


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B-1

MEMORANDUM

SANITIZED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14a
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLS 97-434
By cb . NARA Date 6-7-00

~~SECRET~~

September 9, 1965
9:00 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a hasty review of your decisions and guidelines on India/Pak matters. It's doubtless incomplete but forms a pretty coherent picture.

November 1963. You saw Bhutto twice while he was here for President Kennedy's funeral, the second time to receive a note from Ayub. You told him you were "a friend of Pakistan and would try to continue to be one if Pakistan would let you." You reminded him we were paying "great attention" to Chinese Communist actions and were therefore concerned about the scheduled Chicom state visit to Pakistan. You "wanted him to know there would be a problem of public relations in this country if Pakistan should build up its public relations with Communist China." You said you were not pro-Pakistani or pro-Indian but pro-Free World. "The United States was not going to let anyone attack Pakistan. But it was going to be increasingly difficult for us in this country when Pakistan invited the Chinese Communists for state visits."

9 December 1963. Letter thanking Ayub for message delivered by Bhutto also underscored your concern over Pakistan's several recent "actions which redound to the advantage of Communist China," especially the state visit planned for February 1964. "Regardless of Pakistan's motivations, which I understand but frankly cannot agree with, these actions undermine our efforts to uphold our common security interests in the face of an aggressive nation which has clearly and most explicitly announced its unswerving hostility to the Free World." You said you were aware of his "intensity of feelings" about India and reminded him "we have given--solemnly and with full awareness of their significance and importance--assurances that we would come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of aggression from India."

30 January 1964. You replied to Ayub letter explaining that he had asked for a Security Council meeting because India had begun to "integrate" Kashmir. While we would help wherever we could, we continued to believe that the Kashmir problem would have to be settled between India and Pakistan, not by a solution imposed from outside.

8 February 1964. You signed NSAM 279 on "Military Assistance to India and Pakistan." You approved "exploratory approaches looking toward possible five year MAP programs for India and Pakistan" but said you did not want us to discuss MAP levels yet with either country.

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- 2 -

3.4(b)(1),(6) We were to "make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military aid." You singled out for India holding down defense expenditures, so they wouldn't upset our economic program. In Pakistan, you required that "our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect to its alliance obligations [REDACTED]"

4 June 1964. You were to see Indian Defense Minister Chavan, but he had to leave suddenly because of Nehru's death. So you approved a press release and McNamara-Chavan memo outlining the agreements reached while Chavan was here. The Indians had produced a Five-Year Defense Plan; we agreed to \$50 million MAP in FY 65 but withheld any definite commitment beyond that. We also agreed to \$10 million credit in FY 64 for military purchases and \$50 million in FY 65.

7 July 1964. Ambassador Ahmed delivered a letter from Ayub spelling out the dangers of US military aid to India. You interrupted Ahmed's presentation to ask whether this explained Ayub's silence on requests for help in Vietnam, which had "shocked you." After an exchange on Ayub's statement that he might have to "reconsider" Pakistan's "commitments to her allies," you said you could not agree with Ayub's analysis but "guessed we were coming to the point at which we would all have to re-evaluate the condition of our relationship." This troubled you deeply because of your warm personal regard for Ayub and the Pak people.

15 July 1964. You reviewed US-Pak relations with McConaughy, who explained that Ayub felt we had not taken Pak views into account in developing MAP for India. You gave him an oral message to Ayub along these lines: "You had read Ayub's letter with considerable distress. You did not share Ayub's view that we were being disloyal to our alliance. You were distressed by his attentions to Communist China. You recognized Pakistan's right to re-examine its policies. We valued the Pak alliance, but we would have to re-examine our policies too, if Pakistan did." You then told McConaughy that you would decide after our election whether you wanted "to have Ayub here for a debating contest, or let Pakistan go its own way." You asked how much we were getting for the large amounts of aid we have given India and Pakistan, especially now that Ayub was no longer willing to help in Southeast Asia. You were not sure all our actions with India have been the wisest possible but we were set on that course and would see it through. Then after the election we should take a "long look" at our Indian policy over the next four years.

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- 3 -

July 29, 1964. You instructed McConaughy to give Ayub an oral message in response to Ayub's letter, including this point: "USG expected Pakistan to join the Free World effort in Vietnam and at least show the flag there."

1965

February 18, 1965. You wrote Ayub confirming your invitation for a Washington visit 24-30 April. 23 March 1965 letter invited Shastri.

April 14, 1965. You wrote Ayub: "I have ... reluctantly come to the view that this month is not a good time for the two of us to meet in Washington ... I think it would be in the interests of both our countries and contribute to the assurances of close and mutually helpful relations between us if we could postpone our meeting until later this year -- perhaps early in the fall... I shall, therefore, look forward to a full, frank and friendly discussion, but I do think it can be more profitable in a few months than at the moment." Similar letter to Shastri.

April 20, 1965. You told Mann you did not want to make any pledge to the Indian consortium till our aid bill was passed. Upon pleas that the pledge was due the next day, you authorized one only if it was sufficiently hedged by conditions that we were not obligated to any specific level or timing. After this, we put out a special White House request that all pending Pak/Indian aid decisions be cleared here first.

April 23, 1965. Following the above, we assembled for you a run-down on current Pak/Indian aid decisions. You approved four small loans, but disapproved any advances on FY 66 money because we might not even get an aid bill.

June 9, 1965. After a broad review of Bell-Mann recommendations on aid, you gave a go-ahead on loans already authorized and announced plus several others which Bell specified as nearly ready. But you also directed that there be no additional decisions, authorizations or announcements on loans to India or Pakistan without your approval, pending passage of the FY 66 aid appropriation. At the same time, you requested a State-AID review of India/Pak aid in the global context of making the best use of our aid money.

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- 4 -

3.4(b)(1),(6) 21 June 1965. You approved several tactical moves (stalling on MAP, stalling on the July Pak consortium meeting, thinking [redacted] that we fear a break with the Paks) to flesh out a harder line designed to make the Paks and Indians come to us. You elaborated to Mann and Komer why you felt unable to approve any US pledge until Congress had appropriated the funds. On June 30 (Deptel 1485) McConaughy was instructed to inform Shoaib and/or Ayub that "given fact US Congress has not yet completed its authorization action on aid bill, given fact that after authorization process is completed it will be necessary to go through a separate appropriation procedure in the Congress, given consortium meeting be postponed until after Congress adjourns." (Note: This message (Deptel 1485) conveyed by McConaughy "almost verbatim" to Ayub. "Ayub took the news quite hard -- worse than I had anticipated.")

July-August. Discussions of new India PL 480 agreement. In early July, you told Mann to get the Indians to ask us for PL 480 before you'd approve a new agreement. On 15 July (?) B. K. Nehru brought in Shastri's 14 July letter and you gave a go-ahead for a stop-gap agreement to cover two months' supply.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~1965 - Page Two

6 July, 1965. You requested (via Bundy memo to Rusk and McNamara) an orchestrated USG effort to convince Pakistan of our dissatisfaction with its current posture.

18 July 1965. You told Bundy "you would like to get a message to the Paks either through a letter to Ayub or a talk with the Ambassador - making it very clear indeed that you do not propose to talk about assistance programs until they have been authorized and appropriated by the Congress." Rusk said "that the message had been communicated over and over, but that he thought it would be good to do it again."

2 August 1965. You asked Komer through Califano to pass on to Rusk and McNamara that we ought to get the word to Ayub that he couldn't afford to wait out the 23 September consortium deadline because you wanted to talk with him before approving our pledge. You talked with Rusk, McNamara and Goldberg yourself and underscored that we should get the word out that the Paks couldn't run our India policy, though we didn't want to be Pakistan's masters either. You told Goldberg to talk with the Pak ambassador at the UN [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1),(6)

4 August 1965. John Bonny of Morrison Knudsen delivered an oral message from Ayub. You voiced your annoyance with the way Ayub had reacted to the consortium postponement but said you'd be willing to talk to him as soon as the aid bill was through Congress. "Then you would decide what to do in our national interest." You warned that Ayub couldn't pressure us by trying his case in the papers.

6 August 1965. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1),(6)

20 August 1965. In commenting on a wrapup of our Pak/Indian progress you noted: "We will await Congressional action before commitments. Then we will await their visit before participating in consortium. Goldberg goes too far in assuming as soon as Congress acts all is well. We will determine what is in our national interest and act accordingly after Ayub visit. Get this word to them loud, clear and unequivocal. L."

4 September 1965. Reply to Ayub letter of September 2 (regarding the critical situation in Kashmir) urging that Pakistan accede to the SYG's appeal for an immediate cease fire.

R. W. Komer
R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

15

B-2

7
Pak
November 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

15a

The Bhutto session may be tricky. Pakistani and Indians both regarded President Kennedy as pro-Indian; both seem to think you may now be pro-Pakistani. So you'll want to be wary of any special Bhutto appeal.

In essence Pakistan wants a veto on our Indian policy. It sees US military aid to India against China as inevitably diminishing Pak leverage on India on such issues as Kashmir. This is quite true, of course, but we can't afford to let our India policy (which is based on boxing in Communist China) be dictated by Ayub. Bringing 450 million Indians into the anti-China fray is just too important to us in the long term.

But we've done very well by our Pak allies (over \$3 billion in aid since 1955). We've also told them that while we must just agree to disagree about India, we're prepared to reassure them flatly against what they profess to fear most--an Indian attack (see State brief attached).

Since Bhutto is an accomplished marathon talker, I urge you not to let him hit full stride but pre-empt:

1. US stands fully behind its Pak ally, provided Pakistan stays faithful to alliance obligations too (and doesn't lean too far toward Chicom).
2. But we are in the business of defending the Free World against Communist aggression. As President Kennedy made clear, we intend to help any free country like India which is seeking to defend itself.
3. US/Pak alliances are against Communists, not India. We do not agree India will just acquire US arms then turn on Pakistan. Nonetheless, US prepared to give concrete assurances it will deter any Indian aggression against Pakistan or support Pakistan effectively if the unthinkable happens. Ayub can rely on our word.
4. If Bhutte raises Kashmir, our position is that we've made every effort to resolve it but we can't force a solution on either party. Both must display willingness to compromise (we ought to avoid any commitment to new mediation just yet).

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

R. W. KOMER

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BHUTTO TALKING POINTS

- Your interest in stability and security of Pakistan requires no demonstration. We'll continue stand fully behind our Pak allies, so long as Pakistan too stays faithful to alliance obligations (doesn't lean too far toward China).
2. You also participated in formulating policy of support for India's freedom and security. You fully endorse this policy; it will also continue. As President Kennedy made clear, we are in anti-Communist business; we will help any nation like India which is seeking to defend itself.
 3. Future of subcontinent requires that both nations in it be secure and stable. Our economic and military aid to each has contributed to the security of the other and helped each to develop in its own way as a nation.
 4. US/Pak alliances are against Communists, not India. We do not agree India will just acquire US arms and then turn on Pakistan. Nonetheless, US prepared to give concrete reassurances it will deter any Indian aggression or support Pakistan effectively if unthinkable happens. Ayub can rely on our word.
 5. If Bhutto raises Kashmir, we've made every effort over the years to resolve it, but US can't force solution on either party. Both must display will to compromise (we should avoid any commitment to new mediation).

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

6. As President Kennedy made clear to Bhutto last month, we are going ahead with ~~India~~ but stand ready to do what we can to ease Pakistan's fears. Gen. Taylor will continue discussions of military aspects of this problem.

7. Send Ayub personal respects as able statesman.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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INFO: AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1137
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Bhutto Visit

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION S/S

summary of November 29 conversation between
Following summary of November 29 conversation between
President Johnson and Foreign Minister Bhutto.
XX
XX

President saw Foreign Minister Bhutto November 29. Under Secy Ball, Amb Ahmed and Talbot also present. Meeting had been arranged because Bhutto had told President on November 25 he had very important ~~mess~~ message from President Ayub and that he would stay as long as necessary to meet the President and deliver it.

At beginning of conversation Bhutto handed President written message (text being transmitted septel) from President Ayub expressing warm friendship and best wishes. After Bhutto had amplified message by his own comments and had heard President's appropriate response, it became clear that he thought purpose of meeting had been served and that he did not expect to discuss substantive issues in US-Pakistan relations.

The President then referred to Bhutto's statements that in spite of some difficulties the association between the people of Pakistan and the US was fundamentally strong and that the US still had a true friend in

Drafted by: NEA: Phillips Talbot/
TCC:meron/hmh

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Phillips Talbot

Clearances: S/S - Mr. Nobbe
U - Mr. Ball
The White House

FORM 5-61 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED FRUS, 64-63, Vol. 19, #341
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 1-12-01

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~~SECRET~~

Pakistan. He thanked Bhutto for these sentiments, said he was indeed a friend of Pakistan and would continue to be one if Pakistan would let him. He said the American people and Congressional leaders had known Pakistan as resolutely strong against Communists. Now he understood Pakistan was going to have a state visit by the leaders of Communist China. He wanted Bhutto to know there would be a serious public relations problem here if Pakistan should build up its relations with the Communist Chinese. ~~Such a state visit would make it increasingly difficult for us.~~ He was not pro-Pakistani or pro-Indian but pro-Free World. Such a state visit would make it increasingly difficult for us.

Bhutto said he appreciated this but he wanted the President to understand that Pakistan had its own public opinion. He could not describe the intensity of Pakistani feeling about India. India was bigger and stronger and Pakistan could never forget Indian antagonism.

To this the President responded that the Pakistani people knew that we would not let India attack Pakistan. President Ayub knew this. Pakistan had our assurances that we would live up to our commitments. We would also make sure that we would do nothing to hurt Pakistan.

Bhutto replied that Pakistan, being an ideological state itself, understood the strength of other ideological states such as the Communist ones. There were dangers but Pakistan could be trusted to handle them. US actions which contribute to the growing power of India were driving Pakistan to the wall. Ayub Khan had the strength to stand against this trend. Pakistan did not want to end its relations with the U. S. Yet everything since the Chinese attack on India had confirmed Pakistan's views that Southeast Asia, not India, was the

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object of the Chinese appetite. But, the President interjected, it is you who are going to sit down to eat with the Chinese Communists.

In response to an assertion that the Chinese leaders were going to visit a number of Asian and African states, Mr. Ball said that these included such as Mali, Guinea, Ghana, and Somali--countries ~~XXXX~~ countries/with which the Communists have been involved-and ~~that~~ this was fine company for Pakistan to put itself in.

The President said that the strongest men in Congress in favor of Pakistan are also the strongest against the Chinese Communists. The Chinese state visit was coming just at a time when we are making strenuous efforts to keep our alliances strong and our foreign aid program going. There was great opposition to aid. These were facts of life. When the Congressional leaders learned of the state visit, their adverse reactions could be expected. Bhutto replied that he could understand this but asked that the U. S. also examine with Pakistan the difficulties American actions were causing it.

In parting, the President said again that he was a friend of Pakistan and would remain so. He asked Bhutto to give his warm regards to President Ayub.

When Talbot saw Bhutto off at the airport later ~~that~~ same evening Bhutto showed himself deeply upset and disturbed by turn conversation had taken. He seemed to regret that he had not taken issue with the President's statements and said he could not understand why the Chinese visit had been raised in this way. Mr. Talbot explained again corrosive effect on our relations of increasing Pakistani relations with Communist China. We have strong indications both the Chinese and the Soviets are extending area of their conflict to embrace

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subcontinent and we regretted seeing our ally Pakistan become an instrument of Chinese Communist ploys. President Johnson spoke from his heart and out of realities of American interests when he had reaffirmed his friendship with Pakistan, when he had said he wanted to continue this friendship, when he had made clear we would not let India attack Pakistan, and when he had expressed his deep concerns over Pakistan's involvements with Chinese Communists. Mr. Talbot added that we indeed appreciated Mr. Bhutto's strenuous efforts to come to Washington and acknowledged with gratitude the Pakistani tribute inherent in his action. On our side we were anxious to retain and strengthen this friendship. Unfortunately, when Pakistan got itself mixed up with Communist China this tied our hands domestically and also, of course, removed any leverage we might have had to influence India in direction of accommodations with Pakistan.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

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152

*Copy to Secretary
of State
12/13/63*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1963

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter to President Ayub

Rob

I recommend that you authorize us to cable the enclosed message from you to President Ayub of Pakistan.

This message does several things:

1. It thanks Ayub for his message of friendship and best wishes;
2. It expresses appreciation for Bhutto's trip here;
3. It says that continued Pakistani flirtation with Communist China will limit our ability to help;
4. It renews the assurances of our support to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack which we consider unlikely; and
5. It says you hope he and Max Taylor will have a good talk about some of these problems.

The message is in effect a balance between reassurances to Ayub and some plain truths about the effect of his moves toward Communist China. It reinforces the line you took with Bhutto and makes certain that your thoughts are accurately reflected to President Ayub.

George Ball
Under Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested message to President Ayub.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

DEC 13 1963

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *1-12-01*

Ambassy KARACHI

~~SECRET~~

I know that our personal friendship and the friendship between our two peoples will become even stronger as we work together in the months ahead.

With warm regards and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

GP-3

End

~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telegraph Branch

December 13, 1963

*File
Pak
+ Same Pak
15F*

McGB:

I forward the attached without prejudice but without enthusiasm. It simply reiterates precisely what the President already told Bhutto on 29 November-- and what Taylor is supposed to say inter alia next week. We also sent a warm reply to Ayub condolences on 25 November (attached).

I fully understand and share the President's view that we must "embrace" both India and Pakistan. But my instinct is that the best way to bring Ayub around (and he'll come if we're skillful) is to stop pampering him with a parade of dignitaries or faintly apologetic messages and stay aloof for a while. As the President said at lunch, Ayub isn't really serious about the Chicoms; he's been conned by his advisers into conducting a pressure campaign, counting on our vulnerability on Chicom issue. The more we react, the more he'll think he's succeeding. But if we're not so apologetic, Ayub will step in and call a halt to this nonsense.

Having said this, I'll defer to my betters.

RWK

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-163

By mg NARA, Date 8-17-87

Attach. Memo Ball to President dtd 12/12/63, subj
Letter to President Ayub

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Deput 742 / Karachi

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B-3

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

October 26, 1963

THE PRESIDENT

You might want to look over the draft scenario for Taylor's visit to Pakistan and India, though they are not very meaty.

Meanwhile, I'm afraid that far from calming down, the Paks are stepping up their effort to force us to halt aid to India. You saw Ayub's talk with McConaughy in which he accused us of a "stab in the back" (Rawalpindi 24, 21 October). The Paks also seem to be heaping coals on their "hate India" campaign. They are now talking up alleged Indian encroachments on the Kashmir cease-fire line, and claiming US-supplied weapons are appearing opposite them (not the Chicoms). We're checking this out.

The British were much tougher with Bhutto in London than we were here. They told him flatly there was no threat from Pakistan to India, and cooled him down considerably. We seem at the moment perhaps too much on the track of "reassurances", and this may result in a fairly sizable bill. I think you should talk with Taylor before he leaves next Sunday and give him a clear sense of where you stand.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Att.: Karachi 821, 10/23/63
Murray Draft of General Maxwell Taylor's
Visit to Pakistan - Nov. 1963 - Scope Paper
Murray Draft of General Maxwell Taylor's
Visit to India - Nov. 1963 - Scope Paper
Paper on Chinese Communist Intentions
Toward India
Paper on Indian Military Intentions
Toward Pakistan

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-71
By Sj, NARA Date 7-17-01

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Poll

X Taylor Visit

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Mac -

November 23, 1963

While not an urgent item, the Indian MAP decision is an important one, which instinct tells me it would be best to get sawed off if possible before Bowles leaves. First, we've gotten up real momentum (and have a paper); second, unless we get the new President signed on now while he is still carrying out the Kennedy policy, we may lose a real opportunity. Against this is the chance, of course, that LBJ will be more pro-Pak (as I recall him being). I also well realize that he has many more urgent problems to decide this week.

Talbot and I fear the Paks will take great heart from LBJ's advent, and be more intransigent than ever. By the same token, B. K. Nehru is reported to be exceedingly nervous. For these reasons, among others, I see some kind of signal as needed within the next week.

If you feel LBJ will simply not want to handle this kind of issue before Thanksgiving, I urge he give Bowles at least five minutes so Chet can go back with a personal message to Nehru, hopefully that LBJ is firmly signed on to our Indian enterprise.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81
By inf, NARS, Date 10-9-81

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

December 23, 1963

THE PRESIDENT

Taylor's visit
X Jones
X White

Taylor's trip to India/Pakistan. General Taylor returns agreeing with Bowles that we ought to offer a five-year MAP program to India if it keeps its forces down to reasonable levels, minimize diversion of its scarce foreign exchange to defense, and plays ball on Pakistan and China. But he points out India has no real conception of its own military goals yet. So instead of offering now to trade a MAP program for Indian commitments, he says let's ask India to prepare its own 5-year plan first, and then (if it is satisfactory) reveal our program. Since such plan would take some time to develop, we'd cover this gap with currently planned \$50 million one-year program.

His proposals make great sense. True, we tend to lose the real political advantage of being forthcoming now (which Bowles prizes). Also, do we get more leverage by moving in now or by letting India set its own goals first? Unless we give some clues as to what we might provide (e.g. supersonics) India can't plan efficiently either, and may be tempted to make peace with China or to get more from the Soviets. But these problems can be worked out.

On Pakistan, Taylor is optimistic. While Ayub and his generals talked nothing but India, Taylor feels they're slowly coming around to accept US aid to their rivals. He urges that we buck up Pak confidence by offering a parallel five-year MAP program, conditioned on continued Pak fidelity to its alliance obligations

3.3
(b)(1)

In both the Pak and Indian cases we are not proposing new MAP programs, but merely packaging them in 5-year rather than year-by-year terms, contingent on appropriations here and performance there. Without firmly committing yourself now, you might simply:

1. Ask for a revised policy recommendation along Taylor's lines for you to look at after New Years.
2. Establish the principle of parallelism between Indians and Paks (e.g. if we give supersonics only to one it will raise hob with the other). Admittedly, Pakistan is an ally and India a neutral; but in fact Pakistan is using our MAP aid entirely against India, whereas India is at least facing the Chinese.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 11-72

NARA, Date 6-8-11

R. W. Kemer

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By *ind*

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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

December 23, 1963

Authority ~~SECRET~~ ^{DECLASSIFIED} OSD letter MAY 12 1978
By isg, NARS, Date 10-17-79

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: General Taylor's Report on His Visit to
India and Pakistan

On his return from India and Pakistan, General Taylor submitted to me the attached memorandum reporting on his discussions in those countries and making certain recommendations with respect to military aid to them. When he meets with you this afternoon, he will undoubtedly report orally along the lines of the attached memorandum.

There has not yet been an opportunity for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to review and comment on General Taylor's recommendations insofar as they affect our current planning in the military assistance area.

Ronald S. Spector

Copies to: Secretary of State
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

SecDef Control No. X8341

~~SECRET~~

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

162-1
575
CM-1089-63
23 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Military Aid to India and Pakistan

- References:
- a. Memorandum for the President, "Next Steps on Military Aid to Pakistan and India".
 - b. Embassy New Delhi cable 1943 to State dated 20 December 63.
 - c. Embassy New Delhi cable 1929 to State dated 19 December 63.
 - d. Embassy New Delhi cable 1942 to State dated 20 December 63.
 - e. Memorandum of Conversation, 1000 hours, 20 December 1963, Karachi.
 - f. Memorandum of Conversation, 1200 hours, 20 December 1963, Karachi.
 - g. Memorandum for Record, "Private Conversation with President Ayub Khan, 20 December 1963".

As a result of my recent visits to India and Pakistan and the conferences reported in the referenced documents above, I have reached the following conclusions and have formulated certain recommendations relating to the next steps for military aid to these two countries. In effect, they represent suggested modifications and extensions of reference a.

I. INDIA

1. I am in agreement with Ambassador Bowles that it is time to develop a five-year military assistance plan with India provided the Indians will (a) limit their force goals, (b) hold down procurement from the Soviet Bloc, (c) hold to a minimum diversion of foreign exchange from economic development, (d) exercise restraint in relations with Pakistan, and (e) cooperate with us in the containment of Communist China. I would go about assuring the attainment of these five conditions not by negotiating them with the GOI but through encouraging the development of a five-year plan by the Indians which if put into effect would assure meeting the first three provisos. Conditions (c) and (d) would remain a continuing background requirement for cooperation with India in both the economic and the military fields.

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~~SECRET~~

Authority JCS 8/19/75
By MIE, NARS, Date 3/29/78

~~SECRET~~

2. If my information is correct, there is at the present time no interdepartmental plan in the Indian government which establishes a balanced relationship between the economic and the military programs of the GOI. In the case of the military program, there are as yet no agreed time-phased levels of force goals, no plan for the allocation of available or anticipated resources to the needs of the three services, and no determination of the kind and extent of foreign aid needed to augment domestic resources.

3. It would be a service to the Indian government as well as in our own interest to press for governmental planning to remedy these deficiencies as a precondition to a discussion of long-term aid in the specific terms of dollar levels, numbers and types of MAP supported units, the provision of advanced equipment, and similar matters. A five-year plan would have the advantage of obliging the GOI to face the economic facts of life and of reinforcing the hand of the civilian leaders who appear genuinely interested in preserving the economic program from excesses in the field of rearmament.

4. The kind of five-year military program which we should seek would include the following features:

a. Statement of the Indian resources available in the period for military purposes, expressed in terms of internal expenditures and foreign exchange outlays.

b. Assumption for the preparation of the program that US would contribute from 50 to 60 million dollars per year.

c. Indication of third country aid anticipated or to be sought.

d. Force levels supportable by the application of the foregoing resources.

e. Impact of this military program on economic development.

5. If the Indians are capable of producing such a plan with or without our help, it would allow us to verify their intentions as to force goals, Soviet procurement and the diversion of foreign exchange from economic developments (conditions (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph 1 above). By this device, we could hope to avoid arguments with them over force goals, always a source of irritation, and would force the Indians to decide for themselves between the competing needs of their economy and of their own services. The US position would be strengthened vis-a-vis our own Congress by putting us in a position to explain our aid in terms of a coherent Indian program.

~~SECRET~~

6. To make such a plan a precondition for long-term aid injects an undesirable time factor. Even if the Indians accept our help in developing such a plan, it will take time to draft one. To bridge the time gap, we would be justified in offering an interim one-year program of about \$50 million providing for the Army continued support of the mountain division program, of improved logistics for the forces along the Chinese border, and of better intelligence efforts oriented toward China north of the frontier. For the Air Force, in the interim program we should continue to support radar, communications and air transport.

Recommendations - India

7. It is recommended that the US indicate to the GOI a willingness to embark on parallel military planning provided that the GOI first produce a satisfactory five-year plan for its military forces along the lines of paragraph 4 above. Pending the completion of such a plan, the US would make the interim offer suggested in paragraph 6 above. However, it should be clearly intimated that we are not willing to go forward indefinitely with military or economic aid without a firm five-year military plan.

II. PAKISTAN

1. President Ayub and his Chiefs of Staff view West Pakistan as exposed to attack from Afghanistan, China, and India; but of these potential enemies, in their opinion India is the prime threat toward which the major defensive effort must be directed. This view of the primacy of the Indian threat is reinforced by consideration of the isolated situation of East Pakistan which, encircled by India, is virtually indefensible by direct means.

2. Finding itself in such a disadvantageous strategic posture, Pakistan is deeply and genuinely afraid of Indian aggression. Our US pledge to help the GOP to resist such aggression is politely noted but Ayub and those around him openly express their fear that US aid in a crisis would be delayed by the possible ambiguities of the situation, by the delays or hesitations inherent in the decision-making process of a democracy, or by the distances to be traversed by our reinforcements. Ayub would say that these factors plus the inexplicable action of the US in giving aid to India have caused an acute uneasiness which obsesses his people.

SECRET

3. With this view of the military situation of Pakistan, Ayub appears to have set for himself certain defense goals for his armed forces. The latter should have the capability in themselves of deterring or checking an Indian attack against West Pakistan. They should also be capable of deterring India from attacking East Pakistan; but if deterrence fails, there is little likelihood of checking an attack against this exclave. To effect deterrence, Pakistan needs supersonic aircraft as a threat against Indian targets. With the foregoing capabilities, the armed forces would have the visible strength necessary to deter India, reassure the people and allay the current fears.

4. It then becomes a question of how to obtain such forces. For this purpose Ayub must have the US as an ally willing to provide the essential military equipment. But our military aid to India and our reluctance to meet his equipment needs to the extent desired have led him to embark on a campaign of sharp criticism of US behavior coupled with moves to "normalize" relations with Red China. Such moves appear useful to him both in neutralizing an unfriendly neighbor and in goading the US to pay greater attention to his needs. While the campaign is in progress to get greater and more expeditious help out of the US, Ayub can hardly be expected to drop the quarrel with India or become enthusiastic over military exercises which will demonstrate that the US forces are not as far away as he says. But in spite of his strong objections to US help to India, I have the feeling that while he is swallowing hard, it is going down.

5. In these circumstances, it is to the interest of the US to give due recognition to the Pak case and strengthen Pak confidence and good will without appearing to succumb to querulous complaining. This purpose could best be served by offering the Paks US support through a five-year military plan under essentially the same conditions as the Indians. The goal of 5-1/2 modernized divisions for West Pakistan remains valid. The provision of two more squadrons of supersonic aircraft would add to Ayub's weapons of deterrence against India and to the arsenal of CENTO and SEATO. If, as it appears, the Indians have made a deal with the Soviets for the purchase of surface-to-air missiles, this decision on supersonic aircraft for Pakistan becomes much easier. The foregoing offer should be conditioned on a wholehearted change of attitude by the GOP toward CENTO, SEATO, and the US.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

162

~~SECRET~~

February 8, 1964

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 279

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Military Assistance to India and Pakistan

I have no objection to going forward with exploratory approaches looking toward possible five year MAP programs for India and Pakistan under the conditions described in the Secretary of State's 16 January memorandum to me.

However, I do not believe that we should yet discuss MAP levels with either country. Until we have a clearer idea of the prospects for the FY 1965 aid program, it seems to me premature to indicate to India or Pakistan how much military aid they might be able to count upon, regardless of how tentatively we put it. Instead, we should indicate to both governments that they should prepare austere minimum five year programs. Then, as their plans mature and as we get a better reading on Congressional attitudes, we can make a final decision on what MAP to provide.

Furthermore, in the course of these discussions I desire that the following precautions be observed:

1. We should make clear to both countries what we expect of them in return for prospective long-term military aid. As to India, we particularly want it to hold foreign exchange diversions from development to defense to a reasonable level, lest we end up indirectly helping finance an excessive defense effort via aid which we provide for quite another purpose.
2. In the case of Pakistan, our MAP help should be appropriately linked to satisfactory performance with respect to its alliance obligations and to our intelligence facilities.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #13

By JC, NARA, Date 3-13-01

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

Page Two

3. Both governments must be made to understand that no irrevocable five year MAP commitments can be undertaken by the US, both because aid levels each year will depend on Congress and because our actual aid each year will depend on continuing Pakistani and Indian performance.

4. Our approaches to India and Pakistan should be timed for optimum impact. For example, I do not believe that we should initially approach Pakistan until we have assessed the results of the Chou En-lai visit.

With these caveats, I approve proceeding along the lines of the Secretary of State's 16 January proposals.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'W. J.', is located in the center-right of the page.

cc: The Administrator, AID
The Director of Central Intelligence

17

B.4



AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN

W

EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 24, 1964.

17a

*To Jtch for memorandum
1/24/64*

*Robinson
Kashmir*

My dear Mr. President,

As desired by President Mohammad Ayub Khan,
I am forwarding to you a letter which he has addressed
to you.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances
of my highest consideration.

(G. Ahmed)

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-139
By *SL*, NARA, Date 8/3/01

My dear Mr. President,

I am taking the liberty of inviting your attention to the grave turn that the situation in the Indian-occupied part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has taken as a result of the announcement by the Government of India of further measures to "integrate" that part of the State with the Indian Union, followed by the wide-spread killings of Muslims and the looting and arson of their property in the city of Calcutta and in several other Indian districts of West Bengal.

The Government of India's decision to obliterate the special status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was first fore-shadowed by Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad, the then "Premier" of Indian-occupied Jammu and Kashmir on October 3, 1963. This was confirmed by the Indian Home Minister on 27 November in the Indian Parliament. He then outlined in detail the specific "integration" measures that were envisaged. His statement was endorsed the same day by the Prime Minister of India.

It is manifest from those declarations that the Government of India is deliberately set on defying the Security Council by acting in flagrant repudiation of its commitments to the principles contained in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, namely that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. More specifically, the measures that the Government of India seems determined to impose would violate the resolutions of the Security Council of 30 March 1951 and 24 January 1957 which affirms that no measures by any of the parties concerned in the

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Kashmir dispute to determine the shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the principles set forth in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission.

My Government protested to the Security Council and to the Government of India against the contemplated measures. I regret that the Government of India has summarily rejected our protests characterising them as "unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of India".

The Government of Pakistan will never recognise India's fictitious claim to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir in disregard of the right of self-determination pledged to the people of the State in the resolutions of the Security Council and the United Nations Commission, to which India is also a party.

The persistence of the Government of India over the last 15 years, in a policy of trampling underfoot the basic and inalienable rights of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and its illegal and arbitrary legislative and administrative measures to annex the State, have created a vicious climate in the State. It is this climate, in which the political, religious and cultural rights of the people of the State are treated with scorn by the Indian rulers that has made possible such criminal acts of sacrilege and vandalism as the recent theft of the sacred hair of the Holy Prophet Mohammad from the Hazratbal Shrine near Srinagar and an attempt to fire a Muslim shrine in Kishtwar in Jammu province.

Since the theft of the Holy Relic on 26th December, the Muslim population of Jammu and Kashmir has given vent to its anguish and anger through massive demonstrations for more than ten days despite official repression, paralyzing life in Srinagar,

the capital, and many other parts of the State. These massive demonstrations were manifestations of what foreign observers have described as an "open rebellion against the Bakshi Government and India itself". Even Indian newspapers themselves have acknowledged the complete break-down of administration in Jammu and Kashmir during that time.

The demonstrations are not only an expression of resentment of the long-suffering people of the State against the outrages perpetrated against their deepest religious sentiments, but also an expression of their intense frustration and bitter discontent at India's policies of repression and forcible annexation of their homeland. As testified by a well known English journal, the theft of the Holy Relic was "spark to tinder".

The "open rebellion against the Bakshi Government (and his nominee Shamsuddin) and India itself" continues. Despite the alleged recovery of the Holy Relic, the situation inside Jammu and Kashmir remains tense and explosive. An awesome blanket of secrecy has enveloped the State. Foreign correspondents have been shut out of Kashmir. Very little news is allowed by the Government of India to trickle through. The administration remains paralysed. A reign of repression and terror has been let loose. The Indian Army has been reinforced. Nevertheless, the people of the State are determined to continue their struggle until liberation from Indian rule is won.

Ever since the Hazratbal and Kishtwar outrages and the subsequent repression in Indian occupied Kashmir, the feelings of the people of Azad (Free) Kashmir and of Pakistan have been incensed. Tension has mounted dangerously. To my great regret, it found expression in some incidents in the Khulna and Jessore districts of East Pakistan on 3 January, against the Hindu minority. However,

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the disorder was promptly suppressed and the rule of law enforced.

On the other hand, in the recent session of the ruling Congress Party of India, inflammatory speeches about the situation in Khulna and Jessore were made. The Indian Minister for Home Affairs, Mr. Gulzarilal Nanda threatened on January 9, to take "appropriate action to deal with the situation created by the communal riots in Khulna and Jessore in East Pakistan". Within hours of these speeches, violence and killings were directed against the Muslim minority in the city of Calcutta and in several West Bengal districts. Wide-spread killing of Muslims and numerous cases of arson, looting and destruction of Muslim property have since taken place. The death toll has risen to 500. On 12 January, in one day alone, 14,000 terror-stricken Muslim refugees crossed into East Pakistan. By the following day, the figure had mounted to over 20,000.

On the same day, I issued a strong appeal to the people of Pakistan to maintain calm despite the anxiety and provocation caused to them. I also sent an urgent appeal to the President of India to take immediate and effective steps to restore order and peace in Calcutta and the other areas of West Bengal. I added that "I could not help feeling that in thus taking the law into their own hands with a view to driving the Muslims out of West Bengal into East Pakistan, certain elements in the majority community in West Bengal may have drawn encouragement from the policy that the Government of India has been following for over 2 years, despite my Government's protests and appeals, to drive out the Indian Muslims living in the Indian districts bordering East Pakistan. The number of such refugees who have registered themselves with East Pakistan authorities by the end of December, had already

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reached a figure of 95,613. To this number has now been added more than 20,000 terror-stricken Muslim refugees who have fled their homes from the riot-affected districts of West Bengal."

To the great regret and anxiety of my Government, the situation in Calcutta and West Bengal, has not yet been brought under full control. The killings, arson and looting continue. In Calcutta alone, there have been 500 cases of arson. As many as 75,000 Muslims have been rendered homeless in that city. Thousands continue to escape into East Pakistan. The number of Muslim refugees that have entered East Pakistan so far exceeds 50,000.

The present communal riots are not the first of their kind or an isolated instance. There have been since the great Indian riots of 1950, well over 500 outbursts of communal frenzy against the minority community in India.

I feel constrained to point out to you that the communal fury in Calcutta and West Bengal and the grim situation in Jammu and Kashmir are the outcome of the same deep-rooted malady, namely, denial of human rights by India.

The Government of India's actions since Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad's announcement of 3 October, the Hazratbal and Kishtwar outrages, the subsequent regime of Indian repression in the state now concealed from the world by a wall of secrecy, followed by wide-spread killings, looting and arson in Calcutta and in the other districts of West Bengal, have created an extremely tense and explosive situation in Azad (Free) Kashmir and throughout Pakistan. India-Pakistan relations have become dangerously strained.

I fear that unless it is demonstrated that the peaceful procedures of the United Nations are capable of halting the high-handed and dangerous policy that India is following in regard to



the State of Jammu and Kashmir and of inducing her to respect the rights of the Muslim population of the State and of the Indian Union, the people of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan may, in desperation, turn to other courses.

Therefore, my Government has taken this matter to the Security Council.

In concluding this message, I venture to express the hope that your representative in the Security Council will take into consideration the great importance which your Government attaches, as a Member of the United Nations, to respect for human rights and will press for an urgent solution of the Kashmir dispute which is the root cause of all tension between India and Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,

MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN

His Excellency
Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
Washington D.C.

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



January 30, 1964

178

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reply to President Ayub's Letter
of January 21, 1964

Paul
See Rusk
memo to President
1/31/64

There is enclosed a proposed reply to President Ayub's letter of January 21 to President Johnson, which was delivered to the Department January 24.

We note that President Ayub's letter is formal in tone, suggesting that it is a departure from previous personal letters to the President. We have suggested a reply along similar lines, having in mind that the Government of Pakistan may intend to publish the letters.

for Grant G. Hillier
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested reply
(Transmitted separately)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 9-20-79; NSC 9-9-81
By rip, NARS, Date 10-9-81

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

JAN 30 1964

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

170
1. Kowal
2. [Signature]

January 29, 1964
Date

*Examined by BRS
with Read memo
1/30/64*

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

The enclosed is for White House
clearance prior to transmission.

BHR
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft tel. to Karachi and
Rawalpindi Office

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT A SOURCE IDENTITY
INFORMATION SOURCE ID (A) (S)
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY *lg* ON 5-26-88

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

JAN 30 1964

~~SECRET~~

172

Ambassy KARACHI
" RAWALPINDI Office
INFO: Ambassy LONDON
Ambassy NEW DELHI
USUN New York

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-8-80 letter
By ijf, NARS, Date 9-3-80

LINDIS

There follows text of message from the President to President Ayub which you are requested to deliver urgently. Notify delivery time.

QUOTE Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of January 21, informing me of the reasons why your government has requested a meeting of the Security Council.

The concern of the Government of the United States for the welfare of the peoples of Pakistan and India and our efforts to contribute to the peaceful solution of the differences between you are well known to you. It remains our policy to do all that we can to help restore harmony to the sub-continent so that the aspirations of your peoples for freedom from fear and want may be realized.

We have, therefore, been disturbed over the recent signs of increasing tension between Pakistan and India and my Ambassadors in both countries have, at my direction, urged the desirability of restraint and peaceful negotiation of your differences. The recent communal riots on a large scale in both Pakistan and India are a tragic reminder of the gravity of the problem and the urgency of the task.

You say
U - George W. Ball
NEA - Phillips Talbot

IO - Mr. Jackson

S/S
White House -

~~SECRET~~

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FOR DS-322

JAN 30 1964

~~SECRET~~

You say that the basic problem is the Kashmir dispute. Consequently, you have sought redress in the Security Council, lest the people of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan, in desperation, turn to other courses. I read the frankness with which you have expressed your views as characteristic of our friendship and I will be equally frank.

The position of the United States on the problem of Kashmir has been and remains quite clear. It is an issue in dispute between Pakistan and India. It cannot be settled unilaterally. Neither can it be settled except by agreement between you. A solution cannot be imposed from outside. We are as desirous as ever of being of whatever help we can, but the principal responsibility for solving the issue lies with Pakistan and India. It requires a realization that a solution is essential to your common security interests.

The search for a solution of your outstanding problems can take many forms, of which the United Nations may be one. As you know, we had thought that before airing the latest developments in the Security Council, it would have been better to exhaust first all bilateral means for lowering the communal tension which is threatening both of your countries. We still believe such efforts are desirable and hope that current negotiations leading to this end will be successful. Experience shows that the flames of controversy have to be damped down before it is possible to negotiate on more basic issues. This applies to the long standing Kashmir problem just as it does to some of the problems with which I am now wrestling.

I do assure you, Mr. President, that we are deeply committed to the protection of individual liberties, wherever they are threatened, and the search for peace, wherever violence flares. Moreover, our record has shown that this commitment goes
beyond mere

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beyond mere declaration; it has found expression in the harder task of making the sacrifices and exercising the patience required to create a climate for constructive action on behalf of these great causes. I am sure that you, statesman and friend as you are, share our view as to the value of making such an effort.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

GP-3

End

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

January 31, 1964

17c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At Tab A is State's proposed reply to Ayub's long 21 January letter which I mentioned to you. It explained (Tab B) why Pakistan was taking the Kashmir dispute back to the UN, despite US/UK advice that this was the wrong time and place. From its impersonal tone, it was obviously drafted by his foreign ministry for the record.

State proposes you go back promptly in a similarly impersonal and lengthy way, saying coolly that basic problems like Kashmir cannot be solved without will to compromise and efforts to improve the surrounding climate, rather than one side leaning on the other.

I'm not sure I agree. Rather than exchanging diplomatic niceties for the record, your correspondence with Ayub should be direct, warm and private. In this case such a reply is hardly appropriate. Nor does his letter call for reply, since it is simply explanatory. So I'd suggest just not answering for a while. This would also make clear our displeasure with the Pak gambit. Our public position in favor of human rights and peaceful settlement of disputes can be made clear by Stevenson at the UN.

Related subject. Foreign Minister Bhutto, in New York for the SC debate, has put out feelers for another meeting with you. I'd urge a soft turndown because: (1) You saw Bhutto twice last November but we fobbed off the Indians--so if you see Bhutto again the Indians will insist on coming in too; (2) from both you'll get the same old phonograph record; (3) should we let the Pak Foreign Minister have free access to our President when their President is shortly entertaining Chou En-lai? Equally important, [redacted] that Bhutto and the clique around him are the ones selling Ayub his China policy, over the objections of many of our good Pak friends. So the cooler we are to Bhutto the quicker Ayub will curb or sack him. May we pass word you're too busy?

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

Let me assure you that in persistently counseling a stiff line I am not being anti-Pak. On the contrary, I deeply believe we must preserve our Pak ties. But to me the best way to do so is to show the Paks that pressure tactics of the sort they've been using won't work on us. The Paks desperately need our help (some \$4-500 million in aid and PL 430 per annum) and can't get it anywhere else. So they won't sacrifice this

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SANITIZED

EO 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-70

By cbm, NARA, Date 3-29-03

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- 2 -

if we play our cards right. As Taylor said, Ayub is slowly coming around, if only we keep making clear he can't dictate our India policy. Moreover, unless we can persuade Ayub to change his own ill-chosen tactics toward far larger India, we'll never get Kashmir settled. Instead we'll face a continuing series of painful Pak/Indian hassles at the very time when the Chicom threat and Nehru's approaching demise promise further success in bringing India our way.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

JIM GRANT

Free
Pah

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Jim, here's an Ayub draft done in haste by me. I'd like you all to treat it as informal between thee and me, and to let me have your reactions rather than start it back up through the machinery at this point.

RWK

2/3/64

Attach. RWK draft ltr to Ayub
dtd 2/3/64 - 5:30 pm

Called to
Grant's office
2/4/64

~~SECRET/DRAFT~~

February 3, 1964 - 5:30 p.m.

Dear President Ayub,

17F-1

I greatly appreciate your letter of 21 January explaining why Pakistan felt compelled to take the Kashmir issue back to the Security Council. We, as friends and supporters of both Pakistan and India, remain deeply concerned over such unresolved disputes between you, and are doubly distressed at the revival of communal strife in both nations.

Beyond this, I know you are well aware that I personally am a strong supporter of our ties with Pakistan. I have fully supported our many efforts to restore harmony to the sub-continent by helping contribute to a Kashmir solution. You may also rely on my continuing desire to help provide the economic aid and military assistance essential to the security and popular well-being of Pakistan.

But neither of us should blink the fact that we have some quite substantial differences of view. Our correspondence and our own personal friendship, which I so value is best served by mutual candor and straight from the shoulder talk. So I will express privately to you my real doubts that the buildup of tensions between India and Pakistan provides a very fruitful setting for the compromise settlement which is the only way Kashmir will be resolved. Nor do I see the Indian government, at the moment of Nehru's illness, being in much of a position to do other than stonewall. So I personally doubt that recourse to the Security Council, with the

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-05

By inf NARA. Date 6-27-89

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- 2 -

inevitable exchange of recriminations, will bring you much satisfaction. Disputes like Kashmir are only going to be resolved by creating the kind of atmosphere in which mutual give and take can take place.

In saying this, I fully appreciate your problems and frustrations. My plate is pretty full of them just now too. But whatever our differences of view about India, you and I must find ways of halting what I see as a drifting apart which in the long run will hurt both our countries, and help neither. We must keep in close touch with each other yet avoid pressing issues where we simply, for reasons well known to us both, do not see eye to eye. I shall not forget Pakistan, but I hope in turn that you will understand why we take certain actions in the light of our global security concerns.

With warm regards,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

February 11, 1964

Paul

17a

Mac -

Reply to Ayub. On 21 January Ayub sent LBJ a long impersonal explanation of why Paks were taking Kashmir to SC.

On 30 January State sent over a long comatose reply. On 31 January I sent it to President arguing against any reply, and saying in any case his letters to Ayub should be warm, direct, personal.

1 February Valenti called to say that President agreed State draft no good, but wanted a short, warm, personal reply.

Perhaps regrettably, I sought to clear my revised draft with State, which then decided, after much hemming and hawing, that because SC debate was already on, no reply should be sent until after it was over. Harriman agreed today.

I've no objection, though I think State's reasoning unpersuasive. This is merely to clue you in case LBJ asks about Ayub reply. SC debate may be over in 3-4 days, at which time we'll start up again.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81
By isf, NARS, Date 10-9-81

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B-5

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

February 24, 1964

THE PRESIDENT

You'll want to read attached two cables from Bowles. Despite his wordiness, they bring into sharp relief how our India affairs are sliding backwards from the high point reached as a result of our vigorous response to the Chicom attack in October 1962. This trend is largely inevitable, as the Chicom attack recedes into the background and the more normal factors which plague our relations--Indo/Pak acrimony over Kashmir, Indian non-alignment, etc.--assume their usual place. But as Bowles points out, it is costing us.

The Soviets faltered when Peiping attacked India, while we responded magnificently. But as the Sino-Soviet split widens, Moscow has been making up for lost time. Delhi 2457 makes patently clear that Soviets are now doing more than we to woo the Indian military establishment. Meanwhile, our Pak friends are doing their best to prove their thesis that India isn't serious about China, by forcing India to focus on Pak/Indian issues. The more they distract Delhi from Peking the more they hurt us.

This is not a trend likely to create great complications for us this year, or maybe next. Only if the Paks press Kashmir to the point of open violence is a crisis likely. But it is a trend of great long term significance. India, as the largest and potentially most powerful non-Communist Asian nation, is in fact the major prize for which we, the Soviets, and Chicoms are competing in Asia.

We have already invested \$4.7 billion in the long-term economic buildup of a hopefully democratic power. But our politico-military policy has never been consonant with the size of our economic investment, partly because Pakistan (in one of the shrewdest moves ever made by a less-developed country) signed two alliances with us as a means of reinsurance against India. For this Pakistan has gotten some \$700 million in US military aid, all of which has in fact gone to protect it against India. We can and should protect Pakistan against India, but we cannot permit our ties to stand in the way of a rational Indian policy. This just permits the tail to wag the dog.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, Nsc 9-9-81

By if, NARS, Date 10-9-81

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

With India heading into a succession crisis, we have to watch our step. If India falls apart we are the losers. If India goes Communist, it will be a disaster comparable only to the loss of China. Even if India reverts to pro-Soviet neutralism, our policy in Asia will be compromised. These risks are not just Bowlesian hyperbole; and if they prove real, Pakistan loses as well.

As you know, we here don't buy all the Bowles solutions. However, we do feel he makes strategic sense.

R. W. Komer

*Att: New Delhi 2445, 2/20/64
New Delhi 2457, 2/20/64*

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Lile
India - Pave

Sent 20 J
per Bundy

February 27, 1964

[REDACTED]

188

For Bowles from KOMER

Bundy and I can't help but feel that Orpheus engine for HF-24 is our secret weapon for sidetracking Soviet MIG and possibly SAM deals. You yourself have pointed out how going ahead with HF-24 would also pander to Indian nationalism, while being the course least painful to the Paks. This track is also a lot easier than SAMs from here, which are out.

We understand that if UK would only get Bristol to put two of the test engines into flyable conditions, it should cost less than \$1 million. Bristol of course is holding out for commitment on full development and tooling up cost first but surely HMG could make them see the light. Why shouldn't this be top priority claim on UK military aid?

We've been touting this here, and have gotten DOD to raise in London. But it badly needs another big push from you and Gore Booth now, if we're not to shut the barn door just after the horse is gone.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-70 + FRHS, Vol. XXV, # 21

By cbm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

March 8, 1964

Park
Y. Constance
18c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Two Pak/Indian matters pose immediate problems. Recent evidence suggests that Ayub smells blood in his effort to lean on India over Kashmir, at a time when India is weak. He just told McConaughy he wouldn't let up until he got a settlement (Karachi 1654). We see his tactics as totally miscast. India's weakness will just lead it to dig its heels in harder, so the only result may be a big Kashmir crisis, perhaps this summer, which could reduce rather than enhance the prospects for settlement and catch us in the middle again to boot.

Even more worrisome, that tough bargainer Ayub seems to think he has us on the run, given our mild reaction to the Ayub-Chou love feast and our continued benign tolerance of constant flaying of us by the Pak press, plus public criticisms by Ayub himself. He'll be convinced of it if we now go in and dangle a five-year Military Assistance carrot before him, without simultaneous blunt talk about having reached the limits of our tolerance over his playing with Peiping at the very time when it is squeezing us in Southeast Asia. Indeed, we planned the five-year package (which as you recall has been kept free of any price tag) for the very purpose of permitting us to talk bluntly.

We here believe Ayub fully realizes how his utter dependence on us sets limits of tolerance beyond which he cannot go. But State's intelligence chief (just back from Karachi) says that the Paks are very pleased that these limits are so flexible, and will keep stretching them as far as they can.

So it's time for us to do a bit of hard bargaining with Ayub by setting out firmly to him the terms on which we will continue US military and, implicitly, economic aid (several hundred million dollars a year). A five-year MAP approach (even on a no-commitment basis) is such a big carrot that unless we put the ^{quid pro quo} ~~price tag~~ clear on it he may see it as another evidence we're caving. This will only encourage him to step up his pressure on India thus putting us on a direct collision course.

Talbot, our Near East Assistant Secretary, will see Ayub Wednesday, which is the time for setting out where we stand. Only if Talbot is clearly speaking for you, however, will he carry the necessary weight. As you know, Ayub believes in direct dealing at the top. So we suggest that you arm Talbot with the attached message which is carefully calculated for effect.

McGeorge Bundy

Robert W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-144
By is, NARA Date 11-16 99

~~SECRET~~

March 9, 1964

*File
Pak*

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Mac -

I well realize the risks inherent in getting Ayub sore at us, though as you know I fear that unless we tell him what we really think, we and they are going to get so far out of step we may be unable to recover our relationship. If it weren't that the Paks know so clearly how dependent they are on us, it would of course be much riskier to call their bluff.

There is no point in Talbot growling even gently at Ayub unless it's known he speaks for the Boss. Ayub is a sharp customer, and still thinks LBJ might be an easier mark than JFK. I think he's dead wrong, and the problem is how to get this across.

One alternative would be to scratch the direct LBJ message, but authorize Talbot to speak on his behalf. This is a big step further removed; it will expose Talbot more but that's what he's paid for. Also, you know that Talbot, who's a soft-sell man, will deliver the word much more gracefully than the cold type from here might sound. So I've redone a softer third person message, attached.

Another alternative is to continue being evasive, and keep the Paks in the dark a while longer, by not even mentioning 5-year MAP yet. Since Paks will soon find out (if they don't know already) that we've asked India to come up with 5-year plan, this will make them more nervous (though also a lot angrier). Rationale of 5-year approaches was to move along parallel tracks with both Indians and Paks, and Pentagon will be most unhappy. But the basic problem is that the longer we postpone the moment of truth with Ayub, the farther out on a limb he may get, and the harder it will be for us to pull him back without grave damage to us in both Pakistan and India. Nonetheless, I also attach instruction to Talbot to stay out of MAP business.

Attach. RWK draft cable to Karachi 3/9/64 3:15 pm;
Cable for Talbot dtd 3/9/64

RWK

*Attached Revised
sent as reply to
1182/Karachi*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-71
By Sj, NARA Date 7-7-01

~~SECRET~~

By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

March 9, 1964/3:15 pm

AMEMBASSY KARACHI _____ (Eyes only for Talbot and Ambassador)

The President is deeply concerned over the indications that Ayub intends to continue his policy of leaning on India (and on us), using the Chicomra as a lever. He desires that before opening five-year MAP discussions with the Paks we seek to reach the necessary degree of understanding on future US/Pak relations.

To this end President wants Talbot to make frank, straightforward exposition of the obligations as well as benefits of Pakistan's alliance with the US. Ayub must be made to understand that there are limits of US tolerance beyond which he cannot go if he wants continued US support, and that he is close to these limits now.

President authorizes Talbot to say he speaking on behalf of President about importance of preserving the basic Pakistani-US relationship which has served us both so well in the past. We fully aware of Pak unhappiness over our policy toward India, but believe Paks are now fully aware that for reasons of global anti-Communist strategy we are determined to help India.

Despite our differences, we on our side have continued our full support of Pakistan's vital economic development, we have sought to help bring about a Kashmir settlement, we have tried in a number of ways to reassure Paks of our support against any aggression--even from India. We are now prepared to discuss what needs to be done toward the longer term maintenance of the security posture of excellent Pak forces if an acceptable meeting of minds can be reached.

~~SECRET~~

2.

But we cannot continue to sustain past close US/Pak relationship if it becomes more and more of a one-way street. In effect, while continuing to give lip service to alliance, Paks are adopting tactics which seem quite inconsistent with overall US anti-Communist strategy in Asia, which necessarily focussing largely on Chicom threat. We are determined to face squarely our responsibility for helping to maintain the security of free Asia against the Chinese Communists until the nations concerned are strong enough to preserve it themselves. Pak policy cuts across this grain. When we are trying to stop Chinese Communist infiltration in Southeast Asia, Paks in effect seem to be encouraging them to make hay in South Asia.

Moreover, though we understand Pak motivations in using China to help them lean on India, we gravely doubt that it will produce the results Paks want. The Free World cannot afford to let India, any more than Pakistan, succumb to Communism or fall apart. As to Kashmir, we see Pak pressure tactics as forcing India to dig in its heels at a time of weakness, whereas making common cause with India against China could be far more productive.

Nor is it consonant with the spirit of our alliance to find ourselves the object of constant public harassment in Pakistan, even including high-level pronouncements.

You may say that President, who feels he knows Ayub well and admires what he has done for Pakistan, believes Ayub will not misconstrue candor of our exposition. After all, Paks from Ayub on down have been even more

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3.

frank in telling us publicly as well as privately what they see wrong in US policy. But it is President's earnest desire to see end to mutual backbiting, and reaffirmation of those strong mutual interests which still underly US/Pak relationship, in order prevent this relationship from slipping further downhill.

FYI, we desire you not get into discussion 5-year MAP approach, beyond reference authorized above till we have had chance to sort out Pak reactions and to see whether further exchanges necessary before proceeding to offer MAP carrot to Paks. END FYI.

~~SECRET~~

18f

FOR TALBOT

March 9, 1964

President desires that, until we have had opportunity to take Pak temperature as result of your talks, we hold off on five-year MAP approach.

Reasoning is that offering MAP carrot in absence of prior indication that Paks are prepared to arrive at meeting of minds on future Pak/US relationships, may only confirm reported Pak feeling that they are successfully pressuring US as well as India by use of Chicom gambit and other pressure tactics. By contrast your failure develop five-year MAP approach may shake up Paks a bit, since they doubtless know we have opened talks with India. We are not unduly concerned over getting out of step between Pak and Indian MAP programs because shaping of Indian program is still well behind that for Pakistan.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Governor,

March 6, 1964

*Pak
x India*

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Attached is personal for you only, but I want to pass on my fear we're at a critical juncture in Pak/Indian affairs. Grant will be bringing you a draft instruction for Talbot's pitch to Ayub shortly, which is so feeble that I fear it will only convince Ayub he's taking us, rather than helping bring him around.

I'm also much concerned lest the Paks drag us along in the SC again; if they force us to back a resolution we'll gain nothing while the Sovs make hay with India by vetoing it. Perhaps we could talk about these matters tomorrow.

RWK

*Att: RWK memo to Meg B
3/6/64, re India PWC.*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

~~SECRET~~

March 6, 1964

File
Pak

189-1


We feel US/Pak relations have reached point when unless we sort out our various problems and reach an acceptable modus vivendi, real deterioration will set in.

Most important, while Paks still proclaim their fidelity to anti-Communist alliances with US, in fact it is moving away.

We not talking about so-called normalization of relations with CPR but about

1. Developing Pak use of China to lean on India, which runs directly counter to anti-Communist purpose of all.
2. Continuing Pak efforts stall US aid to India, which fully consistent with SEATO-CENTO purposes, the perhaps complicating Pak interests.
3. Continued Pak public and official criticism of US policy even by Ayub himself. We've not responded but our patience exhausted.

4.



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ CI-70
By *cbm*, NARA, Date 3-24-03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

March 26, 1964

18^h *Bohr*
James Bohr

Mac -

Phil Talbot's long cable (London 4705) strikes me as penetrating in its analysis but feeble in the responses it proposes.

Agreed that our stake in the subcontinent remains "very high." Agreed that "some Indo-Pak climax is slowly approaching." Phil's policy recipe for dealing with the matter is, characteristically, not to get too involved and to continue business as usual (i. e. aid).

There's much to be said for this recipe. But one major flaw is the assumption that we can stand aloof--if real trouble develops the very fact that our stake is so "high" will tend to drag us in. More active preventive diplomacy might at least minimize the likelihood of a galloping crisis in which our interests almost inevitably suffer. Cyprus is a case in point. And as in Cyprus, we face a double dilemma on the subcontinent--not only is a risky crisis likely but we are friends with both sides. So we're forced to carry water on both shoulders, to pursue a middle course, to satisfy neither of our suitors, while the Soviets and Chinese take the easy road of backing one side or the other.

For these reasons I favor a more active effort to turn aside a Kashmir crisis. Phil himself admits we can't avoid being involved, but his "ploy" of encouraging secret talks will only be accepted if we do a lot of arm-twisting and above all make clear to the "aggressor"--at this point Pakistan--that continued escalation might cost it dearly.

I also see compelling reasons for not returning to "a frank business as usual approach" to Ayub on such a slim basis as Shoiab's private assurance that the Paks are coming around. We'll remain trapped on the horns of the Pak/Indian dilemma until we get across to the Paks that they have only a limited partnership with us. We can subsidize their development, protect them against Indian aggression, continue to seek a Kashmir compromise, but we cannot back them in leaning on India.

Moreover, we've never had a better opportunity for the necessary readjustment of our Pak relations (to rectify the overcommitment we slid into in 1954-60). Mao's attack awakened the Indians, while Ayub's flirtation with the Chicom's has belatedly made all of us realize that Pakistan's overriding concern is to use us against India. This is wholly understandable, but hardly a mutual US/Pak interest. Moreover, Pakistan's utter--and irreplaceable--

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #31

By JC, NARA. Date 1-12-01

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2.

dependence on us means we can, with skill, bring it around to accepting our terms, and still giving us the one thing we really want.

I feel that if we revert to "business as usual" with Ayub now it will simply convince him that he can have his cake and eat it too. It will embolden him more than deter him. Phil argues that the alternative of registering "our unhappiness with Paks by dragging our feet on aid projects and planning...has not worked." I flatly disagree. In the first place this hasn't been a consistent policy--we've wobbled all over the lot. Only in the last few weeks have we begun to growl (even here we had to get Harriman to say what Talbot didn't) and more important, to show by actions as well as words that we're unhappy (Kashmir SC postponement, not talking 5 year MAP).

So what's the risk in waiting at least a few more weeks to see if we've registered before starting to talk MAP. I want more to go on than Shoiab's siren song; I don't think we'll lose this turn in their thinking "by waiting (it may make them turn more). And I doubt that "we can drag feet later" if we're wrong--it's been all too difficult to get even the half-baked foot-dragging we're doing now.

In sum, I urge (1) holding off till we get a few more signals on five-year MAP approach to Paks; (2) developing a scenario for US/UK preventive action to forestall a major Kashmir crisis this year (let's at least get an option to look at); (3) developing some kind of package to forestall Soviet pre-emption of all aid to the Indian air force (we were hot on this in mid-1962 but no one even heeds Bowles' pleas today).

With these amendments, I'd buy Talbot policy lines (otherwise excellent) and see in Bowles' return a real opportunity to get top level focus on them.

(note on 3rd to last para.)

I agree strongly and so does LBJ.

(note on last para)

I agree, except I'm less scared and so less activist on Kashmir; I think Talbot's tamp-down is fairly good.

RWK

mcg

~~SECRET~~

18i ^{file} Pak
April 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN

I'm glad you're not weakening as our chief instrument for bringing the Paks around. After all, calculated testiness was precisely what was called for last time you saw G. Ahmed. And we're lucky there's someone around who will use this diplomatic technique.

As for G. Ahmed's dinner, perhaps the best theme to develop is our continued wondering whether the Paks are changing the terms of their alliance with us. It's worth pointing out that our relationship is based on two anti-Communist alliances--SEATO and CENTO--yet the first time that a real Communist military threat to the subcontinent itself developed, Pakistan sympathized with the enemy. So how can the Paks expect us not to re-examine the alliance? Nor has Pakistan's own performance in SEATO and CENTO, especially since 1961, been anything other than an attempt to bring both around to providing support for Pakistan against India.

No outside nation has done more to try and bring about a Kashmir settlement than the US. Apparently, however, only 100% performance is ever considered satisfactory by one's allies. Nor has Pakistan recently shown the spirit of compromise necessary if any peaceful settlement is to be worked out.

We continue to wonder what might have been discussed when Chou En-lai visited Pakistan. We note we have been carefully assured that no treaties of friendship and commerce or cultural agreements were signed. But we've never been told that no political understandings were reached. Pakistani connivance with China against India would only force us to India's side.

So long as you've been cast in the tough role of Pak beater, I suggest you carry it on through. To validate your position, you might tell G. Ahmed that the White House itself is most uncomfortable with Pakistan and ask him whether he has ever gotten it straight from Bundy or Komer (Mac and I have sedulously avoided all contact, social and otherwise, with the Paks as a sign of displeasure, so Ahmed will be discomfited by such a remark).

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/mg NARA, Date 1-22-01

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, # 38

By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

file
Judith
X. S. ...

~~SECRET~~

VIA CLASSIFIED POUCH
EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

April 24, 1964

Dear Chet:

I'm concerned by a number of developments, or the lack of them, which have tended to cloud the highly favorable atmosphere upon your departure.

First is the lack, to my knowledge, of a major effort to get across to the GOI as yet about the grossly inflated size of their five-year plan. Any program of this magnitude would inevitably be at the expense of economic development and we've got to get across as soon as possible that this would be robbing Peter to pay Paul. AID is quite unhappy, and will become more so when the extent of diversion contemplated sinks in. Moreover, pressure against undue diversion of foreign exchange from the development program is a good indirect means of getting the Indians to focus on the need to cut down their elaborate hardware demands, especially in the air defense field.

Chavan's visit and then TTK's will simply be a flop if we have to spend all our time pressing them to squeeze the water out of their plan. If we let this issue become later a major bone of contention between the US and India it will do neither country any good. By all odds the best thing, therefore, is to get the Indian Finance Ministry to do our dirty work for us. We're relying on you for this.

I don't know what you did to General Adams (all to the good nonetheless), but it's highly premature to start plugging 104s. We barely got an F6A plus HF-24 engine program going, with a few squadrons of F5s as a possible alternative, when you come back changing the bidding again. Mind you, I think it makes political sense to give India 104s if necessary, but this must emerge as the logical outcome of a prolonged discussion in which we successively discard other options. Again, we here have seen nothing firm about whether you have ever even tried out the original package on the Indians yet.

I hate to badger you like this, but we scored rather a breakthrough when you were here and it's dangerous to attempt to improve on what we got without even trying it out. As I know you realize, there are strong suspicions here that indeed you did try out the package and got nowhere, so are coming back for more. If this is the case, tell us so because only if you tried and failed will we be able to argue effectively for trying something else.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I've just heard you have the amoebic bug. All best wishes for a quick recovery. It's also best for cosmetic reasons that you postpone your return in May as late as possible.

Meanwhile, do try to warn off Chavan and others from coming with any exaggerated expectations of the US cornucopia. Big ideas which are then disappointed will only set back our Indian enterprise at a time when we finally got it moving forward again.

Once again my apologies for these admonitory words. But you know they come from a friend. All the best for an early recovery.

Sincerely,

R. W. Komer

The Honorable
Chester Bowles
U. S. Ambassador
New Delhi, India

P. S. Since writing this, I just saw your talk with TTK.
Good stuff!

cc: Mr. G. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

19

B6

~~SECRET~~

April 27, 1964

19a
Indira
Indira Vast
(2)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your short session with Indira Gandhi (she goes on to tea with Mrs. Johnson) will still give time to read Nehru's letter and make one or two points.

A. She will be fascinated by your economic program, attack on poverty, civil rights drive, etc. Alluding to them will remind her that America is on the move.

B. But to avoid any impression you're preoccupied with domestic affairs, you might take polite exception to Indira's remark about US "favoritism toward Pakistan" on Kashmir (attached). Our only interest is in a peaceful settlement of the 17-year old issue, so both India and Pakistan can get on with their wars on poverty too. Nor does our current help to India jibe with such remarks. In fact the Paks are quite unhappy with our policy.

Indira is going straight back to India tonight, so can carry your good wishes to Nehru (her line is that he's much better but we think not, even though he's said he's going to annual Commonwealth Conference in July).

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 88-164

By sig NARA, Date 6-27-89

U.S. Losing India's Goodwill, Mrs. Gandhi Says

By ROBERT TRUMBULL

The United States is losing much goodwill in India because of Washington's "favoritism toward Pakistan" in India's dispute with that country over Kashmir, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, daughter and political confidant of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, said here yesterday.

"We have no doubt that if China should attack India again, Pakistan would attack too," she declared in an interview. Communist Chinese troops seized areas of Ladakh Province, in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir, and part of India's northeastern frontier area in 1962 after a prolonged border dispute.

Mrs. Gandhi, a political confidant of her father, said that India had "definite" knowledge that Pakistan had assured the Chinese Communists that she would not take up arms against them. Pakistan would use arms supplied by the United States only "to hold the balance against India and not for containment of Communism," she asserted.

Relations to Both Strained

United States relations with both India and Pakistan have suffered from time to time because of the animosity between those neighboring countries since they divided over the Hindu-Moslem religious issue in 1947, when the former British rulers departed.

India has repeatedly expressed concern over United States military aid to Pakistan and has decried Pakistan's membership in the Central Treaty Organization and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. American policy favoring a plebiscite in Kashmir, which Pakistan wants, has also irritated relations with New Delhi.

Nehru's Daughter, Here for Fair, Sees 'Favoritism' to Pakistan on Kashmir

When Washington gave arms and other assistance to India to bolster her defense against the attacking Chinese, it was Pakistan's turn to complain that the United States was arming her enemy. It was during this period that Pakistan entered into warmer relations with Communist China.

Border Accord Attacked

Mrs. Gandhi complained that Pakistan, which holds a third of Kashmir, had "handed large chunks of Kashmir to China" in a demarcation of borders in the area last year. Peking subsequently endorsed Pakistan's position on Kashmir.

"We feel that the West is on Pakistan's side no matter what," Mrs. Gandhi said.

Mrs. Gandhi has been mentioned as a possible successor to her ailing father. She was credited with doing much to revitalize the governing Congress party as its president in 1959 and 1960.

She is in New York to inaugurate the Indian Pavilion at the World's Fair.

"There can be no major change in India's policy on Kashmir," Mrs. Gandhi said. "The whole stability of India depends upon it. A change would mean that the Government, any government, would go out."

The Kashmir question has been before the United Nations Security Council since 1947, when India and Pakistan fought over the state.

Islamic Pakistan demands a plebiscite of the predominantly Moslem population. India con-

tends that the territory legally belongs to her because of an act of accession by its Maharaja, later approved by an assembly in the Indian-held part of the territory and written into its Constitution.

The state has been divided along an uneasy cease-fire line since the fighting was ended by a cease-fire arranged by the United Nations on Jan. 1, 1949.

Mrs. Gandhi took a reserved view of statements attributed to Sheik Mohammed Abdullah, the former Kashmiri Premier, who was released April 8 after 10 years' imprisonment, the last six on charges of conspiring against the state and collusion with Pakistan. Since his release he has been demanding that the state's future be settled by "self-determination of the people."

"It is better to wait to talk to him," Mrs. Gandhi said, alluding to the Sheik's plan to confer with Mr. Nehru in New Delhi next week. She suggested that some of his statements, interpreted as anti-Indian in New Delhi, might have been reported "out of context."

Mrs. Gandhi declined to comment on possible successors to her father, whose activities have been curtailed since he suffered a stroke in January.

"For years," she said, "my father has been trying to distribute responsibility. He has always tried to consider a large area of opinion, for which he has sometimes been criticized."

Mrs. Gandhi said that the Indian Government's main interest was in "making a success of democracy."

India's progress under a democratic system will affect all of South and Southeast Asia, she declared. "If we fail, there is no doubt that many will look for another method," she said.

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प्रधान मंत्री भवन
PRIME MINISTER'S HOUSE
NEW DELHI
April 14, 1964

India

19c

Dear Mr. President,

My daughter, Indira Gandhi, is visiting the United States in connection with the inauguration of the World Fair. I thought I would take this opportunity to send you a letter, as you had been good enough to suggest in your last message to me that we should continue in the tradition of frank and friendly exchanges on problems we face together.

May I, to begin with, thank you, personally, for the kind message that was conveyed to me by your officers in the State Department, wishing me speedy recovery from my recent illness? I am feeling much better now, and am able to attend to my work, more and more, every day.

Much has happened in the world since I wrote to you in November last year. A number of countries have been faced with new difficulties and new problems, some of them with their near neighbours. You have had your own share of these difficulties, and may I say that we, in India, have watched with admiration your handling of so many matters, with patience and perseverance in a spirit of understanding. Among other things, we have been greatly impressed by your efforts at preserving world peace, as outlined in your State of the Union message to the Congress, on January 8, 1964. Your emphasis on a policy which admits the futility of a nuclear war offers the possibilities of lasting peace and this, I am sure, is welcome to all peace loving countries. Similarly, your emphasis in favour of the United States initiative in the expansion of World Trade, in an effort to strengthen the ability of the developing nations to preserve their independence and raise their standard of living, and your desire to supply food, as an instrument of peace, to the needy people, are policies which we appreciate and admire.

Perhaps the most important development in recent months in international affairs is the success you have had, partial though this may be, in bridging the gap between the East and the

His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
White House, Washington, D. C.

Contd....

APR 29 1964

West. As a result of your efforts in bringing about the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, there is, today, so much less suspicion and so much less fear in the world, even among the larger nations. There is a greater sense of security among the smaller nations, undoubtedly, but this is perhaps true of the larger nations also, to some extent at least.

Unfortunately for us, our differences with Pakistan continue. We are making every effort to try and bring about an understanding with Pakistan in the spirit of peace and goodwill, and although we have not succeeded so far, I need hardly assure you that our efforts will continue, both in regard to Kashmir and also in regard to the even more distressing communal disharmony in India and Pakistan that has plagued our two countries these last three or four months. We are very conscious of our responsibilities for the security and welfare of 45 million members of the minority community in our country and we will never fail them.

We continue to face the threat from China and certain areas on our Northern border remain under Chinese occupation. The Chinese have continued to be in a truculent and aggressive mood. With the Chinese armies still stationed in Ladakh and all along our northern borders, we are determined to strengthen the country to meet this threat, which we know is a long term proposition. We have now prepared a Defence Plan and I am glad my colleague, the Defence Minister, expects to visit the United States, shortly, to discuss our Defence plans and our military requirements with your Government. We are, I need hardly say, grateful to the United States for all the help we have so far received and we continue to receive in this matter, as also in the field of our economic and industrial development. I am happy that this collaboration means so much more understanding and goodwill between our two countries.

May I also, in this letter, offer my good wishes to you and the United States for the success of the World Fair? This is bound to add to more and more understanding in so many countries that are participating in this great event, and I cannot help feeling

Contd.....

that this, yet once again, is a step in the right direction that your country has taken under your able leadership and guidance.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely

Jawaharlal Nehru

~~SECRET~~

2.

The President came back again on the issue of US friendship for India and decried any suggestion of partisanship on any issue between us. As for the Indians being disturbed at our relations with Pakistan, they should realize that the Pakistani were far more angry with us. The Paks were far more unhappy about our policy toward India than India seemed to be about our policy toward Pakistan.

The President went on to describe how the US was not only seeking to help nations abroad develop themselves but to deal with the problems of poverty and discrimination in the US. He outlined his own recent efforts to this end citing various statistics. He mentioned, for example, that 49% of draft-age Americans failed to meet minimum physical standards for the draft. Ambassador Nehru was shocked that this figure should be so high but Mrs. Gandhi pointed out that India had had similar difficulties in recruitment after the Chinese attack.

Mrs. Gandhi then presented a letter from Prime Minister Nehru to the President. The latter read it carefully and commented on how much he appreciated the friendly sentiments it contained. India could count on US friendship and on continued US help.

The President remarked on how many friends India had in his Administration. We sent ambassadors to India who seemed to spend every day thinking of new ways in which we could be helpful. Indeed the Pakistani kept complaining that we did not send outstanding ambassadors to Pakistan of the sort we consistently sent to India. They pleaded that just once we

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3.

send somebody who could represent them so effectively here as Bowles or Calbraith.

Mentioning his particular affection for Mr. Nehru, the President asked about his current health. Mrs. Gandhi replied that he was better and up and around a bit more. The President remarked upon how people had counted him out at the time of his own heart attack but two months later he was back in shape again and had been ever since. No one should count Mr. Nehru out either. He urged Mrs. Gandhi to carry this message back to Prime Minister Nehru and to give him the President's affectionate regards.

After pictures were taken, the President showed Mrs. Gandhi and the Ambassador the Rose Garden.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

20

B-7

~~SECRET~~

May 16, 1964

Free
Pak 20a
x Ayub Visit

Mac -

Ayub Visit. Entirely aside from whether President would want to joust with Ayub for two days during election year (Ayub would be offended at less than full treatment), neither NEA nor I think McConaughy's judgment very good. We don't see US/Pak relations deteriorating, but rather on a pretty even keel--with our cool line gradually sinking in. Nor do we quite get why Walter should use his admittedly longer range fears as lever for a panic reaction (more a palliative for Walter than Ayub, I suspect). Finally, I see a lot less to talk about now (Ayub would still trot out old phonograph record) than this winter, when Kashmir, etc. may be further along and our hard line may have borne more visible fruit.

But I see visit then as a likely plus! Ergo, when McConaughy back, suggest he be permitted to tell Ayub quietly: (a) LBJ can't invite anyone before election for afterward; but (b) if things go well, LBJ would hope to see his old pal next winter.

Anyway, I see more hope of moving Malaysia than Kashmir this summer, so favor Tunku!

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/rj, NARA, Date 1-22-01

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

May 26, 1964

Rusk is now fully briefed on Indian air defense matter. So, of course, is Bob. A few key reminders:

1. This is our last chance to forestall MIG production in India. Their team goes from here to Moscow, probably to tape down MIG deal.

2. State agrees with me, not Chet, that Indians are probably too far along to renege on MIGs. So odds are we get a free ride.

3. Threat to Paks is greater if Indians assemble larger number of MIGs than if we control number of 104s.

4. F-104 has become a symbol. If we keep offering them to Paks, but not to Indians we give Soviets the free ride.

5. We've done very well in bringing Indian defense plan down to reasonable proportions. Sole major unresolved issue is US help on air defense. If we show goodwill here, we gain a lot politically, at no more out-of-pocket cost.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

zuo
India Map
208

file

Judea Nap

20c

May 27, 1964

Bob -

While I know how flinthearted you are on fancy birds for the underdeveloped, let me try out on you the political side of the case. Here's a note to me from Bob Komer, which I find quite persuasive. Rusk is going to talk with Bowles and perhaps Chavan on the plane, and perhaps wire us his own view.

McGeorge Bundy

file

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol 25#48

By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

202

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

May 27, 1964

While Bob McNamara is dead right that F-104s are too rich for India's blood (and that F-5 is far better suited than F-104 to most of our indigent clients), I suspect he'd agree that issue really turns on political grounds:

1. Indians are determined to get supersonics somewhere, most likely MIGs. To have a fighting chance of pre-empting them we have to offer something they think comparable.

2. All of us except Bowles feel that India is already so signed on to MIG deal that it couldn't back out now. Thus odds are we'd get the political credit for being forthcoming without really having to give. All-important here is not to make Indians feel they're second-class citizens, i. e. they can't have F-104s when Paks already have them.

3. True, F-104s are wasteful but they need involve no extra out-of-pocket cost to us. We'd merely substitute 104s for other credit items. Since Indians are going to waste money on supersonics anyway why not let it flow back to us?

4. While pre-empting MIG production isn't absolutely crucial, it is a sensitive sector. More important, since Indians are passionate about 104s (Chavan was simply afraid to raise it with Bob), it would put capstone on a highly successful Pentagon exercise in which we've brought Indians a long way.

5. Soviets are picking up too many options we let drop--Bokaro, VOA transmitter, supersonics, etc. An F-104 offer is about only big gesture we have currently available--at a crucial time of indecision following Nehru's death.

On all these scores, I'd argue for a package proposal of: (a) F-6As as interim help; (b) all-out help on HF-24; (c) if this doesn't pan out, 2-3 squadrons of F-104s a few years from now--all predicated on India not going ahead with MIGs (except rounding out one squadron they have). I'll bet this offer (which probably wouldn't be taken up) would produce enough real political plus to justify the military loss. And Paks, though mighty unhappy, couldn't complain too much; they're getting F-104s too, and they'd face supersonics in any case--better our 104s than a lot more MIGs.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

cc: Salinger
w/ Raw memo
6/4/64

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

June 12, 1964

You should be aware that Indo-Pak relations have entered new period of maneuver with release of Abdullah and Nehru's death. Both Ayub and now Shastri have made very conciliatory public noises. They'll get together at London Commonwealth Conference in July, and then may meet together with Abdullah in August.

We want to help nurse this along, but quietly for a while. If LBJ weighed in just now, Paks would promptly try to push us out in front again (in fact our "cool" treatment may have been a major factor in bringing Ayub around).

So I see as asbest holding our fire for a while (not inviting Shastri or Ayub). If and when situation warrants, then is time to jump in. But so far both sides are doing well without our help.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

Indo Pak
X Shastri
Visit

20*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #57

By JC, NARA, Date 1-12-01

June 16, 1964

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chat Bowles is back full of vim and vigor. He's quite optimistic about the new Shastri cabinet, which he sees as more practical and less woolly-minded than Nehru's. You should get his slant.

The chief pending item of Indian business is whether we should include in our longer term military program an air defense package designed to preempt their MIG deal with Moscow. Proposal is that we offer to sell or grant India (within proposed MAP ceilings--so no added cost to us): (a) 72 surplus F-6As; (b) help in making their own homegrown HF-24 supersonic; and (c) if HF-24 doesn't pan out, we'd provide 24-36 F-104s a few years from now; all this only on condition that India give up MIG-21 production.

Most of us are convinced that India is much too far down the road to renege on MIG deal (only Bowles differs--and he's climbing down now too). Thus we'd get all the political benefit of showing the Indians they're not second-class citizens (i. e. we're willing to give F-104s to them as well as Paks) without ever having our offer taken up. Or, if we were all wrong, and Indians bit, then we have the great plus of getting non-aligned India to reject MIGs. This would also protect the Paks, since a few squadrons of Indian F-104s would be less dangerous than a whole MIG production line.

McNamara has come around to buying this deal. He says let's offer F-104s to both India and Pakistan or to neither. State, however, is more equivocal; it sees an air offer to India as upsetting the Paks just when Ayub is coming around to a conciliatory policy. So State says let's hold off awhile (see their brief attached).

But one of the factors bringing Paks around (aside from Nehru's death) is that we're finally getting through to them that they can't have a veto on our Indian policy. Also this air offer is a non-starter anyway, so why all the worry? At any rate, you might hear argument from Bowles, and then take issue up at lunch if you see a case.

Only other issue is State's proposal you give Shastri an open-ended visit invite. I told them you couldn't do this before election, but suggest instead you allow Bowles to tell Shastri this, and to say that if elected you'd much look forward to seeing him at some mutually convenient time thereafter.

Attach. Rusk Memo to President 6/15/64

R. W. Komer

subj. Apptmt w/Amb. Bowles Tuesday ~~1-12-01~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRvs 64-68, vol. 25, #44

By X, NARA, Date 1-12-01

209
May 21, 1964

Mac -

Indian Defense Team talks here have boiled down to two issues, which may be decided when McNamara talks with Chavan tomorrow morning.

A. FY'65 arms credit ceiling. Indian 5-Year Defense Plan called for \$1.9 billion foreign exchange outlays 1965-69. By some tall talking about how to get more defense for less and overriding need to protect development program, we've brought Indians down to \$1.5. We think proper level ought to be about \$1.3 billion, a cool one-third cut (but we can probably get Indian Finance Ministry to do this).

Issue turns on whether we should now offer Indians up to \$50 million in FY'65 MAP credit sales (on top of \$50 million MAP grants we plan). Since Indians will spend foreign exchange anyway, credit offers mean they'll buy from us rather than Sovs (or Brits, etc.) thus limiting purchases they can make from Sovs (pre-emption in fact). DOD wants to tell Indians now, so they can plan properly. State wants to hold off firm credit offer as lever to bring Indian ceiling down from \$1.5 to \$1.3. I don't feel strongly but lean toward State, especially since we could give 3/4 % terms which makes Indian mouths water.

B. Should we offer F-104s? We're convinced Indians won't buy our aid package of 75 surplus F-6As plus help on HF-24 designed to pre-empt MIG deal. If not, McNamara would like to offer his favorite F-5. But Indians don't want it; like everyone else they want flashy 104s (Lockheed went out and sold them again). Bob says "never!" From a purely military viewpoint he's dead right. F-5 or F-6A is cheaper, easier to handle, maintain, etc.

But issue turns on political grounds (and NEA hopes to get Rusk to talk to Bob). NEA would like to tell Indians let's see if HF-24 deal can be worked out in lieu of MIGs. If not, we'll help you get alternate 2-3 squadrons of 104s within next 3-4 years, provided you don't build MIGs. Argument runs:

a. This gives fighting chance of blocking MIG production (1 in 5 is my guess). But if Indians don't bite, as all too likely, then we at least get the credit for having been forthcoming. We've convinced them at least that we don't regard them as second-rate citizens vis-a-vis the Paks (who get 104s). So we get a free ride.

b. True 104s are "wasteful", but they involve no extra out-of-pocket cost to us. All we'd do is substitute 104s for other items, not add them on. Since Indians are going to waste money on supersopics anyway, why not let it flow back to us rather than to Soviets?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2.

c. Bowles is right, after all, that Sovs are mounting a major new Indian aid effort (in response to ours, by the way). We'll have to live with it, and it partly serves our purpose, but after the big upward push of 1961-63 why let the Soviets gain too much kudos by picking up every option--supersonics, BOKARO, new VOA transmitter--we let drop.

d. We know we're going to give Paks two more squadrons of 104s, even though we're playing hard to get just now. Are 104s for Paks more sensible than for Indians? Hell no.

- - - - -

I've carried this as far as I can with DOD. Would you entertain calling Bob on this before he sees Chavan tomorrow? Bob's right that 104s are wasteful, but I think you'll agree that's not the point.

At minimum I'd like to see Bob avoid saying "no" till you, he and Rusk could talk with LBJ next Tuesday lunchtime. LBJ sees Chavan Thursday. He could make some real Indian mileage by offering 104s in lieu of MIGs, an offer which probably wouldn't be picked up, which wouldn't cost extra if it was, and which is no more than we're already doing for no better reason for Pakistan.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

India
+ Chavan
+ Indira
June 3, 1964
20h

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

McNamara has approved attached US/Indian Memorandum of Understanding on military aid to India resulting from the Chavan visit. We merely want to check it (and accompanying press release) with you before sending it out.

It falls far short of what Bowles wants, but will still be a plus noise in India at a time when we want one. In fact, Shastri has already described Chavan's visit as "successful." Nor will the Paks be too unhappy because we haven't given much yet.

The Memorandum commits us only on FY'65 MAP (\$50 million). In accord with your NSAM 279, we reserve on any 5-year promise till Indians have revised their plan (though we say that for planning purposes only they can assume continuation at same level). We had considerable success in getting Indians to cut \$332 million in foreign exchange out of their plan, and McNamara intends to keep working for more cuts, especially on air side. However, to meet Indian political sensibilities, he has at Chavan's request put his reservations in a separate letter to Chavan (also attached).

Only new feature is our willingness to provide credit for sales up to \$10 million in FY'64 and \$50 million in FY'65, if Indian plan is satisfactory. This means in effect that we'll get a fair share of the hard currency the Indians intend to spend anyway, instead of it flowing to the Soviets, UK, or someone else.

Air package which Bowles badly wants is not included in attached, but Bundy and I hope you'll hear argument on this shortly. We see some real political mileage to be gained at little cost.

Recommend your early approval, as Chavan has urged we make press release Saturday before new Indian cabinet leaves to scatter Nehru's ashes.

Rw by Rwk
See 6/4/64
memo

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Attach. Tab A - Memo of Understanding Rev. Draft dtd 5/27/64

~~SECRET~~ Tab B - Ltr McNamara to Chavan and Press Release June 4, 1964

India
x Chavan
20i
x India

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

McNamara's talks with Indian Defense Minister Chavan went quite well, until interrupted by Nehru's death. Indians had produced a 5-Year Defense Plan at our request, and we managed to squeeze the key foreign exchange component down \$332 million (about 20%) on grounds deleted items were militarily unnecessary and too great a burden on the economy.

In turn McNamara has agreed to \$50 million MAF in FY'65 for mountain warfare equipment, communications, and defense production. He has withheld any 5-year MAF promises until he can work over their plan some more, especially on the air side. We did, however, tell Indians they could assume for planning purposes roughly same level in future years.

McNamara also agreed to sell on credit terms up to \$10 million in FY'64 and \$50 million FY'65 certain items to be agreed. Since the Indians intend to spend some of their own hard currency anyway, this neat device meant that much of it will flow to us rather than to the Soviets or UK.

Both we and Indians regard this exercise to date as successful and want to tape it down in a Memorandum of Understanding (Tab A), which McNamara has OKed. Chavan has himself appealed to us to OK it, so that he can run it through Indian cabinet, and we can put out a brief announcement on success of talks, a good gesture in India just now.

The Memo, and proposed bland press release (Tab B), fall far short of what Bowles wants (but will be a plus in India even so). For example, it does not include any US jet offer designed to pre-empt Indian MIG deal with Soviets. Bundy and I hope you'll hear argument on this separately later

We simply want to give you the final word on this before going ahead. It's only an early stage in a long and painful dialogue with the Indians but both sides are happy with progress to date. Nor will Paks be too unhappy, because we haven't given much (we've kept them clued).

Recommend your early approval. Indians hope to get it so their cabinet can act before it goes Saturday to bury Nehru's ashes.

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #53

R. W. Komer

By JC, NARA. Date 1-12-01

Approve ✓

McG. Bundy

Disapprove _____

21

B-8

~~SECRET~~

June 23, 1964

India Pak 21a
X India Regs

McGB:

It looks as though Mikoyan's surprise stop-over in Delhi (en route to Djakarta) may have clinched MIG deal. Our DCM was told (Delhi 3851) that it was "confirmed" by Mikoyan. DCM regards die as cast, but a few of us here still hope there may be some F-104 play left for us. In any case, we can keep plugging HF-24 engine, in hopes that if it pans out we'll have new case for limiting MIG purchases.

Meanwhile Paks seem to be whomping up another anti-US MAP for India campaign (note attached). To me, this is not yet the time to start being nice to Paks, but to growl back at them a while longer. Paks claim long-term US aid prevents India/Pak reconciliation, but in point of fact unless we keep them in suspense it is they who lose incentive for compromise with Shastri.

RWK

Attach. TDCS 5/584,363

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81
By inf, NARS, Date 10-9-81

6 C Aug 1/6

JUL 5 1964

Handwritten notes:
A circle containing the word "Ambassador".
Below it, "Pak" and "218" with a horizontal line under "218".

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with Ambassador Ahmed of Pakistan

I recommend that you receive Ambassador G. Ahmed of Pakistan who has requested an appointment on July 6 or July 7 to deliver a letter from President Ayub Khan.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Date and time _____

Ambassador Ahmed has requested, under instructions, an appointment to deliver to you personally a letter from President Ayub Khan. We do not know the contents of the letter but the Pakistan press has reported that it concerns our arms assistance to India. As you know, the Paks have been complaining about this assistance and have suggested that it may require a reappraisal by them of their relations with the U.S. and with CENTO and SEATO.

Ambassador Ahmed leaves Washington on the afternoon of July 7 to join Ayub at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

~~SECRET~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
Not automatically declassified.

Handwritten note:
Ahmed saw Pres 7/7/64

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20 79, NSC 9-9-81
By mf, NARS, Date 10-9-81

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-2-

It would be desirable for you to see the Ambassador because of a) our decision not to invite Ayub to stop over here after the Commonwealth Conference, b) President Ayub's known concern about our arms aid to India, and c) our desire to convey to Ayub our appreciation of his statesmanlike response to the situation in India created by the death of Nehru and our determination to meet the Communist challenge to freedom in South East Asia.

1
/s/ George W. Ball

Acting Secretary

Added in covering note: we also want to signal to Ayub our displeasure over his and Bhutto's recent intemperate statements about US MAP to India.

~~SECRET~~

From: Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan,
N.Pk., H.J.

President's House,
Rawalpindi.
1st July 1964.

Robert Johnson
India

2/c

My dear President Johnson,

I am asking my Ambassador to call on you and apprise you of the likely repercussions of the recent decision of your Administration concerning military aid to India. I think the time has come for me to make a personal approach to you.

We have, over the last two years, repeatedly represented to the United States Government the dangers implicit in their policy of massive arms aid to India. From the very beginning we have held the view that the arming of India on the scale chosen by the United States was uncalled for. Time has proved that we were right. It must now be clear to everyone that China does not plan to invade India and there is no likelihood of recrudescence of even a limited arms conflict between India and China.

On the other hand, this aid imperils the security of Pakistan, your ally; it prevents an Indo-Pakistan rapprochement over Kashmir which immobilises the bulk of their armed forces in a dangerous confrontation; it must lead to an arms race between India and Pakistan and thereby place a crushing burden on their economies. Surely this is no way of preventing the inroads of Communism into the sub-continent - if this is the United States objective. On the contrary, it would facilitate them.

Further, by continuing to build India's armed might, the United States might well force India's smaller neighbours already deeply mistrustful of India - to seek the protection of China.

In short, the policy the United States is following in

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #60.
NARA. Date 3-13-01

The foregoing considerations have been put before the United States Government time and again. If I am restating them, it is because I have a feeling that these considerations have not been given the weight they deserve.

On May 26 my Foreign Minister explained to Ambassador McConaughy Pakistan's growing concern at the continued arming of India. He also stated that if this policy continued, Pakistan would be compelled to reconsider its commitments to her allies.

Your Government has since decided not merely to continue to arm India; it has offered India twice as much arms aid in FY 1965 as in previous years. India has also been given to understand that she may expect to receive military aid of this order for the next five years.


Not to mention the timing of previous decisions to arm India which have all contributed towards complicating Indo-Pakistan relations, the present decision, in particular, has been singularly ill-timed. Latterly, we were moving towards a relaxation of tension in our relations with India. There was some hope that the Shastri Government recognised the importance of improving relations with Pakistan and, to that end, might be willing to settle the Kashmir dispute. That hope has now been rudely shaken.

This latest manifestation of US Administration's resolve to continue to give long term military aid to India has caused deep misgivings in Pakistan. Faced with the resultant growing

peril to our security, because of the enormous Indian arms build up with US support, I am writing to you in the hope that you will please look personally into the issues I have mentioned and take suitable corrective action in the interest of Pakistan-United States relationship which has so far been cordial and warm. And to my way of thinking very little effort is required to maintain it so. I am saying this as I have belief in your wisdom and sagacity. I also believe that this is not only necessary in the interest of Pakistan but also very much in the global interest of the United States relating to Asia.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Nawaz Khan', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

His Excellency Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
July 10, 1964

T. Rowland
R. F. [unclear]

212

BKS -

This conforms to Talbot's earlier telegram summary. Of course, no WH staff was present, so we have to depend on Talbot's account.

FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

HHS

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Memoranda of conversation
between the President and
the Ambassador of Pakistan

For approval prior to
distribution.

The President's remarks are
sidelined in blue.

Enclosures:

1. Bashir Ahmed
2. US Military Assistance to
India (EXDIS)

EXDIS ENCLOSURES

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10205

Memorandum of Conversation

212

EXDIS

DATE: July 7, 1964

SUBJECT: U.S. Military Assistance to India

DECLASSIFIED**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6****NLJ 97-144****By ics, NARA Date 11-16-98**

PARTICIPANTS: The President
His Excellency Ghulam Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
Mr. Tayeb-Uddin Mahtab, Second Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan
Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot (NEA) (D)

COPIES TO: S NEA Amembassies: NEW DELHI
U S/VN KARACHI
M FE LONDON
G G/PM
S/S White House - 2
INR CINCSTRIKE FOR POLAD

Ambassador Ahmed congratulated the President on the passage of the Civil Rights Act, and expressed the admiration of the Pakistani people for the President's courage and skill in successfully carrying through legislation of such historic importance. He then handed over a letter from President Ayub.

When the President had read the letter, the Ambassador suggested that from its contents the President would recognize the depth of President Ayub's anxiety about United States military assistance to India. Pakistan had hoped the time had come when this aid would be stopped, since the Chinese threat to India had clearly receded. Instead, United States military assistance to India had been doubled. There was also now a long-term understanding on arms aid. He was sorry to have to say that these regrettable developments had definitely upset the balance of power in the subcontinent, and, in addition, had clearly eroded Pakistan's ability to meet its obligations to its allies. ?

The President interrupted to ask if this were why President Ayub had not replied to requests for some assistance to Vietnam. He had been shocked at President Ayub's silence, especially as Pakistan had once before offered troops to assist in protecting Southeast Asia. He had thought that now President Ayub would at least put the Pakistan flag there.

The Ambassador, clearly uninformed on this question, said he did not know about other assistance but, of course, Pakistan could not now put any soldiers there. Pakistan faced a difficult threat. Its neighbor, India, was completely non-aligned and had made

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year
no commitment
intervals; not
automatic

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-2-

no commitment whatsoever to any free world cause. As President Ayub had pointed out before, Pakistan could foresee that a militarily strong India would oust the American presence from Southeast Asia. President Ayub had great respect for President Johnson and trusted that, with his knowledge of the situation in the area, he would be able to understand the situation and rectify the steps that were being taken.

After a quiet pause, the President said he would study President Ayub's letter carefully and talk with his associates about it. However, he did not share President Ayub's feeling that because the United States has helped India, Pakistan should ignore its alliance obligations. Obviously Pakistan would have to decide its course. He himself did not think it would be in Pakistan's interest to leave the alliances, but that would have to be Pakistan's decision.

The Ambassador, visibly concerned at the President's reaction, interposed that President Ayub had not said he would leave the alliances. In response the President read from the Ayub letter, saying he had inferred the President was thinking of this possibility from such phrases as the following:

"On May 26 my Foreign Minister explained to Ambassador McConaughy Pakistan's growing concern at the continued arming of India. He also stated that if this policy continued, Pakistan would be compelled to reconsider the commitments to her allies."

The Ambassador asserted that what President Ayub hoped was that this United States policy would not continue. The President then read another quotation from the letter:

"Further, by continuing to build India's armed might, the United States might well force India's smaller neighbors - already deeply mistrustful of India - to seek the protection of China."

The Ambassador responded that this could happen. Without referring to Pakistan's relations with China, he said that after all Nepal was already almost in the mouth of China; Burma was under considerable pressure; Ceylon, as everyone knew, was going wildly from policy to policy; and there were difficulties in Sikkim and Bhutan.

Speaking slowly,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Speaking slowly and seriously, the President expressed great admiration for President Ayub and great affection for the people of Pakistan. He knew that the Ambassador was about to go to London to see President Ayub, and asked him to give President Ayub his warm personal regards. However, he added soberly, he did not agree with what President Ayub had written about the necessity of the United States following the course President Ayub recommended. In light of the way President Ayub seemed to feel, he guessed we were coming to the point at which we would all have to re-evaluate the condition of our relationship. This troubled him deeply, he concluded, because there was no people for whom he had greater regard than for the Pakistani people.

After a pause, when it became clear that the President had no more to say, the Ambassador, who appeared shaken by the tone and content of the President's comments, said he would carry the President's message to President Ayub, and took his leave.

~~SECRET~~

NEA:Phillips Talbot/hmh

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10211

21f

Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: July 7, 1964

SUBJECT: Bashir Ahmed

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs (7)

His Excellency Ghulam Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
Mr. Tayeb-Uddin Mahtab, Second Secretary, Embassy of Pakistan

COPIES TO:

- S/S
- NEA
- SOA
- P
- White House

The President asked Ambassador Ahmed what news he had of "my camel driver." The Ambassador reported that Bashir Ahmed was doing very well, although as the President knew he was operating a truck rather than driving a camel. The President asked Mr. Talbot whether we hear anything about the welfare of the camel driver. Mr. Talbot replied that we occasionally get news through the Embassy. The President instructed Mr. Talbot to give him a report on Bashir Ahmed so he could see how he is doing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 3
Declassified at 18 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Hr 2/25/77

By MIE, NARS, Date 3/31/78