

FILE: National Security Files, Country File, Vietnam, Tonkin Gulf
AGENCY:

<u>ITEM NOS.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
----------------------	-------------	-------------------------	-----------------------

Department of Defense

02	09/18/64	1	U
03	09/18/64	1	U
04	09/18/64	1	U
05	09/18/64	1	U
06	09/18/64	1	U
09	09/18/64	1	U
14	09/18/64	1	Secret (Gp 4)
17	09/18/64	1	Secret (Gp 4)
21	09/18/64	1	Conf. (Gp 4)
25	09/19/64	1	U
28	09/18/64	1	Secret (Gp 4)
29	09/18/64	1	Secret (Gp 4)

FILE: National Security Files, Country File, Vietnam, Tonkin Gulf
AGENCY: Central Intelligence Agency

<u>ITEM</u> <u>NOS.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>NO. OF</u> <u>PAGES</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
10	09/18/64	1	Confidential Navy ltr. 3-3-74
11	09/18/64	1	Confidential Navy ltr. 3-3-74

FILE: National Security Files, Country File, Vietnam, Tonkin Gulf
AGENCY: Department of Defense

<u>ITEM NOS.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
08	09/18/64	1	Secret (Gp 3) <i>DOD etc. 1-14-76</i>
15	09/18/64	2	Secret (Gp 3) <i>DOD etc. 1-14-76</i>
18	09/18/64	2	Secret (Gp 3) <i>DOD etc. 1-14-76</i>
22	09/18/64	1	Secret (Gp 3) <i>DOD etc. 1-14-76</i>
23	09/18/64	1	Secret (Gp 3) <i>DOD etc. 1-14-76</i>
24	09/18/64	1	Secret (Gp 3) <i>DOD etc. 1-14-76</i>
27	09/18/64	1	Secret (Gp 3) <i>DOD etc. 1-14-76</i>

FILE: National Security Files, Country File, Vietnam, Tonkin Gulf
AGENCY: Department of Defense

<u>ITEM NOS.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>NO. OF PAGES</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
07	09/18/64	1	Top Secret (Gp 1) <i>DoD ltr. 1-15-76</i>
12	09/18/64	1	Top Secret (Gp 1) <i>DoD ltr. 1-15-76</i>
13	09/18/64	1	Top Secret (Gp 1) <i>DoD ltr. 1-15-76</i>
16	09/18/64	1	Top Secret (Gp 1) <i>DoD ltr. 1-15-76</i>
19	09/18/64	1	Top Secret (Gp 1) <i>DoD ltr. 1-15-76</i>
26	09/18/64	1	Top Secret (Gp 1) <i>DoD ltr. 1-15-76</i>
30	09/18/64	1	Top Secret (Gp 3) <i>DoD ltr. 1-15-76</i>

FILE: National Security Files, Country File, Vietnam, Tonkin Gulf
AGENCY: Joint Chiefs of Staff

ITEM <u>NOS.</u>	<u>DATE</u>	NO. OF <u>PAGES</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>
---------------------	-------------	------------------------	-----------------------

<u>20</u>	<u>09/18/64</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>Secret (Gp 3)</u> <i>CS etc 12-5-75</i>
-----------	-----------------	----------	--

FILE: National Security Files, Country File, Vietnam, Tonkin Gulf
AGENCY: Department of the Navy

ITEM NOS.	DATE	NO. OF PAGES	CLASSIFICATION
--------------	------	-----------------	----------------

01.	09/18/64	114	Top Secret Navy Ltr. 2-18-74
-----	----------	-----	---

TOP SECRET


TONKIN GULF INCIDENT

18 SEPTEMBER 1964

COMDESDIV
52



USS RICHARD S. EDWARDS (DD-950)



USS MORTON (DD-948)

TOP SECRET

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

1
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NAVY 2-18-76
By LW, NARS, Date 3-1-76

INCIDENT IN THE GULF OF TONKIN

ON

18 SEPTEMBER 1964

INVOLVING

USS MORTON (DD 948) AND USS EDWARDS (DD 950)

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO. 1 OF 5 COPIES

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

INDEX

i.....	Participants
Pages 1 - 12.....	Overall Summary, Conclusions, and Corrective Actions
Enclosure (1).....	Individual Target Plot and Discussions
Annex A.....	Target A Plot and Discussion
Annex B.....	Target B Plot and Discussion
Annex C.....	Target C Plot and Discussion
Annex D.....	Target D Plot and Discussion
Annex E.....	Target E Plot and Discussion
Annex F.....	Target F Plot and Discussion
Annex G.....	Target G Plot and Discussion
Annex H.....	Target H Plot and Discussion
Annex I.....	Target I Plot and Discussion
Annex J.....	Target J Plot and Discussion
Enclosure (2).....	Sensor Performance
Enclosure (3).....	Visual Evidence
Enclosure (4).....	Communications
Enclosure (5).....	Weather and Sonar Conditions
Enclosure (6).....	Statements of Personnel Involved
Enclosure (7).....	Intelligence (Note: This enclosure is not included with the report. It may be obtained by contacting Captain H. H. Barton, at phone X-76384.)

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

TOP SECRET
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

PARTICIPANTS

1. The following personnel attended the subject discussions at Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, on 21-22 September 1964:

Rear Admiral W. E. Guest, USN...Commander Task Group 77.6
Captain H. H. Barton, USN.....CNO - Op-33B
Captain J. J. Haffey, USN.....CINCPACFLT - Operations
Captain B. J. Bailey, USN.....CINCPACFLT - Electronics
Captain L. E. Harris, USN.....COM TG 77.6 - Chief of Staff
Captain E.E. Hollyfield, USN...Com Task Unit 77.6.6
Captain N. W. Gill, USN.....CINCPACFLT - Communications
Commander J.E. McGill, USN.....CO, USS MORTON (DD 948)
Commander J. E. Evans, USN.....CO, USS EDWARDS (DD 950)
Commander B. D. Inman, USN.....BUSHIPS, Code 684
Commander J. W. Jenkins, USN...COMSEVENTHFLT - Operations
Commander W. R. Johnson, USN...CNO - Op-951C
Lieutenant J.W. Hayward, USNR..COMSEVENTHFLT - Intelligence
Lieutenant K.W. Larabee, USN...COMSEVENTHFLT - Communications
Lieutenant L.J. Carlson, USN...CINCPACFLT - Intelligence
Mr. I.W. Fuller, Civilian.....NRL, Code 5310
Mr. J.H. Dunn, Civilian.....NRL, Code 5340

~~Top Secret~~

TOP SECRET

~~Top Secret~~

TOP SECRET
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

OVER-ALL SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

(All times are local Gulf of Tonkin times)

1. At 0740 on 17 September 1964, USS MORTON (DD 948) and USS EDWARDS (DD 950), with COMDESDIV 52 embarked in MORTON as CTU 77.6.6, entered the Gulf of Tonkin at Lat. 17-05N and Long 107-40E to conduct a DeSoto patrol. The immediate superior in command was CTG 77.6 embarked in USS CONSTELLATION (CVA 64).
2. The patrol was uneventful until the early evening of 18 September at 1929, at which time MORTON at Lat 18-47N and Long 106-43E (42 miles from mainland of North Vietnam) received surface search radar indications of a fast moving contact to the eastward. (For graphic display of ensuing discussion, see pages 11 and 12.) At this time, MORTON and EDWARDS were steaming in column with MORTON in the van, distance 2,000 yards on course 130⁰T, speed 20 knots. This course and speed had been taken at sunset in order to open the North Vietnamese mainland during hours of darkness in accordance with patrol instructions. Both ships were darkened (including navigational lights) and in readiness condition III; no EMCON was set; search radars and sonars were operating properly. The electronic countermeasures equipments in both ships were operating and properly guarded. The weather was clear with scattered clouds with about 50% coverage, the ceiling was unlimited except in clouded areas, the moon was half-full, visibility about four

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

miles, winds were from 345°T to 010°T velocity 8-13 knots, sea calm (state 1), the currents were negligible.

3. Upon confirmation that the contact was tracking on course 210°T speed 20 knots by both ships of the patrol unit, the unit commander ordered Readiness Condition I set at 1949. Patrol unit speed was increased to 30 knots and unit course changed to the right, first paralleling the track of the contact, then changed further to the right and the patrol began opening the westward. Soon after steadying on course 280°T, the patrol held search radar indications of a second contact closing rapidly sharp on the starboard bow. The patrol unit then changed course to the left to head south between the projected tracks of the two contacts. Meanwhile, the first contact appeared to split into two distinct units which were maintaining close station on each other. Believing that the contacts were DRV torpedo boats, at 2017 the unit commander directed that warning shots be fired. At this time contacts to the east were at a range of 9,000 yards and the contact to the west at 12,000 yards. Warning shots were fired -- MORTON firing to the east and EDWARDS to the west. Observing no reaction from the warning shots, the unit commander ordered additional warning shots fired at 2021. At 2022 after observing no reaction from the latest warning shots, the unit commander gave order to "open fire".

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

The ranges at this time were 7,000 yards for the targets to the east and 12,000 yards for the target to the west. At 2025 EDWARDS ceased firing to the west and at 2027 MORTON ceased fire to the east. During the next hour, three additional targets were taken under fire by one or both ships. Firing ceased at 2136 and the last target faded from the screen at 2211. A total of 170 rounds of 5"/54 and 129 rounds of 3"/50 ammunition were fired during the action. There was no credible visible evidence of target destruction. However, splashes were noted to engulf the targets on ships radar in three cases. There was no credible evidence of fire being returned from these targets against the patrol unit.

4. A complete and thorough analysis of each suspected target and the actions taken are set forth in Enclosure (1). A summary of these analyses is as follows:

a. Facts.

(1) The action commenced with the firing of two warning shots prior to deliberate fire at the targets. Deliberate fire was commenced 5 minutes and 1 minute, respectively, after first and second warning shots.

(2) DRV "Swatow" PGM have 37 mm (range 4,000 yards) and 12.5 mm (range 2,500 yards) guns, 4 diesel engines, 4 screws, "Skinhead" radar, and a maximum speed of 43 knots.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(3) DRV "P-4" PT have two 12.5 mm guns (range 2,500 yards), two 18-inch torpedoes (range 5,000 yards)# two diesel engines, two screws, "Skinhead" radar, and a maximum speed of 50 knots.

(4) DRV Submarine Chasers (SO.1 Class) have four twin 37 mm (range 4,000 yards) and 12.5 mm (range 2,500 yards) and up to eight depth charges, 4800 horsepower internal combustion engines and a maximum speed in excess of 20 knots.

(5) The three type units listed above are the only known combatant units in the DRV naval forces capable of speeds of more than 20 knots.

(6) The initial warning shots were fired at 9,000 yards for the eastern targets and 12,000 yards for the western target.

(7) Deliberate fire at the target was commenced at a range of 7,000 yards on the eastern targets and 12,000 yards on the western target.

(8) The unit commander had studied the previous MADDOX and MADDOX/JOY incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin and had made up his mind that if similar incidents should occur to him he would commence corrective measures at double the effective range of the enemy's weapons systems, i.e., torpedoes and guns.

#Note: As a result of the 2nd and 4th of August incidents, the intelligence community began a re-evaluation of the performance of DRV torpedoes. In the future a new figure may appear. However, at the time of this incident, the official intelligent estimate was 5,000 yards.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(9) MORTON and EDWARDS had observed no overt hostile action on the part of the targets other than to close the range.

(10) EDWARDS and MORTON steamed "darkened ship" (including navigational lights) throughout the action.

(11) No running lights were observed on any targets taken under fire during the action.

(12) No explosions positively identified as hits were observed during the action.

(13) The targets were tracked by radar at speeds which varied from 15 to 30 knots.

(14) Return fire from the targets engaged was not observed.

(15) The patrol unit commander considered ramming target Hotel but discarded the idea because he believed he had taken sufficient action to establish the patrol unit's resolve.

(16) The patrol unit commander retired to the southeast following the action because of two inoperative 5"/54 guns in MORTON.

(17) No shipboard illumination was used during the action. Neither MORTON nor EDWARDS was equipped with star shells.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

(18) CAP aircraft were on station in the vicinity of MORTON and EDWARDS during the action.

(19) Although an active search was made by aircraft and ships the day following the action, no visible physical evidence was obtained to establish the sinking of any small craft. (See Enclosure (1) for graphic display of search.)

(20) The only creditable evidence of targets in the area was obtained by means of radar sensors.

(21) There were no creditable reports of radar jamming or similar phenomena which affected the sensors on MORTON and EDWARDS during the action.

(22) The patrol unit was not operating under electronic silence.

(23) During the action, MORTON and EDWARDS were within the radar range of known DRV radars located at Vinh Son and the Cong Ca Estuary. The range of these radars is at least 70 miles on destroyer-sized targets.

(24) All points along the designated DeSoto track fell within the range capability of DRV shore-based surface search radars.

(25) Recent aerial photography had shown "Swatow" PGM in the Song Ca River and at Quang Khe, both locations were near the DeSoto track.

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(26) Personal discussions and advance preparations had been made by the Task Group and patrol unit commanders to cope with the situation reporting requirements.

(27) Response to queries from higher authority was delayed because of inadequate communication equipment and insufficient personnel.

(28) The patrol unit was innundated with action messages from higher authority and was unable to handle the volume.

(29) MORTON and EDWARDS have on-line crypto communication receivers but do not have on-line crypto transmitters.

(30) Due to the non-availability of an on-line cryptographic capability all outgoing classified traffic had to be manually encrypted and was transmitted by hand keying on a CW ship-shore circuit at an average speed of 20-words per minute. As a result of this manual operation, the unit commander was unable to provide rapid communication reporting and response to urgent requests for information received from higher authorities.

b. Opinions. It is believed that:

(1) The warning shots which landed 3,000 yards as measured by radar observations from the target could have been ineffective in deterring the target.

(2) A high speed (20 knots or greater) radar contact without lights in a hostile environment as the Gulf of Tonkin is suspect and may be subject to attack.

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(3) Analysis of radar information substantiates the fact that the eastern contact was a real target producing a continuous track and was most probably one or more small craft.

(4) All reported contacts were real radar targets, i.e., contacts that reflected signals to the radar receiver as opposed to any spoofing action on the part of the enemy. However, some of these reflectors could have been wakes, fish stakes, clouds, weather, etc.

(5) Some contacts although real radar targets produced no continuous tracks and were not small craft.

(6) Radar conditions were excellent at the commencement of the action, however, weather clutter progressively increased during the action thus making contact classification increasingly difficult.

(7) There were no valid sonar contacts or significant ECM intercepts either before or during the engagement.

c. Conclusions. In view of the above it is concluded:

(1) That there is evidence substantial enough to conclude that track A was a small high speed craft.

(2) That there is some evidence that track A was two small craft. (one is later shown on plot as track C by MORTON and the other as track E by both ships.)

(3) That there is little evidence to substantiate that tracks other than tracks A (both ships), track C (by MORTON) and track E (both ships) were small craft targets.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

TOP SECRET
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

(4) That within the framework of his guidance, the patrol unit commander acted prudently.

(5) That the communications installations in MORTON and EDWARDS were not capable of giving the rapid and timely response required.

(6) That more means of target identification at night are required.

(7) That there were insufficient personnel on the staff of the unit commander during the patrol.

(8) That there was unfortunately a lack of visual and physical evidence in this incident.

d. Corrective Actions. In order to improve the effectiveness of these patrols, the fleet commander has directed the following action:

(1) For future DeSoto patrols, a Destroyer Squadron Commander and his staff or a Destroyer Division Commander with augmented staff will be assigned in order to have personnel available to meet the reporting requirements.

(2) All destroyers conducting DeSoto patrols will have both on-line crypto receiving and transmitting equipments to meet the rapid communications required.

(3) In order to provide illumination for visual identification of targets, at least one destroyer in a

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

DeSoto patrol unit will have a star shell capability. In addition, VP aircraft with searchlight capability will be provided the destroyer unit commander during hours of darkness.

(4) DeSoto patrol Commanders will be further instructed to collect any and all forms of physical evidence, i.e., still and moving pictures, debris, prisoners, radar scope photography, etc.

(5) The use of low light television equipment to assist in target classification and identification to be investigated on a priority basis.

~~Top Secret~~


~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

USS EDWARDS (DD950)
181929 H

USS MORTON (DD948)
181929 H

"B not initially plotted by either ship.
Track from 2004 to 2031 is re-
constructed from JA Circuit Tape."




SUMMARY OPERATIONAL PLOT

LEGEND
TIME 181929 H SEPT. 1964
LAT 18-47 N
LONG 106-43 E

WARNING SHOT ————
OPENED FIRE ————
CEASED FIRE ————
TRACKS BY MORTON A ————
TRACKS BY EDWARDS A ————

0 4,000 8,000 12,000
SCALE IN YARDS

TOP SECRET



DESOTO PATROL

USS MORTON (DD-948)

POST ACTION AIR AND
SURFACE SEARCHES
FOR VISIBLE EVIDENCE

182400H

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

1

ENCLOSURE (1)

INDIVIDUAL TARGET PLOT AND DISCUSSIONS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (1) - ANNEX A

TARGET "A" DISCUSSION

Ship Reports (For graphic display see pages 4 and 5)

Target "A" was first picked up by MORTON at 1929, range 20,000 yards and on course 210°, speed 16 knots. EDWARDS picked up the target at 1946, range 11,000 yards; target courses and speeds were confirmed between the ships. The target blips appeared to split about 1958. The subsequent track showed course variations between 190° and 234°; speed variations between 15 and 20 knots.

MORTON's MK-68 director acquired the target about 1945 and held a steady track until directed to shift to target "B" about 2004, which was evaluated as a more immediate threat. "B" was then acquired and tracked by the MK-68 GFCS until it was assigned to EDWARDS at which time "A" was acquired by MORTON and tracked solidly until it faded at 2033. (MORTON's MK-56 director was inoperative at this time.) The MK-66 director on EDWARDS acquired "A" about 1955 and held steady tracks.

MORTON fired one warning shot at 2017, range 9,000 yards, and a second at 2021. Neither shot appeared to cause any reaction by target. At 2022 MORTON took "A" under fire at range of 7,000 yards, checked fire at 2028, resumed fire at 2032 and ceased at 2033. About 2032, EDWARDS reported observing four splashes on the target blip. A total of 84 rounds of 3"/50

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

VT FRAG, 21 rounds of 5"/54 VT FRAG and 8 rounds of 5"/54 AAC were fired against this target.

Opinion.

This target appears to be the most valid of any reported during the action. It was picked up under "no-pressure" conditions of a routine alerted patrol. It would therefore appear to have been evaluated with a greater degree of care than would have been expected later during ensuing action. The solid track by two surface search radars and two MK-68 GFCS gives further evidence of a positive small craft target.

The question, "Why was "A" not tracked earlier by EDWARDS," arises. The fact that EDWARDS was on station 2000 yards astern accounts for some delay. Operator technique, radar sensitivity, and more time spent in target classification are possible explanations. In subsequent detections, MORTON's CIC team appeared to detect and classify blips on their scopes earlier and more frequently than did EDWARD' CIC team.

When firing ceased, the patrol unit was opening range and it is very logical for the target to have been "lost" by all tracking radars because of the shadow zones of the surface radar and the blind zones of the fire control radars tracking the target.

Evaluation of target hits by radar is questioned because of the small size of the target when compared with the apparent area covered by blips from the projectile bursts.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~


From the reported firing ranges and bearings, the warning shots to target "A" are estimated to have landed about 3,000 yards from the target. At this range, it is difficult to believe that anyone on "A" could have observed them and acted conclusively in response.

Conclusion.

Target "A" has a very high probability of having been a small craft target capable of speeds of at least 20 knots.


~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (1) - ANNEX B

TARGET "B" DISCUSSION

Ship Reports (For graphic display see pages 3 and 4)

Target "B" was first picked up by MORTON at 2004, range 14,000 yards, and was then designated by voice radio to EDWARDS which locked on with its MK-56 GFCS about 2018. However, neither EDWARDS nor MORTON actually maintained a plot of "B" in their CIC's until 2034. Track as shown was reconstructed from a taped voice record of the JA circuit in MORTON; therefore, the validity of track, courses and speeds is questionable. At 2004 MORTON had ceased to track "A" and locked on "B" as it appeared to be more threatening. About 2018 MORTON shifted back to "A".

At 2020 EDWARDS fired a warning shot ahead and short of "B" and then commenced firing about two minutes later at a range of 12,000 yards. Firing was ceased about 2025, having expended about 4 rounds of 3"/50 and 26 rounds of 5"/54. The target blip faded from MORTON's scope at 2031 and from EDWARD's scope at 2045. Four splashes were observed on the target blip.

Opinion.

This target is of very questionable validity. The reconstructed track is not very "solid". By the time it was reported closing and the ships turned to the left, the range had closed to 5,000 yards. With the reported visibility of four miles, it would appear that the target should have been observed visually

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

TOP SECRET
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

during the two-minute interval it was near this range band. Both ships were still closing when fades were reported. Even though the echo return was adequate for two gun fire control radars to track solidly for some time, the blip appears to have shown a non-coherent return as range decreased with a breakup similar to weather or wake phenomena.

Conclusion.


Target "B" was other than a small craft. The probability of its having been a small craft is very low.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

MORTON'S IND. TRACK OF SKUNK

"B"




• PROCEEDING MINUTES

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EDWARDS' IND.
TRACK OF SKUNK
"B"



4

"B"
182034H
47

45
FADED

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (1) - ANNEX C

TARGET "C" DISCUSSION

Ship Reports (For graphic display see pages 3 and 4)

Target "C" was first picked up by MORTON at 2052, range 14,000. At 2057 it faded for about three minutes when it was again tracked until 2107. EDWARDS picked up a contact in general vicinity of initial reported position of "C" (MORTON) at 2112 and fired a warning shot shortly thereafter. "C" (EDWARDS) was plotted "dead in the water" from 2114 to 2120. Nevertheless, it was taken under fire at 2114 and seven rounds were expended before firing was ceased as a result of having made a "non-target" evaluation. "C" was not designated to the fire control radars on MORTON since no target blip was observed on the MK-5 designation scope.

Opinion.

At first glance the nature of this target is questionable. Since it failed to show up in EDWARDS' surface search, there is evidence of non-validity; however, the preoccupation with firing on a "non-target" blip may have diverted the attention of EDWARDS personnel from an actual target nearby.

If the track of "A" is dead reckoned ahead, it appears that "C" might well be the target which had previously been designated "A". The courses and speeds check reasonably well.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~


LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Conclusion.

Target "C" has a median probability of being one of the small craft which was originally reported as "A".

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET




TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

EDWARDS' IND. TRACK OF SKUNK

"C"



2114-2120
DIW

19 "C"
20 •

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (1) - ANNEX D

TARGET "D" DISCUSSION

Ship Reports (For graphic display see pages 2 and 3)

Target "D" was first picked up by MORTON at 2051, range 16,000 yards, and was tracked erratically until it faded at 2055. It was next reported by EDWARDS at 2103 and tracked until 2111. In each case the target was opening and evaluated as non-threatening so no attempt was made by either ship to lock-on with their fire control radars.

Opinion.


The scanty and uncorrelated track information obtained by both ships does not support the presence of a small craft target.

Conclusion.

Target "D" has a very low probability of having been a small craft target.


~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET



**EDWARDS' IND.
TRACK OF SKUNK**


"D"




TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

182049H



• PROCEEDING MINUTES



FADED

MORTON'S IND.
TRACK OF SKUNK

"D"

TOP SECRET

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (1) - ANNEX E

TARGET "E" DISCUSSION

Ship Reports. (For graphic display see pages 2 and 3)

Target "E" was picked up by MORTON at 2114, range 14,000 yards, and by EDWARDS at 2119. Both ships then acquired "E" with their MK-68 directors. MORTON fired one warning shot at 2116 and EDWARDS commenced firing about 2120 and ceased at 2124, having expended 13 rounds of 5"/54. No splashes were noted in vicinity of the target. "E" faded from MORTON's scope at 2124 and EDWARDS' scope at 2137.

Opinion.

"E" was picked up in vicinity of last known position of "A" which had faded about 47 minutes earlier. Consequently, there exists the possibility that it may have been one of the two targets which were observed when "A" had split. However, there remains to be accounted for the 47 minutes it had remained stationary. Repair of damage may be postulated with some degree of confidence.



Conclusion.

Target "E" has a high probability of having been a small-craft target. There is also a median probability that it may have been one of the targets in track "A".

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

MORTON'S IND.
TRACK OF SKUNK
"E"




~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

EDWARDS' IND. TRACK OF SKUNK

"E"



TOP SECRET

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (1) ANNEX F

TARGET "F" DISCUSSION

Ship Reports (For graphic display see pages 3 and 4)

Target "F" was first picked up by MORTON at 2119, range 20,000 yards, and tracked on courses between 215° and 226°, and speeds between 20 and 24 knots. It was acquired and tracked by both of MORTON's fire control systems. EDWARDS gained contact at 2128 and locked on with the MK-68 director about 2130 two minutes later and fired one warning shot. Both ships opened fire at 2131 with MORTON ceasing at 2132 and EDWARDS about 2136. MORTON had expended 6 rounds of 5"/54 and 38 rounds of 3"/50; EDWARDS 22 rounds of 5"/54 and 3 rounds of 3"/50. Splashes noted on target blip on both surface and fire control radars appeared to "engulf" the blip which disappeared at 2135.

Opinion

The speeds at which "F" was tracked by MORTON were somewhat erratic. EDWARDS did not pick up the target until it had closed over 10,000 yards and in a position which was over 2000 yards from the position reported by MORTON. Position correlation was very poor during interval both ships were tracking. The patrol unit closed to within 4,000 yards of the reported position of "F"; however there was no visual confirmation of the existence of any small craft.

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Under existing visibility conditions, it is a reasonable assumption that one should have been sighted.

Conclusion



There is a very low probability that "F" was a small craft.

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

MORTON'S IND. TRACK OF SKUNK "F"




• PROCEEDING MINUTES

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

• PROCEEDING MINUTES



EDWARDS' IND.
TRACK OF SKUNK

"F"

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (1) - ANNEX G

TARGET "G" DISCUSSION

Ship Reports (For graphic display see page 2)

After changing position of the DRT bugs former target "B" was picked up and reported as a new target "G" by EDWARDS at 2047 7000 yards - 8000 yards. The MK-68 acquired and firing commenced at 2049. Firing ceased at 2054 having expended 66 rounds of 5"/54. The target faded at 2059. No splashes were observed on the target blip. MORTON did not track this target.


Opinion and Conclusions

Since this was a continuation of plot of "B", the same opinions and conclusion apply i.e. a very low probability of having been a small craft.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

• PROCEEDING MINUTES



**EDWARDS' IND.
TRACK OF SKUNK**
"G"

TOP SECRET

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

ENCLOSURE (1) - ANNEX H

TARGET "H" DISCUSSION

Ship Reports (For graphic display see pages 2 and 3)

Target "H" was first acquired by MORTON at 2133, range 19,000 yards. The MK 56 director locked on and tracked target until blip faded at 2204. The target was not designated to the MK 68 GFCS. EDWARDS picked up a contact in the vicinity of "H" but later evaluated its contact as non-target. No orders were given to fire on this target.

Opinion


There was no correlation between ships on this target. Both ships should have been able to track the target with some correlation. There was only one other reported contact during most of the period that MORTON held a track on "H" so intership designation of a valid small craft target should have been effective. With the clutter buildup observed about this time and the sequence of previous events, it is very probable that contact evaluation suffered.

Conclusion.

There is a very low probability that "H" was a small craft.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET



**EDWARDS' IND.
TRACK OF SKUNK
"H"**


• PROCEEDING MINUTES



TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

MORTON'S IND. TRACK OF SKUNK "H"



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (1) - ANNEX I

TARGET "I" DISCUSSION

Ship Reports (For graphic display see page 2)

Target "I" was picked up by MORTON at 2138, range 14,000 yards and tracked by the surface radar and MK 56 GFCS until it faded at 2211. EDWARDS was not able to pick up and track this target. "I" was not fired upon.

Opinion.

There was no correlation between ships on this target. Both ships should have been able to track the target with some correlation. There was only one other reported contact during most of the period that MORTON held a track on "I" so intership designation of a valid small craft target should have been effective. With the clutter buildup observed about this time and the sequence of previous events, it is very probable that contact evaluation suffered.

Conclusion.

There is a very low probability that "I" was a small craft.

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

182136H

C-180
S-25

40

44

C-150

50 C-080

55

2200

C-110

40

C-210
S-30

182138H

05

2212

C-210
S-29

48

C-245
S-25

C-210
S-23

2200

2211

FADED

• PROCEEDING MINUTES

MORTON'S IND.
TRACK OF SKUNK

"P"

TOP SECRET

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (1) - ANNEX J

TARGET "J" DISCUSSION

Ship Reports (For graphic display see page 2)

Target "J" was picked up by EDWARDS at 2148, range 4,000 yards, and tracked for seven minutes until it faded at 2153. MORTON did not track this target. It was not tracked by any fire control system.

Opinion.

"J" remained within the reported maximum visibility range for the entire period it was tracked. There was no correlation on this target.

Conclusion.

There is almost a zero probability that "J" was a small craft.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~


~~TOP SECRET~~

"J"

182148H

182148H

2



54

52

50

49

EDWARDS' IND.
TRACK OF SKUNK


"J"

~~TOP SECRET~~

53

51

50



~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

2

ENCLOSURE (2)

SENSOR PERFORMANCE

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Summary of Sensor Performance

Facts.

1. The surface search radar, air search radar, fire control radar, radar repeater, target designation system, electronic countermeasure (ECM passive receiver) and sonar systems for USS MORTON and USS EDWARDS are almost identical and are described in Annex A.
2. In both MORTON and EDWARDS the surface search radars (AN/SPS-10) and the fire control radars (AN/SPG-53) were in good operating condition. Both ships had trouble with their MK 56 fire control system (MK 35 radar).
3. The ships' ECM passive receivers (AN/BLR-1) were manned and operating but did not contribute any positive information to the Commander during the action.
4. The ships' sonar systems (AN/SQS-23) were operating passively but did not contribute any positive information to the Commander during the action.
5. The air search radars (AN/SPS-40), though operating, contributed nothing to the detection and classification of surface contacts.
6. At least two of the contacts were well defined and steady but small radar targets which produced continuous, well coordinated, linear tracks.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Opinions.

1. The two ships had competent radar and fire control operators.
2. Radar conditions were excellent at the start but were degraded by weather clutter by the end of the action.
3. All reported contacts were real radar targets.
4. Some contacts produced no continuous well-coordinated tracks and were not surface craft.
5. Contact "A" was in fact a real target, produced a continuous track and was most probably one or more small surface craft.
6. Contacts "C" (MORTON) and "E" (both ships) were probably small surface craft and possibly were the same surface craft that made track "A".
7. There is a very low probability that there were more than two valid surface craft targets.

Conclusion.

In an operation of this nature our radars do not provide positive classification unless supported by reliable sighting, ECM or sonar information.

Recommendation.

In addition to star shells and aircraft illumination, provide low-light television equipment to ships on this type operation to provide more positive contact classification.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTIONS

ENCLOSURE (2) - ANNEX A

Electronic Material

1. Surface Search Radar - AN/SPS-10.

This radar operates in the frequency band 5450-5825 Mcs. Pulse repetition rate is 625-650 cps. In a normal search mode the resolution is 275 yards in range by about 1° in azimuth (1° is 175 yards at a range of 10,000 yards). The surface search radars were operable during the entire period of the DeSoto patrol giving what was considered to be excellent performance. "Ring times" were taken at regular intervals and were satisfactory and constant. ("Ring Time" is an overall measure of radar transmitter and receiver performance.)

2. Air Search Radar - AN/SPS-40.

These radars were operable during the entire period of the DeSoto patrol with the exception of a few short periods.

3. Fire Control Radars

Forward director (Gun Fire Control System MK 68) - AN/SPG-53. This radar operates in the frequency band 8500-9600 Mcs. Pulse repetition rate is 1190-1450 cps. The resolution with a surface target is about 80 yards in range by about 1.3° in azimuth (1.3° is 225 yards at a range of 10,000 yards). Aft director (Gun Fire Control System MK 56) - Radar MK 35. This radar operates in the frequency band 8740-8890 Mcs. Pulse repetition rate is 1620-1980 cps. The resolution with a

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

surface target is about 35 yards in range by about 1.5° in azimuth (1.5° is 260 yards at a range of 10,000 yards). The forward fire control radars performed very well with no casualties during the action. The aft fire control radars were not very useful during the action because of material problems in the parent fire control systems.

4. ECM Passive Receiver - AN/BLR-1.

This is a frequency scanning receiver which covers the frequency range 90 to 10,750 Mcs. in 8 bands. Only one band at a time can be operated and the scanning rate for an entire band varies from 3 to 7 minutes per scan. These receivers were considered to be in good operating condition.

5. Displays.

Surface search radar was displayed on a repeater (AN/SPA-4) on the open bridge, a similar repeater in the pilot house and on two repeaters (AN/SPA-4) and the Target Designation System (MK 5) in CIC. Air Search radar was displayed on two repeaters (AN/SPA-8) in CIC.

6. Sonar.

Both ships were equipped with AN/SQS-23 sonar which can be operated as active sonar or as a listening system. The equipments on both ships were operating satisfactorily.

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (2) - ANNEX B

Analysis of Radar Contacts

1. General Comments.

At 181900H in the vicinity of TU 76.6.6 there was scattered cloud cover, the seas were slight and the wind was 345⁰, speed 10 knots. Later in the period of the engagement cloud cover increased and rain squalls were observed. Wooden poles, referred to as "fish stakes", some 4 to 5 inches in diameter and extending 8 to 10 feet out of the water are encountered in the Gulf of Tonkin. Fish stakes, reportedly, can be reliably detected at a distance of 8,000 to 10,000 yards with the surface search radar. With the fire control radar the typical tracking range for a fish stake is reported to be about 15,000 yards.

Before the first contact, the MORTON surface search master repeater was being operated with a maximum display range of about 25 miles. Sea return was present out to a range of 4,000 to 5,000 yards. The surface search radar was being operated in the long pulse mode which is the normal search mode as it provides the longest detection ranges. Sensitivity Time Control (STC) was "on". There was no sign of weather clutter on the surface search displays at this time. Later considerable weather clutter was noted. During interviews of the various radar operators it was noted that they had vivid recollections of the radar return characteristics associated with each of the first two or three contacts. For

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

the later contacts their recollection of details often was not directly relatable to the specific contacts.

2. Target "A" Facts.

Target "A" was detected at about 20,000 yards on the surface search master display. The detection was almost immediately verified by the operator of the other surface search display in the MORTON CIC. The operator stated that the target appeared on the display as a small, well defined blip, about the size of the range bug. Just after detection, a blip was obtained for each two or three radar antenna rotations. This improved to an essentially solid contact as the target closed. Later when projectile splashes were observed near this target, these returns were reported to be about the same size as the target. In other words, this was a small but steady target.

Some time after being reported as a contact, this target was detected on surface search radar displays in EDWARDS. In both ships this contact provided a long continuous track indicating a target velocity of 18 to 20 knots.

When designated to MORTON forward fire control system, this target was easily acquired by the fire control radar. The fire control radar operators described the target as small but steady. It was rated as being about the size of a typical return from a 30 to 40 foot motor boat and four times the

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

size of a fish stake return at the same range. It provided a steady track for the fire control system. When the target appeared to split into two targets the tracking noise increased and it was necessary to provide manual aid for tracking. After the split the operator selected the target at the closest range and the track was again steady.

3. Target "A" Opinions.

It is the opinion of the group that this contact was a real radar target and not an anomalous phenomenon such as a second return echo due to ducting or the result of self generated interference or deliberate electronics countermeasure (ECM) "spoofing" with false targets. This opinion is based on the fact that it was simultaneously tracked by both ships using four different frequencies and four different pulse repetition frequencies.

At the time of detection MORTON was about a mile closer to the target than EDWARDS . This would account for a four minute difference in detection time. The additional time difference is attributable to a normal variation in overall radar system sensitivity, display range used, and/or a difference in radar operator performance. The long continuous tracks from each ship correlated well, with such errors as did exist attributable to a lag error in the MORTON's DRT, during turns. The target fade at 2032H occurred as the ship executed a turn which placed the weak target astern in the blind zone of the forward fire control radar and the reduced sensitivity zone

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

of the surface search radar. By the time the target was again on a favorable bearing it would have been beyond normal detection range.

Inspection of the tracks suggests the possibility that target "C" track is a continuation of the target "A" track with redetection occurring when the target was again within range.

It is the opinion of the group this was an actual surface craft. Debris is ruled out due to the target velocity and the lack of periodic fluctuation normally associated with floating debris. A rain squall, cloud, or other weather effect is ruled out due to the lack of elevation effects on the fire control radar, the velocity, and to the fact that the target's return was small and well defined. Birds can be ruled out due to the lack of reaction to gunfire and the fact that the detection range is too great for a single bird. Wakes from the MORTON and EDWARDS are not the source of a target because the detection and a major portion of the track are ahead of the ships. The target velocity is too high for such a track to be produced by waves (wind velocity of 8-10 knots) and no reaction to firing bursts was noted.

4. Target "A" Conclusions.

There is a very high probability (confidence level greater than 90%) that Target "A" was in fact at least one small surface craft. There is a median probability (confidence level of

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

of about 50%) that Target "A" was two small surface craft that eventually were reacquired as Targets "E" (both ships) and "C" (MORTON).

5. Target "B" Facts

Target "B", which was reported to be a very weak and intermittent target, was first detected by MORTON. It was designated to EDWARDS which locked on with its FCS MK 56. Operators reported wake-like clutter effects during acquisition and more background clutter after firing at Target "B". The surface search radar operator who made the initial detection noted additional clutter in the area of the target.

6. Target "B" Opinion.

It is the opinion of the group that the wakes, from the time MORTON and EDWARDS were on course 130, could have been the original Target "B". As the tracks proceeded in an intermittent fashion it is also considered possible that sea clutter, fish stakes, birds, etc. may have contributed to the track.

7. Target "B" Conclusions.

There is a very low probability (confidence level much less than 50%) that Target BRAVO was in fact a surface craft.

8. Target "C" Facts

Target "C" was detected by MORTON and a Target "C" also detected by EDWARDS. EDWARDS subsequently determined that their contact was a fixed target and evaluated it as a fish stake. As tracked by MORTON this contact produced a good solid track which was a dead reckoning extension of the track of Target "A".

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

9. Target "C" Conclusions

There is a median probability (confidence level 50%) that "C" was in fact a small surface craft, and represents a redetection of contact "A".

10. Targets "D", "F", "G", "H", "I", and "J" Facts.

It was reported that during the latter part of the action (after 2100H) there was an increase in weather clutter. Several operators stated that in this period there were a considerable number of "Targets" to the SE and only those closing the ship were designated. In some cases targets were lost at ranges considerably less than 10 miles. In some cases a closing target was lost as it came into a close range. In response to direct questions, it was reported that some of these contacts were lost because they ran into weather clutter and some were lost because they "faded from the scope". In general there was poor correlation of tracks between the two ships.

11. Targets "D", "F", "G", "H", "I", and "J" Opinions.

It is the opinion of the group that these target tracks could have been generated under the stress conditions then prevailing using weather returns and other clutter which was then present in abundance. On the other hand the possibility cannot be completely discounted that one or more of these tracks were valid surface craft tracks which were lost in the weather clutter.

12. Targets "D", "F", "G", "H", "I", and "J" Conclusions. There is a low probability (confidence level much less than 50%) that these

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

targets were, in fact, actual small surface craft.

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

ENCLOSURE (2) - ANNEX C

SONAR, ECM PASSIVE RECEIVER AND

AIR SEARCH RADAR PERFORMANCE

1. Sonar.

MORTON and EDWARDS sonar systems were operated passively (listening only) during the period of the action. Sonar performance (both active and passive) is critically dependent on the speed of the ship and the bearing of the target. Performance is degraded when the target is astern and at all bearings when the ship speed exceeds 15 knots. Degradation increases rapidly with increasing speed and with high speed during almost all of the action. Passive sonar "contacts" were subsequently evaluated as own ship noise.

2. ECM Passive Receivers.

ECM intercept receivers were manned and operating during the action. For the most part these receivers were employed to search the frequency band known to include SKINHEAD radar, the most probable radar expected in P-4 and SWATOW craft. This radar is known to operate in the "S" band of frequencies and is similar to our SO series of small craft radar. The frequency search rate with the MORTON and EDWARDS equipment is, at best, one minute per scan which, considering the scanning rate of the target radar, makes interception in a situation such as this far from certain even if an actual target radar is present. EDWARDS picked up a radar to the west. This was evaluated as

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

a shore based radar. MORTON picked up extensive "S" band jamming between 2023H and 2105H. In view of the fact that neither MORTON nor EDWARDS have "S" band radar the significance of this intercept is not known. After the action MORTON picked up an emission to the southwest and evaluated it as SKINHEAD. After listening to a recording of this intercept the group evaluated it as a sector scan and tracking radar such as would be used at a coast defense site rather than a rotating SKINHEAD type radar.

3. Air Search Radar.

The surface contacts were not picked up by the air search radar. Due to the land locked nature of the Gulf of Tonkin this radar was being operated in the Moving Target Indicator (MTI) mode of operation. In this mode fixed and slowly moving targets are cancelled out. Even in the Non-MTI mode of operation this radar would provide only a small amount of target classification information on small surface contacts, because of the small range band between the radar horizon and the minimum range of the AN/SPS-40 radar.

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Enclosure (3)

Visual Evidence

3

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

VISUAL EVIDENCE

Ship Reports

Annex A contains a summary of visual sighting reports and Annex B contains copies of statements of individuals who reported visual information.

Discussion

During night actions of this kind it is most difficult to correlate visual sightings with electronic sensor indications. As an example an SN stated he sighted tracer bullets being fixed from somewhere at sea in direction of MORTON - he was not sure of the direction nor the time so it was practically impossible to correlate. However, both the MK-56 and MK-68 Directors do have optics and the Director Officers in these positions were considered reliable sources for visual evidence. With but one exception, (Ensign Hudnell MK-56 Director Officer, on the EDWARDS) no director officers at anytime saw any targets visually with the optics provided by the fire control director. Upon interrogation it was ascertained that Ensign Hudnell had made his sighting during a period when his director was out of control due to a malfunction. As the director was "slewing" out of control Ensign Hudnell stated he sighted "a target that was a craft". Further interrogation revealed that Ensign Hudnell was not sure of the bearing of his visual sighting, therefore, it was impossible to correlate with other information.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

Opinion

The uncorrelated and fleeting nature of the reports, and the absence of any solid visual information from the Director Officers or their rangefinder operators make all reports questionable. It appears that the visual information was "after the fact" and none was made available to the commander on a timely basis to influence the decisionary process. More detailed interrogations of each individual might give a better evaluation of the credibility of the statements about visual sightings. There was insufficient time available to the team members to conduct this thorough an interrogation.

Conclusion

There is no fully credible visual information which can be used to positively establish either the nature of the targets engaged or whether or not hostile actions were taken, or return fire against the patrol unit.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

SUMMARY OF VISUAL SIGHTINGS

The following items of significance were sighted by personnel of Task Unit 77.6.6 during the action in the Gulf of Tonkin on the night of 18 September 1964. More detailed statements of what was sighted are attached.

1. EDWARDS (DD 950) personnel saw:

a. Ensign James H. N. Hudnell, stationed in Mk 56 Director as Director Officer spotted small craft silhouette, bow on, quite distinct and with the appearance of a boat built for speed. Remarked that boat was quite streamlined. Estimated length to be 50 or 60 feet.

b. D. G. Bowlen, Jr., SN, USN, stationed in Mk 56 Director as Director Operator sighted, with but a brief glance, the bow shape of a boat perhaps 40 or 50 feet long, at almost the same time as Ensign Hudnell.

c. George T. Green, CSCA, USN, observing from the 03 and 02 levels sighted many "Tracer" bullets arcing towards MORTON from somewhere out in the sea. Objects appeared blue in color and were noted to arc high in the air and fall short of MORTON.

d. Alton A. Nordine, GMG2, USN, sighted flashes of light originating from target on EDWARDS' beam.

e. Jesse D. Shepherd, SN, USN, sighted tracer bullets being fired from somewhere at sea in the direction of MORTON, also claims sighting the reflections (silhouette) of a small craft.

f. Paul E. Sherman, SM2, USN, sighted what he believes were tracer bullets emanating from the horizon.

g. T. D. Brown, Jr., SM2, USN, sighted tracer bullets going over MORTON's mast.

h. Richard W. Dailey, CS3, USN, sighted shell bursts off MORTON's port side at 200 feet above the sea. (Believe this was from a loaded gun cleared by MORTON at an angle of depression -- COMDESDIV 52.)

2. MORTON (DD 948) personnel saw:

a. Olmstead, Thomas J., 595 20 69, SN, USN, starboard lookout -- at 1935H Olstead states that he saw a very dim light on the horizon and noted it had a steady bearing.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

b. Hutchinson, Carl L., 428 03 03, RMG2, USN, MT 52 --
Saw projectile flash on target, appearing many times brighter
than normal. Also believes he saw some oil smoke following
the flash. (Time not pinned down.)

c. Egge, Sheridan L., 699 28 16, SA, USN, after lookout.
At about 1948H saw a dim, white light to port about half-way
to the water. Appeared to be moving toward MORTON.

d. Darling, Michael N., 597 12 93, SN, USN, Rangefinder
Operator, MT 51 - Saw contact on port beam through rangefinder
and described it as a small, black shapeless object, not part of
the plane of the sea.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

Eyewitness statement of Ensign James H. N. Hudnall, Jr., USNR.

I, Ensign James H. N. Hudnall, Jr., 679204/1105, USS RICHARD S. EDWARDS, was during general quarters on the night of 18 September stationed in the Mark 56 director on board USS RICHARD S. EDWARDS (DD 950). We commenced firing at what appeared on radar to be small surface targets. After the first few shots my director radar would not lock on properly and I intermittently lost control of director train and elevation. All mounts were switched to the Mark 68 director. A short time later during one of the brief periods my director would train, I spotted a small craft silhouette. At the time I spotted the craft, plot 2 was making a radar sweep below the horizon. The craft passed across my binoculars' field of vision in 3 or 4 seconds and before I could take control and put the director back on the craft, I had lost power again. At the time the craft swept into my field of vision my optical tracker was manning his sights. He shouted "there's a boat" or words to that effect just at the same time I said, "I see one" or words to that effect. The silhouette that I saw was almost directly bow on, and quite distinct. It looked like a boat built for speed, being quite streamlined. I remember being able to see one side slightly (starboard), and would estimate the length to be very roughly about 50 or 60 feet.

I certify that the above statement is complete and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ James Henry Natt Hudnall, Jr.
JAMES HENRY NATT HUDNALL, JR.

19 September 1964

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

Eyewitness Statement of BOWLEN, Daniel O., Jr., 687 91 09, USN.

I, Daniel O. Bowlen, 687 91 09, while on duty aboard the USS RICHARD S. EDWARDS (DD 950) serving as director operator, observed a low boat silhouette just after mount 32 fired a single round and the director 52 was making a bearing sweep controlled by plot 2. It was just the briefest of glances, but enough to clearly define the bow shape of a boat perhaps 40 to 50 feet long. The director officer, Ensign Hudnall, also saw it and we both spoke up almost in chorus. Then the director suffered a casualty in the system which then prevented us from reversing the sweep and acquiring the target.

I certify that the above statement is complete and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ DANIEL O'CONNELL BOWLEN, JR.
DANIEL O'CONNELL BOWLEN, JR.

19 September 1964

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

Eyewitness Statement of Green, George T., 672 08 40, CSCA, USN.

I, George T. Green, CSCA, 672 08 40, USN, did witness on the night of 18 September 1964 what appeared to be small caliber possibly 20 mm. or thereabout, gun fire coming in at a high altitude toward the USS MORTON (DD 948) which was between us (RICHARD S. EDWARDS) and the source of the gun fire. There appeared to be some tracer effect prior to explosion of these objects. Distance could be determined by me but they appeared to be away short of the USS MORTON and at, I repeat a very high altitude. The explosion from these objects appeared to be blue in color. There were very many, possibly a hundred or more. This occurred approximately 10 to 15 minutes after the MORTON first opened repeated fire. I have no idea of the time of night by the clock. Observed by me from the 03 level and the 02 level in plain view in that order.

I certify that the above statement is complete and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ George T. Green
GEORGE THEODORE GREEN

19 September 1964

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

Eyewitness Statement of NORDINE, Alton A., 419 93 05, USN.

I, Alton A. Nordine, 419 93 05, GMG2, USN, am mount Captain for mount 31 in between the barrel of the mount. When we fired I saw flashes in return of the firing that we did and had time, when we fired there was a return flash from our beam. This was about 2300 on 18 September 1964. The flashes came from our beam. When USS MORTON fired the warning shot a return fire from our port beam. I couldn't hear anything, but I saw the flashes.

I certify that the above statement is complete and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Alton Alvin Nordine
ALTON ALVIN NORDINE

19 September 1964

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~
SECRET

I, Jesse D. Shepherd, on or about the 18 September 1964 did see while on my General Quarters station. At or about 2130 tracers bullets being fired in the direction of the USS MORTON (DD 948). Also I saw, the same night, reflections of a small craft.

I certify that the above statement is complete and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Jesse D. Shepherd
JESSE DOUGLAS SHEPHERD

19 September 1964

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
SECRET

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

Eyewitness Statement of SHERMAN, Paul E., SM2, 429 86 91, USN

I, Paul E. Sherman, SM2, 429 86 91, USN, in the early morning hours of 19 September 1964, or late on the night of the 18th September 1964 while standing Signalman of the Watch, port side, was looking through ships binoculars on a relative bearing of about 270° while USS MORTON was firing to port, noticed what appeared to be return fire from the horizon (off MORTON's port beam). It looked something like tracer bullets or something to that effect. At first I thought it was an aircraft firing at us but the longer I watched it, it appeared to come from the horizon.

I certify that the above statement is complete and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Paul Edward Sherman
PAUL EDWARD SHERMAN

19 September 1964

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~

SECRET

Eyewitness Statement of BROWN, Theodore D., Jr., SM2, 515 28 62, USN

I, Theodore D. Brown, Jr., SM2, 515 28 62, USN, while standing watch on the Signal Bridge of the USS RICHARD S. EDWARDS (DD 950) while the ship was at General Quarters, sighted the following things. On 18 September 1964, while USS MORTON (DD 948) was 220° relative from USS RICHARD S. EDWARDS (DD 950) and on a firing run, to the best of knowledge an unidentified surface craft on relative bearing 290° was returning fire. It appeared to be tracers going over USS MORTON's mast, plus unidentified contacts was firing at the same time as USS MORTON (DD 948).

I certify that the above statement is complete and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Theodore Dale Brown, Jr.
THEODORE DALE BROWN, JR.

19 September 1964

C O P Y

~~Secret~~

SECRET

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

Eyewitness Statement of DAILY, Richard W., CS3, 691 71 18, USN

The MORTON had fired a warning shot and shortly after the EDWARDS fired a warning shot. I then saw an exchange of fire between the MORTON and other ships or ship. I saw what seemed to be small burst of projectiles off the port side of the MORTON which were about 200 feet high off the water and about 1000 to 2000 yards short. The burst were staggered in distance but in a sweep to take in the length of the MORTON. Then we began to return the fire also. This all took place close to 2000, 18 September 1964.

I certify that the above statement is complete and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Richard Wayne Daily
RICHARD WAYNE DAILY

19 September 1964

COPY

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

Statement and recorded times and events of OLMSTEAD, Thomas J.,
595 20 69, SN, USN, Starboard lookout, USS MORTON (DD 948),
18 September 1964

I was the starboard lookout just prior to general quarters
on the night of 18 September 1964.

About 1935 I was starboard lookout. The moon was bright.
We were heading into it, bearing 035° - 045° R. Just off
the starboard bow I saw a very dim light on the horizon
with steady bearing. I told Mr. Cooper, JOOD, of my
contact. Mr. Cooper checked the radar and came back and
told me there seemed to be a contact in that direction.
My relief then came up to relieve me. I told him I saw a
light that was either a reflection off the moon or a light
on the horizon. At that time my relief, WOLF, Raul Louis,
698 32 46, SA, USN, took over, and I went up to the 03 deck
to look at it some more with the sky lookout glasses. I
was adjusting them when I heard some one say, "Sound
General Quarters." I then went to Magazine 53, my GQ
station. The more I think about it I recall that it was
a steady light and not a reflection, as a reflection varies
off and on with the waves.

/s/ Thomas J. Olmstead

Witnessed:

/s/ R. J. Royer, LT, USN
R. J. ROYER, LT, USN

C O P Y

19 September 1964

Statement and recorded times and event of HUTCHINSON, Carl L.,
428 03 03, CMG2, USN, GQ Station L OMC, MT 52.

While MT 52 was in cease fire status I saw hits from MT 31
take target under fire, saw flashes of projectiles bursting
around it. Then saw a flash about 10 times brighter than
projectile flash, looked like some oil smoke following the
flash.

/s/ Carl L. Hutchinson

Witnessed:

/s/ R. J. Royer
R. J. ROYER, LT, USN

C O P Y

Statement and recorded times and events of EGGE, Sheridan L.,
699 28 16, SA, USN, After Lookout, USS MORTON (DD 948)

Just came on watch about 1945 on 18 September, put on phones
and called the bridge I was on the line. About three minutes
after that I saw MT 53 turn to port, which called my attention
the the port side. I saw a dim dirty white light about half
way to the horizon, low on the water. It looked like it was
moving toward the MORTON. Right after that I heard General
Quarters sounded. I then went to Repair 3 which is my GQ
station.

/s/ Sheridan L. Egge

Witnessed:

/s/ R. J. Royer
R. J. ROYER, LTJG, USN

C O P Y

STATEMENT OF DARLING, Michael N., 597 12 93, SN, USN, USS
MORTON (DD 948)

We were locked on a contact off the port beam. As it came in it split into two contacts and a short time later it split again. All the time the range was closing. I was watching for it with the rangefinder when I saw it. The contact was a small, black, shapeless object not part of the plane of the sea. Only saw it for a short time, then lost it. I did not see it again. My GQ station is Rangefinder Operator for Director 51.

/s/ Michael N. Darling
Michael N. DARLING

Witnessed:

/s/ R.J. Royer
R. J. ROYER
LTJG, USN

C O P Y

STATEMENT AND RECORDED TIMES AND EVENTS OF LANCE CORPORAL
James Harold STANTON, USMC, 1ST RADIO BATTALION, ECM OPERATOR
AND MEMBER OF DESOTO TEAM EMBARKED IN USS MORTON (DD 948),
18 SEPTEMBER 1964

1950 - Contacts were reported and ship went to GQ. I was
on the ECM gear.

2016H- Ship fired first shot at target for warning.

2019H- Heard second shot fired. I was sitting next to
COTTRELL, RD1, who was on SPS-10. Second round
seemed to hit target. Target disappeared.

2021H- Heard four rounds fired.

2022H- One round heard. Jamming started on ECM at this time.
On freq spectrum 2700-3200 mcs. I was searching this
spectrum at this time looking for fire control radars
when jamming commenced. Jamming continued for about
35 minutes until about 2105. Jamming varied from
complete blackout of the scope to where no signal
could possibly be distinguished to a weak signal
lasting not over 10 seconds. Both audio and video
gain were noted to be extremely strong, so much so
that I had to take my earphones off, then cut the
gain down and listen with earphones in my hand.

2203H- Picked up possible skinhead freq ^{2980 JHS}~~2880~~, 4 photos taken,
recording made of about 3 minutes duration. (R.S.
EDWARDS reported same to us.) I then turned to this
freq and picked up the recorded signal.

/s/ L/CPL James H. Stanton

Witnessed:

/s/R. J. Royer
R. J. ROYER
LTJG, USN

C O P Y

19 September 1964

From: Main Battery Officer, USS MORTON (DD 948)
To: Commander Destroyer Division FIFTY TWO
Via: Commanding Officer, USS MORTON (DD 948)

Subj: Surface engagement, night of 18 September 1964

1. At Condition 3 Watch. First target picked up approximately 1940. Locked on and tracking 1945. Range 7,000 yards. Target closing at high speeds 150° true, 20 knots. 1950 General Quarters set. 2016 one round fired across target's bow. Target continued to close at high speed. 1921 commenced rapid continuous fire. First few rounds noted to be short of target. Received plus 500 yards spot from gun control. Shot then noted to be long by radar and a minus 300 yard spot set. Shot then appeared to be directly on target. After several rounds appeared directly on target range ceased closing and target disappeared from scope. Ceased firing 2023.

2. Track several targets at approximately 13,000 yards into 11,000 yards. At this time targets appeared to split, one closing, one staying at approximately 11,000 yards. Track closing target into approximately 5,000 yards at which time target opened in range, while second target closed at high rate of speed. This seemed to be their designed method of attack. Experienced difficulty in tracking closing targets because of small radar return and jamming. Jamming was in the form of radar interference, to wit: sine wave effects on b and e sweeps, spike effects and brought blot out effects on A and R sweep. All incoming targets were tracked and either locked on or gaited. Throughout engagement encountered blot out effects on all sweeps similar to weather or jamming. Upon many occasions targets seemed to head for these areas of cover. Changing frequencies and pulse repetition rate eliminated most of the electronic effects (jamming). Targets were taken under fire during this time twice. At times 2026 commenced firing, 2027 ceased firing; time 2032 commenced firing, 2035 ceased firing.

3. Received designation of target at 8,000 yards closing at high speeds, 22 knots. 2039 taken under fire. Shot appeared to be directly on target in radar scope. Target obscured by splashes and disappeared from scope. Ceased firing 2043 at range 4,000 yards.

C O P Y

4. Received designation of target closing at high speed. 2114 fired round across its bow. Target observed to turn away and open range.

5. Received designation of target at 15,000 yards. Locked on and observed two small targets. Target split, one maintaining its range, the other closing. Locked on closing target at 11,000 yards. 2126 fired warning shot across the bow. Target continued to close in range. Time 2131 commenced firing at range 9,000 yards. Target completely obscured by shot. Estimated 20 rounds. No target visible on scope when shot splash cleared away. Ceased firing 2132.

6. Several more targets tracked but not taken under fire when range opening.

7. NOTES:

1. Heavy electronic jamming or interference noted during first part of engagement.

2. Targets throughout appeared extremely small, very difficult to lock on and track. Though we were able to track most targets at all times either by being locked on or gaited in.

3. 3. One target tracked at plus 30 knots, the rest tracking approximately 20 to 23.

Very Respectfully,

/s/ R. J. Royer
R. J. ROYER
LTJG, USN
Main Battery Officer

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE 4
COMMUNICATIONS

4

~~SECRET~~
~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~

COMMUNICATIONS

FACTS:

Incident to the DeSoto Patrol operations in the Gulf of Tonkin on 18 and 19 September. CTU 77.6.6 in MORTON, accompanied by EDWARDS, was required to process a highly abnormal amount of communication traffic, both incoming and outgoing, most of which was of high precedence requiring the most rapid handling possible. On 18 and 19 September, for example, CTU 77.6.6 and MORTON handled a total of 145 and 148 messages respectively which represented an increase of over 300% of their normal traffic load. Of even greater significance is the fact that on 18 September CTU 77.6.6 and MORTON processed a total of 41 off-line encrypted messages comprising 5,758 encrypted groups. On 19 September this was increased to 53 messages consisting of 6,656 encrypted groups. This is in contrast to a normal load of 6 off-line messages per day totaling 1,110 groups. The general result of this heavy increase of high precedence traffic was that CTU 77.6.6, with the present communication capability of his flagship, was unable to provide real time communication reporting and response to urgent requests for information received from higher authority. In order to analyze the failure of traffic flow, the problem was reviewed in two steps. One, the incoming message flow and two, the outgoing, with the problems attendant to each.

A. Incoming. The only means that both ships had to receive traffic via teletypewriter was the GR broadcast, which is an on-line 100 wpm circuit. It should be noted that this circuit is cleared for information of a classification up to and including Secret, and requires no manual decryption process by ships personnel except for messages of a Top Secret classification. Analysis of ships records, including logs, messages and delivered copies of messages, discloses that the broadcast reception aboard MORTON was highly reliable during 18th and 19th September and no appreciable delays in incoming traffic can be attributed to this means of delivery of traffic classified Secret and below. On the 18th and 19th, however, delays were encountered in processing 16 incoming messages because of their Top Secret classification which required manual off-line decryption. The speed of the off-line decryption was degraded drastically by the fact that the ships only reperforator

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

which supplies a teletype tape to be used for decryption in conjunction with a mechanical tape reader operating at 60 wpm could not be utilized due to incorrect wiring of patch panels in the communication center. Consequently, these messages had to be broken by hand typing.

B. Outgoing. Unlike the receive side, neither MORTON nor EDWARDS had an on-line cryptographic capability. All outgoing classified traffic was transmitted on a CW ship shore circuit to NAVCOMMSTA PHIL and had to be manually encrypted before transmission. This ship shore circuit, although highly reliable during the time in question, was limited to a speed of approximately 18 to 20 wpm. This time consuming off-line operation was compounded by the fact that the same crypto machines used in decrypting Top Secret incoming messages appearing on the broadcast, as described above, were required for the encryption of all outgoing classified traffic.

Transmission of off-line encrypted messages on the CW ship shore circuit occasioned further delays in handling at NAVCOMMSTA PHIL since that station had to prepare a teletype tape from the typed page copy prior to decrypting the messages for onward routing via on-line circuits. The following examples of messages received and answered by CTU 77.6.6 show graphically the time delays attributable: (a) to the drafting/releasing process in the Flagship, (b) the off-line encryption and CW transmission process on board and (c) the off-line encryption process at the COMMSTA:

1. Incoming message:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>PREC</u>	<u>TOR on BCST</u>
CINCPACFLT	182243Z	-0-	190230Z

1A. Outgoing Reply:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>TOR Ship COMMCEN</u>	<u>TOD to COMMSTA</u>	<u>FWD by COMMSTA</u>
CTU 77.6.6	192017Z	192017Z	200251Z	200406Z

2. Incoming Message:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>PREC</u>	<u>TOR on BCST</u>
CNO	182225Z	ZZ	182236Z

~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

2A. Outgoing Reply:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>TOR SHIP COMMCEN</u>	<u>TOD to</u> <u>COMMSTA</u>	<u>FWD by</u> <u>COMMSTA</u>
CTU 77.6.6	190138Z	190138Z	190226Z	190308Z

3. Incoming Message:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>PREC</u>	<u>TOR on BCST</u>
CINCPACFLT	190354Z	ZZ	190446Z

3A. Outgoing Reply:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>TOR SHIP COMMCEN</u>	<u>TOD to</u> <u>COMMSTA</u>	<u>FWD by</u> <u>COMMSTA</u>
CTU 77.6.6	190514Z	190514Z	190611Z	190626Z

4. Incoming Message:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>PREC</u>	<u>TOR on BCST</u>
CINCPACFLT	190711Z	ZZ	190729Z

4A. Outgoing Reply:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>TOR SHIP COMMCEN</u>	<u>TOD to</u> <u>COMMSTA</u>	<u>FWD by</u> <u>COMMSTA</u>
CTU 77.6.6	190751Z	190751Z	190846Z	190903Z

5. Incoming Message:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>PREC</u>	<u>TOR on BCST</u>
CINCPACFLT	190234Z	ZZ	190500Z

5A. Outgoing Reply:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>TOR SHIP COMMCEN</u>	<u>TOD to</u> <u>COMMSTA</u>	<u>FWD by</u> <u>COMMSTA</u>
CNO	191602Z	191602Z	191732Z	191802Z

14 Sections Total - 13 Sections sent via on-line from
USS COLUMBUS

6. Incoming Message:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>Prec</u>	<u>TOR on BCST</u>
CNO	182240Z	ZZ	190045Z

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~

6A. Outgoing Reply:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>TOR SHIP COMMCEN</u>	<u>TOD to COMMSTA</u>	<u>FWD by COMMSTA</u>
CTU 77.6.6	190720Z	190720Z	190950Z	191040Z

7. Incoming Message:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>PREC</u>	<u>TOR on BCST</u>
CINCPAC	182006Z	ZZ	182128Z

7A. Outgoing Reply:

<u>Orig</u>	<u>DTG</u>	<u>TOR SHIP COMMCEN</u>	<u>TOD to COMMSTA</u>	<u>FWD by COMMSTA</u>
CTU 77.6.6	182204Z	182204Z	182301Z	190025Z

Examination of the above figures shows that although communication handling times were unacceptable for the nature of the traffic concerned, not all the delays in response can be attributed to the mechanics of communications. In many instances a considerable lapse of time between receipt of messages requiring reply and the release of such replies to the ship's communication center is readily apparent.

2. Opinions: It is readily apparent that the requirement for rapid dissemination of information to be available to the President and the JCS as well as to the unified commander and Fleet Commanders in Chief in order that a constantly up-dated picture of an operation be continuously available cannot be met with the present limited capability of many units of the Naval Operating Forces. It is necessary that the best possible tools consistent with the state of the art be provided our ships now in order that present time consuming communications procedures can be eliminated thus enabling rapid dissemination of information to higher authority during important operations. Specifically, ships operating in forward areas must have modern high-powered transmitters, receivers with the highest sensitivity, on-line cryptographic equipment, and effective teletype systems. The necessary program to accelerate the modernization of afloat communications was submitted by the Navy and received SECDEF approval in November 1963. The program is tied to the ship overhaul cycle and will take 3-4 years to complete.

3. Conclusion. No surface ships assigned to this type of mission which have to rely on a CW mode of transmission and

~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~

an off-line cryptographic system can communicate rapidly enough to provide the information requested by higher authority within the desired time frame. Forces assigned to the DESOTO Patrol should in the future have on-line cryptographic equipment installed and checked out prior to their arrival on station.

4. Recommendations:

A. That the Navy Afloat Communications Program be accomplished without slippage.

B. That the Navy KW-7 installation program be modified as necessary to provide designated units now deployed or subject to deployment with an on-line ship-to-shore capability.

C. That the high speed off-line cryptographic program (KW-8) be accelerated so that existing and future on-line broadcast receive systems can be utilized for Top Secret and Limited Distribution messages.

5. Interim Actions Taken:

A. COMSEVENTHFLT has been provided a small pool of KW-7 equipments so that each DESOTO Patrol ship can be fitted with two KW-7 and ancillary devices.

~~SECRET~~
~~Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Enclosure (5)

Weather and Sonar Condition Summary

5

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

Weather and Sonar Condition Summary

Weather Conditions.

Throughout the period 182000H - 190100H the sea was calm (sea state 1) and winds were from 345° to 010°, 8 to 13 knots. Although a half-full moon provided patches of light in some areas, scattered clouds, coverage of about 50 percent with a solid dark cloud and thunderhead blanket along the horizon, reduced visibility to about 4 miles. Flashes of heat lightning in the distance further reduced effective night vision.

Moon.

Time 182000H

Approx Latitude 18-45N

Approx Longitude 106-52.8E

Altitude 37-47.8

AZIMUTH 044.5°T

Sonar Conditions.

During the period covered by this report, no Bathythermograph drops were made due to the shallow depth (80-90 feet) of the water. For this depth, sonar conditions were considered to be generally good. While traveling at medium speeds (15-20 knots) with sonar in Active mode, bamboo poles and small fishing craft were detected at ranges up to 8000 yards.

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

In Passive mode at medium speeds, slight noise spokes were encountered from 150° - 210° (relative) on the sonar scope. During the entire period of surface action sonar was in Passive mode of operation.

When traveling at high speeds (in excess of 27 knots), detection capability was greatly reduced by own ship's noise and sonar dome cavitation. In Passive mode at high speed, the sonar scope was practically completely blanked from 090° - 270° . During high speed turns, the entire sonar scope was blanked, rendering detection capability practically zero.

(Note: Sonar was in passive mode during entire period of action.)

~~Top Secret~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (6)

Statements of DESDIV 52/ USS MORTON/ USS EDWARDS

6

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

22 September 1964

~~SECRET~~

From: Captain Ernest E. HOLLYFIELD, Jr., 283440/1100, USN
Subj: Statement for Discussion on DESOTO Patrol of September
Ref: CINCPACFLT 210112Z
Encl: (1) Detailed chronological narrative of event

I am in my twenty-second year as an officer in the U.S. Navy. In additio to officer years I spent three years at the U.S. Naval Academy, graduating in 1943. I have spent fifteen of those officer years on sea duty, four on shore duty and three on foreign shore duty, one of which was at the U.S. Naval War College. Command of Destroyer Division FIFTY TWO is my fourth command at sea.

I was just preparing to depart from the United States with my division at the time of the MADDOX incident in the Tonkin Gulf, and had the good fortune to see the tremendous impact that U.S. reaction to the MADDOX case had on the American public. I watched President Johnson on television, and appreciated then the urgency of his needing to know what had happened before he ordered a retaliation against the North Vietnamese.

I knew then that it was well possible that I would have the responsibility for leading another patrol up into the Tonkin Gulf, and commenced preparing myself and my staff for the event. When I became Commander of the Taiwan

C O p Y

~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

Patrol Force, the files of previous DESOTO patrols came into my custody, as part of my duties. I read each of the files avidly, and searched for weak points and how I could overcome them. The MADDOX-TURNER JOY file I read over several times. The preparations for reporting to higher authority which I made are contained in enclosure (1) hereto, and I will not reiterate them.

I conducted the first day of my assigned DESOTO Patrol on 17 September 1964, after the patrol had been twice delayed by higher authority. On the night of the 17th I retired into the Tonkin Gulf on an evasive track to avoid a trap or ambush, using EMCON to the best advantage. During the night of the 17th I had been followed at a distance of about ten miles by two unknown craft, and tracked by a North Vietnamese shore station as I proceeded in for the second day's patrol on the 18th. During the patrol on the 18th, no North Vietnamese naval craft were sighted, although we were tracked by shore stations and reported regularly by junks with antennas. I knew that we were being very closely watched, and that if we were to have any trouble it would probably be that night.

For this reason, I again took an evasive patrol, but this time at sustained high speed (20 knots), and did not use any EMCON procedures, for I felt we would need our radars. It was necessary that I stay pretty well up in the Gulf, for the third day's patrol would begin well up in the Gulf.

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

It was while on one of the legs of my evasive night steaming that the action being discussed today took place.

At 181929H we were on course 130T, speed 20 knots, ships in column at 2000 yards, with MORTON in the van, when MORTON picked up her first radar contact. This contact was initially picked up on the port bow at a bearing of 095T, range 20,350 yards, closing. This in itself was not especially significant, but further plots showed this contact, hereinafter called "ALFA", to be making about 20 knots. This was significant, since no junk made such speed and as ALFA closed it showed no lights. From this point on I watched this radar contact closely. We were not showing any lights either.

When ALFA closed to a range of 9000 yards and was still closing by 1949H, I decided to execute a series of course changes for two reasons: First, to see if the contact would alter course to follow, and Second, since we had no lights on either we could not claim any right of way, and our courses were convergent. Just in case the target was aimed at attack I sent both ships to Condition of Readiness I and speeded up to 25 knots and told the ships to be ready for full power. Shortly after coming to the new course, which was 280T, MORTON's radar picked up another high speed target, hereinafter called "BRAVO" closing rapidly (about 20 knots) from the northwest, bearing 297T distance 13,700 yards. We were at this time then between two darkened closing targets.

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

~~Secret~~

At almost the same time jamming began on the HICOM Net.

Now, at this time, I found myself with two United States Navy ships well up in the Tonkin Gulf where two previous attacks had occurred on U.S. Navy ships, faced with two darkened, fast moving targets on converging courses. I knew full well that the striking power of the SEVENTH FLEET was to the southeast and ready to strike if provoked, and that such provocation could well come from my patrol. I fully appreciated the serious implications of an overt act by myself and ships. I also knew that the United States could not have one or both of its ships damaged or sunk in these waters.

I initiated a call for assigned aircover 15 minutes to the south, and sent my first FLASH message, which unfortunately used the word "attacked", which I clarified in later messages.

I now turned to a southerly course, and advised both ships that if the targets continued to close I would direct them to fire warning shots, then if the targets continued closing to be ready to fire. The targets continued closing, and ALFA split into two contacts. I then directed MORTON to fire a warning shot at ALFA on her port hand. When ALFA continued closing I directed another warning shot by MORTON. I designated BRAVO as EDWARDS' target and ALFA as MORTON's target. ALFA continued to close, jamming was intensifying, and I directed

~~Secret~~
SECRET

C O P Y

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

EDWARDS to fire her warning shot and then open fire if the target came on. I directed MORTON to open fire. Both ships opened fire at their respective targets. Chronological details of subsequent events are contained in enclosure (1).

Although there were many rain squalls around, the moon was bright and I could see EDWARDS well. I could not, and did not, see any targets, except on the radar. I observed the fall of shot closely. During the course of the next hour, we engaged what I would estimate as at least four different vessels, attacking the same targets more than once. I believe we sunk one, but cannot prove it. During thistime the ships were maneuvered on various courses to give best firing arcs and close new contacts. By time 2150H we had aircraft overhead and under positive control with flares and weapons. These were directed at the most probable escape routes for Vietnamese craft, in an effort to find the darkened craft which had converged on us. We had also worked our way well toward the North Vietnamese coast and in range to be tracked by North Vietnamese shore stations. Further, despite reports already sent, I knew that I had to get out a good SITSUM. Crypto facilities and transmission facilities in MORTON were already working to full capacity, with messages awaiting transmission. Further, to the best of my knowledge

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

COPY

~~secret~~
~~SECRET~~

no shots had been fired at us, although the position of the craft about us was most menacing. If we had been threatened in our right to be in the Gulf of Tonkin we had already well expressed our determination to stay there by the shots already fired. With these pressing thoughts in mind, I decided to open the North Vietnamese coast, and direct the aircraft present to the search for craft.

I proceeded to open the coast, meanwhile preparing and submitting my first SITSUM. By this time FLASH messages from higher commands were beginning to arrive at a rapid rate, all requiring near instantaneous replies. While engaged in these replies, I turned my ships and headed back up into the Gulf to augment the search through the action area. The destroyer RUPERTUS was ordered up to join us, and I vectored her in, directed the search aircraft, laid out a search plan to be conducted, and commenced the search in driving rain squalls. All the while, I was preparing answers to FLASH messages. Composition of a rational SITSUM was impossible. I refused to say we were fired on, when I did not know we were, and still do not. I knew that careless or inaccurate reports would provoke more questions, as they had in the MADDOX case. We began piecing together the composite plot and records.

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~secret~~

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

Answers to FLASH requests for information were backlogged in the hand encryption center of MORTON and in radio for transmission. All the while we were directing the search. In addition, five different directives of the highest priority were received for the patrol to commence at noon on the 19th closer to the coast as far up in the Gulf as we could get. This took some planning and organizing to get air cover over RUPERTUS, continue the search and get to our patrol begin point. I had EDWARDS transfer her records to me by highline enroute to patrol station, so some sort of composite report could be put out.

At noon we commenced a high speed patrol at 29 knots down the North Vietnamese coast. I could not divorce myself from this patrol completely, although I continued to write answers to FLASH messages. In addition, I received a directive to come up with a complete composite report in message form and see that it arrived at CINCPACFLT's headquarters not later than 201000Z. Work on this had to commence immediately, for each part would have to be hand encrypted and transmitted by hand. This report was prepared, and transmitted and received by CINCPACFLT by 191851Z, 15 hours before the deadline.

One hour before sunset at 1804H on 19 September we left the Tonkin Gulf as directed, and proceeded to rendezvous with COLUMBUS for fueling. COLUMBUS, fortunately transmitted almost all of our report on-line.

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

I feel that I accomplished my DESOTO Patrol mission of showing the United States Flag again in the Tonkin Gulf, fully and honorably, and that through our endeavors we displayed to the world that we do not intend to be intimidated in that area. I sincerely regret that the reporting was not adequate, but I feel that I was as well organized to do the reporting job as is possible on a ship of this class. I also firmly believe that more faith must be put in the on-scene commander to do his duty fully and make reports on his actions as quickly as is humanly possible. But accomplishment of his mission must come first. This cannot be done when he is pummeled by FLASH precedence questions from all levels of superior echelons.

Very respectfully,

/s/ E. E. Hollyfield, Jr.
E. E. HOLLYFIELD, Jr.

C O P Y

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~
SECRET

NARRATIVE OF ENGAGEMENT IN GULF OF TONKIN NIGHT OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1964
(Period 181930H - 182400H) (All times are HOTEL (-8) time)

181929H TU 77.6.6 Steaming in column on course 130T speed 20 knots, maximum boiler power available (although ships had been notified they could secure to two boilers on the line and others boosted after 200H, since they had had full boiler power available watch-and-watch and more of the same could be expected on the 19th). MORTON guide, RICHARD S. EDWARDS 2000 yards astern. MORTON made radar contact on SKUNK ALFA bearing 095T range 20,350 yards, closing.

181932H -
181938H ALFA tracked on course approximately 200T speed 20 knots. No lights showing, but we were showing no lights either. No ECM from ALFA. Too fast for any craft sighted in these waters by this DESOTO Patrol.

181949H ALFA still closing no lights, bearing 118 range 9000 yards. Decided to execute a series of course changes to see if ALFA changed his course.

181950H Altered course by Turn to 160T, changed speed to 25 knots, then as soon as steady to 190T by TURN, then to 220T by TURN. ALFA still closing.

181954H Set Condition of Readiness I on both ships, just in case.

181955H Directed both ships to keep full boiler power available. Sonar reported hydrophone effects on the same bearing as ALFA, executed TURN 6 to 280T to evade if torpedoes (this later proved to be bad information from sonar). ALFA altered course some to right, then appeared to come left again.

182003H ALFA appeared to maintain course. Slowed to 15 knots, to let him pass.

182004H Made radar contact on SKUNK BRAVO bearing 297T range 13,700 yards, closing fast. No lights showing. Jamming on HICOM Net, both electronic and voice. At this point, with two converging, high speed, darkened targets converging on my ships, in waters where two previous attacks on U.S. ships had taken place, it appeared to me that we were about to get in a trap. I ordered EMERGENCY 160 TURN, and we came to 160T. I asked EDWARDS if he concurred in SKUNK BRAVO, which he did. Very audible jamming continued. I attempted to call CTG 77.6 on the HICOM net to report converging

Enclosure (1)

~~Secret~~
SECRET

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

182004H (cont'd) targets, request air cover, and that I intended to fire warning shots and commence firing if necessary. Couldn't get through on HICOM, but MORTON CIC relayed the message on the CID net, which message got through.

182010H Both targets still closing. BRAVO at 294T range 8500 yards. ALFA at 12600 yards. Increased speed to 25 knots.

182014H Directed MORTON to take targets (ALFA had now split into two targets) to port, and EDWARDS to take target to starboard, and instructed both ships that I was directing MORTON to fire one warning shot at ALFA. Changed course by TURN to 190T.

182016H MORTON fired one shot over ALFA. Jamming of circuits continues, and some on radars. Target continued on course. BRAVO closing.

182020H Directed Both MORTON and EDWARDS to fire a warning shot on their targets and to stand by to commence firing if targets kept closing. Air cover overhead, but are fighters with only sidewinders. Illumination on the way by CTG 77.6.

182021H Directed MORTON to commence firing, which she did, at ALFA.

182022H Heavy jamming noticed on MORTON's ECM gear. MK 68 Director having difficulty tracking through jamming.

182023H MORTON MK 68 dropped track. CIC reported shells landing all around target ALFA and target obscured. Increased speed to 30 knots. changed course to 210T by TURN.

182026H Directed EDWARDS to commence firing at BRAVO which she did. MORTON CIC reported ALFA broke up, but still tracking. Designated to the MK 68 by TDS and MORTON resumed fire on ALFA. HYDROPHONE effects closing rapidly reported by MORTON sonar. (I put some faith in the sonarmen for we had practiced with the sonarmen at high speed just the day before, in order that they might distinguish own ship noises from possible torpedo noises. This report by sonar also eventually proved to be erroneous, for I do not believe any torpedoes were fired this night).

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~

182027H MORTON checked fire. EDWARDS checked fire, reported four hits on BRAVO.

182028H Executed **EMERGENCY** TURN 9 to 300T after double checking with sonar on the hydrophones. This was a bad course for firing, so as soon as the ships ceased turning I wanted to change course left.

182029H Executed 250 TURN to open up the batteries as much as possible and still be going away from the hydrophone effects.

182032H MORTON resumed fire on ALFA.

182034H Changed course by TURN to 280T.

182035H More hydrophone effects (Evaluated subsequently not so). Did emergency TURN 9 to 340T. This of course put EDWARDS in a very poor firing position, which I wanted out of as soon as I was sure about the hydrophone effects.

182036H Changed course by TURN to 250T.

182039H MORTON Cleared loaded gun.

182041H EDWARDS reported new contact bearing 300T distance 3000 yards from him. Directed to take contact under fire. Changed course by TURN to 220T to give EDWARDS better shot at target and to not open the range further on ALFA.

182044H EDWARDS reported new target (analysis shows this was still BRAVO) now at 266T at range of 4000 yards.

182048H EDWARDS commenced firing at new target, GOLF (actually this was probably what was originally designated BRAVO, which had faded from EDWARDS scope.)

182049H Changed course to 180T by TURN to give EDWARDS better shot.

182055H EDWARDS checked fire. Target completely obscured by shell bursts. EDWARDS reported four hits on GOLF.

182057H Changed course by TURN to 130T to close targets to the eastward.

182059H Target GOLF faded from EDWARDS scope.

182103H Changed course by TURN to 220T.

~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~

182104H Changed course to 130T by TURN to close targets CHARLIE and ECHO. Formed column. At this time, MORTON had a loader casualty to MT 51 and a misfire in MT 53.

182106H Changed course to 110T by CORPEN.

182110H Changed course to 060T CORPEN to give EDWARDS A better shot at CHARLIE and to close target ECHO to the northeast.

182112H EDWARDS fired warning shot at target CHARLIE.

182114H Changed course to 120T by CORPEN.

182116H EDWARDS opened fire on CHARLIE which went dead in water on CIC plot in MORTON from 2114 to 2120. Ceased fire. EDWARDS fired 4 rounds at CHARLIE and ceased fire. MORTON fired 1 warning shot at SKUNK ECHO.

182118H Increased speed to 30 knots. SKUNK ECHO bearing 041T distance 11,000 yards from EDWARDS.

182119H EDWARDS commenced firing at ECHO and ceased at 2124H. MORTON detected SKUNK FOXTROT bearing 077 range 20350. Since aircraft under control of EDWARDS were already attempting to illuminate contacts astern of us, decided to try and intercept FOXTROT, fire at him and pass close aboard to see what he looked like. Ordered ships not to fire any more at targets astern since we would use incoming planes to illuminate them.

182130H Changed course to 140T to cross ahead of FOXTROT. Commenced firing with both ships. Many burst observed all around and on FOXTROT by radar. EDWARDS reported four or five hits on FOXTROT.

182135H SKUNK FOXTROT faded from scopes on both ships. Believe sunk. MORTON had radar contact on SKUNK HOTEL bearing 114 range 19,400 yards. Decided to change course to intercept and see what he was, since I was convinced FOXTROT was sunk.

182136H Changed course to 180T by CORPEN.

182148H Changed course to 150T by CORPEN.

~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

182150H Changed course to 110T when HOTEL made no overt moves. By this time I knew that planes with flares were in the area under positive control, and felt that we could direct them to illuminate targets. We had closed the North Vietnamese coast and the base at QUANG KHE considerably during the action, and I knew we were being tracked by the same tracking station on VINH SON (LAT 17-56N LONG 106-27E) which had tracked us (from ECM) for two days and nights. Further, to the best of my knowledge no shots had been fired at us, although the position of the craft about us had been most menacing. Further, I knew that I had to get out a comprehensive report of what had happened right away. If we had been threatened in our right to be in the Gulf of Tonkin we had already well expressed our determination to be there by the shots already fired. With these pressing thoughts in mind, I decided to open the North Vietnamese Coast, which I did.

182342H Changed course to 322T, speed 25 knots and formation to line abreast to go back through the action area in an effort to find any debris or evidence of the action.

~~Secret~~
~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~

SECRET-NOFORN

C O P Y

22 September 1964

Statement of CDR John C. McGILL, USN, Commanding Officer, USS MORTON (DD948) concerning surface action in the Gulf of Tonkin on the night of 18 September 1964.

On the night of 18 September at about 181900H MORTON was steaming in company with USS RICHARD S. EDWARDS on course 130, speed 20 knots. Ships were in column, distance between ships 2000 yards, MORTON in Station 1, EDWARDS in Station 2. COMDESDIV 52 and CTU 77.6.6 was OTC embarked in MORTON.

Ships darkened and in Condition of Readiness III were retiring from point alfa of the Gulf of Tonkin, Desoto Patrol in the general direction of point Yankee. MORTON's navigation log records the ship's position at 182000H to have been latitude 18-47N, longitude 106-43SE.

At about 181929H a small surface contact was detected on surface search radar bearing 094, range 20,000 yards. This contact, designated Skunk A was tracked by CIC and determined to be on course 220, speed 17 knots, closing range. Skunk A was designated to gun control and by about 181940H the contact was acquired by the AN/SPG 53 fire control radar. By 1949 the range had closed to 9,000 yards, and the OTC ordered turn 3 away from the closing contact. At time 1952 with the range to Skunk A reduced to about 8,200 yards, I ordered the ship to General Quarters. At this time the MK 68 GFCS was tracking the contact. The courses and speeds generated by the MK 68 GFCS correlated with those reported by CIC. At time

C O P Y

1

~~SECRET~~-NOFORN

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

1953, with range at about 7,000 yards, OTC ordered a second turn 3 in the direction away from the contact. In spite of these successive turns away from the contact, ranges continued to close and at time 1955 the OTC ordered turn 6 to course 280T. Information received from the EDWARDS confirmed MORTON's plot of Skunk A. At time 2004H MORTON picked up a second contact, Skunk B, at a range of about 13,600 yards bearing 292T. This contact appeared to pose the more immediate threat and Gun Control was directed to shift from Skunk A and acquire Skunk B. Plot 1 reported locked on and tracking almost immediately. At time 2004 the OTC ordered 160 turn, and directed RICHARD S. EDWARDS to track contacts to starboard (west) and MORTON to track contacts to port (east). MORTON again shifted contacts, and by means of the MK 5 TDS Skunk A was redesignated to gun control. At time 2011 CIC reported Skunk A at 137 range 10,800 closing rapidly. At time 2014 the OTC ordered a turn 3 to course 190T and directed MORTON to fire a warning shot ahead of Skunk A. With the contact bearing 137, range 10,000 yards, I directed gun control to fire a warning shot at bearing 145T, range 8,000 yards with MT 51. A malfunction in MT 51 prevented firing that mount, and MT 52 was directed to fire the warning shot. A warning shot was fired at 2016 and the fall of shot was observed on both surface search and fire control radars to fall short and ahead of the target. At time 2020 a second shot was fired with range decreased to about 8,000 yards. Skunk A continued to close and at time

~~SECRET~~-NOFORN

2021 MORTON was directed by the OTC to take the target under fire. From time 2021 to 2027 MORTON fired upon the target, Skunk A. At time 2028 CIC reported the target appeared to be breaking up on the radar scope and it subsequently faded from both surface search and fire control radar. At time 2023 the OTC ordered a course change by turn movement to course 210, speed 30 knots. At 2029, sonar reported hydrophone effects bearing 178. Although these hydrophone effects were not confirmed by an actual radar contact, sonar again reported hydrophone effects at bearing 176. Several rounds were fired in the direction of the hydrophone effect. The hydrophone effect was subsequently evaluated as possibly own ship's noise. The OTC continued to maneuver the formation on various courses and speeds which enabled EDWARDS to take her contacts under fire. At time 2114 MORTON picked up another surface contact, Skunk E, at 047 at about 15,000 yards, closing. At about 2114 the OTC directed MORTON to fire one warning shot ahead of Skunk E, which was done. The target was subsequently reported by plot 1 to have turned away and combat reported the contact to have faded from the scope. At 2119 a new contact was reported at 077, range 20,350 yards on course 220, speed 20 knots, closing. This contact was designated Skunk F. At this time the formation was on course 120, speed 25 knots. This contact continued to close and

~~SECRET~~-NOFORN

~~SECRET~~-NOFORN

at time 2131 with range reduced to 6600 yards, the OTC directed both ships on open fire on Skunk F. Soon after opening fire on this target, both combat and fire control radar reported that the fall of shot appeared literally to "engulf" the target which disappeared from the scope. MORTON ceased fire at time 2132. At 2136 the OTC ordered course changed to 180 by corpen movement. Two additional contacts, Skunks I and H, were tracked to the southeast and continued to open, hence were not taken under fire. At time 2151 the OTC directed a course change to 080T in an attempt to close and investigate the contacts to the east. The contacts continued to open to the south, southwest, and at about 2200 faded from the scope.

Radar performance during the three day patrol was considered excellent.

AN/SPS-40 Radar performance was considered normal with respect to aircraft detection, tracking and air controlling. Down time during the patrol was as follows: 180830H - 181000H due to a capacitor failure, 182025H - 182028H overload tripped momentarily probably due to gunfire.

AN/SPS-10 surface search radar. A noisy receiver crystal was replaced on 17 September during an EMCON silence period. There were no down times on this radar during emission periods. The radar consistently picked up small fishing pole markers

~~SECRET~~-NOFORN

~~SECRET~~-NOFORN

at ranges of 8000-10000 yards, and radar accuracy and discrimination were considered excellent for radar navigation throughout the period. No abnormalities were noted, and the radar performance and reliability appeared normal in all respects.

Correlation between surface search and fire control radars during the night of 18 September functioned normally, and were in consonance with reported contacts. Courses and speeds of contacts were confirmed by exchange of information on contacts with the RICHARD S. EDWARDS.

ECM AND JAMMING. There was evidence of jamming from 182022H to 2105H in the frequency spectrum 2700 - 3250 mcs and varied in intensity from a complete blackout of the scope to a weak signal lasting about 10 seconds. Both audio and video gain were reported by the ECM operator to be extremely strong. Only one active ECM emission was detected, and evaluated as a possible "skinhead" radar with a frequency of 2980 mcs, intercepted at time 182203H lasting for approximately three minutes. Photographs were taken and a recorded tape made of this signal.

Weather Conditions. Throughout the period 182000H-190100H the sea was calm (sea state 1) and winds were from 345 to 010 at 8 to 13 knots. Although a nearly full moon provided patches of light in some areas, scattered clouds of about 50 percent coverage with solid dark clouds and thunderheads blanketing

~~SECRET~~-NOFORN

~~Secret~~
the horizon reduced visibility to about 5 miles. Occasional flashes of heat lightening in the distance plus own ship's gunfire further reduced effective night vision. Despite calm seas and fair visibility, I did not at any time hold any of the radar contacts visually.

JOHN C. MC GILL, 181443/1100
Commander, U.S. Navy

~~Secret~~
SECRET-NOFORN

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~

22 September 1964

STATEMENT OF COMMANDING OFFICER, USS EDWARDS, DD-950, Commander Jack EVANS, U. S. Navy, Serial Number 386257

On the night of 18 September 1964, USS EDWARDS with the USS MORTON, under the command of Commander Destroyer Division 52 were on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. As understood, the EDWARDS' mission was to ride "shotgun" on the USS MORTON. At approximately 1929 Hotel, the ships were in column, distance, 2000 yards, the EDWARDS astern of MORTON, course, 130, speed 15. At approximately 1946 Hotel, the EDWARDS made radar contact on a target to the eastward designated by MORTON as Contact ALPHA. The contact was tracking on a course of about 200, speed 20. At about the time of 1949, the ship was ordered to set Condition One by COMDESDIV 52, and was complied with. Immediately after General Quarters was set, the task unit commander ordered several turn movements; in succession was a turn three, turn three, turn three, turn six. These maneuvers were executed between the time 1944 and 1955. At approximately 2014, Commander Task Unit 77.6.6 notified EDWARDS that he was directing MORTON to fire one warning shot at Contact ALPHA. Commander Task Unit 77.6.6 then asked EDWARDS if she had the contact to EDWARDS' starboard, (to westward). At this time there were no contacts on the SPS-10 radar to the west that could be identified as a possible target. However, by sweeping the area with fire control radar a positive lock-on was obtained about 2018. At this time

C O P Y

1

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

22 September 1964

STATEMENT OF COMMANDER JACK EVANS (Cont'd):

EDWARDS was ordered to fire one warning shot at the contact. At time 20, EDWARDS complied with a warning shot. At time 21 MORTON fired a second warning shot at Contact ALPHA. At approximately time 22, both ships were ordered to open fire on their contacts; both ships complied. EDWARDS fired on the contact that was later identified as Contact BRAVO, for approximately two minutes before cease fire was ordered to evaluate the results. At time 31 Contact BRAVO faded from the fire control radar. At time 32 EDWARDS was ordered to re-fire on Contact BRAVO and did so. At time 34, EDWARDS made contact on the SPS-10 radar on a contact in the vicinity of the previous fade of Contact BRAVO. This contact was held for approximately ten minutes at which time it faded. The contact then reappeared (probably the same contact) and was re-designated as Contact GOLF. At 2047 EDWARDS was ordered to open fire at GOLF which she did from time 49 to 54. At time 59 the target faded from the scope. We were running at speeds between 25 and 30 knots at this time. At time 2106 COMDESDIV 52 brought the formation around to an easterly course, the contact designated CHARLIE (plotted dead in the water) was obtained on the SPS-10 radar. The fire control radar locked on and seven shots were fired at Contact CHARLIE. EDWARDS was then ordered to open fire on Skunk ECHO. EDWARDS opened fire to port at 2119 until time 24 on Skunk ECHO.

~~SECRET~~

22 September 1964

STATEMENT OF COMMANDER JACK EVANS (Cont'd):

EDWARDS was ordered at time 30 to fire one warning shot at Contact FOXTROT. This warning shot was fired at time 30 and both EDWARDS and MORTON opened fire on Contact FOXTROT at about time 32. Cease fire was ordered at time 36. This concludes the resume of firing on contacts for EDWARDS during the night.

Evaluation of firing is as follows: On the first target, Contact PRAVO (GOLF), four hits; On the second target which was evaluated as a fish trap buoy, Contact CHARLIE, zero hits; On the third firing, Contact ECHO, zero hits; On the last firing on Contact FOXTROT, evaluation five hits. All hits were evaluated electronically by fire control radar with the targets hitting in the range notch and also in several cases confirmed by splashes appearing on the SPS-10 radar.

There was never any doubt in my mind what my orders were. I was to ride "shotgun" and augment the MORTON with the fire-power of EDWARDS. Commander Destroyer Division 52 in my estimation handled the situation admirable. The movement of his forces and the positive control that he exercises was considered extremely logical and at no time did he allow the situation to get out of hand; He did an admirable job. During the engagement at the approximate time of 1925 the Director Officer and BOLEN, FTG 3, operating the Mark 56 director, while peering through their high powered spotting binoculars,

~~SECRET~~
~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~

22 September 1964

STATEMENT OF COMMANDER JACK EVANS (Cont'd):

stated that they saw a surface contact. They saw it instantaneously, for a period of three to four seconds; distance of about 5000 yards. It appeared to them to be a fast high speed small craft of approximately 50 to 60 feet in length. Statements to this effect have been forwarded to higher authority. All of EDWARDS' records, logs, charts, DRT tracings and other information pertaining to this incident have been transferred to Commander Destroyer Division 52 in order to assist him to complete his report.

JACK EVANS
Commander, U. S. Navy
Commanding Officer, USS
EDWARDS (DD-950)

~~SECRET~~



2

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER**

UNCLASSIFIED

ZZ CWY502
RUEPCR
DE RUECW
T NMCC
VZCZCECA307ZCMCA274VVV TMB966

''''ZZ RUECW
DE RUMFCR 975C

ZNR

Z 181217Z *sent*
FM CTU 77.6.6

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUATUL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUMFUI/NAKT/CTF 77
RUHLHG/CINCPAC
RUMSMA/COMUSSSSCV
RUMGUY/TBGL/CTF 72

BT

UNCLAS

1. TWO FASS MOVING TARGETS TO PORT. AM AT CONDITION ONE
ONE FASS MOVING TGT H STBD AM FIRING ONE WARNING SHOT
ON TGTS ON PORT POSITION 18 45N 106-45E
BT

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2 JRG-2
SECDEF-5 ISA-9 PA-5 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE)-3
(STATE) (CIA) FILE-1(74) FJC
ADVANCE COPY TO: CJCS NMCC JRG OSD

CS/18/343

WD *J*

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

181217Z SEP 64

UNCLASSIFIED

3

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

VV...TMB950
..ZZ RUHLHQ
DE RUMFCR 976C
ZNR
Z 181223Z *Sent*
FM CTU 77.6.6
TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUATUL/BVKG/COMSSSENTHFLT
RUMFUI/U4KT/CTF 77
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMGUY/T5GL/CTF 72

UNCLASSIFIED

BT
UNCLAS

1. MY POSIT 18-43.0N IMI 18-43.0N 106-44.0E IMI 106-44.0E
 2. AM UNDER ATTACK BY 4 CRAFT
 3. HAVE FIRED ABT 15 RDS 5 INCH
 4. HYDROPHONE AFFECTS CLOSING AM MUEUVERING TO AVOID
 5. BELIEVE ONE TARGET HIT
 6. BOTH SHIPS FIRING ALL GUNS ON 3 TO 4 REMAINING TARGETSSM
- BT

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2 JRG-2 SECDEF-5
ISA-9 PA-5 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE)-3 (STATE)
(CIA) FILE-1(74) FJC
ADVANCE COPY TO: CJCS DJS DIA NMCC JRG OSD

CS/18/338

WD *J*

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

181223Z SEP 64

UNCLASSIFIED

4

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER**

VV CWY055
''''ZZ RUEPCR
DE-RUECW
T NMCC
VVCECA309MCA276VV TMB969CCSSSTTIVV TFC644
''''ZZ RUECW
DE-RUMFCR WIETA 18/1227Z
ZNR
Z 181229Z *SMT*
FM CTU 77.6.6
TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUATUL/BVKG/COMSSSENTHFLT
RUECW/CNO
RUMFUI/U4KT/CTF 77
RUHLHQ/CINCVVC
RUMSMA/COMUSSACV
RUMGUY/T56L/CTF 72
BT
UNCLAS
REQUSS AIR COVER ASSS
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

INFO.....CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2 JRG-2
SEC DEF-5 ISA -9 PA-5 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE)-3
(STATE) (CIA) FILE-1 (74) FJC

ADV CY TO CJCS NMCC JRG OSD

CS/18/347

WD *D*

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

181229Z SEP 64

UNCLASSIFIED

FLASH

RECEIVED
WHASA 5120

1964 SEP 18 14 46 *recd WH*

EUC482

*****ZZ RUEPWW

DE RUEPCR 76 18/14444Z

Z 1814443Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

181240Z *Sent*

FM CTU 77.6.6

TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUATUL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUEWIZUOKT/CTF *!

47) 1/CINCPAC

KMSSA/COMUSMACV

RUMGUY/T56L/CTF 72

BTCDNCLAS

1. MEELIEVE 3 HITS ON ONE BOAT WILL INVESSIGATE

LATER

BT

NNNN

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

UNCLASSIFIED

VV CWY054
*****Z RUEPCR
DE RUECW
T NCNMCC
VZCZCECA310CA277V
*****ZZ RUECW
DE RUMFCR 632A 18/1251Z
ZNR
Z 181250Z *K*
FM-CTU 77.6.6
TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUATUL/BVKG/C7MOMSSSENTHFLT
RUECW/CNO ..
RUMFUI/U4KT/CTF 77
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMGUY/T5GL/CTF 72
BT

UNCLAS

1. HAVE SITUATION INHAND FOR PRESENT WILL HOLDOAN YOUR CAP OVHD UNTIL
RQRD
BT

INFO.....CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2 JRG-2
SEC DEF-5 ISA-9 PA-5 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE)-3
(STATE) (CIA) FILE-1 (74) FJC
ADV CY TO CJCS NMCC JRG OSD

CS/18/345

WD *A*

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

181250Z SEP 64

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED
WHASA

1964 SEP 19 01 32 *read WH*

EUC571
37:571
OO RUEPW
ZOV RUEPCR

DE RUMGUN 289 18/1256Z

Z O 181256Z ←

FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX
TO RUATUL/BVKG/COMSEVAQTHFLT

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUECW/CNO

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUMFUI/U4KT/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE

RUEPCR/STATE DEPARTMENT

RUEKDA/SEC DEF

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/DIRNSA

RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL

RUMFCR/CTU SZYAN SEVEN PT SIX PT SIX

RUMFKB/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE

RUEAHQ/DIA

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

TONKIN GULF DESOTO PATROL (S)

SITREP TWO

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120633Z

B. MY 180001Z

1. 181230Z WAVY PEON POSIT IARRN QPYARTE,
REQUESTING AIR IMVER CEPORTS FIRING ON CLOSING TGTS.

BHR LAUNCHED 2 F8 181240Z. CONSTEL 2 F4B CTUD I.

BOTH CVA HAVE 4A4/2 A1H COND I LOADED FOR

PT BOATS. FLARES INCLUDED

2. 181245Z WAVY PEON REPORTS QUOTE BELIEVE

SITUATION IN HAND AT PRESENT. DO NOT

REPEAT NOT REQUIRE ADDITIONAL ACFT. OVERHEAD UNQUOTE.

GP-10P

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

8

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

TKA614
''''ZZ RUEKDA
DE RUMFCR 383B 18/1325Z
Z 181327Z
FM CTU 77.6.6
TO AIG 181
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
ZEN/CTF 77
ZEN/CTF 76
ZEN/CTG 77.7
ZEN/CTG 77.6
RUWDAF/MOPHOTOUPAC
ZEN/NAVCOMMSTA PHIL
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD 1-14-76
By LLW, NARS, Date 1-29-76

~~SECRET~~

STATUS TU77.6.6

1. POSIT 18-35N 106-28E. CUS 110 SPD 30.
2. HAVE CHECKED FIRE. MORTON FIRED APPROX 65 RDS/ 5 IN, 35 RDS
3. IN BY EDWARDS
3. TWO CAP A/C ON STA, UNDER POS CONTR EDWARDS BUT ONLY HAS 0
SIDWINDER. PLANES FBR ILLUMINATING ENROUT.
4. FAST RECAP OF ACTION THUS FAR: WHILE NITE STEAMING AT 20 KTS
IN VOLUMN PICKED UP ONE UNLIGHTED TARGET ON PORT BOW CLOSING.
ALTERED COURSE 150 DEG STBD SINCE TU 77.6.6 ALSO UNLIGHTED. TARGET
SPLIT TO TWO TARGETS TURNED TOWARD DESOTO AND INCREASED SPEED/ THIRD
TARGET APPEARED AHEAD EDWARDS ON NEW COURSE. DECIDED GO BETWEEN/
FIRED WARNING SHOTS SSON TARGETS. NO LIGHTS, TARGETS HEADING IN.
COMMENCED FIRE ALL TARGETS. EDWARDS ON TGT TO STBD, MORTON ON
TARGETS TO PORT.
5. HITS OBSERVED ONE TARGET EACH SIDE. TARGETS BROKE UP. NO FIRES
SEEN.
6. WILL ADVISE/
GP-3
BT.

INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2 JRG-2 SECDEF-5
ISA-9 PA-5 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE)-3 (STATE)
(CIA) FILE-1(74) FJC

CS/18/354 WD *J* PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
ADV CY TO CJCS NMCC JRG OSD

181327Z SEP 64

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHASA

9

1964 SEP 18 14 48

EUC084

*****ZZ RUEPWW

DE RUEPCR 078 18/1444Z

Z 181443Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE

RUEPIA/CIA

181337Z

FM CTU 77.6.6

TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

RUATUL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUECW/CNO

RUMFUI/U4KT/CTF 77

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUMSMA/OMUSMACV

RUMGUY/T56L/CTFABUW

BTNCLAS

1. HAVE TAKEN UNDER FIRE WITH BOTH SHIPS A NEW TARGET
2. POSIT 18-30N 106-52E IMI 18-30N 106-52D
3. ONE DIR HIT BY MORTON 2 OR MORE BY EDWARDS

BT

55122

NNNN

10
105

RECEIVED
WHASA

1964 SEP 18 13 44

Time received in WH

SFI668
ZZ ESF
DE ESI 5582 13/1344Z SEP
FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE INT SIT ROOM

55115

*Recd via Telephone
from JRC & NMCC*

XCRITIC XCRKTIC *****
ZCZC
ZZ YEKAH
DE YEADLKR
ZKZK ZZ ZZZ DE
ZYH
FM COMNAVFORJAPAN
TO DIRNSA
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NAVY 3-3-76
By LW, NARS, Date 4-1-76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM CTG 77.6.6 OVER HICOM NET.
AT 181233Z AM FIRING ON CLOSING TARGET. REQUEST COVER
MSG WAS SENT TO USTDC FOR RELAY.
C FT 18/1301Z SEP DTG 181302Z *sent from field*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

15 13 Rnd

55130

K
FIGG9
OO EBF
DE ESI 5663 16/1514Z SEP
FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE INT SLT ROOM
O 181437Z ZYH
FM DIRNSA
TO OSCAR/COLL RONEO
ZICOM
FT RITCHIE
SSO NECPA

Z 181404Z ZYH
FM COMNAVFORJAPAN
TO DIRNSA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOLLOZ-UP NO 1 TO MY CRITIC 1-64
AS OF 181337Z CTU 77.6.6 INDICATES QUOTE
HAVE TAKEN ONE ADDITIONAL UNIT UNDER FIRE POSIT 18-30N 106-52E.
ONE DIRECT HIT BY MORTON AND TWO BY EDWARDS UNQUOTE
SSO

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NAVY 3-3-76
By LW, NARS, Date 4-1-76

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

////////////////// ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOLLOW S//////////////////

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD 1-15-76
By FW, NARS, Date 2-2-76

VV TKA615VV FUN159
*****ZZ RUATUL RUHLHL
DE RUMGUN 315 18/1426Z
Z O 181426Z
FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX
TO RUATUL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUECW/CNO
RUHLHQ/CINPAC
RUMFUI/U4KI/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPCR/STATE DEPT
RUEKDA/SEC DEF
RUEPIACIA
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMFS/COMNAVPAC
RUMFCR/A0EV/CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX PT SIX
RUAGFL/; 3TC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE
RUEAHQ/DIA
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~
TONKIN GULF DESOTO PATROL (S)
SITREP FOUR

- A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120633Z
- B. MY 181337Z
- 1. 181355Z WAVY PEON REPORTS HE HAS HELD TOTAL OF FIVE HOSTILE SURFINGTS AND HAS FIRED ON ALL. REPORTS BELIEVE THREE TGTS SUNK.
- 2. NEGATIVE DAMAGE TO DESOTO SHIPS 181408Z.
- 3. 181408Z. WAVY PEON REPORTS PROCEEDING TO POINT NORTHEAST OF POINT ALK. AND WILL AMPLIFY INFO SENT PREVIOUSLY. ALL QUIET AT PRESENT.

surface targets

GP-1
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

RECEIVED
WHASA

1964 SEP 18 15 02

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD 1-15-76
By LW, NARS, Date 2-2-76

EUC 88

*****ZZ RUEPWW

DE RUEPCR 083 18/14562

EM10055Z

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEPCR/5-53

273089ZC1A

FM CTG SEVEN SSSN PT SIX

TOO RUATULBVKG/COMSSSNTHFLT

RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JCSS

RUECWONO

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUMFUI/UAKTCTF SEVEN SEVEN

RUEPCRWHITE HOUSE

RUAPCR/UTATE DAPT

RUEKDASSC DEF

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/JIRNSSSSSSSUMJIRAMEMB SAIGON

RUMSSSSSSSSSUSMACV

JENFSSSSSSSCOMNAVPNHL

RUMPCR/AGEV/CTU SSSN SSSN PT SIX PT SIX

RUAGFL/M3TC/CTU SSSN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE

RUEAHQ/DIA

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

TONKINVULF DESSSS PATROL (SSLQ

SITREP THREE

A. COMSAVENTHFLT 120533Z

B. NY 181259Z

1. 181240V WAVY PEON REPORTS HAVING FIRED FIFTAEN FIVE INCH
RNDs AGAINST TGTSSSS ASSIMATAS THREE HITS ON ONE BOAT.

2. 181253W WAVY PEON REPORTS SITUATION IN HAND FOR PREVENT AND
HOLDING CAP OVERHEAD.

3. 181305Z. WAVY PEON REPORTS ONE TGT HELD, BELIEVE PT BOAL. NO
ADDNL ASSY REQUIRED.

4. 181-17W. CONSTEL LAUNCHED 2 F4B, 1 E1B, 4 A4, 2 A1. WILL KEEP CAP/
STR

CEFLARE ACFT OVER DESSTO PATROL UFN.

GP-1

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

14

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

~~SECRET~~

VV EUH711CED 942
''''ZZ RUEPCR
DE RUECW
T NMCC
VV 305
''''ZZ RUECW
DE RUHLHL 2793 18/1531Z
Z 181531Z
FM CINCPACFLT
INFO RUECW/CNO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
Z 181433Z
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTG 77.6
INFO CTU 77.6.6
CINCPACFLT
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By LLI, NARS, Date 10-29-75

~~SECRET~~

1. REQUEST YOU DETACH ONE WATCHDOG DD TO PROCEED TO AREA OF NIGHT ACTION FOR SEARCH AND COLLECTION OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF ATTACKS.
 2. IN ADDITION HAVE RECON AIRCRAFT OVER AREA AT FIRST LIGHT TO SEARCH AREA AND PROBABLE RETIREMENT TRACK OF ATTACKING CRAFT.
 3. UNODIR RESUME DESOTO PATROL 19 SEPT IN ACCORDANCE LATEST INSTRUCTIONS.
- GP FOUR
BT

INFO.....CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2 JRG-2
SEC DEF-5 ISA-9 PA-5 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE-3)
FILE-1(72)(STATE)(CIA)
CS 18/377 WD ADV COPIES FURN CJCS, NMCC, JRG AND SEC DEF
PAGE 1 OF 1

181433Z SEP 64

~~SECRET~~

15

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

*****ZZ RUEKDA
ZOV RUMF

~~SECRET~~

*****ZZ RUMFUAO RUEKDA
DE RUMFCR 417B
RUAUDA T CTU 70.2/3
RUMFUAO T CZ 72
RUATNS T NAVSECGRU ACT FIEEMA
RUEAHQ T DIA
RUECW T JACE/AJCC
OSD/ISA
RUAGFL T NAVSECGRUDET COMUSTDC
NAVSECGRUACT TAIPEI
RUERC T NECPA
RUEKMJ T NEACP
RUEKDA T JCS (JRC)
RUMALC T 6925 SG CLARK AFB
ZOC

DECLASSIFIED
Authority DD 1-14-76
By LLW, NARS, Date 1-29-76

Z 181542Z
FM CTU 77.6/6
TO AIG 181
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
ZEN/CTFS77
RUMFUAO/C70G/CTF 76
ZEN/CTG 77.7
DYZEN/CTG 77.6
RUWDAF/MOPHOTOUPAC
ZEN/NAVCOMMSTA PHIL
BT

~~SECRET~~

AMPLIFYING REPORT ON DESOTO 181327Z SITREP

1. SUTREP FOLLOWS, IN TWO PARTS, FACTS AND OPINIONS.
2. FACTS:

A. AT 181942H MORTON AND EDWARDS STEAMING IN COLUMN DISTANCE 2000 YDS, COURSE 130 SPD 20 KTS, CONDITION OF READINESS THREE, AT LAT 18-48N LONG 106-48.6E.

B. MADE SURFACE RADAR CONTACT AT 181943H BRG 118 RANGE 20,500 YDS. TRACKED ON COURSE 213 AZ 17 KTS. NO LIGHTS SHOWING. WATCHED CONTACT CLOSING UNTIL AT 11,500 YDS WITH A 3400 YD CPA.

INFO.....CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACS-5 NMCC-2 JRG-2 SEC DEF-5
ISA-9 PA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE)-3 (STATE) (CIA)
(NSA) FILE-1 (54)

ADV COPIES TO CJCS NMCC JRG AND SEC DEF

~~SECRET~~

TWC CS/18/468 PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

181542Z SEP 64

~~SECRET~~

C. AT 181950H WITH TARGET AT APPROX 9500 YDS (TURNED) RIGHT 30 DEGREES AND INCREASED SPEED TO 2 KTS. TO CLEAR CONTACT MORE. AT 2014 TURNED RIGHT 60 MORE DEGREES WHEN RANGE CONTINUED TO CLOSE. CONTACT SPLIT TO 2 CONTACTS, CAME RIGHT AND INCREASED SPEED TO 23 KNOTS. HEARD HYDROPHONE EFFECTS ON SAME BEARING. (NOTE: TRAINING OF SONARMEN CONDUCTED YESTERDAY.)

D. 182000H SQV COND OF READINESS SHIPS. TUNED 60 DEGREES D FURTHER RIGHT TO EVADE TORPEDOES IN CASE FIRED.

E. 182006H MADE SURFACE CONTACT BRG 292 RANGES 11,200.

F/ 182008H CHANGED COURSE TO 160. AND SLOWED TO 15 KNOTS TO PASS BETWEEN CONTACTS IN CASE FRIENDLY.

G. NO CONTACTS SHOWED ANY LIGHTS.

H/ 182018 H SIDED TO MOVE BETWEEN AND AWAY FROM TARGETS RAPIDLY.

I. 182018H CONTACTS ON BOTH BOWS CLOSING TRACKED AT SPEEDS FROM 22-35 KNOTS

J. 182019H AT BEARING 137 RANGE 5 MILES DIRECTED MORTON FIRED ONE WARNING SHOT AHEAD OF CONTACTS ON PORT BBW/

K. 182020H WHEN TARGETS CONTINUED TO CLOSE RAPIDLY ORDERED MORTON TO OPEN FIRE.

L/ AT 182022H DIRECTED EDWARDS TO FIRE WARNING SHOT AHEAD OF CLOSING TARGET ON HIS SIDE/

M. 182023H MORTON CEASED FIRE, HITS OBSERVED, ONE TARGET DISAPPEARED, OTHER OPENED RAPIDLY TO SOUTHWEST.

N. AZ 182025Z DIRECTED EDWARDS TO OPEN FIRE ON TARGET CLOSING ON HIS SIDE. FOUR HITS OBSERVED X EDWARDS. TARGET DISAPPEARED AND EASED FIRE AT 182032H.

O. 182128H MORTON FIRED WARNING SHOT AT TARGET BEARING 145-8500 WITH HYDROPHONE EFFECTS. OPENED FIRE AT 2026H. THREE HITS OBSERVED TARGET FADED.

P. BOTH SHIPS FIRED ON TARGET AT 079-8500 AT 2136 ONE DIRECT HIT BY MORTON AND FIVE HITS OBSERVED BY EDWARDS. TARGET DISAPPEARED.

Q/ 182137H CEASED ALL FIRING.

R. NO TARGETS VISUALLY SIGHTED. NO DESCRIPTION POSSIBLE.

S. TOTAL ROUNDS FIRED BY MORTON 56-5 INCH 128-3 INCH. BY EDWARDS 152-5 INCH 6-3 INCH NO KNOWN ROUNDS FIRED AT EITHER MORTON OR EDWARDS. NO KNOWN TORPEDOES FIRED AT EITHER SHIP/

T. ALL CONTACTS RADAR

3. OPINIONS: TYPE SHIP NOT KNOWN COULD BE SWATOWS OUTSIDE OF GUN RANGE. IF SWATOWS ONLY EXPLANATION FOR NOT USING ALL OF SPEED IS UNSURE OF DESTROYER POSITIONS.

GP-3

BT

~~SECRET~~

TWC

CS/18/468

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

181542Z SEP 64

RECEIVED
WHASA

FLASH

1964 SEP 18 17 10

DECLASSIFIED

EUC502

Authority DOD 1-15-76
By LLW, NARS, Date 2-2-76

ZZ RUEPWW
DE RUEPCR 141 18/1706Z
Z 181705Z
FM JCS
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE
RUEPIA/CIA

55143

~~Z-0 181601Z~~
FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX
TO RUATUL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUECW/CNO
RUHLHQ/CINCPACFLT
RUMFUI/U4KT/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPCR/STATE DEPAT
RUEKDA/SEC DEF
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL
RUMFCR/A0EV/CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX PT SIX
RUMSBJ/M3TC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE
RUEAHQ/DIA
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
TONKIN GULF DESOTO PATROL (S)
SITREP FIVE
A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120633Z
B. MY 181426Z
1. NO CHANGE SINCE SITREP FOUR.
2. 181520Z CONSTEL E1B ILLUMINATED AREA
VICINITY SCENE OF ACTION IN
EFFORT SIGHT BOATS VISUALLY. REE FLARES
EXPENDED. NO EVIDENCE SIGHTED. 3. USS RUPERTUS
PROCEEDING SCENE OF ACTION TO JOIN DESOTO
PATROL FOR SEARCH AND COLLECTION OF
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF ATTACK. DESOTO
PATROL SHIPS NOW RETURNING TO SCENE OF
ACTION, FOR SEARCH OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.
ACFT SEARCH LAID ON FOR FIRST LIGHT.

F
S

GP-1
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

17

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

EEZCIE0769CEIA265CEA901

OO RUEKDA

DE RUHLHL 2826 18/2139Z

O 182139Z

FM CINCPACFLT

INFO RUECW/CNO

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUEKDA/JCS

O 181610Z

FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX

TO USS CONSTELLATION

INFO CINCPACFLT

COMSEVENTHFLT

CTF SEVEN SEVEN

CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SEVEN

BT

~~SECRET~~

1. LAUNCH TWO A3B 190515H TO VIC 18-44N/106-45E. REPORT TO
CTU 77.6.6 364.2 MC FOR SEARCH OF AREA AND PROBABLE RETIREMENT
TRACK FOR PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF ATTACK NITE OF 18 SEP.

GP-4

BT

INFO.....CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACSA-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2
JRG-2 SEC DEF-5 ISA-9 PA-1 GSA-2 CSAF-2 CMC-10 (WHITE
HOUSE-3) FILE-1(68)(STATE)(CIA)(NSA)
CS 18/612 TWC PAGE 1 OF 1

182139Z SEP 64

181610Z

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By LW, NARS, Date 10-29-75

TKA699
OO RUEKDA
DE RUMFCR 602B 17/1728Z
RUAUDA T CTU 70.2.3
RUATNS T NAVSECGRUACT FUTEMA
RUEAHQ T DIA
RUECW T JACE/ATCC OSD/ISA
RUAGFL T NAVSECGRUDET COMMUSTDC
NAVSECGRUACT TAIPEI

RUERC T NECPA
RUEK MJ T NEACP
RUEKDA T JCSSPKJRC)
RUMALC T 6925 SG CLARK AB
ZOC

0 181730Z
FM CTU 77.6.6
TO AIG 181
ZEN/CTF77
ZEN/CTG 77.6
INFO ZEN/TU 77.6.6
ZEN/CTF 76
RUWDAF/XOPHOTOUPAC
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
ZEN/NAVCOMMSTA PHIL
BT

~~SECRET~~

SEP 181200Z DESOTO PATROL OPTUM (S)

A. CTU 77.6.6 180318Z

1. PATROLLED FROM DELTA-ECHO-FOXTROT-ECHO-DELTA RANDOMLY/ PASSED THRU DELTA NORTH BOUND AT 180743H. EXITTED AT DELTA AT 11755H. POSITSS AS FOLS: 180800H - 17-46/5N 106-11.2E 181200H - 19-42.5N 106-24E 182000H -18-45N 106-53E VARIOUS MODERATE SPEEDS AND INTERMITTENT EMCON USED. WEATHER VARIED FROM HEAVY THUNDERSTORMS AND RAIN SQUALLS 0200H-1000H TO CLEAR WUTH OCCASIONAL SMALL SHOWERS DURING REMAINDER PERIOD.

2. CONTACTS DURING PERIOD:

A. VISUAL:

(1) NUMEROUS FISHING FLOATS THROUGHOUT PATROL AREA, BUT NO FISHING BOATS EXCEPT AS BELOW.

(2) 2 FISHING JUNKS TRAWLER TYPE AS REPORTED REF A DROPPED SAILS, WENT ON POWER AT RANGE ABOUT 8000 YDS/ BOTH HAD RADIO ANTENNA/ PASSED ABEAM AT 2100 YDS AT 19-22N 116-10E. PROBABLY MADE REPORT INCLUDING BOW NUMBERS HAVE PHOTOGRAPHS.

(3) AT 181045H AT 19-30N 106-13.5E SIGHTED LARGE JUNK BEARING 026T 11.5 MILES CLOSING IN JUNK HAD TWO LARGE SAILS AND JIB, APPEARED NEW AND IN UNUSUALY GOOD CONDITION THEN PASSED ABEAM AT RANGE ABOUT 2.5 MI. TRACKED AND ALTERED COURSE TO NORTH. AT 181140H EDWARDS MADE SONAR CONTACT AT 19.44.1N 106-23.2E, ALTHOUGH ONLY 80 FEET IN WATER, THE JUNKS PRESENCE GAVE MORE LOGISTIC THE CONTACT. BOTH SHIPS HELD CONTACT AT 1142. DIVERTED FROM PATROL AN INVESTIGATED CONTACT USING

INFO.....CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACSA-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2 JRG-2
SEC DEF-5 ISA-9 PA-5 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE)-3
(STATE) (CIA) (NSA) FILE-1 (73)

ADV COPIES TO CJCS NMCC JRG AND SEC DEF
TWC *W* CS/19/460

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

181730Z SEP 64

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DDI 1-14-76
By LW, NARS, Date 1-29-76

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

PINWHELL TACTIC UNTIL 181210H. BOTH SHIPS EVALUATED PROBABLE NON-SUB. LARGE JUNK OPENED TO NORTH. BROKE OFF CONTACT SINCE PATROL WOULD CONTINUE NORTH EAST FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR TOWARD END OF PATROL AT POINT FOXTROT AND THEN AGAIN WOULD REVERSE COURSE AND RETRAVERSE CONTACT AREA. WANTED TO WATCH JUNK MOVEMENTS. SET EMCON BUT NO SUB TYPE RADARS PICKED UP FOR NEXT THREE HOURS. WHEN PATROL REVERSED AND HEADED BACK TO CONTACT AREA, SAME LARGE JUNK REVERSED COURSE AND CLOSED TRACK. WHEN CONTACT AREA PASSED WITHOUT CONTACT AND JUNK PASSED ABEAM AT ABOUT SIX MILES, JUNK REVERSED COURSE AND CONTINUED NORTH TOWARD MAINLAND. EVALUATION: A LARGE JUNK ON PATROL, BUT WORTH NOTING IN FUTURE SURVEILLANCE.

(4) 181415H NEAR HON ME. SIGHTED FAST MOVING SURFACE CONTACT WHICH DISAPPEARED ON NORTHWESTERLY COURSE.

B. RADAR CONTACT (NOT HEWD VISUALLY) AT 172217H HELD TWO CONTACTS BRG 012T-39.5 MI AND 120T-25.3 MI FROM MORTON (POSIT 19-01.9N 107-25.2E2 BOTH CONTACTS TRACKING 150 12 KNOTS, SAME AS TU 77.6.6. CONTACTS HELD STEADY IN RESPECTIVE TRACKS AFTER PATROL CHANGED COURSE TO NW AT 180155H. EVALUATION: PROBABLE SMALL COASTAL VESSELS FROM HAIPHONG.

C. ECM CONTACTS: 181555H AT 19-08.0N 106-12.8E DETECTED (INITIAL DF BRG 125). FORMED SAU, RAN DOWN BEARING. NO SONAR CONTACT. LATER SAME FREQ PICKED UP AND FOLLOWING FINGERPRINTS MADE AND TAPED: CONICAL SCAN, PRF NOT DTMD, HELD FOR THREE MIN. PICTURES OF TRACE MADE. EVALUATION: NOT SUB RADAR/

3. FUEL ONBOARD MORTON AT 182400H 65 PERCENT, ON EDWARDS 60 PERCENT.

4. INTEND RESUME PATROL ONE HOUR AFTER SUNRISE 19 SEP

GP-3

BT

TWC

CS/19/460

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

181730Z SEP 64

SECRET

EUC514
OO RUEPWW
ZOV RUEPCR

IMMEDIATE

RECEIVED
WHASA

1964 SEP 18 19 00

OO RUEPCR
DE RUMGUN 394 18/1737Z

~~Z O 181737Z~~

FM CTG SEVVEN SEVEN PTHKIX
TO RUATUL/BVVKG/OMSEVENTHFLT
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUECW/CNO

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUMGUI/U4KT/CTF SEVVEN SEVEN

RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE

RUEPCR/STATE DEPT

RUEKDA/SEC DEF

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/DIRNSA

RUMJIR/MEMB SAIGON

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

RUMFS/COMNAVPHILA

RUMFCR/A0E000/CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX PT SIX

RUMSBJ/M3TC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE

RUEAKQ/DIA

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

TONKIN GULF DESOTO PATROL (S)

SITREP SIX

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120633Z

B. MY 181601Z

1. NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE SITREP FIVE.

2. EA MORTON/EDWARDS SCENE OF ATTACK

ABT 181900Z; ETA RUPERTUS ABT V182020Z

3. A1H/E1B ACFT FROM BOTH CVAS

SEARCHING FWENE OF ATTACK CONTINUOUSLY.

WILL AUGMENT SEARCH WITH A3 AT FIRST LIGHT. A1H ACFT UNDER E1B

POSITIVE RADAR CONTROL

GP-1

BT

55162

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD 1-15-76

By LW, NARS, Date 2-2-76

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNNV

WHASA

20

1964 SEP 18 18 44 *read WH*

EUC511

FLASH

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 12-5-75
By LW, NARS, Date 1-8-76

55157

*****ZZ RUEPWW
DE RUEPCR 159 18/1840Z
Z 181839Z
FM JCS — *From JCS*
INFO REEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE
RUEPIA/CIA
Z 181809Z *← from CINCPAC*
FM CINCPACFLT
INFO RUEKDAX/JCSCSS

RUECW/CNO

RUHLHQ/CNINCPAC
Z 181722Z *← from ship*
FM CTG SSSSN SSSSN PT SSSN
TO RUMGUN/H3WX/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SSIX
INFO RUMFUI/U4KT/CTF SSSSN SSSSN
RUATUL/BVKG/COMSSSNTHFLT
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
BT

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT PILOT DEBRIEF

1. BON HOMME RICHARD CAP PILOT LT WOODROW VF194 (ACFT MODEX 404)
WAS SSATIONED AT 25,000 FT. OVER EDWARDS HELD VISUALLY ON
EASSERLY HEADING. PILOT DESSENDED TO 10,000 FT. AND SSIGHTED TWO
WAKES BEARING 330T ESSIMATED FOUR TO FIVE MILES FROM EDWARDS AT APP-
ROXIMATELY 182115H. WAKES PARALLELED EDWARDSSS

COURSE AND SPEED. NO VISUAL

IGHTSNG OF CRAFT CAUSING WAKESSSS VISIBILITY
UNRESSICTED IN MOONLIGHT. AT THIS TIME EDWARDS REPORTED CONTACTSSS

PAGE 1

RUMUG 757 ~~SECRET~~

ONE TO TWO MILES TO HER NORTH WERE TO BE
TAKEN UNDER FIRE. PILOT RETURNED
TO 25,000

5. COULD SEE GUN FLASHES BUT NOT INPACT POINTS NOR EVIDENCE OF
HITSSM DD'S PRVEDED UNDER OVERCASS AND WERE LOSS TO CAP PILOT.

GP-3

BT

PRESERVATION COPY

21

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

VZCZCIEN309CEIA160ERB149

OO RUEKDA

DE RUHLHQ 3093 18/1757Z

O P 181759Z

FM CINCPAC

TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUEKDA/JCS

RUATUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

RUMGUN/CTG 77.6

RUMFCR/CTU 77.6.6

RUHLKM/CINCPACAF

RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By LW, NARS, Date 10-29-75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DESOTO (U)

A. JCS 8790 DTG 181550Z NOTAL

1. IN ADDITION QUESTIONS IN REF A DESIRE INFO ON FOLLOWING:

A. ANY PT OR TORPEDO WAKES SIGHTED BY OUR DD'S OR AIRCRAFT?

B. ANY PHOTOS?

C. ANY ECM?

D. ANY VISUAL SIGHTINGS?

E. WERE OUR DD'S ABLE TO LOCK ON WITH FC RADAR?

F. BEARING AND RANGE TO REPORTED TARGETS ON INITIAL CONTACT.

G. BEARING AND RANGE TO TARGETS WHEN DD'S OPENED FIRE.

H. COULD TGT HAVE BEEN FLOCK OF BIRDS?

2. INCLUDE JCS AS INFO ADDEE.

GP-4

BT

INFO.....CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J4-2 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2

JRG-2 SEC DEF-5 ISA-9 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 (WHITE

HOUSE-3)(STATE)(CIA)(NSA) RRA-1 FIL -1(72)

CS-18/513 TWC ADV COPIES FURN CJCS, DJS, NMCC AND SEC DEF

PAGE 1 OF 1

181759Z SEP 64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

ZCZCPHP002VV PBK656
OO RUEKDA
DE RUHLHL 2822 18/2117Z
O 182117Z
FM CINCPACFLT
INFO RUECW/CNO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEKDA/JCS
Z 181824Z

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DaD 1-14-76
By LLW, NARS, Date 1-29-76

FM CTU 77.6.6
TO COMSEVENTHFLT
INFO CTG 77.6
CINCPACFLT
BT

~~SECRET~~

DESOTO PATROL ACTION

A. YOUR 181702Z

1. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT WE ENCOUNTERED SURFACE TARGETS. BOTH COS CONCUR. SURFACE RADARS TRACKED THEM FIRE CONTROL RADARS BOTH SHIPS LOCKED ON WITH GOOD SOLUTIONS PRIOR FIRING

2. WHAT THE TARGETS WERE I DO NOT KNOW, SINCE NONE WERE SIGHTED VISUALLY. ALL FIRING BY THIS UNIT WAS DONE OUTSIDE SWATOW GUN RANGE. OF SWATOWS, THEIR HIGH SPEED WAS NOT FULLY UTILIZED. NORMAL RADAR RANGE ON SWATOW CRAFT SHOULD BE BEYOND THE MAX RANGE OF 21,500 YDS CONTACT MADE TON SHT. CAN ONG TRUE THAT SADHQEMJS TONIGHT AND TOMORROW FOR DEBRIS WILL PROVIDE AN ANSWER.

3. I WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE MOST SERIOUS NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF OVONKGG FP AO. I WAS EQUALLY AWARE OF THE MOST SERIOUS NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF LOSS OR DAMAGE TO ONE OF OUR SHIPS AT THIS TIME IN THIS AREA.

4. THE DECISION TO OPEN FIRE WAS MINE, WITH FAST MOVING, UNLIGHTED, CLMNING CONTEDSS ON EITHER BOW, AT NIGHT, IN AN AREA IN WHICH PREVIOUS ATTACKS ON U.S. SHIPS HAD BEEN MADE- I DECIDED TO FIRE WARNING SHOTS FIRST, THEN WHEN THESE WENT UNHEEDED, I DIRECTED BOTH SHIPS TO OPEN FIRE, WHICH THEY DID PROMPTLY AND CAPABLY.

I WILL RESUME DESOTO PATROL SIMIOUSLY DIRECTED 19 SEP.

GP-3

BT

INFO.....CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2
JRG-2 SEC DEF-5 ISA-9 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE-3)
FILE-1 (68)(STATE)(CIA)(NSA)
CS 18/588 TWC. ADV COPIES. FURN CJCS, DIA, AND SEC DEF

PAGE 1 OF 1

181824Z SEP 64

~~SECRET~~

23

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

CIH912

''''ZZ RUEKDA

ZOV RUECW

RUEKC T JACE/AJCC

RUEKDA T OSD/ISA

PHK313V TFC851

''''ZZ RUECW

DE RUMFGWIB 18/2137Z

RUAUDA T CTU 70.2.3

RUMFUAO T CTF 72

RUATNS T NAVSECGRU ACT FUTEMA

RUEAHQ T DIA

RUECW T JACE/AJCC

OSD/ISA

RUAGFL T NAVSECGRUDET COMUSTDC

NAVSECGRUACT TAIPEI


RUERC T NECPA

RUEKMJ T NEACP

RUEKDA T JCS (JRC)

RUMALC T 6925 SG CLARK AB

ZOC

Z 181925Z 

FM CTU 77.6.6

TO AIG 181

INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV

ZEN/CTF 77

ZEN/CTF 76

RUWDAF/MOPHOTOUPAC

ZEN/NAVCOMMSTA PHIL

ZEN/CTG 77.6

ZEN/CTG 77.7

BT

~~SECRET~~

AMPLIFYING REPORT ON DES O 181542Z SITREP

A. MY 181542Z

1. ADD TO REF A AFTER SUB-PARA 2 GOLF: TU 77.6.6 MANEUVERING AT HIGH SPEED TO MAINTAIN MOST GUNS BEARING AT MOST THREATENING TARGETS. ALL COURSES AND SPEEDS NOT INCLUDED IN INTEREST EXPEDITING SITSUM.

3. AT PRESENT TIME, 190313H, TU 77.6.6 PLUS RUPERTUS COMMENCING SWEEPS THROUGH ACTION AREA ATTEMPTING LOCATE DEBRIS.

4. MORTON MT 51 OPERATIVE ETR EDWARDS MK 56 DSR 190400H.

GP-3

BT

INFO.....CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACSA-5 NMCC-2 JRG-2

SEC DEF-5 ISA-9 PA-1 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE-3)

FILE-1(54)(STATE) (CIA)(NSA)

CS 18/610 TWC ... PAGE 1 OF 1.

181925Z SEP 64

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

DD 1-14-76

By

LW

NARS, Date

1-29-76

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

RECEIVED
WHASA

1964 SEP 18 23 49

EUC559

*****ZZ RUEPWW

DE RUEPCR 235 18/2345Z

Z 182344Z

FM JCS

INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE

RUEHCR/STATE DEPT

RUEHCR/STATE DEPT

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEPCR/NSA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

DOD 1-14-76

By

LW

NARS, Date

1-29-76

~~Z182000Z~~

55222

FM CTU 77.6.6

TO CTF 77.6

INFO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT

ZEN/COMSEVENTHFLT

ZEN/CTF 77

ZEN/TU 77.6.6

ZEN/USS RUPERTUS

BT

~~SECRET~~

19 SEP DESOTO PATROL AND RUPERTUS

1. CTU 77.6.6 PLUS RUPERTUS CONDUCTING SEARCH FOR DEBRIS VICINITY 18-41N 106-29E IN SCOUTING LINE. HEAVY RAIN SQUALL ACTIVITY PRESENT AND WILL PROBABLY PERSIST UNTIL ABOUT 191000H IF FOLLOWS PATTERN LAST TWO DAYS MAKING AIR YGIQNG AND/OR SUPPORT DIFFICULT. TU 77.6.6 MUST DEPART SEARCH AREA BY 190615H TO RESUME PATROL ON TIME.

2. RUPERTUS SHOULD NOT BE LEFT HERE ALONE TO CONTINUE SEARCH.

3. RECOMMEND RUPERTUS JOIN TU 77.6.6 IN DESOTO PATROL COMMENCING 190745H

4. REQ ADVISE.

GP-3

BT

~~SECRET~~

NNNN,

PRESERVATION COPY

25

RECEIVED
WHASA

1964 SEP 19 00 53

EUC563
00 RUEPWW

55227

DE RUEPCR 22 19/0020Z
ZNR
O 190019Z
FM JCS
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE DEPT
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/NSA
182052Z ✓

FM CINCPACFLT
TO RUATUL/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUEPDA/JCS
RUMFCR/H3WX/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX
RUMFCR/X15W/CTU SEVEN SEVEN PT SIX PT SIX
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUATH/COMNAVFORJAPAN
RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL
RUMFCR/U4KR/CTF SEVEN SEVEN
RUECW/CNO
RUMFCR/R2TZ/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FOUR
RUMFCR/Z0R0/CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT SEVEN

BT

UNCLAS

✓ CINCPAC 181934Z PASEP YOURS FORAC. ACKNOWLEDGE.

BT

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

EUC549
OO RUEPWW
ZOV RUEPCR
T WHITE HOUSE
VZCZCIEM329CIA102
OO RUEKDA RUEPCR RUEKDA RUEPIA RUEPCR
DE RUMGUN 436 18/2110Z

RECEIVED
WHASA

1964 SEP 18 22 31

Z O 182110Z
FM CTG UXMEN SEVEN PT SIX
TO RUATUL/BVKG/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUECW/CNO
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUMGUI/VUORKT/CTNMSEVEN SEVEN
RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPCR/STATE DEPT
RUEKDA/SEC DEF
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/DIRNSA
RUMJIR/AMEMS SAIRMFV
RQSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMFS/COMNAVPHIL
RUMFCR/A0EV/CTU SEVEN SEVAN PT SIX PT SIX
RUMSBJ/M3TC/CTU SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE
RUEAHQ/
BTJF

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DoD 1-15-76
By LW, NARS, Date 2-2-76

55210

9

~~TOP SECRET~~
TONKIN GULF DESOTO PATROL (S)
SITREP SEVEN

~~TOP SECRET~~

A. COMSEVENTHFLT 120633Z
B. MY 181737Z

1. NO CHANGE SINCE SITREP SIX.
2. DEBRIEF ONE EIB/TWO A1H PILOTS 181945Z IN CONSTEL REVEALS SITREP FIVE PARA 2 INACCURATE. FROM DEBRIEF, " A1H UNDER EDWARDS CONTROL VECTORED IMMEDIATELY ASTERN EDWARDS//.9459, (IN COLUMN) TIME 181530Z VIC 17-57N, 107-26E INVESTIG TWO SURF CONTACTS. LEAD PILOT SIGHTED WHAT HE BELIEVED TWO WAKES TRAILING DESOTO SHIPS BY EST 8-10NM. ZX CLEAR, NEAR FULL MOON, GOOD VIZ MADE WAKES EASILY SEEN. BOATS NOT, RPT NOT

PAGE TWO RUMGUN 436 ~~TOP SECRET~~
SIGHTED. TWO ACFT ILLUMINATED WITH FIVE PARAFIARES. WAKES DISAPPEARED, BOATS NOT, RPT NOT SIGHTED. NO FURTHER WAKE SIGHTING AFTER ILLUMIN CEASED.

GP-1
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

27

SECRET

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER**

ZCIEM411VZCZCCIA133CMCB666V TMD191
OO RUEKDA
DE RUMFCR 037C 19/0339Z
RUAUDA T CTU 70.2.3
RUATNS T NAVSECGRUACT FUTEMA
TUEAHQ T DIA
RUECW T JACE/AJCC OSD/ISA
RUAGFL T NAVSECGRUDET--COMUSTDC NAVSECGRUACT TAIPEI
RUERC T NECPA
RUEKMJ T NEACP
RUEKDA T JCS(JRC)
RUMALC T 6925 SG CLARK AFB

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DOD 1-14-76
By LW, NARS, Date 1-29-76

TO 182125Z
FM-CTU 77.6.6
TO AIG 181
INFO RUMSXA/COMUSXACV
ZEN/CTF 77
ZEN/CTF 76
RUWDAF/MOPHOTOUPAC
ZEN/NAVCOMMSTA PHIL
ZEN/CTG 77.6
ZEN/CTG 77.7
BT

~~SECRET~~

DESOTO PATROL 182130Z SITREP
1. CONDUCTING SURFACE SEARCH FOR DEBRIS IN ACTION AREA WITH
TU 77/6.6 PLUS RUPERTUS/ THREE AURCRAFT ALSO UNDER POSITIVE
CONTROL MORTON CONDUCTIN SEARCH ALONG POSSIBLE RETIREMENT
FOOTS FOR ANY CRIPPLES. SEARCH HAMPERED BY FREQUENT RAIN SQUALLS/
2. MUST DEPART SEARCH AREA BY 190615H TO RESUME DESOTO PATROL
GR-3
BT.

ACT...J3-6

CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J5-1 SACS-5 NMCC-2 JRG-2 SEC DEF-5 ISA-9
CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE)-3 (STATE) (CIA) (NSA)
FILE-1 (56)KH

ADVANCE COPIES TO NMCC & SEC DEF
CS/19/177

PAGE 1 OF 1

182125Z SEP 64

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

ZCZCPHP006VV PAF208
OO RUEKDA
DE RUHLHQ 3130 18/2217Z
O 182205Z
FM CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~

TO RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUMFCR/COMSEVENTHFLT
RUMFCR/CTG 77.6
RUMFCR/CTU 77.6.6
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUAGFL/COMUSTDC
RUUAZ/COMUS JAPAN
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By 66, NARS, Date 10-29-75

~~SECRET~~

DESOTO

A. MY 181934Z

B. JCS 8805 DTG 182037Z NOTAL

C. MY 110450Z NOTAL

1. CANCEL REF A IN VIEW OF REF B.

2. RESUME PATROL IAW REF C COMMENCING PT DELTA OBSERVING 20 MILE
OFF NVN MAINLAND REQUIREMENT.

3. UNODIR, UPON RECEIPT OF EXECUTE FOR REF B COMPLY ACCORDINGLY
AND ACKNOWLEDGE. GP-4.

BT

INFO.....CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2 JRG-2
SEC DEF-5 ISA-9 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CNO-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE)-3
(STATE) (CIA) (NSA) FILE-1 (70)

NA

ADV COPIES TO CJCS DIA AND SEC DEF

~~SECRET~~

TWC

CS/18/587

182205Z SEP 64

29

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

VVV CWY539PBN314
OO RUEKDA
DE RUHLHL 2840 18/2256Z
O 182256Z
FM-CINCPACFLT
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUECW/CNO
RUEKDA/JCSSS
Z 182223Z
FM COMSEVENTHFLT
TO CTF 77.6
INFO CTG 77.6.6
RUPERTUSSS
CINCPACFLT

CTF 77

BT

~~SECRET~~

YOUR 182000Z

RETAIN RUPERTUS IN SSARCH AREA UNTIL THOROUGH SSARCH MADE OF
AREA ORIGINAL FUNFIRE. PROVIDE CAP. DISSNTINUE SEARCH AT
19100H THEN HAVE RUPERTUS RESUME WATCHDOG SSATION.

GP-4

BT

V

INFO.....CJCS-2 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-6 J5-1 SACS-5 DIA-14 NMCC-2
JRG-2 SEC DEF-5 ISA-9 CSA-2 CSAF-2 CMC-10 (WHITE HOUSE-3)
FILE-1(68) (STATE) (CIA)(NSA)
CS 18/611 TWC

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JW, NARS, Date 10-29-75

PAGE 1 OF 1

182223Z SEP 64

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

CIEM370ZCPH0812VV PAG466X
PP RUEKDA
DE RUHPA 3150 18/2342Z
P 182343Z
FM CINCPAC
TO AIG 929
INFO RUHPHR/CINCUSARPAC
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUAMC/COMUSKOREA
RUAGFL/COMUSTDC
RUUAZ/COMUSJAPAN
RUMFS/CINCPACREP PHIL
RUKDAG/CINCAL
RUWGALB/CINCINORAD
RUFLC/USCINCEUR
RUAPAL/USCINCSO
RUCJKH/CINCSSTRIKE
RUECBAC/CINCLANT
RUHPCR/CINCSAC
RUHPHK/CICPAC ADV
RUMGO/CINCPAC ACC
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority DAD 1-15-76
By JW, NARS, Date 2-2-76

~~TOP SECRET~~

TONKIN GULF (U)
SITREP 1 THROUGH 182200Z
1. AT 181143Z GULF OF TONKIN DESOTO PATROL CONSISTING OF DD'S MORTON AND EDWARDS MADE RADAR CONTACT WITH SURFACE TARGETS CLOSING AT SPEEDS FROM 22-35 KNOTS. WARNING SHOTS FIRED, TARGETS CONTINUED CLOSING. TARGETS ENGAGED DURING PERIOD 181220Z TO 181337Z. ESTIMATED FOUR TO FIVE TARGETS TAKEN UNDER FIRE.
NO TARGETS VISUALLY SIGHTED. NO KNOWN ROUND OR TORPEDOES FIRED AT EITHER DD.
2. AREA TO BE SEARCHED AT DAYLIGHT FOR EVIDENCE. PREPARATIONS BEING MADE FOR POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY PACFLT AND PACAF UNITS.
3. RESUMPTION OF DESOTO PATROL AWAITING JCS APPROVAL.
4. 20 F-100'S DIRECTED PROCEED CLARK TO DANANG.
5. NO OTHER ACTIONS ORDERED. GP-3.
BT

59

ACT....J3-6 (1-6)
CJCS-2 (7-8) DJS-3 (9-11) SJCS-1 (12) J5-1 (13) SACSA-5 (14-18)
DIA-4 (19-22) NMCC-2 (23-24) JRG-2 (25-26) SEC DEF-5 (27-31)
ISA- 9(32-40) CSA-2 (41-42) CSAF-2 (43-44) CNO-2 (45-46)
CMC-10 (47-56) (WHITE HOUSE)-3 (57-59) (STATE) (CIA) (NSA)
FILE-1 (60) KH (1-60)

ADVANCE COPIES TO NMCC AND SEC DEF
CS/19/055 PAGE 1 OF 1 182343Z SEP 64

~~TOP SECRET~~