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EEA233 OO WTE 10 WTE 15 DE WTE 863

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (HAYDEN)
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP80576

Authority OSD 11-15-78 letter

By____, NARS,

TOPSECRET

SITUATION ROOM REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 26, 1968

SOUTH VIETNAM

IST CORPS

IN A 2 1/2 HOUR ENGAGEMENT 400 METERS NORTH OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE PERIMETER, A MARINE PATROL MET STIFF ENEMY RESISTANCE. ON TERMINATION OF THE ENGAGEMENT THE MARINE LOSSES WERE 1 KILLED, 21 WOUNDED, AND 25 MISSING. ENEMY LOSSES AT THIS TIME ARE UNKNOWN. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT DURING THIS PERIOD ATTACKED 3 ENEMY TANKS CLOSE TO THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE, 3 ENEMY SELF-PROPELLED GUNS WHICH WERE SIGHTED 11 MILES NORTHWEST OF THE BASE, AND AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF VEHICLES 1 MILE SOUTH OF THE BASE. SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT HAS NOT BEEN REPORTED, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS WERE NOTED IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE BASE. MARINES AND ARVN UNITS, WHILE SWEEPING THE AREA SOUTH OF THE PERFUME RIVER IN OPERATION HUE CITY, ACCOUNTED FOR 103 ENEMY KILLED YESTERDAY DURING MODERATE CONTACTS.

YESTERDAY, ENENY SHELLING OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE PERSISTED AS 689 ROUNDS OF MIXED ARTILLERY, MORTAR, AND ROCKET FIRE IMPACTED IN THE AREA. KHE SANH COMBAT BASE RECEIVED 350 ROUNDS WHICH KILLED 3 AND WOUNDED 52 US MARINES. TWO HELICOPTERS WERE DESTROYED AND 2 WERE DAMAGED BY THE SHELLING. THE RUNWAY AT KHE SANH WAS REPORTED TO BE IN POOR CONDITION. CON THIEN RECEIVED 285 ROUNDS WITH NO CASUALTIES REPORTED. THE REMAINING 54 ROUNDS IMPACTED AT CAMP CARROLL, DONG HA, AND CUA VIET RESULTING IN SERIOUS WOUNDS TO ONE US MARINE, AND DAMAGING 3 HELICOPTERS AND 4 OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT.

WHILE SEARCHING THE PALACE GROUNDS AT HUE, US MARINE AND VIETNAMESE FORCES UNCOVERED THE GRAVES OF 140 NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS.

AN AIR FORCE F-100D ON A CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSION WAS SHOT DOWN BY ENEMY GROUND FIRE 7 MILES NORTHWEST OF CAN THO. THE PILOT WAS RECOVERED IN GOOD CONDITION WITHIN 7 MINUTES AFTER EJECTING FROM THE DOWNED AIRCRAFT.

AN A-4E ON A CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSION WAS HIT BY GROUND FIRE AND CRASHED 10 MILES SOUTHEAST OF DA NANG. THE PILOT EJECTED AND WAS RECOVERED.

RECENT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS REVEAL A NUMBER OF OCCUPIED ANTIAIRCRAFT POSITIONS ALONG ROUTE 548 IN THE A SHAU VALLEY. THIS ACTIVITY, COUPLED WITH ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS ON ROUTES 547 AND 548, INDICATES THE IMPORTANCE THE ENEMY ATTACHES TO THE PROTECTION OF THIS IMPORTANT LOGISTICAL AND INFILTRATION ROUTE. POUTE 547 IS AN EAST-WEST ROAD RUNNING FROM THE LAO BORDER AREA NORTH OF THE A SHAU VALLEY, BECOMING A LIMITED ALL-WEATHER, LOOSE SURFACE ROAD WEST OF HUE. INTERCEPTS INDICATE THAT CAMOUFLAGED "TANKS" WOULD POSSIBLY MOVE EASTWARD TODAY ALONG ROUTE 547 TO A POINT SOME 18 MILES WEST OF HUE.

2D CORPS

THE THREAT OF A MAJOR ATTACK CONTINUES IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLAND PROVINCES OF KONTUM, PLEIKU, AND DARLAC. DAK TO MAY BE AN EARLY TARGET. TO THE EAST ALONG THE COAST, THE ENEMY'S DETERMINED DEFENSE OF FORTIFIED POSITIONS NORTH OF QUI NHON SUGGESTS PLANS TO CONDUCT AN OFFENSIVE IN THAT AREA.

3D CORPS

OPERATION YELLOWSTONE HAS BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED.
THIS OPERATION WAS OF THE SEARCH-AND-DESTROY VARIETY AND TOOK PLACE IN AN AREA NORTH OF TAY NINH NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. CASUALTY TOTALS FOR THIS OPERATION WERE 135 U.S. AND 5 AMVN KILLED, 1,094 U.S. AND 67 ARVN WOUNDED, WITH 3 ARVN MISSING. ENEMY LOSSES WERE 1,254 KILLED, 1,438 DETAINED, AS WELL AS 214 INDIVIDUAL AND CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED. SOME 1,128 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT SORTIES AND 117 B-52 MISSIONS WERE FLOWN AS PART OF THIS OPERATION.

YESTERDAY, 2 ENEMY FORCES WERE ENCOUNTERED NEAR SAIGON.
IN THE FIRST ENGAGEMENT, 2 U.S. ARMY COMPANIES MET AN UNKNOWNSIZE ENEMY FORCE 5 MILES NORTH OF THE CITY. AFTER A FIERCE
25-MINUTE BATTLE THE ENEMY BROKE CONTACT LEAVING 32 DEAD ON
THE BATTLEFIELD; U.S. CASUALTIES WERE 2 KILLED AND 10 WOUNDED.

IN THE SECOND CONTACT, AN ARVN AIRBORN BATTALION ENGAGED AN ENEMY FORCE LATE SATURDAY 8 MILES NORTHWEST OF THE CITY. DURING SPORADIC FIRING WHICH LASTED FOR 12 HOURS, THE FRIENDLY FORCES CALLED IN HELICOPTER LIGHT FIRE TEAMS AND TACTICAL AIR TO SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS. TWENTY ENEMY SOLDIERS WERE KILLED AND 8 WERE DETAINED, WHILE THE ARVN PARATROOPERS LOST 2 KILLED AND 23 WOUNDED.

4TH CORPS

YESTERDAY, THE ENEMY STRUCK BINH THUY AIRFIELD, WITH 35 ROUNDS OF 75-MM RECOILLESS RIFLE FIRE IN A BRIEF 5-MINUTE PERIOD. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE NOMINAL WITH 1 VNAF BEING KILLED AND 5 WOUNDED. THERE WAS NO MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE AIRFIELD, WHICH REMAINS OPERATIONAL.

NORTH VIETNAM

ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS: THE MAJORITY OF THE 85 SORTIES FLOWN OVER NORTH VIETNAM YESTERDAY WERE EMPLOYED ON ARMED RECONNAISSANCE MISSION; HOWEVER, 4 A-6A AIRCRAFT, STRUCK THE PHU LY RAILROAD YARD NEAR HANOI, THE HAIPHONG RAILROAD YARD, THE UONG BI THERMAL POWER PLANT NORTHWEST OF HAIPHONG AND THE BAI THUONG AIR-FIELD 70 MILES SOUTH OF HANOI. IN ALL CASES, DARKNESS PREVENTED BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. THERE WERE NO AIRCRAFT REPORTED LOST OVER NORTH VIETNAM LAST NIGHT.

MILITARY CASUALTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

26 FEBRUARY 1968

	(1) 24 HRS ENDING 11 AM 25 FEB	11 17 TH EST 11		1	(3) CUMULA- TIVE TROM I JAN 68		(5) CUMULA- TIVE FROM 1 JAN 61
UNITED STATES	(A)						
KILLED WOUNDED NOT HO WOUNDED HOSP CAPTURED MISSING	OSP	19 85 92 0	497 836 910 7 26		2,714 6,702 7,770 7	11,879 36,356 40,121 142 661	53,477 60,738 238
SOUTH VIETNAM							
KILLED WOUNDED MISSING/CAPTUR	RED	46 152 10	423 1,157 135	s	3,097 9,315 1,107	13,977 38,763 3,447	124,005
OTHER ALLIED	06 - 2385 (06)	Ĭ			8		** TE
KILLED WOUNDED MISSING/CAPTU	RED	0 8 0	11 28 0	8 × 4)	237 494 2	1,342 2,812 5	
VIET CONG/NVA		e e	e *			(40)	¥
KILLED WOUNDED (ESTIMATE) (B))	62.0 93.0	6,887		46,849	134,930 202,396	294,083 441,125

- A. U.S. CASUALTIES INCLUDE LAOS AND VIETNAM.
- B. ESTIMATE BASED ON A 1.5 TO 1 WOUNDED TO KILLED RATIO.
- C. THE FIGURES SHOWN IN COLUMN (1) ARE PRELIMINARY, UNREFINED BATTLEFIELD REPORTED CASUALTIES RECEIVED FROM COMUSMACY DAILY.
- D. THE FIGURES IN COLUMNS (2) THROUGH (5) ARE VERIFIED FIGURES REPRESENTING CASUALTIES REPORTED DURING THE PERIOD INDICATED.

DTG 261117Z FEB 1968





VZCZCEEA248 OO WTE10 DE WTE 85

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Received: Washington CommCen 8:59 PM Monday 26 February 1968

Received: LBJ Ranch CommCen 9:27 PM Monday 26 February 1968

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (WOTRING)
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80596

SECRET



MR. ROSTOW WANTED YOU TO READ THE FOLLOWING REPORT:

TODAY AT ABOUT NOON, ELEMENTS OF A US SPECIAL FORCES UNIT ENGAGED AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY IN AN AREA 22 MILES WEST OF TAY NINH CITY--ABOUT A MILE FROM THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. DURING THE ENCOUNTER THE ENEMY WAS REINFORCED BY THREE TANKS. THE SPECIAL FORCES UNIT TOOK THE TANKS UNDER FIRE AND DESTROYED ONE WITH AN ANTI-TANK WEAPON. AT THIS POINT THE REMAINING TWO TANKS WITHDREW WEST TOWARD THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. THIRTY ENEMY SOLDIERS WERE ALSO KILLED WHEN THE ENEMY TANK EXPLODED.

DTG: 270259Z FEB 68

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSB 11-15-78 letter

By _____, NARS, Date 3-20-79

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Received shington CommCen 6:33 A.M. UST 27 Feb 1968

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,4TP VZCZCEEA254 OO WTE10 WTE15 DE WTE 889

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (WOTRING)
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE: CAP80600

SANITIZED

Authority OSD 11-15-28 + NSC 1-29-79

By NARS, Date 3-30-74

TOPSECRET SENSITIVE

SITUATION ROOM REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT -- FEBRUARY 27, 1968 (WOTRING)

SOUTH VIETNAM

MAJOR GROUND ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN RELATIVELY LIGHT DURING THE PAST 24-HOURS, HOWEVER, THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO INITIATE ROCKET, MORTAR, ARTILLERY AND PROBING ATTACKS AGAINST SEVERAL LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

FIRST CORPS

ENEMY GUNNERS KEPT UP ITS PRESSURE ON ALLIED INSTALLATIONS IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE YESTERDAY WITH APPROXIMATELY 1,000 ROUNDS OF ROCKET, MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE DIRECTED AGAINST KHE SANH, CON THIEN AND DONG HA. DURING THE ATTACK ON DONG HA ONE U.S. WAS KILLED AND 22 WERE WOUNDED. ADDITIONALLY, TWO LIGHT OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT, APPROXIMATELY 20,000 GALLONS OF DIESEL FUEL AND PORTIONS OF AN AMMUNITION DUMP WERE DESTROYED. ONLY LIGHT DAMAGE WAS REPORTED AT KHE SANH AND CON THIEN.

ALSO IN THE DMZ AREA, NEAR CON THIEN, U.S. AIRCRAFT ACCOUNTED FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF FIVE ENEMY ARTILLERY POSITIONS.

FOUR ARTILLERY BATTALIONS WILL BE MOVING ALONG ROUTE IA IN NORTH VIETNAM'S HA TINH PROVINCE BETWEEN NOW AND NEXT TUESDAY. THEIR DESTINATION IS NOT YET KNOWN, BUT THEY MAY BE INTENDED TO AUGMENT THE ENEMY'S FIREPOWER IN THE DMZ AREA.

MEANWHILE, THE MAJOR NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMAND ENTITY CONTROLLING ENEMY UNITS AROUND KHE SANH MAY HAVE MOVED SOME SIX-MILES CLOSER TO THE BORDER AREA OPPOSITE KHE SANH. DETAILED ENEMY RECONNAISSANCE AND ARTILLERY SPOTTING ACTIVITY CONTINUES.

CONTINUING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HIS TACTICAL SITUATION AROUND KHE SANH.

ELSEWHERE IN THE FIRST CORPS, ALLIED FORCES CACCOUNTED FOR 205
ENEMY KILLED IN SMALL-UNIT ENCOUNTERS.

ELEMENTS OF ALL THREE REGIMENTS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 324B DIVISION MAY NOW BE IN THIS GENERAL AREA WHICH IS NOT FAR FROM QUANG TRI CITY. THE ENEMY MAY ATTACK THE CITY AT A TIME OF HIS CHOOSING OR TO POSE THE THREAT OF SUCH ACTION WITH A VIEW OF FRIGHTENING THE POPULATION.

SECOND CORPS

YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THE ENEMY LAUNCHED A MORTAR ATTACK AGAINST CAMP HOLLOWAY, LOCATED ABOUT FOUR MILES EAST OF PLEIKU CITY. DURING THE SEVEN-MINUTE ATTACK AN ESTIMATED 75 ROUNDS IMPACTED WITHIN THE CAMP RESULTING IN 15 U.S. WOUNDED AND TWO HELICOPTERS DAMAGED. THERE WAS NOT REPORT OF DAMAGE TO THE AIRFIELD.

THERE ARE CONTINUING INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY IS PREPARING FOR FURTHER ATTACKS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AREA, WITH POSSIBLE ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS AGAINST PLEIKU, KONTUM AND DARLAC PROVINCES. THE DAK TO AREA ALSO APPEARS TO BE MARKED FOR SUCH ATTACKS. THE TIMING AND INTENSITY OF SUCH ATTACKS IS NOT CLEAR

THIRD CORPS

YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THE ENEMY FIRED SEVEN ROUNDS OF ROCKETS INTO TAN SON NHUT AIRBASE. ONE ROUND IMPACTED WITHIN THE AIR AMERICA PARKING AREA, DAMAGING TWELVE AIRCRAFT. THERE WERE NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES REPORTED.

VARIOUS REPORTS CONTINUE TO REFLECT THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO INITIATE ROCKET AND GROUND ATTACKS AGAINST SAIGON AND BIEN HOA. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT SUCH ATTACKS MAY TAKE PLACE SOMETIME TODAY, WITH A GROUND ATTACK AGAINST BIEN HOA AIRBASE CONSIDERED LIKELY.

FOURTH CORPS

TWENTY ENEMY WERE KILLED AND 12 PERSONS WERE DETAINED, 3 MILES WEST OF CAN THO WHEN A U.S. ARMY COMPANY ENGAGED AN ESTIMATED REINFORCED ENEMY COMPANY. A U.S. BATTALION AND AN ADDITIONAL U.S. COMPANY REINFORCED THE ENGAGED UNIT, WHILE TACTICAL AIR STRIKES AND ARTILLERY ALSO PROVIDED SUPPORT DURING THE DAY-LONG ACTION. FOURTEEN U.S. WERE KILLED AND 51 WOUNDED IN THIS ACTION.

NORTH VIETNAM

U.S. PILOTS FLEW 90 SORTIES OVER NORTH VIETNAM YESTERDAY.
THE HAIPHONG RAILROAD YARD (WEST), 2 MILES NORTHWEST OF THE
CITY, WAS STRUCK; RESULTS WERE NOT OBSERVED BECAUSE OF
DARKNESS. THE PHU LY RAILROAD YARD, 33 MILES SOUTH OF
HANOI, AND THE BAC THUONG AIRFIELD, 22 MILES NORTHWEST OF
THANH HOA, WERE ALSO STRUCK AND AGAIN DARKNESS PRECEDEDINES Johnson Library
ANY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

CUMULATIVE CASUALTIES SINCE JANUARY 29

	KILLED	WOUNDED	DETAINED
ENEMY	43,004		7,014
UNITED STATES SOUTH VIETNAM	3,257	8,233	W 40 W

MILITARY CASUALTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

27 FEBRUARY 1968

(1) 24 HRS ENDING 11 AM EST 26 FEB 68	CURRENT WEEK 11 AM EST 24 FEB 68 THROUGH 11 AM EST 25 FEB 68	(3) CUMULA- TIVE FROM 1 JAN 68	(4) CUMULA- TIVE FROM 1 JAN 67	(5) CUMULA- TIVE FROM 1 JAN 61
UNITED STATES (A)			•	
KILLED 43 WOUNDED NOT HOSP 129 WOUNDED HOSP 140 CAPTURED 0 MISSING 0	135 87 95 0	2,822 7,298 8,265 7 306	11,987 36,952 40,636 142 577	18,844 54,073 61,253 238 953
SOUTH VIETNAM	8		.*	
KILLED 14 WOUNDED 113 MISSING/CAPTURED 18	84 286 13	3,143 9,467 1,117		56,313 124,157 28,461
OTHER ALLIED		5 20 54 54 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55		
KILLED 1 WOUNDED 8 MISSING/CAPTURED 0	10 0	237 502 2	1,342 2,820 5	
VIET CONG/NVA				
KILLED 740 WOUNDED 1,110 (ESTIMATE) (B)	1,238 1,857			294,703 442,055

- A. U.S. CASUALTIES INCLUDE LAOS AND VIETNAM.
- B. ESTIMATE BASED ON A 1.5 TO 1 WOUNDED TO KILLED RATIO.
- C. THE FIGURES SHOWN IN COLUMN (1) ARE PRELIMINARY, UNREFINED BATTLEFIELD REPORTED CASUALTIES RECEIVED FROM COMUSMACY DAILY.
- D. THE FIGURES IN COLUMNS (2) THROUGH (5) ARE VERIFIED FIGURES REPRESENTING CASUALTIES REPORTED DURING THE PERIOD INDICATED.

TO STORE C

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DTG: 271133Z FEB 68

MILITARY CASUALTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

~	28	FEBRUARY 1968		DECLASS		
	765	(2) Current Week	Author By	ity <u>QSD</u> 8-	7-78 lette Date 3-20-	-
. 24	(1) Hrs ding AM EST FEB 68	11 AM EST 24 FEB 68 Through 11 AM EST 26 FEB 68	(3) Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68	(4) Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67	(5) Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61	
UNITED STATES	[7		***************************************		H
Killed Wounded Not Hosp Wounded Hosp Captured Missing	15 110 119 0 3	180 195 211 0 5	2,867 7,406 8,381 7	12,032 37,060 40,752 142 582	18,889 54,181 61,369 238 958	
SOUTH VIETNAM		,	0	28	a st	
Killed Wounded Missing/Captured	21 91 6	98 399 31	3,157 9,580 1,135	14,037 39,028 3,475	56,327 124,370 28,479	
OTHER ALLIED			*	o •••		
Killed Wounded Missing/Captured	2 4 0	18 0	238 510 2	1,343 2,828 5	1,941 4,558 22	
VIET CONG/NVA	-				ž.	
Killed Wounded (estimate ^b)	1,004	1,978 2,967	48,209 72,314	136,290 204,436	295,443 443,165	5

- a. U.S. Casualties include Laos and Vietnam.
- b. Estimate based on a 1.5 to 1 Wounded to Killed ratio.
- c. The figures shown in column (1) are preliminary, unrefined
 battlefield reported casualties received from COMUSMACV daily.
- d. The figures in columns (2) through (5) are verified figures representing casualties reported during the period indicated.

COMPIDENTIAL


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MILITARY CASUALTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1 MARCH 1968

En 11	(1) Hrs ding AM EST Feb 68	(2) Current Week 11 AM EST 24 Feb 68 Through 11 AM EST 28 Feb 68	(3) Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 68	(4) Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 67	(5) Cumula- tive From 1 Jan 61
Killed Wounded Not Hosp Wounded Hosp Captured Missing	61 75 82 0 3	300 825 893 2 7	2,987 7,036 9,063 9	12,152 37,690 41,434 144 584	19,009 54,811 62,051 240 960
SOUTH VIETNAM Killed Wounded Missing/Captured	22 79 1	157 560 78	3,216 9,741 1,182	14,096 39,189 3,522	56,386 124,531 28,526
OTHER ALLIED Killed Wounded Missing/Captured VIET CONG/NVA	2 8 0	3 26 0	240 518 2	1,345 2,836 5	1,943 4,566 22
Killed Wounded (estimate)	413 570	3,211 4,817	49,442 76,164	137,523 206,286	296,676 445,015



- b. Estimate based on a 1.5 to 1 Wounded to Killed ratio.
- c. The figures shown in column (1) are preliminary, unrefined battlefield reported casualties received from COMUSMACV daily.
- d. The figures in columns (2) through (5) are verified figures representing casualties reported during the period indicated.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 8-7-78 letter

By J, NARS, Date 3-20-79

NN

Wednesday, March 6, 1968 7:25 AM 13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

A C-123 with a crew of 4 and 44 passengers was hit by Communist gunfire and crashed at Khe Sanh this morning. Initial reports from the base indicate that there were no survivors

White House Situation Room

Clatha Maffety Briefing Officer



MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

13 MARCH 1968

Current Week AM EST (3) (4) Cumula-24 Hrs .Cumula-Cumula-Ending Through tive tive tive 11 AM EST 11 AM EST From . From From 12 Mar 68 11 Mar 68 1 Jan 61 1 Jan 68 1 Jan 67 UNITED STATESA 3,835 13,000 19,857 97 12 Killed 57,007 570 10,232 39,886 83 Wounded Not Hosp 619 11,295 43,666 64,283 90. Wounded Hosp 253 0 22 157 0 Captured 32 219 490 861 Missing. SOUTH VIETNAM 99 14,608 3,528 56,798 59 Killed 661 11,831 41.279 126,621 162 Wounded 1,404 28,748 15 3,744 Missing/Captured OTHER ALLIED 273 1,378 1,976 0 Killed 289 2,907 4,677 5 Wounded 0 Nissing/Captured VIET CONG/NVA .619 Killed 394 64,942 153,023 312,176 2,428 97.412 229,534 591 Wounded 468,263 (estimateb) WEAPONS SEIZED 71 286 12,894 41,316 Individual 47 2,789 , 5,665

a. U.S. Casualties include Laos and Vietnam:

Crew Served

- b. Estimate based on 1.5 to 1 Wounded to Killed ratio.
- c. The figures shown in column (1) and (2) are preliminary, unrefined battlefield-reported casualties received from COMUSMACV daily.
- d. The figures in columns (3) through (5) are verified figures representing casualties reported during the period indicated.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 8-7-78 letter

PP

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RECEIVED WASHINGTON COMMCEN 6:10 A.M. EST SUNDAY 17 MAR 68

00 WTE15 DE WTE10 062AU

RECEIVED LBJ RANCH COMMCEN 6: 14 A.M. CST SUNDAY 17 MAR 68

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THES CALEFULLY RELAYED TO AUSTIN COMMCEN 6:19 A.M. CST SUNDAY 17 MAR 68

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (BROWN)

THE PRESIDENT INFO CHRISTIAN

CITE CAP80690

goes pel andre

TOPSECRET

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEF FOR 17 MARCH 1968

SOUTHEAST ASIA

SUMMARY: US FORCES CONTINUE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY WITH SIGNIFICANT RESULTS AROUND QUANG NGAI AND SAIGON. ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY WAS AGAIN LIGHT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

THE CHANCES OF AN EARLY ATTACK ON BAN ME THUOT SEEM MORE LIKELY WITH A CRACK NVA REGIMENT NOW POSITIONED CLOSER TO THE CITY. IN THE DELTA, EARLY VIET CONG PROPAGANDA SUCCESSES ARE EBBING; CURRENT SOUTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE ACTIONS MAY FURTHER IMPROVE CONDITIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

SOUTH VIETNAM

1ST CORPS

Authority OSD 11-15-78 letter.

By NARS, Date 3-20-79

A US ARMY THREE-COMPANY TASK FORCE ATTACKED A LARGE ENEMY FORCE LOCATED 6 MILES NORTHEAST OF QUANG NGAI CITY. THE FIGHT LASTED OVER 7 HOURS WITH ARTILLERY AND HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS IN SUPPORT. THE ENEMY WAS FORCED TO FLEE LEAVING 128 DEAD. TWO US WERE KILLED AND 10 WOUNDED. PRISONER REPORTS HAVE INDICATED A PLANNED ATTACK ON QUANG NGAI CITY BY SEVERAL NVA UNITS, INCLUDING A ROCKET BATTALION. ALLEGEDLY

EQUIPPED WITH 122-MM ROCKETS.

2ND CORPS

A US NIGHT SPOTTER AIRCRAFT OBSERVED FOUR TRUCKS MOVING SOUTH OF PLEIKU CITY EARLY YESTERDAY MORNING. ONE TRUCK WAS TOWING AND ANOTHER TRUCK WAS CARRYING UNKNOWN TYPE LAUNCHERS. THE AIRCRAFT FIRED AT THE VEHICLES AND CAUSED FOUR SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. A SWEEP OF THE AREA FOUND ONE DESTROYED TRUCK BUT NO SIGN OF THE LAUNCHERS.

QQ

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLY ATTACK ON BAN ME THUOT SEEMS MORE LIKELY WITH TWO NVA REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS NOW LOCATED NEAR THE CITY. A TWO-DAY MOVE OF HEADQUARTERS, NVA 32D REGIMENT PLACED IT WITHIN 7 MILES OF BAN ME THUOT ON 15 MARCH; THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 33D NVA REGIMENT IS ABOUT AS CLOSE. MACV CONSIDERS THE 32D REGIMENT AS PROBABLY THE BEST ENEMY COMBAT UNIT IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS.

3RD CORPS

U.S. ARMY COMPANY AND AN ARVN BATTALION MADE A COORDINATED ATTACK ON AN ENEMY REINFORCED COMPANY 15 MILES NORTHWEST OF SAIGON. FRIENDLY UNITS WERE SUPPORTED BY TACTICAL AIR, ARTILLERY, AND ARMED HELICOPTERS. AFTER 6 HOURS THE ENEMY BROKE CONTACT LEAVING 95 DEAD, AND 13 INDIVIDUAL AND SIX CREW-SERVED WEAPONS. THERE WERE NO U.S. CASUALTIES BUT 10 ARVN WERE KILLED AND 19 WOUNDED.

4TH CORPS

YESTERDAY, BINH THUY AIRFIELD SUSTAINED A 40-ROUND MORTAR ATTACK RESULTING IN ONE AIRCRAFT DESTROYED AND FIVE DAMAGED. THESE WERE ALL VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT. THE AIRFIELD REMAINS OPERATIONAL AND THERE WERE NO PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

FOLLOWING A SHARP DROP IN THE NUMBER OF COORDINATED ENEMY ACTIONS SINCE MID-FEBRUARY, VIET CONG PROPAGANDA HAS FEATURED THREATS OF A SECOND ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE AGAINST POPULATION CENTERS IN THE 4TH CORPS AREA. THE INITIAL SUCCESS OF THE PROGRAM IS BEGINNING TO WEAR THIN, HOWEVER, DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT ENEMY ATTACKS. SOUTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS NOW UNDER WAY IN THE DELTA MAY HELP TO OFFSET VIET CONG PROPAGANDA EVEN MORE.

ARC LIGHT OPERATIONS:

TWNENTY-EIGHT B-52 SORTIES WERE AGAIN FLOWN WITHIN AN 8 MILE RADIUS OF KHE SANH COMBAT BASE, STRIKING TROOP CONCENTRATIONS, FORTIFICATIONS, ARTILLERY POSITIONS, AND SUPPLY AND STORAGE AREAS. AN ADDITIONAL 26 SORTIES WERE FLOWN AGAINST TROOP CONCENTRATIONS, TUNNEL AND CAVE SYSTEMS, AND ENEMY BASE CAMPS IN THE HUE, DA NANG, PLEIKU. AND SAIGON AREAS.

NORTH VIETNAM

ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS:

THERE WERE 149 SORTIES FLOWN OVER NORTH VIETNAM YESTERDAY INCLUDING TWO STRIKES AGAINST ALFA TARGETS. THE YEN VIEN RAILROAD CLASSIFICATION YARD 6 MILES NORTHEAST OF HANOI WAS STRUCK BY ONE AIRCRAFT ON AN AIRBORNE RADAR RELEASE. WEATHER PREVENTED DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. THE KIEN AN HIGHWAY BRIDGE AND ONE OF THE BYPASSES ARE REPORTED DOWN WITH ALL APPROACHES ALSO RECEIVING SOME DAMAGE. ONE AIRCRAFT ACCOMPANYING THIS STRIKE FORCE STRUCK A SAM SITE WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.

THREE AIRCRAFT WERE LOST ON STRIKES OVER THE NORTH, ONE PILOT WAS RESCUED.

U.S. PILOTS OBSERVED 11 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES.

LAOS

BARREL ROLL AND STEEL TIGER OPERATIONS:

THERE WERE 335 SORTIES FLOWN IN LAOS, YESTERDAY, WITH 251 SORTIES FLOWN AGAINST TARGETS IN THE AREA ADJACENT TO KHE SANH. A TOTAL OF 17 TRUCKS WAS REPORTED DESTROYED AND EIGHT DAMAGED.

THAILAND

THE DEPLOYMENT OF SIX F-111A AIRCRAFT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA FOR OPERATIONS AND COMBAT EVALUATION (OPERATION COMBAT LANCER) WAS COMPLETED TODAY WHEN THE LAST AIRCRAFT LANDED AT TAKHLI ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE BASE.

LATE ITEM

SOUTH VIETNAM - 1ST CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

YESTERDAY, AT KHE SANH, FRIENDLY ARTILLERY FIRED 1457 ROUNDS AGAINST ENEMY POSITIONS KILLING 26 AND THE ENEMY FIRED 135 ROUNDS OF MIXED MORTAR, ARTILLERY AND ROCKETS WOUNDING 10 MARINES. TACTICAL AIRCRAFT SORTIES INCREASED TO 427 CAUSING 47 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND TWO SECONDARY FIRES. ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-TWO MONTAGNARD TRIBESMEN WERE GIVEN SANCTUARY TO THE KHE SANH BASE. AIRLIFT HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO EVACUATE THESE REFUGEES.

U.S. MARINES ATTACKED AN ESTIMATED ENEMY BATTALION NEAR GIO LINH. AFTER A DAY OF HEAVY FIGHTING THE ENEMY WITHDREW LEAVING 83 KILLED. TWO U.S. WERE KILLED AND 31 WOUNDED.

MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

17 MARCH 1968

		(2)			
		CURRENT WE			(5)
	(1)	11 AM EST	(3)	(4)	(5)
	HRS	9 MAR 68	CUMULA-	CUMULA-	CUMULA- TIVE
	DING	THROUGH	TIVE FROM	TIVE FROM	FROM
16	AM EST MAR 68	11 AM EST 15 MAR 68	1 JAN 68	1 JAN 67	1 JAN 61
UNITED STATES A	MAR 00	13 MAR GO	I JAN OO	1 DHN OF	I DAN OI
KILLED	35	295	4033	13198	20055
WOUNDED NOT HOSP	112	837	10499	40153	57274
WOUNDED HOSP	122	908	11584	43955	64572
CAPTURED	0	1	22	157	253
MISSING	Ö	21	208	479	855
	(<i>575</i> (12)			
SOUTH VIETNAM	123				
KILLED	47	336	3765	14845	57035
WOUNDED	162	1413	12583	42031	127373
MISSING/CAPTURED	2	33	1422	3762	28766
OTHER ALLIED	S a s			1700	1000
KILLED	1	.4	273	1378	1976
WOUNDED	1	14	298	2916	4686
MISSING/CAPTURED	U	2	4	7	24
VIET CONG/NVA					
KILLED	747	3637	66960	155041	314194
WOUNDED	1120	5354	100338	232460	471189
(ESTIMATE B)	1120	2024	100000	202400	411103
1201111112 0/					-
WEAPONS SEIZED					
INDIVIDUAL	128	775	13383	41806	
CREW SERVED	17	102	2844	5720	

- A. U.S. CASUALTIES INCLUDE LAOS AND VIETNAM.
 - B. ESTIMATE BASED ON 1.5 TO 1 WOUNDED TO KILLED RATIO.
 - C. THE FIGURES SHOWN IN COLUMN (1) AND (2) ARE PRELIMINARY, UNREFINED BATTLEFIELD-REPORTED CASUALTIES RECEIVED FROM COMUSMACY DAILY.
 - D. THE FIGURES IN COLUMNS (3) THROUGH (5) ARE VERIFIED FIGURES REPRESENTING CASUALTIES REPORTED DURING THE PERIOD INDICATED.

DTG 171110Z MAR 1968



DE WTE10 067A

VZCZCEEA2?9 00 WTE10 DE WTE 1097 Reduived LBJ Ranch Common 5:55 A.M. CST Honday 18 Mar 68

Relayed to Austin CommCen 6:15 A.M. CST Monday 18 Mar 68

FROM THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP80702

SANITIZED

TOPSECRET SENSITIVE

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEF FOR 18 MARCH

SOUTHEAST ASIA

SANITIZED

Authority 050 11-15-78 + NSA 1-29-79

By RARS, Date 3-20-79

SUMMARY:

FRIENDLY FORCES CONTINUE TO COUNTER ENEMY
ARTILLERY, ROCKET, AND MORTAR ATTACKS AS WELL AS PERSISTENT
GROUND ATTACKS BELOW THE DMZ WHILE U.S. AND ARVN COMBINED
OPERATIONS CONTINUE TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT AND SUCCESSFUL
CONTACTS WITH COMMUNIST FORCES IN THE SAIGON AREA.

... OLIGINE

INFILTRATION GROUP HAS BEEN FORMED, BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR AT THIS TIME WHETHER AN INCREASED RATE OF INFILTRATION IS INDICATED.

SOUTH VIETNAM

1ST CORPS

YESTERDAY, THE ENEMY FIRED 500 ROUNDS OF MIXED MORTAR AND ROCKET ROUNDS ON THE KHE SANH COMEAT BASE WOUNDING 19 MARINES. THE ARVN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AT KHE SANH REPELLED AN ENEMY GROUND ATTACK. RESULTS OF THIS ACTION ARE NOT KNOWN. TACTICAL AIR STRIKES TOTALED 310 IN SUPPORT OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE AREA. THERE WERE 43 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, 28 SECONDARY FIRES, 14 MILITARY STRUCTURES AND ONE BRIDGE DESTROYED.

ELEMENTS OF A U.S. MARINE BATTALION ATTACKED AN ENEMY

FORCE 14 MILES WEST-SOUTHWEST OF DA NAMS. HEAVY ARTILLERY

FIRE WAS DIRECTED ON THE ENEMY POSITIONS CAUSING THEM TO

BREAK AND RUN. U.S. ARTILLERY CONTINUED TO POUND THE ENEMY

WITHDRAWAL ROUTES. U.S. CASUALTIES WERE 10 KILLED AND 30

WOUNDED. INITIAL RESULTS OF ENEMY CASUALTIES ACCOUNT FOR 16

KILLED AND THREE DETAINED. A CLANDESTINE INFORMANT SAID

COORDINATED ATTACKS AGAINST DA NAMS AND HOI AN WOULD BEGIN

SHORTLY AFTER 21 MARCH. U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE AREA, HOWEVER,

HAVE PROBABLY UPSET THE PLAN.

A PRISONER AND SEVERAL AGENTS SAY THAT QUANG TRI CITY WILL BE ATTACKED THIS MONTH. POSSIBLY RELATED

TO MOVE FROM SOUTH OF KHE SANH TO QUANG TRI.

00 WTE15 DE WTE10 067A

VZCZCEEA2?9 00 WTE10 DE WTE 1097



Received Washington CommCen 5:51 A.M. EST Monday 18 Mar 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen 5:55 A.M. CST Monday 18 Mar 68

Relayed to Austin CommCen 6:15 A.M. CST Monday 18 Mar 68

FROM THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM TO THE PRESIDENT INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN CITE CAP80702

TOPSECRET SENSITIVE

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BRIEF FOR 18 MARCH

SOUTHEAST ASIA

SUMMARY:

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ARTILLERY, ROCKET, AND MORTAR ATTACKS AS WELL AS PERSISTENT
GROUND ATTACKS BELOW THE DMZ WHILE U.S. AND ARVN COMBINED
OPERATIONS CONTINUE TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT AND SUCCESSFUL
CONTACTS WITH COMMUNIST FORCES IN THE SAIGON AREA.

THIS TIME WHETHER AN INCREASED RATE OF INFILTRATION IS INDICATED.

Authority 050 11-15-78+ NSA 1-29-79

By R NARS, Date 3-20-79

SANITIZED

SOUTH VIETNAM

1ST CORPS

YESTERDAY, THE ENEMY FIRED 500 ROUNDS OF MIXED MORTAR AND ROCKET ROUNDS ON THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE WOUNDING 19 MARINES. THE ARVN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AT KHE SANH REPELLED AN ENEMY GROUND ATTACK. RESULTS OF THIS ACTION ARE NOT KNOWN. TACTICAL AIR STRIKES TOTALED 310 IN SUPPORT OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE AREA. THERE WERE 43 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, 28 SECONDARY FIRES, 14 MILITARY STRUCTURES AND ONE BRIDGE DESTROYED.

ELEMENTS OF A U.S. MARINE BATTALION ATTACKED AN ENEMY FORCE 14 MILES WEST-SOUTHWEST OF DA NANG. HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE WAS DIRECTED ON THE ENEMY POSITIONS CAUSING THEM TO BREAK AND RUN. U.S. ARTILLERY CONTINUED TO POUND THE ENEMY WITHDRAWAL ROUTES. U.S. CASUALTIES WERE 10 KILLED AND 30 WOUNDED. INITIAL RESULTS OF ENEMY CASUALTIES ACCOUNT FOR 16 KILLED AND THREE DETAINED. A CLANDESTINE INFORMANT SAID COORDINATED ATTACKS AGAINST DA NANG AND HOI AN WOULD BEGIN SHORTLY AFTER 21 MARCH. U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE AREA, HOWEVER, HAVE PROBABLY UPSET THE PLAN.

A PRISONER AND SEVERAL AGENTS SAY THAT QUANG TRI CITY WILL BE ATTACKED THIS MONTH. POSSIBLY RELATED

AT LEAST AN ELEMENT OF THE NVA 304TH DIVISION IS ABOUT TO MOVE FROM SOUTH OF KHE SANH TO QUANG TRI.

2D CORPS

YESTERDAY, A U.S. ARMY COMPANY FOUND 49 ENEMY DEAD 10 MILES NORTH-NORTHWEST OF KONTUM AS A RESULT OF ARTILLERY AND TACTICAL AIR STRIKES WHICH WERE DIRECTED AGAINST THE ENEMY IN A FIGHT THE PREVIOUS DAY. U.S. CASUALTIES FROM THAT FIGHT WERE ONE KILLED AND THREE WOUNDED.

A POSSIBLE NEW NVA INFILTRATION GROUP (
HAS BEEN FORMED, | CONTROLLED BY THE HIGH
COMMAND IN HANOI.)

ON 17 MARCH, ELEMENIS OF TWO ARVN BATTALIONS ALFACKED AN ENEMY COMPANY 30 MILES NORTHWEST OF SAIGON. ARMED HELICOPTERS AND ARTILLERY WERE IN SUPPORT FORCING THE ENEMY TO BREAK CONTACT AFTER FIVE HOURS OF FIGHTING LEAVING 50 DEAD. ARVN LOSSES WERE SIX KILLED. 13 WOUNDED. AND ONE MISSING.

LATER THE SAME DAY A POPULAR FORCES PLATOON ENGAGED A LARGE ENEMY FORCE 17 MILES NORTH-NORTHWEST OF SAIGON. AN ARVN BATTALION AND A POPULAR FORCES COMPANY REINFORCED AND TACTICAL AIR AS WELL AS ARMED HELICOPTERS WERE CALLED IN FOR SUPPORT. THE ENEMY BROKE CONTACT AFTER A FOUR-HOUR FIGHT LEAVING 55 DEAD, SEVEN INDIVIDUAL AND NINE CREW-SERVED WEAPONS. AND A LARGE QUANTITY OF AMMUNITION. ARVN LOSSES WERE SEVEN KILLED AND SIX WOUNDED.

4TH CORPS

ARVN UNITS IN SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY MADE TWO SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS. ONE 3 MILES NORTHEAST AND THE OTHER 21 MILES WEST OF MY THO. FORTY-ONE OF THE ENEMY WERE KILLED, EIGHT DETAINED, 31 INDIVIDUAL AND EIGHT CREW-SERVED WEAPONS SEIZED. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE TWO KILLED AND 17 WOUNDED.

A PRISONER CAPTURED ON 14 MARCH IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE. ABOUT 50 MILES SOUTHWEST OF SAIGON, SAID ABOUT FIVE SOLDIERS DESERT DAILY FROM HIS BATTALION. RECENT REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE VIET CONG HAVE BEEN FORCING YOUTHS 12 YEARS OF AGE AND OLDER INTO SERVICE, WHICH MAY BE A FACTOR IN THE DESERTIONS.

ARC LIGHT OPERATIONS:

THIRTY-FIVE B-52 SORTIES AGAIN STRUCK WITHIN AN EIGHT-MILE RADIUS OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE, STRIKING TROOP CONCENTRATIONS FORTIFICATIONS, ARTILLERY POSITIONS, AND SUPPLY AND STORAGE AREAS. AN ADDITIONAL 25 SORTIES HAMMERED ENEMY TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, FORTIFICATIONS, AND BASE CAMPS IN THE HUE. QUANG NGAI, PLEIKU. AND NHA TRANG AREAS.

PROPAGANDA:

THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS ISSUED A WORLDWIDE APPEAL TO OBSERVE 19 MARCH, THE "ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIETNAM DAY OF STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. IMPERIALISM." THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE ENEMY IS PLANNING TO MARK THE DAY WITH COORDINATED, ATTENTION-GETTING ATTACKS; HE IS IN A POSITION TO DO SO, HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY IN THE 1ST AND 2D CORPS AREAS.

NORTH VIETNAM

ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS:

THERE WERE 119 SORTIES FLOWN OVER NORTH VIETNAM YESTERDAY. ALL SCHEDULED ALFA STRIKES WERE CANCELLED BECAUSE OF POOR OPERATIONAL WEATHER IN THE TARGET AREAS. C OPY - Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

With the second

AIR ACTIVITY:

A NORTH VIETNAMESE 11-28 JET LIGHT BOMBER RETURNED TO PHUC YEN AIRFIELD FROM CHINA ON 16 MARCH, BRINGING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF IL-28S BASED IN COUNTRY TO THREE; FIVE REMAIN IN CHINA. THERE IS NO CLEAR INDICATION AS TO WHAT USE IS PLANNED FOR THEM.

LAOS

BARREL ROLL AND STEEL TIGER OPERATIONS:

YESTERDAY, 326 SORTIES WERE FLOWN OVER LAOS OF WHICH 163 WERE IN THE SECTOR ADJACENT TO KHE SANH. PILOTS REPORTED 43 TRUCKS DESTROYED AND 16 DAMAGED.

- CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY CASUALTIES AND ENEMY WEAPONS SEIZED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

18 MARCH 1968

		(2)			
		CURRENT WE	20,99000	#. @ 882	
	(1)	11 AM EST	(3)	(4)	(5)
	4 HRS	9 MAR 68	CUMULA-	CUMULA-	CUMULA-
	NDING	THROUGH	TIVE	TIVE	TIVE
1		11 AM EST	FROM	FROM	FROM
1	7 MAR 68	16 MAR 68	1 JAN 68	1 JAN 67	1 JAN 61
UNITED STATE (A	1				
NCKILLED	11	356	4094	13259	20116
WOUNDED NOT H		913	10575	40229	57350
WOUNDED HOSP	82	991	11667	44038	64655
CAPTURED	Õ	Ö	22	157	253
MISSING	Ö	45	232	503	879
	8 5				
SOUTH VIETNAM		a	(2)		
KILLED	24 .	383	3812	14892	57082
WOUNDED	116	1575	12745	42193	127535
MISSING/CAPTU	RED 0	35	1424	3764	28768
OTHER ALLIED					
KILLED	1	. 5	274	1379	1977
WOUNDED	1	15	299	2917	4687
MISSING/CAPTU	RED 0	2	4	7	24
				2 T	
VIET CONG/NVA					
KILLED	376	4384	67707		314941
WOUNDED	564	6474	101458	233580	472309
(ESTIMATE) (B)	(8)	*		
WEAPONS SEIZED			V.		***
INDIVIDUAL	128	903	13511	41934	
CREW SERVED	14	119	2861	5737	

- (A) U.S. CASUALTIES INCLUDE LAGS AND VIETNAM.
- (B) ESTIMATE BASED ON 1.5 TO 1 WOUNDED TO KILLED RATIO
- (C) THE FIGURES SHOWN IN COLUMN (1) AND (2) ARE PRELIMINARY, UNREFINED BATTLEFIELD-REPORTED CASUALTIES RECEIVED FROM COMUSMACY DAILY.
- (D) THE FIGURES IN COLUMNS (3) THROUGH (5) ARE VERIFIED FIGURES REPRESENTING CASUALTIES REPORTED DURING THE PERIOD INDICATED.

DTG 181051Z MARCH 1968



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INFORMATION

Wednesday March 20, 1968 - 3:25 p.m.



SITUATION ROOM MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Attack on Tan Son Nhut

During a ten-minute period shortly after noon EST today Tan Son Nhut Airbase was hit by seven rounds of recoilless rifle fire.

There were no personnel casualties reported and aircraft damage was as follows:

Three C-130's received major damage Two C-130's received minor damage Two helicopters received minor damage

W. Rostow

INFORMATION

Friday March 22, 1968 -- 3:45 a.m.

J. 420

SITUATION ROOM MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Latest Vietnam Situation Report

A check as of 3:15 EST indicates that there have been no ground offensive activities reported from any of the corps areas. The Khe Sanh Combat Base, however, has been receiving heavy mortar and artillery fire since approximately 6 a.m. EST this morning—a total of 465 rounds, two or three times the normal heavy rate.

Will Rostow

CIA MEMOS

CIA MEMOS

January.	
30 Situation in SVN #3	A
31 Telephone Conversation with Saigon Station	В
31 Spot Report on Situation in Hue	C
31 Situation in SVN #4	Đ
31 Situation in SVN #5	E
February:	
1 Situation in SVN #7	F
2 Situation in SVN #8	C
2 Situation in SVN #9	Н
2 Situation in SVN #10	I
3 Situation in SVN #11	J
3 Situation in SVN #12	K
4 Situation in SVN #13	L
4 Situation in SVN #14	N
5 Situation in SVN #15	N
5 Situation in SVN #16	C
7 Spot Report on Situation in Khe Sanh	F
17 Indications of NVN offensive beginning	0

82

SC-07425/68

CENTRAL INGULLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 30 January 1968 LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 82-23 0
Document # 82

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 3 (As of 4:30 P.M. EST)

- January, the Gremy offensive spread to the Saigon area where a series of mortar and ground assaults were launched. The US Embassy was subjected to mortar or rocket fire, with small arms fire occuring outside the compound. Late reports indicate that this fire has abated. A report that the Viet Cong had penetrated the Embassy and taken "control" is apparently false. However, terrorists reportedly did enter the building and blew up the main reception desk. No casualties have been reported, aside from the wounding of one Marine guard. Military police have been sent to reinforce the compound.
- 2. According to various reports, shelling and small fire has been occurring elsewhere in and around the capital. Both Tan Son Nhut airfield serving Saigon and nearby Bienha air base have been under mortar fire. There has been no report of damage or casualties. Press reports also state that Saigon radio is off the air, and that Viet Cong in ARVN uniforms were attacking around the presidential palace. These reports remain unconfirmed.
- 3. Da Nang: Allied mopping-up operations are reportedly continuing in the Da Nang urban area following the series of attacks there on allied installations and strategic points on 30 January. Sporadic exchanges of fire with groups of Viet Cong are said to be continuing in a hamlet within the city limits about a mile from the ARVN Corps headquarters. Civilian casualties are reported to be heavy due to the fighting and the strafingof sections of the city by government planes.

Approved for Release Date 15 SEP 1983

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Authority NLJ 82-230

ics , NARS, Date 10-6-83



- 5. Hoi An: In the 30 January attack on this city, the provincial capital of Quang Nam, it now appears that an estimated 200-300 enemy troops seized a number of allied installations including the provincial hospital and ARVN engineer battalion compound. The Communist forces apparently still control the area. A Republic of Korea (ROK) Marine Brigade was reported to have retaken the Hoi An airfield and, at last report, was advancing toward the city. Elements of the North Vietnamese 2nd Division appear to have been involved in the Hoi An action, along with other local Viet Cong forces.
- 6. Attacks in the Western Highlands: Confirmation has been received that troops of the US 4th Infantry Division have pushed the Communists out of Kontum city where they had apparently occupied several government installations early on 30 January. The enemy force, estimated at two battalion strength, has been driven to positions on the northern outskirts of the city, where allied artillery and tactical air bombardment can be brought to bear. The attacking force was apparently composed both of Viet Cong guerrillas and North Vietnamese soldiers—the latter probably from the NVA 24th Regiment.
- 7. The DMZ Area: There have been no official reports of significant action today in any sector of the Demilitarized Zone. Press reports that Khe Sanh air strip was closed due to enemy bombardment have not yet been confirmed or clarified through official channels.
- 8. Other Related Actions: The Communists have continued their broadcasts, begun on 30 January, which condemn the allies for violating the Tet truce. The broadcasts have announced that Communist forces have launched many simultaneous attacks in northern and central South Vietnam. One broadcast said the attacks were aimed at developing the "winterspring" campaign and "punishing" the US for violating



the Communist "order" for a cessation of military attacks. Hanoi has also issued a Foreign Ministry statement claiming that the US has "completely cancelled the 1968 Tet truce" and condemning the Americans for continuing the air attacks during Tet.

S. .

9. There has so far been no other significant foreign commentary; either from bloc or non-bloc sources, on the current military action in South Vietnam.

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Case # NLJ 82-230
Locument # 83

83/

20-07433/63

SANITIZED

CENTEAL INVELLIGINGS AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 30 January 1983

INTELLIGENCE MEHORANDUM

The Situation in South Victuan (AS of 13 NULL 131)

Some additional details have been received on the enemy attacks reported in the situation report early this morning. In addition, information is now available on two new attacks against Ninh Nos and Tay Hos cities in constal II Corps.

In addition, the pross has reported Who Sach sirstrip closed due to enemy artillery bencardment. There is no confirmation of this as yet from US military sources. Otherwise, the situation along the DNN appears quiet.

Da Hang Area


- 1. Enemy forces launched coordinated mortar, rocket and ground attacks in the Pa Nang area on 30 January. Torgots within the urban area included the sirkage, a strategic highway bridge, and the Vielmanese and US Army military headquarters. At about the same time as the attack on the city, the enemy hit several other installations in the area, including the "Darble Hountain" air facility, a US Harine regiment northwest of the city, and Vietnamese forces guarding the strategic Hoi Van Pass.
- 2. Amost simultaneous enemy morter barrages were directed into at least five aircraft landing zones throughout the area of Operation VHIDLER/JALLOJA--astrice the Quang Ram/Quang Tin borders--and in the area surrounding Chu Lai. Approximately 15 miles south of Da Mang, the Quang Ram provincial capital of Esi An was apparently bit by

Authority NLJ 82-230

By Los NARS, Date 10-6-83

Approved for Release Dat 5 SEP 1983

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3. Reports presently indicate that the situation is quiot in the Cha Lai and harmanal mallaced area. Allied forces in La Mass appear to have repulsed enemy incursions and are conducting a house to house morping up operation. The situation in Mei An, however, is less clear. Press reports indicate that allied forces in and around Eci An have not yet forced the enemy to abandon positions he coined.

Cui Ehon

4. An entimated Viet Cong capper company has penetrated the provincial capital of Bigh Bigh Frovince and is prospently controlling the radio station facilities and a nearby allied maintenance complex. Cue ROX battalien specifing the area has reportedly surrounded the attackers. Prolinizary casualty reports show Communist lesses of 50 killed and 03 lesses of three killed and five wounded.

Mha Trang

5. Eperadic fighting centiaues in the previncial capital of Whanh Hea with allied reaction forces presently attempting to cut off enemy units exhibitrating from the city. The Communists, estimated to range from two supper occapanies to a full battalien, have thus far sustained lesses of 60 killed and 15 captured. Allied casualties to date stand at 21 killed and 63 wounded.

Ploths City

6. Heavy fighting apparently continues in the Pleiku provincial capital, with ARVN reaction forces attempting to block enemy routes of escape from the area. Eattle results to date include 103 Communists killed, as against allied losses of 7 killed and 23 wounded. The enemy force is estimated to total at least two companies.

Kontun City

7. The Kontum provincial capital is now reported under secure allied control, with artillery and tactical mir strikes being exployed against an estimated two Communist



tattalions on the outstirts of the city. At least 165 enemy troops have been reported killed thus far, in contrast to allied leases of seven killed and five wounded.

Dan Lo Thuot

8. Fighting continues within the Parlae provincial capital, with an estimated two Communist hattalians apparently poised to strike on the sutskirts of the city. An enemy captive has stated that the SCrd NVA Regiment planned to infiltrate and take Fan I's Threet. Enemy losses thus far include Ol killed and S3 captured, as against allied casualties of seven killed and 10 counded.

Minh Mea

9. Eperadic fighting continues in this important district town in coastal Thanh Hea Province. Eleven Viet Cong have been killed to date.

Tuy Hoa

10. Heavy fighting has broken out in the provincial capital of Phu Yea. Allied relation forces, attempting to intercept enemy units leaving the city, have thus far killed 33 of the attackers, ville sustaining friendly lesses of seven killed and 31 wounded.

Tan Canh

11. Sporadic contact continues between elements of an ABYN regiment and an energy force of unknown size. No results are available.

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30 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Walt W. Rostow

SUBJECT

: The Situation in South Vietnam

As agreed between you and the Director of Central Intelligence last evening, CIA has prepared the following report on the unprecedented Communist attacks in South Vietnam which began yesterday. Information is current as of 0700 EST,

- 1. Communist forces staged a series of well-coordinated attacks on eight principal cities and several key military installations throughout South Vietnam's I and II Corps early on 30 January. This flurry of enemy activity was intended primarily for the psychological impact it would have on the South Vietnamese on Vietnam's most important holiday -- the lunar new year's day. The enemy may also have believed that the celebrations would impace the effectiveness of the allied reaction effort.
- The enemy's principal targets included provincial capitals, cities in the western highlands and major cities and military installations along the coastal area as far south as Cam Ranh Bay.

The Current Tactical Situation

Da Nang: Both the giant US aithases and key US and South Vietnamese military installations within Da Nang itself were attacked by enemy forces early on 30 January. The airfield complex was hit by 40 rounds of mixed rocket and mortar fire which resulted in at least seven aircraft destroyed and nine damaged. Fires were reported at the airfield's bomb storage area and in hangar and troop housing areas. At last report the east runway of the airfield was under small arms

SANITIZED Authority . N L 3 82-230 NARS, Date 10-6-83

Approved


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fire. Initial reports list one American killed and six wounded. No estimate of the effect on US air operations staged from the base has been received.

- 4. At Da Nang, the I Corps Headquarters and MACV compound were hit by 40-50 rounds of 82-mm. mortar fire, small arms and satchel charges. Three South Vietnamese soldiers were killed and another seven wounded according to initial reports. US Marine and South Vietnamese reaction forces moved to counter the enemy's assaults and, at last report, the enemy raiders were withdrawing.
- 5. Nha Trang: In Nha Trang, the capital of Khanh Hoa Province. Communist forces attacked in the early morning hours and occupied the provincial headquarters, the military sector headquarters, the radio station, and the railroad station. The enemy also attacked the provincial jail, reportedly freeing several hundred prisoners.
- 6. Pleiku City: A 500 to 700-man Viet Cong force followed up a heavy rocket barrage on the Pleiku airfield with an assault which penetrated the city. A knearby montagnard training center was also a target of a Communist rocket barrage. At last report the fighting was continuing within the city itself.
- 7. Kontum City: An estimated 500 to 1,000 enemy troops penetrated Kontum city in the early morning hours of 30 January. A US 4th Infantry Division reaction force fought its way into the city and by mid-morning the situation was reported as "no longer critical."
- 8. Tan Canh: This South Vietnamese village located some 20 miles north of Kontum near the Dak To Special Forces Camp, was overrun and burned early this morning. The assault on the village was mounted by a Communist company-size force and was preceded by a heavy barrage of 82-mm. mortar fire.
- 9. Other Attacks: Fighting was reported in Binh Dinh's provincial capital of Qui Nhon with an enemy company conducting raids on the police headquarters, radio station, and other key installations in the city. The airfield at Ban Me

Thuot in Dar Lac Province, Phu Yen Province's capital of Tuy Hoa, Hoi An in Quang Nam Province, and the large US military complex at Cam Ranh Bay were also targets of enemy raids. Details of these attacks are still extremely sketchy.



12. Although it is too early to determine the over-all scope of the Communist offensive, it appears that the enemy has aimed his campaign at undermining the population's confidence in the present government. The initiation of the offensive at a time when the country was celebrating the Tet holiday was probably calculated to achieve a significant psychological impact despite the fact that it displayed a blatant disregard for the cease-fire periods ennounced by both the Viet Cong and the South Vietnamese.

Other Related Actions

13. A radio broadcast from Hanoi indicates that the Communists hope to shift the responsibility for their blatant truce violations to the allies. The 30 January broadcast, in English to international audiences, charged that the US and South Vietnam had canceled the cease-fire and had launched "raids" against the people in many northern provinces. The broadcast also condemned the continued bombing of southern North Vietnam during the allied truce, and claimed the allies had "trampled upon the legitimate aspirations and traditional customs of the Vietnamese people." It appears that the Communists are laying a propaganda base for future claims that their own offensive activity was in retaliation for US misdeeds.



- 16. There are as yet no indications of any North Korean initiatives or activities which can be related to the enemy offensive in South Vietnam.
- 17. Pyongyang's military posture remains essentially defensive. As it has since the seizure of the Pueblo, the North Korean Air Force is continuing to fly defensive patrols, particularly in the vicinity of Wonsan harbor. No major incidents have been reported along the DMZ during the past 24 hours.
- 18. Other than the Hanci broadcast noted above, bloc media have not as yet commented on the attacks. Neither have ther been any signs of Communist military or diplomatic activity relating to the offensive.

Late Item

19. General Westmoreland gave his personal assessment of the situation in a Telecon with Washington at about 0700 EST this morning. He described the situation as "well in hand," adding that more enemy were killed in the raids than at any other time in his memory. It appears that enemy losses will be over 700 dead. Allied casualties were light. Captured enemy soldiers said their mission was to terrorize the civilian population, and attack civilian installations such as radio stations. According to Westmoreland, the situation in the DMZ is quiet. The weather there is good and facilitates extensive allied air attacks.

20. Da Nang: Late information indicates there were numerous incidents in the area between 1400 and 1600 local Vietnam time today. The Marble Mountain installation received a mortar attack. At 1430, Da Nang airbase was hit by mortars. US casualties were one killed and 10 wounded. The ARVN headquarters in Da Nang was also attacked by an enemy company-size force and with mortars. The attack was repulsed with heavy enemy casualties.

BY DIRECTION OF THE DCI:



CIA Operations Center

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HC .E

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Wednesday, January 31, 1968 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have marked the key passages in this interesting report from the CIA Station in Saigon. It indicates clearly (pages 3-4) the task ahead for Thieu and Bunker in regaining confidence after the shock of these attacks.

War Rostow

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-129

By is, NARA Date 8-20-98



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SANITIZED

31 January 1968

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NI 81-124 + 82-230

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow By NARA, Date 2-14-89

Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT

: 31 January Telephone Conversation with Saigon Station

- 1. At 31/0433Z I was in telephonic communication with our Saigon Station. The circuit was bad: I could hear Saigon but they could not understand The Station reported that the situation was generally stabilizing and the press greatly exaggerating the seriousness of the penetration of the Embassy. The Chancery was not actually penetrated, though Viet Cong did get into the compound. There were no U.S. civilian casualties in Saigon known as of that time.__
- 2. After the phone conversation I transmitted the following specific questions explaining that these were the points I had hoped to raise over the phone.
 - a. What does the countrywide situation look like?
 - b. What do regional officers report?
 - c. Was attempt made against Thieu, Ky or other senior GVN officials?
 - d. Did Saigon attack seem primarily aimed at American targets?
 - e. Was there any local intelligence or other warning of these attacks (in Saigon or elsewhere)?
 - f. What do you expect in Saigon and countrywide within next 24-48 hours?
 - g. Any indication of effect attacks had on mood or attitudes of Vietnamese population?

- h. Your general preliminary comments on meaning and import current countrywide spate of VC activity.
 - i. How is VC surge likely to affect GVN standing and stability?
- 3. At 31/0710Z, replied. The text of his reply is given below. I am passing it to the recipients of this memorandum in the belief that you may find it useful. You will understand, of course, that these are initial reactions in a very fluid situation, the full dimensions and details of which were not known to him at that time.

FOR

- 1. Appreciate your need for rapid coverage of events and assure you we are doing everything possible to comply. It has been extremely difficult during the morning hours to obtain any hard information on the events of the night since police are fully occupied in mopping up operations in various sectors of the city. For example, the VC continued to be holed up in a house across from the Palace and apparently in houses in the area of Tan Son Nhut. Contrary to earlier reports, Embassy employees have been instructed not to report to work this afternaon.
 - You will shortly receive dissem concerning enemy plans for this evening.
- telecon just received. As you can see from above, announcement premature that situation was calm enough to permit return of personnel to work. At this moment, it is impossible to estimate how long-it will take to mop up VC who are holed up around town. If intelligence referred to above is accurate, we may have a busy night again this evening.
- 4. Will be filing report shortly on countrywide situation
 Regional officers are preparing sitreps for direct transmission.

 President Thieu was in My Tho resterday and requested MACV assistance in returning to Saigon this morning. Although American facilities received their share of attention, other targets were Korean and Philippine Embassics. Palace and Saigon redictations. During the last few days, Station has diligently pursued all available sources for intelligence that might have given us warning of these attacks.

not prepared for this attack on the opening day of Tet, when large numbers of

At this point, we anticipate that countrywide attacks will continue tonight. However, we lacking intelligence from the
regions which would give us an accurate read-out. Your telecon questions, para
2g, h, and i will be dealt with separately.

5. COS and EXO will spend night in Station, with a backup commo command post in another area of the city.

Every possible precaution being taken to assure security of personnel and classified facilities.

6. Re your telecon questions g, h and i:

- a. You will appreciate the difficulty we have in even beginning an answer to these questions which will be of great importance when the security situation settles down.
- b. We are not today in contact with many elements in the Vietnamese population to discern their attitudes and moods. A circling airplane with loudspeakers told the people to stay off the streets and in their homes. VC have reportedly made specific threats to persons living in certain areas to vacate homes at risk of death. Most Saigonese have indeed stayed at home and we assume that they will follow VC orders as well. The mood is very tense.
 - c. The meaning and import of current activity can be extracted from VC stated intentions regarding the winter-spring campaign, their calls for general uprising, and their obvious drive toward a major victory for propaganda and morale purposes. While we may be undergoing a major multiple harassment without; lasting military significance, the ultimate import will depend on their degree of success on the ground and the impact on American and South Vietnamese willingness to rebound. The boost to VC/NVA phorale is in any case certain to be substantial.
 - d. Regardless of what happens tonight or during the next few days, the degree of success already achieved in Saigon and around the country will adversely affect the image of the GVN (and its: powerful American allies as well) in the eyes of the people. All Vietnamese, both those who are sympathetic and those who are

and the relative lack of VC activity in Saigon during recent months created a presumption of GVN and police strength in this area at any rate. Those who believe that sacurity situation (not the political) is paramount will deduce that only a tough. efficient, no-nonsense government run by the military can meet the sheet physical thrust of the Viet Cong.; Those who cannot stomach such a government will be moved further toward the temptation of negotiations and coalition government.

e. We would hope to be permitted to delay additional analysis and prediction until we have provided for the necessary security of our installations and personnel and can begin to move about the city to communicate with sources able to provide authoritative reactions and ideas. In meantime, hope above will be helpful.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

cc: Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler

INFOR MATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

Wednesday, January 31, 1968 5:28 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is a bad report about Hue. We will check it with Westy when he gets on the phone.

WW. Rostow

SEGRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSO 11-15-78 letter

By_____, NARS, Date 3-20-79

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OCI 1173/68

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CENTRAL INTULLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 31 January 1968

Intelligence memorandum

Spot Report on the Situation in Hue N (Information as of S:30 PM EST)

- 1. The friendly position in this city has apparently deteriorated seriously during 31 January.
- 2. According to a local US official who made a flight over the area late on the afternoon of 31 January, and received information relayed from US military officials in Hue, the city appears to be largely under the control of the Communicia.
- 3. During his flight, the official reported that a major market place on the north side of the Song Huong river in flames, with other smaller fires burning on the south side of the river. A fire fight was in progress along the river road on the south side. Ground fire was also coming up from the vicinity of the air strip inside the citadel area.
- 4. The official was able to raise several local elements by radio and was told that a provincial reconnaissance headquarters outside the city had been overrun, and that many VC were present throughout the area. The official was unable to make contact with the MACV headquarters, or the CORDS headquarters. He observed an ARVN battalion approaching Hue from the northwest, firing artillery to clear the way.
- 5. A message from the G-2 advisor's office in the MACV compound at Hue, received at I Corps Headquarters at Da Nang, stated that the MACV compound and the let Division Headquarters in the citadel at

Authority NLJ 81-124

SECRET By 158, NARS, Date 9-16-86

NO FOREIGN DISSES

Hue were the only "known" places still holding out against the VO. Reportedly, a marine company had tried to cross the highway bridge from the south into the northern sector of the city, but had been driven back with heavy casualties.

6. There is no other information currently available here to confirm the above report.

SC No. 01911/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 31 January 1968 LBJ LIBRARY
Mindatory Review
Case # NLJ 82-230
Document # 87

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 4 (As of 7:00 AM EST)

- 1. Communist forces continued their unprecedented wave of bold attacks against South Vietnamese cities and key allied civil and military installions for the second consecutive day on 31 January. The enemy activity was focused primarily on the Saigon area and the delta provinces to the south of the capital. Allied mopping-up operations continued throughout South Vietnam's I and II Corps areas, amid sporadic new forays by the Communists in some sectors of this region, the center of the 30 January attacks. President Thieu has declared a state of martial law throughout the country.
- 2. Although the action has thus far been characterized by a brazen enemy disregard for his own casualties, allied personnel losses have been relatively light. Enemy casualties are currently tenuously estimated at around 1,400.
- 3. It is clear that the Communists made careful preparations for this spectacular phase of their "winter-spring" campaign. The countrywide pattern of mortar attacks, in many cases followed by ground assaults against the provincial capitals and major district towns, in addition to large-scale attacks on key allied military installations and positions, required a great deal of planning and coordination. It is also evident that North Vie(namese main force units were heavily engaged in many of the assaults, and worked closely with local Viet Cong units. A number of recently captured documents have indicated

Approved for Release Date 15 SEP 1983. 1

SANITIZED > Authority NLJ 83-230

NARS, Date 10-6-83



that the Communists were planning an effort to spark at least a degree of "general uprising" among the populace in the urban areas. It is probable that they hoped the present wave of attacks would spur some general civil unrest and support by the urban people. There is little evidence as yet that it did, however.

The Saigon Area

- 4. Allied military forces in the capital have restored a semblance of order to the city following a night of enemy attacks against targets including the US Embassy, the Presidential Palace, and the large mirfield and military complex at Tan Son Nhut as well as numerous other allied installations both in and near the city.
- 5. US troops drove a band of attackers from the US Embassy compound by 9:00 AM (Saigon time) on 31 January. The building itself was rocked by several large explosions, but no structural damage was reported. The embassy is now fully operational. Most of the fighting occurred in the compound surrounding the embassy. Although the attackers were able to fire into it, they apparently did not physically penetrate the building. At least six allied personnel were killed in the assault and five wounded. Enemy casualties were at least 19 killed.
- 6. A group of 20 Viet Cong, dressed in civilian clothes, attempted to attack the residence of President Thiou, but were driven away by an alert guard force with no injury to the president or his family.
- 7. The government radio station in Saigon continues off the air due to enemy action; however, the military radio has been broadcasting to the Saigon population.
- 8. At last report, fighting was continuing at the Tan Son Nhut airfield with some 100 Viet Cong still holding out within the field's perimeter. The Communists reportedly overran the western section of the base, which included a control tower in the area. Several other areas of the base, including airmon's





barracks and one runway, were apparently also under attack by mortar, rocket, or small arms fire.

9. Just to the northeast of the capital city, the US bases at Bien Hoa and Long Binh were hit by Viet Cong mortar and ground attacks. At Bien Hoa, two US jet aircraft were destroyed and 10 aircraft damaged.

The Delta Provinces

10. Eight of the 16 province capitals of South Victnam's IV Corps came under Vict Cong mortar attack on 30-31 January. Numerous other district towns and Villages were also attacked. One of the enemy's prime targets was the IV Corps Headquarters at Can Tho which was hit by a mortar and ground attack. Some 75 enomy casualties have been counted. At last report, however, Victnamese soldiers and police were still attempting to drive the attackers out of Can Tho city.

I Corps

- 11. New attacks occurred this morning on the northern cities of Quang Tri, Hue, Tam Ky, Quang Ngai and the US base at Chu Lai. Each city was struck by a mortar attack and a ground assault. At the Chu Lai installation, three US jet aircraft were destroyed and five others damaged by an extensive mortar and rocket barrage.
- 12. Renewed mortar and rocket attacks were reported at Da Nang on 31 January. Seventeen US helicopters were damaged at the Marble Mountain air facility.
- 13. At last report, South Korean Marines were still heavily engaged with dug-in enemy troops in the city of Hoi An, south of Da Nang. Initial reports show 52 Communists killed thus far in the sharp fighting there.

II Corps

14. Two battalions of enemy troops continue to control Kontum city. Reports yesterday that the city had been cleared were apparently incorrect. The MACV compound is said to be still under attack but holding




out against the enemy. About 150 Communists have been reportedly involved in the fighting. Allied reinforcements from the US 4th Infantry Division are presently en route to Kontum.

- 15. The situation in the coastal city of Phan Thiet remains unclear. Large numbers of enemy troops are apparently in control of strategic positions within the city. The two battalions of the North Victnamese 18B Regiment which hit Nha Trang have now been driven from the city leaving some 70 dead behind. The enemy force destroyed the sector headquarters and had captured the province headquarters and radio station.
- 16. Sporadic fighting also continues in Qui Nhon with the radio station and railroad depot still in enemy hands. Light fighting was also reported outside Tuy Hoa, but the situation there appears to be under control.
- North Victnamese underwater demolition teams were reported to be operating in the Cam Ranh Bay area. At least one of these men has been captured. The prisoner claimed he participated in the attack on a Norwegian tanker early on 31 January, during which the vessel was damaged by an explosion.

DMZ Area

18. The area immediately south of the Demilitarized Zone remains relatively quiet with US Marine patrols reporting light, sporadic contact with small enemy units. Evidence of the intense enemy buildup throughout the area continues, however.



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20. A successful US strike against the North Vietnamese command group in Laos could significantly affect the development of enemy operations in the Khe Sanh area.

21. A US Marine patrol observed four to five surface-to-air (SAM) missile launching sites in the Demilitarized Zone approximately six miles northwest of Con Thien on 29 January. The positions were apparently close to a state of operational readiness as air strikes directed at them resulted in nine secondary explosions.

Other Related Developments

- 22. Communist radio in both South and North Victnam is continuing to play up the current enemy offensive. According to the enemy broadcasts, extensive damage was inflicted on the allies in the Saigon area. During upcoming days, the Communists can be expected to tout their raids as a great victory both among their own forces and to the people at large in South Vietnam, in the hope of bolstering rank and file morale and intimidating the uncommitted populace.
- 23. Communist commentators abroad are utilizing the enemy assaults as a basis for claims that they "give the lie" to US assertions that the allies are on the way to victory in Vietnam. According to a Moscow commentator in a 31 January account, the strength of the enemy attacks demonstrates the futility of the continued allied effort to "settle the Vietnam problem through war." The implication of his remarks is that the US should moderate its policy in a manner sufficient to bring about a political solution to the conflict.



M ndatory Review Case # NLJ 82-280

Document # 88 20

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CENTRAL INGELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 31 January 1968 (4/) 82

SANITIZED

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Authority NLJ 83-230

By NARS, Date 10-6-83

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 5
(As of 12 NOON EST)


The focus of Communist military action appears to have shifted back to the northern part of the country on the night of 31 January. Major thrusts were mounted against cities along the central coast. It appears possible that the enemy is attempting to whip saw the allied reaction, perhaps in the hope of impeding the friendly reaction.

More fighting, however, is also reported in the Saigon area, while some of the Delta towns are apparently also still under enemy pressure. Reports indicated that fresh enemy attacks were expected in some areas of the Delta on the night of 31 January.

- 1. Saigon: Information on the situation in the city has been reported through about 10 PM local Saigon time 31 January. In general, the scene of the action has shifted to the southwest part of the town, with Communist elements dug in and apparently beseiged at various points, including the bank of the Kinh Doi river and possibly the An Quang pagoda. Other fighting is also reported in the Gia Dinh sector near Ton Son Nhut airfield. Friendly air action has apparently been conducted in this area and has resulted in at least one fire in a residential section.
- 2. It is not clear whether the fighting now reported in Saigon represents the rear guard action of
 retreating Communist elements, or the attempted
 entry of new Communist components into the area.

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Approved for Release Date 15 SFP 1983



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- 3. The only ground fighting possibly still underway in the central city area was reported during the afternoon of the 31st (local Saigon time) in the area of the presidential palace where police were said to have trapped and beseiged some VC remnants in a residential home.
- 4. MACV also reports that about 10 PM local Saigon time, small arms fire was occurring in the vicinity of Ambassador Bunker's quarters and that two claymore mines had apparently been set off in the general vicinity.
- 5. It appears that American casualties in the attack on the US Embassy may have been higher than earlier reported. At least 4 US military police were killed and possibly over 20 wounded. One Marine was also killed and 7 wounded.
- 6. In the attack on the main Saigon radio station, the enemy apparently penetrated the building. Reportedly, the enemy intended to broadcast a message of general revolt to the local populace. The enemy reportedly seized several other radio stations in the attacks on central coastal cities on 30 January. He probably also intended to use these facilities to broadcast calls for support from the populace at large. There is no detailed information as yet on this aspect, however.
- 7. The Delta: No major new attacks have been reported in the Delta area in information received through about 10 PM local time on 31 January. The situation in various provincial capitals, however, is not yet wholly clear. It appears that the enemy offensive in this area also involved numerous attacks on smaller district towns and allied facilities, some of which were reportedly overrun. Following is the current situation in the Delta towns and provinces for which some detailed information is available:





- 7. Soc Trang (Ba Xuyen Province): On the late afternoon of the 31st, light fighting was reportedly still going on in this town, with more expected tonight. The airfield at Soc Trang was attacked, apparently on the 31st.
- 8. Bac Lieu (Bac Liu Province: The town was quiet on the afternoon of the 31st after a mortar and small arms attack. Possibly there was no ground probe in this area.
- 9. Ca Mau (An Xuyen): Some firing was still going on in Ca Mau on the afternoon of 31 January, but was reported sporadic. More fightingwas expected at night.
- was under friendly control on the afternoon of 31
 January, but heavy fighting was reported throughout parts of the province. The VC possibly still held a few strongpoints in the town, including one pagoda.
- 11. Rach Gia (Kien Giang Province): The situation had settled down here on the afternoon of the 31st after a day of sporadic mortar and small arms fire.
- 12. My Tho (Dinh Tuong Province): On the afternoon of the 31st the situation was improving, although some firing was still reported. Heavy maneuver activity was also reported throughout the province. The district town of Cai Be was mortared.
- 13. Ben Tre (Truc Giang): In this capital of Kien Hoa Province the VC penetrated the city and engaged the ARVN in street fighting. The enemy had : been driven to the outskirts of the town. The District towns of Ba Tri and Binh Dai in Kien Hoa were also mortared.
- 14. Tra Vinh (Vinh Binh Province): On the evening of the 31st, some local US authorities considered the situation "serious" and had requested troops from the ARVN 9th Division.



- companies were involved in the attack on the Vinh. Long air base: Five aircraft were damaged. The district town of Vinh Liem in this province was reportedly overrun.
 - 16. Chau Phu (Chan Doc Province): According to an unconfirmed report, this provincial town had been overrun on the 31st. The deputy province chief was reported missing. Reinforcements were enroute, and all US civilians were being evacuated.

 Ist Corps Area
 - 17. Quang Tri City: Communist forces have reportedly occupied positions to the north, east, and west of the Quang Tri provincial capital, and a major assault was expected on the night of 31 January. An enemy battalion which entered the city during the night of 30 January has been driven to the suburbs by ARVN reaction forces. Three ARVN battalions are presently on the north side of the city with another allied battalion in position to the east. The security situation is still considered in good shape, under the prevailing circumstances.
 - 18. Hue: According to MACV, allied forces are in full control of the Thua Thien provincial capital and the situation there is relatively quiet.

There had been earlier fragmentary reports from the field that at least two Viet Cong sappor companies had penetrated the Hue citadel, were patrolling streets inside the citadel, and had hoisted a Viet Cong flag atop the main citadel building.

artillery continued through the night of 30-31 January south of Da Nang city where the US Marine airbase near Marble Mountain absorbed its second consecutive rocket attack. Da Nang airbase is fully operative after brief closure for civilian traffic on the morning of 30 January. There have been no Vict Cong-initiated incidents or acts of torrorism within Da Nang city itself. Demonstrations and a rally were instigated by the enemy on 30 January at Tin Hoa Pagoda in an attempt to persuade participants that the





Viet Cong had won a significant victory and taken over the city. This enemy propaganda play generated little popular support, and GVN authorities made a number of arrests.

US authorities in Da Nang feel the Viet Cong attack against Da Nang city failed in its initial thrust, and has reduced enemy capabilities in the area to mortar/rocket harassment of military targets combined with isolated and uncoordinated sapper-type actions.

- apparently dislodged an estimated force of 300 Viet Cong heavily dug-in and interspersed with the civilian population at the east end of Hoi An, the Quang Nam provincial capital. The city has been declared under allied control.
- 21. Quang Tin: The provincial capital of Tam Ky came under heavy mortar, small arms, and ground attack early on 31 January by elements of the 21st NVA Regiment reinforced by two additional NVA battalions. The attack was repulsed, however, with enemy losses reported in excess of 400 killed (body count), the majority of whom were young boys. Although the situation is now relatively quiet, Communist forces remain on the outskirts of Tam Ky, with further enemy offensive activity anticipated on the night of 31 January.
- 22. Quang Ngai City: The Quang Ngai provincial capital, along with three nearby district headquarters, came under heavy enemy attack during the early morning hours of 31 January. According to late reports, the assault was repulsed, with very heavy Viet Cong and relatively light allied casualties resulting. Elements of the 2nd ARVN Division have been committed to bolster the area defenses. Small pockets of enemy troops are apparently still active in the city, but they are believed to pose no serious threat at this time.

The Central Highlands

23. Kontum City: The situation remains unclear; however, at last report two enemy battalions continued to control the Kontum provincial capital. Tactical air strikes have been launched against a concentration of some 600-700

enemy to the northeast of the city. Communist losses are now reported to number nearly 300 killed.

- 24. Pleiku City: The Pleiku provincial capital is reported quiet and apparently under allied control. Elements of the 22nd ARVN Ranger Battalion are reported in sporadic contact with an unknown size Communist force outside the city.
- 25. Ban Me Thuot: While the 31 January attacks against the MACV compound and airfield at the Darlac provincial capital were both successfully repulsed, the overall security situation remains unclear.

Central Coastal Provinces

- 26. Qui Nhon: South Korean forces have secured the radio station and South Viotnamese special forces have secured the railroad station. However, sporadic mortar and small arms fire continues to be reported throughout the Binh Dinh provincial capital.
- 27. Phu Cat: On 31 January, Phu Cat subsector headquarters received heavy mortar bombardment followed by ground attack, with VC sappers penetrating the compound. Contact continues.
- 28. Nha Trang: The Khanh Hoa provincial capital is reported quiet and under allied control. Allied reaction forces are continuing to press pursuit operations against a two-battalion force from the NVA Regiment which yesterday captured the provincial headquarters and radio station and destroyed the sector headquarters. Scattered enemy sniping continues on the outskirts of the city.
- 29. Tuy Hoa: The Phu Yen provincial capital is reported under allied control, although sporadic fighting continues in outlying areas. A captive from the NVA 5th Division has stated that his parent unit—the 5th Battalion/NVA 95"B" Regiment—was committed in its entirity to the attack against Tuy Hoa, and that the battalion commander was killed. Enemy losses at Tuy Hoa thus far include 76 killed.
- 30. Phan Thiet: An estimated two enemy battaltions under cover of heavy mortar fire, penetrated the outer defenses of the provincial capital of Binh Thuan. The



city is under heavy mortar fire. Heaviest action continues to focus on the MACV compound. US personnel report that VC within the city have been seen changing into civilian clothes. US airborne and ARVN reaction forces are attempting to bloc enemy routes of withdrawal from the city.






Other Related Developments

- 31. Communist propaganda is continuing to give heavy play to the upsurge in military activity in the South and stressing that it shows the US cannot accomplish its objectives. The unstated, but clear implication, is that the US must resort to a political compromise.
- 32. Hanoi has made no attempt, however, to portray the current offensive as a conclusive or final stage in the struggle, but is treating it as further proof that Communists forces hold the initiative and still are able to launch large-scale, coordinated attacks. A broadcast on 31 January said the upsurge in Communist military activity is a continuation of success achieved during the past month.
- 33. There has been no Chinese Communist commentary on the situation as yet. Soviet broadcasts, however, are carrying both Western and Vietnamese Communists accounts of the action and stressing the US predicament. A commentary in Pravda on 31 January says the Communist have launched a "new major offensi" which disproves "US propaganda" that Viet Cong for as are "depleted."
- 34. First accounts from the French press take the line that by launching a "general offensive" the Communists have again successfully demonstrated their military capabilities and shown that the US has reached an "impasse."





BJ LIBRARY M ndatory Review 'Case # NLJ 82-230 Documerit # 89

EC No. 01915/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 1 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 7 (As of 11:20 A.M. EST)

There have been no major changes in the military situation since 7 A.M. this morning, although a few new attacks have been reported.

I Corps

- 1. Enemy forces hit the US Marine installations at Phu Bai with about 8 rounds of 140-mm. rocket fire on the morning of 1 February. They also seized control of Phu Loc, a district capital near the Quang Nem - Thua Thien provincial border along Route 1.
- 2. The situation in Hue is still unclear, although one report states that the allies have retaken most of the city. It appears, however, that enemy forces may still control much of the citadel area -a traditional military strongpoint.

. II Corps

3. Enemy forces estimated at company size attacked Dalat in Tuyon Duc Province early on 1 February. They hit an MP billet, seized the market place and a number of civilian hostages and are said to be largely in control of at least the center of the. town. The enemy action against Dalat could have an important psychological effect on the South Vietnamese, since the town to some extent has been an alternate residential area for South Vietnamese leaders, and has not been the scene of military action for some years.

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- 4. In Kontum, at least one North Vietnamese battalion is still entrenched in strongpoints in the city. Friendly forces still control all the military compounds, however.
- 5. In Ean Me Thuot, elements of the 33rd NVA Regiment, apparently in conjunction with Viet Cong local forces, are continuing to occupy significant portions of the Darlac provincial capital.

III Corps

- 6. A ground attack was launched on the Cu Chi District headquarters on 1 February, but failed to penetrate the main defenses. Later, a 350 round rocket and mortar attack was initiated against the nearby headquarters of the US 25th Division. Personnel casualties in the latter assault were light; there is no report of material damage.
- 7. In Saigon, sniper fire continues throughout the city, but no major new enemy initiatives have been reported.

IV Corps

- 8. Another enemy attack was apparently launched in Ben Tre, capital of Kien Hoa on 1 February. Considerable destruction was apparently inflicted on the buildings and homes in the city, and heavy casualties were apparently sustained by the civilian populace.
- 9. Some additional ground probes against delta towns on 1 February have been reported, but details are lacking.
- 10. The friendly situation in My Tho, which was under heavy mortar and ground attack at noon on the 1st, has reportedly "improved."
- 11. No additional, confirmed information is available on the situation in Chau'Phu which was reportedly in Viet Cong hands on the 31st.



Other Related Developments

- 12. The Vietnamese Communists are now portraying their current offensive as an all-out effort to destroy the Thieu government and replace it with a Communist-controlled administration. They are trying to give the impression that their efforts are winning widespread popular support and that a new administrative apparatus is being set up to manage the seizure of power.
- 13. A statement issued by the Viet Cong headquarters on 31 January says the time has arrived for a "general offensive" aimed at toppling the Saigon regime. The statement asserts that a government will be set up "which will be entirely ours," and calls on the people to join in the effort of trying "to win victory at any cost."
- 14. There are no signs so far that the Communists have, in fact, been successful in rallying significant popular support for their current effort. Both Hanoi and Viet Cong propaganda, however, are trying to convey the impression that the time is now ripe for bringing about a solution to the conflict in accord with the program of the National Liberation Front. The propaganda plays down the role of the Liberation Front itself, and asserts that other groups are demanding a new administration based on Front objectives. The Communists say an organization called the "Alliance of National and Peace Forces" has become a rallying point for coordinating political action. Communist broadcasts claim there has been an enthusiastic popular response to a call from the "alliance" demanding that the US withdraw and end the war, and that negotiations be conducted with the National Liberation Front for restoring peace and bringing about "independence and sovereignty" for the South.





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SANITIZED

BC No. 01917/68

· CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 2 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 8 (As of 7:00 A.M. EST)

- The Communist Tet offensive continued into its fourth day with Communist forces resisting allied mopping-up operations within, or on the outskirts of key cities throughout South Vietnam. fighting in Saigon is subsiding; however, the Communists still maintain strong positions in the provincial capitals of Hue, Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, Da Lat, and several cities in the delta provinces.
- Enemy losses continue to soar with US military authorities in Saigon claiming well over 10,000 Communists killed in the first three days of fighting. An additional 3,000 suspect Communists have reportedly been detained. By contrast only some 1,700 individual and crew-served enemy weapons have been recovered in the fighting. Friendly losses now total 559 killed (232 US) and some 2,300 wounded (1,000 US).

Saigon

Saigon was relatively quiet during the night of 1-2 February. In early morning action, however, the Viet Cong overran two South Vietnamese police precinct stations. Sporadic firing was reported at several other points in the city and fighting continued early this morning near Tan Son Whut airbase just northwest of the capital. Only limited aircraft traffic was permitted at the airfield due to reports of an imminent rocket attack.

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NARS, Date 10-6-83

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- 4. Available evidence indicates that the enemy troops involved in the Saigon area were mostly in the 16 to 18 age bracket and were woll armed with modern automatic rifles and rocket launchers. Soveral prisoners stated that they had infiltrated into the city in civilian clothes where they were armed from weapons caches which had been set up well in advance. The enemy in Saigon did not appear to be well trained, although their morale was high in the early stages of the fighting.
- 5. Several enemy units in the city have been tentatively identified as Viet Cong units from the Mekong Delta and from as far west as Tay Ninh Province. Reports of North Vietnamese units in the Saigon fighting have not been confirmed, but northerners assigned to nearby Viet Cong units as cadre and fillers possibly participated.



1,3 (2)(3)(4)

I Corps

- 7. The city of Hue is still the focal point of stubborn enemy resistance in South Vietnam's northern I Corps area. The rest of the major cities in the northern provinces are under the control of allied forces, although scattered attacks were conducted against some of them on 1-2 February.
 - 8. Hue: The two-square-mile, walled citadel area is still partially occupied by enemy forces this morning. Two South Vietnamese armored battalions are committed to the clearing operations around the citadel, and a US 1st Air Cavalry battalion may be added to the effort. Three other South Vietnamese battalions have encountered stiff enemy resistance in clearing operations in some areas on the outskirts of the city. All US and South Vietnamese installations within Nue remain under allied control.



- 9. Cam Lo: The Combined Action Platoon Headquarters at Cam Lo was attacked with mortar and small arms fire early today. The enemy was forced to withdraw after a heavy six-hour battle.
- 10. Phu Loc: The Phu Loc area, located some 25 miles south of Hue, was subjected to a day-long attack, which ended late last night. The Phu Loc District Headquarters and village were reported secure; however, a sizeable enemy threat is believed still in the general area. According to an unconfirmed report, the US Marine base at Phu Loc was overrun at one point in the fighting.
- 11. Tam Ky and Quang Ngai: Both of these provincial capitals were attacked by Communist mortarmen during the night of 1-2 February. The bombardment of Tam Ky reportedly included artillery fire. No reports of casualties or damage have been received.
 - 12. Duy Xuyen: This district capital located several miles southwest of Noi An in coastal Quang Nam Province was reported still under the control of an unknown-sized enemy force. 'A South Korean brigade has moved into the area in preparation for a counterattack later today.

II Corps

- 13. Kontum: The most serious threat in the II Corps area continues to exist in the city of Kontum in the western highlands. The enemy continues attacks in and around the city, and has established strongpoints in several buildings, including pagodas and churches. An entire North Vietnamese battalion is still believed in control of approximately half of the city. The airfield has been cleared out is now open to emergency traffic.
- of the North Vietnamese 33rd Regiment were still occupying most of the city. Two South Vietnamese 23rd Infantry Division battalions, together with US units, are attempting to regain control of the city. The airfield is still open, but has been hit by mortar and small arms fire.



- 15. Da Lat: At last report, Communist forces still held the market place in the center of town as well as scattered strongpoints within the city. South Vietnamese forces are leading the effort to drive the attackers out of the city.
- 16. Tan An: A total of 208 enemy troops were reported killed during a fierce two-hour battle yesterday, when they attempted to overrun this village which is located some 15 miles southwest of Pleiku. The village was defended by South Vietnamese irregulars who sustained light losses.
- 17. Phan Thiet: Heavy fighting was still reported from this coastal provincial capital through the mid-morning of 2 February. The MACV and Sector Headquarters compounds have not yet come under attack. US and South Vietnamese troops have established a blocking position and are presently attempting to sweep through the city in an effort to drive the attackers out.

III Corps

18. To the north of Saigon in III Corps-the area where the current Communist campaign has so far been the lightest--several new attacks were reported during the night of 1-2 February. Xuan Loc, the capital of Long Khanh Province, was under heavy attack throughout the night. One Viet Cong platoon penetrated into the town, but by morning allied reaction troops had cleared them out. First reports indicated that US and South Vietnamese casualties were light in the action. Other enemy assaults and mortar attacks occurred in Phuoc Tuy, Hau Nghia, and Tay Ninh but few details were available.

IV Corps

- 19. In the Mekong Delta, sharp fighting continues within several provincial capitals and a number of smaller towns.
- 20. Some 700-800 Viot Cong are still believed to be inside Ben Tre, the capital of Kien Hoa Province, where two companies of the US 9th Infantry Division companies have arrived to reinforce ARVN COPY



forces. Heavy fighting occurred during the night in the provincial capital of Vinh Long. A US Navy patrol boat base in the city was overrun but later retaken by South Vietnamese forces.

21. Allied troops were also engaged with Viet Cong forces in Can Tho, My Tho and Moc Hoa, the capital of Kion Tuong Province. The latter city was under heavy mortar and rocket attack early this morning. The Viot Cong were reported using loud-speakers to appeal to ARVN troops to lay down their arms.

Prospects for the Immediate Future

- acteristic of many areas in South Vietnam, where enemy forces have been pushed out of the urban area, but continue to maintain positions on strategic ground nearby. It seems possible that, in some areas, the Communist units will attempt to renew their attacks on urban areas, or will attempt to remain nearby in an effort to keep the situation tense and the populace intimidated.
- Although the enemy units so far involved in the current action have reportedly taken heavy losses in some of the fighting, it appears certain that the enemy high command was fully prepared to sacrifico these units in their entirety, if necessary, in order to carry out the offensive. This would strongly suggest that the enemy has not thrown his full weight into the current effort, but that it is rather a caroful, selective application of his power. In the bitterly contested fighting in Hue, for example, only elements of the North Vietnamese 6th Rogiment have been identified, along with a few, possible local force elements. This would indicate, in view of the standard OB for the area, that at least one other full NVA regiment is in this sector, and at least three other regiments within 20 miles.
- 24. Although the Communists are probably incapable, in the immediate future, at least, of again mounting a coordinated attack against so many targets as in the past four days, they do appear to have



the necessary punch in reserve to keep up heavy pressure on selected semi-urban and urban areas for a considerable period. Prospects for such enemy pressure appear good.

25. Khe Sanh: The situation in the Khe Sanh area of western Quang Tri Province remains static. The US Marine garrison there received a light mortar attack during the night. According to a prisoner, however, the second phase of the Communist Khe Sanh offensive will begin on 3 February with "artillery, tanks, and twice as many troops."

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91

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 9 (As of 11:30 A.M. EST)

1. The Communists are continuing to apply heavy pressure against a number of major population centers and their surrounding environs throughout the four corps areas of South Vietnam. The allied military position appears to be most critical in Hue, Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, Da Lat, and Ben Tre. There are indications that the Communists are planning renewed attacks in the Saigon area, although the situation at present remains relatively stable.

I Corps

2. Fighting continues in Hue as US and South Vietnamese troops press against Communist forces who continue to offer stiff resistance within the citadel and in scattered parts of the city. Quang Ngai remains quiet.

1.3 (4)4)

II Corps

3. In the western highlands, the allied situation remains most critical at Ban Me Thuot and Kontum City, where regimental-sized North Vietnamese forces continue their occupation of major portions of both cities and surrounding environs. Civilian casualties continue to mount in both areas, largely because of allied air strikes against enemy units holed up in heavily populated sections. Enemy forces have also resumed battalion-sized or larger attacks against Pleiku City.

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NARS, Date 10-6-83

4. In the coastal provinces of II Corps, North Vietnamose forces apparently continue to maintain a major presence in Da Lat and Phan Thiet, the capitals of Tuyen Duc and Binh Thuan provinces, respectively. No major fighting has been reported in Khanh Hoa Province, the scene of recent heavy enemy activity.

Saigon and III Corps



6. To the north of Saigon in the III Corps area there were no new attacks on 2 February, however, there are indications that the capitals of Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long provinces along the Cambodian border may be the next targets to come under attack. Some 4,000 refugees have been generated in the Bien Hoa city area, where fighting in recent days has resulted in heavy damage to civilian housing.

IV Corps

7. The Communists continue to apply pressure against several provincial capitals and key areas according to information as of 1800 Saigon time on 2 February. The most critical area appears to be Ben Tre where heavy fighting is taking place. The enemy controls most of the city. Sporadic sniper fire and fighting in the outskirts is reported in Can Tho, Moc Hoa, Soc Trang and My Tho. VC elements remain in the immediate vicinity of Can Tho, Camau, and Rac Gia and additional attacks are expected. There is no further information on the situation at Vinh Long.



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Status of Enemy Forces

- 8. Available evidence indicates that the Communists retain major combat elements in I and II Corps which have not been committed in their current offensive effort. The situation in III and IV Corps is less clear, but is probably substantially the same. In I and II Corps the remaining units are capable of launching additional strong attacks in certain areas and can also reinforce the current assaults.
- 9. Enemy strength along the Demilitarized Zone and in northern Quang Tri Province remains considerable—up to four divisions. There are indications that two battalions participated in attacks on Quang Tri City and major elements of the North Vietnamese Regiment were involved in heavy righting at Hue. It appears that two North Vietnamese regiments and several independent and local force battalions are still available in the northern coastal provinces.
- regions, elements of the North Vietnamese Division have been joined by Tocal force units in attacks at Da Nang, Hoi An and Tam Ky and scattered actions in the countryside. At least two regiments and probably as many battalions emain uncommitted in this area.
- 11. The picture in Quang Ngai is not clear. However, it appears the enemy has used at least elements from many of his seven battalions here at this juncture.
- Most of the North Vietnamese Division and soveral local force battalions are still available for action. Further south, about one-half of the North Vietnamese Division has been identified at Tay Hoa and Nha Trang, while the majority of enemy local force strength here has been committed.
- 13. Despite heavy fighting at Kontum and Pleiku, only a small percentage of the Front combat power has participated. Up to five regiments and a few more separate battalions remain uncommitted and available in the western central highlands.



Political Developments

- 14. Vietnamese Communist propaganda on the Tet offensive in employing a strong anti-American theme in an effort to rally popular support for Communist objectives. Broadcasts by both Hanoi and the Liberation Front have characterized the current offensive as primarily directed toward ridding the country of the US "imperialists" and their Saigon "lackeys." The program of the Liberation Front is singled out as the guide to achieving these objectives.
- anti-American appeal directly to South Vietnamese armed forces and police personnel. After painting a black picture of American involvement in South Vietnam, it told these people that their "golden chance" to contribute to the salvation of their country had come and urgently called on them to "resist the Americans." The broadcast reminded them that the program of the Front contains provisions for rewarding those who join the Communist cause as well as those who cooperate in the anti-American struggle, even if they do not join the Communists now. The broadcast strossed the need for immediate action, saying that the "situation is urgent and time does not wait."
- 16. The theme that the offensive represents a groundswell of popular sentiment favoring an anti-American struggle was also underscored in a 2 February article in the Hanoi party daily Nhan Dan. The article claimed that the offensive showed the strength of the revolution and of the "national union" resisting the US "aggressors", all of which it said is in line with the Front's program. Front statements discussing the formation of new popular front "alliances" in Hue and Saigon have stressed that their first objective is to oppose the US, bring about the withdrawal of US troops, and to negotiate with the Liberation Front.
- 17. The attempt to characterize the Communist military offensive as a broad, patriotic uprising against the US and Saigon regime was carried further in special Viet Cong and Liberation Front statements on 1 February.



- 18. The Viet Cong issued a "special communique" describing the "insurrectional atmosphere of the masses," and claiming that the nationwide attacks were an "irrepressible uprising of tens of millions of people" bent on a common course of "national liberation." It said that although the recent fighting occurred for only a short time, it provided a basis for continued military successes throughout the country.
- 19. Nguyen Huu Tho, head of the National Liberation Front, wrapped himself in the same patriotic, anti-American robes in a special appeal carried by Hanoi radio on 2 February. Tho's appeal was addressed to South Vietnamese military and civilian personnel and called on them to join in a common strugglo against the US and the Saigon regime. The Front's "only and highest goal", he said is the "save the country."



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SC-07428/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 2 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 10 (As of 5:00 P.M. EST)



- 1. The Vietnamese Communists may be trying to put together some new kind of political facade to back up claims that their current offensive has touched off a popular uprising in favor of objectives long sought by the Communists.
 - The Vict Cong radio on 2 February broadcast as "appeal" from the "National Leadership Committee" of the new organization called the "Alliance of National and Peace Forces." The appeal is dated 30 January to coincide with the nationwide surge of Communist attacks which began then. The appoal is designed to show that a popular "revolution" has "broken out." It calls on all elements of the South Vietnamese population to join the "ranks of the people" and says that "we must at once set up a rovolutionary government." The goals of the "Alliance" ere said to include overthrowing the Saigon regime and replacing it with a "really" representative "administrative power," recovering national independence by demanding the withdrawal of the US and ending the war, building an independent, democratic, and neutral South Viotnam, and negotiating with the National Liberation Front to achieve these goals.
 - 3. It is difficult to perceive how the new
 "Alliance" will be any more usoful to the Communists
 than the National Liberation Front itself in accomplishing Communist objectives. The Front's basic
 weakness since it was formed in late 1960 has heccopy
 its almost total failure to attract supportant Delivery
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 Date 15 SEP 1983



politically significant individuals and groups in South Vietnam.

- 4. So far the new "Alliance" shows no signs of being anything more than a paper organization. Although it is presented as a "national" apparatus, Communist broadcasts have referred specifically only to alliances in the cities of Saigon and Nuc.
- 5. There are no details about the organization in Saigon. A Hanoi breadcast reported its establishment and said it issued a manifesto. Hanoi claims, however, that in Hue the alliance is headed by Le Van Hao, a doctor of othnology and professor of Saigon and Huo universities. Hao reportedly read an "appeal" over Huo radio.
- . 6. Le Van Hao seems to be a non-Communist political nonentity of the same stripe found throughout the ranks of the National Liberation Front. He was active in the 1966 Buddhist struggle movement and was imprisoned for his participation between June and Cotober of that year. He has also been mentioned in connection with the Hung Viet Party, a small, little known anti-government group formed in contral Vietnam during or shortly after the struggle movement, and, at some time before the struggle was editor of a leftist magazine Vietnam Vietnam.
- 7. Little is known of Hao's influence in central Vietnam or even at Hus University, but he may be able to generate some support for his "alliance" among university students, who have frequently been active in antigovernment agitation. There is no evidence that Hao has had Viet Cong or Liberation Front connections, but this is possible in view of his apparently leftist, antigovernment tendencies.
- themes of peace, war weariness, Anti-Americanism, and neutrality in the name of a new organization untained by any known links with either the Communists or the Liberation Front, they can muster greater support for their objectives than they have in the past. The effectiveness of this tactic, however would still seem to hinge on success in somerating

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some real popular enthusiasm and ferreting out solid political support in order to create a power base.

9. It also is conceiveable that, even if the Communists do not rally much support for the "Alliance," they might try to fashion an administration structure to pass off as a "coalition government"—an objective frequently montioned in captured documents as a goal of the "winter-spring" campaign. This could eventually involve staging some kind of "negotiations" between the Front and groups represented by the "Alliance." The ensuing "coalition" could then be presented as the "real" government of South Vietnam. The Communists have avoided such a course with the Front itself, presumably because the Front's failure to develop a political base makes it so patently a creature of the Communists.

The Military Situation

- 10. There has been no significant change in the overall military situation.
- 11. Hue continues to be the focal point of heavy enemy pressure in I Corps. A large concentration of Communist troops has been reported massing for an attack against Quang Mgai City. This is unconfirmed, however. Da Mang Air Base has again been subjected to 122-mm. rocket fire.
- 12. Regimental-sized North Vietnamese forces are continuing to occupy extensive areas of Kontum City and Ban Me Thuot in the western highlands, with heavy fighting reported in both cities. In coastal II Corps, heavy fighting between allied reaction forces and three Viet Cong battalions continues in and around the Binh Thuan province capital of Phan Thiot.
- 13. In III Corps, the provincial capitals of Muan Lou and Ba Ria are reported to be under heavy Communist attack, with the latter city at loast 50 percent under enemy control. While no substantial fighting is currently underway in the Saigon area, there are reports that major corpentrations of enemy forces have infiltrated into the southern people of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and into the New Fort addition barres: 90 Mills of the capital and the capital



14. The situation in the delta remains essentially unchanged, with heavy fighting apparently still continuing in some major population centers.

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Friday, February 2, 1968 9:16 PM

Mr. President:

Mr. Rostow requested that the attached cable be brought to your attention.

White House Situation Room

Briefing Officer

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TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOE 3 FEBRUARY 1963

SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500 HOURS, SAIGENTIME; 5:00 PM EST, 2 FEU.

LOCAL TIME, 3 FEBRUARY 1933

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 FEBRUARY 1968) FIELD NO. SOURCE THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED

AT 0600 HOURS LOCAL TIME IN 3 FEBRUARY 1963

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1. SITUATION IN SALGON AREA GULET:

BEEN THE QUIETEST NIGHT IN SAIGON SINCE THE CURRENT SERIES OF ENEMY ATTACKS BEGAN ON 30 JANUARY. THE ENEMY, HOWEVER, STILL RETAINS CONSIDERABLE COMBAT POTENTIAL IN THE SURROUNDING AREA AND COULD BE REORGANIZING OR REPOSITIONING BEFORE RENEWING HIS ATTACKS.)

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACELT

ARPAC PACAF

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By ics NARS, Date 10-6-83

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SC-07429/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 3 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 11 (As of 8:30 A.M. EST)

The Communist offensive continues to maintain considerable momontum in some urban areas and against some allied military installations. Enemy forces are still resisting allied efforts to drive them out of many provincial capitals, and have launched several new attacks in the III and IV Corps areas. Saigon was relatively quiet during the night, but there were some indications that new enemy initiatives may soon be staged there.

I Corps

- 1. The situation throughout this area was general'y quiet on the night of 2-3 February; however, the fighting in Hue is continuing with the enemy still offering stiff resistance in their offorts to hold several strongpoints in the city.
- 2. Hue: The northern portion of the citadel and parts of the city itself are still under enemy control. Several of the compound areas within the citadel exchanged hands late yesterday. Reports of sizeablo enemy units in the city's environs continue. One prisoner claimed that 2-3 battalions were massing on the southern side of the river which divides the cities, and that their mission was to attack the MACV compound. Other prisoners have stated the enemy plans to hold Hue for at least seven days. Heavy enemy sniper activity from rooftops and other strategic locations continues to hamper the allied reaction forces which have been making slow progress in clearing the city. Six South Vietnamese Army battalions, a ranger battalion, a tank company, plus two Approved for Belease

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NARS, Date 10 -6-83

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battalions of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division and two US Marine battalions are now committed to recovering the city.

3. DMZ: The allied strongpoint at Con Thien was hit by 73 rounds of enemy artillery fire, while and nearby US Marine positions received 65 rounds of artillery and rocket fire late yesterday. There have been no reports of enemy activity at Khe Sanh; however, a press report claims 650 rounds of artillery, rocket, and mortar fire were directed at allied positions all along the southern portion of the DMZ on 3 February.

II Corps

- 4. Fighting continued in two provincial capitals—Dalat and Phan Thiet—in contral South Vietnam on 3 February. Although the enemy presence in or near the western highland cities of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot remains considerable, these cities were generally quiet overnight and the Communists may now, in fact, be withdrawing under strong allied pressure.
- 5. Dalat: Early this morning, an unknown size force struck at the railroad station, two US billets, a South Vietnamese Army outpost, and a sector head-quarters in a brief 15-minute attack. No results have been reported. South Vietnamese forces are presently establishing control of the city.
- 6. Phan Thiet: Sharp fighting which began yesterday noon was reported continuing in this coastal city this morning. The bulk of the battle is concentrated in north and northeast sections of the city in the vicinity of the MACV compound, which is still secured by friendly forces.

Saigon

- 7. Saigon was relatively quiet during the night and this morning with only a few scattered clashes.
- 8. Some reports state that groups of Viet Cong have been sighted withdrawing from the city. Other reports raise the possibility of widespread renewed attacks. Prisoners and captured documents indicate



that the action so far may have been aimed at creating turmoil in preparation for another attack. Some 25 to 30 Viot Cong battalions are said to be staging in areas north and south of the city.



Other III Corps Developments

- 10. Two provincial capitals, Xuan Loc and Phuoc Le, came under attack during the night. By noon on 3 February, however, most provinces in the III Corps area reported that the military situation had stabilized.
- 11. Xuan Loc: Xuan Loc was assaulted for the second consecutive night. An ARVN artillery position was hit by rocket fire; ground probes were directed at the MACV compound, the National Police Station, and other points in the city. There were few details on casualties.
- 12. Phuoc Le: The capital of Phuoc Tuy Province east of Saigon was attacked on I February and
 at last report late on 2 February (local Vietnam time),
 parts of the city were still occupied by a Viet Cong
 company. Heavy fighting was reported, but the only
 confirmed casualties have been one US civilian and
 one Australian killed.
- 13. Bien Hoa: Estimates of civilian refugees in the Bien Hoa area now reach as high as 11,000. Information from prisoners indicate that the Main Force Regiments of the Viet Cong Division participated in the attacks on Bien Hoa. The prisoners state that they had no withdrawal plan as they were told that it would be easy to overrun the city.

1,3(2)(4)





Other Action

14. In other recent action in III Corps US Army troops reported a sharp clash with an enemy force of undetermined size about five miles northeast of Saigon, while Viet Cong gunners attacked the US Army base at Cu Chi for the third time within a week on 2 February. Some 100 rounds of mortar and heavy rocket fire hit the camp. US losses were light.

IV Corps

- 15. Reports indicate that there was a slackening off of fighting in several previously hard hit
 provinces in this area during the night of 2-3 February.
 Heavy action is still going on in some sectors, however, and many major cities are still experiencing
 sniper and harassing fire.
- 16. Ben Tre: Some of the heaviest fighting in the delta has continued over the past three days in this provincial capital, located some 43 miles south of Saigon. Viet Cong forces, estimated to be 200-800 strong, have infiltrated virtually all parts of the city and control most of it, especially at night. More than half of the buildings in the city have been destroyed.
- 17. The ARVN Regiment defending Ben Tre is reportedly fighting "tenaciously, but rather ineffectively because of a lack of "planning and organization." One US Army unit has already arrived in the city and most of the 2nd Brigade of the US 9th Infantry Division was scheduled to arrive during the night.
- 18. Chau Phu: Chau Phu, a provincial capital near the Cambodian border 115 miles due west of Saigon, was reported almost completely secure this morning. An ARVN search and destroy operation is sweeping the outskirts of the city. Unconfirmed estimates list 77 Viet Cong killed and eight captured. Some 100 civilians have been wounded and it is estimated that the fighting against at least two Viet Cong battalions in the city over the past few days destroyed the homes of up to 4,000 people.



19. One prisoner, taken during the battle.

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
was launched with considerable ideological preparations but without the thorough tactical rehearsals which traditionally preceed Viet Cong attacks. He said that he first learned of the Tet offensive about two weeks prior to the Chau Phu attack.

- 20. Viet Cong main force units, according to the prisoner, were given the responsibility of "liberating" provincial capitals, whereas district forces and guerrillas were responsible for seizing their respective district seats. He claims that the force which attacked Chau Phu city included ten party members who were to constitute the city front which was to organize a provisional government. The prisoner first heard the term coalition government about six months ago, but had never heard it brought into formal party proceedings until the briefings for the Tet operation.
- 21. If these statements do provide an accurate reflection of current Viet Cong strategy, the Communists have indeed decided to expend a great part of their resources in the Tet offensive.

Other Delta Action

22. Sporadic mortar and small arms fire continues within or on the outskirts of several provincial capitals—including Can Tho, My Tho, Moc Hoa, Vinh Long, and Rach Gia—as well as a number of other smaller towns. At Ca Mau a Viet Cong assault was repulsed during the night of 1-2 February but further attacks were expected.





- 23. There are indications of considerable confusion and indecision within the Saigon government in the wake of the current Communist offensive.
- dicates that Prime Minister Loc has taken no initiative toward restoring public confidence in the government's ability to act effectively. Loc, who was described as "bewildered" when the enemy attacks first erupted, has since rejected suggestions that he act to strengthen health, postal, information and emergency relief services and that he try to enlist active support in the crisis from labor, Buddhist, intellectual and other groups. Loc's attitude reportedly is that civilians can do nothing until the military have restored some normality to the situation.
- that the government has been able to function "reasonably well," although there has been a noticeable lack of coordination, particularly through conflicting orders to civil servants about reporting for work during the curfew. This source claims that President Thieu is now beginning to turn his attention to the pressing political and psychological aspects of the crisis. Thieu reportedly met on 2 February with Loc, Vice President Ky, and senior cabinet, armed forces, and National Assembly officers to discuss urgent food and medical needs, and to arrange for a public pledge of support from assembly leaders.
- 26. The source feels, however, that the people of Saigon are edgy and susceptible to rumors and that not enough has yet been done to reassure them. He fears that, if the Viet Cong are not cleaned out of the city within 48 hours, public moralo will further deteriorate, supplies may run out, and allied troop fatigue may force resort to increased bombing and strafing with counterproductive effects on the population.
- 27. Overall information on popular reactions to the crisis is still relatively sparse--particularly for areas outside Saigon. From the evidence available,



however, it still appears, as earlier reported, that the general reaction is one first: of fear, second: of surprise at the demonstration of continued Communist strength and, third: of disgruntlement at the government's inability to block the attacks.

28. There are numerous reports of belief in a widespread rumor that the US connived with the VC in the attacks in order to force formation of a coalition government. While the enemy is doubtless pushing this line as part of the psywar side of his current offensive, the widespread willingness to believe the story is significant, since it seemingly indicates a growing political malaise among the people over the war.



SC No. 07430/68

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 82-230
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
INTRLLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Victor No. 12 (As of 5:30 P.M. EST)

tary situation since our report of 8:30 A.M. EST on 3 February. The following, however, are the most significant of the developments reported.

I Corps

1. The military situation in northern and western Quang Tri Province remains generally quiet,



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By is NARS, Date 10-6-83

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- 4. The Communists have the capability to strike at any time against Khe Sanh with two divisions, against the Camp Carroll-Rockpile area in the north-central DMZ with one division, and against the Con Thien Gio Linh area in the east-central DMZ with a division equivalent.
- 5. The allied situation at Hue seems to have Improved somewhat. While there has been no significhange in positions occupied by enemy or allied forces, US Marines in battalion strength have recaptured the provincial jail which had been held by the Viet Cong. Some 2,500 prisoners, 300 to 500 of whom were considered hard-core Viet Cong, were liberated by the cuemy during their initial attack against the prison compound. An ARVN force equivalent to division-strength is continuing to press clearing operations against Communist forces heled up in the citadel area.
- 6. In the Quang Tri city area, although the Communists have been pushed out of the urban area, they are said to still hold about two-thirds of the RD campaign area, in the district north of the city. It is believed allied forces will have to move in and clear them out, probably with substantial damage to civilian interests.
- 7. A US Marine battalion has been reported in heavy contact with a large enemy force south of Da Nang, but no further details are presently available. The Communists are believed to pose a very serious threat to the entire Da Nang Hoi An area, with two regiments of the NVA Division.

8.

9. A major buildup of Communist forces has been reported near the Quang Tin Province capital of Tam Ky, but no significant new fighting has yet developed.



II Corps

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that the Dak To airstrip has come under heavy rocket and recoilless rifle attack, but apparently remains operational. Elsewhere in the western highlands, no new information has become available on the status of enemy and allied forces in and around the cities of Pleiku, Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot.

- committed its entire regional force as well as elements of three of its subordinate NVA regiments to the Tet offensive in the highlands. The Front's entire NVA Division, however, with three regiments supported by 122-mm. rockets and 120-mm. mortars, has apparently been kept in reserve. This division poses a continuing threat to allied units and installations in northwestern Kontum and western Pleiku provinces, and also is capable of joining the attacks against population centers which have been initiated by local forces and independent regiments of the Front.
- 12. In the coastal provinces of II Corps, Phan Thiet, the capital of Binh Thuan Province, is under attack by three Viet Cong battalions. Meanwhile, Communist forces have ambushed two South Korean army convoys in or near the Binh Dinh provincial capital of Qui Nhon.

. III Corps

- 13. Information on this area is not up to date, but a field wrap-up as of noon (Vietnam time) on 3 February indicated that most of the provinces in the Corps were quiet.
- 14. Fighting apparently continues in the provincial capitals of Xuan Loc and Phuoc Le, with Vict Cong forces possibly holding positions in both cities. Meanwhile, brigade-strength base camps of the US 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe and Quan Loi came under heavy rocket and mortar bombardment on the evening



of 3-4 February. Enemy forces have also been reported moving toward the Binh Duong Province capital of Phu Cuong, although no major attack has yet erupted.

The Saigon Area

- 15. Press reports indicate that heavy fighting orupted between elements of the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and a large Viet Cong force near Thu Duc, just northeast of Saigon, on the morning of 3 February Saigon, time. Vietnamese Marines and other American units were also engaged. There are no reports yet on the outcome.
- 16. In the capital itself, light sporadic contact and sniper fire continues throughout the city. Firing incidents were reported still occurring near the national palace, the US embassy, the embassy marine barracks, and along the main road to Tan Son Nhut airport on the evening of 3-4 February. Police stations and roving security patrols remain prime enemy targets.

17.

Regiment continue to pose a distant threat to the Saigon aroa. These forces, generally located around the Michelin rubber plantation, have not been identified in any recont actions

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


IV. Corps

19. There has been no significant change in the situation here, according to the fragmentary reports now available. Only sporadic sniper fire was reported in Vinh Long City where friendly forces continued clearing out VC elements. Enemy attacks during the night of 2-3 February were repulsed at cities in Kien Phong, Kien Hoa and Bac Lieu provinces. Throughout much of the corps area, Viet Cong elements continued scattered harrassing fire. There is no firm information on the situation at Ben Tre, although two Viet Cong battalions on the outskirts of the city are believed preparing for renewed attacks.

Political Reactions

- 20. Victnamese Communist propaganda is continuing to claim that their military offensive has evoked broad popular support particularly in flue and Saigon and has generated the formation of political "alliances" throughout the country which will eventually overthrow and replace the Saigon government. The composition of these alliances, their function, and their relationship to the Liberation. Front continues to be vague, but it is becoming increasingly clear that the Communists probably intend them to be the instrument for the establishment of a coalition government in conjunction with the Liberation Front.
- 21. An appeal from the "alliance" In Hue, broadcast by the Front on 2 February, is the clearest statement of this objective to date. The appeal stated for the first time that one of the alliance's objectives was the establishment of a national coalition administration in the South and the normalization of relations with the North in order to affect reunification. Previous appeals by the Saigon and Hue alliances and by the National Leadership of the Alliances have called only for negotiations with the Front but have not mentioned the formation of a government, or the issue of reunification.
- 22. Despite the suggestions that the Communists really intend to march ahead with the formation of a government, there continues to be scant evidence that the Alliances have gained any popular support.
- 23. Meanwhile, several Banoi commentaries have suggested that the current military offensive is but one battle in a more prolonged struggle. The Banoi party paper on 3 February said the current fighting was creating conditions for additional military victories. The North Vietnamese army journal the previous day called for the southern forces to maintain and develop their victories, enlarge their fronts, and develop their revolution.
- the DRV military command has sent a message to the Front unit in Hue and Saigon assuring them that the



DRV armed forces stand "ready every second to coordinate their actions with them." In Hanoi itself, mass meetings are being held by various political and religious groups in support of the southern offensive. It would appear that the North Vietnamese authorities are utilizing the successes in the South to pump up popular morale in the North.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 4 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Eithation in South Vietnam No. 13
(As of E: C.A.M. ESP).

Summary

There were ro major new attacks by Communist forces during the night of 3-4 February.

Allied forces continue to clear dug in enemy elements from the city of Hue. It major wrhat areas in the II Corps area are now in friendly hands but sporadic mortar and sniper fire is still reported in several of the provincial capitals. To major fighting occurred during the night in the Saigest area, although a few scattered skirmishes with small enemy remnants took place within the city. Enemy activity in the Delta provinces was characterized by a series of small unit assaults against district towns, outposts, and night defensive positions.

Despite the present relative calm, there are continuing for leations that the Communists are planning new offensives, particularly in the Da Nang area and north and west of Saigon in South Vietnam's III Corps

The trends previously reported on the initial reaction of the populace to the attacks, continue to be evident. The assaults apparently produced foar and surprise ever the VC presence and strength, and revulsion at the gross enemy violation of the sacred Tet holiday in about even proportions. Evident also is a strong undercurrent of belief that, if the government does not move speedily and with vigor to normalize the situation in the cities, and restore its presence and authority in the countryside, it will lose heavily in terms of popular confidence. Approved for Release the situation in the cities and restore its presence and authority in the countryside, it will lose heavily in terms of popular confidence.

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By ico, NARS, Date 10-6-83



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I Corps

- 1. No significant Communist offensive activities were reported during the night of 3-4 February; however, several small-scale mortar attacks and ground probes took place.
- 2. Hue: At mid-morning on 4 February, sporadic contact between allied and enemy forces continued within the walled citadel area of the city just north of the Perfume River. South Vietnamese have complete control now of the citadel airstrip and, together with US units, are continuing to sweep sections of the city outside the citadel. The enemy is still holed up in scattered city buildings on the south bank of the river.
- 3. Interrogation of a prisoner taken in the Hue fighting reveals that at least some of the attacking force was composed of Viet Cong or regroupees. The captive claimed that the Hue city municipal unit and the 800th Viet Cong Battalion of the North Vietnamese 6th Regiment were tasked with attacking the MACV compound for three days and if resistance proved heavy, to centinue the attack for an additional four days. He also claimed that if these forces were reinforced, the fighting could continue for 15 days.
- 4. Other elements of the North Vietnamese 6th Regiment probably were also given target areas within the city to attack. The enemy's stubborn resistance within the city may stem from their intention to follow the battle plan or in anticipation of additional enemy forces coming to their aid. There have been reports of large groups of enemy troops—probably reinforcing elements—on the outskirts of town, but allied blocking maneuvers have effectively kept them from joining up with the enemy within the city.
- 5. Quang Tin Province: A South Vietnamese field position and a nearby refugee area some 10 miles north of Tam Ky were attacked yesterday. The enemy penetrated the refugee camp and destroyed 71 buildings with gronades and explosive charges. Twenty-five civilians and one soldier were killed and another 19 civilians wounded during the action.



6. No further details are available on the large-scale action reported earlier between US Marine and enemy units several miles south of Da Kang; however, an additional subordinate of the . North Vietnamese Division has joined the build-up of Communist units in the coastal flatlands between Hoi An and Da Nang

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It is massing of enemy main force elements in this important area along the coast, together with the reported positioning of a regimental-size enemy force near the strategic Hai Van pass just north of Da Nang, suggest a Communist effort may be underway to cut off Da Nang. This could lead to, or be connected with, further attacks, including rocket and artillery, on the key US airbase as well as the city itself.

II Corps

- 8. There has been little significant enemy activity in central South Vietnam thus far on 4 February. The situation in the coastal city of Phan Thiet, capital of Binh Thuan Province, has improved and all major population centers are now under friendly control.
- 9. Phan Thiet: On the morning of 4 February sporadic firing was continuing around the outskirts of town following the successful allied drive to repol three Communists battalions which attacked during the night. A prisoner stated that one of the enemy units involved in the fighting—the 840th Viet Cong Battalion—is withdrawing to a secret base camp northeast of the city. Early on 4 February a company—sized Viet Cong force attacked a small village just north of Phan Thiet, possibly as a diversionary tactic to cover the retreat of the other units.



- 10. Ban Mc Thuot: The city remains quiet, however, reports continue on the build-up of North Vietnamese troops--numbering as many as 2,000--near the
 city. The Battalion of the North Vietnamese
 Regiment has been
 as relocating just south of this highland provincial capital.
- Il. Kontum: Light enemy mortar and small arms fire was still coming in at several points in the city at noon on 4 Pebruary. Sporadic sniping has also continued during both nighttime and daytime hours. A probing attempt against the airfield was made during the night, but was swiftly beaten back.
- 12. Dalat: Only sporadic sniper fire has been reported in Dalat as South Victnamese reinforcements continue to move into the city.

Saigon and III Corps.

- 13. No major fighting occurred in Saigon during the night or early on Sunday. Elsewhere there were several assaults on the US base facilities and district towns during the night.
- ld. Saigon: Several sharp clashes took place between bands of Viet Cong and South Vietnamese police and Rangers. In at least two instances, government forces had plateen size enemy forces surrounded in Saigon buildings and were preparing to attack and clear them out. In one case a group of terrorists were reported as having taken refuge in a school house. They are armed with automatic weapons and grenade launchers and had a machine gun on the roof of the school.
- 15. Build-up: Captured documents indicate that the 5th Viet Cong Division-which normally operates in northwest III Corps along the Cambodian border--may be moving closer to Saigon.

· 16. One document—a notebook captured several days ago about 30 miles northwest of Saigon—outlines a "new mission" for the 9th Division. According to the notes, higher headquarters recently ordered the



Oth to undertake a "long march" which would be the greatest march in the history of the war against the Americans. The notebook indicates that at least elements of the division were to leave Cambodian territory on 21 January, move through Tay Ninh Province, and arrive in Cu Chi District northwest of Saigon on 30 January. The division was to operate in an area where the terrain features were extremely complicated, an area never experienced in the past. During the march every effort would be made to maintain march schedule, security, and noise discipline.

identify the 9th Division's 271st Regiment and probably elements of the 272nd Regiment. In addition.

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third regiment, the 273rd, was deployed just to the north of the capital in southern Binh Duong Province and Thu Due District, Gia Dinh Province. The latter district headquarters is located only five miles northwest of Saigon.

18. A South Vietnamese Marine base in Thu Duc district came under a sharp, but unsuccessful, enemy attack on 3 February, possibly by a battalion of the 273rd Viot Cong Regiment. During the past few days all of the US bases located in an area around Saigon from northwest to northeast -- Cu Chi, Ben Cat, Lai Khe, and Bien Hoz--have been shelled repeatedly, in many cases with heavy 122-mm. rockets which are held only by main force units. The 274th and 275th Regiments of the 5th Viet Cong Division were identified in the attacks on Bien Hoa, northeast of Saigon. Now there is fairly good evidence that the 9th Division is applying pressure from the northwest. The general Communist strategy may have been for these forces to follow-up and reinforce the initial attacks in the Saigon area which are believed to have been conducted by Viet Cong local forces and special squads. Pailing this the 9th and 5th Divisions may hope to spread out US forces and tie them down on the outskirts of the capital.



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Other III Corps:

- 20. In other action in the III Corps area, a
 US base camp and district town in Binh Long Province
 came under attack last night. There was no report
 of casualties, but the US base was hit by heavy 122-mm.
 rocket fire. There has as yet been no attack on An
 Loc, the capital of Binh Long, but reports today indicate that the Viet Cong have taken over control of
 most of the hamlets in the province and can move at
 will. They have also set up readblocks on the routes
 leading into An Loc. A somewhat similar condition
 exists in Tay Ninh Province where Revolutionary Development Teams have had to withdraw from their hamlets
 to their respective district towns.
- 21. An attack was reported last night on Tam Uyen district town in Bien Hea Province. An unknown size Viet Cong force breached the ten's protective wire barrier, overran several sections of the town and at last report was advancing on the district headquarters. There was no word on casualties. US Army sweeps in Hau Nghia and Binh Duong Provinces reported sporadic centact with enemy troops yesterday afternoon.
- 22. Xuan Loc, the capital of Long Khanh Province northeast of Saigon, was quiet at last report yesterday evening but the town was tense. Some Viot Cong are still believed to be in the town and allied authorities anticipated further attacks on their compounds during the night.
- 23. The intention of the enemy to continue his pressure on urban areas is continuing to be borne out by personer attrogations and now, by captured documents. One such document captured at the Tan Son Nhut Airbase perimeter states that in order to be victorious, the VC must expand attacking forces

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and guerrilla war to the cities, and increase attacks on lines of communications so as to isolate the urban areas.

IV Corps

- 24. All of the major provincial capitals in the delta are in friendly hands, although on the periphery of several cities, speradic contact with Viet Cong forces is still reported. During the night of 3-4 February, the Communists launched small unit attacks on district towns, outposts, and allied field positions.
- 25. Sa Dec: Early this morning, an undetermined size Viet Cong force attacked Sa Dec city and a nearby district town. The MACV compound was penetrated before the attackers were driven back after a two-hour fight. This attack followed one late on 3 February which was directed against the Chieu Hoi center and the provincial headquarters building. At last report, elements of the enemy force were still in the city.
- 26 'Cao Linh: This capital city of Kien Phong Province was attacked today by an estimated two Viet Cong companies. The enemy withdrew after one hour of fighting; no casualties were reported.
- ince, five different South Vietnamese outposts were struck with receilless rifle barrages late on 3
 February. In Phong Dinh Province, the Thuan Nhon District town and the Binh Thuy airfield were hit by Viet Cong mortarmen. Twelve aircraft were damaged at Binh Thuy. In Vinh Long Province, the provincial capital of Vinh Long, its airfield, and a nearby district town were all attacked with harassing mortar and small arms fire. Ben Tre and the nearby district town of Mo Cay, in Kien Hoa were hit by light mortar attacks during the night. Other scattered district towns were also lightly mortared on 3-4 February as the Viet Cong continued to maintain pressure on populated areas throughout the delta provinces.





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SC No. 07433/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 4 February 1968

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 14
(As of 5:00 P. M. EST)

I Corps

- 1. With the exception of Hue, where heavy fighting continues, the situation in the northern provinces remains generally quiet-particularly in the recently troubled areas of Quang Tri City, Da Nang, Hoi An, Tam Ky, and Quang Ngai.
- 2. Hue: The situation in Nue remains tense, as allied reaction forces continue to press air and ground assaults against an estimated three Viet Cong companies entrenched within the walled citadel area of the ancient imperial capital. US Marines are also engaged in house-to-house fighting along the banks of the Porfume River, Hue's principal waterway. The citadel airstrip apparently remains in ARVN hands, but is not operational. Two US Marine convoys en route to Hue from Phu Bai have encountered heavy enemy sniper fire along Noute 1, thus delaying their commitment as reinforcements to the provincial capital defenses.

II Corps

3. The main Communist thrust in II Corps continues to be directed against Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban He Thuot in the western highlands and against Dalat and Tuy Hoa in the coastal provinces, although no major now fighting has been reported since our last situation report. Enemy still are being reported in the vicinity of these cities. Phan Thiet, which was previously under attack by three Vict Cong battalions, has been cleared of enemy forces.

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Authority NLJ 82-230

By is ; NARS, Date 10-6-83



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The Saigen Area

4. Although the security situation in some areas of the capital city has stabilized, there continue to be numerous reports of small-scale Viet Cong activity. The National Police headquarters compound care under heavy mortar and automatic weapongs fire on 4 February.

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- 5. South Vietnamese forces apparently have planned a major operation to begin on the morning of 5 February to clear Viet Cong remnants from Saigon. The multi-battalien sweep is to include a thorough house-to-house search and will be controlled by senior officers of the Joint General Staff, the National Police and the ARYN III Corps headquarters. Possibly as many as 16 battaliens of Vietnamese marines, rangers, paratroopers, army forces and police are committed.
- 6. There is no confirmation of the indications, noted in the 8:30 A.M. Sitrep, that the VC 9th Division may have moved closer to Saigon. US military officials in Saigon, however, report they have some evidence from prisoners that at least elements of the 3 regiments of the 9th were involved in the initial assault on the city.

Other III Corps

7. The eleven provinces of III Corps have reported no significant changes in the allied or enemy situation since 1800 Hours 4 February Saigon time.

IV Corps

8. Multibattalion Viet Cong troop concentrations are continuing to apply havey pressure against friendly areas in and around the provincial capitals of Tra Vinh, Bac Lieu, Vinh Long City, and Cao Lanh. The district capital of Duc Thanh, in Sa Dec Province, is also reported to be under heavy enemy mortar and ground attack. On the positive side, however, allied



forces have generally cleared major enemy elements out of the important delta cities of Can Tho, My Tho, and Ben Tre.

Khe Sanh

- 9. A late report indicates that fighting has broken out in the Khe Sanh area. At 4:20 A.M. on the morning of 5 February (Vietnam time) Hill 861, one of the main defense points for Khe Sanh some 4 1/2 kilometers to the northwest, received a ground attack by an unknown size enemy force. Contact is said to be continuing.
- 10. Khe Sanh base has also received an unknown number of rocket rounds.

Throat to Captive Americans

Il. The Communist's Liberation Radio on the morning of 5 February Vietnam time carried a statement denouncing an alleged allied plan to try a number of Communist soldiers captured in the recent fighting. It warned that if they were killed, the Communist National Liberation Front "will take retaliatory action against detained Americans."

SC No. 07433/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 5 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 15 (As of 7:00 A.M. EST)

- 1. Allied forces appear to have regained the initiative in many of South Vietnam's urban areas. Most of the major provincial capitals were reported relatively quiet throughout the night of 4-5 February and into the morning. Bitter fighting still continues in Hue, however, as well as in isolated sections of Saigon and in several large cities and district towns. The Communists also hit at Khe Sanh after a long period of relative quiet.
- 2. There have been no significant political developments since those reported in the 5 February Central Intelligence Bulletin.

Khe Sanh

- 3. Early on 5 February, US Marines drove back some 200 to 300 North Vietnamese regulars during an assault on the defensive position atop strategic Hill 861. The attack was staged in conjunction with a four-hour artillery, rocket, and mortar barrage on the main base camp of Khe Sanh.
- 4. Communist losses totaled 100 killed in contrast to American casualties of seven killed and 44 wounded. No major damage to the base was reported and the airstrip remains open.

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I Corps

- 5. Bitter, door-to-door fighting was reported continuing in Hue as US and South Vietnamese soldiers exert increasing pressure on pockets of enemy resistence in several sectors of the city. Progress is slow, with determined Communist elements clinging to isolated strongpoints in the citadel and on the south bank of the Perfume Rivor.
- 6. Heavy fighting erupted in the market place of Trieu Phong, a district capital just to the north of Quang Tri city, at mid-morning today. Additionally four, possibly eight, Communist battalions are reported moving toward Quang Tri city from the southwest, and it is possible that a new attack is upcoming in this area, although there is no other confirmation of the report.
- 7. Other reports state the Communists are planning to strike the provincial capitals of Tam Ky and Quang Ngai city and several district towns sometime before 10 January. Although such reports of imminent enemy action may be part of a Communist scare campaign, the enemy still retains the potential to mount at least limited attacks, supported by mortar and rocket forays throughout I Corps.
- 8. There are no developments on the massing of North Vietnamese forces, including the entire 2nd Division, in the Da Nang area reported in our Sitreps of 3 and 4 February.

II Corps .

9. During the night of 4-5 February and up to mid-morning today, there was relatively little enemy offensive activity throughout the central part of South Vietnam. Allied forces continue to flush out areas where small elements are holed up in several cities such as Tuy Hoa, Ban Me Thuot, and Dalat. In Kontum and Pleiku, the situation was reported "very quiet." Sporadic, light mortar attacks were directed at a few cities last night but damage and casualties were reported light.

highlands, under the direction of the B-3 Front, continue to pose a substantial threat to key cities and major allied outposts there. Three regiments of the North Vietnamese 1st Division have been relocating to the Dak To area in central Kontum Province. This maneuver was further confirmed by two prisoners purportedly from the North Vietnamese 32nd Regiment which, according to the captives, is about to launch a three-pronged attack on Dak To, together with the 66th and 174th regiments. A rocket and mortar attack there on 3 February was reported earlier. Other Communist main force units remain active in the vicinity of Kontum and Pleiku cities, and another major round of fight-

III Corps

ing could develop there.

11. No new attacks were reported in the III Corps area last night or early this morning.

Saigon

12.

The heaviest

fighting last night was in Cholon, the Chinese quarter in the southwest corner of the capital, but firing incidents have been reported in nearly every section.

- 13. US intelligence sources in Saigon feel that a relatively small number of Viet Cong are responsible for the most recent terrorist activities. At noon on 5 February (local Vietnam time) US officials estimated that less than 100 Viet Cong "action agents" remained in the city with probably three-four battalions on the boundaries of the western precincts.
- appear to be deployed within striking range of the capital. There is further evidence that the Viet Cong 9th Division has moved towards Saigon from northwest III Corps, a movement which was reported earlier based on captured documents

The US Command disclosed last night that prisoners from all three regiments of the 9th Division have been captured in recent days in the general area north and west of Saigon.

- 15. Information has come in from a number of prisoner interrogations which tends to support the theory that, in general, the Communists may have believed that the people of Saigon and other urban areas were "ripe for revolution." Low level cadre, for example, apparently were not provided with withdrawal plans since their superiors told them there could be no question but that a "general uprising" would be sparked.
- 16. Nevertheless, the Communist high command was prudent enough not to commit all of their reserves to the first assault. Thus, it is possible that the viewpoints expressed by the prisoners mainly represent exhortative propaganda pumped into them by the hardcore cadro, and are not true representations of the real Communist estimates and intentions.

IV Corps

- 17. US forces remained in contact with an estimated 100 Viet Cong within the provincial capital of Vinh Long early this morning. Fighting also continued within or on the outskirts of a number of other provincial capitals and district towns in the delta.
- 18. At Go Cong a small Viet Cong force released over 100 prisoners from the provincial jail; Tra Vinh continues to be surrounded by some 2,000 of the enemy.



SC No. 07434/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 5 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam No. 16 (As of 12:30 P.M. EST)

The Viet Cong appear to be maintaining strong pressure against government security installations in the Saigon area, notwithstanding the initiation of a massive allied clearing operation throughout the entire city. There have been no further indications of an imminent large-scale Communist offensive against the capital.

Heavy fighting continues for the sixth consecutive day in Hue, while to the north, US forces have reported three major contacts with battalionsize Communist forces near Quang Tri City. Elsewhere in I Corps, the military situation remains relatively quiescent. No further significant North Vietnamese initiatives have been reported against the US combat base at Khe Sanh.

In central Vietnam, allied forces appear to have stabilized the security situation in the troubled provincial capitals of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot, although the cities of Tuy Hoa and Dalat are continuing to experience significant enemy pressure.

While the eleven provinces of III Corps remain generally quiet, Viet Cong forces in the delta continue to pose a major threat to a number of important populalation conters and government military installations.

SANITIZED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NLJ 8/-124 + 82-230 By if, NARA, Date 2-14-89



The Saigon Area

- 1. There are unconfirmed press reports that an estimated 400 Communist attackers early today overran a police substation in Saigon and drove police out of a nearby precinct headquarters which they had set ablaze. The Saigon police reportedly abandoned their 8th Precinct Headquarters in the southern (Cholon) sector of the capital and withdrew northward toward the center of the city.
- 2. Official reporting from the field has confirmed additional small-scale Viet Cong harassing attacks against Saigon municipal police units and installations in the central residential area's 3rd Precinct and in the 6th and 7th Precincts in Cholon.
- 3. Viet Cong elements thus far contacted in the Saigon attacks have been described as wearing a variety of outfits, ranging from Buddhist robes and civilian attire to ARVN, Regional Force, Chieu Hoi, and jungle green uniforms.
- 4. Meanwhile, an 18-battalion ARVN task force, supported by National Police units, has begun a massive house-to-house search of the entire capital city. US troops have been deployed around the perimeter of Saigon to screen the ARVN security sweep within the city proper.
- 5. There was reported to be an abundant supply of rice and bread in the shops of Saigon and Cholon as of 4 February. Some merchants, however, are apparently not selling their rice, probably in the expectation that prices will continue to soar. It is estimated that the Saigon populace can endure to the 9th or 11th of February without an inflow of food.

I Corps

6. Action here continues to be centered in the northern provinces. US forces reported three major contacts—each with an enemy battalion—near Quang Tri on 5 February. It appears the Communists were routed in two of the contacts, north and east of the

city. No results are available on the third. US observers report morale in Quang Tri is poor. Prominent Vietnamese officials, including the province chief, are apparently moving their families out of the city.

7. Elsewhere, there have been no major changes reported since the 7:00 A.M. Sitrep. Unconfirmed press reports indicate US Marine progress in Hue on 5 February continued to be slow in bitter street fighting against determined Communist forces.

II Corps

8. In the western highlands, allied reaction forces continue to press sweeping operations against enemy concentrations near the provincial capitals of Kontum, Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot. No major developments have been reported since the 7:00 A.M. Sitrep. Along the coast, Tuy Hoa was again attacked by about a battalion of Viet Cong during the day of 5 February according to press reports. The mountain resort city of Dalat is also said to be under renewed enemy pressure.

III Corps

9. American observers in the area report no new outbreaks of Communist activity as of the early evening of 5 February. Enemy forces still pose a threat to some provincial capitals including An Loc and Phu Cuong.

IV Corps

abated somewhat during 5 February in the Delta provinces. However, substantial Communist forces remain in the immediate vicinity of some administrative and population centers and US observers on the scene expect renewed attacks at My Tho, Tra Vinh and Rach Gia. Last night, an enemy battalion attacked Go Cong and VC gunners shelled installations near Can Tho. Both areas were quiet by daybreak. Elsewhere, there was sporadic sniper fire in several cities and scattered resistance around the outskirts. Although much of the city has been ravaged, Vinh Long now appears to be firmly in friendly hands.

Status of Forces

- pears to have lost a measure of its countrywide momentum, substantial enemy forces still threaten population centers and allied positions in some parts of Vietnam. Available evidence places significant concentrations of enemy troops near Quang Tri City, Da Nang, and Quang Ngai City in the northern provinces; Dak To, Kontum and Pleiku in the western highlands; in the III Corps provinces of Binh Duong, Binh Long and Bien Hoa; and in the northeastern provinces of the Delta. Enemy dispositions in the Saigon area are unclear. And enemy strength in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area remains substantial.
- 12. Should the Communists elect to initiate a fresh round of major attacks, these are likely to be focused on the areas mentioned above.

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SC No. 07681/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 7 February 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NLJ 81-124 + 82-230 By NARA, Date 2-14-89

Spot Report on the Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

- I. Late reports indicate the North Vietnamese gained control of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp on the afternoon of the 7th...
- 2. The Camp's defenders commenced evacuation from the area under cover of intensive friendly aerial and artillery bombardment. Six of the 24 Americans and over three-fourths of the 450 man Vietnamese garrison have not yet been accounted for. Earlier in the day, an estimated Communist company had controlled the camp above ground while friendly personnel were entrenched in underground bunkers.
- 3. Two relief columns were reportedly converging on the scene late in the afternoon for a combined raid on the camp. Neither had entered the camp-site at last report. One of the relief forces was composed of Special Forces personnel helo-lifted from Khe Sanh; the other was a local Lastian volunteer battalion.
- 4. The unit identity of the attacking Communist force is not yet clear. The attack was possibly conducted by elements from the 66th Regiment of the NVA 304th Division. A senior non-commissioned officer who defected one week ago, stated that when he left this unit, it was near lang Vei awaiting orders to attack the camp.
- 5. It is also possible that elements of the 101D Regiment of the NVA 3250 Division were involved.

- 6. According to a report from the scene, the Khe Sanh garrison was faced with potentially serious complications on the night of 7 February when approximately 6,000 Laotian refugees moved from lang Vei to within one-quarter mile of Khe Sanh.
- 7. The Khe Sanh base commander has been advised to deter the refugees from moving closer. Officials in Saigon will ask the Laotian charge to fly to Khe Sanh tomorrow to encourage the refugees to clear the area.
- 8. Aside from the obvious political delicacy of the situation, the mass of refugees pases tactical problems for the base defenders. Should the enemy attack, the refugees could shield his approach or cause confusion among friendly troops.
- 9. It is possible that very large numbers of refugees are in the area. Some of the dependents of the Laotian defenders at Ban Houei Same were in the vicinity of Lang Vei, along with dependents of the Lang Vei camp itself.
- 10. There have been no other significant developments reported by field elements on the military situation in South Vietnam, or with regard to DRV aircraft.

SANITIZED:

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, NARS, Date_10-6-83



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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

Saturday, February 17, 1968 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA concludes that a new phase in the Viet Cong offensive may well begin at 2:00 p.m. EST this afternoon

W. Rostow

SANITIZED OCT 3 1979 Authority CIA NARS, Date 10-12-79

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SANITIZED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NLJ 8/-124 + 82-230 By R. NARA, Date 2-14-89

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER
SELECT FOR THE DCI

FEB 17 10 29 AM '69

CIA OPS CEN.

SUBJECT: INDICATIONS OF NVN OFFENSIVE BEGINNING AROUND

SOURCE : 2:00PM EST, 17 FEB. 1968

FM: SSO MACV

TIME STAMP

DTG

17 FEB. 6:23AM EST, 1968

DISTO : DCI. DDCI. EX/DIR. DDI(2), DDP(VIA CSDO), DDS&T(VIA D/OSI), D/OCI(5), D/ONE, D/OSI, D/OSR, CH/WATCH COM, MR. HAND, C/IRS, SAVA, OCI(4), C/OPSCEN, CSDO, PDB, INDICO, ORR/CSS, RAD, SDO, DD/S, ADDED;

SUBJECT: HOTSIT

1. Within the past few hours a number of indications have been received suggesting enemy offensive activity beginning early tomorrow morning (18 Feb.) Saigon time.



- on 12 Feb., VC transported 3 tons of ammo to WR 090 149. This ammo was NNEXX divided among the units to participate in the second attack of CA MAU, which was reported to come before 18 February 1968.
- 4. On 17 Feb., VC in Bien Hoa area conducted propaganda lecture and stated that the POL Farms at NA DHE will be attacked in the near future.
- 5. Employees of Everett Shipping Company in the Commercial Dock area of Saigon refused to come to work on 18 February. Employees were offered double wages and still refused to work.
- 6. Your attention is invited to the J-2 estimate recently forwarded for your comment (EO MACV 2213 NOTOAL). Above cited evidence plus that set forth in estimate suggests that the indication of the described second phase of the offensive activity is imminent.

PAGE / OF /

CLASSIFICATION

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

SECRET

Saturday, February 17, 1968 -- 8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two Saigon responses to Loan's judgment that a coordinated attack on Saigon and elsewhere should be expected for February 18:

- Bunker says that Westy regards it as probable that there will be further attacks between February 18 and 23, with the principal targets being Saigon, Hue, Quang Tri, and Can Tho.
- The CIA reports that there are no "firm indications" of an imminent attack on Saigon.

In any case, you will note Westy's judgment that "both U.S and ARVN forces are fully alert and prepared to deal with any emergency."

Thieu's assessment is as follows, in a talk with Bunker on February 15:

"I asked Thieu how he assessed the Tet offensive from the perspective of about two weeks. Thieu remarked that he was increasingly impressed with the indication it gave of the price the enemy was willing to pay for its political and psychological objectives. He thought it would take them quite some time to recover from the high losses they had suffered both in men and weapons. He anticipated that they will continue to try to apply pressure wherever possible, seeking to pin down our troops to the maximum extent while continuing their build up for possible future offensives. He expected they would make use of mortar attacks, harassments, attacks on air fields, and a general build up of tension among our troops. Their hope would be to prevent us from using our forces elsewhere and he thought this might go on for some time, maybe 3 to 4 months. Anticipating a major offensive in the north, during the dry season there, perhaps beginning in April or May, he predicted that its timing and duration would be designed to have the maximum effect during our summer political conventions."

DECLASSIFIED Authority OSD 11-15-78 letter

R , NARS, Date 3-20-79

