

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
65a	cable	State 902 to Seoul - sanitized, 5/91 dup., #1337, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "NODIS-LOR, Volume 2B," Box 46	TS	2	3/27/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, NSC Histories

Folder Title "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 2"

Box Number 40

Restriction Codes

(A) Closed by Executive Order 13526 governing access to national security information.

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4/11/2014

Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 10

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#54b memo [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	CIA secret <i>sanitized</i> to Copper re Vietnam <i>added to file 10-4-75</i> (duplicates #184a in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 31) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	<i>open 4-11-14</i> 03/22/65 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	A [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
#54a memo	C to Mac re attachment <i>open 4-11-14</i>	4 p undated	C

FILE LOCATION
 National Security File, NSC History
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 2

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#41a memo	JCS top secret (gp 1) to SecDef from Gen. Wheeler	1 p 03/06/65	A
#50a-1	JCS top secret to SecDef from Gen. Wheeler	14 p	
report	Report of Survey of the Military Situation in RVN (partial duplicate of #189 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 31)	05/15/65	A
#64a memo	JCS top secret (gp 3) to SecDef from Gen. Wheeler	2 p 03/27/65	A
#64a-1 report	JCS top secret ICSM-221-65	15 p 03/--/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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National Security File, NSC History
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 2

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	78-616		
	TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT FOR CONSULTATION		
#7a memo	WH secret <i>Exempt - nsc 9-4-79</i> to president from McG. B. <i>OPEN 8/1/96 NY 96-2082 p</i>	02/19/65	A
#40a memo	WH secret <i>open 3-16-87 NLS 86-230</i> to president from Frank McG. B. <i>4 p</i> (duplicates #204 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 31)	03/06/65	A + φ
#68a memo	WH conf <i>agen 9-25-79 imp</i> to president from McG. B. <i>2 p</i>	03/31/65	A
#74a memo	WH secret " to president from McG. B. <i>2 p</i>	01/27/65	A

"C" restriction removed 8-1-86

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National Security File, NSC History
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 2

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#72b memo	TO STATE DEPT FOR CONSULTATION WH top secret <i>open 1-25-80 imp</i> discussion points 5 p (duplicates #235 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	04/01/65	a
#74b memo	WH top secret to president from Bundy 13 p (duplicates #118 and 118a in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 27) <i>open 6-9-86 NSC 11-10-76 letter</i>	02/07/65	A

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 National Security File, NSC History
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 2

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#45a memo	TO OSD FOR CONSULTATION WH to Bundy from Cooper (duplicates #120 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 30)	03/09/65	A
#49c memo	Memorandum for discussion, 3/16 (duplicates #192 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 31)	03/16/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSC History
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 2

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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60810

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2a cable	<i>(dup of #15, NSF, CF, VN, NODIS, Vol I LB), Box 45)</i> state top secret <i>sanitized 2-1-80</i> 1744 to Saigon	<i>open 4-11-14</i> 2 p 02/17/65	A
#3a cable	state 2665 from Saigon top secret	1 p 02/19/65	A
#4a cable	state top secret 1757 to Saigon	1 p 02/19/65	A
#8a cable	state top secret 2685 from Saigon	1 p 02/20/65	A
#9a cable	state top secret (gp 1) 1783 to Saigon	2 p 02/20/65	A
#10a cable	state top secret (gp 3) 771 to Seoul, et al	2 p 02/20/65	A
#11a cable	state top secret (gp 1) 653 to Canberra	<i>Example - State 6-26-79</i> 2 p 02/20/65	A
#12a cable	state top secret 2698 from Saigon	<i>open 2-1-80</i> 1 p 02/22/65	A
#16a cable	state top secret <i>Downgraded to Secret per NLS 85-75 Sanitized 9-20-85</i> 2711 from Saigon (section 1 of 2)	4 p 02/23/65	A <i>NLS 85-75</i>
#17a cable	<i>(duplicates #96 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 29)</i> state top secret (gp 3) <i>Downgraded to Secret per NLS 85-75 - sanitized 9-20-85</i> 2711 from Saigon (section 2 of 2)	2 p 02/23/65	A <i>NLS 85-75</i>
#18a cable	state top secret (gp 3) 1805 to Saigon	<i>open 2-1-80</i> 2 p 02/23/65	A
#22b report	state top secret <i>Sanitized State 7/1/76, open 1-24-85</i> Vietnam <i>open 7-30-85 NLS 85-75</i>	8 p 02/23/65	A
#24a cable	state top secret (gp 1) 5327 to London	<i>open 2-1-80</i> 2 p 02/24/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#31a cable	state top secret <i>open 1-28-86 NLS 85-221</i> 1848 to Saigon	1 p 02/28/65	A
	<i>(duplicates #79 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 29)</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF, NSC History
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 2

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#32a cable	<i>open 4-11-14</i> state top secret (gp 1) <i>Example per State 6-26-79</i> 699 to Wellington 1 p	03/02/65	A
#34a cable	state top secret <i>open 2-1-80 ip</i> 2820 from Saigon 1 p	03/02/65	A
#35a cable	state top secret " 2821 from Saigon 1 p	03/03/65	A
#36a cable	state top secret " copy of 2822 from Saigon 1 p	03/03/	A
#37a cable	state top secret (gp 1) <i>sensitive 2-1-80 ip</i> 1876 to Saigon <i>open 4-11-14</i> 1 p	03/03/65	A
#39a cable	state top secret (gp 1) <i>sensitive 2-1-80 ip</i> 1885 to Saigon <i>open 4-11-14</i> 1 p	03/04/65	A
#44a cable	state top secret <i>sensitive 2-1-80 ip</i> 2888 from Saigon <i>open 4-11-14</i> 2 p	03/08/65	A
#49b cable	state top secret <i>open 1-25-80 ip</i> 3003 from Saigon 5 p (duplicates #188b in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 31)	03/17/65	A
#55a memo <i>Downgraded to Confidential per NLS 85-221</i>	state top secret (gp 1) <i>sensitive 1-28-86 NLS 85-221</i> to SecDef, et al from Wm. Bundy 5 p (duplicates #182 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 31) <i>open 4-11-14</i>	03/23/65	A
#65a cable	state top secret (gp 3) <i>sensitive 2-1-80 ip</i> 902 to Seoul <i>Sensitive 5/91, 4-11-14</i> 2 p <i>dup #137, NSF, CF, Vietnam "NODIS-LOR, Vol. 2B," Box 46</i>	03/29/65	A
#66a memo	state top secret to Rusk, McNamara, Bundy from Wm. Bundy 2 p (duplicates #159 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 31)	03/28/65	A <i>open 4-11-14</i>
#67a cable	state] top secret (gp 1) <i>sensitive 2-1-80 ip</i> 931 from Seoul 8 p <i>open 4-11-14</i>	03/30/65	A
#70a report	state top secret <i>open 4-11-14</i> re Vietnam 10 p (duplicates #151 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 31)	03/31/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#78a report	state top secret <i>open 2-1-80 ip</i> subjects for discussion 1 p	04/03/65	A

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NSF, NSC History
Deployment of Major US Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 2

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#33a cable	State secret (gp 1) <i>open 4-11-74</i> 2569 from Moscow	2 p	03/02/65 A
#38a cable	state secret (gp 3) <i>open 8-31-79 sig</i> Deptel 1881 to Saigon	2 p	03/03/65 A
#43a cable	state secret <i>open 6-28-79 sig</i> 2889 from Saigon	2 p	03/08/65 A
#53a cable	state secret " 2052 to Saigon	1 p	03/22/65 A
#56a cable	state secret 3066 from Saigon	1 p	03/23/65 A
#57a cable	state secret <i>open 4-11-74</i> 2781 from Moscow	2 p	03/23/65 A
#58a cable	state secret (gp 3) <i>open 6-28-79 sig</i> 2067 f to Saigon	2 p	03/23/65 A
#60a cable	state secret " 3073 from Saigon	2 p	03/24/65 A
#62a memo	state secret <i>open 1-25-80 sig</i> to Rusk, McNamara, McG. Bundy from Wm Bundy (duplicates #163 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 31)	1 p	03/26/65 A
#71a cable	state secret <i>open 4-11-74</i> 3178 from Saigon (duplicates #100 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	1 p	04/01/65 A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#77a cable	state secret (gp 3) <i>open 1-25-80 in B</i> 2171 to Saigon 2 p (duplicates #134 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	04/02/65	A
#80a cable	state secret 3219 from Saigon <i>open 4-11-74</i> 1 p (duplicates #87 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 32)	04/04/65	A
#18a cable	state secret <i>open 6-28-79 in B</i> 2720 from Saigon 2 p	02/23/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a cable	OSD <i>DSD 11-1-78 letter</i> top secret (gp 1) Security Situation in RVN	2 p 02/18/65	A
#13a cable	OSD top secret 2699 from Saigon	4 p 02/22/65	A
#14a cable	OSD top secret XXXXXX 36860 (duplicates #13a)	5 p undated	A
#15a cable	OSD top secret (gp 3) MAC JOO 5515	2 p 02/24/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#29a cable	OSD top secret (gp 3) MACJOO 6127	2 p undated	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#49a cable	OSD top secret copy of Saigon 3003	3 p 03/16/65	A
#51a cable	OSD top secret (gp 3) MAC JOO 5153	2 p 03/18/65	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE


You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 11, 2014

1

61



1a

31607
31607

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

~~TOP SECRET~~

1824/18/JCS136/R-12/
VV PHB009VV PAG063
OO RUEKDA
DE RUEKA 2218 18/0213Z
O P 180210Z
FM CINCPAC
TO RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMKR/CINCUSARPAC
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
BT

READD:WH/ST/CIA/NSA/SAC/STRIKE #359

35
AC
2E

21. 04 08Z

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SECURITY SITUATION IN RVN (U)

A. COMUSMACV J3 4999 DTG 171820Z (NOTAL)

B. COMUSMACV J5 4614 DTG 141412Z (NOTAL)

1. CINCPAC CONCURS IN COMUSMACV'S ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY SITUATION IN RVN AS OUTLINED PARA 1 REF A AND IN THE SELECTION OF DANANG; SAIGON/BIEN HOA/VUNG TAU COMPLEX AND NHA TRANG/CAM RANH BAY IN THAT ORDER AS PRIORITY AREAS FOR FUTURE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. COMBAT FORCES.

2. IN REF B, COMUSMACV STATED THAT MEB SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO DANANG NOW FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. US/GVN INVESTMENT AT DANANG AB KEYSTONE OF CURRENT COMBINED EFFORT TO INCREASE PRESSURES ON DRV THROUGH REPRISALS, YANKEE TEAM, BARREL ROLL AND 34-A OPNS.

B. VULNERABILITY TO MAJOR DRV INFILTRATION EFFORT. DANANG IS FIRST CHOICE OF COMUSMACV AND RVNAF AS LIKELY TARGET FOR EXTRAORDINARY INFILTRATION/ATTACK EFFORT BY VC/DRV.

ACT...J3-6 (1-6)

INFO...CJCS-2(7-8) DJS-3(9-11) SJCS-3(12-14) J1-1(15) J4-2(16-17)

J5-2(18-19) SACSA-5(20-24) DIA-4(25-28) NMCC-2(29-30) SAMAA-1(31)

SECDEF-5(32-36) ISA-9(37-45) PA-1(46) CSA-2 (47-48) CSAF-2(49-50)

CNO-2(51-52) CMC-5(53-57) WHITE HOUSE-3(58-60) FILE-1(61) ADV CYS TO OS

J3- NMCC

EX COPY DJS-4(62-65) SJCS-2(66-67) CJCS-2(68-69) AGENDA 18 FEB 65

EX COPY NMCC-1(70) CMDR HENSON 19 FEB 65

EX CY: DJS-1 (71) (;THOMPSON) 24 FEB 65. OT

G1

(AGENDA) CJCS-2 (72-73) DJS-4 (74-77) SJCS-2 (78-79) 24 FEB 65. OT

PAGE 1 OF 2

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 11-1-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-26-79

R-1

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

C. QUESTIONABLE INTEGRITY OF SOME RVNAF TROOP ELEMENTS AS DEMONSTRATED DURING RECENT PRE-TET PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-GVN/US DEMONSTRATIONS.

D. ABILITY OF RVNAF TO REPEL ALL OUT VC/PAVN EFFORT TO NEUTRALIZE BY INSURGENT TYPE ACTION DANANG AB AND ITS US/GVN ASSETS IS QUESTIONABLE.

3. CONCUR WITH COMUSMACV'S ASSESSMENT DESCRIBED IN PARA 2 ABOVE. THE ASSESSMENT CLEARLY ILLUSTRATES DANANG TO BE A MOST PROFITABLE TARGET FOR VC AND, IN MANY WAYS, A MOST CONVENIENT ONE. IN THIS CONNECTION, I CONSIDER THAT THE VC NOW HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO UNDERTAKE SABOTAGE ON THE AIRFIELD, LAUNCH 57 MM RECOILLESS RIFLE AND/OR MORTAR ATTACKS FROM OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER AND TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK IN BATTALION STRENGTH.

4. IN VIEW OF THE VULNERABILITY OF DANANG, CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT WE ACT RATHER THAN REACT. IF WE ACT QUICKLY BY ESTABLISHING FORCES OF VISIBLE CAPABILITY IN THE AREA, CONSIDER THAT IT WILL HAVE A DETERRENT EFFECT ON THE CALCULATIONS OF THE VC/DRV. HOWEVER, IF WE DEFER AND AWAIT THE OCCURRENCE OF A TRAGEDY, THE REACTION EFFORTS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE TO BE MUCH GREATER IN SCOPE. OUR POSTURE FOR ACTION NOW IS EXCELLENT IN THAT TWO BLTS ARE CURRENTLY AFLOAT OFF THE COAST OF RVN AND BY AIR/SEA LIFT WE CAN QUICKLY BUILD THE FORCE AT DANANG INTO AN MEB AND THEN RECONSTITUTE THE SLF. WITH DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH A FORCE, BELIEVE THE LIKELIHOOD OF VC/DRV ATTACK OF THE DANANG COMPLEX WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED. THEREFORE, CONCUR WITH COMUSMACV THAT FORCES AT DANANG SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO MEB STRENGTH ASAP. COMUSMACV IS OBTAINING AMB TAYLORS THOUGHTS THIS SUBJECT TODAY.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS PERTINENT TO DEPLOYMENT OF COUNTER MORTAR AND GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR ARE BEING SUBMITTED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.

6. DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY MILITARY POLICE BATTALION IS PENDING DECISION HIGHER AUTHORITY. RECOMMEND EXPEDITE DEPLOYMENT BY AIRLIFT FROM CONUS RESOURCES.

7. THE 1ST MARINE BRIGADE IS EMBARKED IN AMPHIB SHIPPING IN HAWAII, ITS PARTICIPATION IN EXERCISE "SILVER LANCE" HAS BEEN CANCELLED AND IT IS HELD IN READINESS FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT TO WESTPAC. IN THE EVENT THE 9TH MEB IS LANDED AT DANANG, RECOMMEND THESE FORCES DEPLOY TO OKINAWA/JAPAN.

GP -1
BT

REF A IS JCS IN 31201 B IS JCS IN 28615

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31607

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

62

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

09867

2a/s

FEB 17 6 42 PM '65

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE.

1744

Info

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

British Ambassador has informed me that they have just yesterday been approached by Soviet Foreign Office raising the possible reactivation of UK-USSR co-chairmanship of 1954 Conference. British apparently expect that next Soviet step might be to propose a joint statement by two Co-Chairmen on bombings in North Viet-Nam as reported to Co-Chairmen by regime in Hanoi. Interest of Soviet Government in co-chairmanship, though not yet confirmed, might also reflect some relief for Moscow regarding dilemma in which they may find themselves in dealing with Hanoi, Peiping and Southeast Asia issues. It may prove desirable for us to provide to UK and USSR full statement of facts as we see them, US purposes in Southeast Asia and our concept of necessary solution. Further message to you would spell this out in more detail. We would stop short of ourselves proposing formal systematic negotiations but assumption of 1954 co-chairmanship by two governments would imply that they might themselves explore with interested

Drafted by:

S:DRusk:fr 2/17/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

For The Secretary

Clearances:

White House - McGeorge Bundy *WMB*

DOD - Secretary McNamara *WMB*

S/AL S/AL

Ambassador Thompson

Mr. Read

DECLASSIFIED

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

Authority *NEJ 94-375*
By *Cb/ty*, NARA, Date *4-8-11*

Classification

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

governments possibilities of solution, which we could encourage or otherwise as we see fit. If message is made to two Co-Chairmen, which would be made public, it may mean that better procedure would be to present full documentation on North Viet-Nameese aggression to UNSYG in writing for circulation to members rather than make oral presentation in meeting of Security Council which might require Soviets to act as defense counsel for Hanoi.

Obviously, this has bearing on timing of next strike. Hope to be in touch with you within next several hours on our further reflection on this problem. Do not believe a Thursday strike therefore feasible because of this time factor and because these possibilities have not been explored here at highest level.

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

3

63

Copy given Bundy

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

003

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL: 16714
RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 19, 1965, 6:10 A.M.
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2665 FLASH
DATE: FEBRUARY 9, 7 P.M.

3a
F
S

~~TOP SECRET~~

N O D I S

DEPT PASS CINCPAC FLASH INFO 1615 FROM SAIGON
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

IN VIEW OF EVENTS IN SAIGON THIS AFTERNOON, I RECOMMEND
CANCELLATION OF AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST DRV SCHEDULED FOR
20 FEBRUARY. GENERAL WESTMORELAND CONCURS.

CFN DRV 20

Also CINCPAC

DECLASSIFIED

TAYLOR

RNL/AF

Authority STATE letter JUN 26 1979

By *ip*, NARS, Date 2-1-80

NOTE: NOT PASSED CINCPAC AS SAIGON'S 1615 BY OC/T.

*Because McNamara on Hill, Gen. Wheeler asked
Rush to clear with CBS stand down of strike
as recommended by everyone in field and here.*

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4

64

#1

W.H.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

0388

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Classification

4a

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON FLASH 1757

Info:

INFO: CINCPAC FLASH
CIA FLASH
OSD FLASH
WHITE HOUSE FLASH
JCS FLASH

FEB 19 10 05 AM '65

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NO DIS

Saigon's 2665

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

Your recommendation accepted and air operations
scheduled for 20 FEB cancelled.

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter JUN 26 1979
By if, NARS, Date 2-1-80

Rov

Drafted by:

FEL Under: hjh 2/19

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - Mr. Hilliker

Clearance:

APB

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TOP SECRET

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65

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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5a

February 19, 1965

~~TOP SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: The Vietnam Crisis -- One Dove's Lament

Last week I sent Chet Cooper a brief note (attached) in which I raised some questions that disturbed me after reading your report to the President. Nothing that has happened in the intervening days has reassured me on these questions. Indeed, a number of developments, most especially last night's attempted coup d'etat, have increased my doubts and concern.

I have assumed that the proposed policy of sustained reprisals seeks to achieve two objectives: (a) to stiffen the spine, morale, and sense of unity of the South Vietnamese and thereby induce greater political stability; and (b) to signal our determination, and our willingness to inflict increasingly heavy damage, to the Hanoi regime and its supporters. I have also sensed that where doubts might exist on the attainability of either one of these objectives, the reprisal track has been considered justifiable on the basis of the other objective alone. Thus, even though I have seen no intelligence estimates (including that of February 18th) which conclude that Hanoi would "call off its dogs" in response to a sustained reprisal track, I assume that the track has nonetheless commended itself to the Administration as a means to achieve stability through sustained euphoria in Saigon.

I would judge that last night's coup attempt has seriously undermined our argument for the therapeutic effect in the South of air strikes against the North (although I suspect some may argue that the coup occurred as the result of our failure to make further air strikes earlier this week). Certainly the wide-spread public impression of air strikes as a desperation move -- as a substitute for political stability in Saigon -- will be compounded by this most recent power grab.

I continue to believe that a policy of sustained reprisals against the North entails greater risks than we have any right to take in terms of our world-wide interests. Not so far down the track, given the factors of North Vietnamese and Chinese aircraft, U.S. rules of

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority NSC 2/24/76
By MIE, NARS, Date 4/19/78

engagement, Peiping's paranoia, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty, is the strong possibility of a ground war with China -- a war in which we do not have the wherewithal to achieve any meaningful "victory" even if our people and our allies allowed us to take on the Chinese armies for a long ground struggle.

The only rational alternative remains negotiation. In this regard the much-abused gentlemen of the NEW YORK TIMES and several thoughtful members of the President's own party on the Hill have been doing their duty persistently over the past two weeks and have been speaking truth -- oversimplified as it may sometimes sound, and hard as it may be for us to bear. What concerns me most deeply in the course of this period has been the polarization of political and press opinion in the absence of a clear and comprehensive message from the top of the Government. If we have many more speeches like those of Dodd and Dirksen yesterday, the option of negotiation will become far more difficult -- through its repeated equation with appeasement and sell-out (and ultimately, treason.)

In my view, it is therefore imperative -- before the lines of public debate tighten even more severely -- that the President be responsive to the initiatives of U Thant, the Pope, and the thoughtful press; and that we be specifically responsive through secret channels by exploring actively the possibilities for a negotiated solution with the British, the Russians, and other intermediaries. (In this regard I should note that we have a Warsaw conversation with the Chinese scheduled for next week.) As far as I can judge, we have failed to do any significant exploration of Hanoi's actual private terms for a settlement. And although several able individuals at State and elsewhere have put their minds to the specifics of a realistic U. S. negotiating position, the Administration has made no concerted effort to staff this out with any of the care and vigor given to target-selection and the like.

It seems to me vital that we not lose our perspective: in South Vietnam we have slipped into a gross overcommitment of national prestige and resources on political, military, and geographic terrain which should long ago have persuaded us to avoid such a commitment. Our national interest now demands that we find ourselves a face-saving avenue of retreat -- that we marshal our imaginations and those of other powers -- to discover such an avenue.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

I may well misunderstand the thrust and subtleties of the sustained reprisal track; but I get no sense that it is currently directed toward the discovery of such an avenue. I should add, finally, that I obviously have not been privy to all that has been in train this week; and for all I know some aspects of the preceding analysis may well be part of your current planning and actions.


James C. Thomson, Jr.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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February 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Comments on Vietnam for your newspaper visitor

1. The situation today in Saigon

Our reports are still fragmentary and the matter is not yet sorted out, but appearances are that this was an effort by Catholics and conservatives to get rid of Khanh by taking control of his person and of several other strategic points in Saigon. Since they failed to capture Khanh, my own guess is that the whole effort will fall and that the Armed Forces Council will keep Khanh and gradually reassert authority with little, if any, bloodshed. But of course there could be more explosive results. The intended victor in this enterprise was General Khiem, the Ambassador here, and he has now made public statements which will obviously cost him his job if Khanh wins.

It is of course always possible that the armed forces will somehow bargain this out and that Khanh might lose his job without Khiem winning it. It may take some days to tell just how this one is going to come out. It could make the armed forces more or less unified depending on the skill and firmness of the individuals concerned.

2. Negotiations

The pressure for negotiations is coming mostly from people who simply do not understand what that word means in Asian ears right now. If the U. S. proposes negotiations or even indicates a desire for them, the word in Saigon will be that we are getting out. And the consequences of that rumor would be very severe for our whole position.

So we are planning to act quietly and firmly, and to stick to a policy: that we are helping these people to help themselves and that we are acting appropriately against a sustained and dangerous aggression of a very complex and difficult sort.

At the same time, when the appropriate occasion comes, we will be more than ready to state our position, and our cases, and our purposes

-2-

and our objectives. There is no secret and will be no secret about our policy. And nobody wants a peaceful settlement more than we do.

McG. B.

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~~SECRET~~

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February 19, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Couve de Murville at 11:30 this morning

1. Obviously the dominant topic is Southeast Asia and especially South Vietnam. Couve takes the immediate military disturbance calmly, although he obviously feels that it reinforces his own conviction that there is not, and cannot be, any workable government in a situation of "American occupation." He professes to think there is a possibility of such a government after a political settlement and an American withdrawal, but he produces no evidence whatever to support the notion that such a government would be anything but Communist.

2. Couve told me that he thought we had decided on "escalation" and that he was very fearful of the results. This is what he has told others and I think it is what he honestly believes. I pointed out that no one had more experience of negotiation and of the settlement of political differences than you, and that our current lack of interest in negotiation should not be construed as willful insistence upon a violent solution. Couve readily admitted -- and indeed volunteered -- the opinion that you are a very prudent man and that you have made no mistakes since November 1963 -- "a remarkable achievement."

3. I pointed out to Couve that just a year ago today he had suggested to Bohlen in a private talk that we might have to take further military action before we would be in a position to negotiate. He did not deny that he had said this (the cable is at Tab A). He simply said that he thought it was now too late for such measures. In his own view the dangers of action beyond the 17th Parallel outweighed any possible return, and he thought we would do better to limit our attention to the South. I told him that you more than any other man in the government were insistent upon a maximum effort in the South, but that we also had to take account of the very heavy role and responsibility of Hanoi and of the problem of morale which is created when there is increasing violence against our people and the Vietnamese, and no visible response.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-208

By lig, NARA, Date 7-1-96

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

All this was standard back and forth. I then tried to make a more important and less obvious point -- without much success. I told him that we did not think it was helpful for the French to make public calls for a conference. He said that this was no more than a restatement of their own well-known position. I said that any restatement was a political act, especially at a moment of tension. I told him that I thought the French might have to choose between having a real private diplomatic role in these matters and taking the posture of public disapproval of what an ally was doing. I did not see how they could do both. Couve said that France aspired to no private role and that we could not object if the French stated their honest opinion. This was the only sign of heat which he displayed in the whole meeting.

My conclusion is that Couve honestly does not think we can avoid defeat in South Vietnam. This is of course a comforting conclusion for a Frenchman for obvious reasons. He is not troubled by the shifting of the power balance in Southeast Asia because France has no ambitions there, and he is a Frenchman through and through. He does think there is real danger in any "escalation", and since this danger might affect Europe and France, his worry is not pretense. He will be reassured by anything you choose to tell him about your own care and watchfulness. I think he will also see the value of the argument that anything we do now will be designed to be essentially continuous with our policy of insistent support for action in the South and very careful and moderate and measured naval action, air patrol, and so on in other areas.

McG. B.

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- (62) Br. Amb. informs of approach by USSR on co-comm. role.
- (72) Talk w/ Aueris re "possible intro. signif. ground forces northern SVN for security or pre-emptive purposes"
- (73) Taylor - reservations about deployment of ground forces.
- (75) " " " " " " " "
- (84) UK/Soviet gambit - delay in strikes
- (85) Proposed announcement of new strikes
- notes Vung Ro arms ship capture on 2/16
- (88) - 2/26 - Decision to increase Marine force at Danang.
- (89) Westwoodland asks authority to use U.S. aircraft to reinforce VNAF or to support V-N forces as he judged prudent.
- (92) US-Aus. - NZ mtg. ^{at CINCPAC} proposed re troops to SVN
- (98) Possibility of 'internat'l combat force' (3/3/65)
- * (100) M. Bundy memo on new policy
- 102 JCS favor use of U.S. jets vs VC in SVN
- 108 Gen. Johnson's recommendations (3/14/65)
- (109) ~~109~~ Taylor's - pro's & cons of a US Division in V-N
- 110 - M. Bundy memo for Tues. Lunch (3/16) - 3/16/65 - current problems (notes air strikes alone won't pressure Hanoi to quit)
- 111 - JCS Survey of Mil Situation (17 Mar. 65) - Gen. Johnson's recommendations + Pres.'s decisions
- 122 LBJ Statement - 3/25/65
- 125 JCS Air Strike Program - 12-Wk, 27 Mar. 65
- 126 Message to Seoul - re possible buildup

McCone Memo to Pres. 2 Apr. 65

Check - Vol. II

- Text - Pres's statement of 2/17/65
"continuous actions..."
- Saigons 2789 - 2/28/65
missing pages -
- Pres. mtg - 2/26/65
- Meeting at W.H. (w/ Amb. Taylor, Rusk et al) - Sat. after 3/26/65
- * - April 1 W.H. Mtg - decision to assign troops to combat

- 127 B. Bundy memo on Taylor recommendation 3/28
- 128 ROK reaction (Emb. estimate) - 3/30
- 129 MB. memo to Pres. re talks w/ Taylor 3/31
- 132 " " " " for Apr. 1, 65 Mtg.
- Policy in V-N
- " toward peace moves.
- US + 3rd Cnty forces.
- 133 JCS message - decision on mil. deployment
- Marine mission expanded to C-Inaug. Combat
- * 134 McCona urges harder air strikes vs DRV
including industry. April - no date
- * 135 McCona's April memo on same
- 138 Checks list of items Amb. Taylor to discuss w/ GVN +
get concurrence - incl. 20,000 troops/men 3 Apr 65
- 139 List of U.S. decisions - 4/3/65

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 17963
RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 20, 1965, 4:38 A.M.

Info

FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2685 IMMEDIATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 20, 5 P.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

N O D I S

DEPT PASS IMMEDIATE FOR INFO FROM SAIGON: DOD 470 WHITEHOUSE
370 CIA 350 CINCPAC 1630

EMBASSY TELEGRAM 2665 AND DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 1757.

AS INTERNAL SITUATION HERE NOW APPEARS RAPIDLY TO BE STABILIZING,
I RECOMMEND THAT WE CARRY OUT NEXT REPRISAL STRIKES ON DRV
DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22 SAIGON TIME.
GENERAL WESTMORELAND CONCURS. AS FOR TARGETS, I CONCUR IN
CINCPAC'S RECOMMENDATION TO JCS (DTG 191933Z) FOR TWO TARGETS
(WITH ALTERNATES FOR EACH) ONE FOR VNAF AND ONE FOR US
AIRCRAFT. I ALSO CONCUR WITH CINCPAC THAT IF IN ADDITIONAL
TARGET IS DESIRED FOR US AIRCRAFT, IT BE SOUGHT NORTH OF
18TH PARALLEL ON PRINCIPLE THAT VNAF SHOULD BE GIVEN SPECIAL
CONSIDERATION FOR TARGETS SOUTH THEREOF.

CFN 470 370 350 1630 2665 1757 DRV 22 WESTMORELAND
CINCPAC JCS DTG 191933Z VNAF US 18TH VNAF

TAYLOR

RNL

NOTE: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES BY OC/T

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STATE letter JUN 26 1979

Authority

By if, NARS, Date 2-1-80

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

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Origin
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON ¹⁷¹ 1783 IMMEDIATE

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Embtel 2685

Authority STATE letter JUN 26 1979

By ip, NARS, Date 2-1-80

We concur that next operation should be just as soon as possible, but believe that Feb 22 may be too soon until Saigon situation not only more stable but clearly seen to be so. We particularly concerned AFC press conference indicating Khanh's status may still not be resolved. Question his successor, if any, also not clear.

Second factor here is that developments reported Deptel 1744 have taken different turn in last two days. British approached Sovs today with suggestion both governments as co-chairmen join in soliciting expression of views from members 1954 conference, plus ICC members, as to situation generally and also as to views on what conditions for peaceful answer might be. We do not yet have Sovs response and would not wish throw Sovs off this track by drastic action before they may make decision, although we believe dramatic boat incident tends minimize possibility such reaction. Moscow had felt immediate further operation might jeopardize Sov reaction, and we have now asked for judgment as to

01/15

Dated by: FE: W. P. Bundy/omm 2/20

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary
XXXXXXXXXXXX

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Mills

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Classification

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Classification

operation directed in part against naval base and in response VC actions putting boat incident in forefront although also including VC activity since Feb. 11.

You should not reveal possibility this UK/USSR gambit to GVN for time being. We naturally wish have it appear entirely as their initiative, so that our reply would not be any kind of initiative on our part and would, in its content, make clear how stiff our views are. We of course have no thought holding back on basic program, but do wish for clear assessment at all stages.

In light above factors, we now inclined hold off operation until Feb. 23, so that you would not approach GVN for political clearance until Feb. 22. We expect make decision tomorrow, and fullest continuing flow findings from boat incident will remain most helpful here in accordance your 2690.

GP-1.

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

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Authority STATE letter JUN 26 1979

By ip, NARS, Date 2-1-80

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

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Origin	ACTION:	AmEmbassy SEOUL	771	PRIORITY
Info:		AmEmbassy TAIPEI		" 797
		AmEmbassy MANILA		" 1324
		AmEmbassy VIENTIANE		" 715
	INFO:	AmEmbassy BANGKOK		" 1284
		AmEmbassy CANBERRA		" 654
		AmEmbassy WELLINGTON		" 650
		AmEmbassy TOKYO		" 2111
		AmEmbassy SAIGON		" 1784

FEB 20 10 50 AM '85

NODIS

In view stabilizing situation Saigon, addressees should now carry out instructions Deptel 1268 to Bangkok. Bangkok and Tokyo had already acted, and we have handled Canberra and Wellington through Ambassadors here this morning.

Following are additional points you may cover as desired:

1. We do not expect program to persuade Hanoi change position at early time, but do ~~not~~ expect cumulative impact over a period.
2. Hanoi and Peking reactions to date do not seem to threaten early drastic reaction, and we have no evidence to confirm significant troop movements or similar indicators. (No evidence SAM's have been introduced.) We also find Sov reaction to date moderate with no discernible element further commitment to DRV beyond ~~functionary~~

Handwritten initials

Drafted by: WP Bundy/bmm 2/20 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
 Clearances: S/S - Mr. Mills XXXXXXXXXXXX

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Classification

furnishing air defense equipment which we had expected in any event from interested in Kosygin visit. Some indications Sovs / in co-chairman role, but these highly tentative to date. You should of course stress these assessments necessarily based on propaganda and other evidence to date, and that we taking these factors very much into account as we proceed with program.

3. Although Indians and U Thant publicly, Canadians privately, have come forward with proposals along lines of "cessation of provocations" as prelude to convene conference, we see no indication Hanoi or Peking interested in any serious negotiations at this time on any terms that could produce our objective of independent secure SVN.

Realize difficulties reaching chief of state or government tomorrow, but hope you can do so not later than Monday. We hope Saigon situation will settle down over weekend so that we can resume operations early next week.

GP-3.

END

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE COLLECT
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~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

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Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy CANBERRA 653 IMMEDIATE

Info INFO: CINCPAC _____ IMMEDIATE
AmEmbassy WELLINGTON 649 IMMEDIATE

FEB 2 1965

NODIS

We today informed Waller we prepared enter into immediate staff talks to consider contingency plans for possible introduction significant ground forces northern SVN for security or pre-emptive purposes as part of policy program adopted this week along lines Deptel 1268 to Bangkok. (For CINCPAC: reftel ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ summarizes policy conveyed separately to you by JCS.)

We held off today on similar invitation GNZ but expect immediate GOA agreement and would then put same proposition to GNZ. CINCPAC informed and upon receipt GOA reply we have told Waller GOA should simply get directly in touch with CINCPAC.

We stressed talks would be in low key and without publicity. Believe they should take place just as soon as possible.

In presentations today along lines Deptel 1268 to Bangkok, we covered with Waller and Laking points raised Deptel 715 to

21/1
Dated by: FE: WPBundy/bmm 2/20
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
XXXXXXXXXXXX
Clearances: S/S - Mr. Mills

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Authority NLT 88-203
By isp/ty, NARA, Date 7814

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Vientiane of today. You may indicate awareness this disclosure to GOA and GNZ officials who clearly informed, and report any reactions. Continue to stress security and that we plan no public ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ announcement this policy.

GP-1.

END

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Classification

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL: 18594
RECEIVED: FEBRUARY 22, 12:23 AM
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE 2698, IMMEDIATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 22, 1 PM

~~TOP SECRET~~

N O D I S

DEPTEL 1787.

ALTHOUGH KHANH'S STATUS MAY BE RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY BY
END OF TODAY, I RECOMMEND SETTING 24 FEBRUARY AS DAY FOR NEXT
STRIKE. I TOLD QUAT THIS MORNING THAT WE MIGHT SOON RAISE
MATTER OF RESCHEDULING POSTPONED FRIDAY STRIKE AND HE, TOO,
INDICATED THAT LITTLE MORE DELAY WAS DESIRABLE TO SEE HOW
KHANH MATTER IS FINALLY SETTLED.

CFN 1787 KHANH'S 24 QUAT KHANH

TAYLOR

DDC/AE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter JUN 26 1979
By *if*, NARS, Date 2-1-80

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INFO RUMPA/CINCPAC
RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE BRNC

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INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 1641 DEPT 2699 FROM SAIGON FEB 22, 1 PM

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L I M D I S

REF: JCS 1616/1Z.

THE REF CABLE REQUESTS CINCPAC, MACV AND AMBASSADOR'S VIEWS AS TO REQUIREMENT FOR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS TO THIS AREA IN VIEW OF SECURITY SITUATION OF SVN. GENERAL WESTMORELAND I AGREE THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO CONSIDER DEPLOYMENTS TO SVN AT THIS TIME EXCEPT POSSIBLY FOR PROTECTION OF AIRFIELD AT DANANG.

AS I ANALYZE THE PROS AND CONS OF PLACING ANY CONSIDERABLE GVN 473 1641 2699 22 1 1616/1Z
~~MACV SVN WESTMORELAND SVN DANANG PRO CONS~~

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 12520:1 ~~TOP SECRET~~

NUMBER OF MARINES IN DANANG AREA BEYOND THOSE PRESENTLY ASSIGNED, I DEVELOP GRAVE RESERVATIONS AS TO WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF SO DOING. SUCH ACTION WOULD BE STEP IN REVERSING LONG STANDING POLICY OF AVOIDING COMMITMENT OF GROUND COMBAT FORCES IN SVN. ONCE THIS POLICY IS BREACHED, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO D LINE. IF DANANG NEEDS BETTER PROTECTION, SO DO BIEN HOA, TOM SON NHUT NHA TRANG AND OTHER KEY BASE AREAS. ONCE IT BECOMES EVIDENT THAT WE ARE WILLING ASSUME SUCH NEW RESPONSIBILITIES, ONE MAY BE SURE THAT GVN WILL SEEK TO UNLOAD OTHER GROUND FORCE TASKS UPON US. INCREASED NUMBERS OF GROUND FORCES IN SVN WILL INCREASE POINTS OF FRICTION WITH LOCAL POPULATION AND CREATE CONFLICTS WITH RVNAF OVER COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. THESE DISADVANTAGES CAN BE ACCEPTED ONLY IF THERE IS CLEAR AND UNCHALLENGED NEED WHICH CAN BE SATISFIED ONLY BY US GROUND FORCES. TURNING TO POSSIBLE USES FOR ADDITIONAL MARINES IN DANANG AREA, I CAN SEE SEVERAL WHICH ARE WORTH EXAMINING. FIRST, THEY COULD BE USED TO REINFORCE PROTECTION OF DANANG AIR BASE AGAINST BIEN HOA-TYPE OF ATTACK BY FIRE OR AGAINST COMBINED VC FIRE AND GROUND ATTACK.

MORE AMBITIOUS MISSION WOULD BE READINESS TO ENGAGE IN MOBILE ~~ON DANANG SVN DANANG BIEN HOA TOM SON NHUT NHA TRANG GVN SVN RVNAF~~
~~US DANANG DANANG BIEN HOA-TYPE VCI~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 11-1-78 letter
By if, NARS, Date 3-26-79

STATE GRNC

BT

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ SETWO OBTWO ACTION PRIORITY JCS 473
INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 1541 PT 269 FROM SAIGON FEB 2 1 PM

L I M D I S

THE USE OF MARINES IN MOBILE COUNTER-VC OPERATIONS HAS THE
ATTRACTION OF GIVING THEM AN OFFENSIVE MISSION AND ONE OF
FAR GREATER APPEL THAN THAT OF MERE STATIC DEFENSE. HOWEVER,
IT WOULD RAISE MANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS WHICH IN PAST HAVE APPEARED
SUFFICIENTLY FORMIDABLE TO LEAD TO REJECTION OF USE OF US
GROUND TROOPS IN A COUNTER-GUERRILLA ROLE. WHITE-FACED
SOLDIER ARMED, EQUIPPED AND TRAINED AS HE IS IS NOT SUITABLE
~~REF 473 1541 2699 22 1 VC ONE US NOT~~

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 12524/2 T O P S E C R E T~~

GUERRILLA FIGHTER FOR ASIAN FORESTS AND JUNGLES. FRENCH TRIED
TO ADAPT THEIR FORCES TO THIS MISSION AND FAILED; I DOUBT THAT US
FORCES COULD DO MUCH BETTER. FURTHERMORE, WE WOULD HAVE VASTLY
COMPLICATING FACTOR OF NOT RUNNING WAR AND HENCE PROBLEM OF
ARRANGING SATISFACTORY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUR VIETNAMESE
ALLIES. FINALLY, THERE WOULD BE EVER PRESENT QUESTION OF HOW
FOREIGN SOLDIER WOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A VC AND FRIENDLY
VIETNAMESE FARMER. WHEN I VIEW THIS ARRAY OF DIFFICULTIES,
I AM CONVINCED THAT WE SHOULD ADHERE TO OUR PAST POLICY OF
KEEPING OUR GROUND FORCES OUT OF DIRECT COUNTERINSURGENCY ROLE.

IF THERE WERE ANY GREAT LIKELIHOOD OF DRV FORCES CROSSING THE
DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, THERE WOULD BE NO
QUESTION OF NEED FOR STRONG US GROUND FORCE TO ASSIST ARVN IN
DEFENSE OF COASTAL PLAIN. HOWEVER, THIS SITUATION WOULD NOT
ARISE SUDDENLY AND WE SHOULD HAVE AMPLE TIME TO MAKE OUR DE-
PLOYMENTS BEFORE SITUATION GOT OUT OF HAND.

IN VIEW OF FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, I CONCLUDE THAT ONLY
MISSION WORTH CONSIDERING NOW FOR ADDITIONAL MARINES IN DANANG
AREA IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE OF BASE AGAINST MORTAR FIRE
AND GROUND ATTACK. HOWEVER, TO DEFEND AGAINST MORTAR FIRE
~~WPN US NOT VC DRV THE NO US - ARVN NOT~~

~~SECRET~~

OPERATIONS AGAINST VC IN DANANGAREA TO KEEP VC UNITS AT DISTANCE FROM BASE AND MAKE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PACIFICATION OF AREA. SUCH US FORCES WOULD CONCURRENTLY BE AVAILA LE TO JOIN IN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF AREA IF DRV ARMY MOVED SOUTHWARD IN RESUMPTION OF FORMAL HOSTILITES.

IN DEFENSE OF THE DANANG AIRBASE AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK BY FIRE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR MARINES TO BE IN PLACE ON GROUND IN CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH. (MACV HAS ESTIMATED THAT ABOUT SIX BATTALIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KEEP 81MM MORTAR FIRE OFF LARGE AIRFIELD.) EVEN IF WHOLE MEB WERE DEPLOYED, THEY COULD NOT PROVIDE COMPLETE ASSURANCE THAT SURPRISE MORTAR FIRE BY SMALL GROUPS ATTACKING AT NIGHT WOULD BE KEPT OFF FIELD. PROTECTION OF FIELD AGAINST VC GROUND ATTACK WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY SIMPLER AND WOULD REQUIRE FEWER MARINES. IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE AN ATTACK ON FIELD BY MORE THAN VC REGIMENT AND EVEN AN ATTACK IN THOSE NUMBERS WOULD BE EXTREMELY RISKY IN FACE OF SUPERIOR FRIENDLY AIR AND GROUND FIRE. TO MEET SUCH AN ATTACK, BATTALION OF MARINES SUPPORTED BY LOCAL ARVN FORCES SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. ON OTHER HAND, AS INDICATED ABOVE, EFFECTIVE PERIMETER DEFENSE AGAINST MORTAR FIIRE WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST
~~N VC DANANG VC US DRV DANANG MACV 81MM MEB VC VC ARVN~~

~~SECRET~~

WHOLE BRIGADE OF MARI NES.

IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT AN ANCILLARY BENEFIT TO DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL MARINES TO DANANG WOULD BE FREING OF ARVN UNITS FOR USE ELSEWHERE IN MOBILE OPERATIONS. WHILE SOME ARVN TROOPS OF ORDER OF BATTALION MIGHT BE SO RELIEVED, NUMBER WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE STRONG ARGUMENT FOR BRINGING IN MARINES. GENERALLY SPEAKING, MARINES WOULD BE PERFORMING TASK WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DONE ADEQUATELY IN PAST.

TAYLOR

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1252A/2 ~~TOP SECRET~~

WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST FULL BRIGADE AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THREAT AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTAR ATTACK ARE SO GREAT AS TO WARRANT PINNING DOWN SO VALUABLE FORCE IN STATIC DEFENSIVE MISSION. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF THIS IMPORTANT BASE, I WOULD BE WILLING TO RECOMMEND PLACING IN DANANG MARINE BATTALION LANDING TEAM. SUCH FORCE WOULD STRENGTHEN DEFENSE OF BASE AND, AT SAME TIME, WOULD BE MANAGEABLE FORCE FROM POINT OF VIEW OF ACCOMMODATING IT ON BASE AND ABSORBING IT INTO DANANG COMMUNITY. SUCH FORCE WITH THOSE MARINES ALREADY PRESENT SHOULD REMOVE ANY SUBSTANTIAL DANGER OF VC GROUND ATTACK AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH AVAILABLE ARVN FORCES PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF SECURITY AGAINST ATTACK BY FIRE.

IF WASHINGTON DECISION IS TO INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL MARINES INTO DANANG, IT SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE MADE CONTINGENT UPON GETTING CONCURRENCE OF GVN. IT WOULD BE USEFUL AND, I BELIEVE, NOT DIFFICULT TO GET GVN TO INITIATE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES TO WHICH USG COULD THEN ACCEDE.

TAYLOR

BT

GVN NOT WESTMORELAND DANANG DANANG VC DANANG GVN NOT GVN USG

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~ SEONE OPING ACTION PRIORITY JCS 473
INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 1641 DEPT 2099 FROM SAIGON FEB 22, 1 PM

L I M D I S

REF: JCS 161001Z.

THE REF CABLE REQUESTS CINCPAC, MACV AND AMBASSADOR'S VIEWS AS TO REQUIREMENT FOR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS TO THIS AREA IN VIEW OF SECURITY SITUATION OF SVN. GENERAL WESTMORELAND I AGREE THAT THERE IS NO NEED TO CONSIDER DEPLOYMENTS TO SVN AT THIS TIME EXCEPT POSSIBLY FOR PROTECTION OF AIRFIELD AT DANANG.

AS I ANALYZE THE PROS AND CONS OF PLACING ANY CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF MARINES IN DANANG AREA BEYOND THOSE PRESENTLY ASSIGNED, I DEVELOP GRAVE RESERVATIONS AS TO WISDOM AND NECESSITY OF SO DOING. SUCH ACTION WOULD BE STEP IN REVERSING LONG STANDING POLICY OF AVOIDING COMMITMENT OF GROUND COMBAT FORCES IN SVN.

ACT... J3-6/1-6)

INFO... CJCS-2(7-8) DJS-3(2-11) SJCS-1(2) JS-2(13-14) SECDEF-5(75-9
ISA-5(21-24) WHITE HOUSE-5(25-27) SA-7(28-29) CSAT-2(30-31)
CNO-2(32-33) CMC-2(34-35) ADVANCE COPY 053
6-10/65

ADDED DIST: 22 FEB 65 J3-1(37) (CAPT MILLER)

ADDED DIST: NMCC/DDO-1 (38) 24 FEB (CAPT ELKINS) NMCC/OCC

EX CY: DJS-1 (39) (THOMPSON) 24 FEB 65. OT

(AGENDA) CJCS-2 (40-41) DJS-4 (42-45) SJCS-2 (46-47) 24 FEB 65. OT

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Authority OSD 11-1-78

By if, NARS, Date 3-26-79

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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ONCE THIS POLICY IS BREACHED, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO HOLD LINE. IF DANANG NEEDS BETTER PROTECTION, SO DO BIEN HOA, TON SON NHUT NHA TRANG AND OTHER KEY BASE AREAS. ONCE IT BECOMES EVIDENT THAT WE ARE WILLING ASSUME SUCH NEW RESPONSIBILITIES, ONE MAY BE SURE THAT GVN WILL SEEK TO UNLOAD OTHER GROUND FORCE TASKS UPON US. INCREASED NUMBERS OF GROUND FORCES IN SVN WILL INCREASE POINTS OF FRICTION WITH LOCAL POPULATION AND CREATE CONFLICTS WITH RVNAF OVER COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. THESE DISADVANTAGES CAN BE ACCEPTED ONLY IF THERE IS CLEAR AND UNCHALLENGED NEED WHICH CAN BE SATISFIED ONLY BY US GROUND FORCES. TURNING TO POSSIBLE USES FOR ADDITIONAL MARINES IN DANANG AREA, I CAN SEE SEVERAL WHICH ARE WORTH EXAMINING. FIRST, THEY COULD BE USED TO REINFORCE PROTECTION OF DANANG AIR BASE AGAINST BIEN HOA-TYPE OF ATTACK BY FIRE OR AGAINST COMBINED VC FIRE AND GROUND ATTACK.

MORE AMBITIOUS MISSION WOULD BE READINESS TO ENGAGE IN MOBILE

OPERATIONS AGAINST VC IN DANANG AREA TO KEEP VC UNITS AT DISTANCE FROM BASE AND MAKE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PACIFICATION OF AREA. SUCH US FORCES WOULD CONCURRENTLY BE AVAILABLE TO JOIN IN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE OF AREA IF DRV ARMY MOVED SOUTHWARD IN RESUMPTION OF FORMAL HOSTILITIES.

IN DEFENSE OF THE DANANG AIRBASE AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK BY FIRE, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR MARINES TO BE IN PLACE ON GROUND IN CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH. (MACY HAS ESTIMATED THAT ABOUT SIX BATTALIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY TO KEEP 81MM MORTAR FIRE OFF LARGE AIRFIELD.) EVEN IF WHOLE MEB WERE DEPLOYED, THEY COULD NOT PROVIDE COMPLETE ASSURANCE THAT SURPRISE MORTAR FIRE BY SMALL GROUPS ATTACKING AT NIGHT WOULD BE KEPT OFF FIELD. PROTECTION OF FIELD AGAINST VC GROUND ATTACK WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY SIMPLER AND WOULD REQUIRE FEWER MARINES. IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE AN ATTACK ON FIELD BY MORE THAN VC REGIMENT AND EVEN AN ATTACK IN THOSE NUMBERS WOULD BE EXTREMELY RISKY IN FACE OF SUPERIOR FRIENDLY AIR AND GROUND FIRE. TO MEET SUCH AN ATTACK

PAGE 2 OF

36860

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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BATTALION OF MARINES SUPPORTED BY LOCAL ARVN FORCES SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT. ON OTHER HAND, AS INDICATED ABOVE, EFFECTIVE PERIMETER DEFENSE AGAINST MORTAR FIRE WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST WHOLE BRIGADE OF MARINES.

IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT AN ANCILLARY BENEFIT TO DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL MARINES TO DANANG WOULD BE FREEING OF ARVN UNIT FOR USE ELSEWHERE IN MOBILE OPERATIONS. WHILE SOME ARVN TROOPS OF ORDER OF BATTALION MIGHT BE SO RELIEVED, NUMBER WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE STRONG ARGUMENT FOR BRINGING IN MARINES. GENERALLY SPEAKING, MARINES WOULD BE PERFORMING TASK WHICH HAS NOT BEEN DONE ADEQUATELY IN PAST.

TAYLOR
BT

REF NOT IDENTIFIED (BELIEVE TO BE JCS 5311 DTG 16:610Z)

SECTION 1 OF 2 OF 36860

PAGE 3 OF 3

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INFO RUHQA/CINCPAC

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~~TOP SECRET~~ SETWO OF TWO ACTION PRIORITY JCS 473

INFO PRIORITY CINCPAC 1641 DEPT 2699 FROM SAIGON FEB 22, 1 PM

L I M D I S

THE USE OF MARINES IN MOBILE COUNTER-VC OPERATIONS HAS THE ATTRACTION OF GIVING THEM AN OFFENSIVE MISSION AND ONE OF FAR GREATER APPEL THAN THAT OF MERE STATIC DEFENSE. HOWEVER, IT WOULD RAISE MANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS WHICH IN PAST HAVE APPEARED SUFFICIENTLY FORMIDABLE TO LEAD TO REJECTION OF USE OF US GROUND TROOPS IN A COUNTER-GUERRILLA ROLE. WHITE-FACED SOLDIER ARMED, EQUIPPED AND TRAINED AS HE IS IS NOT SUITABLE GUERRILLA FIGHTER FOR ASIAN FORESTS AND JUNGLES. FRENCH TRIED TO ADAPT THEIR FORCES TO THIS MISSION AND FAILED; I DOUBT THAT US FORCES COULD DO MUCH BETTER. FURTHERMORE, WE WOULD HAVE VASTLY COMPLICATING FACTOR OF NOT RUNNING WAR AND HENCE PROBLEM OF ARRANGING SATISFACTORY COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUR VIETNAMESE ALLIES. FINALLY, THERE WOULD BE EVER PRESENT QUESTION OF HOW

ACT.....J3-6(1-6)

CJCS-2(7-8) DJS-3(9-11) SJCS-1(12) J5-2(13-14) SECDEF-5(15-19)

ISA-5(20-24) WHITE HOUSE-3(25-27) CSA-2(28-29) CSAF-2(30-31)

CNO-2(32-33) CMC-2(34-35) FILE-1(36)(36)JCK/M

PAGE 1 OF 2

ADDED DIST: 22 FEB 65 J3-1(37) (CAPT MILLER)

ADDED DIST: NMCC/DDO-1 (38) 24 FEB (CAPT ELKINS, NMCC/OTC)

(AGENDA) CJCS-2 (39-40) DJS-4 (41-44) SJCS-2 (45-46) 24 FEB 65 CT

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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FOREIGN SOLDIER WOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A VC AND FRIENDLY VIETNAMESE FARMER. WHEN I VIEW THIS ARRAY OF DIFFICULTIES, I AM CONVINCED THAT WE SHOULD ADHERE TO OUR PAST POLICY OF KEEPING OUR GROUND FORCES OUT OF DIRECT COUNTERINSURGENCY ROLE.

IF THERE WERE ANY GREAT LIKELIHOOD OF DRV FORCES CROSSING THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION OF NEED FOR STRONG US GROUND FORCE TO ASSIST ARVN IN DEFENSE OF COASTAL PLAIN. HOWEVER, THIS SITUATION WOULD NOT ARISE SUDDENLY AND WE SHOULD HAVE AMPLE TIME TO MAKE OUR DEPLOYMENTS BEFORE SITUATION GOT OUT OF HAND.

IN VIEW OF FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, I CONCLUDE THAT ONLY MISSION WORTH CONSIDERING NOW FOR ADDITIONAL MARINES IN DANANG AREA IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE OF BASE AGAINST MORTAR FIRE AND GROUND ATTACK. HOWEVER, TO DEFEND AGAINST MORTAR FIRE WHEN US NOT VC DRV THE NO US ARVN NOT WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST FULL BRIGADE AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THREAT AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF MORTAR ATTACK ARE SO GREAT AS TO WARRANT PINNING DOWN SO VALUABLE FORCE IN STATIC DEFENSIVE MISSION. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF THIS IMPORTANT BASE, I WOULD BE WILLING TO RECOMMEND PLACING IN DANANG MARINE BATTALION LANDING TEAM. SUCH FORCE WOULD STRENGTHEN DEFENSE OF BASE AND, AT SAME TIME, WOULD BE MANAGEABLE FORCE FROM POINT OF VIEW OF ACCOMMODATING IT ON BASE AND ABSORBING IT INTO DANANG COMMUNITY. SUCH FORCE WITH THOSE MARINES ALREADY PRESENT SHOULD REMOVE ANY SUBSTANTIAL DANGER OF VC GROUND ATTACK AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH AVAILABLE ARVN FORCES PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF SECURITY AGAINST ATTACK BY FIRE.

IF WASHINGTON DECISION IS TO INTRODUCE ADDITIONAL MARINES INTO LZ F

D76 85 970, OF COURSE, BE MADE CONTINGENT UPON GETTING CONCURRENCE OF GVN. IT WOULD BE USEFUL AND, I BELIEVE, NOT DIFFICULT TO GET GVN TO INITIATE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES TO WHICH USG COULD THEN ACCEDE.

TAYLOR

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CFN NOT WESTMORELAND DANANG DANANG VC DANANG GVN NOT GVN USG

SEC 2 OF 2

PAGE 2 OF 2

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FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
INFO RUEKDA/CJCS
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AGENDA: CJCS-2 (59-60)
DJS-4 (61-64) SJCS-2 (65-6)
24 FEB 65. OT

CALL 53337
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Authority OSD 11-1-78

By ip, NARS, Date 3-26-79

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PERSONAL FOR ADM SHARP AND GEN WHEELER FROM WESTMORELAND

- A. JCS 005148, DTG 122140Z FEB.
- B. MACJ-5 4614, DTG 141412Z FEB.
- C. CINCPAC 160405Z FEB.
- D. JCS 005311, DTG 161610Z FEB.
- E. MACJ-3 4999, DTG 171820Z FEB.

~~EXCLUSIVE~~

1. DEADLINES PLUS THE EMERGENCY NATURE OF EVENTS IN SAIGON HAD NOT THUS FAR PERMITTED ME TO MAKE A PERSONAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE DA NANG AREA TO STUDY SITUATION ON GROUND RE DEPLOYMENT OF MEB. HOWEVER, YESTERDAY AFTERNOON I HAD OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT DA NANG AND FORMULATE MORE PRECISE VIEWS AS TO SUITABLE COMPOSITION OF THE MEB TAILORED TO LOCAL REQUIREMENTS.

2. HAE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD BRING ELEMENTS OF THE MEB ASHORE ON A PHASED BASIS. THOSE TROOPS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR THE IMMEDIATE SECURITY TASK SHOULD NOT BE BROUGHT ASHORE ALTHOUGH CERTAIN MINIMUM COMMAND AND SUPPORT ELEMENTS MUST BE INCLUDED. INITIALLY, ONE BLT IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE MARINE ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTING HAWK BATTERY POSITION ON HILL 327. THIS BATTALION WOULD REMAIN ON HILL 327 TO SECURE THE HAWK BATTERY LOCATED THERE. AFTER THE MOVE OF THE BATTERY TO HILL 327, A SECOND BLT SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO PROVIDE WHAT I CONSIDER APPROPRIATE INNER PERIMETER SECURITY FOR THE US RESOURCES ON THE AIRFIELD IN CONSIDERATION OF THE VC THREAT. UNTIL ONE OF THE HAWK BATTERIES IS MOVED TO HILL 327, THE POSITIONING OF A BLT ON THE AIRFIELD WOULD OVERCROWD THE SPACE AVAILABLE. ONE SQUADRON OF HELICOPTERS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO

EX CY: DJS-1 (59) (THOMPSON) 23 FEB 65. OT

ACT.J3-6 (1-6)

INFO....CJCS-1 (7) DJS-3 (8-10) SJCS-3 (11-13) NMCC-2 (14-15) SECDEF-5
(16-20) ISA-5 (21-25) CSA-6 (26-31) CSAF-6 (32-37) CNO-6 (38-43)
CMC-6 (44-49) FILE-1 (50) JCK/L

PAGE 1 OF 2

ADDED DIST: OCJCS-2(51-52) WHITE HOUSE-3(53-55) STATE-1(56)
(PER KEARNEY) (22 FEB 65) (56)
22 FEB 65 J3-1(57) (CAPT MILLER)

50 R1

CANCEL ACTION: J3-1 (58) (PER DENBOW, SJCS) 23 FEB 65. OT

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INSURE SUFFICIENT LIFT FOR A RESERVE OF ONE RIFLE COMPANY AND TO AUGMENT THE PRESENT LIT CAPACITY AVAILABLE FOR I CORPS OPERATIONS. AT THIS JUNCTURE, I SEE NO NECESSITY OF BRINGING FIXED WING AIRCRAFT ASHORE; HOWEVER, THIS MATTER REQUIRES FURTHER STUDY. THE THIRD BLT SHOULD NOT COME ASHORE FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE BUT BE AVAILABLE WHEN AND IF REQUIRED.

3. THE MEB SO DEPLOYED WOULD PERMIT FOUR REGIONAL FORCE COMPANIES TO DISPLACE TO MORE EFFECTIVE TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS. A TANK PLATOON WOULD BE RELIEVED, AND AN ADDITIONAL REGIONAL FORCE BATTALION, NOW BEING RECRUITED, SHOULD BE EMPLOYED AS PACIFICATION TROOPS IN POPULATED AREAS NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE AIRFIELD THEREBY PROVIDING IMPROVED SECURITY.

4. IN SUMMARY, I BELIEVE THAT THE MEB AILORED TO CURRENT REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO DA NANG ON A PHASED BASIS AS SOON AS POLITICAL CLEARANCE IS OBTAINED.

5. MY VIEWS HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH AMB TAYLOR WHO IS FILING A MESSAGE ON THIS SUBJECT. GP-3
BT

PAGE 2 OF 2

4614 IS 28615

160405Z IS 29949

4999 IS 31201

ADV TO CJCS

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHJS/DOD WASHDC ✓
RUEHEX/WHITEHOUSE
RUEHJS/JCS WASHDC ✓
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUHPA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

32

~~TOP SECRET~~ (SEONE OF TWO) ACTION PRIORITY (DEPT 2711)
DOD 476 WHITEHOUSE 375 JCS 26 INFO PRIORITY BANGKOK 559
VIENTIANE 428 CINCPAC 1652 FROM SAIGON FEB. 23, 5PM

L I M D I S

SEACOORD MET SAIGON FEBRUARY 22 AND 23 AND DISCUSSED AGENDA
ITEMS TRANSMITTED IN SAIGON'S 2678 TO SECSTATE.

MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY AMBASSADORS MARTIN AND SULLIVAN,
THEIR MILITARY AIDES, AND GENERAL MILTON, CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE.

AMBASSADORS TAYLOR, MARTIN AND SULLIVAN GAVE APPRAISALS OF THE
GENERAL SITUATION IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES, FOLLOWED BY AN
CFN 2711 476 375 26 559 428 1652 23 5PM 22 AND 23 2678

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 1291A1 ~~TOP SECRET~~
APPRAISAL OF DRV REACTIONS (SEE SEPTEL 1292).

AGENDA ITEM II - US AIR OPERATIONS IN AND OVER LAOS:

(1) YANKEE TEAM OPERATIONS UDORN.

THE GROUP CONSIDERED PROS AND CONS OF OPERATING YANKEE TEAM
MISSIONS FROM UDORN. ADVANTAGES INCLUDE FASTER REACTION TIME,
BETTER COORDINATION AND BRIEFING, MORE RESPONSIVE TO USERS AND
THINNING OUT VULNERABLE A/C CONCENTRATIONS ON RVN BASES.
CONS WERE CONSIDERED RELATIVELY MINOR AND INCLUDED POSSIBLE
OVERCROWDING AT UDORN AND POTENTIAL FOR SOME CONFUSION IN CONTROL.
BOTH OF THESE SEEM MANAGEABLE. THE GROUP NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR
MARTIN SAW NO OBJECTION TO THIS PROJECT AND IT WAS
AGREED THAT THIS PROJECT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO MORE EFFECTIVE
OPERATION.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority NLS 85-75
By 18, NARA, Date 1

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 20876
By 10/14, NARA, Date 4/4/14

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2711, February 23, 5 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Saigon.
(2)(3)(4)(5) - COORDINATION BARREL ROLL MISSIONS.

VIENTIANE IS CONFUSED BY NUMBER OF SOURCES WHICH INITIATE TARGET SUBMISSIONS AND AMENDMENTS FOR BARREL ROLL MISSION. MAIN RESULTANT PROBLEMS ARE TIMING AND RESPONSIVENESS OF EXECUTION DECISIONS AND COORDINATION AT VIENTIANE TO INCLUDE SAR. LAST MINUTE CHANGES AGGRAVATE THESE PROBLEMS. GROUP REVIEWED CURRENT BARREL ROLL PROCEDURES AND STATUS AND DISCUSSED SOLUTIONS TO RELATED PROBLEMS. CONCLUSIONS BEING EXPRESSED THROUGH REGULAR

CHANNELS. GROUP BELIEVES THAT CONFUSION ON TARGET FOR RECENT CFN DRV 1292 II US (1) A/C RVN NO (2)(3)(4)(5) SAR

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 1291A1 ~~TOP SECRET~~

SAM NEUA BARREL ROLL MISSION COULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY MORE PRECISE DESCRIPTION OF MISSION AND RESTRICTIONS ATTENDANT THERETO. THE GROUP WAS BRIEFED IN VALUE OF SEVERAL LUCRATIVE TARGETS ON ROUTE 6 WHICH WILL BECOME ESPECIALLY VALUABLE TO THE ENEMY WHEN BAN KEN FORD ON ROUTE 7 WILL BE CLOSED BY RAINY SEASON.

THE GROUP NOTED EMBASSY VIENTIANE'S REQUIREMENTS FOR INCREASED HELICOPTER SAR CAPABILITY IN LAOS AS OPS INCREASE IN FREQUENCY AND DISTANCE FROM FRIENDLY TERRITORY. THE GROUP CONCURS THAT VIENTIANE HAS A PROBLEM IN PROVIDING ADEQUATE SAR SUPPORT, AND SUPPORTS AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN'S EFFORTS TO ENHANCE THAT CAPABILITY.

OF 42 INTERDICTION TARGETS IN LAOS, 16 ACTIVE TARGETS REMAIN. OF THESE 13 HAVE BEEN HIT (30 PER CENT AVERAGE DESTRUCTION), 3 ARE UNHIT, 8 MORE ARE BEING PROPOSED BY VIENTIANE. IT WAS NOTED THAT US FORCES HAVE RECENTLY BEEN AUTHORIZED TO ESTABLISH CHOKE POINTS AT NAPE PASS, ROUTE 23, AND MUGIA PASS.

AGENDA ITEM III - DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS INHERENT IN OVERFLIGHT OF LAOS BY US/VNAF AIRCRAFT EN ROUTE TO TARGETS IN DRV.

AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN STATED THAT US AIRCRAFT CAN CONTINUE OVERFLIGHTS CFN SAM NEUA 6 TO BAN KEN FORD 7 SAR LAOS OPS SUR TO 42
16 13 30 3 8 US TO NAPE PASS 23 MUGIA PASS III US/VNAF DRV US

PAGE FOUR RUMJIR 1291A1 ~~TOP SECRET~~

OVER LAOS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES DEVELOPED AT LAST SEACOORD MEETING (EMBTTEL 2077) AND ON UNDERSTANDING SUCH OVERFLIGHTS WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED BY US.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-3- 2711, February 23, 5 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Saigon.

HOWEVER HE FELT THAT THE LAOTIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT AT THIS TIME APPROVE OVEGFLIGHTS OF VNAF AIRCRAFT.

AGENDA ITEM IV - USE OF THAILAND BASES TO LAUNCH US REPRISAL STRIKES AGAIFST DRV.

AMBASSADOR MARTIN STATED THAT CONCURRENCE IS NOT REQUIRED TO USE THAILAND BASES TO LAUNCH SPECIFIC REPRISAL STRIKES FOR SPECIFIC INCIDENTS SUCH AS PLEIKU AS HE HAS ALREADY OBTAINED THIS AUTHORITY FROM THE THAI GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, HE MUST BE INFORMED BEFORE THE BASES ARE USED. FOR MORE GENERAL PERMISSION, HE WOULD HAVE TO AGAIN APPROACH THAI GOVERNMENT.

AGENDA ITEM V - DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE INCREASED LOGISTICS REQUIREMENT IN MUONG SOUI/PDJ.

GROUP WAS BRIEFED BY ARMA VIENTIANE ON DEVELOPING BATTLE IN SAM NEUA AREA AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR EXPANDING SOUTHWARD TOWARD MUONG SOUI AREA. FIRST PHASE IS PL EFFORT TO CLEAN OUT MEO AND TWO FAR BNS, DRIVING THEM WESTWARD. SECOND PHASE MAY BE DIRECTED AGAINST MUONG SOUI AND JUNCTION OF ROUTES 7 AND 13. CFN 2077 NOT RPT NOT US NOT VNAF IV US DRV NOT TO TO PLEIKU THAI THAI V MUONG SOUI/PDJ ARMA SAM NEUA MUONG SOUI PL MEO FAR BNS MUONG SOUI 7 13

PAGE FIVE RUMJIR 1291A1 ~~TOP SECRET~~
IF SECOND PHASE MATERIALIZES, VIENTIANE WILL NEED A MAJOR EXPANSION OF LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES AND HAS REQUEST IN PROCESS FOR SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN LOGISTICS AIR LIFT TO MEET THIS CONTINGENCY. GROUP NOTED VIENTIANE MISSION DISCUSSION ON POSSIBLE QUICK REQUIREMENT FOR SUBSTANTIAL LOGISTIC AUGMENTATION, MUCH OF WHICH PROBABLY MUST COME FROM US SOURCES IN SEA. IT WAS NOTED ALSO THAT THESE PL OFFENSIVES WILL CREATE SOME TARGETS FOR FRIENDLY AIR STRIKES. AIRA AND ARMA VIENTIANE ARE COORDINATING TO KEEP BARREL ROLL TARGET ~~IN~~VENTORY UP TO DATE IN THIS RESPECT.

AGENDA ITEM VI - POSSIBLE USE OF UDORN FOR SOME OPLAN 34-A AIR OPS.

AMBASSADOR MARTIN STATED THAT HE ANTICIPATED NO PROBLEM IN SECURING THAI PERMISSION FOR STAGING SOME OF THESE OPERATIONS THROUGH UDORN OR NAKON PANOM.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4- 2711, February 23, 5 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO) from Saigon.

AGENDA ITEM VII - US/THAI COMMAND RELATIONS IMPLICATIONS IF
US FORCES CATEGORY 3 AND 4 OF OPLAN-37 INTRODUCED INTO THAILAND.

THE GROUP TURNED TO POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD BE CREATED
BY PROPOSED DEPLOYMENTS OF US GROUND FORCES INTO THAILAND
ENVISIONED IN OPLAN 37 AND RECENTLY RECOMMENDED BY JCS TO SECDEF.
IT WAS NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR MARTIN FELT THAT THAI FEEL PRE-
CAUTIONARY DEPLOYMENTS ARE UNNECESSARY, SINCE THEY FEEL THE
TAYLOR

BT

CFN US SEA PL AIRA ARMA VI OPLAN 34-A AIR OPS NO THAI NAKON PANOM
VII US/THAI US 3 4 OPLAN-37 US OPLAN-37 JCS SECDEF THAI

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 7:40 A.M., 2/23/65; PASSED
WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 8:40 A.M., 2/23/65.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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77

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

17a N5c

46

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

PP RUEHCR RUEHEX RUEHJS
DE RUMJIR 1291A2 23/1115Z

SS

P 231045Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)

Info

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHJS/DOD WASHDC
RUEHEX/WHITEHOUSE
RUEHJS/JCS WASHDC
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUHPA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

1 9 2 0 2

1965 FEB 23 AM 8:57

32

~~TOP SECRET~~ (SETWO OF TWO) ACTION PRIORITY (DEPT 2711)
DOD 476 WHITEHOUSE 375 JCS 26 INFO PRIORITY BANGKOK 559
VIENTIANE 428 CINCPAC 1652 FROM SAIGON FEB. 23, 5PM

L I M D I S

MORE PRESSURE US PUTS ON DRV, THE LESS POSSIBILITY OF DRV/CHICOM
OVERT GROUND AGGRESSION. THEY WOULD HOWEVER WELCOME ANY
DEPLOYMENTS TO CONDUCT ACTIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY IN
LAOS. IT WAS NOTED THAT PROJECT 22, BILATERAL THAI/US PLAN FOR
DEFENSE ACROSS THE MEKONG, WHEN IT IS COMPLETED MAY PROVIDE
A RATIONALE FOR TEMPORARY US DEPLOYMENTS.
CFN US DRV DRV/CHICOM 22 THAI/US MEKONG US

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 1291A2 ~~TOP SECRET~~
IN DISCUSSION OF SECURITY OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS IN THAILAND,
IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO TAKE ALL FEASIBLE
MEASURES TO IMPROVE SECURITY CONDITIONS. ON QUESTION OF WHETHER
US SENTRIES IN THAILAND COULD BE ARMED, AMBASSADOR MARTIN SAID
THAI WOULD NOT AGREE TO THEIR USE. HE SAID CHIEF JUSMAG
THAILAND. HAD MADE EXTENSIVE SURVEY AND WAS IN PROCESS OF DISCUSSION
WITH SUPREME COMMAND TO INSURE THAT THAI TAKE MEASURES TO PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL SECURITY FOR US INSTALLATIONS. DEPUTY CHIEF JUSMAG
SAID HE IN PROCESS OF PROCURING AND INSTALLING AT PEPPER GRINDER
PASSIVE SECURITY FACILITIES IN ADDITION TO THAI ARMED GUARDS
AND HAD FOUND THAI RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE.
THERE IS AN INSURGENCY THREAT IN NE THAILAND WHICH COULD GROW
INTO A POSITIVE THREAT TO NAKON PHNOM. ELSEWHERE, COMMIES ARE
UNDERGROUND AND CAPABILITIES ARE NOT PRECISELY KNOWN.

AGENDA ITEM VIII, ROUTE 9, WILL BE REPORTED BY SEPTEL.

Downgraded to Secret

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority NLS 85-75

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Authority RAC 20875

By [Signature], NARA, Date _____

By [Signature], NARA, Date 4-4-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2711, February 23, 5 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO) from Saigon.

AGENDA ITEM IX - MEO OPERATIONS IN DRV.
THE GROUP DISCUSSED POTENTIAL FOR ESTABLISHING AN ACTIVE RESISTANCE PROGRAM IN DRV BY MEANS OF MEO ASSETS ALREADY DEVELOPED IN LAOS AND DRV BORDER AREAS. CAS REPRESENTATIVE FELT THAT DRV HILL PEOPLE NOT WELL ENOUGH DEVELOPED AT THIS TIME TO PERMIT CFN US NOT JUSMAG US JUSMAG PEPPER GRINBER NE NAKON PHANMM COMMIES NOT VIII 9 IX MEO DRV DRV MEO LAOS DRV CAS DRV

PAGE THREE RUMJIR 1291A2 ~~TOP SECRET~~
ANY APPRECIABLE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN INTELLIGENCE. SUCCESS WITH MEO IN LAOS HAS BENEFITTED FROM THE EXCEPTIONAL LEADERSHIP OF ONE MAN. GROUP NOTED DIFFICULTY OF RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF ANY RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN DRV BASED ON HILL PEOPLE BECAUSE OF BACKWARDNESS, UNPREDICTABILITY, LACK OF UNITY OF ANY KIND AND LONG TERM MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL PROBLEMS FOR SPONSORS.

ACTION SUMMARY:

1. YANKEE TEAM MISSIONS OPERATING FROM UDORN. ACTION CINCPAC.
2. VIENTIANE REQUIREMENTS FOR BETTER AND MORE HELICOPTER SAR CAPABILITY IN LAOS. ACTION VIENTIANE.
3. VIENTIANE REQUIREMENT FOR EXPANSION OF SUBSTANTIAL LOGISTIC AIR LIFT IN EVENT OF PLA EXPANSION SOUTHWARD TOWARD MKONG SOUI AREA. ACTION VIENTIANE AND CINCPAC.

GP-3.

TAYLOR,

BT

CFN MEO LAMS DRV 1. 2. SAR 3. PL MUONG SOUI GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 9:10 A.M., 2/23/65; PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 10:10 A.M., 2/23/65.

~~TOP SECRET~~

18

78

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

#2 18a

~~SECRET~~

Action CONTROL: 19204

RECD: February 23, 1965 8:58 a.m.

Info

FROM: Saigon

ACTION: Secstate 2720. PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter NOV 7 1978

DATE: February 23, 8 p.m.

By ing, NARS, Date 6-28-79

~~SECRET~~

Weekly Report

FOR THE PRESIDENT From Ambassador Taylor

N O D I S

THIS HAS BEEN THE MOST TIPSY-TURVY WEEK SINCE I CAME TO THIS POST. A NEW GOVERNMENT INSTALLED, A COUP ATTEMPTED AGAINST THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, THE COUP SUPPRESSED, THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF DEPOSED BY THOSE WHO HAD PUT DOWN THE COUP. THE COUP ATTEMPT ITSELF WAS AN ILL-CONSIDERED, ILL-TIMED MOVE AGAINST KHANH BY A GROUP OF OFFICERS AND FORMER OFFICERS, MANY OF WHOM HAD ALREADY BEEN DISCREDITED BY THEIR EARLIER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AGAINST KHANH LAST SEPTEMBER 13. ONE MIGHT HAVE EXPECTED THAT GENERAL PHAT, THE COUP LEADER, WOULD HAVE DONE BETTER ON A SECOND GO BUT HE AGAIN MISJUDGED THE TEMPER OF THE MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVING EFFECTIVE MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE SAIGON AREA. PHAT'S UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORT DID HAVE THE EFFECT, HOWEVER, OF BREAKING KHANH'S SPELL OVER HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL AND OF BRINGING THEM TO A DECISION TO UNSEAT HIM. THIS ACTION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND KHANH'S APPOINTMENT AS AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE HAS JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED. I UNDERSTAND THAT HE WILL DEPART SAIGON FOR HONG KONG ON 25 FEBRUARY: BUT ONE CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS MAKING ANOTHER LAST MINUTE MANEUVER TO SAVE HIMSELF.

WITH KHAN, THE TROUBLEMAKER, REMOVED FROM THE SCENE, WE HOPE THAT THE QUAT GOVERNMENT CAN GET UNDER WAY WITH OUR JOINT

PROGRAMS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL BUT ITS BASIC STRENGTH WILL NOT BE KNOWN UNTIL PUT TO THE TEST. THAT TEST IS LIKELY TO BE A CHALLENGE BY THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTE WHERE THICHTAM CHAU IS PRESENTLY MAKING

PRO-KHANH ANTI-SUU NOISES. IT IS HARD TO SEE WHAT OBJECTION THE INSTITUTE CAN FIND IN THE QUAT GOVERNMENT, THE MEMBERS OF WHICH WERE CAREFULLY CHOSEN WITH A VIEW TO THEIR ACCEPTABILITY TO THE BUDDHISTS.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-2- 2720, February 23, 8 p.m., From Saigon

THE EXCITEMENT OVER THE COUP TENDED TO DIVERT ATTENTION SOMEWHAT FROM THE VIET CONG MUNITIONS SHIP SUNK OFF THE COAST OF PHU YEN PROVINCE. THE CARGO OF THIS SHIP FURNISHES BY FAR THE MOST DRAMATIC EVIDENCE OF HANOI INVOLVEMENT YET UNCOVERED IN THE WAR. AN INCOMPLETE COUNT OF THE CARGO AND NEARBY CACHES INDICATES THAT SOME 4,000 WEAPONS, LARGE QUANTITIES OF AMMUNITION AND SOME 500 POUNDS OF MEDICINES WERE CAPTURED. THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITIONS WERE THE USSR, EAST GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND COMMUNIST CHINA; HANOI PACKING SLIPS WERE FOUND IN THE MEDICAL CONTAINERS, WHICH INCLUDES SUPPLIES MANUFACTURED IN NORTH VIETNAM, THE USSR, COMMUNIST CHINA, EAST GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, BULGARIA AND JAPAN. THIS DISCOVERY IS PARTICULARLY TIMELY IN TERMS OF JUSTIFYING THE US/GVN AIR STRIKES AGAINST NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY TARGETS.

VIET CONG ACTIVITY WAS DOWN DURING THE WEEK BUT PACIFICATION CONDITIONS REMAINS UNSATISFACTORY IN MANY PROVINCES, PARTICULARLY IN BINH DINH AND PHU YEN. THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN THIS LATTER AREA HAS REQUIRED A CUT BACK IN OUR ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, SINCE USOM REPRESENTATIVES ARE GENERALLY UNABLE TO LEAVE THE PRINCIPAL LOANS. WE CAN HARDLY EXPECT TO REVERSE THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM UNTIL THE QUAT GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO INCREASE ITS OPERATIONAL MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY STRENGTH.

CFM NODIS KHANH KHANH 13 PHAT PHAT'S KHANH'S KHANH'S
25 CANNOT KHANH QUAT NOT THICH TAM CHAU PRO

QUAT PHU YEN 4,000 500 USSR USSR US/GVN BINH DINH PHU YEN
USOM QUAT KHANH ANTI-SUU

TAYLOR

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19

79

19a

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

37 7 3 9

D051/23/JCS287
RR RUEKDA
DE RUMSMA 3068B 23/0925Z
R 230915Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC
INFO RUHPP/CINCPACFLT
RUEKDA/JCS-
RUMFCR/3D MEB
RUMFCR/79.3.3.6
RUMSAG/SR ADV I CORPS
BT

CAL 3337
FOR MC/MC
SEC ICE

223 6 24Z

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By sp, NARS, Date 4-7-78

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC J32 5604

DEPLOYMENT OF MEB TO DA NANG

- A. CINCPAC 160405Z FEB 65.
- B. COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-64.
- C. III MEF ADMIN PLAN 37-64 FOR CG NINTH MEB.
- D. COMUSMACV 220743Z FEB 65.

1. FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE VIEWS REQUESTED IN REF A NOT ALREADY COVERED BY REF D.

A. MISSION: MEB DEPLOYS SELECTED FORCES TO AREA OF DA NANG AND IN COORDINATION WITH GVN FORCES OCCUPIES DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ON CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES IN ORDER TO SECURE THE AIRFIELD AND AS DIRECTED COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, SUPPORTING INSTALLATIONS, PORT FACILITIES AND LANDING BEACHES AT DA NANG AGAINST ATTACK.

B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

- (1) AIRLIFTED MEB ELEMENTS LAND AT DA NANG AIRFIELD AND SURFACE ELEMENTS LAND OVER RED BEACH (AT990789).
- (2) CG MEB ASSUMES COMMAND OF MARINE UNITS PRESENTLY AT DA NANG AND CONTINUES TASKS ASSIGNED THOS UNITS.
- (3) GROUND FORCES OCCUPY TERRAIN CRITICAL TO DEFENSE OF DA NANG AIRFIELD AND ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SECURITY AT KEY INSTALLATIONS.
- (4) HELICOPTER SQUADRON WITH TG 76.5 COLLOCATES WITH MARINE SQUADRON (MTU 79.3.5) NOW AT DA NANG, SUPPORTS MEB OPERATIONS ASHORE, AND ASSISTS MTU 79.3.5 WITH PRESENT MISSION.

(5) ALTHOUGH THE AIRBASE LOADING STUDY JUST COMPLETED SHOWS DA NANG AIRFIELD CAN ACCEPT ONE F-4 SQUADRON UNDER CURRENT OPERATING CONDITIONS, DEPLOYMENT OF THIS ELEMENT IS NOT CONTEMPLATED INITIALLY BUT WILL BE GIVEN FURTHER

INFO.....CJCS-2 (1-2) DJS-3 (3-5) SJCS-1 (6) J3-6 (7-12) NMCC-2 (13-14)

SECDEF-5 (15-19) ISA-9 (20-28) CSA-2 (29-30) CSAF-2 (31-32)

CNO-2 (33-34) CMC-5 (35-39) FILE-1 (40) L/L

PAGE 1 OF 3

EX CY: DJS-1 (41) (THOMPSON) 24 FEB 65. OT
ADDED DIST: J4-3 (42-44) 24 FEB 65 (PER DENBOW)

12-1

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

CONSIDERATION BY MACV.

(6) IF DEPLOYED, F-4 SQUADRON IS PREPARED TO ACCOMPLISH FOLLOWING MISSIONS:

(A) CONDUCT AIR OFFENSIVE, DEFENSIVE, AND CLOSE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US/RVNAF FORCES.

(B) ASSIST IN AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS.

(C) PARTICIPATE IN SAR OPERATIONS.

(D) MAKE AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO CINCPACFLT FOR THE CONDUCT OF RETALIATORY AIR STRIKES.

(7) CG MEB ESTABLISHES AND MAINTAINS LIAISON WITH CG I CORPS THROUGH US SENIOR ADVISOR I CORPS AND WITH OTHER US AND ALLIED FORCES IN DA NANG AREA, PROVIDES LIAISON TO USMACV COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER (C).

(8) MEB IS PREPARED TO CONDUCT JOINT AND/OR COORDINATED OPERATIONS WITH RVNAF AND/OR OTHER FORCES.

C. COMMAND RELATIONS:

(1) COMUSMACV EXERCISES OPERATIONAL CONTROL THROUGH CG MEB OVER MEB FORCES DEPLOYED IN RVN.

(2) CG MEB ONCE ASHORE SERVES AS NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER.

(3) COMMANDER SECOND AIR DIVISION AS AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER ACTS AS COORDINATING AUTHORITY FOR OPERATIONS OF AIR UNITS/ELEMENTS IN COMUSMACV AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. HE EXERCISES THIS FUNCTION THROUGH THE AOC, ON WHICH CG MEB WILL BE REPRESENTED WHEN AND IF F-4 AIRCRAFT ARE DEPLOYED.

D. RELATIONSHIP WITH RVNAF.

(1) MEB FORCES WILL NOT BE PLACED UNDER COMMAND OF RVNAF. TACTICAL OPERATIONS REQUIRED BY ASSIGNED MISSION WILL BE COORDINATED WITH I CORPS SENIOR ADVISOR AND RVNAF CORPS COMMANDER.

(2) RULES BY WHICH MEB GROUND FORCES WILL DEAL WITH LOCAL POPULACE, ENGAGE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED ENEMY TARGETS, AND CONDUCT PATROLLING AND RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES WILL BE AS UNDER GROUND RULES DEVELOPED BY COMUSMACV AND RVNAF AND ON THE GROUND COORDINATION BETWEEN COMMANDERS.

E. LOGISTIC SUPPORT:

(1) IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION IV OF REF B AND ANNEX D OF REF C.

PAGE 2 OF 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

(2) KEY ITEMS TO BE RESOLVED BY PLANING AND AGREEMENTS WHERE APPLICABLE ARE OFFLOADING, REAL ESTATE, STORAGE, POL, AMMUNITION, AND IN-COUNTRY LABOR AND MATERIALS.

(3) SILTED CONDITIONS PORT OF DA NANG WILL LIMIT DOCKSIDE UNLOADING.

(4) BRIDGE AT BE 040702 IS OUT, ESTIMATE RESTORED FOR TRAFFIC BY 1 JULY 65 UNDER PRESENT SCHEDULE.

GP-4
BT

PAGE 3 OF 3

160405 IS 29949

220743 IS 36886

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Steph. Summers
20a / 5

84

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Action PP RUEHCR RUEHEX RUEHJS
DE RUMJIR 1292A 23/1825Z
P R 231815Z ZEA
Info FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUEHJS/DOD WASHDC
RUEHJS/JCS WASHDC
RUEHEX/WHITEHOUSE
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RUHPA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

19616
FEBRUARY 23, 1965
3:06 PM

~~SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT. PRIORITY 2712: DOD 477 WHITEHOUSE 376
JCS 27 INFO BANGKOK 560 VIENTIANE 429 CINCPAC 1633 FROM SAIGON
FEB 23, 5 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

EMBTEL 1291

FOLLOWING IS CONSENSUS OF DISCUSSIONS IN SEACOORD MEETING ON
DRV.

AS HANOI VIEWED DEVELOPMENTS IN SVN UP TO TIME OF RECENT JOINT
US/GVN REPRISAL STRIKES AGAINST DRV MILITARY TARGETS, DRV
LEADERS COULD FEEL CONFIDENT THAT SITUATION IN SVN WAS PROGRESSIVELY
EVOLVING IN HANOI'S FAVOR, BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY.
CFN 2712 477 376 27 560 429 1633 1291 SEACOORD DRV SVN US/GVN
DRV BRV SVN

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1292A ~~SECRET~~

MILITARILY, HANOI HAD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED ITS ASSETS IN
SVN THROUGH INCREASED INFILTRATION OF TRAINED PERSONNEL AND
RE-EQUIPPING VC MAIN FORCES WITH MODERN FAMILY OF CHICOM
COPIES OF SOVIET-TYPE WEAPONS. THE WAR HAD GENERALLY DEVELOPED
IN ITS FAVOR. POLITICALLY, HANOI COULD POINT TO POLITICAL
INSTABILITY IN SAIGON WITH RAPID CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT AND
ACCOMPANYING GRADUAL DISLOCATIONS IN COUNTRYSIDE. THIS COUPLED
WITH TRADITIONAL DIVISIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOCIETY PROVIDED
THE VC WITH AMPLE GROUND FOR EXPLOITATION. FROM THIS VANTAGE
POINT. HANOI REGIME COULD LOOK FORWARD TO EVENTUALLY WINNING

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Authority State 10/2/75
By MJE, NARS, Date 4/19/78

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-2- 2712, FEBRUARY 23, 5 PM, FROM SAIGON

THE WAR IN SVN. AT SAME TIME DRV HOPED THAT VICTORY COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT PROVOKING MAJOR COUNTERBLOWS OR EXCESSIVE INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN VIET-NAM.

WHILE RETALIATORY AIR STRIKES AGAINST DRV MILITARY INSTALLATIONS BEGINNING ON FEB 7 INJECTED NEW FACTOR INTO SITUATION, IT SEEMS TO US TO BE EVIDENT THAT TO DATE HANOI HAS NOT READ CLEAR SIGNAL US TO THE EXTENT AND DEGREE OF US DETERMINATION AND INTENTIONS. IT STILL COUNTS ON KEEPING INITIATIVE. THUS FAR THE SPECTER OF CONTINUED RETALIATORY STRIKES IS OFFSET BY HANOI'S

READING OF AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PRESS, DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER SOURCES AS DESIRE OF UNITED STATES TO FIND A FACE-SAVING SOLUTION THAT WOULD PERMIT US DISENGAGEMENT.

WHILE OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC REACTIONS TO JOINT AIR STRIKES IN THAILAND, LAOS AND SVN HAVE BEEN UNIVERSALLY FAVORABLE, THERE IS STILL CONSIDERABLE DOUBT AS TO WHETHER STRIKES WERE MERELY REPRISALS FOR SPECIFIC VC OUTRAGES AGAINST AMERICANS OR A PART OF A SYSTEMATIC DEVELOPING PROGRAM OF PRESSURE AGAINST THE DRV WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO CARRY THROUGH TO ACCOMPLISH OUR ANNOUNCED OBJECTIVES. THE THAIS IN PARTICULAR ARE CONVINCED HANOI HAS NOT READ A CLEAR SIGNAL; THEY BELIEVE NEITHER THE SOVIETS NOR CHICOMS WILL FACE A CONFRONTATION WITH THE US IF JOINT US/GVN AIR OPERATIONS AGAINST DRV MILITARY TARGETS ARE CONDUCTED IN A DISCRIMINATING MANNER. SOUVANNA PHOUMA IS ENCOURAGED TO THE POINT WHERE HE APPEARS TO BE WILLING TO PLACE HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE US AND DECLINE TO HEDGE HIS BETS WITH THE FRENCH.

WITH REGARD TO GENERAL DRV TACTICS WITHIN COMMUNIST BLOC, DRV HAS ATTEMPTED TO REGAIN NEUTRAL IDEOLOGICAL POSITION IN SINO-SOVIET SPLIT IN ORDER OBTAIN MAXIMUM SUPPORT WITHOUT EXCESSIVELY OFFENDING THE CPR. HOWEVER, THIS WILL BE PUT TO THE TEST IF THE SOVIETS ATTEMPT TO EXERT HEAVY PRESSURE ON THE DRV
CFN YVN VC DRV NOT US/GVN DRV SOUVANNA PHOUMA US DRV CPR
DRV

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1292A ~~SECRET~~

FOR ATTENDANCE AT THE MARCH 1 MOSCOW MEETING AS TRUCE FOR SOVIET WIN. HANOI MUST VIEW WITH DISAPPOINTMENT REACTIONS OF USSR AND THE CPR TO THE JOINT US/GVN REPRISAL STRIKES. IN EFFECT THE SOVIETS BACKED AWAY FROM FULL SUPPORT OF DRV WITH ONLY MODERATE LANGUAGE AND HAVE PUBLICLY RESERVED THEIR POSITION; THE CHINESE GOADED THE DRV TO STRONGER ACTIONS BUT APPEARED TO RETREAT FROM EARLIER PUBLIC COMMITMENT. RECENT DRV/SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT MAY BE CONSOLIDATED THROUGH ECONOMIC AND MILITARY

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-3- 2712, FEBRUARY 23, 5 P.M., FROM SAIGON

AID AGREEMENT ALTHOUGH IT UNLIKELY SOVIETS WILL INTRODUCE SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT (SUCH JS SAM 2'S) WHICH REQUIRE SUSTANTIAL TRAINING OR SOVIET TECHNICIANS.

IN ITS REACTION TO INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES FOR CONFERENCE ON VIET-NAM, DRV HAS MADE VAGUE NOISES FROM TIME TO TIME INDICATING DRV WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, THESE HAVE BEEN AND ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO BE CAREFULLY CONTROLLED HINTS DESIGNED TO GENERATE OPPOSITION TO US/GVN STRIKES. IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER DRV LEADERS ARE WILLING TO TALK IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY NOW BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE AT THIS STAGE THAT THEY CAN WIN.
CFN 1 SAM2'S BRV US/GVN

RPAGE 4 RUMJIR 1292A ~~SECRET~~

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE ARE THAT DRV WILL BASICALLY CONTINUE ITS PRESENT TACTICS IN SVN AND WILL ATTEMPT TO INCREASE THE SCOPE AND TEMPO OF ITS EFFORTS. (DRV/CHICOM MOVES TO RE-EQUIP VC WITH MODERN FAMILY OF WEAPONS REQUIRING HEAVY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR AMMUNITION CLEARLY INDICATED AN INTENTION TO INTENSIFY WARE AND CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO PROVIDE NECESSARY LOGISTIC SUPPORT.) WILL HOPE TO KEEP US OFF BALANCE BY VARYING TYPE AND PACE OF VC ACTIVITIES. TAYLOR

BT

CFN DRV SVN DRV VC US

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 2/23/65, 3:10 p.m.

NOTE: PASSED CIA, 2/23/65, 4:30 pm

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Page 2 of telegram to Saigon

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which remains active. As you can see, this gambit continues to have great broad policy importance. Secrecy on it remains essential, although stories today from London have given us grave concern whether it can be preserved. End FYI.

In response to concerns Embtel 2706 (which we did not pass to other addressees as they had not received our 1718 and 1724) you are correct that we have been reconsidering sequence and forum of public statement and presentation of case against DRV. Not clear yet just how ~~thz~~ these will work, and we hope for clearer picture by tomorrow. In any case, developments do not yet warrant any new statement to Quat other than to say that we still contemplate public statement our purposes and objectives and also presentation of case, but timing on these not yet firm.

Let me take this opportunity to congratulate you, along with Alex, Westmoreland, and your whole mission, on your expert handling of the recent semi-coup. It had all sorts of dangers whether US hand might be charged, and Thao and his friends certainly did their best to implicate us. But we seem to have come out relatively untouched, and perhaps the results will be for the best.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

22

82

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

22a

February 23, 1965

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Rusk was reading
from this paper during the
meeting with you this afternoon.

Bromley
Bromley Smith

~~TOP SECRET~~

22b

February 23, 1965

VIET NAM

It seems desirable and timely for me to put down an outline of my own thinking about a comprehensive approach to our effort to assure the security of South Viet Nam. I am convinced that there is no single miracle-working approach which can get the job done. I am convinced that it would be disastrous for the United States and the free world to permit Southeast Asia to be overrun by the Communist North. I am also convinced that everything possible should be done to throw back the Hanoi-Viet Cong aggression without a major war if possible. We cannot accomplish this result without the risk of major escalation; but the other side, too, must face and worry about the same risk.

I. Stable and Unified Government in South Viet Nam

The highest possible priority must be given by us and the South Vietnamese to the establishment of a government and leadership which not only is stable but looks stable. Without the elementary platform, other efforts in the military and political field are likely to prove fruitless. Political confusion in Saigon (a) diverts military

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By sig, NARS, Date 7-30-85

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-2-

leaders away from their main job of fighting the Viet Cong, (b) undermines the capacity of administration throughout the country to take effective action in pacification and the non-military measures required to organize the countryside, (c) undermines the morale and sense of purpose of the American people, (d) frustrates our effort to obtain increasing help from other free world countries to South Viet Nam, (e) most important of all, convinces Hanoi and its Communist allies that if they persist in their present course of action, they have every prospect of victory, and, (f) finally, political confusion in Saigon makes it almost impossible to activate political processes which have the prospect of resulting in the security of South Viet Nam.

It is not easy to prescribe from Washington what further steps the United States can take to bring about greater unity and stability in the GVN. If General Khanh does in fact leave the country, it would be timely for Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson and General Westmoreland to interview all of the principal political and military leaders and to obtain from them a pledge to demonstrate both publicly and in their actions that, at long last, they are prepared to put aside personal rivalries and work together for the security of South Viet Nam. Every effort should be made to obtain public declarations of support

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-3-

from any and all of the existing non-governmental groups, including Buddhists, Catholics, labor, students, business, or anyone else whose voice can add to a chorus of unified determination.

II. Increased Effort by the South Vietnamese

The gravity of the present situation in South Viet Nam, as well as the gravity of the decisions with which the United States is faced, calls for maximum effort on the part of the South Vietnamese. The slightest acceptance of a "business as usual" situation is not consistent with the possibility of an explosion into larger hostilities nor with the experience of other guerrilla actions in Greece, Malaysia and elsewhere. Apart from the governmental question, discussed above, the South Vietnamese should undertake (a) additional measures of mobilization, (b) the organization of the civilian population into a pacification effort, with emphasis upon information and intelligence, (c) vigorous execution by the South Vietnamese of agreed psychological warfare programs, on which the South Vietnamese have been dilatory and ineffective, (d) sharply increased international diplomatic and political effort, (e) intensified military and pacification effort on the

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-4-

basis of a 24-hour day and 7-day week. It should be made clear that intensified South Vietnamese efforts should not be limited by budgetary considerations or US financial and material support.

III. US Effort in South Viet Nam

We ourselves should consider whether there are additional steps which we ought to take in South Viet Nam. Apart from the political results which increased efforts might achieve, we should think of the importance of conveying a signal to Hanoi and Peiping that they themselves cannot hope to succeed without a substantial escalation on their part, with all of the risks which they would have to face. I would favor the immediate stationing in Da Nang of a Marine battalion combat team, to be reinforced promptly to a brigade if the security situation calls for it. I would also favor the use of US Naval forces, particularly destroyers, to reinforce counter-junk operations and to ensure that there are no repetitions of seaborne Viet Cong supply similar to the recent ship discovered in Vung Ro Bay. US destroyers could assist GVN junks and other craft in systematic surveillance of those portions of the seacoast not securely in government hands. They could act as command ships for flotillas of smaller craft to intensify and tighten surveillance of junk traffic

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-5-

coming both from the North and Cambodia. Our military authorities should be asked to be certain that every possible step is being taken for the security of key installations, such as intensive patrolling and the dispersal of the living quarters of American personnel. The military should be asked to look again at the applicability of our most sophisticated conventional weapons, some of which are still highly classified and have not been used. We should continue to permit US aircraft of all types to engage in direct action against the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam.

IV. Strikes into North Viet Nam

For the present, strikes into North Viet Nam should be considered as serving the political purpose of indicating to the North that they cannot expect to rely upon a sanctuary in the face of their increased infiltration and operations in South Viet Nam.

In this respect, they play their part alongside of MAROPS and our air missions in Laos. The more air strikes against North Viet Nam can be directly linked to specific events in South Viet Nam, the better from a general political point of view. If, at a given moment, there are political reasons for deferring a strike (such as political confusion in Saigon or a major international political contact), we should not

~~TOP SECRET~~

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-6-

bind ourselves to a specific schedule. A strike directly related to the full examination of the evidence of the ship at Vung Ro Bay would involve smaller political difficulties than one not so related. To the extent that strikes can be specifically related to events in South Viet Nam, the responsibility for major escalation will continue to rest with the other side.

V. Political Possibilities

Obviously, the United States should be ready to take advantage of any political possibility of bringing the fighting in Southeast Asia to an end consistent with the security of South Viet Nam and of Laos. The international political objective should be to bring about a cessation of infiltration and the repatriation of those previously infiltrated. This would include, of course, assured compliance with the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos. Negotiation as a cover for the abandonment of Southeast Asia to the Communist North cannot be accepted. This is a weakness of President de Gaulle's attitude. A formal and public negotiation at this time which would simply register the impossibility of a peaceful settlement would add even greater dangers to the present situation. Our problem is to bring about a

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-7-

combination of circumstances in which negotiations can achieve the abandonment of aggression by Hanoi and Peiping. We have no reliable evidence that Hanoi and Peiping are prepared for any such result. The attitude of the Soviet Union is somewhat more equivocal and it should be a major effort on our part to keep the Soviet Union from complete solidarity with Hanoi and Peiping about Southeast Asia. I will discuss orally the various contacts and possibilities as they shape up at the present time.

VI. Reiteration of Policy

There is some danger that protracted periods of silence on our part can lead to an impression either of indecision or of discouragement and nervousness. Although the essential elements of our policy have been stated many times, reiteration is necessary to remind public opinion here and abroad of the essentials as we see them. I would consider these essentials to be the following:

- (1) The right of the nations of Southeast Asia to be left alone by their neighbors to work out their own national life and their own international policy without interference by others;

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-8-

(2) The systematic and large-scale infiltration of trained personnel by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam contrary to the Geneva Agreements and international law;

(3) The large scale and illegal infiltration of arms by North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam;

(4) The absence of any US desire for a national military presence in Southeast Asia, whether in the form of bases or in the form of the continuing presence of American military personnel;

(5) Our commitment to the settlements of 1954 and 1962;

(6) The absence of any desire on our part to destroy by military means the regimes in North Viet Nam or Mainland China;

(7) Our receptivity to political action which would achieve a result consistent with these essential elements.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

23a

SEC 1 OF 2 - 3 8 5 4 9

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Feb 24/65

E348/24/JCS196

// ~~TOP SECRET~~ F O L L O W S //

VV PHB649 PAG354
RP RUEKDA
DE RUHKA 2963 24/0317Z
P 240315Z
FM CINCPAC
TO RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SEC 1 OF 2

DEPLOYMENT OF MEB TO DANANG (S)

- A. JCS 005148 DTG 122140Z LIMDIS
 - B. COMUSMACV MAC J5 4614 DTG 141412Z
 - C. COMUSMACV J3 4999 DTG 171820Z
 - D. CINCPAC 180210Z
 - E. COMUSMACV J00 5515 DTG 220743Z EXCLUSIVE
 - F. SAIGON 2699 TO STATE, FEB 22, 1 PM LIMDIS
 - G. COMUSMACV J32 5604 DTG 230915Z
1. IN REF A, JCS RECOMMENDED, INTER ALIA, DEPLOYMENT OF ONE MEB TO DANANG.
 2. IN REF B, COMUSMACV CONCURRED WITH JCS RECOMMENDATION

ACT...J3-6(1-6)

INFO...CJCS-2(7-8) DJS-3(9-11) SJS-3(12-14) J4-2(15-16) J5-2(17-18)
SACSA-4(19-22) DIA-4(23-26) NMCC-2(27-28) SECDEF-5(29-33)
ISA-5(34-38) WHITE HOUSE-3(39-41) STATE-1(42) CSA-2(43-44)
CSAF-2(45-46) CNO-2(47-48) CMC-2(49-50)

ADV CY TO...NMCC

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Authority DOD 1/29/76
By NFE, NARS, Date 4/19/78

AND GAVE THE FOLLOWING REASONS WHY HE BELIEVED MEB SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO DANANG NOW:

A. US/GVN INVESTMENT AT DANANG AB KEYSTONE OF CURRENT COMBINED EFFORT TO INCREASE PRESSURES ON DRV THROUGH REPRISALS, YANKEE TEAM, BARREL ROLL AND 34-A OPS.

B. VULNERABILITY TO MAJOR DRV INFILTRATION EFFORT. DANANG IS FIRST CHOICE OF OURSELVES AND RVNAF AS LIKELY TARGET FOR EXTRAORDINARY INFILTRATION/ATTACK EFFORT BY VC/DRV.

C. QUESTIONABLE INTEGRITY OF SOME RVNAF TROOP ELEMENTS AS DEMONSTRATED DURING RECENT PRE-TET PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-GVN, ANTI-US DEMONSTRATIONS.

D. WE ARE NOT SANGUINE THAT RVNAF COULD REPEL ALL OUT VC/PAVN EFFORT TO NEUTRALIZE BY INSURGENT TYPE ACTION DANANG AB AND ITS US/GVN ASSETS.

3. IN REF C, COMUSMACV COMMENTS FURTHER ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND INDICATED HIS PRIORITY FOR DEPLOYMENT OF US COMBAT FORCES, INDICATING THAT DANANG WAS THE FIRST PRIORITY. SECOND PRIORITY WAS SAIGON/BIEN HOA/VUNG TAU COMPLEX. THIRD

PRIORITY WAS NHA TRANG/CAM RANH BAY. COMUSMACV FURTHER INDICATED WHAT STEPS HE HAD PROPOSED OR HAD UNDER CONSIDERATION FOR INCREASED SECURITY THESE AREAS.

4. IN REF D, CINCPAC CONCURRED WITH COMUSMACV'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN RVN AND WITH HIS RECOMMENDATION THAT THE MEB SHOULD BE DEPLOYED TO DANANG NOW. REF D FURTHER STATED THAT IN VIEW OF THE VULNERABILITY OF DANANG, CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT WE ACT RATHER THAN REACT AND INDICATED THE DETERRENT EFFECT UPON THE VC THAT WOULD RESULT FROM A MEB IN PLACE AT DANANG.

5. COMUSMACV IN REF E DISCUSSED THE RESULTS OF A PERSONAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE DANANG AREA AND CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD BRING ELEMENTS OF THE MEB ASHORE ON A PHASED BASIS.

INITIALLY, ONE BLT TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR MARINE ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTING HAWK BATTERY POSITION ON HILL 327 WITH A SECOND BLT TO PROVIDE INNER PERIMETER SECURITY FOR US RESOURCES ON THE AIRFIELD. COMUSMACV INDICATED THAT UNTIL ONE OF THE HAWK BATTERIES IS MOVED TO HILL 327, THE POSITIONING OF A BLT ON THE AIRFIELD WOULD OVERCROWD THE SPACE AVAILABLE. HE INDICATED THAT THIRD BLT SHOULD NOT COME ASHORE FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE BUT BE AVAILABLE WHEN AND IF REQUIRED.

6. IN REF F, AMB DISCUSSED PROS AND CONS OF DEPLOYING MEB TO DANANG. THE AMB COMMENTS ON THE DIFFICULTY OF PROVIDING COMPLETE ASSURANCE OF SECURITY FROM SURPRISE MORTAR FIRE EVEN WITH THE WHOLE OF A MEB. THIS IS TRUE AND CONSEQUENTLY, WHAT WE ARE OBLIGED TO DO HERE IS TO REDUCE WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR CAPABILITY THE HAZARDS TO OUR PEOPLE. I BELIEVE THAT THE VULNERABILITY OF THE US INVESTMENT IN DANANG IS AS APPARENT TO THE VC/DRV AS IT IS TO US. WITH A STRONG MOBILE FORCE IN THE AREA PROVIDING A TIGHT DEFENSE OF THE AIRFIELD COMPLEX AND GOOD SECURITY OF US OUTLYING INSTALLATION, I BELIEVE THAT TWO ANCILLARY BENEFITS WILL EMERGE. FIRST, THE RVNAF WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO USE THE FORCES THUS FREED FOR PATROL AND SECURITY OPERATIONS, AND SECOND, THE VC/DRV WILL BE OBLIGED TO REGARD DANANG AS A TOUGHER TARGET. FINALLY, THE AMB REJECTS THE USEFULNESS OF US GROUND ELEMENTS IN A COUNTER-GUERRILLA ROLE BECAUSE OF OUR COLOR, ARMAMENT, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. THIS STANDS ATHWART PAST PERFORMANCE IN THIS FUNCTION. THE MARINES HAVE A DISTINGUISHED RECORD IN COUNTER-GUERRILLA WARFARE.

7. IN REF G, COMUSMACV GIVES THE MISSION, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS, COMMAND RELATIONS, RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RVNAF, AND THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF A MEB TO DANANG. I CONCUR GENERALLY WITH COMUSMACV'S PROPOSAL.

8. WE NOW HAVE ONE BLT AFLOAT ON A 6 HOUR REACTION TIME FROM DANANG. WE HAVE ANOTHER BLT AFLOAT WITH A 44 HOUR REACTION TIME TO DANANG. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR WHAT THIS REACTION TIME MEANS. 6 HOURS AFTER THE ORDER IS GIVEN TO LAND AT DANANG, THE TRANSPORTS WITH THE FIRST BLT EMBARKED WILL BE IN THE TRANSPORT AREA AT DANANG. IF THEY HAPPEN TO ARRIVE DURING DARKNESS, SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF THE BLT WILL COMMENCE LANDING AT DAYLIGHT AND TWO COMPANIES WILL BE READY FOR COMBAT ASHORE SIX HOURS THEREAFTER WITH OTHERS FOLLOWING PROGRESSIVELY. THUS IT IS APPARENT THAT OUR PRESENT POSTURE IS A REACTIVE ONE, IT GIVES NO DEFENSE AGAINST A VC HIT-AND-RUN ATTACK AGAINST THE US INSTALLATION IN DANANG. THE MARINES WILL BE ASHORE AFTER THE DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE AND THE ENEMY HAS WITHDRAWN.

9. MY APPRAISAL OF THE WHOLE MATTER AS CONVEYED IN REF D IS STILL REGARDED AS SOUND. I CONSIDER THE LANDING OF THE MEB IN DANANG TO BE AN ACT OF PRUDENCE WHICH WE SHOULD TAKE BEFORE AND NOT AFTER ANOTHER TRAGEDY OCCURS. I WOULD STILL PREFER THAT THE COMPLETE FORCE, LESS ONE JET ATTACK SQUADRON, BE ESTABLISHED ASHORE.

BT

REF (A) IS JCS OUT 5147
REF (B) IS JCS IN 28615
REF (C) IS JCS IN 31201
REF (D) IS JCS IN 31607
REF (E) IS JCS IN 36886
REF (F) IS JCS IN 36860
REF (G) IS JCS IN 37739
FJC

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38549

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SEC 2 OF 2 - 3 8 5 4 9

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PHB654PAG355
PP RUEKDA
DE RUHKA 2964 24/0317Z
P 240315Z
FM CINCPAC
TO RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
RUHPB/CINCPACFLT
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~~TOP SECRET~~ FINAL SEC OF 2

HOWEVER, THERE ARE VALID REASONS FOR INITIATING THE MOVE ON AN INCREMENTAL BASIS. I THEREFORE ENDORSE COMUSMACV'S PROPOSAL IN REF E, MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

A. LAND A MEB COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENT AND A SURFACE BLT, PLUS ONE HELO SQUADRON, AT ONCE.

B. BUILD UP BY AIR AND SURFACE MOVEMENT THE EXISTING US MARINE SECURITY FORCES TO PROVIDE A SECOND BLT.

C. LAND THE THIRD BLT WHEN IT CAN BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED AND LOGISTICS PERMIT.

D. DEPLOY ONE MARINE F-4 SQUADRON TO DANANG WHEN MARINE FORCES HAVE A NEED FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. THIS MIGHT POSSIBLY REQUIRE DISPLACEMENT OF SOME OF THE AIRCRAFT NOW AT DANANG. ALL CINCPAC CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA PROVIDE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE AIRCRAFT FROM DANANG. THESE AIRCRAFT CAN BE USED FOR OTHER MISSIONS ALONG WITH THE PRIMARY MISSION OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT.

E. RETAIN AN SLF AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ON 95 HOUR REACTION TIME TO RVN.

F. ADVANCE THE FIRST MARINE BRIGADE FROM HAWAII TO OKINAWA AND JAPAN TO FILL THE HOLES CREATED BY LANDING OF THE MEB. AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING TO LIFT ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST MARINE BRIGADE TO WESTPAC BEING RETAINED IN HAWAII NOW PENDING DECISION ON LANDING MEB AT DANANG. GP-3.

BT

ACT...J3-6(1-6)

INFO...CJCS-2(7-8) DJS-3(9-11) SJS-3(12-14) J4-2(15-16) J5-2(17-18)

SACSA-4(19-22) DIA-4(23-26) NMCC-2(27-28) SECDEF-5(29-33)

ISA-5(34-38) WHITE HOUSE-3(39-41) STATE-1(42) CSA-2(43-44)

CSAF-2(45-46) CNO-2(47-48) CMC-2(49-50) FILE-1 (51) FJC/REB
ADV CY TO...NMCC PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

41 FJC

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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ACTION: Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE 5327

Info:

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FEB 24 11 09 PM '65

NODIS.

Authority STATE letter JUN 26 1979

By if, NARS, Date 2-1-80

Deliver Ambassador Earliest on Waking.

We have decided that we must go ahead with next operation Feb 26

unless there should be further political difficulties in Saigon. Taylor will be
afternoon Saigon time
seeking political clearance/Feb 25/once Khanh is off the scene.

We told Harlech this decision today stating that while we recognized
British concern and possibility some Soviet reaction we cannot even by
implication get into position of withholding continuation of program. We may
hear further from London following his report but would now expect to
maintain decision and indeed Taylor would probably have gone ahead on
political side. If matter comes up you may of course note that we have held
off five days but that British have not had any indication of Soviet response
so that further delay now appeared unwise. We continue of course attach
major importance to UK/Soviet gambit but note that Soviets have involved
themselves somewhat further in meantime by publicized Vinogradov approach
to de Gaulle. (We do not have specifics on this from French.)

OWB

Drafted by: FE:WP Bundy:mk 2/24/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Smith S/S - Mr. RENN Read

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We also told Harlech Feb 26 operation would be heavily oriented to DRV arms shipment and that primary targets were both naval in character. (In event of weather difficulty, we may of course have to hit alternates which are not naval.) We used this rationale to note that operation really represented minimum reaction.

We also commented briefly with Harlech on Couve talks, explaining that French simply restated familiar position. French reports of North Vietnamese and ~~Sxigox~~ ~~zix~~ Chicom attitudes have not given us any feeling there is receptiveness to any realistic negotiations.

GP-1.

End.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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5
Action
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RR RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 1395A 25/0625Z
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUMPA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
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002

~~TOP SECRET~~ ACTION DEPT 2743 INFO CINCPAC 1670 FROM
SAIGON FEB 25, 1 PM

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E X D I S

REF: (A) DEPTTEL 1815, MAY 1, 1964; (B) EMBTEL 2101 (1088 TO
CINCPAC), MAY 2, 1964; (C) CINCPAC 080257Z, DECEMBER 1964.

REF DEPTTEL 1728, AMBASSADOR LODGE IN REF (B) PROPOSED ESTABLISH-
MENT OF US NAVAL PRESENCE AT CAM RANH BAY AT LEAST IN PART AS
CHEAP TRUMP CARD WHICH COULD BE DEALT AWAY AT DIPLOMATIC
CONFERENCE IF PRICE WERE RIGHT. SECOND ASPECT OF PROPOSAL WAS
CFN 2743 1670 25 1 A 1815 1 1964 B 2101 1088 2 1964 C 080257
1964 1728 B US CAM RANH BAY

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1395A ~~TOP SECRET~~
THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO HANOI/PEKING US
DETERMINATION TO REMAIN IN SVN. EMBASSY POSITION AT TIME WAS THAT
AIR AND SEA OPERATIONS PLUS AMPHIBIOUS EXERCISES PROPOSED IF REF
(A) NOT RPT NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVINCE COMMUNISTS THAT WE MEANT
BUSINESS. REF (C) RECOMMENDED THAT CLEARANCES BE OBTAINED TO USE
CAM RANH BAY AS CONTINGENCY ANCHORAGE AND AMPHIB TRAINING AREA.

IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT RATIONALE FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AS
COUNTER FOR PURPOSES OF EVENTUAL DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING RETAINS
SOME VALIDITY BUT THAT SYMBOLIC VALUE AS EVIDENCE OF US DETERMIN-
ATION VASTLY OVERREACHED BY AIRSTRIKES ON DRV, PRESENCE OF HAWKS
AT DANANG, ETC.

USCM HAS UNDERTAKEN GENERAL STUDIES LOOKING TOWARD DEVELOPMENT
OF KHANK HOA-NINH THUAN-TUYEN DUC REGION, WITH CAM RANH BAY
AS INDUSTRIAL AND TRANSPORT HUB, WHICH INDICATE BASICALLY

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Authority State 17 6/29/76
By MTE, NARS, Date 4/19/78

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 2743, February 25, 1 p.m. from Saigon

FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR SUCH DEVELOPMENT. MISSION THEREFORE FAVORABLY DISPOSED AS MATTER OF LONG-TERM POLICY TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF CAM RANH BAY AREA WHEN SITUATION FAVORABLE. HOWEVER, GIVEN DISINCLINATION OR INABILITY OF GVN DURING RECENT MONTHS TO DEVOTE REQUIRED ATTENTION TO THIS OR SIMILAR PROJECTS, PLUS WORSENING SECURITY SITUATION IN AREA, LITTLE OR NO ACTION HAS
CFN HANOI/PEKING US SVN A C CAM RANH BAY US DRV HAWKS DANANG
USCM KHANH HOA-NINH THUAN-TUYEN DUC CAM RANH BAY CAM RANH BAY
GVN

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1395A ~~TOP SECRET~~
BEEN INITIATED. PRESENT SITUATION IS NOT RPT NOT CONDUCTIVE TO OPTIMISM IN ASSESSING FUTURE PROSPECTS ON EITHER COUNT.
POUCHING COPIES OF USCM PAPERS. TAYLOR
BT
CFN USOM

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION:

- ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
- Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE 4444
- Amembassy OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 932
- Amembassy NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1748
- Amembassy MANILA IMMEDIATE 1349
- Amembassy WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 671
- Amembassy TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2145
- Amembassy TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 807
- Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE 789

FEB 25 6 47 PM '65

INFO:

- Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 1824
- Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE 5346
- Amembassy CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 675
- Amembassy MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2302
- Amembassy DJAKARTA IMMEDIATE 748

002

EXDIS.

Following is probable text joint GVN/US announcement expected about 0200 Washington time Feb 26.

QUOTE Republic of Viet-Nam and United States aircraft today took further action against two coastal military installations in the southern part of North Viet-Nam. These installations are being used by Hanoi to support its aggression against the people and territory of South Viet-Nam.

Conclusive new evidence of Hanoi's aggression was revealed by the discovery on February 16 of an armed, ocean-going North Vietnamese vessel in Vung Ro Bay, South Viet-Nam. The vessel had carried large

Drafted by:
FE:WPBundy:mk 2/25/65
Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: FE - William P. Bundy

S/S Mr. Read

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

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Authority State 11/7/75
By MDE, NARS, Date 4/19/78

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quantities of Communist bloc arms, including rifles, machine guns, mortar shells and more than one million rounds of ammunition. Substantial quantities of arms and ammunition were uncovered in dumps on the shore nearby. These supplies came from Hanoi. This is established beyond question by written records, photographs, nautical charts and packing lists. All this evidence has been presented to the International Control Commission and to the world press.

The discovery confirms that North Viet-Nam is in a major operation to send arms into South Viet-Nam by sea, as well as by land.

Under the direction and control of Hanoi, the Viet Cong is using the weapons ~~continuation of the aggression against South Vietnam and in~~ and ammunition supplied by North Viet-Nam in acts of terror against the South Vietnamese people and their local institutions of government. This campaign of ~~violence continues on a day to day basis.~~ (Para) of recent terrorism / Two examples/are cited from the long list: on February 12, a Viet Cong platoon entered Thu Lap hamlet in Thua Thien Province and kidnapped a hamlet official, and murdered his wife, a few days later the Viet Cong blew up a bus in Kien Giang Province injuring 10 civilians, including four children.

The governments of the Republic of Viet-Nam and of the United States wish to avoid widening the conflict, but they are compelled to make clear to Hanoi that North Viet-Nam will be held fully accountable for continuing aggression against South Viet-Nam. END QUOTE.

~~SECRET~~

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As on Feb 7 and 11 addressees should be prepared contact appropriate level upon receipt FLASH instruction tonight our time after we have word mission actually carried out. Weather may prevent hitting intended primary targets and FLASH instruction will cover any such modification.

For Canberra: We have already informed Embassy here.

For Ottawa: Timing presumably means you should simply call at opening of business.

For Djakarta: It may accordingly be wise in course your conversation with Sukarno to point out that while we do have our differences on Vietnamese issue we have our sound reasons. We can at least agree to disagree on this issue and trust it will not be cause for actions against our properties. You should of course under no circumstances mention upcoming actions against North Viet-Nam unless already announced.

All addressees should explain this action responds to major boat episode but also more broadly to VC activity as described and represents action under policy stated by President on Feb 17 calling for "continuing actions . . . which are justified and . . . made necessary by the continuing aggression of others. These actions will be measured and fitting and adequate."

GP-3,

RUSK

End.

~~SECRET~~

27

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

27a

L

February 26, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

To: The Secretary
From: S/AL - Llewellyn E. Thompson **LE3**
Subject: Kosygin's TV Address

From the text I have seen so far, it would seem to me that Kosygin's TV speech is addressed more to the Communist world than to us. It is interesting that he confirmed that they had not been able to work out their differences with the Chinese Communists. From a Tass review of a "Kommunist" article published today, the Soviets appear to be offering economic and scientific cooperation in return for ChiCom restraint in the ideological battle. It is also significant that Kosygin maintained the Soviet position on peaceful coexistence to which the Chinese strongly object.

Kosygin was cautious in threatening Soviet involvement and his inclusion of a demand for our withdrawal from South Korea would appear to diminish the importance of his remarks about Viet-Nam. On the other hand, the new regime in Moscow is probably inclined to talk less and do more than was Khrushchev. I believe, however, that the Soviets genuinely desire a settlement of the Viet-Nameese affair without a major confrontation with us.

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Authority State 11/7/75
By MJE, NARS, Date 4/19/78