

KHE SANH

KHE SANH

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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CM-2944-68
3 Feb 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: KHE SANH

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

In response to your telephone call to me last evening, I asked General Westmoreland to provide me his views as soon as possible on our reinforcement capability in the Khe Sanh area. His reply to me is presented in the following paragraphs for your information.

"1. I agree with (General Wheeler's) response on the question of our Khe Sanh reinforcement capability and would add the following amplification.

"2. Our situation at Khe Sanh as compared with the French at Dien Bien Phu is different in three significant respects. We have supporting air (tactical air and B-52's) for all-weather attack of enemy forces by orders of magnitude over that at Dien Bien Phu. We have reinforcing heavy artillery within range of the Khe Sanh area from USMC positions east of the mountains. We have multiple and vastly improved techniques for aerial supply and we are within helicopter support range for troop reinforcement, logistic support, medical evacuation and other requirements.

"3. We now have four Marine Corps battalions and one ARVN ranger battalion with combat and combat service support in the Khe Sanh area. We currently have two brigades of the 1st Air Cavalry Division (Airmobile), plus one brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, with appropriate light and medium artillery support, located north of the Ai Van Pass, within prompt reinforcing distance of Khe Sanh. We have plans to further reinforce this area on short notice if required.

"4. We have a significant capability to reinforce Khe Sanh by fire in all weather conditions by artillery, tactical air, and B-52's. There are 18 105MM howitzers and 6 155 MM howitzers within the Khe Sanh defensive system. Additionally, 16 175MM guns are with the 3d Marine Division forces east of Khe Sanh positioned at the Rock Pile and at Camp Carroll. These guns are within range of Khe Sanh and their fires can be massed as required through the use of the centralized fire direction facility at Dong Ha. In addition to this heavy artillery support, and in contrast to the French situation at Dien Bien Phu, we have a highly effective tactical air and B-52 capability. Radar or "SKY SPOT" technique allows us

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direct tactical air strikes either at night or in zero visibility conditions throughout the Khe Sanh area. In addition to tactical air, our B-52 strikes are also weather independent. During adverse weather in the Khe Sanh area there are frequent breaks of three or four hours, in which we could intensify the air strikes, and insert helicopter gun ships into the area for additional fires as required. If the enemy masses to attack, he will be extremely vulnerable to the massed B-52's against his supporting forces and destructive power of tactical air, gunships and artillery against his infantry. This capability of reinforcement by fire alone could have changed the course of battle at Dien Bien Phu.

"5. Although logistical support will present a major problem, I am satisfied we can resolve it by our multiple means of resupply. Enemy interdiction of the airfield at Khe Sanh will not deny our reinforcement and support capability by helicopters. As pointed out in (General Wheeler's) response to the President, we could also re-open Route 9 for a land line of communication. This would take 22 company days of engineer effort, but with considerable cost in security.

"6. Although not ideal, the tactical situation at Khe Sanh as well as our improved combat techniques and capabilities are considerably different from those at Dien Bien Phu.

"7. Addressing the President's query on additional help required, with the current level of activity we need an additional squadron of C-130 aircraft, complete with ground handling and maintenance crews, for immediate usage. In addition, I recommend a second squadron of C-130's be alerted for immediate movement if unforeseen contingencies arise. Admiral Sharp may wish to address these requirements from the standpoint of assets available elsewhere in the theater. Additionally, it would be prudent to have heavy air drop equipment in reserve which can be called forward if we need it. We currently have a capability of delivering 600 tons per day for 14 days with no recovery. I would like at least an equal quantity ready for immediate air shipment forward if required. These requirements are also being submitted separately. Acceleration of the issue of M-16 rifles, M-60 machine guns and M-29 mortars to South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) units would improve our posture in economy of force areas. The importance of helicopter assets in the pending battle cannot be overstated. To achieve the necessary helicopter lift for forces deployed to Northern Corps Tactical Zone, I plan drawing on Rosson's (Commander I Field Force) and Weyand's (Commander II Field Force) assets to a major degree. Expediting the rate of delivery of replacement helicopters for assault helicopter companies and assault support helicopter companies would aid in maintaining our situation in the south during the battle in the north. We are also experiencing high loss rates of O-1 observation aircraft and

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
replacements are urgently needed to maintain our observation and surveillance capability over our newly opened LOC, new areas under pacification, enemy routes of infiltration and enemy base areas. The northern I Corps Tactical Zone has greatly increased our engineering requirements. Construction of a logistical base, the maintenance of Route I in that area, construction of DYE MARKER obstacle/strong point system, plus the need of opening Route 9 to Khe Sanh will tax severely our construction capability. Providing the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion yet to be furnished as part of Program 5 would significantly improve our buildup in the north. With regard to Republic of Korea Forces, action should be taken to oppose any thought of withdrawing elements of Republic of Korea forces in Vietnam and returning them to Korea. In addition, every effort should be made to re-open negotiations regarding the proposed ROK light division deployment as soon as the situation in Korea will allow. Expedited deployment of the Thai light division, within practical limitation, is most desirable and would permit greater flexibility in the employment of our ready reaction forces in RVN.

"8. The use of tactical nuclear weapons should not be required in the present situation in view of the authority to use COFRAM. However, should the situation in the DMZ area change dramatically, we should be prepared to introduce weapons of greater effectiveness against massed forces. Under such circumstances I visualize that either tactical nuclear weapons or chemical agents would be active candidates for employment."

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, Feb. 5, 1968

12:00 noon *rec'd 12.20*

PS
Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's first daily
report on Khe Sanh.

"Gravel munitions," in para. 7, are
the small anti-personnel mines developed
for the barrier.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority *JCS 10-2-78 letter*
By *if*, NARS, Date *3-16-79*

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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CM-2968-68
5 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

1. At the present time, the situation in the Khe Sanh area is quiet. No enemy contacts have been reported in the area since the attack on Hill 861 ended yesterday at 6:25 PM EST, the details of which are described in the succeeding paragraphs.

2. At 3:00 PM EST yesterday, the Khe Sanh combat base began receiving heavy concentrations of enemy rocket, artillery and mortar fire. Twenty minutes later a force of from 200 to 300 enemy, supported with rocket and mortar fire, launched a ground attack against the US Marine company position on Hill 861, three and one-half miles northwest of the Khe Sanh airstrip. As the fighting grew in intensity, the Khe Sanh combat base provided artillery support, which included the delivery of chemical munitions (CS tear gas) on the enemy. At 4:20 PM EST a small group of the enemy succeeded in penetrating the defensive wire on the perimeter of the position, but the Marine defenders held their positions and drove the enemy off. Approximately thirty minutes later the enemy resumed the assault on Hill 861 while continuing to deliver mortar fire on the Khe Sanh combat base. Approximately one hour later the mortar fire on the Khe Sanh base ended and the attack on Hill 861 began to diminish in intensity. At 6:25 PM EST all action had ended and the Khe Sanh airstrip was open. In the attack on Hill 861, the enemy lost approximately 108 killed, eight of the dead were found inside the perimeter and numerous enemy dead were hanging from the barbed wire on the perimeter of the Marine company position. US Marine casualties, all from the company on Hill 861, were placed at seven killed and 44 wounded. Marine units in the Khe Sanh area expended a total of 2,800 rounds of various calibre artillery and mortar rounds in response to enemy shelling of the Khe Sanh base and surrounding area.

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3. Yesterday, US Air Force B-52 bombers flew 45 sorties against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. This brings the total number of B-52 sorties flown in that area since 15 January 1968 to 566, with approximately 16,980 tons of bombs delivered on the enemy. In these strikes a total of 426 secondary explosions have been observed.

4. US tactical aircraft flew 216 strike sorties in support of US Marine units at Khe Sanh during the past 24 hours (79 US Air Force, 94 US Marine Corps, and 43 US Navy). Bomb damage assessment of the foregoing sorties included three structures destroyed, seven bunkers destroyed and three secondary explosions. Weather prevented complete bomb damage assessment.

5. Air landed resupply during the period amounted to 128 tons.

6. No COFRAM was used during the period; however, these munitions are available and will be considered for use at the appropriate time.

7. General Westmoreland told me this morning at 9:30 AM EST that gravel munitions were emplaced yesterday in areas north of Khe Sanh.

8. The weather observation at 3:00 AM EST today in the Khe Sanh area reflects cloudy conditions with visibility at 15 miles. The outlook for the next 15 hours is cloudy with low ceilings, poor visibility, drizzle and fog. From 10:00 PM EST today until 7:00 AM EST tomorrow the outlook is improved; cloudy, but with higher ceilings and visibility at seven miles.

9. Planned operations in support of Khe Sanh:

a. During the next 24 hours, a total of 45 US Air Force B-52 aircraft are scheduled to bomb six targets near the Demilitarized Zone. Four of the targets are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh while two targets are adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone approximately 20 miles northeast of Khe Sanh.

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b. For the period ending 11:00 PM EST today, 156 tactical sorties are planned in the Khe Sanh area. Some 192 additional sorties are available on call to augment the planned effort. Should the situation require it, additional sorties up to a theoretical total of 623 could be diverted. The actual number which could be employed depends upon the weather in the area and the ability to control the strikes. In addition, the aircraft carrier KITTY HAWK has been alerted to provide additional close air support when requested.

10. Enemy units in contact are unknown at this time, but it is believed that the 95C Regiment is targeted on Hills 881 and 861 and the 101st Regiment on Khe Sanh. The exact location of other enemy units believed to be in the area is unknown.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

London

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Tuesday, February 6, 1968
9:50 a.m.

Rec'd 10:25

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's daily Khe Sanh summary.

The handwritten note on Abrams' assessment is encouraging.

In fact, there are now two solid conclusions:


- the people didn't rise;
- the government and the South Vietnamese functioned under maximum surprise, shock, and strain.

W. Rostow

CM-2970-68
6 February 1968

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Authority JCS 10-2-78 letter
By if, NARS, Date 3-16-79





THE JOINT STAFF

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CM-2970-68
6 February 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

1. There have been no major enemy contacts reported in the Khe Sanh area since the enemy attack on Hill 861. An updated report on US Marine casualties during the attack on Hill 861 shows 14 killed and 32 wounded.
2. Marine units in the Khe Sanh area received sporadic small arms and mortar fire. The enemy fire increased as supply missions to the outlying outposts and Hill 861 were conducted. However, there were no reports of casualties during the period. Marine units in the Khe Sanh area expended a total of 7,788 rounds of various caliber artillery and mortar ammunition in response to the sporadic harassment fire by the enemy forces.
3. During the past 24 hours, US Air Force B-52 bombers flew 55 sorties against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. On 4 February (5 February South Vietnam time), 33 B-52 sorties, not previously reported, were flown against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. The B-52 sorties flown in that area since 15 January 1968 now total 654, with approximately 19,000 tons of bombs delivered on the enemy.
4. US tactical aircraft flew 213 strike sorties in support of US Marine units at Khe Sanh during the past 24 hours (88 US Air Force, 90 US Navy, 35 US Marine Corps). Bomb damage assessment of the foregoing sorties included fifteen bunkers destroyed, seven gun positions destroyed, three trucks destroyed, three secondary fires, and one secondary explosion.
5. Air landed resupply during the period amounted to 214 tons.
6. No COFRAM was used during the period.
7. The weather observation at 3:00 AM EST (4:00 PM, 6 Feb, South Vietnam time) today in the Khe Sanh area reflects cloudy conditions with visibility at 10 miles. The outlook for the next 14 hours is cloudy with low ceilings, poor visibility,

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drizzle and fog. From 9:00 PM EST, 6 Feb (10:00 AM, 7 Feb, South Vietnam time) until 7:00 AM EST, 7 Feb (8:00 PM, 7 Feb, South Vietnam time) the outlook is improved: cloudy, but with higher ceilings, and visibility at seven miles, with occasional light showers.

8. Planned operations in support of Khe Sanh:

a. During the next 24 hours, a total of 33 US Air Force B-52 aircraft are scheduled to bomb five targets near the Demilitarized Zone. Two of the targets are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, two targets are near the Laotian border approximately 10 miles southwest of Khe Sanh, and one target is adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone approximately 20 miles northeast of Khe Sanh.

b. For the period ending 11:00 PM EST today (12:00 Noon, 7 Feb, South Vietnam time), 175 tactical sorties are planned in the Khe Sanh area. One hundred thirty-four additional sorties are available on call to augment the planned effort. Should the situation require it, additional sorties up to a theoretical total of 646 could be diverted into the area.

9. There have been no changes reported in enemy troop dispositions in the Khe Sanh area.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

P.S. I talked to Gen Westmoreland at 0830 hours. He had nothing spectacular to report. However, he stated that Gen Abrams has now visited all ARVN divisions except the 1st and 2nd in I Corps. Gen Abrams is highly pleased by alertness, aggressiveness and steadiness of all division commanders?

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Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

~~SECRET~~ MAC 01666 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: DAILY REPORT ON KHE SANH/DMZ SITUATION

THIS IS MY INITIAL REPLY TO YOUR REQUEST FOR A SUMMARY
OF ACTIVITY IN THE KHE SANH/DMZ AREA. THE PERIOD COVERED IS 041200H
TO 051200H FEB 68:

DURING THE INITIAL 17 HOURS OF THE PERIOD KHE SANH COMBAT
BASE AND MARINE UNITS IN THE SCOTLAND AREA REPORTED A TOTAL
OF APPROXIMATELY SIX ROUNDS OF ROCKET FIRE AND 70 ROUNDS OF MORTAR
FIRE RESULTING IN THREE USMC WIA EVACUATED. AN ARTILLERY MISSION WAS
FIRED RESULTING IN A REPORTED 10 NVA KIA. IN ADDITION, AT 050400H,
KHE SANH COMBAT BASE BEGAN RECEIVING ROCKETS, ARTY AND MORTAR
FIRE AND AT 050400H MARINES ON HILL 861, NW OF KHE SANH, CAME UNDER
GROUND ATTACK BY AN ESTIMATED 200 ENEMY (BN MINUS) USING BANGALORE
TORPEDOES, SATCHEL CHARGES AND MORTARS. THE MORTAR ATTACK ON KHE
SANH COMBAT BASE TERMINATED AT 0630H BUT RESUMED AGAIN AT 1100H.
THE GROUND ATTACK ON HILL 861 HAD DIMINISHED AT 0645H, WITH INITIAL
CASUALTY REPORTS LISTING AN ESTIMATED 100 ENEMY KIA AND FRIENDLY LOSSES
OF SEVEN KIA AND 24 WIA EVACUATED. DURING THE PERIOD, 39 B-52'S RAN
SIX STRIKES DELIVERING 975 TONS OF ORDNANCE IN SUPPORT OF THE KHE
SANH COMBAT BASE AND THE SCOTLAND AREA.

MARINE UNITS IN THE KHE SANH AREA EXPENDED A TOTAL OF 2819
ROUNDS OF VARIOUS CALIBER ARTY/MORTAR IN RESPONSE TO THE ENEMY SHELLING
OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE AND ENVIRONS. THE MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
FLEW 94 SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION DURING THE
PERIOD. 81 OF THE SORTIES WERE TPQ'S IN DIRECT SUPPORT, 13 SORTIES
WERE IN CLOSE SUPPORT. BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF THE FOREGOING
SORTIES INCLUDED THREE STRUCTURES DESTROYED, SEVEN BUNKERS
DESTROYED, AND THREE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. WEATHER CONDITIONS
PREVENTED A COMPLETE BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. 43 OF THE TOTAL SORTIES
FLOWN, DELIVERING A TOTAL OF 100.7 TONS OF ORDNANCE, WERE FLOWN IN
SUPPORT OF THE IMMEDIATE KHE SANH AREA.

REPORT OF THE IMMEDIATE KHE SANH AREA. USAF SORTIES AMOUNTED TO 79, WHILE THE USN FLEW 43 SORTIES. TOTAL TACTICAL SORTIES FLOWN WERE 203.

AIRLANDED RESUPPLY DURING THE PERIOD AMOUNTED TO 128 TONS. NO COFRAM WAS USED DURING THE PERIOD.

FOR THE NEXT 24 HOUR PERIOD, FMAW PLANS 50 STRIKE SORTIES IN THE KHE SANH AREA IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE 26TH MARINES. THESE SORTIES WILL BE FLOWN THROUGHOUT THE 24 HOUR PERIOD AND CONSIST OF A VARIETY OF ORDNANCE.

AN ADDITIONAL 12 STRIKES SORTIES WILL BE AVAILABLE ON HOT PAD ALERT FOR SCRAMBLE AS REQUIRED. DUE TO DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY MARINE AIRCRAFT ON GROUND DURING RECENT ROCKET ATTACK ON CHU LAI, THERE HAS BEEN A REDUCTION IN AVAILABLE MARINE AIR SORTIES. FIFTY EIGHT 7TH AF STRIKES SORTIES ARE PLANNED TO AUGMENT THE FMAW EFFORT IN THE VICINITY OF KHE SANH COMBAT BASE. THE USN WILL FLY 48 SORTIES. FIVE ARC LIGHT STRIKES WILL BE FLOWN FOR THE 5 -6 FEB PERIOD. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 32 ADDITIONAL AF TACTICAL SUPPORT AIRCRAFT ON CALL IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH WHICH COULD PRODUCE 180 SORTIES IN A 24 HOUR PERIOD. SHOULD THE SITUATION REQUIRE, ADDITIONAL SORTIES COULD BE DIVERTED UP TO A THEORETICAL TOTAL OF 623. THE NUMBER THAT COULD BE EMPLOYED WOULD DEPEND UPON THE WEATHER AND OUR ABILITY TO CONTROL THE STRIKES.

ENEMY UNITS IN CONTACT ARE UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT THE 95C REGT IS TARGETED ON HILLS 881 AND 861 AND THE 101ST REGT ON KHE SANH. THE EXACT LOCATION OF OTHER ENEMY UNITS BELIEVED TO BE IN THE AREA IS UNKNOWN.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY. CAS "PASS TO MR CHILLEMI" FOR AMB BUNKER.

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FM GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASH DC

INFO GEN JOHNSON, CSA, WASH DC

GEN MCCONNELL, CSAF, WASH DC

GEN CHAPMAN, CMC, WASH DC

ADM MOORER, CNO, WASH DC

FMROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE, WASH DC

MR RUSK, STATE DEPT, WASH DC

MR HELMS, CIA

O 061029Z ZYH ZFF"

5:29 AM

FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV, SAIGON

TO GENERAL WHEELER, CJCS, WASHINGTON

INFO ADMIRAL SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

AMBASSADOR BUNKER, SAIGON (ASS TO MR CHILLZMI)

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 01695 EYES ONLY

THIS IS THE SECOND REPORT ON THE KHE SANH AREA AND COVERS THE PERIOD 051200T TO 061200 FEBRUARY 1968.

DURING THIS PERIOD THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE AND MARINE UNITS IN THE SCOTLAND AREA CONTINUED TO RECEIVE SPORADIC SMALL ARMS AND MORTAR FIRE. THE ENEMY FIRE INCREASED AS SUPPLY MISSIONS TO THE OUTLYING OP'S AND HILL 861 WERE CONDUCTED. HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF CASUALTIES DURING THE PERIOD. MARINE UNITS IN THE KHE SANH AREA EXPENDED A TOTAL OF 7788 ROUNDS OF VARIOUS CALIBER ARTILLERY AND MORTAR AMMUNITION IN RESPONSE TO THE SPORADIC HARASSMENT FIRE BY THE ENEMY FORCES. NO COFRAM WAS USED. DURING THE PERIOD, 43 B-52 AIRCRAFT MADE FIVE STRIKES IN THE NIAGARA AREA. AIR SUPPORT IN THE KHE SANH (NIAGARA) AREA WAS PROVIDED BY 35 USMN SORTIES, 88 USAF SORTIES AND 90 USN SORTIES FOR A TOTAL OF 213 TACTICAL SORTIES. ALTHOUGH COMPLETE BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WAS PREVENTED BY ADVERSE WEATHER, THE FOLLOWING WAS REPORTED: ONE SECONDARY EXPLOSION, THREE SECONDARY FIRES, SEVEN GUN POSITIONS DESTROYED, THREE TRUCKS DESTROYED, AND 15 BUNKERS DESTROYED.

AIR RESUPPLY WAS EFFECTED IN THE KHE SANH AREA DURING THE PERIOD WITH THE DELIVERY (AIRLANDED) OF 214 SHORT TONS.

FOR THE PERIOD 061200T TO 071200H FEBRUARY, THE MARINE AIR WING PLANS TO FLY 69 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF THE KHE SANH AREA WHILE AN ADDITIONAL 14 AIRCRAFT WILL BE ON CALL DURING THE PERIOD. USAF SORTIES PLANNED FOR THE NEXT PERIOD IN NIAGARA AMOUNT TO 54, WHILE THE USN WILL FLY 52 SORTIES, FOR A GRAND TOTAL OF 175 PLANNED SORTIES. THE USAF WILL HAVE 120 SORTIES ON CALL FOR THE NIAGARA AREA. ALSO, AN ADDITIONAL 396 USAF SORTIES AND 250 USN SORTIES COULD BE DIVERTED INTO THE KHE SANH AREA, FOR A THEORETICAL TOTAL OF 646 ADDITIONAL SORTIES. THIRTY-SIX ARC LIGHT STRIKES ARE SCHEDULED IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

ENEMY UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS REMAIN THE SAME AS REPORTED YESTERDAY, AND THE THREAT TO KHE SANH REMAINS UNCHANGED.

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SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS.

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By inf, NARS, Date 3-31-78

Robtson

This was in
Wheeler's report

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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JS

Wednesday, February 7, 1968
10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's Khe Sanh
daily -- key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-78



~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

CM-2971-68
7 February 1968

30a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

1. ~~The enemy has renewed his efforts against US and South Vietnamese forces in the Khe Sanh - Lang Vei area.~~ During the early morning hours yesterday (approximately 3:00 PM on 6 February, South Vietnam time) the Khe Sanh Combat Base and US Marine units in the surrounding area received 58 rounds of mixed mortar fire and an undetermined number of rockets resulting in five US Marines wounded. At 11:45 AM EST yesterday (12:45 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time), the Khe Sanh Combat Base began receiving a heavy volume of rocket and mortar fire. At approximately the same time, the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp came under a heavy ground attack by an estimated enemy infantry company supported by nine armored vehicles believed to be Soviet PT-76 Amphibious Tanks (description attached). By 1:50 PM EST (2:50 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time) five of the tanks were reported to have been damaged or destroyed. The attacking enemy also directed heavy supporting mortar and artillery fire on the Lang Vei defenses, and an aerial observer saw the enemy employing flame-throwers in the assault on Lang Vei. Despite poor weather conditions US tactical aircraft provided continual close air support during the heavy fighting and the Khe Sanh Combat Base delivered a large volume of supporting artillery fire throughout the battle. The supporting fire included 28 rounds of 105-mm COFRAM ammunition, but no report of its effectiveness has been received. The intensity of the fighting began to diminish at 10:00 PM EST last night (11:00 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). US tactical aircraft continued to strike enemy concentrations throughout the Khe Sanh - Lang Vei area during the day (7 February, South Vietnam time). A reaction force was en route to Lang Vei at 3:30 AM EST this morning (4:30 PM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). Latest reports indicate fighting still prevails, but on a limited scale. There are no reports as yet of the exact extent of enemy or friendly casualties, but a preliminary report states

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that 16 US Special Forces advisors, who had been wounded, were evacuated from Lang Vei at 2:00 AM EST today (3:00 PM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). Fourteen wounded South Vietnamese were also evacuated at the same time. A preliminary report also indicates that all buildings in the Lang Vei camp were destroyed. The military population of the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp included 18 US Army Special Forces advisors, 494 members of the South Vietnamese Civilian Irregular Defense Group organized into three companies and a mobile strike force, and 29 other South Vietnamese personnel. The Khe Sanh Combat Base continued to receive enemy fire throughout the night and early morning hours (South Vietnam time) until it ceased completely at 9:47 PM EST last night (10:47 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). The runway at Khe Sanh airfield was cratered, but it was repaired and the airfield was fully operational at 9:30 PM EST last night (10:30 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). In another action at 9:40 AM EST yesterday (10:40 PM on 6 February, South Vietnam time), the US Marine company on Hill 861 was hit by a light-ground attack from the southeast. The attack ended about one hour later. The results of the attack have not yet been reported.

2. During the past 24 hours, US Air Force B-52 bombers flew 30 sorties against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh area. The number of B-52 sorties flown in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area since 15 January 1968 now totals 684 with approximately 19,900 total tons of bombs delivered on the enemy.

3. US tactical aircraft flew 199 strike sorties in support of units at Khe Sanh during the past 24 hours (83 US Air Force, 67 US Marine Corps, 49 US Navy). Bomb damage assessment of the reported air sorties was somewhat hindered by weather, however, one very large explosion and 15 other secondary explosions were reported by tactical support aircraft.

4. During the period, 136 short tons of supplies were delivered to the Khe Sanh Combat Base by air, over half of which was ammunition.

5. The latest weather observation at 5:00 AM EST (6:00 PM 7 February, South Vietnam time) today in the Khe Sanh area reflects cloudy conditions with visibility at five miles in fog. The forecast for the next 14 hours is cloudy with low ceilings, poor visibility, drizzle and fog. From 9:00 PM EST, 7 February (10:00 AM, 8 February, South Vietnam time) until 7:00 AM EST, 8 February (8:00 PM, 8 February, South Vietnam time) the outlook is improved: cloudy with intermittent light rain, higher ceilings and visibility at seven miles.

6. Planned operations in support of Khe Sanh:

a. During the next 24 hours, 39 US Air Force B-52 sorties are scheduled against targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. Four of the targets are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, and one target is adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone, approximately six miles north-northwest of Camp Carroll.

b. For the period until 11:00 PM EST today (12:00 noon 8 February, South Vietnam time) 152 tactical air sorties are scheduled into the Khe Sanh area. 16 additional sorties are available on immediate call to augment the scheduled sorties. An additional 396 US Air Force and 250 US Navy sorties could be diverted into the Khe Sanh area, for a total of 646 additional sorties.

7. US Marine units defending the Khe Sanh area have a vast amount of fire support available to them from external sources (16 175-mm guns, all-weather tactical aircraft, armed helicopters, and B-52 bombers). These units also have considerable fire power from their own assigned weapons, which, in addition to a large number of automatic weapons, include 102 mortars (60-mm, 81-mm, and 4.2 inch), 32 106-mm recoilless rifles, and 24 howitzers (105-mm and 155-mm). Also available are two vehicles which mount four .50-caliber machine-guns (quad 50s) each and two track-type armored vehicles with two 40-mm guns (twin 40s) on each vehicle. The quad 50s and twin 40s are dual-purpose and can be used either for air defense or against ground targets. In addition, there are five M48 tanks (90-mm guns) and ten light track-type vehicles (ONTOS) on each of which are mounted six 106-mm recoilless rifles. Because of the significant fire power of the units defending Khe Sanh and the reinforcing fires immediately available from the heavy artillery east of Khe Sanh along with the supporting strikes of tactical aircraft, armed helicopters and B-52 bombers which can be delivered against the enemy, it is not considered necessary to deploy additional supporting weapons and forces to the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Moreover, additional weapons and units within the Khe Sanh defensive perimeter would inordinately increase the concentration of our resources in a relatively confined area, correspondingly increasing the risk of losses to enemy fire, and would add a significant amount of logistic support requirements. It is considered preferable to retain additional fire support means for employment in concert with counter-attacking and exploitation forces when they are committed.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

VV MACV0665

TELECON ITEM 0281/68

ZNY CCCCC

O 071615Z FEB 68

FM COMUSMACV

TO NMCC

CINCPAC

INFO ZEN/CG III MAF DA NANG

ZEN/CG I FFORCEV NHA TRANG

ZEN/CG II FFORCEV LONG BINH

ZEN/SA IV CTZ CAN THO

ZEN/CDR 7TH AIR FORCE SAIGON

ZEN/COMNAVFORV SAIGON

ZEN/CO 5TH SFGA NHA TRANG

ZEN/MACV FORWARD

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM MACCOC3

SUBJ: SPECIAL TELECON (KHE SANH/LANG VEI) (U)

1. SITUATION AS OF 071200H FEB: THE ENEMY CONTROLLED THE CAMP ABOVE GROUND WITH AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF CIDG AND AN ESTIMATED 14 USASF PERSONNEL HOLED UP IN BUNKERS (UNDERGROUND). ARTILLERY AND AIR WAS DELIVERED AGAINST THE ENEMY AND AN ELEMENT OF BV 33 BATTALION ADVISED BY A USASF SGT ATTEMPTED TO PENETRATE THE CAMP TO ASSIST IN THE EXTRACTION OF THE FRIENDLY PERSONNEL ON SITE.

2. AS OF 071630H FEB: A HELIBORNE RELIEF FORCE LED BY USASF PERSONNEL FROM THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE WAS DISPATCHED WITH THE MISSION OF JOINING WITH THE BV 33 UNIT IN A RAID ON THE CAMP. GUNSHIPS AND TACTICAL AIR FROM THE 1ST MARINE AIR WING FIRED SUPPRESSIVE FIRE ON THE TOC OF THE CAMP IN PREPARATION FOR THE RAID. UNDER COVER OF THIS FIRE AND PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE RELIEF FORCE, THE FRIENDLY PERSONNEL ON SITE TOOK ESCAPE AND EVASION ACTION.

3. THE RELIEF FORCE PUT DOWN AT "OLD" LANG VEI (XD 794357) AND MOVED OVERLAND TO THE NEW LANG VEI SIXT (XD 786356). ENROUTE THE RELIEF FORCE ENCOUNTERED 13 OF THE 20 US PERSONNEL WHO WERE IN THE CAMP AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL ATTACK. ONE ADDITIONAL US PERSONNEL WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RECOVERED. A TOTAL OF 14 OF 20 US PERSONNEL WERE RECOVERED. SIX US PERSONNEL REMAIN UNACCOUNTED FOR. SINCE NO REENTRY OF THE CAMPSITE WAS MADE BY THE RELIEF FORCE, THE EXACT STATUS OF THESE SIX IS NOT KNOWN.

4. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT APPROXIMATELY 70-100 OF THE 450 INDIGENOUS FORCES ORIGINALLY IN THE CAMP HAVE BEEN PICKED UP. AN ADDITIONAL UNKNOWN NUMBER OF THESE PERSONNEL ARE ASSUMED TO BE IN AN ESCAPE AND EVASION STATUS.

5. THREE DESTROYED TANKS WERE OBSERVED IN THE AREA (ONE INSIDE THE PERIMETER, TWO ON THE ROAD OUTSIDE THE PERIMETER). IT IS BELIEVED THAT AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY NOW CONTROLS THE CAMP SITE.

6. THE FOREGOING CONSTITUTES A PRELIMINARY REPORT. FURTHER INFORMATION AND REFINEMENT WILL BE PROVIDED AS AVAILABLE.

GP-4

BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By isb, NARS, Date 3-31-78

306



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By if, NARS, Date 3-16-79

CM-2971-68
7 February 1968

2A

30c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

1. The enemy has renewed his efforts against US and South Vietnamese forces in the Khe Sanh - Lang Vei area. During the early morning hours yesterday (approximately 3:00 PM on 6 February, South Vietnam time) the Khe Sanh Combat Base and US Marine units in the surrounding area received 58 rounds of mixed mortar fire and an undetermined number of rockets resulting in five US Marines wounded. At 11:45 AM EST yesterday (12:45 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time), the Khe Sanh Combat Base began receiving a heavy volume of rocket and mortar fire. At approximately the same time, the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp came under a heavy ground attack by an estimated enemy infantry company supported by nine armored vehicles believed to be Soviet PT-76 Amphibious Tanks (description attached). By 1:50 PM EST (2:50 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time) five of the tanks were reported to have been damaged or destroyed. The attacking enemy also directed heavy supporting mortar and artillery fire on the Lang Vei defenses, and an aerial observer saw the enemy employing flame-throwers in the assault on Lang Vei. Despite poor weather conditions US tactical aircraft provided continual close air support during the heavy fighting and the Khe Sanh Combat Base delivered a large volume of supporting artillery fire throughout the battle. The supporting fire included 28 rounds of 105-mm COFRAM ammunition, but no report of its effectiveness has been received. The intensity of the fighting began to diminish at 10:00 PM EST last night (11:00 AM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). US tactical aircraft continued to strike enemy concentrations throughout the Khe Sanh - Lang Vei area during the day (7 February, South Vietnam time). A reaction force was en route to Lang Vei at 3:30 AM EST this morning (4:30 PM on 7 February, South Vietnam time). Latest reports indicate fighting still prevails, but on a limited scale. There are no reports as yet of the exact extent of enemy or friendly casualties, but a preliminary report states

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
Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY KHE SANH/DMZ AREA

AS OF 070600 EST



DEMILITARIZED ZONE, VIETNAM VSC75010

31

PS
/A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy reports minor
operations at Khe Sanh.

Weather operational for both resupply
and tactical air support.

W. West
W. West Rostow



24
31a
Thursday, February 8, 1968

Following is the text of a cable sent by General Westmoreland at 5:22 AM this morning.

This is the fourth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the period from midnight EST February 7 to midnight EST February 8.

During this period the Khe Sanh combat base continued to receive sporadic shelling from mortar and rockets throughout the afternoon and night.

By 3:00am February 7 thirty two persons had been helilifted from the Lang Vei special forces camp, including 14 Americans. Three helicopters received enemy fire in the extraction resulting in one pilot being wounded. Three enemy tanks are reported to have been destroyed in the Lang Vei area.

At 4:25 pm the Marine outpost southwest of Khe Sanh started receiving rocket and mortar fire, followed by a ground attack. The attack continued until 5:45 pm. The enemy penetrated the wire of the platoon outpost but was repulsed. The enemy broke contact by 6:30 pm.

At 8:00 pm a Marine reinforcing element moved into position at the outpost. The position continued to receive sporadic incoming fire throughout the morning (last evening Washington time). The enemy fire was returned but with unknown results. During the period one Marine was reported killed, and two Marines were wounded and evacuated.

At 10:45 pm EST an air observer reported four enemy tanks southwest of Khe Sanh. Air strikes were run and it is believed that two of the tanks were disabled. An air observer also reported sighting 20 vehicles moving in a westerly direction five kilometers west of Lang Vei. Air strikes were conducted with unknown results.

During the period Marine tactical air flew 44 sorties in support of the area, the Air Force flew 98 sorties, the Navy 37, for a total of 179 sorties. Four Arc Light strikes (35 sorties) were flown against targets in the Niagara area. Reported bomb damage assessment as the result of the Arc Light strikes included three secondary fires and numerous secondary explosions.

The logistics status remains satisfactory in the Khe Sanh area. Airlift resupply provided 127 short tons of supplies, 94 tons of which was

ammunition. Individual combat rations were increased from 15 to 26 days.

No COFRAM type ammunition was expended during this period.

For the period encompassing the 24-hours of February 8 EST, seven Arc Light strikes (45 sorties) will be flown in the Niagara area. Tactical sorties include 44 Marine, 48 Air Force, and 52 Navy, for a total of 144 sorties. The Marines will have 16 aircraft on call for the Khe Sanh area while the Air Force will have 120 sorties on alert. Additional sorties that could theoretically be diverted into the Khe Sanh area total 406 Air Force, 250 Navy, for a grand total of 656.

Enemy unit identifications in the Khe Sanh area remain the same as previously reported.

The weather on the afternoon of February 7 was marginal for flying with a ceiling of 1,500 feet. The period from 7:00 am to 7:00 pm was poor with low ceilings and visibility as low as one third to one half miles in fog. Weather conditions improved to marginal at 7:00 pm, with ceilings of 2,000 feet and good visibility.

The forecast is for marginal to good conditions in the afternoon and evening of today, with ceilings varying from 2,000 to 3,000 feet. Early tomorrow the weather will become poor, with low clouds and visibilities restricted to one quarter to one mile in fog. By morning the weather should improve again to marginal, with ceilings of 1,500 feet.

31a

INFORMATION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

PS

Thursday, February 8, 1968
2:00 p.m.

Rec'd 2:15p

Mr. President:

Herewith a supplementary from
Gen. Wheeler on Khe Sanh.

W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority GC 5 10-2-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-2972-68
8 February 1968

2A

31b

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

You have received General Westmoreland's fourth report on the Khe Sanh area, covering the period through 11:00 PM EST, 7 February 1968. I have received additional information from General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp which is reported in the succeeding paragraphs.

General Westmoreland informed me that he has issued instructions to General Weyand (Commanding General, II Field Force) to arrange for a US unit to be brought into the race track area of Saigon. This will release Vietnamese troops to put more pressure on enemy elements in the city. Although General Westmoreland is reluctant to take this step, he feels that it is essential to push ARVN to greater action to clean up Saigon. Additionally, as I told you yesterday, he plans to move a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division to Hue/Phu Bai. Also, a Vietnamese Marine Battalion will be moved to Hue/Phu Bai to replace one of the depleted Vietnamese airborne battalions in that area. He indicates that he may follow these deployments with two more Vietnamese Marine Battalions into that area.

You may be interested to know that, yesterday, as a result of an ambush of an enemy party by US forces west of Saigon, a North Vietnamese passport containing a Cambodian visa, stamped Phnom Penh, and a baggage claim check from Phnom Penh, were taken from one of the bodies. The party had a sophisticated radio, believed to be single sideband. It was reported that this appeared to be a most important group.

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Regarding the North Vietnamese air threat, Admiral Sharp has assured me that all concerned have been watching this activity closely and that all forces have been alerted to this potential threat. In this regard, air strikes are being conducted daily at Vinh and Bai Thuong airfields to preclude their being used as forward staging bases for MIG operations. These airfields are being seeded with 500 pound bombs with influence fuzes (Mark 36s) as necessary to harass and disrupt repair operations. Additionally, fighter cover is being provided for B-52s operating in the DMZ and Mu Gia Pass areas. A full report on the air threat will be provided separately as requested by you.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

26
32
CM-2993-68
9 February 1968

PS
7
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

You have received General Westmoreland's fifth report on the situation in Khe Sanh through 11:00 PM EST, 8 February 1968. I talked to General Westmoreland at 8:30 AM EST this morning and obtained some additional information which is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

Yesterday was fairly quiet. The enemy appears to be tired. However, General Westmoreland expects the second cycle of attacks to begin soon and he has been getting ready for these attacks.

In Khe Sanh, B-52 and tactical air strikes continue to pound the area. The weather is marginal in that area and bad along the coast.

In Hue/Phu Bai, three ARVN Airborne Battalions are down to the approximate strength of 160 men each. General Westmoreland is reinforcing with three Vietnamese Marine Battalions - one to be airlifted into Hue today, one tomorrow, and one the day after. In addition, one battalion of the 101st Airborne Division will be deployed to Hue/Phu Bai tomorrow. A second battalion of the 101st will be moved to Hue by landing ships. There have been reports out of I Corps that the Citadel in Hue has been cleared of enemy; however, General Westmoreland can neither confirm nor deny this yet.

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The situation in Dalat is clearing up, although there is still some fighting in the western part of the city. In Saigon, there have been some skirmishes.

The IV Corps area, according to General Westmoreland, is in good shape. He is concentrating his Riverine Force at My Tho.

The Provisional Field Army Headquarters, to be called MACV Forward, under General Abrams (who continues in his capacity as Deputy COMUSMACV) will open tomorrow, to control all forces generally in the area of the I Corps Tactical Zone. I previously reported this to you, but the events since TET have delayed the establishment of this headquarters.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

32a

INFORMATION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

(P) Friday, February 9, 1968
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's latest on Khe
Sanh.

Walt
W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-18-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

306

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 9, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the fifth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24 hour period of Thursday, February 8, 1968.

During the period the Khe Sanh Combat Base and the surrounding area continued to receive sporadic mortar, rocket, and harassing small arms and sniper fire. A total of 21 Marines were killed and 27 were wounded and evacuated. There were 124 enemy killed, one captured, and 27 individual and 23 crew-served weapons captured as a result of the enemy mortar and ground attack on the Marine Company yesterday morning.

Marine aircraft flew 49 sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area while the Air Force flew 101, and the Navy flew 77, for a total of 227. Ten secondary fires and one secondary explosion were reported. Three personnel carriers and a "tank-like" vehicle were destroyed, and 10 other vehicles were damaged. The latter was the action taken against the enemy tanks and vehicles sighted yesterday southwest and west of Khe Sanh.

Seven ARC LIGHT strikes (39) sorties were run in the Niagara area. Four of these strikes were in proximity to Khe Sanh. Marine units in the area fired 5543 rounds of mortar and artillery ammunition.

The Khe Sanh logistics position continues to improve. A total of 214 short tons of supplies were airlifted in during the period for an increase of 87 short tons. The bulk of the airlift was the delivery of 140 short tons of ammunition. 41.5 short tons of engineering equipment, including bunkering material, and 24 short tons of vehicles were also delivered. Airlift resupply is being accomplished with Air Force C-130 and C-123 Aircraft and Marine C-130 and CH-53 helicopters. The 26 days of individual combat rations reported yesterday was not correct. The revised status of these ratios is 12 days. The ammunition stocks are adequate, the lowest being 11 days for the 105 MM howitzers. No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 96-198
By ilz, NARA, Date 8-12-04

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- 2 -

For the next period, four ARC LIGHT strikes (27 sorties) will be flown in support of Khe Sanh. Marine tactical air plans 44 sorties (additional 16 on call), the Air Force plans 74 sorties, and the Navy 52, in support of Khe Sanh, for a total of 172 sorties. The Air Force will also have 128 tactical air sorties on call, and a potential of diverting pre-planned strikes from other areas for a total of 631 sorties (Air Force 381, Navy 250).

There is no new information on enemy identification, strengths, and capabilities.

The weather in the Khe Sanh area for the early afternoon of the 8th February was good but about 2:00 PM it became marginal. Fog formed at about 8:00 PM making the weather poor for the rest of the night and for the morning of the 9th. The forecast for the afternoon of the 9th is for marginal weather. The formation of fog by 8:00 PM will make the rest of the night poor with improvement to marginal again by noon on the 12th.

We have undertaken to evacuate the BV-33 Laotian Battalion, their dependents, and other refugees from the immediate Khe Sanh area. We will back-load resupply aircraft and take them to Danang for onward shipment to Laos. I am hoping we can arrange for other than military aircraft for the leg from Danang to Laos. The evacuation is underway and I will inform you as we proceed.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968
9:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's latest on Khe Sanh.

Walt
W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-18-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

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2A

33a

Saturday, February 10, 1968, 9:15 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the sixth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24-hour period of February 9, 1968 (Washington time).

During the reporting period the Khe Sanh Combat Base and the outlying areas continued to receive sporadic shelling from mortars, with occasional rocket rounds reported.

The night of February 9 - 10 was characterized by brief contacts with exchanges of small arms fire and grenades. At 10:15 AM EST a Marine Listening Post about three kilometers northwest of the Khe Sanh Base received small arms fire and grenades in conjunction with a ground attack by an estimated 35 to 40 enemy. The Listening Post withdrew to the company perimeter and the Marine Company then received seven satchel charges in the perimeter wire, with two enemy penetrating the outer wire. In the face of the defense action, the enemy did not press the attack. This action resulted in two Marines killed and three other receiving minor wounds. The extent of the enemy casualties is unknown.

At midnight last night C-130 aircraft received enemy fire about two miles southwest of the Khe Sanh airstrip while approaching for a landing. The aircraft caught fire and was completely destroyed, resulting in two killed, four critically injured, and three missing.

During this period Marine Tactical Air flew 34 sorties. The Air Force flew 66 sorties, the Navy flew 63, for a total of 163 sorties in the Khe Sanh Area. The Marine air strikes produced several secondary explosions while the Air Force reported three secondary explosions, four secondary fires, and three trucks destroyed.

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- 2 -

Photo reconnaissance obtained confirms the presence of several PT-76 tanks in the Lang Vei area. There were four ARC LIGHT strikes (27 sorties) run in the Niagara area in support of the Khe Sanh Base and its environs.

On February 9 the Ground Control Facility at the Khe Sanh was rendered inoperative due to enemy fire. As a result only three C-130 aircraft were able to resupply with 32 short tons of cargo. Twenty-two short tons of the resupply was petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and the remaining ten short tons were individual combat rations. The level of stocks of all classes remains adequate. The Ground Control equipment was back in operation today. No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period. For the period midnight Friday to midnight Saturday EST, there will be six ARC LIGHT strikes (39 sorties) flown in the Niagara area. Marine tactical air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, while the Air Force has 88 sorties planned, and the Navy has 100 planned, for a total of 232 sorties. The Air Force has 120 additional sorties on alert.

There is no change in enemy unit identification in the area.

On February 9 the weather was poor in the afternoon with cloud ceilings of 700 feet and fog. By 4:00 PM the weather conditions began to deteriorate with zero visibility by 8:00 PM. The weather improved to marginal early Saturday morning and there was good visibility. The weather then remained marginal the rest of the morning. The forecast for the period noon Saturday to noon Sunday is for marginal weather to continue until about 8:00 PM. At this time the formation of fog will make the weather poor with visibilities of less than 1 mile. Conditions will improve to marginal by 11:00 AM on February 11 with ceilings of 1200 feet.

The first two groups of Lao personnel (83 total) arrived in Danang. All are personnel of the BV-33 Battalion. They are housed on the Danang Air Base. Rations are being furnished. U.S. and local relief officials have made arrangements for sanitation, water, and other necessities. Embassy Vietiane has responded in this matter and we expect that either Lao Aircraft or Air America will eventually transport the Laotians to their destination.

~~SECRET~~

33b

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

87
Saturday, February 10, 1968
1:45 p.m.

Mr. President: *Rec'd 130*

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's
latest situation report.

W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 9CS 10-2-78 letter
By if, NARS, Date 3-16-78



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

20
330
CM-2999-68
10 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

You have received General Westmoreland's sixth report on the situation in the Khe Sanh area for the period through 11:00 PM EST, 9 February 1968. I talked to General Westmoreland at 8:00 AM EST this morning and obtained the information on the situation in Vietnam which is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

General Westmoreland assesses the current situation as similar to that which prevailed in China in 1948, in that the Red Chinese moved their people into the cities and then besieged the cities. In this connection, he is continuing his preparations for an anticipated second cycle of attacks. He is also striving to reopen the roads, so as to permit the resupply of food. He reports that there is plenty of rice in Saigon and Danang.

General Westmoreland considers that the enemy may use tanks in the eastern part of the DMZ area, and he is sending General Abrams to talk to the commanders in that area about this potential threat. General Westmoreland is concerned about the impact a tank attack might have upon the ARVN units, and accordingly, General Mommyer is developing plans for the use of Napalm and Zuni rockets against any tank attack in that area.

The Hue/Phu Bai area is, as was reported yesterday, being reinforced by three Vietnamese Marine Battalions. Presently, three-fifths of the city is controlled by South Vietnamese forces; however, General Westmoreland estimates that there are some 2,000 Viet Cong still in Hue.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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There are five battalions of the Americal Division south of Danang. There was heavy fighting there yesterday, and it is reported that elements of the 2d North Vietnamese Division are now pulling back.

The KC-130 which was destroyed in Khe Sanh was hit on landing by a 12.7 mm machine gun; as the aircraft landed, the POL aboard exploded.

The II Corps area was relatively quiet. There is still fighting in Dalat, but we are making headway there. Elements of the 33d North Vietnamese Regiment have been located south of Ban Me Thuot along the river. Kontum is quiet. In Dak To, a lieutenant who defected from the 174th North Vietnamese Regiment reported that one-third of his regiment had been killed. In Binh Dinh Province, the ROK forces have been doing well, killing some 800 members of the 3d North Vietnamese Division in the Qui Nhon area.

In Long An Province, 123 enemy were killed and 17 captured, one of whom was a North Vietnamese from Cambodia - - significantly, several brand new weapons, of Red Chinese make (still in cosmoline) were captured. In the capital, Viet Cong assassins killed eight policemen.

General Westmoreland has intelligence of an expected attack on Tan Son Nhut tonight, and has made preparations for this.

The IV Corps area was also relatively quiet. The Riverine Force killed 83 enemy in the My Tho area, where there is an enemy build-up. General Westmoreland hopes to reopen Highway 4 by Sunday night.

MACV Forward, the Provisional Field Army Headquarters which I mentioned in my memorandum to you yesterday, has opened. General Abrams will operate from that headquarters from time to time.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Sunday, February 11, 1968
11:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's
supplementary report from Westy,
including the possibility of their
using ground-to-ground missiles on
their tanks.

They have a 400 lb. warhead.

Westy Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78 letter

By JP, NARS, Date 3-16-79

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3001-68
11 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

You have received General Westmoreland's seventh report on the situation in the Khe Sanh area for the period through 11:00 PM EST, 10 February 1968. I talked to General Westmoreland at 8:15 AM EST this morning and obtained the information on the situation in Vietnam which is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

As General Westmoreland's report indicated, Khe Sanh airfield was shelled yesterday. A C-130 aircraft was hit by fragments of a mortar shell upon landing, damaging its hydraulic system; they may be able to repair this aircraft tomorrow. General Westmoreland plans to use C-123 and Caribou aircraft in resupplying Khe Sanh and, to meet this need, has had General Mommyer convert for airlift use some C-123s used in the defoliation effort.

Sniper fire continued in Hue. The first of the three Vietnamese Marine Battalions to reinforce in Hue arrived there yesterday; in addition, elements of a US Marine Battalion were moved in. There was heavy fighting south of Danang, resulting in 195 enemy killed. There was light contact on the outskirts of Dalat.

The attack on Tan Son Nhut did materialize as General Westmoreland expected, resulting in 196 enemy killed and 170 or so weapons captured.

In the IV Corps area there was light contact in several towns.

A rallier (defector) taken at Khe Sanh gave information on the following order of enemy attack: (1) Lang Vei; (2) Con Thien; (3) Khe Sanh. He stated also that he had seen near Thanh Hoa several weeks

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~~TOP SECRET~~

ago about 20 missiles mounted on PT-76 Amphibious Tank chassis (the PT-76 was used at Lang Vei). General Westmoreland indicated these could be FROG missiles (see attachment) and that this could be the "big surprise" which the Soviet correspondent in Hanoi wrote about recently. Other possibilities for the "big surprise", in General Westmoreland's view, could be the use of SA-2 missiles near the DMZ, air strikes in the DMZ area by IL-28s, and MIG attacks against B-52s. General Westmoreland and his commanders are alert to all of these possibilities and taking appropriate measures.

In addition, General Westmoreland provided me the following assessment of South Korean and Australian troops in Vietnam:

"South Korean and Australian forces have aggressively and professionally fought the enemy wherever and whenever encountered. In addition to providing very capable defense of their own tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) the presence of these allies has provided us the flexibility for redeployment of our own more mobile forces to contend with other threat areas. It is also significant that Highway 1 has remained open through the length of the Korean TAOR during the current situation. The fact that the more dramatic events of well coordinated enemy attacks have bypassed Korean and Australian areas is attributable to an extent to the emphasis of enemy strategy."

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

FROG Missile

PT-76 Amphibious Tank

~~TOP SECRET~~

34b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 11, 1968
Sunday 11:05 am

Mr. President:

Here is Gen. Westmoreland's
morning report.

Figures on the Khe Sanh
supply situation are given on
page 2.

Brom
Bromley Smith

Sunday, February 11, 1968

34c

Following is the text of a ~~cable sent by General Westmoreland this morning~~

This is the seventh report on the ~~Khe Sanh~~ area and covers a period of 24-hours ending at midnight last night.

During the reporting period the Khe Sanh combat base and the surrounding area continued to receive ~~sporadic shelling from mortars, rockets and~~ ~~occasional artillery rounds~~. Between 7:17 February 10 and noon February 10 units had brief exchanges of small arms fire and grenades on the western end of the perimeter and western outposts resulting in three enemy killed. At 7:15 February 10 a trip flare exposed 14 enemy just west of Khe Sanh near the wire. An exchange of fire resulted in one enemy killed. At noon February 10 lights were spotted moving between Hills 861 and 881S, and metallic noises were heard. Lights and noises were fired on with unknown results. Tactical air strike runs during the period resulted in four secondary explosions.

Several enemy encroachments toward friendly positions and increasing enemy pressure was noted during the period. ~~Enemy in the area continued to improve their defensive positions with emphasis on anti-tank defense~~. On February 10, 136 mines were emplaced southwest of the airfield. A review of all 106mm recoilless rifle, 3.5 rocket launchers, light-antitank weapon, and tank positions has been conducted to ensure complete coverage of all likely tank approaches.

Latest information received on the Marine C-130 crash which was reported yesterday reveals that the aircraft is believed to have received 50-caliber machine gun fire on its approach. The aircraft was loaded with POL which caught on fire and burned upon landing resulting in two killed and four wounded in critical condition and three missing. Search continues for the missing. During the period a total of 2,985 rounds of various caliber and types of mortar/artillery was fired in response to enemy efforts in the area.

~~Marine tactical air flew 62 sorties, and the Navy flew 102 missions for a total of 237 sorties~~. Aside from the tactical strikes mentioned, there were five additional secondary explosions, 14 secondary fires, 42 enemy killed, two bridges damaged, and 193 military structures destroyed.

~~Weather continued to hamper visual reconnaissance and strikes~~. There were no sightings of enemy vehicles.

~~thirty-eight B-52 aircraft ran six strikes~~ during the period delivering a total 975 tons of ordnance in the Niagara area.

~~The airfield at Khe Sanh was back in operation~~ following the C-130 crash of yesterday, and received a total of 53 short tons of supplies. The resupplies

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-35
By Cb, NARA Date 2-11-97

represented four of the five classes, class I, rations, excepted. Unfavorable weather continues to effect air resupply in the northern highlands; however, early sorties were able to land on February 11, without the aid of the ground control facility. Requisitions received from Khe Sanh on the night of February 10 are being scheduled for air delivery or air drop on February 11.

The Khe Sanh dump or ammo supply point status reported as number of days on hand on February 11 is as follows: Class I: ~~Rations, 10 days on hand~~; Class III: ~~Aviation fuel, 12 days on hand~~, jet fuel, 4 days on hand; motor fuel, 6 days on hand and diesel fuel, 6 days on hand; Class V: ~~ammunition, 80mm and high explosive, 12 days on hand~~, 81mm, 17 days on hand; 90mm, 94 days on hand; 4.2 inch shells, 36 days on hand; 105mm, 10 days on hand and 155mm, 25 days on hand. Class V (firecracker). 105 mm, 5 days on hand; 155mm, 5 days on hand; 40mm, 5 days on hand and hand grenades, 10 days on hand. The ammo supply point status of anti-tank ordnance, not including basic loads on position is as follows: 90mm head, 478 rounds; 66mm rocket, 190 rounds; M19 mines, 100 mines and 106mm head, 316 rounds. NOTE: Firecracker ammo is COFRAM.

No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period.

For the next 24-hour period Marine tactical air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, while the Air Force has 76 scheduled and the Navy has 100, for a total of 220 sorties. The Marines will have 16 aircraft on call for additional runs, and the Air Force will have 120 alert sorties on call. Five Arc Light strikes (33 sorties) are scheduled in support of the Khe Sanh area.

The weather for the afternoon of February 10 was marginal and deteriorated to poor after noon EST with zero visibility in fog by 3:00 PM EST, February 10. Weather conditions continued to be poor through the morning of February 11. The forecast for the afternoon of February 11 is for marginal weather conditions. By 8:00 AM EST fog and low clouds will cause poor weather which will last until 10:00 AM EST on the 12th of February. Conditions should improve to marginal with cloud ceilings increasing to 1,200 feet by mid-night February 11.

~~There is no change in enemy unit identification in the area.~~

Lao personnel evacuated from Khe Sanh and now located at DaNang for on-shipment to Laos, total 114. Four persons remain to be evacuated on February 11, including the BV-33 battalion commander. Arrangements are underway to transport the Lao personnel to ultimate destination by Lao aircraft.

35

formation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 12, 1968
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's daily report on
Khe Sanh.

We will send up shortly a table on
the supply situation.

W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DSD 10-18-78 letter

By JP, NARS, Date 3-16-79

~~SECRET~~

24

35a

Monday, February 12, 1968, 8:20 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the eighth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24-hour period of February 11, 1968.

During the period the Khe Sanh Combat Base and the surrounding area continued to receive heavy enemy shelling by mortars, rockets, and artillery. By 1:00 AM the shelling had subsided to sporadic incoming and terminated at 3:00 AM. Early Sunday morning a 122MM rocket impacted 15 feet away from a Air Force C-130 in the process of off-loading troops, resulting in one killed and four wounded and evacuated. The aircraft was damaged, but repairs are underway and hopefully it can be flown out today.

A helicopter conducting medical evacuation on Hill 861 received small arms fire resulting in one wounded and evacuated.

Two Navy aircraft dropped eight tanks of tear gas on a village eight kilometers southwest of Khe Sanh and followed with air strikes. No movement was observed from the village.

For the period there were four Marines killed and eight wounded, including those mentioned above. Two thousand two hundred and five rounds of mortar and artillery were fired by friendly forces. Tactical air sorties for the period totalled 258, Marine Tactical Air flew 75 sorties, and reported one road cut, four secondary fires, and one tank destroyed. The Air Force and Navy Tactical flew 88 and 95 sorties respectively, reporting six road cuts, four military structures destroyed, one secondary explosion, eight secondary fires, and one bridge damaged. Five ARC LIGHT strikes (33 sorties) were flown in the Niagara area.

Aerial resupply of Khe Sanh increased to 83 short tons on February 11. Ammunition and engineer bunkering material accounted for 40 and 25 short tons respectively. Seventeen short tons of replacement were delivered along with one short ton of medical supplies. C-123 Aircraft are providing air landed delivery to the Khe Sanh Airfield and air drops from C-130 Aircraft began at 11:00 hours.

No COFRAM Type Ordnance was used during the period.

~~SECRET~~

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OSD letter JAN 3 1979
Authority _____
By if, NARS, Date 6-25-79

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

For the next 24 hours Marine Air Plans 44 Tactical Air Sorties, the Air Force will run 74, while the Navy plan 100, for a total of 218 tactical air sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area. I have just instructed Mommyer to increase the above with emphasis in the B-52 ring.

The Marines will have 16 aircraft on call. The Air Force will have 120 sorties on call. There will be five ARC LIGHT strikes (36 sorties) run in the Niagara area.

There is no change in enemy unit identification in the area.

The weather was poor on the afternoon of February 11. Cloud ceilings were 500 to 700 feet and visibilities were 3 to 5 miles in fog. By 6:00 PM the fog increased and visibility was reduced to 1/16 of a mile. The weather remained poor all night and through the morning hours. The weather is forecast to remain poor until about mid-morning on February 13. During this period cloud ceilings will remain 600 feet or lower and visibilities will be near zero at night. Late on the morning of the 13th weather should improve to marginal.

~~SECRET~~

36

(PS)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968
9:45 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's Khe Sanh daily, plus the
supply table.

You will note he plans to move to a daily
air drop of 140 tons.

W. R. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-18-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

36b

(PS)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968
9:45 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's Khe Sanh daily, plus the
supply table.

You will note he plans to move to a daily
air drop of 140 tons.

W. C. Rostow
W. C. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 3-16-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

18 FEB 1968

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FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO GENERAL WHEELER OJCS WASHINGTON

INFO ADMIRAL SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

AMB ASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 32353 EYES ONLY

THIS IS THE NINTH REPORT ON THE KHE SANH AREA AND COVERS THE PERIOD 121200H TO 131200H FEBRUARY 1968.

DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE INCOMING ENEMY ARTILLERY, ROCKETS, AND MORTARS. A TOTAL OF 65 ROUNDS IMPACTED AT KHE SANH OF WHICH 55 WERE MORTARS AND FIVE EACH WERE ARTILLERY AND ROCKET ROUNDS. SIX MARINES WERE WOUNDED AS A RESULT. ELSEWHERE ALONG THE DMZ MODERATE CONCENTRATIONS FELL UPON MARINE ELEMENTS. MID-AFTERNOON BARRAGES DROPPED 24 MORTAR ROUNDS ON CAMP CARROLL, 19 AT

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By 140 NARS, Date 3-31-78

CA LU, AND EIGHT ROUNDS AT CON THIEN. WHILE CON THIEN AND CA LU HAD NO CASUALTIES, THE INCOMING AT CAMP CARROLL RESULTED IN INJURIES TO 13 MARINES (NINE WERE MED-EVACUATED). FARTHER NORTH, ELEMENTS OF THE 3D MARINES IN THE VICINITY OF GIA LINH RECEIVED 35 ROUNDS OF MIXED CALIBER MORTAR, CAUSING MAJOR INJURIES TO FOUR MARINES. GIA LINH ITSELF RECEIVED 19 ROUNDS OF MIXED MORTAR AND ROCKETS WITH NEGATIVE CASUALTIES. FINALLY, LIMA 31 IN OPERATION SALINE RECEIVED FOUR ROUNDS OF UNKNOWN CALIBER ARTILLERY. DAMAGE RESULTING FROM THE DAYS SHELLING WAS MINIMAL, AND CASUALTIES WERE LIGHT WITH NO FATALITIES RECORDED. IN TOTAL, 23 MARINES WERE INJURED, 14 OF WHOM REQUIRED MED-EV.

CUATION. OTHER THAN INCOMING ACTIVITY AT KHE SANH AND BORDERING AREAS OF THE DMZ, ACTIVITY WAS LIGHT WITH NO SIGNIFICANT GROUND CONTACT REPORTED.

MARINE TACTICAL AIR FLEW 65 SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF THE KHE SANH AREA, WITH 16 AIRCRAFT ON CALL. USAF FLEW 33 AND USN FLEW 85 SORTIES. TOTAL 233 SORTIES FLOWN. BDA REPORTS 13 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, 31 SECONDARY FIRES, 9 MILITARY STRUCTURES DESTROYED, 10 ENEMY KBA, 11 TRUCKS DESTROYED, TWO 57MM GUNS

SILENCED, ONE BRIDGE PARTIALLY DESTROYED. FIVE ARC LIGHT STRIKES (36 SORTIES) WERE RUN IN THE NIAGARA AREA. 1637 ROUNDS OF ASSORTED CALIBER MORTAR AND ARTILLERY WERE FIRED IN THE KHE SANH AND DMZ AREAS.

NO COFRAI TYPE ORDNANCE WAS USED.

DURING THE PERIOD, A TOTAL OF 34.3 SHORT TONS WERE DELIVERED BY ONE USMC C-130, SEVEN USAF C-123 AND TWO USMC OH-53. THE RESUPPLY INCLUDED 24 SHORT TONS OF AMMUNITION, SIX SHORT TONS

PRESERVATION COPY

OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT, .5 SHORT TONS OF CLASS II SUPPLIES AND FOUR SHORT TONS OF MAIL. THE C-130 THAT WAS DISABLED BY ENEMY FIRE ON 11 FEB WAS REPAIRED TODAY AND FLOREN OUT OF KHE SANH.

ON 12 FEBRUARY ENEMY FIRE WAS RECEIVED AT THE AIRFIELD. OFFLOADING IN ONE CASE WAS CONDUCTED AT THE END OF THE RUNWAY, VIDE THE LOADING RAMP. A NEW AIR DROP AREA HAS BEEN SECURED AT KHE SANH WITH IMPLEMENTATION PLANS, WEATHER PERMITTING, TO AIR DROP 140 SHORT TONS DAILY FROM C-130 AIRCRAFT. AIR DELIVERY BY C-123 AND CH-53 AIRCRAFT, TO BE OFFLOADED ON THE AIRFIELD, WILL CONTINUE.

THE DUAP OR ASP STATUS AT KHE SANH, REPORTED AS NUMBER OF DAYS ON HAND ON 12 FEBRUARY IS AS FOLLOWS: CLASS I: MCI - 9,

NO CHANGE, 3 RATIONS - 9, DECREASE OF ONE DAY; CLASS III: AVGAS - 12, NO CHANGE; JP-4 - 4, NO CHANGE; MOGAS - 4, DECREASE OF ONE DAY; AND DIESEL - 5, NO CHANGE. CLASS V HE: 60MM - 15, NO CHANGE; 81MM - 21 INCREASE OF 9 DAYS; 90MM - 98, DECREASE OF 19 DAYS; 4.2 IN - 35, INCREASE OF 5 DAYS; 105MM - 10, DECREASE TWO DAYS; AND 155MM - 21, DECREASE OF TWO DAYS. THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF FIRECRACKER OR ANTI-TANK ORDNANCE.

FOR THE PERIOD 131200H TO 141200H MARINE TACTICAL AIR PLANS 44 SORTIES IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH WITH 16 AIRCRAFT ON CALL, THE USAF WILL FLY 145 SORTIES, THE USN WILL FLY 100 SORTIES FOR A TOTAL 292 PLANNED SORTIES. ARC LIGHT WILL RUN FOUR STRIKES (33 SORTIES) IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

THE WEATHER AT KHE SANH CONTINUES TO BE CHARACTERIZED BY LOW CLOUDS AND HEAVY NIGHT AND MORNING FOG. THE WEATHER FROM 1200H TO 1700H ON 12 FEBRUARY WAS 500 FOOT CLOUD CEILINGS AND VISIBILITIES RANGING FROM TWO TO FOUR MILES IN FOG. THE FOG INCREASED BY 2000H AND THE VISIBILITIES DURING THE REST OF THE NIGHT OF THE 12TH AND THROUGH THE MORNING OF THE 13TH RANGED FROM ZERO TO ONE-HALF MILE. THE WEATHER FORECASTED FOR THE AFTERNOON OF 13 FEBRUARY IS FOR CLOUD CEILINGS TO RAISE TO 1000 FEET AND

VISIBILITIES TO IMPROVE TO FIVE MILES. IN HAZE BY 1500H, CONDITIONS WILL BEGIN TO DETERIORATE BY 1800H AND BY 2000H CLOUD CEILINGS WILL BE 400 FEET AND VISIBILITIES WILL BE NEAR ONE MILE, OCCASIONALLY GOING TO ZERO. STARTING ABOUT 0900H ON THE MORNING OF 14 FEBRUARY, CONDITIONS WILL BEGIN TO IMPROVE AND CLOUD CEILINGS WILL RAISE TO 1500 FEET AND VISIBILITIES WILL BE FIVE MILES IN HAZE. WARM REGARDS.

GP-4

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO GEN WHEELER
DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS TO SHARP AND BUNKER
650

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

36e

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968
11:30 a.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rec'd
11:30a

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's supplementary report
from Westy.

Westy's cheering up a bit.

W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-78



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3007-68
13 February 1968

2c
36f

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telephone Conversation with General Westmoreland

1. I conferred by telephone with General Westmoreland at 0800 hours. In addition to the brief of operations attached hereto and his ninth report on the Khe Sanh area which has already been provided to you, he provided the following comments on the situation:

a. A rallier from the 812th Regiment of the NVA 324B Division, currently located south of Quang Tri, stated that enemy propaganda to North Vietnamese troops emphasizes four points: (1) 80% of South Vietnam has been liberated by the enemy during the Tet offensive; (2) the war will end if every man and unit put forth maximum effort; (3) the ARVN is deserting to the enemy in large numbers; (4) the United States has no more troops to furnish to the South Vietnamese conflict.

b. The situation is looking better to him in all areas. US Marines had a heavy contact during the day near Hue, and the 1st Cavalry Division had a heavy contact north of Hue. He does not have details of this action as yet.

c. The Soviet model 120 mm mortar was employed yesterday near Can Tho in the Delta for the first time.

d. Dalat has been cleared of enemy forces.

e. Enemy elements still hang on in the Citadel in Hue. The third of the three ARVN Marine Battalions which will replace the ARVN Airborne Battalions in this action will move into Hue tomorrow. The situation in the Hue area was

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Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

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better today enabling air support to be employed; the forecast is that the weather will be better tomorrow also.

f. In Saigon, small enemy groups continue to be encountered in Cholon, but there appears to be no organized resistance. There have been sporadic contacts with enemy groups of 20 to 30 men to the north of Saigon.

g. The C-130 which was damaged by enemy fire while delivering supplies in Khe Sanh has been repaired and flown out. This was a gallant, dangerous, and tough effort because the repair crews had to work all night with lights shielded in order to avoid enemy fire.

h. The Riverine Force moved by water to the vicinity of Can Tho yesterday afternoon (Saigon time). Its objective is an enemy force south of Can Tho. He ordered this deployment in order to demonstrate that US forces are helping the ARVN in the area because VC propaganda directed at the population has stated that US forces have joined with VC forces to destroy the ARVN and overthrow the Saigon government.

i. He is employing additional barrier sensors and gravel in the Khe Sanh area. Preliminary information indicates that this effort is being helpful.

2. General Bruce Clarke and Mr. Frank Mayborn of Temple, Texas, met with General Westmoreland yesterday. Both seemed to be impressed by what they had seen.

3. He regrets that I cannot come to Saigon and visit with him now; he hopes that I can come later when things have quieted down so that he can discuss the over-all situation with me.

4. General Westmoreland raised with me rather diffidently the quantity and the detail of reports being requested of him from Washington. Back channel traffic has been extremely heavy and

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~~TOP SECRET~~

duplicative requests for information are frequent. A recent request for much detail to be on the wires from his headquarters at 0400 hours in the morning is requiring him to change his reporting cycle in order to honor the request. He expressed the hope that, except for the daily telephone conversations with me, requests for information can be handled through the NMCC in order to preclude duplication and reduce volume. Note: The NMCC has constantly opened and manned at both ends a voice circuit to the MACV Combat Operations Center as well as a teletype service.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

*P.S. Inadvertently omitted from the above:
General Westmoreland expressed his
gratitude at the prompt affirmative
response to his request for troop
reinforcements.*

W

37

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~Secret~~

(109)

Wednesday, February 14, 1968
10:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Khe Sanh daily.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

~~SECRET~~

3na

2A

Wednesday, February 14, 1968, 9:30 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the tenth report on the Khe Sanh - DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 13, 1968.

During the reporting period Khe Sanh Combat Base and surrounding areas received over 200 rounds of mixed mortars, artillery and rocket fire. Neighboring elements at Camp Carroll received 10 rounds of mortar fire while Marines in the vicinity of A-3 (5 kilometers northeast of Con Thien) received three consecutive afternoon barrages of 30 rounds of enemy mortar and 70 rounds of artillery. Seven mortar rounds impacted within the perimeter at Con Thien. Concluding the day's bombardment, shortly after noon, elements at Gio Linh received nine rounds of artillery.

~~Although damage attributed to the shelling was minimal, one Marine was killed and 12 Marines wounded, 6 of whom required medical evacuation.~~

In Operation Scotland in the Khe Sanh area, a 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion Patrol encountered a small enemy force at mid-afternoon, killed ~~two North Vietnamese Army~~ and captured an 82MM recoilless gun.

Elsewhere in northern I Corps, at 7:45 AM a ~~Marine unit ambushed a 20 man North Vietnamese Army Patrol~~ around Gio Linh and counted 7 North Vietnamese Army bodies and 1 detainee resulting from the engagement. ~~One Marine was killed, and one Marine was wounded.~~

Other elements along the DMZ reported no significant contact for the period. Total casualties for the period in the Khe Sanh area were: friendly, killed 1, wounded 10; enemy, killed 2. Elsewhere along the DMZ one Marine was killed and three Marines were wounded; nine North Vietnamese Army were killed.

~~Marine aircraft flew 65 sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area, the Air Force flew 192 tactical air sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area, the Navy flew 51, for a total of 308 sorties.~~ Bomb Damage Assessment included ~~2 secondary explosions (one extremely large)~~, 6 artillery positions were destroyed, 5 artillery positions damaged, there were 2 secondary fires, and 250 meters of trench were destroyed. ARC LIGHT ran 4 strikes (30 sorties) in the Niagara area in support of Khe Sanh.

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Authority OSD letter JAN 3 1979
By if, NARS, Date 6-25-79

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-2-

Khe Sanh was resupplied with 83 short tons on February 13. Ammunition amounted to 50 short tons. There were 16 short tons of vehicles and 4 short tons of general supplies delivered. In addition, 175 replacements were air lifted into the Khe Sanh Airfield.

Air operations on February 14 began at 9:00 AM with air drops from C-130 aircraft. So far today, some 76 short tons have been air dropped. C-123 aircraft are enroute for air delivery to the airfield. Present weather looks favorable for air resupply operations.

For the next 24 hours Marine Tactical Air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force will have 150 sorties, and the Navy 100 sorties, for a total of 294 sorties planned. There will be 16 additional Marine aircraft and 120 Air Force sorties on call for Khe Sanh. There will be six B-52 strikes (27 sorties) run in the Niagara area.

During the period the weather at Khe Sanh was characterized by low clouds and heavy night time and morning fog. Until 5:00 PM on February 13 the ceiling was 500 feet and visibility 3 - 7 miles in fog. After 5:00 PM the ceiling was 100 feet and the visibility 1/4 mile in fog. Low ceilings and visibilities continued throughout the remainder of the night and early morning with an improving trend beginning after 2:00 AM on the 14th. By 9:00 AM the ceiling had improved to 2,000 foot overcast with the visibility to 7 miles. By noon the ceiling was 2,000 foot broken.

The forecast is for partly cloudy skies and visibility 6 miles by early afternoon on the 14th. The sky will continue to be partly cloudy throughout the afternoon and evening and continuing through noon on the 15th. The visibility will continue to be 6 miles throughout the period except lowering to 5 miles in smoke and haze near sunrise on the 15th.

~~SECRET~~

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 14, 1968
11:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Rec'd 11:35 p

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's report
of his daily conversation with
Gen. Westmoreland.

As you will see, a number of
offensive operations are under way.

W. Rostow
Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3010-68
14 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telephone Conversation with General Westmoreland

1. I talked to General Westmoreland for some forty minutes beginning at 0800 hours this morning. In addition to his tenth report on the Khe Sanh area which you have already received, and the attachment to this memorandum setting forth combat operations throughout the country, General Westmoreland reported several interesting developments:

a. He spent yesterday (last night Washington time) visiting the I Corps Tactical Zone. He met with General Lam, Commander I Corps; General Cushman, and other senior US and ARVN commanders. He also visited the ARVN 51st Infantry Regiment and the American 7th Marine Regiment. He says that the ARVN troops have their tails up; they are proud of themselves because of the way they defeated the enemy.

b. General Lam had been marked for assassination at the outset of the attack on Danang when he was scheduled to visit a pagoda to pay his respects to his ancestors. Lam got wind of this, went to another pagoda to worship and arranged for a force to seize the assassination group.

c. Lam states that the young VC captured (mostly NVA) have been propagandized that the South Vietnamese wouldn't fight and that there would be an uprising; also that there would be peace in six months under a coalition government. As a matter of fact, there was no uprising and in certain instances some South Vietnamese civilians actually captured NVA soldiers and turned them over to the authorities.

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Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

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~~TOP SECRET~~

d. The attack on Danang, according to General Lam, was poorly planned, hastily put together, and not too well executed. Regional Force and Popular Force units acquitted themselves well.

e. The food situation in Danang is satisfactory. The local citizens have voluntarily donated 600,000 piasters to provide assistance to the homeless.

2. In Hue, the remaining enemy is bottled up in three or four strong points; they are short of food. The weather is better today and flyable, and General Westmoreland has ordered General Cushman to use Napalm on these strong points in order to reduce them. The people in Hue have been generally cooperative with US and ARVN troops; they have voluntarily provided food and water to friendly forces. The radio station is operating and electricity is available throughout the town. There was no uprising in Hue.

3. As to ARVN combat effectiveness, General Westmoreland reports that in the First ARVN Division, which is an excellent fighting outfit, the 1st Regiment has an average strength present of 420 per battalion; the 2d Regiment an average of 320 per battalion; the 3d Regiment (which was heavily engaged) has only about 200 effective per battalion. The Ranger Battalions in I Corps are in good shape as are the 2d ARVN Division and the 51st ARVN Regiment. The Vietnamese Joint General Staff is taking extraordinary actions to provide replacements for under-strength units.

4. The elements of the Americal Division, which attacked the 2d NVA Division south of Danang, is still finding additional dead enemy in the very extensive area over which they fought. Westmoreland still does not have an accurate estimate of the very heavy losses sustained in that area by the enemy. Parenthetically, he remarked that he saw 500 POWs being held in a compound at General Lam's I Corps Headquarters. Lam states that the people are indignant at the violation of Tet by the VC and the brutality they have displayed towards civilians and their homes.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

5. General Abrams has been at Headquarters MACV Forward, located in the Hue/Phu Bai area, for a couple of days. The headquarters has been operational for several days, has a strong staff, and is prepared to control all military operations north of the Ai Van Pass.

6. On his return to Saigon late yesterday, after consulting with Ambassador Bunker, he informed President Thieu, in the presence of General Vien, of the additional US reinforcements being sent. Both were very happy to learn of this fact. President Thieu has agreed to replace General Vinh Loc, Commander II CTZ, this week. Westmoreland has urged, and Thieu has agreed, that General Thang should assume command of IV CTZ at an early date.

7. Yesterday, near Quang Ngai, a refugee center was overrun and burned. Casualties and destruction are unknown at this time. Moreover, there was a contact in this area with the NVA 33rd Regiment resulting in 30 enemy KIA. General Westmoreland has instructed General Rosson, Commander II FFV, to seek out and destroy this already battered enemy unit.

8. North of Saigon, an ARVN unit searching for the enemy made a rather heavy contact in which they killed 70 enemy while losing four of their own men.

9. The Riverine Force, which, as I reported to you yesterday, had moved into the Can Tho area in the Delta, had a light contact with the enemy yesterday. However, they located and captured a cache of large quantities of ammunition to include rocket and mortar rounds.

10. The weather opened up briefly in the Mu Gia Pass area and a North Vietnamese POL convoy was seen in the open. General Momyer put 36 tactical air sorties on it. Results not yet known.

11. The Army Engineer Battalion is working to open Highway 1 through the Ai Van Pass. General Westmoreland believes he can restore the railroad part way to the north and establish a rail head from which he can shuttle supplies by truck.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

12. He is moving an Armored Cavalry Battalion from the II Corps area into the northern I CTZ in order to provide additional highway security as well as an anti-tank capability in the Con Thien/Gio Linh area where he anticipates the enemy may employ PT-76 light Soviet tanks.

13. General Westmoreland discussed with Ambassador Bunker yesterday the establishment of a Tet Assistance Relief Fund (TARF) to be funded by donations from American troops in South Vietnam, to provide relief to those unfortunate South Vietnamese who were made homeless and destitute by the recent enemy attacks. General Westmoreland considers that this fund will not only create good will between the people and the US Military Forces, but will help to establish a good image of the American soldier - that is, that he is not a cold blooded killer but is compassionate to the unfortunate. Ambassador Bunker may well query State on this matter in order to receive guidance of a policy nature.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

38

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

pg Thursday, February 15, 1968
9:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

They really got some supplies
into Khe Sanh yesterday -- 188 tons.

W. Rostow Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

~~SECRET~~

2A

38a

Thursday, February 15, 1968, 8:45 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the eleventh report on the Khe Sanh - DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 14, 1968.

Significant activity yesterday in the First Corps continued to center in northern Quang Tri Province as renewed enemy shelling impacted at Khe Sanh Combat Base and outlying areas bordering the DMZ.

At Khe Sanh, elements of the 26th Marines received 65 rounds of mortars and 13 rounds of rocket scattered throughout the day and night. Friendly casualties for the period amounted to three Marines killed, 10 wounded (nine evacuated). The 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines in the vicinity of Camp Carroll counted 30 rounds of mortars during mid-day shellings. Friendly casualties were one killed, nine wounded (seven evacuated).

A noontime barrage of 13 rounds of mortar at Con Thien inflicted no casualties or damage on the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. Twenty additional mortar rounds fell at Cl, seven kilometers south of Gio Linh, causing minor injuries to four ARVN soldiers.

Marine aircraft flew 106 tactical air sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area, the Air Force flew 98 sorties and the Navy flew 39, for a total of 243 tactical air sorties. Bomb Damage included 15 bunkers destroyed, six anti-aircraft positions destroyed, numerous secondary fires, 10 secondary explosions, 14 killed by air, one rocket position destroyed. Twenty-one B-52's flew four ARC LIGHT strikes delivering 525 tons of ordnance in the Niagara area.

Khe Sanh was resupplied with 188 short tons during the period, with 80 short tons being air dropped from Air Force C-130 aircraft. Nineteen C-123 and helicopters airlanded the additional 107.5 short tons. A total of 141 short tons of ammunition and 31 short tons of engineering equipment were included.

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Authority OSD letter JAN 3 1979

By if, NARS, Date 6-25-79

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For the next 24-hour period Marine Tactical Air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force plans 150, and the Navy 100, for a total of 294 sorties. Sixteen Marine aircraft and 120 Air Force sorties will be on call. ARC LIGHT will run 15 strikes (45 sorties) in the Niagara area, commencing the Bugle Note Program of three-aircraft strikes with time over targets' each 1 1/2 hours.

Weather at Khe Sanh throughout the period was favorable for most military operations. The visibility was greater than five miles except for a short period near midnight due to ground fog. During most of the afternoon the sky condition was 2500 foot broken. By early evening cloudiness decreased and remained scattered throughout the night. Valley stratus formed after sunrise 1500 to 2000 feet producing a broken ceiling which remained in the area throughout the morning.

Forecast for Khe Sanh during the next period is for generally good visibility in daytime. After sunset, fog and stratus will gradually form lowering the ceiling to from 200 - 500 feet and the visibility to one mile or less by sunrise. Shortly thereafter, the ceiling will gradually improve to 100 broken and the visibility to five miles.

SECRET

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INFORMATION
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968
11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's daily report via Bus Wheeler. Its tone and substance continue to be optimistic.

Aside from the unresolved situation in Hue today, my major concern, arising from current reports, is the enemy is exploiting the loose situation in the countryside to take back some villages where we had established security, and is probably trying to recruit men to make up their losses. Aside from the I Corps battle, I suspect getting pacification back on its feet will gradually become a number one task.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-18-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3016-68
15 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telephone Conversation with General Westmoreland

1. In addition to General Westmoreland's eleventh report on the Khe Sanh/DMZ area, I have attached hereto a summary of the more significant actions in South Vietnam yesterday. At 0800 this morning I talked with General Westmoreland on the telephone, and he made the following comments:

a. Weather in the Khe Sanh area was generally good yesterday, permitting air operations, both tactical and logistic, to be accomplished. However, the weather was not good enough to permit him to distribute gravel* in certain areas north of Khe Sanh as he would like to do.

b. Our air had a good day yesterday. They destroyed a large ammunition cache southwest of Khe Sanh, struck a large storage area near Tchepone in Laos, with smoke rising 6,000 feet in the air. The tactical air strike reported to you yesterday near Mu Gia Pass uncovered a North Vietnamese storage area which was also attacked during the period.

c. The Vietnamese Ranger Battalion at Khe Sanh carried out an excellent small unit operation yesterday. They moved a platoon outside of the perimeter during darkness to a hilltop; as day broke, they sent out a small patrol which deliberately exposed itself. The North Vietnamese troops came out of their holes to attack the patrol, and the whole Ranger platoon attacked them, inflicting casualties, and captured an 82 mm mortar.

* small anti-personnel mines.

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Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

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d. At Hue, the enemy is still dug into the south wall of the Citadel. General Westmoreland plans to use air strikes again today, employing high explosives, white phosphorous, and Napalm weapons. He now has three ARVN Marine Corps Battalions (which replaced the understrength ARVN Airborne Battalions in Hue). There are also seven companies of US Marines engaged in the operation. He anticipates that the enemy can hold out for about three more days.

e. North of Saigon, armed helicopters and tactical air caught a large force of the enemy in the open, inflicting about 120 casualties on them. General Westmoreland thinks that the enemy's command and control system has broken down in the Saigon area. At any rate, the enemy seems to be confused and apparently has no orders or plans to withdraw. He considers this a satisfactory situation since it will permit him to destroy them element by element.

f. As reported to you yesterday, the Riverine Force operating near Can Tho discovered and captured a very sizeable enemy ammunition depot containing large quantities of grenades, 120 mm mortar rounds, etc.

2. General Westmoreland yesterday (last night Washington time) visited the 1st US Infantry Division, the 25th US Infantry Division and the 199th Infantry Brigade. These units have done and are doing extremely well. He stated that the 199th Brigade, located near Bien Hoa, has been commanded during the recent heavy fighting by a negro colonel named Davidson who did a splendid job in leading and commanding his forces. General Westmoreland believes that in the first two or three days of the fighting, this brigade killed over 1,100 of the enemy.

3. I discussed the Khe Sanh situation at some length with General Westmoreland. I conveyed to him the message which you transmitted to me through Secretary McNamara. General Westmoreland told me that he understands and appreciates greatly your firm support.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pertinent to this aspect of the war, he stated that all events support the belief that the pounding from the air and from our artillery is having a good effect from our point of view on enemy capabilities in the area; i. e., his supply and command system is being constantly disrupted, and casualties are being inflicted on enemy troops in the Khe Sanh area.

4. General Westmoreland reported that except for the foregoing, the situation was quiet elsewhere.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

39

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

Friday, February 16, 1968
9:15 a.m.



MR. PRESIDENT:

In DMZ:

- scattered shelling;
- an incredible number of secondary explosions (p. 2);
- 119 tons delivered.

We have a firm report that one enemy unit around Khe Sanh has 193 combat-ready men from an original 289. How they lost 96 is not indicated.

Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~

39a

Friday, February 16, 1968, 8:40 am

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the twelfth report on the Khe Sanh - DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 15, 1968.

Enemy shelling continued throughout much of northern First Corps yesterday as Khe Sanh Combat Base and neighboring areas in proximity to the DMZ received scattered incoming rocket, artillery and mortar rounds. Latest information received indicates that the enemy fired 14 rocket rounds and 110 rounds of mixed caliber mortar at the Khe Sanh Combat Base, resulting in two Marines killed, 28 wounded (16 evacuated). While Khe Sanh bore the heaviest barrage, moderate concentrations fell upon other friendly locations, as Marine elements at Camp Carroll received five mid-afternoon mortar rounds and 9 rounds of 152 artillery. Fifty-two additional mortar rounds impacted four kilometers southwest of Gio Linh, in the area occupied by the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, in the vicinity of Quang Tri Airfield, received five mortar rounds and at noon, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Con Thien, received 30 rounds of mortar.

In Operation Lancaster, elements of K Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines engaged an unknown size enemy force 12 kilometers northeast of Khe Sanh. Relief force of I Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines arrived to render support. Contact broke at 3:45 PM but resulted in 12 Marines killed, 107 wounded (37 evacuated). Enemy casualties are unknown at this time.

In other action in northern Quang Tri Province, small unit contacts in Operation Kentucky accounted for three North Vietnamese Army killed; two additional North Vietnamese Army were confirmed as a result of mortar mission on an enemy location. No significant contacts were reported in either the Napoleon or Saline Operations.

Disposition of friendly forces and allied armament in the Khe Sanh area did not change during the period.

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Authority OSD letter JAN 3 1979
By if NARS, Date 6-25-79

In all, there were 317 tactical air sorties flown in support of the Khe Sanh area and the adjacent Niagara area. Marine aircraft flew 111 sorties in support of Khe Sanh delivered 282 tons of ordnance. Bomb Damage Assessment included five structures damaged, (3 - 50 caliber machine gun position destroyed, and two tanks destroyed. The Air Force flew 166 sorties and the Navy flew 40, reporting the attack onto two major supply areas. One supply area six nautical miles south of Tchepone had a total of 89 sorties with over 500 secondary explosions and fires. A second storage area had 23 sorties with the Forward Air Control reporting over 1000 secondary explosions. B-52's flew 15 ARC LIGHT strikes (45 sorties) on Niagara targets.

Khe Sanh was resupplied with 119 short tons during the period. A total of 19 sorties (Air Force: five C-130 air drops; 11 - C-123 airlanded) (Marines: one C-130; two CH-53 airlanded) delivered the material.

For the next 24 hours the Marine Tactical Air Sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area will total 44. The Air Force plans 202, and the Navy plans 100. ARC LIGHT planning calls for 15 strikes (45 sorties) continuing the Bugle Note Series in the Niagara area.

Regarding the weather for the period in the Khe Sanh area, the sky was mostly cloudy with ceilings near 2000 feet during the daylight hours of February 15 but lowering to 1500 feet broken after sunset, and remaining so throughout the night. For the next 24-hour period, the morning visibility will be restricted to 1 - 3 miles with ground fog beginning about 6 AM, and will gradually improve to 7 miles by noon. The sky will be mostly cloudy with the lower ceiling near 1000 feet, but improving to 1000 feet scattered, 2500 feet broken from 1 PM to 7 PM.

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THE WHITE HOUSE INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

Friday, Feb. 16, 1968
10:30 a. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Westy's morning telephone conversation.

The most worrying thing at the moment (see pages 1 and 2 of the attached operational intelligence briefing) is the VC exploitation of the withdrawal of our forces from the countryside.

(W) W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

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Authority OSD 10-18-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3019-68
16 February 1968

2C

39c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telephone Conversation with General Westmoreland

1. Attached hereto is a very brief biography of Colonel Davison, the negro Deputy Commander of the 199th Brigade whose performance as Acting Commander of the brigade was so highly praised by General Westmoreland yesterday.

2. In addition to General Westmoreland's twelfth report on the Khe Sanh/DMZ area, I have attached hereto an Operations/Intelligence brief which I believe you will find of interest. When I talked to General Westmoreland at 0800 hours this morning, he furnished additional information as follows:

a. ~~Weather has been good in the Hue area~~, permitting air support to ground units attempting to eliminate the tenacious group of enemy ensconced in the south wall of the Citadel. The enemy has moved a considerable force, exact size still unknown, north of Hue in an apparent attempt to reinforce the enemy elements still in Hue.

b. Battalions of the US 1st Cavalry Division are in contact with them, and General Abrams is maneuvering to get more battalions deployed to defeat this force. Of interest is the fact that ~~armed helicopters of the 1st Cavalry Division~~ caught one company of the reinforcing enemy in the open as they attempted to charge our forces across an open field.

c. ~~Air operations in support of Khe Sanh continue to be heavy and successful~~. As mentioned to you earlier, our attack air struck with much success a POL convoy on Highway 15 near the Mu Gia Pass; additionally, strikes in the Tchepone area caused at least 1,000 secondary explosions. An ammunition depot in Laos southwest of Khe Sanh was struck heavily causing many secondary explosions;

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Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

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~~TOP SECRET~~

a Forward Air Controller reported that as soon as the secondary explosions ceased, North Vietnamese troops swarmed in like ants attempting to recover boxes of ammunition. General Momyer is continuing to bomb the area during the night, using radar control, tactical air, and, as I dictate this memorandum, a B-52 mission is re-striking this particular depot.

d. At Tay Ninh, the MACV compound and the province headquarters were attacked with mortar fire, and, apparently, enemy elements have infiltrated into the city of Tay Ninh. This force, which apparently came from Cambodia, is being dealt with by elements of the ARVN 25th Division and the US 25th Division. The strength of the enemy is at present unknown.

e. IV Corps was rather quiet yesterday although there were small contacts with enemy forces near Can Tho and My Tho.

f. Highway 4 is now open all the way from Saigon to the city of Can Tho. The traffic on it is heavy.

g. Dak To is still threatened by enemy elements; however, General Westmoreland considers that he has ample troops in the area. Moreover, he is scheduling B-52 strikes in the area over the next several days.

3. General Abrams is in residence at MACV Forward in the Hue/Phu Bai area in order to control combat operations in the northern portion of I Corps.



EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INFORMATION

fo
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, Feb. 17, 1968
9:15 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Today's DMZ report shows (marked passages);

- light mortaring;
- 191 tons of resupply;
- Khe Sanh attack expected "within a week";
- enemy 324B division heading for Quang Tri.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

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Authority OSD 10-18-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD letter JAN 3 1979

By if, NARS, Date 6-25-79

2A
40a
Saturday, February 17, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND (MAC 02269)

This is report number thirteen on the Khe Sanh/DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 16, 1968.

During the reporting period the ~~relative lull continued in northern~~ Quang Tri province with interruptions caused by enemy shelling. While ground contacts were minimal, the Khe Sanh combat base and neighboring areas bordering the DMZ received a total of 222 rounds of mixed mortar, artillery and rocket rounds.

Characteristic of enemy shelling, Marine elements at Khe Sanh combat base bore the heaviest concentration as 85 mortar rounds and seven rounds of rocket impacted in the area. Casualties attributed to the shelling were ~~one killed, 10 wounded (8 evacuated)~~.

A mid-afternoon barrage brought 40 rocket rounds, 31 rounds of mortar and three artillery rounds to friendly elements at Camp Carroll, resulting in five wounded (two evacuated). The 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines at the rockpile counted two additional rounds of artillery in late evening. At Con Thien, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines was the recipient of 18 rounds of mixed caliber mortars. Eight additional rounds of mortar were received by friendly elements at C-3 causing major injuries to three Marines.

Harassment moved northeasterly as a mid-day artillery barrage brought 14 rounds to friendly elements positioned at Gio Linh. Fourteen additional mortar rounds were received near the Cua Viet, at positions occupied by the 1st AMTRAC Battalion. Casualties attributed to the day's incoming were light and damage was reported minimal.

Significant contacts in northern Quang Tri centered in the DMZ with sightings of three reported enemy tanks 12 kilometers north of Con Thien. Reaction was instantaneous as friendly tanks and artillery fired several missions earmarked for their locations. Results are unknown at this time.

No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period. There were no changes in the dispositions of friendly forces and Allied armament.

~~SECRET~~

~~In the Khe Sanh area, the enemy still threatens with two divisions~~ and most evidence points to an attempted assault within a week. ~~Friendly firepower, however, is undoubtedly hurting the enemy there and may further disrupt his timing. New instructions to the 324B Division apparently committed it to a new assault on Quang Tri and they are moving in that direction. The 320th seems to have backed off from Camp Carroll to fill the void created by the departure of the 324B.~~ Threat of major ground assault against Camp Carroll is apparently reduced.

Tactical Air Support for the Khe Sanh totalled 388 sorties. Marine aircraft flew 80 sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area. Bomb damage included ~~one secondary explosion and one secondary fire.~~ The Air Force flew 232 sorties and the Navy flew 76 (27 Navy sorties were diverted because of weather). Bomb Damage Assessment included ~~35 secondary explosions, eight secondary fires, and 10 mortar positions damaged.~~ The secondary explosions and fires resulted from strikes put in against a supply area. The Forward Air Control reported yesterday that the enemy had made attempts to remove munitions and weapons from the area, however, there were still areas where supplies of weapons, munitions and rice remain. ARC LIGHT strikes for the period in the Niagara area totalled 16 strikes (44 sorties).

~~Khe Sanh was resupplied with 191 short tons on February 16.~~ A total of 21 sorties were delivered, including seven air drops by C-130 aircraft. Seven Air Force C-123 aircraft landed at the airfield as did Marine helicopters.

During the next 24-hour period, the Marine Air Wing will fly 44 tactical air sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area, with 16 additional aircraft on call to run sorties as the situation indicates. The Air Force plans to run 150 sorties, and the Navy schedules 100 sorties. Total tactical air effort will be 294 sorties. The ARC LIGHT effort will total 16 strikes (48 sorties) in the Niagara area.

The weather for the period resulted in fog and stratus on both days reduced the ceiling and visibility to zero during the morning hours. The visibility improved to seven miles by noon of the 16th but was again lowered by fog after 11:00 p.m. Ceilings improved to 500-1000 feet during the afternoon and early evening hours. During the next 24-hour period, in the mornings of both days the visibility will be restricted to less than one mile by fog, but will increase to five miles or more from 12:00 Noon to 9:00 p.m. Ceilings will be 1000 feet or less except from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

40a-1

information

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, February 17, 1968 -- 12:10 pm

Mr. President:

Rec'd
12:30p

Herewith Westy's report to Bus Wheeler.

You will note that Westy now concludes that "the long-heradled second wave of enemy attack may start tonight; i.e., today Washington time."

You will note also (para 5) Westy's concern about the NEWSWEEK leak on Abrams' new headquarters. This raises the question of whether we cannot clamp down military censorship at least in Corps.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-18-78 letter
By if, NARS, Date 3-16-79

~~TOP SECRET~~

40c

CHAIRMAN

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

F₅

Mr. Clark Clifford

The White House

Read by Mr. Clifford
17 Feb 5:30 p.m.

4

INFORMATION

(85)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 19, 1968
10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

In I Corps (attached):

-- shelling and light ground
contact;

-- 160 tons delivered by air
drop despite continued bad weather.

W. Rostow
Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-18-78 letter
By 18, NARS, Date 3-16-79

~~SECRET~~

4/a

Monday, February 19, 1968, 10:00 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This report is number fifteen on the situation in the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24-hour period of February 18, 1968.

~~Activity in the northern First Corps continued to focus on enemy~~ shelling; as 175 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery rounds were distributed among friendly elements bordering the DMZ. Forty rounds of mortar and 35 rounds of artillery impacted at Khe Sanh Combat Base in positions occupied by the 26th Marines, which resulted in one Marine wounded.

Marines positioned at Camp Carroll, received a mid-day barrage of 42 rounds of mortar with two intermediate rounds of artillery. Friendly casualties were: one killed, nine wounded (four evacuated).

Three small craters were caused at C-2 outside Con Thien, as three rounds of mortar were aimed at friendly elements. Marine elements at Con Thien and Gio Linh received 33 and 8 rounds respectively, none of which inflicted casualties nor caused significant damage.

Ground contacts in northern Quang Tri were limited to two light skirmishes, both inflicting moderate enemy losses while causing only minor injuries to friendly elements. Five North Vietnamese Army were killed at the hands of a 37th ARVN Ranger Patrol east of Khe Sanh, in an early morning contact which inflicted no friendly casualties.

There were a total of 358 tactical air sorties flown in the Khe Sanh area during the period. Marine tactical air flew 78 sorties, reporting four secondary explosions and one secondary fire. The Air Force flew 215 sorties, and the Navy flew 65. The weather was workable only for combat sky spot strikes, with a few isolated attempts to put in visual strikes. Bomb Damage Assessment was correspondingly bad. There were 12 ARC LIGHT strikes (35 sorties) flown in the Niagara area. For the next period, 19 - 20 February, 354 tactical air sorties will be flown in the Khe Sanh and surrounding areas. The Marines will fly 44, the Air Force 210, and the Navy 150. There will be 15 ARC LIGHT strikes (45 sorties) flown in the Niagara area.

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DECLASSIFIED
OSD letter JAN 3 1979
Authority _____
By if, NARS, Date 6-25-79

Air resupply for the reporting period amounted to 160 short tons of which 133 short tons was ammunition.

No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period.

Weather at Khe Sanh during the period was bad. Low clouds and dense fog reduced the ceiling and visibility to less than 500 feet and one mile throughout the period. Most of the time the ceiling and visibility were near zero. Little change is expected on 19 - 20 February. The sky will be obscured by low stratus clouds and fog. Ceilings and visibilities will be near zero except for a slight improvement to a ceiling of 400 feet and visibility of 1/2 mile from 2 PM to 6 PM on 20 February.



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-2980-68
19 Feb 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJ: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. You will have received General Westmoreland's 15th report on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. Attached hereto is an operations/intelligence summary of events of the past two days. I have also attached a copy of the trip report of General Bruce C. Clarke, U.S. Army (Retired) giving his impressions during his recent trip to South Vietnam. General Clarke was accompanied by Mr. Frank W. Mayborn of Temple, Texas whom I am sure you know.

2. Due to communications difficulties between Washington and Hawaii my telephone conversation with General Westmoreland was not possible until 0830 hours. He provided the following information:

a. Yesterday an OP-2E aircraft with a crew of 9 was shot down in the MUSCLE SHOALS area while laying sensors.

b. The ground control approach equipment was knocked out at Khe Sanh yesterday; there is a backup set available and it is being installed.

c. Light contact continues with the enemy in the vicinity of Dalat.

d. The stickiest situation at present is at Phan Thiet. The enemy force which penetrated the town, seized the jail and the hospital, still occupies about one-third of the town. It continues to hold the hospital area and occupied bunkers outside of town. Despite the fact the force has lost 103 men killed, the going to clear the town is tough and proceeding slowly.

e. There continue to be contacts with the enemy north of Saigon and south of Saigon. In a heavy contact south of Saigon Vietnamese Marine Corps units killed 144 enemy.

f. North of Tay Ninh City an enemy force apparently preparing rocket positions was discovered and attacked, resulting in 60 enemy KIA.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

g. Certain new units of the enemy have been identified near Song Be. These appear to be groups of replacement which have been formed into combat units to continue enemy pressure in the Song Be area.

h. The enemy has been driven out of Vinh Long. There was some damage to the Cathedral in the town and 58 enemy were killed.

i. The Riverine force had a contact with the enemy south of Can Tho. Results are not yet known.

3. He anticipates that there may be additional enemy activity in the Khe Sanh area tonight; however, this is not positive information.

4. The additional battalion of the First Cavalry Division which I reported yesterday as moving to the Quang Tri area began closing into Quang Tri today.

5. As a general observation, General Westmoreland stated that the enemy continues to hang in close to the cities. The enemy is apparently attempting to resupply his forces and bring up replacements and reinforcements.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET~~(85) Tuesday, February 20, 1968
10:55 a.m. *Rec'd 11:32*

Mr. President:

The first two pages are Bus Wheeler's report of his morning conversation with Westmoreland. I have marked the key elements.

Attached is a full length NMCC (National Military Command Center) report which you saw early this morning in summary form.

Walt Rostow~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *JCS 10-2-78 letter*By *ip*, NARS, Date *3-16-79*

~~TOP SECRET~~

20



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3031-68
20 Feb 1968

42a

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. You have already received General Westmoreland's 16th report on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. In addition, I am attaching hereto the Presidential operational/intelligence brief (you may have already seen this but I wish to make sure that it comes to your personal attention). Moreover, I am attaching a sheet setting forth two or three late items of interest.

2. I talked to General Westmoreland at 0810 hours this morning. He made the following comments:

a. After talking to General Vien and analyzing information from intelligence reports, he has called a full alert tonight in the Saigon area, and he is particularly arranging to defend the Tan Son Nhut airbase. There is a reported increased threat north of Saigon with fresh elements of the 2nd NVA and 9th VC Divisions moving into the area. It is also reported that villagers are fleeing to get out of the way of their advance. Among other precautionary measures, General Westmoreland has organized a provisional defense battalion from the MACV Staff.

b. A few rocket rounds were fired in the direction of Tan Son Nhut today; one fell on the runway; one landed in an open field, and one apparently went into the city. He now has complete aerial photographic reconnaissance of the rocket site area and the photo interpreters have picked up several suspected rocket sites for attack by air.

c. A new rocket round was found north of Saigon today; it is a 170 mm round in diameter and has a range of about 9,000 meters.

d. In general, the enemy is hanging in close to Saigon and gives no indication of withdrawal.

e. The Song Be situation has cleared up; the enemy has been driven out of the town.

f. The city of Phan Thiet has been cleared of the enemy after a hard fight.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

g. The enemy has been cleared out of Vinh Long, but there seems to be a buildup commencing south of Can Tho by a new enemy battalion of picked-up troops.

3. He conferred with General Vien today. The latter is concerned about the fatigue factor on the ARVN. They have been fighting continuously now for over two weeks. He has been trying to push the ARVN out into the country, but this is difficult to do when the enemy continues to stay in close to the populated areas.

4. Enemy KIA now stands at over 38,000. General Westmoreland recognizes that some of them are undoubtedly porters and other support elements. He has charged his J-2 with trying to get a break out of the enemy casualties so that he will be able to estimate the effect of enemy losses on his combat elements.

5. As a general observation, after visiting all of the Corps Areas and senior commanders, if General Westmoreland had to make an estimate now as to further troop reinforcements he will need, he will probably require the remainder of the 82d Airborne Division. He is not asking for it at this time because he believes that he will have a better feel for the problems facing him when I visit him within the next couple of days.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(PS)
~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 21, 1968
8:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Another quiet day at Khe Sanh/DMZ:

- mortar fire less;
- 143 tons delivered;
- weather continues poor.

W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78 letter

By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79



~~SECRET~~

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43a

Wednesday, February 21, 1968,

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number seventeen on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 20, 1968.

A small unit encounter and intermittent enemy shelling constituted the principal activity in northern First Corps yesterday. The pace of enemy incoming fire slackened somewhat during the period. Incoming to friendly forces bordering the DMZ totaled 124 rounds of mixed caliber mortar and artillery.

A marked decline in enemy efforts was evident yesterday as only 69 rounds of mortar fell at Khe Sanh. Five kilometers east of Ca Lu, the Marines received six rounds of mortar and an equal amount of artillery rounds. The ramp at Dong Ha received six mid-afternoon rounds of artillery, causing minor injuries to two Marines. Elements of the Marines at Camp Carroll bore 13 enemy rounds of mortar; and finally Marines, at Con Thien received 28 rounds of mortar in an early morning barrage. Casualties attributed to the shelling: 10 Marines wounded (five evacuated).

In ground contact during the day, a contact at Thon Le Xuyen confirmed nine North Vietnamese Army killed and captured seven POW's, two recoilless guns, one mortar and nine individual weapons. Casualties to friendly forces were: three killed, eight wounded (evacuated).

There were a total of 296 tactical air sorties flown. The Marine aircraft wing flew 64 sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area. Bomb Damage Assessment included three secondary explosions, two secondary fires. The Air Force flew 146 and the Navy flew 86. The weather was still unsuitable for any but combat sky spot missions.

Thirty-nine B-52's flew 13 strikes in the Niagara area.

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OSD letter JAN 3 1979

Authority By if, NARS, Date 6-25-79

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- 2 -

Aerial resupply for the reporting period amounted to 143 short tons. In addition, 90 passengers were flown into the airfield in three C-123 aircraft. Eleven C-130 completed 11 airdrops.

There was one COFRAM mission of 15 rounds fired on the basis of a sensor report of enemy troop movement. Results were unobserved.

For the next 24-hour period, the Marines will fly 44 tactical air sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force will fly 148, and the Navy plans 100, for a total of 292 sorties. There will be nine ARC LIGHT strikes (27 sorties) flown in the Niagara area.

Weather at Khe Sanh during the period produced low clouds and dense fog and reduced the ceiling and visibility to near zero except from 2:00 PM to 4:00 AM when the ceiling improved to 100 - 500 foot overcast and the visibility from 1/4 to five miles in fog. The forecast for Khe Sanh for the next 24 hours is for little change.

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436

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 21, 1968
10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's report on
today's call to Westy.

Main item: firepower now allocated
to try to clean up Hue by the end of this
week.

Gen. Johnson will report the daily
phone call in Bus' absence.

Walt
W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78 letter
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter CM-3032-68
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79 21 Feb 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. You will have already received General Westmoreland's 17th report on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. Additionally, I am attaching hereto a copy of the Presidential operations/intelligence brief of salient activities over the past twenty-four hours, together with a sheet of recent items which you will find of interest.

2. General Westmoreland reported that the situation was generally quiet and that he had little of significance to add to what is in the operational/intelligence brief. He made really only two points:

a. General Abrams, located at Headquarters MACV Forward in the Hue/Phu Bai area, conferred today with General Cushman, over-all Marine Commander; General Lam, the Vietnamese I Corps Tactical Zone Commander; and General Tolson, Commander of the U.S. First Cavalry Division. The subject of their conference was the situation in Hue and how best to deal with it. General Westmoreland has agreed to send one troop of U.S. armored cavalry (units such as this are equipped with medium tanks) to Hue tomorrow to provide additional armored firepower to friendly forces operating against a heavily dug-in enemy. Moreover, he is providing an additional ten 106-mm recoilless rifles to the Vietnamese Marine Corps battalions which are fighting in the Citadel in order to give them more mobile destructive power against enemy bunkers. He thinks that with the added firepower Hue can be cleaned out by the end of this week.

b. Another new weapon, a 107-mm rocket made by the CHICOMS has been picked up in-country. He describes the projectile as being about 42 inches long and weighing 40 odd pounds; no launcher has yet been captured. The technical intelligence people estimate that this weapon would have a range of between 8,000 to 9,000 meters. Samples of this weapon will be provided to technical intelligence agencies in the United States for further evaluation.

3. General Westmoreland has arranged for me to see President Thieu, Vice President Ky, and General Vien during my stay in Vietnam. Ambassador Bunker has also made arrangements for me to confer with him and key members of the mission

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 of 7 copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

staff.

4. During my absence General Johnson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, will talk by telephone to General Westmoreland each morning to provide you with the updates of the situation. I shall, of course, communicate with you and the Secretary of Defense promptly any significant items which cannot await my return next week.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE. G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

43d

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD letter JAN 3 1979
By ig, NARS, Date 6-25-79

VV EEA135
OO WTE10
DE WTE 744

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Received Washington CommGen
8: A.M. EST Thursday 22 Feb 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommGen
9:00 A.M. CST Thursday 22 Feb 68

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (MCCAFFERTY)
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80474

ps

2A

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

THIS IS REPORT NUMBER EIGHTEEN ON THE SITUATION IN THE KHE SANH AREA AND COVERS THE 24-HOUR PERIOD FEBRUARY 21, 1968.

ENEMY EFFORTS INTENSIFIED IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE YESTERDAY AS 690 ENEMY ROUNDS OF MIXED MORTAR, ARTILLERY AND ROCKET FELL ON FRIENDLY POSITIONS. ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS CENTERED AT KHE SANH AS FRIENDLY ELEMENTS RECEIVED 250 MORTAR ROUNDS, 50 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY AND 70 ROCKET ROUNDS, CAUSING MINOR INJURIES TO 22 MARINES. ONE ROCKET ROUND IMPACTED ON THE AIRSTRIP TEMPORARILY CLOSING THE FACILITY TO C-130 TRAFFIC. THE AIRSTRIP IS NOW OPEN TO ALL NORMAL TRAFFIC.

AT CAMP CARROLL, ELEMENTS OF THE 4TH AND 9TH MARINES, FROM 3:00PM TO 5:50PM, WERE RECIPIENTS OF 15 ROUNDS OF ROCKET, 33 ROUNDS OF MORTAR, 38 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY, WITH ONE ROCKET ROUND LANDING ON THE 3D BATTALION, 4TH MARINES, FIVE KILOMETERS EAST OF CA LU. CASUALTIES WERE RECORDED AS 13 WOUNDED IN ACTION (NINE EVACUATED).

FIVE NOONTIME ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY FELL AT DONG HA COMBAT BASE, WITH THREE ADDITIONAL MORTAR ROUNDS FALLING AT DUSK. HEAVY MID-DAY BARRAGES FELL ON CON THIEN AS ENEMY LAUNCHING POSITIONS DELIVERED 55 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY AND 48 ROUNDS OF MORTAR. THREE MARINES WERE WOUNDED FROM THE SHELLING WITH ONE EVACUATED. IN NEIGHBORING GIO LINH, 17 ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY ROUNDS IMPACTED ON FRIENDLY POSITIONS. FINALLY, A 24 HOUR LULL IN ENEMY SHELLING AT THE CUA VIET WAS ENDED AS POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY 1ST AMTRAC BATTALION BORE 64 ROUNDS OF ROCKETS AND 45 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY, WITH CASUALTIES ATTRIBUTED TO THE DAY'S BOMBARDMENT INCLUDED FOUR KILLED IN ACTION, EIGHT WOUNDED IN ACTION (TWO EVACUATED).

R

GROUND ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE WAS LIMITED TO AN ESTIMATED COMPANY SIZE PROBE AT KHE SANH. BY DARK ACTIVITY HAD CEASED. RESULTS ARE UNDETERMINED.

A TOTAL OF 284 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE KHE SANH AREA. THE MARINE AIRCRAFT WING FLEW 82 SORTIES. BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT INCLUDED FOUR SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, ONE SECONDARY FIRE. THE AIR FORCE FLEW 138 SORTIES, AND THE NAVY FLEW 64 SORTIES. WEATHER DIFFICULTIES REQUIRED USE OF COMBAT SKY SPOT. B-52'S FLEW FIVE STRIKES (15 SORTIES) IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

AERIAL RESUPPLY FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD AMOUNTED TO 172 SHORT TONS. IN ADDITION, 71 PASSENGERS WERE LANDED AT THE KHE SANH AIRFIELD. A TOTAL OF 17 SORTIES WERE FLOWN BY RESUPPLY AIRCRAFT. FOURTEEN C-130 AIRCRAFT MADE TEN AIR DROPS. A SINGLE C-123 AND TWO HELICOPTERS LANDED.

SEVEN ROUNDS OF COFRAM ORDNANCE WAS EXPENDED RESULTING IN FOUR ENEMY KILLED.

SIXTEEN B-52 STRIKES (48 SORTIES) WILL BE FLOWN IN THE NIAGARA AREA FOR THE NEXT 24-HOUR PERIOD. THERE WILL BE 292 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES FLOWN DURING THE SAME PERIOD.

THE WEATHER AT KHE SANH DURING THE PERIOD AGAIN CONSISTED OF LOW CLOUDS AND DENSE GROUND FOG REDUCING THE CLOUD CEILING AND SURFACE VISIBILITY TO NEAR ZERO. DURING THE EARLY AFTERNOON HOURS THE CEILING IMPROVED SLIGHTLY TO 400 - 1000 FEET BROKEN AND THE VISIBILITY TO THREE MILES IN FOG. THE FORECAST FOR KHE SANH FOR TOMORROW IS MORE ENCOURAGING. THE CLOUD CEILING AND SURFACE VISIBILITY WILL GRADUALLY IMPROVE FROM NEAR ZERO CONDITIONS TO A 2000 FOOT CEILING AND SIX MILES VISIBILITY BY 2:00PM. AFTER 5:00PM THE CEILING AND VISIBILITY WILL GRADUALLY LOWER TO NEAR ZERO AND REMAIN SO THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE PERIOD.

DTG 22/1319Z FEB 68

 ~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

VV EEA142
OO WTE10
DE WTE 751

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80481

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Received Washington CommCen
11:44 A.M. EST Thursday 22 Feb 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
12:00 P.M. CST Thursday 22 Feb 68

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-4-78; NSC 8-19-80

By WJF, NARS, Date 9-2-80

43e

HEREWITH GENERAL JOHNSON'S REPORT ON HIS MORNING CONVERSATION WITH WESTY.

1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAD JUST COMPLETED A CALL TO GENERAL ABRAMS AT MACV FORWARD LOCATED AT HUE/PHU BAI. GENERAL ABRAMS STATED TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME HE, GENERAL ABRAMS, WAS PERMITTING HIMSELF TO BE SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGED. HE HAD VISITED THE AMERICAL DIVISION AND THE 2D ARVN DIVISION ON 22 FEBRUARY AS WELL AS THE ELEMENTS OF THE 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION, THAT HAVE ARRIVED AT CHU LAI. THE BRIGADE HAS NOT YET COMPLETED ITS MOVE. BOTH THE AMERICAL AND THE 2D ARVN DIVISION ARE PERFORMING EFFECTIVELY AND ARE STEPPING UP OPERATIONS AWAY FROM THE POPULATED AREAS ONCE AGAIN. GENERAL ABRAMS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL IN THE 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION WAS VERY HIGH; THAT THEIR ATTITUDE WAS EXCELLENT; AND THEY WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE RECEPTION GIVEN THEM BY GENERAL KOSTER OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION. IT IS GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S INTENTION TO EASE THE BRIGADE INTO COMBAT OPERATIONS SLOWLY SO THAT TEAMWORK TRAINING WITHIN THE BRIGADE CAN BE REFRESHED FULLY.

2. THE THREE VIETNAMESE MARINE BATTALIONS IN HUE HAVE MADE SLOW PROGRESS BECAUSE OF A LACK OF DIRECT-FIRE HIGH VELOCITY WEAPONS. TEN 106 MM RECOILLESS RIFLES ARRIVED IN HUE/PHU BAI ON 22 FEBRUARY AND WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE VIETNAMESE MARINES ON 23 FEBRUARY TO CORRECT THIS DEFICIENCY. IN ADDITION, BRIGADIER GENERAL OSCAR DAVIS, ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER OF THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION, IS LOCATED AT THE FIRST DIVISION COMMAND POST WITH GENERAL TRUONG, THE FIRST ARVN DIVISION COMMANDER. GENERAL DAVIS IS ACTING AS FIRE COORDINATOR FOR GENERAL TRUONG, AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND INDICATED THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT IS WORKING WELL.

3. THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION HAS ENCOUNTERED FOUR ENEMY BATTALIONS NORTH AND EAST OF HUE AND IS IN HEAVY CONTACT WITH THESE UNITS. THE DIVISION COMMANDER REPORTED SOME SUCCESS BUT HAS NOT REPORTED ANY DETAILS. FURTHER, TWO 8 INCH HOWITZERS HAVE ARRIVED NEAR QUANG TRI TO REINFORCE THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION AND AN ADDITIONAL TWO ARE EXPECTED TO BE IN POSITION TOMORROW (23 FEBRUARY) AT THE SAME LOCATION. THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION CAPTURED 12 PRISONERS. INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE THAT THREE DIFFERENT ENEMY REGIMENTS ARE REPRESENTED BY THE 12 PRISONERS. GENERAL WESTMORELAND DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THIS MEANS, BUT HE EXPECTS TO OBTAIN SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION FROM INTERROGATION THAT WILL BE EXPLOITABLE IN TERMS OF IDENTIFYING SOME INDICATION OF ENEMY INTENTION.

4. GENERAL WESTMORELAND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT HUE MAY HAVE BEEN THE ENEMY'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE FROM THE OUTSET OF THE TET OFFENSIVE. REPORTS INDICATE AN ENEMY EFFORT TO REINFORCE HUE THROUGH THE A SHAU VALLEY AND HE IS WATCHING THE A SHAU VALLEY VERY CAREFULLY.

5. THERE WAS LITTLE ACTIVITY IN THE II CORPS AREA.

6. THERE WAS CONTACT EARLY 22 FEBRUARY ABOUT 3 KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON WITH THE ENEMY REPULSED AND DISPERSED. NORTH OF SAIGON IN SOUTHERN BINH DUONG PROVINCE THE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OF THE 5TH ARVN DIVISION ENGAGED AN ENEMY FORCE KILLING 20 ENEMY WHILE LOSING ONLY ONE KILLED. SOUTHEAST OF SAIGON IN THE RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE AN ENEMY FORCE OVERRAN A LOCAL POLICE STATION KILLING 7 AND SEIZING A SMALL NUMBER OF WEAPONS, THE EXACT NUMBER NOT SPECIFIED.

- . ON THE AFTERNOON OF 22 FEBRUARY AT CAT LAI, ANTI-TANK ROCKETS WERE USED BY THE ENEMY TO STRIKE SEVERAL AMMUNITION BARGES. TWO BARGES EXPLODED AND TWO BARGES WERE BEACHED. DEMOLITION EXPERTS ARE IN CONTROL IN THE AREA AND ARE ASSESSING DAMAGE. SMALL ENEMY DETACHMENTS ARE INTERDICTING ROADS AROUND SAIGON USING THE RPG-2 OR B-40 ROCKET AND RPG-7 OR B-41 ROCKET WITH SOME EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST VEHICLES. AS WE WERE TALKING GENERAL WESTMORELAND REPORTED ARVN CONTACT WITH TWO ENEMY BATTALIONS EAST OF TAN SON NHUT WITH THE SPOOKY GUN SHIP WITH MINI-GUNS FIRING ON THIS FORCE. INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE 1 VC MAIN FORCE BATTALION AND 1 VC LOCAL FORCE BATTALION. THE SIZE OF THE ENEMY FORCE IS TENTATIVE AND SPECIFIC UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MADE.

8. GENERAL WESTMORELAND REPORTS THAT SINCE THE TET OFFENSIVE BEGAN ON 29 JANUARY, 39,417 ENEMY HAVE BEEN REPORTED KILLED IN ACTION AND 6,590 INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN DETAINED.

DTG 22/1644Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78 letter CM-3049-68
By ip, NARS, Date 3-16-79 23 Feb 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. General Westmoreland reported quite a bit of shelling at Khe Sanh and in the DMZ area. Other intelligence reports cover the scale. The helicopter reported hit by mortar fire at Khe Sanh may have been hit by a rocket according to information that General Abrams passed to General Westmoreland. An attack on Khe Sanh is expected during the night of 23-24 February, Saigon time. The Vietnamese Ranger Battalion holding a part of the perimeter at Khe Sanh was probed by a force estimated to be a possible enemy battalion. The probing force used fire crackers, but initial reports indicate the probe was not successful.

2. U.S. Marines continued to clear the area of the Citadel in Hue for which they are responsible. The Vietnamese Marines have been less active than desirable. Recoilless rifles discussed in yesterday's telephone call were delivered to Vietnamese Marines on 23 February. More aggressive attacks by this force are expected on 24 February. Security forces on Highway 1, between Da Nang and Hue-Phu Bai continued to be thickened. One battalion of the 82d Airborne Division Task Force moved from Chu Lai and closed at Hue-Phu Bai just southeast of Hue.

3. Throughout the rest of South Vietnam the tempo of activity decreased. There were no reports of activity in II Corps. Contact continues with enemy forces west, north and east of Saigon. General Weyand reported to General Wheeler that forces in III Corps are killing about 300 enemy a day. There is some indication that enemy forces have been directed to break up into smaller units in the Saigon area and to focus their efforts on disrupting normal activity to the maximum extent of their capability. This indication has not been confirmed.

4. In IV Corps there is a mixed picture. General Eckhardt reported to General Wheeler that the main road from Saigon to the south should be opened to Cau Mau in the southernmost province of the Delta by the night of 24 February. He expects interruptions to occur during hours of darkness but expects to be able to restore traffic during daylight hours.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 of 1 copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

5. The damage to regional and popular forces appears to be small in III Corps. Reports are not yet complete. There is a mixed picture in IV Corps. Some regional forces have been hard hit. Reports indicate that approximately 500 popular forces are still missing, although General Westmoreland does not believe that this is an alarming number because it is a relatively small proportion of the total popular forces in IV Corps.

6. Special B-52 strikes were directed at a reported location of the Headquarters, 7th NVA Division, approximately 10 kilometers south of Phuoc Vinh. Initial assessment indicated some underground complexes have been opened up, and there were numerous secondary explosions. Additional bomb damage assessment will be made. General Westmoreland had intended to direct an intensive bombing by the B-52s of enemy concentrations in the A Shau Valley. He has delayed these strikes in favor of shifting the B-52 effort to the Khe Sanh area because of the reported imminence of enemy attack on Khe Sanh.

7. General Westmoreland reported the latest casualty figures accrued since 29 January 1968: KIA 40,199; detained 6,671; individual weapons captured 9,853; and crew-served weapons captured 1,482. General Westmoreland went on to explain that he believes the casualty count is a reasonable one, although it probably includes porters and laborers assisting enemy forces. Any inflation of reported casualties caused by the inclusion of porters and laborers is offset by casualties resulting from artillery and air strikes that are not included in the reports of enemy casualties.

8. I also talked briefly to General Palmer who believes that the situation throughout southern Vietnam is stabilizing somewhat, although obviously not yet back to normal.



HAROLD K. JOHNSON
ACTING CHAIRMAN
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

2A

~~SECRET~~

Received Washington CommCen
9:59 A.M. EST Friday 23 Feb 68

VZCZCEEA170
OO WTE10
DE WTE 784

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
10:05 A.M. CST Friday 23 Feb 68

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (MCCAFFERTY)
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80511

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD letter JAN 3 1979

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

By if, NARS, Date 6-25-79

THIS IS REPORT NUMBER NINETEEN ON THE SITUATION IN THE KHE SANH AREA AND COVERS THE 24 HOUR PERIOD FEBRUARY 22, 1968.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE YESTERDAY PARALLELED THE PREVIOUS DAY, AS HEAVY ENEMY SHELLING POUNDED POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY FRIENDLY TROOPS. THE DAY'S TOTAL CLIMBED TO 935 ROUNDS OF ENEMY ARTILLERY, MORTAR AND ROCKET FIRE. REPETITIOUS OF RECENT WEEKS, THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE RECEIVED THE BRUNT OF THE INCOMING AS THE 26TH MARINES BORE 170 ROUNDS OF MORTAR, 155 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY AND 52 ROCKET ROUNDS CASUALTIES ATTRIBUTED TO THE SHELLING WERE SEVEN KILLED, 22 WOUNDED: (18 EVACUATED).

WHILE CAMP CARROLL RECEIVED ONLY 29 ROUNDS OF MIXED MORTAR AND ARTILLERY, FRIENDLY ELEMENTS AT DONG HA COUNTED 81 ROUNDS OF HEAVY ARTILLERY. AT THE DMZ, FOUR MID-AFTERNOON BARRAGES BROUGHT 193 ROUNDS OF MIXED MORTAR AND ARTILLERY TO CON THIEN. TWO MARINES REQUIRED MEDICAL EVACUATION DUE TO WOUNDS SUSTAINED FROM THE BARRAGE. AT NEIGHBORING GIO LINH, THE RECEIPT OF 125 ARTILLERY ROUNDS WAS LINKED WITH EIGHT LATE MORNING ROCKET ROUNDS. INCOMING ROUNDS AT CUA VIET CEASED AT 10:00 A.M., BUT ONLY AFTER 86 ARTILLERY ROUNDS HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY 1ST AMTRAC BATTALION POSITIONS. CASUALTIES FROM THE SHELLING WERE: ONE KILLED, 12 WOUNDED (NINE EVACUATED).

IN GROUND ACTIVITY, ONLY ONE CONTACT WAS REPORTED. MARINES IN OPERATION KENTUCKY, AMBUSHED A SMALL ENEMY FORCE AND KILLED FIVE NVA. ONE MARINE WAS KILLED AND NINE WOUNDED IN THE ENCOUNTER.

AT 4:45 P.M. A HELICOPTER, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO LIFT OFF AT KHE SANH, WAS HIT BY A MORTAR ROUND CAUSING THE AIRCRAFT TO CRASH. RESULTING CASUALTIES WERE TWO KILLED, ONE WOUNDED (EVACUATED).

241 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN THE KHE SANH AREA. THE MARINE AIRCRAFT WING FLEW 87 SORTIES. BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT INCLUDED ONE SECONDARY FIRE, ONE MORTAR POSITION DESTROYED AND THREE KILLED. THE AIR FORCE FLEW 132 SORTIES, THE NAVY FLEW 22, USING COMBAT SKY SPOT. ARC LIGHT B-52'S FLEW 14 STRIKES (40 SORTIES) IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

AERIAL RESUPPLY FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD AMOUNTED TO 183.5 SHORT TONS. THERE WERE 82 SHORT TONS OF CLASS V, AMMUNITION. NINETEEN SHORT TONS OF VEHICLES, CONSISTING OF FORKLIFTS. MAIL AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES AMOUNTED TO 1.5 AND 4 SHORT TONS RESPECTIVELY. IN ADDITION, 76 REPLACEMENT PASSENGERS WERE LANDED AT THE AIRFIELD. SORTIES INCREASED TO A TOTAL OF 26. ELEVEN C-130 AIRCRAFT COMPLETED 11 AIR DROPS. TWO C-130'S AND ONE USAF C-123 AIRCRAFT LANDED ON THE AIRFIELD. IN ADDITION, RESUPPLY SORTIES BY MARINE HELICOPTERS WERE FLOWN.

THERE WERE TWO MISSIONS FIRED DURING THE PERIOD USING FIRECRACKER. TWELVE ROUNDS WERE FIRED ON ENEMY TROOPS IN THE OPEN WITH UNDETERMINED RESULTS. ANOTHER SIX ROUNDS WERE EXPENDED IN CLOSE DEFENSIVE FIRES.

FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS A TOTAL OF 288 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES WILL BE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH. THERE WILL BE EIGHT ARC LIGHT STRIKES (24 SORTIES) FLOWN IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

THE WEATHER AT KHE SANH DURING THE PERIOD REMAINED BAD. LOW CLOUDS AND DENSE GROUND FOG REDUCED THE CEILING AND VISIBILITY TO NEAR ZERO DURING MOST OF THE PERIOD. CONDITIONS IMPROVED SOMEWHAT DURING THE AFTERNOON WHEN THE CLOUD CEILING AND VISIBILITY BECAME 1500 FOOT BROKEN AND SEVEN MILES. THE FORECAST FOR TODAY CALLS FOR GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT FROM NEAR ZERO CONDITIONS TO A 1200 FOOT CEILING AND SIX MILES VISIBILITY BY 1:00 P.M. AFTER 6:00 P.M. THE CLOUD CEILING AND VISIBILITY WILL BOTH LOWER TO NEAR-ZERO AND REMAIN SO THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE PERIOD.

DTG 231459Z FEB 68

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Received Washington CommCen
11:21 A.M. EST Friday 23 Feb 68

Received LBJ Ranch CommCen
11:40 A.M. CST Friday 23 Feb 68

VZCZCEEA172
OO WTE10
DE WTE 737

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80513

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-4-78; NSC 8-19-80
By inf, NARS, Date 9-2-80

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 23, 1968

HERewith GENERAL JOHNSON'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND REPORTED QUITE A BIT OF SHELLING AT KHE SANH AND IN THE DMZ AREA. OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OVER THE SCALE. THE HELICOPTER REPORTED HIT BY MORTAR FIRE AT KHE SANH MAY HAVE BEEN HIT BY A ROCKET ACCORDING TO INFORMATION THAT GENERAL ABRAMS PASSED TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND. AN ATTACK ON KHE SANH IS EXPECTED DURING THE NIGHT OF 23-24 FEBRUARY, SAIGON TIME. THE VIETNAMESE RANGER BATTALION HOLDING A PART OF THE PERIMETER AT KHE SANH WAS PROBED BY A FORCE ESTIMATED TO BE A POSSIBLE ENEMY BATTALION. THE PROBING FORCE USED FIRE CRACKERS, BUT INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE THE PROBE WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL.

2. U.S. MARINES CONTINUED TO CLEAR THE AREA OF THE CITADEL IN HUE FOR WHICH THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE. THE VIETNAMESE MARINES HAVE BEEN LESS ACTIVE THAN DESIRABLE. RECOILLESS RIFLES DISCUSSED IN YESTERDAY'S TELEPHONE CALL WERE DELIVERED TO VIETNAMESE MARINES ON 23 FEBRUARY. MORE AGGRESSIVE ATTACKS BY THIS FORCE ARE EXPECTED ON 24 FEBRUARY. SECURITY FORCES ON HIGHWAY 1, BETWEEN DA NANG AND HUE-PHU BAI CONTINUED TO BE THICKENED. ONE BATTALION OF THE 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION TASK FORCE MOVED FROM CHU LAI AND CLOSED AT HUE-PHU BAI JUST SOUTH EAST OF HUE.

3. THROUGHOUT THE REST OF SOUTH VIETNAM THE TEMPO OF ACTIVITY DECREASED. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF ACTIVITY IN II CORPS. CONTACT CONTINUES WITH ENEMY FORCES WEST, NORTH AND EAST OF SAIGON. GENERAL WEYAND REPORTED TO GENERAL WHEELER THAT FORCES IN III CORPS ARE KILLING ABOUT 300 ENEMY A DAY. THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT ENEMY FORCES HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO BREAK UP INTO SMALLER UNITS IN THE SAIGON AREA AND TO FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS ON DISRUPTING NORMAL ACTIVITY TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT OF THEIR CAPABILITY. THIS INDICATION HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED.

4. IN IV CORPS THERE IS A MIXED PICTURE. GENERAL ECKHARDT REPORTED TO GENERAL WHEELER THAT THE MAIN ROAD FROM SAIGON TO THE SOUTH SHOULD BE OPENED TO CAU MAU IN THE SOUTHERNMOST PROVINCE OF THE DELTA BY THE NIGHT OF 24 FEBRUARY. HE EXPECTS INTERRUPTIONS TO OCCUR DURING HOURS OF DARKNESS BUT EXPECTS TO BE ABLE TO RESTORE TRAFFIC DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS.

5. THE DAMAGE TO REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES APPEARS TO BE SMALL IN III CORPS. REPORTS ARE NOT YET COMPLETE. THERE IS A MIXED PICTURE IN IV CORPS. SOME REGIONAL FORCES HAVE BEEN HARD HIT. REPORTS INDICATE THAT APPROXIMATELY 500 POPULAR FORCES ARE STILL MISSING, ALTHOUGH GENERAL WESTMORELAND DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS IS AN ALARMING NUMBER BECAUSE IT IS A RELATIVELY SMALL PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL POPULAR FORCES IN IV CORPS.

6. SPECIAL B-52 STRIKES WERE DIRECTED AT A REPORTED LOCATION OF THE HEADQUARTERS, 7TH NVA DIVISION, APPROXIMATELY 10 KILOMETERS SOUTH OF PHUOC VINH. INITIAL ASSESSMENT INDICATED SOME UNDERGROUND COMPLEXES HAVE BEEN OPENED UP, AND THERE WERE NUMEROUS SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. ADDITIONAL BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT WILL BE MADE. GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAD INTENDED TO DIRECT AN INTENSIVE BOMBING BY THE B-52S OF ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS IN THE A SHAU VALLY. HE HAS DELAYED THESE STRIKES IN FAVOR OF SHIFTING THE B-52 EFFORT TO THE KHE SANH AREA BECAUSE OF THE REPORTED IMMINENCE OF ENEMY ATTACK ON KHE SANH.

7. GENERAL WESTMORELAND REPORTED THE LATEST CASUALTY FIGURES ACCRUED SINCE 29 JANUARY 1968: KIA 40,199; DETAINED 6,671; INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS CAPTURED 9,853; AND CREW-SERVED WEAPONS CAPTURED 1,482. GENERAL WESTMORELAND WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT HE BELIEVES THE CASUALTY COUNT IS A REASONABLE ONE, ALTHOUGH IT PROBABLY INCLUDES PORTERS AND LABORERS ASSISTING ENEMY FORCES. ANY INFLATION OF REPORTED CASUALTIES CAUSED BY THE INCLUSION OF PORTERS AND LABORERS IS OFFSET BY CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES THAT ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE REPORTS OF ENEMY CASUALTIES.

8. I ALSO TALKED BRIEFLY TO GENERAL PALMER WHO BELIEVES THAT THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT SOUTHERN VIETNAM IS STABILIZING SOMEWHAT, ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY NOT YET BACK TO NORMAL.

DTG : 231621Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~