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You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

April 11, 2014

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
03f	report	Annex C - Sanitized, 3/02 dup., #282d, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Volume, 34," Box 18	TS-	5	[4/65]	A
28b	memo	JCSM-415-65 - Sanitized 12/08 dup., #234a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "Volume, 34," Box 18	TS	22	5/27/65	A

Collection Title National Security File, NSC Histories

Folder Title "Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, Volume 4"

Box Number 41

Restriction Codes

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4/11/2014

Initials

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
 WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

18/8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#28b memo	JCS Top secret (gp 3) to Sec Def from Gen. Wheeler (duplicates #234a in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	22 p 05/27/65 <i>Sanitized, 12/08</i>	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSC History
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 4

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO BE SUBMITTED TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONSULTATION		
#7a memo <i>Open 5/4/98</i>	WH top secret <i>sanitized</i> 2p to Rusk, McNamara, Raborn & Bundy from McG. Bundy	05/11/65	A
#XX memo #41a <i>Open 5/4/98</i>	WH top secret <i>sanitized</i> XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX To Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Thompson & McG. Bundy from Wm. Bundy 1p	06/05/65	A
#46a memo	WH top secret 1p Bundy to the President re Ball's cable to Taylor	06/05/65 <i>Open 7-19-79</i>	A

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National Security File, NSC History
 Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 4

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3/8

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO CIA FOR CONSULTATION		
	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#11a memo	Bundy to the President re conversation with John Hightower of Associated Press	1 p 5/12/65	C
#33a memo	Bundy to the President re conversation with Joe Alsop	1 p 5/31/65	C
	<i>open 3-88</i>		

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSC History
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#9a cable	State secret <i>sanitized State 8-21-78 letter</i> 3727 from Saigon	2 p	05/11/65 A <i>open 4-11-74</i>
#14a cable	state secret <i>sanitized 1-6-84</i> 3768 from Saigon	2 p	05/14/65 A <i>open 4-11-74</i>
#18a cable	state conf <i>agen 1-29-80 ing</i> 3802 from Saigon	4 p	05/18/65 A
#21a cable	state secret <i>agen 1-29-80 ing</i> 3820 from Saigon	2 p	05/20/65 A
#26a cable	state secret (gp 3) <i>agen 1-29-80 ing</i> 2702 from Saigon to Saigon	2 p	05/25/65 A
#30a memo	state secret <i>State 8-21-78 letter</i> to Bundy from Read	1 p	05/28/65 A
#31a cable	state secret <i>Foreign State 8-21-78 letter</i> 3580 from Moscow	2 p	05/28/65 A <i>Open 4-11-74</i>
#32a cable	state secret (gp 10) <i>State 8-21-78 letter</i> 3266 to Moscow	4 p	05/26/65 A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#39a cable	state secret <i>sanitized 1-6-84</i> 4039 from Saigon	1 p	06/03/65 A <i>open 4-11-74</i>
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#45a cable	state secret (gp 3) <i>agen 1-29-80 ing</i> 2812 to Saigon	1 p	06/04/65 A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 4

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578

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3b letter	CIA top secret [open 12/30/85, NLJ 85-223] to president from Raborn 4 p (duplicates #282 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, vol. 34)	05/08/65	A
#3c letter	CIA top secret [open 12/30/85, NLJ 85-223] to president from McCone 2 p (duplicates #282a in NSF, CF, Vietnam, vol. 34)	04/28/65	A
#3d report	CIA top secret [open 11/14/85] Annex B 4 p (duplicates #282c in NSF, CF, Vietnam, vol. 34)	undated	A
#3f report	CIA top secret - Annex C 5 p (duplicates #282d in NSF, CF, Vietnam, vol. 34) [sanitized 11/14/85] <i>sanitized (more info) 4/19/82 NLJ/RAC 01-17</i>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, NSC History
Deployment of Major U. S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 4
Box 41

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#49b cable	OSD top secret (gp 3) <i>OSD 10-11-78</i> Force Requirements and Deployments to RVN (U) 3p	undated	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#58a memo	OSD secret <i>OSD 10-11-78</i> to Vance from Niederlehner 3 p	06/10/65	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSC History
Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam, July 1965, vol. 4

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2a cable	State top secret 3681 from Saigon <i>sanitized 1-6-84</i> (duplicates #110 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	<i>open 4-11-14</i> 05/07/65	A
#5a cable	state top secret 3703 from Saigon <i>open 1/6/84</i> (duplicates #104 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	05/09/65	A
#6a cable	state top secret State 2553 to Saigon <i>open 2-4-80</i>	05/10/65	A
#8a cable	state top secret (gp 1) 3731 from Saigon <i>open 7-19-79 imp</i>	05/11/65	A
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX
#12a cable	state top secret (gp 3) 2569 to Saigon <i>open 1-6-84</i> (duplicates #146 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	05/13/65	A
#13a cable	state top secret (gp 2) 2594 to Saigon <i>open 8-21-80</i>	05/14/65	A
XXXX cable	state top secret		
#15a	3776 from Saigon <i>open 1-6-84</i> (duplicates #91 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	05/16/65	A
#17a cable	state top secret 3796 from Saigon <i>open 7-19-79 imp</i>	05/18/65	A
XXXX cable	state top secret		
#19a	3808 from Saigon <i>open 7-19-79 imp</i>	05/19/65	A
#20a cable	state top secret to Saigon 2633 <i>sanitized 1-6-84</i> (duplicates #144 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	<i>open 4-11-14</i> 05/19/65	A
#22a cable	state top secret fm Saigon 3845 <i>sanitized 1-6-84</i> (duplicates #76 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	<i>open 4-11-14</i> 05/22/65	A
a			
#23a cable	state top secret (gp 3) fm Saigon 3855 <i>open 1-6-84</i> (duplicates #69 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	05/24/65	A
XXXXXXXXXXXX			
#27a cable	state top secret (gp 2) to Saigon 2707 <i>open 4-11-14</i> (duplicates #163 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	05/26/65	A
#29a cable	state top secret 3908 from Saigon <i>open 1-6-84</i> (duplicates #50 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	05/27/65	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#30b cable	state top secret <i>Example p - state 3-29-79</i> from Moscow 3586	05/28/65	A
#35b report	state top secret re: Vietnam <i>Open 4/95</i> (duplicates #248b and #248c in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 34)	05/20/65	A
#35c cable	state top secret <i>Open 3-19-79</i> to Saigon 2685	05/25/65	A
#36a cable	state top secret (gp 1) to Saigon 26 2769	06/01/65	A
#37a cable	state top secret 4035 from Saigon	06/03/65	A
#43a cable	state top secret <i>Open 1-29-80</i> 4074 from Saigon <i>ing</i> (duplicates #4 in NSF, CF, Vietnam, Vol. 35)	06/05/65	A
#45a cable	state top secret		
#47b	4035 from Saigon <i>Open 1-29-80</i> (duplicates #37a) <i>ing</i>	06/03/65	A
#57a cable	state top secret (gp 3) <i>sanitized 3-4-80</i> 2847 to Saigon <i>Open 4/1/74</i>	06/09/65	A

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MAY 7, 1965

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT

AT THE

SIGNING OF THE

SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL

EAST ROOM

(9:20 AM EDT)

Members of the Congress and my fellow Americans:

Congress has acted with dispatch and clear purpose to approve the request that I made on Tuesday for \$700 million to meet our mounting military requirements in Viet Nam.

I am very proud to be signing this resolution only three days after it was sent to the Congress.

Let the meaning of this action be clear. To the brave people of South Viet Nam, who are fighting and who are dying for the right to choose their own way of life, this resolution says: America keeps her promises, and we will back up those promises with all the resources that we need.

To our own boys who are fighting and dying beside the people of South Viet Nam, this resolution says to them: We are going to give you the tools to finish the job.

To the aggressors, to those who by assassination and terror seek conquest and plunder, and to those who encourage and guide their aggression from afar, this resolution says: We will not be defeated. We will not grow tired.

This money will be spent for arms, for weapons of war, for helicopters, for ammunition, for planes, not because we want war, but because the aggressors have made them necessary.

We will lay aside these weapons when peace comes -- and we hope it comes swiftly. But that is in the hands of others besides ourselves.

For months now we have waited for a sign, a signal, even a whisper, but our offer of unconditional discussions has fallen on unreceptive ears. Not a sound has been heard. Not a signal has been sighted. Still we wait for a response. Still America is anxious for peace.

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say with guns and planes -- that armed hostility is futile. Because once this is clear, it should also be clear that the only path for reasonable men is the path of peaceful settlement.

But our willingness to talk must not be taken as a symbol of cowardice. Until there is a response, until the aggressors have indicated their willingness to talk, we intend to press on. Our patience and determination are unending.

This is why this resolution, that you patriotic men and women so promptly considered and so wisely passed, is so important. It is not the money but it is the message that matters. And that message is simple. I think that message is honest and clear. We will do whatever must be done to insure the safety of South Viet Nam from aggression. We will use our power with restraint and we will use it with all the wisdom that we can command. But we will use it.

MORE

Once this message is clearly understood by all, all the aggressors, there should be much greater hope for peace. For then the men who now seek conquest by force will learn to seek settlement by unconditional discussions -- the talks that we have invited and that we want will start, and the road then to the peace, that the people of the world want so much, will finally be open.

On behalf of all the American people, I say to this Congress made up of patriots of both parties, you have acted wisely. You have acted patriotically. You have acted promptly. Again you have measured up to the finest American tradition.

Thank you very much.

E N D

2

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

F S 2a

~~TOP SECRET~~

002

4
Action PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 356A 07/0905Z
SS P 070853Z ZEA

006283

Info FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3681 MAY 7 AM 5 19
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC PRIORITY 2145

STATE GRNC
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~ MAY 7

EXDIS

DEPTEL 2513.

IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH QUAT ON ALL MARINE DEPLOYMENTS AND DEPLOYMENT OF 173RD ABN BDE, HE HAS WELL UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED THAT PRIMARY MISSION WAS DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF PERTINENT INSTALLATIONS AND SUCH OTHER EMPLOYMENT IN SUPPORT OF GVN FORCES AS WAS WORKED OUT BETWEEN MACV AND RVNAF HIGH COMMAND. QUAT HAS NOT DESIRED AND NEITHER HAVE I SOUGHT TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSION OF DETAILS MILITARY ASPECTS, HE HAVING CFN 3681 2145 7 2513 QUAT 173RD ABN BDE GVN MACV RVNAF QUAT

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 356A ~~TOP SECRET~~
INDICATED HE WAS SATISFIED WITH WHATEVER WAS SATISFACTORY TO RVNAF.

THE MISSION AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT WORKED OUT BETWEEN MACV AND RVNAF REPORTED IN MACV 11535 HAS MY CONCURRENCE AND THE CONCEPT FOR THE 173RD ABN BDE AND THE MARINES AT CHU LAI ARE THE SAME MUTATIS MUTANDIS.

WESTMORELAND IS TODAY FILING A MESSAGE SPELLING OUT IN GREATER DETAIL OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS APPLICABLE TO ALL US FORCES DEPLOYED HERE. HE HAS FULLY DISCUSSED THAT MESSAGE WITH JOHNSON AND ME AND IT HAS OUR CONCURRENCE.

IF ANY FURTHER INFORMATION IS DESIRED, PLEASE INSTRUCT. TAYLOR
BT
CFN RVNAF MACV RVNAF MACV 11535 173RD ABN BDE CHU LAI MUTATIS MUTANDIS US

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O MAY 7, 5:32 A.M.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA MAY 7, 7:03 A.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority NLS 0002 4206
By pc/ly, NARA, Date 4-4-14

3

223

3a

CLARK M. CLIFFORD
815 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

May 17, 1965 ✓

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith the letter of the Director of Central Intelligence, dated May 8, 1965, together with enclosures.

I wish to make one major point.

I believe our ground forces in South Vietnam should be kept to a minimum, consistent with the protection of our installations and property in that country. My concern is that a substantial buildup of U. S. ground troops would be construed by the Communists, and by the world, as a determination on our part to win the war on the ground.

This could be a quagmire. It could turn into an open end commitment on our part that would take more and more ground troops, without a realistic hope of ultimate victory.

I do not think the situation is comparable to Korea. The political posture of the parties involved, and the physical conditions, including terrain, are entirely different.

I continue to believe that the constant probing of every avenue leading to a possible settlement will ultimately be fruitful. It won't be what we want, but we can learn to live with it.

Respectfully yours,



~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

T. S. #188645

Copy #1

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

3/5

8 May 1965

Dear Mr. President:

I have shown this letter to both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. If you wish I will hold further discussions with them to evolve a paper which will set forth the several views on the enclosed recommendations.

Basically, I agree with Mr. McCone's argument that the courses of action recommended in the Secretary of Defense's memorandum of 21 April are not likely, by themselves, to gain us our present objectives. As I understand it, Mr. McCone felt that the deployment of additional US troops to South Vietnam should be accompanied by heavier attacks on the more important targets located in northern North Vietnam, though this expansion need not be sudden and dramatic but could be gradual and extend over a period of time.

a. Our limited bombing of the North and our present ground force build-up in the South are not likely to exert sufficient pressure on the enemy to cause him to meet our present terms in the foreseeable future. I note very recent evidence which suggests that our military pressures are becoming somewhat more damaging to the enemy within South Vietnam, but I am inclined to doubt that this damage is increasing at a rate which will bring him quickly to the conference table.

b. I concur in the CIA-DIA-State view of 21 April that the large-scale introduction of US ground forces will not initially cause the enemy to back off.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-223

By WSP, NARS, Date 1-3-86

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

c. I also concur in the recent intelligence warnings that the VC may seek some dramatic local victories in South Vietnam (e. g., investment of Da Nang and/or Kontum) in the near future -- that is, before the US can accomplish a large ground force build-up.

d. The envisaged US ground force holding operation will buy time for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), but it will also give the enemy time to improve his capabilities -- including the infiltration of more units of the "People's Army of North Vietnam" (PAVN). It is of course possible that the greater US/Government of South Vietnam (GVN) military effort on the ground will in time prove overwhelmingly discouraging to the enemy. Given our present course, this question -- the anti-guerrilla effectiveness of a greatly expanded US/GVN effort in South Vietnam -- will almost certainly prove the key determinant of whether, over a period of some time, we can impel the enemy to meet our terms. The French experience may unduly influence my judgment, but I am impressed with the consideration that if our air attacks against the North are confined within the limits recommended in the Secretary of Defense's memorandum, we will in effect be pressing the conflict on the ground where our capabilities enjoy the least comparative advantage. In these circumstances -- and given the enemy's known resolve and skill concerning attrition tactics over the long term -- I am concerned that we will find ourselves pinned down, with little choice left among possible subsequent courses of action: i. e., disengagement at very high cost, or broadening the conflict in quantum jumps.

e. In the event that, instead, the US/GVN effort should begin to wear down the Viet Cong (VC), I share the 21 April memorandum's judgment that the chances would be somewhat better than even that the "Democratic Republic of North Vietnam" (DRV) would seek at least a temporary political solution, rather than launch a major ground invasion.

-2-

~~TOP SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

I feel that Mr. McCone's recommended course of greater air action against the DRV is based on the following considerations:

a. The DRV is, in my view, unlikely to engage in meaningful discussions at any time in coming months until US air attacks have begun to damage or destroy its principal economic and military targets. I also concur with the USIB's judgment of 18 February 1965 (the State Department member dissenting) that, given such US punishment, the enemy would be "somewhat more likely" to decide to make some effort to secure a respite, rather than to intensify the struggle further and accept the consequent risks.

b. Insofar as possible, we should try to manage any program of expanded bombings in ways which (1) would leave the DRV an opportunity to explore negotiations without complete loss of face, (2) would not preclude any Soviet pressures on Hanoi to keep the war from expanding, and (3) would not suddenly produce extreme world pressures against us. In this connection, the timing and circumstances in which the bombings were extended northward could be of critical importance, particularly in light of the fact that there have been some indications of differing views between Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi. For example, it would probably be advantageous to expand bombings after, not before, some major new VC move (e.g., obvious concentration for imminent attack on Da Nang or Kontum) and after, not before, any current possibilities of serious negotiations have been fully tested. And such bombings should not be so regular as to leave no interval for the Communists to make concessions with some grace. Indeed, we should keep in mind the possibility of a pause at some appropriate time, which could serve to test the Communist intentions and to exploit any differences on their side.

We must not of course get overly preoccupied with military action and lose sight of the basically political aspect of the war. In the final analysis, it can only be won at the SVN hamlet level.

This will thus entail certain measures over and above greater military commitment and expanded punishment of the DRV. The most imperative of these are:

- a. Creating effective administrative, police, and local defense instrumentalities at the hamlet level.
- b. Making US and GVN military measures support a growth of indigenous civilian political authority and serve legitimate local and national aspirations.
- c. Expanding such political, economic, and sociological efforts as will close the gap between Saigon governments and the South Vietnamese population.

The expanded air attacks on North Vietnam, judiciously exercised, are not expected to result in large-scale Chinese Communists intervention by ground forces in Vietnam or elsewhere in Southeast Asia, as long as the Chinese do not believe their vital security interest is threatened by US actions. In other words, the chances of such actions are less than even, but should not be wholly excluded.



William F. Raborn, Jr.
Vice Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Director

Attachments:

- Annex A - Mr. McCone's ltr of 28 Apr 65
- Annex B - Expansion of views contained in DCI's letter, 8 May 65
- Annex C - Recent Intell Resume pertinent to Vietnam Situation

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX A

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

T. S. #188645-a

Copy #1

3c

28 April 1965

Dear Mr. President:

I remain concerned, as I have said before to you, Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, over the limited scale of air action against North Vietnam which we envision for the next few months.

Specifically I feel that we must conduct our bombing attacks in a manner that will begin to hurt North Vietnam badly enough to cause the Hanoi regime to seek a political way out through negotiation rather than expose their economy to increasingly serious levels of destruction. By limiting our attacks to targets like bridges, military installations and lines of communication, in effect we signal to the Communists that our determination to win is significantly modified by our fear of widening the war.

In these circumstances the Communists are likely to feel they can afford to accept a considerable amount of bomb damage while they improve their air defenses and step up their insurgency in South Vietnam. If they take this line of action, in the next few months they can present us with an ever-increasing guerrilla war against the reinforced Viet Cong in terrain and circumstances favorable to the Communists.

If this situation develops and lasts several months or more, I feel world opinion will turn against us, Communist propaganda will become increasingly effective, and indeed domestic support of our policy may erode.

I therefore urge that as we deploy additional troops, which I believe necessary, we concurrently hit the north harder and inflict greater damage. In my opinion, we should strike

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 85-223

By mg, NARS, Date 1-3-86

ANNEX A

~~TOP SECRET~~

their petroleum supplies, electric power installations, and air defense installations (including the SAM sites which are now being built). I do not think we have to fear taking on the MIG's, which after all the ChiNats defeated in 1958 with F-86's and Sidewinders.

I am not talking about bombing centers of population or killing innocent people, though there will of course be some casualties. I am proposing to "tighten the tourniquet" on North Vietnam so as to make the Communists pause to weigh the losses they are taking against their prospects for gains. We should make it hard for the Viet Cong to win in the south and simultaneously hard for Hanoi to endure our attacks in the north.

I believe this course of action holds out the greatest promise we can hope for in our effort to attain our ultimate objective of finding a political solution to the Vietnam problem. This view follows logically, it seems to me, from our National Intelligence Estimate of 13 February 1965, which concludes that the Hanoi regime would be more likely than not to make an effort to "secure a respite" by some political move when and if, but not before, a sustained U. S. program of air attacks is damaging important economic or military assets in North Vietnam.

I attach a copy of my memorandum of April 2nd, which may not have come to your attention, since it argues this case in a little more detail.

Respectfully yours,

John A. McCone

Attachment:

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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2 April 1965

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor

I have been giving thought to the paper that we discussed in yesterday's meeting, which unfortunately I had little time to study, and also to the decision made to change the mission of our ground forces in South Vietnam from one of advice and static defense to one of active combat operations against the Viet Cong guerrillas.

I feel that the latter decision is correct only if our air strikes against the North are sufficiently heavy and damaging really to hurt the North Vietnamese. The paper we examined yesterday does not anticipate the type of air operation against the North necessary to force the NVN to reappraise their policy. On the contrary, it states, "We should continue roughly the present slowly ascending tempo of ROLLING THUNDER operations ----," and later, in outlining the types of targets, states, "The target systems should continue to avoid the effective GCI range of MIG's," and these conditions indicate restraints which will not be persuasive to the NVN and would probably be read as evidence of a U. S. desire to temporize.

I have reported that the strikes to date have not caused a change in the North Vietnamese policy of directing Viet Cong insurgency, infiltrating cadres and supplying material. If anything, the strikes to date have hardened their attitude.

I have now had a chance to examine the 12-week program referred to by General Wheeler and it is my personal opinion that this program is not sufficiently severe or damaging to the North Vietnamese to cause them to compromise their present policy.

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Authority CIA 9/21/77, State 11/9/77
By MIE, NARS, Date 11/18/80

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On the other hand, we must look with care to our position under a program of slowly ascending tempo of air strikes. With the passage of each day and each week, we can expect increasing pressure to stop the bombing. This will come from various elements of the American public, from the press, the United Nations and world opinion. Therefore time will run against us in this operation and I think the North Vietnamese are counting on this.

Therefore I think what we are doing is starting on a track which involves ground force operations which, in all probability, will have limited effectiveness against guerrillas, although admittedly will restrain some VC advances. However, we can expect requirements for an ever-increasing commitment of U. S. personnel without materially improving the chances of victory. I support and agree with this decision but I must point out that in my judgment, forcing submission of the VC can only be brought about by a decision in Hanoi. Since the contemplated actions against the North are modest in scale, they will not impose unacceptable damage on it, nor will they threaten the DRV's vital interests. Hence, they will not present them with a situation with which they cannot live, though such actions will cause the DRV pain and inconvenience.

I believe our proposed track offers great danger of simply encouraging Chinese Communist and Soviet support of the DRV and VC cause if for no other reason than the risk for both will be minimum. I envision that the reaction of the NVN and Chinese Communists will be to deliberately, carefully, and probably gradually, build up the Viet Cong capabilities by covert infiltration of North Vietnamese and, possibly, Chinese cadres and thus bring an ever-increasing pressure on our forces. In effect, we will find ourselves mired down in combat in the jungle in a military effort that we cannot win, and from which we will have extreme difficulty in extracting ourselves.

Therefore it is my judgment that if we are to change the mission of the ground forces, we must also change the ground rules of the strikes against North Vietnam. We must hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage. Instead of avoiding

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the MIG's, we must go in and take them out. A bridge here and there will not do the job. We must strike their air fields, their petroleum resources, power stations and their military compounds. This, in my opinion, must be done promptly and with minimum restraint.

If we are unwilling to take this kind of a decision now, we must not take the actions concerning the mission of our ground forces for the reasons I have mentioned above.

JOHN A. McCONE

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ANNEX B

DATA TO SUPPORT VIEWS CONTAINED IN DCI'S LETTER TO THE
PRESIDENT DATED 8 MAY 1965

- I. The current programs for our air strikes against North Vietnam, as I understand them, limit the targets to such objectives as bridges, military installations, and lines of communication, avoiding targets in populated areas or within the "effective GCI range" of MIG jet fighters.
 - A. I do not believe that an air strike program operating under these restrictions is going to hurt the North Vietnamese enough to persuade Hanoi to end its support of the guerrillas in South Vietnam, or even to negotiate.
 - 1. We have some recent evidence that the intensification of our air strikes is disrupting the economy and the every-day life of the North Vietnamese, but the strikes to date have not caused any change in the North Vietnamese policy of directing the Viet Cong insurgency, infiltrating cadres, and supplying materiel.
 - 2. If anything, the strikes to date appear to have hardened Hanoi's attitude. By now the North Vietnamese may well have discerned for themselves the restraints under which the ROLLING THUNDER operations are conducted. They are likely to read this as evidence of an U.S. desire to temporize.
 - 3. In these circumstances, the Communists will probably feel that they can afford to accept a considerable amount of bomb damage while they improve their air defenses and intensify the insurgency in South Vietnam. If they do this, we face the prospect over the next few months of an ever-increasing war against a reinforced Viet Cong, in terrain and under circumstances favorable to the Communists.

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ANNEX B

4. Another hazard that must be kept in mind when we speak in terms of a "slowly ascending tempo" for ROLLING THUNDER is that with the passage of each day and each week, we can expect increasing pressure to stop the bombing. This pressure will come from various elements of the American public, from the press, from the United Nations, and from world opinion. Under these restraints, time is running against us. The Communists not only know this and count on it, but are doing what they can to further the pressure.

B. We are changing the mission of our ground forces in South Vietnam from one of advice and static defense to one of active combat operations against the Viet Cong guerrillas, and to do this we are deploying additional troops.

1. I think what we are doing is starting on a track involving ground force operations, which is necessary, and which will restrain some Viet Cong advances, but a track which -- in all probability -- will have limited effectiveness against guerrillas.
2. We can expect requirements for an ever-increasing commitment of U.S. personnel, but we cannot reasonably predict that this will materially improve the chances for victory. In the final analysis, the submission of the Viet Cong can only be brought about by forcing Hanoi to the necessary decision.
3. As long as our actions against North Vietnam do not impose unacceptable damage nor threaten the vital interests of North Vietnam, I believe that the new ground operations in the South carry the risk of simply encouraging Hanoi to support the Viet Cong, and encouraging Moscow and Peiping to support Hanoi. They are likely to conclude that the risk to them is minimal.
4. As I see it, the reaction of the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists will be to build up the capabilities of the Viet Cong deliberately, carefully, and probably gradually, by the covert infiltration of North Vietnamese and possibly Chinese reinforcements. We will, in effect, find ourselves pressing the fight on the ground,

in the jungle, where our capabilities have the least comparative advantage. We may become bogged down in a military effort which we cannot win, and from which we cannot easily extricate ourselves.

- II. It is my judgment that if we are to change the mission of the ground forces, we must also change the rules for the air strikes against North Vietnam. We must hit them harder and more frequently, and inflict greater damage. If we are not willing to do this, I question seriously whether it is wise to become more deeply involved in the ground operations.
 - A. Specifically, I feel that we must carry on the air strikes in a manner that will begin to hurt North Vietnam badly enough so that Hanoi will prefer negotiation, in search for a political way out, rather than exposure of its economy to increasingly severe levels of destruction.
 - B. I feel we must hit their petroleum supplies and their electric power installations. We should knock out their air defense installations, including any surface-to-air missile sites we can find under construction or completed. We should not avoid their MIG fighters, but go after them. I do not think we need to fear taking on MIG's which, after all, the Chinese Nationalists defeated badly in 1958 with F-86's.
 - C. I am not talking about bombing centers of population per se, and killing civilians who are not involved. There will, of course, be some casualties, but what I am proposing is to "tighten the tourniquet" on North Vietnam, to multiply the damage to the military and economic fabric of their society so that they will have to measure the actual loss against the long-term prospect for gains.
 - 1. There is probably room for some leeway in the timing of this expanded air strike program. For example, it would probably be advantageous to launch it after, rather than before some major new Viet Cong move, such as obvious concentration for an attack on Da Nang or Kontum.
 - 2. I feel it might also be wise if the pace of the expanded air strikes were irregular enough so that there would be intervals from time to time when the Communists

could move toward the negotiating tables without total loss of face -- not out of any consideration for their sensitivities, but because this is, after all, what we desire.

3. I do feel, however, that this new program -- including the "timing" element -- must be taken promptly. If it is implemented too gradually, then we will not only face the increasing pressures of domestic, allied and world opinion which I mentioned before, but there is also some danger that the Communists will be slow to get the message.

III. I believe this course of action holds out the greatest hope there is for our ultimate objective of finding a political solution to the Vietnam problem. If we only make it hard for the enemy in the South, we are not bringing effective pressure to bear on his commander in the North. Hanoi, in my view, is not likely to engage in meaningful discussions at any time in coming months, if U.S. air attacks have not yet begun to damage or destroy its principal economic and military targets, which are overwhelmingly in the northern portion of North Vietnam, beyond the scope of our present strikes.

- A. The Intelligence Community, less the Department of State, is in agreement, however, that the Hanoi regime would be more likely than not to seek a respite by some political move when and if -- but not before -- a sustained program of U.S. air strikes is damaging important economic and military assets in North Vietnam.
- B. I think we have got to proceed forthwith to fulfill this condition, and hit the North Vietnamese where it really hurts.

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ANNEX C

INCREASED COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES

FOR VIETNAM

- I. Recent intelligence has pointed to a continuing increase in the capabilities of the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese, the Soviets, and the Chinese Communists for action in Vietnam.
- II. We continue to accumulate reports and evidence of re-training, re-grouping, and re-arming of the Viet Cong main force units, pointing to a probable new offensive when the rainy season starts this month.
 - A. A gradual increase in Viet Cong activity has been noted over the past few days.
 - B. The extensive arms cache discovered last week in Kien Hoa Province, southeast of Saigon in the delta, provided fresh evidence of a concerted program to modernize Viet Cong equipment and increase firepower. The cache had such items as Chinese Communist flame throwers and ammunition for 70 millimeter pack howitzers.
- III. A number of recent reports point to a step-up in training programs for North Vietnamese pilots.

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[REDACTED] Chinese fighter pilots are still stationed at Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi, where the North Vietnamese MIGs are based. So far, the only activity by Chinese pilots in Vietnam that we have detected has been in a training role. Chinese

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-117
By cbm, NARA, Date 4-5-02

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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
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ANNEX C

pilots previously were last noted at Phuc Yen in late March, shortly after the first group of Vietnamese pilots to be trained in North Vietnam were thought to have completed their training.

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(S)

A.



- B. According to a recent report from an untested source, Vietnamese pilots, radio operators, and radar specialists were being trained in Poland prior to last November.
- C. We know from Laotian pilots who have been in the Soviet Union that large groups of Vietnamese had been trained in the Soviet Union for several years prior to the Tonkin Gulf incidents last August, when many of the trainees were called home.
- D. The training of this many pilots and other specialists for aviation duties suggests that there must also be plans to make more combat aircraft available to the North Vietnamese. Our latest reconnaissance shows that they have a total of 44, all based at Phuc Yen.


IV. Recent photographic analysis indicates that the North Vietnamese are engaged in construction at several other airfields -- probably to use them as recovery or dispersal bases. New revetments, with exhaust vent slits indicating that they are meant for jets -- are under construction at four airfields.

- A. At least 20 revetments are being built at Phuc Yen, in a dispersal area some four miles from the main runway. A taxi-way is being built to connect the revetments with the base.

- B. At the Haiphong Cat Bi airfield, eight revetted hardstands are being built.
 - C. At Kep, a small airfield about 40 miles northeast of Hanoi, two new revetments and a new taxi-way are being built, and several older revetments and the short sod runway are being improved.
 - D. At Vinh, in the southern part of the country, 25 new revetments are completed or under construction.
 - E. Neither Vinh nor Kep is considered capable of sustained jet fighter operations, but they could extend the combat time of fighter missions in emergencies by affording additional dispersal and recovery bases.
- V. Our latest photography shows that the surface-to-air missile site 15 miles from Saigon is virtually complete, but still had no equipment in evidence at that time.

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VI.
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since at least May 5 there have been restrictions on the movement of both passengers and freight on the main north-south rail lines in Communist China. The restrictions apparently apply to the lines from Shanghai to Canton and from Peiping to Canton.

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These restrictions may be of short duration.

[REDACTED]

B.
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[REDACTED]

C. The restrictions appear consistent with priority movement of military equipment across China to North Vietnam, and a desire to shield these movements from view. A speculation is that this could reflect the expected movement of Soviet surface-to-air missile equipment across China. There is as yet no evidence of any Chinese troop movements.

VII.
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A.

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B. There is also evidence that the Soviets, to ensure prompt and reliable communications with shipping in the area of Vietnam, have reinstated a system they used once before in Cuban waters at the time of the 1962 missile crisis. Apparently one specific ship is designated as a "communications duty ship," maintaining a 24-hour watch, and all other shipping in the area is to maintain contact. If any ship then loses communication with stations in the USSR, messages will be relayed by the duty ship.

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SUBJ: CONCEPT FOR US/ ALLIED COMBAT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT
OF RVNAF

REF: MACVJ3 11682 DTG 110845Z (TS)

1. (S) GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS BY US/ALLIED GROUND
COMBAT FORCES IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF WAS INTRODUCED DURING THE
RECENT HONOLULU CONFERENCE. PROCEDURES AND RELATIONSHIPS
INVOLVED

N COMMITMENT US FORCES TO SECURITY AND OFFENSIVE
MISSIONS WITHIN RVN AS INDEPENDENT ELEMENTS OR IN COMBINATION
WITH RVNAF AND /OR ALLIED FORCES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED HERE, AS

ACT.....J3-8

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FOLLOWS:

A. DEFINITIONS: THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS APPLY TO TERMS USED IN THIS CONCEPT:

(1) OPERATIONAL CONTROL- (DICTIONARY OF US MILITARY TERMS FOR JOINT USAGE) - - THOSE FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND INVOLVING THE COMPOSITION OF SUBORDINATE FORCES, THE ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS, THE DESIGNATION OF OBJECTIVES AND THE AUTHORITATIVE DIRECTION NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION. OPERATIONAL CONTROL SHOULD BE EXERCISED BY THE USE OF THE ASSIGNED NORMAL ORGANIZATIONAL UNITS THROUGH THEIR RESPONSIBLE COMMANDERS OR THROUGH THE COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE FORCES ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMANDER EXERCISING OPERATIONAL CONTROL. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE SUCH MATTERS AS ADMINISTRATION, DISCIPLINE, INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND UNIT TRAINING, EXCEPT WHEN A SUBORDINATE COMMANDER REQUESTS ASSISTANCE.

(2) TACTICAL DIRECTION- (AS SPECIALLY APPLIED IN THIS CONCEPT) - - THE DEVELOPMENT BY A SENIOR TACTICAL COMMANDER OF TASKS, OBJECTIVES, AND OTHER INSTRUCTIONS NECESSARY FOR THE COORDINATED EXECUTION OF COMBAT OPERATIONS BY MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES UNDER INDEPENDENT OPERATIONAL CONTROL WHICH NONETHELESS ARE PREPARED BY MUTUAL CONSENT TO COORDINATE THEIR COMBAT ACTION. (TACTICAL DIRECTION

IS A MORE PALATABLE TERM TO THE VIETNAMESE THAN OPERATIONAL CONTROL ALTHOUGH THE TACTICAL ARRANGEMENT IS THE SAME).

(3) COMBAT SUPPORT- (AS SPECIALLY APPLIED IN THIS CONCEPT) - - THE SUPPORT OF ONE COMBAT ELEMENT IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS MISSION BY ANOTHER COMBAT ELEMENT OF THE SAME OR DIFFERING NATIONALITY. THE NATURE OF THE SUPPORT IS MUTUALLY AGREED BETWEEN SENIOR COMMANDERS CONCERNED.

B. ASSUMPTIONS:

(1) NATIONAL FORCES WILL RETAIN THEIR COMMAND IDENTITY.

(2) US WILL NOT PLACE ITS FORCES UNDER THE OPCON OF RVNAF OR ALLIED COMMANDERS BUT WOULD IN AN EMERGENCY SUBMIT TO TEMPORARY TACTICAL DIRECTION OF TACTICAL ELEMENTS BY THE SENIOR COMMANDER ON THE SCENE.

(3) RVNAF MAY IN SOME SPECIAL CASES PLACE ITS FORCES UNDER US OPERATIONAL CONTROL OR TEMPORARY TACTICAL

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DIRECTION.

(4) ALLIED FORCES WILL ACCEPT OPCON BY US COMMANDERS, AND COMBAT UNITS WILL NORMALLY BE PLACED UNDER OPCON US COMMANDERS AT BRIGADE LEVEL OR HIGHER.

(5) OVERT, LARGE-SCALE PAVN/CHICOM INTERVENTION WILL NOT OCCUR.

C. DISCUSSION:

(1) MISSION OF US FORCES AND ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS TO RENDER ADVICE AND/OR COMBAT SUPPORT TO RVNAF. THIS RELATIONSHIP IS RESULT OF EVOLUTION OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS; IS THOROUGHLY UNDERSTOOD BY RVNAF; AND IS AN ACCEPTED MILITARY RELATIONSHIP RECOGNIZED AND UNDERSTOOD BY MILITARY FORCES. EVOLUTION AS FOLLOWS:

(A) INITIALLY, US FORCES IN REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FULFILLED A STRICTLY ADVISORY AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE ROLE. THIS INVOLVED SUPPLY OF MAP MATERIEL COUPLED WITH TRAINING AND ADVICE IN ITS EMPLOYMENT AND UPKEEP.

(B) WHEN COMMUNIST INSURGENTS RENEWED ACTIVITY IN 1960, 1961 AND 1962, ADVISORY EFFORT WAS EXTENDED AND INCREASED SO THAT US ADVISORS WERE POSITIONED IN LARGER NUMBERS AT LOWER ECHELONS WHILE AT SAME TIME AMOUNT OF MATERIEL SUPPORT WAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED. AT THIS TIME, US GOVERNMENT AGREED TO FURNISH CERTAIN MILITARY CAPABILITIES WHICH WERE NOT PRESENT AND COULD NOT BE QUICKLY CREATED WITHIN RVNAF. THESE INCLUDED TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS, AS WELL AS DEPLOYMENT IN COMBAT SUPPORT ROLE OF US ARMY HELICOPTER COMPANIES AND MARINE HELICOPTER SQUADRON.

(C) AS DEMANDS FOR OPERATIONS INCREASED, US INSTALLED EXTENSIVE SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK WITHIN COUNTRY AND ALSO INSTALLED AND OPERATED ALONG WITH VNAF A TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.

(D) AT THIS POINT IN TIME- THAT IS, UP UNTIL END OF 1964 - US SUPPORT OF RVNAF ENCOMPASSED FOLLOWING CHIEF ACTIVITIES:

1. STAFF SUPPORT IN CONNECTION WITH PLANNING, INTELLIGENCE, OPERATIONS, AIR SUPPOG, LOGISTIC SUPPORT, ADMINISTRATION AND COMMUNICATIONS.

2. OPERATION, BOTH UNILATERALLY AND COOPERATIVELY, OF A BACKBONE, LARGE-CAPACITY, LONG-LINES COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.

3. PROVISION OF AIR MOBILITY AND MEDICAL EVACUATION TO RVNAF WITH HELICOPTER UNITS AND TRANSPORT SQUADRONS.

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4. TACTICAL FIGHTER SUPPORT THROUGH
THE EMPLOYMENT OF AIR COMMANDO SQUADRONS WHICH ALSO WERE
INVOLVED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN A TRAINING MISSION, PLUS OPERATION

ACT: J3-8

CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J5-2 SACSA-4 SECDEF-5 WHITE HOUSE-3

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OF A TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM.

(E) UPON SHARP INTENSIFICATION OF OPERATIONS AT END 1964 AND EARLY MONTHS 1965. SUBSTANTIAL US AIR FORCES INCLUDING JET AIRCRAFT WERE COMMITTED IN COMBAT SUPPORT OF RVNAF. THIS INCLUDED AIR STRIKES WITHIN AND OUTSIDE BORDERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS AN AUGMENTATION AND REINFORCEMENT OF RVNAF. MOST RECENTLY, SEVENTH FLEET FORCES HAVE BEEN INVITED BY GVN TO PARTICIPATE IN COASTAL ANTI-INFILTRATION OPERATION IN ORDER TO SUPPORT VNN FORCES SO ENGAGED. IN ORDER FURTHER TO SUPPORT RVNAF IN ITS DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE MISSION AND TO FREE RVNAF FORCES FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATION, SUBSTANTIAL DEPLOYMENT OF US GROUND FORCES HAS BEEN MADE AND OTHERS ARE PLANNED.

(F) THIS CONCEPT PAPER SETS FORTH PROCEDURES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS INVOLVED IN THE COMMITMENT OF THESE ADDITIONAL US GROUND FORCES IN COMBAT SUPPORT OF RVNAF AS A LOGICAL EXTENSION AND EXPANSION OF ROLE ALREADY PERFORMED BY A WIDE RANGE OF US UNITS AND FORCES THROUGHOUT RVN.

(2) THERE IS A RECIPROCAL ASPECT TO RENDERING SUPPORT TO RVNAF. US ADVISORS AND FORCES THROUGHOUT COUNTRY ARE SUPPORTED BY RVNAF IN TERMS OF VEHICLES, SECURITY, LOCAL COMMUNICATIONS, HOUSING, REAL ESTATE, INTERPRETERS AND INDEED RECIPROCAL TACTICAL ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE. RELATIONSHIP HAS EVOLVED INTO TWO-WAY SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE IN MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST OF ALL PARTIES.

D. INTERNATIONAL MOBILE SECURITY TASK FORCE (IMSTAF)
CONCEPT:

(1) ALLIED FORCES WILL NORMALLY BE BRIGADED WITH US FORCES UNDER A US COMMANDER AND A COMBINED STAFF. ONE OR MORE SUCH IMSTAF'S WILL BE FORMED AS APPROPRIATE, AND WILL OPERATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONCEPT AND PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED BY THIS MESSAGE.

(2) NORMALLY, A US BRIGADE WILL FORM NUCLEUS OF IMSTAF. THERE MAY BE SOME ALLIED REPRESENTATION ON TASK FORCE STAFF.

(3) AN IMSTAF WILL BE UNIT OF COMPLETE TACTICAL INTEGRITY WHICH CAN BE EMPLOYED IN MANNER SIMILAR TO STANDARD US BRIGADE.

(4) IN EFFECT US AND ALLIED FORCES, EITHER SEPARATELY OR AS IMSTAF, WILL PROVIDE COMBAT SUPPORT TO RVNAF. AN RVNAF UNIT MAY BE ASSOCIATED WITH AN IMSTAF IF APPROVED BY CINCRVNAF AND LOCAL ARVN CORPS OR DIVISIONAL COMMANDER. IN THIS CASE RVNAF UNIT WOULD BE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT OPERATIONAL

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CONTROL OR TACTICAL DIRECTION OF IMSTAF COMMANDER.

E. GENERAL MISSION OF US AND COMBINED FORCES IS COMBAT SUPPORT OF RVNAF. SPECIFIC MISSIONS ARE:

- (1) SECURITY OF BASE AREA.
- (2) DEEP PATROLLING AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.
- (3) REACTION OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH RVNAF.
- (4) US CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED.

F. MISSIONS REPRESENT LOGICAL PROGRESSION FOR NEWLY ARRIVED UNITS. THIS MESSAGE CONSIDERS ONLY FIRST THREE MISSIONS OR STAGES.

G. STAGE I: SECURITY OF BASE AREA

(1) ARVN CORPS COMMANDERS ARE CHARGED BY RVNAF HIGH COMMAND WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF ENTIRE ZONE. WITHIN THAT ZONE BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT US FORCES MAY ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEGMENTS OF DEFENSE PERIMETERS AND FOR LARGER SECURITY ZONES OR TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY (TAOR).

(2) IN BASE AREAS SUCH AS DA NANG AND QUI NHON, US/ALLIED FORCES WILL NORMALLY ACCEPT LARGE BUT NOT TOTAL SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY. PARTICIPATION OF VIETNAMESE MILITARY, PARAMILITARY AND POLICE FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY SINCE US/ALLIED FORCES MAY BE COMMITTED OUTSIDE BASE AREAS ON OFFENSIVE AND/OR REACTION OPERATIONS, THUS REQUIRING ARVN COMMANDER TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR PORTIONS OF US TAOR.

(3) COORDINATION WITH RVNAF FORCES AND POLICE IN AREA WILL BE EFFECTED THROUGH SENIOR ARVN COMMANDER AND THROUGH SECTOR OR SUB-SECTOR ADVISORY CHANNELS.

(4) IN BASE AREA THERE MAY BE THREE ZONES:

(A) CLOSE-IN PERIMETER AROUND SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS (DEPOTS, AIRFIELDS, AMMO DUMPS, COMMUNICATIONS INSTALLATIONS) TO PREVENT SABOTAGE OR DIRECT ATTACK.

(B) INTERMEDIATE EXTENDED ZONE (TAOR) PREFERABLY OUT TO MORTAR RANGE.

(C) OUTER ZONE (EXTENDED TAOR) PREFERABLY EXTENDING OUT TO LIGHT ARTILLERY RANGE AND COVERING MOST LIKELY AREAS OF ASSEMBLY AND AVENUES OF ATTACK. AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING WILL TAKE PLACE IN THIS ZONE.

H. STAGE II: DEEP PATROLLING AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

(1) FOLLOWING ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE SECURITY AREA, AND CLOSE-IN COORDINATION WITH CORPS AND LOCAL RVNAF COMMANDERS, US/ALLIED FORCES WILL INITIATE RECONNAISSANCE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST VC BASES AND FORCES. INITIALLY THESE WILL BE CONDUCTED UNILATERALLY IN EASILY IDENTIFIABLE TACTICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM WHICH, FOR DURATION OF OPERATION, ALL ARVN AND REGIONAL FORCES HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED. THESE OPERATIONS
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~~SECRET~~ 15182 WESTMORELAND SENDS. SECT 3 OF 4
SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SECURITY OF BASE AREAS, AND SERVE AS MEANS
TO PREVENT MASSING OF ENEMY FORCES FOR SURPRISE ATTACK ON BASE
SECURITY AREA.

(2) DESIGNATION OF THESE AREAS MAY BE ON A CASE-BY-
CASE BASIS AS DETERMINED BY ARVN CORPS OR DIVISION COMMANDER IN

ACT.....J3-8

INFO....CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J5-2 SACS-4 SECDEF 5 W/HOUSE-3 FILE-1

(28)ETO/CL

PAGE 1 OF 3

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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COORDINATION WITH US/ALLIED FORCE COMMANDER. SELECTIONS WILL BE BASED ON AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE.

(3) MOVEMENT TO AND FROM TAOR'S WILL BE COORDINATED WITH ARVN CORPS AND WITH SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS AS NECESSARY THROUGH APPROPRIATE US ADVISORS. RVNAF LIAISON PERSONNEL MUST ACCOMPANY US UNITS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE IDENTIFICATION OF FRIENDLY TROOPS AND AS A MEANS OF CONTACT WITH AND IDENTIFICATION OF CIVILIANS.

(4) WITH EXPERIENCE, SCOPE OF OPERATIONS MAY BE INCREASED. EVENTUALLY, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO EFFECT COORDINATION BETWEEN US/ALLIED OPERATION IN ONE TAOR WITH RVNAF FORCE IN ADJACENT BUT SEPARATE AND CLEARLY DEFINED TAOR'S.

I. STAGE III: SEARCH AND DESTROY AND RESERVE REACTION OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH RVNAF.

(1) STAGES I AND II CONTINUE.

(2) US/ ALLIED FORCES WILL PROVIDE COMBAT SUPPORT TO RVNAF ON BASIS OF OPERATIONAL COORDINATION TO INCLUDE SEARCH AND DESTROY AND RESERVE REACTION OPERATIONS. INITIATION OF RESERVE REACTION OPERATIONS WILL GENERALLY BE AT THE REQUEST OF A SENIOR RVNAF UNIT COMMANDER AND APPROVED BY THE CORPS COMMANDER FOR SUPPORT OF RVNAF FORCES IN CONTACT WITH AN ENEMY FORCE.

(3) UPON RECEIPT OF REQUEST FOR COMBAT SUPPORT US/ALLIED COMMANDER AND PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS WILL MOVE TO APPROPRIATE RVNAF CP, MEE O DH THEIR OPPOSITE NUMBER AND JOINTLY DEVELOP OPERATIONS

AGREEMENT ON DETAILS OF OPERATIONS (OBJECTIVES, TIMES, FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND SIGNALS), WILL BE DEVELOPED AS PLANNING PROGRESSES. TACTICAL PLAN MUST BE AS SIMPLE AND CLEAR AS POSSIBLE.

(4) BECAUSE OF THE COORDINATION PROBLEMS AND THE ABSENCE OF A POSITIVE COMMAND CHAIN CONTROLLING ALL UNITS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PLAN AVOID CLOSE AND INTRICATE MANEUVER AND AVOID CLOSE TACTICAL CONTACT BETWEEN US/ALLIED AND RVNAF FORCES WHICH WOULD REQUIRE PRECISE EXECUTION TO INSURE OPERATIONAL SUCCESS. THEREFORE, IT IS IMPORTANT

PAGE 2 OF 3

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THAT CLEARLY DEFINED ZONES AND OBJECTIVES BE ASSIGNED WHICH ARE READILY IDENTIFIABLE ON THE GROUND AND ON THE MAP.

(5) ASSUMING AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC PLAN, EACH COMMANDER EXECUTES HIS PORTION OF THE PLAN. THE COMMANDERS AND STAFFS REMAIN CO-LOCATED THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION INsofar AS POSSIBLE AND AS A MINIMUM RETAIN SENIOR AND RESPONSIBLE REPRESENTATIVE THROUGH THE COMBINED CPM COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN US/ALLIED FORCES AND ADJACENT RVNAF UNITS THROUGH THE ICSORS WITH THOSE UNITS WHO, ACTING AS COMBAT LIAISON OFFICERS, WILL REPORT POSITIONS, ASPTIODU AND INTELLIGENCE DIRECTLY TO THE US COMMANDER OR HIS STAFF.

(6) SUPPORTING GROUND WEAPONS AND TACTICAL AIR ELEMENTS WILL BE CLOSELY CONTROLLED IN ORDER TO AVOID FIRE ON FRIENDLY POSITIONS. A FIRE SUPPORT CREEDINHASAP VRFTRNGKFSCC IS DESIRABLE AND, IF ESTABLISHED, WILL BE A COOPERATIVE UNDERTAKING. IN THE CASE OF AN FSCC THE CONTRUHY FIRES BECOMES A PROBLEM OF KEEPING CURRENT Y: '00 08,3. THE EXCHANGE OF GROUND FIRE SUPPORT AND COMMON USE OF AIR SUPPORT MUST BE ANTICIPATED.

J. GENERAL COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) VIETNAMESE LIAISON PERSONNEL WILL BE PROVIDED AT BATTALION LEVEL AND WITH ARTILLERY UNITS AS NECESSARY TO IDENTIFY AND PREVENT FIRING ON FRIENDLY FORCES OR CIVILIANS. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO PROVIDE VN LIAISON PERSONNEL TACTICAL ELEMENTS OPERATING SEPARATELY.

(2) WHEN OPERATING IN A SECTOR (PROVINCE) OR SUBSECTOR (DISTRICT), LIAISON WILL BE ESTABLISHED WITH US ADVISORS AND LOCAL MILITARY AUTHORITIES. PERMANENT LIAISON WILL BE MAINTAINED WITH APPROPRIATE CORPS OR DIVISION COMMANDERS.

(3) US COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS MUST ACCOMMODATE THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH RESPONSIBILITY IS SHARED AND COOPERATIVELY DISCHARGED WITHOUT BENEFIT OF TRADITIONAL COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS. IN PLANNING FOR AND CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE EMPLOYMENT OF COMBINED FORCES, IT IS DESIRABLE TO PROGRESS SEQUENTIALLY FROM THE RELATIVELY SIMPLE TO THE MORE COMPLEX AND THEN DEVELOP EXPERIENCE. INTRICATE MANEUVERS ARE TO BE AVOIDED. BOUNDARIES, PHASE LINES AND OTHER CONTROL MEASURES MUST BE UNMISTAKEABLE AND UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH COMMANDERS AND THEIR STAFFS. SIMPLE, EASILY UNDERSTOOD TACTICAL PLANS ARE A PREREQUISITE TO SUCCESS.

K. COMMAND RELATIONS.

(1) COMUSMACV WILL ASSUME AND RETAIN OPCON OF US/ALLIED FORCES UPON ARRIVAL IN RVN.

(2) THE BASIC CONCEPT UNDERLYING COMMAND RELATIONS BETWEEN US/ALLIED FORCES AND RVNAF WILL BE ONE OF COMBAT SUPPORT THROUGH COORDINATION AND COOPERATION IN THE MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST OF BOTH COMMANDS.

(3) AS A MATTER OF POLICY, US FORCES WILL NOT BE PLACED UNDER THE COMMAND OR OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ALLIED BT

ADV CY TO OSD DJS CJCS NMCC

PAGE 3 OF 3

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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COMMANDERS, NOR IS THE GVN PREPARED TO ACCEPT AS A REGULAR
PRACTICE THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF US COMMANDERS. HOWEVER,
THIS RESTRICTION IS NOT INTENDED TO PRECLUDE EXCEPTIONS AS TO
TACTICAL DIRECTION UNDER PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES AND US
MUTUALLY AGREED BY THE APPROPRIATE COMMANDERS. NATIONAL
COMMAND INTEGRITY WILL BE MAINTAINED AT ALL LEVELS. MATTERS
OF THIS NATURE WHICH CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY SUBORDINATE US
COMMANDERS WILL BE REFERRED TO COMUSMACV.

(4) MACV ADVISORY TEAMS, AT ALL LEVELN WILL

ACT....J3-8

INFO...CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J5-2 SACS-4 SEC DEF-5 WHITE HOUSE-3

FILE-1 (28) ETO/E

SEC 4 OF 50858
ADV TO OSD, CJCS, DJS.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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CONTINUE THEIR MISSION OF ADVICE, ASSISTANCE, AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT OF RVNAF UNDER DIRECTION OF COMUSMACV. THE MACV ADVISORY TEAMS WILL PERFORM COMBAT LIAISON FUNCTIONS AS REQUIRED AND DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV.

2. IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE PUBLIC STANE ON THIS MATTER BY THE US AND GVN BE AS FOLLOWS: US/ALLIED FORCES WILL NORMALLY PROVIDE COMBAT SUPPORT TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FORCES THROUGH COORDINATION AND COOPERATION. ON OCCASIONS THIS RELATIONSHIP MAY BE REVERSED. UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, TACTICAL DIRECTION MAY BE EXERCISED BY A COMMANDER OF EITHER THE SUPPORTED OR THE SUPPORTING FORCE.

3. THE ABOVE CONCEPT AND PROCEDURES HAVE PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR LETTERS OF INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO MARINE FORCES AND 173D ABN BDE. THEY WILL BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION TO ALLIED AND ADDITIONAL US GROUND COMBAT FORCES; FOR COORDINATION WITH GVN; AND FOR JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.

4. AMBASSADOR HAS REVIEWED THIS CONCEPT AND CONCURS.

GP-3
BT

SEC 4 OF 50855

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1965 MAY 9 AM 1 09

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~~T O P S E C R E T~~ MAY 9

WHITE HOUSE ATTN BUNDY
E X D I S
DEPTEL 2513

MACV LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS (LIO) DATED MAY 5 TO CG III MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (NOW CALLED III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE -MAF) SETS FORTH FOLLOWING MISSION: QUOTE: IN GENERAL RENDER COMBAT SUPPORT TO RVNAF. IN COORDINATION WITH CG, I CORPS, PARTICIPATE IN OR PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE OF HUE-PHU BAI, DA NANG, AND CHU LAI AIRFIELDS AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES. MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY CFN 3703 2160 404 9 2513 (LOI) 5 CG III III MAF RVNAF CG I HUE-PHU BAI DA NANG CHU LAI

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 432A ~~T O P S E C R E T~~
TO CONDUCT, ON ORDER, DEEP PATROLLING AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND RESERVE/REACTION OPERATIONS IN COORDINATION WITH CG, I CORPS. BE PREPARED TO EXECUTE US CONTINGENCY PLANS AS DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV. UNQUOTE.

MACV LOI OF MAY 5 TO CG 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE USES SAME LANGUAGE, STIPULATING COORDINATION WITH CG, III CORPS, AND ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENSE OF BIEN HOA AND VUNG TAU AIRFIELDS AND ANCILLARY FACILITIES.

IN BOTH LOI'S, CONCEPT IS THAT OPERATIONS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN THREE STAGES. IN STAGE I, US UNITS WILL BE ASSIGNED TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (TAOR) FROM WHICH RVNAF UNITS WILL BE WITHDRAWN, ALTHOUGH RVNAF LIAISON OFFICERS WILL BE ASSIGNED TO US UNITS TASK IS DEFENSE OF ASSIGNED SECTORS AND MOBILE DEFENSE

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State 11-24-80
By DCB/IS NARS, Date 1-6-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3703, May 9, from Saigon

OF AIRFIELD AREAS. IN STAGE II, US UNITS, WILL LAUNCH UNILATERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST VC BASES AND FORCES IN CLEARLY DESIGNATED AREAS OUTSIDE THE BASIC TAOR, AFTER COORDINATION WITH RVNAF AREA COOMANDERS AND FROM WHICH RVNAF UNITS HAVE BEEN REMOVED. WHEN UNITS SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED, SCOPE OF OPERATIONS MAY BE INCREASED TO INCLUDE ARVN FORCES IN ADJACENT BUT SEPARATE TAOR'S. IN STAGE III, US UNITS WILL PROVIDE COMBAT SUPPORT TO RVNAF TO INCLUDE SEARCH AND DESTROY AND RESERVE REACTION OPERATIONS ON REQUEST OF ARVN AREA COMMANDERS AND WHEN APPROVED BY CORPS COMMANDERS. AIRBORNE LOI STIPULATES THAT IN STAGE III COMUSMACV, IN COORDINATION WITH HIGH COMMAND, MAY ORDER 173RD TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OR RESERVE REACTION OPERATIONS, EITHER UNILATERAL OR COMBINED, OUTSIDE THE III CORPS AREA.

INITIAL ELEMENTS OF III MAF (9TH MEB) NOW IN STAGE II. OTHER UNITS OPERATING IN STAGE I. DETAILS FOLLOW IN MACV'S 080700Z MAY, AND COPIES OF LOI'S BEING POUCHED.

BOTH LOI'S CONTAIN FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE WHICH MAY BE OF INTEREST TO ADDRESSEES:

"AS A MATTER OF POLICY, US FORCES WILL NOT BE PLACED UNDER THE COMMAND OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ALLIED COMMANDERS, NOR IS THE GVN PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF US COMMANDERS. HOWEVER, THIS RESTRICTION IS NOT INTENDED TO PRECLUDE THE TEMPORARY TACTICAL DIRECTION OF US FORCES BY RVNAF COMMANDERS UNDER PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES SO WARRANTING OR THE TEMPORARY TACTICAL DIRECTION OF RVNAF BY US COMMANDERS UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN MUTUALLY AGREED BY THE APPROPRIATE COMMANDERS. NATIONAL COMMAND INTEGRITY WILL BE MAINTAINED AT ALL LEVELS. MATTERS OF THIS NATURE WHICH CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY SUBORDINATES US COMMANDERS WILL BE REFERRED TO COMUSMACV."

TAYLOR
BT

Note: Advance Copy to S/S-0 at 1:16 a.m., May 9

Passed White House, DOD, CIA at 1:29 a.m., May 9

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON FLASH 2553

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Info

Authority State 3-21-79; NSC 7-11-79

NODIS

By [Signature], NARS, Date 2-4-80

TO AMBASSADOR TAYLOR FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have learned from Bob McNamara that nearly all ROLLING THUNDER operations for this week can be completed by Wednesday noon, Washington time. This fact and the days of Buddha's birthday seem to me to provide an excellent opportunity for a pause in air attacks which might go into next week and which I could use to good effect with world opinion.

My plan is not to announce this brief pause but simply to call it privately to the attention of Moscow and Hanoi as soon as possible and tell them that we shall be watching closely to see whether they respond in any way. My current plan is to report publicly after the pause ends on what we have done.

Could you see Quat right away on Tuesday and see if you can persuade him to concur in this plan. I would like to associate him with me in this decision if possible, but I would accept a simple

Drafted by: Text rec'd from W.H.:amp 5/10/65

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

[Signature]
S/S:Mr. Tueller

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Bundy [Signature]
THE SECRETARY (in substance)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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FORM 8-63 DS-322

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Classification

concurrence or even a willingness not to oppose my decision. In general, I think it important that he and I should act together in such matters, but I have no desire to embarrass him if it is politically difficult for him to join actively in a pause over Buddha's birthday.

We have noted your 3699 and 3706 but do not yet have your appreciation of the political effect in Saigon of acting around Buddha's birthday. From my point of view it is a great advantage to use Buddha's birthday to mask the first days of the pause here, if it is at all possible in political terms for Quat. I assume we could undertake to enlist the ~~XXXXXX~~ Archbishop and the Nuncio in calming the Catholics.

You should understand that my purpose in this plan is to begin to clear a path either toward restoration of peace or toward increased military action, depending upon the reaction of the Communists. We have amply demonstrated our determination and our commitment in the last two months, and I now wish to gain some flexibility.

I know that this is a hard assignment on short notice, but there is no one who can bring it off better.

I have kept this plan in the tightest possible circle here and wish you to inform no one but Alexis Johason. After I have your report of Quat's reaction I will make a final decision and it will be communicated.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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promptly to senior officers concerned.

KX END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

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227

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

May 11, 1965

7a

PERSONAL FOR

Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Admiral Raborn
Assistant Secretary William Bundy

Up to this moment, the knowledge of the President's plan for a trial pause has been restricted to the President himself and to those addressed in this memorandum.

The President now approves the extension of this circle to include in the State Department Under Secretary Ball, Ambassador Thompson and Ambassador Unger; in the Defense Department Deputy Secretary Vance, Assistant Secretary McNaughton, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and in the White House Mr. Bromley Smith. The President has further approved most private transmission of the existence of his plan to Prime Minister Wilson, Prime Minister Pearson, and Prime Minister Menzies, with explicit caution to each of these Heads of Government against revealing the substance of the President's plan at this time to anyone but his Foreign Minister. The President has himself informed Ambassador Taylor and Ambassador Johnson in Saigon, and he now authorizes a message to Ambassador Taylor instructing him to inform General Westmoreland.

The President has consulted fully with Prime Minister Quat, who has expressed his understanding of the President's plan.

The President has authorized the Secretary of State to convey appropriate messages with respect to this plan to the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of North Vietnam.

The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense to carry out the military aspects of this plan.

Beyond this point, the President has given no authorization whatever for any discussion or disclosure of this plan by anyone at any time with anyone inside or outside the Government. The President has directed me to

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines, + NSC letter 5-18-79

By ju, NARA, Date 4-30-98

emphasize the importance of complete discretion among those who are authorized to be informed, and he asks me to impress upon the Secretary of Defense and upon Mr. William Bundy, in Secretary Rusk's absence, the importance of insuring complete discretion in the State and Defense Departments. Needless to say, he has given me a similar caution with respect to the White House, and he omits this warning in the case of Admiral Raborn simply because he expects that no other office of the CIA will be informed at this time.

This operation needs a code word and the best that I can think of is HOLIDAY.

McGeorge Bundy

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228

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

w/d ✓
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~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONROL : 9976
RECD : MAY 11, 1965 11:45 AM
FROM : SAIGON

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ACTION: SECSTATE FLASH 3731

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Authority STATE letter MAR 21 1979

~~TOP SECRET~~ May 11

By *mg*, NARS, Date 7-19-79

N O D I S

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR

DEPTEL 2553

PART I

ALEX JOHNSON AND I CALLED ON QUAT THIS AFTERNOON TO TAKE UP MATTER RAISED IN REFTEL. WE EXPLAINED FEELING IN WASHINGTON THAT THERE WAS NEED TO VARY PATTERN OF OUR ACTIVITY VIS-A-VIS HANOI AND GIVE MORE FLEXIBILITY TO OUR OPERATIONS. TO THIS END, CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO PAUSE OF SEVERAL DAYS DURATION IN AIR ATTACKS AGAINST DRV WHICH, IT SEEMED TO US, WOULD OFFER SEVERAL ADVANTAGES. SUCH ACTION WOULD BE VIEWED FAVORABLY BY WORLD OPINION AS AN INDICATION OF OUR RELUCTANCE TO PROCEED TOO RAPIDLY IN APPLYING MILITARY PRESSURES. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE REACTION OF HANOI LEADERS WHO ARE UNLIKELY TO RESPOND OTHER THAN WITH DEFIANCE WHILE ATTACKS ARE IN PROCESS. FINALLY, WE COULD ANTICIPATE SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT DERIVING FROM QUIET OF SEVERAL DAYS OF SUSPENDED ACTION FOLLOWED, IF REQUIRED, BY RESUMPTION OF ATTACKS.

AFTER POINTOUT ADVANTAGES, WE NOTED DANGER OF MISINTERPRETATION AND NEED FOR PLAUSIBLE REASON FOR TIMING OF OUR ACTION. WE SAID THAT OBSERVANCE OF BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY OFFERED CONVENIENT PEG UPON WHICH TO HANG OUR PROPOSED ACTION. WE KNEW THAT FROM PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS QUAT HAD NOT FAVORED ANYTHING RESEMBLING CEASEFIRE RELATED TO THIS PERIOD BUT WE WERE RAISING MATTER AGAIN IN AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT CONTEXT.

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-2- 3730 From Saigon, May 11, 1965, CN 9976

QUAT DID NOT TAKE ISSUE WITH ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PAUSE OF LIMITED DURATION. HE DID SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT PAUSE BE INTRODUCED PROGRESSIVELY, ONE DAY OF AIR ACTIVITY FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER OF QUIET. I OBJECTED THAT THIS KIND OF PATTERN WOULD NOT FULLY MEET ANY OF THREE PURPOSES WHICH WE CONSIDERED TO JUSTIFY SUSPENSION OF AIR ACTIVITY. HE ABANDONED ARGUMENT WITHOUT MUCH RELUCTANCE AND INDICATED GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH PAUSE CONCEPT (FOUR OR FIVE DAYS ONLY) EXCEPT FOR LINKAGE WITH BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY. HE FEELS STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY ADVANCE THIS OCCASION AS REASON FOR OUR ACTION. TO DO SO WOULD CAUSE HIM DIFFICULTY WITH LOCAL CATHOLICS AND WOULD BE EMBARRASSING IN OTHER RESPECTS SINCE HIS GOVT HAS DECLINED TO GIVE OFFICIAL RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT TO BIRTHDAY PERIOD. FINALLY, HE POINTED OUT THAT AMBASSADOR LODGE WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE PURSUED PRO-BUDDHIST POLICY AND THAT HE FELT AMERICANS WOULD GIVE SUPPORT TO THIS ALLEGATION IF WE JUSTIFIED PAUSE ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY.

WITHOUT SUCH PRETEXT, WE ASKED HIM HOW WE COULD RESPOND TO INEVITABLE PRESS QUERIES AS TO REASON FOR LACK OF AIR ACTIVITY. HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD CAUSE HIM NO DIFFICULTY AS HE AND HIS SPOKESMEN WOULD SIMPLY RESPOND THAT THIS IS MATTER OF STRATEGY ABOUT WHICH THEY WOULD MAKE NO COMMENT.

WHILE I DID NOT MENTION PLAN TO CALL SUSPENSION OF AIR ACTIVITIES PRIVATELY TO ATTENTION OF MOSCOW AND HANOI, I DID COMMENT ON NEED OF CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MOTIVES ON PART OF COMMUNISTS AND MENTIONED THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENTER INTO SOME KIND OF COMMUNICATION WITH THEM ON SUBJECT. QUAT ACCEPTED THIS REMARK WITHOUT COMMENT.

IN SUMMARY, QUAT CONCURS IN CONCEPT OF PAUSE FROM FOUR TO NOT MORE THAN FIVE DAYS PROVIDED THERE IS NO PUBLIC LINKING OF THIS ACTION WITH BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY. IF SPECULATION ASSUMES THIS LINKAGE, HE WOULD NOT TRY TO DISPEL IMPRESSION BUT WOULD GIVE NO VERIFICATION. JOHNSON AND I RECOMMEND THAT WE RESPECT HIS OBJECTIONS AND ADJUST OUR PLANS IN CONSONANCE WITH THEM.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 3731, May 11, From Saigon

PART II

IF DECISION IS MADE TO PROCEED WITH PAUSE, WE SHALL NEED ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WITH REGARD TO OUR PUBLIC RELATIONS ATTITUDE. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF FACTORS WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. (SOME DO NOT APPLY IF WE FOLLOW QUAT'S VIEWS WITH REGARD TO BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY.)

1. AS PATTERN OF DAILY ANNOUNCEMENTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AIR ACTIONS AGAINST NORTH NOW ESTABLISHED HERE AND ELSEWHERE, ABSENCE OF ANNOUNCEMENT WILL IMMEDIATELY BE NOTED AND QUERIES MADE AS TO REASON.
2. BONZE KHIET'S REQUEST FOR "CESSATION OF ATTACKS" IS ONLY FOR PERIOD 0000 HOURS TO 2400 HOURS MAY 15. IF WE USE BIRTHDAY AS PRETEXT FOR PAUSE OF SEVERAL DAYS, WE APPEAR MORE BUDDHIST THAN VENERABLE.
3. QUAT WILL HAVE TO GIVE SOME REASONS FOR PAUSE TO HIS GENERALS AND SOMETHING AS TO TRUE MOTIVES CAN BE EXPECTED TO LEAK FAIRLY PROMPTLY TO PRESS.
4. PRESS CAN BE EXPECTED TO PROBE HARD TO EARN WHETHER INITIATIVE FOR PAUSE CAME FROM GVN OR USG AND, IF LATTER, WHETHER FROM SAIGON OR WASHINGTON,

INITIALLY, PRESS CAN BE EXPECTED TO PERCEIVE CONNECTION BETWEEN PAUSE AND BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY BUT TO EXTENT THAT PAUSE EXTENDS BEYOND MAY 15 SPECULATION AS TO OTHER REASONS CAN BE EXPECTED TO BECOME INTENSE BOTH IN LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS, AND CORRESPONDENTS WILL HOUND EVERY POSSIBLE SOURCE. OUR REFUSAL TO ANSWER QUESTIONS HERE AND WELL-KNOWN FACT THAT WASHINGTON ISSUES INSTRUCTIONS ON STRIKES CAN BE EXPECTED TO DIVERT MUCH OF PRESS PRESSURE TO WASHINGTON. WE HOPE THAT AS SITUATION DEVELOPS WE CAN BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED ON HOW MATTER BEING HANDLED WASHINGTON, INCLUDING ALL BACKGROUNDEERS, SO THAT WE AND GVN CAN KEEP IN STEP.

GP-1

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

9

229

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Being typed *WA*
2

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL : 10013
RECD : 11 MAY 1965, 12:27 P.M.

Info

FROM : SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE PRIORITY 3727

~~SECRET~~ MAY 11

FOR THE PRESIDENT

N O D I S

THE BIG EVENT OF THE POLITICAL WEEK WAS THE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL BY THE GENERALS WHO COMPOSED IT. QUAT GETS THE CREDIT FOR HAVING ENGINEERED THIS OPERATION, QUIETLY PRESSING THE SENIOR GENERALS TOWARD THIS SOLUTION. WE FEEL THAT IT IS A MOST HAPPY DEVELOPMENT AS THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL REMOVES A MECHANISM WHICH INVITED THE GENERALS TO INTERFERE WITH CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AND ENGAGE IN POLITICS.

AS I REPORTED DURING THE WEEK, QUAT IS STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND. HE WANTS TO GET RID OF GENERAL "LITTLE" MINH, NOW COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, BECAUSE OF HIS UNPOPULARITY WITH HIS FELLOW GENERALS BUT DOES NOT KNOW WHOM TO PUT IN HIS PLACE. IN VIEW OF THE PAUCITY OF ABLE GENERALS FOR THE SENIOR POSITIONS, QUAT MAY END UP WITH GENERAL THIEU AS BOTH MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. ORGANIZATIONALLY THIS FOCUSING OF RESPONSIBILITY OFFERS SOME ADVANTAGES BUT IT IS ALSO A DANGEROUS CONCERNTRATION OF POWER IN ONE OFFICER WHOSE CHARACTER IS UNTESTED.

OUR TWO LATEST U.S. REINFORCEMENTS, THE 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE AND THE MARINE BATTALIONS FOR THE CHU LAI AIRFIELD, HAVE ARRIVED AND ARE RAPIDLY SHAKING DOWN IN THEIR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THE IMPRESSION OF PROFESSIONAL ALERTNESS AND COMPETENCE WHICH THEY CONVEY HAS HAD A GOOD EFFECT ON ALL WHO SEE THEM BUT THE FUTURE WILL HOLD PROBLEMS IN THIS REGARD. IF THEY ARE NOT ACTIVELY EMPLOYED SHORTLY, I SUSPECT BOREDOM IS GOING TO BE A MAJOR FACTOR TO PREOCCUPY THEIR COMMANDERS. THERE IS SOME LIMIT ON THE USEFUL WORK WHICH COULD BE DONE WITHIN THEIR DEFENSIVE PERIMETERS.

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority *FRUS, Vol. II, # 290*
By *ky*, NARA, Date *4-4-14*

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3727, May 11, From Saigon

THE VIET CONG RAISED THE TEMPO OF THEIR ACTIVITY SOMEWHAT DURING THE PAST WEEK, PARTICULARLY IN THE MEKONG DELTA REGION. THERE THEY COMMITTED A VIET CONG BATTALION TO BATTLE, THE FIRST TIME SINCE MARCH 8 THAT A UNIT OF THIS SIZE HAS BEEN ENGAGED. WE HAVE THE FEELING THAT THE PERIOD OF RELATIVE INACTION IS OVER AND THAT THE VIET CONG OFFENSIVE MAY BE UNDER WAY. IT MAY TAKE THE FORM OF A LARGE NUMBER OF SMALL ACTIONS RATHER THAN OF THE LARGE HEADLINE FILLING TYPES WHICH THE PRESS IS ANTICIPATING.

THERE IS CONSIDERABLE ACTION UNDER WAY IN PREPARATION OF THE MUNICIPAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS WHICH ARE SCHEDULED FOR MAY 20. WITH THEIR APPROACH, THE VIETNAMESE PRESS HAS BEEN PLAYING GREATER ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR ELECTIONS FOR A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. MANY OF THE EDITORS SHOW MORE FERVOR THAN GOOD SENSE IN URGING GENERAL ELECTIONS UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITIONS OF INSECURITY IN MANY PROVINCES. QUAT IS THOROUGHLY AWARE OF WHAT IS REALISTIC AND CAN BE COUNTED UPON KEEPING THIS ENTHUSIASM WITHIN BOUNDS. INCIDENTALLY, THERE IS A HIGHER INTEREST IN STANDING FOR OFFICE IN THE MUNICIPAL AND PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED. WE ARE TOLD THAT THERE IS AN AVERAGE OF FIVE CANDIDATES FOR EACH PROVINCIAL COUNCIL SEAT AND NINE FOR EACH MUNICIPAL SEAT, A COMPETITION WHICH IS DOUBLE THAT OF PREVIOUS ELECTIONS. WORKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE GAINING IN APPEAL.

TAYLOR

~~SECRET~~

10

230

DECLASSIFIED

10a

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By *ip*, NARS, Date 4-5-78
BUNDY-SMITH
BATOR
BOWDLER
BRYMAN
JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
~~TOP SECRET~~ FOR SECRET/LIM DIS

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

CHASE
COOPER
HAYNES
JESSUP
JOHNSON
KEENEY
KLEIN
DIST: SECDEF-5(4-8) FILE-1 (1) ML READD: WHITE HOUSE/STATE/CIA
NSA/ PER NMCC/DDO (COL CABELL)
#2-DACC #3-SECDEF COMEBACK CY
ZFF 1 & 6 #377
DTG: 112359Z MAY 65

PRECEDENCE	FLASH	TYPE MSG (Otech)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION	FLASH	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	
INFO	FLASH		XX	OSD	

FROM: ON
SEC DEF, WASHINGTON, D. C. **FLASH** SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: Ambassador Taylor, Saigon DEF 001900 SECDEF SENDS DIST:

CINCPAC
INFO: COMUSMACV
In order to observe reaction of DRV rail and road transportation systems, bombing (including armed recce and other strike operations) of targets within DRV will cease for several days effective 2400 12 May Saigon time. CINCPAC should issue the necessary instructions to US forces and Ambassador should seek to obtain compliance of VNAF.

During the period in which bombing operations are suspended, photo and eyeball reconnaissance flights over DRV, in so far as they can be carried out without flak suppression escorts and within currently approved rules relating to altitudes and latitudes, will be increased to the level required to permit a thorough study of lines of communication. The bombing sorties which would have been directed against the DRV during this period, to the extent practical, will be targeted against appropriate targets in South Vietnam.

ROLLING THUNDER 15 as outlined in JCS 1736 has been approved.

43
SEC DEF ONLY

ADDED: DIST: CJCS-1 (9) DJS-3 (10-12)
SJCS-1 (13) J3-8(14-21) J5-2 (22-23) SACSA
(24-27) NMCC-3 (28-30) JRC-2 (31-32)
ASD/ISA-5 (33-37) DIA-4 (38-41) W/HOUSE-3
(42-44) CSA-2 (45-46) CNO-2 (47-48) CSAF-2
(49-50) CMC-2(51-52) SECDEF-1 (53) (53)

DATE	TIME
11	
MONTH	YEAR
May	1965

SYMBOL OSD

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)
Robert S. McNamara, SecDef

PHONE 55261 PAGE NR. 1 NR. OF PAGES 2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
~~TOP SECRET~~ FOR SECRET/LIM DIS

SIGNATURE *Robert S. McNamara*

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

*Substantiated concerned in by
Lark & M. Brady*

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET/LIM DIS~~

FROM:

SEC DEF, WASHINGTON, D. C.

It is to be executed upon receipt of appropriate execution orders.

Press guidance for the period during which bombing operations are suspended will be furnished in a separate message.

GP-4.

SYMBOL

OSD

PAGE NR

2

NR OF PAGES

2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET/LIM DIS~~

INITIALS

11

231

9:15 P
5-12-65

(7)
MR 5/12

33

✓
11a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, May 12, 1965
7:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Conversation with John Hightower

John Hightower came in to follow up on your conversation with the AP people at lunch. I gave him for background use a pretty clear account of your view of the constitutional and political position with respect to the Southeast Asia Resolution and the recent appropriations and the Korean War. We agreed to make it clear that you were in no sense predicting any such enlargement as a "Korean" war, and that in fact you were opposed to speculations about what might come next week there.

Hightower and I were both somewhat surprised that Gallagher thought the Southeast Asia Resolution was a fresh story, but it was clear that John had instructions to write something substantial about it.

At the end of our cordial talk -- we treat each other pretty candidly -- I told him that we had deliberately stayed away from our one problem with AP reporting -- namely, Arnett. Hightower at once said that he thought this was very wise indeed because he thought Gallagher would almost surely become both protective and resentful if the White House attacked one of his reporters. I asked Hightower if he would have written the gas story the way Arnett did. He answered that he has as many years' experience as Arnett has years of life. He said that it was hard to get experienced and senior men to stay put in Saigon.

I told him that the AP problem sounded very much like our problem in Saigon, but that you had insisted on putting the first team there. I said that I could not judge the daily merits of Arnett's reporting, but that I respected Zorthian, and Zorthian was troubled. Hightower agreed that Zorthian was a very good man.

Although somewhat puzzled by his mission, Hightower obviously felt the luncheon has been highly successful.

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
By DC H, NARA, Date 3-2-88

McG. B.

12

232

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

07077

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

✓ Bundy 12a

43
Origin

ACTION: CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

SS
Info

INFO: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 2569

MAY 13 1 20 PM '65

White House
DOD

Joint State-Defense Message.

NSC

20/25

LIMDIS.

Def 001900.

Press guidance should be that operations being announced in normal fashion. No comment on operational factors. All personnel should be instructed to avoid speculation of any sort.

GP-3.

End.

BALL.

Drafted by: FE:WPBundy:mk 5/13/65	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: FE - William P. Bundy
Clearances: DOD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton (substance)	S/S - Mr. Rattray

~~TOP SECRET~~

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State 11-24-80
By OCA/ISP NARS, Date 1-6-84

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233

GOING TELEGRAM Department of State

collect

W H
08650

Bundy
13a

MAY 14 8 22 PM '65

OR COPY USE ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 2594
INFO: CINCPAC
SAIGON PASS COMUSMACV

NODIS

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE

Ref: A. Saigon's 3384; B. DEF 9653 DTG 231859Z April.

Deployment of US combat units recommended by participants Honolulu Conference and listed para 4 ref B have been made with exception of one US Army brigade (three battalions) to be deployed to Qui Nhon/Nha Trang. This brigade of four thousand men was to close in RVN on June 15 but present schedule calls for deployment June 27 if decision is made by May 21. Final approval for deployment this Army brigade has not yet been given.

Would appreciate your present evaluation as to desirability of deploying this brigade.

GP-2

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-21-79, OSD 8-21-79

By ijg, NARS, Date 8-21-80

BALL

FE-LUnger;hjh

Telegraphic transmission and

5/11/65

classification approved by:

FE - Leonard Unger

DOD/ISA - Mr. McNaughton
(Jt Stf - Gen. Burchinal) (informed)

S/S - Mr. Read

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

DS-322

14

234

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

14a

~~SECRET~~

6
Action
SS
Info

PP RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 728A 15/0310Z
P R 150250Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC **PRIORITY 3768**
INFO ZEN/AMCONSUL HUE UNN
RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 2194
STATE GRNC

014505
1965 MAY 14 PM 11 33

P R I O R I T Y

~~SECRET~~ MAY 15

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

L I M D I S

TRI QUANG TOLD EMBOFFS YESTERDAY THAT HE BELIEVED PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFT FROM BOMBINGS OF NORTH AND LANDING OF US TROOPS WAS WEARING OFF. SAID PRO-US FEELING BEGINNING TO DIMINISH AND ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENTS WILL GROW THE LONGER THE WAR CONTINUES WITHOUT CLEAR DECISION. FELT VC STRATEGY WAS TO HANG ON AND PERSIST NO MATTER WHAT THE PRICE, SINCE THEY COULD THEN CAPITALIZE ON THIS ANTI-US FEELING AND ON US LOSS OF PATIENCE AND "JUST CAUSE" BOTH HERE AND AT HOME. QUANG THOUGHT VC STRATEGY WAS SOUND AND THEREFORE DANGEROUS, SINCE PROTRACTED STRUGGLE COULD ONLY REBOUND TO THEIR BENEFIT BY CONVINCING THE PEOPLE THAT COMMUNISTS WERE ONLY ONES WHO WERE STRONG AND DETERMINED ENOUGH TO CARRY FIGHT TO END.

QUANG CLAIMED HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN CRITICIZED BY SOME STUDENTS AND OTHER BUDDHISTS FOR NOT TAKING STRONGER LINE CALLING FOR PEACE AND END TO DESTRUCTIVE HOSTILITIES. SAID THERE WAS SOME FEELING THAT AS WAR CONTINUED, DISMAY AT DESTRUCTION CAUSED TO COUNTRY AND PEOPLE WOULD CERTAINLY GROW AMONG "GOOD PATRIOTS", AND EVEN THESE STALWARTS WOULD HAVE TO START TO OPPOSE CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT. STATED HE EXPECTED MORE PRESSURE ALONG THIS LINE, AND SAID RISK OF MORE VIOLENT EXPRESSIONS OF ANTI-US FEELING COULD BECOME CONSIDERABLE.

ASKED IF HE THOUGHT ANYTHING COULD BE DONE ABOUT FORCING VC TO CHANGE ATTITUDE AND STRATEGY, QUANG REPLIED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE RIGHT APPROACH. RATHER, US SHOULD TRY TO WIN PEOPLE AWAY FROM VC BY SOUND POLITICAL ACTION, THEREBY UNDERCUTTING THEIR POLITICAL STRENGTH AMONG MASSES AND WEAKENING THEIR RESOLVE TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE. ASKED HOW TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WORTHY AIM, QUANG REPLIED HE HAD SET IT ALL DOWN IN PERSONAL LETTER TO AMBASSADOR LODGE, WHICH HE THEN GAVE TO EMBOFFS FOR FORWARDING.

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 23460
By 102/16 NARA, Date 4-4-14

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3768 MAY 15 FROM SAIGON

(NOTE: LETTER IS VERY DISCOURAGING ANTI-CATHOLIC DIATRIBE, ACCUSING CATHOLICS OF BEING PRO-FRENCH, SOMETIMES PRO-VC, ALWAYS ANTI-BUDDHIST AND ANTI-NATIONALIST, ETC. COMPLAINS OF CATHOLICS USING POPULAR FORCES AND OTHERS AS PRIVATE ARMIES AND SAYS US SHOULD NOT SUPPORT SUCH GROUPS. ACCUSES US OF FAVORING CATHOLICS IN GENERAL AND SAYS US WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY POLITICAL CHAOS AND RELIGIOUS STRIFE THAT RESULTS FROM POLICY OF SUCH FAVORITISM AND IGNORING PEOPLE AND "REVOLUTION". CONCLUDES WITH WARNING THAT AMERICANS FACE SAME DEFEAT AS FRENCH IN VIETNAM IF THEY LOSE POPULAR BACKING THROUGH RELIGIOUS ISSUE. FULL TRANSLATION OF LETTER FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM.)

DURING CONVERSATION QUANG ALSO DESCRIBED PRO-FRENCH NEUTRALIST GROUP OF CATHOLICS INCLUDING FORMER MINISTER OF ECONOMY AU TRUONG THANH. SAID GROUP HAD CONTACTED HIM TO ENLIST HIS SUPPORT, BUT HE HAD OF COURSE REFUSED. STATED CATHOLICS WERE ALREADY TURNING AGAINST US AND COULD NOT BE TRUSTED, AS THEIR SYMPATHIES WERE BECOMING MORE AND MORE PRO-FRENCH. CLAIMED THANH'S GROUP WAS "ONLY" SERIOUS AND WORRISOME NEUTRALIST GROUP IN VIETNAM NOW.

COMMENT: QUANG'S STATEMENTS RE PROLONGATION OF WAR PROBABLY REFLECT ACCURATELY SOME GROWING UNEASINESS AMONG VIETNAMESE THAT ESCALATION HAS SO FAR NOT BROUGHT HOSTILITIES THEMSELVES TO MORE FAVORABLE POSITION FOR GVN AND US. ALSO SHOW SOME OF LATENT NATIONALIST FEELINGS THAT ARE BEGINNING TO SHOW UP IN REACTION TO SUDDENLY INCREASED US PRESENCE.

ALSO, ATTITUDE IS UNDOUBTEDLY A REFLECTION OF BUDDHIST UNEASINESS ABOUT HAVING EXPOSED THEMSELVES BY TAKING STRONG ANTI-COMMUNIST AND ANTI-PEACE MOVEMENT LINE IN RECENT WEEKS. BUDDHIST ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN IN GENERAL HAS SLOWED DOWN NOTICEABLY AND STILL SHOWS LITTLE PROMISE OF REAL CONTINUITY AND ENTHUSIASM. QUANG'S STATEMENTS HINT AT ANOTHER PERIOD OF BUDDHIST UNREST AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY, WITH US AND GVN IN MIDDLE AS USUAL AND WITH STRONGER ANTI-CATHOLIC OVERTONES THAN BEFORE. IN EFFECT, BUDDHISTS SEEM TO BE FOCUSING ONCE AGAIN ON WHAT THEY CONSIDER EQUAL IF NOT GREATER ENEMY, I.E., CATHOLICS.

QUANG'S LETTER IS TOTALLY UNHELPFUL AND DEMONSTRATES ONCE AGAIN HIS THOROUGHLY UNRECONSTRUCTED ANTI-CATHOLIC BENT. ALSO SHOWS HIS PROCLIVITY FOR BLITHELY ASSIGNING MUCH OF RESPONSIBILITY TO US, AND IN SOME WAYS EVEN CONTAINS ELEMENTS OF BLACKMAIL

VIS-A-VIS US-CATHOLIC RELATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENT AS ARTICULATION OF WHAT IS PROBABLY DEEP FEELING ON PART OF MANY VIETNAMESE BUDDHISTS AND PARTICULARLY THOSE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM. TAYLOR

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 12:30 A.M. MAY 15
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA, DOD, 1:05 A.M. MAY 15

~~SECRET~~

15

235

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

15a

~~TOP SECRET~~

5
Action
SS
Info

NNNNVV MJA926JIA364
RR RUEHCR RUEHEX
DE RUMJIR 759A 16/0350Z
R 160340Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC (3776)
INFO RUEHEX/WHITEHOUSE 406
RUEKDA/JCS UNN
RUHKA/CINCPAC 2198
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 632
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 849
STATE GRNC
BT
TOP SECRET MAY 16.

015139

1965 MAY 16 AM 12:14

E X D I S

REF: JCS MESSAGE 071459Z MAY ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR MARKET TIME

JOINT EMBASSY/MACV MESSAGE

INASMUCH AS GVN REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITH SEA SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS STATES THAT GVN REPS WILL BE ASSIGNED TO US NAVY SHIPS EXECUTING SUCH MISSIONS IN GVN TERRITORIAL WATERS AND IN CONTIGUOUS ZONE TO DISTANCE OF 12 MILES, AND TO THE DEGREE FEASIBLE TO SHIPS OPERATING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS BEYOND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE, REQUEST PARA 2 OF RULES BE AMENDED ALONG FOLLOWING LINES. QUOTE, GVN REPS WILL BE ASSIGNED TO ALL

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 759A ~~TOP SECRET~~
US SHIPS OPERATING IN GVN TERRITORIAL WATERS OR IN THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE TO A DISTANCE OF 12 MILES, AND TO THE DEGREE FEASIBLE TO SHIPS OPERATING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS BEYOND THE 12 MILE ZONE, TO ASSIST THE COMMANDING OFFICER IN THE CONDUCT OF MARKET TIME OPERATIONS. THE GVN REP WILL LEAD BOARDING AND SEARCH PARTIES AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF GVN AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DETERMINING, IN CONSULTATION WITH US SHIP COMMANDERS, WHETHER A BOAT OR SHIP WHICH HAS BEEN SEARCHED IS TO BE DETAINED OR PERMITTED TO PROCEED ON ITS WAY. HOWEVER, THE PRESENCE OF GVN REPS ABOARD US SHIPS IN NO WAY MODIFIES THE ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDING OFFICERS IN THE EXERCISE OF COMMAND OVER THEIR SHIPS. UNQUOTE.

DECLASSIFIED
State 11-24-80
By Ocf/ISP NARS, Date 1-6-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 3776, MAY 16, FROM SAIGON

IN ADDITION, GENERAL OPERATIONAL PRECEPTS SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT, DESPITE DISPARITY IN US AND VIETNAMESE RESOURCES COMMITTED TO THESE OPERATIONS, WE ARE IN FACT AS WELL AS IN NAME ASSISTING THE GVN. WE REALIZE THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE EASIER FOR ALL CONCERNED TO ASSIGN RESPONSIBILITY FOR BOARDING AND SEARCH PARTIES TO US COMMANDERS, BUT RADIO HANOI AND LIBERATION RADIO ARE ALREADY INTENSIFYING XENOPHOBIC "US MASTER-GVN PUPPET" CAMPAING, CLAIMING JOINT COMMAND IS TO BE ESTABLISHED

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 759A T ~~O P S E C R E T~~
AND CITING LANDINGS OF AMERICAN TROOPS AS EVIDENCE WE INTEND OCCUPY SOUTH VIETNAM. MARKET TIME OPERATIONS WILL PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR MUCH OF MARITIME POPULATION OF VIETNAM TO CONTRAST GVN AND US PERFORMANCE WITH VC CLAIMS.

DEPT PASS TO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH IF DESIRED. TAYLOR

NOTE: NOT PASSED PHNOM PENH BY OC/T

~~TOP SECRET~~

16

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17

237

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* *wld*

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~~TOP SECRET~~

17a

CONTROL: 16571
RECEIVED: MAY 18, 1965, 5:20 A.M.
FROM: SAIGON
ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 3796

S

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter MAR 21 1979

By ms, NARS, Date 7-19-79

MAY 18

N O D I S

DEPT PASS IMMEDIATE TO CINCPAC AS SAIGON'S 2238

EMBTEL 3788

I HAVE JUST BEEN BRIEFED ON MACV'S CONCEPT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MAJOR FIELD-TYPE LOGISTIC BASE AT CAM RANH BAY COSTING (LESS ANY AIRFIELD) ABOUT \$19,900,000 AND 16 BATTALION MONTHS OF CONSTRUCTION. ALTHOUGH THESE FIGURES ARE QUICK ESTIMATES WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CHANGE WITH REFINEMENT, THEY INDICATE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROJECT CONTEMPLATED. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT SUCH A BASE IS ESSENTIAL IF ONE OR MORE DIVISIONS OF U.S. OR THIRD COUNTRY TROOPS ARE INTRODUCED INTO SVN BEYOND THOSE TROOPS PRESENTLY APPROVED. EVEN WITHOUT THESE ADDITIONAL FORCES, SUCH A BASE IS DESIRABLE TO GIVE GREATER FLEXIBILITY TO THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM, TO REMOVE SOME OF THE LOAD ON THE SAIGON PORT, AND TO AVOID A LARGE INCREASE IN THE MILITARY POPULATION AND ACTIVITIES AT NHA TRANG. THE CAM RANH BAY AREA IS PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE FOR SUCH A BASE BECAUSE OF THE EXTRAORDINARILY FINE DEEP WATER FACILITY, THE AVAILABILITY OF GOVERNMENT LAND FOR THE BASE AND EASE OF ITS PROTECTION FROM VC.

ALTHOUGH GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS DISCUSSED THIS PROJECT TENTATIVELY WITH GENERAL MINH, IT IS BECOMING TIME FOR ME TO BROACH THE MATTER FORMALLY WITH PRIME MINISTER QUAT. IT WOULD DO SO IN TERMS OF THE NEED TO ESTABLISH A BASE FOR THE SUPPORT OF BOTH GVN, U.S. AND THIRD COUNTRY FORCES PRESENTLY APPROVED FOR DEPLOYMENT TO SVN WITHOUT MENTIONING ANY POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON OF ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS. BEFORE RAISING THE MATTER, I NEED TO HAVE ASSURANCE THAT THE PROJECT HAS WASHINGTON APPROVAL. I WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE AND INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT.

TAYLOR

NOTE: NOT PASSED CINCPAC BY OC/T.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Billy 18a

43
Action

SS

Info

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

016854

1965 MAY 18 AM 9 09

VV MJA402JIA671
PP RUEHCR RUEKDA
DE RUMJIR 870A/1 18/1147Z
P R 181133Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3802
INFO RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC 518
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 18 SECTION ONE OF TWO

DEPT PASS AID AND TREASURY

LINDIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State 11-2-78 letter*

By *LSB* RARS, Date *1-29-80*

1. BUILDUP OF FACILITIES FOR USE OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN VIETNAM INVOLVED EXPENDITURES OF LARGE VOLUME OF PIASTERS ON AIRFIELDS, ACCESS ROADS, LAND PROCUREMENT, OCCUPANT RESETTLEMENT, WAREHOUSES, CANTONMENTS, ETC. QUESTION IMMEDIATELY ARISES AS TO SOURCE SUCH PIASTER FUNDING. BELIEVE PROBLEM OF SUCH SIGNIFICANCE AS TO WARRANT CONSIDERATION BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES AND GUIDANCE TO MYSELF AND THOSE ELEMENTS MISSION COUNCIL CONCERNED. RE-ORIENTATION OF

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 870A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN VIETNAM FROM STRICTLY ADVISORY ROLE TO STRUCTURE PRESENTLY ENVISAGED PRESENTS BOTH MACV AND USOM WITH NEW FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH PROBLEM MUST BE CONSIDERED.

2. UNDER TRADITIONAL PRACTICE HERE, GVN MILITARY BUDGET HAS CARRIED ONE-LINE ENTITLED AID-IN-KIND (AIK) WHICH PROVIDES USUAL TYPE PIASTER SUPPORT FOR MACV ADVISORY EFFORT. THESE FUNDS UNDER CONTROL OF MACV AND SERVE SAME PURPOSE AS USOM TRUST FUND. CY 65 FIGURE FOR AIK IS 1.5 BILLION PIASTERS (CY 64 WAS .9 BILLION) OUT OF PRESENTLY AGREED TOTAL MILITARY BUDGET SUPPORT OF 9.1 BILLION PIASTERS.

3. THERE HAS BEEN OVER PAST MONTHS REQUIREMENT FOR LIMITED CONSTRUCTION FOR USE U.S. HELICOPTERS SUPPORTING ARVN PLUS OTHER RELATIVELY SMALL CONSTRUCTION NEEDS IN SUPPORT US FORCES, BOTH ADVISORY AND OTHER. IN FACE THESE NEEDS, MACV HAS UTILIZED AIK FUNDS FOR THIS TYPE EXPENDITURE. AS RESULT, ANNUAL ALLOTMENT AIK BEING DRAWN DOWN MORE RAPIDLY THAN PRO RATA DISBURSEMENT WOULD PERMIT AND FUNDS FOR USUAL TYPE SUPPORT NEEDS WILL PROBABLY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- 3802, MAY 18, (SEC ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

BE EXHAUSTED DURING EARLY FALL. THIS WOULD NECESSITATE REPLENISHMENT FROM LARGELY NON-EXISTENT RESOURCES - IN OTHER WORDS, FROM MORE OVER-DRAFTS ON CENTRAL BANK. HOWEVER, LEVEL THESE UNPROGRAMMED

PAGE 3 RUNJIR 870A/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EXPENDITURES UP TO THIS TIME NOT AS YET OF SUCH MAGNITUDE AS TO CREATE UNMANAGEABLE PROBLEM.

4. NEW SITUATION CREATED BY INFLOW OF LARGE NUMBERS U.S. COMBAT FORCES. THEIR LOGISTICAL AND OPERATIONAL FACILITY NEEDS SHARPLY ALTER FORMER CIRCUMSTANCES.
5. IN VIEW OF NEED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH MAXIMUM SPEED, PLUS CURRENT LACK ANY OTHER KIND OF MONEY, MACV HAS UTILIZED AIK FUNDS FOR PRELIMINARY EXPENDITURES IN LAND PURCHASE, RESETTLEMENT COSTS, ETC. AMOUNT DISBURSED TO DATE MODEST BUT MACV AND COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL NEED TO COMMIT SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS TO CONTRACTORS IN NEAR FUTURE. MACV OFFICER NOW IN WASHINGTON SEEKING MCA FUNDS.
6. WHEN APPROACHED BY MACV RE AVAILABILITY OF EITHER ADDITIONAL COUNTERPART OF P.L. 480 FUNDS TO AUGMENT AIK RESERVOIR BY APPROX 1.1 BILLION PIASTERS FOR U.S. CONSTRUCTION NEEDS, USOM RAISED QUESTION RE SUITABILITY AND PROPRIETY THIS USE AIK FUNDS. USOM POSITION IN CAPSULE FROM AS FOLLOWS:

A) CIP GENERATED COUNTERPART GVN FUNDS AND COMMITTED TO JOINT BUDGET SUPPORT UP TO MAXIMUM LEVEL POSSIBLE;

B) P.L. 480 GENERALTION, WHILE U.S. OWNED, ALSO COMMITTED TO

PAGE 4 RUNJIR 870A/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MILITARY BUDGET SUPPORT UNDER SEC 104(c);

C) EXCESSIVELY LARGE DEFICIT IN GVN BUDGET ALREADY ENVISAGED (IN VICINITY 15-20 BILLION PIASTERS) MAKES IT DESIRABLE THAT ALL FUNDS GENERATED BY ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM GO TO BUDGET SUPPORT, EXCEPT FOR USUAL AIK AND TRUST FUND NEEDS;

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-3- 3802, MAY 18, (SEC ONE OF TWO) FROM SAIGON

D) WHILE USOM COULD PROPOSE REVISED USE OF COUNTERPART TO GVN IN LIGHT OF BUDGETARY SITUATION, IT PUT U.S. IN UNFAVORABLE LIGHT TO SUGGEST SCARCE BUDGETARY RESOURCES BE DIVERTED TO MEET EXPENDITURES WHICH WOULD MORE PROPERLY BE DRFRAYED BY U.S. DOLLARS.

E) GIVEN THE OVERALL B/P POSITION OF GVN FOR THIS YEAR AND NEXT, IT IS PROBABLE THAT SOME FORM OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR GVN FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS WILL BE NECESSARY. WERE THE PIASTERS NEEDED FOR U.S. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PURCHASED FROM BANK OF VIETNAM, A SIGNIFICANT ASSIST WOULD BE GIVEN IN THIS DIRECTION; AND

F) POLITICALLY, IT WOULD REFRESENT POOR PRACTICE TO PROPOSE THIS CONSTRUCTION BE FUNDED BY GVN RESOURCES OR U.S. RESOURCES ALREADY COMMITTED TO GVN BUDGET SUPPORT.

PAGE 5 RUNJIR 870A/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USOM THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT U.S. DOLLARS BE MADE AVAILABLE SOONEST WITH WHICH TO BUY PIASTERS TO COVER THESE EXPENDITURES.

7. WESTMORELAND HAS RECENTLY RECEIVED CABLE FROM CINCPAC SUGGESTING USE OF P.L. 480 PIASTERS FOR FUNDING U.S. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION UNDER QUOTE COMMON DEFENSE UNQUOTE MEANING OF SEC 104(C). KILLEN HAS NO DISAGREEMENT, IN PRINCIPLE, WITH THIS APPROACH BUT POINTS OUT THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH FUNDING SOURCE, FACTORS CITED PARA 6 ABOVE STILL MAKE SUCH COURSE BOTH UNWISE POLITICALLY AND ILL-ADVISED FROM STANDPOINT GOOD BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT. TAYLOR.

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-0 AT 9:28 AM, 5/18/65.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, CIA DOD AT 10:45 AM, 5/18/65.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Action

PP RUEHCR RUEKDA
DE RUMJIR 870A/2 18/1210Z
P R 181133Z ZEA

Info

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3802
INFO RUEKDA/DOD WASHDC 518
STATE GRNC

1 6 8 4 5
MAY 18, 1965
8:59 AM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAY 18. SECTION TWO OF TWO

DEPT PASS AID AND TREASURY

LIMDIS

8. MATTER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AT LENGTH BETWEEN MYSELF, WESTMORELAND AND KILLEN. THERE IS COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON NEED FOR MACV TO MOVE QUICKLY IN ALL NECESSARY ASPECTS ON CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. KILLEN AGREES THAT AIK FUNDS, SO LONG AS THEY LAST, MIGHT BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE, PROVIDED AIK ACCOUNT WOULD BE REIMBURSED WITH DOLLAR PURCHASED PIASTERS SOONEST. SUCH REIMBURSEMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED IN NEAR FUTURE DUE PROBABLY RAPID INCREASE IN RATE OF MACV OBLIGATIONS.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 870A/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FOR U.S. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION.

9. IN VIEW ALL FACTORS INVOLVED, I BELIEVE THERE ARE TWO URGENT REQUIREMENTS WHICH MUST BE MET: FIRST, CONSTRUCTION MUST MOVE FORWARD AT MOST EXPEDITIOUS RATE, AND SECOND, SUFFICIENT FUNDING MUST BE FORTHCOMING PROMPTLY FROM APPROPRIATE SOURCE. I, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THAT U.S. DOLLARS ARE REQUIRED IMMEDIATELY IN ADEQUATE AMOUNT TO BUY PIASTERS TO COVER REQUIRED COSTS.

10. REQUEST CONCURRENCE WASHINGTON AGENCIES CONCERNED IN ALLOTMENT DOLLARS FOR THIS PURPOSE.

11. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST. TAYLOR.

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE DELIVERY TO S/S-O 5/18/65 AT 9:20 AM
PASSED DOD, CIA, AND WHITE HOUSE AT 9:35 AM

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Hold for Bundy
2.
WH 19a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 17821
RECEIVED: MAY 19, 1965
6:04 AM

FROM: SAIGON

Info

ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 3808

DECLASSIFIED

CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 2213

DECLASSIFIED

DATE: MAY 19

Authority STATE letter MAR 21 1979

N O D I S

By *WH*, NARS, Date 7-19-79

EMBTEL 3738.

THE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THE BUILD-UP U.S. AND THIRD COUNTRY COMBAT FORCES ARE CREATING PROBLEMS FOR MACV, WHICH ALSO HAVE STRONG POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OVERTONES. BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF JUNE, THE COMBINED U.S. AND THIRD COUNTRY MILITARY POPULATION WILL EXPAND FROM TODAY'S TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 48,000 TO THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 80,000. TO SUPPORT THIS OVERALL MILITARY POPULATION, IT IS NECESSARY TO EXPAND LOGISTIC FACILITIES IN THE DANANG AND SAIGON AREAS, AND TO ESTABLISH BASES AT QUI NHON AND CAM RANH BAY. THE LOGISTIC EXPANSION NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE END JUNE STRENGTH WILL NOT, IN MY JUDGEMENT, OVERTAX THE CAPACITY OF ANY OF THESE AREAS. I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FURTHER EXPANSION OF THE LOGISTIC BASE, IN ANTICIPATION OF INTRODUCTION OF ONE OR MORE ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS OR DIVISION EQUIVALENTS. FOR INSTANCE, I QUESTION WHETHER DANANG AND QUI NHON CAN SATISFACTORILY ABSORB THE ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IMPLICIT IN PREPARING FOR THE CONTINGENT FOLLOW-ON DEPLOYMENTS DISCUSSED AT THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE.

GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS THOROUGHLY AWARE OF THESE GROWING PROBLEMS AND IS ANALYZING THE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS IN TERMS OF INCREMENTS RELATED TO THE SUPPORT OF FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS. IT IS PREMATURE TO TAKE A POSITION ON THESE QUESTIONS UNTIL ALL THE FACTS ARE IN AND THE PROBLEMS CAN BE SEEN IN PERSPECTIVE. HOWEVER, I DO WANT TO FLAG NOW THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY DECISION TO PREPARE IN ADVANCE THE NECESSARY LOGISTIC BASE FOR ADDITIONAL U.S. COMBAT FORCES. THE IMPACT OF SUCH A DECISION WILL BE FELT VERY SHARPLY IN THE COASTAL COMMUNITIES WHICH INEVITABLY WILL ATTRACT OUR LOGISTIC FACILITIES. THESE COMMUNITIES WILL FIND IT HARD TO SWALLOW AND DIGEST THE HEAVY AMERICAN DIVISION SLICE. THIS CONSIDERATION UNDERLINES THE POINT WE HAVE STATED BEFORE, NAMELY, THAT ADDITIONAL AMERICAN COMBAT UNITS SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO SVN ONLY IN CASE OF CLEAR AND INDISPUTABLE NECESSITY. THERE IS EVERY REASON TO PAUSE NOW AND ABSORB THE 80,000 FORCE BEFORE CONSIDERING FURTHER EXPANSION. TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

11175

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Origin
35

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE 2633

INFO: CINCPAC

MAY 19 8 27 PM '65

003

EXDIS

Saigon's 3788

Decision has been taken to deploy Army brigade to Qui Nhon/Nha Trang area closing main body on or about 12 July. Request you secure agreement PriMin Quat to this deployment at earliest time possible.

You should work out with PriMin Quat public announcement this deployment. May be advantageous to have GVN make unilateral announcement which US will affirm when queried. Timing of release should be as close to arrival of main body as possible.

Decision on whether to station one battalion Cam Ranh Bay held in abeyance pending outcome study on this project.

GP-2

END

RUSK

Drafted by: FE:JRDcleland:gm	5/19/65	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
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Clearances:

DOD/ISA - Adm. Blouin

S/S -Mr. Rattray

FE - Mr. Unger

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~~TOP SECRET~~

FORM 8-63 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ0002 3473

By pi/6, NARA, Date 4-4-14

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

FILE COPY 2/a

42-S

~~SECRET~~

Action

P

Info

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USIA

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CIA

NSA

AID

RMR

VV MJB964JIA038
RR RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 1010A 20/1230Z
R 201222Z ZEA
FM ANEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 3820
INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 2217
RUMTBK/ANEMBASSY BANGKOK 861
RUMJFS/ANEMBASSY VIENTIANE 640
STATE GRNC
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019246 07
1965 MAY 20 AM 9

~~SECRET~~ MAY 20

FOR GREENFIELD

PASS USIA FOR BUNCE, DOD FOR SYLVESTER

JOINT MISSION MESSAGE

EMBTEL 3539

- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWLER
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE
- KLEIN
- KOMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- THOMSON

IN FURTHER DEVELOPMENT PROPOSED HANDLING QUESTION OF BROADER COMBAT MISSION FOR U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM DISCUSSED IN REFTEL, MISSION ELEMENTS INVOLVED HAVE CONCURRED IN TEXT GIVEN BELOW FOR USE IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES WHEN INITIAL COMBAT MISSION SUPPORT UNDERTAKEN.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1010A ~~SECRET~~
PROSPECT OF EXPANDED MISSION FOR US COMBAT FORCES HERE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED OF COURSE TO SOME EXTENT BY VARIOUS CORRESPONDENTS AND IN FACT MACV SPOKESMAN TWO WEEKS AGO POINTED OUT THAT BOTH MARINES AND AIRBORNE BRIGADE HAVE COMBAT SUPPORT ROLE, IN ADDITION TO DEFENSIVE MISSION. HOWEVER, WHILE THERE HAS THUS BEEN SOME PUBLIC AWARENESS OF EXPANDED MISSION, DO NOT BELIEVE IMPORT OF DECISION HAS FULLY SUNK HOME AND WE EXPECT THAT QUESTIONS WILL BE RAISED WHEN AND IF FIRST SUCH ACTUAL COMBAT SUPPORT MISSION IS UNDERTAKEN. IN THAT EVENT, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO USE TEXT BELOW IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS.

BEGIN TEXT:

MISSION OF US FORCES IN VIETNAM

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 11-2-78 letter

By MB, NARS, Date 1-29-80

~~SECRET~~

-2- 3820, MAY 20, FROM SAIGON

THE MISSION OF THE USMC III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE AND THE US ARMY 173RD AIRBORNE BRIGADE ARE TO ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF THE KEY INSTALLATIONS IN THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND TO PROVIDE COMBAT SUPPORT TO THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AS THE SITUATION REQUIRES. THE CONDUCT OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE WILL INVOLVE PATROLLING IN DEPTH AND CLEARING OPERATIONS IN AREAS CONTIGUOUS TO THEIR BASE AREAS. IN THEIR COMBAT SUPPORT ROLE,

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1010A ~~SECRET~~
THEY ARE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST RVNAF IN OPERATIONS IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH APPROPRIATE RVNAF COMMANDERS. END TEXT.

APPRECIATE WASHINGTON REACTION. TAYLOR.

BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 9:21 AM, 5/20/65.
PASSED DOD AT 9:30 AM, 5/20/65.

~~SECRET~~