Vietnam without risk of escalating into nuclear war. It offers an escape from traps like Vietnam where limited military force cannot accomplish its purpose when applied to a revolutionary civil war which is more political, in its character, than military.

This second policy calls for taking some risks. Where the traditional cold-war policy would not permit failures around the Soviet perimeter, the alternative would recognize the possibility of having to absorb some setbacks. But in the long run, it is expected to provide a more effective resistance to the dangerous expansion of Communist power, in the underdeveloped world, than the hard-line policy of the past 20 years.

U.S. acceptance possible

This second route to stability is likely, if events move in their present direction, to be accepted by the American people for the long pull.

But to have expected President Johnson to adopt it during the Vietnam conflict, or to have expected the majority of political forces in the United States to ratify it, would be unrealistic in this reporter's judgment. A change of this magnitude in a deeply entrenched policy, supported by attitudes that had been shaped by great effort over the entire postwar era, requires time and a process of reeducation.

Hence this observer's conclusion: The war in Vietnam can reasonably be called a war which proceeded from a long-established national policy. It would be misleading to call it Mr. Johnson's war and would blur the responsibility that the American people bear as a whole. It also would blur the need for a thorough review of the commitments this nation should undertake in a nuclear world and the reasons for them—a review that was far from complete when the bombing of North Vietnam was stilled and the peace talks began.

PROCESSING NOTE:

#68 not used in this file

MP 3/20/98

- INFORMATION

69

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~

Sunday, January 5, 1969
12:00 noon

Mr. President:

This cable on Ky's mood
and attitude towards procedural issues
may interest you.

For file

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 160

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 6, NARA, Date 3-5-91



Department of State

69a
TELEGRAM
15

~~SECRET~~

P 050440Z JAN 69
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6990
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3418
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL : 869Q
RECEIVED : Jan. 5, 1969
12:57AM

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 160

NODIS/HARVAN

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH KY

REF: SAIGON 154

1. WHEN BERGER AND I SAW KY YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, HIS MOOD WAS ONE OF MELANCHOLY, WITH TRACES OF BITTNERNESS. HE DID MOST OF THE TALKING IN THE HOUR AND A HALF WE SPEND TOGETHER. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN ITEMS COVERED:

2. I STRESSED THE NEED TO GET OVER THE PROCEDURAL HURDLES, GAVE HIM THE SUMMARY OF THE LAST VANCE-LAU MEETING, AND SAID I HOPED THAT THIEU WOULD AGREE TO EXTEND VANCE'S NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS, AND THAT WE NEEDED TO HAVE AN EARLY MEETING.

3. KY THREW UP HIS HANDS SAYING THE QUESTION OF THE TABLE SHAPES HAD NOW BECOME RIKICULOUS. A ROUND TABLE WITHOUT FLAGS AND NAMEPLATES IS PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY HE IS NOT MAKING THE DECISIONS. PRES THIEU, IN HIS CAUTION, HAS A WAY OF MOVING SLOWLY, CONFERS WITH EVERYONE, THEN DIGS HIMSELF INTO AN INDEFENSIBLE POSITION, FROM WHICH IT IS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO MOVE. IN GOING TO CONFERENCE, IT WAS CLEAR THE NLF WAS GOING TO BE THERE, AND THE GVN ARE GOING TO HAVE TO TALK WITH THEM. TO PRETEND THEY ARE NOT HERE IS A FICTION. THIS WAS THE REASON HE, KY, HAD TALKED ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A REALITY AND AN ENTITY.

4. KY CHUCKLED. HAD ANYONE ELSE SPOKEN IN THIS VIEN, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN CONDEMNED AS SOFT AND COMPROMISING, BUT HE, KY, COULD SAY THESE THINGS, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE TRUSTED HIM, AND KNEW HE WOULD NEVER SELL THEM OUT. IN THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT THERE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO BE COMPROMISES, BUT THE GVN DELEGATION, UNFORTUNATELY, GIVES THE APPEARANCE THAT IT IS EVEN AFRAID TO MEET HANOI, AFRAID TO TALK TO THE NLF, AFRAID OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By 47 NARA, Date 3-5-98

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, SAIGON 160, January 5, 1969, NODIS/HARVAN

5. THE PROCEDURAL ISSUES SHOULD BE GOT OUT THE WAY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, AND HE WOULD EVEN LET THE OTHER SIDE OPEN FIRST ON THE A A B B FORMULA. HE HAD SAID AS MUCH TO THIEU.

6. I SPOKE OF THE NEED FOR A JOINT MEETING ON MONDAY, SAYING BERGER HAD SEEN THANH EARLIER, AND WITH THIS MEETING WITH HIM, I HOPED WE COULD AT THE NEXT MEETING AGREE TO GIVE VANCE ALL THE AUTHORITY HE NEEDED TO BUTTRESS THIS US. I COUNTED ON KY TO TALK TO THIEU AND IMPRESS ON HIM THE NEED FOR MOVEMENT. THE NLF/DRV STATEMENT ON FLAGS, NAMEPLATES AND TABLES WILL BE TREATED BY EVERYONE AS A REASONABLE OFFER AND COMPROMISE, AND THE GVN WILL BE IN A DIFFICULT POSITION IF THEY HOLD OUT ON THE ROUND TABLE.

7. KY NODDED, WITH A GESTURE AND A SHRUG, AS IF TO SAY, "WELL, IF I WAS THE PRESIDENT, THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH DIFFICULTIES. BUT YOU HAVE THIEU, AND I HAVE THIEU, AND SO WHERE ARE WE." KY THEN SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THIEU IN THE MORNING THAT HE WOULD ONLY GO BACK TO PARIS ON TWO CONDITIONS: FIRST, THE GOVERNMENT HAD TO BE STRENGTHENED TO ENABLE THE DELEGATION TO BARGAIN AND COMPROMISE FROM A STRONG POSITION AT HOME; AND SECOND, HE HAD TO BE ASSURED THAT HE HAD FULL BACKING AND SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT. THAT HAD NOT BEEN THE CASE, HE SAID, AND HE MENTIONED "THE NONSENSE" OF THE PRIME MINISTER CALLING BACK AND DISCIPLINING SOME POOR TYPISTS AND CLERKS HAD TAKEN TO PARIS WITHOUT PROPER CLEARANCE.

8. EXCEPT FOR ONCE KY MADE NO DIRECT ATTACK ON THIEU, BUT EVERYTHING HE SAID DRIPPED WITH IMPLIED CRITICISM. THE EXCEPTION WAS IN CONNECTION WITH PARA 3 WHEN HE SAID IF THIEU KEEPS "BACKING AWAY, BACKING AWAY (FROM TAKING TOUGH DECISIONS), HE IS GOING TO TUMBLE OVER THE EDGE OF A CLIFF WITHOUT KNOWING IT WAS THERE."

9. COMMENT: I THINK KY WILL TALK WITH THIEU ON THE NEED TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY TO GET AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES, BUT I'M NOT SURE THIEU IS GOING TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AS WE WOULD HOPE OR GIVE VANCE AS MUCH AUTHORITY AS WE THINK HE NEEDS. BERGER WILL ASK TO SEE THANH TOMORROW MORNING TO SEE WHERE MATTERS STAND. I AM HOPING THAT THEY WILL VOLUNTEER THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO MEET TOMORROW. IF NOT, WE SHALL ASK FOR A MEETING.

10. ALTHOUGH IT MAY APPEAR FROM THE FORGOING THAT THE THIEU-KY HONEYMOON IS OVER AND THAT KY MAY NOT BE GOING BACK TO PARIS, I WOULD NOT DRAW EITHER OF THESE CONCLUSIONS YET. THERE IS TOO MUCH AT STAKE FOR BOTH MEN IN A BREAK NOW. I THINK THIEU WOULD PREFER TO HAVE KY IN PARIS RATHER THAN HERE FOR TWO REASONS: KY WILL BE HELPFUL IN GIVING FLEXIBILITY AND AUTHORITY TO THE DELEGATION, AND KY IN PARIS WILL BE LESS TROUBLESOME THAN KY HERE. WHETHER THIEU WILL PAY KY'S FULL PRICE I DOUBT, BUT THEY MAY WORK OUT A COMPROMISE.

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

70

SECRET/HARVAN

Saturday, January 4, 1969 - 2:40pm

Mr. President:

Herewith for your clearance
a draft cable reflecting this morning's
discussion.

Free file

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Approved as amended _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 0, NARA, Date 3-5-98

70a

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

Info

INFO: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

STATE

PARIS TODEL _____

NODIS/HARVAN.

For Ambassador from Secretary.

1. We have reviewed the report in Paris 0038, the recommendations in Paris 0042, and the progress report and comments in Saigon 154. News stories here reflect excellent backgrounding in Paris and some expectation of progress. We believe this has improved our position somewhat for the moment. Nonetheless, we continue to believe--and to surmise that Hanoi believes--that their proposal for an unmarked and continuous round table appears plausible and reasonable to American and significant ~~xxx~~ third-country opinion.
2. Hence, we continue to believe that we must make every effort to resolve this matter without further delay on some reasonable basis, and we accept the thrust of Paris 0042 that Thieu's concurrence in our accepting in the last analysis the unmarked

LTP

SR per LTP

EA:WPBundy:mk 1/4/69

Tel. Ext.
4235

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearance

S/S -

White House - Mr. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Classification

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By h, NARA, Date 3598

Page 2 of telegram to Saigon Info: Paris Todel

~~SECRET~~

Classification

continuous round table is crucial. Like Paris, we reject totally any thought of changing the present agreed format (Paris 110), and likewise believe that there is no effective way to cushion the effects of delay by any form of useful bilateral in Paris that would not become rapidly disruptive in Saigon.

3. On the table shape, our reading ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ is that further progress is most unlikely if we stay where we are. Although we can understand that the GVN may well read Hanoi's dropping of flags and nameplates as proof that standing firm gets results, we note from Paris 0038 that the dropping of flags and nameplates remains conditional on our acceptance of a continuous round table and was only put forward after we had shown motion in our position on tables. We come back to the basic judgment that Hanoi thinks it has a good thing going, in terms of American public opinion, in resisting any physical demarcation of a round table.

4. At the same time, we believe that accepting the unmarked continuous round table would put us in a very strong position to get strong two-sided flavor on the order of speaking. While our maximum objective in Saigon should be Thieu's concurrence in the full range of possibilities contained in paras 9-12 of State 291645, we are concerned that these

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Page 3 of telegram to Saigon Info: Paris Todel

~~SECRET~~

Classification

complexities may delay our next move in Paris. Moreover, we feel that --just as it is almost impossible to explain our resistance to a round table--a position that calls for two lots and for each side completing its presentation before the other side speaks (AABB repeat AABB) is an extremely persuasive one for public opinion here and elsewhere. It is simple common sense, conforms to the normal practice in any multi-party litigation, and fits the basic fact that there are two sides both in the fighting and in our concept of the arrangements for the meeting.

5. In sum, I ~~hi~~ believe that you must seek to see Thieu as soon as possible, presumably Monday, to ~~gwx~~ go over the situation with the following maximum and fall-back objectives:

- a. As a maximum objective, to get his concurrence in the full sweep of authority covered by Paris 0042.
- b. If in your judgment he simply will not agree to this--or will not do so without significant further delay--to get his concurrence to a further meeting in Paris at which Vance would accept the continuous and unbroken round table, contingent upon the dropping of flags and nameplates and also upon Hanoi's acceptance of a two-lot draw and an AABB order of speaking. You could further suggest that Vance might open by offering to let the other side speak first under a two-lot draw and an AABB order, provided that

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Page 4 of telegram to Saigon Info: Paris Todel

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Hanoi accepted the baize strips.

6. ~~xxxxxx~~ In seeking to get the maximum possible freedom, you should of course reiterate all the arguments concerning the state of opinion here. Moreover, you may make clear that we would certainly join with the GVN in stressing the fact that, even with the unbroken and continuous round table, space would be allocated on a 50-50 basis--i.e., by sides--and the definitely two-sided flavor that any of our proposed order of speaking arrangements--but particularly two lots and AABB--would have. As we see it, the total deal would be taken not only as more two-sided than ~~xxxxxx~~ anything else, but as representing a serious and sober arrangement in which Hanoi backed down heavily, first on the flags and nameplates and finally on its unrealistic and now public position on order of speaking.

~~GRxxx~~

~~BNxxx~~

7: If you should move to the position described in para 5-b above, you should of course make clear that we cannot be sure this will produce agreement, and that it would be necessary to consult further if it did not. In other words, we must not get into a flat and final position at least at this stage.

GP-3.

~~BNXX~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Page ⁵~~8~~ of telegram to SAIGON

~~SECRET~~
Classification

8. This instruction reflects discussions at highest levels today.
As I am sure you realize, we all feel a very great sense of
urgency in getting these procedural matters resolved.

END.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, January 4, 1969
1:25 p. m.

from file

Mr. President:

Herewith two independent memcons
of Allon's call on the President, September 9:

- The State Department draft, done
by Luke Battle.
- Hal Saunders' draft for our records.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By , NARA, Date 3-5-88

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 84-181

By mp/irs, NARA, Date 3-2-98

716
September 9, 1968


~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Israeli Deputy Prime Minister's Call at the White House


Before Allon's talk with the President, Mr. Rostow said the President had asked him to begin discussing substance. Ambassador Rabin, Mr. Argov, Mr. Battlo and Mr. Saunders were present.

Mr. Rostow said the President was deeply concerned about the instability of the Middle East and about failure to move closer to peace. He said he had found an especially cogent formulation of the problem in a recent conversation with General Tzur.




1.3a3

Mr. Rostow interjected to say there is a choice; "it's just that you prefer one approach over the other." He thought there were two choices for Israel: basing peace on topographical premises--a purely military boundary--and trying to make a peace in which Israel and Jordan would be closely tied in all their activities--an active coexistence.



1.3a3

The group then moved into the President's office. Mr. Rostow summarized for the President the conversation to that point.



1.3a3

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 2 -

1.3a3

The President said he had great respect for "the abilities of your people" and sympathized with the views Allon had expressed.

(s)

H.S.
Harold H. Saunders

SECRET

72

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN

Saturday, January 4, 1969
10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read this
telegram from Saigon about modalities,
before the noon meeting with Sec. Rusk
and Sec. Clifford.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *mp/rg*, NARA, Date 3-2-98

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 154

HARVAN/PLUS

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

72a 8
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Bridgman

8 1 4 Q

1969 JAN 4 AM 8 42

O 041230Z JAN 69 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6987
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3415
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 154

NODIS/HARVAN

FOR VIETNAM MISSION

REF: . PARIS 0038 (DELTO 1116)
B. PARIS 0042 (DELTO 1117)
C. STATE 00954 (TODEL 1911)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *h*, NARA, Date 3-5-98

1. I REALIZED THE NEED TO GET MORE FLEXIBILITY INTO VANCE'S INSTRUCTIONS AND WILL DO WHAT I CAN. I DO NOT THINK IT ADVISABLE FOR ME TO SEE THIEU AS THE NEXT STEP HERE. INSTEAD THIS MORNING I SENT BERGER AND HERZ TO TALK TO FOREIGN MINISTER THANH AND PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT DUC ON THE RESULTS OF THE VANCE-LAU MEETING (SEE SEPTTEL) AND THIS AFTERNOON I CALLED ON KY, ACCOMPANIED BY BERGER. I THOUGHT IT BETTER TO PREPARE THE GROUND WITH THEM BEFORE SEEING THIEU, AND LET THEM WORK ON HIM FOR A DAY OR SO.

2. I DON'T THINK WE SHALL BE ABLE TO GET THIEU TO AGREE TO THE FULL AUTHORITY WE ASKED FOR IN THE ORIGINAL STATEMENT WE SUBMITTED TO THE GVN, BUT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO GET HIM TO AGREE ON A CONTINUOUS CIRCLE WITHOUT BAIZE, AND PERHAPS GO A LITTLE FURTHER ON THE SPEAKING ORDER IN THE DIRECTION OF INCLUDING A B A B, AS AN ADDITIONAL ALTERNATIVE. KY REMARKED THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PIECE OF BAIZE AND NO BAIZE IS HARDLY SOMETHING WE CAN FIGHT FOR, AND HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE EASIEST SOLUTION TO THE SPEAKING ORDER PROBLEM IS SIMPLY TOSS A COIN, OR LET THE OTHER SIDE SPEAK FIRST. HE SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS BOTH WITH THIEU.

3. AT THE MORNING MEETING WITH THANH AND DUC, THEY AT FIRST TOOK THE POSITION THAT THE OTHER SIDE WAS INTRANSIGENT AND WE SHOULD AND WAIT BEFORE MAKING ANY FURTHER MOVE. BY THE TIME THE MEETING ENDED, HOWEVER, THEY SAY THE DANGER OF THIS COURSE. BERGER ASKED THEM TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS TO SEE HOW MUCH FURTHER THEY COULD GO, ARGUING THAT THE GREATER VANCE'S FLEXIBILITY THE BETTER WOULD BE THE OUTCOME. THEY PROMISED TO HAVE ANOTHER LOOK, PARTICULARLY AT THE UNBROKEN CIRCULAR TABLE AND AT THE A B A B FORMULA, AND TO DISCUSS THE WHOLE MATTER WITH THIEU THIS AFTERNOON, IF THEY COULD GET TO HIM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 154, JAN 69 (NODIS/HARVAN)

4. I HOPE TO HEAR SOMETHING FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OR KY TOMORROW, BUT IF BY MONDAY MORNING WE HAVE HEARD NOTHING I WILL ASK TO SEE THIEU, OR ASK FOR A JOINT MEETING. I TOLD KY, AND BERGER TOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER, THAT WE WOULD LIKE A JOING MEETING ON NEXT STEPS AS SOON AS THEY HAVE FINISHED STUDYING THE VANCE-LAU EXCHANGE, AND THE NLF STATEMENT.

5. GIVEN THIEU'S PAST PERFORMANCE, HIS CAUTION AND STUBBORNNESS, HE MAY LAND US, AND HIMSELF, IN TROUBLE AGAIN BY TAKING TOO LONG TO COME TO A DECISION. EVEN IF WE CAN PERSUADE HIM TO GIVE VANCE MORE ROOM FOR BARGAINING, HE MAY FEEL HE CANNOT DO THIS WITHOUT FIRST GOING TO THE NSC AND THE LEADERS OF THE ASSEMBLY.

6. THERE IS A FEELING HERE IN TOP GVN CIRCLES THAT WE HAVE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PUBLICIZED TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE TWO-SIDED NATURE OF THE NEW TALKS, AND THAT IN THE ARGUMENT OVER TABLE SHAPES THIS FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE IS BEING LOST. I THINK WE SHOULD BE MAKING A STRONG PUBLIC CASE THAT THE WAR IN VIET-NAM IS BETWEEN TWO SIDES AND NOT BETWEEN FOUR SIDES, AND THAT THE CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS MUST REFLECT THIS. IF WE MAKE THIS PUBLIC CASE, IF WE SHOW WHY THE ENEMY'S ATTEMPTS TO PUT THE NLF ON A BASIS OF EQUALITY WITH THE GVN GO TO THE HEART OF THE CONFLICT, I THINK THE GVN WILL FIND IT MUCH EASIER TO GO ALONG IN ACCEPTING THE ROUND TABLE BECAUSE THEY WILL BE BETTER CONVINCED THAT WE STAND WITH THEM ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT IS INVOLVED IN THE CURRENT IMPASSE. THE SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE, JUST RECEIVED, IS VERY HELPFUL IN THIS CONNECTION.

7. I HAVE TWO FURTHER THOUGHTS. I THINK WE MIGHT PROPOSE TO THIEU THAT AS BETWEEN THE CIRCULAR TABLE DIVIDED BY BAIZE, AND THE UNMARKED TABLE, THIS IS NOT AN ISSUE ON WHICH WE CAN LONG STAND, AND WE MIGHT PROPOSE TO HANOI THAT WE DRAW LOTS ON THE TWO. MY SECOND PROPOSAL IS TO PUSH KY'S THOUGHT THAT THE OTHER SIDE CAN START ON THE A A B B FORMULA. WOULD LIKE PARIS AND WASHINGTON VIEWS.

BUNKER

BT

~~SECRET~~

ACTION 73

Friday, January 3, 1969

7:18pm

Pres file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Tour of the White House by President of the Republic of Nauru and His Family

The President of the Republic of Nauru, Hammer DeRoburt (Deh-Roh-Bert), his wife, a daughter, an aide-de-camp and three relatives are making an unofficial tour of the United States January 3-15. Although his visit is private, State is facilitating it and will host a luncheon.

The DeRoburt party has expressed an interest in a tour of the White House which has been arranged for Tuesday, January 7, at 2:45 p. m.

While no cognizance from you of his visit is obligatory, if you find it convenient it would be a gracious gesture to this miniscule state if you either:

-- Greeted DeRoburt when he is signing the guest book in the Cabinet Room, or

-- received him briefly in your office and presented him with an autographed picture. In this event, a suitable inscription might be "To President Hammer DeRoburt of Nauru, With Warmest Personal Greetings and Best Wishes."

Attached is a biographic sketch of DeRoburt and brief background notes on the Republic of Nauru.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Will Greet in Cabinet Room _____
TIME _____
Will Receive in Office _____
TIME _____
Cannot Meet _____
Call Me _____

AJenkins:pas:1/3/69

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Hammer DeRoburt, President of the Republic of Nauru

Hammer DeRoburt (Duh-ro-bert) was born on Nauru, is 46 years old, married, with several children. He speaks English.

He is quiet and reflective. Australian officials who dealt with him during the negotiations for independence characterized him as quick-witted, shrewd, incorruptible, and a first-class negotiator. He is proud, but neither vain nor arrogant. He has no illusions about Nauru's place in the world and claims to have no interest in joining the United Nations, opening embassies abroad (except in Australia), or in any other fashion engaging in external affairs, except as they may directly affect Nauru's interests.

The single most important motivating factor in DeRoburt's life is his determination to assure the future welfare and continuing existence of the Nauruan community.

DeRoburt has commented that he hopes for closer ties with the United States through education of Nauruans in the United States and through trade and transport links with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and Hawaii. He has indicated a tentative interest in financial ties with the United States, possibly through investment of Nauruan trust funds and Government reserves in the United States.

DeRoburt has visited the United States a number of times in connection with the United Nations Trusteeship Council's consideration of Nauru. He has not met President Johnson before.

REPUBLIC OF NAURU

Nauru has a total land area of 8 square miles, a population of 3,100 Nauruans and an equal number of foreign contract laborers, and one of the highest per capita incomes in the world--something over \$4,000.

Nauru is a phosphate mass and its wealth derives from the export of the mineral. At the present rate of extraction, however, the reserves will be exhausted in about 30 years. Accordingly, most earnings are invested in various trust funds to insure that the island's economic needs will be met from interest on accumulated investments when the phosphates are depleted.

Formerly a Trust Territory held by Australia, Britain, and New Zealand, and administered by Australia, the island became an independent republic on January 31, 1968. Located in the central Pacific, some 2500 miles southwest of Hawaii, it is one of the most isolated of the Pacific islands.

Nauru remained untouched by the outside world until 1888 when it was proclaimed German territory. Following World War I, the island became a mandated territory. In 1942, the Japanese occupied the island and during the course of the war transported most of the Nauruan population to Truk. The surviving Nauruans were returned in 1946.

ACTION

74

Friday, January 3, 1969

7:15 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

The daughter of Governor General Michener of Canada died of an accident on New Year's Day. Ambassador Linder recommends a personal message of sympathy from you to the Governor General. I concur.

Pres file

A suggested text is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF/JKN:mm

74a

Suggested Reply

Dear Governor General:

I have just learned of the tragic death of your daughter. Mrs. Johnson and I send to you our heartfelt sympathy in your time of sorrow.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
The Right Honorable
Roland Michener, Q. C.
Governor General of Canada
Ottawa

07A951
00 WTE13
00 WTE 0035

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-508
By 1-8, NARA, Date 1-11-93

75

FROM: WALT BOSTON
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP9231

1969 JAN 3 16 03

Free file

69 JAN 3 AM 11:10

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

~~SECRET~~ HARVAN PLUS

JANUARY 3, 1969

HERewith HARRIMAN AND VANCE'S RECOMMENDATION ON MODALITIES
IN THE WAKE OF YESTERDAY'S MEETING.

PARIS 00042.

1. AFTER REVIEWING CAREFULLY OUR LENGTHY MEETING OF LAST
EVENING, WE HAVE REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS AND
MAKE THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS.

2. WE BELIEVE WE HAVE A GOOD CHANCE OF CLOSING OUT THE
PROCEDURES AT THE NEXT MEETING, IF WE HAVE FLEXIBILITY
TO MOVE TO AN UNMARKED, CIRCULAR TABLE, WHICH WE BELIEVE
WILL BE REQUIRED. WITHOUT THIS FLEXIBILITY, WE DO NOT
REPEAT NOT BELIEVE THAT WE CAN WRAP IT UP.

3. WE HAVE ACHIEVED WHAT THE GVN HAS AGREED IS THE MOST
IMPORTANT ISSUE--THAT IS, THAT THERE BE NO FLAGS OR
NAMEPLATES. WE BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT IT WILL NOT BE
DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE PRINCIPLE OF TWO SIDES BY THE
MANNER IN WHICH WE SEAT OURSELVES AND CONDUCT OURSELVES
WITHOUT A LINE OF DEMARCATION ON THE TABLE. WE CAN
ARRANGE OURSELVES ON OUR SIDE OF THE TABLE IN A MANNER
WHICH WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE ARE TWO SIDES. WE
FIND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND GVN CONTENTION THAT AN
UNMARKED ROUND TABLE (WITHOUT FLAGS OR NAME PLATES)
SOMEHOW GIVES NLF GREATER STATUS THAN IF THERE WAS A
BAIZE STRIP DIVIDING THE SIDES. WE THEREFORE RECOMMEND
STRONGLY THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO ACCEPT A CIRCULAR
TABLE WITHOUT A LINE OF DEMARCATION.

4. WE ALSO RECOMMEND THAT WE BE GIVEN THE ADDITIONAL
FLEXIBILITY WHICH WE ORIGINALLY REQUESTED ON ORDER OF
SPEAKING, AS SET FORTH IN STATE 291645 PARAS 9-12, ALL
OF WHICH PRESERVE THE PRINCIPLE OF TWO SIDES.

5. WITH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THEIR PRIME OBJECTIVE--NO
NAME PLATES AND NO FLAGS--THE GVN SHOULD BE IN A
POSITION TO AGREE TO A CIRCULAR TABLE WHILE MAINTAINING
THE "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA.

6. WE URGE THAT EMBASSY SAIGON RAISE THIS MATTER
IMMEDIATELY WITH THIEU AND OBTAIN THE FLEXIBILITY
WHICH IS REQUIRED.

DTG: 031532Z JAN 69

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

76
—

INFORMATION


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

16

~~SECRET~~

Friday, January 3, 1969

Mr. President:



Walt. Rostow

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 95-34

By isp, NARA, Date 7-26-95

~~SECRET~~

4:45PM 1-3-69 JDR

PRIORITY

TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ATT.: MR. BROMLEY SMITH 004
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~ **SANITIZED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 95-33

NARA, Date 3-2-98

~~SECRET~~ - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

1969 JAN 22 05 By *mclisp*

76a
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
JAN 3 3 11 PM '69

END PAGE ONE

PAGE TWO ~~(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)~~

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE ~~(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)~~

ACTION

77

Friday, January 3, 1969 -- 3:45 p.m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Joe Alsop would like to see you before January 20th.

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rlm

78

Friday, January 3, 1968 - 3:5pm

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Tony Solomon is leaving January 10. He would greatly appreciate an inscribed photograph of you. If you approve, I suggest the following inscription:

For Tony Solomon -- wise counselor
and outstanding negotiator -- one of
our best when the chips are down.

The State Department is having a large farewell luncheon for Tony on Monday, January 6. If we could have the photograph by then it would add greatly to the ceremony.

W. W. Rostow



ERF:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

79

EFAGGI
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 0039

1969 JAN 3 19 18 '69 JAN 3 PM 2:30

FROM WALT W ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP9034

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

for file

JANUARY 3, 1969

ATTACHED IS THE TEXT OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S WARM REPLY TO
YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 29.

THE FRENCH WANT TO PUBLISH THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS AND
WE ARE ARRANGING A COORDINATED RELEASE.

TEXT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER OF
DECEMBER 29, 1968 TO PRESIDENT DE GAULLE

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE I THANK YOU FOR YOUR WARM
MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON THE COMPLETION OF THE APOLLO VIII
MISSION. COL. BORMAN, CAPT. LOVELL, AND MAJ. ANDERS JOIN ME
IN THIS EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR YOUR GRATIFYING WORDS.

AS WE COME TO THE NEW YEAR, I ALSO WISH TO TELL YOU AGAIN OF
THE WARMTH OF MY FEELING FOR THE PEOPLE OF FRANCE AND OF MY
ABIDING FAITH THAT THE DESTINY OF OUR TWO NATIONS WILL REMAIN
CLOSELY LINKED IN THE YEARS TO COME.

WE HAVE BOTH FACED SERIOUS PROBLEMS THIS YEAR IN BEARING
OUR RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES. BUT STANDING BACK FROM
THESE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS, I TRUST YOU SHARE WITH ME THE FAITH
THAT THE CLOUDS OF WAR ARE SLOWLY BEGINNING TO LIFT FROM
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THAT BY GIVING OUR FULL SUPPORT TO THE
JARRING MISSION WE CAN PREVENT THEM FROM ENVELOPING THE
MIDDLE EAST AGAIN.

IN DIFFERENT WAYS, WE EACH HAVE BORNE GOVERNMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SOME THIRTY YEARS. RECALLING WHAT OUR
NATIONS HAVE BEEN THROUGH IN THIS TIME AND THE UNDERLYING
PROSPERITY AND SECURITY THEY NOW ENJOY, I WOULD HOPE YOU,
TOO, LOOK WITH CONFIDENCE ON THE FUTURE OF OUR NATIONS AND
THE WESTERN FAMILY OF WHICH THEY ARE A PART.

YOU HAVE MY VERY BEST WISHES IN CARRYING OUT THE DEMANDING
TASKS OF LEADERSHIP IN THE YEAR AHEAD.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 4, NARA, Date 3-5-88

BEGIN TEXT

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT.

I SINCERELY THANK YOU FOR THE SENTIMENTS THAT YOU WERE GOOD ENOUGH TO EXPRESS TO ME IN THE LETTER THAT YOU SENT ME THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADOR.

ON THE THRESHOLD OF THIS NEW YEAR, MY FERVENT WISH IS THAT THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE MAY WORK TOGETHER TO HELP JOINTLY IN SOLVING THE GRAVE PROBLEMS WEIGHING OVER THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD.

AMONG THESE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN, SOME STAND OUT OWING TO THEIR URGENCY AND THEIR IMPORTANCE. THAT IS TRUE OF VIET-NAM, WHERE, THANKS TO THE COURAGEOUS DECISIONS THAT YOU HAVE ALREADY TAKEN, AND THE OTHER DECISIONS THAT DOUBTLESS WILL FOLLOW UPON THEM, THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE HOSTILITIES ARE NEARING AN END, PENDING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT, FOLLOWED BY THE PEACEFUL WORK OF RECONSTRUCTION. IT IS ALSO TRUE OF THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO REPUDIATE THE EVENTS OCCURRING NEARLY NINETEEN MONTHS AGO, WHICH HAVE PRODUCED A SERIES OF RECIPROCAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE.

THE FRIENDSHIP LINKING OUR TWO PEOPLES, THEIR ESTEEM FOR ONE ANOTHER, AND THEIR AWARENESS, ON BOTH SIDES, OF THEIR WORTH AND STRENGTH, COULD NOT, I BELIEVE, BE MORE FRUITFULLY MANIFESTED THAN BY JOINT ACTION IN THE CAUSE OF DETENTE EVERYWHERE, AND OF COOPERATION WITH ALL OTHER PEOPLES.

ALLOW ME TO TELL YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, HOW GLAD I AM OF THESE SIGNS, WHICH SEEM TO INDICATE THAT AN IMPORTANT PART OF YOUR PERSONAL WORK CONSISTS IN GUIDING THE UNITED STATES INTO THE PATH WHERE OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE THE BEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY OF FEELING AT ONE WITH EACH OTHER, AND STANDING SHOULDER TO SHOULDER.

MOST SINCERELY AND CORDIALLY,

END TEXT

DTG 031836Z JAN 1969

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

80
INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

**Friday, January 3, 1969
2:25 p.m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith the exact text of a
telephone conversation this morning
with Tom Ottenad of the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch. As you will see, the
Lady is about to surface.**

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

80a

1/3/69 11 40 am

Phone conversation, Tom Ottenad of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and W. W. Rostow

Ottenad: I have been working on a story that I wondered if I might talk to you about. It's on background basis, or however you want to talk about it. It has to do with the last period of the Presidential campaign about the time of the President's announcement of the bombing halt and steps to broaden the Paris talks. I've been told that during that period some Republican contacts were made with South Vietnamese officials urging them to go slow in the hope that, from their standpoint, they might get a better shake under Nixon than they would otherwise, and that these contacts--contacts of this type--were made by Mrs. Chennault. We have established this from a number of sources, and it's not really about that as such that I was inquiring, but rather about another aspect of it. I was told also that this activity had come to the attention of the Administration, and I wondered -- I wanted to ask you -- if that is in fact correct.

WWR: I have not one word to say about that matter.

Ottenad: Not even on background or completely non-attributable basis?

WWR: On no basis whatsoever.

Ottenad: There is no point about my asking other questions related to it.

WWR: That is correct.

Ottenad: That would be just a waste of your time.

WWR: I'm afraid that's right.

Ottenad: May I ask about a different but somewhat related matter -- because I don't know whether you will say the same thing to that or not; if it is, of course, I'll drop the business right there. The other matter I've been told of is about this same time. Contacts were made indirectly by South Vietnamese officials with the Nixon camp asking -- unsuccessfully, as it turned out -- asking for an opportunity to meet with Nixon or one of his aides and hinting that South Vietnamese would not take action on the question of going to Paris until after the election. My question: Did that ever come to your attention.

WWR: I have nothing whatsoever to say about it.

Ottenad: All right. Fine -- really not fine, from my standpoint, but I'm afraid your tone is so firm there's no point in going further with you about it.

WWR: That's quite correct.

Ottenad: If you find at any time that is no longer the case, I would appreciate an opportunity to talk with you about it.

WWR: Right. Thank you.

81

INFORMATION

Friday, January 3, 1969 - 1:30pm

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. President:

Pres file

The representative of the new Peruvian Government, Ambassador Berckemeyer, will be presenting his credentials to you at 5:30 p.m. today.

Our relations with Peru are in a downward spiral after the military junta's decision in early October to nationalize the International Petroleum Company (IPC), a Standard Oil of New Jersey subsidiary. We have put President Velasco and all his key Ministers on notice that the Hickenlooper Amendment will require termination of all our economic aid and the Peruvian sugar quota -- unless IPC receives satisfactory compensation as required under international law. The time limit runs out in early April.

So far, the picture looks very discouraging. Peruvian leaders and press are publicly rejecting so-called "inadmissible U.S. Government pressures" against Peru's sovereignty. No real negotiations are going on, although the issue of compensation is in the Peruvian courts. We hope that during the next one to two months cooler heads in Peru will prevail and the government will decide to seek a negotiated settlement before the deadline.

Ambassador Berckemeyer may be a key factor in this effort. He is a former Ambassador to the United States, a widely-respected diplomat and businessman, and (incidentally) a big sugar grower. He has already started to work behind the scenes to convince the military government of the economic facts of life about Peru's sugar quota. He is well aware that the success or failure of his mission in Washington depends on finding some accommodation with the United States on the IPC question.

When Berckemeyer called on Secretary Rusk December 3, Rusk emphasized that the problem was not one of sovereignty -- we weren't challenging Peru's sovereign right to expropriate. At the same time, we had the sovereign right to implement our own legislation by

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *lg* 3528

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

refraining from buying Peruvian sugar. Rusk stressed that the challenge was to find ways to "resolve differences" rather than insist on sovereignty. (Tab A)

State thinks you should not get into this issue at the credentials meeting. Berckemeyer has gotten our message clearly from Rusk and from other State Department officials. Since it would be hard to talk informally with Berckemeyer without getting on to the subject of IPC, I suggest you keep the ceremony brief and formal.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Secretary Rusk's MemCon of
December 3, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Approved in S 12/10/68

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Lewis
15755

81a
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 3, 1968

SUBJECT: Presentation of Credentials--IPC Case

PARTICIPANTS: Foreign
Ambassador-designate Fernando Berckemeyer, Peru

United States
The Secretary
Mr. Sancho-Bonet, Deputy Chief, S/CPR
Mr. Vaky, Deputy Assistant Secretary, ARA

COPIES TO: S/S ARA - 3
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CIA AID
DOD Amembassy LIMA

Ambassador Berckemeyer called on the Secretary to present copies of his letters of credence.

After welcoming the Ambassador back to Washington, the Secretary noted that his appointment came at a crucial time in US-Peruvian relations. The Ambassador agreed, and after noting that the IPC case was a difficult and highly important issue stated that he was convinced it could be resolved. He had discussed the problem from all sides, including officials of Standard Oil of New Jersey.

The Secretary noted that while this was not the time or occasion to discuss the issue in detail he wished to make the following observation: Sovereignty was not at issue in this case. Clearly Peru had the right to exercise sovereign power, and the same was true of the US. Peru could, in the exercise of its sovereignty, expropriate property, and the US could, in implementing its legislation, refrain from buying Peruvian sugar. Just as the US could not tell Peru it must do X, Peru could not

(Drafting Office and Officer)
ARA:VPVaky:svm

FORM DS-1254
2-65

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *[signature]*, NARA, Date 3-5-98

tell the US it must not do Y. The question of sovereign power or rights was thus not involved, but clearly, the exercise of sovereignty could be carried to extremes.

The Secretary emphasized that the challenge was to find ways to resolve differences rather than merely insist on "sovereignty". The Secretary expressed the opinion that if the GOP and IPC could get their heads together a solution could be found.

The Ambassador said he completely understood the Secretary's point. He had explained to the Peruvian military the requirements of US legislation and what it meant. He thought a solution could be found and would work to that end.

Friday, January 3, 1969 - 1:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Prime Minister Holyoake

Free file

New Zealand Prime Minister and Mrs. Holyoake will spend two days in the United States en route to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London. They are in Los Angeles today and will be in New York tomorrow, January 4, at the Waldorf Astoria.

State recommends that you send the attached suggested personal message. It is brief but seems appropriate after your very warm New Year's greeting.

I recommend that you approve the attached suggested message.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

82a

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

Dear Prime Minister and Mrs. Holyoake:

I am delighted to welcome you once again to America and only regret that your stay will be so brief. Lady Bird and I so much enjoyed your last visit.

Though this will probably be my last opportunity to communicate with you officially, I trust that our association will continue. Lady Bird and I extend best wishes for a successful conference in London and a profitable and enjoyable visit to Europe.

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable

Keith J. Holyoake and Mrs. Holyoake

Prime Minister of New Zealand

83
Friday, January 3, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Call on You Today by Ambassador Johnson

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson has an appointment with you at 5:45 p.m. today. He returned to Washington on December 29 at the request of Secretary-Designate Rogers, and his appointment as Under Secretary for Political Affairs will be announced tomorrow.

Ambassador Johnson returns to Tokyo tomorrow. On January 15 he will go to Saigon for consultation. He will return to Washington on January 19 having had conversations at CINCPAC enroute.

You may wish to ask Ambassador Johnson to review the major current developments in our relations with Japan, with emphasis upon:

-- Prime Minister Sato's desire for a solution of the Ryukyu reversion issue during 1969; and

-- our not very successful efforts to gain liberalization of residual Japanese restrictions against imports. (Japan's performance has been extremely disappointing in this regard. We do not consider the present Japanese position to be defensible.)

W. W. Rostow

P.S. Kei Wakaizumi, Sato's informal contact with us, came in the other day. He asked me to pass to the President, on behalf of Sato, the word that a resolution of the Okinawa problem will be critical to U.S. - Japanese relations in the time ahead. I promptly responded that an increase in Japanese acceptance of responsibility in Asia would be equally required if the relationship between the two countries is to remain sound. In this connection, he said Sato is taking most seriously the problem of a Japanese role, within a multilateral setting, for monitoring the peace settlement in Southeast Asia. You may wish to discuss this possibility with Alex.

W. W. R.

AJenkins:pas:1/3/69

CONFIDENTIAL

Pres file
sent Pres on plane

Friday, January 3, 1969

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is the text of General de Gaulle's warm reply to your letter of December 29.

The French want to publish the exchange of letters and we are arranging a coordinated release.

W. W. Rostow

ERF:mst

84a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S JANUARY 3
REPLY TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DECEMBER 29 LETTER:

BEGIN TEXT

January 3, 1969

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
Washington

My Dear Mr. President:

I sincerely thank you for the sentiments that you were good enough
to express to me in the letter that you sent me through your Ambassador.

On the threshold of this New Year, my fervent wish is that the United
States and France may work together to help jointly in solving the grave
problems weighing over the future of the world.

Among these subjects of international concern, some stand out owing
to their urgency and their importance. That is true of Viet-Nam, where,
thanks to the courageous decisions that you have already taken, and the
other decisions that doubtless will follow upon them, there is reason
to believe that the hostilities are nearing an end, pending a political
settlement of the conflict, followed by the peaceful work of reconstruction.
It is also true of the Middle East, where it has become necessary to
repudiate the events occurring nearly nineteen months ago, which have
produced a series of reciprocal acts of violence.

The friendship linking our two peoples, their esteem for one another,
and their awareness, on both sides, of their worth and strength, could not,
I believe, be more fruitfully manifested than by joint action in the cause
of detente everywhere, and of cooperation with all other peoples.

Allow me to tell you, Mr. President, how glad I am of these signs,
which seem to indicate that an important part of your personal work consists
in guiding the United States into the path where our two countries have the
best possible opportunity of feeling at one with each other, and standing
shoulder to shoulder.

Most sincerely and cordially,

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 10, NARA, Date 3-5-98

C. de Gaulle. END TEXT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TEXT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER OF
DECEMBER 29, 1968 to PRESIDENT DE GAULLE

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the American people I thank you for your warm message of congratulations on the completion of the Apollo VIII mission. Col. Borman, Capt. Lovell, and Maj. Anders join me in this expression of appreciation for your gratifying words.

As we come to the new year, I also wish to tell you again of the warmth of my feeling for the people of France and of my abiding faith that the destiny of our two nations will remain closely linked in the years to come.

We have both faced serious problems this year in bearing our respective responsibilities. But standing back from these immediate problems, I trust you share with me the faith that the clouds of war are slowly beginning to lift from Southeast Asia and that by giving our full support to the Jarring Mission we can prevent them from enveloping the Middle East again.

In different ways, we each have borne governmental responsibilities for some thirty years. Recalling what our nations have been through in this time and the underlying prosperity and security they now enjoy, I would hope you, too, look with confidence on the future of our nations and the Western family of which they are a part.

You have my very best wishes in carrying out the demanding tasks of leadership in the year ahead.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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~~SECRET~~

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 0028

1969 JAN 3 00

free file
1969 JAN 2 PM 7:45
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP9026

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 2, 1969

CY VANCE REPORTS BY TELEPHONE:

-- HE HAD A MEETING OF 4 HOURS AND 15 MINUTES WITH THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE ON MODALITIES;

-- THEY INSIST ON A SIMPLE ROUND TABLE;

-- THEY CAVED ON THE FLAGS AND NAME PLATES;

-- ON DRAWING THEY SHIFTED FROM ONE OF OUR PROPOSALS
(IN WHICH THE U.S. AND HANOI WOULD DRAW, DETERMINING THE FIRST
SPEAKER, WITH SUBSEQUENT SPEAKERS FOLLOWING IN A SEQUENCE WE
COULD DETERMINE) TO A PROPOSAL IN WHICH THE GVN AND THE NLF
WOULD DO THE DRAWING FOR THE TWO SIDES.

IF WE ARE TO GET A SIMPLE ROUND TABLE, THIEN TELLS US
HE WILL HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE VIETNAMESE NSC. MOREOVER,
SAIGON WILL NOT LIKE AT ALL THE DRAWING TO BE DONE BY THE
NLF AND THE GVN FOR THE TWO SIDES.

THEREFORE, WE HAVE HAD IMPORTANT MOVEMENT (ON THE FLAGS
AND NAME PLATES) BUT WE STILL DO NOT HAVE A DEAL.

DTG 022358Z JAN 1969

~~SECRET~~

FROM QUICK COPY

86
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
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By 12, NARA, Date 10-26-10

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FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP9024

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 2, 1969

THIS FRENCH EXPERT'S ANALYSIS OF SOVIET INTENTIONS IN
MIDDLE EAST MAY INTEREST YOU.

PARIS 37

1. EMBOFF SAW QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST DE NANTEUIL (PLEASE PROTECT) JAN 2, KEEPING APPOINTMENT MADE TEN DAYS AGO. NANTEUIL ABANDONED COMPLETELY HIS USUAL RETICENCE AND TALKED FREELY ABOUT SETTLEMENT ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT IN LIGHT SOVIET "PEACE PLAN".
2. NANTEUIL BEGAN BY RESPONDING SHARPLY TO QUESTION ABOUT FRENCH FOUR-POWER PROPOSAL AND SOVIET PLAN, SAYING THAT "TIME FOR IRONY OVER AND FRENCH AND AMERICANS SHOULD GET DOWN TO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS ON MIDDLE EAST. SOVIET PLAN IS MAJOR NEW EVENT IN MIDDLE EAST AND FRENCH PROPOSAL OVERTAKEN". NANTEUIL HAD JUST FINISHED STAFF STUDY FOR DEBRE ON SOVIET PLAN RECOMMENDING SERIOUS TALKS WITH US, POINT HE CLAIMS TO HAVE MADE REPEATEDLY SINCE HIS OWN CONTACTS WITH AMBASSADOR PEDERSEN AND OTHERS AT 1967 UNGA. HE THOUGHT FONMIN WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO THIS SUGGESTION, WHICH IS IN LINE WITH HIS DEC 30 REFORMULATION OF FOUR-POWER PROPOSAL. DEC 30 REMARKS BY DEBRE DRAFTED PERSONALLY WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF SOVIET PROPOSAL.
3. NANTEUIL WENT ON TO SAY DEBRE "FURIOUS" AT SOVIETS BECAUSE HE BELIEVES THEY HAVE AGAIN "HAD" FRENCH. THEIR "PEACE PLAN" MAKES NO REAL PROVISION FOR INDEPENDENT FOUR-POWER ROLE DE GAULLE HAS BEEN PRESSING, DESPITE SOME INDICATIONS SOVIETS MIGHT FAVOR FRENCH PROPOSAL. MOREOVER, DEBRE AWARE THAT SOVIET PLAN WORKED OUT AFTER SEVERAL SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH US ON MIDDLE EAST, AS RESULT OF WHICH ORIGINAL SOVIET IDEAS WERE MODIFIED. FRENCH, ON OTHER HAND, NEVER REALLY TAKEN INTO SOVIET CONFIDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST. NANTEUIL SAID HE UNABLE PREDICT WHAT DEGAULLE MIGHT THINK OR DO SINCE GENERAL WILL STICK TO IDEA OF DOING BUSINESS WITH SOVIETS "UNTIL HE IS CAUGHT."

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4. WHEN HE TURNED TO SUBSTANCE SOVIET PROPOSAL, ENROFF TOLD NANTEUIL HE UNABLE DISCUSS IT IN DETAIL SINCE OUR ANALYSIS NOT YET COMPLETE. HOWEVER, WE DID CONSIDER IT MAY BE IMPORTANT DEVELOPEMENT AND THERE SEEM TO BE SOME SIGNIFICANT INNOVATIONS IN EARLIER SOVIET THINKING. NANTEUIL REPLIED THAT HE CONSIDERED SOVIET PLAN TO BE MAJOR EFFORT BEING ABOUT PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST, AND ONE WHICH WOULD GIVE ISRAEL AT LEAST TWO THIRDS OF WHAT IT HAS BEEN CLAIMING, INCLUDING "JUST AND LASTING PEACE", BORDER RECTIFICATIONS, FREE NAVIGATION, ETC. IDEA OF AGREEMENT AMONG PARTIES BEFORE FIRST PHASE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SUEZ CANAL ALSO SIGNIFICANT. FRENCH INTERPRETATION IS THAT PLAN IS "PACKAGE DEAL" ALTHOUGH NANTEUIL ADMITS LANGUAGE SOMEWHAT VAGUE.

5. NANTEUIL SAID HIS PERSONAL ANALYSIS SOVIET MOTIVATION IS THAT SOVIETS SEE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT BECOMING TOO DANGEROUS FOR THEMSELVES (RISK OF BEING DRAGGED IN BY UAR), TOO DANGEROUS FOR THOSE REGIMES THEY SUPPORT IN AREA (SYRIA AND UAR) WHICH MIGHT SOON COLLAPSE UNDER PRESSURE, AND WITHOUT ANY SIGNS OF PAYOFF SO FAR AS THEY ARE CONCERNED. TIME, IN SHORT, ACTING AGAINST SOVIET INTERESTS SO THEY WOULD LIKE TO PUT MIDDLE EAST ON ICE.

6. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS TO OPEN SUEZ CANAL, WHICH NANTEUIL SAID COMES OUT CLEARLY IN SOVIET PLAN. SECOND STEP IS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED AND DIFFICULT AS IT INVOLVES ALL OF REALLY TRICKY QUESTIONS, AND WOULD TAKE LONG TIME TO SETTLE (AT BEST). HOWEVER, IF SUEZ COULD BE OPENED WITH ISRAELI TROOPS PULLING BACK AND UAR TROOPS STAYING ON THEIR SIDE OF CANAL (NANTEUIL READING OF SOVIET INTENTIONS), THEN NASSER AND UAR WOULD BE SAFE AND MAIN RISK OF CONFLICT ENDED. OPENING OF SUEZ WOULD ALSO SERVE SOVIET STRATEGIC INTERESTS ELSEWHERE (E.G. VIETNAM) BUT THIS PROBABLY SECONDARY IN IMPORTANCE.

7. NANTEUIL THOUGHT THAT SOVIETS NOT VITALLY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED IN JORDAN AND WILLING ACCEPT SOLUTION THERE WHICH ISRAELIS MIGHT WORK OUT EITHER WITH JORDAN OR WITH PALESTINIANS. SYRIA IMPORTANT TO SOVS BUT NOT, IN NANTEUIL'S VIEW, SO IMPORTANT THAT SYRIA CONCURRENCE NECESSARY FOR ANY SETTLEMENT. FRENCH IMPRESSION IS THAT SYRIANS WOULD BE LEFT TO FUME AND STEW IN SOLITUDE IF THEY DID NOT GO ALONG. NANTEUIL DID NOT THINK ISRAELI ATTACK ON BEIRUT AIRPORT HAD PLAYED PART IN SOVIET THINKING, ALTHOUGH IT PERHAPS INCREASED URGENCY OF MOVING TOWARD SETTLEMENT.

8. COMMENT: NANTEUIL KNOWN TO SOME DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS AS RESULT HIS TIME AT UNGA IN 1967. HE HAS BEEN DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST SINCE JUNE 1964 AND IS BY HABIT MOST UNCOMMUNICATIVE. HE IS NOT RPT NOT IN HABIT MAKING PRO-AMERICAN STATEMENTS OR CRITICIZING HIS OWN GOVERNMENT. NOW EXPERT HE IS ON SOVIET MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS, WE CAN NOT JUDGE, BUT HE SEEMS KNOW MIDDLE EAST VERY WELL.

~~SECRET~~

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OO WTE19
DE WTE 0024

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE WH9022

UNCLAS

JANUARY 2, 1969

SECRETARY RUSK PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE TO BE
ISSUED AT GEORGE CHRISTIAN'S BRIEFING TOMORROW, FRIDAY
MORNING.

THE PRESIDENT HAS DESIGNATED VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY,
MRS. CLIFTON DANIEL (THE FORMER MARGARET TRUMAN) AND
AMBASSADOR MARGARET JOY TIBBETTS TO REPRESENT THE UNITED
STATES AT THE FUNERAL IN NORWAY OF FORMER UNITED NATIONS
SECRETARY GENERAL TRYGVE LIE. MR. LIE, WHO DIED
DECEMBER 30, WAS THE FIRST SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS. THE STATE FUNERAL WILL BE HELD AT TRINITY CHURCH
IN OSLO, MONDAY MORNING, JANUARY 6.

DTG: 022317Z JAN 69

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

1969 JAN 2

69 JAN 2 2 PM 7:03

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Sample

1969 JAN 2 23 56

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
69 JAN 2 PM 7:02

EEA943
OO WTE12
DE WTE 0023

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP9021

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY

JANUARY 2, 1969

HERewith POPE PAUL RESPONDS, IN A LETTER DATED
DECEMBER 15, TO YOUR MESSAGE OF NOVEMBER 25.

AS NEGOTIATIONS GET UNDER WAY, HE IS LEANING TO
THE NEED FOR A SOLID AND SECURE PEACE IN VIETNAM.
HIS ANXIETY IS LESS, AT THE MOMENT, FOR PEACE THAN
THAT IT BE AN HONORABLE PEACE. WE MAY WISH TO FIND
A WAY OF ENCOURAGING HIM TO MAINTAIN THIS STURDY
STAND IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS.

TO LYNDON B. JOHNSON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

WE EXPRESS TO YOU, MISTER PRESIDENT, OUR GRATITUDE
FOR THE KIND MESSAGE, DATED NOVEMBER 25TH LAST, BY WHICH
YOU ASSURED US OF YOUR CONSTANT PERSEVERANCE IN THE SEARCH
FOR PEACE.

WITH SATISFACTION HAVE WE TAKEN NOTE OF SUCH NOBLE
RESOLUTION, WHICH GIVES RISE TO WELL-FOUNDED HOPES
THAT A SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH EAST ASIA MAY
SOON BE REACHED, AND WE WISH WITH ALL OUR HEART THAT IT
MAY PROVE TO BE EQUITABLE AND HONORABLE.

THE NEWS OF THE ARRIVAL IN PARIS OF THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE DELEGATION HAS BROUGHT US JOY. THAT DECISION
UNDOUBTEDLY MARKS A GREAT STEP TOWARDS THE FINAL
GOAL, FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF WHICH - AS WE HAVE DONE
IN THE PAST - WE WILLINGLY OFFER OUR MODEST COLLABORATION
AND OUR FERVENT PRAYERS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By *isl* NLJ/RAC 10-132 (#5)
NARA Date 4-20-11

QUICK COPY

Pres file

WE CANNOT OMIT TO EXPRESS THE LIVELY HOPE THAT THE GREATEST UNDERSTANDING MAY CHARACTERIZE THE JUDGEMENT OF THE ANXIETY AND PREOCCUPATIONS OF AN ENTIRE PEOPLE WHO, WHILE LAWFULLY ASPIRING TO TRANQUILLITY, ORDER AND PEACE AFTER YEARS OF SACRIFICE AND SUFFERING, YET EXPERIENCE SOME FEARS REGARDING ITS FUTURE FATE.

WE THEREFORE CONSIDER IT OUR DUTY, ON THE EVE OF SERIOUS AND DECISIVE DELIBERATIONS, TO RECOMMEND MOST WARMLY THAT AMONG THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE SECURITY OF NORTH VIETNAM, THERE SHOULD WELL BE KEPT PRESENT ALSO THE SECURITY AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALL CITIZENS, ACCORDING TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS OF THAT POPULATION.

ARDUOUS IS THE TASK AND GRAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AT THIS MOMENT. WE ARE SURE THAT YOUR NATION WILL ONCE AGAIN PROVE ITSELF A FAITHFUL AND EFFICACIOUS DEFENDER OF THOSE IDEALS OF LIBERTY AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE HUMAN PERSON, WHICH ARE SO NOBLY AND GENEROUSLY MANIFESTED IN THE HISTORY OF YOUR LAND.

MAY THE HOPED-FOR JUST AND HONORABLE SOLUTION OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM CONSTITUTE AN EXAMPLE, AND AN INVITATION TO ALL GOVERNMENTS TO ENGAGE IN THAT DIFFICULT UNDERTAKING WHICH STRIVES TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD, IN THE SPIRIT OF UNIVERSAL SOLIDARITY AND MUTUAL RESPECT.

IN RENEWING THE ASSURANCES OF OUR HIGH CONSIDERATION, WE WILLINGLY INVOKE UPON YOU, MISTER PRESIDENT, UPON YOUR FAMILY, AND UPON THE ENTIRE AMERICAN PEOPLE, THE ABUNDANCE OF THE GIFTS OF CHRIST, THE PRINCE OF PEACE.

FROM THE VATICAN, DECEMBER 15, 1968.

PAULUS P P. VI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP9009

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NLT 95-46

By mp/cb

NARA, Date 3-2-98

Prep file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEREWITH AS YOU DIRECTED A RESPONSE FROM GEN ABRAMS
TO GEN WHEELER ON MAJ. ROWE.

1. PHYSICAL CONDITION: PHYSICAL CONDITION IS GOOD.
MENTAL ATTITUDE AND SPIRIT ARE EXCELLENT. HE HAS A
GENERALIZED SKIN RASH AND BECAUSE OF EXTENDED TIME
WITHOUT DENTAL CARE, SOME CAVITIES AND GUM TROUBLE
EXISTS.

2. DETAILS OF CAPTURE: ON THE MORNING OF 31 DECEMBER
1968, MANY HELICOPTERS WERE IN THE AREA WHERE ROWE WAS
LAST DETAINED AND IT APPEARED THAT ARVN TROOPS WERE CLOSING
IN ON THE CAMP. THERE WERE SEVEN VC WITH ROWE AT THIS TIME.
ROWE COULD TELL IT WAS ARVN TROOPS BECAUSE THE VC WERE
MONITORING THE ARVN RADIO NET. ROWE AND HIS GUARDS STARTED
TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE ARVN SWEEP. THE VC MOVED IN A GROUP;
HOWEVER, ROWE CONVINCED ONE OF HIS GUARDS TO BREAK FROM
THE GROUP BECAUSE THE GUNSHIPS COULD EASILY ENGAGE THEM.
ROWE AND HIS LONE GUARD SEPARATED FROM THE GROUP AND TOOK
ANOTHER TRAIL. AS ROWE AND THE GUARD WERE MOVING, THE GUARD
ACCIDENTALLY LOST THE MAGAZINE TO HIS WEAPON DESCRIBED BY
ROWE AS A "BURP GUN". ROWE COULD HEAR HELICOPTERS COMING
TOWARDS HIS LOCATION AND HE JUMPED THE GUARD AND BELIEVED
THAT HE KNOCKED HIM OUT. ROWE RAN TO A CLEARING AND SIGNED
THE HELICOPTER WITH A NET. ONE OF THE GUNSHIPS PICKED UP
ROWE AND TOOK HIM DIRECTLY TO THE 23TH EVAC HOSPITAL AT CAN
THO. ROWE ESTIMATED THE PICK-UP TIME TO BE ABOUT 30 DEC 68
12:20 A.M. EST GRID SQUARE VR 953498. HE WAS RESCUED BY TROOP
B, 7TH SQUADRON, 1ST CAVALRY (U.S.) WHICH WAS SUPPORTING THE
32 ARVN REGIMENT.

3. RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD: WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ASSEMBLE
DATA NECESSARY FOR A RECOMMENDATION FOR THE AWARD OF THE
MEDAL OF HONOR.

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP9007

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 95-46

By MP/cb NARA, Date 3-2-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HERewith A QUICK PRELIMINARY REPORT ON MAJ ROWE.
GEN WHEELER IS SENDING A SEPERATE MESSAGE WHICH
SHOULD ELICIT MORE DETAILS AND A FIRM RECOMMENDATION
FROM GEN ABRAMS.

NAME: JAMES ROWE
091033 USA REGULAR ARMY
AGE 30 B FEB 1938

HOME ADDRESS 300 N 15TH ST
MCALLEN TEXAS
78801

PHONE NUMBER 512 686-3903

NEXT OF KIN MR AND MRS LEE T. ROWE
300 N 15TH ST
MCALLEN TEXAS

GRADUATED FROM WEST POINT IN 1960

COMMISSION 8 JUNE 1960

FORT SILL NOV 60 - APR 61

LANGUAGE SCHOOL APR 61 - AUG 61

FT BRAGG AUG 61 - JULY 63

VIETNAM (IV CTZ) JULY 63 - 29 OCT 63 (DATE OF CAPTURE)

HAS RECEIVED USVN CAMPAIGN RIBBON
VN SERVICE MEDAL
PARACHUTIST BADGE
RANGER BADGE

MACV HAS NO PLANS AT THIS TIME TO AWARD ANY DECORATIONS.

NMCC REPORTS

1. HE WILL NOT RECEIVE ANY BACK PAY AS HIS FATHER
HAS BEEN RECEIVING IT SINCE THE TIME OF HIS CAPTURE.

2. HE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE BROOKE ARMY MEDICAL
CENTER AT FT. SAM HOUSTON, SAN ANTONIO TEXAS UPON
HIS RETURN TO THE STATES.

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