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R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

O F F I C E O F N A T I O N A L E S T I M A T E S

26 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Outlook in Vietnam

1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over a long term. It is addressed only to the specific question put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to involve a continuation of combat into the indefinite future at a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable to sustain such a level beyond a few months.

2. The current phase of combat will have a critical bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to be decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will last, but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results and the longer term implications will be fairly clear to Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington. At present, the key questions concern:

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Authority NLS 81-91

By ics, NARS, Date 8-20-82

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(1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their current challenge, and whether they can continue the fighting thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese political and military establishment to cope with the tasks imposed by the present Communist offensive.

Communist Plans and Prospects

3. Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to register significant military successes against US and especially ARVN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses, physical destruction and disorganization on the GVN as to produce a total situation favorable to a negotiated settlement on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely to have a rigid timetable, but they probably hope to achieve decisive results during the course of the summer. The high importance which Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evident from the risks and costs of the enterprise.

4. The toll on Communist forces has been considerable, even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of low level recruits and impressed civilians. To some extent these losses have been offset by measures already taken. Heavy

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infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the guerrilla and Main forces could still be committed. And, at present, the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas, where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able to recoup their recent losses, though at some sacrifice in quality.

5. In any case, the Communists probably will maintain their offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept the high losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be capable soon again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are almost certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including major battles with US forces, assaults on selected cities, and rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations.

6. It is possible that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term. ~~On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their present~~

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~~push falls short they will wish to be able to sustain a~~
~~protracted struggle. Hence, they will probably not exercise~~
~~their capabilities in such a profligate manner as to deny~~
~~themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle should~~
~~the present phase fail to produce a decisive result.~~

GVN/ARVN Prospects

7. ~~The will and capability of the GVN and its armed forces~~
~~remain the keys to the eventual outcome.~~

8. ~~In the main, the ARVN has acquitted itself fairly well~~
~~since 30 January, though the record is uneven.~~ Morale has held
up on the whole, and we know of no unit defections. However,
the ARVN is ~~showing signs of fatigue and~~ in many areas it has now
~~lapsed into a static defensive posture. Security in the country~~
~~side has been sharply reduced.~~ A long and costly effort would
have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. It is
highly unlikely that the ARVN will be inspired enough or strong
enough to make such an effort -- certainly not in the near future.

9. ~~The GVN also performed adequately in the immediate~~
~~emergency, particularly in the Saigon area.~~ There now appears

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to be a greater recognition of the need to push forward with additional measures, but the Communist challenge has not yet proved a catalyst in stimulating an urgent sense of national unity and purpose.

10. ~~The overall position of the government has been weakened. Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet offensive; its control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular attitudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying to the government side.~~ Passivity is likely to continue as the dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government. While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse, its ability to provide energetic leadership throughout the country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible that over the next few months certain provinces, especially in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authority.

11. ~~The psychological factor is now critical for South Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus.~~ The widespread rumors that the US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic

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of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there are no signs of a crisis of confidence within the government.

12. ~~If major military reverses occur, the political and military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness. If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the Communists and the general offensive appears to be contained, then the GVN might manifest new energy and confidence and draw new support to itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the present phase without being still further weakened.~~

Alternative Outcomes of Present Phase

13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a high level of military activity for at least the next two or three months. It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain, given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our best estimate is as follows:

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a. The least likely outcome of the present phase is that the Communist side will expend its resources to such an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady advances by the US/GVN.

b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that the GVN/ARVN will be so critically weakened that it can play no further significant part in the military and political prosecution of the struggle.

c. More likely than either of the above is that the present push will be generally contained, but with severe losses to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that a period will set in during which neither will be capable of registering decisive gains.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



ABBOT SMITH
Chairman

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Tuesday
February 27, 1968 -- 6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have marked the key passages in this CIA document on the outlook in Vietnam. So far as the decisions before you are concerned, paragraphs 11 and 13, sidelined in red (pp. 5-6), are critical.

Whether "the U.S. and ARVN regain the initiative" is really what your decision in the days ahead is about.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

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Authority NSC 2-9-79 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 6-11-79

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(S) INFORMATION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Tuesday, February 27, 1968
7:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA's appreciation of
Communist military strategy in the weeks
and months ahead.

There is a summary (pp. 1-3) with
key passages marked.

Walt
W. W. Rostow

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Authority CIA 2-6-80 letter + NSC 10-25-78 letter
By lif, NARS, Date 7-16-80

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

*Future Communist Military Strategy
in South Vietnam*

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Authority NLJ-CBS 2
By is, WAKS, Date 9-18-84

~~Top Secret~~

27 February 1968

SC No. 01933/68

Revised

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Future Communist Military Strategy in South Vietnam

Summary

Developments during the past few weeks have made it clear that the Communists now plan to put extensive and sustained military pressure on the urban areas of South Vietnam. At a maximum, they hope to move in and control some of the major cities; failing this, they will try to bring about a deterioration of governmental authority in urban areas, as well as in the country-side. They would hope that the disintegration of the government position eventually would force a political accommodation in the war on Communist terms.

During the last few weeks there have also been a number of indications, apart from the attacks on the cities, that additional shifts in Communist war strategy are in process. Among these has been evidence of plans to use the limited North Vietnamese air arm in a logistic or attack role in South Vietnam. New Communist weapons including tanks and possibly better artillery rockets have appeared in the DMZ area. Signs pointing to additional troop infiltration to the South have been noted, while the flow of supplies to the DMZ and down the Lao corridor has continued at a stepped-up pace. Additional enemy road building has also been under way which will improve the Communists' ability to support military units in both the DMZ and the coastal area of the two northern provinces in South Vietnam.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and was coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

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The developments suggest that the enemy is trying to get in a position throughout the two northern provinces which will permit him to conduct sustained offensive operations, probably along more conventional military lines than ever before in the war. Recently the bulk of one division of Communist troops from the DMZ area has slipped south into the coastal plains of Quang Tri and, along with NVA elements already in the sector, will probably attempt a gradual, but sustained campaign, to erode and destroy friendly control over the rural population and the cities in the area. It also appears that the Communists are going to make a major effort to hold positions around the city of Hue, ~~invest or capture Quang Tri, and, if possible, gain de-facto administrative control over Thua Thien and Quang Tri provinces.~~

Continued pressure on the allied bastion at Khe Sanh is likely in the course of the Communist effort in the north, with the enemy seeking to tie down a substantial allied reaction force. Whether Hanoi will make an all-out effort to overrun the base remains to be seen; there is some evidence in the recent shift of Communist troops to the eastward that the enemy may be reducing his forces somewhat in the general vicinity of Khe Sanh. On the other hand, there is evidence of continuing enemy preparations for a ground assault against the base, should the prospects for success appear promising.

~~We believe the most likely course of overall enemy action in Vietnam during the near term will revolve around a major effort in the north combined with selective pressure in the central highlands and against the urban areas farther south. The pressure against the cities will include both limited ground probes and coordinated attacks by fire. We think it likely the enemy will make a special effort, partly for political and psychological reasons, to harass and disrupt the city of Saigon. Should security in the city deteriorate, the enemy could decide to move in again with major forces.~~

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The Communists will also be heavily engaged in trying to consolidate the gains they have made throughout the rural areas of the country since the government's retreat to defend the cities. In particular, they will attempt to destroy much that has been achieved in the pacification/RD program, and will utilize renewed access to the rural population to intensify recruitment efforts and the collection of taxes and other forms of logistic support.

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Recent Enemy Activities

1. New Weapons: There have been many indications in recent weeks that the North Vietnamese now plan to use their limited air arm in an offensive and/or logistic role to support the war in South Vietnam. Radar and communications facilities have been established in North Vietnam's southern provinces since the first of the year which would permit Hanoi-based MIGs to intercept B-52 flights in the DMZ area. A few of North Vietnam's IL-28 bombers have returned from reserve bases in China and are in a position to strike targets in South Vietnam. AN-2 and IL-14 transports, some of which have been modified for bombing missions, have made several flights over South Vietnamese territory in recent weeks.

The enemy has used significant new weapons on the ground in northern South Vietnam. In addition to the surface-to-air missile units positioned just north of the DMZ, Hanoi has introduced a number of antiaircraft artillery units around Khe Sanh and in the A Shau valley which may be equipped with weapons as large as the 37-mm. AAA gun. Other ground weapons which have been discovered in Communist hands since the first of the year include an extended range 122-mm. rocket supplied by the Soviet Union and a new, highly portable, 107-mm. rocket provided by the Chinese.

3. Perhaps the most significant development in Communist weaponry in recent weeks has been the introduction of armor. PT-76 amphibious tanks spearheaded the drive against Lang Vei near Khe Sanh and have recently been sighted in the eastern sector of the DMZ. | reports indicate the presence of enemy armor units just north of the DMZ in the Vinh Linh area and on a new road the Communists are building between the A Shau valley and Hue. Unconfirmed agent reports credit the enemy with tanks in the western highlands in a position to threaten Kontum and Pleiku. On 26 February a US special forces detachment engaged an enemy unit 65 miles northwest of Saigon which was equipped with three armored vehicles, initially reported as T-34 tanks.

4. Renewed Infiltration and Redeployments:

additional North Vietnamese manpower probably is moving to South Vietnam.

At least battalion-size elements probably are involved. Whether they constitute replacement pockets, or augmentation groups is not clear. There is no current evidence, however, that additional organic NVA army units have started moving. There are tenuous indications that some of the current infiltration may funnel through the A Shau valley in northern South Vietnam. Units coming in via this route have usually filled up or augmented Communist forces in the northern provinces of the country.

5.

One or both of these regiments could be in the DMZ area. There is some evidence from POWs, moreover, that elements of the North Vietnamese 308th Division have been in the DMZ/Quang Tri Province area for some time.

6. At present, the Communists are known to have at least 18 regiments, under four division headquarters and one senior front command, arrayed throughout the DMZ sector and Quang Tri Province. there are a number of unidentified terminals in the DMZ-Quang Tri sector. Thus it seems probable that additional enemy forces are present whose exact identity is still unknown. About half of the forces in Quang Tri are concentrated in the western half of the province; strong elements of the other half, however, have been repositioning southeastward over the past few weeks for what will probably become one of the major enemy offensive movements of the war.

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7. The 324B Division has slipped down from the DMZ along the foothills and joined several independent NVA regiments operating out of the mountainous base area (called Base Area 101) and the open country south of Dong Ha and north of My Chanh. These forces now pose a major threat to the urban centers in the area. The continued use of north-south Route 1 and the Cua Viet River, as allied supply links to the DMZ, is also threatened by these enemy deployments.

8. It seems unlikely that the Communists would move DMZ forces as far south into eastern Quang Tri if they were not fairly confident of their ability to maintain relatively secure supply links from the DMZ area to these units. It is possible that some of the missing elements of the 316th Division are now filling in along the eastern DMZ in order to plug the hole left by the southward shift of the 324B Division.

It also appears that some elements of the 320th Division which shifted eastward are intended to help cover the area around Con Thien.

9. New Logistic Patterns: The Communists may also intend their recent logistic activity in the A Shau valley area to play a supporting role in the stepped-up NVA operations in eastern Quang Tri. Photography late last month showed that about four miles of new road had been constructed eastward off Route 548, which runs through the A Shau valley. [REDACTED] the Communists hope to link it up with the existing road to the lowlands and to the city of Hue which runs from the village of Ta Luong in central Thua Thien. Some US officials in the area believe the Communists are already moving supplies over the truckable portion of this road net, and [REDACTED] indicates enemy plans to send in artillery and armor.

10. Photography shows in addition that the integration of the A Shau valley complex with other enemy facilities in northern South Vietnam involves the construction of landline telephone circuits along the Laos-GVN border from the DMZ to the A Shau area. Completion of the links will provide an additional element of security, as well as permanence, for some North Vietnamese military communications in the area.

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11. The road building around A Shau has been accompanied by other enemy road improvement to the north which facilitates movement into the Khe Sanh sector and central Quang Tri. Aerial photography shows two new roads under construction from a point near Ban Dong on Route 9 toward the Khe Sanh area. The enemy has also been using Route 9, having driven a Lao military unit from its position at Ban Houei Sane in late January. Photography of early February showed that medium to heavy vehicular traffic had been moved over portions of Route 9 near the South Vietnam border.

12. Communist road construction has been paralleled by a sharp step-up in the movement of supplies into the southern DRV-DMZ area and down to the Lao panhandle road net. Although the exact level of this activity is not apparent, it appears to have been sufficient to build up at least a substantial reserve of war supplies throughout much of the DMZ area. Particularly in the eastern DMZ sector, [REDACTED] major movements of artillery, rockets, and mortar ammunition have come south since the beginning of February. In the Laos panhandle, reports on truck activity show that traffic since the first of February has been about twice the level as that during the same period last year.

13. Expanded Ground Pressure in Laos: The Communists have also been maintaining an unusually high level of military pressure in Laos over the past several weeks. Much of this activity has been centered around the strategic Bolovens Plateau area in southern Laos. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops have surrounded and harassed the provincial capitals of Saravane and Attapeu and attacks have been mounted in recent days against the important government base camp at Lao Ngam and outlying positions along the southern rim of the Bolovens. The Communists have also been more active in the northern portion of the country, pushing government troops from advanced bases south of the Plaine des Jarres and occupying Tha Thon on 20 February. In addition, the Communists are closing in on Phou Pha Thi, a guerrilla base only 15 miles from the North Vietnamese border which has played an important role in guiding US air strikes against North Vietnam, and it appears increasingly doubtful that the base can be held in the face of a concerted thrust.

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Possible Communist Strategy

14. We believe that the developments described above, together with the current pattern of major Communist military action--particularly the buildup and harassment of Khe Sanh and the tenacious enemy defense in Hue--point to the probability that the most concentrated enemy effort in South Vietnam over the near term will be focused on the two northern provinces. Action in this sector could be accompanied by continued military pressure of various types elsewhere in South Vietnam and possibly on a wider scale in Indochina. The following paragraphs describe some of the possibilities and our assessment of their likelihood.

15. A Second Front in Laos: It is conceivable that the North Vietnamese intend greatly to expand the fighting in Laos, possibly in combination with a new outbreak of insurgent activity in Thailand. They might hope to accomplish further thinning of US military resources in Vietnam by forcing the US to deploy troops into Laos or Thailand. Even if the US did not react with troops, Hanoi might hope that the threat created in Laos would confuse and cloud the war issue in Washington and possibly deter or delay the US from some additional commitments in Vietnam. The best of the evidence for such a Vietnamese plan is seen in the current pressure in southern Laos.

16. Hanoi doubtless would be pleased if its current effort in Laos had a deterrent effect on US commitments in Vietnam, but we doubt that this is the primary goal of the North Vietnamese action around the Bolovens, or that Hanoi is prepared at the present stage of the war to commit very many resources to a major military campaign in Laos. The Communists have not, for example, attempted to follow up on the panicky government retreat from the Nam Bac valley in northern Laos. We believe they are probably interested primarily in reestablishing their presence in the Se Done valley west of Saravane and, when they have stripped out the area's rice stocks to support their Vietnam-oriented buildup in the infiltration corridor and in northern South Vietnam, will probably relax their pressure on the town. It is entirely possible that the Laotians will have deserted Saravane by that time, however, and that the city will come at least temporarily under enemy control.

17. In summary, we do not believe that Hanoi intends to greatly expand its military objectives in Laos over the next several months, nor do we see any signs of Vietnamese intent to expand hostilities there much beyond the normal level of dry-season fighting. There is a good chance, however, that the enemy will attempt--probably in orchestration with events in South Vietnam--to win a psychological victory by harassing government towns on the Mekong River or possibly even occupying one for a short period. The timing of such a move is of course difficult to predict, but our best guess is that the Communists will hold off until and unless the situation in South Vietnam reaches a climatic stage, when Hanoi might expect that a series of dramatic "victories" in Laos could have an additional and telling psychological impact on the overall allied positions in the war.

18. Current anti-government activity by insurgents in Thailand may be viewed in Hanoi as helpful in deterring fuller US or Thai commitments in Vietnam. There is little evidence, however, that sufficient Communist assets are presently in place there to pose much more than a continuing terrorist threat to Thai security forces or the US air bases, assuming that the insurgents were ordered into an all-out effort by Hanoi and/or Peking.

19. A Full Scale Invasion of South Vietnam: There is also the possibility that the military developments described earlier in this paper indicate that Hanoi has decided to throw its full military weight into the fray and launch an "all-out invasion" of South Vietnam, putting sufficient manpower into the effort to try to ensure that allied forces cannot block Communist occupation of at least the far northern provinces. Hanoi might be acting either from a belief that the allies were on the ropes in South Vietnam as a result of recent Communist military action, or that Vietnamese Communist resources are no longer sufficient to sustain a protracted war. In this case, Hanoi might have assurances from Peking that Chinese forces will be sent into the DRV to man the defenses left by the NVA as it moves south en masse.

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20. Evidence of recent NVA activity, however, does not suggest that any such plan is currently being implemented.

The warning signals, however, might be less explicit were the movement to come directly across the DMZ rather than down the traditional Laotian route.

Although there is evidence that infiltration into the South is continuing, the pattern and pace so far are in line with "normal" NVA movements and are not suggestive of wholesale deployments. It does not appear, moreover, that the present scale of logistic support to the South is indicative of an all-out push. Rather, the level seems designed more to support sustained military operations by the forces now in place in the area.

21. Other evidence on the state of affairs within the DRV, including the regime's domestic propaganda pitch, covert reporting on popular attitudes and activities,

also appear "normal" for the current wartime situation and do not suggest that any all-out push is coming. In fact, regime propaganda in the wake of the Tet offensive is again stressing the protracted nature of the conflict as if to prepare the people for a long road of sacrifice ahead.

22. New Mass Urban Attacks: Another possibility is a new round of coordinated mass attacks on the urban areas of South Vietnam--similar in scale and magnitude to the Tet offensive. This might be kicked off simultaneously with a heavy offensive in the northern provinces--perhaps a major push against Khe Sanh and a thrust in the eastern coastal plains. The Communists may also reopen a major campaign in the highlands where they retain substantial uncommitted force, principally from the NVA 1st Division. There is evidence [redacted] that they may be planning renewed attacks in this area on the three provincial capitals of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot, possibly in coordination with diversionary probes against military strongpoints guarding the western approaches to these urban centers.

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23. At the present time, however, we do not believe the evidence is indicative of a new urban offensive on anything like the scale of the Tet attacks. The Tet offensive, it is now clear, took long, careful planning and extensive logistic preparations. To repeat such an effort, particularly given the heavy losses in military manpower and covert resources which the Communists suffered, would, in our judgment, take a long time to prepare. Moreover, the important element of surprise is now lost to the Communists--probably for some time. Were they to throw in the bulk of their uncommitted forces, they could hardly expect now to accomplish much more with a new round of mass assaults than they did the first time. In view of their near total failure to enlist the active support of the populace in the first round, they may be preparing for an extensive propaganda effort among the people before kicking off a new mass effort at a "general uprising." Field reports, in fact, indicate that such a campaign may be getting under way.

24. It is clear, nonetheless, that even if a new mass wave of attacks is not in the offing, the Communists plan to keep up military/terrorist-type pressure on the cities much more extensively than before. A recently captured document giving an assessment of the Communist situation on 1 February, just after the opening of the Tet offensive, indicates clearly that the initial attacks were only the opening of a longer period of sustained Communist offensive operations. In the Saigon area, for example, the enemy may make a special effort, partly for political and psychological reasons, to harass and disrupt the life of the city. The current lull there could be covering enemy efforts to infiltrate a core of regular and guerrilla fighters for a new round of terrorist attacks. If the city's defenses began to falter, the substantial enemy main force elements still positioned near Saigon could be moved in to exploit the situation.

25. It would also appear from the present military dispositions of Communist forces that continuing, selective attacks on provincial capitals and lesser centers are highly likely. Some of these will probably be coordinated assaults along the lines

of the 17-18 February assaults. In the countryside, reports indicate that the Communists are attempting to mix more readily with the people than they did during the past year, and that they are trying to enlist and arm the rural populace in some places, thus bolstering their guerrilla and militia capability. Attacks on the urban areas support Communist actions in the countryside, partly by drawing the allied forces out of the rural areas.

26. It is probable that this type of action, combined with major feints and probes at isolated allied military and civil facilities in the highlands and in concert with a very heavy push in the two northern provinces of South Vietnam, constitutes the most likely scope of enemy military strategy over the near term.

27. We believe that the coming weeks will also see a continuing increase in attacks by fire on allied airfields and other key installations. Assaults of this type have been rising steadily in number and intensity for over a year, as the Communists moved new arms into most areas of South Vietnam to help accomplish the mission. Such attacks tend to reduce friendly reaction capability and also force the concentration of more allied resources into static defense operations.

28. Even if their maximum objectives are frustrated, the Communists will endeavor to maintain enough control over rural areas and enough psychological, military and terrorist pressure on urban centers to erode popular confidence in the GVN's ability to govern and in the capacity of allied and GVN arms to provide basic physical security anywhere in South Vietnam. Through propaganda and political agitation, the Communists will also endeavor to focus popular resentment over the physical destruction of property and the plight of the dislocated against the GVN and its foreign allies, principally the US.

A Major Effort Probable in North South Vietnam

29. The developments described earlier in this paper strongly suggest that the Communists intend to inaugurate a major military push in the northern two provinces of South Vietnam. Major Communist

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forces are, of course, in position around Khe Sanh, and a massive ground assault on the base could come at any time. We think it probable, however, that the heavy aerial bombing raids in the vicinity of the base and the continuous allied artillery fire into surrounding Communist positions will make it very difficult for the Communists, at least over the near term, to mount ground attacks of the extent necessary to overrun the site.

30 It is possible they will attempt a long "siege" effort, seeking by occasional infantry forays and strong attacks by fire, gradually to render the base untenable or at the least, to keep major allied forces tied down in defense of the base. On the other hand, there is evidence of continuing enemy preparations for a ground assault against the base, should the prospects for success appear promising.

31. In the course of the action, the Communists may even reduce their besieging units by deploying some of them into other areas of Quang Tri and Thua Thien for military operations. The move of the 90th Regiment of the 324B Division eastward toward the coast, after it had engaged in at least logistic support operations for the Khe Sanh build-up, may be an indicator of Communist plans, as is the shift eastward of 320th Division elements.

32. Whether or not the Communists make an all-out try at Khe Sanh, it appears that they plan to move into a stage more closely approximating conventional warfare against the allies throughout the northern two provinces during the coming months. Enemy air operations, the introduction of new weapons, the spreading of Communist units deep into the coastal sector, and the long-term logistic backup implied by the construction of roads and landline facilities in the area are all indicative of such an intent. They denote an intent to keep up sustained military operations--albeit possibly gradualistic in nature--over a long period in the area.

33. The pattern in the repositioning of enemy units throughout the northern two provinces suggests the Communists may be planning a slow, steady, creeping effort to make the allied position gradually less tenable. If the Communist 324B Division is successful in blocking Route 1, for example, elements from it and other NVA units, such as the 270th Independent Regiment, would be in a position gradually to besiege such allied strongpoints as Gio Linh, Dong Ha, and Quang Tri city. In the meantime, strong ground

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probes and attacks by fire on these points are likely at any time. Action over the long term in this sector would be similar to that conducted by the enemy along Route 9 during the past few months. Because of enemy positioning, the road in the mountain sector is virtually impassable to all but the very strongest allied convoys; at present, it is not a dependable route for allied reinforcements and resupply.

34. Communist plans apparently also call for attempts to sustain and hopefully to increase military pressure around Hue in Thua Thien Province. This is strongly suggested by the road building activities and logistic operations being conducted eastward by the Communists from the A Shau Valley area. It is likely that some of the new infiltration [] will funnel through this area in order to replace and augment the three or so NVA regiments which normally operate in the coastal sector north and south of Hue. One of these regiments, the NVA 6th, carried the brunt of the fighting inside Hue. There are also strong local forces in this area which could form the nucleus for a further buildup. [] elements of the 324B Division may try to move on down to Hue to stiffen the Communist position in this area.

35. It would appear from the general pattern of the Communist buildup in Quang Tri and Thua Thien that they envisage the development of a situation in both provinces before the end of the summer wherein their military initiative and control of the populace will be strong enough to reduce the allied capability largely to static defense actions and cautious, limited search operations such as are now conducted against Communist units in the highlands of South Vietnam. From this formidable position, the Communists would have numerous options, depending on how things went for them politically and militarily in other areas of the country during the same period.

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36. The Thua Thien area is so far the only sector where the Communists have chosen to announce that a "provisional administration" has been formed. This is another indication of their intent to make a strenuous effort to bring the region under permanent administrative control.

37. They could use the area for staging farther south into Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces, augmenting and building their forces there and then attempting to repeat the same strategy as in Quang Tri and Thua Thien. On the other hand, if things went against them elsewhere, they might attempt to get negotiations started, using their position in the northern two provinces as a lever to gain concessions during the talks.

38. The Communists probably hope that the major effort they are developing in the northern provinces will eventually cause additional diversion of allied units from areas farther south, particularly the Saigon and delta sectors. Such a diversion would assist in the current enemy effort to keep up heavier pressure in selected provinces. Even if no further allied diversion to the north occurs, the continuation over an extended period of enemy pressure by fire attacks and outright assaults on urban centers could lead to virtual Communist domination of large areas in the southern provinces if, in the course of the attacks, the government's administrative and military apparatus declines in effectiveness and the confidence of the populace in the government continues to drop.

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Wednesday, February 28, 1968
7:20 p.m. 7:40V

Mr. President:

Despite its length, the gravity of the issues ahead suggests that you will wish to acquaint yourself with this full report of Gen. Wheeler and his staff on their trip to Vietnam.

Pages 1-15 constitute the summary.

I myself have not had a chance to read it carefully, since it has just arrived.

If I have any comments, I shall submit them to you tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

JCS 2472/237
28 February 1968

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By ap, NARS, Date 3-28-79

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28 February 1968

Page 1

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REPORT OF CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ON SITUATION
IN VIETNAM AND MACV FORCE REQUIREMENTS (U)

The attached memorandum by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 27 February 1968, together with its enclosures, subject as above, is circulated for information.

L. R. VASEY

R. J. HALLENBECK

Joint Secretariat

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Authority JCS 10-478 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 4-6-79

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THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

27 February 1968

REPORT OF CHAIRMAN, JCS ON SITUATION IN VIETNAM AND
MACV FORCE REQUIREMENTS

1. The Chairman, JCS and party visited SVN on 23, 24 and 25 February. This report summarizes the impressions and facts developed through conversations and briefings at MACV and with senior commanders throughout the country.

2. Summary

- The current situation in Vietnam is still developing and fraught with opportunities as well as dangers.

- There is no question in the mind of MACV that the enemy went all out for a general offensive and general uprising and apparently believed that he would succeed in bringing the war to an early successful conclusion.

- The enemy failed to achieve his initial objective but is continuing his effort. Although many of his units were badly hurt, the judgment is that he has the will and the capability to continue.

- Enemy losses have been heavy; he has failed to achieve his prime objectives of mass uprisings and capture of a large number of the capital cities and towns. Morale in enemy units which were badly mauled or where the men were oversold the idea of a decisive victory at TET probably has suffered severely. However, with replacements, his indoctrination system would seem capable of maintaining morale at a generally adequate level. His determination appears to be unshaken.

- The enemy is operating with relative freedom in the countryside, probably recruiting heavily and no doubt infiltrating NVA units and personnel. His recovery is likely to be rapid; his supplies are adequate; and he is trying to maintain the momentum of his winter-spring offensive.

- The structure of the GVN held up but its effectiveness has suffered.

- The RVNAF held up against the initial assault with gratifying, and in a way, surprising strength and fortitude.

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However, ARVN is now in a defensive posture around towns and cities and there is concern about how well they will bear up under sustained pressure.

- The initial attack nearly succeeded in a dozen places, and defeat in those places was only averted by the timely reaction of US forces. In short, it was a very near thing.

- There is no doubt that the RD Program has suffered a severe set back.

- RVNAF was not badly hurt physically -- they should recover strength and equipment rather quickly (equipment in 2 - 3 months -- strength in 3 - 6 months). Their problems are more psychological than physical.

- US forces have lost none of their pre-TET capability.

- MACV has three principal problems. First, logistic support north of Danang is marginal owing to weather, enemy interdiction and harassment and the massive deployment of US forces into the DMZ/Hue area. Opening Route 1 will alleviate this problem but takes a substantial troop commitment. Second, the defensive posture of ARVN is permitting the VC to make rapid inroads in the formerly pacified countryside. ARVN, in its own words, is in a dilemma as it cannot afford another enemy thrust into the cities and towns and yet if it remains in a defensive posture against this contingency, the countryside goes by default. MACV is forced to devote much of its troop strength to this problem. Third, MACV has been forced to deploy 50% of all US maneuver battalions into I Corps, to meet the threat there, while stripping the rest of the country of adequate reserves. If the enemy synchronizes an attack against Khe Sanh/Hue-Quang Tri with an offensive in the Highlands and around Saigon while keeping the pressure on throughout the remainder of the country, MACV will be hard pressed to meet adequately all threats. Under these circumstances, we must be prepared to accept some reverses.

- For these reasons, General Westmoreland has asked for a 3 division-15 tactical fighter squadron force. This force would provide him with a theater reserve and an offensive capability which he does not now have.

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3. The situation as it stands today:

a. Enemy capabilities

(1) The enemy has been hurt badly in the populated lowlands, but is practically intact elsewhere. He committed over 67,000 combat maneuver forces plus about 25% or 17,000 more in other organized forces and recently impressed men and boys, for a total of about 84,000. He lost 40,000 killed, at least 3,000 captured, and perhaps 5,000 disabled or died of wounds. He had peaked his force total in excess of 260,000 just before TET, by troop movement from North Vietnam of at least two NVA divisions, hard recruiting, and civilian impressment. So he has lost from one-fifth to one-sixth of his total strength. About two-thirds of his trained, organized unit strength can continue offensive action. He is probably infiltrating and recruiting heavily in the countryside while allied forces are securing the urban areas. (Discussions of strengths and recruiting are in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Enclosure (1)). The enemy has adequate munitions, stockpiled in-country and available through the DMZ, Laos, and Cambodia, to support major attacks and countrywide pressure; food procurement may be a problem. (Discussion is in paragraph 6, Enclosure (1)). Besides strength losses, the enemy now has morale and training problems which currently limit combat effectiveness of VC guerrilla, main and local forces. (Discussions of forces are in paragraphs 2, 5, Enclosure (1)).

(a) I Corps Tactical Zone: Strong enemy forces in the northern two provinces threaten Quang Tri and Hue cities, and US positions at the DMZ. Two NVA divisions threaten Khe Sanh. Eight enemy battalion equivalents are in the Danang-Hoi An area. Enemy losses in I CTZ have been heavy, with about 13,000 killed; some NVA as well as VC units have been hurt badly. However, NVA replacements in the DMZ area can offset these losses fairly quickly. The enemy has an increased artillery capability at the DMZ, plus some tanks and possibly even a limited air threat in I CTZ.

(b) II Corps Tactical Zone: The 1st NVA Division went virtually unscathed during the TET offensive, and represents a strong threat in the western highlands. Seven combat battalion equivalents threaten Dak To. Elsewhere in the highlands, NVA units have been hurt and VC units chopped up badly. On the coast, the 3d NVA Division had already taken heavy losses just prior to the offensive. The 5th NVA Division, also located on the coast, is not in good

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shape. Local force strength in coastal II CTZ had dwindled long before the offensive. The enemy's strength in II CTZ is in the highlands where enemy troops are fresh and supply lines short.

(c) III CTZ: Most of the enemy's units were used in the TET effort, and suffered substantial losses. Probably the only major unit to escape heavy losses was the 7th NVA Division. However, present dispositions give the enemy the continuing capability of attacking in the Saigon area with 10 to 11 combat effective battalion equivalents. His increased movement southward of supporting arms and infiltration of supplies has further developed his capacity for attacks by fire.

(d) IV Corps Tactical Zone: All enemy forces were committed in IV Corps, but losses per total strength were the lightest in the country. The enemy continues to be capable of investing or attacking cities throughout the area.

(2) New weapons or tactics:

We may see heavier rockets and tube artillery, additional armor, and the use of aircraft, particularly in the I CTZ. The only new tactic in view is infiltration and investment of cities to create chaos, to demoralize the people, to discredit the government, and to tie allied forces to urban security.

b. RVNAF Capabilities:

(1) Current Status of RVNAF:

(a) Strength

-- As of 31 Dec RVNAF strength was 643,116 (Regular Forces - 342,951; RF - 151,376; and PF - 148,789). Of the total RVNAF Regular Forces strength of 342,951, approximately one-third of the personnel were assigned to the 10 RVN Infantry Divisions. Status of these division-assigned personnel was as follows:

--	<u>Date</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>PFD</u>	<u>% of Strength</u>
	31 Dec	112,435	96,667	86
	10 Feb	112,435	77,000	68.5
	15 Feb	112,435	83,935	74.7

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-- Casualties 291800 JAN - 232400 FEB

KIA 3,052

WIA 11,136

MIA 186

TOTAL 14,374

-- Desertion figures not available.

-- From 31 Jan through 22 Feb, 11,114 replacements were furnished to units.

-- 15 Feb to 15 Mar, JGS expects to recall 15,000 reserves.

-- Net ARVN losses (desertions estimated at 7,000) are 36,000 -- gains 26,000.

-- Average strength of RVNAF maneuver battalions:

	<u>ASGD</u> <u>31 Dec</u>	<u>Present for Operations</u> <u>31 Dec</u>	<u>19 Feb</u>
CTZ I	483	451	405
CTZ II	492	491	481
CTZ III	541	473	378
CTZ IV	546	464	411
Rangers	482	432	426
Airborne	636	487	516
Marines	750	716	515

-- Current strength of RF companies is estimated (incomplete information available) at 85% of authorized, and PF platoons at 80% of authorized.

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-- Effective RVNAF maneuver battalions on 19 February: effective - 98; ineffective 57; for Corps breakout - Encl (2); RF/PF - unknown.

-- Action taken to increase ARVN strength levels:

* Halting discharge of servicemen for release after 1 February

* Recalling servicemen of draft age, who have completed less than 5 years of military service.

* Reducing basic training from 12 to 9 weeks.

* Granting amnesties.

* Conscripting for regional forces.

(b) RVNAF Equipment status:

-- There have been no meaningful losses of individual weapons.

-- 101 crew served weapons were lost from 1 through 23 February. (for corps breakdown see Enclosure (2)).

-- RVNAF lost (destroyed) in the TET battle 31 APC's, 14 tanks, 100 2 1/2 ton trucks. (for breakdown of items see Enclosure (3)).

-- ARVN has received about 40,000 M-16 rifles; 2,000 M-79 grenade launchers and 1,000 M-60 machine guns. (for status of RVNAF modernization see Enclosure (4)).

(2) Recovery to pre-TET status:

(a) Except for tanks, RVNAF should regain its pre-TET equipment status by end of March.

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(b) ARVN should recover strength at the pre-TET levels in 3 to 6 months if there are no more major losses and no collapse of administrative machinery throughout the country. For details of RVNAF strength, manpower and training see Enclosure (6)).

c. U. S. Forces:

(1) The US/Free World combat capability remains virtually unchanged from that of the pre-TET attacks. Summarized below is current status of the impact of the recent TET offensive on US/Free World capability:

(2) Personnel. The operating strength of US Army units rose from 98.9 of authorized on 1 Feb and 99.3% on 8 Feb to 99.5% on 23 Feb. Total US forces on 23 Feb was 494,923 assigned versus 488,543 authorized. Other US components reflected no significant changes. Free World personnel strength rose from 60,752 on 1 Feb to 61,591 on 23 Feb. Free World authorized strength is 59,465.

(3) Impact on close air support (29 Jan - 21 Feb). The overall capability of the US tactical air units was not significantly degraded during the TET offensive. Twenty-two aircraft of all types were destroyed and no one unit sustained enough losses to impair its mission capability. In fact, 7th AF increased its tactical fighter sorties by 8.5 percent and FAC sorties by 11 percent. Nonetheless, with forces spread thinly and the enemy on the offensive, MACV states a requirement for the remainder of the Program 5 squadrons and additional squadrons to match additional maneuver battalions.

(4) Intra-theater airlift. The airlift system has devoted major effort to aerial resupply of the Khe Sanh area and movement of reinforcing troop units and equipment within and into I CTZ. Due to the magnitude of this effort and airfield limitations only emergency resupply and some combat essential items have been moved by air during the TET offensive. Enemy action has further aggravated the airlift problem. This situation is particularly true in the Hue/Phu Bai area where both land LOCs and sea LOCs have been under constant interdiction. MACV estimates that his daily resupply, unit redeployment, and passenger requirement will be 4,394 short tons in March. This load can just be satisfied by the airlift currently

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in-country when augmented by the 8 C-130s now at Tachikawa AB, Japan that have been made available to MACV.

(5) Fixed Wing and Helicopter Status (US Army).

During the period 29 Jan - 23 Feb, 89 aircraft (10 fixed wing and 79 rotary wing) were totally destroyed; however, since 29 Jan, 10 fixed wing and 194 rotary wing aircraft have been received to replace losses and previously existing shortages. In addition, 88 helicopters arrived for the 7th Air Cavalry Squadron of the First Cavalry Regiment. The 203 rotary wing aircraft increases were in three areas -- direct fire support, airlift and mobility. During the period 1-22 Feb, 57,033 tons of cargo and 506,954 troops were moved. During the period 1-22 Jan, 59,204 tons of cargo and 528,121 troops were moved. The increasing requirement for rapid reaction by US forces has placed an even higher premium on helicopter mobility. All commanders state an urgent requirement for more troop carrying helicopters.

(6) The TET offensive has aggravated the spare parts problem. Tank and APC engines, tires and tubes for 2 1/2 and 5 ton trucks and radiators are critical. Critical shortages for the UH series include engines, main rotar hubs, drive shafts, dampers and tail booms. These are only examples and parts shortages exist in many other areas. Utilization rates are up in all categories and will remain high. Action at the Washington level is required. Solution is to place on procurement additional spare parts to support current consumption rates.


(7) The impact of the TET offensive on logistics:

(a) First, there has been a heavy drawdown of equipment and supplies, especially ammunition, both through consumption and through battle losses.

(b) Second, there has been a loss of capability at ports and other supporting activities through absenteeism and reduced hours of work of civilian direct hire and contractor employees.

(c) Third, the interdiction of LOCs has caused local shortages, maldistribution and heavy dependence on airlift.

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(d) The redeployment of forces has caused major relocations of support forces, logistical activities and supplies.

(e) The short range solutions to the four major areas listed above were: (a) Emergency replacement of major equipment items and ammunition from the CONUS and (b) day-to-day emergency actions and relocation of resources within the theater. In summary, the logistics system in Vietnam has provided adequate support throughout the TET offensive.

d. GVN Strength and Effectiveness:

(1) Psychological -- The people in South Vietnam were handed a psychological blow, particularly in the urban areas where the feeling of security had been strong. There is a fear of further attacks.

(2) The structure of the Government was not shattered and continues to function but at greatly reduced effectiveness.

(3) In many places, the RD program has been set back badly. In other places the program was untouched in the initial stage of the offensive. MACV reports that of the 555 RD cadre groups, 278 remain in hamlets, 245 are in district and province towns on security duty, while 32 are unaccounted for. It is not clear as to when, or even whether, it will be possible to return to the RD program in its earlier form. As long as the VC prowl the countryside, it will be impossible, in many places, even to tell exactly what has happened to the program.

(4) Refugees -- An additional 470,000 refugees were generated during the offensive. A breakdown of refugees is at Enclosure (7). The problem of caring for refugees is part of the larger problem of reconstruction in the cities and towns. It is anticipated that the care and reestablishment of the 250,000 persons or 50,000 family units who have lost their homes will require from GVN sources the expenditure of 500 million piasters for their temporary care and resettlement plus an estimated 30,000 metric tons of rice. From US sources, there is a requirement to supply aluminum and cement for 40,000 refugee families being reestablished under the Ministry of Social Welfare and Refugee self-help program. Additionally, the GVN/Public Works City Rebuilding Plan will require the provision of 400,000 double sheets of aluminum, plus 20,000 tons

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of cement. Furthermore, the Ministry of Social Welfare envisages the construction of 2000 temporary shelters to house TET refugees until their reestablishment can be accomplished. This temporary shelter construction program will involve the provision from US sources of an estimated 130,000 sheets of aluminum roofing and 2000 tons of cement. Although rice is available in quantity, there is a need for substantial quantities of meat, fish and similar high protein food commodities to supplement stocks available from GVN sources. The plan to augment these supplies calls for the use of US Army canned stocks costing one million dollars. Construction of temporary refugee shelters will require the equivalent of four engineer battalions. Initial estimates of US dollar requirements are about 23 million. (For refugee program and budget see Enclosure (8)).

(5) Civilian casualties: (See Enclosure (7))

- 1018 Vietnamese civilians with war related injuries were admitted to US military hospitals in RVN from 29 January to 22 February 1968. In addition, 289 civilians with non-war related injuries were admitted to US military hospitals during the same period for a total of 1307.

- The 300 beds set aside in the 91st Evacuation Hospital at Tuy Hoa and the 100 beds in the 36th Evacuation Hospital at Vung Tau were filled with the remainder of the 1307 civilian patients hospitalized in US military hospitals throughout the country.

- As of midnight, 22 February, 505 Vietnamese civilians remain hospitalized in US military hospitals.

(6) National Police:

- Casualties during TET offensive: (as of 19 Feb)

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE	16	10	0	26
SAIGON METROPOLITAN DIRECTORATE	55	48	2	105

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Casualties during TET offensive: (as of 19 Feb)
(Cont'd)

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
I CORPS	32	57	99	188
II CORPS	131	164	8	303
III CORPS	61	131	1	193
IV CORPS	<u>152</u>	<u>348</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>542</u>
TOTALS	447	758	152	1,357

- Desertions -- No information is available on desertions as yet, but indications are that desertions were practically nil, with only 152 listed as missing in action.

- Defections -- One ex-Chief of Police in Hue joined the VC. No further information available on other defections.

- Based on fragmentary reports received to date, it is considered that with two exceptions, all 69 National Police Field Force companies were effectively employed. Reports indicate a rise in the attack on the VC infrastructure in conjunction with other elements of the NP and armed forces.

- There are adequate personnel in training schools to offset the losses incurred during the TET offensive. National Police operational strength will be above pre-TET levels as soon as the Director General releases personnel from their present security functions at training facilities.

- Expansion of the National Police force is already planned and programmed. The force level goals which the US mission regards as attainable are:

STRENGTH:	<u>(Est.) Present</u>	<u>6 Mos.</u>	<u>12 Mos.</u>	<u>24 Mos.</u>
	72,000	84,000	94,000	114,000

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4. What does the future hold?

a. Probable enemy strategy. (Reference paragraph 7b, Enclosure (1)). We see the enemy pursuing a reinforced offensive to enlarge his control throughout the country and keep pressures on the government and allies. We expect him to maintain strong threats in the DMZ area, at Khe Sanh, in the highlands, and at Saigon, and to attack in force when conditions seem favorable. He is likely to try to gain control of the country's northern provinces. He will continue efforts to encircle cities and province capitals to isolate and disrupt normal activities, and infiltrate them to create chaos. He will seek maximum attrition of RVNAF elements. Against US forces, he will emphasize attacks by fire on airfields and installations, using assaults and ambushes selectively. His central objective continues to be the destruction of the Government of SVN and its armed forces. As a minimum he hopes to seize sufficient territory and gain control of enough people to support establishment of the groups and committees he proposes for participation in an NLF dominated government.

b. MACV Strategy:

(1) MACV believes that the central thrust of our strategy now must be to defeat the enemy offensive and that if this is done well, the situation overall will be greatly improved over the pre-TET condition.

(2) MACV accepts the fact that its first priority must be the security of Government of Vietnam in Saigon and provincial capitals. MACV describes its objectives as:

- First, to counter the enemy offensive and to destroy or eject the NVA invasion force in the north.
- Second, to restore security in the cities and towns.

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- Third, to restore security in the heavily populated areas of the countryside.
- Fourth, to regain the initiative through offensive operations.

c. Tasks:

(1) Security of Cities and Government. MACV recognizes that US forces will be required to reinforce and support RVNAF in the security of cities, towns and government structure. At this time, 10 US battalions are operating in the environs of Saigon. It is clear that this task will absorb a substantial portion of US forces.

(2) Security in the Countryside. To a large extent the VC now control the countryside. Most of the 54 battalions formerly providing security for pacification are now defending district or province towns. MACV estimates that US forces will be required in a number of places to assist and encourage the Vietnamese Army to leave the cities and towns and reenter the country. This is especially true in the Delta.

(3) Defense of the borders, the DMZ and the northern provinces. MACV considers that it must meet the enemy threat in I Corps Tactical Zone and has already deployed there slightly over 50% of all US maneuver battalions. US forces have been thinned out in the highlands, notwithstanding an expected enemy offensive in the early future.

(4) Offensive Operations. Coupling the increased requirement for the defense of the cities and subsequent reentry into the rural areas, and the heavy requirement for defense of the I Corps Zone, MACV does not have adequate forces at this time to resume the offensive in the remainder of the country, nor does it have adequate reserves against the contingency of simultaneous large-scale enemy offensive action throughout the country.

5. Force Requirements:

a. Forces currently assigned to MACV, plus the residual Program Five forces yet to be delivered, are inadequate in numbers

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and balance to carry out the strategy and to accomplish the tasks described above in the proper priority. To contend with, and defeat, the new enemy threat, MACV has stated requirements for forces over the 525,000 ceiling imposed by Program Five. The add-on requested totals 206,756 spaces for a new proposed ceiling of 731,756, with all forces being deployed into country by the end of CY 68. Principal forces included in the add-on are three division equivalents, 15 tactical fighter squadrons and augmentation for current Navy programs. MACV desires that these additional forces be delivered in three packages as follows:

(1) Immediate Increment, Priority One: To be deployed by 1 May 68. Major elements include one brigade of the 5th Mechanized Division with a mix of one infantry, one armored and one mechanized battalion; the Fifth Marine Division (less RLT-26); one armored cavalry regiment; eight tactical fighter squadrons; and a groupment of Navy units to augment on going programs.

(2) Immediate Increment, Priority Two: To be deployed as soon as possible but prior to 1 Sep 68. Major elements include the remainder of the 5th Mechanized Division, and four tactical fighter squadrons. It is desirable that the ROK Light Division be deployed within this time frame.

(3) Follow-On Increment: To be deployed by the end of CY 68. Major elements include one infantry division, three tactical fighter squadrons, and units to further augment Navy Programs.

b. Enclosure (9) treats MACV's force requirements for CY 68 to include troop lists, and service strengths for each of the three packages which comprise the total MACV request.

c. Those aspects of MACV's CY 68 force requirements recommendations meriting particular consideration are:

(1) Civilianization. Approximately 150,000 Vietnamese and troop contributing nation's civilians are currently employed by MACV components. Program Five contains provisions to replace 12,545 military spaces by civilians during CY 68. MACV is experiencing difficulties with the civilian program because of curfew impositions, disrupted transportation, fear, movement of military units which include civilians, strikes, and prospective mobilization

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of the civilian employees. MACV proposes a six months moratorium on the Program Five civilianization. JCS action is required. This would increase the current ceiling to 537,545. Enclosure (10) further describes the civilianization situation.

(2) Deployment of Air Squadrons. 15 tactical fighter squadrons (11 Air Force and 4 USMC) are included in the request in order to furnish adequate air support for additional Program Five forces and the maneuver battalions in the add-on request. This total includes the three tactical fighter squadrons (1 Air Force and 2 USMC) included in Program Five but not yet deployed. Enclosure (11) describes the proposed beddown for these squadrons.

(3) Deployment of Engineer Units. MACV requests a substantial add-on in engineer units: eleven engineer battalions, nineteen separate engineer companies, and augmentation for naval construction forces. These requirements are described and justified at Enclosure (12).

(4) In-Country Airlift. At the present time, in-country cargo airlift is the minimum required to meet emergency lift requirements. Unforeseen contingencies such as requirements to support operations at Khe Sanh or to provide airlift support to Camp Carroll and Camp Evans would require immediate augmentation of in-country C-130s. Thus, MACV requires a more substantial in-country cargo airlift to meet these contingencies. See Enclosure (13).

(5) Military Construction Funds. MACV will require 110 million in a FY 68 supplemental to support the deployments described above. He will also require 149M as an addition to the FY 69 MCP Program. See Enclosure (14) for details. (CINCPAC preliminary analysis is that MACV's estimates of total MCP costs for FY 68 and FY 69 add on is approximately 100 million too low).

(6) Additional Naval Forces. See Enclosure 15.

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Encl (1) Intelligence

Encl (2) ARVN Effectiveness

Encl (3) RVNAF Crew Served Weapons Losses

Encl (4) RVNAF Equipment Losses

Encl (5) Status of RVNAF Modernization

Encl (6) RVNAF Strength, Manpower and Training Program

Encl (7) Refugee Status and Civilian Casualties

Encl (8) Refugee Program Costs

Encl (9) Force Package

Encl (10) Civilianization

Encl (11) Deployment Air Squadrons

Encl (12) Engineer Requirements

Encl (13) Airlift Augmentation

Encl (14) Military Construction Funding

Encl (15) Additional Naval Forces

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INTELLIGENCE

1. Magnitude of Enemy Forces Involved in Tet Offensive:

a. Enemy maneuver forces committed in the Tet offensive through 23 February 68 totaled 67,305. This total was derived from accepted, pre-offensive strength of all VC/NVA committed maneuver battalions, regiments, and local force companies and platoons in the affected areas. It does not attempt to estimate the number of guerrillas, combat support, administrative services, or infrastructure personnel who participated, although we know that elements of all of these were used. Also not included are those who were conscriptive or impressed into the VC just prior to the offensive. A very rough estimate is that all these unknowns might increase committed strength by 10% - 25%.

(1) NVA Committed. A recapitulation of NVA maneuver units committed in each CTZ is as follows:

(a) I CTZ	14,885
(b) II CTZ	5,805
(c) III CTZ	1,625
(d) IV CTZ	0
(e) TOTAL	<hr/> 22,315

(2) VC Committed. The recapitulation shows the following breakdown for VC committed maneuver units and separate companies and platoons:

(a) I CTZ	6,803
(b) II CTZ	9,337
(c) III CTZ	13,255
(d) IV CTZ	15,595
(e) TOTAL	<hr/> 44,990

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Enclosure (1)

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(3) Total Force committed by CTZ.

(a) I CTZ (NVN & VC)	21,688
(b) II CTZ (NVN & VC)	15,142
(c) III CTZ (NVN & VC)	14,880
(d) IV CTZ (VC)	15,595
	<hr/>
(e) TOTAL	67,305

(4) There were some units committed to the Tet offensive which had not previously been reflected in Order of Battle. A breakout by CTZ follows:

(a) I CTZ. Hard intelligence on the 7th Battalion, 9th NVA Regiment was acquired during the Tet offensive which meets the criteria for inclusion in the OB. COMUSMACV was well aware of the presence of the 9th, however, lacking only identity of subordinates. A 409B NVA Sapper Battalion had been reported, but is not yet confirmed.

(b) II CTZ. No new units appeared.

(c) III CTZ. Two VC battalions were identified during the offensive. The 211th and 212th VC Battalions appeared in PHUOC LONG Province. Analysts believe the strength to be about 300 men each, but do not think that the battalions will remain as permanent units and that they will be broken up when they have served their purpose. They may have been formed from MR 10 guards and admin units.

(d) IV CTZ. One battalion, the 307th VC Battalion, was identified during the offensive and may be accepted into Order of Battle. Analysts believe the strength to be about 350 men. Evidence of this unit was known prior to Tet.

(e) In general, there are tenuous indications of a few other units, but available evidence tends to indicate that these were Local Force companies, perhaps filled up with fillers, new recruits, or impressed civilians, and operating under a battalion flag. COMUSMACV does not have sufficient evidence to include them here and further believes any such units would have been created on a short-term basis. Further, two units which were carried in OB before the offensive now look very doubtful. The 3123rd and 3125th VC Battalions of IV CTZ probably do not exist. Every unit in the CTZ was committed except these two.

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2. Enemy Long Term Losses from 1 January 1968 to Tet and the Following Period:

a. It is difficult to separate these losses and attribute them to a point in time. Some losses, however, have been identified and are related, where possible, to a specific period during or before the offensive.

(1) Recruiting. There are indications that the VC conducted an extensive "recruiting" drive immediately prior to the Tet offensive, propagandizing that the "final battle" was at hand and that the population was rising. What COMUSMACV does not know is how much of that "recruiting" was done at the point of a gun. There is evidence of widespread impressment of civilians into either military or labor duty for the offensive. This impressment could have been either a supplement to his recruiting drive or a necessity because of a failure at recruiting in the classic sense. MACV estimates the VC ability to recruit should be severely damaged as a result of both the weakened VC structure and the psychological impact of the failures and losses upon the people of the cities and villages. There may be an immediate, but temporary, surge of recruitment as the enemy exerts his influence and propagandizes. The increased animosity of the people toward the VC will, however, reduce his access to the human resources of SVN, and enemy capability to sustain that temporary surge of recruitment will rapidly decline.

(2) Lowered Combat Potential. It will take time to rebuild the VC units which participated in the Tet offensive. Some of them, for instance the H-15 Sapper Battalion, will probably never be rebuilt.

(3) Replacements. Recruiting problems and the necessity to rebuild those VC units which participated will probably force the NVA to increase the flow of individual replacements at the price of sending new NVA units to South Vietnam. These factors will force the NVA to take an increasing role in any future combat activity in South Vietnam.

(4) Psychological. The psychological let-down of the enemy will be magnified because of the intensity of his pre-offensive propaganda buildup. His forces and infrastructure throughout SVN, particularly in III and IV CTZ, were thoroughly indoctrinated that the Winter-Spring Campaign would be the decisive and concluding period of the war, that a coalition government would be formed, and that their hardships would cease and instead they would be placed in responsible positions in the coalition government. This propaganda was believed, and was a factor in greatly reducing the Chieu Hoi rate and in building up the morale of his forces to undertake this offensive. The ultimate let-down for the VC

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should be most rapid and severe among provincial and regional forces, guerrillas, and infrastructure. The impact on major units, especially in the peripheral areas, will be slower to develop and of a lesser intensity. Failure of the VC to keep their promises is certain to have far-reaching and long-term effects.

3. Enemy Recruiting:

a. Estimates of the enemy recruiting about 3,500 recruits per month remains valid. MACV is aware there was a strong effort to recruit young teenagers and women prior to the offensive, but no evidence of greater than normal success. The evidence acquired during the offensive indicates the contrary. Convalescent camps were emptied, admin services were tapped heavily, and civilians impressed at gun point. Further, many VC units had just received some of the rawest of NVA recruits just prior to attack. This suggests a lack of success in the recruitment effort.

b. There appears to be a concerted recruitment (or more likely, impressment) effort going on now in parts of the countryside. This may reduce the enemy's numerical deficit temporarily, but the reliability of the conscriptees is another question. Large numbers of the pre-offensive impressed personnel ran away before they arrived at the target areas.

c. It is quite likely that the VC recruitment problem will become even worse after the reality of VC failure and especially the heavy casualties become well known.

4. Effect of Tet Offensive on Security in Rural Areas:

a. Only fragmentary information is available regarding this vital question. Military actions continue to be concentrated in and around the urban areas and countryside travel has been limited. In general, it appears that rural security is most degraded in those regions where allied forces have been drawn from rural areas to counter threats in the urban centers, the two northern provinces of I CTZ, the Western Highlands, the provinces surrounding Gia Dinh, and extensive portions of IV CTZ. In these regions RF/PF units have devoted much time and effort to self defense and survival. In many instances ARVN forces designated to provide rural security have been withdrawn from the countryside to provide security for the urban centers as well as the province and district capitals. On the other hand, the provinces less affected by the Tet offensive fighting seem to have their rural defense forces still largely in place.

b. In I CTZ, enemy forces are probably able to influence two thirds of Quang Tri Province and are relatively free to move throughout all of Thua Thien except in the immediate vicinity of Hue. What few reports

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we have indicate the enemy is coercing food, shelter, and support from the rural inhabitants, but is concentrating his emphasis on the population centers and the Khe Sanh, Rock Pile/Camp Carroll complexes. In the remaining three provinces, enemy incursions in the rural areas remain relatively unchanged from the pre-Tet balance.

c. A similar pattern appears to pertain in II CTZ. Reports from the field indicate the most turbulence in the rural areas of Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac, and Tuyen-Duc Provinces while the friendly rural defensive posture in the remaining provinces is still reasonably effective.

d. III CTZ reports VC burning of some hamlets and numerous private dwellings. In Long An, Gia Dinh, and Hau Nghia Provinces the enemy could be attempting to demonstrate to the people of the rural area that GVN and U.S. forces cannot provide security. Information from the northern provinces is quite limited, and, for the most part, rural defenses appear to be in place.

e. In IV Corps where the enemy had more freedom than in the other CTZ's, scattered reports indicate set backs to rural security in every province but Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, An Giang, and Ba Xuyen.

f. While it is still too early to assess how extensive they may be, it appears that the enemy has made potential gains of varying degrees in a number of rural areas, but he continues to concentrate his efforts on the urban centers. In those rural areas where he has freedom of movement, he seems to be exploiting the inhabitants for what support they can render during his campaign, but we have little evidence that he is yet attempting to establish long-range area control.

5. Status of Enemy Morale:

a. The enemy has been conducting a vigorous propaganda campaign to convince his personnel that victory is certain. This has raised the morale considerably as they now believe the war to be almost over and victory to be near. This type of propaganda has been disseminated to the troops at all levels.

b. Upon entering the Tet offensive the enemy's morale was probably higher overall than it had been during any time since early 1966. There still appears to be the feeling this campaign is going to be the decisive one.

c. Since primarily only VC main and local force units were used in the Tet offensive, it is difficult to gauge the level of the morale of the NVA units. It is apparent the NVA units in I CTZ, primarily around the Khe Sanh area, are experiencing morale difficulties, primarily due to the air

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strikes. This does not appear to have affected their ability to fight. In II CTZ there appears to be little change in morale from that prior to the Tet offensive. In III CTZ morale appears to be up and will probably remain there until the Viet Cong are convinced their Tet offensive was not a success. In IV CTZ, morale appears to be high, again based on the propaganda which has preceded the offensive.

6. Enemy Logistics Picture:

a. During the Tet offensive, the enemy expended large quantities of ammunition with no evidence of any shortage. The widespread distribution of automatic weapons coupled with the increased use of B-40, B-41 and 122mm rockets all attest to the emphasis placed on the movement of ammunition and weapons. MACV notes in fact that rice appears to be the one item that might be in short supply. Enemy forces rely heavily on procuring rice locally through purchase or confiscation.

b. At the moment, large scale resupply efforts appear to be underway now throughout all of South Vietnam. In addition, prisoners and ralliers report adequate stocks of all types of supplies are in place along the Cambodian border. MACV further notes that almost all enemy logistical movement into the III CTZ appears to originate along the Cambodian border.

c. In summary, COMUSMACV concludes:

(1) The enemy expended large, but unknown quantities of ammunition during the Tet offensive with no evidence of a shortage.

(2) Units which were committed to the Tet attacks probably have already been resupplied.

(3) The widespread use of automatic and crew-served weapons, indicates an increased logistical capability.

(4) Inasmuch as his logistic activity is devoted primarily to ammunition resupply, the present tempo of the enemy's offensive operations will not be affected by ammo shortages.

(5) Though food procurement may pose a problem, MACV estimates the enemy has adequate supplies to support major attacks and peripheral pressure on the urban areas.

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7. The Enemy's Capabilities and Strategy:

a. Capabilities:

(1) The enemy in South Vietnam is capable of conducting major attacks in the following areas:

- (a) Khe Sanh - 16 Combat effective equivalent battalions (CEEB)
- (b) DMZ - 9 CEEB
- (c) Quang Tri City - 4 CEEB
- (d) Hue - 8 CEEB
- (e) Danang/Hoi An - 8 CEEB
- (f) Dak To - 7 CEEB
- (g) Saigon - 10-11 CEEB
- (h) Cai Lay/My Tho - 2 CEEB
- (i) Can Tho - 2-3 CEEB

(2) To maintain economic, psychological, and military pressure on the cities noted above as well as the following: Quang Ngai, Kontum, Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, Dalat, Phan Thiet, Song Be, Xuan Loc, Bien Hoa, Vinh Long, and other provincial towns of political significance to the enemy.

b. Strategy:

(1) The enemy's over-all objective during this Winter-Spring Campaign is to reverse the trends of Summer 1967, to strengthen his position politically and psychologically both in South Vietnam and abroad.

(a) During the first phase of the campaign, October-December, the enemy attacked in the remote areas of II and III CTZ and conducted widespread assaults in the Delta.

(b) He hoped to divert and disperse allied forces, to draw them from the populated lowland; thereby developing and strengthening his position in the urban areas.

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(2) During the first stage of his Tet offensive, the enemy conducted coordinated attacks in the urban areas. His objectives were:

(a) Primarily political/psychological

1. disrupt the GVN
2. Cause ARVN defection
3. Intimidate the populace
4. Create a general uprising

(b) Secondarily military

1. Disrupt control--attack Hqs
2. Hinder air power--attack airfields
3. Divert and disperse--widespread attacks

c. His current strategy is designed to conduct major coordinated attacks in selected areas for psychological impact and to maintain pressure on the cities in hopes of aggravating the populace to revolt against the government of Vietnam, and to attrite RVNAF and Free World Forces. Concurrent with the execution of this strategy, he will attempt to disrupt the GVN in the following manner:

(1) He will take every opportunity to make incursions into the rural area, taking advantage of the reduced security waxed by increased friendly security requirements in the urban areas. He will attempt to establish his infrastructure and guerrilla organization in those areas over which he lost control, and will strengthen his position in heretofore contested areas.

(2) In the cities and towns, he is expected to continue harassment, attacks by fire, disruption of LOC. This pressure is designed to extend the temporary disruption of the GVN economy wrought by the first stage of his Tet offensive. He will continue his attempt to arouse the people to a "general uprising."

(3) Concomitantly, the enemy will use psychological means to maintain direct pressure on the population. He will circulate rumors of impending attacks; he will threaten ARVN and GVN officials and their families; and he will commit terrorist acts to maintain intimidation.

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(4) He will continue his attacks by fire, assault and ambush against RVNAF and Free World Forces to attrite them and weaken their will to resist.

d. In summary, in the rural areas, he hopes to establish firm control and deny access to the GVN. In the urban areas he will attempt to aggravate the people to demonstrate against the government. In the latter case he hopes to create conditions which will bring down the government and put in its place a coalition government controlled by the NFF. Should this strategy fail, he probably will withdraw from further emphasis against the cities and return to his usual primary and secondary base areas; seeking once again to exploit and consolidate opportunities in the rural area.

8. New Weaponry in South Vietnam:

a. Since 31 January 1968, there have been a number of new weapons introduced into South Vietnam. These include: (1) ChiCom 107mm Spin Stabilized Rocket, (2) Unknown origin 7.62mm AKM Assault Rifle, and (3) Polish 7.62mm PMK Assault Rifle. There is every reason to anticipate the introduction of additional new weapons based on this trend. However, it is much more difficult to predict what type weapons will be introduced. The following are likely candidates:

(1) Soviet 7.62mm RPK Light Machine Gun. This would replace/supplement the RPD LMG currently in use. The principal advantage would be that many of its parts are interchangeable with the AK and AKM series of assault rifles.

(2) Soviet 23mm ZU-23 Anti-aircraft Cannon. This weapon system is highly mobile and rapidly emplaced, and in addition, provides a high rate of sustained fire. The ZU-23 would most probably be employed in peripheral areas of South Vietnam.

(3) 130mm field gun and 152mm gun-howitzer for employment against US fixed bases along the DMZ and northern Laos border.

(4) Soviet Armored Personnel Carriers and tanks in support of future enemy assaults.

(5) Probably the 14.5mm ZPU series of Heavy Machine Guns, the 37mm AA Gun, and the 57mm AA Gun in I Corps.

(6) Employment of converted IL-14's and AN-2's and possibly IL-28 light bombers in tactical bombing missions in I Corps areas.

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- (7) Night viewing devices, such as IR scopes and image intensifiers.
- (8) General increase in communications capability, through better equipment.

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ARVN EFFECTIVENESS

1. At present, the only valid measure of ARVN battalion effectiveness is obtained by a comparison of authorized and present for duty strengths. With the exception of the airborne battalions, ineffective units are regarded as those with less than 60 percent of authorized personnel. Airborne battalions are considered ineffective when their strength drops to 54 percent of that authorized.

2. As the chart below reveals, on 31 December 1967 there were 21 ineffective battalions; however, this data was obtained from the USMACV Advisory Report for October-December 1967 and considers additional factors than that stated above when rating units combat effectiveness. In view of this difference in factors used in rating units, the 29 January statistics are also portrayed.

RVNAF BATTALIONS									
CTZ	Assigned			Combat Effective			Combat Ineffective		
	31 Dec	29 Jan	19 Feb	31 Dec	29 Jan	19 Feb	31 Dec	29 Jan	19 Feb
I	33	35	34	32	33	20	1	2	14
II	30	29	26	30	25	22	0	4	4
III	49	48	56	35	39	36	14	9	20
IV	42	42	39	36	39	20	6	3	19
TOTAL	154	154	155	133	136	98	21	18	57

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ENCLOSURE 2

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RVNAF CREW SERVED WEAPONS LOSSES

PERIOD 010001H TO 312400H JAN 68

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ARVN	12	13	9	2	36
RF	13	10	4	15	42
PF	6	6	10	31	53
TOTAL:	31	29	23	48	131

PERIOD 010001H TO 232400H FEB 68

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
RVNAF	40	15	26	20	101

NOTE: RF/PF reporting is incomplete.

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ENCLOSURE 3

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RVNAF EQUIPMENT LOSSES

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>SEVERELY DAMAGED</u>
M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER	31	32
V100 COMMANDO CAR	5	3
M41 TANK	14	10
2 1/2 TON CARGO TRUCK	100	NOT REPORTED
M101A1 105MM HOWITZER	3	2
M114A1 155MM HOWITZER	2	2
H34 HELICOPTER	5	1
O1 AIRCRAFT	4	0
A1 AIRCRAFT	8	0
C47 AIRCRAFT	1	1
C119 AIRCRAFT	1	1
U17 AIRCRAFT	1	0

NOTE: RVNAF losses of equipment reports are incomplete and additional losses are anticipated in later reports.

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ENCLOSURE 4

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STATUS OF RVNAF MODERNIZATION

1. The status of the RVNAF Modernization Program of the 10 items of equipment and ammunition approved by the Secretary of Defense as modified by recent expediting actions appears in Washington to be:

M16 Rifles - 26,669 enroute by air; remainder of 82,041 prior to 30 June 1968.

PRC-25 Radios - 6,000 phased in by mid-July 1968

M606 1/4T Trucks - 200 to be provided by 30 June 1968

M602 2 1/2T Trucks - 1,702 to be provided by 30 June 1968
(Substitution of more expensive U. S. Army M-Series vehicles may be required)

M79 Grenade Launchers - 4,183 to be provided by 30 June 1968

M60 Machine Guns - 1,000 being withdrawn from units/depots for air shipment; remainder of 1,489 to be provided from production by 31 December 1968

M29 Mortar - 25 air shipped; 250 being withdrawn from Reserves for delivery MACV; action on remaining 549 pending decision on certain Reserve Brigade call-up

M101 Howitzer (105) - 36 approved to be provided by 31 December 1968; remaining 72 deferred pending approval of 105mm arty units of FY69 RVNAF Force Structure Increase (formal FY69 requirements not yet received)

M114 Howitzer (155) - 72 deferred pending approval of 155 arty units of FY69 RVNAF Force Structure Increase

105mm Ammo Allocation - Immediate requirement to be met by delegation of allocation authority to COMUSMACV. Production increase under study.

M113 A. P. C. - 29 airlifted; 114 to be sealifted with ETA before 22 March 1968

H-34 Helicopters - 16 from U. S. Army assets to be airlifted with ETA before 6 March 1968; 2 from USMC assets enroute; remaining 14 to be earmarked.

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ENCLOSURE 5

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24 February 1968

2. Received in SVN

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
M16 Rifles	39,788 *
PRC 25 Radios	614
M602 2 1/2 Ton Trucks	190
M79 Grenade Launcher	2,073
M60 Machine Guns	1,000
M29 Mortars	25
M113 Armored Personnel Carrier	29
105MM Allocation	30,300 rounds HE (405,000 rounds HE transferred to RVNAF from USARV assets)

* 1,500 M16's awaiting installation of buffers.

3. Delivered to RVNAF units

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
M16 Rifles	33,288
PRC 25 Radios	564
M602 2 1/2 Ton Trucks	190
M79 Grenade Launchers	2,073
M60 Machine Guns	802
M29 Mortars	17
M113 Armored Personnel Carriers	25

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RVNAF STRENGTH, MANPOWER, AND TRAINING PROGRAM

1. The RVNAF strength as of 31 December 1967 was 643,116 (Regular Forces - 342,951; RF - 151,376; and PF - 148,789). Later reports of the total RVNAF strength are not available. Initial RVNAF casualties reported through operational channels between 29 January and 23 February have been 14,374 (KIA - 3052; WIA - 11,136; MIA - 186). As a measure of the reduction of ARVN strength in the ten Infantry Divisions, the following comparison between authorized strength (auth str) and present for duty strengths (PFD) is provided on the dates indicated:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>AUTH STR</u>	<u>PFD</u>	<u>% OF AUTH</u>
31 Dec 67	112,435	96,667	86.0
10 Feb 68	112,435	77,000	68.5
15 Feb 68	112,435	83,935	74.7

2. It is believed that the RVNAF strength was reduced to the lowest point during 1-10 February 1968 and the strength has started to increase since that time. It is recognized that some of the increase is due to personnel returning from Tet leave; however, other measures have also been taken to increase the strength. These measures include:

a. Granting amnesty to battlefield laborers (convicted deserters) and integrating them into the units.

b. Providing replacements rapidly from the training centers.

c. Granting amnesty to military prisoners.

3. Initial casualty data (unverified) based on the losses since 29 January are shown below.

RVNAF CASUALTIES (INITIAL)

	<u>Period of</u> <u>291800 Jan - 232400 Feb</u>
KIA	3,052
WIA	11,136
MIA	186
TOTAL	14,374
DAILY RATE	569
MONTHLY RATE	17,070

The figures above make no allowance for return of wounded personnel to duty.

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ENCLOSURE 6

The losses above do not take into account any desertions and no data are available on the desertions for the period. However, if the desertion rates for CY67 (11.1 per 1,000 per month) are used, the desertion losses for a month will add approximately 7,000 for a total loss, based on the above casualty rate, of 24,070.

Looking at the short term replacement picture, the RVNAF provided a total of 11,114 replacements to units during the period 31 January through 22 February. These replacements were made up primarily of trainees from the training centers, deserter laborers (convicted deserters) and military prisoners. During the period 15 February - 15 March, the JGS expects to gain approximately 15,000 from the recall of reserves. Based on the loss rates used above, the losses during this period (1 Feb - 15 Mar) would be approximately 36,000 while the gains would be approximately 26,000.

The maximum capacity of the training centers is 33,000 for each nine week training cycle. The losses based on the rates above during the nine week period would be approximately 54,000 or a shortfall of approximately 21,000 during the nine week period. However, this shortfall will likely exceed 21,000 in the period March through May since the training centers are not at full capacity and some are still hampered by enemy activity.

4. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam training base consists of Central Training Command (CTC), Controlled Training Centers (9), and Schools (24), 10 ARVN Division Training Centers and 37 Popular Force Training Centers. As a result of the Tet offensive, training base operations halted for approximately two weeks.

As of now, 8 CTC Controlled Training Centers and 8 schools are training. The remainder are capable of resuming training as soon as the level of enemy activity is reduced. Damage to some installations was severe but expedient means are being used to continue operations. (The Armed Forces Language School was 75% destroyed, but 80% of normal student load is now training). To increase the production of trained replacements, BCT/AIT has been reduced from 12 weeks to 9.

Three of the 10 Division Training Centers have resumed training. Since they produce neither replacements nor units for ARVN, the training lost affects primarily the Division Commander's Remedial Training Program.

Four of the 37 Popular Force Training Centers (PFTC) have resumed training. One PFTC was totally destroyed. The remaining 32 can resume training as soon as recruits or units are made available.

While the training base suffered a temporary setback, the CTC Controlled

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Training Centers and Schools have displayed resiliency and each day a greater degree of pre-Tet capability prevails. The Division Training Centers and Popular Force Training Centers have the capability to resume training and will do so as soon as individuals and/or units are available to train.

Assuming the present progress toward normalcy continues and no further disruption of the activities of the training base is experienced, ARVN can achieve the training goals programmed for CY 1968.

5. The Mobilization Directorate is functioning efficiently, and during 1968 has met previously prescribed draft quotas. During the period 3-23 February, 4,662 conscripts were moved through Recruiting and Induction Centers to Training Centers. While reports are not complete, the major known disruption to the mobilization effort occurred in I CTZ, where the main office was displaced from Hue to DaNang for safety and better communications.

The number of men who voluntarily reported or were rounded up for the draft has increased significantly since the enemy offensive. The January total was 3,766; the number for the period 1-22 February is 6,640.

Additional measures taken to provide manpower include: The President's decision to go ahead with the drafting of 18-19 year-olds, despite the Legislature's objections; suspension of discharges; recall of Reservists aged 18-33 with less than 5 years service; encouragement of Reservists beyond age 33 to voluntarily return to duty; suspension of sentences and return to duty of deserter laborers; and re-examination for those previously deferred for physical unfitness.

The Mobilization Director is confident that he can meet manpower demands consistent with the ability of training centers to accept them.

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REFUGEE STATUS AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AS OF 2/23/68

Province	No. Refugees	Houses Destroyed	Civilians Killed	Civilians Wounded
<u>I CTZ</u>				
Da Nang	115 ^a	136	13	19
Quang Nam	15,749 ^a	841	193	713
Quang Ngai	2,190 ^a	898	137	514
Quang Tin	3,936 ^a	638	151	560
Quang Tri	11,835 ^a	1,671	103	332
Thua Thien	44,000 ^a	596	557	562
TOTAL I CTZ	77,825	4,780	1,154	2,700
<u>II CTZ</u>				
Dalat	20,435 ^b	2,800 ^b	37	162
Binh Dinh	23,000 ^b	1,271	22	287
Binh Thuan	21,436 ^b	4,019	36	500
Cam Ranh	0	0	0	0
Darlac	18,400	3,319	560	800
Khanh Hoa	3,192	600	33	124
Kontum	6,970 ^b	696 ^b	48	147
Lam Dong	0	0	0	0
Ninh Thuan	0	0	0	0
Phu Bon	0	0	0	0
Phu Yen	5,500 ^b	600 ^b	15	460
Pleiku	5,863 ^b	888	117	275
Quang Duc	0	50		
Tuyen Duc	0	0	0	0
TOTAL II CTZ	86,796	14,243	868	2,755

ENCLOSURE 7

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Refugee Status and Civilian Casualties (Cont'd)

Province	No. Refugees	Houses Destroyed	Civilians Killed	Civilians Wounded
<u>III CTZ</u>				
Bien Hoa	3,557 ^b	1,054	113 ^b	70 ^b
Binh Duong	5,542 ^b	1,642 ^b	52	967
Binh Long	0	2	1	9
Binh Tuy	0	0	0	0
Gia Dinh	43,275 ^b	4,000 ^b	500 ^b	
Hau Nghia	1,500 ^b	664	49	126
Long An	1,247 ^b	88 ^b	25	215
Long Khanh	3,357 ^b	191	16	59
Phuoc Long	3,904 ^b	400	18	50
Phuoc Tuy	4,400 ^b	111 ^b	40 ^b	249 ^b
Tay Ninh	1,828 ^b	17 ^b	20	52
Vung Tau	20 ^b	0	4	39
TOTAL III CTZ	68,630	8,169	838	1,836
<u>IV CTZ</u>				
An Giang	10,528	133	1	5
An Xuyen	104 ^b	0	24	80
Ba Xuyen	4,000 ^b	716 ^b	82	173
Bac Lieu	6,805	958	22	83
Chau Doc	7,195 ^b	1,263	67	162
Chuong Thien	500 ^b	79	29	52
Dinh Tuong	5,025 ^b	5,039 ^b	193	965
Go Cong	2,000 ^b	37 ^b	17	61
Kien Giang	2,139 ^b	364	82	153
Kien Hoa	23,921 ^b	4,582 ^b	234 ^b	2,005
Kien Phong	5,638 ^b	954	13	65
Kien Tuong	1,200 ^b	143	53	70

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Refugee Status and Civilian Casualties (Cont'd)

Province	No. Refugees	Houses Destroyed	Civilians Killed	Civilians Wounded
<u>IV CTZ (Cont'd)</u>				
Phong Dinh	12,662 ^b	2,106	118	145
Vinh Binh	738 ^b	282	49	271
Vinh Long	10,168 ^b	4,545	112	1,000
Sadec	1,100 ^b	320 ^b	28	73
TOTAL IV CTZ	93,723	21,521	1,124	5,363
Saigon	144,481 ^d	15,000 ^d	284 ^c	5,108 ^c
National Total	471,455	63,713	4,268	17,762

NOTE: Source: All figures are from Province SITREP unless otherwise indicated.

a. I Corps Refugee Officer for all I Corps figures. (Thua Thien figures include 29,000 for the city of Hua and 15,000 at Phu Bai)

b. Corps Refugee Officer

c. MOH

d. MSWR

e. Displaced Persons are from adjacent provinces

*PSA and Province Chief have determined that only this number require assistance.

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REFUGEE PROGRAM AND BUDGET (as of 1/15/68)

1. GVN Agency Responsible for Refugee Program: Ministry of Social Welfare/Refugees, Minister: Dr. Nguyen Phuc Que

2. SCR Budgets:

<u>Temporary Relief</u>	<u>CY 67</u>	<u>CY 68</u> (Tentative)
Relief Allowance	VN\$ 350,000,000	VN\$ 367,500,000
Temp. Camp Construction	105,000,000	150,000,000
Auxiliary Facilities	15,000,000	33,000,000
Transportation	50,000,000	
Contingency Fund	5,900,000	5,000,000
Other Expenditures		280,000,000
TOTAL:	VN\$ 525,900,000	VN\$ 835,500,000

Resettlement Budget:

Relocation Grants	VN\$ 400,000,000	VN\$ 516,000,000
Voc. Tng. & Handicrafts	50,000,000	104,000,000
Hamlet Construction	250,000,000	428,500,000
Special Resettlement Hamlets	60,000,000	160,000,000
TOTAL:	VN\$ 760,000,000	VN\$ 1,208,500,000

GRAND TOTAL: VN\$ 1,285,900,000 VN\$ 2,044,000,000

3. U.S. Budget Support:	<u>FY 1967</u>	<u>FY 1968(Est)</u>	<u>FY 1969 (Est.)</u>
Commodities	14,000,000	12,726,000	15,330,000
Contract Services	1,300,000	2,684,000	4,012,500
Personnel Services	1,200,000	1,952,000	2,236,000
Other		700,000	
	<u>16,500,000</u>	<u>\$18,062,000</u>	<u>\$21,578,500</u>

4. Refugee Division Personnel:	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>On-Board</u>
U.S. Saigon	20	20
U.S. Field	76	56
Total:	<u>96</u>	<u>76</u>
Vietnamese-Saigon	30	27
-Field	<u>None</u> 30	<u>None</u> 27
TCN	9	None

ENCLOSURE 8

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5. MSWR Personnel: In November 1967, the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Special Commissariat for Refugees were combined into one organization designated Ministry of Social Welfare/Refugees. In addition to a Saigon headquarters staff, there will be a provincial staff in each of the provinces. In those provinces where there are large numbers of displaced persons, additional staff will be provided at district level. An Inspectorate staff will also be provided and will operate from regional level.
 6. Voluntary Agencies-Affiliated with Refugee Division, No. of Agencies - 29.
 7. Vocational Training:
 - a. Secondary technical high schools - 18.
No. completed training - 4426
No. in training - 2,483
 - b. Rural trade schools - 6
 - c. Capacity in schools exists to train up to 6000 refugees per year.
 8. Ministry of Social Welfare/Refugees 1968 Program Goals:
 - a. Relief payments and commodity assistance for an estimated 340,000 new refugees in 1968.
 - b. Construction of 200 new temporary refugee centers in 1968.
 - c. Construction of 600 wells and 6,000 latrine units, both as integral parts of the new temporary centers.
 - d. The building of 160 classrooms at temporary refugee centers, as well as the recruitment and training of 160 teachers.
 - e. The resettlement of 40,000 families in 200 independent resettlement hamlets. These hamlets are to be placed on a self-sustaining basis with public facilities which would include 2,000 wells, 8,000 latrines, 648 permanent classrooms and 12 maternity-dispensaries.
 - f. Five special projects for the intra-provincial refugees are to be realized in 1968. Each project is designed for 1,000 refugee families.
 - g. Short-term vocational training courses for 6,300 refugees at 20 Ministry of Education trade schools.
 - h. Support for handicraft or vocational training courses at provincial schools should benefit a further 9,000 refugees.
 - i. Support for handicraft or cottage industries estimated to aid 5,400 refugee families.
 - j. Support for 200 self-help projects.

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9. Estimates of Refugees:

	New Refugees	No. Return to Village	No. GVN Resettled	No. Remaining in Temporary Status at beginning of calendar year 68
CY 68	340,000	200,000	300,000	793,944

Refugee Statistics - December 31, 1967

		<u>Temporary Refugees</u>		
		<u>In</u>	<u>Outside</u>	<u>Total</u>
		<u>Camp</u>	<u>Camp</u>	
<u>Region I</u>				
Danang		7,994	0	7,994
Quang Nam		75,907	82,041	157,948
Quang Ngai		39,565	109,205	148,770
Quang Tin		42,832	12,433	55,265
Quang Tri		15,680	0	15,680
Thua Thien		17,285	0	17,285
Total		199,263	203,679	402,942
<u>Region II</u>				
Binh Dinh		7,234	46,557	53,791
Binh Thuan		1,289	12	1,301
Cam Ranh		60	0	60
Darlac		13,845	3,134	16,979
Khanh Hoa		1,007	21,940	22,947
Kontum		19,065	741	19,806
Lam Dong		1,924	564	2,488
Ninh Thuan		330	1,229	1,559
Phu Bon		1,461	234	1,695
Phu Yen		12,914	39,417	52,331
Pleiku		10,136	0	10,136
Quang Duc		6,259	1,798	8,057
Tuyen Duc		0	14	14
Total		75,524	115,640	191,164
<u>Region III</u>				
Bien Hoa		0	15,477	15,477
Binh Duong		9,610	22,916	32,526
Binh Long		0	5,671	5,671
Binh Tuy		0	918	918
Gia Dinh		0	4,253	4,253
Hau Nghia		474	7,321	7,795
Long An		0	127	127
Long Khanh		2,474	0	2,474
Phuoc Long		847	450	1,297
Phuoc Tuy		0	3,262	3,262
Tay Ninh		415	7,564	7,979
Vung Tsu		0	272	272
Total		13,820	68,231	82,051

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Refugee Statistics - December 31, 1967

	Temporary Refugees		
	In Camp	Out side Camp	Total
Region IV			
An Giang	5,591	0	5,591
An Xuyen	58	3,863	3,921
Ba Xuyen	0	9,717	9,717
Bac Lieu	0	4,371	4,371
Chau Doc	0	1,777	1,777
Chuong Thien	1,040	3,942	4,982
Dinh Tuong	110	223	333
Go Cong	123	954	1,077
Kien Giang	0	38,186	38,186
Kien Hoa	1,302	3,840	5,142
Kien Phong	0	10,624	10,624
Kien Tuong	240	1,571	1,811
Phong Dinh	37	15,785	15,822
Vinh Binh	0	2,499	2,499
Vinh Long	0	7,878	7,878
Sadec	0	4,056	4,056
Total	8,501	109,286	117,787

CUMULATIVE TOTAL AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1967

Region	Temporary In Camp	Refugees Out-Camp	Resettled Refugees	Refugees Ret'd to Orig. Village	Total No. of Refugees
Region I	199,263	203,679	98,141	71,985	573,068
Region II	75,524	115,640	116,526	366,429	674,119
Region III	13,820	68,231	179,278	69,689	331,018
Region IV	8,501	109,286	285,392	132,813	535,992
Total	297,108	496,836	679,337	640,916	2,114,197

No. Temporary Refugee Camps - 408

No. Refugee Hamlets - 172

No. Refugee Sub-Hamlets NLD - 520

WCLuken:mco:5372

Jan 9, 1968

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FORCE PACKAGE (U)

I. (S) BACKGROUND

Force requirements additive to Program 5 have been developed to support the current MACV concept of operations. This concept and an outline of the additional forces required were presented to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during his recent visit to South Vietnam.

II. (TS) FORCE REQUIREMENTS

A. The additional forces required have been developed into three packages (TABS A - C) by time phasing and major combat units as follows:

<u>TAB</u>	<u>TIME PHASING</u>	<u>MAJOR COMBAT UNITS</u>	<u>MANEUVER BN'S</u>	<u>TFS</u>
A	NLT 1 May 68	6 Armd Cav Regt 5 Mar Div (-) Bde, 5 Inf Div (Mech)	3 6 3	4 AF * 4 Marine *
B	ASAP But Prior to 1 Sep 68	5 Inf Div (Mech) (-) Light ROK Div	6 6	4 AF
C	NLT 31 Dec 68	Inf Div (US Army)	9	3 AF
D	Recapitulation			

B. Forces addressed in TABS A - C would add 27 US and 6 FVMAF maneuver battalions and 15 US tactical fighter squadrons to the MACV force structure. This would increase the approved forces (Program 5) from 106 to 133 US maneuver battalions, from 31 to 37 FVMAF maneuver battalions, and from 32 to 47 US tactical fighter squadrons. The overall MACV force structure would contain 60% combat and combat support forces and 40% combat service support forces.

C. Recapitulation of total space requirement starting with the Program 5 base and building through each package to the resulting total MACV force structure is shown in TAB D.

* Includes 2 AF TFS and 1 Marine TFS recommended by MACV to fill the requirement to deploy the 3 TFS deferred in Program 5.

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ENCLOSURE 9

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TAB A

IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY ONE
REQUIRED IN-COUNTRY PRIOR TO 1 MAY 1968

* * * * *

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>MAJOR COMBAT UNITS</u>	<u>TFS</u>
ARMY	6TH ARMD CAV REGT (3 BN'S) BDE, 5TH INF DIV (MECH) (3 BN'S)	
USMC	5TH MAR DIV (-) (6 BN'S)	4 *
USAF		4 *

* * * * *

MACV FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASE

	ARMY	NAVY	USMC	USAF	USMACV
PROGRAM 5	348,880	35,472	81,939	58,709	525,000
IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY ONE	<u>54,000</u>	<u>8,060</u>	<u>37,132</u>	<u>8,791</u>	<u>107,983</u>
TOTAL	402,880	43,532	119,071	67,500	632,983

* * * * *

- * Includes the 2 AF TFS and 1 Marine TFS recommended by MACV to fill the requirement to deploy the 3 TFS deferred in Program 5.

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USARV
IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY ONE

COMBAT	STR	9,200 ¹
6th Armd Cav ² Regt		
Bde 5th Mech		
Corps HQ		
Corps LRRP Co		

COMBAT SUPPORT	STR	5,800
1 - Field Arty Bn 155 (SP)		
2 - Field Arty Bn 155 ₃ (T)		
1 - AW (SP) (40mm) Bn		
1 - Field Arty Btry 175/8"		
1 - Field Arty Btry ₃ 155 (SP)		
1 - AW 50 Cal Btry		
1 - HQ & HQ Btry Corps Arty		
3 - Engr Bn (C)		

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT	STR	39,000 ⁴
Deferral of Program 5 Civilianization (9,595)		
1 - Engr Bn (Constr)		
4 - Engr Co (Bridge)		
3 - Engr Co (Equip Spt)		
1 - Engr Co (Topo)		
2 ⁵ - Evac Hosp		
1 - Field Hosp		
1 - Med Det (RA) (Hel)		
1 - Radio Research Bn		
8 - Med Truck Co		
4 - Lt Truck Co		
1 - Med Boat Co		
1 - Heavy Boat Co		
1 - Medium Truck Co (POL)		
4 - MP Bn (Tailored)		

TOTAL	54,000 ⁶
-------	---------------------

- NOTES: 1. Includes many other miscellaneous units not listed which will be developed in force tabs at a later date.
2. Appropriate division slice of organic support included.
3. CG USARV will conduct study on most effective organization to include weapons mix of AW Wpn Bn in SVN.
4. This figure is inclusive of units requested per USARV message 200143 DTG 181042Z Feb 68 stating requirement for 1,197 spaces to support the displacement of US Army forces to I CTZ, and the in-country displacement support requirements to fill voids in the II, III, and IV CTZs caused by the northern build-up.

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USARV
IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY ONE

- NOTES: 5. One of these evac hospitals is included in Program 5.
The strength is not included but the unit deployment
must be expedited.
6. Strength rounded to nearest hundred.

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NAVFORV
IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY ONE

A. COMBAT/OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

1. CTF 117 10 LCPL	STR	33
2. CTF 117 STF AUG	STR	44
3. 3 APL	STR	297
3 YTB	STR	30
4. 2 HELOs for CTF 117	STR	8
5. CTF 117 UDT PLATOON	STR	20
6. CTF 117 SEAL PLATOON	STR	20
7. 12 ASPBs - I CTZ	STR	100

B. SERVICE/SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS¹

1. CIVILIANIZATION	STR	2,050
2. NSAD ARMY R&U	STR	482
3. NAVCOMMSTA CRB	STR	81
4. 400 BED HOSPITAL - I CTZ	STR	473
5. NSAD CARGO HANDLERS	STR	200
6. NSAD PICKET BOATS	STR	43
7. NSAD PUSHER BOATS	STR	44
8. NSAD SMALL CRAFT REP FAC	STR	57
9. NMCB - I CTZ	STR	762
10. NSAD AUG (USAID CARGO)	STR	139
11. NMCB AUG	STR	50
12. NSAD AUG (PNs)	STR	11
13. NSAD AUG (POSTAL CLERKS)	STR	6
14. NSAD AUG (GENERAL SERVICE)	STR	297
15. 5 LCU/8 LCM-8 I CTZ	STR	240
16. CBMU I CTZ	STR	500
17. NSAD AUG	STR	353
18. NSAD AUG	STR	340
19. USN w/USMC	STR	1,380
PRIORITY 1 TOTAL		<u>8,060</u>

NOTE: 1. MACV is studying the requirement for an additional hospital ship in support of operations in I CTZ.

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III MAF
IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY ONE¹

Deferment of Civilianization	300
5th Marine Division (-)	15,301
(Includes RLT-27)	
Force Troops, FMF (-)	8,200
Aviation Forces (Wing (-)) ²	4,762
Marine Air Traffic Control Unit	23
Radio Bn, Det	165
Counter Mortar Radar Teams	125
Air Support Radar Team	23
III MAF HQ Augmentation	157
Observation Squadrons (3 HML)	732
III MAF t/o Increases	7,344
	<u>37,132</u>

Combat - 10,662

Combat Support - 15,214

Combat Service Support - 11,256

- NOTE: 1. COMUSMACV is requesting CG III MAF to initiate the necessary action through service channels to give the III MAF an Air Cavalry Squadron capability.
2. Does not include the one TFS Squadron to meet the Program 5 Deferred Requirement.

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AIR FORCE IMMEDIATE INCREMENT

a. Priority I.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Strength</u>
1. TAC FTR SQ (F4D)	526 (C)
2. BOS AUG	74 (S)
3. TAC FTR SQ (F100)	489 (C)
4. BOS AUG	69 (C)
5. TACP (ARMD CAV REGT)	18 (C)
6. FAC (5-02s) MAINT & SUP	21 (S)
7. TACP (BDE, 5 MECH DIV)	18 (C)
8. FAC (5-02s) MAINT & SUP	21 (S)
9. TACP (3RD BDE)	18 (C)
10. FAC (5-02s) MAINT & SUP	18 (2)
11. TACP (A/NZ TASK FORCE)	18 (C)
12. FAC (5-02s) MAINT & SUP	18 (2)
13. AIRLIFT AUG (44 C-130s TDY)	979 (110)
14. SECURITY POLICE AUG	55 (C)
15. AERIAL PORT AND SUPPORT	1291 (182)
16. FAC (16-02s) MAINT & SUP	58 (7)
17. FAC (34-02s) MAINT & SUP	121 (15)
18. FAC (10-02s) MAINT & SUP	36 (4)
19. FAC (59-0V10s) MAINT & SUP	353 (42)
20. FAC (23-0V10s) CREWS, MAINT & SUP	165 (21)
21. OUT COUNTRY FACs	112 (C)
22. FAC (F100F)	218 (28)
23. 20TH HELIO SQ AUG (2-UH1s)	23 (C)
24. ABCCC AUG	59 (C)
25. HQ 7TH AF AUG (MUSCLE SHOALS)	10 (C)
26. COMPTROLLER AUG	78 (S)
27. AFCS COMMUNICATION AUG	26 (4)
28. BUDGET DECISION 288	52 (C)
29. COMM/ELECT STAFF AUG	28 (C)
30. RADAR OPERATIONS AUG	24 (C)
31. 12TH AIR COMMANDO SQ AUG	12 (C)
32. CONTRACT MAINT PROC AUG	3 (S)
33. RAPID AREA MAINT TEAMS	32 (S)
34. LIFE SUPPORT AUG	49 (S)
35. STILL PHOTO LAB AUG	31 (S)
36. AFCS COMMUNICATIONS AUG	17 (S)
37. AFCS RAPCON AUG	14 (C)
38. 27TH CAS STG. FLT	24 (S)
39. MOBILE CAS STAG FLT	14 (S)
40. MOBILE CAS STAG FLT	14 (S)
41. MOBILE CAS STAG FLT	14 (S)
42. BASE SECURITY TEAMS (APC)	422 (C)
43. BASE SECURITY TEAMS (MORTARS)	198 (C)
44. BASE SECURITY TEAMS (RECOILLESS RIFLE)	114 (C)
45. BASE SECURITY TEAMS (ARMORED GUN)	308 (C)
46. BASE SECURITY TEAMS (MACHINE GUN)	22 (C)
47. SECURITY INTELL TEAMS	44 (S)

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<u>Description</u>	<u>Strength</u>
48. SECURITY TRAINING	22 (S)
49. CIVIL ENGINEERING SQ	600 (S)
50. WEATHER AUG (A/NZ TASK FORCE)	3 (S)
51. WEATHER AUG (3BDE, 82 ABN)	3 (S)
52. LAUNDRY AUG	3 (S)
53. PERSONNEL SERVICES	59 (S)
54. COMBAT SUPPORT GP, HQ, SQ.	3 (S)
55. COMBAT SUPPORT GP, COMMAND	1 (S)
56. PACEX-REGIONAL EXCHANGE	155 (S)
57. 20TH HELIO SQ AUG (3 CH-53)	48 (7)
58. 20TH TASS INTELL AUG	17 (S)
59. OUT COUNTRY MIL AIRLIFT CHANNEL AUG	17 (S)
60. AIR RESCUE & RECOVERY AUG	7 (C)
61. WEATHER AUG (6 ARMD CAD REGT)	3 (S)
62. WEATHER AUG (BDE, 5TH MECH DIV)	3 (S)
63. 834 AD AIRLIFT AUG	69 (C)
64. 2ND AERIAL PORT AUG	28 (C)
65. PPIF AUG (460 TRW)	95 (S)
66. HQ 7TH-AF STAFF AUG	181 (C)
67. 12TH RITS AUG	125 (S)
68. COMBAT INTELL RESEARCH CENTER	299 (S)
69. MEDIAL DISPENSARY AUG	20 (S)
70. AIRLIFT AUG (13-C-130)	268 (C)
71. BOS AUG	38 (S)
72. AERIAL PORT AUG	347 (C)
73. BOS AUG	49 (S)

OPERATIONS FORCES
SUPPORT FORCES

6379
2412
8791

- NOTE 1. These figures do not include two F-100 from CONUS to be deployed ASAP and AC-119 gunship approved for deployment from June 68 to January 69.
2. Figures or letters in parentheses in strength column connote following:
- (C) - Operating Forces
 - (S) - Support Forces
 - (7) - Figure such as seven denotes number of support spaces out of total figure.
3. Does not include the two TFS to meet the Program 5 deferred requirement.

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TAB B

IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY TWO

REQUIRED IN-COUNTRY ASAP BUT PRIOR TO 1 SEPT 1968

* * * * *

MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS

SERVICE

MAJOR COMBAT UNITS

TFS

ARMY

5th INF DIV (MECH) (-)
(6 BN'S)

USAF

4

* * * * *

MACV FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASE

	ARMY	NAVY	USMC	USAF	MACV
PROGRAM 5 PLUS IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY ONE	402,880	43,532	119,071	67,500	632,983
IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY TWO	<u>31,600</u>	<u>4,446</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>5,750</u>	<u>41,796</u>
TOTAL	434,480	47,978	119,071	73,250	674,779

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USARV

IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY TWO

COMBAT

STR 12,900

5TH Inf Div Mech (-) (11,824)
1st Air Cav Sqdn (956)
LRRP Co (-) (57)

COMBAT SUPPORT

STR 3,600

1 - Field Arty Bn 155 (SP) (-)
1 - Field Arty Bn 175/8" (SP) (-)
3 - Assault Hel Co
2 - Aerial Wpns Co
2 - Assault Support Hel Co
1 - Aer Arty Bn (-)
1 - Arty Avn Btry
1 - Engr Bn (Cbt)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

STR 15,100

1 - Engr Bn (Constr)
2 - Engr Co Equip Spt
1 - Engr Co Port Constr
1 - Evac Hosp
1 - Field Hosp
2 - Surgical Hosp
4 - Med Det (RA) (Hel)
1 - Division Radio Research Co (-)
2 - Military Police Bn (Tailored)
1 - Signal Bn Spt
5 - Medium Truck Co
3 - Light Truck Co
1 - Heavy Boat Co

TOTAL

31,600 2

NOTES: 1. Consists of HQ and HQ company, radio cable battalion, two (2) signal support companies and one (1) signal company TROPO.

2. Strengths rounded to nearest one hundred.

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NAVFORV

IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY TWO

A. COMBAT/OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

1. 4 HELOs FOR CTF 116	STR	16
2. 4 LCM(R) FOR CTF 116	STR	30
3. 3 YTBs FOR CTF 116	STR	30
4. 20 ASPBs FOR CTF 116	STR	164

B. SERVICE/SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

1. NCB STF AUG	STR	52
2. NCR STF AUG	STR	3
3. STABLE DOOR	STR	19
4. NSAD AUG (UADPS)	STR	42
5. 1 AFDL CRB	STR	25
6. NSAS AUG (ELEC STORES)	STR	53
7. NSAS AUG (MRF SUPPORT)	STR	14
8. MSTSO-V AUG	STR	4
9. CSC DA NANG AUG	STR	6
10. 10 LCU/6 LCM-8 I CTZ	STR	200
11. NSAD AUG	STR	538
12. NMCB AUG	STR	<u>3,250</u>

PRIORITY TWO TOTAL

4,446

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7TH AF

b. Priority II.

<u>Description</u>	<u>Strength</u>
1. TAC FTR WG	78 (C)
2. TAC FTR SQ (F4D)	526 (C)
3. TAC FTR SQ (F4D)	526 (C)
4. TAC FTR SQ (F4D)	526 (C)
5. BASE SUPPORT UNITS	1274 (S)
6. CIVIL ENG SQ	400 (S)
7. BIAS HUNTER (4-C-130)	233 (C)
8. CONVERSION 308 TAC FTR SQ (F4D)	201 (23)
9. PRISCILLA ELLEN MAINT AUG	12 (S)
10. GAME WARDEN SUPPORT (10-A1)	141 (15)
11. GAME WARDEN SUPPORT (6-01)	41 (6)
12. GAME WARDEN SUPPORT (6-AC47)	155 (20)
13. MEDICAL DISPENSARY AUG	12 (S)
14. MEDICAL DISPENSARY AUG	3 (S)
15. AIR DEFENSE SQ (F4E)	461 (C)
16. BOS AUG	65 (S)
17. TACP (ROKDIO)	48 (C)
18. FAC (8-02s) MAINT & SUP	35 (10)
19. WEATHER AUG	26 (S)
20. TACP (5TH MECH DIV(-))	48 (C)
21. FAC (7-02) MAINT & SUP	32 (10)
22. RECONNAISSANCE COURIER (10-U10)	63 (C)
23. TWO AERIAL PORT SQ	190 (3)
24. AIRLIFT AUG (10-C-130)	187 (C)
25. BOS AUG	26 (S)
26. AERIAL PORT AUG	263 (C)
27. BOS AUG	37 (S)
28. HQ 7TH AF STAFF AUG	141 (C)
OPERATIONS FORCES	3621
SUPPORT FORCES	2129
	<u>5750</u>

NOTE: Figures or letters in parentheses in strength column connote following:

(C) - Operating Forces

(S) - Support Forces

(7) - Figure such as seven denotes number of support spaces out of total figure.

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TAB C

FOLLOW-ON INCREMENT

REQUIRED IN-COUNTRY NLT 31 DEC 68

* * * * *

MAJOR TACTICAL UNITS

SERVICE

MAJOR COMBAT UNITS

TFS

ARMY

INF DIV (9 BN'S)

USAF

3

* * * * *

MACV FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASE

	ARMY	NAVY	USMC	USAF	MACV
PROGRAM 5 PLUS IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITIES ONE AND TWO	434,480	47,978	119,071	73,250	674,779
FOLLOW-ON INCREMENT	<u>46,700</u>	<u>805</u>	<u>2,004</u>	<u>7,468</u>	<u>56,977</u>
TOTAL	481,180	48,783	121,075	80,718	731,756

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USARV

FOLLOW-ON INCREMENT

STR 20,600

COMBAT

"X" Inf Div
3 - Air Cav Sqdn
2 - Air Cav Troop
Div LRRP Co

COMBAT SUPPORT

STR 12,900

1 - Field Arty Bn 155 (T)
1 - Field Arty Bn 175/8" (SP)
3 - AW (40mm) Bn^{1,5}
1 - AW (50 Cal) Brty⁵
14 - Assault Hel Co
8 - Assault Support Hel Co
1 - Engr Bn (Combat)
3 - Engr Co (Land Clearing)
1 - Sig Bn Combat Area (-)⁴

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

STR 13,200

1 - Engr Bn Const
1 - Engr Bn (Topo) (-)
2 - Engr Co Bridge
3 - Engr Co Equip Spt
1 - Evac Hosp
1 - Surg Hosp
2 - Med Det (RA) (Hel)
1 - Corps Avn Co
1 - Command Airplane Co
1 - Signal Co Spt
1 - Div Radio Research Co
5 - Medium Truck Co
3 - Lt Truck Co
3 - Medium Boat Co

TOTAL

46,900

NOTES: 1. Includes one AW Bn added by MACV.

2. Includes three Assault Helicopter companies added by MACV to meet SOG and 5th Special Forces requirements. Support for these three companies is not included in combat service support list. This support will be added at a later date.

3. Consists of Hq and Hq Co Combat Area Sig Bn, two (2) Signal Companies Combat Area, and one (1) TSC-48/50 Team.

4. Strengths rounded out to nearest 100.

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NAVFORV

FOLLOW-ON INCREMENT

A. COMBAT/OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

1. VP RON CRB	STR	225
2. YRBM AUG	STR	162

B. SERVICE/SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

1. NSF CRB AUG	STR	104
2. NISO-V AUG	STR	6
3. OICC AUG	STR	12
4. 6 100 FT UTILITY BOATS	STR	84
5. CNFV STF AUG	STR	12
6. NCB STF AUG	STR	50
7. 3 HELOs FOR 3D NCB	STR	12
8. USN w/USMC	STR	<u>138</u>

FOLLOW-ON TOTAL	805
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III MAF

FOLLOW-ON INCREMENT

Combined Action Program

2,004

Combat - 2,004

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FOLLOW-ON INCREMENT

7TH AF

<u>Description</u>	<u>Strength</u>
1. TAC FTR SQ (F4D)	526 (C)
2. BOS AUG	74 (S)
3. TAC FTR SQ (F4D)	526 (C)
4. BOS AUG	74 (S)
5. TAC FTR SQ (F-100)	489 (C)
6. BOS AUG	69 (S)
7. TACP (RTAVF)	48 (C)
8. FAC (8-02s) MAINT & SUP	35 (10)
9. WEATHER AUG (RTAVF)	26 (S)
10. RADAR SITE, PHU CAT AREA	72 (C)
11. MEDICAL DISPENSARY AUG	17 (S)
12. TACP (XX DIV)	66 (C)
13. FAC (12-02s) MAINT & SUP	52 (14)
14. WEATHER AUG (XX DIV)	29 (S)
15. TAC AIRLIFT WING	73 (C)
16. TAC AIRLIFT MSB (6 SQ)	2885 (356)
17. TAC AIRLIFT FOL	103 (13)
18. TAC AIRLIFT (12-C-130 TDY)	288 (C)
19. BOS AIRLIFT TDY	41 (S)
20. TAC AIRLIFT (18-C-130 TDY)	344 (C)
21. BOS AIRLIFT TDY	48 (S)
22. MEDICAL DISPENSARY AUG	64 (S)
23. TAC AIRLIFT AUG (12-C-130)	228 (C)
24. BOS AUG	32 (S)
25. AERIAL PORT AUG	306 (C)
26. BOS AUG	43 (S)
OPERATIONS FORCES	6558
SUPPORT FORCES	910
	<u>7468</u>
SUBTOTAL I	8791
SUBTOTAL II	5750
SUBTOTAL III	7468
	<u>22,009</u>

NOTE: Figures or letters in parentheses in strength column connote following:

(C) - Operating Forces

(S) - Support Forces

(7) - Figure such as seven denotes number of support spaces out of total figure.

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TAB D

RECAPITULATION

OF

MACV FORCE STRUCTURE INCREASE

	ARMY	NAVY	USMC	USAF	MACV
PROGRAM 5	348,880	35,472	81,939	58,709	525,000
IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY ONE	54,000	8,060	37,132	8,791	107,983
IMMEDIATE INCREMENT, PRIORITY TWO	31,600	4,446	-	5,750	41,796
FOLLOW-ON INCREMENT	<u>46,700</u>	<u>805</u>	<u>2,004</u>	<u>7,468</u>	<u>56,977</u>
TOTAL	481,180	48,783	121,075	80,718	731,756

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CIVILIANIZATION (U)

I. (S) GENERAL:

A. MACV components and III MAF are currently utilizing approximately 150,000 VN and TCN civilians by direct hire, as well as by contractual arrangements. As an example, 1st Log Command is currently utilizing over 60,000 direct hire and contract civilians which represents 53 percent of the total work force.

B. Program 5 contained a plan to replace 12,545 military with civilians. In MACV Msg 04754, DTG 151058Z Feb 68, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC, with info JCS, that:

1. There be a six months deferral of Program 5 civilianization and a reevaluation of the program.

2. The services continue to deploy replacements and units scheduled for civilianization.

3. DOD be requested to authorize 537,545 US military force structure, established in Program 5, plus such additional forces as are being deployed to meet the current contingency requirements.

C. The TET offensive resulted in a significant loss of civilian capability. For the first days of the offensive, few civilians could come to work due to the security situation. Logistics activities in depots, ports, and transportation came to a virtual standstill. After 26 days, most civilianized activities are still below their pre-TET capability. The loss of capability at this critical time required the diversion of combat and other troops to logistics functions in order to accomplish essential missions.

D. Recent troop redeployments into I Corps have necessitated moves of support troops. A civilianized labor force is relatively immobile. The civilian labor force is also subject to, and has experienced, work stoppages through strikes. Again, it has been necessary to divert military to the performance of essential services.

E. The Government of South Vietnam has announced plans for mobilization which will increase conscription by approximately 120,000 men by drafting 19 and 18 year old men. This will greatly reduce the available labor market.

II. (S) CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST:

A. No response has been received to COMUSMACV's recommendations quoted above.

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ENCLOSURE 10

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B. In the immediate increment proposed for the force structure package, spaces are included to reverse the civilianization in Program 5.

C. Spaces have not been requested to replace additional local nationals with US troops. However, this alternative will be considered in the reevaluation referred to in I.B.1. above. Another alternative is that of supplementing US units with civilians to increase unit capability, while retaining a viable US unit to meet contingencies.

III. (S) PROPOSED POSITION/RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. The spaces required to reverse the Program 5 civilianization and included in the first increment of the force package, should be approved by JCS and DOD as a matter of urgency.

B. While a general trend away from civilianization is indicated, no specific recommendations as to numbers and types can be made until a complete evaluation has been made by the component commands.

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DEPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL AIR SQUADRONS (U)

I. GENERAL. The Program 5 supplemental force package developed by MACV includes the addition of fifteen Tactical Fighter Squadrons. These squadrons include three required to round out current Program 5 forces, and twelve add-on tactical fighter squadrons. One of the twelve add-ons is for Air Defense requirements.

II. CURRENT STATUS.

A. Following is proposed beddown for the eleven USAF Tactical Fighter Squadrons:

1. Program 5 Roundout

1 F-100 Sq Phu Cat ASAP
1 F-100 Sq Phan Rang ASAP

2. Immediate Requirements Package

(a) Priority I.

1 F-4D Sq Da Nang 1 May 68
1 F-100D Sq Phu Cat 1 May 68

(b) Priority II.

3 F-4D Sq Nam Phong ASAP but NLT 31 Dec 68
1 F-4 Sq (Air Def) Tuy Hoa ASAP but NLT 31 Dec 68

3. Follow-on Package

1 F-100 Sq Phan Rang NLT 31 Dec 68
1 F-4D Sq Nam Phong NLT 31 Dec 68
1 F-4D Sq Tuy Hoa NLT 31 Dec 68

B. The following is proposed beddown for the four USMC Tactical Fighter Squadrons:

1. Program 5 Roundout

1 TFS Chu Lai ASAP

2. Immediate Requirements Package - Priority I

2 TFS Chu Lai Jun 68
1 TFS Da Nang Jun 68

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ENCLOSURE 11

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C. Facilities for Aircraft Beddown. The following improvements will be required at existing installations to beddown the tactical fighter squadrons described in the foregoing paragraph as well as the C-130 squadrons requested in the Program 5 supplemental force package. The runway paving projects outlined for Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang will be accomplished by contractor.

1. Remove AM-2 runway at Cam Ranh Bay and replace with 8000 foot AC and 1000 foot PCC on each end.

2. Remove AM-2 runway at Phan Rang and replace with 8000 foot AC and 1000 foot PCC at each end.

3. Construct vertical facilities at Nam Phong to house TFS for immediate Priority II and follow-on.

4. Construct 880,000 square yards of ramp space to park aircraft. This will be placed at airfields according to increased densities.

III. PROPOSED POSITION. No new airfields will be required for the Program 5 supplemental force package.

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ENGINEER REQUIREMENTS (U)

I. GENERAL. The Program 5 supplemental force package developed by MACV includes the addition of eleven engineer battalions/squadrons, nineteen separate companies and a horizontal construction augmentation for the Naval Mobile Construction Battalions. These forces include one AFCES approved in Program 5 but recommended for substitution by contractor which has been deferred, and one AFCES which is already located in Thailand and will be used to construct vertical facilities at Nam Phong.

II. CURRENT STATUS.

A. The Army Engineer units are required for support of added maneuver units. There are presently approximately 335,000 Army troops in RVN being supported by 30,572 nondivisional engineer troops (or about 9%). At the present 27 engineer battalions are required to support 83 maneuver battalions (a ratio of 1 : 3.1). The estimated overall increase in Program VI is 132,300 of which 12,232 are nondivisional engineers (or about 9%). FM 101-10-1, on page 4-30, shows that the engineer portion of the theater Army slice is 9 to 12%. The overall percentage of engineer units when all of Program VI units arrive in country will still be 9%. At that time there would be 36 engineer battalions supporting 112 maneuver battalions (a ratio of 1 : 3.1). Detailed justification for engineer units in the immediate package priority 1 is at Tab A, priority 2 at Tab B, and follow-on at Tab C.

B. The following justification is provided for the increase in Naval Construction Battalions:

1. The NMCB requested in first increment priority one is necessary to provide engineering support for the 51,780 added Marine and Naval forces deploying to I CTZ.

2. The horizontal construction augmentation requested in the immediate increment priority two is required to increase assets needed on Route 1 in I CTZ. The standard organization of a NMCB provides for only 30% of its construction capability to be horizontal. With this capability it has been determined that the priority road construction in I CTZ will not be completed until 1973. This is an unacceptable delay and only through NMCB augmentation can sufficient assets be obtained to complete this requirement in a timely manner. The contractor, due to security, is restricted to the immediate vicinity of

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ENCLOSURE 12

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Da Nang and Chu Lai, therefore his forces cannot assist in road construction. This augmentation will allow us to complete the priority one highway program in I CTZ in accordance with our present plans.

C. The AFCE Red Horse Squadron requested in the immediate package, priority one, is the unit authorized in Program 5 and offered for civilianization. Deferral of civilianization requires that this unit be deployed now. The Red Horse Squadron, indicated in the immediate package, priority two, is required for construction of vertical facilities at Nam Phong, Thailand as outlined in CINCPAC Message (S), 170619Z FEB 68, subject: Additional Air Support SVN (U). This unit is presently constituted in Thailand and should not be included in the overall SVN force ceiling.

D. Contractor forces will be used in secure areas with emphasis on horizontal construction to capitalize on his capabilities. The runway paving projects required by the deployment of fifteen tactical fighter squadrons will be accomplished by the contractor.

III. PROPOSED POSITION. The engineer forces requested in the Program 5 supplemental package are required to support deployments, increased operations, the LOC program, and to support TET recovery programs.

TAB A - Justification Priority I Units
TAB B - Justification Priority II Units
TAB C - Justification Follow-on Units

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TAB A
IMMEDIATE PACKAGE PRIORITY 1

<u>Line</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>TOE</u>	<u>Strength</u>
1	Space Requirement	-----	1224
2	Engr Group (C)	5-52G	114
3	Engr Bn (C)	5-36G	836
4	Engr Bn (C)	5-36G	836
5	Engr Bn (C)	5-36G	836
6	Engr Bn (Const)	5-115E	905
7	Engr Co FB	5-78G	234
8	Engr Co FB	5-78G	234
9	Engr Co PB	5-77G	124
10	Engr Co PB	5-77G	124
11	Engr Co DT	5-124G	114
12	Engr Co DT	5-124G	114
13	Engr Co LE	5-58G	212
14	Engr Co Topo	5-327E	130
15	Engr Det (Tech Intel)	5-500C IG	9

Line 1 is required to convert 6 Type B Engineer Battalions (Construction) to Type A. During the recent MTOE Standardization, in converting to the latest series TO&E, it was necessary to develop 1224 spaces due to imposed ceilings. At this time as an interim measure it was decided to convert 6 construction battalions to Type B configuration. These battalions should receive the highest priority so they may be reconfigured to Type A, thus standardizing all battalions in-country.

Line 2 is required to provide command and control for the additional units. Presently we are displacing one group headquarters into the I CTZ. Due to communications problems and shortage of aircraft support, it is inadvisable to increase the span of control of existing group headquarters.

Line 3 & 4 are required to replace units being displaced into the I CTZ. Even though certain tactical units may depart an area, considerable engineer effort is required to bring projects to a point where work can be stopped without degrading what has been previously accomplished. Engineer support is provided on an area basis. A continuing effort is required to support the LOC (2288 miles to be upgraded through FY70) and Revolutionary Development Program as defined in the Combined Campaign Plan. Engineer units will continue to support tactical and nontactical units within their area of responsibility on a continuing basis. These two units will replace three combat battalions scheduled for redeployment.

Line 5 required to provide nonorganic support to add-on units: 6th ACR, Brigade of 5th Mech Division, and 4 MP battalions.

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Line 6 required to replace construction battalion scheduled to move to I CTZ. Interdiction of roads during the TET offensive destroyed approximately 30 bridges. A continuing effort must be maintained allowing the construction of semipermanent bridging thus allowing the recovery for re-use of tactical bridging.

Line 7 & 8 required to maintain float bridging both in place and reserve stock. These units are required in the I CTZ. There are no nonorganic Army float bridge units in I CTZ. Recently 10 sets of bridging have been shipped to that area. Experience has shown that in this climate without proper maintenance float bridging deteriorates rapidly.

Line 9 required to replace unit moved to I CTZ. All intelligence reports reflect that high priority is placed on interdiction of LOC. Bridging must be available to span rapidly all gaps blown by the enemy. Thus insuring constant access to tactical elements.

Line 10. Two panel bridge companies are required to support a corps area. There are approximately 295 miles of primary LOC within the I CTZ with numerous bridges that are prime enemy targets.

Line 11 & 12 required to haul soil products. Adequate quarry locations are not available and thus as operations move into more remote areas haul distances become progressively greater. Present haul capability is insufficient. As a result a haul contract has been negotiated that will cost approximately \$3,000,000 per year. The contractor will not haul into insecure areas, thus the organic haul capability must be available for support to be utilized during the initial phases of operations in such areas.

Line 13 required to augment nonorganic combat battalion Line 5. Due to the area support concept, during periods when the combat battalion is not engaged in a combat support mission it is assigned the mission of upgrading LOC. Equipment found in the Light Equipment Company is required to assist in this mission.

Line 14 required to support the Corps Headquarters.

Line 15 required to provide intelligence information to Corps G2.

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TAB B
IMMEDIATE PACKAGE PRIORITY II

<u>Line</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>TOE</u>	<u>Strength</u>
1	Engineer Bn (C)	5-35G	836
2	Engr Bn (Const)	5-115E	905
3	Engr Co LE	5-58G	212
4	Engr Co DT	5-124G	114
5	Engr Co PC	5-129E	227
6	Engr Det (Quarry)	5-500C	37
7	Fire Fighting HQ	5-500C FA	4
8	Fire Truck Det	5-500C FB	6
9	Fire Truck Det	5-500C FB	6
10	Fire Truck Det	5-500C FB	6
11	Fire Truck Det	5-500C FB	6
12	Water Truck Det	5-500C FD	2
13	Water Truck Det	5-500C FD	2
14	Water Truck Det	5-500C FD	2
15	Water Truck Det	5-500C FD	2
16	Water Truck Det	6-500C FD	2
17	Brush Fire Truck Det	5-500C FE	2
18	Utilities Det	5-500C HG	83
19	Utilities Det	5-500C HD	28
20	Utilities Det	5-500C HD	28

Line 1 required to supplement the organic engineer units of the additional forces. Tactical experience in RVN has shown that each Division requires one non-organic engineer battalion to provide back-up support. This unit will be assigned an area support role and thus be available to provide required support to the division on a mission basis.

Line 2 is required to provide an increased horizontal and vertical construction capability. The expansion of the LOC program requires a continuing increase in the effort expended. A major goal of the Combined Campaign Plan is further development of the road network in RVN. The increase in combat strength will secure more roads. If engineer forces are available, upgrading may be accelerated and reduce dependence on air LOC. Also increased LOC upgrading requirements in I CTZ and IV CTZ are anticipated.

Line 3 is required to augment the capabilities of Line 1. When not engaged in combat support these battalions are utilized in an area support role and require the equipment found in this company to augment the horizontal capability for LOC type work.

Line 4 required to increase the haul capability of soil products. As pointed out in TAB A haul capability becomes more critical as the LOC program is expanded. This item is essential to full utilization of the additional construction effort programmed.

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Line 5 is required to perform the special engineering work involved in providing port, beach, and POL facilities in support of the military operations. The three port construction companies and one detachment are fully committed at the four existing Army ports and will not be available for re-deployment in the foreseeable future. With the move of the 9th Inf Div into the IV CTZ additional over the water work will develop requiring the special skills found in this company.

Line 6 is required to provide the special skills required in quarry operations. This unit is the only unit authorized the 225 TPH plant. Presently there are three 225 TPH plants in-country. Two of these are being operated as additional plants. This detachment would provide the required skills to operate one of these plants. Rock production is becoming more and more critical as Delta operations are expanded.

Line 7 is required to provide personnel and equipment to serve as a command element for an engineer fire fighting composite unit capable of planning and organizing an area or installation fire prevention and fire fighting program and commanding and controlling assigned or attached fire fighting teams. Basis one (1) per division of five (5) locations.

Lines 8 through 11 are required to provide personnel and equipment for fire protection, administration of timely and adequate first aid, and implementing fire prevention programs for four (4) installations having 5,000 to 10,000 troops each, or four (4) warehouse and open storage areas of 100,000 square feet each.

Lines 12 through 16 are required to provide personnel and equipment for water transport for fire fighting purposes on the basis of one (1) per each FB and FE team.

Line 17 is required to provide equipment and supervisory and training personnel for protection against grass or brush fires within its area of responsibility on the basis of one (1) per installation as determined by field conditions.

Line 18 is required to provide post engineer type services in the overseas theater of operations installations with population of up to 10,000 persons each (division area), and in forward areas, new base camps, and in security areas where restrictions limit the use of local national personnel. (One team supports 10,000 persons).

Lines 19 and 20 are required to provide post engineer type services in the overseas theater of operations installations with a population of up to 2,500 personnel each, and in forward areas, new base camps, and in security areas where restrictions limit the use of local national personnel. (One team supports 2,500 personnel).

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TAB C
FOLLOW ON PACKAGE

The units found in Immediate Priority 1 and 2 force package will not be capable on a continuing basis of providing all the engineer support required by the tactical and support elements found in these packages. They must be augmented by some of the units found in this section to provide continuing adequate support.

<u>Line</u>	<u>Type Unit</u>	<u>TOE</u>	<u>Strength</u>
1	Engr Group (C)	5-52G	114
2	Engr Bn (C)	5-36G	836
3	Engr Bn (Const)	5-115E	905
4	Engr Bn (Topo)	5-305E	367
5	Engr Co Land Clearing	-	118
6	Engr Co Land Clearing	-	118
7	Engr Co Land Clearing	-	118
8	Engr Co FB	5-78G	234
9	Engr Co PB	5-77E	127
10	Engr Co LE	5-58G	212
11	Engr Co DT	5-124G	114
12	Engr Co CS	5-114D	164
13	Engr Platoon (Asphalt)	5-114D(-)	32
14	Engr Platoon (Asphalt)	5-114D(-)	32
15	Fire Fighting Headquarters	5-500C FA	4
16	Fire Truck Det	5-500C FB	6
17	Fire Truck Det	5-500C FB	6
18	Fire Truck Det	5-500C FB	6
19	Fire Truck Det	5-500C FB	6
20	Water Truck Det	5-500C FD	2
21	Water Truck Det	5-500C FD	2
22	Water Truck Det	5-500C FD	2
23	Water Truck Det	5-500C FD	2
24	Water Truck Det	5-500C FD	2
25	Brush Fire Truck Det	5-500C FE	2
26	Utilities Det	5-500C HG	83
27	Utilities Det	5-500C HD	28
28	Utilities Det	5-500C HD	28

Line 1 is required to provide command and control for the additional units. One group can control three to five bns and three to five separate companies.

Line 2 is required to provide nonorganic engineer support to the additional division.

Line 3 is required to provide the horizontal and vertical construction required by the additional tactical and support forces.

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Line 4 is required to provide the required support to the field army. This unit is capable of responding to the needs of the Army Headquarters as well as to the other normally assigned units. This unit serves as back-up for the corps topographic companies and accomplishes projects beyond their capability.

Lines 5 through 7 are required to provide the additional land clearing capability required. A land clearing company can clear 300 acres per day. These units have proven to be highly effective in support of RVN combat operations. This increased capability will lessen the VC capability to mount ambushes. By destroying the enemy's cover and concealment his ability to re-use a given area is greatly reduced.

Line 8 is required to help maintain both installed and reserve float bridges. Presently there are 3,675 feet of float bridge installed and 20 sets in reserve.

Line 9 is required to maintain both installed and reserve fixed bridge. Presently there are 560 feet of single single, 6480 feet of double single, 2267 feet of double double and 1590 feet of triple single installed. In addition there are presently 41 sets in reserve.

Line 10 is required to augment the construction capabilities of line 2. During periods when the combat battalion is not engaged in combat support this additional equipment is required to accomplish the LOC upgrading program and other horizontal missions.

Line 11 see lines 11 and 12 TAB A.

Line 12 is required to augment the quarry and asphalt capability. The LOC program calls for 2288 miles of road to be upgraded to MACV standards. This will require 5,000 plant-days of asphalt production.

Line 13 and 14 see line 12 above for justification of increased asphalt capability.

Line 15 see line 7 TAB B.

Line 16 through 19 see lines 8 thru 11 TAB B.

Line 20 through 24 see lines 12 thru 16 TAB B.

Line 25 see line 17 TAB B.

Line 26 see line 18 TAB B.

Line 27 and 28 see lines 19 and 20 TAB B.

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AIRLIFT AUGMENTATION (U)

I. (S) GENERAL: Airlift requirements within RVN have continued to increase as the number of maneuver battalions and troop strengths have increased. Deployment and resupply of maneuver battalions and support units to areas with inadequate or no surface LOC's have also generated additional requirements for airlift.

II. (S) CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST:

A. MACV daily resupply and passenger airlift requirements are forecasted to be:

March 1968: 4,044 STONS/Day

B. In addition, experience during January and February indicates a daily requirement of approximately 350 STONS for unit deployments. Therefore, the total daily requirement estimated for March is as follows:

March 1968: 4,394 STONS/Day

C. The above requirements do not include I Corps contingency requirements.

D. To satisfy the 4,394 STON requirement for March, a total capability of 1,310 STONS can be provided by the C-123, C7A and RAAF A-4 aircraft. The remaining 3,084 STONS must be supported by C-130 aircraft.

E. Requirements which cannot be accomplished by capability in paragraph D above, will require C-130 augmentation. The tonnage requirements for C-130's is 3,084 STONS in March, or a total of 103 C-130 aircraft. Currently, arrangements have been made to have 96 aircraft assigned in-country by 28 February, and eight (8) additional C-130 aircraft will be available at Tachikawa AB, Japan for in-country use to meet requirement surges generated by unit moves and tactical contingency requirements over and above that forecasted.

F. If troop strengths continue to increase in SVN; and operations continue at present or higher levels, it is possible that within the near future additional aircraft over and above that reflected above will be required. Any additional requirements will be the subject of separate requests.

ENCLOSURE 13

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MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING (U)

I. GENERAL:

A. Previous MACV submittals contained specific urgent requirements for \$200 million FY 68 contingency funding.

B. Reduced level of FY 68 contingency funding (\$100 million) has precluded the funding of many of these urgent facility requirements for approved force deployments.

C. Funding for the majority of Program 5 construction requirements has been deferred to FY 69.

II. CURRENT STATUS:

A. Facilities and funds requirements are attached as Tabs A through D. The first three Tabs list urgent requirements for currently approved deployments by service and in priority order. They include, in addition to previously identified projects, requirements for battle damage repair, hardening of selected facilities, LOC and port work, and troop to contractor switch to free engineer troops for operational support missions. FY funds are required as follows:

FY 68C \$66.0 million*

FY 68S \$135.0 million

B. Tab D lists broad facilities and funds requirements for recommended additional force deployments. Funding requirements are time phased based on planned deployments scheduled as follows:

FY 68S \$95.7 million

FY 69 28.7 million

C. Total funding requirements and recommended funding vehicles are given below:

	<u>68C</u>	<u>68S</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>Total</u>
Currently Approved Deployments				
Army	26.8	21.8	--	48.6
Navy	24.1	61.3	--	85.4
Air Force	15.1	51.9	--	67.0
Additional Force Deployments	<u>----</u>	<u>95.7</u>	<u>28.7</u>	<u>124.4</u>
	66.0	230.7	28.7	325.4

* Does not include \$24 million previously released.

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ENCLOSURE 14

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TAB A

URGENT FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS-CURRENTLY APPROVED DEPLOYMENTS

ARMY

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>CWE \$ MIL</u>
1	Mekong Delta	Delta Dredging & Waterfront Facilities	4.1 (1)
2	Chu Lai	Americal Division Support Facilities	2.4 (1)
3	Various	LOC Repair and Improvement, Including Battle Damage Repair	11.3
4	Various	Troop to Contractor Transfer	8.0
5	Various	Materials for Repair and Replacement of Structure (Battle Damage)	<u>1.0</u>
		FY 68C FUNDING	26.8
<hr/>			
6	Long Binh	Underground Tactical Operations Centers for USARV, II FFV, 1st Log Cmd	2.8
7	Tan Son Nhut	Cantonments for EM to be relocated from Downtown Saigon	5.5
8	Various	Cantonments for Approved New FVMAF Units	7.0
9	Various	Repair of RVNAF Facilities	4.0
10	Various	Aircraft Protective Shelters (Fixed Wing Only)	<u>2.5</u>
		FY 68S FUNDING	21.8

(1) Submitted to OSD for funding.

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III. CONCLUSIONS:

A. Supplemental FY 68 funds in the amount of \$230.7 million are required. However, projected construction capability indicates that only approximately \$110 million can be utilized prior to the receipt of FY 69 funds. Hence, \$110 million is requested for FY 68S funding.

B. The additional required funds of \$149.4 million ($230.7 - 110.0 + 28.7$) should be included in the FY 69 Military Construction Program.

TAB A - Army Requirements
TAB B - Navy Requirements
TAB C - Air Force Requirements
TAB D - Requirements for Additional
Force Deployments

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TAB B

URGENT FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS-CURRENTLY APPROVED DEPLOYMENTS

NAVY

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>CWE \$ MIL</u>
1	Tan My	Port Facilities, First Incr	1.4 (1)
2	Phu Bai/Quang Tri	1st MAW Facilities	1.9 (1)
3	Chu Lai	MAG-13 Facilities	1.0 (1)
4	Danang	Maint Battalion FSR	1.3 (1)
5	Chu Lai	VW-1 Facilities	.2 (1)
6	Binh Thuy	Helo Maint Facilities	2.0 (1)
7	Phu Bai	Electr. Distribution	.4 (1)
8	Danang	1st Div Support Facilities	.3 (1)
9	Chu Lai	Replace A/C Maint Facilities	1.7 (2)
10	Chu Lai	Replace Ammo Storage Facilities	.1 (2)
11	N. I CTZ Ports	Port Facilities	10.0
12	I CTZ	Highway Repair	1.1 (2)
13	Hue	Repair Bridge (YD 768223)	.7 (2)
14	Hue	Repair Bridge (YD 749212)	.4 (2)
15	Danang	Ammo Storage Facility	<u>1.6</u> (3)
		FY 68C FUNDING	24.1
<hr/>			
16	Chu Lai	On-Base Roads	2.8 (3)
17	Danang	NSA Cantonment	2.1
18	Danang	Supply Facilities	3.3

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<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>CWE</u> <u>\$ MIL</u>
19	Danang	Various Projects/Troop to Contractor	6.0 (3)
20	Chu Lai	Various Projects/Troop to Contractor	4.0 (3)
21	Hue	Song Huong River Bridge (Hue by-pass)	2.5
22	Danang/Chu Lai	Install Bin-type Revetments (223 A/C)	1.7
23	Danang/Chu Lai	Install Revetment Covers (251 A/C)	32.6 (4)
24	Cam Ranh Bay	Phase II TRIM Facilities (NAF)	4.0
25	VNMC (MAP)	VNMC Base Facilities	1.6
26	VNN (MAP)	VNN Base Facilities	<u>.7</u>
		FY 68S FUNDING	61.3

NOTES:

- (1) Submitted to OSD for funding.
- (2) Repair to battle damage.
- (3) Troop to contractor transfer to free troop effort.
- (4) Cost of erection only; assumes timely delivery of service-procured materials.

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TAB C

URGENT FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS-CURRENTLY APPROVED DEPLOYMENTS

AIR FORCE

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>PROJECT</u>	<u>CWE \$ MIL</u>
1	Cam Ranh Bay	Operational Apron Addition	2.1
2	Danang, Bien Hoa	A/C Protective Shelters, Inc I	8.0 (1)
3	Various	Battle Damage Repair	2.0
4	Various	On-Base POL Storage	<u>3.0</u>
		FY 68C FUNDING	15.1
<hr/>			
5	Bien Hoa	Operational Apron	1.7
6	Tuy Hoa, Phu Cat Danang, Bien Hoa	A/C Protective Shelters	29.0
7	Various	Utilities	5.5
8	Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang	A/C Shelters, Inc III	12.0
9	Phu Cat	Replace AM-2 Apron	1.5
10	Various	Harden Command Centers	1.1
11	Danang	Airmen Dormitories	<u>1.1</u>
		FY 68S FUNDING	51.9

(1) Cost of erection only; assumes timely delivery of service-procured materials.

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TAB D

FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL FORCE DEPLOYMENTS

IMMEDIATE INCREASE - PRIORITY I

(8 TFS, 6th Armd Cav Regt, 5th Marine Div-, Bde of 5th
Mec Div; through August 1968)

Cantonments and Support	\$32,300,000
Aircraft Bed-down	20,400,000*
C-130 Airfield Upgrade	<u>4,200,000</u>
FY 68S Funds Required	\$56,900,000

IMMEDIATE INCREASE - PRIORITY II

(4 TFS, 16 C-130 A/C, 26 C-119 A/C, 5th Mech Div-, ROK
Lt Div; September through December 1968)

Cantonments and Support	\$22,500,000
Aircraft Bed-down	<u>16,300,000</u>
FY 68S Funds Required	\$38,800,000

FOLLOW-ON FORCES

(3 TFS, 30 C-130 A/C, 6 C-119 A/C, Army Division;
CY 1969)

Cantonments and Support	\$16,600,000
Aircraft Bed-down	<u>12,100,000</u>
FY 69 Funds Required	\$28,700,000

* Includes \$14,000,000 (CINCPAC estimate) for troop
construction at Nam Phong Air Base, Thailand.

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25 FEB 1968

SUBJECT: Additional Navy Forces

I. (S) GAME WARDEN (CTF 116)

A. The concept of GAME WARDEN operations in which the forces are penetrating deeper into the narrowing Delta waterways, requires employment of helicopters for SEAL Team insertion and extraction, landing craft with a rocket capability to provide fire support for patrol boats river (PBR's), tug boats for non-self-propelled craft, and assault patrol boats for canal and river patrol support and security.

B. Additional Forces:

Immediate Increment-Priority 1

None

Immediate Increment-Priority 2

4 Helicopters, UH-1	STR 16
4 LCM(R), Landing Craft Medium Rocket	STR 30
3 YTB's Yard Tug Boat	STR 30
20 ASPB's Armed Support Patrol Boat	STR 164

Follow-on Increment

YREM, Non Self-propelled Berthing, Messing and Repair
Craft on an APL Frame. STR 162

II. (S) MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE (CTF 117)

A. This force needs light landing craft to help provide security and base defense for the afloat bases. It needs Barracks Lighters (APL's) and associated tugs in order to provide a mobile barracks capability. Requested APL's will place the second brigade afloat. Command and control of the expanding forces and operations can be handled with additional helicopters, and an Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) capability with additional SEAL forces will improve the reconnaissance posture and the river clearing capability needed for the expanding operations.

B. Additional Forces:

Immediate Increment-Priority 1

10 LCPL, Landing Craft Personnel Light	STR 33
CTF 117 Staff Augmentation	STR 44
3 APL's, Auxilliary Personnel Lighter	STR 297
3 YTB's, Yard Tug Boat	STR 30
2 Helicopters, UH-1	STR 8
1 UDT Platoon, Underwater Demolition Team	STR 20
1 SEAL Platoon, Sea Air and Land	STR 20

Immediate Increment - Priority 2

None

Follow-on Increment

None

III. (S) I CTZ OPERATIONS:

A. The extensive increase in forces planned for I CTZ requires a substantial increase in Naval Support Activity Da Nang (NSAD) cargo handlers, public works activities, Army Repair and Utilities facilities, and Construction Battalion (CB) maintenance personnel. The general service requirements will constitute a substantial increase in personnel. This embraces such personnel as cooks and bakers, warehousemen, shore patrolmen, and general utilitarian ratings.

B. In addition, picket and pusher boats are required to provide security and tug capability for ocean going vessels. Landing craft of various sorts are needed for backloading cargo throughout I CTZ. The Small Craft Repair Facility augmentation is required to provide support to the additional craft programmed for I CTZ. And finally, Assault Patrol Boats are required to provide security for logistics craft on the Perfume and Cua Viat Rivers.

C. Additional construction personnel are required in I CTZ to help eliminate the current construction backlog and to provide for additional horizontal and vertical construction. This requirement includes augmentations for OICC, Officer-In-Charge of Construction, the 3d Naval Construction Brigade and the regimental staffs.

D. Additional Forces:

Immediate Increment - Priority 1

NSAD Army Repair and Utilities	STR	482
NSAD 400 Bed Hospital	STR	473
NSAD Cargo Handlers	STR	200
NSAD Picket Boats	STR	43
NSAD Pusher Boats	STR	44
NSAD Small Craft Repair Facility	STR	57
NSAD Augmentation (Personnelmen)	STR	11
NSAD Augmentation (General Service)	STR	990
NSAD Augmentation (USAID Cargo)	STR	139
NMCB, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion	STR	762
NMCB Augmentation (Augments Program 5 NMCB's)	STR	50
5 LCU's (Landing Craft Utility) & 8 LCM-8's (Landing Craft Medium)	STR	240
CBMU Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit	STR	500
USN Elements with USMC (Corpsmen, Doctors, Chaplains)	STR	1,380

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Immediate Increment-Priority 2

NCB Staff Augmentation, Naval Construction Battalion	STR	52
NCR Staff Augmentation, Naval Construction Regiment	STR	3
NSAD Augmentation, UADPS, Uniform Automatic Data Processing Service	STR	42
10 LCU's and 6 LCM-8's	STR	200
NSAD Augmentation (General Service)	STR	538
NMCB, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Augmentation	STR	3,250

Follow-on Increment

3-100 foot Utility Boats	STR	42
NCB, Naval Construction Battalion, staff Augmentation	STR	50
3 Helicopters for the 3rd NCB	STR	12
USN Elements with USMC (Corpsmen, etc.)	STR	138

IV. (S) NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON (NSAS)

A. Additional personnel are required for NAVSUPACT, Saigon to provide support for the expanding Mobile Riverine Force, as well as handle additional support requirements brought about by the increase in military activity in RVN.

B. Additional Forces:

Immediate Increment-Priority 1

None

Immediate Increment-Priority 2

NSAS Augmentation (Electronic Stores)	STR	53
NSAS Augmentation (MRF Support)	STR	14
MSTS Office Augmentation	STR	4

Follow-on Increment

3-100 foot Utility Boats	STR	42
COMNAVFORV Staff Augmentation	STR	12
Naval Investigating Services Office	STR	6
Officer-in-Charge, Construction, Augmentation	STR	12

V. (S) MARKET TIME (CTF 115)

A. It is anticipated that the MARKET TIME activities, with headquarters in Cam Ranh Bay (CR Bay), and the attendant support can be consolidated to provide more effective operations. Such consolidation involves putting the Patrol Plane Squadron in-country on a permanent basis. A squadron has been stationed in CR Bay temporarily. However, a squadron has been here without a break since MARKET TIME began.

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B. Additional Forces:

Immediate Increment - Priority 1

Naval Communications Station, Cam Ranh Bay	STR	81
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Immediate Increment - Priority 2

STABLE DOOR	STR	19
1 AFDL, Floating Dry Dock at Cam Ranh Bay	STR	25
CSC, Coastal Surveillance Center, Da Nang Aug	STR	6

Follow-on Increment

VP Squadron, Patrol Plane Squadron, Cam Ranh Bay	STR	225
NSF, Naval Support Facility, Cam Ranh Bay	STR	162

TOTAL 13,311*

* Includes civilianization and miscellaneous units.

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