

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy OSLO 90

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Ref: Deptel 76

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Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979

By ing, NARS, Date 7-20-79

Drafted by: S/VN:MVForrestal:pp 8/18/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/VN - Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

DOD - Admiral Blouin (in substance)
S/S - Mr. Mills

EUR - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
Mr. Shullaw (subs)

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Bundy 141

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Control: 12352
Rec'd: August 14, 1964

2:28 p.m.
DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979

By *ing*, NARS, Date 7-20-79

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RMR

FROM: Belgrade

ACTION: Secstate 290, Immediate

DATE: August 14, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

Reference: EMBTELS 106, 230, 240, 251, 263

During last ten days US has been subjected in Yugo press to series of attacks of unusual virulence and scope extending from events in Tonkin Gulf to OAS action against Cuba and encompassing even racial discrimination, a subject generally avoided in the past. Culmination of these attacks occurred in personal statement of President Tito in which he surveyed situation in Vietnam, Cyprus, and Congo and clearly attributed responsibility for crises in these countries to US.

These attacks are the more disturbing in view of recent GOY desire to resolve outstanding problems between our two countries. After years of negotiations, Fulbright agreement is ready to be signed. After an equally long period of frustration, a claims agreement has apparently been reached. Even pre-war bonded indebtedness to US citizens has recently been negotiated satisfactorily. Progress on each of these issues has been explained to us as representing sincere GOY effort to settle outstanding question in order to open way for new period of increasingly close cooperation in many fields.

Contrast of these friendly and constructive GOY statements with virulence of current press attacks must be viewed in light of following factors:

(1) To focus first on Vietnam, it should be recognized that Yugos have never approved of our South Vietnamese policy. We have had discussions with them from time to time but in each case we have found complete lack of understanding for American

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-2- 290, August 14, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Belgrade

American position. As recently as July 22 (EMBTel 145) I discussed with Under Secretary Nikezic US policy in Vietnam and here as elsewhere I found innate sympathy for Viet Cong. Vietnam therefore, represents an area in which US is regarded as vulnerable in Yugoslavia. Because of Yugo refusal to recognize US position, any action taken by US in Vietnam is immediately subject to misunderstanding.

Re Latin America, we have been subject to continuous attacks locally ever since US began to react to Castroism. Recent intensity of this criticism as well as insertion in press of new element of racial discrimination can only be attributed to relative ease of piling on invective at time when we are considered vulnerable for our Vietnamese actions.

General misunderstanding of US position in these and other issues is intensified by Yugo impression that candidacy of Goldwater places pressures on President Johnson to point of influencing US actions through-out world.

(2) In Yugoslavia there are forces working towards increased cooperation with West and other forces working counter to them. Until recently it appeared that those forces favoring friendly relations with US were gaining in ascendancy within GOY. But the influence of those forces is not unlimited as proved by recent events. When an issue arises such as Vietnam which GOY can exploit in its national or international interests, influence of these forces wanes. Gains of relatively friendly elements, however, are not always made at expense of unfriendly elements. In present case, settlement of some outstanding problems between US and GOY may well have been made with full consent of those forces suspicious of the West in order to justify and balance increasing warmth of GOY relations with other Communist countries.

GP-3.

ELBRICK

TRT/12

Advance Copy to S/S-0 8/14/64, 3:40 p.m.

Note: Passed White House 8/14/64, 4:05 p.m.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

Control: 12400
Rec'd: August 14, 1964
2:59 p.m.

EUR

FROM: Belgrade

Info

SS

ACTION: Secstate 290 Immediate

SVN

G

DATE: August 14, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

SP

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Reference: EMBTELS 106, 230, 240, 251, 263.

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AF

(3) To understand this point better, we must look at somewhat ambiguous position Yugoslavia holds in Socialist and non-aligned world. As the original revisionist, GOY is peculiarly vulnerable for seeking relations with West which other Socialist countries would find unacceptable. Although Yugoslavia is less subject to criticism on this point now than it was before ferment started in Eastern Europe, still the vulnerability exists and is undoubtedly considered prior to all major Yugo decisions. Attacks on US actions against Socialist North Viet Nam, therefore, would be considered here as essential in maintaining Yugo position in Socialist world.

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(4) Similarly, GOY position in non-aligned world figures prominently in orientation of its foreign policy. For many years now Yugoslavia has fancied itself as a leader of non-aligned countries. As such, it must constantly seek to anticipate Afro-Asian reaction to significant political situations as well as to develop opportunities for asserting its leadership. Viet Nam appears to have provided unexpected and welcome occasion for Tito to strengthen claim as leader at a time when tangible issue needed to impress non-aligned colleagues.

RMR

Timing and wording of Tito's anti-US statement on Viet Nam show direct connection with non-aligned conference. For the first 36 hours after Tonkin Gulf, Yugo reaction was especially cautious. It took six days before Tito's statement was issued. This lapse of time was sufficient for Yugos to gauge effect of US actions among its Socialist and non-aligned friends. Although we have no confirming data here, we can only assume that Tito sensed anxiety

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-2-290, August 14, 6 p.m., (SECTION TWO OF TWO), From Belgrade

sensed anxiety among Afro-Asian nations concerning Vietnamese developments, seized on occasion as one susceptible of asserting his leadership, and issued resulting strong statement. Last paragraph of this document is especially significant in bluntness with which it establishes connection between Viet Nam incidents and Cairo Conference.

Recognizing reasons which may have impelled Yugos to do what they have done, question now arises whether we can allow attacks of this magnitude to pass unnoticed. Throughout the years, US image has had its ups and downs in Yugo press. For rare periods of time anti-US articles have been at a minimum, perhaps because attention was focused on other natural targets such as Britain or West Germany. Usually, however, there has been an underlying current of unfriendliness and non-objectivity in reporting of US events. We start from premise, therefore, that anything we might plan to do in respect to present situation will not have permanent effect, nor will it reverse Yugo policy. It would be only realistic for us to expect that as "Capitalist and Imperialist country" US will generally be vulnerable to some form of Yugo attack. In past our main purpose has been to minimize frequency and extent of such attacks and perhaps this is as much as we will be able to accomplish in future.

I believe Yugos were sincere in their constructive initiatives toward US had Viet Nam incidents not occurred, GOY would not have had occasion to take public position unusually critical of US and our relations would have continued as before. Still, under these changed circumstances I consider it not only appropriate but necessary to demonstrate to Yugos that they cannot propagate views harmful to US vital interests without some recognition by US that these interests have been injured.

Following cable will deal with recommendations in this respect.

GP-3.

ELBRICK

NAR/17

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 4:02 pm 8/14/64

Passed White House at 4:15 pm 8/14/64

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Director of Intelligence
and Research

Research
Memorandum

INR-33, August 28, 1964

To : The Secretary

Through: S/S

From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*

DECLASSIFIED

Subject: Third Country Assistance to South Vietnam

Authority RAC 00014906
By is NARA, Date 10-29-97

This paper examines the status of third country assistance to South Vietnam as of August 24 and the likely communist reaction to such assistance. It does not reflect reaction to the most recent government changes in Saigon or the full results of the Lodge mission.

Abstract

A number of Asian and western European countries are providing or have agreed to give assistance to South Vietnam. Little if any is likely to be forthcoming from Africa and Latin America. For the most part, contributions have taken the form of small-scale grants of economic and technical assistance and represent in most cases a continuation or increase in programs that have been in existence for some time. Most countries have been reluctant to provide military assistance, and where it has been given it has been of a largely token character, such as the training missions from Australia and Great Britain. There has been little evidence of enthusiasm for a more direct involvement, particularly in the form of military aid, and willingness to provide additional assistance has come largely as a response to US urging. Only Nationalist China and, to a lesser extent, South Korea have shown an interest in developing on their own a greater degree of military cooperation with Saigon, including indications of a possible willingness to make available ground forces for use in South Vietnam.

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downgrading and
declassification

While the South Vietnamese government, largely at US prompting, has requested assistance from a number of countries, it has not made a great deal of effort to push the third country program nor apparently held any great expectation from it. The present level of third country assistance is unlikely to provoke any significant communist response other than propaganda, and would probably not do so as long as it remains small and essentially peripheral in its effect upon the war against the Viet Cong. However, the Chinese Communists would be extremely sensitive to the presence of any sizeable contingent of Chinese Nationalist military personnel in South Vietnam.

Background

Although the United States is the major source of foreign assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, a number of other Free World countries have over the past contributed small amounts of economic and technical aid, including a number of economic, agricultural, and technical advisors. Moreover, due to the exigencies created by the sharply accelerated Communist insurgency, aid from virtually all Free World countries has been increasingly focussed on counterinsurgency requirements. Both the Vietnam and the United States Governments have encouraged increased assistance in material as well as advisory personnel. Most recently, the United States made such recommendations to member nations of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, during the meeting in Manila in April 1964; this recommendation was acknowledged in SEATO Council's communique issued on April 15. On April 23, 1964, President Johnson reiterated during a press conference American hopes "that we would see some other flags" in South Vietnam and "that we would all unite in an attempt to stop the spread of Communism in that part of the world." Since that time, both the Vietnamese Government and the US have sought to increase the number of countries providing support to South Vietnam and the amount of such assistance.

Third Country Contributions

1. The Far East

Australia. By the end of 1961 Australia, through the Colombo Plan, had provided South Vietnam technical co-operation totalling approximately \$1.2 million and \$1.9 million for economic development. In addition as a member of SEATO, Australia has provided economic assistance which would help member countries in Asia to discharge their defense responsibilities, some benefits of which applied to South Vietnam.

Australia has been giving military assistance to South Vietnam since July 1962. In May 1964 the Australian military effort in Vietnam consisted of 30 officers and NCO's. Ten were assigned as training cadre to I Corps Centre at Phu Bai, ten scattered by two's with five Special Forces "A" Teams, and the remainder engaged in "combined studies" and other semi-covert counterinsurgency operations. Several Vietnamese officers were also being trained at Army schools in Australia.

At the April 1964 SEATO Council of Ministers Meeting, Australia undertook to consider additional assistance to South Vietnam if requested to do so. Having made this commitment, and attaching prime importance to the struggle in South Vietnam, the Australian response to the request for third country assistance was immediate and helpful.

On June 8, 1964 Minister for Defense Shane Paltridge announced that the Army training team would be doubled by the provision of an additional thirty officers and senior NCO's. He stated that the Australian training personnel would be employed in the field at battalion and lower levels as adviser teams. In addition, consultations were proceeding for the provision of some further

twenty Army specialist instructors and advisers required by the South Vietnamese. Furthermore, an Australian Air Force detachment of three Caribou transport aircraft and crews would be deployed to Vietnam, with a further three by October 1964. In August the three Caribou aircraft and 21 Australian military personnel arrived in South Vietnam.

Burma has relations at the consulate-general level with both North and South Vietnam. Its neutralist orientation and desire to avoid any difficulty with Communist China rule out any possibility that the present government would extend assistance to South Vietnam.

Cambodia has no relations with South Vietnam. In Sihanouk's present frame of mind, he would be more likely to support North Vietnam than Saigon.

Indonesia has raised its relations with North Vietnam to the Embassy level, as a result of which Saigon has removed its representative (consul-general) from Djakarta and broken off relations. Under existing circumstances, there is no possibility of any Indonesian assistance to South Vietnam, although Sukarno might follow this move up with some gesture of support for the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam.

Japan has approved an immediate program of assistance which involves grants of nearly \$500,000. This total includes the cost of dispatching a medical team to South Vietnam, and the provision of medical equipment including beds and ambulances, and 20,000 radio receivers. Japan apparently intends to give one-half to one million dollars in additional aid, presumably of a similar nature. Future Japanese aid will probably be kept limited in nature and size by financial conservatism, the absence of enthusiastic popular support, and the government's desire to minimize offense to North Vietnam and Communist China, and avoid jeopardizing growing Japanese trade with those countries. It is highly unlikely that Japan will extend any form of military aid.

In responding to our request for assistance to South Vietnam, Japan wished to show readiness to assume responsibilities as an advanced nation, probably in order to reinforce its claims to treatment as an equal partner by the United States. In arguing for aid before the Diet, Foreign Minister Ohira noted that Japan was a member of the Free World and had a close relationship with the United States. The Tokyo Shimbun, a paper relatively sympathetic to the government, also advocated aid on the grounds that Japan shared responsibility as a great power in Asia.

However, government leaders approached the matter with some caution, stressing that this was not a program of military aid. This was apparently a response to charges in the Diet by the Socialist and Democratic Socialist Parties that compliance with the United States request would involve Japan in the military conflict in Vietnam. A secondary theme in the Japanese Government's response was that any aid given would be based on direct ties between Japan and the Republic of Vietnam, rather than being simply an appendage of the United States aid effort. Foreign Minister Ohira asserted that Japan should, as an Asian country, give aid regardless of whether it was requested by the United States, and noted that there had already been direct requests for aid from the Republic of Vietnam.

In general, the issue has not aroused any strong popular reaction. Some front organizations of the Japanese Communist Party held demonstrations to protest the despatch of the medical team, and actually sought to block their departure at the Tokyo airport. The non-communist left does not appear to have pursued the issue after the initial Diet questioning mentioned above. There has been only limited editorial comment in the press.

Laos. While the Lao Government has not given aid to South Vietnam, and is in no position to do so, there has been sporadic, rather low-level cooperation and liaison between Lao and South Vietnamese forces. This has been confined almost entirely to the southern panhandle area of Laos with the objective of combatting, or at least hindering, infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam via Laos. Nothing very effective has been done. Recently, however, a group of Vietnamese military officers arrived in Vientiane. We do not know how large the group is nor the purpose of the visit, but it is quite possible that some new arrangements for closer cooperation may result.

Malaysia. On August 4, 1964, a joint Malaysian-South Vietnamese statement was issued at the conclusion of a visit to Kuala Lumpur by a Vietnamese delegation led by Defense Minister Major General Tran Thiem Khiem. In the statement the Malaysian government reiterated its sympathy and support for the Vietnamese struggle against Communist aggression, stated that police training facilities in Malaysia would continue to be made available for Vietnamese personnel, and promised further sympathetic support within the limits of its own resources.

Malaysian assistance to South Vietnam will continue to be very limited, largely because its own counterinsurgency program against Indonesian mounted guerrilla raids and subversive activity consume a large part of its national effort. Malaysia has, however, taken a definite anti-communist stance officially, and can be expected to continue support of the Saigon regime and its program of limited assistance.

Nationalist China. Nationalist China has been providing economic assistance to South Vietnam for several years. As early as 1955 a Nationalist medical team was sent to assist in the care of refugees from North Vietnam and a Sino-Vietnamese technical cooperation agreement was concluded in 1959. To date, nearly 200 Chinese Nationalist technicians have served in South Vietnam and 420 Vietnamese technicians have received training in Taiwan.

In July 1964, the Nationalist Government announced an intensified program of economic aid to South Vietnam including the gift of 26 aluminum prefabricated warehouses and 300 sets of improved plows, the printing of 500,000 textbooks valued at US \$150,000 for South Vietnam, the recruiting of additional experts to increase the size of the Nationalist agricultural technical mission in South Vietnam from 29 to 86 persons, the provision of power experts and materials to construct electric substations and Nationalist assumption of local costs for trainees sent to Taiwan from Vietnam. As of August 13, Taipei was still "reconsidering" a ministerial level decision not to send surgical teams to South Vietnam.

In the military field, both nations have recently indicated their interest in restoring the close military cooperation that existed before the overthrow of the Diem Government. A secret South Vietnamese-Chinese Nationalist agreement, signed in March 1964, provided for cooperation in joint operations to include guerrilla and sabotage activities, the exchange of intelligence information on Viet Cong and Chinese Communist organizations and activities, and the furnishing by Taipei of transmitters, receivers, and supplies for joint clandestine operations.

In July 1964, the South Vietnamese Government presented to the United States Embassy in Saigon the proposed format for a reorganization of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff having as the major innovation the creation of a military-political warfare department based on the Chinese Nationalist model. As part of the reorganization plan, a contingent of Chinese Nationalist officers was expected to arrive in South Vietnam on August 1 to advise in the formation of the new department and a team of Chinese Nationalist instructors was scheduled to arrive in mid-August to teach approximately half the courses at the South Vietnamese School of Military Political Cadres.

Chinese Nationalists assistance to South Vietnam is primarily intended to indicate Nationalist solidarity with the strongly anti-Communist South Vietnamese Government. At United States urging, Taipei would probably increase the level of its economic assistance to Saigon but would request American financial support to underwrite the increased costs.

Militarily, the Nationalists would probably be eager to increase their assistance in terms of advisors and supplies in return for increased South Vietnamese military cooperation in joint intelligence and guerrilla activities. However, despite press reports that Taipei was considering sending two Nationalist divisions to fight in South Vietnam, the Nationalists have privately indicated they would prefer to commit their forces directly against the Chinese Communists.

New Zealand. On June 6, 1963, the New Zealand Government announced its intention to assist South Vietnam by providing military personnel in a non-combatant role. However, bilateral arrangements were not completed, owing to the 1963 Buddhist crisis, Diem's overthrow, and the 1963 federal elections in New Zealand. Through the Colombo Plan, New Zealand had already been providing some assistance to South Vietnam, e.g., the maintenance of a six-man surgical team centered at Qui Nhon in Vietnam, and Vietnamese students were being trained in New Zealand.

Despite its limited military resources, New Zealand did respond favorably to the first 1964 request for third country aid to South Vietnam. The Prime Minister announced that a 25-man Army Engineer detachment would be dispatched to South Vietnam to assist in the pacification program. At the same time that Prime Minister Holyoake made the announcement, he stated that New Zealand's first military priority was to Malaysia. The New Zealand non-combat unit arrived at Saigon on June 29, 1964.

While showing sympathy with the idea of assisting South Vietnam, Prime Minister Holyoake has stated that New Zealand's first military priority was to Malaysia.

Philippines. Philippine assistance to South Vietnam prior to 1964 was negligible, although under "Operation Brotherhood" Filipino doctors were sent to Vietnam and scholarships established in Philippine universities for Vietnamese students. Owing to a cooling of relations between the two countries during the latter stages of the Diem regime, this assistance gradually diminished.

In reply to an initial request from the Government of South Vietnam, a visit from Defence Minister Khiem, and considerable US encouragement, the Philippines at its National Security Council meeting on July 7, 1964, decided to extend technical assistance to South Vietnam. The Philippine Congress on July 8, 1964 appropriated a sum of 1,000,000 pesos for Philippine assistance. This action was indicative of the anti-communist stance of the Philippines, its strong opposition to de Gaulle's neutralization proposals for South Vietnam, and its support of United States policy. At the same time, Philippine willingness to assist South Vietnam is tempered by a reluctance to become enmeshed in a foreign conflict, which has been reflected in concern over involvement of US-Philippine bases in Indochinese hostilities. Although there is widespread support of the United States Vietnam policy and for non-military, non-combatant Philippine assistance to South Vietnam, practically all sectors of opinion oppose Philippine military involvement even to the extent of military advisers.

The Philippine teams -- a total of 28 people -- arrived at Saigon on August 16, 1964. The group consists of two surgical teams (2 commissioned doctors, 2 commissioned nurses, and 2 enlisted men each) and 16 Philippine Army Officers for employment as a civic action team or teams. Because the surgical suites, for which the Philippine doctors were requested, will not be ready for another 60 days, the two surgical teams are expected to be employed temporarily at Saigon and Hue, pending completion of the surgical suites.

In addition, six civilian personnel arrived at Saigon on August 22. This group consisted of two doctors, two nurses, and two civilians, who will operate as part of the civic action teams which arrived in Vietnam on August 16.

On July 25, South Vietnam submitted an additional request for aid to the Philippines. The Vietnamese Charge in Manila submitted requests for four aid projects as follows: (1) nine telecommunications experts and considerable equipment for the improvement and extension of telecommunications networks; (2) a request for personnel and equipment for the modernization of existing surgical centers, including 74 medical personnel, 8 medical scholarships, textbooks, operating room equipment and financial assistance for constructing and equipping three orthopedic and physical rehabilitation centers; (3) two specialists for a project of quality control of pharmaceutical products; and (4) laboratory equipment for hospitals.

The Philippine Congress has now adjourned until January 1965, and the one million pesos was approved to cover the initial request. Therefore, if the Philippine Government is able to comply with the second Vietnamese request, it will probably need further financial approval.

South Korea. It is evident that the leaders of the South Korean Government are anxious to assist South Vietnam, in part because they believe that a Free World victory in Southeast Asia will promote a favorable settlement of the Korean problem.

The South Koreans think in terms of direct military intervention in the struggle, and, from time to time, they have talked of an expeditionary force of two or more divisions. It is obvious that a force of this size could not be committed or maintained without large-scale United States assistance and that the South Koreans' plans have not been refined, even on a contingency basis, to cover many problems which action on this scale would raise.

In providing concrete military assistance to South Vietnam, the South Koreans seem plagued, however, by an inability to provide the skilled cadres -- aircraft pilots, special forces advisors, etc., with a good command of English and/or French, who might be most useful against the Viet Cong. Nevertheless, they have completed arrangements for sending one Mobile Army Surgical Hospital unit of some 120 men, as well as 10 karate instructors, to assist the Saigon Government.

The stringencies of the South Korean budget and balance of payments almost certainly rule out any large-scale economic assistance to South Vietnam. However, South Korea can produce certain light industrial goods, notably cotton cloth, which might be useful. Conceivably, some arrangement by which the United States reimbursed Seoul for deliveries to Saigon might make possible a South Korean economic contribution.

Thailand. During his one-week visit to Bangkok in June, Defense Minister Khiem requested Thai aid in both the military and economic fields. On the military side, assistance was asked for in jet-pilot training (this assistance has been granted and publicly announced) and in the provision of Thai military engineers, transport pilots, and field hospital units. On the economic side aid was requested in the construction of a tapioca-flour and a cement plant. On July 30 the Thai cabinet approved sending 10,000 sheets of galvanized iron and 100 tons of cement to South Vietnam. The announcement of this aid was coupled with the statement that followup on military aid would be through military channels while economic aid would be discussed through diplomatic channels.

The Thai desire to be as forthcoming as possible in response to South Vietnamese requests for aid, although its capabilities in fields related to Vietnam's needs are rather limited. The Thai Government has already stated that it will not send troops to Vietnam. It has very little in the way of transport pilots, military engineers, or medical personnel to spare and no known industrial capacity for the construction of plants in Vietnam. It does have, however, some expertise in insurgency-preventive measures in the Mobile Development Units that are working in Thailand's rural areas. These are showing increasing skill as they gain experience. In addition, the Thai have a very effective organization in the Royal Irrigation Department and could be of advisory assistance to Vietnam in this field.

The prospects are that Thailand will make a real effort to give effective aid to Vietnam but that their assistance will be limited by their capabilities and their realization of their own needs at home.

2. Western Europe

Austria. When the Secretary General of the South Vietnam Foreign Office visited Vienna recently, he was promised aid in the form of tents, blankets, and medical supplies. The Austrians also discussed possibility of scholarships for Vietnamese students, cultural exchanges, and loans for purchase of Austrian goods.

Belgium. To date, Belgium has not made a contribution to the war effort, but it is expected to send medical aid, including doctors and other personnel, and food to South Vietnam. After Prime Minister Lefevre met with Lodge on August 19, Lefevre indicated that the Belgian Government would do everything possible to assist the US effort in Vietnam. In an obvious dig at France, Lefevre remarked that "other European countries have not been so able and skillful in Southeast Asia that they can render negative judgments on US policy in Vietnam." On August 19 press reports quoted informed sources as stating that Belgium will soon assign a resident ambassador to Saigon.

Britain. The major contribution made by the UK to date in support of the South Vietnamese war effort has been the provision of the five-man Thompson advisory mission on counterinsurgency, administration, and police matters. The mission arranged for the training of over 300 police and civil guardsmen in Malaysia last year. In response to a US request, the UK has agreed to send additional police training advisors to Vietnam.

The UK some time ago offered the Vietnamese government a loan of £500,000 which was not accepted. In late July the UK Government obtained parliamentary approval for a £56,000 grant to South Vietnam to be spent on roadbuilding equipment and engines for fishing boats.

In response to US requests that it increase its aid to South Vietnam, the UK has explained its inability to do so as follows: Britain already bears a considerable burden in aiding Malaysia against Indonesia; the US has said it could not provide such aid. The UK holds a special position as co-chairman of the Geneva agreements, which inhibits its participating in military aid. The UK has agreed with the US that the bulk of British financial aid to non-Commonwealth countries in Southeast Asia should go to Laos.

Canada. As of early August, Canadian aid for South Vietnam during FY1965 was understood to consist of C\$150,000 worth of flour and C\$580,000 worth of technical assistance. Prime Minister Pearson then informed General Khanh that Canada would try to provide further aid. Since then, Canada has allotted additional aid, bringing the cost of the program to over C\$1 million.

In the past, Canada has been concerned that increasing its aid to South Vietnam might conflict with its role on the ICC. On the other hand, one high External Affairs official has criticized this view, arguing that the contrary was closer to the truth.

Denmark. An official Danish statement released on August 21 after Ambassador Lodge had talked with Premier Krag and Foreign Minister Haekkerup said that Denmark's commitments did not allow aid for South Vietnam, at least this year.

France. Although France has long had important technical assistance and cultural relations programs in South Vietnam, the French Government's well-known policy toward the war there precludes any direct contribution to the war effort of the type requested by the US. Paris views its programs as assistance to the people, but certainly not to the present government, of South Vietnam. Nevertheless, France's programs are probably greater than those of any nation except the US.

Federal Republic of Germany. West Germany has for some years had a modest commodity aid and technical assistance program in operation in South Vietnam. This program has included assistance for industrial development and for general commercial imports, as well as for machinery and equipment for an engineering and trade school. In the area of technical assistance, most German expenditures have been earmarked for the training of skilled labor, for an expert forestry instructor with equipment, for medical professors, and for engineering experts. German commitments to date amount to nearly DM 100 million and have involved the despatch of 30 to 40 German technicians to Vietnam.

In response to US requests for increased aid to Vietnam in May, the West German Foreign Office proposed doubling the amount of commodity credits from DM 10 million to DM 20 million, utilizing the entire amount for specific development projects, and increasing the German physical presence in Vietnam by sending medical personnel and additional experts for an existing training school project. West Germany also raised the possibility of providing a military hospital or staffing a hospital ship. There has not yet been a cabinet decision on these proposals, and a government spokesman has since indicated (earlier this month) that these two items were no longer under consideration. As for the kind of increased aid that might be provided, the government spokesman said the decision would depend "to a certain extent on economic and financial questions," but the government planned to send additional assistance in the form of doctors for the medical faculty at the University of Hue. Recently, German officials have assured Embassy Bonn that there will be new aid commitments once existing ones have been fulfilled.

Chancellor Erhard has long opposed increasing the Federal budget and has attempted to hold the line on all forms of government expenditure. This attitude will undoubtedly influence the final cabinet decision on aid to Vietnam. Furthermore, Germans generally view aid as largely a waste, pouring money down a rathole. Traditionally, German economic assistance is tied to specific projects, and the Germans have had difficulty finding the kinds of projects which they consider worthwhile. For these reasons, West Germany is not likely to provide more than a very modest increase in assistance to Vietnam.

As for a military contribution, earlier this month, a Ministry of Defense official told the press that the German Government was not considering direct military aid to Vietnam. A government official was quoted by the AP on August 18 as saying that the Federal Republic could not become involved in helping to control brush-fire wars outside Europe: "Military adventures outside our own borders have characterized two disastrous world wars. People still remember and resent that all over the world. So please leave us out."

Ireland. An External Affairs official indicated, August 18, that Ireland was not considering complying with the most recent US request for aid. The Irish, ever concerned to make sure that their neutrality is maintained, most likely feel that such assistance, outside a UN framework, would constitute an unwanted involvement.

Italy. The Italian Government intends to send a medical team to Vietnam in the near future and is studying Vietnamese requests for additional aid.

Netherlands. Following Ambassador Lodge's talks with the Dutch, the Netherlands may consider a program to send Dutch technicians to Vietnam, presumably in those fields requested by the South Vietnamese. According to our embassy in The Hague, the Dutch response to Lodge's visit is gratifying in view of the previous negative posture. The Dutch have been miffed over the US refusal to invite them into SEATO. To judge from press reports, it appears that some technical assistance and fellowships may be forthcoming.

Norway. The Norwegian Foreign Minister informed our Ambassador "unequivocally" in July that Norway could not see its way clear to assist South Vietnam and thus become involved in Vietnamese problems. In a public statement to Parliament he reiterated this view adding that the Norwegian Government did not wish to be "branded" by associating itself with our Vietnam policy nor with the Vietnamese regime of which his government could not approve.

Portugal. The Portuguese Foreign Minister said on August 18 that his government had not replied to the South Vietnamese request for assistance. He gave no reason. As is well known, Portugal is preoccupied with holding on to its overseas possessions. Moreover, the Portuguese, who are strongly anti-Communist in Europe, are careful not to take any action in Asia that would antagonize Communist China, inasmuch as Lisbon retains control of Macao by the grace of Peiping.

Spain. The Spanish Foreign Minister gave Ambassador Woodward "almost complete assurance" in late June that Spain would "be glad to offer assistance of some kind" to Vietnam. A decision for such an offer requires cabinet approval; the Spanish cabinet, often slow to act, has passed up several opportunities to take this decision, and may well postpone action until after Ambassador Lodge - visits Madrid on August 29. In view of Spain's strongly anti-Communist orientation, however, some aid is likely to be forthcoming from Madrid.

Sweden. The Department and Embassy Stockholm have agreed that any direct US effort to induce Sweden to provide assistance to the war effort in South Vietnam would be counter-productive. Sweden's policy of neutrality is expected to preclude any such aid.

3. South Asia and The Middle East

India. India is inhibited in providing assistance in South Vietnam by two factors. First of these is Indian non-alignment and unwillingness to become involved in Cold War issues. The second is India's chairmanship of the ICC in Vietnam which reenforces the desire to maintain a position of neutrality.

Operating in the other direction, however, is the fact that India does not see itself non-aligned with regard to Communist China. New Delhi recognizes that the Chinese are the real power behind Communist operations in Southeast Asia, and may be in the process of adopting a much harder policy line in areas where Communist China is involved.

It is too early to predict a significant shift in the Indian position that would permit Delhi to give substantial support to South Vietnam. Much will depend upon the Indian suggestion that a UN peacekeeping force be introduced into Southeast Asia, one in which Indian forces would participate. This arrangement would free India from the restrictions posed by its ICC chairmanship and permit it to take a forceful role in resisting Peiping-sponsored expansionism.

Under present conditions, the most that could be hoped for in terms of Indian support to South Vietnam would be such clearly non-military aid as technical training and assistance or perhaps a civilian medical team. India has already given six technical scholarships to Vietnamese students and presumably this type of program can be expanded.

Over the longer run a more active Indian effort in South Vietnam could include some military training of South Vietnamese in India and other token military support. However, the Indian armed forces are themselves in a tight budgetary position, so that it would not be realistic to expect substantial military aid. Furthermore, even if a more forceful foreign policy line is adopted in New Delhi, there will be strong forces opposing any dramatic shifts and blocking attempts to give strong support to South Vietnam.

Ceylon. Ceylon has no diplomatic relations with either North or South Vietnam. South Vietnam was extensively criticized in Ceylon on charges of discrimination and repression of the Buddhist population by the former Diem regime. The Government of Ceylon was instrumental in the organization of a UN observer mission which was sent to South Vietnam in November 1963.

As a result of popular feeling among Ceylon's predominantly Buddhist population, Ceylon most probably could not be persuaded to assist South Vietnam and any attempt at persuasion would be highly resented.

In addition to the inflammable cause of Buddhist rights, Ceylon's government is fearful of an enlargement of cold war disputes in Asia and has criticized US involvement in Southeast Asian affairs.

Pakistan. Pakistan has given no aid to South Vietnam and it is most unlikely that any aid will be given in the future. The Pakistan Foreign Office delayed answering an aid request made in May until August 11 when President Ayub ruled out either military or economic aid.

Pakistan has not supported the US in South Vietnam; instead it has tended to side with the French view, by requesting a reconvening of the 14-nation Geneva conference and suggesting a possible neutralization of the area. Foreign Minister Bhutto has also announced that there can be no settlement of Southeast Asian problems without the participation of Communist China. Subsequent to the US bombing of the North Vietnamese fleet, the Pakistani press criticized "US aggression" and Bhutto expressed "extreme concern and anxiety" over the growing conflict in Southeast Asia.

Pakistan's reluctance to render aid to South Vietnam stems from the belief that Pakistani resources are needed at home because of increasing Indian military strength. In order to supplement existing sources of support against India, Pakistan has promoted a closer relation with Peiping, entered into an agreement with Turkey and Iran for regional cooperation, and engaged the support of Afro-Asian countries for its position in Kashmir. The Pakistanis also believe that any aid to South Vietnam could damage their relations with Communist China.

Afghanistan. Afghanistan has given no aid, economic or military, to South Vietnam and, because of its desire to maintain a neutral posture, is unlikely to do so.

Turkey. Turkey has supported US policy in Vietnam and has stated its belief in a common front in support of South Vietnam's war with the Communists. Turkey has also signified its support of the government of South Vietnam and could be counted upon, for example, to oppose any attempt by the "National Liberation Front of South Vietnam" to engage in propaganda or other activities in Turkey. But in spite of diplomatic support for South Vietnam, the Turkish government apparently feels that the Cyprus problem prevents Turkey from volunteering material assistance. Apart from the economic aspects of the question, the Turkish position has been that the frustrated and disgruntled mood of public opinion as a result of the Cyprus dispute does not allow the Turkish government to assist Vietnam at this time.

Turkish displeasure with the alleged lack of support from its Western allies in the Cyprus dispute appears to be a major factor in Turkey's reluctance to take a stronger stand on the question of supplying assistance to Vietnam. Turkey resents the fact that while the US acts strongly in defense of its interests in Southeast Asia, it prevents Turkey from taking similar action to protect the Turkish Cypriots. Preoccupation with Cyprus means that Turkey will probably not change its attitude on Vietnam unless and until it is assured of a

- 12 -

satisfactory solution to the Cyprus dispute; thus the US role in the Cyprus settlement will greatly influence Turkish attitudes toward those problem areas in which the US is deeply involved.

Greece. Although the Greek government generally has supported US policy in Vietnam and agrees in principle to joining the program of collective assistance to that country, it has been slow to respond to Vietnam's request for material support. In mid-1964, the Greek government implied that it might provide counterinsurgency instructors to Vietnam, and there have also been suggestions that Greece could send rural development advisors and C-47 pilots. However, there are no current indications that Greece will act on these suggestions.

In August 1964, the Greek government stated that it was contemplating sending a shipment of medical equipment, but that the question was still being discussed by the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries. Because of its preoccupation with the Cyprus dispute, the Greek government will probably do little more than talk about the possibility of giving aid to Vietnam. Greek public opinion is probably sufficiently aroused against the US because of Cyprus to inhibit the government from giving tangible support to a country which is already receiving massive US aid.

Iran. The Shah has consistently supported US policy in Vietnam, and there are no indications at present that he is contemplating a change in attitude. In May 1964, Iran agreed to extend assistance to Vietnam and, after some delay, the government decided to send 1000 tons of petroleum products, a few veterinarians, and a supply of animal serum. Subsequently, the government of South Vietnam decided that it needed neither the veterinarians nor the serum. Although Iran has not yet sent the petroleum, there are no indications that the Shah is planning to withdraw his offer.

In view of the Shah's support of US policy, he would probably agree, under US urging, to give additional material assistance to Vietnam. However, the Shah is quite capable of changing his mind suddenly if he should again feel immediately threatened by his Arab neighbors or for other reasons decide that Iran cannot afford to divert additional resources to remote Vietnam.

Israel. The Israelis do not recognize South Vietnam and as far as we know are not providing any assistance there. Some years ago, in 1959, a Vietnamese delegation visited Israel to lay the groundwork for possible future economic ties between the two countries. At that time Israel's Water Planning Authority agreed to send 15 Israelis to Vietnam to make a survey and prepare a colonization program for a small area. During the period of 1959 and 1960, there were indications that the Israelis were considering recognizing Vietnam but the Vietnamese reportedly were cool to the suggestion on the grounds that it would create a problem in the establishment of relations with the Arab states. We have no record of later overtures to establish relations or to provide technical assistance.

The Israelis have provided technical assistance to a large number of under-developed countries in Africa and more recently Latin America; their Asian program has been relatively small scale. They could probably send a medical team

to Vietnam as they have experience in setting up hospitals and in sending medical personnel to Africa. They could also give advice on the establishment of border villages patterned after their own cooperative settlements that have a defense function as well as an agricultural one. In either case, they probably would not expect to finance the program themselves.

Israel's technical assistance program has a frankly political motivation. It is designed to counter Israel's isolation in the Arab world and to gain support for Israel's policies in the Palestine question among the members of the UN. Their aid to Asian nations is further designed to establish a position for Israel in the Afro-Asian bloc. If the Israelis were to provide assistance to Vietnam in response to a US request, they can be expected to exploit this cooperation to maximum political advantage and in matters not related to Vietnam. They may try to give the impression that their participation in a military assistance program, at US behest, implies military cooperation between Israel and the US, a particularly sensitive issue in US-Near East relations. The Israelis have for some time attempted to involve the US in their aid programs in Africa and Latin America.

Arab States. None of the Arab states is assisting South Vietnam and none contemplates doing so. In general, they tend to regard the involvement of a great power in military action in a small country distant from its own borders as "imperialism." In any case, to choose sides publicly in such a matter would be inconsistent with their professions of neutralism. Arab officials in private occasionally express sympathy with the US stand, but their public and press comments generally are critical of the US role. For the most part, the Arabs find it easier to ignore Vietnam. Because of its remoteness and its non-involvement in Arab-world issues, the plight of South Vietnam does not interest the general public.

4. Africa

African countries have by and large not been asked to make a contribution to the cause of South Vietnam, and it is unlikely that they would respond if they were. There are several reasons for this. 1) They are thoroughly preoccupied with their own problems and only marginally interested in what is happening in Southeast Asia. 2) They consider that their own material needs are greater, and their means of satisfying them smaller, than those of most other countries, including South Vietnam. 3) They view the conflict in South Vietnam as one having cold war overtones and therefore calling their policy of nonalignment into play.

Both North and South Vietnam are working to rally African sympathy through their diplomatic missions in Africa, but the scope of their endeavors has been modest. In Algeria, Guinea, and Mali, where North Vietnam has diplomatic representatives, and in Ghana, where it does not, the press has shown considerable doctrinaire sympathy for the Viet Cong. In Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Ivory Coast, where South Vietnam has representatives, there has been official cordiality

toward the South Vietnamese cause. It is probable that de Gaulle's views on the need for "neutralizing" the area have reinforced a number of French-speaking African leaders in their conviction that Africa must avoid becoming involved.

There thus appears to be no prospect of a significant African contribution to South Vietnam in its struggle with the Viet Cong.

5. Latin America

No assistance is currently being provided to South Vietnam from Latin American countries, although it is possible that military observers may be sent from Argentina and Mexico. In general, the Latin Americans are prepared to give moral support to the United States position on South Vietnam in the United Nations or elsewhere. However, Asia still seems distant and remote and they feel that they have more pressing needs for their limited resources at home.

South Vietnamese Attitude

While demonstrating considerable interest in increasing third country assistance, the South Vietnamese government has not viewed the problem with the same urgency as the United States. It has been only after persistent pressure by the United States that Saigon has increased its diplomatic initiative with foreign governments, has formulated recommendations on specific aid requirements for this program, and has established a bureaucratic apparatus for implementing and administering it. Although emissaries and special representatives have been despatched to various foreign countries to elicit assistance, Saigon has thus far failed to act, despite repeated recommendations by the United States, to strengthen its diplomatic missions abroad and thus assure as effective as possible presentation of the Vietnamese case in the Free World. In general, South Vietnamese efforts to elicit greater support from countries other than the United States have been directed principally to the Far East. In this respect, Saigon has looked particularly to Nationalist China and South Korea and has drawn upon its generally close relations with Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia.

Communist Reaction

Communist China. Peiping will presumably interpret any third country aid to South Vietnam as a further evidence of US determination to prolong and expand the conflict in Indochina. Such action will be cited as further justifying any assistance rendered North Vietnam by Communist China, although Peiping has already claimed this right as a consequence of the August 5 US air strike. Actually, the extent and nature of Peiping's assistance is expected to be gauged to its assessment of the imminence and severity of the military threat to North Vietnam, rather than directly related to third country assistance to South Vietnam as such. So long as third country contributions remain relatively small-scale and peripheral in the effect upon the actual conflict in South Vietnam, they are unlikely to provoke any significant response from Peiping other than propaganda.

However, Peiping can be expected to display extreme sensitivity to Chinese Nationalists military assistance, and would probably interpret a substantial commitment of KMT troops to South Vietnam as part of a Chinese Nationalist-US scheme directly aimed at itself and likely to involve other areas of operation (e.g., Yunnan or Taiwan Straits) as well. In addition, Peiping can be expected to play on other's fears of these implications of GRC involvement.

North Vietnam. US efforts to promote greater foreign assistance for the GVN have been scored in North Vietnamese propaganda, and instances of assistance have been protested in memoranda to the ICC. Hanoi's primary reaction will remain political and propagandistic, seeking to bloc aid where it can and making capital out of foreign refusals to participate. Hanoi may also seek to expand and publicize assistance to the National Liberation Front from other "Socialist" and friendly countries.

Soviet Union

Third country assistance likely to be forthcoming will probably not bring any significant Soviet reaction. At the propaganda level, Moscow seems to regard Dutch, German, Japanese, and other aid promised thus far without alarm or surprise. Moscow has predictably gloated over Lodge's alleged failure in Paris. The overall tone set by Moscow's propaganda seems an indication that little more than diplomatic protests is contemplated in response to the "five or six NATO nations" Moscow expects to "support" the Lodge mission.

144

Lodge Mission

144

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS (1020) THIRTY-FIRST

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

WOULD TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, BE A GOOD DAY FOR YOU AND PRESIDENT
TO RECEIVE MY PERSONAL REPORT ON EXECUTION OF MY MISSION IN
WESTERN EUROPE? BRUCE

BT

CFN 1020 8

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Bundy
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ACTION:

Amembassy LONDON 1530

FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979

By *ing*, NARS, Date 7-20-79

AUG 31 8 45 PM '64

039

We have repeated Saigon's 684 to you. The line we have taken here is that we continue to support the GVN and its Prime Minister, General Khanh. We are most anxious to avoid any speculation that USG determination to continue to assist Vietnamese people and government in struggle against Communist insurgency has lessened as result of recent events.

According our reports, week-end editorial London Times foresaw total collapse SVN and contended that American hope ^{of} ~~for~~ strengthening GVN in order effectively negotiate settlement becomes fainter with each new sign of bickering and division in Saigon.

We do not repeat not agree this assessment and hope that you will be able emphasize in UK government circles our firm determination continue our help in this struggle and our hope that General Khanh will soon be able to return to his full-time duties as Prime Minister.

RUSK

Drafted by: S/VN:MVForrestal:pay 8/31/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/VN: Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

~~SECRET~~ S/S-O - Mr. Williams

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

147

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Action

CONTROL: 25386
REC'D: AUGUST 29, 1964, 10:19 AM

SVN
Info

FROM: ROME

DECLASSIFIED

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE (613)

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By VB, NARS, Date 10 MAR 76

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INFO: LONDON 76

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SAIGON 14

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DATE: AUGUST 29, 2 PM

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USIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC

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AID

RMR

AMB LODGE MET AUG 28 WITH FOLLOWING FONMIN OFFICIALS: SECGEN CATTANI, AMB TOSCANO, DEPDIRGEN POLITICAL AFFAIRS GAJA, VICE-DIRGEN MAJOLI, FONMIN'S CHIEF OF CABINET Malfatti, BACCI, AND DEPDIPADV TO PRIMIN COTTAFVI.

ATMOSPHERE OF MEETING WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL AND FRIENDLY, AND DISCUSSION FRANK. AMB LODGE REVIEWED US AIMS AND POLICY IN VIETNAM AND USG VIEWS ON DESIRABILITY NEW INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT PRESENT TIME. IT QUICKLY APPARENT THAT IZU AC IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH USG ON SLRL GIC CONSIDERATIONS BUT WERE CONCERNED

AND SKEPTICAL AS TO WHETHER PRESENT APPROACH TO PROBLEM CAN BE SUCCESSFUL. ITALIANS ALSO EXPRESSED BELIEF SITUATION GRADUALLY DETERIORATING. IN RESPONSE AMB LODGE DESCRIBED FULL RANGE US EFFORTS AND EMPHASIZED US RECOGNITION OF FACT THAT PROBLEM BASICALLY POLITICAL AND THUS OF NECESSITY CREATE EFFECTIVE STABLE GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION, HE DESCRIBED CURRENT USG PLAN TO CONCENTRATE OUR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE ON SEVEN PROVINCES AROUND SAIGON. HE DESCRIBED GVN AGREEMENT TO THIS PLAN AS SIGNIFICANT STEP AND AS DEMONSTRATION THAT GVN RECOGNIZES NEED TO CREATE STABLE EFFICIENT CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTAL MECHANISM. IN COURSE OF THIS DISCUSSION AMB LODGE EMPHASIZED NEED FOR EXTERNAL CIVILIAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND DESIRABILITY THIS ASSISTANCE COME FROM WIDE RANGE WESTERN NATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION HE EXPRESSED USG APPRECIATION FOR CURRENT GOI PROJECT SEND MEDICAL TEAM SAIGON. HE ALSO URGED ITALIAN OFFICIALS TO CONSIDER PROVIDING ADDITIONAL TECHNICIANS IN OTHER FIELDS.

AMB LODGE CALLED AUG 29 ON MININTERIOR TAVIANI, SENIOR GOVERNMENT MINISTER PRESENT IN ROME AND THUS "ACTING PRIMIN". WITH TAVIANI, AMB LODGE REVIEWED US AIMS AND POLICY IN VIETNAM, PARTICULARLY STRESSING ARGUMENTS AGAINST HAVING MULTI-NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON

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-2- 613, August 29, 2 PM from Rome.

VIETNAM IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. DISCUSSION CORDIAL AND AMB LODGE'S PRESENTATION SYMPATHETICALLY RECEIVED.

AMB LODGE ALSO CALLED AUG 28 ON SECSTATE VATICAN CARDINAL CICOGNANI AT LATTER'S REQUEST. CARDINAL CICOGNANI INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING CURRENT CATHOLIC-BUDDHIST DIFFICULTIES IN VIETNAM. AMB LODGE STRESSED IMPORTANCE HAVING FORCEFUL AND ACTIVE PAPAL DELEGATE IN VIETNAM AND WELCOMED NEWS THAT PAPAL DELEGATE ARCHBISHOP PALMAS HAD RECENTLY ARRIVED IN SAIGON.

AMB LODGE DEPARTS AUG 31 AT 10:20 AM ALITALIA 632 FOR LONDON.

GP-4

CFN 14 29 28 31 10:20 632 GP-4

REINHARDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Lodge mission
143

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CONTROL: 25385
RECD: AUGUST 29, 1964, 10 AM

FROM: ROME

ACTION: SECSTATE (612)

INFO: ~ SAIGON ~12

DATE: AUGUST 29, 3 PM

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LIMDIS.

AMB TOSCANO, CHIEF RESEARCH FONOFF, INFORMED AMB LODGE THAT GOI HAD JUST RECEIVED CABLE FROM D'ORLANDI, ITALIAN AMB SAIGON, SAYING THAT HE BELIEVED VIET CONG WOULD LAUNCH ALL OUT MILITARY OFFENSIVE TO CAPTURE PRIOR TO US ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER. LODGE REGARDS D'ORLANDI AS ONE OF ABLEST AND BEST INFORMED DIPLOMATS IN SAIGON.

GP-1.

CFN GP-1.

REINHARDT

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By is, NARA, Date 10-29-97

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149

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DE RUMJIR 27A/1 28/1539Z
O R 281516Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
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RUEPIA/CIA
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
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Jestung

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1964 AUG 28 PM 12:49

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DOD 98 CIA 83 INFO CINCPAC 319 ROME 11 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 28
11PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 000/4908
By MS NARA, Date 10-29-97

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

ROME FOR LODGE

L I M D I S

EMBTEL 594 AND 598

FOLLOWING IS MORE COMPLETE ACCOUNT MEETINGS SUMMARIZED REFTELS.
WHEN JOHNSON AND I FIRST SAW KHANH AT 11 AM THIS MORNING IN
GENERAL KHIEM'S OFFICE IN JGS COMPOUND, HE STARTED OUT BY
CFN SECONE OPTWO 606 76 98 83 319 11 28 11PM 11 594 598 11

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 27A/1 ~~SECRET~~
SAYING THAT THE "SITUATION WAS BAD". HE FIRST TALKED AT GREAT
LENGTH OF THE PERFDY OF THE DAI VIET, SINGLING OUT HOAN WHO
TOGETHER WITH ELEMENTS IN THE ARMY (THIEU, COL. 70N. GG SEVENTH
DIVISION, AND COL. TRANG, GIA DINH PROVINCE CHIEF) AS WELL AS
COLONEL BEN, POLICE "HAD SOUGHT POWER FOR THEMSELVES IN
HAD CALLED HOAN BACK AFTER JANUARY 30 COUP BUT INSTEAD OF
SUPPORTING KHANH, HOAN AND HIS COHORTS HAD CONSISTENTLY WORKED
AGAINST HIM WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF HOAN BECOMING PRIME MINISTER
WITH HIM AS CHIEF OF STATE. FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER, HA THUC KY,
HAD BEEN PLOTTING AGAINST HIM, AND
HUYNH SAK THONG FORMER DAI VIET INFORMATION MINISTER, HAD BEEN
WORKING AGAINST HIM IN WASHINGTON.

HE THEN OUTLINED TO US STATEMENT WHICH HE WAS PROPOSING TO

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-2- 606, AUGUST 28, 11 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

MAKE TO THE PRESS, THE FIRST PART OF WHICH CASTIGATED DAI VIETS MUCH ALONG THE LINES OF STATEMENT HE FINALLY MADE; THE LAST PART OF WHICH WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT HE HAD DEFINITELY RESIGNED AND WOULD ONLY RESUME POWER UNDER CONDITION THAT HE HAD THE SUPPORT OF: (1) RELIGIOUS GROUPS, (2) THE ARMY, (3) MINH AND (4) POLITICAL GROUPS.

WE ARGUED WITH HIM OVER THE WISDOM OF SUCH A STATEMENT, CFN (1) (2) (3) (4)

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 27A/1 ~~SECRET~~

POINTING OUT THAT BY HIS OWN STATEMENTS HE ALREADY HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE FIRST 3 ELEMENTS AND FROM WHAT POLITICAL GROUP DID HE EXPECT SUPPORT AFTER HIS DENUNCIATIONS OF THE DAI VIET? IT WOULD BE EXPECTING TOO MUCH TO ASK ALL FOUR ELEMENTS PUBLICLY AND SPONTANEOUSLY TO UNITE AND ASK HIM TO RETURN AFTER HE HAD DEFINITELY RESIGNED. IN THE DISCUSSION IT CAME OUT THAT WHAT HE WAS REALLY SEEKING WAS UNQUALIFIED PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM MINH AND "SYMBOLIC" SUPPORT OF SOME KIND FROM SOME POLITICAL GROUP.

WE URGED ON HIM THAT THE COURSE HE PROPOSED WOULD LEAVE A VACUUM IN GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS ALSO POLITICALLY DANGEROUS FOR HIM, ESPECIALLY AS IT WOULD GIVE MINH A VETO OVER HIS POLITICAL LIFE. WE URGED HE RATHER WORK OUT WITH THE GROUPS CONCERNED A PUBLIC PRESS CONFERENCE AT WHICH APPROPRIATE NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES WOULD APPEAR WITH HIM ON THE PLATFORM AND HE WOULD STATE THAT AT THEIR URGING HE WAS REMAINING AS PRIME MINISTER. AT THIS POINT HE SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION LAST NIGHT TO THE MRC ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS BUT SEEMED RECEPTIVE TO OUR SUGGESTION. HE THEN SAID MINH WANTED TO SEE US PRIVATELY WOULD WE FIND OUT IF MINH WOULD SUPPORT HIM PUBLICLY? MEETING ENDED ON THIS NOTE AND WE AGREED TO GET TOGETHER LATER IN THE AFTERNOON.

CFN 3

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 27A/1 ~~SECRET~~

HAD CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO TALK WITH THE PRESS OR DISCLOSE HIS RESIGNATION UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

SHORTLY AFTER HE LEFT GEN MINH ENTERED MRC AND AT MY REQUEST GAVE HIS VERSION OF THE EVENTS MRC DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS. HE SAID THAT "EVERYBODY" AGREED THAT THE AUGUST 16 CHARTER

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-3- 606, AUGUST 28, 11 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

MUST BE ABOLISHED; KHANH HAD SUBMITTED THE CHARTER TO THE MRC FOR APPROVAL IN SUCH A WAY THAT ALL FELT AT THE TIME THEY MUST VOTE FOR IT IN ORDER TO SHOW UNITY IN THE ARMY. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE ELECTION OF A "LEADER" YESTERDAY, CONSENSUS WAS THAT IF THE "PEOPLE" WOULD ACCEPT THE CHARTER FROM THE MRC, THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT A "LEADER" ELECTED BY THE MRC. THE ARMY REPRESENTED ONLY A SMALL MINORITY OF THE POPULATION. MINH AND OTHERS HAD URGED KHANH ~~REMAIN~~ AS PRIME MINISTER BUT THAT THE MRC BE DISSOLVED. HOWEVER, "THE YOUNG OFFICERS WOULD NOT ACCEPT KHANH ALONE"; THEY FEARED A DICTATOR. HE, MINH, HAD THREE TIMES ASKED EVERYBODY IN THE MEETING TO SUPPORT KHANH, POINTING OUT THAT HE WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO HAD AMERICAN SUPPORT. AMERICAN SUPPORT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE COUNTRY.
TAYLOR

BT

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OO RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 38A/2 28/1539Z
O R 281516Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEPWW/WHITEHOUSE
RUEPDA/DOD
RUEPIA/CIA
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
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76 DOD 98 CIA 83 INFO CINCPAC 319 ROME 11 FROM SAIGON AUG
28 11 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

ROME FOR LODGE

L I M D I S

IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION CONCERNING THE ATTITUDE OF THE DAI VIET, MINH SAID THAT THE DAI VIETS FEAR A DICTATOR AND HAVE A "FIXATION" AGAINST KHANH. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE A SOLUTION THAT WOULD "SATISFY THE PEOPLE AND VIETNAM'S ALLIES". "THINGS ARE NOW THE SAME AS AT THE TIME OF THE END OF THE DIEM REGIME". HOWEVER, HE URGENTLY SOUGHT OUR HELP IN HAVING KHANH REMAIN IN OFFICE --- HE COULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO RESIGN.

WHEN I PUT FORWARD MY THOUGHT WITH RESPECT TO UNITED FRONT PUBLIC SUPPORT OF KHANH, MINH ASKED WHETHER WOULD ACCEPT HIM AS CHIEF OF STATE. I AVOIDED A DIRECT REPLY.
CFN 606 76 98 83 319 11 28 11

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 38A/2 ~~SECRET~~
HOWEVER, AS MINH DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ENTIRELY UNRECEPTIVE TO THE CONCEPT OF SUCH A UNITED FRONT, IT WAS AGREED THAT HE SHOULD SEEK OUT KHANH SO THAT WE COULD DISCUSS THE MATTER TOGETHER. HE RETURNED TO SAY THAT KHANH WAS HOLDING A PRESS

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-2- 606, AUGUST 28, 11 PM, (SEC TWO OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

CONFERENCE AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT KHANH NOT ANNOUNCE HIS RESIGNATION IN SUCH A CONFERENCE. WE EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT KHANH WAS HAVING A CONFERENCE; SAID THAT IT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING KHANH DID NOT INTEND ANNOUNCE HIS RESIGNATION AT THIS TIME.

WHILE WE WERE WAITING FOR KHANH, MINH RUMINATED AT MUCH LENGTH ON THE THEME THAT THE LEADER THE US SUPPORTS IN VIETNAM MUST BE POPULAR, ANTI-US FEELING WAS GROWING (EVERYBODY WAS WILLING TO CHARGE THE CIA RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING THAT WENT WRONG), KHANH HAD LOST HIS POPULARITY (IF HE APPEARED IN HUE, HE WOULD BE ASSASSINATED), BUT WE MUST URGE KHANH AT ALL COSTS TO REMAIN IN OFFICE. WE DID NOT ATTEMPT TO PROBE THE LOGIC OF ALL THIS. HOWEVER, IT WAS OUR GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT MINH MIGHT GO ALONG WITH PUBLIC SUPPORT OF KHANH IF HE COULD HAVE THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF STATE "WITH SOME POWER".

WE FINALLY GAVE UP WAITING FOR KHANH AND IT WAS ARRANGED WE WOULD RETURN AT 3 PM, FIRST TO SEE KHANH ALONE.
CFN 3

PAGE THREE RUNJIR 38/A2 ~~SECRET~~

WHEN WE RETURNED, KHANH INDICATED THAT FOLLOWING OUR ADVICE HE HAD NOT "BURNED HIS BRIDGES" AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN MORNING, AND WHILE SAYING THAT HE HAD SUBMITTED HIS RESIGNATION, SAID THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN ACTED UPON. HE SAID A FORMULA HAD NOW BEEN AGREED TO UNDER WHICH THE TRIUMVIRATE WOULD REFUSE TO ACCEPT HIS RESIGNATION BUT THEY WOULD GIVE HIM SEVERAL DAYS LEAVE BECAUSE OF HIS HEALTH. DURING THE INTERIM, JACK OANH WOULD SIGN PAPERS AS ACTING FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. (IN FACT KHANH HAS BAD COLD AND IS OBVIOUSLY AT POINT OF PHYSICAL EXHAUSTION).

HE SAID THAT DURING THIS INTERIM A COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL UNITY WOULD BE FORMED WITH THE DUAL ROLE OF SELECTING THE PRESIDENT REPEAT PRESIDENT OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY WHICH WOULD ACT BOTH AS A LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL UNITY WOULD ALSO FORM ITSELF INTO A PERMANENT COUNCIL TO ADVISE THE EXECUTIVE AND HE HAD IN

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-3- 606, AUGUST 28, 11 PM, (SEC TWO OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

MIND THAT MINH WOULD BE CHAIRMAN (PRESIDENT) OF THE COUNCIL. HE SAID HE HAD IN MIND VU VAN MAU AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, BUT IF HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT, HE WOULD TAKE QUAT. HE GAVE US THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS HAD BEEN GENERALLY AGREED AND ASKED THAT WE JOIN THE GROUP IN THE NEXT ROOM TO INDICATE MY SUPPORT.

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 38A/2 ~~SECRET~~

IN THE NEXT ROOM MINH, KHIEM, THIEU AND GEN. CO WERE PRESENT. I SPOKE BRIEFLY IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE AND NECESSITY FOR UNITY AND EXPRESSED PLEASURE THEY SEEMED TO BE MAKING PROGRESS. DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION KHANH OUTLINED HIS PLAN IN SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FORM THAN IN HIS PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH US, BUILDING UP THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL UNITY INTO QUITE A MAJOR GOVERNMENTAL ORGAN. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY DOING THIS IN PART TO IMPRESS MINH OF IMPORTANCE OF JOB HE WOULD HAVE AS CHAIRMAN. MINH WAS CLEARLY NOT IMPRESSED AND COMPLAINED THAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH A GROUP WHO JUST TALKED AND NEVER AGREED ON ANYTHING. IT WAS NOT THE KIND OF JOB THAT APPEALED TO HIM. HE IMPLIED THAT HE FELT THERE OUGHT TO BE SOME PROVISION SOMEWHERE IN THE SCHEME FOR HIMSELF AS THE CHIEF OF STATE. KHANH MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS WAS NOT HIS IDEA. THE OTHERS DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION BUT IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT GROUP WERE FAR FROM HAVING ARRIVED AT ANY CONSENSUS. I AGAIN URGED ON THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTING FAST IF THEY EXPECTED TO HAVE CONTINUED AMERICAN SUPPORT. THE US PUBLIC WILL HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING WHAT IS GOING ON.

PAGE FIVE RUMJIR 38A/2 ~~SECRET~~

ALTHOUGH KHANH PREVIOUSLY PROMISED ME THAT A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE THIS EVENING FOR HANDLING OF HIS RESIGNATION AND OANH'S POSITION, AS OF THE TIME OF DRAFTING THIS MESSAGE THE MEETING HAS BROKEN UP AND NO ANNOUNCEMENT HAS AS YET BEEN MADE.

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-4- 606, AUGUST 28, 11 PM, (SEC TWO OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

PERHAPS OUR ONLY CONCRETE GAIN DURING THE DAY WAS THAT HAVING
RAISED WITH BOTH KHANH AND MINH QUESTION OF CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PUBLIC ORDER IN SAIGON, I AM TOLD THAT THIS EVENING THE
PREFECT, GEN LAM, HAS FINALLY ISSUED ORDERS TO THE POLICE AND
GENDARMERIE WHICH ARE BEGINNING TO MOVE IN TO CONTROL STUDENTS
WHO HAVE BEEN GETTING INCREASINGLY OUT OF HAND DURING THE DAY
WITH CLASHES BETWEEN CATHOLIC AND BUDDHIST STUDENTS. GP-2
TAYLOR
BT
CFN GP-2

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 2:08 PM, 8/28/64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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DE RUFGWP 1052/1 26/1250Z

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

BT

~~SECRET~~ SEONE OF TWO ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 1072

INFO SAIGON 56 BONN UNN FROM PARIS AUG , 26 12 NOON

FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE

2 1 9 8 7

1964 AUG 26 AM 11:05

070

IN SEVENTY MINUTE DISCUSSION AUGUST 25 WITH CHANCELLOR ERHARD AT HIS HOUSE ON TEGERNESEE, WE COVERED IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF SITUATION IN VIETNAM. CHANCELLOR EVIDENCED LIVELY INTEREST AND ASKED A NUMBER OF POINTED QUESTIONS. HE WAS COMPLETELY SYMPATHETIC TO OUR APPROACH AND CONCERNED ONLY WITH POSSIBILITY THAT OUR EFFORT MIGHT FAIL. HE WAS VERY FRANK ABOUT HIS DIFFICULTIES WITH DE GAULLE

PAGE 2IRUFGWP 1052/1 ~~SECRET~~
OVER SOUTHEAST ASIAN POLICY

I BEGAN BY GENERAL REVIEW OF SITUATION AND OUR AIM IN SOUTH VIETNAM, EMPHASIZING THAT THIS IS A WORLD WIDE AND NOT A REGIONAL PROBLEM. DEFEAT WOULD HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS NOT ONLY FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA BUT FOR EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. ERHARD COMMENTED THAT HE SAW THE PROBLEM IN EXACTLY THE SAME WAY AND THAT THE FREE WORLD COULD NOT BE GRATEFUL ENOUGH FOR THE AMERICAN EFFORT IN VIETNAM, THOUGH THE SOLUTION MIGHT BE UNCERTAIN.

I DESCRIBED THE PECULIAR QUALITIES OF THE WARFARE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AFTER CITING GENERAL BEDELL SMITH'S REMARK IN 1954 TO BIDAULT (WHO HAD ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO RELIEVE GENERAL NAVARRE) THAT "ANY SECOND-RATE GENERAL COULD WIN IN INDOCHINA IF THERE WERE A PROPER POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE". I STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ESSENTIALLY A STRUGGLE WITH GUERRILLAS AND TERRORISTS. WHEN WE ACHIEVED THE POINT WHERE THE TERRORISTS COULD NO LONGER GO INTO THE AVERAGE CITIZEN'S HOME FOR HELP, THE WAR WOULD BE OVER. WHEN DE GAULLE SAYS THAT AMERICA WANTS A PURELY MILITARY SOLUTION, HE IS WRONG. ALL AMERICANS; INCLUDING THE MILITARY KNOW

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By is NARA, Date 10-29-97

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-2- 1072, August 26, NOON, (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Paris

PAGE 3 RUFGWP 1052/1 ~~SECRET~~

THAT A SOLUTION MUST ALSO BE FOUND IN THE SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND TECHNICAL AREAS, THOUGH THE MILITARY STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE THE REQUIRED BASIC SECURITY. I OBSERVED THAT WE CANNOT WIN THIS FIGHT SIMPLY BY KILLING THE VIET CONG. WE MUST REACH THE POINT WHERE THE YOUNG VIET CONG FIGHTER WAKES UP ONE MORNING AND SAY " I AM NOT GOING BACK BECAUSE HE KNOWS IT IS DANGEROUS AND HE MAY GET KILLED, AND ALSO BECAUSE HE SEES THAT CONDITIONS ARE GENERALLY SATISFACTORY IN THE AREA WHERE HE IS.

THIS IS WHY, I STRESSED, IT IS SO IMPORTANT TO GET YOUNG GERMAN NATIONALS OUT TO VIETNAM TO WORK ALONG WITH THE SOME 1000 AMERICANS IN USOM. EXPERTS ARE NEEDED IN MANY AREAS OF ACTIVITY, SUCH AS TRADE, AGRICULTURE, MEDICINE. YOUNG GERMAN DOCTORS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY VALUABLE IN A COUNTRY LIKE VIETNAM, WHICH IS EXTREMELY SHORT OF TRAINED MEDICAL PERSONNEL. THEY WOULD MAKE A VERY FAVORABLE IMPRESSION IN VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES.

IN RESPONSE TO THE CHANCELLOR'S QUERY, I POINTED OUT THAT, WHILE VIETNAM IS NOT A MODERN NATION STATE ON THE WESTERN MODEL AND IS DIVIDED INTO A NUMBER OF ANTAGONISTIC

PAGE 4

PAGE 4 RUFGWP 1052/1 ~~SECRET~~

GROUPS, ALL VIETNAMESE ARE UNITED IN NOT WANTING CHINESE DOMINATION. THIS IS A LONG TRADITION, AND IT IS THEREFORE LEGITIMATE TO DESCRIBE THE VIETNAMESE STRUGGLE AS ONE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION.

THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT, AS WE KNOW, VIETNAM IS A MAJOR SOURCE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GERMANY AND FRANCE. DE GAULLE HAD BEEN BITTER ON THIS SUBJECT DURING HIS JULY MEETING WITH ERHARD, POINTING TO GERMAN FINANCIAL AND MORAL SUPPORT TO SOUTH VIETNAM. HE EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO ARGUE THIS WAS AGAINST THE CONTENT AND SPIRIT OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY. THIS IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM, ERHARD CONTINUED, BUT IT WILL NOT CHANGE THE GERMAN POSITION. THE GERMANS KNOW THAT FREEDOM MUST BE DEFENDED EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD, NOT MERELY IN BERLIN AND GERMANY. THE GERMANS WERE ON THE US SIDE AND THIS WAS A POINT DE GAULLE COULD NOT STOMACH.

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-3- 1072, August 26, NOON, (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Paris.

ERHARD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN MY MEETING EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER STRAUSS. I SAID THAT HE HAD CALLED AT MY HOTEL AT HIS REQUEST, AND THAT I TRIED TO EXPLAIN TO HIM WHY DE GAULLE'S VIEWS WERE NOT RELEVANT TO THE PRESENT SITUATION.

PAGE 5 RUFGWP 1052/1 ~~SECRET~~

WHEN I WAS IN PARIS I HAD FOUND THAT DE GAULLE'S DESIRE FOR A CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM WAS ESSENTIALLY A PERSONAL AND SUBJECTIVE IDEA WHICH HAD NOT COME TO HIM FROM HIS EXPERTS OR MILITARY ADVISERS. THE GENERAL HAD NEVER BEEN TO SOUTHEAST ASIA. ERHARD MERELY COMMENTED "AS SO OFTEN IS THE CASE".

I WENT ON TO MAKE THE VARIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST GOING TO A CONFERENCE NOW ON VIETNAM, A POINT WHICH WESTRICK YESTERDAY HAD INDICATED IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS WITH THE CHANCELLOR. I OBSERVED THAT FOR A COUNTRY LIKE SOUTH VIETNAM TO GO TO A CONFERENCE UNDER CONDITIONS OF INFILTRATION SUCH AS NOW PREVAILED WAS TO INVITE HUMILIATING CAPITULATION, THAT WE HAVE HAD TWO CONFERENCES WHICH WERE SUPPOSED TO LEAD TO NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM BUT HAD NOT DONE SO IN THE ABSENCE OF A WILL TO EXECUTE, AND THAT THE RADICAL DIFFERENCE WHICH EXISTED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RED CHINA ON WHETHER VIETNAM WAS TO BE LEFT ALONE WOULD GUARANTEE THAT THE CONFERENCE COULD ONLY END IN BITTER AND DANGEROUS DISAGREEMENT. GP-3. BOHLEN

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 11:40 A.M., 8/26/64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
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SAIGON 56 BONN UNN FROM PARIS AUG 26, 12 NOON

FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE

ALSO NOTED THAT THE WAR NOW IS ESSENTIALLY IN LOW GEAR, AND THAT THE CHINESE, DESPITE THEIR VERBAL VIOLENCE, ARE BEING VERY CAUTIOUS. WE HOPE TO WIN THE STRUGGLE BY HAVING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE MAKE THE MAIN EFFORT. A TOTALLY DIFFERENT SITUATION WOULD ARISE IF THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT WERE TO CHANGE AND TO EXPAND. THE COST OF THE WAR TO US IS 1.1 MILLION DOLLARS PER DAY, LESS PER YEAR THAN THE COST

PAGE 2 RUGWP 1052/2-~~SECRET~~

OF AN AIRCRAFT CARRIER. WE HAD LOST SOME 200 MEN IN THE PAST TWO AND A HALF YEARS, EACH OF WHICH REPRESENTED A PERSONAL TRAGEDY, BUT SOME 8,700 MILITARY PERSONNEL HAD BEEN KILLED DURING THE SAME PERIOD IN THE UNITED STATES IN AUTOMOBILE AND OTHER ACCIDENTS.

IN RESPONSE TO ERHARD'S QUERY, I REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF MY TRIP SO FAR, NOTING THAT THE BELGIANS WERE NOW SENDING AN AMBASSADOR TO SAIGON, THAT THE DUTCH HAD AGREED TO SEND A TECHNICAL MISSION OF YOUNG MEN AND TO TAKE VIETNAMESE STUDENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS, AND THAT THE DANES WERE NOW HAMPERED BY THEIR FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS BUT HAD PROMISED TO DO SOMETHING THEREAFTER.

ERHARD SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT ENJOYED BY GENERAL KHANH IN VIETNAM, AND I WENT INTO SOME DETAIL IN DESCRIBING THE VARIOUS CURRENTS OF OPINION IN SAIGON AS WELL AS THE BASIC FACT THAT 85 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IS MADE UP OF POLITICALLY DISINTERESTED PEASANTS. ERHARD ASKED WHETHER WE DID NOT FEAR AN UPRISING WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT PULL THE CARPET OUT FROM UNDER US. I SAID WE DID NOT, BUT NOTED THAT, WHEN I WAS IN SAIGON,

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-2- 1072, AUGUST 26, NOON, (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM PARIS

PAGE 3 RUFGWP 1052/2 ~~SECRET~~

I HAD STRESSED THAT WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR ANYTHING. SOUTH VIETNAM IS ADMITTEDLY AN UNSTABLE COUNTRY BUT WE COULD NOT SIMPLY LEAVE EVERY UNSTABLE COUNTRY TO FALL PREY TO THE COMMUNISTS. ERHARD THEN ASKED WHETHER WE WERE PREPARED TO MOVE MORE TROOPS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. I SAID THAT THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY PURE SPECULATION, BUT THAT IT WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT ARISE WHICH WOULD REQUIRE US TO DO MORE. I TOLD HIM, IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, OF MY BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT LEAVE, EVEN IF THERE WERE A COMMUNIST COUP. HOWEVER, I DID NOT CONSIDER THIS LIKELY, SINCE KHANH KNEW MORE ABOUT COUPS THAN ANYONE ELSE.

ERHARD THEN ASKED ABOUT THE SPECIFIC EFFORT OF THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, SUCH AS WHETHER WE HAD ANY COMBAT TROOPS THERE AND THE ACTIVITIES OF OUR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ADVISERS. I RESPONDED FRANKLY.

ERHARD QUERIED WHETHER, IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO SEND SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO SOUTH VIETNAM, THIS WOULD INVOLVE US IN A SERIOUS FIGHT WITH RED CHINA. I SAID THAT, IF THE NATURE OF THE WAR CHANGED, WE WOULD RESERVE THE RIGHT TO DO THAT KIND OF THING WHICH WAS EASIEST FOR US TO DO,

PAGE 4 RUFGWP 1052/2 ~~SECRET~~

FOR EXAMPLE INVOLVING PLANES AND BOATS. THE RED CHINESE HAD A MASSIVE LAND ARMY, AND, AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, UNDER GENERAL GIAP, COULD CONQUER THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ON THE GROUND, IF IT WERE NOT FOR THEIR FEAR OF UNITED STATES RETALIATION. IN THE GULF OF TONKIN WE HAD SHOWN THAT WE COULD DO SPECIFIC THINGS WITHOUT DANGER OF ESCALATION.

ERHARD ALSO SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE DIMINISHING ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. I NOTED THAT SOVIET REACTION TO THE BAY OF TONKIN HAD BEEN RITUALISTIC, AND THAT THEY HAD PULLED THEIR ECONOMIC MISSION OUT OF NORTH VIETNAM. PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH, WHO DESPITE HIS COMMUNISM DID NOT WANT TO BE SWALLOWED BY RED CHINA, HAD BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT INCREASING CHINESE DOMINATION. THOUGH HE WAS UNHAPPY ABOUT IT, FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAD TO SUPPORT THE CHINESE POSITION ON THE TEST BAN TREATY.

CHANCELLOR ERHARD ASKED WHETHER WE BELIEVED THAT FRENCH RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA HAD CHANGED THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ASIA. I SAID THAT IT HAD NOT AND POINTED OUT THAT BRITISH RECOGNITION HAD BROUGHT LITTLE ADVANTAGE TO THE BRITISH,

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-3- 1072, AUGUST 26, NOON, (SECTION TWO OF TWO) FROM PARIS

PAGE 5 RUFGWP 1052/2 ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

WHOSE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVE COULD NOT EVEN MANAGE TO
SEE LEADING CHINESE OFFICIALS.

IN MY EARLIER MEETING WITH STRAUSS IN MY HOTEL ROOM,
WE HAD GONE OVER MUCH THE SAME GROUND IN SOMEWHAT LESS
DETAIL. HIS APPROACH WAS NON-TENDENTIOUS AND HE ADMITTED
THAT, WHILE HE AGREED WITH CERTAIN ASPECTS OF DE GAULLE'S
POLICY IN EUROPE, HE FELT THAT HIS CALL FOR NEUTRALIZATION
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WAS WRONG. HE ASKED A NUMBER OF FACTUAL
QUESTIONS- WHICH I BELIEVE I WAS ABLE TO ANSWER TO HIS
SATISFACTION, AND GAVE THE GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS
IN AGREEMENT WITH OUR VIETNAMESE POLICY. IT WILL BE INTERESTING
TO SEE WHETHER THIS IS CORROBORATED BY ANY REPORTS OF OUR
CONVERSATION WHICH EMANATE FROM HIM.

MEMORANDA COVERING BOTH CONVERSATIONS WILL FOLLOW.
END TEXT. GP-3. BOHLEN

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 11:20 AM 8/26/64

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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A-418

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PRIORITY

TO : Department of State 1004 SEP 1 PM 4 02

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INFO: Paris, London, Saigon, CINCPAC for POLAD

ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
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FROM : Amembassy BONN

DATE: August 26, 1964

SUBJECT: Ambassador Lodge's Talks in Bonn on Viet Nam

REF : Embtel 711 of August 24, 1964

There is enclosed a memorandum of Ambassador Lodge's meeting in Bonn with German officials on August 24, 1964. The German officials present were Minister for Special Tasks Westrick (who presided), Finance Minister Dahlgren, State Secretary Langer and Herr Prass from the Economics Ministry, State Secretary Vialon from the Economic Cooperation Ministry, State Secretary Knieper from the Defense Ministry, Herr Marker from Chancellor Erhard's office and, from the Foreign Office, Acting Foreign Minister Lahr, Assistant Secretary Jansen (Political Division I), Herr Bassler (in charge of Far Eastern Affairs), Herr Hoffmann (in charge of American Affairs), von Hardenberg (Acting Chief of the Trade Policy and Development Aid Division) and an interpreter (Weber). Ambassador Lodge was accompanied by the Charge, Mr. Hillenbrand, and the Political Counselor, Mr. Kidd.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

Coburn Kidd

Coburn Kidd
Counselor of Embassy

Enclosure:
Memorandum

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals,
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Authority RAC 00014910

By is NARA, Date 10-29-97

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by:-

POL:CKidd:etc

Contents and Classification Approved by:
CKidd

Clearances:

Coordinated (in draft)
Amb.HCLodge CK The Charge

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Page 1 of Enclosure 1 to
Airgram No. A-418
Amembassy BONN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Ambassador Lodge's Conversation with German Officials
DATE and PLACE: August 24, 1964 - Palais Schaumburg

Ambassador Lodge, accompanied by Charge Hillenbrand, today had a very useful and congenial meeting with almost every official in the German Government who might have anything to do with South Viet Nam (Minister Westrick and Herr Marker from the Chancellor's office, Finance Minister Dohlgruen, State Secretary Langer, and Herr Prass from the Ministry of Economics, State Secretary Vialon from the Economic Cooperation Ministry, State Secretary Knieper from the Ministry of Defense, and Acting Foreign Minister Lahr, with Assistant Secretary Jansen, Herr Bassler, Hoffmann, von Hardenberg, and Weber from the Foreign Office).

Ambassador Lodge said that he would first like to express appreciation to the FRG for the impressive contribution to South Viet Nam which the Germans are now making. The moral and material effect of this assistance meant a good deal more to the struggling new government of South Viet Nam than was realized. There were three aspects of the situation there which he wished to stress: (1) it was not merely a regional problem, but was of world-wide significance; (2) it would be a mistake to relegate the Viet Nam problem to an international conference at the present time; and (3) how we propose to go about this situation to achieve our objectives.

Re (1), Ambassador Lodge referred to the Communist efforts at expansion which had occurred since World War II. These efforts in Greece and Turkey, Korea, Malaya, the Philippines, Viet Nam, had all either been thwarted through such institutions as the Marshall Plan, NATO, and other defensive means, or had at least been dealt with creditably. If we pulled out of Viet Nam, Western Europe could not be indifferent. What self-determination meant was well understood here. Viet Nam was also a case of self-determination. That country had a distinct ethnic character and had the will to exist. If we withdrew, the situation in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines would become immediately precarious. The effect on Sukarno could be readily imagined. The consequences for Australia would be very serious. It would put in question our capacity and will to live up to our commitments in other parts of the world, including Europe, as well. It might well have the effect of driving back

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Page 2 of Enclosure 1 to
Airgram No. A-418
Amembassy BONN

public opinion at home to the old concept of "fortress America". There now exists a deadlock in Viet Nam, with neither side winning.

With regard to the second point, Ambassador Lodge said that we opposed an international conference now, under existing conditions, because we felt that it would amount to a defeat for South Viet Nam in advance. For a government to go to a conference with much of its country occupied by foreign forces on its soil was equivalent to going to a capitulation. Moreover we and the Chinese Communists disagreed fundamentally on the proposition whether Viet Nam should be left alone. A conference would simply amount to a scene for bitter disagreement between Peking and ourselves. We are not opposed to a conference in principle, but considered the time and circumstances important.

With regard to the third point he had mentioned, viz how to go about winning, Ambassador Lodge said he was reminded of a remark which General Bedell Smith had made to Bidault at Geneva in 1954, when Bidault spoke of the necessity of relieving General Navarre because of Dienbienphu. Bedell Smith said that any second-rate General could win in Viet Nam if he had the proper political atmosphere. Our objective was to create a proper political atmosphere. General de Gaulle was incorrect in accusing us of trying to enforce a purely military solution. We believed in a political solution in the broadest sense. Military assistance was necessary to provide security, but the objective was political.

Ambassador Lodge explained how we were faced with a new kind of fighting man in the Viet Cong terrorists. He felt that 90 per cent of the young men in the Viet Cong forces were there because they had been terrorized into it. The terrorists were not defeated with infantry divisions and bombing planes. There was need of a counter-terrorist organization in each precinct, a committee of young men who could carry out a census, issue identity cards, enforce a curfew, comb out the terrorists, and dispose of them. The totality of the population would have to be so organized. The plan is to carry these measures out in Saigon, then in the eight provinces surrounding Saigon. This would cover 40 per cent of the population, and would break the back of the problem. There was no speedy solution. While going ahead locally, one must not shrink from protecting against external pressures from the north, an example of which was seen in the recent Tonkin incident. There was negligible danger of war from such incidents. If we persisted in our counter-terrorist campaign in the south, and hit back in the north, the prospects for victory were good.

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Page 3 of Enclosure 1 to
Airgram No. A-418
Amembassy BONN

Ambassador Lodge had been asked on arrival whether he would be pleased if the FRG provided more aid. He had replied that Viet Nam was a country emerging from twilight. Victory would be achieved when the young men who had joined the Viet Cong felt that it was too dangerous to continue and that a peaceful life on the farm looked good. The struggle was not won merely by killing. Our side had killed 25,000 men in the past two years, and there were now 30,000 arrayed against us. One had to create the right kind of atmosphere. Schools, agricultural help, technical assistance, all this was needed; young doctors and mobile medical teams would stand out. These would be more popular than diplomats.

Describing the country, Ambassador Lodge said South Viet Nam could be rich. They had a food surplus. The Mekong Delta was one of the richest lands in the world. The people were not starving, but there was much misery. There were not enough doctors -- only 700 in a population of 14 million, and 450 of these were in the Army. All of the projects which the FRG was now undertaking were excellent, but many of these did not make much impact on public opinion. Ambassador Lodge concluded by expressing the hope that the Government might give particular consideration to such projects as the medical teams.

Minister Westrick expressed much appreciation for Ambassador Lodge's report. He said he could well believe that work for the Viet Cong was enforced by terror, but how about General Khanh? Was he respected by the people? Would the people be able to keep up the fight out of inner conviction, or would their loyalty gradually be eroded by doubts?

Ambassador Lodge explained that this country had never had an election. Its history was that of a succession of tyrants, then the French came, then Diem, now General Khanh. Khanh is a clever person, one of the ablest professional soldiers that the country had. He knew that politics, economics, and finance were important. He studied, but he was not a great politician; he did not have a very great hold on the people. There was a very great cleavage between country and town in Viet Nam. Some 85 per cent of the population lived in the countryside, and probably most of these simple people did not even know that Diem was dead. The peasant is not concerned with ideology; he is for the man who can give him a night's sleep. Language officers at the Embassy who listened to the conversations in the villages reported that the main subject was whether one would get through the night without being attacked. The main desire

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Airgram No. A-418
Amembassy BONN

of these people was to be left alone. They have never had a political leader in our sense of the word; they have always been ordered around. General Khanh is a kindly man, not a dictator, but not really a political leader. There is hardly any such thing as public opinion yet. Viet Nam is not a modern nation-state, but a collection of some seven or eight ethnic and religious groups. Loyalty is largely to the group. General Khanh cannot demand loyalty to "fatherland and flag" but to a group. The Vietnamese have produced brave soldiers, and the officer corps is improving. Ho Chi Minh had been to some extent an exception; he had got himself known through the mass of the people, but the atrocities of the Viet Cong have turned people against him.

Minister Westrick asked whether there were already a Communist majority in large parts of the south.

Ambassador Lodge replied that on the Camau Peninsula in the extreme south the Communists did have a majority. This was a country always infested by bandits, without roads, which even the French avoided. There were 42 provinces in the country, and the situation varied. As a rough generalization, Ambassador Lodge said that in the countryside perhaps as much as 10 per cent were pro-Viet Cong, 20 per cent pro-Government, and 70 per cent were merely trying to stay out of trouble. All that, however, could be changed.

Minister Westrick asked about the living standard in the north.

Ambassador Lodge replied that we had some fairly reliable evidence on this, especially from the Canadian member of the International Commission. The people in the north did not have enough to eat. Ho Chi Minh used to play Moscow against Peking; he was said to have his "heart in Moscow, his stomach in Peking". Now the Russians have left. Ho Chi Minh sided with the Chinese on the Test Ban Treaty, but he obviously does not wish to be swamped by them.

State Secretary Lahr said he had a question occasioned by the items in the morning's press about Buddhist and student demonstrations in Saigon. This would not appear to be a conflict of Communist and non-Communist, but of right-wing opposition to the Government. The students apparently desired a more democratic regime. How did Ambassador Lodge evaluate this opposition?

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Airgram No. A-418
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Ambassador Lodge said that it was certainly true that the anti-Communist Vietnamese disagreed a great deal among themselves. When he had gone out there, President Kennedy had mentioned the troublesome dilemma of supporting an anti-Communist dictator who was in many respects as bad as a Communist. The atrocities of Diem's brother Nhu were well known: machine-gunning people, taking young girls away; an assassination attempt was inevitable. We did not instigate the coup, but we had put pressure on the Government for changes, and this in turn had encouraged the groups behind the coup. This represented a fight among anti-Communists. In addition, Saigon was a city full of people who wanted to hold the offices themselves and were against anyone else who was holding office.

This country is unstable. Speaking frankly, it was a military revolutionary committee which brought about the reorganization of November 1. Those in power are moving toward democracy, perhaps even faster than they should. General Khanh would like to have elections this year. Man for man the Vietnamese are a clever people, yet one would have to change their whole manner of life to bring them anywhere near a comparable political situation with Western democracy. One must in fact be ready for anything. Khanh could be killed. We might have another period of governmental paralysis. Ambassador Lodge had advised Washington that if Diem had gone on for another month, there might well have been a Communist takeover. Even with a Communist takeover, it might be to the interest of the Free World to stay. In spite of all this, Ambassador Lodge did not think that Khanh was going to be killed, nor would any coup against him succeed. We were lucky to have him, yet we should recognize that it is an inherently unstable situation. But we should not abandon all the unstable situations in the world to the Communists.

Minister Westrick said that before Ambassador Lodge had been good enough to thank them for their economic aid -- which had rather taken the wind out of their sails -- they had prepared some figures on the subject. They were not without a certain pride that in comparison with other countries the FRG appeared to be well toward the top of the list of those giving aid. As the United States had helped Germany in its hour of need, they felt it only right to help an ally when called upon to do so. Minister Westrick enumerated a number of items: the units in the industrial complex in the north, credits for imports, capital for a slaughter house, for a tire factory, bilateral technical help, trade school, advisors for forestry, an ambulance unit, etc.

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Airgram No. A-418
Amembassy BONN

Minister Westrick said that although they felt that they had done a good deal, they will continue with their assistance. They agreed that it was important to show moral support to South Viet Nam.

Ambassador Lodge said he had not come here to ask for things. President Johnson had thought it could be of interest to acquaint his listeners with our views, and he would be glad to answer any questions. He said in fact that the Germans did not appreciate how wonderful they were. All the same, some young German doctors would have a very good effect.

Dr. Jansen said that he believed there was a team of doctors at Hue University. Ambassador Lodge said there was indeed, from Freiburg; he had met them.

Minister Dahlgreen referred to the problem of underdeveloped countries in general, which had been discussed at the time of the visit of Secretary Dillon. Did we make proper use of all the monies we were spending in those countries? Was the slaughter house important, for example, or were there other things which would be much more useful?

Ambassador Lodge replied that in his opinion the medical teams were much more fundamental. Health was basic. Both substantively and psychologically, he felt that the mobile medical teams would have a great effect.

.....(At this point the meeting was interrupted for lunch).....

Resuming the conversation after lunch, Minister Westrick asked whether Ambassador Lodge would not like to hear something about German development aid?

State Secretary Vialon (Ministry for Economic Cooperation), who had joined the group for lunch, explained that their organization was still very young. At present they had teams only in Tanganyika and Libya. They would review soonest, however, whether it would be possible to send young medics to Viet Nam. Their development aid work required much modesty in pretensions and great readiness for self-sacrifice. There was only a small group of young doctors who could be drawn upon. It might take a little time, but the possibility would be excellent. Some 300 young persons were now in training, and 1,000 had expressed an interest. All of these candidates already had finished occupational training; they needed only language and field training.

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Ambassador Lodge remarked that French was not a prerequisite in Viet Nam any more, certainly not for the younger generation. It was desirable, but not indispensable, provided they could speak English.

State Secretary Vialon asked whether some medical experience was presupposed.

Ambassador Lodge said that young medics were better than none at all. In the schools, certainly experienced doctors were required for teaching purposes; but in the teams for the country, medical students would serve. Ambassador Lodge added that advisors in other fields, such as animal husbandry, etc. were also of course highly useful, but he would give doctors the highest priority.

Minister Westrick mentioned that Vietnamese representatives had given a slightly different impression; they had appeared to attach more importance to the slaughter house. Did the Vietnamese Government fully support this priority?

Ambassador Lodge replied that if the Germans would make the decision, he would see to it that it was supported.

State Secretary Lahr said that the feeling in the Foreign Office was that this problem in Viet Nam, along with Cyprus, the Congo, etc., was one of the standing problems. They agreed that this was indeed a world problem, not merely regional. If they in Germany were interested in Viet Nam, it was because, along with Korea and Germany, it was one of the countries divided by Communist domination of a part. The Germans also agreed very much with the concept of self-determination; this was a central point of their philosophy, which, they believed, applied to others as well as themselves. There was agreement, then, in these fundamentals. Consistently therewith, the Government had budgeted assistance for Viet Nam. It might seem small in itself, but it was a large item for the Germans, in comparison with what they were doing for other countries. They had taken what practical steps they could within the limits of their capabilities. There were more than 75 developing countries, and of these more than 60 had received capital aid from the FRG, and more than 70 had received technical aid. The sum set aside for Viet Nam was substantially above the average. Only last week they had promised an additional DM 20 million. There was some question of capacity to absorb this amount, and perhaps some need to go

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Amembassy BONN

slowly. They had reached these decisions largely from the American assessment of the situation, and because they realized how we felt about it. Their assistance was of course of a civilian character; a military contribution was another question. As Minister Westrick had said, however, the Foreign Office felt that it was important to stand by us in this matter.

State Secretary Lahr added that he was glad to hear this morning that Ambassador Lodge did not oppose international conferences as a matter of principle, although the right time and circumstances must be present, which was not now the case. The Germans had great understanding for our point of view. They agreed on the difficulty of dealing with a partner like the Communist Chinese and agreed that the free world must be able to erect a barrier to their further encroachment. The Government would nevertheless be glad when circumstances permitted a conference to be held. The Germans saw that despite our great effort (20,000 advisors) we were still not able to stop the Communists. They had listened with interest to our thoughts about re-enforcing the internal defensive strength by organizing a counter-terrorism. It was difficult for the FRG to judge how far the pre-suppositions for this existed. They wondered whether a certain unanimity was pre-supposed: perhaps it would be necessary to give the Vietnamese greater incentives, both political and moral as well as military. In any event the Foreign Office would continue to give our efforts against Communism in Viet Nam the greatest attention. It was self-understood that the Federal Government would do what it could for us within its limitations.

Ambassador Lodge in replying stated that in the course of his work on foreign affairs, he had had to deal with the Cyprus question at the UN, and he had also had much to do with the Congo problem; but Viet Nam had a very special character, owing to its position on the edge of the Chinese land mass, and the fact that it was the one place where shooting was going on. It was a divided country, yet there was an underlying unity despite the strange shape on the map. Viet Nam was distinct in culture and language from both Laos and Cambodia. Ambassador Lodge said he personally would like to see the free nations sign a piece of paper in support of self-determination for South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam. He greatly appreciated the German support, and understood that this would be of a civilian nature. There was talk of military help from Korea and the Philippines; Australia was giving military help and the UK was giving military advice. Lodge was glad to catch the phrase "We will do more later." He was reminded of Churchill's

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remark "We arm to parley." The question was: How do you go to a conference? - As an equal or as a beaten dog? He was glad to hear State Secretary Lahr say that he appreciated the difficulties of going to a conference now. A very intelligent Vietnamese friend had remarked after the Tonkin incident that if such a thing occurred two or three more times, North Viet Nam would be asking for a conference on the proper terms.

Ambassador Lodge said he had tried to be candid. Our operations were not going as well as we liked. Neither side was victorious. We could not be pushed out. We have had to learn by trial and error. We had begun years ago by thinking of the situation as a military problem, but we had been mistaken. We have accomplished a great deal. Our advisors are changing the country, they are doing something big. The Vietnamese Army is being improved. No colonial relationship is involved. In Malaya the British had had a commanding general, which we have not got. There is indeed no unanimity but history shows that an organized minority who knows what it wants is apt to get its way. That is what is needed. We are determined to stick this out. It has not been a major effort for us. It has cost us 200 casualties in the past 2 1/2 years. In the same period we have lost 8,000 military men in the United States, through accidents and in training. We spend \$1.1 million per day which, for a year, is not quite the cost of one airplane carrier.

Minister Westrick said he had one more question: The Ambassador assumed that the Germans knew more about Viet Nam than they did. He should demonstrate a little more clearly to the Chancellor tomorrow why a conference would be equivalent to a defeat. It was important to the public to know why a conference would not suffice. De Gaulle mentions the necessity of a conference every day. Minister Westrick personally did not quite understand why a conference should be equivalent to capitulation.

Ambassador Lodge said that if there had been a conference last winter on Cambodia it would probably have brought an end to any further military resistance of the people in Viet Nam. It would have destroyed the will to win. When the New York Times had an editorial in favor of the Cambodia conference, the Ambassador had been summoned to the Foreign Office, where he was asked to explain to the Cabinet what it meant. He explained that the New York Times was not the voice of the United States Government. If they felt that way about a conference on

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Cambodia, they would have felt more concerned about a conference on Viet Nam. This war was now being fought in low gear. Either of us -- the Chinese or ourselves -- could change it. The Chinese were cautious. If the war were one in which the United States were making the main effort, one might have a conference, but, as matters now stood, the negotiations would be with South Viet Nam. It was better for the world to keep this a war of the Vietnamese. If we were making the main effort, that would be a new situation, but in that case we would necessarily become involved on the ground. Our military power can be brought to bear on the sea and in the air, but the kind of ground warfare that is being waged there is not easy for us. The plain fact was that North Viet Nam without China was stronger than South Viet Nam without the United States. If the army of North Viet Nam were to invade South Viet Nam, we would have to come in. The South Vietnamese could not possibly deal with invasion by General Giap.

Minister Westrick said that the situation was now quite clear, but the Ambassador had not explained all this earlier.

Ambassador Lodge said that we did not oppose the idea of a conference if held at the proper time and in the proper circumstances. We could see no merit in having one now and felt it would undermine moral. There had already been two conferences on Southeast Asia which the Communists had violated. Before another conference is held, there should be some sign that the Communists will leave their neighbors alone. A conference at present would amount to a surrender. Article X of the Geneva Accords is itself, for example, equivalent to neutralization, yet it has never been observed by the Communists.

Minister Westrick said: "Therefore you are forced to win, but the question is how, in a jungle?"

Ambassador Lodge said that if the North Vietnamese did what they did three weeks ago, the situation could evolve very fast.

State Secretary Lahr said, as they used to say during the war: "Man lebt von den Dummheiten des anderen."

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ACTION: Amembassy MADRID 198 IMMEDIATE

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FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

040

Concur in line you have taken in private and public conversations that present unrest in South Viet Nam cannot deter us from primary goal of resisting Communist aggression and achieving stability in that country. Buddhist and student demonstrations which have forced Khanh to abrogate August 16 Constitution spring from continuing religious tension which is one of numerous critical problems GVN must meet in order to preserve its independence.

We do not RPT not intend to make any public statement here today on the subject of whom we favor in the current crisis. We are taking line that it not appropriate for US Government to comment while Military Revolutionary Council still in session. We are pointing out that Khanh is still head of GVN, and as we have stated many times in past, we continue to support GVN.

Drafted by: 8/26/64

S/VN:MLBreckon:pp

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/VN - MVForrestal

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Bundy

P - Mr. Shverts (in substance)

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Authority: *State Bu 2/20/78*

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FORM 8-63 DS-37 *mmg*, NARS, Date *4/10/78*

MADRID
188

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FYI: Ambassador Taylor has made clear to Generals Minh and Khiem that we strongly favor General Khanh's continuance as head of GVN. August 26 meeting of MRC was inconclusive, and next MRC meeting scheduled to begin 0100Z August 27. End FYI

We shall continue to pass you most important messages from Saigon on situation.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~



OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

Lodge Mission
153

August 24, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: Information Support for Ambassador Lodge's European Mission

Ambassador Lodge's explanation of U.S. policies on Viet-Nam, although directed primarily to European government officials, has received unprecedented public attention. USIS posts in Paris and Brussels report the widest coverage by press, radio and television of the visit and of Mr. Lodge's remarks.

USIS throughout Europe is seeking to give maximum exposure to the Lodge presentation. It set up press conferences and arranged for special TV and radio interviews in France, Belgium and The Netherlands. In Germany he is scheduled for an off-the-record briefing of the foreign press in Bonn, an appearance on the country's top news-feature television show, "Panorama", and a press conference in Munich after he sees Chancellor Erhard.

In addition, USIS is arranging for showings of Troubled Harvest, a 15-minute USIA film on Viet-Nam specially prepared for the European audience and rushed to the field August 14. Reports so far show that the film is being scheduled for network TV showings in Austria, Denmark, Spain and The Netherlands, with probable similar use elsewhere, especially in those countries to be visited by Mr. Lodge. Foreign language versions of the film are being prepared for additional theatrical and special showings.

Carl
Carl T. Rowan
Director

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Decontrolled following
August 24, 1966

154
INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SUBJECT: VISIT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE

IGA

AID

RMR

AMBASSADOR LODGE TODAY HAD VERY USEFUL MEETING WITH ALMOST ALL OF THE OFFICIALS IN OFFICE OF CHANCELLOR, FONOFF, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ECONOMICS MINISTRY, AND MINISTRY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION WHO MIGHT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH ASSISTANCE FOR VIET-NAM.

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 286 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LODGE TANKED THE GERMANS FOR THE CONTRIBUTION THEY HAD ALREADY MADE. IN EXPLAINING THE SITUATION IN VIET-NAM, HE DEVELOPED IN DETAIL THE THREE POINTS:

(1) THAT THIS WAS NOT MERELY A REGIONAL CONFLICT, BUT WAS OF WORLD-WIDE SIGNIFICANCE: (2) THAT IF WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO TRY TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM BY AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT THIS TIME: (3) HOW WE PROPOSED TO GO ABOUT STABILIZING THE SITUATION AND EVENTUALLY TO WIN.

WITH REGARD TO AID, LODGE SAID THAT ALMOST ANY FORM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WOULD USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TOWARD CREATING THE NECESSARY POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN THE COUNTRY, BUT THE PROVISION OF YOUNG DOCTORS AND MEDICAL TEAMS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL. THIS WOULD HAVE THE WIDEST AND MOST DIRECT IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION. THE AMBASSADOR HOPED IT MIGHT RECEIVE URGENT CONSIDERATION.

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- 2 - 711, August 24, 11 P.M. From Bonn

MINISTER WESTRICK REPORTED UPON THE GERMAN ASSISTANCE EFFORT, AND TOOK NO EXCEPTION WITH ANY OF THE POINTS RAISED BY LODGE. LAHR CONFIRMED THIS WITH THE STATEMENT THAT "WE WILL BE ABLE TO DO MORE IN THE FUTURE". LODGE TOLD HIM HE WAS PARTICULARLY GLAD TO HEAR THIS. HE WOULD REGARD IT AS A

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 3286 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MORAL COMMITMENT.

WESTRICK HAD STATE SECRETARY VIALON OF THE MINISTRY FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION EXPLAIN ABOUT THE GERMAN PEACE CORPS ORGANIZATION. VIALON REFERRED TO CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES IN PROVIDING DOCTORS AND MEDICAL TEAMS, BUT PROMISED, WITH WESTRICK'S BLESSING, TO REVIEW THE SITUATION AND SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE.

WESTRICK AND STATE SECRETARY LAHR (FONOFF) HAD A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN VIET-NAM. WAS GENERAL KHANH RESPECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE AND SUPPORTED AS A POLITICAL LEADER? WERE THERE ALREADY COMMUNIST MAJORITIES IN PARTS OF THE SOUTH? HOW WERE LIVING STANDARDS IN THE NORTH? WHAT WAS THE STRENGTH OF THE NON-COMUNIST STUDENT AND BUDDHIST OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME, REPORTED IN TODAY'S PRESS? WOULD GERMAN PEACE CORPS PERSONNEL NEED TO KNOW FRENCH IN ORDER TO WORK IN VIET-NAM? WOULD MEDICAL STUDENTS BE OF ANY USE OR WERE ONLY EXPERIENCED DOCTORS NEEDED? WOULD THE VIET-NAM GOVERNMENT SUPPORT THE PRIORITY FOR MEDICAL UNITS, WHICH THE AMBASSADOR RECOMMENDED?

LODGE ANSWERED THESE QUESTIONS AT LENGTH, DRAWING UPON HIS EXPERIENCE IN SAIGON TO ILLUSTRATE. IN SUMMING UP STATE SECRETARY LAHR SAID THAT THE FONOFF AGREED THAT VIET-NAM WAS WORLD PROBLEM, NOT MERELY REGIONAL. IF GERMANY WERE

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INTERESTED, IT WAS BECAUSE, LIKE KOREA AND VIET-NAM, IT TOO WAS DIVIDED BY COMMUNIST OCCUPATION. THE CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WAS CENTRAL IN THE GERMAN PHILOSOPHY. FRG ASSISTANCE TO VIET-NAM HAD BEEN BUDGETED CONSISTENTLY WITH VIEWPOINT. THEIR ASSISTANCE MIGHT APPEAR MODEST IN ITSELF,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 9 - 711, August 24, 11 P.M. From Bonn

BUT IT WAS LARGE FOR THEM AND ABOVE THE AVERAGE OF THAT WHICH THEY WERE DOING FOR 70 OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (OVER 60 RECEIVING CAPITAL AID AND 70 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE).

ALTHOUGH LAHR ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF TIMING AND CIRCUMSTANCES FOR ANY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, HE APPEARED SLIGHTLY MORE HOPEFUL ABOUT THIS EVENTUALITY THAN AMBASSADOR LODGE HAD MEANT TO SUGGEST. LODGE WENT OVER THE COURSE FOR HIM AGAIN, STRESSING THAT IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A DEFEAT FOR SOUTH VIET NAM TO BE BROUGHT INTO A CONFERENCE NOW. LODGE SPOKE QUITE CANDILY ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION: OPERATIONS WERE NOT GOING AS WE WISHED, NEITHER SIDE VICTORIOUS, LEARNING BY TRIAL AND ERROR; BUT OF OUR CONFIDENCE THAT THE SITUATION COULD BE SAVED AND OF OUR DETERMINATION TO STICK IT OUT. THE LOSSES IN LIVES WERE LESS THAN OCCURED IN THE CONTINENTAL U.S. FOR THE SAME PERIOD THROUGH ACCIDENTS AND IN MANEUVERS, AND THE MONEY INVOLVED IN ONE YEAR WAS LESS THAN THE COST OF ONE AIRCRAFT CARRIER.

IN CLOSING, WESTRICK SUGGESTED THAT AMBASSADOR LODGE MAKE IT DOUBLY CLEAR IN HIS TALK WITH THE CHANCELLOR TOMMORROW WHY A CONFERENCE IS NOT FEASIBLE AND WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT

PAGE 4 RUFHOL 3286 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO CAPITULATION.

THE GROUP WHICH THE AMBASSADOR MET TODAY WAS OBVIOUSLY INTERESTED IN HIS REPORT, AND RECEPTIVE TOWARD HIS SUGGESTIONS. IF THEY DO MANAGE TO ASSEMBLE SOME OF THE MEDICAL UNITS TO WHICH HE ASSIGNED TOP PRIORITY, THEIR TOTAL EFFORT SHOULD APPEAR FAIRLY CREDITABLE.

DETAILED MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION FOLLOWS BY POUCH.
HILLENBRAND
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ *Bundy*

56

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Action

Control:

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Rec'd:

August 23, 1964

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Info

FROM: Copenhagen

SS

ACTION: Secstate 184

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INFO: Ottawa 9

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DATE: August 23, 8 p.m.

~~NSC~~

RMR

FROM LODGE

1. Due Boston September 1 or 2. Planning report to Secretary and President on following Monday or Tuesday September 7 or 8.
2. Pearson statement indicates he expects me in Ottawa. Intend to go there later in week of September 8.

WHITE

CMR/14

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

156 ✓

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FROM: Copenhagen

ACTION: Secstate 183, Priority

INFO: Paris 34
Brussels 8
The Hague 7
Bonn 21
Madrid 5
Rome 7
London 23
Saigon 6

057

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979
By ing, NARS, Date 7-20-79

DATE: August 23, 8 p.m.

PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

Two ideas have come to the fore on my visit to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, The Hague, and Copenhagen:

1. One is the creation of a consortium of nations which would all subscribe to a single statement regarding South Vietnam. This has interested journalists and government officials. It came out of a statement by the Greek representative in NAC who recalled that the anti-Communist forces in Greece in 1945 "operated under the UN, the Security Council, and the GA. These covers of legality helped the morale of the Greek people in terms of international opinion."

2. The other idea is the strong appeal of the proposition that South Vietnam is in truth struggling for self-determination, that it is a country with a distinct civilization, culture, language, art, literature, and peoplehood which wants to have its own national existence of which a giant Communist and expansionist neighbor is trying to deprive it.

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-2- 183, August 23, 8 p.m. from Copenhagen

3. Judging by the change in facial expression and the atmosphere of those to whom I sought to convey this thought, it was all important in bringing favorable decisions in The Hague and in Copenhagen. There is still some magic in the phrase "self-determination."

4. I suggest, therefore, that consideration be given to creating a free world grouping which believes that South Vietnam has the right of self-determination and deserves to be commended, encouraged, and helped in its attempt to achieve it. I do not envisage a governing body and a budget, but a statement by governments most of which are already doing something anyway.

5. Such an act (statement, declaration or communique) would give the effort in South Vietnam the kind of aegis which it badly needs from the standpoint of international public relations. Unlike Greece in 1947 or Korea in 1950, it can not have a UN aegis. A SEATO aegis is impossible for other reasons. The failure of many Europeans to think of South Vietnam as being on a par with the objects of Communist aggression in Berlin or in Korea may be largely due to the lack of such an aegis.

6. Self-determination is hard to oppose. If any questions were raised we could express our willingness to see self-determination also extended to North Vietnam.

7. If something of this sort were done it would make the effort in Vietnam look much less like a unilateral American adventure and much more like the struggle for freedom which it really is. It might thus be rather effective propaganda, discouraging to the Communists and encouraging to the Vietnamese.

8. There might be a meeting, which I think should be in Europe

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-3- 183, August 23, 8 p.m. from Copenhagen

Europe where education on Vietnam is most needed. It would be attended by representatives of governments from the American hemisphere and from the Orient. Many flags should be on exhibit. There should be speeches by newsworthy persons.

9. You may wish to send this idea to the "more flags" addressees (Circular 217) for their comment.

10. Your comments requested.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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P PRIORITY 11 FROM BONN 20TH
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NSC COPENHAGEN FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE
INR THE GERMAN PRESS HAS FOLLOWED CLOSELY AMBASSADOR LODGE'S
CIA VISIT TO EUROPEAN CAPITALS. EDITORIAL COMMENT HERE HAS BEEN
NSA GENERALLY FAVORABLE, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION GIVEN TO STATEMENTS
DOD MADE BY LODGE IN PARIS AND BRUSSELS COMPARING SOUTH VIET-NAM TO
AID BERLIN AS A TEST FOR THE FREE WORLD, AND ARGUING THAT A MILITARILY
SAFE SOUTH VIET-NAM IS THE PREREQUISITE TO AN EVENTUAL POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.
RMR

PAGE 2 RUFKC/2817 UNCLAS

STORIES IN YESTERDAY'S AND TODAY'S PAPERS BEAR THE FOLLOWING
TYPICAL HEADINGS: "NATO COUNTRIES INTEND TO HELP US IN VIET-NAM"
(INDEP GENERAL ANZEIGER, BONN); "CABOT LODGE WAS EXPLICIT"
(INDEP WELT, HAMBURG); "LODGE ARGUES FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION"
(RIGHT-CENTER HANDELSBLATT, DUESSELDORF); "CABOT LODGE INFORMS
NATO" (LEFT-CENTER SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, MUNICH).

SEVERAL PAPERS TODAY CARRY FRONTPAGE REPOTS WITH PICTURES
OF VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR NGUYEN QUI ANH SIGNING AN AGREEMENT
COMMITTING DM 15 MILLION IN GERMAN CREDITS TO SOUTH VIET-NAM.
AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY IN FRANKFURT YESTERDAY TO MAKE FORMAL
THIS FRG AID COMMITMENT, AMBASSADOR ANH HAD WORDS OF PRAISE FOR
"THE SOLIDARITY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE WITH THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH
VIET-NAM." THE CEREMONY HAS BEEN WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN ALL MAJOR
MEDIA, INCLUDING TV. IT IS NOTED THAT THE NEW CREDIT HAS RAISED
THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF AID FURNISHED BY THE FEDREP TO SOUTH VIET-NAM
DURRNG THE PAST THREE YEARS TO DM 95 MILLION.

IN A FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL, THE INFLUENTIAL WELT COMMENTED
TODAY, "CABOT LODGE, AN EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT HIGHLY ESTEEMED BY
BOTH US POLITICAL PARTIES, HAS UNMISTAKABLY POINTED OUT THAT THE
CAUSE OF FREEDOM IS BEING DEFENDED WITH JUST AS MUCH DETERMINATION

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-2-668, August 20, From Bonn -

IN SAIGON AS IN BERLIN. THOSE WHO HAVE OBSERVED CABOT LODGE IN HIS LONG YEARS OF ACTIVITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND AS AMBASSADOR IN SAIGON KNOW THAT THIS MAN NEVER SAYS MORE THAN IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. THEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENTS HE IS NOW VISITING HAVE EVERY REASON TO ABANDON THEIR PREVIOUS ATTITUDE OF COOLLY DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. LODGE HAS POINTED OUT THAT IT IS SELF-EVIDENT THAT THE INDOCHINESE PROBLEM CAN BE SETTLED ONLY BY POLITICAL AND NOT BY MILITARY MEANS. BUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION PRESUPPOSES A MILITARILY SECURE SOUTH VIET-NAM. OTHERWISE, NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS ISSUE WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO YIELDING TO BLACKMAIL BY THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS." WELT CONTINUES, "TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED. LODGE HOPES TO BE ABLE TO CONVINCE AMERICA'S EUROPEAN ALLIES OF THIS FACT. BONN HAS JUST GIVEN SAIGON ANOTHER DM 15 MILLION CREDIT. THIS CREDIT HAD BEEN ON ICE FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. ITS RELEASE MAY BE INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION THAT THE BONN GOVERNMENT FROM NOW ON WILL TAKE A MORE ACTIVE INTEREST IN THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA."

IN A SEPARATE ARTICLE, WELT'S PARIS CORRESPONDENT REPORTS THAT THE STATEMENTS OF AMBASSADOR LODGE HAD "A VERY GOOD RECEPTION"

PAGE 4 RUFKC 2817 UNCLAS

IN THE NATO COUNCIL. "BEFORE THE PARIS PRESS, THE AMERICAN DISPOSED, WITH A FEW WELL-CHOSEN SENTENCES, OF PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S STUBBORNLY REPEATED CALL FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE FOURTEEN SIGNATORIES OF THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS.CABOT LODGE RADIATED CONFIDENCE AND DECISIVENESS, AND THIS IMPRESSION WILL NOT BE LOST ON OTHER (EUROPEAN) AUDIENCES." HILLENBRAND
BT

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

158

53

~~SECRET~~

Action NNNNVV FHE690VV OLA297
PP RUEHCR
SVN DE RUFHOL 2816 20/1757Z
Info P 201737Z ZEA
SS FM AMEMBASSY BONN
G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
SP RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
H BT

1964 AUG 20 017488 PM 3 18

~~SECRET~~

ACTION PRIORITY COPENHAGEN INFO PRIORITY DEPT (667) SAIGON 15
AUG 20 7 PM

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FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE.

Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979

REF: SAIGON.S 2 TO BRUSSELS.

By 128, NARS, Date 7-20-79

THERE HAS BEEN, IN THE PAST, CONSIDERABLE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING
IN GERMANY FOR WHAT IS AT STAKE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. EVEN THOSE
WHO WERE CONSCIOUS THAT THE LOSS OF SOUTH VIET-NAM MIGHT MEAN
THE LOSS OF ALL OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, TENDED TO REJECT THE DESIR-
ABILITY OR EVEN POSSIBILITY OF ANY MAJOR GERMAN ROLE THERE..

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 2816 ~~SECRET~~

LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES, THE GERMANS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE
CHOSEN A COURSE CLOSER TO THAT FAVORED BY THE FRENCH. IT WAS
LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE EFFORTS OF THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY
AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PERSUADE THE
GERMAN GOVERNMENT THAT, AS A LEADING MEMBER OF THE WESTERN
ALLIANCE, THEY MUST MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION. ALTHOUGH
THEY HAVE REFUSED TO CONSIDER THE SENDING OF ANY MILITARY
PERSONNEL TO SOUTH VIETNAM, THEY HAVE INCREASED THEIR ECONOMIC
AID EFFORT DESPITE BUDGET LIMITATIONS AND THE HEAVY PRESSURES
WE AND THE FORCE OF EVENTS HAVE EXERTED UPON THEM IN OTHER
AREAS OF THE WORLD, E.G., EAST AFRICA.

WE HOPE THAT YOUR VISIT WILL DO MUCH TO FIX IN GERMAN MINDS THE
IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM, FOR THEM AS WELL AS FOR US.
THE GERMAN PRESS HAS WARMED UP IN THE PAST FEW DAYS (SEE
SEPARATE UNCLASSIFIED TELEGRAM) AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAS
BEGUN TO PUBLICIZE ITS COMMITMENTS TO SOUTH VIETNAM. ON AUGUST
19, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS EXTENSIVE TV AND PRESS COVERAGE
(ARRANGED BY THE GOVERNMENT) OF THE SIGNING BY THE VIETNAMESE
AMBASSADOR AND A GERMAN OFFICIAL OF THE DM 15 MILLION COMMODITY
CREDIT.

~~SECRET~~

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-2-667, August 20, 7 p.m., From Bonn

IT IS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THAT THE GERMANS HAVE UNDERTAKEN

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 2816 ~~SECRET~~

COMMITMENTS TO SAIGON WHICH TO DATE HAVE AMOUNTED TO CLOSE TO DM 100 MILLION (\$25 MILLION) IN GRANTS AND LONG-TERM CREDITS AND HAVE INVOLVED THE DESPATCH OF SOME 30 OR 40 GERMAN TECHNICIANS TO VIET-NAM. MOREOVER, GERMAN OFFICIALS HAVE ASSURED US THAT THERE WILL BE NEW AID COMMITMENTS ONCE THE EXISTING COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN UTILIZED. THE BASIC ELEMENTS IN THE TOTAL PROGRAM ARE:

1. CREDIT TO NONG SON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX - DM 50 MILLION
2. COMMODITY CREDIT (SIGNED AUGUST 19) - DM 15 MILLION
3. CREDITS FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS - DM 20 MILLION
4. GRANTS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE - DM 8 MILLION

ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US, THIS PROGRAM IS LARGER THAN ANY OTHER ALLY HAS MOUNTED IN VIETNAM. WE ARE SENDING TO YOU IN COPENHAGEN (BY REGISTERED APO) A MORE DETAILED REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PROGRAM.

GP-3.
HILLENBRAND
BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 4:25 pm 8/20/64

Saigon's 2 to Brussels, repeated Department 481.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1964 AUG 20 PM 4 27

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By STB, NARS, Date 10 MAR 76

GEIC488

Action

SVN

RR RUEHCR
DE RUDTBS 09A 20/1745Z

Info

R 201520Z ZEA

SS

FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

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INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT (292) INFO SAIGON 6 BONN
PARIS UNN AUG 20 4PM

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PARIS ALSO FOR USRO

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IO

AMB LODGE'S VISIT TO BRUSSELS.

P

USIA

REF EMBTEL 291

NSC

AMB LODGE MET INFORMALLY AT RESIDENCE AUG 19 WITH SIX IMPORTANT
POLITICAL LEADERS REPRESENTING ALL THREE MAJOR BELGIAN PARTIES.
LODGE REVIEWED PRESENT SITUATION SE ASIA AND OUTLINED STEPS
U.S. TAKING IN SUPPORT GSVN TO PREVENT COMMUNIST TAKEOVER.

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

PAUL STRUYE (PSC) WORRIED ABOUT UNDEMOCRATIC NATURE OF
PRESENT SVN GOVT WHICH HE TERMS MILITARY DICTATORSHIP.
ASKED WHETHER ITS CHANCES OF SURVIVAL ANY BETTER THAN PREVIOUS
REGIMES BACKED BY U.S. AND FRANCE. LODGE AGREED KHANH
CFN 292 6 6 20 4 291 19 PSC

RMR

PAGE TWO RUDTBS 09A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GOVT NOT "DEMOCRATIC" IN WESTERN SENSE BUT EXPLAINED NO
GENUINELY DEMOCRATIC GOVT POSSIBLE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
NO COUNTRY WITH BACK TO WALL CAN BE VERY DEMOCRATIC. HE
STRESSED U.S. AWARENESS THAT CRISIS PRIMARILY POLITICAL
NOT MILITARY. ALL AGREED FEW REAL DEMOCRACIES ANYWHERE.

VAN ACKER (PSB) ADMITTED IGNORANCE OF SE ASIA SITUATION AND
SAID ONLY INTERESTED IN QUESTION OF POSSIBLE WORLD WAR BREAKING
OUT THERE. VOLUNTEERED THOUGHT THAT IT SOMETIMES NECESSARY
DO EVEIL (I.E. TAKE MILITARY ACTION) IN ORDER AVOID GREATER
EVIL. ASKED ABOUT POSSIBILITY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BY NEGOT-
IATION.

LODGE STRESSED U.S. DESIRE AVOID ESCALATION, POINTING OUT

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-2-292, August 20, 4 p.m., From Brussels

STRICTLY LIMITED NATURE RESPONSE TO TONKIN GULF INCIDENT. CONTINUED U.S. NOT OPPOSED NEW CONFERENCE IN PRINCIPLE BUT NOT IN FAVOR UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. AMBASSADOR MACARTHUR REFERRED 1954 GENEVA CONFERENCE, WHICH HE HAD ATTENDED, AND POINTED OUT COMMUNIST INTRANSIGENCE HAD CAUSED THAT SETTLEMENT TO COLLAPSE.

SENATOR HOUARDY (PLP) AND OTHER LEADERS DREW PARALLELS BETWEEN U. S. ACTION IN VIETNAM AND EARLIER RESPONSES COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, SUCH AS BUILDING NATO AND KOREAN WAR.

AMBASSADORS LODGE AND MACARTHUR BOTH EMPHASIZED STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE VIETNAM AS DEFENSIVE KEYSTONE SE ASIA AND U.S. WILLINGNESS SUPPORT FREE SVN AS LONG AS NECESSARY.

IN EARLIER MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER LEFEVRE AND LUNCHEON THAT FOLLOWED WITH HIM AND TOP FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS MUCH SAME GROUND COVERED. PRIME MINISTER CONCERNED PRIMARILY WHETHER VIETNAMESE PEOPLE COULD CONTINUE BEAR STRAIN AND ALSO IF WE COULD HOPE WIN STRUGGLE IN LONG RUN. AMB LODGE REASSURED HIM ON BOTH POINTS BUT NOTED THAT PROGRESS WOULD BE SLOW. HE WAS CRITICAL OF DE GAULLE'S UNHELPFUL STATEMENTS RE SOUTHEAST ASIA. HE NOTED ALSO THAT HE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT SPREAD OF GAULLIST IDEAS TO WEST GERMANY AND GROWTH OF NATIONALISM THERE. CITED RECENT ARTICLE IN GERMAN RELIGIOUS WEEKLY "CHRIST UND WELT" IN SUPPORT HIS CONCERN.

LATER, AMBASSADOR LODGE REVIEWED SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION FOR BELGIAN PRESS CORPS. QUESTIONS POSED BY JOURNALISTS CLOSELY PARALLELED THOSE PRESENTED EARLIER BY POLITICIANS WITH SOME ADDITIONS.

TO QUESTION RE FUTURE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF U.S. AND COMMUNISTS IN AREA, AMBASSADOR ASSURED QUESTIONER U.S. WOULD ALWAYS REMAIN STRONGER.

IN REPLY QUERY RE ADVISABILITY OF REFUSAL SEAT RED CHINA IN UN, AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED UN CHARTER SPECIFICALLY REQUIRED PEACELOVING NATIONS AND THAT PEKING'S RECORD OF AGGRESSION DISQUALIFIED IT.

TO REPORTER ASKING IF AMBASSADOR HAD DISCUSSED CONGO WITH SPAK, AMBASSADOR ANSWERED HE HAD NOT SEEN SPAK AND HAD NOT DISCUSSED CONGO WITH ANYONE HERE.

WHEN ASKED IF HE WERE HERE SOLICIT AID FOR VIETNAM, AMBASSADOR REPLIED IN NEGATIVE BUT THAT IF ANY SUCH AID FORTHCOMING IT WOULD BE MOST WELCOME. GP-4. MACARTHUR

BT

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160

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

30

Action

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONTROL: 17473

SVN

RECD: AUGUST 20, 1964, 3:09 P.M.

Info

SS

FROM: THE HAGUE

G

SP

ACTION: SECSTATE 144 PRIORITY

EUR

SAIGON 7

FE

DATE: AUGUST 20, 7 P.M.

P

USIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC

INR

LODGE VISIT

CIA

FRIMIN MARIJNEN, ACCOMPANIED BY FONOFF STATE SECRETARY DIEPENHORST, CORDIALLY RECEIVED AMBASSADOR LODGE WITH CHARGE, SHOWED KEEN INTEREST IN AMBASSADOR'S FULL PRESENTATION OF VIETNAM SITUATION AND PRESENT NEEDS VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IN DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FIBRE. IN LIGHT OF FACTORS PRESENTED BY LODGE, THEY UNDERTOOK TO

DOD

AID

RMR

CONSIDER MOST SYMPATHETICALLY PROGRAM (A) TO GET SOME DUTCH TECHNICIANS TO VIETNAM PRESUMABLY IN FIELDS REQUESTED BY GVN,

AND (B) TO GIVE FELLOWSHIPS IN NETHERLANDS TO VIETNAMESE STUDENTS. OTHER PRINCIPAL POINTS MADE BY GON OFFICIALS:
A. EMPHASIZED BELIEF GON CURRENT EFFORT TO RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA IMPORTANT TO FREE WORLD AND LARGELY INVOLVED SAME TYPE OF RESOURCES AS NEEDED VIETNAM.

B. GRATIFIED AT CONFIDENCE AMBASSADOR LODGE EXPRESSED IN LEADERSHIP OF GENERAL KHAHN ON WHICH THEY APPARENTLY HAD HAD SOME DOUBT

C. APPRECIATIVE OF IMPORTANCE AMBASSADOR LODGE ATTACHED TO DUTCH DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN SAIGON.

D. WELCOMED AMBASSADOR'S BELIEF FRENCH LANGUAGE NOT REQUISITE FOR TECHNICIANS.

LODGE AND EMBASSY BELIEVE FOREGOING DUTCH RESPONSE MOST GRATIFYING PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF PREVIOUS NEGATIVE POSTURE AND IS TANTAMOUNT TO ASSURANCE SOME TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WILL BE FORTHCOMING, NATURE AND AMOUNT OF WHICH, HOWEVER, STILL UNDEFINED. THEY HAVE CERTAINLY MADE A MORAL COMMITMENT THAT THERE WILL BE SOME DUTCH PEOPLE IN THE FIELD IN VIETNAM.

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Authority RAC 00014912

By is NARA, Date 12-29-97 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ALTHOUGH NO DISCUSSION OF ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE LEFT TO DUTCH INITIATIVE AND EMBASSY IN NEXT FEW DAYS SHOULD SUITABLY FOLLOW UP WITH FONOFF ON IMPLEMENTATION PLANS.

HOWE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

161

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Action RR RUEHCR
EUR DE RUFGRP 813/1 9/2130Z

Info
SS R 192125Z ZEA
SVN FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
SP INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
L RUDTBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
H BT

FE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 ACTION DEPT POLTO
NEA 279 INFO SAIGON POLTO TWO BRUSSELS POLTO 12 NATO CAPS POLTO
IO UNN AUGUST 19 9PM

SMF RE POLTO 271

P USIA ON AUGUST 18 NAC MET IN SPECIAL SESSION TO HEAR PRESENTATION
NSC BY AMBASSADOR LODGE ON SOUTH VIETNAM. (TEN PERMREPS PRESENT
INR INCLUDING FRENCH WHO CUT INTO LEAVE). BRIEF SUMMARY HIGHLIGHTS
CIA THIS MEETING GIVEN SEPARATE MESSAGE. IT OBVIOUS FROM NUMBER OF
NSA QUESTIONS AND PARTICULARLY PRIVATE COMMENTS MADE AFTER
DOD MEETING AND AT LUNCHEON LATER ATTENDED BY REPRESENTATIVES
RMR SEVEN DELEGATIONS, DEBATE WAS EFFECTIVE AND APPRECIATED

PAGE 2 RUFGRP 813/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY ALL.

AMBASSADOR LODGE BEGAN WITH PREPARED STATEMENT, PLACING
SOUTH VIETNAM IN GEOGRAPHICAL, HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVE. (COPY POUCHED ADDRESSEES AND NATO CAPITALS.)
WENT ON TO EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM TO FREE WORLD,
POINTING OUT THAT SUCCESSFUL AGGRESSION FROM NORTH VIETNAM
SUPPORTED BY CHICOMS WOULD CONVINCE LATTER THEIR INTERNATIONAL
POLICY CORRECT; MIGHT INDUCE SOVIETS TO ADOPT MORE BELLIGERENT
STANCE WITH OUTSIDE WORLD; WOULD BE REGARDED EVERYWHERE
AS INDICATION OF INABILITY OR LACK OF WILL FREE WORLD
TO PREVENT AGGRESSION; AND WOULD PRODUCE ISOLATIONIST
REACTION IN US. US HAS THEREFORE UNDERTAKEN TO SUPPORT
VIETNAM BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY AND BELIEVES EVENTUAL
SUCCESS WILL BE ACHIEVED. SUCCESS HOWEVER DEPENDENT UPON
OVERCOMING HOSTILE PRESSURES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
(WHICH SHOULD NOT BE HELD WHILE ATTACKS CONTINUING AND NO
AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO SIDES EXISTS) AND NEUTRALIZATION (WHICH
ALREADY TECHNICALLY PROVIDED FOR BY GENEVA ACCORDS).
NEEDS ONLY CESSATION OF ATTACKS TO BRING PEACE.

ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS THEN SPOKE, EXPRESSING GRATITUDE FOR

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-2- POLTO 279, August 19, 9 p.m. (SECTION I OF III), from Paris

PAGE 3 RUFGWP 813/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
AMBASSADOR LODGE'S STATEMENT AND APPRECIATION OF HIS VISIT. MANY (CANADA, ITALY, GREECE, NETHERLANDS, GERMANY, TURKEY, PORTUGAL AND ICELAND) SPECIFICALLY STATED THEIR SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING OF US ACTION IN GULF OF TONKIN. BALANCE THESE STATEMENTS DEVOTED LARGELY TO QUESTIONS WHICH AMBASSADOR LODGE ANSWERED AT CONCLUSION MEETING.

CANADIAN PERM REP SPECULATED THAT ATTACKS ON US DESTROYERS MIGHT HAVE BEEN MADE TO ADVANCE 14-POWER CONFERENCE OR TO COMMIT USSR TO FURTHER ROLE IN INDOCHINA, BUT MORE LIKELY MADE BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE THOUGHT THAT THERE HAD BEEN SERIOUS DETERIORATION IN SECURITY SITUATION GULF OF TONKIN. DANGER OF SOVIETS GIVING FURTHER COMMITMENT TO NORTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN AVERTED BECAUSE US RESPONSE MADE UNDER BEST CIRCUMSTANCES, I. E., IN REPLY TO ATTACK. THEN ASKED WHETHER WESTERN DIPLOMATIC POSITION MIGHT NOT SEEM TOO NEGATIVE IN OPPOSITION TO CONFERENCE AND WHETHER WEST SHOULD NOT AGREE ON CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH CONFERENCE MIGHT BE HELD.

ITALIAN REP ASKED WHAT STEPS US ENVISAGED NEXT FOR RESTORATION OF PEACE AND WHETHER THESE WOULD BE MORE THAN CURRENT MILITARY MEASURES. BELGIAN REP ASKED (1) WHETHER

PAGE 4 RUFGWP 813/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT HAD IMPORTANT EFFECT IN VIETNAM SITUATION AND (2) WHETHER SUBVERSION FROM SANCTUARIES IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA COULD BE STOPPED WITHOUT NEUTRALIZATION THOSE TWO COUNTRIES.

UK REP CALLED ATTENTION TO IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM TERRITORY AND TO DANGEROUS DRIFT IN BALANCE OF POWER WHICH WOULD GO AGAINST FREE WORLD IF SOUTH VIETNAM AND OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD FALL TO GOVERNMENTS UNDER CHICOM INFLUENCE. EMPHASIZED THAT STRUGGLE WAS IN HEARTS AND MINDS OF MEN AND THAT DIEM REGIME HAD ALIENATED ALL CLASSES. THEN ASKED (1) WHETHER KHANH LIKELY TO OBTAIN NECESSARY PUBLIC SUPPORT AND WHETHER RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES WOULD ALSO MEET PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE; (2) WHETHER WEST COULD DERIVE MUCH COMFORT FROM EFFECT OF SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE IN VIETNAM SITUATION; AND (3) WHETHER RECENT PROCLAMATION OF STATE OF EMERGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS PRELUDE TO MARCH NORTH. RE LATTER POINT UK THOUGHT PROCLAMATION MORE LIKELY SUBSTITUTION FOR ACTION THAN PRELUDE TO IT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- POLTO 279, August 19, 9 p.m. (SECTION I OF III), from Paris

GREEK PERM REP CALLED ATTENTION TO SIMILARITIES IN VIETNAM SITUATION AND GREEK WAR OF SUBVERSION FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES WHICH HAD LASTED 2 1/2 YEARS. EMPHASIZED THAT ELEMENT OF

PAGE 5 RUFOWP 813/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TERRORISM WAS MOST IMPORTANT AND MUST BE WIPED OUT, THAT SEALING BORDERS WAS VERY DIFFICULT OPERATION, AND THAT UN CONNECTION HAD GIVEN COVER OF LEGALITY AND HAD BEEN OF HELP TO MORALE OF GREEK PEOPLE AND IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL OPINION.

NETHERLANDS REP EXPRESSED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN UK QUESTIONS. WANTED TO KNOW HOW FAR POPULATION SUPPORTED STRUGGLE AND WHETHER PRESENT GOVERNMENT WAS RIGHT ONE FOR LOCAL PEOPLE AND FOR US EFFORTS.

QUESTIONS BY GERMAN PERM REP RELATED LARGELY TO NORTH VIETNAMESE MOTIVATION. (1) TONKIN ATTACKS MIGHT HAVE BEEN (A) LOCAL INCIDENT; (B) INDICATION OF INCREASING CONCERN IN NORTH VIETNAM RE US REINFORCEMENTS AND INTENTIONS; (C) EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE; (D) RESULT OF CLOSE PLANNING WITH CHICOMS SO LATTER COULD TEST US DETERMINATION AND BRING ABOUT SHOWDOWN ON SOVIET INTENTIONS; AND (E) EFFORT TO PROVOKE DIRECT MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN ORDER OBLIGE CHICOMS LEND ASSISTANCE. ASKED FURTHER (2) WHY DID NORTH VIETNAM NOT REACT MORE STRONGLY TO US AIR STRIKES; (3) WHETHER US EXPECTED STRONGER REPLY FROM NORTH VIETNAM AT LATER TIME, AND (4) WHAT PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTION HAD BEEN IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

DANISH PERM REP ASKED (1) WHETHER ORDINARY VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ABLE JUDGE ISSUES INVOLVED I.E., FREEDOM LIBERTY, ETC. AND COMMENTED (2) THAT THERE WAS SOME OPINION TO EFFECT US CONSIDERED CAMBODIA LESS IMPORTANT THAN VIETNAM.
GP-4 FINLETTER.
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 11:17 p.m., August 20.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

46

Action

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Info

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RR RUEHCR

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CZCCSB245ZCDGB608

ZCDGB608

RR RKEHCR RUMJIR RUDTBS

DE RUFGWP 813/2 19/2215Z

R 192210Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON

RUDTBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 ACTION DEPT. POLTO
279 INFO SAIGON POLTO TWO BRUSSELS POLTO 12 NATO CAPS POLTO
UNN AUGUST 19, 9 PM

RE POLTO 271

FRENCH PERMREP CONFINED HIMSELF TO BRIEF STATEMENT THAT
FRENCH POSITION RE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WELL
KNOWN AND ALREADY EXPRESSED AT HIGHEST LEVEL AND TO OBSERVATION-
THAT AMBASSADOR LODGE'S STATEMENT WOULD BE READ WITH GREATEST
ATTENTION AND INTEREST.

PORTUGUESE PERMREP MADE POINT THAT SOUTH VIETNAM PART OF

PAGE 2 RUFGWP 813/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GLOBAL STRUGGLE. HE AND OTHER MEMBERS EITHER ASKED NO FURTHER
QUESTIONS OR SAID QUESTIONS WHICH HAD OCCURRED TO THEM HAD
ALREADY BEEN ASKED.

AMBASSADOR LODGE ANSWERED QUESTIONS LARGELY IN FOREGOING
SEQUENCE, NOTING THAT STIMULATING POINTS HAD BEEN RAISED
AND US WAS EAGER FOR NEW IDEAS. RE US POSITION ON CONFERENCE,
ANSWERED CANADA BY SAYING IF VIET CONG WOULD CEASE MURDEROUS
INTRUSION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, WHOLE BUSINESS WOULD BE OVER
AND CONFERENCE COULD BE HELD IF DESIRED TO WORK OUT EQUITABLE
SETTLEMENT BUT AS MATTER OF FACT AGREEMENTS WERE QUITE ADEQUATE
IF IMPLEMENTED BY GOOD WILL. STATED THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE
WOULD GAIN NOTHING BUT BENEFITS, AT LEAST IN WESTERN SENSE,
BY CEASING ATTACKS, BUT WERE PROBABLY IMPELLED BY COMMUNIST
DOCTRINE. SAID THAT REFERENCE BY ITALIAN REP TO KOREA WHICH
NOW SEEM BE REMOTE AREA, THOUGH NOT ACTUALLY SO, RECALLED
STATEMENTS MADE IN EUROPE IN 1950 RE KOREA WHICH NOT REMOTE

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-2- POLTO 279, August 19, 9 p.m. (SECTION 2 OF 3), from Paris

THEN, TO EFFECT THAT UN RESPONSE IN KOREAN CASE WAS TEST OF US AND UN DETERMINATION TO STAND UP FOR FREE WORLD; IN 1964 WEST, HOWEVER, DOES NOT SEEM TO LOOK AT VIETNAM PROBLEM IN THESE TERMS BUT IT IS AGAIN SAME SORT OF COMMUNIST TEST WEST'S DETERMINATION.

PAGE 3 RUFGWP 813/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REFERRING TO ITALIAN AND GREEK STATEMENTS RE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL APPROACH, AMBASSADOR LODGE SAID IT MUST BE RECALLED SOUTH VIETNAM NOT NATION STATE IN WESTERN SENSE. IT WAS ANCIENT CIVILIZATION, WITH TROPICAL DISINCLINATION TO EXTEND BORDERS AND LOYALTY DIRECTED PRIMARILY TO DISPARATE AND LOCAL GROUPS. THERE HAS BEEN SOME INCREASE IN NATIONAL SENSE, BUT LONG WAY STILL TO GO, WITH VARIOUS RELIGIOUS GROUPS MAKING GREATER APPEAL LOCAL LOYALTY THAN NATIONAL FLAG OR UNITY. VIET CONG EXPLOITS THIS LOCAL SENSE AND WOULD BE OUT OF BUSINESS IF COUNTRY BECAME UNIFIED WHICH WE AND GVN MAKING DETERMINED EFFORTS ATTAIN. FOR THAT REASON SOLUTION MUST BE POLITICAL, AND PEOPLE MUST BE BROUGHT TO ADHERE AND LOOK TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT FOR PROTECTION AND SECURITY. THEY WANT NIGHT'S SLEEP AND CESSATION OF THREAT OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE, AND US MILITARY SUPPORT IS IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO AID IN THIS DIRECTION BY FACILITATING STATE OF SECURITY, WHICH MUST BE ATTAINED THROUGH NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTS IF UNITY TO BE ACHIEVED. TERRORISTS HAVE BIG ORGANIZATION SUPPORTING THEM, MADE UP OF TRAINED CADRES FROM NORTH. CONVINCED ADHERENTS FROM SOUTH WITH BULK SIDING WITH THEM

PAGE 4 RUFGWP 813/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THROUGH TERROR. THIS IS DIFFICULT, BUT CAN BE DONE, AND SAIGON REGION IS BEING USED AS CENTER (OIL SPOT) TO GIVE POPULATION SECURITY. ONCE THIS AREA OF POPULATION IN PROVINCES AROUND SAIGON GIVEN SECURITY OTHERS WILL BE EASIER TO HELP.

RE BELGIAN QUESTIONS, SAID SOVIET ACTIVITY AND INFLUENCE IN AREA HAD DIMINISHED SINCE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT; TRUE NEUTRALIZATION OF BOTH LAOS AND CAMBODIA VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE, SINCE COMMIES WON'T LET THEM BE NEUTRAL.

IN ANSWER UK, SAID PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT WILL COME ABOUT BY ADHERENCE POPULATION TO GOVERNMENT IF THEY CAN SLEEP IN SECURITY. KHANH HIMSELF IS IMPRESSIVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- POLTO 279, August 19, 9 p.m. (SECTION 2 OF 3), from Paris

PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, BUT LACKS KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICS AND OTHER FIELDS, BUT IS TRYING TO GAIN KNOWLEDGE IN OTHER FIELDS. HE HAS TAKEN TO MAKING PUBLIC APPEARANCES AND SPEECHES, WHICH IS NOVELTY IN VIETNAM, ALTHOUGH HE CANNOT YET BE DESCRIBED AS OUTSTANDING TRIBUNE OF PEOPLE. BEST ELEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS ARMY, WHICH IS OBLIGED TO DO MANY NON-MILITARY THINGS. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES MAY ENABLE KHANH TO CONCENTRATE ON MILITARY SUBJECTS AND LEAVE OTHER MATTERS TO CIVILIANS.

PAGE 5 RUFGWP 813/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FOR INSTANCE, HE MIGHT HAVE MAU, FORMER FONMIN RETURN FROM LONDON TO HEAD UP CIVILIAN OPERATIONS OF GOVERNMENT. STATE OF EMERGENCY DOES NOT FORECAST MARCH TO NORTH, WHICH SOUTH VIETNAMESE UNABLE TO UNDERTAKE; IT HAS PLENTY TO DO PUT DOWN INTERNAL SECURITY.

AMBASSADOR LODGE EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH POINTS MADE BY GREEK PERMREP. IT WOULD BE GOOD THING IF THERE WERE UN PRESENCE IN VIETNAM, BUT UN HAS NOT STRENGTH TO DO WHAT NEEDS DOING THERE AND VIETNAM NOT IN UN.

RE NETHERLANDS QUESTION, SAID 85 PERCENT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION IS AGRICULTURAL, AND 15 PERCENT LIVES IN CITIES. CLEAVAGE REPRESENTS TWO DISTINCT WORLDS, AND MAIN PREOCCUPATION OF LARGER ELEMENT IS, AS HE SAID, WHETHER THEY CAN GET SAFELY THROUGH NIGHT. ONCE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT COULD ASSURE THIS VIET CONG COULD NO LONGER OPERATE AND GUERRILA WAR WOULD BE OVER.

TURNING TO GERMAN SPECULATION NORTH VIETNAM **MOTIVES**, AMBASSADOR LODGE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT CONCEIVE SECOND NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACK MADE WITHOUT PRIOR CHICOM KNOWLEDGE. MIGHT HAVE BEEN TEST OF US WILL, BUT STRANGE THING TO DO, FOR ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE ADVANTAGE ON LAND, THEREFORE STUPID ATTACK MOST POWERFUL SEA AND AIR POWER IN WORLD. SAID, THEREFORE, ATTACKS MIGHT HAVE BEEN MISTAKE FOR NO EXPLANATION STANDS UP.

GP--1. FINLETTER.
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-O at 4:58 a.m., August 20.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

162

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Action

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1964 AUG 18 PM 8 33

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUJTB/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
RUMJIC/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979

By inf, NARS, Date 7-20-79

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT POLTO 271 INFO BRUSSELS
POLTO 11 SAIGON POLTO ONE AUGUST 18, 10 PM

USIA

BRUSSELS FOR LODGE

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NATO MET IN SPECIAL SESSION AUGUST 18 TO HEAR PRESENTATION BY AMBASSADOR LODGE ON SITUATION IN VIETNAM. (TEN PERM REPS PRESENT MOST UNUSUAL FOR AUGUST.) SESSION BEGAN WITH PREPARED STATEMENT PLACING VIETNAM IN GEOGRAPHICAL, HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND, EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE OF STRUGGLE THERE TO FREE WORLD AS WHOLE, AND REITERATING US DETERMINATION TO FIND POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR THIS

PAGE TWO RUFGWP 758 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DANGEROUS PROBLEM. THERE FOLLOWED QUESTIONS BY MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS ON THEMES SUCH AS POLITICAL AND MILITARY STEPS TO BE TAKEN, ON DEGREE OF SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FOR KHANH REGIME AND ON POSSIBLE MOTIVATION CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND NORTH VIETNAMESE FOR ATTACKS IN GULF OF TONKIN. IN ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS, AMBASSADOR LODGE TOOK OCCASION TO GIVE COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND TO EMPHASIZE US DETERMINATION TO SOLVE PROBLEM BY POLITICAL MEAN USING MILITARY ARMS PRIMARILY AS MEANS OBTAIN SECURITY FOR VN PEOPLE AND THUS ENABLE POPULATION TO ADHERE TO GOVERNMENT, THEREBY MAKING FURTHER TERRORISM IMPOSSIBLE.

FROM EXPRESSIONS OF SINCERE GRATITUDE AND QUALITY OF QUESTIONS ASKED, IT WAS APPARENT THAT AMBASSADOR LODGE'S STATEMENT WAS RECEIVED WITH CLOSE INTEREST AND ATTENTION.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- POLTO 271, AUGUST 18, 10 PM FROM PARIS

(THIS APPRECIATION REITERATED LUNCHEON LATER WITH NAC REPRESENTATIVES WHO MUCH IMPRESSED WITH FACT US REALIZES SOLUTION IS BASICALLY POLITICAL AND ONLY USING MILITARY ARMS TO THAT END.) IN SUMMING UP, SYG BROGIO CALLED PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO US DESIRE FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION,

PAGE THREE RUGWP 758 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHICH SHOWED THAT WESTERN ALLIES' APPROACH TO PROBLEM WAS NOT SO DIFFERENT AND POINT MIGHT SOMEDAY BE REACHED AT WHICH ALL MIGHT AGREE POLITICAL SOLUTION WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

DETAILS WILL FOLLOW IN SEPARATE MESSAGE; COPY OF PREPARED STATEMENT BEING POUCHED TO ADDRESSEES AND ALL NATO CAPITALS.
GP-1. FINLETTER
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Lodge memo
163

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1964 AUG 17 PM 2 25

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AMEMBASSY PARIS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC

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~~SECRET~~ (920) AUG 17, 6 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 00014914

By isa NARA, Date 10-29-97

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LODGE AND I THIS MORNING WERE RECEIVED BY JOXE, ACTING PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, AND CHARLES LUCET. THE DISCUSSION WAS MOST AMICABLE AND LODGE OUTLINED THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM AS HE HAD LEFT IT, EMPHASIZING THE PLANS TO CLEAN UP THE SEVEN PROVINCES AROUND SAIGON IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE TERRORISM, WHICH HE SAID WOULD TAKE APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS TO COMPLETE.

HE ALSO DEALT, IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, WITH THE INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE KHANH GOVERNMENT, STATING THAT MINH HAD SULKED AFTER KHANH HAD TAKEN OVER THE GOVERNMENT AND THAT KHANH

PAGE RUFGWP 699 ~~SECRET~~

FELT THE NECESSITY OF A NUMBER TWO MAN WHO WOULD BE BETWEEN HIM AND THE PEOPLE AND WHO COULD GIVE ALL HIS ATTENTION TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE REPLACEMENT OF MINH BY KHANH HAD ON THE WHOLE BEEN A GOOD THING FOR VIETNAM AND EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS IN NO SENSE ANY COUP.

LODGE ALSO STATED THAT THE U.S. HAD NO OBJECTION TO A CONFERENCE IN PRINCIPLE BUT MERELY THAT WE WISHED TO HAVE THE SETTING SUITABLE FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE. HE SAID HE DID NOT THINK CIRCUMSTANCES NOW WOULD LEND THEMSELVES TO A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE SINCE THERE WAS NO SHADOW OF AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AS TO THE FUTURE OF VIETNAM.

JOXE THANKED LODGE FOR COMING TO PARIS AND FOR THE EXPOSITION WHICH HE HAD GIVEN OF THE SITUATION AS WE SAW IT AND SAID THAT WE WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF LETTING THE COMMUNISTS TAKE OVER VIETNAM, BUT THAT HE MUST TELL LODGE THAT FRENCH VIEWS IN REGARD TO THE SITUATION AND HOW TO DEAL WITH IT NOT ONLY REMAINED UNCHANGED BUT WERE INDEED STRENGTHENED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. HE SAID HE DID NOT SEE THAT THERE WAS ANY HOPE OF A SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES; THAT FRENCH DID NOT SEE WHY A CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE

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-2- 920, AUGUST 17, 6 PM, FROM PARIS

PAGE 3 RUFGWP 699 ~~SECRET~~

ANY CATASTROPHIC EFFECTS AND THAT IN HIS VIEW THE CHIEF QUESTION TO EXPLORE WAS WHETHER OR NOT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WANTED TO SEE A PACIFICATION OF THE AREA OR WERE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN WAR. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT A CONFERENCE WOULD BE ONE METHOD OF BRINGING OUT THESE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS WITH NO GREAT DAMAGE TO THE WESTERN CAUSE.

LODGE REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE ONLY POINT IN WHICH WE REALLY DIFFERED WAS ONE OF TIMING AND THE NECESSITY OF STABILIZING THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE SAID THAT WHAT WE WERE REALLY AFTER WAS TO BRING ABOUT SOME EQUALITY OF FORCE BETWEEN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN VIETNAM BUT WE FELT THAT THIS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME TO BRING ABOUT. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT NORTH VIETNAM IN WHICH LUCET MENTIONED THAT BALL HAD BEEN TOLD THAT SOMETHING OF THE SAME FORMULA COULD BE UTILIZED WHICH HAD BEEN APPLIED AT THE TIME OF THE ORIGINAL GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954.

LODGE SAID THAT 1964 WAS NOT THE SAME AS 1954 AND IT WAS NOT CORRECT TO ASSUME THAT UNITED STATES WAS TRYING TO DO NOW WHAT FRENCH WERE TRYING TO DO THEN. AS TO THE FRENCH VIEW OF NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM LODGE QUOTED BEDEL SMITH AS SAYING AFTER THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN 1954 THAT EVEN A

PAGE 4 RUFGWP 699 ~~SECRET~~

THIRD RATE GENERAL COULD WIN GIVEN THE PROPER POLITICAL SITUATION. OUR AIM WAS NOT A MILITARY SOLUTION, THE CENTRAL AIM OF THE UNITED STATES WAS POLITICAL SOLUTION BUT IN THE ORIENT A PROPER MILITARY SITUATION WAS NEEDED TO BRING IT ABOUT.

IN CONCLUSION JOXE AGAIN EXPRESSED HIS GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THE INFORMATION WHICH LODGE HAD GIVEN HIM AND ALSO FOR THE TROUBLE HE HAD TAKEN TO VISIT PARIS.

COMMENT: THE CONVERSATION THROUGHOUT WAS ENTIRELY AMICABLE AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRENCH POSITIONS AGAIN EMERGED CLEARLY. JOXE WAS PERHAPS MORE INCLINED TO PUT A QUESTION MARK IN FRONT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS THAN I HAD HEARD FROM OTHER FRENCH OFFICIALS, BUT IN ESSENCE THE POSITION WAS THE SAME. GP-3. BOHLEN
BT

~~SECRET~~

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✓ Bundy

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Info:

ACTION:

AmEmbassy PARIS 908

Aug 17 4 38 PM '64

FOR LODGE FROM FORRESTAL

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Ref Embtel 909

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21

Am having several Saigon cables repeated you giving Saigon's assessment events over week-end and am also asking Saigon repeat policy cables to you.

No basis for press statements re "new formula" nor preparations regarding NVN. These stories probably refer to joint U.S./GVN council for implementation pacification program set up several weeks ago. FYI only. Joint planning for contingencies between MACV and GVN military authorized several weeks ago. George Roberts can give you background. END FYI.

At first blush new government arrangements seem improvement in giving Khanh somewhat more control, but we do not have full details on ix changes civilian ministers.

DECLASSIFIED

END

Authority

RAC 00014915

By us

NARA, Date 10-29-97

RUSK

S/VN;MForrestal:caw 8/17/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Michael V. Forrestal - S/VN

Clearances

S/S - Mr. Davies

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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57

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ACTION: **CIRCULAR 301 PRIORITY**

Aug 15 4 06 PM '64

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Amembassy THE HAGUE
Amembassy COPENHAGEN
Amembassy BONN
Amembassy ROME
Amembassy MADRID
Amembassy STOCKHOLM

INFO: Amembassy BERN
Amembassy DUBLIN
Amembassy LISBON
Amembassy LUXEMBOURG
Amembassy OSLO
Amembassy VIENNA
Amembassy SAIGON
Amembassy OTTAWA
Amconsul MUNICH

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter FEB 14 1979
By inf, NARS, Date 7-20-79

Dept appreciates prompt reply by action addressees Depcirtel 277 re Amb Lodge's trip to Europe. On basis these replies following tentative itinerary and schedule have been prepared and approved by Amb Lodge, subject to further adjustment as necessary following his arrival Paris:

Sunday Aug 16. Fly to Paris via TWA 802 arriving 2155 hours, accompanied by Amb Finletter, Mrs. Lodge, FSO George Roberts, and

Drafted by:

EUR:RCCreel/hm 8-15-64

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

EUR - Richard H. Davis

SVN - Mr. Roberts
S/S - Mrs. Davis

Amb. Lodge (by phone)

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Miss Marilyn Army.

Monday Aug 17. Call on Acting PriMin (and FonMin) Joxe. Lunch with Ambs Bohlen and Finletter and General Smart.

Tuesday Aug 18. Meet with NATO SecGen Brosio at 1045 and with special session NAC at 1100. Afternoon available for meeting with press and possibly French radio-TV.

Wednesday Aug 19. Proceed Brussels for meeting with FonMin Spaak if available (Brussels' 258). Also willing as suggested meet with small groups of prominent political leaders of various parties and leading editors. Overnight Brussels (Astoria Hotel).

Thursday Aug 20. Proceed The Hague for meeting with PriMin (and acting FonMin) Marijnen. Overnight The Hague.

Friday Aug 21. Proceed Copenhagen for meetings with PriMin Krag and FonMin Haekkerup Aug 21 or 22 depending on availability. Amb Lodge welcomes Amb Parsons' suggestion latter come down from Stockholm for purposes indicated Stockholm's 159.

Monday Aug 24. Proceed Bonn to call on Minister Westrick and State Secy Carstens. Amb Lodge appreciates Amb McGhee's offer of residence but would prefer stay at hotel.

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Tuesday Aug 25. Proceed Tegernsee via Munich to see Chancellor Erhard. Overnight Munich. Assume Emb Bonn and ConGen Munich can make all arrangements.

Wednesday Aug 26. Proceed Rome from Munich to see PriMin Moro and FonMin Saragat. Amb Lodge agreeable to suggestion luncheon Aug 26 or Aug 27 to meet key FonOff and political figures. Overnight Rome Aug 26 and 27 (Grand Hotel).

Friday Aug 28. Return to Paris for calls on PriMin Pompidou and Couve de Murville if available then.

Saturday Aug 29. Proceed San Sebastian via Biarritz for lunch with Spanish FonMin Castiella and Amb Woodward. Return Paris via Biarritz either afternoon Aug 29 or Aug 30.

Monday Aug 31. Proceed London to see any of personalities listed London's 758 who may be available. Spend Sept 1 in London for same purpose.

Wednesday Sept 2. Return to US. (Visit Ottawa later.)

Action addressees are reminded above tentative schedule may require some adjustment, depending on various relevant factors in individual capitals, following Amb Lodge's arrival Paris. If addressees perceive any serious objection from their own standpoint to schedule as outlined,

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they should communicate urgently with Emb Paris (attention FSO George Roberts) Monday Aug 17. Otherwise they should proceed make arrangements on tentative basis pursuant above schedule.

Amb Lodge would prefer no dinner parties be scheduled unless posts feel this would serve some really essential purpose.

END

GP-3

RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

166

Memo's & Misc.

—

Dai Viet party of South Vietnam

- Established 1930 as an offshoot of the Nationalist Party.
- Has little popular base.
- Is divided into two major factions, one in the north, one south.
- Southern faction leader is Hoan, who was in Paris until about the time Khanh came in to power.
- Most leaders of the southern faction are Catholics and the Buddhists try to label the Dai Viets as a Catholic party.
- Present outlook is strongly nationalistic and anti-Communist but not entirely pro-West.
- Diem had little to do with the party and it did not support him.

168 F

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP 8/29			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Mr. Smith, White House S		
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ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<p>Remarks:</p> <p>Attached is a brief biography of Oanh prepared in February. It is my understanding that another was laid on a day or so ago. We'll ship it down when it comes out. Our desk analyst tells me that this Oanh is not known to have any political affiliation. Khanh has been complaining about Oanh's inability to work with other ministers. Whether this is true is an open question. Pretty generally cooperative with American officials. Savvy about economic matters, but leadership qualities unknown.</p>			
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FORM NO. 2-61 237

Use previous editions


U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 O-587262

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

NGUYEN XUAN OANH

Vice Premier, Minister of Finance

Nguyen Xuan Oanh, a Harvard-trained economist and an expert on fiscal policy, was named Vice Premier in charge of Economy and Finance on 8 February 1964. Sometime after the November coup headed by General Duong Van Minh, Oanh was asked by the government to return to Vietnam from the United States, where he was working as an International Monetary Fund expert. At the request of Prime Minister Nguyen Ngoc Tho, he assumed the position of Special Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs in the Premier's Office in mid-December 1963. Shortly after becoming Tho's adviser on economic matters, Oanh was given the concurrent assignment of Governor of the National Bank.



Born on 14 July 1921 in Tonkin province, North Vietnam, Nguyen Xuan Oanh worked as a technician with the US Army occupation forces in Japan from 1946 until 1948. In this position, he was placed in charge of several phases of administration of the local economy: interurban and municipal transportation, public utilities, communications, and allocation of scarce resources. Evidently his record of achievement in this position helped Oanh to receive a study grant in the United States through the Economic Cooperation Administration. He first came to the United States in September 1951, when he began studying for his master of arts in economics at Harvard. By 1953 he had completed his doctorate, specializing in monetary and fiscal policies with special reference to international economic relations. After receiving his degree, he reportedly taught college for six years, although it is not known whether he returned to Vietnam or found a position in the United States. He was employed by the International Monetary Fund for three years.

Oanh undoubtedly speaks English well. *Known to his US friends as Jack Owen.*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIAA 6/15/76
By my, NARS, Date 7/15/76

10 February 1964

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

-13-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

P

4545
Mr Bundy
169 F S

TO : The Secretary
FROM : P - James L. Greenfield
SUBJECT : American Opinion on Viet-Nam
and Related Topics, August 20-26

August 27, 1964

Kaleidoscopic developments in South Viet-Nam have provoked unusually heavy discussion this week. The opinion highlights are summarized here; a fuller analysis is attached.

- 1 - The violent demonstrations in the big cities of South Viet-Nam have evoked grave concern about the future of the war effort, as well as the stability of the Khanh government.
- 2 - Editors commended Gen. Khanh for his attempt to placate disgruntled groups, but they tended to feel that a government that cannot cope with "student" rioters cannot cope with the Viet-Cong.
- 3 - Among the "depressing effects" of the civilian explosions, observers see: encouragement of the Communists, attrition of American staying power; increased pressure for a negotiated settlement.
- 4 - Press and political speculation that the U.S. may be shifting toward a policy of negotiated settlement has been heightened by revelation of a CIA document asserting that some kind of neutralization "is the only solution in Viet-Nam."
- 5 - Some advocates of a political settlement have cited the Tonkin Gulf action as evidence that we can negotiate from strength.
- 6 - Opponents of neutralization continued to warn that neutralization of only South Viet-Nam "could undermine the whole Western position on the Asian mainland."

P/POS:HSF:em

American Opinion Summary

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169a

Department of State

FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT USE

August 26, 1964

VIET-NAM AND RELATED TOPICS

Kaleidoscopic developments in South Viet-Nam have provoked unusually heavy discussion this week, and there has been continuing editorial debate on aid to Indonesia.

- 1 - The violent demonstrations in Saigon and other big cities in South Viet-Nam have evoked grave concern about the success of the war effort, as well as the achievement of a stable government in South Viet-Nam.
- 2 - Editors generally commended Gen. Khanh for his attempts to placate disgruntled groups; at the same time they stressed that a government that cannot cope with "student" rioters cannot cope with the Viet Cong.
- 3 - Among the "depressing effects" of the civilian explosions observers see: encouragement of the Communists, attrition of American "staying power"; increased pressure for a negotiated settlement.
- 4 - Press and political speculation that the U.S. may be shifting toward a policy of negotiated settlement has been heightened by revelation of a CIA document asserting that some kind of neutralization "is the only solution in Viet-Nam."
- 5 - Advocates of a political settlement have been vocal this week, citing the Tonkin Gulf action as evidence that now we can negotiate from strength, and the CIA document as proof that the time has come to find out whether both sides can "end this wasting confrontation" by negotiation.
- 6 - Opponents of neutralization continued to warn that the only settlement to which North Viet-Nam would agree would be neutralization of the South alone, which would leave it to the mercy of the Communists, and "could undermine the whole Western position on the Asian mainland."

Public Opinion Studies Staff • Bureau of Public Affairs

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Saigon, Other
Demonstrations

Gen. Khanh's difficulties with student and Buddhist demonstrators gave observers a "Here's where we came in" feeling, as they recalled gloomily that a short year ago similar demonstrations were aimed at the Diem regime (William R. Hearst, Jr., AP's Malcolm Browne, Scripps-Howard's Friedenberg, Beverly Deepe of N.Y. Herald Tribune).

This time, however, most saw "little evidence supporting Buddhist charges of suppression," and considerable evidence to indicate Communist agitators are helping incite the riots (N.Y. News).

Khanh's "capitulation" to the demands of the demonstrators, and the "growing anti-American leanings" of the students and Buddhists are viewed with alarm by many observers (e.g. Ray Cromley in Scripps-Howard's Wash. News).

"Unless Khanh puts down the spreading riots by a few thousand self-styled students, he has come to the end of the road," said the Washington Star. "If he will not use the necessary force to crush the rioters, then he is doomed and we strongly suspect the war effort is doomed with him. A government which cannot cope with student rioters certainly cannot cope with the Viet Cong."

Similar reactions were voiced by the Denver Post, Washington Post and the Baltimore Sun. "Khanh's withdrawal from the presidency throws the country into the kind of disorder from which the Communists extract the most profit," the Sun declared. "It is not enough to win the war in the jungles, if it is to be lost in Saigon." The resort to violence and disorder "seems even more of a menace to future freedom of the citizens than the strict temporary rules of the military regime," to the Washington Post. "Extremism in the defense of freedom, in this case, seems dangerously likely to cost the South Vietnamese what little freedom they have left" (similarly, Louisville Courier-Journal).

In seeking to "placate disgruntled civilian groups," the N.Y. Herald Tribune contended, "Gen. Khanh can rightly demand something in return--responsible and orderly conduct. The violence suggests extremist and Communist elements have deeply penetrated the student and Buddhist movements. Both should purge themselves of these elements."

It may not be possible to save the South Vietnamese from Communist oppression and tyranny, several assert, without more help from the South Vietnamese themselves (W.R. Hearst, Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times). "The crisis is unlikely to be resolved unless the military cease feuding and bring leading Buddhists and

Catholics into a broadened government," the New York Times concluded. "Clearly," it warned, "unless the current power struggle in Saigon is brought to an end quickly, its participants may find they have lost the country whose control they have been disputing."

CIA Report The "leaked" CIA paper, which expressed "serious doubt that victory can be won" in Viet-Nam and predicted "some kind of negotiated settlement based on neutralization" will be the eventual outcome, was immediately assailed by Republican and nationalist press sources (N.Y. Herald Tribune, Chicago Tribune, N.Y. News). Sen. Goldwater departed from the prepared text of his VFW speech to warn: "We should prepare ourselves for an announcement in the very near future of a negotiated peace. If it's the kind of peace we negotiated in Laos... I think we should take a long, hard look at it. If it is consent to neutralization, it's an open door to Communist infiltration."

Terming it "a defeatist document," the New York News protested "it can only hurt the morale of South Vietnamese anti-Reds, and of our 'advisers' over there, and encourage the Hanoi, Peking and Moscow Reds to believe the White House is moving to pull the rug out from under Saigon." The News hoped Sen. Goldwater "will hammer on this matter until he forces a full explanation from the White House, the Pentagon, CIA and State."

The Chicago Tribune revived its charge of "managed news". The Administration "tells the people one thing while its secret intelligence estimates tell a story quite the opposite," this paper complained. "We should think a campaign issue would be whether this administration can be trusted at all."

The New York Herald Tribune, noting the Administration's denial that the paper represents "either government or CIA policy", asserted: "We hope not, because its extremely pessimistic evaluation, repeating President de Gaulle's proposal of 'neutralization', has been rejected by Washington as a move toward surrendering the region to the Communists."

But supporters of a negotiated settlement argue that, if the study was not representative of high-level Administration thinking, "it should be" (New York Post and Times). The Times added that there should be "a full, frank, realistic report on the facts which led to this CIA assessment, so the country can judge for itself whether the administration is right to reject it."

Negotiation Advocates of a negotiated settlement for Viet-Nam see their position strengthened by several recent developments. Some argue that we have made it clear we are in a position to "negotiate from strength" by our Viet-Nam military buildup and the Tonkin Gulf action, and that there should be a parallel diplomatic effort to "explore an accommodation that protects South Viet-Nam's independence" (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, N.Y. Times, Lippmann).

There is some tendency to interpret envoy Lodge's Paris and Brussels statement that "our goal is a political solution" as indicating that "a shift in U.S. policy" is in the making--toward acceptance of a new international conference on Southeast Asia to discuss a political settlement (U.S. News & World Report).

Sen. Bartlett (D-Alaska) cited the arguments of his colleagues, McGovern (D-S.D.) and Nelson (D-Wis.), that there is need for "development of other options for American policy in Vietnam. Diplomatic and political solutions may be possible...and if we can achieve peace and freedom by this method, we should be more than willing to 'walk the last mile' in search of a peaceful settlement."

We must "make our readiness to negotiate credible," the Post-Dispatch insists. In reviewing the 1954 Geneva accords, this paper maintains "it is not quite true to say the United States' one consistent aim has been to secure observance of these agreements. These stipulated that the military demarcation line was not to be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary, which it has become. A prompt 'political settlement' was envisioned. The conflict in Viet Nam is a civil war with outside assistance being furnished to both sides in violation of the agreement."

In due time, wrote John Gange (Univ. of Oregon) of our "Misadventure in Vietnam", we must "face up to: (1) our dubious legal position in South Vietnam; (2) the soundness of our continuing passivity toward a strong role for the UN in Southeast Asia strife; (3) a new look at neutralization of 'border' areas between East and West in Asia; (4) a hard review of all our interests in Asia, eventually in conference with Communist China; and (5) abandoning the shibboleth of containing communism along artificial latitudes or longitudes" (in The Nation).

Richard Rovere asserted that "if and when the day comes that an effective anti-Communist government is established in South Viet-Nam, the U.S. will urge Saigon to enter into immediate negotiations with its neighbors--through the UN

or some specially convened group of interested powers. This is the view substantially held by Pres. Johnson, Senators Fulbright and Humphrey, Amb. Lodge and Amb. Taylor. It is the view that prevails in the Defense and State Departments, where it would be hard to find anyone who favors extending the war or who defines 'victory' as anything more grandiose than a return to the status quo ante" (in New Yorker).

According to the press, Sen. Goldwater, at his "seagoing press conference" in California, said that any peace negotiations now under way, and he felt in his "political bones" that some were, must also include the Red Chinese. This did not imply recognition of the Chinese Reds, or even face-to-face negotiations, the Senator added quickly. "We can tell the Red Chinese we don't want their land. I wouldn't say I'd be willing to sit down with them. You always have someone else do that for you," the Republican nominee explained. "It's worth a thought. I don't know if I'd advocate it." He stressed, however, that "before this administration makes any settlement with the Viet Cong, it must show an improved military posture there. We should interdict their supply lines and make the Chinese recognize we can go further." While ruling out the reconvening of the 1954 Geneva conferees, he seemed to suggest that negotiations might be initiated through the UN.

Skeptics continue to argue that "the Communist terms" for a negotiated settlement--American withdrawal and a conference to neutralize only South Viet-Nam--have not changed, and are unlikely to. This arrangement, they hold, "would leave the south to the mercy of the Communists when they were ready to move, and conceivably could undermine the whole Western position on the Asian mainland and lead to Chinese domination of the continent" (William Ryan of AP).

"It would be nice," said the Flint (Mich.) Journal, "if we could be sure that a negotiated settlement could be reached with the Communists and it would be even nicer if we believed we could then rest assured that the agreement would be honored. There is a sneaking suspicion that the best we can hope for is a standoff similar to the one we reached in Korea."

Politics and Viet-Nam Republican attacks on U.S. policy in Viet-Nam continue, abetted by some press supporters. At the same time, there are also objections to the level of the political debate. The campaign must not become a "saber-rattling contest," warned the Washington Star, questioning key-noter Pastore's reference to the "sting of President Johnson's determination" at the Gulf of Tonkin.

Sen. Goldwater's charge that Pres. Johnson's "advance warning" on TV shattered the "element of surprise" in the Tonkin Gulf attack, indicating that "the safety of our airmen was not the primary concern of such an advance warning," provoked sharp disapproval. "An ugly allegation" which totally disregards the facts, many protested (Wash. Post and Star, N.Y. Post, Chicago Sun-Times, Milwaukee Journal, Robert Spivack in N. Y. Herald Tribune, Richard Starnes in Scripps-Howard press).

Meanwhile, Republican criticism seems to follow a fairly well-defined pattern:

The Administration is pursuing the same type of "no win" war in Viet-Nam as we fought in Korea. "American lives, resources and prestige are going down the drain without so much as a victory target in Viet-Nam" (Sen. Dirksen, Rep. Chamberlain of Mich.; St. Louis Globe-Democrat).

"Confusion over American policy in Viet-Nam is partly due to the fact that the Administration has one eye on the election, instead of both eyes on the affairs of this nation. The 'treadmill' policy in Viet-Nam is due to the administration's desire to postpone a decision on Southeast Asia until after the election" (Rep. Halleck of Ind.).

The American public is not being told the truth about what is happening in Viet-Nam (Sen. Goldwater, Chicago Tribune).

The "measured" show of force at Tonkin "provides no solution for the whole Viet-Nam mess. The Communists still wage war from a privileged sanctuary" (Dirksen; Globe-Democrat).

"Withdrawal of the U.S. destroyer patrol after the Tonkin counterattack lends weight to Sen. Goldwater's charge that the administration misleads the enemy by backing away at critical times and showing weakness rather than strength" (Portland Oregonian).

Administration spokesmen have emboldened the Communist camp by creating abroad the impression that we would not, in any circumstances, use the atomic arsenal of tactical and strategic weapons that we have spent so much money and effort in creating (Cincinnati Enquirer).

The Democratic foreign policy platform is hit for its "blandness" (Chamberlain in Hearst press), for being "basically chicken" in concept (N.Y. News), and for contributing "little that is new or penetrating" (Wall St. Journal). The platform asserts, said the Journal, that the world is closer to peace today than in 1960,

"but the U.S. is at war in Vietnam and it is not winning even in the limited sense of halting the Communist incursions (because) of the political instability in South Vietnam."

Republican platform chairman Laird charged that the Democratic platform "deliberately evades almost every issue that confronts the American people....There is no expression that we mean to win in Southeast Asia; there is not even an indication that they believe we could win if we had the will."

Administration supporters take issue with the "no win" charge, asserting that it has never been "the official policy of the U.S. to obtain the 'unconditional surrender' of either the Soviet Union or of communism. Three administrations have pursued an official strategy of seeking a limited success through limited means," said Joseph Harsch, "while the seeds of destruction within communism itself work to the advantage of the free world."

Indonesia The Senate-passed aid-bill amendment, forbidding all assistance to Indonesia, continues to provoke controversy. It should be "killed in conference with the House," the Louisville Courier-Journal and Newark News contended. "It would leave Indonesia only one place to go--to Peiping--and would deprive the Administration of its flexibility to lay down 'certain conditions' for the resumption or the increase of aid" (also, Long Island Newsday).

Others, however, applauded the Senate action. "We've been trying bribery and cajolery and appeasement for 16 years in vain," said the Chicago Tribune. Sukarno "trots along with the Communists like a tame poodle," the Chicago American declared. "He is a self-serving dictator, who has made Indonesia a nakedly aggressive and imperialist power" (similarly, Boise Statesman).

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You have seen
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RESUME OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
TELECON WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND
25 AUGUST 1964

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD ltr. 4/23/76

By rmg, NARS, Date 6/28/76

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QUESTION

WHAT IS KHANH'S STATUS AT THE MOMENT? IS HE STILL CLEARLY LEADER OF THE WAR EFFORT?

ANSWER

THE ABROGATION OF CHARTER 11 AUGUST APPARENTLY LEAVES THE MRC AS ONLY AUTHORITY BODY WITH KHANH AS ITS CHAIRMAN. HE IS THEREFORE IN EFFECT THE LEADER OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE FULL MRC IS EXPECTED TO MEET TOMORROW TO ELECT A CHIEF OF STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCLAMATION ISSUED TODAY. IT IS EXPECTED THAT KHANH WILL BE ELECTED; HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT CERTAIN. KHIEM TOLD TO ME THIS EVENING THAT BIG MINH HAD MADE HIMSELF AS A CANDIDATE. BIG MINH ALLEGES THAT KHANH HAS GIVEN IN TO THE BUDDHISTS AND THEREFORE WILL BE UNDER THEIR CONTROL; WHEREAS HE, MINH CAN RESIST THEIR INFLUENCE AND PERSUADE THEM. UNTIL REPLACED BY THE ELECTION TOMORROW, KHANH IS DEFINITELY THE LEADER OF THE WAR EFFORT.

THE FOLLOWING PROCLAMATION OF THE MRC MAY BE HELPFUL:

"THE MRC, CONVENED THIS MORNING 25 AUG 64 AT THE CINC HQ, ARVN, HAS DECIDED THE FOLLOWING:

FIRST: THE 16 AUG CHARTER IS RESCINDED.

SECOND: THE CONGRESS OF THE MRC WILL BE CONVENED WITHOUT DELAY TO RE-ELECT THE CHIEF OF STATE.

THIRD: AFTER THE RE-ELECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STATE, THE MRC WILL DISBAND ITSELF AND WILL RETURN TO ITS PURELY MILITARY POSITION TO FIGHT AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS, NEUTRALISM, COLONIALISTS AND ALL FORMS OF DICTATORSHIP AND BETRAYAL.

FIFTH: IN THE MEANTIME, THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NATION WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE EXISTING" (GOVERNMENT)

SAIGON, 25 AUGUST, 1964
FOR THE MIL. REV. COUNCIL
THE STEERING COMMITTEE

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QUESTION

WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF HIS RESIGNATION AS PRESIDENT ON OUR OBJECTIVES IN SVN? ON THE MILITARY EFFORT? ON THE STUDENT RIOTS AND BUDDHIST PROBLEM?

ANSWER

1. I CALLED ON GENERAL KHIEM AT 1915 HOURS TO EXPRESS CONCERN OVER AN INCIDENT IN DA NANG THIS AFTERNOON WHEREIN A MOB OF BUDDHISTS LOOTED AND DESTROYED A CATHOLIC SETTLEMENT. GENERAL THI, THE ACTING CORPS COMMANDER IN THE ABSENCE OF GENERAL XUNG, STOOD BY AND PERMITTED THIS INHUMANE ACT. THE TROOPS NOT ONLY FAILED TO CONTROL THE MOB BUT REPORTEDLY PARTICIPATED. KHIEM STATED THAT HE HAD HEARD ABOUT THIS AND HAD SENT GENERAL XUNG BACK TO HIS CORPS WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO RESTORE ORDER. WHEN ASKED WHY GENERAL THI HAD NOT EXERCISED HIS AUTHORITY, HE STATED THAT HE WAS AFRAID OF THE BUDDHISTS AND WISHED TO CURRY FAVOR WITH THEM.

2. AFTER AN EXPRESSION OF CURIOSITY ON EVENTS OF THE DAY AND DIRECT QUESTIONING, GENERAL KHIEM IMPARTED TO ME THE FOLLOWING:

A. THIS MORNING A STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE MRC MET TO CONSIDER THE DEMANDS MADE BY THE BUDDHISTS IN PERSONS OF THI QUANG, THICH TAM CHAU, AND THICH THIEN MINH. PRESENT WERE KHANH, KHIEM, THIEU AND THE FOUR CORPS COMMANDERS, XUNG, THRI, TAM, AND DUC. HE STATED THAT THIS GROUP HAD BEEN PERSUADED BY KHANH TO ACCEPT AND THE DEMANDS OF TRI QUANG AS SPOKESMAN FOR THE BUDDHISTS. HE MENTIONED AMONG THE DEMANDS THE ELECTION OF A NEW CHIEF OF STATE, DESOLVEMENT OF THE MRC, AND TENURE FOR THE NEW CHIEF OF STATE OF ONLY ONE YEAR, HIS SUCCESSOR TO BE CHOSEN BY POPULAR ELECTION, ADDITIONALLY, TRI QUANG HAD NOT REPEAT NOT AGREED TO DENOUNCE THE COMMUNISTS AND THAT HE, KHEIM, WAS UNSURE OF TRI QUANG'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VC. THE BUDDHISTS DEMANDS WERE IN EFFECT AN ULTIMATUM AND KHANH FELT THERE WAS NO CHOICE BUT TO ACCEPT SINCE THE INFLUENCE OF TRI QUANG WAS SO GREAT THAT HE COULD NOT ONLY TURN THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT BUT COULD INFLUENCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARMED FORCES. BY ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEMANDS OF THE BUDDHISTS LEADERS, THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD IN EFFECT BE DOMINATED BY TRI QUANG. HE WAS NOT SURE THAT THE BUDDHISTS WOULD PERSECUTE THE CATHOLICS BUT HE DID NOT RULE THIS OUT. HE MENTIONED THAT THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF A

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ANSWER CONTINUED

YEAR AGO SINCE AT THAT TIME THE BUDDHISTS WERE ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT BUT NOW THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO TAKE OVER AND CONTROL THE GOVERNMENT. HE STATED THAT DOCTOR HOAN HAD ABETTED THE SITUATION BY DISTRIBUTING LEAFLETS WHEREIN HE DENOUNCED GENERAL KHANH AS SPOKEMAN OF THE DAI VIES.

B. TOMORROW THE FULL MRC WILL MEET TO ELECT A CHIEF OF STATE. GENERALS DON, KIM AND DINH WILL BE PRESENT AS WELL AS GENERAL MINH. KHIEM STATED THAT HE HAD JUST LEFT GENERAL MINH WHO FEELS STRONGLY THAT KHANH MUST GO BECAUSE HE HAD SUBMITTED TO THE BUDDHISTS AND WOULD BE UNDER THEIR INFLUENCE WHEREAS HE, MINH, COULD PERSUADE THE BUDDHISTS AND NOT BE UNDER THEIR INFLUENCE. IT WAS IMPLIED THAT MINH WAS A CANDIDATE FOR ELECTION TOMORROW. KHIEM SAID THAT THEIR AGENTS WERE ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF VC INFLUENCE IN RECENT ACTIVITIES WHICH WAS SUSPECTED BUT NOT ESTABLISHED. IF ESTABLISHED, THEY COULD DENOUNCE THE BUDDHISTS DEMONSTRATIONS AS VC INSPIRED. HE STATED THAT THE PRESENT POLITICAL TURMOIL HAD NOT YET INFLUENCED THE ARVN BUT HE EXPECTED THAT IT WOULD HAVE REVERBERATIONS DUE TIME. HE STATED THAT VU VAN MAU WAS RETURNING FOR LONDON TOMORROW AND THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY END UP AS "VICE PRESIDENT" AND WOULD BE WILLING TO SERVE IN SUCH CAPACITY.

3. AS I WAS LEAVING GENERAL KHIEM'S OFFICE, DR. HOAN AND TWO OF HIS DAI VIET COLLEAGUES, OBVIOUSLY WORRIED, ENTERED THE JGS BUILDING.

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QUESTION

WHAT IS THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SAIGON? HUE? DA NANG? NHA TRANG? IS GOVERNMENT IN CONTROL OF THESE CITIES? CAN THE GOVERNMENT KEEP CROWDS UNDER CONTROL?

ANSWER

ALTHOUGH DEMONSTRATIONS IN ALL PLACES, THE SECURITY SITUATION IS SATISFACTORY IN SAIGON, HUE AND NHA TRANG. THERE WERE DISORDERS TODAY IN DA NANG WITH NO CONTROL EXERCISED OVER THE MOBS BY THE ACTING CORPS COMMANDER, GENERAL THI. GENERAL KHIEM REPORTED TO ME EARLIER THAT GENERAL XUNG WAS RETURNING TO HIS CORPS BUT HAVE JUST LEARNED HE IS STILL IN SAIGON, HAS ORDERED THI TO RETURN TO 1ST DIVISION IN HUE AND DESIGNATED COLONEL SANG OF 2ND DIVISION ACTING COMMANDER IN DA NANG. A TELEPHONE CALL TO DA NANG REVEALS THAT MOBS ARE STILL MILLING ABOUT STREETS. A SOUND TRUCK IS ON THE STREETS ANNOUNCING CURFEW BETWEEN 2100 AND 0500 HOURS. PEOPLE ARE REPORTED TO BE PAYING NO ATTENTION. ARVN ELEMENTS OF ARVN ARE PRESENT BUT NOT ATTEMPTING TO EXERT INFLUENCE.

SENIOR ADVISOR, I CORPS, REPORTED DA NANG QUIET AT MIDNIGHT. PEOPLE GOING HOME. TROOPS POSTED AROUND TOWN AND DEPLOYED VICINITY AIRFIELD.

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QUESTION

WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PROTECT AMERICANS FROM DISORDERS?

ANSWER

AT PRESENT TIME NO SECURITY PROBLEM REGARDING AMERICAN PERSONNEL. FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO AMERICAN PERSONNEL:

- A. DO NOT CONGREGATE IN GROUPS ON STREETS OR OPER PUBLIC PLACES.
- B. STAY OFF THE STREETS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE DURING THE HOURS OF DARKNESS.
- C. STAY AWAY FROM AREAS WHERE LARGE NUMBERS OF LOCAL CITIZENS ARE CONGREGATED.
- D. EXERCISE DISCRETION IN PERSONAL CONDUCT WHEN IN PUBLIC PLACES. REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTIONS THAT WOULD CALL ATTENTION.
- E. ALL U.S. PERSONNEL MUST BE AWARE THAT THE WOUNDING OR KILLING OF VIETNAMESE DEMONSTRATORS OR RIOTERS BY AMERICANS NO MATTER WHAT THE PROVOCATION COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. THEREFORE, U.S. PERSONNEL WILL NOT FIRE UPON DEMONSTRATORS OR RIOTERS EXCEPT IN DEFENSE OF THEIR LIVES.

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QUESTION

HAVE YOU DETECTED SIGNIFICANT UNREST IN THE ARMED FORCES?

ANSWER

AT THIS TIME NO UNREST HAS BEEN DETECTED WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES.

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QUESTION

PLEASE REPORT SOONEST ANY INDICATION OF VIET CONG ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE ON RECENT EVENTS.

ANSWER

NO IDENTIFIABLE VC REACTION HAS BEEN REPORTED THUS FAR. NO UNUSUAL MOVEMENTS OF VC UNITS HAVE BEEN NOTED. ALL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO REPORT IMMEDIATELY ANY INDICATIONS OF INCREASED VC ACTIVITY.

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QUESTION

WHAT ROLE IS BIG MINH PLAYING?

ANSWER

THE ROLE OF BIG MINH IS INDETERMINATE. ALL INDICATIONS, TO INCLUDE GENERAL KHANH'S STATEMENT TO AMB TAYLOR, ARE THAT HE IS NOT RPT NOT ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN EITHER THE BUDDHIST OR STUDENT AGITATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT HE HAS GIVEN HIS TACIT APPROVAL TO AND MORAL BACKING OF EFFORTS TO BRING DOWN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

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QUESTION

NEWS REPORT JUST RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON STATES THAT OANH REPEAT OANH TOLD STUDENTS THAT KHANH IS RESIGNING AND IS DISBANDING HIS MILITARY JUNTA. THAT MAJOR GENERAL VAN MINH WILL TAKE OVER AS CARETAKER CHEIF OF STATE. AND THAT THERE WILL BE A RULING COUNCIL CREATED COMPOSED OF CIVILIANS. PLEASE COMMENT ON THIS NEWS REPORT.

ANSWER

IN OANH TOLD STUDENTS THIS HE IS SPECULATING. THE MRC IS SCHEDULED TO ELECT A CHIEF OF STATE TOMORROW. MINH COULD BE A CANDIDATE.

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QUESTION

HOW DO YOU BELIEVE RVN MILITARY LEADERS WILL REACT? COULD THIS FOMENT COUP MOVEMENTS?

ANSWER

IT IS EXPECTED THAT MILITARY LEADERS WILL SUPPORT KHANH ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT CERTAIN. IT IS ALSO NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE MILITARY WILL SIT BACK OVER THE LONG PULL IF A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IS INSTALLED. THE POLITICAL BASE IS STILL ONE OF SHIFTING SAND.

AT THIS JUNCTURE, COUPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED A THING OF THE PAST.

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ADDITIONAL QUESTION AND ANSWER
TELECON WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND
25 AUGUST 1964

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Request this be attached to previously
furnished resume of Questions & Answers

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Authority DOD la 4/23/76
By mg, NARS, Date 6/28/76

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QUESTION

CAN YOU IN VIEW OF ANSWERS TO ALL QUESTIONS, GIVE US SHORT OVER-ALL EVALUATION OF SITUATION AS SEEN BY YOU?

ANSWER

MACV OVERALL EVALUATION EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS, DURING WHICH KHANH HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO EXERCISE POWERS LEGALLY HIS TO CURB EXCESSES, HAS CAUSED SHARP CLEAVAGES AND DEEP SUSPICIONS WITHIN RANKS OF MRC. CONVERSELY, THE BUDDHIST LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN REMARKABLY SUCCESSFUL IN POLITICAL ACTION TACTICS OF DIVIDE AND CONQUER. WHILE THE ARMY CONTINUES TO BE THE KEY POWER FACTOR, IT IS, AT THE MOMENT, EFFECTIVELY NEUTRALIZED BY A WELL ORGANIZED, HARD HITTING MINORITY. IT IS EXPECTED BUT BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THE MRC, DESPITE SOME DISENCHANTMENT WITH KHANH, WILL RE-ELECT HIM HEAD OF STATE TOMORROW - FOR WANT OF ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE. IT IS ALSO ANTICIPATED THAT THE TRI QUANG FACTION WILL THEREAFTER SUCCESSIVELY AND SUCCESSFULLY PRESS DEMANDS ON KHANH ENROUTE TO A STILL INDETERMINATE FINAL OBJECTIVE. HOW LONG KHANH WILL LAST IS LARGELY UP TO THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. IT MAY NOT BE VERY LONG. IN ANY CASE, THE LESSENING ROLES OF CAPABLE CATHOLIC CIVIL AND MILITARY EXECUTIVES AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DAI VIETS FROM THE GOVERNMENT WILL FURTHER THIN OUT AN ALREADY INADEQUATE STRUCTURE. THUS, OUR PREDICTION IS THAT UNSETTLED CONDITIONS WILL BE THE RULE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS AND THAT THERE WILL BE LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS IN THE PACIFICATION OF SVN. INDEED, THERE IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESSIVE DETERIORATION.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

25 August 1964

MR. BROMLEY SMITH S

Attached is a despatch from Peking dealing with Chinese reaction to the Tonkin incident. You might find it interesting, and Mac, if he has a free moment, might wish to see it. Paras 5 to 8 are of particular interest. The British Charge concludes "provisionally," that the attack was a calculated risk by Hanoi in the hope of scoring a big propaganda victory. He feels that the Chinese probably encouraged the North Vietnamese in undertaking such an attack.

CLCooper

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SUMMARY OF PEKING DESPATCH NO. 50 OF THE 11TH OF AUGUSTThe Gulf of Tonkin Incident

The Chinese did not react officially until after the United States retaliatory action had been taken when they came out in full support of the North Vietnamese line. Forthwith they mounted a country wide solidarity with North Vietnam campaign. Three-and-a-half million people demonstrated peacefully in Peking and 10 million in China as a whole. The Government's propaganda machine set out to show world-wide condemnation of the United States action, but seems deliberately to have minimised publicity for expressions of solidarity from the East European countries (paragraphs 1 - 4).

2. Chinese reaction has been noisy, but no indication has been given what form a "helping hand" to North Vietnam might take. The Chinese are expected to provide any military assistance for which North Vietnam might ask, including troops or "volunteers" if wanted. The identification of the people with the solidarity campaign could be a prelude to a "volunteer" movement. But the situation is very different from Korea in 1950 (paragraph 5).

3. **Assessment of the streams of thought** which have become discernible in Chinese propaganda and the insight which these appear to give into the origins of the attack on the United States ships. Provisional conclusion that the attack was mounted at North Vietnamese initiative after consultation with the Chinese with **the objective of scoring a substantial propaganda success.** By products have been world-wide anti-American campaign and sniping at Russians in context of Sino-Soviet dispute for their failure to support another Socialist state adequately (paragraphs 6 - 8).

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By iss NARA, Date 10-27-97~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(1024/64)

No. 50

Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING

August 11, 1964

Sir,

Although it is as yet difficult to see clearly the reasons for, and effects of, the attacks on the American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, I wish to take advantage of the fortnightly bag to report more fully on events as seen from Peking. The attack on U.S.S. Maddox took place on the afternoon of the 2nd of August and news of it reached us here in a B.B.C. broadcast the next afternoon. The second attack took place during the night of the 4th/5th of August and news of it became known here at least as early as the afternoon of the 5th, though the Chinese Government may have had earlier news from their representatives in Hanoi. News of the crisis must thus have been fairly general in Peking from the 5th of August. Yet not a word of it appeared in the Chinese press, even quotations from North Vietnamese sources. It was only after the American retaliatory bombing of targets in North Vietnam that the Chinese took public cognizance of events. The Government's reaction was prompt. The fact that an English version of the statement was available to correspondents early on the morning of the 6th of August at the same time as the statement first appeared in Chinese suggests considerable burning of the midnight oil and rapid consultation with the North Vietnamese. Within an hour or two of the statement having reached the press I was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive it.

2. Once the die was cast to support the Vietnamese version of events, including the absolute denial that the second attack had taken place at all, the propaganda machine was put into top gear throughout the whole country. Messages from all the usual Chinese

/bodies

The Right Honourable

R. A. Butler, C.H., M.P.,

etc., etc., etc.,

Foreign Office,

LONDON S. W. 1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

bodies expressing indignation began to appear in the press. Messages of solidarity with the Vietnamese were despatched by Chinese bodies to their opposite numbers in North Vietnam. The press was full of reports from abroad of reactions of solidarity with North Vietnam or simply critical of U.S. action. In this latter field Canon Collins' letter to The Times, The Guardian leader of the 6th of August, statements by minor Trades Union spokesmen and Lord Russell all received prominence. But having sought to show that British public opinion was against the Americans the Chinese press then printed British Government statements both at home and at the United Nations in such a way as to bring out that Her Majesty's Government were "servilely" following the United States line. Apart from a brief report of the reaction of the Federal German Government (the only other Government statement supporting the U.S. to be mentioned) the general theme was that the people of the whole world, including the American public, were either disquieted by or fully opposed to U.S. actions. It has, however, been particularly noticeable that as the press campaign has mounted (to the extent that Peking newspapers are now almost totally devoted to North Vietnam) the East European nations have received precious little credit for their expressions of solidarity. East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have at best got no more than a few lines. Later still the Bulgars and Mongolians got slight mentions. The impression has been given that those in the Socialist camp who follow the "Soviet baton" have shown little or no solidarity with their Socialist brothers in North Vietnam. The Reuter correspondent has however told me that the East European press has contained many more statements of support for North Vietnam than have in fact been published. The Soviet statement which appeared in Tass on the 5th of August received a little publicity, but since then the Soviet performance in the Security Council has come in for oblique criticism. This is, of course, because they have not accepted as gospel the North Vietnamese version of the incident and compounded their crime by opting to have the question of Vietnam discussed in the United Nations while the Chinese and North Vietnam wish to have it dealt with at a renewed conference of the fourteen Geneva Powers. Thus the overtones of the Sino-Soviet conflict make themselves heard.

3. But apart from the press and radio solidarity campaigns the people of Peking and of other Chinese cities have been on the march.

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On the morning of the 7th of August the first slogan shouters made their appearance marching down the Kuang Hua Lu where both we and the North Vietnamese live. Fifty yards from our gate a saluting base was erected outside the North Vietnamese Embassy. Huge slogans were quickly run up on hoardings opposite their Embassy (and throughout the city). When no doubt the Ambassador and his colleagues began to wilt in the heat as they stood receiving letters of solidarity and answering slogans with slogans, they were provided with a tent (It probably did little to keep out the downpour which descended on Saturday evening and put a stop to "play" for the day!). The demonstrations continued for three days. That they would last so long was known from the start. Each day from about 9.30 to 12, and 2.30 to 6.30 or 7.00 crowds paraded past. Some inevitably more enthusiastic than others; some frankly bored, some taken straight from night-shift probably only wanting to go home; some keen cadres who outshouted the others; and not a few militia wearing bandoliers and carrying small arms. Included in many of the groups were people dressed up as caricatures of President Johnson and United States soldiers. Others dressed as North Vietnamese acted skits representing aggression or the shooting down of United States aircraft. This, I am told, is a regular feature of Chinese demonstrations. Another regular feature is the greatly enlarged reproductions of the cartoons appearing in the local papers which are produced at great speed and borne by the demonstrators. The completion of our air-conditioning installation shortly before the **demonstrations** fortunately ensured that we were little disturbed by the liturgical chanting of slogans. Nor was any conscious attempt made of which I was aware to include us as a target in the demonstrations. Altogether 3½ million people in the capital were said to have demonstrated and for all China the figure was 10 million.

4. The mass demonstrations concluded in Peking with a rally attended by about 100,000 people of "all walks of life" on the afternoon of the 9th of August. **It's task was to underline the solidarity of the people with the Party in condemning the Americans.** It was attended by Chou En-lai, Lu Ting-yi and Liao Ching-chih. It was significant that these, the most prominent public figures present, were described in subsequent press reports in such a way as to give prominence to their party positions rather than to their positions in the State hierarchy. The speeches made added /nothing

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nothing to the Government's statement, but the speakers were carefully chosen so as to enable the representatives of the various "walks of life" to have their say.

5. The Chinese reaction thus far has been noisy, but the emphasis has been on political solidarity rather than on the practical measures whereby North Vietnam is to receive the promised "helping hand". The Chinese have shouted loudly about the solidarity of the Socialist camp - indeed the phrase in the Government statement to which I drew attention in my telegram No. 779 of the 6th of August was developed in the course of a rally held on the 8th of August for quite another purpose into "American aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is aggression against the Socialist countries". Certainly apart from saying that they "absolutely will not stand idly by" and will lend a "helping hand", they have made no public pronouncement about practical assistance to the North Vietnamese. As I have said I expect them to give the North Vietnamese any help for which they may ask, not excluding material, aircraft and even troops in uniform if they should be needed. I have seen in reports from Washington and Hanoi that some such Chinese aid may already have been given. I cannot confirm this and our possibilities of observation are so limited that I very much doubt if we shall have any opportunity to do more than report whatever the Chinese may later announce. But there is at least the possibility that once again the Chinese may prefer to provide "volunteers". This could explain the studied presentation of the peoples indignation at "American aggression", and the stress laid on the phrase "the blood debt must be repaid". At the same time, there is the phrase in the Government statement the purport of which appears to be that neither China nor any other signatory of the Geneva Agreements need any longer feel inhibited about introducing troops into North Vietnam - the American action has freed them from their obligations. Moreover, while I do not wish to create unjustified alarm because the situation is so very different from that which obtained in Korea when Chinese "volunteers" appeared there, the language used in Chinese statements has been reminiscent of warnings issued in 1950.

6. But all this gives no clue about the purpose of the North Vietnamese in attacking the U.S.S. Maddox. Since the event six main streams of thought can be discerned in Chinese public

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statements. In the hope that these might give some clue to the reasons for the attack I set them out below:

- (a) All good Socialists must unite behind the North Vietnamese. China has done so.
- (b) The attack on North Vietnam by the United States aircraft is the culminating point of a deliberate plan. The plan was hatched in June and first outlined in Mr. Rusk's press briefing (Washington telegram No. 2266), developed at Honolulu, put into effect by General Taylor's appointment to Saigon and then brought to fruition by the coat trailing of U.S.S. Maddox and other warships. This shows the cynical nature of United States imperialism which believes that it can embark on aggression wherever it likes.
- (c) The United States has miscalculated and the effect of raining down relatively few bombs has been to line up "billions of people throughout the world" against her.
- (d) It is people, not weapons, who win wars - see how well the Vietnamese anti-aircraft units acquitted themselves (and five or eight aircraft down out of sixty-four is quite a high percentage).
- (e) The right way to resolve the Vietnam situation is to call the body which is responsible into session - that is the Geneva Conference, not the United Nations.
- (f) President Johnson, in an attempt to curry favour with influential voters in the monopoly capitalist groups, has deliberately engineered an incident and shown that he is not soft on China. This is designed to outflank Senator Goldwater.

7. Without at this stage ascribing responsibility either to North Vietnam or to China or to the two jointly, satisfactory by-products of the incidents have thus been:

- (a) to mount a world-wide anti-American campaign;
- (b) to bring home to the people of the Socialist countries the unchanging and ferocious nature of American imperialism;

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- (c) to bring nearer a meeting of the Geneva Conference;
- (d) to show the Russians as less good socialists than the Chinese with its obvious implications on the Sino-Soviet conflict;
- (e) to prove the validity of the theme of Mao Tse-tung that it is men who win revolutionary victories.

Of these effects all but (d) and (e) are likely to have been held equally valid by both the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. But as time goes on, (d) achieves increasing importance and, as reports from various posts have shown, many people think that the whole affair was mounted to embarrass the Russians. I believe that to have been only a side effect - but one which is now being exploited to the full. If the Russians were really the target of the operation I do not believe that the denial of the second attack would have been introduced into the story. It would have been much harder for the Russians to wriggle out, as the Chinese must have known they would like to do, if the second attack had been admitted and ascribed to continuing violations of territorial waters. If the Americans are in a position to prove irrefutably that the second battle did take place (as I hope they are), the Russians would have realised what a false position they would be in if they accepted the North Vietnamese (Chinese) story. Moreover, in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict it would enable them to point out to the world how rash and foolish the Chinese are with their ignorance of the facts of life of the nuclear age.

8. I conclude provisionally therefore, though admittedly not on the basis of all the information which must be available to you, Sir, that the attack was a calculated risk taken by the North Vietnamese in the hope of scoring a substantial propaganda success by sinking a United States warship (though this does not explain the denial of the second attack). While I accept the French thesis that Hanoi is not simply a creature of Peking (Paris telegram No. 552), I very much doubt whether the North Vietnamese took this initiative without consulting the Chinese, at any rate to the extent of ensuring that they would be backed up if things went wrong. In such circumstances I am sure that the Chinese, basing

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themselves on the "paper tiger" argument, would have encouraged the North Vietnamese to go ahead assessing (rightly) that if there were any retaliation it would be on North Vietnamese heads, not Chinese. In the event the retaliation was considerably sharper than the Chinese probably expected and they have been obliged to do their noisy best to support the North Vietnamese. But for them the affair has paid un hoped for dividends in their argument with the Soviet Communist Party, although these may yet turn out to be less profitable than they hoped. And a wave of anti-Americanism has swept the world - or at least it looks that way when we read the Peking press.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Washington, Saigon, Moscow and Warsaw; to the British High Commissioners at Ottawa and New Delhi; to the United Kingdom Mission at New York and to the Delegation to N.A.T.O. in Paris; and to the Political Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, Singapore.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(K. M. Wilford)

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August 25, 1964

TO: MR. RAY CLINE

Following information received from CIA Watch Office:

Source: (B) American, from General Minh

At 8:00 P.M. on 25 August, General Minh said he planned to attend meeting of MRC to be held 26 August and he said that all Generals would attend the meeting.

Minh said that one hour earlier Generals Khiem and Thieu had asked him if he would agree to be President. Minh said he could not answer question until he judged situation at MRC meeting. He added that if he accepted position he would not want Americans to go to his subordinates.

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Authority

CIA Reg 6/15/76

By

Lmg

NARS, Date

7/15/76

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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September 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Booklet on Vietnam

I have further reviewed the * Vietnamese question
* & answer booklet which I showed you the other
night, and by agreement with Bob Manning in the
State Department we have put it on ice. While
today's errors of emphasis could be corrected,
there is just no way of knowing what else might
get out of whack in the next two months, and history
suggests that "white papers" of this sort attract
more criticism than they prevent.

We do not think the news that a number of copies
were printed will leak, but if it does, we will
simply say that our position is being stated in
another way in the light of the steadily developing
situation. There will, of course, be speeches on
South Vietnam as time goes on by appropriate
spokesmen.

This memo is for information only, unless you
have further guidance.

McG. B.

McG. B.

* dated 8/24/64