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DECLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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~~SECRET~~

Action

SS

002861

Info

TP PVV MJA261JIA239 1965 JUN 3 AM 9 32
RR RUEHCR
DE RUMJIR 181A 03/1235Z
R 031230Z ZEA
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 4036
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC 2354
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ JUNE 3

E X D I S

RE: DTG 080700Z MACV TO CINCPAC

AT ONE POINT IN THE RECENT ARVN BATTLE WITH THE VC IN THE VICINITY OF QUANG NGAI, CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN BY THE I CORPS COMMANDER TO REQUESTING U.S. MARINE ASSISTANCE, BUT FOR GOOD AND SUFFICIENT REASONS, THE REQUEST WAS NOT MADE. IT IS A REMINDER, HOWEVER, THAT AT ANY MOMENT A SITUATION MAY ARISE WHERE IT WILL BE OPERATIONALLY DESIREABLE TO COMMIT U.S. GROUND FORCES TO ACTION IN SUPPORT OF RVNAF.

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT COMUSMACV HAS THE AUTHORITY TO AUTHORIZE SUCH COMMITMENT, IN WHICH CASE U.S. FORCES WOULD OPERATE UNDER THE CONCEPT AND THE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN REFTL.

TAYLOR
BT

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Authority State hr 12/19/77
By MIE, NARS, Date 4/11/78

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259

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

39a

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Action

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Info

~~SECRET~~

NNNNV MJA329JIA309
RR RUEHCR RUEKDA
DE RUMJIR 193A 04/0246Z
R 040229Z ZEA

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 4039
INFO RUHKA/CINCPAC 2357
RUEKDA/DOD 526
STATE GRNC

BT
~~SECRET~~ JUN 4

REF: DEPTTEL 2780

EXDIS

QUAT HAS GIVEN PERMISSION FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOGISTIC FACILITIES AND AIRFIELD AT CAM RANH BAY. WHEN READY, HE WILL WISH TO SEE THE SPECIFIC PLANS FOR THE BASE AND UNDERSTAND THE METHOD OF FINANCING.

TAYLOR
BT

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1965 JUN 3 PM 11 05

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Authority RAC 20977

By scs/ly, NARA, Date 4-4-14

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

02445

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

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86

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 2801

PInfo

RPT INFO: CINCPAC

Jun 4 5 08 PM '65

SS

DEPTELS 2702, 2747

G

SP

SAH

H

FE

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

AID

Reuters Saigon item 62 today foresees stepped-up involvement of US combat troops, quotes unidentified "high-ranking US spokesman" who purportedly stated time would come when US combat troops "will play their role". Department being pressed for comment.

What was stated?

In view above recommend early public announcement by GVN concerning combat missions American troops.

GP - 3

RUSK

Drafted by: P: JMontgomery:he 6/4/65	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: P - William J. Jordan
Clearances: FE/VN - Col. Cleland	DOD - Col. Bankson

USIA - Mr. Tull

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FORM 8.63

DS-322

Authority State H 12/19/77

By MIE, NARS, Date 4/11/78

41

261

41a

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Ambassador Thompson
Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Subject: Possible Topics for Luncheon Discussion.

1. Military Matters

✓ a. Future RT operations (Deptel 2709 and Saigon's 4086).

-12285-

— ✓ b. JCS proposal and intelligence estimates on consequences of acting or not acting.

3mm for 13

92000 ✓ c. Review of ground force deployment schedules.
end of summer

✓ d. Possible expansion of combat role of ground forces, especially Marines in Da Nang.

✓ e. ROK contribution. (I will have a short status report on this.)

✓ f. Review of recent operations and whether they have affected GVN morale.

✓ g. Effectiveness of naval patrol operations.
- Suspicion at algeria

2. Political Developments

(I ~~will~~ ^{will have} a longer memorandum giving the status of these topics.)

- a. Bo message and Seaborn approach.
- b. Chen Yi conversation with British.
- c. Status of Indian proposal, and letter to Shastri.
- d. U Thant status.
- e. Consultations with GVN and possible GVN initiative.

William P. Bundy

FE: WPBundy:mk

~~TOP SECRET~~

42

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42a

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EHX831
 OO RUEPWW
 DE RUEHCR 5012 05/0555Z
 O 050533Z ZEA
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE ATTN MR BUNDY
 RUEKDA/DOD
 RUEPIA/CIA
 O 050510Z ZEA
 FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
 TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4058
 INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC IMMEDIATE 2368
 STATE GRNC
 BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ JUNE 05

✓ Brandy

EMBTTEL 3912; DEPTTEL 2801

IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES SKETCHED OUT REFEELS, MILITARY
 SPOKESMAN SURFACED STATEMENT ABOUT COMBAT ROLE U.S. TROOPS
 DURING REGULAR MONTHLY REVIEW MILITARY SITUATION. IN REPLY
 TO PLANTED QUESTION, GENERAL DEPUY MADE STATEMENT QUOTED BY
 REUTERS AND DOUBTLESS OTHER WIRE SERVICES AS WELL.

FOR FULL TEXT DEPUY SEE MACOI 18896 SUPPLEMENTAL PRESS
 TRENDS 148A-65 JUNE 4. VIEW LOW KEY THIS ANNOUNCEMENT PLUS
 FACT LOCAL NEWSMEN REGARD GRADUAL PASSAGE U.S. FORCES TO COMBAT

~~PAGE TWO RUMJIR 284A C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
 ROLE NATURAL, FORMAL GVN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD SEEM ARTIFICIAL
 AT THIS STAGE AND CALL UNDUE ATTENTION THIS DEVELOPMENT.
 WE PLAN REPLY ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS BY SAYING U.S./GVN WILL
 JOINTLY WORK OUT TIMING, DETAILS U.S. FORCES COMBAT SUPPORT
 ROLE. FORMAL GVN REQUEST FOR USE OF U.S. FORCES IN COMBAT
 MISSION SHOULD, WE FEEL, COME CLOSER TO THE ACTUAL EVENT.

GP-3. TAYLOR
 BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority State ltr 12/19/77
 By MJE, NARS, Date 4/11/78

NSNN

43

263

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

#6 ✓

CORRECTION ISSUED:
6/5/65; 1:35 P.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL: 5269

RECD: JUNE 5, 9:06 AM

Info

FROM: SAIGON - CORRECTED PAGE 1

ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 4074 SECTION ONE OF THREE

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ JUNE 5

Authority State 7-5-78 letter

N O D I S

By ig, NARS, Date 1-29-80

43a

THE FOLOWING IS AN ESTIMATE OF THE POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS OF 5 JUNE 1965, DRAFTED BY THE MISSION INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AND CONCURRED IN BY AMBASSADOR TAYLOR, AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND. SUGGEST IT BE PASSED EYES ONLY TO SECRETARY MCNAMARA, MCGEORGE BUNDY, ADMIRAL RABORN AND ADMIRAL SHARP.

POLITICAL SITUATION

BROADLY SPEAKING, THE CURRENT UNSETTLED POLITICAL SITUATION IS A REFLECTION OF THE TRADITIONAL DIVISIVE FORCE AT WORK IN SVN (PARTICULARLY THE RELIGIOUS AND REGIONAL CLEAVAGES), THE INEXPERIENCE OF THE VIETNAMESE WITH PRACTICAL POLITICAL PRECESSES, THE FRUSTRATIONS OF TWO DECADES OF WAR WITHOUT VICTORY IN SIGHT, AND THE PREDOMINANT WEIGHT OF THE SAIGON "INTELLECTUALS" IN THE POLITICAL EUATION. THE QUAT GOVERNMENT DID NOT CREATE THESE DIFFICULTIES BUT RATHER IS A VICTIM OF THEM. QUAT AND HIS ASSOCIATES HAVE FAILED AS HAVE PAST REGIMES TO NEUTRALIZE OR BALANCE THE OPPOSING FORCES BEFORE THEY REACHED SUCH PROPORTIONS AS TO CONSTITUTE A STRONG CHALLENGE TO HIS GOVERNMENT. IN THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION QUAT'S OPPOSITION IS COMPOSED PRIMARILY OF THE SUDISTES, MILITANT CATHOLIC ELEMENTS, AND OUT-POLITICIANS SEEKING TO IMPROVE THEIR LOT IN ANY CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT. FUNDAMENTALLY, THE SUDISTES AND THE MILITANT CATHOLIC ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN OPPOSED TO QUAT FROM THE DATE OF HIS INVESTITUTE BUT HAVE LACKED THE ISSUES WWITH WHIC TO MOUNT A REAL CONFRONTATION. IN SEEKING TO RENDER HIS GOVERNMENT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS, QUAT PRESENTED THEM WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO ORGANIZE AND ORCHESTRATE A CAMPAIGN TO BRING HIM DOWN. IN THIS, THEY HAD ENLISED THE SUPPORT OF A PLIABLE CHIEF OF STATE AND OF ELEMENTS OF THE CAO DAI AND HOA HAO SECT MOTIVATED PRIMARILY BY REGIONAL AND POLITICAL SENTIMENTS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 4074, June 5, Section One of Three, From Saigon

THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF OF STATE SUU HAS BEEN CRUCIAL AND THE PRESENT CONFRONTATION. HE HAS PROVIDED BOTH THE ISSUE (IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONAL CHARTER) AND THE MEANS TO FOCUS THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION. SUU'S ACTIONS MAY WELL BE MOTIVATED BY LONG-TERM POLITICAL AMBITIONS AS WELL AS THE SHORT-TERM POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. HE IS STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THE SUDISTE GROUPS (LE VAN THU, HOANG HO, TRAN VAN VAN, ETC.) RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS ELECTION AS CHIEF OF STATE. HE IS UNDOUBTEDLY BEING USED BY THIS GROUP, THE MORE READILY SINCE HE FORESEES FOR HIMSELF A MORE EXALTED AND POWERFUL ROLE THAN THAT WHICH HE NOW ENJOYS AS CHIEF OF STATE WITH NOMINAL POWERS. THESE AMBITIONS ARE REFLECTED IN THE PROJECTED DRAFT CONSTITUTION PROVIDING FOR A STRONG CHIEF OF STATE ALONG DE GAULLE LINES, WHICH SUU HAS ANNOUNCED THAT HE WISHES TO SUBMIT FOR REFERENDUM TO THE PEOPLE, AND BY HIS CALL FOR EARLY NATIONAL ELECTIONS. IN THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION HE HAS BEEN A WILLING TOOL OF THE OPPOSITION IN RAISING CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS IN THEIR CONFRONTATION WITH QUAT.

THE POSITION OF THE MILITARY HAS BEEN TO WITHDRAW PROGRESSIVELY FROM THE ACTIVE POLITICAL SCENE AND TO DEVOTE THEIR EFFORTS TO FIGHTING THE WAR AND PUTTING THEIR OWN HOUSE IN ORDER. THE MILITARY APPEARED CONTENT WITH CIVILIAN RULE SO LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT GAVE EVIDENCE THAT IT COULD EFFECTIVELY MAINTAIN A DEGREE OF POLITICAL STABILITY AND DIRECT THE AFFAIRS OF STATE. HAVING WITHDRAWN FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE UNDER STONG URGING FROM QUAT, THE MILITARY HAVE BEEN LOATH TO INTERVENE ACTIVELY IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. THEY MUCH PREFER TO REMAIN ALOOF IN THE CURRENT SITUATION UNLESS THEIR INTERVENTION IS OFFICIALLY REQUESTED OR SHOULD PROVE NECESSARY AS THEY VIEW THE SITUATION. HOWEVER, THE MILITARY LEADERS ARE UPSET AND INCREASINGLY IMPATIENT AT THE APPARENT INABILITY OF THE CIVILIAN ELEMENTS TO SOLVE THE CURRENT IMPASSE. THEY DESIRE ABOVE ALL A STRONG EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT AND IF PROSPECTS FOR THIS APPEAR DIM, THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY MOVE TO ASSUME POWER.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 4074, June 5, Section one Of Three, From Saigon

PRIME MINISTER QUAT'S PERFORMANCE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS HAS NOT BEEN REASSURING. HE HAS NOT PROJECTED AN IMAGE EITHER AS A FORECFUL LEADER OR AS AN ASTUTE POLITICIAN. IN ADVANCING HIS PROPOSED CABINET RESHUFFLE, HE DID NOT PREPARE THE GROUND EITHER WITH THE CHIEF OF STATE, THE NLC, OR THE MINISTERS CONCERNED. WHEN FACED WITH THE "CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE," QUAT DID NOT SEIZE THE INITIATIVE NOR UTILIZE HIS STRONG ASSETS. HAD HE DONE SO, AT THE OUTSET HE COULD HAVE FORCED THE PACE AND PROBABLY ACHEIVED HIS OBJECTIVES BEFORE THE OPPOSITION WAS TRONGLY ORGANIZED. HIS FAILURE TO ACT DECISIVELY HAS FED THE OPPOSITION AND ALLOWED THEM VALUABLE TIME TO DEVELOP THEIR CAMPAIGN. HIS CHIEF ASSET HAS BEEN SUPPORT FROM THE MILITARY. QUITE UNDERSTANDABLY, HE DID NOT WISH TO INJECT THE MILITARY INTO THE PICTURE DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CONFRONTATION; HOWEVER, HE HAS NOT PLAYED THIS CARD EFFECTIVELY WHEN EVENTS APPEARED TO BE RUNNING AGAINST HIM. IN SHORT, WHEN FACED WITH HIS FIRST REAL CHALLENGE, QUAT HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE INDECISIVE - AN ALMOST FATAL POSTURE IN THE ARENA OF JUGULAR-VEIN POLITICS IN SAIGON. HAVING SAID THIS, ANY REALISTIC ASSESSMENT MUST ADMIT THAT QUAT AND HIS CLOSE ASSOCIATES CONSTITUTE PERHAPS THE BEST GROUP ON THE SCENE AT PRESENT. NO SINGLE LEADER STANDS OUT AS A CLEAR ALTERNATIVE AND NO GROUP EXISTS WHICH SHOWS PROMISE OF HANDLING THE AFFAIRS OF SATE MUCH BETTER.

TAYLOR

NOTE: *As Received. Will be serviced upon request.

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~TOP SECRET~~

CORRECTION ISSUED:
6/5/65; 2 P.M.

Action CONTROL: 5340
RECD: 05 JUNE 1965, 10:36 A.M.

Info FROM: SAIGON - CORRECTED PAGE 1 AND 1/2

ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 4074

(SECTION TWO OF THREE)

~~TOP SECRET~~ JUNE 5

N O D I S

UNTIL LATE ON 4 JUNE, QUAT FACED TWO GENERAL ORDERS OF PROBLEMS; (1) THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE POSED BY SUU TO HIS RIGHT TO DISMISS CABINET MINISTERS, AND (2) THE VOCAL OPPOSITION TO HIS GOVERNMENT ARTICULATE BY THE CATHOLICS, CAO DAI, HOA HAO, AND SUDISTE POLITICIANS. ALTHOUGH THE SECOND ORDER OF PROBLEM WAS BROUGHT TO A FOCUS BY THE YT55, THE FACT OF PUBLIC OPPOSITION REMAINS, EVEN THOUGH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM APPEARS TO BE ON THE WAY TO SETTLEMENT.

THE CHIEF OF STATE HAS BEEN ASKED TO INTERCEDE WITH THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS ON QUAT'S BEHALF, BUT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER HE WILL IN FACT DO SO, OR IF HE DOES, WHETHER HE WILL PURSUE THE TASK WITH ENERGY AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERESTS IN MIND. NOR IS IT CLEAR HOW RECEPTIVE THE RESPECTIVE OPPOSITION GROUPS WILL BE TO HIS APPROACHES AND THOSE OF QUAT. THE CATHOLICS, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE UP TO THE PRESENT GIVEN EVERY EVIDENCE OF IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY TO QUAT, WITH INDICATION THAT THIS DISAFFECTION EXISTS TO A DEGREE WITHIN THE CATHOLIC HIERARCHY ITSELF. THE SOUTHERN CATHOLICS SEEM TO BE UNITED WITH NORTHERN CATHOLICS ON THIS ISSUE.

IN CONSIDERING OUR OWN OPTIONS, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO DETERMINE THE DEPTH AND EXTENT OF THE OPPOSITION TO QUAT NOW THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCK HAS BEEN BROKEN AND AFTER SOUNDING HAVE BEEN TAKEN WITH THESE GROUPS BY SUU AND THE GVN TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEIR GRIEVANCES CAN BE SATISFIED. IN THE INTERIM PERIOD, OUR COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE TO URGE ON ALL SIDES (THE GVN AND THE RELIGIONS) THE IMPORTANCE OF ARRIVING AT AN AMICABLE ACCOMMODATION. WE WILL ALSO HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND THE INTERESTS OF SUCH GROUPS AS THE UNITED BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION, WHO WILL NOT BE DIRECT PARTIES, TO BE SURE THAT THEY ARE NOT GIVEN A CAUSE FOR GRIEVANCE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-1½- 4074, June 5 Section Two of Three, From Saigon

IF SUCH AN ACCOMMODATION -- IMPERFECT AND VULNERABLE THOUGH IT BE -- CAN BE REACHED, THE IMMEDIATE OBSTACLE WILL HAVE BEEN SURMOUNTED AND WE CAN PERHAPS LOOK FORWARD TO THIS GOVERNMENT SURVIVING FOR SOME TIME MORE. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OPPOSING INTERESTS PROVE IRRECONCILABLE, OR THE MILITARY SITUATION CONTINES SERIOUSLY TO DETERIORATE, WE WILL HAVE TO ASSESS THE SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACTS AS THEY EMERGE AND CONSIDER VARIUS ALTERNATIVES, OF WHICH A MORE ACTIVE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION MAY BE BEST FROM BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY POINTS OF VIEW.

MILITARY SITUATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 4074, June 5 Section Two of Three, From Saigon

AFTER A TWO-MONTH RELATIVE LULL, EVIDENTLY SPENT IN REGROUPING, RE-EQUIPPING AND TRAINING, THE VIET CONG HAVE QUICKENED THE TEMPO OF FIGHTING. SINCE EARLY MAY, MAIN FORCE UNITS HAVE RETURNED TO THE BATTLEFIELD IN INCREASING NUMBERS, ENGAGING IN A NUMBER OF ATTACKS AND AMBUSHES WITH FORCES UP TO REGIMENTAL SIZE. WHILE THE MONTHS OF MARCH AND APRIL WERE RELATIVELY FAVORABLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT FORCES IN TERMS OF CASUALTY AND WEAPONS LOSS RATIOS, THE TREND IN MAY BECAME LESS FAVORABLE AS VIET CONG PRESSURE MOUNTED.

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS INDICATE THE VIET CONG HAVE EMBARKED ON A NEW MILITARY CAMPAIGN WHICH WILL PROBABLY EXTEND THROUGH THE SUMMER. BOTH HANOI AND LIBERATION FRONT BROADCASTS HAVE HERALDED THIS NEW CAMPAIGN AS A DEMONSTRATION OF THE COMMUNISTS' WILL AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE WAR DESPITE INCREASED U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM. THE APPARENT AIMS OF THIS CAMPAIGN ARE TO ALTER THE BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES IN FAVOR OF THE VIET CONG BY INFLECTING MAXIMUM ATTRITION ON THE GOVERNMENT FORCES, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY THE PIECEMEAL DESTRUCTION OF REGULAR ARVN GROUND COMBAT UNITS WHERE POSSIBLE, AND TO EXTEND VIET CONG CONTROL IN RURAL AREAS BY CONSTRICTING GVN FORCES TO THE PRINCIPAL TOWNS AND CITIES. THE PATTERN OF VIET CONG OPERATIONS TO DATE INDICATE THE CAMPAIGN WILL BE PRESSED VIGOROUSLY IN ALL MILITARY REGIONS, THE MAJOR ATTACKS AND AMBUSHES WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY INTENSIFIED, SMALL-SCALE GUERRILLA ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY SABOTAGE AND HARASSMENT OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AND THAT THE VIET CONG INTEND TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR RURAL GAINS THROUGH INTENSIFIED SUBVERSION AND POLITICAL ACTION. INCREASED TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS IN URBAN AREAS ARE ALSO LIKELY.

SO FAR, THE ENEMY HAS NOT EMPLOYED HIS FULL CAPABILITIES IN THIS CAMPAIGN. ONLY TWO OF THE NINE VIET CONG REGIMENTS HAVE BEEN HEAVILY ENGAGED (ONE IN PHUOC LONG AND ONE IN QUANG NGAI), AND PROBABLY ONLY A SIMILAR PROPORTION OF THEIR SEPARATE BATTALIONS HAS BEEN COMMITTED. IN MOST ENGAGEMENTS, THEIR MAIN FORCE UNITS HAVE DISPLAYED IMPROVED TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE, HEAVIER FIREPOWER, AND A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE HEAVY LOSSES IF NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES. THEIR HEALTHY RESPECT FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. AND GVN TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT IS REFLECTED, HOWEVER, IN THEIR RELIANCE ON AMBUSH TACTICS INSTEAD OF OPEN ASSAULTS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 4074, June 5 Section Two of Three, F^Rom Saigom

IN PRESSING THEIR CAMPAIGN, THE VIET CONG ARE CAPABLE OF MOUNTING REGIMENTAL-SIZE OPERATIONS IN ALL FOUR ARVN CORPS AREAS, AND AT LEAST BATTALION-SIZED ATTACKS IN VIRTUALLY ANY PROVINCE. THE LARGER ATTACKS CAN BE SUPPORTED BY A LIMITED NUMBER OF 70-MM OR 75-MM ARTILLERY PIECES. KNOWN DISPOSITIONS INDICATE MAJOR ACTIONS ARE LIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN THE BINH-DUONG-PHUOC THANH-PHUOC LONG AREA NORTH OF SAIGON, IN THE QUANG NGAI-QUANG TIN AREA IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, AND IN KONTUM PROVINCE. MAJOR ATTACKS COULD OCCUR ALSO IN OTHE AREAS, SINCE THE VIET CONG HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY ARE CAPABLE OF CONCENTRATING IN REGIMENTAL STRENGTH WITHOUT GIVING SIGNIFICANT WARNING.

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

#6

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 5296
Info RECD: JUN 5, 9:50 AM

FROM: SAIGON

ACTION: SECSTATE IMMEDIATE 4074

SECTION THREE OF THREE

~~TOP SECRET JUNE 5~~

N O D I S

WHILE THE VIET CONG REMAIN NUMERICALLY INFERIOR IN OVER-ALL STRENGTH, THEY CAN ACHIEVE TEMPORARY LOCAL SUPERIORITY AT TIMES AND PLACES OF THEIR SELECTION. THEIR ABILITY TO DO THIS IS FACILITATED BY THE COMMITMENT OF A LARGE PORTION OF THE RVNAF INFANTRY-TYPE BATTALIONS TO RELATIVELY STATIC MISSIONS, WHILE THE VIET CONG MAIN FORCE AND LOCAL BATTALIONS ARE EMPLOYED ONLY IN AN OFFENSIVE ROLE. DURING PERIODS OF INTENSIVE ACTIVITY, THE VIET CONG THUS ENJOY THE INITIATIVE IN THAT THEY CAN CHOOSE THE TIME, CONDITIONS, AND PLACE OF ENGAGEMENT; SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS RARELY OCCUR, EVEN WHEN RVNAF UNITS ARE ENGAGED IN AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS

UNLESS THE VIET CONG ELECT TO ENGAGE. BY POSING SIMULTANEOUS OR SUCCESSIVE THREATS IN WIDELY SEPARATED AREAS, THE VIET CONG HAVE DEMONSTRATED AN ABILITY TO OFFSET SOME EXTENT ARVN'S SUPERIOR TRANSPORTATION RESOURCES.

DESPITE SEVERE LOSSES ON OCCASION, VIET CONG FORCES HAVE SHOWN A REMARKABLE RECUPERATIVE ABILITY. THIS HAS BEEN FACILITATED BY A SYSTEMATIC RECRUITING EFFORT AND AN EVIDENTLY EFFECTIVE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM, SUPPLEMENTED BY THE INFILTRATION OF NORTHERN DRAFTEES WHO HAVE BEEN INTEGRATED INTO VIET CONG UNITS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES. ACCESS FOR RECRUITING PURPOSES TO THE MAJOR PORTION OF THE POPULATION HAS ENABLED THE VIET CONG NOT ONLY TO REPLACE THEIR LOSSES BUT TO CONTINUE TO FORM NEW UNITS. IN ADDITION TO ELEMENTS TO THE PAVN 325TH DIVISION ALREADY IDENTIFIED IN THE SOUTH, OTHER UNITS OF THIS DIVISION AND THE PAVN 304TH DIVISION MAY ALREADY HAVE ENTERED OR ARE STATIONED IN THE LABOS BORDER AREA. THESE ELEMENTS REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY FOR VIET CONG UNITS IN THE I AND II CORPS AREAS.

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-2- 4074, June 5, Section Three of Three, From Saigon

ALTHOUGH GVN FORCES GENERALLY HAVE RESPONDED WELL TO THE INCREASED VIET CONG PRESSURE, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL DISTURBING INSTANCES OF POOR PERFORMANCE IN CRITICAL SITUATIONS. SOME UNITS HAVE BROKEN UNDER PRESSURE AND FLED FROM THE BATTLEFIELD. THESE MANIFESTATIONS, COUPLED WITH THE CONTINUING HIGH DESERTION RATE IN MANY UNITS, REFLECT A GENERALLY MARGINAL STATE OF MORALE. THE MORALE AND CONFIDENCE OF THE OFFICER CORPS WERE BUOYED UP BY THE MORE DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. FORCE SINCE FEBRUARY. THIS IMPROVED SPIRIT WAS ENHANCED BY THE PERIOD OF RELATIVE INACTIVITY OF THE VIET CONG MAIN FORCE UNITS. THE GROWING REALIZATION, HOWEVER, THAT THE INCREASED U.S. COMMITMENT WOULD NOT PRODUCE AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE WAR, TOGETHER WITH ARVN'S APPARENT INABILITY TO COPE DECISIVELY AS YET WITH THE RENEWED VIET CONG OFFENSIVE, APPARENTLY HAS CAUSED MORALE TO SAG AGAIN. UNLESS THE ANTICIPATED VIET CONG MAJOR ATTACKS ARE EFFECTIVELY COUNTERED, MORALE WILL DETERIORATE FURTHER. INDEED, THE CUMULATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF A SERIES OF SIGNIFICANT ARVN DEFEATS COULD LEAD TO A COLLAPSE IN ARVN'S WILL TO CONTINUE TO FIGHT, DESPITE THE PRESENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM OF U.S. FORCES. TO WARD AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A COLLAPSE AN IT WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO COMMIT US GROUND FORCES TO ACTION.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP IN HANOI HAS NOT YET BEEN SHAKEN IN ITS DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE WAR. IT APPARENTLY HAS ELECTED TO RESPOND TO THE GROWING COMMITMENT OF U.S. MILITARY RESOURCES IN VIETNAM BY EMPLOYING THEIR PRINCIPAL WEAPON - THE VIET CONG GROUND FORCE REINFORCED BY PAVN - IN INTENSIFIED OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH.
2. HAVING RESUMED MAJOR OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF CONTINUING THE RECENT PACE OF ATTACKS AND AMBUSHES OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, ALTHOUGH THERE WILL PROBABLY BE LOCAL CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS IN THE LEVEL ACTIVITY. WHILE THE VIET CONG HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES, THEY HAVE GENERALLY ACHIEVED THEIR OBJECTIVES IN ACTIONS TO DATE.
3. RVNAF GENERAL RESERVES HAVE BEEN BARELY ADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH ANY ONE MAJOR THRUST AND ARE INADEQUATE TO COUNTER SIMULTANEOUS OR SUCCESSIVE THRUSTS IN WIDELY SEPARATED AREAS. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF TERRAIN AND WEATHER CONDITIONS, THE VIET CONG APPEAR LIKELY TO ACHIEVE FURTHER SUCCESSES. TO MEET THE SHORTAGE OF ARVN RESERVES, IT WILL PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO COMMIT U.S. GROUND FORCES TO ACTION.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 4074, June 5, Section Three of Three, From Saigon

4. FURTHER MILITARY REVERSES, COUPLED WITH THE ECONOMIC DISRUPTION CAUSED BY THEIR HARASSMENT AND BLOCKING OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION, WILL HAVE A SERIOUS ADVERSE IMPACT ON POPULAR CONFIDENCE AND MORALE, EXASPERATING POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN SAIGON.

5. THE POLITICAL SITUATION REMAINS ESSENTIALLY UNSTABLE. ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPASSE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, THE QUAT GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BE FACED WITH THE DIFFICULT TASK OF REACHING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH STRONG OPPOSITION GROUPS SEEKING ITS OUSTER AND ITS LIFE LINE IS OF UNCERTAIN LENGTH. THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SITUATIONS ARE CLOSELY INTERRELATED, AND REVERSES IN EITHER AREA WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE REACTION IN THE OTHER.

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

44

264

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

03163

44a

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

85

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY 2810

Jun 5 1 05 PM '65

P Info

INFO: CINCPAC

SS

G

FE

USIA

NSC

INR

CIA

NSA

DOD

In response to question held over from yesterday Department spokesman made following statement today:

As you know, American troops have been sent South Viet-Nam recently with the mission of protecting key ~~installations~~ installations there. In establishing and patrolling their defense perimeters they come into contact with the Viet Cong and at times are fired upon. Our troops, naturally, return the fire. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that our troops engage in combat in these and similar circumstances. Let me emphasize that the Vietnamese Government forces are carrying the brunt of combat operations. Those US forces assigned as advisers to the Armed Forces of Viet-Nam remain in that capacity.

RUSK

Drafted by:

P: McCloskey:he 6/5/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

P - James L. Greenfield

Clearances:

DOD - Col. Bankson
P - Mr. Jordan

FE/VN - Col. Cleland
USIA - Mr. Tull

UNCLASSIFIED

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45

265

46

266

Saturday, June 5, 1965
6:00 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

46a

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: George Ball's cable to Taylor

1. Here is George's outgoing of June 1, and the answer from Taylor and Johnson. What they say in essence is that they would like to maintain and increase pressure by air attacks as well as by efforts in the South. They would avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area except for an occasional selected target -- and they believe a little more than we do that pain in the North will help bring a change of heart in Hanoi.

2. I share Bob McNamara's view that we can readily frame a specific program over the next month that will be acceptable to the Embassy without unacceptable risks of escalation. I myself am more attracted than Rusk and McNamara by the notion of an occasional limited attack inside the Hanoi perimeter -- probably in the Haiphong port area.

McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

file 2769
Seigon 4035

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 715C 5-18-79
By iq, NARS, Date 7-19-79

47

267

2) 8/17/65
47a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, June 5, 1965
7:25 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cable from Saigon

This extensive telegram sets forth the current estimate of Embassy Saigon on the overall situation. You may not wish to read it all, but the last two pages on the basic military balance are interesting, and also troubling.

mjb
McG. B.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

EMTEL 4074 10015

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W 1d

47b

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL : 2984
RECD : JUNE 3, 1965, 11:35 AM

Info

FROM : SAIGON
ACTION : SECSTATE PRIORITY 4035

SECTION ONE OF TWO

~~TOP SECRET~~ JUN 3

N O D I S

FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

RE: DEPTTEL 2769

1. IN ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTIONS, WE DO NOT SEE HERE THAT THE LINE BETWEEN THE TWO POSSIBLE APPROACHES SET FORTH IN REFTTEL IS QUITE AS SHARP AS IT COMES OUT IN THAT TELEGRAM. THE AIR CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH AND THE ANTI-VIET CONG CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH ARE, IN OUR THINKING, TWO PARTS OF A SINGLE COHERENT PROGRAM. THE AIR ATTACKS HAVE AS THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES THE TERMINATION OF HANOI'S SUPPORT FOR THE VC WHEREAS THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAS AS ITS PRIMARY OBJECTIVE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE VIET CONG MILITARY APPARATUS WITHIN THE COUNTRY. IN ADDITION TO THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, EACH PROGRAM REACTS UPON THE OTHER. THUS, THE ANTI-VIET CONG EFFORT IS MADE EASIER BY ANY REDUCTION OF INFILTRATION, AND THE WILL OF HANOI IS SAPPED BY EVIDENCE OF FAILURE OF THE VIET CONG EFFORT IN THE SOUTH. VIEWED IN THIS LIGHT, THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF HOLDING BACK THE AIR STRIKES IN THE NORTH WHILE MAXIMIZING THE IN-COUNTRY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VIET CONG (APPROACH I) OR OF STEPPING UP THE AIR STRIKES TO COMPENSATE FOR THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE IN-COUNTRY PROGRAM (APPROACH II). RATHER, BOTH SHOULD BE MAXIMIZED CONCURRENTLY, NOT ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ATTAINING THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES, BUT FOR THE COLLATERAL EFFECTS IN SUPPORT OF ONE ANOTHER.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *State 3-21-79 letter*
By *if*, NARS, Date *1-29-80*

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 4035, June 3 (Section One of Two), From Saigon

2. IN FURTHER COMMENT ON APPROACH II, WE SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE VERY CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY FEASIBLE AMOUNT OF BOMBING OF THE NORTH IS OF ITSELF LIKELY TO CAUSE THE DRV TO CEASE AND DESIST IN ITS ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH. SUCH A CHANGE IN DRV ATTITUDES CAN PROBABLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT ONLY WHEN, ALONG WITH A SENSE OF MOUNTING PAIN FROM THE BOMBINGS, THERE IS ALSO A CONVICTION ON THEIR PART THAT THE TIDE HAS TURNED OR SOON WILL TURN AGAINST THEM IN THE SOUTH. OBVIOUSLY THESE TWO CONDITIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN MET AND OUR JOB IN THE COMING MONTHS WILL BE TO BRING THEM ABOUT. THIS MAY TAKE A LONG TIME AND WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT QUICK RESULTS. HOLDING THIS VIEW, WE DO NOT HERE SENSE THAT OUR ACTION AGAINST THE DRV BY US-GVN FORCES HAS YET REACHED A "CRITICAL POINT" IN THE SENSE THAT WE MUST SHARPLY CHANGE THE PATTERN AND OBJECTIVES OF OUR ATTACKS AGAINST THE DRV. WE DO THINK, HOWEVER, THAT THE PATTERN SHOULD BE CONSTANTLY EVOLVING. OUR AIR ACTIONS AGAINST HANOI SHOULD ALWAYS BE ON AN ASCENDING SCALE EXPRESSED BOTH IN WEIGHT OF EFFORT AND GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF TARGETS. IT IS TRUE THAT THE LAST TWO ROLLING THUNDERS HAVE HAD SINGLE TARGETS PROGRESSIVELY SOMEWHAT CLOSER TO THE HANOI-HAIPHONG AREA, BUT IN GENERAL AFTER COMMENCING ROLLING THUNDER ATTACKS, WE QUICKLY REACHED A PLATEAU WHICH IS STILL BEING MAINTAINED. ALSO AS SET FORTH IN OUR EMBTEL 3753, WE FEEL THAT THE PATTERN SHOULD BE SOMEWHAT MORE RANDOM. THIS THOUGHT WAS TO SOME EXTENT INCORPORATED IN ROLLING THUNDER 16 AND WEATHER HAS ALSO CONTRIBUTED BY FORCING ON US A MORE RANDOM PATTERN. WE UNDERSTAND THAT WEATHER WILL BE AN INCREASING FACTOR IN THE COMING MONTHS.

3. IF OUR ASSUMPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DRV REACTIONS ARE CORRECT, THERE IS NO STRATEGY THAT CAN BRING ABOUT A QUICK SOLUTION, BUT RATHER OUR STRATEGY MUST BE BASED UPON A PATIENT AND STEADY INCREASE OF PRESSURE FOLLOWING AN ESCALATING PATTERN WHILE MAKING MAXIMUM EFFORT TO TURN THE TIDE HERE IN THE SOUTH. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE MUST "WIN" IN THE SOUTH TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN DRV ATTITUDES, BUT RATHER THE DRV MUST PERCEIVE THAT THE TIDE HAS TURNED OR IS LIKELY SOON TO TURN. HOPEFULLY AT THIS POINT THE DRV WILL SEEK TO FIND SOME WAY OUT, AND IF AND WHEN IT DOES, THERE COULD BE A "BANDWAGON" EFFECT THAT WOULD SO LOWER VC MORALE AND SO RAISE THAT OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS TO PERMIT BRINGING MAJOR HOSTILITIES TO A REASONABLY EARLY CONCLUSION.

4. IN EXTENSION OF THE FOREGOING OBSERVATIONS, WE WOULD ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 4035, June 3 (Section One of Two), From Saigon

(A) QUESTION NO. 1 - WE DO NOT BELIEVE IN EMPLOYING AIR ATTACKS IN THE NORTH FOR PURPOSES PRECISELY AS EXPRESSED IN APPROACH I. IN PARTICULAR, WITH REGARD TO NO. I-3, WE WOULD NOT TAKE AS OUR PURPOSE TO "CREATE CONCERN IN HANOI THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MIGHT EXTEND ITS BOMBING SO AS GREATLY TO INCREASE THE COSTS OF TRYING TO OVERRUN SOUTH VIETNAM BY MILITARY MEANS". THIS STATEMENT SUGGESTS THAT A FEAR OF POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES ALONE IS OUR MAIN PURPOSE, WHEREAS IT SEEMS TO US THAT THERE MUST BE ACTUAL PAIN INFLICTED BY ATTACKS AND, IN ADDITION, THE FEAR OF INCREASED PAIN IN ORDER TO HAVE MAXIMUM EFFECT IN CHANGING HANOI'S BEHAVIOR. OF COURSE, WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO RAISE MORALE IN THE SOUTH AND LOWER MORALE IN THE NORTH, BUT THESE BENEFITS ARE COINCIDENTAL TO THE DRIVE ON THE HANOI WILL TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE VIET CONG. ALSO, WE WOULD LIKE TO DO AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN THE HARASSMENT OF SUPPLY LINES TO REDUCE EFFECTIVE INFILTRATION, BUT WE RECOGNIZE AND ACCEPT THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ATTAINING THIS OBJECTIVE EXCEPT TO A LIMITED DEGREE.

TAYLOR

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

w b

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action CONTROL : 2985
RECD : JUNE 3, 1965, 11:37 AM

Info FROM : SAIGON
ACTION : SECSTATE PRIORITY 4035

SECTION TWO OF TWO

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ JUN 3

N O D I S

FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

RE: DEPTTEL 2769

(B) QUESTION NO. 2 - WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD RE-SHAPE OUR AIR EFFORT WITH THE IDEA THAT INCREASED BOMBING WILL COMPENSATE FOR LOSSES ON THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FRONTS IN THE SOUTH. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE WOULD NOT CEASE TO APPLY THE KIND OF MOUNTING PRESSURE DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE. WHILE WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WIN ON BOTH FRONTS, NORTH AND SOUTH, WE SHOULD NOT LET UP IN THE NORTH BECAUSE THINGS ARE NOT GOING WELL IN THE SOUTH.

(C) QUESTION NO. 6S* - AS WE HAVE INDICATED ABOVE, THE CHANCE OF PERSUADING HANOI TO LAY OFF WHILE THE VIET CONG ARE WINNING OR HOLDING THEIR OWN IN THE SOUTH IS OBVIOUSLY NOT GOOD. HOWEVER, WE REPEAT THAT THIS FACT IS NO REASON TO LIMIT THE BOMBING EFFORT IN THE NORTH. IT SIMPLY MEANS THAT WE MUST TRY HARDER IN THE SOUTH WHILE BEARING DOWN ON THE NORTH. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY WHETHER ADDED PRESSURE WOULD CREATE UNACCEPTABLE RISKS OF AN ENLARGED SOVIET-CHINESE INVOLVEMENT EXCEPT IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC TARGETS. OBVIOUSLY, ANY EXTENSION OF THE PRESENT TARGET SYSTEM SHOULD BE EXAMINED CLOSELY FOR THIS POINT OF VIEW.

(D) QUESTION NO. 4 - IN CONSIDERATION OF OUR VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOVE, WE HAVE RECOMMENDED THE APPROVAL OF ROLLING THUNDER 17 (EMBTEL 4034).

5. WITH RESPECT TO THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT AUTHORIZED STIKES, THE PRESENT PATTERN IS GENERALLY SATISFACTORY TO US. WE NEED APPROXIMATELY 48 HOURS, FROM RECEIPT OF THE EXECUTION ORDER TO BOMBS ON TARGET, FOR ME TO CLEAR WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND WITH THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND COMMANDER-

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET (NODIS)~~

-2- 4085, from Saigon, CN 2985, Section two of two

IN-CHIEF OF THE RVNAF. A TWO-WEEK PROGRAM IS PREFERABLE TO A ONE-WEEK PROGRAM. DESIRABLY, OPERATING UNITS SHOULD RECEIVE THE WARNING ORDER ONE WEEK PRIOR TO EXECUTION IN ORDER TO PERMIT ADEQUATE PLANNING. A TWO-WEEK PROGRAM WITH EXECUTION DELEGATED TO THE OPERATION LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN COPING WITH THE VAGARIES OF THE WEATHER AND OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING IN-COUNTRY COMPETITION FOR SORTIES. WHETHER STRIKES ARE MADE DAILY OR INTERMITTENTLY WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE SIGNIFICANT, BUT EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT MORE FREQUENT STRIKES BY FEWER AIRCRAFT REDUCES LOSSES. ADDITIONALLY, VARIED AND REPEATED STRIKES SERVE TO COMPLICATE THE PROBLEM FOR THE DRV DEFENSES.

6. IN ADDITION TO ANSWERING YOUR QUESTIONS, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON TARGETING. DERIVED FROM THE THREE COURSES OF ACTION DISCUSSED IN REFTTEL. AS WE UNDERTAKEN THESE THREE COURSES OF ACTION, THE FIRST INVOLVES A PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT NORTHWARD WITHOUT CONSIDERATION FOR THE SENSITIVITY OF THE HANOI/HAIPHONG AREA; THE SECOND MOVE NORTHWARD BUT SIDESLIPS TO THE WEST, AND PERHAPS TO THE EAST, TO AVOID THE SAM'S; AND THE THIRD CONFINES OUR EFFORTS SOUTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL BUT INCLUDES INDUSTRIAL OR NON-MILITARY TARGETS.

7. IN CONSONANCE WITH THE CONCEPT EARLIER EXPRESSED, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE CONSTANTLY ADD TO THE PRESSURE OF THE DRV. IF WE CONTINUE TO CONCENTRATE ON LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AS IN THE PAST, THE VERY REPETITION OF OUR ACTIONS DESIGNED TO DISRUPT AND MAINTAIN THE DISRUPTION OF THESE COMMUNICATIONS IS IN ITSELF A FORM OF ESCALATION. IN ADDITION, WHILE MAINTAINING THIS INTERDICTION PROGRAM, WE WOULD LIKE TO INTRODUCE VARIETY BY OCCASIONALLY STRIKING A TARGET ON A RANDOM BASIS OUTSIDE OF THE LOONC PATTERN, SUCH AS A POWER PLANT, MILITARY INSTALLATION, DAM SITE, SUPPLY AREA, INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, DAM SITE, BY SO DOING, WE COMPLICATE THE DRV DEFENSE PROBLEM AND MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE LIMITED TO NO SINGLE TARGET PLAN. THUS, NOTHING OTHER THAN POPULATED AREAS IS IMMUNE TO ATTACK.

8. UNDER THIS CONCEPT, WE WOULD AVOID THE SENSITIVE AREA OF HANOI/HAIPHONG EXCEPT FOR AN OCCASIONAL WELL SELECTED TARGET WITHIN THE AREA STRUCK TO SHOW THAT WE CAN PENETRATE AND THAT THERE IS NO SURE CANCTUARY. WE DO NOT FEEL THAT AN OCCASIONAL SELECTIVE INTRUSION INTO THIS AREA IS LIKELY TO INVOKE A CHINESE REACTION EVEN THOUGH WE TANGLE WITH MIG'S.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ NODIS

-3- 4085 from Saigon, CN 2985, Section two of two

9. THE NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT NON-MILITARY TARGETS BELOW THE 20TH PARALLEL ARE FEW AND FAR BETWEEN. IN FAKF THERE ARE VERY FEW SUCH TARGETS OUTSIDE OF THE HANOI/HAIPHONG COMPLEX. WE AGREE THAT NON-MILITARY TARGETS SHOULD BE STRUCK AS A VARIATION FROM THE LOC PATTERN, BUT ONLY OCCASIONALLY AND SELECTIVELY, BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL.

10. IN SUMMARY WE RECOMMEND A BASIC PATTERN OF LOC TARGETS VARIED OCCASIONALLY BY OTHER KINDS OF TARGETS BOTH SOUTH AND NORTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL TO INCLUDE THE HAOI/HAIPHONG AREA. UPON THIS PATTERN, WE WOULD SUPERIMPOSE A PROGRAM OF FULL FLEDGED PSYWAR OPERATIONS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF ROLLING THUNDR. THIS WOULD REQUIRE ONLY A SLIGHT INCREASE IN AIR EFFORT. LEAFLET DROPS SHOULD PRECEDE AND SOMETIMES ACCOMPANY STRIKES, HAVING THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF EXPLAINING THE CAUSE AND NATURE OF ROLLING THUNDER AND OF MAGNIFYING POPULAR ANXIETY.

11. WE APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS ON THESE IMPORTANT SUBJECTS.

TAYLOR

* AS RECEIVED. WILL BE SERVICED ON REQUEST.

~~TOP SECRET~~ NODIS

48

268

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Bundy 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

48a

5
Action

0058117

1965 JUN 7 AM 6 21

NP ZTHQVV MJA858JIAB10KT
P RR RUEHCR
Info DE RUMJIR 365A 07/1000Z
R 070955Z ZEA
SS FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
G TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC 4096
SP INFO RUHLHQ/CINCPAC 2390
SAH STATE GRNC
BT
H ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ JUNE 7
FE

USIA DEPTELS 2702, 2702, 2801; EMBTEL 3912

NSC
INR SEEMS TO US THERE IS DISCREPANCY BETWEEN STATEMENT ON COMBAT
CIA MISSION FOR U.S. FORCES AUTHORIZED IN DEPTEL 2702 AND STATEMENT
NSA MADE BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TRANSMITTED IN DEPTEL 2801.
DOD AS EMBTEL 4053 POINTS OUT, WE PUT AUTHORIZED STATEMENT ON THE
RECORD IN REGULAR BRIEFING LAST WEEK. THIS STATEMENT NOTED THAT
U.S. FORCES MAY UNDERTAKE COMBAT MISSIONS AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUM-
RSR STANCES. DEPARTMENT STATEMENT TENDS TO TIE SUCH COMBAT MISSIONS
STRICTLY INTO DEFENSE PERIMETER MISSION. WHILE THIS DISCREPANCY

PAGE TWO RUMJIR 365A ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
MAY BE RATIONALIZED IN STRICT READING OF TWO STATEMENTS,
CORRESPONDENTS HAVE DEVELOPED IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS DIFFERENCE
AND YOU MAY SEE STORIES TO THIS EFFECT.

ASSUME ACTUAL FACTS ARE STILL THAT COMBAT MISSIONS WILL BE
AUTHORIZED BY COMUSMACV AS REQUIRED IN HIS JUDGEMENT. FIRST SUCH
INSTANCE WILL HELP RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM BUT UNTIL THAT TIME,
IF THIS COMES UP AGAIN, WE ASSUME WE SHOULD FOLLOW GUIDANCE IN
DEPTEL 2702. WE ARE STILL ATTEMPTING TO FIND APPROPRIATE
OCCASION FOR GVN SPOKESMAN TO GET SOME POINT ON THE RECORD.

JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State lt 12/19/77
By MJE, NARS, Date 4/11/78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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49

269

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 1 OF 2
OF 9 2 2 4 4

Bundy
CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

49a

6 07 05 49Z

LIMDIS 002

IMMEDIATE

A39C 07 CS085
VV MAH225
OO RUEKDA
DE RUMSMA 1941U 07 0340Z
O 070335Z
(FM COMUSMACV)
TO RUHKA CINCPAC
RUEKDA JCS
INFO RUHKR CINCUSARPAC
RUHLKM CINCPACAF
RUHPB CINCPACFLT
RUHPG CG FMFPAC
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS 19118 SECTION ONE OF TWO MACJOO PERSONAL FOR
ADMIRAL SHARP AND GENERAL WHEELER FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND.
JCS PASS TO AMB TAYLOR, CINCUSARPAC FOR GEN WATERS, CINCPACAF
FOR GEN HARRIS, CINCPACFLT FOR ADM JOHNSON AND CG FMFPAC FOR
GEN KRULAK.

SUBJ: US TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO SVN (S)

- REF: A. COMUSMACV 041133Z NOTAL
- B. JCS 2343 564-7
- C. COMUSMACV 260040Z MAY NOTAL
- D. USASCV USG 65-TS 101 311200Z MAY NOTAL
- E. CINCPAC 052249Z (PASEP)
- F. COMUSMACV 201207Z MAY 65

1. AS INDICATED REF A, A BROAD REVIEW OF FORCE RE-
QUIREMENTS HAS BEEN CONDUCTED IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGING
SITUATION IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND WITHIN RVN.
2. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST

ACT.....J3-8(1-8)

INFO....CJCS-1(9) DJS-3(10-12) J4-2(13-14) CSA-2(15-16) CNO-2(17-18)
CSAF-2(19-20) CMC-2(21-22) FILE-1(23) . (23)JCK/CL

ADD DIST: CJCS-3(24-26) (26) 7 JUN 65 (MCO) /
ADD DIST: ISA-5(27-31) SECDEF-5(32-36) AMB TAYLOR(37 VIA STATE DEPARTMENT)
(PER MR KEARNEY) 7 JUNE 65

PAGE 1 OF 3

37

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD 1/2 2/24/77
By MJE, NARS, Date 4/12/78

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

ASIA IS IN THE PROCESS OF MOVING TO A HIGHER LEVEL. SOME PAVN FORCES HAVE ENTERED SVN AND MORE MAY WELL BE ON THE WAY. ADDITIONAL JET FIGHTERS AND SOME JET LIGHT BOMBERS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN THE DRV.

3. SPECIFICALLY, ELEMENTS OF THE 325TH PAVN DIVISION ARE IN THE NORTHERN ZONE OF II CORPS. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE MAJOR PORTION, IF NOT ALL, OF THE DIVISION IS NOW DEPLOYED IN THE KONTUM, PLEIKU, PHU BON AREA. ELEMENTS OF THE 304TH PAVN DIVISION ARE SUSPECTED TO BE IN THE PANHANDLE AND, THEREFORE, CAPABLE OF FOLLOWING THE 325TH. THE RECENT HEAVY ACTIONS IN PHUOC LONG AND QUANG NGAI, AND VC INITIATIVES IN PLEIKU, KONTUM, PHU BON AND THUA THIEN, ARE DEMONSTRATIONS OF VC STRENGTH AND THEIR APPARENT DETERMINATION TO EMPLOY THEIR FORCES AGGRESSIVELY. RECENT EVENTS AS WELL AS CAPTURED VC PRISONERS AND DOCUMENTS SUGGEST THAT A SUMMER CAMPAIGN IS NOW UNDERWAY TO DESTROY GOVERNMENT FORCES AND, CONCURRENTLY, TO FIRST ISOLATE AND THEN ATTACK DISTRICT AND PROVINCE TOWNS.

4. SO FAR, THE VC HAVE NOT EMPLOYED THEIR FULL CAPABILITIES IN THIS CAMPAIGN. ONLY TWO OF THE NINE VIET CONG REGIMENTS HAVE BEEN HEAVILY ENGAGED (ONE IN PHUOC LONG AND ONE IN QUANG NGAI), AND PROBABLY ONLY A SIMILAR PROPORTION OF THEIR SEPARATE BATTALIONS HAS BEEN COMMITTED. IN MOST ENGAGEMENTS, VC MAIN FORCE UNITS HAVE DISPLAYED IMPROVED TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE, HEAVIER FIREPOWER FROM THE NEW FAMILY OF WEAPONS WITH WHICH MOST MAIN FORCE UNITS HAVE BEEN EQUIPPED, AND A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE HEAVY LOSSES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES.

5. IN PRESSING THEIR CAMPAIGN, THE VIET CONG ARE CAPABLE OF MOUNTING REGIMENTAL-SIZE OPERATIONS IN ALL FOUR ARVN CORPS AREAS, AND AT LEAST BATTALION-SIZED ATTACKS IN VIRTUALLY ALL PROVINCES. KNOWN DISPOSITIONS INDICATE MAJOR ACTIONS ARE LIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN THE BINH DUONG-PHUOC THANH-PHUOC LONG AREA NORTH OF SAIGON, IN THE QUANG NGAI-QUANG TIN AREA IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, AND IN KONTUM, PLEIKU, PHU BON AND BINH DINH PROVINCES. MAJOR ATTACKS COULD OCCUR ALSO IN OTHER AREAS; THE VIET CONG HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY ARE CAPABLE OF CONCENTRATING IN REGIMENTAL STRENGTH WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING. WHETHER OR NOT THE 304TH DIV IS IN, OR MOVING TOWARD SVN, THE DRV HAS A "DOORSTEP" CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE

PAGE 2 OF 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

THE VC WITH SIZABLE FORCES.

6. ARVN FORCES ON THE OTHER HAND ARE ALREADY EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTY IN COPING WITH THIS INCREASED VC CAPABILITY. DESERTION RATES ARE INORDINATELY HIGH. BATTAL LOSSES HAVE BEEN HIGHER THAN EXPECTED. IN FACT, FOUR ARVN BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN RENDERED INEFFECTIVE BY VC ACTION IN THE I AND II CORPS ZONES. THEREFORE, EFFECTIVE FIGHTING STRENGTH OF MANY INFANTRY AND RANGER BATTALIONS IS UNACCEPTABLY LOW. AS A RESULT, ARVN TROOPS ARE BEGINNING TO SHOW SIGNS OF RELUCTANCE TO ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE AND IN SOME CASES THEIR STEADFASTNESS UNDER FIRE IS COMING INTO DOUBT. IN ORDER TO BRING EXISTING BATTALIONS UP TO ACCEPTABLE BATTLEFIELD STRENGTH, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DECLARE AT LEAST A TEMPORARY MORATORIUM ON THE ACTIVATION OF NEW BATTALIONS. THUS, THE GVN VC FORCE RATIOS UPON WHICH WE BASED OUR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION IN MARCH HAVE TAKEN AN ADVERSE TREND. YOU WILL RECALL THAT I RECOMMENDED THE DEPLOYMENT OF A U.S. DIVISION IN II CORPS TO COVER THE PERIOD OF THE RVNAF BUILDUP AND TO WEIGHT THE FORCE RATIOS IN THAT IMPORTANT AREA. WE ASSUMED AT THAT TIME THAT THE ARVN BATTALIONS WOULD BE BROUGHT TO FULL STRENGTH BY NOW AND THAT THE FORCE BUILDUP WOULD PROCEED ON SCHEDULE. NEITHER OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS HAS MATERIALIZED.

7. THE PROBLEM OF LOW BATTLEFIELD STRENGTH IN ARVN HAS FORCED US TO PLAN THE USE OF PERSONNEL NOW TRAINING IN 11 NEW BATTALIONS AS FILLERS FOR OLD BATTALIONS. IN EFFECT, THESE 11 BATTALIONS WILL BE DEFERRED AND DURING THE PERIOD FROM MID-JULY TO EARLY NOVEMBER NO NEW ARVN BATTALIONS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE. THUS THE GAP TO BE FILLED IS BOTH DEEPER AND WIDER.

8. IN SUMMARY, THE FORCE RATIOS CONTINUE TO CHANGE IN FAVOR OF THE VC. I BELIEVE THAT THE DRV WILL COMMIT WHATEVER FORCES IT DEEMS NECESSARY TO TIP THE BALANCE AND THAT THE GVN CANNOT STAND UP SUCCESSFULLY TO THIS KIND OF PRESSURE WITHOUT REINFORCEMENT. EVEN IF DRV VC INTENTIONS ARE DEBATABLE, THEIR CAPABILITIES MUST BE ACKNOWLEDGED AND FACED. ADDITIONALLY, IT IS PRUDENT TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE ENEMY AIR ACTION, LEADING TO SIGNIFICANT ESCALATION AND A BROADENING OF THE ARENA OF CONFLICT. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO FACE SUCH A CONTINGENCY.

BT

041133 NOT IDENTIFIED
260040 IS IN 76878
101 IS IN 88382
052249 & 201207 NOT IDENTIFIED

ADV CY TO CJCS NMCC/DDO

PAGE 3 OF 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
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SECTION 2 OF 2
OF 9 2 2 4 4

Ag97 07 CS090
VV PHB033KVV MAH226
OO RUEKDA
DE RUMSMA 1942U 07 0340Z
O 070335Z
FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKA CINCPAC
RUEKDA JCS
INFO RUHKR CINCUSARPAC
RUHLKM CINCPACAF
RUHPB CINCPACFLT
RUHPG CG FMFPAC
BT

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607 0604Z

LIMDIS
IMMEDIATE⁰⁰²

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS 19118 FINAL SECTION OF TWO

9. IN ORDER TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION OUTLINED ABOVE, I SEE NO COURSE OF ACTION OPEN TO US EXCEPT TO REINFORCE OUR EFFORTS IN SVN WITH ADDITIONAL U.S. OR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES AS RAPIDLY AS IS PRACTICAL DURING THE CRITICAL WEEKS AHEAD. ADDITIONALLY, STUDIES MUST CONTINUE AND PLANS DEVELOPED TO DEPLOY EVEN GREATER FORCES, IF AND WHEN REQUIRED, TO ATTAIN OUR OBJECTIVES OR COUNTER ENEMY INITIATIVES. GROUND FORCES DEPLOYED TO SELECTED AREAS ALONG THE COAST AND INLAND WILL BE USED BOTH OFFENSIVELY AND DEFENSIVELY. U.S. GROUND TROOPS ARE GAINING EXPERIENCE AND THUS FAR HAVE PERFORMED WELL. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT YET ENGAGED THE ENEMY IN STRENGTH, I AM CONVINCED THAT U.S. TROOPS WITH THEIR ENERGY, MOBILITY, AND FIREPOWER CAN SUCCESSFULLY TAKE THE FIGHT TO THE V.C. THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS RECOMMENDED BELOW IS TO GIVE US A SUBSTANTIAL AND HARD HITTING

ACT.....J3-8(1-8)

INFO.....CJCS-1(9) DJS-3(10-12) J4-2(13-14) CSA-2(15-16) CNO-2(17-18)

CSAF-2(19-20) CMC-2(21-22) FILE-1(23) (23)JCK/CL

ADD DIST: CJCS-3(24-26) (26) 7 JUN 65 (MCO)

PAGE 1 OF 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
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OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY ON THE GROUND TO CONVINCING THE V.C. THAT THEY CANNOT WIN.

10. IN SUB-PARAGRAPH "A" BELOW, DEPLOYMENTS AND ACTIONS ARE RECOMMENDED ON WHICH DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE NOW. IN SUBPARA "B" WE HAVE IDENTIFIED FURTHER ACTIONS ON WHICH PLANNING SHOULD START AND ON WHICH SEPARATE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE FORTHCOMING:

A. ACTIONS RECOMMENDED:

(1) DEPLOY AT ONCE TO I CTZ THE REMAINING TWO BLTS OF THE 3D MAR DIV AND APPROPRIATE SUPPORTING DIVISION AND AIR ELEMENTS. (APPROXIMATELY 8,000 PERSONNEL) RECONSTITUTE THE SLF AS A FLOATING RESERVE.

(2) DEPLOY BALANCE OF INCREMENT 1 AND ALL OF INCREMENT 2 (AS DEFINED IN REF C) OF ARMY LOGISTIC AND OTHER SUPPORT UNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCHEDULE SET OUT IN REF D. (APPROXIMATELY 8,000 PERSONNEL)

(3) DEPLOY THE US ARMY AIR MOBILE DIVISION (AND LOGISTIC INCREMENT 3) THROUGH QUI NHON TO AN KE, PLEIKU AND KONTUM (APPROXIMATELY 21,000 PERSONNEL). QUI NHON WILL BE READY TO RECEIVE THE DIVISION APPROXIMATELY 1 AUGUST, UPON THE CLOSURE OF INCREMENT 2 FORCES.

(4) CONCURRENTLY WITH THE AIR MOBILE DIVISION, DEPLOY I CORPS HEADQUARTERS (APPROXIMATELY 1,500 PERSONNEL).

(5) DEPLOY THE ROK MARINE RCT TO CAM RANH BAY AS SOON AFTER 1 JULY AS THE UNIT CAN BE READIED FOR MOVEMENT (APPROXIMATELY 4,000 PERSONNEL). DEPLOY BALANCE OF THE ROK DIVISION FORCE (APPROXIMATELY 14,500 PERSONNEL) PLUS US LOGISTIC INCREMENT 4 (1,500 PERSONNEL), STARTING 15 SEPTEMBER TO THE GENERAL AREA OF QUI NHON. (THIS ANSWERS REF E IN PART - SEPARATE MESSAGE ON F86F WILL FOLLOW)

(6) DEPLOY ADDITIONAL TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS TO CAM RANH BAY WHEN EXPEDITIONARY LANDING FIELD COMPLETE AT THAT LOCATION. ALSO PROVIDE NAVAL AIRCRAFT CARRIER SUPPORT OF IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED; WE BELIEVE THIS LATTER WILL ENGAGE ONE CARRIER FULL TIME.

(7) HOLD THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE IN-COUNTRY UNTIL THE AIR MOBILE DIVISION HAS DEPLOYED AND IS READY FOR OPERATIONS.

(8) CONTINUE AIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE DRV. (REF F APPLIES)

B. ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT THAT MAY BE REQUIRED AND ON

PAGE 2 OF 3

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WHICH PLANNING SHOULD BEGIN:

(1) THREE U.S. ARMY HAWK BATTALIONS TO TSN BIEN HOA, QUI NHON AND CAM RANH IN TAT PRIORITY.

(2) THE REMAINDER OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION OR THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION BEGINNING 1 OCTOBER.

(3) ONE ADDITIONAL MAB TO REINFORCE THE III MAF.

(4) TACTICAL AIR UNITS FOR SUPPORT OF INCREASED U.S. FORCE (ADDITIONAL AIRFIELDS IN SVN AND THAILAND MAY BE REQUIRED).

(5) REQUIRED COMBAT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCES TO INCLUDE HELICOPTER UNITS TO SUPPORT THE FOREGOING.

11. MESSAGE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADORS TAYLOR AND JOHNSON. AMBASSADOR TAYLOR IS PREPARED TO COMMENT THEREON DURING CURRENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. GP-3
BT

ADV CY TO CJCS NMCC/DDO

PAGE 3 OF 3

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IMMEDIATE

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PHP470KVV KAF388
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DE RUHKA 713 07/2331Z
O 072325Z
FM CINCPAC
TO RUEKDA/JCS
INFO RUMSMA/COMUSMACV
RUHKB/CINCPACFLT
RUHLKM/CINCPACAF
RUHKR/CINCUSARPAC
RUHPG/CG FMFPAC
BT

READD: WHITE HOUSE/STATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND DEPLOYMENTS TO RVN (U)

A. COMUSMACV 19118/070335Z ← *attd*

1. PARAGRAPHS FOLLOWING CONTAIN CINCPAC COMMENTS ON REF A.
2. CONCUR IN THE REMARKS ON THE ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION IN REF A.
3. CINCPAC COMMENTS ON PARA 10.A., "ACTIONS RECOMMENDED," ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. PARA 10.A.(1). CONCUR IN THIS DEPLOYMENT AT ONCE. DEPLOYMENT OF TWO BLT AND SUPPORTING DIVISIONAL ELEMENTS CAN BE MADE IN FOLLOWING MANNER:

- (1) DECISION PLUS 4 DAYS: LOAD FIRST BLT.
- (2) DECISION PLUS 6 DAYS: LOAD SECOND BLT.
- (3) DECISION PLUS 8 DAYS: COMMENCE LOAD OUT OF

REMAINDER OF DIVISION.

EASTPAC RLT NOW ENROUTE TO OKINAWA WILL BE IN PLACE ABOUT 18 JUNE. WILL RECONSTITUTE SLF IN SOUTH CHINA SEA ON 96-HOUR REACTION TIME TO

ACT.....J3-8(1-8)

CJCS-1(9) DJS-3(10-12) SJCS-3(13-15) JI-1(16) J4-2(17-18) J5-1(19)

SAQSA-5(20-24) ASD/ISA-5(25-29) DIA-4(30-33) WHITE HOUSE-3(34-36)

CSA-2(37-38) CNO-2(39-40) CSAF-2(41-42) CMC-5(42-46) NMCC-1(47)

SEC DEF-5(48-52) FILE-1(53) JRT/LN

- BONDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWDLER
- BOWEN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENE S
- KLEIN
- KOMER
- MOODY
- REEDY
- SAUNDERS
- THOMSON

PAGE 1 OF 3

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-11-78 letter
By 10, NARS, Date 3-23-79

35

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

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RVN BY EMPLOYMENT OF BLT FROM THIS RLT. DUE TO SHIPPING AVAILABILITY, DATE OF RECONSTITUTING SLF WILL DEPEND ON ACTUAL LANDING DATES OF FORCES TO BE DEPLOYED TO RVN AND DATE DECISION MADE.

B. PARA 10.A.(2). CONCUR IN DEPLOYMENTS OF BOTH INCREMENTS AND AT TIMES INDICATED. THE NEED FOR ARRIVAL OF THESE LOGISTIC UNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCHEDULE CONTAINED IN CGUSARCU MSG DTG 311200Z MAY IS EMPHASIZED. IMPORTANT FACTOR IN ENTIRE MACV DEPLOYMENT PLAN IS ABILITY OF DA TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC UNITS AND PERSONNEL AS RAPIDLY AS REQUIRED BY MACV. INFO HELD HERE INDICATES THAT SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF INCREMENT I NOT YET ALERTED AND FEW, IF ANY, OF INCREMENT II ALERTED.

DEPLOYMENTS OF LOG UNITS MUST MEET MACV SCHEDULE INCREMENTS I AND II IF THE DESIRED DEPLOYMENT DATE FOR THE DIVISION IS TO BE MET. GEN JOHNSON, CSA, ADDRESSES PROBLEM OF ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENTS IN DA MSG 718460/DTG 032320Z JUNE.

C. PARA 10MA.(3). CONCUR IN DEPLOYING AIR MOBILE DIVISION AND LOGISTIC INCREMENT III AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER INCREMENTS I AND II ARE IN PLACE. I CONTINUE TO HAVE GRAVE RESERVATIONS ON DEPLOYING THIS DIVISION TO THE HIGHLAND AREAS. DEPLOYMENTS TO INLAND POSITIONS AT AN KHE, PLEKIU AND KONTUM SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED UNTIL DIVISION FORCE IS SECURELY ESTABLISHED ASHORE IN QUI NHON AND LOC TO HIGHLANDS IS SECURED. IN VIEW OF PREMIUM ON AVAILABILITY OF U.S. AND ALLIES FORCES, GENERATION OF REQUIREMENT FOR ONE DIVISIONAL FORCE TO PROTECT LOC OF ANOTHER SEEMS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. AIR RESUPPLY OF AIR MOBILE DIVISION DEPLOYED TO ABOVE INLAND LOCATIONS, ESTIMATED 600-800 TONS PER DAY, WOULD OVER-TAX AIRFIELD FACILITIES NOW AVAILABLE FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND IMPOSE HEAVY ADDITIONAL BURDEN ON TROOP CARRIERS. FACILITIES AT QUI NHON WOULD BE HEAVILY STRAINED AND PROBABLY OVER-TAXED WITHOUT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IF AIR MOBILE DIVISION PLUS SEPARATE BRIGADE PLUS ROK DIVISION MINUS ARE ALL TO BE SUPPORTED FOR SOME TIME THROUGH QUI NHON, WHICH IS SUCH A VERY LIMITED POINT OF INGRESS. A COMPLETE STUDY OF THIS OPERATION BY COMUSMACV IS ESSENTIAL.

D. PARA 10.A.(4). CONCUR WITH DEPLOYMENT IX CORPS HEADQUARTERS CONCURRENTLY WITH AIR MOBILE DIVISION.

E. PARA 10.A.(5). QUANG NGAI WAS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED AND APPROVED AS LOCATION OF ROK RCT. ITS IMPORTANCE AS A PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, PRINCIPAL POPULATION CENTER ASTRIDE THE NORTH-SOUTH RAIL AND ROAD COMMUNICATIONS, GOOD 3400 FT LATERITE AIRSTRIP ADJACENT TO TOWN AND PROXIMITY TO THE STRONG VIET CONG THREAT FROM THE DO XA BASE AREA WERE AMONG THE REASONS QUANG NGAI WAS APPROVED AS ROK RCT LOCATION

PAGE 2 OF 3

93177

~~TOP SECRET~~

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
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INITIALLY. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE COMUSMACV PROPOSAL IS TO LAND ROK RCT THROUGH CHU LAI AND SUPPORT IT FROM THOSE BEACHES AS IT MOVES TO QUANG NGAI, WHICH LIES 15 MILES SOUTH OF III MAF TAOR. THIS WOULD REINFORCE AND EXTEND FRIENDLY CONTROL IN VITAL COASTAL AREA. IF ROK RCT SENT TO CAM RANH BAY, BELIEVE ONE BATTALION OF SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE SHOULD BE SENT TO CAM RANH BAY INITIALLY, AS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED BY COMUSMACV, AND REMAIN THERE UNTIL RELIEVED BY ROK RCT. PARA 3.C. ABOVE PROVIDES COMMENT RE ROK DIVISION (-). LOG UNITS IN INCREMENT IV HAVE NOT YET BEEN IDENTIFIED BY MACV. PHASING OF DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. DIVISION (START 1 AUG) AND OF ROK DIVISION (START 15 SEP) AS PROPOSED BY MACV SHOULD BE ADHERED TO DUE TO LIMITATIONS OF PORT OF QUI NHONM UNTIL PORT DEVELOPMENT COMPLETE FOLLOW-ONE SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR TWO DIV FORCE WILL SATURATE CAPACITY THIS PORT, INCLUDING BEACHES.

F. PARA 10.A.(6). THERE WILL BE A REQUIREMENT FOR AT LEAST 4 ADDITIONAL TFS AS SOON AS AIRFIELD FACILITIES PERMIT. WITH RESPECT TO CARRIER SUPPORT, A CARRIER WILL BE PROVIDED FOR CONTINUOUS PERIODS OF 10-12 DAYS AT A TIME, AS FREQUENTLY AS POSSIBLE, BUT ONE CANNOT BE PROVIDED ON AN INDEFINITE, CONTINUOUS BASIS UNLESS ADDITIONAL CARRIERS ARE DEPLOYED TO WESTPAC.

G. PARA 10.A.(7). CONCUR IN HOLDING 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE IN-COUNTRY UNTIL AIR MOBILE DIVISION HAS DEPLOYED AND IS READY FOR OPERATIONS.

H. PARA 10.A.(8). AIR ATTACKS AGAINST DRV WILL BE CONTINUED.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE FIVE RECOMMENDED PLANNING ACTIONS (PARA 10.B., REF A) PLANNING BETWEEN CINCPAC, COMUSMACV AND THE COMPONENT COMMANDERS IS REQUIRED. THIS WILL PROCEED IMMEDIATELY. DATES, UNITS, LOCATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT CONCEPTS WILL BE DEVELOPED BEFORE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS OR COMMENT ARE SUBMITTED. ADDITIONAL AIRFIELDS ARE PROBABLY REQUIRED AND BEST POSSIBLE LOCATIONS ARE PRESENTLY UNDER STUDY. EFFECT OF THE LARGER COMMITMENTS ON THE PACOM POSTURE AND CAPABILITY TO MEET OTHER CONTINGENCIES WILL BE ASSESSED. GP-3

BT

PAGE 3 OF 3

93177

~~TOP SECRET~~

50

270

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

DIST: DJS-3 SECDEF-10 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/PA-5 WHOUSE-3 STATE-1 CSA-2
CNO-2 CSAF-2 CMC-7 USIA-1 FILE-1 (46) ML/RAD S

DTG: 07/2327Z JUN 65

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (Check)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION PRIORITY	BOOK MULTI SINGLE	OSD		
INFO PRIORITY	X			

<p>FROM: OSD WASH DC</p> <p>TO: CINCPAC</p> <p>INFO: COMUSMACV</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">AMEMB SAIGON</p> <p>UNCLASSIFIED DEF 003513 FROM OASD(PA)</p> <p>In annual address to Naval Officers Washington area today, Sec Nav Nitze made following statement: "The increasing likelihood that the Communists will turn to the sea for infiltration of contraband into South Vietnam has involved us in another challenging naval operation. In response to an urgent request from the South Vietnamese Government, we have established, in close cooperation with their Navy, a counter-sea infiltration patrol in the South China Sea. Small and large naval craft are involved and we have called upon units of the Coast Guard to provide expertise and equipment well suited to coastal patrols. Since March, South Vietnamese and our own counter infiltration forces in the area have stopped, boarded and</p>	<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p> <p>DIST: WHITE HOUSE STATE/P USIA JCS ASD(ISA) CINFO, Army CHINFO, Navy SAFOI, AF DIR OF INFO, MARCORPS OSD - 10 OASD(PA) - 5</p> <p>(SA/V - 1) (DIS - 1) (P&P - 1) (DSR - 1)</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>DATE</td> <td>TIME</td> </tr> <tr> <td>07</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>MONTH</td> <td>YEAR</td> </tr> <tr> <td>June</td> <td>1965</td> </tr> </table>	DATE	TIME	07		MONTH	YEAR	June	1965
DATE	TIME								
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June	1965								

WRITER	SYMBOL	OASD(PA)			RELEASING OFFICER	SIGNATURE	<i>[Signature]</i>		
	TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required)	Cdr Thomas, Info O, VN				TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	RODGER R. BANKSON Colonel, USA Special Assistant (Vietnam)		
	PHONE	72873	PAGE NR.	1		NR. OF PAGES	2		
	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED							

FROM:

OSD WASH DC

searched over 20,000 vessels."

Press is playing up fact that this is "first official confirmation that U.S. Navy had switched from passive to active role in attempting to cut off a serious flow of reinforcements and war goods by sea from the North."

Above passed for your info. Full text of speech by mail.

003513

SYMBOL	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
OASD(PA)	2	2	UNCLASSIFIED	

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271

KNAB09
 PP YEKADN DE YADNIN 08/0250Z JUN
 P 080245Z ZFF-1
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND SAIGON
 TO AMB TAYLOR WASH
 INFO LT GEN THROCKMORTON WASH
 ZEM

City and country
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 51a
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~~SECRET~~ MAC 2984 EYES ONLY
 SUBJECT: ALLIED VS VC FORCE RATIOS
 REF: A. COMUSMACV 070355Z

1. FORWARDED AS ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR YOUR CURRENT DISCUSSIONS ARE RATIOS OF ALLIED BATTALIONS VERSUS IN COUNTRY VIET CONG/PAVN BATTALIONS AS REVISED THROUGH CONSIDERATION OF FORCES REQUESTED IN PARA 10A REFERENCE A.

2/ FOLLOWING PARAMETERS IN TERMS OF BATTALION EQUIVALENTS APPLY:

- A. ONE ARVN BN EQUALS ONE VC/PAVN BN
- B. ONE US ARMY, ROK, OR ANZAC BN EQUALS TWO VC/PAVN BNS.
- C. ONE US MARINE BLT EQUALS THREE VC/PAVN BNS.

3. USING THE FOREGOING PARAMETERS, THE ALLIED (ARVN PLUS US PLUS THIRD COUNTRY) BATTALION EQUIVALENTS SHOWN IN COLUMN A BELOW ARE COMPUTED FOR FORCES ON BOARD PLUS THOSE NOW APPROVED FOR DEPLOYMENT; COLUMN B SHOWS THE SUM OF COLUMN A AND FORCES REQUESTED IN PARA 10A REFERENCE A:

CORPS AREA	COLUMN A	COLUMN B
I	46	52
II	37	59
III	47	47
IV	33	33
TOTAL	163	191

4. RVNAF/ALLIED VS IN COUNTRY VC/PAVN RATIOS ARE COMPUTED UNDER THREE TERMS OF REFERENCE: CONFIRMED VC FORCES; CONFIRMED PLUS PROBABLE VC FORCES; AND CONFIRMED PLUS PROBABLE PLUS POSSIBLE VC FORCES. THE 32TH PAVN DIVISION IN II CORPS AREA NOTED IN PARA 3 REFERENCE A IS LISTED BELOW IN THE "POSSIBLE" CATEGORY/ READ IN 4 COLUMNS.

CORPS AREA	CONFIRMED DL	CONFIRMED PLUS PROBABLE	CONFIRMED PLUS PROBABLE PLUS POSSIBLE
I CORPS:			
NR VC/PAVN BNS	26	34.5	34.5
ALLIED VS VC (COL A PARA 3)	1.8/1	1.3/1	1.3/1
ALLIED VS VC (COL B PARA 3)	2.0/	1.5/1	1.5/1
II CORPS:			
NR VC/PAVN BNS	25	37.5	48.5
ALLIED VS VC (COL A H PARA 3)	1.48/1	.99/1	.76/1
ALLIED VS VC (COL B PARA 3)	2.36/1	1.57/1	1.22/1

DECLASSIFIED
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 By MTC, NARS, Date 4/12/78

NRWC/PAVN BNS	27		
ALLIED VS VC (COL A PARA 3)	1.74/1	1.47/1	1.47/1
ALLIED VS VC (COL B PARA 3)	1.74/1	1.47/1	1.47/1
IV CORPS:			
NR VC/PAVNRUDDL	37	51	51
ALLIED VS BC (COL A PARA 3)	.9/1	.65/1	.65/1
ALLIED VS VC (COL B PARA 3)	.9/1	.65/1	

65/1

TOTALS:			
NR VC/PAVN BNS	115	155	166
ALLIED BS VC (COL A PARA 3)	1.41/1	1.05/1	.98/1
ALLIED VS VC (COL B PARA 3)	1.66/1	1.23/1	1.15/1

DTL 5. NEW SUBJECT. YOU INQUIRED ABOUT THE DESERTION RATE FOR MAY. THE FOLLOWING IS THE BEST INFO WE HAVE ON THE MAY PERFORMANCE PLUS PREVIOUS MONTHS FOR COMPARISON:

A. RATE PER/1000 TROOPS

	FEB	MAR	WSDBL	MAY
ARVN	10.33	20.46	14.52	13.76 EST
RF	8.20	11.40	12.26	12.40 EST
PF	23.84	31.49	34.95	34.40 EST

B. COMPARSON IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF DESERTIONS:

	LFEB	MAR	APR	MAY
REG	2532	5018	3611	3500 EST
RF	812	1137	1242	1300 EST
PF	3894	5010	5402	5200 EST

SSO NOTE: DELIVER OPENING DUTY HOURS
700

L JPPNE

52

272

File

52a

June 11, 1965

To: Mr. O'Brien

From: McGeorge Bundy

Larry:

The President would like to have this memorandum sent from your office to Fulbright, Mansfield, and Dirksen.

June 8, 1965

SUBJECT: Rebuttal of Congressional Attack on \$89 Million for Southeast Asia

1. Why Extra Economic Money Now in Such a Hurry?

(Senator Aiken: "Mr. President, I am not now in a mood to be very obliging when the Administration asks for \$89 million which it does not need at the present time. The Administration does not need it now any more than it will need the money on the 1st of July. It can get it on the 1st of July. What it now desires is to propagandize the world into believing that the Congress is unanimously behind any move which the Administration chooses to make. For that reason I am voting for the amendment and against the substitute.")

a. Vietnam (\$56.5 million)

It is difficult for a country with per capita income of \$100 to fight a war, and at the same time to maintain a growing civilian economy to support the essential long-term task of nation building. During 1965, there is a massive build-up of the Vietnamese' own war effort. (Vietnamese spending for military purposes will rise by the equivalent of about \$100 million. Military and para-military forces are scheduled to increase by about 160,000 men.) We have just completed detailed planning for FY 1966. It is now clear -- as we said it might be in the Aid message in February -- that without substantial new resources from the U.S., the local Vietnamese military build-up would result in (i) an appreciable cutback in the already meager standard of consumption; (ii) a sharp reduction in basic economic investment; (iii) run-away inflation.

If we were concerned only with the short-run military effort, we could say: "Shift resources to defense from investment." But since we are in this for the long pull, that would be short-sighted.

\$45 million is explicitly earmarked to cover additional industrial and construction materials and consumer goods which we don't think the local economy can supply; \$5 million is reserved for important village electrification projects; \$5 million for improved

medical services; and \$1.5 million for feasibility surveys to map out further nation building investment.

- b. Baltimore Follow-Up, \$19 million (Nam Ngum Dam \$13.5 million; Laos-Thailand transmission lines \$0.5 million; feasibility/engineering studies of other Mekong project, \$5 million.)

The Nam Ngum is the International Mekong Committee's highest priority project. On the basis of his diplomatic explorations following the Baltimore speech, Eugene Black strongly recommended that we make a commitment now to support half its cost. In Black's judgment, if we had dragged our feet on this -- or on financing of the feasibility and engineering studies -- the momentum generated by the Baltimore speech would have been lost.

- c. Other Regional: Laos/Thailand, \$13.5 million

Police Program, \$4.5 million

Medical, \$2 million

Village Public Works, Equipment and Training, \$6 million

Agricultural Development, \$1 million

The \$4.5 million extra for the police program in Northern Laos and Thailand reflects a reassessment of security needs in the area.

The other \$9 million is a proof that the President meant business in Baltimore, and that we really care about peaceful development in the entire area. Health, agriculture, and village public works are the fields in which we can move both quickly and productively.

2. Will this commit us to unlimited economic spending on the Mekong (Hickenlooper, Williams, Gruening, and Ellender)? No
3. Not a dime will go to support the war effort (Williams).

Wrong: The large increase in Vietnam's own defense effort would be impossible without such help. It would result in run-away inflation in the short run, and stagnation over the longer run.

4. Why not spend it all in Vietnam "on the bull's eye" (Mundt)?

The President meant what he said in Baltimore about the peaceful development of the entire region.

5. Any of it to be spent in North Vietnam (McClellan)? No.
6. This will help the VC, which really controls the country (Morse)

No: funds will be spent in and in support of secure areas.

7. Take it out of original MAP appropriations (Morse Amendment, 22 votes in favor)

This is an attack on the FY '66 MAP request, and has nothing to do with the merits of the \$89 million.

8. They tacked it on the aid bill "as a whip to make us vote for the whole package" (Cotton) Not so.

9. Is this part of a comprehensive plan, or an emergency palliative (Cooper)?

It is both an emergency measure and a first step in a larger plan.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 8, 1965

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medical services; and \$1.5 million for feasibility surveys to map out further nation building investment.

- b. Baltimore Follow-Up, \$19 million (Nam Ngum Dam \$13.5 million; Laos-Thailand transmission lines \$0.5 million; feasibility/engineering studies of other Mekong projects, \$5 million.)

The Nam Ngum is the International Mekong Committee's highest priority project. On the basis of his diplomatic explorations following the Baltimore speech, Eugene Black strongly recommended that we make a commitment now to support half its cost. In Black's judgment, if we had dragged our feet on this -- or on financing of the feasibility and engineering studies -- the momentum generated by the Baltimore speech would have been lost.

- c. Other Regional: Laos/Thailand, \$13.5 million

Police Program, \$4.5 million

Medical, \$2 million

Village Public Works, Equipment and Training, \$6 million

Agricultural Development, \$1 million

The \$4.5 million extra for the police program in Northern Laos and Thailand reflects a reassessment of security needs in the area.

The other \$9 million is a proof that the President meant business in Baltimore, and that we really care about peaceful development in the entire area. Health, agriculture, and village public works are the fields in which we can move both quickly and productively.

2. Will this commit us to unlimited economic spending on the Mekong (Hickenlooper, Williams, Gruening, and Ellender)? No
3. Not a dime will go to support the war effort (Williams).

Wrong: The large increase in Vietnam's own defense effort would be impossible without such help. It would result in run-away inflation in the short run, and stagnation over the longer run.

4. Why not spend it all in Vietnam "on the bull's eye" (Mundt)?

The President meant what he said in Baltimore about the peaceful development of the entire region.

5. Any of it to be spent in North Vietnam (McClellan)? No.

6. This will help the VC, which really controls the country (Morse)

No: funds will be spent in and in support of secure areas.

7. Take it out of original MAP appropriations (Morse Amendment, 22 votes in favor)

This is an attack on the FY '66 MAP request, and has nothing to do with the merits of the \$89 million.

8. They tacked it on the aid bill "as a whip to make us vote for the whole package" (Cotton) Not so.

9. Is this part of a comprehensive plan, or an emergency palliative (Cooper)?

It is both an emergency measure and a first step in a larger plan.

46

Tuesday, 7:15 p. m.
June 8, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Rebuttal of Congressional Attack on \$89 Million for
Southeast Asia.

1. Why Extra Economic Money Now in Such a Hurry?

(Senator Aiken: "Mr. President, I am not now in a mood to be very obliging when the Administration asks for \$89 million which it does not need at the present time. The Administration does not need it now any more than it will need the money on the 1st of July. It can get it on the 1st of July. What it now desires is to propagandize the world into believing that the Congress is unanimously behind any move which the Administration chooses to make. For that reason I am voting for the amendment and against the substitute.")

a. Vietnam (\$56.5 million)

It is difficult for a country with percapita income of \$100 to fight a war, and at the same time to maintain a growing civilian economy to support the essential long-term task of nation building. During 1965, there is a massive build-up of the Vietnamese' own war effort. (Vietnamese spending for military purposes will rise by the equivalent of about \$100 million. Military and para-military forces are scheduled to increase by about 160,000 men.) We have just completed detailed planning for FY 1966. It is now clear as we said it might be in the Aid Message in February -- that without substantial new resources from the U.S., the local Vietnamese military build-up would result in (i) an appreciable cut-back in the already meager standard of consumption; (ii) a sharp reduction in basic economic investment; (iii) run-away inflation.

If we were concerned only with the short-run military effort, we could say: "Shift resources to defense from investment." But since we are in this for the long pull, that would be short-sighted.

\$45 million is explicitly earmarked to cover additional industrial and construction materials and consumer goods which we don't think the local economy can supply; \$5 million is reserved for important village electrification projects; \$5 million for improved

5. Any of it to be spent in North Vietnam (McClellan)? No
6. This will help the VC, which really controls the country (Morse)

No: funds will be spent in and in support of secure areas.

7. Take it out of original MAP appropriations (Morse Amendment, 22 votes in favor)

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8. They tacked it on the aid bill "as a whip to make us vote for the whole package" (Cotton) Not so.
9. Is this part of a comprehensive plan, or an emergency palliative (Cooper)?

It is both an emergency measure and a first step in a larger plan.

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273

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH GEORGE REEDY

12:10 PM EDT

JUNE 9, 1965

WEDNESDAY

MR. REEDY: I have a White House statement.

There has been no change in the mission of U. S. ground combat units in Viet Nam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to General Westmoreland recently or at any other time. The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations, like the air base at Danang. They have the associated mission of active patrolling and securing action in and near the areas thus safeguarded.

If help is requested by appropriate Vietnamese commanders, General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ these troops in support of the Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available, and when, in his judgment, the general military situation urgently requires it. If General Westmoreland did not have this discretionary authority a situation could easily arise in which heavy loss of life might occur and great advantage might be won by the Viet Cong because of delays in communications. This discretionary authority does not change the primary mission of U. S. troops in South Viet Nam, which has been approved by the President on the advice and recommendation of responsible authorities.

However, I would emphasize --

Q. Who is he?

MR. REEDY: Me.

Q. Reedy.

MR. REEDY: The White House. I'm speaking for the White House.

However, I would emphasize that any such change of primary mission would obviously be a matter for decision in Washington.

Q. Is that the statement?

MR. REEDY: Yes.

Q. George, what, in the estimation of the White House, accounts for versions at the State Department yesterday which seem slightly counter to this, somewhat counter?

MR. REEDY: I would refer you to the State Department. But for BACKGROUND, I have gone over the transcript fairly carefully and my own judgment is that certain speculative matters and certain contingencies, which are inherent in the situation, came out the other end as though these were decisions which had been taken and orders which had been issued.

Q. Came out the other end by the State Department, or by whom?

MR. REEDY: Appeared in public versions.

MORE

Q. George, various officials that we were in touch with last night, including some in the White House, do not lead us away from the interpretation that we gave to that?

MR. REEDY: Still speaking for BACKGROUND, I think there were some matters for emphasis here. However, this is the White House statement on policy.

Q. George, can I ask you your impression that the State Department statement was too hard on certain points?

MR. REEDY: Well, again, I still want to appear on a BACKGROUND basis because of obvious situation involved here. But I think that certain contingencies were discussed as though they were matters of hard and fast orders that had been issued.

Q. Discussed by whom, George?

MR. REEDY: I'm talking in terms of the State Department. I think that certain contingencies and certain speculative possibilities were discussed as though they were rather in terms which inadvertently appeared to be hard and fast matters.

Q. George, I have a couple of questions about your statement. The authority which you refer to as having been given General Westmoreland, first, when did he receive this authority, and second, is it up to him to define such terms as active patrolling, securing action, and faced with an aggressive attack?

MR. REEDY: Still on BACKGROUND, I would define the situation as follows. In effect, the authority was there from March when the Marines were landed with the mission I have mentioned of protecting the air base. Now, from a practical standpoint, and I think this is one of the difficulties, I think certain practicalities have been discussed here as though they were hard and fast issues facing us -- from a practical standpoint, of course, this would not be an effective authority until General Westmoreland had sufficient forces at his disposal to support South Vietnamese operations when requested an effective operation. That is number one. You had two questions, Chuck.

Now, the other question, and again I am still on BACKGROUND. In any tactical situation, obviously you have to lodge within a commanding officer certain amounts of discretionary authority. The terms of the statement, I'll point out, refer to a situation in which heavy loss of life might occur, and great advantage might be won by the Viet Cong because of delays in communications. You have to make an assumption that when a commanding officer is given command in a theater, and he has certain responsibilities, that it is implicit that he will have to carry out those responsibilities.

Q. May I ask one follow-up question? This statement could be read, it seems to me, so that if, let us say, a Vietnamese government force were surrounded and in danger of being overrun, Westmoreland would have authority to commit a battalion, or even a brigade, of American troops into combat to prevent that from occurring? Is that a correct interpretation?

MR. REEDY: First of all, you are coming up with a speculative "if." But I think the language here is extremely plain. I'm not trying to dodge the issue. I'm trying to avoid any speculative questions because, I think, speculative discussion is what got us into this. It says to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggression of attack when other effective reserves are not available, and when, in his judgment, the general military situation requires it. If General Westmoreland did not have this discretionary authority, a situation could easily arrive in which heavy loss of life might occur, and great advantage might be won by the Viet Cong because of delays in communications.

Now, if a situation which you are presenting arose and fell within the limits that have been defined, they are obvious. I am not going to fence or argue about it. I just do not want, Chuck, to be setting up a situation. I outlined certain specifics in which this might come about but, nevertheless, I think it is tied down. It is very broad language because when you're talking in these terms you have to talk in terms of broad language, but within the statement you can see the rather clear language.

Q. You said General Westmoreland had the authority, it's implicit within his mission?

Q. He does now have authority to commit us?

MR. REEDY: I don't want to get into military judgments. That is a military judgment.

Q. When you say he had sufficient evidence, does he define the word sufficient?

MR. REEDY: No, I did not say sufficient evidence. I used sufficient force.

Q. He would make the judgment?

MR. REEDY: What I said was this would not be a practical question until he has sufficient force to act effectively. Obviously, that would be a military judgment.

Q. In view of the State Department announcement yesterday --

MR. REEDY: I want to make this thing very clear. This was not a State Department announcement. This was a question of questions being asked of a State Department briefing officer, and as I said, I think there was some speculative contingencies.

Q. Yesterday we were led to believe that what, in effect, this meant was that U. S. troops would be used if requested on an offensive action. Obviously, what you are saying now is that this is not true at all?

MR. REEDY: Wait a minute.

Q. At least I was led to believe, and several others, yesterday, that what this new move meant was that U. S. troops would hence forth be used in offensive actions against the Viet Cong instead of perfectly defensive actions. Now, from your statement today, it would seem that what you are saying -- correct me if I'm wrong now if this is not true -- is that U. S. troops will not be used on offensive actions, but would be still on defensive actions?

MR. REEDY: Not as a matter of correcting you, or anything like that, Doug, but still on BACKGROUND, I want the statement itself to be the thing on the record. I'll try to clarify it as much as I can. I am not a military expert, and I am not going to get into defensive and offensive of what this means. On BACKGROUND, it is a rather obvious thing that when Vietnamese forces are faced with an aggressive attack, and when these various situations that are outlined in the statement are in effect, and when they request authority, and when in the judgment of General Westmoreland these criteria have been met, he does have authority to move.

Q. To commit American troops?

MR. REEDY: In support of South Vietnamese forces.

Q. And that is not a new policy -- to commit ground troops?

MR. REEDY: No, there is nothing new about this thing, as I stated before. If there was any change in the primary mission there would be a decision in Washington.

Q. Was there a primary mission to commit troops on the ground?

MR. REEDY: I stated that the primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations, like the air base at Danang. They have the associated mission of active patrolling and securing action in and year the areas safeguarded.

Q. But there is a change, is there not, from the old role of being simply advisory?

MR. REEDY: Well, the primary missions were stated, and have been stated, on a number of occasions. They were stated last March when those troops were landed to protect the air base.

Q. I'm not aware of this statement?

MR. REEDY: The statement of the primary mission is to secure and safeguard important military installations. Now, that is obviously different from the mission just to advise troops. I'm not going to fence on that one.

Q. George, there is no formal statement comparable to what you are giving us today?

MR. REEDY: This thing has been stated on so many occasions.

Q. Can you cite us some occasions?

MR. REEDY: This has been stated on a number of occasions by the State Department. I can give you plenty of citations on that. I'll dig them out for you. But it has been stated on a number of occasions what the primary mission of these troops which were landed last March is. This has been stated out there. It has been stated here.

Q. Even though the primary mission has been stated, has the secondary mission, which we are now describing, ever been stated before?

MR. REEDY: Active patrolling and securing action in the areas thus safeguarded. I know that has been stated.

MORE

Q. Discretionary authority?

MR. REEDY: This authority is within the primary mission of the associated mission that we have stated already, and again, since we are still on Background, yes, this is known out in Viet Nam. It was stated to the press by a military spokesman in the very recent past. I do not know whether it has been stated in these terms in Washington before, but it has been stated to the press in South Viet Nam.

Q. When General Westmoreland went out there -- these troops landed in March. Was it decided at that time that we would come to the support of the Vietnames forces when they got in trouble?

MR. REEDY: Yes, this was inherent within the mission, it was implicit within the mission.

Q. This change in policy came in March?

MR. REEDY: If you regard it as a change in policy. I am not going to fence. This particular --and I am referring now to the subject under discussion, I am not referring to the securing and safeguarding of important military installations, but this was within the mission that he had in March, yes.

Q. George, within the current mission, under certain circumstances it could be possible then that instead of merely defensive or securing action it could turn into offensive action if the circumstances warranted it, would it not?

MR. REEDY: You are discussing a speculative question of military operations. You can also, on the basis of speculation, speculate yourself into any foreseeable conclusion. The basic point here is that the mission has been outlined, the role of General Westmoreland has been outlined and ~~outlined~~, when you have a theater commander it is implicit in the whole question of government that you have to lodge certain discretion in that man.

Q. George, the only situation under which we would use our troops is on their request and if they are in trouble?

MR. REEDY: Yes, I have outlined it.

Q. Do they have to actually be under attack?

Q. Or faced with the threat of a massive attack ?

MR. REEDY: I think we are getting into fine shades of meaning here.

Q. What was your answer to Doug's question?

C. Was the answer yes?

MR. REEDY: Yes. I answered yes. We are still on Background. I am trying to keep the statement on the record.

Q. George, does this apply to the whole theater of the war or just to our bases or installatins? Does he apply his judgment of attack to elsewhere?

MR. REEDY: I think in a case like this you run into the whole question of just where the limits would be and I am not going to make a commitment this far away. I am not going to get into questions of perimeters of this authority because I think it would be very unfortunate to try to set limits here.

Q. George, for clarification here, going back to Doug's question. You answered yes when he asked whether or not U.S. troops would be used only if the South Vietnamese requested. You are saying then that U. S. troops would not take part if an offensive was launched by the South Vietnamese?

MR. REEDY: I think that is right, when they are faced with an aggressive attack and effective reserves are available. I think it is clear in the statement.

Q. I am confused. I thought you said originally General Westmoreland always had this authority but he did not have the troops to carry it out until March?

MR. REEDY: No, no. Wait a minute. Let's get one thing at a time. What I said, we are still on Background, of course. What I said was that this authority was implicit in the mission assigned to him when these troops were landed in March. I said as a practical matter it would not mean anything.

Q. Is it a fair statement?

MR. REEDY: I don't want to get into fair statements.

Q. There are some limitations of my understanding. Is it true then that in March or since March, Westmoreland has had the authority to use U. S. forces for combat purposes and combat assignments if requested by the South Vietnamese? That is representing a change from the mission prior to March, is that true?

MR. REEDY: Let me think about that for a few seconds. I am not going to fence. I want to be certain that there are no words in there because we got involved in something yesterday, I think, out of making a few quick conclusions.

Q. I thought you said he had the authority but not the muscle?

MR. REEDY: That is an excellent summation. I am not accepting that word. Yes, I'll accept that. I think that is very clear within here. The only thing not in here of course is the date.

Q. I think the question of Doris's is really a question.

MR. REEDY: I have not heard it?

Q. That is, whether if an attack came that was not on an American air base, is that encompassed within this ability to go to the aid of South Vietnamese troops?

Q. It was about the theater of war, how wide is it now?

MR. REEDY: That could get into something I wouldn't want to comment on now for the simple reason when you are talking about protection of an important vital center, you get yourself into quite a military hassle as to the extent.

Q. Let me ask one question. Would he have to come to Washington before he could put that Marine brigade into the job of cleaning out a province?

MR. REEDY: You mean without the circumstances I have outlined here, yes.

Q. The language said he could work out those circumstances within ten minutes.

MR. REEDY: The point is if there is any change in the mission and the mission has been stated clearly. He would have to come to Washington. You can always get into a question of what a human being will do with his orders, Chuck.

Q. The language of that seems to me --

MR. REEDY: I think the language is clear here and I am not going to speculate on some of these contingencies.

Q. George, is General Taylor conferring with the President this morning?

MR. REEDY: Not to my knowledge.

Q. Is he on the schedule?

MR. REEDY: No, I don't have it on the schedule.

Q. Is Rusk and Secretary McNamara here?

MR. REEDY: I don't know.

Q. What meeting is underway in the Cabinet Room now?

MR. REEDY: I have been in here with you. I do not have that.

Q. Was the Secretary of Defense here this morning?

MR. REEDY: Not to my knowledge.

Q. Could you find out if there has been a meeting of that kind, including General Taylor?

MR. REEDY: I am not going to hold up this now. Obviously I will give you whatever I can as soon as I get it.

Q. What has the President been doing this morning?

MR. REEDY: He has been receiving reports from the agencies and staff people and studying this matter and getting the customary intelligence briefing.

Q. George, do you have anything else?

MR. REEDY: Also he has seen some members of the Iowa Trade Council. I do not have the details on that. Mr. Laitin has them and he can give them to you as soon as this thing breaks up.

MORE

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Q. The authority that General Westmoreland has cover a particular situation for this to be applied broadly on a day-to-day basis across the board been a matter of Presidential decision?

MR. REEDY: Would you say that over again?

Q. The authority General Westmoreland has covers specific situations as they arise, not on an across-the-board basis?

Q. Such a decision would have to be made by the President?

MR. REEDY: Obviously this is a question of tactical discretion that has to be granted to any commander.

Q. I don't understand that answer.

MR. REEDY: Whenever you have a commander in the field he has certain tactical discretion, that is inevitable.

Q. How wide is this discretion, George?

MR. REEDY: I am standing on the statement.

Q. Can I ask one more question? Does this authority we are talking about, air fields or let's say defense areas where U. S. troops now are stationed, does this authority allow General Westmoreland, let's say, to put troops in a helicopter, send them 100 miles away if the South Vietnamese say we are in trouble here and we need your help?

MR. REEDY: You have a speculative "if" there. I am not going to pass judgment on.

Q. George, could you interpret something you said on Background? You said the authority for Westmoreland being there and these activities, the authority was there since the Marines landed in March and you said from a practical point of view it could not be effective?

MR. REEDY: It could not be a question until he had enough forces.

Q. That is right. Now I'd like to ask you is it your judgment now that he has enough forces?

MR. REEDY: I am not going to make a military judgment.

THE PRESS: Thank you, George.

END

54

274

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH GEORGE REEDY

4:35 PM EDT

JUNE 9, 1965

WEDNESDAY

MR. REEDY: Gentlemen, the President intends to renominate the following: Carl W. Feickert of Belleville, Illinois as U. S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Illinois. He has served in this position since May 1961; Floyd M. Buford of Macon, Georgia, U. S. Attorney for the Middle District of Georgia, which he served since April 1961; William J. Andrews of Atlanta, Georgia, as U. S. Marshal for the Northern District of Georgia; he served in this position since May 1961. I'll post the biographies.

I won't have the schedule for a while yet. I will post it when I get it. Are there any questions?

Q. George, I have about three or four questions I would like to ask all at once. What was the date on which General Westmoreland received authority to answer a call for help from the South Vietnamese, by sending American troops under terms of the statement of this morning? Was it in writing, was it verbal? And if either, by whom was the authority granted? When was the existence of this authority first announced? Was it last Friday in a briefing by a U. S. general in Saigon?

MR. REEDY: Since the basic elements of this were discussed on BACKGROUND this morning, I will keep this one on BACKGROUND. I want to distinguish the White House statement from the Background explanation.

Q. George, can we say White House sources?

MR. REEDY: Of course. I am just trying to distinguish the official White House statement from the explanation. As I said this morning, the authority was implicit in the missions that were assigned to General Westmoreland when the Marines were landed in March. The President approves missions and as I made clear, would approve any change in missions.

As far as specific orders are concerned, that would have to be something that would come out of the Pentagon; whatever can be discussed about specific orders, I don't know how far the military would be willing to go on that matter. It would have to come out of the Pentagon.

Your question as to the spokesman, I think I also said this morning it was my understanding this specific question had been discussed last week by a military spokesman in Saigon and I have not pinned it down beyond that other than confirm the fact it was discussed.

Q. Was this the first discussion or disclosure of this authority?

MR. REEDY: I don't know that it was the first, Doug. I know it was discussed specifically last week by a military spokesman in Saigon is as far as I can go.

Q. Now the question of time and date?

MR. REEDY: I can't pin down times and date. I said it was discussed by a military spokesman in Saigon last week.

MORE

Q. This morning's statement said no order had been issued to General Westmoreland recently or any time in connection with --

MR. REEDY: The President has issued no order of any kind in this regard to General Westmoreland recently or at any other times. As I have said, the role of the White House, the role of the President is to approve missions and any change in the mission would, as we have stated, come back to Washington.

Q. So no order to him exists with regard to combat missions?

MR. REEDY: I haven't said that. When you get to the question of orders you are getting into a question of military lines of communication. The President has approved specific missions.

Q. Did somebody else issue orders?

MR. REEDY: As I said when you get into the question of military orders issued, you have to get that from the Pentagon.

Q. This morning didn't you get into that, George?

MR. REEDY: The President issued no order of any kind in this order.

Q. Are you referring to military orders?

MR. REEDY: I said the President issued no orders of any kind. The President has approved this mission and that is the role of the President to approve missions.

Q. George, when you say it is implicit, that this authority is implicit, are you saying that he wouldn't need orders in writing or doesn't have orders in writing?

MR. REEDY: I said implicit within the mission. I also pointed out to you this morning, however, this would, whatever authority might be implicit might not become effective authority until sufficient force is at General Westmoreland's disposal.

Q. George, one thing I don't understand. Since we are on Background, you said in effect the authority became effective as of March when the troops landed.

MR. REEDY: No, I didn't say effective, I said the authority would only become effective authority when General Westmoreland had enough troops at his disposal.

Q. That point, the written statement itself says in effect that if South Vietnamese troops request help and are in difficulty, he has the authority to give help?

MR. REEDY: Right.

Q. Well, last week General Nguyen Chanh Thi, the I Corps Commander of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam publicly requested troops. He told reporters he requested the Marines at the time of the Quang Ngai battle in which the government lost 1100 men and he got no troops. Can you explain that for us?

MR. REEDY: I am not familiar with that particular statement. I am not even familiar enough with it to go into BACKGROUND. However, I would like to extend this a bit further, when I said this authority does not mean a directive exists. I don't want to imply any request from the South Vietnamese would trigger our forces. I am not familiar with it. This is a matter which I think you should take up with the Pentagon.

Q. One step further. The Friday briefing in Saigon -- that ties in with certain other things said by certain officials here in Washington not for direct quotation. The whole indication of those statements, including Friday's, that the authority was about to become effective, which would tend to refute the whole idea this had been in effect since March?

MR. REEDY: I think we are getting into semantics here. The whole question -- on the question when authority becomes effective, obviously authority is never effective until you have strength to do something about it. Obviously authority is not exercised until there is occasion; obviously authority is not exercised until judgment of those who are going to exercise it, there is occasion to exercise it, and I really think we are getting into semantics.

Q. One question directly, because it is important: is it or is it not true that until this battle in Quang Ngai Province last week in which government forces suffered disastrous casualties the President hesitated to issue this authority and that as of about the end of last week it was issued in view of --

MR. REEDY: As I stated here, the President has not issued any order of this kind. The President has approved certain missions. Those missions were approved -- I am not going into the exact time when approved, but the Marines were landed in March under those missions. Now, I think the language here is very clear and very plain and you men think the President issued an order last week or change in the mission last week, the answer is no.

Q. Is what the White House is saying is this: that the President didn't issue any orders, he did approve the mission, and therefore, General Westmoreland's authority was implicit in the mission?

MR. REEDY: Of course.

Q. That is what you are saying?

MR. REEDY: That is right.

Q. Why didn't General Westmoreland exercise that authority to rescue these three Ranger battalions which were wiped out? It appears to an outside observer this order was approved after that unfortunate incident and because of that unfortunate incident.

MR. REEDY: Well, I think the key question there is an outside observer. General Westmoreland, as commanding general on the scene, has certain responsibilities upon him. He has certain decisions he must make as commanding officer on the scene. I am not getting into the question of second guessing decisions. I am not becoming a military commander thousands of miles removed from the scene.

Q. General Westmoreland knew he could use the troops?

MR. REEDY: Gentlemen, gentlemen, I think we are going to go round and round on this. I have already made the statement that it was implicit in the missions that he was assigned to. If you want to get into any question of military orders you can go to the Pentagon. What they say about it I don't know because that is a matter that becomes a military matter. I am not going to make military judgments on the matter.

Q. May I ask an unrelated question which may seem parochial? The President addressed 110 citizens in the Rose Garden off-the-record. Since then prepared text has been made available. Why is such an event off-the-record?

MR. REEDY: I do know as soon as it is put on the record I release the information as rapidly as I can.

Q. Is there any kind of a practice or policy that intimate events like this will be kept off-the-record?

MR. REEDY: I couldn't speak to the question of policy on it, Chuck. As I said, as far as I am concerned I put as much stuff on the record as I possibly can and put it out as fast as I can.

Q. Could you possibly give us what the President said? He said something measurably different than the text according to persons who heard it?

MR. REEDY: I'll look into this matter.

Q. Was a transcript taken?

MR. REEDY: I'll look into it.

Q. Do you see the position we are in? It is off-the-record, then you put out a prepared transcript and people there gave our people quite a changed version, not as to subject, but as to emphasis, such as allusions to peace and war is what we would like to have?

MR. REEDY: I'll look into that.

Q. George, this morning you told us the policy of committing American ground troops to the defense of Vietnamese soldiers under attack was formulated in March?

MR. REEDY: I said it was implicit in the mission.

Q. Did the government ever say it?

MR. REEDY: I know it was stated on at least one occasion in Saigon, possibly other occasions.

Q. Talking about the secondary mission?

MR. REEDY: I am talking now what was implicit within the mission.

Q. For clarification on one point, George, this sort of follows what Charlie was asking about, do you correctly understand your position as being that General Westmoreland's authority was the same before the Quang Ngai battle as it has been since then?

MR. REEDY: As I said, this is implicit within the mission.

Q. I said authority?

MR. REEDY: It was implicit.

Q. Why was it never made public before?

MR. REEDY: I am not going into questions why something was not done, Helen.

Q. I'd like to follow up Chancellor's question because I looked it up at the Pentagon and all he referred to was guarding Vietnamese installations --

MR. REEDY: I am not saying it was all stated at one time.

Q. That seems misleading to what we are saying now.

Q. Back in March when the troops were sent in, it was their role to defend the area and move out and secure the area. May we assume that our role is still one of self-defense and often if only to the extent of protecting a limited area?

MORE

MR. REEDY: I think you can assume exactly what is in this statement. It is clear.

Q. Or initiating a --

MR. REEDY: I think you can stick entirely to the language of this statement -- if he is requested by appropriate Vietnamese commanders, General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ these troops in support of the Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack. I prefer that language. When other effective reserves are not available and when, in his judgment, the general military situation urgently requires it.

Q. This is a question that has arisen, aside from a Vietnamese request or Vietnamese position if the military situation urgently requires, Westmoreland can act, is that correct?

MR. REEDY: Now you are isolating one phrase from an overall phrase, Smitty.

Q. I am not isolating, I am asking.

MR. REEDY: I said you are isolating and I am saying within the limits of these statements Westmoreland can act.

Q. Is it possible for you to give a yes or no answer to the questions as to whether General Westmoreland's authority is the same now as it has been ever since the Marines landed?

MR. REEDY: I think in terms of authority, I think the answer is yes, it has been implicit within his authority. However, authority and practicability to effectuate something are two different things.

Q. I am not asking about practicability.

MR. REEDY: Right.

Q. But you say yes, he had this authority all along since the Marines landed?

MR. REEDY: Right.

Q. How was he made aware of the implications?

MR. REEDY: I do not know -- military chain of command.

Q. George, last week when the military spokesman in Saigon discussed this authority, is that the first time this was mentioned publicly?

MR. REEDY: As I said, I have confirmed it was mentioned publicly on that occasion.

Q. This apparently is what you were talking about this morning when you said citations on the implicit part of the mission --

MR. REEDY: No, they were talking about the primary mission and associated mission. As I said, I would look those matters up. Most of the citations would be out of Saigon.

Q. Let's take the citation on implicit -- a minute ago you said it was stated once by government officials in Saigon. Can you give us the date?

MR. REEDY: I can't give you a date. I said it is a military spokesman last week.

MORE

Q. Since the Quang Ngai incident?

MR. REEDY: Could be.

Q. George, could it be -- I know we are circling, but could it be that as of March and the entrance of the Marines into the picture, General Westmoreland had a certain policy outline within which he could operate?

MR. REEDY: That is right.

Q. Then under this general understanding, of authority, has come a specific event. Could it be, like the question Charlie Mohr raised, or any other similar specific event, does he have to check back with Washington to see how far --

MR. REEDY: There could have been a large number of events. There could have been a specific event in the terrain shift, there could be specific directives as distinguished from authority, there could have been a whole broad range of possibilities, Smitty, I am not going to discuss here, and it is not the place to discuss here. He is within his mission.

Q. George, we have not had to use U. S. troops like this yet -- I'll phrase the question more simply. Does General Westmoreland have to check with Washington before he can commit U. S. troops to either offensive battle or --

MR. REEDY: If General Westmoreland did not have this discretionary authority --discretionary is a very clear word. I invite your attention to Webster or Funk and Wagnall.

Q. Doug said offensive?

MR. REEDY: I would emphasize any such change of primary mission would be obviously a matter of mission to Washington. I think the language is quite clear.

Q. We are not talking about what you define as the primary mission?

MR. REEDY: I have also stated beyond that if help is requested by appropriate Vietnamese commanders, General Westmoreland has authority within the assigned mission.

Q. That statement is clear and the only thing is the intent is not clear.

MR. REEDY: The only thing that is not clear is you are trying to get me into a number of "ifs" and contingencies, that I am not going to get into. Also, you are asking me about battles which were matters of judgment within General Westmoreland's --

Q. I think the written part of the statement is quite clear. What I don't understand in substance seems to be what McCloskey said, the first part, why this statement is even issued?

MR. REEDY: You are welcome to interpret any way you wish, Charlie.

Q. Does this statement in any way differ from the statement out of the State Department yesterday?

MR. REEDY: I have stated already this morning that it seemed to me this whole situation arises because of speculative discussions of contingencies which is what I am specifically trying to avoid. I am outlining the situation as I see it and I am outlining the situation as the White House sees it in this statement. Whatever interpretation you want to draw you can.

MORE

Q. What are these contingencies and speculative matters which--

MR. REEDY: I am not getting into that matter. You have the statement.

Q. Are you saying McCloskey brought up contingencies?

MR. REEDY: As I said, I studied the transcript this morning. It seemed to me there was some discussion of certain types of contingencies which came out as hard and fast decisions which had been made.

Q. Since this had been issued yesterday?

MR. REEDY: It was not issued yesterday. Let me be clear on that.

Q. Since it was issued?

MR. REEDY: It was in response to a question.

Q. I just want to complete the sentence, I am not going to quote myself -- since yesterday, Senator Javits has said that he feels the President should ask again for Congressional resolutions endorsing his actions in Viet Nam and Senator Aiken has gone so far as to say he thinks the President should ask Congress, if the President did ask Congress to declare war in Viet Nam he would be willing to support it. Without going that far, does the President have any intention at this time of going to Congress again for any expression of endorsement of his Viet Nam policy?

MR. REEDY: Two things: Number one: I wouldn't comment on what the legislators have to say. Number two, in the event that the President was prepared to go to Congress, certainly we would make that fact known.

Q. Was the President personally annoyed at the fact the State Department did what it did yesterday? Is that the reason for this statement?

MR. REEDY: I am not going into the President's personal feelings. I presented you the White House statement on this.

Q. George, did the President know the State Department was going to make the reply it did?

MR. REEDY: I am not getting into internal matters. What I am saying is this is the statement of the White House and I am not going into a lot of internal questions.

Q. George, why did the White House feel it was necessary to issue this today?

MR. REEDY: Because there was a large number of interpretations of what the American position was and I think this is a statement of American position. I am referring to interpretations generally what was the American position. I think this is a clear statement on America's position.

Q. George, has the President seen Ambassador Taylor yet?

MR. REEDY: I have nothing like that.

Q. Who has the President conferred with today in the line of foreign policy in Viet Nam?

MR. REEDY: He had some discussions with Secretary McNamara and with David Bell on the foreign aid bill and discussions with staff; he had some discussions naturally with McGeorge Bundy.

Q. Do you have an advance text of the President's remarks this evening?

MR. REEDY: No.

MORE

Q. What is the schedule for tomorrow?

MR. REEDY: I don't have it yet.

Q. George, were you able to ascertain whether Rusk or McNamara have been here?

MR. REEDY: I already said he conferred with McNamara, and Rusk is at Carlisle Barracks making a speech.

Q. George, may I ask a question on a lighter subject? Has the President been making use of the yacht "Honey Fitz" as reported by well known news services?

MR. REEDY: He has used it on two or three occasions, yes.

Q. It is put back into commission or was it ever decommissioned?

MR. REEDY: I am not familiar with the technical status. Obviously it is seaworthy.

Q. George, do you have any information that you can give us on the President's meeting with the astronauts?

MR. REEDY: No, I have no schedule yet.

Q. Will it be Saturday?

MR. REEDY: I just have no schedule.

Q. One thing more, George. Getting back to topic A of this afternoon, the President, after he left the East Room or sometime subsequent to the Scholarship thing, took Senator Fulbright and Dr. Seaborg upstairs for a private chat. Did that relate at all to Viet Nam do you know?

MR. REEDY: I know nothing about that.

THE PRESS: Thank you, George.

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
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

June 9, 1965

MEMO FOR McGeorge Bundy

Attached is a list of statements by Defense Department personnel concerning the mission of U. S. combat forces in Vietnam. Secretary McNamara's March 9 statement was made in response to a question during a background meeting with the press here in the Pentagon.

Copies of this list have also been sent under separate cover by Art Sylvester to George Reedy.


Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Attachment

✓

STATEMENTS CONCERNING MISSION OF U.S. COMBAT FORCES IN
VIETNAM

MACV Spokesman, 5 December:

"About 150 U.S. marines have reported. Serve as internal security forces at Danang Air Base."

9 March, Secretary McNamara:

"... Serve as security force only. Patrol within narrow limits of the area and thus should not tangle with the VC. There may be VC infiltration attempts of course, and the marines will shoot if they are shot at."

"The two battalions (of marines) can only function as a security force."

8 March, MACV:

Press release at Danang. Quoting General Karch.

"...reinforcing defense of Danang airfield." "Marine helicopters operate in support of ARVN forces."

General Karch, Q&A: "Assist in defense of Danang air base."

"will be operating strictly in defensive role."

"will be patrolling within zone we are assigned as defensive sector."

Distance from air base. "Depends on Gen Thi."

9 April, MACV Spokesman Saigon:

Q. "Are these going to be purely security troops?"

A. "Yes."

9 March, Gen Karch, Danang:

Q. "Will U.S. Marines train Vietnamese?"

A. "Sounds like a good idea, will be delighted to assist in training Vietnamese Marines."

9 March, MACV Spokesman, Saigon:

At dawn this AM planes of USMC medium helo sqdn HMM 162 began arriving here to further bolster marine units at Danang. Brigade was brought to SVN at request of GVN to serve as security element for Danang Air Base.

9 March, Gen Karch, Danang:

Q. "Will marines be used in any special forces type ground operations?"

A. "Don't foresee this."

Q. "What will helos be used for?"

A. "Only used to move marines around defense perimeter. Base security is primary mission."

28 April, MACV Spokesman, Saigon:

Referring to General Wallace M. Greene's press conference at plane-side at Danang.

"Marines will patrol out as far as they have to go."

MACV Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations in monthly Q&A news conference in Saigon, 4 June:

Q. "What is the combat mission of American troops here?" "When are they going to go into action?"

A. "They're here to do the two things I mentioned before: to be stationed at important places and add to the defense, and then to participate in battle in what we call combat support of the government forces when it becomes necessary. The details on how to do that are being worked out."

6 May 1965

Gen. DePuy-Saigon. Deputy Chief of Staff- Monthly News Briefing

C. I WOULD SAY THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR A JOINT MILITARY COMMAND WITH THE VIETNAMESE, AND I KNOW OF NO PLANS FOR SUCH A COMMAND. WHEN I SAY THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR IT, I SAY IT FOR THIS REASON. WE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT WE NOW HAVE MARINE AND ARMY GROUND FORCES IN THE COUNTRY, ARE STILL BASICALLY IN A POSITION OF SUPPORTING THE OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND ITS ARMED FORCES. I DON'T THINK THAT ANYBODY OUGHT TO FORGET THAT. WE STARTED OUT A LONG TIME AGO WITH A MAAG OVER

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

HERE WITH ADVISORS WHO TAUGHT PEOPLE HOW TO USE U.S. MATERIAL. THEN, AS THE VCC INTENSIFIED THE THING, WE GRADUALLY AND QUITE STEADILY HAVE FED IN HELICOPTERS, THEN FIGHTERS AND THEN EVENTUALLY, AS YOU KNOW BETTER THAN I, A STEADY BUILD UP IN COMBAT SUPPORT, INCLUDING MUCH HELP IN COMMUNICATIONS, LOGISTIC LIFT WITH AIRCRAFT, TROOP LIFT WITH HELICOPTERS, AND AIR SUPPORT NOW INCLUDING JETS. AND THE GROUND FORCES ARE HERE IN EXACTLY THAT SAME CONTEXT. THEREFORE, THE BASIC DECISIONS ARE TAKEN BY THE HIGH COMMAND AND THE GOVERNMENT, AND ALL OF THESE VARIOUS AMERICAN MILITARY ASSETS ARE PLACED IN POSITION AND UNDER GROUND RULES IN WHICH THEY SUPPORT THESE OPERATIONS, AS A MATTER OF FACT, AT A FAIRLY LOW LEVEL. THE MISSION, FOR EXAMPLE, OF THE MARINES AND THE AIRBORNE IS STATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY SUPPORT, REALLY, THE CORPS COMMANDER IN WHOSE AREA THEY'RE LOCATED. THE MARINES AT DA NANG HAVE A MISSION OF GIVING COMBAT SUPPORT TO GEN. THI, WHETHER IT BE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE AIRFIELD OR RELATED ACTIVITIES, AND IT'S THE SAME WAY WITH THE PARATROOPERS OVER AT BIEN HOA. THEY HAVE THE MISSION OF GIVING COMBAT SUPPORT TO GEN. VIEN. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT VERY WELL, AND SUPPORT IS A RESPECTABLE MILITARY TERM OF LONG STANDING. SO I DON'T SEE ANY REAL NEED FOR A HIPTNKJSZGQCGJ OR SO-CALLED COMBINED COMMAND AT THE MOMENT. IF A GREAT HUGE WAR WERE TO BREAK OUT, THEN I GUESS EVERYONE WILL TAKE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE THING. I WON'T GET INTO VERY MUCH DETAIL ON THIS ONE. I MEANT EXACTLY WHAT I SAID, THAT THEY'RE HERE TO RENDER COMBAT SUPPORT, WHICH INCLUDES, IF NECESSARY, FIGHTING.

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At noon today White House issued following statement re mission of US troops in Viet-Nam.

BEGIN TEXT: There has been no change in the mission of U.S. ground combat units in Viet-Nam in recent days or weeks. The President has issued no order of any kind in this respect to General Westmoreland recently or at any other time. The primary mission of these troops is to secure and safeguard important military installations like the air base at Danang. They have the associated mission of active patrolling and securing action in and near the areas thus safeguarded. If help is requested by appropriate Vietnamese commanders, General Westmoreland also has authority within the assigned mission to employ these troops in support of Vietnamese forces faced with aggressive attack when other effective reserves are not available and when, in his judgment, the general military situation urgently requires it. If General Westmoreland did not have this discretionary authority, a situation could easily arise in

Drafted by: FE/P:JONeill:jmv 6/9/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Mr. John W. Henderson
FE/P - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearances:

FE - Mr. Unger P - Mr. McCloskey

WH - Mr. Laitin (telephone)

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arise in which heavy loss of life might occur and great advantage might be won by Viet Cong because of delays in communications.

This discretionary authority does not change the primary mission of U.S. troops in Viet-Nam which has been approved by the President on the advice and recommendation of responsible authority. However, I would emphasize any such change of primary mission would obviously be a matter for decision in Washington. END TEXT.

END.

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We are considering here proposal to knock out IL-28's and SAM sites / through major single air strike including use of ~~SAC~~ SAC B-52's. We would like your personal reaction, in consultation with Westmoreland only, if he is available, concerning such a course of action.

Intelligence community estimates that such attack would cause DRV to believe future attacks on urban centers much more likely and that general US actions might be stepped up. However, conclusion is that Hanoi would as long as it believes it is winning in SVN accept punishment/and would not be led to make conciliatory gestures. Retaliatory VC raids and even possibly air strikes would be considered by Hanoi, but intelligence community does not believe DRV would react by overt invasion of SVN although it might step up VC support and increase DRV line units in SVN.

Estimate is that Chicoms would furnish additional support, which DRV would probably request, including additional fighter aircraft. Majority believe Chicoms would not engage in air combat over DRV from Chicom bases.

Drafted by: WPBundy/bmm 6/9/65 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary

DoD - Secy McNamara

S/S - Mr. Hilliker

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Authority FRUS, Vol II, #342
By [Signature], NARA, Date 4-4-84

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Page 2 of telegram to Saigon~~TOP SECRET~~

but minority thinks this probable. Soves would be put on major spot but would probably react initially by replacing most of destroyed equipment, though perhaps not IL-28's themselves at once. Soves would probably reach general conclusion they had little choice but to increase aid to DRV.

On other hand, intelligence community estimates that not attacking these targets might lead to Communist conclusion US, at least for time being, has accepted certain limitations and ground rules in bombing of DRV. Soves might take somewhat more rigid position though still hoping for negotiated settlement and Hanoi might conclude it could press war in south at no greater risk to key DRV areas. Intelligence community does not believe Soves would necessarily increase build-up of offensive weapons, although they might do so. Also conclude ^{it} that ~~there~~ is unlikely DRV now intends to use IL-28's in offensive operations with or without attack, although special circumstances might arise or Hanoi might conceivably try an individual raid with them.

Your comments should cover your general reaction and any comment you may have on above intelligence community estimates. I personally am not ~~GRXX~~ of course necessarily in agreement with the estimates but they ~~are~~ are part of the material I must use in reaching my personal judgment. Request reply to reach here morning June 10 if possible.

GP-3.

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GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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Authority OSS 10-11-78 letter June 10, 1965

By iq, NARS, Date 3-23-79

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE CYRUS R. VANCE

This memorandum is addressed to your question:

"Does the President have authority to commit troops, on the order of 18-32 combat battalions and 25 combat air squadrons, plus 50,000-60,000 men in logistic support units for use in supporting South Vietnam military forces in whatever way is necessary (including use as mobile reserve) to counter Viet Cong efforts to subvert the political institutions of South Vietnam?"

In the opinion of this office the President has complete authority to dispose the listed United States forces in any way necessary to counter Viet Cong efforts to subvert the political institutions of South Vietnam. The authority of the President to take such action rests upon the several powers conferred upon the President by the Constitution and by the specific power vested in him pursuant to Public Law 88-408 (commonly referred to as the Southeast Asia Resolution). The exercise of this power is consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and the obligations of the United States under the Southeast Asia collective defense treaty.

Historically, the issue of the President's authority to order the Armed Forces of the United States abroad in furtherance of its security interests has generally arisen in the context of a dispute as to whether such authority is dependent on Congressional authorization, particularly in those instances involving the Armed Forces in hostilities. Since the Constitution was adopted, there have been more than a hundred instances in which the President without Congressional authorization and in the absence of a declaration of war has ordered the Armed Forces to take action or maintain positions abroad. These instances range from the deployment of relatively small forces in the war against the Barbary Pirates in Jefferson's time, to the sending of substantial numbers of troops to Korea by President Truman in 1950. These instances are enumerated in two Congressional documents: H. Rep. No. 127, 82nd Cong., First Sess., pages 55-62; H. Doc. No. 443, 84th Cong., Sec. Sess., pages 1-14. These documents also contain excerpts from court decisions, and from statements of legal scholars and members of Congress, arguing the issue pro and con. A State Department memorandum of July 3, 1950,

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dealing with the Korean action, is set forth in full on pages 49-54 of H. Rep. No. 127 (supra). A later State Department memorandum of February 15, 1951, dealing with the question of sending troops to Europe under the NATO Treaty, appears at pages 66-72 of House Document No. 443 (supra).

At the present time, however, the question presented is not the narrow one of the powers of the President acting alone, but of the President acting pursuant to the umbrella of the combined powers of the Executive and Legislative Branches. Public Law 88-408 referred to above states that ". . . the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines to take all necessary steps, including the use of Armed Forces, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia collective defense treaty, requiring assistance in defense of its freedom." A copy of the full text of Public Law 88-408 is attached at Tab A. Also attached at Tab B are excerpts from the Senate debates on P. L. 88-408. These debates reveal quite clearly the understanding of both the proponents and opponents of the Southeast Asia Resolution that the Resolution grants to the President advance authority to take whatever action he may deem necessary regarding the South Vietnam and its defense. Illustrative of these debates is the following colloquy between Senator Cooper and Senator Fulbright:

Mr. Cooper. ". . . In other words, are we now giving the President advance authority to take whatever action he may deem necessary respecting South Vietnam and its defense, or with respect to the defense of any other country included in the treaty?"

Mr. Fulbright. "I think that is correct."

Mr. Cooper. "Then, looking ahead if the President decided that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will give that authority by this resolution?"

Mr. Fulbright. "That is the way I would interpret it. If a situation later developed in which we thought the approval should be withdrawn, it could be withdrawn by concurrent resolution. That is the reason for the third section."

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As pointed out by Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, at 635 (1952)

"When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."

Accordingly, since the Congress has acted in support and approval of the President's exercise of power as Commander in Chief, by the grant of authority "as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of the Armed Forces, to assist any -- protocol state --", the President has the clear authority to commit US Forces in whatever way is necessary to counter Viet Cong efforts to subvert the political institutions of South Vietnam.



L. Niederlehner
Acting General Counsel

Attachments
as stated

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Public Law 88-408
88th Congress, H. J. Res. 1145
August 10, 1964

Joint Resolution

78 STAT. 384.

To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. Southeast Asia.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. 59 Stat. 1031.
6 UST 81.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Approved August 10, 1964.

(over)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

HOUSE REPORT No. 1708 (Comm. on Foreign Affairs).
SENATE REPORT No. 1329 accompanying S. J. Res. 189 (Comm. on Foreign Relations).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 110 (1964):

- Aug. 6: Considered in Senate.
- Aug. 7: Considered and passed Senate, in lieu of S. J. Res. 189.
- Aug. 7: Considered and passed House.

STATE DEPT

To provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia

Whereas several units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the people of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these people should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way; Now, therefore, be it

Enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approve and support the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consistent with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Approved August 10, 1964.

(over)

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TAB
B

DEBATES ON P.L. 88-408
(S.E. ASIA RESOLUTION)

1964

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

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neighboring country without a declaration of war. It does not fit the pattern of the traditional way we think of war. It is, nevertheless, aggression—a modernized, specialized kind of aggression, brought to a high degree of perfection by the leader of the Chinese Communists, Mao Tse-tung, who established the basic theory of how to conduct this type of warfare.

It is difficult to adjust our concepts to warfare of this kind. I think it is just as savage and as much in violation of international good behavior and law as is an overt invasion by troops. I tried to make this point in my remarks. North Vietnam has been an aggressor against South Vietnam; and I do not think so merely because of the testimony in the past 2 or 3 days. Over several years, we have received testimony about what the North Vietnamese were doing in Laos and to a much higher degree in South Vietnam.

They had two major ways of approaching South Vietnam, one by sea, and one by ground. The sea approach was the easiest way to supply the Mekong delta. So we helped the South Vietnam Government try to interrupt the transfer of men and supplies to the Mekong delta. Junks were built up for that purpose. The boats that may have struck at the coastal areas of North Vietnam may have been supplied by us. We have been helping South Vietnam arm itself. I do not know about the specific boats.

I personally think this is a perfectly legitimate and proper way to defend oneself from the kind of aggression South Vietnam has been subjected to for many years.

Mr. McGOVERN. I am inclined to agree with the Senator. I did not want my remarks to be interpreted as prejudicing the case for aid—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am glad to try to clarify the situation. It is difficult and confusing.

Mr. McGOVERN. There have been references in the press to the effect that General Khanh was in political trouble and that one way he thought he could get out of it was to divert attention from failure in the conduct of the war in the south to some kind of strike in the north, presumably largely underwritten by the United States. It was because of my concern with that possibility that I raised these questions.

I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator has stated that in the last 2 or 3 days the committee has had some hearings. Can he tell us how long these ships of ours have been in that area?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. On patrol?

Mr. ELLENDER. On patrol, yes and at whose request?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have had patrol in the Tonkin Gulf for about 18 months.

Mr. ELLENDER. At whose request were these patrols made?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. These are international waters. Our assistance to South Vietnam is at the request of the

South Vietnamese Government. The particular measures we may take in connection with that request are our own responsibility. The particular ships on this particular patrol are there at our own decision.

Mr. ELLENDER. Are they part of the 7th Fleet, which protects Formosa?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. ELLENDER. The Senator says our ships have been in that area for a year and a half.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. ELLENDER. In the Gulf of Tonkin?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In the Gulf of Tonkin. I can be corrected on this by the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee. My recollection is that they have been in that particular area a year and a half.

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, elements of our fleet have been in this gulf periodically for about 1½ years.

Mr. ELLENDER. Why?

Mr. RUSSELL. These waters are the high seas. If in our general patrolling throughout the world and in the movements of our fleet on the high seas everywhere we saw fit to send our ships there. Certainly no foreign nation has a right to challenge our use of the high seas. We have a right to be there.

Mr. ELLENDER. Was any action taken by any of our ships to prevent the carrying of war materiel to the Mekong Delta?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator mean ships flying our flag and manned by our personnel?

Mr. ELLENDER. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is my understanding that that operation was conducted entirely by Vietnamese ships and personnel.

Mr. ELLENDER. Were we there to protect them?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; what happened here happened on patrol duty. As the Senator from Georgia has said, these ships were there in accordance with our responsibility and our rights in this general area. The ships were not assigned to protect anyone. They were conducting patrol duty. That question was asked specifically of the highest authority, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State.

They stated without equivocation that these ships, the *Maddox* and the *C. Turner Joy*, were not on convoy duty. They had no connection whatever with any Vietnamese ships that might have been operating in the same general area.

Mr. ELLENDER. Was their presence in the delta area at the request or suggestion of the South Vietnamese Government?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They were not in the delta area. Does the Senator mean in the Gulf of Tonkin area?

Mr. ELLENDER. I understood that this—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The delta area is north of the gulf area.

Mr. ELLENDER. I am trying to discover if our forces could have done anything which might have provoked these attacks. You say the ships were not

engaged in any activity near the Mekong Delta?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; where they were is hundreds of miles north of the delta area.

Mr. ELLENDER. The ships that were attacked?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. ELLENDER. The patrols carried out in the delta area were to give protection or confidence to the junks and patrol boats that were there to prevent the North Vietnamese from carrying materials of war to the South Vietnamese from carrying materials of war to the South Vietnamese. Is that correct?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was not the duty of the *Maddox* or the *C. Turner Joy*. They were on patrol duty in the Gulf of Tonkin—not near the Mekong Delta. They had nothing to do with the interruption of such traffic as may be carried on between North Vietnam and the delta. This duty was assigned to a fleet of junks and small craft of the South Vietnamese navy. That is still their function. They stop and examine thousands of people in order to identify them and see what they are up to. They have found a good many North Vietnamese who were coming down to carry on guerrilla warfare.

Mr. ELLENDER. Is the Senator satisfied from the evidence presented to the committee that our Armed Forces, that is, our naval forces, did nothing to invite the attack that was made in the last few days?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Nothing that they are not entitled to do. Their very presence in the Gulf of Tonkin could be said by someone to invite an attack, but they had every right to be there, and they were not shelling the coast or intervening in any of the legitimate operations of the Government of North Vietnam. In an area in which there is tension and in which there has been this very bloody kind of guerrilla warfare or irregular warfare, one might say, broadly speaking, that their presence could be a provocation. I do not think so. I do not believe that can be rightfully said. They had every legitimate right to be there.

Mr. ELLENDER. I do not question that fact at all. My question was directed to whether or not the evidence showed any act on our part which might have provoked this attack.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would say categorically that that was not shown. Whatever provocation there may have been arose, if it did arise, from the activity of the North Vietnamese ships.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I had the opportunity to see warfare not so very far from this area, and it was very mean. I would look with great dismay on a situation involving the landing of large land armies on the continent of Asia. So my question is whether there is anything in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it. I agree with the Senator

that that is the last thing we would want to do. However, the language of the resolution would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever the Commander in Chief feels is necessary. It does not restrain the Executive from doing it. Whether or not that should ever be done is a matter of wisdom under the circumstances that exist at the particular time it is contemplated. This kind of question should more properly be addressed to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. Speaking for my own committee, everyone I have heard has said that the last thing we want to do is to become involved in a land war in Asia; that our power is sea and air, and that this is what we hope will deter the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese from spreading the war. That is what is contemplated. The resolution does not prohibit that, or any other kind of activity.

Mr. BREWSTER. I thank the distinguished chairman.

Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MORTON. Mr. President, first I say to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas that I approve the action that has been taken, and I approve this resolution. On the matter which was the subject of the colloquy between the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, can we not associate our presence in the Gulf of Tonkin to a degree with our own interpretation of our obligations under the SEATO Treaty?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. I made mention of it. That is a further responsibility that we undertook in alining ourselves with other countries in trying to bring peace and stability into this area. That was another obligation which we undertook. It fortifies our right or responsibility for being in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Mr. MORTON. I believe the action taken by the President helps to avoid any miscalculation on the part of either the North Vietnamese or the Chinese Communists. I believe the joint resolution gives that policy further strength. In my opinion, the three major wars in which we have been involved in this century have come about by miscalculation on the part of the aggressor.

I believe Congress should speak loud and clear and make it plain to any would-be aggressor that we intend to stand here. If we make that clear, we will avoid war, and not have to land vast land armies on the shores of Asia. In that connection I share the apprehension of my friend the Senator from Maryland [Mr. Brewster].

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has put it very clearly. I interpret the joint resolution in the same way. This action is limited, but very sharp. It is the best action that I can think of to deter an escalation or enlargement of the war. If we did not take such action, it might spread further. If we went further, and ruthlessly bombed Hanoi and other places, we would be guilty of bad judgment, both on humanitarian grounds and on policy grounds, because then we

would certainly inspire further retaliation.

This situation has been handled in the best way possible under the circumstances, so as to calm the situation, and not escalate it into a major war.

Mr. MORTON. I thank the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I should like to add something to the answer that was given to the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Ellender]. In my opinion, the evidence is very clear that our Government did not design or manipulate a situation which would precipitate violence. The proof shows clearly that the commander of the *Maddox*, when the patrol boats were following it, called the commander of the *Ticonderoga* and informed him that the North Vietnamese patrol boats were following him and were indicating all the purposes of violence. It was not until the patrol boats fired upon the *Maddox* that the *Maddox* took any action. We waited; and no action was taken by our Government until the torpedoes were set into motion. Our ship turned seaward.

Second, the Island of Hainan is in the gulf. Chinese aircraft and military bases are on that island. Our ships were patrolling the gulf, surveying the activities that were going on in the gulf. My answer is that not to have been there would have been a disservice to our country. We were where we had a right to be. We did nothing to precipitate this unwarranted action. The action of violence was not on the part of our Government, but on the part of the North Vietnamese against us.

What were we to do? Were we to allow them to fire at us and take no action? The commander of the *Maddox*, when he contacted the commander of the *Ticonderoga*, acted with complete restraint and indicated no purpose of engaging in violence. Not until we were fired upon did we fire back.

Furthermore, to conclude that we developed a design to precipitate this violence is not supported by any testimony whatsoever. To make the pronouncement that we manipulated the situation, that we designed a set of circumstances that would give us an excuse to fire, is wholly unwarranted. Not one syllable of testimony supports that conclusion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator from Ohio allow me to answer questions? Then he may speak on his own time.

Mr. LAUSCHE. Just half a second more.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought the Senator wished to ask a question. But I have no objection to his concluding his statement.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I wanted to give my understanding of this very important, crucial aspect of the dispute. I repeat: There is not a single bit of testimony warranting the conclusion that we manipulated or designed the situation.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I was questioning the Senator from Arkansas merely to seek assurance that the evidence shows there was no possibility that our forces took any action, even acci-

dentally, which might have provoked an attack. Certainly I did not intend to intimate that the commanders of our ships were at fault, or that we were looking for an excuse to attack North Vietnam.

Mr. LAUSCHE. I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to make plain that our forces were not at fault in any way; that our ships had a perfect right to be in those waters, and that there is absolutely no evidence of any design or manipulation involved in the chain of events which took place. I did not wish to allow that impression to stand in the Record.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? I wish to ask a question.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I should like to yield the floor.

Mr. JAVITS. I wish to ask a question, and a rather serious one.

I shall support the resolution, because I think we must defend freedom in that area, or else see the balance of a large segment of the population of the world tipped against freedom. The degree of our resistance under the action that may be taken in southeast Asia, under the resolution, will determine not only future events in Vietnam, but also the freedom of Malaysia, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia, and perhaps even Australia and New Zealand.

My question is this: To the extent that the Senator may know—and be permitted to disclose—are we not implementing the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty? This treaty has eight countries who are parties to it including the United States—three in the area, the rest in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, and ourselves. The inclusion of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam is by protocol. That is, the protection of the treaty is extended to them, though they are not parties to it.

The question I address to the Senator is this: Are we to assume that the action which the President has taken with respect to reacting to the attack on American vessels is the result of a consultation with our allies who are parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty? If it is, what are we to assume with respect to the future progress of the action which we authorize under the resolution, which is admittedly a broad action? Is it that the President may take all necessary steps, including the use of Armed Forces, to assist any member or protocol state, which would include Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, that may request assistance in defense of its freedom?

What I wish to know from the Senator is, first: Have we consulted with our allies? Second, what are we to look to from our allies in the way of assistance, aid, comfort, partnership, and the future implementation of the resolution? It is one thing to stand alone; it is another thing to stand with seven other countries, three of them in the area, implementing a solemn commitment, which is just as binding on them as it is on us. I am sometimes inclined to agree with those who say that we cannot be the policeman or guardian of the whole

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. SCOTT. I support the resolution. I was glad to hear the chairman say that there is nothing in the resolution which limits the right of the President to repel any attack or prevent further aggression within the areas described in the resolution.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. SCOTT. That is one of the reasons I support the resolution. As I understand it, the question of so-called privilege sanctuaries has always been a question of how long such sanctuaries remain privileged if the security of the United States is menaced by vessels operating out of such privileged sanctuaries. I believe the President has quite properly and rightly announced that the United States is authorized and seeks approval of Congress to continue to act to defend the United States, even if it be against a so-called or hitherto described privileged sanctuary. Is that not correct?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is correct. The retaliatory action taken against the bases from which these ships came fits that description.

Mr. SCOTT. I do not have the experience that the distinguished Senator from Arkansas has. However, I have heard the President, in off-the-record discussions, refer to the pros and cons of privileged sanctuaries generally, with reference to a specific country.

I understand he is doing now what he was at any time prepared to do if in his judgment it was necessary to do it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was wise and proper to do it. It is difficult to generalize about these matters. I believe that under the circumstances which existed in this situation he was wise. The action was well calculated and designed to achieve his purpose. I hesitate to generalize too far, because the conditions under which these things are done must be understood. We should not ruthlessly attack a country under different circumstances, perhaps, than these. I have reference to the Greek rebellion. Senators will remember that we had forces there seeking to maintain the independence of Greece. The Communists had a sanctuary across the border. By persistence we finally brought the affair to a successful conclusion. When that border was closed, the rebellion stopped, and Greece went on its way quite successfully as an independent country. That is what we hope to bring about here.

Mr. SCOTT. I believe we all have confidence that the President was right under international law to do what he did, whether it be called hot pursuit or anything else, in order to protect this country.

Is it not a fact that our naval planes, in the course of reconnaissance along the Chinese mainland, have received—and is not classified information, and it has been published in the newspapers—numerous warnings and, in fact, a series of warnings, for having proceeded within the 12-mile zone, which, of course, we

do not recognize, but these warnings were based on our penetrating what the Communists call a 12-mile zone. That is nothing new. There have been a whole series of similar objections. However, we have been engaged in this process for the purpose of protecting the 7th Fleet and protecting our lines of communication and protecting our roles and missions and protecting the security of the United States.

Our vessels had every right to be where they were within the 12-mile limit and without the 3-mile limit. That is what I understood the Senator to have said.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I said it so happens—I say this to keep the record straight—that the actual attack, according to my information, took place far beyond the 12-mile limit. The first attack was approximately 25 miles out, and the second was about 60 miles.

Mr. RUSSELL. I believe it was 30 and 60 miles.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. RUSSELL. I might add that our vessels has turned away from the South Vietnam shore and were making for the middle of the gulf, where there could be no question, at the time they were attacked.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. At the time of the first attack they were steaming away from the shoreline. The second attack came at night. The first one was in the daytime. Our ships were not within the 12-mile limit, so called, at the time of the attack. I have stated that from time to time we did go deliberately within the 12-mile limit simply to emphasize our nonrecognition of the 12-mile limit, or, to put it another way, to establish and reaffirm our right to go there.

Mr. SCOTT. That clarifies the situation. I am glad the President has acted. The action was very much indicated. I believe it helps to make our Nation more secure. I intend to support the resolution.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for two questions?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. COOPER. I know the Senator has been on his feet for a long time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is not that. The Senator from Georgia would like to say something.

Mr. RUSSELL. My remarks will be very brief.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am perfectly willing to continue. I believe the Senator from Georgia should have an opportunity to say something.

Mr. COOPER. I thank the Senator. I ask these questions for two reasons: One is to get the opinion of the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee as to the extent of the powers that are given to the President under the resolution. The second is to distinguish between a situation in which we act in defense of our own forces, in which without question we would risk war, and the commitment to defend South Vietnam.

My first question goes to the first section of the resolution—the operative part which, as the chairman has said, applies

to any armed attack or any aggression directed against the forces of the United States.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. COOPER. In that case, of course, we confirm the power that the President now has to defend our forces against an immediate attack.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is a very distinguished lawyer, and I therefore hesitate to engage in a discussion with him on the separation of powers and the powers of the President. We are not giving to the President any powers he has under the Constitution as Commander in Chief. We are in effect approving of his use of the powers that he has. That is the way I feel about it.

Mr. COOPER. I understand that, too. In the first section we are confirming the powers.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We are approving them. I do not know that we give him anything that he does not already have. Perhaps we are quibbling over words.

Mr. COOPER. We support and approve his judgment.

Mr. RUSSELL. Approve and support.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Approve and support the use he has made of his powers.

Mr. COOPER. The second section of the resolution goes, as the Senator said, to steps the President might take concerning the parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the countries under the protocol—which are, of course, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. The Senator will remember that the SEATO Treaty, in article IV, provides that in the event an armed attack is made upon a party to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or upon one of the protocol states such as South Vietnam, the parties to the treaty, one of whom is the United States, would then take such action as might be appropriate, after resorting to their constitutional processes. I assume that would mean, in the case of the United States, that Congress would be asked to grant the authority to act.

Does the Senator consider that in enacting this resolution we are satisfying that requirement of article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty? In other words, are we now giving the President advance authority to take whatever action he may deem necessary respecting South Vietnam and its defense, or with respect to the defense of any other country included in the treaty?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is correct.

Mr. COOPER. Then looking ahead if the President decided that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will give that authority by this resolution?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is the way I would interpret it. If a situation later developed in which we thought the approval should be withdrawn, it could be withdrawn by concurrent resolution. That is the reason for the third section.

Mr. COOPER. I ask these questions—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is properly asking these questions.

**COMMEMORATION OF FORMER
PRESIDENT HOOVER'S 90TH
BIRTHDAY**

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an attested copy of Senate Joint Resolution 184, for the commemoration of the Honorable Herbert Hoover's 90th birthday, August 10, 1964, approved by the President of the United States on August 6, 1964, may be prepared and printed in such appropriate format and binding as the Joint Committee on Printing may direct, and that it be transmitted to the former President by the Secretary of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

**MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTH-
EAST ASIA**

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 189) to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

VICTORY AND PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, whatever the reasons may be for some Senators opposing either the language or the purpose of the resolution before the Senate, I am sure that there can be no disagreement on one point—that party lines cease to exist on issues affecting the national security of the United States and of the free world. I rise to lend my wholehearted support to this resolution. I was heartened by the decision to strike against the naval bases from which the unprovoked attacks on our naval ships were launched. At long last perhaps here is the beginning of the initiative that has been totally lacking in our southeast Asian effort, for it is our purpose not only to "assist in defense," as the resolution states, but to assist in achieving victory against an avaricious enemy bent upon the total conquest of all of southeast Asia.

Mr. President, I support this resolution because in Vietnam there is a crisis in which politics has no part. But, let me say that I sincerely hope that the next time Soviet missiles are implanted in Cuba or the next time Cuban exiles attempt to exercise their rightful prerogatives in fighting for the freedom of what was once known as the Pearl of the Antilles the United States will act with spontaneity, enthusiasm, and force comparable to what we have done in Vietnam.

It is tragic that a response as dramatic as our destruction of naval bases upon the territory of a sovereign Asian state was not executed in our own hemisphere in October of 1962 or even earlier—in April of 1961, when we responded then with arms as well as metaphors, we could have struck a significant blow for freedom and independence in our own hemisphere.

I support wholeheartedly the military action of this Government against the North Vietnamese naval bases, and I support this resolution in the sincere and reverent hope that it indicates an end

of our policies of indecision, vacillation, and compromise, and heralds the beginning of that measure of commitment which will forge victory from the Communist-fomented chaos of southeast Asia.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I support the pending resolution.

Not only is it important to stand behind our President in this time of tension, when unity is above partisan debate, but I have confidence in President Johnson's prudence and in his determination to avoid any unnecessary widening or escalation of military clashes.

I have full confidence that the President with his wide experience and his intimate knowledge today of the facts of this situation will even further strengthen our efforts toward peace as he seeks to avoid any weakening of our position and purpose.

Still, let us think ahead as we support this resolution. Ho Chi Minh's action cannot have been by error or accident. Therefore, let us practice prudence and play our hand with reason and calmness. If we over-respond, we can, by destroying installations considered vital by Communist China to her national interest, induce an outpouring of Red Chinese soldiers as happened in Korea.

In the days and weeks ahead, this current crisis may—and probably will—worsen. Let us act—and wisely. And, let us resolve here and now, today, in wisdom, and for the sake of our people and Nation, to keep this issue removed from the arena of political conflict and ambition. Rather, let us support this issue in the reasoning place of men's minds which we have helped establish for this purpose—the United Nations.

I would hope, too, that other freedom-loving Asian nations, particularly Pakistan, the Philippines, and Japan, might help us carry some of the burdens for keeping the peace in the Far East. It is also their responsibility to participate in this endeavor, which is vital to their safety and security as well. It is my hope that such a sharing of the load may also emerge from the United Nations Security Council.

This country's policy cannot, and must not, be pummeled for the sake of political gain. As an American, I urge leaders of both political parties to exert every effort to keep Vietnam out of this campaign.

I trust the people and press of the world will be aware that as the world's strongest nation and defender of freedom, we will not stand for unprovoked attack or aggression, but at the same time be aware we do not seek material or territorial gain. We only desire freedom, for ourselves, and for peoples of other nations.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator withdraw that request?

Mr. MORSE. I shall withdraw it on the condition that the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] asks for a quorum call at the close of his remarks, unless I am back on the floor.

Mr. COOPER. That is agreeable.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I withdraw the request for a quorum call.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I appreciate the courtesy of the Senator from Oregon.

A few moments ago I directed several questions to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I spoke briefly on the joint resolution. I wish now to raise some considerations which I know have addressed themselves to the President of the United States, but which we have the duty, in this debate, to convey to the President of the United States.

I intend to vote for the joint resolution. I shall vote for it not merely because we are required to do so because of recent events. I shall vote for it because it expresses the unity of one purpose to defend our country.

The first section of the resolution supports the President and approves his determination to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression. That is his right and authority. If we have any power to confirm it, we do confirm it. We support him in his power to protect the security of our country and its honor. I join other Senators wholeheartedly in asserting our support of the President.

Earlier, I raised questions about the second section of the joint resolution, although I know it is practically impossible to separate the objectives of the first section from those of the second section. In response to my questions, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], and I believe, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], confirmed my viewpoint that in passing this joint resolution we would satisfy the conditions of the SEATO treaty, and would exercise our constitutional function to give the President of the United States authority to do what he determines may be proper and necessary with respect to any situation which affects our security in South Vietnam.

I believe that is the essence of the second section. At least that was the meaning and interpretation given to it by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

There is no choice so far as the first section of the joint resolution is concerned. If there is any attack upon our troops, our vessels, or our installations, we have the duty, for our security and our honor, to defend our own forces.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. COOPER. I am glad to yield.

Mr. MORSE. I am not sure I understand the meaning of the Senator's comment on the SEATO treaty. Is the Senator arguing that the SEATO treaty gives us the authority to do what we have done in South Vietnam?

Mr. COOPER. No. What I said is that article IV of the SEATO treaty provides that in the event of an armed attack upon one of the parties to the SEATO treaty, or upon the countries such as South Vietnam included in the protocol, the United States, or any party

to the treaty, could take action after resorting to its constitutional processes—which I would assume would mean coming to the Congress for authority.

Earlier today I asked the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the chairman of the Armed Services Committee whether they considered that, by enacting the resolution, the Congress would be exercising its constitutional process, providing to the President power to take such action as he determined proper in South Vietnam in the future?

Mr. MORSE. I shall not interrupt the Senator further. I shall discuss the point in detail later. I only wish the Senator to know that, in my opinion, we have violated the United Nations Charter time and time again in South Vietnam, and that we cannot justify it on the basis of carrying out the SEATO treaty.

Mr. COOPER. A few minutes ago, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] said that the situation is not simple. We are in a crisis.

I hope that this joint resolution, connected with the resolute action the President has taken, will have effect in bringing the North Vietnamese and the Communist Chinese to their senses, and that they will know that to continue to take aggressive measures could lead to consequences which can hardly be contemplated. And we must know for ourselves the extent of the determinations we are making. Whether we dislike saying it—and there is a tendency to dislike making the statement—it must be said that there is great danger in the situation. The two attacks upon our destroyers indicate a system in the action of North Vietnam or the Communist Chinese.

We remember that, during the early days of the Korean war, the threats of Communist China were not believed—but they were carried out. We must contemplate, hoping that it will not be true, the possibility of an expanded war. And with an expanded war, which again we hope will not occur, there is the possibility of a great war.

I make this statement because the President has, with respect to our action in South Vietnam, a certain maneuverability, and avenues of negotiation which should be assiduously used, however they may be received.

I have confidence in President Johnson. I know that he is a man of good judgment. I know that he speaks truly when he says it is not our intention to expand the war except as it would be in our own defense. And I know that he is a man of peace. But I hope very much that he will continue to make every effort to find, if it is possible, some solution for the situation in South Vietnam, without the choice of war.

I may not be joined by others in the statement I am about to make, but I have not believed that southeast Asia is the chief area of interest to the United States. We are committed in Europe and believe our chief interest is in the Western Hemisphere and Europe. In the Pacific we are committed to the defense of Formosa, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. I do not know how widely we

can spread our resources and our men in the military forces. It may be argued that this decision has been made, because for 10 years we have been on the present course, in South Vietnam. But I shall still emphasize my hope that the President of the United States will use all of the great powers of his office and of our country to find some peaceful and just solution in South Vietnam, slender as the chance may be.

The Senator from Oregon has argued the subject for months; I have spoken on it. There is still the possibility of reference to the United Nations. There is still the possibility of action through the Geneva powers; and these courses must not be overlooked.

Like many other Senators, I have had some experience in war, an experience which I value above all others. Anyone who has had such experience knows, awesome as it is, that it does not make one less afraid or less courageous. It makes one determined to protect the security and honor of his country. But it makes one also more determined and more thoughtful about seeking out every honorable and just course to avoid the possibility of a great war, and the awful eventuality of a nuclear war with all the sorrow and disaster it would bring to our country and humanity.

I am hopeful that the joint resolution and the President's action will bring reason to the North Vietnamese and the Communist Chinese, and that they will cease their aggressions. But I state my conviction that the President and the Congress have the responsibility to continue to work for ways, consonant with our honor and security, to avoid the great catastrophe of war. If we cannot do so, we stand together to defend, at whatever cost, our country and freedom.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I should like to support the position just enunciated, with his usual heart and humanity, as well as wisdom, by my colleague from Kentucky. I rise not necessarily because he needs any support. His word is strong enough in this Chamber and in the world. I rise only because the discussion ties in so closely with the questioning of the Senator from Arkansas on the real meaning and implication of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. We who support the joint resolution do so with full knowledge of its seriousness and with the understanding that we are voting a resolution which means life or the loss of it for who knows how many hundreds or thousands? Who knows what destruction and despair this action may bring in the name of freedom? I hope we shall be very sober in our judgment, as befits the great historic tradition of this body.

We have a right to expect from the President of the United States, who will receive this great grant of confidence, which I am sure the Senate will give by an overwhelming vote, and from the Foreign Relations Committee, which has direct charge of these matters in this body, as vigorous a diplomatic effort as we are authorizing in the other field. We have every right to believe that the nations in the SEATO treaty have interests in this region as great as ours. They may

not be able to muster the military power we can, but they certainly can muster some help which will give them a sense of participation. We know they can muster great moral strength. There is a great population in that area. Pakistan has a population of more than 100 million. India, though in dire trouble, is still the counterweight to Communist China. She has a profound interest in what happens in that area. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have considerable influence. All those strengths must be mustered, in a physical and moral sense. The same is true of France, Great Britain, and others.

I thoroughly agree with the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MOSE] as to the moral strength—although I do not agree with him as to what we have to do in this situation—that must be mustered by the United States, constantly and continuously, to appeal to the conscience of the world, in order to give the world an opportunity to bring about a sense of justice and morality, and an opportunity to act in its own freedom.

In fundamental aspect, the prize that the Chinese Communists are seeking is the possession of the great arsenal of production in Asia, including Japan. The aim of Communist China in respect of Japan is parallel to that which the Soviet Union, in its worst Stalinist days, had toward Germany. They seek a ready-made arsenal in order to develop it quickly—

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Will he repeat what he just said? I think it is important.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator. The objective of the Chinese Communists is the great arsenal of production which is Japan, just as the objective of the Soviet Union in its Stalinist days—and probably still is—was the great arsenal of production which was Germany. They are the main bases which the Communists are seeking to capture.

We must understand the deep feeling of every American and every American family on this question. I have already received in my office, as I am sure all other Senators have, numerous telegrams since yesterday on this subject. I was awakened three times between 12 o'clock and 3 in the morning—and I do not complain; I understand the feelings of the families involved—by people in New York telling me how deeply concerned they were and with what prayer and devotion I must determine how to act on the joint resolution.

For those people we have a pledge to use every instrument of diplomacy, as we are willing to use every element of force, necessary to preserve freedom.

We have also another pledge. The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] said it was expected that these means should be used with the greatest moderation and understanding of the vital issue with which we are dealing.

Also, and finally, we have the sad duty which generals have in war, of comparing the number of casualties we are willing to endure in order to achieve an objective which will save even greater casualties. Does anyone think that President Truman had an easy decision

fense Treaty in the protection of their freedom as a contribution to international peace. It pledges military action only to resist aggression against American forces in that area. Of course, the President has authority to respond to attacks upon American forces without any approval in advance by Congress. So the resolution means only a recommitment of the Nation to the policy it has been following—an almost unanimous recommitment in the face of the inexplicable North Vietnamese challenge.

This means of reasserting the national will, far short of a declaration of war, follows sound precedents set in other crises. President Johnson noted in his message to Congress that similar resolutions had been passed at the request of President Eisenhower in connection with the threat to Formosa in 1955 and the threat to the Middle East in 1957. The same course was followed in 1962 at the request of President Kennedy to meet the missile threat in Cuba. None of these emergencies led to war. Rather, the firm action that this country took interrupted Communist maneuvers that might otherwise have led to war.

Congress ought to be very pleased with the now firm establishment of this mechanism for meeting an emergency with a united front. Reliance solely upon the power of Congress to declare war as a last resort would not be appropriate in these days of repeated crises short of war. A resolution of support for the executive arm in meeting an emergency has all the virtue of rallying national strength behind a firm policy—without taking the calamitous step of war in this nuclear age. We surmise that the almost unanimous sentiment behind this resolution on Capitol Hill reflects appreciation for the President's sharing of responsibility as well as support for the tough punishment for aggression that he initiated.

Mr. MORSE. The Washington Post has demonstrated in editorial after editorial that it does not have a good constitutional lawyer on its editorial staff. The editorials published in the newspaper demonstrated that fact constantly. In an editorial which appeared in this morning's issue of the newspaper there appears the following statement:

There is no substance in Senator Morse's charge that the resolution amounts to a "predated declaration of war."

One wonders whether or not the editorial writer has ever read the joint resolution. No one can read the joint resolution and the authority proposed to be given the President in the joint resolution without recognizing that it would clearly authorize the President to proceed to follow whatever courses of action are necessary in his opinion; and such action would constitute authority to conduct war.

I should like to make an additional comment on a statement in the editorial in reference to resolutions passed by previous Congresses. In the body of the editorial the statement is made:

President Johnson noted in his message to Congress that similar resolutions had been passed at the request of President Eisenhower in connection with the threat to Formosa in 1955 and the threat to the Middle East in 1957. The same course was followed in 1962 at the request of President Kennedy to meet the missile threat in Cuba.

The editorial writer apparently had not read, or certainly had not read recently before he wrote that editorial, the Cuban resolution, for there is no simi-

larity between the Cuban resolution on the one hand and the Formosa, the Middle East, and the pending resolutions on the other hand.

But returning to the comment of the Washington Post that there is no substance in Senator Morse's charge that the resolution amounts to a "predated declaration of war," I should like to read for the benefit of that unlightened editorial writer of the Washington Post page 2 of the joint resolution:

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President—

Not the Congress, but of the President—

as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

The joint resolution thus gives the President warmaking power.

I shall come to another section of the resolution same item in a moment. The Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, has the inherent constitutional power immediately to defend the United States in case of an attack, but he does not have the inherent power after that immediate defense to proceed to make war. That is the distinction which this unlightened editorial writer of the Washington Post has never grasped.

Mr. President, the right of immediate defense is something quite different from the right to proceed to lay out a campaign of war. Under the joint resolution the President would be given the authority to go beyond immediate self-defense of the United States and proceed with a war campaign. That is why I say today, as I said in 1955, and as I said at the time of the Middle East resolution, that such resolutions constitute a predated declaration of war. The Washington Post editorial writers ought to consult with Senators who occupy high positions in the Senate on the other side of the issue in connection with the defense activities of the country. They might be surprised to learn that they are not quarreling with the Senator from Oregon in regard to the effect of the joint resolution. The joint resolution does propose to give to the President of the United States authority beyond the inherent authority that he already possesses to act immediately in national self-defense.

Mr. President, that is a very important distinction in constitutional law. The Senator from Oregon repeats that, under the Constitution, the President has no power to wage war until a declaration of war is passed by the Congress. The joint resolution is a contravention of article I, section 8, of the Constitution, just as the Formosa resolution and the Middle East resolution were contraventions of the Constitution and caused the senior Senator from Oregon in the debate on those two resolutions to take a stand in opposition. As one of the Armed Services Committee leaders of the Senate told me this morning,

"Wayne, there is no difference between the position that you are taking today and the position that you have taken consistently with regard to the other resolutions. No one can really quarrel with your conclusion that the joint resolution does go beyond the inherent authority of the President to act in the self-defense of our country and does vest in him authority to proceed to carry out a campaign that amounts in fact to the waging of war."

Mr. President, I do not believe we should do it. It is not necessary to do it. There is inherent power in the President as Commander in Chief under the Constitution to meet an attack immediately, and then come to the Congress of the United States asking for a declaration of war. We should require those steps, rather than give the President blanket authority under the joint resolution to proceed to wage war without a declaration of war.

Ah, but it may be said, and is said, by some in conversations with me, "But, WAYNE, a President would not do that for very long."

I do not care whether he does it for a short time or a long time. It is not necessary for him to do it, so long as he has the inherent authority to meet attack with immediate self-defense actions.

As I said in 1955, I believe it is important in these trying times that we not extend and expand the authority of the President of the United States beyond the limits of the Constitution.

It may be said that if the President should commit an unconstitutional act under the joint resolution, or if the joint resolution in effect, as argued by the Senator from Oregon, is an attempt to give to the President an unconstitutional power, he can be checked. I wish I could say that he could be. The difficulty in relation to these constitutional questions as they involve the Presidency of the United States is that we do not have a procedure for having them tested in the U.S. Supreme Court. That has been the subject of great discussion, concern, and debate among constitutional lawyers for many decades. It is difficult to bring the President of the United States before the U.S. Supreme Court. Our constitutional fathers provided for other procedural checks upon the President of the United States, one of which is impeachment, which, of course, is unthinkable when we have a President who seeks only in the exercise of his powers—though he may be mistaken in regard to having exceeded an inherent power—to protect the interest of the United States. But that is a check that is provided in the Constitution. Then, of course, we check the President in regard to the purse strings by way of appropriations.

We have the authority, of course, to check the President by way of appropriations, with his ancillary check on Congress of the veto. It is not impossible to eventually get a case before the Supreme Court involving the warmaking powers of the President, but the legal road could be long and tortuous. The time con-

sumed would make the question moot by the time it was decided as far as the emergency is concerned will give rise to the issue in the first instance.

When Congress passes a joint resolution such as this, it is practically impossible—in fact, I think it impracticable—procedurally to have the power checked, on constitutional grounds, before the U.S. Supreme Court. I do not know, and I know of no constitutional lawyer who has ever been able to point out, a procedure by which we could bring the President before the Court on the charge that he was making war unconstitutionally. I can hear the Court, in refusing jurisdiction, say, "Congress will have to follow the procedures set out in the Constitution for checking the President."

So I am concerned about the resolution in respect to its giving to the President what I honestly and sincerely believe is an unconstitutional power—that is, the power to make war without a declaration of war. It feeds a political trend in this country that needs to be checked. For some time past in this Republic we have been moving in the direction of a government by executive supremacy.

It is very interesting to listen to the arguments that one hears for extending and expanding the power of the White House. It is extremely important—and I speak soberly and out of a depth of great sincerity—that we never grant a single power to any President, I care not who he is, that in any way cannot be reconciled with that precious fundamental foundation of our Republic; namely, a system of three coordinate and coequal branches of Government.

It is dangerous to the freedoms and liberties of the American people to vest in any President, at any time, under any circumstances, power that exceeds the constitutional concept of three coordinate and coequal branches of Government.

The American people will quickly lose their liberty if you do not stop feeding the trend toward Government by executive supremacy. In my opinion, the joint resolution would do just exactly that. It would give to the President of the United States an authority which, in my judgment, he does not need, by any stretch of the imagination. He has inherent power to react, in the self-defense of this Republic, in the event of an immediate attack.

It is particularly essential that we continue to require a President of the United States to conform to article I, section 8, of the Constitution, in regard to making war, and that we continue to hold any President—I care not who he is—under the strictest restraint with regard to the making of war.

We have entered an era of civilization in which an unconstitutional act of war on the part of a President of the United States can lead to nuclear war and the end of this Republic, no matter how sincere a President may be in his intentions in respect to exercising the power to make war.

We need to be on guard in respect to vesting power in the White House. The White House has plenty of power under

the Constitution. I am for giving the White House no more power than the Constitution gives him.

I have heard sincere colleagues on the floor of the Senate—and I respect them—differ with me in regard to the effect of the joint resolution. There are also colleagues on the other side of the issue who have come to me and said, as did one who discussed it with me this morning, "Wayne, there is no doubt as to the effect of the resolution that you are pointing out, and that you pointed out in 1955. It bothered me in 1955; but we have every reason to count on the fact that the President of the United States will not abuse the power."

Mr. President, I do not think he would deliberately abuse the power, but he could most sincerely exercise the power in a manner that would result in great damage to this Republic.

There is an elementary rule of law which states that when we come to deal with procedural matters, if a procedure is subject to abuse we had better change the procedure.

My majority leader, who always is courteous to me and was exceedingly courteous to me in arranging the format for this debate, has heard me say many times as we have served together in this body that we should never forget that our substantive rights are never any better, and can never be any better, than our procedural rights. Our procedural rights determine our substantive rights. There are no substantive rights unless there are procedures for implementing them.

I have said many times—and the statement should be applied to this issue, because it is applicable—let me determine the procedure of any human institution or the administration of any law, and I will determine all the substantive rights anyone may have under that law, that tribunal, or that administrative body. Let me determine the procedure of any courtroom, and I will determine all the substantive rights that can be adjudicated in that courtroom."

Although some critics will say that this principle involves a legalistic abstraction, nevertheless the great principles of so-called legalistic abstraction are principles that determine, in the last analysis, whether one remains a free man or not. This is true because the procedures of our Government written into the Constitution and the laws of our country determine our substantive rights as freemen.

In my judgment, the pending joint resolution tinkers with and impairs the great procedural rights of the American people written in article I, section 8 of the Constitution—namely, that the power and the right to declare war is vested in the Congress, and not in the President of the United States.

War cannot be declared speculatively; war cannot be declared in futuro under article I, section 8 of the Constitution. War cannot be declared to meet hypothetical situations yet to arise on the horizons of the world. War is declared in relation to existing operative facts of the moment of the call for a declaration of war.

In the resolution before the Senate—and I shall read the section to which I have referred and another section momentarily—the President of the United States would be given power to make war in relation to operative facts not now in existence, but which may come into existence in futuro. That cannot be reconciled with article I, section 8 of the Constitution.

For the education of the unenlightened editor of the Washington Post who wrote the ignorant editorial in respect to this constitutional point, I hope he will reread article I, section 8 of the Constitution, and that he will read again—assuming that he ever read the resolution before he wrote the editorial—the section to which I have referred and read, and which I repeat. That part of the joint resolution reads:

The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Let us analyze that sentence for a moment. Let us analyze that part of the sentence that deals with the inherent power of any commander in chief, any President, to react immediately in the defense of this Republic. That part of the sentence is not needed. He has that power now. If there is to be read into that part of the sentence which starts on line 4—"to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States"—authority to commit an act of aggression, preventive in nature, it goes beyond the Constitution.

That was my argument in 1955. How well I remember it. In 1955 I participated in the same format of committee organization in which I took part yesterday; namely, a joint meeting of the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee. I opposed the Formosa resolution. My recollection is that in committee in 1955 two of us took that position. When we came to the floor of the Senate, my recollection is that I was supported by a third member, as I said last night, the great Senator from New York, Herbert Lehman; and I believe we ended in 1955 with three Senators voting against the resolution. As I remember my opening speech in 1955—and the Record will speak for itself—I said, as I say now, that I was standing in a position on the floor of the Senate in which a few other liberals had stood throughout the history of this great parliamentary body. Like them I was confronted with the choice of telling the American people what I was satisfied they were entitled to know about their foreign policy, and run the risk of violating the rules of secrecy of the Senate, thereby risking the discipline of the Senate, or failing in my obligation to tell the American people things that I thought they were entitled to know in regard to the foreign policy of the country and avoid running the risk of being disciplined by the Senate.

If Senators will read that speech they will see that I said I thought I could give the American people what they should

That is when we say to the President, "You can go beyond acts of immediate self-defense of the Republic. You do not have to come to the Congress, as Franklin Roosevelt did after Pearl Harbor, and ask for a declaration of war. You can proceed in the exercise of your judgment to prevent further aggression."

The uninformed, unenlightened editor of the Washington Post who wrote that stupid editorial in this morning's paper has not the slightest conception of the meaning of those words. If he had, he would not have written in his editorial:

There is no substance in Senator Morse's charge that the resolution amounts to a "predated declaration of war."

That is exactly what those words mean. It is incontrovertible. The President would not have to come and ask for a declaration of war. He would be given sanction by Congress to make war without a declaration of war. It will be noted that I do not say "the authority," for the authority cannot be granted by Congress. Congress cannot amend the Constitution in this way. This does not conform to the amendment processes of the Constitution. It is proposed that Congress sanction the action of the President in making war if, in his judgment, he thinks making war is necessary to prevent further aggression. I shall come to that point later. But that is why I said last night that so many want to turn away from the most delicate question involved in the debate.

That is why I said last night—and shall discuss it at greater length today—that the President and our country were quite right in meeting the attack on the destroyers last Tuesday night. But, in my judgment, that did not empower him, under the right of self-defense, to try to proceed beyond protecting those ships, and strike the mainland of North Vietnam. In my judgment, that constituted an act of war—not an act of self-defense.

Mr. President, at that point, under our treaty commitments, our allegations in regard to the absolutely inexcusable and illegal attack on our ships on the high seas by the North Vietnamese forces should have been taken immediately to the United Nations. As to that attack we had an unassailable case. They attacked us on the high seas and we responded in self-defense.

We were clearly within our international law rights. Unfortunately we did not stop there. We then went beyond our rights of self-defense and proceeded to bomb the mainland of North Vietnam.

We either support a rule of law procedure or we ignore it. We ignored it. We had an irrefutable case of violation of international law by North Vietnam in connection with their attack on our ships. We would have a hard time, under international law, supporting our subsequent attack on North Vietnam in the absence of a declaration of war. There will be those who will say that that is uttering the line pretty fine. Nevertheless, the difference is between acting within the Constitution and acting outside of it. It is the difference between staying within our rights of self-defense

and proceeding to turn ourselves into an aggressive warmaking power.

No one despises, hates, and repudiates more than does the senior Senator from Oregon, communism, Communist regimes, including North Vietnam, Red China, Cuba, Red Russia, and all of the rest. But I do not propose to allow my hatred, my detestation, my complete disgust with the police state methods of a Communist regime to cause me to give support to a proposal to go outside the constitutional guarantees of our system of government. I want to keep my Government in an impregnable position, so that we can go before any international tribunal and establish our case, and not have thrown back in our teeth a showing to establish a series of allegations in regard to the exercise of power and military might on the part of the United States that takes us outside the framework of international law.

There is no doubt that the language, "to prevent further aggression," rouses all the objections that I made in 1955 to the Formosa resolution. This proposal seeks to vest in the President of the United States the power to carry on a so-called preventive war. By preventive war, we mean making a war against another country because it is assumed that that country is about to make war, or contemplates making war, against the United States. Such authority is not to be found in the Constitution. The Congress cannot give such authority to the President of the United States as far as the Constitution is concerned. It can sanction the exercise of the authority, but the exercise of the authority would still be just as much outside the Constitution as though the President acted without the joint resolution. The joint resolution could never make legal the exercise of such authority by the President of the United States.

That is not the only place in the resolution in which we would give to the President a preventive war authority. I refer the Senate to section 2, line 7, which provides—

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution—

It has been agreed, by way of an amendment to the joint resolution, that that means the Constitution of the United States—

and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Mr. President, that is an awful power to give to a President. If the Washington Post does not think that that is a predated declaration of war, the editor ought to start asking himself some questions about certain hypothetical situations.

Shall we allow any President of the United States to decide, with no check—that is, no check for immediate applica-

tion—to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom?

We had better pause long enough to take a look at the nature of some of the countries involved, because many of the countries are not free countries. Many of those countries are totalitarian countries. Many of those countries are dictatorships. It is wishful thinking to assume that it would be safe to give the President of the United States unchecked authority to proceed to use American boys in defense of those countries on the basis of claims that acts of aggression are being committed against them by some other country, without a congressional check. Have we reached the point in American foreign policy where we are going to permit the President to send American boys to their death in the defense of military dictatorships, monarchies, and fascist regimes around the world with which we have entered into treaty obligations involving mutual security, no matter what the provocation and no matter what wrongs they may have committed that cause an attack upon them? Are we going to do that without a check of Congress by way of a declaration of war? What are we thinking of? What time factor would justify such precipitate action?

Mr. President, this Senator will never vote to send an American boy to his death anywhere in the world under any such language as is contained in that part of the joint resolution. It is of utmost importance that we surround that language with a congressional check. And there is none.

One could say, as I said a few moments ago, "But, Mr. Senator, the Congress can terminate this authority by a concurrent resolution."

I have already pointed out the kind of hassle that such a situation would create, and the kind of disunity that such action would produce. The American people should be protected from a possible abuse of the authority. So long as abuse of a procedure is possible, the procedure should be modified to prevent the possibility of the abuse.

Mr. President, that is why it is so important that we hold any President—I care not who he is—to Article I, section 8, of the Constitution in the carrying out of mutual security agreements. We should hold him to the approval of the Congress before the fact and not after the fact.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. I wish the Senator would discuss what seems to me the obvious escalation of the war by the authority granted in section 2 of the joint resolution—

To assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

Mr. MORSE. I was about to do so.

Mr. GRUENING. Hitherto we have been dealing wholly with South Vietnam.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 5 minutes of the Senator from Wisconsin have expired.

Mr. NELSON. I ask the Senator from Oregon to yield me some time.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I am willing to make a deal with the Senator from Arkansas. If I yield the Senator 4 minutes, will the Senator from Arkansas yield him some time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have only 7 minutes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. All the time for the quorum calls came out of our time.

Mr. MORSE. I did not ask that it come out of the time on the other side. I did not ask for any quorum call. I am willing to enter into a unanimous-consent agreement that the time taken for the quorum calls be not counted.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Perhaps we should find out how the timekeeper can change the record.

Mr. MORSE. I specifically said I would reserve time to yield to the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Is it the understanding of the Chair that the last hour was to be equally divided between the two leaders for disposition as they saw fit; and is it also correct that the time for the quorum calls was taken out of our time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, 1 hour was to be divided between the leadership. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, at the request of the Senator from Montana, the time used during the quorum calls was taken out of that 1 hour.

Mr. MORSE. I say most respectfully that quorum calls were asked for by the proponents of the bill.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What happened to my half hour?

Mr. MORSE. The proponents did not have any speakers for the resolution. That is why they suggested the absence of a quorum. Let us be frank about it. We have speakers against the resolution. I shall not deny my colleague from Alaska an opportunity to close the debate on the resolution. It is now 20 minutes to 1. Do Senators still wish to vote at 1 o'clock? How much time have I remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon has 15 minutes remaining. Very briefly let the Chair state that 1 hour was allotted to the majority leader and the minority leader. It was not understood that the time was to be divided between them.

Mr. MORSE. I will reserve 10 minutes of my time for the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. The Senators from Arkansas and Illinois may have the rest of the time and use it as they see fit.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Out of whose time is that to come?

Mr. MORSE. I have 15 minutes. I am reserving 10 minutes for the Senator from Alaska.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have 7 minutes.

Mr. MORSE. I will give the Senator 5 minutes of my time.

Mr. NELSON. I wonder if the Senator would accept an amendment.

Mr. MORSE. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin, with the understanding that the time that I have reserved for the Senator from Alaska will be protected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NELSON. In view of the differing interpretations which have been put upon the joint resolution with respect to what the sense of Congress is, I should like to have this point clarified. I have great confidence in the President. However, my concern is that we in Congress could give the impression to the public that we are prepared at this time to change our mission and substantially expand our commitment. If that is what the sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the resolution. I therefore ask the distinguished Senator from Arkansas if he would consent to accept an amendment, a copy of which I have supplied him. I shall read it into the Record:

On page 2, line 3, after the word "That" insert "(a)".

On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

"(b) The Congress also approves and supports the efforts of the President to bring the problem of peace in southeast Asia to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the President's declaration that the United States, seeking no extension of the present military conflict, will respond to provocation in a manner that is 'limited and fitting'. Our continuing policy is to limit our role to the provision of aid, training assistance, and military advice, and it is the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid a direct military involvement in the southeast Asian conflict."

This amendment is not an interference with the exercise of the President's constitutional rights. It is merely an expression of the sense of Congress. Would the Senator accept the amendment?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It states fairly accurately what the President has said would be our policy, and what I stated my understanding was as to our policy; also what other Senators have stated. In other words, it states that our response should be appropriate and limited to the provocation, which the Senator states as "respond to provocation in a manner that is limited and fitting," and so forth. We do not wish any political or military bases there. We are not seeking to gain a colony. We seek to insure the capacity of these people to develop along the lines of their own desires, independent of domination by communism.

The Senator has put into his amendment a statement of policy that is unobjectionable. However, I cannot accept the amendment under the circumstances. I do not believe it is contrary to the joint resolution, but it is an enlargement. I am informed that the House is now voting on this resolution. The House joint resolution is about to be presented to us. I cannot accept the amendment and go to conference with it, and thus take responsibility for delaying matters.

I do not object to it as a statement of policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statements. That does not mean that as a practical matter I can accept the amendment. It would delay matters to do so. It would cause confusion and require a conference, and present us with all the other difficulties that are involved in this kind of legislative action. I regret that I cannot do it, even though I do not at all disagree with the amendment as a general statement of policy.

Mr. NELSON. Judging by the Record of yesterday, many Senators do not interpret the resolution in the same way.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Senators are entitled to have different views. However, most members of the committee, with one or two exceptions, interpret it the same way.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Wisconsin has expired.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Differences of interpretation are necessarily always present. I think the Senator's statement is a fair statement.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Times, Aug. 4, 1964]

THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS

My fellow Americans, as President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against U.S. ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer *Maddox* on August 2 was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes.

The destroyers and supporting aircraft acted at once on the orders I gave after the initial act of aggression.

We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the U.S. Navy.

But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense but with positive reply.

ACTION NOW IN EXECUTION

That reply is being given, as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations.

In the larger sense, this new act of aggression aimed directly at our own forces again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in southeast Asia.

Aggression by terror against the peaceful villages of South Vietnam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America.

The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the Government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response for the present will be limited and fitting.

We Americans know—although others appear to forget—the risk of spreading conflict.

We still seek no wider war. I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries and, in indeed, to all.

I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations.

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10 June :965

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: US OPTIONS AND OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

1. We take US objectives in Vietnam to be the reduction of Viet Cong insurgency to manageable levels and, as part of this, forcing the DRV to cease promoting that insurgency. More specific and limited objectives are dealt with in the following discussion of the particular options which appears to be open to the US under present circumstances. *

OPTION A

2. Course of Action: To continue with essentially our present course and objectives: that is, to bomb selected targets in the DRV (but not population centers, economic targets, SAM sites,

* We do not include the extreme courses of withdrawal on the one hand or invasion of the DRV on the other.

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and jet-capable airfields in the Hanoi-Haiphong area), and to build up US combat strength considerably in the South.

3. Objectives: To give the GVN/ARVN sufficient stiffening support to permit the reduction of the VC insurrection to manageable proportions; to lessen the DRV supporting increment to VC strength; and to cause DRV/VC leadership to cease or to tamp down the war, at least for some time.

4. Consequences: In our view, this will probably not permit us to impose our will on the enemy. The DRV would continue to reinforce the VC, and we doubt that US/ARVN forces could soon produce any decisive improvement in the military situation. The most likely results would be heavy US casualties, an over-emphasis on the military aspects of the conflict to the detriment of the political, and bogging-down of the war at higher levels of commitment and intensity, and, perhaps ultimately, a petering out of GVN/ARVN determination and intensity.

OPTION B

5. Course of Action: To continue to increase US forces to the extent necessary to defeat the Viet Cong, to increase sharply our weight

of attack on the DRV, bombing virtually all targets; to impose a naval quarantine; to accept further difficulties with the USSR and the possibility of major hostilities with Communist China.

6. Objectives: Raised from those of a above, to compel the DRV to cease and desist in the South; to coerce Communist China into acquiescing in such a DRV decision lest it incur attacks on its own territory, perhaps including destruction of its nascent advanced weapons capability.

7. Consequences: This would risk convincing the Communists that the US intended to destroy the DRV regime and thus bring us close to the "flash-point" of Chinese Communist intervention. If they judged that the Hanoi regime was losing control of the country, they would probably enter the DRV unilaterally and might engage US air forces with their own.

OPTION C

8. Course of Action: To cease bombing in the North, to hold on in the South, and to seek to negotiate as good a Vietnam settlement as we can get.

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9. Objectives: To settle for a Laos-type "neutralist" solution -- guaranteed by other powers and by a continuing, but markedly lessened, US presence in South Vietnam -- on the grounds that we cannot, at an acceptable cost, "win" militarily or impose our will on Hanoi.

10. Consequences: US overtures for negotiation would probably be rejected and, the enemy, scenting a weakening in US determination, would probably fight on, while raising his terms. Also, a sudden US turning in this direction, without punishing the DRV above present levels, would have a seriously dispiriting effect upon non-Communists in Southeast Asia.

OPTION D

11. Course of Action: To increase our weight of attack on the DRV; to increase US forces up to the 70,000 man strength already authorized; and, most importantly, to place major stress on a program of political, social, and economic action in South Vietnam.

- 4 -

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12. Objectives: To prevent a collapse in South Vietnamese morale and military capabilities during the next few months; to accomplish certain improvements basic to the creation of a viable non-Communist state in the South, and, meanwhile, to keep open the preceding options.

13. Consequences: Though Option D also has its drawbacks, it has the following relative merits:

a. Heightened US pressure on North Vietnam would increase the difficulty of supporting the Viet Cong and make Hanoi pay an ever heavier price for continuing that support. Furthermore, it would demonstrate our willingness to accept heightened political risks.

b. It would involve the deployment of substantial US ground forces in the South -- a prime requirement for the immediate future. Further, it would not convey to the GVN/ARVN the notion that the US was taking over the war.

c. It would give the US time and opportunity to increase the civic action, political, paramilitary, local defense, and administrative improvements which are needed to create a viable non-Communist state in the South.

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d. The net effect of the foregoing would have some chance of persuading the DRV that time was no longer running their way and that they should move to negotiate.

e. The US would avoid the negative reactions abroad and at home which would be produced by all-out bombings of the DRV and ever-increasing US troop commitments.

- 6 -

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TS# 185864 b

10 June 1965

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Reactions to a Further US Buildup in South Vietnam

1. In this memorandum we consider foreign reactions to an assumed US buildup to 150,000 troops in Vietnam as compared with the 50,000 now present and the 70,000 level due to be reached in August. We assume that no comprehensive public announcement of force goals would be made, and that foreign opinion would be reacting to a gradual perception of the US course of action.

2. Our main conclusions are that this strengthening of the US commitment would make some impression on the Communists, and would raise some dangers in our relations with the South Vietnamese, but that the important reactions would come later, when the effectiveness of the total US effort was tested in combat. These considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Reactions in South Vietnam

3. The initial reactions of the South Vietnamese would be somewhat ambivalent: encouragement over the reinforcement,

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accompanied by some tendency to relax and let the US do the fighting. Much would depend upon the way in which US troops were employed. If used to clear and hold large areas, particularly heavily populated areas, the US forces would tend to acquire both the responsibility for the war and the stigma of an army of occupation with colonialist ambitions. This tendency would be less if the US forces were used in a mobile fashion to assist ARVN units, and shared in the most difficult fighting.

4. Ultimately, of course, the key determinant would be the effectiveness of the total US effort, political, economic, and diplomatic, as well as military. If this produced a slackening of VC pressures, US-South Vietnamese working relations would be fairly smooth. If, on the contrary, the war dragged on without respite, war weariness and anti-Americanism would probably begin to threaten the US political base in South Vietnam.

Communist Reactions

5. Viet Cong and DRV. We believe that a US buildup itself, on the scale considered here, would not alter VC/DRV determination to prosecute the struggle. The Communists would recognize that, in military terms, their task had become harder. They would recognize that, in political terms, the US action reaffirmed

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its determination not to accept military defeat. But the arrival of US forces in these numbers would not change the Communists' basic calculation that their staying power is inherently superior to that of Saigon and Washington.

6. The real test, then, would be that of combat. The Viet Cong would respond, as it has to past injections of US forces, by stepping up the insurgency, and the DRV would reinforce it as necessary with men and equipment, including further line units of the PAVN. In this effort, the Communists would probably hold to their present strategy of attrition and subversion, although on a significantly increased scale. They would still seek to defeat the GVN through exhaustion and internal collapse without letting US/GVN forces engage them in decisive battle.

7. We do not know how the test of combat would come out at the level of US involvement now being considered. If, at this or some higher level, the tide of battle runs against the Viet Cong for a substantial period, the Communists would probably consider a large-scale ground offensive by DRV troops. They would recognize, however, that the enlarged US forces had made this more difficult. They would also fear that the US, with a very heavy stake in the war, would not accept defeat in that new

- 3 -

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kind of war without expanding it to the DRV and China. In these circumstances, they would probably prefer to resort to negotiations or simply to let the fighting subside while conserving their own forces. They would be particularly likely to react in this way if they had become convinced that in any enlarged war, the US would use nuclear weapons.

8. China. Peiping would react to the assumed US buildup by urging the VC and the DRV to continue the struggle. It would promise to come to Hanoi's aid if the US involvement reached the point of an invasion of North Vietnam. It might also make some troop movements in South China to underscore this commitment. We believe that as the fighting continued, China would be even less ready than the DRV to conclude that larger US ground forces could turn the tide.

9. The USSR. As the US commitment grew, the Soviet Union would find its problems growing more acute. Moscow would recognize that its own military assistance, and its general shift to a hard, anti-US line, had failed to turn the US from its course. We believe that the Soviets would see no alternative to continued support for the DRV. In time, however, the risks of a prolonged

- 4 -

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and intensified war in Vietnam might press hard on the new collective leadership and face Moscow with the choice of further deepening its commitments and aid or moving toward withdrawal.

Non-Communist Reactions

10. A wide sector of non-Communist world opinion doubts that the US can avoid eventual defeat in Vietnam. In this sector, an increasing injection of US forces would be seen as a prolongation of the agony and an increase in the risks of future escalation. Governments which now support the US course, such as the British, Italians, and Japanese, would come under renewed domestic criticism. Governments which oppose the US, such as France and India, would step up their pressures for negotiations. In general, however, these world reactions would not have as much force as would reactions to more dramatic events, such as a change in the scope of the air war. The ultimate effect upon the US position would continue to be determined by the eventual success or failure of US policy in the Vietnamese war.

Reactions to Use of ROK Forces

11. The South Vietnamese would not be unreservedly receptive to increased ROK contingents in their midst. Greater ROK troop

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commitments probably would not cause serious repercussions in South Korea, though some mutterings would be heard. In the event of major ROK troop losses, it is likely that public sentiment in South Korea -- stimulated by Pyongyang radio and domestic oppositionists -- would begin to question the judgment of President Pak, thereby contributing to the endemic political instability in South Korea. North Korea, through propaganda and troop movements and, possibly, contrived incidents in the Korean DMZ area would attempt to heighten any insecurity among South Koreans that developed as a result of troop shifts to Southeast Asia.

- 6 -

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