

61

200

Rec'd
Apr 26 1965
11:05 a
L

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/a

April 26, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cable from Max Taylor

For information. Max Taylor has made one reservation to Bob McNamara's statement of his views in Bob's memorandum of April 21, and I think you ought to know about it. It is stated in his cable 3504 (at Tab A), and the McNamara text is at Tab B.

In essence, Max says that he thinks we can get a favorable settlement in a matter of months rather than in "perhaps a year or two" if we keep up our bombing and introduce substantial U. S. and third-country forces.

McG. B.
McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

61b.

(Copy of SAIGON 3504 April 24, 1965)
(for Secretary McNamara)

I would like to amend the statement of my views expressed in the memo for the President dated April 21 in two respects.

A. II, paragraph 1. "This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from Viet Cong failure in the South as from DRV pain in the North and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate Viet Cong failure in the South. "

Comment: This statement suggests that it may take a year or two to break the will of Hanoi to continue their present course even if we continue our bombing and introduce substantial U. S. forces. My view is that a favorable settlement should be possible from a combination of continued air attacks and by the introduction of sufficient U. S. and third country forces to demonstrate to Hanoi that the Viet Cong have no ultimate chance of success. This process will probably take months; how many is impossible to estimate.

B. II, paragraph 2. "All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or two, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period. "

Comment: I subscribe to this statement less the phrase "perhaps a year or two. "

TAYLOR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-5-79 letter
By if, NARS, Date 1-23-80

62

201

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Y
62a
DECLASSIFIED

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

26 April 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There have been repeated statements that we should pause in our bombing raids on North Vietnam to give the North Vietnamese Government an opportunity to accept your continued offer to discuss the situation in South Vietnam.

It is important, particularly in view of such statements, that we recognize that the North Vietnamese Government has had ample opportunity to negotiate a settlement with us. The actions of this country in the past -- yours in particular -- have clearly demonstrated that:

A. Before the Gulf of Tonkin Incident

On February 9, 1964, the Viet Cong exploded bombs under the bleachers during a softball game at Pershing Field in Saigon, killing 2 Americans and injuring 23 (including 7 women and 1 child). On February 16, 1964, the Viet Cong attacked a movie theater killing 3 Americans and wounding 35 (including 9 women and children). Viet Cong incidents of this kind persisted in South Vietnam throughout 1964. Throughout this period, we frequently indicated our willingness to seek a peaceful solution in South Vietnam and we took no action to retaliate for the acts of terrorism against United States personnel.

B. First Gulf of Tonkin Attack

On August 2, 1964, North Vietnamese boats attacked the U.S. destroyer MADDOX in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. We took no military action against North Vietnam, but you issued a statement on August 3, indicating that we intended to pursue our right to be in international waters and ordering another destroyer to the Gulf of Tonkin.

C. Second Gulf of Tonkin Attack

North Vietnamese boats again attacked our destroyers on August 4, 1964. On August 5, U.S. planes retaliated in a limited fashion against naval bases which were the home ports of boats and the oil storage area at Vinh which supported them. At the time of this attack, you made it clear that our response was "limited and fitting" and that "we still seek no wider war". The U.S. retaliation did not extend beyond August 5.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD /h/ 3/22/77
By MJE NARS, Date 4/10/78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D. Post Gulf of Tonkin Negotiation Overtures (August 5 to November 1)

There were no U.S. attacks on North Vietnam between August 5, 1964, and February 7, 1965. During this period, you made our position clear. On October 11, 1964, in discussing Vietnam you said, "We are willing to go anywhere, any time, talk to anyone and try to reason together for peace. We would rather talk than fight." On October 28, 1964, in Los Angeles, specifically referring to the Gulf of Tonkin you said, "we can keep the peace, in the words of the prophet Isaiah, by reasoning together, by responsibility, by negotiation."

E. November and December Viet Cong Attacks

The Viet Cong answered your peace overtures with terrorism. On November 1, 1964, the Viet Cong attacked Bien Hoa airfield, killing 4 Americans and wounding 72. On November 18, 1964, they bombed a snack bar in Saigon wounding 18 Americans. On Christmas Eve the Viet Cong bombed the Brink Hotel killing 2 Americans and wounding 64. Nevertheless, we took no action against the North Vietnamese.

F. VC Attack on Pleiku

Finally on February 7, 1965, the Viet Cong attacked the barracks and airfield at Pleiku, killing 9 Americans and wounding 107. As a result, U.S. planes attacked the North Vietnam Army barracks at Dong Hoi and Chap Le again, a limited response to the Vietnam attack at Pleiku. As the White House statement you approved said on this date, "the response is appropriate and fitting. As the U.S. Government has frequently stated, we seek no wider war. Whether or not this course can be maintained lies with the North Vietnamese aggressors." The U.S. took no further action on February 8 and 9.

G. VC Attack on Qui Nhon Barracks

The Viet Cong persisted in their terrorist activities and on February 10, 1965, attacked the U.S. enlisted men's barracks at Qui Nhon, killing 23 Americans and 7 Vietnamese and wounding 21 Americans. Again, we responded in a limited fashion on February 11, 1965, by bombing the Vietnamese Army barracks at Chap Le and Chanh Hoa.

Then another extended period -- three weeks -- elapsed without any attacks on North Vietnam by our planes.

H. Continued VC Terrorism

Following February 11, VC terrorism continued unabated and, therefore, on March 2, 1965, we struck the Xom Bang ammunition depot and Quang Khe Naval Base in North Vietnam specifically limiting ourselves, as we always have, to military targets to avoid injuring civilians.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


Again we paused in our raids and no air attacks against the North were carried out during the next eleven days.

I. -Further VC Terrorism

The Viet Cong persisted in their acts of terrorism. On March 4, 1965, they exploded a bomb in a bar frequented by U.S. personnel in Saigon, killing 2 Americans and 3 Vietnamese and wounding 5 Vietnamese. On March 12, Viet Cong terrorists attempted unsuccessfully to bomb U.S. barracks in Saigon. Therefore we conducted raids on the barracks at Hon Gio and Phu Qui ammunition and storage depot on March 14 and 15. There was a brief pause in our program. But Viet Cong terrorism persisted and on March 19 we conducted raids on North Vietnamese military depots at Phu Van and Vinh Son. Since then, the raids have been frequent, but so have our indications of a willingness to talk. And, unfortunately, so have the acts of Viet Cong terrorism.

On March 19 a bomb in a loaf of bread exploded wounding 4 Americans in Saigon. On March 30, 1965, Viet Cong terrorists exploded a 250 pound bomb in front of the U.S. Embassy killing 2 Americans (including one woman) and 14 Vietnamese, and wounding 48 Americans and 106 Vietnamese, many of them innocent bystanders. On April 4, a Viet Cong terrorist was apprehended at the Grand Hotel at Danang carrying a plastic explosive which he intended to use there. On April 14, 1965, Viet Cong terrorists exploded a bomb in an ammunition storage site at Qui Nhon, wounding 31 Americans. On April 19, 1965, a Viet Cong terrorist exploded a bomb in a bar frequented by U.S. personnel in Ban Me Thuot, wounding 4 Americans.

During this period your position has been abundantly clear. In a statement on Vietnam on March 25, 1965 you said, "As I have said in every part of the union, I am ready to go anywhere at any time, and meet with anyone whenever there is promise of progress toward an honorable peace." On April 7, 1965, at Johns Hopkins University, you again reiterated your willingness to negotiate. On April 8, in response to the 17 nation declaration of March 15, you said, "We will never be second in the search for such a peaceful settlement in Vietnam." As recently as April 17, you said, "To those governments who doubt our willingness to talk, the answer is simple: Agree to discuss. Come to the meeting room. We will be there." And as you know, Secretary Rusk and I have on numerous occasions during this period indicated our hope for peaceful settlement in Vietnam and our willingness to negotiate with the North Vietnamese.


Robert S. McNamara

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

63

202

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

63a

85
Action

~~SECRET~~

CORRECTION ISSUED
4/26/65, 9:15 PM - cc
21417
APRIL 26, 1965
9:22 AM

Control:
Rec'd:

95
Info

FROM: SAIGON - CORRECTED COPY

ACTION: SECSTATE 3539

030

INFO: CINCPAC 2068
BANGKOK 765
VIENTIANE 573

DATE: APRIL 26

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *State 2-9-78 letter*
By *us*, NARS, Date *1-29-84*

FOR GREENFIELD

PASS USIA FOR BUNCE, DOD FOR SYLVESTER

WE HAVE BEEN GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO PRESS PROBLEMS WHICH WILL
ARISE AS MARINES OR OTHER U.S. TROOPS MOVE TO MORE ACTIVE ROLE
AGAINST VIET CONG.

OFFICIALLY AND ON THE RECORD MISSION SPOKESMEN HAVE RESTRICTED
THEMSELVES TO LANGUAGE USED IN DOD RELEASE OF MARCH 7, 1965,
SPECIFYING THAT "LIMITED MISSION OF MARINES WILL BE TO RELIEVE
GVN FORCES NOW ENGAGED IN SECURITY DUTIES FOR ACTION IN
THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND IN OFFENSIVE ROLE AGAINST COMMUNIST
GUERRILLA FORCES".

ON BACKGROUND SPOKESMEN HAVE ANSWERED AFFIRMATIVELY QUESTIONS AS
TO WHETHER MARINES WOULD (A) FIGHT IF ATTACKED AND (B) ENGAGE IN
"PATROLLING IN DEPTH" TO DEEPEN DANANG PERIMETER DEFENSE. WITH
RESPECT TO (B) IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT SUCH PATROLLING
IN DEPTH IS NECESSARY PART OF MARINE PRIMARY DEFENSIVE
MISSION.

SPECULATIVE STORIES HAVE APPEARED HERE ON EVENTUAL COMBAT ROLE
FOR MARINES. ANY ADDITIONAL INPUT OF U.S. COMBAT TROOPS WILL
DOUBTLESS FEED THIS SPECULATION.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3539, APRIL 26, FROM SAIGON - CORRECTED COPY

(AN AP "NEWS ANALYSIS", FOR EXAMPLE, DATED SAIGON, APRIL 22, SPEAKS OF THE EVENTUALITY THAT INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. GROUND TROOPS IN COMBAT WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF A JOINT COMMAND. WHILE CONCEDED THAT SUCH A COMMAND "WOULD HAVE LITTLE PRACTICAL EFFECT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ALLIES", THE ARTICLE STATES THAT IT "WOULD BE A MAJOR DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENT THAT COULD SPARK POWERFUL INTERNATIONAL REACTION". FURTHER, ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO "VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS", THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE TO BE "CONDITIONED" TO ACCEPT SUCH A SITUATION, AND EFFORTS WOULD NEED TO BE MADE TO COUNTERACT COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS THE "LACKEY OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS".)

UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE BELIEVE THAT THE MOST USEFUL APPROACH TO PRESS PROBLEM IS TO MAKE NO REPEAT NO SPECIAL PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT U.S. GROUND TROOPS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS, BUT TO ANNOUNCE SUCH ACTIONS ROUTINELY AS THEY OCCUR. AS THE MARINES MOVE FROM THEIR PRESENT POSTURE OF SECURING THE DANANG AIRBASE "IN DEPTH" TO ACTIONS WHICH CAN BE RELATED ONLY INDIRECTLY TO DANANG, MILITARY SPOKESMAN WILL BE QUERIED ON WHETHER MARINE MISSION HAS CHANGED AND HE WILL ANSWER THAT, WHILE WE NEVER DISCUSS FUTURE, CURRENT OPERATIONS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. EVENTUALLY, OF COURSE, FACT THAT MARINES OR OTHER GROUND TROOPS ARE ENGAGED IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT WILL BE OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED. THIS LOW-KEY TREATMENT WILL NOT REPEAT NOT OBTAIN THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS MENTIONED ABOVE, BUT WILL ALLOW US TO HANDLE THEM UNDRAMATICALLY, AS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF OUR DETERMINATION TO MEET OUR COMMITMENTS HERE.

OUR TREATMENT, IN SHORT, SHOULD BE PATTERNED ON THE MANNER IN WHICH WE PRESENTED THE APPLICATION OF U.S. AIR POWER AGAINST THE VIET CONG.

BAP

TAYLOR

NOTE: CORRECTIONS PASSED DOD 4/26/65.

NOTE: HANDLED LIMDIS PER S/S-O.

NOTE: PASSED DOD APRIL 26TH

~~SECRET~~

64

203

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

64a

5

~~SECRET~~

Action

FE

21092

Info

VV MJA183JIA175

1965 APR 26 AM 12 20

SS

OO RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 1443A 26/0405Z
O 260355Z ZEA

G

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

SP

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3529

SAH

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 2062

L

STATE GRNC

H

BT

P

~~SECRET~~ APRIL 26

DECLASSIFIED

NSC

INR

NSA

AID

PASS USIA, DOD, JCS

Authority *State 2-9-78 letter*

DEPTELS 2417, 2413

By *[Signature]*, NARS, Date *1-29-80*

RMR

FOLLOWING IS COMPLETE TEXT GVN ANNOUNCEMENT ON PAVN PRESENCE SOUTH VIETNAM AS RELEASED BY SEMI-OFFICIAL VIETNAM PRESS AT 10:00AM (SAIGON TIME) APRIL 26.

QUOTE REGULAR NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY PRESENT IN SOUTH (HEADING READS). THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS CONFIRMED THE PRESENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM OF AN ELEMENT OF THE REGULAR NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY.

CFN 3529 2062 26 2417 2413 GVN PAVN 10:00AM 26

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 1443A ~~SECRET~~

THE GOVERNMENT SAID THAT THE 2ND BATTALION, OF THE 101ST REGIMENT OF THE 325TH PAVN DIVISION HAS BEEN POSITIVELY LOCATED IN KONTUM PROVINCE.

IT BASED THE CONFIRMATION OF THE BATTALION'S PRESENCE ON INNERQUOTE RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE WHICH INCLUDED A STATEMENT MADE BY A MEMBER OF THE BATTALION WHO SURRENDERED TO RVN AUTHORITIES IN KONTUM ON MARCH 23 END INNER QUOTE.

THE GOVERNMENT ALSO SAID THAT BEGIN INNER QUOTE ENEMY FORCES ENGAGED BY THE 21ST RANGER BATTALION MARCH 29 AND 30, TEN KILOMETERS SOUTH OF DAK SUT DISTRICT TOWN, KONTUM PROVINCE, WERE WELL-EQUIPPED, WELL-DISCIPLINED PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS WITH SUPERIOR FIREPOWER, THUS LENDING CREDENCE TO THE DEFECTOR'S REPORT END INNER QUOTE.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3529, APRIL 26, FROM SAIGON

THE GOVERNMENT SAID IT HAD OTHER EVIDENCE OF THE BATTALION'S PRESENCE, WHICH IT PREFERRED NOT TO DISCLOSE FOR SECURITY REASONS. END QUOTE.

GP-3. TAYLOR

CFN 2ND 101ST 325TH PAVN KONTUM RVN KONTUM 23 21ST 29 30
DAK SUT KONTUM NOT TO GP-3

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 4-26-65, 12:22 A.M.
PASSED DOD, CIA, 4-26-65, 12:40 A.M.
PASSED USIA, 4-26-64, 12:44 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

65

204

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

1782

2
5
65a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

27 April 1965

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 11-65

SUBJECT: Future Soviet Moves in Vietnam

1. Step by step, the USSR is getting more deeply involved in Vietnam. The recent record clearly shows that Khrushchev's successors, while they have no clear-cut plan for solving the crisis, find that the price he was willing to pay in order to disengage from it is too high. They feel unable to bear passively the opprobrium which the Chinese are only too ready to heap upon them for abandoning the struggle in Vietnam. That struggle at its present state has two vital aspects -- the territorial integrity of a socialist country and the cause of a "national liberation" movement against the "imperialists." Because both these aspects are bound up with the USSR's position in the Communist world and in the underdeveloped areas, the post-Khrushchev leadership feels compelled to act, even in the face of risks which Khrushchev had turned away from.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 23433
By ms/8, NARA; Date 4-4-14

2. But the USSR is in an extremely complicated position. China is determined to prevent the Soviets from rebuilding their influence in Hanoi, or gaining any credit for supporting the DRV, unless Moscow alters its policies so radically as to confirm Chinese strategic arguments. Merely to gain a seat at the table, Moscow has had to throw overboard the US-USSR detente inherited from Khrushchev, and now it has to put more chips in the pot in order to stay in the game.

Relations with the DRV

3. The Soviets won one hand this month when a DRV delegation visited Moscow for a week of talks. The joint communique contained Vietnamese expressions of gratitude for past Soviet aid, thereby spiking Chinese charges to the contrary. And the two parties kept slightly ajar the door to negotiations, which Peiping is trying to slam, by endorsing the proposed conference on Cambodia. Kosygin's subsequent speech claimed agreement on "forms of methods of struggle ... further strengthening of the defensive capacity of socialist Vietnam, and settling the problems of Indochina on the basis of the Geneva agreements." China was clearly displeased; the DRV delegation spent several days in Peiping on its way home, but no communique marked its departure from the Chinese capital.

4. Moscow's political gains, however, evidently were bought at some military price. The communique spoke of an "understanding on further measures designed to safeguard the security and defend the sovereignty of the DRV." It said that "appropriate measures for these purposes" had been agreed upon. This has the ring of new military plans, and in fact these passages followed directly on the statement that the "earlier understanding" on "strengthening the defense potential of the DRV" was being carried out "to the envisaged extent and procedure."

Some Possibilities

5. What forms might new military aid take? What the DRV needs most, and what the USSR can better supply than China, is assistance in air defense. Anti-aircraft weapons almost certainly will be provided in quantity, particularly for defense of that part of the DRV under continuous US attack. Radars are equally likely to appear on the list. The Soviets probably have agreed to make good DRV losses and to meet any demands for a general increase in DRV capabilities in these categories.

6. SAMs were evidently included, at least to the extent of one site, in the February agreement, and it is likely that out

of those talks and the April meeting will come a substantial SAM deployment, complete with Soviet technicians, in northern North Vietnam. By putting up a defense of areas which the US, at least for the present, does not mean to attack, the USSR can gain considerable credit at little risk and add to the deterrents on US strikes and high-altitude reconnaissance in the north.

7. Fighter aircraft pose more difficult problems. It is almost certain that China would not make its bases available for Soviet tactical air operations. The base structure in North Vietnam is very limited, and even if the Communists counted on escaping retaliation against these bases, it is hard to see how the USSR could put enough aircraft into the area to match present US strength.

8. For these reasons, we doubt that the Soviets will dispatch tactical air units to North Vietnam. They may turn over some new aircraft to the DRV and provide some pilots and technicians. But we think that such a move would not be a prelude to early engagement with US strike aircraft. Rather, it would be intended to provide the DRV with another tangible proof of Soviet support, to add to the military deterrents on attacking northern North Vietnam, and to increase US worries that, if attacks were extended northward, matters might quickly get out of control.

9. Another decision concerns the status of Soviet personnel sent to the DRV with these or other equipments. We have estimated that, in order to retain flexibility in the event of casualties, these personnel would appear as "volunteers" or technicians, perhaps without any official acknowledgement. The increasing Soviet involvement casts some doubt on this estimate. If Moscow wishes to jolt the US with a new commitment, and is willing to accept the risks, it might issue a statement acknowledging these personnel and warning that attacks on them would produce a response in force.

More Radical Departures

10. There is an argument for more radical Soviet measures than those suggested above. The Soviet leadership, new and untried in crisis, finds itself in perhaps the most complicated situation since the Korean War. It is attempting to influence a distant crisis in which the leading roles are played by an independent DRV determined to conquer the southern half of its nation, a hostile China which lies between the USSR and the seat of the fighting, and a US which is regularly strengthening its commitment. Thus the risks will remain largely beyond Soviet control and, worse, they may have to be borne for an indefinite period of time. These factors, exerting contradictory and growing

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

pressures on Soviet policy, may eventually force it in either of two directions.

11. One direction leads to an early military confrontation in Vietnam. The Soviets might reason that this would be preferable to the prolonged acceptance of lesser but still substantial risks. Thus they might deploy to Vietnam military forces of a type, and on a scale, intended to convince the US that it could continue bombing the DRV only at very high risk. Such Soviet forces could include the air defense units mentioned above, ground units, a variety of other technical personnel, and coastal naval vessels. Submarines might be deployed to the South China Sea. Conceivably they could include light bombers or surface-to-surface missiles intended, not for their military utility, but for shock effect to reinforce the impression of a farreaching Soviet commitment requiring an immediate US retreat.

12. This would be a very dangerous course of action, and the USSR might instead move in the opposite direction. In their dilemma, perhaps sharpened by some new US moves, the new Soviet leaders might come to decide that Khrushchev was right after all, that the Soviet Union could not sustain a substantial commitment in Southeast Asia without taking on unacceptable risks. Thus

- 6 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

they might choose gradually to disengage, covering their military non-support with vigorous diplomacy and propaganda on behalf of Hanoi and the Viet Cong.

13. These alternatives -- one risky, the other costly -- are very unattractive. The Soviets will wish to steer a middle course between them for as long as possible, and some sort of middle course is probably what emerged out of the April meeting in Moscow. But if the crisis persists at present or higher levels of risk, indecisiveness, and complication, the middle way may not survive.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Sherman Kent

SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

- 7 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

66

205

April 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cable from Max Taylor

1. I attach Max Taylor's message on his conversation with Quat today (Tab A). Max now recommends a 9-battalion decision. My own view is that we ought to decide something more limited -- perhaps the items (a) and (b) in his third paragraph (6 battalions).

2. The more gradual that we can keep this process of decision and action, the better. I attach at Tab B a telegram from Sullivan which shows the wary reaction of one of our wisest diplomats in the field.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

4/27/65

66b

(copy of Vientiane 1712) April 21, 1965

During Southeast Asia Coordinating meeting, participants were briefed by MACV on JCS proposals for extensive new U. S. troop deployments in Southeast Asia. Since I believe execution of these proposals would have widespread reactions in all countries of this region, you may find it of some use to have my judgment re probable Lao reactions to these deployments.

First, as I have reported, Lao believe our methodical bombardment of North Vietnam is correct and will produce results. They are perhaps more optimistic than we that in reasonable period of time North Vietnam and Viet Cong morale will collapse and they will sue for peace on terms acceptable to us. They have taken great heart from our actions and have gained a new confidence in their own future.

If we, by proposed deployments, indicate we, on the other hand, have lost confidence in prospect that bombardment will produce results, Lao will rethink their own estimates. They will probably interpret our deployments as evidence of panic and this atmosphere can be very infectious.

Second, despite many earlier misgivings and in the face of Communist and French propaganda to the contrary, Lao accept the idea that we have no, repeat no, colonial or neo-colonial ambitions here. A massive occupation of South Vietnam by U. S. forces except in extremis would also cause this assumption to be re-examined.

The net result of these two factors would, in my judgment, be considerable diminution in Lao confidence re U. S. objectives and capabilities. The practical consequences would probably include much less active cooperation with us in our current military operations and a rather headlong rush to embrace French policy of "negotiated neutrality" for Southeast Asia.

SULLIVAN

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

State 10-10-78 letter

By

if, SRS, Date 1-23-80

~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

(Cy of Saigon 3552, pril 27, 1965)

b6c

FROM AMBASSADOR ~~=====~~ Taylor

Although Quat had not summoned us to resume the discussions reported in reference telegram, Alex Johnson and I went to see him this afternoon to find out the current status of his thinking on the introduction of international forces. We found that he was full of the subject, having discussed many aspects of the military manpower shortage with Generals Thieu and Minh over the weekend.

He is particularly impressed with the need and possibility of increasing the national effort beyond the present program of 31 additional ARVN battalions between July 1965 and March 1966 (the so-called second alternative). He sees numerous possibilities of utilizing certain specially trained regional force soldiers, ex-non-coms dismissed by Diem in the late 1950's, and officers presently assigned to civilian ministries. He also considers that the Nungs and Hao Hoa are capable of producing many more soldiers and units than at present. He has charged General Minh with looking into these possibilities and of formulating a new program to superimpose on the second alternative. Knowing something of the problem of raising additional forces, I have doubts as to the feasibility of most of Quat's ideas, but his enthusiasm is certainly laudable.

With regard to additional US forces, we agreed that General Westmoreland should contact Generals Thieu and Minh and work out plans for the following movements: (a) three battalion equivalents to move into Bien Hoa-Vung Tau in early May; (b) three battalion equivalents, followed by three air squadrons, to move into Chu Lai early May; (c) three battalion equivalents to move into Qui Nhon-Nhatrang in mid-June. It is understood that in addition to these US combat forces, there will be substantial numbers of logistic troops brought in to add to the logistic support presently in-country, to provide support for the additional combat forces, and to improve the logistic facilities in the three areas mentioned above.

With regard to publicity, it was agreed that, as combat units are about to enter the country, as in the case of the Marines, there will be a simple announcement made, indicating that the additional forces come at the invitation of the Government of Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 85-224

By lj, NARA, Date 7-23-87

TOP SECRET

We then passed to a discussion of third country forces. Quat made a fuzzy introduction which led me to believe for a moment that he was going to raise obstacles to non-US foreign troops. However, in a circumlocution which was difficult to follow, he concluded that since it was the position of his Government that the cause of South Vietnam is really the cause of the Free World, it would be entirely consistent for him to accept third country units. He noted in passing that he was aware of our US domestic problem and that the presence of other flags would be of assistance to us.

I told him that I felt sure the Australians were prepared to offer a battalion and that Ambassador Anderson would no doubt be seeking an appointment with him shortly. He replied that Anderson was already on his list for callers for tomorrow. He showed some interest in the possibility of a Korean reinforcement but was markedly cool to the thought of additional Philippine forces. We left both matters open with the agreement to obtain Ambassador Lodge's impressions of his visits to Seoul and Manila when Lodge calls tomorrow. Also, Quat authorized Alex Johnson to discuss the matter of these foreign contingents with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do who we found is abreast of these matters.

find

General Westmoreland is undertaking planning at once with Thieu and Minh on the approved subjects. As these matters were presented to Quat as being what I would recommend to Washington if he concurred, I now request approval of the introduction of the US Combat and Logistic Forces on the general schedule indicated above.

67

206

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

S 67a

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DIST: ASD/PA-10 ASD/ISA-9 LA-2 ASD/MPR-1 CSA-2 CNO-2 CSAF-2 CMC-7
SECDEF-5 STATE-1 WHITE HOUSE-3 CJCS-1 DJS-3 USIA-1 (MAIL-) (FILE-1 (50)
WS&R

| | | | | | |
|------------|------------------|------|-------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| PRECEDENCE | TYPE MSG (Check) | | ACCOUNTING SYMBOL | ORIG. OR REFERS TO | CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE |
| ACTION | ROUTINE | BOOK | MULTI | SINGLE | |
| INFO | ROUTINE | | X | | OSD |

FROM: OSD WASH D C

TO: CINCAL
CINCLANT
GINCONAD
USCINCEUR
CINCPAC
CINCSAC
USCINCSO
CINCSTRIKE

INFO: COMUSJAPAN
COMUSMACV
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
STATE DEPT/ZEN
WHITE HOUSE/ZEN

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Distribution:
OASD(PA)-10
OASD(ISA)
OATSD(LA)
OASD(M)
CINFO
CHINFO
SAFOI
Dir Info USMC
OSD - 10
STATE:P
USIA
JCS

OASD(PA)
Distribution:
F.O. - 1
SA/VN - 1
DIS - 1
DSR - 4
P&P-3

UNCLASSIFIED DEF 00981 From OASD(PA) sgd Sylvester

For Public Affairs Officers.

| | |
|-------|------|
| DATE | TIME |
| 26 | |
| MONTH | YEAR |
| Apr | 1965 |

| | | | | | | | |
|----------|---|------------------------|----------|-----------|-----------------------------------|------------------|----|
| WR-1-111 | SYMBOL | OASD(PA) | | SIGNATURE | <i>Arthur Sylvester</i> | | |
| | TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required) | Col. C. F. Heasty, USA | | | TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE | Arthur Sylvester | |
| | PHONE | 71346 | PAGE NR. | | 1 | NR. OF PAGES | 11 |
| | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | UNCLASSIFIED | | | DTG: 270041Z APR 65 | | |

JOINT MESSAGEFORM-CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM

OSD WASH D C

This is a Public Affairs Policy cable.

The Secretary of Defense held a news conference 26 April 1965 at which he made the following statement:

"The clandestine infiltration of personnel and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam continues to play a vital role in providing the Viet Cong with the leadership, technical competence, weapons, and munitions required to carry on the insurgency against the Government of Vietnam.

"Recent evidence, from newly captured prisoners and documents, has increased the estimate of infiltrators since 1959 to a total of 39,000. Reports so far confirm the infiltration of between 5,000 and 8,000 personnel in 1964 alone, and, in view of the normal time lag between actual infiltration and confirmation, it is probable that there were at least 10,000 infiltrators in that single year.

"Furthermore, recent captures indicate that approximately 75% of those infiltrated during 1964 were born in North Vietnam. It is clear that the Communists are determined to keep up this support despite the drying up of the supply of former Southerners who were ordered North by the Viet Minh in 1954. Many of the recent captives are young draftees called into infiltration units

009811

SYMBOL OASD(PA)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

PAGE NR 2

NR OF PAGES 11

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

INITIALS

JOINT MESSAGEFORM-CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: OSD WASH D C

that marched south through Laos in units 500-600 strong.

"With the changing nature and the intensification of infiltration both of arms and of personnel, the course of aggression pursued by the government of North Vietnam has grown progressively more flagrant and unconstrained. The latest step is the covert infiltration of a regular combat unit of the North Vietnamese Army into South Vietnam. Evidence accumulating in the last month has now confirmed the presence in northwest Kontum Province of the 2d Battalion of the 101st Regiment, 325th Division of the People's Army of Vietnam.

"Meanwhile, the great bulk of the weapons requirements of the Viet Cong are supplied from external sources. Since 1960, the Viet Cong have captured approximately 39,000 weapons from government troops while losing 25,000 of their own -- a net gain of only 14,000. Thus the Viet Cong have gained only 10 - 15% of their over-all weapons requirements by capture. The remainder of the weapons, for their 38-46,000 main force troops and for their 100,000 irregulars have come from external sources.

"Moreover, it appears that the Viet Cong main force units now are being entirely reequipped and retrained with the newest Chinese Communist family of weapons. For example, 101 weapons

009811

SYMBOL

OASD(PA)

PAGE
NR 3

NR OF
PAGES
11

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

INITIALS

JOINT MESSAGEFORM-CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM:

OSD WASH F C

were capture fr n elements of a Viet Cong regiment in Chuong Thien Province on April 5 and 6. They are believed to be representatives of the weapons mix of VC main force units. They consisted of one US M1 rifle and four US carbines, an East German light machine gun, two Czech assault rifles and the rest Chinese Communist weapons, including 72 modern rifles and carbines, 11 assault rifles, four light machine guns, two 60 mm mortars, three rocket launchers and a 75 mm recoilless rifle. Thus over 90% of the small arms and 100% of the larger pieces were of Bloc -- mainly Chinese -- origin. Prisoners captured in this battle stated that their units had been quiet in the past two months because they had withdrawn to the U Minh Forest to receive and to train with the new family of Chinese Communist weapons. The ammunition supply for these weapons has been and will have to be infiltrated from North Vietnam.

"The current South Vietnamese and US air strikes against the North have been carefully designed to impede infiltration of the men and materiel which make the difference between a situation which is manageable and one which is not manageable internally by the Government of South Vietnam. The air strikes have been carefully limited to military targets -- primarily to infiltration targets: transit-point barracks, supply dumps,

009811

| | | | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|---|-----------------|
| <p>SYMBOL OASD(PA)</p> | <p>PAGE NR 4</p> | <p>NR OF PAGES 11</p> | <p>SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED</p> | <p>INITIALS</p> |
|----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|---|-----------------|

JOINT MESSAGEFORM-CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM:

OSD WASH D C

ammunition depots, lines of communication, radars in the vicinity of these facilities, and more recently railroads, highways and bridges serving the infiltration routes.

"The strikes against bridges have been particularly successful. During the period April 3 - 26, Vietnamese and US aircraft struck a total of 27 rail and highway bridges along key lines of communication in North Vietnam. Primary emphasis has been placed on those routes south of 20° North which have been associated with the movement of men and material southward into Laos, and from there, ultimately into South Vietnam. Twenty-four of the bridges have been destroyed or so badly damaged as to be rendered incapable of supporting traffic.

"The basic objective of these bridge strikes has been to inhibit, reduce and deflect the movement southward of men and materiel by effectively denying use of primary lines of communication and by forcing dependence on an inadequate secondary road system and alternate means of transport. Secondly, such strikes have been designed to increase dependence on an already overburdened truck transport capability by denying use of rail lines in the South. That is, the objectives are to force the infiltration from railroads to

009811

SYMBOL

OASD(PA)

PAGE
NR 5

NR OF
PAGES
11

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

INITIALS

JOINT MESSAGEFORM-CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: OSD WASH D C

trucks and fr n trucks to feet.

"A total of ten highway bridges have been struck and destroyed along the key North-South coastal highway Route 1. In addition, two railway and two combination railway-highway bridges situated along Route 1 between the Thanh Hoa area and Vinh also have been destroyed. These latter strikes have effectively terminated the movement of rail traffic from Thanh Hoa southward to the various convoy-support and staging areas near Routes 8 and 12. Destruction of the railway bridges will result in increased dependence on the highway systems; destruction of the highway bridges will complicate the movement of vehicle convoys southward.

"Nine bridges have been struck along the routes leading westward into Laos. Heaviest emphasis has been placed on bridges situated along Routes 8 and 12 which are directly associated with the movement of men and material into the Panhandle area of Laos and, ultimately, southward into South Vietnam.

"U. S. strikes against bridges in North Vietnam have been extremely accurate and very effective. Spans and piers have been dropped and destroyed, and bridge approaches and abutments have been severely damaged. Supplementing the bridge strikes,

009811

| | | | | |
|--------------------|--------------|-------------------|---|----------|
| SYMBOL OASD(PA) | PAGE NR 6 | NR OF PAGES 11 | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED | INITIALS |
|--------------------|--------------|-------------------|---|----------|

JOINT MESSAGEFORM-CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM:

OSD WASH D C

armed reconnaissance is being conducted against truck convoys, maritime traffic, and rolling stock along rail lines. In addition, strikes are being accomplished against secondary target areas associated with the lines of communication.

"The carefully controlled air strikes will continue as necessary to impede the infiltration and to persuade the North Vietnamese leadership that their aggression against the South must stop."

In reply to queries by representatives of news media the Secretary made the following points:

- a. There is no military requirement for the use of nuclear weapons in the current situation and no useful purpose can be served by speculation on remote contingencies.
- b. North Vietnamese will use ferries to replace destroyed bridges but it will be quite a task and will take a considerable period of time. Secondly, they will get around destroyed bridges by diverting traffic from the main routes to secondary routes, which increases the time and labor required for infiltration.
- c. To avoid hitting civilians in air strikes each target is chosen after very careful review of reconnaissance photographs to insure that the target is isolated from areas of

009811

| | | | | |
|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------|---|----------|
| SYMBOL OASD(PA) | PAGE NR 7 | NR OF PAGES .11 | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED | INITIALS |
|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------|---|----------|

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM:

OSD WASHDC

civilian population. To the best of our knowledge there have been few, if any, civilian casualties associated with air strikes to date.

d. The air strikes into North Vietnam have not resulted in completely isolating the battlefield. We have impeded the progress of men and materiel from North Vietnam through Laos and into South Vietnam.

e. The size of the North Vietnamese battalion operating in South Vietnam is believed to be on the order of 400 to 500 men. Its presence there is primarily significant in indicating that the North Vietnamese no longer have sufficient individual fighters who could be recruited, trained and sent back to fight in South Vietnam and that the North Vietnamese are now having to call upon the regular units of their forces for that purpose. In the past 4-1/2 years the Viet Cong has lost 89,000 men killed in South Vietnam. Not all of these men have been infiltrated from the North but an important number have been. The casualty rates for both the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese are high. The South Vietnamese are suffering casualties at rates higher than we have ever experienced in our history. This is an indication of their will to fight and defend their own country and government.

f. Concerning infiltration by sea, the Viet Cong depend more and more upon North Vietnam for their ammunition. As that

009811

| SYMBOL | PAGE NR | NR OF PAGES | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | INITIALS |
|----------|---------|-------------|-------------------------|----------|
| OASD(PA) | 8 | 11 | UNCLASSIFIED | |

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM:

OS WASHDC

supply requirement increases, the Viet Cong are seeking to supplement their land routes by sea routes. Therefore, we have joined with the South Vietnamese in expanding the sea patrol, which already includes 400 or 500 junks, to which we have added U. S. Naval vessels and aircraft to help detect North Vietnamese vessels and to allow the South Vietnamese to inspect and, where necessary, destroy men and equipment being infiltrated from the North.

g. In 1961 Khrushchev strongly endorsed wars of liberation and made it perfectly clear that it would be through application of that strategy that the Communists would seek to subvert independent nations. This is the strategy being used by the Communist Chinese in Southeast Asia. It is a strategy we should oppose.

h. There are no plans to increase procurement above previously established levels. Stocks of tactical aircraft have been vastly increased during the past 4 or 5 years. We have taken delivery on some 3,500 tactical aircraft during the past 4 years. Losses in Southeast Asia are low in relation to the aircraft procurement schedule. Similarly, we have increased our inventories of conventional munitions which appear adequate at the present time.

i. There is clear evidence from interrogation of Communist prisoners that aerial bombing in North Vietnam is adversely

009811

SYMBOL

OASD(PA)

PAGE NR

9

NR OF PAGES

11

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

INITIALS

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM:

OSI WASHDC

affecting morale of the Communists in South Vietnam. Furthermore, North Vietnamese are being forced to divert their limited resources to a greater degree to the aggression they are carrying on in the South.

j. The infiltration of the North Vietnamese battalion does not suggest that the Viet Cong may be trying to move into the third stage of insurgency. The Viet Cong have had battalions operating in the South heretofore but organized from individuals sent as individuals into the South. The difference is that they have sent a battalion as a battalion into the South with consequent implications as to their manpower problems rather than operational tactics.

k. It will be difficult for the Soviets and Red Chinese to send volunteers to Vietnam in that they must recruit men, train them in guerrilla tactics and infiltrate them through very long and difficult routes of communication.

l. To the best of our knowledge there are no operational SAM missile sites in North Vietnam at present, but we should assume that there will be and plan accordingly.

m. It is not anticipated that the effect of air strikes will be less in the future than it has been to date. With the destruction of some 23 bridges, our air strikes are now concentrating on armed reconnaissance, attacking military trucks and convoys. Concerning

009811

| SYMBOL | PAGE NR | NR OF PAGES | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | INITIALS |
|----------|---------|-------------|-------------------------|----------|
| OASD(PA) | 10 | 11 | UNCLASSIFIED | |

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM:

OSD WASHDC

turning Da Nang into a possible Dien Bien Phu, the war in South Vietnam is a guerrilla war that must be fought primarily by the South Vietnamese. The U.S. must depend upon them for guerrilla combat. They are fighting for the preservation of their own government and their own nation.

n. The results so far of the controlled escalation tactics are quite clear. The obvious effects on the rate of infiltration and the increased effort that these strikes are causing the North Vietnamese are much to our advantage.

o. The estimated cost of the operation in Vietnam is running approximately \$300 million a year in economic aid, \$70 million a year in PL-480 contributions, \$330 million in the military assistance program for Fiscal 1965, and \$800 million a year for U.S. forces operating in the waters of South Vietnam and in the air to include the cost of our advisory and logistical support. The total approximates a billion and a half dollars a year at the present time.

009811

| SYMBOL | PAGE NR | NR OF PAGES | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | INITIALS |
|----------|---------|-------------|-------------------------|----------|
| OASD(PA) | 11 | 11 | UNCLASSIFIED | |

68

207

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

68a

44

UNCLASSIFIED

22540

1965 APR 27 AM 9 10

Action

FE

Info

SS

G

SP

SAH

L

H

EUR

IO

P

USIA

NSC

INR

NSA

NIC

AID

E

MC

COM

TRSY

RMR

CO RUEHC
DE RUABSG 1553E/1 27/1150Z
ZNR
O 271200Z
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3550
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 2072
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS SEONE OPTWO APRIL 27

SECTION ONE CINCPAC FOR POLAD.

GVN HAS JUST RELEASED FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY ON NEW MEASURES OF SEA SURVEILLANCE:

BEGIN TEXT. DUE TO THE FACT OF A CONSTANT AND INCREASING INFILTRATION BY SEA INTO THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM OF VIET CONG PERSONNEL, ARMS, AMMUNITION AND VARIOUS WAR SUPPLIES, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SIGNED DECREE NO. 81/NG OF THE 27TH OF APRIL 1965, BY WHICH THE FOLLOWING MEASURES HAVE BEEN DECIDED UPON TO ENSURE THE SECURITY AND THE DEFENCE OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS CFN 3550 2072 27 81/NG 27TH 1965

PAGE 2 RUABSG 1553E/1 UNCLAS OF VIETNAM:

I. THE TERRITORIAL WATERS UP TO THE THREE MILE LIMIT IS DECLARED A DEFENSIVE SEA AREA. THE PASSAGE OF VESSELS THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE PEACE, GOOD ORDER OR SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM IS NOT CONSIDERED AS INNOCENT PASSAGE AND IS FORBIDDEN BY THE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. SHIPS OF ANY COUNTRY OPERATING WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM WHICH ARE NOT CLEARLY ENGAGED IN INNOCENT PASSAGE ARE SUBJECT TO VISIT AND SEARCH, AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO ARREST AND DISPOSITION, AS PROVIDED BY THE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM IN CONFORMITY WITH ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

CARGOES WILL BE CONSIDERED SUSPECT UNLESS IT CAN BE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT THEY ARE DESTINED FOR A PORT OUTSIDE THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM OR A LEGITIMATE RECIPIENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM. CARGOES WILL BE CONSIDERED PARTICULARLY SUSPECT IF CONTAINING ANY OF THE ITEMS LISTED BELOW.

UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 3550, April 27, from Saigon (sec 1 of 2)

1) WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, ELECTRICAL AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.

2) PRIMER, MINE, GUNPOWDER AND OTHER EXPLOSIVES.

3) CHEMICAL PRODUCTS WHICH CAN SERVE MILITARY PURPOSES
(SUCH AS AMMONIA NITRATE, SODIUM NITRATE, POTASSIUM NITRATE,

PAGE 3 RUABSG 1553E/1 UNCLAS

CALCIUM NITRATE, POTASSIUM CHLORATE, AMMONIA CHLORATE, POTASSIUM PERCHLORATE, POTASH PERCHLORATE, SODA PERCHLORATE, SODIUM PERCHLORATE, DIPHENYLAMINE, CONTIALITE, ETHER, NITRO CELLULOSE, NITRO GLYCERIN, MAGNESIUM, ALUMINUM POWDER, BARIUM CHLORIDE, MERCURY FULMINATE, BENZENE, CHLORINE, CALCIUM CARBIDE, ACETYLENE, LIQUID AND COMPRESSED OXYGEN, SULPHUR, ACETONE, NITRIC ACID, SULPHURIC ACID, HYDROCHLORIC ACID).

4) MEDICAL SUPPLIES OF COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM, COMMUNIST CHINA OR SOVIET BLOC ORIGIN.

5) FOODSTUFFS OF COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM, COMMUNIST CHINA OR SOVIET BLOC ORIGIN.

II. THE PASSAGE OF VESSELS THROUGH THE WATER CONTIGUOUS TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM UP TO TWELVE NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE BASELINE FROM WHICH THE BREADTH OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA IS MEASURED ARE SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO PREVENT OR PUNISH INFRINGEMENTS OF THE CUSTOMS, FISCAL, IMMIGRATION AND SANITARY REGULATIONS EFFECTIVE WITHIN THE TERRITORY OR TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. ENTRY OF MATERIALS AND MERCHANDISES INTO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OTHER THAN THROUGH

PAGE 4 RUABSG 1553E/1 UNCLAS

RECOGNIZED ROUTES OR PORTS OF ENTRY IS FORBIDDEN BY CUSTOMS REGULATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

ENTRY INTO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OF PERSONS OTHER THAN THROUGH RECOGNIZED ROUTES OR PORTS OF ENTRY IS FORBIDDEN BY IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM INTENDS TO ENFORCE STRICTLY THESE CUSTOMS, FISCAL AND IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS.

TAYLOR

BT

ADVANCED COPY TO S/S-O

4/27/65 9:20 AM

PASSED
WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA
4/27/65 9:37 AM

UNCLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

44

UNCLASSIFIED

22600

Action

APR 27 10 05

FE

OO RUEHC
DE RUABSG 1553E/2 27/1200Z

Info

ZNR
O 271200Z

SS

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3550

G

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 2072

SP

STATE GRNC

SAH

BT

L

UNCLAS (SETWO OF TWO) APRIL 27

H

EUR

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

IO

P

USIA

ACCORDINGLY, VESSELS WITHIN THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE SUSPECTED OF PREPARING TO AID IN INFRINGEMENTS OF THE CUSTOMS, FISCAL OR IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARE SUBJECT TO VISIT AND SEARCH, AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO ARREST AND DISPOSITION, AS PROVIDED BY THE LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN CONFORMITY WITH ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

NSC

INR

NSA

NIC

AID

E

MC

COM

TRSY

III. IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO ACT BEYOND THE 12 MILE CONTIGUOUS ZONE TO PREVENT OR PUNISH ANY INFRINGEMENT OF THE LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BY VESSELS FLYING THE FLAG OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM OR REASONABLY
CFN 3550 2072 27

RMR

PAGE 2 RUABSG 1553E/2

BELIEVED TO BE SOUTH VIETNAMESE, THOUGH FLYING A FOREIGN FLAG OR REFUSING TO SHOW A FLAG; THE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST SUCH SHIPS MAY INCLUDE STOPPING, VISITING, AND SEARCHING. IF THE REASONABLE SUSPICIONS AS TO VIETNAMESE NATIONALITY PROVE UNFOUNDED AND THE VESSEL HAS NOT COMMITTED ANY ACT JUSTIFYING THESE SUSPICIONS, THE VESSEL WILL BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE WITH PROMPT AND REASONABLE COMPENSATION PAID BY THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM FOR ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED.

IV. VESSELS WHICH ARE WITHIN THE TERRITORY, THE TERRITORIAL SEA OR THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND WHICH ARE SUSPECTED OF INFRINGING THE ABOVE REGULATIONS WITHIN THE TERRITORY OR TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARE SUBJECT TO HOT PURSUIT ON THE HIGH SEAS AS PROVIDED FOR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-3550, April 27, (Section 2 of 2) from: Saigon

V. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS REQUESTED AND OBTAINED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S.A. FOR THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE U.S. NAVY WITH THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO ENFORCE THE NEW SECURITY AND DEFENSE MEASURES AS ORDERED BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

PAGE 3 RUABSG 1553E/2

SAIGON, 27 APRIL 1965. END TEXT.

GVN INTENDS TO SEND TEXT THIS COMMUNIQUE BY CIRCULAR NOTE TOMORROW TO EMBASSIES OF COUNTRIES WITH WHICH IT MAINTAINS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH REQUEST IT BE TRANSMITTED TO RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN 27 1965

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 10:10 a.m. 4/27/65

Passed to White House, DOD & CIA at 10:20 a.m. 4/27/65

UNCLASSIFIED

69

208

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

3
69a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL : 22627
RECD : APRIL 27, 1965, 10:22 AM

Info FROM : SAIGON
ACTION : SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 3552

~~TOP SECRET~~

APRIL 27

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY RUSK FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

N O D I S - EMBTEL 3511.

ALTHOUGH QUAT HAD NOT SUMMONED US TO RESUME THE DISCUSSIONS REPORTED IN REFTTEL ALEX JOHNSON AND I WENT TO SEE HIM THIS AFTERNOON TO FIND OUT THE CURRENT STATUS OF HIS THINKING ON THE INTRODUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES. WE FOUND THAT HE WAS FULL OF THE SUBJECT HAVING DISCUSSED MANY ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY MANPOWER SHORTAGE WITH GENERALS THIEU AND MINH OVER THE WEEKEND.

HE IS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH THE NEED AND POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING THE NATIONAL EFFORT BEYOND THE PRESENT PROGRAM OF 31 ADDITIONAL ARVN BATTALIONS BETWEEN JULY 1965 AND MARCH 1966 (THE SO-CALLED SECOND ALTERNATIVE). HE SEES NUMEROUS POSSIBILITIES OF UTILIZING CERTAIN SPECIALLY TRAINED REGIONAL FORCE SOLDIERS, EX-NON-COMS DISMISSED BY DIEM IN THE LATE 50S, AND OFFICERS PRESENTLY ASSIGNED TO CIVILIAN MINISTRIES. HE ALSO CONSIDERS THAT THE NUNGS AND HAO HOA ARE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING MANY MORE SOLDIERS AND UNITS THAN AT PRESENT. HE HAS CHARGED GENERAL MINH WITH LOOKING INTO THESE POSSIBILITIES AND OF FORMULATING A NEW PROGRAM TO SUPERIMPOSE ON THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE. KNOWING SOMETHING OF THE PROBLEM OF RAISING ADDITIONAL FORCES, I HAVE DOUBTS AS TO THE FEASIBILITY OF MOST OF QUAT'S IDEAS, BUT HIS ENTHUSIASM IS CERTAINLY LAUDABLE.

WITH REGARD TO ADDITIONAL U.S. FORCES, WE AGREED THAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND SHOULD CONTACT GENERALS THIEU AND MINH AND WORK OUT PLANS FOR THE FOLLOWING MOVEMENTS; (A) THREE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS TO MOVE INTO BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU IN EARLY MAY; (B) THREE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS, FOLLOWED BY THREE AIR SQUADRONS, TO MOVE INTO CHU LAI EARLY MAY; (C) THREE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS TO MOVE INTO QUI NHON-NHATRANG IN MID-JUNE. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT IN ADDITION TO THESE U.S. COMBAT FORCES, THERE WILL BE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF LOGISTIC TROOPS BROUGHT IN TO ADD TO THE

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Authority NS 85-224

By Lg, NARA, Date 4-4-74

~~TOP SECRET (NODIS)~~

-2- 3553, From Saigon, Cn 22627, April 27, 1965

LOGISTIC SUPPORT PRESENTLY IN-COUNTRY, TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE ADDITIONAL COMBAT FORCES, AND TO IMPROVE THE LOGISTIC FACILITIES IN THE THREE AREAS MENTIONED ABOVE.

WITH REGARD TO PUBLICITY, IT WAS AGREED THAT, AS COMBAT UNITS ARE ABOUT TO ENTER THE COUNTRY, AS IN THE CASE OF THE MARINES THERE WILL BE A SIMPLE ANNOUNCEMENT MADE, INDICATING THAT THE ADDITIONAL FORCES COME AT THE INVITATION OF THE GVN.

WE THEN PASSED TO A DISCUSSION OF THIRD COUNTRY FORCES. QUAT MADE A FUZZY INTRODUCTION WHICH LED ME TO BELIEVE FOR A MOMENT THAT HE WAS GOING TO RAISE OBSTACLES TO NON-U.S. FOREIGN TROOPS. HOWEVER, IN A CIRCUMLOCUTION WHICH WAS DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW, HE CONCLUDED THAT SINCE IT WAS THE POSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT THAT THE CAUSE OF SVN IS REALLY THE CAUSE OF THE FREE WORLD, IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY CONSISTENT FOR HIM TO ACCPET THIRD COUNTRY UNITS. HE NOTED IN PASSING THAT HE WAS AWARE OF OUR U.S. DOMESTIC PROBLEM AND THAT THE PRESENCE OF OTHER FLAGS WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO US.

I TOLD HIM THAT I FELT SURE THE AUSTRALIANS WERE PREPARED TO OFFER A BATTALION AND THAT AMBASSADOR ANDERSON WOULD NO DOUBT BE SEEKING AN APPOINTMENT WITH HIM SHORTLY. HE REPLIED THAT ANDERSON WAS ALREADY ON HIS LIST FOR CALLERS FOR TOMORROW. HE SHOWED SOME INTEREST IN THE POSSIBILITY OF A KOREAN REINFORCEMENT BUT WAS MARKEDLY COOL TO THE THOUGHT OF ADDITIONAL PHILIPPINE FORCES. WE LEFT BOTH MATTERS OPEN WITH THE AGREEMENT TO OBTAIN AMBASSADOR LODGE'S IMPRESSIONS OF HIS VISITS TO SEOUL AND MANILA WHEN LODGE CALLS TOMORROW. ALSO QUAT AUTHORIZED ALEX JOHNSON TO DISCUSS THE MATTER OF THESE FOREIGN CONTINGENTS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO WHO WE FIND IS ABREAST OF THESE MATTERS.

GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS UNDERTAKING PLANNING AT ONCE WITH THIEU AND MINH ON THE APPROVED SUBJECTS. AS THESE MATTERS WERE PRESENTED TO QUAT AS BEING WHAT I WOULD RECOMMEND TO WASHINGTON IF HE CONCURRED, I NOW REQUEST APPROVAL OF THE INTRODUCTION OF THE U.S. COMBAT AND LOGISTIC FORCES ON THE GENERAL SCHEDULE INDICATED ABOVE.

CFN 3511 QUAT NOT ALEX JOHNSON GENERALS THIRU MINH 31 ARVN 1965
1966 DIEM 50S NUNGS HAO HOA GENERAL MINH QUAT'S U.S. THIEU
MINH BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU (B) CHU LAI (C) QUI NHON-NHATRANG U.S.
GVN QUAT NON-U.S. SVN U.S. AMBASSADOR ANDERSON NO LODGE'S
QUAT ALEX JOHNSON FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO THIRU MINH
QUAT NOW U.S.

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET (NODIS)~~

70

209

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- JCS 01141 (301829Z) APRIL FROM JCS

- B. TIMING AND MODE OF TRANSPORTATION AS DETERMINED BY CINCPAC. (SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS OF REFERENCE)
2. (TS) FOR CINCSTRIKE/USCINCPACAFSA
REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B:
- A. TO DEPLOY TO RVN SOONEST AUGMENTATION FOR TACTICAL AIR CONTROL TEAMS AS INDICATED IN REF C.
B. TO DEPLOY ONE AIRBORNE BRIGADE, ORGANIZED AS INDICATED IN REF D, TO REPLACE THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE IN SVN NLT 60 DAYS HENCE.
3. (C) FOR ALL
A. DIRECT COORDINATION AUTHORIZED.
B. REQUEST JCS BE FURNISHED MOVEMENT SCHEDULES

PAGE RUEKDA 143 ~~TOP SECRET~~
AS DEVELOPED.

C. NO PUBLIC STATEMENT AUTHORIZED EXCEPT AS DIRECTED BY OSD (PA) THROUGH PUBLIC INFO CHANNELS. DEPLOYMENTS WILL BE TREATED IN LOW KEY. GP-4
BT

ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 4/30/65, 4:16 PM

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER S/S.

~~TOP SECRET~~

71

210

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

17623

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

71a

80

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 2468
AmEmbassy SEOUL 1070
AmEmbassy BANGKOK 1833
AmEmbassy MANILA 1837

SS

Info

APR 30 6 33 PM '65

INFO: Amembassy LONDON 6956
Amembassy OTTAWA 1158
Amembassy CANBERRA 949
Amembassy WELLINGTON 932
Amembassy TOKYO PRIORITY 2823
CINCPAC
EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 10-10-78 letter
By if, NARS, Date 1-23-80

Ref DEF 1097, DTG 301329Z Apr (NOTAL).

Decision has been taken to deploy in early May 3 US battalion equivalents into Bien Hoa/Vung Tau (4000 men) and 3 US battalion equivalents into Chu Lai (6200 men). A marine air unit will be deployed later in May to Chu Lai. Saigon has been directed to work out with Prifin Quat public announcement or announcements this deployment.

Action addressees will inform host governments on classified basis of these deployments shortly prior to public announcement by Saigon. You then should/inform host governments deployment is imminent and US forces will operate essentially same as marine force now stationed Danang area, i.e. to provide essential security to Bien Hoa airfield complex and to new airfield to be constructed Chu Lai area. Info addressee countries will be notified through Embs here and above furnished to U.S. Embs these countries for information only.

FOR SAIGON: Request you notify Dept and action addressees of time and

Drafted by:

Telegraphic transmission and

Clearances:

FE:JRDcleland:hjh 1/30

classification approved by:

FE - William P. Bundy

Mr. Friedman (draft)
DOD/ISA

Mr. Unger
FE -

~~TOP SECRET~~

S/S - M. Road
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

date first ~~will~~ public announcement will be made these deployments. This notification should allow sufficient time for action addressees inform host governments as outlined para 2 above. ¹⁸³³ ~~Text of announcement~~ Text of announcement should be included. ⁴⁴⁹

~~RP-3X~~

~~RP-3X~~

FOR TOKYO: In view fact Takeuchi was leaving for three days, we informed him of proposed ground deployments today on private basis. He asked whether any units would come from Japan and we said they would not. We did not refer to Marine air units and question whether they will come from Japan and if so whether they should be staged through other locations will be examined next week. Embassy may wish to comment.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

72

211

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

✓
72a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

30 April 1965

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 12-65

SUBJECT: Current Trends in Vietnam

1. During the past two months in Vietnam, some downward trends appear to have been checked, at least for the moment, and in a few cases even reversed. Nonetheless, the general outlook remains dreary and in some respects the dangers of the situation have increased.

2. Within South Vietnam governmental weakness and the possibility of military coups will continue. Although a greatly enlarged US presence and involvement has thus far boosted South Vietnamese morale and combativeness, this will continue only if our efforts are demonstrably effective. There will be constant danger that the war weary people of South Vietnam will let the US assume an even greater share of the fighting. There will also be danger that increased US troop commitment will lead more South Vietnamese to accept the Communist line that US colonialism is replacing French. This could turn increasing numbers of Vietnamese toward support of the Viet Cong effort to oust the US.

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority CIA 3/21/77, State 2/3/78
By MDE, NARS, Date 4/10/78


3. In any event, we stress that the essential elements of the equation of power in South Vietnam have not been altered significantly. There is an immediate danger of a new drive by the Viet Cong. The very factors which justify some cautious optimism on our part also point to the Viet Cong need for such a drive to re-establish their momentum. Their capabilities for enlarged military action are formidable: they have 38,000 to 46,000 hard-core regulars (perhaps more) and around 100,000 irregulars. MACV has recently confirmed the presence of a battalion of regular PAVN troops with the Viet Cong, and we believe that there are two more. Their concentration of forces in the northern part of South Vietnam gives them the capability of launching large-scale (for Vietnam) attacks on one or more of a number of important centers or bases. In this part of Vietnam, the interior will be frequently under cloud cover during the summer rainy season, while the coastal strip will be generally clear and dry and open to US/GVN air action. We believe, therefore, that a major Viet Cong military effort is more likely to be launched against Kontum, Pleiku, or some place in the interior, although it may be preceded by a diversionary attack on a coastal target. It is possible, however, that the Viet Cong will attempt to drive to the coast from their inland strongholds and cut South Vietnam in two.

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

4. The Viet Cong also have considerable military strength in the region 40 miles or so north of Saigon, and in the Southern delta areas, which could be used to whiplash ARVN forces between the north and south portions of South Vietnam. In addition, the Viet Cong could sharply step up their tactics of terrorism and sowing political confusion in both the countryside and the cities.

5. The Vietnam situation thus appears to be entering a critical phase. If, during the next few months, the Viet Cong can pull off one or more spectacular military victories, or if defeatism increases substantially in South Vietnam or if the political situation again deteriorates, the Communist effort in Vietnam would gain great momentum. If, on the other hand, a major Viet Cong military effort this summer is generally repulsed, the Viet Cong position would suffer substantially, with a corresponding increase in GVN morale and popular support. It is of course possible, though we believe it unlikely, that the Viet Cong will avoid a major engagement this summer because of supply difficulties and a desire to increase their build-up for combat at a later date.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

- 3 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

73

212

212

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

73a

4/30/65

Mac:

He agrees. He asks that you
let Secretaries Rusk and
McNamara see this also.

Marvin

Raid of
Pres. May 1, 1965
11:55a

✓
73b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Douglas Dillon's views on Vietnam

I talked with Douglas frankly about a possible pause. His comments follow:

1. He thinks that by our air strikes we have got out of a very bad box -- the gravely weakening situation of January. But he thinks we may be building ourselves another box, in that we will eventually run out of these carefully chosen military targets and have not yet laid a good base for larger air action.
2. In this situation Douglas thinks that a carefully managed pause may be very useful -- not now but later -- in proving our good faith and laying a basis for stronger action if the pause produces no response from the other side.
3. Douglas thinks that the pause should not come in the next few weeks. When it does come, he thinks it should be somewhat longer than we have been saying. He thinks that about three weeks would be needed in order to make it clear that the other side has had a chance to respond.
4. Dillon also thinks that the pause should come after any currently planned troop movements and not before them. Otherwise he thinks the troop movements would spoil the political effect of the pause.
5. Douglas would inform the Russians the moment that a pause was begun and tell them of its purpose. He would also make it clear to them that if the pause produced no such response by the other side, the bombings would be resumed and intensified. He discounts the possibility, which Tommy has raised, that they might issue alarming threats in such a situation.
6. Dillon is not worried about morale in Saigon during a pause. He thinks we have proved our determination and that we ought to be able to keep them with us in a pause designed along the lines described above.
7. On balance, Dillon likes the pause idea. I repeat that he sees it as a way out of a position which he thinks will be hard to sustain for very

long. He noted that the Kiplinger letter is already talking about a "deal" by which we have limited our bombing to relatively cheap targets, while the Soviets limit their defense operation to the Hainan area. He also noted that General Ky was already talking of the need to do more in the north.

My own summary judgment is that Dillon made a great deal of sense in a short space of time and that we should keep in touch with him constantly. He flies to Europe on May 5, but he will be where we can reach him by diplomatic channels right through May.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~

4/25/65 (2d draft)
McNaughton

73c

*Put in
Pam Folley*

CRITICISM OF THE INITIATIVE BY "THE UNSYMPATHETIC"

1. The US is trying to get concession from the VC by turning on and off bombing of the DRV, an innocent party. There is no more basis for this new US objective than there was for starting bombing in the first place. The fundamental point is that the VC are independent of the DRV, that the war is a civil war, that the DRV cannot compel the VC to stop the war in SVN in exchange for the US halt in bombing.

2. The US proposal contemplates that the GVN will continue military operations in SVN. This means that the US is asking "a horse for a rabbit" -- the US is expecting the DRV/VC to halt all of their activities in exchange for a cessation of only one-half of the US/GVN activities. Why should the VC give up land and people they hold in SVN (some for 25 years) in exchange for cessation of bombings in the DRV? This request is patently unfair. What would be fair is a total cessation of all hostilities in both the DRV and SVN, a recognition of the existing power relationships of the contending parties and the immediate start of "unconditional discussions" (quoting President) on that basis between the GVN and the NLF/VC. These are the two parties that truly represent the South Vietnamese people's interests, and they should reach an accommodation among themselves.

3. The real reason the US is stopping the bombings is that the bombing policy is bankrupt and always has been. It has not succeeded in compelling discussions; it has not broken the DRV/VC will (it has really strengthened their will); it has united the Soviets and Chicoms; it has alienated world opinion. The bombing pause is a patent confession of failure of a bad idea.

4. The US/GVN gave too short a period of time before resuming bombing for the initiative to work. They did not give DRV/VC a reasonable chance

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 10-18-78 letter

By ing, NARS, Date 1-23-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

to respond, for cooler heads to prevail, or for discussions to begin.

5. The conclusion is inescapable that this is a grandstand play -- a piece of "crisis management" for the world audience -- intended to demonstrate Johnson's statesmanlike magnanimity and reasonableness, intended to fail, and intended to be followed, "regretfully, but unavoidably" with air strikes against DRV that are less justifiable and put greater pressure on the Chinese and the Soviets to enter the war than anything we have seen so far.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

✓
4/25/65 (2d draft)
McNaughton

POSSIBLE "PAUSE" SCENARIO

*Start a
full on pause
with this +
with my
Dillon memo
included
my (1)*

1. P-7 -- Introduce 1- and 2-day pauses in the weekly ROLLING THUNDER program (without reducing the weekly sortie level).
2. P-3 -- Perhaps announce certain US ground/air/sea deployments to South Vietnam and Southeast Asia.
3. P-2 -- Taylor lays out the program to GVN and obtains GVN concurrence. To assuage any GVN fears, he emphasizes (a) that, while the chances of DRV/VC compliance are slight, the basic aim is to marshal world opinion in support of GVN/US position for peace and for an independent South Vietnam, that the main purpose this time is to demonstrate US/GVN good faith and to lay a groundwork for possible later uses of the same technique with better chances of success in abating the DRV/VC aggression, (b) that, to prevent resumption of the bombings, the DRV/VC must stop the aggression in the South* and that the US firmly intends to resume the bombings after a pause of approximately a week if there is no halt by then to DRV/VC aggression in the South, (c) that the US is undertaking significant further ground/sea/air deployments to the area, showing US commitment and determination and adding to the US/GVN deterrent and fighting capability, and (d) that there is to be no stand-down of US/GVN civil or military activities in the South during the pause.**

too quick

too short

?
3A P-1 - Discuss with leadership in Hill.

* "Aggression in the South" is intended to be broader than infiltration of men and material and broader than control of the war from the North. It is intended also to include VC attacks, terrorism and sabotage in the South.

** Such a stand-down in the South may be the principal bone of contention. The critics will say that we are offering a "half ceasefire" (stop bombing) in exchange for a "whole ceasefire" (infiltration plus VC activity) -- that it is

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. P-Day* -- US/GVN suspend air strikes against North Vietnam. Also suspended are 34A operations, medium- and low-level reconnaissance operations and any leaflet drops against the North; not suspended are U-2 operations over North Vietnam, operations in Laos, or normal GVN military and civil operations in the South.

5. P-Day -- US/GVN begin energetic private efforts to induce the DRV/VC to stop the aggression against the South in response to the cessation of US/GVN air strikes against the North. Specifically:

Why not Chicom ?

Pampal ?

(a) US informs Soviets and DRV (but not Chicom) that bombings have been halted "to see what happens in the South"; stresses that this is a major US/GVN attempt to bring about a reduction in tensions; urges the Soviets to urge the DRV/VC to respond by stopping the aggression against the South; explains that the GVN, as the lawful government of South Vietnam, intends to and will carry out normal civil and military functions in the South; and makes clear that the US/GVN will be compelled to resume the bombing, whether or not talks are offered or begin, if DRV/VC aggression in the South continues.

(b) Privately communicate the US/GVN action to certain allies (Canada and SEATO less the Philippines and France), to certain

?x

unreasonable to expect the VC to allow the ARVN to mow them down and take over VC areas. The scenario recommends (Item 3(d) above) that there "be no stand-down of US/GVN civil or military activities in the South during the pause" and (Item 11) that GVN carry on "typical" and "demonstrably normal" civil and military governmental activities during the bombing pause. An alternative approach during the pause would be for the GVN to lay on a full and representative program of "probes" (tax collection, AID distribution, medical activities, battalion movements along highways, etc.) in all "safe" and "contested" areas, but to avoid search-and-clear and saturation bombing attacks on VC base areas. The important point is to ensure that the DRV/VC are on notice of US/GVN intention not to accept a "cease-fire" which turns over a large part of the country to the VC.

* ~~Events~~ Events relevant to the choice of P-Day include (1) Buddha's birthday on May 14-15, (2) the Cambodian conference, (3) the SEATO meetings in London, (4) US deployments to South Vietnam (and their announcement), (5) any strong steps taken by the USSR or the Chicom.

neutrals (India, Yugoslavia, Japan), and to selected Communist nations (Rumania, Poland).

- ? 6. P+1-7 -- Publicly and privately urge that "unconditional discussions" begin.
7. P+3-7 -- The DRV/VC may (a) ignore our overture, or may reply (b) negatively (either flatly or in an unacceptable counter-offer), (c) ambiguously, or (d) affirmatively. (The most likely response is a negative one. The most difficult one to handle would be one which offered to talk "provided the pause continues.") X
8. P+3-6 -- News leaks out, either from the above sources, from US sources, or because reporters observe a longer-than-usual gap in the ROLLING THUNDER program. US/GVN say "no comment on military operations." (Speculation should be postponed a few days by the pauses in the prior week's program, per Item 1 above.) ?
9. P+5-7 -- Rumors increase and suspense builds. US/GVN continue "no comment" policy.
10. P+1-7 -- US/GVN observe VC operations in the South and sea and land infiltration from the North; immediately and continuously report privately to the Soviets/DRV/allies/neutrals/etc., the specific acts of VC aggression and/or DRV infiltration that have occurred and that must stop if the bombing pause is to continue. DRV/VC aggression against the South may:
- (a) Increase. If so, the US/GVN might resume bombing even before the end of the one-week period.
 - (b) Continue at the prior pace. If so, the US/GVN should report the aggressions as indicated above, and should resume the bombing at the end of the one week.

- (c) Abate substantially but not entirely. If so, the US/GVN should report the aggressions as indicated above, and should imply throughout the week that bombing would be resumed at the end of the one week; but in fact resumption of the bombing might be postponed beyond the one-week period if the abatement of VC activity is sufficient either (i) to show promise of further abatement or (ii) to constitute a manageable level for the GVN.
- (d) Stop almost entirely. This is very unlikely. But if so, this fact would be noted by the US/GVN, and resumption of bombing would of course be suspended even longer.

11. P+1-7 -- GVN carries on normal civil and military governmental activities in the South. (Care should be taken to ensure that GVN activities during the pause are "typical" and demonstrably at the normal level -- this, to avoid allegations that the GVN went out of its way to "bait" the VC and "incite" incidents.)

12. P+7 -- US/GVN, in private contacts with other nations, with leadership on the Hill, and with knowledgeable press on a ^{deep} background basis, explain the efforts we had made to de-fuze the war, the lack of success achieved, and the unfortunate necessity to resume the bombing of the North soon.

13. P+8 -- Resume the ROLLING THUNDER program at the same level and according to the same plan as now pertains.

14. P+8* -- Presidential statement on all networks, Syncom (if possible), etc.:

(a) Review the nature of the war in South Vietnam, emphasizing

* An alternate approach would have the President make his statement before resumption of the bombing, offering to delay resumption a few more days to see if the DRV/VC could not be brought to end their aggression in South Vietnam. Resumption of the ROLLING THUNDER program would follow that "last mile."

details of the VC terrorism and the evidence of DRV support and direction of VC activity.

- (b) Emphasize that we have a very limited objective: Our bombing has been and is intended only to lead to a cessation of the aggression and infiltration.
- (c) Review prior US statements on US willingness to talk -- "unconditional discussions."
- (d) State that he has noted and studied carefully the views of those who have recommended a temporary cessation of bombing as a US/GVN move in the direction of a peaceful outcome.
- (e) State that the US/GVN reviewed the bombing policy, believed that continuation was fully justified in view of the continuing level of DRV/VC aggression, but nevertheless in good faith made a major concession on bombing in the hope of producing an end to the DRV/VC aggression against the South.
- (f) Continue that, accordingly, US/GVN a week ago directed that the bombing of the North cease so that the US/GVN and the world could see if such action would lead to an ending in the DRV/VC aggression against the South.
- (g) Reveal that at that time -- a week ago -- the suspension of bombing was communicated to the DRV and to a number of other nations which have an interest in the matter and which might bring their good offices to bear.
- (h) Indicate that the US/GVN watched carefully what course DRV/VC chose to follow -- continuation of the aggression or reduction of tensions by ceasing hostilities.

- (i) Describe in detail the DRV/VC behavior during the week --
 - (i) aggression in the South (attacks, terrorism, sabotage),
 - (ii) infiltration from the North (men and materiel by land and sea), and (iii) negative responses to our verbal initiatives.
 - (j) State that the US/GVN have been compelled to order the air strikes against North Vietnam resumed. Those orders have been given and the first of the new series of strikes has already taken place.
 - (k) Emphasize that the US will not be pushed out of SVN by DRV/VC, will keep up its guard in SEA to deter continued aggression (this is the reason for the additional deployments), and will not settle for meaningless agreement that does not assure the independence of SVN from DRV/Chicom domination.
 - (l) Repeat statement on limited US objectives in SEA, on desire to have unconditional discussions, and possibly on US willingness to join in a SEA economic/social development,
15. P+8 -- GVN confirms resumption of bombing with own announcement.
16. P+8-10 -- Conduct USIA broadcasts and leaflet drops into the DRV and broadcasts elsewhere to inform the people everywhere of the President's speech and of the points made on it.

Put in Pamm folder
4/25/65
McNaughton

RISKS IN "POSSIBLE PAUSE SCENARIO"

(Enemy moves not all consistent)

1. USSR, Chicoms, DRV and VC may use the pause as "proof" of US recognition that the bombing policy was wrong from the start -- i.e., the suspension is a US "admission of error."

2. USSR and Chicoms may deliver the equivalent of an ultimatum that resumption of bombing will produce "grave consequences" (or perhaps specific forms of intervention). This risk is greater if resumption is announced in advance.

3. USSR or the Chicoms may use the period of pause to rush new Soviet or Chicom-manned AA or MIGs into the southern part of the DRV. They could inform us of this, facing us with the prospect of knowingly striking Soviet or Chicom nationals.

4. USSR, Chicoms, DRV and VC may respond (ultimately publicly) that they are willing to talk but only if the US agrees not to resume the bombing. I.e., they may push for a "half ceasefire" on our part in exchange for "no ceasefire" on their part.

5. The U Thants and "war weary" of the world will probably urge "full ceasefire," meaning not only continuation of the pause, but also stand-downs by both sides in the South (equivalent to writing off vast areas of SVN to the VC).

6. DRV/VC may reduce but not stop their aggression in the South. This could lead to a debate as to whether they have or have not fulfilled the stated US/GVN requirements for continuation of the pause, making it difficult to resume.

NOTE: Domestic opposition may muster forces during the week, after the news has leaked, to impose obstacles to resumption of the bombing.

74

213

74a

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

102

46

~~TOP SECRET~~

00340

1965 MAY 1 AM 8 38

Action: OO RUEHCR
 DE RUMJIR 46A/1 01/1152Z
 SS O P 011148Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)
 Info TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE (3606)
 INFO RUALOS/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 69
 RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 790
 RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 383
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 233
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 51
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 51
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 27
 RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 171
 RUHKA/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 2106
 STATE GRNC
 BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAY 1

EXDIS

REF. DEPTTEL 2468 AND DEF 001097, DTG 301329Z APRIL (NOTAL).

ACCOMPANIED BY MANFULL, I CALLED ON QUAT ON 1 MAY TO INFORM HIM OF PERTINENT USG DECISIONS CONTAINED IN REFTELS. I TOLD HIM THAT THE MAY DEPLOYMENTS; THAT GENERAL THROCKMORTON WAS TRYING TO CONTACT GENERAL MINH TO WORK OUT WITH HIM THE TIMING OF ARRIVAL OF UNITS. I EXPLAINED THAT THROCKMORTON WOULD PROPOSE THAT AN ADVANCE PARTY OF ABOUT 70 MEN OF THE BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU FORCE (173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE) ARRIVE BY AIR ON 3 MAY, TO BE CFN 3606 69 790 383 233 51 51 27 171 2106 1 2468 001097 301329Z QUAT USG U.S. NO MINH 70 BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU 173RD 3

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 46A/1 ~~TOP SECRET~~
 FOLLOWED BY THE MAIN BODY ARRIVING AND CLOSING IN THE PERIOD 5 MAY - 7 MAY. TOTAL STRENGTH ABOUT 3,500 MEN. I ADDED THAT IT MAY BECOME DESIRABLE AT A LATER DATE TO REPLACE THESE AIRBORNE TROOPS BY A THREE BATTALION INFANTRY FORCE IN WHICH CASE THE TOTAL STRENGTH WILL BE ABOUT 4,000.

WE NEXT TOOK UP THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES TO CHU LAI. I TOLD QUAT THAT CONSIDERABLY MORE PREPARATION WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE LANDING OF THIS FORCE OF 6,200 MARINES AND SEABEES (I REMINDED HIM THAT THREE AIR SQUADRONS ADDITIONAL TO THIS FIGURE WOULD FOLLOW) THAN FOR THE AIRBORNE TROOPS. ALTHOUGH THE MARINES WERE, OF COURSE, CAPABLE OF COMING ASHORE UNASSISTED, THERE WERE PRACTICAL REASONS FOR HAVING GENERAL THI CONDUCT A

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NET COR 3471
 By 7/14 ; NARA, Date 7-4-14

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3606, MAY 1, FROM SAIGON
CLEARING OPERATION OF THE AREA IN ADVANCE OF THE LANDING TO PREVENT
ANY VIET CONG INTERFERENCE WITH IT. MACV ESTIMATES THAT THESE
PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS CAN NOT BE COMPLETED BEFORE 7 MAY AT
THE EARLIEST. HENCE, WE WILL HAVE TO AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF
PLANS BEFORE FIXING THE LANDING DATE. WE WILL LOOK TO OUR
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES TO WORK OUT THESE PLANS.

WE THEN DISCUSSED PRESS RELEASES AND AGREED THAT, PROVIDING THE
SCHEDULE IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE CAN BE MET, THE ONE FOR THE
CFN 5 7 3,500 4,000 CHU LAI QUAT 6,200 GENERAL THI VIET CONG
MACV NOT 7 1

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 46A/1 ~~TOP SECRET~~
AIRBORNE FORCES WOULD BE MADE AT 1700, MAY 3 (SAIGON TIME), SINCE
THE ARRIVAL OF THE ADVANCE PARTY ON THAT DATE IS ALMOST CERTAIN
TO GIVE AWAY THE MOVEMENT. WE GAVE QUAT THE FOLLOWING TEXT
WHICH HE SAID SEEMED SATISFACTORY BUT RESERVED PRIVILEGE OF
SUGGESTING CHANGES OR ADDITIONS LATER.

QUOTE AS A CONTINUATION OF THE GVN'S EFFORTS TO ASSURE SECURITY
OF KEY INSTALLATIONS AND TO PRESS THE WAR EFFORT AGAINST THE
VIET CONG MORE VIGOROUSLY, THE GVN HAS REQUESTED AND THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO FURNISH THREE BATTALIONS OF
UNITED STATES AIRBORNE FORCES FOR DEPLOYMENT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.
THIS CONTINGENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES WILL AUGMENT THE SECURITY
FORCES ASSIGNED TO THE VITAL BIEN HOA-VUNG TAU MILITARY BASE
COMPLEX. AN ADVANCE PARTY ARRIVED ON 3 MAY AND THE MOVEMENT WILL
BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. UNQUOTE

WE AGREED THAT A SEPARATE BUT SIMILAR RELEASE COVERING THE CHU
LAI MARINES SHOULD BE MADE SLIGHTLY AHEAD OF LANDING. WE WILL
WORK THIS OUT AT THE PROPER TIME.

FOLLOWING THIS MEETING WITH QUAT, I RECEIVED WORD FROM GENERAL
THROCKMORTON THAT GENERAL MINH CONCURRED IN THE SCHEDULE FOR
THE 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE. HENCE, SO FAR AS THE SAIGON END IS
CONCERNED, THE OPERATION IS APPROVED ON THE INDICATED SCHEDULE.
TEXT AND TIME OF PRESS RELEASE MAY BE CONSIDERED FINAL UNLESS
OTHERWISE INFORMED.

TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 5/1/65 8:44 A.M.

PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA 5/1/65 9:10 A.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

75

214

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

75a

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

P

Info

SS

G

SP

SAH

FE

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

RMR

TOW MJA400JIA206A DW
RR RUEMCR
DE RUMJIR 67A 020240Z
R 020228Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3610
STATE GRNC
BT

1965 MAY 1 PM 11 02 786

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By *ip*, NARS, Date 4-5-78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 2

FOR GREENFIELD FROM ZORTHIAN

PASS DOD FOR SYLVESTER, USIA FOR BUNCE

WHILE WE RECOGNIZE DETAIL OF COAST GUARD VESSELS TO SEVENTH FLEET FOR SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS IS COMMAND ARRANGEMENT WHICH DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY AFFECT MISSION IN SAIGON, WASHINGTON ANNOUNCEMENT CAUGHT US UNAWARES AND LED TO SOME QUESTIONS ON PART OF BOTH GVN OFFICIALS AND FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS WHICH WE WERE UNABLE TO ANSWER.

WE URGE THAT, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, WE RECEIVE ADVANCE WARNING WITH MAXIMUM LEAD TIME ON ANY INTENDED ANNOUNCEMENTS FROM WASHINGTON WHICH INVOLVE VIETNAM. THIS WILL PERMIT US TO ALERT GVN AND FORWARD ANY REACTIONS ON ITS PART AND TO HANDLE PRESS QUERIES MORE EFFECTIVELY.

GP-4
TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: PASSED DOD, 5/1/65.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

76

215

Wm Bundy's copy

DRAFT - 5/3/65

76a

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

On August 5, 1964, I asked the Congress to adopt a resolution to express the unity and determination of the American people to support freedom, to protect peace and to resist communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

I asked for the resolution after years of terrorist attacks by the Viet Cong against the South Vietnamese people and against the Americans who were supporting them in their fight against communist aggression.

I asked for this resolution after North Vietnamese gun boats twice attacked US Naval ships in international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin.

I asked for this resolution after we had retaliated against the naval bases which were the home ports of the attacking North Vietnamese gun boats and against an oil storage area which supported them.

When I asked for this resolution I made it clear that we sought no wider war in Southeast Asia, and ^{that} our retaliation did not extend beyond August 5.

The Congress acted promptly and overwhelmingly. The Congress resolved almost unanimously that it "approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." The resolution further stated: "Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations, and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President

determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

That resolution of the Congress expressed the support of the American people for the policies of three successive Presidents -- President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and myself -- to assist the South Vietnamese people in their fight against Communist aggression and for peace and freedom.

Our reasons for being in Vietnam are well known.

We are there to fulfill a promise we made to the people of South Vietnam.

We are there to demonstrate to the free people of the world that our word will remain good. World order -- in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, in Latin America -- depends on the value of our national pledge.

We are there to halt aggression, as we have had to do repeatedly through the last generation -- under President Truman, under President Eisenhower, under President Kennedy, and now again. By standing firm, aggression has been halted in Europe, the Far East, the Near East, and the Caribbean. It is being halted in Southeast Asia. Just as aggression by nuclear threat has been stopped and just as aggression by conventional invasion has been stopped, aggression by externally supported so-called "wars of liberation" is being stopped.

United States policy with respect to Southeast Asia and US actions in Southeast Asia continue to be in accordance with the principles

recognized in the Congressional Resolution and in support of the national interests which I have just repeated.

Our actions have been restrained -- they have been limited and fitting. We seek only to achieve a halt to the aggression against the people and Government of South Vietnam.

Following the Resolution, in addition to widespread and increasing terrorist assaults primarily against Vietnamese civilians -- men, women and children -- there was the November 1 Viet Cong attack on the Bien Hoa airfield, there was the Christmas Eve bombing of the Brinks Hotel in Saigon, and there was the February 7 attack on the Pleiku base in northern South Vietnam. In these attacks, 14 Americans were killed and 269 were injured.

It was not until the outrage at Pleiku that I directed the withdrawal of American dependents from South Vietnam.

It was not until that outrage that South Vietnamese and United States air attacks began against ammunition and supply depots, barracks, roads, railroad lines, bridges and other military facilities used by the North Vietnamese to train and infiltrate Viet Cong men and materiel into South Vietnam. South Vietnamese and United States raids against the North have been directed against military targets, not against populations; at concrete and steel, not at human life.

Throughout, America's essential position has been peaceful settlement. The purpose has been and is firmly to resist aggression and to bring peace to Southeast Asia.

Fulfilling our commitments in Southeast Asia has not been accomplished without cost. In terms of dollars -- the least important measurement --

in Fiscal Year 1965 alone we have already requested and will spend \$210.2 million for economic aid, \$64.1 million for P.L. 480, \$333.4 million for military assistance and over \$800 million for the operation of US forces committed to that area -- a total of almost \$1.5 billion.

More important than the money we are spending are the men we are committing and the equipment we are using. In December 1961, we had 3,164 men in South Vietnam. By the end of last week the number of our armed forces there had increased to over 35,000. At the request of the Government of South Vietnam in March, we sent Marines to secure the key Danang/Phu Bai area; two days ago, we sent the 173d Airborne Brigade to the important Bien Hoa/Vung Tau area. As the need appears for more men and equipment in the future, that need will be met. The Marine and airborne combat units are in addition to the United States military and civilian advisory and support personnel, who are equally at risk in South Vietnam. More than 400 Americans have given their lives there.

In the past two years, our helicopter activity in South Vietnam has tripled -- from 30,000 flying hours in the first quarter of 1963 to 90,000 flying hours in the first quarter of this year.

In February we flew 160 strike sorties against military targets in North Vietnam. In April, we flew over 1500 strike sorties against such targets.

Prior to mid-February we flew no strike sorties inside South Vietnam.

In March and April, we flew more than 3,200 sorties against military targets in hostile areas inside the country.

Just two days ago, we dispatched General C. L. Milburn, Jr., Deputy Surgeon General of the Army, to assist United States representatives in

Vietnam in formulating an expanded program of medical assistance for the people of South Vietnam. We are contemplating the expansion of existing programs under which mobile medical teams travel throughout the countryside providing on-the-spot medical facilities, treatment and training in rural areas.

The cost of operating United States forces associated with Southeast Asia alone now exceeds 800 million dollars per year.

As I have said in every part of this country on numerous occasions, we seek no wider war.

As I have told the world many times, we are willing to go anywhere, anytime, talk to anyone and try to reason together for an honorable peace.

Unfortunately, the Communist regime in Hanoi continues its brutality and terrorism against the South Vietnamese people and against the Americans we have sent there to help them achieve a free and independent country. No man, woman or child in South Vietnam -- civilian or military, at home in bed or in the street -- is secure against the vicious acts of terrorism perpetrated by the Viet Cong. One of the recent illustrations was the bombing of the United States Embassy in Saigon on March 30. In that attack, two Americans were killed and 48 injured; 14 Vietnamese were killed and 106 injured.

The Communist acts of terrorism continue under the direction and control of North Vietnam. And Hanoi continues in its aggression aimed at total conquest of this free and independent country of South Vietnam.

And so long as this aggression continues, we must and we will stand firm in Southeast Asia.

We must be prepared to use whatever power is necessary to fulfill the commitments of three Presidents and the Congress to the South Vietnamese people and to the free world. We must continue to sharpen our state of readiness and we must provide insurance so that we have all the military power we need and can use it with speed and precision to assist the South Vietnamese people.

We must continue to provide our forces with the best of everything. We must replace the items that are destroyed. We must keep our inventory of ammunition and other expendables high. We must build the facilities that are needed to house and protect our men and equipment. We must continue to improve the equipment.

I am therefore asking the Congress for additional monies for South Vietnam. I am asking for \$690 million -- all for this fiscal year.

Nothing is more sacred than the lives of our American men who are fighting Communism in South Vietnam. Nothing is more sacred than the word of this country -- affirmed by three Presidents and the Congress -- to support the freedom-loving people of South Vietnam.

We realize that this kind of support -- against this kind of Communist aggression -- is expensive.

That is because of the nature of the aggression we find in South Vietnam. There, the techniques of rebellion are being employed by a

neighbor set on conquest. There, the technique is to destroy the roots of existing government by demonstrating the government's inability to provide physical security. Armed by outside weapons and provided the critical margins of manpower and direction from outside, the Viet Cong destroy and disappear, usually by night. They sabotage a railroad, they bomb a restaurant, they assassinate a hamlet chief -- forcing the government to guard all bridges, to search all public places, to protect all administrators. The Communist technique -- not one of winning people and areas, but one of making it impossible for the Government to retain confidence of the people and to administer the areas -- gambles on exhausting the population's will to resist. Suppression of such terrorism has in the past required a superiority ratio of 10 or 15 to one.

The South Vietnamese Government is increasing its military and paramilitary forces and police. They are multiplying the effectiveness of their forces by better equipment, better mobility, better communications. At the same time, the United States has put her sons at risk along side the sons of South Vietnam. And we have given our men in South Vietnam the best -- and all of the best -- that they need to do the job. We must be certain that they will continue to have what they need.

As long as I am President and as long as Hanoi persists in its aggression against South Vietnam, I will fulfill my duty to make certain that our men who are fighting there have first call on the resources of this country.

I ask the Congress to appropriate this additional \$690 million as rapidly as possible so that there may be no delay in the purchase of equip-

ment and the construction of facilities needed in South Vietnam, and so that there may be no degradation in our readiness and willingness to meet Communist aggression whenever and wherever it attempts to destroy free nations and free men.

By such action we also are making clear beyond the shadow of doubt to our men who are risking their lives in South Vietnam, to their families and all the American people, and to friend and foe alike, that this country will not hesitate to do what is necessary to stop Communist aggression in South Vietnam.

77

216

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

77a
#2
W 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

CORRECTION ISSUED
5-3-65, 11 A.M. GWL

Action

CONTROL : 1168

Info

RECEIVED : MAY 3, 1965, 4:17 AM

FROM : SAIGON - CORRECTED COPY

ACTION : SECSTATE PRIORITY 3579

DATE : APRIL 29

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter MAR 5 1979
By *ip*, NARS, Date *6-28-79*

~~TOP SECRET~~ APRIL 29

~~EYES ONLY~~ FOR SECRETARY RUSK FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

N O D I S

EMBTel 3552

ON APRIL 28, GENERAL ESTMORELAND HELD THE MEETING WITH THIEU AND MINH ANTICIPATED IN REFTEL. HE FOUND THESE OFFICERS WELL BRIEFED ON THE MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL US AND AUSTRALIAN FORCES CONTAINED IN REFTEL. THEY WERE ENTIRELY RECEPTIVE TO THE ACTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT REQUESTED THAT NO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BE UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN MACV AND GVN STAFF UNTIL FINAL US APPROVAL.

IN DISCUSSING COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS, GENERAL MINH SHOWED CONSIDERABLE SENSITIVITY ON THIS MATTER OF A POSSIBLE COMBINED STAFF. THERE HAVE BEEN PRESS LEAKS IN SAIGON PREDICTING A COMBINED COMMAND WHICH IS INTERPRETED AS THE US TAKING CHARGE AND EDITORIAL COMMENTS HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF ANY YIELDING OF VIETNAMESE AUTHORITY OVER ITS FORCES. THE INCIDENT IS A REMINDER THAT WE WILL HAVE TO PRECEED CAUTIOUSLY IN PROPOSING ARRANGMENTS IN THIS AREA.

TAYLOR

DDC/01

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

78

217

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

✓ Bundy 11

~~SECRET~~

78a

Action

02199

SS

1965 MAY 3 PM 11 46

Info

PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 143A 04/0340Z
P 040300Z ZEA

P R I O R I T Y

FN AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3632
INFO RUHLKQ/CINCPAC PRIORITY 2122
STATE GRNC

DECLASSIFIED

BT
~~SECRET~~ SEONE OPTWO MAY 4

Authority State 11-2-78 letter
By isg, NARS, Date 1-29-80

L I N D I S

IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUEST FROM WASHINGTON, THERE IS GIVEN BELOW AN "ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE DRV/VIET CONG COURSES OF ACTION DURING NEXT THREE MONTHS" AS DRAFTED BY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, WHICH REPRESENTS ALL ELEMENTS OF MISSION, AND WHICH HAS BEEN APPROVED BY AID:

1. HANOI FOR SOME TIME HAS BEEN PURSUING POLICY OF INCREASING SCOPE AND PACE OF VIET CONG INSURGENCY. THIS POLICY HAS BEEN MANIFEST IN PROGRESSIVE BUILD-UP OF VIET CONG MILITARY CAPABILITIES.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 143A ~~SECRET~~

WHICH APPARENTLY ACCELERATED OVER PAST YEAR, AS REVEALED BY CAPTURE OF VUNG RO DAY ARMS CACHE, APPEARANCE OF ARTILLERY AND MODERN SMALL ARMS IN VIET CONG UNITS, AND INFILTRATION OF AT LEAST ONE BATTALION OF 325TH PAW DIVISION. BEGINNING OF SYSTEMATIC AIR STRIKES AGAINST NORTH ALMOST CERTAINLY CAUSED HANOI TO REVIEW THIS POLICY IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH. TONE OF STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM HANOI SINCE THEN INDICATE THAT DRV HAS NOT WEAKENED IN ITS DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE DIRECTING AND SUPPORTING VIET CONG AND SEEKING FURTHER INTENSIFICATION OF WAR IN THE SOUTH.

2. FROM DRV VIEWPOINT, OUTLOOK IS PROBABLY STILL FAVORABLE DESPITE AIR STRIKES ON NORTH. ALTHOUGH THEIR GENERAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN NORTH HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGED THUS SOMEWHAT REDUCING THEIR INFILTRATION CAPABILITY, HANOI MAY CALCULATE IT CAN ACCEPT LEVEL OF DAMAGE BEING INFLICTED AS REASONABLE PRICE TO PAY FOR CHANCE OF VICTORY IN SOUTH. VIET CONG FORCES IN SOUTH RETAIN CAPABILITY OF TAKING LOCAL INITIATIVES ON GROUND, ALTHOUGH THEY MUST ACCEPT COST OF HEAVIER LOSSES

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3632, May 4 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Saigon

FROM TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT, AND THEIR MORALE POSSIBLY HAS BEEN REDUCED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. GVN FORCE LEVELS STILL ARE NOT ADEQUATE TO COPE WITH THESE VIET CONG CAPABILITIES. DESPITE RELATIVE LONGEVITY OF QUAT GOVT, WHICH MARKS IMPROVEMENT OVER

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 143A ~~SECRET~~

PREVIOUS RECENT GOVTS, POLITICAL SITUATION IS STILL BASICALLY UNSTABLE. WHILE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MORALE HAS RISEN, RUMBLINGS AMONG GENERALS CONTINUE, SUSPICIONS AMONG POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS PERSIST AND ARE SUBJECT TO EXPLOITATION BY COMMUNISTS. ON BALANCE, HANOI PROBABLY BELIEVES IT HAS CONSIDERABLE BASIS FOR EXPECTATION THAT VIET CONG, WHO WERE CLEARLY MAKING PROGRESS AS RECENTLY AS FEBRUARY, CAN REGAIN THE INITIATIVE AND, BY THE APPLICATION OF OFFENSIVE POWER, CAN CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS FAVORABLE TO THE DRV CAN BE INSTITUTED.

3. GIVEN THIS SITUATION, DRV CAN PURSUE ANY OF THREE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE COURSES:

A. OPEN MAJOR INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF VIETCONG WITH ACKNOWLEDGED PAVN FORCES. THIS WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF BRINGING MAJOR SOURCE OF DRV MILITARY POWER TO BEAR MOST RAPIDLY AND WITH GREATEST PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT. THEY PROBABLY ESTIMATE, HOWEVER, THAT A MINIMUM THIS WOULD ENTAIL RISK OF UNLIMITED AIR STRIKES ON NORTH, AND PERHAPS MAJOR US INTERVENTION ON GROUND, AND THUS POSSIBILITY OF RAPID ESCALATION TOWARD KOREAN TYPE SITUATION INVOLVING CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION. IT WOULD

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 143 ~~SECRET~~

ALSO REPRESENT TACIT ADMISSION OF FAILURE OF PEIPING-HANOI DOCTRINE OF LIMITED WAR. DRV PROBABLY FEELS THAT THESE RISKS ARE NOT WORTH TAKING AT PRESENT TIME, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT PROBABLY BELIEVES SUCCESS MAY BE ATTAINED BY OTHER MEANS.

B. CONTINUED EFFORTS EXPAND MILITARY ACTION IN SOUTH, INCLUDING COVERT INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL PAVN UNITS ON ORDER OF SEVERAL REGIMENTS. THIS COURSE OFFERS MANY ADVANTAGES OF FIRST ALTERNATIVE WITHOUT INCURRING SOME OF RISKS. IT OFFERS PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING MAJOR MILITARY GAINS CAPABLE OF OFFSETTING US/ GVN APPLICATION OF AIR POWER. SUCH GAINS WOULD EXPAND VIET CONG AREAS OF CONTROL AND MIGHT LEAD TO POLITICAL DEMORALIZATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- 3632, May 4 (SECTION ONE OF TWO), from Saigon

C. CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT AT PRESENT OR EVEN FURTHER REDUCED PACE, LIMITED VIET CONG ACTIONS LARGELY TO TERRORIST AND COVERT POLITICAL ACTIVITY. DRV MIGHT HOPE THIS COURSE WOULD PRODUCE MAXIMUM INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES AGAINST CONTINUED AIR STRIKES ON NORTH AND ENCOURAGE GREATER FOCUS ON POLITICAL MANEUVERING. IT WOULD POSE MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH VIET CONG MORALE, HOWEVER, AND MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH WOULD DETERIORATE CONSIDERABLY FROM DRV VIEWPOINT.

TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 1:30 a.m., May 4.

Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 2:17 a.m., May 4.

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

5

Action

SS

Info

PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 143A/2 040400Z

P 040325Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY (SAIGON)

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC (PRIORITY 3632)

INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC PRIORITY 2122

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ (SETWO OF TWO) MAY 4

0 2 2 5 4

1965 MAY 4 AM 1 46

041

L I M D I S

4. GIVEN DRV PERFORMANCE TO DATE, WE BELIEVE SECOND ALTERNATIVE IS MOST PROBABLE HANOI CHOICE UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES TO BE TOUGH ENEMY, BOTH PHYSICALLY AND MORALLY, AND IT IS LIKELY THAT THEY INTERPRET OUR APPARENT RELIANCE ON AIR POWER AND THE RESTRICTED EMPLOYMENT OF US GROUND FORCES AND STATEMENTS OF CERTAIN US LEADERS AS INDICATING PRETTY CLEARLY WE ARE RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN GROUND WAR. DRV MIGHT FEEL FIRST ALTERNATIVE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE US STEP AIR OFFENSIVE TO COVER ENTIRE DRV AS WELL AS TO INTERVENE ON GROUND ENTAILING RISKS OF UNCONTROLLABLE ESCALATION

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 143A ~~SECRET~~

WHICH DRV, SOVIETS AND PERHAPS EVEN CHINESE NOT ANXIOUS TO SEE EVOKED. HANOI MAY CONSIDER, HOWEVER, THAT LIMITED REINFORCEMENT OF VIET CONG GROUND CAPABILITIES THROUGH COVERT INFILTRATION OF PAVN UNITS OFFERS CONSIDERABLE CHANCE OF BUILDING UP SUFFICIENT LOCAL PREPONDERANCE OF FORCE TO PERMIT SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST POLITICALLY SENSITIVE OBJECTIVES IN SVN. SUCH SUCCESSES WOULD SUPPORT CRITICS OF US BOMBING BY SHOWING THAT AIR EFFORT IS NOT WINNING AND THUS DETER FURTHER AMERICAN ESCALATION. IF THIS COURSE FAILED, HANOI COULD STILL OPT FOR FIRST OR THIRD ALTERNATIVE.

5. IN VIEW OF OUR GROWING INTERFERENCE WITH DRV CAPABILITIES TO SUPPLY FORCES BY GROUND OR BY SEA IN SOUTH VIETNAM, WE BELIEVE THEIR MAJOR EFFORT WILL HAVE TO COME SOON AND WILL BE STRONGEST IN NORTHERN HIGHLANDS AND COASTAL PROVINCES NEAR THE DRV. SECONDARY THRUSTS AIMED AT DIVERTING AND WHIPSAWING GVN RESERVES MAY OCCUR IN OTHER AREAS. UPCOMING RAINY SEASON IN HIGHLANDS AND DELTA, WHICH WILL HAMPER AIR RECCE AND CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, IS OBVIOUSLY BEST TIME FOR ANY MAJOR VC DRIVE IN WHOSE AREAS. TIMING MAY ALSO BE DEPENDENT ON ACQUISITION OF

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3632, MAY 4, (SECTION II OF II) FROM SAIGON

STRENGTHENED AIR DEFENSES IN NORTH, WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO COUNTER INTENSIFIED US STRIKES WHICH HANOI LIKELY TO ASSUME AS PRINCIPAL REACTION TO GROUND OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, AS TO WHEN THIS CONDITION MAY BE MET,

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 143A ~~SECRET~~
AND COMMUNISTS MIGHT MERELY RELY ON EFFECTS OF RAINY SEASON IN NORTH TO DAMPEN EFFECTS OF US STRIKES OVER NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS.

6. WE ALSO EXPECT THAT DRV WILL ACCOMPANY THESE MILITARY STEPS WITH CONTINUED POLITICAL EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. IT WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS IN SOUTH TO PENETRATE AND INFLUENCE POLITICAL GROUPINGS AND TO FOMENT INSTABILITY AND MISTRUST WHEREVER POSSIBLE. TERRORISM WILL PROBABLY BE INTENSIFIED IN INTERNATIONAL FIELD, DRV WILL CONTINUE AND PERHAPS STEP UP EFFORTS TO GAIN INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF LIBERATION FRONT AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION TRULY REP OF VIETNAMESE POPULAR WILL. IT WILL ALSO ATTEMPT FOMENT INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION TO US STRIKES AND PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON US TO CEASE STRIKES AND NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH VIET CONG.

TAYLOR
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:53 A.M. MAY 4, 1965
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, 5/4/65 - 2:32 A.M.

~~SECRET~~

79

218

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

✓ 79a

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 3410
RECD: MAY 4, 1965 10:51 PM
FROM: SAIGON
TO: SECSTATE PRIORITY 3645

Info

5

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~ MAY 5

Authority State Letter 10-6-78
By ip, NARS, Date 3-23-79

N O D I S

FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE SITUATION WAS COMPARATIVELY QUIET BOTH ON THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FRONTS DURING THE PAST WEEK. QUAT IS PROCEEDING WITH PLANS FOR A REORGANIZATION OF HIS CABINET, A DESIRABLE ACTION PROVIDED THAT HE DOES NOT GO TOO FAR AND RECREATE THE IMAGE OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTABILITY WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO DISPEL. IN ELIMINATING THE INCOMPETENT, HE HOPES TO STRENGTHEN HIMSELF POLITICALLY BY BRINGING IN MORE SOUTHERNERS AND THUS PLACATING THE MOST IMPORTANT GROUP WHICH IS SHOWING DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS GOVERNMENT.

QUAT ALSO HOPES THAT HE IS ABOUT TO GET AGREEMENT FROM HIS GENERALS TO DISSOLVE THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL. THIS, ALSO, IS A GOOD THING PARTICULARLY IF IT CAN BE DONE WITHOUT REOPENING DISSENSION AMONG THE GENERALS. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT QUAT PROBABLY COULD GO FASTER IN STRAIGHTENING OUT THE MILITARY BUT IS RESTRAINED BY HIS INSTINCTIVE FEAR OF CONFRONTATIONS AND TESTS OF STRENGTH. PERHAPS IN THE LONG RUN THIS CAUTION WILL PAY.

ALTHOUGH QUAT HAS DISPLAYED CONSIDERABLE ADROITNESS IN HANDLING HIS OPPONENTS, HE IS NOT ESCAPING GROWING CRITICISM IN THE LOCAL PRESS. SOME CRITICS COMPLAIN OF CORRUPTION AND WEAK OFFICIALS; COME OF THE NEED FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS; OTHERS COMMENT ON AN ALLEGED OVER-EAGERNESS OF THE QUAT GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS. ALSO, THERE IS THE CHRONIC IMPATIENCE OVER A GOVERNMENT WHICH DOES NOT SHOW QUICK AND DRAMATIC SUCCESSES IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. ONE HEARS ALL OF THESE RUMBLINGS AT THE MOMENT BUT WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO ATTACH TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THEM YET.

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

-2- Saigon 3645 May 5

I WAS DEEPLY VEXED BY THE UNFORTUNATE BORDER VIOLATION IN WHICH USAF PLANES BOMBED A CAMBODIAN VILLAGE AND THUS GAVE SIHANOUK HIS EXCUSE TO BREAK OFF RELATIONS WITH US AND PERHAPS LATER GROUNDS FOR SCUTTILING THE CAMBODIAN CONFERENCE. WHILE THE BREACH WITH SIHANOUK WAS PROBABLY INEVITABLE, IT IS MOST REGRETTABLE THAT IT CAME ABOUT AS IT DID. GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS HAVING A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION MADE OF THE VIOLATION AND WE WILL SEE THAT APPROPRIATE DISCIPLINARY ACTION IS TAKEN.

THE MAJOR EVENTS OF THE MILITARY WEEK WERE THE ARRIVAL OF THE ADVANCE PARTY OF THE 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT AUSTRALIA WILL SEND A BATTALION OF COMBAT TROOPS TO VIETNAM. BOTH ANNOUNCEMENTS WERE RECEIVED WITH ENTHUSIASM AND, FOR THE MOMENT, CONSTITUTE A LIFT TO THE LOCAL MORALE. WHAT THE EVENTUAL EFFECT WILL BE OF THE PRESENCE OF SO MANY FOREIGN TROOPS IS STILL UNPREDICTABLE.

THERE ARE MANY SENSITIVITIES IN THIS COUNTRY OF WHICH WE FOREIGNERS ARE UNPERFECTLY AWARE. RECENTLY, THE LOCAL PRESS PICKED UP A REPORT THAT A JOINT US/GVN COMMAND WAS BEING CONSIDERED WHICH HAS TRIGGERED MANY ADVERSE COMMENTS BOTH IN PUBLIC AND IN PRITHYE. A JOINT COMMAND TO THE VIETNAMESE MEANS ONE DOMINATED BY THE US AND SUCH A SUBORDINATION WOULD BE OFFENSIVE TO MOST VIETNAMESE. GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS THOROUGHLY AWARE OF THIS SENSITIVITY AND WILL PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY IN SUGGESTING SUCH CHANGES OF RELATIONSHIP AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE PRESENCE OF US GROUND FORCES IN ACTION.

I HOPE THAT YOUR ATTENTION HAS BEEN CALLED TO THE HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL ANTI-VIET CONG OPERATION IN KIEN HOA PROVINCE WHERE THE SEVENTH DIVISION HAS JUST EXECUTED AN EXTREMELY WELL PLANNED OPERATION. IT RESULTED IN THE DISCOVERY OF A LARGE ARMS AND SUPPLY CACHE AND THE CAPTURE OF IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS GIVING CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION ON SEABORNE INFILTRATION. IT MAY WELL BE THAT THIS DISCOVERY WILL BE MORE VALUABLE THAN THE SHIP WE SANK AT VUNG RO BAY IN EARLY MARCH.

WE ENJOYED VERY MUCH CABOT LODGE'S VISIT LAST WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY. HE SAID THE RIGHT THING TO THE RIGHT PEOPLE AND LEFT MUCH GOOD FEELING BEHIND HIM. MANY THANKS FOR HAVING HIM CALL ON US.

CFN 5 QUAT NOT NOT NOT NOT USAF 173RD US/GVN US US KIEN HOA
VUNG RO

TAYLOR

~~SECRET~~

80

219

Raid
5/5/65
4:00 P.M.

L 80a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: My Talk with Senator Joseph S. Clark

I finally had breakfast with Clark this morning and he is clearly in tough shape. He simply does not like the notion of contest and conflict with any Communists, and yet he does not want to break with you publicly. We went up and down Santo Domingo and Vietnam and Disarmament, but it all comes back to the fact that he believes the Cold War is more our fault than that of the Communists. He believes we are fighting unnecessary wars when we should be making a basic settlement with Moscow against Peking -- and if necessary, against the Germans, whom he dislikes intensely. He thinks that you are getting too much hard-nosed advice from Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy, and not enough soft advice from Humphrey, Moyers, and Fulbright (this is his way of stating it, not mine, and I cooled him off a lot by telling him that Humphrey was absolutely firm and clear-cut on the need to go into Santo Domingo last week).

Clark is furious at our supplemental for Vietnam, but he thinks he will probably have to vote for it. I asked him point-blank whether he would have let the Dominican Republic go Communist. He said, "No," but he obviously prefers to believe that there was no such danger and that we were deluded by McCarthyite-CIA reports (this again is his imagery, not mine).

Clark is in the very uncomfortable position of a man who has plenty of convictions, but not quite enough courage to give them full expression. I see no chance whatever of changing his mind on any of these issues, but I think he can be kept moderately quiet by the simple fact that he is not ready to break with you -- though emotionally, he would certainly like to.

The one thing he wants us to do for him is to give some sympathy to his resolution on disarmament, Senate Concurrent Resolution 32. I am inclined to think that with some reservation this may be a good thing to do in its own right, and I am having our position checked. This resolution had been held up at our request last year, but Clark says you have allowed him to go ahead with it this year.

McG. B.
McG. B.

81

220

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

81a

40

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

SS

Info

00 RUEHCR
 DE RUMJIR 300A 06/1030Z
 O P 061018Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3664
 INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 241
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 52 ✓
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 30 ✓
 RUALOS/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 73
 RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 805
 RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 387
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 55
 RUALOT/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 174
 RUHKA/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 2136
 STATE GRNC

05021
 1965 MAY 6 AM 6 39

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAY 6

Authority State 11-24-80
 By DCM/IS NARS, Date 12-29-83

EXDIS

EMBTEL 3606.

IN ANTICIPATION OF THE MARINE LANDING AT CHU LAI TOMORROW, I SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE TO QUAT WHICH HE ACCEPTED SUBJECT TO CHECKING OVER TEXT WITH HIS STAFF. AGREED HOUR OF RELEASE, 1000, MAY 7.

QUOTE AS A FURTHER STEP IN THE PROGRAM OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM TO PROSECUTE THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG MORE VIGOROUSLY, THE GVN HAS REQUESTED AND THE UNITED STATES CFN 3664 241 52 30 73 805 387 55 174 2136 6 3606 CHU LAI QUAT 1000 7 VIET CONG GVN

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 300A ~~TOP SECRET~~
 GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO DEPLOY APPROXIMATELY THREE BATTALIONS OF UNITED STATES MARINES WITH SUPPORTING ELEMENTS TO THE CHU LAI AREA IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE. THE MARINE BATTALIONS WILL PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW AIR FIELD WHICH WHEN COMPLETED WILL MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VIETNAMESE AND FRIENDLY AIR FORCES. THIS DEPLOYMENT BEGAN AT 0800 HOURS TODAY. UNQUOTE

~~TOP SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-3664, May 6, from: Saigon

I EXPLAINED THAT THE THREE BATTALIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO ABOUT 4,800 BUT THAT HEADQUARTERS, SUPPORT PERSONNEL AND EVENTUALLY THREE A-4 SQUADRONS WOULD RAISE THE FORCE TO ABOUT 7,000. ADDITIONAL THERETO WILL BE AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL.

TAYLOR

BT

CFN CHU LAI QUANG TIN 0800 4.800 A-4 7,000

Note: Advance copy to S/S-0 at 6:55 a.m. 5/6/65
Passed to White House, DOD & CIA at 7:17 a.m. 5/6/65

~~TOP SECRET~~