

SAIGON AND WASHINGTON CABLES

SUBSEQUENT TO ATTACK OF AUGUST 2

Also see TABS 40, 41 on Laos + Thailand
and TABS 8 + 9 on B4A & other Military ops.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

00181

40

5

30-39

Origin
INR
Info

ACTION: Amembassy Saigon

FLASH

328

DECLASSIFIED

AUG 2 1 41 PM '64

Authority State Dep. 4/2/78

By Shu, NARS, Date 5/10/78

SS

Embtel 281

SVN

G

FE

NSC

CIA

NSA

OSD

NAVY

Maddox was engaged in fleet patrol similar to patrols conducted routine basis ~~in~~/various parts of world. Ships engaged such activities operate in international waters. For instance ship engaged in patrol along coast Communist China normally remains 15 NM from coast in view Chicom claim 12 mile limit. Observing claimed limits does not indicate recognition of claim. Firing by DRV patrol craft took place in international waters over 20 NM from coast of North Vietnam. Similar destroyer patrol was conducted February-March in Gulf of Tonkin by destroyer Craig. All of foregoing may be passed to GVN.

FYI. Maddox was on Desoto Patrol and had been authorized approach 8 NM coast of North Vietnam or 4 NM to certain North Vietnamese islands. Destroyer Craig in Feb-March was authorized approach ~~12 NM~~ to 4 NM coast of N VN. Maddox will resume patrol observing an 11 mile limit. In case DRV Department has no record of specific distance claimed by them so approach closer than 12 NM authorized. Just prior to incident Maddox may have approached to about 11 NM of coast. Assume you have seen press release issued Honolulu this morning. END FYI.

RUSK

Drafted by:

INR/CS - Wm. McAfee

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

INR/DEC - H. Bartlett Wells

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Green

INR - Mr. Hughes

DOD/JRC - Col. Steakley

Jim J. T. H.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

41 ✓

30-39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

FE

Info

SS

SVN

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NSC

INR

NSA

RMR

*****ZZ RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 07A 02/1235Z
Z 021230Z
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHTA/CINCPAC

000531
1964 AUG 2 AM 8 46

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State Ltr. 4/2/78*
By *lhur*, NARS, Date *5/10/78*

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION FLASH DEPT 281 INFO FLASH CINCPAC
129 FROM SAIGON AUG 2, 9PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF MADDUX INCIDENT, MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO
GIVE FACTS TO GVN BEFORE HANOI BREAKS STORY AND FALSIFIED VERSION IS
DISSEMINATED. REQUEST OFFICIAL VERSION TO BE USED AND, WHEN
DETERMINED, WHAT ACTION USG EXPECTS TO TAKE. PLEASE INDICATE HOW
MUCH OF THIS LATTER INFORMATION CAN BE PASSED TO GVN.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, OPERATIONAL RADIO TRAFFIC RELATING TO THIS
INCIDENT WAS IN CLEAR.

GP-2. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 281 129 2 9PM GP-2

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 8:46 AM 8/2/64
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 8:57 AM 8/2/64

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

42

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

SVN

Info

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TSIA

NSC

INR

NSA

SEC

EMR

PP RUENCR RUDTLN
DE RUMJIR 11A 0/0930Z
P R 030925Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)
TO RUEVR/SCSTATE WASHDC
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
INFO KMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUDTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUSBA/AMEMBASSY NEWDELHI
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BO

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

NARS, Date

000866

1964 AUG 3 AM 10 37

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (24) VIENTIANE 16 INFO BANGKOK 18 LONDON 20
NEW DELHI 7 CINCPAC 151 OTTAWA 4 FROM SAIGON AUG 3, 5 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPTEL 26

MACV CONFIRMS NO RPT NO US JETS FIRED ON KHANG KHAYMR
VICINITY JULY 28.

GP-3. TAYLOR

BT

CFN284 16 18 20 7 131 3 5PM 326 MACV US 28 GP3.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 11:51 AM 8/3/64

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 1:00 PM 8/3/64

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DATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Classification

43

FOR OC/T

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON

FLASH 341

AUG 4 6 35 PM '64

Info

EXDIS Pierce Arrow

DECLASSIFIED

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978

By inf, NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

In view of two MADDOX incidents and certain responses which are now being developed here, you should see Khanh as soon as possible to be sure he has accurate account of NVN actions against our two destroyers. You should tell him that President will shortly be announcing U.S. responsive measures against NVN including actions against NVN naval craft wherever they may be found on the high seas, U.S. air strikes against four torpedo ^{boat} bases on NVN coast, air cover for these operations which will engage any unfriendly aircraft. These actions are expected to take place approximately 1830 Washington time.

You should enjoin Khanh to keep this information strictly secret. We expect to have a Presidential message out to you in the next few hours. We will also insure that you are informed through military channels of results of U.S. action

Drafted by:

S/VN: MVForrestal

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

MR The Secretary

Clearances:

FE- Wm Bundy Wrb
S/VN - M. Forrestal Wrb

S/S - Mr. Hilliker S

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

which you may also pass on to Khanh in your discretion.

Our position is that this deliberate and unprovoked attack on U.S. vessels in international waters cannot go ~~un~~ unanswered. On the other hand, we have limited our response to the offending boats and supporting facilities in order to avoid forcing escalation.

We want to keep Khanh as fully informed as possible, consistent with operational security. In meantime you should forcefully advise Khanh to take no independent action external to SVN and avoid public statements during this critical period. You may wish, however, to suggest to him precautionary and alerting measures against possible NVN retaliation. We leave these to your judgment.

When these actions have become public, they may help you in your efforts convince military and politicians that drastic changes in GVN leadership must not be considered at this time.

Slug all future messages this subject "Pierce Arrow."

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: 13 COLLECT
PAGE 10

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44

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Flash

Origin

ACTION:

AmEmbassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE FLASH

342

AUG 4

9 47 PM '64

Info

EXDIS

Pierce Arrow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

FOR AMBASSADOR

NLJ

90-142

By WJ

NARA. Date 10-30-90

Following is personal message from President to Prime Minister to be delivered with Presidential statement transmitted septel.

QUOTE: I am asking Ambassador Taylor to convey to you personally a statement I am making in Washington tonight concerning the deliberate attacks which have been made by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats on American vessels operating on the high seas. The measures I have ordered are intended to make it unmistakably clear to the Communist leaders in Hanoi that the United States defends its rights and that our commitment to assist your country in preserving her freedom and independence cannot be shaken.

The Hanoi regime has embarked upon an adventure which can have the gravest consequences for world peace, and I believe that you and I have responsibilities which extend

Disseminated by

S/VN: MVForrestal, caw 8/4/64

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary MK

Clearances:

White House - McGeorge Bundy MK

S/S - Mr. Christensen R

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Classification

beyond our own borders. For this reason our response to North Vietnamese provocation has been, for the present, limited in the hope that the Hanoi regime will recognize the dangers which flow from increasing violence in Southeast Asia.

It is of the utmost importance therefore that our two countries continue to plan and act in the closest consultation during the very critical days ahead. Ambassador Taylor will always be prepared to communicate your thoughts to me, and I will keep in close touch with you through him. END QUOTE.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Classification

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: [] COUNTRY
[] CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION:

AmEmbassy SAIGON

FLASH

344

LIMDIS

Info:

~~XXXXXX~~

Pierce Arrow

Ref

Embtel 302

POL 15-VIETS
(K) POL 15-1 US/JONNISON
POL 27 VIETS

45

AUG 4 11 29 AM '64

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Authority

State ltr. 4/7/78

By

shw

NARS, Date

5/10/78

15-1
MVF per yr
8/4/64
(3)

SAIGON 344

Drafted by:

MVF per yr

S/VN: MVForrestal.ca

8/4/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Michael V. Forrestal - S/VN

Clearances:

FE - Wm. Bundy

WPP per yr

~~SECRET~~

MVF per yr

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION:

AmEmbassy SAIGON

PRIORITY

Info

INFO

AmEmbassy BANGKOK
 AmEmbassy VIENTIANE
 CINCPAC

239

158

EXDIS

Ref Saigon's 312, 413

Department approves confidential meeting
 proposed reftels. Would hope meeting could sort
 out various programs mentioned reftels and ~~pay~~
 pave way for coordinated U.S. effort and effective
 cooperation between GVN, RLG and RTG, and would be
 follow-up your comments requested Deptel 439

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978

By isg, NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

Drafted by:

S/VN:MVForrestal:caw 8/14/64

Telegraphic transmission and
 classification approved by:

Michael V. Forrestal

Clearances:

FE - Wm. Bundy (in substance)

S/S -Mrs. Davis

~~TOP SECRET~~

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FORM DS-322
 8-63

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46

AUG 4 7 51 PM '64

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

47

Thomson

41

Action

SS

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

Control:

Rec'd:

2633

AUGUST 4, 1964

11:58 PM

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE 303 FLASH
DOD 24 FLASH

INFO : CINCPAC 141 FLASH
WHITE HOUSE 20 FLASH
CIA 21 FLASH

08

DATE : AUGUST 5, 11 AM

EXDIS

PIERCE ARROW

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978

By inf, NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 341.

IN COMPANY WITH ALEX JOHNSON AND WESTMORELAND I SAW KHANH AT 0930 SAIGON TIME AND GAVE HIM INFORMATION AND ADVICE CONTAINED IN REFTEL. KHANH WAS DELIGHTED WITH NEWS AND ASKED PERMISSION TO TELL CABINET WHICH WAS MEETING AT 1000. AS EXECUTION OF ATTACKS HAD NOT BEEN CONFIRMED, I AUTHORIZED COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION LESS INDICATION OF TARGETS.

AT SAME TIME, I URGED KHANH AND HE AGREED TO STRESS TO CABINET SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION AND NEED TO CLOSE RANKS AND ACHIEVE GREATER UNITY.

THERE FOLLOWED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES TO TAKE IN SVN IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE HOSTILE REACTION. KHANH WAS INCLINED TO PUT OUT SOMETHING TO PUBLIC WARNING PEOPLE (OF SAIGON IN PARTICULAR) OF DANGER OF AIR ATTACK. WE PERSUADED HIM NOT TO DO SO, POINTING OUT DANGER OF PANIC AND GOT HIS AGREEMENT TO SAY NOTHING PUBLICLY NOW. LATER, FOLLOWING PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT NOT YET RECEIVED HERE, HE WILL WANT TO MAKE SOME STATEMENT

EXPLAINING

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 303, AUGUST 5, 11 AM FROM SAIGON

EXPLAINING SITUATION AND URGING NATIONAL UNITY.

IT WAS AGREED THAT AN ALERT SHOULD GO OUT THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS WARNING OF POSSIBLE VC REACTION AND AIR ACTION AGAINST TARGETS IN I AND II CORPS, PARTICULARLY THE AIR FIELD AT DANANG AND THE 34A MARINE BASE. WESTMORELAND IS MEETING WITH DEFMIN KHIEM TO WORK OUT DETAILED ALERT PLAN.

GEN KHANH STATED THAT HIS AIR FORCE WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS ACTION AGAINST NVN. I TOLD HIM THAT I UNDERSTOOD HIS DESIRE TO JOIN FORCES BUT THAT NOW WAS NOT THE TIME. HE SHOULD KEEP HIS MILITARY GUARD UP AND AWAIT OUTCOME OF EVENTS IN PROGRESS.

KHANH MENTIONED THAT IN CASE OF AIR ATTACKS ON SAIGON HE WAS PREPARED TO MOVE TO EMERGENCY CP'S WHICH HE HAD PREPARED AT CAP ST. JACQUES, DALAT AND NHAN TRANG. IN VIEW OF FACT THAT SOMETHING MIGHT HAPPEN TO HIM, HE SUGGESTED GIVING ME A PAPER ASKING US INTERVENTION AND TAKE OVER OF COMMAND IF HE DISAPPEARED. I ACKNOWLEDGED THIS MIGHT BE A DESIRABLE THING BUT LET MATTER DROP. (I WOULD APPRECIATE ADVICE ON ATTITUDE TO TAKE ON THIS POINT.) KHANH ALSO INDICATED THAT HE STILL REGARDS KHIEM AS HIS SUCCESSOR.

WESTMORELAND INFORMED KHANH THAT HE WAS SEEING GEN MINH SHORTLY FOR PURPOSE OF INTRODUCING GEN THROCKMORTON AND GOT KHANH'S AGREEMENT TO TELL MINH THE SAME THINGS WHICH KHANH WAS ABOUT TO TELL CABINET REGARDING EVENT IN TONKIN GULF.

I INFORMED KHANH ON LEAVING THAT US WOULD INCREASE THE NUMBER OF F-102'S PRESENTLY IN SVN AND HE EXPRESSED THANKS WHILE REMINDING US THAT US HAS THE ONLY MEANS FOR AIR DEFENSE OF HIS COUNTRY.

GP-1.

TAYLOR

UMT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 12:33 AM AUGUST 5, 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

4855-0

51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

SS

Info

ZCZCMJA435VZCZCJIA911
 *****ZZ RUEMNR
 DE RUMJIR 04A 05/0250Z
 Z 050245Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC
 STATE GRNC
 BT

1964 AUG 4 PM 10 55

002624

1/22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FLASH 302 AUGUST 5TH, 1050AM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State Ltr 4/7/78*
 By *Chu*, NARS, Date *5/10/78*

EXDIS

PIERCE ARROW

DEPTTEL 342

WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDE SCE IF, AS IS POSSIBLE, KHANH DESIRES
 MAKE PUBLIC RELEASE TEXT THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER.
 TAYLOR

BT

CFN 302 5 1050 342 KHANH
 ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 8/4/64-1056PM

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 8/4/64, 1110PM

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COMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

49

41.

Action

SS

info

*****ZZ RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 09A 05/0520Z
Z 050515Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT
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Authority *State Ltr. 4/2/78*
By *Shu*, NARS, Date *5/10/78*

002660
1704 AUG 5 AM 130

F.L.A.S.H.

1/22

ACTION FLASH DEPT 304 INFO CINCPAC 142 FROM SAIGON AUGUST
5TH 1:15PM

EXDIS

PIERCE ARROW

DEPTTEL 343

GVN RPT GVN APPROVES MOVEMENT TO SVN RPT SVN UNITS MENTIONED
REFTEL.
TAYLOR
BT
CFN 304 142 5 115 343.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:33 AM AUGUST 5, 1964
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 1:50 AM AUGUST 5, 1964.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SECRET

41
ActionControl:
Rec'd:2807
AUGUST 5, 1964
6:09 AM

S/VN

SS

FROM: SAIGON

Info

ACTION: SECSTATE 310 IMMEDIATE
DOD 25 IMMEDIATEINFO : CINCPAC 146 IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE 21 IMMEDIATE
CIA 22 IMMEDIATE

DATE : AUGUST 5, 5 PM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 17042
By us NARA, Date 5-18-98

EXDIS

PIERCE ARROW

DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND PUBLIC STATEMENT TO KHANH AT 1600 LOCAL 5 AUGUST. HE WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE LETTER AND EXPRESSED COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH IT. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT IT IS CONFIDENTIAL AND NOT TO BE RELEASED. I TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO STRESS IMPORTANCE OF GETTING ON WITH OUR JOINT MILITARY PLANNING WHICH IS BEING INITIATED TODAY BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND DEFMIN KHIEM.

I GAVE HIM IN GENERAL TERMS OUR US PLANS FOR REINFORCING SEA AREA OF WHICH THE INTRODUCTION INTO SVN OF 2 SQUADRONS OF B-57'S AND 1 SQUADRON OF F-102'S WAS A PART. HE RESPONDED THAT HIS COUNTRY WAS OPEN TO US FORCES AT ANY TIME AND NO PERMISSION FOR INTRODUCTION NEED BE SOUGHT, PARTICULARLY IF TIME PRESSES.

I CITED DANGER AT TIME LIKE THIS TO NEGLECT THE COUNTER VC CAMPAIGN AND URGED HIM TO KEEP PRESSURE BEHIND THE OPERATIONS IN PROGRESS. HE STATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT.

HE HAS DECIDED TO MAKE CAP ST. JACQUES HIS ALTERNATE COMMAND POST. WESTMORELAND IS LOOKING THE FACILITIES OVER TODAY.

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-2- 310, AUGUST 5, 5 PM FROM SAIGON

PARTICULARLY THE SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

WE DECIDED TO POSTPONE THE GVN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL-US
MISSION COUNCIL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW, 6 AUGUST.

STILL NO NEWS HERE ON RESULTS OF SEVENTH FLEET STRIKES. KHANH
MOST INTERESTED (AS AM I).

GP-2.

TAYLOR

UMT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:12 AM AUGUST 5, 1964

SECRET

PROCESSING NOTE

On this date, Archives staff noted that the third page of document #51 was illegible. Using a duplicate of the document (located in National Security File, Vietnam Country File, "Vietnam, Volume 15," Box 7, #77), the text of page 3 was handwritten on a preservation copy.

Alexis Percle
April 21, 2014

National Security Files, NSC Histories, "Presidential Decisions—Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964, Tabs 1-8," Box 38

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

5/UN
51

39
Action

88
Info

....ZZ RUEHC
DR RUHMA 093 05/1235Z
Z (051229Z)
FM CCMUSMACV & US EMBASSY
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
RUEKDA/JCS
RUEHC/STATE
RUEPCR/WHITE HOUSE
BT

DECLASSIFIED

003123
1954 AUG 5 AM 10 07

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By *JTB*, NARS, Date *4/20/76*

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC JOO 7425

1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND MET AT 1130, 5 AUGUST, WITH GENERAL KHANH, GENERAL KHIEM, GENERAL THIEU, COLONEL THONG J3, JOINT GENERAL STAFF, GENERAL KY, COMMODORE CANG AND COLONEL KHAN COMMANDERS OF VNAF, VNN AND VNMC RESPECTIVELY.
2. GENERAL WESTMORELAND EXPLAINED THE FIRST ATTACK OF PT BOATS AGAINST THE MADDOX AND THE ATTACK LAST NIGHT AGAINST THE MADDOX AND TURNER JOY, AND OUTLINED RETALIATORY ACTION BEING TAKEN BY THE 7TH FLEET AGAINST PT AND SWATOW BASES IN NORTH VIETNAM.

PAGE 2 RUHMA 093 ~~TOP SECRET~~

3. GENERAL WESTMORELAND STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THE VIET CONG WOULD RETALIATE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT SECURITY AND OTHER MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN, SPECIFICALLY, MAXIMUM SECURITY SHOULD BE PUT ON PORTS AND AIRFIELDS, COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER VITAL INSTALLATIONS INCLUDING THE CHANNEL INTO SAIGON, AND POL STORAGE SITES. HE FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT THE R AF MOUNT A MAXIMUM EFFORT AGAINST THE VC TO THROW THEM OFF BALANCE AND DISRUPT VC RETALIATORY PLANS AND OPERATIONS.
4. GENERAL KHAN AGREED WITH THESE MEASURES AND STATED THAT FORCES IN THE 1ST CORPS AND THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES OF THE 2ND CORPS, AS WELL AS THE VIETNAMESE NAVY AND AIR FORCE HAVE BEEN PLACED ON MAXIMUM ALERT STATUS WHICH MEANS 100 PER CENT OF TROOPS CONFINED TO QUARTERS, TROOPS ON LEAVE TO RETURN TO UNITS, ALL ARMY UNITS STAND BY WITH ONE UNIT OF AMMUNITION AND TWO DAYS RATIONS AND BE READY TO MOVE IN 30 MINUTES. REACTION TIME FOR AIR FORCE 25 PER CENT OF AIRCRAFT ALL WINGS READY FOR TAKE OFF IN 30 MINUTES, THE REMAINING 75 PER CENT READY FOR TAKE OFF IN 45 MINUTES. NAVY-SMALL BOATS AND NAVAL CRAFT PREPARE FOR MOVEMENT IN 30 MINUTES. THE REST OF THE COUNTRY IS ON ALERT CONDITION NUMBER TWO WHICH

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- August 5, 1964, 1229Z, FROM COMUSMACV AND US EMBASSY.

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 093 ~~TOP SECRET~~

MEANS ALL ARMY UNITS ON STAND BY READY TO MOVE IN 30 MINUTES, 25 PER CENT OF THE AIRCRAFT OF ALL WINGS READY FOR TAKE OFF IN 45 MINUTES, THE REMAINING 75 PER CENT READY FOR TAKE OFF IN ONE HOUR. THE NAVY - SMALL BOATS READY FOR MOVEMENT IN ONE HOUR AND NAVAL CRAFT READY FOR MOVEMENT IN 3 HOURS.

5. GENERAL KHANH STATED THAT HE WAS NOW ESTABLISHING A FIELD COMMAND POST AT CAP SAINT DUCQUES. GENERAL WESTMORELAND EXPLAINED THAT A FIELD COMMAND POST AT NHA TRANG WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE TROPICAL SCATTER SYSTEM BUT THAT HE WOULD HAVE HIS STAFF STUDY THE COMMUNICATION PROBLEM AND IN ANY EVENT MACV WOULD SEND A STAFF ELEMENT TO BE COLOCATED WITH THE HIGH COMMAND OF THE RVNAF AT CAP SAINT JACQUES. GENERAL KHANH STATED THAT HE WAS ON THE VERGE OF ESTABLISHING A WAR CABINET AND A CIVIL CABINET SO THAT THE WAR CABINET AT CAP SAINT JACQUES WOULD BE FREED FROM THE DAY TO DAY ROUTINE BUSINESS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

5. GENERAL KHANH THEN STATED THAT DOCTRINE OF THE VC GUERRILLA INVOLVES PREPLANNING FOR A MAXIMUM EFFORT CAPABLE OF BEING TRIGGERED BY THE TRANSMISSION OF A CODE WORD. HE EXPECTS THAT SUCH A SIGNAL HAS ALREADY BEEN SENT FROM HANOI AND

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 093 ~~TOP SECRET~~

PROBABLY INVOLVES MASS SABOTAGE AND THE ASSASSINATION OF HIGH VIETNAMESE OR U. S. OFFICIALS. IN THIS CONNECTION HE STATED THAT GENERAL KHANH IS HIS NUMBER TWO MAN FOR ALL MATTERS BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL AND THAT HE AND GENERAL KHANH WOULD ENDEAVOR NOT TO BE TOGETHER AT THE SAME PLACE AT THE SAME TIME.

7. GENERAL KHANH STATED THAT WE COULD EXPECT A CURFEW TO BE IMPOSED IN SAIGON - CHOLON WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

8. AT THIS POINT GENERAL KHANH STATED AND THEN REPEATED WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT IF EITHER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OR THE CHICGS ATTACK DA NANG, SAIGON OR ANY OTHER PART OF SOUTH VIETNAM. IN THIS EVENT HE STATED THAT GVN WOULD RETALIATE IMMEDIATELY BY AIR ATTACK AT TARGETS OF ITS OWN CHOOSING AND THAT HE DID NOT REQUIRE A GREEN LIGHT FROM WASHINGTON.

9. GENERAL WESTMORELAND SUGGESTED THAT GENERAL KHANH DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND CAUTIONED AGAINST A QUICK REACTION ON THE BASIS OF INCOMPLETE INTELLIGENCE. GENERAL KHANH RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF AIR ATTACK FROM CAMBODIA AND SAID THAT IN SUCH AN EVENT HE WOULD RETALIATE AGAINST PHNOM PENH. GENERAL WESTMORELAND SUGGESTED THAT IT

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

52

34

UNCLASSIFIED

002848

Action

00 RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 23A 05/0945Z

1964 AUG 5 AM 7 02

SVN

ZNR

Info

O 050926Z

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

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UNCLAS ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT 311 INFO BANGKOK 19 CINCPAC 147
FROM SAIGON FIFTH

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DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE AND DOD.

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FOLLOWING TEXT OF STATEMENT ISSUED BY PRIME MINISTER'S
OFFICE THIS AFTERNOON:

INR

NSA

RMR

"ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE SECOND ATTACK PERPETRATED IN THE
GULF OF TONKIN BY THE PT BOATS AGAINST THE USS MADDOX AND THE
USS TURNER JOY DESTROYERS, THE SPOKESMAN OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S
OFFICE DECLARED:

THIS SECOND ATTACK CONFIRMS MORE AND MORE THE PROVOCATIVE
CFN 311 19 147

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 23A UNCLAS

ATTITUDE OF THE COMMUNISTS OF NORTH VIETNAM AND RED CHINA.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SUPPORTS THE FIRM
REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

FACING THE FLAGRANT AND GROWING AGGRESSION OF THE COMMUNISTS,
WE FURTHER TIGHTEN OUR NATIONAL UNITY TO MEET ANY EVENTUALITY".
TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 8:15 A.M., 8/5/64.
ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 7:17 A.M., 8/5/64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Action

NNNNZCZCMJA653JIA969

DECLASSIFIED

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RR RUEHCR RUEHDTT

Authority

State ltr. 4/2/78

Info

DE RUMJIR 24A 05/0955Z

By

Chw, NARS, Date *5/10/78*

R 050950T ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

SS

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

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INFO RUMJNO/AMEMBA SY PHNOMPENH

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USIA

ACTION DEPT (313) INFO PHNOMPENH 51 USUN 0 CINCPAC 149 FROM

NSC

SAIGON AUG 5 5 PM

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CIACINCPAC FOR POLAD

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REF DEPTTEL 244 REPEATED USUN 224 PPHNH 54

ARMY MACV ASSURES US THAT NO RPT NO OPERATIONS WERE IN PROGRESS
NAVY AND NEITHER US PERSONNEL NOR LCM'S WERE IN AREA IN QUESTION
AIR ON OR ABOUT JUNE 15. INVESTIGATIONS THIS NATURE HAVE TIED UP
RMR COUNTLESS MAN HOURS IN EMBASSY, MACV, AND ARVN HIGH COMMAND.
NOW THAT SIHANOUK APPEARS TO BE SPURNING ALL SERIOUS EFFORTS
TO ALLEVIATE BORDER PROBLEMS, INCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS OF UN SC
CFN 313 51 30 149 5 5PM 244 224 54 MACV LCM'S IMACV ARVN UN SC

PAGE TW RUMJIR 24A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMITTEE, WE SUGGEST THAT FUTURE ALLEGATIONS OF BORDER
VIOLATIONS, REAL OR IMAGINED, EMANATING FROM PHNOMPENH BE
IGNORED UNLESS DAMAGE TO US OR GVN INTERESTS APPARENT OR
CAMBODIAN PRODUCE EVIDENCE.

GP-3. TAYLOR

BT

CFN US GVN GP-3.

NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 10:40 A.M., 8-5-64.

ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O 10:26 A.M., 8-5-64.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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PP RUEHCR

DE RUMJIR 34A 05/1400Z

PR 051341Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA

STATE GRNC

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State Ltr. 4/7/78*

By *Shu*, NARS, Date *5/10/78*

1964 AUG 5 AM 10 37

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT *314* INFO CINCPAC 150
MANILA 20 HUE 40 HUE VIA OTHER MEANS FROM SAIGON AUG 5 7PM

MANILA FOR FELG

PIERCE ARROW

INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH WILL PROBABLY BECOME PUBLIC TOMORROW
MORNING, ARE BEING ISSUED TO ALL MISSION PERSONNEL ENCOURAGING
THEM TO REMAIN IN BILLETTS OR HOMES DURING NON-DUTY HOURS
EXCEPT ABSECES ON NECESSARY OFFICIAL OR PRIVATE BUSINESS, AVOID
PUBLIC BARS, PLACES OF AMUSEMENT AND NOT SCHEDULE ANY SOCIAL
FUNCTIONS UNNECESSARY TO CONDUCT OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS.
CFN 314 150 20 40 5 7PM

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 34A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
INSTRUCTIONS ALSO CALL FOR CARE IN USE OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION,
INCREASED ALERT FOR SECURITY PERSONNEL, INSPECTION OF VEHICLES FOR
BOOBY TRAPS, ETC. ADDITIONALLY, CONFIDENTIAL MACV INSTRUCTIONS
CALL FOR ALL PERSONNEL OUTSIDE SAIGON/CHOLON AREA CARRY SMALL
ARMS WHEN AWAY FROM PLACE OF WORK OR BILLETTS. NO REPEAT NO ARMS
OR AMMUNITION WILL BE ISSUED INSAIGON/CHOLON AREA.

MEASURES ARE DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO PROTECT AGAINST POSSIBILITY
OF VIET CONG TERRORISM AGAINST AMERICANS, WHILE ALSO
MAINTAINING ALL OFFICIAL PERSONNEL IN STATE OF READINESS AND ALERT.
BACK GROUNDING PRESS ONLY LATTER ASPECT WILL BE MENTIONED.
TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 11:42 AM, AUGUST 5.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 11:55 AM, AUGUST 5.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~SECRET~~

Action

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 28A 05/1255Z
PR 051234Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUKDA/DOD
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr. 4/7/78
By Shaw, NARS, Date 5/10/80 03126 073

1964 AUG 5 AM 9 56

~~SECRET~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 317 INFO DOD 28 CINCPAC 152
FROM SAIGON AUGUST 5 8PM

YOU WILL RECOGNIZE EXTREME PRESSURES ON US FROM SAIGON BASED PRESS FOR INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND PRESENT DEVELOPMENTS. WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING FIRMLY TO POSITION THAT ANNOUNCEMENT AND DETAILS ON 7TH FLEET ACTIONS MUST COME FROM CINCPAC AND WASHINGTON AND THAT WE ARE CONCERNED ONLY WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR AREA OF JURISDICTION BUT PRESS REPRESENTATIVES MAKE POINT THAT THEIR EDITORS TAKE POSITION STORY IS IN VN AREA AND EXPECT COPY FROM THIS POINT. WHILE WE WOULD NOT PROPOSE TO VIOLATE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS CFN 317 28 152 5 8PM

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 28A ~~SECRET~~
OR DEPART FROM LOGIC OF HAVING NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON 7TH FLEET INITIATED FROM HONOLULU MERELY TO SATISFY CORRESPONDENTS DESIRE TO GET SAIGON DATELINE, THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE PRESS COVERAGE RESULTING FROM FRUSTRATIONS OF SAIGON BASED PRESS WHICH IN TURN COULD CLOUD IMPACT OF OUR FIRM ACTIONS ON BOTH AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE PUBLIC OPINION. IN ORDER TO COUNTER THIS POSSIBILITY AND ALSO TO PROVIDE AS KNOWLEDGEABLE COVERAGE AS POSSIBLE, I PROPOSE AS SOON AS FACT OF AIR STRIKE IN NORTH VIETNAM CONFIRMED AND PICTURE CLEARER, TO UNDERTAKE BACKGROUND BRIEFING ATTRIBUTABLE TO "AMERICAN OFFICIALS" ON NATURE OF OUR PRECAUTIONARY STEPS WITHIN SVN AREA. WOULD ALSO TOUCH ON BROADER MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF SITUATION IN GENERAL, INCLUDING SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN WEIGHING ACTIONS AGAINST NVN.
IN ADDITION, IF THERE ARE PROSPECTS FOR NEWSMEN TO BOARD ANY OF THE 7TH FLEET CARRIERS WHILE IN THIS AREA, I WOULD URGE THAT PRIORITY BE GIVEN SAIGON BASED CORRESPONDENTS, FOR BOTH PRACTICAL REASONS OF LIMITED DISTANCE INVOLVED AND AS MEANS OF OFFSETTING SOME OF THEIR LACK OF INFORMATION. IF THIS POSSIBILITY

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-2- 317, August 5, 8:00 P.M., FROM SAIGON.

MATERIALIZES, WE COULD WORK OUT DETAILS WITH CINCPAC TO PERMIT PICK-UP IN DANANG. WHILE NEWSMEN ARE WITHIN 7TH FLEET JURISDICTION, NATURE AND CONTENT OF INFORMATION PROVIDED THEM WOULD, OF COURSE, BE 7TH FLEET RESPONSIBILITY.

GP-3. TAYLOR

BT

CFN 7TH WKUTH 7TH GP-3

NOTE: PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE AND CIA, 11:50 A.M. AND ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 11:25 A.M., 8/5/64.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

56

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Action

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O 061230Z

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUEHDT/USUN

RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE 327 INFO USUN
IMMEDIATE 32 INFO CINCPAC 156 FROM SAIGON AUG 6, 8 PM

DEPTEL 353 SC - VIET-NAM.

JOHNSON SAW FONMIN QUAT THIS AFTERNOON WHO, AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, AGREED TO DEPTS PROPOSAL.

QUAT FIRST TOOK POSITION THAT WHILE THEY SHOULD ATTEND IF DRV ATTENDED, THEY SHOULD LOBBY IN NEW YORK AGAINST DRV ATTENDANCE BECAUSE OF FEAR THAT IF BOTH DRV AND GVN ATTENDED, FRENCH AND SOVIETS MIGHT BE ABLE TO MANEUVER SC PROCEEDINGS TOWARD GENEVA TYPE CONFERENCE. JOHNSON POINTED OUT THAT CONTEXT OF SC CFN 327 32 156 6 8 353

PAGE TWO RUMJJR 34A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONSIDERATION BEING OUR COMPLAINT AGAINST DRV, WE COULD NOT SUCCESSFULLY OPPOSE DRV ATTENDANCE AND THERE SHOULD NOT BE TOO MUCH DIFFICULTY IN BLOCKING ANY SOVIET-FRENCH MOVES TOWARD GENEVA TYPE CONFERENCE. POINTED OUT ADVANTAGES TO GVN OF OUR BEING ABLE USE SC FORUM FOR FOCUSING WORLD ATTENTION ON DRV AGGRESSIONS. ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE MUCH PULLING AND HAULING BETWEEN HANOI, MOSCOW AND PEIPING AS TO WHETHER DRV WOULD ACTUALLY ATTEND AND THIS TO OUR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

TAYLOR

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S-O AT 9:07 AM AUGUST 6TH
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 9:30 AM AUGUST 6TH

Distributed by [unclear]

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 3-21-01~~CONFIDENTIAL~~REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
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10
INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

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SVN RR RUEHC
Info DE RUMSMA 502H 06/0915Z
ZNR
R 060723Z
SS FM COMUSMACV
G TO RUEHKO/CINCPAC
SP RUEPDA/OASD/PA
FE RUAPDT/OIC PAC STARS AND STRIPES
IO INFO RUEKDA/JCS
P RUEHC/STATE DEPT
USIA ZEN/AMEMB/PA SAIGON
INR ZEN/USIS SAIGON
BT

1964 AUG 6 PM 12 03

UNCLAS MACOI 7460.
SUPPLEMENTAL PRESS TRENDS NUMBER 185A
RMR- SUPPLEMENTAL PRESS TRENDS FOR 06 AUGUST 1964.
1. DUE TO PREOCCUPATION OF MEDIA REPS IN SAIGON WITH EVENTS
RELATED TO TONKIN GULF OPNS, WAS DECIDED NOT TO HOLD REGULAR
WEEKLY BRIEFING BY REP OF JOC ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH
VIETNAM. MEDIA REPS SOUNDED OUT ON SUBJECT WERE UNANIMOUS
IN THEIR CONCURRENCE THIS IDEA. IN LIEU THEREOF, ISSUED FLAG
SUPPLEMENTAL RELEASE AT 051700H AUG COVERING PERIOD ENDING
012400H AUG 64:

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 502H UNCLAS

A. RVNAF ACTIV:

- (1) GRD OPNS TOTALED 60 THIS WK. COMPARES TO 65 LAST WK.
- (2) GRD OPNS W/VC CONTACT WAS 25 FROM 35 LAST WK.
- (3) DECREASING ORDER BY CORPS: IN NR GRD OPS W/VC CONTACT:
THIS WK: II, IV, III, 7TH DIV AND I
LAST WK: II, IV, III, I, 7TH DIV
- (4) BN DAYS OFF OPN WERE 540 COMPARED TO 490 LAST WK.
- (5) SMALL UNIT ACTIONS THIS WK 13,470. LAST WK 14,440.
- (6) SUA WITH VC CONTACT THIS WK WAS 80. LAST WK 100.
- (7) AIR SORTIES TOTALED 8,230 THIS WK COMPARED TO
9,370 LAST WK.

B. NAVAL ACTIV: PRIMARY MISSIONS

SEA FORCE: ABOUT 20 OPNS INCL TWO SHORE BOMBARDMENTS.
RIVER FORCE: ABOUT 90 OPNS.
COASTAL FORCE: ABOUT 220 OPNS.

JUNKS SEARCHED 4,080
JUNKS DETAINED TWO
PERSONS SEARCHED 17,660
PERSONS DETAINED 35

C. VC INCIDENTS: TOTAL THIS WK WAS 640 INCL TWO BN-SIZE
AND TWO CO-SIZE ATKS. LAST WK WAS 700 INCIDENTS.

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-2- 060723Z July from COMUSMACV

FLWG INCIDENTS BY CORPS:

	THIS WK	LAST WK	DECREASING ORDER OF MAGNITUDE (A)
I CORPS	93	100	T/P/S/-
II CORPS	130	150	T/P/S/A
III CORPS	130	120	T/PSA EQUAL
CMD	10	10	T/A/-/-
TG (7TH DIV) TA	170	100	T/S/A/P
IV CORPS	110	220	T/S/A/P

(A) A-ATTACKS, T-TERRORISM, S-SABOTAGE, P-PROPAGANDA.
 D. PERSONNEL LOSSES KIA WIA MIA/CPTD
 U.S./HOSTILE FIRE 5(B) 19 0
 RVN 510 145(C) 310 55
 VC 320 255(C) --- 65

(B) THREE IN LONG AN, ONE IN HAU NGHIA AND ONE IN BINH DUONG.

(C) KILL RATIO: 1.8:1 IN FAVOR OF RVN.

E. SUMMARY: ACTIVITIES INITIATED BY VC DECLINED CONSIDERABLY THIS WEEK. HOWEVER, THE NUMBER OF INCIDENTS REMAINED ABOVE THE PRE-JULY WEEKLY AVERAGE FOR 1964. THERE WAS A SHARP DROP IN OVERALL VC ACTIV IN IV CORPS.

PAGE 4 RUNSMA 502H UNCLAS

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT MIL EVENTS DURING THE WEEK OCCURRED IN THE VICINITY OF BEN CAT. OVER A THREE DAY PERIOD THERE WAS A SERIES OF REACTION OPNS BY FRD FORCES AS RESULT OF VC AMBUSHES. THE PATTERN AND TEMPO OF AIR OPNS GENERALLY KEPT PACE WITH THAT OF PREV WEEK, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS DROP IN NR OF SORTIES. FLARESHIPS AND FIGHTER-BOMBERS WERE QUITE ACTIVE IN SPT OF POSTS AND HAMLETS UNDER VC NIGHT ATK.

2. ANALYSIS OF MIL ACTIVITIES IN RVN DURING JULY BY BRIG GEN DEPUY, MACV J-3, SCHEDULED FOR 061600H AUG. HOWEVER, DUE TO PRESSING COMMITMENTS OF GEN DEPUY AND POSSIBLY OF MEDIA REPS IT MAY BE CANCELLED. WILL ADVISE

BT

CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING NOTE

Archives staff noted that document #58, although declassified, does not contain the text of Saigon 328. A copy of Saigon 328 containing the full text can be found in National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, "Volume 15," box 7, document #27.

Alexis Percle
April 21, 2014

National Security File, NSC Histories, "Presidential Decisions—Gulf of Tonkin Attacks of August 1964, Tabs 1-8," Box 38

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

POL 27-14 LACS
POL 27 VIETS
INT 6 RMR

33
Action

~~SECRET~~

58

SS
Info

00 RUEHCRV
DE RUMJIR 35A 061230Z
O 061215Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

004244


1964 AUG 6 AM 8 46

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Authority State Ltr. 4/7/78
By chw, NARS, Date 5/10/78

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT IMMEDIATE (328) INFO CINCPAC 159
FROM SAIGON AUG 6, 8 PM

L I M D I S



Saigon 328

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

59 *file Nam*

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Action

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 36A 06/1250Z
P 061230Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEPDA/OSD
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
STATE GRNC
BT

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1964 AUG 6 AM 10 45

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Authority *State Ltr. 4/7/78*

By *Shaw*, NARS, Date *5/10/78*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 329 INFO
PRIORITY CINCPAC 157 DOD 31 CIA 26 WHITEHOUSE 23 FROM SAIGON
AUGUST 6, 8 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FIRST REACTION PIERCE ARROW

OFFICIAL REACTION, LED BY DECLARATIONS OF GENERAL KHANH
(EMBTELS 311 AND 316) SEEM UNIFORMLY FAVORABLE, INDICATE
UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT OF ACTION IN VIEW OF PROVOCATION.

PUBLIC REACTION DEVELOPING SLOWLY DUE TO FACT VIETNAMESE DAILIES
DISTRIBUTED ON TIGHT SCHEDULE, DO NOT ISSUE EXTRAS.
FIRST NEWS OF ATTACK CARRIED IN ISSUES DATED AUGUST 7 WHICH
APPEARED ON STREET 1530 LOCAL TIME AUGUST 6.
CFN 329 157 31 26 23 311 316 1530 6

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 36A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THESE ISSUES CONTAIN NO RPT NO EDITORIAL COMMENT AS YET COMMENTING
SPECIFICALLY ON STRIKES AT DRV, ARE DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO
FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF STRIKES DRAWN FROM PRESS SERVICES. THEY REPRINT
ALSO MESSAGES OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON, PRIMIN KHANH, INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN MCNAMARA PRESS CONFERENCES. EDITORIAL COMMENT
WILL NOT APPEAR BEFORE ISSUES OF AUGUST 8.

PUBLIC INTEREST IS HIGH. ISSUES OF PAPERS BEING SCOOPED UP
AND AVIDLY READ AND DISCUSSED.
TAYLOR

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Action RR RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 37A 06/100Z
SVN R 061244Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
Info TO JUHCR/SCSTA WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
SS STATE GRNC
G BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 172 3/14/75
By MIE, NARS, Date 10/20/76

1964 AUG 6 AM 11 39

004404

SP ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT. (330) INFO CINCPAC 158
EUR FROM SAIGON AUG 6, 8 PM
FE
IO CINCPAC FOR POLAD

NSC AT MEETING TODAY ON ANOTHER SUBJECT FONMIN QUAT, WHO HAD
INR JUST COME FROM CABINET MEETING, SAID THAT AT REQUEST OF SOME OF
CIA HIS COLLEAGUES HE WANTED TO RAISE WITH JOHNSON QUESTION AS TO
NSA WHAT WE SAW "COMING NEXT" WITH RESPECT NVN. JOHNSON REPLIED
OSD THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM WE WERE NOW IN EXCELLENT POSITION BOTH
ARMY PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND POLITICALLY RE DRV AND NEXT MOVE, IF ANY,
NAVY WAS UP TO THEM. HANOI AND PEKING RADIOS WERE THUS FAR PLAYING
CFN 330 158 6 8

NIC

RMR PAGE TWO RUMJIR 7A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VERY CAUTIOUSLY AND THEY OBVIOUSLY FACED WITH SERIOUS DILEMMA
WHICH WE SHOULD NOT ASSIST THEM IN RESOLVING. THEY HAVE TAKEN
HEAVY BLOW PRESTIGE UNDER SITUATION BROUGHT ABOUT DIRECTLY BY
THEM AND U DIRECT RESULT THEIR ACTIONS WE HAD BEEN ABLE SUBSTANTIAL
REINFORCE OUR MILITARY POSITION THROUGH SOUTHEAST ASIA.
IF THEY TOOK NO ACTION, NOT ONLY DRV BUT VC WOULD HAVE SUFFERED
HEAVY PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW, AND IN FACE OUR MILITARY STRENGTH IN
AREA DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT ACTION THEY COULD TAKE.

QUAT EXPRESSED FULL AGREEMENT. SAID THAT PEOPLE OF SVN HAD RE-
CEIVED GREAT LIFT. HE HOPED THIS WOULD ALSO BE EXPLOITED
BY PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR AGAINST NVN. JOHNSON ASSURED HIM THIS WAS
BEING DONE.

HE SAID HE HAD EXPRESSED TO KHANH THIS AFTERNOON FEAR THAT
VC MIGHT TRY TO OFFSET BY SOME SPECTACULAR ACTION IN SAIGON
OR IMMEDIATE ENVIRONS. JOHNSON SAID HE AGREE. FELT SATISFIED
MACV AND ARVN WERE ALERT TO THIS POSSIBILITY/?
TAYLOR
BT

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COMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

104 27 VLT S
XP PL 33-6 HS-VLT N
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

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PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 36A 06/1250Z
P 061230Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEPDA/OSD
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
STATE GRNC
BT

004335

1964 AUG 6 AM 10 45

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr 4/2/78
By Chin, NARS, Date 5/10/78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION PRIORITY DEPT 329 INFO
PRIORITY CINCPAC 157 DOD 31 CIA 26 WHITEHOUSE 23 FROM SAIGON
AUGUST 6, 8 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FIRST REACTION PIERCE ARROW

OFFICIAL REACTION, LED BY DECLARATIONS OF GENERAL KHANH
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CFN 329 157 31 26 23 311 316 1530 6

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 36A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S-O AT 11:05 AM AUGUST 6TH

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DE WASHDC
DE WASHDC 28A 07/0055Z
7 010055Z ZEA
FM EMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUENOR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUENOR/DA WASHDC
RUEPIA/CIA
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

1964 AUG 7 PM 4040 6007

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State ltr. 4/7/78

By

NARS, Date

5/10/78

~~SECRET~~

338

ACTION DEPT 338 INFO DOD 338 CIA 29 CINCPAC 164 FROM SAIGON
AUG 7 6:00 PM

DEPT PASS AID AND USIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

MISSION MESSAGE

1. OVER PAST TEN MONTHS, U.S. MISSION AND WASHINGTON COMMUNITY
HAVE EMPLOYED SEVERAL LISTS OF SO-CALLED KEY PROVINCES.
CFN 338 35 29 164 1

PAGE TWO RUNNER 28A ~~SECRET~~

LISTS HAVE CHANGED FROM TIME TO TIME BOTH IN MEANING AND IN
PACE WITH ALTERED CIRCUMSTANCES. FOLLOWING FRANCES EVOLUTION
OF THESE LISTS AND SUGGESTS STANDARD DEFINITIONS TO BE EMPLOYED
HERE AND BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

2. INITIAL LIST OF SO-CALLED CRITICAL PROVINCES WAS DEVELOPED
BY U.S. MISSION AT WASHINGTON DIRECTION FOR DISCUSSION AT 0
NOVEMBER HONOLULU MEETING. THAT LIST INCLUDED THIRTEEN PROVINCES
WHICH, IN MISSION ESTIMATE, WERE MOST HEAVILY DOMINATED OR
CONTESTED BY VC. THEY WERE: QUANG NGAI, QUANG TIN, BINH DINH,
PHUOC THANH, BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN, DINH
TUONG, KIEN HOA, KIEN TUONG, CHUONG THIEN, AN XUYEN.

3. CONFERENCE PRINCIPALS DIRECTED THAT MISSION PLACE MAJOR
ATTENTION ON THESE THIRTEEN PROVINCES IN ITS PERIODIC REPORTS.
BY SUBSEQUENT JCS DIRECTIVE, THESE PROVINCES (INCREASED TO

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-2- 33, AUGUST 7, 6 PM, FROM: SAIGON

FOURTEEN WHEN DINH TUONG (GO CONG) WERE TWENTY-SEVEN AFTER SPOTLIGHTED IN MACV WEEKLY WILDER.

4. DURING SAME CONFERENCE, SECDEF WAS BRIEFED ON MACV VIEWS OF PACIFICATION STRATEGY AS COMMUNICATED TO GVN IN CONNECTION WITH DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW NATIONAL PLAN. SECDEF WELCOMED FOCUS OF EFFORT ON AREA SURROUNDING SAIGON AND INDICATED THAT CRUCIAL PROVINCES WERE THOSE ON LIST OF THIRTEEN WHICH WERE CLOSEST TO SAIGON.

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PAGE TWO RUMJIR 28A ~~SECRET~~

THIS WAS ORIGIN OF SECDEF PHRASE "SEVEN CRITICAL DELTA PROVINCES". THE SEVEN (WHICH BECAME EIGHT WHEN GO CONG WAS CREATED) WERE: BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN, DINH TUONG, (GO CONG), KIEN HOA, KINH TUONG.

5. PUBLISHED CHIEN THANG PLAN FAITHFULLY REFLECTED US GUIDANCE BY ALLOCATING NATIONAL PRIORITY OF EFFORT TO PROVINCES ADJACENT TO SAIGON, PRECISELY BECAUSE THOSE PROVINCES WERE CRITICAL TO GVN. AT THIS POINT, "PRIORITY" AND "CRITICAL" BECAME SYNONYMOUS, WITH ONE EXCEPTION. FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, US MISSION, WHILE APPRECIATING THAT GIA DINH SHOULD GET PRIORITY IN SUPPORT, HAD REFRAINED FROM DESIGNATING THAT PROVINCE AS CRITICAL. COMPLETE LISTING OF MOST STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT, NATIONAL FIRST PRIORITY PROVINCES IN CHIEN THANG PLAN ARE: GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN, DINH TUONG, GO CONG, KINH HOA. INFERENTIALLY, THE SOUTHWESTERN PORTION OF PHUOC THANH AND PORTIONS OF BIEN HOA BORDERING ON GIA DINH ARE ALSO INCLUDED.

6. ON 26 JUNE, US MISSION REPRESENTATIVES MET WITH PRIME MINISTER AND HIS PRINCIPAL MINISTERS TO DISCUSS JOINT DIRECTION OF PACIFICATION. AT THAT MEETING, US MISSION PROPOSED AND GVN ACCEPTED, A MODIFIED LIST OF PRIORITY PROVINCES.

CFN 5 6 26

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 28A ~~SECRET~~

KIEN HOA WAS DROPPED AS A PRIORITY PROVINCE BECAUSE OF ITS DETACHED POSITION, ALTHOUGH ITS NORTHERN DISTRICTS RETAIN PRIORITY STATUS. VINH LONG AND QUANG NGAI WERE ADDED TO GIVE

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-3- 33, AUGUST 7, 6 PM, FROM: SAIGON

NATIONAL PRIORITY STATUS TO AN ADDITIONAL PROVINCE IN SOUTH AND ONE IN NORTH RESPECTIVELY. THUS, JOINT US/GVN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON FOLLOWING NINE PRIORITY PROVINCES: QUANG NGAI, GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN, GO CONG, DINH TUONG, VINH LONG.

7. SUBSEQUENTLY, US MISSION AND GVN'S NSC HAVE AGREED ON CONCEPT OF PICA I (HOP TAC). THIS IS A PACIFICATION PLAN WHICH STRATS FROM ASSUMPTION THAT SAIGON-CHOLON CONSTITUTE NATION'S LARGEST "OILSPOT" AND CALLS FOR EXPANDING CLEARING, HOLDING AND DEVELOPING OPERATIONS BUILDING OUTWARD FROM THAT BASE. BY VIRTUE OF SPECIAL EFFORT TO BE GIVEN HOP TAC, THESE PROVINCES ENCOMPASSED THEREIN HAVE TOP PRIORITY AMONG THE NINE. THESE ARE: GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN.

8. MISSION PROPOSES FOLLOWING AS DEFINITIONS FOR USE HERE AND THROUGHOUT EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

A. PRIORITY PROVINCES ARE DEFINED AS THOSE WHOSE PACIFICATION HAVE BEEN JUDGED TO BE OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. THERE ARE NINE SUCH PROVINCES AND ELEMENTS OF THREE OTHERS.

CFN 7 I

PAGE FIVE RUNJER 284 ~~SECRET~~

THEY ARE: QUANG NGAI, GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, TAY NINH, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN, DINH TUONG, GO CONG, VINH LONG, PLUS ELEMENTS OF: (A) SOUTHWEST PORTION OF PHUOC THANH, (B) PORTIONS OF BIEN HOA CONTIGUOUS TO GIA DINH, (C) NORTHERN DISTRICTS OF KIEN HOA.

B. WITHIN GROUP OF PRIORITY PROVINCES, FOUR ARE CENTRAL TO SECURITY OF SAIGON AND TO SUCCESS OF ENTIRE PACIFICATION EFFORT. THESE ARE DEFINED AS TOP PRIORITY PROVINCES AND ARE GIA DINH, BINH DUONG, HAU NGHIA, LONG AN.

C. THE TERM "CRITICAL PROVINCES SHOULD BE ABANDONED.

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Info FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
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UNCLAS ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (344) INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 166
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FROM SAIGON SEVENTH

(FIRST OF TWO TAKES)

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

IN PRESS CONFERENCE DIEN HONG HALL SAIGON 3 P.M. TODAY, PRIME
MINISTER KHANH READ TEXT OF TWO DECREES. FIRST ONE, SIGNED BY
KHANH IN CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN MRC DECLARES STATE OF EMERGENCY
THROUGHOUT REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. SECOND, IN CAPACITY AS PRIME
MINISTER, SETS FORTH MEASURES TO BE FOLLOWED DURING STATE OF
EMERGENCY.
CFN 344 166 37 28 31 31 29 24

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 41A UNCLAS
OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL,
CONSIDERING THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ACTS NO. 1 OF
NOVEMBER 4, 1963 AND NO. 2 OF FEBRUARY 7, 1964;

CONSIDERING THE DECISIONS OF JANUARY 30, 1964 OF THE MILITARY
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL APPOINTING MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL;

CONSIDERING THE PRESENT URGENT INTERNAL SITUATION AND IN ORDER
TO SAFEGUARD THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN
THE FACE OF THE DANGER OF OPEN AGGRESSION OF COMMUNIST IMPERIALISM.

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-2- 344, August 7, From Saigon

ARTICLE 1. THE STATE OF EMERGENCY IS HEREBY PROCLAIMED ALL OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FROM THE DATE OF PROMULGATION OF THIS DECREE-LAW UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE.

ARTICLE 2.-ALL LAWS AND REGULATIONS, THE SUSPENSION OF APPLICATION OF WHICH IS CONSIDERED TO BE NECESSARY WILL BE PROCLAIMED TO TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED.

ARTICLE 3. THE PRIME MINISTER IS CHARGED WITH TAKING APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD PUBLIC SECURITY AND TO PROTECT NATIONAL TERRITORY.

CFN 1 4 1963 2 7 1964 30 1964 1 2 3

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 41A UNCLAS

THIS DECREE-LAW WILL BE PROMULGATED ACCORDING TO URGENT PROCEDURE.

THE PRIME MINISTER,

CONSIDERING THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANF NO. 1 OF NOVEMBER 4, 1963;

CONSIDERING THE DECISIONS OF FEBRUARY 7, 1964 OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTION COUNCIL DESIGNATING MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN-KHANH TO FORM THE GOVERNMENT;

CONSIDERING THE DECREE-LAW NO. 215-SL/CT OF AUGUST 7, 1964 OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL PROCLAIMING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY,

ARTICLE 1.-DURING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND FROM THE DATE OF PROMULGATION OF THIS DECREE-LAW ONWARDS, THE FOLLOWING MEASURES WILL BE APPLIED:

- CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD.
- SEARCH PRIVATE HOUSES AT ANY HOURS IF NEED BE.
- DECIDE THE DETENTION OF OR ASSIGN RESIDENCE TO THOSE ELEMENTS WHO ARE CONSIDERED AS DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY.
- BAN ALL STRIKES.
- BAN ALL DEMONSTRATIONS OR MEETINGS CONSIDERED AS HARMFUL TO PUBLIC ORDER.

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-D- 344, August 7, From Saigon

- APPLY CENSORSHIP TO ALL PRESS REPORTS, RADIO PROGRAMS, MOVIE PICTURES, THEATRES, PUBLICATIONS.
- FORBID THE DETENTION AND THE CIRCULATION OF ALL PUBLICATIONS, DOCUMENTS, LEAFLETS, CONSIDERED AS HARMFUL TO PUBLIC ORDER.
- CONTROL, RESTRICT ALL TRAVEL DEPENDING ON SECURITY NEEDS.
- PROCLAIM MARTIAL LAW DEPENDING ON THE SECURITY SITUATION OF EACH REGION.

ARTICLE II.-ACCORDING TO THE NEED OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER AND REQUISITION OF NATIONAL RESOURCES WILL BE APPLIED.

ARTICLE III.-STRENGTHEN TO THE MAXIMUM THE SYSTEM OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO PROTECT THE LIVES AND PROPERTIES OF THE POPULATION ESPECIALLY TO FACE WITH EVENTUAL AERIAL ATTACKS FROM THE ENEMY.

ARTICLE IV.-ANY VIOLATION OF PUBLIC ORDER AND NATIONAL SECURITY WILL FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY COURT AND WILL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO URGENT PROCEDURES.

ARTICLE V.-TERRORISTS, PEOPLE WHO INDULGE IN SABOTAGE, SPECULATORS HARMFUL TO THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, CAUGHT RED-HANDED, WILL BE SENTENCED TO DEATH AND WILL NOT BENEFIT FROM ATTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

ALL THESE CASES MUST BE TRIED BY THE MILITARY COURT IN THE SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE AND WITHOUT PREVIOUS HEARINGS.

THE DEFENDANT IS ALLOWED NO RIGHT TO APPEAL THE SENTENCE OR APPLY FOR LENIENCY.

ARTICLE VI.-THE DEPUTIES PRIME MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF STATE, THE MINISTERS, THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, THE UNDER-SECRETARIES OF STATE, THE GENERAL COMMISSIONERS AND SPECIAL COMMISSIONERS WILL BE CHARGED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PRESENT DECREE-LAW.

THIS DECREE-LAW WILL BE PROMULGATED ACCORDING TO URGENT PROCEDURES.
END TEXT.

TAYLOR

NOTE: PASSED USUN AT 2:45 P.M., 8-7-64.
ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 2:30 P.M., 8-7-64.

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INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEPDA/DOD
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPIA/CIA
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UNCLAS ACTION PRIORITY DEPT (344) INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 166
DOD 37 WHITE HOUSE 28 CIA 31 PARIS 31 LONDON 29 BANGKOK 24
FROM SAIGON SEVENTH
SETWO OF TWO

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

AFTER READING DECRES, KHANH READ PROCLAMATION PROVIDING
RATIONAL FOR THEIR ISSUANCE:

BEGIN TEXT. PROCLAMATION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY
REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

MY DEAR FELLOW VIETNAMESE, DURING THE PAST YEARS THE USUATING
COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES IN NORTH VIETNAM, ON ORDERS FROM THEIR CHINESE

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 42A UNCLAS
COMMUNIST MASTERS HAVE CONTINUALLY IGNORED THE NATIONAL SENTIMENTS
AND HAVE RUTHLESSLY BROUGHT THE CALAMITIES OF WAR INTO FREE AND
PEACEFUL SOUTH VIETNAM. WITH THEIR AGGRESSIVENESS AND
PARTISANSHIP THE COMMUNISTS OF THE NORTH HAVE BLATANTLY
VIOLATED THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS WHICH THEY THEMSELVES
HAD SIGNED. THE WHOLE WORLD KNOWS THIS FACT AND THE ICC
ITSELF HAS CONFIRMED IT.

THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE VC ARMY INFILTRATED INTO THE SOUTH
HAS REACHED THOUSANDS IN THE LAST FEW YEARS AND AT PRESENT HAS
REACHED A NUMBER LIABLE TO HARM THE NATIONAL SECURITY.

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-2- 344 AUGUST 7 FROM SAIGON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

HOWEVER THEY HAVE MET WITH THE DETERMINED OPPOSITION OF OUR ENTIRE FREEDOM AND PEACE LOVING PEOPLE, AND OUR ARMED FORCES HAVE VALIANTLY DEALT WITH THE INFILTRATIONS ACROSS THE BORDER TO PROTECT OUR FELLOW VIETNAMESE, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE REMOTE COUNTRYSIDE.

THAT IS WHY THE PLAN OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR HENCHMEN IN THE NORTH AIMING AT SWALLOWING THE SOUTH CANNOT MATERIALIZE.

NOW THE COMMUNIST IMPERIALISTS ARE TURNING TO ANOTHER METHOD WHICH IS TO BE BLANTANTLY AGGRESSIVE AND OPENLY TAKE OVER THE WHOLE OF

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 42A UNCLAS
SOUTH EAST ASIA WITH THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AS THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AS WELL AS THE EVENTS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN ARE CONCRETE EVIDENCES OF THE COMMUNIST SCHEME FOR THE DOMINATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND OF THE OTHER SMALL COUNTRIES OF SOUTH EAST ASIA.

TO EFFICIENTLY DEAL WITH THE CALAMITIES OF INTERNAL WAR AND EXTERNAL AGGRESSION, TO SAFEGUARD THE LIVES AND PROPERTIES OF THE POPULATION, THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN ALL MEASURES SUITABLE WITH THE PRESENT STATE OF EMERGENCY.

THE FIRM MEASURES PUT INTO APPLICATION AIM ONLY AT ELIMINATING THE COMMUNISTS AND THEIR NEUTRALIST SYMPATHISERS, AS WELL AS SPEEDILY BRINGING ABOUT FINAL VICTORY. THUS REDUCING THE HARDSHIPS OF THE COUNTRY PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHO HAVE BEEN SUFFERING FROM THE CALAMITIES OF WAR FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS.

AS FOR THE PEOPLE OF NORTH VIETNAM, WE ARE READY TO EXTEND OUR ASSISTANCE FOR THEM TO STAND UP AND OVERTHROW THE DICTATORIAL PARTY RULE OF THE COMMUNISTS AND EXTERMINATE THE TRAITORS WHO WANT TO OFFER OUR COUNTRY TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS.

WE HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT THIS YEAR WAS A DECISIVE YEAR. NOW WE

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-3- 344 AUGUST 7 FROM SAIGON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 42A UNCLAS
CAN SAY THAT THE COMING WEEKS WILL DECIDE THE DESTINY OF OUR
ENTIRE PEOPLE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO BUILD UP A POWERFUL NATION,
FREE AND INDEPENDENT, AND WE DON'T ACCEPT BECOMING A MINOR
PROVINCE OF RED CHINA.

THE CRUCIAL HOUR OF HISTORY HAS STRUCK.

THE MRC ONCE MORE CALLS FOR THE ASSISTANCE AND THE RESPECT OF THE
NATIONAL DISCIPLINE FROM THE ENTIRE PEOPLE, WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION
AS TO RELIGION, PARTY OR RACE.

WE ARE READY TO UNITE WITH ALL FRIENDLY NATIONS AS WELL AS ALL
CITIZENS WHO SHARE OUR IDEALS OF DESTROYING THE COMMUNISTS AND
SAVING THE COUNTRY. ON THE CONTRARY WE CANNOT CONDONE THOSE WHO
WANT TO UNDERMINE THE VALIANT STRUGGLE OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE
THE PURPOSE OF WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN LIBERTY, INDEPENDENCE AND
UNIFICATION.

REALIZING GRAND NATIONAL UNITY, SCRUPULOUSLY RESPECTING THE
NATIONAL DISCIPLINE, WITH SPIRIT OF SACRIFICE WHICH WE READILY
HAVE WE ARE SURE TO ACHIEVE TOTAL VICTORY. END TEXT.

AT CONFERENCE, KHANH WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ALL THREE DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTERS, DEFMIN KHIEM, FONMIN QUAT, MINJUSTICE MAU, MININFO PHAM
THAI. CONFERENCE WAS ATTENDED BY APPROXIMATELY 250 LOCAL AND FOREIGN

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 42A UNCLAS
PRESSMEN.

CONFERENCE OPENED WITH MILITARY BRIEFING. KHANH THEN MADE
BRIEF STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT IT WAS TIME TO TELL VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE ABOUT CURRENT SITUATION OF COUNTRY. HE SAID THAT THERE WAS
COMMUNIST ARMY IN SVN OF ABOUT 150,000 TROOPS OF WHICH 30,000 ARE
REGULARS. HE SAID THAT SIHANOUK'S STATEMENTS AND ATTITUDES SHOW
THAT CAMBODIAN FRONTIER IS MENACE TO SOUTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL
SECURITY. HE REFERRED TO INFORMATION THAT CHICOMS HAVE "FAIRLY
SIZABLE" ARMY IN VARIOUS PROVINCES OF SOUTH CHINA AND HAVE TROOPS
STATIONED IN DRV. FOR THESE REASONS, HE SAID, WE MAY BE ATTACKED
OR INVADDED AT ANYTIME. KHANH THEN READ ABOVE DECREES AND PROCLAMATION.

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-4- 344 AUGUST 7 FROM SAIGON (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

BEFORE DEPARTING FROM CONFERENCE, KHANH APOLOGIZED TO NEWSMEN FOR NOT HAVING TIME FOR QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD, STATED HE WAS "LEAVING IMMEDIATELY TO JOIN HIS TROOPS IN THE PROVINCES." KHANH WAS APPLAUDED AS HE LEFT THE ROOM.
TAYLOR

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
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SS RUEPWW/WHITEHOUSE
G RUEPIA/CIA
SP RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
L RUEGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS
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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

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FOLLOWING ARE INFORMAL TRANSLATIONS OF TEXTS OF DRAFT DECREES
DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY HANDED TO ME THIS MORNING BY
KHANH. FURTHER REVISION OF LANGUAGE OF "DECREE OF PRIME MINISTER"
LIKELY BEFORE PUBLICATION THIS AFTERNOON AND OFFICIAL ENGLISH
TRANSLATIONS MAY WELL VARY.
CFN 336 34 26 28 162 29 27 23 333

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 21A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR CONVENIENCE KHANH'S COMMENTS AT OUR MEETING THIS MORNING
CONCERNING CERTAIN ARTICLES HAVE BEEN INSERTED IN
PARENTHESES FOLLOWING THE ARTICLE:

BEGIN TEXT. DECREE OF CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY
COMMITTEE.

BASED ON TEMPORARY DECREES #1 OF NOVEMBER 11, 1963 AND #2
OF FEBRUARY 7, 1964.

BASED ON THE DECISION OF JANUARY 30, 1964 OF THE MRC
DESIGNATING MAJOR GEN NGUYEN KHANH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE MRC.

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-2- 336, August 7, 4 p.m., from Saigon

BECAUSE OF THE PRESENT INTERNAL EMERGENCY AND IN ORDER TO PROTEST ALL THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AGAINST THE MENACE OF OVERT INVASION BY THE IMPERIALIST COMMUNISTS

IT IS DECREED:

1. THE PRESENT DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY THROUGHOUT ALL OF VIETNAM WILL BE VALID FROM THE TIME IT IS PROMULGATED UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A NEW DECREE IS ISSUED.

2. IF IT IS CONSIDERED THAT ANY EXISTING LAW OR REGULATION SHOULD CEASE TO BE CARRIED OUT IT SHALL BE ORDERED THAT THE REGULATION BE TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED.

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PAGE THREE RUMJIR 21A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. THE PRIME MINISTER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CARRYING OUT MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE NATION.

THIS DECREE WILL BE PROMULGATED BY URGENT PROCEDURES.

DECREE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

ARTICLE 1 - IN THE PRESENT STATE OF EMERGENCY, THE FOLLOWING MEASURES WILL BE APPLIED FROM THE DATE OF PROCLAMATION OF THIS DECREE:

CONTROL THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOODSTUFFS;
SEARCH ANY PRIVATE RESIDENCES DAY OR NIGHT; (KHANH SAYS PUBLIC SECURITY AUTHORITIES WILL BE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN SEARCH WARRANTS AS IS NOT THE CASE).

ARREST OF FIX THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF ELEMENTS JUDGED TO BE DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY: (KHANH SAYS THIS WILL PERMIT MOVING VC SYMPATHIZERS OR UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS FROM VICINITY OF KEY INSTALLATIONS REQUIRING MAXIMUM SECURITY.)

PROHIBIT ALL STRIKES; (KHANH SAYS HE DOES NOT INTEND PROHIBIT ALL STRIKES BUT MOSTLY THOSE LIKELY AFFECT MOVEMENT OF CRITICAL COMMUNITIES).

PROHIBIT ALL DEMONSTRATIONS OR MEETINGS HARMFUL TO PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY;

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-3- 336, August 7, 4 p.m., from Saigon

CENSOR NEWS, THE PRESS, BROADCASTING, FILMS, THEATER, AND PUBLISHING;; (KHANH SAYS THIS APPLIES ONLY TO VIETNAMESE PRESS, NOT TO FOREIGN PRESS, AND WHAT IS BROUGHT IN AND PRINTED LOCALLY. THIS PROVISION WILL NOT BECOME OPERATIVE UNTIL PUBLICATION OF SUPPORTING REGULATION.)

PROHIBIT CONCEALMENT AND CARRYING OF PRINTED MATERIAL AND BROCHURES JUDGED TO BE HARMFUL TO PUBLIC SECURITY;

CONTROL AND RESTRICT COMMUNICATIONS AND TRAVEL ACCORDING TO SECURITY NEEDS;

ANNOUNCE A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW ACCORDING TO THE LOCAL SECURITY SITUATION.

ARTICLE 2 - ALL SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION WILL BE MOBILIZED AND NATIONAL RESOURCES REQUISITIONED ACCORDING TO THE NEEDS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. (KHANH NOTES THAT THIS ARTICLE PROVIDES BASIS FOR FILLING UP RANKS OF REGULAR MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES AND FOR RESOURCES CONTROL).

ARTICLE 3 - ALL VIOLATORS OF PUBLIC ORDER AND NATIONAL SECURITY REGULATIONS FALL UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL TO BE JUDGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCTY. PROCEDURES. (THIS WOULD TRANSFER TO MILITARY COURTS MANY OFFENSES NOW TRIED BY CIVIL COURTS).

ARTICLE 4 - PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO TERRORIST AND SABOTEURS AND SPECULATORS DAMAGING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY CAUGHT IN THE ACT, THE CULPRITS WILL BE CONDEMNED TO DEATH. EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED.

THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL MUST DECIDE SUCH CASES WITHIN A MINIMUM PERIOD WITHOUT THE NECESSITY OF PRIOR INSTRUCTION. (E.G. THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE CONDUCTED BY A JUGE D'INSTRUCTION UNDER FRENCH LAW.)

THE OFFENDER DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT OF APPEAL TO A HIGHER COURT NOR MAY HE REQUEST CLEMENCY. (KHANH POINTS OUT THIS WILL PERMIT GVN DISPENSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST CULPRITS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANT DELICTO AS AN EXAMPLE TO OTHERS. IN HIS VIEW IT WOULD NOT APPLY TO POW'S OR TO VC CAPTURED AS RESULT ARMED ENGAGEMENT

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-4- 336, August 7, 4 p.m., from Saigon

WITH GVN ARMED FORCES, NOR WOULD IT BE APPLIED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO UNDERCUT THE CPEU HOI PROGRAM)

ARTICLE 5 - THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS, SECRETARIES OF STATE, MINISTER, DEPARTMENT HEADS, MAYORS, (ETC), WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES, WILL CARRY OUT THIS DECREE.

THIS DECREE WILL BE PROMULGATED URGENTLY. END TEXT. TAYLOR

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RUEKDA/DOD
RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEGWP/AMEMB 0-43
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RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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1964 AUG 7 AM 12 54

I M M E D I A T E

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Authority State 14 3/14/75
By MIE, NARS, Date 10/20/76

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ACTION IMMEDIATE DEPT (333) INFO IMMEDIATE CINCPAC 161 DOD 33
WHITE HOUSE 25 CIA 27 INFO PRIORITY PARIS 28 LONDON 24
BANGKOK 22 FROM SAIGON AUGUST 7, 1130AM
AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN EMBTELS 286, 213, 184, GENERAL
KHANH HAS BEEN GIVING THOUGHT FOR SOME TIME TO THE DECLARATION
OF A CONDITION OF WAR OR OF EMERGENCY. HE FEELS THAT SOME
SUCH ACTION IS NECESSARY TO ENERGIZE THE COUNTRY AND SNAP
THE PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY IN SAIGON, OF THEIR APATHY
TOWARD THE WAR. HE ALSO FEELS THE NEED FOR BETTER LEGAL MEANS
CFN 333 161 33 25 27 28 24 22 7 1130 286 213 184 KHANH

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 03A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO COPE WITH TERRORISM, SABOTAGE AND COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA.
YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, AUGUST SIXTH, HE TELEPHONED ME THAT HE
INTENDED TO PROCLAIM A CONDITION OF EMERGENCY (URGENCE) TODAY.
I ASKED HIM TO PROVIDE US AT ONCE WITH A TEXT OF THE PROPOSED
DECLARATION SO THAT WE COULD UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF
AN ACTION WHICH, IN THE PAST, HAD OFTEN BEEN MENTIONED BUT
NEVER DEFINED. AN EMBOFF PICKED UP A COPY OF THE VIETNAMESE
TEXT AND FURNISHED ALEX JOHNSON AND ME A TRANSLATION LATER
IN THE EVENING.

THE DOCUMENT TURNED OUT TO BE TWO DECREES. ONE A SHORT DEC-
LARATION OF EMERGENCY BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MRC RPT MRC
AND THE SECOND, A DECREE OF THE PRIME MINISTER LISTING MEASURES
TO BE CARRIED OUT TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE DECLARATION OF
EMERGENCY. IT REQUIRED ONLY A GLANCE AT THEIR DRACONIAN
CHARACTER (CANCELLATION OF ALL ELECTIONS, CONTROL OF MOVEMENT
OF FOREIGNERS, SUMMARY ARREST AND EXECUTION OF TERRORISTS,

microfilmed by RMRS

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-2-333, AUGUST 7, 11:30 M, FROM SAIGON.

ETC.) TO IMPRESS US WITH NEED FOR SOME ATTENUATION OF LANGUAGE AND CONSIDERABLE PREPARATION OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC PUBLIC FOR SUCH DECREES. I TELEPHONED KHANH, COMMUNICATED SOME OF MY CONCERN, AND GOT AGREEMENT TO HOLD EVERYTHING UNTIL JOHNSON AND I COULD SEE HIM THIS MORNING.

WE CALLED ON HIM AT HIS OFFICE AT 0830 THIS MORNING AND FOUND THAT HE HAD WORKED HARD OVERNIGHT TO MEET THE CRITICISMS WHICH I HAD INTIMATED BY TELEPHONE THE PREVIOUS EVENING. THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DECREE WHICH CONTAINED THE TOUGH LANGUAGE HAD BEEN MODERATED CONSIDERABLY. GONE WERE THE REFERENCES TO CANCELLATION OF ELECTIONS AND CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF FOREIGNERS. OTHER PARAGRAPHS WERE CONSIDERABLY MODIFIED IN LANGUAGE.

KHANH WENT OVER EACH PARAGRAPH GIVING US A FRENCH TRANSLATION OF THE VIETNAMESE TEXT. IN EFFECT HE IS TRANSFERRING TO TRIAL BY MILITARY COURT MANY OFFENSES NOW RPT NOW UNDER CIVIL JURISDICTION. THE FULL EFFECT OF THE DECREE WILL NOT RPT NOT BE CLEAR UNTIL A MASS OF SUPPORTING REGULATIONS ARE PUBLISHED. NONETHELESS, KHANH HOPES TO PUT THE DECREE IN EFFECT AT ONCE.

WE POINTED OUT THE GREAT SENSITIVITY OF THE PARAGRAPH ANNOUNCING CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, HE APPARENTLY AGREED TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD MAKE THE PROVISION INOPERATIVE UNTIL THE PUBLICATION OF SUPPORTING REGULATIONS.

THE NEW TEXT OF THE DECREE IS STILL TOUGH BUT, AS WE UNDERSTAND THE LANGUAGE, IS TOLERABLE IF ACCOMPANIED BY AN AMPLE EXPLANATION OF THE PURPOSE AND INTENTION OF THE GVN RPT GVN. KHANH INTENDS TO PUBLISH THE DECREE OF THE CHAIRMAN MRC RPT MRC THIS MORNING AND THAT OF THE PM RPT PM LATER IN THE AFTERNOON. HE WILL MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT EXPLAINING HIS ACTION PRIOR TO THE RELEASE OF THE PM RPT PM DECREE. HE HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE HELP OF ZORTHIAN RPT ZORTHIAN IN PREPARATION OF THE PUBLIC STATEMENT.

WE BROUGHT BACK A COPY OF THE REVISED DECREES IN VIETNAMESE WHICH WE WILL CABLE SEPARATELY AS SOON AS TRANSLATED. MEANWHILE, WORK ON THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS IS PROCEEDING IN CONSULTATION WITH BRITISH ADVISORY MISSION (DRAWING ON MALAYAN EXPERIENCE), PUBLIC SAFETY DIRECTOR USOM RPT USOM AND APPROPRIATE OFFICERS OF EMBASSY AND MACV RPT MACV. BY THIS MEANS WE HOPE TO BRING FURTHER INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON END PRODUCT.

TAYLOR

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O-AT-1:02-AM, 8/7/64.

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Distribution coordinated with SS-O

(10) INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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33

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Action

SVN

Info

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FE

P

USIA

INR

RMR

PP RUEHC
QDE RUMSMA 551H 07/0805Z
ZNR
P 070719Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
RUEPDA/OASD PA
RUAPDT/OIC PAC STARS AND STRIPES
ZEN/AMEMB PA SAIGON
ZEN/USIS SAIGON
RUEKDA/JCS
RUEHC/STATE DEPT WASH

5 3 0 4

1964 AUG 7 AM 8 40

BT
UNCLAS MAC OI 7523 SEC I OF II
SUPPLEMENTAL PRESS TRENDS NUMBER 186A
SUPPLEMENTAL PRESS TRENDS FOR 07 AUGUST 1964
2. DUE TO OTHER COMMITMENTS IT WAS NECESSARY TO HAVE SOMEWHAT
ABBREVIATED SESSION FOR ANALYSIS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN RVN
DURING JULY. FLWG ARE STATISTICS FOR THE PERIOD 01-31 JULY 64:
RVNAF JULY JUNE 64
ZN-STZE AND LARGER OPNS 210 190
SMALL UNIT ACTIONS 54640 32940
EN DAYS OF OPNS 2280 2990

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 551H UNCLAS

PERSONNEL LOSSES	TOTAL 3190	1890
	KIA 900	460
SU	WIA 1790	1120
	MIA 500	310
WPNS LOSSES	TOTAL 1860	710
INDIV WPNS	1810	680
CREW SERVED	50	30
VIET CONG		
PERSONNEL LOSSES	TOTAL 1590	1140
	KIA 1300	860
	CPTD 290	280

DEFECTORS (NOT INCL IN TOTAL)	240	160 (NOT INCL IN TOTAL)
WPNS LOSSES	TOTAL 460	410
INDIV WPNS	445	400
CREW SERVED WPNS	15	10

2. FLWG ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF 20-MINUTE SESSION IN WHICH BRIG
GEN WILLIAM DEPUY, MACV, J-3, ANSWERED QUESTIONS ON NOT FOR
ATTRIBUTION BASIS:

1. DO STATISTICS ON VC INCIDENTS AND GVN CASUALTIES
REPRESENT HIGHS FOR 1964?

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-2- DTG 070719Z, AUGUST FROM COMUSMACV (SEC I OF II)

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 551H UNCLAS

A. DO NOT KNOW ABOUT CASUALTIES BUT IS HIGHEST NR INCIDENTS IN 1964. HAD HIGHER NR IN NOV 1963 FLWG COUP D'ETAT.

Q. HOW DO YOU INTERPRET THIS?

A. OBVIOUSLY, THE VC MADE INTENSIFIED EFFORT, FOR SOME REASON UNKNOWN TO US. COULD BE LINKED TO SOME OVERALL SCHEME, TO ARRIVAL OF AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, OR TO TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF FALL OF DIEN BIEN PHU. WE JUST KON'T KNOW REASON.

Q. WAS THIS INCREASE OF EFFORT LARGELY IN FIRST CORPS?

A. NO. WAS SPREAD GENERALLY OVER RVN. HOWEVER, RELATIVELY SPEAKING, FIRST CORPS DID HAVE BIG INCREASE.

Q. HOW BADLY WERE VC HURT IN JULY?

A. VC BADLY HURT, BUT SO WERE GVN FORCES.

Q. WHICH HURT THE MOST?

A. THINK WAS A TOSS-UP. WE CARRY ONLY KIA AND CPTD FOR VC CASUALTIES, WHEREAS LARGE NR OF GVN CASUALTIES ARE IN WOUNDED CATEGORY. IF AN ESTIMATE OF VC WIA WHO EVENTUALLY DIE WERE CRANKED INTO THE DATA, THE CASUALTY STATISTICS FOR BOTH SIDES WOULD NOT BE FAR APART.

PAGE 4 RUMSMA 551H UNCLAS

Q. KILL RATIO SEEMS TO BE DROPPING, ALTHOUGH STILL FAVORABLE TO RVNAF. WHAT IS REASON FOR THIS?

A. UNHAPPILY, IT HAS BEEN ZDL FCCIWMO TREND IS IN WRONG DIRECTION. BELIEVE ONE OF PROBLEMS HAS BEEN VERY LOW OPERATING STRENGTH OF ARVN BNS. THIS WILL BE CORRECTED WHEN DRAFTEES NOW IN TRAINING ARE PUT INTO OPERATING UNITS. BN WHICH HAS ONLY 250 OR 300 MEN INSTEAD OF ABOUT 500 WILL USUALLY TAKE MORE CASUALTIES.

Q. HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE VC CAPABILITY AT END OF JULY?

A. BELIEVE THEY LOST MORE PEOPLE THAN THEY GAINED DURING JULY. HOWEVER, SAME PROBABLY TRUE OF RVNAF.

Q. DO YOU THINK CURRENT RECRUITING DRIVE WILL RECTIFY

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-3- DTG 070719Z, AUGUST FROM COMUSMACV (SEG I OF II)

CURRENT LOW STRENGTH OF ARVN BNS?

A. THEY ARE INDUCTING PEOPLE NOW, BUT TAKES TIME BEFORE THEY EVENTUALLY REACH THE RIFLE COMPANIES.

Q. DOES TARGET FIGURE OF 50,000 ADD'L TROOPS FOR RVNAF CITED BY SECY MCNAMARA IN MARCH NOW SEEM REALISTIC?

A. THEY MUST GO AWFULLY HARD TO MAKE THE PROGRAM AS SCHEDULED. MACHINERY THAT BRINGS PEOPLE INTO SERVICE

PAGE 5 RUMSMA 551H UNCLAS

WAS SLOW IN GEARING UP. AS RESULT, HAVE FALLEN BEHIND QUOTAS. GVN FEELS, AND OUR PERSONNEL PEOPLE ARE INCLINED TO AGREE, THAT THEY MIGHT MAKE TOTAL YEAR-END FIGURE, BUT NOT TO EXTENT OF HAVING ALL IN OPERATING UNITS. THEY ARE BEHIND THE PROGRAM. WHETHER THEY WILL MAKE TARGET WOULD ONLY BE SPECULATION ON MY PART.

Q. WERE VC TACTICS IN JULY SAME AS ANTICIPATE OR DID THEY INTRODUCE ANYTHING NEW?

A. THEY DID MORE OF THE SAME. PROPORTIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS KINDS OF VC INCIDENTS WERE RELATIVELY UNCHANGE.

Q. IS NOTED THT RVNAF WPNS LOSSES IN JULY WERE ABOUT 2 1/2 TIMES LOSSES DURING JUNE. IS THIS RESULT OF SOME VERY LARGE TAKES BY VC? ALSO DID LARGE PERCENTAGE COME FROM CIDG CAMPS?

A. WPNS LOSSES FAIRLY EVENLY DISTRIBUTED OVER VARIOUS RVNAF COMPONENTS. AMBUSHES OF LARGE UNITS WAS BIG FACTOR. CIDG HAD SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES, BUT NOT TO EXTENT OF REPRESENTING MAJOR PART OF TOTAL.

Q. IS THERE ANY AREA NOW, PARTICULARLY IN THE DELTA, WHERE POP FORCES (SDC) SEEM TO BE FALLING APART, AS THEY DID SOME BT

* AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 8:48 AM, 8/7/64.

PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 9:03 AM, 8/7/64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

42

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Action EUB205TED451
PP RUEHC
SVN DE RUMSMA 552H 07/0805Z
ZNR

Info 073719Z
FM COMUSMACV

SS TO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
G RUEPDA/OASD PA
FE RUAPDT/OIC PAC STARS AND STRIPES
P ZEN/AMEMB PA SAIGON
USIA ZEN/USIS SAIGON
INR RUEKDA/JCS
RMR RUEHC/STATE DEPT WASH ✓
BT

6341

1964 AUGUST 7 PM 10:41

PRIORITY

UNCLAS MAC OI 7523 FINAL SEC OF II
MONTHS AGO IN PONG AN?

A. GENERALLY SPEAKING, POP FORCES IN THE DELTA HAVE BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE THAN ANYWHERE ELSE. THEY HAVE FOUGHT BRAVELY AND TENACIOUSLY. THERE ARE NO PLACES IN RVN WHERE THERE IS A CRISIS IN THE MORALE OR TRAINING OF THE POP FORCES.

Q. LAST MONTH YOU SAID THAT THE PACIFICATION EFFORT AROUND SAIGON COULD NOT SEEM TO GET OFF THE GROUND. HOW DOES IT STAND NOW?

A. IT IS CLOSER TO BEING OFF THE GROUND. YOU MUST REALIZE THAT PACIFICATION PLANNING IS ABOUT MOST COMPLICATED AREA FOR PLANNERS. INVOLVES SO MANY FACTORS, SUCH AS CALORIES, WPNS, FERTILIZER AND SCHOOLS. IS MASSIVE PLANNING JOB. AS HAS BEEN STATED, GVN IS SHORT OF HIGHLY TRAINED AND SKILLED ADMINISTRATORS.

Q. HAVE YOU RECD ANY INFO IN LAST SEVERAL DAYS ABOUT PENDING COUP D'ETAT?

A. I HAVE NOT.

Q. ANY IDEA AS TO HOW SOON VC COULD LAUNCH ANOTHER INTENSIFIED EFFORT?

A. THEIR LAST EFFORT INVOLVED ONLY HANDFUL OF BN SIZE ATTACKS. WOULD THINK THEY COULD MOUNT SIMILAR EFFORT ON FAIRLY SHORT NOTICE.

Q. IS AMMO THEIR PROBLEM?

A. NO. THINK THEIR MAIN PROBLEM IS PLANNING. THEIR MODUS OPERANDI CALLS FOR ASSEMBLING FORCES OVER PERIOD OF TIME, ATTACKING VIOLENTLY, FINISHING AT DAYBREAK AND GETTING OUT. THIS TAKES LOT OF DETAILED PLANNING. ESTIMATE THAT A VC BN PROBABLY CARRIES OUT SUCH AN ACTION NO MORE FREQUENTLY THAN ONCE A MONTH. PERHAPS NOT THAT FREQUENTLY AS AN AVERAGE OVER LONG PERIOD.

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-2- MAC OI 7523, DTG 070719Z (AUGUST) (SECTION II OF II)
FROM: COMUSMACV

1. DOES THAT MEAN THEY ARE IN SHAPE LOGISTICALLY?
A. WE DON'T NOTICE THAT THEY ARE SUFFERING FROM ABSENCE OF AMMO.
Q. WHAT WAS INFILTRATION PICTURE IN JULY?
A. GENERAL TREND IS THAT EVERYTHING, INCLUDING INFILTRATION, HAS BEEN GRADUALLY ACCELERATING.
Q. ANY EVIDENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE IN ZONE DELTA?
A. HAVE EVIDENCE OF PERSONNEL BORN IN NORTH VIETNAM COMING IN WITH OTHERS SPORADICALLY OVER PAST SIX MONTHS. AS ANNOUNCED, NUMBER CAME IN WITH GROUPS IDENTIFIED IN FIRST CORPS COUPLE WEEKS AGO. IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE BEEN SPRINKLED THROUGHOUT CADRES WHICH HAVE GONE TO ALL PARTS OF RVN. IMAGINE HAVE BEEN SPREAD AS EVENLY AS THEY CAN, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS.
Q. GVN HAS CHARGED THAT THERE ARE RED CHINESE ADVISORS WITH VC. CAN YOU FILL US IN ON THAT?
A. YOU ARE REFERRING TO THE BODIES WITH THE HEADS CHOPPED OFF AT CAI BE?
Q. THAT IS CORRECT.
A. I HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND THAT THERE WERE ANY CHINESE ADVISORS AT CAI BE--EVIDENCE THAT IS PERSUASIVE TO ME.
Q. HOW ABOUT CHINESE ADVISORS AT OTHER PLACES?
A. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS OF HEARING CHINESE VOICES ON RADIOS AND REPORTS OF SIGHTINGS OF CHINESE. BUT NOBODY HAS BEEN ABLE TO CONFIRM IT. I AM NOT PREPARED TO BELIEVE IT.
Q. DO YOU SEE AN INCREASE IN TERRORISM AGAINST THE RVN POPULACE?
A. I ASKED THAT SAME QUESTION THE OTHER DAY. WANTED TO SEE THE BREAKDOWN BETWEEN TERRORISM DIRECTED AGAINST THE POPULACE IN GENERAL AND AGAINST OFFICIALS. ANALYSIS SHOWED NO CHANGE IN PROPORTIONS OF TERRORISM AGAINST EACH ELEMENT. CAN UNDERSTAND OBVIOUS DIRECT PURPOSE OF ELIMINATING GVN OFFICIALS. CANNOT UNDERSTAND PURPOSE OF TERROR AGAINST POPULACE.
3. SESSION ENDED WITH REMINDER THAT WAS FOR ATTRIBUTION TO A MILITARY SPOKESMAN AND NOT TO BRIG GEN DEPUT.
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 4:31 AM AUGUST 8TH.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 7 AM, AUGUST 8TH.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

67

45

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Action

PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 33A 08/1455Z
P R 081445Z ZEA

P R I O R I T Y

006817

SVN

FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)

Info

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC

1964 AUG 8 PM 9 26

SS

STATE GRNC

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BT

SP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ACTION DEPT PRIORITY (356) INFO CINCPAC
172 FROM SAIGON AUG 8, 10:45 ~~DECLASSIFIED~~

L

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

FE

By JB, NARS, Date 4-20-76

AID

IMMEDIATELY AFTER KHANH'S PRESS CONFERENCE (EMBTEL 344)

P

SAIGON JOURNALISTS WERE INFORMED THAT PRESS CENSORSHIP MEASURE

USIA

WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY ENFORCED. ISSUES APPEARING AFTERNOON

NSC

AUGUST 8 WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO MININFO PRIOR TO 8 AM. AS CONSEQUENCE,

INR

TWO ENGLISH-LANGUAGE DAILIES WHICH NORMALLY APPEAR ON STREETS

NSA

AT 0700, APPEARED 1000 (SAIGON DAILY NEWS), AND 1600 (SAIGON

OPR

POST).
CFN 356 172 344 8 8 0700 1300 1600

RMR

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 33A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ELEVEN PM TO FOUR AM CURFEW WAS IMPOSED IN SAIGON AUGUST 7,
WAS TO CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. NEWS OF CURFEW CIRCULATED BY
RADIO VIETNAM LATE AFTERNOON, EARLY EVENING AND DESPITE LATE
NOTICE, CURFEW WAS WIDELY OBSERVED WITH FEW VIOLATIONS NOTED.
ENFORCEMENT APPARENTLY IN HANDS OF POLICE AND NO TROOPS EVIDENT.

ALSO, EVENING AUGUST 7, MINISTRY NATIONAL ECONOMY ISSUED
COMMUNIQUE REMINDING MERCHANTS THAT NEW REGULATIONS PROVIDED
DEATH PENALTY FOR SPECULATORS AND HOARDERS OF MERCHANDISE.
COMMUNIQUE POINTED OUT THAT STOCKS IN SAIGON WERE PLentiful
AND THAT THEREFORE SPECULATORS AND HOARDERS WOULD BE ULTIMATELY
RUINED AS MINISTRY COULD DECIDE TO LOWER PRICE WITHOUT WARNING.

PUBLIC REACTION TO KHANH'S ASSUMPTION EMERGENCY POWERS STILL
DEVELOPING. ON BASIS OF SMALL, QUITE INCOMPLETE SAMPLE EMBOFFS
HAVE FOUND CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT FOR MOVE. PEOPLE SEEM AGREED
THAT GRAVE SITUATION DEMANDS AND DESERVES STRONG MEASURES ON
PART OF GOVERNMENT TO GUARANTEE SECURITY. BUDDHIST LEADER
TRI QUANG, IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, NOT CONCERNED WITH DICTATORIAL
THREAT DECREES POSED, SEEMED INCLINED TO ACCEPT THEM.
HIS MOST INTERESTING OBSERVATION WAS EXPRESSED DOUBT AS TO WHETHER
KHANH ACTUALLY POSSESSED ENOUGH POWER ENFORCE THEM.

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-2- 356, AUGUST 8, 11 P.M., FROM SAIGON

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 33A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THICH QUANG LIEN (SOUTHERNER) IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION EXPRESSED
APPROVAL OF DECREES AS NECESSARY STEPS IN VIEW OF SITUATION.
DIRECTOR, MINORITIES OFFICE, WHICH COMES ADMINISTRATIVELY
UNDER DEPPRIMIN HOAN, WAS HEARTILY IN FAVOR OF DECREES, SAW
THEM AS EVIDENCE OF STRENGTHENED LEADERSHIP. THIS CONTRASTS
WITH RECENT OPINION IN WHICH SAME MAN FELT KHANH HAD TO GO
IF PROGRESS WERE TO BE MADE IN WAR AGAINST VC.

ONLY NEGATIVE NOTE HEARD TO DATE WAS FROM PHAM DANH LAM,
FORMER FONMIN. WHILE HE DID NOT SEEM OBJECT TO PRINCIPLE OF
ALERT DECREES, HE FEARED THEY, AND ESPECIALLY CURFEW, WOULD
INDUCE ALARM AMONG GENERAL POPULACE. FOR THIS REASON, HE FELT
KHANH'S DECLARATIONS UNWISE. AT SAME TIME, SOME VIETNAMESE
WHO EXPRESSED FAVORABLE REACTION TO DECREES ALSO EXPRESSED
CONCERN AT POPULAR ATTITUDE IF FIRM US RPT US RESPONSE TO
DRV PROVOCATION AND GVN EMERGENCY DECREES WERE NOT FOLLOWED UP
BY ENERGETIC POSITIVE STEPS TO PROSECUTE WAR.

EMBASSY COMPILING ATTITUDES OF KEY GROUPS REGARDING RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS, WHICH WILL BE REPORTED WHEN AVAILABLE. GP-4

TAYLOR

BT

CFM GP-4

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 10:23 P.M. AUGUST 8, 1964

PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 8-8-64 - 11:25 P.M.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

68

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Action

Control: 6402
Rec'd: AUGUST 8, 1964
6:35 AM

SVN

Info

FROM: SAIGON

SS

ACTION: SECSTATE 351 PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE 29 PRIORITY
DOD 38 PRIORITY
CIA 32 PRIORITY

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INFO: PARIS 33 PRIORITY
CINCPAC 168 PRIORITY
MOSCOW 8 PRIORITY

DATE: AUGUST 8, 5 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPT PASS USIS

TO COUNTER SOVIET AND POTENTIAL FRENCH STATEMENTS THAT US DESTROYER PATROLS IN TONKIN GULF ARE "HOSTILE", DEPT MIGHT CONSIDER HAVING SPOKESMAN, EITHER OPENLY OR ON BACKGROUND, POINT OUT THAT USSR NAVAL VESSELS CONFIGURED AS TRAWLERS OPERATE CONSISTENTLY ALONG US AND WESTERN EUROPEAN COASTS AT TIMES MOVING MUCH CLOSER TO SHORELINE THAN HAVE TONKIN GULF PATROLS.

TAYLOR

KEA

NOTE: PASSED USUN PER S/S-O, 8-8-64, 6:49 AM.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 8-8-64, 6:43 AM.

NOTE: PASSED USIA, 8-8-64, 6:55 AM.

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PP RUOTLN RUEHCR RUEHDT RUFGWP
DE RUMJIR 14A 091340Z
PR 091334Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUOTLN/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUFGWP/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUSSAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
RUMJNO/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUEHDT/USJN
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

006992
1964 AUG 9 AM 11 340

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Sec. 4/2/78
By Shw NARS, Date 5/10/78

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT PRIORITY (365) INFO VTINE 29 LONDON 32
PARIS 37 BANGKOK 31 OTTAWA 9 NEWDELHI 11 MOSCOW 10 PHNOM
57 HONKONG 51 USJN 36 CINCPAC 178 FROM SAIGON AUG 0,9 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

IN OUR REPLY TO DEPTTEL 378 WE ARE TAKING HIGHLY NEGATIVE
POSITION ON COURSE OF ACTION OUTLINED THEREIN. SINCE OUR REASONING
IS BASED IN LARGE MEASURE ON CONSIDERATIONS OF EXTREMELY SENSITIVE
NATURE, WHICH CLOSELY HELD, OUR REPLY NOT RPT NOT BEING SENT
ALL ADDRESSEES OF DEPT TEL.

TAYLOR
BT

CFN 365 29 32 37 31 9 11 10 57 51 36 178 9 9 9 10 378

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 2:42 pm 8/9/64
Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 6:50 pm 8/9/64

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OSD	USIA	NSA
19		3
		NSC
		6

47

A-112

NO.

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : HUE, HONG KONG for Gard

1964 AUG 12 PM 4 21

RM/AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

DATE: August 10, 1964

FROM : Amembassy SAIGON

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation.

REF :

The Embassy forwards herewith the following memoranda of conversation:

Conversation with Pham Dang Lam, Foreign Affairs Adviser to Chief of State (Former Foreign Minister).

Conversation with Tri Quang, Buddhist leader.

For the Ambassador:

Melvin L. Manfull

Melvin L. Manfull
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

Enclosures *1*

As stated.

FORM DS-323

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL:JBurke:rgb 8/10/64

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL:MIManfull

Cles es:

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc* NARA, Date *3-21-01*

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Enclosure 1
A-112 from Saigon

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Pham Dang Lam, Foreign Affairs Adviser to Chief of State
(Former Foreign Minister)
Charles C. Flowerree, Embassy Officer

DATE: August 7, 1964

In a brief conversation before dinner Mr. Lam expressed himself on the momentous developments of the preceding days in the following vein.

He did not criticize General Khanh's Emergency Decree which had just been promulgated, but indicated some reservations. He said he had not been to the press conference and asked me to fill him in on what had gone on. The announcement of the 11 p. m. curfew (one of the first practical results of the decree) had just come over the radio and Mr. Lam was mildly critical of this measure. He said that there had been only a slight degree of anxiety among the population during the past few days, but the imposition of a curfew would probably cause many people to become alarmed and on balance the harm it did to the general morale outweighed the possible benefits to security.

Turning to the events in the Gulf of Tonkin, Lam said that reactions had been almost universally favorable. He thought that, to the average man, the U. S. air strike on North Vietnam had provided the first glimmer of hope that the end of the war might be in sight. There was, of course, a danger that the South Vietnamese people might become overly optimistic. He did not think that most people feared reprisal bombings from the DRV or the Chinese Communists, but said that they were concerned that the Viet Cong might take action to cut off the flow of essential supplies to Saigon, especially food.

Lam commended the U. S. for its handling of the whole Gulf of Tonkin affair, saying that our response had been just right. He was pleased that we had chosen targets which did not endanger large segments of the civilian population. (Lam is a southerner and has no relatives now in the North.) He hoped that the U. S. would not take any further initiatives against North Vietnam as long as the Security Council was discussing the recent events, unless, of course, the DRV again deliberately provoked us.

Lam indicated he would like to continue our conversation after dinner. Unfortunately dinner was not over until ten minutes before the curfew began which gave him an excuse to grumble again about the measure.

POL:CCFlowerree:ek
8/10/64.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: The Venerable Tri Quang, Buddhist Leader
JDRosenthal, U.S. Embassy

TIME & PLACE: August 8, 1964 - An Quang Pagoda

Tri Quang's views on recent events were expressed as follows:

1. U.S. Attack on North Vietnam

Quang said the attack on North Vietnam proved U.S. determination and was approved by all Buddhist leaders as well as the population. However, he noted that because it was only in response to open provocation, he feared that the North Vietnamese and Red Chinese would not provoke the U.S. again but would step up the war in the South in retaliation instead. In this case, U.S. air and sea power could not be applied to pressure the North. Quang felt this represented a significant danger now and hoped the Embassy was aware of the need to take proper defensive measures here in the South.

2. General Khanh's Emergency Decrees

Quang said he himself could see the need for such decrees at this time, although the people in general probably feared the sweeping powers Khanh had taken into his hands. Quang noted popular reaction would probably be to wait and see what use Khanh makes of his power. If he uses it properly, Quang could see no great problem. However, if he uses it to suppress legitimate criticism and to protect wrongdoers in his government, then the reaction could be quite serious and of great benefit to the Communists. Quang mentioned Khanh's handling of current abuses of Buddhists by local authorities in Central Vietnam (see below) as a possible test case of the GVN's intentions.

Quang himself believed Khanh was not clever or strong enough to enforce the new decrees effectively. Khanh ran great risk of getting himself ousted if he cracked down hard on certain people; Quang mentioned General Do Cao Tri in this regard. The next several weeks would be most dangerous, Quang believed, particularly if there is popular revulsion against Khanh, which would certainly weaken the anti-Communist effort. When asked what he thought was necessary to avoid this, Quang replied Khanh should undertake "a revolution" which would oust all the old Diemists and former Can Lao party members, particularly in the countryside. Only this would satisfy the people and restore confidence in GVN authority.

Quang did note the decrees would permit Khanh to prevent student demonstrations which were aimed at creating diplomatic difficulties for the GVN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and the U.S. Quang gave as an example the student sacking of the French Embassy, inspired as he believed by Catholic circles out to embarrass the U.S. and give the French a cause celebre here.

3. Anti-Buddhist Incidents

Quang expressed his concern over the rash of alleged anti-Buddhist incidents in Central Vietnam. He stated these were the work of Can Lao remnants still in positions of local authority at the district and village level. What was particularly disturbing was the failure of the GVN to punish any of the wrongdoers. Quang said officials and other elements who had killed innocent people should be tried and executed if necessary rather than simply transferred to another position elsewhere. (He mentioned a former district chief in Binh Dinh who had been removed a few months ago for anti-Buddhist activities and had reportedly been promoted to Major and named Deputy Province Chief in Khanh Hoa.) He said a man like Do Cao Tri, for instance, should be brought to trial.

Quang said the GVN could not cover up these misdeeds on the part of local authorities and expect the people to support the anti-VC fight. He claimed among those responsible for the policy of transferring rather than punishing such officials were "Catholic Dai Viets" like Nguyen Ton Hoan and Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu. According to Quang, these and others had been mentioned as the culprits by Tam Chau in the Buddhist Association's recent investigation on the incidents in Quang Nam.

Quang noted Tam Chau was supposed to go to Central Vietnam today to investigate further. I remarked that General Khanh had gone there himself to try to settle the situation. Quang did not comment but reiterated the necessity for punishment of guilty parties.

4. Information on VC Involvement

Quang stated these incidents did not involve VC incitement but admitted the possibility existed in other cases. However, the Buddhists were always able to get information from the local people if the VC were involved. Quang remarked he had his own informal intelligence system which, for instance, had just informed him that five top VC leaders in Quang Ngai--including "a very high VC official"--had been killed about a month ago in GVN operations; he knew no more details but believed VC activity in Quang Ngai had recently declined as a result.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6B

71

IN COMMERCE

TO RUMPA/CINCPAC

INFO RUE/LA/JCS
EN/ANEMB SAIGON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB, NARS, Date 4/20/76

~~SECRET~~ EXCLUSIVE MAC J3 8149

EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL SHARP AND GENERAL WHEELER FROM WESTMORELAND

IMPROVEMENT US POSTURE SVN

- CINCPAC 050549Z.
- CINCPAC 120320Z.

IN VIEW OF THE RECENT MADDON INCIDENT INVOLVING IRRATIONAL
 CTS BY THE DRV THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS REVIEWED THE MILITARY POSTURE
 OF THIS COMMAND IN CONSIDERATION OF PROSPECTS OF EXCALATION OF THE
 CONFLICT BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN.

RECOGNIZE THAT THE RECENT AIR STRIKES AGAINST NVN WERE IN
 RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC PROVOCATION AND DO NOT REFLECT A DECISION
 AT THIS TIME TO EXECUTE FURTHER OPERATIONS AGAINST DRV. HOWEVER,
 FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE DRV AND CHICOMS THEY WERE OVERT U.S.
 ATTACKS.

THE CHICOMS HAVE ALREADY REACTED BY THE MOVEMENT OF AIR ELEMENTS
 INTO THE DRV. IF THE DRV ATTEMPTS TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE, THEIR
 MOST LIKELY REACTION WILL BE ON THE GROUND INASMUCH AS THIS IS THE
 AREA OF THE GREATEST DRV STRENGTH AND CONSIDERING THE CURRENT
 SECURITY SITUATION IN SVN IS THE GREATEST VULNERABILITY HERE. IF
 THE DRV/CHICOMS DO NOT TAKE OFFENSIVE ACTION AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE
 RECENT AIR STRIKES AGAINST NVN PORTS, WE DEEM IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT
 THEY WOULD DO SO IN RETALIATION FOR INITIATION OF CATEGORY II OR III

CT.....J3-2 (1-42)

- CJCS-2 (3-4) DJS-3 (5-7) SJCS-3 (3-10) J4-1 (11) J5-1 (12)
- SECDEF-1 (13) DIA-1 (14) NMCC-1 (15) JRG-1 (16) CSA-6 (17-22)
- CSAF-6 23-28) CNO-6 (29-34) CMC-6 (35-40) RRA-1 (41)
- FILE-1 (42) (1-42) KLH

ADVANCE COPIES TO: CJCS, NMCC

#59

ATTN OFFICER	PAGE OF PAGES	DATE NO.	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
KLH	1	MACJ3 8149	150123 Z AUG64

FORM 13
1 DEC 63

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PAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

DENSE (ACTION)

MESSAGE (INFO)

OPERATIONS UNDER OPLAN 33. THEY ARE PROBABLY NOW PREPARING THEIR MILITARY POSTURE SO AS TO GIVE THEM SUCH A CAPABILITY.

• THERE ARE THREE POSSIBLE MODIS OF GROUND ACTION BY THE RV RELATING TO RVN:

A. AN OVERT ATTACK SOUTH ACROSS THE DMZ AND AROUND THROUGH LAOS. THIS WOULD EXPOSE THE DRV TO AIR ATTACK AND IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED UNLIKELY.

B. THE PATTERN OF INFILTRATION COULD BE INTENSIFIED AND THE CURRENT TEMPO OF VC ACTIVITY STEPPED UP IN THE FORM OF SABOTAGE, TERRORISM AND ATTACKS. THIS MAY BE THE COURSE OF ACTION SELECTED BY THE DRV BUT IT DOES NOT AFFORD THEM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SATISFACTION OF A CLEAR CUT REPRISAL.

C. ENTIRE UNITS OF THE PAVN COULD BE INFILTRATED ON AN INTENSIVE SCALE PROBABLY WITH UNIT DESIGNATIONS CHANGED AND IN VC UNIFORMS BUT OTHERWISE MAINTAINING UNIT INTEGRITY. THIS INFILTRATION COULD TAKE PLACE ACROSS THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND THROUGH THE LAOTIAN PAN-HANDE. FORCES EQUIVALENT TO DIVISION STRENGTH COULD BE THUS INFILTRATED AND MARSHALLED TO LAUANG THAM OR THUA THIEN AND COULD MAKE A SUDDEN AND VIOLENT DESCENT UPON DA NANG AND FUE OR BOTH, WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING. AN ATTACK AT DA NANG COULD BE HIGHLY DESTRUCTIVE AND WOULD REPRESENT A DIRECT BLOW AGAINST A MAJOR US AIR BASE. THE JCS CONSIDERS THIS AS THE MOST PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION AND STATES THAT THE VC MAY HAVE PREPARATIONS WELL ADVANCED AT THIS TIME. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO INTELLIGENCE AT THAT THE VC ARE MAKING PREPARATIONS TO EXECUTE THIS COURSE OF ACTION AT THIS TIME, WE DO GIVE THEM THE CAPABILITY.

• A SIGNIFICANT STEP UP IN THE SCOPE AND PACE OF VC OPERATIONS, WHICH IS ENTIRELY WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITY, COUPLED WITH SUBSTANTIAL REINFORCEMENT BY INFILTRATION COULD CREATE A MILITARY SITUATION AT TIMES AND PLACES OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF THE RVNAF TO HANDLE. IT IS THE CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT OF MACV AND JCS THAT LITTLE MORE THAN THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE ARVN DIVISION COULD BE WITHDRAWN AT THIS TIME FROM SECURITY AND PACIFICATION WITHOUT SERIOUS LOSS OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER VAST AREAS AND THEIR POPULATIONS. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED FROM A U.S. POINT OF VIEW ABOUT THE SECURITY OF THE DA NANG, BIEN HOA AND TAN SON NHUT AIRBASES, ALL OF WHICH ARE NOW LOADED WITH U.S. AIRCRAFT AND NONE OF WHICH ARE DEFENDED TO OUR SATISFACTION.

ATTN OFFICER	PAGE OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION
2	3	DATE NO. MACJCS 8149 DTG 150123Z AUG 64

FORM NO. 10-100-100

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT STAFF OF STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

4. AS AN IMMEDIATE MEASURE MACV HAS COMPLETED SECURITY SURVEYS OF DA NANG, BIEN HOA AND TAN SON NHUT. STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN WITH THE GVN TO REINFORCE AND IMPROVE AIRBASE SECURITY. THE 6TH ABN BN HAS BEEN DEPLOYED TO DA NANG FOR THIS PURPOSE.

5. IN LIGHT OF THE OVERALL SITUATION AND RECENT RETALIATORY ACTIONS, I BELIEVE IT PRUDENT TO TAKE CERTAIN STEPS TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL MILITARY POSTURE IN VIETNAM, AND THEREFORE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING:

A. PREPARE THE FOLLOWING UNITS FOR DEPLOYMENT ON-CALL IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK ON DA NANG WHICH BY COMUSMACV TO BE BEYOND THE CAPABILITY OF RVNAF TO HANDLE OR A DECISION TO EXECUTE OPERATION PLANS (CATEGORY III OPLAN 37 AND OPLAN 99) LIKELY TO CAUSE RETALIATORY ACTIONS AGAINST SVN:

(1) A BLT TO DA NANG (DESIRED REACTION TIME WITHIN 5 HOURS).

(2) THE REMAINDER OF THE MET AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER.

(3) THE 173RD ABN BDE (OR 2D BDN, 25TH DIW TO TAN SON NHUT, BIEN HOA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. (REQUEST REACTION TIMES OF THESE UNITS.)

B. DEPLOY THE FOLLOWING UNITS TO SVN ASAP:

(1) LOGISTIC UNITS (TROOP LIST TO FOLLOW) FOR BUILDING A SMALL LOGISTIC COMMAND WITHIN USASCV--CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE COMBAT TROOPS IN SUB-PARA A. ABOVE AND OF ESTABLISHING AN UP-COUNTRY (I.E., OUTSIDE SAIGON) COMMON-USER RETAIL LOGISTIC SYSTEM NOW NOT IN EXISTENCE BUT REQUIRED IF U.S. FORCES ARE TO BE INCREASED. DEPLOYMENT MUST INITIATE NOW TO ASSURE LOGISTIC PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE RECEIPT OF U.S.

(2) ONE SIG CMBT AREA BN, TOE 11-85E (MINUS ONE CO, 11-87D FOR REASONS COMPARABLE TO THOSE CITED IN (1)).

(3) ONE MARINE AND TWO ARMY HAWK BNS, V AS PROPOSED REF B, FOR DEFENSE OF SAIGON COMPLEX, DA NANG, AND NHA TRANG. CONSIDERING THE U.S. INVESTMENT IN THESE AIRBASES AND THEIR CRITICALITY TO THE ENTIRE OPERATION HERE, THESE UNITS WILL BE NEEDED OVER THE LONG TERM FOR AIR BASE DEFENSE, IRRESPECTIVE OF AIRCRAFT POPULATION AT ANY GIVEN TIME.

DUTY OFFICER

PAGE OF PAGES

SITE NO.

MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

3

4

MACJ3 8149

DTG

150123Z AUG 64

FORM NO. 10-1 DEC 63

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MESSAGE

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE (ACTION)

PRECEDENCE (INFO)

7. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH AMBASSADOR TAYLOR WHO DOES NOT CONTEST THE MILITARY LOGIC BUT WITHHOLDS HIS RECOMMENDATION AT THIS TIME.

GP-4

51

DUTY OFFICER

PAGE OF PAGES

MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

CITE NO.

DTG

4

4

MACJS 8149

150123Z AUG64

FORM NO.
DD FORM 1300

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: ☐ COLLECT
LARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

08644

72

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AUG 17 - 4 33 PM '64

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy PARIS

908

Info:

FOR LODGE FROM FORRESTAL

EXDIS

Ref Embtel 909

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978

By MB, NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

Am having several Saigon cables repeated you giving Saigon's assessment events over week-end and am also asking Saigon repeat policy cables to you.

No basis for press statements re "new formula" nor preparations regarding NVN. These stories probably refer to joint U.S./GVN council for implementation pacification program set up several weeks ago. FYI only: Joint planning for contingencies between MACV and GVN military authorized several weeks ago. George Roberts can give you background. END FYI.

At first blush new government arrangements seem improvement in giving Khanh somewhat more control, but we do not have full details on hx changes civilian ministers.

END

RUSK

MF

S/VN;MVForrestal:caw 8/17/64

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Michael V. Forrestal - S/VN

Clearance:

S/S - Mr. Davies

~~TOP SECRET~~

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73

8

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

74

41

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Control: 20742
Rec'd: JULY 26, 1964
2:57 A.M.

SS

Info

FROM: COMUSMACV

ACTION: SECSTATE MAC SOG 6938 IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
CIA IMMEDIATE
JCS IMMEDIATE
OSD IMMEDIATE

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 08-31
By 128, NARA, Date 1-22-09

INFO: CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

33(b)(1)

AMERICAN EMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
CAS SAIGON IMMEDIATE

DATE: DTG 260443Z JULY

SECSTATE EXCLUSIVE FOR FORRESTAL

OSD EXCLUSIVE FOR MCNAMARA AND ANTHIS

WHITE HOUSE EXCLUSIVE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY

CIA EXCLUSIVE FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND HELMS

JCS EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL WHEELER

AMERICAN EMBASSY SAIGON EXCLUSIVE FOR AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, SULLIVAN

CINCPAC EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL SHARP

OPLAN 34A SPOT REPORT

1. OVERFLIGHT (AIROPS)

A. RESUPPLY OF IN PLACE TEAM BELL (ACTION 55) WAS

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- MAC SOG 6938, DTG 260443Z JULY, FROM COMUSMACV

SUCCESSFULLY AIR DELIVERED TO AREA VJ574139 ON 25/1655Z.
SIX SUPPLY BUNDLES WITH CLOTHING, FOOD, MEDICINE, BATTERIES
AND AMMUNITION FOR A THREE MONTH PERIOD.

B. DURING OVERFLIGHT EXECUTED PIGGYBACK WITH PSY OPS
MISSION COVERING ACTIONS 5, 7, AND 9. 100,000 STRATEGIC,
279,600 TACTICAL LEAFLETS AND 600 GIFT KITS WERE DROPPED.
ESTIMATED LEAFLET GROUND ARRIVAL AREA COORDINATES 22-08N
105-06E TO 21-42N 105-15E TO 21-33N 105-05E.

2. LOKI III JUNK CAPTURE (MAROPS)

A. THE FOLLOWING MAROPS CRAFT AND PERSONNEL SUCCESSFULLY
PARTICIPATED IN THE CAPTURE PHASE OF LOKI III ON THE NIGHT OF
25-26 JULY:

CRAFT	MISSION	CREW	OFFICERS	OTHERS
PTF 4	ESCORT	VN	VN	NONE
PTF 5	ESCORT	VN	VN	NONE
SWIFT 2	TOW	VN	CHINAT	NONE
SWIFT 3	TRANSPORT	VN	CHINAT	6 BIET HAI AND 2 VN INTERPRETERS

B. LOKI III LAUNCHED AT 250100H AND CAPTURE OF ONE DRV VESSEL
AND FIVE PERSONS EFFECTED APPROX 17-50N/106-40E
AT 251830H. JUNK TOW ATTEMPT ABANDONED DUE TO ATTACK FROM
2 ENEMY CRAFT.

C. ALL MAROPS CRAFT RETURNED TO DANANG. CAPTIVES PRESENTLY
AT INTERROGATION SITE WITH INTENTIONS TO RELEASE
THEM AFTER A 36 HOUR PERIOD. MAROPS AMPLIFYING DETAILS
WILL FOLLOW.

GP-3.

SMD/23

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 3:08 A.M., JULY 26.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

75

41

Action

55

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

PP RUECH RUEKDA RUEPDA RUEPIA RUHPA
DE RUMSMA 111 25/0205Z

P 250153Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUECH/SECSTATE, WHITEHOUSE

RUEPDA/OSD

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEKDA/JCS

INFO

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPA/CINCPAC

ZEN/CAS SAIGON

BT

02031715
1964 JUL 25 AM 1 54

PRIORITY

3.3(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT TIGER EXCLUSIVE MAC SOG 6886

SPECAT TIGER

EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR FORRESTAL, OSD FOR MCNAMARA AND
ANTHIS, WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE,
CARTER AND HELMS, JCS FOR GEN WHEELER, INFO AMEMB
SAIGON FOR AMB TAYLOR, SULLIVAN, CINCPAC FBR ADM SHARP
OPLAN 34A SPOT REPORT

1. SEVEN MAN REINFORCEMENT TEAM CODE NAME PERSEUS
(ACTION21) TO AUGMENT IN-PLACE TEAM TURBILLON WAS
SUCCESSFULLY AIR DELIVERED TO AREA VJ300/160 ON

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 111 ~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
24/1706 JULY. SIX SUPPLY BUNDLES WERE DROPPED WITH EQUIPMENT
TO ENABLE THE TEAM TO CONDUCT PSY/OPS SABOTAGE
MISSIONS.

2. DURING OVERFLIGHT EXECUTED PIGGYBACK PSY/UK ION
COVERING ACTIONS 5, 7, AND 9. 2,100 STRATEGIC, 144,000
TACTICAL LEAFLETS AND 300 GIFT KITS WERE DROPPED. ESTIMATED
LEAFLET GROUND ARRIVAL ARE COORDINATES 1850N 69508E TO
1907N 10502E.

GP-1

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 1:58 a.m., July 25

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI/RAC DB-31

By 12 NARA, Date 1-22-89

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PERMANENT RECORD COI

51
Action

SS
Info

~~TOP SECRET~~

76.

009153

PP RUEHC
ZFH 1

DE RUMSMA 195 10/1015Z
P 101005Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE

RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE

RUEPDA/OSD

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUHPA/

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPA/CINCPAC

ZEN/CAS SAIGON

BT

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 08-32

By NARA Date 8-17-09

33

(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

MACSOG 7669 LINDIS TIGER

TIGER LINDIS EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR FORRESTAL, OSD FOR MCNAMARA AND ANTHIS, WHITE HOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND HELMS, JCS FOR GEN WHEELER, INFO AMEMB FOR AMB TAYLOR, SULLIVAN, CINCPAC FOR ADM SHARP.
OPLAN 34A SPOT REPORT

1. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM RADIO HANOI INDICATES THAT TEAM LOTUS PARADROPPED 19 MAY 64 WAS CAPTURED. CORRECT NAMES OF TEAM MEMBERS WERE LISTED AS HAVING BEEN TRIED 4 AUG. SENTENCES WERE DEATH FOR ONE, LIFE FOR ONE AND 10-20

YEARS FOR REMAINING FIVE.

2. IN VIEW ABOVE FACTS, PLAN TO CLOSE OUT ALL ACTION ON THIS TEAM. GP-1.

BT

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77

~~TOP SECRET~~

59
Action

55
Info

021402

1961 JUL 27 PM 2 56

CRF 176
OO RUEHCR
ZFH1
CZC IEM757 DIC500V OKS704MXB051VV MAD377
OO RUEHC RUEPCR RUEPIA RUEPDA RUEKDA
DE RUMSMA 146 27/1110Z

0271035Z
FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPDA/OSD
RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC
RUHPA/██████████
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
BT

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 08-32

By *isl* NARA, Date 8-17-09

3.3
(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT MAC SOG 6986
TIGER SPECAT EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR FORRESTAL, OSD FOR
MCNAMARA AND ANTHIS, WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY,
CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND HELMS, JCS FOR GEN WHEELER,
INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB TAYLOR, SULLIVAN, CINCPAC
FOR ADM SHARP.

OPLAN 34A AMPLIFYING REPORT

A. COMUSMACV 260443Z

B. COMUSMACV 250153Z

1. REPORT AMPLIFIES AIROPS/AIRBORNE OPS AND

PAGE 2 RUMSMA 146 ~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT
MAROPS SPOT REPORTS REFS A AND B.

A. AIROPS/AIRBORNE OPS:

(1) ON 260830Z BELL REPORTED RECEIVING RE-
SUPPLY BUNDLES. CONTACT SUSPENDED TEN DAYS TO
PERMIT CACHING OF SUPPLIES.

(2) TOURBILLON REPORTED 250830Z MAKING
CONTACT WITH MEMBER OF PERSEUS. IS SEARCHING FOR
REMAINDER OF PERSONNEL AND BUNDLES. WILL ADVISE WHEN
ASSEMBLY COMPLETED.

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GPO 867-149

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- BTG 271035Z, JULY, FROM COMUSMACV

B. MAROPS SPOT REPORT AMPLIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) JUNK CAPTURE TOOK PLACE 17-43/
106-41E. SELECTED 2 JUNKS FISHING TOGETHER. MANY
JUNKS NOTED TOWARD SHORE. TWO DRV JUNKS FISHING
TOGETHER (WITH NETS BETWEEN THEM) CHALLENGED BY
PTF 5. ONE JUNK BOARDED 1840H TAKEN IN TOW BY
SWIFT AT 8 KNOTS SPEED UTILIZING 5 BIET HAI AS
CREW. SECOND JUNK SET ADRIFT AFTER CREW REMOVED
BY SWIFT 3 CREW. SWIFT 3 DEPARTED FOR BASE 1900H.
TOTAL 7 HAND MADE GERNADES AND 11 CAPTIVES TAKEN FROM
JUNKS.

PAGE 3 RUMSMA 146 ~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT

(2) TWO ENEMY PATROL BOATS SIGHTED VISUALLY
1910H AT WHICH TIME TWO CUT, BIET HAI CREW REMOVED
SAFELY AND JUNK LEFT IN SINKING CONDITION. PTF'S
POSITIONED THEMSELVES BETWEEN SWIFTS AND ENEMY CRAFT
2.5 MILES ASTERN AND CLEARED AREA TO EAST AT 26 KNOTS
VERSUS ENEMY 22 KNOTS. PHOTOS ENEMY CRAFT OBTAINED.
DRV CRAFT BROKE OFF CHASE 1930H AFTER FIRING APPROX
20 ROUNDS UNDETERMINED CALIBER. NO HITS SUFFERED BY
OUR FORCES. PTF 4, CLOSER OF TWO ESCORT CRAFT,
RETURNED FIRE.

(3) REMAINDER TRIP NORMAL WITH FORCE IN COMPANY
TO 17TH PARALLEL WHERE SWIFT 3 PROCEEDED PHOENIX SITE
TO OFFLOAD CAPTIVES, REMAINDER ACTION FORCE PROCEEDING
DANANG. SWIFT 2, AND PTF'S ARRIVING DANANG 0220H, SWIFT 3
AT 0330H. INTERROGATION UNDERWAY PHOENIX SITE WITH RETURN
CAPTIVES SCHEDULED APPROX 271430H.

(4) RESULTS INTERROGATION WILL BE FORWARDED ASAP.

GP-
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 3:30 PM, 7/27/64.

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State**78*

48

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

AAE121VV MAD908

SS

PP RUEPDA RUEPCR RUEPIA RUEKDA RUHPA RUENC
DE RUMSMA 176 28/0420Z

Info

P 280351Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEHC/SEC STATE ✓

RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE

RUEPDA/OSD

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUHPA

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPA/CINVCAC

ZEN/CAS SAIGON

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT [MAC SOG 7005]TIGER EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR FORRESTAL, OSD FOR
MCNAMARA AND AN THIS, WHITE HOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY,
CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND HELMS, JCS FOR GEN WHEELER,
INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB TAYLOR, SULLIVAN, CINCPAC
FOR ADM SHARP.

OPLAN 34A SPOT REPORT

A. MACSOG 6319 DTG 190217Z

TEAM EASY/21 REPORTS ON 270850Z MAKING CONTACT ON
26 JULY WITH ALL OF TEAM PISCES.

GP-1

BT

PRIORITY

*1/22**3.3
(b)(1)*

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 08-32

By *isl* NARA, Date *8-17-09*

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41.

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Action

SS

Info

PP RUEHC RUEPCR RUEPIA RUEKDA

DE RUNEMA 198 29/0345Z

P. 290321Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE

RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE

RUEPDA/OSD

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUHPA/

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPA/CINCPAC

ZEN/CAS SAIGON

BT

22963

JULY 29, 1964

6:15 AM

PRIORITY

011

3.3

(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT TIGER MACSOG 7060

EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR FORRESTAL, OSD FOR MCNAMARA AND ANTHIS, WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND HELMES; JCS FOR GEN WHEELER, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB TAYLOR, SULLIVAN, CINCPAC FOR ADM SHARP OPLAN 34A SPOT REPORT

NINE MAN TEAM CODE NAME BOONE, ACTION 21, SUCCESSFULLY DELIVERED AT VF925850 ON 28/1840Z JULY. SIX SUPPLY BUNDLES DELIVERED WITH TEAM. MISSION OF TEAM IS TO CONDUCT PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND SABOTAGE ACTIONS IN THE AREA OF ROUTE 7 EAST OF CUA RAO TO INCLUDE BRIDGES AT VF525250 AND VF 670175.

GP-1

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 6:26 AM JULY 29, 1964

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLI/RAC 08-32

By is NARA, Date 8-17-09

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34
Action

~~SECRET~~

SS
Info

002058

1964 AUG 4 PM 12 38

CRF606
*****ZZ RUEHCR
DE RUEPCR 113 04/1629Z
Z 041628Z
FM JCS
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE
RUEPIA/CIA
RUEPCR/NSA
RUECEM/CMC

Z O 041607Z
FM CINC PAC
TO RUMSNA/COMUSMACV
INFO RUEKDA/JCS
RUHLHL/CINCPACFLT
RUMGZN/CTG 77.5
RUMGZN/CTG 77.6
RUATZL/COMSEVENTHFLT
BT

~~SECRET~~

1. RECALL ALL RVN PTF'S TO DANANG ASAP. DISCONTINUE
34A MAROPS THAT MAY BE IN PROGRESS. GP-3

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 12:47 P.M., 8-4-64.

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER SS

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By *ring*, NARS, Date *4/15/77*

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CRD766

39
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28
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00 RUEHC
DE RUMSMA 073 04/1000Z
O 040955Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE
RUEPDA/OSD
RUEKDA/JCS
RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE
INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC
RUHPA/CAS HONOLULU
ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON
BT

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By JB NARS, Date 4-20-76 003166

1964 AUG 5 AM 10 41

013

~~TOP SECRET~~ SPECAT TIGER EXCLUSIVE MAC SOG 7358.
STATE FOR FORRESTAL, OSD FOR MCNAMARA
AND ANTHIS, WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE,
CARTER AND HELMS, JCS FOGYGEN WHEELER, INFO AMEMB SAIGON
FOR AMB TAYLOR, SULLIVAN, CINCPAC FOR ADM SHARP.
PLAN 34A SPOT REPORT

1. FOLLOWING CRAFT AND PERSONNEL LAUNCHED ON MAROPS MISSIONS
32 AND 45C NIGHT OF 3-4 AUGUST:

OFFICERS

CRAFT AND MEN	OTHERS	MISSION
PTF 1	VN 57MM TEAM	CAPE VINH SON RADAR (32)
PTF 5	VN 57MM TEAM	CAPE VINH SON RADAR (32)
PTF 2	VN HYTUMM TEAM	RON SECURITY POST (45C)
PTF 6	VN 57MM TEAM	RON SECURITY POST (45C)

A. ALL CRAFT LAUNCHED 031610H. PTF'S 1 AND 5 PROCEEDED TO
FIRING POINT OFF CAPE VINH SON COMMENCING FIRE 2400H EXPENDING
APPROX 770 ROUNDS 40MM AND 57MM WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. CEASED
FIRE 040025H. BOTH CRAFT RETURNED HOME BASE BY 0720H WITH NO
ENEMY CONTACT.

B. PTF 2 SUFFERED SUPERCHARGER CASUALTY 1845H AND RETURNED
AT REDUCED SPEED TO BASE AT 2110H. PTF 6 PROCEEDED TO A POINT OFF
CUA RON. COMMENCED ILLUMINATION AND BOMBARDMENT OF TARGET AT 032352H
CEASING FIRE 040002H. AMMO EXPENDED INCLUDED 60MM (ILLUMINATING),
57MM, 40MM AND 20MM. ONE BURST SMALL ARMS FIRE FROM NORTH BANK
CUA RON, NO HITS SUSTAINED. RON SECURITY POST EASILY VISIBLE AND
BELIEVED HEAVILY DAMAGED, WITH SEVERAL FIRES IN EVIDENCE UPON
WITHDRAWAL. PURSUED ENEMY PATROL CRAFT FROM 0020H TO 0100H
WHICH WAS TRACKED AT SOA 20-25 KTS. RANGE EASILY OPENED WITH
NO EXCHANGE OF FIRE. REMAINDER TRIP HOME BASE ROUTINE; RETURNED
AT 0625H.

C. AIR PHOTO RECON BEING PROVIDED.

GP 4
BT

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 11:27 a.m. 8/5/64

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36

Action

CONFIDENTIAL

34A

SVN

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PP RUEHCR

DE RUMJIR 36A 07/1235Z

P 11230Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC

STATEXNRC

BT

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY 343 AUGUST 7, 8:35 PM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State Ltr. 4/7/78

5 4 2 8

By

Shaw

NARS, Date

5/10/78

1964 AUG 7 AM 9 15

FOLLOWING HAS APPEARED ON ASIAN NEWS SERVICE UPI DATED WASHINGTON, AUGUST 7 (UPI)

BEGIN TEXT. A HIGH STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGED THURSDAY NIGHT THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE GUNBOATS MAY HAVE ATTACKED TWO NORTH VIETNAMESE ISLANDS A DAY OR TWO BEFORE THE FIRST COMMUNIST ASSAULT ON THE U.S. DESTROYER MADDOX. CFN 343 7

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 36A CONFIDENTIAL BUT HE SAID THE AMERICAN WARSHIP WAS AT LEAST 60 MILES AWAY AT THE TIME AND "HAD NO PART WHATEVER IN ANY SUCH ACTION."

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. BUNDY DID NOT DIRECTLY CONFIRM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS, WHICH HANOI CLAIMED TOOK PLACE LAST FRIDAY. HE DID HOWEVER, THAT "ASSUMING THE REPORT WAS CORRECT, THE SUBSEQUENT COMMUNIST TORPEDO BOAT ASSAULT ON THE MADDOX DID NOT COME FOR AT LEAST 24 HOURS AFTERWARD." END TEXT.

REQUEST GUIDANCE.

GP-3 TAYLOR

BT

CFN 60 2

(GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O AT 10:40 AM, 8/7/64. PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA AT 11 AM, 8/7/64.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

84

41

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action
SS CONTROL: 5063
RECEIVED: AUGUST 7, 1964, 12:48 A.M.

Info
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 332 IMMEDIATE
DEFENSE 32 IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE 24 IMMEDIATE

DATE: August 7, NOON

DECLASSIFIED
STATE letter OCT 11 1978

EXDIS

Authority
By *ing*, NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

FOR RUSK FROM TAYLOR

DOD FOR MCNAMARA, WHITE HOUSE FOR BUNDY

AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE HAVE SUSPENDED ACTIONS UNDER OPERATION PLAN 34-A IN ORDER TO AVOID CONFUSING SIGNALS ASSOCIATED WITH RECENT EVENTS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. THE JCS RPT JCS HAS NOW RPT NOW ASKED CINCPAC TO RECOMMEND A DATE FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THESE ACTIONS. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, MARITIME OPERATIONS COULD BE RESUMED ABOUT AUG 10. AIR OPERATIONS, WHICH DEPEND UPON THE MOON PHASE, COULD BE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN AUG 17.

FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, I CANNOT RPT CANNOT JUDGE THE TOTAL POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM RESUMPTION OF THESE ACTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. IN GENERAL, I WOULD EXPECT THAT, UNLESS THE DRV RPT DRV OBTAINS JET FIGHTERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AIR OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE PRINCIPALLY RE-SUPPLY DROPS AND PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS DROPS COULD BE RESUMED WITH THE MOON PHASE ON AUG 17. HOWEVER THE MARITIME OPERATIONS, WHICH INCLUDE TWO OR THREE BOMBARDMENTS FROM SHIP TO SHORE, AS WELL AS JUNK CAPTURES, COULD ADVERSELY INTERFERE WITH ACTION UNDERWAY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ELSEWHERE. I THEREFORE HESITATE TO CONCUR IN ANY RECOMMENDATION BY MACV RPT MACV TO CINCPAC THAT THESE MARITIME OPERATIONS RECOMMENCE AS EARLY AS AUG 10 WITHOUT KNOWING WASHINGTON'S PLANNING IN THE LARGER POLITICAL ARENA.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS MY CONVICTION THAT WE MUST RESUME THESE OPERATIONS AND CONTINUE THEIR PRESSURE ON NORTH VIETNAM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, LEAVING NO RPT NO IMPRESSION THAT WE OR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE BEEN DETERRED FROM OUR OPERATIONS BECAUSE OF THE TONKIN GULF INCIDENTS. I WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE YOUR COLLECTIVE GUIDANCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 332, August 7, noon from Saigon

WHICH YOU CAN PERCEIVE FROM THE WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVE.
SINCE THE BOATS EMPLOYED IN THE MARITIME OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN
DISPERSED AND SHOULD BE REASSEMBLED AT THEIR MAIN BASE AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE, I WOULD APPRECIATE AN EARLY RESPONSE.

GP-1.

CFN 32 24 34-A 10 17 17 10

TAYLOR

Note: Advance copy to S/S-O at 3:01 a.m. August 7, 1964
Passed CIA at 3:02 a.m. August 7, 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

IN DATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ AGE TO

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Classification

04045

85

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Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 379

Info:

EXDIS

Embtel 332

1. All here agree we should hold off further OP 34A operations and review situation early next week. Meanwhile we will be reviewing whole gamut operations against NVN with particular view to those most justifiable in terms of activity against South Viet-Nam. Would welcome any recommendations you have under this rough guideline.

2. Assume you know photography 6 August revealed six MIG 15/17 at Phuc Yen Airfield. MACV should consider whether this affects risk factor any planned air ops.

GP-1

RUSK

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter OCT 11 1978

By isg, NARS, Date JUL 30 1979

OK/R

Drafted by:

FE:WPBundy:mk:ej 8/7/64

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

The Secretary (subs)

S/S - Mr. Moose

White House - Mr. Bundy (subs)

DOD - Secretary McNamara (subs) S/VN - Mr. Forrestal

xxx

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AIRGRAM

POL 27 VIETS

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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	10	3
OSD	USIA	NSA
19	8	3
	NSC	
	6	

A-329

UNCLASSIFIED

TO : Department of State
Info: Saigon

1964 AUG 10 PM 12 23

HANDLING INDICATOR

IN / AN
ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH

FROM : American Embassy, Paris

DATE: August 8, 1964

SUBJECT: Press Story on US Support for SVN Guerilla Operations in North

REF :

Writing on the front page of Le Monde of August 7, Georges Chaffard, a generally strongly anti-American writer on Viet Nam, charges that since 1957 "US special services have encouraged and supported guerilla operations" against NVN

According to Chaffard, the initial efforts were aimed solely at helping to provoke the fall of the Hanoi Government. A "Presidency Liaison Service" was established with a number of Americans heading it. Within it "Section 45" (including four American advisers) was trained for operations in the North. Soon there was also set up "Intergroup for Observation Number 1" for the recruitment of Tonkinois for special missions. Training took place in Nha-Trang, and the best trainees were then sent to Formosa or Guam for further polishing. The effort remained minimal, however, until 1961, when the objective was changed to the disorganization of the military and economic potential of the North. Although almost all agents were parachuted in, one frogman group was introduced by boat in 1962. Two out of every three operations, however, were failures.

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

John A. Bovey, Jr.
John A. Bovey, Jr.
Counselor of Embassy

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: POL:JPMoffat:ae:8-7-64

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:JABovey, Jr.

nces:

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NEA

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Action

Info

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 364 PRIORITY
DOD 40 PRIORITY
WHITE HOUSE 30 PRIORITY
CIA 33 PRIORITY

CONTROL: 6993 001
RECD: August 9, 1966
11:07 a.m.

INFO: CINCPAC -177

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Hx 6/9/75

DATE: AUGUST 9, 10 PM

By NIE NARS, Date 10/20/76

REFERENCE: DEPTTEL 379; EMBTEL 285

EXDIS

1. WE WILL SUSPEND ALL OP 34-A ACTIONS UNTIL WE RECEIVE WORD FROM WASHINGTON FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF REVIEW OF SITUATION PLANNED FOR EARLY THIS WEEK. MIG 15/17 DEPLOYMENT NORTH VIETNAM WILL ADD SOME RISK TO AIR AND SEA OPERATIONS BUT, IN VIEW OF LACK OF ANY KNOWN NIGHT INTERCEPT CAPABILITY, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT RISK FOR NIGHT OPERATIONS AND DAY-LIGHT ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

2. LANGUAGE OF REF DEPTTEL INTERPRETED HERE TO INVITE RECOMMENDATIONS BEYOND SCOPE OF 34-A OPERATIONS. ON THAT ASSUMPTION, WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. MAINTAIN DESTROYER PATROLS IN GULF OF TONKIN AND EXECUTE CONTINUING AIRSWEEPS INTERNATIONAL WATERS WITH AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE DRV BOATS AND AIRCRAFT UNDER RELAXED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE RECENT ATTACKS OF THE DRV ON US VESSELS.
REVIEW FOR POSSIBLE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS
B. AND C. OF EMBTEL 285.

B. AFTER TALK WITH KHANH EARLY THIS WEEK, BEGIN US ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS IN LAOS PANHANDLE, PROGRESSIVELY ATTACKING MOST CLEARLY IDENTIFIED INFILTRATION INSTALLATIONS. THESE MISSION SHOULD HAVE AUTHORITY TO STRIKE SPECIFIED FIXED TARGETS, TO ATTACK ROAD TRAFFIC IN SPECIFIED AREAS AND TO CONDUCT FIRE-SUPPRESSIVE ATTACKS WITH APPROPRIATE ORDNANCE AGAINST ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES AS NJDED. ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT REGARDING FLIGHTS WOULD STRESS THE NEED TO PROTECT OUR RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS AND AVOID ANY OTHER COMMENT ON OPERATIONS.

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-2- 364, AUGUST 9, 10 AM. FROM: SAIGON.

C. EXECUTE APPROPRIATE INCREMENTS (PARTICULARLY AGAINST TARGETS RELATED TO INFILTRATION) OF CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST NVN AFTER COMPLETING FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

- (1) SET FORTH PUBLICLY AND EFFECTIVELY THE EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED INFILTRATION AND CONTROL FROM NVN.
- (2) COMPLETE NECESSARY JOINT PLANNING WITH KHANH.
- (3) ESTABLISH EVIDENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION OF PROVINCES AROUND SAIGON TO WARRANT UNDERTAKING NEW MILITARY COMMITMENT.

IF THESE THREE CONDITIONS ARE MET, IT PROBABLY MEANS TARGET DATE FOR BEGINNING 37-64 OPERATIONS ABOUT 1 JANUARY 1965.
GP-1. TAYLOR

ON 40 30 33 177 379 285 1. OP 34-A MIG 15/17 2. 34-A A.
B. C. 285 B. C. 37-64 (1) (2) (3) 37-64 1 1965 GP-1

~~TOP SECRET~~