

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

10/12

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#23 memo	CIA secret sanitized 8-20-82 ies NLS 81-91 Tet offensive open 5-7-84 NLS CBS 1 6 p	02/21/68	A
#44 memo	CIA secret (gp 1) open 8-20-82 ies NLS 81-91 for the Director from Abbot Smith 7 p	02/26/68	A
#45a report	CIA top secret SC No. 01933/68 new info released 9-18-84 NLS-CBS 2 16 p	02/27/68	A
#53 cable	CIA conf (gp 1) sanitized 8-20-82 ies NLS 81-91 TDCS 314/03659 2 p	02/29/68	A
#56 memo	CIA secret (gp 1) open 8-20-82 ies NLS 81-91 re: Vietnam 5 p	02/29/68	A
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
#12a Report	CIA conf re: Vietnam open 12-13-82 ies NLS 81-91 8 p	02/28/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 3

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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2012

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#9 report	OSD secret <i>open 6-28-79 sig</i> Fact Sheet 1 p	02/17/68	A
#10 report	OSD secret " supply data 1 p	undated	A
#12 report	OSD secret " combat status undated	undated	A
#15 memo	OSD secret <i>sanitized 4-21-81 ip</i> to Rostow from Carver 2 p	02/17/68	A
#40a memo	OSD top secret <i>open 4-21-81 ip</i> to Deputy SecDef from Adm. Lowrance 11 p	02/12/68	A
#55a memo	OSD conf <i>open 6-28-79 sig</i> for record by Garth 1 p	02/29/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#19 memo	<i>NSC 6-18-79 letter</i> NSC top secret <i>open 7-22-80-8</i> to Rostow from Ginsburgh 2 p	02/19/68	A
#26 memo	NSC secret " to Rostow from Ginsburgh 1 p	02/23/68	A
#27 memo	NSC top secret " to Rostow from Ginsburgh 1 p	02/23/68	A
#37 memo	NSC top secret <i>sanitized 7-22-80-8</i> to Rostow from Ginsburgh 2 p <i>Open NLJ 99-228 1-21-80</i>	02/26/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#45 memo	to CIA for consultation WH top secret <i>again 7-16-80 ip</i> to president from Rostow 1 p	02/27/68	A
#49 memo	WH conf. <i>again 7-16-80 ip</i> to president from Rostow 1 p	02/28/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#41 memo	JCS top secret to president from Gen. Wheeler 6 p	02/27/68	A
#46a report	JCS top secret Report of Chairman, JCS, on Situation in Vietnam and MACV Force Requirements (U) 84 p	02/28/68	A
#49a report	JCS conf re: Vietnam 8 p	02/28/68	

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO OSD FOR CONSULTATION <i>NSC 2-9-79</i>		
#1a memo	WH secret <i>open 8-29-80 ip</i> to president from Rostow 1 p	02/16/68	A
#2 memo	WH secret <i>open 6-21-79 ip</i> to president from Rostow 1 p	02/16/68	A
#3 memo	WH secret " to Rostow from McCafferty 1 p	02/17/68	A
#4 memo	WH secret " to Rostow for president, CAP80415 1 p	02/17/68	A
#14 memo	WH secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/17/68	A
#16 memo	WH secret " to Rostow from Gen. Ginsburg 1 p	02/18/68	A
#24 memo	WH secret " to president from McCafferty, CAP80475 2 p	02/22/68	A
#29 memo	WH conf " to president from Rostow, CAP 80520 1 p	02/23/68	A
#32 memo	WH secret <i>sanitized 8-24-81 ip</i> to president from Rostow, CAP80547 2 p	02/24/68	A
#34 memo	WH conf <i>open 6-21-79 ip</i> to president from Rostow, CAP80569 1 p	02/25/68	A
#38 note	WH secret " to Walt 1 p	02/12/68	A
#44a memo	WH secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/27/68	A
#55 memo	WH conf " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/29/68	A

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

7812

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	78-631 TO OSD FOR CONSULTATION		
#28 memo	WH top secret <i>open 9-2-80 ip</i> to President president from Rostow, CAP80504 3 p	02/23/68	A
#30 memo	WH top secret " to president from Rostow, CAP80542 2 p	02/24/68	A
#31 memo	WH top secret " to president from Rostow, CAP 80538 2 p	02/24/68	A
#33 memo	WH top secret <i>sanitized 9-2-80 ip</i> to president from Rostow, CAP80558 1 p	02/24/68	A
#35 memo	WH top secret <i>open 9-2-80 ip</i> to president from Rostow, CAP80566 4 p	02/25/68	A
#40 memo	WH top secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/27/68	A
#42 memo	WH top secret " to president from Rostow, CAP 80608 2 p	02/27/68	A
#43 memo	WH top secret " to president from Rostow, CAP 80610 1 p	02/27/68	A

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National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 3

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO STATE DEPT FOR CONSULTATION		
#51 memo	WH top secret to president from Walt Rostow <i>open 10-19-79 inf</i>	02/28/68	A
#51a memo	WH top secret to SecState & SecDef "	02/28/68	A
#50 memo	WH top secret to president from Rostow "	02/28/68	A

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National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 3

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	JCS 9-19-78 letter to JCS for consultation		
#25 memo	WH top secret cover memo 1 p	02/23/68	A
#25a memo	WH top secret to Gen Wheeler & Gen. Westmoreland from Rostow (duplicates #25b) 2 p	02/23/68	A
#25b cable	WH top secret (gp 1) to Rxxxxx Gen. Wheeler & Gen. Westmoreland from Rostow 2 p	02/23/68	A
#46 memo	WH top secret to president from Rostow 1 p	02/28/68	A

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March 31st Speech, vol. 3

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National Security File, NSC History
March 31st Speech, vol. 3

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
	TO STATE DEPT. FOR CONSULTATION		
#7 memo	WH secret <i>conf</i> <i>open 8-21-79 inf</i> for Amb. Bunker from Rostow 1 p	02/17/68	A
#48 memo	WH secret " to president from Rostow 1 p	02/28/68	A
#48a report	WH secret <i>open 6-21-79 inf</i> situation in Vietnam 17 p	02/26/68	A
#54 memo	WH secret <i>sanitized 8-21-79 inf</i> to president from Rostow 2 p	02/29/68	A

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March 31st Speech, vol. 3

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12812

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a-1 cable	<i>open 4-3-98 NLG 96-211</i> state secret (gp 1) Exempt per State 7-2-79 from USUN 3794 3 p	02/15/68	A
#20a memo	<i>(Dup # 74, NSF memos to the President, Rostow, vol. 62)</i> state secret to president from Rusk <i>open 9-2-97 NLG 96-213</i> 11 p	02/20/68	A
#22 memo	state secret <i>Exempt per State 7-2-79</i> U Thant-Bunche meeting 2 p	02/21/68	A
#39 report	state secret situation in Vietnam 17 p (partial duplicate of #48)	02/26/68	A
#50a memo	state top secret <i>open 3-24-80 ip</i> to president from Lodge 1 p	02/28/68	A
#52 report	state top secret " re: Negotiations 13 p	02/29/68	A

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GENERAL

16 Feb 68 thru 29 Feb 68

February:

16 -- Msg from U Thant regarding negotiations -----	A
16 -- Rostow memo, VC critique of TET offensive -----	B
16 -- McCafferty memo, troop movements -----	C
17 -- SitRoom report on Saigon -----	D
17 -- Wheeler msg, CJCS trip to Vietnam -----	E
17 -- Excerpts from President's remarks at Ft Bragg -----	F
17 -- Rostow msg, morning items for Bunker -----	G
17 -- Memo, impending Viet Cong attacks -----	H
17 -- JCS fact sheet, 82d Airborne and 27th USMC RLT -----	I
-- Supply data at Khe Sanh -----	J
-- Reply msg from Saigon -----	K
-- JCS paper, status of 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne -----	L
17 -- Airfield attacks begun -----	M
17 -- Rostow memo -----	N
17 -- Carver memo, communist objectives in "Second Wave" -----	O
18 -- Ginsburgh msg, recommendations of Rusk-Clifford target discussions; Wheeler reviewing target possibilities -----	P
18 -- Christian's press briefing on Vietnam -----	Q
19 -- Rostow memo, Clarke's report -----	R
19 -- Ginsburgh memo, proposed call-up -----	S
20 -- State memo, talking points for U Thant session -----	T
20 -- JCS memo, deployment of troops -----	U

February:

21 -- Memo of conversation: U Thant/Bunche -----	V
21 -- CIA memo, communist forces used in TET -----	W
22 -- SitRoom report, Khe Sanh dump -----	X
23 -- Memo to McNamara with msg for Wheeler & Westmoreland -----	Y
23 -- Ginsburgh memo, status of forces -----	Z
23 -- Ginsburgh memo, reserve call-up -----	AA
23 -- Rostow summary from SitRoom -----	BB
23 -- Rostow msg, Khe Sanh -----	CC
24 -- Wheeler and Westmoreland response to yesterday's query -----	DD
24 -- Rostow summary from SitRoom -----	EE
24 -- SitRoom report, CIA suggests another attack on Saigon -----	FF
24 -- SitRoom report, Westmoreland request to use COFRAM at Khe Sanh -----	GG
25 -- SitRoom report, improvement around Quang Tri -----	HH
25 -- SitRoom report, Wheeler conclusions on three additional troop packages -----	II
25 -- Proposed statement on the battle of Hue -----	JJ
26 -- Ginsburgh memo, additional pressures on North Vietnam -----	KK
-- Ginsburgh note on COFRAM supply -----	LL
26 -- Situation in Vietnam by person talking to Americans and Vietnamese in Saigon -----	MM
27 -- DIA appraisal of the ARVN as of 12 February -----	NN
27 -- Wheeler memo, military situation and requirements in SVN ----	OO
27 -- Talk between Gen Kerwin and Gen McConnell -----	PP

February:

27 -- SitRoom report, proposals for additional troops -----	QQ
27 -- CIA memo, 26 Feb, the outlook in Vietnam -----	RR
27 -- CIA memo, future communist military strategy in SVN -----	SS
28 -- Wheeler's report on situation and requirements in Vietnam -----	TT
28 -- Rostow memo, input to GVN forces -----	UU
28 -- Habib's observations on the situation in Vietnam -----	VV
28 -- Captured enemy document on continuation of TET -----	WW
28 -- Lodge memo, urban security -----	XX
28 -- Wheeler situation and proposals forwarded to State, Defense, and Clifford -----	YY
29 -- Bundy draft, options on our negotiating posture -----	ZZ
29 -- CIA report on I Corps -----	a
29 -- Rostow memo with questions and answers from Indian Embassy --	b
29 -- NMCC report, most marines and 82d Airborne in South Vietnam -	c
29 -- CIA memo, communist alternatives in Vietnam -----	d

1a

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 16, 1968 -- 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith (starting page 2) what U Thant
got from Mai Van Bo. The simple answer is:

- They will talk if the bombing stops;
- They will not commit themselves in
any way to the "assumption" of the
San Antonio formula.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 3794

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 12-19-78 letter + NSC 2-9-79
By isb, NARS, Date 8-29-80

~~SECRET~~

1

A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

20

2

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 16, 1968 -- 1:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: VC Critique of Their Tet Offensive (Summary as requested)

This summarizes VC document dated 9 February. It was taken from a VC Captain captured at Danang. It analyzes the tet offensive from the viewpoint of VC Military Region 5 (parts of First and Second Corp -- see map attached).

The document notes three failures:

- (1) failure of the VC to get popular support -- "a big mistake";
- (2) failure to defect South Vietnamese troops;
- (3) failure in coordinating attacks.

It attributes military failure to the timidity of main forces which should have been used in the cities and the fact that the offensive was "staggered." On the latter point, it had been planned for all attacks to occur at the same time but units in MR 5 did not get delay orders and attack one day early.

The document lists three options now open:

- (1) continue to try to get a "popular uprising";
- (2) launch military attacks, then try an uprising;
- (3) launch military attacks but defer any popular uprising.

MR 5 concluded that option one -- the general uprising -- must be their target while relatively strong forces still exist; their rural bases are intact and administration is still effective. MR 5 advocates continued terrorism in the cities, renewed guerilla warfare outside the cities, and new waves of major military attacks.

The document indicates clearly that the Communists realize their efforts have largely failed so far. They see no real alternative to try to achieve a popular uprising. They are worried about the effect of their offensive on the morale of their own forces and cadre.

This is an MR 5 view. The analysis and recommendations may or may not be acceptable to the Front headquarters in Hanoi.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 2-9-79 letterBy is, NARS, Date 6-11-79

Att.

W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

B

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

20

3

~~SECRET~~

February 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Further Information re Troop Movements

Marines from El Toro

3rd Battalion of the 27th will be moving out today, tomorrow, and into Monday

82nd Brigade from Fort Bragg

1st Battalion of the 508th will continue its movements through late Sunday p. m.


The Brigade Headquarters and Provincial Support Battalion will follow.

The 1st Battalion of the 505th will move on the 19th or 20th.


DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 2-9-79 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 6-11-79


Art McCafferty

~~SECRET~~



4

~~SECRET~~

RVLAK

WV A HOT N. ONE

WTE N
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WTEI
WTE 639

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 2-9-79 letter

By SP, NARS, Date 6-11-79

FROM: WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO: WALT ROSTOW FOR THE PRESIDENT
SITE: CAPEJ415

~~SECRET~~

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1968
4:40 P.M.

TO WALT ROSTOW FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM THE SITUATION ROOM

INFORMATION FROM SAIGON, AS OF 4:30 EST.

AN SON NHUT RECEIVED APPROXIMATELY 40 ROUNDS OF ROCKET
FIRE RESULTING IN SEVEN AIRCRAFT DESTROYED AND FOUR OTHERS
DAMAGED. ADDITIONALLY, ALL FIRMS REPORTED ON THE BASE
ARE NOW UNDER CONTROL. SIX U.S. PERSONNEL WERE WOUNDED
DURING THE ATTACK. THERE WAS NO ENEMY PENETRATION OF
THE BASE.

IN THE CHOLON AREA OF SAIGON, FIGHTING WAS REPORTED IN THE
SIXTH AND EIGHTH PRECINCTS.

THERE WAS SOME GROUND FIGHTING UNDERWAY ABOUT FOUR MILES EAST
OF SAIGON.

AT BIEN HOA AIRBASE, TWO AIRCRAFT WERE DESTROYED BUT THE
BASE IS COMPLETELY OPERATIONAL. THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES
REPORTED.

THE AMMUNITION STORAGE AREA AT LONG BINH, 25 MILES SOUTHWEST
OF SAIGON, WAS BROUGHT UNDER A MORTAR ATTACK WITH ONE STORAGE
AREA DESTROYED.

THE BANH REMAINS RELATIVELY QUIET FOLLOWING THE BRIEF
MORTAR ATTACK REPORTED AT ABOUT NOON.

WE HAVE RECEIVED NO REPORTS OF ATTACK ON ADDITIONAL TOWNS
OR VILLAGES.

MSG 172153Z FEB 68
INFO IKA

JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL				DIST: CJCS-10 J3-8 J4-3 J5-2 J6-3 SACSA-3 WH-4 DIA-15 CSAF-1 RF/FILE-1(50)WW ADV CYS TO NMCC (4)	
TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE		
		X			
PRECEDENCE					
ACTION				IMMEDIATE	
INFO				IMMEDIATE	
FROM				OCJCS	
TO				CINCPAC COMUSMACV AMEMB SAIGON	
INFO:				STATE DEPT WHITE HOUSE	
CONFIDENTIAL				JCS 1406 FROM OCJCS	
SUBJ: CJCS TRIP TO VIETNAM, FEB 1968					
1. THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WILL VISIT VIETNAM AND HAWAII DURING THE PERIOD 21 FEB 1968 - 26 FEB 1968. AIRCRAFT WILL BE SAM C-135 #4129. PILOT IS MAJOR JAMES P. WELLS.				<div style="text-align: right;"> IMMEDIATE <i>Post</i> </div>	
2. COMPOSITION OF PARTY OSUBJECT TO CHANGE:				<div style="text-align: right;"> DECLASSIFIED Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D) By <i>100</i>, NARS, Date <i>3-29-78</i> </div>	
GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER, USA, 018715, CJCS {PP NO. Y 395512};				SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OCJCS {10} DIA {SS0}	
MR. PHILIP C. HADIB, DEPUTY ASST SECY.				J-3 J-4 J-5 J-6 SACSA	
EA/PAC AFFAIRS;				NMCC/DDO	
MR. STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR, FSO-4, {EA}				CSAF FOR SAM	
MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM E. DEPUY, USA, 034710, SP ASST FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES, JCS {PP NO. Y 565018};					
TYPED NAME AND TITLE				ZFF-3	
PHONE				DATE	
79847				17	
SIGNATURE				TIME	
<i>D. P. MacLiff</i>				1730R	
TYPED (OR STAMPED) NAME AND TITLE				MONTH	
D. P. MacLIFFE				FEB	
Colonel, USA				YEAR	
				1968	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				PAGE NO.	
CONFIDENTIAL				1	
REGRADING INST				NO. OF PAGES	
GP 4				5	

E

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRECEDENCE

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

PHONE

ACTION

INFO

MAJOR GENERAL GROVER C. BROWN, USAF, FR 4144
ASST DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION, DIA
{PP NO. Y 253100};

BRIGADIER GENERAL VIRGIL W. BANNING, USMC,
06740, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR COMMAND AREAS, J-3,
JCS {PP NO. - TO BE FURNISHED LATER};

COLONEL D. P. MCAULIFFE, USA, 026609, EXEC
TO CHAIRMAN, JCS {PP NO. Y 202062};

COLONEL ALAN C. EDMUNDS, USAF, FR 15875,
CJCS STAFF GROUP {PP NO Y 495327};

MAJOR CHARLES E. WILSON, USAF, FR 26347,
AIDE TO CJCS {PP NO. Y 316904};

MSGT GEORGE D. ROTHMEIER, USA, RA 55310193,
MILITARY SECY TO MGEN DEPUY, {PP NO Y 583722}

SM/SGT WILLIS G. OWENS, USAF, AF 12167276,
ORDERLY TO CJCS {PP NO. Y 416860}

3. TENTATIVE ITINERARY {ALL TIMES LOCAL}

21 FEB {WED}

1950 ETD ANDREWS AFB

CONTROL NO.

TOR/TOD

PAGE
NO.

NO. OF
PAGES

MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

INITIALS

2

5

1406

REGARDING INSTRUCTIONS

GP4

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
AND/OR CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRECEDENCE
ACTION
INFO

RELEASED BY

DRAFTED BY

PHONE

2210 ETA ELMENDORF AFB. REFUEL ONLY.

CJCS WILL NOT DEPLANE.

22 FEB {THURS}

0010 ETD ELEMNDORF

23 FEB {FRI}

0250 ETA YOKOTA AFB. REFUEL ONLY.

CJCS WILL NO DEPLANE.

0450 ETD YOKOTA AFB.

1000 ETA TAN SON NHUT

25 FEB {SUN}

1600 ETD D SAIGON

0940 ETA HONOLULU. GROUND TIME

13 + 20.

2300 ETD HONOLULU

26 FEB {MON}

1250 ETA ANDREWS AFB

4. REQUEST THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS:

A. BILLETING. QUARTERS IN SAIGON FOR CJCS
PARTY AS DISCUSSED BY MAJOR WILSON AND CAPT SAMPSON
{ADC TO COMUSMACV}. MAJOR WILSON SHOULD BE IN

CONTROL NO.

TOR/TOD

PAGE
NO.

NO. OF
PAGES

MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION

INITIALS

3

5

1406

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS

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PHONE

ACTION

INFO

VICINITY OF CJCS. IT IS DESIRABLE THAT COLONELS MCAULIFFE AND EDMUNDS ALSO BE IN VICINITY CJCS. NO BILLETING REQUIREMENTS AT HAWAII ANTICIPATED AT THIS TIME. REQUEST AMEMB SAIGON HANDLE BILLETING ARRANGEMENTS FOR STATE DEPT REPRESENTATIVES.

B. TRANSPORTATION. FIVE SEDANS ASSIGNED TO PARTY IN SAIGON AND HONOLULU INCLUDING APPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR CJCS. TWO BAGGAGE VEHICLES ON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE SAIGON ONLY. REQUEST AMEMB SAIGON HANDLE ASSIGNMENT APPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR ASD AND AIDE.

C. ADMINISTRATION.

{1} TOP SECRET COURIER MEET AIRCRAFT ON ARRIVAL SAIGON AND HICKAM FOR STORAGE OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL. NAME, RANK AND SERIAL NUMBER OF COURIER TO BE FURNISHED PRIOR TO ARRIVAL IF POSSIBLE.

{2} SECURE PARKING FOR CJCS AIRCRAFT AT HICKAM.

{3} NAMES OF GREETING PARTY AT SAIGON AND HICKAM.

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<div style="text-align: right; margin-bottom: 20px;">7</div> <p>D. SECURITY. APPROPRIATE PERSONAL SECURITY FOR CJCS DURING MOVEMENT IN-COUNTRY AND CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF CJCS FROM HOSTILE AREAS IF REQUIRED. PASS DETAILS TO CJCS AIDE OR EXECUTIVE ON ARRIVAL.</p> <p>5. CJCS DESIRES NO PRESS CONFERENCE OR INTER-VIEWS</p> <p>6. OTHER DETAILS WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN KNOWN BY AMENDMENT TO THIS MESSAGE.</p> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;">J</div>					
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Excerpts from the President's Remarks, February 17-18

Fort Bragg, 2/17/68

In every capital where there was a prospect, in every forum where there was a promise, your Nation and its leadership has sought peace.

The answer of the enemy in Vietnam has been pillage. The enemy has launched a major counter-offensive against the Government and the people of South Vietnam. He has marshaled his power around the cities of South Vietnam, in I Corps and elsewhere.

After 2-1/2 years in which he has seen his grip on the people weaken, he has finally decided to try to win now -- this year. His aim is to shake the Government of South Vietnam to its foundations, to shake the confidence of the South Vietnamese people -- to destroy the will of your people, the American people -- to see this struggle through.

In his first attempt three weeks ago, he failed. He did inflict terrible wounds on the people, and he took terrible losses himself. He did prove, again, what the world has long known -- that terrorists can strike and can kill without warning before the forces of order can throw them back.

. . .

El Toro Marine Air Station, 2/17/68

Your destination -- I Corps in Vietnam -- is torn and scarred tonight. More than any other stretch of territory, it is a place where the meaning of this war is clearly revealed.

The enemy, who set out nine years ago to conquer South Vietnam by force, is showing precisely what he intends in I Corps. He makes no pretense of talking about land reform, or of improving the lives of the people. He wants, instead, his neighbor's land. He believes the way to get it is at the point of a gun.

He is undertaking what he calls his "Route 9 Offensive." He plans to strike along that route and to plant his flag on the free soil of the Republic of Vietnam. Defeated in every other part of the country, he has concentrated his major effort there, with regular forces of the North Vietnamese Army. At Quang Tri -- at Hue -- at Danang -- at Khesanh -- tonight United States Marines stand squarely in the path of his plan.

The enemy's tide will be broken. The villages -- and the treasured city of Hue -- will be rebuilt. Freedom will survive -- because brave men like you are going there to preserve it.

Aboard USS Constellation, 2/18/68

So we have taken our stand. We shall do all to stand -- all that is asked -- and all that may be required. The will of this generation of Americans will never be found wanting, abroad or at home.

You know -- no men know better -- that the tasks of war are tasks that all Americans abhor. But the tests of freedom are tests from which Americans will never turn.

Few of those tests are to be met by the tools or the tactics of war. The demanding cause that we champion never is more demanding than when it asks of us that we be a responsible nation -- steadfast in our resolve, but no less steadfast in our restraint.

The past of nations, the past of powers, cannot guide or govern a nation whose power is greater than all the power of all nations past. Ours is such a power. We shall use it, as you have used it, with precision on the fronts of war, and with principle on the fronts of peace, praying always, as we prayed this morning, that our use will be wise and that the end will be just.

But until freedom stands tall and strong in Asia, until this vast Pacific is a great community of peace, until the gun and the knife are sheathed, and until neighbors fear neighbors no more, Americans cannot rest, and Americans cannot sleep, and you Americans cannot be idle.

VIA-CAS-CHANNEL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7
February 17, 1968

~~EYES ONLY~~

FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER FROM WALT ROSTOW

Two morning items from here:

1. We assume Embassy is now well protected against intrusion into compound or buildings. The earlier attack was blown out of proportion and was disproportionately damaging here. And, of course, we care greatly about our people and installation.

2. It would help us greatly if Thieu, Ky, or both could somehow get to the U.S. press corps in Saigon with an account of:

- how the people have behaved;
- how the ARVN fought ;
- how recovery is going;
- how the constitutional machinery is working;
- how political groups are cooperating with the government.

~~###~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 10-27-78, NSC 7-13-79
By ing, NARS, Date 8-21-79

~~SECRET~~

17 February 1968

FACT SHEET

Subject: Deployability Status of Personnel in the 82nd Airborne Brigade Task Force and the 27th USMC RLT.

The percentage of individuals that deployed to South Vietnam having less than one year since their return and the percentage of individuals who have less than 120 days service remaining at time of departure from CONUS or Hawaii is as follows:

	<u>Less Than One Year</u>	<u>Less Than 120 Days</u>	<u>Personnel Deployed</u>
82nd A/B TF	27.8%	8.6%	3,610
27th RLT	0	0	7,363

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD letter OCT 25 1978

By ing, NARS, Date 6-28-79

Prepared by:
Colonel L. V. Hoyt
J-3 Pacific Division
Extension 53031

~~SECRET~~

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SUPPLY CONSUMPTION DATA IN KHE SANH

In reply to the question as to daily consumption (on gross basis) of Class I (Rations), Class III (POL), and Class V (Ammo) supplies at Khe Sanh, the following is submitted:

Class I	7-1/2 tons per day
Class III	14 tons per day
Class V	73 tons per day

The above data is an estimate only, based on available information from reports covering the period 11-16 February 1968, representing days of supply on hand and receipts in the Khe Sanh area. More detailed information would require a query direct to III MAF.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD letter OCT 25 1978
By isp, NARS, Date 6-28-79

~~SECRET~~

*Ref in
ENCLOSURE*

~~SECRET~~

COMBAT STATUS OF THE THIRD BRIGADE
TASK FORCE, 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION
AND THE MARINE RLT (S)

1. The Third Brigade Task Force, 82nd Airborne Division, moving by air to CHU LAI, closes at 250335Z Feb 1968. It plans for a two-week orientation program after arrival in-country; however, the unit is capable of initiating combat operations upon closure if required.
2. The Marine Regimental Landing Team 27 (-), moving by air to DANANG, closes at 231250Z Feb 1968. It will be ready to initiate combat operations upon closure if required.
3. The Battalion Landing Team 1/27, moving by sea to DANANG, closes at 282400Z Feb 1968. It will be ready to initiate combat operations upon closure if required.

COORDINATION

Army - Col. Grimsley
Marine Corps - Brig. Gen. Owens/Col. Peal
SASM - Col. Delmar

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD letter OCT 25 1978
By isp, NARS, Date 6-28-79

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED
Authority NISC 2-9-79 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 6-11-79

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(P5)
~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 17, 1968
2:30 p.m. Rec'd 2:50p.

Mr. President:

Herewith answers to the three
questions you put to Bob Ginsburgh
last night.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

OSD, 10/25/78, CIA, 10/28/80
BY JK WARS, Date 3/26/81

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SANITIZED COPY

17 February 1968

15

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Communist Objectives in "Second Wave" Attacks

REFERENCE : TDCS-314/03012-68

1. The referenced intelligence report, which outlines Communist plans and objectives for a "second wave" attack on Danang, merits your urgent attention.

[REDACTED]

2. The information in this new report is consistent with that contained in the 9 February MR V document picked up in Danang, a careful retranslation of which has been received from our Station. This document had indicated that, despite the very limited success attained in the initial Tet attack on Danang, all VC elements were to conduct activity to exploit favorable conditions in preparation for possible further attacks. The decision on the next phase was to be considered at a meeting to be convened by MR V on 12 February. In the interim, military elements -- including three units under "Brother TRUC" -- were to "attack continuously, fight small and medium actions everywhere, and simultaneously prepare to fight concerted big actions at the same time, in waves, to make the enemy incapable of stabilizing the situation again."

3. This new report would seem to reflect the results of the 12 February meeting. The attack plan seems feasible, and it is interesting to note that it refers to three regiments under Le Truc (Chief of Staff of MR V), who may have the NVA NT2 Division under his direct operational control. The objectives outlined in this report are significant: to win complete victory, but -- failing that -- to seize the villages surrounding Danang which would then be used as stepping stones for subsequent continuous attack.

4. Because of the accuracy of the earlier report from this source, we place considerable credence in this new report. It would seem that, at least in the Danang area, the "second wave" will be a major effort with maximum objectives comparable to those of the "first wave." Whether there will be a coordinated country-wide "second wave" of similar intensity remains to be seen, but information

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coming in as of this writing (1630 EST, 17 February) suggests that substantial coordinated efforts will indeed be made against various urban centers.

G. A. Carver, Jr.
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

cc: Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
General DePuy
Secretary Rusk
Mr. Habib

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16



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Authority NSC 2-9-79

By ip, NARS, Date 6-11-79

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18 FEB 68

Received 4 Copies

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DATE _____

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FROM GENERAL GINSBURG
O WALT ROSTOW
CITE CAP80431

~~SECRET~~

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS OF RUSK-CLIFFORD TARGET DISCUSSIONS ARE NOT YET READY FOR FORWARDING.

AS A FOLLOW ON TO THESE DISCUSSIONS GENERAL WHEELER WILL BE REVIEWING TARGET POSSIBILITIES BEGINNING AT 0530 PST FOR FURTHER REVIEW BY RUSK-CLIFFORD.

I HAVE PASSED ON THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES TO GENERAL WHEELER'S OFFICE SO THAT HE CAN HAVE PREPARED ON AN URGENT BASIS A PROGRAM MOST EFFECTIVE USE OF AIRPOWER AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.

WHAT IS THE LATEST TIME BY WHICH YOU MUST RECEIVE PROGRAM AND RECOMMENDATIONS?

DTG: 181011Z FEB 1968

~~SECRET~~

17
THIS COPY FOR _____

P R E S S B R I E F I N G (ON THE RECORD)
(Situation in Vietnam)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE
(Indian Wells, California)

WITH GEORGE CHRISTIAN; WALT W.
ROSTOW, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO
THE PRESIDENT; LT. GENERAL LEWIS
W. WALT, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT,
U. S. MARINE CORPS

2:10 P.M. PST

FEBRUARY 18, 1968

SUNDAY

MR. CHRISTIAN: I think we can go on and get started.

First, it appears that we will leave here at some point this afternoon. I cannot tell exactly when. We will be going directly to Andrews from here. Don't ask me when we will leave. I don't know.

The President met with President Eisenhower in his home at Palm Desert, and discussed with him the present situation in Vietnam.

General Lewis Walt, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Mr. Walt Rostow, Special Assistant to the President, gave the General a full rundown on the military operations in Vietnam at the present time.

Mr. Rostow also discussed briefly with President Eisenhower the situation in Korea, especially as it relates to the PUEBLO incident.

Mr. Rostow and General Walt will give you now BACKGROUND on the Vietnam situation. For those of you who are not familiar with these rules, this is attributable to Administration sources. Obviously, much of what they give you will be a repeat of their discussions with President Eisenhower. But the rules on BACKGROUND will be Administration sources for quotation of their portion of this briefing. We may change that on one or two things as we go along, but that is the rule. (changed later to on-the-record)

Walt, do you want to go ahead?

MR. ROSTOW: I might begin by saying a few words about the two briefings or two sessions, I should say, that the President had this morning on board the CONSTELLATION before he left.

The first session was with the men of the crew. There were about 25 of them there. He went around the table and asked all of us around the table -- including his own aides -- to stand up, firmly recite their name, what part of the country they came from, and their job. The men did.

MORE

It was a very well scattered group -- New York to California, and from Texas to Massachusetts, as I recall.

The President asked a number of these men how long they had been in service. He asked them how far along in their education they had gotten. He inquired about their plans for the future, including their educational plans -- and in some cases, went rather deeply into how many children there were in the family and what the pressures were that had gotten them to get out before they had finished high school. Then he went on and talked about the jobs.

I think for all those present there was a memorable question in which one of the men asked about the hippies and the protesters about the war. The President replied, explaining why we must accept this as normal in our history and that those who serve and do the job should proudly go about their business.

Then, as I recall after the church service, but before the President spoke on the deck of the CONSTELLATION, he met with a group of the officers of the ship, including many who had flown missions from Yankee Station in support of our forces in Vietnam. That was a technical briefing in which certain of the new technology that is being used in these operations, and certain of the problems and the attitudes of the men towards their job were discussed.

As for the situation in Vietnam, I hope you will question General Walt in greater detail. My own summary would be this: From the first time we captured prisoners in the first wave which began on the 29th of January, we had reports of the second wave of an attack that was planned.

The date for that attack kept sliding forward. The first dates we had were somewhere around the third to the fifth of February. The second dates of an attack centered somewhere between the eighth and the 11th, with a number focusing on the 10th of February. Then there was a focusing around the 15th.

Despite the danger that we might have been caught short on the 18th, intelligence was good enough so that our men in the field had every unit on alert, and that goes for the Americans and the South Vietnamese on the 18th.

We know that between the first attack and the 18th, the Communists have been taking stock of what they had achieved and did not achieve in the first wave. We know from prisoners -- including relatively high prisoners -- that they honestly expected an upsurging of political support in the cities. They did not expect the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to be as alert and to fight as well as it did. We know they were trying to think over how they should go from here.

MORE

We heard on the so-called Liberation Radio -- the radio of the Communists in Vietnam -- a report on the 17th, just before midnight on the 17th, which was about a half hour or so before the first mortar attacks began. We heard an announcement that they had had a meeting of the Presidium -- as they call it -- of the NLF, on the 11th and 12th of February.

They obviously took stock and decided to proceed on the 18th. The document is interesting. It is in the usual Communist jargon, but I commend it to you. It is available to you. It is unclassified. It says it admits that Saigon, Danang, and other towns, are under what they call enemy control -- that is, government control.

This is the first formal admittance of the extent to which the first attack on the cities failed. They talk about some gains in the countryside. There is, indeed, with both sides fighting in the city, a great deal of looseness in the countryside in which they are trying to get back some of the areas that have been brought under pacification.

Instead of talking about a victory in the first wave, they talk about important changes in the balance of forces.

But the net conclusion they come to is that despite the failure to achieve their total objectives in the first wave, they will go forward; in their language, "to surge forward to fulfill the task they had been entrusted with by the Front."

And so there were attacks yesterday. Let me try to give you the best picture we have. I think the President has been kept up to date. I think he is as up to date as anyone in Washington. There were mortar and heavy rocket attacks on 30 cities and military bases. There was a rather heavy attack on Tansonghut Air Base, in which there were low U. S. casualties -- four killed and some aircraft destroyed and damaged.

But there was nothing like the destruction of aircraft in these attacks that there was in the first wave.

In each of the other Corps areas, there were also mortar attacks, rocket attacks. The ground action, however, was much less than it was in the first day of the first wave -- the 29th-30th. There was a little fighting outside of Saigon where a Viet Cong unit was caught by the Vietnamese who imposed about 100 casualties or so. They killed 200 in that operation outside of Saigon.

There were also quite a number of small contacts around the country.

QUESTION: Who killed 200?

MORE

MR. ROSTOW: The ARVN catching a Viet Cong unit to the South of Saigon -- they estimate 200 VC killed in the outskirts.

In the IV Corps, in the Delta, eight of the 16 capitals were hit by rocket and mortar fire. There were no major ground actions. In general, as in III Corps, where Saigon is, the ground action was light.

There were actions in the other Corps, but in I Corps, where the main North Vietnamese forces are who have not been committed to the battle, at Khe Sanh or Quang Tri, there was no major ground battle -- merely a number of contacts.

At the end of this first day, all that one can say surely is that it is too soon to judge the future weight of the follow-on attacks. Some of the prisoners are saying they are going to sustain this pressure for a week. We don't know.

But the basic fact is that in the II, III, and IV Corps there have been attacks -- mortar attacks. They may or may not be followed by ground action. The first weight of attack is lighter than the previous time.

In the Khe Sanh-Quang Tri-I Corps area generally, the major forces remain uncommitted in that battle. The battle of I Corps still is to be fought. I might say that they are grinding away at Hue. They estimate that some 200 or so of those still fighting in the Hue Citadel were killed yesterday. But that pocket in the Citadel has not yet been cleared out.

General Walt, would you like to add anything to what I have said?

GENERAL WALT: When I was out in Vietnam -- I left there last June, you will recall, after command of the Marines in the I Corps area for a little over two years -- the pitch of the enemy at that time and since that time, actually, up until recently, was that he was going to wear us down. He was going to make us fight a protracted war, which we were not able to win.

Well, certainly, his tactics have changed. He has decided he could not win a protracted war. Sometime last fall, he started figuring out that he would have to go in and win quickly or not at all.

I think what we have seen here in the last two or three weeks are results of those decisions he made last fall. When he committed some 60,000 of his guerrilla and main force units in the cities' battle two or three week ago, he committed his blue chips. These are the people who are hard to replace. It takes a long time to train them and to put them into the village and hamlet areas where they do their work.

MORE

As a result of having put all of these people into these battles, he has lost some 40,000 of them -- 34,000 killed and the rest captured. Along with that, he has lost nearly 12,000 weapons, over 2,000 of which were machine guns, mortars and recoilless rifles -- that type of weapon that he can ill afford to lose.

There is no question in my mind but what he received a real defeat as a result of his attempts to take over the cities. We have proof, both from prisoners and from documents, stating that he fully expected that in at least half of the cities he went into, the people would rise up and cheer him on.

Well, this didn't happen. Instead of that, the people didn't help them. The people turned against them. In order to try to force the people to support them, they deliberately murdered many thousands of the civilians -- women and children -- in trying to terrorize the people and force them into support in these city battles.

The reaction of the people, instead of rising up and supporting the VC, has just been the opposite. It has been indignation and hatred.

First of all, this attack was launched during their holy holiday, the Tet period, when they are all supposed to take off. They don't fight on that period. But this attack was launched five hours after the beginning of that period where both sides agreed there was going to be a ceasefire.

That is one of the big things that the people resent, besides all the terrorist tactics that have been pulled against them.

Another thing the people up in I Corps, where I was, resent, is the fact that the enemy came in and used the sacred buildings of the old capitol as a battle ground. I was assured time and again out there by the Vietnamese, who I took great stock in what they said, that the enemy would never fight in the Citadel because it was sacred to all of Vietnam -- the North as well as the South.

Well, here again, they threw caution to the winds and went into the Citadel. They have used it as a fortress. We have done everything we could, and the South Vietnamese have done everything they could, to preserve as many of those buildings as we possibly could in clearing out that area.

This is one reason why it has taken so long.

Another reason is that the South Vietnamese Army has a great deal of pride. They wanted to be the ones that pushed the people out of Hue. They are the ones who are doing the majority of the fighting, because they feel this is their Capitol.

This brings me to another point: I can only talk about the I Corps area, the 1st and 2nd Division and the 51st Regiment of the ARVN forces because those are the people I know, where I have had the direct contact.

As a result of the enemy attack in I Corps and as a result of the ARVN and the regional forces there having defeated the enemy in this attack, their morale is higher now than it has ever been. The morale of the ARVN forces in I Corps now is high. Their tails are up and they are ready to go. They have defeated the enemy.

If the enemy comes back at them again, I think he is going to have a tough time.

Many people have asked me whether or not the count of bodies and weapons in this conflict is accurate or overstated. I would say they are understated. These people came in this time -- I am talking about the VC and the main force, and the NVA -- came in to these cities with no withdrawal plan at all.

They came in to stay. They had no idea of leaving. In most cases, the ARVN forces and our forces were able to surround them, cut them off and capture or destroy them. This is why we have such a very high weapons count. It is quite contrary to the tactics they have used before.

They always have had a hit and run tactic before. This has been a hold, a clear and hold, or a cease and hold operation, because they were going for broke. They had no idea of leaving the area.

Just a word on Khe Sanh. I am very familiar with Khe Sanh. I established the outpost up there. It was initially a Special Forces camp. We moved the Special Forces over and we made a combat base out of it for our Marine Corps. I think it is a very important area, militarily.

If you were to give the enemy that Khe Sanh area, then you would allow him to close in in the heavily vegetated and very rough terrain to where he could make attacks, direct attacks, onto the populated areas along the coast. It would be very difficult to stop him in that area without a lot of damage and losses to the civilian populace.

In the Khe Sanh area, we have a good combat base. It is not a bad piece of ground to defend. I have walked it all. I know.

If the enemy takes it, he is going to pay terrifically for it. I don't think he can take it. I think it is important that we hold it for psychological reasons, for political reasons, as far as the Viet Cong or the Communists are concerned, and militarily, it is important to us also.

I have the fullest confidence that those 6,000 Marines who are there are going to hang onto that. I think that is all I have to say.

MR. CHRISTIAN: I think it is all right for both Mr. Rostow and General Walt's statements to be on the record, rather than background.

Have you any questions?

MORE

QUESTION: Can we hear what Walt Rostow told Eisenhower about Korea and the PUEBLO incident?

MR. CHRISTIAN: He generally just explained what the situation was.

MR. ROSTOW: It was a general summary in bringing General Eisenhower up to date. You should recall that General Eisenhower is very regularly briefed, as I believe George has told you, by General Goodpaster, so that in briefing him you didn't have to start at the beginning.

We explained the reasons the boat was there, why it was not protected, the fact that the Commanders in the field decided not to send aircraft in, and we then explained the state of diplomacy, focused on achieving the return of the men and the ship.

QUESTION: What is the status of the diplomacy?

MR. ROSTOW: We still are having meetings at Panmunjom. It is unresolved.

QUESTION: Mr. Rostow, did you indicate or tell General Eisenhower what President Johnson has said before, that this may be a long, drawn-out process of diplomatic negotiation to get the ship back?

MR. ROSTOW: I was simply a briefing officer on this occasion. President Johnson had ample time and has had ample time to express his substantive views on policy to the General. My task was simply that of a factual briefing officer.

QUESTION: I have a question for either one of these two gentlemen.

In your opinion, is there a cut-off time you have established at which point it would be too dangerous or too costly for the enemy to launch this major counter-offensive? Is there a period when the weather gets so bad that they cannot launch this?

MR. ROSTOW: General Walt is the reigning authority on that. He knows the weather up there better than we know it in Washington. If I recall, General, they fought in that last round into May; did they not?

You might want to comment on it.

MORE

GENERAL WALT: You remember the 881-861 Hill battle last year. That battle started on the 21st of April. It started because that was the first time that we could get on top of the mountains without going into clouds. The clouds were right down on the mountain tops around Khe Sanh. The first day I was able to get a platoon up there where it was clear enough where they were able to see something from the top of Hill 861 was the 24th of May.

When we did that, of course, we ran into the enemy forces. They were waiting up there.

MR. ROSTOW: That was April or May?

GENERAL WALT: I am sorry. It was April.

He was waiting there. He had planned to attack Khe Sanh on the 28th of April. We hit him on the 24th. We took those two; 881 North and South, and 861 away from him, and we had them in our hands by the 27th.

So, on the 28th he was well defeated and was unable to make the attack which he had planned. However, with his long-range planning as he does out there, he has to, the attacks that he had planned at Phu Bai and Dang Hau on the airfields there, to coordinate with and support the attack that he planned on Khe Sanh, went on anyway on the 29th.

They shelled our airfields for four or five hours that night. But if he had had Khe Sanh I would have had reinforced those two airfields. He was going to make sure I didn't.

I think if it is like last year we can expect bad weather up until at least the middle of April.

QUESTION: General, is there any indication as to how long the Communists might continue this "go-for-broke" offensive before they either run out of gas or the weather sets in?

GENERAL WALT: We know that some of the lower echelons were told before Christmas that there was going to be a big offensive around Tet time and when this big offensive was over there was going to be a great victory and we would have peace.

They told their soldiers that.

The soldiers have had that big offensive. They have had a tremendous loss of personnel and weapons and they still don't have what they call peace.

So, I think it is going to be very difficult for any of us to judge right at this moment what the enemy plans to do. He is in a defeatist status right now as far as his main forces and guerilla forces are concerned.

It is very true that he has some North Vietnamese Army forces poised, particularly around Khe Sanh, but let me remind you that that force around Khe Sanh and along the DMZ is everyday getting tons and tons of bombs and artillery placed on them. We know they have been hit hard; some of the units. Some of them have been forced to withdraw at least a

little distance. We don't know how much damage we have done to him. But, he hasn't had a picnic up there in his preparation to get ready to attack in the DMZ area.

QUESTION: General Walt, can this war be won militarily?

GENERAL WALT: This is a very complicated war, as I have said many times. It is more than a military war. It is military, psychological, political all mixed up into one. I think it takes a little effort on all these fronts before we are going to come up with a conclusion of this conflict.

QUESTION: General, is it your view that he has gone for broke and that this is his last gasp?

GENERAL WALT: I wouldn't term it his last gasp. I think he put everything he had in the assault on those cities. Some of them got away. We didn't kill them all. We killed or captured about 40,000 of them. He still has NVA forces back which were originally, supposedly, according to reports we get from prisoners and so forth, to come in and take advantage of the successes of the main VC forces.

The successes of the main forces and VC forces didn't occur, so the NVA were not used in that role. So, they still have that capability. Three days ago we think we detected an NVA unit trying to move in to relieve that outfit in Hue, but they were headed off by the Army we have there, the United States Army, the First Cav. They headed them off and knocked them off, over 100 of them.

They have tried to reinforce Hue and haven't been able to do it. I have always said there is never going to be a dramatic end to this war and I don't think it is going to be. It isn't that kind of a war.

But I do feel that the last two or three weeks have been a real plus for our side. I honestly feel that from the result of my experience out there and the study and research I have done on it.

QUESTION: General, are you saying that the VC, as such, as opposed to the North Vietnamese, don't really have the capacity to mount a second wave of the size and force of the first?

GENERAL WALT: I say the VC are the ones who took the beating in the city battles. There are the ones who took the beatings; some 60,000 of them entered into that. There is no question but that they went in with everything they had, with no intention of withdrawing.

QUESTION: In the wake of the Tet offensive, the head of the military intelligence in Saigon said the Communist forces had another 60,000 men they were prepared to throw into battle. Do you say you have later intelligence to indicate this is not so?

MORE

GENERAL WALT: No. I am talking about the VC guerrilla and main force units, the ones that were able to slip into the cities in civilian clothes, having already hidden their weapons and capability in the cities. These are the ones that hit the cities. I say this is where we have really hurt them, in that area. I say they still have other capabilities.

QUESTION: The military intelligence, after that happened, reported that they could mount another offensive of the same magnitude, that they had another 60,000 men.

GENERAL WALT: The North Vietnamese, yes. But they don't have that capability in their main force and guerrilla force. They just don't have it.

QUESTION: Was the former President also briefed on all of the diplomatic moves in the past six weeks to try to bring this thing to negotiations?

MR. ROSTOW: Not on this occasion. I am sure he has been informed of them.

QUESTION: Mr. Rostow, would you talk for a moment, if you would, about the political or psychological impact as you read it on the South Vietnamese people of this enemy offensive? Not the one just yesterday.

MR. ROSTOW: I understand.

The cities have been hit hard. There is a great deal of human suffering. There are refugees. The people were frightened. That is a part of it.

The other part of it is that the cities of South Vietnam have, in the whole history of the war in Indo-China, especially the larger cities, been virtually untouched. People could live a relatively normal life in urban terms in a developing nation.

To many of them, the VC were rather abstract. They were not abstract in the villages of Vietnam, but in the cities people could think about them, be philosophical and discuss them. People could afford living in relative security to discuss the Government, its weaknesses.

As I read the cables, the effect of the first wave of attacks was to force people to take a clearer view of where they stood, vis-a-vis the VC on the one hand and the Government on the other.

As for the VC, the first and most primitive fact is that they came in proclaiming they were coming to take over the cities and they failed. They did great damage. They terrorized. They assassinated. But in terms of their own proclaimed objective, which was very widely circulated among the South Vietnamese people--namely, that they were going to overthrow the Government and establish their own rule--they failed.

They even circulated the rumor that the Americans were conniving with them to overthrow the Government.

Aside from the failure of the effort, as General Walt said, people were shocked by the reality of two things: The simple brutality of the VC, and their violation of Tet.

Third, I think that the people of Vietnam were moved by the courage of their soldiers and police and the Americans who fought side-by-side with them.

I think it was in Hue, General Walt, if I am not mistaken, that for the first time simple citizens came out to bring food to both the South Vietnamese and the American soldiers when they were fighting. For the first time, the police stations have been flooded with telephone calls in Saigon, of people telling them where the VC were. The Government was put to a great test. People felt that perhaps the Government should have protected them, but they understood the surprise of attacking in Tet.

But the real measure of the Government was, A, whether it succeeded in throwing the VC out; B, whether it succeeded in feeding the people, which was not easy in some of those cities; C, whether they were capable of looking after the civilian wounded; D, whether they could get the garbage out, which carried with it the threat of plague; and then to begin to look after the refugees.

We are conscious that the Government of South Vietnam is in a kind of goldfish bowl in the world and is often criticized. But as a student of developing nations, and knowing something about the Governments, the weaknesses and strengths in developing nations all over the world, in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, I don't think one can judge the performance of the Government of South Vietnam in these weeks as anything but good, very good.

They pulled together all the elements of strength and executive energy. When I list these things, food, medicine, garbage, health, refugees, I am listing a series of anxieties that came through the cables, each of which represented fear of a mortal breakdown. And that didn't come.

Now something else. All manner of political groups outside the Government representing the Secretaries, representing major political figures, like Dr. Suu and others, in the face of this rallied to the Government.

In these weeks, I would say that in the cities of South Vietnam, you come closer to a sense of nationhood than you ever have before. You must understand the meaning of these attacks from the Communist point of view.

I believe it was in the Washington Post last week there was an article summarizing the views of a good many Frenchmen about the battle in Vietnam, whether Khe Sanh would be a Dien Bien Phu.

MORE

One of the, you may recall, cited a statement of General Giap, who said, "I am not a western general. You must not judge me by those standards. I am a Marxist. All my military operations have a purpose."

It is very clear what the political purpose of the first wave of attack was. We have it in documents; we have it in prisoners. They were trying to eliminate from the equation in Vietnam the two institutions, if you like, which distinguish their struggle with the Americans from their struggle with the French.

The two institutions are, first, a national army, the ARVN, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam; the other is this Constitutional Government. In all their propaganda, they never cease to refer to the Government as the Thieu-Ky clique. They never cease to refer to the ARVN except as a puppet force.

They are obsessed with their memories of 1954. What they were trying to do in the first wave of attacks was to eliminate from the equation the two elements that distinguish the United States from France. We are not there to maintain a colonial empire. We are there to help a nation find its feet and to make its decisions, relieved of aggression.

That is their greatest concern -- the fact that a legitimate Government, supported by the people, might emerge; that a national army with a national spirit might emerge.

That is why he hit at Tet. They knew that the ARVN soldiers would, in substantial part, be home on leave. So they hit at the weakest point. And they knew that the Government would expect this. No man bred in Vietnamese culture would accept this. So it was an extraordinary event.

The Government did not fall. It pulled itself together and did its job. The ARVN, although under strength did a magnificent job. One of the reasons for this pervasive new pride in the ARVN, to which General Walt referred, which all observers note, is that they took the full weight of the attack, rolling up a Sunday punch of 60,000 men, at perhaps half strength -- and they did the job.

They took twice as many casualties as we in the American Armed Forces. They had to do the job. It was an urban job. It was an intimate job.

Let's be clear. You don't take a blow like this and not suffer. Human beings have been killed. People are frightened. Both forces came in from the countryside.

Certain, not all, of course, of the hamlets where work has been done have been overrun, but some have been. It is a mean and tragic circumstance in human terms.

But in terms of the ultimate objective of the VC in these attacks, which was written in their documents and then carried out in practice with almost a pedantic precision, they failed to do what they wanted to -- which was to strip the United States of the symbols of what we stand for there, an independent national army and a Constitutional Government, and leave us naked to negotiate with them what they would call an "honorable defeat".

So it is a balance sheet. We are in the middle of a battle which is unresolved. As General Walt will tell you, you don't really count the end to a battle until it is fought.

But from their own documents, from their own interrogations after the attack, they failed to achieve their strategic objective, and may have left the ARVN and the Government stronger institutions than before they attacked.

QUESTION: General Walt, with the speed-up of troops being sent to 10,000, the additional 10,000, do you feel there is enough men to handle the job in I Corps?

GENERAL WALT: I have been away from there too long to evaluate the situation. I want to say this, though, about I Corps and particularly Danang; I don't think it has been brought out very clearly. Danang is a city of nearly some 300,000 people. A lot of refugees are around there, too. That city has been secure from the first day that this started.

I think this is a great thing for the people who are responsible for the security of Danang in the job they have been doing there. The Viet Cong guerrilla and the main force were not able to get into that city and raise havoc.

I think this is a plus that we ought to talk about sometime.

MR. CHRISTIAN: Is there anything else?

QUESTION: Is the President still with General Eisenhower?

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President still is with General Eisenhower.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(2:57 P.M. PST)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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19 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Proposed Call-up

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 6-18-79 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 7-22-80

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
I Immediate:	32,000	2,300	12,000	-	46,300
II Subsequent:	58,000	11,700	39,000	28,300	137,000
III TOTAL:	90,000	14,000	51,000	28,300	183,300

Initial call-up would involve:

Army: 2 infantry brigades

Navy: 2 naval mobile construction battalions
600 individual medical, dental, chaplain
reservists

Marine: 1 Marine regiment and support forces

Subsequent call-up would involve:

Army: 1 infantry division
1 infantry brigade force

Navy: 3 naval mobile construction battalions
demobbing of 2 cruisers and 15 destroyers
and
6,000 personnel
2,800 logistics personnel
400 medical, dental, chaplain reservists

MARINES: Balance of 4th MARINE Expeditionary
Force

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Air Force: 8 tactical fighter squadrons
5 tactical reconnaissance squadrons
1 tactical air control group
5 air rescue squadrons
2 military airlift groups
1 Prime Beef
1 security squadron
1 tactical airlift wing

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ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1968
9:15 PM

Mr. President,

Herewith, talking points and agreed press statement (tab C) for U Thant session 11:00 AM tomorrow Wednesday.

We learned from intelligence sources he will make a statement of his own Friday. You may-- or may not--wish to probe him or attempt to influence him in your session tomorrow.

We know he would like some part of his time with you alone.


W. W. Rostow

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 20, 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Talk with UN Secretary-General
U Thant, February 21

Your meeting with U Thant will: (a) afford him the opportunity to give you a first-hand account of his recent meetings with the North Vietnamese, Soviets, UK and De Gaulle; (b) afford you the opportunity to impress U Thant with the numerous steps you have taken to get negotiations started, particularly the step forward embodied in the San Antonio formula. (TAB A contains a useful summary of the San Antonio formula. TAB B is the paper given to you by Governor Harriman which summarizes United States peace efforts and which you may wish to draw upon.)

We understand the Secretary-General will not make any new, formal proposal to you, and we presume he will convey substantially the information given Arthur Goldberg last week about Hanoi's responses to his questions as relayed through Mai Van Bo in Paris. According to U Thant the North Vietnamese made the following responses:

1. Mai Van Bo indicated that the San Antonio formula could not be accepted because it posed conditions to the cessation of bombing.

2. In answer to U Thant's question whether talks could take place in less than three or four weeks if the U.S. stopped bombing, Hanoi said they "will hold talks with the U.S. at the appropriate time; that is as soon as the unconditional cessation of

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV becomes effective." U Thant understands that the French have been informed by Hanoi that only two weeks would be required to verify that Hanoi's conditions that the cessation be "effective". (We have not had verification of this from the French.)

3. As to whether there could be a reconvening of the Geneva Conference following discussions between the U.S. and Hanoi, Hanoi stated that convening of the Geneva Conference could be discussed between the U.S. and Hanoi.

4. Hanoi also indicated that the U.S. would be free to raise any item in talks with the DRV, including the question of reduction of hostilities in South Vietnam. The Secretary-General points out that in the past Hanoi has said this latter question would have to be discussed with the NLF;

5. As to who should represent South Vietnam at Geneva, Hanoi responded that the question of participation could also be discussed between the United States and Hanoi.

In your responses we suggest you may wish to make the following points:

1. There can be no question of our deep interest in achieving prompt and productive negotiations;

2. The key problem is that the other side must not take advantage of a bombing cessation;

3. The San Antonio formula and the Clifford statement constitute the most flexible possible position consistent with minimum security for United States and allied forces;

MR. PRESIDENT:
Here I would
Refer to
AIR BORNE AND
MARINES You
SAW OVER THE
week-end.

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- 3 -

4. Following the Trinh statement of December 29, 1967, we promptly explored Hanoi's position through intermediaries;

5. Hanoi has responded with a clear rejection, which it communicated privately through the intermediaries, publicly through editorial comments and militarily through heavy attacks on South Vietnam's cities;

6. Despite Hanoi's response, all our proposals made for peace in Southeast Asia remain valid;

7. We are prepared to continue our cooperation with the Secretary-General's efforts toward a peaceful settlement.

Although we understand U Thant will make a statement of his own views later this week, we have obtained his agreement to a low-key statement (attached) to be issued by George Christian after your meeting with the Secretary General.

WLS
for
Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

- TAB A - San Antonio Formula
- TAB B - "Our Efforts to seek a peaceful
Settlement of the Vietnam Conflict"
- TAB C - Press Statement
- TAB D - Schedule

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retrospect, it seems evident that they never intended to do so short of further United States concessions to be made in Warsaw well beyond what the United States originally understood to be the terms of a meeting. The Warsaw talks broke down despite a United States proposal that there would be "no bombing within 10 miles of Hanoi City Center . . . for an indefinite period if talks can be gotten underway shortly." The United States also suggested that talks could occur in Warsaw or in any third country, secretly or openly.

In the course of January and February 1967, United States representatives had a number of contacts with North Vietnam officials in Moscow. During these sessions the United States made several substantive proposals including suggestions of a broad agenda, indications of our willingness to consider measures of de-escalation (over and above the 10-mile bombing limit on Hanoi which was still in effect), and agreement to a prior cessation of bombing upon private assurances that the North Vietnamese would subsequently de-escalate its military actions. This series of meetings was climaxed by a personal letter from President Johnson to President Ho, offering to stop bombing and United States troop reinforcements upon assurances that North Vietnamese infiltration was stopped. Ho Chi Minh rejected the President's proposals on February 15 (on March 21, Hanoi made public the texts of both messages).

In early February 1967 (just prior to, during, and shortly after Tet), Mr. Kosygin was in London for high-level talks. We were in close touch with Mr. Wilson and took three separate occasions to ask Mr. Wilson to pass on to Kosygin our deep concern that the North Vietnamese not take advantage of the bombing pause to send men and materiel South. We pointed out to Mr. Wilson, who in turn informed Mr. Kosygin, that prospects for any extension of the bombing pause and the likelihood of talks leading to a settlement hung on our conviction that Hanoi was not taking advantage of our restraint. But Hanoi sent 3 divisions and vast supplies just north of the DMZ. This posed a grave threat to our forces. Nevertheless we extended the Tet pause for the better part of 2 days to permit Mr. Kosygin to communicate to Hanoi a last-minute message from Mr. Wilson.

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~~SECRET~~SAN ANTONIO FORMULA

The U.S. position on the cessation of the bombardment of North Viet-Nam was set forth in President Johnson's September 29, 1967 speech in San Antonio. As the President said:

"The U.S. is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."

The U. S. is not assuming that North Vietnam will cease its support to its forces in the South. On the contrary, as Secretary of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we assume that until a cease-fire is agreed on, Hanoi "will continue to transport the normal amount of goods, men and munitions."

In setting forth its assumption, the U.S. is not setting a condition, but attempting to make clear to North Vietnam that any cessation of U. S. bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking advantage of the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part as to make continued U. S. forbearance impossible. If Hanoi, by taking advantage, forces the U. S. to resume bombing the possibilities of a negotiated solution would drastically recede. Under such circumstances calls for intensified U. S. military action would increase and the possibility of another halt in the bombing would be low. The U. S. is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi appreciates this vital fact and fully understands the importance the U. S. attaches to the no-advantage assumption.

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At San Antonio the President, in addition to setting forth his assumption, stated his readiness to stop the bombing when such action would lead "promptly to productive discussions." "Productive discussions" are serious exchanges in which either side will be able to put forward for full consideration in good faith its position on any matter. "Prompt" of course refers to a willingness by Hanoi to begin discussions with the U. S. immediately after cessation of bombing.

It is worth noting that Hanoi is unwilling to give a clear response to questions as to the length of time between a U. S. bombing cessation and the beginning of talks. If Hanoi were serious in desiring talks then surely its response would have been one of unequivocal readiness to begin immediately.

The U. S. evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into account Hanoi's actions as well as its words. The unprecedented offensive against most of South Viet-Nam's urban centers, which Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the traditional Tet holidays, causing widespread civilian casualties and suffering, was made notwithstanding the fact that we were still exploring with Hanoi its position through diplomatic channels, and that we had exercised restraint in bombing targets in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. In this context, we cannot but weigh Hanoi's words with great skepticism and caution. These actions carry a harsh political message:

The U. S. favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's position. We shall continue to evaluate all information and to pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us closer to the resolution of this conflict through serious negotiations.

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~~SECRET~~OUR EFFORTS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

There follows a brief recapitulation of our efforts, over the past few years, to seek a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam. This review merely gives the highlights of our own many direct and indirect initiatives and the responses we have made to the initiatives of others. Each incident or event alluded to below can be documented in detail.

The efforts of the United States to bring about negotiations started even before the introduction of American combat troops into Vietnam. In early April 1965, the President in a speech at Johns Hopkins stated that the U. S. remains "ready for unconditional discussions". At about the same time we told a group of Seventeen Unaligned Nations that we approved of its efforts and would welcome "negotiations without preconditions". For almost three years, this has been the keynote of all American initiatives and of its responses to the initiatives of others. This remains our position at the present time.

The United States position on the cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam was set forth in San Antonio by President Johnson on September 29, 1967: "The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation".

The United States is not assuming that North Vietnam will cease its support to its forces in the South. Rather, we assume that until a cease-fire is agreed on, Hanoi (as stated by Mr. Clark Clifford) "will continue to transport the normal amount of goods, men and munitions". The United States is not setting a condition here, but attempting to make clear that any cessation of United States bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking advantage of the cessation (such as

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an increase by Hanoi of its infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part as to make continued United States forbearance impossible.

At San Antonio the President also stated his readiness to stop the bombing when such action would lead "promptly to productive discussions." "Productive discussions" are serious exchanges in which either side will be able to put forward for full consideration in good faith its position on any matter. "Prompt", of course, refers to a willingness by Hanoi to begin discussions with the United States immediately after cessation of bombing.

This position has been conveyed to Hanoi through a private, confidential channel --- a channel which Hanoi has every reason to believe is reliable and sympathetic. This will be described in further detail below.

Over the past several years we have made repeated efforts to refer the Vietnam issue to the United Nations Security Council and have responded to the Secretary General's initiatives. In August 1964, we requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the North Vietnamese torpedo boat attack on United States ships in international waters. Ambassador Goldberg made several efforts throughout the summer and fall of 1965 to engage the United Nations in a search for peace in Vietnam and on January 31, 1966 and again on August 8, 1967 ~~we~~ reiterated our desire for an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in Vietnam. None of these efforts has been successful -- because of the obstruction of the Communist delegations and the refusal of North Vietnam to recognize the competence of the United Nations.

The Secretary General, recognizing the difficulties of working directly through the United Nations, has taken many steps on his own initiative to bring about negotiations or at

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least preliminary talks. Three such efforts warrant special mention.

In late 1964 and early 1965 U Thant had several conversations with Ambassador Stevenson to the effect that the North Vietnamese were prepared to meet with United States representatives secretly in Rangoon. The terms of such a meeting were never reported to Washington with any precision. U Thant's reports were assessed in the light of available intelligence information and the offers then being made by various hopeful intermediaries. We doubted that U Thant's approach contained substantive value and recognized that, to the extent Ho Chi Minh was involved, it could have been designed to embarrass us with Saigon. We did not reject the Secretary General's offer: we simply indicated that we were not ready to proceed at that time. Nevertheless, U Thant later claimed that we rejected this opportunity for direct negotiations with Hanoi.

On August 31, 1966 U Thant made a three-point proposal to halt bombing, scale down the fighting and enter into discussions and on March 15, 1967 he proposed a general ceasefire, preliminary talks and reconvening the Geneva Conference. The United States and the GVN welcomed both proposals and agreed to discuss them seriously and promptly. Hanoi rejected both.

The United States on its own, or in response to initiatives by allied, unaligned and Communist countries, has made many attempts to engage Hanoi in meaningful discussions. Some of these efforts, while public knowledge now, were kept highly secret at the express request of the North Vietnamese. One of the events in this category was the one that culminated in Warsaw in late December 1966, but which had its beginning in Saigon in late June. The United States was led to believe that the North Vietnamese would be in Warsaw to meet the American representatives, but they did not appear. In

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retrospect, it seems evident that they never intended to do so short of further United States concessions to be made in Warsaw well beyond what the United States originally understood to be the terms of a meeting. The Warsaw talks broke down despite a United States proposal that there would be "no bombing within 10 miles of Hanoi City Center . . . for an indefinite period if talks can be gotten underway shortly." The United States also suggested that talks could occur in Warsaw or in any third country, secretly or openly.

In the course of January and February 1967, United States representatives had a number of contacts with North Vietnam officials in Moscow. During these sessions the United States made several substantive proposals including suggestions of a broad agenda, indications of our willingness to consider measures of de-escalation (over and above the 10-mile bombing limit on Hanoi which was still in effect), and agreement to a prior cessation of bombing upon private assurances that the North Vietnamese would subsequently de-escalate its military actions. This series of meetings was climaxed by a personal letter from President Johnson to President Ho, offering to stop bombing and United States troop reinforcements upon assurances that North Vietnamese infiltration was stopped. Ho Chi Minh rejected the President's proposals on February 15 (on March 21, Hanoi made public the texts of both messages).

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US foreign
relations*

In early February 1967 (just prior to, during, and shortly after Tet), Mr. Kosygin was in London for high-level talks.

We were in close touch with [] and took three separate occasions to ask [] to pass on to Kosygin our deep concern that the North Vietnamese not take advantage of the bombing pause to send men and materiel South. We pointed out to [] who in turn informed Mr. Kosygin, that prospects for any extension of the bombing pause and the likelihood of talks leading to a settlement hung on our conviction that Hanoi was not taking advantage of our restraint. But Hanoi sent 3 divisions and vast supplies just north of the DMZ. This posed a grave threat to our forces. Nevertheless we extended the Tet pause for the better part of 2 days to permit Mr. Kosygin to communicate to Hanoi a last-minute message from [] []

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In April of 1967, we agreed to a Canadian proposal to restore the integrity of the Demilitarized Zone. More than this: we proposed that the Demilitarized Zone be expanded by ten miles North and South of the present lines, providing the ICC would be able to supervise the Zone. We indicated that this could be regarded as a first step in phased de-escalation. Hanoi rejected both the Canadian proposal and our own.

In late August of 1967, the United States sent a special emissary to Paris to serve as a direct channel to two private French citizens who had established direct contact with the North Vietnamese regime. These Frenchmen went to Hanoi, having first been carefully informed of the U.S. position. On the basis of their report we then delivered a message through our emissary that the United States would agree to stop all military actions against North Vietnam if Hanoi would agree to engage in prompt talks regarding a political settlement of the war. The message was, in fact, consistent with Foreign Minister Trinh's statement that "talks could start" if the bombing stopped. Hanoi rejected the U.S. offer as containing "conditions" and this dialogue ended on October 20.

In late 1967, as a result of discussions with the President, the leaders of a foreign state decided that the U.S. was sincerely interested in a negotiated solution and that their Government would approach Hanoi to explain the U.S. position and to attempt to arrange talks between the U.S. and the North Vietnamese.

A high-ranking official of that foreign state, with our encouragement, went to Hanoi in December and came to Washington in early January. His report made to the Secretary of State and Governor Harriman included the essence of the December 29 Trinh statement, which was released subsequent to his departure from Hanoi. He was given a written message to take back to Hanoi explaining in detail the U.S. position based on the San Antonio formula and asking for clarification of Hanoi's position. He was also informed that the U.S. would exercise certain restraints in bombing targets in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. He agreed to return to Hanoi as he regarded the U.S. response as a step towards peace.

However,

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
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However, on February 12, after his return to his own capital, he reported by telegram that Hanoi rejected the San Antonio formula contending that it contained conditions, a principle that was unacceptable. Before his message was received and notwithstanding the fact that Hanoi knew we were still exploring its position and still exercising certain bombing restraints, Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the Tet holidays an unprecedented offensive against most of South Vietnam's urban centers which caused widespread civilian damage and suffering. Our Ambassador at the foreign capital has been instructed to obtain fuller details of the official's impressions, but there is no doubt that Hanoi has rejected the U.S. position based on the San Antonio formula.

In addition to the events described above there have been indirect contacts, with our encouragement, with North Vietnamese representatives through the Italians, French, Swedes, Norwegians, Romanians, Indonesians, Burmese, Swiss, Japanese, Indians, Canadians, Egyptians, Russians and others. We have given encouragement to the efforts of the International Red Cross, the Quakers, journalists (Communist and non-Communist), businessmen, pacifists, clergymen, and parliamentarians. Since May of 1965 we have instituted a number of bombing pauses (one in January-February 1966 lasting 37 days).

We are still continuing every effort to find a path towards a peaceful settlement.



February 20, 1968

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR STRATEGIC MOBILITY

SASM 114-68
20 February 1968

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By 118, NARS, Date 3-29-78

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Deployment Status of the 3rd BDE TF,
82d ABN DIV and Marine RLT 27 (S)

1. (S) The deployment status of units, as of 1700 (EST),
20 February 1968, is as follows:

a. 3rd Brigade Task Force, 82d Airborne Division
moving by air from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, to
CHU LAI with planned closure date of 24 2235 (EST)
February 1968:

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DEPARTED</u>	<u>TO GO</u>	<u>OUTLOADED</u>
TROOPS	3800	2555	1245	67.2%
CARGO (S/T)	2600	1446.4	1153.6	55.6%
MISSIONS	159	106	53	66.7%

b. Marine Regimental Landing Team 27(-) moving by
air from El Toro Marine Corps Air Station, California,
to DA NANG with planned closure date of 23 0750 (EST)
February 1968:

TROOPS	3470	3423	47	98.6%
CARGO (S/T)	1882	818.2	1063.8	43.5%
MISSIONS	116	76	34	69.1%

~~SECRET~~

GROUP - 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

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c. Battalion Landing Team 1/27 is moving by sea from Hawaii to DA NANG. Based upon the latest plot furnished by CINCPACFLT, the predicted closure date for BLT 1/27 is estimated to be 282400Z Feb 68.

Strength: 1995
Cargo (S/T): 1495

SHIPS		ETA	DA NANG
VANCOUVER	LPD 2	23	February 1968
BEXAR	APA 23	26 2400Z	February 1968 (26 1900 (EST) February)
WASHBURN	AKA 108	28 2400Z	February 1968 (28 1900 (EST) February)

2. (S) Actual air movements are eight missions ahead of planned flow schedules for the 3rd BDE TF, and Marine RLT 27(-). Aerial port buildup continues to be manageable and within normal levels experienced prior to the beginning of these deployments. Fog at El Toro has delayed operation of some missions today. By the end of today, airlift operations at El Toro should complete passenger movements; the remaining missions will be airlifting USMC cargo.


JAMES C. SHERRILL
Major General, USAF
Special Assistant for
Strategic Mobility

cc: SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
WHITE HOUSE
STATE OPS
J-30

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20

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

23

(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

21. February 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Communist Forces Used in the Tet
Offensive

The following comments are in response to questions passed to us on behalf of Mr. Walt W. Rostow. These comments are based on the fragmentary evidence now available in Washington and hence must be regarded as tentative rather than definitive.

Question 1: "What is our estimate of the number of Communist forces used in the 'first wave' of Tet attacks?"

Answer: Communist regular forces used during the first 14 days probably totaled well over 60,000. Units actually identified as attacking urban areas and military installations have a total strength, according to MACV's Order of Battle figures, of about 58,000. A number of other main and local force units, and at least some guerrilla units, are believed to have participated but have not been

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Authority NLS/CBS 1

By id, NARS, Date 5-7-84 ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

identified. The unidentified regular forces, added to the 58,000 in identified units, almost certainly brings the regular force total to well over 60,000. In the rural areas, small local force units and guerrillas also appear to have been active during the Tet offensive, but there is insufficient evidence available to judge the extent of their activity and possible losses.

Question 2: "What is our estimate of the composition of the attacking forces?"

Answer: Of the 58,000 regular forces identified, 21,500 (or about 37 percent) were in North Vietnamese units, 16,800 (or 29 percent) were in VC main force units, and 19,300 (or 34 percent) in VC local force units. These percentages may or may not be applicable for the unidentified participating units. In addition, local guerrillas apparently took part in relatively small numbers in the urban areas. In the rural areas, active Communist forces presumably comprised local force companies and platoons and local guerrillas.

-2-

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

Question 3: "What proportion of North Vietnamese fillers were involved in the Tet attacks?"

Answer: North Vietnamese fillers have been provided to VC units during the last year, but these units do not appear to have placed unusual reliance on NVA fillers for the Tet offensive. There is evidence that some newly infiltrated northerners were among the VC units attacking Saigon, but in general replacements to flesh out units for the Tet attacks appear to have come mainly from VC guerrilla forces and new recruits.

Question 4: "What is our present estimate of the composition by force of the prisoners captured so far?"

Answer: Most prisoners taken in the Tet attacks are in the custody of the ARVN, which does not provide a statistical breakdown by force components. We understand that DIA is taking steps to secure this information and hopes to have it in about two weeks. Meanwhile, we expect that the prisoner breakdown will roughly reflect the force breakdown, that is, over one-third North Vietnamese, about one-third VC local force, and under one-third

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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VC main force. Prisoners, it should be noted, have been an important source of information for unit and force identification, and there should be some correlation between the two.

Question 5: "To what extent and where did the urban infrastructure surface and where was it damaged?"

Answer: There was no widespread surfacing of the urban infrastructure because the Communists did not establish anything approaching secure control over any urban area. In two or three towns, police captured a number of allegedly high or medium level members of the VC covert town or provincial apparatus and in some places fragmentary elements of the Communist political organization have appeared. "People's courts," for example, have been reported active in the Cholon district of Saigon and in Hue. Members of the National Front, not necessarily Communists, have also been reported active in Hue.

In addition, individual party officials have been killed or captured in several provincial centers, notably in Nha Trang and Pleiku, as well

-4-

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

as in Da Nang, Kontum, and Go Cong. Screening of the large numbers of suspects arrested may also yield a few key figures. No urban infrastructure, however, is definitely known to have been seriously damaged. There is no confirmation of reports that Front officials Phung Van Cung or COSVN General Tran Do were killed in Saigon. There is also no confirmation that Front official Tran Van Tra was killed in Vinh Long.

Question 6: "What forces do the Communists still have available that have not been committed to the attack?"

Answer: The Communists probably have available over half of their main and local forces not yet committed. The 58,000 identified regular forces are about half the 115,000 carried in MACV's Order of Battle of 31 December 1967. We believe, however, that units not carried in the OB, some of which were identified for the first time as a result of their participation in the Tet attacks, actually raise the total regular force figure substantially above 115,000. Thus, the total regular forces directly involved would comprise less than half

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the actual OB, and over half would have remained "uncommitted."

It should be noted, however, that some main force units which were not directly committed acted as blocking forces in support of the attacking units and could be used in new attacks only at the cost of such support. Furthermore, substantial forces are concentrated in the DMZ area, particularly around Khe Sanh, and are unlikely to be employed in any renewal of widespread ground attacks against urban centers. Those probably should not be included in forces considered available for this purpose. On the other hand, many units identified in the "first wave" are still combat effective and should be included--witness the reappearance of the 840th VC Main Force Battalion at Phan Thiet.

In sum, about half the 115,000-plus regular force OB and the bulk of the 71,000-man guerrilla force are probably available for further country-wide attacks.

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

24

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 2-9-79

By ij, NARS, Date 6-11-79

~~SECRET~~

2A

Received Washington CommCen
8:27 A.M. EST Thursday 22 Feb

Received LBJ Panch CommCen
8:35 A.M. CST Thursday 22 Feb

VZCZCEEA134
OO WTE10
DE WTE 745

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (MCCAFFERTY)
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80475

~~SECRET~~

THE KHE SANH DUMP AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINT (ASP)
STATUS AS OF THIS MORNING IS AS FOLLOWS:

DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND	PREVIOUS STATUS 8:00 PM 20 FEB EST (9:00 AM 21 FEB SVN)
------------------------	---

CLASS I (RATIONS)		
MEAL, COMBAT		
INDIVIDUAL	3	1.5 DAYS
B RATIONS	9	9 DAYS
CLASS III (FUEL)		
AVIATION GAS (AVGAS)	9	9 DAYS
JP-4 FUEL (JET FUEL)	4	4 DAYS
MOTOR GASOLINE (MOGAS)	7.7	1.7 DAYS
DIESEL	3	4 DAYS

CLASS V (AMMUNITION)

A. HIGH EXPLOSIVE:



60-MM MORTAR	24	26 DAYS
81-MM MORTAR	15	15 DAYS
90-MM (TANK)	93	92 DAYS
4.2" MORTAR	23	24 DAYS
105-MM HOWITZER	19	21 DAYS
155-MM HOWITZER	15	16 DAYS

B. ANTI-TANK:

ROUNDS ON HAND

90-MM HEAT	385
66-MM ROCKET (LAW)	1,385
ANTI-TANK MINES (M-15)	48
ANTI-TANK MINES (M-19)	334
ANTI-TANK MINES (M-21)	100
106-MM HEAT	144
106-MM RECOILESS RIFLE (HEP-T)	965
3.5" ROCKET	690

DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND	PREVIOUS STATUS 8:00 PM 20 FEB EST (9:00 AM 21 FEB SVN)
------------------------	---

CLASS V

(COFRAM)

105-MM HOWITZER	5	5 DAYS
155-MM HOWITZER	5	5 DAYS
40-MM GRENADE LAUNCHER	5	5 DAYS
HAND GRENADES	10	10 DAYS

2. ON 21 FEBRUARY KHE SANH WAS RESUPPLIED WITH 172 TONS
AS FOLLOWS:

CLASS I	73 TONS
CLASS II	2 TONS
CLASS III	21 TONS
CLASS IV	18 TONS
CLASS V	58 TONS

DTG: 221327Z FEB 1968

~~SECRET~~

25

SENT 1:00 P.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 23, 1968


2C

Send LDX to Secretary McNamara, EYES ONLY, from Walt Rostow

For dispatch via Back Channel, as per our telephone conversation.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 9-19-78 letter
By CB, NARS, Date 3-28-79



DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 9-19-78 letter
By ig, NARS, Date 3-28-79

25a

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 23, 1968

TO: General Wheeler and General Westmoreland from Walt Rostow

Roughly speaking, our appreciation of the situation, as seen from here, runs about as follows:

- The enemy is preparing to strike in the Western Highlands (Pleiku, Kontum, Dak To).
- He is apparently bringing major units in towards Saigon.
- He is, of course, positioned to attack at both Khe Sanh and Quang Tri.
- He has forces around Hue and Danang; degree of readiness less certain, although major contact northwest of Hue is reported.
- In the Delta, especially, but elsewhere as well, he is moving rapidly to exploit the relative vacuum in the countryside to recruit in an effort to make up recent losses, to expand rural control, and exert pressure on towns.
- The effort to close off Route 4 to deny food supplies to Saigon continues, as well as the effort to keep Route 1 closed between Danang and Hue to limit military supplies to I Corps.
- Diplomatically, the enemy is establishing a whole range of diplomatic contacts "to explain his victories" and to keep lines open for a later negotiating offensive.
- We now estimate that more than 60,000 were used in the first wave of attack at Tet made up roughly as follows: 37 percent VC local forces; 34 percent North Vietnamese units; 29 percent VC main forces; 34 percent CIA estimates that main force units (North Vietnamese and VC), estimated by MACV at 115,000 in December, were higher than that at Tet. "Over half" of main forces are available for follow-on major attacks.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

-- There is the suggestion in intelligence that additional North Vietnamese regulars are being brought south -- perhaps two additional divisions.

It may well be that the enemy is about to make a virtually total effort with the capital he has in hand. He may then try to lock us into a negotiation at his peak position before we can counterattack. In particular, he may try to dissipate Westy's reserves by simultaneous attacks at a number of places and take Khe Sanh, if possible.

In what way would your appreciation on the spot conform or differ from this thumb-nail sketch?

~~TOP SECRET~~

20

23 FEB 66 72 257

256

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	
PRECEDENCE			
ACTION IMMEDIATE			
INFO			

COMPARISONS

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DIST:
SecDef
White House
(Mr. Rostow)

OSD

C2175

FEB 68

ZFF-1

-- In the Delta, especially, but elsewhere as well, he is moving rapidly to exploit the relative vacuum in the countryside to recruit in an effort to make up recent losses, to expand rural control, and exert pressure on towns.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 9-19-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-28-79

DATE 23	TIME
MONTH Feb	YEAR 1968
PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES 2

D R A F T E R	TYPED NAME AND TITLE Walt Rostow Special Assistant to the President The White House	PHONE	R E L E A S E R	SIGNATURE
	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE Robert G. Gard, LC01, USA Mil Asst to SecDef			
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET EYES ONLY TOP SECRET REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS GP-1				

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION TOP SECRET	Robert G. Gard, LtCol, USA	Walt Rostow, Spec Asst to	
INFO	Mil Asst to SecDef	Pres., White House	

-- The effort to close off Route 4 to deny food supplies to Saigon continues, as well as the effort to keep Route 1 closed between Danang and Hue to limit military supplies to I Corps.

-- Diplomatically, the enemy is establishing a whole range of diplomatic contacts "to explain his victories" and to keep lines open for a later negotiating offensive.

-- We now estimate that more than 60,000 were used in the first wave of attack at Tet made up roughly as follows: 37 percent North Vietnamese units; 29 percent VC main forces; 34 percent VC local forces.

CIA estimates that main force units (North Vietnamese and VC), estimated by MACV at 115,000 in December, were higher than that at Tet. "Over half" of main forces are available for follow-on major attacks.

-- There is the suggestion in intelligence that additional North Vietnamese regulars are being brought south -- perhaps two additional divisions.

It may well be that the enemy is about to make a virtually total effort with the capital he has in hand. He may then try to lock us into a negotiation at his peak position before we can counterattack. In particular, he may try to dissipate Westy's reserves by simultaneous attacks at a number of places and take Khe Sanh, if possible.

In what way would your appreciation on the spot conform or differ from this thumb-nail sketch?

SSO NOTE: Deliver during waking hours.

CONTROL NO.	TCR/TOD	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	2		

REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS
GP-1

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
~~TOP SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

26

23 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

A rough line-up of opposing forces at key locations (does not include guerrillas) based on order of battle strengths:

	<u>Enemy</u>		<u>Friendly</u>	
Khe Sanh	5-7 regiments	15,400	6 battalions (5 US)	6,000
Camp Carroll-Rockpile	2 regiments	5,000	4 battalions (4 US)	4,000
Quang Tri	3-4 regiments	6,200-8,800	10 battalions (6 US)	8,000
Hue	1 regiment, 2 battalions	2,500	8 battalions (3 US)	6,500
DaNang	2-3 regiments, 3 battalions	5,600-8,000	16 battalions (10 US)	11,200
Subtotal		29,700-39,700		35,700
Dakto	-			
Kontum	- 5 regiments, 10 battalions	15,000-17,000	9 battalions (9 US)	7,200
Pleiku	-			
Saigon	-- elements of 3 divisions, 1 regiment	8,000-20,000	49 battalions (25 US)	36,800
IV Corps	-- 24 battalions	13,000-16,800	34 battalions (7 US)	24,500

2

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 6-18-79 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 7-22-80

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~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

27

23 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Last week the JCS recommended an immediate callup of about 46,300 Reserves and that 137,000 additional Reserves should be brought to a high state of readiness. In the latest staff review, these planning figures have been revised to 51,100 and 135,100, respectively. This would give the following situation:

<u>Recommended Reserve Callup</u>			
<u>Immediate</u>			
	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Individual</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Army	27,500	4,500	32,000
Navy	1,449	2,180	3,629 ^{1/}
Air Force	2,874	600	3,474 ^{2/}
Marine Corps	<u>10,500</u>	<u>1,500</u>	<u>12,000</u>
Subtotal	42,323	8,780	<u>51,103</u>

<u>Total Recommended for Immediate Callup</u>			
<u>and Increased Readiness</u>			
	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Individual</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Army	77,300	12,700	90,000
Navy	5,872	10,959	16,831 ^{3/}
Air Force	25,964	2,372	28,336
Marine Corps	<u>43,500</u>	<u>7,500</u>	<u>51,000</u>
Subtotal	152,636	33,531	<u>186,167</u>

^{1/} Includes 1,329 spaces above last week's recommendation.

^{2/} Includes 3,474 spaces above last week's recommendation.

^{3/} Includes 2,831 spaces above last week's recommendation.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 6-18-79 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 7-22-80

2
ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Received Washington CommCen
7:16 EST A.M. 23 Feb 1968

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
7:35 CST A.M. 23 Feb 1968

DECLASSIFIED

VZCZCEEA162
OO WIE10
DE WIE 777

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80504

Authority OSD 10-11-78, NSC 8-12-80
By inf, NARS, Date 9-2-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

JIM JONES TOLD ME LAST EVENING YOU WISHED A DAILY VIETNAM SUMMARY FROM ME. I CAME IN EARLY THIS MORNING TO SUMMARIZE YESTERDAY.

I SHALL DO SO UNDER THREE HEADINGS: FACT, OPINION, AND ACTION.

FACT:

- THE ENEMY IS PREPARING TO STRIKE IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS (PLEIKU, KONTUM, DAK TO);
- HE IS APPARENTLY BRINGING MAJOR UNITS IN TOWARDS SAIGON;
- HE IS, OF COURSE, POSITIONED TO ATTACK AT BOTH KHE SANH AND QUANG TRI;
- HE HAS FORCES AROUND HUE AND DANANG; DEGREE OF READINESS LESS CERTAIN, ALTHOUGH WESTY REPORTED A MAJOR CONTACT NORTHEAST OF HUE;
- IN THE DELTA ESPECIALLY, BUT ELSEWHERE AS WELL, HE IS MOVING RAPIDLY TO EXPLOIT THE RELATIVE VACUUM IN THE COUNTRYSIDE TO RECRUIT IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE UP RECENT LOSSES, TO EXPAND RURAL CONTROL, AND EXERT PRESSURE ON TOWNS.
- THE EFFORT TO CLOSE OFF ROUTE 4 TO DENY FOOD SUPPLIES TO SAIGON CONTINUES, AS WELL AS THE EFFORT TO KEEP ROUTE 1 CLOSED BETWEEN DANANG AND HUE, TO LIMIT MILITARY SUPPLIES TO I CORPS.
- DIPLOMATICALLY THE ENEMY IS ESTABLISHING A WHOLE RANGE OF DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS "TO EXPLAIN HIS VICTORIES" AND TO KEEP LINES OPEN FOR A LATER NEGOTIATING OFFENSIVE.
- WE NOW ESTIMATE THAT MORE THAN 60,000 WERE USED IN THE FIRST WAVE OF ATTACK AT TET MADE UP ROUGHLY AS FOLLOWS: 37 PERCENT NORTH VIETNAMESE UNITS; 29 PERCENT VC MAIN FORCES; 4 PERCENT VC LOCAL FORCES. CIA ESTIMATES THAT MAIN FORCE UNITS (NORTH VIETNAMESE AND V), ESTIMATED BY MACV AT 115,000 IN DECEMBER WERE HIGHER THAN THAT AT TET. "OVER HALF" OF MAIN FORCES ARE AVAILABLE FOR FOLLOW-ON MAJOR ATTACKS.

BB

- THERE IS THE SUGGESTION IN INTELLIGENCE THAT ADDITIONAL NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULARS ARE BEING BROUGHT SOUTH -- PERHAPS TWO ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS.

OPINION:

GENERAL TAYLOR AND I WENT OVER ALL THIS AT LENGTH YESTERDAY. HE BELIEVES THEY WILL MAKE A TOTAL EFFORT, WITH ALL THEIR CAPITAL SOON. THEY WILL THEN TRY TO LOCK US INTO A NEGOTIATION AT THEIR PEAK POSITION BEFORE WE CAN COUNTER-ATTACK. HE AGREES WITH NAPOLEON THAT PROVIDENCE IS ON THE SIDE WITH THE LAST RESERVES. THEREFORE, RIGHT NOW WE SHOULD BE MOVING OUT TO WESTY ALL THE READY FORCES WE HAVE AND CALLING UP RESERVES FOR:

- A VIETNAM COUNTER-ATTACK;
- KOREAN CONTINGENCY;
- GENERAL PURPOSES, FOR OUR WORLD POSTURE.

I AGREE. I BELIEVE WE FACE THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE WAR. THEY WILL TRY TO DISSIPATE WESTY'S RESERVES BY SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS AT A NUMBER OF PLACES AND TAKE KHE SANH IF POSSIBLE.

I AM UNCERTAIN ABOUT TIMING; BUT THEY ARE SO OBSESSED WITH MEMORIES OF 1954 I SUSPECT THEY WILL HIT SOON, GET A MAXIMUM POSITION, AND THEN FORCE A NEGOTIATION, PERHAPS VIA THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA BEFORE THE WEATHER OPENS UP FOR US IN I CORPS AND AT HANOI-HAIPHONG. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1954 OPENED ON APRIL 26. DIENBIENPHU FELL ON MAY 7/8.

I SUSPECT BUS WILL REPORT CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY IN SAIGON.

- WESTY REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT "FOR THE FIRST TIME GENERAL ABRAMS WAS PERMITTING HIMSELF TO BE SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGED."
- ELLSWORTH'S CABLE CONTAINED THIS KEY PASSAGE AFTER REVIEWING THIEU'S AND WESTY'S VIEWS:

"IF THESE VIEWS ARE CORRECT, AND THEY SEEM TO ME QUITE LOGICAL, THEN IT APPEARS THEY WILL INVOLVE A MAJOR EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE ENEMY. HOW LONG HE CAN SUSTAIN SUCH AN INTENSIVE EFFORT, GIVEN THE LOSSES WHICH HE HAS ALREADY TAKEN AND WHICH SUCH AN EFFORT WILL INEVITABLY INTAIL, IS PROBLEMATICAL, ESPECIALLY IF WE HAVE THE MEN AND MATERIAL TO MEET AND FRUSTATE HIM AT EVERY TURN. I THINK THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE WILL."

ACTION:

AFTER GOING OVER ALL THIS WITH GENERAL TAYLOR HE AGREED THAT
 31 JUL 68
 11 31 11

ACTION:

1. AFTER GOING OVER ALL THIS WITH GENERAL TAYLOR WE AGREED THAT ON SATURDAY HE WOULD HAVE IN THE CIA AND DIA ORDER OF BATTLE PERTS TO DETERMINE THE ENEMY FORCES NOW AVAILABLE FOR THE MAIN FORCE BATTLE AND, ESPECIALLY, TO SEE WHETHER HANOI IS NOW BRINGING IN - OR HAS BROUGHT IN - AN EXTRA TWO DIVISIONS. THIS WOULD BE A CRITICAL FACTOR IN MAKING OUR CASE TO THE CONGRESS, IF YOU SO DECIDE.

2. I TOOK THE OCCASION OF MY 10:30 AM MEETING WITH SECRETARY RUSK AND CLARK CLIFFORD TO REVIEW THE PICTURE AND UNDERLINE THE DIPLOMATIC PROBLEM WE MIGHT FACE IF THEY TRIED, HAVING EXPENDED THEIR CAPITAL, TO FORCE US TO NEGOTIATE BEFORE OUR POWER COULD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR. SECRETARY RUSK OBSERVED WE MIGHT WORK TO MODIFY THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA IN THE LIGHT OF LARGE NORTH VIETNAMESE MOVEMENTS AND LET THEM KNOW WE WOULDN'T NEGOTIATE UNTIL NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULARS ARE OUT OF I CORPS.

3. I SHALL BRING HARRY MCPHERSON UP-TO-DATE ON THE WHOLE PICTURE, AT HIS REQUEST, THIS MORNING, TO PREPARE HIM FOR DRAFTING, IF NECESSARY.

4. I SAW A NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERMEN IN THE PAST TWO DAYS: ROWLIE EVANS, HUGH SIDEY, JACK LEACOCOS, DICK WILSON, AND BOB KLEIMAN. I REVIEWED THE FIRST WAVE; EMPHASIZED, AS WE HAVE FROM THE BEGINNING, THAT WE EXPECTED I CORPS AND OTHER MAIN FORCE ATTACKS; USED ELLSWORTH'S CABLE OF YESTERDAY FOR BACKGROUND PROPOSES TO SUGGEST THE PRESENT BALANCE SHEET. EVANS WAS IN A HAND-WRINGING MOOD OF NEAR DISPAIR. HE, SIDEY, LEACOCOS, AND WILSON ALL ASKED ABOUT WHETHER WE'D SEND MORE TROOPS. I FLATLY SAID I WOULD MAKE NO COMMENT WHATSOEVER. KLEIMAN WANTED TO KNOW IF WE LOOKED ON THE NEW NATIONAL CONGRESS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT WITH THE NLF. I TOLD HIM THAT WAS NOT WHY THEY CAME TOGETHER; BUT IF THE COMMUNISTS EVER WANTED TO NEGOTIATE A ONE-MAN ONE-VOTE SETTLEMENT, ALONG THE LINES OF YOUR TV STATEMENT, JUST BEFORE CANBERRA, THERE WERE MANY WAYS. RIGHT NOW THEY APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO TAKE OVER SOUTH VIETNAM LOCK, STOCK, AND BARREL.

DTG 231216Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM THE SECRETARY, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: VIETNAM, SOUTH - MILITARY SITUATION
1. The following information was obtained from a review of the
2. The information is being provided for your information.
3. The information is being provided for your information.
4. The information is being provided for your information.
5. The information is being provided for your information.
6. The information is being provided for your information.
7. The information is being provided for your information.
8. The information is being provided for your information.
9. The information is being provided for your information.
10. The information is being provided for your information.

29

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 2-9-79

By JP, NARS, Date 6-11-79

2A

CC

PS

EEA178
00 WTE10
DE WTE 795

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Received Washington CommCen
3:11 P.M. CST FRIDAY 23 Feb 68

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80520

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
3:26 P.M. CST FRIDAY 23 Feb 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEBRUARY 23, 1968

RECENT REPORTS FROM KHE SANH INDICATE THAT 1300 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY, MORTARS AND ROCKETS WERE FIRED BY THE ENEMY DURING THE PERIOD 11 O'CLOCK LAST NIGHT TO 9:00 A.M. THIS MORNING. EIGHTEEN MARINES WERE KILLED AND 38 WERE WOUNDED AS A RESULT OF THIS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 232111Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

26
Received Washington CommCen
10:46 A.M. EST Saturday 23 Feb 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
11:17 A.M. CST Saturday 23 Feb 68

WYTDI
EEA200
OO WTE10
DE WTE 819

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80542

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-11-78, NSC 8-12-80

By if, NARS, Date 9-2-80

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

FEBRUARY 24, 1968

HEREWITH BUS AND WESTY RESPOND TO OUR QUERY OF YESTERDAY
WITH THEIR PICTURE OF THE SITUATION.

FROM HERE THE ENEMY SITUATION LOOKS LIKE THIS:

I CORPS - THE ENEMY ATTACKED KHE SANH YESTERDAY
WITH A HEAVY ATTACK BY FIRE AND CONTINUES TO ADJUST
HIS FIRE TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HIS ARTILLERY.
THE THREAT TO QUANG TRI HAS BEEN REDUCED SOMEWHAT AND NOW
CONSISTS OF THE 803RD REGIMENT ATTEMPTING TO INTERDICT
THE CUA VIET RIVER, NORTH OF QUANG TRI CITY, AND THE 812TH
REGIMENT ATTEMPTING TO CUT ROUTE 1 SOUTH OF QUANG TRI CITY.
THERE ARE AT LEAST EIGHT EQUIVALENT COMBAT EFFECTIVE
BATTALIONS THREATENING HOI AN AND DANANG. THE BATTLE AT
HUE INVOLVES ABOUT EIGHT COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS
AND THE FIGHTING IS HEAVY AS THE ENEMY ATTEMPTS TO HANG ON
IN THE CITY. THERE IS EXTENSIVE SUPPLY ACTIVITY IN A-SHAU
VALLEY, AND THE ENEMY IS BUILDING A ROAD FROM THE VALLEY
TO JOIN HIGHWAY 547 WHICH RUNS TO HUE. WE HAVE NO INFOR
MATION ON WHAT TROOP UNITS ARE LOCATED IN A-SHAU.

II CORPS - THE ENEMY IS TACTICALLY DEPLOYED TO
CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DAK TO AREA. HE
IS CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING GROUND ATTACKS WITH SEEN
BATTALIONS OF THE 1ST NVA DIVISION SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS
OF THE 40TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT. AVAILABLE EVIDENCE
INDICATES THAT THESE ATTACKS CAN BE INITIATED AT ANY TIME.
IN KONTUM CITY, THE RELOCATION OF MAJOR UNITS COUPLED WITH
EVIDENCE OF DETAILED PLANNING INDICATES AN OFFENSIVE ACTION
AGAINST THAT CITY WITH AS MUCH AS THREE INFANTRY AND TWO
SAPPER BATTALIONS AT ANY TIME. IN PLEIKU CITY, THE ENEMY
DOES NOT POSE AN IMMEDIATE MAJOR THREAT AT THIS TIME. HE
IS HOWEVER, CAPABLE OF ATTACKS BY FIRE AND HARASSMENT TYPE
ACTIVITY.

III CORPS - THE THREE REGIMENTS OF THE 9TH VC DIVISION
REMAIN IN NORTHERN AND WESTERN GIA DINH PROVINCE. ELEMENTS
OF THE 101ST NVA DIVISION HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED NORTH OF
SAIGON, AND A PW FROM THE 141ST NVA REGIMENT, CAPTURED IN
SOUTHERN BINH DUONG STATED HIS BATTALION WAS FOLLOWING TWO
OTHERS TO GIA DINH. AIRBORNE DIRECTION FINDING LOCATED A
TERMINAL SERVING THE 2ND BATTALION, 274TH VC REGIMENT ON
23 FEBRUARY IN EASTERN GIA DINH. THUS, ELEMENTS OF THREE
DIVISIONS THREATEN SAIGON, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN
HIT HARD IN THE PAST WEEKS.

IV CORPS - THE ENEMY IS CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO

DD

CAPITALIZE ON THE FACT THAT ARVN FORCES IN THE DELTA HAVE BEEN FORCED TO CONCENTRATE UPON THE DEFENSE OF URBAN CENTERS THROUGHOUT THE AREA. WHILE KEEPING HIS MANEUVER UNITS WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF THE MAJOR CITIES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION, HIS EFFORTS IN THE RURAL AREAS HAVE CENTERED AROUND RECRUITMENT AND ANTI-GVN/US PROPAGANDA. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS MOVING RAPIDLY TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE THROUGHOUT THE CORPS. DURING RECENT WEEKS THE ENEMY HAS BEEN ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY INTERDICT HIGHWAY 4 THROUGHOUT THE DELTA. ROAD BLOCKS, CRATERING, AND HARASSING ATTACKS HAVE BEEN USED TO BRING TRAFFIC ON THIS MAJOR THOROUGHFARE TO A NEAR STANDSTILL. WE DOUBT THE ENEMY BELIEVES THAT THIS WILL CUT OFF FOOD SUPPLY TO SAIGON.

STRENGTH - ABOUT 60,000 ENEMY COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS WERE COMMITTED IN THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE. UP TO 25 PERCENT MORE WERE COMMITTED FROM THE GUERRILLAS, ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. OF THE TOTAL, ABOUT 30 PERCENT WERE NVA TROOPS. IN THE THREE WEEKS SINCE THAT TIME THE ENEMY HAS COMMITTED ADDITIONAL FORCES (FIVE TO SEVEN BATTALIONS IN I CORPS, FOUR BATTALIONS IN II CORPS, FIVE TO NINE BATTALIONS IN III CORPS, AND NONE IN IV CORPS). MAIN FORCE STRENGTH AT THE BEGINNING OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS ABOUT 133,000 DUE TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE 304TH AND 320TH DIVISIONS. ABOUT HALF OF ENEMY'S MAIN FORCE STRENGTH PROBABLY REMAINS UNCOMMITTED, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INTACT ELEMENTS BEING THOSE AT KHE SANH, THE DMZ, THE HIGHLANDS, AND FOUR NVA REGIMENTS (2ND DIVISION AND 31ST REGIMENT) IN THE DANANG-HOI AN AREA.

REINFORCEMENT 7 ALTHOUGH A FEW PW'S HAVE STATED THAT THE 308TH AND 30TH DIVISIONS ARE IN THE DMZ, THERE IS NO CREDIBLE INTELLIGENCE HELD BY MACV INDICATING THAT ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS ARE IN OR NEAR SOUTH VIETNAM OR ENROUTE THERETO. THE NVA DIVISIONS LOCATED IN NVN HAVE NOT EXHIBITED ANY UNUSUAL COMMUNICATIONS PATTERNS WHICH WOULD INDICATE SOUTHWARD DEPLOYMENT, ALTHOUGH THE 08TH DIVISION IS NOT CURRENTLY ISOLATED IN SIGINT.

SUMMARY - WE AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE ENEMY CAN CONDUCT SIMULTANEOUS LARGE SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST KHE SANH, HUE, DANANG, DAK TO, AND SAIGON. HE WILL NO DOUBT ATTACK OTHER TOWNS AND CITIES AT THE SAME TIME. WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR THE LOCATION AND STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY THREAT COMUSMACV HAS DEPLOYED HIS FORCES TO BE IN THE BEST POSTURE TO COUNTER THESE SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

WHILE WE ARE PREPARED TO DEFEND AGAINST MULTIPLE ATTACKS, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE ENEMY MAY DELAY FOR WEEKS, EVEN MONTHS BEFORE INITIATING HIS NEXT OFFENSIVE. IN THE INTERIM HE WILL ATTEMPT TO INVEST THE CITIES AND TOWNS, ATTRITING THE AIR FORCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND WEAKENING THE WILL OF THE CIVILIANS AND THEIR LOYALTY TO THE GVN. TO CAPITALIZE ON ANY SUCH DELAY, TOGETHER WITH RVNAF WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO DESTROY THE ENEMY OR TO PUSH HIM AWAY FROM THE TOWNS, WHILE MOVING TO REOPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND REASSERT FRIENDLY PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

DTG: 241546Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2C
Received Washington CommCen
9:19 A.M. EST Saturday 24 Feb 68

VZCZCEEA197
OO WTE10
DE WTE 814

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
9:15 A.M. CST Saturday 24 Feb 68

EE

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80538

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-11-78; NSC 8-12-80

By inf, NARS, Date 9-2-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

31
FEBRUARY 24, 1968

HEREWITH A SECOND VIETNAMESE ROUND-UP OF FACTS AND ACTION.

FACTS.

- WE ARE IN ANOTHER PHASE WHEN INTELLIGENCE IS POINTING TO VARIOUS DATES FOR A RESUMED MAJOR OFFENSIVE. A ROUND UP OF SUCH DATES TENDS TO FOCUS AROUND FEBRUARY 25; BUT THEY RUN ANYWHERE UP TO MARCH 1 -- OR EVEN MARCH 10.
- THE PACIFICATION SITUATION REMAINS OBSCURE. CIA REPORTS SUGGEST MAJOR DISRUPTION OF PACIFICATION IN MOST PROVINCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, WESTY REPORTS THAT ONLY 18 OF THE 54 ARVN BATTALIONS ASSIGNED TO PACIFICATION WERE WITHDRAWN FOR DEFENSE OF THE CITIES AND THAT LOSSES IN THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES SEEMED TO BE MODERATE, ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF THOSE FORCES AND SOME OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TEAMS WERE PULLED BACK TO DEFEND PROVINCIAL TOWNS. IN THE DELTA THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT A MAJOR EFFORT IS UNDER WAY TO RECRUIT QUICKLY ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL BY THE VC AND TO EXPAND VC RURAL CONTROL. HOW FAR THEY GET WITH THIS DEPENDS ON HOW QUICKLY OUR OWN AND VIETNAMESE FORCES CAN GET BACK INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT IS SIGNIFICANT, IN MY JUDGMENT, THAT GIAP SPOKE IN HANOI YESTERDAY ABOUT THE "EXPANSION OF LIBERATED AREAS" AS ONE OF THE MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE OFFENSIVE THUS FAR. WE MUST MAKE SURE THEY DO NOT FRIGHTEN US INTO AN "ENCLAVE" POLICY, REMEMBERING ALWAYS THAT WHAT TRIGGERED THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES WAS COMMUNIST AWARENESS THAT THEY WERE GRADUALLY LOSING CONTROL OF THE RURAL POPULATION.

- A CIA REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLICE GIVES THEM, ON THE WHOLE, HIGH MARKS EXCEPT IN A FEW PLACES. THE REPORT INDICATES THAT THE CITY ATTACKS PERMITTED THE POLICE TO GET AT THE URBAN VC INFRASTRUCTURE IN A NUMBER OF TOWNS.
- EXCEPT FOR KHE SANH AND THE KONTUM-PLEIKU FRONT, WE STILL ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO ASSESS HOW STRONG AN ATTACK BY MAIN FORCE UNITS CAN BE MOUNTED. WE HAVE TO KEEP OUR MINDS OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE PINNING ARVN AND US FORCES IN THE CITY AS CHEAPLY AS POSSIBLE, AND WITH RUMORS OF MASSIVE ATTACKS, IN ORDER TO EXPLOIT AND CONSOLIDATE THE COUNTRYSIDE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE CERTAINLY IMPORTANT FORCES OUTSIDE OF QUANG TRI, DANANG, AND SAIGON, AS WELL AS ON THE FRONTIERS. (IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO FOLLOW UP ON GENERAL WEYAND'S REPORT OF YESTERDAY THAT THE ENEMY FORCES AROUND SAIGON HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO BREAK UP INTO SMALLER UNITS. THERE WAS ALSO AN INDICATION THAT SOME OF THE UNITS AROUND QUANG TRI WERE FRAGMENTED.)

ACTION.

- I BROUGHT GENERAL TAYLOR AND CLARK CLIFFORD UP TO DATE. GENERAL TAYLOR AGREED WITH MY STATEMENT OF HIS VIEWS TO YOU YESTERDAY.
- I ASKED BUS AND WESTY, VIA THE PENTAGON BACK CHANNEL, FOR THEIR JUDGMENT ON THE ASSESSMENT WHICH I FORWARDED TO YOU YESTERDAY.
- CLARK CLIFFORD AND I ASSURED THAT THE PREPARATORY STEPS YOU INDICATED TO HIM WERE UNDER WAY.
- I BROUGHT HARRY MCPHERSON FULLY UP TO DATE AND PUT HIM IN TOUCH WITH BOB GINSBURGH ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF WHAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED.
- I SHALL TRY TO TAKE STOCK AGAIN TODAY WITH CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR.

LG 241419Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

32
SANITIZED

MFJXVVZCZCEEA205
OO WTE10
DE WTE 824

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80547

~~SECRET~~

Received Washington CommGen
12:19 P.M. EST Saturday Feb 24 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommGen
11:55 A.M. CST Saturday 24 Feb 68

SANITIZED

Authority 11-2-78 State ; CIA 2-13-81
By if, NARS, Date 8-24-81

FEBRUARY 24, 1968

THIS CIA-SAIGON WRAP-UP SUGGESTS ANOTHER ATTACK ON SAIGON
BETWEEN FEBRUARY 24 AND FEBRUARY 26.

1. A NUMBER OF REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN THE PAST
EIGHT HOURS INDICATING THE VIET CONG (VC) MAY BE ABOUT TO LAUNCH
THE SECOND PHASE OF THEIR "TET OFFENSIVE". AMONG THESE ARE:

A. REFUGEES OUTSIDE SAIGON STATED THEY LEFT SAIGON
BECAUSE THE VC TOLD THEM THEY WERE GOING TO ATTACK SAIGON
BETWEEN 24 AND 26 FEBRUARY.

B. SAID THE VC WOULD ATTACK EITHER
ON 21 FEBRUARY OR 24 FEBRUARY.

C. EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY WERE WARNED TO STAY
AWAY FROM THE AREA (WHICH INCLUDES AN AMERICAN BILLET) BECAUSE
THE VC WILL ATTACK TONIGHT.

D. ON 24 FEBRUARY OR LATER THE VC WILL ATTACK CAN GUOIC
VILLAGE, LONG AN PROVINCE, TO CUT PROVINCIAL ROAD NUMBER FIVE AND
ISOLATE SAIGON.

E. THE VC WILL ATTACK INTO THE SIXTH PRECINCT ON THE
NIGHT OF 24 FEBRUARY.

F. LEAFLETS HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED IN HAU NGHIA PROVINCE
STATING THE VC WILL ATTACK SAIGON ON 25 FEBRUARY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONF~~

G. THE DECISIVE BATTLE FOR SAIGON WILL BE FOUGHT ON 27 FEBRUARY.

1-310(c)
C

2. A COLLATION OF INFILTRATION ROUTES, AS GAINED FROM PRISONER INTERROGATIONS, AND ORDER OF BATTLE REVEALS THAT THE VC ARE LOCATED CONVENIENTLY TO AGAIN USE THE SAME ROUTES.

A. INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS CAPTURED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAIGON PROVIDED INFORMATION WHICH, THOUGH INCOMPLETE, IDENTIFIED SEVERAL INFILTRATION ROUTES INTO THE CITY. CORRELATION WITH ORDER OF BATTLE DATA AS OF 23 FEBRUARY, WHICH ARE BASED ON CONTACTS WITHIN THE PAST THREE WEEKS, REVEALS A NUMBER OF ENEMY UNITS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE PREVIOUS INFILTRATION ROUTES. SOME OF THESE UNITS HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE TET ATTACK. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE INFILTRATION ROUTES ARE SO NUMEROUS, AND THE ENEMY UNITS SO WIDELY DISPERSED WITHIN THE AREA, THAT THEY WOULD NATURALLY OVERLAP. MOREOVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE NOTED IN THESE UNITS' LOCATIONS.

B. THE IDENTIFIED INFILTRATION ROUTES TENDED TO CLUSTER TO THE WEST AND SOUTHWEST OF THE CITY, WITH ONLY A FEW SMALL UNITS COMING DIRECTLY FROM THE NORTH, NORTHEAST AND SOUTH. AN EXCEPTION WAS THE 2ND BATTALION/GO MON WHICH ENTERED FROM THE NORTHEAST.

C. ORDER OF BATTLE AS OF 23 FEBRUARY CARRIES THE 267TH BATTALION, THE 269TH BATTALION, AND THE 6TH LOCAL FORCE BATTALION IN THEIR NORMAL OPERATING AREAS, WHICH ARE IN THE VICINITY OF THE ROUTES THEY USED TO ENTER THE CITY DURING THE OFFENSIVE. IN ADDITION, THE 2ND INDEPENDENT BATTALION AND THE 3RD BATTALION OF THE 272 REGIMENT HAVE BEEN LOCATED ADJACENT TO ROUTES USED BY THE 6TH BATTALION. TO THE SOUTH, THE 5TH LOCAL FORCE BATTALION HAS BEEN PLACED SOUTH OF DISTRICT 8, NEAR ROUTE 5, A PREVIOUSLY USED ROUTE. SEVERAL UNITS ARE LOCATED SOUTH OF THE CITY ADJACENT TO ROUTES USED BY SMALL SAPPER UNITS. THE MAJORITY OF LOCATED ENEMY UNITS ARE WITHIN 7 TO 10 MILES OF THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY AND GENERALLY CLOSER TO THE CITY THAN THE STAGING AREAS IDENTIFIED FOR MOST OF THE UNITS WHICH INFILTRATED SAIGON FOR THE TET ATTACK.

DTG 241719Z FEB 68



~~CONF~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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1968 FEB 15 PM 9 38

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 96-211

By us, NARA Date 4-3-98

~~SECRET~~ USUN 3794

NODIS

SUBJ: VIETNAM

I SPENT ONE AND A HALF HOURS WITH SYG FEB 15 AND WAS GIVEN FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS TRIP TO NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, LONDON AND PARIS. BUNCHE AND BUFFUM ALSO PRESENT.

SYG TOLD ME THAT IN HIS MTG WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL IN NEW DELHI HE POSED FOL QUESTIONS:

1) COULD TALKS TAKE PLACE IN LESS THAN THREE OR FOUR WEEKS IF US BOMBING STOPPED?

2) AFTER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN US AND HANOI, COULD THERE BE RECONVENING OF GENEVA CONF?

3) WOULD PRIMARY PURPOSE OF SUCH CONF BE TO AGREE ON MODALITIES FOR IMPLEMENTING 1954 ACCORDS?

4) WHO SHOULD REPRESENT SOUTH VIETNAM AT GENEVA?

NORTH VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL SAID HE WOULD REQUIRE INSTRUCTIONS ON ALL THESE POINTS FROM HANOI.

SYG CONFIRMED HE HAD BEEN INFORMED AT LUNCH GIVEN BY WILSON IN LONDON OF MESSAGE THROUGH NORTH VIETNAMESE CORRESPONDENT IN LONDON THAT HANOI'S ANSWERS WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN PARIS. HE DELAYED DEPARTURE FROM LONDON OVER NIGHT TO PERMIT CONSULTATION WITH FRENCH GOVT AND SEEK APPOINTMENTS WITH DEGAULLE AND COUVE DE MURVILLE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- USUN 3794, FEB 16

IN PARIS SYG SPENT JUST OVER AN HOUR WITH MAI VAN BO WHO DELIVERED FOL REPLY FROM HANOI TO THANT'S QUESTIONS:

1. ~~THERE WILL BE TALKS AS SOON AS UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM IS EFFECTIVE.~~ (SYG WAS SPEAKING FROM MEMORY, WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER QUALIFIER SHOULD BE "IS EFFECTIVE", "IS IN EFFECT", OR "IS IN FORCE"; I ASKED HIM TO CHECK HIS WRITTEN NOTES TOMORROW AND GIVE ME PRECISE TEXT, WHICH HE PROMISED TO DO.) SYG ASKED IF TALKS COULD BE EARLIER THAN THREE OR FOUR WEEKS AND MAI VAN BO SAID HE HAS NO INSTRUCTIONS ON TIMING BUT THAT THEY WOULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS NVN CAN VERIFY THEIR CONDITIONS MET. SYG THEN LET SLIP FACT (WHICH FRENCH HAD NOT WANTED HIM TO REVEAL) THAT FRENCH THEMSELVES PRIVATELY ASSERTED THAT TWO WEEKS WOULD BE INVOLVED. SYG CATEGORIC IN SAYING FRENCH HAVE ASSURANCE FROM HANOI TO THIS EFFECT AND IT IS NOT MERELY THEIR ASSESSMENT.

2. ~~CONVENING GENEVA CONF CAN BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN US AND HANOI.~~

3. US IS FREE TO RAISE ANY ITEM IT WANTS. SYG ASKED IF QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF HOSTILITIES IN SOUTH COULD BE DISCUSSED. MAI VAN BO REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, THOUGH SYG SAID IN PAST NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD SAID THIS QUESTION WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED WITH NLF.

4. ~~QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA CONF COULD BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN US AND HANOI.~~

SYG SAID HE GOT DEFINITE IMPRESSION NORTH VIETNAMESE WISHED TO CONVEY VIEW THAT HANOI VERY EAGER TO TALK, MUCH MORE SO THAN IN HIS TALKS WITH THEIR REPS IN RANGOON LAST YEAR.

I ASKED SYG IF MAI VAN BO COMMENTED ON SAN ANTONIO FORMULA. HE SAID MAI VAN BO HAD INDICATED FORMULA CANNOT BE ACCEPTED BECAUSE IT IS CONDITIONAL.

FINALLY, SYG ASKED MAI VAN BO IF NVN MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN ACCREDITING CORRESPONDENT TO UN, AS DO EAST GERMANS, AND HE IS PUTTING QUESTION TO HANOI.

SYG ALSO DESCRIBED HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW SAYING THAT THEY CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF RECAPITULATION OF WELL KNOWN SOV VIEWS ON VIETNAM WAR WITH LITTLE NEW. HE THOUGHT MOST SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT WAS BREZHNEV'S COMMENT THAT USSR WOULD NEVER LET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- USUN 3794, FEB 16

HANOI BE DEFEATED. SYG REPORTED KOSYGIN SPOKE IN MUCH MORE SOBER AND RESTRAINED FASHION THAN BREZHNEV, WHO TALKED IN BLISTERING TERMS. HE FOUND PODGORNYY MILDEST OF THREE. SYG GAINED IMPRESSION SOV UNION WOULD GO ALONG WITH ANYTHING HANOI WANTS. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY, SYG INDICATED SOVS NEVER THREATENED INVOLVEMENT OF SOV PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM. KOSYGIN MADE SAME COMMENT TO HIM ABOUT SAN ANTONIO FORMULA HE RECEIVED FROM HAI VAN BO LATER, I.E. HANOI WOULD NOT ACCEPT BECAUSE IT IS CONDITIONAL.

SYG ALSO DISCLOSED, RELUCTANTLY, INTERESTING FACET OF HIS TALKS WITH DEGAULLE AND COUVE. HE INDICATED NOT ONLY DID DEGAULLE REPEAT HIS USUAL CRITICISM OF US POLICY IN VIETNAM, BUT HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT US MIGHT USE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE. HE HAD APPARENTLY SEIZED ON US STATEMENTS WHICH WERE LESS THAN CATEGORICAL DENIAL. COUVE WAS EVEN MORE SPECIFIC IN POINTING OUT DISASTROUS RESULTS THAT WOULD FLOW FROM SUCH DEVELOPMENT. FRENCH DID NOT VOLUNTEER VIEW ON WHETHER PRESENT SITUATION RIPE FOR SETTLEMENT. SYG RECALLED DEGAULLE TOLD HIM THREE YEARS AGO THERE WOULD BE NO SETTLEMENT BEFORE US ELECTION IN 1968.

I TOLD SYG WE HAD SEVERAL INDICATIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT HANOI'S POSITION WAS ALONG LINES HE DESCRIBED BUT WOULD LIKE TO CHECK PRECISE LANGUAGE WITH HIM TOMORROW AGAINST WHAT WAS GIVEN TO US BY OTHERS. I EXPLAINED THIS HAD BEEN A BAD PERIOD IN WHICH TO PURSUE DIPLOMATIC TRACK. PRES HAD MADE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO DIALOGUE IN SAN ANTONIO FORMULA AND THIS NOW SEEMED TO BE REBUFFED THROUGH WHOLESALE ONSLAUGHT AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAMESE CITIES. WITHOUT ENGAGING IN DETAIL, I SAID MILITARY SITUATION NOW SEEMED TO BE SETTLING DOWN A BIT AND HE THOUGHT HANOI MUST BE DISAPPOINTED THAT POPULAR UPRISING THEY EXPECTED IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR ATTACKS DID NOT TAKE PLACE.

GP-1.

GOLDBERG
BT

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

33

~~TOP SECRET~~

Received Washington CommCen
5:01 PM Saturday 24 February 1968

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
5:20 PM Saturday 24 February 1968

12 14

*24
JCS - sent Paul - Clifford
New on board*

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80558

SANITIZED

Authority OSD 10-11-78, NSC 8-12-80
By inf, NARS, Date 9-2-80

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

FEBRUARY 24, 1968

PAUL NITZE JUST CALLED. HE SAID THAT WESTY HAS ASKED URGENT PERMISSION THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WHO ARE SHARING IN THE DEFENSE OF KHE SANH BE PERMITTED TO USE THE COFRAM SPECIAL AMMUNITION, ESPECIALLY IN THE FORM OF GRENADES. THEY WILL BE BEARING SOME OF THE SHOCK OF GROUND ATTACK IF AND WHEN IT COMES. IN FACT, THE ENEMY MAY TRY TO CONCENTRATE ON THEM. WESTY FEELS STRONGLY THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE THE BEST THAT WE HAVE FOR THE DEFENSE. THE JCS CONCUR. PAUL NITZE CONCURS.

WESTY WANTED AN URGENT DECISION BECAUSE HE THINKS THE ATTACK MAY BEGIN AT ANY TIME AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE MUST BE INSTRUCTED.

FINDING THAT YOU WERE AWAY FOR AN HOUR, I TOLD PAUL THAT HE SHOULD GIVE WESTY AN ASSENT AND PREPARE TO BEGIN TO INSTRUCT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AT KHE SANH; BUT THAT I WOULD LAY THE MATTER BEFORE YOU FOR FINAL DECISION.

*EP 12065
1-301a*

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT [] WE HAVE ALWAYS ENVISAGED SHARING IT WITH OUR ALLIES AT A TIME OF COMBAT

DTG: 242301Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

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34

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 2-9-79 letterBy ip, NARS, Date 6-11-79

2A

Received Washington CommCen
12:03 P.M. EST Sunday 25 Feb 68Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
11:40 A.M. CST Sunday 25 Feb 68~~CONFIDENTIAL~~EEA226
PP WTE10
DE WTE 854FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80569KEEP THIS
WIRE HANDY~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEBRUARY 25, 1968

HEREWITH FURTHER EVIDENCE OF GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT AROUND
QUANG TRI.

THE SITUATION IN QUANG TRI CITY REMAINS RELATIVELY CALM, BUT KHE SANH BASE HAS BEEN TAKING A LARGE NUMBER OF ROCKET AND MORTAR ROUNDS. THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION, ESPECIALLY TO THE EAST AND WEST, IN THE LOWLANDS HAVE RECEIVED SPORADIC FIRE. DURING THE NIGHT OF 24/25 FEBRUARY FOR THE FIRST TIME SOME OF THE RD SUPPORT BATTALIONS STAYED IN THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AREA NORTH OF QUANG TRI CITY. U.S. AND VIETNAMESE FORCES IN THE LOWLANDS HAVE BEEN MOVING ABOUT ACTIVELY SEEKING TO CORNER THE ENEMY. NO LARGE ENGAGEMENTS HAVE RESULTED, BUT MANY NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY HAVE BEEN KILLED. THE NVA SEEMED TO HAVE NO FIGHT LEFT AND SOME WERE CAUGHT BREAKING AND RUNNING. THE ENEMY HAS BEEN PROPAGANDIZING OF ANOTHER ATTACK, BUT THIS SEEMS TO BE IN TERMS OF THE FUTURE, TWO OR THREE MONTHS, RATHER THAN VERY SOON.

DTG: 251703Z FEB 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 10-11-78, NSC 8-12-80

By inf, NARS, Date 9-2-80

VV EEA225

OO WTE 10

DE WTE 851

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80566

Received Washington CommGen
11:46 A.M. EST Sunday 25 Feb 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommGen
12:05 P.M. CST Sunday 25 Feb 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEREWITH BUS WHEELER'S TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON THREE
ADDITIONAL TROOP PACKAGES TO CLOSE AT LATEST BY MAY 1,
SEPT. 1, AND DEC. 31, 1968, TOTTALLING 205,179.

HE UNDERLINES TENTATIVE CHARACTER OF FIGURES.

HIS BASIC ANALYSIS LEADING TO THESE RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWS
IMMEDIATELY.

1. AS PER OUR TELECON THIS MORNING, MY IMPRESSIONS ON THE
SITUATION IN SVN ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ENEMY MADE A MAJOR AND POWERFUL MILITARY EFFORT AT
THE BEGINNING OF TET. HIS CAMPAIGN WAS WELL PLANNED BUT, IN SOME
INSTANCES, POORLY TIMED AND EXECUTED. FORTUNATELY, BASED ON INTEL-
LIGENCE, WESTY STARTED TO DEPLOY AMERICAN TROOP ELEMENTS FROM BORDER
AREAS TO THE URBAN CENTERS ABOUT MID-JANUARY; HAD HE NOT DONE SO, I
AM CONVINCED THAT WE WOULD HAVE SUFFERED SEVERE SETBACKS IN II
CORPS AND III CORPS. IT WAS A VERY NEAR THING. I WILL HAVE ON MY
RETURN EXAMPLES OF HOW NARROW THE MARGIN WAS BETWEEN VICTORY
AND DEFEAT IN CERTAIN KEY AREAS.

B. THE ENEMY HAS SUFFERED VERY SUBSTANTIALLY, BUT HE STILL
HAS SIZEABLE UNCOMMITTED RESERVES. HE DISPLAYS A TENACITY WHICH WE
HAVE NOT SEEN BEFORE IN THIS WAR; INTELLIGENCE REVEALS THAT HE IS
CLINGING CLOSE TO URBAN PERIMETERS IN ORDER TO HARASS AND INTIMIDATE
THE POPULATION BY BOTH RUMOR AND GUERRILLA ACTION. HIS TACTICS MAY
BE DESCRIBED AS AN ATTEMPT TO STRANGLE THE CITIES BY DISRUPTING
THE FLOW OF FOOD, DESTROYING THE ECONOMY, AND SHAKING THE CONFIDENCE
OF THE PEOPLE. IT IS MY BELIEF HE HAS FORCES AVAILABLE FOR A SECOND
ROUND OF ATTACKS AGAINST SELECTED URBAN AREAS, INCLUDING SAIGON,
AND THE DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES AND HIS ACTIONS SUBSTANTIATE HIS
INTENTION TO DO SO.

C. CONTRARY TO MANY NEWS MEDIA ACCOUNTS, ALL AMERICAN
OFFICERS STATE THAT THE ARVN FOUGHT VERY WELL, SOMETIMES UNDER
ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES. THERE WERE EXCEPTIONS BOTH WAYS; I.E., A FEW
REGULAR ARVN UNITS PERFORMED POORLY BECAUSE OF SUBCALIBER
LEADERSHIP (COMMANDERS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING RELIEVED),
WHILE CERTAIN RF AND PF UNITS BORE THE BRUNT OF EARLIER ATTACKS
AGAINST URBAN AREAS BY LARGE ENEMY FORCES AND ACQUITTED THEMSELVES
WELL.

D. A CURRENT TROUBLESOME FACT IS THAT THE ARVN IS TOO MUCH CONCENTRATED ON SECURING THE URBAN AREAS AND IS NOT PUSHING OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE TO FIND AND DESTROY THE ENEMY ENGAGED IN THE HARASSING, TERRORISM, AND STRANGULATION ACTIVITIES MENTIONED ABOVE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH PRESIDENT THIEU, VICE PRESIDENT KY, AND GENERAL VIEN. WESTY IS WORKING WITH VIEN ON A PROGRAM WHICH WOULD HAVE VIETNAMESE POLICE FORCES GENERALLY CHARGED WITH SECURITY IN THE CITIES, SUPPORTED BY SMALL, MOBILE REGULAR ARVN TROOP ELEMENTS.

2. IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT WESTY'S FORCES ARE STRETCHED TOO THIN. HE HAS HAD TO DRAW OFF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM II AND III CORPS AREAS IN ORDER TO MEET THE ENEMY THREAT IN NORTHERN I CORPS. HE HAS NO THEATER RESERVE WITH WHICH TO MEET CONTINGENCIES. I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST REINFORCE HIM PROMPTLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY. WHILE WE HAVE NOT FINISHED OUR DETAILED PLANNING, THE BROAD OUTLINE OF HIS REQUIREMENTS IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. NOT LATER THAN 1 MAY 1968, HE WANTS AN ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT, THE REMAINDER OF THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION, A BRIGADE OF THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH) COMPRISED OF ONE TANK, ONE MECH, AND ONE INFANTRY BATTALION. HE ALSO WANTS AN ADDITIONAL EIGHT TAC FIGHTER SQUADRONS, THREE OF WHICH WOULD BE THOSE SQUADRONS INCLUDED IN PROGRAM 5 BUT WHOSE DEPLOYMENT WAS DEFERRED.

B. ASAP BUT PRIOR TO 1 SEPTEMBER 1968, HE WANTS THE REMAINDER OF THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH), COMPRISED OF ONE TANK, ONE MECH, AND FOUR INFANTRY BATTALIONS, AND THE LIGHT ROK DIVISION. HE ALSO WANTS FOUR MORE TAC FIGHTER SQUADRONS WITH THIS PACKAGE.

C. HE WANTS NOT LATER THAN 31 DECEMBER 1968 ONE INFANTRY DIVISION AND THREE ADDITIONAL TAC FIGHTER SQUADRONS.

3. THE FOREGOING REQUESTS, PLUS COMBAT AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND OTHER BITS AND PIECES, WOULD RESULT IN A COMBAT FORCE STRUCTURE OF 133 US MANEUVER BATTALIONS, 37 FREE WORLD MILITARY ARMED FORCES MANEUVER BATTALIONS, AND 47 US TAC FIGHTER SQUADRONS. WE ESTIMATE THE US PORTION WILL REQUIRE ABOUT 200,000 ADDITIONAL US TROOPS.

4. AS POINTED OUT ABOVE, WE ARE STILL WORKING ON MACV'S REQUIREMENTS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO, BOTH HERE AND IN HAWAII. I AM CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE MAJOR STRUCTURE WILL NOT DEVIATE GREATLY FROM THAT OUTLINED.

5. IN SUMMARY, THE MILITARY SITUATION CONTINUES TO BE FLUID; THE ENEMY IS DETERMINED AND TENACIOUS; TROOP MORALE, BOTH US AND ARVN, IS GOOD; WESTY'S FORCES ARE STRETCHED THIN IN VIEW OF THE ENEMY THREAT AND THE COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO THE ENEMY. I DO NOT HAVE ANY APPREHENSION THAT WE WILL BE RUN OUT OF THE COUNTRY BY MILITARY ACTION, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT TO ACHIEVE VICTORY WE MUST EXPAND OUR EFFORT SUBSTANTIALLY AND PROMPTLY.

WARM REGARDS.

THIS CABLE IS READDRESSSED WITH THE FOLLOWING NOTE OF CAUTION: IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WHEELER AT 6:40 P.M., 24 FEB 1968, WASHINGTON TIME, GENERAL WHEELER INDICATED TO ME (GENERAL JOHNSON) THAT HIS FINAL REPORT MIGHT WELL ALTER THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN. HE RECOMMENDED THAT NO SPECIFIC ACTION BE TAKEN UNTIL HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON AND PRESENTED HIS FINAL WRITTEN REPORT.

1. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH WESTY, SPIKE MOMYER, CUSHMAN, PEERS, WEYAND AND ECKHART, MY IMPRESSIONS ARE:

A. THE FIGHTING IS BY NO MEANS OVER.

B. LARGE ACTIONS ARE IN THE OFFING AT KHE SANH AND/OR HUE AND IN THE HIGHLANDS FROM DAK TO BAN ME THUOT.

C. THE ENEMY HAS SNUGGLED UP TO SAIGON WITH ELEMENTS OF SIX REGIMENTS AND STILL POSES A THREAT IN THE CAN THO AREA.

D. THE LOGISTICS SITUATION IN I CORPS IS MARGINAL AND STEPS TO IMPROVE IT ARE UNDERWAY.

E. ARVN HAS HELD UP EXTREMELY WELL BUT IS GENERALLY IN A DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE, AND THERE ARE SOME SOFT SPOTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WESTY IS FINDING IT NECESSARY TO PICK UP SOME OF THE TAB FOR ARVN AROUND SAIGON AND IS CONTINUING TO DO SO AT HUE AND IN THE DELTA.

F. IF EXPECTED ENEMY INITIATIVES IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, AND THE HIGHLANDS ARE SYNCHRONIZED WITH CONTINUED PRESSURE AT SAIGON AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WESTY WILL BE STRETCHED PAPER THIN.

2. I HAVE JUST COMPLETED MY FINAL DISCUSSIONS WITH WESTY ON FORCE REQUIREMENTS. MAJOR ELEMENTS AND APPROXIMATE STRENGTHS ARE LISTED BELOW:

PACKAGE	TIME	UNITS		
		MAJOR UNITS	MANEUVER BATTALION TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS	
A (PRIOR- ITY 1)	NOT LATER THAN 1MAY68	6 ARMD CAV REGT 5 MAR DIV (-) BDE 5TH INF DIV (M)	3 6\$ 3	5 USMC\$\$ 3 USAF\$\$
B (PRIOR- ITY 2)	ASAP BUT NOT LATER THAN 1SEP68	5TH INF DIV (M) (-) ROK LIGHT DIV	6 6	4 USAF
C (PRIOR- ITY 3)	NOT LATER THAN 31DEC68	INF DIV (USA)	9	3 USAF

\$ INCLUDES 27TH MAR (REINF) NOW ENROUTE SEA.

\$\$ INCLUDES 3 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS IN PROGRAM 5 APPROVED BUT NOT DEPLOYED

PACKAGE	STRENGTHS				
	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOTAL
A	54,000	8060	37,132	8797	107,983
B	31,600	4446	-----	5750	41,796
C	46,700	138	2,004	6558	55,400
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	132,300	12,644	39,136	21,099	205,179

3. THE STRENGTHS SHOWN ABOVE ARE BALL PARK FIGURES, BUT CONSIDERED BY WESTY AND STAFF TO BE FAIRLY VALID.

~~TOP SECRET~~

. DTG 15/1646Z FEB 68

36

CAP 80567
Feb 25, 1968

file

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Following is the text of a proposed statement you may wish to make on the battle at Hue, including a pledge to help restore the ancient capital and cultural center. State approves and it incorporates Ambassador Bunker's ideas.

Bunker notes however that fighting continues in one small area. He also reports that Thieu and Ky are visiting Hue today. He urged that this statement not repeat not be issued here until Thieu and Ky have returned and until we get word from the Mission that Hue has been fully cleared. Bunker thinks this kind of statement would then be quote particularly timely. unquote.

Begin text:

Today a gallant yet tragic victory was won in the city of Hue.

The bravery of the South Vietnamese and United States forces who re-took the ancient citadel in bitter fighting was in the highest tradition of military valor.

It was a victory because we know the great importance the enemy attached to holding Hue--an importance underlined by the incredible brutality and terror against civilian officials and an innocent populace which accompanied their attack on a sacred city at a sacred time.

It was tragic because so much of a beautiful city, rich in history and heritage, has been destroyed.

We Americans are now engaged with the Vietnamese people in repairing and restoring the damage inflicted throughout Viet-Nam. We will continue to help in healing the scars of the Tet ~~att~~ attack. Today, we want particularly to pledge to the people of South Viet-Nam that together we will rebuild the ancient city of Hue, and that the history and tradition of this city will be the more honored and cherished by the fact that brave men fought and died to make it a citadel of freedom and not of terror. (end text)

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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37

26 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Additional Pressures on North Vietnam

Entirely apart from increasing pressures on NVN because of their direct effect on the war in the south, a stepped-up campaign could:

- provide a measure of retaliation for the current enemy offensive;
- indirectly let the North Koreans know that our patience is not inexhaustible;
- re-establish the credibility of our determination in Soviet eyes;
- allay the criticism of those hawks who are opposed to additional effort in SVN so long as we "unduly" restrict our effort against NVN.

A catalogue of the increased pressures available includes:

1. Reducing the circles. The JCS have proposed:
 - a. Reducing the ten-mile Hanoi circle to a three-mile radius circle less that area east of the west bank of the Red River.
 - b. Reducing the four-mile Haiphong circle to a one and one-half mile radius circle less that area north of the south bank of the Cua Cam River.
 - c. Reduction of the ChiCom buffer zone (bounded by Highway 4).
2. Attacking selected targets within the circle and the buffer zone. This would involve about 20 targets such as RR shops, supply depots, warehouses, shipyards, naval bases, electric power, and perhaps the Ministry of National Defense.

DECLASSIFIED 141359-228

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cb/is NARA, Date 1-21-00

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3. Continue to prohibit attack on population as a target but accept greater risks of civilian casualties.

4. Extend coastal armed reconnaissance and the SEA DRAGON area northern boundary from 20 degrees to 21°15' - 15 miles south of the ChiCom border.

5. Use of surface-to-air missiles against hostile aircraft throughout NVN.

6. Mine the approaches to the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha.

7. Mount a shallow amphibious invasion of NVN. (Not feasible until late spring or early summer.)

8. Destroy each of the cities of NVN after giving enough warning to permit evacuation of the population.

9. Attack the dikes. (Not feasible until June or July.)

I don't see any persuasive reason that we should not go ahead with the first four or five right now. Because of weather the impact of these authorizations might not become apparent for some time.

Mining, of course, would have the greatest immediate impact -- militarily and psychologically. Current weather would not preclude the laying of minefields. It also occurs to me that mining could be a useful bargaining lever. Instead of offering ~~to~~ stop bombing in return for talks a la San Antonio, we could simply say that we would not renew our minefields in return for talks and without making a "not take advantage" assumption.

We should preserve the option for a shallow amphibious invasion at the earliest possible date -- although I continue to feel that this is a riskier prospect than mining and more difficult to justify.

The final two items would seem to be beyond the pale although the destruction of evacuated cities continues to intrigue me.

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ROBERT N.G INSBURGH

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC letter 2-9-79

By if, NARS, Date 6-11-79

38

~~COFRAM~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Walt:

1. Via the NMCC and via supply channels, I have asked whether units deployed in the Khe Sanh area have COFRAM. When the answer is received, you will be informed through the WH Situation Room.
2. The 40mm cartridge is in effect a grenade projected from a hand-held launcher. For more details on this and other munitions, see attached.
3. For purposes of comparison, I will have for you tomorrow an estimate of monthly rates of MACV expenditure of non-COFRAM munitions.
4. Also by tomorrow I expect to have the dates when the logistics people expect to have attained the desired supply levels.

~~SECRET COFRAM~~

LL

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file out
12 Feb 68*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 27, 1968
7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is a cool, cold turkey appraisal of the ARVN as of 12 February -- two weeks out of date -- and based on very incomplete evidence.

It suggests that we shall need a good deal of buddying to get the ARVN fully back on their feet; although they did not perform badly.

W. C. Rostow

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Authority DSD 10-11-78, NSC 8-12-80

By ing, NARS, Date 9-2-80

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MR. NITZE HAS SEEN

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TS-123/DD


12 February 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Attached Report

This report is based primarily on CIA field reporting, General Westmoreland's EYES ONLY dispatches, and some further background furnished by General Abrams. This report is only tentative in nature. The report has been coordinated with CIA.


V. L. LOWRANCE
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Acting Director

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 10-25-78, CIA 10-28-80

By inf, NARS, Date 4-21-81

Sec Der has seen

24 FEB 1968

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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES RVNAF

1. Pre-TET Situation

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) combat forces prior to TET consisted of 120 Infantry, 20 Ranger, nine Airborne, and six Marine Battalions. The operating field strength of the infantry battalion, that is the number of troops that could be put in the field to fight, averaged about 400. Since the average operating strength desired was 450, the pre-TET strength of ARVN forces was somewhat less than desired. A battalion with an operating field strength of 450 would have an overall authorized strength of about 650-700.

2. Strengths During TET

a. RVNAF commanders had authority to grant leaves up to 50 per cent of the assigned strengths of their units. Accordingly, the ~~operating field strengths of many battalions at the onset of TET~~ ~~dropped to an average of 200.~~ In a few instances, a unit commander ~~knew an attack was coming in that area and did not grant leave for~~ ~~TET. Battalion strengths in these cases remained at 400 or at 500~~ ~~if a ranger or airborne battalion.~~

b. ~~At least in some divisions, ARVN troops began to return to~~ ~~their units on 3 February.~~ For example, in the 7th Division, it was reported that 250 troops returned on 3 February and 100 more on the 4th. In one case, Go Cong, they were formed into a provisional reaction company. How general this return of troops to their units has been is not known.

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3. Reductions in RVNAF Strengths

a. Casualties During the TET Offensive

Reported casualties for ARVN units for the period 291800 January to 101200 February consisted of ~~1,900 killed, 7,135 wounded,~~ and ~~86 missing in action.~~

~~The total of approximately 9,100 casualties represented about three per cent of the total ARVN forces~~

b. Desertions

~~There have been few reports received of desertions or defections.~~

Elements of the ARVN 45th Regiment in Ban Me Thuot may have joined the Viet Cong; troops in ARVN uniforms and in vehicles of that unit fired on a US civilian compound, and the Communists claim the defection of parts of that unit. No information is available to confirm Communist claims of defections of elements of the 1st Division in Hue, or of troops in Ba Xuyen Province; however, due to the confused situation in Hue, their claims cannot be either confirmed or denied and remain "possibly true." Various Government of Vietnam (GVN) officials have mentioned defections by individual officers assigned to headquarters and support units in the Saigon area, but details on identifications and circumstances are lacking. In Sa Dec Province, however, the VC reportedly occupied a number of outposts (presumably Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF)) in rural areas, and Liberation Front flags were reported flying

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over them. Also in that province, RD cadres reportedly "melted away." In Chau Doc, some officials reportedly doffed their uniforms when the VC entered the city, but put them back on after the enemy was driven off. There is almost no information available on the status of RVNAF elements at the district village, and hamlet level, where the VC have been active in several provinces, nor on the status of RVNAF (RF and PF) elements on leave in rural areas during TET. These elements would seem to be vulnerable to local VC propaganda claims of success.

4. Performance During the TET Offensive

a. Although the data are incomplete, reflecting the fragmentary reporting, ~~the effectiveness of RVNAF in combating enemy attacks during this period varied markedly. In general, the data reflect a mixed situation, with GVN forces reacting aggressively and courageously in some areas, but ineffectively and with malfeasance in others.~~ No clear-cut geographic patterns are evident, except that most reports of ineffective performance come from IV Corps. Generally, however, the reaction of GVN forces seems to have varied in direct relation to the professional competence and performance of their leaders.

b. Leadership at the national and Corps levels apparently was effective. General Vien himself was reportedly being steady and dedicated, and the Commanders of the Rangers and National Police effectively led their forces in the Saigon fighting. The III Corps Commander General Khang reportedly performed well, but the I Corps

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~~Commander General Lam has been implicitly criticized for an overly~~
~~defensive posture in I Corps.~~ The 22d and 23d Division Commanders
in II Corps reportedly had their troops on alert during TET, and had
restricted TET leaves; there are indications, however, that this alert
was not fully honored in at least one province (Khanh Hoa).

c. ~~At lower levels, the Commander of the 24th Special Sector~~
~~(Kontum) reportedly performed very poorly, drawing criticism for his~~
~~preoccupation with his personal safety and for the destruction caused by~~
~~his heavy reliance on armor.~~ The Province Chief in Ba Xuyen reportedly
became hysterical and lost control, and the Chief of Quang Tri Province
was ineffective. The ~~Kien Hoa Province Chief, however, reportedly~~
~~performed creditably even after receiving news that his family had been~~
~~murdered by the Viet Cong in Saigon.~~ In Binh Thuan, the Province Chief
and his Police Chief squabbled and blamed each other for deficiencies
in security before the attack. ~~The Kontum Province Chief reacted quickly~~
~~and effectively, demonstrating excellent leadership.~~ The Thua Thien
Province Chief was forced to hide for several days when ^{the} Viet Cong
occupied his house. The Quang Nam Chief was quite effective in
organizing and directing his forces and in attempting to maintain civil
morale. No specific reports have been received on other officials at
that level.

d. ~~The alert posture of RVNAF elements varied, but seems to have~~
~~been generally adequate, considering their normal standards observed~~
~~during the TET holidays.~~ Major deficiencies were noted in Chau Doc

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Province, where defenses apparently were totally relaxed for TET. Quang Ngai forces, on the other hand, reportedly were not granted TET leave.

e. ~~Some ARVN infantry units were effective in managing to resist repeated assaults of the enemy. However, it was reported that other units, after initial pinning by sniper fire, maneuvered only slightly or not at all, but called in armor or armed helicopter strikes often, resulting in heavy volumes of fire being directed into civilian dwellings causing resentment against RVNAF troops.~~ The initial reaction of RVNAF and other security elements to the Viet Cong attacks were generally described as fair to good with the notable exception of the forces in Vinh Long, Chau Doc, and Sa Dec Provinces. There was no organized resistance to the attack in Chau Doc, and Rangers in Vinh Long were slow in reacting and unaggressive afterwards. In Sa Dec, provincial authorities initially "refused to operate." Considerable confusion was reported in the early defense of Vinh Long. ARVN units in Ba Xuyen were reported ineffective. ~~In Phong Dinh, the reaction was slow but once the troops rallied, they displayed exceptional bravery and esprit.~~ Outstanding defensive performances were recorded by ARVN units in An Xuyen, Khanh Hoa, Dinh Tuong, and Kien Hoa. A lack of planning and organization was reported, however, in Kien Hoa.

f. ~~ARVN's performance, after the initial enemy attacks were repelled and the cities were secured, seems generally to have lacked aggressiveness.~~ In only a few Provinces (Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and

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Dinh Tuong) were there indications of reasonably aggressive pursuit and a determination to maintain pressure on the enemy. In Quang Tri, ARVN units reacted slowly to attacks on district towns near the province capital, and their tactics tended to maximize property damage. "Over-reaction" or excessive destruction was reported in other areas, including Kontum, Vinh Long, and Chau Doc. In IV Corps, ARVN forces were generally described as passive, unaggressive, and preoccupied with defensive -- rather than offensive -- operations, except in those areas where US troops were brought in to assist in clearing the provincial capitals. In one instance, the presence of US forces was described as "electrifying" in its impact on ARVN. The ARVN 7th Division (colocated with a brigade of the US 9th Division in My Tho), however, has had its troops out on operations during the past few days.

5. Current Situation

a. ~~There are few reports indicative of current RVNAF combat effectiveness. In Quang Tri, concern has been expressed about dwindling ammunition, gasoline, and other supplies and the absence of resupply movements from the beleaguered 1st Division headquarters in Hue.~~ Reports on casualties in individual units have been rare. ~~In two instances ARVN units are reported at considerably reduced strength; one battalion reinforcing Vinh Long reportedly had only 90 men, while another battalion in Chau Doc reportedly had only 200 men present for duty of an assigned strength of 600.~~ Many units are considerably below strength because of the apparently widespread disruption of communications and

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transportation facilities which probably has delayed the return of troops from TET leave. Moreover, ~~the psychological impact of the Viet Cong offensive may add to the normally high AWOL and desertion rates associated with TET.~~

b. ~~There are virtually no reports specifically describing RVNAF morale as other than fair to good.~~ Other indicators -- lack of aggressiveness, indiscipline in the form of looting and pilfering -- *may* suggest ~~that morale has been shaken to some extent.~~ Moreover, some officers have expressed concern at the lack of US military support in certain areas, and others have repeated rumors prevalent among the civil populace alleging US collusion in various forms with the Viet Cong. Vietnamese Marines fighting in Saigon have expressed dissatisfaction with the US M-16 rifle, alleging it is inferior to the AK-47 automatic rifles with which the Viet Cong are equipped. This concern has not been reported elsewhere, but other RVNAF elements, not so well-equipped as the Marines, may be once again apprehensive over their relatively limited firepower as they were when they first encountered enemy units armed with the new family of 7.62-mm small arms in 1964-65. The Vietnamese Marines have also reflected concern with the apparently plentiful supply of B-40 and B-41 rocket launchers in the hands of Viet Cong units in Saigon; they have also been used extensively in other areas and may have adversely impressed other RVNAF elements.

c. ~~Popular reactions to ARVN performance have been mixed.~~ In two instances (Quang Tri and Khanh Hoa), the populace reportedly

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indicated gratitude or appreciation for ARVN's performance. In most areas, the people are reported to be confused, frightened, traditionally passive or non-committal, while in other areas (Quang Tri, Phan Thiet, Long Khanh, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long, Ba Xuyen, and Chau Doc) the popular reaction has been generally unfavorable to RVNAF. A mixture of these reactions has been reported in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area. Criticism of the RVNAF ranges from complaints about the lack of security to bitterness at the allegedly wanton destruction of property. In several areas (Vinh Long, Ba Xuyen, and Saigon) looting and pilfering by ARVN and police elements has been charged.

d. ~~There are no uncommitted RVNAF forces in RVN at this time. At present four RVNAF battalions are technically listed as uncommitted. In point of fact in each Corps tactical zone one battalion is held as a reaction force.~~

The RVNAF response to the current emergency situation is summarized in the battalion mission assignments as of 29 January and 10 February.

	<u>29 January</u>	<u>10 February</u>
Combat Operations	62	90
Security	24	29
Training	3	0
Reserve	15	4
Pacification	51	32
TOTAL	<u>155</u>	<u>155</u>

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e. An assessment of ARVN battalion effectiveness at this time is complicated by several factors: the reduction in strength of approximately 9,100 troops killed, wounded or missing; the aftermath of the TET holiday leave situation (3,000 have been given transportation back to their units, many others await transportation); an untabulated number of unauthorized absences stemming from TET leave; and continuing recruiting problems. Using a criteria of a minimum of 60 per cent personnel present for duty constituting an effective unit, RVNAF battalion effectiveness is indicated as:

ARVN Infantry (120 Battalions)	* Effective
Ranger (20 Battalions)	* Effective
Airborne (9 Battalions)	4 Effective
VN MC (6 Battalions)	6 Effective

* Battalion strength breakdowns for ARVN Infantry and Ranger Battalions are not available at this time, but based on authorized strengths, the over-all per cent for duty level on 7 February was: ARVN Infantry 50 per cent, Ranger 43 per cent. As of 7 February, the average present-for-duty strength of RVNAF Battalions was:

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Present</u>
ARVN Infantry	639	320
Ranger	755	320
Airborne	836	350
VNMC	876	500

As an example of unit strength deficiencies, the 9th Airborne Battalion

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present for duty totals range from a low of 157 to a high of 500 out of the authorized strength of 836.

f. In sum, in view of the incomplete information available it is difficult to generalize with confidence. It does appear that most ARVN units reacted reasonably well to the initial attacks. Subsequently there seemed generally to have been a lack of aggressiveness, and some breakdowns in discipline were reported. Although morale and confidence seem to have been shaken, morale does not appear to have collapsed. Because of the disruption of communications, RVNAF units are probably not well informed of the situation and thus susceptible to the same rumors that seem to be upsetting the civil populace. Thus their vulnerability to Viet Cong propaganda has probably increased. ~~factors considered, some ARVN elements would seem to be ill-prepared for sustained or renewed pressure without a respite for several weeks or even months, and some in isolated areas operating without close US support might disintegrate. However, many of the units can be expected to still give a good account of themselves.~~

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

27 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Situation and Requirements in South Vietnam

1. I spent the better part of three days conferring with General Westmoreland, General Abrams, General Momyer and the Senior American Commanders in each of the four Corps areas. With Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland, I called on President Thieu and Vice President Ky and, with General Westmoreland, saw General Vien.
2. I have prepared a more detailed report which you may wish to see later, but the major points are outlined in this memorandum.
3. There is no doubt that the enemy launched a major powerful nation-wide assault against the Government of South Vietnam and its Armed Forces. This offensive has by no means run its course. In fact, we must accept the possibility that he has already deployed additional elements of his home army without our having detected such a move. We must be prepared to encounter enemy use of longer range missiles or rockets (Frog) and limited use of enemy tactical air. All commanders on the scene agree that his initial attack nearly succeeded in a dozen places and the margin of victory -- in some places survival -- was very very small indeed. Whether he intends to expend himself fully at the current level of intensity or hold out enough to fight next year is not known. However, the scope and severity of his attacks and the extent of his reinforcement are presenting us with serious and immediate problems.

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Authority JCS 10-4-78 letter
By if, NARS, Date 4-6-79

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4. The South Vietnamese Armed Forces performed remarkably well in most places, most elements were not hurt too seriously, and are on the road to recovering their fighting strength, but they are not yet out of the woods. On 20 February RVNAF forces had 97 effective and 58 ineffective battalions. The ineffective battalions seemed to be recovering fairly rapidly. The Regional and Popular Force situation is not yet clear. There is some question as to whether the South Vietnamese Armed Forces have the stamina to withstand the pressure of a prolonged enemy offensive. General Westmoreland has already been forced to move to their assistance in a number of important areas. Commanders are unanimous in the view that the VC would have achieved a number of significant local successes at the outset, except for timely reinforcement by US forces. At the moment there are ten US battalions operating in the outskirts of Saigon against a number of enemy regiments which have encircled the city. US forces are carrying the brunt of the action at Hue and are preparing for large scale actions in the northern two provinces, in the Highlands, and around Saigon. With respect to northern I Corps the major engagements may be at Hue and Quang Tri instead of Khe Sanh.

5. The enemy has undoubtedly been hurt, but he seems determined to pursue his offensive -- apparently he has the capability to do so. There has been a substantial withdrawal of ARVN forces from the countryside in order to protect the cities and towns. Therefore, unless ARVN forces reenter the countryside quickly it may go by default. In my meetings with President Thieu, Vice President Ky and General Vien, I emphasized the need for ARVN units to move out of the cities and towns into the countryside and operate against the enemy infesting the environs. All three agreed, but they commented upon the serious effect on the urban population of a recurrence of the TET operations. General Westmoreland is working with General Vien to implement a program whereby urban security would be turned over in a major way to Police Forces supported by small mobile military forces held in reserve to reinforce the police when they encounter enemy forces with which they can not cope. Most commanders believe that ARVN will need, or -- just as importantly -- think it needs, assistance from US forces for this purpose. Thus, at the very time General Westmoreland is redeploying and otherwise preparing to meet major thrusts by large NVA forces, he is forced to pick up part

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of the tab from ARVN. This is especially true in and around Hue, Saigon and the II and IV Corps.

6. It is the consensus of responsible commanders that 1968 will be the pivotal year. The war may go on beyond 1968 but it is unlikely that the situation will return to the pre-TET condition. The forces committed and the tactics involved are such that the advantage will probably swing one way or the other, during the current year.

7. US forces are in good combat shape. Air support has not been significantly degraded. Increased requirements for rapid reaction by US forces has placed a premium on helicopter availability in the face of increasing battlefield losses. In-country airlift is increasingly critical. Logistical support is marginal in the northern I Corps but will improve with the opening of Hwy 1 and with temporary facilities now being built for over-the-shore supply. Equipment loss rates are up and we must review the adequacy of replacements and spare parts programs.

8. In many areas the pacification program has been brought to a halt. The VC are prowling the countryside, and it is now a question of which side moves fastest to gain control. The outcome is not at all clear. I visualize much heavy fighting ahead. Casualties will probably remain high. Equipment losses will continue at a high level. ARVN may prove to be a bit shaky under sustained pressure. The government will have enormous problems with refugees, civilian casualties, morale and recovery.

9. If the enemy synchronizes his expected major attacks with increased pressure throughout the country, General Westmoreland's margin will be paper thin. He does not have a theatre reserve. We can expect some cliff-hangers, and with bad luck on weather or some local RVNAF failures he may suffer some reverses. For these reasons he is asking for additional forces as soon as possible during this calendar year.

10. General Westmoreland wants, as a matter of urgency, a mechanized brigade consisting of one tank battalion and one mechanized battalion and one infantry battalion from the 5th Mechanized Division. He also wants an armored cavalry regiment and the

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remainder of the 5th Marine Division/Wing, and the acceleration of the deployment of certain supporting units now programmed for deployment under Program 5.

11. These immediately required forces, which he hopes to receive before the first of May, will permit him to deploy additional armored elements to reinforce along the DMZ and will include a capability to cope with a potential enemy armored threat. He hopes that this will permit him to disengage at least some elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division or the 101st Airborne Division for the beginnings of a theatre reserve. The additional requirement, which he considers necessary as soon as possible, but not later than 1 September 1968, includes the ROK Light Div, the remainder of the 5th Mechanized Division and associated elements. The armored elements of this force could be deployed in a mobile defense of the DMZ thus releasing the remainder of the airborne infantry or air cavalry forces for employment elsewhere as a substantial theatre reserve. This would also permit the repatriation of the brigade of the 82d Airborne Div.

12. As a matter of prudence, particularly in light of the protracted NVA buildup, General Westmoreland states a requirement during the calendar year for an additional infantry division to anticipate possible deterioration of some ARVN units, and to provide a reasonably available two-division theatre reserve at all times of the year.

13. It is my judgment that General Westmoreland requires a theatre reserve of about two divisions. The deployment of the 5th Mechanized Division, the armored cavalry regiment, and additional Marines would permit him to shake loose either the air cavalry or the airborne division as a theatre reserve. Additionally, at the onset of the good weather season in the DMZ area (from May to November), he could probably extract the other Army division to constitute an adequate reserve. If Hanoi deploys additional elements of the home army, this reserve might also be committed and additional force requirements would be generated.

14. The rough estimate of added strength required for the three force increments is:

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	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. Immediate Increment, Priority One	54,000	8,060	37,132	8,791	107,983
b. Immediate Increment, Priority Two	31,600	4,446	--	5,750	41,796
c. Follow-on Increment	<u>46,700</u>	<u>138</u>	<u>2,004</u>	<u>6,558</u>	<u>55,400</u>
TOTAL	132,300	12,644	39,136	21,099	205,179

15. The spread sheet attached sets forth the major units included in the above strength figures.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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	REQUESTED CLOSURE DATE	US ARMY FORCES	USMC FORCES	US AIR FORCES	US NAVY FORCES
IMMEDIATE INCREMENT PRIORITY 1	BY 1 MAY 68	1 BDE, 5TH MECH DIV 1 ARMD CAV REGT 3 ARTY BNS 4 ENGR BNS 4 MILITARY POLICE BNS 2 HOSPITALS OTHER SUPPORTING FORCES	5TH MARINE DIV (-) 2 REGIMENTAL LAND- ING TEAMS* & SUP- PORTING ELEMENTS FORCE TROOPS (-) TANK, ARTY, ENGR, COMMUNICATIONS, & OTHER SUPPORTING ELEMENTS MARINE AIR WING(-) 4 TAC FTR SQDNS 3 HELICOPTER SQDNS	4 TAC FTR SQDNS BASE SECURITY INCREASED AIRLIFT INCREASED BASE SUP- PORT FOR ADDITION- AL FORCES	MOBILE RIVERINE FORCES (MEKONG DELTA) 3 BARRACKS LIGHTERS 3 TUGS LANDING CRAFT INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ICTZ 1 HOSPITAL 1 CONSTRUCTION BN LANDING CRAFT NAVY PERSONNEL WITH MARINES
IMMEDIATE INCREMENT PRIORITY 2	AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT PRIOR TO 1 SEP 68	5TH MECH DIV (-) 2 BDES 1 AIR CAV SQDN 2 ARTY BNS 3 ENGR BNS 3 HOSPITALS 2 MILITARY POLICE BNS HELICOPTER COMPANIES	NONE	4 TAC FTR SQDNS 1 AIR DEFENSE SQDN AIRCRAFT TO SUPPORT NAVY GAME WARDEN OPERATIONS INCREASE AIRLIFT	GAME WARDEN (INTERDICTION OF INLAND WATERWAYS) LANDING CRAFT 3 TUGS PATROL BOATS INCREASED SUPPORT FOR ICTZ CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL
FOLLOW-ON INCREMENT	BY DEC 68	INF DIV 3 AIR CAV SQDNS 2 ARTY BNS 2 ENGR BNS 2 HOSPITALS HELICOPTER COMPANIES	12 COMBINED ACTION COMPANIES 138 COMBINED ACTION PLATOONS	3 TAC FTR SQDNS INCREASED AIRLIFT	NAVAL PATROL PLANE SQUADRON CONSTRUCTION PERSON- NEL NAVY PERSONNEL WITH MARINE COMBINED ACTION UNITS

ATTACHMENT

RECOMMENDED DEPLOYMENTS - MAJOR UNITS

* Includes 27th Marines
Now Deployed

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2C

Received Washington CommCen
12:03 P.M. EST Tuesday 27 Feb 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
12:24 P.M. CST Tuesday 27 Feb 68

EEA258
PP WTE10
DE WTE 902

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80608

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FEBRUARY 27, 1968

HEREWITH WESTY'S CHIEF OF STAFF (GEN. KERWIN) TALKS
WITH GEN. MCCONNELL. NO MAJOR OPERATIONS REPORTED.

1. IT IS GENERALLY QUIET THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IN THE
KHE SANH AREA VISIBILITY WAS UP TO 10 MILES WITH EARLY MORNING
AND EVENING FOG. THERE WERE 41 B-52 STRIKES ON 7 TARGETS IN
THE KHE SANH AREA. IN ADDITION, THERE WERE 268 SORTIES WHICH
CAUSED 27 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND 9 FIRES.
2. THERE WAS PATROL ACTION YESTERDAY AT KHE SANH ABOUT
400-500 METERS OUTSIDE OF THE OPERATING BASE. THE MARINES SENT
OUT A PLATOON RECONNAISSANCE FORCE FOLLOWED UP BY A REACTION
FORCE. AS OF YESTERDAY THERE WERE 15 MISSING. TODAY A FORWARD
AIR CONTROLLER LOCATED THESE MISSING PERSONNEL. APPARENTLY THE
BODIES WERE IN A TRENCHED AREA ABOUT 400-500 YARDS FROM THE BASE
ITSELF. AS OF LAST EVENING THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET TO THEM.
3. NEAR QUANG TRI LATE YESTERDAY ARTILLERY FIRED ON 200
ESTIMATED ENEMY USING FIRE CRACKERS. BECAUSE OF HEAVY ENEMY FIRE
THE FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER WAS UNABLE TO OBSERVE ANY RESULTS.
4. AT DONG HA AND CON THIEN, ALONG THE DMZ, THERE WAS SOME
HEAVY INCOMING FIRE. AT DONG HA 20,000 GALLONS OF DIESEL FUEL
WERE LOST; TWO OBSERVATION PLANES WERE DAMAGED; HEAVY DAMAGE
REPORTED TO VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT. THERE WERE 1 KIA AND 22 WIA.
AT 0110 THIS MORNING CON THIEN RECEIVED ABOUT 200 ROUNDS.
5. THE SECOND BATTALION OF THE FIRST MARINE REGIMENT SAW
THE ENEMY ATTEMPTING TO EXTINGUISH A FIRE ABOUT FOUR KILOMETERS
NORTH/NORTHWEST OF CON THIEN AND CALLED IN AIR STRIKES. THERE
WERE 26 SECONDARY FIRES.

PP

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Authority OSD 10-11-78, NSC 8-12-80

By inf, NARS, Date 9-2-80

6. IN THE II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE THE 3D BATTALION OF THE 12TH INFANTRY REGIMENT WENT INTO A HOT LANDING ZONE, ABOUT 19 KILOMETERS WEST OF DAK TO, AND HAD THE LEAD HELICOPTER HIT. THE REMAINING HELOS WENT INTO AN ALTERNATE LANDING ZONE ABOUT 200 METERS AWAY. RESULTS WERE ONE KIA AND NINE WIA. THE ENEMY LOST 21 KILLED BY BODY COUNT.

7. AT PLEIKU THIS MORNING, CAMP HOLLOWAY RECEIVED AN ESTIMATED 75 ROUNDS OF 82 MM MORTAR FIRE CAUSING 15 FRIENDLY WOUNDED AND TWO HELICOPTERS DAMAGED.

8. IN III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE, 22 KILOMETERS WEST OF TAY NINH CITY, SPECIAL FORCES ELEMENTS ENGAGED AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY. ALLEGEDLY THIS COMPANY WAS REINFORCED WITH THREE TANKS AND A HALF-TRACK MOUNTING QUAD 50-CALIBRE MACHINE GUNS. IT WAS REPORTED THAT ONE OF THE TANKS HAD BEEN KNOCKED OUT WITH A LIGHT ASSAULT WEAPON AND EXPLODED. TODAY A GROUP FROM THE J-2, MACV WAS SENT TO CHECK THIS OUT AND AS YET THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF A DESTROYED TANK, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE TANK TRACKS IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, A FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER REPORTED THAT THERE WAS A TANK ACROSS THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. NONE OF THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN VERIFIED.

9. EARLY THIS MORNING TAN SON NHUT RECEIVED 7 ROUNDS OF 122 MM ROCKET. TWO ROUNDS WENT INTO THE AMERICAN COMPOUND CAUSING LIGHT DAMAGE. ADDITIONALLY, TWELVE AIR AMERICA AIRCRAFT WERE LIGHTLY DAMAGED.

10. IN DOWNTOWN SAIGON THIS MORNING TEN ROUNDS OF 75 MM RECOILLESS RIFLE FIRE WERE DIRECTED AT THE CAPITOL MILITARY DISTRICT COMPOUND. TWO ARVN WERE WOUNDED.

11. IN IV CORPS, AT 12 NOON TODAY, THE RIVERINE FORCE, IN OPERATION CORONADO 11, FOUND A GRAVE IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE CONTAINING 39 BODIES; AND VERY LARGE WEAPONS CACHE.

DTG: 271703Z FEB 1968

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EYES ONLY~~

Received Washington CommCen
2:59 P.M. EST Tuesday 27 Feb 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
2:30 P.M. CST Tuesday 27 Feb 68

VZCZCEEA259
OO WTE10
DE WTE 904

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80610

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

THE FOLLOWING HAD LUNCH TODAY TO CONSIDER THE TENTATIVE PROPOSALS OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND GENERAL WHEELER FOR ADDITIONAL TROOPS: SECRETARY RUSK, SECRETARY MCNAMARA, MR. CLIFFORD, UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACH, W. BUNDY, H. MCPHERSON, J. CALIFANO, AND MYSELF.

ALTHOUGH WE HAD A FRESH MCPHERSON DRAFT OF A SPEECH AVAILABLE, THE LUNCH WAS TAKEN UP WITH AN EXTENDED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE TROOP ISSUES ITSELF.

THE FOLLOWING KEY QUESTIONS WERE RAISED:

- THE MILITARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS UNDERLYING THE TROOP REQUESTS;
- THE BUDGETARY AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE RAISED;
- THE RATIONALE FOR PUBLIC PRESENTATION IN THE U.S.;
- REACTIONS IN EUROPE, AS WELL AS REACTIONS IN MOSCOW, PEIPING AND HANOI;
- WHAT SORT OF PEACE PROPOSALS, IF ANY, SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT;
- THE STATE OF THE GVN AND ITS CAPACITY TO CARRY THE LOAD IN THE DAYS AHEAD;
- THE STATE OF THE ARVN AS WELL AS REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES: AN ASSESSMENT IS PROMISED US FROM SAIGON ON FEB. 29, ALTHOUGH BUS WHEELER MAY BE BRINGING BACK SUCH A DETAILED ASSESSMENT.

A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS WERE STATED AND EXPLORED. THE ONLY FIRM AGREEMENT AMONG SECRETARIES RUSK AND MCNAMARA, KATZENBACH, AND CLIFFORD WAS THIS: THE TROOP ISSUE RAISES MANY QUESTIONS TO WHICH YOU OUGHT TO HAVE CLEAR ANSWERS BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION. THEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT YOU NOT MAKE A FINAL DECISION AT BREAKFAST TOMORROW BUT, AFTER LISTENING TO GENERAL WHEELER, ORDER A TEAM TO GO TO WORK FULL-TIME TO STAFF OUT THE ALTERNATIVES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (PERHAPS CLARK CLIFFORD COULD CHAIR THIS INTENSIVE WORKING GROUP). THEY OUGHT TO REPORT IN A VERY FEW DAYS.

I WILL HAVE WAITING FOR YOU ON YOUR RETURN TONIGHT AN AGENDA AND SET OF QUESTIONS FOR THE BREAKFAST MEETING TOMORROW MORNING.

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Authority DSD-10-11-78, NSC 8-12-80

By 48, NARS, Date 9-2-80

DTG: 271959Z FEB 68

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