

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

July 21, 2003

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Page 1 of 2

Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
002	Memo	Rostow to the President sanitized 10/23/13 per NLJ/RAC 99-75	S	1	01/22/68	A
002a	Cable	Copy of MAC 01049 [Sanitized 12/16/83 NLJ/CBS-8] more info released 10/23/13 per NLJ/RAC 99-75	S	1	01/22/68	A
003	Memo	Rostow to the President Open 10/23/13 per NLJ/RAC 99-75	S	1	01/22/68	A
003a	Cable	MAC 00967 [Sanitized 12/16/83 NLJ/CBS-8] more info released 10/23/13 per NLJ/RAC 99-75	S	5	01/22/68	A
004a	Cable	MAC 01333 [Sanitized 12/16/83 NLJ/CBS-8] more info released 11/8/13 per NLJ/RAC 99-75	S	2	01/29/68	A
017	Cable	MAC 01487 [Sanitized 12/16/83 NLJ/CBS-8] more info released 10/23/13 per NLJ/RAC 99-75	S	2	undated	A
021	Cable	Sharp to Wheeler [Sanitized 6/4/02 NLJ 93-469] [Sanitized 10-04 NLJ 92-356 Appeal (more info released)] [Duplicate of #7a, Files of WWR, "Nuclear Weapons..Contingency Planning", bx 7]	TS	3	02/02/68	A
023a	Cable	Copy of TDCS 314-01890-68 [Sanitized per CIA letter 12/21/78]	C	2	02/02/68	A
036a	Cable	TDCS 314/02051-68 [Sanitized per CIA letter 12/21/78]	C	1	02/04/68	A

Collection Title National Security File, NSC History

Folder Title "March 31st Speech, Vol. 2"

Box Number 47

Restriction Codes

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12958 governing access to national security information.
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06/10/2003

Initials

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Doc #	DocType	Doc Info	Classification	Pages	Date	Restriction
038	Memo	Rostow to President [Sanitized 8/19/98 NLJ 96-199]	C	1	02/05/68	A
052a	Cable	Text of cable from Westmoreland [Sanitized 12/16/85 NLJ/CBS 8]	S	3	02/08/68	A
<i>open 5-17-09 NLJ/RAC 03-182</i>						
055a	Letter	Gen. Walt to Rostow [Duplicate of #32a, MTP, Rostow vol. 60]	S	2	02/08/68	A
<i>open 6-14-04 NLJ 96-198</i>						
056a	Report	RE: Vietnam	TS	1	02/09/68	A
075	Memo	TH Moorer to JCS chairman	TS	1	02/12/68	A
<i>open 8-27-04 NLJ/RAC 99-76</i>						
076	Report	TDCS DB-315/00518-68 [Sanitized per CIA letter 12/21/78]	S	10	02/12/68	A
089a	Cable	TDCS-314/02654-68 [Sanitized per CIA letter 12/21/78]	C	3	02/13/68	A
091	Memo	Rostow to the President [Sanitized 11/08/00 NLJ/RAC 99-78]	TS	1	02/14/68	A
091a	Memo	Hentley to Rostow [Sanitized 3/14/03 NLJ/RAC 99-79]	TS	3	02/14/68	A
095a	Cable	DIRNSA to White House [Sanitized 2/13/03 NLJ/RAC 99-81]	S	1	02/14/68	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 16

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO OSD OSD letter NOV 22 1978		
#8 cable	secret <i>open 6-11-79</i> XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX MAC 01438	4 p 01/30/68	A
#16b report	secret <i>Example open 4-28-99</i> re: military forces	1 p 02/01/68	A
#18 cable	secret <i>open 6-11-79</i> MAC 01464 from Gen. Westmoreland	3 p undated	A
#30a memo	top secret <i>open 6-11-79</i> re: Vietnam	2p 02/04/68	A
#50 cable	conf <i>open</i> to president from Gen. Westmoreland, MAC 01719	1 p 02/07/68	A
#60a memo	secret <i>open</i> re: VC campaign	4 p 02/10/68	A
#61 memo	secret <i>open 7-22-80 if</i> military report	6 p 02/11/68	A
#65a memo	secret <i>open 6-11-79</i> re: Khe Sanh	2 p 02/12/68	A
#69a memo	secret to WH Situation room from Adm. McClendon	1 p 02/12/68	A
#71a report	secret <i>open</i> troops deployed to Vietnam	1 p 02/12/68	A
#72a KKKK report	secret <i>open</i> troops deployed to Vietnam	1 p 02/12/68	A
#72c report	secret <i>open</i> troops deployed to Vietnam	1 p 02/12/68	A
#85b report	secret (gp 3) <i>open</i> effect of weather	4 p 02/12/68	A
#93a memo	secret <i>open 11-7-79 if</i> to president re: Khe Sanh	2 p 02/14/68	A
#97a cable	conf <i>open 4-3-98</i> <i>Example per OSD 11-22-78 + State 4-25-79</i> Telegram No. 090	6 p 02/13/68	A

FILE LOCATION

(dup # 494 + 495. NSF. Memos to the President, Kissinger Vol. 62)
National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 2

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	to State dept. for consultation <i>State 7-10-78 + NSC 11-27-78 letters</i>		
#47 memo	conf to president from Rostow	1 p 02/07/68	A
#53a memo	conf to president from Rostow	1 p 02/08/68	A
#54 memo	conf secret to president from Rostow	1 p 02/08/68	A
#86 memo	secret to president from Rostow	1 p 02/13/68	A
#98 memo	secret <i>open 4-28-99 Exempt</i> to president from Rostow	1 p 02/14/68	A

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National Security File, NSC History
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO STATE DEPT. <i>declassified per State 3-6-79 letter</i>		
#16a memo	Conf (gp 3) to Secretary from Hughes	9 p 02/01/68	A
#27 cable	Secret (gp 1) 445 from Amb. Bunker in Saigon	2 p 02/04/68	A
#47a cable	conf Text of Saigon 18399	3 p 02/07/68	A
#49 cable	secret 18443 from Saigon	2 p 02/07/68	A
#53b cable	conf 18562 from Saigon	3 p 02/08/68	A
#54a memo	secret to president from Lodge	1 p 02/08/68	A
#83 memo	secret to Rostow from Lodge	1 p 02/13/68	A
#86a memo	secret to president from Lodge	5 p 02/13/68	A
#99 cable	secret (gp 2) 115654 to Saigon	5 p 02/14/68	A

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FILE LOCATION National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 2

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#13 memo	NSC secret <i>open 4-20-81 ip</i> to Rostow from Ginsburgh 2 p	01/31/68	A
#28a memo	NSC secret <i>sanitized 4-20-81 ip</i> to Rostow from Ginsburgh 1 p <i>open NLJ 96-205 7.20.98</i>	02/04/68	A
#53 memo	NSC secret <i>open 4-20-81 ip</i> to Rostow from Ginsburgh 1 p	02/08/68	A

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National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol.

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO CIA FOR CONSULTATION		
#36 memo	conf to president from Rostow <i>agen 10-2-79 inc</i>	02/05/68	A
#38 memo	conf to president from Rostow <i>sanitized 10-2-79 inc</i> <i>same sanitization NLT 96-199 8.19.98</i>	02/05/68	A
#89 memo	conf to president from Rostow <i>agen 10-2-79 inc</i>	02/13/68	A

FILE LOCATION National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 2

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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64/16

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#23a cable	CIA Conf copy of TDCS 314-01890-68 <i>sanitized</i>	02/02/68	A
#36a cable	conf (gp 1) TDCS 314/02051-68 <i>sanitized</i>	02/04/68	A
#76 report	secret (gp 1) TDCS DB-315/00518-68 <i>sanitized</i>	02/12/68	A
#89a cable	conf (gp 1) TDCS-314/02654-68 <i>sanitized</i>	02/13/68	A

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FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 2

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>Decisions per JCS 10-10-78 letter</i> JCS		
#5 memo	top secret (gp 3) to president from Gen. Wheeler	2 p 01/29/68	A
#11 cable	top secret from Gen. Wheeler	2 p 01/31/68	A
#12 cable	secret to Gen. Johnson from Gen. Wheeler	2 p 01/31/68	A
#19 cable	top secret to Adm. Sharp from Gen. Wheeler	2 p 02/01/68	A
#24 cable	secret to Gen. Johnson from Gen. Wheeler	3 p 02/13/68	A
#25a cable	secret to Gen. Johnson from Gen. Wheeler	5 p 02/03/68	A
#26a cable	secret MAC 0161 from Gen. Wheeler	4 p 02/04/68	A
#64a cable	top secret fm Gen. Wheeler	1 p 02/12/68	A
#66 cable	secret to Gen. Westmoreland from Gen. Wheeler	3 p 02/11/68	A
#67a memo	top secret to president from Gen. Wheeler	3 p 02/12/68	A
#78 memo	top secret (gp 3) to Rostow from Gen. Wheeler	3 p 02/13/68	A
#90 memo	secret Employment of B-52's (U)	1 p 02/13/68	A

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National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 2

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#55a letter	Navy secret to Walt Rostow from Gen. Walt <i>(dup # 32a, NSF, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 60)</i>	2 p 02/08/68	A
#75 memo	Navy top secret to chairman JCS from T. H. Moorer	1p 02/12/68	A

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National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 2

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#42a memo	<i>Decisions per State 1-24-79 letter</i> state top secret to Walt Rostow from Henry Cabot Lodge 1 p	02/05/68	A
#42b memo	state top secret to president from Henry Cabot Lodge 3 p	02/05/68	A
#51 cable	state top secret 1398 from Vientiane from Amb. Sullivan 2 p	02/07/68	A
#84 cable	state top secret (sp 3) 1 p 114390 to Amb. Bunker, Adm. Sharp & Gen. Westmoreland	02/13/68	A

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March 31st Speech, vol. 2

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#59a cable	OSD top secret <i>open 6-11-79</i> to Gen. Wheeler from Gen. Westmoreland 10 p	letter NOV 22 1978 undated	A
#63a cable	OSD top secret <i>open 6-11-79</i> to Adm. Sharp from Gen. Westmoreland 4 p	02/12/68	A
#73a cable	OSD top secret <i>open 6-11-79</i> to Gen. Wheeler from Gen. Westmoreland 3 p	undated	A
#77 report	OSD top secret <i>open 11-7-79</i> Vietnam forces 10 p	undated	A

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March 31st Speech, vol. 2

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO CIA		
#2 memo	WH secret 1 p to president from Rostow	01/22/68	A
#2a cable	OSD secret 1 p copy of MAC 01049 <i>sanitized 12-16-83 NLJ/CBS 8</i>	01/22/68	A
#3 memo	WH secret 1 p to president from Rostow	01/22/68	A
#3a cable	OSD secret 5 p MAC 00967 <i>sanitized 12-16-83 NLJ/CBS 8</i>	01/22/68	A
#4a cable	JCS secret 2 p MAC 01333 <i>sanitized 12-16-83 NLJ/CBS 8</i>	01/29/68	A
#17 cable	OSD secret 2 p MAC 01487 <i>sanitized 12-16-83 NLJ/CBS 8</i>	undated	A
#20 memo	JCS secret 3 p for Chairman, JCS <i>open 11-18-99 NLJ 99-2</i>	02/01/68 undated	A
#22 memo	WH secret 1 p to president from Rostow <i>OPEN NLJ 96-206 10-8-98</i>	02/02/68	A
#44 memo	WH secret 1 p re: Khe Sanh <i>open 4-28-99</i>	02/06/68	A
#52a cable	OSD secret 3 p Text of cable from Gen. Westmoreland <i>sanitized 12-16-83 NLJ/CBS 8</i>	02/08/68	A
#56 memo	WH top secret 1 p to president from Rostow <i>OPEN 11-18-99 NLJ/PAC 99-71</i>	02/09/68	A
dup. #18, NSF, MTR, Rostow Vol. 60, 2/7-9/68, bk 28 #56a report	CIA top secret 1 p re: Vietnam	02/09/68	A
#91 memo	WH top secret 1 p to president from Rostow <i>Sanitized 11/8/00 NS/PAC 99-78</i>	02/14/68	A
#91a memo <i>Sanitized 3-14-03 NLJ/PAC 99-79</i>	CIA top secret 3 p to Rostow from Hantley	02/14/68	A

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120616

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO CIA		
#95 memo	WH secret <i>open 4/17/01 NS PAC 99-80</i> to president from Rostow	1 p 02/14/68	A
#95a cable	OSD <i>secret</i> to WH from DIRNSA <i>sanitized 2-13-03 NW/EAR 99-81</i>	I P 02/14/68	A
#100 memo	OSD <i>possible classified info</i> Gen Ginsburgh to Walt <i>open 7/27/01 NS 99-160</i>	1 p 02/15/68	A
[REDACTED]			

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	<i>NLS-78-643</i>		
#10 memo	TO OSD FOR CONSULTATION WH conf <i>open 8-29-80 ip</i> to president from McCafferty 4 p	01/30/68	A
#14 memo	WH conf " to SecState, SecDef, Dir. BOB 4 p	01/31/68	A
#15 memo	WH secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	01/31/68	A
#15a memo	WH secret " to president from [Rostow] 2 p	01/31/68	A
#25 memo	WH conf " to president from Smith 1 p	02/03/68	A
#33 memo	WH conf " to Gen. Wheeler from Rostow 1 p	02/05/68	A
#34 cable	Wh conf <i>omitted 8-29-80 ip</i> to Gen. Westmoreland from President <i>open 11/25/87</i> 1 p <i>DT 96-193</i>	02/05/68	A
#43 memo	WH secret <i>open 8-29-80 ip</i> Khe Sanh Area 1 p	02/06/68	A
#45 memo	WH secret " to president from Smith 1 p	02/06/68	A
#48 memo	WH conf " to president from Rostow 2 p	02/07/68	A
#52 memo	WH secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/08/68	A
#57 note	WH secret " to McNamara from Rostow 1 p	02/09/68	A
#57a memo	WH secret " military situation in Vietnam 1 p	02/08/68	A
#59 memo	WH top secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/09/68	A
#60 memo	Wh secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/10/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	NLS-78-643		
#63 memo	TO SECRET OSD FOR CONSULTATION WH top secret <i>open 8-29-80 ip</i> to president from Rostow 1 p	02/12/68	A
#64 memo	WH top secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/12/68	A
#68 memo	WH top secret " to president from Rostow 2 p	02/12/68	A
#69 memo	WH secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/12/68	A
#70 memo	SECRET Wh conf " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/12/68	A
#73 memo	WH top secret " to president from Smith 1 p	02/12/68	A
#83a memo	Wh top secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/13/68	A
#85 memo	WH top secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/13/68	A
#85a memo	Wh secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/13/68	A
#93 memo	Wh secret " to Bob McNamara from Rostow 1 p	02/14/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#21 cable	<p><i>TO ERDA</i></p> <p>Navy top secret - ^{Formerly} restricted data to Gen. Wheeler from Adm. Sharp 3 p</p> <p><i>Sanitized per NWS 93-469 (#7a) 6/4/02</i></p> <p><i>Exempt 8-30-95 NWS 92-356</i></p> <p><i>Duplicate in Files of WWR, box 7, "Nuclear Weapons... Contingency Planning"</i></p> <p><i>Exempt per DOE 9-1-98 letter also change RD to formerly RD</i></p>	02/02/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#92 memo	Army conf <i>Army 5-23-78 letter</i> information brief 1 p	02/14/68	A

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GENERAL

22 Jan 68 thru 15 Feb 68

January:

22 -- Westmoreland's assessment last 48 hours -----	A
22 -- Westmoreland msg, current winter-spring campaign -----	B
29 -- Westmoreland's assessment last 72 hours -----	C
29 -- JCSM-63-68, The Situation at Khe Sanh -----	D
30 -- Viet Cong Attack the U. S. Embassy -----	E
30 -- U. S. Embassy cleared of Viet Cong -----	F
30 -- Westmoreland's assessment last 18 hours -----	G
30 -- Wheeler memo, phone call to Westmoreland -----	H
30 -- MACV report -----	I
31 -- Wheeler msg, talk with Westy -----	J
31 -- Wheeler msg, situation IV CTZ -----	K
31 -- Ginsburgh memo, Westmoreland's answers to President --	L
31 -- White House memo, crises at home -----	M
31 -- Rostow memo, crises in Viet Nam and Korea -----	N

February:

1 -- Statement by Hq of the Revolutionary Armed Forces -----	O
1 -- Westmoreland assessment -----	P
1 -- Westmoreland msg, his call to Rostow -----	Q
1 -- Wheeler msg, Khe Sanh -----	R
1 -- JCS memo, movement of COFRAM into SEA -----	S
2 -- Sharp msg, use of tactical nuclear weapons at Khe Sanh ----	T

February:

2 -- Memo to President, authority to use COFRAM -----	U
2 -- Intell Report, Viet Cong account of attack on Chau Doc City	V
3 -- MACV assessment of situation -----	W
3 -- Report of fighting in Saigon suburb -----	X
4 -- Wheeler msg, VN situation, Bunker handling press -----	Y
4 -- Bunker msg, handling press -----	Z
4 -- Ginsburgh memo, why Khe Sanh not yet begun -----	AA
4 -- Ginsburgh memo, Khe Sanh -----	BB
4 -- NMCC SEA operational highlights -----	CC
4 -- Ginsburgh memo, attack on Hill 861 diminishing -----	DD
4 -- Ginsburgh memo , Khe Sanh -----	EE
5 -- White House msg, confidence in Westmoreland -----	FF
5 -- McCafferty msg, gravel laid north of Khe Sanh -----	GG
5 -- Msg, summary of prisoner of war reports -----	HH
5 -- Ginsburgh memo, Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu -----	II
5 -- Rostow memo, intell report VC support will be withdrawn in March 1968 -----	JJ
5 -- McCafferty memo, statistics of past week -----	KK
5 -- Rostow memo, response to Elspeth question -----	LL
6 -- Rostow memo, interrogation of prisoners -----	MM
6 -- Lodge memo, raids in Viet Nam -----	NN
6 -- SitRoom memo, Khe Sanh under heavy attack -----	OO
6 -- SitRoom memo, Khe Sanh -----	PP

February:

6 -- Smith memo, Lang Vei not overrun -----	QQ
7 -- SitRoom memo, Lang Vei evacuated -----	RR
7 -- Bunker assessment -----	SS
7 -- Rostow memo, <u>Economist</u> article <u>This is It</u> -----	TT
7 -- Saigon msg, Lao refugees -----	UU
7 -- Westmoreland msg, grateful for President's confidence--	VV
7 -- Sullivan msg, suggest contingency plans -----	WW
8 -- Westmoreland msg, assessment -----	XX
8 -- Ginsburgh memo, personal conclusions -----	YY
8 -- Bunker msg, COSVN order for TET offensive -----	ZZ
8 -- Lodge memo, hold Khe Sanh -----	a
8 -- Walt memo, situation at Khe Sanh -----	b
9 -- DIA summary, B-52 strikes -----	c
9 -- Rostow msg, questions at 10:30 meeting -----	d
9 -- Rostow memo, prisoner interrogation -----	e
9 -- Westmoreland's msg of assessment -----	f
10 -- Carver's analysis of VN situation -----	g
11 -- Memo, enemy force increase since December -----	h
12 -- Rostow memo, support for SitRoom at White House -----	i
12 -- Westmoreland msg, assessment and requirements -----	j
12 -- Sharp msg, concurs in assessment and requirements -----	k
12 -- NMCC report, Khe Sanh supply situation -----	l
12 -- Wheeler msg, additional troops -----	m

February:

12 -- Wheeler's supplement to Westmoreland msg -----	n
12 -- Rostow memo, thoughts on Viet Nam -----	o
12 -- NMCC report, road from DaNang to Hue is open -----	p
12 -- Rostow memo, enemy killed -----	q
12 -- McNamar's proposed pre ss statement on battalions -----	r
12 -- Rostow's suggested addition to McNamara statement -----	s
12 -- Westmoreland's reply to questions by Wheeler -----	t
12 -- JCS msg, deployment of army and marine forces to SVN -----	u
12 -- Moorer memo, emergency reinforcement of COMUSMACV ----	v
12 -- CIA cable, analysis of Viet Cong TET offensive -----	w
12 -- Paper on Vietnam armed forces RVNAF -----	x
12 -- Wheeler memo, Status of RVNAF -----	y
12 -- Johnson memo, items for action -----	z
13 -- Paper, rationale for partial mobilization -----	aa
13 -- Ginsburgh paper, mobilization issues -----	bb
13 -- Paper, optional near-term action programs -----	cc
12 -- Lodge memo, ARVN -----	dd
12 -- State msg, command relationships -----	ee
12 -- Rostow memo, question should we hold Khe Sanh -----	ff
12 -- Lodge memo, minuses and plusses of attack on cities -----	gg
12 -- JCS msg,, deployment of 82d Airborne to SVN -----	hh

February:

13 -- JCS msg, deployment of Marine Corps regiment -----	ii
13 -- CIA report, Quant Tri in I Corps wobbly -----	jj
13 -- JCS msg, employment of B-52's -----	kk
13 -- Rostow memo, CIA assessment of DaNang document -----	ll
14 -- Army info brief, deployment of 82d Airborne Division -----	mm
14 -- Rostow memo, Khe Sanh -----	nn
14 -- Rostow memo, initiative away from U Thant -----	oo
14 -- Msg, planned attacks on Khe Sanh Base -----	pp
14 -- Rusk statement, pre-empt U Thant's believed position -----	qq
14 -- Msg, Longon's man in Hanoi -----	rr
14 -- British account of U Thant's conversation with Mai Van Bo --	ss
15 -- Saigon msg, Fanfani talks with NVN regarding negotiations ---	tt
15 -- Ginsburgh memo, Khe Sanh battle may be over -----	uu
15 -- President's memo, questions related to call-up of reserves --	vv

7 INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

Monday, January 22, 1968
4:45 p.m. *10:5002*

Mr. President:

I believe you will wish to read Westy's
assessment of the situation as it has developed
over the past 48 hours.

I am getting typed a more general
military assessment he also filed with us.

West Rostow

MAC 01049, January 22, 1968

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RLC 99-75

By *UUD* NARA, Date *10-18-2013*

20

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] EYES ONLY

Copy of MAC 01049 from General Westmoreland Jan. 22, 1968

1. The following is my assessment of the situation as it has developed over the past 48 hours.
2. The initial attacks of the expected enemy offensive in northern I Corps began on 20-21 January with assaults on 26th Marine positions north of Khe Sanh and on the Huong Hoa subsector. These were repulsed by the Marines and the Regional and Popular Forces in the area. Attacks by fire destroyed some ammunition and fuel and cratered the runway on the airfield. (3,000 feet of runway is still usable, however.) There was also a heavy attack by fire on Camp Carroll, with no significant damage or casualties resulting. The enemy broke contact around Khe Sanh at about noon the 21st and his activity subsided.
3. These actions were probably preliminary to a full-scale attack on Khe Sanh by the entire 325th North Vietnamese Army division sometime in the next few days. Some, if not all, of the newly arrived 304th North Vietnamese Army division will probably be involved in this attack.
4. The 320th North Vietnamese Army division will probably conduct supporting attacks against friendly installations along Highway 9, particularly Camp Carroll. The current dispositions of the 320th headquarters and supporting artillery indicate that an attack on Camp Carroll may occur within 24 hours.
5. We have good evidence that the enemy will attempt a multi-battalion attack on Hue City, and he may sally out of the Hai Lang jungle base area to attack Quang Tri City. There are intelligence indications that some of the recently arrived reinforcements are on their way to the Hai Lang Base area or are already there. There is also intelligence evidence of a possible attack on Danang.
6. The two-week general lull in country-wide activity that was interrupted on the 20th indicates preparations for a widespread effort. The presence of high echelon representatives near tactical units in all corps areas strengthens the probability. I believe that the enemy will attempt a country-wide show of strength just prior to Tet, with Khe Sanh being the main event. In II Corps, he will probably attack around Pleiku and Kontum cities, and I expect attacks on the Special Forces camps at Dak Seang, Duc Co, and Dak To. In III and IV Corps, province towns are likely targets for renewed attacks by fire. Terrorism will probably increase in and around Saigon.

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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] EYES ONLY

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/rnc 99-75

By LCLB NARA, Date 10-18-2013

3
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET--SAVIN~~

Monday, January 22, 1968
6:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this two-part message from Gen. Westmoreland, especially part 1. He concludes:

"The current winter-spring campaign is unusual in its urgency and intensity. The bulk of our evidence suggests that the enemy is conducting a short-term surge effort, possibly designed to improve his chances of gaining his ends through political means, perhaps through negotiations leading to some form of a coalition government."

W. A. T. Rostow

MAC 00967, January 22, 1968

~~SECRET--SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / 12AC 99-75; NLS 141.021.021/2
NARA, Date 10-18-2013

B

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~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

Monday, January 22, 1968

~~SECRET~~ MAC 00967 EYES ONLY

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

This is a two-part message. Part I represents my assessment of the enemy's overall winter-spring campaign; Part II gives my current views on the enemy's disposition and offensive plans in Quang Tri-Thua Thien. Part I follows:

The enemy's winter-spring activity to date has given rise to a number of widespread impressions: that he is showing an unusual sense of urgency, that he has increased the tempo and intensity of the war, that his infiltration exceeds our estimates, that he is engaging in unprecedented unit reinforcement, and that he has increased the coordination of his forces. Some of these, I believe, are valid, while others are false or marginally true.

He is definitely displaying a very unusual sense of urgency. His documents indicate this, exhorting all his forces to conduct continuous operations in this "decisive campaign". In the Central Office for South Vietnam area, final victory is even promised in this campaign. His operations also show this urgency. Song Be and Dak To were attacked with inadequate preparation. The Second and Third North Vietnamese Divisions with green replacements persist in the offense despite serious losses. His reinforcement activities also show this urgency, with the 304th Division accomplishing in two months a move comparable to the four-month move of the 325C Division a year ago.

The intensity of the war has increased. Although total incidents have decreased since September, the number of assaults and attacks by fire have shown a steady increase throughout the year. Enemy action in the DMZ influenced this through September; since then, however, sharp drops in the First and Second Corps have been counterbalanced by increases in the Central Office for South Vietnam area.

As a result of the enemy activity and of our operations, the enemy's losses in the fourth quarter of 1967 were high. Killed in action's were 50 percent higher than a year earlier, while weapons loss nearly doubled. Enemy losses, however, while above the yearly average, remained below the peaks reached in the spring. The continuation of enemy offensive action despite these losses may give the impression that our infiltration estimates were low. Through August, 1967, the enemy was infiltrating about 6100 troops per month as compared to our estimate of 6500. Since then, we have estimated a spread of 5000 to 6000. Our data, while admittedly incomplete, shows an unusually low count for this period, suggesting a period of low infiltration similar to that of late 1966. While some units, as the divisions in MR 5, have probably received an unusual share of available replacements, we see no evidence as yet that our overall estimate for 1967 will be significantly exceeded. Following the 1967 pattern, however, we would expect to see an upsurge in infiltration during the current quarter.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ / DAC 99-75

By 4448 NARA, Date 10-18-2013

Enemy reinforcement during this campaign has resulted in the most serious threat of the war to northern First Corps. Reinforcement to date, however, may be a repetition of the 1966-early 1967 pattern, when the 325 C Division deployed and the first of about 40 Hanoi mainline terminals representing replacements and reinforcements appeared. Whether present reinforcement activity is in fact unprecedented depends upon the nature of the 320th Division's deployment, and cannot yet be answered.

The enemy achieved an unusual degree of coordination during the last week in October, with near simultaneous actions beginning in the Fourth Corps and moving northward to the Second Corps. Since then, however, he has shown little improvement in his ability to coordinate at higher levels. He has achieved through reorganizations an improvement at the lower level. We believed, however, that this resulted from normal evolutionary moves, and is not specifically attributable to the present enemy campaign.

To summarize my view of the current impressions, I feel that the truly unusual factors of the present enemy campaign are his urgency and the increased intensity of the war in the Third and Fourth Corps. Enemy losses are not significantly higher than average 1967 rates, but it is striking that the enemy has not attempted to reduce his losses. The other factors enumerated in paragraph 2 seem less unusual, and partially explainable either as extensions of long-standing trends or similar to previously observed patterns of enemy activity.

There are two possible hypotheses for the unusual aspects of the enemy activity. Either the enemy is making a major effort for a short period of time in order to gain exploitable victories for political purposes, or else the enemy has escalated the tempo and hopes to continue the protracted war at current tempo.

Abundant documentary evidence favors the short-term hypothesis. Enemy documents increasingly talk of the possibility of negotiations and of a coalition government. The enemy drawdown on his coastal defenses in North Vietnam also suggests a concern with relatively short-term goals. He has made determined attempts to gain a spectacular victory, and is now preparing for another attempt in northern First Corps. I believe that the enemy sees a similarity between our base at Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu and hopes, by following a pattern of activity similar to that used against the French, to gain similar military and political ends.

On the other hand, there is some evidence supporting a longer-term hypothesis. Some very recent captured documents refer to continuation of the war at least into the summer. There is no firm indication to date that North Vietnam has backed down from its previous conditions for negotiation.

The key question becomes the enemy capability to continue the war at its present pace. The answer to this lies in his manpower problems. Continuation of the war at the present tempo will presumably cause enemy losses in 1968 at least as great

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

as those suffered during the past year. The enemy's current input is failing to meet his requirement by at least 5000 men per month. A continuation of such losses, with a resultant upgrading of local and guerrilla forces, would cause the rapid deterioration of the Viet Cong and the war would become increasingly a North Vietnamese Army war. To counteract this, if the enemy made a maximum effort with infiltration of about 11,000 men per month, and takes losses no greater than in 1967, he could sustain the war at current levels for only about one year, and then at great sacrifice. The enemy cannot indefinitely accept either alternative.

In summary, the current winter-spring campaign is unusual in its urgency and intensity. The bulk of our evidence suggests that the enemy is conducting a short-term surge effort, possibly designed to improve his chances of gaining his ends through political means, perhaps through negotiations leading to some form of a coalition government.

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SECRET [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

This message is Part II of a two-part message and gives my current views on the enemy's disposition and offensive plans in Quang Tin-Thua Thien Province.

In the Khe Sanh area, evidence indicates that the 325C and 304th North Vietnamese Army divisions are deployed north and south of the camp, respectively. [REDACTED] located the 95C North Vietnamese Army Regiment 13 km northwest of Khe Sanh and a rallier partially confirms this. The 325 Division Headquarters' current location west of Khe Sanh places it in position to control subordinate elements. Though the remainder of the division was last located in Laos, it probably has deployed to positions northwest of Khe Sanh. [REDACTED] the Headquarters, 304th Division and one subordinate regiment south of Khe Sanh. [REDACTED] another infantry regiment plus rear service elements may also be in that area. Another subordinate 304th regiment is located in Laos west of Khe Sanh.

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Since late December, most of the 324B Division has been deployed from east to west across the DMZ and has been transporting supplies from depots north of the DMZ to caches north and northeast of Khe Sanh. At least 114 short tons of rice were moved, and I believe that 200-300 tons probably were transported. This is enough rice to feed an entire division for one month. In addition, at least 41 tons of ammunition, i. e., the equivalent in weight of a basic load for one division, were also moved. Unlike past years, traffic north of Dong Hoi to the DMZ area has been extremely heavy since January 7, indicating a continued supply buildup, probably artillery ammunition, increased truck traffic in Laos indicates the enemy will be supplied from the west as well. Since January 16, [REDACTED] most of the 324B Division's elements ceased their transportation mission. A tenuous fix located the 812th regiment in Ba 101, 56 km. south of its January 7 position. [REDACTED] the unit was to relocate and suggest coordination with the 274th independent battalion deployed east of Cam Lo. The 90th regiment may still be near its January 16 position north of the Rock Pile. The 803rd is deployed generally north of Con Thien.

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The 320th Division Headquarter and its subordinate regiments may be deployed north of Highway 9. [REDACTED] indicate that the Division Headquarter and one, possibly two regiments, may be deployed north of the Rock Pile. [REDACTED] one 320th Regiment may be serving a logistics mission and possibly is deployed west of the Rock Pile.

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From his deployment, I believe that the enemy plans a coordinated offensive designed to seize and hold key objectives in the northern two provinces. Current

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SECRET [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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evidence indicates that the 325C and 304th Division's have Khe Sanh/Lang Vei as objectives; however, the 304th Division may side-step Khe Sanh and move to Base Area 101. Elements of the 320th Division appear targeted against Camp Carroll and the Rock Pile, probably to hinder friendly artillery support. The Khe An Artillery Brigade Headquarters, recently deployed to the DMZ area probably will direct suppressing fires from artillery positions located just north of the Ben Hai River. The 803rd and 9th probably will attempt diversionary attacks in the Con Thien/Gio Linh areas. They could be supported by the 164th Artillery Regiment, if the 812th Regiment joined the 9th Regiment in Base Area 101, an attack on Quang Tri City is probable. And the 320th Division may also move south to the Quang Tri area. Certainly, the movement of Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region Headquarters and the 6th Regiment South to positions near Hue, threatens that city.

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, Jan. 29, 1968
6:45 AM

ps
Mr. President;

Attached is Gen. Westmoreland's
latest assessment of the situation
in South Vietnam.

Arthur M. McCafferty
Arthur McCafferty



EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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1968 JAN 29 11 14

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OO YEKADS
DE YSNKQA 18 0291051
O 291044Z ZYH ZFF-5
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
INFO WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
STATE DEPT WASH DC
CIA MR CARVER
O 281019Z ZYH ZFF3
FM GEN WESTMORELAND
TO ADM SHARP
INFO GEN WHEELER
AMB BUNKER
ZEM

EO 12958
3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SECRET MAC 01333 EYES ONLY
COMUSMACV SENDS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS MY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AS IT HAS DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST SEVENTY-TWO HOURS.
2. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY MAY NOT CEASE MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING TET. IN FACT HE IS NOW WELL INTO HIS ANNOUNCED TET STANDDOWN PERIOD WITH NO DISCERNABLE DECREASE IN SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY IN THE NORTHERN TWO CORPS AREAS.
3. THE ENEMY CONTINUES HIS ATTACKS BY FIRE IN THE KHE SANH AREA. ANOTHER REGIMENT OF THE 304TH DIVISION, POSSIBLY

THE 9TH, MOVED NORTHWARD TO A POSITION 7 KM SOUTH OF KHE SANH. AIR STRIKES AND ARTILLERY ARE SERIOUSLY INTERDICTING ENEMY SUPPLY EFFORTS IN THIS AREA. THERE ARE TENTATIVE INDICATIONS, THROUGH PHOTO INTERPRETATION, THAT THE ENEMY MAY ATTEMPT TO IS HIS WAY INTO KHE SANH DUE TO OUR TREMENDOUS FIREPOWER ADVANTAGE. (AS HE DID AT DIEN BEN PHU).

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3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. WE NOW HAVE A FIRMER HOLD ON THE PROBABLE LOCATION OF MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE 320TH NVA DIVISION. DETAINEES TAKEN

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 99-75

NARA, Date 10-18-2013

YESTERDAY IN A HEAVY CONTACT NORTH OF CAMP CARROLL STATE THEY
ARE FROM THE 64TH NVA REGIMENT, 320TH NVA DIVISION. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

PROBABLY THE 52ND REGIMENT, 320TH NVA DIVISION. ENEMY ACTIV-
ITY ALONG THE DMZ REMAINS MODERATE WITH THE SITUATION AT QUANG
TRI CITY AND HUE REMAINING UNCHANGED. ENEMY MOVEMENTS HAVE
ACCENTUATED THE THREAT IN THE PHU LOC, HAI VAN PASS AND DA-
NANG AREAS. TAM KY AND HOI AN MAY ALSO BE ATTACKED AS A
DIVERSION. ISOLATION OF THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES MUST
INCLUDE CLOSING THE PASS AND CRIPPLING THE DANANG AIR AND
LOGISTICS FACILITIES. ATTEMPTS TO DO THIS MAY OCCUR AT ANY

TIME.

5. IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS OF II CTZ, AND IN MR-5,
[REDACTED] URGENT ENEMY PREPARATIONS FOR
OFFENSIVE ACTION. THESE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT SOME UNITS
ARE BEHIND SCHEDULE IN PREPARATIONS. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

6. [REDACTED] FOR FAILURE TO CARRY OUT THE PLANNED ATTACK ON DUC CO.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] HANOI'S CONCERN, AND PERHAPS
FRUSTRATION, WITH THE INABILITY OF ITS MAJOR COMMANDS TO
INITIATE PLANNED OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT
THE ENEMY PLANS TO LAUNCH WIDESPREAD ACTIVITY TO DETER REIN-
FORCEMENT OF NORTHERN I CORPS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

440

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-63-68

29 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Situation at Khe Sanh

1. You will recall that on 12 January 1968 General Westmoreland informed me that the Khe Sanh position is important to us for the following reasons: (a) it is the western anchor of our defense of the DMZ area against enemy incursions into the northern portion of South Vietnam; (b) its abandonment would bring enemy forces into areas contiguous to the heavily populated and important coastal area; and (c) its abandonment would constitute a major propaganda victory for the enemy which would seriously affect Vietnamese and US morale. In summary, General Westmoreland declared that withdrawal from Khe Sanh would be a tremendous step backwards.

2. At 0910 hours this morning I discussed the Khe Sanh situation by telephone with General Westmoreland. He had just returned from a visit to northern I Corps Area during which he conferred with senior commanders, personally surveyed the situation, and finalized contingency plans. General Westmoreland made the following points:

a. The Khe Sanh garrison now consists of 5,000 US and ARVN troops. They have more than a battalion of US artillery supporting them, and 16 175 MM guns which can fire from easterly positions in support of the Khe Sanh force.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-10-78 letter

By iq, NARS, Date 3-29-75

Copy 1 of 1 Copies each
of 1 pages series "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

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~~TOP SECRET~~

b. Among other reinforcing actions, he has moved a full US Army Division into northern I Corps. Within a few days the equivalent of an ARVN airborne division will also reinforce this area.

c. He has established a Field Army Headquarters in the Hue/Phu Bai area to control all forces, both US and ARVN, in northern I Corps. This headquarters is commanded by General Abrams.

d. General Momyer, Commander 7th Air Force, is coordinating all supporting air strikes in the NIAGRA area which constitutes the locale of enemy buildup around Khe Sanh.

e. Air action since 17 January has been remunerative. About 40 B-52 sorties per day and some 500 tactical air sorties per day are being conducted in the NIAGRA area. There have been numerous secondary explosions. It appears that air strikes and our artillery fire have disrupted the enemy's logistic buildup and troop concentration.]

3. General Westmoreland stated to me that, in his judgment, we can hold Khe Sanh and we should hold Khe Sanh. He reports that everyone is confident. He believes that this is an opportunity to inflict a severe defeat upon the enemy. Further, General Westmoreland considers that all preparatory and precautionary measures have been taken, both in South Vietnam and here, to conduct a successful defense in the Khe Sanh area.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the situation at Khe Sanh and concur with General Westmoreland's assessment of the situation. They recommend that we maintain our position at Khe Sanh.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

2C

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 30, 1968
Tuesday, 3:15 P.M.

6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Viet Cong Attack on U.S. Embassy in Saigon

By direct telephone, NMCC has learned that in an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, several Viet Cong got into the compound.

There is one U.S. casualty, an officer in the Embassy's Political Section. The compound is under full U.S. control.

W. A. Rostow

E

MEMORANDUM

2C
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7
Tuesday, January 30, 1968, 10:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Westmoreland Reports U.S. Embassy Saigon Cleared
of Viet Cong

At 9:00 P.M. (EST) General Westmoreland telephoned from the U.S. Embassy compound to report that the Embassy Chancery as well as the entire compound are completely cleared of Viet Cong attackers.

In the rest of Saigon, he reports that things are now quiet. There is still some fighting at the nearby U.S. base at Ton Son Hut. This fighting at the base may be Viet Cong attempting to get out of the area. He reports he has all the strength needed to take care of this fighting.

Ambassador Bunker is safe but has not yet returned to his Embassy office. All Embassy civilians are safe, one marine was killed and two were wounded in the action. Four Military Police were killed and three were wounded. Nineteen Viet Cong were killed in the fighting.


Damage to the Embassy building is minimal. There was no structural damage but part of the lobby was destroyed and the outside of the building damaged.

General Westmoreland reconstructs the operation as follows:
At about 3:00 A.M. Saigon time a Viet Cong platoon of about twenty men dressed in civilian clothes and armed with automatic weapons, rockets, satchel charges and explosives, attacked the Embassy compound. They made a hole in the outer wall through which they crawled. Their purpose was apparently to destroy the building.

The MPs moved in, encountering sniper fire coming from buildings nearby. At about 5:00 A.M. U.S. troops moved into the compound, engaging the Viet Cong. At 8:00 A.M. a platoon of the 101 Airborne Division landed on the roof. The fighting ended about 9:00 A.M., all Viet Cong in the area believed killed.

Brom
Bromley Smith

Picture of Embassy attached



DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD letter NOV 22 1978

By sp, NARS, Date 6-11-79

~~SECRET~~ 2C
~~EYES ONLY~~

30 JAN 1968
O 301255Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC

ZEM

TO: MR RUSK-STATE

TO: MR HELMS-CIA

TO: MR. MCCAFFERTY
WHITE HOUSE

From: Gen WHEELER

~~SECRET~~ MAC 21438 ~~EYES ONLY~~

THE EVENTS OF THE PAST 18 HOURS HAVE BEEN REplete WITH ENEMY ATTACKS AGAINST CERTAIN OF OUR KEY INSTALLATIONS IN THE I AND II CTZS. THE HEAVIEST ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED AGAINST DANANG, KONTUM, PLEIKU, NHA TRANG, BAN ME THUOT, AND TAN CANH IN THE DAK TO AREA. LESSER ATTACKS WERE MADE ON QUI NHON AND TUY HOA. ALTHOUGH ENEMY ACTIVITY IN III AND IV CTZS WAS COMPARATIVELY LIGHT DURING THIS PERIOD, WE ARE ALERT TO ATTEMPTS BY THE ENEMY TO ATTACK SIGNIFICANT TARGETS IN THESE AREAS. REPEATED ATTEMPTS CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED IN THE I AND II CTZS. WHILE OUR OPERATIONS REPORTS TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS HAVE COVERED THESE ATTACKS IN SOME DETAIL, I FELT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO GIVE YOU A WRAP-UP ON THE SITUATION AS IT STANDS NOW.

IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT IN I CTZ NONE OF THESE ATTACKS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST OUR INSTALLATIONS NORTH OF THE AI VAN PASS, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF THE THICKENING OF US FORCES IN THAT AREA. DANANG WAS THE PRIME TARGET AND WAS ATTACKED BEGINNING AT 20 MINUTES PAST MIDNIGHT. THE FACILITIES AT MARBLE MOUNTAIN AND THE DANANG AIR BASE WERE MORTARED AND ROCKETED WITH A NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT RECEIVING DAMAGE, TO INCLUDE FIVE JET AIRCRAFT DESTROYED. THE ROCKET SITE WAS IMMEDIATELY LOCATED AND BROUGHT UNDER FIRE WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS AT THIS TIME. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ARVN CORPS HEADQUARTERS CAME

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

UNDER ENEMY MORTAR AND GROUND ATTACK BY AN ESTIMATED REINFORCED ENEMY COMPANY. AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE AGAINST THE DANANG BRIDGE BY UNDERWATER SWIMMERS. IT WAS THWARTED WITH THREE ENEMY KIA AND ONE CAPTURED. TIMELY WARNING OF THE ATTACKS PLUS RAPID REACTION BY US/ARVN/ROK FORCES HAS BROUGHT THE SITUATION IN THE DANANG AREA UNDER CONTROL AT THIS TIME. CASUALTIES SO FAR LIST 89 ENEMY KIA AND 7 FRIENDLY KIA. NOTEWORTHY AMONG THE COUNTERACTIONS LAUNCHED IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS WAS THAT OF THE ROK MARINES, WHO, IN RESPONSE TO AN ENEMY GROUND ATTACK IN THE HOI AN AREA, INSERTED A FORCE BY HELICOPTER, ENGAGED THE ENEMY, KILLING 21 WITH NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES.

THE II CTZ RECEIVED THE BULK AND INTENSITY OF THE ENEMY ATTACKS. IN THE KONTUM AREA, IN EXCESS OF 500 ENEMY ATTACKED FROM THE NORTH IN THE VICINITY OF THE AIRFIELD, AND WERE ENGAGED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 4TH U.S. DIVISION AND ASSORTED VIETNAMESE UNITS. THE AREA IS NOW UNDER CONTROL WITH ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES BEING EMPLOYED AGAINST AN ESTIMATED TWO ENEMY BATTALIONS. SEVEN U.S. WERE KILLED IN THIS ACTION, WITH 165 NVA KIA. VIETNAMESE CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN. IN TAN CANH OF KONTUM PROVINCE, CONTACT IS SPORADIC WITH ELEMENTS OF THE 3/42 ARVN REGIMENT OPPOSING AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE. FOUR FRIENDLY HAVE BEEN KILLED AND FIVE NVA. IN PLEIKU, CONTACT CONTINUES WITH AN ENEMY OF UNKNOWN SIZE IN THE CITY, WITH FRIENDLY FORCES ATTEMPTING TO CUT OFF THE ENEMY FORCES TRYING TO ESCAPE. THE 4TH INF DIV CAPTURED 220 ENEMY IN THE VICINITY OF PLEIKU. OF THESE, 20 HAD NORTH VIETNAMESE MONEY ON THEIR PERSON. THE VAST MAJORITY ARE MONTAGNARDS BELIEVED TO BE PRESSED INTO SERVICE. AVERAGE AGE

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

APPEARS TO BE 18 TO 30. 58 CLAIM TO BE HOI CHANH. ARVN FORCES ARE IN THE CITY. (PLEIKU). SEVEN FRIENDLY HAVE BEEN KILLED AS AGAINST 103 ENEMY. IN NHA TRANG, SPORADIC FIGHTING CONTINUES IN THE CITY. FRIENDLY LOST 21 KIA; ENEMY 60 KIA. FIGHTING CONTINUES AGAINST THE ENEMY ATTEMPTING TO WITHDRAW. CITY FIGHTING CONTINUES IN BAN ME THUOT WITH ENEMY STILL IN THE VICINITY. CASUALTIES ARE REPORTED TO BE 7 FRIENDLY KIA AND 131 ENEMY KIA. IN ADDITION, 36 ENEMY HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE TUY HOA AREA AND 11 NVA KIA IN THE NINH HOA AREA. IN QUI NHON, THE ENEMY HOLDS THE RADIO STATION AND THE MAINTENANCE AREA BUT HAS LOST 50 KIA. THE ROKS HAVE THE RADIO STATION SURROUNDED BUT HAVE NOT ATTACKED, SINCE THE ENEMY IS HOLDING THREE HOSTAGES.

IN III CTZ IN BINH DINH DOUNG PROVINCE, SOUTHWEST OF BEN CAT, UNITS OF THE 25TH US DIVISION MADE A SIGNIFICANT CONTACT WITH AN ENEMY FORCE, RESULTING IN 66 ENEMY KILLED, WITH EIGHT FRIENDLY KILLED AND 14 WOUNDED. IV CTZ HAD ONE SIGNIFICANT ENCOUNTER IN THE VINH LONG AREA, WHERE GUNSHIPS AND TACTICAL SUPPORT AIRCRAFT ENGAGED A CLEARED TARGET OF SAMPANS IN A CANAL AREA, KILLING 80 ENEMY, DESTROYING 124 SAMPANS, WITH THREE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.

DURING THE COURSE OF THE DAY WE HAD A MAXIMUM AIR EFFORT, WHICH WAS REPORTED TO BE EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE.

THE CURRENT OUTLOOK DEPICTS A SITUATION SIMILAR TO MY FOREGOING ACCOUNT.

IN SUMMARY, THE ENEMY HAS DISPLAYED WHAT APPEARS TO BE DESPERATION TACTICS, USING NVA TROOPS TO TERRORIZE POPULATED AREAS. HE ATTEMPTED TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE BY ATTACKING DURING THE TRUCE PERIOD.

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

THE REACTION OF VIETNAMESE, US AND FREE WORLD FORCES TO THE SITUATION HAS BEEN GENERALLY GOOD. SINCE THE ENEMY HAS EXPOSED HIMSELF, HE HAS SUFFERED MANY CASUALTIES. AS OF NOW, THEY ADD UP TO ALMOST 700. WHEN THE DUST SETTLES, THERE WILL PROBABLY BE MORE. ALL MY SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS REPORT THE SITUATION WELL IN HAND.

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

20
9
January 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WHEELER:

I feel I owe you an explanation ^{in writing please} of the circumstances surrounding the telephone call to MACV and General Westmoreland this morning from the Situation Room.

At 5:30 Art McCafferty and Bob Ginsburgh were looking over the information available on the situation in Vietnam. They became concerned that we had no additional material beyond that which had been shown to the President at midnight. They decided that, in order to assure the President we were attempting to get more information and to save time, they would personally call the MACV Duty Officer for a report. As the call was being placed, the President telephoned down from his bedroom. In answer to his query as to why we did not have more information, he was informed that we were attempting to call MACV at that time.

The first person with whom Art talked was General Westmoreland's aide. The aide asked if he wouldn't like to speak personally with General Westmoreland. Art replied that he would not want to disturb the General and would prefer to talk to the Duty Officer. He was then transferred to the MACV COC, where he talked to the Colonel on duty. After about five minutes, the Colonel informed Art that General Westmoreland had just walked into the center and would like to speak with the person in the White House. It was at that point that the conversation was held with General Westmoreland.

At no time was there any intent to disturb General Westmoreland who, we understand quite well, is a very busy man, especially in situations as we had last evening. The intent was to be certain that we could assure the President that he was receiving the best and latest information on the situation.

*I know well that - at a time like now -
the field commander is the man at the wheel.*
15/Walt
W. W. Rostow

AMcC:jjjs

Dispatched 1/30/68 Outside Rpt.

2C

10

WL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, January 30, 1968 -- 11:45 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-25-78, NSC 8-14-80

By JK (ig), NARS, Date 8-29-80

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT *(see Situation, p. 3-4)*

The following is a situation report from MACV, sent at 7:30 a.m. this morning. (All times are EST.)

Principle activity in the Republic of Vietnam on 29/30 January 1968 is summarized as follows:

First Corps

Enemy forces launched coordinated mortar, rocket and ground attacks in the Danang, Wheeler/Wallowa and Chu Lai areas.

At 11:20 a.m. several enemy snipers were observed in the water in the vicinity of the Danang Bridge. The enemy was engaged with small arms fire resulting in one enemy killed and one detained.

At 12:48 p.m. a Marine unit located northwest of Danang received four rounds of rocket fire and at approximately the same time, the 1st ARVN Battalion and a Regional Force unit in Hai Van Pass area reported receiving mortar and small arms fire. There was no report of enemy penetration.

Between 2:00 and 4:00 p.m. the Marble Mountain air facility received approximately 20 rounds of mortar fire with numerous Army aircraft receiving damage. No casualties reported.

At 2:30 p.m. the Danang Air Base also came under rocket attack with initial reports indicating a total of 20 rounds received. Additional reports reflect five aircraft destroyed, 18 aircraft with various degrees of damage. Results were: friendly, one killed, 10 wounded, 37 non-battle casualties; enemy casualties are not known.

Between 2:30 and 4:40 p.m. the ARVN Headquarters at Danang came under enemy mortar and ground attack by an estimated reinforced enemy company or larger. A total of 40-50 mortar rounds were received in and around the ARVN compound area. The attack was repulsed. Results were: friendly, 2 killed; enemy, 64 killed, 7 detainees.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In response to the enemy attacks to the Danang area, artillery missions were conducted and gunships launched attacks on enemy forces south of Danang. The exact extent of enemy losses is not yet known.

At 1:55 p.m. an ARVN artillery unit in the vicinity of Hoi An reported receiving mortar, small arms, and automatic weapons fire. Korean Marines were inserted by helicopter and engaged the enemy force. Latest information reflects 21 enemy killed and two detained, no friendly casualties have been reported.

American division units also report a number of incidents during the period. Between 12:50 and 5:10 p.m. a total of 90 rounds of mortar fire was reported by US units at five different landing zones throughout the Wheeler/Wallowa area of operation and the Chu Lai area. No reported ground attacks.

Second Corps

In Qui Nhon, the enemy controls the radio station and the maintenance area. One Korean battalion is sweeping the area, and results to date: three US killed, five US wounded, and 50 enemy killed.

In Kontum City artillery and air strikes are being employed against an estimated two enemy battalions. Results: friendly, seven killed, five wounded; enemy, 165 killed, two detained. An estimated two enemy battalions are outside the city.

In Ban Me Thuot, fighting continues within the city. An estimated two battalions are outside the city. Results: friendly, seven killed, 16 wounded; enemy: 91 killed and 28 detained.

In Ninh Hoa contact continues on a sporadic basis. Results: friendly, one wounded; enemy, 11 killed.

In Tuy Hoa heavy fighting continues. The enemy force is trying to break out. Results: friendly, seven killed, 31 wounded, six missing; enemy, 36 killed.

In Nha Trang sporadic fighting continues in the city with friendly elements attempting to cut off enemy forces leaving the city. Results: friendly, 21 killed, 66 wounded; enemy, 60 killed, 15 detained.

In Pleiku contact continues with an unknown size enemy force in the city. ARVN units are in the city. Friendly forces are attempting to cut off the enemy forces trying to escape. Results: friendly, seven killed, 22 wounded; enemy, 103 killed.

In Tan Canh contact is sporadic with elements of an ARVN regiment against an unknown size enemy force. Results: friendly, four wounded, enemy, five killed.

Third Corps

In Binh Duong province, 14 miles southwest of Ben Cat, the 4th Cavalry fought a five-hour battle, beginning at 4:25 a.m. yesterday morning. Enemy losses are reported as 66 killed compared with US losses of 8 killed and 14 wounded.

Fourth Corps

In Vinh Long province, 21 miles south of Vinh Long, helicopter gunships fired on a number of sampans traversing canals in the area. Results were 124 sampans destroyed with 80 enemy killed.


In Phong Dinh province aircraft fired on a number of sampans, sinking two. Eight enemy were killed and a number of weapons were captured.

Casualties reported:

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Captured</u>
US/ARVN*	74	173	--
Enemy	749	---	54

*Note: exact breakdowns are not available.

White House Situation Room


Briefing Officer



~~EYES ONLY~~~~TOP SECRET~~RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 JAN 31 14 02

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 00 YEKADS
 DE YSNKQA 21 0311312
 O 311253Z ZYH ZFF-5
 FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
 INFO GEN JOHNSON C/S ARMY
 GEN MCCONNELL C/S AIR FORCE
 ADM MOORER CNO
 ZEN/GEN CHAPMAN CMC
 MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
 MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC
 MR HELMS CIA
 O 310707Z ZYH ZFF4
 FM ADM SHARP, CINCPAC, HAWAII
 TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASH DC
 INFO ZEN/NMCC
 ZEM

2:07 AM EST

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-10-78 letter

By ib, NARS, Date 3-29-79~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO

1. I HAVE JUST TALKED WITH WESTY BY TELEPHONE. HE PROVIDED ME AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AS OF NOW BY SECURE TELEPHONE AND FILLED IN THE COMPLETE DETAILS WHICH FOLLOW.
2. THE SITUATION IS STILL CONFUSED BUT IT IS APPARENT THAT THE ENEMY HAS TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE GENERAL STATE OF RELAXATION EXISTING DURING TET. HIS FORCES INFILTRATED INTO SAIGON IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. THEY ARE MOVING THROUGHOUT THE CITY AGAINST GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND IN A GENERAL CAMPAIGN TO TERRORIZE AND KILL CIVILIANS. THEIR CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN WELL PLANNED AND OBVIOUSLY FORMED OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.
3. THE EXPECTED ATTACK AGAINST KHE SAN OR ACROSS THE DMZ HAS NOT MATERIALIZED, BUT IT COULD COME MOMENTARILY AND WE MUST BE READY FOR IT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE MASSIVE AIR ATTACKS CONDUCTED IN I CTZ AND ALONG THE DMZ MAY HAVE THROWN HIM OFF HIS TIME TABLE BUT THE THREAT OF HIS ATTACK STILL REMAINS.
4. IN THE CAPITAL DISTRICT ONE OF THE MOST DRAMATIC ATTACKS TOOK PLACE AGAINST THE U.S. EMBASSY. THE ENEMY BLEW A HOLE IN THE WALL AND ATTEMPTED TO ENTER ACROSS THE COMPOUND. A DETACHMENT OF THE 101ST AIRBORNE LANDED ON THE ROOF AND JOINED MARINE GUARDS AND MPS IN REPELLING THE ATTACK. WESTY HAD JUST RETURNED FROM THE EMBASSY WHERE HE VIEWED 19 VC BODIES ON THE GROUND OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY BUILDING. WESTY STATES THAT NO VC ACTUALLY ENTERED THE BUILDING. THIS CHANGES MANY CONFLICTING REPORTS WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED EARLIER IN THE DAY INDICATING THAT ENEMY TROOPS WERE ACTUALLY INSIDE THE EMBASSY. ONE MARINE WAS KIA, AND 4-5 ARMY MPS WERE KILLED AT THE EMBASSY. THE BUILDING WAS PARTIALLY DEFACED BUT THERE IS NO STRUCTURAL DAMAGE. THERE IS MINOR DAMAGE IN THE LOBBY DOWNSTAIRS BUT NOTHING THAT CANNOT BE REPAIRED.
5. THE ENEMY HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN GETTING INTO TAN SON NHUT AND A FRIENDLY BATTALION IS NOW SWEEPING THE FIELD. TWO TROOPS OF CAVALRY HAVE ARRIVED AT TSN AND ONE COMPANY IS ENGAGING THE ENEMY IN THE RACE TRACK AREA. THERE IS A BIG FIGHT NOW IN PROCESS THERE. ROCKETS FROM U.S. GUN SHIPS COULD BE HEARD OVERHEAD WHILE GENERAL WESTMORELAND MADE THIS REPORT. HE ADVISED THAT THE IMPACT WAS APPROXIMATELY 1000 YARDS AWAY.

6. AN ORDNANCE DEPOT IN GIA DINH PROVINCE HAS BEEN PENETRATED BY THE VC AND THEY ARE NOW BEING ENGAGED BY ARVN RANGERS. A VC CAPTAIN HAS BEEN CAPTURED AND CLAIMS THAT 30 VC BATTALIONS ARE IN THE ENVIRONS OF SAIGON. ANOTHER POW STATES THAT 21 BATTALIONS HAVE INFILTRATED THE CITY. BOTH REPORTS ARE UNCONFIRMED BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT INFILTRATION IS WIDESPREAD, THAT THE ENEMY CAN BE EXPECTED IN ANY KIND OF UNIFORM, AND THAT HE IS WELL EQUIPPED AND ARMED WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS. ATTACKS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AGAINST THE PALACE, SEVERAL OF OUR BOQS AND GENERALLY THROUGHOUT THE CITY.

7. BIEN HOA IS CLOSED TO JETS BUT THE VNAF IS TAKING OFF ON AN OPEN RUNWAY. THERE IS ROCKET FIRE NOW TAKING PLACE THERE, WITH A BATTALION SWEEPING THE AREA. THE ENEMY HAS ATTACKED THE POW CAMP AT HIEN HOA BUT HAS NOT PENETRATED. II FIELD FORCE HEAD-QUARTERS HAS BEEN INFILTRATED AND MORTARED WITH ONE FRIENDLY KIA. 199TH BRIGADE HAS BEEN IN AN INTENSE FIRE FIGHT WITH THE ENEMY IN A VILLAGE NORTHEAST OF BIEN HOA. FIRST REPORTS INDICATE THAT UPWARDS OF 500 ENEMY KIA MIGHT BE ANTICIPATED, BUT WESTY DOES NOT ATTACH TOO MUCH RELIABILITY TO THIS FIRST REPORT. OUR CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN LIGHT IN THE 199TH.

8. NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

660

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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1968 JAN 31 14 13

ZCZCQAA676
DE YENKDN 16 0311305
O 311249Z ZYH ZFF-5
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
TO GEN JOHNSON C/S ARMY
GEN MCCONNEL C/S AIR FORCE
ADM MOORER CNO
ZEN/GEN CHAPMAN CMC
MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC
MR HELMS CIA

310918Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON
ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII
ZEN

~~SECRET~~ MAC 01449 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

REF: NMCC MSG 310127Z

IV CTZ

THE SITUATION IN IV CTZ IS NOT CLEAR, BUT A SERIES OF ATTACKS HAVE BEEN MADE BY FIRE AND GROUND ELEMENTS AGAINST MY THO, CAI LAY, CHAU PHU (TOWN OVERRUN), TRUC GIANG, QUANG LONG, VINH LONG CITY, VUNG LIEM, SA DEC, CAN THO, SOC TRANG, RACH GIA AND VINH LOI. THE MOST SERIOUS SITUATION APPEARS TO BE AT VINH LONG AND IN CHAU DUC PROVINCE. ALL ENEMY ACTIONS HAVE BEEN MET BY ARVN REACTION FORCES. I AM PASSING OPCON OF THE MRF TO SA IV CTZ TO ASSIST IN COUNTER-ATTACKS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-10-78 letter

By JB, NARS, Date 3-29-79

AN EARLY SUMMARY

Y. INDICATES THAT TWENTY-FOUR AIRFIELDS HAVE

BEEN HIT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

IT IS ESTIMATED THAT ENEMY HAS LOST OVER 3,000 KIA SINCE 291800H, WITH FRIENDLY KIA REPORTED AT LESS THAN 300, INCLUDING AN ESTIMATED 100 U.S. KIA.

ENEMY SITUATION

ENEMY ATTACKS DURING THE TET HOLIDAYS REVEAL AN EMPHASIS ON DRAMATIC RESULTS IN HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS AND DAMAGE TO FRIENDLY AIR INSTALLATION. MILITARILY, THESE ARE DIVERSIONARY EFFORTS WHILE THE ENEMY PREPARES FOR HIS MAJOR ATTACK IN NORTHERN I CTZ. HIS TARGETING OF AIRFIELDS ARE DESIGNED TO HINDER FRIENDLY AIR SUPPORT. THE ENEMY ALSO HOPES FOR CONSIDERABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT BOTH IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND WORLDWIDE. AT A MINIMUM, HE PROBABLY EXPECTS THESE ACTIONS TO PREVENT A REPETITION OF LAST YEAR'S HEAVY LOSSES TO THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM AROUND TET.

ENEMY ATTACKS ON 30 JANUARY WERE CONFINED PRIMARILY TO MR V AND NOT PARTICIPATED IN BY ENEMY UNITS IN THE COSVN AREA OR IN NORTHERN I CORPS. THE 31 JANUARY ATTACKS WERE PRIMARILY CONCENTRATED IN THE COSVN AREA, WITH A FEW OF THE PREVIOUS DAY'S ATTACKS CONTINUING IN MR V. THUS FAR, THE ENEMY UNITS CONDUCTING THE ATTACKS HAVE

LONG BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA OF CONTACT AND IN MOST CASES THEIR PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR RECENT ACTIONS WERE KNOWN. THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION IS THE PROBABLE PRESENCE OF THE 167, 169, & 506 BNS AND REPORTED PRESENCE OF 272D VC REGIMENT IN THE ATTACKS ON TAN SON NHUT. HOWEVER, THIS REPORT REMAINS UNCONFIRMED.

IN VIEW OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND HIS ACTIVITIES OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS, WE BELIEVE THAT HE CAN CONTINUE SIMILAR ATTACKS FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER DAY OR TWO. THESE ADDITIONAL ATTACKS SHOULD BE EXPECTED AS A PRELUDE TO MAJOR OFFENSIVE EFFORT IN NORTHERN I CTZ.

THE ENEMY AROUND KHE SANH, IN THE DMZ, AND AT TRI THIEN MILITARY REGION COULD ATTACK AT ANY TIME. HOWEVER, THERE ARE NO SIGNS AT PRESENT THAT THE ENEMY WILL MOUNT AN ATTACK IN THESE AREAS WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS. ENEMY PLANS HAVE ALMOST CERTAINLY BEEN DISRUPTED TO SOME EXTENT BY FRIENDLY AIR AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT IN THE AREA.

THE ENEMY ATTEMPTS HAVE THUS FAR PRODUCED NO SIGNIFICANT MILITARY RESULTS AND HAVE COST THE ENEMY HEAVILY. INCOMPLETE REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY HAS LOST AT LEAST 3000 KILLED IN ACTION. DUE TO THE NATURE OF THESE ACTIONS A LARGE NUMBER OF ENEMY HAVE ALSO BEEN CAPTURED, BUT WE HAVE NO RELIABLE FIGURES NOW.

SO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

50

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

13

~~SECRET~~

January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rostow

Herewith Gen. Westmoreland's telephonic answers to the President's questions.

1. Casualties to date

From the beginning of the planned truce at 6 P. M., 29 January, the following casualties have been suffered by us or inflicted on the enemy:

- Friendly: 421 killed in action, including 189 U. S.
- Enemy: 4,320 killed in action
1,811 detainees, many of whom are prisoners of war

2. Enemy capacity to sustain present campaign

We see this as a 3-phase campaign.

The first phase involved build-up, sporadic attack, and a well-orchestrated psychological warfare program against the population.

We are now in the second phase, which is an all-out military effort throughout South Viet Nam, except for the two northern provinces. The enemy has achieved some local successes, but the initiative is turning against them. However, we feel that he has the capability of continuing this phase for perhaps several more days at great risk to himself.

(Kle Sam) The third phase will involve a massive attack in Quang Tri and Quang Nam provinces. The enemy is now poised for this phase which he considers his decisive campaign. Our air strikes have blunted his attack, but we still give him the capability to strike at any time with large forces supported by an abundance of artillery and rockets.

3. Relationship between North Vietnamese and North Korean actions

It would seem to us there is a relationship.

4. Is there a military impasse in South Viet Nam?

We do not think the situation in South Viet Nam is at an impasse, since the initiative is turning in favor of the government and the allies, and the enemy is suffering unprecedented casualties, indeed.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 1-5-81 LetterBy ing, NARS, Date 4-20-81~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

5. Is the enemy holding any towns in South Viet Nam now?

The enemy does not control any single town in South Viet Nam.

However, he has some degree of control in several towns. Specifically, he now has forces in Quang Tri, Hue, Duy Xuan, Kontum City, Chau Phu and Ben Tre, and scattered elements in Saigon.

I repeat, he does not control any single town. In those areas where the enemy has troops, they are confronted by Vietnamese troops and fighting continues.

6. What political and psychological problems do Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland foresee?

It seems to Ambassador Bunker and me that initially there will be some adverse psychological impact on the people and the government. However, if the government handles the matter carefully, they can use the opportunity to improve their position with the people.

President Thieu has the opportunity to exercise rare leadership.

The National Assembly has the opportunity to be more constructive.

President Thieu has declared martial law, but this will have to be approved by the Assembly after 12 days in accordance with the Constitution. The situation should not slow down major programs for a prolonged period. [It will harden the government's position on negotiations with the Front. It may set back civilianization of the government.]

Military success should give the Army of South Viet Nam and its leadership self-confidence and should encourage the acceleration of their improvement.


ROBERT M. GINSBURGH

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO:

Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, Bureau of the Budget

I have been giving every moment, aside from time spent in meetings, to quiet thought about the crises which have blown up in the last week, particularly in Viet Nam and Korea, but also some here at home.

In general, it appears to be the judgment of our enemies that we are sufficiently weak and uncertain at home, sufficiently stretched in our military dispositions abroad, and sufficiently anxious to end the war in Viet Nam so that we are likely to accept, if not defeat, at least a degree of humiliation. It is some such appreciation that must account for: his seizure of the PUEBLO; the attacks across the DMZ at the 38th parallel; the mobilization of 40,000 men at the 17th parallel; the attacks on the cities and towns and airfields in South Viet Nam.

In one way or another in the days ahead, we have to rally our country so that the enemy comes to believe that we will insist on even-handed application of rules of international law -- like the freedom of the seas -- and the terms of international agreements -- like the armistice agreements in Korea and the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

Before proposing a course of action, we may wish to see what the Rumanian brings us tomorrow; but it is my present judgment that we should:

- respond to Kosygin's letter on the PUEBLO;
- and strengthen our position in Viet Nam*
-- strengthen our military positions in Viet Nam and Korea;
- go to the Congress and the country seeking additional support for our programs and greater unity in facing the present crises.

I would wish you, therefore, to put the ablest men who report to you at work to recommend action along these lines. Among the measures to be considered are these:

- ① Presidential authority to extend tours of duty, and to
- ② call up individuals with special technical qualifications for military service;

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 10-25-78, NSC 8-14-80

By JK (imp), NARS, Date 8-29-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- an extra \$100 million in military aid for South Korea; *hidden?*
- prompt lifting of the gold cover;
- prompt passage of the tax bill;
- allocation of funds for the Price Stabilization Board;
- freeing of exchange stabilization fund to defend the dollar;
- trade and tourist legislation.

I wish a preliminary report at 5:00 p.m. this afternoon, January 31,
and your final recommendations tomorrow.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VC Attacks
JANUARY 30 AND 31, 1968

2C

1/31/68
1/31/68
S
U
EA-KTF
✓ DH-Rostow
S/S

Province

City

I Corps

5 provinces, 5 province capitals hit

Quang Tri
Thua Thien
Quang Nam
Quang Tin
Quang Ngai

Quang Tri
Hue
Hoi An
Tam Ky
Quang Ngai

Danang city was also hit.

II Corps

12 provinces, 8 province capitals hit

Kontum
Pleiku
Binh Dinh
Phu Yen
Darlac
Khanh Hoa
Ninh Thuan
Binh Thuan

Kontum
Pleiku
Qui Nhon
Tuy Hoa
Banmethuot
Nha Trang
Phan Rang
Phan Thiet

(Phu Bon, Quang Duc, Tuyen Duc, Lam Dong province capitals not hit)
Cam Ranh municipality hit, Dalat municipality not hit

III Corps

11 provinces, 2 province capitals hit

Bien Hoa
Gia Dinh

Bien Hoa
Saigon area - Gia Dinh

(Phuoc Long, Binh Long, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long Khanh,
Binh Tuy, Phuoc Tuy, Long An province capitals not hit)

Saigon municipality hit

IV Corps

16 provinces, 13 province capitals hit

Dinh Tuong
Go Cong
Kien Hoa
Vinh Binh
Vinh Long
Sa Dec
Kien Phong
Chau Doc
Kien Giang
Ba Xuyen
Bac Lieu
An Xuyen
Phong Dinh


Mytho
Go Cong
Ben Tre (Truc Giang)
Tra Vinh (Phu Vinh)
Vinh Long
Sa Dec
Cao Lanh
Chau Phu (Chau Doc)
Rach Gia
Soc Trang
Bac Lieu (Vinh Loi)
Ca Mau (Quan Long)
Cantho

(Kien Tuong, Chuong Thien, An Giang province capitals not hit)

SOUTH VIETNAM ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

Provinces whose capitals were attacked or harassed on the nights of January 29-30 and 30-31 are underlined in blue (28 of 44)

Autonomous municipalities attacked or harassed on same nights are underlined in brown (Saigon, Da Nang and Cam Ranh). Municipalities of Hue (attacked) and Dalat (no enemy action) are not counted because they are also the capitals of Thua Thien and Tuyen Duc provinces respectively.



24
15
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968 -- 1:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

You might wish to read what I had just finished dictating before you put me to work on the Friday message.

I shall drop the Kosygin draft letter; although you might wish to send a letter to him simultaneously with your message to Congress.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 10-25-78; NSC 8-14-80
By JK (ing), NARS, Date 8-29-80

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-25-80, NSC 8-14-80

~~SECRET~~ By JK (ing), NARS, Date 8-29-80

Wednesday, January 31, 1963
11:45 a. m.

15a

MR. PRESIDENT:

1. I gave some quiet thought last night to our position in the face of the crises in Viet Nam and Korea; and, also, to the enemy's view of our position.

2. In general, it appears to be his judgment that we are sufficiently weak and uncertain at home, sufficiently stretched in our military dispositions abroad, and sufficiently anxious to get the war in Viet Nam off our necks, so that we are likely to accept not defeat, but what I might call unbalanced or "double standard" behavior. For example:

-- a degree of humiliation in order to get the men of the PUEBLO and the ship back;

-- a defensive stance in the face of increasing incursions across the 38th parallel and the attack on President Park;

-- gross and open violations of the DMZ at the 17th parallel without our moving ground forces into North Viet Nam;

-- increasingly overt violation of Laos and Cambodia, despite international obligations to the contrary;

-- a formula for negotiations which promises, in effect, nothing but talk for a major military act -- the end of the bombing of North Viet Nam.

3. In one way or another in the days ahead, we have to rally our country so that the enemy comes to believe that we will insist on a single standard in the application of rules of international law and the terms of international agreements.

4. Before proposing a course of action, I believe we must wait a few days to see what we get out of the Rumanian (who arrives in Bucharest tomorrow, February 1st) and out of the North Koreans at Panmunjom. Right now, therefore, I am not proposing a course of action.

5. But let us assume that the Rumanian gives us an unsatisfactory answer, while urging us to keep the channel open; and that the North Koreans demand some kind of phony apology based on the Captain's "confession" in order to get our men and ship back. In the circumstances, I believe, we should consider three courses of action which would represent not a radical change in our present policy, but a stiffening of that policy. The three actions would be:

-- a letter to Kosygin (I attach at Tab A a rough draft to give you the flavor of what I have in mind);

-- a somewhat toughened set of military moves in both Viet Nam and Korea, the exact character of which we would have to work out with the JCS and Defense;

-- going to the Congress and the country on the theme of "a single standard" asking for support for a limited group of additional measures, but in so doing signaling to the world this stiffening of the national spine.

6. If you decided to move down this path in the days ahead you would, I am sure, wish to get as much of the Congressional Leadership aboard from the beginning as possible -- and possibly even groups like the Douglas Committee, labor and business leaders, etc.

2c
16
Robert
FBIS 49

STATEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES

LIBERATION RADIO (CLANDESTINE) IN VIETNAMESE 1110 GMT 1 FEB 68 B

(STATEMENT BY HEADQUARTERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES)

(TEXT) ON 31 JANUARY 1968, THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES--THE COMMANDING ORGAN OF VARIOUS PATRIOTIC SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, WHICH IS COMMANDING THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE AIMED AT TOPPLING THE THIEU-KY PUPPET REGIME AND RESTORING NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, PEACE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY, AND HAPPINESS TO THE PEOPLE--ISSUED A STATEMENT ADDRESSED TO ALL VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

THE FULL TEXT OF THE STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

COMPATRIOTS, THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE THIEU-KY CLIQUE YOU HAVE WAITED FOR SO LONG HAS ARRIVED. THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES, UNSWERING THE ASPIRATIONS AND THE ANGER OF ALL VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, HAVE LAUNCHED ATTACKS AGAINST OUR SWORN ENEMY. WE TELL OUR COMPATRIOTS THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO TOPPLE THE REGIME OF THE TRAITOROUS THIEU-KY CLIQUE AND TO PUNISH AND ANNIHILATE THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN MASSACRING, AND OPPRESSING OUR COMPATRIOTS. OUR GOAL OF STRUGGLE IS TO RESTORE INDEPENDENCE, PEACE, AND SOVEREIGNTY TO THE NATION, AND TO WREST BACK DEMOCRACY AND HAPPINESS FOR THE PEOPLE. WE ARE GOING TO SET UP A GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL BE ENTIRELY OURS, A GOVERNMENT SERVING THE FATHERLAND AND THE PEOPLE.

TO PERMIT THE ARMED FORCES TO FULFILL THEIR SACRED TASKS, WE ASK OUR COMPATRIOTS TO:

1--GET IN TOUCH WITH US CONCERNING THE ATTACKS AND PURSUIT OF THE U.S.-PUPPET FORCES.

2--HELP US ARREST ALL THE U.S.-PUPPET CRUEL HENCHMEN.

BEING THE SONS AND BROTHERS OF THE PEOPLE, THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES WILL TRY THEIR BEST TO WIN VICTORY AT ANY COST FOR THE FATHERLAND AND PEOPLE.

(SIGNED) 31 JANUARY 1968, THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES.

1 FEB 1321Z GKE/BK

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~Intelligence
Note

2c

-89

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-6-79 letter February 1, 1968

To : The Secretary By ip, NARS, Date 3-21-79
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*

Subject: The Communist Offensive: A Situation Summary

The unprecedented Communist offensive against South Vietnamese urban centers launched on January 30 has abated somewhat, but a number of towns are still actively engaged by Communist troops or remain under the threat of Communist attack. A detailed resume of Communist actions in all Corps areas is attached.

The intensity of the Communist effort is reflected in the fact that 29 of South Vietnam's 44 provincial capitals, from northernmost Quang Tri to southernmost An Xuyen, were hit by artillery or mortar fire or by ground attack. Sixteen of these capitals were penetrated by Communist armed forces and an additional eight, Qui Nhon, Hue, Hoi An, Kontum, Nha Trang, Chau Doc (Chau Phu), Ben Tre, and Dalat were at some point actually under at least partial Communist control (see map). Hue, Kontum, Chau Doc, Ben Tre, and Dalat are still under some degree of Communist control. Indeed, Communist forces in Hue hold about one-half of the city, including the airfield and the Citadel.

In addition to Hue and Dalat, three of the four other autonomous municipalities were also hit and penetrated. The attack on Danang, with which the Communists initiated their offensive, involved simultaneous actions against several military installations. In Saigon, an estimated Communist force of 3 battalions launched coordinated attacks on a number of Vietnamese and US facilities, including the American Embassy, the Presidential Palace, and Tan Son Nhut airport. In Dalat, a Communist company seized the US military billet and moved into the center of the city, while Communist demolition teams damaged a ship in Cam Ranh.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year

not

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

Declassified

- 2 -

The Communists also attacked 19 district capitals. In Quang Ngai province, three of the ten district capitals--Binh Son, Son Tinh, and Nghia Hanh, all close to the provincial capital--were hit on January 31 by coordinated mortar and ground attacks. In Quang Nam province, the district capital of Duy Xuyen is now occupied by Communist forces. In addition to US installations in Saigon, Communist forces attacked and/or shelled other major US installations, including Chu Lai, Phu Bai, II Field Force Headquarters outside Bien Hoa, and Marble Mountain and the airbase at Danang.

The most intense effort was in Corps I and II where the Communists committed appreciable strength and fought sustained or intermittent engagements to retain the towns, as in Kontum, Hoi An, Hue, and Ban Me Thuot. In Kontum, an enemy force of three Viet Cong companies and one North Vietnamese Army (NVA) battalion continues to press the defenders and to occupy one-half of the city. Communist forces have attacked and penetrated Ban Me Thuot repeatedly since January 30, and heavy fighting is continuing in the city. In Corps I, all five provincial capitals were attacked and penetrated; six Corps I district capitals were attacked, two of which are still under Communist control. In Corps II, the Communists attacked nine of the 12 province capitals, of which five were penetrated and four occupied by enemy forces; three Corps II district capitals were also attacked of which two were temporarily overrun.

In Corps III, the Communist effort initially was directed almost entirely against Saigon and the immediate surrounding area of Gia Dinh and Bien Hoa, although Communist harassment now seems to be spreading to district towns around Saigon. Elsewhere in Corps III and in Corps IV, the Communists seemed to have engaged primarily in harassing and hit-and-run actions by smaller forces. However, a full battalion entered the town of My Tho, and the Communists apparently succeeded in isolating a US compound.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

- 3 -

While 13 of the 16 province capitals were attacked in Corps IV, only six were penetrated and only two were occupied, Chau Doc and Ben Tre where heavy fighting is still going on. Although seven district capitals were attacked in Corps IV, only one was penetrated or occupied.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

RESUME BY CORPS AREAS

I Corps

Quang Tri province: Provincial capital of Quang Tri initially hit by limited rocket attacks and Communist infiltration. On 31 January VC/NVA launched heavy mortar, rocket, and ground attacks and 2 NVA battalions attacked and penetrated city briefly. Allied units are now in control but enemy forces reported to be grouped in suburbs of town. NVA/VC launched two battalion attack on 1 February, but attack was repulsed and most areas of city are now under government control.

Thua Thien province: Provincial capital of Hue came under heavy mortar, rocket, and ground attack on 31 January. The enemy, initially two companies, gained control of at least one-half the city, including the airfield and the Citadel. Most allied compounds were reported secure, but on 1 February NVA 6th Regiment was reported still in control of key sector of town. Phu Loc district capital was seized by enemy force on 1 February. Phu Bai has been under occasional mortar and rocket attack.

Quang Ngai province: Province capital of Quang Ngai city and three nearby district capitals (Binh Son, Son Tinh, and Nghia Hanh) all suffered heavy mortar and ground attacks on 31 January following earlier, lighter attacks on Quang Ngai city. While Allies have retained control, pockets of resistance remain throughout Quang Ngai city.

Quang Nam province: Province capital of Hoi An came under heavy ground attack on 30 January by VC/NVA units which seized many installations, including hospitals, ARVN compound, and airfield, as well as most of city. ROK forces regained control of city, but Hoi An continues to receive minor harassment. District capitals of Dien Ban and Duy Xuyen have been hit by strong ground forces and mortar fire, and Duy Xuyen was occupied by enemy force.

Quang Tin province: Province capital of Tam Ky was hit by heavy mortar and small armsfire and by a ground assault by two NVA battalions which succeeded in penetrating the city briefly before attack was repulsed. Enemy forces remain on outskirts of town. Chu Lai airfield has suffered occasional rocket and mortar shellings.

Danang: Enemy forces launched coordinated small arms, mortar, rocket, and ground attacks 30 January against city, the airbase, a highway bridge, and Vietnamese Corps and US marine HQ's in the Danang area. The enemy simultaneously mortared other installations, including the Marine air facility at "Marble Mountain". Allied forces regained control of the city although fighting continues in the area and the airbase remains subject to repeated mortar and rocket attacks. NVA/VC have launched three ground attacks against key bridge.

II Corps

Kontum province: The provincial capital of Kontum city, the airfield, 24th Special Zone and Sector HQ's, and nearby special forces camp have been hit repeatedly by NVA/VC ground forces and mortar fire since early 30 January. As of 1 February, enemy (reportedly 3 VC companies and 1 NVA battalion) continue to occupy most of city although allied forces occupy all military installations. Kontum airfield is closed. North of Kontum, Tan Canh village, base camp of ARVN 42nd Regiment, was hit and overrun 30 January and hit again 1 February. Much of the village has reportedly been burned.

Pleiku province: On 30 January, after heavy rocket barrage against provincial capital of Pleiku city, airfield, and Montagnard training center, 500-700 Communists assaulted and penetrated city. Control now re-established in city but skirmishing and mortar attacks continue around city. Plei Djereng Special Forces camp suffered rocket attack on 31 January.

Darlac province: Province capital of Ban Me Thuot hit repeatedly since 30 January by heavy NVA/VC ground and mortar attacks. Main targets have been airfield, MACV compound, Sector HQ, and ARVN 23rd Division HQ. Enemy forces have penetrated into city several times. Fighting has been very heavy and is now taking place in city itself.

Khanh Hoa: Two NVA battalions attacked province capital of Nha Trang on 30 January and occupied Sector HQ, province HQ, nearby special forces camp, radio station, jail, and railway station. After two days of fighting, allies regained control, but scattered sniping continues on fringes of town. Air base and special forces camp occasionally mortared. Allied installations, power stations, and PF training center in Ninh Hoa, the district capital north of Nha Trang, have been attacked twice. Enemy briefly overran town but friendly forces regained control. Cam Lam district capital was attacked on 30 January but ROK forces re-established control.

Phu Yen province: NVA elements launched heavy attack 30 January on province capital of Tuy Hoa and succeeded in entering city. Allied forces regained control relatively quickly, although sporadic fighting continues on outskirts of city.

Binh Dinh province: VC penetrated province capital of Qui Nhon and seized radio station, railway station, and maintenance area. US airbase mortared. Allied forces have regained control although sniping within and skirmishing around city continues. VC sapper attack on 1 February repulsed; northeast of city remained insecure. Phu Cat district capital was struck 31 January by heavy mortar fire and ground attack.

Ninh Thuan province: Enemy entered province capital of Phan Rang on 30 January but were driven out.

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II Corps (contd.)

Binh Thuan province: Province capital of Phan Thiet attacked 31 January by an estimated VC/NVA force of two battalions. Enemy attacked under cover of mortar fire; main target appeared to be MACV compound. Enemy forces penetrated the city but were repulsed. Enemy mortaring continues but city is regarded as secure.

Dalat: Dalat, autonomous municipality and province capital of Tuyen Duc province, hit by mortar and small arms attack on 1 February by VC company. Enemy seized US military billet, market place, and other points in city.

Cam Ranh: Underwater demolition teams damaged one ship on 30 January; airfield at nearby Dong Ba Thin shelled same day.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

III Corps

Gia Dinh province and Saigon: Estimated three battalion VC force 31 January launched coordinated attack on key targets in Saigon area, including US Embassy, Presidential Palace, Vietnamese Navy HQ, Saigon radio station, US billets. As VC elements swept through city, they struck at other buildings as well. Tan Son Nhut came under heavy mortar and ground attack and the engagement continued through 31 January. Enemy forces remain centered near Tan Son Nhut and the Cholon area in An Quang pagoda. GVN attempts to clean up area have been rebuffed.

Bien Hoa province: Province capital of Bien Hoa city, including airbase and III Corps HQ, and US II Field Force HQ and supply depot at Long Binh came under heavy mortar and ground attacks throughout 31 January.

Hau Nghia province: District capital Duc Hoa and the ARVN 25th Division Tactical Operations Center received heavy mortar and ground attacks from an estimated three VC companies. Cu Chi, District HQ of US 25th Division, attacked on 1 February following heavy mortar and rocket attack on US camp.

Binh Duong province: District capital of Phuoc Vinh mortared on 1 February.

Tay Ninh province: VC attacks reported in province.

IV Corps

Dinh Tuong province: Light VC action reported throughout province. One enemy battalion entered province capital of My Tho and isolated US compound. On 1 February My Tho was reported to be under continuing heavy attack. Sporadic light firing reported on district capitals in Cai Lay and Cai Be.

Go Cong province: Go Cong city, province capital, was mortared on 31 January.

Kien Hoa province: Province capital of Ben Tre reported under heavy attack by six VC companies and rockets. VC entered town but forced to outskirts where a VC regiment reportedly now lurks. On 1 February, Ben Tre reported one-fourth city destroyed and under heavy attack with situation critical. District capitals Ba Tri and Binh Dai also mortared.

Vinh Binh province: Province capital of Tra Vinh reported two battalion VC attack on 31 January. Enemy reportedly penetrated province chief's compound; reinforcements were airlifted in. Moderate contact continues on outskirts of town.

Vinh Long province: Province capital of Vinh Long, nearby airfield twice attacked by mortars and ground action. Fighting in streets reported on 31 January but situation returned to normal following day. District capital of Vung Liem also reported under fire and ground attack and possibly overrun.

Sa Dec province: Province capital of Sa Dec reported light fighting on 31 January.

Kien Giang province: Province capital of Rach Gia reported sporadic mortar and small arms fire against the city and heavy fighting outside city during 31 January.

Ba Xuyen province: Province capital of Soc Trang reported 31 January attack by one VC battalion and light fighting in streets. Enemy mortared and attacked airfield 31 January-1 February.

Phong Dinh province: Province capital of Can Tho reported 31 January that city and airfield under mortar and ground attack. Heavy fighting throughout province. Can Tho under control and attackers repulsed but contact continues outside city. On 1 February radio station came under attack and VC still holding out in small pockets in city. Two district capitals have received harassing fire.

An Xuyen province: Provincial capital of Quan Long attacked and penetrated by VC force of undetermined size. Situation now reported under control.

Kien Phong province: Province capital of Cao Lanh reported under fire and ground attack on 31 January. Situation under control and returning to normal on following day.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

IV Corps (contd.)

Chau Doc province: Province capital of Chau Doc (Chau Phu) reported under heavy ground and fire attacks on 31 January. Americans reported evacuated from city. One ARVN battalion reportedly engaging VC force in streets of city on 1 February.

Bac Lieu province: Province capital of Bac Lieu reported under fire and ground attack on 31 January but situation remained under control.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

Estimate of Maximum U.S. Capability to Reinforce
SEA with Land Forces

	Maneuver Battalions	Deployable Within (Days)	Time From Go-Ahead to Closure (Days)	
			No Diversion of SEA Air Lift	40% Diversion of SEA Air Lift
By Air				
82nd Airborne Division	9	7	30	8-10 ^{a/}
By SEA b/				
2nd Marine Division c/	6 $\frac{2}{3}$	7-14	50-55	
5th Marine Division d/	6 $\frac{2}{3}$	7-14	30-35	
Total Battalions	22 $\frac{1}{3}$			

- a/ CRAFT Stage III (i.e., maximum use of civil fleet).
b/ Requires 9 Troop Ships and 61 Cargo Ships.
c/ Excludes 3 battalions stationed in the Mediterranean and Caribbean.
d/ Includes 1 battalion in Hawaii.

If we moved these two divisions we would eliminate the rotation base for the Marine Divisions already deployed. We should therefore simultaneously call up the 4th Marine Division/Wing and extend tours of duty if this deployment is ordered.

as well as other personnel actions such as lengthening tours in theatre and exchanging policy on time between theatre tours

DASD(SA) LFP
February 1, 1968

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30
By: cb, NARA, Date 4-28-99

SAIGON (AP) - GEN. WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND PREDICTED TODAY THAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL FOLLOW UP THEIR CURRENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST KEY CITIES OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITH THEIR BIGGEST OFFENSIVE OF THE WAR, A LIVE IN THE NORTHERN END OF THE COUNTRY.

IT WILL BE THE ENEMY'S "MAIN EFFORT," SAID THE COMMANDER OF U.S. FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND "IT COULD COME AT ANY TIME."

THE FOUR-STAR COMMANDER TOLD A CROWDED NEWS CONFERENCE THIS WOULD BE THE THIRD PHASE OF A THREE-PHASE PLAN HATCHED IN HANOI LAST SEPTEMBER BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP.

THE CURRENT WAVE OF ATTACKS ON SAIGON, PROVINCIAL CAPITALS AND OTHER KEY CITIES AND TOWNS, WHICH BEGAN MONDAY, IS THE SECOND PHASE OF HANOI'S MASTER PLAN AND "MARKS A CHANGE IN STRATEGY BY THE ENEMY," WESTMORELAND CONTINUED.

"HE IS USING NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY FORCES TO SPEARHEAD HIS TERRORIST ATTACKS."

THE 54-YEAR-OLD GENERAL SAID THE COMMUNISTS HAVE "PAID DEARLY" FOR THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE, WHICH HE CALLED A "TREACHEROUS AND DECEITFUL ACT." HE SAID SO FAR THEY HAVE LOST 5,800 DEAD, AND ALLIED FORCES HAVE DETAINED 2,500 SUSPECTS, MANY OF WHOM WILL SUBSEQUENTLY BE CLASSIFIED AS PRISONERS OF WAR.

RZ952AES FEB. 168

19

SAIGON--ADD WESTMORELAND (18)

WESTMORELAND SAID 530 ALLIED TROOPS HAD BEEN KILLED, APPROXIMATELY 200 OF THEM AMERICANS. THE U.S. COMMAND SAID THERE WERE 555 ALLIED DEAD, INCLUDING 232 AMERICANS.

WESTMORELAND SAID THE CURRENT COMMUNIST DRIVE WAS A "GO FOR BROKE PROPOSITION."

"IT WAS ALL OR NOTHING," HE SAID. "HE HAS PUT FORTH HIS MAXIMUM EFFORT. HE WILL BE VERY BADLY HURT. IT WILL TAKE HIM MANY, MANY WEEKS TO RECOVER, AND IN SOME AREAS MANY MONTHS."

"I GIVE HIM THE CAPABILITY OF CONTINUING THIS PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR SEVERAL MORE DAYS. THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST HE IS ABOUT TO RUN OUT OF STEAM. HE HAS, HOWEVER, SOME RESERVES YET TO BE COMMITTED. WE ARE WATCHING THIS."

ASKED IF HE WAS SURPRISED BY THE SUDDEN, WIDESPREAD OFFENSIVE, WESTMORELAND REPLIED: "NOT COMPLETELY. I FELT THERE WOULD BE FIREWORKS DURING THE TET (LUNAR NEW YEAR) PERIOD."

IN ANTICIPATION OF THIS, WESTMORELAND CONTINUED, ALLIED TROOPS WERE REDEPLOYED IN CERTAIN POPULATED AREAS.

RZ956AES FEB. 1

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

17

Z 010835Z ZYH ZFF3

FM GEN WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS

INFO AMB BUNKER

ADM SHARP, CINCPAC

ZEN

SECRET [REDACTED] MAC 01487 EYES ONLY

EO 12958.3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

I ASSESS THE ENEMY SITUATION AS FOLLOWS:

THE ENEMY CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS AGAINST MAJOR CITIES AND AIR FACILITIES SOUTH OF THE DMZ AREA DURING THE TET HOLIDAYS. HIS AIM APPEARS TO BE TO CAUSE MOVEMENT OF FRIENDLY UNITS AND TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM WHAT I BELIEVE WILL BE HIS MAIN EFFORT, THE KHE SANH/DMZ AREA. CERTAINLY, HE HOPED TO SECURE AND HOLD A MAJOR CITY AT LEAST FOR AWHILE. HE SOUGHT ALSO TO OBTAIN A FAVORABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON THE SVN (AND PROBABLY THE US) POPULACE. HIS AIRFIELD ATTACKS WERE AIMED AT THE DESTRUCTION OF SOME PORTION OF OUR AIR CAPABILITY TO PREVENT ITS USE AGAINST HIM WHEN HE LAUNCHES HIS MAJOR EFFORT. HIS RESULTS WERE PYRRHIC, SINCE ENEMY BODY COUNT FOR THE TET HOLIDAY PERIOD WILL PROBABLY EXCEED 5,000.

MEANWHILE, THE ENEMY REMAINS QUIESCENT IN THE KHE SANH/DMZ AREA, INDICATING HE MAY BE WAITING TO ASSESS FRIENDLY REACTION TO HIS ATTACKS FARTHER SOUTH. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ESTIMATE THE EFFECT

EO 12958.3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

SANITIZED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/nac 99-75

NARA, Date 10-18-2013

By 448

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

FRIENDLY AIR AND ARTILLERY HAS HAD ON THE ENEMY.
CERTAINLY THE AIR ATTACK ON HIS MAJOR HQS LOCATED
WEST OF THE DMZ DISRUPTED ENEMY CONTROL FOR
PROBABLY SEVERAL DAYS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

IN THE KHE SANH/DMZ AREA, THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE
OF ATTACKING AT ANY TIME.

BOTH THE 325C AND
304TH DIVISIONS ARE MANEUVERING THEIR REGIMENTS
CLOSER TO THE KHE SANH AND APPEAR TO BE READY TO COM-
MENCE BATTLE. THE 320TH DIVISION WITH TWO REGI-
MENTS, AND POSSIBLY ALL THREE, IS DEPLOYED JUST
NORTH OF CAMP CARROLL.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

ARE PLANNING COUNTER BATTERY
FIRE, PROBABLY IN SUPPORT OF THE 320TH. THOUGH NOT
FULLY COMBAT EFFECTIVE, THE 803RD REGIMENT, IN
COORDINATION WITH THE 270TH INDEPENDENT REGIMENT
CONTINUE TO POSE A THREAT IN THE CON THIEN AREA,
PROBABLY AS A DIVERSION TO THE KHE SANH EFFORT.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

IN SUMMARY, THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF ATTACKING
IN THE KHE SANH/DMZ AREA AT ANY TIME WITH UP TO
FOUR DIVISIONS. THOUGH FRIENDLY AIR AND ARTILLERY
OPERATIONS ARE CAUSING HIM DIFFICULTIES, I BELIEVE
THAT THE ENEMY WILL COMMENCE HIS MAJOR OFFENSIVE
IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AT THIS TIME INDICATIONS
POINT TO KHE SANH COMBAT BASE AS HIS PRIMARY
OBJECTIVE.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

LC

171168

18

TO: MR. McCAFFERTY
WH
FROM: PAUL KEARNEY
OCJCS

O 010013Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GEN WESTMORELAND

TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS

ADM SHARP, CINCPAC

AMB BUNKER, AMEMB, SAIGON

ZEM

~~SECRET MAC 21464 EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD letter NOV 22 1978
By if, NARS, Date 6-11-79

^{4:45 PM EST}
AT 0545 HOURS, GENERAL WHEELER CALLED ME ON THE SECURE TELEPHONE
AND DIRECTED THAT I CALL MR. ROSTOW AT THE WHITE HOUSE AND PROVIDE
ANSWERS ON BEHALF OF AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND MYSELF TO SIX QUESTIONS.
^{5:50 PM EST}
AT 0650 HOURS, I CONTACTED ON THE SECURE TELEPHONE GENERAL
GINSBERG. THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSCRIPT OF MY ORAL REPORT.

THIS IS GENERAL WESTMORELAND SPEAKING.

I WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
TO CALL THE WHITE HOUSE AND ASK FOR MR. ROSTOW.

SIX QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN POSED. I WILL READ THESE AS I
INTERPRET THEM AND WILL GIVE YOU OUR ANSWERS. I AM SPEAKING FOR
AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND MYSELF--I HAVE COVERED WITH AMBASSADOR
BUNKER ALL THESE MATTERS ON THE TELEPHONE.

QUESTION NUMBER 1: OUR ESTIMATE OF FRIENDLY AND ENEMY
CASUALTIES.

^{5 AM EST}
ANSWER: FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE TRUCE PERIOD--1200 HOURS,
29 JANUARY--THE FOLLOWING CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN SUFFERED BY US
OR INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR BEST ESTIMATES.
KIA, FRIENDLY, 421, WHICH INCLUDES 189 US, 3 FREE WORLD, AND
REMAINDER--229--VIETNAMESE. ENEMY 4320 KIA, 1131 DETAINEES, A
NUMBER OF WHOM ARE PRISONERS OF WAR.

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

QUESTION NUMBER 2: HOW LONG DO WE ESTIMATE THE PRESENT CAMPAIGN WILL CONTINUE?

ANSWER: WE SEE THIS AS A THREE-PHASE CAMPAIGN. THE FIRST INVOLVED PREPARATION, BUILD-UP, SPORADIC ATTACKS, AND A WELL-ORCHESTRATED PSY WAR PROGRAM. WE ARE NOW IN THE SECOND PHASE, WHICH IS AN ALL-OUT MILITARY EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM, EXCEPTING THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES. THE ENEMY HAS ACHIEVED SOME LOCAL SUCCESSES, BUT THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE INITIATIVE IS TURNING AGAINST HIM. HOWEVER, WE FEEL HE HAS THE CAPABILITY OF CONTINUING THIS PHASE FOR PERHAPS SEVERAL MORE DAYS, AT GREAT RISK TO HIMSELF. THE THIRD PHASE INVOLVES A MASSIVE ATTACK IN QUANG TRI AND THIEN PROVINCES. THE ENEMY IS NOW POISED FOR THIS PHASE, WHICH HE CONSIDERS HIS DECISIVE CAMPAIGN. OUR AIR STRIKES MAY HAVE BLUNTED THIS ATTACK, BUT WE STILL GIVE HIM THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE AT ANY TIME WITH LARGE FORCES SUPPORTED BY AN ABUNDANCE OF ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS.

QUESTION NUMBER 3: DO WE BELIEVE THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THOSE IN KOREA?

ANSWER: IT WOULD SEEM TO US THAT THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP.

QUESTION NUMBER 4: THE FRENCH PRESS ALLEGED THAT THERE IS AN IMPASS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WHAT IS OUR COMMENT?

ANSWER: WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE SITUATION AN IMPASS, SINCE THE INITIATIVE IS TURNING IN THE FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT AND HER ALLIES AND THE ENEMY IS SUFFERING UNPRECEDENTED CASUALTIES.

QUESTION NUMBER 5: IS THE ENEMY HOLDING ANY TOWNS IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

ANSWER: THE ENEMY DOES NOT CONTROL ANY SINGLE TOWN IN SOUTH

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VIETNAM. HOWEVER, HE HAS SOME DEGREE OF CONTROL IN SEVERAL TOWNS. SPECIFICALLY, HE HAS FORCES IN QUANG TRI, HUE, DUYXUAN, KONTUM CITY, CHAU PHU AND BEN TRE, HE HAS SCATTERED ELEMENTS IN SAIGON. REPEAT, HE DOES NOT CONTROL ANY SINGLE TOWN. IN THOSE TOWNS WHERE HE HAS TROOPS, THEY ARE CONFRONTED BY VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND FIGHTING IS CONTINUOUS.

QUESTION NUMBER 6: WHAT POLITICAL PROBLEMS DO WE ANTICIPATE AS A RESULT OF THIS ENEMY ACTIVITY? WILL IT HAVE A PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON THE PEOPLE AND AFFECT THE STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT?

ANSWER: IT SEEMS TO US THAT INITIALLY THERE WILL BE SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON THE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, IF THE GOVERNMENT HANDLES THE MATTER CAREFULLY, THEY CAN SEIZE AN OPPORTUNITY TO STRENGTHEN THEIR POSITION WITH THE PEOPLE.

PRESIDENT THIEN HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE REAL LEADERSHIP. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE. THE PRESIDENT HAS DECLARED MARTIAL LAW, BUT THIS WILL HAVE TO BE APPROVED BY THE ASSEMBLY AFTER 12 DAYS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION. THE SITUATION SHOULD NOT SLOW DOWN FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD MAJOR PROGRAMS. IT MAY WELL HARDEN THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRONT. IT MAY TEND TO SET BACK CIVILIANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

MILITARY SUCCESSES SHOULD GIVE THE ARVN AND ITS LEADERSHIP SELF-CONFIDENCE AND ENCOURAGE THE ACCELERATION OF THEIR IMPROVEMENT.

END OF STATEMENT.

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~~EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-10-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date, 3-29-79

SEC II

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PRECEDENCE			
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DTG

BOOK COPY

1 FEB 68 15 26 Z

COMMUNICATIONS

FROM: General Wheeler, CJCS

TO: Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC
General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

CJCS

West has
not been
made to anyone
outside OCSJCS
Plr

ZFF-1

~~TOP SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY - JCS 01151 Feb 68

(DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS TO ADDRESSEES ONLY)

1. There is a considerable amount of discussion around town about the Khe Sanh situation to include the inevitable comparisons with Dien Bien Phu. One question raised recently in this connection (and I believe it received some consideration at the time of the Dien Bien Phu siege) is whether tactical nuclear weapons should be used if the situation in Khe Sanh should become that desperate. I consider such an eventuality unlikely. Nevertheless, I would appreciate your views as to whether there are targets in the area which lend themselves to nuclear strikes, whether some contingency nuclear planning would be in order, and what you would consider to be some of the more significant pros and cons of using

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Feb	68
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EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

PAUL M. KEARNEY, Administrative Assistant to Chairman, JCS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

R

DD FORM 173
1 NOV 64

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 66 WHICH WILL BE USED.

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFIED BY

ACTION
INFO

EYES ONLY

tac nukes in such a contingency.

2. I do not need a reply quite so urgently as on many of my other requests to you lately -- early next week should suffice. While I know you will have to put a few of your bright planners on this, I would caution you to hold this subject very closely. Warm regards.

EYES ONLY

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		2	2	TOP SECRET	
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	



THE JOINT STAFF

~~SECRET COFRAM~~

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35

171668

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-2

By is, NARA Date 10-24-99

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Movement of Certain Controlled Fragmentation Munitions (COFRAM) into Southeast Asia (S)

1. (U) It is requested that all holders of this paper take extraordinary security precautions in its handling, limiting access to those who must know the contents in order to execute their official duties.

2. (S) The supply objective for the COFRAM items currently planned for employment in Southeast Asia provides operating and safety levels and a pipeline sufficient for conduct of a 120-day evaluation and to support continued subsequent use for purposes and at rates to be determined based upon analysis of the initial evaluation. Monthly quantities available to COMUSMACV follow:

a. Ground Munitions

105mm Cartridge (M444, M444E1)	32,000
155mm Projectile (M449)	9,900
8" Projectile (M404)	1,400
40mm Cartridge (M386, M397, M441)	105,000
Hand Grenade (M33, M33A1)	56,000

b. Air Delivered Munitions

CBU-1	830
CBU-7 (when available)	500


3. (S) The basis for calculating the objective is a combination of several supply factors; required supply rates to support planned employment and, protection of stockpiles in and earmarked for EUCOM and Korea. COMUSMACV had proposed required supply rates based on the use of COFRAM by US forces throughout the theater of operations. As a consequence of

~~SECRET COFRAM~~

AUTHORITY FOR ACCESS TO COFRAM INFORMATION REQUIRED

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employment limitations to specific geographical areas and protection of previously mentioned stocks, a lesser quantity than was requested has been authorized. The monthly quantity will support the initial 120-day combat evaluation plus consumption at the same rate for at least 20 months thereafter.

4. (S) Upon receipt of the approval for employment of COFRAM munitions, the Military Services Ammunition Allocation Board provided CINCPAC the quantity and type of munitions allocated, by geographical location of assets within the CINCPAC area, and by month for the 120-day evaluation period. CINCPAC was requested to provide suballocations between the Marine Corps and Army users. CINCPAC passed action on the suballocation to COMUSMACV who provided the suballocation advice for the Marine Corps and Army for each of the four 30-day increments.

Upon receipt of COMUSMACV allocation CINCPAC passed shipment action to CINCPACFLT for the Marine Corps movement, and to CINCUSARPAC for the Army movement. Both CINCPACFLT and CINCUSARPAC took action to move in-theater assets as made available by the Military Services Ammunition Allocation Board and passed action to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the US Army Ammunition Procurement and Supply Agency respectively for the movement of those assets required from the CONUS.

By these actions all items required for the first 30-day period were under movement by 25 January 1968 and many of the earlier movements were on the ground in Vietnam. On 27 January 1968, both the Commandant of the Marine Corps and CINCUSARPAC took action to initiate movements of the second monthly increment. The Commandant of the Marine Corps took cognizance of the total 120-day evaluation period, while the CINCUSARPAC action was by a 30-day increment with additional increments to follow.

The current reporting system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established for this movement will provide advice of in-country arrivals and later use as these events occur. Approximately one-fourth of the Marine Corps initial 30-day ground munitions increment is now on the ground in the Republic of Vietnam, while the Army portion is enroute. It is anticipated that the 27 January 1968 reports will include Army arrivals. COMUSMACV had requested the III MAF (Marine Corps) be provided the initial priority for delivery of these munitions.

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5. (S) The Air Force initiated action on 23 January 1968 per CINCPACAF message to Clark Air Force Base to airlift 620 CBU-1s to the Republic of Vietnam for Air Force use against CINCPAC/MACV allocation of 591 to the Air Force. Remaining assets on Clark Air Force Base, 1,064, will support this allocation for approximately an additional two months. Immediate action is planned to ship Air Force CONUS assets sufficient to provide a 45-day in-country stock level and support the expenditure allocation.

The CBU-7 is a new production item and has not been certified for use. All action on this munition has reflected "shipment to be made when available." The first shipments are expected in early February 1968.

6. (U) The foregoing actions will provide a smooth and orderly movement in-country of the quantities required by each force.

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AUTHORITY FOR ACCESS TO COFRAM INFORMATION REQUIRED

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~~SECRET~~ ~~COFRAM~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

BOOK

21

2 FEB 1968

P 020238Z

FM ADM SHARP, CINCPAC HAWAII
TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS WASHINGTON DC
INFO GEN WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV VIETNAM
ZEM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 92-356 (Appeal)
By SJ, NARA, Date 3-4-04

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

FRACTURE JAW (U)

A. JCS 01154/011526Z FEB 68.

1. IN LINE WITH YOUR OWN THOUGHTS, WESTY AND I EXCHANGED VIEWS SEVERAL DAYS AGO ON THE NEED FOR SOME VERY CLOSELY HELD PLANNING FOR EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD THE SITUATION AROUND KHE SANH WARRANT AND SHOULD THE HIGHEST NATIONAL AUTHORITY DIRECT THEIR USE. WHILE AGREEING THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT KHE SANH WOULD BECOME SUFFICIENTLY DESPERATE TO CALL FOR THE USE OF TAC NUCS, WE FELT THAT MILITARY PRUDENCE ALONE REQUIRES THAT WE DO SOME DETAILED PLANNING REGARDING UNITS TO BE EMPLOYED, DELIVERY VEHICLES, WEAPON AVAILABILITY, PREFERRED WEAPONS BY TYPE AND YIELD, CONSTRAINTS, PREFERRED DELIVERY MEANS, TACTICS AND OTHER OPERATIONAL DETAILS.
2. CONSIDERING THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS MATTER, WE ARE ACCOMPLISHING THE PLANNING UNDER THE STRICTEST SECURITY IN OKINAWA WITH A SPECIAL PLANNING TEAM HEADED BY A CINCPAC PLANNER AND CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC AND CG FMFPAC.

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~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

TO SIMPLIFY REFERENCE TO THE HIGHLY CLASSIFIED PROJECT,
THE UNCLASSIFIED NICKNAME OF FRACTURE JAW HAS BEEN ASSIGNED.
THE PLANNING CURRENTLY IS WELL UNDERWAY.

3. BEARING IN MIND THE VERY REMOTE POSSIBILITY THAT CINCPAC
MIGHT BE CALLED UPON FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR SUPPORT OF BELEA-
GUERED FORCES DURING THE VERY TIME THAT THE PLANNING GROUP
WAS ENGAGED IN ITS WORK, I FORWARDED TO WESTY ON 29 JANUARY
A MESSAGE DESCRIBING STEP BY STEP THE PROCEDURES FOR REQUEST-
ING THE SELECTIVE RELEASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE HOLDS THE
NECESSARY DOCUMENTS AND AUTHENTICATORS AND THE PURPOSE OF MY
MESSAGE WAS TO GIVE HIM A SIMPLIFIED REMINDER FOR HIS USE.
ADDITIONALLY, MY MESSAGE INFORMS HIM OF THE TYPE AND LOCATION
OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AVAILABLE AND BEST SUITED FOR
THE PURPOSE. AIR DELIVERED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROVIDE
THE IMMEDIATE CAPABILITY. SUITABLE WEAPONS ARE AVAILABLE

6.1(a)

4. THE FOREGOING IS TO GIVE YOUR A QUICK SKETCH OF OUR TAC
NUC PLANNING AND TO LET YOU KNOW THAT I BELIEVE WE ARE
PREPARED FOR THIS EVENTUALITY, UNLIKELY AS IT MIGHT BE.
UPON COMPLETION OF THE PLANNING NOW UNDERWAY IN OKINAWA,
OUR PLANS AND PREPARATIONS WILL BE REFINED.

5. ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THERE ARE
TARGETS IN THE KHE SANH AREA AND THE PROS AND CONS OF USING
TAC NUCS IN SUCH A CONTINGENCY WILL BE PROVIDED SUBSEQUENTLY.

6. THIS ENTIRE SUBJECT HAS BEEN VERY CLOSELY HELD IN MY

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~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

STAFF AND I HAVE CAUTIONED EACH COMMANDER CONCERNED TO HOLD

STAFF OFFICERS ON THE STRICTEST NEED TO KNOW BASIS.

WARM REGARDS.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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21

~~SECRET~~-- SENSITIVE
LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Friday, February 2, 1968 -- 10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

General Westmoreland has given authority to subordinate commanders to use COFRAM.

He expects it may be used tonight, Southvietnamese time (i.e., any time from now on), in the Khe Sanh area.

We are now hearing clear voice transmissions in the Khe Sanh area.

Heretofore, this has been an indication of imminent attack.

Captured prisoners say the attack begins on February 3 -- one hour from now.

W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 96-205

By Julius NARA, Date 10-8-98

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE



23

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


Friday, Feb. 2, 1968
6:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

I hate to ask you to read a whole document; but this gives, better than anything I have seen, the flavor of this operation from the point of view of the enemy.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment



SANITIZED

Authority CIA 12-21-78 letter

Feb. 2, 1968

By ip, NARS, Date 4-6-79

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy of intelligence report TDCS 314-01890-68 (advance)

Subject: Viet Cong Prisoner's Account of Preparations for Attack on
Chau Doc City

Source: |

SANITIZED

1. | There are indications that source may be lying on some points which he made during the interrogation, especially concerning facts involving him personally. He claimed that when he was captured he was acting in the capacity of rear services support for Viet Cong troops. However, only about 200 Viet Cong actually are believed to have entered the city of Chau Doc as the multi-battalion Viet Cong attack was repulsed before they could enter the city. Also, he was captured behind a movie theater in Chau Doc City on 31 January, and it is felt that he may have been reconnoitering the city prior to the arrival of the Viet Cong battalions. |

2. | said that he first became aware of the Tet military operations of the Viet Cong about two weeks prior to the assault on Chau Doc City on the night of 30-31 January. At that time, | Chin Tanc, chief of security for Viet Cong An Giang province (Government of Vietnam Chau Doc and An Giang provinces and Ha Tien district of Kien Giang province) attended an indoctrination briefing in the Viet Cong redoubt on Nui Dai mountain. This briefing lasted for three days with 8-hour sessions each day. One of the principal indoctrinators was Bay Tha, a member of the provincial committee. Chin Tanc gave | a general account of these briefings shortly after his return. In general the briefings reviewed the entire Vietnamese situation, the world balance of forces, the balance of forces within Vietnam, and future plans of attack to create conditions which would bring the U. S. Government to negotiate in order to "proceed to peace." The briefings also touched on the point that the attacks being carried out by the Viet Cong during Tet are a departure from previous operational practice of the Viet Cong.

3. | said that the Viet Cong realized that they were committing everything and every person they had in this assault. It was obvious to all, he said, that

the assault was a "go for broke" matter. He believes that few of the participants expected success, although most of them hoped that they would succeed.

a
officer in Chau Doc province stated that if it had not been for the presence of the gunship "Spooky" and U. S. Navy PBR boats, the city would have indeed fallen.) There was no contingency plan for withdrawal or retreat because if even the possibility of defeat had been mentioned the morale of the troops would have been shattered and the operation would probably not have taken place. As it was, an unknown number of the troops fled with the first contact with defending forces.

4. | claims that he was assigned to the 512th and 510th battalions under the command of Major Nam Xuong. The objective of the operation was the liberation of Chau Doc. | learned of this objective only 24 hours before it was to begin, although he believes that the troops knew somewhat sooner. They were told that conditions were now right for a general uprising of the population, so that an aggressive and rapid assault would bring the people to the side of the Viet Cong and make untenable the positions of the Government of Viet Nam and American defenders. The uprising in fact did not take place during the attack, and | stated that it is likely that this lack of all-out popular commitment to the campaign is having a bad effect on the morale of the Viet Cong attackers. Source knew of no sandtabling of the operation nor any specific rehearsals. He said he was unfamiliar with the town of Chau Doc, and says he knew of no Viet Cong infiltrators or agents in the town before the actual attack took place.

5. | said Viet Cong main force units in Viet Cong An Giang province were designated the responsibility for "liberating" provincial capitals, whereas district forces and guerrillas were responsible for gaining control of their respective districts. The assault force which struck Chau Doc included ten party members who were to constitute the city front which was to organize a provisional government. | said he first heard the term "coalition government" about six months ago, but had never heard it brought into formal party proceedings until the briefings for the current operation.

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