

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

August 29, 2003

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
04	report	Guide to Documents; sanitized NLJ/RAC 01-112, 2002 dup. #1d, NSF, Files of Saunders, "South Asia, 4/1/66-1/20/69," Box 30; #5, NSF, Files of Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-1966, Vol. I," Box 40	S	8	undated	A
10e	report	"Instructions for Ball's Mission"; sanitized 7/05 dup. #49, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-1966, Preface," Box 40 <i>same sanitization 8/15/12 per NLJ/RAC 11-9</i>	S	4	8/28/63	A
10f	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 7/05 dup. #50, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-1966, Preface," Box 40	S	1	9/9/63	A
10h	memo	Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy; sanitized 2/01 dup. #52, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-1966, Preface," Box 40	S	1	9/[63]	A
10i	memo	Robert Komer to Mr. Ball; sanitized 7/05 dup. #53, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-1966, Preface," Box 40	S	1	9/10/63	A
14a	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 1/01 dup., #16, NSF, NSC Histories, "Indian Famine, Vol. 1," Box 25; #87a, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 14, Bundy, Box 4; near dup., #63, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-66, Preface," Box 40	S	5	9/9/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, NSC Histories

Folder Title "South Asia, 1962-1966"

Box Number 24

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
16c	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 9/03 dup., #4, NSF, IM&T, "Taylor Trip to India & Pakistan," Box 30; #71, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, "India 63-64," Box 23; #64, NSF, Files of Komer, "Pakistan 63-64," Box 46; #72, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 1," Box 40 <i>Same sanitization 4/15/11 NLJ 11-72</i>	S	1	12/23/63	A
17e	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 9/03 dup., #53, NSF, Files of Komer, "Pakistan 63-64," Box 46; #78, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 1," Box 40; #104, NSF, HOS Correspondence, "Pakistan, Ayub Correspondence, Vol. I," Box 6	S	2	1/31/64	A
18b	draft	draft cable, Robert Komer to Chester Bowles; sanitized, 9/03 dup., #83, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 1," Box 40	S	1	2/27/64	A
18g-1	memo	"US-Pak Relations"; santized 3/03 dup., #87, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 1," Box 40; #43e, NSF, Files of Robert Komer, "Pakistan 63-64", Box 46	S	1	3/6/64	A
24a-1	memo	Harold Saunders to McGeorge Bundy; sanitized 3/03 dup., #120a, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 1," Box 40;	S	1	3/10/65	A
24a-2	memo	McGeorge Bundy to Chester Bowles; sanitized 3/03 dup., #120b, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 1," Box 40;	S	1	n.d.	A

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<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
25h	draft	draft State cable to New Delhi; sanitized 3/03 dup., #133, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 1," Box 40; #37a, NSF, NSC Histories, "Indian Famine, Vol. 1", Box 25	S	2	4/15/65	A
28a	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 3/03 dup., #4, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 21" Box 40; #17, NSF, NSC Histories, "Indian Famine, Vol. 1," Box 25; #178, NSF, Files of Robert Komer. "India-1965," Box 23	S	4	4/22/65	A
28b	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 3/00 dup., #5, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 2," Box 40; #178, NSF, Files of Robert Komer. "Pak-1965-3/66," Box 46; #75, NSF, Files of Komer, "Pakistan (Economic) 1964-3/66," Box 47	S	2	4/22/65	A
28e	memo	Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy; sanitized 3/00 same sanitization 6/13/11 NJ 10-420 dup., #8, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 2," Box 40; #21, NSF, NSC Histories, "Indian Famine, Vol. 1, Box 25"; #92, NSF, Name File, "Komer Memos, Vol. 1," Box 6	S	5	5/30/65	A
29a	letter	Robert Komer to Mr. Cook; sanitized 6/02 dup., #14, NSF, Files of Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 2," Box 40; 22, NSC Histories, "Indian Famine, Vol. 1," Box 25; 93, Files of Robert Komer, "India -1965," Box 23; 168, Files of Komer, "Pak 1965-3/66," Box46; 18, Files of Komer. "India-Pak" more info released 6/15/11 NJ 11-72	S	5	6/3/65	A

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29f	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 6/02 dup. #85a, NSF, Files of Komer. "India-1965," Box 23; 160a, Files of Komer, "Pakistan, 1965- 3/66," Box 46; 47, Memos to the President, "Vol. 11, " Box 3; 19, Files of Saunders, "South Asia, 62-66, Vol. 2," Box 40; 33, NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1	S	1	6/21/65	A
32b	memo	McGeorge Bundy to Secretaries of State and Defense and Director, CIA; exempt. 5/02 dup. #33a, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-66, Vol. 2," Box 40	S	1	7/1/65	A
37aa	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 5/02 dup., #157, NSF, Country File, "Pakistan, Vol. 5," Box 152; #27a, NSF, Memos to the President, "Vol. 17, Bundy," Box 5; #115, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders, "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 2," Box 40	S	1	12/20/65	A
37m-1	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 3/00 dup., #106a, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 2," Box 40	S	5	12/12/65	A
37q	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 7/04 dup., #109, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 2," Box 40	S-	1	12/14/65	A
38b	memo	Robert Komer to the President; sanitized 5/02 dup., #118, NSF, Files of Harold Saunders. "South Asia 1962-66, Vol. 2," Box 40 SANITIZED NL/PAC 10-245	S	4	1/27/66	A

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41b	cable	New Delhi 225; sanitized 8/01 dup., #93, NSF, Country File, "India, Vol. 5," Box 129; #311, NSF, Files of Rober Komer, "Kashmir Cables-1965," Box 38	S	3	8/9/65	A
43	memo	White House Meeting on South Asian Problems; sanitized 1/03	S	2	9/17/65	'
80	memo	Research Memorandum, RNA 46.1; sanitized 8/01 same sanitization 5/22/14 per NLS 11-218	S	9	9/4/65	A
81	memo	Research Memorandum, RNA 46.2; sanitized 8/01 more info released 5/22/14 per NLS 11-218	S	3	9/6/65	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#6a memo	State To president from Komer <i>Decisions per State 9-20-79 NSC 9-9-81</i>	secret <i>Exempt open 7-25-89 NLJ</i> 2 p 01/11/62	87-213 A
#6b memo	State to McGB from RWK	secret <i>Exempt open 7-25-89 NLJ</i> 3 p 01/11/62	87-213 A
#6c memo	State to McGB from RWK	secret <i>open 10-9-81 ig</i> 2 p 01/12/62	A
#7a memo	State to McGB from RWK	secret " 1 p 05/09/62	A
#7b memo	State <i>open 1-22-01</i> to McGB from RWK <i>sanitized 7-25-89 NLJ 87-213</i>	secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81 ig</i> 1 p 05/22/62	A
#7d memo	State president's meeting <i>sanitized 7-25-89 NLJ 87-213</i>	secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81 ig</i> <i>open 12-18-96 per FRUS</i> 1 p 06/15/62	A
#7e memo	state for the record by Komer <i>sanitized 7-25-89 NLJ 87-213</i>	secret <i>Exempt open 12-18-96 per FRUS</i> 2 p 06/20/62	A
#7f memo	State to McGB from RWK <i>open 7-25-89 NLJ 87-213</i>	secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81 ig</i> 2 p 07/26/62	A
#8a memo	state <i>open 7-25-89 NLJ 87-213</i> to Phillips Talbot from RWK	secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81 ig</i> 2 p 10/24/62	A
#8b memo	State topresident from CK	secret <i>open 10-9-81 ig</i> 1 p 10/26/62	A
#8c cable	state New Delhi 1706	conf <i>open 7-18-89 NLJ 87-212</i> 2 p 10/29/62	A
#8h memo	state <i>open 7-25-89 NLJ 87-213</i> to McGB from RWK	secret <i>Exempt</i> 1 p 11/06/62	A
#8i memo	state <i>open 7-25-89 NLJ 87-213</i> to president from Komer	secret <i>Exempt</i> 1 p 11/12/62	A
#8j-1 memo	state <i>open 7-25-89 NLJ 87-213</i> to Carl Kayson from Komer	secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81 ig</i> 2 p 11/16/62	A
#8m memo	state to Carl from RWK <i>open 7-25-89 NLJ 87-213</i>	secret <i>Exempt</i> 1 p 11/19/62	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decision per State 9-20-79</i> <i>NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#8a memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> to Carl from RWK <i>open 7-25-89</i> <i>NLS 87-213</i>	1 p 11/20/62	A
#8p memo	state <i>open 12-18-96 per FRUS</i> secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81</i> for the record by Komer <i>sanitized 7-25-89 NLS 87-213</i>	11/27/62	A
#8r memo	state secret <i>open 10-9-81</i> to McGB from Komer	3 p 12/07/62	A
#8s memo	state <i>open 7-25-89 NLS 87-213</i> secret <i>Exempt</i> to Phil from Komer	1 p 12/18/62	A
#8v memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 11-22-01</i> to president from Komer <i>Exempt NLS 87-213</i>	1 p 01/08/63	A
#8v-2 memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 1-22-01</i> Draft terms... <i>Exempt NLS 87-213</i>	1 p undated	A
#9c memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 12-18-96 per FRUS</i> for record by Komer <i>sanitized 7-25-89</i> <i>NLS 87-213</i>	5 p 04/29/63	A
#9d memo	state <i>open 7-25-89 NLS 87-213</i> secret <i>Exempt</i> for president by from Komer <i>213</i>	2 p 05/08/63	A
#9e memo	state <i>open 1-22-01</i> secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81</i> for president from Komer	1 p 05/09/63	A
#10a memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 12-18-96 per FRUS</i> for president from Komer <i>sanitized 7-25-89</i> <i>NLS 87-213</i>	2 p 08/09/63	A
#10b memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 12/12/01 NLS/RAC 01-61</i> for president from Komer <i>sanitized 7-25-89</i> <i>NLS 87-213</i>	2 p 08/12/63	A
#10c memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 12-18-96 per FRUS</i> for record by Komer <i>sanitized 7-25-89</i> <i>NLS 87-213</i>	4 p 08/12/63	A
#10d memo	State secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 7-18-89 NLS 87-212</i> to George Ball from Harriman	1 p 08/12/63	A
#10e report	state secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>sanitized 7-18-89 NLS 87-212</i> instructions for Ball's Mission <i>same as 10e/10f</i> <i>NLS/RAC 01-62</i> 4 p 08/28/63 A <i>Same sanitization per RAC 7/2005</i>		
#10f memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> to president from Komer <i>sanitized 7-25-89</i> <i>NLS 87-213</i>	1 p 09/09/63	A
<i>[Dup. # 50, as above]</i>			
FILE LOCATION	<i>Same as 10e/10f. NLS/RAC 01-61</i> NSF, NSC History South Asia, 1962-1966 <i>Same sanitization per RAC 2005</i>		

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per State 9-20-79 NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#10g memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 12-18-96 per FRUS</i> for record by Komer <i>sanitized 7-25-89</i> 3 p	09/09/63	A
#10h memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLS</i> to McGB from RWK <i>sanitized 12/12/01 NLS/RAC 41 p</i> 09/--/--		88-163 A
#10i memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> to Ball from Komer <i>sanitized 8-18-89 NLS 88-163</i> 1 p	09/10/63	A
#11a memo	state <i>Open 7/24/01 NLS 01-71</i> secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLS 88-163</i> to president from Komer 3 p	10/03/63	A
#11b memo	state <i>open 1-22-01</i> secret <i>Exempt</i> to president from Komer <i>sanitized 8-18-89 NLS 88-163</i> 1 p	10/09/63	A
#11c memo	state <i>open 8-18-89 NLS 88-163</i> secret <i>Exempt</i> to Mac from RWK 1 p	10/10/63	A
#11d memcon	state <i>open 1-22-01</i> secret <i>Exempt</i> MemCon by Komer <i>sanitized 8-18-89 NLS 88-163</i> 3 p	10/09/63	A
#14a memo	State Secret <i>sanitized 1-22-01 NLS 97-434</i> to president from Komer 5 p	09/09/65	A
#15a memo	State secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>sanitized 8-18-89 NLS 88-163</i> to president from Komer <i>open 1-22-01</i> 1 p	11/29/63	A
#15b report	state Secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 1-22-01</i> Talking points <i>sanitized 8-18-89 NLS 88-163</i> 2 p	undated	A
#15c cable	state <i>open 1-22-01</i> secret (gp 3) <i>sanitized 8-18-89 NLS 88-163</i> Karachi 755 4 p	12/02/63	A
#15d memo	state secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 1-22-01</i> to president from Ball <i>sanitized 10-5-89</i> 1 p	12/12/63	A
#15f memo	State secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 8-18-89 NLS 88-163</i> to Bundy from RWK 1 p	12/13/63	A
#16a memo	state secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>sanitized 8-18-89 NLS 88-163</i> to president from Komer <i>Open 7/24/01 NLS 01-71</i> 1 p	10/26/63	A
#16b memo	state secret <i>open 10-9-81</i> to Mac from RWK 1 p	11/23/63	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	Decisions for State 9-20-79 NSC 9-9-81		
#16c memo Same sanitization Sg. 03 NW 9-70	State secret sanitized 8-18-89 NLS 88-163 to president from Komer 1 p (duplicates #4 in NSF, IM&T, Taylor Trip to India & Pakistan) 12/23/63 [Dup. #12, NSF, Files of Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-66, Preface..." Box 40] Ap #71, India 11/63-1964		A
#17b memo	State secret (gp 3) open 10-9-81 to Bundy from Read 1 p	01/30/64	A
#17c memo	state secret cover memo 1 p	01/29/64	A
#17e memo Same sanitization Sg. 03 NW 9-70	state secret Exempt sanitized 8-18-89 NLS 88-163 to president from Komer 2 p [Dup. #104, NSF, HDS, "Pakistan - Ayub Corresp, Vol. I" Box 6]	01/31/64	A
#17f memo	state secret open 10-9-81		
#17g memo	to Mac from RWK 1 p	02/11/64	A
#18a memo	state secret to president from Komer 2 p	02/24/64	A
#18b cable Same per FELS Sg. 03 NW 9-70	state secret Exempt Exempt NLS 88-163 to Bowles from Komer 1 p [Dup. #83, Files of Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-66, Vol. I..." Box 40]	02/27/64	A
#18c memo	state secret Exempt NLS 88-163 open 11-24-98 NLS 98-144 to president from Bundy & Komer 1 p (duplicates #75a in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 1)	03/08/64	A
#18d memo	state secret Exempt Open 7/24/01 NLS 01-71 to Mac from RWK Exempt NLS 88-164 1 p	03/09/64	A
#18e cable	state secret Exempt Exempt NLS 88-164 draft cable to Karachi open 1-22-01 3 p	03/09/64	A
#18f memo	state open 1-22-01 secret Exempt Exempt NLS 88-164 for Talbot 1 p	03/09/64	A
#18g memo	state open 1-22-01 secret Exempt Exempt NLS 88-164 to Governor from RWK 1 p	03/06/64	A
#18g-1 memo Sanitized Sg. 03 NW 9-70	state secret Exempt Exempt NLS 88-164 US/Pak relations 1 p [Dup. #87, Files of Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-66 Vol. I..." Box 40]	03/06/64	A
#18h memo	state open 1-22-01 secret Exempt Exempt NLS 88-164 to Mack from Komer 2 p	03/26/64	A
#18i memo	state open 1-22-01 secret Exempt Exempt NLS 88-164 to Governor Harriman from Komer 1 p	04/21/64	A

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NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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	<i>Decisions on State 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#18j letter	to State Dept. secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLS 88-164</i> to Chet Bowles from Komer	<i>Open 1-22-01</i> 2 p 04/24/64	A
#19a memo	Secret <i>open 7-7-89 NLS 88-164</i> to president from Komer	1 p 04/27/64	A
#19d memcon	Secret President and Gandhi meeting	<i>sanitized 10-9-81</i> 3 p 04/27/64	A
#20a memo	secret <i>Exempt open 1-22-01</i> Mac from RWK	<i>Exempt NLS 88-164</i> 1 p 05/16/64	A
#20b memo	secret <i>Cap of #101, H of S corresp, Arab, Vol 1</i> to Mac from RWK	<i>Exempt NLS 88-164</i> <i>open 1-22-01</i> 1 p 05/26/64	A
#20d memo	secret <i>open 1-22-01</i> to Mac from Komer	<i>sanitized 10-9-81</i> <i>Exempt NLS 88-164</i> 1 p 05/27/64	A
#20e memo	secret <i>open 1-22-01</i> to Mac from RWK	<i>sanitized 1-26-89 NLS 88-164</i> 1 p 06/12/64	A
#20f memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLS 88-164</i> to president from Komer	<i>Open 1-22-01</i> 1 p 06/16/64	A
#20g memo	secret <i>open 1-22-01</i> to Mac from RWK	<i>Exempt NLS 88-164</i> 2 p 05/21/64	A
#20h memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLS 88-164</i> to president from Komer	<i>open 1-22-01</i> 1 p 06/03/64	A
#20i memo	secret <i>Exempt NLS 88-164</i> to president from Komer & Bundy	<i>open 1-22-01</i> 1 p 06/04/64	A
#21a Memo	secret to McGB from RWK	<i>open 10-9-81</i> 1 p 06/23/64	A
#21b memo	secret (gp 3) to president from Ball	" 2 p 07/05/64	A
#21c memcon	secret (gp 3) re: Indian	<i>Exempt open 11-24-98 NLS 97-144</i> <i>Exempt NLS 88-165</i> 3 p 07/07/64	A
#21f memcon	conf (gp 1) Bashir Ahmed	1 p 07/07/64	A

FILE LOCATION NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions for State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#22a memo	TO STATE DEPT. secret (gp 3) <i>open 10-5-89 NLJ 88-162</i> to president from Rusk (duplicates #39 and 39a in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 2)	2 p 07/15/64	A
#22b memcon	secret (gp 1) <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i> sanitized 3-27-00 NLJ 87-144 conversation with amb. McCaughy (duplicates #79 in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 2) <i>open 4-6-01</i>	3 p 07/15/64	A
#22c memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81 ig</i> to president from Komer	1 p 07/15/64	A
#22d memo	conf. <i>open 4-6-01</i> sanitized 10-9-81 ig to RWK from HHS sanitized 6-2-89 NLJ 88-165	1 p 04/29/64	A
#22e memo	conf. <i>open 10-9-81 ig</i> to RWK from HHS	1 p 05/26/64	A
#22f cable	secret <i>open 10-4-89 NLJ 88-162</i> Karachi 108 [near top #88a, HDS, Pakistan Pres. Ayub Khan vol I, page 6]	4 p 07/23/64	A
#23a memo	secret <i>open 7/24/01 NLJ 88-165</i> to Mac from RWK Exempt NLJ 88-165 (duplicates #11 in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 2)	3 p 09/23/64	A
#23b memo	secret to Mac from RWK	1 p 09/25/64	A
#23c memo	secret <i>open 1-22-01</i> for record by Komer Exempt NLJ 88-165 (duplicates #9a in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 2)	4 p 09/24/64	A
#24a-1 memo	secret <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i> to Bundy from HHS [Dup. #1205 NSF, Files of Saunders, "South Asia, 1962-66, Vol. 1... Box 403]	1 p 03/10/65	A
#24a-2 memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> sanitized 4-5-91 NLJ 87-513 to Bowles from Bundy [Dup. #1206, as above]	1 p undated	A
#24b memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> Exempt NLJ 88-165 <i>open 1-22-01</i> to RWK from HHS	2 p 03/15/65	A
#24c letter	secret <i>open 10-9-81 ig</i> to Chet Bowles from Komer	2 p 03/20/65	A
#24d memo	secret <i>ii</i> to RWK from HHS	1 p 03/31/65	A
#24e memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> Exempt NLJ 88-165 <i>open 1-22-01</i> to RWK from HHS	2 p 04/20/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per State 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#25a memo	TO STATE DEPT. confidential <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165 open 1-22-01</i> to Mac from RWK (duplicates #106a in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 3)	1 p 01/11/65	A
#25b memo	secret <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i> to Mac from RWK <i>Open 7/24/01 NSC 01-71</i>	2 p 02/02/65	A
#25c memo	secret <i>open 1-22-01</i> to president from Komer <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i> (duplicates #142 in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 3)	1 p 04/02/65	A
#25d memo	secret <i>open 1-22-01</i> to president from Komer <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i> (duplicates #5 in NSF, CF, India, Shastri Visit, June 1965-1966)	1 p 04/05/65	A
#25d-1 memo	secret <i>open 1-22-01</i> to president from Komer <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i> (duplicates #5a in NSF, CF, India, Shastri Visit, June 1965-66)	4 p 04/05/65	A
#25e memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> to Ben from RWK <i>open 6-2-89 NLJ 88-165</i>	1 p 04/07/65	A
#25e-1 cable	secret <i>Exempt open 1-22-01</i> draft cable to Teheran <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i>	1 p 04/07/65	A
#25f memo	secret <i>Exempt open 1-22-01</i> to president from Komer <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i>	1 p 04/18/65	A
#25g cable	secret <i>Exempt open 1-22-01</i> Karachi 1143	1 p 04/18/65	A
#25h cable <i>sanitized 5-9-03 NLJ 88-165</i>	secret [dup #139, NSF, Files of Saunders, "SOUTH ASIA, 1962-66, Vol. 1..." Box 40] draft to New Delhi <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i> (duplicates #37a in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	2 p 04/15/65	A
#25j memo	secret <i>sanitized 6-2-89 NLJ 88-165</i> to president from Komer <i>Open 5/24/01 NSC 00-253</i> (duplicates #58 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	1 p 04/16/65	A
#25k memo	secret <i>Open 7/24/01 NSC 01-71</i> to Mac from RWK <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i> <i>Komer Memo, Vol. I</i>	1 p 04/20/65	A + C
#25m memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81 ip</i> to Mac from Komer	3 p 04/21/65	A
#26a memo	conf (gp 3) <i>sanitized 10-9-81 ip</i> to Bundy from Read <i>Open 10-5-89 NLJ 88-165</i>	1 p 05/12/65	A
#26b memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> to Mac from RWK <i>Open 7/24/01 NSC 01-71</i> <i>Exempt NLJ 88-165</i>	1 p 05/15/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions for Sept 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#26c memo	STATE DEPT. secret <i>Exempt</i> open 1-22-01 to RWK from HHS <i>Exempt</i> NLJ 88-165	1 p 05/19/65	A
#26d memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt</i> NLJ 88-165 open 1-22-01 to president from Komer (Dup. of #61, NSF, HHS Corresp, Pakistan, Ayub, Vol 1)	1 p 05/19/65	A
#26e memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> open 10-5-89 NLJ 88-162 to president from Rusk	1 p 05/19/65	A
#26g memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> to Mac from RWK open 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05	1 p 06/12/65	A
#26h cable	secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt</i> open 1-22-01 to London 792 <i>sanitized</i> 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05	2 p 06/16/65	A
#28a memo same sanitization 5-1-03 NW 8-70	secret <i>sanitized</i> 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05 to president from Komer (duplicates #17 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1) Edup. #4, Saunders, "South Asia, 62-66, Vol. II" Box 40	4 p 04/22/65	A
#28b memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>sanitized</i> 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05 to president from Komer <i>more info released</i> (Dup. #5, as above)	3 p 04/22/65	A
#28c memo	secret open 11/22/88 per NSC ltr 7/25/80 to president from Komer	1 p 04/23/65	A
#28d memo	secret open 11/22/88 per NSC ltr 7/25/80 to president from Komer (duplicate of #24 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	2 p 06/05/65	A
#28e memo more info Released 8-27-88 NLJ 87-144	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>sanitized</i> 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05 to Mac from Komer (also dup #93 NSF Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I) (duplicates #21 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	5 p 05/30/65	A
#28f memo	secret open 10-9-81 ip to Mac from RWK	1 p 06/07/65	A
#28g memo	secret <i>sanitized</i> 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05 open 4-9-01 to president from Komer <i>sanitized</i> 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05 (duplicates #27 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1) Komer Memos, Vol. I	5 p 06/08/65	A
#28h memo	secret <i>sanitized</i> 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05 to SecState, SecDef, AID, from Bundy	1 p 06/09/65	A
#29a letter Dup. #14, Saunders, "South Asia, 62-66, Vol. II" Box 40	secret <i>sanitized</i> 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05 Dup # 93, NSF, Files of Komer Box 23, India- to Cook from Komer Same sanitization per NSC 01-140 6/1/02 (duplicates #22 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	5 p 06/03/65	A
#29b memo	secret open 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05 to president from Komer (duplicates #38 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	1 p 07/07/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per State 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#29c memo	TO STATE DEPT. secret <i>Exempt NLJ 89-05</i> to Mac from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> 2 p	06/11/65	A
#29d memo	(duplicates #134 in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 3) secret <i>Exempt NLJ 89-05</i> to Mac from RWK <i>open 4-9-01</i> 2 p	06/18/65	A
#29g memo	(duplicates #32 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1) <i>#75, NSF Name file Komer/Memo. Vol. 5</i> secret <i>sanitized 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05</i> to president from Komer <i>OPEN 5.6.99</i> 2 p	06/28/65	A
#30a memo	(duplicates #34 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1) <i>#68a NSF Name file Komer/Memo. Vol. 5</i> secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLJ 89-05</i> to president from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> 2 p	07/06/65	A
#30b memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>sanitized 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05</i> to president from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> 1 p	07/06/65	A
#30c memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLJ 89-05</i> to President from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> 1 p	07/15/65	A
#30d memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLJ 89-05</i> to president from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> 2 p	07/30/65	A
#30e memo	confidential to Mac from RWK <i>open 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05</i> 1 p	07/08/65	A
#30f list	(duplicates #39 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1) conf. <i>open 10-9-81</i> decision points (India) 2 p	undated	A
#30g decision list	conf. <i>"</i> decision points (Pakistan) 2 p	Undated	A
#30h memo	secret <i>open 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05</i> for record by Komer 4 p	07/16/65	A
#30i memo	(duplicates #42 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1) <i>#222, NSF, CF, India Vol. 5</i> secret <i>open NSC 7-25-80</i> to president from Komer <i>open 11/17/88</i> 1 p	07/19/65	A
#31a memo	(duplicates #43 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1) secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81</i> <i>OPEN 5.6.99</i> to president from Komer <i>sanitized 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05</i> 1 p	07/09/65	A
#31b memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> to RWK from HHS <i>open 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05</i> 1 p	08/27/65	A
#33a memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLJ 89-05</i> to Tom Mann from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> 1 p	07/24/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per Sec 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#33b memo	State Dept. secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLS 89-05</i> for record by Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i>	1 p 08/03/65	A
#33c memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>NLS 89-05</i> for record by Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> (duplicates #209 in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 4)	3 p 08/04/65	A
#33e memo	secret <i>open 4-9-01</i> for record by Komer <i>Exempt NLS 89-05</i> (duplicates #208 in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 4)	1 p 08/06/65	A
#33f memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 4-9-01</i> to Mac from RWK <i>Exempt NLS 89-05</i>	1 p 08/09/65	A
#33g memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81 ip</i> to Mac from RWK	1 p 08/11/65	A
#33h memo	secret <i>sanitized 7-18-89 NLS 89-06</i> to Mann from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> (duplicates #210a in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 4)	1 p 08/19/65	A
#33h-1 cable	secret <i>open 4-9-01</i> for Amb. Goldberg <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> (duplicates #210b in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 4)	2 p 08/19/65	A
#33i memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 4-9-01</i> to Mac from RWK <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i>	1 p 08/20/65	A
#33j memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 4-9-01</i> to Mac from RWK <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i>	1 p 08/20/65	A
#34a memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> to Mac from RWK <i>open 7-18-89 NLS 89-06</i>	1 p 06/05/65	A
#34b memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81 ip</i> to president from Komer and Bundy	1 p 06/05/65	A
#34c memo	secret (gp 2) New Delhi 257	2 p 08/20/65	A
#35b memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>sanitized 7-18-89 NLS 89-06</i> to president from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> <i>9861 6/9/00</i>	1 p 08/31/65	A
#35c memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 1-9-98</i> to president from Komer <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i>	2 p 09/01/65	A
#35d memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> <i>open 1-9-98</i> for record by Komer	2 p 09/02/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per Sec 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#35c memo	state dept. secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 1-9-98</i> to president from Komer <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> 1 p	09/03/65	A
#35f memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 4-9-01</i> to Mac from RWK <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> 2 p	09/04/65	A
#35g memo	secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81 is open 4-9-01</i> to president from Komer <i>sanitized 7-18-89 NLS 89-06</i> 1 p	09/06/65	A
#35h memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81 is</i> to Mac from RWK 1 p	09/07/65	A
#35i memo	secret to Mac from RWK 1 p	09/07/65	A
#35j memo	secret <i>open 4-9-01</i> to president from RWK <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> 1 p (duplicates #184 in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 4)	09/07/65	A
#35k memo	secret <i>confidential</i> <i>open 9-6-89</i> to president from Komer <i>NLS 89-11</i> 1 p (duplicates #182 in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 4)	09/07/65	A + G "C" restriction after 11/5/88 TH
#35l memo	secret to president from Komer 1 p	09/07/65	A
#35n memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 4-9-01</i> Karachi 398 <i>Exempt NLS 89-09</i> 1 p	undated	A
#35r memo	secret <i>open 1-9-98</i> for record by Komer <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> 4 p (duplicates #8 in NSF, CF, India, Agenda Points 9/17/65)	09/08/65	A
#35s memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 4-9-01</i> for president by Komer <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> 2 p	09/16/65	A
#35t report	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 4-9-01</i> Agenda points <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> 1 p	09/17/65	A
#35u memo	conf (gp 3) <i>open 10-9-81 is</i> to Bundy from Read 1 p	09/16/65	A
#35v memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 4-9-01</i> to Mac from RWK <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> 1 p	09/17/65	A
#35y memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 4-9-01</i> to Mac from RWK <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> 1 p	09/20/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per State 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81</i> State dept.		
#35z memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> open 4-9-01 to Mac from RWK <i>1 p Exempt NLS 89-06</i>	09/20/65	A
#35aa memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81 is</i> to president from Komer 1 p	09/21/65	A
#35cc memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> open 5-1-89 NLS 89-09 to Amb. Goldberg from Secretary 1 p	09/21/65	A
#36a memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81 is</i> to president from Komer 1 p	09/22/65	A
#36b memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> open 11/8/00 NS 98-61 to president from Komer <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> 3 p	09/24/65	A
#36c letter	conf <i>open 10-9-81 is</i> to Bell and Macomber from John Lewis 5 p	09/25/65	A
#36d memo list	secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81 is</i> open 7-18-89 NLS 89-06 re: India 2 p	09/27/65	A
#36e memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81 is</i> to Mac from RWK 1 p	09/29/65	A
#36f memo	secret <i>Exempt sanitized 7-18-89 NLS 89-06</i> to president from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> 2 p	10/01/65	A
#36g memo	secret <i>sanitized 7-18-89 NLS 89-06</i> to president from Bundy & Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i> 4 p (duplicates #46 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	10/05/65	A
#36h memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81 is</i> to president from Komer 1 p	10/08/65	A
#36j memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> open 4-9-01 to Mac from RWK <i>sanitized 7-18-89 NLS 89-06</i> 1 p	10/09/65	A
#36k cable	secret <i>Exempt</i> open 4-9-01 to New Delhi <i>Exempt NLS 89-09</i> 4 p	10/09/65	A
#36n memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> to Mac from RWK <i>open 7-18-89 NLS 89-06</i> 1 p	10/20/65	A
#36p memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> open 4-9-01 to Mac from RWK <i>Exempt NLS 89-06</i> 2 p	10/23/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#36q List]	State Dept. secret <i>open 4-9-01</i> What may be on the president's mind <i>sanitized 7-18-89 NLS 89-06</i> (duplicates #50 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	1 p 11/16/65	A
#36r memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81</i> to Moyers from Komer	1 p 11/23/65	A
#37a memo	secret " to Mae from RWK	1 p 10/21/65	A
#37b memo	secret " to president from Komer	1 p 10/28/65	A
#37c cable	secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt open 4-9-01</i> Karachi 804 <i>sanitized 5-1-89 NLS 89-09</i>	3 p 11/09/65	A
#37d memo	secret <i>sanitized 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> <i>open 8-17-01 NLS 01-139</i> to Mae from Komer (duplicates #49 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	2 p 11/10/65	A
#37e memo	secret <i>Exempt open 8-17-01 NLS 01-139</i> to Mae from RWK <i>sanitized 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i>	1 p 11/12/65	A
#37f memo	secret <i>sanitized 10-9-81</i> for record from Komer <i>open 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i>	2 p 11/22/65	A
#37g memo	secret <i>Exempt sanitized 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> for Moyers from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i>	6 p 11/27/65	A
#37h memo	secret <i>sanitized 9-12-89 NLS 89-04</i> <i>open 4-9-01</i> to president from Komer	1 p 11/29/65	A C
#37i memo	confidential <i>open 10-9-81</i> to RWK from HHS	1 p 12/06/65	A <i>"C" restriction removed 9-7-89</i>
#37j memo	secret <i>Exempt open 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> to president from Komer	1 p 12/06/65	A
#37k memo	secret <i>Exempt sanitized 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> to president <i>open 4-9-01</i>	1 p 12/10/65	A
#37m memo	secret <i>Exempt open 11-24-98 NLS 97-144</i> to President from RWK <i>Exempt NLS 89-07</i>	1 p 12/12/65	A
#37m-1 memo	secret <i>Exempt sanitized 3-27-00 NLS 97-144</i> to president from Komer <i>Exempt NLS 89-07</i> [Dup. #106a, NSF, File of Saunders, "SOUTH ASIA, 62-66, Vol. (I)" Box 40]	5 p 12/12/65	A
FILE LOCATION	NSF, NSC History South Asia, 1962-1966		

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per State 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81</i>		
	STATE DEPT.		
#37m-2 report	Confidential <i>Exempt open 4-9-01</i> re: Pakistan Exempt NLS 89-07	1 p 12/12/65	A
#37n memo	secret <i>Exempt open 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> to president from Komer	1 p 12/13/65	A
#37p report	secret <i>Exempt sanitized 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> talking points <i>open 8-14-98 NLS 97-145</i>	2 p 12/13/65	A
#37q memo	secret <i>Exempt Exempt NLS 89-12</i> to president from Komer <i>sanitized 3-12-03 NLS 98-61</i> [Dup. #109, NSF, Files of Saunders, "SOUTH ASIA, 62-66, Vol. II" Box 403]	1 p 12/14/65	A
#37r memo	secret <i>Exempt open 4-9-01</i> to president from Komer <i>Exempt NLS 89-07</i>	1 p 12/14/65	A
#37s memo	secret <i>Exempt open 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> to president from Komer	1 p 12/14/65	A
#37u memcon	secret <i>Exempt open 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> meeting between Am. and Pakistani Advisers	9 p 12/14/65	A
#37y memo	secret <i>Exempt sanitized 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> to president from Komer <i>open 4-9-01</i>	2 p 12/15/65	A
#37z memo	secret <i>open 10-9-81 ip</i> to president from Dean	1 p 12/15/65	A
#38a memo	secret <i>open 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> to president from Komer	3 p 01/12/66	A
#38b memo	secret <i>Exempt open 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i> to president from Komer <i>sanitized 10-4-81 ip</i> [Dup. #118, NSF, Files of Saunders, "SOUTH ASIA, 62-66, Vol. II" Box 403]	4 p 01/27/66	A
#38c memo	secret (gp 1) <i>Exempt open 4-9-01</i> to Bundy from Read <i>Exempt NLS 89-07</i>	13 p 02/01/66	A
#38f memo	secret <i>sanitized 10-4-81 ip</i> to president from Komer <i>open 12-6-89 NLS 89-07</i>	1 p 03/10/66	A
#38g memo	secret <i>Exempt open 12-6-89</i> to president from Komer <i>NLS 89-07</i>	1 p 03/18/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions for State 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#39b memo	State Dept. secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 12-6-89 NLJ 89-07</i> to president from Komer	9 p 03/26/66	A
#39d memo	confidential <i>open 10-9-81 ig</i> WWR-LBJ talks	2 p 04/05/66	A
#41 memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> to Rostow from E. Rostow	1 p 10/29/68	A
#41a report	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>sanitized 12-6-89 NLJ 89-07</i> India-Pakistan War and Its Aftermath <i>open 12/19/02</i>	21p undated per NSJ/RAL 01-113	A
#41b cable	secret (gp 3) <i>sanitized 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> New Delhi 225 <i>sanitized 8-27-01 NLJ 01-138 (more info/leads)</i>	3 p 08/09/65	A
#41c cable	conf <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> Karachi 253	2 p 08/31/65	A
#41d cable	secret New Delhi 452	1 p 09/02/65	A
#41e cable	secret New Delhi 230	1 p 09/02/65	A
#41g cable	confidential New York 383 <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i>	3 p 09/03/65	A
#41h cable	secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt</i> <i>NLJ 89-09 open 4-9-01</i> New Delhi 343	4 p 09/03/65	A
#41i cable	conf (gp 3) Karachi 277	6 p 09/03/65	A
#41k cable	conf (gp 3) <i>open 12-6-89 NLJ 89-07</i> Karachi 283 (duplicates #158 in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 4)	3 p 09/04/65	A
#41n cable	secret (gp 3) New Delhi 359	2 p 09/06/65	A
#41p cable	secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt</i> <i>NLJ 89-09 open 4-9-01</i> Karachi 290 (duplicates #85 in NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 4)	3 p 09/06/65	A
#41s memcon	conf <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Comte.	4 p 09/08/65	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per State 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#41c cable	STATE DEPT. New Delhi Conf (gp 3) New Delhi 382	1 p 09/08/65	A
#41d cable	secret New Delhi 383	2 p 09/08/65	A
#41e memo	secret to president from Rusk	3 p 09/09/65	A
#41w cable	conf (gp 3) <i>open 4-9-01</i> Ankara 210 <i>sanitized 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i>	2 p 09/10/65	A
#41x cable	conf Tehran 286 <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i>	3 p 09/10/65	A
#41y cable	conf Karachi 407	5 p 09/15/65	A
#41z cable	secret (gp 1) <i>Exempt NLJ 89-13</i> New Delhi 484 <i>open SA 03 NWD-138</i>	5 p 09/16/65	A
#41aa cable	conf (gp 3) New York 520 <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i>	5 p 09/16/65	A
#41cc memo	secret (gp 3) " to secretary from Hughes	3 p 09/17/65	A
#42 cable	secret (gp 3) " New Delhi 492	2 p 09/16/65	A
#43 memo	secret <i>Exempt Exempt NLJ 89-12</i> WH meeting son South Asian problems <i>san 2-11-03 NLJ 01-140</i>	2 p 09/17/65	A
#44 cable	secret (gp 1) <i>Exempt NLJ 89-09 open 4-9-01</i> New Delhi 498 (duplicates #70 in NSF, CF, India, Vol. 5)	3 p 09/17/65	A
#46 cable	conf (gp 3) Circular 318 <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i>	4 p 09/17/65	A
#48 cable	secret (gp 3) <i>open 4-9-01</i> New Delhi 503 <i>Exempt NLJ 89-09</i>	1 p 09/17/65	A
#49 cable	secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt NLJ 89-09</i> New Delhi 513 <i>open 4-9-01</i>	2 p 09/18/65	A

FILE LOCATION
NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#50 cable	Secret <i>Exempt NLJ 89-09</i> New Delhi 518 <i>open 4-9-01</i> 5 p	09/19/65	A
	(duplicates #72 in NSF, CF, India, Vol. 5)		
#52 cable	Secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt</i> New York 584 <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> 1 p	09/21/65	A
#53 cable	Secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt NLJ 89-09 open 4-9-01</i> Rawalpindi 94 2 p	09/20/65	A
#54 cable	Secret (gp 3) New Delhi 535 1 p	09/21/65	A
#55 cable	secret <i>sanitized 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> Paris 328 <i>open 4-9-01</i> 3 p	09/21/65	A
#56 cable	conf (gp 3) <i>sanitized 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> Hong Kong 479 <i>open 4-9-01</i> 2 p	09/22/65	A
#59 cable	conf <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> New York 626 5 p	09/24/65	A
#60 cable	conf <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> Circular 491 4 p	09/25/65	A
#63 cable	secret (gp 3) " Karachi 541 1 p	09/29/65	A
#64 memo	secret <i>Exempt</i> <i>Exempt NLJ 89-09 open 4-9-01</i> Memcon re India/Pakistan Conflict 6 p	10/02/65	A
#65 cable	Secret New Delhi 519 4 p	10/01/65	A
#66 cable	secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt NLJ 89-09 open 4-9-01</i> Karachi 595 4 p	10/05/65	A
#67 memo	secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt NLJ 89-09 open 4-9-01</i> to Acting Secretary from Raymond Hare 10 p	10/09/65	A
#72 cable	secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt</i> New Delhi 1422 <i>open 12-6-89 NLJ 89-07</i> 4 p	02/05/66	A
#73 cable	conf New Delhi 659 <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> 2 p	10/08/65	A

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NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions for State 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81</i>		
#75 cable	Secret (gp 3) Exempt Karachi 1225 <i>open 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09 5 p</i>	02/11/66	A
#77 cable	Secret (gp 3) Saigon 2374 <i>open 12-6-89 NLJ 89-07 3 p</i>	02/12/66	A
#80 memo	Secret (gp 3) <i>sanitized 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> to Secretary from Hughes <i>sanitized 8-27-01 NLJ 01-138 - 9 p #16, Files of Kerner, Box 38, Kashmir Chron. of Events</i> <i>(more info released)</i>	09/04/65	A
#81 memo	Secret (gp 3) <i>sanitized 5-1-89 NLJ 89-09</i> to Secretary from Hughes <i>sanitized 8-27-01 NLJ 01-138 - 3 p</i> <i>(more info released)</i> <i>Near dup. of #16, Files of Kerner, Box 38, Kashmir Chron. of Events</i>	09/06/65	A
#78	LBJ mtg w/Pres. Ayub Secret <i>6 p</i>	12-15-65	A
[Also listed on page 26]			
	<i>open 11-24-98 NLJ 97-144</i> <i>[dup. #1K, files of Howard Weigins</i> <i>"India-Pakistan Military Assistance, Box 2"]</i>		

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NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	NLS-78-559 NSC 8-25-80	later	
#9a memo	to state Dept for consultation XXXXX WH Top Secret open 9-11-80 is p to SecState & Sec Def. from Bundy 1 p	4/26/63	A
#9b memo	WH top secret Exempt for record from Bundy open 8-29-89 NLS 89-11 1 p	04/26/63	A
#37aa memo Sanitized 6/4/02 YWS, 64-68, U, 25 #28	WH top secret Exempt for the president from Komer Exempt NLS 89-11 1 p [Dep. #115, NSF, Files of Saunders, "South Asia, 62-66, Vol. II" Box 40]	12/20/65	A
#29e memo	WH top secret Exempt to Mac from RWK open 8-29-89 NLS 89-11 1 p	06/21/65	A
#29f memo SEE BELOW	WH top secret Exempt NLS 89-11 to president from Komer Sanitized 6/4/02, YWS, 64-68, U, 25 #164 1 p (duplicates #33 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	06/21/65	A
#32a memo	WH top secret Exempt Sanitized 8-29-89 NLS 89-11 to Mac from RWK Downgraded to Secret 1 p	07/01/65	A
#32b memo	WH top secret to SecState, SecDef & DirGIA from Bundy 1 p	07/01/65	A

29f more duplicates: #85a, NSF, Files of Komer, Box 23, Index 1965
#47, NSF, memos to Pres. Bundy, Vol. 11, Box 3
#160a, NSF, Komer, "Pakistan 1965-3/66" Box 46
[#19, NSF, Files of Saunders, "South Asia, 62-66, Vol. II" Box 40]

FILE LOCATION NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#32b memo	<p>78-560</p> <p>to CIA for consultation</p> <p>WH top secret <i>Exempt from</i> NSC 10-18-78 Bundy to SecState, SecDef, and DirCIA 1 p 7/1/65 A</p> <p><i>Exempt NLJ 89-12</i> [Dup # 33a, NSF, Files of Saunders, "SOUTH ASIA, 62-66, Vol. II" Box 40]</p>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#34d memo	OSD— TOP SECRET <i>sanitized 10-17-79</i> re: Vietnam <i>Reunited to secret NLS 89-11 4 p</i> <i>sanitized 8-29-89 NLS 89-11 open 4-9-01</i>	06/05/65	A

FILE LOCATION NSF, NSC History
 South Asia, 1962-1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#35w cable	<p><i>Downgraded to Secret NLS 89-214</i></p> <p>Top secret <i>Sanzitized Date 11/22/78</i></p> <p>State for Amb. from Secretary <i>open 4-9-01</i> 2 p</p> <p><i>Sanitized 1-17-90 NLS 89-214</i></p>	09/20/65	A

FILE LOCATION
NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	to State Dept. for consultation		
#35bb memo	WH Secret <i>agen 10-17-79 inf</i> to President from Wm. Jay 1 p	09/21/65	A
#39a memo	WH conf <i>Exempt NLS 88-166 open 4-9-01</i> to president from Komer 1 p (duplicates #46 in NSF, CF, India, PM Gandhi Visit Papers)	03/10/66	A + C
#39c memo	WH conf <i>Exempt NLS 88-166 open 4-9-01</i> to president from Komer 3 p (duplicates #29 in NSF, CF, India, PM Gandhi Visit Papers)	03/27/66	A
#39e memo	WH conf <i>Exempt</i> to president from Rostow 1 p <i>Exempt NLS 88-166 NSC 11-24-78</i> <i>sanitized 7-12-89 NLS 88-166</i> <i>(dup. of #82, NSF, Head of State Corresp, Pakistan, Ayub Corresp Vol 1)</i>	04/14/66	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	NSC conf <i>agen 9-3-80 ip</i> Preface 1 p	01/08/69	A
#7c-1 letter	NSC secret " to Prime Minister 1 p	06/12/62	A
#8c letter	NSC <i>open 8-17-01 NLJ 01-139</i> conf <i>Exempt per NSC 8-8-80</i> text of Nehru letter to President 5 p	10/28/62	A <i>Exempt NLJ 88-166</i>
#8d letter	NSC secret <i>agen 9-3-80 ip</i> text of JFK letter to Nehru 2 p	10/28/62	A
#8f letter	NSC secret <i>sanitized 9-3-80 ip</i> text of JFK letter to Ayub <i>open 6-24-02</i> 3 p	10/28/62	A
#8q letter	NSC <i>open 7-12-89 NLJ 88-166</i> secret <i>sanitized 9-3-80 ip</i> text of JFK letter to Ayub 2 p	12/05/62	A
#8t letter	NSC <i>open 4-6-01</i> secret <i>sanitized 9-3-80 ip</i> text of JFK letter to Ayub <i>sanitized 7-12-89 NLJ 88-166</i> 4 p	12/18/62	A
#8u letter	NSC secret <i>agen 9-3-80 ip</i> text of JFK letter to Ayub 2 p	12/22/62	A
#8v-1 letter	NSC secret " for prime minister from president 1 p	undated	A
#15e cable	NSC Secret (gp 3) <i>sanitized 9-3-80 ip</i> Message from president to Ayub 3 p	12/09/63	A <i>OPEN 9-25-88 NLJ 84-80</i>
#16e memo	NSC secret <i>sanitized 8-15-89 NLJ 88-163</i> Memo No 279 <i>open 4-6-01</i> 2 p	02/08/64	A
#17d cable	NSC secret (gp 3) <i>agen 9-3-80 ip</i> from President to Pres. Ayub 3 p	01/28/64	A
#17f-1 letter	NSC secret <i>sanitized 9-3-80 ip</i> to Pres. Ayub <i>open 7-5-89 NLJ 89-05</i> 2 p	02/03/64	A
██████████	██████████ secret (gp 1) ██████████	██████████	██████████
#26a-1 letter	NSC Conf. <i>Exempt per NSC 8-8-80</i> to Secretary from Ayub Khan 5 p	<i>open 4-9-01</i> 05/11/65	A
<i>(Dup. of #65a NSF Ho's corresp. Pakistan, Ayub, Vol. I)</i>			
FILE LOCATION	NSF, NSC History South Asia, 1962-1966		

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#26b-1 letter	NSC secret <i>agen 9-3-80 ip</i> to President 1 p	05/15/65	A
#26e-1 memo	NSC secret (gp 3) " from Pres. Johnson fro Pres. Ayub 3 p	undated	A
#26g-1 letter	NSC secret " to Prime Minister 2 p	06/12/65	A
#26i cable	NSC conf (gp 3) " London 8235 1 p	06/30/65	A
#34e letter	NSC secret " to Shastri from LBJ 2 p	06/05/65	A
#34e cable	NSC secret (gp 3) " New Delhi 124 3 p	07/25/65	A
#34f letter	NSC <i>Qn 11/20/00 413 00-172 Exempt per NSC 8-8-80</i> to pres. Johnson from Lal Bahadur 4 p <i>Exempt NLJ 89-06</i> <i>(dup of SS, NSF, Spec Itats Corresp, India, 4/15/65-2/28/66, Box 22)</i> 07/09/65 07/09/65		A
#38d-1 letter	NSC conf <i>Exempt per nsc 8-8-80</i> to Rusk from Ahmed <i>open per DCI 11/10/88</i> 1 p	02/04/66	A
#38d-2 letter	NSC conf <i>Exempt per nsc 8-8-80</i> to pres. Johnson from Mazhar Ayub Khan 2 p	01/22/66	A
#38e cable	NSC conf <i>agen 9-3-80 ip</i> Karachi 1220 3 p	02/11/66	A
#40a memo	NSC secret " for record by Foster 2 p	01/09/69	A
#45 cable	NSC secret (gp 3) <i>Exempt per nsc 8-8-80 open 4-9-01</i> New Delhi 502 <i>Exempt NLJ 89-07</i> 6 p	09/17/65	A
#76 cable	NSC Secret <i>Exempt per nsc 8-8-80 open 4-9-01</i> Saigon 2371 <i>Exempt NLJ 89-07</i> 2 p	02/11/66	A
#37e memo	NSC secret <i>sanitized 9-3-80 ip more released 12-6-89</i> Pres. Johnson meeting with Pres. Ayub 4 p	12/15/65	A <i>NLJ 89-07</i>
#37v memcon	NSC secret <i>sanitized 9-3-80 ip some sanitization</i> pres. Johnson meeting with Pres. Ayub 6 p	12/15/65	A <i>NLJ 89-07</i>

FILE LOCATION NSF, NSC History
South Asia, 1962-1966

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#37x speech	NSC conf <i>open 9-3-80 in</i> Draft Joint Communique 1 p	12/15/65	A
#78 memo <i>open 11-24-98 NLJ 88-144</i>	NSC secret <i>sanitized 9-2-80</i> (dup #1K 7/65 Howard Wiggins "India-Pakistan Military Hostilities" Box 1) President's meeting with Pres. Ayub 6 p	12/15/65	A
#79 memo	NSC secret <i>open 8-17-01 NLJ 01-139 sanitized 7-12-89 NLJ 88-166</i> President's meeting with Pres. Ayub 6 p	12/17/65	A
#8k letter	(duplicates #37v) <i>open 8-17-01 NLJ 01-139</i> NSC "CONFIDENTIAL" possible classified info <i>Exempt per NSC 8-8-80</i> Nehru to the President <i>Exempt NLJ 88-166</i> 5 p	11/19/62	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#17a letter	NSC possible classified info <i>open 8-17-01 NLJ 01-139</i> G. Ahmed to the President transmitting Ayub to the President letter 7 p	<i>Exempt per NSC 8-8-80 NLJ 88-166</i> 1/24/64	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#21c letter	NSC possible classified info <i>open 4-6-01</i> Ayub to the President <i>Exempt NLJ 88-166</i> 3 p	<i>Exempt per NSC 8-8-80</i> 7/1/64	A
#26f letter	NSC possible classified info <i>open 4-9-01</i> BK Nehru to the President transmitting Shastri to the President 3 p	<i>Exempt per NSC 8-8-80 NLJ 88-166</i> 5/28/65	A
#33d letter	NSC "CONFIDENTIAL" possible classified info <i>open 4-9-01</i> JB Bonny to the President transmitting memcon of Bonny and Ayub 3 p	<i>Exempt per NSC 8-8-80 NLJ 88-166</i> 8/5/65	A
#35q letter	NSC <i>open 11/28/00 NLJ 00-172</i> possible classified info <i>open 4-9-01</i> Shastri to the President <i>Exempt NLJ 88-166</i> 3 p (dup. of #48a, NSF, Spec. Hqs. Conesp. India, 4/15/65-2/28/66, Box 22)	<i>Exempt per NSC 8-8-80</i> 9/7/65	A
#39e-1 letter	NSC possible classified info President Johnson to Ayub 2 p	4/13/66	A
#25g cable	NSC secret (gp 2) to Karachi 1145 3 p	4/14/65	A
#41i cable	NSC conf (gp 3) <i>open 4-9-01</i> fm Karachi 277 <i>Exempt NLJ 88-166</i> 6 p	<i>Exempt per NSC 8-8-80</i> 9/3/65	A

FILE LOCATION

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#41y cable	NSC 407 to Karachi Exempt NLS 89-02 conf Exempt 8-8-80 7:52 open 4-9-01 5 p	9/15/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per</i> <i>NSC 9-9-80 letter</i>		
#1 report	NSC table of contents <i>top secret open 10-8-80 ip</i>	1 p 1962-66	A
#3 report	NSC Introduction <i>top secret open 10-8-80 ip</i>	2 p undated	A
#4 report	NSC <i>note info released</i> <i>sanitized NS/AN 01-112 5115102</i> <i>Declassified to</i> <i>Exempt</i> guide to documents <i>Edw. #1d NSF, Files of Saunders, "South Asia, 4/1/66-1/20/69" Box 36</i> <i>CPW. #5, NSF, Files of Saunders, "South Asia 1962-1964, vol. 1, Preface... " Box 40</i>	8 p undated	A
#8g letter	NSC <i>open 4-6-01</i> To Pres. Kennedy from Ayub Khan <i>Exempt NS 589-11</i>	9 p 11/5/62	A
#1 report	NSC NSC Control No. 136 top secret	1 p 05/09/63	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16d memo	OSD Secret <i>open 10-17-79 inf</i> to president from Gilpatrick 1 p	12/23/63	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#28h Memo	AID conf <i>Exempt NLS 89-10</i> to president from David Bell <i>open 4-9-01</i> 3 p (duplicates #25 in NSC History, Indian Famine, Vol. 1)	06/09/65	A
#33a-1 letter	AID secret To Don from Bell <i>open 4-9-01</i> 2 p <i>Exempt NLS 89-10</i>	06x 07/24/65	A

FILE LOCATION

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PRESIDENTIAL POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA

1962 - 1966

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Authority NSC 9-8-80 Letter

By inf, NARS, Date 10-8-80

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PREFACE

The documents which follow have been assembled from the working files of the staff of McGeorge Bundy. Additional material will be available in the Bundy files. However, this collection is complete enough for the purpose of these volumes.

Unlike the other documentary histories assembled by the Rostow staff in the closing months of President Johnson's Administration, the purpose of these volumes is to provide a broad survey of four years of US relations with the Indian subcontinent. Whereas the crisis histories provide a comprehensive record of a relatively brief period of decision, the purpose of these volumes is to plot the important milestones in a gradual shift of relationships.

The rationale behind this different approach is simple. We started to do a crisis history of the three weeks' war between India and Pakistan. Our first stab at the material persuaded us that this in itself did not involve Presidential decisions of the first magnitude. It was clear that the significant decisions which reshaped our posture toward this important part of the world were made on other issues over a much longer period. Therefore, Walt Rostow and I decided that we should take this study outside the project of intensive crisis histories and put together this more general survey.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSC 8-8-80 letter
By isg, NARS, Date 9-3-80

Harold H. Saunders
Harold H. Saunders
Member, Senior Staff
National Security Council

January 8, 1969

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Authority NSC 9-8-80 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 10-8-80

INTRODUCTION

Summary of Major Presidential Decisions during the Change in South Asian Alignments

During President Johnson's Administration the major political development in South Asia was the breakdown in a contradictory system of alignments built up during the 1950's. In possibly oversimplified terms, in the late 1950's, the United States was closely allied with Pakistan, had acceptable relations with neutralist India, and opposed Communist influence on the sub-continent. Both Moscow and Peking had fairly good relations with New Delhi, but neither was close to Karachi. Although Indo-Pakistani relations were poor, there was no immediate prospect of a conflict.

In the early 1960's, the surfacing of Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet differences and a revival of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry resulted in a new system. By 1966, Pakistan and China had moved much closer together in mutual opposition to India. Although the USSR maintained its ties with India, it had begun efforts to improve relations with Pakistan. The American alliance with Pakistan no longer had any substance, and Washington, like Moscow, was moving towards more balanced relations with the two South Asian nations.

During this change, the United States with its strong position in Pakistan stood to lose the most of the outside powers. The United States was never in a position to determine the course of events, however, so many of the President's decisions could do no more than minimize the damage to American interests.

The major Presidential decisions during this period were:

1. President Kennedy's decision to go to India's aid against China in 1962. The decision was probably made shortly prior to his October 28 letter to Nehru but his policy had tended in this direction since the spring and further decisions implementing the basic decision would be made by him and President Johnson in the next three years. In deciding to give military aid to India, the President began the move away from the previous close alliance with Pakistan, and the move towards greater cooperation with India against China.

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2. A series of decisions by President Johnson in the spring and summer of 1965 designed to bring India and especially Pakistan into line with American policies. The most important were the cancellation of the Ayub and Shastri visits in April, the decision to withhold aid which led to the postponement of the Pakistan consortium, and the stalling on military aid.

It has been theorized that these decisions were an important factor in driving Ayub to war over Kashmir, that they would have been successful had Ayub realized his own best interests, or that nothing the President could have done would have changed the course of events in South Asia. The answer is to be found in New Delhi and Islamabad.

3. The President's meeting with Ayub in December 1965. The meeting--and decisions immediately preceding it--ended the US-Pakistan alliance, allowed a new understanding in both Washington and Rawalpindi and the development of a new relationship consistent with the new situation in South Asia.

4. President Johnson made a series of decisions on economic aid. This collection of documents deals with these decisions only in the context of political pressures for political ends. The President, however, also had economic and domestic political reasons for his decisions, and they led to important changes in the thrust of our aid program and our approach to the world food-population problem. This aspect of his South Asian policy is covered more fully in the background documents for another study--The President and the Indian Famine.

These documents were collected from the files of the National Security Council to show some of the thinking behind President Johnson's decisions. Because he inherited a fully developed problem and a basic policy from President Kennedy the collection begins with Kennedy's reaction to the events of 1962. The shifting of alignments had not completely worked itself out by the end of 1968, but the main elements of the new pattern were evident by the spring of 1966.

The following are short summaries of the documents contained in each tab. These summaries are intended to indicate the episode covered by each tab, to show the relationship among the documents, and, in some cases, to highlight significant points. In general, no attempt was made to treat individual documents separately.

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NARRATIVE AND GUIDE TO THE DOCUMENTS

1962

A. The Kennedy Administration

1. These three memos indicate the views of the President and his staff on South Asia at the beginning of 1962. Pushtoonistan was of major concern, there was an inclination to side with Pakistan on Kashmir, and the problem of balancing relations with India and Pakistan was mentioned in connection with possible arms sales to India "if the Sino-Indian dispute gets worse," but it was not given major emphasis.

2. Indian defeats in the Himalayas in the fall of 1962 would bring a dramatic US involvement in military supply to India, but in May Indian plans to acquire MIG jet fighters from the USSR led to consideration of American aircraft sales to India. The primary aim was not to strengthen India against China, but to limit Soviet influence. On June 15, the President decided to support British jet fighter sales, but India decided to take the Soviet offer. The effect of American arms sales to India on our relations with Pakistan was considered throughout this episode, but it was hoped that Ayub could be mollified by pointing out that India would receive planes in any case.

3. The initial reaction in Washington to the Indian defeats in the Himalayas was mixed, with the three main elements being recognition of the possibility that the US would have to help India, hope that India would be forced out of its neutralist position, and some concern over the probable Pakistani reaction to US military support for India.

On October 28, President Kennedy sent letters to both Ayub and Nehru. To Nehru he offered "support as well as sympathy." To Ayub he wrote that we would "insure, of course, that whatever help we give will be used only against the Chinese." On November 5, Ayub replied pointing out that most of the Indian army remained deployed against Pakistan, citing a long list of broken Indian promises as evidence that US arms would be used against Pakistan, and informing the President that the Pakistanis believed Chinese military objectives were limited.

Despite Ayub's letter, there was considerable optimism that the US could achieve a basic reorientation in Indian foreign policy without undue damage to US-Pakistani relations. Nehru's letter of November 19, appeared to indicate that India was ready to abandon neutralism. Among

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 01-112

By abm, NARA, Date 3-19-02

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other things Nehru asked for 12 all-weather fighter squadrons to be manned by Americans for operations over India and two B-47 squadrons to be manned by Indians. On November 27, with the Indian military situation still critical despite a cease-fire, the President decided the US should send transport aircraft and a mission to New Delhi to explore Indian needs. The Chinese withdrawal beginning December 1 removed some of the urgency from the arms aid for India, but the President decided to go ahead with the policy and at Nassau arranged a joint US-UK effort.

1963

4. On May 9, the President approved going forward on Indian air defense arrangements. This was a confirmation of decisions made in November and December of 1962. In late April, the President had made it clear that we couldn't afford to let the Indians "get into a position where they feel that they can't cope with the Chicoms and Paks on top of their other problems."

5. In August, the President decided to send Under Secretary Ball to Pakistan to attempt to reach an understanding with Ayub. From his remarks at the August 12 meeting, President Kennedy apparently didn't expect Ball to achieve all his goals. After his trip Ball reported some success but it was obvious that Indo-Pakistani problems would continue to plague Washington's relations with Karachi. The tone of the analyses of Bundy's staff seems slightly more optimistic than Ball's remarks to the President.

6. In October, the President saw Ayub's two most prominent foreign policy advisors, pro-American Finance Minister Shoaib and anti-American Foreign Minister Bhutto. Although the Bundy staff recommended a somewhat tougher line, President Kennedy put the emphasis on reassuring the Pakistanis of our support.

7. On November 11, Nehru wrote to Kennedy outlining India's view of the situation in South Asia. The letter is interesting mainly as an indication of the degree to which India had returned to many of its former views in the year since Nehru's plea for American manned fighter squadrons.

1963

B. The Johnson Administration

1. In September 1965, Robert Komer prepared a list of President Johnson's major decisions on South Asia. His compilation is substantially accurate, but the "9 December 1963" letter to Ayub was sent a few days later, and the "30 January 1963" letter does not appear to have been sent. (See Tab B-4).

2. On November 29, President Johnson saw Bhutto and pointed out the dangers to mutual relations if Pakistan continued to make gestures toward the Chinese. On December 9, he wrote to Ayub along the same lines. Among other things, the President may have been trying to disabuse the Pakistanis of the notion that he was pro-Pakistani and would reverse Kennedy's "pro-Indian" policies.

3. General Taylor's mission to India and Pakistan had been planned during the Kennedy Administration. On his return, Taylor recommended a five-year military assistance for India and begin with an interim one-year program. He recommended a similar program for Pakistan. In commenting on Taylor's report, Komer recommended that the President establish a principle of parallelism in our relations with India and Pakistan. On February 8, 1964, the President approved exploratory approaches on MAP with both countries.

1964

4. On January 21, Ayub sent the President a long letter explaining why Pakistan was taking Kashmir to the Security Council again. Komer recommended against any reply, and especially the long reply State had prepared. The President agreed that State's version was unsuitable, and asked for a short, more personal letter. Because the Security Council was already meeting on Kashmir, State felt any reply should be delayed for a few days. There is no indication in NSC files that further action was taken.

5. This collection of documents from February, March and April show the effort to reevaluate US policy towards South Asia. The problem was how to improve relations with India without losing ground in Pakistan, with the subsidiary problem of limiting Chinese gains in Karachi. The thinking tended towards pressure on Ayub, especially to prevent his raising Indo-Pakistani tensions. There was, however, some realization that an Indo-Pakistani crisis was approaching.

6. Nehru's daughter, the future Prime Minister Gandhi, saw the President on April 27. He took the occasion to assure her of US support for India, and to refute her statement to the press that we favored Pakistan.

7. In May and early June, the White House staff detected an improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations, and still felt that US-Pakistani relations were not deteriorating. It was in this atmosphere that Indian Defense Minister Chavan arrived to negotiate our military assistance program. Although the Indians did not get all they wanted, they felt the visit was successful. On June 3, Komer planned to tell the President, "Nor will the Paks be too unhappy because we haven't given much yet."

8. By late June adverse reaction to the arms negotiations with India was increasing in Pakistan. On July 7, Pakistani Ambassador Ahmed called on the President to deliver a letter from Ayub. Ayub told the President that there was little possibility of a Sino-Indian conflict and that US arms aid would be used against Pakistan, and that help for India made it more difficult to achieve a Kashmir settlement. The President told the Ambassador that he was shocked by Ayub's silence on Vietnam, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The effect of Nehru's death on May 24 on Indo-Pakistani relations and consequently on US-Pakistani relations is outside the scope of this study, but it is possible that it was an important factor in Ayub's decision to protest arms shipments so strongly.

9. On July 15, the President saw Ambassador McConaughy. McConaughy recommended that the President invite Ayub to Washington to talk out US differences with Pakistan. The President rejected this suggestion, and told McConaughy to deliver an oral message to Ayub indicating the President's distress at Ayub's views on US aid to India and at Pakistan's attention to Peking. [REDACTED]

Previously the main aid question had been import liberalization. On July 29, more specific instructions were sent to McConaughy.

10. Shoaib ended a visit to Washington by talking with McGeorge Bundy on September 25. Bundy explained our position to the pro-American Shoaib, and Shoaib explained Pakistan's difficulties in accepting our actions. Komer's briefing memorandum for Bundy probably reflects accurately some of the frustration felt by those in Washington who dealt with Pakistan.

1965

11. In March studies began on an Indian request for six squadrons of F-5's. There were a number of difficulties in deciding on an answer--including the fighting in the Rann of Kutch--and later a decision to stall on MAP to both India and Pakistan. (See Komer to the President, June 21, Tab B-15.) The F-5 question was unresolved when all arms shipments ended in September.

12. Invitations for Ayub and Shastri had been under consideration for some time. (See Tabs B-7 and B-9) Komer's two memos of April 2, outline some of the difficulties expected in entertaining Ayub but indicate clearly that the visit was still expected. By April 5, the President was thinking of cancelling both visits, and he made the final decision on April 7.

Among the reasons for cancelling Ayub's invitation was the feeling that his defense of Pakistan's relations with China and his attitude on Vietnam would have an adverse effect on the AID bill. There was also the question of whether the visit would improve or worsen relations with Pakistan. Because the President would not meet Ayub it was necessary to cancel Shastri's visit as well. The 15 April cable to Bowles, however, indicates that the President felt neither he nor Shastri would be in a position to "talk turkey" and that Shastri's visit would focus unwelcome attention on South Asian bickering and the apparent lack of economic progress despite large amounts of US aid.

In assessing the cancellations on April 21, Komer thought that they might have been handled better because "we ended up hitting Shastri harder" than Ayub, but that the operation was a success on the whole, and "Ayub got the signal."

13. The British moved quickly to solve the Rann of Kutch crisis and their efforts were successful so there was never any need for great US involvement. There was also some reluctance to upset an apparently successful British effort by our own involvement, but the President did send Prime Minister Wilson a message that "he would be happy if Prime Minister chose to say President as eager as Prime Minister in devoutly hoping for early agreement."

Both Shastri and Ayub wrote to the President to present their side of the argument, and complain about US arms supplied to the other. The President's answer to Shastri is in Tab B-20.

14. On June 9, the President directed that no additional decisions be made on aid to India and Pakistan without his prior approval pending passage of the aid bill and asked for an early review of our aid relationship with the sub-continent. Basic to this decision was the President's feeling that the US was not getting enough for the money it spent. In late April, shortly after the cancellation of the Ayub and Shastri visits, he had directed that our pledge to the Indian consortium be made without obligation to specific levels and timing, and had limited aid authorizations to four minor loans.

Through May and June pressure mounted from the sub-continent and within the US government for action, but as Komer's May 30 memo shows there was also a feeling that we should move to using aid to gain political ends. Judging by Komer's memorandum for the June 9 meeting, the main purpose was not to decide on future aid levels, but to inform those responsible for our aid program of the President's misgivings, and of the need for greater political results.


15. Along with the aid decision, the President began a much broader effort to influence Indian and Pakistani policies. Among the tools the US government used were: economic aid (Tab B-16), military aid (Tab B-17), [REDACTED] and a number of official and unofficial communications to both countries (Tabs B-19 and B-20).

16. The most important result of the June aid decision was the postponement of the Pakistan Consortium. The postponement was designed to show Ayub that American aid was far from automatic, and to be a forceful reminder that his relations with China and other US-Pakistani difficulties could endanger his nation's economy. Ayub took the news very hard, and instead of reacting as Washington hoped, made the postponement a major public issue. Subsequent efforts are covered in Tab 19.

Indian aid presented fewer problems, in part because much aid for India was already committed. The President did use his talk with Ambassador Nehru to point out that India's attitude on Vietnam made it more difficult for him to get aid bills through Congress.

17. The decision to stall on MAP is covered in part by documents in Tab B-15. These two documents merely indicate some of the problems involved in sticking to that decision.

18.



19. The major effort at communication was directed at Pakistan following the consortium postponement. Because of Ayub's reaction to the consortium the first efforts were at unofficial communication. The President wanted Ayub to be told that Pakistan couldn't run our India policy, and that we didn't want to dominate Pakistan, and he wanted a visit from Ayub soon. An oral message from Ayub through a non-government channel gave the President an opportunity to reply that Ayub had an open invitation to Washington, but that President Johnson wouldn't be bullied. Later in August another message offering an invitation was sent through the UN ambassadors.

20. Relations with India followed a much smoother course during the summer of 1965. Probably the most important message was the President's request in July for Indian help in Vietnam, which followed his explanation of US policy to Shastri in June. By August 20, the President had decided to invite Shastri to Washington.

21. These documents and those under Tabs B-22, B-23, and B-24 supplement the appendix--the State Department's "The Indo-Pakistan War and its Aftermath." Documents attached to the Department's study have not been included in these tabs, but several covering memos for these documents have.

Although done without the benefit of NSC files, State's study of US policy during the war is substantially correct. The major addition these documents make to State's study is to point out the emphasis placed by the President and his staff on taking an even-handed and balanced approach. The primary worry does not appear to have been ending the war, but preserving the US position in both India and Pakistan, although we did participate energetically in efforts to achieve a cease-fire.

These documents also add a letter from Shastri explaining India's invasion of Pakistan which Ambassador Nehru delivered directly to the President.

22. These documents provide considerable amplification to State's account of US policy in the immediate post-war period. For the Bundy staff the major issue remained keeping a good US position in both India and Pakistan, and this led to considerable sentiment that the US should stay out of the middle on a peace settlement. This did not preclude strong efforts to encourage India and Pakistan to settle their differences.

23. State's account of the Ayub visit may leave the impression that the major purpose was to urge a peaceful settlement. As can be seen from the documents leading up to the visit, peace was important but US-Pakistani relations were of more importance. Komer's December 12 memorandum to the President is the most thorough treatment of this theme.

24. Following the Tashkent agreement on January 10 and Shastri's death the next day the Indo-Pakistani problem underwent a new examination. The State study covers the resulting actions, the most important of which were decisions on military sales and economic aid. These documents give some of the thinking behind those decisions and indicate that the main consideration was still the enhancement of the US position in both India and Pakistan.

25. Prime Minister Gandhi's visit was concerned primarily with economic matters and is covered more fully in The President and the Indian Famine, a study in the series of crisis histories done by the Rostow staff and available in the Johnson Library. The main political importance of the visit may have been its economic emphasis. As the President told Komer on March 27, the visit was "with the slate wiped clean of previous commitments and India coming to us asking for a new relationship." The letter to Ayub reporting on the visit also shows that the United States had ended the old commitments to Pakistan and begun building a new relationship with the slate wiped clean.

26. An analysis of the parallelism in US and Soviet policies towards South Asia.

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file
Pakistan

+ Sale

January 11, 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: State Briefing Paper on South Asia Issues

State rightly points out that a strong and stable subcontinent is essential to our long range interests and that chief threat to this goal rises from painful intra-regional disputes. However, State memo doesn't come up with much that is calculated to get real movement on them. Thus basic question is whether we shouldn't set our sights higher in each case.

- (a) Pushtoonistan. State advises against US mediation and prefers working on the immediate cause of friction--the transit issue. But transit is merely a facet of larger dispute, which (far from obsolescing) may grow worse if Soviets step up backing for Afghans. Query--should we make a real attempt to settle this one before it is too late?

Afghans would like to stay out of Bear's clutches if possible, but dubious whether they can do so, even with our support. Odds are stacked against us in this particular corner of world. Query--why not gamble in a game we probably can't win anyway? We could scare Afghans by discreetly conveying to them that unless they reverse their policy, we have no recourse but to leave them alone with the Bear. Indeed, Afghans already showing signs of nervousness over likelihood they'll lose out on US aid.

- (b) Pak/Afghan Transit Issue. State wants to open a temporary AID pipeline through Iran. I question this on grounds of feasibility as well as policy. Having to use inadequate Iran route only stacks the odds even further against us. And developing a permanent route through Iran might cost tens of millions, far better spent on buttressing

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 87-213

By ip NARA, Date 6-29-89

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Iran and Pakistan. Query--should we throw good money after bad in attempting to salvage a country already far gone?

- (c) Kashmir dispute. State favors "active efforts" to get the two parties together, but goes no further. But aren't positions of dispute so frozen that we'll have to come up with a compromise and push both sides toward it? Galbraith has suggested the outlines of a possible solution, though unresolved issue is how many "minor" adjustments in present cease-fire line Indians might concede.
- (d) Ayub proposals on policy toward India. State says we should not accede to offensive Pak suggestions on how US should run its policies. Query--should we go further and use opportunity to impress upon Ayub that (while we will protect him against India), we cannot back his ambitions vis-a-vis India, e.g. Kashmir? If we must choose between Pakistan and India, latter is far more important. Obviously, we want both. But is this feasible until we dispel Ayub's illusions that we will back him against India? Until we do so, he will keep kicking when we inevitably have to build up Indians vis-a-vis Chicom.
- (e) One example is Military Sales. If Sino-Indian dispute gets worse, we'll face major military sales to India, probably at a discount. Ayub will raise hob unless Kashmir already settled or unless he already knows that we are determined on this course.
- (f) Economic Support of Pakistan. We must decide immediately how much to commit to Pak Consortium. Query--should we consider tying commitment of a cool \$500 million to some warnings to Ayub about taking our support for granted?

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

January 11, 1962

McGB

Subject: Briefing Paper on U.S. Relations with South Asia

State's bland proposals add up to even less of a policy than just being nasty to both sides. Though State rightly points out a strong and stable subcontinent is essential to our long range interests and that chief threat to this goal rises from painful intra-regional disputes, it comes up with very little that is calculated to settle them. This, even though it admits that only U.S. influence would be likely to get any movement on them.

I'm afraid that in every case what will be required, but what State memo notably lacks, is a certain amount of skillful U.S. pushing of one side or the other. This raises the question of whom we must push. I have tried to summarize my ideas below.

(a) Pushtoonistan. State asks whether U.S. should mediate but advises against and prefers working on the immediate cause of friction--the transit issue. To me, the transit issue is merely a facet of a larger dispute which has been going on for years, has periodically flared up in such cases, and (far from obsolescing), may grow worse if Soviets step up backing for Afghans. Ergo, I think we ought to make a real attempt to settle this one before it is too late.

Most observers agree that Afghans would like to stay out of Bear's clutches if possible. However, it is dubious whether they can do so, even with our support. The geographic odds are simply stacked against us in this particular corner of the world. Therefore, why not gamble in a game we probably can't win anyway?

Neither Afghans nor Paks are yet ready to retreat on Pushtu on transit issues so long as they each think they might get U.S. to lean on the other. Since holding Afghanistan may be a losing proposition anyway, why not scare Afghans by discreetly but unmistakably conveying to them that we have already written them off and that unless they reverse their policy, we have no recourse but to leave them alone with the Bear? Indeed, Afghans already showing signs of nervousness over likelihood they'll lose out on US aid.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 87-213

By ip NARA, Date 6-29-89

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2.

(b) Pak/Afghan Transit Issue. State proposes to prolong the agony by keeping a temporary AID pipeline open through Iran. I question this on grounds of feasibility as well as policy.

As seen above, I think we ought to take a chance on scaring Afghans, rather than reassuring them. Moreover, having to use inadequate Iran route only stacks the odds even further against us. As for developing a permanent alternative route through Iran, it might cost tens of millions which could be far better spent on buttressing Iran and Pakistan. Let's not throw good money after bad in attempting to salvage a country already far gone. Instead, let's risk the shock treatment.

(c) Kashmir dispute. State thinks we should continue "active efforts" to get the two parties together, but goes no further. I am afraid that here's another situation where positions of dispute² are so frozen that we'll have to come up with a compromise and push both sides toward it.

Galbraith has suggested the outlines of a possible solution, though the unresolved issue is how many "minor" adjustments in present cease-fire line Indians might concede. I agree that we should not turn our aid on and off as leverage, but do feel that we should use the vast sums we are giving both parties as entitling us to tell both bluntly how their quarrel really is at their own expense. Both may get mad at us but this is nothing new.

(d) Pak proposals on our policy toward India. While agreeing with State that we should not accede to offensive Pak suggestions on how U.S. should run its policies, I think we should go further and use opportunity to impress upon Ayub that (while we will protect him against India), we can not back his ambitions vis-a-vis India, e.g. Kashmir. We are running into so many differences with Ayub that I question whether we should wait much longer before explaining to him the limitations as well as the advantages of our support.

As State memo points out, if we must choose between Pakistan and India, the latter is far more important. Obviously, we want to bring both into camp but this is hard to do until we dispel Ayub's illusions that we will back him against India. And until we do so, he

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3.

will keep kicking every time we do the various things we inevitably will have to do to build up Indians vis-a-vis Chicombs.

One example is military sales. Sooner or later, if Sino-Indian border dispute gets worse, we'll have to face up to major military sales in India, probably at a discount. Ayub will raise hob about this unless Kashmir already settled and unless he already knows that we are determined on this course.

(c) Support of Pakistan Economic Plan. We must decide immediately how much to commit to Pak Consortium. But let's at least consider desirability of tying commitment of a cool \$500 million to some warnings to Ayub about taking our support for granted. I'm well aware of facilities problem, but my own hunch is that Ayub is far from turning to neutralism if we slap his wrist. Indeed, I suspect he will respect straight talk from us.

RWK

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Authority State 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81
By if, NARS, Date 10-9-81

January 12, 1962

McGB

South Asia Issues Decided at Meeting
with President 11 January 1962

1. Kashmir Dispute. Upon the Acting Secretary's proposal, the President agreed that we should propose to both sides a high-level mediator. It was agreed both sides looked to us on this issue. An effort will be made to get Eugene Black right away, with second choice David Lillenthal. To justify Black's use, we could say that Kashmir dispute jeopardizes IBRD stake in Indus Waters settlement.

2. With respect to Pakistani Resolution in SC, the President felt that in view of his commitment to Ayub, we would have to vote for relatively innocuous Pakistani resolution in SC, and had better tell Nehru if necessary. However, we should attempt to persuade Paks against SC, arguing that it would undermine our other commitment to Ayub to get Indians to negotiate. State is to get a letter off pronto to Ayub urging him to call off SC action.

3. Upon State's recommendation, President approved going ahead and starting to release aid to India into the pipeline, after waiting a week. A small DLF loan for \$5-6 million which had been pending for a long time would be a good thing to start with.

4. Military Sales to India. We should hold up action until after the Indian election to avoid helping Krishna Menon. In any case, even then we should hold off on big items like C-130s. The President wanted it emphasized to both India and Pakistan that their "arms race" was ruining our economic aid program by diverting their assets from economic development.

5. Commitment to Pakistan Consortium. The President was concerned about so much aid going to India and Pakistan, in contrast to Latin America, for example. He directed a restudy to determine whether we could tighten up and increase interest rates on long term development loans. The purpose would be to make it easier to sell larger aid programs on the Hill, recognizing that we wouldn't actually get the money back anyway in many cases. However, we shouldn't worry about problems which wouldn't be upon us until ten years from now. The President did agree to go ahead on the \$500 million commitment to Pak consortium, contingent upon remainder of \$945 million being found elsewhere.

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6. Pakistan and Transit Trade. The President was very reluctant to agree to the extra outlays (\$150 a ton as opposed to \$50) required to ship aid goods to Afghan over temporary Iranian route. He could not see why we should pay extra to ship what was after all aid to the Afghans. He agreed to the eight week moratorium proposal permitting US aid goods already in Pakistan to go forward by the direct route but reserved judgment on the Iran route. When Assistant Secretary Talbot pointed out that Afghans would not accept moratorium proposal unless we agreed also to go ahead with subsequent shipments via Iran route, the President's inclination was to let them stew, and tell them that Congress would not accept such a huge increase in transport costs. However, he reluctantly accepted Talbot's plea that we take a gamble for a few months, using a quarter of the estimated \$2 million it would take to ship the remainder of our aid over the Iranian route during 1962.

RWK

cc: *Fayson*
Konzen
Dunyon

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7

A-2

~~SECRET~~

May 9, 1962

*File
India
7a*

McGB:

I hope we won't panic at MIG-21s for India. One can see Galbraith leading up to plea for F-104s on highly favorable terms.

In time I can see strong case for subsidized arms "sales" to Delhi, but question wisdom at this time:

- (1) It would raise hob with Paks who will see in it final confirmation of their suspicions we are shifting to a pro-Indian stance--true, we are but now is not the time to push Paks to wall;
- (2) At present Paks have air superiority so Indians are just catching up--we can resist Pak pleas for more 104s on these grounds;
- (3) MIGs for India will encourage Delhi to take strong line against Chinese, even more than 104s would;
- (4) I don't think we're in danger of setting a precedent whereby Indians will turn to Sovs for all arms supplies--Indians are too smart for this;
- (5) Indeed, I doubt that this transaction will lead to any shift in India's increasingly pro-Western orientation; on the contrary, it will make Indians more anxious to show us that it has not.
- (6) While it is true that Pak-Indian arms race siphons off benefits from US economic aid, this will be fact of life until Pak-Indian differences resolved.

In sum, while protesting vigorously for effect, I don't think we should break our backs to forestall MIG purchase.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81
By inf, NARS, Date 10-9-81

RWK

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file
India
(cur)

McGB:

May 22, 1962

7/8

We have achieved a delay en route on Indian MIG deal, but will have to do more if we want to block it. Assuming that we can't "sell" 104s to India at this point, I see following possibilities (am trying them out on State):

1. Some kind of tie-in deal by which we would help French or more likely UK on some kind of NATO project if they would sell Mirage III or Lightning at a discount. Bill Bundy tells me this theoretically possible with UK in particular, but hard to see practically what we could do. He also underlined high risk of leak and resultant furor in US. Such a deal would have to be explored at very highest level with UK; I'll ask DOD to look at possibility if any interest here.
2. Tell Indians that if they'll buy from UK or France, we'll indirectly compensate them via increased economic aid. This wouldn't be easy, since even revised Symington amendment bars it.
3. Play for time, telling Indians that this is worst possible juncture at which to spring MIG deal; it will jeopardize Congressional approval of planned Indian aid level and make Symington amendment a sure thing; thus Indians will lose far more in hard currency than they would have to spend to buy UK or French planes. Talbot favors this line, laying it on thick and asking them to count the cost to Indian development.
4. Simultaneously play down threat to India from PAK 104s (it is really these, not Chicom MIGs, which worry Delhi). We could even reassure Indians that we'll give no more 104s to Paks if Indians will turn down MIGs (we haven't promised Paks any more). However, I gather intelligence people will be in shortly arguing for big new MAP package as trade goods. This will have to be sorted out!

All above are full of risks and disadvantages. I'd settle for Indian MIG purchase myself. But above may provide some leverage to pro-Westerners in Indian Cabinet against Menon. Sooner or later, of course, we are going to have to become arms purveyors to India or it will inevitably turn more to Moscow.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

RWK

cc: Ralph Dungan

~~SECRET~~

MR. GRANT

Jim, this has been approved by the President. Regard it as cleared and send it on by cable, unless you feel some changes essential. I think it a fine way to help buy time till Galbraith returns.

R. W. KOMER

12 June 1962

Letter JFK to Nehru dtd 6/12/62 on MIGs

Copy to Smith & Bundy

*File
India
Air*

7c

7c-1

June 13, 1962

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I know that you are considering the important question of placing an order for supersonic aircraft. In recent days I have been reviewing with care those aspects of this matter which relate to our own problems and purposes; I have talked at length with Ambassador Galbraith and I am asking him to bring you a full statement of our thoughts when he returns to New Delhi next Monday. Meanwhile I send this interim message simply to indicate that we do have a real and serious interest in helping to work out an answer to this question which will serve our common interests.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-8-80 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 9-3-80

DECLASSIFIED

Authority IRUS XIX, '61-'63, p.269

By ju, NARA, Date 12-18-96

72 7 ill India

~~SECRET~~

June 15, 1962

DECISIONS TAKEN AT PRESIDENT'S MEETING ON COUNTERING MIG
SALE TO INDIA, 14 JUNE 1962

PRESENT: The President Mr. Robert McNamara
 Mr. George Ball Mr. McG. Bundy
 Mr. U. Alexis Johnson Mr. William P. Bundy
 Ambassador Galbraith Mr. R. W. Komer
 Ambassador McCaughy
 Mr. James P. Grant

The President was opposed to subsidizing the sale of two LIGHTNING Mark II squadrons to India for rupees, at a likely cost of around \$60 million.

Instead he approved telling Prime Minister Macmillan that we would be willing to share 50/50 the hard currency cost of one LIGHTNING squadron. We would also finance 75 per cent of the further development cost of the ORPHEUS engine, if the Indians accepted the UK offer. To complete the package, he approved a simultaneous US offer to sell India nine C-130 transports for rupees. All of the above are contingent upon the Indians not buying the MIG-21.

The President directed that Ambassador Galbraith make a strong presentation to Nehru on the likely blow to US aid prospects if the Indians bought MIGs. He agreed to send a personal letter to Nehru for Galbraith to present after his first talk with Nehru.

The President desired that we tell Ayub frankly why we were trying to forestall an Indian purchase of MIGs. He expressed willingness to write Ayub a personal letter to try to disarm him. He reserved judgment on the suggestion that we attempt to placate Ayub by offering him the public security reassurances he has been seeking.

Copied to
Bundy
Komer

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, XIX '61-63, p. 278

By JW, NARA, Date 12-18-96

72

~~SECRET~~

June 20, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Meeting with the President on India-Pakistan Problems

Present: The President	Ambassador McConaughy
Mr. G. McGhee	Mr. McG. Bundy
Mr. J. Grant	Mr. R. Komer

1. The President approved a reply to Prime Minister MacMillan's messages of 18 and 19 June on a counter-offer to forestall Indian purchase of MIG-21s. He accepted Mr. McGhee's arguments as to why we couldn't sell F-104s to India for rupees, even though it was technically feasible to do so. These were chiefly the likely strong Pakistani reaction, which might even lead to restrictions on our key intelligence facilities, and secondarily the likely Congressional reaction. The President agreed to tell MacMillan that we would pay more than half the hard currency costs of a Lightning squadron if necessary, especially if we could find some way to minimize the dollar drain involved.

2. Ambassador McConaughy explained how he would propose to explain our maneuvers to Ayub, depending upon the possible outcome in Delhi. The President instructed Ambassador McConaughy to tell Ayub in the event our counter-offer seemed likely to be accepted that we were serving Pakistani interests as well as ours, and that a Western-controlled supply of jets to India was infinitely preferable to uncontrolled reliance on Soviet sources. On the other hand, if the MIG deal went through we should tell them that it didn't change the military balance much (as a hedge against new Pakistani requests for jets), and explain that counter offers to India had been in an attempt to spoil this deal. The President was dubious about giving more jets to the Pakistani regardless of what happened.

3. The desirability of meeting the Pakistani request for bilateral joint planning vis-a-vis India and Afghanistan was discussed. Although Ambassador McConaughy pointed out how the Pakistani argued that this was purely contingency planning of the sort, any two allied general staffs would normally carry out, the President was opposed to our engaging in any joint planning which might leak to the Indians and suggest that we were planning with the Paks against them.

4. Mr. McGhee noted the Pakistani desire for a public US guarantee of Pakistan's security against Indian aggression. He felt that reiteration of the Pak guarantee in some form might be essential to mollify Ayub if

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-2-

we and the UK supplied planes to India. The President said he was extremely reluctant to give any new commitments to the Pakistani; he queried why we got into such commitments in the first place. Mr. McGhee briefly explained the history of our past "guarantees" to Pakistan and India.

Mr. McGhee suggested that if we could get the two countries, perhaps in the UN discussion on Kashmir, to make public statements disavowing any intention of attacking each other, the US could then come out with a public statement noting these declarations and "guaranteeing" the security of each in event of aggression by the other. Mr. Grant noted that our main objective in supplying such security reassurances to Pakistan was to forestall their "doing something" to our Peshawar facilities in retaliation for what they regarded as pro-Indian US actions. The President reserved judgment on any such idea, and asked that it be studied further when the occasion arose.

The President said that perhaps he ought to have one more meeting with McConaughy before the latter returned to Pakistan; he also thought that he might write a letter to Ayub.

R. W. Komer

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File
Indian Air

July 26, 1962

7f

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McGB

Indian Mig Issues

1. Team to London, State, DOD, I all agree team should still go to London even though utility of LIGHTNING offer grows dimmer. However, joint US/UK R&D review this week reveals few satisfactory projects which could be used to repay Brits. Therefore, DOD urgently exploring other areas, e.g. installations, etc. But this will take until early next week. I see no point in team going until they know what they have to talk about, so agreed to delay.

2. Did UK ever make a soft currency LIGHTNING offer? Everyone else but I seems to think UK made clear to Indians that LIGHTNINGs being offered on concessional terms. However, I think Brits may well have avoided any talk about soft terms till they got us locked on. Thus Indians may never have been told of a genuine viable alternative (this supported by Calbraith comment that Menon talking about "costly" LIGHTNINGs). I am trying to get this clarified; we may yet have a card to play here.

3. One more try at Nehru. I'm much in favor of Calbraith proposal (Delhi's 279 of last night) that he try out argument that if Indians buy lots of MIGs, it will create great Pak pressures on us for more 104s and thus start new round in arms race. On other hand if Indians would forego (or limit) MIGs, US would undertake to keep Paks under control. Calbraith tried this argument on Desai (Delhi's 4230 of 29 June) but without much effect. Nonetheless, I agree it worth another try with Nehru himself. I recall JFK himself stressed this line of argument in talk with McCaughy.

4. Should we begin to disengage from opposition to MIG deal? Everyone agrees with Ken that Indians have almost certainly decided to go ahead with MIGs. At this point further frenetic efforts on our part will merely depreciate our currency further and create bad blood. We should now begin thinking of how best to damp down expected US domestic reaction and recover our footing in India. On other hand, final closing of deal still seems a few weeks to months ahead and there is an off chance that something might happen. Therefore, I hesitate to see us stack arms at this point even though we should mute our noise.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 87-213

By ip NARA, Date 6-29-89

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2.

For example, would it be worth taking line with Indians that we recognize they have decided to go ahead and we will have to live with this; but we would like to urge on them not to be too greedy. A squadron or two of MIGs would satisfy their psychological requirement vis-a-vis Paks (and Chinese). Is it really so important for them to go further, however, and manufacture MIGs, particularly since they seem interested in building HF-24 with Sov engine? If they build MIGs in India it will be 18 months at least before they get the first one and by this time MIG will not be such a hot new item. Moreover, they will heat up arms race to point where we will find it hard to resist Pak argument that Indians have undeniable air superiority. In other words, is there some purchase in trying to convince Indians that they can both have their gesture of buying MIGs and satisfying us by not building them too?

RWK

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A-3

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-213

By sig NARA Date 6-29-89

file
India-cpr
8a
October 24, 1962

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR PHILLIPS TALBOT

Though we still see through a glass darkly, we may have a golden opportunity for a major gain in our relations with India. The sheer magnitude of India's reversal on the Chicom border may at long last awaken Delhi to the weakness of its position. Therefore, while I recognize the delicate tactical problems involved in handling this one, we ought to be prepared to move fast.

New Delhi seems gripped (despite the brave words) by acute frustration, which may soon turn to despair. They don't know what to do next, and are clearly feeling out both us and the Russians for help.

We've had plenty of feelers (BK to Kaysen, Desai to Galbraith, Sarathy to Bill Bundy, etc.). In this situation it's a close argument as to whether quiet receptiveness but no positive overtures on our part might not let an opportunity slip by. Indian pride, plus Menon's arguments, may lead Indians not to give us the clear signal we want. So we ought urgently to canvas the possibilities (I gather Bill Bundy is working on this), and then perhaps at least tell Indians privately what's available.

Equally important is to do what we can to convince Delhi there's little hope in the Soviet track.

The Indians still seem to be relying largely on Soviets to help bail them out. Note Delhi's 1349 where Desai says that Soviets and Chinese have been "repairing differences" and "we cannot hasten a Sino-Soviet reconciliation." To our knowledge, he is inaccurate on both counts. Sino-Soviet relations have reached a nadir; we should document this to Indians and tell them we think Moscow has little if any leverage left with Peking. It has already used up all its cards and would use more if possible. Indeed Peking must have already discounted the possibility of Soviet pressure on India's behalf. So this is a thin reed in our view.

If we fear Indians would regard it as self-seeking if we were to advance this line of argument, why not get the British or other third parties to do so? Until the Indians are convinced that Moscow offers little hope (convincing them would also be a blow at Menon), the way for better US/Indian relationship will not be fully open.

The other direction from which India badly needs reassurance is Pakistan. It seems so desirable to press Ayub along these lines that I'd like to see us do more. In fact, I think we could argue honestly that

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-2-

Ayub will get better results on Kashmir, etc. in the long run by a forthcoming attitude now. While reviving the "joint defense" idea might be premature as yet, wouldn't it have an electric effect if Ayub broke off China border talks, saying he wouldn't negotiate while Chicomms were invading India.

Even if Ayub turns us down, I see little risk in pressing him along these lines, because one of the things we want to do anyway is get across that we will not back Pakistan against India. So whether or not Ayub responds to our suggestions, he'll read their implications clearly enough.

An added reason for exploring the Pak angle is that the best and cheapest way to get Indian military resources freed for use against the Chicomms is from the Pak frontier. If the Indians go into a massive military buildup, it can only be at the expense of their current Plan. This would be a tragedy from our standpoint. Therefore, the cheapest and most immediate way of freeing Indian military resources for next spring's campaign would be via rapprochement with the Paks.

We can't let our other current preoccupations, large as they loom, distract us unduly. The Sino-Indian conflict may have entered a stage whose long term implications are fully comparable to those arising from Cuba. If necessary, we should force these on the top echelon, once we've decided how we ought to move.

RWK

cc: Carl Kayser
Walt Rostow/Bill Polk
Jim Grant
Bill Bundy

~~SECRET~~

88 *File*
Cyr
October 26, 1962

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President:

Here is some background for you before seeing Ambassador Nehru.

1. The Indians are in retreat along a wide area of their border in both the Northwest and the Northeast. The Chinese have occupied some inhabited places. They are now beyond the territory they had previously claimed.
2. The Chinese offer of a cease-fire and mutual retreat of 20 kilometers from the present line of battle was rejected by the Indians.
3. Pravda characterized the offer as reasonable and urged the Indians to accept it. This and intelligence that Soviets told Nehru they couldn't intercede for him suggest that Soviets have decided to remain at least tacitly on Chinese side.
4. We are now prepared to do the following things if you approve.
 - a. Help the Indians with arms and equipment on a military assistance basis if they ask for it. Up to now, as you know, they have been dealing with them on a cash sale basis.
 - b. Make a public statement through Galbraith that we recognize the McMahon line as the traditional border between India and China (This is the Northeast border).
 - c. Approach Ayub with the suggestion that he recognize the danger and make some significant gesture; for example, breaking off in a public way his own negotiations with the Chinese about the border.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81 C.K.
By inf, NARS, Date 10-9-81 ~~SECRET~~

URGENT TELEGRAM Department of State

IND: ☐ COLLECT
☐ IC

31

Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Ambassador NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1715

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

There follows full text Nehru letter to President dated October 26, 1962, and delivered personally by Indian Ambassador 6:00 P.M. October 26. Non-essential words omitted.

"Your Excellency,

I am taking liberty addressing you in regard to very serious situation that has arisen on our frontiers because of armed aggression of Chinese forces on our territory. Consequences this large scale aggression not only serious for India, but also for rest of world.

2. Conditioned as we are by our historical background and traditions of tolerance, understanding and peace, we have, ever since India became independent, consistently followed policy of peace and friendly relations with all countries. Abhorrence war and violence part our national tradition.

3. We understand horrors war, all our efforts have been directed to prevention war and preservation peace. We have endeavoured to follow same policy of peace in our differences with neighbors. That is why when Chinese aggression first started in Ladakh five years ago, we showed patience and restraint. Even though 12,000 square miles Indian territory ~~was~~ occupied by Chinese forces, we did not force crisis, but continued explore avenues peaceful and honourable settlement. In 1960, Chinese Prime Minister expressed desire

Drafted by:

NEA/SCA;DUM:dlr 10/28/62

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearance:

S/S = Mr. Little

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-139

By Si NARA, Date 8-13-01

White House - Mr. Kaysen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FORM DS-322
5-61

OCT 30 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

desire meet me, and I met him readily to find some way resolving differences between us peacefully. Differences were not resolved, and we agreed that officials of both the Governments should examine all facts. The report produced by our officials fully supported our position in regard to traditional and customary boundary between India and Tibet which had been repeatedly confirmed by agreements and treaties. It was my hope that these facts would be considered by Chinese Government, and a further effort would be made to resolve differences peacefully. However, Chinese aggression continued and was even intensified. We were obliged, therefore, to take limited defensive measures to halt this aggressive advance. While taking these measures, however, we continued make peaceful approaches with view easing tensions so that proper climate might be created for further talks to resolve differences.

While these approaches were being made, and we were hoping that they would lead to results, Chinese forces, suddenly, on 14th September 1962, made fresh incursion into our territory. They crossed international boundary in Eastern Sector which they had respected for 12 years since they came into Tibet. Our frontier in that sector traditionally and by treaty, is the high ridge of the Himalaya mountains which forms the water-shed. We could have taken immediate action to resist this further aggression. However, being wedded to ways of peace, we continued our effort to persuade Chinese to end this aggression by withdrawing from our territory, more particularly in Eastern Sector which had been invaded for first time for ages past. On 6th September, we pointed out correct facts to them about location of border which was the high ridge of Himalaya mountains. We also took some steps for defence that border.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. While exchange of notes this subject going on, Chinese, after number probing attacks, made massive attack on our defence forces on morning of 20th October all along the India-China border, in Eastern Sector as well as Western Sector. An attack this scale could only have been made after careful preparation. Our defence forces have put up a stiff resistance, but they have been pushed back by greatly superior ^{and} numbers/~~or~~ massive weapons. In spite these set backs, our resistance will continue; for we are determined to defend our country, and to put an end to aggression.

6. It is matter deep regret that Chinese, in their relations with India, have paid back evil for good. Friendly and peaceful relations with China have been our basic policy ever since India became independent. We have consistently followed this policy and gone out of our way to support China's case in councils of world. We regret that in their relations with India, China has not merely shown a hostile attitude, but has also resorted to aggression. This attack on our defence forces on ~~the~~ 20th October has been represented by China as an attack by Indian forces on China's border guards. That this assertion completely false clear from weight and intensity of Chinese attack which not confined to Eastern/~~or~~ ^{Sector}, but includes other Sectors of India-China border. No self-respecting country, and certainly not India with her love of freedom, can submit to such aggression whatever may be consequences/^{nor} ~~can~~ can India allow China's occupation of Indian territory to be used as bargaining counter for dictating to India a settlement of differences regarding boundary on China's terms.

~~7. Further information regarding this attack is being received and will be reported as soon as it is available.~~

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PRESERVATION COPY

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7. This is not a mere boundary dispute or question of small territorial frontier adjustment. Apart from ~~the~~ vast, fantastic claims that China has made, China had already occupied 12,000 square miles of Indian territory during ~~the~~ last five years, while notes were being exchanged for arranging talks and discussions to ease tension, and dates and places were being suggested, further aggression by China started on 2 September, and further areas of Indian territory were occupied in new sector. Issue involved not one of small territorial gains one way or other, but of standards of international behaviour between neighbouring countries, and whether world will allow the principle of 'might is right' prevail in international relations. Bearing this in mind, India will continue to resist aggression both to preserve her honour and integrity, and to prevent international standards from deteriorating into jungle-law of 'might ^{is} ~~and~~ right'. When aggression continuously taking place, and vast Chinese armies are moving further into our territory, how can we discuss or talk about peaceful settlement? The first essential is that that Chinese forces along the India-China border should go back at least to where they were prior to 6th September 1962.

8. I have ventured give you this short account of crisis that has arisen on the Indian frontier with China. The story of aggression long one going back several years. The most recent aggression in our Eastern Sector which began on September 8, and has since massive Chinese attacks along entire India-China frontier which started on 20th October, resulted in serious conflicts, has brought matters to a crisis. This crisis not only of India but of world, and will have far-reaching consequences on standards of international behaviour and on

peace

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peace of world. We cannot submit to this law of jungle which effects our integrity and the honour of our motherland.

9. In this hour of crisis when we are engaged in resisting this aggression, we are confident that we shall have your sympathy; and support as well as sympathy and support of all countries, not only because of their friendly relations with us, but also because our struggle is in interests of world peace and is directed to elimination of deceit, discrimination and force in international relations.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

SD. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C."

RUSH

END.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

13644

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

31

Origin
SS
Info:

ACTION: Ambassador NEW DELHI NIACT 1687
INFO: " KARACHI NIACT 683
" LONDON NIACT PRIORITY 2351

OCT 26

11.11.52

82

LEHT DISTRIBUTION S/S

Deptel 1677 to New Delhi, rpt info London 2330, Karachi 677

There follows text of President's reply to Nehru's letter delivered to White House by Ambassador Nehru on October 26. ~~YOU~~ are instructed transmit this letter to Prime Minister:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"Your Ambassador handed me your letter last night. The occasion of it is a difficult and painful one for you and a sad one for the whole world. Yet there is a sense in which I welcome your letter, because it permits me to say to you what has been in my mind since the Chinese Communists have begun to press their aggressive attack into Indian territory. I know I can speak for my whole country, when I say that our sympathy in this situation is wholeheartedly with you. You have displayed an impressive degree of forbearance and patience in dealing with the Chinese. You have put into practice what all great religious teachers have urged and so few of their followers have been able to do. Alas, this teaching seems to be effective only when it is shared by both sides in a dispute.

I want

Dated by:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

11/26/52

White House - Mr. Rayson
S/S - Mr. Little

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UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

FORM 1-61 DS-312

Authority NSC 8-8-80 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 9-3-80

~~SECRET~~

"I want to give you support as well as sympathy. This is a practical matter and, if you wish, my Ambassador in New Delhi can discuss with you and the officials of your Government what we can do to translate our support into terms that are practically most useful to you as soon as possible.

"With all sympathy for India and warmest personal good wishes.

"Sincerely,

Signed John F. Kennedy."

His Excellency

Jawaharlal Nehru

Prime Minister of India

New Delhi, India."

Signed original being received.

END.

RUSK

OPENING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Orig
NEA

ACTION:

AmEmbassy NEW DELHI 1706

Info

RPTD INFO:

AmEmbassy KARACHI 688

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LONDON 2360

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RMR

Talbot gave Ambassador Nehru fill-in this morning on recent developments

here including President's letter to Prime Minister, report of Ambassador

Galbraith's conversation with PM and Delhi's press release. Ambassador

characterized letter as hitting exactly right note; he obviously welcomed

India's decision and thought it marked revolutionary development with far-

reaching effects. Conversation mainly devoted to arrangements that would be

necessary to get hardware rolling. Following are high points:

(a) We informed him of our intention of sending DDA2 officers to Delhi; noting this was not negotiating effort, but one of getting procurement program going.

(b) Basis for our arrangements already exists in military sales agreement. Some modifications will be required but these are not basic; they relate to making it clear equipment will be used for Chicom threat and to specifying nature and time of payment. It was agreed documents to be signed should be prepared in Washington.

(c) Major and most urgent need is for joint control mechanism to coordinate efforts so that procurement to meet Indian needs in various capitals (Ottawa, London, and Washington) is orderly, rapid and complementary.

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Classified by: 10/29/62

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-212

By: ing NARA, Date 7-7-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(d) It was agreed Ambassador would report his understanding to Delhi that following steps required: control committee in Delhi to provide for consultation between GOI and supplying governments re requirements and probable availabilities; requests to US to be made through US Embassy, Delhi with copies to Washington; Indian Embassy here to set up procurement group here to meet with US counterpart; US group to process and dispatch material. Talbot stressed success rested on frank consultation to which and avoidance of coyness, ~~misinterpretation~~ BK replied this was Delhi's stock-in-trade, not his.

(e) Security survey (S/SEC) would be required before classified equipment could be released and Ambassador will alert GOI. Talbot described process for Ambassador but indicated this should not hold up priority needs for transport and warfare mountain/equipment as this not in classified category.

Ambassador reported PM had replied to Chicom proposals saying in effect he did not understand them and would negotiate only after withdrawal to Sept 8 line. Amb also reported ^{Nasser informed} ~~XEROX~~ had ~~informed~~ Delhi he had proposed to Chou that there be a ceasefire and then withdrawal.

END

RUSK

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~~SECRET~~

India. But I think that this will be more than counter-balanced if their aggression has the effect of awakening India to the dangerous intentions of the Peiping regime, and turning the attention of the Indian Government and people to their true long-run security interests. These are interests which we all share. Certainly the United States as a leader of the free world must take alarm at any aggressive expansion of Communist power, and you as the leader of the other great nation in the subcontinent will share this alarm.

Unfortunately, press comment in Pakistan has already produced a negative reaction in India. This is particularly distressing at a time when a unique opportunity exists for laying the basis for future solidarity.

We now intend to give the Indians such help as we can for their immediate needs. We will insure, of course, that whatever help we give will be used only against the Chinese. You, on your part, are in a position to make a move of the greatest importance which only you can make. This is to signal to the Indians in a quiet but effective way that the concerns--which you know I think totally unjustified--that have led them to maintain the greater part of their military power on their borders with you, should be put aside in the present crisis. Perhaps an effective way would be a private message from you to Nehru. You could tell him that he can count on Pakistan's taking no action on the frontiers to alarm India. No possible outside aid can increase the ability of the Indians to withstand the Chinese offensive as much as a shift in their own dispositions.

Knowing the history of Kashmir, I do not make this suggestion lightly, but in

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the hope and belief that the painful moments which India is now experiencing will teach them how much more important the threat from the North is to the whole of the subcontinent than any regional quarrels within it. Our own recent experience with the response of our Latin American neighbors when they were confronted with the Soviet threat in Cuba gives me ground for this belief. Action taken by you now in the larger interests of the subcontinent will do more in the long run to bring about a sensible resolution of Pakistani-Indian differences than anything else I can think of.

Further, I am sure that the lesson of such a change in Indian dispositions would not be lost on the Peiping regime. Communism has always advanced in the face of disunity in the free world. This crisis is a test of the vision of all of us, our sense of proportion and our sense of the historic destiny of the free nations.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ John F. Kennedy"

Signed original being pouched.

End

RUSK

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89

~~TOP SECRET~~PRESIDENT'S HOUSE,
RAWALPINDIFrom: Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan, N.P.A., H.J.5th November 1962.

Dear Mr. President,

I am grateful to you for your kind message of October 29, 1962, which was delivered by your Ambassador.

For the last fifteen years, India has posed a major military threat to Pakistan. She has built up her forces, my I say, mainly with American and British equipment three to four times our strength and has openly declared that Pakistan is her enemy number one.

Eighty per cent or more of her Armed Forces have already been earmarked against us and the bulk of them remain concentrated on our borders on ten days' state of readiness. We have been exposed to these aggressive designs all these years simply because the Indian Prime Minister himself is not prepared to

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Authority FRUS 61-63, vol. 19, #195
By yc, NARA, Date 3-12-01

honour his pledge in regard to so many agreements and especially in regard to the solution of Kashmir in which Pakistan is vitally interested for profound economic and security reasons. Therefore, by and large, we have spent these fifteen years in a state of mobilization which has been forced upon us by India. On top of all this, the recent conflict between India and China has led to developments of grave concern to us.

However, our own information, although meagre, leads us to believe that Chinese intention seems to be to occupy the territory which they believe belongs to them and over which there has been a dispute between her and India. Even Mr. Nehru thought it fit in his wisdom to declare in the Indian Parliament in 1954 with reference to the Chinese position in Tibet that "I am not aware of any time during the last few hundred years when Chinese sovereignty, or if you like suzerainty, was challenged by any outside country. All during this period, whether China was weak or strong, or whatever the Government of China was,

113/62



PRESIDENT'S HOUSE,
RAWALPINDI.

- 2 -

China always maintained its claim to sovereignty over Tibet.....
The British Empire in the days of Lord Curzon had expanded into
and made several types of arrangements in Tibet. Now it is
impossible or improper for us to continue any such arrange-
ments These maps and treaties are all prepared by the
British Imperialists. These treaties and maps are intended to
show that we must act as they did."

Militarily, however, we do not believe that China can bring
to bear against India her major forces through the difficult
terrain of the Himalayas to achieve decisive results, and even if
she has any such intention the way to do it would be to outflank
India through Burma. In our opinion, that would be a simpler way
of doing it and in cost it would be cheaper. If the Chinese
intentions were more than limited and they were to expand into

the territories of Assam, we would have as much cause for concern as India, as our East Pakistan would be directly affected. We are making this appreciation about the actual situation in no light hearted mood.

Why has such a situation developed on this sub-continent and around India? We believe that this is the direct outcome of distorted and fallacious thinking on the part of Mr. Nehru and his associates and a consequence of a baseless foreign policy that he has been following. This foreign policy has been based on the following factors:-

- (a) bend backwards to appease Communism;
- (b) hoist the white flag of Neutralism to appease Communism and get other wavering nations to join him in order to be able to create a world nuisance value for themselves;
- (c) intimidate and threaten Pakistan in order to politically isolate it and economically weaken it; and

infantry division and a half away from us but there are definite indications that they are moving forward their reserve armoured formations of one division and one brigade to battle locations against Pakistan. Similarly they now have a corps headquarters to control troops deployed against East Pakistan. The bulk of their Navy, barring a couple of small vessels, have been concentrated in Bombay harbour, ostensibly for refit but in reality to pose a threat to us. Under no stretch of imagination, Mr. President, can these moves be described as indications of peaceful intentions towards us by India. So, how can we, in a situation like this, be expected to show our friendship to them!

No, Mr. President, the answer to this problem lies elsewhere. It lies in creating a situation whereby we are free from the Indian threat, and the Indians are free from any apprehensions about us. This can only be done if there is a settlement of the question of Kashmir. This matter is sometimes



PRESIDENT'S HOUSE,
RAWALPINDI

- 3 -

(d) abuse the West, and especially the U.S.A.,
in season and out of season.

The events have proved that all that is happening to Mr. Nehru is the direct consequence of this warped thinking. We have been warning and pointing to this all along.

Mr. President, what you now ask of us is to give an assurance to Mr. Nehru of a kind that will enable him to deploy his troops at present concentrated against us elsewhere. I am surprised that such a request is being made to us. After all, what we have been doing is nothing but to contain the threat that was continuously posed by India to us. Is it in conformity with human nature that we should cease to take such steps which are necessary for our self-preservation? Or, will our own people ever accept such a position?

According to our information, India has withdrawn an



PRESIDENT'S HOUSE,
RAWALPINDI

- 4 -

stated as very difficult to resolve. I do not agree with that. I believe that if there is a change of heart on the part of India, it should not be difficult to find an equitable and an honourable settlement.

Our object is to have peace, and especially with our neighbours. I am very grateful for the assurance you have given that the arms you are now supplying to India will not be used against us. This is very generous of you, but knowing the sort of people you are dealing with, whose history is a continuous tale of broken pledges, I would not ask a friend like you to place yourself in an embarrassing situation. India's conduct over the questions of Junagadh, Mangrol, Hyderabad, Kashmir and Goa should be well-known to you. Our belief is that arms now being obtained by India from you for use against China will undoubtedly be used

against us at the very first opportunity. However, in the light of the promise that you were good enough to make, namely, that we shall be consulted before you gave any military assistance to India, we did expect to be consulted and also informed as to the types and the quantities of weapons and equipment which are now in the process of being supplied to them. It is regrettable that none of this has been done.

I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that India although today poses as an aggrieved and oppressed party, in reality she has been constantly threatening and intimidating, in varying degrees, small neighbouring countries around her. Let me assure you that in the eyes of many people in free Asia Indian intentions are suspect and the Indian image as a peace-loving nation has been destroyed.

You have referred, Mr. President, to press comments in Pakistan. While we have endeavoured to restrain expression of



PRESIDENT'S HOUSE,
RAWALPINDI

- 5 -

extremist views in our newspapers, it is not possible to interfere with the freedom of the press which reflects the real sentiment of the people. It must be realised that public opinion is gravely exercised by the new developments as the result of arms aid to India, more so, as India continues to pose a serious threat to our security. I am afraid it is going to be extremely difficult for my Government to discount public opinion.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

His Excellency
Mr. John F. Kennedy,
President of the United States of America,
Washington.

~~SECRET~~

November 6, 1962

File
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x Indrag

McGB:

Carl is much more modest than I in defending the rather firm letter the President sent Ayub (about which I gather JFK now has second thoughts).

I'd argue that JFK's initial reaction was right; firing first, as we did, was practically indispensable to turning aside a much more violent Pak reaction. We now have the Paks on the defensive, not the reverse. Moreover, the letter was essential to justify our military aid offer to India (note Ayub's complaint that, even so, we didn't "consult" enough.)

We're in for a long and painful dialogue with Ayub, but one which was essential at some point and which from our standpoint could hardly be conducted under better cover than now. The Chicom attack in effect justifies a long needed readjustment in our policy.

And we can achieve this without losing our Pak assets and alliance if we play our cards right. I argue for tolerant understanding but no give on our part, while the Paks readjust their thinking to the facts of life.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 87-213
By if NARA, Date 6-29-89

~~SECRET~~

November 12, 1962

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Pak
India
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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The Pakistanis are going through a genuine emotional crisis as they see their cherished ambitions of using the US as a lever against India going up in the smoke of the Chinese border war. Their plaint about lack of consultation is more cover for this (if we'd "consulted" with the Paks, instead of notifying them, we'd still be arguing about Kashmir).

Given Pak bitterness, our pitch should be sympathetic understanding and no pressure. We can let the facts themselves work for us.

But I urge equally strongly that there be no give in our position. We have no need to apologize. If we compensate Ayub for our actions vis-a-vis India, we will again be postponing the long-needed clarification of our position, and this at a time when we've never had a better excuse for clarifying it.

Whether Pakistan moves from words to action depends on whether it is willing to risk its relationship with the US. Ayub probably isn't, but he may be a prisoner of Pak public emotions in this case. Moreover, even Ayub has found that a hard line often works well with us. I am convinced, however, that in the last analysis the Paks will realize that they get far too much from their US tie to be able to do without it. So if we can weather the current shock, we should be able to hold on to our assets in Pakistan, while still emerging with the sub-continent-wide policy toward which we aim.

R. W. KOMER

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-213

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By

NARA, Date 6-29-89

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PHIL TALBOT/JIM GRANT

FYI, I've put briefly on paper the concerns I expressed to you both, and Carl. It is not so much that I am wedded to any approach; I simply want to be sure we canvas all the options.

R. W. KOMER

Attach.

RWK Memo to Kaysen
dtd 11/16/62

11/17/62

~~SECRET~~

November 16, 1962

*File
Sino-Ind
85-1*

MEMORANDUM FOR CARL KAYSEN

One possible flaw in the otherwise excellent US/UK summation of our objectives in the Sino-Indian affair (London 1965) is a tendency to view this as a strictly limited objective exercise, in which we should be careful not to over-extend ourselves or arouse undue Indian hopes.

For example, the aim of our military aid should be "to enable India to counter further Chinese attacks" (not to recover lost territory), to which end meeting the equipment deficiencies of about five divisions ought to suffice.

There are many valid reasons for this cautious approach, among them (1) the Pakistani angle; (2) the resultant importance of getting India to redeploy major forces away from the Pak frontier; (3) our fear lest a more ambitious Indian effort exert undue strain on the fragile Indian political fabric or mean too great a diversion from the development program; and (4) the five division program is about the largest in which the UK could participate as an equal partner (it is anxious to do so). There is also no doubt some DOD concern lest the US get involved in a major new MAP program at a time when funds are tight.

Nonetheless, it seems important to ask whether we are not setting our sights too low. If one sees, as I do, the Sino-Indian confrontation as potentially one of the most crucial events of the decade, then one must look further than immediate requirements to the ultimate ends we seek.

To me, these ends are twofold. First, we can hope for a basic re-orientation of India's foreign policy (whether or not India ever abandons formal non-alignment). This development could have far-reaching implications for the other neutralist states. Second, the Sino-Indian crisis may give us the best opportunity yet for promoting the Pak-Indian reconciliation we seek.

Both these developments, however, will take time to mature. The initial Pak reaction to the crisis, for example, has been the precise opposite to that for which we eventually hope. Nor has the traumatic shock to India led yet to recognition of the need to avoid a two-front war. As to India's general non-alignment bias, the ingrained habits of a decade will die hard. On both these counts, therefore, we are still far from definitive change for the better, though there are encouraging signs.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 89-213

By lp NARA, Date 6-29-89

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2.

If we need time for these changes to mature, then it may not be in our interest to see the Sino-Indian crisis tail off too fast. My own concern is less that it will escalate and become an intolerable strain on India than that normal Indian apathy and tendency to compromise will become ascendant, and lead to premature accommodation with the Chicom.

I am not sure we would, on balance, wish to counter such a trend, nor that we could affect it even if we tried. But we might do so if we could sustain Indian confidence in Western support not only to defeat further Chicom attacks but to throw back the Chicom from their present gains. It is this option which leads me to argue that we should consider a more forthcoming aid program than that of the US/UK group.

Many other factors obviously bear on this equation. To some, our problem may be more one of restraining Indian impetuosity than of sustaining Indian will. We must also watch carefully the Pakistani response, or at least the added cost of compensating Ayub, if we help Nehru much more. Moreover, a modest initial approach to Indian aid does not preclude further steps later as Indian intentions clarify. My point is only that we should fully examine all the alternatives before firming up our policy on an issue of this moment.

R. W. KOMER

cc: Burey
Talbot/Gent

~~SECRET~~

NEW DELHI
19th November 1962

Dear Mr. President,

Within a few hours of despatching my earlier message of today, the situation in the N.E.F.A. Command has deteriorated still further. Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces from Sola have been trapped between the Sola Ridge and Bomdila. A serious threat has developed to our Digboi oil fields in Assam. With the advance of the Chinese in massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.

2. The Chinese have poised massive forces in the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan and another invasion from that direction appears imminent. Our areas further North West on the border with Tibet in the States of U.P., Punjab and Himachal Pradesh are also threatened. In Ladakh, as I have said in my earlier communication, Chushul is under heavy attack and shelling of the airfield at Chushul has already commenced. We have also noticed increasing air activity by the Chinese air force in Tibet.

3. Hitherto we have restricted our requests for assistance to essential equipment and we are most grateful for the assistance which has been so readily given to us. We did not ask for more comprehensive assistance particularly air assistance because of the wider implications of such assistance in the global context and we did not want to embarrass our friends.

4. ~~The situation that has developed is, however, really~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-139
By 51, NARA, Date 8-13-01

Dear Mr. President,

Within a few hours of despatching my earlier message of today, the situation in the N.E.F.A. Command has deteriorated still further. Boudila has fallen and the retreating forces from Sala have been trapped between the Sala Ridge and Boudila. A serious threat has developed to our Digboi oil fields in Assam. With the advance of the Chinese in massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.

2. The Chinese have poised massive forces in the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan and another invasion from that direction appears imminent. Our areas further North West on the border with Tibet in the States of U.P., Punjab and Himachal Pradesh are also threatened. In Ladakh, as I have said in my earlier communication, Chushul is under heavy attack and shelling of the airfield at Chushul has already commenced. We have also noticed increasing air activity by the Chinese air force in Tibet.

3. Hitherto we have restricted our requests for assistance to essential equipment and we are most grateful for the assistance which has been so readily given to us. We did not ask for more comprehensive assistance particularly air assistance because of the wider implications of such assistance in the global context and we did not want to embarrass our friends.

4. The situation that has developed is, however, really desperate. We have to have more comprehensive assistance if the Chinese are to be prevented from taking over the whole of Eas. India. Any delay in this assistance reaching us will result in nothing short of a catastrophe for our country.

5. We have repeatedly felt the need of using air arm in support of our land forces, but have been unable to do so as in the present state of our air and radar equipment we have no defence against retaliatory action by the Chinese.

6. I, therefore, request that immediately support be given to strengthen our air arm sufficiently to stem the tide of Chinese advance.

7. I am advised that for providing adequate air defence a minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic allweather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. For this also we seek your assistance. Our needs are most immediate. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained. U.S. fighters and transport planes manned by U.S. personnel will be used for the present to protect our cities and installations from Chinese air attacks and to maintain our communications. We should if this is possible also like U.S. planes manned by U.S. personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in air battles with the Chinese air force over Indian areas where air action by the I.A.F. against Chinese communication lines supplies and troop concentration may lead to counter air action by the Chinese.

~~8. Any air action to be taken against the Chinese beyond the limits of our country, e.g. in Tibet, will be taken by I.A.F. planes manned by Indian personnel.~~

~~9. Determined as we are to liberate all parts of our~~

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8. Any air action to be taken against the Chinese beyond the limits of our country, e.g. in Tibet, will be taken by I.A.F. planes manned by Indian personnel.

9. Determined as we are to liberate all parts of our territory which may pass into the hands of the Chinese aggressors it is clear that sooner or later we would have to neutralise their bases and airfields by striking from the air. For this purpose I request you to consider assisting us with two Squadrons of Bombers of B-47 type. To man this indispensable arm we would like to send immediately our Pilots and Technicians for training in the United States.

10. The Chinese threat as it has developed involves not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this sub-Continent or in Asia. The domestic quarrels regarding small areas or territorial borders between the countries in this sub-Continent or in Asia have no relevance whatever in the context of the developing Chinese invasion. I would emphasise particularly that all the assistance or equipment given to us to meet our dire need will be used entirely for resistance against the Chinese. I have made this clear in a letter I sent to President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. I am asking our Ambassador to give you a copy of this letter.

11. We are confident that your great country will in this hour of our trial help us in our fight for survival and for the survival of freedom and independence in this sub-Continent as well as the rest of Asia. We on our part are determined to spare no effort until the threat posed by Chinese expansionist and aggressive militarism to freedom and independence is completely eliminated.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON D.C.

NEW DELHI
19th November 1962

Dear Mr. President,

Within a few hours of despatching my earlier message of today, the situation in the N.E.F.A. Command has deteriorated still further. Bomdila has fallen and the retreating forces from Sela have been trapped between the Sela Ridge and Bomdila. A serious threat has developed to our Digboi oil fields in Assam. With the advance of the Chinese in massive strength, the entire Brahmaputra Valley is seriously threatened and unless something is done immediately to stem the tide the whole of Assam, Tripura, Manipur and Nagaland would also pass into Chinese hands.

2. The Chinese have poised massive forces in the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan and another invasion from that direction appears imminent. Our areas further North West on the border with Tibet in the states of U.P., Punjab and Himachal Pradesh are also threatened. In Ladakh, as I have said in my earlier communication, Chushul is under heavy attack and shelling of the airfield at Chushul has already commenced. We have also noticed increasing air activity by the Chinese air force in Tibet.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-139
By Sj, NARA, Date 8-13-01

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PRESERVATION COPY

of Chinese advance.

7. I am advised that for providing adequate air defence a minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic allweather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. For this also we seek your assistance. Our needs are most immediate. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained. U.S. fighters and transport planes manned by U.S. personnel will be used for the present to protect our cities and installations from Chinese air attacks and to maintain our communications. We should if this is possible also like U.S. planes manned by U.S. personnel to assist the Indian Air Force in air battles with the Chinese air force over Indian areas where air action by the I.A.F. against Chinese communication lines supplies and troop concentrations may lead to counter air action by the Chinese.

8. Any air action to be taken against the Chinese beyond the limits of our country, e.g. in Tibet, will be taken by I.A.F. planes manned by Indian personnel.

9. Determined as we are to liberate all parts of our territory which may pass into the hands of the Chinese aggressors it is clear that sooner or later we would have to neutralize their bases and airfields by striking from the air. For this purpose I request you to consider assisting us with two Squadrons of Bombers of B-47 type. To man this indispensable arm we would like to send immediately our Pilots and Technicians for training in the United States.

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10. The Chinese threat as it has developed involves not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this sub-Continent or in Asia. The domestic quarrels regarding small areas or territorial borders between the countries in this sub-Continent or in Asia have no relevance whatever in the context of the developing Chinese invasion. I would emphasize particularly that all the assistance or equipment given to us to meet our dire need will be used entirely for resistance against the Chinese. I have made this clear in a letter I sent to President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. I am asking our Ambassador to give you a copy of this letter.

11. We are confident that your great country will in this hour of our trial help us in our fight for survival and for the survival of freedom and independence in this sub-Continent as well as the rest of Asia. We on our part are determined to spare no effort until the threat posed by Chinese expansionist and aggressive militarism to freedom and independence is completely eliminated.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON D.C.

PRESERVATION COPY

10. The Chinese threat as it has developed involves not merely the survival of India, but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this sub-Continent or in Asia. The domestic quarrels regarding small areas or territorial borders between the countries in this sub-Continent or in Asia have no relevance whatever in the context of the developing Chinese invasion. I would emphasize particularly that all the assistance or equipment given to us to meet our dire need will be used entirely for resistance against the Chinese. I have made this clear in a letter I sent to President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. I am asking our Ambassador to give you a copy of this letter.

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With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON D.C.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

November 19, 1962

*File
Sino India
(pak)
8m*

CARL -

Let's reconsider whether an immediate JFK note to Ayub wouldn't be desirable. If McConaughy is half-way right, this is no time to hold back and risk emotional binge in now Pak Assembly which may commit Ayub beyond the point of no return.

The only man who can turn this off is Ayub, and the only man who can get to Ayub is Kennedy. I've tried to draft a letter which states the case boldly, though in friendly fashion, and insinuates that the best way to get Kashmir settlement is to be helpful rather than bitter. We ought to consider this option at JFK's meeting.

RWK

cc: Phil Talbot
Jim Grant

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-213

By ip NARA, Date 6-29-89

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

November 20, 1962

*File
Seno Lach
(pink)*

CARL -

8w

I think we are duty bound to inform Ayub of the direction in which we are moving. I think that to inform him at any level lower than JFK would be almost insulting. I think that if we are escalating our own participation in the Sino-Indian affair, we are more than entitled to make an appeal to Ayub to do the same. I think that a letter, almost an appeal, from the President at this point would be highly desirable from the standpoint of our policy interests. We don't want to enter what may be a truly major enterprise with the key ally who can help us most standing disgruntled on the sidelines.

I think you should raise this matter with the President.

RWK

Attach.

Draft Letter to
President Ayub

(11/20/62 10⁴⁰)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-213

By *ip* NARA, Date *6-29-89*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, XIX, '61-'63, p. 394
By yw, NARA, Date 12-18-96

November 27, 1962

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting on Sino-Indian Conflict
4:15 - 5:15 p.m., November 19, 1962

PARTICIPANTS

Dean Rusk	Robert McNamara	Carl Kayser
Phillips Talbot	Paul Nitze	R. W. Kerner
W. Averell Harriman	William P. Bundy	
James P. Grant	Maj. General A. Goodpaster	
Roger Milsman		
William Sullivan	John McCone	
William Gaud	Huntington Sheldon	
	D. Fitzgerald	

The meeting began with an intelligence briefing to explain to the President the locale of the recent Chinese gains. Secretary Rusk asked about Chicam logistic capabilities. Mr. McCone felt that the Chicams could support about 300,000 men in the fighting area (170,000 in combat), assuming no interdiction of their road net, but that this would take about 35,000 trucks out of a total Chicam inventory of 200,000.

While the meeting's purpose had originally been to get approval of the US/UK Memorandum of Understanding prepared during the London meetings, Rusk suggested it seemed overtaken by events. The situation was already getting to a point where we and others could no longer act as if it were normal. He agreed that the Commonwealth ought to be moving faster. We were already supporting most of the countries around the Communist Asian periphery, hence there was some advantage to the Commonwealth taking the lead in helping India while we trailed somewhat behind.

McNamara urged that the first move be to find out what the real situation was. If we were to put our prestige and resources at risk, we must find out the score. He proposed sending a small high-level military mission immediately to Delhi. He doubted that the Indians were asking for enough, but felt that we couldn't appraise their plans without detailed knowledge. Hence the JCS should select 10-15 officers to go out to size up the situation. They could be ready in 2-3 days.

Rusk queried whether strategic and technical advice shouldn't come from the UK in the first instance, but McNamara doubted whether this would come soon enough. Rusk acknowledged that the Assam Valley could be in

~~SECRET~~

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Chicom hands within a week and urged that transport aircraft be sent soonest because they would be needed in any case. We needed to get some C-130s on the way while we were making a more systematic evaluation. Otherwise, the Indians might get kicked out of Assam. Komer argued that doing so would help deter the Chicombs by signaling that we would get involved in a big way if this happened. There was also some discussion of the Indian need for spare parts for their C-119s.

The President indicated that we should ask Macmillan about Commonwealth plans, what they could do about Australian and other wheat to Communist China and what military missions the Commonwealth might be planning to send out (he had Ormsby Gore called over to meet with him and Rusk).

At the President's request, Grant explained the rationale behind the US/UK recommendations, particularly the five-division package. It was impossible to say what share the UK would take. McNamara doubted that the British would be willing to go 50-50 on any such substantial amount. The President agreed that the UK ought to take the lead. This wouldn't last long, but we ought to start them up in front.

There was discussion of whether Sino-Indian negotiations were likely. Rusk said that we suspected Nehru was still hoping for some kind of a deal. We were aware he had proposed one involving a Chinese return to the November 1959 line and an Indian return to the 8 September 1962 line. This might be why Nehru hadn't declared war.

The subject of Pakistani reactions was also discussed. Talbot indicated that there could be a wide swing in Pakistani attitudes if Assam was really threatened.

McNamara again urged getting a high level mission out to Delhi, including State and Intelligence people in order to concert a plan of action with the Indians. We needed a mission on the lines of the Taylor mission to Vietnam. Rusk preferred to see the UK take the lead on this mission, with us participating if desirable, rather than a straight US mission. It was pointed out that the more we got in front the more we would push Moscow toward Peking.

~~SECRET~~

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3.

The President decided that we should: (1) get a mission off to Delhi; (2) send some C-130s; (3) take care of the C-119 spare parts; and (4) push the UK to get the Commonwealth in, and decide what we want to tell Macmillan.

Rusk and Harriman showed the President a proposed press conference statement for Tuesday, indicating language which we had used previously in the Cabot-Wang talks to indicate to Peiping that we meant business. The President decided we ought to review the proposed press conference statement and put the Western response on a broader basis than that of the US alone. We should push the UK to get the Commonwealth involved.

McNamara couldn't understand why the Indians didn't use air. They could certainly tear up the Chicom roads.

There was some discussion of the desirability of using Tibetan guerrillas.

Talbot reminded the President of the "gentlemen's agreement" limiting FY 63 aid to India. Gaud explained that in the light of new PL 480 needs we would run afoul of this agreement if we spent more than 25 million on military aid to India. The President preferred not to go to the congressional committee yet; however, he told Talbot to bring Senator Symington up to date.

R. W. KOMER

*Buddy
Lagren*

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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~~SECRET~~
VERBATIM TEXT

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI

PRIORITY 866

DEC 5 8 58 PM '62

SS

Info

INFO: Amembassy NEW DELHI

2571

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-166

By sig NARA, Date 6-27-89

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

Ambassador requested deliver following letter to Ayub/at earliest opportunity:

"Dear Mr. President:

"Governor Harriman has told me in great detail of his talks with you and some of your Ministers. I want to thank you for the cordiality with which you received him and the members of his mission to Pakistan and India last week and for the personal message you asked him to give me.

"I am gratified that a start will be made on Kashmir, and I want to congratulate you on the statesmanlike approach you have taken. There is understanding here, of course, that a quick and easy solution to the problem is not possible. As you indicated to Governor Harriman, a settlement of the Kashmir issue will cause dissatisfaction among many in India and Pakistan. Yet you have shown yourself prepared to go ahead with determination to reach a settlement. The coming months will be a test of the patience, perseverance and good will of both countries. I welcome your decision most warmly. We stand prepared to give appropriate support and assistance in the search for a solution.

Governor Harriman has/

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA:SOA:TC Cameron, Jr.:bld 12/5/62

NEA/SOA - Turner C. Cameron, Jr.

Clearance:

White House -

FE - Gov. Harriman - in draft

NEA - Mr. Talbot - in draft

S - The Secretary

S/S - Mr. Weiner

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UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

~~SECRET~~

FORM 5-61 DS-322

DEC 6 1962

~~SECRET~~

"Governor Harriman has told me of your appreciation of the threat that Chinese Communist aggression against India poses to Pakistan and, with the settlement of Kashmir, of the long term need of a combined plan for the defense of the subcontinent. Your discernment in this matter, going beyond the passions of the moment, is of the highest importance for your country and the whole free world. Governor Harriman has also told me that you understand the need for the United States and the United Kingdom to give military assistance to India to the extent necessary to make it possible for India to contain and defeat a renewed Chinese attack. This is the purpose for which we have been giving emergency military aid to India, and will guide us in consideration of longer-term programs. We shall keep in touch with you about further developments in our military aid to India.

"This is a time not only of challenge but also of hope.

"With warm personal regards,

"Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy"

End

In accordance with usual practice, this letter is not for publication.
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

End

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Free India
December 7, 1962

McGB:

Where Do We Go From Here?

There are real disadvantages, from the US viewpoint, in the already pronounced trend toward petering out of the Sino/Indian affair. This crisis has been a great net gain to us, but we are as yet far from being able to exploit its full potential. Boldly stated, our prime aims are to use it as a means of:

- (1) getting the Indians to recognize definitively that their interests lie with the West (not that they need change their official non-alignment posture, but they must be clear in their own minds where they stand).
- (2) achieving a Pak/Indian reconciliation, which demands a Kashmir settlement.
- (3) forestalling such escalation as might involve us in a major overt commitment to a Korea-type war, or place a crippling burden on the Indian economy.

We must recognize the third aim tends to argue with the first and second. In the last analysis, only continued Sino-Indian bickering (possibly even renewed fighting) will suffice to drive home to India the lesson that its interests lie with the West and, by the same token, that it must settle with Pakistan. In fact the same Chicom threat is the best justification we have for (1) pressing Ayub too to compromise with India; and (2) continuing our military aid to Delhi. The lesson is clear--only Chinese pressure will compel Nehru to settle Kashmir; undue US/UK or Pakistani pressure will only get Nehru's back up.

But the focus of dispute is already shifting from the China border to Kashmir; the more the Pakistanis shout for blood, the more it diverts Indian attention from the Chicoms. At all costs, we must avoid letting the Kashmir dispute get out ahead of the China border issue.

This suggests that we not push India too hard at this juncture, but concentrate our fire on Ayub instead. Another reason for doing so is that the Paks seem determined to bid very high on Kashmir, so high in fact that the new talks we have just gotten going may collapse at the outset. This would be tragic. We must prevent Ayub from overbidding (which many like Dehlavi are egging him on to do). If the talks flounder prematurely (all too possible in an atmosphere of reduced Sino-Indian tension) it will be doubly hard to get them started again.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81

By inf, NARS, Date 10-9-81

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2.

Meanwhile, the Sino-Indian trend is not toward escalation but toward negotiation, which makes our third objective less and less valid as a constraint on our policy. We now see Chicom policy more clearly than in the late dark days. Instead of pushing its luck, Peiping is skillfully disengaging (while still not giving up its real territorial claims). I share Embassy Delhi's estimate (2264) that Peiping clearly wants to quit while it's ahead, instead of risking embroilment with the US and UK along with a re-armed India. If this is the case, it seems highly unlikely that the Chicomso would renew a major attack on India (as opposed to minor border reprisals) almost regardless of what the Indians could do.

Nor do the Indians seem very pugnacious; despite Nehru's hortatory speeches, Embassy Delhi thinks they won't even follow up the Chicom retreat. There are signs that the initial burst of Indian nationalist fervor has already spent itself. If the neutralists now press for compromise, and if Peiping is smart enough to let India go back to some variant of the 8 September line, the whole affair may die down quickly.

If my analysis is correct, it is important that we give the Indians sufficient sense of confidence in our support that they will not compromise too easily. For India to mount a major offensive now, or even next spring, would be foolhardy; but this is a rather remote contingency since it lacks any capability to do so. However, if the Indians have sufficient confidence that we would back them should a stiff attitude on their part lead to renewed border strife, they might be less willing to settle on Chinese terms. Therefore, such gestures as a carrier visit, a promised air defense package, and a high level of continued aid have real political significance in terms of bucking up Indian morale. They also entail considerable risks: but as Calbraith has pointed out these risks are really twofold--against those of becoming overcommitted are those of leaving a disastrous sense of Indian disappointment from our failure to act. Can we let the Indians come to think either that we won't back them unless they settle Kashmir or that we will back them only defensively but not to the extent of regaining territory they regard as theirs?

The following guidelines seem to flow from my analysis:

1. To the extent we can influence the situation (which may be limited), we don't want to let a long hiatus period develop unless we are confident that at the end India will resume a forward posture.
2. So we must be sufficiently forthcoming in aid to India (and promises of future help) to sustain Indian confidence that we will back them if they take a hard line toward Peiping.

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3.

3. While we want to keep up the incentive for India to compromise on Kashmir, we don't want to push so hard that Indian concern is diverted from the China issue.

4. Therefore we must press Ayub not to overplay his hand.

5. Though we want to push the UK out front, we should not let UK reluctance or limited resources become a major restraint on actions otherwise in our interest.

6. While we must prudently calculate the risks of overcommitment, or of overstimulating Indian appetites, we must avoid on the other hand being so cautious that the Indians conclude we will not really back them against Peiping.

7. We must also walk a fine line between such eagerness to help Delhi that it concludes it is under no pressure to settle Kashmir, and making a settlement so much a precedent for any major aid that we divert Indian focus from the China issue.

The above conclusions may seem unduly bellicose and imply too large a price tag. But the greater danger is not that we will be imprudent and overcommit ourselves; it is that we may be too cautious and fail to exploit the situation fully. If we can only manage to continue using Peiping's adventurism against it, we have the greatest chance of making major gains. Thus, to put it crudely, if we can encourage the Indians to be reasonably pugnacious (without going hog wild in military buildup, the more our interests will be served. While we can't afford to get so far out in front that it appears we are pulling India along, this likelihood is minimal if we are responding to Indian requests.

R. W. KOMER

cc: Governor Harriman
Phil Talbot
Carl Kaysen
Mike Forrestal

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

December 18, 1962

file
Pah
X Kashmir
8A

Phil -

Here is the draft letter to Ayub Carl and I have contacted. While it is straightforward and even brusque in spots, we feel it imperative to impress on Ayub now that we intend to give further emergency aid to India and that he as well as Nehru must give on Kashmir. Ayub's latest letter demonstrates all too clearly a critical misunderstanding on US aid to India, which must be clarified now before it creates another crisis of confidence between us. There are risks in a tough letter, but far greater risks in letting such misunderstanding fester and burst forth in March.

R. W. Komer

Revised
12/19/62

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 87-213
By JP NARA, Date 6-29-89

~~SECRET~~

file

DRAFT

December 18, 1962

8X

Dear President Ayub:

Thank you for your two letters of 17 December which I have just received. I will answer you separately on the matter of the Tarbela Dam after I have had a chance to hear the views of my advisors on this difficult and complex problem.

I have reviewed your other letter with Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau. We are both convinced that this critical period in the sub-continent demands not only the highest order of statesmanship from India and Pakistan but the utmost candor from their friends. It is in this spirit that I am making a prompt reply.

As we see it, India is acting so far with prudent restraint in its response to the Chinese Communist aggression. In any event, it would be difficult for us to tell the Indian Government what course it should pursue toward an aggressor who is still occupying Indian soil. Were the positions reversed, and Pakistani instead of Indian territory occupied by the Chinese, I feel sure that you would look askance at such counsel from us.

I can assure you that we intend to do all we reasonably can to bring about "an early settlement of the Kashmir question", because we, like you, regard it as essential to freeing Indian and Pakistan resources to meet a common threat. However, I am sure that you will recognize the

difficulty for India, having just endured some humiliating setbacks at Chinese hands, in appearing alas to capitulate to Pakistan. Nehru must have some rationale for moving in your direction. This leads me to wonder whether, despite your natural reluctance to propose again joint defense with India, the best way to give Nehru an opening wouldn't be to hint at the importance of a Kashmir settlement to this end. It would also strengthen our hand in justifying our reluctance to provide excessive aid to India.

We are also firm in our determination not to

permit India to divert such military aid as we provide for use against Pakistan. I might add, however, that there is no indication the Indians will so use such aid; indeed all their discussions with us indicate otherwise.

We have firm information that they have already removed over half their forces from the Pakistan border, and do not plan to return them. In any case you have our firm assurances that the US would support you against Indian aggression just as we would support India in opposite circumstances.

But I cannot agree that "any further supply of arms to India be made contingent on" a Kashmir settlement. In your conversation with Governor Harriman, you yourself recognized the need to provide India enough military help to enable her to repulse a renewed Chinese attack. This is what we are doing. To deny India these minimum requirements of defense would only encourage further Chinese Communist aggression, aggression which would as we see it pose as grave an ultimate threat to Pakistan as to India.

Achieving a Kashmir settlement is going to be a painful and no doubt time-consuming process. It will come about, in the last analysis, only as India and Pakistan come to recognize that they must submerge their differences because of the larger interests at stake. To judge from numerous Pakistani as well as Indian statements such a spirit of compromise does not yet seem to have developed fully on either side. For this reason,

- 4 -

it is of utmost importance that the new talks we have brought about not be allowed to break down prematurely or be prejudiced by public recriminations. Unless a new atmosphere can be created, US and UK efforts to assist in a settlement will be of no avail.

Consciousness of the great opportunity that this moment presents for a reconciliation of Pakistani-Indian differences has led me to speak frankly to you. If the opportunity is not seized to good advantage, it may never recur. This could mean the indefinite continuation of the present unsatisfactory situation, which serves neither your interests nor ours.

Sincerely,

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

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Origin

NEA

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy Karachi 938

RPTD INFO: Amembassy New Delhi 2691

Amembassy London 3306

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DEC 22 11 35 PM '62

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IOP

INR

Ambassador requested deliver following letter from the President to

President Ayub.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-8-80 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 9-3-80

VERBATIM TEXT

Dear President ~~KYUX~~ Ayub:

RMR

Thank you for your two letters of December 17. I will answer you separately on the ~~mx~~ matter of the Tarbela Dam after I have had a chance to hear the views of my advisors on this difficult and complex problem.

SMITH-BUNDY

BELK

BURRIS

DAVIS

DUNGAN

FELDMAN

FORRESTAL

HARSH

JOHNSON

KELLEY

KLEIN

KOMER

LEGARE

PARROTT

PETERSEN

SAUNDERS

SCHLESINGER

I have reviewed your other letter with Prime Minister Macmillan at

Nassau. After a full discussion of the problems created by the Chinese Communist aggression against India, we have come to what seems to us a prudent course of action at this time to meet the challenge -- a course of action which is in the best interests of the Free World. We agreed on a reasonable and frugal program of military assistance designed solely to enable India to defend itself better should the Chinese Communists renew their attacks at an early date.

To deny India the minimum requirements of defense would only

Drafted by: NEA:JPGrant/SOA:JNGatch:
bw 12/22/62

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

Clearances: FE - Mr. Sullivan
(in substance)
G - Mr. Johnson
(re-typed in S/S-C)

EUR - Mr. Tyler

S/S -

White House - Mr. Komer
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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

encourage further Chinese Communist aggression, an aggression which we both see as posing as grave an ultimate threat to Pakistan as to India. Therefore, the supply of arms for this purpose should not be made contingent on a Kashmir settlement. Beyond this stage, however, we will certainly take any one-sided intransigence on Kashmir into account as a factor in determining the extent and pace of our assistance.

The Prime Minister and I are fully conscious of the great opportunity that now exists for the settlement of this major issue within the Free World. As you know, our primary concern is the long-range defense of the subcontinent within the context of our global strategy. No single step could contribute as much to the security of the subcontinent as the resolution of the Kashmir problem. Despite the probably painful and time consuming process required, we look forward with confidence to real progress in the ministerial discussions which lie ~~xy~~ ahead.

Ambassador McConaughy, who participated in all of our deliberations, will give you a full account of the meetings in Washington and Nassau.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy END VERBATIM TEXT

In accordance usual custom this letter ~~is~~ is not to be published.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

January 8, 1963

*File
India
map*

8 v

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

At Nassau you and Macmillan agreed that you would get in touch again by 10 January before sending out the US/UK air defense team to India. A UK aide memoire of 4 January says:

"Regarding the date of departure the United Kingdom Government attaches importance to the conclusion of the Nassau Meeting that there should be communication between the President and the Prime Minister on the subject on January 10. The assumption therefore is that as between our two Governments we should agree on the terms of reference and composition of the team before that date."

We'll be ready to go about 15 January. There seem to be no major problems to resolve so the brief message at Tab A will serve the purpose better than a call.

At Tab B are the UK-proposed terms of reference which seem acceptable with sub-paragraph (c) added by us. We're sending seven people; we hope the UK will do the same, and add on Canada and Australia too.

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

~~SECRET~~

8V-1

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

Now that the Indians have let us know that they would welcome the visit of a Joint UK/US Air Defense Team, we are ready to move ahead and get our experts on the ground. In his last letter to me Prime Minister Nehru said, "the earlier it comes, the better."

The small group of officers which we are selecting for the Team can come over to London around January 15 if this is convenient. After several days work with your officers, the Joint Team could then go to India.

I understand that our people are in general agreement about the exact composition of the Joint Team and its terms of reference.

While the odds that the Indians and Chinese will get engaged again on a scale which might involve us seem to be declining, I still believe that an air defense commitment of the sort we discussed at Nassau would be a desirable gesture at hopefully little cost.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-8-80 letter
By rif, NARS, Date 9-3-80

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

84-2

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. The joint Commonwealth/United States Air Defense Mission will proceed to India to investigate the adequacy of the Indian Air defenses and requirement for supplementing them by re-inforcement with a United States/Commonwealth force consisting of all weather fighters and ground radars with supporting equipment and to make recommendations to the Governments which have appointed them as to how this could best be achieved. In particular, the Mission will:-

- (a) Discuss with the Indian authorities, in the light of the agreed intelligence assessment, the scale of likely Chinese air attack. Every effort should be made to persuade the Indians to make a realistic assessment of the Chinese threat;
- (b) Consider which areas are most vulnerable and can most effectively be protected.
- (c) Consider what steps can be taken to improve the utilization of existing Indian air defense equipment and facilities including those now directed against Pakistan which might be used to better advantage against the Chinese Communist threat.
- (d) Consider what steps can be taken by the provision of radar and ground control to make the Indian fighter defense effective against the likely scale of Chinese air attack.
- (e) Consider what re-inforcement by Commonwealth/United States fighter forces up to a combined total of four squadrons would be effective in giving an additional degree of protection to those targets of the highest priority.
- (f) Consider the feasibility of ensuring by visits by Squadrons of Commonwealth/United States aircraft a high degree of readiness so that, in the event of fighter protection being required, such squadrons could be brought rapidly into effective action;
- (g) Ascertain the best system for the command and control of the proposed integrated air defense system to be acceptable to the Indians.
- (h) Examine how best to deploy the re-inforcing squadrons in the light of the available airfields and taking into account use of existing technical and administrative facilities.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

9

A-4

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Let me pass on to you the attached summary of the President's views on India from the 25 April meeting. The President has seen and approved.

The chief item for early action seems to be the air defense commitment. May I suggest we get all the staff work on this in order for final review after Secretary Rusk's return.

McGeorge Bundy

Attach.

Memorandum for Record, dtd 4/26/63
subj. The President's Views as
Expressed at 25 April Mtg on India

~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

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Authority NSC 8-25-80 letter

By ig, NARS, Date 9-11-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 26, 1963

98

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The President's Views on India as
expressed at 25 April Meeting

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-11

By 48 NARA. Date 8-24-89

1. In general, we should prepare to go ahead on military support for India. Given the declining prospects for a Kashmir settlement, we should not hold off so long on aid, in order to get leverage on Kashmir, that we jeopardize the developing relationship between the US and India. It is hard to see how we can stop the Chinese Communists without India.
2. As to the magnitude of further military aid, we should try to get the Indians down to a realistic program, but should regard \$300 million (including defense production aid) over three years from the US and UK as a floor rather than a ceiling. It will be difficult to bridge the political gap between India's exaggerated hopes for \$1.6 billion in aid over this period and our preliminary judgment that no more than \$300 million is militarily realistic.
3. While we should make every effort to bring the UK along on further aid, we should not limit ourselves to their preferred pace. It is unrealistic to expect that the British will go fifty-fifty even on a \$300 million program. Therefore, our policy should be not to let the UK restrain us from moving to the extent we think desirable.
4. We and the British should engage in intensive talks with the Indians at the DOD and military level to bring more realism into their thinking and to counter any impression that we are stalling on aid. The State Department should avoid participating in these talks so they won't appear to be tied to political conditions, i. e. Kashmir.
5. We ought to go ahead shortly on the air defense commitment, but will reserve final judgment until Secretary Rusk's return from the subcontinent. This commitment seems the least expensive way to reassure India of our continued interest in its defense, while being the move least offensive to the Pakistani. We should try hard to get the UK to join us, but be prepared to do most of the job ourselves if necessary.
6. We must make clear to Ayub that we can't hold off indefinitely on aid to India because of Kashmir. Let's tell Ayub that we've got to go ahead soon, while telling Nehru that if we give him major aid without a Kashmir settlement, it will cause all sorts of trouble with Pakistan and the US Congress.

McGeorge Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

India
Map
x Kashmir

By AW, NARA, Date 12-18-96

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April 29, 1963

5 June

PRESENT:	The President	Secretary McNamara
	Secretary Rusk	Deputy Secretary Gilpatric
	Undersecretary Ball	Mr. Paul Nitze
	Mr. James Grant	Admiral George Anderson, Jr.
	Ambassador Bowles	Mr. John McCone
	Mr. Frank Coffin	Mr. McGeorge Bundy
	Mr. William Caud	Mr. R. W. Komer

5 June

Secretary McNamara then outlined the military aid problem. It was essentially a small one; as the intelligence community pointed out, the Chicom threat was small over the next 2-3 years. Their maximum capability in Tibet/Ladakh amounted to 230,000 men, of whom only 120,000 could be combat forces. They would need 40,000 trucks and 40% of the Chicom 1962 gasoline supply to support such a force. To cope with this threat, we and the British estimate that 12-14 Indian divisions are needed or with reserves some 16 divisions and 3 brigades, totalling an

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army of 650,000. But the Indians want to build up to 1.4 million men, a \$1.8 million annual defense budget of their own, and \$1.6 billion in MAP over the next three years. All this is quite unrealistic.

The air threat is even smaller than the ground threat; McNamara himself really didn't think there is any. The Indians could meet this air threat by themselves if they were not so inefficient.

So the first problem from a military viewpoint was to develop a realistic program. McNamara personally estimated this at a maximum around \$300 million jointly from the US and UK over the next three years (including defense production), and perhaps only half that. It would take 2-3 months to work up such a realistic program. However, there was also a serious political problem involved in the Indian military buildup as it bore on Kashmir. The President queried whether \$300 million would be enough for the purpose and McGeorge Bundy asked whether the estimated threat included that from Burma; it was essential to look at the problem of defense of the entire subcontinent. Including Burma was essential if one looked at the problem in the framework of a decade. McNamara agreed but felt this didn't bear on the immediate Indian buildup problem. Komer pointed out that our estimate of the threat is based on existing Chicom logistic facilities and does not include what the Chicom could do over the next three years or so. McCone said one couldn't add Burma to NEFA as an additional route of invasion because we estimated the Chicom couldn't support both. Moreover, Burma would present the Chicom with a vastly more complicated political problem if they chose to use this route.

Ambassador Bowles regarded the Indian buildup problem as 70% political. We had hoped for ten years that India would see the Chicom threat as we saw it. Now the Indians did; indeed they were the only major Asian power which took such a realistic view. Japan did not, for example, Indian help is essential for a non-nuclear balance of power in Asia vis-a-vis the Chicom. Nor should we make the mistake of assuming that the Indians don't have other options; they are perfectly capable of patching up their differences with China and of getting more Soviet help as an alternative to their current desire for US/UK support. Could we let this happen? We should give the Indians an "emotional assurance" as soon as possible that we are with them; this would buy us a little time. Third, we should think of aiming Indian manpower toward SEA, not just of Indian defense against the threat from the north. This would also ease our problem with Pakistan, because the SEA threat would tend to unite the Indians and Paks.

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The President again asked whether we could get the Indians to take the same view of the Chinese threat we do with only \$300 million in US/UK support. As we saw it, we couldn't get the Indians to "come down from \$1.6 billion to \$300 million". How could we avoid a real clash and disillusionment? McNamara thought that we could; however, we could go to \$500,000 men and could probably agree on a \$300 million and 500,000 men program in 2-3 months. The President said he was inclined to agree with Bowles that we should go ahead with the Indian program shortly. We had never been able to get the UK to go 50-50 on anything else, so while trying to bring them along, we should not limit ourselves to their pace. McNamara and Rusk both pointed out the Congressional problem, if we tried to go much above \$300 million and the UK didn't participate.

The President said he couldn't see how we could stop Communist China without India. "Let's not be penny wise about India; let's not let them get into a position where they feel that they can't cope with the Chicom and Paks on top of their other problems." Our policy should be not to let the UK restrain us from going ahead. He agreed we should do our best to bring the UK along, but "India is the important thing; not the UK." We shouldn't settle finally on \$300 million just because this is the most we could get on a 50-50 basis. McNamara argued we should separate the UK issue from that of realistic planning. He thought the UK wouldn't even go along with half of \$300 million. It was generally agreed this was so.

The discussion turned to the air defense commitment. McNamara felt this had great political value; Rusk agreed it was very important. The President said that if the Chicom bombed India we would of course become involved, so he didn't see too much risk in giving a prior commitment. He asked when we should give the Indians our decisions on aid. Grant argued that we need to convince the Indians we are really going to help them. An air defense commitment shortly would buy us time to hammer out a realistic MAP program. Rusk contended that shooting at Chicom planes in India would lead almost certainly to the Chicom shooting at us elsewhere. It would immediately broaden the war. At the President's request, McNamara, Nitze and Komer described the proposed air defense package. McNamara indicated that the only cost would be some \$15 million for radar, nothing else. Rusk suggested we not commit ourselves on air defense until he and Sandys returned.

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The President agreed, but said let's consider air defense shortly. We want the Chicom's to know what we are going to do so they won't attack. We were sending planes to Saudi Arabia so why shouldn't we go ahead with India? He felt that we should engage in intensive talks with the Indians and attempt to bring them down to realistic levels. But we should keep these talks on the DOD level without State Department participation so we didn't appear to tie the talks too much to political conditions such as Kashmir.

As to a Kashmir settlement, the President thought the chances were almost nil. Rusk agreed unless the UK could manage to move the Indians. Maybe Mountbatten could when he was out in India. The President asked what we should do about Ayub. He felt we must make clear to Ayub we were doing our best on Kashmir but couldn't hold off indefinitely on aid to India. Rusk agreed and said we must tell the Paks we couldn't subordinate our larger interests to their quarrel with India over Kashmir. Bundy suggested that Rusk give a careful oral rebuttal in Delhi to Nehru's accusations about the "elements", in lieu of the President's replying to Nehru's letter now (especially since Macmillan had already given a written reply). The President thought we should tell Ayub we've got to go ahead with Nehru, while telling Nehru that military aid to him without a Kashmir settlement will cause us all sorts of trouble with the Paks and our own Congress. He asked whether we were likely to get thrown out of our base in Pakistan if we went ahead with aid to India? Rusk thought it would be rough; we might lose our Pakistani base unless the Chicom's attacked again.

The President asked about the consortium problem with Pakistan. Gaud explained the situation. The Paks want from us at least last year's level of \$250 million, and a total of \$550 million from the consortium as a whole. We just didn't think they needed this much.

The President returned to the air defense problem, saying Komer and others on the staff felt we should go ahead with air defense soon. However, we would wait for Rusk's judgment. Bowles urged that we go ahead on some gesture of this sort. Rusk suggested staff talks with the Indians at a military level about sending the US/UK air defense squadrons as a means of indicating to the Indians our continued interest in helping them.

McNamara returned to the problem of UK participation. We certainly ought to have the UK in. To get Congressional support of our Indian program, one of three conditions would have to be met: (1) a Kashmir settlement; or (2) a realistic program; or (3) the UK going along. He had discovered on the Hill that Congressional opposition

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to Indian aid was strong. We had also found the British most reluctant to go along with further aid to India at this point. Rusk pointed out that as always the UK had the vulnerability of Hong Kong very much in mind.

The President thought we ought to go ahead on air defense and work on Congress to this end. Congress would be much madder if India went Communist. Air defense was the least expensive move we could make and the least offensive to the Paks. If the UK wouldn't go along, we should go ahead ourselves. We could put the program under the guise of training. He wondered why we couldn't fly squadrons into India for exercises? McNamara indicated this was part of the proposal. It was agreed that if the Paks wanted similar exercises there wouldn't be much problem, since we already had SEATO and CENTO exercises with the Paks. Rusk asked if it made sense for us to have a carrier in the Indian Ocean on a regular basis? McNamara and Anderson indicated that carrier visits would be no problem but that it would over-extend us if we tried to maintain a carrier there on a regular basis. The UK had a small carrier in the area.

R. W. Komer

orig. to
cc: McGeorge Bundy
✓ Carl Kaysen

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 87-213

By NARA, Date 6-29-89

India map
X Kachmir

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MEMORANDUM FOR

May 8, 1963

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THE PRESIDENT

The chief item on the NSC Agenda for 5:00 p.m. Thursday is the attached State/Defense recommendations we go ahead on the air defense "commitment" to India. The paper effectively argues the case.

Note particularly the judgment (p. 3) that even if the Indians reject our offer it is still worth making; as credible evidence of our desire to help defend India, it will tend to forestall any growing Indian sentiment that we are not really willing to help them unless they settle Kashmir. Since India's real interest, however, is in US/UK help to build up its own air defense, it is most important that we present our offer as an interim arrangement pending further discussion of India's own air force buildup (p. 5).

Note the legal brief indicating that we can proceed by Executive Agreement with the necessary deployments. We would only commit ourselves to "consult" with India regarding the use of our forces in combat. This would suffice, of course, since if the Chicomas actually attack India you have authority to take whatever military action is necessary to defend US security interests without waiting for Congressional action.

If you approve the recommendations, the next step is to bring the British along. I'd urge this be handled initially on Macmillan level; State has a draft message to propose.

Other business. This would be a good time to discuss some of the other proposals in the Bowles memo. If Ayub accepts Nehru's suggestion that further Kashmir talks be conducted privately with a US/UK mediator, this will keep the Kashmir ball in play. However, no one anticipates any early break-through. Therefore, we still face the issue of how far to go ahead with military aid to India while Kashmir is still unresolved.

For example, what do we tell Krishnamachari when he comes here May 15-23 May? Bowles urges a warm unequivocal commitment in principle to proceed with defense production aid and the rational buildup of India's own forces on a long-term basis. But my sense is that many key officials are reluctant to go this far. The differences of view go not

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only to the undesirability of weakening our Kashmir leverage but to the magnitude of effort we should posit for our own planning purposes, and to the likely repercussions in Pakistan.

As you noted 25 April, there is a big "political gap" between Indian ambitions and some of our own thinking. McNamara's view has been that Indian planning was wildly unrealistic, but the Bhoothalingam team visits here and in London seem to have convinced us and the British on the technical level that Indian planning by and large makes sense (see London 4390 at red tab).

The Indian consortium aid for 1963/64 bids fair to be well below Indian expectations. We'll probably also have to finesse Bokaro this year. If on top of this, we fall too far short of Indian expectations on the military side, we may risk serious backsliding on Nehru's part vis-a-vis the Chinese. Commitment in principle should carry us through the TTK visit. But you might ask that MAP planning be done on alternative "high" and "low" bases, so that if you do decide later we have to go high for high political reason, we won't get caught short for lack of prior plans.

R. W. Komer

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May 9, 1963

*File
India May
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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Here is a brief recap of issues for NSC meeting on India:

1. Should we go ahead now with air defense package?
2. How best to bring UK along.
3. Nature of Congressional consultations.
4. What do we tell TTK next week about future military aid? What do we have in mind if we commit ourselves in principle?
5. What interim aid steps, if any, should we take during period while Kashmir talks are still underway? Here DOD is thinking about finishing off Nassau \$120 million (US road-building equipment and UK aid to IAF are still pending), adding an extra \$2 million for more road-building gear, \$8 million for permanent radar under air defense scheme, and perhaps \$5 million in defense production items.

R. W. KOMER

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Copy No. 30

RECORD OF ACTIONS

NSC
Action

2467 AIR DEFENSE FOR INDIA

Air Defense

Following discussion of U. S. policy toward India, the President:

- (1) Approved going forward with the arrangements on air defense for India recommended in the Secretary of State's memorandum to the President of May 8, 1963.
- (2) Asked the Secretaries of State and Defense to recommend how we can best proceed unilaterally should the United Kingdom prove reluctant to commit itself to joint arrangements for the air defense of India.
- (3) Asked the Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies, to prepare a scenario on the steps necessary to carry out the approved recommendations to include:
 - (a) Consultations with the United Kingdom;
 - (b) Congressional soundings; and
 - (c) Informing the Indians and Pakistanis of the U. S. decision.
- (4) Asked the Secretary of State to recommend what Indian Defense Coordination Minister Krishnamachari should be told in order that his forthcoming visit to the United States results in his returning home with a clear feeling that the United States wants to help India.

May 9, 1963
514th NSC Meeting
NSC Action No. 2467

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Authority NSC declass list 10/14/77
By MIC NARS Date 3/29/78

NSC Control No. 136

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Authority FRUS, XIX, '61-63, p. 631

By ju, NARA, Date 12-18-96

Pak file
Ball Mission
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MEMORANDUM FOR

August 9, 1963

THE PRESIDENT

We're heading for a tricky confrontation with Ayub, in an attempt to bring him around to reality before it's too late. George Ball is to make the hard sell, but several issues need to be sorted out first. We hope to discuss these with you at 5 p. m. Monday.

Ayub's latest talk with McCaughy (Karachi 307 attached) suggests that he sees Ball's trip as showing nervousness on our part and may think his pressure tactics on us are working. We'll have to disabuse him on this score, but his line to McCaughy shows how hard this will be.

After letting us think it was all squared away, the Paks have started stalling on our crucial Peshawar expansion. The intelligence people are all worked up, and seem to favor a simple trade with Ayub--more supersonics (as part of 3-year MAP offer) for Peshawar acreage. State feels, and I quite agree, that to succumb to such blackmail would be folly. Instead we must get across to Ayub that if he doesn't play ball with us, our whole aid program will be at risk.

Ball inclines toward doubting that we should offer anything to the Paks just now. Let's wait and see instead how they come around under our pressure. Harriman argues that we should tell Ayub flatly he can't hope to defend himself against a much larger India, and that China can't supply him, so that his only recourse is to us. But Averell thinks we should lend credibility to our assurances by telling Ayub we'll put some carriers in the Indian Ocean or by doing some joint planning with the Paks.

Other issues are how hard to keep pushing Kashmir mediation, and how to handle India if we offer the Paks more supersonics.

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Preliminary State/Defense thinking is in attached position paper, but many of us feel that the tone is too soft to move Ayub, while there are too many goodies offered to make the tough talk believable. Ayub is trying a hard line on us, while letting his own domestic situation get out of control. Unless we jar him out of these tactics, he'll lose and so will we.

Latest word is that Ayub may not be available till later than the 20th, which will give us more time to devise our pitch.

R. W. Komer

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August 12, 1963

File Pak Mission
(Ball Mission)
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MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Today's session is so you can call the signals for Ball mission--the latest step in our continuing effort to bring Ayub around toward accepting our Indian policy.

Despite Ayub's repeated assurances to us (e.g. talk with McCaughy), his own public statements (and Bhutto's) have a quite different tone. We also get disturbing reports about Chicom officers in Pakistan, and Pak press is still having a pro-Chicom, anti-US field day. Latest ploy is the obvious stall on Peshawar expansion, which we thought fully agreed in principle. All in all, Ayub is mounting a major pressure campaign on us and India--which we want to convince him is counterproductive on all scores.

Since we think Paks realize they can't do without immense US aid, Ball's job is to warn Ayub that if he goes any further down present road, he'll be jeopardizing the immense aid we presently give him--and which is the real guarantee of Pakistan's viability and security. We also want to tell Paks that playing up to China is just the wrong way to get Kashmir, and undermines our own efforts to get the Paks half a loaf.

If Ayub responded, original Ball scenario called for our then saying what we were prepared to do for him, e.g. Tarbela and 3-year MAP program including 24 more F-104s in 1965 and 1966. But we now feel this would simply convince Ayub we were in fact succumbing to his pressure. Instead let's wait and see if Paks respond to Ball. And rather than appear to offer new bakshesh for Peshawar, let's make Paks come through on this commitment (which we paid for during 1961 visit) as a test of their relationship with us.

Issues for Discussion (suggest you hear argument on each of these).

1. Tone of Ball Approach. Since Ayub is most persuasive and this is Ball's first shot at him, you ought to charge George to hit Ayub hard. If he ends up with Ayub conning him, our effort will be wasted. Ayub must understand we can't continue to pay all his bills if he's undermining our Chicom policy.

2. Reassurance to Ayub. He now argues that if we're determined to go ahead with MAP for India, we should give balancing aid to the Paks so they can defend themselves. Our line must be that we aren't helping India against Pakistan, nor will we get involved in paying Paks for privilege of helping India. In any case Pakistan can't hope to match far larger India. We've said we'll back Paks if Indians do attack (which we gravely doubt, since it would cost India over a billion in Western aid).

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3. Joint Planning, Indian Ocean Task Force. But many of us, including Harriman, feel our assurances lack credibility unless bolstered by telling Paks a little about how we could back them quickly. Here is the old issue of whether to reveal contingency plans (we do in NATO--why not with our other allies). It would help if Ball could say we're considering deployment of a few carriers to Indian Ocean--which could be used against Indians or Paks.

4. Peshawar. Instead of letting Paks blackmail us, first gambit should be to turn tables on them, and say we expect them to come through as allies lest we cut our aid. If this fails, we still have option of paying more later.

5. Supersonics to Paks. Even if we hold this off awhile, Paks will keep pressing for a modernized air force (though it buys us little militarily). But Indians will react violently unless we tell them we're prepared to give them supersonics too. And Soviets will no doubt come in with a spoiling offer to India. Since the USSR may offer more MIGs anyway (and Indians may buy even if we make a prior offer), an offer to India as well as Pakistan seems "politically" desirable soon.

6. Kashmir. Ball's brief says we'll keep pressing mediation, if only to cover us through aid debate here and to forestall Paks raising issue in GA. But many of us share Bowles' view Indians may no longer buy mediation, so let's not press this to point of another blow-up with Nehru (since Paks aren't ready to compromise anyway). With Indians again in a position to play us off against Soviets, we have to tread softly for a while.

7. Press Handling. It's essential we not let the Pak press play up Ball visit as a trip to Canossa, or the Indians play it as US reversion to Pak-loving. This will take some shrewd backgrounding.

R. W. KOMER

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Authority FRUS, XIX, '61-'63, p. 635

By pw, NARA, Date 12-18-96

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Poh + Br...
August 12, 1963
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Meeting with the President on Pakistan, 12 August 1963 at 5 p. m.

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State

Secretary Rusk

Undersecretary Ball

Governor Harriman

Asst. Secretary Talbot

Administrator Bell, AID

Turner Cameron, NEA

Department of Defense

William Bundy

Brig. General Charles Johnson

CIA

John McCone, Director

James Critchfield

White House

McG. Bundy

R. W. Komer

Secretary Ball described his mission as being to tell Ayub where we are going and to find out where he is going. The core of the problem is that Ayub can't defend himself against India so has to rely on us. Our problem is to reassure him that our commitment to defend him is credible. The question is what we can do to make our assurances more credible. Ball suggested we might talk about a possible Indian Ocean carrier task force, joint exercises, extending planned airlift demonstrations through Turkey to Pakistan, etc. He wasn't talking of joint planning -- this would create real problems with India -- but of things we could do short of this. We had given Ayub materiel; what was lacking was evidence we would back him if attacked.

Bill Bundy explained some of the complications involved, e. g. it took three carriers to keep one on station. There was also the problem of where to base them in the area. Joint exercises might be feasible, and we had earlier offered one to Ayub. It might also be possible to demonstrate our airlift capability, though probably with a smaller unit than we were planning to send to Turkey. The President said we should "talk with McNamara" before mentioning any carrier task force; otherwise we might upset our present carrier plans. At this point we should just talk about how fast we could get carriers there if necessary. Bill Bundy felt the best gambit would be joint exercises against the contingency of an attack through Afghanistan, which would implicitly show the Paks how we could support them against India too. Rusk felt planning against Afghanistan was hardly a good noise, just at the time when things were going our way, and the Afghan King was coming here. Talbot interposed that what Ayub really wants is less reassurances against Indian attack than that we will not help India militarily.

At the President's request, Bill Bundy explained what military aid we were currently giving India and planning over the next two years. The various tranches added up to \$75-100 million in FY 1964, depending of course on the appropriations outcome. On the Pak side we had made a big delivery push

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this year, amounting to about \$58 million. In fact we delivered more firepower to Pakistan than to India. Over the next few years our military aid ought to balance out at about 2-1 in favor of India over Pakistan. The President wondered what Ball could say about comparative aid to India and Pakistan; Ayub wouldn't like a 2-1 ratio.

Harriman thought the real problem was that Ayub wants to take care of the Indian threat himself. We have got to convince him he can't but must depend on us. This is why credible assurances are necessary. In fact, the Indians are now fearful that the Paks will attack them, so India wants reassurances too. Thus the nub of the problem is how to convince Ayub we mean what we say. If we demand that Ayub stop his flirtation with China, we must give him confidence we will protect him. The President queried whether Ayub was really trying to use us to solve Kashmir. What could Ball say to him that would be helpful? Harriman's answer was to tell Ayub he couldn't get along without us. While we can't go to joint planning against India, we can give credible evidence of our ability to support Pakistan.

Talbot said that Ball's job was not just to reassure Ayub against Indian aggression but to stress our primary interest in the threat to the north, which demanded Pak/Indian reconciliation if it was to be met effectively. McCone thought it would be difficult to keep Ayub off the track of worrying about India.

The President doubted that Ayub was worried militarily about the Indians. He wanted to use us against the Indians on Kashmir and we couldn't give this to him. So what could we offer him? There wasn't much for Ball to say except to repeat our position. We weren't getting much from the Pakistanis either. About all the alliance was worth to us was the intelligence facilities. He asked about the apparent slow-down in negotiations. McCone explained that since 15 June the Paks had been stalling on the final agreement for Peshawar expansion, amid growing criticism of the US. McCone feared that the next Pak move would be to cut back on existing facilities which he stressed were far more important than the expansion. In response to Rusk's question, he saw no alternative option elsewhere to expansion of Peshawar. It gave us a 30% increase in efficiency, much better coverage of China, and a more flexible arrangement.

The President reverted to what Ball could say that would convince Ayub. Ball replied we could warn him about coming trouble on the Hill, citing the Broomfield Amendment which almost passed. McGeorge Bundy felt that simply to say "disagreeable words" was worth the effort. Harriman adverted to the thought that the Paks were genuinely worried about an Indian attack, so we should study how we could reassure them. Rusk proposed the

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tactic of asking Ayub some direct questions. For example, did he want US military aid to continue? Did he want US support in event of an Indian attack? We should try and put the monkey on Ayub's back. Komer added that what Ball didn't say would be just as important as what he did. The Paks were mounting a pressure campaign on us, and to the extent that Ball did not respond by promising them additional aid, it would be a warning that such tactics wouldn't work.

The President seemed unsatisfied by these rejoinders and again asked "what precisely do we want to get from Ayub." We know each other's arguments, so the best we can do is remind them we don't like the Chicoms, get them to call off their distasteful press campaign, and tell them that Peshawar is vital to us so that if they don't play ball, we will give our aid to someone else. The President said he understood Ayub's arguments and could see his point of view. As seen by the Pakistani, India was a threat to their interests. However, we were right too in our position, so the best we could get was a "standoff." Ball rejoined that the Paks needed us more than we needed them. Ayub would pull back from his China gambit if we pressed him hard enough.

The President still didn't think that Ayub was really scared of India. What would the Indians get out of attacking Pakistan? They'd lose a billion dollars in Western aid. What Ayub was really worried about was that he was losing the capability to attack India successfully or at least to get his way vis-a-vis India. Rusk interjected that the Pakistani must know we could pulverize India with nuclear weapons. The President simply doubted that we could or would use nuclear weapons except if forced to against the Soviets. Bundy pointed out that this illustrated the value of an Indian Ocean task force with conventional capabilities. This would give us a little cushion out in the area. Rusk indicated he was dubious about any cut-back in our carrier force. For just this sort of reason he would want to take a close look at any such proposals. The President said he'd asked McNamara about an Indian Ocean squadron.

Talbot felt the real point was for Ball to make clear that Ayub's "gamesmanship" is now getting out of bounds. But the President asked why we were so worried about how far Ayub went with China? He couldn't be really serious about this. Bill Bundy indicated that while we wouldn't really be ready to talk about carriers for awhile, we could give Ayub some dope about how fast we could get out there if he were attacked. We could describe, for example, what we could do with the CASF. DOD would provide some ammunition to Mr. Ball.

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In response to the President's query as to whether Ball would say anything about MAP to Ayub, especially F-104s, Ball replied it was preferable to hold off any such discussions and make his mission a strictly political exercise. There was some discussion about giving supersonics to Pakistan and India. Bill Bundy pointed out we have to face this issue in the next MAP program in any case, because the Paks expected modernization of their air force. It was pointed out that the Soviets might give supersonics to India. The President's view was "Let's not give supersonics to the Paks if we don't to the Indians or vice versa." This led the President to ask again what Ball realistically expected to achieve. Ball answered that we would at least clarify to Ayub our views on his China gambit. The President asked how we would respond if he countered that the Indians were playing with the Russians. Ball felt we could argue this was different -- we have an alliance with the Paks and not with the Indians.

Komer raised the question of what Ball might say on Kashmir. Ball felt we should not "disengage" on this issue, partly because of the repercussions on the Hill. Rusk recalled that the Indians had agreed to mediation, but Komer pointed out they had recently changed their tune. McGeorge Bundy wondered whether the Paks were really much interested in mediation at this point. If the Paks raised the issue in the UN, we could use the President's new policy of "abstention".

Talbot asked about press treatment. When news of the trip got out he favored as neutral a press guidance as possible. We should simply say that Ball was going out at the President's request to discuss US/Pakistani relations. Ball agreed that neutral treatment was best, although both the Paks and Indians were going to speculate widely on his purpose.

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

*India -
Ball mission
102*

August 12, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. GEORGE BALL:

Subject: Scope Paper: Under Secretary Ball's
Mission to Pakistan - August, 1963

My principal reservation is that there is no indication in the scope paper that you should be given authority to explain to President Ayub what the United States would do in the unlikely event that India attacked. This might be a broad statement, leaving details to be discussed when General Taylor visits Pakistan. By this time, a decision might have been reached on the stationing of a U.S. carrier task force in the Indian Ocean.

My other comment is minor: In the first paragraph, on the "Problem," add at the end of the first line, "and if possible reverse this trend."

W. Averell Harriman

Copy to Mr. Talbot

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 87-212

By *sig* NARA, Date 7-7-89

~~SECRET~~

M:WAHarriman:hbs

AUG 13 1963

102
Revised 8/28/63

~~SECRET~~

17

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MR. BALL'S MISSION TO
PAKISTAN, SEPTEMBER 1963

I

Your mission should be regarded as designed to continue and expand conversations which Governor Harriman had with President Ayub in November, 1962, and which the Secretary had with him in April, 1963. You should, therefore, draw as appropriate on the instructions prepared for Governor Harriman's meetings and regard the theme and spirit of those instructions as your principal guidance.

II

In your talks with President Ayub you should try to obtain:

1. A clearly stated definition of Pakistan policy towards the Chinese Communists and an assurance that the Government of Pakistan will not adopt a posture towards or extend further its involvement with the Chinese Communists to the detriment of the alliance relationship.

2. Recognition

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / RAC 11-9
By LVB NARA, Date 07-16-12

~~SECRET~~

AUG 29 1963

~~SECRET~~

-2-

2. Recognition that public attacks on the U.S. and the alliance relationship have gone too far and that he must take steps to reverse this trend.


3. A statement by President Ayub that he is willing to live with a version of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance relationship compatible with continued Western military assistance to India designed to increase India's capacity to resist Chinese Communist pressure.

4. An understanding that Kashmir is a subcontinental problem, not a U.S. problem. His moves towards Communist China and his refusal to recognize the Chinese threat to the subcontinent have reduced sharply our ability to help in the resolution of this problem. More specific instructions on the line you should take on the Kashmir mediation proposal will be sent to you in time for your talks with Ayub.

~~SECRET~~

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-3-



III

If the conversation otherwise goes well and you feel it necessary or useful to increase in Ayub's eyes the credibility of our assurances that we would come to his assistance if Pakistan were subjected to aggression from any source, you are authorized:

1. To reaffirm U.S. assurances to Pakistan (see proposed language for inclusion in possible communique).
2. To offer to participate in an extensive joint military exercise.
3. To offer a joint U.S.-Pakistan military study of the Sino-Soviet threat to Pakistan.

4. To offer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

4. To offer to consider the pre-stockage of military supplies and equipment in Pakistan.

If you are satisfied that Ayub understands our position and is prepared to make his contributions to the alliance, you are authorized to tell him that we are prepared to have a high ranking military officer visit Pakistan in the near future to discuss our MAP plans for the next three years. You can also tell Ayub that we are actively working with the Indus Fund and the Bank to devise some way of being more responsive to Pakistan's desire for the construction of the Tarbela Dam.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

September 9, 1963

*Ball
Museum
+ Pak
108*

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

We take it you are satisfied with proposed tactic of sitting tight for awhile on Pakistani issues, waiting to see if in fact we have moved Ayub.

The first omens seem favorable. Ayub just called in McConeughy privately (Karachi 526) to suggest Paks might be able to live after all with our aid to India, if we gave Paks more MAP too. This fallback position tends to support thesis Paks have been procuring us, and are shaken that Ball brought no carrots.

Even if George didn't put up a strong front he gave away nothing; the more the Paks reflect on this, the more it may impress them. No need to make up our own minds until more returns are in; we'll see what Bhutto has to say when he comes the 24th.

There are other signs Paks may be coming around a bit: (1) caving of key anti-US propaganda officials Shahab and Saxiras; (2) switch of chief opposition party to pro-US stand; (3) Ayub's apparent move against Dawn and rumored general press curbs.

3.4(b)(1)

While you were out of the room today, McNamara eloquently pled the same line Harriman and I have argued. We can't ever build up Pakistan enough to balance far larger India (nor do we want to). What we can give it, however, is a credible guarantee that we won't let India knock it over. Chicomé can't really match this; they're too far away. So we should take this line when Bhutto is here, and then have Taylor plug it when he goes out for CENTO meeting.

Meanwhile Bowles has come in with a lengthy pleading of India's case (Delhi 972 attached). Some of his ideas are little more viable than Ayub's, but it's hard to argue with his basic premises.

All in all, I'd urge we sit back and rethink Pak-Indian matters. We're not going to get Kashmir going again, and we may not end up with enough MAP to meet either Pak or Indian demands. So perhaps we should relax and let them come to us for a change.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI/RAC 01-61

By SJ NARA, Date 12-11-01

R. W. KOMER

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS, XIX, '61-63, p. 675

By ju, NARA, Date 12-18-96

September 9, 1963

SECRET

File
Ball Mission
x India

109

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Meeting with the President on Ball Mission to Pakistan, 9 September 1963

PRESENT:

The President

State

Secretary Rusk

Under Secretary Ball

Under Secretary Harriman

Dep. Under Secretary Johnson

Asst. Secretary Talbot

Defense

Secretary McNamara

Paul Nitze

General Quinn

White House

McG. Bundy

R. W. Komer

CIA

John McCone

Under Secretary Ball summed up his impressions of Pakistani visit. He thought central thrust of Pak policy was deep, obsessive fear of India. We were mistaken if we thought this merely tactical. Rusk asked for a look at whether this fear had grown in last few years--he thought it had. Harriman commented that when he saw Ayub in '55 latter was optimistic over Indo-Pak settlement, but no longer. Ball continued that what touched off the current outburst of Pak fears was US military aid; they feel they'll be overrun--East Pakistan manifestly was indefensible. But they want the old 3-1 ratio maintained at least. Their main pitch to Ball was to stop US aid to India; but now they've conceded to McCone they can't get this, so they want more balancing MAP from us.

Ball went on to say that Ayub's own domestic position is not as secure as it was; strong popular sentiment exists for a deal with China. The rationale is that, after all, Americans condone Indian-Russian relationship. But this line was not to Ayub's personal taste or Bhutto's. When Ball pressed Ayub about precise meaning of Pak intent to go on "normalizing relations", Ayub was extremely fuzzy. He was categorical that alliance with Peking was not what they had in mind. Nor would they pull out of CENTO and SEATO. So what it seemed to come down to was increased trade relations, perhaps cultural relations too. Ayub felt he had to go this far for domestic political reasons, but would go any further. So Ball saw this as an empty threat. He had no real fear they'll go very far down road toward China and USSR, unless "pushed to the wall" as Ayub put it.

The President asked about Peshawar. Ball replied that when he taxed Ayub privately, the latter admitted he'd made "2/3 of a commitment" to McCone. He needed more time since Assembly was in session but intended to go ahead with expansion.

SECRET

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2.

Rusk asked if Ayub knew how little we were actually doing with the Indians. Ball said this never really came up. Quinn thought the Paks really knew; their intelligence was excellent. Ball said it must be understood that the Paks were not wholly rational on this issue. They were reacting to the very fact we were helping, not so much to the amount of help.

Ayub had dismissed Ball's suggestions for closer military relations with us, because he feared we'd take this as carte blanche to go ahead with MAP for India. Ball summed up by saying we should re-examine the Pak-Indian military balance. Perhaps we should give supersonics to neither. In the meantime, "let's be cagy with Bhutto when he comes". We could go ahead with some economic aid before Bhutto comes, but not the airport loan. We were not at any point of immediate crisis; "Ayub said they wouldn't do anything stupid." The visit gave him a chance to blow off steam. We also need to do enough for Ayub to permit him to hold his position, because he's a lot better than anyone else in Pakistan.

The President asked why Ayub had no interest in pre-positioning, etc. Ball said he feared we would take this as putting us in a position to go ahead with India. Quinn further elaborated on their position as being that CENTO planning took care of the Communist threat, so there was no use in bilateral planning unless we were ready for planning against India.

The President left the room at this point. Mr. Ball, continuing the discussion, suggested that we not resist too much any little gestures of the Paks toward Peking because then they have less incentive to try them. Perhaps we shouldn't have objected to the civil air agreement.

Rusk asked how about pre-stocking equipment for India in Pakistan, to be released only in event of Chicom attack. Perhaps this was grasping for straws. Talbot felt the Indians wouldn't be very happy over this.

McNamara was certain that over the next six months the Paks would become interested in the dual-purpose moves we proposed. If General Taylor stopped in Pakistan in early November, on his way back from CENTO and re-raised these matters, he might get a ^{pretty} good response.

Ball interjected that the Paks feared India, with our help, would create two armies, one to block the Chinese and the other to take on Pakistan. McNamara agreed with the Pak feeling that they had a serious military problem. Indians could reach a level when they could lick the Paks soon. It wasn't US military aid that created this problem, but India's increase in its own military budget from around a \$750 million level before the Chicom attack

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3.

to \$1.8-\$2 billion later. Our aid to India was marginal so far. But we couldn't build up Pakistan to the point where it matched far larger India. The only useful counter for the Paks was not US military aid, but the promise of US military support if they were attacked. Since the Paks couldn't possibly match Indians, they'd increasingly look to us for the military guarantee China couldn't really give them. It was too far away. So let's pursue this line when Bhutto is here, and then when Taylor goes out.

Rusk asked whether the real problem was fear of India or Pak fear that an Indian buildup would prevent Pak military pressure on India over Kashmir.

The President returned to the room, and Secretary Rusk summarized the sense of the meeting: (1) We had reasonable assurance the Paks won't withdraw from CENTO or SEATO; (2) We had reasonable assurance on continued use of Peshawar and a fair prospect they will go ahead with expansion; (3) We were not so sure there wouldn't be further flirtations with the Chinese. However, Ball commented that these were unlikely to go very far and we should not make too much noise about them. Ball couldn't believe that they'd go as far as defense relations with the Chinese. Rusk was not so sure, so felt we should look at the alternative possibilities.

The President wondered if there wasn't danger of an informal understanding that the Paks would attack India if the Chicombs did. Ball and Quinn both thought this highly unlikely. The Paks didn't want to get overcommitted to Peking. Ball's visit would also produce some Pak second thoughts, as was already evident from Ayub's subsequent talk with McCaughy.

The President asked about Joe Alsop's thesis that the Chicombs just might attack again. Bundy said CIA doesn't think so; Joe was just sniffing the fearful air of New Delhi.

After Mr. Ball described how General Quinn had beaten Ayub at golf, despite Ball's orders, Quinn briefly described the difference in Pak and US estimates of the Chicom threat. In essence there was only minor disagreement over capabilities, but a larger one on intentions. The Paks just didn't think the Chicombs would attack again, but we saw this as a possibility.

(the meeting then turned to the Lisbon visit)

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

September 2, 1961

McGB -

Item. At Ball session this morning McNamara joined the Harriman-Komer line that we can't possibly build up Paks to point where they match India; but what we can do is really underwrite Paks against Indian take-over. In this connection, Averell simply cannot understand why we couldn't tell Paks in general how we'd come militarily to their support if Indians attacked. He is completely unpersuaded by Pentagon argument this reveals our hand, and wonders if you and I can't plug this line with Taylor. I agree, as you know, that our credibility in Iran, Israel, and other spots besides Pakistan would be served by more candor.

File
Ball
X memo & mcg
10h

3.4(b)(1)

Item. M. J. Desai wrote Indian Minister Dax that Ghosh told them he was coming here "because of the interest of McGeorge Bundy" in his US/USSR proposition. He did not see Nehru before coming, and State thinks the idea is exclusively his own promotion. Query-- what if he does go to Khrushchev and represents you as being in favor?

Item. Malaysia hassle could just become more dangerous than WNG (or as bad as Vietnam) unless we turn Sukarno and Macapagal aside. Do consider whether a bit of JFK preventive diplomacy might not be a good investment. I hate to keep proposing letters but, by gum, they have worked.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-61
By SJ, NARA, Date 12/1/01

~~SECRET~~

September 10, 1963

*File
Munich
Bull
10i*

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BALI

I'd like you to know that the more I mull the returns, the more my own sense is that your Pak mission is paying off.

Ayub's promptly calling in McConaughy to suggest Paks might be able to live after all with our aid to India if we gave Paks more MAF too suggests that you shook them. The very fact that you offered no real carrots and kept boring in on risks to them if they went too far toward China will in my judgment sink in.

3.4(b)(1)

[Redacted]

3.4(b)(1)

[Redacted]

(3) Ayub's apparent move against Dawn and rumored general press curbs.

So our strategy is working and as you say we ought to sit tight. While I wouldn't shade one whit your sense of real depth of Pak security concerns, I'd argue that Ayub is a realist and means it when he says he won't do anything "stupid."

New business -- Mac and I hope to get the President to jog DOD again on Indian Ocean task force, which we see as best multi-purpose means of enhancing our credibility in the whole area, including Pakistan. When you talk with Chiefs Friday, you might also strike a blow.

R. W. KOMER

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-61 + NLJ 88-163
By 81, NARA, Date 12-12-01

11

A-6

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Pak & Bhutto
October 3, 1963

11a

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Your talk with Bhutto at 4 p.m. tomorrow assumes special importance because of divided counsels in both the US and Pak governments. Here George Ball may not have recovered from the full treatment Ayub gave him. For example, he is still toying with the idea of cutting off military aid to India. This horrifies Talbot and company, who feel frozen out by Ball.

As to the Pakistanis, we see Ayub as increasingly disillusioned with Bhutto and the Foreign Office crowd which plugged the Chicoms flirtation as a means of pressure on the US. If so, he'll listen more to pro-US advisors like Sholab, whose talk with Talbot (attached) is an eye-opener. McConaughy also thinks Bhutto's days are numbered. Another straw in the wind is that Ayub has sharply damped down the violent anti-US press campaign.

If we read these signs right, then our strategy of resisting the Pak pressure campaign is succeeding. But unless we can finally convince the Paks that they can't blackmail us, they won't settle for what we can give them (which is plenty). So we must impress on Bhutto that (1) despite its fear of India, we cannot give Pakistan a veto on our Indian policy; (2) but what we can continue to give the Paks, if they play ball with us, is solid reassurance against re-absorption by India. In short, we cannot build Pakistan up to where it is as strong as India, but we can protect it against what it most fears.

On how to make these reassurances credible, there is also disagreement within the USG. Ball offered the Paks: (1) a combined exercise; (2) bilateral planning against the Communist threat; (3) possible pre-stockage of equipment; and (4) public restatement of our reassurances against Indian aggression. Ayub turned these down as inefficient. Harriman and others of us believe we should frankly tell the Paks how we would come to their support against India, and buttress this assurance by deploying a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean (which would also serve many other purposes). However, DOD is highly reluctant, while some in State argue that too much reassurance to Pakistan would only encourage extremist policies toward India. These issues can be worked out in time for Taylor to carry the message when he goes to CENTO meeting in November.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-71
By Sj, NARA Date 7-17-01

~~SECRET~~

2.

Ball's first talk with Bhutto today nets out fairly well. Ball told him we accept Pakistan's deep fear of India as a political fact, however much we disagree. Similarly, we expect Pakistan to accept as a fact of life our continuing military aid to India; here the Paks in turn may disagree with our logic but we are going ahead. Bhutto seemed to accept these propositions, and suggested we talk about their logical outcome, i.e. how do we accommodate their fear of India.

The Paks seem to be angling for more MAP here, but aside from our shrunken aid appropriation, we can't pay double for everything we give India. Yet unless we can straighten the Paks out, we'll continue to have nothing but trouble in every move we make. The process of bringing the Paks around is already well advanced, if only we'll stick to our guns. So I'd urge you further underline the new basis of our Pakistani relationship:

(1) We value our ties with Pakistan. They have been of help to us, especially in intelligence terms, but have been even more beneficial to Paks. We've underwritten Pak development and supported Pak military, to tune of over \$3 billion. Paks, in turn, have not committed a single soldier to SEATO or CENTO.

(2) Nevertheless, we are prepared to continue the alliance relationship so long as Paks hold firm to it. But this means:

a. We cannot give Pakistan a veto on our Indian policy. We will continue to back the Indians against the Chicomcs, because we're convinced India is serious. If Paks insist price of alliance with them is veto on help to India, we'll have to re-examine our Pak alliance.

b. But we will continue to take Pak interests into account in our Indian policy. We have done this to date, with scant credit from our Pak friends (who grossly overestimate MAP to India, which is still nothing compared to what we've already given Paks).

c. Even so, Paks have chosen to play games with Chicomcs to bring pressure on us and Indians (we think Bhutto is architect of this policy). We are tolerant of this (though we think it foolish) so long as it doesn't go too far. But if Pakistan goes as far as defensive ties with Peiping against Delhi, this would be wholly inconsistent with SEATO/CENTO ties and remove basis for US military aid.

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3.

(3) On other hand, we can assure Pakistan categorically against what it so fears--re-absorption by far larger India. Most important, our development aid to Pakistan (2nd largest US aid recipient) is making it a viable state. Second, we are equipping Pak army. Third, we are fully prepared to support Pakistan effectively in remote event of Indian aggression.

(4) Frankly, we see no likelihood of such aggression. India would sacrifice a billion dollars annually in Western aid to acquire 100 million indigestible Muslims. This would be madness indeed. From now on, moreover, India cannot concentrate its forces against Pakistan without protecting its Chinese flank.

(5) Nonetheless, if clearcut aggression did occur US could cut off all food shipments on which India lives, blockade Indian ports, bring overwhelming air and sea power to bear. Indians know this--Goa is hardly to be equated with Pakistan.

(6) So we want Bhutto to tell Ayub we stand by our alliance pledges. Our alliance is not directed against India, but we will not permit India to absorb an ally. In turn, we expect the Paks to live up to their alliance pledges to us, and to live with the fact that the US sees its global responsibilities somewhat differently than Paks see their own national aims.

- - - - -

State has provided a softer brief, but my sense is that a straight-forward line is better calculated to cap the process of moving the Paks (and getting Ayub to rain in Bhutto). Bhutto loves to debate, so I'd urge you pull an Ayub and preempt the stage. Otherwise, you may be in for a more polished repeat of the Aziz Ahmed line.

R. W. KOMER

Attach. Memcon dtd 9/30/63 subj.
Pakistan/US Relations (Talbot-Shoaib)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

October 9, 1963

THE PRESIDENT

One reason why you can be quite frank with Shoaib is that he obviously doesn't care for Bhutto policy toward China (or Bhutto). So he'd be likely to pass fully to Ayub any criticism of it. This is all the more necessary because Pak press is billing Bhutto as having gotten US "OK" that normalization with Peking can continue.

However, no point in raising past moves. With both Dillon and Talbot, Shoaib explained these (border settlement, civil air agreement, etc.) away as trivial. Our pitch is that, however trivial, such moves give Pakistan a bad name here and give India an excuse to procrastinate (Nehru just told news conference today he ruled out any Kashmir mediation so long as Paks continued to have "close relations with China".)

Our aid to Pakistan totalled \$420 million in FY'63 (\$177 million DL, \$186 in PL 480, etc.). We hope to go higher this year (\$432--depending on Hill cuts and Pak absorption capacity).

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Att: Cy, RWK Memo to President, 10/8/63,
re Shoaib Visit

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-16-01

file
Pak
X Shoaib Visit

118

~~SECRET~~

October 10, 1963

File 11c
Pak
Shoaib

MAC -

JFK-Shoaib session did not go as well as I hoped (nor did JFK-Bhutto). JFK seemed too preoccupied to pay much attention to brief, and I now see him as preferring a softer line to jolly along the Paks than I had proposed.

Next phase will be Taylor "reassurance" exercise (incidentally Taylor is reportedly quite miffed that Ball signed him on with no more "by your leave" than a casual remark at State/JCS meeting many moons earlier). JFK merely followed Ball line, but question is now whether Taylor should be a personal envoy; I've tentatively said "no."

By asking Paks "what reassurances can we give you", we're courting trouble. Their bill will be high and half the people in town are willing to pay it. I'll keep a close eye out.

RWK

Attach. Memcon dtd 10/9/63
JFK/Shoaib

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-163
By mg NARA, Date 8-17-89

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

October 9, 1963

Participants: The President
Pakistan Finance Minister Shoaib
R. W. Komer

The President warmly welcomed Minister Shoaib and said he appreciated the opportunity to talk with him. As a result of the recent Ball-Bhutto conversations, Mr. Ball's earlier visit to Rawalpindi and the President's own talk with Bhutto, we now well understood Pakistan's concerns. We realized that the Pakistani fear we are making India too strong and that this may create an ultimate threat to Pakistan. We don't agree with this proposition; we have a different view of Indian motives and Indian strength; nonetheless, we want to help reassure our Pakistani friends to the extent possible. Therefore, General Taylor would be coming out to discuss the military aspects of this problem. The President added that we and the Paks had had more trouble with each other over the last nine months than seemed necessary; the Pakistani press in particular seemed to take a very dim view of us as an ally, and the Pak Government seemed to be going rather far toward Communist China.

Shoaib replied that he thought the worst of our difficulties were now over. President Ayub wanted to go only so far with China. For ideological reasons, Pakistan could only go so far. It had no love for China, and was still anxious to preserve its good relations with the United States. In fact, said Shoaib, "we can't afford to burn our bridges with the US." He granted that the totality of recent Pak moves toward China might give us cause for concern. However, each of these moves could be explained individually as of only minor importance. He explained the background of the border agreement, the civil air agreement, and the recent trade agreements with Communist countries.

Shoaib then pointed out that things were very far from normal with India. He deplored the latest Indian move "toward integrating Kashmir into India" as another example of how the Indians were making a reasonable Kashmir settlement impossible. What really bothered Ayub was that India might use whatever help the U.S. gave it against Pakistan. Neither he nor the three Pakistan commanders-in-chief wanted to go too far with China, but all were afraid of the Indians. India had already mobilized three times against Pakistan in the last fifteen years. General Musa, whom Shoaib fervently assured the President was a great friend of the US, said he could not understand why the Indians had to be armed. They would not

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-16-01

~~SECRET~~

really fight against the Chinese but they might turn on Pakistan. The basis of this ingrained fear of India was the 1947 partition and the accompanying massacres of a million people--Hindu as well as Moslem. This led in turn to the Kashmir dispute; Kashmir was like a constant thorn in Pakistan's side.

The President asked why the Pakistani seemed so bitter against us when we had done so much for Pakistan, including all our efforts on Kashmir. Shoaib's reply was "because we look on you as friends we expect a little more of you." He explained that Ayub had a local political problem too. As for the press, its hostility was largely because it thought it was hurting the Ayub government by attacking the US. Shoaib explained that Dawn and Altaf Hussain were bitterly anti-regime, to the point where Ayub refused to see Hussain. However, Shoaib had told Ayub several weeks ago that the Pakistan press was succeeding in doing what the Indians had failed to do in twelve years, i. e. to drive a wedge between Pakistan and the US. Ayub had taken steps to calm the press down and there had been much less press outcry in the weeks since the Ball mission.

The President acknowledged this, and went on to say that what we were doing for India in a military way had been greatly exaggerated. India had asked for a billion dollars in arms, we were giving it only \$50 million worth this year. Taylor could tell the Pakistani military where we were going with India. We were helping India because of the Chinese threat. The Chinese might not attack again this fall but then again they might. So we felt continued help was necessary. If we could explain the reasons for our aid to the Pakistani, if we could develop some additional reassurances to them, we should be able to surmount the current difficulties in our relations.

Shoaib replied that the Pakistani didn't think the Chinese Communists would attack this fall. He, Shoaib, agreed that the main thrust of the Chinese Communists would eventually be towards South Asia, but this was not likely for the next 15-20 years. Shoaib had written an article for The Wall Street Journal some time ago advancing this viewpoint. But the current Chinese Communist thrust was towards Southeast Asia only.

The President asked Shoaib (who said he would be returning to Pakistan in two days) to tell Ayub we thought we could demonstrate why we saw a threat to India and also Pakistani, and why we didn't think India would be getting too strong as a result of what we were giving the Indians.

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- 3 -

This should ease matters between us. Shoaib agreed that "everything is settling down; the Pakistani press is quieter and Ayub has gotten over his chief domestic political difficulties."

The President indicated that we realized the Indians were not 'very good' on Kashmir, but Pakistan's China policy was giving India an excuse to avoid negotiations. Nehru had just said in a press conference that he wouldn't accept mediation as long as the Pakistani were moving closer to China. The President then asked Shoaib to tell President Ayub we hoped he could help out on the Malaysia dispute. We appreciated his help so far and hoped there might be something more he could do. Shoaib should also tell President Ayub we wanted to stay in close touch and to work matters out in a way which would preserve our basically good relations. Shoaib said he ventured to express one personal hope-- that we would still be able to do something about Kashmir; a solution here would go far to restore good Indian-Pak relations. The President ended by asking Shoaib to give his very warm regards to Ayub.

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As they went out to Shoaib's car, the Minister told Mr. Komer how pleased he was that Mr. Ball had arranged a chance for him to meet with the President. He was confident that matters would be on the upgrade from now on. He admitted that some of the Pakistani moves over the last several months had been at least partly politically inspired, especially the "silly business" of raising the Pakistani legation in Havana to an embassy. Mr. Komer commented on what a pity it was that Ayub had made his statesmanlike offer of joint defense with India in 1959, when Nehru had looked out the window; how much better it would have been if Ayub could have made this offer in October 1960. Shoaib emphatically agreed, saying that had he been in Pakistan at the time he would have advised Ayub to make precisely such an offer; regrettably, he had been in the United States.

R. W. Komer

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भारतीय राजदूतावास
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 11, 1963

My dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to transmit to you
a letter from the Prime Minister of India, which
has been received by this Embassy telegraphically.

With my high regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,

(B.K. NEHRU)
Ambassador of India

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

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New Delhi,
November 11, 1963

Dear Mr. President:

It is just about twelve months since the sudden Chinese attack along India's frontiers last autumn. Though the Chinese withdrew from the bulk of the area in the North East, where they had penetrated over 150 kilometres inside the Indian frontiers, they have resisted all attempts by Colombo Powers and others to get the status quo prior to the attack last autumn restored, fully or in part, in the North Eastern frontier in Ladakh. Since July, there has been a heavy concentration of Chinese troops, within 50 to 80 kilometres all along the Indian border. These troops have settled down in this area and constructed barracks, supply, ammunition and oil dumps, with gun emplacements etc., at strategic places. Just about this time in July/August, a group of about 300 Chinese soldiers intruded into North Burma and carried out a reconnaissance of the routes across North Burma towards the Indian border. The Burmese Government protested about this and these 300 Chinese soldiers are withdrawing this month into Chinese territory. It appears that the Chinese had made plans for an attack during August/September but, with the acute Sino-Soviet differences, they decided to postpone their plans till Chinese internal and external policies were reviewed in a meeting of the Chinese Communist party which is being held this month. This, to some extent, explains the toning down, during the last few days, of the propaganda barrage in the Sino-Soviet differences.

No one can predict what policies will emerge from the November meeting of the Chinese Communist party. We have, however, to continue the limited measures we have undertaken to strengthen our defence against the immediate and short-term Chinese threat. The loan of mobile radar and communications equipment and the supply of permanent radar equipment that will follow, coupled with the training exercises now being held, will give our Air Force personnel valuable equipment for, and training in, air defence. There has, however, been little progress in securing the machinery and equipment required for

defence ..

defence production and this has been causing us some worry. We will be grateful if something could be done to expedite the procurement of this machinery and equipment.

The Chinese threat to India, and to Asia generally, is however, essentially long term. The only way of meeting and containing this threat is to go ahead with plans of economic development as the battle between the Indian way of life and the Chinese way of life will be won or lost ultimately by the speed and the extent of progress on the development front. We have had to accept heavy additional sacrifices to build up limited defence against the Chinese physical threat and to ask for assistance in equipment, particularly for defence production to equip and support the additional divisions required to resist the Chinese pressure. Our defence programme, however, is limited to the minimum required and we want to concentrate our energies and resources on the vital task of economic development.

It is to us a matter of great regret that our other neighbour, Pakistan, with whose people we have so many common ties, should resort to opportunist expedients and continue to harrass and vilify us during the emergency created by the Chinese attack and even threaten to go further in aligning itself with Peking than it has done hitherto, unless defence and development aid to India was stopped or heavily curtailed. Despite the fact that we have offered them a "No War" agreement and other assurances, and your Government has given repeated assurances that there is no Indian threat to Pakistan, the Pakistan leaders are making all sorts of wild statements about Pakistan being in danger and creating a hysterical war psychosis amongst the people of Pakistan. We will continue to be calm and restrained and refuse to be provoked and hope that the atmosphere between the two countries will improve some time later when Indo-Pak relations can be developed along co-operative and friendly lines.

The growing Sino-Soviet differences during the last few years which have come out in the open in such a dramatic manner in the last few months, present an extremely important development requiring adjustment in

our thinking. ...

our thinking. We feel that the limited rapprochement between your great country and the U.S.S.R., evidenced by the partial Test Ban Treaty, is a very good beginning. If that new developing situation is carefully handled, there are possibilities of reaching satisfactory agreements on other questions connected with disarmament which have a vital bearing on the important issue before the world today, viz., the issue of war or peace.

We propose to continue our policy of non-involvement with one group or the other, while being friendly to both, so far as Governments headed by your great country and the U.S.S.R. are concerned, because we feel that this is the best policy both in our own interest and in the interest of world peace and harmony. We do not, however, propose to submit to pressures from Peking and will, while going ahead as rapidly as possible, with our plans of economic development, undertake all additional sacrifices necessary to build up the necessary minimum defence potential required to resist the Chinese threat.

While on this question of Sino-Soviet differences, I would like to mention that it is important that this new development connected with Sino-Soviet differences should be carefully studied and a fully coordinated policy worked out by all countries interested in world peace and peaceful relations between countries. We are concerned at the overtures to China being made by France, U.K., Japan and even countries like the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden, with offers of vital equipment and machinery for aircraft production, oil refineries, chemical plants, etc. Such policies, dictated by the lure of short-term political gains or commercial profits will create a situation which may pose a serious threat not only to us in Asia, but to the peace of the world. I am sure active thinking is going on on this subject amongst your experts.

This is rather a long message, but I was tempted by the concluding paragraph of your message of September 5, on the Bokaro Steel project, to share with you my thoughts on this developing situation.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

(Sgd.) Jawaharlal Nehru