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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Monday, July 26, 1965
11:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is the agenda for the noon meeting. There is one additional item, relating to covert negotiations, which should be discussed in a still smaller group. The only ones who know about it now are Rusk, Ball, McNamara and myself. We doubt if any other individual should be informed at this time. You may wish to have a small follow-up meeting in your own office on this.

McG. B.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-230
By is, NARS, Date 3-5-84

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

AGENDA

MEETING AT 12:00, Monday, July 26, 1965

Attendance: Vice President, Rusk, Ball, McNamara, Wheeler, Lodge,
Goldberg, Moyers, Busby, Bundy

1. The SAM site problem. Secretary McNamara will have a report and recommendations.
2. Position at the UN -- the pros and cons of a U. S. initiative.
3. The general plan of Congressional consultation and public announcement.
 - a. Shape of meeting with the Leadership.
 - b. Timing and form of a Presidential statement or a message.
 - c. Follow-up statements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
 - d. Speeches by Congressmen and private citizens.
4. Further consultation with Saigon Government.

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Authority NLS 83-230

By ms, NARS, Date 3-5-84

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RECEIVED
McGEORGE BUNDY'S OFFICE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

Mr Mc George Bundy

JUL 26 PM 6 40

COPY NO. 3
of 3 copies

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July 26, 1965

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: S/P - *W. W. Rostow*
SUBJECT: Hitting Hanoi Targets

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Letter 11-2-78
By id, NARS, Date 3-26-79

Two considerations suggest we must soon bite the bullet on hitting serious (but non-sanguinary) targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

One relates to thought in Hanoi; the other relates to thought in the USA.

In Hanoi one critical measure of whether the U.S. is totally committed to achieving our limited, legal objective is whether we hit those targets. They regard their success in deterring us thus far as a major achievement and a measure of the limits of our will to see it through.

At home we shall soon have rising casualty figures and enlarged national sacrifice. This should not lead to an expansion of our objectives, as in the case of Korea after Inchon. It should lead us to do on our own everything within our power to reduce those casualties and shorten the war. We should not be pushed into this by the noise of political opposition.

In short, I do not believe we should confuse the correct limitation of our objectives -- the effective enforcement of the 1954 and 1962 Accords -- with limitation of means, short, of course, of using nuclear weapons or inflicting indiscriminate civilian casualties.

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downgrading and
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July 27, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to Presidential Messages on Vietnam

In accordance with your instructions, messages were delivered Monday to approximately 29 countries which are contributing assistance in Vietnam. France was omitted for political reasons and Laos, Ecuador, and Guatemala for political reasons or because their contributions have in fact been insignificant.

To date, we have received reports from 23 Embassies, which have presented the Presidential message on Vietnam to the heads of government or highest government official of the host country. These reports show sympathy of our principles of action -- resistance to aggression while working for peace -- but yield little tangible evidence of prospects of substantially increased assistance.

Some countries--notably Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the Philippines -- express a willingness to consider an additional effort urgently, but our Ambassador in Ottawa cautions against over optimism while our Ambassador in Manila advises against encouraging the Philippines to diffuse its effort.

In several cases no comment was offered by the foreign government at the time of receipt of the message but comment may be forthcoming later. Thus, Ayub has promised a reply in two days.

There was general appreciation of advance notification of our plans.

Details of replies received to date are given in the attached memorandum.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 2-20-98

William P. Bundy

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1. Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands responded with assurance of support of the United States' position and of their desire to be as helpful as possible. Menzies sent a reply to President Johnson promising "continuing support and readiness to assist to the best of our capacity." Later Bunting told our Ambassador that the letter meant that action was intended "as soon as possible" and that the cabinet would be tackling the question of further Australian military commitment as a matter of urgency. Canada's Prime Minister pledged "ready and most sympathetic cooperation" and promised that the request would be discussed as soon as Parliament could be gotten together. Our Ambassador in Ottawa, however, cautions against overoptimism and referred to Canada's public pledge of last September of \$500,000 which has not yet been drawn because of failure to agree on projects. Cals (Netherlands) said that while military aid was impossible he would see what else could be done.

2. Moro of Italy in conversation with Harriman expressed support of the principles of the United States' position but did not state whether there was any hope for increased aid. Later Nenni authorized Harriman to quote him to Tito as describing as ridiculous the communist insistence on withdrawal of US forces as a condition for negotiation.

3. In Japan Sato said Japan would like to give more aid and that there were items which could be provided such as ships, ammunition, vehicles, drugs and clothing which were directly related to peoples livelihood and thus, unobjectionable. However, the public might not so regard them. Our Ambassador comments that while Sato is convinced of the merits of the United States' case he is inhibited by the domestic political situation. The foreign office has later inquired whether Japan might state publicly that it had been notified in advance by the United States.

4. Macapagal of the Philippines said that he was sending a letter to President Johnson via Ambassador Ledesma reiterating his pledge if elected to call a special session of congress on November 15 for passage of the aid to Viet-Nam bill. He would

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like to have the bill go beyond the call for an engineering battalion and authorize the sending of combat forces. He added that he would be willing in response to the President's message to authorize the sending of additional civil action and medical personnel if this would be helpful. Our Ambassador comments that this offer was vague with no indication of how it would be paid for and he advises against pressing for additional civil personnel and in favor of concentrating on obtaining well organized Philippine contribution.

5. Belgium and Germany asked whether we had any specific suggestions in mind as to what they could do. The Danish Foreign Minister described prospects of any substantial increase in Danish aid as "remote." Switzerland was concerned that there should be no implication that any aid that had been given was in ~~support~~ support of the United States military effort in Vietnam.

6. Some Embassies reported no comments initially on the message: On the part of India (Shastri), Turkey, Ireland, and New Zealand, Ayub of Pakistan who is mourning his mother sent word he would reply within a few days. The Prime Minister of Israel limited himself to asking whether the Vietnamese could really govern themselves.

7. In some cases the recipients had no comment as the head of government was out of town, but comments might be expected later: The GRC, Malaysia, and Iran.

8. Our Embassy in Brazil has urged that any approach in Rio should not be open to the possible interpretation that we were asking military assistance.

9. Several recipients expressed appreciation of the advance notification.

10. Since this morning, the following additional replies have been received:

- a. Athens - no comment.
- b. GRC - President Chiang said he would help as much as possible, but lacks capacity to do much.
- c. Thailand - will be prepared to help, but inquired about US assistance to Thai forces.
- d. UK - Prime Minister said he would reply as soon as possible, as he had not had time to discuss contents with colleagues.

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AIRGRAM

POL 27 VIETS

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REF	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
E	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

⑤ A-66 ~~SECRET~~ NO. HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE Aug 2 7 50

INFO: CINCPAC FOR POLAD 24a

COPY NO. 45 SERIES B ACTION

FROM : American Embassy SAIGON DATE: July 27, 1965

SUBJECT: Secretary McNamara's Visit: Meeting with GVN

REF : LIMDIS

Enclosed is Memorandum of Conversation on the first meeting between Secretary McNamara and party with GVN officials on Friday, July 16.

For the Ambassador:

Melvin L. Manfull
Melvin L. Manfull
Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs

Enclosure: *At 19*
Memorandum of Conversation.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FRUS, Vol 3, #60
By af, NARA, Date 4-7-14

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In Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:MLManfull:ek 7/27/65.

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:MLManfull

Clearances:

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

GVN: General Thieu
General Ky
General Chieu
General Co
General Khang
General Thang
Tran Van Do
Truong Tai Ton
Bui Diem

US: Secretary McNamara
Ambassador Taylor
Ambassador-designate Lodge
General Wheeler
General Westmoreland
General Goodpaster
Ambassador Johnson
Mr. McNaughton
Mr. Sylvester
Mr. Unger
Mr. Cooper
Mr. Zorthian
Mr. Herfurt
Mr. Manfull

TIME & PLACE: Friday, July 16, 1965, Prime Minister's Office, 7 Thong Nhut

SUBJECT: Meeting with GVN

Opening Remarks:

General Thieu welcomed Secretary McNamara and his party. Thieu said after three weeks of its existence the GVN has perhaps not succeeded in producing spectacular results; however, by the firm stand the GVN has taken, the religious and political groups appear to endorse the GVN program and are quiescent. The GVN had first sought to make clear to the people that the new government would be resolute in prosecuting the war, in winning ultimate victory over the VC, and in bringing peace with freedom to South Viet-Nam. Secondly, the new government is attempting to push forward vigorously with the war effort in the countryside and to organize the people in the rear. In order to generate popular support emphasis has been placed on bringing to the

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people a greater measure of social justice. The GVN has attempted to do this by "cleaning up" the organization and administration in Saigon and the countryside, by applying an austerity program, and by focusing attention on corruption and taking measures to eliminate corruption. Further, the GVN believes that "it is time to think of North Viet-Nam and to creating a psychological situation there so that the Vietnamese people in the DRV can help themselves to fight communism."

General Thieu noted that Secretary McNamara and other representatives of the U. S. Government would have an opportunity for fact-finding. For its part, the GVN would like to hear from Secretary McNamara and others an expression of U. S. policies so that the GVN and U. S. could coordinate their policies to better affect and win the war. General Thieu observed that up to now the GVN had tended to present its own point of view and had perhaps not sought an adequate degree of coordination with the Americans. He felt it was necessary to achieve better coordination in the future. To that end in the discussion to follow the GVN spokesman would try to be as honest as possible in presenting the GVN point of view.

General Thieu then called on Truong Tai Ton, Minister of Economy and Finance, to present a review of the economic situation and proposals concerning U. S. aid to Viet-Nam.

Economic:

Mr. Ton made the following presentation:

General Considerations.

1. We are in a total war. The Government of Vietnam endeavors to safeguard a sound and viable economy along with the ever-growing military efforts. It is essential that exertions in the military field do not impede economic stability. Galloping inflation could be as catastrophic as a military disaster.

Our objective is twofold: to win the war and not to lose peace.

2. The Government of Vietnam has already started to implement a series of measures designed to re-establish the national economy and put it on a war-basis: Organization of supply, rice marketing, formation of safety stocks, reorganization of the market, intensification of the tax efforts, budgetary thrift, etc.

Those efforts are nevertheless far from sufficient in view of the increasing burdens we have to face. A substantial increase of American economic aid is therefore necessary to the simultaneous carrying out of the war effort and the maintenance of economic stability.

3. According to reiterated statements of U. S. leaders, American economic aid to Vietnam is unlimited and unconditional.

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From the Government of Vietnam point of view this aid must have the following characteristics:

a) It has to be proportional to the intensification of the military efforts, that is to approximately match the increase of our budgetary expenditures (from 1960 to 1965, this increase is only due to military burdens).

So our budget has more than trebled between 1960 and 1965, going from 15 to 47 billion whereas commercial aid (CIP - PL 480) has stood at the same level. Consequently, in spite of efforts aimed at increasing our own revenues, our budget which was still in equilibrium in 1961/62 has shown a deficit of 12 billion in 1964 and 23 billion in 1965.

b) It must enable us not only to continue the war somehow or other but also to keep ourselves in a fairly good position to face peace.

As far as we are concerned the war effort must be total. It should not, however, bleed the country dry of all its financial resources so that we are completely unprepared to face the hour of peace.

But the tremendous deficit of our budget, the continuous decrease of our reserves in gold and foreign exchange (U. S. dollars 175 million in January 1964, US dollars 100 million in July 1965) plus difficulties of all sorts generated by the war, are about to jeopardize our economic security. This trend is on the increase and will inevitably lead us to an economic crisis, unless American aid adequately supplements our own efforts.

Proposals.

4. CIP 1965/1966.

a) The Commercial Import Program (CIP) for FY June 1965-June 1966 should be brought up to a minimum of US dollars 200 million. To make its absorption possible, more flexibility and greater eligibility are necessary (to be negotiated between the Ministry of National Economy and USOM).

b) The CIP is primarily aimed at securing piasters for our budget support. One million US dollars generate roughly 80 million VN piasters. Ten billion piasters are needed to compensate entirely for the increase of military expenditures between 1964 and 1965 (from 17 to 27 billion). This would require an additional amount of 125 million US dollars, that is a total CIP of 125 - 135 (1964/1965 level) = 260 million in FY 1966.

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c) The increase of CIP amount will also permit us to establish necessary safety stocks.

5. PL 480.

It is requested a total programmed at about 60 million US dollars, with the permission to buy between 100,000 and 150,000 tons of rice in order to establish a permanent safety stock in Saigon to supply the capital and central provinces with rice.

6. Direct Aid.

We entirely support the policy consisting of buying in-country all goods which can be produced locally. However, in terms of direct aid, we don't agree with the in-country purchase of imported goods under the CIP program because such purchases will decrease the CIP amount.

7. Balance of Payments.

Our export situation has deteriorated because of security conditions. Export earnings decreased from 80 million US dollars in 1963 to 35 million in 1965 due to the suspension of rice exports and the lessening of other exportable surpluses. At the same time we had to spend our own foreign exchange stock in order to get piasters for the budget and not to disturb the market.

The amount of our reserves has lowered in an alarming way (100 million of gold and foreign exchange compared to 175 million in January 1964). At this conjuncture of intensive military effort as well as economic and political tension, a more accentuated decrease will run the risk of destroying confidence in our currency and creating a panic. This will, in a short time, be prejudicial to all military political and economic gains thus far obtained with so much struggle.

It is, therefore, suggested that American aid take emergency steps, put US dollars at our disposal to enable us to restore our reserves to the level of 150 million, a sum which we deem minimal to the protection of our currency.

8. Exchange of US Dollars.

The rush of US military men and their expenditures in US dollars have seriously disturbed our economy. The black market flourishes. Dollars introduced in the black market then feed illegal transactions (illicit trading of foreign exchange, smuggling, flight of assets, and, undoubtedly, even VC financial operations). The value and sovereignty of our currency are at stake.

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On the other hand, those expenditures in US dollars are harmful to the American soldiers themselves: due to the absence of coins, they have to pay at the minimum price one US dollar for a glass of beer, a haircut or a taxi drive whereas the real price is only between VN piasters 10 and 30.

American authorities should help us stem the black market of dollars, make the exchange of dollars with piasters at the free market rate and not at the black market rate. This could be viewed as an increased contribution of the United States to the war effort and the strengthening of the Vietnamese economy.

9. The Presence of US Military Men and Economic Activities.

The presence of an important number of US military men has brought about a vertiginous rise in the cost of labor (100%) and the prices of some products. It is suggested that a joint-committee strive to study economic problems generated by the above US presence and that US officials agree with the Government of Vietnam about their wage-policy.

Military:

General Co said that the military briefing would be in three parts: (1) Additional GVN force requirements for the remaining months of 1965 and early 1966; (2) a few considerations and recommendations concerning future strategy and conduct of the war; and, (3) a concept for organization of the "home guard" forces. General Co then turned the briefing responsibility to General Thang, who spelled out additional force requirements as follows:

For the ground forces -
3 additional airborne battalions
4 additional Marine battalions
7 Ranger task force headquarters elements

For the Air Force -
1 squadron of jet aircraft
1 squadron of AlH's

For the Navy -
1 AKA
5 LSD's
5 LSM's

In explaining the background of this additional request, General Thang noted that the present general reserve consists of 11 battalions, of which 6 are airborne and 5 are Marine battalions. Six of the 11 have been deployed in I Corps and II Corps to meet the step-up in VC activity in the highlands; 1 airborne battalion suffered over 50 percent casualties in the Dong Xoai battle and is not combat ready. Therefore, only four

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battalions can be said to be available in the general reserve. In order to meet this critical situation U. S. support for formation of additional battalions as indicated above is urgently requested. The GVN realizes that this additional request is not part of the 85,000 increase previously agreed upon. General Thang believed the additional battalions could be recruited without running into the manpower problem because: (a) operational losses (casualties) are relatively lower with these types of units than in the regular ARVN battalions; (b) the desertion rate is lower; and, (c) recruitment to activate the additional battalions in Saigon and the other urban areas is generally easier for these units and should not prove too difficult. General Thang observed that there has been an evolution in regard to the Rangers, beginning with the formation of Ranger companies, then Ranger battalions, then a reinforcement of the Ranger battalions with heavy weapons, and now there is a need to operate the Rangers as 2-3 battalion task forces. This will require augmentation of the Ranger battalion headquarters elements.

With regard to present and future strategy, General Thang said that the situation in I Corps and IV Corps is relatively good. In IV Corps initiative rests with the GVN because of the aggressive spirit of the troops and a terrain adapted to helicopter and M-113 operations. In I Corps the situation was relatively good and could be improved if the U. S. Marines were committed more actively to search and destroy operations. II Corps he considered as critical because of the introduction of the entirety of the 325th PAVN Division. Thang said that the JGS had now confirmed all regiments of the 325th Division were now in South Vietnam. He therefore requested that the U. S. dispatch a U. S. Assault Division to help meet this critical situation. Thang noted that the situation in III Corps was not good. The 5th Division is low both in morale and effective strength because of the recent series of battles with the VC. The GVN would like to have the 1st U. S. Infantry Division assigned to this area after the U. S. Assault Division is in place in the highlands. Thang foresaw a series of large engagements and VC attacks in the immediate weeks ahead.

General Thang said that in the GVN's view Hanoi had two general courses open to it:

- (1) To make major effort during the monsoon season but eventually to realize that the VC victory was impossible and to sue for a cease fire; and
- (2) To increase their infiltration and recruitment and make an all-out effort to cut off the highlands from the rest of South Vietnam.

Thang believed that general objectives should be to (a) stop and destroy units coming from DRV into South Vietnam; (b) destroy all major VC main force units in the highlands and Central Vietnam; and (c) protect the Vietnamese manpower in South Vietnam to inhibit VC recruitment and exploitation of the manpower pool. Therefore, the GVN/US should continue

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bombing attacks against targets in the DRV and increase the tempo and intensity of the air strikes. With respect to (b) above the U. S. should commit an Assault Division to the highlands and other combat troops from third countries should be deployed there. With regard to (c) above GVN/US should think seriously concerning intensified pacification program to protect the manpower resources. The GVN should commit ARVN primarily to this task and to deploy Vietnamese units along the coastal lowlands and in the Delta. Under this concept, there would be two general areas -- one area, the populous areas where GVN would devote its primary efforts; the other, the relatively unpopulated areas where the US/allied forces would concentrate their efforts, it being understood in the latter case that administration for the large cities and district towns would remain with the GVN. The primary missions of the US/allied forces would be search and destroy operations and the protection of important bases. The primary mission of ARVN would be to engage in pacification programs and to protect the population.

If this concept were approved the GVN would suggest that a US Air Assault Division be deployed to an area comprising of Kontum, Pleiku and Phu Bon; another Division to operate against Zones C and D. This would require an additional Division for the Banmethuot-Phuoc Thanh area.

With regard to the organization of a home guard, Thang observed that all were agreed that the war cannot be won by military means alone, and that all Vietnamese must take part in the war. This implies that Vietnamese not on active military service be organized into groups. Thang alluded to efforts under the Diem regime to organize the Republican Youth and Combat Youth and under General Nguyen Khanh to create civil defense organization. The proposed home guard is conceived to be comparable effort and GVN intends to mobilize all males between ages 15-48 and all females between 18-30. Thang said that the chain of command for the home guard would be incorporated in that for the Regional Forces/Popular Forces down to the hamlet level. It is anticipated that the home guard would have special uniforms and insignia and that selected members would be armed. Thang requested the U. S. to assist the GVN in developing a realistic plan for the home guard and the necessary support to get it launched.

Questions:

General Thieu requested the U. S. representatives to study the GVN proposals and inquired whether there were any questions. Secretary McNamara inquired as to the approximate number of U. S. personnel which the GVN desired to have in South Vietnam. Thieu replied that the GVN proposal involved the 44 additional U. S. battalions previously requested plus one more infantry division. Secretary McNamara observed that we have approximately 75,000 U. S. personnel in South Vietnam at present and the GVN request would bring this figure to approximately 200,000 U. S. personnel in-country. Secretary McNamara inquired whether the Vietnamese people would readily

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accept an American presence of this magnitude. General Ky said he anticipated no real problems and General Thieu added that it would be necessary to explain carefully to the Vietnamese people that U. S. personnel were in South Vietnam only to help fight the war. Thieu believed that most Vietnamese did not consider the U. S. as having any colonialist aspirations but he thought the GVN should embark on an extensive propaganda program to explain U. S. presence. Thieu continued that if U. S. forces were concentrated in separate military zones away from the major population centers and areas of dense population that the impact of American presence could be minimized. He said that this consideration was fundamental in suggesting that U. S. forces operate in the highlands and against Zone C and D. Further, the terrain in these areas is difficult and U. S. availability of helicopter lift and mobility would be additional assets. Thieu observed that up to now the GVN had never had necessary military strength nor the time to conduct a really effective pacification effort in the populated areas. He believed that a concentration of GVN attention to this effort made good sense.

Secretary McNamara said that many Americans asked him whether, if the U. S. were to send up to 200,000 troops, we could count on a stable government in South Vietnam. General Thieu replied that in the past there were two general reasons for political instability: (a) previous governments did not have a clear policy and were not strong enough to carry out their announced policies; and (b) previous governments found that after 3-4 months they have been unable to sustain VC attacks and at the same time to bring social justice to the people. He believed that if U. S. troops were to relieve ARVN to work actively on a pacification program, the current government could demonstrate to the people that it is capable and qualified to govern. He added that he would intend under the new home guard organization to train good political and pacification cadres for the pacification program.

Secretary McNamara inquired as to possible VC actions particularly whether the VC might increase their strength substantially and what the GVN and U. S. should do in this event. General Thieu responded that he felt it was more difficult for the VC to increase its strength now than in the past. While VC ranks can be increased through infiltration, we can inhibit this through stepped up bombing of infiltration routes. However, at the present time, at least half of the manpower of South Vietnam is controlled by the VC. It is therefore essential that the GVN take steps to bring this manpower pool under GVN control.

Secretary McNamara noted his surprise at the elimination of the Chieu Hoi ministry in the current government and inquired whether the GVN had a program comparable to the Chieu Hoi program. Thieu replied that the Chieu Hoi program continues but that the Directory believed that it belonged more properly under the PsyWar Ministry than as a separate ministry. By bringing Chieu Hoi within the PsyWar Ministry, the GVN had not intended in any way to denigrate its importance. General Ky underlined these remarks,

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stating that all agree on the importance of Chieu Hoi and the need to put more emphasis on this program. However, he believed it was more important to have the Chieu Hoi program as part of a more general program to bring the people back under GVN control. With regard to governmental stability, General Ky stated that the Vietnamese also long for a strong, stable government. He said that the current government would do its best to maintain stability. The GVN desired more U. S. troops not because the Vietnamese were unwilling to continue the fight but that it would relieve ARVN for important pacification tasks. He added that the GVN did not like to lose terrain to the VC, therefore it was suggested that the US/allied forces help hold terrain while the GVN "reorganized the rear". General Ky said the reason for government instability in the past has been primarily the lack of social justice. At present corruption exists everywhere, the rich get richer while the mass of the poor Vietnamese see little hope for improvement. The mass of Vietnamese are therefore very vulnerable to VC propaganda. In his view previous governments had based their support primarily on the promises of support from minority groups, such as the religious sects and groups of politicians. In contrast, the current government intends to emphasize support of the mass of the Vietnamese, particularly of the poor Vietnamese, and to give them a sense of hope and confidence in the future. Ky said the GVN would ask for more sacrifices from the people and the members of the government were prepared to make their individual sacrifices. The GVN considers the political and religious groups as being merely individual Vietnamese citizens and not as groups which could validly claim a controlling voice in government policies. It was necessary for the Vietnamese to unite on one road to victory. In this connection none of the Ministers in his government represented any particular group or faction and they were deliberately chosen for this reason. Ky said the GVN hoped to satisfy U. S. public opinion concerning governmental stability by making the government strong and stable enough to carry out this announced policy.

In conclusion Secretary McNamara thanked the GVN participants for their frankness. He said that the discussion had been most helpful and that he looked forward to further discussions in the succeeding days.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 27, 1965

4:30 pm

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Progress on Vietnamese diplomatic front

You will want to know, before you meet the Leadership, that Taylor and Johnson had a very good meeting with Ky, Thieu, and Co on strengthening our international political position at the same time that we move forward with the planned U. S. reinforcements in Saigon. Taylor and Johnson tried out on Ky and Thieu the political language which we drafted over the weekend. They did not call it a Presidential statement, but simply a draft U. S. position which might be stated at some point by a high U. S. official. Ky and Thieu accepted the entire position, and that now allows us to use language equivalent to the paragraphs at Tab A. This language takes us a long way forward and gives us a good political punch to go with our military decisions. The attached paragraphs can be shortened and tightened into whatever form of statement we make from here, and they can be expanded and elaborated in any following presentation by Secretary Rusk. What is new in these paragraphs is the following:

- (1) An explicit affirmation that we are in favor of using the UN if we can get it into the act.
- (2) An explicit affirmation that we are in favor of free elections under international supervision.
- (3) Definite and clear-cut support for the purposes (but not the weak machinery) of the '54 agreements.
- (4) An offer of hope for the Viet Cong if they will turn from war to peace.
- (5) A concrete offer to discuss both their proposals and ours -- this will be read as movement toward a negotiation in which their points and our points would both be on the table.

All these are important from the point of view of men like Mansfield and Fulbright. A couple of them -- like the offer to consider their proposals and the offer of hope for the Viet Cong after a peaceful settlement -- may have real impact in Communist circles as well. Yet there is no weakness in them. And I repeat that Taylor has obtained Saigon's approval for them.

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Authority NSC 7-10-79 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 7-22-80

inf B.
McG. B.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TAB A

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While the US does all that is necessary to turn back the attackers in South Viet-Nam, it will do all that is possible to open the path to peaceful settlement. Again and again it has said that it is ready for unconditional discussion. The US and others have made fifteen efforts to get discussion started. These efforts have all been rejected out of hand. But the US will not be discouraged.

In these last days, messages have been sent to all the more than 30 countries that have given concrete evidence of their concern for the people of South Viet-Nam. It has been emphasized again that just as there is need for wider effort to resist aggression, there is equal need for further effort to open doors to peace. America's friends in these countries know that all their efforts to this end are welcome to the United States.

And the US will do more. Today Ambassador Goldberg has been instructed to consult most urgently with the Secretary General of the United Nations to see if there is not some way in which the good offices of the United Nations can be engaged for peace in Viet-Nam. The earlier efforts of the Secretary General have met with rebuff, but no possibility of progress must be overlooked. Ambassador Goldberg will make it entirely plain that the United States continues to hope that a way can be found to bring the United Nations into action in Viet-Nam. The Ambassador will submit a full report on US actions there and its purpose of peace, both formally to the Security Council and informally to all the Delegates who seek to know the US stand. If it proves possible to engage the United Nations in Viet-Nam, the United States will actively support that engagement.

At the same time that the US seeks by every means to start the discussions that can bring peace, it and its friends in South Viet-Nam are making it plain that they are ready for the kind of peace that will be fair and honorable for all. Already in June, the Foreign Minister of Viet-Nam and the Secretary of State of the United States have stated for all to hear the fundamental principles of such a peace:

- An end to aggression and subversion.
- Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose and shape its own destiny by democratic principles and without foreign interference.
- An end of the military measures now made necessary by aggression, and the removal of foreign military forces from South Viet-Nam.
- And effective guarantees for the independence and freedom of the people of South Viet-Nam.

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MEMORANDUM

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Beyond these principles, it has been made clear that the US looks forward to the day when relations between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam can be worked out by peaceful means -- including a free decision by the peoples of all Viet-Nam on the matter of reunification. These principles imply and include the use of free election under international supervision.

These purposes in essence are the purposes of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The failure of the 1954 Agreements was not in purpose but in practice -- not in the quality of the objectives, but in the effectiveness of the instruments. When there is a new settlement in Southeast Asia, it must be based on stronger and more lasting guarantees than those of 1954.

But the program of peace remains as the US has stated it. This program meets the interests of all who have a stake in Southeast Asia.

For the people of South Viet-Nam -- on both sides of the current contest -- it will bring opportunity for an active and honorable part in the peaceful life of a freely growing society.

For the people and Government of North Viet-Nam it will bring relief from the burdens of war and a prospect of new and peaceful relations with the people to the south.

For the smaller neighbors of Viet-Nam it will mean an end to the danger of nearby warfare and a widened prospect of peaceful development for the whole area.

For the people and Government on the Mainland of China, this plan of peace contains no threat and no danger.

And on a still wider plane, a peace so clearly fair and reasonable for all can remove a clear obstacle to understanding between all of these who call themselves Communist and all of those who don't.

For the real future of Southeast Asia is a future of peaceful progress, not a future of contest and conquest. While the US resists aggression -- and probes for peace -- it is planning for progress. Already there has been an encouraging response to the proposals put forward in April. The prospects for Asian development are good, and US readiness to help has been made plain.

So today America appeals once again to those who have chosen the path of battle. Let them turn from terror to talk, and from subversion to settlement. Let all interested governments go to the conference table and let them bring with them any other parties that they choose. The US will come with its proposals -- let them come with theirs. And let diplomacy replace destruction.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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TAB A

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The first business of such a conference must be to work out terms that can permit an end of fighting. Its final business must be peace. The Government of Viet-Nam and the Government of the United States are ready.

This readiness comes not from weakness but from strength -- not from weariness but from resolution. Until there is a settlement and an end of aggression, America's efforts will go on and they will grow.

The deployments ordered today will be carried out. The Americans who go to Viet-Nam will do their duty. The forces of the United States will carry out the order to resist and to punish aggression. The US is ready for honorable peace, but it will persevere in the hard task of battle until others are ready, too.

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

26a

SUMMARY NOTES OF 553rd NSC MEETING

July 27, 1965 -- 5:40 p.m. - 6:20 p.m.

SUBJECT: Deployment of Additional U. S. Troops to Vietnam

The President: Before formalizing decisions on the deployment of additional U. S. forces to Vietnam, he wished to review the present situation with Council members present. Secretary Rusk will deal with the political situation and Secretary McNamara will describe the military situation.

Secretary Rusk:

- a. The Chinese Communists are most adamant against any negotiations between the North Vietnamese and the U. S. /South Vietnamese. The clash between the Chinese Communists and the Russians continues.
- b. According to the Yugoslav Ambassador, Tito got the impression during his visit to Moscow that "things would happen" if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have asked many times what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We have heard nothing to date in reply.
- c. There appear to be elements of caution on the other side -- in Hanoi as well as in Moscow. Our purpose is to keep our contacts open with the other side in the event that they have a new position to give us.
- d. The U. S. actions we are taking should be presented publicly in a low key but in such a way as to convey accurately that we are determined to prevent South Vietnam from being taken over by Hanoi. At the same time, we seek to avoid a confrontation with either the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union.

Secretary McNamara: Summarized the military situation in Vietnam:

- a. The number of Viet Cong forces has increased and the percentage of these forces committed to battle has increased.

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Authority NLS 93-475

By ju/isp NARA. Date 2-20-98

Secretary McNamara: (Cont'd.)

- b. The geographic area of South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong has increased.
- c. The Viet Cong have isolated the cities and disrupted the economy of South Vietnam. The cities are separated from the countryside.
- d. Increased desertions from the South Vietnamese Army have prevented an increase in the total number of South Vietnamese troops available for combat.
- e. About half of all U. S. Army helicopters are now in South Vietnam in addition to over 500 U. S. planes.

The military requirements are:

- a. More combat battalions from the U. S. are necessary. A total of 13 additional battalions need to be sent now. On June 15, we announced a total of 75,000 men, or 15 battalions.
- b. A total of 28 battalions is now necessary.
- c. Over the next 15 months, 350,000 men would be added to regular U. S. forces.
- d. In January, we would go to Congress for a supplementary appropriation to pay the costs of the Vietnam war. We would ask now for a billion, in addition to the existing 1966 budget. (Draft plan is attached as Tab A.)

The attack on the SAM sites in North Vietnam was necessary to protect our planes. Attacks on other priority targets in North Vietnam are required.

Ambassador Lodge: Asked whether the ratio of government to guerrilla ground forces had to be 10:1. During his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had been asked this question. Comment had been made about the astronomical size of U. S. forces required if this traditional 10:1 ratio was valid.

General Wheeler: The mobility and fire power of U. S. and South Vietnamese forces has put an imponderable element into the traditional ratio of 10:1. Perhaps 4:1 is the right ratio.

General Wheeler: (Cont'd.)

With the additional forces to be sent to South Vietnam, General Westmoreland believes we can hold our present position and possibly move back into areas now contested. The one exception would be in the Fourth Corps.

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara expressed differences of view concerning a map brought to the meeting by Secretary McNamara which purported to show the amount of territory in South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong. Secretary Rusk thought the map overstated the size of Viet Cong controlled areas. Secretary McNamara said it understated the area they control. At least 26% of the population of South Vietnam is controlled by Viet Cong, according to Secretary McNamara's figures.

(The meeting was interrupted briefly to permit the photographers to take pictures.)

The President: The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating. Even though we now have 80 to 90,000 men there, the situation is not very safe. We have these choices:

- a. Use our massive power, including SAC, to bring the enemy to his knees. Less than 10% of our people urge this course of action.
- b. We could get out, on the grounds that we don't belong there. Not very many people feel this way about Vietnam. Most feel that our national honor is at stake and that we must keep our commitments there.
- c. We could keep our forces at the present level, approximately 80,000 men, but suffer the consequences of losing additional territory and of accepting increased casualties. We could "hunker up". No one is recommending this course.
- d. We could ask for everything we might desire from Congress -- money, authority to call up the reserves, acceptance of the deployment of more combat battalions. This dramatic course of action would involve declaring a state of emergency and a request for several billion dollars. Many favor this course. However, if we do go all out in this fashion, Hanoi would be able to ask the Chinese Communists and the Soviets to increase aid and add to their existing commitments.

The President: (Cont'd.)

e. We have chosen to do what is necessary to meet the present situation, but not to be unnecessarily provocative to either the Russians or the Communist Chinese. We will give the commanders the men they say they need and, out of existing materiel in the U. S., we will give them the materiel they say they need. We will get the necessary money in the new budget and will use our transfer authority until January. We will neither brag about what we are doing or thunder at the Chinese Communists and the Russians.

This course of action will keep us there during the critical monsoon season and possibly result in some gains. Meanwhile, we will push on the diplomatic side. This means that we will use up our manpower reserves. We will not deplete them, but there will be a substantial reduction. Quietly, we will push up the level of our reserve force. We will let Congress push us but, if necessary, we will call the legislators back.

We will hold until January. The alternatives are to put in our big stack now or hold back until Ambassadors Lodge and Goldberg and the diplomats can work.

Secretary Fowler: Do we ask for standby authority now to call the reserves but not actually call them?

The President: Under the approved plan, we would not ask for such authority now.

There was no response when the President asked whether anyone in the room opposed the course of action decided upon.

Bronley Smith

65 McKinnara memo 26/8

recommending troops
be sent into Viet Nam.

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Authority DSD 11-1-78; NSC 9-18-80; CIA 11-15-79

6/26/65
(Revised 7/1/65)

By isp, NARS, Date 4-21-81

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program of expanded military and political moves with respect to Vietnam

Introduction. Our objective is to create conditions for a favorable settlement by demonstrating to the VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning. Under present conditions, however, the chances of achieving this objective are small -- and the VC are winning now -- largely because the ratio of guerrilla to anti-guerrilla forces is unfavorable to the government. With this in mind, we must choose among three courses of action with respect to South Vietnam: (1) Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that can be arranged; (2) continue at about the present level, with US forces limited to, say, 75,000, holding on and playing for the breaks while recognizing that our position will probably grow weaker; or (3) expand substantially the US military pressure against the Viet Cong in the South and the North Vietnamese in the North and at the same time launch a vigorous effort on the political side to get negotiations started. An outline of the third of these approaches follows.

I. Expanded military moves. The following military moves should be taken together with the political initiatives in Part II below.

A. Inside South Vietnam. Increase US/GVN military strength in SVN enough to prove to the VC that they cannot win and thus to turn the tide of the war.

1. Increase combined US/GVN ground strength to the level required effectively to counter the current and likely VC ground strength.* On the assumption that GVN strength holds its own, a decision should be made now to bring the US/3d-country deployments to 44 battalions within the next few months. Their mission would include hounding, harassing and hurting the VC should they elect not to stand and fight. General Westmoreland says that infusion of such forces with such missions on the schedule proposed "should re-establish the military balance by the end of December." He continues that "it will not per se cause the enemy to back off."** General Westmoreland's recommendations are shown below:

* Discuss with Ky his view of the military outlook, his plan for improving the situation and his appraisal of the extent to which an increase in US presence along these lines (a) would arrest the deterioration and/or (b) would have a net counter-productive "French colonial" effect. If he suggests the latter, ask how he can offset the VC strength advantage without using additional US forces.

** Westmoreland reports that he "cannot now state what additional forces may be required in 1966 to gain and maintain the military initiative." He says that "instinctively, we believe that there may be substantial US force requirements." He has a study under way, with a fairly solid estimate due soon.

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MACV RECOMMENDED FOR 1965

III MAF	9 bn (2 due 7/5)
173d Abn Bde	2 bn
1st Inf Div	9 bn (3 due 7/15; 6 could arrive 9/1)
101st Abn Div	3 bn (due 7/28)
Air Mob Div	8 bn (due 9/1)
I MAF	3 bn (1 due 7/1; 2 could arrive in 12 days)
Total US	34 bn (175,000)
A/NZ	1 bn
ROK (or US?)	9 bn (could arrive approx. 10/15)
TOTAL	44 bn

2. Deploy 13 additional US helicopter companies and 5 additional Chinook platoons to increase effectiveness of US/GVN forces.

3. Deploy additional US artillery batteries and engineers to reinforce ARVN divisions and corps.

4. Carry out 800 B-52 sorties a month in strikes against VC havens (followed promptly by entry of ground-forces into the struck areas).

B. Against North Vietnam.* While avoiding striking population and industrial targets not closely related to the DRV's supply of war material to the VC, we should announce to Hanoi and carry out actions to destroy such supplies and to interdict their flow into and out of North Vietnam.

1. Quarantine the movement of war supplies into North Vietnam -- by sea, rail and road.

a. Mine the DRV harbors. Seaborne traffic accounts for 80% of the DRV foreign trade, including practically all POL, the single import most vital to the DRV (the DRV armed forces consume 40% of the POL and transportation most of the remainder). Sixty per cent of the bottoms are Free World under charter mainly to China, but almost all POL is carried by Communist tankers. Practically all of the seaborne traffic moves through four ports. Mining of those ports could be launched on 72 hours notice, and delayed fusing (three days) could be employed to permit ships time to exit after the fields were laid. A full mining effort to plant all fields would require 97 sorties; the fields could be sustained with 38

* Because of the short lead-times involved in all of these actions, no decision with respect to them is needed now. Actions to quarantine the ports or to intensify the strike program against the North can on short notice be made a part of an increasing-pressure program.

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sorties per month.

b. Destroy rail and highway bridges leading from China to Hanoi. There are 15 highway, 5 railroad and 8 railroad/highway bridges north and east of Hanoi. The railroads now carry between 1600 and 1900 short tons per day. Roads to Hanoi from China can support considerable truck traffic. It would take approximately 1000 sorties to carry out strikes on the 28 bridges, with 85% probability of dropping one span in each case.

c. Conduct intensive armed reconnaissance of the LOCs from China.

2. Destroy the war-making supplies and facilities of North Vietnam wherever they may be located. There are 56 unstruck targets in this category -- 1 explosive plant, 1 airfield, 5 supply and ordnance depots, 7 ammunition depots, 9 POL storage, 12 military barracks/headquarters, 2 communications facilities, 6 naval base/port facilities, and 13 power plants. Approximately 1650 strike sorties would be required to attack all of these targets. About half of them would be suitable for B-52 attack. Only three are likely to lead to more than 100 civilian casualties under daylight alert conditions.

3. Interdict movement of war supplies within and out of North Vietnam by an expanded strike and armed reconnaissance program against LOCs west and south of Hanoi.

a. Expand strike program against bridges, ferries, railroads and roads. Other than 6 locks-and-dams targets, only 4 bridges and 4 railroad shops and yards remain unstruck in this category. These eight targets would require approximately 266 sorties. Two of them -- both railroad yards in Hanoi -- would probably result in more than 100 civilian casualties. Three of them -- the two Hanoi railroad yards and the Yen Vien railroad yard -- would be suitable for B-52 strike.

b. Expand armed reconnaissance against LOCs. These LOCs south and west of Hanoi, together with the LOCs north and east of Hanoi referred to in para 1c above, should be struck by 1000 sorties a week. This would increase the total strike-plus-armed recce sorties against North Vietnam from 1800 to 5000 a month. (Efforts should be continued in Laos to interdict the "trail" there, and at sea preventing infiltration by water.)

4. Be prepared to destroy airfields and SAM sites as necessary to accomplish the objectives of sub-paras 1-3 above.

C. In the United States. Even if US deployments to Vietnam are no more than 100,000 men, we should:

1. Call up selected reserve forces (approximately 100,000 men).
2. Extend tours of duty in all Services.

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II. Expanded political moves. Together with the above military moves, we should take the following political initiatives in order (a) to open a dialogue with Hanoi, Peking, and the VC looking toward a settlement in Vietnam, (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military involvement and support of North Vietnam until the time when settlement can be achieved, and (c) to cement the support for US policy by the US public, allies and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. While our approaches may be rebuffed until the tide begins to turn, they nevertheless should be made.

A. Political Initiatives.

1. Moscow. Place a high level US representative in contact with Moscow to discuss frankly and fully with Soviet leaders our intentions and our desire to find common ground to work with them rather than come into conflict. We would reiterate that US objectives are limited but at the same time we have a firm determination to achieve them. We would stress the dangers we see to both of us in Chinese expansion, and we would recognize the Soviet need to follow a course which does not destroy its leadership in the Communist world. We would press the Soviets to avoid any deeper involvement. We would emphasize that continuation of the military phase can only be harmful to the Communist cause and urge the Soviets to step in (perhaps with British Co-Chairman) to move the situation away from war and toward a peaceful settlement.

2. United Nations. As a prelude to expansion of the military effort, we should consider once more putting before the UN the Vietnam question for discussion with the Chicoms and North Vietnamese present. They will almost surely refuse to attend and will provide us with a better position for expanding military action; but if they accept we will have the prospect of negotiations without having stopped our bombing.

3. Other international forums. In all international forums and contacts, public and private, continue to demonstrate to the world who is responsible for the trouble in Vietnam and persuade them that our course of supporting the South, including bombings, must be accepted and if possible supported. Whenever we can provide further demonstrations of Communist intransigence and refusal to treat reasonably on this question, this will strengthen our case.

4. Geneva Conference. US should propose a Geneva Conference of all world powers (including France) with the subject, "Peace in Southeast Asia."

5. NLF and DRV. GVN -- and US after consultation with the GVN -- should initiate contacts with the Liberation Front and North Vietnam, making clear a readiness to discuss ways and means of achieving settlement in Vietnam.

6. Chicoms. If there is any sign of Chinese willingness to begin discussions, US should contact the Chinese to set forth US position including our limited objective and the dangers to China of continuation of the war, and should press the Chinese to bring the aggression against the South to an end.

7. UK, Canada, India, France, U Thant. Consult individually with the British, Canadians, U Thant, Indians, French and possibly other neutrals to enlist them in taking peace initiatives bilaterally, multilaterally or through inter-

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national organizations however best calculated to bring about the participation of Communist Governments.

8. Other initiatives. In connection with paras 1-7 above, US and GVN would make it clear they stand ready to take any reasonable action which does not endanger their military posture which might improve the chances of success of any peace initiatives. This could include a bombing "pause." It could include an explicit restatement of US intention of withdrawing from South Vietnam at the appropriate time, a South Vietnamese announcement of responsible treatment of NLF-VC personnel who remain in the South, emphasis on implementation of President's April 7 offer for economic development in South East Asia, etc.

B. Initiatives inside South Vietnam. Take steps to induce VC defections and to increase support for the Ky government -- among other steps, these:

1. Economic program. Sharply expand program of economic aid in South Vietnam -- including a major construction program, junk building, increased rice and pig output, improved distribution and marketing procedures.

2. Chu Hoi program. Improve and expand Chu Hoi program -- with a good man in charge on the US side, and bounties, amnesties, work and educational opportunities, and other inducements.

III. Evaluation of the above program.

A. Domestic US reaction. Even though casualties will increase and the war will continue for some time, the United States public will support this course of action because it is a combined military-political program designed and likely to bring about a favorable solution to the Vietnam problem.

B. Communist reaction to the expanded programs.

1. Soviet. The Soviets can be expected to continue to contribute materiel and advisors to the North Vietnamese. Increased US bombing of Vietnam, including targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, SAM sites and airfields, and mining of North Vietnamese harbors, might oblige the Soviet Union to enter the contest more actively with volunteers and aircraft. This might result in minor encounters between US and Soviet personnel.

2. China. So long as no US or GVN troops invade North Vietnam and so long as no US or GVN aircraft attack Chinese territory, the Chinese probably will not send regular ground forces or aircraft into the war. However, the possibility of a more active Soviet involvement in North Vietnam might precipitate a Chinese introduction of land forces, probably dubbed volunteers, to preclude the Soviets' taking a pre-eminent position in North Vietnam.

3. North Vietnam. North Vietnam will not move towards the negotiating table until the tide begins to turn in the south. When that happens, they may seek to counter it by sending large numbers of men into South Vietnam.

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4. Viet Cong. The VC, especially if they continue to take high losses, can be expected to depend increasingly upon the PAVN forces as the war moves into a more conventional phase; but they may find ways of continuing almost indefinitely their present intensive military, guerrilla and terror activities, particularly if reinforced with some regular PAVN units. A key question on the military side is whether POL, ammunition and cadres can be cut off and if they are cut off whether this really renders the Viet Cong impotent. A key question on the political side is whether any arrangement acceptable to us would be acceptable to the VC.

C. Estimate of success.

1. Militarily. The success of the above program from a military point of view turns on whether the increased effort stems the tide in the South; that in turn depends on two things -- on whether the South Vietnamese hold their own in terms of numbers and fighting spirit, and on whether the US forces can be effective in a quick-reaction reserve role, a role in which they have not been tested. The number of US troops is too small to make a significant difference in the traditional 10-1 government-guerrilla formula, but it is not too small to make a significant difference in the kind of war which seems to be evolving in Vietnam -- a "Third Stage" or conventional war in which it is easier to identify, locate and attack the enemy. (South Vietnam has 141 battalions as compared with an estimated equivalent number of VC battalions. The 44 US/3d country battalions mentioned above are the equivalent of 100 South Vietnamese battalions.)

2. Politically. It is frequently alleged that such a large expansion of US military personnel, their expanded military role (which would put them in close contact and offer some degree of control over South Vietnamese citizens), and the inevitable expansion of US voice in the operation of the GVN economy and facilities, command and government services will be unpopular; it is said that they could lead to the rejection of the government which supported this American presence, to an irresistible pressure for expulsion of the Americans, and to the greatly increased saleability of Communist propaganda. Whether these allegations are true, we do not know.

The political initiatives are likely to be successful in the early stages only to demonstrate US good faith; they will pay off toward an actual settlement only after the tide begins to turn (unless we lower our sights substantially). The tide almost certainly cannot begin to turn in less than a few months, and may not for a year or more; the war is one of attrition and will be a long one. Since troops once committed as a practical matter cannot be removed, since US casualties will rise, since we should take call-up actions to support the additional forces in Vietnam, the test of endurance may be as much in the United States as in Vietnam.

3. Generally (CIA estimate). Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and until two conditions prevail: (1) they are forced to accept a situation in the war in the South which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damaging punitive


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attack. So long as the Communists think they scent the possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe that they will persevere and accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi's doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to carry on the Southern struggle almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions outlined above should be brought to pass, we believe Hanoi probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam.

Hanoi might do so in several ways. Going for a conference as a political way of gaining a respite from attack would be one. Alternatively it might reduce the level of insurgent activity in the hopes that this would force the US to stop its punishment of the North but not prevent the US and GVN from remaining subject to wearying harassment in the South. Or, Hanoi might order the VC to suspend operations in the hopes that in a period of temporary tranquility, domestic and international opinion would force the US to disengage without destroying the VC apparatus or the roots of VC strength. Finally, Hanoi might decide that the US/GVN will to fight could still be broken and the tide of war turned back again in favor of the VC by launching a massive PAVN assault on the South. This is a less likely option in the circumstances we have posited, but still a contingency for which the US must be prepared.


Robert S. McNamara

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last 3 years you have trained one of the outstanding administrators in this Government, and I get so many calls from the Defense Department to make decisions that I have just come over to the Defense Department and got one of your outstanding administrators, Mr. Joseph Califano, to move over to the White House and kind of help take charge of it. So he has not only been helping run the Pentagon, but now he is helping run the White House. And I want to thank you for making him available to me.

I want to publicly thank General Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for his wisdom and counsel during the period that I have been President.

There are many honored and hallowed names on the honor roll of the Chiefs of Staff and the Chairmen of the Chiefs of Staff, but there is none that is greater or has contributed finer service or more wisdom and understanding than the man who now occupies that high office, and if I weren't fearful that I would be charged with plagiarizing Jack Valenti, I would say that I sleep better every night when I sleep, because of General Wheeler.

NOTE: The President spoke at 11:05 a.m. in the Pentagon. In the course of his remarks, he referred to Joseph A. Califano, Jr., whose appointment as Special Assistant to the President was announced by Press Secretary Bill Moyers at his news conference on July 24. Before the appointment, Mr. Califano was serving as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

The President's News Conference of July 28, 1965

Report to the Nation Following a
Review of U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam

My fellow Americans:

Not long ago I received a letter from a woman in the Midwest. She wrote:

"Dear Mr. President:

"In my humble way I am writing to you about the crisis in Viet-Nam. I have a son who is now in Viet-Nam. My husband served in World War II. Our country was at war, but now, this time, it is just something that I don't understand. Why?"

Well, I have tried to answer that question dozens of times and more in practically every State in this Union. I have

discussed it fully in Baltimore in April, in Washington in May, in San Francisco in June. Let me again, now, discuss it here in the East Room of the White House.

Why must young Americans, born into a land exultant with hope and with golden promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die in such a remote and distant place?

The answer, like the war itself, is not an easy one, but it echoes clearly from the painful lessons of half a century. Three times in my lifetime in two world wars and in Korea Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and a brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.

It is this lesson that has brought us to Viet-Nam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Viet-Nam at times with understandable grievances have joined in the attack on their own government.

But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Viet-Nam and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism.

There are great stakes in the balance.

Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist the growing might and the grasping ambition of Asian communism.

Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Viet-Nam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise, or in American protection.

In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened and an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself.

We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another country, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict, as we have learned from the lessons of history.

Moreover, we are in Viet-Nam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American Nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.

Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Viet-Nam have fought for many long years. Thousands of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We just cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment, or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow.

This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Viet-Nam.

THE NATION'S GOALS IN VIET-NAM

What are our goals in that war-strained land?

First, we intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms or by superior power. They are not easily convinced. In recent months they have greatly increased their fighting forces and their attacks and the number of incidents.

I have asked the Commanding General, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs.

I have today ordered to Viet-Nam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested.

This will make it necessary to increase our active fighting forces by raising the monthly draft call from 17,000 over a period of time to 35,000 per month, and for us to step up our campaign for voluntary enlistments.

After this past week of deliberations, I have concluded that it is not essential to order Reserve units into service now. If that necessity should later be indicated, I will give the matter most careful consideration and I will give the country—you—an adequate notice before taking such action, but only after full preparations.

We have also discussed with the Government of South Viet-Nam lately, the steps that we will take to substantially increase their own effort, both on the battlefield and toward reform and progress in the villages. Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a new program to be tested upon his return to that area.

I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara to be available immediately to the Congress to review with these committees, the appropriate Congressional committees, what we plan to do in these areas. I have asked them to be able to answer the questions of any Member of Congress.

Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask the Senate Appropriations Committee to add a limited amount to present

legislation to help meet part of this new cost until a supplemental measure is ready and hearings can be held when the Congress assembles in January. In the meantime, we will use the authority contained in the present Defense appropriation bill under consideration to transfer funds in addition to the additional money that we will ask.

These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement.

We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can perceive, nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power, but we will not surrender and we will not retreat.

For behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources, I believe, of all of the American Nation.

OUR READINESS TO NEGOTIATE

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable.

We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table. I have stated publicly and many times, again and again, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any government at any place at any time. Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions with the help of 40 nations throughout the world, but there has been no answer.

But we are going to continue to persist, if persist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost.

I have spoken many times of our objectives in Viet-Nam. So has the government of South Viet-Nam. Hanoi has set forth its own proposals. We are ready to discuss their proposals and our proposals and any proposals of any government whose people may be affected, for we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the battlefield.

In this pursuit we welcome and we ask for the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations. If the United Nations and its officials or any one of its 114 members can by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and the gratitude of the United States of America.

LETTER TO U THANT

I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to New York today and to present immediately to Secretary General U Thant a letter from me requesting that all the resources, energy, and immense prestige of the United Nations be em-

ployed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Viet-Nam.

I made a similar request at San Francisco a few weeks ago, because we do not seek the destruction of any government, nor do we covet a foot of any territory. But we insist and we will always insist that the people of South Viet-Nam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South or throughout all Viet-Nam under international supervision, and they shall not have any government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.

This was the purpose of the 1954 agreements which the Communists have now cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those agreements was tragically weak, its purposes still guide our action. As battle rages, we will continue as best we can to help the good people of South Viet-Nam enrich the condition of their life, to feed the hungry and to tend the sick, and teach the young, and shelter the homeless, and help the farmer to increase his crops, and the worker to find a job.

It is an ancient but still terrible irony that while many leaders of men create division in pursuit of grand ambitions, the children of man are really united in the simple elusive desire for a life of fruitful and rewarding toil.

As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, I hope that one day we can help all the people of Asia toward that desire. Eugene Black has made great progress since my appearance in Baltimore in that direction—not as the price of peace, for we are ready always to bear a more painful cost, but rather as a part of our obligations of justice toward our fellow man.

Let me also add now a personal note. I do not find it easy to send the flower of our youth, our finest young men, into battle. I have spoken to you today of the divisions and the forces and the battalions and the units, but I know them all, every one. I have seen them in a thousand streets, of a hundred towns, in every State in this Union—working and laughing and building, and filled with hope and life. I think I know, too, how their mothers weep and how their families sorrow.

This is the most agonizing and the most painful duty of your President.

There is something else, too. When I was young, poverty was so common that we didn't know it had a name. An education was something that you had to fight for, and water was really life itself. I have now been in public life 35 years, more than three decades, and in each of those 35 years I have seen good men, and

wise leaders, struggle to bring the blessings of this land to all of our people.

And now I am the President. It is now my opportunity to help every child get an education, to help every Negro and every American citizen have an equal opportunity, to have every family get a decent home, and to help bring healing to the sick and dignity to the old.

As I have said before, that is what I have lived for, that is what I have wanted all my life since I was a little boy, and I do not want to see all those hopes and all those dreams of so many people for so many years now drowned in the wasteful ravages of cruel wars. I am going to do all I can do to see that that never happens.

But I also know, as a realistic public servant, that as long as there are men who hate and destroy, we must have the courage to resist, or we will see it all, all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom—all, *all* will be swept away on the flood of conquest.

So, too, this shall not happen. We will stand in Viet-Nam.

VOICE OF AMERICA APPOINTMENT; JOHN CHANCELLOR

Now, what America is, and was, and hopes to stand for as an important national asset, telling the truth to this world, telling an exciting story, is the Voice of America. I classify this assignment in the front rank of importance to the freedom of the world, and that is why today I am proud to announce to you the name of the man who will direct the Voice of America.

He is a man whose voice and whose face and whose mind is known to this country and to most of the entire world. His name is John Chancellor.

Mr. Chancellor was born 38 years ago in Chicago. For more than 15 years he has been with the news department of the National Broadcasting Company. During that time he has covered the world—in Vienna, London, Moscow, New York, Brussels, Berlin, and Washington.

Since 1964 he has been with you, one of the White House correspondents.

This, I think, is the first time in the history of the Voice of America that a working newspaperman, a respected commentator, an experienced, independent reporter, has been given the responsibility of leadership and direction in this vital enterprise. I think he understands the challenges that are present and the achievements that are possible.

I am satisfied that the Voice of America will be in imaginative, competent, reliable, and always truthful hands.

Stand up, John, will you please?

NOMINATION OF ABE FORTAS TO SUPREME COURT

The President has few responsibilities of greater importance or greater consequence to the country's future than the constitutional responsibility of nominating Justices for the Supreme Court of the United States.

I am happy today, here in the East Room, to announce that the distinguished American who was my first choice for the position now vacant on the Supreme Court, has agreed to accept this call to this vital duty. I will very shortly, this afternoon, send to the United States Senate my nomination of the Honorable Abe Fortas to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

For many, many years, I have regarded Mr. Fortas as one of this Nation's most able and most respected, and most outstanding citizens, a scholar, a profound thinker, a lawyer of superior ability, and a man of humane and deeply compassionate feelings toward his fellowman—a champion of our liberties. That opinion is shared by the legal profession and by the Bar of this country, by Members of the Congress and by the leaders of business and labor, and other sectors of our national life.

Mr. Fortas has, as you know, told me on numerous occasions in the last 20 months, that he would not be an applicant or a candidate, or would not accept any appointment to any public office. This is, I guess, as it should be, for in this instance the job has sought the man. Mr. Fortas agrees that the duty and the opportunity of service on the highest court of this great country, is not a call that any citizen can reject.

So I am proud for the country that he has, this morning, accepted this appointment and will serve his country as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

I will be glad to take your questions now for a period.

QUESTIONS: THE WAR IN VIET-NAM

Q. Mr. President, in the light of the decisions on Viet-Nam which you have just announced, is the United States prepared with additional plans should North Viet-Nam escalate its military effort and how do you anticipate that the Chinese Communists will react to what you have announced today?

THE PRESIDENT. I do not want to speculate on the reactions of other people. This Nation is prepared, and will always be prepared, to protect its national interest.

Q. Mr. President, you have never talked about a timetable in connection with Viet-Nam. You have said, and you repeated today, that the United States will not be defeated; will not grow tired.

Donald Johnson, National Commander of the American Legion, went over to Viet-Nam in the spring and later called on you. He told White House reporters that he could imagine the war over there going on for 5, 6, or 7 years. Have you thought of that possibility, sir? And do you think the American people ought to think of that possibility?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I think the American people ought to understand that there is no quick solution to the problem that we face there. I would not want to prophesy or predict whether it would be a matter of months or years or decades. I do not know that we had any accurate timetable on how long it would take to bring victory in World War I. I don't think anyone really knew whether it would be 2 years or 4 years, or 6 years, to meet with success in World War II. I do think our cause is just. I do think our purposes and objectives are beyond any question.

I do believe that America will stand united behind her men that are there. I plan, as long as I am President, to see that our forces are strong enough to protect our national interest, our right hand constantly protecting that interest with our military, and that our diplomatic and political negotiations are constantly attempting to find some solution that would substitute words for bombs.

As I have said so many times, if anyone questions our good faith and will ask us to meet them to try to reason this matter out, they will find us at the appointed place at the appointed time, in the proper chair.

GHANA-HANOI DISCUSSIONS

Q. Mr. President, there is now a representative of the Government of Ghana in Hanoi talking with the Foreign Minister of North Viet-Nam about the war in Viet-Nam. Do you see any indication of hope that something good will come of these talks?

THE PRESIDENT. We are always hopeful that every effort in that direction will meet with success. We welcome those efforts as we welcomed the Commonwealth proposal, as we welcomed Mr. Davies' visit, as we welcomed the Indian suggestion, as we have welcomed the efforts of the distinguished Prime Minister of Great Britain and others from time to time.

As I just said, I hope that every member of the United Nations that has any idea, any plan, any program, any suggestion, that they will not let them go unexplored.

EFFECT ON THE ECONOMY

Q. Mr. President, from what you have outlined as your program for now, it

would seem that you feel that we can have guns and butter for the foreseeable future. Do you have any idea right now, though, that down the road a piece the American people may have to face the problem of guns or butter?

THE PRESIDENT. I have not the slightest doubt but whatever it is necessary to face, the American people will face. I think that all of us know that we are now in the 52nd month of the prosperity that has been unequalled in this Nation, and I see no reason for declaring a national emergency and I rejected that course of action earlier today when I made my decision.

I cannot foresee what next year or the following year or the following year will hold. I only know that the Americans will do whatever is necessary. At the moment we enjoy the good fortune of having an unparalleled period of prosperity with us, and this government is going to do all it can to see it continue.

Mr. Lisagor?

MISSILE SITES IN NORTH VIET-NAM

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us whether the missile sites in North Viet-Nam that were bombed yesterday were manned by Russians and whether or not the administration has a policy about Russian technicians in North Viet-Nam?

THE PRESIDENT. No, we have no information as to how they were manned. We cannot speak with any authority on that matter. We made the decision that we felt our national interests required, and as those problems present themselves we will face up to them.

REACTION OF FRIENDLY NATIONS

Q. Mr. President, I wonder if you have had any communications from Chiang Kai-shek that he is ready to go to war with you?

THE PRESIDENT. We have communicated with most of the friendly nations of the world in the last few days and we have received from them responses that have been encouraging. I would not want to go into any individual response here, but I would say that I have indicated to all of the friendly nations what our problems were there, the decision that confronted us, and asked for their help and for their suggestions.

Mr. Roberts?

ATTITUDE OF SOVIET UNION

Q. Mr. President, given the Russian military involvement, or apparent involvement on the side of Hanoi on the one side, and the dialog which Mr. Harriman has been conducting for you on the other, as well as the disarmament talks in Geneva at the moment, could you tell us whether you believe this war,

as you now call it, can be contained in this corner of Southeast Asia without involving a U.S.-Soviet confrontation?

THE PRESIDENT. We would hope very much that it could and we will do nothing to provoke that confrontation if we can avoid it. As you know, immediately after I assumed the Presidency I immediately sent messages to the Soviet Union. We have had frequent exchange of views by letter and by conversation with Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Dobrynin. We are doing nothing to provoke the Soviet Union. We are very happy that they agreed to resume the disarmament conference.

I went to some length to try to extend ourselves to make the proposals that I would hope would meet with acceptance of the peoples of the world. We would like to believe that there could be some success flow from this conference although we have not been too successful.

I know of nothing that we have in mind that should arouse the distrust or provoke any violence on the part of the Soviet Union.

ROLE OF SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Q. Mr. President, does the fact that you are sending additional forces to Viet-Nam imply any change in the existing policy of relying mainly on the South Vietnamese to carry out offensive operations and using American forces to guard American installations and to act as an emergency backup?

THE PRESIDENT. It does not imply any change in policy whatever. It does not imply any change of objective.

THE UNITED NATIONS

Q. Mr. President, would you like to see the United Nations now move formally as an organization to attempt to achieve a settlement in Viet-Nam?

THE PRESIDENT. I have made very clear in my San Francisco speech my hope that the Secretary General, under his wise leadership, would explore every possibility that might lead to a solution of this matter. In my letter to the Secretary General this morning, which Ambassador Goldberg will deliver later in the day, I reiterate my hopes and my desires and I urge upon him that he—if he agrees—that he undertake new efforts in this direction.

Ambassador Goldberg understands the challenge. We spent the weekend talking about the potentialities and the possibilities, our hopes and our dreams, and I believe that we will have an able advocate and a searching negotiator who, I would hope, would some day find success.

Mrs. Craig?

CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS

Q. Mr. President, what are the borders of your power to conduct a war? At what point might you have to ask Congress for a declaration?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't know. That would depend on the circumstances. I can't pinpoint the date on the calendar, or the hour of the day. I have to ask Congress for their judgments and for their decisions almost every hour of the day.

One of the principal duties of the office of President is to maintain constant consultation. I have talked to, I guess, more than 50 Members of Congress in the last 24 hours. I have submitted myself to their questions, and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense will meet with them tomorrow if they are ready, to answer any questions that they may need.

Up to now, we have had ample authority, excellent cooperation, a united Congress behind us, and—as near as I could tell from my meetings last night with the leaders, and from my meetings today with the distinguished chairmen of the committees and the members of both parties—we all met as Americans, united and determined to stand as one.

THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE

Q. Mr. President, in this connection, however, last night one of the leading Governors of the Republicans said some rather strong things. Governor Hatfield of Oregon said the most recent escalation of action in Viet-Nam is moving all the people of the world closer to world war III, and we have no moral right to commit the world and especially our own people to world war III unilaterally or by the decision of a few experts.

This seemed to imply rather strong criticism of present policies. Do you care to express any reaction?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes. I don't interpret it that way. I think that there are dangers in escalation. I don't think I have any right to commit the whole world to world war III. I am doing everything I know how to avoid it. But retreat is not necessarily the best way to avoid it.

I have outlined to you what I think is the best policy. I would hope that Governor Hatfield and the other Governors, when they understand what we are doing, and when I have a chance to submit myself to their questioning and to counsel with them, would share my view.

I know they have the same concern for the American people and the people of the world as I do. I don't believe our objectives will be very different.

As a matter of fact, I asked the Governors if they could, to come here at the

conclusion of their deliberations. I will have my plane go to Minneapolis tomorrow, and I believe 43 of the 43 have indicated a desire to come here.

I will give them all the information I can—confidential, secret, and otherwise—because I have great respect for them, their judgments, their opinions, and their leadership. It is going to be necessary in this effort.

I will also have the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense review with them all their plans and answer any of their inquiries and we hope resolve any doubts they might have. Nancy?

Q. Mr. President, after the week of deliberations on Viet-Nam, how do you feel—in the context of your office? We always hear it is the loneliest in the world.

THE PRESIDENT. Nancy, I am sorry, but because of the cameras and microphones, I didn't get your question. Raise the microphone up where I can hear, and you camera boys give her a chance.

Q. Mr. President, I said, after the week of deliberations on Viet-Nam, how do you feel, personally, particularly in the context we always hear that your office is the loneliest in the world?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I don't agree with that. I don't guess there is anyone in this country that has as much understanding and as much help, and as many experts, and as good advice, and many people of both parties trying to help them, as they are me. Of course I admit I need it more than anybody else.

Nancy, I haven't been lonely the last few days—I have had lots of callers.

POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATION WITH THE VIET CONG

Q. Mr. President, would you be willing to permit direct negotiations with the Viet Cong forces that are in South Viet-Nam?

THE PRESIDENT. We have stated time and time again that we would negotiate with any government, any place, any time. The Viet Cong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their views presented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants to cease aggression. And I would not think that would be an insurmountable problem at all. I think that could be worked out. Mike?

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

Q. Mr. President, to shift the subject just a moment, does your appointment of Mr. Gardner suggest that there will be less interest now in the creation of a separate department of education?

THE PRESIDENT. No, not at all. My appointment of Mr. Gardner suggests that I looked over America to find the very

best man I could to lead us forward to become an educated nation where every child obtains all the education that he can take and where the health of every citizen is his prime concern, and where the Social Security system is brought to the needs of the 20th century.

After canvassing some 40 or 50 possibilities, I concluded that Mr. Gardner was the best man I could get. I asked his Board to relieve him of his duties and release him to the Government so that he could furnish the dynamic leadership officially that he has been furnishing unofficially to us.

He told me yesterday morning that he was prepared to do that. I remembered that I had not asked him what State he lived in, where his permanent residence was, so I could put it on the nomination paper, or what party he belonged to. And he rather—well, maybe somewhat hesitantly said, "I'm a Republican."

I don't mean that his hesitating meant any particular significance, but I was happy that he said that because a good many Republicans voted for me and I don't want to be partial or partisan in this administration. I like to see leadership of that kind come from the Republican ranks. So I told him if he had no objections, I would announce very promptly his appointment and I hoped that he would give us American leadership without regard to party. And that's what I think he will do. I believe all the Nation will be proud of him as we are of Secretary Celebrezze.

Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President.

NOTE: President Johnson's forty-seventh news conference was held in the East Room of the White House at 12:34 p.m. on Wednesday, July 28, 1965.

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Letter Accepting Resignation of Anthony J. Celebrezze as Secretary. July 28, 1965

My dear Tony:

You leave this Administration to sit on the bench of one of the highest courts in the land. I am aware that this new calling coincides with your own desires, and no man is more deserving.

You go with my reluctance. No Cabinet officer has worked longer, harder, with a more zestful spirit, than you. The results of what you have done are plainly evident in the Congress, and will

leave even larger imprints in the objective scrutiny of history.

The legacy you bequeath, not merely to your successor, but to the succeeding generations of Americans, is the mark of your achievement. Medical care for the aged; education for more young people too often disadvantaged; bold new pathways in combatting disease, particularly the unapprehended killers: cancer, stroke and heart disease; in all these adventures you were both leader and tireless worker.

You carry with you the gratitude of an advancing nation, and you take with you the appreciation and the friendship of your President.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

[Honorable Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.]

Dear Mr. President:

It is with deep emotion that I submit my resignation as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, effective at your early convenience.

It has been a priceless privilege to serve under your leadership during a period of extraordinary advances in human dignity. The programs of this Department are in the forefront of your conception of the Great Society. You have given a great forward thrust to the dignity of man by your tireless efforts on behalf of civil rights, extending and improving education for those who need it most, security against the high cost of illness in old age, and aid to the disadvantaged and handicapped—a greater forward thrust than has been given in any similar period in our national history. Working under your leadership and that of President Kennedy for these objectives has been a most satisfying experience for which I shall always feel deeply grateful.

No one can go through such an experience without developing a strong attachment to the programs and a deep appreciation for the fine work of the great number of dedicated people who have assisted in formulating and carrying out these programs, in this Department, in your Office, and in the Congress. To these faithful Federal servants, as well as to you, Mr. President, I am greatly indebted.

If I may be of service to you in any way at any time, I stand ready to do so.

Faithfully yours,

ANTHONY J. CELEBREZZE
Secretary

[The President, The White House, Washington, D.C.]

NOTE: For the President's announcement of his intention to appoint Mr. Celebrezze to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, see release dated July 27, 1965, this issue.

The United Nations and the Conflict in Viet-Nam

Letter to Secretary-General U Thant
Expressing Confidence in Ambassador
Goldberg and Hope for U.N. Help.
July 28, 1965

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

I want you to know from me directly of the very great personal confidence which I place in Ambassador Goldberg. His appointment as Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations—and his acceptance of this responsibility in the circumstances—is, I hope, strong evidence that this Government places the very highest importance on the work of the United Nations and will continue to give it our utmost support.

I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg especially to maintain close contact with you on the situation in Viet-Nam. Your efforts in the past to find some way to remove that dispute from the battlefield to the negotiating table are much appreciated and highly valued by my Government. I trust they will be continued.

Meanwhile, as I stated publicly last April, the Government of the United States is prepared to enter into negotiations for peaceful settlement without conditions. That remains our policy.

And as I stated in San Francisco last month, we hope that the Members of the United Nations, individually and collectively, will use their influence to bring to the negotiating table all governments involved in an attempt to halt all aggression and evolve a peaceful solution. I continue to hope that the United Nations can, in fact, be effective in this regard.

I hope that you will communicate to us, through Ambassador Goldberg, any helpful suggestions that may occur to you that can strengthen our common search for the road to peace in Southeast Asia.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

[His Excellency U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, United Nations, New York]

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FROM:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DEF 6980 From OASD(PA)

For Public Affairs Officers.

This is a Public Affairs Policy Cable.

The Secretary of Defense gave a background briefing on 28 July to representatives of news media; all comments on background basis attributable to U. S. officials.

In reply to query, SecDef made the following points:

a. It is anticipated that an amendment to the FY 66 Appropriation Bill will be requested in the amount of from one to two billion dollars. Also a supplemental appropriation will probably be requested from Congress when it reconvenes in January 1966.

b. New Army units will probably be created to offset Army units to be sent to South Viet Nam. One additional divisions and additional brigades are contemplated.

c. It will probably be another week or two before a decision on the MOL program is made.

d. It will probably be necessary to utilize the draft to provide the Navy with additional personnel required.

e. The following analysis was accomplished before and after SecDef's recent visit to South Viet Nam: in arriving at decisions announced by the President on 28 July:

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1. It was believed the Viet Cong had been increasing its strength in South Viet Nam.

2. It was recognized that all of the increase had not been committed to combat.

3. 3. It was anticipated that Viet Cong increased strength would be committed to combat during the summer and early fall.

4. Marked increases in Viet Cong activities were being observed.

5. The Viet Cong forces are composed of approximately 65,000 regulars and 100,000 irregulars for a total of 165,000. South Viet Nam forces total 550,000, or a ratio of 1 to 3. However, the ratio of combat battalions was somewhat less, approximately 1 to 1 1/2. This is an unsatisfactory ratio for encountering guerrilla forces as shown in the Malaya situation where the ratio was 1 to 10.

6. Mobility and fire power had been added to South Viet Nam's forces but not enough to overcome disparity.

7. Under above circumstances deteriorating situations could be expected unless additional forces were introduced into South Viet Nam.

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8. The question was what additional forces were

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required. Not since the Cuban missile crisis has such care been taken in making a decision. On the average of 4 hours per day has been spent with the President in discussing this problem. In addition, the President sought the advise of every responsible Government official in coming to a decision.

9. Alternative discussions prior to making the decision were:

- (a) Intensification of military pressure on the Communist Bloc.
- (b) Completely withdrawing all U. S. forces from South Viet Nam.
- (c) Remaining in South Viet Nam with essentially the present force structure.
- (d) Providing additional forces to South Viet Nam together with a call-up of reserve components to replace these forces.
- (e) Providing additional forces to South Viet Nam and activating additional units of the regular forces to replace these forces.

10. Little consideration was given to alternatives a and b above. Alternative c would limit risks and expenses, but would result in a deteriorating situation. After considerable

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM-CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

A

OSD WASHDC

thought alternative e was determined to be the most desirable since components of the reserves are a perishable commodity, i. e., Congress would probably only authorize the call-up for a period of one year, It was considered the most acceptable course of action to continue to increase the readiness of the reserve components and use them only when they can be utilized more effectively than if was thought they might be at this time.

f. There is no reason to believe that operations in South Viet Nam will grow to the size of the Korean campaign. Wage control, price control and other limits on the economy will not be necessary.

g. Losses have been small. For example, only one helicopter has been lost for every 10,000 sorties and ammunition expended for U. S. troops in South Viet Nam has not been large but will increase. As U. S. forces are added it will be necessary to estimate production increases needed to provide for their requirements. Until estimates of these production increases are completed, it will be impossible to give firm figures for increases in appropriations.

h. SecDef received the following strong impressions during his recent visit to South Viet Nam:

1. The Viet Cong have increased the use of terror

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PAGE NR 5

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tactics to a marked degree, and simultaneously increased the size of unit attacks. Major highways and railroads have been interdicted in many places, isolating a number of provincial capitols. The purpose of the Viet Cong has been to dismember the country and at the same time maul the Army.

2. U. S. military personnel are performing their duties in an absolutely magnificent manner.

i. An additional 50,000 men are presently being sent to South Viet Nam including 13 additional Army battalions and support units. 8 of the 13 battalions are from the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile). A Navy carrier will be used to transport the Army aircraft integral to these air mobile battalions.

j. There is no change in the combat role of U. S. forces in South Viet Nam. South Viet Nameese will continue to carry the brunt of the battle and U. S. forces will form the tactical reserve.

k. The Army division contemplated for activation will not be an air mobiley division but probably a mechanized infantry division.

l. The August draft call, effective in October, will contain the first increase.

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OSD WASHDC

m. Additional materiel to be procured will be largely bombs, additional helicopters (not because of combat losses, but because of the combat value of helicopters in South Viet Nam), and additional aircraft. Approximately 3,200 helicopters have been purchased over the last four years. Approximately 7 to 8 hundred are planned for purchase in the FY 66 budget.

n. It may be necessary to organize ^{additional} U. S. Army Headquarters in South Viet Nam under MACV's control.

o. It is not visualized that a traditional military situation will develop in South Viet Nam soon. The activities of the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam during the monsoon season are generally what we expected.

p. There is no additional information on damage to the two SAM sites recently attacked. Photo reconnaissance has not been completed.

q. There will be no movement of U. S. forces or materiel from Europe to South Viet Nam.

r. The U. S. has no knowledge of any SAM sites around Haiphong.

s. SecDef is fully satisfied with the weapons available in South Viet Nam. There is nothing the military commanders ave requested that they have not received. The U.S. is vastly

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM-CONTINUATION SHEET

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increasing the number of helicopters available to the Army.
There have been differences between the Marine Corps and the Army as to arming helicopters. Experience in South Viet Nam is resulting in concepts of the Marine Corps and the Army coming closer together.

SCP-4

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INITIALS

DD FORM 173-1
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★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964-714-939

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7-28-65
6:25P

NR 7/28

19

29a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 28, 1965 - 6:10 p.m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Phone call to Jack McCloy and Arthur Dean

1. I called Jack McCloy this morning -- and Douglass Cater called Arthur Dean -- to give them a fill-in on the background of your final decisions on Vietnam. They both understood and approved of the international reasons for not blowing the thing way up to the level of option 4. Dean is going full steam, and McCloy is doing what he can to help him.

2. McCloy asked me to tell you that he has heard a lot of playback about Dean Rusk's appearance at Bohemian Grove, and that it was a really outstanding success. He said that he had noticed your reluctance to let Dean go last week, and thought you would want to know of the really deep impression which the Secretary of State made on this group. McCloy stated he had this not from beer-drinking lobbyists but from first-rate people. The conversation occurred just before the news conference and I did not have time to find out just whom he was quoting.

McG. B.
McG. B.

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By Cooper

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RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
RUEHCR/STATE DEPT
RUECEM/CMC
RUCKHC/CINCLANT
RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By ip, NARS, Date 4-6-78

~~SECRET~~ JCS 6893 JCS SEND
SUBJ: DEPLOYMENT OF US ARMY FORCES (U)
REFS: A. JCS 2343/602-3 (NOTAL); B. JCS 9375/200010Z
R 65 (NOTAL); C. DEF 8876/102123Z APR 65
1. (S) DEPLOY TO SVN THE FORCES LISTED BELOW BY LINE
ITEM NUMBER AS REFLECTED IN THE 19 JULY REVISED ANNEX
TO APPENDIX TO REF A. APPROXIMATE CLOSURE DATES ARE AS
INDICATED.
A. ITEM 4: AIR MOBILE DIVISION: 9-13 SEP 65
B. ITEM 5: COMBAT SUPPORT FOR AIR MOBILE DIVISION:

V Bundy

PAGE 2 RUEKDA 092 ~~SECRET~~
19 SEP 65

C. ITEM 6: LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR AIR MOBILE
DIVISION: 19 SEP 65
2. (S) DEPLOYMENTS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH REF B.
3. (U) PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONCERNING DEPLOYMENTS ARE
GOVERNED BY THE POLICY ESTABLISHED IN REFERENCE C. ANY
DEVIATION FROM THIS POLICY MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY CASD
(PA). GP-4.
BT

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

14870

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

31a

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85
Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE 263

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Info

INFO: CINCPAC
COMUSMACV
DOD

JUL 28 8 12 PM '65

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By ip, NARS, Date 4-6-78

LIMDIS

1. Following approved deployments of US forces to South Viet-Nam directed by JCS today:

(a) Airmobile division to close September 9-18, 1965, strength 15,849.

(b) Combat support for airmobile division to close by September 19, 1965, strength 2,777.

(c) Logistic support for airmobile division to close by September 19, 1965, strength 7,540.

(d) ~~Block~~ Marine Amphibious Brigade ~~from West PAC~~, including three HMM squadrons, to close by August 10, 1965, strength 9,650.

2. In addition to above deployments, it is expected that JCS will direct deployment of ~~Block~~ Field Forces Headquarters, to deploy ASAP, approximate strength 253.

3. You should inform GVN of aforementioned deployments and estimated closure dates.

4. Public statements concerning deployments are governed by policy established in Defense 8876/102123Z April 1965.

GP-4

END

Drafted by:

FE:RMCowherd:gm MB

7/28/65

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

FE- Leonard Unger

RUSK

Clearances:

P - Mr. Arzac (subs.) MB
OSD/ISA - Col. Miller (subs.) MB

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~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

13485

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

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Info

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON ~~IMMEDIATE~~ FLASH 237

JUL 26 9 18 PM '65

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter FEB 27 1979

Saigon's 266 and Deptel 236 By isg, NARS, Date 7-18-79

There follows rough first draft of possible US position to be stated at a high level concerning augmentation US forces South Viet-Nam. You should show this draft to General Ky in your July 27 meeting and secure his concurrence, as noted final para ref Deptel. In discussion with Ky (e.g. calling reserves) you should not refer to other related actions/which may be taken in connection with these deployments but on which final decisions not yet made.

QUOTE In this last week the situation in Viet-Nam and the actions it requires have again been reviewed. This has been the most careful and sustained review that has been made at any time since President Johnson took office. The President has discussed the problem with members of the Cabinet--Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Goldberg. He has discussed it with distinguished Americans in private life who have earned the thanks of their country by earlier service, like Mr. Arthur Dean and Mr. John McCloy. He has had the advice of two great Ambassadors, Maxwell Taylor and Henry Cabot Lodge. He has talked at length

Drafted by:

FE:L Unger:gm

7/26/65

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

FE - Leonard Unger

Clearances:

White House - Mr. Bundy (subs.)

FE - Mr. Bundy (subs.)

S/S Mr. Tueller

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with the leaders of the Senate and the House of Representatives. By personal messages and diplomatic discussions the problem has been reviewed with friends and allies in foreign countries. Out of these deliberations have come three important decisions--

The first is that US policy and purpose in Viet-Nam are sound and right.

The second is that the US must now take important additional military measures in support of that policy and purpose.

The third is that the US should continue and intensify its diplomatic search for peace.

The US purpose and policy in Viet-Nam are right. The US is there to keep a promise. That promise was and is to help the people and Government of South Viet-Nam to help themselves against attack supported from outside. This American commitment must and will be kept--both for its own sake and for its meaning to world peace. For the peace of the world cannot be kept if there is not respect for the given word of the United States of America.

But there is more to it than that. South Viet-Nam is not the only small state which is threatened by external pressure and ambition. It is not the only country menaced by subversion and infiltration and terror. If South Viet-Nam is lost, then others are weakened.

And finally, the US is there because it has a deep and enduring national interest in preventing the Communist conquest of Asia. It seeks nothing in Asia for itself, but the independence of the peoples of Asia is essential to

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the peace of the world and to American security itself.

In pursuit of these great purposes, the US has supported and sustained its friends in Asia for a quarter of a century, in war and in peace. It has respected their choice of neutrality or alignment. It has respected their right to determine their own political and social systems. It has helped them to resist aggression--whether by open attack as in Korea, or by bombardment and threat as in the Formosa Straits, or by the more complex and destructive methods now in use against Viet-Nam. This course of action has been right, and it is right today.

And now it is necessary that the US increase its effort in Viet-Nam. The battles of the spring and early summer have brought heavy losses to both sides. It is clear that over a period of many months there has been a growth in the infiltration of Communist forces from North Viet-Nam. The armed forces of South Viet-Nam continue to fight with great courage and with growing skill. But they need more help, and they will get it.

Authorization has been given today for the movement to South Viet-Nam of additional forces which will bring US total troop strength in that country to 175,000 men by November. These enlarged forces will provide 34 combat battalions, 24 air squadrons, and 31 helicopter companies. Under the command of General Westmoreland--an officer who has earned the confidence of all his countrymen--these forces will be used where they are needed. And they will fight.

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Like every action the US has taken in Viet-Nam, these new deployments are ordered at the request of the Government of Viet-Nam and in support of the efforts of the Vietnamese people themselves. It is fully agreed and understood between that Government and the US that the main effort in South Viet-Nam must still be made by the Vietnamese themselves. Ambassador Taylor has been assured that as US efforts are increased the Vietnamese Government itself is reenforcing its own measures to build up its armed forces and to meet the economic pressures caused by war. That Government is reaffirming its determination and announcing its own programs of increasing action at home, including certain measures in the economic and social fields to enhance the solidarity of the Vietnamese people and their government in their critical efforts.

The decisions announced today are decisions to do what is necessary--and only what is necessary. This has been US policy; it is US policy still. These new and increased actions are made necessary by the growing battlefield action of others.

The ever closer partnership of the US with the people and Government of Viet-Nam is the inevitable answer which the US gives, with them, to the increasing efforts of the attackers. Yet the purpose remains unchanged. And it is a purpose of peace.

While the US does all that is necessary to turn back the attackers in South Viet-Nam, it will do all that is possible to open the path to peaceful settlement. Again and again it has said that it is ready for unconditional discussion. The US and others have made fifteen efforts to get discussion

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started. These efforts have all been rejected out of hand. But the US will not be discouraged.

In these last days, messages have been sent to all the more than 30 countries that have given concrete evidence of their concern for the people of South Viet-Nam. It has been emphasized again that just as there is need for wider effort to resist aggression, there is equal need for further effort to open doors to peace. America's friends in these countries know that all their efforts to this end are welcome to the United States.

And the US will do more. Today Ambassador Goldberg has been instructed to consult most urgently with the Secretary General of the United Nations to see if there is not some way in which the good offices of the United Nations can be engaged for peace in Viet-Nam. The earlier efforts of the Secretary General have met with rebuff, but no possibility of progress must be overlooked. Ambassador Goldberg will make it entirely plain that the United States continues to hope that a way can be found to bring the United Nations into action in Viet-Nam. The Ambassador will submit a full report on US actions there and its purpose of peace, both formally to the Security Council and informally to all the Delegates who seek to know the US stand. If it proves possible to engage the United Nations in Viet-Nam, the United States will actively support that engagement.

At the same time that the US seeks by every means to start the discussions that can bring peace, it and its friends in South Viet-Nam are making it plain that they are ready for the kind of peace that will be fair and honorable for all.

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Already in June, the Foreign Minister of Viet-Nam and the Secretary of State of the United States have stated for all to hear the fundamental principles of such a peace:

An end to aggression and subversion.

Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose and shape its own destiny by democratic principles and without foreign interference.

An end of the military measures now made necessary by aggression, and the removal of foreign military forces from South Viet-Nam.

And effective guarantees for the independence and freedom of the people of South Viet-Nam.

Beyond these principles, it has been made clear that the US looks forward to the day when relations between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam can be worked out by peaceful means--including a free decision by the peoples of all Viet-Nam on the matter of reunification. These principles imply and include the use of free election under international supervision, [just as soon as the end of aggression permits.]

These purposes in essence are the purposes of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The failure of the 1954 Agreements was not in purpose but in practice--not in the quality of the objectives, but in the effectiveness of the instruments. When there is a new settlement in Southeast Asia, it must be based on stronger and more lasting guarantees than those of 1954.

But the ^{program} purpose of peace remains as the US has stated it. The ~~program~~ ^{This} of peace remains the same. And the program meets the interests of all who have a stake in Southeast Asia.

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For the people of South Viet-Nam--on both sides of the current contest-- it will bring opportunity for an active and honorable part in the peaceful life of a freely growing society.

For the people and Government of North Viet-Nam it will bring relief from the burdens of war and a prospect of new and peaceful relations with the people to the south.

For the smaller neighbors of Viet-Nam it will mean an end to the danger of nearby warfare and a widened prospect of peaceful development for the whole area.

For the people and Government on the Mainland of China, this plan of peace contains no threat and no danger.

And on a still wider plane, a peace so clearly fair and reasonable for all can remove a clear obstacle to understanding between all of these who call themselves Communist and all of those who don't.

For the real future of Southeast Asia is a future of peaceful progress, not a future of contest and conquest. While the US resists aggression--and probes for peace--it is planning for progress. Already there has been an encouraging response to the proposals put forward in April. The prospects for Asian development are good, and US readiness to help has been made plain.

So today America appeals once again to those who have chosen the path of battle. Let them turn from terror to talk, and from subversion to settlement. Let all interested governments go to the conference table and let them bring with them any other parties that they choose. The US will come with its proposals-- let them come with theirs. And let diplomacy replace destruction. The first

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business of such a conference must be to work out terms that can permit an end of fighting. Its final business must be peace. The Government of Viet-Nam and the Government of the United States are ready.

This readiness comes not from weakness but from strength--not from weariness but from resolution. Until there is a settlement and an end of aggression, America's efforts will go on and they will grow.

The deployments ordered today will be carried out. The Americans who go to Viet-Nam will do their duty. The forces of the United States will carry out the order to resist and to punish aggression. The US is ready for honorable peace, but it will persevere in the hard tasks of battle until others are ready, too. QUNQUOTE

GP-2

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Smith

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-208

By 40, NARA, Date 7-1-96

Wednesday, July 28, 1965
7:30 PM EDT

32a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reaction from abroad to your statement today on Vietnam.

Thirty-three State Department posts, as of 4:00 PM EDT today, had reported initial reaction from local governments to advance notice of your statement today.

The most significant were:

Costa Rica - The Foreign Office expressed full support for US actions.

Ghana - Foreign Minister-designate Quaison-Sackey said Nkrumah would regard our actions as a "slap in the face" in view of his peace efforts and proposed visit to Hanoi.

Kenya - The Acting Foreign Minister asked if the situation was worsening or if we were putting in a mop-up force. He said advance information was helpful, since "other countries" could be expected to blast US action.

Lebanon - President Helou showed sympathy for our motives and asked if Lebanon, in concert with others, might play a useful role in helping toward a peaceful solution. The Government of Lebanon would try to be a moderating influence among Afro-Asians.

Morocco - The King's personal representative hoped US efforts to promote peace and liberty would succeed.

Nigeria - Minister of State Ibekwe hoped the show of US determination would be in time to bring Peiping and Hanoi to the conference table. He understood the inevitability of our actions and agreed Vietnam today was, like Czechoslovakia in 1938, a testing ground of aggression.

Norway - A high Foreign Official was depressed by the news and said it appeared the US was now really at war. He mentioned probable repercussions on the Geneva Disarmament talks.

Portugal - The Foreign Minister appreciated our sense of responsibility in the face of a serious Asian crisis.

Togo - The Foreign Minister expressed complete agreement with our

DELIVERED TO Levy AT 7:35 PM

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Page two

policy, and said it was essential we use all force necessary to show determination and hasten the Communists toward negotiations.

Trinidad - The Foreign Minister feared greater escalation and hoped peace efforts would continue by all possible means.

White House Situation Room

William Jay
Briefing Officer

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White House

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action ~~CONTROL: 19699~~
 RECD: ~~JUL 28, 1965, 9:34 AM~~
 Info FROM: ~~SAIGON~~
 ACTION: ~~SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 299~~

Wednesday, July 28, 1965
 Recd White House 9:00PM EDT
 Recd State 9:34AM EDT

~~SECRET JULY 28~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT
 FROM AMBASSADOR TAYLOR
 NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority State Letter 11-2-78
 By ip, NARS, Date 3-26-79

A COMPARATIVE LULL SETTLED OVER THE MILITARY FRONT THIS WEEK AS MAIN FORCE VIET CONG UNITS CONTINUED TO AVOID CONTACT WITH STRONG ARVN FORMATIONS. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OPERATION WAS ONE CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION BY GVN/US FORCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF OPENING THE IMPORTANT ROUTE 19 FROM QUI NHON TO PLEIKU WHICH HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED FOR SOMETIME BY VIET CONG. AS A CONSEQUENCE, SUPPLIES, PARTICULARLY RICE, WERE BECOMING ALARMINGLY SHORT IN THE HIGHLAND PROVINCES. THE OPERATION MET WITH VIRTUALLY NO OPPOSITION AND CONVOYS BEGAN TO ROLL SHORTLY AFTER ITS INITIATION. WE HAVE NOW DELIVERED SOME 2,700 TONS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SUPPLIES AND THE SHORTAGES HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED FOR THE TIME BEING. UNFORTUNATELY, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN TROOPS ON THE ROUTE TO KEEP IT OPEN AND THE VIET CONG CAN BE EXPECTED TO BLOW THE BRIDGES AGAIN. HOWEVER, THE OPERATION DEMONSTRATES THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN OPEN ANY HIGHWAY FOR NECESSARY PERIODS AND CAN PREVENT THE PERMANENT ISOLATION OF ANY IMPORTANT AREA.

Telegram OUR MOST IMPORTANT BUSINESS WITH THE GOVERNMENT DERIVED FROM THE DEPARTMENT
~~DEPTTEL 257~~ WHICH OUTLINED THE IMPORTANT DECISIONS WHICH YOU ARE ABOUT TO TAKE IN REINFORCING THE UNITED STATES MILITARY EFFORT HERE. ALTHOUGH WE NEEDED AGREEMENT FROM KY AND HIS ASSOCIATES ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT POINTS WITH VERY LITTLE TIME TO CONDITION THEM, THEY PROVED MORE PLIABLE THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED AND AGREED ON ALL POINTS OF PRINCIPLE WHICH WE PRESENTED. THEY GAGGED A BIT, HOWEVER, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS SINCE IT IS A POINT OF HONOR AND PRIDE WITH THE VIETNAMESE TO REJECT THE VALIDITY OF A DOCUMENT SO VITALLY AFFECTING THEM

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~~-2-~~ 299 from Saigon CN-19699 July 28 NODIS

WHICH A FRENCH GENERAL SIGNED. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS A SERIOUS POINT, HOWEVER, AS THIS ATTITUDE DOES NOT PREVENT THEM FROM CONCEDEDING THE DE FACTO APPLICATION OF THE ACCORDS TO THE EXISTING SITUATION.

THE MONTAGNARD SITUATION WHICH IS NEVER REALLY SETTLED IN SOUTH VIET-NAM CAME TO THE FORE AGAIN THIS WEEK. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SO-CALLED FULRO (UNITED FRONT FOR THE STRUGGLE OF THE OPPRESSED RACES) GROUP MADE CONTACT WITH SOME OF OUR REPRESENTATIVES IN DARLAC AND EXPRESSED SOME INTEREST IN OPENING NEGOTIATIONS, PREFERABLY WITH US. AS ALWAYS, WE AVOIDED GETTING INTO A MIDDLE POSITION BETWEEN THE MONTAGNARDS AND THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, BY GUIDING THE MONTAGNARD REPRESENTATIVES TO THE PROPER GVN OFFICIALS. I DOUBT THAT AN AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED FOR THE MOMENT AS THE MONTAGNARDS CONTINUE TO IMPOSE IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS SUCH AS ACCEPTANCE BY THE GVN OF A MONTAGNARD FLAG AND THE MAINTENANCE OF A PRIVATE MONTAGNARD ARMY. HOWEVER, KY AND HIS PEOPLE ARE SHOWING SOMEWHAT MORE CONSIDERATION FOR THE MONTAGNARD POINT OF VIEW THAN SOME OF HIS PREDECESSORS AND WE ARE DOING OUR BEST AS FRIENDLY BY-
-STANDERS TO KEEP THE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION OPEN BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE TRIBESMEN.

I AM SORRY THAT THIS, MY LAST WEEKLY REPORT, CONTAINS LITTLE THAT IS NEWSWORTHY OTHER THAN THAT WHICH REFLECTS YOUR DECISIONS IN WASHINGTON. THESE DECISIONS OPEN A NEW VISTA OF POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVING TOWARD PEACE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD AND I ONLY REGRET THAT I SHALL NOT PARTICIPATE DIRECTLY IN THEIR CULMINATION. ALEX JOHNSON WILL BE YOUR CORRESPONDENT NEXT WEEK. TE

~~TAYLOR~~

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434

✓ McGeorge Bundy ^{34a}

July 29, 1965

TO: The Secretary
FROM: P.- Richard I. Phillips, Acting
SUBJECT: American Opinion on
Viet-Nam, July 22-29

Press and political comment on--and in anticipation of--Pres. Johnson's July 28 statement has constituted most of this week's public discussion. Highlights of this discussion are given here; a fuller analysis is attached.

- 1 - In initial reaction, the President's statement is cordially endorsed by editors and by most Governors and commenting Congressmen.
- 2 - Comment prior to the statement continued to support "whatever is necessary" in terms of military forces to fulfill U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam.
- 3 - Widespread demands from the press and Congress had stressed the need for Presidential definition of the actual situation in Viet-Nam and of actual U.S. goals: forcing negotiations, or "crusading" against Communism.
- 4 - Two minorities also manifested increased activity: those advocating conciliatory moves; and those urging greater military action.

P/POS:HSFoster:em

American Opinion Summary

Department of State

VIET-NAM
(July 22-29)

Press and political comment on--and in anticipation of--Pres. Johnson's July 28 statement has constituted most of this week's public discussion. Highlights of this discussion are:

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- 2 - Comment prior to the statement continued to support "whatever is necessary" in terms of military forces to fulfill U.S. objectives in South Viet-Nam.
- 3 - Widespread demands from the press and Congress had stressed the need for Presidential definition of the actual situation in Viet-Nam and of actual U.S. goals: forcing negotiations, or "crusading" against Communism.
- 4 - Two minorities also manifested increased activity: those advocating conciliatory moves; and those urging greater military action.

President's Statement Pres. Johnson's July 28 statement on U.S. aims and plans is highly praised in initial editorial comment. Editors approve the President's explanation of American war purposes, his plans for further defending South Viet-Nam against Communist aggression, and his continuing emphasis upon attaining a peaceful settlement.

"The aim is still to turn back aggression, not to escalate the war," approvingly declared the New York Herald Tribune. "The aim of protecting freedom and independence from Communist aggression without resort to general war remains the same," the Washington Post stated. Pres. Johnson's statement of determination, said the New York Times, "is quite different from saying we will bring the other side to its knees."

Public Opinion Studies Staff • Bureau of Public Affairs

It is "vital," the Times continued, "that this war be held down to the absolute minimum necessary to prove to Hanoi and Peking that military aggression is not worthwhile and never will be."

Stressing the unusual difficulty of explaining the Vietnamese war to the people, the Wall Street Journal said: "It seems to us that the President has answered the question as well as any man could." Similarly, the Washington Post declared: "We do not see how Pres. Johnson could have explained the necessity of the U.S. course more effectively than he did." These papers and others underscored the President's assertion: "if we are driven from the field in Viet-Nam, then no nation can ever have the same confidence in our promise of protection" (e.g. Phila. Inquirer, N.Y. Herald Tribune).

The President's "escalation of his peace efforts" was approvingly emphasized by several (e.g. Wash. Post, Phila. Inquirer, N.Y. Times). He "steadily broadens his willingness to take part directly or indirectly in negotiations to settle the war," declared the Baltimore Sun, citing Johnson's references to the Viet Cong and his further appeal to the United Nations. According to the Washington Post, "this statement greatly strengthens confidence that the President will be as firm in pushing for a rational settlement as he has been in trying to teach the Communists that peace cannot be bought with terror and aggression."

A number expressed confidence that "the American people will not be lacking in the courage required" to carry out the President's program (e.g. Phila. Inquirer, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Wash. Post).

Of the 50 American State Governors assembled in Minneapolis, 48 were reported as backing the President's presentation. Reports from Capitol Hill indicated that most Congressmen joined Sens. Mansfield (D-Mont.) and Dirksen (R-Ill.) in their approval of the Johnson statement. A few were disappointed at the reduced prospects for a Congressional policy debate (e.g. Javits, R-N.Y.) or at the decision to postpone laying the issue before the UN Security Council (e.g. Cooper, R-Ky.); but Sen. Morse (D-Ore.) appeared to be alone in his flat opposition.

Some disappointment in the President's military decisions was registered by military leaders and some Congressmen, according to Hanson Baldwin. They fear that the "increases in strength

are so gradual they may not meet the needs" (in N.Y. Times). In the Wall Street Journal, Philip Geyelin reported that, "in the opinion of most officials," the new program will not bring "dramatic break-throughs on either the military or the diplomatic front."

Continuing Support Public comment throughout the week preceding the President's statement manifested continuing support for the U.S. course in Viet-Nam. "It's War; Let's Be About It!" was the title of a Scripps-Howard editorial which said: "It seems evident that the Viet Cong are developing faster and more effectively (than the U.S.). . . . McNamara's trip obviously is a part of a program to ready the American public for a sharp upturn of U.S. activity in this war. . . . The whole country has got to go to work."

said the Chicago Sun-Times: "It is not for our national honor alone that America sends her sons to Viet-Nam. It is for the pragmatic and concrete defensive program of containing Communism."

In view of Hanoi's refusal of peace talks, said the Detroit News, "the only recourse is to hold ground in South Viet-Nam until meaningful negotiations are considered." To the Louisville Courier-Journal, there was "reassuring evidence in the emerging outline of our military strategy that we are not committing ourselves irrevocably to the awesome prospect of a major land war in Asia." Maintenance of "enclaves of U.S. strength. . . will indeed up the price of the war," but it could lead to the conference table.

Freedom House, in a New York Times advertisement giving its "Credo of Support" for U.S. policy, made several points refuting the critics. It saw "no hope for reason until the force of lawlessness is checked." It also asserted that the U.S. is "not on a crusade against Communist nations," citing our relations with Eastern Europe.

The magnitude of current U.S. involvement was stressed by some writers. "Soon" said the Kansas City Star, "the American people will be hit by the full force of the Vietnamese war for the first time." Walter Lippmann asserted: "We are about to pit Americans against Asians on the continent of Asia." According to N. H. Shackford of Scripps-Howard: "Because of the failure of the American proxy (the South Vietnamese government) to hold the line--even with massive U.S. help--the conflict is about to

become an American war." However, Crosby Moyes sought to counter the assertions of "agile armchair pessimists" who presented the South Vietnamese army as "practically wiped out."

Some felt that Congress should participate in a decision for a "very large increase in American forces" in Viet-Nam. "Any such decisions," said the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "should be fully shared by both branches of Congress... and preceded by a full and frank debate" (also, Hartford Courant). The San Francisco Chronicle advised: "Congress should hold an inquest... and debate our aims and purpose" (similarly, Sens. Morton, R-KY. Javits, R-N.Y.; Rep. Ford, R-Mich.). A "fresh mandate" was suggested by Sen. Case (R-N.J.). Such demands, however, seemed to the Washington Star to be "just short of demagoguery... stuff that partisan dreams are made of."

Information Requested A number of commentators--including supporters as well as critics--called upon the President to fulfill his "duty to define and explain the goals in Viet-Nam" (e.g. Chicago Sun-Times. Democratic and Republican Governors at Minneapolis). According to the Boston Herald. "The President should not expect the people to close ranks automatically behind a policy which so few of them really understand."

The often-critical Providence Journal conceded that "a good case can be made for a substantial but limited U.S. buildup to create dependable positions of strength on the Vietnamese coast to provide leverage for U. S. negotiators." It added that the buildup "ought to be accompanied by a more precise statement of more reasonable peace aims than has yet been given by any American spokesman."

"The public must be convinced," wrote Erwin Canham. "That there is no acceptable choice other than the greatly increased American participation which nearly everybody now assumes will result. The people must know the details" (similarly, N.Y. Post). Said the St. Louis Post-Dispatch: "The people are entitled to know what the whole military investment is going to be, what policy objectives it is intended to serve."

According to the New York Herald Tribune, "the American people will face up to their responsibilities if these are set forward clearly and honestly." Even the New York News joined the information demand; "Let's have the whole story from the President himself, no matter how gloomy it may be. Americans can take bad news, about wars or anything else."

Conciliation Renewal of the campaign of those advocating con-
Advocated ciliatory moves by the U.S. was signaled by the appearance of two advertisements in the New York Times: one by SANE, the other by a Businessmen's Committee on Viet-Nam. Both advocated the cessation of bombing in North Viet-Nam (as did Sen. McGovern, D-S.D.), plus U.S. willingness to negotiate with the Viet Cong. The Businessmen suggested that a reduction in U.S. military involvement would permit development of a "climate" permitting the "Vietnamese people to negotiate among themselves." Fear of nuclear war was stressed by both organizations (also by Christian Century).

Walter Lippmann continued to advocate a "defensive strategy" which would be a "signal to the South Vietnamese that the time has come for them to move toward peace negotiations with their fellow Vietnamese."

Joseph Kraft stressed that the "old approach" of "graduated deterrence" has failed to impress Hanoi. "What is required, and required soon, is some kind of informal talks with the other side," Kraft concluded. The Denver Post thought Hanoi could hardly "hold the distorted view it now has of U.S. affairs" if it had representation at Washington and the UN. "For the sake of world peace, it may well be time to find a way to bring Hanoi and Peking into contact with the rest of the world."

Air-Sea Action The Hearst papers have supported Rep. Laird (R-Wis.) in his demand for air strikes against the missile sites ringing Hanoi; and they favor a naval blockade to cut off munitions from the north to the Viet Cong. "If even one GI were saved by such a blockade, we should make the move. We have naval superiority. Let's use it," said Hearst's New York Journal-American.

Interviewing four retired generals who were active in the Korean war, the Associated Press reported that three of them-- Almond, Clark, and Hull-- favored the bombing of Hanoi, some with qualifications. Gen. Almond said he would favor use of the atomic bomb, "if needed to protect our troops;" but Gens. Clark and Hull saw no need for its use, citing their belief that it would have been ineffective in Korea. Gen. Ridgway declined to go into details about the Vietnamese war, but favored a single command for the allied forces.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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By *ip*, NARS, Date *3-26-79*

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT

LAST WEEK WAS AMAZINGLY QUIET BOTH ON THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FRONTS, WITH THE MAJOR EVENT YOUR OWN ANNOUNCEMENT OF INCREASED AMERICAN FORCES COMPLEMENTED BY PRIME MINISTER KY'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION. AS THE NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR IN BANGKOK WHO PERIODICALLY VISITS HERE TOLD ME, HE HEARD LESS IN THE WAY OF RUMORS AND FUMBLINGS ON HIS VISIT LAST WEEK THAN ANY TIME DURING THE YEARS HE HAS BEEN COMING HERE.

THE TWO MATTERS ARE, OF COURSE, RELATED AS YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF INCREASED US FORCES HAS SERVED FURTHER TO CONVINCE EVEN THE MOST TORTURED VIETNAMESE MIND THAT THE US REALLY INTENDS TO SEE THIS THING THROUGH, AND THUS TO DAMPEN THOSE PSYCHOLOGICAL FRUSTRATIONS THAT ARE AT THE BASE OF SO MUCH OF THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE MILLENNIUM OF LONG-TERM POLITICAL STABILITY HERE HAS NOW ARRIVED, BUT ONLY THAT WE SEEM TO HAVE A LITTLE BREATHING SPELL OF WHICH WE WILL SEEK TO TAKE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE. THE "DIRECTORATE" OF THE GENERALS, PRINCIPALLY THIEU, KY AND CO, SEEM TO BE CONTINUING TO WORK WELL AND HARMONIOUSLY TOGETHER. (GENERAL THI IN FIRST CORPS IS STILL AN UNKNOWN FACTOR.) HOWEVER, ONE OF OUR TROUBLES IN "GETTING THINGS DONE" IS THAT THE THREE OF THEM HAVE TAKEN SO ENTHUSIASTICALLY TO GETTING OUT AMONG THE PEOPLE IN THE PROVINCES THAT THERE IS ALL TOO OFTEN NO ONE LEFT IN SAIGON FOR US TO TALK TO WHO CAN MAKE DECISIONS. ONE OF THEIR MORE USEFUL TRIPS WAS TO TAY NINH TO CEMENT CAO DAI SUPPORT.

WE ARE CONTINUING TO LABOR AT GETTING THEM TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE MORIBUND CHIEU HOI PROGRAM AND ARE ENCOURAGED THAT CO HAS NOW TOLD US THAT HE STRONGLY FAVORS ITS RESTORATION TO

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-2- 364, AUGUST 3, FROM SAIGON

MINISTERIAL STATUS. KY ALSO PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED HE INTENDS TO ESTABLISH A MINISTRY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS. THIS IS A GOOD MOVE.

IT IS HARDER TO ACCOUNT FOR THE RELATIVE QUIET BY THE VIET CONG ON THE MILITARY FRONT WHICH CONTINUED FOR THE THIRD WEEK. WHILE HARASSMENT, SABOTAGE (PARTICULARLY OF LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS) AND TERRORISM MAINTAINED THEIR LEVEL, MAIN FORCE VIET CONG UNITS CONTINUED TO AVOID CONTACT. SUCH CYCLES ARE, OF COURSE, TYPICAL OF THE VIET CONG ACTIVITY AND ARE AT LEAST IN PART FORCED ON THEM BY THEIR LIMITED SUPPLY SYSTEM. NO ONE HERE BELIEVES THEY ARE BADLY ENOUGH HURT TO HAVE BEEN FORCED TO SUBSIDE AND THAT THE ONLY QUESTION IS WHEN AND WHERE THEY RESUME THE OFFENSE. THE VIETNAMESE STILL SEEM TO BE CONVINCED THAT IT IS GOING TO BE IN THE HIGHLANDS.

DURING THE WEEK THE MONTAGNARD PROBLEM HAD BEGUN TO HEAT UP ALONG LINES ALL TOO SUGGESTIVE OF LAST SEPTEMBER'S UPRISING, AND, IN FACT, INVOLVING THE SAME GROUP AS LAST SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, BY THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEEK WE HAD ACTIONS UNDERWAY WHICH WE HOPE WILL DAMPEN IT DOWN. AS LAST SEPTEMBER, WE WERE FACED WITH THE SAME PROBLEMS OF THE MONTAGNARDS ATTEMPTING TO PLAY US OFF AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE, AND VIETNAMESE SUSPICIONS OF AMERICAN SYMPATHY FOR THE MONTAGNARDS. TO DEAL WITH THE FIRST PROBLEM WE HAD A MEETING YESTERDAY IN BAN ME THUOT WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DISSIDENT MONTAGNARDS ON ONE SIDE, AND ON THE OTHER SIDE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE AMERICAN AND GVN AGENCIES PRESENTING A UNITED AND COORDINATED FRONT. THEY WERE GIVEN A SIGNED STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER KY (WHICH WE HAD LARGELY DRAFTED) MAKING A FORTHCOMING OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM AS VIETNAMESE CITIZENS, AND A SIGNED STATEMENT FROM ME SAYING THEY MUST DEAL WITH THE GVN, BUT IF BOTH PARTIES WANTED WE WOULD BE GLAD TO BE PRESENT AS "OBSERVERS". THE NEXT MOVE IS NOW UP TO THE MONTAGNARDS. TO DEAL WITH THE SECOND PROBLEM OF VIETNAMESE SUSPICIONS WE PROMPTLY AND WITHOUT ARGUMENT MOVED OUT OF DARLAC TWO AMERICANS SUGGESTED BY GENERAL CO, ALTHOUGH WE FEEL, AND CO AGREED, THEY HAD DONE NOTHING WRONG. (I HOPE THIS WILL ENCOURAGE SIMILAR PROMPT ACTION IN CASES WE RAISE WITH THEM OF THEIR PERSONNEL.)

USCY SIGNED AN INTERIM AID AGREEMENT ON JULY 28 WHICH CONTAINS LANGUAGE THAT WE HOPE WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR

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-3- 364, AUGUST 3, FROM SAIGON

MORE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AND MANAGEMENT OF GVN ACTIVITIES
IN RELATION TO OUR OWN.

RETAIL RICE PRICES CONTINUED FAIRLY STABLE IN SAIGON,
ALTHOUGH THERE WERE LOCALIZED PRICE INCREASES IN CERTAIN
AREAS OF THE CENTER BROUGHT ABOUT BY TEMPORARY SHORTAGES.
HOWEVER, THE MEASURES THAT WE AND THE GVN HAVE TAKEN TO
TRANSPORT RICE TO THE CENTRAL AREA, INCLUDING THE USE OF
AIRLIFT WHERE ESSENTIAL, HAVE PREVENTED ANY SERIOUS SHORTAGES.

IN ALL, IT WAS A GOOD WEEK AS WE MEASURE THINGS HERE.

JOHNSON

RNL/1

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~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED
Authority JCS 9-25-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-22-79

JCSM-652-65
27 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Concept for Vietnam (U)

1. ~~(S)~~ In the light of the introduction of major US combat units into Southeast Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it essential that we further formalize our concept for the future conduct of the war. Recognizing this need, they have developed a concept as set forth in the Appendix. This concept, in which the views of CINCPAC have been considered, envisions the military actions that are part of the over-all US strategy for Southeast Asia, including South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos. The correlated military actions to carry out this strategy will be conducted in concert with US major political, economic, and social programs for Southeast Asia. They also will include measures for dealing with the CHICOM threat.

2. ~~(TS)~~ In summary:

a. The objective in Vietnam, as stated by NSAM-288, dated 17 March 1964, is a stable and independent noncommunist government.

b. The major problems to be dealt with in the conduct of the war are:

(1) The continued direction and support of Viet Cong operations by the DRV, infiltration from the north, and the apparent attendant Viet Cong capability to provide materiel support and to replace heavy personnel losses.

(2) The continued existence of a major Viet Cong infrastructure, both political and military, in the RVN.

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(3) The greater growth rate of Viet Cong strength as compared to that of the South Vietnamese ground forces.

(4) The continued loss of LOCs, food-producing areas, and population to Viet Cong control.

(5) The lack of a viable politico/economic structure in the RVN.

(6) The threat of CHICOM intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific.

c. The basic military tasks, of equal priority, are:

(1) To cause the DRV to cease its direction and support of the Viet Cong insurgency.

(2) To defeat the Viet Cong and to extend GVN control over all of the RVN.

(3) To deter Communist China from direct intervention and to defeat such intervention if it occurs.

d. The US basic strategy for accomplishing the above tasks should be: to intensify military pressure on the DRV by air and naval power; to destroy significant DRV military targets, including the base of supplies; to interdict supporting LOCs in the DRV; to interdict the infiltration and supply routes into the RVN; to improve the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF; to build and protect bases; to reduce enemy reinforcements; to defeat the Viet Cong, in concert with RVN and third country forces; and to maintain adequate forces in the Western Pacific and elsewhere in readiness to deter and to deal with CHICOM aggression. By aggressive and sustained exploitation of superior military force, the United States/Government of Vietnam would seize and hold the initiative in both the DRV and RVN, keeping the DRV, the Viet Cong, and the PL/VM at a disadvantage, progressively destroying the DRV war-supporting power and defeating the Viet Cong. The physical capability of the DRV to move men and supplies

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through the Lao Corridor, down the coastline, across the DMZ, and through Cambodia must be reduced to the maximum practical extent by land, naval, and air actions in these areas and against infiltration-connected targets. Finally, included within the basic US military strategy must be a buildup in Thailand to ensure attainment of the proper US-Thai posture to deter CHICOM aggression and to facilitate placing US forces in an advantageous logistic position if such aggression occurs.

3. ~~(S)~~ The over-all strategic concept for Vietnam, as set forth in the Appendix hereto, provides a basis for terminating the war in Vietnam under conditions which are satisfactory to the United States and the GVN.

4. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the attached concept be approved as the basis for subsequent development of courses of action, forces, and other requirements to include the phasing of operations. Recommendations based thereon, including a current evaluation of the capabilities of approved force deployments to achieve the objectives of the concept, will be provided you at the earliest practicable date.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SIGNED

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

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APPENDIX

OVER-ALL US CONCEPT FOR VIETNAM (U)

INTRODUCTION

1. ~~(S)~~ The RVN is a politico/military keystone in Southeast Asia and is symbolic of US determination in Asia - as Berlin is in Europe - to prevent communist expansion. The United States is committed to the defense of the RVN in order to assist a free people to remain free. In addition to the freedom of the RVN, US national prestige, credibility, and honor with respect to world-wide pledges, and declared national policy are at stake. Further, it is incumbent upon the United States at this stage to invalidate the communist concept of "wars of national liberation."

2. ~~(S)~~ The military operations envisioned in this concept paper must:

a. Conform to the over-all US strategy and guidelines for Southeast Asia as a whole, including the RVN, DRV, Laos, and Thailand.

b. Be conducted in concert with appropriate US/GVN political, economic, and social programs in order to guide and to expedite the correlated achievement of US objectives.

c. Be conceived and evaluated in terms of how much and how well they will contribute to the above.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A US MILITARY STRATEGY FOR VIETNAM

3. ~~(S)~~ The Viet Cong are directed, controlled, and supported (including heavy military support and encadrement) by their sponsor, the DRV. Viet Cong activities in the RVN are characterized by persuasion through propaganda, intimidation, and terror. Whenever possible, through armed assault and

coercion, the Viet Cong destroy the capability of GVN authority to govern, thus progressively reducing the ability of the GVN to bring the population and resources base to bear on the problem. Having assumed control over an area, the Viet Cong install their own political organization and infrastructure. Then, using local manpower and logistics, the Viet Cong organize, equip, and train military units to resist GVN attempts to establish its authority and to expand Viet Cong control and influence into other areas.

4. ~~(S)~~ For the most part, the Viet Cong have sought to avoid a large-scale sustained battle with US/GVN forces. Instead, their tactics have been to maximize the advantages of initiative and surprise and to strike at weakness with overwhelming strength, "fading away" when the combat strength ratio is unfavorable to them. Currently, one of their major objectives appears to be the destruction, through both attrition and demoralization, of the RVNAF.

5. ~~(TS)~~ At present, the Viet Cong and DRV leaders appear confident that their course in the RVN promises ultimate and possibly early success without important concessions on their part. This apparent confidence may have been fostered in part by the current quest for some negotiating arrangement. They seem to believe that they can achieve a series of local military successes which, sooner or later, will bring victory through a combination of a deteriorating South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) morale and effectiveness, a collapse of anti-communist government in Saigon, and an exhaustion of the United States will to persist.

6. ~~(TS)~~ In coping with larger US forces employed in a more aggressive fashion, the Viet Cong would seek to avoid the kind of engagements which risked a serious communist defeat.

1 Instead, they would probably concentrate on harassments intended
 2 to bleed and humiliate US forces, attempting to trap and
 3 destroy isolated units where possible. At a minimum, the Viet
 4 Cong would almost certainly continue present efforts to cut
 5 land communications lines and would step up the dispatch of
 6 small, expendable teams on sabotage and assassination missions
 7 designed to gain propaganda advantages. The communists might
 8 also seek to increase their activities in Laos.

9 7. ~~(TS)~~ Additionally, there is the possibility of CHICOM
 10 overt commitment of major combat forces in Southeast Asia
 11 and other areas in the Western Pacific. With the greater
 12 US involvement in the war in Vietnam, US military posture must
 13 be so oriented as to deter CHICOM intervention and defeat
 14 this intervention should it occur.

15 8. ~~(S)~~ The war in Vietnam is the single most critical
 16 international problem facing the United States today, and
 17 it portends the most serious immediate threat to continued
 18 US world leadership and national security. The development of
 19 a US strategy for Vietnam is necessarily influenced in
 20 varying degrees by the desirability to maintain amicable
 21 relations with certain other nations; by the desirability to
 22 receive from third countries a degree of support for US
 23 policy; by US objectives and alliances elsewhere; by the fact
 24 of the sovereignty of the GVN; and, by the necessity to provide
 25 an effective Free World counter or answer to "wars of national
 26 liberation."

27 9. ~~(S)~~ The situation in the RVN has deteriorated to the
 28 point where US national objectives are endangered and may
 29 not be achieved unless GVN forces are bolstered, adequate
 30 security for the South Vietnamese people is provided, and
 31 the DRV is persuaded that the risks of further involvement on
 32 their part outweigh the gains.

10. (TS) Our strategy for Vietnam should not allow the communists to keep pace with or more than match our military efforts. A program of slowly rising intensity with both sides in step carries with it the danger that it will lead to less flexibility of choice, creeping intervention by the Soviets and Chinese, first with materiel and later with troops, and the eventual engulfing of both camps unwillingly into an expanded war.

11. (TS) Briefly, the major problems to be dealt with in the conduct of the war are:

a. The continued direction and support of Viet Cong operations by the DRV, including infiltration from the North, and the apparent attendant Viet Cong capability to provide materiel support and to replace heavy personnel losses.

b. The continued existence of a major Viet Cong infrastructure, both political and military, in the RVN.

c. The greater growth rate of Viet Cong strength as compared to that of the South Vietnamese ground forces.

d. The continued loss of LOCs, food-producing areas, and population to Viet Cong control.

e. The lack of a viable politico/economic structure in the RVN.

f. The threat of CHICOM intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific.

US OBJECTIVES, TASKS, AND BASIC STRATEGY

12. (TS) US national policy* includes as an objective in the RVN a stable and independent noncommunist government. Implicit in this objective is the containment of Communist

* NASM 288, dated 17 March 1964

China insofar as expansion into Southeast Asia or elsewhere 1
in the Western Pacific is concerned. Basic military tasks, 2
of equal priority, in support of this objective are: 3

a. To cause the DRV to cease its direction and support 4
of the Viet Cong insurgency. 5

b. To defeat the Viet Cong and to extend GVN control 6
over all of the RVN. 7

c. To deter Communist China from direct intervention 8
and to defeat such intervention if it occurs. 9

13. ~~(TS)~~ Friendly control of population and resources is 10
essential to success in countering guerrilla warfare. In 11
this regard, the RVN areas of major military significance are: 12
the Saigon area and the Mekong Delta; the coastal plain; and the 13
central highlands. It is imperative that the US/GVN have 14
the support of the people and the control of resources in those 15
areas. Elimination of the Viet Cong from these areas must be 16
vigorously undertaken in order to provide adequate security 17
for the people. Of particular importance is the need for 18
friendly control of the main food-producing areas in order 19
that the GVN may gain control of rice, feed the people under 20
its control, enable exports of rice to bolster the economy, 21
and cause the Viet Cong to import or to fight for food. A 22
paramount requirement under this concept is the building and 23
maintaining of a series of secure bases and secure supporting 24
LOCs at key localities along the sea coast, and elsewhere as 25
necessary, from which offensive operations can be launched 26
and sustained, with the subsequent enlargement and expansion 27
of the secure areas. 28

14 ~~(TS)~~ The US basic strategy for accomplishing the above 29
tasks should be: to intensify military pressure on the DRV 30
by air and naval power; to destroy significant DRV military 31
targets, including the base of supplies; to interdict 32

supporting LOCs in the DRV; to interdict the infiltration 1
 and supply routes into the RVN; to improve the combat effec- 2
 tiveness of the RVNAF; to build and protect bases; to reduce 3
 enemy reinforcements; to defeat the Viet Cong in concert with 4
 RVN and third country forces; and, to maintain adequate forces 5
 in the Western Pacific and elsewhere in readiness to deter 6
 and to deal with CHICOM aggression. By aggressive and sus- 7
 tained exploitation of superior military force, the United 8
 States/GVN would seize and hold the initiative in both the 9
 DRV and the RVN, keeping the DRV, the Viet Cong, and the 10
 PL/VM at a disadvantage, progressively destroying the DRV 11
 war-supporting power and defeating the Viet Cong. The physical 12
 capability of the DRV to move men and supplies thorough the 13
 Lao Corridor, down the coastline, across the DMZ, and through 14
 Cambodia, must be reduced to the maximum practical extent by 15
 land, naval, and air actions in these areas and against 16
 infiltration-connected targets. Finally, included within 17
 the basic US military strategy must be a build-up in Thailand 18
 to ensure attainment of the proper US-Thai posture to deter 19
 CHICOM aggression and to facilitate placing US forces in an 20
 advantageous logistic position if such aggression occurs. 21

PRINCIPAL MEASURES FOR EXECUTING THE BASIC STRATEGY
 AND FOR ACHIEVING US OBJECTIVES

15. (TS) In order to gain the offensive and to seize and 22
 hold the initiative in the RVN, a major effort must be made 23
 not only in terms of direct combat action to expand the areas 24
 under US/GVN control but also to support the GVN in its rural 25
 reconstruction program and to assist that government in 26

the creation of new military units and the rehabilitation of
 its depleted units as rapidly as possible. A psychological
 climate must be created that will foster RVN rural
 reconstruction progress. It will be noted in paragraph 13,
 above that, along with the Saigon area, the Mekong Delta is
 considered of primary importance. While no US land operations
 are currently envisaged in the Mekong Delta (IV Corps
 Tactical Zone) because of the comparatively inactive enemy
 situation now existing there, increased Viet Cong activity
 could later necessitate US/Third Country operations in
 that important area.

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16. (TS) The intensification of military pressures on the
 DRV, PL/VM, and the Viet Cong, the destruction of military
 stocks, supporting facilities, and the interdiction of
 communist infiltration and supply routes into the RVN will
 necessarily require:

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a. An immediate acceleration and increase in the scale,
 scope, and intensity of air and naval actions against the
 DRV. These actions should be directed against key military
 and economic targets, the destruction of which should
 dissuade the DRV from supporting the Viet Cong insurgency;
 this would include mining of DRV ports. Targets would
 include these main groupings: POL, LOCs, mines (including
 coal), military installations, port facilities, and power
 stations. Attacks against population centers as such
 would continue to be avoided.

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b. Intensified land, naval, and air actions to reduce infiltration into the RVN. Such actions would include a stepped-up land, sea, and air campaign against infiltration routes, designed to minimize the flow into the RVN of personnel and materiel.

17. ~~(TS)~~ During the build-up phase US/Third Country and GVN forces should strengthen military and civilian control in present areas of the RVN while intensifying air and naval attacks against the DRV and communist infiltration and supply routes into the RVN. As the force build-up is achieved, a principal offensive effort within the RVN of US/Third Country forces should be to participate with the RVNAF in search and destroy operations while assisting the RVNAF in clearing and securing operations in support of the rural reconstruction effort. US/Third Country air and ground operations should be conducted on a sustained basis; attack and destruction of base areas should be directed at applying continuous pressure on the VC to keep them off balance.

18. ~~(TS)~~ To deter CHICOM direct intervention or aggression in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific, and to deal with such intervention or aggression if it occurs would, in addition to the measures above, require:

a. A credible strategic force posture in Southeast Asia and elsewhere to meet the CHICOM threat.

b. A suitable build-up in Thailand to enable the expeditious deployment there of major US forces. This build-up would include logistic support bases, new airfields, improvement of existing airbases to increase their capacity, improvements to LOCs, and measures to increase the readiness of the Thai armed forces.

EXECUTION

19. ~~(TS)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, as a matter of principle, CINCPAC should be given as wide latitude as possible under the circumstances in executing the above measures in consonance with the forces, support, and general policy guidance provided to CINCPAC by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

ELEMENTS IN A PROGRAM OF CONTINUING
ACTION AGAINST NORTH VIET NAM

There follows a check list of the matters on which decisions must be taken and plans of action elaborated; the guiding principle is to assure that the continuing actions against North Viet Nam are of such a nature and so presented (to governments and to the public) that they convey the desired messages to North Viet Nam, Peiping and Moscow, to the Government and people of South Viet Nam and the Viet Cong, the American public, free world allies and neutrals.

A. Military Actions Against DRV and Infiltration routes

1. Nature of Reprisal Strikes.

(a) Pattern of reprisals in response not to individual actions but to overall VC program of terror including ambushes, assassinations, burnings, bombings, as well as significant Viet Cong regular military initiatives.

(Questions re reprisals: what frequency? what level of action and type of target? to what degree directly reflecting level of activity of Viet Cong, etc.?)

(b) In addition, when opportunities are provided, strikes directly responsive to and contingent on Viet Cong actions in SVN; e.g. railway attacks.

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- (c) In each instance, there should be a mix of GVN and U.S. participation.

2. Other possible military actions.

- (a) Barrel Roll moving up infiltration routes onto DRV territory (this will probably become part of reprisal pattern mentioned in 1.(a))

- (b) RECCE flights over DRV on Yankee Team pattern.

- (c) De Soto Patrols. (Should they be increasingly provocative?)

- (d) MAROPS and 34A. (Should these continue under present rules or be reshaped as part of reprisal program?)

- (e) New U.S. military deployments in West Pacific Theater.

B. Diplomatic Actions.

(See WPB Memorandum)

C. Public Presentation

- 1. Initial presentation of program of continuing action against North Viet Nam.

- (a) There should be no announcement of the initiation of the program itself as a program

- (b) Public should become aware of program:

- (1) Through individual announcements of reprisals made in accordance with A.1.(a) above. Such announcements are required at the beginning of the program but not once it is launched.

- (2) Through playback from Hanoi and other sources once pattern of reprisals is established, of continuing US/GVN military actions against DRV which we will not publicize although we would acknowledge.
2. Information output at outset of program designed to inform public of continuing infiltration and other evidence of Hanoi's support of Viet Cong military, terrorist and destructive activities, perhaps initially presented as White Paper. Once program launched new material should be put before public periodically and as significant events occur.
 3. As far as possible substantial share of presentation to public should be borne by GVN.
 4. At intervals and when appropriate occasion offers leading U.S. officials will confirm that our actions against DRV are in effect reprisals, that we are not seeking to enlarge the war but must demonstrate to North Viet Nam that it cannot get away with its aggression against the South, that if this is brought to an end so will our action. On an appropriate occasion such presentation might also be put forward in the broader context of our peaceful aims in Southeast Asia once Viet Nam problem solved; heavy emphasis on Lower Mekong Project.

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CHRONOLOGY OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS

- 24 Feb CINC PAC 240315Z Sharp recommended 2/3 MEB for security at Da Nang.
 - 24 Feb JCSM 130-65 JCS recommended 2/3 MEB for security. Appr. 25 Feb
 - 26 Feb Deptel 1840 State told Ambassador 2/3 MEB approved for landing contingent on GVN approval. /Dep SecDef approval on 25 Feb./ Remaining elements of MEB deferred.
 - 28 Feb Embtel 2789 Taylor told State he'd get GVN approval for 2 BLTs to land at Da Nang. He said that should be all we send and that they would eventually be relieved by Viet forces.
- * * *
- 14 Mar CSA Memo for SecDef & JCS Gen Johnson recommended 21 separate measures for increased support of the GVN. Measures merely were increases in the same vein as previous steps. He also proposed deployment of up to a full U.S. division for security of various bases with the concomitant release of Viet troops from security mission for combat. The U.S. Division could go either to coastal enclaves and Saigon or into the II Corps highlands. Finally, Johnson proposed a four-division force comprised of U.S. and SEATO troops along the DMZ and into Laos to contain NVN infiltration of men and supplies. Pres. appr 21 pts. 15 Mar & again on 1 Apr; deferred the rest.

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15 Mar JCS met w/Pres. President urged the JCS to come up with measures to "kill more VC"; he approved most of Gen Johnson's recommendations.

1-2 Apr NSC meetings with Amb. Taylor present. President Johnson decided to send two more Marine battalions to Da Nang and Phu Bai and to alter the mission of U.S. combat forces "to permit their more active use" under conditions to be established by the Secy of State in consultation with SecDef. He also approved 18 to 20,000 man increase in U.S. forces to fill out existing units and provide needed logistic personnel. (All of these changes were to be contingent on GVN concurrence.) A slowly ascending tempo in response to rises in enemy rates of activity was approved for the Rolling Thunder program. The President agreed to overtures to GOA, GNZ, and to ROK, seeking combat support from them.

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20 Apr Honolulu Conference McNamara, McNaughton, W. Bundy, Taylor, Wheeler, Sharp and Westmoreland reached consensus that: (1) the DRV was unlikely to quit in the next six months and probably would only give up because of VC "pain" in the South rather than bomb damage in the North; (2) RT was about right but wouldn't do the job alone; (3) best strategy would be to break the DRV/VC will by effectively denying them victory and bringing about negotiations through the enemy's impotence. They proposed establishing four brigade-sized enclaves, in addition to Da Nang - Hue/Phu Bai, at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau (3 Army

battalions plus 1 GOA battalion); Chu Lai (3 BLTs plus 3 Marine TFS); Qui Nhon (3 Army battalions); and Quang Ngai (3 ROK battalions). Added on to the 4 USMC BLTs (33,000 U.S. troops) and 2000 ROK troops already in Vietnam, the total was to be 82,000 U.S. and 7250 3d country troops. Mentioned for possible later deployment were: a U.S. Airmobile Division, a Corps Hq, an ROK Div (-), and the remainder of the III MEF (2 battalions). It was agreed that ARVN and U.S. units would be "brigaded" for operations, that the U.S. would try single managers of U.S. effort in 3 provinces as an experiment, that MEDCAP would be expanded, and that a study of fringe benefits for RVNAF would be undertaken.

21 Apr SecDef Memo McNamara sent the Honolulu for recommendations to the President The President essentially as described above.

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5 May ISA Memo to McNaughton informed Vance that DepSecDef a portion of the force package listed as "approved" by the JCS in JCSM 321-65 was in fact a part of the not-yet sanctioned three-division plan.

5 May Main body of 173d Airborne Brigade arrived at Vung Tau.

7 May Marines began landing at Chu Lai.

* * *

8 June Press Conference McCloskey, State Dept Press Officer, told the press that U.S. troops would be made available to fight alongside Viet forces when and if necessary.

- 9 June White House Press Release Statement released which said that there had been no recent change in mission of U.S. combat units. They would help the Viets if help was requested and COMUSMACV felt U.S. troops were required.
- * * *
- 15 June McNamara gave the green light for planning to deploy the airmobile division to SVN by 1 September.
- 16 June Press Conference McNamara announced deployments to SVN that would bring U.S. strength there to between 70,000 and 75,000 men. 20,000 of these would be combat troops and more would be sent if necessary. He said U.S. troops were needed because the RVNAF to VC force ratio of less than 4 to 1 was too low to enable the GVN to cope with the threat. Total U.S. Bns after deployments would be 15.
- 18 June White House Memo to SecDef McGeorge Bundy passed on to McNamara the President's concern that "we find more dramatic and effective actions in SVN..."
- 22 June Unsigned Memo to SecDef McNamara told that the President could wait until 10 July to approve the deployment of the airmobile division if SecDef is immediately given the go-ahead for readiness preparation. The question of removal of the two Army brigades was to be reconsidered in August.
- 10 July Deftel 5582 McNaughton told Taylor that it had been decided to deploy 10,400 logistic and support troops by 15 August to support current force levels and to receive the airmobile division, if deployed. GVN concurrence sought.

- 17 July NMCC
172042Z Vance told McNamara that the President had decided to go ahead with the plan to deploy 34 U.S. battalions and that he was favorably disposed to the call-up of reserves and extension of tours of active duty personnel.
- 28 July Presidential Press Conference The President told the press that he had ordered the air-mobile division and other units to SVN. Strength after these deployments would be 125,000 and more would be sent if required. He also said he'd decided not to call up reserve at that juncture.