

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/19/68

Ant:

This appears headed
in the right direction

I made the point to
WWZ about the President
& Westmoreland's need to
know.

WWZ is reluctant
to open all the President's
files. E/A knows of the PDB
BKS

1011
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt Rostow

Dear Walt:

Enclosed is the original letter from General Maxwell Taylor to Dick Helms. We are working against a 1 April deadline with either a completed or interim report by that date. A joint CIA/DIA-Joint Chiefs-CINCPAC team is in Saigon this week working on this problem.

Jack

R. J. SMITH
Deputy Director for Intelligence
19 March 1968
(DATE)

Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DDI-566-68

February 23, 1968

Honorable Richard M. Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-6-78, CIA 6-5-79, NSC 8-14-80

By JK (up), NARS, Date 8-29-80

Dear Dick:

Following your appearance before the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on February 16, the members discussed at length your presentation of the facts now known with regard to the lack of warning from intelligence sources of the attacks on the Vietnamese cities which began on January 30. Because of the importance of this matter to the President, they concluded that they should go more deeply into the matter in the hope of identifying lessons which may be applicable to future intelligence problems.

I am writing to enlist your cooperation in attempting to ascertain to what extent, if any, our intelligence services and those of our allies were at fault in failing to alert our military and political leaders of the impending large-scale attack on the cities and towns of South Vietnam. I recognize the difficulty of making such a determination at this distance and the danger of impeding current operation-related activities by anything resembling a detailed investigation. Nevertheless, it would seem to be in the interest of the entire intelligence community, both here and in Saigon, to make an appraisal of the lessons of this experience while it is fresh in our minds.

As the Intelligence Board sees the problem, there are two basic questions which need to be answered:

- a. Did our intelligence collection agencies obtain all or most of the pertinent intelligence which was available in the circumstances?
- b. Was the evaluation of the available intelligence sound and did that evaluation reach the decision-makers in time to assist them in taking appropriate action?

The answer to these questions would require us to know in general what information bearing upon the attack of the cities

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reached senior officials such as General Westmoreland, the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, the DCI and the President and what picture of the evolving situation these reports created in the minds of the recipients. Enclosed herewith is a list of related questions which, if answered, would shed considerable light upon the effectiveness of the working of the intelligence process at this critical time.

The Board would be most grateful if, in concert with your colleagues of the Intelligence Community, you would give us the benefit of your views on these questions. As the matter will be a primary topic on the Board's agenda on April 11-12, it would be most helpful if I could receive your response by April 1. In the interim, I would be most interested in receiving any briefings from intelligence agencies which may bear upon this matter in order to be better prepared to deal with your report when it becomes available.

In appreciation of your cooperation in this matter,

Sincerely,

Maxwell D. Taylor

Maxwell D. Taylor

Enclosure

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ENCLOSURE TO LETTER TO DCI

a. What information reached J-2, MACV, in the period January 15-30 indicating the possibility of the attack on the cities? What can be said as to the origin, the quantity, the accuracy and the timeliness of this information?

b. In how many cases of attacks on the cities and towns did the responsible field commanders receive warning through intelligence sources in sufficient time to avoid being surprised? Please show on a map where these attacks occurred which were thus frustrated.

c. To what extent did the Vietnamese civil population give information to the authorities before and during the attacks? (It has been said on television that there was not a single report from civilian sources alerting GVN/US forces to the impending attacks.)

d. To what extent was there a free and rapid exchange of information between GVN and U.S. agencies?

e. Have the enemy units which engaged in the attacks now been identified? If so, what conclusions have been drawn from these identifications?

f. What substantive evaluated information bearing on the attack on the cities reached the following officials in the period January 15-30? (1) General Westmoreland, (2) JCS, (3) Secretary of Defense, (4) DCI, (5) The President.

g. Insofar as it can be reconstructed, what picture did these officials have of the situation based upon intelligence received just prior to the attack on the cities?

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INFORMATION

Tuesday, March 19, 1968

12:20 p.m.

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MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to take into account at lunch these thoughts of the meeting of the Southeast Asian Ambassadors and Gen. Westmoreland at Cam Ranh Bay.

They raise, among other matters, the possibility of:

- a feint against North Vietnam;
- limited operations in Laos.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

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Authority OSD 10-6-78, NSC 8-14-80
By JK (ig), NARS, Date 8-29-80

MM

Copy of SAIGON 22495 March 19, 1968

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Subject: Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee Recommendations

1. The Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee (SEACoord) convened at Cam Ranh Bay on March 7. Present were Ambassadors Bunker, Sullivan and Unger, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland, together with their principal advisors. Following represents agreed summary of recommendations:

A. Vietnam - 1. In light of enemy divisions in DMZ-Khe Sanh area, the U.S. Government should study possibility of conducting amphibious feint north of the DMZ to relieve pressure on I Corps recommended by CINCPAC. Study should include careful re-examination of earlier expressed fear that failure to follow through on such a feint might be termed a propaganda victory for North Vietnam.

B. Laos - The extensive use of Laos by North Vietnamese military forces has greatly increased the problem of combating the enemy throughout South Vietnam. The use of Laotian territory by the enemy has reached a degree of seriousness where, despite the political problems involved, we should consider permitting limited military operations in Laos. Current military situation in Laos is moreover marked by aggressive enemy action which bears direct relation to increased North Vietnamese presence in Northern provinces of South Vietnam. Specially planned operations by US forces on Khe Sanh plateau may encounter harassment and fire from enemy forces across the border in enemy base areas of Laos.

SEACoord recommends following actions relating to foregoing evaluation:

1. Contingency planning for possible limited ground operations; by US and /or ARVN forces in Laos should proceed. The point may be reached when it will become necessary on a case by case basis to put limited ground forces into Laos. In that event, these forces should be employed close to the border and the operations should be conducted in such a way as to have no press exposure. It is important that the targets selected be worthy of the political risks involved. The Commander, US MACV will prepare contingency plans for consideration by Embassy Vientiane and will forward them to CINCPAC and the JCS for approval. The problems of deniability and/or press disclosure of such operations are recognized, and they will be covered in an appropriate annex.

2. Make immediate efforts to locate an alternate position for Site 85, primarily for aircraft guidance purposes. One such site, Phou Bia, would be valuable but requires specialized helicopter support because of altitude.

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Authority RAC 17839
By W/4 NARA, Date 8-11-0

The 7th Air Force will examine possibilities of obtaining such helicopters.

3. Authorize launching of Prairie Fire missions through Nakhon Phanom, recovering at forward refueling sites in Laos after team insertion when poor weather prevents operations from South Vietnam. These launches from Nakhon Phanom will be subject to existing restrictions on Vietnamese presence in Thailand and Laos. The Commander of Special Operations Groups (MACSOG) will coordinate with Embassy Vientiane re operating arc of current helicopters from Nakhon Phanom in order to determine feasible forward refueling sites in Laos. MACSOG will also propose for consideration by Bangkok alternate launching sites other than Nakhon Phanom. The possible use of other sites in Thailand will be studied by Embassy Bangkok and Commander, U. S. MACV, having in mind military factors as well as the likelihood of approval by the Thai Government which must be sought before any extension in operations beyond the present authorization.

4. Commander, U. S. MACV proposed that Washington accept the principle that the current Prairie Fire boundary is a coordination line and authorize Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and Embassy Vientiane to coordinate locally for exploitation of targets west of Prairie Fire boundary. Vientiane felt case by case coordination locally submitted through Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) for approval by Washington was adequate, but agreed to leave decision on this subject up to Washington.

5. Initiate a Prairie Fire intelligence collection operation, exploiting the potential of Kha tribesmen indigenous to the Prairie Fire area as elements of a low-level MACV-directed intelligence net.

6. Since enemy operations in Laos threatening Khe Sanh area appeared to require extension of dump truck area southward in Laos, it was agreed that Embassy Vientiane would submit a proposal through channels for such extension.

7. Embassy Vientiane proposed an increase in A-1 and A-26 aircraft positioned in Thailand and available for operations in Laos. It was agreed that the weekly planning meetings at Udorn between the 7th Air Force and Embassy Vientiane would include planning air support for ground force operations in counter-insurgency context.

8. Seek immediate augmentation of helicopters for entire SEACORD area and employ a portion of this augmentation to provide better support for CIA guerrilla activity in Laos panhandle.

C. Cambodia - Political

1. Discussion at the SEACoord meeting emphasized the great importance of the collection and exploitation of specific hard intelligence on Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army use of Cambodia, as well as of circumstantial evidence which is convincing by dint of its quality and quantity. Collection of all types of intelligence on Cambodia should be given higher national priority than heretofore. Use of more aggressive intelligence collection methods should be authorized where necessary to obtain such intelligence. Movement of supplies to and through Sihanoukville is a particularly important area for an increased intelligence collection effort. Internal political and insurgency developments should also be covered in new tasking for CIA collection efforts.

2. We should do more to exploit the intelligence assets of other countries. The Australians, for example, should be encouraged to add at least one officer to their Military Attache office in Phnom Penh (which now has only one officer). Personnel of this office should be encouraged to do more travelling to Sihanoukville and the frontier areas. We should be prepared, if necessary, to increase our payments for Australian representation of American interests to compensate for the expenditures entailed in these expanded operations. Efforts should be made to obtain substantially more intelligence on Cambodia from other friendly missions in Phnom Penh, such as the British and Japanese (Embassy Bangkok and Embassy Saigon see very little information from these sources; if it is coming to the Department, they would appreciate being put on distribution for it.)

3. Sihanouk should personally be presented with evidence of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army use of Cambodia on a regular and continuing basis. He should be asked what his investigation of the material we have already given him has revealed. The Asutralians should be asked to impress him again with the seriousness with which we view the situation and call for action on the evidence provided him.

4. Assuming there is no sign of real action to correct the situation on Sihanouk's part in the near future, we should bring our evidence of VC/NVA use of Cambodia to the attention of other friendly governments and ask them to stress our concern to the Cambodians.

5. Pressure should be maintained on the Indians to work to make the International Control Commission an effective instrument for policing VC/NVA use of the border, though we recognize that such a transformation is unlikely. Meanwhile, evidence of VC/NVA use of Cambodia should be presented to the ICC on a regular and continuing basis.

6. No particular pressure should be applied to the Vietnamese to open up the Mekong. The closing of the Mekong puts additional pressure on the port of Sihanoukville, complicating any movement of VC/NVA supplies through that port.

7. The question of reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cambodia should be kept under continuing review. While presence of a U. S. military attache with freedom to travel would be helpful, the present moment -- one in which we do not wish to make a major conciliatory step at a time we are pressing him toward more effective action on his own to deny VC/NVA use of his territory -- does not seem an appropriate time to move toward a re-establishment of relations.

8. It is recommended that the Secretary brief his colleagues on Cambodia in the seven nations meeting in Wellington, with a view to bringing them to understand the lines of action we have in mind and to enlist their cooperation where pertinent. Such a presentation would be an opportunity both to encourage governments with access to Cambodian government to join in emphasizing to it their concern over security problem posed by NVN/VC sanctuary and to explain to all the need for restraint in short term actions against Cambodia while determining what Sihanouk can and will do.

D. Cambodia - Administrative

1. Primary US field responsibility for matters relating to Cambodia (except for VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory) should continue to be vested in Embassy Bangkok. Bangkok will also take initiative in formulating recommendations on appropriate action as viewed from the field, keeping other SEACoord posts informed. Embassy Bangkok should be given necessary resources to do the job. Saigon will continue to have primary responsibility for reporting and policy recommendations relating to VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory, keeping other SEACoord posts informed. Embassy Bangkok will be sending follow-on telegram which will contain specific recommendations for improving collection, collation and dissemination of information.

2. It is recommended that member agencies assign a high priority to the interdepartmental working group under State Department chairmanship that has been established in Washington to coordinate and take action on matters pertaining to Cambodia.

E. Cambodia - Military

Meanwhile, it would be desirable, in the aftermath of the VC/NVA

use of Cambodia in connection with the Tet offensive, to take Sihanouk up on his willingness to have us conduct limited military operations in unpopulated areas of Cambodia. We recommend that increased military activity by U. S. forces against NVA/VC in Cambodia begin now on a small scale, gradually increasing our operations as the situation permits, using care to avoid foreclosing through this program the possibility of obtaining Sihanouk's cooperation with us to reduce VC/NVA use of his territory. We recommend a scenario for U. S. operations in Cambodia as follows:

1. Beginning immediately:

A. The present restrictions on the number, depth, and frequency of Daniel Boone insertions be relaxed in Zone A and that more helicopter support be authorized for cross border operations in Zone A of the Daniel Boone area. This is essential if we are to develop better intelligence for use in the Vesuvius Operation. Further we need to develop hard targets that can later be exploited by fire in the unpopulated areas of Cambodia.

B. Exercising extreme caution to ascertain no Cambodian presence, initiate active defensive measures of short duration in remote, unpopulated sections of the Cambodian border area.

(1) Reconnaissance. Beyond present Daniel Boone squads, authorize US platoon/company size forces be inserted by helicopter and/or ground.

(2) Pursuit by fire on enemy targets retreating into unpopulated areas of Cambodia by use of artillery, gunships and tactical air.

C. Task CIA and other agencies as appropriate to develop resources for the conduct of black psychological operations to exploit differences between the Cambodian government, on the one hand, and the VC/NVA, CHICOMS and their Cambodian supporters on the other.

D. Expand the area of coverage south to the Gulf of Thailand, exercising safeguards to preclude loss of an aircraft in Cambodian territory.

2. Subsequent military operations:

Depending on Sihanouk's reactions to our political pressure and to our increased military operations recommended above, we visualize a carefully controlled and gradual increase in strength and effectiveness of US operations into Cambodia, while at the same time avoiding actions which would jeopardize any political progress we are making with Sihanouk.

The following subsequent military operations are recommended for initiation if it becomes clear that efforts to induce Sihanouk to act more effectively are not going to produce results and in circumstances where there would be a clear military imperative.

A. Increasing our reconnaissance capability by authorizing overflights to a depth of 20 kilometers along the entire Cambodian border area with the QT-2 noiseless aircraft as soon as it proved its operational capability. Also allow the airborne personnel detector (people sniffer) to be employed along the border as an additional airborne sensor. In order for this ~~and to~~ to be employed effectively, authorize additional low-level reconnaissance coverage.

B. On a case by case basis, authorize night-time B-52 strikes on clearly defined significant targets in unpopulated, remote areas astride the South Vietnam-Cambodian border.

C. Increase the strength of our active defensive measures of short duration in remote, unpopulated sections of Cambodia close to the border by:

(1) Raids. Attack specific enemy targets with company/battalion task force supported by artillery, gunships, and tactical air.

(2) Pursuit. Forces not to exceed battalion task force size forces to maintain contact and destroy enemy forces retreating into Cambodia.

(3) Reaction forces. Employment of company/battalion task force size forces to reinforce reconnaissance/raid action and to assist disengagement and withdrawal of forces as necessary.

BUNKER

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI/RAC 99-168
By CB, NARA Date 1-22-01

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
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CITE TDCS -314/04632-68

DIST 20 MARCH 1968


COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: MID-MARCH 1968

SUBJECT: NORTH VIETNAMESE TACTICS ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

ACQ:

SOURCE:



EO 12958
 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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EO 12958
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1.

THE DRV

EXPLAINED THE TACTICS BEING FOLLOWED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ON
 PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE DRV FOLLOWS A POLICY OF GRADUALLY CHANGING AND
 CLARIFYING ITS PEACE TERMS IN ORDER TO CAPITALIZE ON THE
 APPROACHING AMERICAN ELECTIONS. BY ORCHESTRATING THESE SMALL
 CHANGES IN THEIR STATEMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS THEY HOPE TO MAKE

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TDCS-314/04632-68

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~~SECRET~~ / NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

IT INCREASINGLY CLEAR TO WORLD OPINION (AND IMPLICITLY AMERICAN OPINION AS WELL) THAT IT IS THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WANTS TO PURSUE THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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B. AS EXAMPLES OF THIS TACTIC [REDACTED] RECALLED THE CHANGES IN TENSE FROM THE CONDITIONAL "COULD" TO THE FUTURE "WOULD" ON THE QUESTION OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMERICANS. ALSO HE CITED THE VARIOUS MODIFICATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF HOW LONG AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS WOULD THESE DISCUSSIONS BEGIN; I.E., A GRADUAL EVOLUTION FROM "WITHOUT DELAY" TO "RAPIDLY" TO WITHIN "A FEW DAYS". [REDACTED] ALSO CITED THE GRADUAL CLARIFICATION OF WHAT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED UP TO THE PRESENT POINT OF "EVERYTHING WHICH INTERESTS THE PARTIES IN THE CAUSE".

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. SOURCE COMMENT: [REDACTED] TREATED THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN A CYNICAL JOKING MANNER AND LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THE DRV HAD NO SERIOUS INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS TIME AND WAS USING THIS SUBJECT SIMPLY AS A PROPAGANDA GIMMICK.
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL: 5003Q

RECEIVED: Mar. 20, 1968

7:32 a.m.

PP RUEHC

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8992

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BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 22548

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter [2-79]

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By isf, NARS, Date 7-25-79

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER

REFERENCE: STATE 131732

1. I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT AT AN EARLY STAGE ON THE VERY IMPORTANT QUESTIONS RAISED IN REFTEL SINCE, AS YOU HAVE INDICATED, ACTIONS ON THEM CLEARLY WILL HAVE MAJOR EFFECTS HERE WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE DECISIONS ARE MADE. I RECOGNIZE THAT CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE SITUATION IN THE US MAY BE OVERRIDING, BUT I AM SETTING FORTH MY VERY FRANK VIEWS ON THE PROBLEMS WHICH I BELIEVE MAY FOLLOW HERE IF THESE COURSES OF ACTION ARE INITIATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. I WILL

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MAKE SOME GENERAL COMMENTS FIRST AND THAN DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION IN THE LIGHT OF THESE MORE GENERAL COMMENTS.

2. AS YOU INDICATE IN PARA 6 OF REFTEL, WE HAVE REPORTED THE GENERAL ATTITUDES HERE TOWARDS EARLY NEGOTIATIONS OR PEACE INITIATIVES FULLY AND THEY DO NOT NEED TO BE REPEATED IN DETAIL. IN ADDITION TO A CONTINUING SENSE OF UNCERTAINTY AND SOME RESIDUAL FEAR OF FURTHER ENEMY ATTACKS ON THE CITIES, WHICH UNDERLIE THE GVN SENSITIVITY ON NEW NEGOTIATION INITIATIVES, THERE ARE ONE OR TWO ADDITIONAL FACTORS WHICH LIE UNDER THE SURFACE. ONE IS THE LATENT FEELING WHICH I SENSE MANY VIETNAMESE HAVE THAT THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SOME FORM OF IMMEDIATE RETALIATION AGAINST NVN AFTER THE SAVAGE TET ATTACKS. THIS HAS NOT BEEN EXPLICITLY VOICED BY VIETNAMESE LEADERS BUT I SUSPECT THAT IT IS THERE. THE

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-2- SAIGON 22548 Mar 20

RECENT INITIATIVES BY KY AND LOAN THAT SOME OF THEIR FOLLOWERS URGING A "MARCH TO THE NORTH" AND A DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM PROBABLY REPRESENT, INTER ALIA, A REACTION TO THIS FRUSTRATION.

3. THIS FACTOR HAS A BEARING ON THE GENERAL QUESTION

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OF THIEU'S POSITION IF HE SHOULD AGREE TO A PROPOSAL FROM US ALONG THE LINES INDICATED. THIEU, AS YOU KNOW, HAS SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE VERY RESPONSIVE TO OUR WISHES AND NEEDS, EVEN IF HE HAS NOT ALWAYS MOVED WITH THE SPEED AND VIGOR WE MIGHT HOPE. IN DOING SO, HE HAS MADE HIMSELF VULNERABLE TO CHARGES OF BEING UNDULY INFLUENCED BY THE AMERICANS, AND THIS MAY BE ONE OF THE MOTIVES THAT LIE BEHIND THESE NATIONALISTIC INITIATIVES BY KY AND OTHERS. THIEU COULD THEREFORE FIND HIMSELF IN A VERY DELICATE POSITION IF HE SHOULD GIVE HIS CONCURRENCE TO OUR PROPOSALS UNLESS KY IS EQUALLY COMMITTED IN WHATEVER IS DONE.

4. THE TIMING OF THESE MOVES WILL BE CRITICAL TO OUR SUCCESS IN GETTING GVN SUPPORT, OR AT LEAST UNDERSTANDING, FOR THEM, AND I REGARD FULL CONSULTATION WITH GVN LEADERS AS ESSENTIAL. FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PUTTING HANOI ON THE SPOT, I CAN SEE THAT AN EARLY INITIATIVE MIGHT HAVE SOME ADVANTAGE, BUT FROM A SOUTH VIETNAMESE VIEWPOINT IT COULD CREATE PROBLEMS THAT THE GVN MAY NOT BE ABLE TO COPE WITH. AT THE PRESENT MOMENT THE MOOD OF THE PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, IS STILL FLUID AND A MOVE BY

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US TO MAKE A CONCESSION TO HANOI AND THE VC WITHOUT A QUID PRO QUO COULD BE WIDELY MISINTERPRETED AND COULD FEED THE LATENT ANTI-AMERICANISM WHICH THE VC HAVE BEEN CLEVERLY EXPLOITING IN RECENT WEEKS. IT COULD REVIVE THE EARLIER RUMOR OF US-VC COLLUSION. IT COULD ALSO REVERSE THE FAVORABLE TREND OF OPINION IN THE URBAN AREAS WHERE THE NEW MOOD OF UNITY AND ANTI-COMMUNISM IS STILL QUITE STRONG, AS SHOWN FOR EXAMPLE BY THE LARGE NUMBER OF YOUNG MEN VOLUNTEERING FOR MILITARY SERVICE. WE ARE ALSO

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-3- SAIGON 22548 Mar 20

JUST AT THE POINT WHERE THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES ARE TAKING THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE ENEMY AND ARE MOVING BACK OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE. WE DO NOT WANT TO TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT DISCOURAGE THIS TREND AS WE HAVE BEEN WORKING HARD TO ENCOURAGE IT FOR THE PAST FEW WEEKS. IN SHORT, A PREMATURE MOVE TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS COULD UNSETTLE THE FAVORABLE TREND OF VIETNAMESE OPINION AND ACTION AT A CRITICAL MOMENT, ENCOURAGE THE FENCE-SITTERS, DOUBTERS AND RUMOR MONGERS, AND POSSIBLY DISCOURAGE NEW RALLIERS FROM THE OTHER SIDE.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, A FEW MORE MONTHS MIGHT MAKE ALL

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THE DIFFERENCE IN REESTABLISHING VIETNAMESE CONFIDENCE IN THEMSELVES (AND IN US) AND IN THEIR ABILITY TO OVERCOME THE TET ATTACKS AND TO MOVE AHEAD DEMONSTRABLY ON PRIORITY OBJECTIVES. IT WOULD ALSO AFFORD TIME TO JUDGE MORE ACCURATELY THE EFFECT OF THE TET OFFENSIVE ON THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY AND TO DEMONSTRATE OUR OWN INTENTIONS REGARDING FURTHER MILITARY AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR THE GVN, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT FOR AUGMENTED VIETNAMESE FORCES. TIME, IN OTHER WORDS, SHOULD WORK TO OUR ADVANTAGE IN TERMS OF VIETNAMESE RECEPTIVITY TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS INITIATIVES, WHEREAS TOO EARLY A MOVE MIGHT HAVE AN EXTREMELY NEGATIVE EFFECT AND UNDO MUCH THAT WE AND THE GVN HAVE BEEN TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH SINCE THE TET ATTACKS. AS YOU KNOW, THIEU, KY, AND DO HAVE FREQUENTLY SAID TO ME THAT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS NEEDED AND DESIRED BY THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN AT WAR OFF AND ON FOR MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS. THEY CONSIDER, HOWEVER, THAT THE TIMING OF NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT A SETTLEMENT IS CRITICAL AND MUST BE RELATED TO THE STRENGTH OF THE GVN'S POSITION. THEY ALL FEEL STRONGLY THAT IT IS TOO EARLY NOW TO GET ENGAGED IN SUCH AN EFFORT.

BUNKER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PP RUEHC

CN:5077Q

DE RUMJIR 22548/2 0801130

1968 MAR 20PM 12:11

ZNY TTTTT ZZH

P 200533Z MAR 68

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8993

STATE GRNC

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~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 22548

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6. IF I MAY LOOK AT THIS PROPOSITION ALSO FROM HANOI'S VIEW-POINT, I IMAGINE THAT THE LEADERSHIP THERE MIGHT REGARD AN EARLY MOVE ON OUR PART WITHOUT ANY RECIPROCITY FROM THEIR SIDE AS AN INDICATION OF THE SUCCESS OF THEIR TET OFFENSIVE AND OF THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AROUND THE WORLD. THEY MIGHT WELL CONCLUDE THAT THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM HAS BEEN SHAKEN MORE THAN THEY PROBABLY NOW THINK AND THAT IN THE US OUR RESOLVE WITH RESPECT TO VIET-NAM HAS BEEN WEAKENED. I AM INCLINED TO AGREE WITH YOU THAT HANOI WOULD NOT TAKE ANY REAL STEP TOWARD PEACE, BUT THEIR LEADERS WOULD SEEK TO

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 22548/2 ~~TOP SECRET~~

GIVE A WORLD-WIDE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE DOING PRECISELY THIS, AND I BELIEVE WE MIGHT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO RESUME BOMBING IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE HOLDING OF THEIR HAND AT KHE SANH, WHICH MAY BE THEIR INTENTION IN ANY CASE, AND WHICH WE COULD NEVER REALLY BE SURE OF, COULD LEAVE US WITH THE SAME MAJOR COMMITMENT OF FORCES IN NORTHERN I CORPS THAT WE HAVE NOW. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE A SITUATION WITHOUT ANY REAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE SINCE WE WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY THERE. I ALSO QUESTION WHETHER THE HOLDING OF THEIR HAND AGAINST FURTHER ATTACKS ON THE CITIES WOULD HAVE REAL SIGNIFICANCE IN MILITARY TERMS, SINCE IT SEEMS INCREASINGLY LIKELY THAT THEY NO LONGER HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO UNDERTAKE SUCCESSFULLY WIDE-SPREAD AND DESTRUCTIVE ATTACKS ON A SCALE COMPARABLE TO TET. FURTHER HARASSMENT OF THE CITIES AND OF LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS SEEMS MORE LIKELY. OUR MILITARY POSTURE WILL BE FURTHER IMPROVED

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-2- SAIGON 22548 SEC 2 OF 2 MAR 20

IN THE MEANTIME IF VIETNAMESE FORCES ARE BUILT UP SUBSTANTIALLY AND AMERICAN FORCES ARE AUGMENTED TO SOME DEGREE. IN SUM, I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT HANOI'S RESPONSE TO THESE MEASURES WILL BRING US ANY ADVANTAGE, EITHER POLITICALLY OR MILITARILY.

7. WITH RESPECT TO THE TWO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS YOU OUTLINE, THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE (PARA 2 OF REFTTEL) WOULD CREATE THE GREATEST DIFFICULTIES FOR US HERE. I RECOMMEND STRONGLY THAT WE NOT PURSUE THIS COURSE, SINCE FROM A VIETNAMESE VIEWPOINT IT WOULD BRING OUT ALL THE DISADVANTAGES I HAVE MENTIONED AND IT WOULD ALSO MEAN GIVING UP OUR PRINCIPAL CARD WITHOUT OBTAINING ANYTHING IN RETURN.

8. IF YOUR SECOND PROPOSAL WERE ADOPTED, IT WOULD BE EASIER TO OBTAIN GVN CONCURRENCE. I BELIEVE, NONETHELESS, THAT IT WOULD STILL HAVE MOST OF THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS I HAVE DISCUSSED ABOVE IF INITIATED PREMATURELY. THE CONDITIONS SPELLED OUT IN PARA 4 WOULD BE HELPFUL IN PRESENTING THE MATTER TO THE GVN LEADERSHIP, ALTHOUGH I SUSPECT THAT THEY WILL STILL SEE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES IF THIS COURSE IS INITIATED IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND CERTAINLY IF IT IS DONE BEFORE WE HAVE INDICATED PUBLICLY OUR INTENTION TO INCREASE OUR FORCES IN VIET-NAM. GENERALS WESTMORELAND AND MOMYER ARE CURRENTLY STUDYING THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF CONFINING THE BOMBING OF NVN TO ROUGHLY THE AREA YOU HAVE IN MIND AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY IN HAND IN ORDER TO DETERMINE ITS MILITARY EFFECT.

9. IN CONCLUSION, I SHOULD SAY THAT WHILE I DO NOT WANT TO EXAGGERATE THE EFFECTS HERE OF OUR INITIATING AN ACTION ALONG THE LINES INDICATED, I BELIEVE THAT IF IT IS DONE PREMATURELY, IT RUNS THE VERY REAL RISK OF UNDERMINING MUCH THAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED HERE AND OF STIMULATING LATENT VIETNAMESE DOUBTS ABOUT OUR INTENTIONS. AS I HAVE INDICATED, WE MUST CONSULT THIEU AND KY AND WE MUST GIVE THEM TIME TO CONSIDER THE EFFECTS OF SUCH ACTION ON THEIR SITUATION. THIS MIGHT MEAN A FEW DAYS OR POSSIBLY A WEEK. I EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT IT WILL DISTURB THEM DEEPLY AND THAT THEY WILL URGE US TO DEFER SUCH ACTIONS FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL MONTHS WHEN THEY EXPECT TO BE IN A STRONGER POSITION TO BRING OTHER ELEMENTS OF VIETNAMESE OPINION, MILITARY

AND CIVILIAN ALONG WITH THEM IN SUPPORT OF ANY NEW INITIATIVE BY US. BUNKER

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 20, 1968 - 12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Herewith a new calculation which brings the expenditures attributable to the new program in Vietnam down to \$8 billion (\$3.25 FY 1968; \$4.7 FY 1969).

This comes about, in part, by shifting the pay supplemental out of this category.

The additional papers show the exact make up of these expenditures, including the "prudent actions."

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 3-31-80 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 7-22-80

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Department of Defense

Additional Financing

DECLASSIFIED
OSD letter JUN 26 1979

Authority

By ing, NARS, Date 10-19-79

New Obligational Authority

	1968	1969
Operations	430	1,170
Aircraft Procurement	90	40
Munitions Procurement	430	450
Equipment Procurement	550	120
Stock funds	400	0
Construction	120	20
Subtotal, Program 6	2,020	1,800
Zero Supplemental and prudent actions (net)	3,300	1,140
Total Additional NOA	5,320	2,940

Expenditures

From zero supplemental and faster tempo	1,800	0
From prudent actions	740	2,040
Program 6		
Operations	410	1,140
Other	300	1,520
Total Additional Expenditures	3,250	4,700
Pay Supplemental	0	1,350 1/
Per President's Budget	74,200	77,100
Total Expenditures	77,450	83,150

Balance of Payments (DoD net adverse balance)

As forecast, January 23, 1968	3,530	3,480
Additional from above	70	340
Total DoD Adverse Balance	3,600	3,820 2/

1/ This amount is already included in the President's Budget, but not in the DoD portion.

2/ Balance of Payments effect assumes that current value of dollar will be maintained.

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ASD(C)
March 20, 1968

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Department of Defense
Additional Financial Requirements
(Millions of Dollars)

	NOA		Expenditures	
	1968	1969	1968	1969
1. <u>Additional Requirements in FY 1968 Revision:</u>				
Military Personnel	20	-	20	-
Operation and Maintenance	<u>1,530</u>	-	<u>500</u>	-
Subtotal, Operations	1,550	-	520	-
Procurement	30	-	930	-
Research and Development	<u>110</u>	-	<u>350</u>	-
Total, FY 1968 Revision	1,700	-	1,800	-
2. <u>Necessary Prudent Actions (Tab A)</u>	1,600	1,140	740	2,040
3. <u>Program 6</u>				
Military Personnel	180	680	180	680
Operation and Maintenance	<u>250</u>	<u>490</u>	<u>230</u>	<u>460</u>
Subtotal, Operations	430	1,170	410	1,140
Aircraft Procurement	90	40	10	80
Munitions Procurement	430	450	60	590
Equipment Procurement	550	120	70	480
Stock Funds	400	0	140	260
Construction	<u>120</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>110</u>
Total, Program 6	2,020	1,800	710	2,660
• Total of Items 1, 2, and 3	5,320	2,940	3,250	4,700
4. <u>Pay Supplemental</u>	-	1,350*	-	1,350*
Total Additional	5,320	4,290	3,250	6,050
As shown in President's FY 1969 Budget	<u>73,360</u>	<u>79,580</u>	<u>74,200</u>	<u>77,100</u>
Total DoD	78,680	83,870	77,450	83,150

*This amount is already included in the President's Budget, but not in DoD portion.

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ASD(C)
March 20, 1968

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Tab A

"Prudent Actions"
(\$ Millions)

	NOA		Exp	
	1968	1969	1968	1969
1. <u>Reserve Recall, January 25, 1968</u>	37	92	35	90
Six USNR squadrons and 15,000 Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel have been called to active duty. The amount is required for active duty pay and flying hour costs.				
2. <u>Air Force Deployments</u>	156	286	140	270
Increased tempo of operations in Southeast Asia requires conversion of additional gunships, installation of additional electronics countermeasures, increased overhauls, more ammunition and operating costs for B-52's.				
3. <u>Additional Navy Activity</u>	22	50	20	45
Principally additional carrier operating cost.				
4. <u>Helicopters</u>	555	0	100	450
Procurement of 604 UH-1, 160 AH-1G, 300 OH-6A, 72 CH-46, 58 CH-53, and lesser numbers of CH-47, CH-54, and OV-10. Also expansion of T-53 engine production from 200 to 300 per month.				
5. <u>Electronic Countermeasure Pods</u>	23	52	5	40
Procure 239 pods so that there would be two pods per operationally ready aircraft in Korea and in high threat areas in North Vietnam, and one pod for other aircraft.				
6. <u>B-52 Munitions</u>	230	432	50	400
Increase sorties from 1200 to 1800 per month.				
7. <u>Ground and Ship Gun Ammunition</u>	304	21	60	260
Extrapolate increased consumption rates of past few months.				

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	NOA		Exp	
	1968	1969	1968	1969
8. <u>TNT Production Facilities</u>	60	0	20	40
Production capacity is inadequate to support present estimate of requirements.				
9. <u>Aircraft Shelters, South Vietnam</u>	44	17	10	59
619 shelters urgently needed to reduce damage from rocket and mortar attack.				
10. <u>Aircraft Overhaul, Army</u>	25	50	20	50
\$15 million is for increased battle damage of helicopters and components; \$10 million is for double shift operations to speed up turn-around time.				
11. <u>M-16 Rifles</u>	52	0	10	42
Procure 265,000 additional rifles by December 1969 by (a) placing Colt on 21 shift basis, and (b) opening up a new line at General Motors Hydramatic Division.				
12. <u>Replace TET Destruction</u>	68	20	44	44
This amount is reduced from Army's original request of \$229 million, and may need to be increased as better information becomes available.				
13. <u>Anti-Infiltration Equipment</u>	3	12	1	14
This is intended for Korea in addition to \$12 million included in FY 1968 Revision.				
14. <u>Ammunition and Equipment Reserve ROK</u>	237	0	50	187
Provides 75-day stock level for 14 ROK divisions, to be held in U.S. depots until hostilities start. This amount needed for resupply until production received from new orders.				
15. <u>Construction in Korea</u>	153	75	30	180
Improve Army and Air Force facilities in Korea, including aircraft shelters, operational facilities, troop housing, utilities, maintenance and storage facilities.				

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	NOA		Exp	
	1968	1969	1968	1969
16. <u>Equipping ROK Light Division</u>	68	34	20	60
<p>This Division is promised by Korea for deployment to South Vietnam. Procurement is needed to round out its equipment, for deployment early in FY 1969. Operations funds are in FY 1969 budget.</p>				
17. <u>Equipping THAI Light Division</u>	31	0	5	26
<p>Similar need to ROK Light Division.</p>				
18. <u>ARVN Equipment Modernization</u>	49	0	10	39
<p>Add machine guns, trucks, grenade launchers, mortars, and howitzers.</p>				
19. <u>ARVN Additional Ammunition</u>	54	0	10	44
<p>Provide for additional consumption of 105 mm HE rounds.</p>				
20. <u>Research and Development</u>	200	0	100	100
Total Prudent Actions	2,371	1,141	740	2,040
Less amounts provided by reprogramming	767	0	0	0
Total	1,604	1,141	740	2,040

ASD(C)
19Mar68

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 20, 1968 -- 7:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith three papers from Clark Clifford.

1. A memorandum on the reserve call-up, showing:

- the units called up to back up the additional South Vietnam deployment;
- additional call up to replenish the strategic reserves;
- the resulting positioning ^{of} ~~the~~ troops in South Vietnam.

2. A memorandum on the M-14 rifle availability.

3. A memorandum on the present state of Project 100,000.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSO 10-6-78, NSC 8-14-80

By JK (imp) NARS, Date 8-29-80

W. W. Rostow

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March 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING CALL-UP OF RESERVES

I.

Army Reservists and National Guard Units	31,600
Army Support Troops to support the 82nd Airborne and the 27th RLT already sent	13,500
Navy personnel	1,524
Air Force personnel	<u>3,500</u>
TOTAL	50,124

Out of the above call-up, 43,000 are to be deployed to South Vietnam.

II.

An additional call-up of Reserves to replenish the depleted strategic Reserves would be as follows:

Army units	45,300
Air Force personnel	<u>3,100</u>
TOTAL	48,400

III.

The deployment figures to Vietnam after the call-up would be as follows:

Personnel present in South Vietnam or in the pipeline	525,000
Units of the 82nd Airborne and the 27th RLT	11,000
New increment to be sent in accordance with General Westmoreland's request	30,000
Support Troops for the 82nd Airborne and the 27th RLT	<u>13,500</u>
TOTAL	579,500



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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506

20 March 1968

INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

DECLASSIFIED
OSD letter JUN 26 1979
Authority _____
By ing, NARS, Date 10-19-79

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Availability of Rifles for Vietnamese Forces

The Problem

- Colonel Pursley asked that you be provided with an answer to the following question: "Are there surplus M-14 rifles which can be issued to the Vietnamese forces?"

Answer

- The Army will have available by May 25 a quantity of about 39,000 M-14 rifles. These are planned for assignment to U.S. Army Reserve units expected to be called to active duty to reconstitute STRAF.
- In addition to this quantity, there are approximately 149,000 M-14 rifles assigned to U.S. Army troops in Southeast Asia which are being progressively replaced by M-16 rifles. As these rifles are replaced they become available for overhaul and reissue. If required, such a quantity could be made available for issue during the next 9 to 12 months. Most are now planned for issue to active U.S. Army and Reserve forces.
- However, if the objective is to equip additional Vietnamese units, the M-14 rifle is not recommended for this purpose because:
 - It offers no advantage for the Vietnamese over the M-1 rifle, with which the Vietnamese forces are now equipped. As M-16s become available to the Vietnamese they are replacing the M-1s.
 - There are ample quantities of M-1s which can be made available if required for the Vietnamese. 45,000 are now in U.S. depots ready for immediate issue. An additional 400,000 require only inspection or overhaul and could easily be prepared for issue at the rate of 10,000 per month.

lets do so - C

DOWNLOADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DDI DIR 5200.10

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- Thus, if the problem is one of rifles to outfit new Vietnamese units, the M-1 should be used at this time.

Status of the M-16

- A plan of maximum acceleration of M-16 production involving 3 sources has been approved and is being effectuated.
- The attached table prepared last night by the Joint Staff shows the recommended distribution of new M-16 rifles by month. It will be noted that 53,000 will be delivered by June 30, 1968 to the Vietnamese, and an additional 227,000 during FY 1969.

Tom Morris

THOMAS D. MORRIS

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DECLASSIFIED
OSD letter JUN 26 1979
Authority
By ing, NARS, Date 10-19-79

J-4 1725/812/1

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Appendix B to Enclosure A

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

- = Withdrawn for redistribution
+ = Added from Redistribution

No.	Production and Source		Total No. Production
	Colts	GM	
	Requirement		
68 Mar	30,000		30,000
Apr	30,000		30,000
May	31,000		31,000
Jun	32,000		32,000
FY 68	123,000		123,000
Jul	16,000		16,000
Aug	33,000		33,000
Sep	35,000		35,000
Oct	36,000		36,000
Nov	38,000		38,000
Dec	40,000		40,000
69 Jan	40,000	1,000	41,000
Feb	42,000	4,000	46,000
Mar	44,000	6,000	50,000
Apr	46,000	8,000	54,000
May	48,000	10,000	58,000
Jun	50,000	12,000	62,000
69 FY	468,000	41,000	509,000

APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE A
JMPAR RECOMMENDED ALLOCATION

M16/M16A1 RIFLE

ESTIMATED PRODUCTION, REQUIREMENTS, AND ALLOCATION FOR REMAINDER
OF FY 1968 and FY 1969

As of 15 March 1968

Allocation									Total	
Army	RVN	Thai	ROKS	N. Zealand	Malaya	Philippines	Coast Guard	USMC	USAF	USN Requirement
524,238	628,912	35,096	254,630	1,548	250	3,661	1,700	47,000	208,155	9,650
13,000	12,000							5,000		
13,000	13,000		1,500					2,500		
13,250	13,000							2,500		2,250
13,000	15,000							2,000		
53,250	53,000		1,500					12,000		2,250
8,000	8,000									
17,000	16,000									
15,000	15,000							5,000		
17,000	16,600									
14,000	13,400	4,600						6,000		2,400
19,000	18,250	2,750								
16,500	16,000							6,000		2,500
23,000	23,000									
22,000	22,000							6,000		
23,000	24,952			1,548						2,500
26,000	26,000							6,000		
28,000	28,000							6,000		
230,500	227,202	7,350		1,548				35,000		7,400
										1,082,840

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By ip, NARS, Date 3-30-78

SECRET-NOFORN

51

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



Walt:

97



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Ben Pittsburgh

2A

TO : Colonel D. P. McAuliffe,
Executive to CJCS

Mc

DATE: 20 March 1968

FROM : Colonel H. W. Card, Jr., USMC
Pacific Division, J-3

SUBJECT: Informal Answer to Another "Screwy Idea"

1: On the surface, this idea appears to be ridiculous but we are not set in concrete and we may be forced to water down our estimate after we analyze a few statistics.

2: To provide sufficient concrete for a single trench 600 yards long, 2 feet wide and 3 feet deep would require:

400 Cu yds of concrete, which weighs

800 tons, and which would require about

116 sorties of aircraft (C-130/C-123/CH-53/CH-46).

This is approximately

3 times the daily supply effort for Khe Sanh which receives, on the average day,

300 tons of critical (Class I, III, V) supplies to sustain itself.


3: To place this idea in the proper perspective, it is pertinent to note that on 19 March, Khe Sanh received 286 tons of supplies which required 43 sorties of aircraft distributed as follows:

16	- C-130
3	- C-123
7	- CH-53
17	- CH-46

4: On the basis of the foregoing, it is estimated that if sufficient aircraft were available it would take the commitment of about 120 sorties (C-130, C-123, CH-53, CH-46) to fill this (600 yd/2'/3') trench with liquid concrete. Estimating that the enemy constructed at least 20 such trenches for a perimeter of about 14,000 yds around Khe Sanh it would take about 2,400 sorties of aircraft to do the job (assuming no slop-over or bailing by the wily enemy).

5. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that approximately 60 sorties per day could be flown on this project. It would, therefore, take at least 40 good flying days to complete the job. (This assumes, of course, that no aircraft are shot down by the enemy while they hover over the area to discharge their concrete into the enemy trench system.)

6. It is our summary conclusion that, while the suggestion appears solid and weighty, it is by no means feasible enough on which to base a concrete answer.


H. W. CARD, JR.
Colonel, USMC
Current Operations Br.
Pacific Division, J-3

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52
Remarks by the President
Second Draft
McPherson/ 20 March 68

I speak to you tonight in a time of grave challenge to our country.

Our soldiers on the battlefield are being challenged by ^{increased} [an intensified]
military aggression.

Our economy is being challenged by [the threat of] inflation.

Will

Our [sense of purpose] is being challenged by the frustrations of a

^{long}
[protracted] war which we did not invite, and which we are anxious to
end,
[conclude.]

^{In most}
[In many other] countries [of the world,] such a [multiple] challenge
^{be}
would [place] an unbearable strain upon the capacity of the nation and the
confidence of the people.

But this is America -- the strongest nation and the greatest
democracy on earth. This is the land that -- four times in this
century -- has sent its men abroad to fight on foreign fields: not
for love of combat or hope of material gain,

-- but for love of freedom and concern for human dignity.

None of these efforts has been easy. None has been ^{undertaken} [mounted]

without misgivings among some of our people, nor without cost to those who bore the heat of battle.

But each was necessary if freedom was to survive in ^{friendly countries} [the embattled lands] -- and ultimately, in America itself. Each [has] required the steady perseverance of our people through days when the struggle was hard, and the initiative was with the enemy. And each time -- ^{despite} [amid] doubts and conflicting ^{opinions} [judgments], under stress and suffering -- our people have said; "Yes. We will see it through."

That is a proud history. It gives us cause to believe that now, as in the past, America has the capacity -- the intelligence, the resources, and the will -- to endure a distant struggle for freedom's sake.

Tonight, I shall ^{give} [lay before] you my understanding of the state

of that struggle in Vietnam;

-- and [my conviction] of what we must do, as a people, to meet

the challenge it presents.

* * * * *

First, let me review the events of the past two months.

Last January, [when I reported to you and the Congress on the State of the Union,] our representatives were active in many capitals

of the world, ^{trying} [seeking] to find ^a [an acceptable] basis for negotiations

with the leaders of North Vietnam. They carried ^{this} [the] message. [I had

given the previous September:] we would stop ^{bombing} [our bombardment of]

North Vietnam when that would lead promptly to productive discussions.

We assumed that North Vietnam would not take advantage of our restraint to launch new attacks on the South.

In both their words and deeds, Hanoi rejected this offer. In their words, ^{to} they refused to agree that they would refrain from new attacks. In their deeds, they continued to plan and prepare for an unprecedented assault on the people, the government, and the allies of South Vietnam.

At the end of January -- during the TET holidays -- the enemy struck with savage fury at Saigon and at 34 provincial capitals. His objectives were ~~these~~:

-- First, to reverse the tide of a struggle that had been going against him during the past year, ^{and a half,} and which had inflicted ^{huge} terrible losses on his regular and guerrilla forces;

-- Second, to collapse the elected government of South Vietnam and ^{shatter} destroy its army in Saigon and in the countryside.

-- Third, to ^{cause} stimulate what the enemy called a "general uprising" among the people of the cities, ^{encouraging them to} in which they would join in attacking the government and all those who supported it;

-- Fourth, to score a ^{major} military victory on the battlefield -- similar ^{that over} to the one he inflicted on the French army at Dien Bien Phu, in 1954;

-- Finally, to destroy the will of the American people. He ^{was} hoped to make us feel that freedom's cause is hopeless in Vietnam -- ^{accept} that we should acknowledge our defeat and withdraw,

-- leaving South Vietnam to the mercy of the communists,

-- demonstrating to Asia and the world that America's

promise will not be kept when the going is hard;

-- and proving that wars of "national liberation" -- wars

of subversion and terror -- are finally irresistible.

^{basic} His true goal, therefore, was political -- ^{to destroy} the subversion of the

people's will in America and South Vietnam. Military power and

terrorism are his means of achieving that goal.

winter - spring offensive but this
 we had known for some months that the enemy planned a major winter-spring offensive. But his ability to mount many attacks simultaneously proved greater than we had expected. It remains to be seen how effective the Tet attacks were in achieving their political goals

* * * * *

What has the enemy achieved [thus far] since the TET attacks?

He compelled the allies to move forces from the countryside, where they were helping to protect farmers and villagers, into the cities.

By his ^{large} buildup in the northern section of the country, around Khe Sanh and Hue, he caused us to concentrate much of our military power there. His forces in that region are numerous and strong today, and they threaten, not only our military outposts, but the towns and cities of the northern provinces.

He caused widespread disruption and suffering. His attacks, and the battles that followed, made refugees of half a million human beings. Caring for them is taxing the resources of their government.

Incredibly enough, his ruthless attacks caused some people in the United States and elsewhere to condemn, not Hanoi and the Viet Cong,

but the very objects of those attacks -- the elected government and the army of South Vietnam.

* * * * *

[These objectives, then, he achieved.] ^{Where} [In what] did he fail?

-- He failed to ^{stir up} [stimulate] a "general uprising" in the cities.

-- He failed to [bring down] the government of South Vietnam ^{or} _^ to

destroy the representative institutions that have been so painfully built

^{He failed} over the past three years, [or] to break the South Vietnamese army.

He took colossal losses. [Judging from the past] We know that the massacre of human beings -- their own, their enemy's, or innocent civilians -- is of little concern to the men in Hanoi, compared to their political goals. Nevertheless, the enemy committed many of his best troops to the first attacks -- regular and terrorist. More than 40,000 of them were slain, and another 8,000 were captured.

^{failed to} He [could not] hold any urban area for long -- ^{except} [save] for the

beautiful Citadel of Hue -- from which he has now been driven, [- where

the destruction of war was terrible.] He was unable to set up "front" groups that could pose as a coalition government friendly to the communists.

In short, the enemy thus far has failed -- at a monumental cost -- to achieve his maximum objectives.

* * * * *

But the battle is far from over. And we must be wise enough to understand the lessons of its first phase:

-- The enemy has shown that he ^{still has} retains, after years of punishment,] the ability to mount savage attacks on the people of South Vietnam. He still has many thousands of soldiers at his disposal; ^{he} has poured so many] North Vietnamese regular troops [into the South that] today, ^{they} constitute almost 2/3 of all the regular enemy forces in the struggle, as against half last year, ^{and} he continues to receive

massive assistance from Soviet Russia and China -- two nations that
are otherwise at violent odds with one another.

-- The enemy's attacks have demonstrated once again how
difficult it is [-- in an underdeveloped country, burdened with the
legacy of colonialism and deprived of a sense of nationhood --] to
preserve security against aggression directed and supported from
without.

* * * * *

[The judgment of] our commanders in the field ^{believe} [is] that while
the first round^s of the enemy's winter-spring offensive ^{is} ~~are~~ over, others
are in prospect.

The communists ^{hope to} [will very likely] attack the cities again.

They will ^{probably} [very likely] strike in the North, around Hue, Khe Sahn,
Quang Tri, and the demilitarized zone;

-- and in the mountainous provinces just across the border

from their bases in Laos and Cambodia. The enemy^{continues to send} [is already throwing] his forces into neutral Laos in clear violation of the 1962 Laotian settlement.

They may ^{try} [attempt] another assault on Saigon -- though the South Vietnamese Army, supported by our forces, is now conducting a massive drive to disrupt the enemy's preparations for such an ^{attack} [assault].

^{The enemy} [They] will continue to harass provincial capitals, and to try to recruit new forces in the countryside.

They will, in short, try to make 1968 the year of decision in South Vietnam -- the year that brings, if not final victory, [or defeat,] at least the turning point from which ^{to move} [one side or the other will be drawn] irresistibly toward victory, [or defeat.]

* * * *

In the face of such a determined onslaught, what should be our course?

Shall we decide that because the enemy's will to conquer his neighbor to the South has not been broken, we must yield to that will and retire from the field?

Shall we give the enemy and his potential victims a certain sign that America is not strong enough, wise enough, and determined enough to resist terror and aggression?

Shall we say to our allies, "America will make agreements with you. America will promise to help defend you against aggression. America will send you aid and advisors. But when the great test comes and the burden of battle grows heavy, America will leave you to your fate on the battlefield?"

by a sense of unity and national purpose equal to the task that faces that nation.

* * * * *

If the defense of South Vietnam cannot be accomplished without increased efforts by the South Vietnamese themselves, it also cannot now be accomplished without the support of their allies -- of South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and especailly of the United States.

We have approximately 525,000 men in South Vietnam tonight.

We [had] hoped to maintain our forces at about that level -- and until the beginning of the ^{enemy} [winter-spring] offensive at the end of January, it ^{looked} [appeared that this would be] possible.

But it has become clear, in these past six weeks, that the North Vietnamese are determined to invest more of their regular forces

in the struggle -- aiming for a crippling blow this year. Since

the first of the year at least 25,000 additional North Vietnamese

troops ^{were sent} [are known to have been directed] to the South -- as many as

2 divisions. ^{reports} [Some] Intelligence suggests ~~that~~ this figure may be as high as 50,000.

The character of the struggle has changed. It has always been directed from Hanoi, it is [now --] increasingly [-] being manned from Hanoi.

^{Strength we can} The [resources we are able to] mount against this new wave of aggression ^{is} ~~are~~ formidable. Our firepower and mobility ^{are} ~~is~~ unmatched.

The courage and skill of our troops is without parallel in American history.

Yet in this war -- where the "front" can be in almost any sector -- manpower is the indispensable requirement. After several weeks of discussions with my advisors in Washington and Saigon, I have concluded

that the military situation in Vietnam now requires the prudent reinforcement of our troops.

They are needed:

- to protect our forces who are already there;
- to meet and master the enemy's new attacks in the critical months that lie ahead.

To meet

[Responding to] the requests of our commanders in South Vietnam,

I have ordered a limited call-up of our reserve forces. The initial call will be for some 48,000 men, a substantial number of whom will

go to
[embark for] South Vietnam by late this summer.

Because of our commitment in Vietnam, we have [in some part] depleted the forces we require to meet our commitments elsewhere in the world -- the force that is called our "strategic reserve."

I have instructed the Secretary of Defense to give immediate attention to replenishing this reserve;

view

-- not with [an end] to its immediate deployment to South Vietnam,

-- but so that we may be prepared for any eventuality.

I have instructed the Secretary to consider, for this purpose, a later call-up of ready reservists of approximately the same size as the present call.

These actions [- if our review suggests their necessity -] will require, not only the readiness of young Americans to serve their country -- as many hundreds of thousands of their brothers are serving it tonight -- but the readiness of all our people to bear the cost of America's commitment.

New expenditures will be required:

- approximately 3 billion dollars in the current fiscal year,
- and approximately 5 billion, 8 hundred million dollars in the next fiscal year.

Obviously hard choices must be made if we are to meet these requirements. Much that we hoped to do -- to ^{further} expand the social programs

we have begun in these past few years -- must be delayed. We shall make every effort to see that the burden is widely and fairly shared -- so that those who need help most will not pay an ^{unfair} [unconscionable] part of the cost.

One thing is certain: if we do not meet the fiscal demands of this challenge, our economy, and our dollar, will come under such pressure that those who need help most will, ^{certainly} [be sure to] suffer -- through inflation and joblessness.

To avoid that, we must reduce the part of our national budget that is controllable -- the part that is not fixed by law. I shall propose a number of reductions in controllable expenditures, and I shall take every feasible action to reduce costs within the government itself.

Yet government spending is only one side of the economic picture.

The other side is government revenue.

For more than a year, my request for a surtax to meet the costs of the war and the threat of inflation has been pending before Congress. The additional cost of the struggle in Vietnam makes additional revenues not just desirable -- but essential. It is inconceivable to me that we should permit our deficit to mount, and our dollar and our economy to be challenged, without taxing ourselves to ^{meet} ~~forestall~~ those dangers. We cannot expect Americans who need assistance to carry the whole load, through reduced appropriations. We must have the character to impose a higher temporary tax on our incomes.

^{know}
I ~~recognize~~ that higher taxes are never popular -- especially in an election year.

^{know}
I ~~recognize~~ that reduced appropriations for desirable programs are almost never popular.

I recognize that no one -- least of all the President -- wants to continue a ^{hard} [brutal] war thousands of miles from home.

But if we are to defend freedom in Vietnam, and deny the aggressor a victory that would [redound to] haunt us for generations to come, [each of] these unpopular things must be done.

We are ^{a wealthy} [an affluent] people -- blessed with a [general] prosperity beyond the imagination of most men on earth.

We are a progressive people, as well -- and [in our time,] we have ^{been} [set about] extending care and opportunity to all who have been denied it in the past.

I believe we are a people of integrity and courage as well -- who will, in the words of President John F. Kennedy,

"pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

The survival and the success of liberty are being tested now, in a poor country to which America long ago committed its support-- but on whose fate now hinges the future of all of Southeast Asia.

The times call for a measure of austerity in this land of plenty.

I believe we have the character to provide it.

* * * * *

In closing, let me give you my estimate of the chances for peace

-- the peace that will one day stop the bloodshed in South

Vietnam,

-- ^{allow} [enable] that people to rebuild their shattered land,

-- and permit us to turn more fully to our tasks at home.

The enemy's attack six weeks ago -- and the continuing reinforcement of his troops in the South -- ^{meant} [suggested] to most fair-minded men ^{had no desire} that he [did not intend] to negotiate an early settlement of the war,

-- until he could break the will and smash the fighting power of the allied forces.

He will not be able to do that. We ^{oppose} [have set our face against] him, and he will fail.

Therefore the question is, whether he will talk about a settlement of the war despite his inability to destroy us.

We must hope that he will. We must hope that the lesson of our resolve will not be lost upon him.

I repeat again tonight our offer to talk ^{peace} with him, without any conditions.

I urge him once again to consider our offer to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam, ^cwhen [that will lead to productive talks. But] we ~~must~~ have some reason to assume that he will not take advantage of our restraint -- to pour new thousands into the South and mount new attacks with the men and material he has brought down from the North. At this moment, ~~unhappily~~, we have no reason to make such an assumption.

As he considers his course, the enemy should know our intentions --

so that he does not miscalculate the pressures within our democracy during 1968.

We have no intention of widening this war.

[We shall not loose the nuclear beast upon his forces.]

But neither shall we quit.

And neither shall we buy a fake solution to this long and arduous struggle and call it peace.

* * * * *

I cannot give you, tonight, the precise terms of an eventual settlement. Our goal remains the same: simply, to make it possible for South Vietnam to choose its own destiny, free of foreign domination or control. So we support a return to the essential provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954, and the establishment of political conditions that would permit the South Vietnamese -- all the South Vietnamese -- to chart their course under the rule of one man, one vote.

As we have fought to resist the domination of South Vietnam by its northern neighbor, so we ^{do} [shall] not seek domination for ourselves.

[At Manila, in 1966, ^{we have} we pledged to withdraw our forces from South Vietnam as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ^{stops} ceases infiltration, and the level of violence subsides. We shall honor that pledge.

Our goal in Vietnam is peace -- and self-determination for its people. For the great region of which Vietnam is a part, we have a larger goal:

-- to contribute to the development of Southeast Asia -- its political strengthening, its social and economic awakening.

At Johns Hopkins University, three years ago, I announced that we would take part in the great work of developing the Mekong Valley -- for all the people of the region, including the North Vietnamese themselves.

Though this great task of development and reconciliation must await the end of hostilities, much has already been achieved in Southeast Asia.

The right of its people to determine their own future is far more secure today, than it was three years ago. We cannot claim credit for that; credit is due to the people themselves. But [it is fair to say that] without our commitment in Vietnam, it would not have happened.

Every American can take pride in that. It was one of the purposes for which the American commitment was originally made. [It is]

The work of peace ~~that~~ was made possible in Southeast Asia, because we did the hard work of war in South Vietnam.

* * * * *

In our time, this central truth is unmistakably clear:

-- the reason men have the opportunity for democratic life
is because free nations have resisted aggression.

We have seen this truth demonstrated four times on the battlefield
in this century, and many times more in hours of crisis and resolve.

It would be tragic if each generation had to learn this truth anew.

If Asia is to have the possibility of freedom, it must be defended

by those who are strong enough, and wise enough, to defend it. *The Right*
now the people of Vietnam and Laos, Thailand and the Philippines, Korea
and Australia, New Zealand and the United States have put their backs to the wall

And the time to defend it is early, when aggression begins. Those
who say "It is too far away," or "It's not worth the sacrifice," are not
the true men of peace.

They would risk a far wider and more devastating conflict later,
in order to gain the respite of a year or two. Theirs is the easy path
of lamenting the cost of this war, without suggesting how a larger struggle
might be avoided if our shield is withdrawn.

I join them in lamenting the cost of this war -- the cost we are paying in Vietnam, and must pay at home.

But I am determined to do all I can to prevent a far more terrible war from engulfing Asia and the Pacific.

-- a war fed by the success of aggression in Vietnam,

-- a war that would involve many times the number of men who

must fight this one, and that might very well bring on the

disaster of a nuclear exchange.

For I believe the only hope for a rational world order -- the only true hope for peace -- rests in the determination of free nations to
^{resist}
 [assist in the struggle against] aggression -- at its outset. In the service of that hope, we are fighting in Vietnam tonight.

My fellow Americans, I ask you now to make the new commitment

I have described this evening

-- with understanding of its purposes,

-- and with determination to see this conflict through to the

honorable settlement that must and will come.

Good night.

#



MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

RECEIVED WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

20 March 1968

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OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY CLIFFORD

Attached for use at the 5:00 o'clock meeting are:

- (1) A hurriedly compiled round-up of DOD programs of immediate relevance to the disadvantaged.
- (2) A summary of Project 100,000 through 29 February 1968.
- (3) A copy of Table 930 in the Defense Management Summary. This gives much of the same information as Item (2), all on one page, but does not include February 1968 Project 100,000 accessions.

Alfred B. Fitt

Alfred B. Fitt

Attachments

TT

DOD PROGRAMS IMMEDIATELY RELEVANT TO THE
DISADVANTAGED

- (1) PROJECT 100,000 - A program to take in at least 100,000 men each year who would not meet minimum standards in effect during 1958-1966 period. This program, which began in October 1966, is a success thus far. See separate report attached.
- (2) INTENSIFIED RECRUITING - Ordinarily 9% of Armed Forces accessions are Negroes, but this jumps to 37% for the "New Standards" men entering under Project 100,000. However, of the New Standards Negroes, 63.5% are from the South, and relatively few are from large cities.

Consequently, in February 1968 we began a special recruiting effort in urban poverty areas. This is being tested in Detroit, Philadelphia and St. Louis during March and April, with the Services directed to double the enlistment rates hitherto achieved.

The program is being carefully monitored and is pin-pointed on high-unemployment, central city areas. It will be expanded to 17 more large cities on 1 May, and still another 20 on 1 July 1968 for a total of 40.

- (3) SUMMER EMPLOYMENT - Last summer DOD employed 47,000 temporary workers, mainly students. There were no special controls to ensure that those employed were disadvantaged. For the summer of 1968 the employment target is 50,000, with a target of 75% drawn from special Civil Service lists of needy youngsters.
- (4) NEIGHBORHOOD YOUTH CORPS - Defense and Labor have been operating a pilot project in the Washington area to give part-time employment at DOD installations to about 200 NYC youngsters who are following a year long program of combined schooling and employment, with the prospect of full-time DOD employment at the end of the 12 months (August 1968).

In February 1968 we decided to expand the program to 44 more cities where there are nearby Defense installations. This is contingent upon Labor being able to fund its share of the expanded program in FY 1969. The target is to fill at least 25% of the entry level job openings (GS 1-5 and helper) with participants in the NYC-DOD program.

The success of the entire program depends upon obtaining Civil Service Commission assurance that DOD can use preferential hiring practices for NYC graduates. We do not yet have that assurance.

- (5) OFF-BASE OPEN HOUSING PROGRAM - Between June 1967 and 29 February 1968 we increased the number of open rental units near military installations from 663,000 to 874,000, or from 60% open to 79%.

In the same period the number of rental units actually listed with base housing referral offices grew from 282,300 to 710,000.

While DOD only seeks assurances that rental units will be open to military personnel on a non-discriminatory basis, we believe that most landlords who have agreed to open for military are in fact opening to civilians as well.

- (6) PROJECT TRANSITION - This program is aimed at departing servicemen, mainly those without marketable skills. The object is to give counseling, training, academic upgrading and job placement assistance while they are still in service. Operated on a pilot basis at five installations in June-December 1967, it became operational at all major installations in January 1968. We estimate that 500,000 separating servicemen will participate in some phase of Project Transition in FY 1969.

Attachment

ASD(M&RA)
20 March 1968

20 March 1968

PROJECT ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

A. Background

In October 1966, DoD initiated "Project One Hundred Thousand" to accept men who were being disqualified for service under previous mental and physical standards. We were convinced that these men would qualify as fully satisfactory servicemen when exposed to modern instructional techniques used in the Armed Forces and that their service would prepare them for more productive lives when they return to civilian life. The revision in entrance standards is also resulting in a more equitable sharing of the opportunities and obligations of military service among the Nation's youth.

B. Key Policies Governing the Program

- Performance standards are not lowered.
- We are prepared to assist men achieve satisfactory performance levels.
- Results are monitored in detail.

C. Number Accepted - Goal vs. Achieved

We exceeded our first-year goal and are on schedule in meeting our second-year objective.

1. Phase I, October 1966 - September 1967

<u>Quota</u>	<u>Achieved</u>	<u>Overage</u>
40,000	49,252	9,252

2. Phase II, October 1967 - September 1968

<u>Gross Quota</u>	<u>Phase I Overage</u>	<u>Net Quota</u>	<u>Achieved Oct 67 - Feb 68 (5 Months)</u>
100,000	9,252	90,748	39,610

D. Profile of Project One Hundred Thousand Men

Average age - 20.9 years.

38% were non-white.

34% were unemployed; an additional 19% earned less than \$60 a week.

54% had not completed high school.

Average school grades completed was 10.5, but:

- Average reading ability was 6.2 grades;
- 14% had reading ability below 4th grade.

E. Experience with Project One Hundred Thousand Men

1. Basic Training

	<u>Project One Hundred Thousand Men</u>	<u>All Other Men</u>
Graduation Rate*	96%	98%
% Requiring Extra Help (Recycling or Special Training)	12%	4%

* Men who fail basic training are discharged.

2. Skill Training

- After completing basic training, they receive skill training in formal course or on-the-job.
- In formal skill courses, more than 87% graduate. Those who fail are reassigned to other type course or to on-the-job training.

3. Types of Assignments

Combat Specialties	38.2%
Technical Specialties	61.8%*
Total Assigned	100.0%

* Includes maintenance, supply, equipment operation, administrative, medical, craftsmen, and communication specialties.

4. Retention

Of the first group who entered service during October - December 1966, 94% were still in service 30 September 1967, after an average of 10½ months service time.

5. Supervisory Ratings - Army

94% rated Excellent in Conduct and Efficiency during the first year of service.

6. Offense Record

During the first year of service 7% received Non-Judicial punishment, and 4% received court-martial convictions.

F. Future of Project One Hundred Thousand

1. We expect to achieve our goal this year of accepting 100,000 men who would otherwise be disqualified for military service.

2. We are making efforts to improve the program by research -- e.g., better measures to determine abilities of culturally deprived youth; improved training techniques.

3. Increased emphasis will be given to remedial education.

4. We will conduct follow-up studies of these men in civilian life to measure the beneficial impact of military service.

A. New Standards Accessions in Phase I (October 1966 - September 1967) Compared to Quota

	Quota ^{a/}	Achieved		
		Total	Mental	Medically Remedial ^{b/}
Army	30,400	38,135	37,942	193
Navy	3,400	3,696	3,500	196
Air Force	3,600	3,949	3,802	147
Marine Corps	2,600	3,472	3,392	80
DoD	40,000	49,252	48,636	616

^{a/} Combined quota for New Standards mental accessions and Medically Remedials.^{b/} Medically Remedial Enlistment Program initiated February 1967.

B. Progress in Meeting Phase II (October 1967 - September 1968) New Standards Quotas

	Phase II Quota			Progress as of 1/31/68 (4 Months)			12/31/67 (3 Mos.)	
	Gross Phase II Quota	Phase I Overage	Net Phase II Quota	Number Accepted			Progress Rating ^{a/}	Progress Rating ^{a/}
				Mental	Physical	Total		
Army	70,400	7,735	62,665	21,470	459	21,929	107.0%	113.5%
Navy	11,000	296	10,704	3,178	463	3,641	91.8%	87.6%
Air Force	9,300	349	8,951	2,598	572	3,170	118.6%	115.2%
Marine Corps	9,300	872	8,428	2,529	159	2,688	94.8%	98.8%
DoD	100,000	9,252	90,748	29,775	1,653	31,428	104.9%	108.6%

^{a/} Number accepted as % of expected progress in meeting Net Phase II quotas.

C. Characteristics of New Standards Men Accepted October 1, 1966 - September 30, 1967.

Race	Average Age	Educational Level	Reading Ability	Employment Status
White 61.9%	20.9	Average Grades Completed 10.5	Average Grade Level 6.2	% Unemployed 34.4%
Negro 36.7%		% High School Graduates 45.6%	% Below 4th Grade 13.8%	% Earning \$60 or less per week 19.3%
Other 1.4%			% Below 5th Grade 29.5%	
			% Below 6th Grade 46.1%	
				Total 53.7%

D. Performance in Basic Training (Men who fail to graduate Basic Training are normally discharged)

Graduation Rates and Extra Help Required by Mental Group

	Total	Groups I, II, III	Group IV (AFQT 10-30)			
			Total	21-30	16-20A	10-15B
Graduation Rate						
10/66-9/67 (12 Mos)	97.7%	98.1%	96.3%	96.5%	96.3%	96.0%
Oct-Dec 67 (3 Mos)	97.8%	98.2%	96.4%	96.7%	96.3%	96.1%
% Requiring Extra Help ^{b/}						
10/66-9/67 (12 Mos)	4.8%	3.7%	8.6%	8.2%	8.4%	9.8%
Oct-Dec 67 (3 Mos)	5.5%	3.9%	10.6%	9.4%	10.6%	12.5%

^{a/} Most New Standards men are included in these 2 lower Group IV categories.^{b/} Recycling or remedial help in Special Training Companies.Graduation Rates - New Standards Men Only ^{a/}

Army	96.9%
Navy	90.8%
Air Force	89.8%
Marine Corps	92.1%
DoD	95.7%

^{a/} For men who entered service October 1966-June 1967 and completed training September 1967.

E. Performance in Advanced Training

Attrition Rates in Entry Level Courses Attended by New Standards Men ^{a/}

	Army Aug-Dec 1967 (145 Courses)		Air Force April-Dec 1967 (35 Courses)		Marine Corps April-Sep 1967 (62 Courses)	
	New Standards Men	All Other	New Standards Men	Total AF FY 1967	New Standards Men	Total MC FY 1967 1st Qtr FY 68
Infantry, Gun Crews & Allied Spec.	2.5%	1.5%	--	--	3.6%	2.7%
Electronic Equipment Rpmn.	33.2	13.9	--	--		
Commun. & Intell. Spec.	20.5	13.6	--	--		
Medical & Dental Spec.	19.7	2.3	17.7%	3.7%	10.9%	3.1%
Other Technical & Allied Spec.	33.3	7.9	.0	5.1		
Admin. Spec. & Clerks	16.8	4.6	12.6	3.9		
Electrical/Mechanical Equip. Rpmn.	25.8	8.5	26.3	8.1		
Craftsmen	9.2	2.8	9.8	3.4		
Service and Supply Handlers	7.2	4.0	11.3	4.4		
Total	12.2%	5.1%	13.3%	4.2%	4.7%	2.9%

^{a/} Includes attrition for academic, physical and Administrative reasons. Men who fail to graduate in advanced training courses are normally reassigned to another type of training, or are sent to units for on-the-job training. No Navy attrition rates shown because Navy New Standards men rarely attend school courses.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 23, 1968

Saturday - 12:20 pm

FOR THE PRESIDENT

I wonder whether some kind of sequence like this might be useful:

1. North Vietnam tells the Swiss they are seriously prepared to take part in negotiations after the unconditional halt of the bombing.
2. You announce that you have instructed our air forces to halt the bombing north of the 20th parallel,

-- and that you have sent representatives to Geneva and Rangoon to await the North Vietnamese.
3. They say that isn't enough; we've got to stop it altogether.
4. We say, we cannot stop it altogether so long as men and supplies are pouring down the Ho Chi Minh trail.

We show photographs of this and other evidence of the invasion over the past two months.


5. We say, "We'd like to stop the bombing altogether. If you will not mount an attack on our bases or on the cities in I Corps, or upon Saigon, and if you will stop the shelling of South Vietnam from the DMZ and positions north of the DMZ, we will stop it altogether during the period in which you refrain from such attacks. And we will send our man to Geneva or Rangoon."
6. They say that's insulting; we must stop our bombing and all other acts of war, etc.

UU

7. We say we regret they have responded in the same old way -- "You disarm, while we pistol-whip you."

Purpose of the exercise: to show the American people that we are willing to do every reasonable thing to bring about talks.

Each step must be in the open -- not reported after the fact. We are genuinely seeking peace, and we made several offers and counter-offers.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Harry".

Harry C. McPherson, Jr.

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MARCH 23, 1968

GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND:

YOUR APPOINTMENT AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GIVES ME GREAT PERSONAL PLEASURE. I HAVE NEVER HAD HIGHER REGARD OR GREATER RESPECT FOR ANY MILITARY COLLEAGUE. IT WILL BE A SOURCE OF UNCOMMON STRENGTH TO HAVE YOU CLOSE BESIDE ME AS WE CONTINUE TO PRESS THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM IN VIETNAM.

THE PROSPECT FOR SUCCESS IS SO MUCH BRIGHTER BECAUSE OF ALL YOUR LEADERSHIP HAS ACHIEVED. IN A PERIOD OF RAPID EXPANSION OF AMERICAN FORCES, YOU HAVE LIFTED THE QUALITY OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND MARSHALLED A UNIQUE SYSTEM OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT. OUR SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND FREE WORLD ALLIES HAVE SHARED IN THE BENEFITS OF YOUR GREAT ABILITIES.

FOR FOUR YEARS, YOU HAVE THWARTED THE SAVAGE EFFORTS OF AGGRESSION TO CUT A NATION IN HALF. YOU HAVE CARRIED THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY, ROUTING HIS FORCES AT EVERY TURN AND RAISING THE COST OF HIS AMBITIONS.

FOR ALL THESE REASONS, THIS NATION WILL BE PROUD TO WELCOME YOU HOME AS THE HERO YOU ARE. I WILL BE FIRST IN LINE TO SHAKE YOUR HAND AND WELCOME YOU TO NEW RESPONSIBILITIES.

LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON

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FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV

TO THE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON DC

ZEM

UNCLAS E F T O MAC 04091 EYES ONLY

YOUR MESSAGE OF 23 MARCH IS DEEPLY APPRECIATED AS IS
THE NOMINATION TO SERVE YOU AS ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.
WHILE CONFESSING A SOLDIER'S RELUCTANCE TO LEAVE THE
BATTLEFIELD BEFORE THE BATTLE IS OVER, I LOOK FORWARD
TO THE CHALLENGES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THIS
NEW ASSIGNMENT.

WITH HIGHEST RESPECT, W. C. WESTMORELAND.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY

IPB

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END

MEMORANDUM

66
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

87
rec'd
3/25/68
2:30
~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, March 25, 1968 -- 2:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

As you can see, Sec. Rusk was already rolling when Harry McPherson's suggestion arrived.

I had earlier this morning transmitted your desire for a positive proposal.

As background to this proposal, you should be aware that the enemy forces are maneuvering into position for simultaneous attacks in the western highlands, Hue, Quang Tri, as well as Khe Sanh. Moreover, there is very heavy movement of men and materiel on the infiltration trails.

If the offer came before they had launched their attacks, you would, in effect, be giving them a chance to draw back. If, as we suspect, they do not draw back, we would be in a position to fight the unfought battle against the major North Vietnamese units, flat out.

The next natural moment for initiative would come, as I have suggested, in May.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 3-31-80 letter

By inf, NARS, Date 7-22-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

XX

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

57a

March 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

My own mind is running very close to that of Harry McPherson about a possible peace move. The attached papers contain the essence of the suggestion I wanted to discuss with the "wise men." In detail, I have the following observations on Harry's very interesting suggestion:

1. Rather than our sending representatives to Geneva and Rangoon, I would prefer putting the monkey on the back of the two co-chairmen to get in touch with both sides to see what is possible.
2. A simple condition for stopping the bombing all together might be the withdrawal back into North Viet-Nam of all North Vietnamese forces in the two northernmost provinces of South Viet-Nam and the demilitarization of the DMZ.
3. Otherwise, the McPherson suggestion is a very constructive one. It would require careful coordination with Bunker who would need to get the South Vietnamese on board.

Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
Authority STATE letter MAR 13 1979
By ip, NARS, Date 6-21-79

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMENTS ON THE ATTACHED DRAFT

1. For the next month or so the weather in the Hanoi-Haiphong area would mean that the proposal would not make a major difference from a military point of view.

2. Full bombing would be resumed if there were a major attack on Khe Sanh or a second round of attacks on the cities.

3. We would not send Ambassadors rushing all over the world to convert the bombing action into negotiations but would simply sit back and wait for Hanoi to respond.

4. We should notify Prime Minister Wilson in advance in order that he can test the Soviet Union about the convening of the two Co-Chairmen (and perhaps the three members of the ICC) to be available to talk to any interested parties about the possibilities of a peaceful settlement.

5. It would shift away from theological debates about words and put the problem on the de facto level of action. If Hanoi took no corresponding military action, the bombing would be resumed.

6. It would be very important for us not to embroider the statement with all sorts of "conditions" or "assumptions." Just take the action and see whether anybody is able to make anything out of it.

7. The

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

7. The "areas which are integrally related to the battlefield" would presumably be at least as far north as Vinh. Bombing below that area should be intensive and without wraps.

S:DRusk:ml
3/25/68

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DRAFT

After consultation with our allies, I have directed that U.S. bombing attacks on North Viet-Nam be limited to those areas which are directly related to the support of their forces invading South Viet-Nam. No reasonable person could expect us to fail to provide maximum support to our men in combat. Whether this step I have taken can be a step toward peace is for Hanoi to determine. We shall watch the situation carefully.

S:DRusk:ml
3/25/68

~~TOP SECRET~~

57a-1

Office of
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1968

Memorandum for The Honorable Walt W. Rostow

The White House

The Secretary asked me to send this
directly to you for transmission to the President.



Harry W. Shlaudeman
Special Assistant

~~TOP SECRET~~
(Attachment)

58

YY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thurs., March 28, 1968
6:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA warns of a possible
second round of widespread coordinated
enemy attacks between 28 March and
April 2.

Walt Rostow

SANITIZED

~~SECRET~~

3E

58a

SC No. 01253/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 March 1968

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Possible New Offensive in Vietnam

1. Signs are accumulating that a new Communist offensive may be imminent. |

2. | attacks appear most likely to come in the central high-lands, possibly coordinated with other assaults against urban areas and/or allied military installations along the northern coast and in the DMZ area. In the III Corps area the disposition of enemy forces in the provinces surrounding Saigon remains relatively unchanged. |

that attacks in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, and Long Khanh provinces are planned for the very near future. These developments constitute something of a reversal of last week's trends when a number of enemy units were noted moving away from areas of tactical interest.

3. In general, | mortar, artillery, and rocket attacks would be featured in a new offensive. The Communists have strong forces within striking distance of a number of urban areas, however, and a new thrust into selected towns and cities cannot be ruled out.

SANITIZED

only NLS 81-93

ics, Date 4-28-83

~~SECRET~~

138438

59

Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO~~TOP SECRET~~

Origin ACTION: Ambassador SAIGON IMMEDIATE

Info: STATE 138438

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter [2-79]

NODIS

By inf, NARS, Date 7-25-79

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

Ref: State 131732: Saigon 22548

1. We are now thinking in terms of early policy announcement that would have following major elements:

- a. Major stress on importance of GVN and ARVN increased effectiveness, with our equipment and other support as first priority in our own actions.
- b. 13,500 support forces to be called up at once in order to round out the 10,500 combat units sent in February. (Westmoreland has details.)
- c. Replenishment of strategic reserve by calling up some 48,500 additional reserves, stating that these would be designed for strategic reserve.
- d. Related tax increases and budget cuts already

Drafted by: EA:WPBundy:bmm 3/23/68	Tel. Ext. 4235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary S/S- XXXXXXXXXX Mr. Walsh
Clearances: White House - Mr. Rostow		

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 2 of telegram to Saigon

~~TOP SECRET~~

largely needed for non-Vietnam reasons.

2. In order to obtain necessary Congressional and public support for this program, it is now the judgment of highest levels that we must include at this time an announcement of an initiative along the lines of the lesser proposal described in State 131732. This would consist basically of announcing that bombing would be restricted to targets most directly engaged in the battlefield area and that this meant that there would be no bombing roughly north of Vinh. Announcement would leave open how Hanoi might respond, and would be open-ended as to time. However, it would indicate that Hanoi's response could be helpful in determining whether we were justified in assumption that Hanoi would not take advantage if we stopping bombing altogether. Thus, it would to this extent foreshadow possibility of full bombing stoppage at a later point.

3. We recognize necessity of full consultation with Thieu and (in accordance with your recommendation) Ky as well before we announce such action. Time factors ^{are} ~~are~~ such that we would like to move not later than Sunday night. Hence, you should ~~xx~~ now act urgently to obtain their concurrence.

4. In so doing, you may make following points:

a. You should call attention to force increases that would be

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 3 of telegram to Saigon

~~TOP SECRET~~

announced at the same time and would make clear our continued resolve. Also our top priority to re-equipping ~~ARVN~~ ARVN forces.

b. You should make clear that Hanoi is most likely to denounce the project and thus free our hand after a short period. Nonetheless, we might wish to continue the limitation even after a formal denunciation, in order to reinforce its sincerity and put the monkey firmly on Hanoi's back for whatever follows.

c. With ~~and~~ or without denunciation, Hanoi might well feel limited in conducting any major offensives at least in the northern areas. If they did so, this could ease the pressure where it is most potentially serious. If they did not, then this would give us a clear field for whatever actions were then required.

d. In view of weather limitations, bombing north of the 20th parallel will in any event be limited at least for the next four weeks or so -- which we tentatively envisage as a maximum testing period in any event. Hence, we are not giving up anything really serious in this time frame. Of course, a major change in the military situation might require full scale resumption at any time.

e. Insofar as our announcement foreshadows any possibility of a complete bombing stoppage, in the event Hanoi really exercises reciprocal restraints, we regard this as unlikely. But in any case, the period of demonstrated restraint would probably have to

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 4 of telegram to SAIGON~~TOP SECRET~~

continue for a period of several weeks, and we would have time to appraise the situation and to consult carefully with them before we undertook any such action.

5. In making these ~~our~~ points, you may as you see fit use our judgment of the public situation here as another indication of the vital necessity of early and demonstrated GVN improvements such as you have been urging. You may convey our gratification at the actions Thieu has taken and announced, particularly his speech of last week (which we expect to refer to extensively), but make equally clear that a great deal must be done and seen to be done if we are to get through the present difficult period as we must. The Joint Thieu-Ky press conference now ~~being~~ suggested could be most useful as one move.

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

138465

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

29 MAR 68 14 14z

Info:

STATE 138465

NODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

STATE 138438

Because of time required for additional consultations in advance of announcement, we will need to know where you stand with GVN by Saturday morning Washington time.

DECLASSIFIED
 STATE letter [2-79]
 Authority _____
 By ing, NARS, Date 7-25-79

RUSK

Drafted by: S/S: BH Read: jmj 3/29/68 Tel. Ext. 5381 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Mr. Read

Clearances: EA - Mr. Bundy

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classification

00 RUMTBK RUEHBAC RUMJMA RUALOS RUMJFS RUEPWW
DE RUEHC 139431 0901829
ZNY TTTT ZZH
O 301815Z MAR 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 4365
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1115
RUMJMA/AMEMBASSY MANILA 2725
RUALOS/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2589
RUEHBAC/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0630
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1828
INFO RUEPWW/WHITE HOUSE
STATE GRNC
BT

RECEIVED
NSA

1968 MAR 30 20 08

61

DECLASSIFIED

Authority STATE letter [2-79]

By ing, NARS, Date 7-25-79

~~TOP SECRET~~ STATE 139431

NODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

1. YOU SHOULD SEE CHIEF OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT AT ONCE
TO CONVEY FOLLOWING:

2. AFTER FULL CONSULTATION WITH GVN AND WITH COMPLETE
CONCURRENCE OF THIEU AND KY, PRESIDENT PLANS POLICY
ANNOUNCEMENT SUNDAY NIGHT THAT WOULD HAVE FOLLOWING MAJOR
ELEMENTS:

PAGE 2 RUEHC 139431 ~~TOP SECRET~~

A. MAJOR STRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF GVN AND ARVN INCREASED
EFFECTIVENESS, WITH OUR EQUIPMENT AND OTHER SUPPORT AS
FIRST PRIORITY IN OUR OWN ACTIONS.

B. 13,500 SUPPORT FORCES TO BE CALLED UP AT ONCE IN ORDER
TO ROUND OUT THE 10,500 COMBAT UNITS SENT IN FEBRUARY.

C. REPLENISHMENT OF STRATEGIC RESERVE BY CALLING UP
48,500 ADDITIONAL RESERVES, STATING THAT THESE WOULD BE
DESIGNED FOR STRATEGIC RESERVE.

D. RELATED TAX INCREASES AND BUDGET CUTS ALREADY LARGELY
NEEDED FOR NON-VIETNAM REASONS.

3. IN ADDITION, AFTER SIMILAR CONSULTATION AND CONCURRENCE,
PRESIDENT PROPOSES TO ANNOUNCE THAT BOMBING WILL BE
RESTRICTED TO TARGETS MOST DIRECTLY ENGAGED IN THE BATTLEFIELD
AREA AND THAT THIS MEANT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO BOMBING
NORTH OF 20TH PARALLEL. ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD LEAVE OPEN
HOW HANOI MIGHT RESPOND, AND WOULD BE OPEN-ENDED AS TO TIME.
HOWEVER, IT WOULD INDICATE THAT HANOI'S RESPONSE COULD BE

PAGE 3 RUEHC 139431 ~~TOP SECRET~~

HELPFUL IN DETERMINING WHETHER WE WERE JUSTIFIED IN
ASSUMPTION THAT HANOI WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE IF WE
STOPPING BOMBING ALTOGETHER. THUS, IT WOULD TO THIS EXTENT
FORESHADOW POSSIBILITY OF FULL BOMBING STOPPAGE AT A LATER
POINT.

4. IN PRESENTING THIS PLAN, YOU MAY MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. YOU SHOULD CALL ATTENTION TO FORCE INCREASES THAT WOULD
BE ANNOUNCED AT THE SAME TIME AND WOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR
CONTINUED RESOLVE. ALSO OUR TOP PRIORITY TO RE-EQUIPPING
ARVN FORCES.

B. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT HANOI IS MOST LIKELY TO
DENOUNCE THE PROJECT AND THUS FREE OUR HAND AFTER A SHORT
PERIOD. NONETHELESS, WE MIGHT WISH TO CONTINUE THE LIMIT-
TATION EVEN AFTER A FORMAL DENUNCIATION, IN ORDER TO
REINFORCE ITS SINCERITY AND PUT THE MONKEY FIRMLY ON
HANOI'S BACK FOR WHATEVER FOLLOWS. OF COURSE, ANY MAJOR
MILITARY CHANGE COULD CO MPLE FULL-SCALE RESUMPTION
AT ANY TIME.

C. WITHOR WITHOUT DENUNCIATION, HANOI MIGHT WELL FEEL LIMITED IN CONDUCTING ANY MAJOR OFFENSIVES AT LEAST IN THE NORTHERN AREAS. IF THEY DID SO, THIS COULD EASE THE PRESSURE WHERE IT IS MOST POTENTIALLY SERIOUS. IF THEY DID NOT, THEN THIS WOULD GIVE US A CLEAR FIELD FOR WHATEVER ACTIONS WERE THEN REQUIRED.

D. IN VIEW OF WEATHER LIMITATIONS BOMBING NORTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL WILL IN ANY EVENT BE LIMITED AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT FOUR WEEKS OR SO -- WHICH WE TENTATIVELY ENVISAGE AS A MAXIMUM TESTING PERIOD IN ANY EVENT. HENCE, WE ARE NOT GIVING UP ANYTHING REALLY SERIOUS IN THIS TIME FRAME. MOREOVER, AIR POWER NOW USED NORTH OF 20TH CAN PROBABLY BE USED IN LAOS (WHERE NO POLICY CHANGE PLANNED) AND IN SVN.

E. INSOFAR AS OUR ANNOUNCEMENT FORESHADOWS ANY POSSIBILITY OF A COMPLETE BOMBING STOPPAGE, IN THE EVENT HANOI REALLY EXERCISES RECIPROCAL RESTRAINTS, WE REGARD THIS AS UNLIKELY. BUT IN ANY CASE, THE PERIOD OF DEMONSTRATED RESTRAINT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO CONTINUE FOR A PERIOD OF SEVERAL WEEKS, AND WE WOULD HAVE TIME TO APPRAISE THE SITUATION AND TO CONSULT CAREFULLY WITH THEM BEFORE WE UNDERTOOK ANY SUCH ACTION.

PAGE 5 RUEHC 139431 ~~TOP SECRET~~

5. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON. WE PRESUME HOLYOAKE AND GORTON WILL BE TOGETHER SUNDAY, AND BELIEVE BEST METHOD WOULD BE FOR HENNING TO REACH BOTH AT ONCE. HENNING SHOULD REPORT TO CRONK ON SIMPLE "MISSION EXECUTED" BASIS AS SOON AS HE HAS SEEN GORTON. IF HENNING MISSED GORTON, CRONK SHOULD HANDLE WITH GORTON SUNDAY NIGHT.

6. FOR BANGKOK AND WELLINGTON. HANNAH SHOULD SEE THANOM EARLIEST. IN VIEW OF THANAT'S AND DAWEE'S PRESENCE IN WELLINGTON, HE SHOULD OFFER TO HAVE UNGER INFORM THEM IN WELLINGTON SUNDAY NIGHT. IF THANOM DESIRES THIS, HANNAH SHOULD SEND FLASH TO WELLINGTON SIMPLY STATING "ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 6 THIS CABLE." (PURPOSE HERE IS TO OBTAIN ANY THAI USE OF THEIR OWN CABLES.)

7. MESSAGE SHOULD BE GIVEN UNDER STRICTEST INJUNCTION TO HOLD IT IN TOTAL CONFIDENCE AND NOT TO TELL ANY ONE REPEAT ANY ONE UNTIL AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE. THIS IS VITAL. SIMILARLY, YOU SHOULD TELL NO MEMBER OF YOUR STAFF WHATEVER.

PAGE 6 RUEHC 139431 ~~TOP SECRET~~

IN CONVEYING MESSAGE, YOU MAY DISCUSS POSSIBILITY OF RESPONSIVE STATEMENT OF APPROVAL AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE. YOU MAY ALSO BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN, IF ANY OBJECTION IS MADE, THAT SHORT TIMING OF THESE CONSULTATION WAS REQUIRED BECAUSE OF VITAL CONGRESSIONAL TIMING FACTORS HERE IN MAKING ANNOUNCEMENT AT THIS TIME, AND NECESSITY FOR FULL AND FRANK CONSULTATION WITH GVN BEFORE FULL ACTIONS COULD BE DECIDED.

9. ALL ADDRESSEES SHOULD REPORT ACTION TAKEN, AND ANY REACTIONS, AT ONCE SLUGGED FOR BUNDY.

GP-1. KATZENBACH
BT

62

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, March 30, 1968
2:45 PM

Mr. Ponder

Mr. Rostow:


Rec'd
3/30/68

Just received confirmation from NMCC that
the attached press story is true.

(P)

Ray

Walt



2A

NNNNMZCZC EPE 232

SS NOR

1350: BULLETIN''''':

VIET--BATTLE

SAIGON, MARCH 31 (SUNDAY) (REUTERS)--U.S. MARINES AT
KHE SANH TRYING TO SMASH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LINES SURROUNDING
THEM YESTERDAY SURGED OUT OF THE BASE AND ASSAULTED A NORTH
VIETNAMESE BATTALION, A U.S. MILITARY SPOKESMAN SAID EARLY
TODAY.

;; (MORE) MB/EB

NNNNZCZC EPE

2

3

3

UU NOR

1351: URGENT''''

1ST ADD SAIGON VIET--BATTLE:

X X X TODAY.

THE MARINES SENT OUT A REINFORCED COMPANY--ABOUT 200 MEN,
WITH ARTILLERY SUPPORT. THEY REPORTED KILLING 115 NORTH
VIETNAMESE WHILE LOSING NINE MEN KILLED AND 71 WOUNDED.

:: (MORE) MB/EB

NNNNZCZC EPE 234

YY NOR

1352: 2ND ADD SAIGON VIET--BATTLE:

X X X WOUNDED.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID THE MARINES LEFT THE PERIMTER OF THE
REMOTE NORTHWESTERN GARRISON AT 8:30 A.M. LOCAL TIME SATURDAY,
AND ONE MILE SOUTH OF THE BASE RAN INTO AN ESTIMATED NORTH
VIETNAMESE BATTALION DUG INTO BUNKERS AND TRENCHES.

THE MARINES HELD THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WITH RIFLE AND MACHINEGUN
FIRE WHILE THEY DIRECTED A MASSIVE ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT ONTO
THEM.

THE FIGHTING WAS FIERCE BUT BRIEF--ONE HOUR LATER THE
MARINES BEGAN TO WITHDRAW AND, CARRYING THEIR DEAD
AND WOUNDED, HAD ALL MARCHED BACK INSIDE THE BASE BY NOON,
THE SPOKESMAN SAID.

:: REUTERS MB/EB

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

NSC letter 3/31/80

7/7/81

THE WHITE HOUSE

SANITIZED

ACTION

WASHINGTON

Saturday, March 30, 1968
11:45 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have not yet been able to get Sect. Rusk on the phone, but have talked with Bill Bundy. *(I have now talked with Sect. Rusk. He believes Bundy should see me)*

The situation is that the messages to London, Seoul, Bangkok, Canberra and Wellington are now going out.

Bill Bundy requests permission also to inform to whom the bombing of North Vietnam is very important and who has never leaked a personal communication.

He also believes that Marcos personally has proved he can be closemouthed.

Bill Bundy thinks there are two good reasons for getting Bunker to Honolulu:

- it would make the conference appear less purely military;
- it gives you a chance personally to tell Bunker to get working with the South Vietnamese after the press conference, preparing the way for a South Vietnamese peace initiative in a month or so.

Finally, Bill believes that it would be good if we could call in Dobrynin before you speak and tell him what you plan to do, and urge the Soviet Union to seize this opportunity, get to work on peacemaking, and begin to exercise their proper responsibilities as Co-Chairman under the Geneva Accords.

It has just occurred to me that you might want to have Dobrynin in yourself for this purpose.

Sect. 1-301(d)
Y.F.O. ☒ OK ☐ No ☐ Call me

Marcos OK ☒ ☐ No ☐ Call me

Get Bunker to Honolulu ☒ ☐ No ☐ Call me

Let State talk to Dobrynin ☐ President will talk to Dobrynin ☒ *to Regre Saigon - without buying a Comm*

No one talk to Dobrynin ☐ Call me ☐

COPY

LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY

MEMORANDUM

22
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

64

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 30, 1968 -- 7:45 p.m.

Rec'd
7:50 p

Mr. President:

The obvious points with Dobrynin tomorrow you, of course, know:

- The peace proposal itself;
- His understanding as a mature man that this is as far as you can now go;
- The responsibility that the Soviet Union bears to convert it into something that moves us towards peace.

In addition, you may wish to tell him, quietly and thoughtfully, two things that are true and which may not be getting through to Moscow in their intelligence:

-- The Tet attack was obviously meant to destroy the GVN and the ARVN. It not only failed in both, but it is our honest assessment that the GVN has shown more capacity to move and make decisions than before Tet and ARVN morale is higher than before Tet. (You might even read him some of Ellsworth Bunker's cable.) It is our honest assessment that despite their frantic efforts to mount a second wave of attack, time is not Hanoi's friend.

-- One of the reasons you are not sending more troops to Vietnam is that our military men are quite confident in dealing with the situation.

In short, it would be a mistake on the part of Hanoi -- or anyone else -- to believe that you are making this peace proposal from a sense of weakness in Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 10-6-78, State 12-19-78, W.W. Rostow
By JK (isp), NARS, Date 8-29-80 NSC 8-14-80

~~SECRET~~

MARCH 31, 1968

66

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OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION
THE PRESIDENT'S OVAL OFFICE

(9:00 P.M. EST)

Good evening, my fellow Americans.

Tonight I want to speak to you of peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

No other question so preoccupies our people. No other dream so absorbs the 250 million human beings who live in that part of the world. No other goal motivates American policy in Southeast Asia.

For years, representatives of our government and others have travelled the world -- seeking to find a basis for peace talks.

Since last September, they have carried the offer that I made public at San Antonio.

That offer was this:

That the United States would stop its bombardment of North Vietnam when that would lead promptly to productive discussions -- and that we would assume that North Vietnam would not take military advantage of our restraint.

Hanoi denounced this offer, both privately and publicly. Even while the search for peace was going on, North Vietnam rushed their preparations for a savage assault on the people, the government, and the allies of South Vietnam.

Their attack -- during the Tet holidays -- failed to achieve its principal objectives.

It did not collapse the elected government of South Vietnam or shatter its army -- as the Communists had hoped.

It did not produce a "general uprising" among the people of the cities as they had predicted.

The Communists were unable to maintain control of any of the more than 30 cities that they attacked. And they took very heavy casualties.

MORE

But they did compel the South Vietnamese and their allies to move certain forces from the countryside, into the cities.

They caused widespread disruption and suffering. Their attacks, and the battles that followed, made refugees of half a million human beings.

The Communists may renew their attack any day.

They are, it appears, trying to make 1968 the year of decision in South Vietnam -- the year that brings, if not final victory or defeat, at least a turning point in the struggle.

This much is clear:

If they do mount another round of heavy attacks, they will not succeed in destroying the fighting power of South Vietnam and its allies.

But tragically, this is also clear: many men -- on both sides of the struggle -- will be lost. A nation that has already suffered 20 years of warfare will suffer once again. Armies on both sides will take new casualties. And the war will go on.

MORE

There is no need for this to be so.

There is no need to delay the talks that could bring an end to this long and this bloody war.

Tonight, I renew the offer I made last August -- to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam. We ask that talks begin promptly, that they be serious talks on the substance of peace. We assume that during those talks Hanoi will not take advantage of our restraint.

We are prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations.

So, tonight, in the hope that this action will lead to early talks, I am taking the first step to de-escalate the conflict. We are reducing -- substantially reducing -- the present level of hostilities.

And we are doing so unilaterally, and at once.

Tonight, I have ordered our aircraft and our naval vessels to make no attacks on North Vietnam, except in the area north of the Demilitarized Zone where the continuing enemy build-up directly threatens allied forward positions and where the movements of their troops and supplies are clearly related to that threat.

The area in which we are stopping our attacks includes almost 90 percent of North Vietnam's population, and most of its territory. Thus there will be no attacks around the principal populated areas, or in the food-producing areas of North Vietnam.

Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end -- if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi. But I cannot in good conscience stop all bombing so long as to do so would immediately and directly endanger the lives of our men and our allies. Whether a complete bombing halt becomes possible in the future will be determined by events.

Our purpose in this action is to bring about a reduction in the level of violence that now exists.

It is to save the lives of brave men -- and to save the lives of innocent women and children. It is to permit the contending forces to move closer to a political settlement.

And tonight, I call upon the United Kingdom and I call upon the Soviet Union -- as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conferences, and as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council -- to do all they can to move from the unilateral act of de-escalation that I have just announced toward genuine peace in Southeast Asia.

Now, as in the past, the United States is ready to send its representatives to any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this ugly war to an end.

MORE

I am designating one of our most distinguished Americans, Ambassador Averell Harriman, as my personal representative for such talks. In addition, I have asked Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who returned from Moscow for consultation, to be available to join Ambassador Harriman at Geneva or any other suitable place -- just as soon as Hanoi agrees to a conference.

I call upon President Ho Chi Minh to respond positively, and favorably, to this new step toward peace.

But if peace does not come now through negotiations, it will come when Hanoi understands that our common resolve is unshakable, and our common strength is invincible.

MORE

Tonight, we and the other allied nations are contributing 600,000 fighting men to assist 700,000 South Vietnamese troops in defending their little country.

Our presence there has always rested on this basic belief: the main burden of preserving their freedom must be carried out by them -- by the South Vietnamese themselves.

We and our allies can only help to provide a shield -- behind which the people of South Vietnam can survive and can grow and develop. On their efforts -- on their determinations and resourcefulness -- the outcome will ultimately depend.

That small, beleaguered nation has suffered terrible punishment for more than twenty years.

I pay tribute once again tonight to the great courage and endurance of its people. South Vietnam supports armed forces tonight of almost 700,000 men -- and I call your attention to the fact that that is the equivalent of more than 10 million in our own population. Its people maintain their firm determination to be free of domination by the North.

There has been substantial progress, I think, in building a durable government during these last three years. The South Vietnam of 1965 could not have survived the enemy's Tet offensive of 1968. The elected government of South Vietnam survived that attack -- and is rapidly repairing the devastation that it wrought.

The South Vietnamese know that further efforts are going to be required:

- to expand their own armed forces,
- to move back into the countryside as quickly as possible,
- to increase their taxes,
- to select the very best men that they have for civilian and military responsibility,
- to achieve a new unity within their constitutional government,
- and to include in the national effort all of those groups who wish to preserve South Vietnam's control over its own destiny.

Last week President Thieu ordered the mobilization of 135,000 additional South Vietnamese. He plans to reach -- as soon as possible -- a total military strength of more than 800,000 men.

To achieve this, the government of South Vietnam started the drafting of 19-year-olds on March 1st. On May 1st, the Government will begin the drafting of 18-year-olds.

MORE

Last month, 16,000 men volunteered for military service -- that was two and a half times the number of volunteers during the same month last year. Since the middle of January, more than 48,000 South Vietnamese have joined the armed forces -- and nearly half of them volunteered to do so.

All men in the South Vietnamese armed forces have had their tours of duty extended for the duration of the war, and reserves are now being called up for immediate active duty.

President Thieu told his people last week:

"We must make greater efforts and accept more sacrifices because, as I have said many times, this is our country. The existence of our nation is at stake, and this is mainly a Vietnamese responsibility."

He warned his people that a major national effort is required to root out corruption and incompetence at all levels of government.

We applaud this evidence of determination on the part of South Vietnam. Our first priority will be to support their effort.

We shall accelerate the re-equipment of South Vietnam's armed forces -- in order to meet the enemy's increased firepower. This will enable them progressively to undertake a larger share of combat operations against the Communists invaders.

On many occasions I have told the American people that we would send to Vietnam those forces that are required to accomplish our mission there. So, with that as our guide, we have previously authorized a force level of approximately 525,000.

Some weeks ago -- to help meet the enemy's new offensive -- we sent to Vietnam about 11,000 additional Marine and airborne troops. They were deployed by air in 48 hours, on an emergency basis. But the artillery, tank, aircraft, and other units that were needed to work with and support these infantry troops in combat could not accompany them on that short notice.

In order that these forces may reach maximum combat effectiveness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to me that we should prepare to send -- during the next five months -- support troops totalling approximately 13,500 men.

A portion of these men will be made available from our active forces. The balance will come from Reserve component units which will be called up for service.

The actions that we have taken since the beginning of the year

-- to re-equip the South Vietnamese forces,

MORE

-- to meet our responsibilities in Korea, as well as our responsibilities in Vietnam,

-- to meet price increases and the cost of activating and deploying reserve forces,

-- to replace helicopters and provide the other military supplies we need, all of these actions are going to require additional expenditures.

The tentative estimate of those additional expenditures is 2.5 billion dollars in this fiscal year, and 2.6 billion dollars in the next fiscal year.

These projected increases will bring into sharper focus the nation's need for immediate action:

-- action to protect the prosperity of the American people and to protect the strength and the stability of our American dollar.

On many occasions I have pointed out that, without a tax bill or decreased expenditures, next year's deficit would again be around \$20 billion. I have emphasized the need to set strict priorities in our spending. I have stressed that failure to act and to act promptly and decisively would raise very strong doubt throughout the world about America's willingness to keep its financial house in order.

Yet Congress has not acted. And tonight we face the sharpest financial threat in the post war era -- a threat to the dollar's role as the keystone of international trade and finance in the world.

MORE

Last week, at the monetary conference in Stockholm, the major industrial countries decided to take a big step toward creating a new international monetary asset that will strengthen the international monetary system. I am very proud of the very able work done by Secretary Fowler and Chairman Martin of the Federal Reserve Board.

But to make this system work the United States just must bring its balance of payments to -- or very close too -- equilibrium. We must have a responsible fiscal policy in this country. The passage of a tax bill now, together with expenditure control that the Congress may desire and dictate, is absolutely necessary to protect this Nation's security, to continue our prosperity, and to meet the needs of our people.

What is at stake is seven years of unparalleled prosperity -- in those seven years, the real income of the average American -- after taxes -- rose by almost 30 percent --

-- a gain as large as that of the entire preceding 19 years.

So the steps that we must take to convince the world are exactly the steps we must take to sustain our own economic strength here at home. In the past eight months, prices and interest rates have risen because of our inaction.

We must, therefore, now do everything we can to move from debate to action -- from talking to voting. There is, I believe -- I hope there is -- in both Houses of the Congress -- a growing sense of urgency that this situation just must be acted upon and must be corrected.

My budget in January was, we thought, a tight one. It fully reflected our evaluation of most of the demanding needs of this Nation.

But in these budgetary matters, the President does not decide alone. The Congress has the power and the duty to determine appropriations and taxes.

The Congress is now considering our proposals and they are considering reductions in the budget that we submitted.

As part of a program of fiscal restraint that includes the tax surcharge, I shall approve appropriate reductions in the January budget when and if Congress so decides that that should be done.

One thing is unmistakably clear, however: our deficit just must be reduced. Failure to act could bring on conditions that would strike hardest at those people that all of us are trying so hard to help.

These times call for prudence in this land of plenty. I believe that we have the character to provide it, and tonight I plead with the Congress and with the people to act promptly to serve the national interest, and thereby serve all of our people.

Now let me give you my estimate of the chances for peace:

-- the peace that will one day stop the bloodshed in South Vietnam,

-- that all the Vietnamese people will be permitted to rebuild and develop their land,

-- that will permit us to turn more fully to our own tasks here at home.

I cannot promise that the initiative that I have announced tonight will be completely successful in achieving peace any more than the 30 others that we have undertaken and agreed to in recent years.

But it is our fervent hope that North Vietnam, after years of fighting that has left the issue unresolved, will now cease its efforts to achieve a military victory and will join with us in moving toward the peace table.

And there may come a time when South Vietnam -- on both sides -- are able to work out a way to settle their own differences by free political choice rather than by war.

As Hanoi considers its course, it should be in no doubt of our intentions. It must not miscalculate the pressures within our democracy in this election year.

We have no intention of widening this war.

But the United States will never accept a fake solution to this long and arduous struggle and call it peace.

No one can foretell the precise terms of an eventful settlement.

Our objective in South Vietnam has never been the annihilation of the enemy. It has been to bring about a recognition in Hanoi that its objective -- taking over the South by force -- could not be achieved.

We think that peace can be based on the Geneva Accords of 1954 -- under political conditions that permit the South Vietnamese -- all the South Vietnamese -- to chart their course free of any outside domination or interference, from us or from anyone else.

So tonight I reaffirm the pledge that we made at Manila -- that we are prepared to withdraw our forces from South Vietnam as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, stops the infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides.

Our goal of peace and self-determination in Vietnam is directly related to the future of all of Southeast Asia -- where much has happened to inspire confidence during the past 10 years. We have done all that we knew how to do to contribute and to help build that confidence.

MORE

A number of its nations have shown what can be accomplished under conditions of security. Since 1966 Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in all the world, with population of more than 100 million people, has had a government that is dedicated to peace with its neighbors and improved conditions for its own people. Political and economic cooperation between nations has grown rapidly.

I think every American can take a great deal of pride in the role that we have played in bringing this about in Southeast Asia. We shall rightly judge -- as responsible Southeast Asians themselves do -- that the progress of the last three years would have been far less likely -- if not completely impossible -- if America's sons and others had not made their stand in Vietnam.

At Johns Hopkins University, about three years ago, I announced that the United States would take part in the great work of developing Southeast Asia, including the Mekong Valley -- for all the people of that region. Our determination to help build a better land -- a better land for men on both sides of the present conflict -- has not diminished in the least. Indeed, the ravages of war, I think, have made it more urgent than ever.

So, I repeat on behalf of the United States again tonight what I said at Johns Hopkins -- that North Vietnam could take its place in this common effort just as soon as peace comes.

Over time, a wider framework of peace and security in Southeast Asia may become possible. The new cooperation of the nations in the area could be a foundation-stone. Certainly friendship with the nations of such a Southeast Asia is what the United States seeks -- and that is all that the United States seeks.

One day, my fellow citizens, there will be peace in Southeast Asia.

It will come because the people of Southeast Asia want it -- those whose armies are at war tonight, and those who, though threatened, have thus far been spared.

MORE

Peace will come because Asians were willing to work for it -- and to sacrifice for it -- and to die for by the thousands for it.

But let it never be forgotten: peace will come also because America sent her sons to help secure it.

It has not been easy -- far from it. During the past four and a half years, it has been my fate and my responsibility to be commander-in-chief. I have lived -- daily and nightly -- with the cost of this war. I know the pain that it has inflicted. I know perhaps better than anyone the misgivings that it has aroused.

Throughout this entire, long period, I have been sustained by a single principle:

-- that what we are doing now, in Vietnam, is vital not only to the security of Southeast Asia, but it is vital to the security of every American.

Surely we have treaties which we must respect. Surely we have commitments that we are going to keep. Resolutions of the Congress testify to the need to resist aggression in the world and in Southeast Asia.

But the heart of our involvement in South Vietnam -- under three Presidents, three separate Administrations -- has always been America's own security.

And the larger purpose of our involvement has always been to help the nations of Southeast Asia become independent and stand alone, self-sustaining as members of a great world community.

-- At peace with themselves, and at peace with all others.

With such an Asia, our country -- and the world -- will be far more secure than it is tonight.

I believe that a peaceful Asia is far nearer to reality, because of what America has done in Vietnam. I believe the the men who endure the dangers of battle -- fighting there for us tonight -- are helping the entire world avoid far greater conflicts, far wider wars, far more destruction, than this one.

The peace that will bring them home some day will come. Tonight I have offered the first in what I hope will be a series of mutual moves toward peace.

I pray that it will not be rejected by the leaders of North Vietnam. I pray that they will accept it as a means by which the sacrifices of their own people may be ended. And I ask your help and your support, my fellow citizens, for this effort to reach across the battlefield toward an early peace.

Finally, my fellow Americans, let me say this:

MORE

Of those to whom much is given, much is asked. I cannot say and no man could say that no more will be asked of us.

Yet, I believe that now, no less than when the decade began, this generation of Americans is willing to pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

Since those words were spoken by John F. Kennedy, the people of America have kept that compact with mankind's noblest cause.

And we shall continue to keep it.

Yet, I believe that we must always be mindful of this one thing, whatever the trials and the tests ahead. The ultimate strength of our country and our cause will lie not in powerful weapons or infinite resources or boundless wealth, but will lie in the unity of our people.

This, I believe very deeply.

Throughout my entire public career I have followed the personal philosophy that I am a free man, an American, a public servant and a member of my Party, in that order always and only.

For 37 years in the service of our nation, first as a Congressman, as a Senator and as Vice President and now as your President, I have put the unity of the people first. I have put it ahead of any devicive partisanship.

And in these times as in times before, it is true that a house divided against itself by the spirit of faction, of party, of region, of religion, of race, is a house that cannot stand.

There is division in the American house now. There is deviciveness among us all tonight. And holding the trust that is mine, as President of all the people, I cannot disregard the peril to the progress of the American people and the hope and the prospect of peace for all peoples.

So, I would ask all Americans, whatever their personal interests or concern, to guard against deviciveness and all its ugly consequences.

Fifty-two months and ten days ago, in a moment of tragedy and trauma, the duties of this office fell upon me. I asked then for your help and God's, that we might continue America on its course, binding up our wounds, healing our history, moving forward in new unity, to clear the American agenda and to keep the American commitment for all of our people.

MORE

United we have kept that commitment. United we have enlarged that commitment.

Through all time to come, I think America will be a stronger nation, a more just society, and a land of greater opportunity and fulfillment because of what we have all done together in these years of unparalleled achievement.

Our reward will come in the life of freedom, peace, and hope that our children will enjoy through ages ahead.

What we won when all of our people united just must not now be lost in suspicion, distrust, selfishness, and politics among any of our people.

Believing this as I do, I have concluded that I should not permit the Presidency to become involved in the partisan divisions that are developing in this political year.

With America's sons in the fields far away, with America's future under challenge right here at home, with our hopes and the world's hopes for peace in the balance every day, I do not believe that I should devote an hour or a day of my time to any personal partisan causes or to any duties other than the awesome duties of this office -- the Presidency of your country.

Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my Party for another term as your President.

But let men everywhere know, however, that a strong, a confident, and a vigilant America stands ready tonight to seek an honorable peace -- and stand ready tonight to defend an honored cause -- whatever the price, whatever the burden, whatever the sacrifices that duty may require.

Thank you for listening.

Good night and God bless all of you.

END

(AT 9:41 P.M. EST)

6
ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, March 31, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Bundy recommends 5 diplomatic actions this afternoon just before your speech.

In addition, may we dispatch the text to Bunker at about 7:00 p.m.?

✓ *W. Rostow*
Approved _____

Disapproved _____

*Bundy Notified at 1:00 PM
W Jordan*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 3-31-80 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 7-22-80

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

March 31, 1968

66

67a

Proposed Diplomatic Actions

1. Have Goldberg inform U Thant at about 7:00 this evening, on the basis of a summary to be provided by secure means.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

2. Give text to the Canadian and Indian Ambassadors at about 7:00 this evening, with urgings for affirmative response by their governments. (Although the ICC nations are not mentioned in the speech, one of the major proposals in circulation would call for the co-chairmen and the ICC nations to get together. (We would favor this.)

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

3. As a courtesy, call in the South Vietnamese Ambassador and the Manila allies to receive the text at 7:00 this evening, indicating that their governments have already been officially consulted and informed in their home capitals. (Otherwise, word might get around to the effect that we had not consulted these nations, as of course we have.)

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

4. Give the British Embassy the full text at 7:00 this evening, likewise noting that Wilson is already fully informed.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 3-31-80 letter

By if, NARS, Date 7-22-80

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-2-

5. Have Governor Harriman, following the meeting with Dobrynin, call on the Apostolic Delegate at about 6:30 to give him the text and to ask for affirmative comment from the Pope.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

W. P. Bundy:bmm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY~~

2A
file 68

Sunday, March 31, 1968 -- 12:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bus Wheeler called to report as follows: Westy's offensive along Route 9 to Khe Sanh has begun. If it goes well, he would feel quite comfortable going to the meeting. If it should run into difficulties, however, he would not like to be out of his headquarters. He will know by Thursday, his time, where he stands.

The question is: Can we wait as late as, say, Wednesday night here before making a final decision about his going to Honolulu? Bus would like to send a message to him tomorrow morning.

W. Rostow

8-22
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DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-6-78; NSC 8-14-80

By JK (ing), NARS, Date 8-29-80

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

69
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, March 31, 1968
3:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a paper, cleared by Nick Katzenbach, Averell Harriman and Bill Bundy, giving you guidelines for the 5:30 p.m. meeting. I have not read it, but am coming in from my home now. If I have anything to add, I will shortly so inform you.

W. W. Rostow
(dictated over phone)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 3-31-80 letter
By inf, NARS, Date 7-22-80

WWRostow:rln

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State Dep. Ltr. 4/25/79	
By JK	NARS, Date 6/26/79

EA. P. h. h.
FUG. 100 - 100 - 100

SANITIZED COPY

March 31, 1968

Talking Points for the President's
Meeting with Dobrynin

SANITIZED

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1. If available, the full text of the speech might be given to Dobrynin to read before his appointment. (We must recall that he is not quite as perfect in oral English as he makes out.)

2. If text is not thus given, the President might begin by summarizing the key points in the speech.

3. The President might then emphasize the seriousness of this action. We might have been prepared to go further but for two factors:

a. The major military threat to our forces in northern South Vietnam, and the fact that major supplies and reinforcements have been moving from the North into these areas. []

b. Hanoi's apparent rejection of our assumption that there would be no taking advantage if we stopped the bombing altogether. The present action gives an opportunity for Hanoi to show the kind of thing that might happen, and thus to give us a basis for making such an assumption at some time in the future.]

4. Above all, this unilateral act on our part provides an occasions for the Soviets to move. They have assumed a heavy responsibility for what is happening in Vietnam by their major supplies of sophisticated equipment in the past year. Moreover, they have been unable or unwilling to take any action toward peace, at least since Kosygin's Hanoi visit in February 1967. They must understand that we are going to stand firm in South Vietnam -- that we do not seek a military solution but equally will not permit North Vietnam to achieve one. The only reasonable answer is to move toward peace.

Foreign Govt Information
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Section 1-301(b)
EO 12065

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TAB A

MEMORANDUM

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TAB B

MEMORANDUM

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EO 12065

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EYES ONLY

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MAC 04339 EYES ONLY

1. DURING MY RECENT VISIT I TOLD YOU THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT WE MAY HAVE PREEMPTED AN ENEMY ATTACK OF AT LEAST BATTALION SIZE AGAINST KHE SANH ON THE NIGHT OF 22/23 MARCH. HERE IS THE RELEVANT INTELLIGENCE:

A. A PW CAPTURED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TET OFFENSIVE STATED THAT THE EXACT TIMING OF THE TET ATTACK WAS PASSED TO ENEMY UNITS THROUGH THE USE OF A NUMBER OF BEEPS FROM RADIO HANOI. USE OF THE BEEPS INDICATED THAT THE ATTACK WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, WITH THE EXACT HOUR OF ATTACK INDICATED BY THE NUMBER OF BEEPS. WE BEGAN TO MONITOR BOTH RADIO HANOI AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION RADIO. AT 221322H, LIBERATION NEWS AGENCY BROADCAST THREE BEEPS DURING A PROPAGANDA BROADCAST ON THE SITUATION AT KHE SANH.

B. THERE WAS ALSO HARDER INTELLIGENCE INDICATING AN ENEMY ATTACK:

(1) ON THE NIGHT OF 21 MARCH:

HEAVY ARTY FIRE BE CONCENTRATED ON THE COMBAT BASE ON THE NIGHT OF 22/23 MARCH. AS YOU KNOW, KHE SANH RECEIVED OVER 1100 POUNDS OF MIXED CALIBER AND TYPES DURING THE NIGHT OF 22/23 MARCH.

Rostow
(4)

SANITIZED
Authority JCS ltr 5/8/81 re NLJ-81-94
By [signature], NARS, Date 8/21/81

(3) DURING THE NIGHT OF 22/23 MARCH WE HAD UNUSUALLY HEAVY SENSOR ACTIVITY. IN FACT THE SENSOR ACTIVITY WAS AS GREAT AS ANY NIGHT SINCE WE HAVE HAD THE SENSORS OUT AND RAN ABOUT 200 PERCENT ABOVE THE MONTHLY AVERAGE FOR MARCH.

2. OF COURSE, WE WILL PROBABLY NEVER KNOW IF WE DID BLOCK THE ATTACK, BUT HERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT WE DID SO.

A. WE DIVERTED FOUR ARC LIGHT STRIKES INTO CLOSE-IN KHE SANH TARGETS. SOME OF THE AREAS WHERE WE NOTED HEAVY SENSOR ACTIVITY WERE IN OR NEAR THESE B-52 BOXES.

B.

THE 3RD BATTALION OPENED FIRE AT 0300 HOTEL (THE TIME INDICATED BY THE 3 BEEPS), BUT THE 2ND BATTALION FAILED TO RESPOND.

3. THIS IS THE STORY. IT IS INTERESTING, BUT FAR FROM CONCLUSIVE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

460

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 EYES ONLY