

An Outline Rationale for Partial Mobilization

I. A partial mobilization is needed:

- to provide Gen. Westmoreland the troops he needs;
- to provide a reserve for other possible contingencies;
- to reconstitute our strategic reserve so that the deployment of additional troops to Vietnam does not encourage military adventurism in other areas.

II. The need for additional troops results from:

- a change in the enemy's strategy, which
- has significantly affected the military situation.

III. Until recently, the enemy was counting on a long war of attrition which would eventually wear down the willingness of the South Vietnamese and the U. S. to continue to fight. This has not proven to be a "winning" strategy for him, because:

- he has been losing the war of attrition;
- the GVN has made important political progress;
- there has been a rallying of U. S. public support for continuing the struggle to achieve our objectives;
- the bombing of the North and continued high casualties in the South with no gains to show for them have engendered some war-weariness.


IV. Accordingly, the enemy has shifted into a "go for broke" strategy instead of a protracted war of attrition. Its objectives are:

- to generate a massive popular uprising in the cities;
- to administer a significant defeat to US/GVN/FW forces in the field;
- to destroy the governmental apparatus of South Vietnam from top to bottom;
- to create a new popular front, dominated by the NLF, to replace the GVN;
- to use this new "coalition government to bring about the departure of U. S. troops and to turn the country over to the Communists.

V. The enemy has failed to achieve these objectives and he has suffered heavily in the process. On the other hand, his offensives have also been costly to the U. S. and especially the GVN. Furthermore, the battle is not yet over.

VI. In recognition of this new situation, additional troops are desirable:

- to pursue the enemy's defeated units so that they don't have time to recover;
- to exploit enemy weaknesses uncovered as a result of his unsuccessful offensive;



- to provide General Westmoreland with an extra margin of insurance;
 - to preclude the enemy's achievement of any short-term gains which he would use as a basis for a negotiated settlement favorable to him but not warranted by the longer-run strengths or interests of the South Vietnamese;
 - to permit General Westmoreland to achieve previously agreed upon force levels at an earlier date because of the increased tempo of enemy activity. Although the increased pace requires more troops now, in the long run fewer men will probably be needed than if the enemy had chosen to continue to pursue a protracted war of attrition.
 - to provide continuing evidence to the enemy that we shall do what is necessary to cause him to leave his neighbor alone.
-

Mobilization Issues

81

2/13/68

Drafted by
Gen. Linsburgh

1. Size of the call-up

How many units of what types are needed? What is the relationship between the strengths of units to be called up and those to be deployed to Vietnam? Are these troops really needed? Are they enough? How will the call-up affect the draft?

2. Specific units

What are the specific units involved?

What is the basis for selecting the specific units for call-up? What should be said about the possibility of calling up additional units?

3. Time factors

How long will the units be needed? How long will the individuals in these units be required to serve? How will the units or individuals within the units be replaced, if necessary, when their tours of service are finished?

4. Congressional requests

What should the President ask from Congress? Renewal of right to call up units beyond 30 June? Authority to extend tours? Authority for selected call-up of individuals?

5. How much will it cost?

6. Rationale

How do we explain the need for this action?

How do we get everybody to tell the same story?

bb

OPTIONAL NEAR-TERM ACTION PROGRAMS

1. Defer additional reinforcements of U.S. forces in South Vietnam until requested by Westmoreland. Defer "call-up" of reserve units to replace the 6 battalions now being deployed until further information is available as to Westmoreland's additional troop requirements, the extent of defections in the ranks of the ARVN, RF/PF and South Vietnamese security forces and the success of the GVN in restoring services, coping with the refugee problem, etc. Defer request for new legislative authority.

2. Call up now a relatively small number of the Ready Reserves, approximately 40,000, recognizing that additional call-ups may be required later. This can be done without additional legislative authority. This call-up could be accompanied by a Presidential speech noting that a further call-up may become necessary depending upon developments in Southeast Asia, but that for the time being no legislative action is being requested on either personnel or financial matters.

3. Call up either a small (40,000) or large (130,000) number of Reserves and concurrently request Congress to authorize additional personnel actions to strengthen the Armed forces. 1/ Defer request for supplemental financial authorizations and appropriations, but indicate these will be required.

4. Call up either a small (40,000) or large (130,000) number of Reserves and concurrently request from Congress both the authority to take the needed personnel actions and the supplemental financial authorizations and appropriations required. 2/

1/ By Joint Resolution of Congress, the following authorities could be granted:

(a) Authorize the extension of all enlistments, appointments, periods of active duty, and other periods of obligated service of Regular and Reserve members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.

(b) Authorize activation of all needed individual Ready Reservists and extend beyond June 30, 1968 the authority to call both units and individuals of the Ready Reserve.

(c) Authorize re-call of retired Reserve personnel.

2/ The possible increase in our effort in Southeast Asia may require, for Fiscal 1968, additional new Obligational Authority of \$1 billion, with additional expenditures of \$500 million, and for Fiscal 1969, additional new Obligational Authority of from \$2 to \$3 billion, with an increase of expenditures amounting to \$2 billion \$500 million.




DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

615

83



February 13, 1968

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

Dear Walt:

Enclosed is a memorandum for the President.

With warm regards,

As ever yours,



Henry Cabot Lodge

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-6-79 letter

By ib, NARS, Date 3-21-79

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

83a

Tuesday, February 13, 1968 -- 3:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I believe you will wish to read this summary of information on the ARVN. In short:

- They were about 40-50% strength on 29 January because of Tet leaves;
- They may now be back to about 75% of strength;
- There are still some soldiers who have not been able to get back to their units, particularly in IV Corps;
- Komer is working on getting pacification going again;
- Westy has issued an excellent order in the same direction.

The full text that follows will give you a more precise feel for a somewhat uncertain and incomplete picture.

W. A. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 10-25-78, NSC 8-14-80
By JK (isp), NARS, Date 8-29-80

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 1-24-79 letter

By JP, NARS, Date 3-29-79

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET / NODIS~~

Classification

84
114390

5



13 FEB 68 17 30:3

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Origin
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON PRIORITY
CINCPAC PRIORITY
COMUSMACV PRIORITY

STATE 114390
NODIS
FOR AMB. BUNKER, ADMIRAL SHARP, GEN WESTMORELAND

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

SUBJECT: Command Relationships (U)

- In reviewing measures that might be taken to provide a more effective prosecution of the Vietnam war, consideration is being given to the thought of developing a command arrangement that would increase the authority of COMUSMACV over RVNAF and third country forces. One of the command arrangements specifically in mind would be similar to SEATO Plans 5 and 8 wherein a Vietnamese (possibly President Thieu) would be the overall Force Commander and the United States would provide the Field Force Commander.
- Your comments are requested on the feasibility and desirability of this or other command arrangements which might permit more effective conduct of the war. This should not repeat not be discussed with Vietnamese. It is appreciated that any change to existing command authorities would be a delicate and time-consuming effort involving the highest level of ~~xxx~~ interest.
- Would appreciate your comments by 19 February.

CP-3

END

Drafted by

George G. Ryffel, Col. USMC
Jt. Staff

Telegraphic transmission, and
classification approved by:

EA-P. C. Habib

Clearances:

OSD/ISA - Mr. Steadman
CJCS - Gen. Wheeler
S/S - Mr. Read

~~TOP SECRET~~

2A

ff

Tuesday, February 13, 1968
4:00 p. m.

Rec'd 5:30 P

85

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

You should know:

General Taylor again raised the question of whether we should hold Khe Sahn. He believes we could protect the coastal cities of I Corps further to the west.

(Incidentally, we now have in the Situation Room a terrain map that suggests how tough the situation is there. You may wish to drop down and see it.)

If we decide to pull out, he believes we should not pull out when Khe Sahn is under maximum seige, but sooner -- to upset the enemy's plan by moving west after he's dug in, emplaced his guns, and then has to follow westward.

He does not recommend we instruct Westy to get out.

He does recommend:

- another round of questioning of our Khe Sahn strategy, led by yourself;
- on the basis of that, the raising of any questions we may have in a way that doesn't leave Westy feeling either out on a limb or mistrusted -- but, perhaps, with more flexibility.

If we did such a thing we would, in my judgment, require a plan to attack his force, at our initiative, at a time and place of our choice.

The enemy's I Corps

W. A. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 10-25-78; NSC 8-14-80
By JK (isp), NARS, Date 8-29-80

5-
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, February 13, 1968 -- 3:35 p.m.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
Mr. President: Rec'd 2/13/68 85a

Herewith a detailed account of the effect of weather on enemy operations in I Corps. I have marked the critical passages. It comes to this:

-- The enemy prefers to conduct operations in the Western DMZ (Khe Sanh area) in the period of the northeast monsoon and transition (November-May).

-- The enemy prefers to conduct operations in the eastern part of the DMZ during the period of the southwest monsoon and transition (May-October).

His present plans seem to envisage operating from now forward at both ends of the DMZ; for example, just now a report came in of a second regiment putting itself in a position to attack the somewhat wobbly city of Quang Tri on Route 1, which is near the coast.

W. Rostow

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Authority DSD 10-25-78, NSC 8-14-80By JK (isp), NARS, Date 8-29-80
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12 FEB 1968

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD letter NOV 22 1978

By if, NARS, Date 6-11-79

856

~~SECRET~~

FACT SHEET

Subject: Effect of Weather on Enemy Operations In I Corps Tactical Zone

CLIMATOLOGY .

The mountain range which separates North and South Vietnam from the Laos panhandle has a great effect on weather on the east and west sides of the range, and this has some effect on enemy military operations in the I Corps area. During the general period ~~from November through February (Northeast Monsoon), the Laotian panhandle is enjoying its dry season while the I Corps area of South Vietnam has its wet season, with heavy rains, fog, and high winds.~~ During the period from May through September (Southwest Monsoon) conditions are switched, with Laos having its wet season and I Corps having generally dry weather. ~~Transitional seasons are March, April and October.~~ Tab A is a DIA Intelligence Supplement on the subject.

EFFECT OF WEATHER ON ENEMY OPERATIONS

The major effect of the monsoonal changes is that it affords the enemy ~~an alternate means of providing logistical support to his forces in I Corps.~~ Tab B is a map showing the I Corps area and the provinces in the Corps. North Vietnam has developed a series of logistical base areas ~~in Laos~~ just opposite the I Corps Zone. Major base areas exist opposite the ~~Quang Tri-Thua Thien~~ ~~Thua Thien~~ province border, the Thua Thien-Quang Nam province border ~~(these two areas are connected by the A Sna Pass)~~ in South Vietnam which the enemy controls and which he has developed as a line of communication), and opposite Quang Tin Province adjacent to the I Corps southern boundary.

~~Intelligence sources indicate that the enemy makes a major effort during the Northeast Monsoon period to take advantage of the dry weather in Laos and restock.~~

GROUP 3. (Nov. - Feb.)
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

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these base areas (and others opposite II and III Corps). By these efforts he is able to sustain his operations in the four southern provinces in I Corps at a fairly constant rate throughout the year. Reports of 1966 and 1967 indicate no notable seasonal difference in the number of significant enemy operations in these provinces. This is accomplished by concentrating his logistic efforts in Laos during the Northeast Monsoon season and by in-country base areas during the Southwest Monsoon.

There are indications that the weather does make a difference in the pattern of enemy operations in Quang Tri Province. It is in this area, of course, particularly along the DMZ, that we present the strongest defenses to the enemy - both to cut his infiltration through the DMZ and to counter his major invasion threat there.

In Quang Tri Province, the indication is that the enemy prefers to fight at times and places where he is assured of a dry line of communication. Over the past two years, he seems to have concentrated on the eastern portion of the DMZ during that time of the year when North Vietnam was enjoying its dry season (the summer months), and operated toward the western portion of the province, around Khe Sanh, during the winter months when his LOC in Laos was dry. The following are examples of these indications.

NORTHEAST MONSOON PERIOD (Nov. - Feb.)
~~(May - July)~~

- In January 1966, the first 120 mm mortar attacks on Khe Sanh took place. In March of that year, the US Special Forces Camp at A Shau was attacked, resulting in the evacuation of that camp. That area has been in enemy hands since that time. Reports indicate the DMZ area was relatively quiet during the period January through March.

- Reports from mid-October 1966 through February 1967 indicate almost no contact in the eastern portion of the DMZ with major enemy units for the most part withdrawn north of the Ben Hai River and engaged in resupply, training and reconnaissance operations. At the same time, however,

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the enemy was active in the western sector. Early in the year, the enemy was discovered constructing a road into the A Shau Valley from Laos. In February, the enemy used artillery against friendly units in the Khe Sanh-Long Vei area for the first time, and increased enemy infiltration and harassment in the Khe Sanh area was apparent. The enemy buildup in this area was discovered by a Marine patrol in mid-April, and subsequent major contacts during April and May in the Khe Sanh Hill 881 area resulted in a loss of over 1500 enemy killed. It was concluded at that time that the enemy intended to seize Khe Sanh during April 1967. At the same time, significant troop presence and truck movement throughout the A Shau Valley was noted.

- The same significant lowering of contact in the eastern DMZ area has occurred during the current North-east Monsoon period, accompanied by a buildup of enemy forces near Khe Sanh. Some differences are apparent this year, the first being the size of the force. The enemy force in the Hill 881 contact was estimated as a reinforced regiment. The enemy threat at present is considered to be eight regiments. The second difference is that the threat has come earlier than last year. This can permit the enemy to launch an attack while the weather is favorable to his reinforcement and logistic operations and relatively unfavorable to ours.

SOUTHWEST MONSOON PERIOD (May - Sept.)

- This period has generally dry weather in North Vietnam and South Vietnam (in I Corps area) and wet weather in the Laotian panhandle. Most of the major enemy attacks in the eastern sector of the DMZ have taken place during this period. Examples follow:

- The major contacts in the Gia Linh-Con Thien-Camp Carroll area during 1966 came in May, July and in early October. Enemy forces in the area at the time were estimated as two divisions. Marine operation HASTINGS, conducted in June, uncovered several battalion size forces south of the DMZ and very likely preempted a major enemy attack on Con Thien at that time.

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~~- Major contacts in the eastern DMZ sector during 1967~~
came in May, July and September. Marine Operation HICKORY,
undertaken into the southern half of the DMZ in May, was
the first US ground force operation into that area. Enemy
operations in July and September were supported by extremely
heavy artillery fire, particularly on our Con Thien position
and on the Dong Ha logistic complex to the south.

CONCLUSIONS

- Both we and the enemy prefer to fight under dry condi-
tions, primarily for reasons of resupply and reinforcement.
Enemy use of the Laotian panhandle during the Northeast
Monsoon provides him a dry line of communication the year
round.

~~- In the four southern provinces of I Corps, weather~~
~~favours neither the enemy nor friendly forces to a significant~~
~~extent.~~

- In Quang Tri Province, the Northeast Monsoon favours
enemy operations in the western sector because his line
of communication and reinforcement is relatively unhampered
by bad weather whereas ours is. The Southwest Monsoon
favours neither side.

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86

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 7-10-78; NSC 11-27-78

By ip, NARS, Date 4-6-79

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 13, 1968
8:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read Cabot Lodge's memorandum on the minuses and plusses of the attack on the cities.

Walt
W. W. Rostow

(WALT)
Walt Rostow
C

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-6-79 letter
By if, NARS, Date 3-21-79

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1968

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

To: The President
From: H. C. Lodge *H.C. Lodge*
Subject: Some lessons to be learned from the recent
Viet Cong raids.

1. On the MINUS side are the following:
 - a. The great degree of surprise achieved by the Viet Cong confirms the suspicion expressed in my memorandum to you of February 5 that there simply was not enough proficiency in police-type procedures. Had this existed, preparations for many raids would have been discovered and the raids prevented. Those that could not have been wiped out immediately would have been easier to handle. The Australian Ambassador in a perceptive telegram says this:

"We need not be surprised about the success of the infiltrations. The enemy had time and circumstances going for him, particularly the laxity and corruption of the police and the inefficiency of the Government's intelligence machine...

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

"What, then, was at fault? Not under-
estimation of the Viet Cong strength, I
suggest, but failure to insist that the
Vietnamese make a genuine effort to pro-
tect themselves against insidious infiltra-
tion, for only the Vietnamese can do this
work. . ."

- b. The pacification program has suffered a big setback. This underscores the need for making it as realistic and as effective as possible and also getting the very best men involved in it. The newspaper story reporting that "no one talks about pacification any more" is fallacious. Undoubtedly greater emphasis on the policing phase of pacification at the precinct level will be needed, but pacification itself is more necessary than ever.
- c. Another "minus" is the psychological distress which the Viet Cong raids have caused in this country -- on which the hand has not yet been played out.
- d. Unfortunate, too, is the government's decision not to collaborate with private organizations in refugee relief work. This is a typically Vietnamese example of

medieval behavior plus French bureaucratic influence. The "true revolution" which you personally authorized me to mention in my arrival statement in the summer of 1965 is still the most needed single thing to win the people over -- and when the people are won over, the war is won. Such a "true revolution" cannot be done by GVN or AID but by the people themselves, through non-governmental organizations. The notion that problems must be solved by working through government -- which worked in Europe under the Marshall Plan -- cannot work in an underdeveloped country such as Viet-Nam in which there is no local government in our meaning of the word. Government cannot be said to exist when there is no administrative competence, when the confidence of the people is lacking and when the so-called local government does not identify with the people.

e. The final "minus" are, of course, the killed and wounded on our side.

2. On the PLUS side are the following rather remarkable things which were not at first evident:

a. To the best of my knowledge there has nowhere been any recurrence of the "struggle" movement which almost

lost us the war in the first half of 1966. I'm sure you remember how, in Hue and Danang, the police marched down the street carrying anti-government signs and how the government had completely lost jurisdiction over both cities -- which would be comparable to the President of the United States losing jurisdiction over Chicago and Detroit. Similar "inside jobs" were impending in other cities when Prime Minister Ky with great skill and courage finally put the "struggle" down. If there had been a well-organized "struggle" movement in all of the cities which the Viet Cong recently attacked, we would now be very close indeed to a Communist takeover. Our military strength simply would not be applicable in such a situation -- just as our Marine force outside of Danang was not applicable in 1966 when our concern was to keep them out of the way. It was a large-meshed net with which to catch whales -- not the fine meshed net with which to catch the small but deadly fish of terrorism.

- b. This interesting development could mean the growth of what you once referred to in a telegram to me in 1964

as the growth of "political energy" -- a dividend from all the work we have done to bring about constitutional government and a sense of civic consciousness.

- c. It appears there was much good fighting by the ARVN, the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces, which reflects great credit on General Westmoreland and General Abrams. It is a pity that the police-type techniques were not as good or as widespread. If they had been, there would have been less need to fight since many of the raids would have been nipped in the bud.
- d. The high Viet Cong casualties are another plus.
- e. Remarkable too is the lack of back biting and the degree of unity in governmental circles. In 1963-1965, a blow like this would have been considered ample grounds for a "coup."
- f. It is often said that Viet-Nam is drowning in good advice and starving for effective action. The placing of Vice President Ky and General Thang in charge of reconstruction is the best guarantee of getting some action.

N.C. Long

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

TYPE MSG

BOOK

MULTI

SINGLE

X

ADV TO NMCC

PRECEDENCE

ACTION

IMMEDIATE

INFO

IMMEDIATE

DTG 130218Z FEB68

FROM: JCS

TO: CSA /ZEN
CINCSTRIKE/USCINCPAC
CSAF /ZEN
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INFO: CINCARSTRIKE
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IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By isp, NARS, Date 3-29-78

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MGEN COWLES

~~SECRET~~ JCS

9926

JCS SEND

SUBJ: DEPLOYMENT OF BDE TASK FORCE OF 82D

AIRBORNE DIVISION TO SVN (S)

REF: JCS 9375/200010Z APR 65 (NOTAL)

PART I FOR CSA/CINCSTRIKE

1. (S) THE JCS DIRECT THE DEPLOYMENT BY AIR, IN ACCORDANCE REF. OF ONE AIRBORNE BDE TASK FORCE OF THE 82D AIRBORNE DIV FROM FT. BRAGG, N.C., TO SVN. BDE TF, AT STRENGTH OF APPROXIMATELY 4,000, WILL BE DEPLOYED ON A TEMPORARY BASIS TO CLOSE IN-COUNTRY NOT LATER

DATE 12 TIME 2112
MONTH FEB YEAR 68
PAGE NO 1 NO. OF PAGES 3

D
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A
F
T
E
R

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

53031

SIGNATURE

CAPT E. S. JACKSON, USN
PACIFIC DIVISION, J-3

GEORGE B. PICKETT, JR.
Major General, USA

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Operations

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

THAN 262300Z FEB 68. AIRLIFT OF THE BDE TF IS TO COMMENCE NLT 142300Z FEB 68.

2. {C} REQUEST CSA ADVISE ALL CONCERNED IDENTITY, COMPOSITION, AND STRENGTH OF BDE TF, IDENTIFYING UNITS BY FRN NOT ASSOCIATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM 5.

3. {S} PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA AND PERSONNEL ROTATION POLICY WILL BE DETERMINED BY CSA AND INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED SEPARATELY.

4. {S} MAINTAIN 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION MINUS IN A READY DEPLOYMENT STATUS.

PART II FOR CINCPAC

5. {C} ADVISE ALCON DESTINATION AND AERIAL POD FOR BDE TASK FORCE.

PART III FOR CSAF AND CINCSTRIKE

6. {B} MAC WILL ASSUME MOVEMENT CONTROL OF ALL AFSTRIKE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED TO TACTICAL AIRLIFT SQDNS {EXCLUDES ONLY CCTW ACFT} IN ACCORDANCE WITH MAC OPLAN 165.

9926

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	3	GEORGE D. FICKETT	IR.

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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PRECEDENCE

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PHONE

ACTION

INFO

MAC AND AFSTRIKE AIRCRAFT WILL OPERATE AT
WARTIME RATES.

PART IV FOR ALL

7. {C} DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN MAC AND
ALL COMMANDS CONCERNED IS AUTHORIZED FOR
MOVEMENT PLANNING.

8. {S} NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OR
STATEMENT OF ANY KIND WILL BE MADE FOR SECURITY
REASONS. INTERVIEWS WITH DEPARTING
PERSONNEL ARE NOT AUTHORIZED. NORMAL
PHOTOGRAPHY PERMITTED. ADDITIONAL PUBLIC
AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL FOLLOW AS SOON AS
AVAILABLE. GP-4

9926

CONTROL NO.

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TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

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 FILE-1 (64)AJ (ADV CY TO NMCC)(ANMCC/NEACP/NECP)

DTG 130341Z FEB68

88 NT

FROM: JCS

TO: CMC
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INFO: CINCLANT
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 by NARS, Date 3-29-78

~~SECRET~~ JCS 9929 JCS SEND

SUBJ: DEPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS REGIMENT
 {REINF} TO SVN {S}

REF: JCS 9911/122313Z FEB 68 {NOTAL}
 THIS MESSAGE IN IV PARTS.
 PART I FOR ACTION ADDRESSEES.

1. {S} THE JCS DIRECT THE DEPLOYMENT
 TO SVN OF ONE MARINE REGIMENT {REINFORCED}
 AT A STRENGTH OF ABOUT 5,200 FROM THE 5TH
 MARINE DIVISION.

2. {S} THE REGIMENT {REINFORCED}, LESS

DATE	TIME
12	2227
MONTH	YEAR
FEB	68
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	4


CHARACTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE 53031

CAPT E. S. JACKSON, USN
 PACIFIC DIVISION, J-3

SIGNATURE




TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

WILLIAM E. SHEDD, III, BGEN, USA
 DEP DIR FOR OPS (NMCC)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
~~SECRET~~

REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS



ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION			
INFO			

ONE BATTALION {REINFORCED}, WILL BE DEPLOYED BY AIR FROM CALIFORNIA AT A STRENGTH OF ABOUT 3,600.

ASD/PA
MGEN COWLES

3. {S} THE ONE BATTALION {REINFORCED}, PRESENTLY EMBARKED, WILL BE DEPLOYED FROM MIDPAC BY SURFACE LIFT AT A STRENGTH OF ABOUT 1,600.

4. {S} THE REGIMENT {REINFORCED} WILL BE DEPLOYED ON A TEMPORARY BASIS TO CLOSE IN-COUNTRY IN SVN NOT LATER THAN 262300Z FEB 68. AIRLIFT WILL COMMENCE NLT 142300Z FEB 68.

5. {S} PERSONNEL DEPLOYMENT CRITERIA AND PERSONNEL ROTATION POLICY WILL BE DETERMINED BY CMC AND INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED SEPARATELY.

PART II FOR CINCPAC

6. {C} ADVISE ALCON DESTINATION AND AERIAL POD FOR AIRLIFTED PORTION OF THE REGIMENT {REINFORCED}.

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	4	9929	
REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

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ACTION

INFO

7. {C} ADVISE ALL CONCERNED IDENTITY,
COMPOSITION, AND STRENGTH OF REGIMENT {REIN}
IDENTIFYING UNITS BY FRNS, REFERRING TO JCS
DOC NO. 88887.

PART III FOR CSAF AND CINCSTRIKE

8. {S} MAC WILL ASSUME MOVEMENT CONTROL
OF ALL AFSTRIKE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED
TO TACTICAL SQDNS {EXCLUDES ONLY CCTW ACFT}
IN ACCORDANCE WITH MAC OPLAN 165 AND PROVIDE
THE LIFT. MAC AND AFSTRIKE AIRCRAFT WILL
OPERATE AT WARTIME RATES.

PART IV FOR ALL

9. {U} DIRLAUTH CINCPAC/MAC AND OTHER
COMMANDS CONCERNED FOR MOVEMENT PLANNING
AND IMPLEMENTATION.

10. {S} NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OR
STATEMENT OF ANY KIND WILL BE MADE FOR
SECURITY REASONS. INTERVIEWS WITH DEPARTING
PERSONNEL ARE NOT AUTHORIZED. NORMAL

CONTROL NO.

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REGRADEING INSTRUCTIONS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

PRECEDENCE

RELEASED BY

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ACTION

INFO

PHOTOGRAPHY PERMITTED. ADDITIONAL PUBLIC
AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WILL FOLLOW AS SOON AS
AVAILABLE.

11. {U} THIS MESSAGE SUPERSEDES PARAS
3 AND 4 OF REF. GP-4

CONTROL NO.

TCR/TOD

PAGE
NO. 4

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PAGES 4

MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

INITIALS

0029

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

89

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(BS)

Tuesday, February 13, 1968
10:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

Quang Tri is a quite exposed city
in I Corps.

This report -- like others --
shows it continues to be wobbly.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

TDCS 314/02654-68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority CIA letter SEP 1979
By ref, NARS, Date 10-2-79

jj

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Authority CIA 12-21-78 letter
By if, NARS, Date 4-6-79

SECTION ONE OF TWO

CITE TDCS-314/02654-68 (ADVANCE)
REPORT CLASS
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT IN I CORPS
AS OF 0900 HOURS ON 13 FEBRUARY

2A

ACQ: (11-13 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE:

SUMMARY: CONDITIONS WERE QUIET WITH A CONTINUING NORMAL TREND IN I CORPS. ONLY SMALL-SCALE ENEMY ACTION WAS REPORTED. MORALE HAS DECLINED IN QUANG TRI CITY AS A RESULT OF RUMORS THAT THERE ARE VC INSIDE THE CITY AND THAT NVA UNITS ARE MOVING TOWARD THE CITY, MOSTLY UNTRUE. OTHER FACTORS WERE THE 11 FEBRUARY ROCKET ATTACK ON THE CITY, WHICH COST NO LIVES BUT PROVED THE ENEMY CAN STILL ATTACK, AND THE DEPARTURE OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS EMPLOYED BY THE AMERICANS. IN DANANG RESIDENTS HAVE FORTIFIED THEIR HOUSES IN MANY INSTANCES, EVEN THOUGH THE PRESSURE IS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY OFF. SOME ARE CONCERNED THAT BUDDHIST UNREST WILL FOLLOW THE LIFTING OF THE CURFEW, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE BUDDHISTS ARE PLANNING ANY ACTION. LEAFLETS RECOVERED IN QUANG TIN ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY AND APPEAL FOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE NFLSV TO RESTORE PEACE. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT FROM QUANG TIN ALLEGES THAT A VC CADRE SAID THAT THE SECOND AND THIRD PHASES OF VC ATTACKS WILL BE FROM 20 FEBRUARY TO MARCH AND FROM MARCH TO MAY RESPECTIVELY. END SUMMARY.

1. ON 12 FEBRUARY FREE WORLD AND ALLIED FORCES MADE A SWEEP OF THE RD AREA IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, RESULTING IN 12 ENEMY KIA, ONE A-RANKING OFFICER OF THE 808TH VC MAIN FORCE BATTALION, ATTACHED TO THE 5TH NVA REGIMENT; BEFORE DAWN A FORCE OF UNKNOWN SIZE WAS BEING ENGAGED WEST OF AI TU WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. THE ENEMY IS STILL EXERTING PRESSURE ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION, MOSTLY BY INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS. HAI LANG DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS RECEIVED A FEW MORTAR ROUNDS WITHOUT SUFFERING MAJOR DAMAGE. QUANG TRI CITY SPENT THE NIGHT

2. BY 11 FEBRUARY THE MORALE OF THE PEOPLE IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE HAD BEGUN TO DETERIORATE WITH RUMORS OF VC INSIDE THE CITY, A ROCKET ATTACK ON THE CITY, ALLEGED MOVEMENT OF NVA TROOPS TOWARD THE CITY, THE DEPARTURE OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS (FILIPINOS) WHO WORK FOR THE AMERICANS, AND CONTINUED VC CONTROL OF PARTS OF HUE CITY. ON 11 FEBRUARY THE PROVINCE CHIEF ORDERED A DAILY 1400 TO 0900 HOURS CURFEW IN QUANG TRI CITY "TO CONTROL THE POPULATION." THE PROVINCE CHIEF AND MOST ARVN AND GVN OFFICIALS HAVE A PASSIVE ATTITUDE, AND IN THE FACE OF REPORTS THAT TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT WAS TO BE ATTACKED, THE VIETNAMESE LITERALLY JUST FILLED MORE SANDBAGS, GIVING IN TO THE INEVITABLE.

3. INTELLIGENCE REPORTS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE VC WERE GOING TO DISGUISE THEMSELVES AS REFUGEES, ARVN SOLDIERS, AND SO FORTH TO INFILTRATE THE CITY. THERE IS HOWEVER, NO EVIDENCE THAT MANY HAVE SUCCEEDED, AND REGULAR POLICE CHECKS OF POPULATION MOVEMENTS HAVE TURNED UP RELATIVELY FEW SUSPECTS. ENEMY ROCKETS WERE THROWN INTO THE CITY ABOUT 0130 ON 11 FEBRUARY, RESULTING IN NO INJURIES, BUT THE DAMAGE TO THE MOVIE THEATRE WAS DRAMATIC PROOF THAT THE CITY WAS STILL NOT SAFE. THERE WERE RUMORS THAT THE 95TH NVA REGIMENT WAS MOVING FROM WEST OF AI TU AIRSTRIP TOWARD QUANG TRI CITY. THE 95TH WAS SUPPOSED TO BE ONE OF THE UNITS (MISSING PORTION) ON TWO OCCASIONS RUMORS OF NVA UNITS IN OTHER AREAS WERE SPIKED WHEN IT WAS LEARNED THAT U.S. TROOPS HAD BEEN OPERATING FOR TWO DAYS IN EACH OF THE AREAS WITHOUT CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY.

4. IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE HOI AN AND DANANG CITIES HAD QUIET NIGHTS, WITH BOTH CONTINUING TO RETURN TO NORMAL. IN DANANG, ALTHOUGH THE PRESSURE IS TEMPORARILY OFF, LOCAL CITIZENS HAVE BEEN SANDBAGGING THEIR HOMES AND TAKING PRECAUTIONS IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER ENEMY ATTACK. A RESIDENT OF A VILLAGE AT THE NORTHWEST EDGE OF DANANG SAID THAT THE PEOPLE ANTICIPATE BUDDHIST UNREST AFTER THE CURFEW IS LIFTED. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS THAT THE BUDDHISTS ARE PLANNING SUCH MOVES, CONCERN PROBABLY IS TO BE EXPECTED AFTER THE DISRUPTION OF THE 1966 BUDDHIST STRUGGLE. A VNQDD MEMBER HAS STATED THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE ATTITUDES OF THE PEOPLE. THEY ARE NOT TALKING VERY MUCH AND EVIDENTLY ARE KEEPING THEIR OPINIONS TO THEMSELVES. BEGINNING ON 13 FEBRUARY THE CURFEW IN DANANG IS RELAXED FROM 0300 TO 1200 HOURS, GIVING THE PEOPLE FOUR HOURS FOR BUSINESS AND SHOPPING.

5. IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE THE VC MORTARED 6TH ARVN REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS THE NIGHT OF 12/13 FEBRUARY. THE OLD USAID COMPOUND IN TAM KY CITY RECEIVED TWO B-40 ROCKET ROUNDS AND ONE MORTAR ROUND OF UNKNOWN CALIBER. THERE WAS SOME PROPERTY DAMAGE BUT NO PERSONAL INJURIES. CONDITIONS IN TAM KY AND QUANG NGAI CITY REFLECTED A CONTINUING NORMAL TREND.

6. VC LEAFLETS RECOVERED IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE AFTER THE ATTACK OF 31 JANUARY CALL UPON THE PEOPLE TO STRIVE FOR PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND HAPPINESS. A NUMBER OF VC SAFE-CONDUCT PASSES WERE FOUND AROUND THE CITY. A LEAFLET DATED 31 JANUARY 1968 IS SIGNED BY THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES. ANOTHER, UNSIGNED, STATES THAT INFORMATION FROM SAIGON TELLS OF THE FORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY (LIEN MINH CAC LU LUONG DAN TOC VA HOA BINH).

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03723 13 06 43

FINAL SECTION OF TWO

CITE TDCS-314/02654-68 (ADVANCE)
SEVERAL BUSINESSMEN AND REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND RELIGIONS SUPPORT THE APPEAL OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS AND NEGOTIATION WITH THE NFLSV TO RESTORE PEACE. THE LEAFLET SAYS THAT A DECLARATION HAD BEEN RELEASED IN HUE CALLING UPON ALL PEOPLE TO SUPPORT THE ORGANIZATION, WHICH WAS READ BY LE VAN HAO.

7. (COMMENT: THE CONSULATE IN DANANG REPORTED ON THE BROADCAST ANNOUNCING THE FORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE. REGIONAL POLICE IN DANANG HAVE STATED THAT LE VAN HAO, PROFESSOR AT HUE UNIVERSITY, AND HOANG PHU NGOC TUONG, A 1966 STRUGGLE MOVEMENT LEADER WHO FLED TO A VC ZONE AFTER THE MOVEMENT WAS CRUSHED, HEAD THE ALLIANCE. TUONG AND HIS BROTHER HOANG PHU NGOC PHAN, WERE MILITANT LEADERS IN THE 1966 BUDDHIST STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AND CONSIDERED BY MANY TO BE COMMUNIST. THEY ADVOCATED A PEACEFUL, NEUTRALIST SOLUTION TO THE WAR. IN EARLY 1967, THEY WERE INVOLVED IN AN EFFORT TO RENEW THE STRUGGLE.

REPORTED THAT HAO OBTAINED A MASTERS DEGREE IN LETTERS IN FRANCE, WAS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE BUDDHIST STRUGGLE, AND WAS BEING SOUGHT BY POLICE IN NOVEMBER 1966 TO CLARIFY HIS ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE STRUGGLE.)

8. A POLICE INFORMANT WHO LIVES IN KY NGHIA VILLAGE, IN A VC-CONTROLLED AREA OF TAM KY DISTRICT, QUANG TIN PROVINCE, REPORTED THAT ON 6 FEBRUARY A VC PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SECURITY CADRE SAID THAT THERE WERE TO BE THREE LARGE ATTACKS BY THE VC. THE FIRST WAS CARRIED OUT DURING THE TET FESTIVAL, THE SECOND WILL BE CARRIED OUT BETWEEN 20 FEBRUARY AND MARCH, AND THE THIRD WILL OCCUR BETWEEN MARCH AND MAY. THE VC PLAN IS TO ISOLATE U.S. TROOPS IN ORDER TO LAUNCH SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON GVN FORCES.

9. | DISSEM: STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF 7TH AF
USARV COMNAVFORV USAID DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY)
CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF

GP-1
250

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

DIST: CJCS-6 DJS-3 SJCS-3 J3-8 J4-3 J5-2 J6-1
NMCC/DDO-1 S/DEF-7 ASD/ISA-5 ASD/IL-1 ASD/PA-1
WH-4 STATE-1 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-2 FILE-1(52)
JEC

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE	
ACTION	PRIORITY
INFO	PRIORITY

DTG 131611Z FEB 68

HT 90

FROM: JCS

LIMDIS

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: CINCPAC
CINCSAC

INFO: COMUSMACV
COM 3 ADIV GUAM
9947

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS JCS

JCS Send.

Distribution

- CJCS (6)
- DJS
- SJCS
- SECDEF
- DSECDEF
- STATE
- WH
- CSA
- CNO
- CSAF
- CMC
- ASD/I&L
- ASD/ISA
- ASD/PA
- J-3
- J-4
- J-5
- J-6

Subj: Employment of B-52s (U)

Refs: a. JCS 9801/112125Z Feb 68
b. JCS 9802/112126Z Feb 68

1. (S) CINCPAC/CINCSAC authorized to exceed temporarily the 1200 per month ARC LIGHT authorization to support COMUSMACV Khe Sanh/DMZ emergency requirements.
2. (U) This completes action of part 3, ref a. GP-3.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-10-78 letter
By CP, NARS, Date 3-29-79

DATE	TIME
13	1110R
MONTH	YEAR
FEB	68
PAGE NO	NO. OF PAGES
1	1

kk

DRAFTER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
Col James C. Trammell, USAF
Str Ops Div, J-3

PHONE
78508

SIGNATURE
Paul M. Kennedy

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE
Administrative Assistant
to Chairman, JCS

OK W

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) 25Yrs
(C)

~~TOP SECRET~~

15

Wednesday, February 14, 1968 -- 8:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the first quick [redacted] assessment of the "Danang document" and the text itself. It will take much more analysis before we get to the bottom of it.

Reading it through quickly, I find these things of interest, aside from the underlying assumption of failure once they complete their initial self-congratulation:

-- Something, indeed, went wrong with "T No. 1"; that is, the Khe Sanh, DMZ, Western highlands attacks with respect to timing;

-- The reference to "during the last ten days" dates the document round about February 9;

-- At the time they met, they still had high hopes in Hue and Saigon;

-- They appear to be advocating (marked passage, page 5) a second wave of attacks, to be timed with the big offensive in the DMZ, Khe Sanh, Western highlands areas at the frontiers;

-- They are obviously thinking (marked passage, pages 7 & 9) of trying to exploit the situation in the countryside on the basis of guerrilla forces to acquire control of more rural population;

-- This was a preliminary meeting: they envisaged another meeting on 12 February to analyze their situation and options further;

-- Their grandiose hopes are suggested by their references to the Chinese Communist and Soviet revolutions (see reference, page 5, to October 5 revolutions).

My operational conclusion is this: This is a moment of great and unresolved disarray on the other side. Thieu ought to issue an order of the day praising the people, the ARVN, and the police; ordering his forces to take the offensive wherever possible; and Westy ought to do the same thing. I feel in my bones this is not a time merely to wait for the enemy to come at us or to huddle in the towns waiting for the next blow, but to go out and face these nice liberal agrarian reformers.

Walt Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 .
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1) > 25 Yrs
(C)

9/a

14 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Walt Rostow

SUBJECT : Assessment of the "Danang Document"

CIA has prepared the following assessment of the "Danang Document" in response to your request to Mr. Helms last night. You will have received, via the White House Situation Room, a full translation of the document.

1. Our examination of the document (in translation) suggests that it is probably a communication originating from Viet Cong Military Region Five. It is an assessment of the failure of the Tet offensive intended for subordinate authorities--possibly a tactical command center--and contains instructions for future operations. The original document, however, is still in I Corps, and US officials in Saigon state that they are unable at this time to make an accurate determination of its authenticity. Moreover, some questions remain unanswered as to date of document and circumstances of its capture.

2. The document appears generally to agree with other evidence gleaned from interrogations of prisoners taken during the Tet offensive and on what is known of the enemy's advance planning, that the Communists achieved less than they had anticipated. This evidence has suggested that the enemy believed they would meet greater success in sparking a "general uprising," although the extent to which they expected genuine popular support is still not clear. Prisoners of officer rank have stated that they believed most of the population would support them, but their own statements and documents from the pre-Tet period indicate rather strongly that the uprising was to be "motivated and organized" rather than spontaneous.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1) > 25 Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/KAC 99-79
By abm, NARA, Date 1-15-03

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. Although the exact sequence in time of the "general offensive" and the "general uprising" has not been fully clear, there are strong suggestions in statements by other prisoners and in captured documents that the two were to be simultaneous, with the "uprising" at least being initiated during the Tet attacks. Certain troops or cadres apparently were specifically assigned to organize support, to begin in the form of public demonstrations. We know that such demonstrations were started during attacks on several cities in the central coastal area--including Tam Ky--but that they were dispersed by police. Some prisoners have linked the public's lack of cooperation to the failure of the attacks themselves.

4. There has been no evidence as to whether the Communists actually intended attacks throughout the country to be simultaneous or to take place on successive days. If valid, this document provides the first good indication that "N-Day" was intended to be nationwide and that the full impact may have been dissipated through poor coordination. It also raises the possibility that US bombing attacks successfully threw off the timetable in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. Had the Communists genuinely expected to score complete successes in some areas, they almost certainly would have had to act everywhere at once.

5. The document, however, does not appear conclusive as to whether larger North Vietnamese units were to participate in the initial attacks, or were to be committed in follow-up efforts where success loomed promising. Neither does it make clear whether all North Vietnamese units or only some elements were to have been committed.


6. Although the document clearly suggests failure and the need for decision on a future course of action, it does not seem to rule out the possibility that the Communists had maximum and minimum goals, at least by area, nor does it necessarily indicate a "go for broke" effort. All of the future courses cited in the document point to continuing the struggle in Military Region Five, particularly in the urban areas. Although as might be expected, the dangers to morale and resources are highlighted, relatively strong assets are deemed still in place.

-2-

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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
~~TOP SECRET~~ 

7. We would concur with COMUSMACV's cautionary advice concerning both snap interpretations of Communist verbiage, especially in translation, and the possible relevance or significance of this document to the thinking and overall strategic planning of high-level Communist authorities in COSVN or Hanoi.


8. US officials in Saigon are endeavoring to clarify the circumstances surrounding the capture of the document and to establish as precisely as possible its authenticity.

BY DIRECTION OF THE DCI:

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs


Senior Duty Officer
CIA Operations Center

-3-

~~TOP SECRET~~ 

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM THE ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER

ODCSOPS/OD TO
MAJ Bachman/56176
141300(EST) Feb 1968

INFORMATION BRIEF

PURPOSE:

(C) To provide information concerning the deployment of the main body of the 3d Brigade TF, 82d Airborne Division.

FACTS:

1. (C) The main body of the Bde TF consisting of approximately 3677 personnel and 3045.7 short tons of cargo is programed to deploy in five echelons as follows:
 - a. 2/505 Airborne Infantry Battalion reinforced.
 - b. 1/508 Airborne Infantry Battalion reinforced.
 - c. Headquarters 3d Brigade Task Force.
 - d. Provisional echelon consisting of remaining elements of arty, engr, combat service and combat service support units (-).
 - e. 1/505 Airborne Infantry Battalion reinforced.
2. (C) The first element of the main body is scheduled to depart 142300Z Feb 68 and will close RVN approximately 25 hours later. Thereafter, one aircraft is scheduled to depart Pope Airfield every one and one-half hours with the last aircraft, containing elements of the 1/505 Airborne Infantry Battalion reinforced departing 232230Z Feb 68.
3. (C) Last element of the Bde TF is scheduled to close destination 242330Z Feb 68.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Army 5-23-78 letter
By ig, NARS, Date 3-29-79

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
UNCLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
EOD DR 3200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2A

93

~~SECRET~~
~~LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

February 14, 1968

Bob --

This is the paper the President
wished you to have and handle in the
way he indicated.

W. W. Rostow

Honorable Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense


~~SECRET~~

Memo
Subject: Khe Sanh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 10-25-78; NSC 8-14-80
By JK (isp), NARS, Date 8-29-80

WWRostow:rln



DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 11-22-78, State 4-4-79, NSC 7-18-79
By inf, NARS, Date 11-7-79

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

February 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Khe Sanh

I know that Khe Sanh is very much on your mind as it is on mine. It may be too late to do anything about the situation; if so, we should put all doubts behind us and prepare for the fight. On the other hand, if there is still time to exercise a useful influence, we should move quickly.

I have reviewed what General Westmoreland has said about Khe Sanh in his recent messages. To paraphrase his cables, he points out that the original occupation of the position was justified by the need to establish a forward operating base to permit operations against the key infiltration routes in Eastern Laos. More importantly, he also considers that its occupation has blocked the route of enemy advance into Quang Tri and has kept the fighting away from the populated coastal belt of I Corps. He concedes that Khe Sanh has not had much effect on infiltration from Laos and it is not clear whether he regards the role of blocking the Quang Tri approach as of current or of past importance.

Thus, General Westmoreland does not appear to argue strongly for the defense of Khe Sanh because of its present value either in relation to the infiltration routes in Laos or in the defense of major areas of the northern provinces. Although he mentioned to General Wheeler in a telephone conversation his belief that the maintenance of our position in the Khe Sanh area would offer us the opportunity at some time of dealing the enemy a severe blow, he has not amplified this point and, in his cables, he stressed rather the difficulty of getting out of Khe Sanh at the present time and the adverse psychological effects of a withdrawal upon South Viet-Nam and upon the American public.

My review of Westy's cables does not convince me of the military importance of maintaining Khe Sanh at the present time if it is still feasible to withdraw. Whatever the past value of the position, it is a positive liability now. We are allowing the enemy to arrange at his leisure a set-piece attack on ground and in weather favorable to him and under conditions which will allow us little opportunity to punish him except by our air power. The latter can be neutralized to some degree by the favorite Communist tactic of closing tightly around our positions in areas which our air forces, particularly the B-52s, can not attack with safety to our own forces.

General Westmoreland recognizes the difficulties of air supply of Khe Sanh and indicates an intention to open Highway 9 to provide an overland line of communication. To do so will require a large number of troops to keep Highway 9 open in the face of the intermittent road-cutting operations which can be expected from the enemy.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

My present opinion is that Khe Sanh probably can be held but that it will be at a heavy price in terms of casualties and in terms of other ground troops necessary to support and reinforce it. I have real doubt that we can afford such a defense in view of the limited reserves which General Westmoreland is likely to have in the time frame during which these events may take place.

I make the foregoing comments in full realization of how wrong one can be at a distance about a military situation such as this. I have the utmost confidence in General Westmoreland and am sure that he sees possibilities in the situation which are not visible from here. Nonetheless, I would feel greatly relieved if _____ Westmoreland's guidance _____ would contain some of the following points:

"In view of the strong likelihood of a heavy enemy attack along the DMZ and against Khe Sanh, accompanied possibly by other attacks in the cities and along the Kontum-Plaika border, _____ we wish to provide the following comments for your guidance (i.e., General Westmoreland's). _____ ^{we} they are impressed with the many tasks which you may be called upon to perform concurrently with limited reserves and appreciate your problem in establishing priorities among these tasks as they arise. To assist you in making your decisions, they wish you to understand that, in their opinion, you should not hesitate to give up terrain in remote areas in order to meet the enemy on ground favorable to your scheme of maneuver, in favorable weather and under conditions offering you the opportunity of inflicting decisive blows upon his main forces.

"In this connection, Khe Sanh appears to us _____ to be an exposed position difficult to supply by air and expensive to supply overland in terms of lines of communication forces. Khe Sanh has already well fulfilled the purposes which you mention in your cable PAC-02018 of impeding infiltration from Laos and closing the northwest route into Quang Tri. However, it is less clear that its present value now justifies the cost of an all-out defense.

"While we _____ recognize the adverse psychological consequences of a withdrawal which you mention, the effect of a costly defense absorbing forces badly needed elsewhere could in the end be far more disadvantageous to our cause than a withdrawal now. Indeed, the latter could prove to be a useful stratagem nullifying the laborious logistical build-up of the enemy around Khe Sanh and upsetting his winter-spring schedule.

"We _____ are not prepared to assess the feasibility or the desirability of a withdrawal at this late date but wish you to know that ^{we} they will support you completely if you decide to pull back from what may prove to be a disadvantageous position. They will support you equally in a decision to defend Khe Sanh."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, February 14, 1968 -- 8:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have informed Sec. Rusk, who will be working on the lines of the proposed backgrounder to take the initiative away from U Thant.

Here are my initial thoughts which I shall make available to Sec. Rusk.

1. As you know, since last summer we have been ^{exploiting} exploiting, through various intermediaries, the terms under which peace might be negotiated in Vietnam. In particular, an effort was made to see if the so-called Trinh formula was consistent with the President's San Antonio formula.
2. Those efforts have yielded no constructive result.
3. In particular, Hanoi apparently is not prepared to accept our assumption that, if bombing of the north should stop, no advantage would be taken of that situation.
4. In this connection, we must take fully into account what has gone on since the attack on the cities during Tet and what is happening right now. The Communists, exploiting the Tet holiday, sought to overthrow the government in the cities and towns and to disintegrate the armed forces of Vietnam. They tried to kill the military commanders, hoping that their forces, somewhat depleted by Tet leave, would melt away. They hoped that the people in the cities would join in a general uprising against the government. None of these things happened: the people did not join the VC; the government behaved with unity and vigor; the attack on the cities was turned back mainly by the efforts of the armed forces of Vietnam, who took two-thirds of the casualties and fought exceedingly well.
5. Meanwhile, Hanoi has been assembling, day after day, very large forces south of the demilitarized zone, for what Ho Chi Minh calls the Route 9 offensive. Its objective is clearly to take and hold the northern part of South Vietnam. We are not going to let this happen. These forces are not South Vietnamese, they are North Vietnamese. They are not guerrilla or Popular Forces, ~~seeking reform~~. They are regular army troops under Hanoi's direct control.
6. Any proposals for negotiation at the present time must take fully into account the illegal infiltration of forces going on through Laos and the flagrant violation of the demilitarized zone as well as the clear ^{intent} intent of Hanoi in the DMZ area as well as elsewhere along the borders of South Vietnam.

W. Rostow

95

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

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Wednesday, February 14, 1968
9:30 a. m.


Mr. President:

Herewith indication of planned attacks, February 13 and 14, on Khe Sanh Base.

This could be mortars -- or a ground attack.

Evans
RCP
(Joint Chiefs)
W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ Time Past Files



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-80
By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01

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DE [REDACTED] 686 0451151
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FM DIRNSA
TO OSCAR/VICTOR ALFA
WHITE HOUSE
USM-604 -
USM-7
ZEM

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

2/ [REDACTED] R36-63 FLASH RPT

FOLLOW-UP NO 35 TO 2/0/ [REDACTED] R32-68 [REDACTED]

FOLLOW-UP NO. 35 TO

COORDINATED VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE EVIDENCED
IN SOUTH VIETNAM (252532Z)

EARLY IN THE EVENING OF 13 FEBRUARY A DISCUSSION BETWEEN TWO UNIDENTIFIED PAVN ENTITIES IN THE GENERAL KHE SANH VICINITY INDICATED THAT ~~ATTACKS WERE PLANNED FOR THE NIGHTS OF 13 AND 14 FEBRUARY AGAINST KHE SANH.~~ AT 1255Z ON 13 FEBRUARY, AN UNIDENTIFIED ENTITY WAS QUESTIONED AS TO WHEN THE "CONCERT" WOULD BEGIN AT "STAGE ONE." IN REPLY THE OTHER ENTITY REPLIED "ON THE NIGHTS OF 13 AND 14" AND FURTHER STATED "YOU ARE TO GET READY AT THE AIRFIELD." MINUTES LATER THE STATEMENT, "TONIGHT THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A CONCERT AT [REDACTED], WAS NOTED. THIS IS THE COMMUNIST COVER DESIGNATOR FOR THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE.

THESE MESSAGES WERE ALL NOTED IN TACTICAL VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. POSSIBLY RELATED TO THIS ACTIVITY WAS THE OBSERVANCE OF THREE MESSAGES OF A TYPE WHICH HAVE BEEN NOTED BEING ORIGINATED IN THE DMZ AREA ONLY BY ELEMENTS OF THE PAVN 304TH DIVISION BEING PASSED EARLIER ON 13 FEBRUARY OVER VOICE FACILITIES. THESE MESSAGES WERE NOTED PRIOR TO THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST LAO LANG VIL SPECIAL FORCES CAMP ON 15 AND 17 FEBRUARY. ((1))

NO OTHER TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS HAVE REFLECTED PAVN PLANS FOR AN ATTACK IN THE KHE SANH AREA ON THE DATES NOTED ABOVE.

((1)) 3/0/ [REDACTED] R34-63
300

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 99-81

By cbm, NARA, Date 1-17-03

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

66

INFORMATION

Wednesday, February 14, 1968
11:25 a.m.


96

[Handwritten signature]

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's personal statement on negotiations, designed to pre-empt U Thant's believed position.

W. W. Rostow



wwrostow:rln

TO, MOOSE AT WHITE HOUSE
GOULDING AT DEFENSE
FROM SHEGHAN AT STATE
February 14, 1968
TEXT OF RUSK STATEMENT

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Questions have been asked about the connection between the possibility of negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam and the military operations now in progress. It should be obvious that there is a connection since both are involved in moving from hostilities to peace.

Hanoi has repeatedly refused to take steps to reduce the scale of violence in Southeast Asia. They have refused to respect the territorial integrity and neutrality of Cambodia, despite intensive international effort to respond to Cambodia's own wishes in the matter.

Hanoi has repeatedly rejected any efforts to bring about a full compliance by all parties with the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos. Today their forces are increasing their operations in Laos itself and are stepping up their illegal infiltration through Laos into South Viet-Nam.

Hanoi has treated with contempt the demilitarized character of the DMZ between North and South Viet-Nam and has rejected all efforts to restore the demilitarization of that area.

Repeated periods of bombing cessation or reduction in North Viet-Nam have elicited no corresponding action by North

Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam. Quite the contrary, such periods have been used to build up their military forces in South Viet-Nam. Cease-fire periods have been marked by hundreds of cynical violations by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces -- and on a massive scale during the recent Tet holidays.

At no time has Hanoi indicated publicly or privately that it will refrain from taking military advantage of any cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. Nor has it shown any interest in preliminary discussions to arrange a general cease-fire.

In recent weeks Hanoi knew that discussions of a peaceful settlement were being seriously explored; they also knew that there was a reduction of bombing attacks on North Viet-Nam, specifically in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas during these explorations. Their reply was a major offensive through South Viet-Nam to bring the war to the civilian population in most of the cities of that country. Their preparations for a major offensive in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam continue unabated.

In assessing, therefore, whether Hanoi's alleged interest in political talks has anything to do with making peace, one must take into full account the negative meaning of their recent escalation. The President declared in his State of the Union Message that he would continue to explore the possibilities of negotiation and would report the results. I must report that all explorations to date have resulted in a rejection of his San Antonio formula.

All of the proposals made by the United States for peace in Southeast Asia continue to be valid; specifically, the San Antonio formula put forward by President Johnson in September remains the basis of our position.

We are not interested in propaganda gestures whose purpose is to mislead and confuse; we will be interested in a serious move toward peace when Hanoi comes to the conclusion that it is ready to move in that direction. Hanoi knows how to get in touch with us.

97

(6)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

ps

Wednesday, Feb. 14, 1968
6:05 p. m.

rec'd 6:20p


MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a grim -- but possibly realistic --
assessment from London's man in Hanoi
(filed from Singapore).

He says Hanoi is not interested in negotiations;
and it is prepared for a protracted war.

Walt Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RR WASHINGTON 54913 RR OTTAWA 36413

Exclrs
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-211

By us, NARA Date 4-3-98

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CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY POLAD SINGAPORE

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 090

13 FEBRUARY 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

08

ADDRESSED FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 90 OF 13 FEBRUARY REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION SAIGON, WASHINGTON, AND OTTAWA.

FOLLOWING FROM STEWART. (IN SINGAPORE)

YRTEL 243.

~~WHEN GIER AND I LEFT HANOI ON EVENING 9 FEBRUARY WE WERE IN GENERAL
AGREEMENT. I HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AND HE SAW MOST OF
MY MATERIAL ON THE SUBJECT.~~

2. ~~ON REFLECTION I REGRET THAT THERE IS NOTHING SUBSTANTIAL TO ADD
TO MY PREVIOUS REPORTING THAT I CAN DETECT NO EVIDENCE OF A FUNDAMENTAL
MENTAL OR A CHANGE OF MOOD. THE PEOPLE IN HANOI WERE IN GOOD
SECRETS BEFORE THE TEST OF THEMSELVES AND THEY WERE GREATLY ENCOURAGED
THEREAFTER.~~

3. I AM PERSONALLY CONVINCED FROM WHAT LITTLE EVIDENCE OF MOOD AND
APPEARANCES IS AVAILABLE TO ME THAT ~~ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD BE
DELIGHTED TO JOIN THE U.S. AT THE TABLE OF THE WELL KNOWN 1955, THEY
ARE NOT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO THE TABLE OF THE WELL KNOWN 1955 TO
REACH THE TABLE. AND THEY ARE GREATLY REALISTIC TO KNOW THAT
THIS PROBABLY MEANS A PROLONGED WAR FOR WHICH, IN MY OPINION,
THEY ARE FULLY PREPARED AT WHATEVER COST.~~

CHANCERY GENERAL
Chancery Action
338:CHY:gc

/4. FOR ME

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

4. ~~FOR THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE IS PART OF A GENERAL PROPAGANDA EXERCISE WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE 29 DECEMBER. ON THE ONE HAND THE D.R.V. MAKES SEMANTIC CONCESSIONS TO PUT THE PROPAGANDA BALL IN THE WASHINGTON COURT. ON THE OTHER HAND IT TRIES TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD, THE VIETNAMESE AND THE U.S. THAT THEY ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH AND ARE IN NO WAY FORCED TO FUNDAMENTAL CONCESSIONS.~~

5. ~~WERE THERE THE SLIGHTEST EVIDENCE OF A WILL TO COMPROMISE IN HANOI I WOULD TAKE THE FINAL FLING THESE MORE SERIOUSLY. I CAN FIND NONE. I EXPECT THEREFORE THAT WHATEVER THE RESULT OF THE SPRING OFFENSIVE THE D.R.V. ARE READY TO SETTLE DOWN TO A LONG WAR.~~

F O PASS W'TON 1 AND OTTAWA 1.

WATSON

SOSFA/CROSEC

GRS265A

SENT AT 1151Z/13/2/68 RVM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY HANOI TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 9 26 FEBRUARY 1968

V

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

mw

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 9 OF 26 JANUARY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION UNNUMBERED TO SAIGON, WASHINGTON,
MOSCOW AND POLAD SINGAPORE AND SAVING PEKING.

fu d.

PEACE.

MY UNNUMBERED TELEGRAM OF 26 JANUARY VIA SAIGON TELNO 79 TO
FOREIGN OFFICE. I AM EXPANDING ON THE POINTS IN THIS NECESSARILY
BOTTED VERSION SINCE I THINK THAT THE FRENCH ACCESS TO DRV OFFICIALS
IS IMPORTANT. I DO NOT HOWEVER THINK THAT THIS INFORMATION
JUSTIFIES A CHANGE IN MY ASSESSMENT THAT THE SEMANTIC
CHANGE WAS INTENDED TO MAKE A PROPAGANDA POINT RATHER
THAN TO INDICATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE DRV APPROACH.
INDEED, THE SUMMONING OF DIPLOMATS FOR PRIVATE BRIEFINGS FITS
WELL INTO THIS ASSESSMENT.

2. ~~MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT PROVE THE
ANXIETY TO GET TO THE TABLE BUT IT WAS HIS OPINION THAT THE DRV
WERE MORE ANXIOUS THAN BEFORE. HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT BE MORE
CONFIDENT. IT IS EQUALLY POSSIBLE THAT THEY HAVE RECOGNISED
A MILITARY STALEMATE.~~

3. TIME OF THE TALKS. THE DRV HAD EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD
TAKE SOME TIME TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVELY THAT BOMBING HAD REALLY
STOPPED, AND TO ARRANGE FOR TALKS. THIS WAS THE MEANING OF
BO'S STATEMENT IN PARIS.

4. IT WAS POINTLESS TO TALK OF DEFINITIVE STOPPING OF BOMBING
AND EQUALLY POINTLESS TO INSIST ON MEANINGFUL TALKS. THE
MEANING WOULD DEPEND ON THE ACTIVITIES OF BOTH PARTIES.

5. SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION. THE DRV SPOKESMAN DID NOT
EMPHASISE EITHER THE FOUR POINTS OR THE PROGRAMME OF THE FRONT.
THERE WERE THREE SUBJECTS: PLACE, LEVEL OF NEGOTIATIONS AND

AGENDA TO BE SETTLED.
CHANCEY GENERAL
Chancery Action
311: CRY: ap

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

6. THE DRV WERE DISPLEASED THAT THEIR RUDE REMINDERS TO THE STATE OF UNION MESSAGE HAD BEEN INTERPRETED AS A CLOSING OF THE DOOR. ON THE CONGRARY THE MESASAGE WAS NOT A FINAL FULL ANSWER TO TRINHS SPEECH. THE DRV REACTION WAS NOT THEREFORE RELATED TO TRINHS SPEECH. THE DRV STILL WAITED FOR WASHINGTONS REPLY.

7. THE DRV SPOKESMAN REITERATED THAT TRINHS SPEECH WAS A CLARIFICATION OF DRV INTENT. THIS WAS THE POSITIVE POINT TO EMPHASISE NOT (AS IN THE CZECH NEWS REPORT) THE NEGATIVE FACT THAT FUNDAMENTAL DRV POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. BUT IT WAS STILL TRUE THAT DRV COULD ACCEPT NO PRECONDITIONS BEFORE TALKS.

8. ALTHOUGH MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE CONSIDERS THAT THE DRV HAVE EXTRACTED MUCH DIPLOMATIC ADVANTAGE FROM TRINHS SPEECH HE IS INCLINED TO BE LESS CYNICAL THAN ME IN HIS INTERPRETATION AND THINKS THAT SPEECH REPRESENTED MORE THAN A PROPAGANDA STUNT. HOWEVER HE AGREES THAT DRV DO NOT HAVE HIGH HOPES THAT US WILL WRITE THEM A BLANK CHEQUE IN AN ELECTION YEAR.

9. ~~WITH THE SOLITARY EXCEPTION OF THE INDISTINGUISHABLE INDIAN~~
~~I CAN FIND NO ONE IN HANOI WHO REALLY BELIEVES THAT THE~~
~~POSITIONS OF THE TWO MAIN PARTIES ARE YET CLOSE ENOUGH TO~~
~~START TALKS.~~

F O PASS WASHINGTON U/N.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MACLEHOSE/SOSFA

GRPS 430

SENT AT 12/2027Z TWW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RR WASHINGTON 1-33/1098

CYPHER/CAT A

V.

PRIORITY VIENTIANE

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 72

10 FEBRUARY 1968

f.u.d.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDRESSED TO F.O. TELEGRAM NO. 11 OF 9 FEB REPTD FOR INFHM TO SAIGON AND WASHINGTON U/H.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM HANOI

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 36.

I VERY MUCH REGRET THAT CONTINUED NON ARRIVAL ICC PLANE HAS PREVENTED BY REPLYING IN DETAIL TO YOUR TELEGRAM. CANADIAN CHANNEL CANNOT UNFORTUNATELY CARRY LONG MESSAGES FOR ME.

2. ALTHOUGH SO CALLED GENERAL OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH AND NEW CLARIFICATIONS BY FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH AND THE CANADIAN SONDAQE HAVE OVERTAKEN BY ORIGINAL REPORT, I AM RETURNING TO THIS SUBJECT IN HOPE THAT A PLANE WILL ARRIVE TODAY.

3. MAIN CLARIFICATIONS OFFERED TO PRESSMEN AND DIPLOMATS ON AND OFF RECORD TO DATE ARE AS FOLLOWS.

4. TIMING OF TALKS. TRINH'S LATEST TALKS OF ~~AS SOON AS THE US HAS PROVED ETC. DRV OFFICIALS HAVE COMMITTED THAT THIS MEANS THAT TALKS WOULD START QUOTE PARTLY UNQUOTE TALKS WOULD TAKE AN UNQUOTE~~
~~FOR THE TIME BEING I AM STOPPED. THE OTHER REASON OF MY COMPANY IS FOLLOWED THROUGH WITH THE OTHER QUESTION WHETHER PROUNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE PUBLIC OR WHETHER A LETTER WOULD BE SENT BY THE DOWNS WOULD BE OFFERED BY THIS OFFERING.~~

5. AGENDA. ~~THESE TALKS WOULD BE HELD IN HANOI AND WOULD BE HELD IN HANOI~~
~~AND WOULD BE HELD IN HANOI AND WOULD BE HELD IN HANOI~~
~~AND WOULD BE HELD IN HANOI AND WOULD BE HELD IN HANOI~~
~~AND WOULD BE HELD IN HANOI AND WOULD BE HELD IN HANOI~~
~~AND WOULD BE HELD IN HANOI AND WOULD BE HELD IN HANOI~~

CHANGORY G. MURAD
Changory action
251-017:go

1-33-1098-36. TRINH'S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

6. TRINH'S LATEST INTERVIEW DOES NOT THROW FURTHER DIRECT LIGHT ON ANXIETY TO GET TO TABLE, BUT SEEMS TO UNDERLINE THAT DOOR REMAINS OPEN.

7. AS TO CHARGES FOR ~~INFORMATION THAT BASICALLY IN THE DECEMBER~~
~~JANUARY EXERCISE WAS PROPAGANDA. I CAN ONLY DO BETTER IN TERMS OF THAT~~
~~BY UNHINDERED TALKS OF 2 FEBRUARY. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS SUGGEST~~
~~HOWEVER THAT WITH APPARENT SUCCESS OF OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH, THE DRV~~
~~CONSIDER THAT THEY ARE NOT IN A STRONG PROPAGANDA POSITION AND~~
~~CAN THEREFORE GIVE SOME FACILITY TO THEIR INTEREST IN TALKS.~~

8. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO JUSTICE TELEGRAPHICALLY TO FULL QUESTION. LEAVING OUT OF ACCOUNT U S VIEWS ON TRUSTWORTHINESS OF DRV THERE REMAINS THE INEVITABLY FALSE DRV ASSESSMENT OF U S BASED ON (A) DIEN BIEN PHU EXPERIENCE OF FRENCH (B) (GP UNDEC ?THREATS) OF VITUPERATION AGAINST U S (C) SELF RIGHTEOUS MARXIST DOGRMATISM AND COUSURENESS.

9. AS USUAL I CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT DRV ARE WILLING TO TALK BUT ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE CLARIFIED THE PRECONDITIONS AND AGENDA, THEY HAVE NOT ALTERED THEIR OBJECTIONS NOR OFFERED A SHRED OF EVIDENCE ABOUT POINTS ON WHICH THEY WILL COMPROMISE.

10. ~~IT IS NOT KNOWN IF THE DRV CONTAINERS FROM THE DRV ARE WILLING TO~~
~~CONFER WITH US SINCE THE ARRIVAL OF THE PRESIDENT JOHNSON.~~

CHENK/CCCA

GRS 400A

SENT AT 1525Z/10 MAR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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6G
S

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 14, 1968
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a British account of
U Thant's conversation with Mai Van Bo
in Paris.

It adds up to exactly what Mai Van
Bo has told everyone else; that is,
they will not accept the "assumption"
of the San Antonio formula. They are
merely prepared to talk for a cessation
of bombing while maintaining complete
freedom of action for themselves.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rin

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb, NARA, Date 4-28-99

Notes -
W.H. Rosier

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TEL NO 1609 OF 14 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR
INFO TO USINIS NEW YORK (FOR LORD CARADON) AND SAVING TO PARIS
(FOR AMBASSADOR).

98a

BY TEL NO 1574CNOT TO ALL)

(From the British Embassy)

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

VIETNAM.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WOULD LIKE YOU TO PASS ON THE REPORT IN PARIS

TELEGRAM NO 158^(below) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO MR. RUSK.

2. IN DOING SO YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT MR BROWN HAS ASKED YOU TO

PASS THIS ON IN CASE MR RUSK HAS NOT HAD THE REPORT THROUGH

HIS OWN SOURCES. PLEASE ADD THAT IT SEEMS TO MR BROWN THAT THE ONLY

ANSWER GIVEN TO U THAT WAS THAT IN PARA 5. AND THIS HE FEARS MAY

REPRESENT HANOI'S REAL POSITION.

ADDRESSED TO FO TEL NO. 150 OF 14 FEBRUARY REF. FOR INFO TO
UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR LORD CARADON) AND WASHINGTON (FOR AMBASSADOR).

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY,
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 524.
VIETNAM.

U THANT RECEIVED ME AT 15.00 (PARIS TIME). HE SAID THAT HE
HAD HAD A LONG TALK WITH MAI VAN BO THIS MORNING AND THAT HE
WOULD BE SEEING THE GENERAL AT 16.00 AND COUVE LATER THIS
EVENING.

2. U THANT SAID THAT THE FIRST QUESTION WHICH HE HAD PUT
TO THE NORTH VIETNAM CONSUL GENERAL AT NEW DELHI WAS: HOW
SOON AFTER THE BOMBING STOPS CAN TALKS BE EXPECTED TO BEGIN?
WOULD IT BE IN LESS THAN THREE TO FOUR WEEKS? MAI VAN BO'S ANSWER
WAS THAT THE WORDS QUOTE AS SOON AS UNQUOTE MEANT QUOTE AN
APPROPRIATE TIME UNQUOTE (UN TEMPS CONVENABLE). HE EXPLAINED THAT
THIS MEANT A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH NORTH VIETNAM WOULD HAVE PROOF
THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WAS QUOTE EFFECTIVE UNQUOTE AND THE
UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE QUOTE REALITY UNQUOTE
OF THIS CESSATION. U THANT SAID THAT IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT MAI
VAN BO HAD NO PRECISE IDEA OF THE TIME INVOLVED IN TERMS OF DAYS
OR WEEKS: BUT HIS OWN GUESS WAS THAT IT WAS LESS THAN TWO WEEKS.

...../3/ U THANT

3. U THANT SAID THAT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS WHICH HE HAD PUT AT NEW DELHI WAS WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT AFTER THE MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF HANOI AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE GENEVA CONFERENCE COULD BE CONVENED. MAI VAN BO'S ANSWER WAS THAT THIS WOULD BE A MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES. ALL QUESTIONS COULD BE RAISED AT IT. BOTH SIDES WOULD BE FREE TO PROPOSE ANY ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION.

4. U THANT SAID THAT A THIRD QUESTION WHICH HE HAD PUT AT NEW DELHI WAS WHETHER THE LEVEL OF HOSTILITIES (PRESUMABLY HE MEANT IN THE SOUTH) WOULD BE REDUCED ONCE A MEETING TAKES PLACE. MAI VAN BO HAD NOT ANSWERED THIS QUESTION DIRECTLY. HE SAID THAT WHEN AND IF DISCUSSIONS START, THE WHOLE VIETNAM PROBLEM CAN BE DISCUSSED AND ANY POINTS RAISED BY EITHER SIDE CAN BE TAKEN UP. U THANT COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS THUS NO PRIOR COMMITMENT. HANOI'S POSITION WAS IN FACT THAT THIS QUESTION WAS A MATTER FOR THE NATIONAL LIBERAL FRONT AND NOT FOR HANOI.

5. U THANT HAD ASKED MAI VAN BO WHETHER PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SAN ANTONIO FORMULA WAS ACCEPTABLE TO HIS GOVERNMENT. THE ANSWER WAS THAT IT WAS NOT, SINCE THE OFFER TO STOP BOMBING WAS CONDITIONAL.

6. SUMMING UP HIS CONVERSATION WITH NAH VAN BO, U THANT SAID
THAT THE FORMER HAD BEEN VERY EMPHATIC THAT A MEETING WILL TAKE
PLACE AS SOON AS THE EFFECTIVE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OF OTHER
ACTS OF WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM (E.G. NAVAL BOMBARDMENTS) HAS
BEEN PROVED TO BE A REALITY. U THANT ADDED THAT HE REMAINED
CONVINCED THAT TO ACCEPT A MEETING ON THESE TERMS WAS THE ONLY WAY
TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A SOLUTION.

~~6.007-7-1 SAID~~

7. I SAID THAT I KNEW THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE GRATEFUL
TO HIM FOR GIVING ME THIS ACCOUNT OF HIS TALK WITH NAH VAN BO.
WE AGREED THAT HE WOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT,
ANNOUNCE THAT HE HAD SEEN ME.

1 1 5 6 5 4

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT.
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Beck to report

9

99

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE


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Info: INFO: AmEmbassy ROME
USUN
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
STATE Amembassy MOSCOW
115654

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-6-79 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-21-79

A. J. Jones (copy)



~~XXXXX~~ NODIS

1. Italian For Ministry today announced that earlier this month Fanfani had talks with two North Vietnamese Reps on the possibility of starting negotiations. Announcement said contents of talks had promptly been passed on to State Department.

2. The Italian account is correct. Although we were not informed of their intention to make any public announcement and a reply was about to be sent to Fanfani, you should inform GVN at the appropriate level of what Fanfani passed on to us making clear that we do not consider this as precise or complete an account as would be necessary to make a definitive evaluation of what was actually said. Following is summary of Fanfani report:

- a. Two North Vietnamese representatives met Feb 5 and 6 with Fanfani and in course of intense dialogue reiterated desire for peace and freedom, accepted proposition that Viet-Nam remain divided and that regime in South be freely chosen by population so as to prepare

Drafted by:	EA/V N:Hisham;hjh 2/14	Tel. Ext.	4535	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:	William P. Bundy
Clearances:	EA - Mr. Habib			EUR/AIS - Mr. -Stabler	
	S/S- AParker				

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conditions for future reunification.

b. NVN reps specified that bombing cessation was precondition to negotiations and asserted DRV desired to negotiate with USG if cessation took place or were to be announced officially. (Note: Fanfani's account does not use word "unconditional" in this context but we assume this was in fact employed). ~~Following~~ Following bombing cessation NVN would be ready to open contacts for serious negotiations ^{repeat X} X/ days after this condition was met.

c. With respect to necessary participation of NLF this could take place in "second stage". Hanoi could not talk on behalf of NLF which is autonomous but in case of contacts looking toward negotiations the Government would exercise its influence in direction of possible understanding between Washington and Hanoi.

d. With respect to Geneva agreements, NVN reps recognized that spirit of these agreements remain valid but they think that some of their clauses have been overtaken by events.

e. With respect to President Johnson's statements on necessity for some reciprocity in return for bombing cessation and necessity for some sign from Hanoi, NVN reps replied they do not accept concept of reciprocity because they will never negotiate under bombings and December statement of NVN FonMin constitutes clear sign which has been carefully considered and designed to resolve conflict. NVN rep complained that this declaration has not received reply and also complained about length of time US explorations of declaration were taking.

Page 3 of telegram to SAIGON

~~SECRET~~

f. When Fanfani referred to US commitments toward GVN, NVN reps replied that this was "a pretext".

g. NVN reps repeatedly declared that present attempt in Rome was not of tactical or propaganda nature but was seriously meant to establish contacts between Hanoi and Washington with view to starting negotiations on all problems existing between two countries. Fanfani added parenthetical note at this point that "this explains why NLF would take part only in second phase of negotiations."

h. NVN reps proposed that Fanfani issue communique on meetings but he said he was opposed to this idea on grounds it would constitute lack of consideration for US Government and public nature would defeat Hanoi's intention of initiating a serious negotiations. NVN reps then gave up idea of communique and agreed to keep conversation secret for time being. According Fanfani's account above record was compared and confirmed by both sides.

i. Ensuing personal and off-the-record discussion included following points:

- (1) With respect to negotiations it became clear that problem of "guarantees" for application of any eventual agreements was becoming increasingly important.
- (2) With respect to NLF, NVN reps stated several times it represents a great part of the population of SVN.
- (3) With regard to possible free elections in SVN, NVN

~~SECRET~~

Saigon may wish simply to report to GVN that Italian approach seems to be exactly on a par with what is being attempted with U Thant and the Indians, and to reflect concerted propaganda offensive. Today's AFP report from Hanoi and Paris 10291 fit this interpretation.

2
GP-2 END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

file 2H

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/15/68 - about 8:30 p.m.



Walt:

There is an outside chance that the battle for Khe Sanh may be over.

Since I would hate to be found guilty of wishful thinking, I urge that you not raise this possibility just yet.

SIGINT information indicates the movement of six possible NVA units away from Khe Sanh:
- one toward the east which could

Gen. Binsburgh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-160
By SJ, NARA Date 7-24-01

101



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

Walt,

I am supposed to get answers
to these questions.

When do you suggest the
meeting on the reserve
matters?

LBJ/mjdr
Feb 15, 1968
1:30p

2H
Feb 13, 68

QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE CALL-UP OF RESERVE UNITS
AND INDIVIDUALS

1. Why is it necessary to call up reserve units at this time?
 - a. To be ready for further reinforcement of Viet-Nam?
 - b. To be ready for other contingencies outside Viet-Nam?
 - c. To reassure allies such as NATO to whom we have military commitments?
 - d. To contribute to our overall deterrent posture by adding to our visible strength in being?
2. How large should the call-up be to satisfy the foregoing requirements? Can the call-up be diminished by such devices as a reduction in our overseas garrisons in Europe or Korea?
3. Why is it necessary to call up individual reservists at this time? Can't it be avoided or postponed? If not, how many must be called? When? From what sources?
4. What will happen to the reserve units and individuals called up? Where will they go? How long will they serve? Are the necessary housing, equipment, and training facilities ready for them?
5. What are the budgetary implications of these actions?
6. What must be requested from the Congress? What can be avoided or delayed?
7. What will be the manpower requirements for maintaining these increased forces? What will the effect be on draft calls?
8. What will be the domestic and international reactions to these decisions?
9. How should our decision be explained to the domestic and international public? What should be the timing of our statement?

February 13, 1968