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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with Ambassador McConaughy on
Wednesday, July 15, noon

Ambassador McConaughy has been on home leave and returns to Karachi July 21. The Ambassador should be in a position, on his return, to inform Ayub of your reply to Ayub's letter of July 1.

I recommend that you authorize Ambassador McConaughy to deliver the enclosed letter. Its purpose is to:

- (a) restate the position you gave orally to Ambassador Ahmed;
- (b) do so in a way which leaves Ayub a line of retreat from his "either-or" approach without loss of face;
- (c) avoid written debate now, in the expectation that with time and a chance for personal discussions, a more rational and useful exchange will take place;
- (d) thus reduce the possibility of an impasse in our relations.

Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, will also attend.

A biographic sketch of Ambassador McConaughy is enclosed.

DR
Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

- 1. Suggested letter to President Ayub.
- 2. Biographic Sketch of Ambassador McConaughy.

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
Not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-162

By sig NARA, Date 10-2-89

JUL 15 1964

*269 led out
about 9:30 and
a letter*

*McConaughy seen
12:00 July 15, Sec. Rusk
McConaughy 7/15/64*

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SUGGESTED LETTER TO PRESIDENT AYUB

Dear President Ayub:

For some time I have thought it has been far too long since we last met together. Your letter of July 1 confirms my feeling that we have gotten out of touch. I know that Ambassador Ahmed faithfully conveyed to you the warmth of my regards and the problems your letter gave me. Yet I would like to discuss these matters in the kind of personal exchange which we have customarily enjoyed. If you agree this would be useful, I should be very glad if you could visit me in Washington later on this year, our electorate being willing to allow me to continue in office. We can work out a mutually convenient time.

To help in narrowing our differences, and to eliminate any possibility of misunderstanding, I am asking my Ambassador to explain in greater detail some of the points I made to Ambassador Ahmed. In all candor, your recommendations regarding our aid to India and your alternatives do not appear to me to be in our national interest nor yours. I am sure you will agree with me that we need to come to some better meeting of the minds than we appear to have reached so far.

In the meantime, I hope we may continue to work together on the assumption that our friendship and alliance relationship remain unaltered by our present disagreements. I shall keep a close eye on the questions you have raised in your letter, and shall follow personally with great interest Ambassador McConaughy's reports on his conversations with you.

I hope I may have the pleasure of seeing you later this year.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

7/20/64

~~SECRET~~-EXDISThis document consists of 3 pages
of 7 copies, Serials A

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10679

Memorandum of Conversation

226

DATE: July 15, 1964

SUBJECT: President's Conversation with Ambassador McConaughy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 Ambassador Walter McConaughy
 Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, NEA (7)
 Mr. R. W. Komer, White House

COPIES TO:

S NEA-2 (Mr. Talbot Amembassy NEW DELHI (Amb. Bowles)
 U DOD (Mr. Solbert) Amembassy KARACHI (Amb. McConaughy)
 M White House (Mr. Komer)
 G
 S/S

Ambassador McConaughy said Ayub has manifested strong feelings of rapport with President Johnson, especially after his visit to the Texas ranch in 1961. Ayub had been disappointed with what he felt was a failure by President Kennedy to understand fully Pakistan's problem with arms assistance to India and had counted on a more sympathetic hearing from President Johnson. Ayub felt that we were not taking Pakistani views enough into account. The Ambassador thought it would be most useful to build on the great respect which Ayub had for the President by inviting Ayub here for a face-to-face talk after the U.S. elections. This would please Ayub and give him a chance to get things off his chest, even though we might have to agree to disagree again. The Department had incorporated a suggestion for such a meeting in the draft Presidential letter for the Ambassador to take back with him, if the President approved.

After rereading President Ayub's July 1, 1964 letter and reading the proposed reply, the President outlined a different type of reply he wished to have made to Ayub. Instead of taking a letter, Ambassador McConaughy should give an oral response when he next saw Ayub. The President did not want to give Ayub an invitation to Washington now, or anytime before the November election. He did not see much point in another session of unproductive argument with Ayub.

The President said that the Ambassador should restate the President's highest personal regard for President Ayub. The Ambassador should then say that the President had read President Ayub's letter with a great deal of interest and considerable distress. The President had little to add to what he had already told Pakistan Ambassador G. Ahmed when the letter was presented. He did not share

FORM DS-1254
3-61~~SECRET~~

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
 downgrading and
 declassification

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #65
 By jc NARA. Date 3/2-01
 GPO-808982

JUL 23 1964

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- 2 -

President Ayub's viewpoint that he was being disloyal to the Alliance by trying to work with India in what he considers to be our interest and also Ayub's. Moreover he was distressed that such an old and valued ally of ours as President Ayub should want to give the attention he has given to Communist China. Ayub must know we Americans felt strongly about China; we were having all sorts of trouble with China in Southeast Asia right now. As for President Ayub's suggestion that he might have to reappraise Pakistan's commitments to the Alliances, the President could not see that this would be in Pakistan's interest or in ours, but it was a decision that only President Ayub could make. We valued the Pakistan alliance. As he had said to Ambassador Ahmed, we recognized Pakistan's right as a sovereign country to re-examine its policies. Regrettable as it might be, we would have to re-examine ours also, if Pakistan did so.

Commenting on these statements to be made to President Ayub, the President said he did not wish to provoke Ayub. Ayub, who is about as able, tough and ruthless as anyone the President had known, was enough of a dictator so that if the President were to respond to the letter by inviting Ayub to Washington, Ayub would think we were admitting we had been wrong in our policy toward India. After the election, the President would see if he wanted to have Ayub here for a debating contest, or let Pakistan go its own way. If Pakistan wanted to change its course, there wasn't much we could do about it. We were giving Pakistan more than double the per capita aid that we gave India. If Ayub wanted to jeopardize this, it was up to him. The President doubted that Pakistan could get much from either Communist China or the Soviet Union.

Ambassador McConaughy estimated that as long as Ayub was in control in Pakistan, he wasn't about to commit suicide by reversing Pakistan foreign policy and risking the loss of U.S. aid. Ayub was very conscious of the value of his U.S. ties, and while a shrewd bargainer was unlikely to go over the brink. In fact, Pakistan was continuing to work with us in many fields and had just recently offered to share any intelligence they collected on the new air route to Communist China. However, Ayub was very disillusioned with what he saw as a shift in U.S. policy and in the sub-continent power balance at the expense of Pakistan. We should try to bring Ayub around, seeking to avoid any action which might cause him to think he was being forced to the brink.

The President wondered how much we were getting for the very large amounts of aid we were giving to India as well as Pakistan. He asked how much our aid to Pakistan was running; when told that it was over \$400 million including PL-480, he commented that the question of aid to Pakistan would certainly be settled if the Morse Amendment were passed. The President said

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- 3 -

that when Ayub was willing to send men to Laos, he thought our aid was worthwhile. But now that the Pakistanis refused to help us in Viet Nam, he didn't know whether we were getting very much for our money. Mr. Komer and the others present noted the special facilities available to the U.S. and cooperation in various intelligence fields, but agreed that the price was high in terms of specific benefits.

Ambassador McConaughy thought that a Kashmir settlement would contribute more than anything else to the solution of our dilemma on the subcontinent. Ayub had made clear that if only Kashmir could be settled, he would again offer joint defense to India. Pakistan and India would not have to deploy against each other and they could release forces for use elsewhere. The President didn't think that either side would settle Kashmir. The President observed that what we did for many countries was repaid by their involving us in their own ancient feuds -- not only Kashmir between India and Pakistan, but the Arabs and Israel and now the Greeks and Turks over Cyprus.

The President had endured what Ayub had written without questioning his loyalty to our cause, but he did not share Ayub's view that while we were giving twice as much aid per capita to Pakistan as to India we ought to be precluded from doing with India what we thought to be in our interest and the over-all interest as well. He was not sure that all our actions with India have been the wisest possible, but we were set on that course and would see it through. After the election we should take a "long look" at our Indian policy over the next four years.

The President then reiterated that he didn't want to set up a meeting with Ayub now. As the President put it, Ayub says he'll take a look at his hole card. Let's wait till he does so and then we will look at ours. Isn't this good poker?" Mr. Talbot agreed.

Summing up, the President requested Ambassador McConaughy to restate to Ayub the position the President himself had taken with G. Ahmed on July 7. He should tell Ayub that the President had read his letter with interest but with distress. He regretted Ayub's feeling that it was necessary to re-evaluate the desirability of Pakistan's alliance. But he recognized that this was a decision for Ayub himself to make. In this case, we would have to re-examine our policy toward Pakistan, too. The President then repeated that he wasn't sure about all aspects of our India policy either and we should take another look at our policy after the election.

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 Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81
 By *WJ*, NARS, Date 10-9-81

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R. W. Komer

You've so shaken all of us on India/Pak
 policy that we want to be sure you know in
 advance about tomorrow's pledging session
 for the 1964/65 share of the Pak Consortium.
 We and our friends will announce pledges of
 \$420-430 million (about \$212 million US), which
 will get a little play in Friday's papers.
 This just makes public an AID commit-
 ment already given; in fact, we've gotten
 the Pak in return to make some very sensible
 moves to liberalize their private sector. But
 we'll also have McConaughy make the point to
 Ayub that we and our allies are continuing to
 give him major aid at the very time when he's
 slanging us.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 15, 1964

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Commit
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file
Pak Consortium

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RWK:

April 29, 1964

Latest on Pak consortium is that we've decided to lend \$140 million of the \$200 million non-project aid Paks have requested. We'll tell Paks privately now that this figure is contingent on their liberalizing imports. We'll go to \$85 million in DL if projects materialize.

Consortium will hold preview meeting here 27-28 May. Pledging session will meet early July. So Paks need an informal notion of pledges early enough to write reforms into their budget beginning 1 July. Formal pledging session can then base final contributions on Pak action.

MacDonald went back through London and Bonn (see London To-Aid 225, Bonn 3887 attached). Brits said they might increase commodity aid, the big need this year to help Paks use idle industrial capacity. Germans much less encouraging. They're reducing loans and mixing commercial credits into their consortium pledge (which stiffens average terms).

MacDonald's experience in Bonn is another concrete example of why LBJ should hit Erhard on aid. In addition to mentioning this problem to Gaud, it would be very helpful to jog Macomber too. He'll be receptive, but the more people we hit, the better. (Joe Wheeler will hit him from below.)

HHS

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-12-01*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RWK:

May 26, 1964

Pak Consortium

22e

Unlike India meetings, Pak consortium sessions Wednesday and Thursday are preliminary. Pledging won't take place till early July.

Big issue is whether Paks will push import liberalization. If they do, we think \$450 million is a reasonable goal (\$430m. last year, \$500m. Pak request). This would include \$200m. in non-project loans, \$140m. from us. If they don't loosen imports, they'll absorb \$80-100m. less. We still don't think they'll have enough projects to use the remaining \$300m. they've asked for. Maybe they'll make \$250m.

Our main objective is to get a clear Pak statement of intent on import liberalization. We've given up trying to get French and Belgians into the "good money" column, and the Paks may turn down any offers they make.

HHS

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Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81

By is, NARS, Date 10-9-81

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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SMITH, WM. Y.

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Jul 29 11 57 AM '64

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI 107

Info: Amembassy NEW DELHI 221
Amembassy LONDON 666

LEADS

FOR AMBASSADOR

1. Soon after your return you should see President Ayub to give him oral message from President and to review with him your conversations in Washington.

2. You should make following points in message from the President:

a. The President asked you to give his warm personal regards to Ayub.

However, the

b. The President read President Ayub's letter of July 1 with a great interest and considerable distress, as he had indicated to Ambassador

G. Ahmed when the letter was presented July 7.

c. The President did not share Ayub's viewpoint that he was being disloyal to the Alliance by trying to work with India in what he considers to be our interest and also Ayub's. Moreover he was distressed that such an old and valued ally of ours as President Ayub should want to give the attention he has to Communist China. Ayub must know how strongly Americans feel about China; Communist China is now posing a grave threat to us in Southeast Asia.

d. As for inference in Ayub's letter that he might have to reappraise Pakistan's commitments to the Alliances, the President could not see that this

would

Drafted by:

NZA:SOA:WLSimmons/bk 7-23-64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

NEA:NEA/Pfalbot

Clearance:

SOA - Miss Laize

SEA - Mr. Pickering

FE - Mr. Moore

SEATO - Mr. Krausse

White House - Mr. Komer

S/S - Mr. Hilliker

NEA-Amb McConaughy

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 88-162

By WJ NARA, Date 10-2-89

FORM DS-322

30 1964

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would be in Pakistan's interest or in ours. US recognizes Pakistan's right as sovereign country to re-examine its policies. Regrettable as it might be, we would have to re-examine ours also, if Pakistan did so.

3. In addition to delivering President's message, suggest you take opportunity at your discretion to make following points:

a. USG pleased with indications GOP has taken some initiative to create climate conducive to solution its problems with GOI. As Ayub knows, we have always believed compromises necessary to resolve issues can only be made by two sovereign countries concerned and cannot be imposed from outside. We wish them well, and will continue to contribute in any way which might be useful. But we fail to understand how timing our June 6 announcement of military aid to India has set back cause of improved Indo-Pak relations and note reports that Home Ministers to meet also and Ayub-Shastri meeting ~~meeting~~

b. US recognizes last 20 months have been difficult period in US-Pak affairs.

For our part, we continue to place great value on our relations with Pakistan. We continue to be deeply interested in Pakistan's economic and political development. We have been and continue to be committed to Pakistan's security, a commitment formalized in bilateral agreements and in SEATO and through our association in CENTO. Recent highly successful consortium meeting demonstrate our support Pak economic development. US military aid continues to help make Pakistan's armed services among best equipped in Asia. In June you participated in turnover (submarine, making Pakistan one of few Asian countries possessing this type

naval

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naval weapon. Thus we assume Ayub is not complaining about our aid.

From GOP point of view we acknowledge our aid to India is bound to be cause of concern but we have hoped GOP would have confidence in our assurances and intentions. We are nonplussed by Ayub's contention that we have QUOTE doubled military UNQUOTE our aid to India.

c. You found intense concern in Washington over Chicoms ambitions, complete resolve to meet this threat, regardless of what steps may be necessary, and concern that actions of our allies should not lead Chicoms to consider their strategy is succeeding.

Xc However, an even more important factor disturbing US-Pak relations and the one with the most worrisome implications for the future of these relations is Pakistan's policy on Communist China. Free World and especially interests of free countries of Asia now threatened by Chinese subversion and aggression in Southeast Asia in Laos and Viet Nam. As President told Ambassador Ahmed, USG expected Pakistan to join free world effort in Viet Nam and at least show flag there. We have given GOP list items that government needs and are hopeful GOP will give positive response shortly.

We regret GOP saw necessity of issuing public statements supporting 14 nation conference on Laos. Bhutto's July 20 press statement to NCMA gave particular offense in Washington since it comes dangerously close by implication if not explicitly to support Chicom objectives in Southeast Asia. Press leak on our confidential request for GOP to caution Chicoms on Laos and Chicom reply also regrettable.

d. Despite

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d. Despite our differences USG believes fundamentals our alliance relationship remain in national interest of both of us. It would be tragic to let this relationship be jeopardized by our drifting ~~in~~ too far apart.

Senate

FYI During foreign aid hearings before Appropriations Committee July 24, primary criticism was directed at current Pakistan policies. Talbot was pressed to justify continued high level U.S. aid under present circumstances. END FYI

GP-3

END

RUSK

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September 23, 1964

23a

Pak
X Shoaib
Viet
(12)

Mac -

I see your talk with Pak FinMin Shoaib as quite important, as he's our best Pak friend and best way around Bhutto to Ayub. He'll have seen everybody, including Rusk Thursday noon (I plotted to make you clean-up man). Rusk will hit Chicom issue hard, so no need to flog it again.

Since we don't want to beat up Shoaib, best tactic might be for you to philosophize a bit about Pak-US relations 1954-64 as means of bringing home how well Paks have done by us, and how little we've gotten from them. Gently setting Paks straight through Shoaib on crucial issue of who's really helping whom will underline key thought we want Shoaib to take home, i. e. don't kill the goose that lays the golden egg.

Bhutto (and Ayub) keep saying Pakistan has lived up to its commitments to us but we have failed in ours to Paks, i. e. we owe them something. However, a survey of Pak-US relations over last decade would demonstrate that they've really given us nothing aside from some admittedly valuable real estate (if so, it's the most expensive we've ever bought). Their "commitments" to SEATO and CENTO have always been minimal. They've turned us down repeatedly on help in SEA, most recently our request for even a gesture toward Vietnam. Even in UN their voting record has been worse than India's in recent years. Now Bhutto's pro-East swing is actively working against our common interests in Asia.

As opposed to what we've gotten from Paks, let's look at what Pakistan has gotten from us. Through a master stroke (let's give Ayub a left-handed compliment) Paks have reaped vast gains from simply joining two alliances which really haven't limited their freedom of action. Bluntly speaking, it's been worth almost \$4 billion in aid through FY 1965. We have modernized the Pak army and air force (to tune of \$700 million), despite the fact that we knew we were really equipping it for use in the Punjab, not abroad. No need to describe our economic aid to Shoaib. Suffice it to say Pakistan could not have gotten such massive help from any where else. The larger significance of all this is that we have given Pakistan the very military and economic sinews of viability. It is these programs which make Pakistan a viable state, able to maintain its independence of India. What we have done (and can do) is worth 20 Kashmirs.

But Pakistan has always sought (and we can understand why) to extend the US/Pak relationship to serve Pak interests against India. Aside from Kashmir, we've had constant Pak pressure over the years to twist CENTO and SEATO around to meet Pakistan's fears of the "non-communist" threat, i. e. from India.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-71

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By: SA NARA Date: 7/7/01

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Let's face it--it is Pak frustration that we can no longer give the Paks a lien on our India policy that accounts for current problems between us. Ironically enough, the man they should blame is Mao Tse-Tung, not Kennedy. Any wise observer would have known that we'd help India against China and would continue to do so.

Yet since October 1962 Paks have been "leaning on" us (to use Ayub's phrase) and cozying up to China. We've tried to get across that this policy won't work--in fact it has backfired. It only gives Indians arguments to use against Paks, such as who's really anti-China now. And playing game with Peiping touches raw nerve here.

Beyond this, Paks are losing friends by calling President's policy "opportunistic" (Ayub Daily Mail interview) and Bhutto's claim that US is welshing on its alliance commitment. Shoaib must know this just isn't so--our policy has been clearly and consistently aimed at the Soviet-Chicom threat. We made clear from the outset that CENTO and SEATO were anti-communist alliances, not aimed at India.

Indeed it is Pakistan which is welshing on alliance commitments, especially SEATO which was patently directed at Chicom threat. Today it is Pak policy which plays into Chicom hands and weakens free Asian front.

Despite fact that sensible Paks must have known we'd help India if attacked and that we had no obligations to deny India help to serve Pak ends, we did our best in 1963 to reassure Paks about any Indian threat: (1) we've made clear we'd help Pakistan against overt Indian aggression; (2) we've offered joint exercises and joint logistics planning; (3) we've carefully limited our Indian aid to items for use in mountains not on Punjab plain. But Paks spurned all this, so now we've decided not to try any more.

Our fear is that Paks are operating on mistaken assumption that by leaning on us and cozying up to China they can get us to shift our policy back into old mold. Events since Chicom attack on India should have demonstrated this is not so. Realities of power are such that we are determined to back India against China. Any US Administration--Republican or Democrat--would do the same. Eisenhower offered military aid to India. And leaning on us has generated its own backlash; for example, Bhutto tactic of threatening to withdraw from SEATO really backfired here--LBJ personally laid down line that if Paks deserted us, we'd change our policy toward them.

If Paks stay on present track, and try to force us to choose between them and Indians, we see real trouble ahead: (1) COP is deliberately

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stirring up public opinion against US in a way which may make it impossible for Ayub to reverse course in time; (2) GOP must realize it is drawing down capital in US--to us, Chicoms are bad guys, and now that Indians are under the gun, they're good guys; (3) wlrready people in Washington are asking why we spend so much on Pakistan when it's needling us across the board.

The tragedy is that just when Pak economy is beginning to take off (thanks largely to Shoaib, and Harvard Group advice), our political differences are casting a cloud over future collaboration on scale needed. If US and Paks drift further apart, it may kill the goose that lays the golden egg.

In sum, Paks must face up to realities of situation and not overbid. While we can't make Pakistan our chosen instrument at expense of India, we can do for Paks what no one else can. We can continue to give Paks a lot more comparatively than we do India, we can protect Pakistan against India, and we can try to bring the two together, on assumption that over time, they'll see overriding common interest in meeting common threat.

You might ask for Shoaib's ideas on how we can get our reading of problem across to Ayub before it is too late. GOP seems to think it's up to us to change our policy--we wish we could but in fact basic decision is up to Paks.

RWK

N.B. Attached is State's strategy paper. If you want me to do some talking points for you, just holler.

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SECRET

Mac -

September 25, 1964

Try this on for size. I missed a few
gems.

RWK

SECRET

Att: RWK Memo for Record, 9/24/64,
re Shoah conference

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9/24/64
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Authority State 172 5/31/77

By MTE, NARS, Date 3/31/78

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Komer thought that, even accepting Shoaib's contention that nothing serious had happened, there was little question that Pakistan-US relations had soured noticeably in the months since the Shoaib/Kennedy interview. The combination of Pak needling and US defensive reactions was leading to a gradual shift in attitudes on both sides. Our fear was that Ayub might be boxing himself in--if he let Pakistan public opinion get so exercised that he would lose his freedom of action.

Shoaib recalled his meeting with President Kennedy in 1963; he said that, just as he had assured the President then, Pakistan had made no serious moves toward China. They were just keeping on good terms so as to minimize any possible future difficulties. There was nothing in Pak/Chicom relations that was not in the newspapers. He described the circumstances surrounding the \$60 million Chicom loan offer.

For example, Ayub and the Pak military simply didn't think that the Indians would ever fight China. Delhi would soon reach an accommodation with Peking; then, of course, the future weight of India's defense buildup would be directed against Pakistan. Bundy refused to argue the merits of this Pakistan view, but he couldn't understand why, if the Indians were too "cowardly" to fight the Chinese, the Paks were so scared of India.

He and Bundy exchanged thoughts on the differences between Pakistan and US views of Communist China and India. In effect, Shoaib admitted that the Pakistanis couldn't quite understand why we felt as strongly as we did about Peking. However, he continued, Americans seem unable to understand how strongly they feel about India. These differences were probably based more on emotion and geography than on reason, but they were realities nonetheless.

McGeorge Bundy's 45-minute talk with Pakistan Finance Minister Shoaib was most cordial throughout. Shoaib explained that he was passing through from the Tokyo IMF/IB meeting and stopped off to talk financial matters with his old friends in Washington. He had just hit George Woods for a \$25 million "balance of payments" loan. Since Pakistan had taken a deliberate import-substitution and was liberalizing imports, it needed some more money to finance these.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

September 24, 1964

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Authority: FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #73
 By: J. NARA, Date: 1-2-61

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Bundy philosophized a bit about the US-Pak alliance. When originally laid on, it had seemed doubly useful to both countries. First, there was the real common interest which we had in strengthening a vulnerable flank. Second, it had political salability in both countries. Our politicians could justify it as a move against the Communists; Pak politicians could justify it as reassurance against India. Historic circumstance, rather than any shift in our own intentions, had tended to change this situation. Now, politicians here found it hard to defend our Pak alliance because of Pak moves toward China, while Ayub's political sense required him to complain about his US ally aiding India.

But the Paks must understand that we had not changed our position-- we had never envisaged our relationship as aimed at India. We still wanted to be on the best of terms with Pakistan, unless the Paks themselves made this impossible.

Bundy probed on President Ayub's own attitude. So long as we were satisfied that Ayub himself had a clear sense of the desirability of maintaining our relationship we could both sustain a fair amount of political sniping. We wanted to be sure that Ayub was solid on the continued value of the tie. It rather bothered us when Ayub himself used the respected pages of Foreign Affairs to tell us we were foolishly naive about India (Shoaib said "misguided" was a better word) or when he called the President's policy opportunistic in the Daily Mail.

Shoaib insisted that Ayub had no intention of switching away from the US. True, he had certain political requirements which as a politician he must meet; he knew he needed the US. To clear the air, and to make sure that Johnson and Ayub got through clearly to each other, the two Presidents must get together at the summit as soon as possible and talk this matter over. This was the best, indeed the only, way to avoid misunderstanding. It couldn't happen too soon. He had also mentioned this to Secretary Rusk. Bundy agreed that a summit would be useful; there was no one for whom President Johnson had more respect than Ayub. A meeting would rank high on our future agenda.

Bundy stressed, however, that neither Ayub nor any other Pakistani should be under any illusion that leaning on the US or making noises toward China would change our determination to help India against China. This was a major aspect of our foreign policy. The Paks might disagree with our judgment as to the reliability of India and whether the Indians would ever fight China. But this was not the issue. We regarded India as a very

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- 3 -

important place and were determined to avoid the critical vacuum which would be created by India's collapse. This was also in Pakistan's interest. Did Shoaib, for example, want to see India fall apart in 15 years or so? Shoaib asserted, "Not in 15 years, nor in 50."

Nonetheless, he feared that India could fall apart if it bankrupted itself by such huge military expenditures. The Indian military budget was now up to \$2 billion. India couldn't afford this kind of military establishment. He, Shoaib, had firmly resisted this sort of thing in Pakistan. When the service chiefs had recently gone to Ayub and insisted that Pak foreign exchange be used for military purchases, Ayub had vetoed it on Shoaib's plea. Ayub has told Musa and Asghar Khan that he knew they would put up a jolly good scrap with the additional hardware.

Yet we should understand that Musa and Ayub and many others were very unhappy about US military aid to India. Our decision last June to go ahead with a further program had had a bad effect, mainly because that in the talks with General Taylor the previous December they had gotten the impression that they had convinced us there was no need for longer term MAP for India since the Chinese weren't going to attack again. Moreover, they had expected us to offer some compensatory military aid to Pakistan to preserve the previous three-to-one military balance on which the Pak military counted so heavily. Now the balance seemed to be going heavily against them. When the Indians made their peace with China, Pakistan would face this whole new Indian military machine. We should do what we could to butter up the Pak military.

Komer interjected that we found the Pak military a bit too emotional and not coldly professional enough about our aid to India. Regardless of the comparable dollar values, we were sending a lot more fighting value to the Paks. As an example of how Pak emotionalism could work against its own interests, he recounted how we had considered suggesting to the Paks that a US offer of a few supersonics to India on condition that India not buy or build a much larger number of MIGs would actually serve Pak interests. But we concluded that the Paks just wouldn't think this through.

Shoaib and Bundy fenced briefly on Kashmir. The former recounted how TTK had told him in Tokyo that Nehru wanted to settle Kashmir before his death. Shastri was an unknown quantity, and Shoaib was convinced that there was no likelihood of movement on Kashmir just now. Bundy assured him that we still thought a settlement essential, and would do what we could when the time was ripe.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

At several points Shoaib made allusions to the problem with Bhutto and the MEA. He subsequently told Komer that he was aware we knew that Bhutto was at one extreme among Pak policy-makers. Ayub deliberately kept in the middle, and didn't take all Bhutto's advice. He repeated what he had told Phil Talbot, i. e. that he had inspired the RCD gambit as an alternative to Bhutto's pressure for new gestures toward China.

R. W. Komer

cc: Phil Talbot (personal)

~~SECRET~~

B-11

4c

RWK:

1. As you see, McG has not replied to Fowler's letter. Since it's up to you whether you write on McG's behalf or draft a reply for him.
2. Still don't know whether McG has been in. Do you want to push this?

24

Staff 3/11

24a-1

~~SECRET with COMINT attachment~~

McGB:

March 10, 1965

1. Bowles' long plaint to RWK is something he might best answer after he settles down since this involves sensitive relationships he is much closer to than I. Bowles is referring chiefly to his F-5 proposal, since the economic program is going in the right direction. However, if you want to be nice you might send something like the attached (BKS answered his first cable simply saying you and Komer were away and would be in touch when you returned.).


FYI, before he left, Bob asked me to stir people up on Bowles' aircraft proposal. JCS will have a position ready next Monday. At that point, we should be able to get State and Defense together, though Bowles probably won't end up with all he hopes for.

2. Have you ever heard from McCloy (see New Delhi 2385 attached)? If not, would you prefer to wait for him to make the first move or let State set something up? Would you encourage his seeing the President? I'd like to give State some feel if you haven't already.

JHL
HHS

HHS

Att: Proposed message to Bowles
Cy, ltr from Bowles to Komer, 3/2/65
COMINT Msg. from Bowles to Bundy, 3/9/65
New Delhi 2383, 2/24/65



*I'll write him
- Komer if you in
RWK, lunch -
mjd*

2958 3.4(b)(1) > 25Yrs

SANITIZED

~~SECRET with COMINT attachment~~

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-70

By com, NARA, Date 3-24-03

24a-2

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

TO: AMBASSADOR BOWLES
Amembassy New Delhi

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

Bob Komer and I are not ignoring your wires on the F-5 problem. However, as you know from Gov. Harriman, Bob has been involved in ticklish business elsewhere and ^{has only first} will be returned only this weekend. In his absence, we have started wheels turning to get a Defense position ~~by early next week~~, so we have not been wasting time. Also, when he and I have had a chance to chat, we will want to answer your long letter.

~~[You might add a sentence about McCloy if you have seen
or intend to see him.]~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-7D
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

~~SECRET~~

RWK:

March 15, 1965

Bowles argues that we're dealing with a new situation on supersonics for India. Chavan admits his mistake in concentrating on F-104's last spring and also worries about depending on Soviets. So he has officially asked for 6 squadrons of F-5A's 1966-70 (16 aircraft per squadron plus spares) and for support to improve the HF-24 Mark I. Bowles sees this as a second chance to establish a good relationship with the Indian Air Force and "some measure of control over its use vis-a-vis Pakistan."

Indian rationale for the F-5A is to complement HF-24 Mark I for close ground support (MIG-21 doesn't fill this role). However, Bowles points out it could also take the place of the MIG's as an interceptor. The HF-24 Mark I subsonic, and the Indians now admit it will have no intercept capability.

Bowles proposes a package including: (1) 3 squadrons of F-5A's over next 24 months (or F-104C as alternative) until we see whether climate is ripe for other 3; (2) feasibility study (would take 3 months) of HF-24 as a weapons system before we go beyond \$1.25 million (FY 64) to which we're currently committed. (He thinks it won't pass the test.) The Indians are asking for machine tools (\$4million credit sale) to raise HF-24 production to 6 aircraft per month by about 1968. They hope to add 2 squadrons of Mark I in FY 66-67 and 8 more by FY 70. This might eventually require another \$6 million for materials and ~~another~~ \$4-5 million in flight and fatigue testing equipment.

He feels the Indians can't openly reverse their position on MIG-21's (36 from Soviets expected FY 66-67) or on the MIG assembly line (5 more squadrons of 12 planes each by 1972) since this would look too much like a policy switch and might jeopardize \$175 million in yearly Soviet aid. Although L. K. Jha, M. J. Desai and Arjan Singh have hinted that the MIG program may come apart, Chavan has been unwilling officially to give us any hope that they'll kill it. So Bowles says it's unrealistic for us to make abandoning MIG's a condition for F-5's unless we're ready to pick up the check for economic aid which Soviets might drop. However, he does feel our stepping up with F-5's and help for HF-24 might encourage GOI eventually to drop MIG assembly. At least it would dilute Indian dependence on MIG's and put us in a position to move in if MIG production folds.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Bowles rejects McConaughy's argument that giving F-5's to India will necessarily exacerbate our relations with Pakistan. He argues that we've gained a substantial voice in the size and shape of the Indian defense budget to Pakistan's advantage. He argues Soviets would have stepped in in a big way if we'd left the door open. The other side of the argument is that if we give F-104's to Ayub and nothing to India, we'll hurt ourselves in India.

DOD's problem is that F-5A would overlap the roles of both the HF-24 and the MIG-21 and waste precious Indian resources. However, new info which DOD has just received on Indian plans to retire aging aircraft may clarify the problem. I'll have more on this after I see Stoddart Wednesday.

71.
HHS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81

By ig, NARS, Date 10-9-81

~~SECRET/PERSONAL~~

March 20, 1965

24c

Dear Chet,

I realize how distressing you must find our deafening silence in response to your many recent efforts. However, I am sure you know (and I asked Averell to tell you) that it is only because of the fire brigade exercises Mac and I have been involved in here. He has been spending most of his time on Vietnam and I on the Congo, Cyprus and Arab-Israel. It's a pity but our other interests (perhaps even more important in the long run) inevitably get shunted aside by the immediate flaps.

Let me say, however, that we haven't been neglecting our Indian enterprise. On the F-5 matter we are getting a JCS study next week. We had to go through this phase, but even if the Chiefs are reluctant the rest of us realize that military aid to India is as much a political as a military matter. I don't want to hold out too much hope, unless you can actually engineer a tradeoff between F-5s and MIGs. But I can assure you that we will insist on a hard look at substituting F-5s for other MAP or MAP sales under present ceilings.

The concept of a substantial add-on to our investment in Indian development is gaining currency here, particularly since we might be able to tie it in some fashion to some highly important things we want: (a) non-proliferation; (b) significant economic changes which would permit our money to be used more efficiently; and even (c) some progress toward Pak-Indian reconciliation. I just read the report of the latest pre-pledging session in Paris. We are finally getting the IB to take more leadership in insisting on reciprocal Indian economic reforms in return for consortium input. Bill Gaud tells me that we plan a much greater effort next year, when we must come to grips with the Indian Fourth Plan.

Am also taking a hard look at your wheat/cotton substitution idea for the UAR, although I suspect that it's more imaginative than practical at this point (given Hill reluctance to let us do even this much for Nasser). Incidentally, we can find no written reference here to the point you make about your talk with Nasser in 1962, i.e. that Nasser agreed to lay off subversive activities in return for our major PL 480 input.

~~SECRET/PERSONAL~~

~~SECRET/PERSONAL~~

- 2 -

Your stimulating 2 March letter reminded both Mac and myself that the Administration cannot afford to neglect its Indian enterprise. We are getting a number of things underway heading up toward Shastri visit.

Am off to London now to side Averell in our confab with the Laborites on Africa. Was terribly disappointed when our bosses made me stay on in Tel Aviv to mop up, rather than letting me come on out and see you. You can imagine how eager I was to come. However, I'll end with a promise to take up our Indian affairs again as soon as I return. Averell reports you are in fine fettle, which is always good to hear.

Fond regards,

R. W. Komer

Ambassador Chester Bowles
U.S. Ambassador to India
New Delhi, India

~~SECRET/PERSONAL~~

24d

~~SECRET~~

RWK:

March 31, 1965

JCS still hasn't signed off on its study of F-5's for India. We ought to try to break it loose; it's been put off at least two weeks now. (Bowman can't see what's holding it up; I told him about Bowles' 1781 and urged him to stir things up.) McNamara promised Nehru an answer on F-5's and HF-24 by 20 April (see attached memcon), and Bowles is pressing for decision before Ayub's visit.

Attached (purple) outlines requirements as the Indians see them: 8 squadrons of interceptors (6 of which by 1970 would be MIG-21's); 4 squadrons of fighter reconnaissance aircraft; 18 squadrons for close ground support.

The big gap, as they see it, is in close support. It's their greatest need, and the HF-24 Mark I which they plan to use in this role won't come off the production line fast enough. By 1970, they'll still be least 8 squadrons short. So they'd like 6 squadrons (16 planes each) of F-5's by 1970.

Jack Stoddart (speaking personally) thinks JCS could probably buy something close to the Indian targets. Also, our restrictions on what military equipment we can send India are so narrow that we'll have trouble using the \$50/\$50 million credit/grant total unless we broaden them or get into aircraft. However, DOD is leery of duplication among the HF-24, F-5 and MIG-21. Besides, we're not quite sure how the UK offer of Hawker-Hunters will affect the numbers. So the first thing we need is a clear picture of what makes military sense.

Then we get to the big political question--whether we want to put any more strain on the US-Pak tie by sending jet fighters to India. I think we ought to do what makes most political and military sense in India and then adjust to Pak pressures as necessary when we see how Ayub responds here. As far as the MIG's are concerned, I'd take a chance that something will go wrong with the production scheme over the next couple of years. The advantages (cementing role with Indian military, meeting military requirement against Chicoms, nudging MIG's aside) seem to me to overshadow the problems (Pak reaction, cost, co-mingling) if we're sure the F-5's are technically sensible.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81

By inf, NARS, Date 10-9-81

HHS

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24e

SECRET

RWK:

April 20, 1965

The JCS answer on aircraft for India is chiefly a political one. The bulk of their paper (Annex A) argues that (a) there's no urgent Indian need vis-a-vis China so (b) we ought to use any new aid to extract Indian concessions on Kashmir to bring India and Pakistan closer. (You need read only pp. 1-17 of Appendix B, clipped.)

The military argument linking these two points is that Indian force goals are higher than we think they should be, partly because they're geared to a Pak as well as a Chicom threat. So reducing the Pak threat would strengthen the case for a substantial reduction in force goals.

After its 25-page discussion of using MAP to force political concessions, the JCS paper focuses on an optimum Indian air force structure (Appendix B). The basic question this analysis raises is whether we'll give India what we think it needs or what GOI thinks it needs. Indian force goals are over 50% higher than our force guidelines (JSOP-70). They're still shooting for 30 fighter/fighter bomber squadrons (total 45 squadrons). JCS recommends only 22, assuming unified defense of the subcontinent. *What JCS has failed to give us is a realistic force structure assuming (as GOI must) as much threat from CPR and Pakistan.*

JCS concludes (on the basis of our force guidelines) that production of both HF-24 and MIG-21 is not justified either economically or militarily. However, if plans for MIG-21 production fall through, 3 squadrons of F-5s beginning USFY 68 and 3 squadrons of an all-weather interceptor FY 67-70 would fit within our force guidelines. HF-24 production of 3 planes per month up to 6 squadrons and purchase of 3 MIG-21 squadrons would also fit. However, JCS would not go ahead until we strike a deal with the Indians.

Even if the Indians bought our 22-squadron force, they'd still have a choice between two ways of getting there:

6 MIG-21 (3 produced in India)	3 MIG-21 (all bought)
10 HF-24 (by raising production from 3-6 per mo.)	6 HF-24 (3 per month)
4 Gnat	5 Gnat
2 Hunter	1 Hunter
	3 F-5
	3 New all-weather interceptor

DECLASSIFIED 1000 Div. 5200.30
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-16-01

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

JCS views the left-hand column as the poorer bet because it would leave the IAF depending exclusively on the MIG-21 for all-weather intercept. JCS believes the version going to the IAF is an older model with little all-weather capability. (The F-5 doesn't meet that requirement either; hence the need for a new interceptor later on.)

This boils down to the following choices for us: (1) Tell GOI their force goals are still too high so we think F-5s are redundant as long as they produce both MIG-21 and HF-24. However, we could talk about a package for a 22-squadron force if they'd drop MIG production. (2) Tell them their force goals are too high because of their scrap with Pakistan; but we'll sell planes if they'll settle with the Paks. (3) Tell them the foreign aid bill is in trouble partly because our biggest clients waste our resources fighting each other; we'll talk later about planes when the climate improves. ^{Then tell them in context of cutting down on cost of economy} (4) Override JCS and go ahead with 3 squadrons of F-5s in the hope that an effective US program on top of expected MIG production problems will gradually supplant the MIGs.

ISA will probably recommend we tell GOI we just can't decide in the present climate. I don't know whether Solbert will buy the JCS recommendation for telling Indians will only talk planes if they'll settle with Pakistan. This argument doesn't stand up because the F-5s by themselves don't provide enough leverage. If we won't support a force of more than 22 squadrons anyway, GOI doesn't gain anything from talking to us. It can get to 22 with MIG and HF-24 production; it wants our help to reach 30.

Seems to me our decision really depends on whether we think we'll be able to make the kind of big economic deal that would further curb Indian defense spending in time to keep the Indian military from looking for their six squadrons elsewhere. If so, we could afford to defer decision as Solbert may suggest. If not, maybe we should begin talking to the Indians about the relationship between military spending and aid for their Fourth Plan. If we're going to reject or stall, we'd look a lot better if we could show we have some reasonable economic arguments for doing so--not just "irritation."


HHS

~~SECRET~~

2-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mac -

2) *Shastri Visit*
x Sadana
x Palk
x Ay Visit 25a
January 11, 1965

Here are cables authorizing Ayub and Shastri visits, which State anxious to get out in time for McConaughy to clue Ayub when he sees him on 14th. Since Ayub is going to Peiping and Moscow (dates still unspecified), we also don't want to appear to be making a last minute counter-effort. If we invite Ayub, we have to get word to Shastri too. LBJ has of course OKed both.

The only problem of substance lies in last para. of Ayub cable, which is too fruity for me. I don't want to spook Ayub, but I do think we have to get across discreetly that it's up to him to revalidate our association if he expects to keep getting \$350-500 million per annum. We can use other channels to get this over before he comes, but we shouldn't start off by implying we intend to keep giving him everything he asks for. This will only encourage him to think he can come bore our leader with his complaints. My surgery on cable reduces this risk.

RWK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Att: WH-123
WH-124

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc/ing*, NARA, Date 1-22-01

~~SECRET~~

*Ayub
Visit*

258
April 2, 1965

Mac -

The more I catch up with the traffic on Pakistan's current antics, the more convinced I am that Ayub's 26-27 April visit will be a watershed. Ayub will believe we're serious only if the President personally tells him so. But LBJ will only tell him so if we convince LBJ that it's essential. So here's my plan of action:

1. Given importance of this encounter, I favor bringing LBJ into the act now. Attached memo starts the educational process.

2. Next step could be a NSAM to organize the town. I'm drafting.

3. We've utterly failed to get credible signals to Ayub that he's in danger of killing the goose that lays the golden egg. Since McConaughy is less than useless, NEA is too passive, and time presses, how about discreetly using the press:

a. What if a Pariscope item appeared shortly, to wit US officials are coming to a slow boil on the way Pakistan keeps getting closer and closer to Peking, while still relying on the US for vast bulk of its economic and military aid. Pak Fenmin Dhutto charges that US "shattered" its CENTO and SEATO alliances with Pakistan by helping rearm India against the Chicoms, but US officials point out CENTO and SEATO designed specifically against Communist threat not India. All in all, Ayub's forthcoming visit may be a rough one.

b. Some longer press stories on growing US disillusionment with Paks.

4. Since Ayub plainly intends to massage every Congressional and press friend he has here, let's make sure these people are orchestrated beforehand. Symington is a good example.

5. Our other secret weapons are you and McNamara. Unleashing Bullet Bob on the Field Marshal would be fine. We can make a convincing case that the Indian threat to Pakistan has actually decreased since India must now permanently garrison its NE frontier, but someone like McNamara must say this. I'll provide scenarios.

The above is based on my firm conviction that Ayub knows that in the last analysis he can't do without US support. If we can cast real doubt on our willingness to do so any longer, yet without going so far as to affront his pride, we're in business. But we must have more than nice words from

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-71

By Sj, NARA Date 7-17-01

~~SECRET~~

2.

Ayub. So far he's said one thing and done another. And the longer he keeps this up, the more he's going to (a) box himself in with his own domestic opinion to point where he can no longer retreat; and (b) outrage the Congress to the point where it will no longer vote such huge subsidies. So I see a real confrontation as essential to save US/Pak relationship, not to scuttle it.

Any reactions?

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, Vol. 25, #95

By JC, NARA, Date 1-12-01

25c
April 2, 1965

~~SECRET~~
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Foreign Minister Bhutto's latest effusion on Pakistan/Chicom relations is a harbinger of the line you'll get from Ayub on 26 April (see attached). Bhutto had the gall to say publicly there's no inconsistency in Pakistan being friends with both the US and Chicom, since both are "peace-loving" states. Nor do we like Bhutto's remark that US aid to India after the 1962 Chicom attack "shattered" the whole concept of alliances with the US (SEATO and CENTO). These alliances were never at any time aimed against India (as the Faks well know, because they've been trying for the last 10 years to get them changed).

In essence, the Faks seem to have arrived at the conclusion they can have their cake and eat it too. Actually, Pakistan is being a lot more friendly to Peiping than to Washington, despite the fact that we still pay all the bills (about \$450 million in FY 64).

We're getting back quiet word that this casual equating of the US and Chicom goes down like a lead balloon here. We're also making known our slight annoyance that when Rusk goes all the way to Tehran for the CENTO ministerial meeting next week Ayub and Bhutto go to Moscow instead of meeting with their allies. This, of course, after Ayub's recent well-publicized trip to Peiping.

I'm still convinced that Ayub knows at heart he can't do without us, but is going to play the Chicom off against India (and us) so long as he thinks he can get away with it. Our best Pak friend, Finance Minister Shoaib, says flatly that Aziz Ahmed (ex-Ambassador here) keeps telling Ayub that the Pak accommodation with Peiping can be carried much further without jeopardizing the flow of US aid.

So the real problem is how to get across to Ayub that he can't cozy up to our Chicom enemies and pursue an anti-US line on most issues of concern to us (Vietnam, Malaysia), while still getting the second largest chunk of US aid. Unless he pulls back, present trends will carry Pakistan beyond the point of no return, and then Congress may not even allow us to provide \$400-500 million per year. At that point we'll lose our crucial intelligence facility at Peshawar to boot.

We've failed so far to get through to Ayub along these lines, partly because he's surrounded by people who tell him we're only bluffing. Thus his visit here provides our best opportunity (and perhaps our last). And only the President of the US can say such things to Ayub in a credible way.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

April 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Mac Bundy asked me, as a fresh mind not involved in the Pearson exercise, to have a hard private look at how we could turn off the Ayub and Shastri visits if necessary. Since he is away briefly and because time presses if we do want to turn off Ayub, I am sending it to you directly.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

25d

Ayub
Visit

x Shastri
Visit

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

April 5, 1965

Postponing Ayub and Shastri Visits. We could construct a fairly good case for "postponing" (or "cancel") would be too rude) the Ayub and Shastri visits, and even turning this to our diplomatic advantage. There seem to be three alternatives:

A. Postpone both visits indefinitely. By far the toughest problem is Ayub's 25-30 April visit, mainly because it's less than three weeks away and most arrangements are already laid on.

The only means of getting Ayub to live with postponement would be a personal message from you as his host, either by letter or special emissary. One trouble is that Ayub is in Moscow till 11 April and we don't want to rub him the wrong way while he's in the enemy camp.

You could give Ayub several cogent reasons why a visit is better held off (perhaps until fall). Most compelling might be to tell him frankly that April seems more and more unpropitious because it is precisely the time of the big annual fight over our aid bill. Ayub might not realize how much trouble you will have in trying to get aid for Pakistan, given its recent behavior. The very fact of his coming to Washington so soon after his Peking and Moscow trips would lead to a flurry of press attention, which would inevitably spotlight the differences between US and Pak policies. Moreover, Ayub once here would have to answer a lot of hostile public questions about Pak policies, e.g. Pak views on Vietnam, which would only add to the difficulty. So an April visit here would simply highlight that the US is still paying the bills while Pakistan goes its merry way. It might lead to restrictive amendments in the aid bill, as it already has with Maser and Sukarno. You still want a friendly relationship with Pakistan, but must feel your way very carefully. Thus, all things considered, you feel it wiser to postpone visit till a more propitious time. You are saying the same to Shastri.

Even with the above explanation, a last minute postponement would be recognized by Ayub as an unfriendly noise unless we accompanied it by enough reassurances and concrete gestures (i.e. a promise of the 25-30 April visit, or assurances of continued aid). But such gestures at this time would convey precisely the wrong signal.

25d-1

To buy Ayub off would only convince him that Bhutto is right and that Pakistan can both play the Chicom game and keep getting all it needs from Uncle Sugar. So I'd let Ayub ponder the thinness of our excuse; he isn't going to cut off a \$500 million nose to spite his face.

A second difficulty is that, whether or not Ayub personally could live with our story, the press of both countries would inevitably speculate. They'd talk up bad relations, even if we worked out an agreed cover story that both Presidents agreed to postpone-ment because of the press of other urgent business. We at least could live with this, however.

Shastri would be easier to handle, because he isn't coming till June anyway. You could use the same aid bill argument, and also plead subsequent US need to rethink the problem of aid to India. Thus a visit sometime later, perhaps in the fall, would be more profitable. Shastri would be unhappy (he doesn't like to travel and was counting on coming here at same time he went to London for the annual Commonwealth session), but he'd be manageable so long as Ayub was disinvited too.

Though postponing Shastri would cause less public speculation here or in India than postponing Ayub, simply because the visit is further away, key Indians would worry lest the US were retreating to neo-isolationism or shifting to a "plague on both your houses" attitude. There's also risk in not talking nuclear proliferation with Shastri soon. If the Indians think US support is cooling, this could powerfully reinforce their incentive to go nuclear.

B. Have Ayub but postpone Shastri. In theory this would suit our real purposes, assuming that we want to blow the whistle on Ayub but are not yet ready to talk turkey with Shastri. The trouble is that we couldn't explain to the Indians how we planned to lower the boom on Ayub; to do so might lead Shastri to get overconfident and expect too much. Also, the Indians might leak to discomfit the Paks. But postponing Shastri while seeing Ayub would sit very poorly with the Indians unless we could tell them the real reasons. They would conclude that we were shifting back to our old pro-Pak policy at the very time when the Paks were misbehaving most. India would all too likely

~~SECRET~~

3.

draw the conclusion that the way to get along with the US was to do the same.

As for Ayub, he'd draw precisely the same conclusion unless we gave him the business while he was here. If we did, and if it leaked (as is all too likely and in some ways desirable) then it would be easier to postpone the Shastri visit right afterwards.

C. Stick with both visitors, but get word to both of the dim view we'd take of misbehavior while here. We could do a lot to make sure neither pulled a Pearson. Ayub is our immediate problem; we have more time with Shastri.

Rusk is en route now to Teheran CENTO meeting (7-8 April). While there, he could privately tell our best Pak friend, Finance Minister Shoaib: (1) how poorly we viewed Pearson's undiplomatic behavior; (2) how unhappy you are with Pakistan's drift from its alliances at the very time when it's asking even more aid from us; (3) how Ayub's visit could really end up a disaster if he came here and lectured you on Vietnam and the peace-loving Chicomos as well as on India's perfidy, or made any public noises to this effect; therefore, (4) you asked Rusk to get Shoaib's personal advice on whether postponement might not be wise. Shoaib would almost certainly advise against, but even more certainly pass the word to Ayub to behave. If this worked, we could use the same line on Shastri later (telling him gently that Ayub behaved and we expected the same from him).

There are other ways of getting the word to Ayub, for use if the Rusk gambit didn't work (or to reinforce it). In fact, I see merit in such a signal in any event, to soften up Ayub before he comes. A little discreet press backgrounding about our disillusionment with Pak antics would also help.

My own parochial instinct is to favor going ahead with the Ayub visit while holding up till then on whether to postpone Shastri. We're probably too close to 25 April (when Ayub arrives in NY) to permit graceful postponement.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4.

But I'm operating on the assumption that we're going to use the occasion for a forthright confrontation, which is long overdue. Unless we convince Ayub that he can't have his cake and eat it too, we're going to lose Pakistan (attached is a note on my concerns). If your own sense is that the time is not yet ripe for this, given all our other problems of the moment, then I'd vote for postponement. In this case Rusk could pass a stronger message via Shoaib (Ayub doesn't get back from Moscow till 12 April, or Rusk could deliver it himself while out in the area). It could be followed up by a letter delivered by a special emissary (though I worry lest an emissary merely draw undue attention to what we'd prefer to keep low key).

This could be an effective, though blunt and risky, way of letting Ayub know we can't be trifled with and softening him up for a later session, while putting him on good behavior in the interim.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

April 7, 1965

25e
Ayub Vakil

Ben -

Here's my thought on what we ought to send the Secretary pronto. I gather the President wants to get this matter buttoned up pronto.

Ergo, even though we might want to go back to the President, we ought to have all the necessary messages ready to go. I'll now draft a proposed LBJ to Ayub.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-165

By isp NARA, Date 5-31-89

~~SECRET~~ / DRAFT

25e-1
April 7, 1965/11:00 am

TO: AMEMBASSY TEHERAN FLASH

NODIS FOR THE SECRETARY

President today strong reaffirmed his view that proceeding as scheduled with Ayub and Shastri visits would be against their shared interests with US. To have them come in Spring, when differences over Vietnam and other issues would almost inevitably receive public airing, could only have seriously adverse effect on aid bill prospects.

Given short time remaining before Ayub visit, President prefers have Kohler deliver Presidential message to Ayub in Moscow rather than await his return to Pindi. Therefore, unless you and Talbot feel strongly we must reclaim once more, we here feel necessary proceed on this basis. Risk that delivering messages to Ayub in Moscow might trigger Ayub to move closer to Soviets fully taken into account.

We will flash you in Teheran for comment draft Presidential message to Ayub. Assuming this finally sent, would imagine you would want to explain fully and candidly to Shoaib that visit postponement must not be interpreted as calculated insult but represents President's own growing conviction that time simply not ripe for Ayub visit till after aid bill passed.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By xc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

RWK/jk

~~SECRET~~

April 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have fully informed Rusk in Tehran of your decision to postpone the Ayub and Shastri visits. We have also sent him for comment (Tab A) a draft letter from you to Ayub so we can move promptly.

Rusk has come back (Tab B), not fighting the problem but questioning whether we should run the risk of triggering Ayub to do or say something silly in Moscow. An additional reason for waiting is so Rusk can feel out our friend Sheah in Tehran.

We're inclined to agree that a slight delay till Ayub gets home on 11 April is tolerable, particularly since Ayub will probably leave Moscow in a day or so to visit Soviet Central Asia and it may be hard for Kohler to get at him before he leaves. However, we're prepared to move as soon as you want.

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Attach - Tab A - TOSEC 35 to Teheran 4/7/65
Tab B - Teheran's SECTO 20 4/8/65

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-8-80 letter
By LIB, NARS, Date 9-3-80

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

08105

W/P

258

APR 14 10 35 PM '65

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI IMMEDIATE 1145

Info

Rptd: Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 2156

NODIS FOR AMBASSADOR McCONAUGHY FROM SECRETARY

You should seek private appointment with Ayub soonest

and deliver following message from President:

QUOTE

Dear Mr. President:

I need not tell you of the importance which the Government and the people of the United States have steadfastly attached to relationships between our two countries. These relationships have been good for both of us and strong enough to allow the frankest of discussions on matters where we do not share the same views.

I
It was for this reason that I have been looking forward to your visit to Washington so that we might profit from our confidence in each other to discuss frankly our common problems and to chart our courses together for the troublesome months and years that lie ahead.

The fact that you and I have both recently received

Drafted by
U:GWBall/NEA:WJHandley:4/14/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances

S/S - Mr. Mills

White House - Mr. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

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PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~
Classification

unmistakably clear and strong mandates from our electorates to pursue our national and international goals has made this meeting seem even more opportune and desirable.

What I now propose, therefore, comes only after the most serious reflection during the past few days and with our common interests foremost in mind. I have in fact reluctantly come to the view that this month is not a good time for the two of us to meet in Washington.

Our foreign aid legislation is now before the Congress, and my years of political experience in Congress, as Vice President and President, have led me to the conclusion that your visit at this time would focus public attention on the differences between Pakistani and United States policy toward Communist China. This I fear might gravely affect our ability to assist your Government in the economic and defense programs on which you are embarked and would work against the shared interests of the United States and Pakistan.

I cannot overstate the full depth of American feeling about ~~Communist~~ Communist China. The mounting number of ~~American~~ American casualties in South Vietnam is having a profound effect upon American opinion. This is being felt in Congress just at the time when our foreign aid legislation is at the most sensitive point in the legis

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification

cycle.

Under

~~XXXXXX~~/these circumstances I think it would be in the interests of both our countries and contribute to the assurance of close and mutually helpful relations/ ~~XXXXXX~~ between us if we could postpone our meeting until later this year -- perhaps early in the fall.

Certainly there is much for us to talk about when we do meet. While some of our policies have caused concern to us, our mutual interests unquestionably outweigh our differences. For my part, I shall continue to seek the most friendly and constructive alliance ~~relationship~~ relationship with you and your country.

I shall, therefore, look forward to a full, frank and friendly discussion, but I do think it can be more profitable in a few months than at the moment. I would appreciate your judgment on this matter and I would be guided by your thoughts as to how a postponement can best be worked out with a minimum of awkwardness on both sides.

UNQUOTE

GP-2

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

25k
April 15, 1965/5:30 pm

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED]
EYES ONLY FOR BOWLES FROM BUNDY

President and all rest of us here can well understand your distress at Shastri postponement, but I can assure you that this decision taken with best interests India as well as US thoroughly in mind. It is not to be construed as merely a conditioned reflex to decision disinvite Ayub.

In point of fact USG, with Vietnam and host of other problems on its plate over next few months, and with aid bill having rocky passage through Congress, is in no position talk turkey with Shastri just now. Nor for that matter does Shastri seem from here to be as yet in any position to say much to us. So rather than have merely a polite get-together with neither party yet ready for constructive palaver, the President prefers that we both do our homework and get aid bill passed first.

You should know that President feels deeply a Shastri visit here could focus unwelcome attention on the fact that we're spending biggest single chunk of our aid money on an enterprise which isn't going anywhere fast. Add to this the risk of undue focus on the fact that our two largest clients don't seem able to live on the same continent with each other without constant bickering. Regardless of the causes, this doesn't go down well here.

It also makes the time most unpropitious for those of us who feel that US interests dictate constructing a package of substantially larger help for

SANITIZED
EO 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-70
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-24-03

~~SECRET~~

2.

India in return for some quite far-reaching understandings with respect to: (a) non-proliferation; (b) more sensible economic policies; and (c) movement toward Pak/Indian reconciliation. As we see it, Indians are no more ready to talk sensibly about this yet than we.

So our larger interests, as well as our immediate problems, argue for accepting any short term affront to Indian amour propre in the interest of a more productive visit later. Am sure you see this loud and clear.

Thus our chore at this point is to find ways and means of softening the blow. We will shoot for a candid LBJ letter, but much will also depend on your own ability to say convincingly that postponement must not be read as any more than what it is--a feeling on the President's own part plus that of all his advisers that the time would simply be riper in the fall.

RWKomer/jk

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

08973

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy NEW DELHI

IMMEDIATE

Info

INFO: Amembassy KARACHI

FLASH ZMK 2162

IMMEDIATE 1150

APR 15 8 57 PM '65

NODIS

As indicated in immediately preceeding instructions, there follows Presidential message to Shastri which you may deliver in your discretion:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

You know how much I have been looking forward to your visit here as an opportunity for the two of us to share our thoughts on the efforts we are making to give our peoples a better life. As the date approaches, I have realized that circumstances have combined to deprive us of the atmosphere in which we could most profitably do this. The Viet-Nam crisis has focused the attentions of my Government, as I am sure it has yours, on immediate issues related to our security in the Far East. Ambassador Lodge will give you my views on this and I hope you will speak to him most frankly regarding yours.

Furthermore, the future of the United States aid program has been called into question in the Congress and the coming weeks

Drafted by:

NEA:SOA:DTSchneider:apr/14/15/65

Telegraphic transmission and

S/S - Blaine G. Tueller

Classification approved by:

/XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Clearances:

NEA - Mr. Handley

The Secretary (in substance)

White House - Mr. Bundy

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

~~SECRET~~

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Classification

Authority

State 17- 8/11/76 NSC 17r 4/1/77

~~SECRET~~

Classification

promise to be ones of intense debate. In these circumstances the long-term interests of our two countries, and our ability to pursue them jointly, would be better served in my judgment if you came in the fall after the Congress has adjourned than in June. I have, therefore, reluctantly come to the conclusion that the next month or two would not be the right time for us to exchange thoughts on our long-range plans and aspirations. I hope that you will not find it too inconvenient to defer your visit here until early this fall.

Our countries have long been closely associated in many common endeavors. In this association I believe we have developed the confidence in each other which allows me to suggest a new time for us to meet.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

END

GP-1

RUSK

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Ayub Khan
Shastri
25j

MEMORANDUM FOR

April 16, 1965

THE PRESIDENT

All things considered, deferral of Ayub/Shastri visits went off quite well. We're inclined to feel Ayub got the word, and was quite big league about it. Naturally Ayub's main concern was that we disinvite Shastri too, and at the same time. Bowles didn't connect with Shastri, but latter's chief assistant was unhappy chiefly about the bracketing of India with Pakistan.

Fortunately, we got the public statements organized just in time to offset the unfortunate last minute leak. The Washington Post had the story yesterday but Jim Greenfield got them to hold off. The NY Times got it too late last night to confirm for today's papers. Rusk is most distressed about the leak and investigating, but no good leads yet.

We can expect plenty of press attention and some hostile editorials on lateness of postponement and speculation as to why. Were we core because of Pak and Indian behavior? We're lying low, not talking to press, and letting the story blow over, but there may even be some good in the inevitable press speculation about Pakistan's recent behavior (so long as it can't be tied directly to the USC). We don't intend to be apologetic in any way.

It will take a bit longer before we can tell whether our Pak and Indian friends absorbed the lesson. We're looking at later ways to insure they do, and to soften both up before they come in the fall. At risk of being tatted again as India-lover, I'll say that Shastri got the short end of the stick, since India necessarily seems to be lumped with Pakistan as a bad boy. But both will hopefully reflect on the moral that Uncle Sam should not just be regarded as a cornucopia of goodies, regardless of what they do or say.

R. W. Komer

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-253

By cbm, NARA Date 5-8-01

~~SECRET~~

April 20, 1965

*Ayub Khan
X Shastri
25K*

Mac -

Tuesday lunch. While the Paks are lying reasonably low (probably because postponement of visit shook them), the delayed Indian reaction has set in. The Indians, initially baffled at the bolt from the blue, have all too quickly grasped that our real reason was to chasten Ayub and that we threw Shastri in for balance. Naturally, they resent this. Playing to the galleries, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh (a fool) has said that Shastri might not come at all, or at any rate only at his convenience.

But without being too defensive, I persist in thinking these short-term reactions will pass quickly, while the residual feeling that neither Pakistan nor India can take us for granted will net out a plus.

Much will depend on the line we take now. I'd like to see us quietly clue the Paks that US unhappiness with them was actually a large factor (we have very reliable evidence that certain key Paks think it really was Vietnam). As for the Indians, I'd urge we use the line you and I put in side wire to Chet, i.e. that time isn't ripe because a lot of homework needs to be done first.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-71

By Sj, NARA Date 7-17-01

25m

~~SECRET~~

Mac -

April 21, 1965

Since the inevitable furor over postponing Ayub and Shastri now seems to be dying down, here's a post mortem on the exercise.

I may be a pollyanna, but I still see more smoke than fire here. It was inevitable that the simple fact of disinviting Ayub and Shastri simultaneously would cause a to-do, especially in India, because it necessarily bracketed the Indians with the misbehaving Paks.

But the real question is whether the exercise will leave lasting scars. We won't really know for months, perhaps. However, disinviting Ayub seems to have shaken him (though the Indian stink about disinviting Shastri too softens the blow and mutes the lesson). The Paks, who probably see the blow as directed mainly at them, are lying low and letting the Indians get themselves in trouble.

The Indians are showing their injured pride in many ways. Shastri is saying nice things about the Soviets (but partly because he's going to Moscow shortly). We've suffered a setback here, though I doubt it's as serious as Bowles thinks in his 2970 (attached). But there may also be longer term merit in letting the Indians know we can't be taken for granted either.

Could we have softened the blow by handling things a bit differently? Frankly, and with the wisdom of hindsight--yes but not much:

a. We could have dampened the Indian reaction by not disinviting both simultaneously. Because we worried mostly about Ayub, we ended up hitting Shastri harder and with, as Indians saw it, far less cause. This also muted the signal to Ayub, and obscured our case to the US press. Finally, Ayub got a day more notice than Shastri (and may even have been tipped off by Rusk's talk with Shoaib on 8 April). I honestly underestimated the Indian sense of bewilderment and hurt, and State and I should have argued harder for delaying a while (if we didn't tell Ayub we'd disinvite Shastri too, there would have been no risk of leak).

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 9-20-79, NSC 9-9-81

By if, NARS, Date 10-9-81

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

b. We didn't have time to work out a graceful joint pitch that would stick. The nine day delay deprived us of maneuver room. The President gave us the word on 5 April, but Rusk asked delay till he could get back from Tehran. He returned 10 April, but didn't hit the President till after the weekend. We didn't get the Ayub letter out till late 14 April; then waited on Shastri till we heard from Ayub. See Tab B for the bidding.

c. The leak on 15 April then forced our hand. We simply had to get agreed announcements cleared in three capitals before disaster hit. This added to the impression of haste and was extra hard on the Indians.

Given all the circumstances, however, I don't think we were more brusque than necessary. The letters were frank and friendly. Our Ambassadors said the right thing. It was really the timing which hurt, plus the fact that we couldn't publicize our worry lest their coming now could cost them plenty on the Hill. So everybody focussed on our sensitivity about Vietnam.

Now that we've taken our short term lumps, the best thing is to let the issue die and focus on the longer run impact. This affair can still end up a net plus if we play it right: (a) it reminds our friends that we too have feelings--especially about Vietnam; (b) Ayub got the signal, though we may need to remind him; and (c) the Indians too will end up a bit worried. But we do have a problem here. Unseemly haste or new aid gestures would be bad, but a friendly LBJ letter designed to smooth Shastri's ruffled feathers might be useful in a week or so (enough before he goes to Moscow on 12 May that we don't look forced).

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Tab B

1. The final instructions disinviting Ayub and then Shastri are serialim at Tab B. Of course, I don't know what the President finally told Rusk, but his 1143 told McConaughy we were going to approach Shastri along the same lines too, and that Ayub could be told. As to reconsideration Rusk said "if Ayub is badly upset. . . and takes a very hard line, you should advise him that you will report his views to Washington. But you should give him no encouragement that Washington will be persuaded to reverse its position."

2. Ayub's one big concern was whether Shastri was being postponed too. McConaughy naturally told him and commented that this was what saved the day.

3. Rusk's first cable, 2155, to Bowles did not give leeway for reconsideration if Shastri balked. Bowles urgently pled for a new brief in his 2920. Rusk held up a day till we saw whether Ayub balked, but when McConaughy reported Ayub's acceptance, the die was cast. Rusk told Bowles to go ahead without delay.

Relevant cables are attached.

Att: To Karachi 1143
To Karachi 1145
To New Delhi 2155
To New Delhi 2161
To New Delhi 2162

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2-pit.

S/S 7308

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 12, 1965

26a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter from President Ayub of Pakistan
to the President dated May 11

Enclosed is a letter dated May 11, 1965, from Pakistan President Ayub to the President on the situation arising from the dispute between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch. The letter was delivered to the Secretary by Pakistan Ambassador G. Ahmed on May 11.

The letter sets forth in detail and in strong terms Pakistan's position on the background and nature of the fighting in the Rann of Kutch. It notes that the armies of Pakistan and India now stand poised against each other and that the situation is one of utmost gravity. President Ayub's analysis of the developments that led to this situation, of course, conflicts sharply with the Indian version.

As the Secretary indicated to the Ambassador, we are strongly supporting the current British efforts to work out a cease fire and agreement on steps leading to a settlement and we hope that both sides will exercise the greatest moderation and prudence in order not to jeopardize these efforts.

We will follow up this memorandum with our recommendations for handling President Ayub's letter.

John P. Walsh

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Original letter from
President Ayub dated
May 11, 1965.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-162

By *inf* NARA. Date 10-2-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

MAY 12 1965



AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 25, #120
By YC, NARA, Date 3-13-01

26a-1

EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 11, 1965.

My dear Mr. Secretary,

I have received the following message from the President of Pakistan for transmission to the President of the United States:

Begins " Dear Mr. President,

I write to inform you of the grave situation that has arisen in the sub-continent as a result of India's aggressive actions in recent months : First, the forcible occupation of Pakistan's enclave of Dahagram, then an aggressive march into disputed territory of the Rann of Kutch and now concentration of virtually the entire striking power of the Indian armed forces on Pakistan borders. Dahagram was restored to us only after the Indians came to realise that their action was wholly untenable and it was impossible for them to continue to stay there; India's attempt to take over disputed Rann of Kutch territory by force was foiled only by counter military measures which we, under the circumstances, were compelled to take, and, now, we too have had to deploy our forces in defensive positions on the India-Pakistan border to meet the threat that arises from India's latest action.

2. As you know Kashmir has been the prime source of this conflict between India and Pakistan. Even as I write, reports are pouring in from Srinagar and other places in Indian-occupied Kashmir of wholesale arrests of Kashmiri leaders and firing by Indian forces on the unfortunate Kashmiri people whose only crime is that they are struggling to free themselves of Indian military yoke

and are protesting against the imprisonment by India for the third time of their leader Sheikh Abdullah. This is yet another instance of India's cynical disregard of the need for a peaceful settlement of her disputes with Pakistan on a just and honourable basis.

3. This same attitude is demonstrated by the Indian stand in regard to the Rann of Kutch dispute. Here again, as in the case of Kashmir, the Government of India now claims that the disputed territory is Indian territory. In actual fact the dispute concerning this territory has been previously discussed between India and Pakistan on several occasions - the latest in 1960 when the two Governments agreed that pending further consideration of this dispute, neither side would disturb the status quo. India accuses Pakistan of aggression in the Rann of Kutch. In fact it was India that moved large forces into the disputed territory during months of January - April this year, established forward military posts therein and carried out full-scale land, sea and air manoeuvres in its vicinity, thus forcibly demolishing ^{the} status quo. It was only on April 8th when the Indian forces attacked a Pakistan out-post at Ding in an endeavour to complete a military take over of the territory to present Pakistan with a fait accompli that the Pakistan forces went into action for the first time, and it was on April 19th after patiently watching India's aggressive actions in the Rann of Kutch for three and a half months that Pakistan forces went into the disputed territory for the first time. Subsequent military developments in the Rann are known to your Government.

4. Foiled in her attempt to seize the disputed territory by force, the Indian Prime Minister proceeded publicly to threaten Pakistan that India would attack Pakistan on other points of our border of her own choosing if we refused to accept solution dictated by India. These were : a cease-fire and return to status quo

ante, which meant that India would stay in possession of the disputed territory while we would have to clear out, and that the dispute would be settled only on the basis that the border needed to be demarcated and there was no territory in dispute. We could scarcely be expected to accept such a demand at the point of the gun.

5. Even in face of this I have exercised the greatest restraint. On April 29th I stopped our troops in the Rann of Kutch from exploiting a favourable tactical situation when after the capture of Biar Bet they were in a position to cut right through to the Indian forces on the 24th parallel and destroy from the rear the two Indian Brigades located in the disputed territory. Furthermore on April 30th I unilaterally ordered our troops in the Rann of Kutch not to do anything that might aggravate the situation, which ultimately led to a de facto cease-fire there. All this was done in face of considerable opposition and in the hope India may thus be convinced of our sincere desire to settle disputes by the sensible method available i.e., by peaceful means.

6. Following these truculent declarations India has massed practically the entire Indian Army and Air Force, including all Indian armour, on Pakistan's borders in offensive formations. Pakistan has naturally had to deploy her own forces in defensive positions to meet this new threat. We have also informed the Security Council of the threat to peace that has thus arisen in this region.

7. The armies of Pakistan and India now stand poised against each other. The situation is one of the utmost gravity. A trial of armed strength between India and Pakistan will be a war without frontiers. It could engulf the entire six hundred million people of this sub-continent with all its terrible consequences. But we trust that even at this late hour it may be possible for the Indian

leaders to pause and consider where India's true interests lie and that she may refrain from seeking a military decision.

8. As you know Mr. President we have time and again warned your Government that arming of India by the U.S. on the scale on which it has proceeded during the last two years could only lead to situations such as the present, that India would be encouraged to settle her disputes with Pakistan by force, that she was building two armies -- one allegedly to fight the Chinese and the other to contain Pakistan -- but that when she found a suitable opportunity she would employ both these armies against Pakistan. Your Government continued to believe that India had no such aggressive intentions, and has continued to arm India even though the Chinese military threat has admittedly receded. While defending this policy spokesmen of your Government have time and again reminded us of American assurances to come to our assistance in the event of aggression. At one time Mr. Harriman even expressed surprise to our Ambassador that Pakistan should not have been satisfied with those assurances. That India should have followed her aggressive actions in the Rann of Kutch by proceeding to mass against Pakistan practically her entire army -- and a large part of forces allegedly facing China -- regardless of your diplomatic persuasions to the contrary, and that the two countries should now be on the brink of war confirms fears we have repeatedly expressed about the unwisdom of arming an aggressive and unreliable India.

9. Explaining the explosive situation arising out of the massing of Indian troops on our borders we have suggested to your Ambassador that your Government consider reminding Mr. Shastri of the existence of American assurances in the event

of aggression against Pakistan in the hope that such a reminder may help to deter Mr. Shastri and the other fire-eating Indian leaders from involving the sub-continent in a war which could do irreparable damage to the cause of freedom and peace in this region.


With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Mohammad Ayub Khan. " Ends.

I should be grateful if the above message is conveyed to the President.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my highest consideration.


(G. Ahmed)

The Honourable
Dean Rusk,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

May 15, 1968

268

Mac -

As Bowles said in side-wire message, Ayub's letter to LBJ gives us an opening to cool him down, and thus help cut risk of the kind of Pak/Indian fracas which would really put us on the spot. With our plates so full already, I can't think of anything we need less right now.

It's hard to sort out cause and effect, but the finger of suspicion points more at the Paks. At any rate, they humiliated the Indians, who aren't very eager to accept any more humiliations--at least not from the Paks on top of the Chicomos and US. So I'm for preventive medicine.

Am pushing attached brief, cool response. It will be read loud and clear by Ayub, but it's hard for him to fault us on it. Am urging State to try it out informally on Brits, since we ought not to meddle in their show without asking.

RWK

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-71

By Sj, NARA Date 7-17-01

May 15, 1965/12:15 pm

268-1

Dear Mr. President:

I have received and carefully studied your urgent letter of 11 May. Since I so fully agree with you as to the gravity of the situation, I am making an early reply.

In all candor, we find it difficult to attempt to judge the merits of the Pakistan and Indian positions on the Rann of Kutch. But there can be no question as to the terrible consequences of a war between your two countries. So the most important thing, as you say, is to move as quickly as possible toward defusing and settling this dangerous issue by the only sensible method available, i.e. by peaceful means.

Such a method is to hand, in the proposals of Prime Minister Wilson. Therefore, I urge you, as a friend and ally, to accept these as the most quick and sure road to the reduction of tensions which you seek.

Sincerely yours,

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-8-80 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 9-3-80

~~SECRET~~

26c

RWK:

May 19, 1965

Letter to Ayub attached, but one new issue has come up.

James and McConaughy have recommended we renew our security assurances to Pakistan in this letter. State disagrees, not wanting Paks to divert attention from British proposals or get us in the middle.

State would handle this problem by adding this sentence to the telegram as instructions to McConaughy: "If the subject of US assurances is raised, you may say that in principle we stand by our commitments to Pakistan but that Indian retaliatory moves are clearly hypothetical at this point, whereas a cease-fire in the Rann of Kutch is an immediate need. You might add that each party is aware that we have provided certain assurances to both."

NEA is recommending this to Rusk.

H.
HHS

Attn for Carl Lurie.

Aid to Algeria

*Ethiopia req. 1 CL in net.
for 5 m. cash and 20 m. credit.*

*Recommended Res. offer
for budget support*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 1-12-01

~~SECRET~~

May 19, 1965

262

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The British are still trying manfully to settle the Rann of Kutch dispute. But the de facto cease fire they achieved is so fragile that Harold Wilson wants to tape it down soonest. The reconnaissance flights of each side over the other may trigger a new incident at any time.

Rann
x Pak

Because a major Pak/Indian fracas is the last thing we want just now, and because Ayub just wrote you a long self-justifying letter (Tab B), we urge you seize the chance to back up our cousins by sending Ayub attached brief private reply. It avoids arguing with Ayub about the merits, but tells him that if he really wants peace all he has to do is buy Wilson's proposals. Pak stickiness on procedural details is the chief obstacle at this point.

We've checked with the British, who are eager to have you reinforce their pitch--"the sooner the better." This can't hurt and may do a lot of good, because Ayub is becoming nervous about US aid.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

R. W. Komer

~~SECRET~~

Att. Rusk Memo to President 5/19/65, subj.
BritEfforts to work out Cease-Fire w/Pak and
India on Rann of Kutch

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

207
26e
1-Homer
2-Rt.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: British Efforts to Work Out a
Cease-Fire Agreement With
Pakistan and India on the Rann
of Kutch Dispute

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed draft reply to President Ayub's letter to you about the Rann of Kutch.

Discussion:

The British are now at a crucial point in their efforts to bring the Indians and Pakistanis to an agreement on the Rann of Kutch dispute which would lead, hopefully, to a final settlement. Prime Minister Shastri returns on May 19 from his Soviet trip and the British expect then to have a further go at both sides. Since Pakistan agreement is the main sticking point at present, the British join with us in thinking that it is both urgent and desirable for us to weigh in now with President Ayub in support of their proposals. The British have been carrying the major burden of this effort and they have told us that a letter such as I am suggesting would be most helpful at this moment.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosure: A

Draft letter to President Ayub

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 88-162

By inf NARA, Date 10-2-89

5/19/65

262-1

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED TELEGRAM

VERBATIM TEXT

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI PRIORITY
Amembassy Office RAWALPINDI PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy NEW DELHI
Amembassy LONDON

LIMDIS

Deptel 1309; London's 5541 Info Karachi 155

Transmit urgently following letter from the President
to President AYUB:

QUOTE: Dear Mr. President:

I have received and carefully studied your urgent
letter of May 11. Since I so fully agree with you as to
the gravity of the situation, I am making an early reply.

In all candor, we find it difficult to attempt to
judge the merits of the Pakistan and Indian positions on
the Rann of Kutch, but we are of course concerned that our
military assistance should not be used by either country
to settle this issue by force. There can be no question
as to the terrible consequences of a war between your two
countries.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority nsc 8-8-80 letter

By ig, NARS, Date 9-3-80

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED TELEGRAM

VERBATIM TEXT

ACTION: Amembassy KARACHI PRIORITY
Amembassy Office RAWALPINDI PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy NEW DELHI
Amembassy LONDON

n's 5541 Info Karachi 155

5/22/65 - 2:05

p. m.

following letter from the President

Mr. Komer:

Ruth Booth says State wants to make a correction in this draft letter, if it is not too late.

One word to be changed is at the end of first paragraph - "I am making an early reply." Change "early" to "interim".

Pls. let her know if she should advise someone else other than you, or if you will take care of it.

*Ell labo
car*

T.

President:
I have carefully studied your urgent letter and I so fully agree with you as to the situation, I am making an early reply. I find it difficult to attempt to discuss Pakistan and Indian positions on which we are of course concerned that our territory should not be used by either country for military force. There can be no question of the consequences of a war between your two countries.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

country. So the most important thing, as you say, is to move as quickly as possible toward defusing and settling this dangerous issue by the only sensible method available, i.e., by peaceful means.

Such a method is at hand in the proposals of Prime Minister WILSON. My understanding is that both sides have now reached the point where there is essential agreement on the fundamentals of these proposals. I therefore urge you, as a friend and ally, to go the extra mile if this is needed. Since speedy agreement on these proposals cannot help but lead to an improved atmosphere in the Rann and elsewhere along your borders with India, it strikes me as the quickest and surest road to the reduction of tensions which I know you seek.

Sincerely yours, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE.

GP-3.


END

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: 64-6846-35 #123
NARA Date: 3-13-01

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(B.K. NEHRU)
Ambassador of India



Yours sincerely,

With my high regard and esteem,

Embassy.

I have the honour to transmit to you
the enclosed message from the Prime Minister
of India, which has just been received at this
Embassy.

My dear Mr President:

May 28th, 1965

Secretary
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON D.C.



265

H

16



PRIME MINISTER,
INDIA.

May 23, 1965.

Dear Mr. President,

On April 16, 1965 Ambassador Chester Bowles conveyed to me your message informing me that for various reasons it would not be convenient for you to receive me in Washington on the 2nd June as previously arranged. In deference to your wishes, I had naturally, and I must confess with some sense of disappointment, to cancel the visit to the United States which was scheduled for early June. You have suggested that I should visit the USA in autumn. I am, however, not able to say at present whether my parliamentary and other commitments will permit me to do so.

You have referred to our close association in many common endeavours. We greatly value this association and trust that it will continue undiminished in a spirit of mutual understanding.

I was happy to meet Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge who also handed me your letter of April 15. I was interested to learn from him about the Vietnam situation. The situation is really depressing and dangerous. I hope that it might be possible for circumstances to arise which will permit of a dialogue and a peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem. I know the same thought must be uppermost in your mind also. In today's situation when China is pursuing an aggressive policy, it is difficult to anticipate with any degree of certainty, the likely course of events. But believe me Mr. President, I do feel sincerely that the more rational elements might possibly respond well if it were possible for you to consider a cessation of the air strikes. In any case it would greatly strengthen the chances of a peaceful solution. Such a decision on your part would be a significant contribution towards the promotion of world peace and would be in keeping with the high statesmanship which the United States has displayed in moments of crisis.

contd.....




PRIME MINISTER,
INDIA.

-2-

We ourselves have been passing through a difficult situation. You are no doubt informed of the recent attack on us by Pakistan in the Kutch-Gind border area. This has roused a great deal of feeling. We are a peaceful nation wedded to the pursuit of peace and economic development but it seems our neighbours China and Pakistan are determined to provoke us. We are exercising a great deal of patience and we have responded positively to Prime Minister Harold Wilson's initiative to bring about a ceasefire and restoration of status quo ante. I am afraid Pakistan has been raising all kinds of difficulties regarding ceasefire and restoration of status quo as on 1st January, 1965 which have prevented an agreement being reached. The fact that Pakistan has been using United States armour and equipment against us has naturally caused much concern in our country. I know, however, that your Government has already taken up this matter with the Government of Pakistan.

With warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,


(Lal Bahadur)

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

June 12, 1965

India
X Pak
X India
269

Mac -

Bill and Phil Talbot are all for an LBJ letter to Harold Wilson. I told them we'd try our hand at a text.

Bill suggests mentioning the UK proposal to try and sign on the Commonwealth members of the "17" to propose again a conference without preconditions. Amen, and since you know more about this than I, suggest you add it in.

Talbot worries about telling Wilson we might get tougher with India and Pakistan. Let's keep this in-house, he says, till we get it sorted out. I'm not impressed with his argument; given the way in which LBJ has already decided this one, let's use the British too.

RWK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-05
By inf NARA, Date 6-27-89

Att. RWK 6/11/65-3 pm draft ltr to Wilson

~~SECRET~~

June 12, 1965 /12 Noon

269-1

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

While I hesitate to horn in on your Commonwealth Conference, this captive audience provides a major opportunity for moving forward an important joint enterprise of ours. I speak of our common interest in preventing the Afro-Asian session in Algiers from becoming an anti-Western rally. From reports reaching us, I'm far from sanguine that our moderate friends who will be attending will put forth much effort to this end.

For that reason I would hope that you could express our hopes as well as yours to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. At a time when the US is defending the interests of free Asia in Vietnam as it did in Korea, and when the UK is doing the same in Malaysia, it would be painful indeed of if none/these countries were permitted to participate at Algiers. Nor would the US Congress and public understand if our friends should be shy in at least preventing the Chinese Communists and Indonesians from passing resolutions which would tend to justify outright aggression.

Neither you nor we will be represented at Algiers, but I think we are entitled to ask those Commonwealth attendees for whom we've both done so much to act in our interest and theirs. I have particularly in mind Ayub and Shastri, who could each play a major role. If you see fit, you might mention that I told you the US would be watching closely the proceedings.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority nsc 8-8-80 letter
By ef, NARS, Date 7-3-80

~~SECRET~~

2.

I have watched with admiration your persistent effort to mediate the Rann of Kutch. We have made appropriate supporting noises in both Delhi and Rawalpindi and I would be happy if you chose to associate me with you in devoutly hoping for an early end to these non-productive disputes which so sap Pakistani and Indian resources and energies badly needed for their own development. In fact we are re-examining whether a period of more tough minded aid treatment on our part might not help bring home quietly to both that they risk dissipating not only their blood and treasure but our quite substantial contributions to their growth.

U.S. Department of State

U.S. 7 3

~~SECRET~~

ACTION: LONDON PRIORITY

7923
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JUN 16 AM 65

26h

EX-118

FOR AMBASSADOR

President requests that you seek appointment with PM prior to Commonwealth Conference and, speaking on President's behalf cover following topics:

1. Afro-Asian Conference. President sees common US/UK interest in preventing Algiers confab from becoming an anti-Western rally. Since new Commonwealth members could play a major role to this end, President would be grateful if PM could express our hopes as well as those of UK to the Commonwealth conferees.

We are particularly concerned lest South Korea and South Viet-Nam as well as Malaysia, not be invited to Algiers. When US and UK are really defending interests of whole Free World in Viet-Nam and Malaysia, it would be difficult to understand if our friends should not support these beleaguered states. To achieve these objectives, it seems important that conference adopt UN procedures of one-nation, one-vote on at least attendance matters rather than Indonesian-proposed consensus approach. It is equally important, in

Mr. Tolson Mr. Belmont Mr. Mohr Mr. DeLoach Mr. Casper Mr. Callahan Mr. Conrad Mr. Felt Mr. Gale Mr. Rosen Mr. Sullivan Mr. Tavel Mr. Trotter Mr. Tele. Room Mr. Holmes Miss Gandy	Mr. W. J. Mohr Mr. J. A. Mohr Mr. J. B. Mohr Mr. J. C. Mohr Mr. J. D. Mohr Mr. J. E. Mohr Mr. J. F. Mohr Mr. J. G. Mohr Mr. J. H. Mohr Mr. J. I. Mohr Mr. J. K. Mohr Mr. J. L. Mohr Mr. J. M. Mohr Mr. J. N. Mohr Mr. J. O. Mohr Mr. J. P. Mohr Mr. J. Q. Mohr Mr. J. R. Mohr Mr. J. S. Mohr Mr. J. T. Mohr Mr. J. U. Mohr Mr. J. V. Mohr Mr. J. W. Mohr Mr. J. X. Mohr Mr. J. Y. Mohr Mr. J. Z. Mohr	Mr. A. Mohr Mr. B. Mohr Mr. C. Mohr Mr. D. Mohr Mr. E. Mohr Mr. F. Mohr Mr. G. Mohr Mr. H. Mohr Mr. I. Mohr Mr. J. Mohr Mr. K. Mohr Mr. L. Mohr Mr. M. Mohr Mr. N. Mohr Mr. O. Mohr Mr. P. Mohr Mr. Q. Mohr Mr. R. Mohr Mr. S. Mohr Mr. T. Mohr Mr. U. Mohr Mr. V. Mohr Mr. W. Mohr Mr. X. Mohr Mr. Y. Mohr Mr. Z. Mohr
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~~SECRET~~

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JUN 16 1965

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-12-01

~~SECRET~~

in President's view, to forestall anti-Western resolutions tending to justify outright aggression.

President is especially hopeful that Shastri, Ayub and Nigerian delegation will play constructive role at Algiers. If PM sees fit, he of course free to indicate his understanding that President will be following Algiers proceedings closely.

2. Rann of Kutch. President has watched admiringly PM's patient but persistent effort to mediate dispute. He would be happy if PM chose to say President as eager as PM in devoutly hoping for early agreement on Rann of Kutch issue and avoidance by both sides of further inflammatory actions which could touch off a major clash. President especially disturbed by reports that Shastri feels India will have to take retaliatory action if Paks don't vacate "aggression" in Rann. US reading is that Paks are pressing their military advantage in Kutch too hard in order to improve their bargaining position in subsequent negotiations. A particularly troublesome aspect of this problem for us is the use of US equipment in Indo-Pak disputes. You should tell PM that President is increasingly concerned over justifying continued massive US economic and military investment in Pakistan and India, when both are dissipating their energies and resources in such self-defeating disputes.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

18215

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84

NEA
Info

SS

G

EUR

P

USIA

NSC

CPR

ACTION: Ambassador LONDON 8235
INFO: Ambassador NEW DELHI 2674
Ambassador KARACHI 1481

Ram of Kutch
+ cables

262

JUN 30 4 27 PM '65

Please transmit following message from President to
Prime Minister Wilson:

QUOTE Congratulations on your success in working out
a solution to the Ram of Kutch dispute. We all admire the
great skill and patience shown by you and your people in
helping bring about a peaceful settlement between the two
great countries of the subcontinent. UNQUOTE

GP-3.

End

BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWLER
BOWMAN
CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KERRY
KLEIN
KORTER
MOODY
REEDY
BRUNDERS
THOMSON

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 8-8-80 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 9-3-80

Drafted by:

NEA:SCA:EGCrawford:dm 6/30/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Phillips Talbot

s/s - Mr. Thompson

BNA - Mr. Mosde

White House - The President

SCA - Miss Loise

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