

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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DE RUMJIR 08A 15/0345Z
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FM AMEMBASSY-SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
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RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
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AUGUST 15, 1964
12:51 A.M.

I M M E D I A T E

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ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (415) WHITE HOUSE 34 DOD 45 CIA 38 INFO
CINCPAC 203 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 15TH 11AM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979

By isp, NARS, Date 7-20-79

AFTER AUGUST 14 MEETING OF GVN RPT GVN SC AND U.S. MISSION COUNCIL, I RPT I STAYED FOR PICNIC LUNCH, ACCOMPANIED BY SULLIVAN AND MANFULL (JOHNSON HAS BEEN LAID UP WITH FLU). AFTER LUNCH, KHANH TOOK US ASIDE AND PRODUCED A ROUGH ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF HIS NEW RPT NEW CONSTITUTION. FULL TEXT, WITH NOTES, TRANSMITTED BY SEPTTEL. WE FOUND IT BRUSQUE IN LANGUAGE AND SUGGESTED TO KHANH THAT IN PRESENT FORM IT WOULD RAISE CRITICISM IN U.S. AND IN WORLD PRESS. WE STRESSED TO HIM THAT INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF ACCEPTANCE IN VIETNAM WERE HIS OWN AFFAIR, AND WE COULD ONLY OFFER OBSERVATIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS.

KHANH HEARD OUT THESE OBSERVATIONS WITH APPARENT UNDERSTANDING AND THEN SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD PERHAPS MEET WITH THE COMMISSION WHICH HAD DRAFTED THIS DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO DISCUSS OUR OBSERVATIONS WITH THEM. I RPT I PROPOSED THAT SULLIVAN AND MANFULL SHOULD REMAIN IN CAP ST. JACQUES RPT CAP ST. JACQUES FOR THIS PURPOSE WHILE I RPT I RETURNED FOR COMMITMENTS IN SAIGON.

SULLIVAN AND MANFULL WERE THEN TAKEN TO PROVINCE CHIEF'S RESIDENCE WHILE CALL WENT OUT TO VARIOUS VILLAS IN CAP ST. JACQUES TO ASSEMBLE THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION. WHEN MISSION ARRIVED AT RESIDENCE, IT PROVED TO BE HEADED BY ONE-TIME P.M. TRAN CHANH THANH RPT TRAN CHANH THANH, AND TO BE COMPOSED OF TRAN LE QUANG RPT TRAN LE QUANG, PLUS FIVE PROMINENT JURISTS, ONE OF WHOM HAD RECENTLY BEEN CHIEF JUSTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT UNDER DIEM RPT DIEM REGIME.

~~SECRET~~

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-2- 415, AUGUST 15, 11 A.M. FROM SAIGON

DURING TWO AND ONE-HALF HOUR FRANK EXCHANGE AND AFTER FULL EXPLANATION, ACCOMPANIED BY OCCASIONAL JOCLAR COMMENTARY FROM JUDICIAL EXPERTS, SULLIVAN AND MANFULL MADE FOL POINTS:

- (1) PREAMBLE DID NOT RPT NOT MAKE CLEAR PROVISIONAL NATURE OF NEW "CHARTER".
- (2) PREAMBLE SHOULD STIPULATE THAT MRC RPT MRC FELT COMPELLED TO ASSUME AUTHORITY BECAUSE OF THREAT TO REPUBLIC, BUT THAT THIS AUTHORITY SHOULD BE RELINQUISHED AS CONDITIONS PERMITTED.
- (3) CHAPTER II, CONCERNING "BILL OF RIGHTS" AS UNNECESSARILY ABRUPT. RIGHTS SHOULD BE SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL, EVEN IF CHARTER SPECIFIED THAT THEY MUST NECESSARILY BE CURTAILED TEMPORARILY BECAUSE OF EMERGENCY. COMPARISON WAS DRAWN BETWEEN TWENTY ARTICLES CONCERNING RIGHTS OF CITIZENS IN OLD DIEM CONSTITUTION, AND ONLY TWO ARTICLES IN NEW CHARTER DEVOTED TO THIS SUBJECT.
- (4) SEVERAL ARTICLES, NOTABLY THOSE AFFECTING COUNCIL OF GOVT AND HIGH COUNCIL OF MAGISTRATES, WERE CRYPTICALLY OBSCURE IN THEIR MEANING.
- (5) WHOLE DOCUMENT WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS UNDULY PERMANENT FORMALIZATION OF MILITARY TAKEOVER. THEREFORE MOST CAREFUL PREPARATION NEEDED IN PUBLIC RELATIONS FIELD IF THIS TO BE DONE SMOOTHLY.

IN GENERAL, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION ACCEPTED ALL THESE OBSERVATIONS IN GOOD SPIRIT. THEY UNDERTOOK TO CONVENE FORTHWITH AND EXAMINE MEANS BY WHICH ANY OR ALL OF THEM COULD BE PUT INTO EFFECT. SULLIVAN AND MANFULL THEN WITHDREW, AND, BY PRIOR ARRANGEMENT WITH KHANH, RETURNED TO LATTER'S VILLA FOR FINAL CONSULTATION WITH HIM PRIOR THEIR RETURN TO SAIGON.

AT KHANH'S VILLA, MEETING OF TOP LEVEL MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL REPS WAS IN SESSION WHEN SULLIVAN AND MANFULL ARRIVED. KHANH WITHDREW FROM MEETING, LISTENED TO RECITAL OF OBSERVATIONS LISTED ABOVE, AND EXPRESSED GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THESE MATTERS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH. HOWEVER, HE LAID GREAT EMPHASIS UPON URGENCY WITH WHICH ACTION HAD TO BE TAKEN. HE HAD, HE SAID, "FIVE DAYS AT THE OUTSIDE" AND "AT THE INSIDE", MAYBE ONLY A COUPLE OF DAYS. HE THEREFORE WANTED ALL THE HELP HE COULD OBTAIN SOONEST.

~~SECRET~~

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-3- 415, AUGUST 15, 11 A.M. FROM SAIGON

HE SAID HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD DRAFT A PROCLAMATION WHICH THEY WOULD DELIVER TO EMBASSY AUGUST 15 RPT 15 FOR OUR COMMENTS AND THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADVICE WE COULD GIVE ON PUBLIC RELATIONS HANDLING OF THIS ENTERPRISE. HE DOUBTED THERE WAS TIME TO GET PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ADVICE FROM WASHINGTON AND ALSO QUESTIONED WHETHER IT WOULD BE REALLY USEFUL IN THESE "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES". WITH THIS, HE RETURNED, VERY SOLEMNLY, TO THE ROOM WHERE HIS MRC RPT MRC COLLEAGUES, EQUALLY SOLEMN, WERE BUSILY SCRATCHING ON FOOLSCAP, PRESUMABLY DRAFTING THEIR PROCLAMATION.

COMMENT:

WE CONCLUDE THAT KHANH AND HIS MILITARY COLLEAGUES HAVE DECIDED THAT THIS SORT OF CHANGE IS INDISPENSABLE. IT IS OF COURSE STILL NOT DETERMINED WHAT GEN MINH'S RPT MINH'S ATTITUDE WILL BE. WE HAVE CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY OF SEEKING LEGAL AID FROM WASHINGTON TO REVIEW THIS CHARTER, BUT FEEL THIS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE USEFUL BECAUSE THIS DOCUMENT DEPARTS SO WIDELY FROM U.S. EXPERIENCE AND BECAUSE TIME IS SO SHORT. WE HAVE THEREFORE DECIDED THAT OUR BEST EFFORTS WOULD BE DEVOTED TO (1) MAKING WORDING OF DOCUMENT LESS BRUSQUE AND THEREFORE MORE PALATABLE BOTH IN VIETNAM AND ABROAD AND (2) ASSISTING IN PROCLAMATION AND OTHER MEASURES OF PUBLIC RELATIONS NATURE EXPLAINING NECESSITY FOR THIS SORT OF CHANGE. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, THIS IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL FORM WHICH THE MRC RPT MRC FULLY INTENDS TO IMPOSE, AND WE SEE NO RPT NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO MAKE BEST OF IT.
TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AUGUST 15, 1:17 A.M.

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CIA Cables

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Intelligence Information Cable

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

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TDCS DB-315/00578-64

DATE OF INFO. 29 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 30 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

VIEWS OF DANG VAN SUNG THAT SOUTHERN DAI VIET MILITARY LEADERS PLAN AN IMMINENT COUP AND ON ACTION WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 63615

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO. 1

Content UNCLASSIFIED

per 058375

date 24 MAY 1976

SANITIZED +RAC 14888

Authority CIA ltr. 6/15/76

By hmg, NARS, Date 7/15/76

5-8-00

1. (SUMMARY. ON 29 APRIL 1964 DANG VAN SUNG, LEADER OF THE NORTHERN FACTION OF THE DAI VIET PARTY, SAID THAT SOUTHERN DAI VIET MILITARY OFFICERS WERE "BEYOND DOUBT" PLANNING A COUP D'ETAT WHICH, HE BELIEVED, WOULD OCCUR IMMINENTLY. THESE MILITARY OFFICERS MIGHT POSSIBLY PLACE SOUTHERN DAI VIET LEADERS NGUYEN TON HOAN OR NGUYEN XUAN OANH IN CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT. SUNG CONSIDERED A COUP DISASTROUS AND SAID THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MOVING TOWARD

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CIVILIAN CONTROL. CONCERNING CENTRAL VIETNAM, SUNG SAID THAT GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI, COMMANDER OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, WAS NOT A SUPPORTER OF GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH. SUNG SAID THAT HE LACKED SOLID INFORMATION CONCERNING THE VIEWS OF GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM AND COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO.)

2. SUNG SAID THAT HE HAD OBTAINED INFORMATION WHICH INDICATED "BEYOND DOUBT" THAT SOUTHERN DAI VIET MILITARY OFFICERS WERE PLANNING A COUP. SUNG DID NOT KNOW THE EXACT TIMING FOR THE COUP BUT BELIEVED THAT IT WOULD BE IMMINENT. SUNG WAS CERTAIN THAT GENERAL NGUYEN VAN THIEU, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, COLONEL HUYNH VAN TON, COMMANDER OF THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION, AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL DUONG HIEU NGHIA, COMMANDER OF THE 5TH ARMORED SQUADRON WERE MEMBERS OF THE COUP GROUP. SUNG ALSO IDENTIFIED A MARINE OFFICER NAMED CHAU WHO DISOBEYED THE ORDERS OF MARINE COMMANDER LE NGUYEN KHANG IN NOVEMBER 1963 AND WAS AN EFFECTIVE FORCE IN OVERTHROWING NGO DINH DIEM. (FIELD COMMENT. CHAU IS PROBABLY MAJOR CO TAN TINH CHAU, LISTED AS COMMANDER OF THE 2ND MARINE BATTALION FOLLOWING THE 1 NOVEMBER COUP.)

3. SUNG SAID THAT THESE DAI VIET MILITARY OFFICERS WERE PLANNING THE COUP WITHOUT REFERENCE TO OTHER DAI VIETS, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT CHOOSE TO MAKE SOUTHERN DAI VIET LEADER NGUYEN TON HOAN A FIGUREHEAD CHIEF OF STATE. SUNG SAID THAT THE MILITARY LEADERS

ALSO MIGHT CHOOSE TO PLACE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN XUAN OANH AT THE HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT SINCE OANH WAS HOAN'S AGENT FOR MANY YEARS IN THE UNITED STATES.

4. SUNG CONSIDERED THE TIMING OF THE COUP PERFECT, AS THE DAI VIETS MIGHT NEVER HAVE A BETTER OPPORTUNITY. SUNG REASONED THAT GENERALS NGUYEN KHANH, DUONG VAN MINH, AND TRAN THIEN KHIEM HAVE, IN EFFECT, ABDICATED POWER AND NO GOVERNMENT EXISTS. SUNG SAID, HOWEVER, THAT A SOUTHERN DAI VIET COUP WOULD BE DISASTROUS AS IT WOULD BE PRIMARILY CATHOLIC.

5. SUNG SAID THAT HA THUC KY, FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR UNDER KHANH AND A SOUTHERN DAI VIET LEADER, HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO MOUNT A COUP AGAINST KHANH BUT WITHOUT MUCH SUCCESS. SUNG SAID THAT KY HAD CONTACTED GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI IN THIS REGARD. SUNG COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT GENERAL KHANH'S RECENT STATEMENT THAT AN UNIDENTIFIED GENERAL HAD COOPERATED WITH KY IN MOUNTING A COUP REFERRED TO GENERAL NGUYEN VAN THIEU.

6. SUNG SAID THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS FOR THE AMERICANS TO CHOOSE A YOUNGER COLONEL, ACCEPTABLE TO THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, AND PLACE HIM IN CHARGE OF MAINTAINING ORDER AND STABILIZING THE CURRENT SITUATION; THIS COLONEL, HOWEVER, SHOULD NOT BE PLACED IN CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT. SUNG SAID THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, I.E. THE TRIUMVIRATE, SHOULD BE MAINTAINED (POSSIBLY WITH NGUYEN XUAN OANH AS PRIME MINISTER)

BUT THAT MANY OF THE OTHER GENERALS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM POSITIONS OF POWER, EITHER BY DISMISSING THEM FROM THE MILITARY OR BY SENDING THEM ABROAD. SUNG THEN URGED THE FORMATION OF AN ADVISORY COUNCIL COMPOSED OF CIVILIAN POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND STUDENT LEADERS, WHO WERE NOW SCARED AND WILLING TO COOPERATE TO MAINTAIN A STABLE GOVERNMENT.

7. SUNG SAID, "WE ARE AT THE LAST MOMENT, BOTH FOR US AND FOR YOU." SUNG SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER TAKING ACTION IMMEDIATELY AND THAT HE AND OTHER WELL-INTENTIONED VIETNAMESE LEADERS WOULD SUPPORT A REASONABLE SOLUTION.

8. SUNG SAID THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM. SUNG SAID FLATLY THAT GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI DID NOT SUPPORT GENERAL KHANH AND, IN FACT, SUPPORTED GENERAL MINH, IF ANYONE. SUNG SAID THAT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THI MIGHT SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM, NEUTRALIST CENTRAL VIETNAM, AND PROWESTERN SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH HAS BEEN ESPOUSED BY THE FRENCH.

9. SUNG SAID THAT HE HAD NO SOLID INFORMATION CONCERNING THE POSITIONS OF GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM AND COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, BOTH OF WHOM HE CONSIDERED ENIGMAS.

10. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR TAYLOR AND DEPUTY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP).

(END OF MESSAGE)

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102
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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

TDCS DB-315/00577-64

DATE OF
INFO.

DISTR. 30 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

GROUPS PLANNING COUPS D'ETAT, THE POSSIBILITY OF
A SUCCESSFUL COUP D'ETAT, AND EXPECTED PUBLIC
REACTION: SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 30 AUGUST 1964

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

Content UNCLASSIFIED

per 058375

REF IN-63608
TDCS-314/02346-64SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL;

date 24 MAY 1976

FIELD REPORT NO. 1
SANITIZED

Authority CMAA 6/15/76/RAC44889

By nmq, NARS, Date 7/15/76 -58-80

1. THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF A STAFF OFFICER BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION. PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE AS A GUIDE TO THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

2. SUMMARY. COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, PRESS OFFICER TO FORMER PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN KHANH CLAIMS TO BE CONTEMPLATING A COUP D'ETAT DESIGNED TO BRING HIM AND YOUNGER OFFICERS TO POWER. ALTHOUGH THAO HAS NOT MANIFESTED THE SAME MOTIVATION AND DEDICATION TO THE OVERTHROW OF KHANH THAT HE EXHIBITED IN HIS PLANS TO DESTROY NGO DINH DIEM, IF HE BECOMES CONVINCED THAT KHANH MUST GO, HE WILL PROCEED WITH HIS PLANS. HOWEVER, HE MUST BE SUCCESSFUL IN GAINING THE SUPPORT OF ADDITIONAL

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OFFICERS BY 4-5 SEPTEMBER, AND MUST BE CONVINCED THAT THE TRIO OF GENERALS ARE NOT MAKING PROGRESS IN GAINING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY. HE WILL ATTEMPT HIS COUP D'ETAT, IF HE ATTEMPTS IT AT ALL, BY ABOUT THAT TIME, OR VERY SOON THEREAFTER. THE ADVERSE REACTION TO A THAO COUP D'ETAT WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO FOSTER A COUNTER COUP D'ETAT ATTEMPT, OR AT BEST, CREATE AN ATTITUDE OF PASSIVITY. THERE ARE ALSO REPORTS OF A COUP D'ETAT BEING PLANNED BY THE SOUTHERN DAI VIET PARTY, BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN VAN THIEU, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF AND COMMANDER OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY, AND COLONEL HUYNH VAN TON, COMMANDER OF THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION, ARE THE MOST PROMINENT MILITARY OFFICERS BELIEVED TO BE AMONG THE LEADERS OF THE DAI VIET PLANNING. THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE THAO AND THE DAI VIET COUP D'ETAT PLANNERS.

3. COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO IS CONSIDERED THE INDIVIDUAL GENERATOR OF THE COUP D'ETAT PLOTTING DESIGNED TO BRING HIM AND YOUNGER OFFICERS TO POWER. HOWEVER, THERE ARE OTHER GROUPS WHICH SEEM TO BE PLANNING A COUP D'ETAT AS WELL. WORKING VERY CLOSELY WITH THAO ARE OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COUP D'ETAT PLOTTING PRIOR TO 1 NOVEMBER 1963 AND WHO BORE THE BRUNT OF THE ACTUAL FIGHTING IN THE COUP D'ETAT. GENERALS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE OFFICERS HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED OUT OF THE COUNTRY, OR TO SEEMINGLY INNOCUOUS STAFF JOBS, THE QUESTION REMAINS AS TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY HAVE RETAINED THE LOYALTY OF THEIR FORMER TROOPS AND IF THAO HAS BEEN ABLE TO ACQUIRE, BY TRANSFER, THIS LOYALTY.

4. FOR EXAMPLE, COMMANDERS OF THE AIRBORNE AND OF THE MARINES CLAIM THEIR TROOPS ARE LOYAL TO GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH. HOWEVER, AS IN PREVIOUS COUPS D'ETAT, AT LEAST SOME OF THESE UNITS ARE UNPREDICTABLE AND COULD BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE

COPY

BLANDISHMENTS OF THAO AND HIS COLLEAGUES. THAO'S CLAIMS OF SUPPORT OF THE 21ST, 25TH, 9TH AND 2ND DIVISIONS ARE PROBABLY EXAGGERATED. EVEN IF THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF TRUTH IN THAO'S CLAIM, TRANSPORTING TROOPS TO THE SAIGON AREA WOULD BE A DIFFICULT UNDERTAKING AND RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE AIR FORCE PART IN THE COUP D'ETAT PLOTTING. ALTHOUGH GENERAL NGUYEN CAO KY, COMMANDER OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE, APPEARS TO BE RECONSIDERING, HE IS A MERCURIAL INDIVIDUAL, AND CONTINUED INACTION ON THE PART OF GENERALS KHANH, TRAN THIEN KHIEM AND DUONG VAN MINH COULD STIR HIM AGAIN.

5. THAO'S INTENTIONS REST ON TWO FACTORS, HIS OWN STATEMENTS AND A SUBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF HIS CURRENT ATTITUDE. THAO SAID ON 25 AUGUST THAT ANOTHER COUP D'ETAT WOULD BE A DISASTER, AND THREE DAYS LATER SPOKE IN DETAIL OF HIS COUP D'ETAT PLANNING. HE SAID ON 28 AUGUST THAT HE STILL WISHED TO SUPPORT KHANH, DID NOT WANT A COUP D'ETAT, BUT THAT HE BELIEVED HE WOULD PROBABLY END UP WITH NO CHOICE, SINCE HE STRONGLY DOUBTS THE TRIUMVIRATE WILL WORK. HE HAS ALSO CLAIMED, WITH APPARENT HONESTY, THAT HE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTIONS IF ANOTHER GROUP, THE SOUTHERN DAI VIETS, STAGED A COUP D'ETAT BEFORE HIS. A VERY SUBJECTIVE IMPRESSION OF THAO'S ATTITUDE IS THAT HE HAS NOT MANIFESTED THE SAME MOTIVATION AND DEDICATION TO THE OVERTHROW OF KHANH THAT HE EXHIBITED IN HIS PLANS TO DESTROY DIEM AND NHU. THAO IS A COMBINATION OF CAUTION AND IMPETUOUSNESS AND, IF HE BECOMES EMOTIONALLY CONVINCED THAT KHANH MUST GO, HE WILL PROCEED WITH HIS PLANS.

6. THAO STATED ON 28 AUGUST THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO WAIT SOME DAYS PRIOR TO TAKING ACTION IN ORDER TO CONTACT INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS TO ARRANGE THE NEUTRALIZATION OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL DUONG HIEU NGHIA, COMMANDER OF THE 5TH ARMORED SQUADRON, WHO, AS A SOUTHERN DAI VIET ACTIVIST, WOULD BE OPPOSED TO THE THAO COUP D'ETAT. THAO HAS

COPY

ALSO SAID THAT HE WISHES TIME IN ORDER TO REMOVE GENERAL DO CAO TRI, COMMANDER OF THE 2ND CORPS, FROM THE PICTURE, AND THAT 4 OR 5 SEPTEMBER WOULD BE THE BEST TIME FOR THIS. IF THAO IS SUCCESSFUL IN GAINING THE SUPPORT OF ADDITIONAL OFFICERS BY 4 OR 5 SEPTEMBER, AND IF HE IS CONVINCED THAT THE TRIO OF GENERALS ARE NOT MAKING PROGRESS IN GAINING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, HE WILL MOVE, IF HE MOVES AT ALL, BY ABOUT THAT TIME OR VERY SOON THEREAFTER.

7. IN ADDITION TO THE LOYALTY AND STRENGTH STATUS OF MILITARY UNITS IN THE SAIGON AREA, THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THAO'S COUP ATTEMPT WILL DEPEND ON THREE FACTORS: A. WHETHER OR NOT KHANH MOVES ENERGETICALLY IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO CONTROL THE SITUATION;

B. THE ACTIONS OF GENERAL KHIEM IF A COUP D'ETAT IS ACTUALLY ATTEMPTED. KHIEM HAS DISPLAYED AN UNCANNY KNACK IN THE PAST OF BEING ON THE WINNING SIDE, BUT THERE IS SOME QUESTION OF HOW MUCH POWER HE NOW HAS. KHIEM HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY DISCREDITED IN THE PAST FEW DAYS. HE PROBABLY RETAINS CONTROL OF AT LEAST THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND IF HE COULD MAKE AVAILABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES TO THE COUP D'ETAT FORCES, HE WOULD BE A KEY FACTOR. FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THAO AND KHIEM, WHICH WAS FORMERLY CLOSE, APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN STRAINED IN RECENT WEEKS, AND ONE REASON IS THE STRONG RUMOR OF KHIEM'S AFFILIATIONS WITH THE SOUTHERN DAI VIETS.

C. THE ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE AND WHETHER IT WILL PROVIDE TROOP TRANSPORT TO THE COUP D'ETAT FORCES IS ALSO A PRIME FACTOR. NO HARD INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED TO SUPPORT THAO'S CONTENTION THAT HE HAS AIR FORCE SUPPORT.

8. THAO HAS SAID THAT ANY GOVERNMENT IN WHICH HE HAS A VOICE OR INFLUENCE WOULD BE PRO-WEST AND STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST. HE ADVOCATES STRONG MILITARY CON-

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TROL UNTIL THE WAR IS WON, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME VOICING THE IMPORTANCE OF A TWO PARTY SYSTEM, AND A CABINET OF HONEST, YOUNG TECHNICIANS WHO WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSUME FULL AUTHORITY AFTER VICTORY. A MEANINGFUL ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF A THAO CONTROLLED GOVERNMENT IS NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT A FIRMER EVALUATION THAN NOW EXISTS OF THAO HIMSELF.

9. IN SUM, THE PUBLIC REACTION OF A TEMPORARILY SUCCESSFUL COUP D'ETAT BY THAO AND HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD BE EXTREMELY ADVERSE. THERE ARE VIETNAMESE ARMY OFFICERS, SIGNIFICANT IN NUMBER AND POSITION, WHO STRONGLY DISTRUST THAO'S POLITICAL INTENTIONS AND WHO CONSIDER HIM A HIGH-RANKING VIET CONG AGENT. THIS FEELING IS SUFFICIENTLY STRONG TO STIMULATE A COUNTER COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THAO OR, AT BEST, CREATE AN ATTITUDE OF PASSIVITY. THAO, A CATHOLIC, CLAIMS TO HAVE RECEIVED THE BLESSING OF A TOP MEMBER OF THE CATHOLIC HIERARCHY IN SAIGON, AND POSSIBLY THE OVER-ALL CATHOLIC REACTION WOULD BE FAVORABLE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE CATHOLIC FEAR OF A BUDDHIST-CONTROLLED GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THERE WOULD BE STRONG ELEMENTS OF CATHOLIC DISSATISFACTION BECAUSE OF SUSPICIONS OF THAO'S VIET CONG CONNECTIONS. THE REACTION OF THE BUDDHISTS, PARTICULARLY THICH TRI QUANG, WOULD BE VIOLENT OR CLOSE TO VIOLENCE, AND STRONG ENOUGH TO BRING THAO DOWN SHORTLY AFTER HIS ASSUMPTION OF POWER. PERHAPS, MOST IMPORTANT WOULD BE THE GENERAL PUBLIC REACTION. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AFTER TWO COUPS D'ETAT, RIOTS AND NEAR ANARCHY, THE GENERAL REACTION COULD BE ONE OF HOPELESSNESS AND INDIFFERENCE.

10. THERE IS ANOTHER ELEMENT WHICH IS SIGNIFICANT IN ASSESSING A THAO INITIATED COUP D'ETAT. THAO HAS STATED THAT THE SOUTHERN DAI VIETS, SPECIFICALLY, LIEUTENANT COLONEL DUONG HIEU NGHIA, ARMORED CORPS; COLONEL HUYNH VAN TON, COMMANDER OF THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION; GENERAL NGUYEN VAN THIEU; AND, FORMER MINISTER OF

COPY

INTERIOR HA THUC KY, ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COUP D'ETAT PLOTTING. IN ADDITION, ON 29 AUGUST 1964 A MATURE AND RESPECTED VIETNAMESE OBSERVER OF THE LOCAL SCENE EXPRESSED HIS FEAR THAT A SOUTHERN DAI VIET COUP D'ETAT WAS IMMINENT AND WOULD BE DISASTROUS, BECAUSE OF THE CATHOLIC AND CAN LAO ORIENTATION OF THE COUP D'ETAT LEADERS. THE OBSERVER ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE SPECIFICS OR SUBSTANTIATING DATA, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD PEOPLE INVESTIGATING. ALSO ON 29 AUGUST, A SENIOR OFFICER IN THE ARMORED CORPS STATED THAT THE SOUTHERN DAI VIETS WERE PLANNING A LARGE MANIFESTATION OR A COUP D'ETAT. FOR THIS REASON, THE ARMORED OFFICER ORDERED ON 29 AUGUST THAT TWENTY-EIGHT M113 ARMORED CARS BE MOVED TO SAIGON. THE OFFICER IDENTIFIED THE COUP D'ETAT PLOTTERS AS GENERAL NGUYEN VAN THIEU, COLONEL HUYNH VAN TON AND GIA DINH PROVINCE CHIEF LIEUTENANT COLONEL NHAN MINH TRANG. HE REPORTED THAT THE MILITARY SOUTHERN DAI VIETS WERE ATTEMPTING TO ENGAGE THE SUPPORT OF GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM, BUT THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW, KHIEM WAS UNDECIDED. THE ARMORED OFFICER DID NOT KNOW THE TIMING OF THE PLANNED SOUTHERN DAI VIET COUP D'ETAT AND WAS TRYING TO INFLUENCE NGHIA BUT WITHOUT APPARENT SUCCESS.

11. THE PUBLIC REACTION TO A SOUTHERN DAI VIET COUP D'ETAT WOULD BE ADVERSE. THE BUDDHIST REACTION WOULD PROBABLY BE VIOLENT. TRI QUANG HAS EXPRESSED AN INTENSE DISTRUST OF THE CATHOLICS, DAI VIETS, AND THE CAN LAO; THE SOUTHERN DAI VIET PLOTTING CONTAINS ALL OF THESE ELEMENTS. A COALESCING OF THAO AND THE SOUTHERN DAI VIETS IS UNLIKELY. THE SOUTHERN DAI VIETS DO NOT COLLABORATE WITH OTHERS, AND THAO HAS CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE SUCH A CONDITION EVEN MORE UNLIKELY. THE SENIOR ARMORED OFFICER SAID ON 29 AUGUST THAT HE CONSIDERED SUCH COLLABORATION MOST IMPROBABLE, SINCE THE TWO ELEMENTS ARE INCOMPATIBLE.

12. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP)

END OF MESSAGE

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

per 658375

TDCS DB-315/00570-64

DATE OF INFO. 26 AND 27 AUGUST 1964

date 24 MAY 1976

DISTR. 29 AUGUST 1964

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SUBJECT

1. EFFORTS OF COL. PHAM NGOC THAO TO GET SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT ATTEMPT
2. POSSIBILITY THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 63119

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO.

SANITIZED

Authority CIA Ltr. 6/15/76

By hmg, NARS, Date 7/15/76

1. ON 26 AUGUST COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT WITH LT. COL. TU FNU, COMMANDER OF AN ARMORED UNIT AT CU CHI (IN HAU NGHIA PROVINCE, ABOUT 25 MILES WEST OF SAIGON). THE TWO ALSO DISCUSSED MEANS OF COORDINATING AIR FORCE ACTIVITY WITH THE GROUND UNITS INVOLVED IN THE PLANNED COUP. THAO SAID HE HAS SET THE COUP DATE FOR EITHER 4 OR 5 SEPTEMBER. HE REASONED THAT HE KNEW GENERAL DO CAO TRI, COMMANDER OF THE II CORPS, WHO WOULD OPPOSE A COUP, WENT TO NHA TRANG EVERY WEEKEND. THAO THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EASY FOR THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE CREW CHAUFFERING TRI TO NHA TRANG TO LAND AT SOME OTHER

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FIELD WHERE TRI COULD BE ARRESTED BY COUP FORCE.

2. THAO SAID HE DEFINITELY HAS 9TH DIVISION COMMANDER GENERAL VINH LOC LINED UP WITH THE COUP GROUP AS WELL AS THE VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES IN II CORPS.

A UNIT UNDER THE 7TH DIVISION COULD BE BROUGHT IN BY HELICOPTER TO SUPPORT THE COUP, DESPITE THE FACT THAT COLONEL HUYNH VAN TON, COMMANDER OF THE 7TH DIVISION, WOULD OPPOSE A COUP. THAO THEN WONDERED WHETHER THE 217HQ HELICOPTER SQUADRON MIGHT BE USED TO TRANSPORT THE 7TH DIVISION UNIT.

3. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF 27 AUGUST THAO TALKED WITH COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE NGUYEN CAO KY ON THE MATTER OF A COUP. WHEN THAO LEFT KY'S OFFICE HE SAID KY WENT ALONG WITH THE PLAN. HOWEVER, KY SAID NOTHING AFTER HIS TALK WITH THAO. (SOURCE COMMENT: KY DID NOT APPEAR TO BE TOO EAGER TO SUPPORT THAO. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT KY TRIED AT THE MEETING TO DISSUADE THAO FROM MOUNTING A COUP. IT SEEMS ALSO THAT KY IS BEGINNING TO SYMPATHIZE WITH THE POSITION OF GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH.)

4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR TAYLOR AND DEPUTY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP).

(END OF MESSAGE)

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

per 058375

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DISTR. 29 AUGUST 1964

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SUBJECT

PHAM NGOC THAO: BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY AND PERSONALITY
ANALYSIS. SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 29 AUGUST 1964PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL:

SANITIZED

FIELD REPORT NO.

Authority CIA 6/15/76

By mg, NARS, Date 7/15/76

1. THIS IS AN APPRAISAL OF PHAM NGOC THAO. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF A STAFF OFFICER BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION. PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE AS A GUIDE TO THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

2. SUMMARY. COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, PRESS OFFICER TO FORMER PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN KHANH, IS PLANNING A COUP D'ETAT ON 4-5 SEPTEMBER 1964. THAO, A FORMER VIET MINH, DEFECTED TO THE GOVERNMENT IN 1956 AND BECAME A PROTEGE OF BISHOP NGO DINH THUC. HE HAD A VARIETY OF POSITIONS IN THE NGO DINH DIEM REGIME AND ROSE TO PROVINCE CHIEF BY 1961. BY EARLY 1963 HE HAD FALLEN FROM THE POLITICAL GRACES OF THE DIEM REGIME AND PLANNED TO FORM A CLANDESTINE POLITICAL GROUP AGAINST IT. UPON

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HIS RETURN FROM THE SECOND VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN JULY 1964, HE WAS APPOINTED PRESS OFFICER TO KHANH. THAO, A CATHOLIC, HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED AS A DYNAMIC PERSONALITY AND A BRILLIANT LEADER. HE IS PERSUASIVE, ARTICULATE, AND PRESENTS WITTY AND CONVINCING ARGUMENTS. HE IS INTELLIGENT, ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT ERRATIC, AND IS APPARENTLY AN INDEPENDENT PERSONALITY. HIS ULTIMATE POLITICAL ORIENTATION IS NOT KNOWN, BUT NUMEROUS RANKING VIETNAMESE DO NOT TRUST HIM AND A FEW BELIEVE THAT HE MAY STILL BE COMMUNIST-ORIENTED.

3. THAO WAS BORN IN CAN THO, PHONG DINH PROVINCE, ABOUT 1921. HIS FATHER, ADRIEN PHAM NGOC THUAN, WAS BORN IN CAN THO IN 1882, AND HAD A LONG HISTORY OF ANTI-FRENCH ACTIVITY. THAO'S FATHER AND AN UNCLE WERE RESPECTIVELY VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT OF AN ENGINEERS AND DOCTORS ASSOCIATION WHICH WAS EXTREMELY ANTI-FRENCH. FRENCH PERSECUTION IN THE 1930'S DROVE THAO'S FATHER TO MOVE PERMANENTLY TO FRANCE. HIS FATHER SERVED AS TREASURER OF A COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION IN PARIS, AND WAS ACTIVE IN VARIOUS PRO-VIET MINH ORGANIZATIONS. THAO'S FATHER TOOK OUT FRENCH CITIZENSHIP EARLY IN LIFE, AND ALL OF HIS ELEVEN CHILDREN AUTOMATICALLY BECAME FRENCH CITIZENS. ALL MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY ARE CATHOLICS.

4. THAO STUDIED IN CAN THO AND LATER IN SAIGON (FROM 1932 TO 1942 AT THE LYCEE CHASSELOUP LOUBAT), WHERE HE BECAME CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH LEADERS AS NGUYEN HUU CHAU, FORMER MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE DIEM REGIME; GENERAL TRAN VAN DON; NGUYEN KIM HUU, FORMER SOCIAL ACTION MINISTER; AS WELL AS OTHERS, SOME OF WHOM LATER BECAME THE NUCLEUS OF HIS VIET MINH ESPIONAGE SERVICE IN SAIGON. IN 1943 THAO RENOUNCED FRENCH CITIZENSHIP AND, BY SO DOING, WAS NOT PERMITTED ENTRANCE INTO ANY SCHOOLS OF HIGHER EDUCATION. HE REMAINED IN SAIGON AS AN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHER, AND ALSO TAUGHT FOR A WHILE IN VINH LONG. HIS FORMER

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CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC DERIVES FROM HIS EARLY SCHOOLING, WHEN ARCHBISHOP THUC OFTEN TOOK HIM TO CLASSES AND NURTURED HIS CATHOLIC BELIEFS.

5. THAO STARTED FULL-TIME WORK FOR THE VIET MINH IN 1947. THE MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH THEN CONSISTED OF A COALITION OF COMMUNISTS AND DEMOCRATS. ALTHOUGH THAO COMMITTED HIMSELF TO NEITHER GROUP, HE COMMITTED HIMSELF TO THE "RESISTANCE" MOVEMENT AS A COOPERATING INDEPENDENT. HE WAS SOON APPOINTED A CAPTAIN, BUT THEREAFTER REFUSED TO OBEY ORDERS EMANATING FROM NORTH VIETNAM AND WAS STRIPPED OF HIS RANK AND DEMOTED TO LIAISON COURIER BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH. IN 1947 HE MADE MANY TRIPS, AND IT WAS DURING THIS PERIOD THAT HE MET LE DUAN, THE TOP-RANKING VIET MINH CADRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. DUAN LEARNED THAT THAO'S BROTHER WAS PHAM NGOC THUAN GASTON, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. AS A RESULT OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WHICH THAO DEVELOPED WITH LE DUAN, AND THE FACT THAT LE DUAN WAS IMPRESSED THAT THAO DID NOT USE HIS BROTHER'S POSITION IN ORDER TO FURTHER HIMSELF, THAO WAS OFFERED THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF THE VIET MINH ESPIONAGE APPARATUS IN THE SAIGON AREA. HE FIRST REFUSED, BUT WHEN SUBSEQUENT ORDERS CAME FROM HANOI NAMING HIM TO THE POSITION, HE ACCEPTED.

6. THAO MOVED BACK TO SAIGON, ADOPTED THE PSEUDONYM OF LE MINH, AND BECAME PRESIDENT OF A STUDENTS ASSOCIATION, WHICH GAVE HIM EXCELLENT COVER FOR HIS ACTIVITIES AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO RECRUIT FORMER SCHOOLMATES FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. THE MAJOR PORTION OF THAO'S WORK IN THE BEGINNING CONSISTED OF COMPILING INFORMATION ON FRENCH SHIPPING SCHEDULES, TROOP DEPLOYMENTS AND GUARD MOVEMENTS, THUS FACILITATING THE MOVEMENT OF VIET MINH AGENTS, SUPPLY FORCES, ETC. BY 1948 THAO WAS ENGAGED IN ASSASSINATIONS, SUPPLY RAIDS AND AMBUSHES. HE CLAIMS THAT AT ONE TIME, HE PERSONALLY ASSASSINATED A FRENCH COLONEL WITH A CONSEQUENT

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RISE OF HIS OWN STANDING AND THE MORALE OF HIS FOLLOWERS.

7. BY 1949 THAO WAS ALSO ENGAGED IN THE FORMATION OF GUERRILLA COMPANIES IN THE SAIGON AREA, AND LATER BRANCHED OUT INTO THE WESTERN PROVINCES. HE WAS, THEREFORE, APPOINTED A COLONEL WITH THE TASK OF AMALGAMATING VARIOUS COMPANIES INTO A BATTALION FOR THE SOUTHWEST REGION. THIS WAS THE 4010 BATTALION, WHICH AT ONE TIME CONSISTED OF SEVERAL THOUSAND TROOPS. IN 1949 THAO WAS ALSO NAMED LIAISON AGENT FOR CONTACT WITH GENERAL TRINH MINH THE, CAO DAI LEADER. IN HIS CONTACTS WITH THE, THAO MADE THE ACQUAINTANCE OF MANY MEN WHO BECAME CAO DAI POLITICAL OFFICERS AFTER THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN 1954. THAO CLAIMS THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE NOT COMMUNISTS, BUT MERELY AMBITIOUS MEN WHO WERE TRYING TO BETTER THEIR POSITIONS DURING A PERIOD WHEN IT APPEARED THAT THE CAO DAI WOULD RECEIVE FAVORABLE TREATMENT FROM THE DIEM GOVERNMENT.

8. DURING HIS YEARS WITH THE VIET MINH, THAO REGULARLY VISITED ARCHBISHOP THUC IN VINH LONG, USUALLY INCOGNITO. HE INFORMED THUC OF THE PROGRESS AND "PSYCHOLOGY" OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, AND FOUND THE ARCHBISHOP A SYMPATHIC LISTENER AND ADVISOR.

9. THAO CLAIMS THAT IN 1952 THE VIET MINH GENERAL STAFF ASKED HIM TO JOIN IT AS OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MILITARY PLANNING AND MANEUVERS. ON THE STAFF WERE VAN TIEN DUNG, PHAM VAN BACH, LE DUAN, AND HIS BROTHER, PHAM NGOC THUAN. HOWEVER, HE REMAINED WITH THE TROOPS, PREFERRING COMBAT TO STAFF WORK. THAO HAS ALSO SAID THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO BE DIRECTLY ASSOCIATED WITH ARDENT, POMPOUS COMMUNIST OFFICIALS, WHO HAD NOTHING IN COMMON WITH HIM AND OTHER HARD-WORKING INDIVIDUALS. AS A BATTALION COMMANDER, THAO WAS ASSIGNED A SERIES OF POLITICAL COMMISSARS, AND FOUND THEM TO BE WORTHLESS COWARDS. HE STATES THAT HE DISCHARGED A SERIES

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OF THEM AND WAS SUPPORTED FOR DOING SO BY LE DUAN. (AN INDEPENDENT REPORT STATES THAT THAO WENT TO PEKING IN 1952 FOR ONE YEAR OF MILITARY TRAINING.)

10. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1954, THAO WAS CALLED TO NORTH VIETNAM FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE HIGHEST LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME. HE RETURNED PROMPTLY TO THE SOUTH WITH THE MISSION OF BEING CHIEF OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) DELEGATION IN CAMBODIA. THE DELEGATION'S MISSION WAS TO ARRANGE FOR THE EVACUATION OF COMMUNIST ELEMENTS, IN COORDINATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION. FOLLOWING HIS ASSIGNMENT IN CAMBODIA, THAO RETURNED TO SOUTH VIETNAM TO HELP EVACUATE COMMUNIST ELEMENTS TO THE NORTH. THAO AND LE DUAN REMAINED IN THE SOUTH, ALTHOUGH THAO HAD BEEN INVITED TO GO TO THE NORTH. AMONG MANY OF THE VIET MINH LEADERS WHO DID GO TO HANOI DURING THIS PERIOD WAS THAO'S BROTHER GASTON PHAM NGOC THUAN, WHO BECAME COUNSELLOR IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND LATER DRV AMBASSADOR TO EAST GERMANY.

11. THAO MAINTAINS THAT IN 1955, FOLLOWING THE EVACUATION OF THE COMMUNISTS TO NORTH VIETNAM, HE RESUMED HIS RESIDENCE IN VINH LONG, AND AGAIN FELL UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC. HE MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH THE VIET MINH, THE CAO DAI, THE HOA HAO, AND SOME GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS WHOM HE MET THROUGH ARCHBISHOP THUC. IN JANUARY 1955, WHEN CAO DAI GENERAL TRINH MINH THE RALLIED TO THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, THAO WAS INVITED BY THE TO JOIN HIS FORCES, BUT REFUSED. HE WAS ALSO INVITED TO JOIN THE HOA HAO FORCES DURING THIS PERIOD, WHICH HE ALSO REFUSED.

12. THROUGHOUT 1955, IN SAIGON AND IN VINH LONG WHERE HE WAS TEACHING AT THE CATHOLIC NGUYEN TUONG TO SCHOOL, HE UNDERWENT CONTINUAL HARASSMENT BY THE NATIONAL POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICE. THAO BELIEVES THAT THE REASON FOR THIS TREATMENT WAS THAT HE REFUSED TO RALLY, TO RENOUNCE HIS FORMER ASSOCIATES, AND TO GIVE INFORMATION

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ON THE RESISTANCE. THAO'S CONVICTION WAS THAT THE FIGHTERS IN THE RESISTANCE WERE TRUE PATRIOTS, WHO ATTAINED INDEPENDENCE FOR VIETNAM, WHILE THE NATIONAL POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICE OFFICERS WERE COOPERATING WITH THE FRENCH. HE REFUSED TO ACCEPT A CARTE DE RALLIEMENT FROM THE SECURITY SERVICE, AND RESISTED UNTIL ARCHBISHOP THUC INTERVENED AND OBTAINED FOR HIM A REGULAR IDENTITY CARD. THAO STATES THAT HE ALSO REFUSED TO PERFORM THE RITUAL OF PLEDGING ALLEGIANCE TO THE DIEM GOVERNMENT BY EXPLAINING THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY, ESPECIALLY TO THOSE WHO HAD JUST EMERGED FROM THE UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE MOVEMENT.

13. FROM LATE 1955 THROUGH 1956, THAO WAS IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS HIGH-RANKING MEMBERS OF THE CAN LAO NHAN VI PARTY AND OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT. SOME OF THE INTRODUCTIONS WERE MADE BY ARCHBISHOP THUC. HIS CONTACTS INCLUDED: TRAN TRUNG DUNG, NGUYEN DINH THUAN'S PREDECESSOR AS MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE FOR THE DIEM REGIME; COLONEL TRUNG, CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN 1956; AND HUYNH VAN LANG, CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OFFICE DES CHANGES. THAO JOINED THE CAN LAO AND BECAME ITS ORGANIZER IN THE SOUTHWEST, CONCENTRATING ON TRAINING AND PROPAGANDA MISSIONS. IN 1956, IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THAO WAS HEAD OF A STUDY GROUP OF VIETNAMESE ARMY OFFICERS, RANGING IN RANK FROM CAPTAIN TO COLONEL. THE GROUP WAS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF TRAN TRUNG DUNG AND HUYNH VAN LANG AND ITS PURPOSE WAS DEVISE A PLAN TO RAISE THE MORALE OF THE ARMY. DURING THIS PERIOD, THAO AND HIS WIFE ALSO SERVED AS BEHIND-THE-SCENES EDITORS OF A MONTHLY MAGAZINE, BACH HOA, WHICH WAS INTENDED FOR A MIDDLE-CLASS INTELLECTUAL AUDIENCE.

14. FROM 1956 UNTIL MAY 1963, THAO HELD THE FOLLOWING POSITIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM:

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A. APRIL TO LATE 1956: EMPLOYED IN THE OFFICE DES CHANGES IN SAIGON.

B. EARLY TO LATE 1957: EMPLOYED BY THE BANQUE NATIONALE IN SAIGON.

(WHILE IN SAIGON WITH THE OFFICE DES CHANGES AND THE BANQUE NATIONALE, THAO BECAME VERY FRIENDLY WITH HUYNH VAN LANG, HEAD OF THE OFFICE DES CHANGES AT THAT TIME. THAO AND LANG WORKED VERY CLOSELY TOGETHER IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE IN LATE 1963.)

C. LATE 1957: THAO WAS MADE A CAPTAIN IN THE ARMY AND PLACED IN CHARGE OF THE CIVIL GUARD IN VINH LONG PROVINCE.

D. 1959: THAO WAS ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IN SAIGON AND WAS DIEM'S REPRESENTATIVE INVESTIGATING MATTERS RELATING TO THE AGROVILLE PROGRAM IN THE PROVINCES, AND TO SECURITY IN THE WESTERN PROVINCES.

E. MAY 1960 TO JUNE 1962: THAO WAS CHIEF OF KIEN HOA PROVINCE, WHERE HE ACQUIRED THE REPUTATION OF AN UNUSUALLY CAPABLE PROVINCE CHIEF; HE WAGED A SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN TO RESTORE SECURITY IN A HEAVILY COMMUNIST INFESTED AREA BY GAINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEASANTS AND BY ORGANIZING RESISTANCE ON A LOCAL LEVEL.

F. JUNE 1962 TO AUGUST 1962: LEADER GRANTEE IN THE UNITED STATES.

G. AUGUST 1962 TO EARLY 1963: INSPECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY.

15. IN EARLY 1963 THAO, IN COLLABORATION WITH HOANG MINH TUYNH AND HUYNH VAN LANG, AGREED TO FORM A CLANDESTINE POLITICAL GROUP AS THEY BELIEVED THE DIEM GOVERNMENT WAS INCAPABLE OF WINNING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE. THAO WAS ASSIGNED TO KIEN TUONG PROVINCE IN MAY 1963 AS A CANAL CONSTRUCTION ADVISOR, HAVING LOST THE CONFIDENCE OF THE DIEM REGIME. IN LATE JUNE THAO WAS THE LEADER OF ONE OF THREE GROUPS WHICH HAD UNITED TO OVERTHROW DIEM, AND IN AUGUST, THAO HOPED TO

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STAGE A COUP D'ETAT WITHIN A MONTH. HE CLAIMED TO CONTROL THREE BATTALIONS IN AUGUST, BUT HOPED TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF FIVE. ON 24 OCTOBER, THAO PLANNED TO LAUNCH HIS COUP D'ETAT, BUT THE FIVE BATTALIONS OF THE 8TH REGIMENT WHICH WERE COMMANDED BY MAJOR NGUYEN VAN TU, DID NOT OBTAIN THE NEEDED TRANSPORTATION.

16. FOLLOWING THE SUCCESSFUL NOVEMBER 1963 COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME, THAO SAID THAT, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS 24 OCTOBER PLANNED COUP D'ETAT HAD NEVER MATERIALIZED, HE AND A NUMBER OF HIS COPLOTTERS HAD DECIDED TO MAINTAIN THEIR ORGANIZATION. THEY PLANNED TO INCREASE THE ORGANIZATION, ESPECIALLY AT THE BATTALION COMMANDER LEVEL, IN ANTICIPATION OF A FALLING OUT AMONG THE GENERALS, OR AN INABILITY OF THE MILITARY TO GOVERN SOUTH VIETNAM OVER A LONG PERIOD. IN DECEMBER 1963 THAO LEFT VIETNAM TO ATTEND THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE IN THE UNITED STATES.

17. THAO RETURNED TO SAIGON ON 13 JULY 1964 AND BECAME PRESS OFFICER FOR PREMIER NGUYEN KHANH IN AUGUST. AS A RESULT OF THE LATE AUGUST STUDENT AND BUDDHIST/CATHOLIC RIOTS, AND THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THEM, THAO WAS PLANNING ON 26 AUGUST TO STAGE A COUP D'ETAT ON EITHER 4 OR 5 SEPTEMBER.

18. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USMACV AID USIA 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

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per 058375

TDCS DB-315/00555-64

DATE OF INFO. 28 AUGUST 1964

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DISTR. 28 AUGUST 1964

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SUBJECT

PLANS OF COL. PHAM NGOC THAO TO MOUNT A COUP IN THE
EVENT SOUTH VIETNAM SITUATION IS NOT QUICKLY TAKEN
IN HAND BY GEN. TRAN THIEN KHIEM OR OTHER LEADER

PLACE &
DATE ACQ. \

REF IN 62094

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL;

FIELD REPORT NO.

SANITIZED

Authority CIA LA. 6/15/76By rmg, NARS, Date 7/15/76

1. (SUMMARY. COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO SAID ON 28 AUGUST THAT UNLESS GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM, OR SOMEONE ELSE, TAKES THE CHAOTIC SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM IN HAND, HE WILL MOUNT A COUP D'ETAT. THAO DOES NOT EXPECT KHIEM TO TAKE THE SITUATION IN HAND; HE CONSIDERS KHANH WEAK. THAO SAID IF OTHERS, SUCH AS THE DAI VIETS, MAKE A MOVE TO RIGHT THE SITUATION, THAT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO HIM. THAO LISTS THE MILITARY ELEMENTS WHICH WILL SUPPORT HIM AND COMMENTS ON SOME WHICH MIGHT NOT. IF HE IS FORCED TO MOUNT HIS COUP, THAO WILL BE PRIME MINISTER WITH EITHER DUONG VAN MINH OR PHAM KHAC SUU AS CHIEF OF STATE. THAO STATES THAT

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HE DOES NOT SEE HOW GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH CAN STAY.)

2. COLONGEL PHAM NGOC THAO, PRESS SECRETARY TO NGUYEN KHANH, SAID ON 28 AUGUST THAT HE AND MANY OTHER OFFICERS ARE COMPLETELY DISGUSTED WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION AND HE FEELS THAT UNLESS GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM TAKES CHARGE OF THE SITUATION QUICKLY, HE (THAO) WILL ACT; THERE WILL BE A COUP D'ETAT. THAO SAID HE DOES NOT LIKE THE IDEA. HE WOULD LIKE TO WORK WITH GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM BUT HE SINCERELY DOUBTS THAT KHIEM WILL MAKE DECISIONS; KHIEM LACKS COURAGE. THAO SAID, "THE GENERALS ARE FINISHED." HOWEVER, THAO WILL WAIT TO SEE IF KHIEM CAN CONTROL THINGS. THAO, A CATHOLIC, SAID HE HAD TOLD A HIGH-RANKING VIETNAMESE CATHOLIC PRELATE, MONSIGNOR TIEN, WHAT HE PLANNED TO DO, ASKED FOR HIS BLESSING, AND RECEIVED IT.

3. IF HE MOUNTS HIS COUP, THE FOLLOWING WILL BE THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT: THAO WILL BE PRIME MINISTER. THE CHIEF OF STATE WILL BE GENERAL DUONG VAN (BIG) MINH OR PHAM KHAC SUU, AN ELDERLY BUT RESPECTED POLITICIAN WHO LONG OPPOSED THE DIEM REGIME. THAO SAID HE REALIZES SUU'S SHORTCOMINGS—HIS SENILITY AND THE POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT ISSUE SOME SORT OF FOOLISH STATEMENT ABOUT NEUTRALITY, BUT HE (THAO) FEELS THAT THE CHIEF OF STATE WILL BE LARGELY A FIGUREHEAD WHO WILL BE CONTROLLED. THAO HAS NOT THOUGHT IN DETAIL ABOUT A CABINET BUT MENTIONED GENERAL TRAN VAN MINH AS A POSSIBLE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, VU VAN MAU AS POSSIBLY

MINISTER OF INTERIOR, AND TRUONG BUU KHANH, FORMER CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN LONDON, AS A POSSIBLE FOREIGN MINISTER. THAO ALSO SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE PHAN HUY QUAT AS MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENCY.

4. GOING DOWN THE LIST OF MILITARY UNITS WHICH MIGHT OR WOULD SUPPORT A COUP THAO SAID:

A. GENERAL NGUYEN CAO KY, COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE, IS FOR IT.

B. GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, COMMANDER OF THE AIRBORNE, WILL, HE FEELS, NOT BE AGAINST THE COUP.

C. SOME MARINES WILL BE FOR THE COUP; SOME WILL BE NEUTRAL.

D. LT. COL. DUONG HIEU NGHIA, COMMANDER OF THE 5TH ARMORED SQUADRON, WILL BE OPPOSED; BUT HE CAN POSSIBLY BE NEUTRALIZED. SOME ARMOR WILL BE FOR THE COUP.

E. COLONEL HUYNH VAN TON OF THE 7TH INFANTRY DIVISION WILL BE OPPOSED; THE COMMANDERS OF THE TWO BATTALIONS IN SAIGON ARE LOYAL TO TON. HOWEVER, THE COMPANY COMMANDERS OF THESE TWO BATTALIONS AND THE COMMANDER OF THE BATTALION IN TAN AN LONG AN PROVINCE ARE FOR THE COUP.

F. THE VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES ELEMENT IN SAIGON (ABOUT 100 MEN) ARE FOR THE COUP.

G. GENERAL DUONG VAN DUC, COMMANDER OF IV CORPS, MAY GO

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EITHER WAY. THAO SAID HE HAS A RATHER DELICATE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH DUC.

H. GENERAL VINH LOC OF THE 9TH DIVISION IS FOR THE COUP.

I. THE COMMANDERS OF THE 21ST, 25TH AND 2ND DIVISIONS ARE ALL FOR THE COUP.

J. GENERAL DO CAO TRI, COMMANDER OF II CORPS, MAY GIVE THE COUP GROUP TROUBLE. HOWEVER, THEY THINK HE CAN BE NEUTRALIZED. GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA, COMMANDER OF THE NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS ACADEMY IN NHA TRANG, IS FOR THE COUP AS IS THE KHANH HOA PROVINCE CHIEF AND ALL THE SPECIAL FORCES IN THE AREA.

5. THAO SAID HE IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN THE ARMY. HE FEELS THAT IF DAI VIET OFFICERS WANT TO RENOUNCE POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE ARMY ON BEHALF OF THE DAI VIET PARTY THEY WILL BE WELCOMED BY THE COUP GROUP. THAO SAID HE WILL MAKE NO PROMISES OF PROMOTIONS TO ANYONE IN ORDER TO GET THEIR SUPPORT. DUONG HIEU NGHIA OF THE ARMORED COMMAND CAN BE BOUGHT, THAO SAID, BUT HE WILL NOT OFFER TO PAY ANYONE. HE THINKS HE CAN WORK WITH HA THUC KY, A DAI VIET AND FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR.

6. THAO ALSO SAID THAT IF ANOTHER GROUP-DAI VIETS FOR EXAMPLE- MADE A MOVE IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO TAKE THINGS IN HAND- THAT WOULD BE ALL RIGHT. THE DAI VIETS, HE SAID, THINK GENERAL KHIEM IS BACK OF THEM, BUT KHIEM IS ONLY "HALF" SUPPORTING THEM.

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GENERAL DUC, WHO AT ONE TIME MIGHT HAVE BACKED KHIEM, IS NOT A SUPPORTER NOW BECAUSE OF KHIEM'S DAI VIET CONNECTIONS. (FIELD COMMENT: THE CLEAR IMPLICATION HERE IS THAT THAO FEELS THAT THE DAI VIETS WILL NOT TAKE ACTION.) ON KHIEM, THAO RECALLED A CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH THAT GENERAL ON 26 AUGUST. KHIEM WAS CRYING. KHIEM SAID THAT HE LIKED KHANH. HOWEVER, COLONEL TON HAD ASKED KHIEM TO TAKE POWER. HE REFUSED, SAYING HE COULD NOT BECAUSE THE BUDDHISTS DO NOT LIKE HIM.

7. ON EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO DAYS THAO SAID HE DOES NOT SEE HOW KHANH "CAN STAY". KHANH MADE TOO MANY CONCESSIONS TO THE BUDDHISTS; THE RIOTS OF 27 AUGUST WERE TERRIBLE AND THEN KHANH TOOK OFF FOR VUNG TAU. ALL THE OFFICERS FEEL HE SHOULD HAVE STAYED IN SAIGON. KHANH HAS NO PRESTIGE WITH THE PEOPLE. ALMOST EVERYONE THINKS KHANH IS STAYING IN POWER ONLY BECAUSE HE HAS AMERICAN SUPPORT. THAO SAID HE HAS TRIED TO SERVE KHANH HONESTLY AND WELL. WHEN HE (THAO) TOOK THE JOB AS KHANH'S PRESS SECRETARY HE TOLD KHANH THAT HE WAS NO PERSONAL FRIEND BUT WOULD WORK FOR HIM CONSCIENTIOUSLY AS A GOOD CIVIL SERVANT. NOW HE DOES NOT WANT TO GOVERN. THAO SAID HE HAD TALKED WITH KHANH ON THE MORNING OF 27 AUGUST AND HE SEEMED CONFIDENT; BY NIGHTFALL HE WAS DEPRESSED.

8. FIELD DISSEMM STATE (AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP).

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

per 058375

IDCS-314/02342-64

DATE OF
INFO.

date 24 MAY 1976

DISTR. 28 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

AN ANALYSIS OF THICH TRI QUANG'S POSSIBLE COMMUNIST
AFFILIATIONS, PERSONALITY AND GOALS: SITUATION
REPORT AS OF 27 AUGUST 1964

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL:

SANITIZED

Authority CIA REG. 4/15/76 & RAC 14893
By long, NARS, Date 7/15/76/5-800

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THICH TRI QUANG. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF A STAFF OFFICER BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION. PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE AS A GUIDE TO THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

2. SUMMARY. A SUMMARY OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE AS OF 27 AUGUST 1964 ON WHETHER THICH TRI QUANG IS A COMMUNIST LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE POSITIVE INDICATIONS, THEY LACK SUPPORTING EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD MAKE THEM CREDIBLE. THE ASSESSMENT IS, THEREFORE, THAT TRI QUANG IS NOT A COMMUNIST. AN EVALUATION OF TRI QUANG'S PERSONALITY AND AN ESTIMATE OF HIS GOALS DISCLOSES THAT TRI QUANG IS A SUPREMELY CONFIDENT AND AMBITIOUS MAN, WHO PROBABLY WANTS TO

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ESTABLISH A BUDDHIST THEOCRACY IN SOUTH VIETNAM, WITH HIMSELF PLAYING THE DOUBLE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LEADER AND POLITICAL EMINENCE IN A GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS OVERCOME OR SUBDUED THE VIET CONG, BUT WHICH MIGHT WELL HAVE NEUTRALISM AS ITS ULTIMATE GOAL.

3. SINCE SHORTLY AFTER THE HUE INCIDENTS OF MAY 1963, A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF FRAGMENTARY REPORTS, ACCUSATIONS, HEARSAY, EVALUATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS, HAVE BEEN RECEIVED INDICATING THAT TRI QUANG IS A COMMUNIST, OR PRO-COMMUNIST, OR PRONEUTRALIST. HOWEVER, AMONG THE REPORTS, THERE IS A LACK OF HARD INTELLIGENCE WHICH WILL DEFINITELY SUPPORT THE BELIEF OF MANY VIETNAMESE THAT TRI QUANG IS INDEED A COMMUNIST. THERE IS A LACK OF SUCH HARD INTELLIGENCE DESPITE ATTEMPTS TO PIN DOWN TRI QUANG'S ACCUSERS AND TO CLARIFY THE FRAGMENTARY AND GENERALLY NEBULOUS "REPORTS" LINKING TRI QUANG WITH THE VIET CONG. THE FOLLOWING IS A CROSS SECTION OF THE REPORTS ON THE SUBJECT AND INCLUDES WHAT ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ITEMS, BOTH PRO AND CON.

A. A REPORT DATED JUNE 1963, |

STATED THAT IN 1951 A FORMER VIET CONG AGENT HAD SIGNED A STATEMENT FOR THE POLICE THAT TRI QUANG HAD PARTICIPATED IN VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN HUE. THE DATES OF TRI QUANG'S ALLEGED VIET CONG ACTIVITIES WERE NOT SPECIFIED, AND, SINCE THERE WAS NOT CONCRETE EVIDENCE, TRI QUANG WAS NEVER ARRESTED.

B. |

CLOSELY RELATED TO THIS REPORT IS AN ARTICLE, WHICH APPEARED IN THE TIMES OF VIETNAM, IN AUGUST 1963. |

COPY

THE TIMES' ARTICLE

ALSO

DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO TRI QUANG'S THREE BROTHERS. IT STATED THAT ONE BROTHER WAS A PRO-COMMUNIST BONZE IN NORTH VIETNAM; ANOTHER BROTHER HELD AN IMPORTANT POST IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM; AND, THAT A THIRD BROTHER HAD BEEN A VIET MINH SECTION CHIEF UNTIL HIS DEATH IN 1947. WHETHER OR NOT THE ARTICLE IN THE DIEM-CONTROLLED TIMES WAS CORRECT, IT WAS PART OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO PROVE THAT THE BUDDHIST UPRISING OF 1963 WAS COMMUNIST INSPIRED AND DIRECTED.

C. IN 1954 TRI QUANG REPORTEDLY SIGNED A MOTION OF THE "INTELLECTUALS OF SAIGON AND CHOLON IN FAVOR OF PEACE", A GROUP WHICH WAS CONSIDERED TO BE LEFTIST.

D. IN AUGUST 1954, TRI QUANG WAS REPORTEDLY NAMED HONORARY PRESIDENT OF THE MOVEMENT FOR PEACE IN SAIGON AND CHOLON. HE REPORTEDLY WAS ARRESTED IN NOVEMBER 1954, ALONG WITH TWENTY-FIVE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION, BUT DISAVOWED THE MOVEMENT AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED. THE MOVEMENT FOR PEACE WAS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE A LEFTIST ORGANIZATION, AND SOME OF ITS MEMBERS HAVE LATER SHOWN THEMSELVES TO BE COMMUNISTS OR COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS.

E. IN FEBRUARY 1964 TWO PROMINENT BUDDHIST BONZES, THICH DUC NGHIEM AND THICH GIAC DUC, SAID THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED WITH INDICATIONS THAT TRI QUANG IS A VIET CONG AGENT, OR AT LEAST A VIET CONG SYMPATHIZER. THE TWO BONZES SAID THAT TRI QUANG HAD PLACED PRO-VIET CONG INDIVIDUALS IN KEY PLACES IN THE BUDDHIST ORGANIZATION AND CITED TRI QUANG'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THICH MINH

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CHAU, WHO A FEW YEARS AGO HAD MADE A TRIP TO COMMUNIST CHINA, AS SUPPORTING EVIDENCE. THIS INFORMATION IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS BECAUSE BOTH DUC NGHIEP AND GIAC DUC ARE STRONGLY ANTI-TRI QUANG AND HAVE HAD SHARP PERSONAL AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WITH HIM.

F. IN MAY 1964 A PROMINENT VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST, WHO IS INTIMATELY ACQUAINTED WITH BUDDHIST LEADERS, RECEIVED A THREAT FROM THICH THIEN MINH AS A RESULT OF ANTI-TRI QUANG ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN THE JOURNALIST'S NEWSPAPER. THIEN MINH IS GENERALLY REGARDED AS TRI QUANG'S RIGHT-HAND MAN. THE JOURNALIST MADE A COUNTER THREAT THAT HE WOULD PUBLISH EVIDENCE OF THIEN MINH'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY FROM 1948 TO 1951. THIEN MINH'S TREATS IMMEDIATELY CEASED. THE EVIDENCE REFERRED TO BY THE JOURNALIST WAS REPORTEDLY IN THE HANDS OF THICH DUC NGHIEP. THE EPISODE CONCEIVABLY COULD HAVE BEEN A RAMIFICATION OF THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THE HARD-LINE BUDDHISTS (TRI QUANG AND THIEN MINH) AND THE MODERATE FACTION LED BY THICH TAM CHAU.

G. VARIOUS CATHOLIC SOURCES, BOTH LAY AND CLERICAL, HAVE REPORTED CATEGORICALLY THAT TRI QUANG IS AN ACTIVE VIET CONG AGENT. THE REPORTS, OR ACCUSATIONS, ARE NOTABLE FOR THEIR LACK OF SUBSTANTIATING DATA.

H. PERHAPS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OF INDICATIONS POINTING TO TRI QUANG'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE VIET CONG IS A THOUGHTFUL, ALBEIT ADMITTEDLY SUBJECTIVE, EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT OF TRI QUANG BY THE PRO-BUDDHIST JOURNALIST MENTIONED IN "F".

HE IS ALSO WELL ACQUAINTED WITH VIET CONG TECHNIQUES AND CHARACTERISTICS. THE JOURNALIST STATED THAT, ON THE BASIS OF MANY INTIMATE CONVERSATIONS WITH TRI QUANG, HE HAD

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NOTED A CLOSE SIMILARITY IN THOUGHT PROCESSES, TERMINOLOGY AND RATIONALIZATION WITH THAT WHICH HE HAD OBSERVED IN TALKING WITH VIET CONG CADRES AND SYMPATHIZERS. THE JOURNALIST SAID THAT AS A RESULT OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH, AND CLOSE OBSERVATION, OF TRI QUANG, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT TRI QUANG IS A COMMUNIST.

4. CONVERSELY, THERE ARE SEVERAL INDICATIONS CONTRADICTING THE PRECEDING. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH TRI QUANG HAS HIMSELF VOLUNTARILY RAISED THE SUBJECT OF ACCUSATIONS AND SPECULATIONS THAT HE IS A COMMUNIST OR NEUTRALIST. ALTHOUGH TRI QUANG'S DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE TACTICS OF A CLEVER MAN, AND TRI QUANG IS CERTAINLY CLEVER, HE HAS BEEN FORTHRIGHT AND CONVINCING IN HIS COMMENTS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS "INVITED" TO COLLABORATE WITH THE VIET MINH IN THE FORTIES, AND THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO RESIST "VIET MINH POWER". HE WENT TO A COMMUNIST STRONGHOLD ABOUT TWELVE KILOMETERS FROM HIS HOME VILLAGE AND THERE SERVED "PASSIVELY" AS CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED VIETNAMESE ASSOCIATION, A VIET MINH-CONTROLLED ORGANIZATION. TRI QUANG SAID THAT BY A RUSE HE WAS ABLE TO LEAVE THE VIET MINH-CONTROLLED AREA AND RETURNED TO HUE, WHERE HE WAS THE TARGET OF SEVERAL VIET MINH ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS. TRI QUANG ALSO ADMITTED THAT HE HAD A BROTHER WHO WAS AN OFFICIAL WITH THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, BUT TRI QUANG CLAIMS THAT HE HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE BROTHER DIED IN A NORTH VIETNAMESE PRISON. TRI QUANG HAS ALSO CLAIMED THAT HIS FAMILY, PROMINENT LANDOWNERS, WERE THE VICTIMS OF A VIET MINH OSTRACISM PROGRAM AND THAT HIS MOTHER DIED AS A RESULT. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THE EVALUATION OF ONE OF THE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE AND SOPHISTICATED OBSERVERS OF THE VIETNAMESE POLITICAL SCENE. THIS SOURCE STATES THAT WHILE TRI QUANG MAY HAVE WORKED WITH THE VIET MINH AT ONE TIME, IT WAS

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WALDON DAINES JOURNALIST

PROBABLY FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES AND NOT BECAUSE HE IS A COMMUNIST OR A COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER. FINALLY, IN MAY 1964, GENERAL TON THAT XUNG, COMMANDER OF I CORPS, SENT AN EIGHT-MAN TEAM THROUGHOUT THE CORPS AREA TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS THAT TRI QUANG WAS PRO-VIET CONG OR PRONEUTRALIST OR BOTH. THE RESULT OF THE SIX-DAY INVESTIGATION WAS THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FOUND THAT TRI QUANG WAS COLLABORATING WITH THE VIET CONG OR ENGAGING IN PRONEUTRALIST ACTIVITIES.

5. THE ABOVE INDICATIONS ARE THEN, TO SAY THE LEAST, INCONCLUSIVE. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, A DETERMINATION OF WHO TRI QUANG IS, WHAT HE WANTS, AND WHAT HE IS DOING, MUST BE BASED ON A FAIRLY SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT TRI QUANG IS NOT A COMMUNIST, NOR IS HE A COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER. THERE ARE TWO GENERAL REASONS FOR THE ASSESSMENT:

A. THERE IS A LACK OF HARD INTELLIGENCE, IN SPITE OF THE WILLINGNESS OF MANY PERSONS AND GROUPS TO PROVIDE DEROGATORY INFORMATION, TO SUPPORT THE THESIS THAT HE IS A COMMUNIST. ON CLOSE SCRUTINY, THE "REPORTS" CLAIMING THAT HE IS A COMMUNIST FALL INTO THE CATEGORIES OF HEARSAY, GOSSIP AND ACCUSATIONS, WITHOUT ANY SUPPORTING EVIDENCE.

B. SECONDLY, THERE IS THE PERSONALITY OF THE MAN HIMSELF. THIS PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT, ALTHOUGH SUBJECTIVE, LEADS TO THE BELIEF THAT THE DOMINANT CHARACTERISTIC OF TRI QUANG'S PERSONALITY IS SUPREME SELF-CONFIDENCE, BORDERING ON MEGALOMANIA. IF THIS ASSESSMENT IS VALID, IT IS DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE TRI QUANG ACTING AS AN "AGENT" FOR ANYONE, BE IT HANOI, PEKING, OR MOSCOW. THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF STRONG NATIONALISM, AND PERHAPS XENOPHOBIA, IN TRI QUANG'S MAKEUP, AND THESE CHARACTERISTICS WOULD ALSO TEND TO ARGUE AGAINST THE PRO-COMMUNIST THESIS.

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6. IF TRI QUANG IS NOT A COMMUNIST OR A COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER, WHAT THEN EXPLAINS THE SEEMINGLY INEXPLICABLE ACTIONS OF A HIGHLY INTELLIGENT AND ESSENTIALLY RATIONAL MAN? IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS CAN PERHAPS BE EXPLAINED BY ANOTHER CHARACTERISTIC OF TRI QUANG, NAMELY EXCESSIVE AMBITION. TRI QUANG'S PERSONALITY, AND HIS ACTIONS SINCE MAY 1963 SEEM TO POINT TO THE FACT THAT HIS OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN AND IS TO CREATE A SITUATION THAT WILL PERMIT TRI QUANG TO REACH A TWIN-GOAL: THE LEADERSHIP OF A BUDDHIST THEOCRACY IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE ROLE OF THE MOST POWERFUL POLITICAL LEADER IN THE COUNTRY. TRI QUANG IS ESSENTIALLY AN INVERTED PERSONALITY. HE ALSO CONSISTENTLY IS ABLE TO RATIONALIZE, BY A FAIRLY AGONIZING PROCESS, THE BUDDHIST CLAIMS OF NON-INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL AFFAIRS WITH THEIR VERY BLATANT POLITICAL MANEUVERS. THESE FACTORS WOULD NOT PERMIT TRI QUANG TO ASSUME AN OVERT POSITION AS PRESIDENT OR PRIME MINISTER. RATHER, HE WOULD PROBABLY PREFER AND FEEL MORE AT HOME ASSUMING A ROLE AS THE PRINCIPAL EMINENCE, WHO HAS AT LEAST THE POWER OF VETO OVER EVERY IMPORTANT DECISION. SUCH A GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY EVENTUALLY RID THE COUNTRY OF ALL FOREIGN INFLUENCE. ALTHOUGH PRAGMATIC AS HE IS, TRI QUANG WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT AND WANT FOREIGN SUPPORT UNTIL HE FELT THAT COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE WAS POSSIBLE.

7. TRI QUANG'S REFUSAL TO ADMIT THAT HIS PRESENT ACTIONS ARE BENEFICIAL TO THE VIET CONG IS PROBABLY EXPLAINED BY HIS BELIEF, PERHAPS SINCERE, THAT VICTORY OVER THE VIET CONG CANNOT BE ACHIEVED UNTIL THE REFORMS OR CHANGES UPON WHICH HE INSISTS ARE CARRIED OUT. HIS CONCEPT PROBABLY LEADS HIM TO BELIEVE THAT, IF HE ACHIEVES A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE COUNTRY, HE WILL BY SOME UNDEFINED MEANS BE ABLE TO RID IT OF THE COMMUNISTS. THUS, ASSUMING THAT HE IS A STRONG NATIONALIST AND THAT HE REALLY WANTS TO RID SOUTH VIETNAM OF THE COMMUNIST

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MENACE, THE TYPE OF GOVERNMENT TRI QUANG FORESEES IS PROBABLY SOME FORM OF NEUTRALISM, ALTHOUGH NOT THE TYPE ENVISAGED BY DE GAULLE. TRI QUANG TENDS TO EQUATE THE FRENCH WITH THE CATHOLICS AND VICE VERSA, AND IF THERE IS ONE CHARACTERISTIC THAT IS VERY EVIDENT IN HIS MAKE UP, IT IS HIS ANTI-CATHOLICISM. NOW THIS ANTI-CATHOLICISM WOULD BE MANIFESTED IF TRI QUANG ACHIEVES A POSITION OF CLEAR POLITICAL DOMINANCE IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE AT THIS TIME.

8. WHETHER FOR GOOD OR BAD, TRI QUANG IS CERTAINLY ONE OF THE MOST, IF NOT THE MOST, CAPABLE LEADERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE IS HIGHLY INTELLIGENT, CLEVER, DEVIOUS, AND ALSO, A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE DEMAGOGUE. WHILE HE TENDS TO BE MERCURIAL IN HIS UTTERANCES AND TACTICS, HE HAS DEMONSTRATED, SINCE MAY 1963, A STEADY STRATEGY IN PURSUANCE OF HIS GOALS. THE STRATEGY IS TO MOVE FORWARD TWO STEPS AND RETREAT ONE STEP. HIS GOALS SEEM TO BE CLEARLY A PREDOMINANT ROLE FOR THE BUDDHISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WITH TRI QUANG PLAYING A DOUBLE ROLE AS RELIGIOUS LEADER AND BEHIND-THE-SCENES POLITICAL MANIPULATOR. AS A FINAL NOTE, BEING THE AMBITIOUS AND EGOTISTICAL MAN THAT HE IS, THERE IS A STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT TRI QUANG FORESEES HIS ROLE AS EXTENDING BEYOND THE BORDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. TRI QUANG PROBABLY VIEWS HIMSELF AS THE INDIVIDUAL WHO OVERTHREW A TYRANNICAL DICTATORSHIP, WHO RAISED THE POSITION OF THE BUDDHISTS FROM THAT OF A PERSECUTED GROUP TO THAT OF A DOMINANT RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL FORCE. HE THEREFORE, QUITE POSSIBLY, BELIEVES THAT OTHER BUDDHIST COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA SHOULD HAVE THE BENEFIT OF HIS RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, IF AND WHEN HE CONSOLIDATES, TO HIS SATISFACTION, HIS POWER IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

9. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USMACV AID USIA 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

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COUNTRY NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

per 058375
date 24 MAY 1976

TDCS-314/02219-64

DATE OF INFO. 6-12 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 27 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

NORTH VIETNAMESE VIEWPOINTS ON THE VIETNAMESE SITUATION

SANITIZED

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 61820

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO. 1

SANITIZED

Authority CIAA. 6/15/76
by smg, NARS, Date 7/5/76

1. THE PRESENT POLICY OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REGIME (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, DRV) IS TO APPEAR IN FAVOR OF MODERATION AND A DISPLAY OF GOOD WILL IN NEGOTIATING A POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM. THE DRV IS CONGRATULATING ITSELF UPON DE GAULLE'S 1963 DECLARATION IN FAVOR OF NEUTRALIZATION; DE GAULLE IS NOW ENGAGED IN SUPPORTING THE DRV POSITION AND CANNOT BACK OUT OR CHANGE HIS MIND. FRANCE IS ALSO HELPING NORTH VIETNAM BY ALLOWING TRAN VAN HUU, NGUYEN HUU CHAU, HO TONG MINH AND

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NGUYEN MINH HA TO ATTACK AND CRITICIZE THE AMERICANS WHILE THE DRV EXERCISES TACT, TO SMOOTH THE WAY FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN DIRECTLY COMMUNISTS AND AMERICANS.

2. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT IS EXTREMELY UPSETTING TO THE DRV SINCE IT CAUSED THE REMOVAL OF THE SOVIETS FROM ASIAN POLITICS. IF MOSCOW HAD SENT A SQUADRON OF AIRPLANES, IF FOR NOTHING ELSE THAN TO LAND AT THE AIRPORT OF GIA LAM, THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE COAST BY THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE, HOWEVER THE NET RESULT OF THE BOMBARDMENT WAS TO STRENGTHEN THE DRV. ONLY A FEW CIVILIANS WERE KILLED, LITTLE MATERIAL DAMAGE DONE, BUT THE ARMY IS STRONGER AND MORE DETERMINED THAN EVER TO FIGHT, THE HO CHI MINH-PHAM VAN DONG GOVERNMENT IS BETTER ESTABLISHED THAN EVER, AND THE CHINESE ARE NOW ENTIRELY BACK OF THE REGIME.

3. THERE ARE STILL MANY WEAKNESSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM THAT CAN BE EXPLOITED. THANKS TO THE MISTAKES BY DIEM AND HIS REGIME, THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT IS STRONGER. THE DRV HAS CADRES IN BOTH BUDDHIST AND CATHOLIC MILIEUX. GENERAL KHANH WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO HANDLE THE SITUATION. ONE SPECIAL PROBLEM THE DRV MUST FACE IS THE TRADITIONAL DISTRUST BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE; THIS DISTRUST IS EVEN FOUND AMONG MEMBERS IN THE HEART OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

4. THE DRV MUST CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD THE DISRUPTION OF

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THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND LET TIME CONTRIBUTE TO ITS COMPLETE COLLAPSE. AS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE DRV MUST CAREFULLY MONITOR THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND WAIT FOR THE RESULTS OF THE COMING ELECTIONS BEFORE MAKING ANY DECISIONS.

CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE /

END OF MESSAGE

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DCS-314/02190-64

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI: 26 AUGUST 1964

PLACE AND DATE ACQ. |

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: |

SANITIZED

Authority RAC 14895 & NLT 002-007-2-1

By ia, NARA, Date 5-8-00

7/23/03

1. GENERAL NGUYEN CHANH THI, COMMANDER OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION, SAID ON 26 AUGUST 1964 THAT THERE HAD BEEN A MEETING CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN DA NANG; THOSE INVOLVED WERE CATHOLIC AND STUDENT LEADERS FROM THE DA NANG AREA AND MINISTER OF EDUCATION BUI TUONG HUAN AND MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS TRAN QUANG THUAN, BOTH BUDDHIST LEADERS FROM DA NANG AREA, IT WAS AGREED THAT JOINT PROCLAMATION WOULD BE MADE SAYING THAT THE DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE PAST TWO DAYS WERE OVER AND NO FURTHER VIOLENCE WOULD BE TOLERATED. ONE HOUR AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THIS PROCLAMATION THE MILITARY WILL MOVE THROUGH THE TOWN AND PICK UP ANY RIOTERS, AND YOUNG TOUGHS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ATTACKS ON THE HOMES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL; THE BUDDHISTS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED ONLY IN DEMONSTRATIONS. THE MILITARY WILL MOVE STRONGLY AGAINST TOUGHS ONCE THE PROCLAMATION IS ISSUED. (FIELD COMMENT. THI GAVE NO INFORMATION ON WHEN THE PROCLAMATION WAS TO BE ISSUED BUT IT APPEARED TO BE AN IMMINENT MATTER. [source] COMMENT. AS OF 2145 HOURS LOCAL THE STREETS OF DA NANG WERE DERSEPTED.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, USMACV, USON, USIS, 2ND AIR DIV

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THE FOLLOWING VIS [REDACTED]

DATED 25 AUGUST 1964 FOR YOUR BACKGROUND USE.

1. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR HAD LONG MEETING WITH GENERAL KHANH AFTER-
NOON 25 AUGUST WHICH IS BEING REPORTED IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL
IN EMBTEL 555 TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE. AFTER YOU HAVE READ THAT
TELEGRAM, YOU WILL NOTE THAT KHANH, EVEN IF HIS MOST OPTIMISTIC
VIEWS OBTAIN, HAS IN EFFECT PUT HIS GOVERNMENT COMPLETELY IN THE
HANDS OF TRI QUANG, AND BY SO DOING HAS SIMILARLY BOUND
OVER TO TRI QUANG'S SAFE KEEPING OUR OWN GOVERNMENT'S EQUITY,
COMMITMENT, AND POLICY IN THIS COUNTRY.

2. THE ALTERNATIVES TO KHANH'S CONTINUING IN NORMAL POWER
WOULD SEEM TO BE, AT THIS POINT:

A. THE REAPPEARANCE OF BIG MINH AGAIN AS A FIGUREHEAD
NOMINALLY LEADING A GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE TO TRI QUANG.

B. REJECTION OF THE BUDDHIST DEMANDS BY A NEW JUNTA HEADED
BY KHIEM, WITH FURTHER DOMESTIC CONVULSIONS TO FOLLOW.

C. SOME OTHER KIND OF IMPASSE WITH RESULTS DIFFICULT TO
ANTICIPATE.

IN ANY EVENT, A NEW AND DANGEROUS PERIOD HAS BEGUN, AND THE EFFECTS
OF THE CURRENT UPHEAVALS HAVE NOT YET SHOWN THEMSELVES IN TERMS
OF POPULAR OR MILITARY MORALE, BUT THE PROGNOSIS OF THIS SIDE
IS NOT OPTIMISTIC.

GP-1

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Authority CIA LTR 6-15-76 NIDMIS 00007-22
By 106/30 NARA Date 3-23-14

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TO WHITE HOUSE INTL SITUATION ROOM

ZEN/STATE (MICHAEL V. FORRESTAL)

✓ZEN/EXO (ATTENTION JAMES C. THOMSON, JR.)

ZEN/DIA (GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL)

ZEM

~~SECRET~~

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Authority CIA LTR 6/15/76: RAC14897
By RMG/sq, NARA, Date 5-23-14
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THE FOLLOWING IS A CAS OPERATIONAL COMMENT
DATED 25 AUGUST 1964 FOR YOUR BACKGROUND USE.

1. COVERT CONTACTS GENERALLY CONFIRM THE OUTWARD DEMANDS AND OBJECTIVES OF BUDDHIST HIERARCHY AS REPORTED RECENT EMBTELS. TRI QUANG, HOWEVER, APPEARS TO BE SOLE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND CURRENT CAMPAIGN. IN RECENT CONFRONTATIONS WITH EMBASSY OFFICERS, HE HAS MAINTAINED INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE, REFUSING TO BUDGE FROM HIS DEMANDS AND APPARENTLY WILLING TO CONTINUE PRESSURE UNTIL KHANH CAPITULATES, WHICH HE CONFIDENTLY ANTICIPATES. HIS MOTIVES APPEAR TO DERIVE SIMPLY FROM MEGALOMANIA, RATHER THAN FROM ANY GENUINE POLITICAL BELIEFS OR POLICIES. A NATURAL, SHREWD AND RUTHLESS POLITICIAN, HE HAS COME TO DOMINATE MODERATE ELEMENTS IN BUDDHIST UNION. BY EXPLOITING THEMES OF CAN LAO RENNAISSANCE, ALLEGED RECENT BUDDHIST REPRESSIONS, POPULAR FEARS OF NEW CATHOLIC DICTATORSHIP KHANH'S RATHER INEPT HANDLING OF RECENT GOVERNMENT CHANGES, AND LIBERAL POLITICAL IDEALS OF STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS,

HE CAN DRUM UP CONSIDERABLE POPULAR SYMPATHY. WORKING THROUGH NATIONWIDE BUDDHIST ORGANIZATIONS, HE IS ABLE TO MANIPULATE SIZABLE ELEMENTS, INCLUDING LAY BUDDHISTS AND STUDENT GROUPS, IN MANIFESTATIONS OF UNREST IN MOST URBAN AREAS, IN FURTHERANCE HIS OWN AMBITIONS. HAVING TASTED POWER IN BUILD UP TO NOVEMBER REVOLUTION LAST YEAR, HIS APPETITE NOW APPEARS INSATIABLE. HE DOES NOT NECESSARILY DESIRE TO OVERTHROW KHANH PER SE, NOR ASPIRE TO PUBLIC OFFICE, BUT RATHER SEEMS DETERMINED TO BE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF POLITICAL POWER BEHIND SCENES, TO DICTATE POLICIES TO THE GOVERNMENT. IF HE WERE TO BE ELIMINATED, IT IS LIKELY THAT THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN WOULD LOSE COHESION AND DIRECTION. IN VIEW OF HIS BELIEF THAT CATHOLICISM IS GREATER THREAT TO VIETNAM THAN COMMUNISM, AND HIS FUZZY THINKING ON NEUTRALISM, HIS ACCESSION TO REAL POWER EVEN BEHIND SCENES WOULD JEOPARDIZE U.S. INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM.

2. YOU HAVE BY NOW SEEN TDCS-314/0213-64. IF THE STATEMENT CONTAINED IN TDCS-314/0213-64 IS IN FACT IMPLEMENTED, IT WILL MEAN THAT KHANH HAS FULLY ACCEPTED THE MOST STRINGENT AND AT THE SAME TIME ARROGANT STIPULATIONS PUT FORTH BY TRI QUANG IN HIS MEETING WITH KHANH ON 24 AUG. IT IS HARD TO SEE AT THIS POINT HOW THE ARVN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WILL REACT AT THE ACT OF ABDICATION IMPLICIT IN THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MRC. WHILE IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE AND EVEN LIKELY THAT KHANH, HAVING RESIGNED, MAY BE REELECTED AT THIS LAST SESSION OF THE MRC, THERE IS AN EQUAL LIKELIHOOD THAT NEW MILITARY JUNTA HEADED BY KHIEM, DEDICATED TO PRESERVING A MILITARY BODY OF LEADERSHIP, MAY WELL EMERGE AT THIS PHASE, PRESENTING A DIRECT CONFRONTATION TO TRI QUANG AND THAT ASPECT OF THE BUDDHIST LEADERSHIP. ALSO, A NEW GROUPING AROUND BIG MINH MUST BE CONSIDERED.

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

per 058375

TDCS-314/02123-64

DATE OF INFO. 25 AUGUST 1964

date 24 MAY 1976

DISTR. 25 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

RESCISSION OF 16 AUGUST CONSTITUTION AND RESIGNATION
OF GENERAL KHANH

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 59270

SOURCE

SANITIZED

FIELD REPORT NO.

AND
APPRAISAL:

Authority CIA Rm. 6/15/76
By [signature], NARS, D. 7/15/76

1. THE MINISTER OF FINANCE, NGUYEN XUAN OANH, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT 3:05 P.M. LOCAL TIME 25 AUGUST IN SAIGON: THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE 16TH OF AUGUST IS RESCINDED. GENERAL KHANH WILL RESIGN. THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WILL MEET TONIGHT TO ELECT A NEW PRIME MINISTER AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL BE FORMED WILL BE MIXED CIVILIAN AND MILITARY. AFTER TONIGHT'S MEETING THE MRC WILL DISSOLVE ITSELF.

2. GEN. CAO, DIRECTOR OF KHANH'S CABINET, CONFIRMED PRIVATELY THAT THE CHARTER OF 16 AUGUST WAS RESCINDED BY THE MRC IN AN EXTRAORDINARY SESSION TERMINATING AT 2:30 P.M. LOCAL TIME.

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF.

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IMMEDIATE TO:

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SANITIZED

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

per 058375
date 24 MAY 1976

TDCS-314/02047-64

DATE OF INFO. 10 MAY AND 27 JULY 1964

DISTR. 25 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

VIET CONG DOCUMENT GIVING GUIDANCE FOR THE
EXPLOITATION OF ANOTHER ANTICIPATED COUP D'ETAT

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL:

FIELD REPORT NO. []

SANITIZED

Authority CIA W. 6/15/76
By lmq, NARS, Date 7/15/76

1. SUMMARY. GUIDANCE WAS GIVEN BY THE VIET CONG (VC) FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND EFFECTIVE EXPLOITATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE LIKELY EVENT OF ANOTHER COUP D'ETAT. POLITICAL, MILITARY AND MILITARY SUBVERSION (BINH VAN) UNITS WERE TO BE DEPLOYED, IN CONJUNCTION WITH VC GUERRILLAS AND THE LOCAL POPULACE, IN A THREE-PRONGED ATTACK DESIGNED TO DESTROY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) OUTPOSTS, SECURITY MECHANISMS AND NEW LIFE HAMLETS. MAJOR VC UNITS WERE TO BE USED FOR DIRECT ASSAULTS, LEAVING THE AMBUSHING OF GVN REINFORCEMENT UNITS TO SMALL VC GROUPS. THE GUIDANCE WAS GIVEN IN A COPY OF A DOCUMENT, DATED 10 MAY 1964, WHICH WAS OBTAINED DURING THE COURSE OF A VC CONFERENCE HELD ON 27 JULY 1964 IN PHONG MY, BAC LANH DISTRICT, KIEN PHONG PROVINCE. A TRANSLATION OF THE DOCUMENT FOLLOWS.

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2. "ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS REPORTS, THE ENEMY'S INTERNAL ORGANIZATION IS SERIOUSLY DETERIORATING. THE MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH FACTION IS PREPARING A COUP D'ETAT TO OVERTHROW PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN KHANH IN THE NEAR FUTURE. NP (CODE NAME OF THE WRLSVR) (SIC) FORWARDS THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY AND URGENT PREPARATION IN THE LIGHT OF THIS FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE GREATER SUCCESS.

3. "THE AMERICANS AND THEIR AGENTS ARE BECOMING WEAK, DRIVEN TO THE DEFENSIVE BY OUR POWERFUL AND CONTINUED ATTACKS. THEY ARE PREPARING COUPS D'ETAT AGAINST EACH OTHER, WHICH WILL FURTHER WEAKEN THEM. ANOTHER COUP D'ETAT WILL AFFORD US THE OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK AND EXTERMINATE THE ENEMY AND DISINTEGRATE THEIR FORCES MORE SERIOUSLY THAN EVER.

4. "BOTH MINH AND KHANH HAVE THEIR RESPECTIVE ARMED FORCES WHICH MIGHT OPPOSE EACH OTHER DURING THE COUP D'ETAT, THUS CONFUSING ENEMY OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS.

5. "IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER COUP D'ETAT, STRONG AND REPEATED ASSAULTS IN THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FIELDS, AS WELL AS OUR ACTIVITY AMONG THEIR SOLDIERS, I.E., BINH VAN, WILL CAUSE THE ENEMY OUTPOSTS TO FALL INTO A STATE OF CONFUSION AND DISORDER, AFFORDING OUR FORCES THE OPPORTUNITY TO CIRCLE THEM AND FORCE THEM TO SURRENDER OR TO WITHDRAW, ENABLING US TO EXTEND THE AREAS UNDER OUR CONTROL FURTHER THAN EVER.

6. "LEARNING FROM THE TWO PREVIOUS COUPS D'ETAT, YOU SHOULD URGENTLY GIVE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTION TO E (SIC) AND COORDINATE THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FORCES, AS WELL AS THOSE IN CHARGE OF OPERATING AMONG THE ENEMY TROOPS SO THAT, AS SOON AS THE COUP OCCURS, WE CAN LAUNCH OUR ENTIRE EFFORT TO WIN THE GREATEST VICTORIES.

7. "IN GENERAL, WE SHOULD ACCELERATE THE THREE-PRONGED ATTACK; STIMULATE

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IVMADON DAINES JOURNAL

THE PEOPLE TO RISE UP TOGETHER WITH THE ARMED FORCES (REGIONAL FORCES Y, MILITARY E) TO ENCIRCLE ENEMY OUTPOSTS AND FORCE THEM TO SURRENDER OR TO WITHDRAW; DESTROY (GVN) OPPRESSIVE MACHINERY AND THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS; LIBERATE AS MANY HAMLETS AS POSSIBLE; AND, EXTEND THE LIBERATION AREA.

8. "IN THE BASE AREAS, WE SHOULD HOLD MEETINGS AND, IN THE HEAT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY EXCITEMENT, STAGE DEMONSTRATIONS, BEAT TOM-TOMS AND TOCSINS, ERADICATE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENTS, BLOCKADE THE RIVERS, DIG CANALS, CREATE NEW PHYSICAL STRUCTURES, ESTABLISH POPULAR LABOR AND TRANSPORTATION UNITS, AND BUILD COMBAT HAMLETS AND VILLAGES SUPPLIED WITH RUDIMENTARY WEAPONS.

9. "DESTROY THE ROAD AH-CL PLUS CL-EN IN ORDER TO CUT ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS. DEPENDING ON THE PREVAILING SITUATION AT THE TIME OF THE COUP D'ETAT, BRING THE LARGE-SCALE AND DIRECT STRUGGLE INTO S AND X (SIC), USING SLOGANS AGAINST WAR, AND IN FAVOR OF PEACE AND NEUTRALIZATION, AND DEMANDING THAT THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

10. "REGIONAL FORCES Y SHOULD BE CONCENTRATED ACCORDING TO THE PLAN DISCUSSED ON 5 MAY AT THE CONFERENCE AND, IN COORDINATION WITH THE GUERRILLAS AND THE THREE-PRONGED POPULAR ATTACKS, TRY TO LIBERATE AN AREA TO CREATE A BASE FOR Y.

11. "REGIONAL FORCES E WILL FOLLOW CLOSELY THE DIRECTIVE SET FORTH IN MAY AND HASTEN TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN AS SOON AS THE COUP D'ETAT TAKES PLACE. THEY WILL LAUNCH THE ENTIRE FORCE TO ATTACK ONE OR TWO OUTPOSTS IN SURPRISE RAIDS, MASSIVE ATTACKS OR ENCIRCLEMENT, ETC. A VICTORY WILL SERVE TO PROMPT THE PEOPLE TO USE THE THREE-PRONGED ATTACK TO DESTROY STRATEGIC HAMLETS, TO HARASS OTHER OUTPOSTS, FORCING THEM TO SURRENDER OR WITHDRAW, AND THEN, TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE ENEMY'S CONFUSION AND DISORDER DURING THEIR RETREAT, TO HALT AND ELIMINATE THEM. ATTACK THE ENEMY

COPY

CEASELESSLY, DAY AND NIGHT, STRIVE FOR THE GREATEST NUMBER OF VICTORIES.

12. "WE SHOULD TAKE CARE OF THE LEADERSHIP AS SOON AS THE COUP D'ETAT BEGINS, CARRYING OUT BOLD ATTACKS, DAY AND NIGHT, AND STRENGTHENING OUR DEFENSES. IN REGARD TO OUR ONE-POINT ATTACK PROGRAM, PLANS SHOULD ALSO BE MADE FOR THE GUERRILLAS AND THE PEOPLE TO ENCIRCLE NEIGHBORING POINTS. WE SHOULD TAKE CARE TO DEPLOY OUR FORCES TO CHECK AND EXTERMINATE DESERTERS.

13. "WE KNOW FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF BOTH PREVIOUS COUPS D'ETAT, THAT THE ENEMY SENT SCARCELY ANY RELIEF UNITS. THIS TIME THEY WILL SEND FEWER; THEY WILL ONLY STAND ANXIOUSLY DEFENDING A PARTICULAR PLACE, OR, CONFUSED AND FRIGHTENED, FLEE. THEREFORE, OUR OPERATIONAL PLAN SHOULD NOT CALL FOR DEPLOYING OUR MAJOR FORCES IN AMBUSHING GVN RELIEF UNITS. WE SHOULD USE SMALL FORCES TO STOP REINFORCEMENT UNITS WHILE OUR MAJOR FORCES SHOULD BE USED FOR MASSIVE AND REPEATED ATTACKS."

14. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USMACV AID USIA 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC PACAF PACFLT ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

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25X1A29

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

SANITIZED

Authority RAC 14900

DATE OF INFO. 25 AUGUST 1964

By is, NARA, Date 5-8-64

DISTR. 25 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

SITREP AS OF 1200 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 25 AUGUST

PLACE &
DATE ACQ.

VIETNAM, SAIGON (25 AUGUST 1964)

REF 25X1A62 IN 59380

SOURCE
AND
APPRAISAL:

THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED AT 1200 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 25 AUGUST 1964 BY CAS.

1. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE PERTINENT INFORMATION AND STATUS OF DEVELOPMENTS THROUGH 1200 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 25 AUGUST 1964 IN VIETNAM.

2. A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION WAS BEGUN AT 0900 HOURS THIS MORNING BY STUDENTS WHO, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] SOURCES, WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE CONCESSIONS ANNOUNCED THIS MORNING BY PRESIDENT NGUYEN KHANH. A STUDENT CROWD ESTIMATED BY [REDACTED] AT FROM EIGHT TO TEN THOUSAND PARADED DOWN THONG NHUT (NORODOM) STREET TO THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY. THEIR BANNERS BORE SLOGANS AS FOLLOWS: "DOWN WITH DICTATORSHIP"; "LET US CRUSH REGIME APPOINTED BY KHANH"; "AMERICANS SHOULD MAINTAIN POSITION AS ALLIES"; "AMERICANS SHOULD RESPECT RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE"; "OPPOSE SEPARATIST ATTEMPTS OF THE GOVERNMENT"; "TEAR UP REACTIONARY CHARTER"; "NIP MILITARISM IN BUD"; "AN APPOINTED ASSEMBLY IS A PUPPET ONE"; AND, "GOVERNMENT MUST BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR SACKING

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DIA/GIIC	JCS	AFSSO

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PAGE 2

25X1A28

OF THE STUDENT UNION BUILDING." THE CROWD HALTED IN FRONT OF THE PRESIDENCY, SWELLED TO ABOUT 25,000 BY POLICE ESTIMATES (PROBABLY INCLUDING CURIOUS ONLOOKERS.) THE STUDENT LEADERS HARRANGUED CROWD, DEMANDED PRESIDENT KHANH'S APPEARANCE. ACCORDING TO ^{25X1X6} [REDACTED] SOURCES, KHANH EMERGED FROM THE PRESIDENCY ABOUT 1115 HOURS TO CONFER WITH THE LEADERS, AND THE RESULTS WERE APPARENTLY INCONCLUSIVE. RADIO SAIGON IS OCCUPIED BY THE DEMONSTRATORS, AND IS OFF THE AIR. THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IS MEETING AT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS AFTER NOON.

3. ^{25X1X6} [REDACTED] THE STUDENT STEERING COMMITTEE IS MADE UP OF LE HUU BOI, PRESIDENT; NGUYEN HUU DONG, MEDICAL STUDENT; AND NGUYEN TRONG NHOUN, ARCHITECTURE STUDENT. ^{25X1X6} [REDACTED] THE LATTER TWO HAVE LEFTIST IDEAS AND TENDENCIES. ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL REPORTEDLY IS WORKING WITH THIS GROUP AND IS PHAM DUY, SAIGON ORCHESTRA LEADER, WHO ALLEGEDLY WORKED FOR THE VIET MINH IN THE NORTH BEFORE 1954. BOI REPORTEDLY IS THE NEPHEW OF GENERAL DO MAU. ^{25X1X6} [REDACTED] SOURCES CLAIM THAT BOI RECEIVED THREE MILLION PIASTERS FROM BUDDHIST LEADER THICH TRI QUANG AND GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH; HOWEVER, THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED. ACCORDING TO A SOURCE ^{25X1X6} [REDACTED] THE STUDENT RINGLEADERS ARE NOW UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF BONZES THICH TRI QUANG AND THICH THIEN MINH. THE FORMER RECENTLY CHARACTERIZED THE STUDENT-BUDDHIST RELATIONSHIP AS "LINKS IN THE SAME CHAIN." ONE ^{25X1X6} [REDACTED] SOURCE ^{AND MEMBER OF KHANH'S GOV. MINT} [REDACTED] HAS ADMITTED DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE STUDENT RINGLEADERS, CLAIMING THAT HE URGED AGAINST VIOLENCE IN LAST SUNDAY'S DEMONSTRATION. THICH TRI QUANG HIMSELF ^{CLAIMED THIS} [REDACTED] ^{MORNING TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER} [REDACTED] THAT HE FULLY CONTROLS AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE MANIFESTATIONS OF UNREST THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

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PAGE 3

4. KHANH'S COMMUNIQUE THIS MORNING WARNED AGAINST FURTHER VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, SAYING THAT THE INSTIGATORS WOULD BE PUNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS. ^{25X1X6} [REDACTED] ORDERS ARE TO MEET VIOLENCE WITH VIOLENCE, HOWEVER, POLICE ELEMENTS IN THE AREA OF THE DEMONSTRATION ARE REPORTEDLY UNARMED, AS ARE THE MILITARY REINFORCEMENTS OF THE NORMAL POLICE GUARD AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY.

5. IN DA NANG, THERE ARE RENEWED DEMONSTRATIONS AT THE MAYOR'S OFFICE BY THREE TO FOUR THOUSAND STUDENTS, AND CONFLICTING RUMORS OF FURTHER VIOLENCE EXIST. ALSO, SOME FIVE THOUSAND STUDENTS REPORTED DEMONSTRATING THIS MORNING IN QUANG TRI, A SMALLER NUMBER IN TAM KY, CAPITAL OF QUANG TIN PROVINCE, AND A DEMONSTRATION IS SCHEDULED FOR THIS AFTERNOON IN HOI AN, QUANG NAM PROVINCE. THERE ARE NO REPORTS YET ON TODAY'S DEVELOPMENTS HUE AND QUI NHON. THE OCCURRENCE OF SIMULTANEOUS DEMONSTRATIONS YESTERDAY AND TODAY IN OUTLYING CITIES, AS WELL AS IN SAIGON, REFLECTS NATIONWIDE COORDINATION ACHIEVED BY THE BUDDHIST HIERARCHY, AND THE EXTENT OF THEIR CONTROL AND DETERMINATION.

6. EXPLOSION OCCURRED AT 1150 HOURS AT THE CARAVELLE HOTEL, WRECKING SEVEN ROOMS ON THE FIFTH FLOOR. THE OCCUPANTS OF THESE ROOMS AND THE INSTIGATORS OF THE BLAST HAVE NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED. NO OTHER VIOLENCE HAS BEEN REPORTED IN SAIGON THUS FAR TODAY.

7. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE USMACV AID USIA 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

per 058375
date 24 MAY 1976

TDCS-314/02048-64

DATE OF INFO. 24 AUGUST 1964

DISTR. 24 AUGUST 1964

SUBJECT

SITREP AS OF 1500 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 24 AUGUST 1964 IN DA NANG

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 58503

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL:

SANITIZED

Authority CIA/DA 6/15/76
By Long, NARS, Date 7/15/76

FIELD REPORT NO.

1. THE SITUATION IN DA NANG AT 1500 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 24 AUGUST 1964 IS EXTREMELY VOLATILE. THERE IS NO INDICATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL; BOTH THE POLICE AND THE MILITARY APPEAR TO BE PLAYING A PASSIVE ROLE AND OBSERVING THE EVENTS.

2. LATE ON THE EVENING OF 23 AUGUST, THE STUDENTS ARRIVED FROM HUE UNIVERSITY TO CONDUCT A DEMONSTRATION IN DA NANG IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CAUSE. THE DA NANG MAYOR WAS AWARE OF THIS AND ATTEMPTED TO RESOLVE THE MATTER BY A MEETING WITH THE STUDENT REPRESENTATIVE.

3. THE STUDENTS BEGAN MASSING AS EARLY AS 0700 ON 24 AUGUST. THEY WERE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS. MEMBERS OF THE PHAN CHU TRINH SCHOOL WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESENTING A PROTEST TO THE MAYOR AT THE CITY HALL. THE MEMBERS OF THE TAN THANH SCHOOL WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR SOLICITING SUPPORT FOR THE STUDENT CAUSE. THE

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PHAY CHU TRIEN GROUP MASSED AT 0900 AND MOVED TO THE CITY HALL AT 0930. THE OTHER GROUP MASSED AT 0930 AND PROCEEDED TO THE CITY HALL WITH ALLIES.

4. ENROUTE TO THE CITY HALL, THE TAN TRAM STUDENTS PASSED THE MAAG ENLISTED MESS, WHICH IS THE FORMER DA MAAG HOTEL, LOCATED ON CUONG LE STREET. SOME OF THE AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND VIETNAMESE EMPLOYEES OBSERVED THE GROUP AND MADE SOME COMMENTS, WHICH IRRITATED THE GROUP, WHO IN TURN PROCEEDED TO STONE THE HOTEL. THE GATES OF THE HOTEL WERE CLOSED AND VIETNAMESE GUARDS WENT TO THE ROOF AND FIRED INTO THE AIR IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISPERSE THE GROUP. WHEN THIS FAILED, THEY FIRED NEAR THE GROUP AND SCATTERED MOB.

5. DURING THE MELEE, ONE STUDENT WAS BRUISED BY A ROCK AND ELECTED TO SEEK FIRST AID FROM AN ADJOINING REFUGEE VILLAGE NAMED DUC LOI. AN ELDERLY FEMALE RESIDENT OF THE VILLAGE REFUSED TO ADMINISTER AID TO THE STUDENT. THE STUDENT SUMMONED ASSISTANCE FROM THE GROUP, WHICH SEVERELY BEAT THE WOMAN AND INJURED TWO OTHER RESIDENTS OF THE VILLAGE. THE VILLAGERS, WHO ARE PRIMARILY CATHOLIC, OPPOSED THE GROUP ATTACKING THE VILLAGE AND ESTABLISHED LINES OF DEFENSE. A STONE AND STICK BATTLE ENSUED BETWEEN THE FACTIONS.

6. DURING THE CONFRONTATION, TWO GRENADES WERE EXPLODED, REPORTEDLY KILLING TWO AND WOUNDING OTHERS.

7. AT 1400 HOURS, SEVEN HOMES IN THE VILLAGE WERE AFIRE. CROWDS OF STUDENTS AND LOCAL HOODLUMS CONGREGATED IN THE AREA AND THEY WERE IN A VICIOUS MOOD. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE SITUATION BY THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES. ONE JEEP, DRIVEN BY A MEMBER OF THE POLICE, WAS SEEN DISTRIBUTING BREAD TO THE RIOTERS.

8. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE INTENSITY OF THE DEMONSTRATION IS

NO INFORMATION

COPY

ABATING AT THIS TIME. A LARGE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL IS STILL FILTERING INTO THE AREA OF THE CONFRONTATION. UNLESS SOME ATTEMPT IS MADE BY THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO CONTAIN THE SITUATION, GRAVE REPERCUSSIONS IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS CAN BE FORSEEN.

9. FIELD DISSEM. CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT STATE USMACV AID USIA
2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION

END OF MESSAGE

COPY

REVALDOM DAMES JOURNAL LIF

115

Defense Cables

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
PRIORITY	PRIORITY

CIEM828CEIA094REB066

PP RUEKDA

ZDG RUHA

HMA276

PP RUEPJA RUEKDA RUEHC

DE RUMSVVA 2918H 30/1255Z

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 10 MAR 76

P 301151Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEPJA/OASD/PA

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUEKDA/JCS

RUEHC/STATE DEPT

ZEN/AMEMB/PAO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAC OI 8970 SECTION ONE OF TWO
POLICY GUIDANCE FOR INFO PROGRAV IN RVN

A. DEF 977197 DTG 100011Z JUL 64

B. DEF 981773 DTG 112043Z AUG 64

1. PER REQUEST IN REF B EXISTING GUIDANCE ON PUBLIC AFFAIRS
POLICY IN RVN WAS REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF NEW TERMS OF REFERENCE
AS ESTABLISHED BY REF A. IN OPINION MACOI AND BARRY ZORTHIAN
FLWG POLICY DIRECTIVES SHOULD STILL APPLY:

A. OASD/PA 272343Z MAR 64 (NOTAL) PUBLIC AFFAIR POLICY
CABLE CITING ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO DOD 25 MAR
CONCERNING USE OF NAPALM IN RVN. THIS SUPERSEDED DEF
927233 DTG 192217Z APR 64 (NOTAL).

B. DEPTTEL 2235, 10 JUN 64 CITED DECISION OF INTERAGENCY
COMMITTEE THAT MACOI CAN PROVIDE ACTUAL TOTAL STRENGTH
FIGURE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL IN RVN TO PRESS REGULAR
BASIS WHENEVER QUERIED, STIPULATING THAT AS SUCH FIGURES

ACT.....OSD-15

INFO.....CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-3 J3-6 J4-2 J5-1 J6-3 SACS-5 DIA-14

.....NMCC-2 SAMAA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 WHITE HOUSE-3 STATE-2

NIC-1 DIR CIA-3 DIRNSA-4 FILE-1(88) WIS

SECTION I OF II SECTIONS

ADVANCE CP TO: OSD NMCC

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JRT		MAC OI 8970 301151Z AUG 64

JCS FORM NO
1 DEC 63 58

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PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
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GIVEN THEY SHOULD BE INCL IN MACOI WEEKLY PRESS SUMMARY.
COMMENT: AT PRESS CONF 28 JUL 64 FLWG ANNOUNCEMENT BY GVN OF BUILD-UP U.S. ADVISORY/SUPPORT EFFORT IN RVN, AVB TAYLOR TOLD MEDIA REPS HE DID NOT INTEND TO GIVE DAILY OR WEEKLY INFO ON ARRIVAL OF PERSONNEL OR UNITS. STATED HOWEVER THAT WOULD GIVE AN EXACT FIGURE AT END OF EACH MONTH AND CITED 16,353 AS OF 27 JUL, THIS, OF COURSE, WAS MODIFICATION TO POLICY IN CITED DEPTTEL BUT NOT CONSIDERED DIFFICULT PROBLEM. TONKIN GULF INCIDENT AND GVN REORGAN PROBLEMS HAVE DIVERTED MEDIA INTEREST TEMPORARILY FROM U.S. BUILD-UP, IN RESPONSE TO QUERY, RELEASED STRENGTH FIGURE 17,200 AS OF 132400H AUG AND RPTD SAVE IN MACOI 8313 DTG 181129A AUG).

C. STATE DEPT CIRCULAR 49, 07 JUL 64 SET FORTH U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO RVN, ACTION IN OR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS.

D. DEPTTEL 11 JUL 64 ON RESPONSE TO PRESS QUERIES ON USE OF CHEMICAL WEED KILLERS TO DEFOLIATE AND TO DENY FOOD CROPS TO THE VIET CONG.

E. DEF 980511 DTG 312355Z JUL 64 (NOTAL) ESTABLISHED GROUND RULES ON RELEASE OF INFO ABOUT U.S. CASUALTIES IN RVN. PROVIDED THAT FACTS CONCERNING THE INCIDENT COULD BE RELEASED AS SOON AS KNOWN. ALSO THAT NEWS COULD BE RELEASED AFTER NOTIFICATION OF NEXT OF KIN OR 24 HOURS AFTER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OK RECEIPT OF CASUALTY REPORT BY ADDRESSEE, WHICHEVER IS FIRST. (COMMENT: EXPERIENCE MAY PROVE THAT 24 HOURS IS TOO SHORT PERIOD BEFORE RELEASE OF IDENTITQ. HOWEVER, RECOMMEND NO CHANGE AT PRESENT.)

F. ONLY STANDARD AUTHORIZED FOR USE IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES ABOUT PRESENCE OF U-2 ACFT AT BIEN HOA IS QUOTE THESE SPECIALIZED ACFT WILL BE USED IN MAPPING ROLE IN SOUTH VIETNAV END QUOTE. (COMMENT: MACOI 1894 DTG 20630Z MAR 64 (NOTAL) FROM SYLVESTER TO LENNARTUON INDICATED POSSIBILITY OF AN EXPANDED STATEMENT. TO DATE THE FOREGOING SENTENCE IS ALL THAT HAS BEEN USED IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES. PRESSURES FOR ADDL INFO HAVE NOT BEEN HEAVY; HOWEVER, WOULD BE USEFUL IF SLIGHTLY EXPANDED STATEMENT WERE AVAILABLE, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA, SINCE MAR 64.)

G. LOCAL POLICY OF MACV IS THAT MEDIA REPS WILL NOT BE GIVEN INFO AS TO NUMBER OF HITS ON ACFT BY VC GROUND FIRE. THIS IS BASED ON PREMISE THAT SUCH INFO WOULD BE OF VALUE OF ENEMY SINCE WOULD INDICATE TO HIM EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT TECHNIQUES. (COMMENT: THIS IS SMALL BONE OF CONTENTION WITH SOME MEDIA REPS BUT MACV J-3, 2ND AIR DIV AND USA UNITS OPERATING HELOS IN FIELD FEEL QUITE STRONGLY

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PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

THAT THIS INFO SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED. MACOI HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED POSITION OF OPERATORS IN THIS RESPECT AND PLANS CONTINUATION THIS POLICY).

H. STATEMENT OF SECURITY DETACHMENT OF U.S. MARINES AT CLASSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY IN WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. (COMMENT: THIS POLICY WAS GENERATED IN SAIGON AFTER PRESSURE BY MEDIA REPS. RELEASE WAS MADE 130800 H JUN 64 AND RITD BY MACV MSG 4872 DTG 121047Z JUN 64

(NOTAL) NO RECENT QUERIES ON SUBJECT BUT BELIEVE BASIC STATEMENT SHOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR PRESENT).

I. STATEMENT TO BE USED IN EVENT OF QUERY ABOUT OPERATION OK MOTOR PATROL CRAFT OF PT CLASS BY VIETNAMESE COASTAL SECURITY SERVICE. THIS STATEMENT WAS QUOTED IN MACOI 8147 DTG 150015Z AUG 64 (NOTAL. (COMMENTS: HAVE HAD NO QUERIES SO HAVE NOT YET USED STATEMENT).

J. CINCPAC 210240Z DEC 63 (NOTAL) CITED POLICY THAT AUTH TO MAKE DETERMINATION ON REQUESTS BY MEDIA REPS FOR TRAVEL ON GOVT ACFT FROM BANGKOK TO SAIGON WHEN NO COMMERCIAL FLTS AVAILABLE WOULD BE RETAINED IN CINCPAC.

K. DEPTTEL 1111, 21 MAY 63 CONVERYS GENERAL PRESS POLICY IN RVN. (COMMENT: THIS SOURCE WITH REF A. IS NOT RESTRICTIVE IN NATURE AND DOES NOT HAVE PROGRAV IF LEFT IN EFFECT).

2. IN VIEW OF POLICY APPROACH SET FORTH IN REF A, FLWG DIRECTIVES WHICH WERE ON BOOKS ARE CONSIDERED SUPERSEDED:
A. WHAT CAN BE SAID ON RULES ON ENGAGEMENT HAS LONG BEEN PROBLEM FOR MACOI AND AVEMB/PAO DATING BACK TO FEB 63. DEPTTEL 122, 26 JUL 63 CITED DENIAL OF CHANGE IN RULES OF

BT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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VZCZCIEN618EIA131YEA160
PP RUEKDA
DE RUMSMA 2919 H 30/1255Z
P 301151Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUEPDA/OASD/PA
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEKDA/JCS
RUEHC/STATE DEPT
ZEN/AMEMB/PAO
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAC OI 8970 FINAL SECTION OF TWO
ENGAGEMENT AND STATEMENT THAT U.S. ROLE LIMITED TO
ADVISORY, LOGISTIC, TECHNICAL; THAT U.S. PERSONNEL FIRE
ONLY WHEN THREATENED. (COMMENT: MACV DIRECTIVE 95-2
19 JUN 64 STATES: QUOTE USA ARMED HELICOPTERS MAY INITIATE
FIRE ONLY FOR PROTECTION OF HELICOPTERS AND PASSENGERS AND
PROVIDED ENEMY TARGET IS CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AND IS A THREAT
TO THEIR SAFETY. THEY WILL CARRY U.S. MARKINGS AND WILL BE
MANNED WITH U.S. CREW AND VIETNAMESE OBSERVER/CREW MEMBER.
THESE ACFT WILL NOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CLOSE AIR
SUPPORT END QUOTE. UNDER PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM CANDOR AND
DISCLOSURE CONSISTENT WITH REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY AS SET
FORTH IN REF A, MACOI WILL ANSWER QUERIES ON RULES OF
ENGAGEMENT BY QUOTING CITED PARAGRAPH. SAME WILL APPLY
TO USAF TACTICAL ACFT AS COVERED IN MACV DIRECTIVE 95-2
QUOTE USE OF USAF TACTICAL ACSW IS AUTHORIZED SUBJECT TO
CONDITON THAT THEY FLY BONA FIDE OPNL TRNG MISSIONS
AGAINST HOSTILE TARGETS TO PREPARE THE PARTICIPATING VNAF
PERSONNEL FOR EVENTUAL REPLACEMENT OF U.S. PILOTS. SUCH
ACFT WILL BE MANNED WITH COMBINED U.S. AND VIETNAMESE
CREW AND WILL CARRY VNAF MARKINGS END QUOTE. THIS IS NOT
AS MUCH OF A PROBLEM NOW AS IT WAS IN 1963 BUT SOME MEDIA
REPS STILL PUSH FOR STATEMENT BY OFFICIAL U.S. SOURCE THAT
USAF PILOTS ARE FLYING COMBAT MISSIONS IN RVN).
B. CINCPAC 160401Z NOV 63 CITED OASD/PA POLICY TO AVOID
IDENTIFYING MACHINE GUNNERS ON HELICOPTERS WITH 25TH DIVISION.
(COMMENT: IT IS NOW SUCH COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE
PERSONNEL FROM 25 TH DIVISION HERE IN RVN TO MAN MACHINE GUNS
ON USA HELICOPTERS FLYING COMBAT SUPPORT MISSIONS THAT IT
IS NO LONGER NEWSWORTHY AND SUBJECT HAS NOT BEEN RAISED BY
MEDIA REPS IN LONG TIME. HOWEVER, IF QUERIED WE PLAN TO
SIMPLY ACKNOWLEDGE FACT AND LET IT GO AT THAT. WOULD NOT BE
CONSISTENT WITH PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM CANDOR TO DO OTHERWISE).
C. POLICY ABOUT INFO ON ARRIVAL OF U.S. EQUIPEMENT IN RVN
DATES BACK TO AVEMB MEMO 10 SEP 62 WHICH STATED IN PART:
QUOTE IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUERIES, ARRIVALS INCL TYPE
OF UNIT AND TYPE OF EQUIPMENT) CAN BE CONFIRMED ON A NON-

ACT..... OSD-15

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-3 J3-6 J4-2 J5-1 J6-3 SACS-5 DIA-14
NMCC-2 SAMAA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 WHITE HOUSE-3
NIC-1 CIA-3 NSA-4 FILE-1(86)

CS 31/38

SEC II OF II
PAGE 1 OF 2

301151Z AUG 64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTRIBUTABLE BASIS BUT THE NUMBER OF EQUIPMENT ITEMS WILL NOT BE COMMENTED ON. THESE RULES WILL BE FOLLOWED WHETHER THE EQUIPMENT IS UNLOADED IN FULL VIEW OF SAIGON OR MORE UNOBTAINABLY DOWN RIVER A MILE OR SO END QUOTE. (COMMENT: AGAIN, THE ARRIVAL OF U.S. EQUIPMENT IS NOT AS NEWSWORTHY AS IT WAS LATE IN 1962. HOWEVER, COMPLIANCE WITH CITED POLICY OBVIOUSLY IMPAIRED CREDIBILITY OF MACOI. NOW HANDLING EACH INSTANCE AS CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE, RELYING TO LARGE EXTENT ON GOOD JUDGMENT AND COMMON SENSE. AFTER TONKIN GULF INCIDENT, ACKNOWLEDGED PRESENCE OF B-57'S AT BIEN HOA BECAUSE WAS EVIDENT AFTER REPORT OF 3 CRASHED ON ARRIVAL. HOWEVER, DECLINED TO SPECIFY NUMBER. LIKEWISE, ACKNOWLEDGED ARRIVAL F-102'S AT TAN SON NHUT SINCE ACFT COULD BE SEEN FROM COMMERCIAL TERMINAL.)

D. RELATED TO ABOVE ITEM IS FORMER POLICY OF NOT ACKNOWLEDGING PRESENCE OF JET ACFT IN RVN. THIS POLICY WAS SLIGHTLY AMENDED BY DEPTEL 2375, 23 JUN 64 WHICH AUTH AMEMB/MACOI TO AFFIRM PRESENCE OF F-100'S IN RVN IF ASKED QUESTIONS DIRECTLY, SUBSEQUENT EVENTS AND COMMON KNOWLEDGE OF PRESENCE B-57'S, F-102'S AND F-100'S WOULD MAKE REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE SUCH PRESENCE APPEAR EXTREMELY NAIVE AND WOULD AFFECT MISSION'S CREDIBILITY WHICH AS REF A STATES IS KEY TO SUCCESSFUL DISCHARGE OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE FULL AND ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN RVN).

3. AS EVIDENCED BY FOREGOING, RECEIPT OF REF A HAS NOT RESULTED IN ABANDONMENT OF ALL RESTRAINT. HOWEVER, IT HAS AFFORDED THE LOCAL FLEXIBILITY SO ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS MISSION IN RVN.

4. BARRY ZORTHIAN CONCURS WITH THIS MSG AND SUGGESTS THAT ANY QUESTIONS RELATED TO IT BE HELD FOR DISCUSSION DURING HIS VISIT IN WASHINGTON.

GP-4
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SD 135

FLASH

117

ZZ RUEPWW

DE RUEHCR 25432 29/1636Z

Z 291635Z ZEA

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

52594

TO WHITE HOUSE ATTN BUNDY

Z 291608Z ZFF3

FM OSD WASHDC

TO RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

ZEN/DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF

RUEHCR/STATE DEPT

RUEPIA/CIA

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ DEF 984473 FROM OASD (ISA).

NJOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

PRESS REPORTS HERE THAT VICE PREMIER XUAN OANH HAS ANNOUNCED HE WILL HEAD CARETAKER GOVERNMENT AS ACTING PREMIER UNTIL NATIONAL CONGRESS IS CONVENED WITHIN TWO MONTHS. THESE REPORTS SEEM TO INDICATE THAT GENERAL KHANH'S "SHORT ILLNESS" MAY LENGTHEN INTO PERIOD OF MONTH OR MORE.

REQUEST BY FLASH MESSAGE (A) CONFIRMATION OF OANH'S APPOINTMENT AS ACTING PREMIER; (B) YOUR VIEWS ON DURATION OF KHANH'S ABSENCE; (C) YOUR COMMENTS ON THE IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT. GP-4

BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and
NARS, Date MAR 76

DECLASSIFIED

EUC309

PP RUEPWW

DE RUEPCR 138 29/2200Z

P 292155Z

FM JCS

TO RUPHA/CINCPAC

INFO RUEHCR/STATE DEPT

RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUEKC/ANMCC

RUEKVDA/NECPA

RUEKMJ/NEACP

BT

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1964 AUG 30 CO 24

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Authority JCS ltr 8/13/76
By rmg, NARS, Date 10/13/76

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~/JCS 8172/JCS SENDS.-

SUBJ: COMBINED MILITARY PLANNING WITH RVNAF (C)

REFS: A. SAIGON TO STATE 457; B. JCS 7131 DTG 272215Z

JUN; C. COMUSMACV DTG 160943Z

COMUSMACV PASS TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

SUBJECT TO CONCURRENCE OF AMERICAN AMBASSADOR,
SAIGON, FOLLOWING IS GUIDANCE REQUESTED REF A.

A. CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS INTO LAOS. REF B
AUTHORIZED COMBINED US-GVN PLANNING FOR GVN CROSS-
BORDER OPERATIONS INTO PANHANDLE OF LAOS. INITIAL

118

f
s

CONCEPT SHOULD BE SO LIMITED AS NOT TO REQUIRE WITHDRAWAL FOR THESE OPERATIONS OF MORE THAN TWO BATTALIONS FROM THE PRIMARY MISSION OF PACIFICATION OPERATIONS. COMBINED PLANNING GUIDANCE IS EXTENDED (WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO EXECUTION DECISIONS) TO INCLUDE OPTION FOR ADDITION OF USE OF FARMGATE AND/OR OVERT US AIR IN ADDITION TO VNAF.

B. DRV GROUND/AIR ATTACK. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE GROUND/AIR THREAT AND THE COMMAND RELATION ASPECTS THEREOF WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE MESSAGES.

C. AIR ATTACKS ON THE DRV.

(1) THE JCS CONSIDER THAT B-57S SHOULD BE USED IN THE OVERT US VICE FARMGATE ROLE.

(2) COMBINED PLANNING IS AUTHORIZED WITH THE GVN FFR CATEGORY II AND III OPERATIONS OF OPLAN 37-64. PLANNING SHOULD CONTINUE TO RETAIN THE OPTIONS TO USE VNAF EXCLUSIVELY OR VNAF/FARMGATE STRIKES. BY AND LARGE, VNAF AND FARMGATE SHOULD BE SCHEDULED INTO SOUTHERN AREAS OF NVN ONLY AS LONG AS MIG THREAT CONTINUES. GP-1

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

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PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

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PRIORITY

V CWY204PAE896
P RUEKDA
E RUHPA 4111 29/0257Z

290335Z

M CINCPAC

O RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUHPHR/CINCUSARPAC
UHPB/CINCPACFLT
UHLKM/CINCPACAF
UHPG/CG FMFPAC

SANITIZED

Authority JCS 7-13-76 letter

By RME/lp NARS, Date 10-13-76

119 To note CINCPAC
Conclusion - last
paragraph

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 4 SECTIONS

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN RVN (S)

1. IN VIEW OF THE RECENT EVENTS IN RVN, CINCPAC HAS DEVELOPED
FOLLOWING ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN RVN.

2. KHANH RESIGNATION HAS OPENED A PANDORA'S BOX OF POSSIBLE
SITUATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND IN FACT, ALL OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. AT
THE EXTREME WOULD BE COMPLETE COLLAPSE OF THE GOVERNMENT; AT THE
OTHER WOULD BE A ROCKING OF THE BOAT, BUT AN ESSENTIALLY SMOOTH
TRANSITION TO ANOTHER REGIME GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF PROVIDING SOME
EVIDENCE OF STABILITY. MORE PROBABLE RESULT LIES SOMEWHERE IN
BETWEEN, BUT IT APPEARS INEVITABLE THAT EVENTS OF PAST FEW DAYS WILL
HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN AN EFFORT
TO BE PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY CINCPAC HAS PREPARED A REVIEW
OF PRESENT SITUATION, BOTH FRIENDLY AND ENEMY, TOGETHER WITH POSSIBLE
COURSES OF ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE IMPLEMENTED TO ACCOMPLISH US
OBJECTIVES. THIS REPRESENTS A HASTY ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION,
RECOGNIZING THAT RAPIDLY CHANGING EVENTS MIGHT DICTATE FREQUENT
REVISIONS.

3. BASIC ASSUMPTION IS THAT US IS IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO STAY SINCE
ANY MOVE TO ABANDON HER TO HER ENEMIES WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT IN
LOSS OF THE U.S. POSITION IN ALL OF ASIA. IF WE ACCEPT THAT BASIC
OBJECTIVE (STATED REPEATEDLY IN PAST) THEN WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR
ANY EVENTUALITY, INCLUDING IMPLEMENTATION OF OPLAN 32-64.

4. FOLLOWING INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES IN

CT.....J3-6 (1-6) CJCS-2 (7-8) DJS-3 (9-11) SJCS-3 (12-14) J4-2 (15-16)
J5-1 (17) SACSA-5 (18-22) DIA-4 (23-26) NMCC-2 (27-28) CSA-2
(29-30) CSAF-2 (31-32) CNO-2 (33-34) CMC-10 (35-44) OSD-15 (45-59)
RRA-1 (60) FILE-1 (61) ETWC STATE-2 WHITE HOUSE- 66

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PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

SEASIA WITH EMPHASIS ON VC:

A. RED CHINA'S REACTION AND INTENTIONS:

(1) RED CHINA IS EBULLIENT FROM SATISFACTION THAT ANOTHER "LACKEY" OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS HAS FAILED TO CAPTURE IMAGINATION OF THE PEOPLE AND RESTORE THEIR WILL. IT WILL MAKE CAPITAL OF CURRENT INCIDENT IN PROPAGANDA BLASTS AND PROCLAIM TO WORLD THAT HO CHI MINH IS TRUE LEADER OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLES.

(2) ASIDE FROM THIS AND CONTINUED MATERIAL SUPPORT TO DRV, RED CHINA WILL NOT USURP THE PREROGATIVES OF HO'S RECOGNIZED DIRECTORSHIP OF THE CURRENT COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENT OF SVN. IT MAY BE SPECULATED THAT RED CHINA WILL ADROITLY COUNSEL THE DRV TO IMPLEMENT NO BIZARRE MEASURES THAT CAPITALIZE ON THE KHANH PREDICAMENT. ACTIONS ALREADY IN MOTION ARE REAPING CONTINUED SUCCESS. TO INSIGATE BOLDER MEASURES AT A TIME NOT YET PROPITIOUS FOR A COMPLETE VICTORY MIGHT, THROUGH EMERGENCY, WELD THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TOGETHER AGAIN. BETTER TO LET THE CHAOTIC SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM GROW THROUGH ITS SELF-GENERATED MOMENTUM.

B. CAPABILITIES OF COMMUNIST FORCES IN LAOS TO EXPLOIT A GOVERNMENTAL COLLAPSE IN SOUTH VIETNAM:

(1) A COLLAPSE IN THE GOVERNMENT APPARATUS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE BASIV MILITARY OPPORTUNITIES OF PATHET LAOS AND PAVN FORCES IN LAOS. THESE FORCES ARE NEVERTHELESS CAPABLE OF PARTICIPATING IN AN OVER-ALL ESCALATION OF COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. SHOULD A DECISION BE MADE FOR A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN VIET CONG INSURGENCY IN RVN, A COMPLEMENTARY RISE IN ACTIVITY MIGHT OCCUR IN LAOS. BOTH THE VIET CONG AND PATHET LAO ARE RESPONSIVE TO HANOI. SHOULD THE DRV DESIRE TO PUT ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON THE US BY EXPLOITING A GOVERNMENTAL BREAKDOWN IN RVN, LAOS WOULD PROVIDE CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITIES.

(2) COMMUNIST PRESSURE UNDER SUCH AN ASSUMPTION WOULD PROBABLY BE APPLIED IN SOUTHERN LAOS AGAINST ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING: THAKHEK, SENO, SARAVANE, OR ATTOPEU. SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK AGAINST ALL THESE OBJECTIES COULD BE MADE WITH THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF ENEMY BATTALIONS:

	PATHET LAO	PAVN
THAKHEK	4	2
SENO	5	2
SARAVANE	3	0
ATTOPEU	4	2

CONCENTRATION ON ONE OR TWO OF THESE WOULD PERMIT TRANSFER OF UNITS FROM ADJACENT OBJECTIVES.

C. DRV REACTION TO PRESENT SITUATION IN SVN:

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PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

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(1) THE DRV CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT ACTIONS REMAIN ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS IN CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64. THE RECENTLY ACQUIRED MIG FIGHTERS REPRESENT ONLY A MINIMAL GROUND SUPPORT AND/OR AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY. THIS FORCE CAN BE AUGMENTED TO SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS BY RED CHINA.

HOWEVER, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE THAT DRV FORCES WILL BE USED IN THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LIGHT OF THE MADDOX INCIDENTS, AND THE PROBABILITY OF MASSIVE DIRECT INTERVENTION OF US GROUND, AIR AND NAVAL FORCES.

(2) GENERAL RIOTING AND POLITICAL CONFUSION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF LEADERSHIP COULD GIVE DRV CONSIDERABLE CONFIDENCE THAT SVN PEOPLES WILL TO RESIST IN WANING FAST. HANOI SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO INTRODUCE ITS MILITARY UNITS INTO SVN WHILE VC MAINTAIN CAPABILITY TO KEEP GVN OFF BALANCE AND CREATE INCREASING INSTABILITY, DESSENSATION AND CONFUSION.

(3) PROPAGANDA BARRAGE THAT INCREASED FOLLOWING EARLY AUGUST INCIDENTS WILL PROBABLY TAKE ON A NEW VIRULENCE. COMMIES WILL MOST LIKELY CALL FOR SUPPORT AMONG THE "NEUTRAL" NATIONS BLAMING U.S. FOR ALL OF SOUTHEAST ASIA'S PROBLEMS. DRV WILL PROBABLY CALL FOR THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SVN ON THEIR TERMS AND REMOVAL OF ALL VESTIGES OF US PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, HOPING TO ACHIEVE THIS WITHOUT MILITARY ACTION ON ITS PART. EMPHASIS WILL PROBABLY BE DIRECTED AT US LEADERSHIP IN RVN AND ITS INABILITY TO SUPPORT AND MAINTAIN KHANH REGIME IN POWER. THEY WILL PLAY UPON CONFIDENCE

GP-3

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

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E RUHPA 4112 29/0257Z
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M. CINCPAC
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INFO RUHPH/CINCUSARPAC
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MIC FILE COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 4 SECTIONS
ASPECT OF PEOPLE, U.S. INABILITY TO COPE WITH VC POINTING OUT THAT
RUN DESPITE U.S. SUPPORT DOES NOT HAVE BACKING OF MAJORITY OF
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

D. CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE REACTION BY THE COMMUNIST
FORCES IN RVN TO ANY POWER VACUUM RESULTING FROM A CHANGE IN
GOVERNMENT:

(1) VC FORCES WITHIN RVN CONSIST OF 47 MAIN FORCE
BATTALIONS, 132 COMPANIES AND 29 PLATOONS TALLING SOME 34,000 MEN.
THESE FORCES CONTINUE TO BE SUPPORTED BY OTHER LOCAL GURRILLA UNITS
ESTIMATED AT FROM 60 - 80,000.

(2) VC HAVE BEEN MAINTAINING AN AVERAGE OF BETWEEN 500
AND 600 INCIDENTS PER WEEK FOR 1964 WHICH IS ROUGHLY DOUBLE 1963 RATE.
HOWEVER, FREQUENCY OF ATTACKS (DIRECT ASSAULTS) HAS BEEN MAINTAINED AT
ABOUT 40 PER WEEK DURING THIS YEAR, ROUGHLY HALF THE 1963 RATE. THE
GREATEST GAIN BY THE VC WAS MADE IN PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING COUP
AGAINST DIEM. AT THAT TIME BECAUSE OF EVENTS BUILDING UP TO ACTUAL COUP,
VC WERE ABLE TO INCREASE THEIR ACTIVITY THREE-FOLD WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY
SUBSIDED BY ONE THIRD TO LEVEL BEING MAINTAINED DURING 1964.

(3) VC WERE UNABLE TO SIMILARLY EXPLOIT THE JANUARY 30
TAKEOVER BY GENERAL KHANH PROBABLY DUE TO SWIFTNESS OF ITS COMPLETION
AND LACK OF ANY IMPENDING WARNING.

(4) PRESENT SITUATION HAS GIVEN VC ADEQUATE TIME TO
INSTRUCT ALL ITS ELEMENTS AND THUS ALLOW AN EXPLOITATION AS GREAT OR
GREATER THAN THAT FOLLOWING NOVEMBER 1963 COUP. VC HAVE ISSUED
INSTRUCTIONS TO THEIR FIELD UNITS TO BE READY TO EXPLOIT ANY GOVERN-
MENTAL CHANGE BY AGITATION, DIRECT ATTACKS BY THEIR MAIN UNITS AND
AMBUSHES OF RELIEF FORCES TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY LOCAL FORCES.
INSTRUCTIONS HAVE ALSO GONE OUT TO ASSIST IN STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS
AGAINST GOVERNMENT.

(5) THE FACT THAT THERE IS A GOVERNMENTAL CHANGE IMPENDING
AND THE PROBABILITY THAT THERE WILL BE A BREAKDOWN IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT
FOLLOWING ANY CHANGE, ALONG WITH DEMORALIZATION OF GVN'S MILITARY
FORCES RENDERS IT PROBABLE THAT VC WITHOUT ANY OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE
WILL BE ABLE TO REACT WITH GREATER IMPACT THAN THAT OF LAST NOVEMBER.
IN ADDITION THIS TIME THEIR ACTIONS WILL PROBABLY BE DIRECTED
AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL WHO ARE IN EXPOSED POSITIONS (ACCOMPANYING

ACT.....J3-6(1-6)

291513Z
CJCS-2(7-8) DJS-3(9-11) SJCS-3(12-14) J4-2(15-16) J5-1(17)
SAGSA-5(18-22) DIA-4(23-26) NMCC-2(27-28) CSA-2(29-30)
GSAF-2(31-32) CNO-2(33-34) CMC-10(35-44) OSD-15(45-59)
BPA-1(60) FILE-1(61) KLH WHITE HOUSE-3
STATE-2

GS/29/265

JP70A

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

290335Z AHC

RVN FORCES IN THE FIELD). WE CAN EXPECT AN INCREASE IN U.S. CASUALTIES IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ANY MAJOR CHANGES. WE SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR ASSAULTS AGAINST CONCENTRATIONS OF U.S. PERSONNEL OR MATERIAL.

(6) IT IS CONSIDERED LIKELY THAT COMMUNIST REACTION TO POSSIBLE CONFUSION AND CHAOS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD BE GREATLY STEPPED UP VC ACTIVITY AGAINST LUCRATIVE TARGETS. VC ARE CREDITED WITH CAPABILITY OF ATTACKING IN UP TO REGIMENTAL SIZE. PROBABLE LUCRATIVE TARGETS WOULD BE:

(A) AIRFIELDS AT BIEN HOA, TSN AND DANANG.

(B) US PERSONNEL, TO INCLUDE DEPENDENTS.

(C) ARVN UNITS UP TO BATTALION SIZE.

(D) KEY FACILITIES SUCH AS: COMMUNICATION FACILITIES, POL FACILITIES, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES (TO INCLUDE PORTS AND RIVER MINING).

(E) ATTACKS IN AND AROUND SAIGON.

5. PACOM FORCES ARE IN BEST ALERT POSTURE WE HAVE EVER BEEN IN FOR A SEASIA EMERGENCY. A REVIEW OF OUR PRESENT POSTURE AS A RESULT OF DESOTO-PIERCE ARROW OPERATIONS FOLLOWS:

A. NAVAL FORCES

(1) STRIKE CARRIER TG'S:

... (A) TG 77.6 IN POSITION 16N 110E

(B) TG 77.5 IN POSITION 16N 110E

(C) TG 77.4 IN SUBIC WILL RELIEVE TG 77.5 31 AUG

(D) TG 77.7 IN SASEPO

(2) HUK CARRIER TG:

... (A) TG 79.4 IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

(3) AMPHIBIOUS UNITS:

... (A) TG 76.5 (SLF) IN POSITION OFF CAP ST JACQUES.

(B) TF 76 (LESS TG 76.5) HAS 2 BLT'S IN POSITION

OFF DANANG.

(5) CRUISERS:

... (A) THERE ARE 3 GM CRUISERS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA AND 44 DD TYPES IN SEVENTHFLT.

(6) SUPPORT (TF 73):

... (A) THERE ARE ADEQUATE SUPPORT SHIPS IN SOUTH CHINA SEA.

(7) MARINES:

... (A) BLT'S 1/3, 2/3 AND 3/9 ARE CURRENTLY ENBARRED IN TF 76 AMPHIB SHIPS.

... (B) BLT'S 5/3, 1/9 AND 2/9 ARE AT OKINAWA.

(C) FIRST MARINE BRIGADE AT KANEHOE (INCLUDES MAG 13).

(D) MAG 12 AT INAKUMI.

(E) MAG 11 AT ATSUGI.

GP-3
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

290335Z AUG 64

~~TOP SECRET~~

2-703352
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

010

PCWY266AE393
PP RUEKDA
DE RUHFA 4113 29/0257Z
P 290335Z
FM CINCPCAC
TO RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUHPR/CINCUSARPAC
RUHFB/CINCPACFLT
RUHLM/CINCPACAF
RUHFG/CG FMFPAC
BT

MIC FILE COPY
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 4 SECTIONS
(F) MAG 16 AT OKINAWA.

B. AIR FORCE FORCES:

- .. (1) F-100'S - 8 AT DANANG, 10 AT TAKHLI.
- (2) RF-101'S - 12 AT TSN.
- (3) RB-57'S - 2 AT TSN.
- (4) F102'S - 6 AT DANANG, 6 AT TSN, 4 AT DON MUANG.
- (5) F-105'S - 18 AT KORAT.
- (6) B-57'S - 33 AT BIEN HOA, 5 AT TSN.
- (7) A1E'S - 30 AT BIEN HOA.
- (8) C-123'S - 16 AT DANANG, 34 AT TSN, 3 AT DON MUANG.
- (9) KB-50'S - 4 AT TSN, 4 AT TAKHLI

IN ADDITION 2 F-104 SQUADRONS, 2 TSF (PROBABLY F-100'S) AND 1 C-130 SQUADRON ARE ON ALERT IN CONUS. A C&E PACKAGE (CRP, TACC, GRC) IS ALSO ON ALERT IN CONUS. THESE FORCES ALREADY IN PLACE OR AVAILABLE IN

C. ARMY FORCES:

- .. (1) NO ARMY DEPLOYMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE. TWO BRIGADES OF

ACT.....J3-6 (1-6)

CJS-2 (7-8) DJS-3 (9-11) SJCS-3 (12-14) J4-2 (15-16) J5-1 (17)
SACSA-5 (18-22) DIA-4 (23-26) NMCC-2 (27-28) CSA-2 (29-30)
CSAF-2 (31-32) CNO-2 (33-34) CMC-10 (35-44) OSD-15 (45-59)
RRA-1 (60) FILE-1 (61) HLH *HLH*

SECTION 3 OF 4

CS 29/239

290335Z AUG 19 64 *66*

29/4402
~~TOP SECRET~~

PG 1 OF 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE 25TH INF DIV ARE READY FOR MOVEMENT AS FAST AS LIFT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. THE SAME IS TRUE FOR 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE ON OKINAWA.

D. LOGISTICS (WESTPAC AIRLIFT ASSETS):

.. (1) 315TH AIR DIV (UNDER CONTROL OF CHWTO):

... (A) CURRENTLY ASSIGNED:

4 SQ C-130 AT 15 EACH (3 AT NAHA, 1 AT TACHIKAWA)

C-54 AND C-118 AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED 6485 OPS SQ (5AF) AT TACHIKAWA, USED PRIMARILY FOR AIR MEDICAL EVAC MISSIONS WITHIN WESTPAC. 6 AIRFRAMES.

(B) TDY AUGMENTATION:

.. TWO C-130 SQUADRONS OF 16 AIRCRAFT EACH (ONE SQUADRON AT NAHA, ONE AT CLARK FROM CINCSTRIKE FOR 120-180 DAYS (FROM 3-4 AUG).

(2) COMUSMACV:

... (A) THREE SQUADRON OF C-123 (16 EACH).

(B) ONE ARMY FIXED WING COMPANY (APPROX 24 CARIBOU AIRCRAFT)

(C) FOUR C-54 PAX AIRCRAFT FOR VN AND RAR PROGRAM.

(3) AUGMENTATION PENDING:

... (A) ONE C-123 SQUADRON (16 AIRCRAFT) DUE IN RVN ABOUT 1-NOV 64.

(B) ONE ARMY CARIBOU CO (16 AIRCRAFT) DUE IN RVN ABOUT 15 OCT 64

(4) SUMMARY:-

... (A) PRESENTLY UNDER CHWTO:

TYPE & STATUS	TOTAL ACFT
C-130	64
C-130 (TDY)	32
C-123	16
C-121 (VR-7)	4

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-118 (6435TH)	3
C-54 (6435TH)	3
C-54, C-46 ABOUT	5 (AIR AMERICA)
	127 AIRCRAFT

(B) PRESENTLY UNDER MACV:

C-123 (APPROX)	48
CARIBOU (ARMY) APPROX)	24
C-54 (R&R)	4
	76

(5) ADDITIONAL LOGISTIC AIRCRAFT RESOURCES:

(A) 16 KC-130'S (REFUELERS) ASSIGNED MARINE AIR WING AT IWAKUNI.

(B) 12 C-118 PAX/CARGO ARE ASSIGNED BARBERS POINT, OAHU FOR FLEET LOGISTICS SUPPORT.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. HAVING NOTED THE POSSIBILITIES OF OVERT ACTION BY NVN AND THE CHICOMS IT IS CONCLUDED THAT SUCH ACTION IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE. IT IS PREMATURE TO START ACTIONS AT THIS TIME DIRECTED TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION OF SEASIA CONTINGENCY PLANS. OUR AIMS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE ARE:

(1) MAINTAIN THE US POSITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

(2) HELP AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN CONTINUITY

IN THE GVN AND MOMENTUM IN THE WAR EFFORT.

(3) DEMONSTRATE US FIRMNESS OF PURPOSE BY LIMITED

P-3

I.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3 OF 3

29033
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

FILE COPY

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E894
RUEKDA
RUHPA 4114 29/0257Z
290335Z
CINCPAC
RUEKDA/JCS
RUHPHR/CINCUSARPAC
RFB/CINCPACFLT
RMM/CINCPACAF
RGG/CG JMEPAC

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF 4 SECTIONS
OVERT ACTIONS.

(4) MAINTAIN OUR PRESENT POSTURE IN SEASIA UNTIL
WE ARE ASSURED OF A STABLE SITUATION.

B. TO FURTHER THE ABOVE AIMS THERE ARE CERTAIN IMMEDIATE
ACTIONS WHICH WE SHOULD TAKE WHILE MAINTAINING OUR PRESENT INCREASED
POSTURE. THESE ARE:

(1) ENSURE STRINGENT SECURITY OF US/RVNAF INSTALLATIONS
AND FACILITIES. WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO ANY SLACKENING TO ARVN
PROVISIONS FOR SECURITY OF THESE INSTALLATIONS, AND BE PREPARED TO
PROVIDE US TROOP SUPPORT FOR THEIR PROTECTION. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT
THE POSTURE OF THE MARINES OFF THE COAST OF SVN PROVIDES ADEQUATELY
FOR SUCH AN AUGMENTATION AT THE MOMENT.

(2) DURING THIS UNSETTLED PERIOD THERE WILL BE AN
INCREASED NEED FOR OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. WE SHOULD THEREFORE
INCREASE OUR AIR RECCE EFFORT BOTH IN LAOS AND SVN.

(3) WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO EVACUATE US AIRCRAFT
FROM ANY AIRFIELD IF AIRFIELD COMES UNDER ATTACK BY VC OR BY
UNCONTROLLED MOBS.

(4) WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR
EVACUATION OF NONCOMBATANTS FROM SVN IN ACCORDANCE WITH 60-64.
WE ARE IN GOOD POSTURE TO IMPLEMENT THIS. IF SUFFICIENT ARVN
TROOPS REMAIN LOYAL TO PROVIDE SECURITY OF NONCOMBATANTS THEN AN
ORDERLY EVACUATION COULD TAKE PLACE BY AIR AS FIRST PRIORITY AND
BY SEA AS AN ALTERNATE. OR IF THE SITUATION SHOULD BECOME VERY
MUCH WORSE AND ARVN TROOPS REFUSED SECURITY TO US NONCOMBATANTS,
THE SLF IN TF 76 COULD BE PUT ASHORE AT CAP ST. JACQUES TO SECURE
THE AIRFIELD AND HELOLIFTED TO SAIGON TO PROVIDE SECURITY OF US
NONCOMBATANTS AND THE AIRFIELD AT TSN. THERE IS SUFFICIENT AIRLIFT
WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM AND WESTPAC TO PROVIDE FOR VERY RAPID

CT.....J3-6 (1-6)
CJCS-2 (7-8) DJS-3 (9-11) SJCS-3 (12-14) J4-2 (15-16) J5-1 (17)
SACSA-5 (18-22) DIA-4 (23-26) NMCC-2 (27-28) CSA-2 (29-30)
CSAF-2 (31-32) CNO-2 (33-34) CMC-10 (35-44) OSD-15 (45-59)
RRA-1 (60) FILE-1 (61) (61) HLH. While here -> STATV-2

SECTION 4 OF 4

29/270

~~TOP SECRET~~

290335Z AUG 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

EVACUATION OF US NONCOMBATANTS. IN THIS CONNECTION IT APPEARS
DESIRABLE TO TEMPORARILY SUSPEND FURTHER DEPENDENT TRAVEL TO SVN
UNTIL THE SITUATION CLARIFIES.

7. IN SUMMARY, EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO MAINTAIN OUR
PRESENT POSITION IN SVN, BUT NOT TAKE THOSE ACTIONS WHICH COULD
LEAD TO ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT AT A TIME WHEN BOTH GVN AND THE
US WILL BE VITALLY CONCERNED WITH INTERNAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY
PROBLEMS WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM.

P-3
T.

~~TOP SECRET~~

120

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

FLASH

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS Ltr 7/13/76

By rmg, NARS, Date 10/13/76

The following COMUSMACV message was received in the NMCC at 271510Z (271110 EDT).

1. At 1724 hours General "Big" Minh made the following speech over radio Saigon: Quote: Compatriotes, for the past few days compatriot youths, college students and high school students have demonstrated in the capitol and in many provinces in SVN asking that the AFRC be dissolved, that the charter of 16/8/64 be repelled and that the Generals return to their armed forces. According to the proclamation of 25/8/64 the AFRC, convening in an emergency conference at the HC of the RVNAF, during the days of Aug 26-27 1964 has decided as follows:

a. To abrogate the charges of 16/8/64.

b. To dissolve the AFRC as of 27/8/64

c. The armed forces to return to normal duty according to the above cited decisions, for the purpose of unifying the whole armed forces and the whole people of avoiding bloodshed between the army and citizens of avoiding a religious war leading to civil war and the destruction of the nation, to begin with, the armed forces has decided to demonstrate the unification between the armed forces and the population by setting up a Provisional National Guidance Committee of the people and the armed forces for coping with the current dangerous situation. The Provisional National Guidance Committee (PNGC) is composed of Minh, Khanh, Kiem. We call heartily upon all compatriots, Buddhists, Catholics, youths, students, all political groups, people of all strata of the population in the country to place the national interests above all else. We should love each other, support the AF, end all demonstrations to return to normal life, we should heighten our vigilance against all subversive actions and dividise of the communists. All your problems will be quickly solved by the government and the AF. Civilians and servicemen alike should have confidence in us. We will never act counter to the interests of the nation and the people. Saigon Aug 27, 64 signed by Minh, Kiem, Khanh in that order. Delivered by Minh-1724. End Quote.

2. The MRC action is obviously a compromise designed to appease all religious and political factions, at the same time maintain the armed forces as the watchdog of the nation. It is not clear by what

INFO.....GJCS-2(1-2) DJS-3(3-5) SJCS-1(6) J1-3(7-9) J3-6(10-15)
J4-2(16-17) J5-1(18) SACSA-5(19-23) DIA-3(24-26) NMCC-10(27-36)
SAMAA-1(37) CSA-2(38-39) CSAF-2(40-41) CMC-10(42-51) CNO-2(52-53)
WHITE HOUSE-3(54-56) STATE-2(57-58) NSA-4(59-62) OSD-15(63-77)
GIA-3(78-80) File-1(81) jck
ADV TO OSD, GJCS, DJS, J3, DIA

56

DUTY OFFICER

JCK

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MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

CITE NO.

DTG

27 NPT AUG 64

FORM NO
CS-158

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TOP SECRET

**INCOMING
MESSAGE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

FLASH

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

is meant by the "Current Government" but it is assumed that the minister under the Khanh regime will continue in office however, it is difficult to conceive that such an arrangement will be acceptable to the influential pressure groups for a 60-day period. Public riots by and between the Catholics and Buddhists will probably continue for several days; however there are indications that police and troops will be directed to intervene to prevent destruction and bloodshed. Maneuvering and jockeying for position by the political factions, threats and pressures by the religious groups, and fears by the military of a weak government will continue in evidence. Hopefully there will be no upheaval in the military ranks by mass changes in commanders, key staff officers, and province chiefs. However, upon the formation of a new government, broad changes are inevitable and coups will be a constant threat. The military have been in an influential position too long to refrain from using force to change the government to a pattern they visualize to be in this nation's best interest. There are many questions which may not be answered for several days, such as who will command the armed forces, how will decisions affecting the nation's interest be made, who is chairman of the "Guidance council", what is the authority and function of the "Guidance Council".

3. MACV appreciates that extent aggravated political instability can have a detrimental impact on the moral of the VN troops their will to fight. Advisors have been cautioned of this possibility and directed to use their influence to maximum degree in urging their counterparts to keep their minds on the war and not permit the VC to gain the initiative.

4. It is questionable that this situation will be further clarified tonight. My guess is that it will be several days before the pattern unravels for the simple reason that the architects themselves have not yet developed the blueprints.

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FORM NO
JCS-1 DEC 61 58

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121

DE RUHLHQ 3747 26/1749Z
P 261847Z
FM-ADMINO CINCPAC
TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUAGFL/COMUSTDC
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By JB, NARS, Date 10 MAR 76

~~SECRET~~

COMUSTDC NOT ADDEE PASS FOR INFO TO ADM SHARP AS ALFA NR 132
MSG OPENED TO STAFF

POSIT AMPHIB FORCES S. CHINA SEA (C)

A. YOUR 260318Z (ALFA 129)

B. MY 251522Z (ALFA 106)

1. REF A REPORTED REACTION TIMES TG 76.5 AND TF 76 LESS 76.5 FROM
POSITS ASSUMED RESPONSE REF B. REF A ALSO INDICATED FURTHER
IMPROVEMENT IF FORCES WERE POSITIONED CLOSER CAP ST. JACQUES AND
DANANG.

PAGE 2 RUHLHQ 3747 ~~SECRET~~

2. POSITION TG 76.5 OFF CAP ST. JACQUES AND REMAINDER TF 76 IN
S. CHINA SEA LESS 76.5 OFF DANANG TO REDUCE REACTION TIMES IN
EVENT LANDING FORCES REQUIRED ASHORE. KEEP FORCES OUT OF SIGHT
OF LAND. REPORT NEW POSITS, ETA AND REACTION TIMES FOR LANDING
LANDING FORCE SAIGON AND DANANG. GP-4.
BT

NN

INFO.....CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J4-2 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14
NMCC-2 SAMAA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 OSD-15
WHITE HOUSE-3 STATE-2 FILE-1 (74) ETO

CS/26/491

1 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

**INCOMING
MESSAGE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
PRIORITY	ROUTINE

EHD 6'8-001ZCJJE 623
PP RUEKDA
DE RUMSMA 2514H 26/1410Z

P R 261045Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEPDA/OASD/PA
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEKDA/JCS
RUEHC/STATE DEPT .

INFO ZEN/AMEMB/PAO SAIGON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAC OI 8746

ERRONEOUS ALLEGATIONS BY STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS AT DA NANG
A. MACOI 8674 DTG 250351Z AUG 64

1. REF A QUOTED RELEASE BY MACOI ON SHOTS FIRED IN AIR BY
U.S. PERSONNEL WHEN STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS APPROACHED ENLISTED
BILLET IN DA NANG.

2. UPI STORY BYLINED RAY HERNDON DATELINE SAIGON 25 AUG
STATES IN PART: QUOTE STUDENT LEADERS IN DA NANG TODAY BLAMED
THE DEATHS OF 19 PERSONS AND INJURIES TO 70 OTHERS ON TRIGGER-
HAPPY AMERICAN SERVICEMEN WHO THEY SAY TOUCHED OFF RELIGIOUS
WARFARE WHICH WAS CONTINUING TONIGHT...70 CIVILIANS WERE WOUNDED
AFTER AMERICAN MILITARY MEN STAMPEDED A PREDOMINANTLY BUDDHIST
CROWD OF DEMONSTRATORS INTO A ROMAN CATHOLIC VILLAGE SMOLDERING
WITH RELIGIOUS TENSION. AN AMERICAN SPOKESMAN IN SAIGON CON-
FIRMED THAT THE FIRST SHOTS IN THE RELIGIOUS WAR WERE FIRED BY
AMERICANS "WHO CAUSED THE MARCHERS TO BREAK RANKS" END QUOTE
(NOTE: SEE REF A FOR MACOI RELEASE ON SHOTS FIRED).

3. IN SAME STORY ARE OTHER MISQUOTES SUCH AS THAT THE DEMON-
STRATORS TRAMPLED DOWN A SMALL GIRL. IN FACT HERNDON WAS TOLD
THE GIRL WAS KNOCKED INTO A TRENCH.

ACT.....OSD-15SACSA-5

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J3-6 J4-2 J5-1 J6-3 DIA-14 NMCC-2 SAMAA-1
CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 WHITE HOUSE-3 NIC-1 RRA-1
CIA-3 NSA-4 FILE-1 (88) ETO

ADV CY TO NMCC OSD

DUTY OFFICER WU/SJ CS/26/428 WD	PAGE OF PAGES 1 2	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
		CITE NO. MAC OI 8746	DTG 261045Z AUG 64

FORM NO
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

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INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
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4. AS RESULT HERNDON'S REQUEST FOR MACV COMMENT, DISCUSSED EPISODE WITH SR ADVISOR I CORPS AND HIS DEPUTY. BOTH STATE THAT AFTER TALKING WITH PERSONNEL WHO WERE IN EM BILLET AT TIME OF SHOOTING THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WERE HEADED TOWARD NEARBY CATHOLIC VILLAGE FROM OUTSET AND WOULD HAVE GONE THERE EVEN IF SHOTS HAD NOT BEEN FIRED. ALSO THAT ROCKS THROWN AT EM BILLET BY DEMONSTRATORS WERE AIMED AT HOUSEMAIDS STANDING ON BALCONIES AND LEANING OUT WINDOWS, ALL OF WHOM LIVE IN CATHOLIC VILLAGE AND WERE KNOWN TO WORK IN BILLET (NOTE: INITIAL REPORTS INDICATED ROCKS MIGHT HAVE BEEN THROWN BECAUSE U.S. PERSONNEL WERE TAKING PICTURES OF DEMONSTRATION).

5. MACV INFO LIAISON OFFICER AT DA NANG SAYS THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR DEMONSTRATORS TO INADVERTENTLY APPROACH CATHOLIC VILLAGE AS RESULT OF FLEEING FROM SHOTS IN AIR BECAUSE BILLET AND VILLAGE ARE SEPARATED BY LARGE PARKING LOT BOUNDED BY CONCERTINA WIRE. FURTHER STATES THAT IT WAS AT LEAST 30 RPT 30 MINUTES AFTER SHOTS WERE FIRED BEFORE DEMONSTRATORS WALKED AROUND CONCERTINA WIRE AND REACHED VILLAGE WHERE FIGHTING BROKE OUT. HE REPORTS THAT AS OF 261400Z AUG THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY EVIDENCE OF ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING IN DA NANG, SO OBVIOUSLY STUDENT ALLEGATIONS NOT BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY THERE. NOTHING IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE SAIGON DAILIES 26 AUG ON SU' 3:5. UNDERSTAND AP NOT BUYING STUDENT PITCH AND MACOI HAS NOT HAD QUERIES FROM OTHER MEDIA REPS ON SAME

6. IF COMPLICATIONS DEVELOP FROM CONUS PLAYING OF UPI STORY MACOI WILL BE IN POSITION TO FURNISH MORE DETAILS ON REQUEST BASED ON I CORPS REPORT OF INVESTIGATION AND AFFIDAVITS,
(GP 4) BT

DUTY OFFICER	PAGE OF PAGES 2 2	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
		CITE NO. MAC OI 8746	DTG 261045Z AUG 64

JCS FORM NO 1
1 DEC 63 58

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**INCOMING
MESSAGE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

123

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

Subject: Recess of Military Revolutionary council meeting

1. The following message received via TELECON in the National Military Command Center at 260653 EDT.

COMUSMACV-16

~~SECRET~~

TO: JCS

FROM: COMUSMACV

1. COMUSMACV REPRESENTATIVE AT THE HIGH COMMAND HAS JUST REPORTED THAT THE MRC HAS RECESSED UNTIL 270100Z, SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION IS A MEMBER OF THE MRC. THIS PARALLELS INFORMATION DISSEMINATED BY GVN PRESS OFFICER TO THE EFFECT THAT THERE WILL BE NOTHING FURTHER UNTIL TOMORROW.
2. J3OF JGS STATED THAT THERE WAS NO VOTING DURING RECENTLY CONCLUDED SESSION AND THAT THE PROBLEMS ARE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. GENERAL KHANH'S INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL HANDS WAS TO RETURN TO QUARTERS, RELAX AND CONSIDER PROBLEMS AHEAD.

~~SECRET~~

INFO.....CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-3 J3-6 J4-2 J5-1 SACSA-5 DIA-14 NMCC-3
SMAA-1 GSA-2 CSAF-2 CMC-10 CNO-2 OSD-15 WHITE HOUSE-3 STATE-2
CIA-3 F10-1(81) jck

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS Ltr 4/26/76
By nmq, NARS, Date 7/19/76

RECEIVED NMCC/MC 261135Z.

DUTY OFFICER JCK <i>[Signature]</i>	PAGE OF PAGES 1 1	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
		CITE NO. COMUSMACV-16	DTG 26 NPT AUG 64

FORM NO
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

124

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
IMMEDIATE	IMMEDIATE

EEI A896CED 294
OO RUEKDA
DE RUHLHL 39 63 26/0318Z

O 260318Z

FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

INFO RUMFCR/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHPG/CG FMFPAC
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMFCR/CG NINTH MEB
RUATOCTF SEVEN NINE
RUEKDA/JCS
RUECW/CNO
RUECEM/CMC
RUMFCR/CTF SEVEN SIX
RUMFCR/CTG SEVEN SIX PT FIVE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS Ltr 4/26/76

By ring, NARS, Date 7/19/76

~~SECRET~~

REPOSITIONING OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES IN SOUTH CHINA SEA (C)

A. CINCPAC 251522Z PASEP

B. COMSEVENTHFLT 252045Z NOTAL

C. COMSEVENTHFLT 252009Z PASEP

1. IAW REF A, TG 76.5 (SLF) IS ON STATION EAST OF CAP VARELLA REMAINING OUT OF SIGHT OF LAND.

2. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN TACTICAL INTEGRITY OF NINTH MEB(-) AND, IF APPROPRIATE, TO PERMIT ROTATION FOR A POSSIBLE LONG HAUL POSTURE, INTEND ALSO STATION OFF CAP VARELLA THE REMAINDER OF THE AMPHIBIOUS UNITS NOW IN SOUTH CHINA SEA WITH 9TH MEB(-) EMBARKED. IF IMPROVED REACTION TIME IS REQUIRED AT LATER DATE, THE FORCE CAN BE SPLIT WITH

AMPHIB READY GROUP (SLF EMBARKED) BEING POSITIONED OFF CAP ST JACQUES AND REMAINDER OF AMPHIB TASK FORCE WITH MEB HQ, RLT (MINUS SLF) AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT GROUP BEING POSITIONED OFF DANANG.

INFO.....CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J4-2 J5-1 SACSA-5 DIA-14
NMCC-2 SAMAA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 OSD-15 (WHITE HOUSE)-3 (SDLO)
FILE -1 (60)

ADV COPIES FURN DIA, NMCC & OSD

REF B NOT HELD

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

**INCOMING
MESSAGE****THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF****~~SECRET~~**

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

3. IF SPLIT AND IMPROVED REACTIONTIME IS LATER
REQUIRED:

A. AMPHIB READY GROUP (SLF EMBARKED) COULD BE
POSITIONED WITHIN TWO HOURS REACTION TIME OFF CAP ST.
JACQUES. THE CLOSING TIME FROM THIS POSITION IS EIGHT
HOURS.

B. REMAINDER OF AMPHIB TASK FORCE COULD BE POSITIONED
WITHIN FOUR HOURS REACTION TIME FROM DANANG. THE CLOSING
TIME FROM THIS POSITION IS SEVEN HOURS.

4. CURRENT REACTION TIMES FOR TG 76.5 TO CAP ST. JACQUES/
SAIGON AND DANANG ARE DETAILED IN PARAS 2 AND 3 OF REF C.
GP-THREE

BT

DUTY OFFICER

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JCS FORM NO
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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

125
~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

PRIORITY

PRIORITY

ZCZCCIA789 HPA030VVV PBBg19

PP RUEKDA

DE RUHLHL 3958 26/0308Z

P 260308Z

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 10 MAR 76

FM CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUECW/CNO

RUECEM/CMC

RUHPG/CG FMFPAC

O 252009Z

FM COMSEVENTHFLT

TO CINCPACFLT

INFO COMUSMCV

CTF 76

CINCPAC

CG 9H ME

CTG 79.5

CTG 76.5

~~TOP SECRET~~

A. COMUSMACV 251113 NOTAL

B. MY 251448Z NOTAL

1.TG 76/5 (LF) ENROUTE TO MIDPOINT POSITION IAW REFS A AND B. ETA

ABOUT 252200.

2.FROM CAP VARELLA REACTION TIME FOR INITIAL ELEMENTS OF HELO BORNE
FORCE IN VALLEY FORGE (TLO COMPANIES) TO TAN SON NHUT OR DANANG NINE
TO TEN HOURS. HELO LIFT TO BE CLOSED AT TAN SON NHUT BY PLUS SEVENTEEN
HOURS AND DANANG BY PLUS FOURTEEN DUE SHORTER OVERWATER FLIGHT ROUTES
TO DANANG.

INFO.....CJCS-2(1-2) DJS-3(3-5) SJCS-1(6) J1-3(7-9) J3-6(10-15)
J4-2(16-17) J5-1(18) SACS-5(19-23) DIA-4(24-27)
NMCC-2(28-29) SAMAA-1(30) CSA-2(31-32) CSAF-2(33-34)
OSD-15(35-49) (WHITE HOUSE-3) (50-52) (SDLO) FILE-1(53)(53)

ADV COPIES FURN NMCC

REF B NOT HELD

DUTY OFFICER

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MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

CS 26/164

TWG

1

2

CITE NO.

DTG

252009Z AUG 64

FORM NO.

**INCOMING
MESSAGE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

3. REMAINDER OF AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP COULD LAND SLF (LESS MELO BORNE ELEMENTS) AT CAP ST JACQUES R DANANG COMMENCING ABOUT PLUS EIGHTEEN HOURS! CLOSING ABOUT TWENTY-TWO HOURS. (LIFT TO SAIGON BY US/AV AIRCRAFT FROM VUNG TAU AIRFIELD OF CAP ST JACQUES TO TAN SON NHUT ALTERNATIVELY, SHIPS COULD START SIX HOUR RIVER RUN TO SIAGON AT FIRST FAVORABLE TIDE AFTER SEVENTEEN HOURS, AND LAFD TROOPS AT SAIGON.)
4. REMAINDER OF TF 76, WITH 9TH MEB (MINUS) EMBARKED LESS LST' WITH LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP EMBARKED (I.E. TWO BLT, REGIMENTAL HQ, AND MEB HQ) ON SAME TIME SCALE AS SURFACE BORNE READY GROUP ELEMENTS. LST ELEMENTS ARRIVE THREE HOURS LATER.

GP-4
BT

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TOP SECRET

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

126
~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

PRIORITY

VZCZCIEN732CPH0922V SVA253VV PHZ865VV PAF366

PPJRUEKDA

DE RUHPA 3589 25/1521Z

P 251522Z

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By JB; NARS, Date 10 MAR 76

FM ADMINO CINCPAC

TO RUHPB/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUMSMA/COMU MACV

RUEKDA/JCS

RUAGFL/COMUSTDC

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMUSTDC NOT ADDEE PASS FOR INFO TO ADM SHARP AS ALFA NR 106 RPT 106
MSG OPENED TO STAFF

RELOCATION OF SLF (U)

A. COMUSMACV MAC J-31 8697 DTG 251113Z

B. CINCPACOP PLAN 60-62

1. REF A REQUESTED SLF BE POSITIONED APPROX MIDWAY BETWEEN
DANANG AND SAIGON FOR POSSIBLE OPNS UNDER REF BIN VIEW RECENT
CIVILIAN DISTURBANCES IN RVN. THIS MOVE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE.

2. TAKE ACTION TO RELOCATE FORCE AS REQUESTED. FORCE SHOULD REMAIN
OUT OF SIGHT OF LAND.

3. ADVISE COMUSMACV AND OTHER ADDEES APPROX REACTION TIME TO
SAIGON AND DANANG. GP-4
BT

INFO.....CJCS-2 (1-2) DJS-3 (3-5) SJCS-1 (6) J3-6 (7-12) J4-2 (13-14)
J5-1 (15) SACSA-5 (16-20) DIA-3 (21-23) NMCC-2 (24-25)
SAMAA-1 (26) CSA-2 (27-28) CSAF-2 (29-30) CNO-2 (31-32)
CMC-10 (33-42) OSD-15 (43-57) WHITE HOUSE-3 (58-60)
STATE-2 (61-62) FILE-1 (63) JRT

DV CY TO CJCS DJS NMCC OSD

60

DUTY OFFICER

U/SJ CS/25/428

WD

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~~TOP SECRET~~

**INCOMING
MESSAGE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

127

TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

IMMEDIATE

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

IMMEDIATE

VZCZCPH0866VV TFC368

OO RUEKDA

DE RUMSMA 528 25/1120Z

O 251113Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUHPA/CINCPAC

INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUHPB/CINCPAC FLT

RUMFZL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMFZT/CTF 76

RUMFCR/CTF 79

RUMFCR/CG 9TH MEB

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By VB NARS, Date 10 MAR 76

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC J-31 8697

RELOCATION OF SPECIAL LANDING FORCE (TG79.5) (TS)

A. CINCPAC OP PLAN 60-62.

1. IN VIEW RECENT DISTURBANCES IN SAIGON AND DA NANG, RECOMMEND THAT SPECIAL LANDING FORCE BE POSITIONED APPROXIMATELY MIDWAY BETWEEN DA NANG AND SAIGON FOR POSSIBLE OPNS UNDER REF A. FORCE SHOULD REMAIN OUT OF SIGHT OF LAND. REGARD THIS CONTINGENCY UNLIKELY, AND RECOMMENDATION IS PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE ONLY.

2. REQUEST ADVISE APPROX REACTION TIME TO SAIGON OR DA NANG FROM NEW POSITION IF RELOCATED.

3. AMBASSADOR CONCURS GP 4

BT

61

INFO.....CJCS-2(1-2) DJS-3(3-5) SJCS-1(6) J3-6(7-12) J4-2(13-14)

J5-1(15) SACSA-5(16-20) DIA-4(21-24) NMCC-2(25-26)

SAMAA-1(27) CSA-2(28-29) CSAF-2(30-31) CNO-2(32-33)

CMC-10(34-43) OSD-15(44-58) (WHITE HOUSE)-3(59-61) FILE-1(62)..so

ADV TO CJCS DJS NMCC & OSD

(STATE)

DUTY OFFICER

WU/NRF CS/25/320 JCK

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MAC J-31 8697

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TOP SECRET

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

128
UNCLASSIFIED

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

PRIORITY

V EUF772YEA983
PP RUEPDA
DE RUMSMA 2309H 25/0510Z
ZNR

P 250351Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEPDA/OASD/PA
RUEHC/STATE DEPT

INFO ZEN/AMEMB/PA SAIGON
RUEKDA/JCS
ZEN/USIS
RUAPDT/OIC PAC STARS & STRIPE

UNCLAS MACOI 8674
SUPPLEMENTAL PRESS TRENDS NUMBER 201A
SUPPLEMENTAL PRESS TRENDS FOR 25 AUGUST 1964.
A. DELZEL 478

1. FLWG COORDINATED WITH AMEMB/PAO AND RELEASED TO NEWS
MEDIA AT 251000H AUG IN RESPONSE TO NUMEROUS QUERIES IN
CONJUNCTION WITH STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN DA NANG 24 AUG:

"WHEN THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS WERE PASSING THE
DA NANG HOTEL EM BILLET YESTERDAY MORNING, SOME OF THE
DEMONSTRATORS STARTED STREAMING INTO THE COURTYARD OF THE
BILLET AND THOSE AT THE HEAD OF THE GROUP ACTUALLY ENTERED
THE BLDG... AT THAT TIME, TWO SHOTS WERE FIRED INTO THE AIR BY
U.S. MIL PERSONNEL STANDING ON THE ROOF OF THE BLDG.

'IT IS REPTD THAT AFTER THE SHOTS WERE FIRED, LEADERS
OF THE DEMONSTRATORS CAME INTO THE COURTYARD AND PREVAILED UPON
THE DEMONSTRATORS TO RTN TO THE STREET AND REJOIN THE MARCH.

'THE TWO SHOTS WERE NOT FIRED BY PERSONNEL ON GUARD
- DUTY AND THE ACTION WAS TAKEN WITHOUT ANY AUTHORIZATION. THE
MATTER IS UNDER INVESTIGATION BY U.S. AUTH IN DA NANG"
BT

ACT.....OSD-15

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J4-2 J5-1 J6-3 SACSA-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2
SAMAA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 WHITE HOUSE-3 STATE-2 NIC-1
CIA-3 NSA-4 FILE-1 (85)

ADV COPY TO NMCC

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNCLASSIFIED

**INCOMING
MESSAGE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION) PRIORITY	PRECEDENCE (INFO) ROUTINE
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DE RUHLHQ 3562 25/0238Z

R 250655Z

FM ADMINO CINCPAC

INFO RUEKDA/ASD/ISA
RUEKDA/JCS
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUHPHL/DIRPACDOCKS

P 212116Z

FM CINCUSARPAC

INFO CINCPAC

210731Z

FM CGUSASCV VIETNAM

TO CGUSARYIS

INFO CINCUSARAC

~~SECRET~~ ASCV-D 0118 FOR RID

1. (S) COMUSMUCV HAS TRANSMITTED TO JCS FORMAL REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM FOR THE NEXT YEAR. THESE CONSTITUTE AN OVERALL INCREASE IN MILITARY STRENGTH IN VIETNAM OF ABOUT 4,210. THE INCREASE PROVIDES FOR EXTENSION AND REINFORCEMENT OF THE ADVISORY EFFORT AT THE COMBAT UNIT LEVEL AND AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL TO IMPROVE AND ACCELERATE PACIFICATION OPERATIONS. COMUSMACV HAS RECOGNIZED THAT EXTENSION AND AUGMENTATION OF THE ADVISORY EFFORT WILL HAVE AN IMMEDIATE IMPACT UPON THE ADMIN OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT BASE. HE HAS STATED THAT IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THIS INCREASE IN THE FIELD CERTAIN

INFO: CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J1-1 J3-6 J4-2 J5-1 SACSA-5 DIA-14
NMCC-2 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 OSD-15 FILE-1 (69)

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)	PRECEDENCE (INFO)
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ADMINISTRATIVE AUGMENTATION IS NECESSARY AND SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT AND AIRLIFT CAPABILITY ARE GENERATED.

2. (S) INCLUDED IN THE RECOMMENDED AUGMENTATION ARE THE FOLLOWING ARMY ELEMENTS:

- A. A SPECIAL FORCES GROUP WITH A SLIGHTLY REDUCED HEAD-QUARTERS ELEMENT. APPROXIMATE STRENGTH -- 600
- B. ON CV-2B (CARIBOU) COMPANY
- C. TWO AIRMOBILE (UH-1B) COMPANIES.
- D. TWO AIRLIFT PLATOONS ON 10 UH-1B'S EACH
- E. ONE DIRECT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE COMPANY
- F. ONE AVIATION ACFT M&S BATTALION
- G. NECESSARY TRANSPORTATION AND SIGNAL DETACHMENTS TO SUPPORT THE ABOVE

3. (S) TOTAL USASCV PERSONNEL NOT TO INCLUDE SPECIAL FORCES RECOMMENDED INCLUDES 163 OFFICERS, 174 WARRENT OFFICERS, AND 1242 ENLISTED, TOTAL 1579

4. (SX) FACILITIES REQUIRED OVER AND ABOVE THOSE REQUIRED FOR NEW UNITS WILL INCLUDE A 10-BED MEDICAL FACILITY AT CAN THO TO BE CONSTRUCTED BY USASCV AND STAFFED WITH ARMY PERSONNEL.

5. (S) ANNUAL COSTS TO SUPPORT USASCB INCREASES WERE ESTIMATED BY CONMUSMACV TO BE:

- A. PERSONNEL (INCLUDED COLA AND TDY COSTS) = \$140,713.00
- B. EQUIPMENT, SERVICE, AND SUPPLIES
 - (1) MEDICAL - \$173,125.00
 - (2) OTHER - \$1,233,000.00
- C. AIRCRAFT (INCL OP COSTS) - 3,855,700.00

6. (S) THIS HQ EST COST FOR CONSTR REQUIRED TO SPT PROPOSED INCREASES AS FOLLOWS:

TYPE UNIT	TENT LOC	TYPE FACILITY	EST COST
AIR MBL CO	BIEN HAO	CANTONMENT	\$600,000
		FLT LOINE FAC	400,000
1 CARIBOU CO	NHAA TRANG	CANTONMENT	300,000
		FLT LINE FAC	400,000
1 DS MAINT CO	TAN SON NHUT	CANTONMENT	300,000
		FLT LINE FAC	400,000

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

1 AVN ACFT M&S BN	NHA TRANG	CANTONMENT	85,000
	CAN THO	10-BED MED FAC	65,000

7. (S) ONE AIR MOBILE COMPANY CURRENTLY LOCATED AT PLEIKU WILL BE MOVED TO BAN ME THOUT FOR TACTICAL REASONS. THIS WILL NECESSITATE CONSTRUCTION OF CANTONMENT AND FLIGHT LINE FACILITIES AT A COST OF \$500,000.00

8. (S) OTHER FACILITIES ALREADY PROGRAMMED BUT NOT YET SUBMITTED FOR FUNDING APPROVAL INCLUDE

UTT CO/MP CO	TAN SON NHUT	CANTONMENT	\$300,000
AVN SPT BN	VUNG TAU	CANTONMENT	200,000
		FLT LINE FEC	200,000

9. (S) THE TWO PROJECT LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 8 ABOVE ARE REQUIRED ON A URGENT BASIS TO SPT CURRENT REQUIREMENTS, NOT, REPEAT NOT, AS A RESULT OF THE CURRENT AUGMENTATION ACTION. A NEW CANTONMENT IS NEEDED TO PROVIDE UTT CO AND 560TH MP CO ADEQUATE HOUSING. THERE ARE NO CANTONMENT OR FLIGHT LINE FACILITIES AVAILABLE FOR NEW UNITS SHOULD THE MACV PROPOSAL BE APPROVED BY JCS. THESE PROJECTS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN CURRENT LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AS THE MISSION DID NOT EXIST AT THE TIME THE PROGRAM WAS SUBMITTED. THEY CANNOT BE DELAYED FOR INCLUSION IN SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING MILITARY CONSTRUCTION BECAUSE MACV PROPOSED TO PHASE NEW UNITS INTO VIETNAM DURING THE PERIOD OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1964.

10. (S) RECOMMEND THAT CONSTRUCTION PROJECT LISTED IN PARAS 7 AND 8 ABOVE BE INCLUDED WITH PROJECTS PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TO DA BY USARPAC MSG ARP 73602 DTD 22 MAY 64 FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL UNDER SECTION 103, PL 85-174. DETAILED JUSTIFICATION CAN BE PREPARED IMMEDIATELY UPON JCS APPROVAL OF REQUIRED TROOP UNIT INCREASES AND CAN BE PRESENTED TO INTERESTED AGENCIES BY USASCV ENGINEER, LT COL FORBERT BERNSTEIN.

11. (S) PRESENT TENTATIVE PLANNING ALSO INDICATES THAT 451 ADDITIONAL PERSONEL WILL BE ASSIGNED TO AUGMENT THE 39TH SIG BN AND STARCOM. AS DEFINATE INFORMATION IS RECEIVED YOU WILL BE ADVISED OF THE CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS AND ESTIMATED COSTS. INFORMATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE IS INADEQUATE UPON WHICH TO BASE ANY PLANS.

GP-4

BT

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FORM NO. 1051 600

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

**INCOMING
MESSAGE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

File
130

TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

VZCZCIEM529XVZCZCCIA374YRVV PAA919

PP RUEKDA

DE RUHPA 2171 190022Z

P R 190025Z

**NO FURTHER
REPRODUCTION
AUTHORIZED**

FM CINCPAC

TO RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUMSMACOMUSMACV

RUHPCR/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPCR/CINCUSARPAC

RUHPB/CINCPACFLT

RUHLKM/CINCPACAF

RUHPG/CG FMFPAC

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS Ltr 7/13/76

By Amg, NARS, Date 10/12/76

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS

LIMDIS

PLANNING FOR CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS (U)

A. COMUSMACV J34 8213 DTG 160943Z (PASEP)

B. SAIGON 457 TO STATE AUG 17, NOPM (NOTAL)

1. CONCUR WITH CONCEPT FOR PHASE I CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS INTO LAOS DESCRIBED IN PARA 5A OF REF A. USE OF TJM BRIDGEHEAD RATHER THAN OPERAFONAL AREA MAY BE TOO STRONG FOR THE TYPE OPERATIONS CONSIDERED AND MAY NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO LAO POLITICOS IF IT IS NECESSARY TO DISCUSS THESE OPERATIONS WITH THEM.

2. AGREE THAT PHASE II VISUALIZED BY EEGVN IS OVERLY AMBITIOUS (PARA 5B OF REF A). CONTROL OR DOMINATION OF STRIP IN LAOS UP TO 40 KM DEEP AND OVER 430 KM WIDE IS CONSIDERED TO BE BEYOND THE RE-SOURCES OF GVN ALONE. AS DESIRED END, THIS OBJECTIVE COULD BE RETAINED FOR PLANNING PURPOSES AND MAY ENCOURAGE GVN INTO EXPANDING PHASE I OPERATIONS TO ENCOMPASS LARGER OPERATIONAL AREA. SUCCESS DURING PHASE I WILL BE DETERMINING FACTOR FOR THEIR TAKING ON BIGGER THINGS.

3. IF WE ARE TO HOLD STRONG MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER THESE OPERATIONS WITHOUT TAKING COMMAND, PARTICIPATION OF US ADVISORS AT ALL PLANNING AND OPERATING ECHELONS IS ESSENTIAL. US ADVISOR

37

ACT.....SACSA-5(1-5)

CJCS-2(6-7) DJS-1(8) J3-2(9-10) DIA-4(11-14) NMCC/DDO-2(15-16)
CSA(GEN JOHNSON)-3(17-19) CSAF(GEN LEMAY)-3(20-22)
CNO(ADM MCDONALD)-3(23-25) CMC(GEN GREENE)-3(26-28) OSD-8(29-36) WHITE HOUSE-3(37-39) STATE-2(40-41) FILE-1(42)(42)

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MESSAGE**

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

TOP SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

PARTICIPATION SHOULD INCLUDE GOING INTO LAOS ON BOTH AIR AND GRND OPERATIONS. AS GVN EXPERIENCE AND CONFIDENCE GROW, DIRECT US PARTICIPATION MAY BE REDUCED TO DEGREE COMUSMACV FEELS IS NECESSARY.

4. COMUSMACV SHOULD HAVE AUTHORITY TO USE FARMGATE RESOURCES IN THESE OPERATIONS AS HE CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY. INITIALLY ONLY TARGET SPOTTERS FOR VNAF MAY BE REQUIRED. HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE OPPORTUNITY OR REQUIREMENT FOR SOME AIR STRIKES THAT DEMAND US PRECISION.

5. US AIRLIFT, BOTH HELICOPTER AND FIXED WING, WILL ASSURE DLZ IMPROVE CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF THESE OPERATIONS. US AIRLIFT USED ON CROSS BORDER MISSIONS SHOULD BE PROTECTED BY US AIR COVER, FARMGATE OR OTHERWISE.

6. THE LIMITED GROUND PENETRATIONS (15 KM) CONCEIVED FOR PHASE I OPERATIONS PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY FOR TESTING CAPABILITY OF ARVN AND VNAF FOR MORE SOPHISTICATED TYPE OPERATIONS AND COULD PROVIDE MEANS OF HELPING TO REDUCE OR ALERT US TO INFILTRATION. SUCCESS IN OPERATIONS WOULD HELP RETAIN GVN MORALE RAISED BY PIERCE ARROW AND PERMIT US PARTICIPATION WITH REDUCED RISK OF LOSS OF US PERSONNEL TO PL/VM AND BETTER ASSURANCE THAT MISSION IS BEING CORRECTLY PERFORMED.

7. REF B HAS BEEN CONSIDERED IN FORMULATION OF THIS COMJTF AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWING. ASSUME THAT RECOMMENDATION A(4) OF REF B PERTAINS TO GVN/FARMGATE/US AIR OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH LAOS CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS ONLY AS DESCRIBED IN REF A. CONCUR WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JOINT PLANNING RPT PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS CONTAINED IN REF B, HOWEVER, COMUSMACV MUST DETERMINE IN CONJUNCTION WITH GVN MILITARY PLANNERS WHERE TO BEGIN OPERATIONS, HOW LARGE AN AREA THEY SHOULD COVER AND WHAT FORCES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THEM. UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR APPROVAL OF THE CONCEPTS OF REF A AND RECOMMENDATIONS BELOW, WE MUST THEN AWAIT RESULTS OF FINAL US/GVN PLANNING AND COMUSMACV'S SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR INITIATING OPERATIONS.

8. RECOMMEND APPROVAL OF:

A. CONCEPT CONTAINED IN REF A FOR PHASE I AIR AND GROUND OPERATIONS.

B. COORDINATION OF PLANS WITH RLG.

C. USE OF US ADVISORS ON PHASE I OPERATIONS.

D. COMUSMACV USE OF FARMGATE RESOURCES AS HE DETERMINES NECESSARY FOR CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS.

E. PLANNING FOR USE OF US SAR RESOURCES AS REQUIRED.

F. PLANNING FOR USE OF USAF/USN RESOURCES IN CONNECTION WITH CROSS BORDER OPERATIONS. GP=1 BT

DUTY OFFICER	PAGE OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
	2 2	CITE NO.	DTG 190025Z AUG 64

INCOMING
MESSAGE

161045Z
MIG FILE COPY 131
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

ROUTINE

DE RUHLHQ 3564 25/0238Z

DECLASSIFIED

R 250705Z

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 10 MAR 76 *File*

FM ADMINO CINCPAC

INFO RUEKDA/ASD/ISA
RUHLHL/DIRPACDOCKS

Ø 161045Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

INFO ZE/CG 2D AIR DIV
ZEN/CG USASCV
ZEN/CO HSAS
ZEN/US AMBASSADOR SAIGON
ZEN/AF ADV GP
ZEN/NAG SAIGON

~~SECRET~~ MACJ-31 6180. SECTION ONE OF TWO.

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR EXTENSION OF US ADVISORY PROGRAM

A. MACJ32 5380 DTG 250005Z JUN 64.

B. JCS MSG 1448 DTG 271553Z JUN 63.

1. TO ADM SHARP FROM WESTMORELAND AND FOR USE DURING YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH JCS, THIS MESSAGE FORMALLY TRANSMITS THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE IZCIFICATION AND SUPPORTING PROGRAM OVER THE NEXT YEAR. SOME OF THE PROPOSED INCREASES WAS THE SUBJECT OF EARLIER DISCUSSION, LARGELY AS AN OUTGROWTH OF THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE THE CHIEF OF MISSION HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON THESE REQUIREMENTS AND WILL COMMENT BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

JJM THE VARIOUS INCREASES IN MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITY NOW PENDING APPROVAL OF CINCPAC AND/OR JCS AND YIE ADDITIONS RECOMMENDED IN THIS MEFJAGE CONSTITUTE AN OVERALL INCREASE IN THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF ABOUT 4,200. FULL CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO DE-EMPHASIZING

INFO.....CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J4-2 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2
.....SAMAA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 OSD-15 J1-3 FILE-1(72)

Section 1 of 2

DUTY OFFICER

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CS 26/443

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CITE NO.

DTG

MACJ-31 6180

161045Z AUG 64

JCS FORM NO
1 DEC 63 58

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SECRET

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

OR ELIMINATING FUNCTIONS CURRENTLY BEING PERFORMED IN ORDER TO OFFSET THE REQUIRED INCREASE. HOWEVER, WITH THE RISING TEMPO OF ACTIVITY AND INTENSIFICATION OF PACIFICATION EFFORT, NO POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS ARE APPARENT.

3. THE INCREASES ENVISAGED IN MESSAGE REFERENCE A WILL PROVIDE FOR THE EXTENSION AND REINFORCEMENT OF THE ADVISORY EFFORT AT THE COMBAT UNIT LEVEL AND, CONCURRENTLY, A MAJOR EXTENSION AND REINFORCEMENT OF THE ADVISORY EFFORT AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL IN ORDER TO IMPROVE AND ACCELERATE PACIFICATION OPERATIONS. THAT EXTENSION AND AUGMENTATION OF EFFORT HAS AN IMMEDIATE IMPACT UPON THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT BASE. IN A SENSE THE ADDITION OF ADVISORS IN THIS QUANTITY BECOMES THE "STRAW THAT BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK" TO AN ALREADY OVERBURDENED SUPPORT BASE. THUS, SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS ARE CONSIDERABLE AND AFFECT EACH OF THE SERVICES.

4. THIS EXTENSION OF THE ADVISORY PROGRAM GREATLY INCREASES THE NUMBER AND DISPERSION OF US PERSONNEL THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM. IN EFFECT IT NEARLY DOUBLES THE LOWER-ECHELON FIELD ADVISORY EFFORT AND THE NUMBER OF LOCATIONS OF US ADVISORS, ALL AT THE FUA END OF COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLY LINES. IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THIS INCREASE IN THE FIELD CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE AUGMENTATION IS NECESSARY AND SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR HELICOPTER SUPPORT AND AIRLIFT CAPABILITY ARE GENERATED.

5. THE COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM ON A PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION BASIS, VUS-A-VIS TEMPORARY DUTY BASIS, OF A SPECIAL FORCES GROUP WITH A SLIGHTLY REDUCED HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT, AS PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED, WILL PERMIT REINFORCEMENT ON THE BORDER AND DISCONTINUANCE OF THE USE OF ONE-HALF A DETACHMENTS, A PRACTICE WHICH IS NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE IN THE FACE OF BATTALION SIZE ATTACKS NOW BEING MOUNTED THE THE VC AGAINST SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS. THE GROUP WILL ALSO PROVIDE A CAPABILITY FOR SOME CONTINUING OPERATIONS WITH THE MONTAGNARDS, THE SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS, THE TRAINING OF VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES AND THE INITIATION OF OPERATIONS AGAINST VC SECRET BASES.

6. TO ADMINISTRATIVELY AND LOGISTICALLY SUPPORT THE INCREASED SCOPE AND TEMPO OF OPERATIONS WHICH WILL RESULT FROM THIS GREATER ADVISORY EFFORT IT IS NECESSARY TO AUGMENT THE SOUTHEAST ASIA AIR LIFT BY ONE SQUADRON OF C-123'S. IN ADDITION TO THE SCHEDULED "WHOLESALE" DELIVERY CAPACITY WITHIN THE CORPS AREA. THIS CAN BE MET BY AN ADDITIONAL COMPANY OF CARIBOU AIRCRAFT. WE ARE INCREASING BY 100 THE NUMBER OF DISTRICTS WITH AMERICAN ADVISORY TEAMS AND THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 135 AIRFIELDS AVAILABLE AT DISTRICT LEVEL FOR CARIBOU AND LIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

7. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT HELICOPTER SUPPORT FOR
GV
TACTICAL UNITS, A REQUIREMENT EXISTS FOR ONE COMPANY

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~~SECRET~~

INCOMING
MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SECRET

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

OR SQUADRON IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF EACH OF THE 9 DIVISIONS, AND, IN THE CASE OF BOTH III AND IV CORPS, AN ADDITIONAL GENERAL SUPPORT COMPANY OR SQUADRON FOR REINFORCEMENT AND AUGMENTATION. THIS GENERATES AN ADDITIONAL REQ FOR ONE AIR MOBILE CO.

8. ADDITIONALLY, THE BUILDUP OF VNAF HELICOPTER SQUADRONS WILL REQUIRE THE PROVISION OF ARMED HELICOPTERS NOT NOW AVAILABLE OR PROGRAMMED. FOR THIS PURPOSE WE PLAN TO UTILIZE THE UTT COMPANY REORGANIZED AS AN AIR MOBILE COMPANY AS APPROVED BY EARLIER ACTION.

9. THE INCREASING DEMANDS OF THE COMBINED US AGENCIES IN SAIGON FOR ADMINISTRATIVE HELICOPTER SUPPORT IN THE EXECUTION OF DAY-TO-DAY BUSINESS OF THE COMMAND HIGHLIGHTS THE NECESSITY OF ONE AIR MOBILE COMPANY RESERVED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR THIS PURPOSE. SIMILAR REQUIREMENTS EXIST AT THE CORPS/REGIONAL LEVEL, EACH OF WHICH REQUIRES AN AIR LIFT PLATOON FOR THE SUPPORT OF MACV, USOM AND USIS OPERATIONS AT THAT LEVEL. THESE PLATOONS ALSO PROVIDE COMMAND HELICOPTERS FOR CORPS, DIVISION AND TASK FORCE COMMANDERS WHO OTHERWISE COULD NOT EXERCISE COMMAND OF THEIR FORCES OVER THE WIDELY DISPERSED BATTLEFIELD.

10. THE FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS BASED ON THE FOREGOING

A. PERSONNEL.

(1) ARMY (LESS BN/DISTRICT ADV).

MACV STAFF	OFF	WO	ENL	TOTAL
MACV STAFF	16	1	44	61
MACV FIELD	54	17	150	221
USASCV	114	157	1005	1276
FIELD HOSPITAL	5		16	21

GP-4

BT

DUTY OFFICER

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MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

3

3

CITE NO.

MACJ31 6189

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161045Z AUG 64

FORM NO
JCS 1 DEC 63 58

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

132

Bundy

55 - 56

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Action

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NSC
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026780

1964 AUG 31 PM 8 49

DSA796
RR RUEHC
DE RUDSC 734C 01/0005Z
ZNR

R 232319Z ZNH
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS (1020) THIRTY-FIRST

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

WOULD TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, BE A GOOD DAY FOR YOU AND PRESIDENT
TO RECEIVE MY PERSONAL REPORT ON EXECUTION OF MY MISSION IN
WESTERN EUROPE? BRUCE

BT

CFN 1020 8

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Misc. Cables

—

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

✓ Bundy

46

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134

Action

Control: 24441

Rec'd: August 28, 1964
9:26 PM

SVN

Info

FROM: Brussels

SS

ACTION: Secstate 346

G

SP

EUR

FE

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P

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

RMR

DATE: August 28, 11 AM

Vietnam

Embassy Telegram 338

In addition to adverse press reaction noted reference telegram, Ambassador and other Embassy Officers have been struck by extent of damage done to U. S. position by recent events in South Vietnam. Impact on politically aware Belgians of resurgence of student demonstrations and frantic Governmental shuffling in Saigon has been profound, virtually wiping out excellent effort produced here by Ambassador Lodge's sober and thoughtful approach to Southeast Asia problems.

GP-4.

MACARTHUR

ACT/16

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

16139

135

45

Origin
FE
Info

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS 1131
Amembassy LONDON 1484

AUG 28 7 08 PM '64

INFO: Amembassy VIENTIANE 198
Amembassy BANGKOK 304
Amembassy SAIGON 552
Amembassy OTTAWA 278
Amembassy NEW DELHI 452
Amembassy MOSCOW 578
USUN NEW YORK 508
CINCPAC

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014903
By ics, NARA, Date 10-29-97

Paris 1123 to Dept.

Withdrawal Precondition

You should see Manac'h and other Quai officials as appropriate and disabuse them of belief that Secretary told Alphand US would regard "token" PL withdrawal as sufficient meet Souvanna's precondition. (Although British informed us some time ago that French were quoting Secretary to this effect, reftel is first indication we have had that they are doing so directly to us.)

On at least two occasions (May 22 and July 1) Secretary told Alphand that Kong Le's headquarters must be reestablished on PDJ. Secretary noted that PL withdrawal to previous positions would mean actual retreat of only 10 to 20 miles. He told Alphand PDJ was

Drafted by: FE:SEA:RFSlutz, JR:mj 8/28/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

SEA - Mr. Trueheart

S/S - Mr. Davies

EUR:WE - Mr. Imhof

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considered by neutralists as base of their authority and resumption of neutralist presence there would be important symbol to them of restored authority.

Perhaps Alphand distorted "symbolic step" into "token withdrawal," in any case French seem oblivious actual short distances involved, i.e., less than 10 miles from Phou Kout to Moung Phanh, Kong Le's former headquarters.

Chadbourn should set record straight for Souvanna.

FOR LONDON: Although matter was clarified for British Embassy some time ago, it might be well to make sure that Foreign Office understands the position.

GP-3.

End

RUSK

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Action

Control: 21830
Rec'd: AUGUST 26, 1964
9:06 AM

SVN

Info

FROM: LONDON

075

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 940, IMMEDIATE
SAIGON 38, IMMEDIATE

G

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EUR

INFO: CINCPAC 24

FE

IO

DATE: AUGUST 26, 1 PM

NSC

INR

CIA

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NSA

DOD

SAIGON'S 45

RMR

EMBOFF CALLED ON MAU MORNING AUGUST 26. MAU SAID ON REACHING PARIS AUGUST 25 HE HAD PHONE CALL FROM HIS EMBASSY IN LONDON SAYING GVN HAD RESIGNED. HE THEN SENT CABLE TO SAIGON SAYING HE ASSUMED HIS CONSULTATION IN SAIGON WAS CANCELLED AND RETURNING TO HIS POST. MAU HAS RECEIVED NO ANSWER.

EMBOFF HAVING IN MIND DEPTTEL 507 TO SAIGON OFFERED PERSONAL VIEW THAT THIS WAS TIME WHEN A CIVILIAN LEADER OF HIS WISDOM AND EXPERIENCE MIGHT PLAY USEFUL ROLE IN SAIGON. MAU EMPHASIZED HE READY SERVE HIS COUNTRY REGARDLESS RISKS, BUT DID NOT WISH GIVE APPEARANCE HE PURSUING A POSITION. HE FELT MEMBERS MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAD BEEN WISE IN DECIDING THAT AFTER CHOOSING A LEADER THEY WOULD RETURN TO THEIR MILITARY POSTS, BUT FOR PRESENT HE SAW NO WAY SETTLE MILITARY POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN KHANH AND MINH.

PECK OF FONOFF SAYS MAU COMING SEE HIM AT 3:30 P.M. LOCAL TIME TODAY. PECK APPEARED UNDERSTAND MAU'S REASONS FOR HESITATING TO RETURN.

COMMENT: MAU CLEARLY DOES NOT WANT TO INJECT HIMSELF UNINVITED INTO STRUGGLE AT THIS TIME AS THIS WOULD PROBABLY REDUCE HIS USEFULNESS. HE MIGHT CHANGE HIS MIND IF THIS TELEGRAM FROM PARIS WERE ANSWERED IN TERMS INDICATING HE WAS NEEDED TO PARTICIPATE IN FORMATION NEW GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH DISTRESSED BY EVENTS IN SAIGON, HE WAS

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By ics NARA, Date 10-29-97

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-2- 940, AUGUST 26, 1 PM, FROM LONDON

CALM, CLEAR IN MIND AND READY TO BE HELPFUL.

WITHOUT KNOWING INS AND OUTS, MIGHT IT NOT, ON BALANCE, BE BETTER IF MAU STAYED ON SIDELINES WITH HIS REPUTATION INTACT UNTIL HE HAD BETTER CHANCE PLAYING USEFUL ROLE?

GP-3.

BRUCE

BAP

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S-O AT 9:55 AM AUGUST 26TH
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 10:25 AM AUGUST 26TH

210000Z

CINCENOT LOM 0070

TO: 0070 0070 0070

INFO: CINCENOT 0070

ACTION: 0070 0070 0070

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INCOMING TELETYPE

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

137

45

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Action

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RR RUEHCR

DE RUFGWP 995 24/2300Z

R 242250Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

BT

1964 AUG 24 PM 9 41

020403

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ACTION DEPT 1053

INFO SAIGON 55 VIENTIANE BANGKOK PHNOMPENH UNN FROM PARIS AUGUST 24, 7 PM

VIET NAM

ALLEGED WILLARD MATTHIAS "CIA PAPER" ON VN OUTLOOK WIDELY DISCUSSED TWENTYFOURTH IN FRENCH PRESS WHICH CARRYING EXCERPTS GENERALLY DESIGNED SHOW FRENCH THESIS ON NECESSITY NEUTRALIZATION INDOCHINA WELL FOUNDED. RESPONSIBLE MODERATE PAPERS MAKE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN USG POLICY, AGENCY-WIDE AGREED ASSESSMENT AND INTERNAL WORKING PAPER. MORE SENSATIONAL AND LEFT-ORIENTED PAPERS PLAY UP NEUTRALIZATION THEME AND TRY FUDGE WORKING-PAPER ASPECT. LYON
BT

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34

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Control:

Rec'd:

19461

AUGUST 23, 1964

10:27 AM

FROM: KARACHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 377, PRIORITY

INFOR: HONG KONG 21,
LONDON 109,
MOSCOW 2,
SAIGON 6,
BANGKOK 19,

DATE: AUGUST 23, 1PM

1. MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL SHAHI IN COURSE CASUAL CONVERSATION AUGUST 22 MENTIONED TO EMBOFF THAT HE HAD BRIEFLY DISCUSSED GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT WITH CHICOM VICE PREMIER LI HSIEN-NIEN. SHAHI SAW LI HSIEN-NIEN AT KARACHI AIRPORT WHEN LI WAS PASSING THROUGH AUGUST 18 EN ROUTE RUMANIA.

2. ACCORDING SHAHI, LI HSIEN-NIEN STATED LAOS REPORTS OF DAMAGE TO NORTH VIET NAM PORTS AS RESULT OF AIR ATTACKS WERE EXAGGERATED. LI HSIEN-NIEN ACKNOWLEDGED SOME LOSSES AND THEN WENT ON TO STATE THAT CHICOMS "EXPECT TO RECOUP THESE LOSSES ON DIPLOMATIC FRONT."

3. LI HSIEN-NIEN ALSO CLAIMED CHINESE HAD BEEN "PATIENT AND MODERATE" IN RESPONSE US AIR ATTACKS BUT CHINESE CAN NOT BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN ALWAYS PATIENT AND MODERATE IF PUSHED TOO HARD. HE PUNCTUATED THIS, ACCORDING SHAHI, BY WARNING THAT AMERICANS SHOULD REMEMBER LESSON OF KOREA AND SPECIFICALLY THAT CHINESE WARNINGS TO INTERVENE SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

GP-3.

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Authority RAC 00014905

By ics, NARA, Date 10-29-97

MCCONAUGHY

MCA

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31

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Action

Control: 15722
Rec'd: August 19, 1964
5:44 a.m.

SS

Info

FROM: Oslo

ACTION: Secstate 119, Priority

INFO: Saigon 3, Priority
CINCPAC Unnumbered, Priority

002

DATE: August 19, 11 a.m.

EXDIS

Reference: DEPTTEL 90.

As results informal discussions with Norwegian Ministry of Defense and Navy, ALUSNA Norway sent telegram 171746Z to Chief Bureau of Ships reporting status. Negotiations awaiting reply that ALUSNA message.

GP-3.

WHARTON

HEK/12

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Authority State 2-14-75, OSD 8-8-79By inf, NARS, Date 6-9-80~~SECRET~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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